Opinion ID: 874908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the possibility of child support is a direct consequence of a guilty plea to vehicular manslaughter

Text: Heredia pled guilty to vehicular manslaughter, defined in I.C. § 18-4006(3)(c) as vehicular  in which the operation of a motor vehicle is a significant cause contributing to the death because of: . . . (c) the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, without gross negligence. The possible punishments for non-felony vehicular manslaughter as described in I.C. § 18-4007(3) are: (c) For a violation of section 18-4006 3.(c), Idaho Code, by a fine of not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by a jail sentence not exceeding one (1) year, or by both such fine and jail sentence. (d) In addition to the foregoing, any person convicted of a violation of section 18-4006 3., Idaho Code, which resulted in the death of the parent or parents of minor children may be ordered by the court to pay support for each such minor child until the child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years. Support shall be established in accordance with the child support guidelines then in effect, and the nonpayment of such support shall be subject to enforcement and collection by the surviving parent or guardian of the child in the same manner that other child support orders are enforced as provided by law. In no event shall the child support judgment or order imposed by the court under this section be paid or indemnified by the proceeds of any liability insurance policy. (e) In addition to the foregoing, the driver's license of any person convicted of a violation of section 18-4006 3., Idaho Code, may be suspended for a time determined by the court. Heredia was not informed prior to his plea of the provision in I.C. § 18-4007(3)(d) that he might be ordered to pay child support. A guilty plea will only be upheld if the entire record demonstrates that the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Ray, 133 Idaho at 99, 982 P.2d at 934; Colyer, 98 Idaho at 33-34, 557 P.2d at 627-28. There is a prima facie showing that a plea was entered into knowingly and voluntarily when the minimum requirements of I.C.R. 11 are met. Ray, 133 Idaho at 99, 982 P.2d at 934. Idaho Criminal Rule 11 states that when a defendant in Idaho enters a guilty plea the record of the entire proceedings, including reasonable inferences therefrom, must show: . . . the defendant was informed of the consequences of the plea, including minimum and maximum punishments, and other direct consequences which may apply. I.C.R. 11(c)(2). The trial court is not required to inform a defendant of consequences that are collateral or indirect. Huffman, 137 Idaho at 887, 55 P.3d at 880; Ray, 133 Idaho at 99-101, 982 P.2d at 934-36. The Court discussed three factors in Ray: (1) the defendant's power to prevent the consequence; (2) the punitive or remedial nature of the consequence; and (3) the amount of control the sentencing judge has over imposing the consequence. Ray, 133 Idaho at 99-101, 982 P.2d at 934-36. The power to prevent analysis infers that where a possible consequence is within the defendant's power to prevent, such as persistent violator status, it is collateral to a guilty plea. Id. at 99, 982 P.2d at 934. The amount of control discussion by the Court infers that where a judge has no control over a consequence, such as mandatory registration on the sex offender watch list, it is collateral to a guilty plea. Id. at 101, 982 P.2d at 936. These factors indicate that a direct consequence is involved where a judge has a large amount of control over the consequence and the defendant had no power to prevent its occurrence. In Ray, the Court also assessed the remedial or punitive nature of the consequence in determining whether sex offender registration was a direct or collateral consequence, concluding that registering was not a deterrent, that the primary intent of the legislature was informative, that it was not excessive in relation to its non-punitive purpose, and that a defendant can petition to be relieved of the duty to register. Id. at 99-101, 982 P.2d at 934-36. Analysis of the factors discussed in Ray lead to the conclusion that child support is a direct consequence of a guilty plea to vehicular manslaughter. Heredia had no power to prevent the consequence of child support. The judge had control of the consequence of child support. Doubtless there are remedial elements in the possibility of child support in the vehicular manslaughter statute. However, it is also clear that there is a strong punitive intent in the statute. The possibility is listed under I.C. § 18-4007, entitled Punishment for Manslaughter. Also showing the punitive nature of the consequence is the provision that [i]n no event shall the child support be paid or indemnified by proceeds of a liability insurance policy. I.C. § 18-4007(3)(d). If the child support were purely remedial in nature, one of the ways to ensure payment would be through an insurance policy. Part of knowingly and intelligently pleading guilty involves understanding the nature of the consequences which the Court may impose. This includes analysis of the disproportionate nature of the consequence when compared to the other consequences of which the defendant was informed. Heredia was told of the possibility of a maximum $2,000 fine, a year of jail time, and suspension of his driving privileges. Child support for five minor children until they reach the age of 18 is of major magnitude in comparison to the financial threat of the fine of which he was advised. Heredia should have been advised of the potential by the magistrate court before entering a plea.