Opinion ID: 1595978
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Use of Williamson v. United States

Text: Dukes' third ineffective assistance of counsel claim relates to his appellate counsel. Dukes asserts that his appellate counsel did not discuss Williamson v. United States in her brief to us on direct appeal. 512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994). Williamson is a leading Supreme Court case discussing the admissibility of statements under the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 596, 114 S.Ct. 2431. At Dukes' trial, the court considered Williamson and both defense counsel and the state argued at length about its meaning when the court was determining the admissibility of Lewis' plea testimony. Despite Williamson 's importance, appellate counsel failed to mention Williamson in her brief, let alone discuss how it should apply to Lewis' plea testimony. The Supreme Court has indicated that courts may proceed directly to the second prong of the ineffective assistance analysis and first analyze whether the defendant was prejudiced. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Thus, in instances where there is no actual prejudice, courts can avoid evaluating the performance of counsel. Id. The Supreme Court also has encouraged courts to strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result. Id. Therefore, we will first consider whether Dukes was prejudiced by any potential error by counsel. To prove prejudice, Dukes must be able to show that absent his appellate counsel's error, the outcome of his direct appeal would have been different. See id. Even though Dukes' counsel did not discuss or cite to Williamson, the state did raise Williamson and we addressed the case when deciding the direct appeal. Further, we fully analyzed Williamson and concluded that the admission of Lewis' plea testimony conformed to the Supreme Court's requirements in Williamson. Dukes, 544 N.W.2d at 18-19. Dukes cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel's omission. Therefore, we conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief on this claim. Failure to advise of ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims Dukes' final ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that his appellate counsel failed to advise him of any potential ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims and that such claims needed to be raised in his direct appeal. The postconviction court concluded that Dukes did not prove appellate counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that Dukes did not prove prejudice. The court did not make any factual findings on these claims. As with the previous claims, Dukes must show that he was prejudiced by any potential error made by his appellate counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Dukes maintains that if we conclude his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims are waived because they were not raised on direct appeal, then he was prejudiced by the failure of his appellate counsel to advise him of the proper procedure to raise the claims. The first ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim that the postconviction court found Dukes had waived is that his counsel was deficient because he admitted Dukes' guilt without Dukes' consent. Because we have decided to remand this claim, Dukes cannot show he was prejudiced by his appellate counsel's failure to advise him on this claim. On remand, he will have the claim heard on the merits. The second ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim that Dukes may have waived is that trial counsel did not prevent the admission of the incriminating parts of Lewis' plea testimony. We have concluded that Dukes' claim relating to his trial counsel's handling of the Lewis plea testimony is barred because the claim was known, but not raised, on direct appeal. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741. However, the fact that the claim is now barred is not enough to show prejudice. Dukes also must show that absent his appellate counsel's failure to advise him of the proper procedure for raising the claim, there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of his direct appeal would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Dukes cannot make such a showing. We concluded on direct appeal that the plea testimony admitted against Dukes was proper under both the exception to the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause. Dukes, 544 N.W.2d at 19. It is highly unlikely that we would have reached that conclusion on direct appeal and in the same opinion concluded that his trial counsel's representation fell below the objective standard of reasonableness in his attempts to limit the admission of the same statements. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. It is incongruous to conclude that counsel's advocacy was unreasonably deficient because he failed to prevent the admission of evidence that we concluded was properly admitted. Therefore, regardless of whether his appellate counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness on this claim, Dukes cannot show that he was prejudiced by her failure to advise him of this claim. Accordingly, we conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief on this ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim.
Dukes' next argument is that the postconviction court abused its discretion when it failed to consider the merits of his equal protection and due process claim that his sentence is improper relative to the sentence imposed on Lewis. Dukes claims that disparate levels of culpability blameworthinesscannot explain the difference between the two sentences and therefore the sentence imposed on him violates his right to equal protection and due process. Dukes' argument is essentially an equal protection argument. Dukes was sentenced to consecutive terms for first-degree murder and first-degree attempted murder. However, after being found guilty on the same charges, Lewis was sentenced to concurrent terms for the same two convictions. State v. Lewis, 547 N.W.2d 360, 361 (Minn.1996). Dukes asserts that he is less blameworthy because the evidence presented at both trials established that Lewis was the one who actually shot McKinney, while Dukes drove the car used to commit the crime. In Dukes' direct appeal, we concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences on Dukes because his participation in the crime was not so passive that the imposition of consecutive sentences exaggerated his culpability. Dukes, 544 N.W.2d at 20. Because the issue was not raised, we did not consider whether the imposition of different sentences on fellow defendants by the same judge violated Dukes' right to equal protection. Id. However, Lewis was sentenced prior to Dukes' direct appeal. Claims known but not raised on direct appeal will not be considered on a subsequent petition for postconviction relief. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741. Accordingly, we hold that the postconviction court's conclusion that Dukes was procedurally barred from raising this claim is not clearly erroneous.
Dukes' next claim relates to newly-discovered falsified testimony by Lewis. As an attachment to his postconviction petition, Dukes submitted an affidavit by Kevin Lewis, n/k/a Hannabal Shaddai, in which Lewis stated that he lied in his plea testimony because he was trying to obtain the benefit of the plea. The postconviction court denied Dukes relief on this claim, concluding that the new evidence was cumulative, impeaching, doubtful, and would probably not produce an acquittal   . The language used by the court suggests that the court was following the test for determining when to grant a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence. Rainer v. State, 566 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn.1997). This test requires that a defendant must prove four elements before he will be entitled to a new trial: (1) that the evidence was not known to the defendant or his counsel at the time of the trial; (2) that the evidence could not have been discovered through due diligence before trial; (3) that the evidence is not cumulative, impeaching, or doubtful; and (4) that the evidence would probably produce an acquittal or a more favorable result. Id. Although the four-prong Rainer test is the correct test for newly-discovered evidence, it is not the correct test when a court reviews an allegation that false testimony was given at trial. See Sutherlin v. State, 574 N.W.2d 428, 433 (Minn.1998). When it is alleged that false testimony was given at trial, the court must evaluate the claim under the three-prong test articulated by the 7th Circuit in Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.1928). Sutherlin, 574 N.W.2d. at 433. We have previously examined the differences between these two tests. In State v. Caldwell, we concluded that analysis of newly-discovered evidence in cases involving witness recantation should not be an analysis of the impact of the recantation, but should be an analysis of the effect that the absence of the false testimony would have had on the result in the original trial. 322 N.W.2d 574, 585 (Minn.1982). The test for newly-discovered falsified testimony provides that in order to grant a new trial: (1) the court must be `reasonably well satisfied' that the [trial] testimony was false; (2) without the false testimony, the jury might have reached a different conclusion; and (3) the petitioner was taken by surprise at trial or did not know of the falsity until after trial. Sutherlin, 574 N.W.2d at 433 (citing Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d at 584-85). The postconviction court did not conduct an analysis or make any findings on any of the Larrison criteria, although there is evidence in the record that would support either the grant or the denial of relief. Lewis' affidavit directly contradicts his plea testimony, which was substantially referenced by both the state and Dukes. However, there is other evidence in the record in support of Dukes' participation. Although Dukes was not surprised in the sense that he did not know what Lewis had stated in his plea testimony, he was surprised that the plea testimony would be used in place of live testimony by Lewis, because Lewis withdrew his plea and refused to testify after Dukes' trial had already begun. These factual disputes are the type that a postconviction court must resolve when evaluating a claim of newly-discovered falsified trail testimony. We conclude that there are factual disputes on this claim and that the postconviction court did not apply the correct test in evaluating the recanted testimony. Therefore, we remand this claim for an application of the three-prong Larrison test and for findings as to whether a new trial is warranted by the newly-discovered falsified testimony.
The final question we address is Dukes' argument that the postconviction court abdicated its duties as a neutral arbitrator when it promptly and verbatim adopted the proposed findings submitted by the state. He argues that this action by the postconviction court prejudiced him because none of the evidence he presented at the hearing, particularly the testimony of his expert witness, is reflected in the court's findings. Dukes asserts that he was denied procedural due process because the court relinquished [its] duty to conduct an independent review   . Dukes relies on Anderson v. City of Bessemer City for the proposition that appellate courts should be extremely leery and circumspect of findings prepared by one party and accepted without change by the court. 470 U.S. 564, 572, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). In Anderson, the United States Supreme Court criticized the practice of courts adopting verbatim the findings prepared by the prevailing party, particularly if the findings have taken the form of conclusory statements unsupported by citation to the record. Id. As the Eighth Circuit explained in Bradley v. Maryland Casualty Co., the problem with verbatim adoption of one party's findings is that it can make it more difficult to determine whether a court exercised its own careful consideration of the evidence, of the witnesses, and of the entire case. 382 F.2d 415, 423 (8th Circuit 1967). We agree that it is preferable for a court to independently develop its own findings. Therefore, when we review a court's verbatim adoption of one party's proposed findings, we will heed how the findings were prepared when we conduct a careful and searching review of the record. We will devote special care not in the test that we apply to a particular finding of factindividual findings will only be reversed if clearly erroneousbut in the volume of evidence we sift in judging the correctness of such findings   . Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen Local 201, 843 F.2d 1395, 1408 (D.C.Cir. 1988) (emphasis removed). However, if after such a review we conclude that the findings are not clearly erroneous, the verbatim adoption, standing alone, will not be insufficient grounds for reversal. Here, as a result of the postconviction court having adopted verbatim the state's proposed findings, we have devoted special care in our review of the record. After such review, we conclude that with the exception of the findings on the two remanded claims, the findings are not clearly erroneous; therefore, we hold that the postconviction court's verbatim adoption of the state's proposed findings, standing alone, does not constitute grounds for reversal. Affirmed in part and remanded in part.