Opinion ID: 2508473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony of Dr. Schwartz-Watts

Text: Tennant contends that Dr. Schwartz-Watts' testimony was admissible to show Tennant's state of mind at the time of the alleged crime. In addition, he contends Dr. Schwartz-Watts' testimony should have been admitted for the purpose of impeaching the victim's credibility with regard to whether the victim visited Tennant while he was in jail. We disagree. In general, a witness may not testify as to matters about which she has no personal knowledge. An exception to this rule permits testimony by an expert witness. Rule 602, SCRE. An expert may testify [i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue and the witness is duly qualified. Rule 702, SCRE. In this case, the only states of mind relevant to Tennant's guilt were (a) Tennant's capacity to tell right from wrong; (b) Tennant's ability to conform his actions to the requirements of law; and (c) the issue of consent. [2] Dr. Schwartz-Watts opined that although [Tennant] was suffering from Schizoaffective Disorder and cocaine dependence at the time of the offense, these illnesses did not prevent him from knowing legal and moral right from wrong, nor did they prevent him from recognizing the wrongfulness of his actions. In addition, she opined that Tennant did have the capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Thus, the only state of mind left in contention was the matter of consent. As Dr. Schwartz-Watts recognized, the issue of consent was a matter outside the realm of [her] expertise. Nonetheless, Tennant attempted to use the doctor as a conduit for the introduction of his own statements regarding his belief that the victim consented to their encounter. For example, Dr. Schwartz-Watts testified Tennant reported to her that he believed the sex was consensual. These statements were inadmissible hearsay. See Rule 803(3), SCRE. Tennant also sought to use Dr. Schwartz-Watts to introduce his out-of-court assertions that the victim had visited him in jail after having obtained an order of protection against him. These assertions were made to another doctor and recorded in that doctor's notes. Dr. Schwartz-Watts had no personal knowledge of the victim's alleged visits with Tennant, and this factual issue required no special expertise. Thus, the testimony was properly excluded. Rule 602, SCRE (requiring a witness other than an expert to have personal knowledge of the matters testified to); cf. State v. Douglas, 380 S.C. 499, 501-03 & n. 2, 671 S.E.2d 606, 608-09 & n. 2 (2009) (holding a forensic interviewer's personal observations of alleged victims did not require specialized knowledge, and therefore, qualification as an expert was unnecessary). In sum, because Dr. Schwartz-Watts could offer no scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that would assist the jury in deciding the issue of consent, and because she had no personal knowledge regarding the factual issues raised by Tennant, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Schwartz-Watts' testimony. See State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006) (The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.).