Opinion ID: 1854863
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: use of and/or in this case

Text: The Fourth District concluded that use of and/or was not fundamental error. We agree that the use of and/or in this case did not result in fundamental error. See Farina v. State, 937 So.2d 612, 629 (Fla.2006) (We have cautioned appellate courts to `exercise their discretion concerning fundamental error very guardedly. [F]undamental error should be applied only in the rare cases where a jurisdictional error appears or where the interests of justice present a compelling demand for its application.') (citation omitted) (quoting Ray v. State, 403 So.2d 956, 960 (Fla. 1981)). We likewise agree that this is not a case where the court failed to correctly instruct on an element of the crime over which there was a dispute, as in Delva and Reed. Since this case does not present a Delva/Reed error, the Fourth District was correct in examining the totality of the record to determine if the and/or instruction met the exacting requirements of fundamental instruction error. In this case, the evidence demonstrated that there were three perpetrators of the crime. Defendant Balthazar was clearly identified as one of those perpetrators. Evidence was introduced showing that Balthazar had a vehicle matching the description of that used in the attempted kidnapping of the Smiths' son. Balthazar also commonly wore the same type of clothing as the perpetrators were identified as wearing (camouflage pants and a badge hanging around the neck). The Smiths' son identified Balthazar, both in court and in a prior photographic lineup, as the individual who attempted to kidnap him. Sandra Smith, the mother, also identified Balthazar in court as one of the home invaders and testified that he was not wearing a mask when he first entered the home. She described his face as one that she would never forget. The evidence also clearly established Balthazar's association with Coles and Garzon. Similarly, defendant Garzon was strongly linked to the crimes. Several individuals, including multiple representatives of different cell phone companies, testified extensively about numerous calls between phones identified with the codefendants. As the Fourth District noted, the evidence showed that one such call between Balthazar and Garzon was made at the same time as the home invasion and lasted for the approximate duration of the home invasion: thirty-nine minutes. When this call was made, the phone identified with Balthazar was in the vicinity of the Smiths' house, as was the cell phone identified with Garzon. Similarly, [o]ther testimony indicated calls between Balthazar's phone and Garzon's phone during [a] time when Balthazar and Coles had followed Sandra and her daughter prior to the June 4 home invasion. Garzon, 939 So.2d at 281. Garzon also had personal knowledge of the layout of the Smiths' home, access to information about the false wall safe, and access to knowledge of certain aspects of the Smiths' personal lives, all of which was evidenced by the actions of the home invaders. Given this evidence, everyone in the courtroom knew that the issue boiled down to whether the state had proven that [Garzon] was the person to whom Balthazar spoke over the cell phone during the home invasion. Id. at 284. Based on this evidence and the State's argument that Garzon was involved in the criminal scheme but not physically present at the home invasion, the jury was given a principals instruction. This instruction explained to the jury the only method by which it could convict one defendant based on the acts of another defendant in this case. The State emphasized the proper application of the law of principals in its closing argument. The prosecutor read the instruction to the jury and then explained how the law of principals applied. See id. at 284-85. Defense counsel also addressed the law of principals in closing arguments. See id. at 285 (Garzon's attorney hammered home in closing that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he was the person on the other end of the phone during the crime.). This emphasis on the law of principals by the judge, the State, and defense counsel repeatedly communicated to the jury that it could not convict one defendant based on the other defendant's actions unless the requirements of the law of principals were met. Additionally, the other instructions given at trial properly framed the use of the and/or instruction. The jury was given, for example, a multiple defendants instruction. This instruction told the jury that separate counts were charged against each defendant and that [a] finding of guilty or not guilty as to one or some of the defendants must not affect your verdict as to any other defendant or other crimes charged. This instruction clearly explained to the jury that its verdict as to one defendant should not affect its verdict as to another. It reinforced that the jury was to consider each defendant individually. Further, the verdict forms focused on one defendant and one crime each. The jury therefore had before it individualized jury forms that further reinforced the individualized consideration each defendant was to receive. Working in tandem, the instructions and verdict forms strongly emphasized to the jury that each defendant was to receive an individualized consideration. No party argued otherwise at trial, but instead, both sides argued for the proper application of the law of principals. We also note, as the Fourth District set forth in its opinion, that if the jury did in fact conclude that and/or meant that one defendant should be convicted based on the acts of the other defendant  even if the former defendant was not a principal  the acquittal of Garzon and Coles on the extortion count is anomalous. Balthazar was convicted of extortion, but Coles and Garzon were not. If the jury believed it should convict a given defendant based solely on whether a codefendant committed the elements, it logically follows that the jury would have convicted Garzon and Coles of extortion because it found Balthazar guilty. The jury did not, however; it convicted only Balthazar of extortion. The Fourth District concluded that this result demonstrate[d] that [the jury] followed the law on principals and was not misled by the `and/or' conjunction in the extortion instruction. Id. Finally, petitioners argue that we should reverse their convictions because they could have rested on an invalid legal basis, and since a general verdict was returned, we cannot know if this occurred. This Court has previously reversed general verdicts that could have rested on an invalid legal basis. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. State, 859 So.2d 486 (Fla.2003); see also Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957). However, we have not held that this possibility of jury error is fundamental error or that such a possibility attendant to use of and/or would require reversal. In light of our analysis above and the fact that the parties did not object to the instructions in the trial court, we decline to hold either today. Though we do not find fundamental error in this case, we do conclude that the use of the and/or instructions was error. We condemned the use of the phrase and/ or over seventy years ago, and we reiterate that condemnation today. Cf. Cochrane v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 107 Fla. 431, 145 So. 217, 218 (1932) (In the matter of the use of the alternative, conjunctive phrase `and/or,' it is sufficient to say that we do not hold this to be reversible error, but we take our position with that distinguished company of lawyers who have condemned its use.). There are several other alternatives that courts may use, such as  As to each of the defendants, the State must prove the following elements: first, that the defendant [engaged in the element of the crime]. (Emphasis not necessary in actual use.) Such options avoid the potential problems created by and/or.