Opinion ID: 1436706
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the evidence of guilt

Text: I agree with the majority that there was some evidence of Walton's guilt of the two disciplinary charges, see Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2773, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985), but I find the case closer and perhaps more troubling than my colleagues do. The essence of the charges against Walton is an alleged attempt on his part to be a small-scale prison bootlegger. In his brief, Walton argues in pertinent part as follows: With respect to Section 502.11(b) there are two requisite showings: that appellant was (1) in possession of, making or attempting to make (2) an intoxicating beverage. With regard to the making, or attempting to make phrases, there is [no] evidence in the disciplinary report, or any other document introduced at the hearing, or in Sgt. Bonaparte's own testimony that showed there was any evidence of this type of activity on Walton's part. Thus, there is no indication in the disciplinary report [1] that any winemaking paraphernalia [were] found in the course of the shake-down: there were no funnels or filtering devices, or fruit and sugar to further fermentation, or evidence that the grapefruit juice had been altered or enhanced in any way. Further, the standard for a guilty finding of possession of contraband under Section 502.11(b) is that the substance constitute an intoxicating beverage. Here, too, the Department introduced no evidence at the Adjustment Board hearing that the grapefruit juice in Walton's possession was capable of intoxicating. In fact, the only evidence at the hearing on this issue was Dr. Seipel's testimony that a solution of less than 1% alcohol could not intoxicate a normal adult. (Emphasis in original.) The District's response to this contention is brief and to the point: The bottom line in this case, when it is stripped of the complex constitutional issues, is that it is undisputed that Walton had gallons of fruit juice in a bag wrapped in a blanket and mattress cover, and that the prison officials made the logical and permissible inference that Walton was attempting to make shoots, or homemade wine, and used the juice in a manner contrary to the intent of its issuance. This evidence amply supported the finding that he was guilty of the class I and II contraband offenses. To me, the decisive question which emerges from these contentions is whether Walton's possession and apparent concealment of a large amount of improperly acquired grapefruit juice is some evidence that he attempted to make homemade wine. My colleagues emphasize that Walton did not deny that there was a smell in his cell. I should think, however, that such a large amount of non-alcoholic grapefruit juice might also be discernable to the educated nostril. If I were the trier of fact, and if I were not provided with further enlightenment on the subject, I might have considerable difficulty concluding that this evidence proved that Walton was trying to become an amateur manufacturer of wine. The reality is, though, that I am not the trier of fact. Presumably, the Lorton officials who heard the evidence know a great deal more about running a prison than judges do. A part of that superior knowledge doubtless extends, or at least should extend, to the manner in which prisoners try to make shoots or other intoxicants from the limited (one hopes) raw materials available to them. Our review of such proceedings, although apparently authorized by the LRAA, should therefore be very deferential indeed. Under that standard, I agree that we must reject Walton's position on this issue.