Opinion ID: 2273096
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Beaches of Bay Head

Text: The Bay Head Improvement Association, which services the needs of all residents of the Borough for swimming and bathing in the public trust property, owns the street-wide strip of dry sand area at the foot of seven public streets that extends to the mean high water line. It also owns the fee in six other upland sand properties connected or adjacent to the tracts it owns at the end of two streets. In addition, it holds leases to approximately 42 tracts of upland sand area. The question that we must address is whether the dry sand area that the Association owns or leases should be open to the public to satisfy the public's rights under the public trust doctrine. Our analysis turns upon whether the Association may restrict its membership to Bay Head residents and thereby preclude public use of the dry sand area. The general rule is that courts will not compel admission to a voluntary association. See Rutledge v. Gulian, 93 N.J. 113, 118 (1983); Higgins v. American Society of Clinical Pathologists, 51 N.J. 191, 199 (1968). Ordinarily, a society or association may set its own membership qualifications and restrictions. However, that is not an inexorable rule. Where an organization is quasi-public, its power to exclude must be reasonably and lawfully exercised in furtherance of the public welfare related to its public characteristics. See Guerrero v. Burlington Cty. Memorial Hospital, 70 N.J. 344, 358 (1976). In Greisman v. Newcomb Hospital, 40 N.J. 389 (1963), plaintiff, holder of a degree of osteopathy and licensed to practice medicine and surgery, sought to be admitted to the courtesy staff of the defendant hospital. The defendant hospital refused to permit the plaintiff to file an application. The defendant contended that it was a private hospital and that its actions were not reviewable by a court. Justice Jacobs, writing for the Court, responded: They are private in the sense that they are nongovernmental but they are hardly private in other senses. Newcomb [Hospital] is a nonprofit organization dedicated by its certificate of incorporation to the vital public use of serving the sick and injured, its funds are in good measure received from public sources and through public solicitation, and its tax benefits are received because of its nonprofit and non-private aspects. Cf. Fairmount Hospital, Inc. v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 122 N.J.L. 8, 11 (Sup.Ct. 1939), aff'd 123 N.J.L. 201 (E. & A. 1939). It constitutes a virtual monopoly in the area in which it functions and it is in no position to claim immunity from public supervision and control because of its allegedly private nature. Indeed, in the development of the law, activities much less public than the hospital activities of Newcomb, have commonly been subjected to judicial (as well as legislative) supervision and control to the extent necessary to satisfy the felt needs of the times. [40 N.J. at 396.] In considering the public interest, Justice Jacobs noted that the defendant hospital was the only available hospital where the plaintiff practiced and that the hospital was operated not for private ends but for the benefit of the public. Justice Jacobs concluded that courts would indeed be remiss if they declined to intervene where ... the [hospital's] powers were invoked at the threshold to preclude an application for staff membership, not because of any lack of individual merit, but for a reason unrelated to sound hospital standards and not in furtherance of the common good. Id. at 404. In Falcone v. Middlesex Cty. Medical Society, 34 N.J. 582 (1961), plaintiff, a doctor of osteopathy licensed to practice medicine and surgery, was refused membership in the defendant County Medical Society. The effect of the refusal was that the plaintiff could not obtain staff privileges at any hospital in the area. Recognizing the judiciary's reluctance to interfere with the internal affairs of membership associations, the Court stated that it would do so in particular situations, where considerations of policy and justice were sufficiently compelling.... Id. at 590. Noting that the Medical Society was not simply a social organization, the Court viewed membership as an economic necessity and asserted that courts must be particularly alert to the need for truly protecting the public welfare and advancing the interests of justice by reasonably safeguarding the individual's opportunity for earning a livelihood while not impairing the proper standards and objectives of the organization. Id. at 592. A principle that may be distilled from Greisman and Falcone is that a nonprofit association that is authorized and endeavors to carry out a purpose serving the general welfare of the community and is a quasi-public institution holds in trust its powers of exclusive control in the areas of vital public concern. See also Marjorie Webster Jr. College v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 459, 469 (D.D.C. 1969) (stating that court may be forced to intervene in affairs of a voluntary association where the association enjoys monopoly power in an area of vital public concern), rev'd on other grounds, 432 F. 2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965, 91 S.Ct. 367, 27 L.Ed. 2d 384 (1970). When a nonprofit association rejects a membership application for reasons unrelated to its purposes and contrary to the general welfare, courts have broad judicial authority to insure that exclusionary policies are lawful and are not applied arbitrarily or discriminately. Greisman, 40 N.J. at 395; see also Oates v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Service, Inc., 113 N.J. Super. 371, 387-89 (Ch. Div. 1971); Davis v. Morristown Memorial Hospital, 106 N.J. Super. 33, 42 (Ch.Div. 1969). That is the situation here. Bay Head Improvement Association is a non-profit corporation whose primary purpose as stated in its certificate of incorporation is the cleaning, policing and otherwise making attractive and safe the bathing beaches in the Borough of Bay Head and the doing of any act which may be found necessary or desirable for the greater convenience, comfort and enjoyment of the residents. Its constitution states: The objects of this corporation shall be to promote the best interests of the Borough of Bay Head and in so doing to own property, operate bathing beaches, hire life guards, beach cleaners and policemen and do any and all things which, in the judgment of their Executive Committee, may be in the best interests of the Borough of Bay Head.... Shortly after the Association was incorporated and had established a plan to operate beaches that would be open to all residents of Bay Head, the Bay Head Borough Council, after discussion with the Association's members, adopted resolutions approving the plan and agreeing to cooperate with the Association in carrying out this plan insofar as it lies within the power of the Council so to do. The municipality evidenced its cooperation thereafter in a number of ways. It provided office space without charge in the Borough Hall between 1934 and 1973. Until 1975 seven parcels that ran from public streets to the mean high tide, all owned by the Association, were not assessed and the Association paid no realty taxes for those properties. The Borough's blanket liability insurance policies in effect between 1962 and 1968 covered the Association's activities on the beach area. The Borough appropriated public funds for the Association's benefit, $600 annually between 1936 and 1941, and $1,000 in 1969. Six groins (stone jetties) have been installed on the beach. The Borough paid one quarter of their cost; Ocean County, one quarter; and the State, one half. The Association's activities paralleled those of a municipality in its operation of the beachfront. The size of the beach was so great that it stationed lifeguards at five separate locations. The beach serviced about 5,000 members. The lifeguards performed the functions characteristic of those on a public beach. They posted warnings with respect to the safety of swimming. They stood ready to render assistance to anyone in need of aid. These guards were available daily throughout the summer months. The beach was maintained and kept clean by crews who worked each day. These crews cleaned the beach from end to end, including properties not leased to the Association. Membership badges were sold and guards were stationed at entrances to the beach to make certain that only those licensed could gain admittance. Further, some guards patrolled the beach to make certain that members and guests complied with the Association's rules and regulations. When viewed in its totality  its purposes, relationship with the municipality, communal characteristic, activities, and virtual monopoly over the Bay Head beachfront  the quasi-public nature of the Association is apparent. The Association makes available to the Bay Head public access to the common tidal property for swimming and bathing and to the upland dry sand area for use incidental thereto, preserving the residents' interests in a fashion similar to Avon. [9] There is no public beach in the Borough of Bay Head. If the residents of every municipality bordering the Jersey shore were to adopt the Bay Head policy, the public would be prevented from exercising its right to enjoy the foreshore. The Bay Head residents may not frustrate the public's right in this manner. [10] By limiting membership only to residents and foreclosing the public, the Association is acting in conflict with the public good and contrary to the strong public policy in favor of encouraging and expanding public access to and use of shoreline areas. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 43, 465 P. 2d 50, 59, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 171 (1970). Indeed, the Association is frustrating the public's right under the public trust doctrine. It should not be permitted to do so. Accordingly, membership in the Association must be open to the public at large. In this manner the public will be assured access to the common beach property during the hours of 10:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. between mid-June and September, where they may exercise their right to swim and bathe and to use the Association's dry sand area incidental to those activities. Although such membership rights to the use of the beach may be broader than the rights necessary for enjoyment of the public trust, opening the Association's membership to all, nonresidents and residents, should lead to a substantial satisfaction of the public trust doctrine. However, the Association shall also make available a reasonable quantity of daily as well as seasonal badges to the nonresident public. Its decision with respect to the number of daily and seasonal badges to be afforded to nonresidents should take into account all relevant matters, such as the public demand and the number of bathers and swimmers that may be safely and reasonably accommodated on the Association's property, whether owned or leased. The Association may continue to charge reasonable fees to cover its costs of lifeguards, beach cleaners, patrols, equipment, insurance, and administrative expenses. The fees fixed may not discriminate in any respect between residents and nonresidents. The Association may continue to enforce its regulations regarding cleanliness, safety, and other reasonable measures concerning the public use of the beach. In this connection, it would be entirely appropriate, in the formulation and adoption of such reasonable regulations concerning the public's use of the beaches, to encourage the participation and cooperation of all private beachfront property owners, regardless of their membership in or affiliation with the Association. The Public Advocate has urged that all the privately-owned beachfront property likewise must be opened to the public. Nothing has been developed on this record to justify that conclusion. We have decided that the Association's membership and thereby its beach must be open to the public. That area might reasonably satisfy the public need at this time. We are aware that the Association possessed, as of the initiation of this litigation, about 42 upland sand lots under leases revocable on 30 days' notice. If any of these leases have been or are to be terminated, or if the Association were to sell all or part of its property, it may necessitate further adjudication of the public's claims in favor of the public trust on part or all of these or other privately-owned upland dry sand lands depending upon the circumstances. However, we see no necessity to have those issues resolved judicially at this time since the beach under the Association's control will be open to the public and may be adequate to satisfy the public trust interests. We believe that the Association and property owners will act in good faith and to the satisfaction of the Public Advocate. Indeed, we are of the opinion that all parties will benefit by our terminating this prolonged litigation at this time. The record in this case makes it clear that a right of access to the beach is available over the quasi-public lands owned by the Association, as well as the right to use the Association's upland dry sand. It is not necessary for us to determine under what circumstances and to what extent there will be a need to use the dry sand of private owners who either now or in the future may have no leases with the Association. Resolution of the competing interests, private ownership and the public trust, may in some cases be simple, but in many it may be most complex. In any event, resolution would depend upon the specific facts in controversy. None of the foregoing matters were fully argued or briefed, the disputes concerning rights in and to private beaches having been most general. All we decide here is that private land is not immune from a possible right of access to the foreshore for swimming or bathing purposes, nor is it immune from the possibility that some of the dry sand may be used by the public incidental to the right of bathing and swimming. We realize that considerable uncertainty will continue to surround the question of the public's right to cross private land and to use a portion of the dry sand as discussed above. Where the parties are unable to agree as to the application of the principles enunciated herein, the claim of the private owner shall be honored until the contrary is established. The modifications in the membership and daily badge practice we have decided upon here shall be made effective for the next summer season commencing June 1, 1984. The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed in part and affirmed in part. Judgment is entered for the plaintiff against the Association. Judgment of dismissal against the individual property owners is affirmed without prejudice. No costs. For reversal in part; affirmance in part  Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER, HANDLER, POLLOCK and O'HERN  6. Opposed  None.