Opinion ID: 1449523
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: application of the rape shield statute

Text: As previously pointed out, evidence of the victim's past sexual behavior is admissible under former RCW 9.79.150(3) on the issue of consent only if: (1) it is relevant; (2) its probative value substantially outweighs the probability that its admission will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice; and (3) its exclusion will result in denial of substantial justice to the defendant. In determining the relevancy of the victims' prior sexual behavior on the issue of consent, it must be demonstrated that the evidence will make it more probable or less probable that they consented to sexual activity on this occasion. The evidence proffered by the defense concerned only the general promiscuity of the two victims and lacked further indicators showing any past consensual sexual activity comparable to the story offered by respondents Hudlow and Harper. Mr. Proctor's testimony failed to show any factual similarities between the incident forming the basis of the present charges and any of the past sexual activity allegedly consented to by Ms. Smith or Ms. Strong. For instance, no testimony was offered showing that the two women had ever engaged in sex with men other than sailors whom they knew or that they had sexual relations with men who had picked them up hitchhiking. Such evidence would have had greater value in aiding the jury to predict whether consent was given in this case. Without such particularized factors, however, the relevancy of the evidence was limited at best. Further, the testimony of Mr. Proctor was full of inadmissible hearsay evidence in which he related unverifiable incidents of sexual activity involving the two victims. The trial court heard all the testimony, but properly considered only the evidence testified to by Mr. Proctor from his personal knowledge. Those limited instances do not establish such a pattern of indiscriminate consent to sexual activity as to be helpful in predicting whether there was consent in this case. We believe the testimony of Mr. Proctor was of little or no probative worth on the issue of consent in this case. [4] The admissibility of past sexual behavior evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Blum, 17 Wn. App. 37, 46, 561 P.2d 226 (1977). The exercise of discretion in balancing the danger of prejudice against the probative value of the evidence is also a matter within the trial court's discretion, and should be overturned only if no reasonable person could take the view adopted by the trial court. State v. Kalamarski, 27 Wn. App. 787, 789, 620 P.2d 1017 (1980); State v. Blum, supra at 56. We are unable to say the trial court abused its discretion in any way. Although the trial court did consider the possible prejudice to the victims in admitting evidence of their past sexual behavior, it is evident the court gave little weight to that factor. In ruling that the evidence should be excluded, the court concluded that the lifestyle of the women would be so offensive to a substantial number of the members of the jury that the prejudice would get in the way of a fair trial. Report of Proceedings, at 40. The trial court's ruling demonstrates its valid concern that introduction of such evidence would tend to confuse the issues, mislead the jury, or cause them to decide the case on an improper basis. See ER 403. The court's determination that the slight relevancy of the evidence was outweighed by its potentially prejudicial effect on the jury was proper under the circumstances and should not be disturbed. Finally, as to respondents' rights to substantial justice, we must again conclude the trial court's ruling was proper. Assuming that the past sexual behavior evidence was even slightly relevant, that evidence could constitutionally be excluded because of the compelling state interests furthered by the rape shield statute. Insofar as the rape shield law bars minimally probative evidence that may distract or inflame jurors to acquit defendants on the basis of prejudice, furthers the truth-determining function of rape trials, and encourages victims to report and prosecute sex crimes, it furthers compelling state interests. The trial court's decision to exclude the evidence did not deprive respondents of the ability to testify to their versions of the incident. They did so and simply were not believed by the jury. In conclusion, we believe the trial court properly applied former RCW 9.79.150 to exclude evidence of the victims' past sexual behavior. Although the Court of Appeals stated its belief that this was the one exceptional case warranting admission of this type of evidence, State v. Hudlow, 30 Wn. App. 503, 507, 635 P.2d 1096 (1981), we are of a contrary view given the nature of the evidence in this case. On this issue, we must reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decision of the trial court.