Opinion ID: 724570
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: U.S. Citizenship

Text: 8 The BIA did not err in determining that Gutierrez-Tavares could not claim derivative citizenship through his mother, a U.S. born citizen. The Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C. § 601(g) (1946), the statute in force the year of Gutierrez-Tavares' birth, governs his claim of derivative citizenship. Runnett v. Shultz, 901 F.2d 782 (9th Cir.1990). The 1940 Act provides for derivative citizenship for children born to U.S. citizens. However, the statute contains a residency requirement for the parent, which Gutierrez-Tavares' mother did not meet. Therefore, his claim of derivative citizenship under the statute must fail. 9 Gutierrez-Tavares erroneously contends that a savings clause in the 1946 statute preserved his mother's ability to pass citizenship to her children under the Nationality Act of 1934. Not only did Congress repeal the savings clause three months prior to Gutierrez-Tavares' birth, but also, by its express terms, the savings clause does not apply to claims of derivative citizenship. Rodriguez-Romero v. I.N.S., 434 F.2d 1022, 1024 (9th Cir.1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 976 (1971) (holding that the savings clause did not extend to claims of nationality at birth, but was expressly limited to the preservation of provisions relating to nationality through naturalization and to several miscellaneous matters irrelevant to appellant's claim.)