Opinion ID: 2344034
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶ 23 The principal issue in these cases is whether certifications as to the existence or nonexistence of records are testimonial for purposes of the confrontation clause. An alleged violation of the confrontation clause is reviewed de novo. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999). When a violation has occurred, we then review for harmless error. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). [2]
¶ 24 The Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause confers upon the accused the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. As reflected in the constitutional text, the right applies to `witnesses' against the accusedin other words, those who `bear testimony.'. . . `Testimony,' in turn, is typically `[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.' Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court announced the rule that testimonial statements may not be introduced into evidence unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Crawford Court noted, however, that certain statements by their nature [are] not testimonialfor example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy. Id. at 56, 124 S.Ct. 1354. But, the Court declined to provide a comprehensive definition of `testimonial,' id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, leaving courts to develop[] their own interpretation of what is a `testimonial statement' for Sixth Amendment purposes. United States v. Martinez-Rios, 595 F.3d 581, 585 (5th Cir.2010). ¶ 25 In the companion cases of Kirkpatrick, 160 Wash.2d 873, 161 P.3d 990, and Kronich, 160 Wash.2d 893, 161 P.3d 982, we considered whether affidavits certifying the status of a defendant's driving privilege are testimonial statements covered by the Sixth Amendment. In Kirkpatrick, we addressed the specific issue whether a DOL certification as to the absence of a driver's license is testimonial for purposes of the Crawford analysis. 160 Wash.2d at 884, 161 P.3d 990. We held that neither certification of DOL drivers' records nor certifications as to the absence of such records are testimonial for purposes of Crawford.  Id. ¶ 26 In assessing the character of the DOL certification, we adopted the rationale set forth by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d 825 (9th Cir.2005) and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Rueda-Rivera, 396 F.3d 678 (5th Cir.2005). Kirkpatrick, 160 Wash.2d at 884-86, 161 P.3d 990. Those cases held that similar certifications were not testimonial statements, reasoning that although the certifications were prepared for litigation, the documents such certifications addressed were `part of a class of documents that were not prepared for litigation.' Id. at 885, 161 P.3d 990 (quoting Cervantes-Flores, 421 F.3d at 832-33). Recognizing this distinction, we analogized the DOL certification to nontestimonial business records, which exist prior to litigation. Id. at 885-86, 161 P.3d 990. We noted that, like business records, driving records have long been held admissible. Id. at 886, 161 P.3d 990. And we refused to recognize a basis for treating a document certifying the nonexistence of a driver's record any differently than the driving record itself. Id. Both documents are prepared by DOL records custodians for trial purposes and are produced according to the same process, based on identical requests from the relevant prosecutorial authorities. Id. at 887, 161 P.3d 990. ¶ 27 A slightly different certification was presented in Kronich. The defendant there was charged with DWLS in the third degree. Kronich, 160 Wash.2d at 898, 161 P.3d 982. To prove the charge, the State admitted into evidence a certified statement from DOL regarding the status of the defendant's driving privilege on the date of arrest. Id. The certification described the defendant's driving status as `suspended/revoked.' Id. at 897, 161 P.3d 982. We adhered to our reasoning in Kirkpatrick and held such a record is not testimonial for purposes of the Crawford analysis. Id. at 902, 161 P.3d 982. We stated that [t]he admissibility of such documents under the confrontation clause should not `turn on the content thereof when that content includes only verifiable facts, adduced by a government official in the regular course of his or her duties according to standardized procedure.' Id. at 903, 161 P.3d 982 (quoting Kirkpatrick, 160 Wash.2d at 887, 161 P.3d 990). ¶ 28 The United States Supreme Court's decision in Melendez-Diaz casts doubt on Kirkpatrick and Kronich. In Melendez-Diaz, the Court considered whether `certificates of analysis' introduced in a criminal prosecution were testimonial statements. 129 S.Ct. at 2531. The certificates reported the results of a forensic analysis establishing that a seized substance was cocaine. Id. The Court held the certificates were quite plainly affidavits, falling squarely within the `core class of testimonial statements' described in Crawford. Id. at 2532. The Court emphasized that the certificates were used for the purpose of establishing a fact at trial and thus were functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing `precisely what a witness does on direct examination.' Id. (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006)). The Court also underscored the fact that not only were the affidavits `made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,' Crawford, [541 U.S. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (internal quotation marks omitted)], but under Massachusetts law the sole purpose of the affidavits was to provide `prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight' of the analyzed substance, Mass. Gen Laws, ch. 111, § 13. Id. ¶ 29 In its discussion, the Melendez-Diaz Court rejected the government's attempt to distinguish the certificates from other statements that were more clearly testimonial. The government averred, for example, that the analysts are not subject to confrontation because they are not `accusatory' witnesses, in that they do not directly accuse petitioner of wrongdoing. Id. at 2533. The Court dismissed the argument as unsupported by either the constitutional text or the Court's case law. Id. It reasoned that [t]o the extent the analysts were witnesses (a question resolved above), they certainly provided testimony against petitioner, proving one fact necessary for his convictionthat the substance he possessed was cocaine. Id. ¶ 30 The government also argued the certificate was akin to a business or public record and thus not testimonial. Id. at 2538. In rejecting this argument, the Court explained that even if the certificates qualified as business records, they were nonetheless testimonial because they were created for use in court. Id. The Court made plain that [d]ocuments kept in the regular course of business may ordinarily be admitted at trial despite their hearsay status. But this is not the case if the regularly conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial. Id. (citation omitted). ¶ 31 In sum, the Court considered any document prepared for use in a criminal proceeding to be testimonial. It observed one exception: a clerk's certificate authenticating an official recordor copy thereoffor use as evidence. Id. Yet, the Court stressed that at common law, a clerk's authority in that regard was narrowly circumscribed. He was permitted `to certify to the correctness of a copy of a record kept in his office,' but had `no authority to furnish, as evidence for the trial of a lawsuit, his interpretation of what the record contains or shows, or to certify to its substance or effect.' Id. at 2538-39 (quoting State v. Wilson, 141 La. 404, 409, 75 So. 95 (1917)). Thus, [a] clerk could by affidavit authenticate or provide a copy of an otherwise admissible record, but could not do what the analysts did here: create a record for the sole purpose of providing evidence against the defendant. Id. at 2539. ¶ 32 Though not strictly necessary to resolve the case, the Court opined that a clerk's certification used to prove the absence of a public record is testimonial in nature and thus demands confrontation at trial: Far more probative here are those cases in which the prosecution sought to admit into evidence a clerk's certificate attesting to the fact that the clerk had searched for a particular relevant record and failed to find it. Like the testimony of the analysts in this case, the clerk's statement would serve as substantive evidence against the defendant whose guilt depended on the nonexistence of the record for which the clerk searched. Although the clerk's certificate would qualify as an official record under respondent's definitionit was prepared by a public officer in the regular course of his official dutiesand although the clerk was certainly not a `conventional witness' under the dissent's approach, the clerk was nonetheless subject to confrontation. Id. ¶ 33 Shortly after issuing Melendez-Diaz, the Court signaled its intent to follow this dicta. In United States v. Norwood , the Court vacated a Ninth Circuit judgment that had declared that a clerk's affidavit, certifying that a diligent search was performed and that no record existed, was not testimonial. 555 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir.2009), vacated, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 491, 175 L.Ed.2d 339 (2009). The Court remanded for further consideration in the light of Melendez-Diaz.  Norwood, 130 S.Ct. at 491-92. On remand, the government conceded the admission of the certification violated the defendant's right to confrontation. United States v. Norwood, 595 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir.2010). ¶ 34 A substantial majority of courts have held since Melendez-Diaz that clerk certifications attesting to the nonexistence of a public record are testimonial statements subject to confrontation. See, e.g., Martinez-Rios, 595 F.3d at 586 (overruling Rueda-Rivera and holding admission of a certificate regarding the nonexistence of immigration records violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right); United States v. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d 1156, 1161 n. 3 (9th Cir.2010) (overruling Cervantes-Flores and holding admission of a certificate regarding the nonexistence of immigration records violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right); United States v. Villacana-Ochoa, No. CR-10-0013-WFN-1, 2010 WL 3584013, at  (E.D.Wash. 2010) (holding certificate of nonexistence of a record was testimonial and prepared for use at trial but the confrontation clause was not violated because the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the official who signed the certificate); United States v. Montalvo-Rangel, No. SA-10-CR-64, 2010 WL 1484708, at  (W.D.Tex.2010) (concluding certificate as to the nonexistence of a record was testimonial but the confrontation clause was not violated because the defendant was able to cross-examine an immigration official who worked alongside the official who actually signed the record); Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Gumbs, 426 Fed.Appx. 90, 93-94 (3d Cir.2011) (unpublished) (holding certificate as to nonexistence of a firearms license is testimonial); United States v. Madarikan, 356 Fed.Appx. 532, 534-35 (2d Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (holding the trial court erred in admitting a certificate of nonexistence of record regarding the defendant's ability to reenter the United States); Tabaka v. District of Columbia, 976 A.2d 173, 175-76 (D.C.2009) (holding a certificate from a motor vehicles official, which certified to the absence of any records showing that defendant was issued an operator's permit, was testimonial); Washington v. State, 18 So.3d 1221, 1223-24 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009) (holding a certificate of nonlicensure is testimonial); Commonwealth v. Parenteau, 460 Mass. 1, 8-9, 11, 948 N.E.2d 883 (2011) (holding a certificate from the department of motor vehicles, attesting to the fact that a notice of license suspension or revocation was mailed to defendant, was testimonial, violated the confrontation clause, and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (citing Jasper, 158 Wash.App. at 531-32, 245 P.3d 228)). ¶ 35 We now follow suit. The federal opinions relied upon in Kirkpatrick and Kronich have been expressly overruled. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d at 1161 n. 3 ( Cervantes-Flores and its progeny are clearly inconsistent with Melendez-Diaz  and must be overruled to the extent they are irreconcilable with that case); Martinez-Rios, 595 F.3d at 585-86 (The government concedes that Melendez-Diaz implicitly overruled Rueda-Rivera, and we agree.). The certificates used in each case before us are plainly affidavits, falling within the core class of testimonial statements described in Crawford and Melendez-Diaz. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2532. They were created, and in fact used, for the sole purpose of establishing critical facts at trial. Because each certificate was `made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,' id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354), they are testimonial and require confrontation to comport with the Sixth Amendment. ¶ 36 Further, the certificates go beyond mere authentication of otherwise admissible public records. They `furnish, as evidence for the trial of a lawsuit, [the clerk's] interpretation of what the record contains or shows, [and] certify to its substance or effect.' Id. at 2539 (quoting Wilson, 141 La. at 409, 75 So. 95). They also serve as substantive evidence against the defendant whose guilt depended on the nonexistence of the record for which the clerk searched. Id. ¶ 37 The State urges us to stand by our decisions in Kirkpatrick and Kronich, arguing that the Supreme Court appears poised to retreat from its expansive view of Crawford. It notes that, after Melendez-Diaz, the Court in Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011), seemed again interested in reliability as part of the confrontation clause analysis. See Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 14. And, the State suggests the retirement of Justices Stevens and Souter may lead the Court to re-examine the term witnesses against in the Sixth Amendmentlanguage we found significant in Kirkpatrick. Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 20-21; see Kirkpatrick, 160 Wash.2d at 883, 161 P.3d 990. The State even goes so far as to suggest that based on his questions at oral argument in Bryant, Justice Breyer may have second thoughts about his vote in Crawford. Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 21. While the State's musings provide for interesting speculation, we must decide this case based upon United States Supreme Court precedent to date. ¶ 38 The Court in Melendez-Diaz rejected the rationale underlying our opinions in Kirkpatrick and Kronich, emphasizing that confrontation clause analysis does not focus on the nature of the particular records addressed by the certification, but on the nature of the certification itself. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2538. Most recently, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011), the Court signaled it remains focused on the testimonial nature of certifications and the need to cross-examine the government agents who prepare them. See 131 S.Ct. at 2715 (This Court settled in Crawford that the `obviou[s] reliab[ility]' of a testimonial statement does not dispense with the Confrontation Clause. (Alterations in original.)); id. n. 7 (Even so, [the analyst's] testimony under oath would have enabled Bullcoming's counsel to raise before a jury questions concerning [his] proficiency, the care he took in performing his work, and his veracity.). After Melendez-Diaz, it is difficult to regard certifications of the type here (especially those attesting to the nonexistence of official records) as akin to business records, which may be admitted into evidence without confrontation. Instead, as other courts have recognized since Melendez-Diaz, they are best understood as testimonial statements falling within the ambit of the Sixth Amendment. Accordingly, we hold the clerk's affidavits involved in these three cases are testimonial statements and we overrule Kirkpatrick and Kronich to the extent those opinions are contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent. Because the defendants were not given the opportunity to cross-examine the official who authored the certifications, the admission of the certifications into evidence violated the defendants' rights under the confrontation clause.
¶ 39 Confrontation Clause errors [are] subject to Chapman harmless-error analysis. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). Under this standard, the State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824; State v. Stephens, 93 Wash.2d 186, 190-91, 607 P.2d 304 (1980). Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors . . . includ[ing] the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431.