Opinion ID: 48719
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Freeman's Excessive Force Claim

Text: 33 To prevail on an excessive force claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) injury (2) which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable. Tarver, 410 F.3d at 751; Goodson, 202 F.3d at 740. The district court denied the deputies' motion for summary judgment on the excessive force claim because it found that there was an issue of material fact based on Freeman's allegations that the deputies twisted her arms behind her back while handcuffing her, jerked her all over the carport, and applied the handcuffs too tightly, causing bruises and marks on her wrists and arms. 34 Even accepting all of these facts as true, Freeman's excessive force claim fails. To state a claim for excessive use of force, the plaintiff's asserted injury must be more than de minimis. See Glenn, 242 F.3d at 314. The determination of whether a plaintiff's alleged injury is sufficient to support an excessive force claim is context-dependent and is directly related to the amount of force that is constitutionally permissible under the circumstances. Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 435 (5th Cir.1996); see Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir.1999) (In determining whether an injury caused by excessive force is more than de minimis, we look to the context in which that force was deployed.). That the deputies' arrest of Freeman was unlawful on the facts alleged does not, however, mean that any force used by the deputies to effectuate the arrest was necessarily excessive. Rather, Freeman's excessive force claim is separate and distinct from her unlawful arrest claim, and we must therefore analyze the excessive force claim without regard to whether the arrest itself was justified. See, e.g., Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1126 (10th Cir.2007) (en banc) ([I]n a case where police effect an arrest without probable cause . . . but use no more force than would have been reasonably necessary if the arrest or detention were warranted, the plaintiff has a claim for unlawful arrest or detention but not an additional claim for excessive force.); Bashir v. Rockdale County, Ga., 445 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir.2006) (When properly stated, an excessive force claim presents a discrete constitutional violation relating to the manner in which an arrest was carried out, and is independent of whether law enforcement had the power to arrest.); cf. Bodine v. Warwick, 72 F.3d 393, 400 n. 10 (3d Cir.1995) (Officers who detain a suspect unlawfully should be liable for the harm proximately caused by their tortious detention, but this will not necessarily include all harm resulting from the otherwise reasonable use of force to carry out the detention.). 35 In this case, the most substantial injury claimed by Freeman is that she suffered bruising on her wrists and arms because the handcuffs were applied too tightly when she was arrested. This court has previously held, however, that minor, incidental injuries that occur in connection with the use of handcuffs to effectuate an arrest do not give rise to a constitutional claim for excessive force. See Glenn, 242 F.3d at 314 (stating that handcuffing too tightly, without more, does not amount to excessive force); see also Tarver, 410 F.3d at 751-52 (quoting Glenn ). Nor was it excessive force for the deputies to leave Freeman in the patrol car for, as she alleges, 30 to 45 minutes. See Glenn, 242 F.3d at 314 (holding that seizure was not made unreasonable by fact that plaintiff was left in unventilated vehicle for approximately 30 minutes, despite plaintiff's allegation that her multiple sclerosis was exacerbated by the heat). The district court therefore erred in denying the deputies' motion for summary judgment on Freeman's excessive force claim.