Opinion ID: 859460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 Claims

Text: ¶21. Appellants claim that they are entitled to attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 7 for their claims under Section 1983 challenging the constitutionality of the NSM law. Section 1983 reads as follows, in relevant part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. ¶22. At issue in the case sub judice is whether the federal Tax Injunction Act precludes a Section 1983 claim in state court to challenge the constitutionality of a state tax where an adequate state-law remedy is available. The Tax Injunction Act provides that: The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State. 7 Section 1988 provides that: [i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[ ] . . . 1983 . . . of this title, . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . ... 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b) (2000). 13 28 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (1940). The language of Section 1341 prevents federal district courts from granting injunctive relief regarding state tax matters where state law provides a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy. In National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 515 U.S. 582, 115 S. Ct. 2351, 132 L. Ed. 2d 509 (1995), the United States Supreme Court “granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the state courts as to whether, in tax cases, state courts must provide relief under § 1983 when adequate remedies exist under state law.” Nat’l Private Truck, 515 U.S. at 585-86 (emphasis added). ¶23. Our review of the cases reveals a conflict not only among the states, but also within our own jurisprudence. In State Tax Commission v. Fondren, 387 So. 2d 712 (Miss. 1980), a taxpayer sought to enjoin the Commission from approving county recapitulation of assessment rolls until the Commission had equalized assessments among counties. Fondren, 387 So. 2d 712. The Fondren Court found that “a state court entertaining a 1983 action has no more jurisdiction than a federal district court” and that “[i]t is well established that [Section 1341] is an explicit congressional limitation on the jurisdiction of the federal courts in [state tax] cases . . . .” Id. at 723. The Court then found that, in the state-tax action before it: [Section] 1983 collides full force with a specific congressional limitation on federal jurisdiction. In such circumstances, we are convinced that [Section] 1341 must prevail. Id. The Fondren Court cited the holding in Bland v. McHann, 463 F. 2d 21 (5th Cir. 1972), that “Mississippi law provides a plain, speedy and efficient remedy for claims that assessments for taxes in a municipality were not equal and uniform[,]” and reasoned that: 14 [o]bviously this action could not have been brought in federal court under section 1983 because there is a plain, speedy and efficient remedy in Mississippi courts. Complainants, by filing their action in state court, invoked the plain, speedy and efficient remedy granted them by the chancery court and affirmed here. Id. The Fondren Court presciently concluded that “the section 1983 cause of action must fail in the state court because it would have failed if it had been filed first in federal court.” Id. (emphasis added). ¶24. Seven years later, in Marx v. Truck Renting and Leasing Association Inc., 520 So. 2d 1333 (Miss. 1987), this Court applied a contradictory analysis of federal and state courts’ jurisdiction over Section 1983 challenges of state taxes. The Marx Court first recognized that “[t]he courts of this State have jurisdiction concurrent with that of the federal courts over actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Marx, 520 So. 2d at 1346 (citations omitted). However, the Marx Court posited its jurisdictional holding on the antithesis of concurrent jurisdiction, declaring that: it is the absence of federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1341 which operates to open the door to the state courthouse so that the taxpayer may here assert his § 1983 claim. A federal courthouse door is closed under such circumstances by 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Id. Thus, this Court held in Marx that state courts’ jurisdiction over actions challenging the constitutionality of state taxes under Section 1983 is available because the federal courthouse door is closed.8 8 What Marx does not say is that the key to either courthouse door – federal or state – for a Section 1983 state-tax claim is controlled by the availability, vel non, of a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in the courts of the state – as previously held by this Court in 15 ¶25. A year after Marx, this Court decided Burrell v. Mississippi State Tax Commission, 536 So. 2d 848, 864 (Miss. 1988). The Burrell Court interpreted the holdings of Fondren and Marx as follows: [Fondren] says that the state courts have no authority to entertain claims under Section 1983 where the suit is one seeking to enjoin unconstitutional state action with regard to the collection of taxes. Fondren confuses a federal jurisdictional limitation, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, with the enforceability of a federally created right and remedy in state court. . . . [O]ur recent decision in [Marx] may only be read as holding that the Section 1983/1988 discussion in Fondren stands overruled. Burrell, 536 So. 2d at 864. ¶26. Subsequently, courts in other states addressing the same issue revealed that Mississippi was one of only two states to hold that a Section 1983 action could be brought in state court despite the availability of a state-law remedy. Tatten Partners v. New Castle County Bd. of Assessment Review, 642 A. 2d 1251, 1265 (Del. 1993); Greenwich Twp. v. Murtagh, 601 A. 2d 1352, 1356 at n.10 (Pa. 1992). The other state, New Jersey, also had found that Section 1983 actions challenging state taxes – including actions that could not be brought in federal court under the Tax Injunction Act – could be brought in state court. Bung’s Bar & Grille, Inc. v. Florence Twp., 502 A. 2d 1198, 1215 (N.J. 1985). However, after the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in National Private Truck, discussed infra, the New Jersey court rejected its prior approach, holding that “both state and federal courts ‘must refrain from granting federal relief under § 1983 when there is an adequate legal Fondren, and subsequently made clear by the U.S. Supreme Court in National Private Truck. See infra at ¶ 27. 16 remedy.’” General Motors Corp. v. City of Linden, 671 A. 2d 560, 564-65 (N.J. 1996) (quoting Nat’l Private Truck, 515 U.S. at 592). We do the same today. ¶27. In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a definitive statement on this issue. The ruling is clear and unequivocal (repeatedly declared), and relies on the same principles used by this Court in Fondren. Nat’l Private Truck, 515 U.S. at 590-92; see Fondren, 387 So. 2d at 723 (relying on concurrent jurisdiction to find that Section 1983 state-tax action must fail in state court, because it would have failed in federal court due to the availability of a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in state court). In National Private Truck, the Court held that Section 1341 restrains both federal and state court jurisdiction over Section 1983 challenges of state taxes – thus validating the Fondren Court’s approach and rejecting Marx and Burrell. Nat’l Private Truck, 515 U.S. at 590-92. The National Private Truck Court first stated as follows: To be sure, the Tax Injunction Act reflects the congressional concern with federal court interference with state taxation, see 28 U.S.C. § 1341, and there is no similar statute divesting state courts of the authority to enter an injunction under federal law when an adequate legal remedy exists. But this silence is irrelevant here, because we do not understand § 1983 to call for courts (whether federal or state) to enjoin the collection of state taxes when an adequate remedy is available under state law. Given the strong background presumption against interference with state taxation, the Tax Injunction Act may be best understood as but a partial codification of the federal reluctance to interfere with state taxation. After all, an injunction issued by a state court pursuant to § 1983 is just as disruptive as one entered by a federal court. Id. at 590-91 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The Court reiterated that: We simply do not read § 1983 to provide for injunctive or declaratory relief against a state tax, either in federal or state court, when an adequate legal remedy exists. Id. at 591. Again phrasing slightly differently, the Court held that: 17 When a litigant seeks declaratory or injunctive relief against a state tax pursuant to § 1983, . . . state courts, like their federal counterparts, must refrain from granting federal relief under § 1983 when there is an adequate legal remedy. Id. at 592. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court firmly established that the constitutionality of a state tax may not be challenged under Section 1983 in state court if an adequate remedy is available under state law – as stated in Fondren and overruled in Burrell. Fondren, 387 So. 2d at 723; Marx, 520 So. 2d at 1346; Burrell, 536 So. 2d at 864. To the extent that Marx and Burrell conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in National Private Truck, they are hereby overruled. ¶28. Was a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy under Mississippi law available to Appellants? To provide an adequate remedy, a state law must satisfy “minimal procedural criteria[;]” it must “provid[e] the [party] with a ‘full hearing and judicial determination’[to] raise any and all constitutional objections to the tax.” Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 512-15 101 S. Ct. 1221, 1229-30, 67 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1981) (emphasis in original). ¶29. We first turn to the record to answer the question. We find that all Appellants had an adequate remedy, which they invoked, seeking a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy: declaratory relief under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 57.9 In their complaints, all 9 Commonwealth also had a remedy available under Mississippi Code Section 11-1311, which provides that: The chancery court shall have jurisdiction of suits by one or more taxpayers in any county, city, town, or village, to restrain the collection of any taxes levied or attempted to be collected without authority of law. 18 Appellants sought “a declaration” that the NSM fee “discriminates against interstate commerce, unduly burdens interstate commerce, and denies due process of law.” Appellants’ “Motion for Expedited Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,” filed the same day as Commonwealth’s and Corr-Williams’s complaint, states that “[p]ursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 57 and 65, Plaintiffs . . . request that the Court issue a declaration and a preliminary and/or permanent injunction . . .”and requests, inter alia, that the trial court “[e]nter a judgment . . . declaring unconstitutional the Mississippi NSM tax law insofar as it requires the assessment and collection of fees on nonsettling-manufacturer cigarettes sold, purchased or otherwise distributed in the State of Mississippi for sale outside of Mississippi[.]” In their “Brief in Support of Motion for Expedited Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,” Appellants “move[d] . . . for . . . a declaration that . . . [the] NSM fee . . . is unconstitutional . . . .” The brief further stated that: “As the Supreme Court also held in Marx, in an action under 42 USC § 1983 to vindicate constitutional rights, successful plaintiffs are also presumptively entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Marx, supra, 520 So. 2d at 1346.” Their reliance on Marx must fail for the reasons stated supra. There can be no serious debate that Rule 57 provided a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy, upon which Appellants relied. The record clearly establishes that Appellants premised their claim for attorney fees in conjunction with a claim for declaratory relief under Rule 57, and repeatedly referenced Rule Miss. Code Ann. § 11-13-11 (Rev. 2004). Section 11-13-11 clearly provides persons or entities upon whom a tax is levied or attempted to be collected a full hearing and judicial determination at which they may raise their constitutional challenges. 19 57 in their pleadings. Accordingly, we find that adequate remedies under state law were available to all Appellants. Thus, the courts of this State should refrain from considering Section 1983 claims in tax cases, mooting Section 1988 claims for fees. That being said, no basis exists for a claim by Appellants for attorney fees under Section 1988.