Opinion ID: 202005
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence on Witness Tampering

Text: 24 Contending that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for witness tampering, the defendant preserved this challenge with a motion for a judgment of acquittal. Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a). We review de novo the district court's denial of a Rule 29 motion. United States v. Hernandez, 146 F.3d 30, 32 (1st Cir.1998). But, because it is the jury's job to determine what the defendant actually did, knew, and intended, we will conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction as long as a rational jury, making permissible inferences, could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the elements of the counts were satisfied. United States v. Carucci, 364 F.3d 339, 343 (1st Cir.2004). 25 The defendant's argument rests, in large part, on his insistence that Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2129, 161 L.Ed.2d 1008 (2005), imposes new evidentiary requirements on prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3), which he was convicted of violating. We review the Supreme Court's holding in Arthur Andersen, evaluate the defendant's arguments, and then turn to the evidence.
26 In Arthur Andersen, the Supreme Court reversed a corporation's conviction for obstruction of justice, obtained under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2), and in so doing clarified some of the evidentiary requirements of that statute. 2 Arthur Andersen established two things about § 1512(b)(2). First, the Court concluded that in the statutory phrase 27 Whoever knowingly uses intimidation . . . or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person with intent to— 28 knowingly modifies corruptly persuades. Arthur Andersen, 125 S.Ct. at 2136. 29 Second, the Court held that a `knowingly . . . corrup[t] persuade[r]' cannot be someone who persuades others to shred documents when he does not have in contemplation any particular official proceeding in which those documents might be material. Arthur Andersen, 125 S.Ct. at 2137. Consequently, in a prosecution under subsection (b)(2), the government cannot succeed if it fails to show a nexus between the `persua[sion]' to destroy documents and any particular proceeding. Id. at 2136. The Supreme Court recognized in Andersen that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1) (2002) 3 , an official proceeding `need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense.' Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court cautioned, It is . . . one thing to say that a proceeding `need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense,' and quite another to say that a proceeding need not even be foreseen. Arthur Andersen, 125 S.Ct. at 2137. The Supreme Court analogized the situation in Arthur Andersen to the situation it had faced in United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995), where it found a similar nexus requirement in prosecutions for corruptly endeavoring to influence, obstruct, and impede a . . . grand jury investigation under [18 U.S.C.] § 1503. Arthur Andersen, 125 S.Ct. at 2137 (internal quotations and brackets omitted). In Aguilar, the Court said that, under § 1503, if the defendant lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding, he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct. 515 U.S. at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357. 30
31 The defendant insists that everything the Supreme Court said about 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2) in Arthur Andersen applies with equal force to his prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3). He says that Arthur Andersen requires that the government establish a link between the specific intent of the defendant at the time of the [witness tampering] and a particular federal proceeding or investigation. The defendant also argues that Arthur Andersen adds, by reference to Aguilar, a requirement that the government must prove . . . that [the defendant] was conscious that the individuals he is alleged to have persuaded were likely to communicate with . . . . officials who happened to be federal (emphasis in original). 4 On the basis of this argument, he insists that Arthur Andersen requires us to reassess our holding in United States v. Baldyga that the requirements of [§ 1512(b)(3)] are satisfied where the possibility existed that [the witness's] communication would eventually occur with federal officials, 233 F.3d 674, 680 (1st Cir.2000), and our holding in Bailey that a federal investigation need not be imminent or underway at the time of the actus reus, 405 F.3d at 108. 32 In evaluating these contentions, we start with a review of the two subsections at issue. Subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) share the state of mind language that the Arthur Andersen court interpreted: 33 Whoever knowingly uses intimidation . . . or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person with intent to— 34 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). Subsections (b)(2)(A) and (b)(2)(B), at issue in Arthur Andersen, prohibit engaging in the above-quoted conduct with intent to— 35 cause or induce any person to . . . withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an official proceeding [or] alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding . . . 36 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)(2)(A); 1512(b)(2)(B). Subsection (b)(3), which the defendant is accused of violating, makes it a crime to engage in the above-quoted conduct with intent to— 37 hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense. . . 38 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3). See also id. § 1515 (defining terms used in obstruction of justice statutes). 39 The first holding in Arthur Andersen — that knowingly modifies corruptly persuades — clearly interprets the common wording applicable to the two subsections and applies to a prosecution pursuant to subsection (b)(3). In interpreting the language shared by the two subsections, the Arthur Andersen court referred to the section generally, see Arthur Andersen, 125 S.Ct. at 2135 (Section 1512(b) punishes . . .), and explicitly referenced subsection (3) in a footnote. Arthur Andersen, 125 S.Ct. at 2135 n. 8. The defendant correctly observes that Arthur Andersen mandates — to prove the mens rea required by § 1512(b)(2) and § 1512(b)(3) — a showing of consciousness of wrongdoing. Arthur Andersen, 125 S.Ct. at 2136. 40 The second holding, concerning the nexus requirement, does not translate so easily to a prosecution under subsection (b)(3). While the Arthur Andersen court required a nexus between the `persua[sion]' to destroy documents and some particular official proceeding in which those documents might be material, id. at 2136-37, subsection (b)(3) does not refer to an official proceeding. Instead, it refers to a defendant intending to hinder, delay, or prevent communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States. The defendant does not explain how subsection (b)(3) might sensibly be read to require a defendant to contemplate — to use the term in Arthur Andersen — a particular law enforcement officer or judge of the United States in the same way that one might contemplate any particular official proceeding. Arthur Andersen, 125 S.Ct. at 2137. 41 While perhaps one might argue that the inclusion in subsection (b)(3) of the communication to a . . . judge may refer to a judge hearing evidence in some kind of official proceeding — we certainly do not decide the issue — the communication to a law enforcement officer easily encompasses an earlier and less formal investigation than that contemplated by subsection (b)(2). Unlike subsection (b)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 1503, which protect particular official proceedings, see Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599-600, 115 S.Ct. 2357, subsection (b)(3) protects the general ability of law enforcement agents to gather information relating to federal crimes (and the witnesses who desire to speak truthfully to law enforcement agents about those crimes). As one of our sister circuits has concluded, subsection (b)(3) does not connect the federal interest with an ongoing or imminent judicial proceeding, United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1249 (11th Cir.1998), but rather `speaks more broadly' to the character of the affected activity, the transmission of information to federal law enforcement agents, id. at 1251 (11th Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. Shively, 927 F.2d 804, 812 (5th Cir.1991)) (rejecting as misguided an argument that the nexus requirement articulated in Aguilar applies to subsection (b)(3)). 42 Also, the statute explicitly disclaims any requirement that the defendant knew that the communication . . . of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense would be made to a federal official. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(g)(2). 5 See Baldyga, 233 F.3d at 680 (We also want to dispel any notion that the defendant's intent. . . must include an awareness of the possible involvement of federal officials.). In light of the disclaimer in subsection (g)(2), a defendant may be held strictly liable under subsection (b)(3) for the happenstance that a federal law enforcement agent rather than, say, a local police officer or internal affairs specialist investigated his conduct. See United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679, 687 (3d Cir.1999) (One who attempts to corruptly influence an investigation takes his or her witnesses and investigation as he or she finds them.). Given the statutory language, we doubt that a defendant is beyond the purview of subsection (b)(3) merely because he expected the witness he tampered with to be interviewed by State Officer X in particular, but the witness actually was contacted by Federal Agent Y. See Veal, 153 F.3d at 1252-53 & n.27. 43 In the end, we need not resolve the exact contours of any nexus requirement in subsection (b)(3). Indeed, the Arthur Andersen court did not elaborate on the particularity required by the nexus requirement in subsection (b)(2). There is simply nothing in Arthur Andersen that helps the defendant, who specifically and by his own words linked his intent to tamper with all four witnesses to the particular federal inquiry into his commission of a federal offense that eventually resulted in his prosecution. If the defendant's contention is that the government must prove `the possible existence of a federal crime and a defendant's intention to thwart an inquiry into that crime by officials who happen to be federal,' Bailey, 405 F.3d at 108 (quoting United States v. Perry, 335 F.3d 316, 321 (4th Cir.2003)), we continue to agree. 6 If the defendant suggests that Arthur Andersen requires a heightened showing of a nexus in a § 1512(b)(3) prosecution, between the intent to hinder communication and a particular law enforcement agency, we express our doubts but defer any final judgment for a future case that requires resolution of that issue.
44 Peckham testified that, within a week of the incident, the defendant approached him to say that he talked to the captain and everything's all set, that he did the prebooking and the booking. And then he said `don't worry about it. You guys don't know nothing. When Peckham noted that his own name was on Trombly's booking sheet, the defendant responded, `Okay, then just say I did the prebooking and started the booking, and you came in halfway through the booking and finished the booking and put him in his cell.' Peckham testified further that the defendant told us to say nothing to investigators. Finally, Peckham testified that, on the defendant's instruction, he relayed the same information to Lynch. 45 Lynch testified that he was given a message from the defendant by Peckham that we had to say that nothing happened, the incident never happened. Lynch testified that on another occasion the defendant told him that the feds were in the station earlier today and not to talk about it in our car. Lynch was not able to remember when either of these conversations occurred. 46 Harrigan testified that, some days or weeks after the incident with Trombly on September 9th, the defendant told him that the FBI was investigating the incident and that nothing happened. 47 Straub testified that sometime before October 3rd, the defendant came up to me and stated that Internal Affairs was investigating the thing that happened with the kid that night. They found nothing, but it's being investigated by the feds or the FBI, and nothing — nothing happened that night. Straub also testified that the defendant told her that the U.S. Attorney's Office was involved, and that all you know is that you were on the street that night. 48 The evidence was sufficient to warrant all four of the convictions for witness tampering. Peckham testified that the defendant asked him to lie to investigators, and the evidence allowed the jury to find that the defendant persuaded Peckham in contemplation of a likely federal investigation into his criminal conduct. 7 The evidence allowed the jury to find that the defendant corruptly attempted to persuade Lynch, Straub, and Harrigan to lie to or withhold information from federal investigators that he knew were probing his assault on Trombly. The jury also could find that the defendant knew that his assault on Trombly could be a criminal . . . federal civil rights matter. This evidence was sufficient to warrant a conviction under any conceivable reading of the statute. 49 The defendant contends that Lynch's testimony that the defendant said the feds were in the station earlier today is not credible as a matter of law because there was undisputed evidence that the federal authorities did not visit the station house until October 3, after the defendant had been reassigned to another location. The defendant was entitled to make such an argument to the jury. But the jury was entitled to find that the defendant actually did make the comment and that it was indicative of his state of mind, even though he was wrong about the presence of federal agents in the police station before October 3.