Opinion ID: 3011391
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: B.T., 705 A.2d 1325, 1335-36.

Text: 21 privileges are ordinarily found in bilateral confidential relations: attorney-client, husband-wife, clergycommunicator, reporter-source, government-informer. And, of course, the privilege most recently recognized by the Supreme Court, the psychotherapist-patient privilege recognized in Jaffee, fits this standard schema. There is good reason for favoring relatively uncomplicated confidential relationships in assessing candidates for the application of evidentiary privileges as contemplated by Rule 501. Complex multilateral privileges such as the ones here sought would necessarily be extremely broad and unwieldy to enforce. We might, for instance, recognize such a privilege held by all of those with significant interests in confidentiality. Presumably, however, it would follow that the privilege could not be waived without the consent of all the potentially vast number of holders of the privilege. Such a privilege would essentially be unwaivable. Indeed, it is far from clear that such a protection would appropriately be labeled a privilege, in the sense employed in Rule 501, at all. Cf. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 15 n.14 (Like other testimonial privileges, the patient may of course waive the protection.). We might, on the other hand, view such a privilege as held by the state on behalf of all of those who have interests in confidentiality under the statutes. While such a solution would have certain practical advantages over the privilege just described, it would remain a poor fit for the framework of Rule 501. First of all, by placing the power to assert or waive the privilege in the hands of the government, the value of the privilege in promoting unhindered communication would be undermined. Because those who would benefit from the privilege would lack the power to control its application, they would be less able to rely on its protection when deciding whether to provide sensitive information. An uncertain privilege . . . is little better than no privilege at all. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 18 (quoting Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981)); see also In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at 1153-54 (noting the problems that would be created in allowing a parent to assert or waive a privilege created to protect the interests of a child). To the extent that the value of a privilege is thus 22 weakened, it is that much less able to overcome the value of promoting the availability of probative evidence. 16 Furthermore, the variety--both in kind and in magnitude --of the interests at stake calls for a more flexible approach than that possible with a Rule 501 privilege. For such a privilege would effectively grant to the state--or, more precisely, to a congeries of state and municipal agencies-- the power to withhold, or make available, an entire class of documents regardless of the particular complexities of the case. The resolution of discovery disputes of the sort presented in the case at bar would be best served by an approach that allowed the potentially wide variety of interests at stake to be incorporated into a solution balancing the need to protect sensitive information with the need to make relevant material available. Because the interests on both sides have the potential to be so very significant, it is especially important to define the scope of the release of information very carefully. And it seems unreasonable to expect that a government agency, in the midst of litigation, would be best placed to determine whether and to what extent sensitive information should be released. In short, a Rule 501 evidentiary privilege held by the government would be an unacceptably imprecise tool for the protection of a broad and varied landscape of interests. And given the fact that, as we discuss in the next subsection, a more precise and better located tool is available for that purpose, there is little reason to adopt such a problematic device. _________________________________________________________________ 16. We note that while separation of the privilege holder from the interested party substantially undermines the value of the privilege, such a separation is not always fatal to a privilege's recognition. The informer's privilege, for instance, is designed in large part to protect the privacy interests of the informer. It is held, however, by the government, which may freely waive it notwithstanding the desires of the informer. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957) (What is usually referred to as the informer's privilege is in reality the Government's privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law.). Once the government reveals the identity of the informer, the privilege is waived. Id. at 60. Because of the inherent difficulties with such bifurcated privileges, however, they are very rare indeed. 23 In sum, we find that Rule 501 is unsuited for the kind of privilege that appellants have requested: one that maintains its protection despite the express waiver of the primary holder of interests in confidentiality. Given the caution with which federal courts are to approach all questions of novel privileges, we have little trouble rejecting any such privilege. c. Our rejection of appellants' requested privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 should not be taken to amount to a determination that the unhindered release of the information here in dispute is appropriate. On the contrary, district courts have the power, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), to issue protective orders constraining--in any of a variety of ways--the release of sensitive information. Given the potential weight of the considerations in favor of confidentiality of the information here in dispute, the present case is a good candidate for a thorough and conscientious assessment of the various considerations for and against confidentiality. Rule 26(c) empowers the court to issue protective orders which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense. Legitimate interests in privacy are among the proper subjects of this provision's protection.It is appropriate for courts to order confidentiality to prevent the infliction of unnecessary or serious pain on parties who the court reasonably finds are entitled to such protection. Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3d Cir. 1994). Such an order is only appropriate, however, where the party seeking the order show[s] good cause by demonstrating a particular need for protection. Id. To make a showing of good cause, the party seeking confidentiality has the burden of showing the injury with specificity. Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984). The injury shown, however, need be no more than embarrassment; thus, a party need not establish a monetizable injury. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986). Further, in appropriate circumstances, a district court is empowered to 24 issue umbrella protective orders protecting classes of documents after a threshold showing by the party seeking protection. See id. at 1122. Rule 26(c) further provides that such orders may be crafted to create any of a broad range of requirements, including (1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had; (2) that the disclosure or discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of time or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the disclosure or discovery be limited to certain matters; [and] (5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court . . . . Thus, Rule 26(c) provides district courts with the power to formulate a detailed solution that reflects the concerns of particular individual disputes. To that extent, it provides a superior mechanism for the resolution of the present dispute than does Federal Rule of Evidence 501. The District Court order appealed from in this case contains some restrictions of the kind authorized by Rule 26(c). In particular, the District Court ordered that certain identifying characteristics be redacted from certainfiles, that certain files not be viewed by plaintiff 's attorneys, and that all documents received by plaintiff be kept confidential. See supra, note 5. It is clear from the language of that order, however, that it represents an attempt to permit discovery to the extent possible consistent with the District Court's view of the restrictions created by the Pennsylvania statutes.17 A more apt approach to the resolution of this dispute would focus less on the letter of the Pennsylvania statutes than on an accommodation of plaintiff 's legitimate discovery interests with the legitimate interests of third _________________________________________________________________ 17. One of the three restrictions imposed by the District Court begins, In accordance with section 6307(2) of the Juvenile Act, and another purports to be imposed [p]ursuant to 55 Pa. Code S 3680.35(b)(5). See supra, note 5. 25 parties in the confidentiality of portions of the requested material. The flexibility of Rule 26 also allows the court to take into account the particular needs of the parties at the present stage of litigation, a consideration that we view as appropriate in this case. We note that the needs of appellant at this stage are relatively modest. As counsel for Ms. Pearson acknowledged at oral argument, her attorneys are simply interested in developing her case, and would not object to an order that, for instance, prevented anyone other than counsel from viewing or learning the contents of any of the material sought. Such a restriction seems entirely sensible at this point, since any restrictions that would (a) further legitimate interests in confidentiality, but (b) would not interfere with appellee's needs at this early stage, would be appropriate. Indeed, in view of the considerable significance of the interests in confidentiality here at stake, it would appear proper for the District Court to permit no greater release of the information sought by appellee than is absolutely necessary for the particular purposes for which it is sought. The parties may later seek to modify the order as appropriate at a later stage. See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 784 (It is well-established that a district court retains the power to modify or lift confidentiality orders that it has entered.). Accordingly, we reject appellants' request for the federal recognition of one or more evidentiary privileges derived from the Pennsylvania confidentiality provisions under which appellants have sought protection from discovery. We will vacate the order of the District Court, however, for reconsideration of the present discovery dispute in the light of this opinion. Because the District Court placed conditions upon discovery pursuant to inapplicable Pennsylvania law, we will direct the District Court to modify its discovery order to remove any conditions that were imposed solely to conform to state law. At that time, the District Court should entertain requests for protective orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) and impose such restrictions upon discovery as it deems appropriate. 26 A True Copy: Teste: Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 27