Opinion ID: 4532397
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard

Text: “The right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings is guaranteed by the New York and Federal Constitutions” (People v Berroa, 99 NY2d 134, 138 [2002], citing US Const, 6th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 6). The “state standard for effective assistance of counsel has long been whether the defendant was afforded ‘meaningful representation’” (id. at 138 [internal citations omitted]). “[O]ur state standard [for ineffective assistance of counsel] thus offers greater protection than the federal test” (People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 156 [2005]). In contrast to the federal test that expressly requires prejudice to defendant, “‘prejudice’ is examined more generally in the context of whether defendant received meaningful representation,” and “the claim of ineffectiveness is ultimately concerned with the fairness of the process as a whole rather than its particular 5 Since I conclude that counsel failed to provide meaningful representation based on this error alone, I do not consider defendant’s alternative argument that counsel’s performance overall was ineffective because he (1) advocated a defense theory that was implausible, as it was belied by the evidence, and (2) inadequately prepared his expert witness. - 10 - - 11 - No. 25 impact on the outcome of the case” (id.). “Thus, under our State Constitution, even in the absence of a reasonable probability of a different outcome, inadequacy of counsel will still warrant reversal whenever a defendant is deprived of a fair trial” (Caban, 5 NY3d at 156 [2005]). This Court has stressed that “our legal system is concerned as much with the integrity of the judicial process as with the issue of guilt or innocence” (People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 714 [1998], quoting People v Donovan, 13 NY2d 148, 153-154 [1963]). In addition to establishing a lack of meaningful representation, a defendant must “demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel’s failure[s]” (People v Rivera, 71 NY2d 705, 709 [1988]). The United States Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment’s definition of effective assistance of counsel “relies . . . on the legal profession’s maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law’s presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions” (Strickland, 466 US at 688, citing Michel v Louisiana, 350 US 91, 100-101 [1955]; see also Padilla v Kentucky, 559 US 356, 366 [2010] [“The first prong (of the Strickland test)—constitutional deficiency—is necessarily linked to the practice and expectations of the legal community”]). After all, “[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms” (Strickland, 466 US at 688). Similarly, in New York, performance standards have been recognized as “highly relevant in assuring that constitutionally effective assistance is provided and in judging whether in a particular case an attorney’s performance has been deficient” (Hurrell-Harring v State of NY, 15 NY3d 8, 18 [2010]). The ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function imposes upon - 11 - - 12 - No. 25 defense counsel a broad duty to “be aware of legal standards that govern the selection of jurors, and be prepared to discharge effectively the defense function in the selection of the jury, including . . . exercising challenges for cause and peremptory challenges” (ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense Function, Standard 4-7.3 [a] [4th ed 2017]; see also id. Standard 4-1.2 [c]). Significantly, as concerns this appeal, “[a] single error may qualify as ineffective assistance, but only when the error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial as to compromise a defendant’s right to a fair trial” (Caban, 5 NY3d at 152 [internal citations omitted]). “To rise to that level, the omission must typically involve an issue that is so clear-cut and dispositive that no reasonable defense counsel would have failed to assert it, and it must be evident that the decision to forgo the contention could not have been grounded in a legitimate trial strategy” (People v McGee, 20 NY3d 513, 518 [2013]). A violation of a right so central to our system of justice as the right to an impartial jury is the type of single error that meets the standard and warrants reversal (see People v Harris, 26 NY3d 321, 327-328 [2015]; Virgil v Dretke, 446 F3d 598, 607 [5th Cir 2006]; Miller v Webb, 385 F3d 666, 676-677 [6th Cir 2004]; United States v Gonzalez, 214 F3d 1109, 1111 [9th Cir 2000]; Johnson v Armontrout, 961 F2d 748, 756 [8th Cir 1992]; Burton v Johnson, 948 F2d 1150, 1155 [10th Cir 1991]; Coleman v Kemp, 778 F2d 1487, 1540, n 24 [11th Cir 1985]; Cooks v United States, 461 F2d 530, 532 [5th Cir 1972]; cf. Nelson v Estelle, 642 F2d 903, 907 [5th Cir 1981] [stating that the Fifth Circuit’s single-error jurisprudence has consistently found counsel to be ineffective when the error in question violated a separate constitutional right of the defendant]). - 12 - - 13 - No. 25 B. Defendant’s Right to an Impartial Jury and Trial Counsel’s Error “‘[Nothing] is more basic to the criminal process than the right of an accused to a trial by an impartial jury’” (Torpey, 63 NY2d at 365, quoting People v Branch, 46 NY2d 645, 651 [1979]; see also NY Const, art I, § 2). CPL 270.20(1)(b) provides that “[a] challenge for cause is an objection to a prospective juror and may be made only on the ground that . . . [a prospective juror has] a state of mind that is likely to preclude [the prospective juror] from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at the trial.” “Upon such a challenge [under CPL 270.20(1)(b)], a [prospective] juror who has revealed doubt, because of prior knowledge or opinion, about [their] ability to serve impartially must be excused unless the[y] state[] unequivocally on the record that [they] can be fair” (People v Arnold, 96 NY2d 358, 362 [2001]; see also People v Warrington, 28 NY3d 1116, 1119-1120 [2016]; People v Harris, 19 NY3d 679, 685 [2012]; People v Johnson, 94 NY2d 600, 616 [2000]). “Prospective jurors who make statements that cast serious doubt on their ability to render an impartial verdict, and who have given less-than-unequivocal assurances of impartiality, must be excused” (Arnold, 96 NY2d at 363, citing People v Blyden, 55 NY2d 73, 78 [1982]; Torpey, 63 NY2d at 367; see also Johnson, 94 NY2d at 612). “By contrast, where prospective jurors unambiguously state that, despite preexisting opinions that might indicate bias, they will decide the case impartially and based on the evidence, the trial court has discretion to deny the challenge for cause if it determines that the juror’s promise to be impartial is credible” (Arnold, 96 NY2d at 363, citing People v Williams, 63 NY2d 882, - 13 - - 14 - No. 25 884 [1984]). “[T]he principle is a simple one. . . .When a potential jurors themselves say they question or doubt they can be fair in the case, Trial Judges should either elicit some unequivocal assurance of their ability to be impartial when that is appropriate, or excuse the juror when that is appropriate” (Johnson, 94 NY2d at 616). Given a defendant’s basic right to an impartial jury, and trial counsel’s professional obligation to protect that right, trial counsel’s representation cannot be meaningful when counsel fails to challenge a biased juror (People v Claudio, 83 NY2d 76, 79-80 [1993]; Torpey, 63 NY2d at 365; Virgil, 446 F3d at 613; Miller, 385 F3d at 676-677; Hughes v United States, 258 F3d 453, 463-464 [6th Cir 2001]; Johnson, 961 F2d at 755-756). Prospective juror 10 demonstrated bias based on his emotional reaction to the crime. During the prosecutor’s questioning about whether prior experiences would affect any prospective juror’s ability to be impartial and after prospective juror 14 responded, prospective juror 10 affirmatively volunteered his doubts about his ability to be impartial. He stated that he “kind of made up [his] mind” and “ma[de] a decision kind of in [his] own head at that time” based on what he read about the crime prior to the trial because he “didn’t like the circumstances.” Given the context of the prosecutor’s questioning, and that prospective juror 10 was referring to what he had read about the murder, he was expressing his emotional reaction to the crime and whether he could be unbiased towards defendant. And that is exactly how the prosecutor and court understood these statements. Both described prospective juror 10 as having believed the murder was a “bad act.” And because prospective juror 10 viewed the murder as a terrible act, he was expressing that he was biased against a defendant accused of the heinous crime. - 14 - - 15 - No. 25 The statements were sufficiently alarming that the court interrupted the prosecutor’s voir dire of prospective juror 10 to address the entire panel informing them that jurors must avoid all news about the case. To emphasize the need to avoid the media’s potential influence, the court noted that prospective juror 10 “said he made up his mind” about the crime, and that such a predisposition was a “bad thing.” But the court explained that “what is important is that it’s this defendant who is charged with that crime” and that the prosecutor “has to prove that this is the person who did it.” On the heels of this cautionary comment, the court then asked prospective juror 10 directly whether he could “remain fair and impartial.” Prospective juror 10 responded, “I hope so.” Since that was the exact type of indefinite statement the court could not accept, the court again pressed on this point. The court returned to its earlier metaphor about the pilot who announces to the passengers that they are about to land the plane and gives an insufficient answer of “I think I can do this.” Then, the court point blank rhetorically said to prospective juror 10, “back on that plane now.” To this, prospective juror 10 twice responded, “I’m not sure.” Tellingly, he repeated the response notwithstanding the court’s reminder to him and the rest of the panel just moments earlier that such an answer was “unacceptable.” Prospective juror 10 never disavowed these statements.6 6 Contrary to the majority’s mischaracterization, I have not engaged in fact finding by footnoting, as background, citations to publicity of the crime (majority op at 9 n 1; dissenting op at 3-4 n 1, 4 n 2). I base my legal analysis on constitutional doctrine, controlling precedent and on the record of what counsel did and did not do and what prospective juror 10 actually said. Unlike the majority, I do not speculate or fathom an alternative meaning from the prospective juror’s sworn statements that he could not be sure he would be impartial; I take those words for their obvious and intended meaning. - 15 - - 16 - No. 25 The majority’s reading of the record as merely reflecting a general preconceived discomfort with the case (majority op at 8-9) ignores that the point of his responses was that he could not be fair and impartial because of his view of the case, such that he could not judge defendant fairly. Prospective juror 10 was not making an abstract point about his ability to serve, somehow detached from the realities of the case and that defendant was charged with killing another human being. Put another way, the exchange with the prosecutor and the court undoubtedly shows that he was biased against the defendant as the person accused of committing the crime. Moreover, although “[e]motions are natural human responses and the law does not expect jurors to be devoid of such feelings[], jurors must have the capacity and the will to decide the case based solely on the facts as they find them and the applicable law as instructed by the court” (People v Spencer, 29 NY3d 302, 311-12 [2017]; see also People v Reyes, 94 NY2d 600, 615 [2000]; People v Rodriguez, 71 NY2d 214, 216-217, 220-221 [1988]; Arnold, 96 NY2d at 363). Thus, a prospective juror does not need to “‘be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved,’” and may have “‘formed some impression or opinion as to the merits’” (majority op at 8, quoting Irvin v Dowd, 366 US 717, 722-723 [1961]), but a person cannot serve if they fail to state that they can decide the case fairly, notwithstanding their emotional reaction to the crime. Nor is there legal or record support for the majority’s suggestion that because the statements were made early in voir dire, they are somehow less significant or should be given less credence than if they had been made minutes later (majority op at 10). The statements responded to fundamental and direct questions about prospective juror 10’s - 16 - - 17 - No. 25 ability to fairly evaluate the evidence in defendant’s prosecution. Whether made at the beginning, middle or end of voir dire, the inability of prospective juror 10 to make plain his impartiality with an unequivocal assurance that he would judge defendant fairly is what matters here. To prospective juror 10’s credit, he was candid about his uncertainty to be fair and impartial—so candid that he initiated the questioning on this very subject with the prosecutor. And that makes all the difference because the prospective juror—the only person to know what he heard about the case, to fully appreciate what he was feeling before and during voir dire, and to know how these feelings impacted his ability to serve, given the court’s clarity about the need for definitive statements—assessed his impartiality and concluded he was simply not sure he could be fair in this case towards this defendant. Since neither the court nor defense counsel secured an unequivocal statement that he could be unbiased, counsel should have challenged him for cause. Under our case law, the court should have granted the challenge (see, e.g., Arnold, 96 NY2d at 362-63, 368). Counsel’s failure resulted in the seating of a biased juror, thus denying defendant his basic right to an impartial jury (see Johnson, 94 NY2d at 614-16 [also resolving Reyes]). Counsel could not have allowed prospective juror 10 to be seated knowing his bias but hoping that trial evidence would somehow supplant his views or that he would “bend over backwards” to be fair because he was cognizant of his bias, as the People suggest. Who would want their liberty in the hands of a person who says they heard about the case, kind of made up their mind based on what they had read because they did not like the circumstances, and then admits they are not sure they can be impartial and fair? Who wants - 17 - - 18 - No. 25 a juror who, at most, can only say they “hope” they can meet this essential requirement for jury service?