Opinion ID: 2444991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Connecticut and Federal Case Law

Text: We also agree with the state that contemporary federal case law governing the police conduct during routine traffic stops; see parts II A and B of this opinion; similarly does not support the defendant's interpretation of the state constitution. [41] With respect to Connecticut case law, although we have in the past interpreted article first, § 7, to [afford] protections to the citizens of this state beyond those provided by the fourth amendment to the federal constitution, as that provision has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court; [42] State v. Wilkins, 240 Conn. 489, 505, 692 A.2d 1233 (1997); we also have concluded that [a]pplications of Terry principles in the context of motor vehicle stops are already embodied in our state constitution. Id., at 508-509, 692 A.2d 1233. Thus, in Wilkins, we determined, in accordance with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), that the state constitution permitted police officers, with reasonable and articulable suspicion that a suspect is potentially dangerous, to conduct a limited protective search of a motor vehicle for weapons during a routine traffic stop. State v. Wilkins, supra, at 509-11, 692 A.2d 1233; see also id., at 501, 504, 692 A.2d 1233 (officer acted reasonably under state constitution by separating vehicle occupants and detaining suspect in cruiser until backup arrived to allow patdowns to be conducted safely); State v. Dukes, supra, 209 Conn. at 122, 547 A.2d 10 (following Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra, 434 U.S. at 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, and concluding that state constitution permits police officer to require motorist to exit vehicle during routine traffic stop); accord State v. Mikolinski, 256 Conn. 543, 554, 775 A.2d 274 (2001) (sobriety checkpoints operated pursuant to neutral criteria are permissible under article first, § 7); State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990) (concluding that article first, § 9, is due process provision that does not preclude Terry stops or other detentions not founded upon probable cause). Moreover, the defendant has not identified any on point Connecticut case law interpreting the federal constitution that conflicts with the federal constitutional principles recently articulated in Arizona v. Johnson, supra, 129 S.Ct. 781, and Muehler v. Mena, supra, 544 U.S. 93, 125 S.Ct. 1465. [43] Cf. State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 647-52, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992) (rejecting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 [1991], and instead adhering to Connecticut precedents defining seizure as whether reasonable person would have felt free to leave due to restraint of movement by physical force or show of authority). We therefore agree with the state that Connecticut case law does not support the defendant's arguments in support of a more comprehensive state constitutional rule. [44]