Opinion ID: 2197709
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instruction on PDWDCF

Text: We next consider whether the trial court erred in denying Massey's motion for judgment of acquittal where there was an error in the jury instructions relating to the PDWDCF charge. We review de novo the Superior Court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, [9] which should be granted only if there is insufficient evidence to sustain a guilty verdict. [10] Here, Massey does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence but, rather, the sufficiency of the law contained in the jury instruction on PDWDCF. [11] Because the proper vehicle for complaining of such an error would have been a motion for a new trial, [12] as a purely procedural matter the Superior Court did not err in denying the motion for acquittal. Massey's claim also lacks merit, as a substantive matter. We have held that [e]ven where there are some inaccuracies in an instruction, this Court will reverse only if the deficiency undermined the jury's ability `to intelligently perform its duty in returning a verdict.' [13] Here, the deficiency in the jury instruction was harmless error, because it did not undermine the jury's ability to perform its duty intelligently. In assessing the adequacy of an instruction, we must examine the entire instruction and not merely one statement taken out of context. [14] The entire jury instruction relating to the PDWDCF charge was: Under Delaware law, a person is guilty of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During Commission of a Felony when he is in possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony. In other words, in order to find the defendant guilty of Possession of a Deadly weapon During Commission of a Felony, you must find that each of the following three elements has been established beyond a reasonable doubt: First, the defendant committed a felony, Assault in the First Degree; and Second, during the commission of the Assault in the First Degree, the defendant possessed a deadly weapon, a cutting instrument; and Third, the defendant acted knowingly. The first paragraph of the instruction is a correct statement of the law. It informs the jury that, to convict Massey of PDWDCF, it must find that Massey was in possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony. The third paragraphwhich references not only the commission of a felony but also, the specific felony of assault in the first degreeis also a correct statement of the law. The problem is that Massey was not convicted of assault in the first degree, but of the lesser included offense of assault in the second degree. However, the jury knew from the jury instructions [15] that assault in the second degree is also a felony, and would, therefore, provide a sufficient basis for finding Massey guilty of PDWDCF. Had the third paragraph of the PDWDCF been drafted to make reference to assault in the first degree or assault in the second degree,  the verdict would have been the same. We find the error in the wording of the instruction to be harmless because, when considered in its entirety, the jury instruction at issue was reasonably informative [16] and the deficiency complained of did not prevent the jury from intelligently perform[ing] its duty. Accordingly, Massey's claim lacks merit even if he had moved for a new trial rather than moving, as he incorrectly did, for a judgment of acquittal.