Opinion ID: 751710
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Probable Cause to Search Plaintiff's Vehicle

Text: 51 The majority concludes that, under the circumstances, Defendants had probable cause to believe the Stealth may have been a stolen vehicle and, thus, [to] enter the vehicle to determine whether it had been tampered with or the identity of the owner. (Op. at 1075.) Yet, Defendants' testimony regarding their basis for searching Plaintiff's vehicle is grossly inconsistent, which creates genuine issues of material fact as to probable cause. 52 When Defendants were first interviewed by the Internal Affairs Unit regarding this incident, Defendants Slagle and Line indicated that the search of Plaintiff's vehicle was conducted as a search incident to the arrest of the suspect who had been taken into custody within ten feet of the vehicle. These statements directly conflict with their subsequent deposition testimony that the search was conducted because Plaintiff's car appeared to be an abandoned, stolen vehicle. 53 Defendant Slagle stated the following in his interview with Internal Affairs: And our first impression, my impression I was sitting in the car, but my first impression was that it was the car the subject was in 'cause the motor was running. He was arrested..you know, within 10 feet of it. So we checked car [sic].... (J.A., Slagle Interview, at 132.) Similarly, Defendant Line stated the following in his Internal Affairs interview: We thought it was the subject we took down's vehicle 'cause he was standing directly next to it. The engine was running. Officer Thornburg looked inside the vehicle, I assume to see if there's any contraband or weapons laying in plain view. Id., Line Interview, at 139. 54 Later, in their depositions, however, Defendants Slagle and Line developed the story that they searched Plaintiff's vehicle because they believed it was an abandoned, stolen vehicle. Yet, as described above, these Defendants admitted that the facts within their knowledge at the time of the search were not that the car had been left in an abandoned state but rather that the vehicle was running and unoccupied because its driver was being taken to jail. Further, these Defendants have admitted that they searched the vehicle based on their understanding that the driver of the vehicle had just been arrested--not based on their belief that the car was an abandoned, stolen vehicle. 55 Defendants' inconsistent testimony creates issues of fact regarding the factual basis for probable cause that must be resolved by a jury. See Garris v. Rowland, 678 F.2d 1264, 1270 (5th Cir.) (Where there is no conflict in evidence, the court may make its own legal determination of probable cause. But where facts relied upon to show probable cause in a § 1983 action are controverted, they must be resolved by the jury before controlling legal principles can be applied. It is axiomatic that the jury is the sole judge of the facts of the case.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 864, 103 S.Ct. 143, 74 L.Ed.2d 121 (1982); McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1007 (9th Cir.1984) ([I]n a § 1983 action the factual matters underlying the judgment of reasonableness generally mean that probable cause is a question for the jury....) It is inappropriate for the majority to decide that probable cause existed to search the car for evidence of theft when the facts allegedly constituting probable cause are currently in dispute. 56 In addition, even assuming that the factual basis for probable cause were not in dispute, the objective facts known to Defendants at the time of the search, and relied upon by the majority, did not create probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of a crime. The facts known to the officers did not make it probable or present a substantial chance that the vehicle was stolen. Rather, the facts supported nothing more than a mere suspicion that the vehicle might be stolen. See United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 392 (6th Cir.1993) (discussing probable cause standard), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 828, 115 S.Ct. 97, 130 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994). 57 A discussion of the facts which the majority claims provided the basis for probable cause is in order. To begin, the majority emphasizes the fact that it was 12:40 a.m. when Defendants spotted Plaintiff's vehicle. Presumably, this fact is relevant because it tends to negate the inference that the vehicle was left temporarily by its owner, since people are not usually active and mobile at this time of the day. However, the majority disregards other facts, known to Defendants, which suggest that, despite the late hour, there was a high level of human activity in the Green Hills Apartments. Firstly, it was a Friday night; and the Green Hills Apartments is located in the city, not the suburbs. Secondly, the police themselves were in the area trying to engage in drug transactions, which means that the police believed, for whatever reasons, that dealers would still be on the streets looking for customers and that potential customers would be out and about. This scenario suggests that the housing development is still teeming with people at this hour. Thirdly, and perhaps most significant, according to Defendants themselves, a crowd of ten to twenty people gathered, at this time, while police arrested the first suspect. Accordingly, the facts indicate that, despite the hour, there was plenty of human activity in the Green Hills Apartments; such activity supported an inference that the vehicle had not been stolen and abandoned but rather had been left momentarily by its owner. 58 The majority also relies on the following circumstances in concluding that probable cause existed: the vehicle was unoccupied and parked haphazardly; the headlights were on; the engine was running; the radio was turned on; the doors were unlocked; and stolen vehicles, according to Defendants, are frequently left in this condition. Yet, given that there was significant human activity taking place in the area, these facts are innocuous; they support an inference that the vehicle had been left by its owner momentarily as much as they support an inference that the vehicle had been stolen and abandoned. 59 The majority relies on the Defendants' unsubstantiated contention that the Green Hills Apartments is a high crime area, apparently arguing that it is reasonable to assume that one would not leave, even momentarily, a vehicle in such a condition in such an area. Yet, the level of criminal activity in the area is a fact that is presently in dispute. While Defendants claim that the Green Hills Apartments is a high crime area, Plaintiff has testified that he has lived in the area all of his life, does not consider the area high crime, and had no worries about leaving his car unoccupied. (See J.A., Smith Dep., at 63.) 60 Construing the evidence in Plaintiff's favor, a jury could find that there is no unusual incidence of property crime in the Green Hills Apartments and that the nature of the area is such that residents might, momentarily, leave their vehicles running and unoccupied. Accordingly, it is inappropriate to use the high crime nature of the area as a basis for probable cause, especially since Defendants have offered nothing in support of their contention that this is a high crime area other than their unsubstantiated assertions. 61 The majority also finds persuasive Defendants' contention that the Dodge Stealth is a frequently stolen vehicle. There is no indication, however, that Defendants were aware of this and relied on this fact in finding probable cause to search Plaintiff's vehicle. The majority relies on a statement by officer Claiborne--who did not take part in the search--that a Dodge product is a highly stolen vehicle now. Id., Claiborne Interview, at 108. Nowhere in the record do Defendants state that they were aware that Dodges are frequently stolen vehicles and considered this fact in determining probable cause. 62 The majority also relies on the fact that the car was parked only a few feet from a drug bust and within easy reach of any member of the crowd which gathered. (Op. at 1075.) How this situation supports a belief that the vehicle would contain evidence of a crime eludes rationality. 63 Finally, given that the above-described circumstances are entirely consistent with a vehicle that has been left temporarily unoccupied by its owner, the allegation that the Green Hills Apartments is a known dropping off place for stolen vehicles merely makes the condition of the vehicle somewhat suspicious. Rather than immediately search the vehicle, the police officers had available to them less intrusive measures that could have been taken; for example, the police could have taken a moment to call in the license number of the vehicle, before proceeding with the search, in order to determine whether the vehicle had been reported stolen. Although Defendant Thornburg asked Defendant Slagle to call in the license plate check, Thornburg proceeded with the search without waiting for Slagle to do so. The police also could have taken a few minutes to inquire with people on the street in the immediate vicinity of the vehicle as to the ownership of the vehicle, and they could have knocked on the door of the dwelling in closest proximity to the vehicle to determine whether the vehicle's owner was in the dwelling. The officers' failure to take these modest measures before proceeding with the search casts doubt on the issue of whether the police acted reasonably and in good faith in making their probable cause determination. 6 64 For the foregoing reasons, the objective facts relied upon by the majority do not establish probable cause. 65 Even if one were to assume that Defendants had probable cause to search Plaintiff's vehicle to determine if it were stolen, the search should have ended when Defendant Thornburg saw that the ignition was intact and the keys were in the ignition. At that point, there was no longer any basis to believe that the vehicle was stolen; and the facts known to the officers supported the conclusion that the owner had simply momentarily left the vehicle. Thus, if Defendant Thornburg went inside the glove box, as Plaintiff maintains, he did so without probable cause and in violation of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. See United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir.1993) (finding new information can negate prior determination of probable cause); United States v. Bizier, 111 F.3d 214, 219 (1st Cir.1997) (intervening information can weaken probable cause). Under the circumstances present here, Plaintiff can establish a Fourth Amendment violation based solely upon the search of the glove box. 66 As an alternative basis for finding probable cause to search Plaintiff's vehicle, the district court also relied on Tennessee Code section 55-8-162 and Knoxville City Ordinance section 17-191. The majority, in its opinion, also relies on Tennessee Code section 55-8-162. The statute section and the ordinance section are almost identical, and both require a driver to turn off his engine before leaving his vehicle unattended. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-8-162 (1997); Knoxville, Tenn., Ordinance § 17-191. 67 Section 55-8-162 is inapplicable to private property, however. See Beene v. Cook, 43 Tenn.App. 692, 311 S.W.2d 596, 600 (1957) ([55-8-162] probably does not apply where the vehicle is parked off a public road or street....). Section 17-191 is, presumably, also inapplicable to private property since it is modeled after Section 55-8-162. It is undisputed that the parking lot of the Green Hills Apartments is private property. (See J.A., Holloway Aff., at 51-52.) Accordingly, Plaintiff had not committed an offense by leaving his vehicle on private property, unattended, with the engine running; and Defendants did not have probable cause to believe an offense had been committed because they had no knowledge of whether the parking lot was private or public property. 68 The majority also concludes that, under the community care taking function enunciated in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973), Defendants were entitled to enter Plaintiff's vehicle, without a warrant, in order to protect themselves and the public from the danger created by the manner in which Plaintiff's vehicle was left unattended. However, while the authority cited by the majority may support the proposition that Defendants were entitled to enter Plaintiff's vehicle to abate the danger posed by an unlocked, unoccupied, running vehicle, these cases do not suggest that Defendants were also entitled to search Plaintiff's glove box. That is, under the circumstances, this case law only permitted Defendants to make a warrantless entry of Plaintiff's vehicle for the limited purpose of turning off the engine and securing the vehicle; it did not give Defendants permission to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle. 69 In Cady, it was permissible to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle to find a gun which presented a threat to the public's safety. Here, however, the threat to public safety was the fact that the car was left unoccupied with the engine running; thus, a search of the vehicle was not necessary to protect the public. Similarly, in United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506 (6th Cir.1996), the police were allowed to enter a home without a warrant in order to turn down a stereo or to find an occupant to turn down the stereo. This case does not stand for the proposition that, once the police were properly in the home, they had the authority to search the entire premises. Rather, Rohrig indicates that it was permissible to enter the home for the limited purposes described above. See Rohrig, 98 F.3d at 1525-26; see also United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 674, 680 (6th Cir.1994) (finding that warrantless entry of home to free victim being held against will could not lawfully be expanded to include search of home's closets). 70 Plaintiff has testified that he saw Defendant Thornburg searching his glove box. Contrary to the majority's assertion, under these circumstances, such conduct by Defendants cannot be justified under either of the cases cited by the majority. 71 Finally, the district court also found that no warrant was necessary to search Plaintiff's vehicle because it appeared to be abandoned. In determining whether Plaintiff abandoned his vehicle, the appropriate inquiry is whether Plaintiff had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle. See United States v. Tolbert, 692 F.2d 1041, 1044 (6th Cir.1982) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933, 104 S.Ct. 337, 78 L.Ed.2d 306 (1983). We must consider whether Plaintiff, by his conduct, exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and whether that subjective expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. See id. at 1044-45. 72 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants could not conclude that Plaintiff had given up his expectation of privacy in his vehicle. See United States v. Oswald, 783 F.2d 663, 666-68 (6th Cir.1986) (discussing indicia of abandonment); United States v. Sanders, 719 F.2d 882, 886 (6th Cir.1983) (describing conduct demonstrating a continued legitimate expectation of privacy). As previously discussed, the condition of Plaintiff's vehicle was consistent with a situation in which the driver has simply momentarily left his vehicle to run a quick errand. Defendants, apparently, did not wait even two minutes to see if the driver of the vehicle would return before they began to search the vehicle. (See J.A., Tr. Prelim. Hr'g, at 205.) One can hardly say that leaving a vehicle in the condition Plaintiff left his for two minutes evidences a lack of expectation of privacy. Furthermore, accepting Plaintiff's rendition of the facts as true, the condition of the vehicle illustrated that Plaintiff intended to keep its contents private. That is, the doors were closed; the windows were rolled up; the alarm was set; and Plaintiff remained within close proximity of the vehicle to guard against intruders. 73 Accordingly, the facts clearly evidence an interest in keeping the contents of the vehicle private. Moreover, Plaintiff's expectations of privacy under these circumstances were entirely reasonable; one should feel secure that he can momentarily leave his vehicle running and unattended in order to run a quick errand, without giving the government license to search his vehicle. It cannot be said that Plaintiff, under these circumstances, had abandoned his vehicle. 74 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff can show that Defendants' search of his vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights; accordingly, the district court should not have granted summary judgment as to this claim.