Opinion ID: 2141149
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Causes of Action

Text: A Claimants' first five causes of action [4] are based on violations of section 1981, the enabling act which provides a damage remedy for the deprivation of Federal constitutional rights. [5] We conclude they must be dismissed for failure to state causes of action. In Monell v New York City Dept. of Social Servs. (436 US 658), the Supreme Court held that no suit would lie against the State under section 1983 because the State was not a person within the meaning of the statute. [6] It also held that the doctrine of respondeat superior had no application in actions based on the statute. The Court reasoned that the State is not a person because a waiver of its immunity (whether based on the Eleventh Amendment or on historic common-law principles), must be expressly stated before a State may be sued in Federal courts ( see , Will v Michigan Dept. of State Police , 491 US 58, 63-65). Claimants have based their claims on section 1981. They maintain that section provides a basis of liability independent of section 1983. In Jett v Dallas Ind. School Dist. (491 US 701), however, the Supreme Court held that section 1983 provides the exclusive Federal damages remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed by section 1981. The State is not a person within the statute and it cannot be liable in an action based on section 1981 ( Jett , supra , 491 US, at 731; Dennis v County of Fairfax , 55 F.3d 151, 156, n 1 [4th Cir 1995]; Tarpley v Green , 684 F.2d 1, 11, n 25 [DC App 1982], cited with approval in Jett , supra , at 735). Inasmuch as the Jett ruling controls claimants' first five causes of action they fail. Claimants contend, that the Civil Rights Act of 1991, passed after the Jett decision, added subdivision (c) to section 1981 for the purpose of overruling the holding in Jett and providing a broader avenue of relief to claimants. The legislative history accompanying the Act does not address the Supreme Court's holding in Jett . It mentions subdivision (c) only briefly and states that it was added to reaffirm Runyon v McCrary (427 US 160 [holding private parties liable under 42 USC § 1981]; see , HR Rep No. 40 [I], 102d Cong, 1st Sess 92, 141, reprinted in 1991 US Code Cong & Admin News 630, 670). This rationale was not discussed in the Congressional Debate, however (137 Cong Rec S15473, S15483). Federal courts, with little legislative history to guide them, have held conflicting views as to whether the amendment was meant to overrule Jett ( compare , Ebrahimi v City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ. , 905 F Supp 993, 995, n 2 [ND Ala]; Johnson v City of Fort Lauderdale , 903 F Supp 1520, 1523 [SD Fla]; with Federation of African-Am. Contrs. v City of Oakland , 96 F.3d 1204 [9th Cir]; Robinson v Town of Colonie , 878 F Supp 387, 405, n 13 [ND NY]; La Compania Ocho v United States Forest Serv. , 874 F Supp 1242, 1251 [D NM]). We think the likeliest explanation for the amendment is the one adopted without discussion by the Court of Appeals in Dennis (55 F3d, at 156, n 1, supra ): that the amendment was intended to codify the rule in Runyon v McCrary ( supra ). Accordingly, Claims 1-5, based on 42 USC § 1981, were properly dismissed. B New York has no enabling statute similar to those contained in the Federal civil rights statutes permitting damage actions for the deprivation of constitutional rights. Thus, if we are to recognize a damage remedy it must be implied from the Constitution itself. The analysis is similar to that used by the Supreme Court when it recognized causes of action based on the Federal Constitution in Bivens ( supra [search and seizure]) and Davis v Passman (442 US 228 [equal protection]). A civil damage remedy cannot be implied for a violation of the State constitutional provision unless the provision is self-executing, that is, it takes effect immediately, without the necessity for supplementary or enabling legislation ( see generally , Friesen, State Constitutional Law ¶ 7.05 [1], quoting from Cooley, Constitutional Limitations [7th ed]; 16 CJS, Constitutional Law, § 46). In New York, constitutional provisions are presumptively self-executing ( see , People v Carroll , 3 N.Y.2d 686, 691). Manifestly, article I, § 12 of the State Constitution and that part of section 11 relating to equal protection are self-executing. They define judicially enforceable rights and provide citizens with a basis for judicial relief against the State if those rights are violated. Actions of State or local officials which violate these constitutional guarantees are void ( see, e.g. , Foss v City of Rochester , 65 N.Y.2d 247 [equal protection]; People v Griminger , 71 N.Y.2d 635 [search and seizure]). The violation of a self-executing provision in the Constitution will not always support a claim for damages, however ( see , Shields v Gerhart , 163 Vt 219, 658 A2d 924; Figueroa v State of Hawaii , 61 Haw 369, 604 P2d 1198; and see generally , Friesen, op. cit. , ¶ 7.05). The substantive right may be firmly established, as in the case of sections 11 and 12, but it remains to determine whether the remedy of damages for the invasion of those rights will be recognized. C The State courts that have implied damage causes of action have traditionally rested their decisions on (1) the reasoning contained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A, (2) analogy to a Bivens action, (3) common-law antecedents of the constitutional provision at issue, or a combination of all three ( see generally , Friesen, op. cit. ; Baker, The Minnesota Constitution as a Sword: The Evolving Private Cause of Action , 20 Wm Mitchell L Rev 313; Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution , 68 S Cal L Rev 289). Section 874A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that a court may imply a civil remedy from legislative or constitutional provisions, even though one is not expressly provided, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the provision and needed to assure its effectiveness ( see , Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A; see also , comment d ; People v Carroll , supra , at 690-691). Some courts have relied on the reasoning of Bivens (403 US 388, supra ). In Bivens , the Supreme Court implied a cause of action for damages against Federal officials who violated the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment. The underlying rationale for the decision, in simplest terms, is that constitutional guarantees are worthy of protection on their own terms without being linked to some common-law or statutory tort, and that the courts have the obligation to enforce these rights by ensuring that each individual receives an adequate remedy for violation of a constitutional duty. If the remedy is not forthcoming from the political branches of government, then the courts must provide it by recognizing a damage remedy against the violators much the same as the courts earlier recognized and developed equitable remedies to enjoin unconstitutional actions. Implicit in this reasoning is the premise that the Constitution is a source of positive law, not merely a set of limitations on government. The Bivens analysis illustrates the Restatement principle. Although its use in the Federal courts has been narrowed somewhat by the Supreme Court ( see , Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v Meyer , 510 US 471; Schweiker v Chilicky , 487 US 412; United States v Stanley , 483 US 669; see generally , Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution , op. cit. ), it is well recognized and has been applied to support a number of State decisions ( see, e.g. , Widgeon v Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr. , 300 Md 520, 479 A2d 921, supra ; Gay Law Students Assn. v Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. , 24 Cal 3d 458, 595 P2d 592, supra ; Phillips v Youth Dev. Program , 390 Mass 652, 459 NE2d 453, supra ; Newell v City of Elgin , 34 Ill App 3d 719, 340 NE2d 344, supra ; and see generally , Friesen, op. cit. , ¶ 7.05 [2]; ¶ 7.07 [1]). Finally, the courts have looked to the common-law antecedents of the constitutional provision to discover whether a damage remedy may be implied. New York's first Constitution in 1777 recognized and adopted the existing common law of England and each succeeding Constitution has continued that practice. Thus, in some cases, there exist grounds for implying a damage remedy based upon preexisting common-law duties and rights.