Opinion ID: 165864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Change in Law

Text: Lamson next argues that Blakely is a retroactive change in law and, therefore, her plea agreement allows her challenge of the district court’s drug quantity findings and the imposition of a six-point enhancement. In Blakely, after reviewing the State of Washington’s sentencing guidelines, the Supreme Court held the relevant statutory maximum sentence a judge may impose is one based on facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant, __U.S. at __, 124 S.Ct. at 2537, and not based on additional fact-finding by a judge. The Supreme Court has recently applied its holding in Blakely to sentencing under the federal sentencing guidelines. United States v. Booker, __U.S.__, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). Lamson maintains Blakely removed the district court’s authority to apply the enhancement because the drug quantity was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt and she never admitted to conduct that could be construed as creating a substantial risk of harm to the life of a minor. Lamson is mistaken, however, in her assertion that the rule articulated in Blakely places her appeal outside the scope of her waiver. The specific language of the plea agreement states that Lamson’s appeal must be based on a rule that is -6- “held by the Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court to have retroactive effect.” In United States v. Price, we recently held “that Blakely did not announce a watershed rule of criminal procedure that would apply retroactively to initial § 2255 motions.  400 F.3d 844, 849 (10 th Cir. 2005). Consequently, Lamson’s Blakely claim is within the scope of the express language of her plea agreement waiver and is therefore waived.