Opinion ID: 1261992
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pratt's sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable

Text: Pratt first argues that the sentence the district court imposed is unreasonable. Pratt agrees that the district court properly calculated her Guidelines range at 121-151 months, and that because violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) requires a mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months, or 15 years' incarceration, with a maximum of 30 years, the district court could not have sentenced her to less than 15 years in prison. She contends, however, that because her Guidelines range falls below the statutory minimum, the only reasonable sentence would be a sentence of 180 months, or the statutory minimum. As we did with regard to Vowell, we conclude that this argument has no merit. Pratt incorrectly contends that her sentence constituted a Guidelines departure. While the probation officer did indicate that a departure may be warranted according to Section 5K2.0 of the Guidelines, the district court in fact sentenced Pratt above the Guidelines range in accordance with § 3553(a), making the enhancement a variance. Cousins, 469 F.3d at 577. Nonetheless, because the same test for reasonableness applies to both departures and variances, Husein, 478 F.3d at 332; Conrad Smith, 474 F.3d at 894, we must determine whether Pratt's sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district court here considered the factors set forth in § 3553(a), the applicable Guidelines range, Pratt's characteristics, and the extensive testimony presented during the sentencing hearing by Pratt's sister, Jones Reed, and a psychiatrist who examined Pratt. Moreover, the district court adequately explained the reasons for the sentence it imposed upon Pratt. Certainly, the district court put sufficient facts on the record to allow this court to engage in an adequate review. Conrad Smith, 474 F.3d at 894; Trejo-Martinez, 481 F.3d at 412-13. We conclude that Pratt's sentence was procedurally reasonable. Next, we must determine whether the sentence is substantively reasonable. We reiterate that we review a procedurally reasonable sentence for abuse of discretion in determining its substantive reasonableness. See Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597-98. In deciding to sentence Pratt to five years more than the statutory minimum, the district court focused on Several troubling facts. First, the district court found it very significant that Pratt had utterly failed to protect her daughter. Pratt disregarded her parental responsibility and actively participated while Vowell abused and assaulted K.T. Though she had many opportunities to do so, Pratt never told Jones Reed, or anyone else, about Vowel's actions. The., district court did not believe that the testimony from the psychiatrist and Jones Reed regarding Pratt's limited intelligence and susceptibility to control by men was sufficient to mitigate the horrible acts she and Vowell perpetrated on her eight year-old child. It was K.T. who was, in fact, truly helpless. Second, the district court considered the impact of Pratt's actions on K.T. [T]he odds are stacked against [K.T.] before she even begins any kind of useful life. K.T. blames herself for what happened to her, and her brother blames her for Pratt's absence from his life. The district court was particularly struck by the fact that the children were both having severe psychological and behavioral problems. Third, the district court discussed the serious nature of the crimes against K.T. Pratt was Vowell's accomplice in the sexual assaults upon K.T., and knew of other acts of abuse. Furthermore, the abuse would not have stopped but for the intervention of Vowell's mother and law enforcement. Lastly, the district court highlighted the need to protect Pratt's children and also Pratt herself, as there was testimony indicating that she might be a danger to herself. It is clear that the district court considered all the evidence and was mindful of its obligation to impose a sentence that fit the crime. See Conrad Smith, 474 F.3d at 894. In accordance with that obligation, the district court imposed the sentence it concluded was warranted: 20 years in prison. Pratt did not object. As we found in Vowell's case, we cannot ask more of a district court, in terms of weighing the § 3553(a) factors and explaining the reasons for its sentence, than the district court did here. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion, and we hold that the sentence it imposed on Pratt is substantively reasonable.