Opinion ID: 1914829
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preservation and Presentation of Claims on Appeal

Text: In his recitation of issues, Appellant casts all but one of his claims in terms of ineffective assistance of counsel. [4] However, in the body of his brief, he makes an ineffectiveness argument for all eight claims. Our longstanding test for ineffective assistance of counsel derives from the standard set by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973, 976 (1987) (adopting the federal standard in Pennsylvania). Under Pierce, a petitioner must prove that: (1) the underlying legal claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for proceeding as he did; and (3) there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for the challenged act of counsel, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 975. See also Commonwealth v. Dennis, 950 A.2d 945, 954 (Pa.2008). The failure to satisfy any one of the three prongs is fatal to a petitioner's claim. Commonwealth v. Williams, 594 Pa. 366, 936 A.2d 12, 19-20 (2007). In Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (2002), this Court held that challenges to counsel's effectiveness should be deferred until collateral review. However, Grant was filed after Appellant's direct appeal, making the pre- Grant rule of Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977), applicable here. Hubbard requires a petitioner to raise challenges to the effectiveness of counsel at the first stage of litigation in which the petitioner was represented by counsel other than the one whose effectiveness was to be challenged. Id. at 695 n. 6. Thus, in cases like this one, in which ineffectiveness claims should have been, but were not, raised at the first possible opportunity, a petitioner is required to layer his claims. Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574, 832 A.2d 1014, 1021-22 (2003). To layer a claim properly, a petitioner must plead and prove each element of the ineffectiveness test with respect to every counsel whose representation he challenges. Id. The method of compliance with the layering rule is clear: [In] order for a petitioner to properly raise and prevail on a layered ineffectiveness claim, sufficient to warrant relief if meritorious, he must plead, present, and prove the ineffectiveness of [appellate counsel], which as we have seen, necessarily reaches back to the actions of [trial counsel]. To preserve (plead and present) a claim that [appellate counsel] was ineffective ... the petitioner must: (1) plead, in his PCRA petition, that [appellate counsel] was ineffective for failing to allege that [trial counsel] was ineffective ... and (2) present argument on, i.e., develop, each prong of the Pierce test as to [appellate counsel's] representation, in his briefs or other court memoranda. Then, and only then, has the petitioner preserved a layered claim of ineffectiveness for the court to review; then, and only then, can the court proceed to determine whether the petitioner has proved his layered claim. Id. at 1022 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Recognizing that this Court's prior decisions failed to achieve consensus on the proper procedure for layering ineffectiveness claims, we concluded in McGill that it would be unduly harsh to enforce the layering rule strictly in cases where PCRA disposition or appeal therefrom was pending. Thus, we held that a remand to the PCRA court may be appropriate in order to allow an amendment in cases pending in the appellate courts where the petitioner has failed to preserve, by pleading and/or presenting, a layered ineffectiveness claim in a manner sufficient to warrant merits review. Id. at 1024. We have been clear, however, that a remand is not warranted in all cases in which the McGill presentation requirements are lacking. Where a PCRA appellant has failed to satisfy the Pierce test with respect to trial counsel's stewardship, there is no basis for remanding the matter to afford the appellant the opportunity to correct his pleadings in connection with appellate counsel's representation. See Dennis, supra at 956 ( McGill does not save [an a]ppellant from the obligation properly to layer his claims before this Court, or from a failure to plead and prove the ineffectiveness of trial counsel sufficiently under Pierce). See also Commonwealth v. Gibson, 951 A.2d 1110, 1121 (Pa.2008) (assessment of underlying claims regarding trial counsel's conduct employed solely as a means of determining the viability of extant derivative claims). In the instant matter, Appellant failed to layer his ineffectiveness claims in the PCRA court, although he makes an effort to do so in his brief to this Court. Nonetheless, as our discussion below establishes, Appellant has not adequately pled and proven the ineffectiveness of trial counsel under the Pierce standard. As a result, his failure to layer the claims below is moot and Appellant is not entitled to relief in any event. See Dennis, supra ; Gibson, supra .