Opinion ID: 844268
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim I. Denial of Defendant's Motion for Separate Juries for the Guilt Phase and the Special Circumstance and Penalty Phases

Text: Before trial, defendant moved to have separate juries decide his guilt and the truth of the prior-murder special-circumstance allegation, with the special circumstance jury also deciding penalty. He conceded that section 190.1 already requires the truth of a prior-murder special-circumstance allegation to be determined in a separate proceeding following the guilt phase, [5] but he argued that having separate juries for each proceeding would insulate the guilt phase jury from voir dire on the prior murder convictions. In essence, he argued he should be allowed to voir dire the guilt phase jury without mentioning the prior murder convictions and to voir dire the special circumstance and penalty phase jury about their thoughts on his prior murder convictions, and the only way to do that would be to have separate juries. (1) The trial court denied his motion, relying on the analysis in People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551 [286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893]. There we held that section 190.4, subdivision (c) expresses the legislative intent that both the guilt and penalty phases of a capital trial be tried by the same jury absent a showing of good cause for separate juries for each phase. (54 Cal.3d at pp. 573-574.) The mere desire of counsel to voir dire in one way for the guilt phase and a different way for the penalty phase does not constitute good cause for deviating from the clear legislative mandate. ( Id. at p. 573.) The trial court concluded this reasoning applied equally to a request for separate juries for the guilt and special circumstance phases of trial. Defendant argues the trial court's ruling violated his rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury. We conclude the trial court did not err. (2) We review the court's decision for abuse of discretion ( People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 482-483 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373]) and find none. In order to establish good cause for separate juries, defendant must show more than mere speculation that the use of a single jury would result in prejudice ( People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 252-253 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643]), or the mere desire of counsel to voir dire in one way for the guilt phase and a different way for the penalty phase ( People v. Nicolaus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 573). Defendant's motion was grounded only on his counsel's desire to conduct voir dire differently for each stage of the trial. As recognized in People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 120 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166]. the decision whether to use voir dire to probe prospective jurors' attitudes towards a defendant's other offenses is a tactical one . . . . The mere desire to minimize or eliminate such tactical decisions in the voir dire of a capital jury does not constitute good cause. ( Nicolaus, at pp. 573-574.) We find no abuse of discretion in the denial of defendant's motion. Defendant further asserts the denial of the motion violated his rights to due process and fundamental fairness under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, arguing that trying the case before a single jury limited his ability to adequately voir dire the prospective jurors. (See Mu'min v. Virginia (1991) 500 U.S. 415, 425-432 [114 L.Ed.2d 493, 111 S.Ct. 1899].) Defendant failed to explicitly make these constitutional arguments in the trial court, but because they do not invoke facts or legal standards different from those the trial court was asked to apply, and merely assert that the trial court's denial of the motion had the additional legal consequence of violating his rights under the United States Constitution, they are not forfeited on appeal. (See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 441, fn. 17 [42 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 133 P.3d 581].) Although the issues are thus preserved, defendant fails to show the trial court's ruling resulted in fundamental unfairness or the denial of due process. Defendant argues that the prosecution's strongest evidence in aggravation was the three prior murder convictions, and defendant's strongest evidence in mitigation was the fact the victim in this case was a child molester. Because of the court's ruling, he argues, the prosecution was able to question prospective jurors concerning their thoughts regarding the appropriateness of a death sentence for the murder of a child molester, but he was unable to ask the prospective jurors if they would automatically vote for the death penalty in light of defendant's prior murder convictions. He asserts that this resulted in a constitutionally unfair advantage for the prosecution. In fact, defendant's claim that he was unable to ask prospective jurors whether prior murder convictions would cause them to automatically vote for the death penalty is belied by the record. As the trial court suggested, counsel asked numerous prospective jurors whether the existence of various special circumstances, including a prior murder conviction, would, by themselves, cause them to vote for death. The questions were framed in a neutral fashion, in a manner that would not necessarily have aroused suspicions that defendant had actually been convicted of prior murders, and elicited answers from prospective jurors that allowed defendant to gain insight into their views on the death penalty. [6] Defendant fails to show that the trial court's denial of his motion for separate juries precluded him from assessing the qualifications of the prospective jurors or otherwise resulted in fundamental unfairness.