Opinion ID: 217720
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Certification of Scope of Employment under the Westfall Act

Text: Neither party appealed the district court's denial of Mr. Garrick's motion for certification. The district court correctly noted that both the Westfall certification and summary judgment motions depend on the same issue-whether Mr. Garrick was acting within the scope of his employment under Colorado law. See Fowler, 2009 WL 5217980, at . As we have already explained, the FTCA waives the United States's sovereign immunity for tort actions arising from a negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). In effect, this waiver enables tort plaintiffs to bring actions against the federal government under a theory of respondeat superior. Wood v. United States, 995 F.2d 1122, 1125 (1st Cir.1993) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Osborn, 549 U.S. at 247-52, 127 S.Ct. 881. The Westfall Act, on the other hand, create[s] a type of respondeat superior immunity for federal employees that roughly tracks the federal government's respondeat superior liability. Id. Through certification, the United States is substituted as the defendant in place of the defendant-employee who was acting within the scope of his office or employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)-(4). Under the Westfall Act, a court must identify and resolve any disputed issues of fact regarding the employee's scope of employment. Arthur v. United States, 45 F.3d 292, 296 (9th Cir.1995). If there are disputed issues of fact, the district court should hold such hearings as appropriate (including an evidentiary hearing if necessary), and make the findings necessary to decide the Westfall certification question. Id. The court here made no such express findings of fact, and relied on its summary judgment analysis as the basis for denying Mr. Garrick's motion for certification. It declared that if summary judgment for the United States is warranted here, Garrick will have failed to meet his burden of proof [for certification under the Westfall Act]. Fowler, 2009 WL 5217980, at . It also recognized that under Colorado law, the question of whether an employee is acting within the scope of the employment is a question of fact, id. at  (quoting Raleigh, 130 P.3d at 1019) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court then concluded its discussion by stating, [H]ere, there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the United States is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that Garrick was acting outside the scope of his employment when he drove back to the hotel during a break. Id. Accordingly, it granted the United States's motion, dismissed the United States as a defendant, and denied Mr. Garrick's motion without further analysis. See id. The United States contends the district court's determination under the Westfall Act that Mr. Garrick was acting outside the scope of his employment precludes it from being sued in federal court because, under the FTCA, the United States can only be sued for claims involving employees acting within the scope of their federal employment. Because no one appealed the Westfall determination, it argues, this court is without jurisdiction to consider Mr. Fowler's appeal of the district court's similar determination under the FTCA. Its claim is without merit. The United States is incorrect in its apparent assumption that the district court's Westfall determination dismissed the United States from this action. It did nothing of the sort. As already explained, the purpose and effect of the Westfall Act is to protect federal employees, not the federal government. The effect of the district court's Westfall determination was to deny Mr. Garrick's request for immunity, not to dismiss the United States from this action. Because the United States remains a party to this litigation, our review of the district court's grant of summary judgment is not moot. A case is moot when it is impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party. In re Overland Park Fin. Corp., 236 F.3d 1246, 1254 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12, 113 S.Ct. 447, 121 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A live controversy continues to exist in this case, however, because our reversal of summary judgment permits Mr. Fowler to pursue his tort action against the United States. For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court's determination that Mr. Garrick was not acting within the scope of his employment for purposes of the FTCA and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [8]