Opinion ID: 2061564
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Past Litigation

Text: The 1967 Indiana State General Assembly passed House Bill 1818 shortly before the end of the legislative session. This bill provided that ninety percent of the inheritance taxes collected in each county be paid to the county, and the other ten percent be paid to the State of Indiana. House Bill 1818 was, in effect, pocket-vetoed by the governor. The bill provided that in counties with Mass Transportation Authorities (only Marion County), the ninety percent should go to the Mass Transportation Authority; the Mass Transportation Authority of Indianapolis brought suit to have the pocket veto declared unconstitutional. On July 20, 1967, an action for mandate and injunction was filed in Room No. 3, Superior Court of Marion County, asking the Court to find the pocket-veto unconstitutional and asking the court to mandate various state officials to administer and enforce House Bill 1818. The Indiana Attorney General filed a petition for removal under the provisions of Ind. Code § 34-4-18 (Burns 1973), which allowed the Attorney General to remove cases which had statewide public significance from a lower court to the Indiana Court of Appeals. On or about December 28, 1968, the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that the pocket-veto in this case was unconstitutional, and that House Bill 1818 was the law, and that the state would have to pay the Mass Transportation Authority of Indianapolis the inheritance tax money withheld from it since the effective date of the Act. See State ex rel. Mass Transp. Auth. v. Indiana Rev. Bd., (1968) 144 Ind. App. 63, 242 N.E.2d 642. In January, 1969, the Indiana State General Assembly met, introduced, and passed bills repealing each of the pocket-vetoed bills which had been resurrected as a result of the decision of the Indiana Court of Appeals, making the repealers retroactive to the date that they took effect. The Indiana Court of Appeals found, on rehearing, that the court order of judgment should be enforced despite the repeal on the theory that the separation of powers doctrine prohibited the legislature from wiping out a judgment of a court. See State ex rel. Mass. Transp. Auth. v. Indiana Rev. Bd., (1968) 144 Ind. App. 63, 253 N.E.2d 725. The state auditor obeyed the order and paid the Mass Transportation Authority of Indianapolis the sum due it. A class action was begun on October 29, 1969, in Room No. 3, Marion Superior Court, in the name of the County of Elkhart on behalf of itself and all other counties similarly situated to collect their share of the inheritance tax funds. The Indiana Revenue Board filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the suit was a suit against the state, and an action for a money judgment and, as such, was covered by the defense of sovereign immunity. The case had been venued to the Shelby County Circuit Court, and the judge there overruled the motion to dismiss. A motion for summary judgment was filed by the State of Indiana on the relation of the counties, and it was granted. On October 26, 1970, a judgment was entered on behalf of the ninety-one counties for $16,555,787.95. The Indiana State General Assembly then passed Acts of 1971, Public Law 66 (Ind. Code §§ 6-4-1-35.5 and 6-4-1-35.6) which stated: All funds appropriated in Section 35.5 [6-4-1-35.5] of this chapter shall be used to satisfy the judgment rendered October 26, 1970, [by] the Circuit Court of Shelby County, Indiana, in Cause No. cc 70-241, the caption of which cause is:    [omitting caption] which funds shall be dispersed in accordance with the terms of said judgment. Immediately upon this act becoming effective [June 1, 1971] the Auditor of the State of Indiana is authorized and directed to issue a warrant of the State of Indiana to the Clerk of the Shelby Circuit Court in the amount appropriated in Section 1 [6-4-1-35.5] of this Act and satisfy the judgment referred to in said section. No amount of money was specified in the statute, although the exact amount of the judgment was known by the legislature, and the warrant was to be issued in one sum to the Clerk of Shelby County rather than separately to the general funds of each county. The Indiana Revenue Board had commenced an appeal from the judgment; the appeal was dismissed in light of the legislation. The amount ($16,555,787.95) was paid into the Clerk of Shelby County on June 7, 1971, and subsequently was distributed to each of the counties by the Shelby County Clerk pursuant to figures supplied to them by the Circuit Court of Shelby County as a result of computations prepared by the attorneys for the ninety-one counties. The judgment was never marked satisfied of record.