Opinion ID: 771786
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Agent Ajioka

Text: 15 Vallejo argues that the district court abused its discretion when, over his objection, it permitted the Government to introduce the expert testimony of Special Agent Ajioka regarding the structure of drug trafficking organizations. 1 See United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405, 1410 (9th Cir. 1993) (reviewing a district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion). Vallejo was not charged with conspiracy to import drugs; nor did the Government introduce any evidence establishing a connection between Vallejo and a drug trafficking organization. The district court, nevertheless, permitted Agent Ajioka to testify about how such organizations operate: 16 The drug business, from my experience is pretty compartmentalized. In other words, there are individuals who grow the product. In this case we're talking about marijuana. They grow the marijuana. There are individuals who buy it from the growers, store it. There are other individuals whose function in the venture is nothing more than to transport the marijuana. So each step along the way incurs costs; costs of growing marijuana, costs of transporting it, the cost of storing it. And in transiting through a country -in this case we're dealing with Mexico. In transiting through Mexico there are other costs incurred along the way. 17 When it gets to the border, the price has significantly increased since the time it left the marijuana grove. But in Mexico -it is not doing the traffickers any good in Mexico. The idea is to get it in the market place which for this particular product is the United States . . . 18 The seller, or the particular organization whose function is to transport the marijuana, does not know who the end user is going to be. His function is solely to transport the product from one point to another. 19 Evidence may not be admitted at trial unless it is relevant, as defined by Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 401. The particular facts of the case determine the relevancy of a piece of evidence. See 2 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weintstein's Federal Evidence 401.04[2][a] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2000) (Relevance is not inherent in any item of evidence but exists only as a relation between an item of evidence and a matter properly provable in the case.). 20 We do not believe the expert testimony concerning the structure of drug trafficking organizations was relevant here. The Government never articulated -either in its briefs or at oral argument -how the testimony was relevant to Vallejo's particular case. 2 When specifically questioned as to its relevance at oral argument, the Government explained that it now routinely introduces the structure of drug trafficking organizations in every drug importation prosecution to make up for the lack of fingerprints on the drugs in question. According to the Government, the absence of fingerprints is always raised by defendants as evidence that they did not put the drugs in the car and therefore did not know the drugs were there. Vallejo, however, had not indicated that he planned to, and in fact did not, raise the lack of fingerprint evidence as probative of his lack of knowledge. 3 21 Nor did the district court articulate a clear rationale for admitting the testimony. Although it stated that the rationale is pretty clear for that kind of evidence, the court did not discuss -and we cannot glean from the record -what that rationale was in Vallejo's case. Even the most comprehensive evidence may not be admitted unless its significance to the proposition at issue can be ascertained. Weinstein & Burger, supra at 401.04 [2][d]. 22 In addition, although the Government has not asserted that it introduced the evidence to show Vallejo's knowledge, had that been the purpose, the district court should properly have excluded it under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. [E]vidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed. R. Evid. 403. If the district court finds that the testimony would waste time, confuse or not materially assist the trier of fact, or be better served through cross-examination or a comprehensive jury instruction, it has the discretion to exclude the testimony. United States v. Hicks , 103 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1193 (1997). 23 We have allowed government agents or similar persons [to] testify as to the general practices of criminals to establish the defendants' modus operandi. United States v. Johnson, 735 F.2d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 1995). Such testimony helps the trier of fact to understand how combinations of seemingly innocuous events may indicate criminal behavior. Id.; see United States v. Gil, 58 F.3d 1414, 1422 (9th Cir. 1995) (allowing expert testimony that drug traffickers often employ counter-surveillance driving techniques, register cars in others' names, make narcotics and cash deliveries in public parking lots, and frequently use pagers and public telephones to establish defendants' modus operandi in the face of a Rule 403 challenge); United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 783(9th Cir. 1981) (allowing expert testimony that Maher's activities were similar to the modus operandi of persons conducting counter surveillance while transporting drugs). We have also allowed testimony about how criminal narcotics distribution organizations operate to help the jury understand a complex heroin distribution scheme involving twenty to twenty-five members of a structured criminal enterprise. United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1997) ([The expert] testimony was properly admitted to assist the jury in understanding modus operandi in a complex criminal case.). 24 Agent Ajioka's testimony concerning the structure and modus operandi of drug trafficking organizations was not relevant to the Government's case against Vallejo. Nor was it needed to assist the jury's understanding of a complex criminal case. Agent Ajioka testified to the different roles played by various members of drug trafficking organizations, and although he did not cast Vallejo in a particular role, the implication of his testimony was that Vallejo had knowledge of how the entire organization operated, and thus knew he was carrying the drugs. To admit this testimony on the issue of knowledge, the only issue in the case, was unfairly prejudicial, and an abuse of discretion under Rule 403. 25 The improper use of testimony concerning the structure of drug trafficking organizations in this case is akin to the improper use of drug courier profiles. A drug courier profile is a somewhat informal compilation of characteristics believed to be typical of persons unlawfully carrying narcotics. United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440, (1979) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted)). The profiles are based on what investigating officers consider to be the most common characteristics of drug couriers -the characteristics they look for during investigations. See id. Such testimony is generally used to link the behavior of the defendant to the behavior common in the courier profile. Because  `[e]very defendant has a right to be tried based on the evidence against him or her, not on the techniques utilized by law enforcement officials in investigating criminal activity,'  we have not allowed such profiles to be introduced as substantive evidence of a defendant's innocence or guilt. Id. (quoting United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 1208, 1210 (9th Cir. 1989)); see Cordoba, 104 F.3d at 230 (finding that the expert testimony involving drug trafficking was permissible because [n]one of the expert testimony in this case was admitted to demonstrate that Cordoba was guilty because he fit the characteristics of a certain drug courier profile). Furthermore, [d]rug courier profiles are inherently prejudicial because of the potential they have for including innocent citizens as profiled drug couriers. United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d at 1210 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 26 Although the Government claims it was not trying to show Vallejo was a key player in a drug cartel, it portrayed him as a member of an enormous international drug trafficking organization and implied that he knew of the drugs in his car because of his role in that organization. This expert testimony connected seemingly innocent conduct to a vast drug empire, and through this connection, it unfairly attributed knowledge -the sole issue in the case -to Vallejo, a single individual, who was not alleged to be associated with a drug trafficking organization in even the most minor way. As a result, the introduction of this evidence created the same prejudice that has made drug courier profiles inadmissible. And, because the evidence was not relevant to Vallejo's particular case, it lacked any probative value. 27 Therefore, the district court abused its discretion when it allowed Agent Ajioka's testimony. Criminal prosecutions cannot be blueprinted, but must be tailored to the charges and facts of each case in consideration of the individual rights of each defendant. Because the expert testimony regarding drug trafficking organizations improperly and unfairly imputed specific knowledge to Vallejo and knowledge was the central question before the jury, we cannot say this error was harmless.