Opinion ID: 1057579
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: the trial court's exclusion of mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial

Text: Mr. Hester takes issue with four of the trial court's decisions regarding the evidence he intended to introduce during the sentencing phase of the trial. This evidence related to (1) Ms. Hester's opposition to the death penalty, (2) a neighbor's opinion regarding the level of Mr. Hester's intoxication on the evening of December 14, 1999, (3) notes taken by nurses at Erlanger Medical Center regarding statements made by Ms. Hester after she was admitted for treatment, and (4) the opinion of a medical examiner regarding whether the manner in which Mr. Haney died suggested torture. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the trial court did not commit reversible error with regard to the introduction of this evidence. We have determined that the Court of Criminal Appeals reached the correct result.
During the sentencing phase of the trial, Mr. Hester proposed to call Ms. Hester as a witness to testify that she did not believe in the death penalty and, therefore, that she did not believe that Mr. Hester should be punished by death. The trial court excluded this testimony based on the following reasoning: [N]umber one, it invades the province of the jury. Number two, she's not even in a position to speak for the Haney family.... I wouldn't let her say she wanted him hung up by the toes for what he did to her. That's the jury's province. Certainly, she couldn't speak what she thought ought to happen to him on behalf of the Haney family, and that's what you're really doing.... [N]obody's going to be able to recommend or tell their opinion of the death penalty or whether they're for it or against it or what they ought to do or whether they ought to have it or not have it ... that invades the province of the jury and the legislature has set out a very definite way of procedure to reach the death penalty, and it does not include the opinion of anybody, lay or expert. There's aggravating and mitigating circumstances.... I don't think this will qualify as an aggravating circumstance or a mitigating circumstance either one.... I noticed the Haney family has not stated what they want to happen, and if someone in the Haney family was to come in and say they wanted him to have the death penalty, I wouldn't let them do it. I'm certainly not going to let somebody outside the Haney family come in and say, We don't want him to have it. That wouldn't be fair either. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the trial court's characterization of the proposed testimony as essentially irrelevant to the jury's determination of the appropriate sentence for the murder of Mr. Haney. State v. Hester, 2009 WL 275760, at . In addition, the court noted that the defendant failed to make a contemporaneous offer of proof regarding Ms. Hester's proposed testimony at trial. Accordingly, the defendant cannot demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the trial court's refusal to allow Ms. Hester's testimony, and he cannot prevail on this issue. State v. Hester, 2009 WL 275760, at . In general, decisions regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence are entrusted to the trial court's discretion. Accordingly, reviewing courts will not disturb these decisions on appeal unless the trial court has abused its discretion. State v. Franklin, 308 S.W.3d 799, 809 (Tenn. 2010); State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tenn.2007). The Tennessee Rules of Evidence are too restrictive and unwieldy to be applied strictly in the arena of capital sentencing. See, e.g., State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tenn.2001); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(c) (2003). Accordingly, the Tennessee Rules of Evidence should not be applied to preclude introduction of otherwise reliable evidence that is relevant to the issue of punishment, as it relates to mitigating or aggravating circumstances. State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d at 14. Mr. Hester does not cite a single authority supporting his argument that a court must admit evidence that a surviving victim opposes the death penalty and, therefore, does not believe that the defendant should be executed for the murder of another deceased victim. Nor does our review of the case law suggest that such testimony is required to be admitted. To the contrary, such testimony is considered to be irrelevant, Wayne A. Logan, Opining on Death: Witness Sentence Recommendations in Capital Trials, 41 B.C. L.Rev. 517, 539 (2000), and courts have consistently held that such testimony is inadmissible. [60] Accordingly, we decline to find that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to permit Ms. Hester to testify about her philosophical opposition to the death penalty or her opinion that Mr. Hester should not receive the death penalty.
At some point Jeffrey Coleman, a neighbor of Mr. Haney and Ms. Hester, gave a sworn statement that shortly before the murder, Mr. Hester was drunk, I could not smell it, but I could tell by the way he was walking. Mr. Hester's lawyer attempted to cross-examine Agent Brakebill regarding Mr. Coleman's statement during the sentencing phase of the trial, but the trial court prevented him from doing so on the ground that Mr. Coleman's statement was hearsay. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that excluding Mr. Coleman's statement on hearsay grounds was error in the context of a capital sentencing hearing. However, noting that the jury heard testimony from two other witnesses, Ms. Hester and her son-in-law, Tim Lynn, that the defendant was `clearly intoxicated' and `very drunk' just before the fire, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the excluded evidence was cumulative to testimony that the jury heard from two other witnesses, including the surviving victim. State v. Hester, 2009 WL 275760, at . The State does not dispute the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion that the trial court erred by excluding Mr. Coleman's statement but insists that the Court of Criminal Appeals properly found that the trial court's error was harmless. Because of the potential danger posed to the reliability of the sentencing determination, an erroneous exclusion of mitigation evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital trial is deemed to be a non-structural constitutional error. See State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d at 371; State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d 208, 224-25 (Tenn.2005); State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 459 (Tenn.2002); see also State v. Rimmer, 250 S.W.3d at 24. Accordingly, the burden is upon the State to show that the error is harmless by demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict or sentence obtained. State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d at 371. Mr. Coleman's statements regarding Mr. Hester's intoxication on the evening of December 14, 1999 differ from Mr. Lynn's testimony in only one way. Mr. Coleman testified that he could tell that Mr. Hester was intoxicated from the way that Mr. Hester was walking. Mr. Lynn's testimony about Mr. Hester's intoxication suggested that he could not tell Mr. Hester was intoxicated from how he was walking. In all other respects, Mr. Coleman's testimony is merely cumulative to that of Ms. Hester and Mr. Lynn. The evidence that Mr. Hester was intoxicated when he set Mr. Haney on fire was ample and substantial. Ms. Hester testified that Mr. Hester was very highly intoxicated and just real out of it ... because he was so highly intoxicated ... he was just mumbling. He couldn't, you know, just out of it, in other words, intoxicated. She also testified, however, that [w]ithout a doubt ... I know he realized what he was doing because ... he done too many things ... unplugging the smoke alarm, throwing the dog out in the yard... he was highly intoxicated but ... I still believe he had enough mind to know what he was doing. The defense also elicited from Mr. Lynn testimony that shortly before the murder Mr. Hester had been very drunk and that he had been drinking a 32-ounce bottle of beer. To the extent that Mr. Coleman's testimony concurred with others that Mr. Hester was drunk, it was merely cumulative and would not have affected the verdict. Insofar as it differs, we are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that admission of testimony that there was something in Mr. Hester's gait that suggested to Mr. Coleman that Mr. Hester was drunk would not have affected the jury's decision to impose the death penalty. Accordingly, we find any error in excluding this evidence to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
During the sentencing phase of the trial, Mr. Hester attempted to introduce two pages from Erlanger Medical Center's lengthy records regarding Ms. Hester's treatment following the December 14, 1999 fire. These pages contained notes made by either Lynette Stewart or Nadine Emerson, two of Erlanger's nurses who cared for Ms. Hester when she was first admitted to the hospital on December 14, 1999. These notes reflected that Ms. Hester purportedly stated that Mr. Hester had attempted to pull her out of the burning mobile home. The trial court expressed skepticism about the reliability of these records because Ms. Hester would have been seriously injured and heavily medicated when the statements were made. After taking a recess to consider the matter, the trial court concluded that it would permit the evidence to be introduced through a proper witness. The trial court also stated that it would permit Mr. Hester to recall Ms. Hester for that purpose. Rather than pursuing the matter, Mr. Hester's lawyer informed the trial court that this evidence appeared to be irrelevant because Mr. Hester planned to testify. On appeal, Mr. Hester argued that the trial court erred by excluding the notes. The Court of Criminal Appeals disposed of this argument in the following manner: Although the evidence was relevant, it was not presented through an appropriate witness. The record does not reflect that either the nurse or a proper record custodian was present to testify regarding the nurse's notes, and the defendant informed the trial court that he would not be calling Ms. Hester herself because she had already indicated she had no memory of the relevant time period. Further, the defendant made no offer of proof through any witness, and the Erlanger records were not made an exhibit to the record. As a result, the defendant cannot meet his burden of showing how he was prejudiced by the challenged ruling and is not entitled to relief on this claim. State v. Hester, 2009 WL 275760, at . Mr. Hester has not asserted that he tried to procure the appearance of Ms. Stewart, Ms. Emerson, or the official custodian of Erlanger's medical records. Nor has he claimed that the trial court or the State interfered with or prevented him from locating and subpoenaing these witnesses. Instead, he focuses his argument on his belief that it would have been futile to recall Ms. Hester because she would have been unable to recall whether or not she made the statement recorded in the notes and on defense counsel's distraction resulting from the defendant's sudden request to address the jury. [61] Whether recalling Ms. Hester would have been a purposeless endeavor is not material. Nor is any distraction Mr. Hester might have caused at this stage of the proceeding. The trial court afforded Mr. Hester several reasonable alternatives for admitting these recorded statements into evidence despite the fact that his lawyer did not have an appropriate witness at hand to do so. [62] Mr. Hester's lawyer failed to pursue any of these alternatives. We conclude that Mr. Hester failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of [the alleged] error. Tenn. R.App. P. 36(a). Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief on this issue.
Mr. Hester contends that the trial court erred by preventing him from questioning Dr. Ron Toolsie, the medical examiner, regarding whether the manner in which Mr. Haney died suggests any torture. After careful study of the parties' briefs with regard to this issue, we are persuaded that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals on this issue should be affirmed. Moreover, because we find that the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, State v. Hester, 2009 WL 275760, at -34, adequately states the facts and the law on this issue, we adopt this above stated portion of the opinion as the opinion of this Court and include it as an appendix to this opinion.