Opinion ID: 1951278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Culpability of the Defaulting Parties' Conduct

Text: In their motion to set aside the default judgment, the petitioners acknowledged that they had negligently failed to protect their interest and to inquire as to the status of the case, but they asserted that there was no evidence whatsoever indicating that their negligent actions were undertaken in bad faith or willfully. Rather, the petitioners asserted that the papers initiating the action had been sent by Nichols to Family Dollar's home office, but that those papers were somehow lost or misplaced or never received by the home office. The petitioners pointed to the fact, as corroboration of their contention that they had failed to answer the complaint only through negligence, that as soon as their home office received notice of the action and the default judgment, they immediately contacted an attorney and their motion to set aside the default judgment was filed. In response, the respondents assert in this Court, as they did in the trial court, that [r]ather than being diligent in this matter the petitioners chose to ignore the complaint, arguing that [t]here is no indication in the motion or affidavit that copies of the summons and complaint were returned to Nichols or Family Dollar for lack of personal service. We presume they are referring to the fact that the copies of those materials Nichols sent to the home office were not returned for any reason; Nichols and Family Dollar have not challenged the validity of the personal service effected upon them. The respondents further argue to this Court that the facts contradict the petitioners' assertion that they did not know that the claim had been filed against them, pointing to the five separate occasions ... the respondents' previous attorney wrote letters ... to the petitioners apprising them of this matter; they ignored those communications. As noted, the last of the letters written by the respondents' counsel was sent November 19, 2002, approximately 16 months before the action was filed. To warrant a refusal to set aside a default judgment, the defaulting party's actions must constitute willful conduct or conduct committed in bad faith, because `[n]egligence by itself is insufficient.' [ Kirtland, 524 So.2d at 607.] Bad faith or willfulness is identified by `incessant and flagrant disregard for court rules, deliberate and knowing disregard for judicial authority, or intentional nonresponsiveness.' Id. at 608. Ex parte Gilliam, 720 So.2d at 906. The materials submitted by the parties in this case contain no facts suggesting that the petitioners acted willfully or in bad faith in omitting to respond to the complaint served upon them; to the contrary, although they were clearly initially negligent, they exhibited no intentional nonresponsiveness and they acted in a timely fashion once they became aware of the default judgment.