Opinion ID: 2165640
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: default judgment and motion to vacate

Text: Buckhalter contends that the district court should have vacated the referee's report concluding that Buckhalter is A.E.'s father. Buckhalter argues that the court should have vacated the default finding of paternity because he has a meritorious defense. Buckhalter's alleged meritorious defense is that the private paternity test results excluded him as the child's father. The State argues alternatively that (1) the private, unsubstantiated genetic test results do not provide a meritorious defense to paternity, or (2) the court's decision should be upheld on the evidence. [6-9] Section 43-1412(2) provides for a default judgment to be entered in a paternity action upon a showing of service and failure of the defendant to answer or otherwise appear. But when the court has entered a default judgment and the defendant has made a prompt application at the same term to set it aside, with the tender of an answer or other proof disclosing a meritorious defense, the court should on reasonable terms sustain the motion and permit the cause to be heard on the merits. [11] A meritorious or substantial defense or cause means one which is worthy of judicial inquiry because it raises a question of law deserving some investigation and discussion or a real controversy as to the essential facts. [12] To vacate the default judgment, Buckhalter is not required to show that he will ultimately prevail, but only that he has a recognized defense that is not frivolous. [13] The State contends that the private paternity test excluding Buckhalter as A.E.'s father is not a meritorious defense. They assert that Buckhalter's defense is simply to deny paternity. And if we allowed such a defense to vacate the default judgment, defendants in paternity cases would always have the incentive to wait until after the hearing is over before appearing in the case. Two of the leading cases in which we recognized a meritorious defense are Miller v. Steichen [14] and Beren Corp. v. Spader. [15] Miller involved a garnishment proceeding against a liability insurance provider. The summons and garnishment order were served on the ex-president of the insurance company, and the company did not appear. After the trial court entered a default judgment against the insurance company, the company moved to vacate the judgment. It asserted that its policy did not cover the acts upon which the suit was based. It presented a federal district court decision, in which the federal court had previously found that claims such as the plaintiff's were not covered by the insurer's policy. We held that the insurer had sufficiently demonstrated a defense  worthy of judicial inquiry.' [16] In Beren Corp., we addressed whether the trial court should have vacated a default judgment in an action to quiet title to real estate in the plaintiff. The defendants moved to vacate the order and presented a proposed answer in which they alleged that the relevant documents showed they had an interest in the real estate. The issue they raised was primarily one of lawthat under the facts alleged by the plaintiff, they owned an interest. After a detailed analysis of the law in the area, we concluded the defendants had raised a question deserving investigation. [17] Here, we must decide whether the unsubstantiated paternity test results create a `real controversy . . . worthy of judicial inquiry.' [18] In addressing this issue, it is useful to consider when genetic tests may be admitted as evidence of paternity. In State on behalf of Joseph F. v. Rial, [19] we addressed whether paternity test results were properly admitted as evidence. There, the testimony revealed in detail the procedures used and the chain of custody involved in handling the paternity test. We concluded that [t]he procedures for the collection, transportation, and examination of the blood were reliable so as to allow the trial court to find that the test results were what the State claimed, results of parentage tests performed on blood samples drawn from [the parties involved]. [20] Although Rial did not address the same issue, it does demonstrate that evidence is needed to confirm the reliability of genetic tests if they are to be used as evidence. Here, the private paternity test was unsubstantiated, and Buckhalter has offered nothing to suggest that the test results are reliable. Buckhalter argues that this evidence creates a genuine factual controversy. He cites the Nebraska Court of Appeals' decision in Quintela v. Quintela [21] for the rule that medical evidence of nonpaternity convincingly rebuts the presumption of paternity arising from marriage. But in Quintela, the validity and reliability of the testing was not at issue. The existence of Buckhalter's unverified test results does not create a meritorious defense that would require the district court to vacate the referee's findings. Without verification, we cannot determine whether the test results are what Buckhalter claims, and thus, they do not create a real controversy. Further, Buckhalter's defense does not create any dispute that was not already known. Brown's testimony established that the paternity test exists, so the referee was aware of the test results at the evidentiary hearing. And the State attempted for several months to obtain reliable genetic test results after warning Buckhalter that the private paternity test was insufficient. By failing to take the genetic testing ordered by the court, Buckhalter passed up the opportunity to present a meritorious defense. Although he does not need to prove that he would ultimately prevail, under these facts, Buckhalter has failed to show a meritorious defense. The trial court did not err in denying Buckhalter's motion to vacate.