Opinion ID: 2974135
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Enforceability of the Waiver Clause

Text: Caruthers next contends that even if the waiver provision’s language encompasses his appeal, it cannot as a matter of law preclude attacking a sentence on the grounds that it exceeds the statutory 3 Caruthers does not deny that his agreement was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761, 763-64 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Ashe, 47 F.3d 770, 775-76 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 859 (1995). No. 05-5307 United States v. Caruthers Page 10 maximum. Caruthers has cited no cases from this court addressing his argument, and it indeed appears to be a matter of first impression in this circuit.4 It is well settled in the federal courts that “a defendant who waives his right to appeal does not subject himself to being sentenced entirely at the whim of the district court.” United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992). Pursuant to this principle, our sister circuits have uniformly taken the position that an appellate waiver may not bar an appeal asserting that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. See, e.g., United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S. Ct. 320 (2005); United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1327 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 891-92 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 997 (2003); United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 25 n.10 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Phillips, 174 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350 n.18 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1051 (1994); Marin, 961 F.2d at 496; see also United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Rosa, 123 F.3d 94, 100 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1997). Cf. United States v. Hollins, 97 F. App’x 477, 479 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (“[A]5 § 2255 waiver does not preclude review of a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum.”). These courts offer several different rationales for the doctrine. Some suggest that a district court is without jurisdiction to impose a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum, Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1350 n.18 (“It is both axiomatic and jurisdictional that a court of the United States may not impose a penalty for a crime beyond that which is authorized by statute.”); see also Andis, 333 F.3d at 886 (calling a supramaximal sentence “illegal”), which means that the unenforceability of the waiver is simply an application of the general rule that jurisdictional defects may not be waived. Other courts invoke notions of due process. See Bownes, 405 F.3d at 637 (“[S]ome minimum of civilized procedure is required by community feeling regardless of what the defendant wants or is willing to accept.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Marin, 961 F.2d at 496 (“[A] defendant who waives his right to appeal does not subject himself to being sentenced entirely at the whim of the district court.”). Still others use the term “miscarriage of justice,” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327; Khattak, 273 F.3d at 563; Teeter, 257 F.3d at 25, which seems implicitly to invoke both the unconscionability doctrine of contract law (since plea agreements are contracts) and the supervisory power of the courts of appeals. We need not choose from among these justifications, because no matter what the theory, the general soundness of the doctrine is apparent. Thus, we agree with our unanimous sister circuits that an appellate waiver does not preclude an appeal asserting that the statutory-maximum sentence has been exceeded. The question then becomes whether Caruthers’s appeal can accurately be called a challenge of his sentence on the grounds that it exceeds the statutory maximum. The argument for such a characterization is that being a felon in possession of a firearm and being an armed career criminal in possession of a firearm are two separate offenses. Under this view, the baseline statutory maximum for purposes of the waiver inquiry is the ten-year maximum for being a felon in 4 This development (or lack thereof) appears to be an artifact of the language used in many of the appellate waivers in this circuit, which explicitly permit appeals of sentences exceeding the statutory maximum. See, e.g., United States v. Luebbert, 411 F.3d 602, 603 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting the plea agreement, which provided that “[t]he defendant additionally waives the right to appeal his sentence on any ground . . . other than any sentence imposed in excess of the statutory maximum . . . .” (emphasis added) (first omission in original)), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S. Ct. 1178 (2006). 5 The circuits have been similarly uniform in accepting the principle that defendants who have otherwise waived their appellate rights may yet attack sentences based on constitutionally impermissible criteria like race. See, e.g., Bownes, 405 F.3d at 637. The soundness of this rule is incontrovertible, and the fact that it is often paired with the doctrine we consider today lends support to the latter. To paraphrase a familiar adage from another context: “a [doctrine] is known by the company it keeps.” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995). No. 05-5307 United States v. Caruthers Page 11 possession of a firearm, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), and Caruthers’s fifteen-year sentence exceeded it. The argument against such a characterization is that being a felon in possession of a firearm and being an armed career criminal in possession of a firearm are not two separate offenses, but simply recidivism-contingent variants of the same offense. Under this view, the baseline statutory maximum for purposes of the waiver inquiry is the life-imprisonment maximum for being an armed career criminal in possession of a firearm, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); United States v. Wolak, 923 F.2d 1193, 1199 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1217 (1991), and Caruthers’s fifteen-year sentence did not exceed it. Unfortunately, neither party briefed or argued this issue. (Indeed, the government did not bother to address Caruthers’s enforceability argument at all.) In any event, we need not determine whether Caruthers’s appeal qualifies as a challenge on the grounds that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, because, for the reasons discussed below, it fails on the merits. Thus, we assume for present purposes that Caruthers’s appellate waiver is unenforceable, and we now turn to the merits of Caruthers’s sentencing argument.6 6 We acknowledge that we have said that a valid appellate waiver leaves this court without jurisdiction to hear a sentencing appeal. United States v. McGilvery, 403 F.3d 361, 362-63 (6th Cir. 2005). This might suggest that reaching the merits by assuming that Caruthers’s appellate waiver is unenforceable is tantamount to reaching the merits by assuming jurisdiction, an approach that the Supreme Court has disapproved, see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-101 (1998), at least with respect to Article III jurisdiction, see, e.g., Penobscot Nation v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 254 F.3d 317, 324 (1st Cir. 2001) (Boudin, J.) (suggesting that Steel Co.’s mandatory order of disposition might be limited to Article III questions), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002). But see, e.g., Phillips v. Ameritech Info. Sys., Inc., No. 97-1942, 1999 WL 96650, at  n.1 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 1999) (unpublished opinion) (noting that a majority of the Justices agreed that in certain circumstances assuming jurisdiction is appropriate, so long as the jurisdictional issue is difficult and resolving the case on the merits favors the party contesting jurisdiction); Bowers v. NCAA, 346 F.3d 402, 416 n.14 (3d Cir. 2003) (same); Ctr. for Reprod. Law v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183, 194 n.5 (2d Cir. 2002) (same). There are several reasons, however, to read McGilvery for less than all it might be worth. First, we have, both before and after McGilvery, affirmed sentences challenged by defendants who had validly waived their appeals. See United States v. Dillard, 438 F.3d 675, 684-85 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 808 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 126 S. Ct. 548 (2005); United States v. Sykes, 292 F.3d 495, 498 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 965 (2002). By affirming rather than dismissing the appeals, we necessarily exercised jurisdiction in these cases, suggesting that an appellate waiver does not divest this court of jurisdiction. To the extent that McGilvery conflicts with the earlier decisions, we are bound by the prior cases. See Salmi v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985); 6TH CIR. R. 206(c) (a later panel cannot overrule a prior panel’s published opinion). Second, McGilvery cited no authority for its jurisdictional characterization, while the en banc Tenth Circuit has articulated powerful reasons for concluding that even when defendants validly waive their appeals, the courts of appeal do indeed have jurisdiction under both the relevant statutes (28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1)) and Article III. See Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1320-24. Finally, the Supreme Court has recently and repeatedly admonished courts not to be cavalier in their use of the term “jurisdictional.” See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., — U.S. —, 126 S. Ct. 1235 (2006); Eberhart v. United States, — U.S. —, 126 S. Ct. 403 (2005) (per curiam); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413-14 (2004); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004); accord Cobb v. Contract Transp., Inc., — F.3d —, No. 05-6196, 2006 WL 1749628, at - (6th Cir. June 9, 2006); Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Gunter, 433 F.3d 515, 517-20 (6th Cir. 2006). Although these decisions admittedly involved different contexts, at least two principles articulated therein apply with force here. First, “[o]nly Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 452 (emphasis added). Congress established appellate jurisdiction over criminal appeals via 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and, under this principle, a defendant may not destroy that jurisdiction by agreeing to an appellate waiver. Second, “[c]larity would be facilitated if courts and litigants used the label ‘jurisdictional’ not for claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority.” Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455 (emphasis added). The enforcement of appellate waivers fits comfortably in the rubric of a mere claim-processing rule — as we recognized in McGilvery, 403 F.3d at 363 (encouraging the government to file in this court a motion to dismiss the appeal whenever the defendant has agreed to an appellate waiver, as it would facilitate referral to a motions panel) — and therefore should not be labeled “jurisdictional.” For these reasons, we conclude that our assumption that Caruthers’s appellate waiver is unenforceable does not constitute an impermissible assumption of jurisdiction. No. 05-5307 United States v. Caruthers Page 12