Opinion ID: 2637261
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the juvenile court's use of the clear and convincing evidentiary standard at the permanency hearing was proper

Text: ¶ 8 The juvenile court made findings using the heightened clear and convincing evidentiary standard at S.M.'s permanency hearing. S.M. never objected to the use of the heightened standard  not in response to the court's permanency order, not at the termination trial, and not on appeal to the court of appeals. The court of appeals, however, concluded that by using the heightened standard, the juvenile court took it upon itself to treat Mother's permanency hearing as a sort of pre-termination hearing. S.M. v. State (State ex rel. B.R.), 2006 UT App 354, ¶ 76, 144 P.3d 231. The court of appeals concluded that by finding facts by clear and convincing evidence, the juvenile court was erroneously addressing termination and use of the heightened standard resulted in Mother going into her termination trial in the face of a multitude of previously established facts. Id. We review the court of appeals' decision for correctness and disagree with its conclusion. Use of the clear and convincing standard at a permanency hearing is not improper, and all parties to these proceedings should be aware that the trial court has the option of making findings by the heightened standard. [6] ¶ 9 At a permanency hearing where reunification services have previously been ordered by the court, the juvenile court is charged with determining whether the minor may safely be returned to the custody of the minor's parent. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-312(2)(a) (Supp.2007). The juvenile court may determine that the child may not be returned to her parent only [i]f the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that return of the minor would create a substantial risk of detriment to the minor's physical or emotional well-being. Id. § 78-3a-312(2)(b). ¶ 10 Contrary to S.M.'s assertions and the court of appeals' opinion, the juvenile court did not make conclusions about the termination of S.M.'s parental rights at the permanency hearing. It simply made factual findings that were necessary to its determination of the children's safety for the reunification services question by a standard of proof higher than that required by the statute. Those findings, while relevant to the termination question and relied on later by the juvenile court in its consideration of the termination issue, did not mandate a particular outcome at the termination trial. The same conduct that was relevant in determining the children's safety was also relevant to S.M.'s termination. However, S.M.'s unfitness and failure of parental adjustment, along with other grounds for termination of parental rights contained in Utah Code section 78-3a-407, were not considered by the juvenile court at the permanency hearing. Instead, the failure to substantially comply with the service plan, including sporadic and inconsistent attempts at substance abuse treatment, missed visits with the children due to continued drug use, a lack of stable housing and employment, and failure to attend mental health treatment, were factual findings relied upon by the juvenile court in determining that the children could not be safely returned to their mother's custody. These questions  whether the children could be safely returned and whether continued provision of reunification services was warranted  were the only issues considered at the April 2005 permanency hearing. Contrary to the court of appeals' assertion, S.M. was not deprived of notice that termination would be considered at the permanency hearing because, in fact, termination was never considered. The evidence presented at the permanency hearing regarding S.M.'s conduct and her lack of substantial compliance with the service plan, however, was relevant to the separate and subsequent issue of termination, and there was no detriment to S.M. in the court's reliance at the termination hearing on that evidence, which had been already subjected to the appropriate standard of proof. ¶ 11 In this case, the juvenile court's adoption of factual findings from the permanency hearing when it considered termination of S.M.'s parental rights avoided the necessity of reintroducing all of the evidence previously produced at the permanency hearing. Moreover, and importantly, those findings were supplemented with new information offered at the termination trial, including significant evidence about S.M.'s conduct after the permanency hearing and up to the date of the termination trial. Use of the earlier findings allowed the court to forgo hearing the same evidence twice. The facts related to S.M.'s conduct prior to the permanency hearing could not change between the two proceedings  history could not be rewritten. [7] S.M. could not fail to substantially comply with the service plan up until April 2005 at one hearing and then demonstrate substantial compliance for the same time period four months later. In fact, use of a heightened standard for proof of noncompliance is more protective of S.M.'s rights at the permanency hearing. [8] We stress that merely because the same evidence may be relevant at a permanency hearing and a termination trial, the overlapping evidence does not amount to a predetermination of the termination issue. As in this case, the juvenile court did not consider whether termination was appropriate  i.e., S.M.'s unfitness  until the August termination trial; the permanency hearing merely focused on the ability to safely return the children to S.M.'s custody. Thus, we conclude that use of the heightened evidentiary standard of clear and convincing evidence at the permanency hearing is permissible.