Opinion ID: 2575864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Murder Victim's Pregnancy

Text: Before defendant's trial began, the trial court denied his motion to exclude from the penalty phase any evidence that Teresa Holloway was pregnant when defendant murdered her. Defendant contends that the ruling was error because the evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. He further contends that admission of the evidence violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the murder victim's pregnancy at the penalty phase as a circumstance of the offense. The Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution permits the prosecution, in a capital case, to present evidence about the murder victim and the specific harm that the defendant caused as relevant to the jury's penalty decision. ( Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720; People v. Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 351, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545.) In California, the prosecution may introduce evidence of the specific harm caused by a defendant's crime at the penalty phase in aggravation as a circumstance of the crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)). ( People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 494, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 235, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302.) Defendant argues that evidence of the pregnancy was irrelevant because, although the prosecution presented evidence that Terry Holloway told him she was pregnant, there was also uncontradicted evidence that he did not believe it. This court has concluded, however, that facts concerning the victim that are admissible at the penalty phase of a capital trial as circumstances of the crime are not limited to those known to or reasonably foreseeable by the defendant at the time of the murder. ( People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1183, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353; accord, People v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 732, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289.) We also reject defendant's argument that the trial court abused its discretion by not excluding the pregnancy evidence as unduly prejudicial. We have explained the parameters of the trial court's discretion in these situations in this way: `On the one hand, it should allow evidence and argument on emotional though relevant subjects that could provide legitimate reasons to sway the jury to show mercy or to impose the ultimate sanction. On the other hand, irrelevant information or inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury's attention from its proper role or invites an irrational, purely subjective response should be curtailed.' ( People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 836, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436, quoting People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 864, 180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776; accord, People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 494-495, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790; see also People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 1180, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353 [evidence admissible if it is not so inflammatory as to elicit from the jury an irrational or emotional response untethered to the facts of the case].) That in murdering Teresa Holloway defendant also terminated the life of a healthy 17-week-old fetus she was carrying was part of the harm caused by defendant's crime and thus was a legitimate, though emotional, consideration for the jury in making its penalty decision. We note also that defendant does not challenge the manner in which the evidence was presented, and we conclude it was not presented in an unnecessarily inflammatory way. Therefore, we reject defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the victim's pregnancy.