Opinion ID: 2639069
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Objects and effect

Text: There is, however, more than one way to look at neutrality. As Lukumi explains it, [f]acial neutrality is not determinative.... The [free exercise] clause `forbids subtle departures from neutrality' [citation] and `covert suppression of particular religious beliefs.' ( Lukumi, supra, 508 U.S. at p. 543, 113 S.Ct. 2217.) Apart from the text, the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object. ( Id. at p. 535, 113 S.Ct. 2217.) [I]f the object of the law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral [citation]; and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. ( Id. at p. 533, 113 S.Ct. 2217.) The Free Exercise Clause `protect[s] religious observers against unequal treatment.' ( Lukumi, at p. 543, 113 S.Ct. 2217.) But equality in the context of religious liberty must be broadly defined. In effect, the general applicability requirement is needed to ensure neutrality across broad categories of regulation. Pursuant to Lukumi, if other activities which cause comparable harm to the same governmental interests are not regulated, the law is not generally applicable. Thus, Lukumi makes it clear that strict scrutiny is required if a law is not neutral  and it considers the question of neutrality broadly. In this case, for instance, defendants argue that Catholic Charities' ability to opt out, i.e., to choose not to provide any prescription coverage, obviates any concern about infringement. Catholic Charities insists it should not be forced to relinquish its vision of appropriate employee relations to preserve its right to object to the use of contraceptives. From the Church's perspective, to demand that contraception be funded, despite bona fide religious objections, is to take sides, to abandon the commitment to public neutrality. In this sense, the WCEA, with its grudging religious exemption, may not be neutral. The majority's response that the WCEA's narrow exemption is an accommodation and not an imposition seems entirely unresponsive. In the whole scheme of things, the risk associated with allowing government to impose a stifling orthodoxy in pursuit of the good society may greatly outweigh the small harm of tolerating heterodoxy in this circumstance. [4] At oral argument, counsel indicated the Catholic Church, including Catholic Charities, employs fewer than 60,000 of California's millions of employees. [5] Some of the Church's employees belong to religious orders and are presumably fully in agreement with the church's position. Some are men, some are women no longer capable of childbearing, and some are spouses of people employed by other companies who are covered by their spouses' health plans. Of the women of childbearing age who remain, and to whom contraceptive coverage is a critical concern, none are faced with a pervasive practice which would prevent them from finding more congenial employment. [6] THE EXISTENCE OF Wcea's mandate  TO Which the vast majority of California employers apparently have no religious objection  enhances their employment options. In fact, the defection of talented female employees may cause Catholic Charities to reconsider its position. Such a result has no First Amendment implications. A substantial amount of federal case law supports Catholic Charities' claim that the Legislature's attempt to draw distinctions between the religious and secular activities of a single religious entity is an impermissible government entanglement in religion. I am inclined to agree. Such an action is constitutionally invalid and that ends the discussion. If, however, the existence of the narrow exemption simply shows the statutory scheme is not neutral in operation or effect, it is invalid only if it fails strict scrutiny.