Opinion ID: 1085024
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: James H. Carter

Text: Second, Carter contends that the court erred in declining to award him fees and costs for the work James H. Carter did on his case. Specifically, Carter claims that all of James H. Carter’s work on the case, both before he was admitted to practice pro hac vice in Arkansas and after, was reasonable and necessary. This court has often observed that there is no fixed formula in determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees. See Chrisco v. Sun Indus., Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990). However, a court should be guided in that determination by the following long-recognized factors: (1) the experience and ability of the attorney; (2) the time and labor 5 In fact, as the defendant in the breach-of-contract action who had not filed a counterclaim, Carter was not entitled to compensatory damages. 9 Cite as 2013 Ark. 398 required to perform the service properly; (3) the amount in controversy and the result obtained in the case; (4) the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved; (5) the fee customarily charged for similar services in the local area; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed upon the client in the circumstances; and (8) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the attorney. Id. Due to the circuit judge’s intimate acquaintance with the record and the quality of service rendered, we recognize the superior perspective of the trial judge in assessing the applicable factors. Id. Accordingly, the amount of the award will be reversed only if the appellant can demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion. Phi Kappa Tau Hous. Corp. v. Wengert, 350 Ark. 335, 86 S.W.3d 856 (2002). Attached to Carter’s motion for fees and costs was an invoice of James H. Carter’s billing for legal work in this case, which began on September 9, 2006, just prior to the Clines’ filing their complaint, and continued up until September 6, 2010, just prior to the appeal in Carter I. In response, the Clines argued that James H. Carter should not be awarded any fees for work performed prior to July 29, 2009, when he was admitted pro hac vice in Arkansas; that much of the legal work James H. Carter performed was duplicative of Carter’s in-state counsel; and that James H. Carter often ignored direct orders of the court, thereby performing unnecessary legal work. The circuit court found that James H. Carter’s representation as co-counsel for Carter was “duplicative, unnecessary, and did not contribute to Carter’s defense.” Thus, the court concluded that the $38,959.25 in fees associated with James H. Carter’s legal work was 10 Cite as 2013 Ark. 398 unreasonable. Based on a review of the record before us, our deference to the circuit court on issues involving the award of fees and costs, and the heightened standard of review, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion on this point.