Opinion ID: 12479
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Mississippi Long-Arm Statute

Text: 11 On appeal, Allred relies exclusively on the tort prong of the Mississippi long-arm statute to support the exercise of jurisdiction by the district court over the appellees. 5 The Mississippi long-arm statute is not coextensive with federal due process, requiring an analysis of the scope of the reach of the statute itself. See Cycles, 889 F.2d at 616-17 (noting that the Mississippi long-arm statute has a relatively restrictive scope); Rittenhouse, 832 F.2d at 1383 (same). 12 Under the tort prong of the Mississippi long-arm statute, personal jurisdiction is proper if any element of the tort (or any part of any element) takes place in Mississippi. See, e.g., Smith v. Temco, 252 So.2d 212, 216 (Miss.1971); Western Chain Co. v. Brownlee, 317 So.2d 418, 421 (Miss.1975); Rittenhouse, 832 F.2d at 1384; Jobe, 87 F.3d at 753; Cycles, 889 F.2d at 619. As the Mississippi Supreme Court has observed consistently: 13 The tort is not complete until the injury occurs, and if the injury occurs in this State then, under the ... statute, the tort is committed, at least in part, in this State, and personam jurisdiction of the nonresident tort feasor is conferred upon the Mississippi court. Temco, 252 So.2d at 216; see also Anderson v. Sonat Exploration Co., 523 So.2d 1024, 1025 (Miss.1988). 14 Our cases, however, have been careful to distinguish actual injury from its resultant consequences. [C]onsequences stemming from the actual tort injury do not confer personal jurisdiction at the site or sites where such consequences happen to occur. Jobe, 87 F.3d at 753 & n. 2 (observing that [t]he term 'injury' commonly denotes the invasion of any legally protected interest of another whereas the term 'damage' is understood to mean the harm, detriment or loss sustained by reason of an injury); see also Cycles, 889 F.2d at 619 (We have held that with respect to Mississippi's long-arm statute a tort occurs where and when the actual injury takes place, not at the place of the economic consequences of the injury.); Rittenhouse, 832 F.2d at 1384 (same); Estate of Portnoy v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 730 F.2d 286, 290 (5th Cir.1984) (same). 15 At the outset, we reject Allred's reliance on Hyde Construction Co. v. Koehring, 321 F.Supp. 1193 (S.D.Miss.1969), for the proposition that service of process on Allred in Mississippi constituted the commission of a tort in Mississippi for purposes of satisfying the requirements of the Mississippi long-arm statute. Although the district court in Hyde, examining section 13-3-57's statutory predecessor, acknowledged that the abuse of process tort must accrue within the geographical limits of Mississippi and so found, it nevertheless repeatedly emphasized what we think to have been the determinative factor in its analysis: the defendant in the abuse of process action had domesticated itself or qualified to do business within the State of Mississippi having appointed ... [a] registered agent for service of process between [all relevant dates]. Hyde, 321 F.Supp. at 1210 (noting that the defendant corporation was authorized to transact business in Mississippi). Allred neither argued nor presented evidence that any defendant had any contact whatsoever with Mississippi other than the service of process by certified mail from Dallas, Texas to his Jackson, Mississippi law office. To the extent that Hyde supports Allred's questionable proposition, it must be limited to the case of a person or entity subject to the general jurisdiction of the Mississippi courts.
16 In Mississippi, malicious prosecution requires: 17 (1) the institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings, either criminal or civil; (2) by, or at the instance of the defendants; (3) the termination of such proceedings in plaintiff's favor; (4) malice in instituting the proceedings; (5) want of probable cause in the proceedings; and (6) the suffering of damages as a result of the action or prosecution complained of. Mississippi Road Supply Co. v. Zurich-American Ins. Co., 501 So.2d 412, 414 (Miss.1987) (citing Harvill v. Tabor, 240 Miss. 750, 128 So.2d 863, 864 (1961)). 18 Allred does not contend that elements two through five of the tort of malicious prosecution occurred in Mississippi. Rather, Allred argues primarily that his economic, reputational, and emotional injuries set forth in his affidavit were suffered in Mississippi and, therefore, support jurisdiction under the tort prong. Appellees concede that the damages Allred alleges may have occurred in Mississippi, but argue that damages, alone, are insufficient to support personal jurisdiction under the Mississippi long-arm statute. Appellees are correct. 19 As discussed above, this Circuit has recognized consistently that Mississippi does not permit damages to serve as a proxy for injury in the personal jurisdiction calculus. The concepts are distinct and we must endeavor not to conflate the existence of an injury--and hence the completed tort--with the presence of its economic consequences. See Jobe, 87 F.3d at 753 (noting that, especially in a commercial tort situation, collateral consequences can be quite far-reaching). The injury suffered in a malicious prosecution tort is the institution of criminal or civil proceedings where the institution ought not to have occurred (and occurred for an improper reason). Allred's damages-qua-injury argument for personal jurisdiction under the Mississippi long-arm statute flies in the face of our rather clear guidance in Jobe, Cycles, Rittenhouse, and Portnoy. 20 Allred has alleged no facts that support the exercise of personal jurisdiction through the use of the Mississippi long-arm statute over his malicious prosecution claim. Allred's insistence that the service of process by certified mail from out of state can support jurisdiction under the first element of the malicious prosecution tort is misplaced. Service of process on Allred in Mississippi was not a prerequisite to the institution of judicial proceedings against him in the Louisiana suit. A lawsuit is commenced under the federal rules when the complaint is filed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 2 (There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action'.); Fed.R.Civ.P. 3 (A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.). In Louisiana, the filing of a lawsuit both commences the action and tolls the statute of limitation. See La.Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 421 (West 1960)(A civil action is a demand for the enforcement of a legal right. It is commenced by the filing of a pleading presenting the demand to a court of competent jurisdiction.); La. Civ.Code Ann. art. 3463 (West 1994) (An interruption of prescription resulting from the filing of a suit in a competent court and in the proper venue or from service of process within the prescriptive period continues as long as the suit is pending.); accord Segura v. Frank, 630 So.2d 714, 727(La.), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1142, 114 S.Ct. 2165, 128 L.Ed.2d 887 (1994). Even in Mississippi, Allred's preferred forum, it is the filing of a lawsuit--and not the service of process--that is the determinative event in the commencement of a lawsuit. See M.R.C.P. 3(a) (A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.); Watters v. Stripling, 675 So.2d 1242, 1244 (Miss.1996); Erby v. Cox, 654 So.2d 503, 505 (Miss.1995) ([D]oes the simple filing of the complaint without process being issued toll the statute of limitations? We answer in the affirmative.). Stated simply, the injury that Allred complained of in his malicious prosecution claim was the filing of the Louisiana lawsuit, not the subsequent service of process. We have neither found, nor been cited to, any relevant Mississippi authority that supports the proposition that service of process is a necessary element of the malicious prosecution tort in Mississippi.
21 In Mississippi, the elements of abuse of process are: 22 (1) the party made an illegal use of the process, (2) the party had an ulterior motive, and (3) damage resulted from the perverted use of process. McLain v. West Side Bone & Joint Ctr., 656 So.2d 119, 123 (Miss.1995) (citing Foster v. Turner, 319 So.2d 233, 236 (Miss.1975)). 23 For the reasons discussed above, we reject Allred's contention that he can bootstrap his alleged damages incurred in Mississippi into an injury to achieve personal jurisdiction over his abuse of process claim for the purposes of the Mississippi long-arm statute. Furthermore, as is readily apparent from the above quoted excerpt, the abuse of process tort, in Mississippi as elsewhere, involves the corruption of process--not merely the issuance of process simpliciter. 24 The Mississippi Supreme Court has acknowledged that the abuse of process tort does not address the case, as here, where the only alleged abuse of process was the service of a summons without any corruption or impropriety: 25 What defendant complains of in his counterclaim is not based on any perversion of any process, but simply the filing of the suit.... Nothing unlawful was done under any process. It cannot be argued that the process of the court was abused by accomplishing a result not commanded by it or not lawfully obtainable under it when the only process involved was the simple summon to defend the suit. Edmonds v. Delta Democrat Publishing Co., 230 Miss. 583, 93 So.2d 171, 175 (1957); see also Foster, 319 So.2d at 235 ([Abuse of process requires a]n ulterior purpose, and the perversion of the process after its issuance so as to accomplish a result not commanded by it or not lawfully obtainable under it.) (citing Edmonds, 93 So.2d at 174). 26 In Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1442, 1454 (5th Cir.1984), this Court also addressed the point that Allred misunderstands concerning the abuse of process tort. After considering the Restatement 's description of the elements of the abuse of process tort, we favorably quoted the comment: 27  'The gravamen of the misconduct for which the liability stated in this Section is imposed is not the wrongful procurement of legal process or the wrongful initiation of criminal or civil proceedings; it is the misuse of process, no matter how properly obtained, for any purpose other than that which it was designed to accomplish. Therefore, it is immaterial that the process was properly issued, that it was obtained in the course of proceedings that were brought with probable cause and for a proper purpose, or even that the proceedings terminated in favor of the person instituting or initiating them. The subsequent misuse of the process ... constitutes the misconduct for which the liability is imposed....'  Brown, 721 F.2d at 1454-55 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682 cmt. a (emphasis in Brown )). 28 Prosser and Keeton on Torts speaks even more directly to the question of whether the mere service of process--without any allegation that the service of process itself was somehow perverted--constitutes an element of abuse of process: 29 The essential elements of abuse of process, as the tort has developed, have been stated to be: first, an ulterior purpose, and second, a wilful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. Some definite act or threat not authorized by the process, or aimed at an objective not legitimate in the use of the process, is required; and there is no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions.... There is, in other words, a form of extortion, and it is what is done in the course of negotiation, rather than the issuance or any formal use of the process itself, which constitutes the tort. Prosser and Keeton on Torts 898 (5th ed.1984) (emphasis added); see also Brown, 721 F.2d at 1455 (same). 30 Accordingly, because the only activity alleged by Allred to have taken place within Mississippi was the service of process by certified mail from Texas to his Mississippi law office--an event which is simply not an element (or part of an element) of the tort of abuse of process--we hold that Allred failed to allege any facts that would support personal jurisdiction over the defendants under the tort prong of the Mississippi long-arm statute. 31 Allred's reliance on Simon v. United States, 644 F.2d 490 (1981), is similarly misplaced. Simon, unlike the facts here presented, involved allegations of corrupt and perverted abuse of process by the defendant within the forum state. In Simon the abuse of process defendant deliberately had issued a subpoena containing Simon's incorrect name and address in Louisiana. Id. at 492. As a result of the defendant's misrepresentation, Simon was unable to be served in Louisiana. Id. The defendant, however, informed the federal district court judge in Georgia that Simon had in fact been served and the judge subsequently caused a subpoena ticket to be issued in Louisiana. Id. United States marshals subsequently served Simon personally in Louisiana, who left for Georgia the next day. Id. Upon his arrival in Georgia, Simon was immediately arrested. Id. 32 Although the Simon defendant's activities within the forum state were quite limited, we find it significant that, unlike here, the service of process by the federal marshals in Louisiana resulted directly from the defendant's intentional misuse of process--i.e., lying to the federal judge to cause the subpoena to issue and then lying again about whether Simon had in fact been served--and not merely the proper service of a defendant for purportedly improper motives. Here, the service of process was entirely proper and in accordance with the applicable rules. 33 In summary, we hold that Allred failed to allege that any element of the abuse of process tort occurred in Mississippi: (1) to the extent that the tort requires corruption or perversion of process, neither has been alleged, and (2) to the extent that the tort requires an improper motive, it is uncontroverted that all decisions regarding the third-party complaint were made in either Louisiana or Texas. Accordingly, we find that the district court appropriately determined that Allred failed to establish the proper jurisdictional prerequisites to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction under the Mississippi long-arm statute. 6