Opinion ID: 2336124
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: admission of the police blood and urine test.

Text: Pursuant to the search warrant, the police drew a sample of blood and collected a urine specimen to determine if Appellant was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The trial judge overruled Appellant's pretrial motion to suppress the results of tests on these samples and allowed the Commonwealth to introduce that evidence at trial. Appellant claims error because too much time elapsed between the accident and the collection of the blood sample. Additionally, he argues that the admission of the results of the urine test was error as driving under the influence in Kentucky is measured through breath or blood, not urine. He further alleges that the trial court impermissibly allowed the Commonwealth to use the various tests to extrapolate Appellant's blood alcohol level at the time of the accident. At the time of Appellant's prosecution. KRS 189A.010(1) stated in pertinent part: A person shall not operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle anywhere in this state: (a) While the alcohol concentration in his blood or breath is 0.10 or more based on the definition of alcohol concentration in KRS 189A.005; (b) While under the influence of alcohol. Appellant asserts that the four hours between the accident (when he was last operating a motor vehicle) and the collection of his blood sample represents too great a lapse of time to prove he was intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle. In Commonwealth v. Wirth, Ky., 936 S.W.2d 78 (1996), we specifically declined to adopt a bright line rule with respect to when the lapse of time between driving and testing for alcohol intoxication becomes so great as to prevent a rational trier of fact from determining guilt based thereon. Id. at 84. Our views in that regard have not changed. Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates a reason to distrust these results. Hospital staff closely monitored Appellant from the moment he entered the emergency room. He had no opportunity to ingest additional alcoholic beverages so as to skew the test results. In fact, the delay benefitted Appellant by providing more time for his body to oxidize the alcohol in his system. The test results were properly admitted. Nor was it error to admit the results of the urinalysis. KRS 189A.005(1) defines alcohol concentration, the key term in finding a driver in violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a), in terms of milliliters of blood or liters of breath. Appellant argues that since the definition does not include urine, it was error to admit the urine sample test results. However, the failure of KRS 189A.005(1) to mention urine does not affect the admissibility of urine sample evidence to prove guilt under KRS 189A.010(1)(b). We need not decide whether a jury could convict Appellant of violating the per se section of the statute, KRS 189A.010(1)(a), based on the results of a test of his urine sample; for this evidence was relevant in determining whether he was guilty of violating the under the influence section of the statute, KRS 189A.010(1)(b). The jury was instructed on both statutory bases of guilt. We also note that urine tests are contemplated by KRS 189A.103(1), (3), and (5). Appellant's contention that the Commonwealth impermissibly used the various tests to extrapolate his BAC at the time of the accident is also without merit. In Wirth, supra , this Court stated [e]xtrapolation evidence is not required for the Commonwealth to make a prima facie case of a [violation of KRS 189A.010(1)(a)]. Id. at 84 (emphasis added). However, nothing in this wording precludes the Commonwealth, or the defendant, from using extrapolation evidence to assist the trier of fact in its determinations.