Opinion ID: 1697743
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Probable Cause Petition

Text: The primary question in this case is whether a probable cause petition filed under the Ryce Act must be supported by sworn proof. There are two possible sources for such a requirement: (1) the Ryce Act itself, or (2) the Due Process Clause of the federal or Florida constitutions. The majority concludes that sworn proof is required, but does not pinpoint the source of this requirement. [11] The majority does state that due process requires that a probable cause petition filed pursuant to section 394.914 be supported by sworn proof. Majority op. at 1090. Later in the opinion, however, the majority asserts that the Legislature intended for the state attorney to swear to the facts contained in the petition, majority op. at 1091 (emphasis added), and that the Act requires the probable cause petition to be supported by sworn proof. Majority op. at 1094 (emphasis added). In an effort to resolve this ambiguity, I will separate my statutory analysis from my constitutional analysis.
We have repeatedly recognized that the intent of the Legislature must guide our [statutory] analysis, and that intent must be determined primarily from the language of the statute. Hale v. State, 891 So.2d 517, 521 (Fla.2004) (citing Miele v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 656 So.2d 470, 471 (Fla.1995)). I see no evidence in the language of the Ryce Act that the Legislature intended for probable cause petitions to be sworn. The relevant provision states that the state attorney may file a petition with the circuit court alleging that the person is a sexually violent predator and stating facts sufficient to support such allegations. § 394.914, Fla. Stat. (2002). The provision is silent about whether the state attorney must swear to those facts. This silence strongly indicates that the Legislature did not intend to require the probable cause petition to be sworn. Cf. Exceletech, Inc. v. Williams, 597 So.2d 275, 276 (Fla.1992) ([W]e find no requirement in the rules that the [interpleader] petition must be sworn to, and, if this is to be a requirement, it should be expressly set forth in the rules of civil procedure.). When the Legislature has wanted to require a sworn petition, it has said so. See, e.g., § 194.011(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004) (Such petition shall be sworn to by the petitioner.); § 617.2006(3), Fla. Stat. (2004) ([T]he articles of incorporation shall be accompanied by a petition, signed and sworn to by the subscribers....); § 741.30(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004) (The sworn petition shall allege the existence of such domestic violence....); § 812.061(1), Fla. Stat. (2004) (Such petition shall be under oath, sworn to by the petitioner....). The Legislature may have decided not to require sworn petitions because other provisions in the Ryce Act seemed to address any due process concerns. As we explained in Goode, the Legislature intended that ordinarily the review process of potential sexual predators would be concluded while the person was still in prison. 830 So.2d at 825. Under this framework, the petition ordinarily would not affect the length of the detention, thus reducing or eliminating the need for sworn proof. The Legislature did recognize that, in some cases, extra detention would be required. But rather than requiring a sworn petition to protect against improper detention, the Legislature provided for an adversarial probable cause hearing as a fallback procedure in such cases. Goode, 830 So.2d at 827; see § 394.915(2), Fla. Stat. (2002) (Upon the expiration of the incarcerative sentence and before the release from custody ..., but after the state attorney files a [probable cause] petition under s. 394.914, the court may conduct an adversarial probable cause hearing if it determines such hearing is necessary.). Nothing in the Ryce Act itself requires probable cause petitions to be sworn. Therefore, any such requirement must derive from due process principles. I read the majority opinion as reaching this same conclusion. See majority op. at 1090 ([D]ue process requires that a probable cause petition filed pursuant to section 394.914 be supported by sworn proof.). Due process analysis would be superfluous if the statute itself required a sworn petition. I now analyze whether and under what circumstances due process principles require a petition to be sworn.
Whether due process requires probable cause petitions to be sworn is obviously a separate question from whether the statute includes such a requirement. See, e.g., Hollywood Jaycees v. State, 306 So.2d 109, 112 (Fla.1974) (Even though the statute is silent as to due process requisites, they are constitutionally implied.). The majority concludes that [w]hen ... fundamental liberty interests are at stake, the State at a minimum must be required to swear to the allegations made before the judge. Majority op. at 1090. I agree. What the majority does not mention, though, and what I wish to clarify, is that fundamental liberty will not always be at stake. Not every probable cause petition filed under the Ryce Act represents the difference between freedom and confinement. In fact, as I explained above, the Act is specifically designed so that the probable cause petition will be filed long before the offender's anticipated release date, leaving enough time to hold the civil commitment trial during the offender's sentence. When this timeline is followed, the probable cause petition does not place fundamental liberty interests at stake. Majority op. at 1090. In such circumstances, the petition has no effect whatsoever on the length of detention. I recognize that, unfortunately, the timeline is often not followed. [12] This fact, however, does not change the analysis. The United States Supreme Court has explained that `[d]ue process' ... is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961). Rather, due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). When more is at stake, more procedural protection is due. When less is at stake, less protection is due. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (requiring an evidentiary hearing before termination of welfare benefits) with Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (not requiring an evidentiary hearing before termination of Social Security disability benefits, in part because [t]he potential deprivation here is generally likely to be less than in Goldberg ). The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard `at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333, 96 S.Ct. 893 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)). The issue of timing is significant in determining the due process rights of individuals detained in anticipation of civil commitment trials. Some are detained during their sentences; others beyond them. The difference is constitutionally crucial. As the majority recognizes, when someone is being detained after a criminal sentence expires, the detainee's fundamental liberty interests are at stake. Due process requires some determination of probable cause for such a detention. A sworn petition is a minimum requirement. But the inverse is also true: procedural concerns are less compelling when the individual would remain incarcerated even without the filing of a probable cause petition. See Goode, 830 So.2d at 826. In such circumstances, the detainee's freedom does not hang in the balance. A rigorous due process analysis must treat these different circumstances differently. It may be true that, as a practical matter, the offender's sentence almost always has expired, or will be expiring soon, by the time the state attorney files the petition. Nevertheless, our constitutional holding should not extend beyond the circumstances that raise constitutional concerns. This case clearly involves fundamental liberty interests. The petitioners were detained beyond the expiration of their sentences based solely on ex parte probable cause determinations. See Kephart v. Kearney, 826 So.2d 517, 518 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (stating that each petitioner was seeking immediate release). The same was true in the case with which conflict was certified, where the probable cause petition was filed [o]n the day [the offender] was scheduled to be released. Melvin v. State, 804 So.2d 460, 462 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Both courts emphasized that, but for the ex parte probable cause determinations, the offenders already would have been released from custody. See Kephart, 826 So.2d at 519; Melvin, 804 So.2d at 463. The majority understandably focuses on this post-sentence posture. See majority op. at 1092 (referring to cases where the State hold[s] a soon-to-be-released prisoner beyond the expiration of his or her sentence); id. at 1093 (referring to cases where a prisoner is detained beyond the expiration of his or her sentence). However, some of the statements in the majority opinion seem to reach beyond these facts and perhaps even beyond the post-sentence context. For example, the majority states without exception that the Act requires the probable cause petition to be supported by sworn proof. Majority op. at 1094. Elsewhere, the majority broadly states that due process requires that a probable cause petition filed pursuant to section 394.914 be supported by sworn proof. Majority op. at 1090. I do not agree that due process always requires a probable cause petition to be sworn. Due process requires a sworn petition only when the petition itself will result in confinement beyond the prescribed sentence. See majority op. at 1093 ([S]erious due process concerns are implicated when ... the filing of the petition causes an individual to remain incarcerated beyond his or her sentence.). Due process protections are triggered when the government deprives an individual of life, liberty, or property. Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.; amend. XIV, U.S. Const. A petition filed while the offender is serving a criminal sentence, and which will not itself extend the sentence, causes no loss of liberty. At that point, the filing of a petition is just another procedural step toward a civil commitment trial. The trial itself will provide the required due process. As long as the offender's prison sentence has not yet expired and will not expire before that trial, I would hold that the circuit court constitutionally may determine probable cause ex parte based on an unsworn petition, and may proceed to trial. I recognize that this distinction may be of limited practical value. If state attorneys are required to file a sworn petition some of the time, they may decide to file sworn petitions all of the time to avoid possible problems with sentences about to expire. Nevertheless, I believe it important to be analytically rigorous when determining what is constitutionally required, as opposed to what is merely desirable. For these reasons, I would hold that due process requires a petition for civil commitment to be sworn only when filing the petition will result in the offender's confinement beyond the expiration of a criminal sentence, as happened in this case. WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur.