Opinion ID: 1670351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: maximum penalty

Text: As a threshold matter, I believe the Supreme Court's decision in Ring requires this Court to recede from its previous holding in Mills v. Moore, 786 So.2d 532, 537-38 (Fla.2001), that death is the maximum penalty for first-degree murder in Florida. Although the sentencing schemes in Florida and Arizona differ in that an Arizona jury has no role in the penalty phase of a death penalty proceeding, the statutes are otherwise identical regarding the prerequisites to the imposition of the maximum penalty. In Florida, section 782.04(1)(a) defines first-degree murder as a capital felony and section 782.04(1)(b) provides that the procedure in section 921.141 shall be followed to determine a sentence of death or life imprisonment. In Arizona, first-degree murder is a Class 1 felony and is punishable by death or life imprisonment. See Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-1105 (2001). Thus, by examining only the form of the statutes, it could be argued that in both Florida and Arizona the maximum penalty for first-degree murder is death. Indeed, the State of Arizona advanced this precise argument when it asserted in Ring that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), did not render its capital sentencing statute infirm. In rejecting Arizona's argument, the Court in Ring explained that if Arizona prevailed, Apprendi would be reduced to a `meaningless and formalistic' rule of statutory drafting. Ring, 536 U.S. at ___, 122 S.Ct. at 2441. The Court explicitly stated that the relevant question was not of form, but of effect. Id. at 2440 (emphasis supplied). In considering Arizona's statute, the Court noted that [t]he Arizona first-degree murder statute `authorizes a maximum penalty of death only in a formal sense,' for it explicitly cross-references the statutory provision requiring the finding of an aggravating circumstance before imposition of the death penalty. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied); see Ariz.Rev.Stat. §§ 13-1105(C), 13-703(6) (2001). Similar to the Arizona statute at issue in Ring, Florida's death statute explicitly cross-references the statutory provisions of section 921.141, which requires additional findings by a judge, not by a jury, as the precondition for imposition of the death penalty. Section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, provides: A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be punished by death if the proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in s. 921.141 results in findings by the court that such person shall be punished by death, otherwise such person shall be punished by life imprisonment and shall be ineligible for parole. (Emphasis supplied.) Section 921.141(3) states, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding the recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death, but if the court imposes a sentence of death, it shall set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is based as to the facts: (a) That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (5), and (b) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. (Emphasis supplied.) As we explained in upholding Florida's post- Furman capital sentencing scheme in State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1 (Fla.1973), a defendant convicted of first-degree murder is provided with five steps [58] between conviction and imposition of the death penalty: It is necessary at the outset to bear in mind that all defendants who will face the issue of life imprisonment or death will already have been found guilty of a most serious crime, one which the Legislature has chosen to classify as capital. After his adjudication, this defendant is nevertheless provided with five steps between conviction and imposition of the death penaltyeach step providing concrete safeguards beyond those of the trial system to protect him from death where a less harsh punishment might be sufficient. Id. at 7. In State v. Ring, 200 Ariz. 267, 25 P.3d 1139 (2001), the Arizona Supreme Court analyzed the Arizona death statute and stated: The range of punishment allowed by law on the basis of the verdict alone is life imprisonment with the possibility of parole or imprisonment for natural life without the possibility of release. It is only after a subsequent adversarial sentencing hearing, at which the judge ... acts as the finder of the necessary statutory factual elements, that a defendant may be sentenced to death. Id. Just like the Arizona sentencing scheme at issue in Ring, Florida's sentencing scheme requires additional findings by the judge before the death penalty can be imposed. See § 775.082. Neither the statutory label nor a dictionary definition [59] should obscure the effect of Florida's sentencing scheme. [60] In Florida, just as in Arizona, the death penalty cannot be imposed unless and until a trial court makes the additional findings of fact both that the aggravating circumstances exist and that the aggravators outweigh the mitigators. Life is the maximum penalty available under Arizona law for the defendant's crime based solely on the jury's verdict of guilt of first-degree murder. Similarly, in Florida, a first-degree murder verdict without additional findings pursuant to section 921.141 subjects a defendant to no more than a life sentence. See § 775.082(1) (stating that without findings by the court that a defendant shall be punished by death, ... such person shall be punished by life imprisonment). [61] The additional jury findings of aggravators before imposition of death are mandated not only by the plain language of the capital sentencing statute, but also by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as interpreted in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), and its progeny. Indeed, as recognized by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in Ring, the only reason the fact [the aggravating factor] is essential is that [the United States Supreme] Court has ... said that the Constitution requires state law to impose such `aggravating factors.' 536 U.S. at ___, 122 S.Ct. at 2444 (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, while the Eighth Amendment requires the findings of aggravating factors in an effort to ensure against the death penalty being imposed arbitrarily, the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by Ring requires that those aggravating factors be found by a jury. As Justice Scalia explained in Ring, the bottom line is that the fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all facts essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant receives whether the statute calls them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Janemust be found by a jury. Id. (emphasis supplied). On this initial essential question of the maximum penalty for first-degree murder, I must conclude that the maximum penalty after a finding of guilt in Florida is life imprisonment. The death penalty for first-degree murder cannot be imposed unless and until additional factual findings are made as to the existence of aggravators that outweigh the mitigatorsjust as in Arizona. I would thus recede from our decision in Mills to the extent that Mills held first that Apprendi did not apply to capital sentencing and second that the maximum penalty for first-degree murder in Florida is death. See Mills, 786 So.2d at 537-38. The statement in Mills as to the maximum penalty may be true in form, but through the lens of Ring the statement is not true in effect.