Opinion ID: 71999
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First Example

Text: 87 The first improper instance here was, as Cargill describes it, that [t]he prosecutor told the jury that based, inter alia, on 'experience ... we feel [death] to be the appropriate punishment.'  Cargill pulls the prosecutor's assertion out of its setting. The actual context of this statement was as follows: 88 You will have to elect or select between the death penalty and the life sentence. We are obviously encouraging the death penalty. That is no revelation. We are going to make some remarks to you and show you, based on experience, based on the circumstances of this crime, based on the circumstances of this defendant why we feel this to be the appropriate punishment. 89 Viewed in their totality, these remarks were not improper. We agree with the appellee that the prosecutor was merely prefacing the underlying bas[e]s on which a death sentence should be imposed and clearly let the jury [know] that it was a decision for the jury to make. Consequently, these remarks cannot contribute to Cargill's constitutional claim. See Brooks, 762 F.2d at 1403 (comments that are not improper can never be unconstitutional). 90