Opinion ID: 765770
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Authority Over the PTO

Text: 42 The plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred in determining that it lacked statutory authority to order the PTO to reject applications for the St. Louis Rams mark. At trial, each party requested that the district court order the PTO to reject the other party's St. Louis Rams application. The defendants argued that 15 U.S.C. sec. 1119 provides the trial court with the necessary power to do so. Section 1119 provides that [i]n any action involving a registered mark the court may determine the right . . . to the registrations of any party to the action. 43 On appeal, the defendants now contend that the trial court properly determined that it lacked statutory authority. On the other hand, Blastoff seems to challenge the trial court's determination that it lacked statutory authority to order the PTO, but provides no factual or legal support. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(9)(A) provides that all arguments on appeal must be supported by citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies. This Court has previously refused to consider unsupported or cursory arguments, see United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991), and we refuse to make any exceptions in this case. Because the plaintiff has failed to adequately challenge this issue on appeal, we need not reach a conclusion concerning the trial court's authority to order the PTO to reject trademark applications.