Opinion ID: 1930910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Plaintiff's Condition

Text: Applying this definition of unsound mind, we next consider whether plaintiff's condition was such that it tolled the running of the three-year statute of limitations in § 9-1-14(b). In their motions to dismiss, defendants argued that plaintiff was not of unsound mind for purposes of § 9-1-19, and on appeal, they asserted that plaintiff evidenced the capacity to manage his day-to-day affairs of life by pointing to a discharge summary from Fuller Memorial Hospital, which described plaintiff, inter alia, as having normal abstraction and judgment and as being oriented to time, place and person. The defendants also asserted that in four criminal prosecutions, plaintiff was never adjudged incompetent to enter a plea or to stand trial, and a psychological evaluation that Roe underwent for Social Security disability benefits showed him to be lucid, oriented, and able to manage his own money. Finally, defendants contended that plaintiff has not been diagnosed with any psychotic symptoms since he was thirteen years old. The plaintiff, on the other hand, asserted that he was unable to manage his day-to-day activities and thus was of unsound mind for purposes of § 9-1-19, until some time within three years of the filing of his complaint. In support of his claim, Roe submitted, inter alia, his clinical records, prison records, portions of his deposition, and the Plummer affidavit that described plaintiff's severe mental illness during his childhood. The plaintiff contended that he remained in the custody of the state either as a ward or as a convict, for much of the time between the [abuse] event and the filing of his complaint. At the hearing before the justice and on appeal, plaintiff argued that he was not functioning normally in society and that the evidence of his multiple diagnoses, which included atypical psychosis, conduct disorder, aggression, undersocialization, personality disorder, oppositional/defiant disorder, paranoid ideation, high anxiety, impaired social and environmental functioning, and mixed learning disabilities, gave rise to an inference that he was of unsound mind. The hearing justice rejected plaintiff's claim of unsound mind, at one point asking, Does his inability to recall constitute unsound mind? and later commenting, You use that word non-normal to equate with unsound mind. I suggest to you it may not be so. He further explained that one who may have a low IQ, may not be of unsound mind andasked, Wouldn't anyone that suffered from a psychiatric disorder    therefore meet the criteria that you set down for unsound mind    ? The justice continued, There are many, many people that have psychological problems, but they are able to function, and he concluded that plaintiff's application of Kelly did not comport with what I believe the universal interpretation of unsound mind is; one who is [un]able to take care of his day-to-day affairs. After reviewing plaintiff's psychiatric history and his deposition, the hearing justice specifically found that the conditions plaintiff alleged did not qualify as a tolling feature within the purview of § 9-1-19 and that, although plaintiff repeatedly was hospitalized for psychiatric problems, he was able to take care of his daily needs and responsibilities, manage his own money, wend his way through the criminal justice system, and seek representation for the present lawsuit. Consequently, plaintiff's disability did not fall within the legal definition of unsound mind. The motion justice, accordingly, found that the unsound mind provision of § 9-1-19 did not toll the three-year statute of limitations. We agree. We are of the opinion that the facts alleged by the plaintiff do not rise to the level of unsound mind as defined in this opinion. Notwithstanding the plaintiff's low average IQ, memory problems, repeated hospitalizations, and numerous psychiatric conditions, including psychotic symptoms until the age of thirteen, the record revealed that he was, during some periods of his adult life, oriented in time, place, and person, able to manage his income, and competent to take part in criminal proceedings against him. Apparently, no court ever appointed a guardian ad litem on his behalf. This objective evidence of Roe's functional abilities suggests that, notwithstanding his psychiatric diagnoses, he still could take care of his day-to-day affairs. Although the plaintiff pointed out that he was unable to study for his GED and never held a driver's license, these circumstances do not prove an inability to manage daily functions. Thus, even taking the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we are ofthe opinion that they do not establish an inability to manage the day-to-day affairs of his life. Accordingly, we agree with the motion justice that the facts do not support a determination that the plaintiff was of unsound mind for purposes of invoking the tolling provisions of § 9-1-19.