Opinion ID: 795700
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: As-Applied Challenge and Qualified Immunity

Text: 60 As noted above, Field Day has also asserted an as-applied challenge to the actions of Riverhead and Suffolk County, alleging that the actions of Riverhead and Suffolk County employees violated its First Amendment free speech rights. The Suffolk County Employees appeal from the District Court's denial of their motion to dismiss the as-applied claims asserted in Field Day's Second Amended Complaint, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The motion was premised on the Suffolk County Employees' alleged qualified immunity and, as previously discussed, Field Day's alleged lack of standing. Since as applied claims depend on the facts of the case at bar, see Wisconsin Right to Life, 126 S.Ct. at 1018, and we are confronted with a facial challenge to the Complaint, we are confined to an examination of the facts set forth in the Complaint. We, like the District Court, must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Under that standard, we review the facts of this case, as asserted in Field Day's Second Amended Complaint.
61 Field Day began efforts to promote and produce the Festival in June 2002. After considering several other locations, its representatives visited Enterprise Park (the Park), located within Riverhead, in Suffolk County, New York on November 15, 2002, and soon thereafter notified the Riverhead Town Supervisor that they wanted to lease a portion of the Park for the Festival. On February 20, 2003, Field Day entered into a License Agreement for Outdoor Event (the Agreement) with the Riverhead Community Development Agency (CDA), a public instrumentality of Riverhead. 62 Under the terms of the Agreement, Field Day paid $150,000 to lease roughly 1000 acres of the Park from May 5, 2003, until June 22, 2003, for the purpose of holding the Festival. According to the Agreement, Field Day was responsible for carrying out and shall have exclusive control of all operations associated with the [Festival] and related activities, including... security for the [Festival] (other than the officials of the Town Police Department which shall be arranged and provided by the CDA). The Agreement stated that the CDA shall provide sufficient police protection (including necessary barriers and bike racks); and any necessary road signs for purposes of directing highway and road traffic only. The Agreement also stated in part that Field Day will secure a `Mass Gathering Permit,' that such permit is a Necessary Approval, and that if [Field Day] is unsuccessful in obtaining the Necessary Approvals ... then this Agreement shall terminate, and the obligations of each party herein shall be null and void. 63 On February 27, 2003, Field Day held a preliminary meeting with officials from Riverhead and the Suffolk County Department of Health Services (SCDHS), including Suffolk County's Bureau of Public Health Protection Chief Bruce Williamson, Suffolk County's Principal Public Health Sanitarian Robert Gerdts, SCDHS Deputy Chief of Operations Martin Matuza, Riverhead Chief of Police David Hegermiller, and Riverhead Fire Marshall Bruce Johnson. At this meeting, Field Day gave copies of its mass gathering permit application (the Permit Application) to Johnson and Matuza and distributed copies of its Preliminary Draft Event Operation Plan, outlining its plans to ensure adequate and satisfactory water, sewerage, toilet, refuse, food, and medical facilities, fire protection services, traffic and transportation arrangements, and other matters relating to security and public safety. 64 On March 12, 2003, Field Day and SCDHS held a project coordination meeting to discuss the scope of the Festival and the process by which Field Day would satisfy aspects of the New York Mass Gathering Law[ ]. The meeting was attended by representatives from most of the Riverhead and Suffolk County agencies involved with the planning of the Festival, including Suffolk County's Emergency Medical Services, Fire and Rescue Department, and Food Handling Unit, and Riverhead's Fire and Police Departments. At the meeting, Gerdts was authorized by SCDHS to act as lead agent with respect to the planning of the Festival, and he requested additional copies of Field Day's Application and its Preliminary Draft Event Operation Plan. At no time did ... Gerdts or any other public official suggest that receipt of Field Day's Permit Application approximately 75 days prior to the proposed date of the Festival was not sufficient time for the SCDHS to process the Permit Application and fulfill any requirements necessary to ensure the timely issuance of the Mass Gathering Permit. 65 On March 21, 2003, SCDHS held a four-hour permit planning meeting involving representatives of Field Day, Suffolk County, and Riverhead. Field Day provided Gerdts with the requested copies of its Permit Application and Preliminary Draft Event Operation Plan and Gerdts agreed to issue Field Day a conditional mass gathering permit by April 25, pending review of Field Day's submissions on April 21, 2003. On March 24, Field Day received a letter from Gerdts acknowledging receipt of Field Day's Permit Application and indicating that Field Day's Preliminary Draft Event Operation Plan was sufficient in scope to allow Field Day to begin advertising the Festival within fifteen days of the date of the letter. In reliance on this letter, Field Day commenced a massive advertising campaign and spent nearly $200,000 to promote the Festival; began selling tickets to fans located all around the country and abroad; contracted with bands to ensure their participation; hired and made deposits with contractor and production vendors for staging, lights, and sound; purchased insurance; paid licensing fees; and entered agreements with labor unions to construct the Festival Site and provide the various guest services that would be required at the Festival. 66 On April 11, 2003, Field Day met with representatives of the Riverhead Police Department, including Chief Hegermiller, the Suffolk County Police Department, and the New York State Police. At this meeting Field Day presented its initial plans for traffic control, transportation, and emergency communication, which it formulated to conform to Hegermiller's decision to require uniformed police officers inside as well as outside the Event Site. Field Day's representative walked the attendees through its Preliminary Transportation Plan, using a wall map of the site and handouts. Field Day stated that its Permit Application contemplated 60,000 attendees but it expected that it was more likely that only 35,000 to 40,000 people would attend. Field Day also established a working relationship with the involved agencies in continuing to further develop the plan. 67 That same day, Hegermiller sent a letter to Suffolk County Police Commissioner John Gallagher, with copies to the Riverhead Town Board and the Riverhead Attorney's Office, requesting Gallagher's assistance for several events scheduled to occur at the Park that summer, including the Festival, the Bonnaroo Music Festival, and the New York Air Show. The letter requested additional police assistance to fulfill Riverhead's law enforcement and public assistance obligations to Field Day under the Licensing Agreement, and stated that although Field Day was providing its own on-site security, preliminary estimates for police personnel [are] around 200, of which Riverhead could possibly supply around 50. Field Day alleges that Hegermiller's request for 150 Suffolk County police officers was not based on any standards found in the Sanitary Code or requirements under the New York Mass Gathering Laws and that its provision of private security inside the site meant that the Riverhead Police Department could alone have provided a reasonable number of police officers to control traffic outside the site and to help with security inside the site. Field Day additionally alleges that [a]lthough Hegermiller estimated that the daily attendance for the Bonnaroo Festival and New York Air Show would be greater than the estimated attendance at Field Day's event, he did not provide specific police deployment numbers for those events. Nevertheless, relying on both the timing and substance of Hegermiller's representations in connection with Riverhead's desire for additional uniformed public police presence inside the [Park and Festival site], Field Day acquiesced to Hegermiller's recommendation that he request assistance from Suffolk County. According to Field Day, [a]t no time did Hegermiller or any other public official inform Field Day that [procuring] additional law enforcement assistance from Suffolk County or elsewhere outside Riverhead would create a logistical or timing problem. 68 On April 15, 2003, Suffolk County officials allegedly convened a meeting to discuss transportation, security, and communications. Field Day alleges that [i]n addition to participants from previous meetings, this meeting was attended by representatives from the Suffolk County Executive's Office, including Deputy Suffolk County Executive for Public Safety Joe Michaels, and Suffolk County Police Department Sergeant Patrick Maher. Two days later, nearly a month-and-a-half after Field Day provided SCDHS with its Mass Gathering Permit Application and Preliminary Draft Event Operation Plan, SCDHS sent Field Day a letter containing a detailed list of requirements for a Mass Gathering Permit. A day after that, the New York State Police informed Field Day that they would not participate in the Festival as a result of certain political issues involving Riverhead and the State Police. 69 On April 22, 2003, Field Day again met with representatives from the Suffolk County and Riverhead Police Departments to further discuss security, transportation and communication matters. At this meeting, and in the presence of SCDHS officials, Hegermiller informed Field Day's representative that SCDHS wanted to charge Field Day a fee of $2.5 million to process its Permit Application, rather than the $4500 fee provided for by the permit application fee determination schedule. Gerdts also allegedly stated that he did not believe in `trickle-down economics' and that the Festival had `no redeeming value' as far as he was concerned. About one week later, Field Day received an invoice from the Suffolk County Police Department calling for the payment of time-and-a-half as well as 30% benefits for 150 police officers at the Festival, estimated by the Department to be a $245,616.00 cost. 70 In addition to the permit application processing fee, Suffolk County and Riverhead also subjected Field Day to numerous discretionary fees not required by New York Mass Gathering Laws, including $50,000 for personnel and equipment from the Department of Transportation; $15,000 for the assistance of a local fire department; $17,000 to connect the Festival to the Riverhead water system; and $22,864 per day for a local hospital to be ready in case of emergencies. According to Field Day, Riverhead's Town Supervisor stated that Riverhead now felt that it had not charged Field Day enough under the License Agreement and that the water system `connection fee' was being imposed to remedy `some of the difference.' Field Day also was asked to re-pave roads leading to and from the entrances to the Festival, a requirement never before imposed for any event held at the Park. 71 On April 30, 2003, Field Day met with representatives from the Suffolk County and Riverhead Police Departments once more to discuss plans relating to traffic and police deployment in greater detail. Field Day presented an updated version of its Transportation Plan and la[id] out in detail what it believed to be the key traffic control points surrounding the Event Site. In reliance on representations and discussions held at this meeting, Field Day created a Traffic Control Point Staffing Spreadsheet for inclusion into the Transportation Plan. 72 On May 5, 2003, Field Day met yet again with representatives from the Suffolk County and Riverhead Police Departments and discussed the specific deployment of police officers inside the Event Site. At the conclusion of this meeting, officials from both police departments told Field Day that they would be meeting by themselves on May 8 to finalize the deployment plans and that they would reconvene with Field Day the day after that to discuss the final deployment plan. According to Field Day, at no time did anybody at this meeting indicate to Field Day that the procurement of law enforcement assistance from Suffolk County or any other entity would not be forthcoming. Likewise, 73 at no time during any of the preceding meetings did the Suffolk County Police Department ever indicate that it would not assist Riverhead with the Festival or that the procurement of that assistance would be a logistical problem. Relying on Defendants' representations at this and prior meetings, Field Day believed that it had satisfied the obligations regarding traffic control, security and communications required to obtain a Mass Gathering Permit from the SCDHS more than 30 days prior to the commencement of the Festival. 74 Unbeknownst to Field Day at that time, throughout April and early May, Clear Channel Entertainment, Inc., by and through its vice-president Ron Delsener, undermined Field Day's efforts to obtain a Mass Gathering Permit for the Festival. The Second Amended Complaint states that Clear Channel Entertainment and its parent company, Clear Channel Communications, Inc., are Field Day's primary competitors in the concert promotion industry and control other Long Island concert venues and that Delsener has contacts with, and political influence over, upper-level public officials in Suffolk County and New York State. Delsener allegedly sought to enlist the political support of [those] County and State officials and to urge the County to use its authority and political power to prevent [Field Day] from staging the Festival. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Delsener sent a letter to Suffolk County Executive Robert Gaffney, urging him to prevent the Festival from occurring; telephoned the owner of a golf course near the Park to convince him to oppose the Festival in light of the massive traffic and security problems that it would create for his business and other Riverhead residents; and that a man who said he was from Clear Channel called a local conservation organization and convinced it to file an (ultimately unsuccessful) motion for an injunction to prohibit the Festival for environmental reasons. 75 On May 9, 2003, Hegermiller called Field Day's Project Manager to inform him that the final police deployment meeting scheduled for that day had been cancelled, that Suffolk County officials were now demanding that the participation of the Suffolk County Police Department could only be effectuated through an inter-municipal agreement between Riverhead and Suffolk County, and that Suffolk County officials said that Suffolk County could not enter into such an agreement without first obtaining the Suffolk County legislature's approval. This was the first time that the issue of an inter-municipal agreement had been raised, and Field Day was surprised by this turnaround in light of the previous indications by Suffolk County police officials that they would assist Riverhead with the Festival. 76 Despite these new developments, Field Day was informed that there was still sufficient time for Riverhead and Suffolk County to enter into the requisite inter-municipal agreement and for the Suffolk County legislature to approve it. On the afternoon of May 9, 2003, Field Day's representative met with Deputy Suffolk County Attorney Robert Cabble and SCDHS representatives to discuss issues that SCHDS felt were under the domain of the Suffolk County Attorney's office. Cabble promised to, but did not, arrange to obtain the inter-municipal agreement, send it to the Riverhead Town Attorney, and put Field Day in contact with Suffolk County's Risk Management Department to assure Field Day's compliance with liability insurance and financial certification requirements. Beginning on May 12, 2003, when Field Day still had not received a copy of any inter-municipal agreement or information about any insurance or financial requirements, its local counsel called Cabble on at least three occasions to inquire about these issues. Cabble did not return these calls. 77 Field Day then sent its police liaison and consultant, a former Suffolk County Chief of Police, to meet with Police Commissioner Gallagher. The consultant reported back to Field Day that Gallagher conceded that the Suffolk County Police Department had refused to participate in the Festival for `political' reasons. The two met again soon after, and Gallagher stated that the deployment of Suffolk County police officers was completely subject to Suffolk County Executive Gaffney giving the political green light. 78 On May 21, 2003, the Riverhead Town Attorney sent Cabble a letter stating that she had been advised that the legislature could hold a special meeting to approve the inter-municipal agreement. The Town Attorney requested that the proposed inter-municipal agreement be forwarded to Riverhead and that arrangements be made for a special meeting of the legislature. Cabble responded by letter the next day (with a copy to Gallagher), stating: 79 At this juncture, it appears that too little time remains to ... hav[e] an approved cooperation agreement in place before the event. Several steps must be taken to do so. First, the actual language of the agreement must be negotiated. Second, the Riverhead Town Counsel must approve the agreement[.] Third, the agreement must be presented to the Suffolk County Legislature for its approval. 80 The letter went on to state that legislative approval ... is considered to be unlikely because it would require that a special meeting ... be noticed and convened by either the County Executive or the Presiding Officer. The Presiding Officer was out of state, and the County Executive was declining to convene a special meeting. Moreover, the letter stated that it was uncertain whether enough legislators to constitute a quorum can be assembled. Even if legislative approval were to occur at all, stated Cabble, it would not be until very close to the date of the Festival, and there [was] concern that a belated disapproval of the agreement would impair timely notification to ticket holders. In sum, stated Cabble, Suffolk County would not enter into a cooperation agreement to provide police services for the Festival. 81 According to Field Day, however, contrary to Cabble's representations, the Suffolk County legislature was scheduled to meet on or about June 4th to discuss the re-drawing of the voting districts, and thus, there was in fact a scheduled meeting of the legislature at which an inter-municipal agreement could have been approved. 82 On May 23, 2003, Gallagher sent formal notice to Hegermiller that Suffolk County would not enter into any agreement to provide police assistance for the Festival. No further explanation was provided. At Gerdt's request, Hegermiller wrote SCDHS to advise it that because of Suffolk's refusal to offer its assistance in implementing Field Day's proposed traffic control plan, he was unable to support the issuance of a mass gathering permit for the Festival. Field Day again offered to Hegermiller to pay for as many security officers and peace officers, including off-duty police officers and corrections officers, as necessary to satisfy Hegermiller's deployment requirements, but Hegermiller again refused [Field Day's] offer. On May 27, 2003, Gerdts issued a letter denying Field Day's application for a Mass Gathering Permit in light of its failure to obtain a statement from the county sheriff, State Police, New York State Department of Transportation or other law enforcement agency certifying that [its] traffic control plan is satisfactory. 83 On May 28, 2003, Field Day responded by letter to Gerdts, noting that his denial of a permit was premature, as Field Day was continuing to work with the Riverhead Police Department to secure sufficient numbers of police officers and law enforcement personnel that could be employed to effectuate the security and traffic control plans and believed that it could nevertheless obtain certification of the traffic control and safety plans prior to the 48-hour deadline provided by the Sanitary Code. 84 On June 4, 2003, Hegermiller informed the Riverhead Town Board that he no longer supported the Festival because of Suffolk County's refusal to provide police assistance. Riverhead then announced that it was withdrawing its support as well and urged Field Day to cancel the event. Riverhead's Supervisor explained that the reason for withdrawal of support was an unexplained last minute decision by upper level County officials not to participate in the Festival, despite many months of cooperation and participation in various planning meetings. 85 By the time Field Day received notice of Riverhead's decision, it had sold over 55,000 tickets for the Festival at an average price of $80 per ticket, and had expended more than $3 million to book performers and to promote and stage the Festival. With fewer than 48 hours before the Festival was to commence, and with thousands of ticket-holders already in route Field Day was forced to spend substantial additional sums to secure an alternative venue in order to mitigate its damages. Field Day was able to secure Giants Stadium (in New Jersey) for a one-day event, which it staged on June 7, 2003 at a loss in excess of $5 million including lost revenues, advertising costs, costs associated with ... staging the Festival at an alternative venue, and injury to its business reputation, financial standing, and goodwill with artists, ticket buyers, ... and the concert promotion industry. As will be seen, the allegations of the Complaint clearly state a claim upon which relief can be granted for an as-applied challenge to the Mass Gathering Law and its implementing Sanitary Code provisions and do not demonstrate an entitlement to qualified immunity.
86 Below, Suffolk County and its employees (and Riverhead and its employee, though those parties did not appeal) argued that because the Mass Gathering Law is facially constitutional, enforcing it against Field Day was reasonable per se and entitled [them] to qualified immunity. The Suffolk County Employees also argued that they properly applied the facially constitutional Mass Gathering Law and therefore no constitutional violation occurred. Field Day argued that the Mass Gathering Law was so `patently unconstitutional' that enforcing it was `objectively unreasonable,' thereby precluding a defense of qualified immunity. Field Day also argued that the facts of this case precluded the defense of qualified immunity. 87 The District Court first found that qualified immunity may neither be ruled out per se, nor applied per se, merely because the Defendant enforced the Mass Gathering Law, given that the Mass Gathering Law cannot be said to reach the level of `blatancy' necessary to per se strip its enforcers of qualified immunity and because [i]t seems too obvious to state, but apparently is not, that a constitutional law must be enforced in a constitutional manner; for if the validity of a law was all that mattered, there would be no such thing as an `as applied' challenge. Thus, the District Court turned to the merits of the as-applied challenge, determined that a violation of a constitutional right was clearly pleaded, and that the pleaded facts supported a finding that no reasonable official 88 could have possibly believed that he was acting in a constitutionally permissible fashion by misleading [Field Day] as to the likelihood of, and requirement for, obtaining a mass gathering permit, imposing special impediments on them, and basing the denial of such a permit on a mis-application of the law (namely, requiring certification of traffic plans for contiguous parking facilities). 89 This Court reviews de novo a ruling granting or denying a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See, e.g., Flaherty v. Lang, 199 F.3d 607, 612 (2d Cir.1999). A public official is entitled to qualified immunity if his actions do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known or if it was `objectively reasonable' for [the public official] to believe that his actions were lawful at the time of the challenged act. McClellan v. Smith, 439 F.3d 137, 147 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). [A] qualified immunity defense can be presented in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but ... the defense faces a formidable hurdle when advanced on such a motion and is usually not successful. McKenna, 386 F.3d at 434. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is only appropriate if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a district court must limit itself to the facts stated in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint. Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 54 (2d Cir.1999). 90 On appeal the Suffolk County Employees argue that Field Day's rights were not clearly established and that their actions were, in any event, not objectively unreasonable. We agree with the District Court: [B]ased on the allegations in the Complaint, qualified immunity is unavailable at this stage of the proceedings .... 91 In support of their assertion that no clearly established right has been pleaded in this case, the Suffolk County Employees make two related arguments. First, they argue that the Mass Gathering Law withstood a constitutional challenge in the New York State Court system, citing Sullivan County v. Filippo, 64 Misc.2d 533, 315 N.Y.S.2d 519 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1970). Second, citing Vives v. City of New York, 405 F.3d 115 (2d Cir.2005), the Suffolk County Employees argue that because the Mass Gathering Law had never been declared unconstitutional they were entitled to rely on it as presumptively valid, and thus were without prior notice of an alleged constitutional infirmity. These related arguments suffer from the same defect: They confuse and conflate the facial constitutionality of a statute with the unconstitutional application of that same statute. 92 Vives dealt with a facial challenge to New York Penal Law § 240.30(1), prohibiting aggravated harassment in the second degree. Id. at 116; see also Vives v. City of New York, 305 F.Supp.2d 289, 301-02 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (holding the statute unconstitutionally overbroad on its face and not discussing the statute as-applied, save as an example of the statute's facial constitutional faults). This Court did observe that 93 absent contrary direction, state officials... are entitled to rely on a presumptively valid state statute ... until and unless [the statute is] declared unconstitutional.... The enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement officers concerning [the law's] constitutionality — with the possible exception of a law so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws. 94 Vives, 405 F.3d at 117 (quoting Connecticut ex rel. Blumenthal v. Crotty, 346 F.3d 84, 102-03 (2d Cir.2003) (alterations in original)). But this was in the context of a facial challenge, not an as-applied challenge to a facially constitutional law, as Field Day is asserting. Vives has no application to the issue presented here. 95 Neither does Filippo have any application to Field Day's as-applied challenge. In Filippo the Supreme Court, Sullivan County, New York, rejected a void-for-vagueness challenge to Public Health Law § 225(5)(o) (former § 225(4)(o)) and part 7 of the Sanitary Code and upheld these provisions as constitutional. Filippo, 64 Misc.2d at 557, 558, 315 N.Y.S.2d 519. Inasmuch as Filippo likewise involved only a facial challenge to the Mass Gathering Law, that case has no application to the as-applied claim before us. 96 Less than two years before the events underlying this action occurred, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the exercise of discretion granted by a facially constitutional licensing regulation to favor certain speakers over others would of course be unconstitutional. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. at 325, 122 S.Ct. 775 (Granting waivers to favored speakers (or, more precisely, denying them to disfavored speakers) would of course be unconstitutional.). Just as it is obvious that application of a facially neutral law may violate the equal protection clause, see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886), so too may the application of a facially neutral law so as to discriminate against certain speakers or ideas violate the First Amendment. In LaTrieste Restaurant and Cabaret Inc. v. Village of Port Chester, 40 F.3d 587 (2d Cir.1994), for example, a topless cabaret filed a § 1983 action, complaining that a municipality and its officers had den[ied] it equal protection of the laws and interfer[ed] with its First Amendment rights by selectively enforcing its zoning ordinances in an effort to prevent the cabaret from exercising its First Amendment right to have topless dancing on its premises. Id. at 589, 590-91. This Court held that summary judgment in favor of the defendants was precluded where the cabaret had presented evidence of disparate treatment and, based on comments of the officials, that such treatment was due to animus toward the content of the speech (i.e., the nudity). Id. 5 Indeed, the concern that the government may use facially neutral licensing regulations to engage in content discrimination is the very thing that animates courts to entertain facial challenges to licensing regulations. See City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759, 108 S.Ct. 2138 (explaining that facial challenges are permitted because of the difficulty of effectively detecting, reviewing, and correcting content-based censorship `as applied' without standards by which to measure the licensor's action); Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 793, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (noting the necessity of prevent[ing] city officials from selecting wholly inadequate sound equipment or technicians, or even from varying the volume and quality of sound based on the message being conveyed by the performers). Like the District Court, we thought it too obvious to state . . . that a constitutional law must be enforced in a constitutional manner. 97 The Suffolk County Employees also argue that their application of the Mass Gathering Law was objectively reasonable. Under the facts as stated in the Second Amended Complaint, however, that is not so. As set forth above and as found by the District Court, Field Day asserts that various Suffolk County employees thwarted Field Day's efforts to obtain a mass gathering permit through politically motivated, unreasonable, and capricious demands that were imposed under the guise of the Mass Gathering Law, but that were not actually based on its provisions. These demands included a fee of $2.5 million to process [Field Day's] Permit Application, rather than the $4500 fee provided for by the permit application fee determination schedule made by SCDHS. Field Day was instructed that it would have to pay $ 245,616.00 to obtain 150 Suffolk County police officers for the Festival. Field Day was also required to obtain an inter-municipal agreement in order for Suffolk County to provide those police officers — only to have a Deputy Suffolk County Attorney first delay, then mislead, then rebuff, based on a lack of time, Field Day's efforts to obtain that agreement. All the while, the Principal Public Health Sanitarian for SCDHS was asserting that the Festival had no redeeming value and various Suffolk County executives were looking to derail the Festival to placate Clear Channel. 98 The Suffolk County Employees argue in their brief that 99 in the case at bar, [Field Day's] [C]omplaint establishes that 200 police were required for .... this event. Moreover, [Field Day's] [C]omplaint establishes that [it] had secured only 50 police for this event at the time the [m]ass [g]athering [p]ermit was denied. Thus, by its own terms, [Field Day's] [C]omplaint establishes that denial of the [m]ass [g]athering [p]ermit was objectively reasonable. 100 Field Day asserts, however, that 200 police officers were not, in fact, needed. 101 Moreover, the letter from Gertz to Field Day rejecting the Application relied only on a misapplication of § 7-1.41 of the Sanitary Code. That letter stated that because Hegemiller did not find the traffic control plan to be satisfactory, ostensibly because fewer than 200 police officers could be provided, Field Day's engineering report had failed to include a statement from the county sheriff, State police, New York State Department of Transportation or other law enforcement agency certifying that the traffic control plan is satisfactory. See N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 7-1.41(d)(2). However, § 7-1.41(d)(2) makes clear that it applies only to plans for transportation arrangements from noncontiguous parking facilities to the site. Id. (emphasis added). Field Day's parking facilities were contiguous and, therefore, § 7-1.41(d)(2) clearly did not apply. 102 To the extent that the Suffolk County Employees now invoke other sections of the Sanitary Code to support the denial of the Application, New York law limits this Court's review to the grounds invoked by the agency. Scherbyn v. Wayne-Finger Lakes Bd. of Co-op. Educ. Servs., 77 N.Y.2d 755, 758 (N.Y. 1991), 570 N.Y.S.2d 474, 573 N.E.2d 562. Furthermore, in accordance with the interpretation of the Mass Gathering Law and Sanitary Code given above, the rejection of the Application based on any other ground would still have to be reasonable, and Field Day has alleged that the rejection was unreasonable. 103 Finally, the Suffolk County Employees raised, for the first time at oral argument, several new contentions, including that Suffolk County had no duty to provide police officers to assist in this event and that, therefore, the refusal of assistance could not be a constitutional violation. Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal. Norton v. Sam's Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998). We note only in passing that the Second Amended Complaint, read fairly, indicates that Field Day could prove that Suffolk County has provided assistance to other events at the Park, including the New York Air Show and the Bonnaroo Music Festival, and that its refusal here was based solely on disapproval of Field Day as speaker or the content of Field Day's speech. Such conduct would, of course, raise serious constitutional concerns. See Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. at 325, 122 S.Ct. 775 (Granting [discretionary] waivers to favored speakers (or, more precisely, denying them to disfavored speakers) would of course be unconstitutional.). However, we do not pass on this issue given the lack of briefing to this Court. 6 104 Nothing in the Suffolk County Employees's brief to this Court undermines the conclusion of the District Court: It is ... hard to fathom how any reasonable official in the [Suffolk County Employees'] shoes could have possibly believed that he was acting in a constitutionally permissible fashion. Given the allegations contained in Field Day's Second Amended Complaint, qualified immunity is unavailable on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the District Court's denial of the Suffolk County Employees's motion to dismiss is affirmed.