Opinion ID: 3051091
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proximate Cause in Federal Civil RICO Cases

Text: For federal RICO purposes, courts evaluate proximate cause “in light of its common-law foundations.” Hemi Grp., 559 U.S. at 9, 130 S. Ct. at 989. “When a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff’s injuries.” Anza, 547 U.S. at 461, 126 S. Ct. at 1998. Thus, proximate cause requires “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” Id. at 457, 126 S. Ct. at 1996 (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268, 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1318 (1992)) (quotation marks omitted). A link that is “too remote,” “purely contingent,” or “indirect” is insufficient. Id. at 457, 460, 126 S. 10 Case: 13-13284 Date Filed: 02/07/2014 Page: 11 of 18 Ct. at 1996, 1998 (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 271, 274, 112 S. Ct. at 1319, 1321) (quotation marks omitted). Although a plaintiff need not show that the injurious conduct was the sole cause of the injury asserted, proximate causation requires that the plaintiff allege “some direct relation” between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct. Mohawk Indus., 465 F.3d at 1287–88 (quoting Anza, 547 U.S. at 457, 126 S. Ct. at 1996). As explained by the Supreme Court, “Congress modeled § 1964(c) on the civil-action provision of the federal antitrust laws, § 4 of the Clayton Act.” Anza, 547 U.S. at 457, 126 S. Ct. at 1996 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In both federal RICO and federal antitrust cases, proximate cause is not the same thing as a sole cause. Mohawk Indus., 465 F.3d at 1288 n.5 (quoting Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1399 (11th Cir.) (RICO), modified on other grounds by 30 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1994)). In both types of cases, “it is enough for the plaintiff to plead and prove that the defendant’s tortious or injurious conduct was a substantial factor in the sequence of responsible causation.” Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). In evaluating whether proximate causation exists, “courts should consider the ‘motivating principles’ behind the directness component of the proximatecause standard in RICO cases.” Id. at 1288 (quoting Anza, 547 U.S. at 458, 126 S. 11 Case: 13-13284 Date Filed: 02/07/2014 Page: 12 of 18 Ct. at 1997) (alterations adopted). Motivating principles include (1) “the difficulty that can arise when a court attempts to ascertain the damages caused by some remote action”; (2) “the speculative nature of the proceedings that would follow if [the plaintiff] were permitted to maintain its claim”; (3) whether the alleged harm “could have resulted from factors other than [the plaintiff’s] alleged acts of fraud”; (4) “any appreciable risk of duplicative recoveries”; and (5) whether “the immediate victims of [the] alleged RICO violation can be expected to vindicate the laws by pursuing their own claims.” Anza, 547 U.S. at 458–60, 126 S. Ct. at 1997–98. “[T]he less direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of plaintiff’s damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent factors.” Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269, 112 S. Ct. at 1318. “This remoteness concern is heightened when RICO suits are brought by economic competitors seeking damages for lost sales because those types of claims, ‘if left unchecked, could blur the line between RICO and the antitrust laws.’” Mohawk Indus., 465 F.3d at 1288 (quoting Anza, 547 U.S. at 460, 126 S. Ct. at 1998). With this background on proximate causation in the federal civil RICO context in mind, we turn to the sufficiency of plaintiff Corcel’s complaint. 12 Case: 13-13284 Date Filed: 02/07/2014 Page: 13 of 18