Opinion ID: 1186195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Second Issue: Are Defendants' courts-martial comparable to Washington offenses?

Text: This issue has two aspects. First, it must be determined if Defendants' courts-martial, as a factual matter, are included in their offender scores under RCW 9.94A.360. It must then be determined whether their particular courts-martial are comparable to most serious offenses. Both analyses require a comparison of the foreign crimes to Washington offenses. To determine if a foreign crime is comparable to a Washington offense, the court must first look to the elements of the crime. State v. Wiley, 124 Wash.2d 679, 684, 880 P.2d 983 (1994) (citing State v. Franklin, 46 Wash.App. 84, 729 P.2d 70 (1986), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. State v. Dunaway, 109 Wash.2d 207, 743 P.2d 1237, 749 P.2d 160 (1987)); see also State v. Mutch, 87 Wash.App. 433, 437, 942 P.2d 1018 (1997). More specifically, the elements of the out-of-state crime must be compared to the elements of Washington criminal statutes in effect when the foreign crime was committed. Mutch, 87 Wash.App. at 437, 942 P.2d 1018 (citing State v. Luckett, 73 Wash.App. 182, 187-88, 869 P.2d 75, review denied, 124 Wash.2d 1015, 880 P.2d 1005 (1994)). If the foreign conviction is comparable to a Washington crime, it counts toward the offender score as if it were the equivalent Washington offense. If the elements are not identical, or if the foreign statute is broader than the Washington definition of the particular crime, the sentencing court may look at the defendant's conduct, as evidenced by the indictment or information, to determine whether the conduct would have violated the comparable Washington statute. State v. Duke, 77 Wash.App. 532, 535, 892 P.2d 120 (1995). Mutch, 87 Wash.App. at 437, 942 P.2d 1018. See also State v. McCorkle, 88 Wash.App. 485, 495, 945 P.2d 736 (1997) (The key inquiry is under what Washington statute could the defendant have been convicted if he or she had committed the same acts in Washington.) (emphasis added). While it may be necessary to look into the record of a foreign conviction to determine its comparability to a Washington offense, the elements of the charged crime must remain the cornerstone of the comparison. Facts or allegations contained in the record, if not directly related to the elements of the charged crime, may not have been sufficiently proven in the trial. Defendant Morley was court-martialed for robbery, conspiracy to rob, and assault with intent to rob. The court-martial order lists five charges, two of which were dismissed, and three of which the military judge found Morley guilty. One of the convictions was for violation of the U.C.M.J. article 122, 10 U.S.C. § 922. Article 122 sets out the crime of robbery, and the elements of the crime are as follows: Any person ... who with intent to steal takes anything of value from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of force or violence or fear of immediate or future injury to his person or property ..., is guilty of robbery and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 10 U.S.C. § 922. The elements of the court-martial offense are nearly identical to the definition of robbery in this state: A person commits robbery when he unlawfully takes personal property from the person of another or in his presence against his will by the use or threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury to that person.... Such force or fear must be used to obtain or retain possession of the property, or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking; in either of which cases the degree of force is immaterial. RCW 9A.56.190. In this state a person commits second degree robbery, a class B felony, if the robbery does not involve bodily harm or a deadly weapon. RCW 9A.56.210. The elements for article 122 robbery are comparable to Washington's second degree robbery, and the trial court found the same: The second issue, which wasn't really contested, is that the crime of which the defendant was convicted is clearly a crime which qualifies for consideration under the Washington statutes and Initiative 593. It is a second degree robbery by all counts, by all descriptions and by all actions, and qualifies as such. Verbatim Report of Proceedings at 60 (Jan. 27, 1995). As observed by the trial court, Morley did not contest the trial court's factual finding, nor has Morley challenged this finding in his appellate brief. Class B felonies, other than sex crimes, are not considered in the offender score if they have washed out. RCW 9.94A.360(2) (1996). If Morley had lived in the community for 10 years after serving his time for the court-martial, the court-martial conviction would wash out and would not be included in his offender score. The record does not disclose how long Morley was imprisoned on the court-martial conviction, but he was convicted in 1989 for first degree child molestation. This 1989 conviction occurred just seven years after his court-martial, thereby preventing the court-martial from washing out. The court-martial, being comparable to a class B felony, shall be included in the offender score. RCW 9.94A.360(2) (1996). Second degree robbery is also classified as a most serious offense. RCW 9.94A.030(23)( o ). Given these factual findings, Morley's court-martial must be counted as a prior strike, which renders him a persistent offender. RCW 9.94A.030(27)(a). Defendant James challenges the trial court ruling which held his court-martial is comparable to several Washington offenses. First, James claims a court may not look beyond the statutory elements of a foreign crime when determining if the foreign conviction is comparable to a Washington offense. He bases his argument primarily on faulty interpretations of State v. Luckett, 73 Wash.App. 182, 869 P.2d 75 (1994) and State v. Duke, 77 Wash.App. 532, 892 P.2d 120 (1995). In Luckett, the defendant had a prior California conviction for robbery which the sentencing court compared to this state's robbery statutes. The sentencing judge relied on information in a probation officer's report which revealed the defendant had been armed when he committed the California crime. Because of the deadly weapon, the sentencing judge treated the California robbery as a class A felony under Washington law. Luckett, 73 Wash.App. at 187, 869 P.2d 75. The Court of Appeals reversed this finding. The court noted California could have charged the defendant under a different statute for armed robbery but did not do so. The court held it was inappropriate for the sentencing judge to rely on the probation report as a source of additional information regarding the gun. Luckett does not support James' claim that the sentencing judge cannot look behind the statutory elements of a foreign crimethe case holds only a sentencing judge cannot go so far as to rely on unsubstantiated information in a probation officer's report. State v. Duke also refutes James' argument. In Duke the defendant had a prior court-martial conviction for violating article 134, a general catchall provision for any disorderly conduct not specifically mentioned in the U.C.M.J. Duke, 77 Wash.App. at 535, 892 P.2d 120. The underlying crime involved Duke's soliciting another to kill Duke's wife, but solicitation in Washington requires proof the solicitor intended the crime be committed. Id. The court refused to consider the court-martial as comparable to a Washington offense because [t]he record in Mr. Duke's court-martial gives no indication the court found he intended the crime to have been committed. Duke, 77 Wash.App. at 536, 892 P.2d 120 (emphasis added). The court explicitly looked behind the elements of article 134 and examined Duke's conduct as stated in the charging documents and trial record. In James' court-martial, he pleaded guilty to attempted rape (U.C.M.J. article 80 and 120, 10 U.S.C. §§ 880 & 920), sodomy (U.C.M.J. article 125, 10 U.S.C. § 925), and robbery (U.C.M.J. article 122, 10 U.S.C. § 922). The U.C.M.J. elements for these crimes must be compared to the elements of comparable Washington offenses. A punishable attempt to commit a crime, under the U.C.M.J., is defined as: An act, done with specific intent to commit an offense under this chapter, amounting to more than mere preparation and tending, even though failing, to effect its commission, is an attempt to commit that offense. U.C.M.J. article 80, 10 U.S.C. § 880(a). The crime of criminal attempt in Washington is defined in RCW 9A.28.020(1): A person is guilty of an attempt to commit crime if, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which is a substantial step toward the commission of that crime. Since the military attempt charge involved attempted rape, the elements of the attempted crime must also be compared to Washington offenses. The elements of rape under the U.C.M.J. are as follows: (a) Any person subject to this chapter who commits an act of sexual intercourse, by force and without consent, is guilty of rape.... (b) Any person subject to this chapter who, under circumstances not amounting to rape, commits an act of sexual intercourse with a female not his wife, who has not attained the age of sixteen years, is guilty of carnal knowledge.... (c) Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete either of these offenses. U.C.M.J. article 120, 10 U.S.C. § 920. First degree rape was defined in Washington in 1979 as occurring when one engages in sexual intercourse with another person not married to the perpetrator by forcible compulsion where the perpetrator or an accessory: (a) Uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon; or (b) Kidnaps the victim.... Former RCW 9A.44.040. If a deadly weapon or kidnapping were not involved, the crime would be second degree rape. Former RCW 9A.44.050. Sexual intercourse was broadly defined as including any vaginal or anal penetration, however slight, and any act of sexual contact between persons involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another whether such persons are of the same or opposite sex. Former RCW 9A.44.010(1)(b). The U.C.M.J. and Washington elements of criminal attempt appear to be comparable. James argues the U.C.M.J. attempt statute, as it has been applied by the military courts, is broader than the Washington counterpart. Because of this alleged broader application of the statute, he claims the attempted rape charge cannot be considered comparable to any Washington crime. James also argues the elements of rape are not comparable. This argument fails when James' specific criminal conduct underlying the military charges is compared to the Washington statutes. If the elements of a foreign crime are broader than a comparable Washington crime, this court can rely on other court documents underlying the foreign conviction to determine whether the defendant's conduct would have violated a Washington statute. The State has attached to its brief, and also submitted as an exhibit, the entire court-martial record. Two documents within the record shed light on the full scope of the foreign crime. One document involves a stipulation of facts signed by James. The other document is a transcript of the court-martial hearing where the military judge accepted James' guilty plea. Before accepting the plea, the judge questioned James in detail about his conduct underlying the charges. The transcript will not be discussed here, since it merely supports the details set out in the stipulated facts: About 2330 hours on 28 December 1978, Beate Roth, a 16 year old student, was standing at a bus stop in Weisbaden, Germany, with two boys with whom she had spent the evening. The two boys got on a bus and Beate decided to walk home rather than wait for her bus. As she was walking in a well lit residential area, she suddenly heard steps behind her. A man, whom she later identified at a line-up as the accused, put his hand over her mouth, held a knife against her throat and warned her to Shut up when she attempted to scream. The accused forced Beate down a driveway and against a wall where she stepped out one leg of her pants when he ordered her to remove them. The accused then dropped his pants and attempted to insert his erect penis into her vagina while they were standing. He was able to penetrate only slightly and Beate attributed this to the fact that she was very tense. He then forced her to go down some stairs to a cellar where he pushed her to the ground, placed himself on the top of her and again attempted to have sexual intercourse with her. He was again unsuccessful because she stiffened (her) body too much. She has never had intercourse and it hurt her when he tried to penetrate her vagina. He then forced her to take his penis into her mouth which she did because he had told her if she did not comply with his requests he would kill her. After a short while, the accused removed his penis from her mouth and started looking through her purse, saying something about money. She took her purse and handed over the German money she had which was about three marks. Ex. 2. It is clear from these stipulated facts that James' attempted intercourse underlying the court-martial would have met the elements for at least attempted second degree rape. The sentencing court agreed with this comparison. While the use of the knife arguably raised the crime to attempted first degree rape, the State did not raise this argument, so we do not discuss it. In 1979, second degree rape was a class B felony. Former RCW 9A.44.050 (second degree rape is now classified as a class A felony). An attempt to commit a class B felony is classified as a class C felony. RCW 9A.28.020(3)(c). The offender score statute states prior convictions for attempted crimes are to be scored as if they were convictions for completed offenses, RCW 9.94A.360(5) (1996), but it is unclear whether this subsection requires the sentencing court to consider an attempted crime as the same class of felony as the completed crime when applying RCW 9.94A.360(2) (1996), the wash-out provision. We do not decide the issue here, since the distinction is immaterial to James' case. Even with James' attempted rape classified as a class C felony, the crime still fails to wash out because he was convicted of first degree assault in 1981, just two years after his 1979 court-martial. Since the court-martial conviction for the attempted rape does not wash out, it must be included in James' offender score. An attempt to commit a most serious offense is the equivalent of committing the most serious offense. RCW 9.94A.030(23). First and second degree rape are now both classified as class A felonies, RCW 9A.44.040-.050, and third degree rape is currently classified as a class C felony. RCW 9A.44.060(2). All three degrees of rape are listed as most serious offenses. RCW 9.94A.030(23)((a) & (n)). James' attempted rape counts as a most serious offense. By reviewing the stipulated facts above, it is clear James' court-martial for sodomy is also comparable to at least second degree rape. Sodomy is defined in the U.C.M.J. as the following: Any person ... who engages in unnatural carnal copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex or with an animal is guilty of sodomy. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the offense. U.C.M.J. article 125, 10 U.S.C. § 925(a). While these elements admittedly have no direct counterpart under Washington law, James' conduct underlying this charge consisted of his forcing the victim to place her mouth over his penis. Such conduct falls within the broad definition of sexual intercourse, RCW 9A.44.010(1)(c), and could be classified as first degree rape because of the presence of the knife, or at least second degree rape. The sentencing court, for some unknown reason, found the sodomy charge was equivalent just to rape in the third degree. Nonetheless, third degree rape, as a class C felony (RCW 9A.44.060(2)), still counts toward James' offender score, and third degree rape is also listed as a most serious offense. The previous discussion involving Morley's court-martial for robbery, in violation of article 122, equally applies to James' court-martial for the same crime. James' court-martial on the robbery charge is comparable to a class B felony in Washington. As stated above, since James was convicted of another crime in Washington within two years of his 1979 court-martial, his 1979 conviction cannot wash out under RCW 9.94A.360(2) (1996), and it must be included in his offender score. All three charges in James' court-martial independently satisfy the statutory requirements for being considered as prior strikes under I-593. We conclude the courts-martial of both Morley and James were properly included in Defendants' offender scores. None of the court-martial convictions wash out under RCW 9.94A.360(2) (1996), and they are comparable to Washington offenses under RCW 9.94A.360(3). Furthermore, both Defendants' courts-martial are comparable to most serious offenses under RCW 9.94A.030(23), thereby counting as strikes, and elevating Defendants to the status of persistent offenders. RCW 9.94A.030(27)(a).