Opinion ID: 2679782
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: substantive reasonableness of the sentences

Text: Because we remand Lee’s and Stanley’s cases for resentencing without the application of the six-level enhancement under § 3A1.2(c), the Court need not reach the issue of the substantive reasonableness of their sentences. We now turn to Ryan’s claim that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. This Court reviews the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall, 552 U.S. at 41, 128 S. Ct. at 591, 169 L.Ed.2d at 451–52. This Court considers whether the sentence was substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597, 169 L.Ed.2d at 458. The party challenging the sentence has the burden of showing that it is unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). Generally, the weight accorded to any of those factors is committed to the sound discretion of the district court, and this Court will not substitute its judgment in weighing the relevant factors. Amedeo, 487 F.3d at 832 (quotation omitted). The district court must evaluate all of the § 3553(a) factors, but it may “attach great weight to one factor over others.” United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). This Court will defer to the district court’s judgment regarding the weight to be given to the § 3553(a) factors unless the district court has made “a clear error of judgment” and has imposed “a sentence that lies outside the range of 17 Case: 12-16540 Date Filed: 06/20/2014 Page: 18 of 24 reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293, 1297–98 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). A district court making an upward variance must have a justification compelling enough to support the degree of the variance and complete enough to allow meaningful appellate review, and this Court will vacate such a sentence only if “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence [] outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Shaw, 560 F.3d at 1238). The district court may consider facts that were taken into account when formulating the guideline range for the sake of a variance. United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Early, 686 F.3d at 1223. A sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty is an indicator of a reasonable sentence. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). In sum, “a district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189 (quoting United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1174 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). 18 Case: 12-16540 Date Filed: 06/20/2014 Page: 19 of 24 Ryan argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable on three grounds. First, he contends that the district court did not provide sufficient justification for the extensive upward variance. He claims that he was not in immediate flight from the bank robbery when he was caught and that he did not put anyone at risk of bodily harm because there was no evidence that (1) he brandished or discharged a firearm in Colorado, or (2) other people were on the road during the high-speed chase. He further claims that he did not have as extensive a criminal history as defendants in other cases where the district court had varied upward to a significant degree. Second, Ryan asserts that the district court placed undue weight on his criminal history, as compared to other relevant factors. Ryan emphasizes that most of his convictions occurred when he was 18 or younger, were low-culpability offenses, and that his criminal history should not have been the basis of an upward variance because the guidelines adequately accounted for his criminal history. Additionally, he claims the district court should have considered the abuse that Ryan suffered from his stepfather, which affected his mental health and his use of substances from a very young age. Third, Ryan asserts that the district court’s significant upward variance created unwarranted disparities with a similarly situated defendant in another 19 Case: 12-16540 Date Filed: 06/20/2014 Page: 20 of 24 criminal case citing an unpublished opinion of this Court: United States v. Sihwail, 506 F. App’x 955, 956 (11th Cir. 2013). Ryan has not met his burden of showing that his sentence was unreasonable in light of the record and § 3553(a). See Tome, 611 F.3d at 1378. His total sentence of 428 months’ imprisonment, although a significant upward variance from the top of his guideline range, was well below the possible total sentence of life imprisonment, as the district court noted, and his sentences for each count were also below the respective statutory maximums. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (providing for maximum sentence of life in prison), 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (providing 25-year maximum prison sentence). The district court’s stated reasons were compelling enough to justify the significant upward variance and complete enough to allow meaningful review. See Early, 686 F.3d at 1221–22. In discussing the seriousness of the offense and the need to promote respect for the law, the district court expressed particular concern about the number and type of firearms in the robbery and the number of officers and civilians put at risk of death or serious injury during the course of Ryan’s flight in Colorado. The district court also described this as a “crazy, dangerous thing to do” and stated in its opinion that “it was a miracle that nobody was killed.” From the pre-sentence investigation report (PSI), the district court knew that Ryan and his codefendants brandished guns in the bank, that those weapons 20 Case: 12-16540 Date Filed: 06/20/2014 Page: 21 of 24 included an AK-47 assault rifle, and that his codefendants fired shots. The chase in Colorado occurred shortly after 9:00 AM on a weekday and went on for over 20 miles on an interstate highway. Ryan drove erratically, reached speeds of up to 125 miles per hour, passed other cars on the shoulder, and sped through a construction zone. Additionally, multiple shots were fired at the pursuing officers. Under these circumstances, the district court’s reasons sufficiently justified its significant upward variance. See id. Other factors that the district court knew of, which are part of the totality of the circumstances, also justified the significant upward variance. Even before the bank robbery, Ryan and his codefendants had fled from a Florida police officer, and Dylan had shot ten rounds into that officer’s car. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). The district court’s concern for protecting the public also contributed to its decision to vary upward, and the record shows that its concern was well-founded. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). Ryan was on probation for a sex offense involving a minor when he committed the offenses at issue on appeal, and, before setting out for Florida, he disabled his ankle monitor. On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a significant upward variance. See Early, 686 F.3d at 1221. The record does not support Ryan’s argument that the district court placed undue weight on his criminal history. Nothing in the district court’s explanation at 21 Case: 12-16540 Date Filed: 06/20/2014 Page: 22 of 24 the sentencing hearing shows that it believed Ryan’s criminal history, or any particular event in his history, was a primary basis for the upward variance. Rather, the district court focused on the number and type of firearms involved in the offense and the number of people put at risk by Ryan’s and his codefendants’ conduct. Accordingly, Ryan’s argument is unavailing. To the extent Ryan objects to the factual basis for any of the convictions used to make up his criminal history, he is barred from raising those arguments on appeal as he did not object to those facts at sentencing. See United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006). Likewise, he is barred from arguing that there were no other cars on the road in Colorado because the PSI states that he passed other cars on the shoulder during the chase, and he did not object to that fact. Id. To the extent he attempts to argue that the district court miscalculated his criminal history, his waiver of any dispute as to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence bars such an argument. Additionally, although Ryan asserts that the district court should have considered the childhood abuse that he suffered, the district court expressly stated that Defendants’ traumatic childhood did not explain or excuse their conduct here. Ryan’s sentence was substantively reasonable. The court stated that it had considered the § 3553 factors, specifically mentioning Ryan’s history, and characteristics, nature, and circumstances of the offense. See Amedeo, 487 F.3d at 832. It sentenced Ryan to 228 months for Count One, six years less than the 25- 22 Case: 12-16540 Date Filed: 06/20/2014 Page: 23 of 24 year maximum, and 200 months for Count Two—well below the maximum sentence of life. This is indicative of a reasonable sentence. See Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. Finally, Ryan’s argument concerning unwarranted sentencing disparities is unpersuasive. “A well-founded claim of disparity [between sentences] assumes that apples are being compared to apples.” United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Ryan does not argue that there was any unwarranted disparity between himself and his codefendants, but rather focuses on another defendant in an unpublished case that involved bank robbery. But because the case on which he relies, Sihwail, 506 F. App’x 955, was an unpublished decision, it does not bind this Court. See 11th Cir. R. 36-2. And, in any event, that case does not persuasively support Ryan’s argument because (1) it did not involve the discharge of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), and (2) in that case, this Court affirmed the district court’s imposition of a 230-month sentence, which was double the defendant’s highest possible guideline sentence. Ryan’s sentence of 428 months is less than double the highest possible guideline sentence he was facing. Accordingly, Ryan has not shown that his 428-month sentence created any unwarranted sentencing disparities. 23 Case: 12-16540 Date Filed: 06/20/2014 Page: 24 of 24