Opinion ID: 1866125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Teague exceptions analysis.

Text: We earlier noted that Teague recognizes two exceptions to the rubric that new rules do not apply retroactively to collateral review cases. So our remaining task is to determine whether Morgan's case fits either exception. Morgan concedes the first exception does not apply. He argues, however, that the second one does. For reasons that follow, we disagree. The second exception permits retroactive application of a new rule to collateral review cases when the change creates a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating issues of fundamental trial fairness. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310-11, 109 S.Ct. at 1075-76, 103 L.Ed.2d at 356-57; Brewer, 444 N.W.2d at 81. As the State correctly notes, Teague recognizes that few constitutional decisions would qualify as watershed criminal rules. Such rules would be limited to those the violation of which would undermine the fundamental fairness that must underlie a conviction or seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction. Teague, 489 U.S. at 290, 109 S.Ct. at 1064, 103 L.Ed.2d at 359. So fundamental fairness and accuracy are the hallmarks of watershed rules. The Court gave examples of what it was talking about: We are ... of the view that [watershed criminal rules] are best illustrated by recalling the classic grounds for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus that the proceeding was dominated by mob violence; that the prosecutor knowingly made use of perjured testimony; or that the conviction was based on a confession extorted from the defendant by brutal methods. Id. at 313, 109 S.Ct. at 1077, 103 L.Ed.2d at 358. As we said, before Coy v. Iowa several Supreme Court decisions emphasized that face-to-face confrontation was not essential for sixth amendment purposes. In additionas the State correctly notesan exception to the requirement of face-to-face confrontation underlies every hearsay question in a criminal case. Given these cases, we can scarcely say that using one-way closed circuit television is on par with obtaining a flawed conviction by mob violence, perjured testimony, or a confession obtained through the use of brute force. Use of the procedure would notin our viewundermine the fundamental fairness that must underlie a conviction. Nor would it seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction. See Craig, 497 U.S. at ____, 110 S.Ct. at 3159, 111 L.Ed.2d at 682 (holding that similar procedure adequately ensures that the testimony [of the child] is both reliable and subject to vigorous adversarial testing in a manner functionally equivalent to that accorded live, in-person testimony). In sum, we find no error in the district court's refusal to apply Coy v. Iowa retroactively to Morgan's conviction.