Opinion ID: 203977
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Government's Appeal. As a prelude to the

Text: assessment of damages, the district court laboriously recounted the details of the scapegoats' lives behind bars. See Limone IV, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 235-41. The government has not contested the court's -52- narrative, and it is evident that the scapegoats suffered all the hardships customarily associated with prolonged prison confinement. These hardships were magnified by their knowledge that they had been framed: all of them were forced to come to grips with the reality that, innocence aside, they might live out their days in prison. To make matters worse, three of the men — Limone, Tameleo, and Greco — spent the first few years after the trial in the grim shadow of death sentences. All told, Limone and Salvati spent 33 and 29 years, respectively, in prison; Tameleo and Greco died in custody after 18 and 28 years, respectively.14 After considering the particular individuals' circumstances and consulting damage awards in other wrongful incarceration cases, the district court determined that $1,000,000 per year of immurement constituted the appropriate baseline for its calculation of damages. See id. at 243-45. The government maintains that this baseline is overly generous and results in damages that are grossly disproportionate to awards in comparable cases. In the government's view, the district court should have limited its comparability survey to cases arising in Massachusetts and, moreover, looked only to cases involving protracted periods of incarceration. The government's theory seems to be that wrongful 14 Limone served the first seven years of his sentence and Tameleo served the first five years of his sentence concurrent with previously imposed sentences in unrelated cases. Thus, the district court declined to award either of them damages for those periods. See Limone IV, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 245. -53- incarceration gives rise to two distinct strains of emotional harm: the initial jolt of wrongful imprisonment, and some (lesser) injury based on the day-to-day loss of liberty. It asserts that the district court did not appreciate this important distinction; that the court did not use any congeners involving protracted periods of incarceration; and that the court erred in not limiting its canvass to Massachusetts inmates. We find the government's reasoning unpersuasive. To begin, the government uses faulty premises. On the one hand, its assertion that the district court did not look to awards related to lengthy periods of wrongful incarceration is incorrect as a matter of fact. See, e.g., id. at 244 (discussing a 15-year period of wrongful incarceration). On the other hand, its parochial insistence that the lower court should have restricted any inquiry to cases that arose within the borders of Massachusetts is incorrect as a matter of law. Although we have said that helpful guidance may be found in damage awards from similar cases arising out of the same context that are tried in the same locale, Gutiérrez-Rodríguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 579 (1st Cir. 1989), that does not mean that a court is prohibited from looking for guidance elsewhere. The key is comparability: whether the counterpart cases involve analogous facts, similar measures of damages, and are otherwise fairly congruent. See, e.g., Morrow v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 541 F.2d 713, 721-22 (8th Cir. 1976). On the whole, we are satisfied -54- that the district court did not abuse its discretion in looking to other cases for comparison. Warming to the attack, the government touts a string of Massachusetts cases memorializing lesser awards. Without exception, however, these cases involve settlements, not verdicts. See, e.g., Cowans v. City of Boston, No. 05-11574, 2006 WL 4286744 (D. Mass. Aug. 4, 2006); Miller v. City of Boston, No. 03-10805, 2006 WL 4111728 (D. Mass. Mar. 9, 2006); Veláquez v. City of Chicopee, No. 03-30249, 2005 WL 3839494 (D. Mass. Oct. 14, 2005); Harding v. City of Boston, No. 98-11801, 2000 WL 33223074 (D. Mass. Feb. 2000). But it is unrealistic to assume that settlement values (which, by definition, implicate compromise) equate to actual damages. See Neyer, 845 F.2d at 644. This is a comparison of plums with pomegranates. Thus, these cases do not undercut the district court's baseline calculation. The government also seeks to undermine the district court's baseline by marshaling a series of legislative enactments that impose ceilings on the liability of governmental entities for wrongful incarcerations. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1495, 2513(e) (limiting government's liability for wrongful incarceration of federal prisoners to $50,000 per year, or to $100,000 per year in capital cases); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258D, §§ 1, 5 (capping state's liability at $500,000 per incident). But these statutes do not purport to measure the harm actually inflicted by wrongful -55- incarceration; rather, each reflects a legislative choice to limit the sovereign's liability. Congress could have imposed such a ceiling on damages for wrongful incarceration under the FTCA but chose instead to make the United States liable to the same extent as a private party under local law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). We have neither the authority nor the inclination to veto this exercise of legislative judgment. We turn next to the government's plaint that the ratio of emotional distress damages to years served should decrease over time (that is, that the longer an individual is in a penitentiary, the less he should receive in damages on an annualized basis). That is an argument more appropriately made to the trier of fact. There is no flat rule to that effect — nor should there be. In some circumstances, it may be reasonable to conclude that the loss of hope as time marches on warrants larger annualized amounts for emotional injuries. In short, the range of permissible ratios is wide. That is understandable; dollars are at best a rough and awkward proxy for time spent in the throes of wrongful incarceration. In the final analysis, it is for the trier of fact to resolve the difficult questions of quantification and monetization that lurk in the penumbra of cases such as this. See Anderson v. Robinson, 497 F.2d 120, 121 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting that court of appeals possesses no yardstick with which to measure . . . abstractions). -56- Let us be perfectly clear. There are limits to the trial court's discretion in this respect, but those limits are commodious. Langevine v. Dist. of Columbia, 106 F.3d 1018, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The lower court's decision to use a sliding scale, decreasing over time, would be within the encincture of that discretion. So, too, is its decision not to use such a sliding scale. This brings us to the damage awards themselves. We have said before, and today reaffirm, that there is no scientific formula or measuring device which can be applied to place a precise dollar value on matters such as restraint of freedom, fright, anxiety, loss of face, or emotional scarring. Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 216. The wisdom of that statement is evident here: placing a dollar value on the emotional pain incident to wrongful incarceration, the dreary sameness of life behind bars for years on end, and the loss of freedom, relationships, and hope cries out for approximation. Moreover, the difficulty inherent in monetization of those injuries is itself a reason for deference to the front-line judgment of the trial court. Cf. Langevine, 106 F.3d at 1024 (indicating that [a] court must be especially hesitant to disturb a jury's determination of damages in cases involving intangible and non-economic injuries); Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 215 (similar). -57- Viewed through this prism, we cannot say that the district court's choice of baseline was unreasonable. We do not mean to imply that the methodology employed by the district court in this case should be regarded as the norm, nor do we suggest that it should be transplanted root and branch into other factual scenarios. Were we sitting as trial judges, none of us would have employed that same methodology. The $1,000,000 per year baseline is extremely generous, and in cases involving noneconomic damages we have counseled that special attention must be paid to the particular circumstances of each individual plaintiff. See, e.g., Tobin, 553 F.3d at 144-45. But we are not sitting as trial judges in this instance. Our function is solely one of appellate review. In carrying out that task, we are not at liberty to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Rather, we must acknowledge the trial court's superior coign of vantage. Moreover, a district court, sitting without a jury, possesses a variety of implements with which to work in monetizing emotional injuries. Although particular tools must be selected and deployed with a degree of circumspection, the valuation difficulties posed by specific sets of facts also must be taken into account. Given the extent of those difficulties here, the district court's decision to reach into its armamentarium and select a per-year -58- baseline as the methodology of choice cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion. That leaves the naked claim of excessiveness (a claim that encompasses the government's charge that $1,000,000 per year is simply too rich).15 This question is not free from doubt. The district court's awards are considerably more munificent than the amounts that this court would have awarded in the first instance. In our view, the awards approach the outermost boundary of what might be thought conscionable. Cf. Baba-Ali v. State, 878 N.Y.S.2d 555, 568 n.7 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 2009) (chronicling awards of lesser amounts). Still and all, the awards are by no means unprecedented, and the shock-the-conscience test cannot be administered in a vacuum. What is shocking under one set of facts may be acceptable (even if only marginally so) under different circumstances. See United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1993). We are frank to say that, here, the awards for wrongful incarceration are high enough to be troubling. But when we take into account the severe emotional trauma inflicted upon the scapegoats, we cannot say with any firm conviction that those awards 15 The government has not specifically challenged the amounts of the derivative awards (or, for that matter, the liability findings) on the plaintiffs' claims for loss of consortium and the like. Consequently, we eschew any discussion of those awards in connection with the government's appeal. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining that issues not briefed or argued are deemed abandoned). -59- are grossly disproportionate to the injuries sustained. After all, some cases involving analogous factual scenarios have resulted in comparable damage awards. See, e.g., Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 865-66 (5th Cir. 2008) (upholding jury award of $14,000,000 for 18 years of wrongful incarceration), vacated on other grounds by ___ F.3d ___, ___ (5th Cir. 2009) (en banc) [No. 07-30443, slip op. at 1]; Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 302-03 (7th Cir. 2003) (involving award of $15,000,000 for 15 years of wrongful incarceration); White v. McKinley, No. 05-203, 2009 WL 813001, at  (W.D. Mo. Mar. 26, 2009) (upholding jury award of $14,000,000 in compensatory damages for 5 ½ years of wrongful incarceration); Sarsfield v. City of Marlborough, No. 03-10319, 2006 WL 2850359, at  (D. Mass. Oct. 4, 2006) (reflecting judicial award of more than $13,000,000 for 9 ½ years of wrongful incarceration). Consequently, we conclude that the district court's awards must stand. In concluding that the awards in this case fall short of shocking the conscience, we think it important to make clear that the $1,000,000 annuity selected by the district court as the baseline for its calculation should not be understood as a carob seed for measuring the harm caused by wrongful incarceration generally. Applying a literal reading of the statement in Limone IV that wrongfully imprisoned plaintiffs were entitled to compensation of at least $1 million per year of imprisonment, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 243 (emphasis supplied), one district court recently has treated the -60- $1,000,000 per year baseline as a floor for damages arising out of wrongful incarceration. See Smith v. City of Oakland, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1242-43 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citing Limone IV). We regard that characterization as unfortunate. As we have emphasized, the district court's awards are at the outer edge of the universe of permissible awards and survive scrutiny, though barely, only because of the deferential nature of the standard of review and the unique circumstances of the case. 2. The Cross-Appeal. The district court awarded each minor child of a scapegoat $200,000 for loss of consortium and $50,000 in emotional distress damages. Limone IV, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 249-50. Edward Greco, the surviving son of the late Louis Greco, Sr., objects to his award on the ground that he suffered more from his father's wrongful incarceration than did the other children. The cross-appeal comes to us in the following procedural posture. After the district court handed down its decision in Limone IV and entered judgment, Edward filed a motion to alter the judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The court denied that motion, declaring that any additional hardship was attributable to the Greco family's dysfunctionality — a condition that predated Louis Greco's conviction. See Limone v. United States (Limone V), No. 02-10890 (D. Mass. Dec. 21, 2007) (unpublished order). We review the denial of a motion to alter or amend a previously entered judgment for -61- abuse of discretion. Vasapolli v. Rostoff, 39 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 1994). It is axiomatic that damage awards must be based on the evidence presented. A corollary to this axiom is that a court charged with making a damage award should take into account the particular circumstances of each individual plaintiff. GutiérrezRodríguez, 882 F.2d at 579. This corollary holds true with respect to damages for emotional distress and loss of consortium, both of which by their very nature are difficult to monetize. See, e.g., Tobin, 553 F.3d at 144-45; Koster v. TWA, Inc., 181 F.3d 24, 35-36 (1st Cir. 1999); Smith v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19, 32-33 & n.5 (1st Cir. 1999). This does not mean, however, that different plaintiffs can never be given identical damage awards in emotional distress or loss of consortium cases. Identical damage awards at times are warranted. See, e.g., Sutton v. Earles, 26 F.3d 903, 918 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding identical annualized awards of non-economic damages to five parents of deceased seamen). The district court engaged in a thoughtful, detailed analysis of the manner in which each scapegoat and each family member was affected by the government's misconduct. See Limone IV, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 235-43. Within that analysis, the court chronicled the deterioration of the Greco family. Id. at 241-43. The court's rescript reveals that Edward was eleven years old when -62- his father was sentenced. Around that time, his mother, Roberta, began to drink heavily, and Edward became the primary caretaker for his older brother. Roberta abused Edward physically and, when he was thirteen, abandoned him without making provisions for his care. Edward and his brother lived with extended family, but Edward was thrown out when he was sixteen. He soon lost contact with his brother (who eventually committed suicide). The district court determined that Edward's plight, though tragic, was attributable mainly to causes that predated his father's imprisonment. Roberta had filed for divorce three years before Greco's conviction, charging extreme cruelty. In response, Greco attempted to strangle her. Indeed, the marital relationship was so troubled that the district court rejected Roberta's claim for loss of consortium (though it awarded her damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress). Id. at 247, 250. Based on this background, the district court concluded in Limone V that the government's misconduct caused only a fraction of the woes that befell Edward. The rest would have occurred in any event because of the dysfunctional family environment. Edward resists this conclusion, admonishing that a defendant takes a plaintiff as it finds him. See Doty v. Sewall, 908 F.2d 1053, 1059 (1st Cir. 1990); Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669, 679. That is true as far as it goes — but it does not take Edward very far. A defendant may be held liable only for the -63- damages that it actually causes. See W. Page Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts 292 (5th ed. 1984) (reiterating this principle in regard to eggshell-skull plaintiffs). Causation is generally a question of fact, committed largely to the competence of the factfinder. See Peckham, 895 F.2d at 837. Given the idiosyncratic circumstances surrounding Edward's claim, we cannot say that the district court either clearly erred in holding that the government's misconduct was not a but-for cause of Edward's special hardships or abused its discretion in denying his motion to alter the judgment.