Opinion ID: 741743
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Instruction as to Employer Liability

Text: 61 Perry also contends that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the elements of respondeat superior. Her contention is without merit. 62 The matter of whether the harassing conduct of a supervisor or coworker should be imputed to an employer is determined in accordance with common-law principles of agency. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72, 106 S.Ct. at 2408; Murray v. New York University College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d at 249; Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d at 779. Thus, when a supervisor wields the authority delegated to him by an employer either (a) to condition tangible job benefits affecting an employee on the employee's acceptance or rejection of the supervisor's sexual demands, or (b) to further the creation of a discriminatorily abusive work environment, the supervisor's conduct is deemed to be that of the employer, and the employer is liable for that conduct. See, e.g., Murray v. New York University College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d at 249; Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d at 780. In contrast, as discussed in Part II.A. above, when the hostile environment is created by a coworker or by a low-level supervisor who does not rely on his supervisory authority in carrying out the harassment, the employer is liable only if it has either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it. Murray v. New York University College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d at 249 (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d at 780. 63 We review a claim of error in the district court's jury instructions de novo, and will reverse on this basis only if the appellant can show that the error was prejudicial in light of the charge as a whole. See, e.g., Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 556 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Pujana-Mena, 949 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir.1991). A jury instruction is erroneous if it misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard or does not adequately inform the jury on the law. Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d at 556. A party is not entitled to have the court give the jury an instruction for which there is no evidentiary predicate at trial. See generally Gadaleta v. Nederlandsch-Amerekaansche Stoomvart, 291 F.2d 212, 214 (2d Cir.1961); 9A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2556, at 448 (2d ed. 1995). 64 In the present case, the district court correctly instructed the jury that Ethan Allen would be liable if management level employees knew or should have known of the alleged sexual harassment described by Perry and if management level employees failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action. Perry, however, complains that the court refused to instruct the jury that the company would also be liable if the jury found that a supervisor use[d] his actual or apparent authority to further the harassment or if he or she was otherwise aided in accomplishing the harassment by the existence of his or her position as a supervisor. While that would have been a correct statement of the law, the district court properly refused to include it in this case because Perry's testimony was that she had been harassed by her coworkers, not by her supervisors. Although Perry testified that she was harassed by Bowen, who was a supervisor, he was not her supervisor and hence could not have relied on his supervisory authority to harass her, at least not without complicity between Bowen and Perry's own supervisor, of which there was no suggestion at trial. And though Perry contends in her brief on appeal that Geoffroy, a low-level foreman, used his supervisory position to harass her, the evidence she presented at trial was not that Geoffroy himself engaged in sexual harassment but rather that in December 1990 he discriminated against her in job assignments and training after she complained of harassment by her coworkers. That assertion could not provide a basis for recovery because it was not included in her EEOC charge. See generally Butts v. City of New York Department of Housing Preservation & Development, 990 F.2d 1397, 1401 (2d Cir.1993) (A district court only has jurisdiction to hear Title VII claims that either are included in an EEOC charge or are based on conduct subsequent to the EEOC charge which is 'reasonably related' to that alleged in the EEOC charge.). Plainly, therefore, the testimony with respect to Geoffroy did not warrant the respondeat superior instruction of whose omission Perry complains. 65