Opinion ID: 754638
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did Vazquez Have Standing to Challenge the Governments' Action?

Text: 27 The district court adopted the magistrate judge's ruling that Vazquez did not have standing to assert her First Amendment counterclaims and dismissed them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). The court ruled that Vazquez lacked standing because she did not allege a sufficiently concrete injury. It reasoned that there are no factual allegations that Vazquez has actually ceased her participation in pro-life, church-related, or speech activities as a result of the commencement of this civil action or that she will suspend these activities in the future. The court noted that exhibits provided by the plaintiffs showed that Vazquez continued her protest activities despite the lawsuit. The court ruled that it had authority to look outside the pleadings, because Rule 12(b)(1) allows the courts to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction to hear an action. See Antares Aircraft v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 948 F.2d 90, 96 (2d Cir.1991) (a court may consider evidence outside of the pleadings, such as affidavits, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(1)), vacated on other grounds, 505 U.S. 1215, 112 S.Ct. 3020, 120 L.Ed.2d 892 (1992). Finding that Vazquez could not prove that she suffered an injury in fact (an essential element of constitutional standing), the court dismissed her counterclaims. 28 Vazquez argues that the court erred in denying her counterclaims on standing grounds. As the Supreme Court has held, [t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing [the elements of standing]. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). To meet this burden, a plaintiff must show (1) that she suffered an injury in fact--an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particular, and not merely hypothetical; (2) that there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) that it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We believe that Vazquez established standing. 29 We have emphasized that [t]he fundamental aspect of standing is [its focus] on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated. Bordell v. General Elec. Co., 922 F.2d 1057, 1060 (2d Cir.1991) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted.) The aim is to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The standing issue must therefore be resolved irrespective of the merits of [the] substantive claims. Bordell, 922 F.2d at 1060. 30 When standing is challenged on the basis of the pleadings, we accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197; accord Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 7, 108 S.Ct. 849, 99 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988); Thompson v. County of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 249 (2d Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). And [a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alterations in original). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated that 31 When the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that must be averred (at the summary judgment stage) or proved (at the trial stage) in order to establish standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or foregone action) at issue. If he is, there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it. 32 Id. at 561-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (emphasis added); see also Bordell, 922 F.2d at 1060 (Had Bordell been prosecuted or otherwise punished for [his conduct] ... he would have suffered a cognizable injury that would be sufficient to confer standing in this case.). 33 In the case before us Vazquez was the object of a government action--a lawsuit that sought to enjoin her from engaging in certain protest activities outside abortion clinics. Under the circumstances, the fact that she continued to demonstrate outside the clinic during the pendency of the lawsuit hardly shows that her speech was not chilled and that she was, therefore, not injured. Because of the pending suit, she may have felt obliged to tone down her rhetoric, or to refrain from handing out literature at times when she would have liked so to do. Conversely, her continued pamphleteering may have simply been the result of her willingness to risk liability because of a belief in the value of civil disobedience. Accordingly, her persistence in protesting does not mean that she did not suffer a sufficiently concrete injury to challenge the government's action. 34 In light of the pendency of the government's suit against Vazquez, the district court should not have dismissed Vazquez's counterclaims for lack of standing.