Opinion ID: 482542
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard and Scope of Sec. 7003 Liability

Text: 49 As an alternative basis for recovery of the response costs incurred before December 11, 1980, the government argues on cross-appeal that it can also recover its response costs pursuant to RCRA Sec. 7003(a), 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 6973(a) (West Supp.1986). The district court did not reach the recovery issue because it held that under RCRA Sec. 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6973(a) (prior to 1984 amendments discussed below), proof of fault or negligence was required in order to impose liability upon past off-site generators and transporters. 579 F.Supp. at 834-37. Because the government did not allege or prove negligence, the district court found no liability under RCRA Sec. 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9673(a) (prior to 1984 amendments). Id. at 837. The government argues that the standard of liability under RCRA Sec. 7003(a), 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 6973(a) (West Supp.1986), as initially enacted and as amended in 1984, is strict liability, not negligence, and that liability under RCRA can be imposed even though the acts of disposal occurred before RCRA became effective in 1976. We agree. 50 RCRA was initially enacted in 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2826 (1976), and was amended in 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-609, 92 Stat. 3083 (1978), and 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2348 (1980). In November 1984, after the district court's January 1984 decision in the present case, RCRA was again amended by the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3271 (1984) (1984 amendments). We have considered the 1984 amendments and the accompanying legislative history and, for the reasons discussed below, we believe the 1984 amendments support the government's arguments about RCRA's standard and scope of liability and retroactivity. 51 The critical issue is the meaning of the phrase contributing to. Before its amendment in 1984, RCRA Sec. 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6973(a), imposed liability upon any person contributing to the handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste that may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. The district court did not find either the statutory language or the statutory framework helpful in determining whether past non-negligent off-site generators and transporters were liable under RCRA Sec. 7003(a), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 6973(a) (prior to the 1984 amendments). 579 F.Supp. at 834. The district court then considered the legislative history of the 1980 amendments, id. at 835-36, because [t]he legislative history of the [RCRA] as originally enacted contains no specific discussion of the reach of section 7003 and no mention of the reasons for its insertion. The hastiness of the [RCRA's] passage in the final days of a congressional session has been well-documented. United States v. Waste Industries, Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir.1984), citing Kovacs & Klucsik, The New Federal Role in Solid Waste Management: The Resource Conservation & Recovery Act of 1976, 3 Colum.J.Envtl.L. 205, 216-20 (1976). 52 The district court found two apparently contradictory references in the legislative history. The Report on Hazardous Waste Disposal issued by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R.Comm.Print No. IFC 31, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1979) (the Eckhardt Report), stated that a company that generates hazardous waste would be someone 'contributing to' an endangerment under Sec. 7003, even where someone else deposited the waste in an improper disposal site similar to strict liability under common law. The strict liability language in the Eckhardt Report, however, was not adopted later in the Senate Report, which stated 53 a company that generated hazardous waste might be someone contributing to air endangerment under section 7003 even where someone else deposited the waste in an improper disposal site (similar to strict liability under common law), where the generator had knowledge of the illicit disposal or failed to exercise due care in selecting or instructing the entity actually conducting the disposal. 54 S.Rep. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5019, 5023. The district court resolved the battle between the conflicting legislative references in favor of the Senate Report and held that the language in the Senate Report would suggest strict liability of present responsible landowners, but the qualifying phrase 'illicit disposal or failed to exercise due care' requires a finding of negligence prior to holding past off-site generators or transporters liable. 579 F.Supp. at 836; accord United States v. Waste Industries, Inc., 556 F.Supp. at 1308; United States v. Wade, 546 F.Supp. at 790. But see, e.g., United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F.Supp. at 1108; United States v. Price, 523 F.Supp. 1055, 1070-71 (D.N.J.1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir.1982); United States v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 17 Env't Rep. Cases (BNA) 1329, 1333-34 (N.D. Ohio 1981); United States v. Solvents Recovery Service, 496 F.Supp. 1127, 1139 (D.Conn.1980). 55 Then, in November 1984, Congress passed and President Reagan signed the 1984 amendments, which were described as clarifying amendments and specifically addressed the standard and scope of liability of Sec. 7003(a). As amended in 1984, RCRA Sec. 7003(a), 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 6973(a) (West Supp.1986) (new language underlined; deleted language in brackets), now provides in pertinent part: 56 Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, upon receipt of evidence that the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment, the Administrator may bring suit on behalf of the United States in the appropriate district court [to immediately restrain any person] against any person (including any past or present generator, past or present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility) who has contributed or who is contributing to such handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal [to stop] to restrain such person from such handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal [or to take such other action as may be necessary], to order such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or both. 57 As amended, RCRA Sec. 7003(a), 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 6973(a) (West Supp.1986), specifically applies to past generators and transporters. See United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F.Supp. at 1400 (applying RCRA as amended in 1984); United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F.Supp. at 217-18 (applying RCRA as amended in 1984). 58 Congress' intent with respect to the standard of liability under RCRA Sec. 7003(a), 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 6973(a) (West Supp.1986), as amended by the 1984 amendments, is clearly set forth in the accompanying House Conference Report. 5 The House Conference Report also expressly disapproved of the Wade and Waste Industries cases, which were relied upon by the NEPACCO court, as well as the NEPACCO decision itself. The House Conference Report stated: 59 Section 7003 focuses on the abatement of conditions threatening health and the environment and not particularly human activity. Therefore, it has always reached those persons who have contributed in the past or are presently contributing to the endangerment, including but not limited to generators, regardless of fault or negligence. The amendment, by adding the words have contributed is merely intended to clarify the existing authority. Thus, for example, non-negligent generators whose wastes are no longer being deposited or dumped at a particular site may be ordered to abate the hazard to health or the environment posed by the leaking of the wastes they once generated and which have been deposited on the site. The amendment reflects the long-standing view that generators and other persons involved in the handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of hazardous wastes must share in the responsibility for the abatement of the hazards arising from their activities. The section was intended and is intended to abate conditions resulting from past activities. Hence, the district court decisions in United States v. Wade, 546 F.Supp. 785 (E.D.Pa.1982), United States v. Waste Industries, Inc. [556 F.Supp. 1301], No. 80-4-Civ-7 (E.D.N.C.1983), and United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 579 F.Supp. 823 (W.D.Mo.1984), which restricted the application of section 7003, are inconsistent with the authority conferred by the section as initially enacted and with these clarifying amendments. 60 H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1133, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1984) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5649, 5690 (emphasis added). 61 Thus, following the 1984 amendments, past off-site generators and transporters are within the scope of RCRA Sec. 7003(a), 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 6973(a) (West Supp.1986). From the legislative history of the 1984 amendments, it is clear that Congress intended RCRA Sec. 7003(a), 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 6973(a) (West Supp.1986), as initially enacted and as amended, to impose liability without fault or negligence and to apply to the present conditions resulting from past activities. In other words, RCRA Sec. 7003(a), 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 6973(a) (West Supp.1986), as initially enacted and as amended, applies to past non-negligent off-site generators like NEPACCO and tonon-negligent past transporters like Mills. See United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F.Supp. at 1400-01 (applying RCRA as amended in 1984), citing United States v. Hardage, 18 Env't Rep. Cases (BNA) 1685, 1686 (W.D.Okla.1982) (RCRA as amended in 1980); United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F.Supp. at 198. 62 Appellants argue, however, that the 1984 amendments should not be applied to them because the 1984 amendments are not merely clarifying amendments but instead substantively changed the existing law. We disagree. First, Congress itself expressly characterized the 1984 amendments as clarifying amendments. Second, as part of the legislative history of the 1984 amendments, Congress expressly stated what its intention had been when it initially passed the RCRA in 1976, even though the 1976 legislative history contained no specific discussion of the standard and scope of liability of Sec. 7003(a). 63 Although this is not legislative history as such, the views of subsequent Congresses on the same or similar statutes are entitled to some weight in the construction of previous legislation. Although the views of subsequent Congresses cannot override the unmistakable intent of the enacting one, this is not a problem in this case because there was no absolutely unmistakable intent of Congress concerning section 7003. To the extent that the precise intent of the enacting Congress may be obscure, the views of subsequent Congresses should be given greater deference than they would be otherwise entitled to receive. 64 United States v. Waste Industries, Inc., 734 F.2d at 166 (discussing legislative history of 1980 RCRA amendments) (citations omitted); see also Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596, 100 S.Ct. 800, 813, 63 L.Ed.2d 36 (1980). Thus, by passing the 1984 amendments, the 98th Congress made clear that the intention of the 94th Congress in enacting the RCRA in 1976 had been to impose liability upon past non-negligent off-site generators and transporters of hazardous waste.