Opinion ID: 2127227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Evidence of Victim's Criminal Record

Text: At trial, Russell alleged self defense, testifying that Patrick and his friend were the aggressors who had begun stabbing Kern. Russell testified that he was trying to protect Kern. He further testified that before he stabbed Patrick, he tried to pull Patrick off of Kern, and that Patrick lunged at him with a knife. Russell also attempted to testify that Patrick stated to him that he, Patrick, had just been released from prison. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection to this testimony. The Court of Appeals upheld this ruling. The Court of Appeals relied on McCraney v. State (1983), Ind., 447 N.E.2d 589, which states: The defendant in homicide, where there is some evidence of self-defense, may prove specific acts of violence committed by the deceased upon third parties, knowledge of which has been communicated to the defendant prior to the homicide, for the purpose of showing the defendant's state of apprehension.... Id. at 592 (quoting McKee v. State (1926), 198 Ind. 590, 154 N.E. 372) (emphasis omitted). The Court of Appeals held that there was no evidence that specific acts of violence had been committed by the victim on third parties or that, if so, such information was ever conveyed to defendant. Although McCraney states that a defendant may prove specific acts of violence committed by the deceased, 447 N.E.2d at 592, we do not believe the evidence should be limited only to violent acts. Any fact which reasonably would place a person in fear or apprehension of death or great bodily injury is admissible. In this case, Russell testified that Patrick stated he had just been released from prison. This statement could tend to place a person in reasonable fear or apprehension because it is not unreasonable to assume that a person who has been imprisoned for a crime may be likely to have a violent character. Phillips v. State (1990), Ind., 550 N.E.2d 1290. This additional evidence of Russell's state of mind, in combination with testimony that a fistfight broke out in Russell's home and that Patrick was stabbing Russell's roommate, may have been enough to convince the jury that Russell acted in self defense. Therefore, we hold that it was prejudicial error to exclude such evidence.