Opinion ID: 849062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: master's findings

Text: After conducting a formal hearing, the master issued his report on December 7, 2000. He found that respondent had appointed Fletcher as counsel for indigent criminal defendants in matters over which she presided, and had approved payment of legal fees to Fletcher during the period between April 1998 and August 1999, when she and Fletcher had been engaged in an intimate relationship. The master also found that Fletcher had received a disproportionate number of appointments in comparison with other attorneys who practiced before respondent. He concluded that respondent violated the Code of Judicial Conduct by making these appointments to Fletcher. [3] He stated that a judge is enjoined by this provision from allowing social or other relationships to influence conduct or judgment, and is further prohibited from making appointments on the basis of considerations other than merit. [4] The master also found that such appointments had the appearance of impropriety and erode[d] public confidence in the judiciary. [5] Nonetheless, the master concluded that he could not recommend discipline because the JTC has not promulgated a policy respecting disproportionate assignments to close personal friends of the judge, and consequently the Supreme Court has not been called upon to enunciate a rule of law ... justifying a recommendation for the imposition of discipline. Moreover, the master determined that, because respondent had a subjective good-faith belief that she could impartially hear cases in which Fletcher appeared, she was not required by the Code of Judicial Conduct, or by MCR 2.003 [6] to disclose the relationship with Fletcher, or to raise on her own the matter of her disqualification. The master concluded that he was unable to recommend disciplinary action against respondent for this conduct. Concerning allegations that respondent had made false statements to the police, the master determined that the statements were inaccuracies. However, he concluded that [t]he substance, if not the detail, of Chrzanowski's responses was accurate and [v]iewed as a whole, the information conveyed to the officers was accurate. The master found as a matter of law that, unless a statement by a judge is a lie, i.e., `a false statement made with deliberate intent to deceive,' there is not misconduct or conduct clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice within the meaning of Const. 1963, art. 6, § 30, justifying a recommendation of discipline. The master concluded that respondent did not make statements to the police with deliberate intent to deceive, and did not lie to the police. On the basis of these findings, the master recommended dismissal of the charges concerning respondent's statements.