Opinion ID: 458893
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use of the Grand Jury Materials in Civil Litigation.

Text: 39 Appellants argue that the attorneys who conducted the grand jury investigation may not continue to use grand jury materials, without a rule 6(e) order, to litigate a civil case. The Supreme Court expressly left this question unresolved in United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 103 S.Ct. 3133, 3141 n. 15 (1983), where the Court rejected the government's argument that attorneys in the justice department's civil division, who had not conducted the grand jury investigation, were entitled under rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i) to automatic disclosure of grand jury materials for use in preparing a civil suit against subjects of the grand jury investigation. 40 The issue presented here is more subtle. The threshold question is whether the continued access to grand jury materials by the attorneys who conducted the grand jury investigation--and worked with the materials during that time--even constitutes disclosure. Assuming that only the two attorneys who actually worked on the grand jury investigation would have access to the grand jury materials in the civil phase of the dispute--when they will not be functioning as prosecutors--to characterize their continued access in the civil phase to the materials to which they had access in the criminal phase as disclosure within the meaning of rule 6(e) seems fictional at first glance. But the realities belie the apparent fiction. The testimony and documents here are voluminous, and we doubt that the two attorneys could independently recall the details of 250,000 pages of subpoenaed documents or the details of testimony by dozens of witnesses. Civil prosecution of the case would therefore invite them to refer repeatedly to the documents and transcripts of which they have prior knowledge and with which they may be partially familiar. Even when a criminal investigation has generated far fewer materials, any resort to these materials by the attorneys pursuing the civil matter to refresh their recollection as to documents or testimony to which they had access in the grand jury proceeding is tantamount to a further disclosure. Viewed in this context, to permit them continued access to the materials is equivalent to disclosure. See id. at 3137 n. 6 (approving In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 78-184 (Sells, Inc.), 642 F.2d 1184, 1187-88 (9th Cir.1981) (Each day this order remains effective the veil of secrecy is lifted higher    by the continued access of those to whom the materials have already been disclosed.)). 41 That being so, the question then arises whether this type of disclosure requires a rule 6(e) order. Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i) provides that disclosure otherwise prohibited by the provisions of rule 6(e) may be made to an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty. While conceding that civil division attorneys fit within the definition of attorney for the government--as would the antitrust division attorneys here--the Court concluded in Sells that this subsection applied to the performance of the attorneys' duty to enforce the federal criminal law only and commented that disclosure for civil use without a rule 6(e) order was unjustified by the considerations supporting prosecutorial access, [and] threaten[ed] to do affirmative mischief. Sells Engineering, Inc., 103 S.Ct. at 3142. 42 The Sells Court required a rule 6(e) order because disclosure to government attorneys for civil use in that case presented three problems: (1) it threatened to undermine the integrity of the grand jury itself; (2) it threatened to subvert limitations imposed outside the grand jury context on the government's discovery powers; and (3) it raised many of the same concerns that underlie the rule of secrecy in other contexts. To determine whether a rule 6(e) order should be required in the present circumstances, we must analyze these three potential problems in the context of antitrust prosecutors who are seeking to proceed civilly. 43 1. Any possible threat to the integrity of the grand jury is largely absent in this case. In Sells, the Court reasoned that if prosecutors knew that their civil division colleagues would be free to use grand jury materials in a civil case, they might be tempted to manipulate the grand jury process to root out evidence for a civil case that would be unnecessary in a criminal prosecution, or even to start a grand jury investigation where no criminal prosecution seemed likely. 44 This danger is substantially attenuated here in view of the antitrust division's extensive discovery powers under the antitrust civil process act, which the civil division lacked in Sells. The antitrust division would gain little by instigating a grand jury investigation for the purpose of gathering evidence for a civil proceeding, when it could gather that same information through its powers under the ACPA. Further, since a thoroughly prepared presentation to a grand jury in a criminal antitrust prosecution would probably uncover automatically most information that would be useful to a civil antitrust suit based on the same subject, there is little opportunity for the prosecutor to abuse grand jury investigations. And even though it is conceivable that some aspects of a civil case might require evidence different from what a prosecutor would seek for a criminal case, the prosecutor would also know that the antitrust division could seek this information through the ACPA if a civil suit were initiated. Under these circumstances, the threat to the integrity of the grand jury carries little weight. 45 2. The Sells Court's second concern was that automatic disclosure of grand jury materials threatened to subvert limitations on the government's powers of discovery and investigation that are applied outside the grand jury context. The Court commented that [i]f government litigators or investigators in civil matters enjoyed unlimited access to grand jury material,    there would be little reason for them to resort to their usual, more limited avenues of investigation. Id. at 3143. Here, by contrast, the government's discovery powers under the ACPA are almost co-extensive with the grand jury's investigative powers. 46 We recognize that permitting the grand jury attorneys to use grand jury materials in a civil case would in effect give the government exclusive access to a storehouse of relevant fact which is closed to a civil defendant absent a showing of particularized need under rule 6(e). However, had the government collected the same information civilly under the ACPA, a similar limitation on the defendant's access would apply, for material obtained by the government under the ACPA may not be disclosed to third parties, other than duly authorized employees of the justice department, without the consent of the person who produced the material or from whom it was discovered. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1313(c)(3). Thus, we do not view either of the first two problems in Sells as reasons to require a rule 6(e) order here. 47 3. The Court's third concern in Sells, however, that disclosure to government bodies raises many of the same concerns that underlie the rule of grand jury secrecy in other contexts, carries significantly more weight in the circumstances of this case. First, in Sells, the Court noted that allowing automatic disclosure of grand jury materials to nonprosecutors for civil use increases the risk of illegal or inadvertent disclosure of such material to others. Sells Engineering, Inc., 103 S.Ct. at 3142. If it only involved continued access by those antitrust division attorneys who actually carried out the grand jury investigation here, then the disclosure would admittedly be limited. But the risk of inadvertent or illegal disclosure arising from these attorneys' continuing access to the material is also significant. If the attorneys intend to use the testimony and documents in litigating the case, it borders on the unrealistic to assume that paralegal and secretarial staff and other necessary assistants would not also come into contact with the material. Indeed, counsel very likely have already used such assistants in preparing and releasing to the civil division the fact memoranda, memoranda which contained a description and analysis of the evidence (both testimonial and documentary) uncovered by the grand jury and excerpts from documents and testimony of witnesses who appeared before the grand jury. Even though these support employees may have worked on the grand jury investigation and previously seen the grand jury material, it is still being disclosed to them in the sense that they have continued access to it. But since disclosure to nonattorney government personnel is expressly limited to disclosure for the purpose of assisting an attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law, Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii) (emphasis added), even such limited disclosure would contravene the statute. Moreover, given the long life and complexity of many civil antitrust actions, it seems probable that some new support personnel will need to work on some aspect of the case, due either to employee turnover or to increased staffing needs. Any attendant disclosure to those new employees would also contravene rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii). Finally, any such disclosure, even if not in itself in violation of the statute, would increase the risk of inadvertent disclosure to nongovernment personnel. 48 Second, the Supreme Court was also concerned that routine, automatic disclosure would create a risk that a witness, who knew that his testimony could be used in civil litigation, might be less willing to speak candidly before the grand jury for fear that he [would] get himself into trouble in some other forum. Sells Engineering, 103 S.Ct. at 3142. This concern applies with equal force to grand jury investigations by the antitrust division. 49 On balance, we think that the threat of affirmative mischief posed by the use of grand jury materials in this civil action is somewhat less than that present in Sells, and we might be tempted to conclude that the antitrust division need not seek a rule 6(e) order to use grand jury material to litigate this civil action. But, however minimal the threat here, we are directed by the principle that [i]n the absence of a clear indication in a statute or Rule, we must always be reluctant to conclude that a breach of [grand jury] secrecy has been authorized. Sells Engineering, 103 S.Ct. at 3138. Certainly, such a clear indication is lacking here. Consequently, the reluctance imposed on us from above forces us to reinforce the principle of grand jury secrecy and requires, through a rule 6(e) order, judicial supervision of access to grand jury material by the antitrust division in this civil action. 50 Since the complaint filed by the government does not quote from or refer to any grand jury material, and since the statute of limitations on at least one of the government's claims has apparently run, we grant the appellants' request for protective relief only to the extent that we prohibit any further access to or use of grand jury materials by the antitrust division in the pending civil action, unless and until the antitrust division obtains a rule 6(e) order based on an appropriate showing of particularized need for use of the material. 51 Appellants state that this case does not present the more difficult question of whether a prosecutor who conducted the grand jury proceedings may merely use his recollection of facts from those proceedings to litigate a civil case. Since it would be almost impossible for any attorney in such a position to compartmentalize his thoughts and litigate a civil case without in some way using his recollection of facts learned during the grand jury investigation, we think that the real question is whether the prosecutor must be disqualified from litigating the civil case. Since appellants have expressly declined to present that issue, we are not called upon to address it.