Opinion ID: 2634917
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Taylors had standing to pursue their claims.

Text: The Mailes argue that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the Disclaimer divested the Taylors of standing to pursue their claims and made the issue moot. We disagree. We exercise free review over questions of jurisdiction, and such questions must be addressed prior to reaching the merits of an appeal. Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 144-45, 158 P.3d 305, 307-08 (2007). Standing is a preliminary question to be determined by this Court before reaching the merits of the case. Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989). To satisfy the requirement of standing, litigants generally must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. Id. The Taylors argue their standing was established by Taylor I, making it the law of the case, and that the Disclaimer did nothing to alter the decision. The law of the case doctrine provides that when the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal. Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A., 110 Idaho 15, 21, 713 P.2d 1374, 1380 (1985) (quoting Fiscus v. Beartooth Elec. Coop., Inc., 180 Mont. 434, 435, 591 P.2d 196, 197 (1979)). The law of the case doctrine also prevents consideration on a subsequent appeal of alleged errors that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeal. Bouten Constr. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 762, 992 P.2d 751, 757 (1999). In Taylor I, this Court determined that the Taylors had standing to pursue their claims as real parties in interest. 142 Idaho 253, 257-58, 127 P.3d 156, 160-61 (2005). Initially, the district court dismissed the Taylors' complaint pursuant to I.R.C.P. 17(a). On appeal, this Court determined that the Taylors were real parties in interest, as required by this rule, because they would be entitled to the benefits of the action if it were successful. Id. at 258, 127 P.3d at 161. Additionally, the Court determined that the Taylors could proceed with their negligence claim against the Mailes for aiding the trustees in disposing of trust property in violation of their fiduciary responsibilities and receiving the property with knowledge of the same. Id. at 261, 127 P.3d at 164. We found the cause of action could be maintained against the trustees and/or the Mailes, and if the trustees refused to act, the Taylors could seek a constructive trust against the Mailes. Id. Therefore, under the law of the case doctrine, both the issue of whether the Taylors were real parties in interest and whether they could maintain an action against the Mailes without joining the trustees were before this Court. Thus, the principles articulated in Taylor I were necessary to the Court's decision. Nonetheless, the Mailes assert that the procedural posture of the prior appealcoming to the Court from an I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motionand the Taylors' execution of the Disclaimer after the district court granted their motion to dismiss make the law of the case doctrine inapplicable. The Mailes are correct that the Disclaimer could not have been raised in the prior appeal. The Disclaimer was executed by various beneficiaries in June 2004, which was after the district court granted the motion to dismiss that predicated the first appeal in Taylor I. As such, the Disclaimer was not part of the record during the first appeal and the Mailes' argument that the Taylors now lack standing because of this document could not have been raised during the course of Taylor I. We should thus reexamine the Taylors' standing. Although the Taylors executed the Disclaimer with the trustees, it does not divest them of standing. The Mailes argue that the Taylors, as beneficiaries, were required to pursue their action against the trustees. However, in deciding Taylor I, this Court announced the principle that beneficiaries could maintain a cause of action against the trustee, a third party, or both where the third party receives trust property with knowledge that the transfer is in violation of the trustee's fiduciary duty. Id. at 260-61, 127 P.3d at 163-64. While this Court was unable to consider the Disclaimer during Taylor I, the principles announced in that decision are still the law of Idaho. Therefore, we hold that the Taylors had standing to maintain suit against the Mailes and were not required to join the Rogers. Next, the Mailes argue that the Disclaimer made the suit moot because it worked to terminate the purpose of the Trust and to disburse all assets to the beneficiaries. An issue becomes moot if it does not present a real and substantial controversy that is capable of being concluded through judicial decree of specific relief. Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849, 851, 119 P.3d 624, 626 (2005). Mootness applies when an appellant lacks a legal interest in the outcome. State v. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 682, 99 P.3d 1069, 1072 (2004). Mootness also applies when a favorable judicial decision would not result in any relief. State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227, 91 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2004). In the Disclaimer, the Taylors specifically reserved their ownership interest in the lawsuit against the Mailes. Therefore, they have a legal interest in the outcome of the case and a favorable decision will result in relief in the form of title to the Linder Road property. Moreover, under Idaho law, a chose in action is an asset. See Blake v. Blake, 69 Idaho 214, 219, 205 P.2d 495, 498 (1949). Here, the current action is an asset that remained in the Trust, so the Disclaimer did not work to terminate the Trust. Thus, the Taylors' lawsuit is not moot and they have standing to pursue this claim against the Mailes.