Opinion ID: 790472
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Family as a particular social group

Text: 25 The BIA has long and consistently held that kinship ties are the sort of common and immutable characteristic that give rise to a particular social group for the purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). In the seminal case of In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 1985 WL 56042 (BIA 1985), overruled on other grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 441, 1987 WL 108943 (BIA 1987), the BIA first recognized that kinship ties may be the defining characteristic of a particular social group. 26 In Acosta, the BIA analyzed whether the persecution Acosta fears at the hands of the guerrillas is on account of his membership in a particular social group comprised of [taxi] drivers and persons engaged in the transportation industry of El Salvador. Id. at 232. Noting that Congress did not indicate what it understood this ground of persecution to mean, id., the BIA conducted an exhaustive examination of the meaning of the phrase particular social group. 27 First, the BIA explained that the phrase could be of broader application than the other four statutory groups. Id. The Board noted that in add[ing] the elements in the definition of a refugee, Congress intended to conform the Immigration and Nationality Act to the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the United States had acceded in 1968. Id. at 219 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the BIA concluded, it is appropriate for us to consider various international interpretations of that agreement. Id. at 220. By examining these various international interpretations, the BIA decided that the notion of a `social group' was considered to be of broader application than the combined notions of racial, ethnic, and religious groups and that in order to stop a possible gap in the coverage of the U.N. Convention, this ground was added to the definition of a refugee. Id. at 232 (citing A. Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law § 76, at 219 (1966)). 28 Second, the BIA found that the words particular social group implied that there was some kind of link between the people in the group: 29 A purely linguistic analysis of this ground of persecution suggests that it may encompass persecution seeking to punish either people in a certain relation, or having a certain degree of similarity, to one another or people of like class or kindred interests, such as shared ethnic, cultural, or linguistic origins, education, family background, or perhaps economic activity. 30 Id. at 232-33. Quoting the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the BIA explained that a `particular social group' connotes persons of similar background, habits, or social status and that a claim to fear persecution on this ground may frequently overlap with persecution on other grounds such as race, religion, or nationality. Id. at 233 (citing Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 19 (Geneva, 1979)). 31 Finally, the BIA concluded that the doctrine of ejusdemgeneris —the principle that general words used in enumeration with specific words should be construed in a manner consistent with the specific words, id. — indicates an interpretation in harmony with the BIA's international and linguistic analyses. The BIA explained: 32 The other grounds of persecution in the Act and the Protocol listed in association with `membership in a particular social group' ... describe[] persecution aimed at an immutable characteristic: a characteristic that either is beyond the power of an individual to change or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be changed. 33 Id. at 233 (citations omitted). Applying the doctrine to membership in a particular social group, the BIA interpreted the phrase to mean persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic, ... [which] might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former military leadership or land ownership. Id. The BIA explained that only when persecution is directed toward a person on account of a truly innate or fundamental characteristic does the mere fact of group membership become something comparable to the other four grounds. Id. However, because there may be many different common characteristic[s] that define a group, the BIA refrained from attempting to delineate every possible characteristic ex ante, explaining that the particular kind of group characteristic that will qualify under this construction remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. The BIA nevertheless made its standard clear: the characteristic must be one that the members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences. Id. 34 In In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 1996 WL 291910 (BIA 1996), the BIA clarified and affirmed its interpretation of particular social group articulated in Acosta. It concluded that the petitioner in In re H- was a member of a particular social group for the purposes of the refugee statute because, it found, the petitioner was persecuted on account of his membership in the Marehan clan in Somalia. Id. at 343, 345. To arrive at this conclusion, the BIA first cited Acosta for the proposition that a social group is characterized by a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. Id. at 342. Then the BIA noted that the Immigration and Naturalization Service Basic Law Manual on asylum recognized that family ties are just such a common characteristic: [the] Manual recognizes generally that clan membership is a highly recognizable, immutable characteristic that is acquired at birth and is inextricably linked to family ties. Id. Finally, the BIA concluded that because the Marehan clan share[s] ties of kinship and are identifiable as a group based on linguistic commonalities, the clan can be characterized as a `particular social group' within Somalia, of which respondent is a member. Id. at 343. The BIA made this determination even though no other statutory factor was relevant: victims were reportedly singled out for no reason other than their clan affiliation. Id. at 345 (quotations and citations omitted). 3 35 The BIA has never departed from the principle enunciated in Acosta and In re H-. See In re V-T-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 792, 798 (BIA 1997) (citing Acosta for the `particular social group' test and In re H- for the proposition that shared ties of kinship warrant characterization as a social group); In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365, 1996 WL 379826 (BIA 1996) (defining applicant's social group as young women who are members of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo who have not had [female genital mutilation]). 36 Nor have any of the other circuits that have considered the question departed from the principle that a family may constitute a social group. The First Circuit has held that [t]here can, in fact, be no plainer example of a social group based on common, identifiable and immutable characteristics than that of the nuclear family. Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir.1993); see also Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 571 (1st Cir.1999) (While the IJ might have drawn an inference that the FMLN targeted the petitioner because of his membership in a social group (i.e., his family), she chose to draw a contrary, equally plausible inference.). The Third Circuit, explaining that the BIA's interpretation of the phrase membership in a particular social group is entitled to deference, concluded that the BIA's statement in Acosta that kinship ties may constitute such membership is thus a permissible construction of the relevant statutes, and we are consequently bound to accept it. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239, 1240 (3d Cir.1993). The Seventh Circuit, after conducting a thorough review, concluded that [o]ur case law has suggested, with some certainty, that a family constitutes a cognizable `particular social group' within the meaning of the law. Iliev v. INS, 127 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir.1997) (citing Tzankov v. INS, 107 F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir.1997); Najafi v. INS, 104 F.3d 943, 947 (7th Cir.1997); Sharif v. INS, 87 F.3d 932, 936 (7th Cir.1996)); see also Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir.1998) ([W]e have indirectly treated the family relationship as a basis for identifying a `particular social group.') (citations omitted). In Hamzehi v. INS, 64 F.3d 1240, 1243 (8th Cir.1995), the Eighth Circuit implicitly recognized family membership as a basis for refugee status by concluding that, to be eligible for refugee status, the petitioner must show why these rather dated events provide an objectively reasonable basis for present fear of [persecution]... on the basis of her family's political opinions. We have found no out of circuit authority to the contrary. 37 Inexplicably, our circuit has generated two diverging lines of authority on whether family or kinship ties may give rise to a particular social group. At least two panel decisions have squarely held that a family cannot constitute a particular social group for the purposes of the refugee statute. In Estrada-Posadas v. INS, 924 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir.1991), we held that the petitioner failed to show a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a ground specified in the INA even though she demonstrated persecution of her uncle, cousin, and mother's relatives: 38 Estrada argues that persecution based on membership in her family should qualify as persecution on account of ... membership in a particular social group under the Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). However, she cites to no case that extends the concept of persecution of a social group to the persecution of a family, and we hold it does not. If Congress had intended to grant refugee status on account of family membership, it would have said so. Thus, Estrada has not shown that any persecution would be on account of her membership in any social group. 39 We recognized the breadth and significance of the Estrada-Posadas holding in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1092 n. 4 (9th Cir.2000), where we said: We have since held that a family cannot constitute a particular social group under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). See Estrada-Posadas .... 40 We have also held the opposite: that a family is a cognizable social group in the asylum context. In Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir.1986), we stated: 41 Perhaps a prototypical example of a particular social group would consist of the immediate members of a certain family, the family being a focus of fundamental affiliational concerns and common interests for most people. In Hernandez-Ortiz [v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir.1985)], we regarded evidence of persecution directed against a family unit as relevant in determining refugee status, noting that a family was a small, readily identifiable group. 42 Several of our more recent cases have affirmed this proposition. See Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir.2004) (Like our sister circuits, we recognize that a family is a social group.); Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir.2002) (We have recognized that, in some circumstances, a family constitutes a social group for purposes of the asylum and withholding-of-removal statutes.) (citations omitted); Pedro-Mateo v. INS, 224 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir.2000) (Pedro-Mateo offers neither case law nor analysis to contradict our previous statement that the `prototypical example' of a social group would be `immediate members of a certain family.') (citations omitted); Mgoian v. INS, 184 F.3d 1029, 1036 (9th Cir.1999) ([W]e have held that a particular social group implies a collection of people closely affiliated with each other, with the prototypical example of a particular social group []consisting of the immediate members of a certain family.) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 43 Reconciling these contrary lines of intracircuit authority is not possible. Therefore, consistent with the views of the BIA and our sister circuits, we hold that a family may constitute a social group for the purposes of the refugee statutes. We overrule all of our prior decisions that expressly or implicitly have held that a family may not constitute a particular social group within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Our holding defers to both the BIA's stated interpretation of the statutory phrase particular social group, and the BIA's precedent. 44