Opinion ID: 1428329
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: New Mexico's Game and Fish Laws

Text: {16} Even if we had concluded that wild animals are protected by Section 30-18-1, we believe there are additional indications that the Legislature did not intend that Cleve's conduct in this case fall within the meaning of cruelty to animals in Section 30-18-1. Cleve argues that New Mexico game and fish statutes and regulations preempt the application of Section 30-18-1 to game animals. The Court of Appeals rejected his argument on the basis of a rule of statutory construction, the general/specific statute rule, that has proven somewhat difficult to apply. We take this opportunity to clarify our cases and the proper application of the general/specific statute rule in New Mexico. We agree with Cleve that the overall statutory scheme governing hunting and fishing demonstrates a legislative intent to preempt the application of Section 30-18-1 to game and fish with respect to conduct contemplated by game and fish laws. We believe that the general/specific statute rule therefore provides additional support for our interpretation of Section 30-18-1. {17} As a rule of statutory construction in determining legislative intent, [w]here one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter will prevail, regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general statute, unless it appears that the legislature intended to make the general act controlling. 2B Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 51.05 (5th ed.1992) (footnotes omitted); accord State v. Blevins, 40 N.M. 367, 368-69, 60 P.2d 208, 209 (1936). This rule in effect treats the special law as an exception to the general law because the Legislature is presumed not to have intended a conflict between two of its statutes and because the Legislature's attention is more particularly directed to the relevant subject matter in deliberating upon the special law. See Wilburn v. Territory, 10 N.M. 402, 408, 62 P. 968, 971 (1900), overruled sub silencio on other grounds, Tais v. Territory, 14 N.M. 399, 402-03, 94 P. 947, 948-49 (1908). In the context of criminal laws, this rule of construction has a corollary: if two statutes, one general and one special, punish the same criminal conduct, the special law operates as an exception to the general law to the extent of compelling the state to prosecute under the special law. Blevins, 40 N.M. at 369, 60 P.2d at 210. {18} Cleve contends that the unlawful hunting statute, Section 17-2-7, is a special law that conflicts with the general prohibition against cruelty to animals in Section 30-18-1. In discussing this argument, the Court of Appeals concluded that Section 17-2-7 and Section 30-18-1 serve different purposes, are both necessary to fully protect game animals, and, therefore, do not conflict with one another. Cleve, 1997-NMCA-113, ¶¶ 7-8, 949 P.2d 672. The Court of Appeals therefore held that the general/specific statute rule did not apply. Id. While we believe that the prohibition against unlawful hunting, by itself, does not conflict with Section 30-18-1, we disagree with the Court of Appeals' assessment of the general/specific statute rule. Even if we had concluded that Section 30-18-1 prohibits cruelty against wild animals, we believe that the overall scheme of laws in New Mexico governing hunting and fishing would irreconcilably conflict with Section 30-18-1. Thus, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend for Section 30-18-1 to apply to hunting activities contemplated by New Mexico's specific laws governing game and fish. {19} Although courts and commentators are readily able to recite the general/specific statute rule, its practical application has caused considerable difficulty. This Court has discussed the rule on several occasions. In Wilburn, a defendant, who had stolen a cow, argued that he should have been sentenced pursuant to a general larceny provision, which provided for a value-structured punishment based on the dollar amount of the item stolen, rather than under a statute governing the theft of livestock, which contained a single penalty regardless of the value of the livestock. Wilburn, 10 N.M. at 407-08, 62 P. at 970. We concluded that the object of the earlier-enacted statute governing the theft of livestock was not to prevent larceny in general, but to protect the ownership of a certain class of property, and the statute therefore operated as an exception to the statute defining the general crime of larceny. Id. at 409, 62 P. at 971. Subsequently, we relied on the general/specific statute rule in Blevins to conclude that the prosecution had improperly charged the defendant under a general statute proscribing the sale of another's property rather than a specific statute governing the sale of cattle. Blevins, 40 N.M. at 369-70, 60 P.2d at 210. For determining whether the general/specific statute rule applied, we adopted [t]he test applied in the United States Supreme Court [in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 303-04, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932)] for determining whether the offenses inveighed against are the same or distinct offenses. Blevins, 40 N.M. at 369, 60 P.2d at 210. Under this test, the relevant inquiry is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not. Id. Applying this test in Blevins, we noted that the possible prejudice to the [defendant] is in the increased penalty under the general statute proscribing the sale of another's property, id. at 368, 60 P.2d at 209, and concluded that the general statute is not operative as to the special kinds of property described in the special statute, id. at 369, 60 P.2d at 210. {20} Our more recent cases have relied on Blevins in applying the general/specific statute rule as it affects the charging discretion of the prosecutor. For example, in Aragon v. Cox, 75 N.M. 537, 541, 407 P.2d 673, 676 (1965) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds, State v. Chavez, 77 N.M. 79, 82, 419 P.2d 456, 458 (1966), we addressed the relationship between a statute specifically proscribing the possession of marijuana and a statute proscribing the possession of a narcotic drug, the latter of which specifically defined marijuana as a narcotic drug. We concluded that the statutes were equally specific and that, therefore, the general/specific rule did not apply. Id. [1] {21} On a number of occasions, this Court has encountered some disagreement in the application of the general/specific statute rule. In Chavez, for example, while the majority followed Aragon in determining that the two statutes proscribed marijuana possession with equal specificity, two justices dissented because they believed that, under Blevins, the more specific statute relating exclusively to marijuana controlled over the statute relating to narcotic drugs in general. Chavez, 77 N.M. at 83-85, 419 P.2d at 459-60 (Moise, J., dissenting); see also State v. Reams, 98 N.M. 215, 216, 647 P.2d 417, 418 (1982) (reaching a split decision regarding the application of the general/specific statute rule). More recently, the Court of Appeals again recognized some ambiguities in the application of the general/specific statute rule. See State v. Wasson, 1998-NMCA-087, ¶ 19, 125 N.M. 656, 964 P.2d 820 (stating that it is problematic to discern which of the two statutes is the more specific), cert. denied, 125 N.M. 322, 961 P.2d 167 (1998); State v. Arellano, 1997-NMCA-074, ¶ 12, 123 N.M. 589, 943 P.2d 1042 (same), cert. quashed, 124 N.M. 589, 953 P.2d 1087 (1998). These cases demonstrate that New Mexico courts frequently resort to the general/specific statute rule as an aid in statutory construction but that the rule is also frequently difficult for courts to apply. As a result, we believe it is necessary to clarify the application of this rule in New Mexico. {22} Although not explicit in our earlier cases, it is clear that the general/specific statute rule, to the extent that it requires prosecution under one statute instead of another, is connected with the principle of double jeopardy as it relates to multiple punishment for unitary conduct. For example, in Blevins, [w]e start[ed] with the premise that both acts condemn the same offense. A conviction under one statute could be pleaded as a former jeopardy against a subsequent prosecution under the other statute. 40 N.M. at 368, 60 P.2d at 209. Thus, our determination that the Legislature did not intend multiple punishment under the two statutes was a prerequisite to our inquiry under the general/specific statute rule. Indeed, we adopted the test from Blockburger, a test developed in the context of multiple punishments, for deciding whether the general/specific statute rule applied. We later applied this test in State v. Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. 274, 277, 694 P.2d 922, 925 (1985), in which we discussed the relationship between the crimes of vehicular homicide by reckless driving and depraved mind murder. We determined that depraved mind murder requires proof of an additional fact, a higher level of mental culpability in the element of subjective knowledge that the defendant's act is greatly dangerous to the lives of others, when compared to vehicular homicide and that, therefore, the general/specific rule did not apply. Id. at 278, 694 P.2d at 926. In light of the relationship between principles of double jeopardy and the general/specific statute rule, we now clarify our reasoning in Ibn Omar-Muhammad. {23} This Court more recently discussed the principle of double jeopardy in relation to multiple punishments in Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 7-16, 810 P.2d 1223, 1227-36 (1991). We noted that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides limited expectations to criminal defendants facing multiple convictions and punishments in a single trial arising out of the same criminal conduct. Id. at 7, 810 P.2d at 1227. In the context of simultaneously imposed multiple punishments, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983). As a result, we acknowledged that [t]he necessary corollary to the focus on legislative intent is that the Blockburger test is not a constitutional rule, but merely a canon of construction used to guide courts in deciphering legislative intent. Swafford, 112 N.M. at 9, 810 P.2d at 1229. {24} In Swafford, we adopted a two-part test for determining legislative intent to punish. The first part of our inquiry asks ... whether the conduct underlying the offenses is unitary, i.e., whether the same conduct violates both statutes. The second part focuses on the statutes at issue to determine whether the [L]egislature intended to create separately punishable offenses. Only if the first part of the test is answered in the affirmative, and the second in the negative, will the double jeopardy clause prohibit multiple punishment in the same trial. Swafford, 112 N.M. at 13, 810 P.2d at 1233. After describing the relevant considerations for determining whether underlying conduct is unitary, we explained the proper focus in ascertaining legislative intent. First, under the Blockburger test, a court should compare the elements of the two offenses, and if the elements of one crime are subsumed within the elements of the other, the inquiry is over and the statutes are the same for double jeopardy purposes-punishment cannot be had for both. Swafford, 112 N.M. at 14, 810 P.2d at 1234. On the other hand, if the elements of the crimes do not correspond, then the Blockburger test raises only a presumption that the statutes punish distinct offenses. That presumption, however is not conclusive and it may be overcome by other indicia of legislative intent. Here, we must turn to traditional means of determining legislative intent: the language, history, and subject of the statutes. Id. Although double jeopardy prevents certain multiple punishments in accordance with legislative intent, it typically does not infringe upon the discretion of the prosecution to charge multiple offenses. {25} Like the double jeopardy inquiry in the multiple punishment context, the general/specific rule is a canon of statutory construction with constitutional overtones. See Mills v. State, 722 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex. Crim.App.1986) (en banc) (In the case in which the special statute provides for a lesser range of punishment than the general, obviously an irreconcilable conflict exists, and due process and due course of law dictate that an accused be prosecuted under the special provision, in keeping with presumed legislative intent. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Both analyses focus on legislative intent. However, whereas courts use the principle of double jeopardy in this context to assess the propriety of multiple punishments by courts based on multiple crimes charged by a prosecutor, courts use the general/specific rule to scrutinize the propriety of a single charge of one crime as opposed to a different crime. Thus, while the double jeopardy inquiry focuses on whether the Legislature intended to limit a court's discretion in imposing multiple punishments, the general/specific statute rule determines whether the Legislature intended to limit the discretion of the prosecutor in its selection of charges. {26} Accordingly, we reaffirm our reliance on the Blockburger test, as the test has been explained in Swafford, for determining whether the general/specific statute rule should apply. Courts should compare the elements of the two relevant crimes. If the elements of the two crimes are the same, the general/specific statute rule applies, and the prosecution must charge the defendant under the special law absent a clear expression of legislative intent to the contrary. See Blevins, 40 N.M. at 369-70, 60 P.2d at 210; Wilburn, 10 N.M. at 407-09, 62 P. at 970-71. If the elements differ, courts must look to other indicia of legislative intent and determine whether the Legislature intended to limit prosecutorial discretion in the selection of charges for the specific criminal conduct. In ascertaining legislative intent, courts should balance the rule of lenity, which favors applying the general/specific statute rule in cases of ambiguity, with the judiciary's longstanding deference to prosecutorial discretion, which favors the exercise of caution before applying the general/specific statute rule. See State v. Anaya, 1997-NMSC-010, ¶ 32, 123 N.M. 14, 933 P.2d 223 (Application of the rule of lenity requires that criminal statutes be interpreted in the defendant's favor when `insurmountable ambiguity persists regarding the intended scope of [that] statute.' (quoting Ogden, 118 N.M. at 242, 880 P.2d at 853) (alteration in original)); Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 859, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985) (This Court has long acknowledged the Government's broad discretion to conduct criminal prosecutions, including its power to select the charges to be brought in a particular case.); cf. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.3d 1230, 265 Cal.Rptr. 144, 783 P.2d 731, 743 (1989) (stating that the general/specific statute rule do[es] not purport to limit the People's discretion to prosecute under a general statute that provides a sanction less severe than that called for under a specific statute). {27} In Ibn Omar-Muhammad, 102 N.M. at 277-78, 694 P.2d at 925-26, we focused our inquiry on the elements of the two relevant crimes and determined that the Legislature did not intend to limit prosecutorial discretion due to the clearly distinct behavior each statute sought to prevent and the distinct level of culpability that the Legislature sought to punish. Although we focused our inquiry on the elements of the two relevant crimes, we now clarify that we did not intend to suggest that the elements of the crimes serve as the only relevant factor under the general/specific statute rule. Rather, in conformity with Swafford, our application of the general/specific statute rule in State v. Yarborough, 1996-NMSC-068, ¶¶ 26-29, 122 N.M. 596, 930 P.2d 131, serves as an example of additional relevant factors in ascertaining legislative intent. In Yarborough, we reviewed the history of statutes proscribing homicide by vehicle and involuntary manslaughter in New Mexico. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. In addition, we reviewed decisions from other jurisdictions that concluded that the enactment of a comprehensive motor vehicle code shows a legislative intent to preempt the field. Id. ¶ 27. From the history of the statute, we found a similar legislative intent in New Mexico and concluded that the Legislature intended to preempt involuntary manslaughter when the predicate offense is a misdemeanor contained within the Motor Vehicle Code. Id. ¶ 29. Thus, an inquiry under the general/specific statute rule should always focus primarily on whether the Legislature intended that the specific law operate as an exception to the general law and whether the Legislature intended that certain criminal conduct be charged under one special law to the exclusion of other more general laws. This inquiry may include the elements of the crimes, the language of the statutes, the histories and purposes of the statutes, and other relevant indicia of legislative intent. To the extent that Ibn Omar-Muhammad might suggest that we strictly rely on the elements of the crimes in ascertaining legislative intent, see State v. Tisthammer, 1998-NMCA-115, ¶ 34, 126 N.M. 52, 966 P.2d 760 (relying on Ibn Omar-Muhammad and stating that if, under the Blockburger test, each statute includes an element that the other does not, the general-specific rule is inapplicable), cert. denied, 126 N.M. 107, 967 P.2d 447 (1998); Wasson, 1998-NMCA-087, ¶¶ 16-19, 964 P.2d 820 (similar), it is hereby modified in accordance with the reasoning articulated in Swafford and the analysis applied in Yarborough. Cf. People v. Jenkins, 28 Cal.3d 494, 170 Cal.Rptr. 1, 620 P.2d 587, 592 (1980) (stating that a strict elements test is incomplete for determining whether the general/specific statute rule applies). {28} We note that a determination that the Legislature intended to limit the prosecutor's charging discretion may not fully resolve the matter. As expressed in some recent cases, it may be difficult in some circumstances to determine which of two laws can be characterized as specific and which can be characterized as general. However, this difficulty does not preclude application of the rule or signal that such an inquiry would be futile. As with the interpretation of all statutes, courts should resort to traditional means of ascertaining legislative intent. For example, in Reams, Judge Wood of the Court of Appeals, whose dissenting opinion was adopted by this Court, see Reams, 98 N.M. at 216, 647 P.2d at 418, reviewed the purpose and history of the Controlled Substances Act, as well as the language of several of its provisions, to conclude that the Legislature focused its attention on criminal drug offenses more particularly in enacting the Controlled Substances Act than in the Drug and Cosmetics Act and that the Legislature intended that the Controlled Substances Act take priority in criminal prosecutions concerning conduct contemplated by the Controlled Substances Act. See State v. Reams, 98 N.M. 372, 377-78, 648 P.2d 1185, 1190-91 (Ct.App.1981) (Wood, J., dissenting). Judge Wood's analysis demonstrates that, after determining that the general/specific statute rule applies, traditional rules of statutory construction adequately illuminate which of two statutes the Legislature intends to apply in a particular case. {29} Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we note that Cleve's focus on the general/specific statute rule in relation to his prosecution for violations of both Section 17-2-7 and Section 30-18-1 is somewhat misplaced. Cleve was convicted of both unlawful hunting and cruelty to animals. Thus, the facts of this case require us to ask, first, whether principles of double jeopardy preclude these multiple convictions. If the Legislature intended to create separately punishable offenses in Section 17-2-7 and Section 30-18-1, double jeopardy would not bar multiple punishments, and we then would not need to engage in an inquiry regarding the application of the general/specific rule to these two statutes because a legislative intent to create multiple punishments necessarily implies that the Legislature also intended to leave intact the prosecutor's charging discretion. If, on the other hand, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend to create separately punishable offenses, then one of Cleve's convictions would be constitutionally invalid, and we would proceed to address the separate matter of whether, under the general/specific statute rule, the Legislature intended that one crime apply to the exclusion of the other. {30} Under Swafford, we look first at the elements of the two crimes in order to determine legislative intent. [2] From a review of these two crimes, it is clear that the elements of unlawful hunting are not subsumed within the crime of cruelty to animals. Unlawful hunting requires proof that a defendant hunted, took, captured, or killed any game animal, game fish, or game bird, or attempted the same, in a manner not permitted by game and fish regulations or some other law. Section 17-2-7. Specifically, the State relied on the fact that snaring is not an authorized manner for taking deer pursuant to State Game Commission (Commission) regulations. By contrast, cruelty to animals requires proof that a defendant tortured or cruelly killed an animal. Cf. State v. Carrasco, 1997-NMSC-047, ¶ 27, 124 N.M. 64, 946 P.2d 1075 (Both offenses are defined by statutes providing several alternatives, thus we focus on the legal theory of the case and disregard any inapplicable statutory elements.). As a result, if we had concluded that Section 30-18-1 applies to wild animals, the unique elements of torture or cruelty in Section 30-18-1 and of violation of the Commission's regulations in Section 17-2-7 would raise a presumption that the Legislature intended to create separately punishable offenses. Thus, we turn to traditional means of discerning legislative intent in order to determine whether the presumption stands. {31} In this context, we ask whether the violation of one statute will normally result in a violation of the other. See Swafford, 112 N.M. at 14, 810 P.2d at 1234; see also Jenkins, 170 Cal.Rptr. 1, 620 P.2d at 592 (stating that the general/specific statute rule applies [i]f it appears from the entire context that a violation of the `special' statute will necessarily or commonly result in a violation of the `general' statute). As the Court of Appeals noted, if Section 30-18-1 were to protect wild animals, it would be possible to violate each statute, cruelty to animals and unlawful hunting, independently, without violating the other. Cleve, 1997-NMCA-113, ¶ 8, 949 P.2d 672. For example, many hunters could be convicted of unlawful hunting for killing game without a license, or out of season, and yet fail to satisfy the elements of cruelty to animals. Thus, even if Section 30-18-1 had protected wild animals, the violation of one of these statutes would not commonly result in violation of the other. Further, in assessing the particular evil sought to be addressed by each offense, and bearing in mind that the description of social evils can be elusive and subject to diverse interpretation, Swafford, 112 N.M. at 14, 810 P.2d at 1234, we agree with the Court of Appeals that these statutes serve different purposes. Cleve, 1997-NMCA-113, ¶¶ 7-8, 949 P.2d 672. As we have already stated, the cruelty to animals statute serves to define the outer boundaries of acceptable human conduct toward animals. By contrast, the unlawful hunting statute serves to enforce the authority of the Commission in defining the manner and conditions of lawful hunting and fishing in New Mexico and to ensure that hunting and fishing in New Mexico is carried out in a manner consistent with the public policy articulated in NMSA 1978, § 17-1-1 (1931). It is the purpose of this act and the policy of the state of New Mexico to provide an adequate and flexible system for the protection of the game and fish of New Mexico and for their use and development for public recreation and food supply, and to provide for their propagation, planting, protection, regulation and conservation to the extent necessary to provide and maintain an adequate supply of game and fish within the state of New Mexico. Id. Taking into account such statutory factors as language, history, and purpose, we conclude that the Legislature intended to create separately punishable offenses by enacting Section 17-2-7 and Section 30-18-1. Thus, we conclude that, if Section 30-18-1 had protected wild animals from cruelty, double jeopardy would not prevent convictions for both of these crimes, and we therefore need not address the application of the general/specific statute rule in the limited context of prosecutorial discretion in charging one of these crimes instead of the other. {32} Notwithstanding a lack of conflict between the statutory prohibition against unlawful hunting, by itself, and Section 30-18-1, Cleve also asserts that the overall statutory scheme governing hunting and fishing demonstrates a legislative intent to preempt the application of Section 30-18-1 to game and fish with respect to conduct contemplated by game and fish laws. We agree. As outlined above, the general/specific statute rule is broader in application than determining only the potential limits on prosecutorial discretion in charging one crime instead of another. This rule of construction assists courts more generally in determining whether the Legislature intended to create an exception to a general statute by enacting another law dealing with the matter in a more specific way. Although the limited proscription against unlawful hunting, standing alone, does not conflict with Section 30-18-1, we conclude that New Mexico's other laws specifically governing hunting and fishing irreconcilably conflict with Section 30-18-1 and that behavior contemplated by the Legislature's authorization of hunting and fishing is excepted from the general proscription against cruelty to animals. {33} The Legislature has established in New Mexico a system under which game and fish may be use[d] and develop[ed] for public recreation and food supply. Section 17-1-1. In order to implement this system, the Legislature created the Commission, NMSA 1978, § 17-1-2 (1991), and delegated to it, among other things, the power to authorize or prohibit the killing or taking of any game animals, game birds or game fish of any kind or sex and the power to regulate the manner, methods and devices which may be used in hunting, taking or killing game animals, game birds and game fish, NMSA 1978, § 17-2-1 (1983). The Commission's regulations include provisions governing the hunting of deer, as well as provisions establishing the proper use of traps and snares. {34} Cleve's cruelty to animals convictions are based on the snaring of two deer. In placing his snares, it is clear that Cleve was engaged in the activity of hunting the deer on his land and that his manner of hunting, trapping by snare, is within the range of hunting activity contemplated by the game and fish statutes. We believe that Cleve's conviction of cruelty to animals for snaring game animals exemplifies the conflict between Section 30-18-1 and the Legislature's provisions governing hunting and fishing in New Mexico. Although the Commission's regulations do not authorize the capturing of deer by snare, see Legal Sporting Arms and Ammunition, Department of Game and Fish, 19 NMAC 31.1.16.4 (April 1, 1995), the Commission has promulgated regulations authorizing the snaring and trapping of furbearing game animals within certain parameters, see Manner and Method of Taking Furbearers, Department of Game and Fish, 19 NMAC 32.1.10 (April 1, 1995). The language of Section 17-2-1 clearly delegates to the Commission the power to determine whether the snaring of particular game animals is consistent with the statutory purposes articulated in Section 17-1-1. It appears from the evidence introduced in the trial court that the manner of death for the two snared deer, strangulation and either starvation, dehydration, or fatigue, is not atypical for a snared game animal. Thus, under the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Section 30-18-1, the lawful snaring of furbearing animals would appear to be equally subject to prosecution for cruelty to animals. Further, a Department official, Assistant Chief of Operations Pat Barncastle, testified that, when the Department traps antelope and deer for purposes such as relocation, it is not uncommon for them to die of stress-related fatigue. This activity would also appear to violate the cruelty to animals statute under the Court of Appeals' construction. Additionally, the State charged Cleve with cruelty to animals for shooting several deer in the abdomen, even though Officer Barncastle testified that approximately twenty-five to thirty-five percent of deer lawfully taken pursuant to Commission regulations are also shot in the abdomen. Thus, according to the State's interpretation of Section 30-18-1, the lawful hunting of deer would appear to subject a hunter to potential prosecution for cruelty to animals. We believe that these applications of Section 30-18-1 would conflict with the Legislature's authorization of hunting and fishing in New Mexico and would frustrate the Legislature's delegation of power to the Commission to determine the manner in which hunting is to be conducted. {35} Although Cleve's conduct violated Commission regulations, thereby constituting unlawful hunting, it was not beyond the scope of activity that the Legislature has chosen to place within the regulatory power of the Commission. In fact, the Legislature has recently addressed the specific problems arising in this case, providing that landowners may, in accordance with Commission regulations, take a game animal on private land if the animal presents an immediate threat to human life or an immediate threat of damage to property, including crops. NMSA 1978, § 17-2-7.2 (1997). Thus, we determine that the Legislature's endorsement of hunting and fishing activity and its delegation of power to the Commission to determine the manner of hunting substantially and irreconcilably conflicts with the cruelty-to-animals statute. Therefore, we conclude that, even if the Legislature had intended to protect wild animals in Section 30-18-1, the Legislature, having dealt with the subject of the hunting of game animals more particularly in the game and fish laws, intended to create an exception from the cruelty-to-animals statute for hunting and fishing activity contemplated by game and fish laws. {36} Like the comprehensive Motor Vehicle Code addressed in Yarborough, 1996-NMSC-068, ¶¶ 27-29, 930 P.2d 131, we believe the comprehensive nature of the game and fish laws with respect to hunting activity demonstrates a legislative intent to preempt application of Section 30-18-1 to the hunting of game animals. Because Cleve was engaged in the hunting of game animals, specifically deer, and because his manner of hunting was within the range of activity contemplated by game and fish statutes and regulations, we apply the general/specific statute rule and conclude that Section 30-18-1 is inapplicable to the facts of this case.