Opinion ID: 3152753
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Morgan’s Direct Appeal

Text: “Whether the government presented sufficient evidence to support a conviction is a legal question we review de novo.” United States v. Hernandez, 509 F.3d 1290, 1295 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). We “ask[] only whether, taking the evidence— both direct and circumstantial, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom—in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Baldridge, 559 F.3d 1126, 1134 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). “We will not reverse a conviction unless no rational trier of fact could have reached the disputed verdict. The evidence 9 The court granted Skeith’s motion for judgment of acquittal on all counts against him (Counts 1 through 62). It also granted Stringer’s similar motion as to Counts 30 through 62 (the Tenaska counts). Without either of these defendants, and having alleged no other co-conspirators, the government agreed to dismiss Count 30 (conspiracy count relating to Tenaska) against Morgan. The jury eventually acquitted Stringer of the remaining (Dilworth) counts against him (Counts 1 through 29). -8- necessary to support a verdict need not conclusively exclude every other reasonable hypothesis and need not negate all possibilities except guilt.” Id. (quotations omitted). To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B), the government must, of course, prove all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). Among those elements, and critical to this appeal, is that Morgan, while an agent of the State of Oklahoma, “corruptly solicit[ed] or demand[ed] . . . or accept[ed] or agree[d] to accept” Silver Oak’s retainer payments while “intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions” of the State of Oklahoma. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B). Morgan claims the government’s evidence on this element fell short. According to him, a bribery conviction requires proof of a quid pro quo, which, also according to him, requires a corrupt agreement between the payor and payee. In other words, as Morgan would have it, the government is required to show both he and Crosby acted with a corrupt intent. He says there was no evidence establishing Crosby’s corrupt intent—Crosby never testified to having intended to bribe Morgan and his testimony about needing “help” during their initial meeting is not enough for a jury to infer intent. (Morgan’s App’x, Vol. 5 at 1905.) He also claims the following evidence indicates Crosby’s intent was not to obtain his help in the legislature but rather to retain him for legitimate legal services: (1) Arguello’s e-mails to him, (2) Crosby’s request for help with traffic tickets, (3) Crosby’s -9- knowledge of Morgan’s past successful litigation against state agencies,10 and (4) Crosby’s admitted lack of knowledge of S.B. 738 until the government handed him a copy of the bill when it recruited his testimony.11 In support of his argument that both parties must have a corrupt intent, Morgan relies primarily on United States v. Dean, 629 F.3d 257 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Dean was employed by the District of Columbia Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA). Among other things, she processed “various license applications, for example, licenses needed by establishments for their elevators.” Id. at 258. Her scheme was to inform applicants the payments for a timely license submission could be made by check but all late fees had to be paid in cash. Id. She would then keep the cash payments for her own use. Id. After a local hotel employee informed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) about this activity, the FBI set up a sting operation. Id. The hotel employee (acting on instruction from the FBI) approached Dean seeking additional licenses. Consistent with her general scheme, Dean informed the employee that the 10 Trial testimony established that Morgan could, as a legislator-lawyer, sue state agencies, but he could not represent clients before the agencies. 11 Morgan did not raise the “bribery requires both the payor and payee to have a corrupt intent” argument in his motion for judgment of acquittal. Our review, therefore, would normally be for plain error. United States v. DeChristopher, 695 F.3d 1082, 1091 (10th Cir. 2012). However, we need not decide whether he meets the stringent plain error standard because his argument fails under even the more lenient de novo review. United States v. Cooper, 654 F.3d 1104, 1118 (10th Cir. 2011). Moreover, “a conviction in the absence of sufficient evidence will almost always satisfy all four plain-error requirements. Thus, our review for plain error in this context differs little from our de novo review of a properly preserved sufficiency claim.” United States v. Gallegos, 784 F.3d 1356, 1359 (10th Cir. 2015). - 10 - timely license fees may be paid by check but late fees of $1,275 could only be paid in cash. Id. After the employee gave Dean the $1,275 in cash, Dean was arrested, charged, and subsequently found guilty of soliciting a bribe and extortion. Id. The appellate court reversed her conviction, writing: There was no agreement between the parties that the $1275 was for Dean personally. She accepted the money ostensibly on behalf of the DCRA with every indication that the fee was required for the [license]. Furthermore, we see nothing in the record to suggest that the [hotel] expected favorable processing of the license or that Dean agreed to provide favorable processing. Id. at 260. Therefore, the government failed to prove an agreement between Dean and the hotel that she would perform her official duties in return for a personal benefit to the hotel. Id. at 259-60. Dean, however, does not require proof of corrupt intent on the part of both parties. As the D.C. Circuit subsequently made clear, the use of the word “agreement” in Dean was used as a synonym for specific intent. When, as in Dean, a public official is charged with soliciting a bribe, the evidence must show that the official conveyed an intent to perform official acts in exchange for personal benefit. Accordingly, the element absent in Dean [was] an intent to offer or solicit an exchange of official action for personal gain. United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Dean’s conviction was set aside not because the hotel employee lacked corrupt intent but because Dean did—she accepted or solicited the money ostensibly on behalf of the DCRA but not with an intent to use her position or influence to garner favorable licensing treatment for the hotel. In other words, Dean’s crime was theft, not bribery. - 11 - The Ring case is even more instructive. Ring, a lobbyist, was convicted of honestservices fraud (by bribery) based on his having provided dinners, drinks, travel, concerts, and sporting events to congressional and executive branch officials. Id. at 464. Because he was prosecuted for honest services fraud on a bribery theory, the parties agreed the government had to prove the elements of bribery. Id. at 467. Like Morgan, however, Ring claimed the jury instructions were flawed because they failed to require the jury to find the public officials receiving the favors had agreed to the corrupt exchange. Id. at 466-67. But there was no error: The bribery statute expressly criminalizes a mere “offer” of something of value with the intent to influence an official act. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1). That the official need not accept that offer for the act of bribery to be complete is evident from the structure of the statute, which defines two separate crimes: the act of offering a bribe and the act of soliciting or accepting a bribe. See id. § 201(b)(1)– (2). Confirming this interpretation, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 92 S. Ct. 2531, 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1972), that, with respect to a bribe payee, the “acceptance of the bribe is the violation of the statute.” Id. at 526, 92 S. Ct. 2531. The parallel proposition in the context of a bribe payor is straightforward: the offer of the bribe is the violation of the statute. Indeed, we have made clear that the quid pro quo need not be “fully executed for the act to be considered a bribe.” Orenuga, 430 F.3d at 1166. Because bribery does not require the official to agree to or actually complete a corrupt exchange, neither does honest-services fraud by bribery. Although we need look no further than black-letter bribery law to reach this conclusion, the fact that the wire fraud statute “‘punishes the scheme, not its success,’” Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 371, 125 S. Ct. 1766, 161 L.Ed.2d 619 (2005) (quoting United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2000)), lends further support to our conclusion that a defendant may be guilty of honest-services bribery where he offers an official something of value with a specific intent to effect a quid pro quo even if that official emphatically refuses to accept. In other words, though the offerer of a bribe is guilty of honest-services fraud, his attempted target may be entirely innocent. See United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (bribe payer’s culpability may differ from official’s culpability). - 12 - Id. at 467. Although Ring addressed 18 U.S.C. § 201, the statute prohibiting bribes and gratuities by federal officials, we see no reason a different result would follow under the statute here, § 666.12 Morgan also relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. SunDiamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999), where, when addressing § 201, the Supreme Court required a “quid pro quo—a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act.” Id. at 404-05. Morgan hangs his hat on the “quid pro quo” language but his argument exceeds elastic limits. The Court was not saying bribery requires both parties to a bribe to have corrupt intent. Rather, it was distinguishing between bribery and an illegal gratuity, both penalized, but in different sections of § 201. Id. In the end, the Court merely held that to establish a violation of the illegal gratuity statute, “the Government must prove a link between a thing of value conferred upon a public official and a specific ‘official act’ for or because of which it was given.” Id. at 414. The key question in this case, then, is not whether both Morgan and Crosby had a corrupt intent but whether Morgan had a corrupt intent—whether he had the intent to 12 Section 666 is the offspring of 18 U.S.C. § 201. It applies criminal sanctions to bribery by “an agent of an organization, or of a State, local, or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof” where the entity “receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1), (b). As the parties acknowledge, the Oklahoma legislature qualifies as such an entity. - 13 - receive the retainer fees from Silver Oak in exchange for his legislative influence.13 Not surprisingly, Morgan says no. He points to the evidence establishing it is neither illegal nor unethical for him, as a legislator-lawyer, to have an attorney-client relationship with Silver Oak or to charge his clients a monthly retainer fee. He also claims the following evidence negates an inference of his having acted with a corrupt intent: (1) his regular arrangements with other clients for fees in the form of a nonrefundable monthly retainer; (2) his lack of involvement as S.B. 738 proceeded through the Senate and House; and (3) the bill’s application to the industry as a whole, not Silver Oak specifically. He also says the lack of any attempt to conceal his arrangement with Crosby—he deposited the fees into his law office account—belies any corruption.14 Morgan’s argument is unconvincing. The retainer agreement between Morgan and Crosby was made at a meeting at Morgan’s office in the Capitol. The meeting was 13 Although the quid pro quo requirement for bribery requires an intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act, it was not necessary for Morgan to have contemplated S.B. 738 or any other specific act when he solicited the bribe (only that he expected to take some official action in exchange for money). See United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513, 520-21 (6th Cir. 2009). Morgan so conceded at oral argument. 14 According to Morgan, the government admitted at sentencing there was insufficient evidence supporting his conviction by asking “the Court, in spite of its findings, to consider the fact that any fair evaluation of this evidence leads to the conclusion that Mr. Morgan was, at the very least, right up against the line over and over in his dealings with these supposed clients.” (Government’s Supp. App’x, Vol. 3 at 1244.) Morgan takes this statement completely out of context. It was made after the court sustained his objection to consideration of the bribes involving clients other than Silver Oak as relevant conduct. The government’s reference to “this evidence,” read in its proper context, refers to the evidence the government presented at sentencing concerning the other bribes, not the bribe involving Silver Oak. - 14 - brokered by a lobbyist hired to promote Silver Oak’s governmental relations. Crosby told Morgan “[he] didn’t care whether it was a phone call, legislation, meetings,” he just needed “help” in getting the ODH “off [his] back.” (Morgan’s App’x, Vol. 5 at 1905.) Morgan insisted on a monthly retainer, even though he could not represent Silver Oak before the ODH. See supra n.10. Shortly thereafter, Huser learned that “a legislator” requested a meeting between the ODH and Silver Oak representatives to take place at the Capitol. (Id. at 1949.) Seven and a half months later, Morgan introduced a bill favorably addressing Silver Oak’s problems. There was no written engagement letter in spite of the monthly “retainer” Morgan insisted upon.15 Moreover, despite Morgan’s claim to be providing legal representation to Silver Oak, Arguello’s e-mails went unanswered, Morgan’s monthly bill to Silver Oak did not specify the legal services provided, and there was no evidence of any legal services actually performed for Silver Oak (absent Morgan’s self-serving claim to have consulted with Crosby about a possible lawsuit against the ODH). Finally, shortly after the bill was signed into law, Crosby informed Morgan that Silver Oak would no longer pay because its principals decided to limit its “political involvement.” (Morgan’s App’x, Vol. 7 at 2701 (emphasis added).) 15 Although such letter is not required by the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, it is common when retaining the legal services of an attorney and was also common in Morgan’s practice with other clients. While not determinative, the absence of an engagement letter may, in context, be part of the totality of the circumstances a jury may consider. - 15 - The rules governing Oklahoma’s “citizen legislature” allow its members to maintain an outside source of income, something Morgan emphasizes. (Morgan’s App’x, Vol. 6 at 2392.) Indeed, he points to trial testimony establishing that a legislator-lawyer may continue to legislate on matters affecting a client’s interest, so long as the legislation is applied to an industry on a state-wide basis. But, as he admits, the same line of testimony also established such a practice to be unlawful if the legislator-lawyer is paid to do so. Neither federal law nor Oklahoma rules allow a legislator to accept payment in return for wielding political influence. Moreover, S.B. 738’s effect on the industry as a whole (even if beneficial) does not negate corrupt intent. “[A] valid purpose that partially motivates a transaction does not insulate participants in an unlawful transaction from criminal liability.” United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 113 (2d Cir. 1993) (quotations omitted). Finally, Morgan claims he did not attempt to cover up his facial arrangement with Crosby; he deposited the payments he received from Silver Oak into his law office account and testified that his arrangement with Crosby was for legal services he provided. But those aware of all of the facts, for instance the jurors, could conclude he did so merely to conceal the real purpose behind the payments. And that skepticism could well be justified. Parts of Morgan’s story are dubious. He claimed Crosby hired him to determine whether Silver Oak could sue the ODH. But Crosby’s legal armada included an attorney who specialized in dealing with the ODH. And Morgan had no written record of his communications with Crosby. He claims the lack of a written record was for - 16 - Crosby’s protection, but the attorney-client privilege would most likely have adequately met that purpose. Perhaps the hallmark of our jury system is the jury’s role in resolving uncertainty. It, alone, is left to find the facts. And the fruits of its effort lie in the verdict. The jury could have believed Morgan’s version of events but did not.16 See United States v. Oliver, 278 F.3d 1035, 1043 (10th Cir. 2001) (“It is left to the jury to weigh conflicting evidence and to consider the credibility of witnesses.”) (quotations omitted). Instead, this jury determined Morgan demanded retainer fees with the intent to “help” Crosby through his position as an influential legislator. Its decision is rationally supported by the evidence.17 16 As the court aptly explained in denying Morgan’s motion for acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence: [I]t is clear that Morgan’s motion must be denied. Each instance on which Morgan relies to dispute the validity of the jury’s verdict functions in that way only if the Court views his interpretation of the evidence in a manner favorable only to Morgan. For example, when arguing the import of his initial conversation with Crosby, Morgan offers a plausible explanation for the conversation between the two men. However, Morgan’s explanation is not the only one, and in fact the jury’s verdict clearly rejects that explanation in favor of the reasoning offered by Plaintiff at trial. As Plaintiff’s brief makes clear, there was evidence offered at trial which would establish each element of the crime of conviction. That Morgan can now offer an innocent explanation for that evidence does not entitle him to acquittal. (Morgan’s App’x, Vol. 1 at 273.) 17 In his reply brief, Morgan suggests the jury convicted him on Count 63, despite his claim of insufficient evidence, because it was confused and improperly influenced by the evidence presented of the dismissed counts and the evidence concerning his codefendants, including co-conspirator hearsay. But the jury’s mixed verdict (conviction on one count, acquittal on others, no verdict as to others, and acquittal of co-defendant (Continued . . .) - 17 -
Morgan quarrels with the way the jury was instructed on the specific intent required for conviction. But he did not object to the instruction given, limiting our review to plain error. United States v. Davis, 750 F.3d 1186, 1191 (10th Cir. 2014). “Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), an appellate court may, in its discretion, correct an error not raised at trial only where the appellant demonstrates that (1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotations omitted). The relevant portion of the instruction governing the bribery charge required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt: That the defendant solicited, demanded, accepted, or agreed to accept anything of value from another person; [and] That the defendant did so corruptly, that is, with the intent to be influenced in connection with some business, transaction, or series of transactions of the State of Oklahoma. Stringer) suggests just the opposite; it properly distinguished between the counts and defendants. To the extent Morgan is seeking review of the court’s denial of his motion for a severance of counts and defendants or its admission of co-conspirator hearsay, he is simply too late. See M.D. Mark, Inc. v. Kerr–McGee Corp., 565 F.3d 753, 768 n.7 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he general rule in this circuit is that a party waives issues and arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”). - 18 - (Morgan’s App’x, Vol. 1 at 179 (emphasis added).) The instruction further stated: “A person acts corruptly when that person acts with the understanding that something of value is to be offered or given to influence him in connection with his official duties.” (Id. at 180 (emphasis added).) It also provided: “[W]hen payments are accepted by a public official from a payor with the intent to obtain that official’s actions on an ‘as needed’ basis, so that when the opportunity presents itself that public official takes official action on the payor’s behalf in return for those payments, that constitutes bribery.” (Id. at 180-81 (emphasis added).) In his motion for new trial, Morgan argued the latter two instructions erroneously described the payor’s intent not the recipient’s and therefore improperly allowed the jury to convict him if it concluded merely that he had knowledge of Crosby’s corrupt intent, even absent any corrupt intent on his part. Stated differently, the jury may have based his conviction on Crosby’s corrupt intent, not his own. The trial court rejected this argument because Morgan’s arguments focused on very narrow portions or phrases of the instructions, rather than considering them as a whole.18 When properly considered, the 18 We read and evaluate jury instructions in their entirety to “determine whether the instructions, examined in the light of the record as a whole, fairly, adequately, and correctly state the governing law and provide the jury with an ample understanding of the applicable principles of law and factual issues confronting them.” United States v. Denny, 939 F.2d 1449, 1454 (10th Cir. 1991). Generally, “[f]aulty jury instructions require reversal when (1) we have substantial doubt whether the instructions, considered as a whole, properly guided the jury in its deliberations; and (2) when a deficient jury instruction is prejudicial.” Jones v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 674 F.3d 1187, 1198 (10th Cir. 2012). - 19 - instructions fairly and correctly stated the applicable law. But if the supplemental instructions were erroneous, the court concluded, the error did not “so seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings that the Court should grant a new trial.” (Morgan’s App’x, Vol. 2 at 533.) Morgan now reiterates the arguments made in the trial court, relying on a Second Circuit decision, United States v. Ford, 435 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2006). Ford was an officer of a state employees’ union that received federal funds. Id. at 206. The bribery charge against her alleged she accepted free media services for her reelection campaign and, in return, she steered overpriced union work to the media services provider. Id. Ford objected to the district court’s instruction, which stated in relevant part: “A person acts corruptly when the person acts with the understanding that something of value is to be offered or given to influence her in connection with her organizational duties.” Id. at 211 (quotations omitted). The appellate court reversed Ford’s conviction because the instruction “appear[ed] to have told the jury that the ‘corruptly’ requirement was fully satisfied by [Ford’s] knowledge of the donor’s intent and omitted any reference to [Ford’s] intent in accepting the thing of value . . . .” Id. Morgan’s situation is easily distinguished from Ford’s. Here the court told the jury it could not convict unless it found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Morgan demanded or accepted his retainer fees “with the intent to be influenced in connection - 20 - with some business, transaction, or series of transactions of the State of Oklahoma.”19 (Morgan’s App’x, Vol. 1 at 179 (emphasis added).) Although the supplementary language, standing alone, may have been ill-advised in this case, the instructions as a whole could not have misled or confused the jury regarding the government’s burden of proof. See United States v. Smith, 13 F.3d 1421, 1424 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Only where the reviewing court has substantial doubt that the jury was fairly guided will the judgment be disturbed.”) (quotations omitted). There was no error.
Prior to Morgan’s trial, Crosby was arrested and charged with bank fraud. The bank fraud scheme involved Crosby submitting invoices to a bank which falsely alleged that he had purchased cattle. The invoices allowed Crosby to draw on the line of credit he had with the bank. He also sold the cattle he had used to secure the line of credit without notifying the bank and kept the proceeds. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to one count of making a false statement to a bank. The government disclosed the investigation documents, the charge, and the subsequent plea agreement to the defense. 19 The jury instructions in Ford did describe “intending to be influenced” as Ford’s intent. 435 F.3d at 212. However, the Second Circuit found these instructions lacking because, among other things, they allowed the jury to find such intent simply if Ford was aware of the payee’s intent to give something of value for the purposes of influencing her. Id. at 213. The court held that while this awareness “might well constitute strong circumstantial evidence” of the requisite intent, it alone was not enough. Id. Here, in contrast, the jury was specifically told it had to find Morgan “solicited, demanded, accepted, or agreed to accept anything of value from another person” and he did so “with the intent to be influenced in connection with some business, transaction, or series of transactions of the State of Oklahoma.” (Morgan’s App’x, Vol. 1 at 179.) - 21 - The disclosure revealed the participation of Crosby’s daughter who accepted some cattle from him and then gave her father the proceeds after she sold them in her own name. The disclosure also included allegations, in the form of an affidavit from one of the victims, that Crosby fraudulently sold securities in the form of “Preferred Membership Interests” (PMIs) in 2005.20 (Morgan’s App’x, Vol. 1 at 340.) During jury selection, the defense requested Crosby’s presentence report (PSR), which the government supplied (with the court’s permission). The report included information about Crosby’s bank fraud scheme, his daughter’s involvement, and the loans he received from various individuals in the form of PMIs.21 Despite these disclosures, Morgan sought an 20 After trial, the defense learned that in 2011 another victim of Crosby’s PMI scheme had contacted a Colorado lawyer who in turn contacted the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC transferred the matter to the Oklahoma Department of Securities, which brought an action to enjoin Crosby from offering and selling unregistered securities in Oklahoma. Two months after the verdict against Morgan, Crosby stipulated and consented to the injunctive relief requested. 21 Morgan complains the information contained in Crosby’s PSR concerning the PMI scheme was simply that Crosby had incorrectly listed the money he received from the scheme as equity when he obtained his line of credit from the bank. He contends this information gave him no basis to investigate the PMI scheme further. But the report did outline the scheme: Agents also received information from the defendant’s previous accountant that [Crosby] was receiving loans from various individuals in the form of Preferred Member Interest (PMIs) in his numerous business interests and that the defendant guaranteed investors 10% on their investments. The accountant believed these investments began in 2003 or 2004 and estimated [Crosby] received approximately $3,000,000 from investors. (Morgan’s App’x, Vol. 8 at 4.) This information, in conjunction with the previous disclosure from one of the victims, was sufficient notice of the need to investigate. Morgan also complains he did not receive the PSR until jury selection, giving him insufficient time to investigate or verify what was said in the report. But, prior to jury (Continued . . .) - 22 - evidentiary hearing and, in a motion for a new trial, claimed the government failed to disclose tacit agreements it made with Crosby in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and knowingly presented false evidence in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). The court denied Morgan’s requests. It determined the government timely provided all relevant material. Further, it concluded any undisclosed agreements, if they existed, were immaterial because defense counsel fully addressed Crosby’s credibility at trial and additional information would not change the result. Morgan repeats his trial court arguments here. He claims the government knew Crosby was subject to significant additional criminal charges, including bribery (this case), securities fraud, money laundering, and mail fraud. Further, it knew Crosby’s daughter was involved in the bank fraud scheme. In addition, Morgan contends Crosby lied about his assets, employment, and income in his presentence investigation interview. According to Morgan, the government’s failure to prosecute either Crosby or his daughter for any of this conduct should inescapably lead one to conclude the government agreed to much more than was stated in Crosby’s plea agreement. He further claims the government’s failure to seek forfeiture of the assets Crosby received from his criminal activities demonstrates an undisclosed tacit agreement not to do so. selection, Morgan did have the affidavit from one of the victims of the PMI scheme. Moreover, jury selection occurred on February 13, 2012; Crosby was not cross-examined until February 24. In any event, Morgan never requested a continuance. - 23 - Finally, Morgan maintains the government allowed false testimony to go uncorrected at trial. Crosby’s plea agreement stated it protected him only from prosecution for false statements to the bank from January 2003 through June 2008 (bank fraud) and “does not provide any protection against prosecution for any crime not specifically described above.” (Morgan’s App’x, Vol. 7 at 2729.) The agreement further provided: “[T]his document contains the only terms of the agreement concerning [Crosby’s] plea of guilty in this case and that there are no other deals, bargains, agreements, or understandings that modify or alter these terms.” (Id. at 2730.) Morgan argues these assertions were false because there were other deals the government was well aware of and it failed to correct the contrary false statements to the jury.22 Morgan also faults the government for not fully explaining the agreement’s statement: “It is the expectation of the United States that its criminal investigation of the defendant’s conduct (as opposed to the wrongdoings of others) will cease upon the signing of this plea agreement.”23 (Id. at 2723.) 22 Morgan also complains that when his counsel attempted to point out to the jury that Crosby had not been charged with bribery, the court sustained the government’s objection. But the question posed was improper because it indicated the punishment for bribery was fifteen years. See Chapman v. United States, 443 F.2d 917, 920 (10th Cir. 1971) (no error in prohibiting jury from being informed of the mandatory minimum sentence); see also United States v. Peña, 930 F.2d 1486, 1491-92 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Unless a specific statute permits the jury to play a part in meting out punishment, the jury’s sole role in a criminal case is to determine whether a defendant is guilty of the crime charged.”). Defense counsel elected not to re-phrase the question. 23 Morgan says the government rewarded Crosby for his testimony with a sentence of five years of probation. Actually Crosby was sentenced to “zero months” imprisonment, which was the result of a downward variance from the advisory guideline (Continued . . .) - 24 - But, except for his claim about Crosby’s lies during his presentence interview, Morgan knew prior to trial (from the government’s disclosures) about the underlying facts he now suggests prove tacit agreements. He could have cross-examined Crosby on these issues but did not. He chose instead to focus on Crosby’s need to cooperate in this case in order to avoid a harsh sentence in his bank fraud case. While he may have had a tactical reason for not inquiring further, Morgan, in fact, had the information and could have used it rather than lying behind the log in order to create issues for appeal. In any event, he has failed to establish that either a Brady or Napue violation occurred. Brady “established the principle that criminal convictions obtained by . . . suppression of exculpatory or impeaching evidence violates the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1172 (10th Cir. 2009). “The government’s obligation to disclose exculpatory [or impeaching] evidence does not turn on an accused’s request” and “the duty to disclose such information continues throughout the judicial process.” Id. at 1172-73. range of 41 to 51 months imprisonment. (Government’s Supp. App’x, Vol. 2 at 980.) While the government did seek a departure for Crosby’s cooperation, it still recommended Crosby be sentenced to a year and a day. It appears the sentencing judge (a different judge than the judge in this case) varied downward based on Crosby’s cooperation as well as his significant health issues. In any event, we will not automatically “infer a preexisting deal subject to disclosure under Brady” merely because the government chooses to treat a witness favorably following a trial. Bell v. Bell, 512 F.3d 223, 234 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also Shabazz v. Artuz, 336 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2003) (post-trial favorable treatment of a witness, standing alone, is insufficient to establish that the prosecution promised leniency to the witness prior to trial). - 25 - “Brady requires disclosure of tacit agreements between the prosecutor and a witness. A deal is a deal—explicit or tacit. There is no logic that supports distinguishing between the two.” Douglas, 560 F.3d at 1186; see also Bell v. Bell, 512 F.3d 223, 233 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). “A conviction based on testimony implicating concealed incentives to an important witness is potentially tainted.” Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003). “[P]articularized impeachment through possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives arising in connection with as-yet uninitiated or uncompleted criminal prosecution” may be important because it suggests “why the witness might by lying.” Id. at 1215 & n.18 (quotations omitted). “And such impeachment increases in sensitivity in direct proportion to the witness’s importance to the state’s case.” Id. at 1215 (quotations omitted). Under Napue, “criminal convictions obtained by presentation of known false evidence” also violate due process. Douglas, 560 F.3d at 1172; see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972) (“[D]eliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with rudimentary demands of justice.”) (quotations omitted). “The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.” Douglas, 560 F.3d at 1172 (quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 269). Crosby was the key witness for the government as to Count 63. But Morgan merely speculates about undisclosed tacit agreements prior to his trial. He points to no solid evidence of any such agreement. The government’s failure to prosecute either Crosby or his daughter or to seek civil forfeiture of his assets is simply not enough. See - 26 - Jefferson v. United States, 730 F.3d 537, 552 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he fact that both [witnesses] were not prosecuted for particular crimes, without more, is insufficient . . . to establish that an undisclosed deal existed.”). The cases relied on by Morgan illustrate this point. Each case involved evidence demonstrating an undisclosed agreement was reached between the government and a witness prior to trial. For example, in Cargle, the witness to a murder was promised immunity in exchange for his testimony. 317 F.3d at 1214. However, a few years before the trial, the witness had been given a deferred sentence on an assault charge. Id. His current involvement in the murder would have “expos[ed] him to an immediate sentence of up to twenty years’ imprisonment on the pre-existing assault conviction.” Id. “When [later] asked by an investigator . . . whether non-acceleration of the deferred sentence had been a (tacit) part of his agreement to testify in petitioner’s case, [the witness] admitted that he had received an assurance from the district attorney that nothing would come up in court about the deferred sentence.” Id. at 1215 (emphasis added). We concluded “there evidently was an additional, and quite significant, quid pro quo for [the witness’s] cooperation, which was not recited in the [immunity] agreement and never disclosed to the jury.” Id. at 1214. Similarly, in Douglas, the witness testified at two murder trials and “provid[ed] the only direct evidence linking [the defendants] to the murder.” 560 F.3d at 1174. After the trials, the witness executed a handwritten affidavit recanting his trial testimony and “asserting that he had received the [prosecutor’s] assistance in exchange for his testimony, contrary to his denials at both trials.” 560 F.3d at 1167. We agreed with the - 27 - district court that the prosecutor’s failure to disclose his deal with the witness violated Brady and the violation was material. Id. at 1175; see also LaCaze v. Warden La. Corr. Inst. for Women, 645 F.3d 728, 735-36 (5th Cir.) (witness claimed he repeatedly received assurances his son would not be prosecuted prior to implicating defendant), amended by 647 F.3d 1175 (5th Cir. 2011); Harris v. Lafler, 553 F.3d 1028, 1030-31 (6th Cir. 2009) (witness testified the police promised he and his girlfriend would be released from custody if he implicated defendant); Graves v. Dretke, 442 F.3d 334, 340-44 (5th Cir. 2006) (prosecutor informed media five years after trial that star witness had admitted prior to trial that he had acted alone in murders yet prosecutor had failed to reveal this information to defendant; the witness’s trial testimony had the defendant involved in the murders). Unlike Cargle, Douglas, and the other cases relied upon by Morgan, neither Crosby nor the government has admitted to Crosby having been promised anything other than that to which he testified at trial—hopes for a lenient sentence in his bank fraud case. Morgan also relies on United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1986). Shaffer was convicted of drug and income tax violations. 789 F.2d at 684. The court affirmed Shaffer’s entitlement to a new trial due to, inter alia, “the government’s failure to disclose that [the key trial witness] did in fact have assets which were acquired through drug profiteering (i.e., a house in Palm Springs and funds to enter a health spa).” Id. at 689. It said this nondisclosure “coupled with the government’s failure to initiate asset forfeiture proceedings to acquire these assets, implies that a tacit agreement was reached - 28 - between [the witness] and the government that allowed [the witness] to avoid any asset forfeiture liability in exchange for his cooperation.” Id. The court rejected the government’s argument that “because there was no explicit agreement [on the forfeiture issue], it had nothing to disclose”: “While it is clear that an explicit agreement would have to be disclosed because of its effect on [the witness’s] credibility, it is equally clear that facts which imply an agreement would also bear on [his] credibility and would have to be disclosed.” Id. at 690. Morgan claims the government failed to disclose Crosby’s lies during his presentence interview, much like the government’s nondisclosure in Schaffer. But Morgan discovered the claimed misrepresentations after he conducted his own investigation and does not claim (let alone demonstrate) the government was aware of the lies during the relevant time. Evidence of misrepresentation or misleading on the part of the government is lacking and Morgan has failed to provide evidence of an agreement.24 Instead, he merely speculates about a possible agreement based on the government’s charging decisions. Speculation is not enough. “Without an agreement, no evidence was suppressed, and the 24 Morgan cites a string of Second Circuit cases wherein the prosecution deliberately withheld evidence or failed to correct perjured testimony. Neither circumstance is present in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 457 (2d Cir. 1991) (government “consciously avoided recognizing” that witness was lying and instead sought to rehabilitate him on redirect examination); Perkins v. Le Fevre, 691 F.2d 616, 619 (2d Cir. 1982) (prosecutor deliberately withheld rap sheet of a key witness showing he had two prior felony convictions). - 29 - state’s conduct, not disclosing something it did not have, cannot be considered a Brady violation.” Bell, 512 F.3d at 234 (quotations omitted). We see no violation of Napue, which prohibits the presentation of known false evidence to the jury. Because Morgan has provided no evidence of any other deals, he has not demonstrated Crosby’s trial testimony concerning his plea agreement and the absence of any other deals was false. Not only that, but Morgan had the relevant facts from the government which he now uses to assign a sinister motive to the government. He could have inquired more thoroughly about these facts on cross-examination and let the jury decide the credibility issue rather than saving it for appeal.