Opinion ID: 161480
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleging a violation of federal law

Text: 9 We must next determine whether the plaintiffs have alleged a non-frivolous claim for relief that does not merely allege a violation of federal law solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction. Id. at 610 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although this question may rest on the later decision on the merits, we have characterized the two steps as separate, distinct inquires. Id. As the Supreme Court has recognized, a state official must act in violation of federal law and therefore outside any delegated authority in order for plaintiffs to avoid dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1949), cited in Elephant Butte, 160 F.3d at 610. The question of whether state officials violated federal law therefore affects both the initial immunity inquiry and the court's ultimate decision on the merits. Id. at 690 & n.10. At the immunity stage, however, federal courts apply the limited jurisdictional standard used to assess whether a claim sufficiently confers subject matter jurisdiction, asking only whether the claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous, rather than reaching the legal merits of the claim. Id. 10 Applying this standard, we conclude that the plaintiffs' claims are not wholly insubstantial and frivolous. Although the defendants argue that 1396a(a)(8) fails to create a binding obligation on the state, the language of the statute and implementing regulations discourages the dismissal of the plaintiffs' statutory claim as frivolous. As in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498 (1990), the statute and implementing regulations at issue here are at least arguably specific enough to create a binding obligation. See id. at 519-20; see also Sutter v. Artist, 503 U.S. 347, 359 (1992) (noting the Court in Wilder relied in part on the fact that the statute and regulations set forth in some detail the relevant factors). Under 1396a(a)(8), the state must facilitate applications for medical assistance and shall furnish such assistance with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals. 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(8). In addition, the regulations require that states adopt time limits within certain parameters for determining eligibility. 42 C.F.R. 435.911. Given such specific language, the claim that the statute creates a binding obligation on the states is not frivolous. 11 Although the defendants do not raise the argument, we note the more difficult question for resolution on the merits is whether 1396a(a)(8) creates a federal right directly benefitting the plaintiffs in this case. In order to create a federal right, the statute must reflect Congress's clear intent to benefit directly the particular plaintiffs in this case. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 344-45 (1997). This question turns on whether the plaintiffs may be included as eligible individuals under 1396a(a)(8). Whether eligible means eligible for Medicaid or eligible for both Medicaid and waiver services is not entirely clear. But because construing this language involves a more complicated analysis of the Medicaid statutes, the inquiry is more appropriately reserved for resolution on the merits of the case. In light of the statute's ambiguity, the plaintiffs have at least alleged a non-frivolous claim. 12 Finally, although the plaintiffs allege a deprivation of both substantive and procedural due process rights, we note their argument essentially alleges only a deprivation of procedural due process. They argue that state officials have failed to process their applications for waiver services in the manner required by federal law; they do not, quite wisely, argue that the Medicaid statutes create a substantive property interest in waiver services to which they are entitled. Again, although we will not decide the merits, we do conclude that the plaintiffs' procedural due process claim survives the Ex parte Young inquiry because it is not wholly insubstantial or frivolous. In fact, a determination of whether the plaintiffs' procedural due process rights have been violated depends on the resolution of the plaintiffs' statutory claimwhether the Medicaid statutes actually create a federal statutory right to the reasonably prompt provision of services. 13