Opinion ID: 2302690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Void-for-Vagueness Contention

Text: In light of our conclusion that § 16-93 is not preempted, we must now turn to defendant's constitutional contentions. The defendant asserts that § 16-93 is facially invalid because it is unconstitutionally vague. He bases that contention on his view that it fails to provide adequate notice of what is prohibited, leaves virtually unlimited discretion to the police, and chills the exercise of First Amendment rights. It is a well-established principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). We begin by noting that, to succeed on a facial challenge to a law which has no effect on protected conduct, a challenger must demonstrate that the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) (emphasis added); see also URI Student Senate, 631 F.3d at 13; Bradley, 877 A.2d at 605. Nonetheless, in our review of an ordinance that interferes with the right of free speech or association, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2719, 177 L.Ed.2d 355 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), we must remain mindful that such an ordinance can exert a chilling effect that discourages individuals who are not present before the Court from exercising their First Amendment rights for fear of arbitrary enforcement. See DA Mortgage, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 486 F.3d 1254, 1271 (11th Cir.2007); see also Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109, 92 S.Ct. 2294; Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 604, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967) (Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity. (internal quotation marks omitted)); National Organization for Marriage, Inc. v. McKee, 669 F.3d 34, 43-44 (1st Cir.2012). In reviewing the regulation of sound amplification by a loud speaker, sound truck, or sound amplifier (which we view as being a conceptually similar subject to what is at issue in the instant case, which involves sound devices most often employed for personal listening), the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment protects the right of a citizen to play music and express his views on matters which he considers to be of interest to himself and others on a public street through sound amplification devices mounted on vehicles    [12] See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 80-81, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949) (plurality opinion); see also Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 559-60, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 92 L.Ed. 1574 (1948) (holding that the First Amendment protects the right [t]o use a loud speaker or amplifier); Reeves v. McConn, 631 F.2d 377, 382 (5th Cir.1980) (The right to communicate inherently comprehends the right to communicate effectively.). As such, in our review of § 16-93, which regulates the emanation of noise from devices that broadcast sound, we remain mindful that [f]reedom of speech, freedom of assembly[,] and freedom to communicate information and opinion to others are all comprehended on this appeal   . See Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 81, 69 S.Ct. 448. Nonetheless, this Court also remains mindful of the government's substantial interest in protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) (stating that the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court recognizes that municipalities have a weighty, essentially esthetic interest in proscribing intrusive and unpleasant formats for expression); Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 86-87, 69 S.Ct. 448 (The unwilling listener is not like the passer-by who may be offered a pamphlet in the street but cannot be made to take it. In his home or on the street he is practically helpless to escape [the] interference with his privacy by loud speakers except through the protection of the municipality. (footnote omitted)). [13] With respect to what the Supreme Court has called the government's substantial interest in protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise, the Court has stated that that interest is perhaps at its greatest when government seeks to protect the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home, but it is by no means limited to that context, for the government may act to protect even such traditional public forums as city streets and parks from excessive noise. Ward, 491 U.S. at 796, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988). The void-for-vagueness doctrine emanates from the due process requirements that a law must be defined [1] with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); see also Skilling v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 2927-28, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008); Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391-92, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); Russell, 890 A.2d at 459; Bradley, 877 A.2d at 605.
The first requirementthat which requires sufficient definiteness in a lawis intended to furnish the ordinary citizen with the information necessary to conform his or her conduct to the law. Bradley, 877 A.2d at 605 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498, 102 S.Ct. 1186 (Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. (internal quotation marks omitted)); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (stating that a vague law leads citizens to steer far wider of the unlawful zone    than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked (internal quotation marks omitted)); Russell, 890 A.2d at 459. Examining the language of § 16-93, [14] we are entirely unable to conclude that the ordinance is so vague that persons of ordinary intelligence cannot understand what conduct is being prohibited. We realize that human language is a less than perfect medium; as the Supreme Court has memorably commented: Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294; see also Ward, 491 U.S. at 794, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (stating that perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required); URI Student Senate, 631 F.3d at 14 (observing that words are rough-hewn tools, not surgically precise instruments and stating that [c]onsequently, some degree of inexactitude is acceptable in statutory language). It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has recognized that the terms loud and raucous within an ordinance are not inherently vague; the Court reached that conclusion on the basis of the reasoning that, although they are abstract words, they have through daily use acquired a content that conveys to any interested person a sufficiently accurate concept of what is forbidden. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 79, 69 S.Ct. 448. Similarly, with respect to the ordinance before us, some of the terms employed therein may be abstract to some extent; but, when the ordinance is read in its entirety, it conveys a sufficiently accurate concept of what is forbiddenby referencing a person's everyday understanding of what constitutes a volume of sound that would disturb the peace, quiet and comfort of neighborhood residents. Section 16-93 is also specific as to the geographic area in which a violation may occur viz., any residential zone of the city. As a result, a person of ordinary intelligence can comprehend (1) the actual areas in which § 16-93 is applicable and (2) the type of volume that would constitute a violation of the ordinance ( viz., one which may disturb people in their homes). Additionally, although the terms in the Providence ordinance are marked by flexibility and reasonable breadth, the ordinance as a whole provides an ordinary person with sufficiently definite criteria as to what constitutes a violation. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110-11, 92 S.Ct. 2294. Specifically, § 16-91 sets forth the policy underlying chapter 16 in the following words: It is hereby declared to be the policy of the city to prohibit unnecessary, excessive, and annoying noise from all sources subject to its police power. At certain levels, noises are detrimental to the health and the welfare of the citizenry; therefore, in the public interest, such noises shall be systematically proscribed. [15] That section conveys to the ordinary person that a governmental goal is limiting what has come to be known as noise pollution [16] due to the fact that it is deemed to be detrimental to the health and welfare of the citizenry. Id. In our judgment, the ordinance plainly delineates its reach in words of common understanding. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 112, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 616, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968).
We turn next to the second prong of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, which prohibits enactments that encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855. That prohibition serves to prevent standardless sweep[s] such as would allow policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections. Bradley, 877 A.2d at 605 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.); Russell, 890 A.2d at 459. After carefully scrutinizing § 16-93, we perceive no basis for concluding that it encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Indeed, the standard of reasonableness [17] that the Providence ordinance employs is one that a plethora of courts have upheld as constituting a standard which is not void for vagueness. See, e.g., Cameron, 390 U.S. at 616, 88 S.Ct. 1335 (reviewing a Mississippi anti-picketing statute); DA Mortgage, Inc., 486 F.3d at 1272 (reviewing a Miami Beach noise ordinance); Reeves, 631 F.2d at 385-86 (construing Houston's ordinances relative to sound amplification equipment); People v. Fitzgerald, 194 Colo. 415, 573 P.2d 100, 102-04 (1978) (reviewing a Colorado statute relative to disorderly conduct); People v. Bakolas, 59 N.Y.2d 51, 462 N.Y.S.2d 844, 449 N.E.2d 738, 740 (1983) (construing a New York state penal law prohibiting unreasonable noise); City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wash.2d 22, 759 P.2d 366, 369-70 (1988) (reviewing a Seattle ordinance which prohibited disorderly conduct on a bus); City of Madison v. Baumann, 162 Wis.2d 660, 470 N.W.2d 296, 302 (1991) (construing a noise ordinance of the City of Madison, Wisconsin). It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has stated that the term unreasonably is a widely used and well understood word   . Cameron, 390 U.S. at 616, 88 S.Ct. 1335. In the instant case, a violation of the statute occurs when there is the emanation of a volume of noise from devices which broadcast sound that, under the circumstances, a person (defined as one who is not excessive or extreme) could not tolerate. See Bakolas, 462 N.Y.S.2d 844, 449 N.E.2d at 740. We are therefore of the opinion that the reasonable person language sets forth a straightforward and constitutionally sustainable standard for the enforcement of § 16-93. Further bolstering the constitutionality of the Providence ordinance is the fact that, through its prima facie evidence provision, the ordinance provides specific guidance for those called upon to enforce it. The ordinance specifies impermissible dBA levels at certain times and from certain distances as constituting such prima facie evidence. That specific guidance sets forth an objective standard, which is clearly a bulwark against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See DA Mortgage, Inc., 486 F.3d at 1272 (stating that a county noise ordinance which provides a rebuttable presumption as an additional standard to guide those tasked with enforcing the ordinance constitutes an objective standard). Accordingly, this Court perceives no basis for holding that § 16-93 is void for vagueness because (1) the ordinance is defined with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what level of volume is prohibited and (2) it is defined in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
In support of his void-for-vagueness contention, defendant relies on this Court's holdings in State v. Hendershot, 415 A.2d 1047 (R.I.1980) (reviewing an East Greenwich ordinance); State v. Berker, 114 R.I. 72, 328 A.2d 729 (1974) (reviewing a Warwick ordinance); and State v. Jamgochian, 109 R.I. 17, 279 A.2d 923 (1971) (reviewing a Providence ordinance). In those cases, we held that certain public nuisance ordinances were unconstitutionally vague. In Hendershot, for example, we determined the following East Greenwich ordinance to be void for vagueness: Every person who shall commit any nuisance, or who shall be found quarreling, fighting, reveling, screaming, or wantonly making a false alarm or cry of fire, or otherwise behaving in a noisy, disorderly or indecent manner in the town, to the disturbance or annoyance of the peaceable inhabitants thereof or any portion of them, or shall aid, assist, encourage or promote the same to be done by any other person or persons, shall be guilty of an offense. Hendershot, 415 A.2d at 1048 n. 1 (quoting East Greenwich Ordinance ch. 15, § 1 (1972)). [18] The ordinances at issue in those cases are markedly different from the ordinance at issue in the present case. In contrast to the ordinances at issue in the above-referenced public nuisance cases, § 16-93 of the Providence Code of Ordinances contains language that (1) plainly delineates the area in which the noise is prohibited; (2) sets forth a reasonableness standard; and (3) provides guidance for law enforcement officers through its prima facie evidence provision. Moreover, unlike the East Greenwich and Providence ordinances that were reviewed in the cases cited by defendant, § 16-93 does not employ the term annoy or annoyance, which the Supreme Court has held to be inherently vague. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus, the ordinance is vague    in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified   ). [19] In contrast to the standardless ordinances addressed in the public nuisance cases cited in the preceding paragraph, the ordinance at issue in the case at bar provides a straightforward standard which ordinary persons can understand and pursuant to which police officers are able to enforce the ordinance. Accordingly, we find no merit in defendant's contention that Hendershot, Berker, and Jamgochian are controlling with respect to his appeal. In conclusion, it is our opinion that there is no basis for holding that § 16-93 of the Providence Code of Ordinances is void for vagueness. Accordingly, we affirm the hearing justice's ruling with respect to defendant's vagueness argument.