Opinion ID: 1631791
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Transfer from circuit court to chancery court.

Text: ¶ 17. The Circuit Court of Smith County transferred the Georgia-Pacific Actions to the Smith County Chancery Court. Once in the chancery court, the Georgia-Pacific Actions and the Resin Action were consolidated for trial purposes by the chancery court. Later, this Court granted Georgia-Pacific's request for en banc consideration on its petition for interlocutory appeal. This Court granted the interlocutory appeal and consolidated all six cases, the three Georgia-Pacific Actions and the three Resin Actions for the interlocutory appeal as there was no practical way to sever the cases because of the consolidation. ¶ 18. Georgia-Pacific argues that the chancery court does not have jurisdiction to hear the cases. From the beginning, Georgia-Pacific claims that this case has been based on monetary damages and that injunctive relief was requested only after the trial court transferred the Georgia-Pacific Actions to chancery court. As for the Resin Actions, Georgia-Pacific argues that the Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages based on common law theories. Further, Georgia-Pacific argues that the transfer of the Georgia-Pacific Actions to the chancery court would not promote a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the issues. ¶ 19. The Plaintiffs argue that the trial judge's ruling that the cost of restoration would be limited to the value of the property and is consistent with Chevron. However, the Plaintiffs claim that there is another element of damages, that being the cost of closure of the site. The MDEQ considered a property owner a responsible party for closure. Faced with the issue of closure in the case sub judice, the Plaintiffs contend that Chevron interjected an element of equity and that in the interest of efficiency and economy the Georgia-Pacific Actions should be transferred to chancery court. ¶ 20. Jurisdiction is a question of law, and this Court reviews questions of law de novo. Burnette v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 770 So.2d 948, 951 (Miss. 2000). See also Rogers v. Eaves, 812 So.2d 208, 211 (Miss.2002). The Mississippi Constitution of 1890 Art. 6, § 159 sets the jurisdictional parameters of the chancery court and states: The chancery court shall have full jurisdiction in the following matters and cases, viz.: (a) All matters in equity; (b) Divorce and alimony; (c) Matters testamentary and of administration; (d) Minor's business; (e) Cases of idiocy, lunacy, and persons of unsound mind; (f) All cases of which the said court had jurisdiction under the laws in force when this Constitution is put in operation. (emphasis added). Miss.Code Ann. § 9-5-81 (Rev.2002) also provides jurisdiction to the chancery court and states: The chancery court in addition to the full jurisdiction in all the matters and cases expressly conferred upon it by the constitution shall have jurisdiction of all cases transferred to it by the circuit court or remanded to it by the supreme court; and such further jurisdiction, as is, in this chapter or elsewhere, provided by law. In contrast, the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, Article 6, § 156 provides that [t]he circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal in this state not vested by this Constitution in some other court, and such appellate jurisdiction as shall be prescribed by law. Miss. Const. of 1890 art. 6, § 156. Therefore, while chancery courts have jurisdiction of all matters in equity, circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction. Lawrence County Sch. Dist. v. Brister, 823 So.2d 459, 460 (Miss.2001). This Court has addressed the issue of when there is a conflict over whether an action is legal or equitable in nature. In Burnette, this Court stated: We have indicated that, if some doubt exists as to whether a complaint is legal or equitable in nature, that case is better tried in circuit court. Southern Leisure, 742 So.2d at 1090. In McDonald's Corp. v. Robinson Indus., Inc., 592 So.2d 927, 934 (Miss.1991), we stated that [i]t is more appropriate for a circuit court to hear equity claims than it is for a chancery court to hear actions at law since circuit courts have general jurisdiction but chancery courts enjoy only limited jurisdiction. Burnette, 770 So.2d at 952. This Court has held that the trial courts are to look to the substance of the claim rather than the form of the case. Trustmark Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 865 So.2d 1148, 1151 (Miss.2004). See also Brister, 823 So.2d at 460 (citing McLean v. Green, 352 So.2d 1312, 1314 (Miss.1977))(Negligence actions should be brought in circuit court. When a plaintiff's complaint neither requests nor requires equitable relief, a chancery court should not exercise jurisdiction); Southern Leisure Homes, Inc. v. Hardin, 742 So.2d 1088 (Miss. 1999)(breach of contract claim is best heard in circuit court and that the remedy of punitive damages is clearly legal rather than equitable in nature). ¶ 21. Indeed, M.R.C.P. 1 provides that the aim of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure is to govern procedure in the circuit courts, chancery courts, and county courts in all suits of a civil nature, whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity . . . and that [t]hese rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. ¶ 22. Here, the Plaintiffs filed the Georgia-Pacific Actions in the Circuit Court of Smith County in 1997 and 1998. After nearly five years of litigation and the Chevron ruling by this Court, the Plaintiffs requested that the actions be transferred to the Chancery Court of Smith County. The substance of the claims in the complaint was legal, not equitable. Only after this Court decided Chevron and the trial court transferred the Georgia-Pacific Actions to chancery court did the Plaintiffs add an equitable claim for abatement. ¶ 23. The circuit court ordered the transfer to chancery court citing the transfer as being in the interest of equity, efficiency and economy of justice. However, this Court finds that the Georgia-Pacific Actions were in the circuit court for about five years before the transfer to chancery court. The circuit court therefore, is quite familiar with all the issues of the case, most of which are legal in nature. When this Court granted Georgia-Pacific's request for en banc consideration for the petition for interlocutory appeal, we consolidated all six cases, those being the three Georgia-Pacific Actions, originally filed in circuit court, and the three Resin Actions, originally filed in chancery court. Accordingly, the three Georgia-Pacific Actions are remanded to the Smith County Chancery Court and shall be promptly retransferred to the Smith County Circuit Court. The three Resin Actions shall remain in the Smith County Chancery Court.