Opinion ID: 4547352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Nature of Executive and Legislative Powers

Text: ¶95 It is common knowledge that the Wisconsin Constitution organizes our government in a tripartite structure. Goodland v. Zimmerman, 243 Wis. 459, 466-67, 10 N.W.2d 180 (1943) ([G]overnmental powers are divided among the three departments of government, the legislative, the executive, and judicial[.]). At the risk of oversimplification, the legislature's authority comprises the power to make the law,4 whereas the executive's authority consists of executing the law.5 The distinction between the two has been described as the difference between the power to prescribe and the power to put something into effect: In 1792, Jacques Necker, the famous French statesman, neatly summed up the function and significance of the executive power. Of the function: [I]f by a fiction we were for a moment to personify the legislative and the executive powers, the latter in speaking of the former might . . . say: All that this man has talked of, I will perform. Of the significance: The laws would in effect be nothing more than counsels, than so many maxims more or less sage, without this active and vigilant authority, 4The legislative power shall be vested in a senate and assembly. Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1. 5The executive power shall be vested in a governor. Wis. Const. art. V, § 1. 7 Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk which assures their empire and transmits to the administration the motion of which it stands in need. Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 701, 819 (2003) (quoted source omitted). This commentator concluded that, [i]n the late-eighteenth century, someone vested with the executive power and christened as the chief executive enjoyed the power to control the execution of law. Id. ¶96 The executive, however, is not a legislativelycontrolled automaton. Before executing, he must of necessity determine for himself what the law requires him to do. As Alexander Hamilton said, [h]e who is to execute the laws must first judge for himself of their meaning. See Alexander Hamilton, Letters of Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 4 The Works of Alexander Hamilton 438 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed. 1904). This is intrinsic to the very nature of executive authority. The executive must certainly interpret and apply the law; it would be impossible to perform his duties if he did not. After all, he must determine for himself what the law requires (interpretation) so that he may carry it into effect (application). Our constitution not only does not forbid this, it requires it. Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, ¶53, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21 (Kelly, J., lead op.). See also Wis. Const. art. V, § 1 (The executive power shall be vested in a governor . . . .); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 575 U.S. 92, 119 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (It is undoubtedly true that the other branches of Government have the authority and obligation to interpret the law . . . .). 8 Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk ¶97 The executive oftentimes carries out his functions through administrative agencies.6 Although agencies have sometimes been criticized as a headless fourth branch of government,7 they are not——we have only three. Agencies must belong to one of them, and we have said before that they are one manifestation of the executive. Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, ¶14, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 N.W.2d 600 (Agencies are considered part of the executive branch.).8 This understanding is not 6 See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 573 U.S. 302, 327 (2014) (Under our system of government, Congress makes laws and the President, acting at times through agencies . . . 'faithfully execute[s]' them. (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (alterations in original))); State ex rel. Wisconsin Dev. Auth. v. Dammann, 228 Wis. 147, 159, 277 N.W. 278 on reh'g, 228 Wis. 147, 280 N.W. 698 (1938) (It is fundamental that under our constitutional system the governmental power to execute the laws is vested in the executive department of the state, and can be exercised only by duly constituted officers thereof.); DOR v. Nagle-Hart, Inc., 70 Wis. 2d 224, 226–27, 234 N.W.2d 350 (1975) (It is for the department[s] to implement and carry out the mandate of the legislative enactments . . . and stop at the limits of such legislative mandate or direction.); Black & Decker, Inc. v. DILHR, No. 1988AP0409, unpublished slip op. (Sept. 15, 1988) (Wherein the court of appeals described the function of an agency as one of carrying out and implementing a legislative act.). 7 Peter L. Strauss Agencies' Place in Government, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 578 (1984) (internal marks and quoted source omitted). 8 This is also apparent from the fact that the governor appoints agency secretaries, all of whom serve at the governor's pleasure. Wis. Stat. § 15.05(1)(a) (If a department is under the direction and supervision of a secretary, the secretary shall be nominated by the governor, and with the advice and consent of the senate appointed, to serve at the pleasure of the governor.). 9 Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk unique to Wisconsin.9 And when an administrative agency acts (other than when it is exercising its borrowed rulemaking function), it is exercising executive power. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 217 (1890) ([T]here can be no doubt that it [the power conferred on the president of the United States] may be declared through the department of state, whose acts in this regard are in legal contemplation the acts of the president. (emphasis added)); Wolsey v. Chapman, 101 U.S. 755, 769 (1879) ([T]he acts of the heads of departments, within the scope of their powers, are in law the acts of the President.); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 424 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Although the Constitution says that '[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America,' [U.S. Const.] Art. II, § 1, it was never thought that the President would have to exercise that 9See, e.g., Town of Walkerton v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 18 N.E. 2d 799, 803 (Ind. 1939) (Under our form of government an administrative agency belongs to the executive department.); Barrett v. Tennessee Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 284 S.W. 3d 784, 789 (Tenn. 2009) (Administrative agencies are part of the executive branch of government.); Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., 840 S.W. 2d 814, 820 (Ky. 1992) (Decisionmaking performed by an administrative agency is an executive function.); Judges of 74th Judicial Dist. v. Bay Cty., 190 N.W. 2d 219, 226 (Mich. 1971) (Administrative agencies are a part of the executive branch of government. While they often act in a quasi-judicial capacity, it is recognized that they are established to perform essentially executive functions.); Matter of Kallen, 455 A. 2d 460, 463 (N.J. 1983) (Administrative agencies are the arms of the executive branch of government that implement the laws passed by the Legislature.); Muddy Boys, Inc. v. Dep't of Commerce, 440 P. 3d 741, 747 (Ut. Ct. App. 2019) ([A]dministrative agencies are part of the executive.). 10 Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk power personally. He may generally authorize others to exercise executive powers, with full effect of law, in his place. (alterations in original)).; Frank B. Cross, Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498: A Test Case in Presidential Control of Executive Agencies, 4 J.L. & Pol. 483, 507 (1988) (Obviously, one person cannot execute all the functions of government personally. In order to carry out his constitutional responsibility, the president must delegate his authority to other executive officers.). ¶98 In addition to the executive power that agencies exercise as a consequence of their placement in the executive branch, they also exercise some limited legislative power. This second type of authority depends entirely on the legislature's delegation of the power to promulgate rules that have the force and effect of law. Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2) (Rule-making authority is expressly conferred on an agency[.]); Kieninger v. Crown Equip. Corp., 2019 WI 27, ¶16 n.8, 386 Wis. 2d 1, 924 N.W.2d 172 (Administrative rules enacted pursuant to statutory rulemaking authority have the force and effect of law in Wisconsin. (quoted source omitted)). We have recognized before that when an agency promulgates a rule, it is exercising a legislative power[.] Koschkee, 387 Wis. 2d 552, ¶39. An agency, however, has no inherent constitutional authority to make rules . . . . Martinez v. DILHR, 165 Wis. 2d 687, 698, 478 N.W.2d 582 (1992). To the extent it exists, it comes solely through express delegation from the legislature. Because this 11 Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk capability is only on loan,10 agencies necessarily remain subordinate to the legislature with regard to their rulemaking authority. Koschkee, 387 Wis. 2d 552, ¶18. ¶99 The constitutional authority of the executive encompasses determining what the law requires as well as applying it (preferably in that order). Because the executive's power is supplemented by a legislatively-delegated authority to promulgate rules that have the force and effect of law, we must determine what manner of authority an agency uses to create guidance documents before we can evaluate the legislature's right to control them. If it is a delegated rulemaking authority, then the legislature's power to dictate their content and manner of promulgation would be almost beyond question. If, however, the authority to create guidance documents is executive, then we must consider whether the legislature's reach extends far enough to control how members of the executive branch explain statutes and provide guidance or advice about how administrative agencies are likely to apply them. ¶100 Our analysis on this point necessarily begins with the undisputed understanding that a guidance document does not have the force or effect of law. The Act explicitly says so: A guidance document does not have the force of law and does not provide the authority for implementing or enforcing a standard, requirement, or threshold, including as a term or condition of any license. 2017 Wis. Act. 369, § 38 (Wis. Stat. As a legislative creation, [an agency's] . . . rule10 making powers can be repealed by the legislature. Martinez v. DILHR, 165 Wis. 2d 687, 698, 478 N.W.2d 582 (1992). 12 Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk § 227.112(3)). That's an important place to start because right away it establishes that, unlike a rule,11 the executive branch needs no borrowed authority from the legislature to create a guidance document. In fact, the executive was creating them long before the legislature passed the Act and gave them that name. The Act implicitly recognizes this by not even purporting to delegate the authority to create such documents to the executive——it assumed the power already resided there. ¶101 Having established that guidance documents are not rules, we must determine what manner of thing they are. The Act describes them as: [A]ny formal or official document or communication issued by an agency, including a manual, handbook, directive, or informational bulletin, that does any of the following: 1. Explains the agency's implementation of a statute or rule enforced or administered by the agency, including the current or proposed operating procedure of the agency. 2. Provides guidance or advice with respect to how the agency is likely to apply a statute or rule enforced or administered by the agency, if that guidance or advice is likely to apply to a class of persons similarly affected. 2017 Wis. Act 369, § 31 (Wis. Stat. § 227.01(3m)(a)1.-2.).12 Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, ¶18, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 11 N.W.2d 600 (Executive agencies ha[ve] no inherent constitutional authority to make rules[.] (some alterations in original)). 12 The Act also describes what a guidance document is not: (b) Guidance document does not include any of the following: 13 Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk 1. A rule that has been promulgated and that is currently in effect or a proposed rule that is in the process of being promulgated. 2. A standard adopted, or a statement of policy or interpretation made, whether preliminary or final, in the decision of a contested case, in a private letter ruling under s. 73.035, or in an agency decision upon or disposition of a particular matter as applied to a specific set of facts. 3. Any document or activity described in sub. (13) (a) to (zz), except that guidance document includes a pamphlet or other explanatory material described under sub. (13) (r) that otherwise satisfies the definition of guidance document under par. (a). 4. Any document that any statute specifically provides is not required to be promulgated as a rule. 5. A declaratory ruling issued under s. 227.41. 6. A pleading or brief filed in court by the state, an agency, or an agency official. 7. A letter or written legal advice of the department of justice or a formal or informal opinion of the attorney general, including an opinion issued under s. 165.015 (1). 8. Any document or communication for which a procedure for public input, other than that provided under s. 227.112 (1), is provided by law. 9. Any document or communication that is not subject to the right of inspection and copying under s. 19.35(1). 2017 Wis. Act. 369, § 31 (Wis. Stat. § 227.01(3m)(b)1.-9.). 14 Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk ¶102 The Act's plain language allows us to discern the following essential attributes of guidance documents.13 They are not law, they do not have the force or effect of law, and they provide no authority for implementing or enforcing standards or conditions. They simply explain statutes and rules, or they provide guidance or advice about how the executive branch is likely to apply a statute or rule. They impose no obligations, set no standards, and bind no one. They are communications about the law——they are not the law itself. They communicate intended applications of the law——they are not the actual execution of the law. Functionally, and as a matter of law, they are entirely inert. That is to say, they represent nothing more than the knowledge and intentions of their authors. It is readily apparent, therefore, that the executive need not borrow any legislative authority, nor seek the legislature's permission, to create guidance documents. It could hardly be otherwise. This creative power is necessarily inherent to the executive because no other branch of government has even the 13State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning.). 15 Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk theoretical ability to know the executive's mind with respect to the law he is to execute.14 B. May the Legislature Regulate the Executive's Guidance Documents? ¶103 Because the executive branch has the native authority to create and disseminate guidance documents, we must next determine whether the legislature may nonetheless prescribe the content or method of disseminating such documents. The answer depends on whether the creation of guidance documents represents an exercise of the executive's core function, or merely a power shared with the legislature. The separation of powers doctrine envisions a system of separate branches sharing many powers while jealously guarding certain others, a system of 'separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.' State ex rel. Friedrich v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 192 Wis. 2d 1, 14, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). The constitutional powers of each branch of government fall into two categories: exclusive powers and shared powers. State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 643, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999). Shared powers lie at the intersections of these exclusive core constitutional powers, and [t]hese '[g]reat borderlands of power' are not exclusive to any one branch. Id. at 643-44 (quoting Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14); see also State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 42–43, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982). Although the branches may exercise [shared] power within these borderlands, they may [not] 14Chief Justice Roggensack suggests that this is a change in the law[.] See Chief Justice Roggensack's concurrence/dissent, ¶150. But she does not say what it is a change from. We have never said that the creative power to make a guidance document resides somewhere other than the executive branch, and the Chief Justice cites no authority suggesting we have. 16 Nos. 2019AP614-LV & 2019AP622.dk unduly burden or substantially interfere with another branch. Horn, 226 Wis.2d at 644. Tetra Tech EC, Inc., 382 Wis. 2d 496, ¶46 (alterations in original). ¶104 A branch's core powers are those that define its essential attributes.15 With respect to these, we have previously recognized that [e]ach branch has exclusive core constitutional powers, into which the other branches may not intrude. Flynn v. DOA, 216 Wis. 2d 521, 545, 576 N.W.2d 245. Core powers, as has been previously observed, are not for sharing. Tetra Tech EC, Inc., 382 Wis. 2d 496, ¶47. Shared powers[, however,] lie at the intersections of these exclusive core constitutional powers, and [t]hese '[g]reat borderlands of power' are not exclusive to any one branch. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 643-44 (quoting Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14 (alterations in original)). Although the 'branches may exercise [shared] power within these borderlands,' they 'may [not] unduly burden or substantially interfere with another branch.' Tetra Tech EC, Inc., 382 Wis. 2d 496, ¶46 (quoting Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 644 (alterations in original)). So if