Opinion ID: 217548
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Basin Project: Species Monitoring

Text: Sierra Forest argues that the Basin Project falls short of species monitoring required at the project level by the 2004 Framework. See Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1175 (9th Cir.2006) (requiring project-level monitoring, even under the 2000 Transition Rule, because the 2004 Framework expressly require[d] `population monitoring' of the species at issue), abrogated on other grounds by Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 375; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i) (requiring site-specific projects to comply with the existing LRMP). However, in 2007, the Forest Service amended the monitoring requirements of the 2004 Framework. The Forest Service argues that no inconsistency remains between the amended 2004 Framework and the Basin Project's species monitoring provisions. The 2007 Amendment specifies that [o]ngoing monitoring of the selected species identified in [the 2004 Framework] will not be changed in this decision. Nor does the 2007 Amendment drop the adaptive management approach developed in the 2004 Framework. The 2007 Amendment, however, requires monitoring of MIS population trends and determining relationships to habitat changes at the planning-area scale during forest plan implementation and eliminates species monitoring requirements in the project area or at the project level.  The sole MIS requirement that is applied at the project-level is the assessment of habitat for monitoring indicator species. The Amendment is expressly retroactive. Sierra Forest does not contend that the Basin Project is inconsistent with the habitat monitoring provisions of the 2007 Amendment. Rather, it argues that the Forest Service is precluded from applying the 2007 Amendment retroactively. In Friends of Southeast's Future v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir.1998), we addressed a forest plan amendment that purported, in part, to remove certain analytical requirements prior to approving a timber sale. We rejected the amendment's retroactivity provision, holding that agency authority to change the legal consequences of completed acts only exists if Congress conveys such authority in an ` express statutory grant.' Id. (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988)); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272, 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (holding that prospectivity remains the appropriate default rule in statutory interpretation and requiring clear congressional intent for retroactive application); Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 314 F.3d 1060, 1062 (9th Cir.2002) (permitting application of legislation to a suit pending at the time of enactment only because the statute did not retroactively affect past action). The Forest Service argued in Morrison that § 1604(i) of NFMA authorized retroactive application of the amendment, but we disagreed: The Forest Service contends that such a grant of authority is contained in 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i), which provides that instruments for the use and occupancy of National Forest System lands ... currently in existence shall be revised as soon as practicable to be made consistent with [LRMPs.] However, by its plain language, this provision only applies to the revision of instruments to achieve consistency with forest plans, not to the revision of the forest plans themselves. Morrison, 153 F.3d at 1070. [10] That holding does not preclude the Forest Service's argument in this case that a different NFMA provision  § 1604(f)(4)  does provide the requisite express authority to apply the 2007 Amendment retroactively here. I respectfully disagree with Judge Reinhardt's reading of Morrison as going beyond the merits of the statutory argument made to that panel, to announce a blanket interpretation of the whole of NFMA. United States v. Contreras (Contreras II), 593 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (per curiam), which Judge Reinhardt also invokes, is not to the contrary. There, the three-judge panel had interpreted the same provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, but gave a new interpretation to the same language and purported to expressly overrule prior cases. See id. at 1136. Nothing in Contreras II, or in Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc), precludes us from distinguishing a previous panel ruling based on a principled reading of the prior panel's articulated holding. The importance of imposing reasonable limits on the precedential value of related decisions becomes evident when one considers the text of § 1604(f)(4) on its face: Plans developed in accordance with this section shall ... be amended in any manner whatsoever after final adoption after public notice, and, if such amendment would result in a significant change in such plan, in accordance with the provisions of subsections (e) and (f) of this section and public involvement comparable to that required by subsection (d) of this section. § 1604(f)(4) (emphasis added). The term in any manner whatsoever logically includes in a retroactive manner. We have held that clear statement rules can be satisfied through similar general statements; magic words need not be invoked. Alaska v. EEOC, 564 F.3d 1062, 1066-67 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc); see also Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 229 F.3d 1210, 1219 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that a `notwithstanding proviso,' which is an easily invoked, Court-approved `gold standard' for delegation, is an express delegation sufficient to meet a clear statement rule). Contrary to Judge Reinhardt's assertion, it is unremarkable to speak of an action being taken in a retroactive manner. Maldonado-Galindo v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir.2006) (Congress need not use a set phrase to indicate when a statute is to be given retroactive effect; rather, the statute need only evince Congress's `clear intent' that legislation apply in a retroactive manner.). See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 524, 118 S.Ct. 2131, 141 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998) (legislation operates in a retroactive manner); Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 110, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (applied in a retroactive manner); SEC v. Gemstar TV Guide Int'l, Inc., 367 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir.2004) (operates in an unconstitutionally retroactive manner); Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Mallonee, 196 F.2d 336, 370 (9th Cir.1952) (amendments operated in this retroactive manner); see also Garcia-Ramirez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 935, 952 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2005) (Gould, J., concurring) (operate in an impermissibly retroactive manner) (paraphrasing Velasquez-Gabriel v. Crocetti, 263 F.3d 102, 108 (4th Cir.2001)). These citations show that manner need not mean process, and if Congress meant process then it could have said so. Congress chose the phrase any manner whatsoever, which connotes broad authority. See United States v. Yoshida, 303 F.3d 1145, 1152 (9th Cir.2002) (The statute itself conclusively indicates that Congress intended a broad definition of bring: `brings to or attempts to bring to the United States in any manner whatsoever. ') (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (emphasis added)). Judge Reinhardt's attempt to exclude the effect of an amendment from the Forest Service's authority to amend in any manner whatsoever is unpersuasive. Further, nothing about § 1604 generally, or § 1604(f)(4) specifically, suggests that the manner of amendment is a procedural formality. First, we have previously held that § 1604(f)(4) is a broad grant of power to the agency. See Lands Council v. Martin, 529 F.3d 1219, 1227-28 (9th Cir.2008) (holding that Forest Service could amend a LRMP in a limited manner thereby avoiding a significant amendment, which would have required a lengthy and detailed amendment process). That Lands Council focused on procedure is unsurprising because that was that nature of the appellant's argument. See id. In Forest Guardians v. Dombeck, 131 F.3d 1309 (9th Cir.1997) (per curiam), we had previously agreed that § 1604(f)(4) gave the Forest Service authority to choose whether amendments would have prospective or retrospective effect. See id. at 1312-13 (Congress intended to grant the Secretary discretion in amending existing forest plans, including the discretion to determine how those amendments will be implemented.). Although Forest Guardians did not expressly hold that amendments could be applied in a retroactive manner, it clearly implied as much. Second, the context of § 1604(f)(4) is not limited to process. In § 1604(f)(4) itself, the second clause requires significant amendments to adhere to the requirements of § 1604(e), which enforces the substantive requirements of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531. [11] Similarly, the rest of § 1604 is a mixture of substance and process, addressing the life cycle of LRMPs, from development criteria, see § 1604(b), to public participation, see § 1604(d), to directives for substantive regulations, see § 1604(g), to effective dates and applying revised forest plans, see § 1604(i) & (j). Judge Reinhardt's assertion that somehow retroactive amendment is incompatible with that list is not persuasive. I would hold that the 2007 Amendment governs Sierra Forest's NFMA claim that the Basin Project is inconsistent with project-level species monitoring provisions found in the 2004 Framework. Sierra Forest does not contest that any inconsistency exists between the Basin Project and the 2007 Amendment project-level monitoring requirements. Any inconsistency between the Basin Project and the unamended 2004 Framework is moot. I would therefore affirm the district court's denial of Sierra Forest's site-specific NFMA monitoring claim.