Opinion ID: 2371971
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Separation of powers/constitutional conflict

Text: The majority rejects a Murphy -based reading of NRS 11.340 as adding words the statute doesn't contain, in violation of the plain meaning rule. (Plain meaning may be in the eyes of the beholderthe majority's reading applies NRS 11.340 to claim and issue preclusion when all the statute addresses are limitations periods.) Regardless, the plain meaning rule does not justify reading a statute in a way that leads to an absurd result, State v. Friend, 118 Nev. 115, 120-21, 40 P.3d 436, 439 (2002), or that invalidates a statute on separation of powers grounds when another, more limited reading would not. Waite v. Burgess, 69 Nev. 230, 232-33, 245 P.2d 994, 996 (1952). In Waite, the court confronted a statute that, read literally, could have run afoul of the Nevada Constitution's separation of powers clause. The court declined to read the statute aggressively. In the light of our constitutional division of the powers of government, it is our view that such an invasion of the sphere of the judicial department could not have been contemplated by the legislature. Id. at 233, 245 P.2d at 996 (citing Nev. Const, art. 3, § 1). Waite's circumspect approach seems especially appropriate here, where the statute challenged as unconstitutional was passed in 1861, three years before the Nevada Constitution was adopted, Debates & Proceedings of the Nevada State Constitutional Convention of 1864, at 779 (Andrew J. Marsh off. rep. 1866), and has been reenacted many times since, see supra note 2. See also Zamora v. Price, 125 Nev. ___, ___, 213 P.3d 490, 492-93 (2009) (statutes are presumed to be valid and will be upheld unless the constitution is clearly violated (citing Universal Electric v. Labor Comm'r, 109 Nev. 127, 129, 847 P.2d 1372, 1373-74 (1993))); 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction, supra, § 45:11, at 81-83 (statutory provisions should be construed to avoid unconstitutionality.... If [a] law is reasonably open to two constructions, one that renders it unconstitutional and one that does not, the court must adopt the interpretation that upholds [its] constitutionality. (footnote omitted)). At most, NRS 11.340 can be read two ways. Its ambiguity lies in its unqualified use of the word reversal. A reversal can amount to a final judgment on the merits, as with the parties' first appeal here; it can involve a reversal and remand for a new trial before the same trial court for remediable error; or a reversal can lead to dismissal on grounds unrelated to the merits, such as improper venue, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or other defect. Because NRS 11.340 does not differentiate among possible reversals does not mean that it strips final appellate judgments of their claim- and issue-preclusive effect. Another, equally plausible reading is that NRS 11.340 only applies to statutes-of-limitation defenses raised in cases involving reversals for reasons courts recognize as grounds for avoiding claim and issue preclusion in a later-filed, second suit. This leaves the claim and issue preclusion issue where the majority's separation of powers analysis says it should remain: With the courts. [4] This case does not test NRS 11.340's outer limits, as occurred in Bollinger. It can and should be disposed of based on Berkson and Malacky having sustained a judgment on the merits against them that they now cannot avoid. But I note that because a statute is old does not justify its judicial repeal. See 2 Sutherland Statutory Construction, supra, § 34:5, at 35-36 (7th ed.2009) (the separation of powers doctrine places [t]he responsibility to clear dead wood out of the statute books ... with legislatures, even though legislative bodies are almost exclusively preoccupied with passing new laws.). Despite what to us moderns is its confusing brevity, I submit that NRS 11.340 still has a legitimate purpose, in varied, perhaps untested and as yet unimagined ways. Cf. Arceo v. Tolliver, 19 So.3d 67, 75 (Miss.2009) (Mississippi's analogous savings statute, which dates back to 1848, could have saved the plaintiffs second malpractice suit after the first was dismissed for lack of the pre-suit notice required) (dictum). For this reason, I would not invalidate NRS 11.340 on separation of powers grounds but leave it intact for another litigant another day. While I thus concur in the decision to affirm the dismissal below, I respectfully dissent from the majority's interpretation and invalidation of NRS 11.340 on separation of powers grounds and its reversal of the district court's decision awarding attorney fees to LePome.