Opinion ID: 1435910
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Conviction of uncharged offenses Constructive Amendment.

Text: Roberts next contends that he was unconstitutionally convicted, both of carnal knowledge and of rape, on the basis of facts not found by, and perhaps not even presented to, the grand jury which indicted him. Russell, supra, 369 U.S. at 770, 82 S.Ct. 1038. His argument in that regard is two-fold. He claims first, that the indictment was not sufficiently specific to assure that he would be tried only for the offenses charged by the grand jury, and second, that the prosecutor constructively amended the indictment by introducing evidence of uncharged crimes and obtaining Roberts' conviction of them. Given our construction of each count of the indictment as alleging a series of individual incidents rather than a single one, see Part II B, supra, and our conclusion that the indictment is not unconstitutionally vague, the first of these two contentions cannot prevail. [T]wo or more acts, each of which would constitute an offense standing alone and which therefore could be charged as separate counts of an indictment, may instead be charged in a single count if those acts could be characterized as part of a single, continuing scheme. Shorter, supra note 14, 257 U.S.App.D.C. at 360, 809 F.2d 54 at 56. That is how the charging documents were framed in Lakin, Mancinone, and Niemetz. All of the evidence presented by the government relating to sexual assaults on K.L.W. during the periods specified in the indictment fell within the course of conduct charged therein. For substantially the same reasons, we are likewise unpersuaded by Roberts' claim that the amendment was constructively amended. It is necessary, however, to explicate the theory on which Roberts bases this claim. With respect to his carnal knowledge conviction, Roberts relies on K.L.W.'s own testimony. K.L.W. told the jury at trial that she did not reveal to the government the specifics of the only incident identified in the bill of particulars until she spoke with a prosecutor who became involved in the case after the return of the indictment. [16] Thus, according to Roberts, the grand jury did not know about, and therefore could not have indicted him upon, the conduct that led to his conviction of carnal knowledge. Roberts makes a different, though related, argument with respect to his conviction of rape. He points out, correctly, that the only incident identified in the bill of particulars as relating to the rape charge is one that occurred in October 1992. K.L.W. also claimed to have been raped in May 1992, however, and it was the alleged May rape that resulted in her pregnancy and in the subsequent birth of her daughter. The jury heard testimony regarding both of these incidents, and Roberts argues that the verdict as to the rape count may very well have been based on the alleged May 1992 sexual assault. Pointing to the fact that the May incident was not mentioned in the government's bill of particulars, Roberts reasons that it was not part of the indictment, that he therefore may have been convicted of an offense for which the grand jury did not indict him, and that the indictment had thus been constructively amended to charge the May incident. If we were to accept Roberts' contention that each count of the indictment referred only to a single discrete incident, then we would be bound to agree with his claim of constructive amendment. Given our view that each count specified a series of incidents or course of conduct, however, the evidence at trial corresponded to the grand jury's allegations. Although the details of the carnal knowledge incident specified in the bill of particulars had not been presented to the grand jury, that body heard ample evidence of the course of conduct of which that incident was a part. Nowhere in the criminal law do we require all evidence presented at trial to be presented to the grand jury; it is custom and practice to present just enough to get the indictment. United States v. Staggs, 881 F.2d 1527, 1535 (10th Cir.1989) (Logan, J., concurring). Finally, the course of conduct alleged in Count Three embraced both of the rapes regarding which the jury heard evidence.