Opinion ID: 1150904
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was the judge privy to inadmissible evidence?

Text: Judge William Scholl presided over both defendant's and codefendant's trials. Defendant argues that because of this, Judge Scholl heard evidence of codefendant's version of the murder that was introduced at codefendant's trial. At codefendant's trial, the State introduced his statement to the police that codefendant shot one of them in the leg, and that defendant said he placed a pillow over the older lady's head ... and then shot her. According to codefendant, he knew that defendant was going to kill the victims because they had seen his face. Defendant argues that the trial judge is only human, and that it would have been impossible for him not to consider this information in sentencing. To support his argument, defendant argues that Judge Scholl made the following findings at sentencing, even though defendant did not confess, no eyewitness testimony was given, and the State could not prove the order of the shots: (1) defendant fired the fatal shots into each of the victims; (2) defendant committed the offense in expectation of pecuniary gain; (3) defendant planned to go to the house prior to the date of the offense; (4) defendant ascertained that the victims were in the house, but he entered anyhow; (5) Lili was shot first in the leg; and (6) the victims suffered mental anguish prior to their deaths. Therefore, defendant contends that testimony received at codefendant's trial influenced the judge. We disagree. We believe the evidence presented at trial and at the sentencing hearing allowed the trial court to find the aggravating factors without relying on the testimony received at codefendant's trial. Two witnesses at defendant's trial testified that defendant confessed the crimes to them, and defendant's sister testified during the sentencing hearing that defendant told her, I did it. The evidence showed that defendant took the Porsche, drove it around town, and later set it on fire. Testimony showed that defendant attempted to sell the victims' car stereo to a coworker the very next morning. As for the sequence of the shots fired, Dr. Allen Jones testified that Lili was shot first in the leg, and that this was neither a contact (the gun did not contact Lili's body when it was discharged) nor a fatal wound. The second shot, to the forehead, was both a contact and the fatal wound. It occurred after a sufficient length of time for someone to walk over, place a pillow over Lili's head and fire. We cannot accept defendant's argument that a pillow was already over Lili's head and that Lili was first shot in the head and then shot in the leg. Dr. Jones' testimony established that Lili was shot first in the leg and, sometime later, shot in the forehead. Because Lili was shot first in the leg, both victims were uncertain about their fates. The victims suffered mental anguish before their deaths. See Walton, 159 Ariz. at 586, 769 P.2d at 1032. Furthermore, the statements admitted at codefendant's trial were admitted at defendant's sentencing hearing to rebut defendant's mitigating evidence of non-violence and diminished mental capacity. The State may proffer hearsay statements to rebut a defendant's mitigating evidence. State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 402, 694 P.2d 222, 232, cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1143, 105 S.Ct. 2689, 86 L.Ed.2d 706 (1985); State v. Ortiz, 131 Ariz. 195, 208, 639 P.2d 1020, 1033 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984, 102 S.Ct. 2259, 72 L.Ed.2d 863 (1982); see also A.R.S. § 13-703(C) (any information that is relevant to mitigation may be presented and admitted regardless of the rules of evidence). [1] Because defendant knew about the statements and had an opportunity to either explain or deny them, their admission did not violate his due process rights. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (defendant's due process rights were violated when death sentence was imposed on basis of confidential information that defendant neither had an opportunity to explain nor deny). Additionally, Judge Scholl stated, and the record reflects, that the statements were admitted only for rebuttal, and not for establishing any of the aggravating factors. Furthermore, this court has held that it was not error for a trial judge to preside over a wife's trial and her husband's trial, and then sentence the husband. Ortiz, 131 Ariz. at 209, 639 P.2d at 1034. We have also held that, absent proof to the contrary, trial judges in capital cases are presumed capable of focusing on the relevant sentencing factors, setting aside the irrelevant, inflammatory and emotional factors. State v. Beaty, 158 Ariz. 232, 244, 762 P.2d 519, 531 (1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 3200, 105 L.Ed.2d 708 (1989). A trial judge can separate the admissible from the inadmissible. Id. We find that Judge Scholl's findings at the sentencing hearing were based on relevant evidence presented at defendant's trial, as well as at the sentencing hearing.