Opinion ID: 628033
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: reviewability of eop and nsc guidelines defining

Text: PRESIDENTIAL RECORDS 46 Finally, the plaintiffs-appellees cross-appeal the district court's conclusion that it did not have jurisdiction to review the EOP recordkeeping guidelines regarding presidential records. As cross-appellants, they assert that the guidelines improperly instruct NSC and OSTP staff to treat as presidential records materials that are, in fact, agency records subject to the FRA. We have jurisdiction to hear the cross-appeal under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(b) because it challenges aspects of the same interlocutory order that is the subject of the main appeal. See Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 296 n. 13. 47 The district court erred in declining to review the EOP guidelines defining presidential records. The PRA delineates those records over which the President may exercise virtually complete control during his term of office, id. at 290, and the courts may not restrict that control by reviewing the President's recordkeeping practices and decisions. Id. at 291. But the courts are accorded the power to review guidelines outlining what is, and what is not, a presidential record under the terms of the PRA. The PRA does not bestow on the President the power to assert sweeping authority over whatever materials he chooses to designate as presidential records without any possibility of judicial review. Rather, it provides that all materials that were subject to the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552, prior to the passage of the PRA remain subject to the FOIA and do not qualify as presidential records. Thus, the court may review the EOP guidelines for the limited purpose of ensuring that they do not encompass within their operational definition of presidential records materials properly subject to the FOIA. We therefore reverse and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
48 The FRA and the PRA apply to distinct categories of documentary materials. As restated more fully, supra pages 1278-79, the FRA defines the records subject to the Act as all 49 documentary materials ... made or received by an agency of the United States Government under federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation ... as evidence of the ... activities of the Government or because of the informational value of data in them. 50 44 U.S.C. Sec. 3301. (Records subject to the FRA are referred to hereinafter as federal records.) The PRA defines presidential records as 51 documentary materials ... created or received by the President, his immediate staff, or a unit or individual of the Executive Office of the President whose function is to advise and assist the President, in the course of conducting activities which relate to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties of the President. 52 44 U.S.C. Sec. 2201(2). The definition goes on to exclude specifically any documentary materials that are ... official records of an agency, as the term agency is defined in the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(f). Id. Sec. 2201(2)(B)(i). 53 Whereas federal records are subject to a strict document management regime [303 U.S.App.D.C. 124] supervised by the Archivist, see supra pages 1278-79, the PRA accords the President virtually complete control over his records during his term of office. Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 290. Neither the Archivist nor an agency head can initiate any action through the Attorney General to effect recovery or ensure preservation of presidential records. Compare 44 U.S.C. Sec. 3106 (requiring agency heads to notify the Archivist of unlawful removal or destruction of federal records and to seek legal action through the Attorney General to recover or preserve the records); id. Sec. 2905(a) (directing the Archivist to assist the agency head in initiating an action through the Attorney General for the recovery of wrongfully removed federal records or for other legal redress, and requiring the Archivist to make her own request to the Attorney General if the agency head is recalcitrant). Furthermore, the President may designate a period, not to exceed twelve years after the completion of his presidency, during which his presidential records shall not be accessible under the FOIA or otherwise. Id. Sec. 2204. 54 The Archivist can request congressional advice regarding the President's intention to dispose of presidential records if the Archivist believes that the records may be of special interest to Congress or that consultation is in the public interest, 44 U.S.C. Sec. 2203(e), and she can also cause the President to submit a disposal schedule at least 60 calendar days of continuous session of Congress in advance of the proposed disposal date. Id. Sec. 2203(d). But neither the Archivist nor the Congress has the authority to veto the President's disposal decision. Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 290 (citation omitted). 55 The EOP guidelines in question classify broad categories of NSC records as federal records, but also provide that NSC records are [p]residential records if they were received or created for the President, the [National Security Adviser] ... or his Deputy, or a member of the White House staff independently of any meeting or policy and staff actions of the NSC or its various groups. Joint Statement p 157(c). The analogous guidelines for the OSTP provide that OSTP records are federal records, but records produced or received by the Director of OSTP in his role as Science Advisor to the President are [p]residential records and should be segregated as such. Id. p 157(d). 56 Relying in large part on our decision in Armstrong I, the district court held that the NSC is entitled to segregate presidential and federal records.... [T]his Court has no power to review actions taken by the President to ensure that presidential records are maintained. Armstrong, 810 F.Supp. at 347, 348 (citations omitted). The district court also stated that our decision in Armstrong I 57 provided the methodology for separating the FRA and the PRA as it applies here: ... EOP components whose sole responsibility is to advise the President are subject to the PRA and create presidential records. Similarly, the components of the EOP that have statutory responsibility are subject to the FRA. 58 Id. 810 F.Supp. at 349 (citing Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 286 n. 2). The district court further understood Armstrong I to have found that the NSC advises the President and has statutory obligations, and to have applied the foregoing methodology to determine that the NSC produces both presidential and federal records. Id. 810 F.Supp. at 347-48 (citing Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 286 n. 2). 59 In light of its interpretation of Armstrong I, the district court concluded that its order to take all necessary steps to preserve electronic federal records applied only to those agencies 60 that have statutory responsibility and not those that solely advise the President.... The Defendants shall not be required to preserve material[s] which are presidential records produced by components whose sole responsibility is to advise the President. However, in components that produce both types of records, this Court does have the jurisdiction to authorize the preservation of these materials until the Archivist can ensure that federal records are not destroyed. 61 Id. 810 F.Supp. at 349. Thus, although the district court concluded that it could not review [303 U.S.App.D.C. 125] the presidential records guidelines, it nonetheless ordered the NSC--and other EOP components who do not have the sole responsibility of advising the President--to preserve all records, both federal and presidential, until the Archivist can ensure that federal records are not destroyed. Id.
62 As we have already stated, supra page 1290, the PRA defines presidential records as 63 documentary materials ... created or received by the President, his immediate staff, or a unit or individual of the Executive Office of the President whose function is to advise and assist the President, in the course of conducting activities which relate to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties of the President. 64 44 U.S.C. Sec. 2201(2). In addition, Congress explicitly provided that presidential records do not include any documentary materials that are ... official records of an agency, as the term agency is defined in the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(f). 44 U.S.C. Sec. 2201(2)(B)(i). The legislative history explains this limitation on the definition of presidential records as follows: 65 The term presidential records is intended ... to encompass all White House and [EOP] records ... which ... fall outside the scope of the FOIA because they are not agency records. In other words, that which is now subject to FOIA would remain so and that which is [not] now subject to FOIA would be subject to the [PRA,] including those provisions of the [PRA] which in specified circumstances specially apply FOIA to these non-agency records after a President leaves office. 66 H.R.REP. No. 1487, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1978), 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5732, 5742; see also id. at 3. 67 Thus, Congress perceived the potential definitional overlap between agency records under the FOIA and presidential records under the PRA, and explicitly provided that the PRA would apply only to records that fall outside the scope of FOIA because they are not agency records. Put another way, the PRA provides that the definition of agency records in the FOIA trumps the definition of presidential records in the PRA. Congress was keenly aware of the separation of powers concerns that were implicated by legislation regulating the conduct of the President's daily operations, and thus sought to minimize outside interference with the day-to-day operations of the President and his closest advisors and to ensure executive branch control over presidential records during the President's term of office. Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 290. At the same time, however, Congress sought to provide a clear limitation on just which materials the President could legitimately assert control over and to preserve the pre-existing body of FOIA law governing the disclosure of government agency records. 68 The PRA exclusion of records subject to the FOIA from the class of materials that may be treated as presidential records averts a clash in the role of judicial review under the two statutory schemes. Judicial review plays an indispensable role in ensuring proper government disclosure under the FOIA. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(B); Truitt v. Department of State, 897 F.2d 540, 547 (D.C.Cir.1990); Senate of Puerto Rico v. U.S. Department of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 587 (D.C.Cir.1987); McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1148 (D.C.Cir.1983); Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1190-95 (D.C.Cir.1978). At the same time, judicial review of the President's management of admittedly presidential records is impliedly precluded by the PRA. Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 289; see infra pages 1293-94. Congress preserved the critical role of judicial review under the FOIA, and avoided a conflict between the PRA and the FOIA, by explicitly exempting records subject to the FOIA from the scope of the PRA and allowing judicial review of guidelines defining presidential records under the rubric of substantive FOIA law. 69 This narrow, clearly defined limitation on the scope of the PRA is absolutely essential to preventing the PRA from becoming a potential presidential carte blanche to shield materials from the reach of the FOIA. Of [303 U.S.App.D.C. 126] course, we presume that executive officials will act in good faith. But if guidelines that purport to implement the PRA were not reviewable for compliance with the statute's definition of presidential records, non-presidential materials that would otherwise be immediately subject to the FOIA would be shielded from its provisions, whether wittingly or unwittingly, if they were managed as presidential records. See44 U.S.C. Sec. 2204(a), (b) (President may designate a period, not to exceed twelve years after the completion of his presidency, during which his presidential records shall not be accessible under the FOIA or otherwise); id. Sec. 2204(c)(1) (presidential records shall be administered under the FOIA after the expiration of any limitations on access imposed under subsections 2204(a) and (b)). Moreover, in light of the fact that disposal decisions under the PRA are unreviewable, Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 290, a non-presidential document subject to the FOIA could be forever removed from that statute's provisions if it were improperly classified as a presidential record and destroyed. 70 For example, imagine a guideline defining presidential records as all records produced or received by, or in the possession or under the control of, any government agency or employee of the United States. This definition would sweep all, or virtually all, federal records--and many documentary materials that are neither federal nor presidential records--within the ambit of the PRA, and outside the scope of the FOIA. Reading the PRA to forbid judicial review of such a guideline for conformity with the PRA definition of presidential records would be tantamount to allowing the PRA to functionally render the FOIA a nullity. As we have already stated, supra pages 1292-93, Congress avoided this problem by excluding records subject to the FOIA from the scope of the PRA, thereby preserving FOIA law intact and maintaining the integral role of judicial review. 71 Our holding today is also consonant with the relationship between the FRA and the PRA. The FRA defines a class of materials that are federal records subject to its provisions, and the PRA describes another, mutually exclusive set of materials that are subject to a different and less rigorous regime. In other words, no individual record can be subject to both statutes because their provisions are inconsistent. If guidelines that purport to define presidential records were not reviewable, the cross-appellees could effectively shield all federal records not only from the FOIA, but also from the provisions of the FRA--thus evading this court's holding in Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 293, that the courts have jurisdiction to decide whether the NSC's recordkeeping guidelines adequately describe the material subject to the FRA. 72 We held in Armstrong I that the PRA precludes review of the President's recordkeeping practices and decisions. Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 289. The cross-appellees urge the court to give this language the broadest possible reading, holding in effect that we may not review any guidelines that purport to implement the PRA or deal with asserted presidential records. Thus, argue the cross-appellees, the district court correctly held that the guidelines for determining which materials are presidential records are not subject to judicial review. We disagree. The Armstrong I opinion does not stand for the unequivocal proposition that all decisions made pursuant to the PRA are immune from judicial review. 73 The Armstrong I opinion addressed the question whether the courts could review the decision to erase materials designated by the government as presidential records within the meaning of the PRA. See id. at 284, 291. We held that judicial review was not available to monitor disposal and emphasized that Congress drafted the PRA in a manner that would ensure executive branch control over presidential records during the President's term of office. Id. at 290 (emphasis added). Thus, we held that those decisions that involve materials that are truly presidential records are immune from judicial review. We did not hold in Armstrong I that the President could designate any material he wishes as presidential records, and thereby exercise virtually complete control over it, id. at 290, notwithstanding the fact that the [303 U.S.App.D.C. 127] material does not meet the definition of presidential records in the PRA. 74 The cross-appellees point to individual phrases and sentences in our Armstrong I opinion which they contend dictate the broad result they urge upon this court. However, as we have just said, this language must be read in the context of the issue before the court in Armstrong I. In any case, the language seized upon by the cross-appellees is entirely consistent with the result we reach today. We stated in Armstrong I that the PRA require[s] the President to maintain records documenting the policies, activities, and decisions of his administration, but leav[es] the implementation of such a requirement in the President's hands. Id. However, the discussion that immediately follows this statement makes clear that the Armstrong I court was not addressing the initial classification of existing materials. The Armstrong I court discusses only the creation, management, and disposal decisions described in the provisions of 44 U.S.C. Sec. 2203. See id. at 290, 291. None of these decisions encompasses the initial classification of materials as presidential records. 75 A creation decision refers to the determination to make a record documenting presidential activities. See 44 U.S.C. Sec. 2203(a). Thus, the courts may not review any decisions regarding whether to create a documentary presidential record. Management decisions describes the day-to-day process by which presidential records are maintained. See id. Sec. 2204(a), (b). The courts may likewise not review these particulars of the presidential records management system. Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 290. Finally, disposal decisions describes the process outlined in 44 U.S.C. Sec. 2203(c)-(e) for disposing of presidential records. Judicial review of the President's action under these provisions is also unavailable. But guidelines describing which existing materials will be treated as presidential records in the first place are subject to judicial review. 76 Thus, although the PRA impliedly precludes judicial review of the President's decisions concerning the creation, management, and disposal of presidential records during his term of office, Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 291, the courts may review guidelines outlining what is, and what is not, a presidential record to ensure that materials that are not subject to the PRA are not treated as presidential records. We remand to the district court to conduct this inquiry. 77
78 Having held that the recordkeeping guidelines defining presidential records are subject to judicial review, and having remanded to the district court for that purpose, it remains for us to discuss the definition of presidential records to be applied on remand. As our previous discussion of the PRA, supra pages 1290, 1292-93, has undoubtedly indicated, we must turn again to the PRA provision exempting from its scope any materials that are official records of an agency, as agency is defined in the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(f). 44 U.S.C. Sec. 2201(2)(A)(i). Congress expressly intended when it passed the PRA to preserve unchanged the coherent body of law that had been developed under the FOIA, and it is that body of law that provides the basis for our limited review of the definition of presidential records provided in the guidelines. The guidelines violate the PRA to the extent that they classify as presidential records materials that would otherwise be subject to the FOIA. 79 The FOIA definition of agency invoked in the PRA raises a clear but somewhat intricate set of references and cross-references. The FOIA provision mentioned in the PRA, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(f), incorporates the definition of agency provided at 5 U.S.C. Sec. 551(1): agency means each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is subject to review by another agency, but does not include ... the Congress ... [or] the courts of the United States. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 551(1). Section 552(f) itself adds an additional proviso: 80 [A]gency ... includes any executive department, military department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President), [303 U.S.App.D.C. 128] or any independent regulatory agency. 81 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(f). The Supreme Court has added still another layer of complexity, holding that for FOIA purposes, the EOP does not include the Office of the President.  '[T]he President's immediate personal staff or units in the Executive Office whose sole function is to advise and assist the President' are not included within the term 'agency' under the FOIA. Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156, 100 S.Ct. 960, 971, 63 L.Ed.2d 267 (1980) (quoting H.R.CONF.REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974)), 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267. 82 The Supreme Court test adopted in Kissinger for determining which entities within the EOP are agencies subject to the FOIA was originally developed by this court in Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (1971). In Soucie, this court held that only entities whose sole function [is] to advise and assist the President are not separate agencies subject to the FOIA. Id. at 1075. Thus, the court concluded that the Office of Science and Technology (OST)--the precursor of the OSTP, one of the agencies whose guidelines are at issue in this appeal--was an agency subject to the FOIA because its duties went beyond advising the President and included evaluating federal scientific programs. Id. 83 The legislative history of the PRA could not be clearer in indicating congressional intent to adopt the test articulated in Soucie to determine what entities are agencies subject to the FOIA: 84 The [PRA] does not modify the applicability of the [FOIA] to White House and [EOP] records.... That is, it does not redefine the term agency to include entities not now covered by the FOIA. The Conference Report for the 1974 Freedom of Information Act amendments stated that [w]ith respect to the meaning of the term '[EOP]' the conferees intend the result reached in Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 [ (D.C.Cir.1971) ]. The term is not interpreted as including the President's immediate staff or units in the [EOP] whose sole function is to advise and assist the President. 85 H.R.REP. No. 1487, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1978) (quoting H.R.CONF.REP. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974)), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5732, 5742. The FOIA Conference Report quoted in the PRA legislative history is the same report upon which the Supreme Court relied in Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 156, 100 S.Ct. at 971. 86 This court has consistently applied the sole function test developed in Soucie and adopted in Kissinger in its subsequent decisions. In Ryan v. Department of Justice, 617 F.2d 781 (D.C.Cir.1980), we rejected the argument that certain records of the Attorney General regarding judicial nominations were not subject to the FOIA because the Attorney General was acting in his independent capacity as an advisor to the President when he prepared the records in question. Id. at 788. The Court explained that 87 Soucie did not intimate that the [OST] might be an agency only when performing its non-advisory functions, and still be a presidential staff component, or non-agency, when performing its other function of advising the President. In fact, the reports under consideration in Soucie were requested by the President precisely for advisory purposes, but we did not deem the [OST] to be a non-agency in that specific context. 88 Id. (citing Soucie, 448 F.2d at 1075-76). See also Pacific Legal Foundation v. Council on Environmental Equality, 636 F.2d 1259 (D.C.Cir.1980) (holding that the Council on Environmental Equality (CEQ) is a FOIA agency because, in addition to advising the President, the CEQ coordinated federal environmental regulatory programs, issued guidelines for preparing environmental impact statements, and promulgated regulations for implementing the procedural provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act); Rushforth v. Council of Economic Advisers, 762 F.2d 1038 (D.C.Cir.1985) (holding that the Council of Economic Advisers is not an agency under the FOIA because its sole function is to advise and assist the President); Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288 (D.C.Cir.1993) (holding that the President's [303 U.S.App.D.C. 129] Task Force on Regulatory Relief f[alls] within the Soucie test as an entity whose sole function is to advise and assist the President). 89 We hasten to add that our opinion in Armstrong I did not hold as a matter of law that the NSC produces both presidential and federal records because the NSC advises the President and has statutory obligations. See Armstrong, 810 F.Supp. at 347-48, 349 (citing Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 286 n. 2.). The passage on which the district court relied appears as a footnote in the background section of our Armstrong I opinion, without any of the legal exposition that would be expected to accompany a holding announcing the resolution of a previously unsettled legal question. See Maggard v. O'Connell, 703 F.2d 1284, 1290-91 (D.C.Cir.1983) (statements in the background discussion of an opinion should not be construed as deciding unresolved legal issues, especially where the court was only reviewing and reversing a grant of summary judgment). The footnote appears to be nothing more than a description of the position of the defendants-appellants as embodied in the EOP regulations. See Joint Statement p 157 (The records of the [NSC] staff are federal records if they were received or created in connection with the work of the statutorily-created [NSC].... The records of the NSC staff are presidential records if they were received or created for the President, the Assistant to the President for National Security, his Deputy, or a member of the White House staff independently of any meeting or policy and staff actions of the NSC or its various groups.). Consequently, Armstrong I did not provide the legal basis for distinguishing federal and presidential records nor decide the legal status of various NSC materials. 90 Although we hold in accordance with the PRA that materials subject to the FOIA are not presidential records, we are unable to ascertain on the record before us whether the guidelines defining presidential records inappropriately classify certain materials. We cannot determine with certainty whether materials that the guidelines classify as presidential records are in fact official records of an agency subject to the FOIA. The NSC appears to have routinely conceded its status as an agency subject to the FOIA in litigation regarding specific FOIA requests to the NSC. See, e.g., Lisee v. CIA, 741 F.Supp. 988 (D.D.C.1990) (NSC made requisite showing of exceptional circumstances and exercise of due diligence in processing FOIA request to justify stay of further proceedings); Willens v. NSC, 726 F.Supp. 325 (D.D.C.1989) (requested NSC documents were within the FOIA exemption for documents authorized to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy); Halperin v. NSC, 452 F.Supp. 47 (D.D.C.1978) (same). The Supreme Court also appears to have assumed, without deciding the issue, that the NSC is a FOIA agency. See Kissinger, 445 U.S. at 156, 100 S.Ct. at 971 (stating that the FOIA requesters argued that certain documents which related to the [NSC] may have been [NSC] records and therefore subject to the [FOIA]. See H.R.REP. No. [876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974), 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6274], indicating that the [NSC] is an executive agency to which the FOIA applies.). But the issue has never been definitively resolved, and the record before us does not contain sufficient facts for us to make the determination. 91 Moreover, the cross-appellees suggest that the materials in question may not be subject to the FOIA--even if the NSC is an agency under the FOIA--because they are not official records of the NSC. See Brief for Cross-Appellees at 44-48. The factual record is also insufficient to resolve this issue on appeal. Thus, we remand to the district court for further proceedings to determine whether the guidelines under review inappropriately classify as presidential records materials that would otherwise be subject to the FOIA.