Opinion ID: 1878821
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Resentencing

Text: As his fifth issue, Patton argues counsel was ineffective during his resentencing trial. He raises seven claims within this issue. We find each to be without merit. First, the record conclusively rebuts the allegation that counsel was ineffective for failing to impanel a new jury after jurors read a newspaper article detailing the prior jury's findings. Prior to this incident, counsel had specifically asked the court to tell the resentencing jury exactly what had happened in the previous trial. The newspaper article did nothing more than what counsel had previously requested. Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to object when the record proves counsel wanted the jury to know the prior jury had been deadlocked. The court cannot view this issue with the heightened perspective of hindsight and determine that counsel's strategic decision was ineffective assistance of counsel. See Rose v. State, 675 So.2d 567 (Fla.1996) (holding disagreement with trial counsel's choices as to strategy was not ineffective assistance of counsel); see also Cherry v. State, 659 So.2d 1069 (Fla.1995) (concluding standard is not how current counsel would have proceeded in hindsight). Therefore, the court did not err in summarily denying this claim. Patton alleges as his second claim of counsel's ineffectiveness during resentencing the failure of counsel to request removal of the trial judge based on contrary rulings and communication with the victim's mother during a recess. The mere fact that a trial judge makes rulings that are adverse does not give a defendant basis to remove the judge. Accordingly, this claim is without merit. See Barwick v. State, 660 So.2d 685, 692 (Fla.1995); Jackson v. State, 599 So.2d 103, 107 (Fla. 1992). In addition, we find Patton's blanket statement that the judge talked to the victim's mother during a recess to be insufficient to establish that the judge acted improperly. Accordingly, Patton's allegations do not demonstrate counsel should have filed a motion to dismiss the judge. See Valle v. State, 705 So.2d 1331 (Fla. 1997). Since the issue was insufficiently pled, it was not error to summarily deny it. Third, Patton claims counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek a competency hearing prior to the resentencing. This claim was insufficiently pled because there were no specific instances of abnormal behavior alleged that would have put counsel on notice that his client may have been incompetent for resentencing. Without such allegations, there was no basis to find counsel should have asked for such a hearing. Therefore, this claim was legally insufficient. Fourth, Patton's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate and present mitigating evidence is also without merit. Patton alleges counsel should have had his mother testify. There is no allegation that his mother or any other witnesses could have provided any mitigation not presented by his sister and stepsister. [9] Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to present cumulative mitigation. See Valle, 705 So.2d at 1334. Fifth, Patton alleges counsel should have called additional witnesses to corroborate the mitigation presented by his sister and stepsister. Much of the information provided by these witnesses was corroborated by the expert witnesses. Additionally, Patton has failed to indicate that there are persons available who would corroborate the sisters' testimony and has failed to specify the degree of corroboration. Moreover, Patton's sister and stepsister provided not only adequate but substantial mitigation. Counsel cannot be incompetent for failing to present cumulative evidence. This allegation also has not been sufficiently pled. Patton alleges as the sixth instance of ineffective assistance at resentencing that the mental health experts were not provided with adequate background history to make an accurate assessment of his mental and drug-related problems. This allegation is also conclusively rebutted by the record because Dr. Krop and Dr. Toomer, defense experts, were provided with school, social worker, doctor, hospital, and prison records, background information obtained from Patton's family, and the trial transcripts from the original trial. Lastly, Patton argues counsel was ineffective for failing to properly inform Dr. Krop of the legal definition of insanity. While Dr. Toomer's change of opinion between the trial and the resentencing called his understanding of the proper legal standard into issue, there is no basis for the Court to conclude Dr. Krop also failed to understand the legal definition of insanity under Florida law. Dr. Krop is an experienced expert witness who has evaluated over 400 patients to determine competency and mitigation, and has testified on behalf of defendants in over 45 cases. Dr. Krop was aware of the legal definition of insanity; he found Patton sane at the time he shot the police officer. There is simply no basis in the record to support Patton's claim that Dr. Krop was not aware of the proper legal definition of insanity. Therefore, counsel had no reason to question Dr. Krop's understanding of the legal principles applicable to this case. The trial court correctly summarily denied this claim.