Opinion ID: 73319
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Yeomans

Text: The district court ruled that Yeomans was entitled to absolute immunity for his testimony before the grand jury on July 16 and 17, 1992. Although Yeomans received 10 absolute immunity for his grand jury testimony, that immunity does not reach back to protect him for any activities he allegedly engaged in prior to taking the witness stand for his grand jury testimony. See Strength v. Hubert, 854 F.2d at 425. In Strength, the court stated that the determination that a witness has absolute immunity from civil liability based on the witness's grand jury testimony does not end the court's inquiry. Strength, 854 F.2d at 425. The court went on to state that pretestimonial acts in the furtherance of an alleged conspiracy may form the basis for a cause of action under section 1983 for deprivation of constitutional rights. Strength, 854 F.2d at 425. Therefore, even though Yeomans is entitled to absolute immunity for his testimony before the grand jury, that immunity cannot extend backwards to protect him for his alleged involvement in conspiring to violate Mastroianni's constitutional rights. Strength, 854 F.2d at 425; Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29 (1980). Mastroianni alleged that in October 1991, Jackson and Yeomans met with him at the GBI office and threatened to indict him if he did not give them something on Sheriff Smith. Moreover, Mastroianni claimed that Yeomans possessed information indicating that Mastroianni properly conducted the reverse sting operation that formed the basis for his grand jury indictment. Therefore, Yeomans's false testimony before the grand jury contradicting exculpatory evidence contained in his own file suggests that he may have agreed to facilitate an illegal arrest of Mastroianni.5 According to Mastroianni, Yeomans 5 The appellants contend that given Yeoman’s absolute immunity as a grand jury witness, any use of that testimony as evidence of unimmunized pretestimonial acts is 11 conspired with the other appellants to fabricate evidence to aid in his prosecution.6 Those alleged actions would not be protected under absolute immunity. Since genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Yeomans's alleged actions falling outside of the protection of forbidden. That is not and should not be so. The defendants are not being charged with liability for their participation in the grand jury proceedings, but for pretestimonial conduct. The grand jury testimony simply provides evidence of inconsistencies in the defendants’ actions which bolster the conclusion that they were conspiring. A recent Ninth Circuit case examined this very issue. Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1997), recognized that perjured grand jury testimony was immune, but that the subsequent official testimony was simply a part of the implementation of that conspiracy, a step in the overall plan. We do not believe that the general policy that immunizes false official testimony requires that we preclude [plaintiff] from showing the full range of occasions on which [defendants’] falsehoods were uttered, simply because some of them occurred before a grand or petit jury. Harris, 126 F.2d at 1189. Additionally, while the Supreme Court in Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 30 (1980), did hold that a judge was immune from suit based on conspiracy, the Court found that private parties who had conspired with the judge were not. The Court even anticipated that the judge might possibly have to testify about his actions--actions for which he was immune-- in order to establish the conspiracy. As in the situation at hand, the grand jury testimony is immunized, but can be used as evidence of a conspiracy. Moreover, a body of law has been established that, in the criminal context, creates an exception to testimonial immunity where the immunized witness lies under oath. See United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 1998) (cases collected therein). However, the Supreme Court in Briscoe v. Lattue, 460 U.S. 325, 339-41 (1983), while limiting its holding to perjury during trial, makes a distinction in dicta between civil and criminal penalties for perjury in all judicial proceedings. The dissent posits that “[t]o assume that Congress, which had enacted a criminal sanction against state officials, intended sub silentio to exempt those same officials from the civil counterpart approaches the incredible.” Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 362. 6 Yeomans was the GBI agent in charge of Mastroianni's investigation and in that capacity he gathered evidence to be used against Mastroianni. 12 absolute immunity, the district court properly denied Yeomans's motion for summary judgment based on absolute immunity.