Opinion ID: 2518407
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The MMBA

Text: In 1961, the Legislature enacted the George Brown Act (Stats.1961, ch.1964, pp. 4141-4143), which for the first time recognized the rights of state and local public employees to organize and to have their representatives meet and confer with their public agency employers over wages and working conditions. In 1968, the Legislature went a step further by enacting the MMBA (Stats.1968, ch. 1390, pp. 2725-2729), which authorized labor and management representatives not only to confer but to enter into written agreements for presentation to the governing body of a municipal government or other local agency. ( Glendale City Employees' Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328, 331, 124 Cal.Rptr. 513, 540 P.2d 609, fn. omitted; see also Voters for Responsible Retirement v. Board of Supervisors (1994) 8 Cal.4th 765, 780-781, 35 Cal. Rptr.2d 814, 884 P.2d 645.) Although the MMBA covered most employees of local public entities, it did not include school districts' employees. (Stats.1968, ch. 1390, § 2, p. 2726; see Glendale City Employees' Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale, supra, at p. 331, fn. 1, 124 Cal.Rptr. 513, 540 P.2d 609.) State employees were excluded from the MMBA in 1971. (Stats.1971, ch. 254, § 2, p. 402.) The MMBA imposes on local public entities a duty to meet and confer in good faith with representatives of recognized employee organizations, in order to reach binding agreements governing wages, hours, and working conditions of the agencies' employees. (Gov.Code, § 3505.) The duty to bargain requires the public agency to refrain from making unilateral changes in employees' wages and working conditions until the employer and employee association have bargained to impasse.... ( Santa Clara County Counsel Attys. Assn. v. Woodside, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 537, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 617, 869 P.2d 1142.) This court has observed that the MMBA was [a] product of political compromise, that its provisions are confusing, and, at times, contradictory, and that it furnishes only a `sketchy and frequently vague framework of employer-employee relations for California's local governmental agencies.' ( International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. City of Gridley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 191, 197, 193 Cal.Rptr. 518, 666 P.2d 960.) In Glendale City Employees' Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale, supra, 15 Cal.3d 328, 124 Cal.Rptr. 513, 540 P.2d 609, this court resolved one of the MMBA's ambiguities by holding that a written agreement (commonly termed a memorandum of understanding) entered into under the MMBA becomes binding and enforceable when the public agency employer ratifies it. (At p. 332.) Answering another important question, we held that counties with civil service systems are not exempt from the MMBA's meet-and-confer requirement. ( Los Angeles County Civil Service Com. v. Superior Court (1978) 23 Cal.3d 55, 62-65, 151 Cal.Rptr. 547, 588 P.2d 249.) When the Legislature enacted the MMBA in 1968, it had not yet created the PERB, and it did not include in the MMBA any provisions expressly authorizing either administrative or judicial proceedings to enforce its provisions. Resolving the resulting uncertainty regarding methods of enforcement, this court in 1994 concluded that MMBA-created rights and duties were enforceable by a traditional mandate action under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. ( Santa Clara County Counsel Attys. Assn. v. Woodside, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 539, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 617, 869 P.2d 1142.) Although no published appellate decision ever expressly determined what statute of limitations applied to a mandate action to enforce MMBA-created rights and duties, a Court of Appeal held that the three-year statute of limitations in subdivision (a) of Code of Civil Procedure section 338 (hereafter section 338(a)) applied to an action to enforce a state labor law. ( Giffin v. United Transportation Union, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 1364, 236 Cal.Rptr. 6.) The parties here appear to agree that, before the Legislature vested the PERB with exclusive jurisdiction over MMBA unfair practice charges, the three-year period specified in section 338(a) applied to a traditional mandate action brought in superior court alleging an unfair practice under the MMBA.