Opinion ID: 2768720
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of List and Envelope

Text: We review the district court’s admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) for a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 234 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2682 (2014). Under this standard, we affirm so long as the district court’s decision was not based on a clear error of judgment or an application of the wrong legal standard. See United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296, 1312 (11th Cir. 2005). Rule 404(b) provides that: Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Such evidence, however, is admissible for other purposes, such as proving motive, intent, knowledge, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). We have held that evidence of a defendant’s other crimes or acts is admissible under Rule 404(b) when: (1) it is relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character; (2) sufficient proof exists for a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the acts in question; and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007). When determining the probative value of extrinsic act evidence, we 9 Case: 14-11324 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Page: 10 of 17 consider: (1) the government’s incremental need for the evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the similarity of the extrinsic act and the charged offense; and (3) the closeness or remoteness in time between the extrinsic act and the charged offense. United States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1268 (11th Cir. 2008). If extrinsic act evidence is essential to obtaining a conviction, it is more probative, and thus, more likely to be admissible. Sterling, 738 F.3d at 238. The risk of prejudice from extrinsic act evidence may be reduced by an appropriate limiting instruction. Ellisor, 522 F.3d at 1268. Rule 403 permits the district court to exclude relevant evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of “unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence is an extraordinary remedy, though, and it should be used sparingly. United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1295 (11th Cir. 2006). In conducting the Rule 403 analysis, we view any relevant evidence in the light most favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative value and minimizing any undue prejudicial impact. Id. Applying the above standards, we find no abuse of discretion in the admission, pursuant to Rule 404(b), of two of the items found in the search of Defendant’s apartment and car: (1) the envelope sent to “Ronald R.” at the Ocala 10 Case: 14-11324 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Page: 11 of 17 Road address and (2) the one list of 25 names with personal identification information, including “Ronald R.’s” name and identifying information. Contrary to Defendant’s argument, all three prongs of the Rule 404(b) admissibility test are met. First, the above information was relevant to an issue other than Defendant’s character. Specifically, the evidence was relevant in showing that Defendant conspired with and knowingly and intentionally participated in Phanor’s SNAP fraud scheme. Of course, such participation and intent were necessary elements that the government had to prove, and Defendant’s plea of not guilty put the government to its burden on all elements. See United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009) (to obtain a conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1349, the government must show Defendant knew of and willfully joined in the scheme to defraud); see also Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1345 (a defendant who pleads not guilty makes intent a material issue). But beyond the general need of the government to prove all elements of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, there was a more specific need for the evidence here. Specifically, while Defendant had acknowledged that he might not have much of a defense as to the substantive wire fraud counts—because there seemed to be ample evidence that he knew that he was not “David. M,” yet he used the latter’s EBT card to make purchases—Defendant made clear that he was 11 Case: 14-11324 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Page: 12 of 17 vigorously challenging the contention that he had conspired with Phanor as to the overall food stamp fraud conspiracy. To the contrary, Defendant intended to argue that he was but a buyer of one fraudulently-obtained EBT card from Phanor—the David M. EBT card—and was not otherwise involved in Phanor’s overarching conspiracy. Given that defense strategy, tying Defendant to the 1001 Ocala Road address that the government contended he had given to Phanor to use to receive future fraudulent EBT cards was extremely important because, if proved, that act by the Defendant meant that Defendant had been more than a buyer of one EBT card. Instead, it would mean he had acted to further Phanor’s food-stamp fraud conspiracy and scheme. Admission of the envelope addressed to “Ronald R.” at 1001 Ocala Road and found in the possession of Defendant was relevant to this end. Further, Defendant’s possession of this envelope addressed to “Ronald R.” at Ocala Road, with the enclosed debit card to “Ronald R.,” as well as the sheet with the list of personal identification information of 25 people, including “Ronald R.,” also bolstered the government’s argument that Defendant had not just helped Phanor in his conspiracy, but that he had done so knowingly and with the intent to assist Phanor’s fraud scheme. That is, evidence that Defendant possessed this envelope addressed to a “Ronald R.” at the same Ocala Road address he had given to Phanor, combined with Defendant’s admission that he was aware that the list of 12 Case: 14-11324 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Page: 13 of 17 names, including “Ronald R.’s,” was associated with some sort of fraudulent scheme, was evidence that strongly suggested Defendant’s knowledge that Phanor would not be using this Ocala Road address that Defendant had provided him for a benign purpose. This is so, because, indeed, Defendant was not using the address for such a purpose. In addition, the list of names was relevant to whether Defendant knew that the EBT card he used belonged to a real person, which the government had to prove in order to convict him of aggravated identity theft. See Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 647, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 1888 (2009). In his post-arrest statement, Defendant denied having any knowledge of “David M.” Yet, the evidence of this list of names of real people, combined with Defendant’s admission that he had been given the list of names with the understanding it would be used for some type of fraud and that he thought that some of the names on the list belonged to real people, was probative of an element that the government had to prove. Indeed, Defendant indicated his impression that one could discern that a name was not the name of a real person when the social security numbers were too long. In summary, this evidence was relevant to an issue other than Defendant’s character. Second, there was sufficient proof that Defendant committed the extrinsic act of possessing the Ocala Road envelope and the list of 25 names with the 13 Case: 14-11324 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Page: 14 of 17 knowledge that they were related to some sort of fraud. The list and envelope were found in Defendant’s car and, in his post-arrest statement, Defendant admitted that he had provided the Ocala Road address to the person who had given him the list and had arranged for the envelope to be sent. Further, Defendant admitted that he had been given the list of names, with the understanding that it would be used for fraud and that, in fact, some of the names on the list belonged to real people. Third, the evidence’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by any undue prejudice as the envelope and list were extremely important to the government’s case on the conspiracy and identity theft charges. See Sterling, 738 F.3d at 238. Again, the envelope was an important rebuttal to Defendant’s argument that he was merely a buyer, and not a participant in the SNAP fraud scheme. The envelope tied Defendant to the Ocala Road address and corroborated the evidence that Defendant had provided Phanor with the Ocala Road address. From this evidence, the jury could conclude that Defendant intentionally participated in the conspiracy by giving the Ocala Road address to Phanor, not for an innocent purpose, but for use in the SNAP fraud scheme. The list was also probative because, given Defendant’s argument that he did not know that “David M.” was a real person, this element was particularly in play. Defendant told the investigating officer that he knew that some of the identities on the list of names were real and that it was somehow related to fraud. This evidence, in conjunction 14 Case: 14-11324 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Page: 15 of 17 with additional testimony about the application and verification process for obtaining SNAP benefits, was relevant in proving that Defendant knew that a real identity had been used to obtain the EBT card. Finally, when the district court admitted the envelope and list, it gave an appropriate limiting instruction. Specifically, the jury was instructed that it was going to hear evidence about “acts of the defendant that may be similar to those charged in the indictment but may have been committed on other occasions” and that it could not “consider this evidence to decide if the defendant committed the acts charged in the indictment.” The jury was further instructed that the evidence could only be considered to decide whether Defendant “had the state of mind or intent necessary to commit the crime charged in the indictment” or “committed the acts charged in the indictment by accident or mistake.” This instruction minimized any unfair prejudice that might have resulted from admission of the list and the envelope. In sum, all of the requirements of Rule 404(b) were met with respect to the list and the envelope. Consequently, Defendant has not shown that the district court’s decision was based on a clear error of judgment.