Opinion ID: 501759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedural Change

Text: 32 The Court in Dobbert began its analysis by reiterating the well settled principle that the ex post facto clause does not  'limit the legislative control of remedies and modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance.'  Id. at 293, 97 S.Ct. at 2298 (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171, 46 S.Ct. 68, 69, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925)). As a corollary to this principle, the Court noted [e]ven though it may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, a procedural change is not ex post facto. Id. The Court discussed two cases to support this proposition. Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884). In Thompson, the Missouri supreme court reversed the defendant's conviction because of the inadmissibility of certain evidence in a case tried on circumstantial evidence. Prior to his retrial, the law was changed to make the evidence admissible and the defendant was again convicted. The Thompson Court held that the change which rendered the incriminating evidence admissible was procedural and did not violate the ex post facto clause because it did not enlarge the punishment to which the accused was liable when his crime was committed, nor make any act involved in his offense criminal that was not criminal at the time he committed the murder of which he was found guilty. 171 U.S. at 387, 18 S.Ct. at 924. Similarly in Hopt, the Court held that a statute removing disqualification of certain classes of people who could be witnesses was procedural and hence did not violate the ex post facto clause. 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262. See also Beazell, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (passim; new law on joint trial procedural). The Court in Dobbert concluded on the basis of the foregoing authorities that the change in Florida's sentencing law was procedural and therefore was not ex post facto. 432 U.S. at 293-94, 97 S.Ct. at 2298. 33 In the present case, as in Dobbert, Thompson and Hopt, Montana's new sentencing statute is procedural. The statute simply altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed...., Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293-94, 97 S.Ct. at 2298, and did not change the punishment prescribed, or the quantity or degree of proof necessary to establish guilt. Id. (citing Hopt, 110 U.S. at 589-90, 4 S.Ct. at 210). See also McCahill, 765 F.2d at 850-51 (law affecting bail pending appeal procedural); Knapp v. Cardwell, 667 F.2d 1253, 1262-63 (9th Cir.) (Arizona death penalty law enlarging ability to introduce mitigating factors held procedural), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1055, 103 S.Ct. 473, 74 L.Ed.2d 621 (1982); Ward v. California, 269 F.2d 906 (9th Cir.1959) (passim ) (state law allowing introduction of evidence of defendant's background and history and of any facts in aggravation or mitigation of death penalty was procedural; one judge denial of certificate of probable cause, per Pope, J.). Even if Montana's new statute disadvantaged Coleman, therefore, it is procedural and not ex post facto.B. Ameliorative Change 34 The Court in Dobbert further held that Florida's new death penalty statute, viewed in toto, was ameliorative. The former statute established a presumption in favor of the death penalty and was unconstitutional. 432 U.S. at 294-97, 97 S.Ct. at 2298-2300. The new Florida law, in contrast, established extensive procedural protections and had been upheld in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976). Here, Coleman was first sentenced under a mandatory death penalty statute which was unconstitutional. Thereafter, he was sentenced under a new statute which established extensive procedural safeguards (Mont.Code Ann. Secs. 95-2206.6 through 95-2206.15) and is constitutional. Coleman II, 185 Mont. 299, 605 P.2d 1016-17 (and discussion infra section IV). 35 Coleman attempts to distinguish Dobbert by arguing that whereas Dobbert was tried, convicted and sentenced under a constitutional statute, he was tried and convicted under an unconstitutional mandatory death penalty statute, but sentenced under a constitutional statute. Relying on Dobbert, we rejected an identical ex post facto challenge to the Arizona death penalty statute in Knapp, 667 F.2d at 1262-63. In Knapp, several of the appellants were tried, convicted and sentenced under an Arizona death penalty statute later declared unconstitutional. Thereafter, their sentences were vacated and they were resentenced to death under a constitutional statute. Id. at 1257-58. We rejected appellants' attempt to distinguish Dobbert as a distinction without ex post facto implications, id. at 1262, because the new statute was both procedural and ameliorative. Id. at 1263. The effect of the new Arizona statute, like the new Montana statute, was to enlarge the ability of defendants to introduce mitigating circumstances at sentencing. Id. Thus, it 'neither made criminal a theretofore innocent act, nor aggravated a crime previously committed, nor provided greater punishment, nor changed the proof necessary to convict.'  Id. (citation omitted). C. The Review Process 36 Coleman also argues that the new statute violated the ex post facto clause because it changed the process by which a sentence of death was reviewed in Montana. Under Montana's death penalty statute in force at the time Coleman committed the acts of which he was convicted, and at the time he was tried and first sentenced to death, he had a statutory right to have his sentence reviewed by a Sentence Review Division. Mont.Code Ann. Secs. 95-2502, 2211 (amended 1977). This review was designed to determine the appropriateness of the sentence with respect to the individual offender and particular offense, McKenzie, 171 Mont. 278, 557 P.2d at 1029, and gave a convicted person the right to have his sentence reviewed for equity, disparity, or consideration of justice. State ex rel. Greely v. District Court, 180 Mont. 317, 590 P.2d 1104, 1110 (1979). 37 The new statute abolished review of death sentences by the Sentence Review Division and replaced it with automatic review by the Montana supreme court. Coleman II, 185 Mont. 299, 605 P.2d at 1006; Mont.Code Ann. Secs. 95-2206.12 through 95-2206.15. Under the new law, the State supreme court reviews a death sentence to determine (1) whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; (2) whether the evidence supports the sentencing judge's findings of the existence or nonexistence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances listed in the new statute; and (3) whether the sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. Id. Sec. 95-2206.15. Coleman contends this is a substantive change because the Montana supreme court's review is limited, whereas the review commission had wide discretion to reverse a death sentence for equity, disparity, or consideration of justice. This argument proceeds on the false premise that the Montana supreme court's review is limited. It also overlooks the fact that while nebulous considerations of equity and justice could have operated to a defendant's advantage in reversing a death sentence under the old law, those vague terms could just as easily have worked to his disadvantage in upholding a death sentence arbitrarily imposed. See Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 294, 97 S.Ct. at 2299 (finality of jury determination of life or death under old law could operate equally to defendant's advantage or disadvantage; change in law to permit review by court not ex post facto ). 38 Moreover, the Montana supreme court's review is not limited to a restricted list of mitigating circumstances. The court reviews a death sentence to determine whether the evidence supports the sentencing judge's findings of the existence or nonexistence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances specified in Mont.Code Ann. Secs. 95-2206.8 and 92-2206.9. There is, in addition, a final all-encompassing subsection (8) that requires consideration of [a]ny other fact ... in mitigation of the penalty. Id. Sec. 95-2206.9(8). While this final aspect of the court's review is focused on facts which were presented to the sentencing judge, the Montana supreme court makes an additional independent review of the case to determine whether the sentence was imposed under influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors, id. Sec. 95-2206.15(1), and whether the sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. Id. Sec. 95-2206.15(3). These review procedures, coupled with the review of mitigating factors, provide at least the same, if not greater, breadth of review as existed under the former statute, and provide a defendant with the added protection that his sentence review will not be limited to the potentially arbitrary application of a reviewing court's notions of equity and justice. 39 We conclude, as did the district court and the Montana courts, that no ex post facto violation occurred by the application of Montana's 1977 death penalty statutes to Coleman in imposing the death sentence upon him. 40