Opinion ID: 807997
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Louisiana State-Law Negligence Claims

Text: 6 Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the district court erred in prohibiting the deposition of Sheriff Deen. Plaintiffs assert that Sheriff Deen, as “chief policy maker,” had knowledge relevant to Plaintiffs’ case. We conclude that Plaintiffs cannot show that the district court’s evidentiary ruling affected their substantial rights. See Bocanegra, 320 F.3d at 584. In their appellate brief, Plaintiffs state that the “evidence [they] sought to obtain from the Sheriff was necessary to demonstrate [Monell] liability.” However, as explained above, Plaintiffs’ Monell claim against Sheriff Deen already fails because Plaintiffs failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Trey suffered a constitutional violation. 16 Case: 11-30814 Document: 00511976800 Page: 17 Date Filed: 09/06/2012 No. 11-30814 Under Louisiana law, the “standard of care imposed upon the Department of Public Safety and Corrections in providing for the medical needs of inmates is that those services be reasonable.” Robinson v. Stalder, 734 So. 2d 810, 812 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (footnote and citations omitted). In order to establish a negligence claim, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants failed to provide Trey with reasonable medical care and that Defendants’ substandard conduct was the cause of Trey’s untimely death. See Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 646 So. 2d 318, 322 (La. 1994).
In granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ negligence claims, the district court determined that (1) Plaintiffs did not present any evidence that Defendants failed to provide reasonable medical care to Trey and (2) Plaintiffs did not present any evidence that Defendants caused Trey’s death. On appeal, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants were negligent because Trey was not seen by a physician every time he reported a medical problem. Plaintiffs also argue that Warden Toloso intimidated Trey, causing him not to seek medical treatment. Plaintiffs further contend that the district court erred in striking their expert evidence on causation. We first consider whether Plaintiffs created a genuine issue of material fact as to causation. In order to do so, we must address whether the district court abused its discretion in striking the affidavit of Dr. Prather, Plaintiffs’ expert on causation. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to strike Dr. Prather’s affidavit because Plaintiffs disclosed his affidavit five months after the Rule 26 disclosure deadline in the court’s scheduling order.7 On appeal, Plaintiffs concede that they erroneously designated Dr. Prather as a treating physician and that they should have disclosed Dr. Prather’s report by the 7 Rule 26 requires disclosures for a witness who is “retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2)(B). 17 Case: 11-30814 Document: 00511976800 Page: 18 Date Filed: 09/06/2012 No. 11-30814 deadline in the scheduling order. However, Plaintiffs assert that we should reverse the district court’s order because: (1) Plaintiffs believed in good faith that Dr. Prather was a treating physician and thus exempt from the disclosure deadline; (2) Dr. Prather’s testimony is crucial to the success of their claims; and (3) no harm or prejudice resulted to Defendants from the lack of disclosure. We have stated that a district court has broad discretion to enforce the deadlines in its scheduling order. See Turnage v. Gen. Elec. Co., 953 F.2d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that “a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence as a means of enforcing a [scheduling] order must not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In striking Dr. Prather’s affidavit, the district court fairly enforced a scheduling order deadline. Furthermore, the district court was in the best position to assess Plaintiffs’ arguments regarding their good faith, the significance of the evidence to their case, and the potential prejudice to Defendants, and the district court rejected these arguments. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking Dr. Prather’s affidavit. Dr. Prather’s excluded affidavit was Plaintiffs’ sole evidence on causation, and therefore Plaintiffs provided no summary judgment evidence on this issue. Because Plaintiffs failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to causation, which is an element of their Louisiana state-law negligence claim, Plaintiffs’ negligence claims fail. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (stating that summary judgment is proper “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial”). We conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs’ negligence claims.8 8 Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the district court erred in denying their motion to strike the testimony of Dr. Grosbach, Defendants’ expert on causation. Dr. Grosbach opined 18 Case: 11-30814 Document: 00511976800 Page: 19 Date Filed: 09/06/2012 No. 11-30814 D. Denial of Visitation and Denial of Familial Association Claims 1. Qualified Immunity “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. A public official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff demonstrates “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011). The Supreme Court has stated that the courts may “exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. “A Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right [are] sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. at 2083 (alterations in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). “[T]he term clearly established does not necessarily refer to commanding precedent that is factually on all-fours with the case at bar, or that holds the very action in question that, based on the “doubling times” of colon cancer, Trey’s cancer was already terminal in March 2008. Plaintiffs assert that Dr. Grosbach failed to demonstrate the reliability of his methodology, particularly with respect to the “doubling times.” We need not decide this issue. As explained above, because Plaintiffs failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to causation, Plaintiffs’ negligence claims fail. 19 Case: 11-30814 Document: 00511976800 Page: 20 Date Filed: 09/06/2012 No. 11-30814 unlawful.” Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp., 430 F.3d 245, 256-57 (5th Cir. 2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A right is clearly established “if in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [is] apparent.” Id. at 257 (alteration in original, citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see id. (“[T]he unlawfulness of their alleged conduct is readily apparent from relevant precedent in sufficiently similar situations.”) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has recently stated that, for a right to be “clearly established,” “[w]e do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. at 2083 (citations omitted). 2. Analysis Trey was diagnosed with terminal colon cancer at LSU Hospital on May 27, 2008. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants, particularly Warden Toloso, unlawfully precluded Trey’s family from visiting Trey in LSU Hospital for approximately five days after Trey’s diagnosis. Plaintiffs contend that they had to seek the assistance of a retired judge, who obtained an order permitting visitation on June 1, 2008. Plaintiffs assert that they began visiting Trey daily at LSU Hospital on June 2. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert two separate constitutional claims. First, in Trey’s survival action, Trey’s daughter asserts a claim under § 1983 for the denial of visitation in violation of Trey’s First Amendment rights. Second, Trey’s parents assert a claim under § 1983 for the violation of their rights to familial association and parenthood in violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on these constitutional claims. We will address each claim in turn. With respect to the denial of visitation claim, Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in failing to recognize Trey’s First Amendment right to visitation with family and friends. In support of their First Amendment 20 Case: 11-30814 Document: 00511976800 Page: 21 Date Filed: 09/06/2012 No. 11-30814 argument, Plaintiffs only cite to one case, Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093 (6th Cir. 1994), which stands for the general proposition that prisoners “retain their First Amendment rights to communicate with family and friends.” Id. at 1100 (citation omitted). However, the Reno court’s broad proposition of law does not support Plaintiffs’ argument that an inmate has a clearly established right to visitation. In order to show that a right is “clearly established,” Plaintiffs must show that “existing precedent [has] placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. at 2083 (citations omitted). Because Plaintiffs have failed to point to any caselaw that indicates that a prisoner has a right to visitation, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Defendants violated Trey’s clearly established rights. Therefore, we determine that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. See id. at 2080 (noting that an official is entitled qualified immunity unless plaintiff demonstrates “that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct”) (citation omitted). We conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the denial of visitation claim.9 With respect to the denial of familial association claim, Trey’s parents argue that Defendants deprived them of “their constitutional right to familial association with their son . . . by depriving them of their right to be with him during that time of great need.” On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in failing to recognize this viable constitutional claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. However, Plaintiffs have failed to point to any 9 In this case, we do not reach the issue of whether a prisoner has a constitutional right to visitation. However, we note that, in a case where a prisoner was denied visitation with his mother, we stated that a prisoner has “no constitutional right to visitation privileges.” Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 508 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); see also McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332, 1334 (5th Cir. 1975) (stating that, in the context of the denial of conjugal visits, a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to visitation). 21 Case: 11-30814 Document: 00511976800 Page: 22 Date Filed: 09/06/2012 No. 11-30814 caselaw that indicates that a parent of an adult child has a right to visitation with that child.10 Therefore, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Defendants violated a clearly established right to familial association. Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. at 2083. Thus, we conclude that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants on this familial association claim. E. Subrogation and Bystander Claims We conclude that Plaintiffs have not adequately briefed their arguments relating to their subrogation and bystander claims. With respect to the district court’s dismissal of their subrogation claims, Plaintiffs merely mentioned this issue in the “Statement of Issues” section of their appellate brief. Because Plaintiffs failed to present any argument relating to this issue in the argument section of their appellate brief, this issue is waived. See Gen. Universal Sys. v. HAL, Inc., 500 F.3d 444, 454 (5th Cir. 2007); Justiss Oil Co. v. Kerr-McGee Ref. Corp., 75 F.3d 1057, 1067 (5th Cir. 1996). Next, with regard to the district court’s dismissal of their bystander claims, Plaintiffs raised this issue for the first time in their reply brief. We do not consider arguments first raised in a reply brief. See United States v. Jackson, 50 F.3d 1335, 1340 n.7 (5th Cir. 1995).