Opinion ID: 2590272
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Challenge to pattern instructions

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.87 (1989 rev.) concerning its consideration of evidence of uncharged crimes. [15] The prosecution introduced evidence of three acts of violence committed by defendant against his ex-girlfriend, Sylvia Carmona, and an act of violence committed by defendant against his stepfather, Lee Thomas. At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the trial court instructed the jury pursuant to the 1989 revision of CALJIC No. 8.87, as follows: Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant has committed the following criminal acts: assaults and batteries on Sylvia Carmona on July 15, 1991, July 17, 1991, and in May of 1992 and assault with a deadly weapon on Lee Thomas on May 9, 1992, which involved the express or implied use of force or violence or the threat of force or violence. Before a juror may consider any of such criminal acts as an aggravating circumstance in this case, a juror must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did in fact commit such criminal acts. (22) Defendant contends that the use of revised CALJIC No. 8.87 was error because its language constituted a directed verdict to the jury as to (1) whether the uncharged conduct constituted a crime, and (2) whether the evidence involved the express or implied use of force or violence or the threat of force or violence under section 190.3, factor (b). We have held, however, that the characterization of other crimes as involving express or implied use of force or violence, or the threat thereof, is a legal question properly decided by the court. ( People v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 745; see People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 793 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 101 P.3d 956].) Defendant also contends that because the trial court instructed the jury in the terms of CALJIC No. 8.87, and failed to require unanimity regarding factors in aggravation, the penalty phase of his trial was constitutionally inadequate in that the error interfered with the jury's ability to make a reliable determination of the appropriate punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The second paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.87 informed the jury: It is not necessary for all jurors to agree. If any juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that such criminal activity occurred, that juror may consider that activity as a fact in aggravation. Defendant acknowledges that we previously have held that nothing in the federal Constitution or in statutory law requires the penalty phase jury to agree unanimously that a particular aggravating circumstance exists. ( People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 648-649 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 691, 181 P.3d 1035]; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1101-1102 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40].) Defendant contends, however, that our prior conclusions have been abrogated by the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348] and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428]. We previously have rejected this contention. While each juror must believe that the aggravating circumstances substantially outweigh the mitigating circumstances, he or she need not agree on the existence of any one aggravating factor. This is true even though the jury must make certain factual findings in order to consider certain circumstances as aggravating factors. As such, the penalty phase determination `is inherently moral and normative, not factual ....' ( People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 779 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].) Because any finding of aggravating factors during the penalty phase does not `increase[] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum' ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490), Ring imposes no new constitutional requirements on California's penalty phase proceedings. Accordingly, our rulings rejecting the need to instruct on the presumption of innocence during the penalty phase still control. ( People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 263 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123].)
Defendant contends the trial court erred by refusing to modify the language of pattern instruction CALJIC No. 8.85, [16] which sets forth the mitigating factors to be considered by the jury in making its penalty determination. Defendant sought to modify the instructions to add 22 additional specific examples of mitigating evidence such as [w]hether the defendant was a loving and helpful man in his relationship with his friends and relatives; [w]hether the defendant has a calming and guiding effect upon other inmates; and the absence of any prior felony or misdemeanor convictions. The trial court refused to modify the standard instruction as requested by defendant and instructed the jury according to the pattern language of CALJIC No. 8.85, with the modification discussed above relating to defendant's age. Defendant contends that asserted defects in pattern instruction CALJIC No. 8.85 prejudicially affected the jurors' understanding of their weighing function, in violation of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We decline to reconsider our prior decisions holding that this instruction is not flawed for its failure to identify which facts may be considered aggravating and which may be considered mitigating ( People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 681 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 126, 187 P.3d 970]; People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 309 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 605, 180 P.3d 351] [CALJIC No. 8.85 is both correct and adequate.]); that the trial court is not compelled to delete assertedly inapplicable factors from the instruction ( People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 191-192 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988]); and that the instruction does not `encourage the double counting of aggravating factors.' ( People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 289 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193].)
Defendant contends the trial court's refusal to give his proffered instructions regarding the consideration of sympathy and mercy violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and parallel provisions of the state Constitution. Defendant's proposed instruction informed the jury that mitigating evidence did not excuse the offense, but that fairness, sympathy, compassion, or mercy, may be considered in extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability. The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.85, which provides, in relevant part, that the jury may consider [a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial. (CALJIC No. 8.85, factor (k).) The prosecutor did not argue to the jury that it should not consider sympathy or mercy. We have concluded that CALJIC No. 8.85 adequately instructs the jury concerning the circumstances that may be considered in mitigation, including sympathy and mercy. ( People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1070 [71 Cal.Rptr.3d 675, 175 P.3d 632].) There was no error. ( People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 663 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80]; People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1067 [251 Cal.Rptr. 757, 761 P.2d 680].)
Defendant contends the trial court's refusal to give his proffered instructions concerning the distinction between (and the proper use of) aggravating and mitigating factors violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and parallel provisions of the state Constitution. These instructions would have advised the jury, in varied ways, that they might consider any evidence in mitigation including specifically the absence of prior felony convictionsand that any mitigating factor, standing alone, could support a determination that death was not the appropriate punishment in this case. Defendant also sought to have the jury instructed that the view of any one juror that a factor in mitigation exists is sufficient to allow any other juror to consider such factor to have been established, and that the jurors may require a degree of certaintyfor proof of guiltgreater than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant contends his requested special instructions merely supplemented the general principles contained in the pattern CALJIC instructions rendered by the court. In asserting error in the trial court's rejection of his proposed instructions, defendant contends, again, that CALJIC No. 8.85 is defective. He asserts that his proffered special instructions would have corrected those defects, but the sole specific example he provides is that one of his instructions would have informed the jury that the absence of any prior felony conviction incurred by defendant could not be treated as a factor in aggravation but only as mitigation. The pattern instruction, however, does not suggest that the absence of any mitigating factor should be considered in aggravation. ( People v. Page (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1, 51 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 4, 186 P.3d 395].) As noted above, we repeatedly have held CALJIC No. 8.85 to be correct and adequate. ( People v. Valencia, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 309.) There was no error.
Defendant contends he was denied his right to due process and to a reliable determination of penalty under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because the trial court instructed the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.84.1, that it must determine what the facts are from the evidence received during the entire trial unless you are instructed otherwise. Defendant, acknowledging that his proffered alternative set of instructions merely supplemented the standard CALJIC instructions, sought to have the jury instructed regarding the consideration to be given to the guilt phase evidence and verdict and to the evidence of uncharged violent acts. [17] The trial court declined to give defendant's proffered instructions. Defendant asserts that the pattern instruction erroneously permitted the jury to consider in aggravation the crimes his codefendants committed against Cynthia Melson when they fired into her apartment. Defendant's claim is without merit. Defendant told the detectives that he willingly accompanied his codefendants to obtain a gun that was to be used to fire at members of the Watergate Crips gang. Defendant drove his codefendants to the area where Cynthia Melson lived. Forensic experts testified that the shotgun shell casings and wadding recovered from inside the Melson residence were from the same type of cartridge as the casings recovered from Kondrath's automobile. From this evidence, the jury was entitled to conclude that defendant aided and abetted in the firing of shots into Melson's apartment and, therefore, because that shooting constituted part of the criminal activities committed by defendant that night, the jury was entitled to consider the incident at the penalty phase of the trial. It is also beyond dispute that the incident constituted criminal activity involving the use of forceactivity that therefore could be considered by the jury in aggravation pursuant to factor (b) of section 190.3.
The trial court instructed the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 8.88, [18] which defines factors in aggravation and mitigation. Defendant asserts the court erred by refusing to give the modified version of the instruction he requested regarding the proper manner of weighing aggravating and mitigating factors. [19] We repeatedly have held that the standard version of CALJIC No. 8.88 is adequate and correct. ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th 381, 464-465; People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1160-1161 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572]; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 661-662 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224].) Defendant's proffered instructions merely restated the principles that flowed logically from the pattern instructions, and the trial court was not required to inform the jury that the sole aggravating factors it may consider are those listed in its instructions. ( People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1100.)
Defendant also proffered jury instructions purporting to inform the jury regarding the respective burdens of proof required at the penalty phase. [20] The trial court properly declined to give these instructions. [E]xcept for prior violent crimes evidence and prior felony convictions under section 190.3, factors (b) and (c), the court need not instruct regarding a burden of proof .... [Citations.] ( People v. Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 681.) Because `[u]nlike the guilt determination, the sentencing function is inherently moral and normative, not factual [citation] and, hence, not susceptible to a burden-of-proof quantification' ( People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 589 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 123 P.3d 614]), it is sufficient that the jury was instructed that `[t]o return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without possibility of parole.' ( Ibid. ) Moreover, [t]he United States Supreme Court decisions rendered in Ring v. Arizona [, supra, ] 536 U.S. 584 ... and Apprendi v. New Jersey [, supra, ] 530 U.S. 466 ... do not compel a different conclusion. ( Ibid. ; see also People v. Williams, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 649 [the high court's decision in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856] does not compel a different result].)
Finally, defendant asserts the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction informing the jury that, with regard to the statutory aggravating factors, the factors which I have just listed are the only factors that can be considered by you as aggravating factors, but that [a]ny one of the mitigating factors, standing alone, may support a decision that death is not the appropriate punishment in this case. No modified instruction was warranted. The jury was instructed pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.88 regarding the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. We note, too, that in argument to the jury, the prosecution acknowledged, if you find one factor that is mitigating, that alone can be the basis for your returning a verdict other than death. It thus was clear to the jury that a single mitigating factor, standing alone, could justify a verdict of life imprisonment rather than a verdict of death.