Opinion ID: 1095355
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: whether prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire and closing argument was such to warrant reversal of the conviction?

Text: Under this assignment of error, Griffin contends that statements by the prosecution during voir dire were highly prejudicial and improper. The thrust of Griffin's argument concerns the following exchange: Is there anyone that for any reason right now knows in their mind that they would be looking for a doubt other than a reasonable doubt? For instance, a shadow of a doubt and excuse or any reason at all to find this defendant not guilty? ... You'll only require us to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.... So, no one then will be looking for an excuse to find defendant not guilty. Griffin contends that this amounted to a verbal instruction defining reasonable doubt and urges that we reverse the conviction based on this. See Gilleylen v. State, 255 So.2d 661 (Miss. 1971). In Bingham v. State, 434 So.2d 220 (Miss. 1983), we reviewed a similar voir dire exchange and held that such questions were not improper where no jury instructions were submitted to the jury which attempted to define reasonable doubt. 434 So.2d at 225. In the instant case, no instructions were submitted to the jury which attempted to define reasonable doubt. We find that these questions were not improper and therefore, no error resulted during voir dire. Additionally, Griffin argues that the prosecution's questioning of prospective jurors during voir dire with regard to whether they had any prejudice against prostitutes or known convicted felons constituted an obvious comment on the testimony of the witnesses and was therefore highly improper and constituted reversible error. We disagree. In Myers v. State, 268 So.2d 353, 355 (Miss. 1972), we held that it was the duty of the prosecutor to make inquiries that would ensure that the jurors would be fair and impartial to the defendant as well as to the State's case. Further, we noted that in passing upon the extent and propriety of questions addressed to prospective jurors, the trial court was vested with considerable discretion. 268 So.2d at 355; see Bingham v. State, 434 So.2d 220 (Miss. 1983) (reaffirming Myers ). In the present case prosecution was entitled to question prospective jurors with regard to any prejudice they may harbor against witnesses intended to be called by the State during their case-in-chief. Since many of the witnesses in this case had past histories of prostitution or criminal convictions, we find that the questioning was relevant and proper. Further, we note that the trial judge, at the request of defense counsel, instructed the prosecution to rephrase its questioning of the jury in an effort to negate any potential prejudice caused by this line of questioning. In light of this, we fail to see any prejudice that resulted from this line of questioning and therefore find this argument to be without merit. Finally, Griffin contends that the prosecution made impermissible comments on his failure to testify and his failure to call witnesses on his own behalf during their closing argument to the jury. Griffin's argument centers around the following passage: ... the defendant's niece. The only person  on voir dire I said, Tell us who your witnesses are going to be. She's the only name we were given. And why? Why? We found out yesterday, didn't we? Because he had called her and said, Tell him Debra brought the gun out there. And she played along with him. And we found out about it. And we confronted her with it. And she said, Okay, I'll tell the truth. And she took the stand and did. And all of a sudden they don't have that witness any more. That one great witness they told us that they were going to call. We couldn't imagine why they were going to call her. But we found out. If he's so innocent, if that's another witness that didn't have anything to say, why did he bother to call her? Why did he bother to ask her to lie? Although Griffin failed to object at trial, he now contends that this statement clearly made reference to his failure to testify and warrants that this Court reverse his conviction. Commenting on a defendant's failure to testify violates an elementary and long established principle of law. West v. State, 485 So.2d 681 (Miss. 1985) (citations omitted). Further, since the criminal defendant's right not to testify on his own behalf is protected by both the State and the United States Constitutions, we are not precluded from reviewing alleged constitutional violations even though defense counsel fails to make contemporaneous objections. See Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928 (Miss. 1986). Additionally, prosecutorial comments regarding the failure of a defendant to call witnesses on his own behalf are equally prejudicial and have constituted grounds for reversal in many of our past decisions. See Madlock v. State, 440 So.2d 315 (Miss. 1983); Collins v. State, 408 So.2d 1376 (Miss. 1982); Morgan v. State, 388 So.2d 495 (Miss. 1980). With these principles in mind we focus our attention on the statements complained of in this case. The record reflects that Griffin contacted his niece, Carolyn Buck, and attempted to influence her testimony. The comments in this case appear to comment on the evidence properly presented to the jury rather than Griffin's failure to call a witness on his behalf. Both sides are afforded wide latitude in their final arguments to the jury so long as they do not argue some impermissible factor. Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743 (Miss. 1984). Clearly, evidence properly admitted at trial falls within the broad latitude that we referred to in Neal. Further, upon careful review of both parties' closing arguments, it appears that the statements complained of in this case were in direct response to Griffin's argument that the State had failed to link him to the crime charged. The comments above do not directly comment on his failure to testify nor can they be reasonably construed as an impermissible comment on his failure to testify. Further, while the comments may indirectly insinuate that Griffin failed to call witnesses on his own behalf, this is not enough to warrant reversal in this case. Cf. Jackson v. State, 440 So.2d 307, 310 (Miss. 1983) (insinuation that criminal defendant failed to testify not reversible error). Accordingly, we find no merit in this argument.