Opinion ID: 786209
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Denial of the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend

Text: 53 Finally, the Plaintiffs appeal the district court's denial of their motion to amend their complaint to add a claim under § 101 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a). Although the district court most likely would have been justified in denying the motion to amend because of its tardiness — the Plaintiffs filed the motion three months after the deadline for amending the pleadings, two months after the Settlement that allegedly gave rise to the LMRDA claim, and only eleven days before the Defendants' summary judgment motions were due — the district court declined to permit the Plaintiffs to add an LMRDA claim on the basis of futility. We review de novo its decision. 9 54 The Plaintiffs' proposed LMRDA claim alleged that the USWA and RBX conspired together to violate and to limit Plaintiffs' rights ... to institute and to proceed with this action in this Court. J.A. at 432 (Pls. Motion for Leave to File a Second Am. Compl.). Recognizing that the Settlement divested the district court of jurisdiction over the § 301 claim, the Plaintiffs chiefly assert that the agreement to the Settlement left the Plaintiffs without relief in federal court. The Plaintiffs contended that this deprived them of the right to sue ensconced in the LMRDA. Because the LMRDA does not serve the role envisioned by the Plaintiffs and because they did not state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we agree with the district court's denial of the motion to amend on futility grounds. 55 The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 was the product of congressional concern with widespread abuses of power by union leadership. Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 435, 102 S.Ct. 1867, 72 L.Ed.2d 239 (1982). It was designed specifically to regulate internal union affairs. Hrometz v. Local 550, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Constr. & Ornamental Ironworkers, 227 F.3d 597, 601 (6th Cir.2000) (quotation omitted). The LMRDA 56 [P]laced emphasis on the rights of union members to freedom of expression without fear of sanctions by the union, which in many instances could mean loss of union membership and in turn loss of livelihood. Such protection was necessary to further the [LMRDA]'s primary objective of ensuring that unions would be democratically governed and responsive to the will of their memberships. 57 Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 435-36, 102 S.Ct. 1867. As part of the Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations, § 101 of the LMRDA in part mandates, 58 No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency, irrespective of whether or not the labor organization or its officers are named as defendants or respondents in such action or proceeding, or the right of any member of a labor organization to appear as a witness in any judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding, or to petition any legislature or to communicate with any legislator: Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations or any officer thereof: And provided further, That no interested employer or employer association shall directly or indirectly finance, encourage, or participate in, except as a party, any such action, proceeding, appearance, or petition. 59 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4). To establish a prima facie violation of this right to institute a legal action, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she engaged in the protected conduct, the union retaliated against the plaintiff, and the plaintiff suffered an injury as a result of the union's action. Thompson v. Office & Prof'l Employees Int'l Union, 74 F.3d 1492, 1506 (6th Cir.1996). 60 There are no cases that support the Plaintiffs' belief that the actions of RBX and the USWA give rise to a valid LMRDA claim. The plain language of the statute also demonstrates that the Plaintiffs' claim, if added, would not survive a motion to dismiss. First, RBX is not liable under § 411(a)(4). The statute only prohibits labor organizations from inhibiting a plaintiff's right to file suit against that organization. It does not authorize a cause of action against employers. 61 Because they take it out of context, Plaintiffs misunderstand the meaning of the statute's second proviso, which states that a union cannot infringe a member's right to sue, provided that no interested employer or employer association shall directly or indirectly finance, encourage, or participate in, except as a party, any such action, proceeding, appearance, or petition. See Pls. Br. at 54 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4)). This provision limits the union member's complete right to initiate a legal proceeding when the member's suit is funded by the employer. The exception exists to prevent employers from interfering in the relations between union members and the unions, but it does not create an independent basis for employer liability under the LMRDA. Funding by an interested employer of a union member's suit does not make the employer liable; rather, such funding only limits the union member's absolute freedom to initiate legal proceedings. The exception, which if applicable would hurt, rather than help the Plaintiffs' alleged LMRDA claim, is not relevant here in any event given that RBX and the Plaintiffs are adversaries, not allies. 62 Second, the claim must fail as asserted against the USWA, because the union has not limited the Plaintiffs' ability to institute its action. The Plaintiffs successfully instituted their action against both RBX and the USWA in federal court and proceeded to litigate the case for over a year. The Plaintiffs have not even alleged, let alone offered any evidence, that the USWA retaliated against them for engaging in this lawsuit. It is true that the Settlement has impeded the Plaintiffs' ability to win their lawsuit in federal court by divesting the district court of subject matter jurisdiction and by purporting to settle all claims between the Barberton employees and RBX. However, the LMRDA does not create a cause of action against unions for actions that diminish the chances for a member to succeed in a lawsuit against a union. 63 To the extent that the Plaintiffs could argue that the USWA retaliated against Plaintiffs' lawsuit by negotiating and signing the Settlement, this contention would be misguided; if successful, such an assertion would significantly limit the ability of unions to represent the entire bargaining unit. Any suggested causal connection between the Settlement and the lawsuit is tenuous. The Plaintiffs comprised less than 20% of the total membership of Local 77L, but the USWA was charged with obtaining some modicum of benefits for all the Barberton employees. There is no evidence that the USWA signed the Settlement to impact the court's jurisdiction over the action, even though the Settlement had that incidental effect. Signing a settlement that has such a secondary effect does not constitute the type of behavior that § 411(a)(4) is designed to prohibit. 64 Additionally, subjecting unions to liability under the LMRDA for actions such as the USWA's would place into direct conflict the LMRDA and the duty of labor organizations to represent their members under the National Labor Relations Act. A union is obligated to represent all the members of a bargaining unit in negotiations as the exclusive bargaining agent. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a); see also Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967) (It is now well established that, as the exclusive bargaining representative... the Union had a statutory duty fairly to represent all... employees.). If a union were forced to refrain from negotiating plant-closing settlements, which are applauded by some union members and derided by others, whenever a faction of the union membership filed suit over an alleged breach of a CBA, the union could harm the non-litigious members by refusing to negotiate until the conclusion of the lawsuit. The union could also be liable to the nonparty union members for its failure to negotiate. To hold that the USWA's actions here violated the LMRDA would establish a troublesome precedent, because it would prevent unions from reaching settlements when such settlements potentially could have a secondary effect on pending litigation filed by a small percentage of the bargaining unit's members.