Opinion ID: 1133683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Whether the State's closing arguments at the guilt phase of the trial were proper.

Text: ś 182. Rubenstein argues that, in closing argument, the State improperly commented on his exercise of the rights not to testify and to assistance of counsel, misstated applicable law, expressed a personal opinion as to the credibility of witnesses, and referred to facts not in evidence. The record shows the following transpired during the State's closing argument: State: Did Mr. Rubenstein ever acknowledge this statement as being his? Well, sure he did, ladies and gentlemen. Remember what happened, what Officer Applewhite and Don Lindley testified happened at Wally Beaver's [sic] office in New Orleans. . . . [T]hey were told that Mr. Rubenstein had given his statement on the 16th of December â Defense: Objection. We went over this. Mr. Rubenstein never gave a statement. That has been mischaracterized through nine days of this trial, and he is up there doing it again. And I would like that clarified now. That was an interview. Court: Overruled. ś 183. Rubenstein's objection at trial was that the State mischaracterized his interview as a statement. However, on appeal, he claims the State improperly remarked on his exercise of the rights not to testify and to seek assistance of counsel. Thus, this assignment of error is procedurally barred. Carter, 722 So.2d at 1261 (objection on one ground waives all other grounds on appeal). Furthermore, the State's remarks did not concern Rubenstein's failure to testify, but rather demonstrated that Rubenstein stood by his account of events given on December 16. The State's remarks conformed to the evidence admitted at trial. ś 184. Rubenstein further argues the State commented on his exercise of the right not to testify when the State remarked, [t]here is absolutely no evidence to the contrary but that Mr. Rubenstein got that money in cash. Again, the State's comment was based on the evidence admitted at trial, not on Rubenstein's choice not to testify. ś 185. Hiene, the insurance agent, testified that Rubenstein and his wife came to his office after the bodies were discovered to collect on Krystal's life insurance policy. $60,000 of the proceeds were assigned to Attorney Wiley Beevers, and the balance was disbursed to Doris. Officer Applewhite subpoenaed the Hibernia National Bank, and its records showed withdrawals of $63,100 and $57,500 in cash on May 16, 1994, and May 20, 1994, respectively. The officer also obtained cash transaction reports from the Federal Reserve System, which contain information on cash transactions over $10,000. The officer testified he was able to ascertain that Rubenstein ultimately received the bulk of the proceeds from the insurance policy on Krystal. He also discovered that Rubenstein was insolvent in November 1993. The evidence supports the State's comment in closing argument, and the remarks were proper. Bell v. State, 725 So.2d 836, 851 (Miss. 1998) (prosecutor may comment upon any facts introduced into evidence and draw whatever deductions seem proper from those facts). ś 186. Rubenstein also argues the State improperly referred to him as manipulative. First, the defense failed to make a contemporaneous objection at trial. Therefore, this assignment of error is procedurally barred. We have held, [i]t is incumbent on defense counsel to raise proper objection when offensive language is uttered or waive appellate review of issue. Foster, 639 So.2d at 1288-89. ś 187. Second, Rubenstein's claim has no merit. The complained of remarks occurred during the State's rebuttal closing argument: My oath would require me to frankly sack Mr. Goodwin if I thought he was manipulating a witness. And I can't get carried away with the tragedy of the situation. Neither can I be manipulated by the defendant, and allow him to put the State in the position that we cannot ask the jury for justice. And so that's what this trial is about. It's about whether or not the defendant has manipulated the system to the point that you cannot find under your oaths that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.    Where was [Tonya Rubenstein] when she gave her first statement that she had seen Annie at Gatsby's, where was she? She was at Uncle Mike's house. . . . The second time she gave a statement, to the lawyer, how did she get there? . . . Uncle Mike took her there. Now, has Uncle Mike ever been manipulative before, has he ever called upon his family members to go to a lawyer's office and lie? Obviously. Numerous occasions. ś 188. The State contends the remarks were made in response to numerous comments by the defense in its closing argument accusing the State of manipulating the jury. In order to make an appropriate assessment, the reviewing court must not only weigh the impact of the prosecutor's remark, but must also take into account defense counsel's opening salvo. Simmons, 805 So.2d at 490. The State can properly rebut the defense's arguments when the defense invites such a response. Davis v. State, 660 So.2d 1228, 1255 (Miss.1995). Some of the defense's comments in its closing were as follows: You [the jury] know when somebody is trying to twist the facts. I'm not deliberately going to do that. I'm not saying the State didn't do it, but I'm telling you I'm not going to do it.    And I don't mean that these witnesses are dishonest. . . . I'm just saying they have another agenda. . . . And Mr. Goodwin [Assistant District Attorney] can't be judge, jury and executioner.    [Defense Co-counsel Janous] told you that the State was desperate, and in their desperation they've stooped to the lowest level of going to jails and dealing with convicted felons.    You see how some things can be manipulated? Ms. Janous told you their case was about manipulation of the facts, in her opening statement, if you recall it. She was right on the money. They manipulate every date.    But I do care if a man [Officer Applewhite] is biased when he's closing a case. You'd care too. Because when they're biased, they start to manipulate things.    Strong, hard facts, backed up medically and scientifically, each and everything that we put there. Not talking, but producing. . . . She [Janous] said we will produce hard facts for you, not a bunch of bologna to try to get you prejudiced.    [T]hey somehow or another maneuver Ms. Loque to come up here on the stand and say that she called Doris Rubenstein on November 16th. . . . Take the witness in the room and explain the dates-give this date. And then they bring them out here and the dates are messed up. ś 189. In its closing argument, the defense clearly made an issue of the State allegedly manipulating the case against Rubenstein, the evidence, and the witnesses. Therefore, we find the State's remarks in response were not improper. ś 190. Rubenstein also argues that the District Attorney expressed personal opinions about witnesses in the State's rebuttal closing argument. The record reflects that of the excerpts cited by Rubenstein, the defense made no contemporaneous objections. In United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 20, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), the United States Supreme Court stated that bolstering statements made by the prosecution do not amount to plain error as to require reversal. As the defense did not raise any objection to preserve this assignment of error for appellate review, it is procedurally barred. ś 191. Procedural bar notwithstanding, the defense invited the State's response in rebuttal by its repeated attacks on the credibility of the State's witnesses and on the State itself. See Young, 470 U.S. at 17-18, 105 S.Ct. 1038 (any potential harm was mitigated because the jury understood the prosecutor was countering the defense counsel's repeated attacks on the prosecution's integrity. . . .). See also Simmons, 805 So.2d at 490; Davis, 660 So.2d at 1255. ś 192. Finally, Rubenstein argues the State referenced matters not in evidence, citing to the following excerpt from the State's closing argument: [T]he two foremost experts in the worldâ Dr. Bass and Dr. Rodriguez, the people who pioneered the study of decaying bodies, decaying human bodiesâ that these two men are absolutely, just had no question that these bodies had been there for several weeks. And while I'm on December the 2nd, let's talk about Tonya for a moment. Tonya Rubenstein stated and testified to you that the very first time that she told anyone about having seen Annie at Gatsby's on December 2nd, was at the funeral home when the death certificates had come out [,] . . . placing the deaths at November. And she said, oh, that can't be true, because I saw her at Gatsby's. And she said that was the first time she had mentioned to anyone that fact. Well, ladies and gentlemen, the funerals, I think that we can assume, were after the bodies were found. The bodies were found on December 16, 1993. And yet, in Mr. Rubenstein's interview or statement or whatever you want to call it, he said that Tonya had seen them at Gatsby's. . . . I mean, someone is just not telling the truth at that point. ś 193. Again, the defense raised no objection, so the assignment of error is procedurally barred. Moawad, 531 So.2d at 634. Procedural bar notwithstanding, the State's remarks were related to the evidence introduced. Dr. Rodriguez's testimony included questioning by the defense on rebuttal cross-examination and by the State on redirect as to an eyewitness seeing Annie alive on December 2, 1993. On cross-examination, the State questioned Tonya Rubenstein as to discrepancies in her testimony concerning seeing Annie on December 2. ś 194. While the assignment of error is procedurally barred, we alternatively find the State's closing argument conformed to the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit.