Opinion ID: 173282
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gonzales's Testimony

Text: We reject Cardinas's argument regarding the credibility of Gonzales's testimony. Cardinas asserts that because Gonzales initially lied to the police about the origin of the drugs, and failed to explain at trial why he did so, his testimony was inherently incredible. But this assertion does not come close to establishing inherent incredibility under our case law. As an initial matter, the record reveals a perfectly rational explanation for Gonzales's change of story. When Gonzales was arrested, he erroneously believed he would not spend time in jail for possession of the methamphetamine, but would only be deported. At the time, Gonzales might have figured that given his light punishment, he could gain nothing by telling the truth. Indeed, Gonzales testified during direct examination that he fabricated the story about Tony to protect his longtime friend Cardinas. But Gonzales later learned he faced significant potential jail time for possession of methamphetamine. With this knowledge, Gonzales might have perceived he could gain something quite valuable by telling the truth: leniency with the prosecutors and the possibility of a reduced sentence. Indeed, this is exactly what Gonzales received in his plea agreement. Given this explanation of the shifting testimony, the mere fact that Gonzales failed at trial to explain his reasons for changing his story does not make his testimony inherently incredible. Furthermore, during cross-examination Cardinas's counsel was able to reveal the inconsistencies in Gonzales's testimony and his motive for implicating Cardinas (i.e., favorable treatment from the government). The jury thus had before it all facts relevant to Gonzales's credibility. In this context, the jury acted within the bounds of reason when it credited Gonzales's testimony despite the inconsistencies. See Oliver, 278 F.3d at 1043. Moreover, the doctrine of inherent incredibility is a longshot. A fact-finder's credibility determinations are virtually unreviewable on appeal. United States v. Virgen-Chavarin, 350 F.3d 1122, 1134 (10th Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 473, 480 (8th Cir.1998)). Cardinas's arguments simply fail to overcome the stringent standards of the inherent incredibility doctrine. Cardinas relies on our decision in Tapia but does not explain why Gonzales's story described events that he physically could not have possibly observed or events that could not have occurred under the laws of nature. Oliver, 278 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Tapia, 926 F.2d at 1562); see United States v. Williams, 216 F.3d 611, 614 (7th Cir.2000) (Because Williams has failed to allege any such special circumstances here, his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is without merit.). In Tapia, we were not confronted with a situation where the witness claimed to be in two different places at the same time or made other claims contrary to the laws of nature. Rather, thereas herethe witnesses' testimony presented two distinct versions of the historical facts. In these situations, we have held that the testimony of a drug dealer's compatriots, regardless of whether the testimony is confused or self-contradicting, is not inherently incredible. See Lauder, 409 F.3d at 1259-60; see also Williams, 216 F.3d at 614 (We must leave open the possibility that even a liar tells the truth once in a while, and the jury is in the best position to judge [a witness's] credibility.). Given the reality of these types of prosecutions, juries frequently hear conflicting testimony pitting the word of co-conspirators against each other. Nor does Cardinas explain why Gonzales physically could not have possibly observed the events he recounted. Oliver, 278 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Tapia, 926 F.2d at 1562). Gonzales lived at the stash house that Cardinas frequently visited and out of which Cardinas allegedly dealt drugs. Nothing impeded Gonzales's ability to observe Cardinas's actionsthe observations he recounted at trial were of the type any co-conspirator would experience. See id. Despite Cardinas's insistence that Gonzales's waffling made his testimony inherently incredible, conflicting versions of facts are precisely within the province of the jury to resolve and nothing in this case takes the testimony outside of the jury's realm. See Tapia, 926 F.2d at 1562 (Nor does the fact that there are several conflicting versions [of the facts] affect our determination of credibility as a matter of law.); cf. United States v. Smith, 308 F.3d 726, 746 (7th Cir.2002) (Deference to the finder of fact, with the opportunity to observe the witnesses, supports credibility findings even in the face of some internal conflicts [in the witnesses' testimony].). As a final point, it is worth noting that the jury was instructed that it need not believe Gonzales. Indeed, it was told that You should receive this type of testimony with caution and weigh it with great care since it is the product of a plea agreement with Mr. Gonzales, providing a possible recommendation of a lesser sentence than he would otherwise likely receive. R. Vol. 1, Doc. 38 at 15 (Jury Instruction No. 11). Thus, because Gonzales had a rational reason for changing his story regarding the origin of the methamphetamine, and because Cardinas's inherent incredibility arguments fail under our case law, we see no reason to set aside the jury's verdict under a sufficiency of the evidence challenge.