Opinion ID: 586832
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Multiple Conspiracies versus a Single Conspiracy

Text: 32 Having concluded that the indictment charged one conspiracy, the next issue is whether the evidence at trial proved one conspiracy or proved multiple conspiracies. When convictions have been obtained on the theory that all defendants were members of a single conspiracy although, in fact, the proof disclosed multiple conspiracies, the error of variance has been committed. United States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149, 154 (2d Cir.1975) (citations omitted); see also Helmsley, 941 F.2d at 89. If there is a variance between proof and indictment, the next step is to determine whether defendants were so prejudiced by the variance as to be entitled to a reversal of their convictions. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d at 155 (citations omitted); see also Helmsley, 941 F.2d at 89 (Variances are subject to the harmless error rule and thus are not grounds for reversal without a showing of prejudice to the defendant.). 33 Whether the government has proved a single conspiracy or has instead proved multiple other independent conspiracies is a question of fact for a properly instructed jury. United States v. Alessi, 638 F.2d 466, 472 (2d Cir.1980) (citations omitted). 34 In assessing the contention that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's conclusion that there was a single conspiracy, we must view the evidence as a whole in the light most favorable to the government and uphold the verdict if, viewed in that light, a rational juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that the scope of the criminal enterprise proven fits the pattern of the single conspiracy alleged in the indictment, and (2) that the defendant participated in the alleged enterprise with a consciousness of its general nature and extent. 35 United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1192 (2d Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Lavery v. United States, 493 U.S. 933, 110 S.Ct. 324, 107 L.Ed.2d 314 (1989). We find no error in the jury instructions and ample evidence to permit the jury to infer that defendants participated in a single conspiracy to defraud the United States of gasoline excise taxes. 36
37 [A] multiple conspiracy charge is required whenever several conspiracies might be inferred from the evidence offered. United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 625 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 2163, 64 L.Ed.2d 795 (1980). As we observed in United States v. Barlin, 686 F.2d 81, 88 (2d Cir.1982): 38 It is by now commonplace that in order to promote the goal of 'keeping distinct conspiracies distinct,' the court should describe explicitly the possibility of several conspiracies and instruct the jury that in order to convict a given defendant, it must 'find that he was a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment and not some other conspiracy.'  39 Id. at 88 (citations omitted); see United States v. Blanco, 861 F.2d 773, 782 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1139, 103 L.Ed.2d 200 (1989). 40 The charge in this case satisfied these requirements. Judge Wexler explicitly alerted the jury to the possibility of several conspiracies. He stated: Although the indictment charges a single conspiracy, it is possible that you will determine there were two or more separate conspiracies, whether there's one conspiracy or more conspiracies, or no conspiracies at all is a question of fact for you to determine. The judge then properly instructed the jury that it must acquit a defendant if it found that the defendant was a member of a separate conspiracy other than the conspiracy charged in the indictment and [did] not find ... that such defendant was a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment. 41 Defendants argue that reversal is warranted because Judge Wexler refused to charge specifically that if the jury found multiple conspiracies it must acquit. [I]n reviewing claims of error in the trial court's jury charge, we must consider the challenged portions not in isolation but in light of the instructions as a whole. United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 960 (2d Cir.1990) (citations omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2858, 115 L.Ed.2d 1025, 1026 (1991). The instruction regarding multiple conspiracies charged in its entirety: 42 Although the indictment charges a single conspiracy, it is possible that you will determine there were two or more separate conspiracies, whether there's one conspiracy or more conspiracies, or no conspiracies at all is a question of fact for you to determine. 43 If you find that no conspiracy existed, then you must acquit the defendants on the conspiracy charge. However, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that such a conspiracy existed, you then must determine whether--who were the members of that conspiracy. If you find that a particular defendant was a member of a separate conspiracy other than the conspiracy charged in the indictment and do not find beyond a reasonable doubt that such defendant was a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment, then you must acquit the defendant. 44 In other words, to find a defendant guilty of the conspiracy charge, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment, not some other conspiracy. 45 This language is notably similar to language we approved in United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1107 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832, 96 S.Ct. 54, 55, 46 L.Ed.2d 50 (1975). 46 As we observed in Tramunti, although it is preferable to instruct the jury that it must acquit if it finds multiple conspiracies when only one conspiracy is charged, the failure so to charge is not error where the charge examined as a whole stresses that there must be [a] finding of the single conspiracy charged and individual knowing participation by each individual in it. 513 F.2d at 1108 (citations omitted). 47 Judge Wexler's charge stressed the necessity of finding that each defendant participated in the single conspiracy charged in the indictment. Although a more detailed charge on the distinction between multiple conspiracies and a single conspiracy may have been desirable, see, e.g., Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d at 1192 (jury was instructed that it must find a single conspiracy among [defendant and codefendants] in order to convict [defendant]; it was instructed as to certain characteristics of multiple conspiracies, such as incompatible purposes; and it was told that it must acquit if it found the latter rather than the single conspiracy alleged in the indictment), Judge Wexler's charge adequately conveyed defendants' theory of defense and the applicable law. The judge's refusal to comply with defendants' request for an instruction that if you find multiple conspiracies, you must acquit was not error given the overall import of the charge provided. 48
49 The essence of the crime of conspiracy is the agreement. See, e.g., United States v. Alessi, 638 F.2d at 473.  '[I]n order to prove a single conspiracy, the government must show that each alleged member agreed to participate in what he knew to be a collective venture directed toward a common goal.'  Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d at 963 (citations omitted). The government need not prove that each defendant knew every other member or was aware of all acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Alessi, 638 F.2d at 473 (citation omitted). Moreover,  'a single conspiracy is not transposed into a multiple one simply by lapse of time, change in membership, or a shifting emphasis on its locale of operations.'  United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1303 (2d Cir.) (quoting Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d at 625), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 958, 108 S.Ct. 357, 98 L.Ed.2d 382 (1987). Finally, a single conspiracy is not transformed into multiple conspiracies merely by virtue of the fact that it may involve two or more phases or spheres of operation, so long as there is sufficient proof of mutual dependence and assistance. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d at 963. 50 In this case the evidence offered at trial fit the pattern of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment. The government's two main witnesses, Kryssing and Iorizzo, testified that defendants and other individuals agreed to set up a scheme to avoid paying gasoline excise taxes. They described the efforts of defendants and their co-conspirators to obtain a licensed company through which to burn gasoline, efforts that were repeated on at least two other occasions when the previous license became unusable. Other witnesses corroborated their testimony by testifying to defendants' use of specific licenses or daisy chains of gasoline transfers to make it appear that taxes had been paid on the gasoline when in fact they had not. 51 The jury reasonably could have inferred that the different daisy chains set up around each license were part of one overall conspiracy. The evidence revealed that once one license became unavailable, defendants searched for another license to further their scheme. Initially defendants utilized Northbrook to make it appear that taxes had been paid on a series of gasoline transfers. 2 When New York cancelled the Northbrook license, defendants began to use the Cabot license to burn gasoline. Later, when New York cancelled the Cabot license, the co-conspirators discussed using the Rappaport Fuel and Conlo licenses. 52 We agree with the government that the use of various burn companies here is similar to the conduct in Alessi. In Alessi, defendants were members of a single loose-knit multi-person conspiracy to use lost or stolen credit cards to purchase airline tickets for resale at a discounted price. 638 F.2d at 474. Rejecting a claim that the evidence had established a series of smaller, distinct conspiracies rather than the single conspiracy charged, we noted that [t]he scheme depended for its success on a steady flow of recently stolen or lost cards, since a stolen or lost card may be successfully used for only a short time to unlawfully obtain tickets from airlines. Id. at 470. Likewise, the conspiracy here at all times required a licensed company through which to burn gasoline. It was only a matter of time before the IRS or the state recognized that a burn company was not paying its tax liability and cancelled the license. When a license no longer was available, the conspirators scrambled to find a replacement license in order to continue the conspiracy. 53 The instant case also is analogous to United States v. Heinemann, 801 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094, 107 S.Ct. 1308, 94 L.Ed.2d 163 (1987), where we upheld convictions for conspiracy to defraud the United States. The Heinemann defendants were charged with conspiring to impede, impair, obstruct, and defeat the IRS's lawful functions in assessing and collecting revenue, 'to wit, the income taxes of themselves and other purported ministers of [specific churches] and related churches. '  801 F.2d at 91. The conspiracy involved the sale of ministries in purportedly tax-exempt churches. Id. at 88, 91. Because defendants moved from church to church defendants argued that the evidence proved multiple conspiracies involving the sale of ministries in four different churches rather than the single conspiracy charged in the indictment. We rejected this argument because there was ample evidence of a single conspiracy through which the names of churches changed but the enterprise's goal of avoiding taxes and making money through the sale of ministries did not. Id. at 92. Likewise, in the instant case there is ample evidence of a single conspiracy through which the name of the companies in a daisy chain changed but the conspiracy's goal of avoiding taxes did not. 54 We are not persuaded by defendants' argument that isolated statements by witnesses that the Cabot conspiracy was a separate conspiracy from the Northbrook conspiracy are dispositive of the multiple conspiracy issue. The jury reasonably could have inferred based on the evidence as a whole that each license represented a different phase of a single continuing conspiracy. See Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d at 963; see also United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 945 (2d Cir.1961) ( 'A single scheme to defraud may involve a multiplicity of ways and means of action and procedure.... Mere details may be changed and the scheme remain the same.' ) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 984, 82 S.Ct. 599, 7 L.Ed.2d 523 (1962). As one witness explained, it was one scheme into another, into another, into another. Defendants did not end one conspiracy and join a new one each time a license became unusable. Instead, they obtained a new license as part of the same fraudulent scheme. 55 Defendants also point to acrimony among participants in the different phases of the scheme as being inconsistent with a single conspiracy. It appears that Kryssing was responsible, in part, for the cancellation of the Northbrook license, because he burned too many gallons of gasoline through the Northbrook license without notifying Iorizzo. Similarly, Iorizzo allegedly caused the cancellation of the Cabot license by burning too many gallons of gasoline through it. However, it is not at all uncommon for disagreements to occur in a common enterprise. Id. Nor is it inconsistent with such an ongoing, unitary conspiracy that disputes might arise ... and that switches in affiliation might occur from time to time. Heinemann, 801 F.2d at 92 (footnote omitted); see also Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d at 1192 ( 'That certain defendants were eager to cheat each other for a large slice of the spoils does not obscure the unifying means used by all of them to defraud the public.' ) (citation omitted); Nersesian, 824 F.2d at 1303 (That conspirators may have problems or difficulties in dealing with one another which result in angry accusations or heated discussions does not necessarily negate the existence of a single conspiracy.) (citation omitted). 56 Neither does the fact that Kryssing and Iorizzo may have been involved at different phases of the conspiracy depending on which license was being used demonstrate that the evidence established more than one conspiracy. The jury need not have concluded that the same people were involved throughout the entire period of the conspiracy in order to find one conspiracy. Nersesian, 824 F.2d at 1303. 57 In sum, there was ample evidence that defendants were involved throughout the different phases of the conspiracy charged and met with various co-conspirators regarding the use of different licenses as circumstances necessitated. The similarities in each of the phases of the conspiracy support a finding that they were part of the same conspiracy, rather than separate conspiracies.