Opinion ID: 162957
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The integrity, fairness, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings

Text: 39 When a plain error affecting substantial rights seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, we may in our discretion choose whether to correct the error. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. at 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770). We have observed, after Olano, that our recognition of a plain error represents a narrow exception to the general rule that objections not made are deemed forfeited on appeal. See United States v. Nelson, 36 F.3d 1001, 1003 (10th Cir.1994) (Nelson did not raise this objection at his sentencing hearing, which normally precludes review by this court. However, we recognize a narrow exception for plain error.) (internal citation omitted). In order to invoke the exception, we have stated, the error must be  particularly egregious.  Id. at 1003 (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). 40 [B]ecause relief on plain-error review is in the discretion of the reviewing court, Ms. Brown as the defendant/appellant has the [] burden to persuade the court that the error `seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity[,] or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 1048, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770) (additional internal quotations omitted). Ms. Brown nowhere contends on appeal that the district court's error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, thus failing to meet her burden of persuasion. Further, as detailed below, even after conducting an independent analysis, we conclude that the facts of her case do not justify the exercise of our discretion. 41 A review of federal appellate decisions considering whether to correct unobjected-to sentencing errors reveals that the key concern has been whether correct application of the sentencing laws would likely significantly reduce the length of the sentence. When circuit courts have concluded that it would, they have not hesitated to exercise their discretion to correct the error. See, e.g., United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 157-58 (3d Cir.2002) (when the erroneously applied offense level was 21 (37-46 months) and the correct level was 19 (30-37 months), concluding that the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 619, 154 L.Ed.2d 525 (2002); United States v. Portillo-Mendoza, 273 F.3d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir.2001) (in exercising its discretion under Olano, stating that fairness is undermined where a court's error impose[s] a longer sentence than might have been imposed had the court not plainly erred) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Williamson, 183 F.3d 458, 464 (5th Cir.1999) (Leaving [the defendant] incarcerated for 30 years when he should have been sentenced to no more than 15 under existing precedent ... seriously would affect the fairness, integrity and public reputation of judicial proceedings by undermining the rule of law.); United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1356 (4th Cir.1996) (If we do not correct this error, [the defendant] will serve a term of imprisonment three years longer than required by the sentencing guidelines.) (emphasis added). 42 Conversely, however, where, on plain error review, applying the proper rule would not likely result in significant reduction in the length of an erroneous sentence, circuits have chosen not to exercise their discretion to correct plain sentencing errors.... when the difference in the length of the sentence imposed and the correct sentence was not significant enough to justify recognizing the error. United States v. Gordon, 291 F.3d 181, 194 (2d Cir.2002), petition for cert. filed (No. 02-6163 Aug. 20, 2002). See also United States v. Posters `N' Things, Ltd., 969 F.2d 652, 663 (8th Cir.1992) (stating that the sentencing error at issue was plainly an error, but declining to recognize the error because imposition of the proper sentence would have yielded a sentence of 120 months, as opposed to the erroneous actual sentence of 108 months), aff'd, 511 U.S. 513, 114 S.Ct. 1747, 128 L.Ed.2d 539 (1994); United States v. Filker, 972 F.2d 240, 242 (8th Cir.1992) (in declining to recognize the sentencing error at issue, reasoning that [the defendant] will serve fifteen months in prison less than the minimum sentence he would have served had the district court adopted the [correct sentence] and stating that [the defendant's] eighteen-month sentence does not constitute a gross miscarriage of justice ) (emphasis added); United States v. Garcia-Pillado, 898 F.2d 36, 39 (5th Cir.1990) (declining to recognize a plain error where the claim is in essence that the sentence is ten percent shorter than it should have been, fifty-four months rather than sixty), disapproved of in part, on other grounds, United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162, n. 20 (5th Cir.1994). 43 Our plain error review of Ms. Brown's case presents an unusual combination of circumstances: a plea agreement, subsequent fraud on the court by the defendant, the district court's grant of a compromise one-level departure likely in the defendant's favor that was legally erroneous but led to the imposition of a sentence within the range prescribed by Congress, 5 no objection at the trial level by any party, an assertion of error on appeal only by the appellant/defendant, and a close question as to whether substantial rights were affected. 44 We think that the rationale of the latter category of cases — those where the district court's error was in the defendant's favor and not significant enough to merit reversal — is applicable here. Our review of the record suggests rather strongly that the district court's error subtracted, rather than added, one level from the offense level the district court would have otherwise imposed had it recognized that a one-level adjustment was impermissible. We note that the PSR recommended that Ms. Brown receive no points for acceptance and a consequent offense level higher than that imposed. Further, the government specifically opposed, and continues to oppose, a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 45 Nor do we find it remotely likely that Ms. Brown would receive a sympathetic ear from the district court if we remanded for further proceedings. The district court's comments regarding Ms. Brown's obstruction of justice reflect its highly critical outlook on Ms. Brown's conduct, one that is difficult to reconcile with a prospective scenario where the court on resentencing would award the full two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. See, e.g., Aple's App. at 4 (Sentencing Hr'g dated June 29, 2001) (concluding that the evidence can only compel the Court's conclusion of fabrication); id. at 8 (I mean when people stand here ... and say these are the facts ... and it turns out that ... those aren't the facts, those just happen to be the documents ... then it enormously undermines the system.); id. at 11 (So I'm simply troubled by that input being manufactured.). 46 The district court's error strikes us as unlikely to generate much of an unfavorable view of the proceedings or of the judiciary, let alone one with a serious impact on the fairness, integrity or reputation of the judicial proceeding as required under Olano to recognize error. 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Nor do we think that the district court's error, which likely subtracted three months from a twenty-seven month sentence, was particularly egregious, thus failing the standard we reaffirmed in Nelson, 36 F.3d at 1003 (internal quotation marks omitted). 47 Indeed, the district court could plausibly have reached the same result via a correct application of the guidelines, either through applying the offense level one level higher or lower than the one used, or by, given the unusual mix of facts in this case, relying on USSG § 5K2.0, which authorizes departures from the otherwise applicable guideline range when an offender characteristic or other circumstance that is... not normally relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range ... is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the `heartland' cases covered by the guidelines. USSG § 5K2.0. 48 This then is not a case where letting an erroneous sentence stand would fly in the face of one of the primary purposes of the sentencing guidelines — the elimination of disparities in sentencing. Barajas-Nunez, 91 F.3d at 833. Rather, we think that Ms. Brown's sentence is similar to those likely to be imposed on other similarly situated defendants and is consistent with the guidelines' purpose. See id. ([I]n enacting sentencing guidelines, `Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders.') (quoting USSG Ch. 1, Pt. A, § 3). 49 In short, the district court's error does not represent the kind of error that we should go out of our way to correct where we are within our discretion to let the sentence imposed by the district court stand. Accordingly, we hold that Ms. Brown has not met her burden of establishing that the district court's error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. We therefore decline to exercise our discretion to reverse the district court's error.