Opinion ID: 75849
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Life History

Text: Petitioner also claims that Counsel’s failure to present evidence of Petitioner’s life history deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel. He specifically points to evidence of a difficult childhood, abuse at the hands of caretakers, and abuse suffered in juvenile prison. Petitioner identifies several additional witnesses who he says could have testified to the early death of Petitioner’s mother, the emotional withdrawal of his father, physical abuse at the 10 hands of a housekeeper, the fact that the Van Poyck children were looked after for a time by a mentally unstable aunt (Aunt Phyllis), and further abuse at the hands of Petitioner’s stepmother (the father’s second wife). Petitioner points to evidence of conditions Petitioner suffered at the Florida School for Boys at Okeechobee, where he was allegedly beaten and witnessed sexual abuse of other children. In resolving this issue, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that “[e]vidence of [Petitioner’s] life history was adequately presented by [Counsel].” Van Poyck II, 694 So. 2d at 692. We accept that conclusion and the findings that support it; they are reasonable. During the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Counsel testified that he and Petitioner had discussed the penalty phase and the presentation of mitigating evidence “constantly.” At the penalty phase hearing itself, Counsel called five witnesses. These witnesses testified to much of what Petitioner now claims Counsel failed to show the jury. At trial, Jeff Van Poyck, Petitioner’s brother, testified to their mother’s early death, abuse from the housekeeper, and the strict discipline imposed by their stepmother. He also testified about how he had involved Petitioner in crime and in alcohol use at an early age. Petitioner’s stepmother testified to the mental instability of Aunt Phyllis and to the negative influence Jeff had over Petitioner. 11 Another aunt also testified to the mental instability of Aunt Phyllis. Finally, Counsel called a nurse who had met Petitioner while he was in prison. She testified that Van Poyck was a caring and friendly person and that he had expressed remorse over the death of Officer Griffis. Petitioner also testified on his own behalf. He testified to his close relationship with O’Brien, his educational pursuits in prison, and his regret of the death of Officer Griffis. The presentation of life-history evidence at the trial satisfied the performance element of the Strickland test. That additional evidence might exist does not establish defective performance. It is well-settled in this Circuit that a petitioner cannot establish an ineffective assistance claim simply by pointing to additional evidence that could have been presented. See Waters, 46 F.3d at 1518.6 Moreover, the omission at trial of the specific evidence that Petitioner says should have been introduced was not so unreasonable as to give rise to a valid ineffective-assistance claim. The only non-cumulative, mitigating life history 6 We note what is well-established in this circuit because, if this circuit’s law has developed in a certain way, we are hard-pressed to say that that development was unreasonable. 12 evidence7 Petitioner identifies is abuse from his stepmother and abuse suffered in juvenile prison. The failure to present this evidence was not, however, ineffective assistance. First, the additional evidence was not so powerful that every objectively reasonable lawyer who had the evidence would have used it. And, even if the evidence was that powerful, the evidence was not known to Counsel at the time of the penalty phase; and the failure to know of it was not the result of a constitutionally deficient investigation. Counsel and Petitioner talked “constantly” about potential mitigating evidence. During these conversations, the question of abuse was discussed “on a number of occasions,” according to Counsel’s postconviction testimony. Petitioner stated that he did not think he had been abused as a child. Furthermore, Petitioner specifically denied that he was ever raped in prison and told Counsel that he generally got along fine in prison. Although Petitioner’s experiences in the juvenile prison were never explicitly discussed, at 7 As noted above, much of the additional evidence Petitioner says should have been presented was presented. See Van Poyck II, 694 So. 2d at 692 (“[T]he jury was actually aware of most aspects of Van Poyck’s life that he now argues should have been presented.”). A petitioner cannot establish ineffective assistance by identifying additional evidence that could have been presented when that evidence is merely cumulative. See Glock v. Moore, 195 F.3d 625, 636 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that, “where much of the new evidence that [petitioner] presents is merely repetitive and cumulative to that which was presented at trial,” petitioner could not show prejudice), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 213 (2000). 13 no time during the many conversations Petitioner and Counsel had about potential mitigating factors did Petitioner suggest abuse in juvenile prison. Information supplied by a petitioner is extremely important in determining whether a lawyer’s performance is constitutionally adequate. In Strickland, the Supreme Court wrote “[c]ounsel’s actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant.” Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at 2066 (emphasis added). When a petitioner (or family members petitioner directs his lawyer to talk to) do not mention a history of physical abuse, a lawyer is not ineffective for failing to discover or to offer evidence of abuse as mitigation. See Williams v. Head, 185 F.3d 1223, 1237 (11th Cir. 1999) (“An attorney does not render ineffective assistance by failing to discover and develop evidence of childhood abuse that his client does not mention to him.”), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2696 (2000). Therefore, the Florida Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was not unreasonable.