Opinion ID: 2179099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: October 31, 2000, to January 22, 2001

Text: Feldhacker's pretrial motions filed on September 21, 2000, included a Jackson v. Denno motion and were originally set for hearing on October 31. The district court granted a continuance of the hearing date to December 4 in response to a motion for continuance filed by the State which recited that the State of Nebraska has advised [the] attorney for [Feldhacker] of this Motion and he has no objection to this Motion. The district court ruled on the Jackson v. Denno motion on January 22, 2001, after holding the record open, to permit the State to submit additional evidence, to which Feldhacker's counsel stipulated on the record that he had no objection. Feldhacker contends that the Court of Appeals erred in excluding the period from the original date set for hearing on the Jackson v. Denno motion until its disposition because (1) he did not consent to the continuance of the hearing date, (2) the State did not exercise due diligence, and (3) the State did not prove good cause for the delay. Brief for appellant in support of petition for further review at 8. None of these arguments have merit. As noted, Feldhacker did not object to the continuance and therefore consented. In addition, § 29-1207(4)(a) does not include any requirement that the State show due diligence or good cause. See State v. Turner, 252 Neb. 620, 564 N.W.2d 231 (1997). We have specifically declined to rewrite the provisions of § 29-1207(4)(a) to include and require a reasonable time or good cause for delay in disposition of the pretrial matters described or characterized in § 29-1207(4)(a) as a part of the Nebraska speedy trial act. State v. Lafler, 225 Neb. 362, 373, 405 N.W.2d 576, 583-84 (1987), distinguished on other grounds, State v. Oldfield, 236 Neb. 433, 461 N.W.2d 554 (1990). In Lafler, we cited and followed the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986). Henderson construed a provision of the federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974 which was substantially similar to § 29-1207(4)(a). Noting that courts often find it impossible to resolve motions on which hearings have been held until the parties have submitted posthearing briefs or additional factual materials, the Court in Henderson specifically held that the federal statutory provision relevant to pretrial motions filed by a criminal defendant excluded the time after a hearing has been held where a district court awaits additional filings from the parties that are needed for proper disposition of the motion. 476 U.S. at 331, 106 S.Ct. 1871. The Court of Appeals thus did not err in affirming the finding of the district court that the entire period between filing and final disposition of Feldhacker's pretrial motions was excluded from the speedy trial computation. In computing the excluded period, the Court of Appeals correctly followed State v. Baker, 264 Neb. 867, 652 N.W.2d 612 (2002), and determined that the first excludable day was September 22, 2000, the day after Feldhacker filed his pretrial motions. See, also, State v. Oldfield, 236 Neb. at 443, 461 N.W.2d at 561 (holding an excludable period under § 29-1207(4)(a) commences on the day immediately after the filing of a defendant's pretrial motion). To the extent that State v. Recek, 263 Neb. 644, 641 N.W.2d 391 (2002), and State v. Ward, 257 Neb. 377, 597 N.W.2d 614 (1999), suggest a different method of computation, they are disapproved.