Opinion ID: 1130069
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Superior Court Properly Consider the Relevant Statutory Factors?

Text: Virginia argues that the superior court misconstrued certain statutory factors, and ascribed too much weight to the continuity factor and not enough weight to other statutory factors. Before addressing the superior court's factual findings regarding the specific statutory criteria, we note that as a general matter, the court did not give too much weight to the continuity factor. It appears from the superior court's findings that the superior court was not relying on the continuity factor to the exclusion of the other statutory factors. Instead, it found that Morgan's interests would be equally served by placement with either of the parents and therefore that the single factor which weighed heavily for Tom rather than Virginia should dictate the outcome. [9] Such reasoning is permissible. [10] We now address the superior court's application of the specific statutory criteria.
Alaska Statute 25.24.150(c)(5) requires that in making custody determinations the court must consider the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity. With respect to the continuity factor, the superior court stated: The length of time Morgan has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity is the most important statutory factor from the court's perspective. This factor weighs heavily in favor of primary physical custody being with Tom Rooney. There is no need to risk moving Morgan from Wrangell, where he is thriving, when the court does not have to. Virginia argues that the superior court's finding with regard to continuity was clearly erroneous because the court considered only continuity of place, while disregarding continuity of family. She contends that the stability which Morgan experienced in Wrangell was due to her presence and protection. She notes that throughout the time which they were together, Tom's job kept him away from home for long periods of time. Thomas Sr. testified that it wasn't until December of 1992 that he came home to take care of Morgan according to the terms of the custody agreement. From 1987 until this time, Virginia was the primary custodian to the minor children, with the assistance of Thomas Sr.'s mother. Virginia also points out that the superior court noted that Morgan was having problems merging with his step-mother and her children in Wrangell, and contrasts that to the consistent care which Morgan has received from her. The superior court does seem to have treated the concept of continuity somewhat narrowly. [11] Continuity and stability for a child come not only from staying in the same house, or going to the same school. Consideration should also be given to social and emotional factors such as who the primary care-giver was for the child and whether the child would be separated from siblings or family members if he was placed with one parent rather than another. On the basis of our study of the record, however, we cannot say that the superior court abused its discretion. First, according to Virginia, Tom's mother assisted her in raising Morgan. Thus, the presence of both Tom's mother and Morgan's brother in Wrangell suggests that at least two important people in Morgan's past support network will remain with him in Wrangell. Additionally, Morgan is not being thrust into a new custody situation by being placed with Tom. From some time in 1992 to September 1993, when the motion to modify was filed, Morgan lived four days a week with Tom. Third, the superior court addressed many of the psychological aspects of Morgan's relationship with his father in its other findings. For example, the court found that [t]he love and affection existing between Morgan and his parents ... [is] equal as to Tom and Virginia. Finally, the superior court addressed the problem of Morgan's merging with his new step-mother by stating that the family was taking active steps to deal with this issue. Thus, despite the fact that the separation from his mother for long periods of time will have a destabilizing effect, it is not clearly erroneous to find that continuity, in its broader sense, is served by keeping Morgan in Wrangell. Thus, we find no error in this aspect of the superior court's custody decision.
The superior court is required to consider the child's preference if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form a preference. AS 25.24.150(c)(3). In the present case, the superior court disregarded Morgan's stated preference that he alternate years between his parents. The superior court reasoned that Morgan has made it clear that he does not want to have to make a choice and any expressed wish for equal time with his parents most likely arises out of his desire to be extremely fair to both of them. Virginia argues that Morgan did make a choice: he chose not to choose between his parents, but instead to live with both of them. She contends that in light of the GAL's findings that Morgan is an extremely bright and capable ten year old, the record shows he had the capacity to express his preference. Therefore, she concludes that it was error for the superior court to disregard Morgan's expressed preference to alternate years with each parent. The statutory standard is meant to give weight to the child's wishes. Thus, where a child wishes to divide his time between his parents because he desires to, that preference should be given weight. However, where a stated preference results entirely from the child's desire to satisfy his parent's wishes  or because he does not wish to offend either of them  such a preference does not fall within the statutory ambit. The superior court's finding on this issue amounts to a conclusion that Morgan's stated preference was unreliable in light of his desire not to hurt either of his parents. We conclude that this finding was not clearly erroneous. The GAL testified that Morgan sees things in equals. She also told the superior court judge that he should not discuss the issue with Morgan because he might simply tell the judge what he thought the judge wanted to hear. This suggests that throughout the proceeding Morgan had sought to satisfy others rather than his own desires. Based on this evidence it was reasonable for the superior court to conclude that Morgan was unable to articulate a preference and chose the alternating years schedule because he perceived it as the only way to satisfy both his parents. We therefore conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by ordering a custody arrangement contrary to Morgan's stated preference.
With regard to Morgan's cultural needs, the superior court found as follows: The evidence indicated that Tom Rooney in the past has ignored certain cultural/heritage needs of Morgan. This is relevant to the statutory factor found in AS 25.24.15(c)(1) and (2).[ [12] ] This statutory factor tips the balance in Virginia's favor. However, this was not entirely Tom's doing, as the evidence showed that Virginia Rooney did not pursue this issue with the older two boys, Jeff and Tommy. In the future, Tom needs to be sure to address these needs and not wait until Morgan brings them up, and he needs to take more responsibility in ensuring that Morgan has contact with Virginia's family members in Wrangell without having to specifically ask each time. Virginia points to certain evidence adduced at trial to the effect that there is a lack of cultural opportunities in Wrangell due to the absence of native elders and the small native population. She notes that the problem is particularly acute for young native males because of the lack of role models. Finally she contrasts this with the abundance of programs available in Sitka, as well as the exposure which Morgan would get to his cultural heritage from living with her on a day-to-day basis. Although it seems clear from the evidence that the opportunities for Morgan to be exposed to his Tlingit heritage are greater in Sitka than in Wrangell, this is not the sole test in custody disputes. Rather, the court must consider the child's cultural needs as one factor in the overall context of his best interests. We think it clear from the above finding that the superior court considered Morgan's cultural needs, and it is implicit that the court believed these needs could be met through its custody order. Morgan will be with his mother for three months each year as well as during various school vacations. She undoubtedly will also see him upon her visits to Wrangell. Additionally, the superior court mandated that Tom take measures with Morgan to assure adequate contact with Virginia's family members in Wrangell and otherwise address his cultural needs. Finally, noting that Morgan is a child of mixed ethnic background, the GAL stated her belief that it is imperative that Morgan learn all that he can about both cultures. Thus, we conclude that the superior court adequately considered Morgan's cultural needs and therefore did not abuse its discretion.