Opinion ID: 68394
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sanctions 1 and 2

Text: In its briefs to this court, SLG does not purport to challenge the magistrate judge’s findings of fact, but rather only argues that sanctions 1 and 2 are disproportionately harsh and broad because the solicitation was conducted by a non-attorney and there is no evidence of attorney knowledge or ratification of the 6 solicitation. Also, SLG argues that the calls were of short duration and there is no evidence that individuals were solicited to join the lawsuit. SLG also asserts that sanction 1 is disproportionately harsh in light of SLG’s First Amendment interests. In sum, SLG concedes that imposition of some sanctions was appropriate, but argues that sanctions 1, 2, and 5 are too far-reaching. SLG contends that a more appropriate sanction would permit the representation and collection of fees from plaintiffs that might opt-in in the future.1 “[A] federal court has the power to control admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it.” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991). A court’s decision as to “whether a party or lawyer’s actions merit imposition of sanctions is heavily dependent on the court’s firsthand knowledge, experience, and observation.” Harris, 97 F.3d at 506. The Rules Regulating the Florida Bar (“Florida Rules”) contain an anti-solicitation provision which mandates that “a lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from a 1 SLG also argues that five current opt-in plaintiffs that were not co-workers of the named plaintiffs should be exempted from the order. In its objection to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, however, SLG expressly stated that it “do[es] not object to all recommendations.” It went on to explain that it “agreed to withdraw from representation of all [current] opt-in plaintiffs except for those who worked with the named plaintiffs.” Thus, SLG has waived the right to challenge the portion of the district court’s order that prohibits the representation of any current opt-in plaintiffs that were not co-workers of the named plaintiffs because SLG invited the alleged error. See Birmingham Steel Corp. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 353 F.3d 1331, 1341 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003) (invited error precludes review). We therefore limit our review to the sanctions prohibiting representation and collection of fees for future opt-in plaintiffs. 7 prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, in person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s pecuniary gain.” R. Reg. Fla. Bar 4-7.4(a). The Southern District of Florida Local Rules (“Local Rules”) subject attorneys to discipline for violating the Local Rules or Florida Rules. S.D. Fla. L. R. 11.1.C. Such disciplinary measures may include disbarment, monetary sanctions, or “any other sanction the Court may deem appropriate.” S.D. Fla. R. I.B. First, it is appropriate to discuss the scope of the sanctions imposed. SLG interprets the district court’s order as a categorical prohibition from SLG ever representing any plaintiff in any case against any defendant, unless the plaintiff is one of the six named plaintiffs in the instant case or was first a co-worker of one of the named plaintiffs. Although the language in the district court’s order is imprecise, we find SLG’s interpretation of the sanctions unreasonable. The district court expressly identified the purposes of the sanctions as “ensuring that counsel acts ethically in this litigation and . . . sanctioning The Shavitz Law Group for unethically soliciting clients.” Hamm v. TBC Corp., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (emphasis added). There is no evidence indicating the district court intended for these sanctions to apply to future cases, or that the misconduct in this case would impact suits against defendants other than Tire Kingdom. We thus 8 conclude that the district court’s sanctions order only limits SLG’s ability to represent opt-in plaintiffs in the instant case. Once this misconception is removed, we conclude that sanctions 1 and 2 are not disproportionately broad or excessive. The named plaintiffs in this action are from Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. There was no evidence before the magistrate judge as to how the opt-in plaintiffs, which included individuals from Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, Ohio, Maryland, Missouri, Massachusetts, and Illinois, learned about the suit and selected SLG as counsel. Under these circumstances, it was impossible for the magistrate judge to know which, if any, of these clients had also been solicited by SLG. Thus, the magistrate judge recommended narrowly tailored sanctions to permit SLG to continue to represent the named plaintiffs and co-workers of the named plaintiffs (presumably because they most likely learned about SLG and the lawsuit from the named plaintiffs), but prohibited SLG from representing opt-in plaintiffs from other stores. These were reasonable and limited sanctions that balanced the danger that current and future opt-in clients were impermissibly solicited against SLG’s interest in representing lawfully-obtained clients.2 2 The magistrate judge expressly found that SLG failed to train Oliveira and that the firm solicited the clients for the purpose of pecuniary gain. We find it irrelevant that SLG claims that the solicitation was by a non-attorney, there was no evidence of attorney knowledge or ratification, and there were only three instances of solicitation. SLG’s interpretation of the facts, 9 We similarly conclude that SLG’s First Amendment argument is meritless. SLG argues that the sanctions in this case are too broad because under Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981), sanctions must be tailored to specific findings, rather than the “mere possibility of abuses.” SLG argues that because the sanctions prohibit the representation of opt-in plaintiffs that may not have been solicited, the sanctions are impermissibly broad and abridge SLG’s ability to represent legitimately-obtained clients. We conclude that the district court’s order does not violate Gulf Oil. That case dealt with a broad sanction – a “complete ban on all communications concerning the class action between parties or their counsel and any actual or potential class member who was not a formal party, without the prior approval of the court.” Id. at 94-95. The lower court in Gulf Oil did not hear any evidence, make any findings of fact, and did not write an explanatory opinion to justify this sweeping ban. Id. at 93-96. The Supreme Court found it troubling that there was no record for appellate review, and concluded that in light of the litigants’ and attorneys’ First Amendment interests, “an order limiting communications between parties and potential class members should be based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential even if correct, does not necessitate the conclusion that the district court abused its discretion. 10 interference with the rights of the parties.” Id. at 101. In the instant case, an evidentiary hearing was held, the report and recommendation contained detailed factual findings, and the magistrate judge discussed the Gulf Oil opinion when determining the appropriate form of sanctions. Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting SLG from representing or collecting fees from opt-in plaintiffs, other than those that were co-workers of the named plaintiffs.