Opinion ID: 512413
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jones' Anectodal Evidence

Text: 98 Lastly, Jones offered anectodal evidence of individual actions within the Department which he alleged were racially-tinged.Anectodal testimony recounting personal experiences of discrimination plays an important role in Title VII litigation. Such testimony may '[bring] the cold numbers convincingly to life.'  99 Segar, 738 F.2d at 1277 (citing Valentino v. United States Postal Service, 674 F.2d 56, 68 (D.C.Cir.1982) (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 338-39, 97 S.Ct. at 1855-56)). 100 Jones proffered evidence that several Departmental employees had received discipline ranging from written reprimands to mandatory apologies for using racial epithets on the job. 10 The relevance of these concededly deplorable racial epithets, as a whole, is questionable. First, only one of these remarks was attributed to a supervisor. The other two were made by lower-ranking personnel. 101 Not only is it hard to see how an isolated racial slur could be thought a significant enough event to count as employment discrimination; it is unclear what practical steps an employer could take to purge all racially offensive speech from the work place. An employer is not charged by law with discharging all Archie Bunkers in its employ. Howard v. National Cash Register Co., 388 F.Supp. 603, 606 (S.D.Ohio 1975). That would be an unrealistic burden. 102 Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., Engine Div., 797 F.2d 1417, 1421 (7th Cir.1986). Second, in all three instances the Department took immediate action to discipline each employee. Third, even though the discipline in each case fell short of demotion, the violations, although certainly meriting some form of discipline, were simply not comparable to an intentional act of physical violence against another's person. See note 9, supra. 103 In addition, Jones offered two other anectodal pieces of evidence which the district court found persuasive. First, Lieutenant Ronald Moore, who is black, testified that he was transferred to another engine house after three white firefighters under his command requested that they be transferred. Moore testified that the white deputy chief who approved the transfer, Robert Stott, told Moore that the reason for the transfer was to give the white men some relief. Second, Jones offered evidence that Deputy Chief Robert Smith, who is white, once sat in on a disciplinary hearing for a black lieutenant because, in the district court's words, he felt that an all-black disciplining inquiry would cause 'controversy.'  Lieutenant John Alsobrook, black, was scheduled to be disciplined by his District Chief, Floyd Newsum, who is also black. 104 While the Department offered some evidence that these two decisions were unmotivated by racial animus, 11 we simply note that Jones' evidence, at best, shows no more than the mere occurrence of isolated ... sporadic discriminatory acts. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336, 97 S.Ct. at 1855. When viewed in the context of Jones' entire case, these two instances fail to show the repeated, routine, or generalized denial of rights necessary to constitute a pattern or practice of discrimination. Id. at 336 n. 16, 97 S.Ct. at 1855 n. 16. Although not entirely irrelevant, Jones' anectodal testimony, even when considered together with all the other evidence of departmental discipline, is insufficient to make out a case of a pattern and practice of racial discrimination. 105 We are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court erred in finding that the Memphis Fire Department engaged in a pattern or practice of administering disparate discipline on the basis of race. That being so, under the terms of the parties' 1980 consent decree, the district court was, therefore, without jurisdiction to hear this case.