Opinion ID: 77685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 16-Level Enhancement for Conviction of a Crime of Violence

Text: 6 The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a 16-level enhancement of a defendant's offense level if the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the United States, after a conviction for a felony that is a crime of violence. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The Application Notes for U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1) provide that a crime of violence means, inter alia, any offense under ... state ... law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1), comment. (n.1(B)(iii)). 7 On appeal, Llanos-Agostadero argues that the district court erred in concluding that his Florida convictions for aggravated battery were crimes of violence for purposes of the 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1). Whether a previous offense of conviction is a crime of violence is a question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Glover, 431 F.3d 744, 747, 749 (11th Cir. 2005). 8 Generally, in determining whether a prior conviction is a qualifying offense for enhancement purposes, we apply a categorical approach—that is, we look no further than the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-02, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 2159-60, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990); United States v. Aguilar-Ortiz, 450 F.3d 1271, 1273 (11th Cir. 2006). But where the judgment of conviction and statute are ambiguous, we remand for the district judge to look at the facts underlying a state conviction. Aguilar-Ortiz, 450 F.3d at 1273. In examining the facts underlying a prior conviction, the district court is generally limited to relying only on the charging document[s], written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented. Id.; Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 19-26, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 1259-63, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005). 9 Under Florida law, aggravated battery on a pregnant woman is committed if the person who was the victim of the battery was pregnant at the time of the offense and the offender knew or should have known that the victim was pregnant. Fla. Stat. § 784.045(1)(b) (emphasis added). A person commits the offense of battery (that is, simple battery) under Florida law when he [a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; or . . . [i]ntentionally causes bodily harm to another person. Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1)(a) (emphasis added). Thus, an essential element of the offense of aggravated battery on a pregnant woman is that the defendant commit simple battery—that is, he [a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the latter's will, or [i]ntentionally causes bodily harm to another person. Small v. State, 889 So.2d 862, 863 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2004) (construing Fla. Stat. §§ 784.03(1)(a), 784.045(1)(b)). 10 This court has yet to address the issue of whether aggravated battery on a pregnant woman, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 784.045(1)(b), constitutes a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1). We have, however, addressed closely analogous issues in Glover and United States v. Griffith, 455 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2006). 11 In Glover, this court set forth the elements of simple battery under Florida law and held that simple battery on a law enforcement officer, in violation of Fla. Stat. §§ 784.03 and 784.07, is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Glover, 431 F.3d at 749. Notably, like the Application Notes for § 2L1.2(b)(1), § 4B1.2(a) defines a crime of violence as, inter alia, any offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1)). And in Griffith, this court held that simple battery under Georgia law (which occurs when a person [i]ntentionally makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with the person of another) constitutes a crime of domestic violence under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which, like the Application Notes for U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1), defines a crime of domestic violence to include, inter alia, any offense that has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force. Griffith, 455 F.3d at 1340-45 (citing O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), 922(g)(9)). 12 In our view, the offenses at issue in Glover and Griffith cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the offense at issue in the instant case, at least with regards to determining whether the offense is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1). First, there is no meaningful distinction between the definition of a crime of violence under § 2L1.2(b)(1) (at issue in the instant case), the definition of a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a) (at issue in Glover ), or the definition of a crime of domestic violence under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (at issue in Griffith ). Moreover, the offense of aggravated battery on a pregnant woman under Florida law has as an element that the defendant commit simple battery, Small, 889 So.2d at 863, and there is no persuasive reason why simple battery on a law enforcement officer is a crime of violence, as this court held in Glover, 431 F.3d at 749, while simple battery on a pregnant woman (which constitutes aggravated battery) is not. We therefore conclude that aggravated battery on a pregnant woman, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 784.045(1)(b), is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1). Accordingly, the district court did not err in holding that Llanos-Agostadero's prior convictions for aggravated battery on a pregnant woman were crimes of violence for purposes of the 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).