Opinion ID: 4530397
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Elements Clause

Text: The government’s position is that Smith’s bank robbery and attempted murder predicate convictions qualify as COVs under the elements clause because both require “the use, threatened use, [or] attempted use of physical force.” We agree with the Government. 4 To qualify as a COV, the predicate offense must have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). The phrase “physical force” in § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)’s identically worded force clause “means violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Johnson v. United States (Johnson I), 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). In deciding whether a crime falls within the ambit of § 924(c)(3)(A), we are guided by the categorial approach. See United States v. Buck, 847 F.3d 267, 274 (5th Cir. 2017). This approach provides that we only analyze the elements of Smith’s predicate offenses, 5 rather than the facts, and compare those elements to “the elements of the ‘generic’ crime—i.e., the offense as commonly understood.” Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013). If the elements of Smith’s predicate offenses necessarily involve “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or 4 On appeal, Smith is mum as to whether his predicate offenses are COVs under § 924(c)(3)’s elements clause. His position is that because this elements clause alternative was not before the district court, the government forfeited its opportunity to raise it before us. We disagree. As an initial point, the record reflects that the elements clause was before the district court and Smith actually addressed this alternative in his original briefing. Regardless, we are reviewing Smith’s § 2255 motion de novo and may affirm or deny on alternative grounds not presented to the district court, if this were the case. See Sealed Appellee, 900 F.3d at 666. 5 “Elements,” for purposes of categorical analysis, “are what the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the defendant.” Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). 4 Case: 18-10476 Document: 00515400622 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/30/2020 No. 18-10476 property of another,” then his predicate offenses may be treated as COVs for sentence-enhancement purposes. This categorical approach is employed “when a statute sets out a single (or ‘indivisible’) set of elements to define a single crime.” Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). If the statute at issue is divisible—that is, if it “lists multiple, alternative elements, and so effectively creates ‘several different . . . crimes’”—“we [employ the modified approach which we first] determine which crime formed the basis of the defendant’s conviction.” Descamps, 570 U.S. at 263–64 (quoting Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41 (2009). Once the charged crime is ascertained, we then do a categorical approach analysis, i.e., compare the generic crime’s elements to those disjunctive elements that formed the basis of the conviction. See id. at 260−63 (“[T]he modified approach merely helps implement the categorical approach when a defendant was convicted of violating a divisible statute.”).
We first look to Smith’s predicate aggravated bank robbery conviction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d). As we previously stated, “§ 2113(a) constitutes a crime of violence” under Section 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause. United States v. Pervis, 937 F.3d 546, 553 (5th Cir. 2019); see also United States v. Cheers, 760 F. App’x 272, 273–74 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (same with regard to a predicate offense of aiding and abetting an armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d)). In turn, because Smith’s federal bank robbery offense is a COV under the elements clause, his firearm convictions survive Smith’s habeas challenge. See Reece, 938 F.3d at 637 (“Federal bank robbery constitutes a COV” under § 924(c)(3)(A) “‘because the least culpable conduct under that statute requires, at a minimum, an implicit threat to use force.’”) (quoting United States v. Cadena, 728 F. App’x 381, 382 (5th Cir. 2018)