Opinion ID: 6337651
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Date in the Indictment

Text: Finally, Mr. Dodson argues he cannot be required to pay restitution for the damage caused by the September 16 fire because (1) the indictment listed September 15 as the arson fire’s date and (2) the judgment of conviction specified an offense end date of September 15. Because this argument was not raised in the district court, Mr. Dodson must show plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court’s attention.”); Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2096 (2021) (observing that “[i]f the defendant has an opportunity to object and fails to do so, he forfeits the claim of error,” and “[i]f the defendant later raises the forfeited claim on appeal, Rule 52(b)’s plain-error standard applies” (quotations omitted)). Under the plain error standard, (1) “there must be an error”; (2) “the error must be plain”; and (3) “the error must affect substantial rights, which generally means that there must be a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2096. (quotations omitted). Then, “[i]f those three requirements are met, [we] may grant relief if [we] conclude[ ] that the error had a serious effect on the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 8 Appellate Case: 21-7046 Document: 010110679525 Date Filed: 05/04/2022 Page: 9 Id. at 2096-97 (quotations omitted). We conclude there was no error, let alone plain error.4 Mr. Dodson’s argument stems from the rule that “MVRA restitution [must] be limited to the offense of conviction,” which “necessarily includes the temporal limits of the offense as outlined in the indictment.” United States v. Allen, 983 F.3d 463, 472 (10th Cir. 2020) (quotations omitted). Thus, “a restitution order cannot compensate for losses stemming from conduct that occurred outside the charged period.” Id. at 472-73. These general principles do not help Mr. Dodson here. The indictment charged Mr. Dodson with setting the fire “[o]n or about September 15.” ROA, Vol. I at 8 (emphasis added). “[W]here the phrase ‘on or about’ is used in an indictment in connection with a specific date, if the prosecution proves that the offense was committed within a few weeks of the date, the proof will be deemed sufficient to hold the defendant responsible for the charge.” United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1272 (10th Cir. 1999) (alterations and quotations omitted); see also United States v. Ellis, 868 F.3d 1155, 1179 (10th Cir. 2017) (“When an indictment lists a specific date, the government must produce some evidence which tends to show that the defendant committed the charged offense on a date reasonably near to the specified date alleged in the indictment.” (quotations omitted)). The record shows that Mr. Dodson parked at the motel at 12:08 a.m. on September 16 and that he set fire to the home at 12:32 a.m. The criminal activity occurred “on or 4 Mr. Dodson’s argument is a challenge to the legality of the restitution order, which as noted above, we review for error de novo. See Anthony, 22 F.4th at 950. 9 Appellate Case: 21-7046 Document: 010110679525 Date Filed: 05/04/2022 Page: 10 about September 15.” A few minutes into September 16 falls well within the range upheld in Charley and Ellis. Also, the record shows the district court confined restitution to Mr. Dodson’s September 16 conduct. No restitution in his case derived from the first fire at 3:00 a.m. on September 15. During the sentencing proceedings, both parties focused the court’s attention on Mr. Dodson’s September 16 conduct. See, e.g., ROA, Vol. II at 25, 29 (Mr. Dodson’s objections to the PSR, twice stressing that his plea involved his conduct on September 16); id., Vol. III at 45 (the Government’s representation at Mr. Dodson’s sentencing hearing that the September 15 fire “is not part of . . . what the government has proved or what [Mr. Dodson and Mr. Thomas] have pled to in this case”). Thus, despite the “September 15” references in the indictment and judgment, the district court’s restitution order covered only the losses caused by Mr. Dodson’s admitted conduct during the first hour of September 16.