Opinion ID: 2575291
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Change of venue motions

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erroneously denied his two motions for change of venue [7] in violation of his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We disagree.
On July 17, 1989, two years before trial, defendant filed a motion for a change of venue. At the hearing on the motion, held before Judge John Flaherty, defendant produced expert testimony, newspaper articles, and television news reports. On August 21, 1989, the trial court denied the motion without prejudice to its renewal after voir dire. The trial court expressed the view that this is an extremely close case, and stated that its decision to deny the motion was based in part on the applicability of the Hovey voir dire.... I'm satisfied that by the use of that ... extensive voir dire procedure, that the defendant here can receive a fair trial in this county. (See Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1 [168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301].) Almost two years later, on June 13, 1991, after jury voir dire, defendant filed a second motion for a change of venue. The hearing on the second motion was held before Judge Joseph Biafore, the trial judge, on June 26, 1991, the day before the parties were scheduled to exercise peremptory challenges. The court considered the moving papers, the hearing transcript, and the exhibits from the first motion for a change of venue, as well as written and oral arguments and additional exhibits, including newspaper articles, television news reports, and summaries of voir dire responses, received prior to and at the hearing on the second motion for a change of venue. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court announced it would defer ruling on the motion until 12 jurors were chosen, to allow the court to take a good hard look at those particular people seated in terms of analyzing whether or not the Defendant would, in fact, receive a fair trial from those persons. Following the selection of 12 jurors, but before they were sworn and before alternates were selected, the court heard further argument, and then denied the motion. The court found that the gravity of the offense, and the nature and extent of the publicity, weighed in favor of granting the motion, but also noted that during voir dire, prospective jurors indicated there was a spate of media exposure, followed by a decline in news reports. [M]any of them indicated there was actually nothing they heard about this case until the time for jury selection.... [I]n the intervening time, there was not a great mass of media exposure. This case did not generate the type of hysteria that counsel for the defense was talking about. The court also found that the status of the victims and defendant, who were not well known in the community, weighed against granting the motion. The most salient factor, the court found, was the size of the community. The population of Santa Clara County was large, approaching 1.5 million persons. With respect to the jurors selected, the court had no doubt that these people will follow the law as instructed by the court. The jurors exhibited to the court that they can set aside whatever opinions, impressions that they may have derived from the media and judge ... this case fairly and squarely on the evidence presented in this courtroom. The court found no reasonable likelihood defendant could not receive a fair trial in this community.
A trial court must order a change of venue for trial of a criminal case to another county on motion of the defendant `when it appears that there is a reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be held in the county.' (§ 1033, subd. (a).) ( People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1250 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645].) We consider the correctness of the trial court's ruling at the time it was made. ( People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1127 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 297, 163 P.3d 4] ( Zambrano ), disapproved on different grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 198 P.3d 11] ( Doolin ).) `We will sustain the court's determination of the relevant facts where supported by substantial evidence. We independently review the court's ultimate determination of the reasonable likelihood of an unfair trial.' ( People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 598 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683] ( Hart ).) Both the trial court's initial venue determination and our independent evaluation are based on a consideration of five factors: `(1) nature and gravity of the offense; (2) nature and extent of the media coverage; (3) size of the community; (4) community status of the defendant; and (5) prominence of the victim.' ( People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1394 [58 Cal.Rptr.3d 368, 157 P.3d 973] ( Leonard ).) On appeal, a defendant challenging a trial court's denial of a motion for change of venue must show both error and prejudice: that is, that at the time of the motion it was reasonably likely that a fair trial could not be had in the county, and that it was reasonably likely that a fair trial was not had. [Citations.] ( People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 578 [94 Cal.Rptr.3d 322, 208 P.3d 78].) We begin with defendant's initial motion, which was made before jury voir dire took place. The first factor of the analysisthe nature and gravity of the offenseweighed in favor of a change of venue for the trial of these seven senseless murders. The same could be said, however, of most capital crimes, and we have concluded that this factor is not dispositive. ( People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 506 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420]; People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 224 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643].) Indeed, on numerous occasions we have upheld the denial of change of venue motions in cases involving multiple murders. (See, e.g., Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 1395, 1397 [six counts of murder]; People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 407, 434-435 [46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 139 P.3d 64] ( Ramirez ) [13 counts of murder]; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 721, 744-745 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754] [six counts of murder].) We next consider the nature and extent of the media coverage, the factor upon which defendant primarily relies. Defendant presented evidence of numerous newspaper articles and television news stories that discussed or mentioned the events, including film of persons being rescued from the ESL building during the siege, pictures of an injured Laura Black, and segments of defendant's recorded statements to Lieutenant Grijalva. He complains that some reports portrayed him as having committed various criminal acts rather than referring to him as a suspect or as an alleged criminal. He also complains that the media consistently portrayed [him] as an obsessed, dangerous man. The media coverage, which decreased over time, was largely factual. (See Murphy v. Florida (1975) 421 U.S. 794, 800, fn. 4 [44 L.Ed.2d 589, 95 S.Ct. 2031] [the court has distinguished largely factual publicity from that which is invidious or inflammatory]; id. at p. 802; Beck v. Washington (1962) 369 U.S. 541, 556 [8 L.Ed.2d 98, 82 S.Ct. 955] [the court noted that [e]ven the occasional front-page items were straight news stories rather than invidious articles which would tend to arouse ill will and vindictiveness]; Hart, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 599 [noting that the trial court found the reporting to be neutral, not inflammatory, and insufficient to sway public opinion].) Even in a case in which the trial court described the media coverage as `saturation,'  we found no error in the denial of a motion for a change of venue, noting, among other factors, that the defendant did not show that the media coverage was unfair or slanted against him or revealed incriminating facts that were not introduced at trial. ( Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 434-435.) (1) Defendant asserts, however, that even noninflammatory journalism may warrant a change of venue if the facts are sensational. We have acknowledged that press coverage need not be inflammatory to justify a change of venue ( People v. Tidwell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 62, 69-70 [89 Cal.Rptr. 44, 473 P.2d 748]), but the cases upon which defendant relies involved additional factors that weighed in favor of a change of venue. In Tidwell, two of the victims were prominent members of a small community, the defendants were strangers to that community, and some of the jurors selected to serve knew one or more of the victims or witnesses. ( Id. at pp. 64-65, 67, 69-75.) Similarly, the change of venue ordered in Corona v. Superior Court (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 872 [101 Cal.Rptr. 411], was motivated by a concern that jurors in a small community, in which the defendant was charged with the murder of 25 migratory farm workers, would be vulnerable to claims of insensitivity toward migratory farm workers, and conscious of the community's reputation for peace and security ( id. at pp. 875-876, 883). As explained below, such circumstances were absent in the present case. The remaining three factorsthe size of the community, and the status of defendant and of his victims in the communityweighed against a change of venue. Santa Clara County, with a population of almost 1.5 million persons, was a large community. ( People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 523 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035] [noting that Santa Clara County in 1988 was the fourth most populous county in the state].) Neither defendant nor his victims were prominent members of this community. Contrary to defendant's contention, the circumstance that defendant, his victims, and many qualified jurors worked in the high tech industry did not affect the status of the participants for purposes of the change of venue motion; the terror engendered by defendant's attack stemmed not from its occurrence in a technology company, but from the circumstance that it happened in the middle of the workday in an office setting. Some degree of juror identification with the victims would occur in any venue. (See People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 515 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 779, 862 P.2d 779] [Any sympathetic features of the case would be apparent wherever it was tried.].) For the same reason, defendant's contention that jurors would perceive him as a `changeling,' who had turned on and murdered his own kind, does not establish that a change of venue was warranted. For these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying defendant's first motion for a change of venue. As noted above, the court deferred its ruling on defendant's second motion for a change of venue until after jury selection. (See Maine v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 375, 380 [66 Cal.Rptr. 724, 438 P.2d 372] [it has long been the practice to permit the trial court to defer its final ruling on a motion for a change of venue until the jury is empaneled].) By this point in the proceedings, the trial court had heard on voir dire from the jurors selected that they would decide the case based solely upon the evidence and argument presented in court, and the trial court expressly credited those assertions. (See Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1396 [jurors selected to try this case bear out the trial court's conclusion that an unbiased jury could be found].) In addition, none of the sitting jurors or alternates had been challenged for cause. ( Beck v. Washington, supra, 369 U.S. at pp. 557-558 [the circumstance that the defendant did not challenge for cause any of the jurors selected is strong evidence that he was convinced the jurors were not biased].) Nor did defendant exhaust his peremptory challenges, thus indicating that `the jurors were fair, and that the defense itself so concluded.' ( People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 448 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790]; see also Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1127-1128 [the court cited the circumstance that the defendant did not challenge any of the sitting jurors for cause or exhaust available peremptory challenges, in support of its conclusion that hindsight demonstrated that retention of the case did not produce an unfair trial].) [8] Defendant relies upon the circumstance that numerous jurors were excused for bias against the defense. [9] The number of excusals may have been more than would occur in an ordinary criminal trial, but it by no means suggests a community with sentiment so poisoned against [the defendant] as to impeach the indifference of jurors who displayed no animus of their own. ( Murphy v. Florida, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 803.) (2) Defendant also relies upon the circumstance that three years after his commission of the crimes, many prospective jurors still had a recollection of the murders. The relevant question is not whether the community remembered the case, but whether the jurors at [the defendant's] trial had such fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt of the defendant. ( Patton v. Yount (1984) 467 U.S. 1025, 1035 [81 L.Ed.2d 847, 104 S.Ct. 2885]; see Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 434-435 [Although only one member of the jury indicated ... he never had heard of the case, they all stated they had not `formed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of [the defendant] ...' and could be fair.].) We must distinguish between mere familiarity with [the defendant] or his past and an actual predisposition against him. ( Murphy v. Florida, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 800, fn. 4.) Defendant asserts without citation to the record that four jurors believed he was guilty, but our review of the voir dire indicates all jurors demonstrated a willingness to set aside any preconceived notions and make their decision solely upon the evidence presented. (See Beck v. Washington, supra, 369 U.S. at p. 557 [`It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.'].) (3) Defendant further contends, however, that jurors' assertions that they could be impartial should not be credited. In exceptional cases, `adverse pretrial publicity can create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the jurors' claims that they can be impartial should not be believed, [citation] ....' [Citation.] `The category of cases where prejudice has been presumed in the face of juror attestation to the contrary is extremely narrow. Indeed, the few cases in which the [high] Court has presumed prejudice can only be termed extraordinary, [citation], and it is well-settled that pretrial publicity itselfeven pervasive, adverse publicitydoes not inevitably lead to an unfair trial [citation].' [Citation.] This prejudice is presumed only in extraordinary casesnot in every case in which pervasive publicity has reached most members of the venire. ( People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1216 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543, 156 P.3d 1015] ( Prince ).) In Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th 1179, we reviewed some of the extraordinary cases in which the high court has presumed prejudice from pretrial publicity. In one case ... the critical feature was that a local television station in a relatively small community on several occasions broadcast the entire spectacle of the defendant's jailhouse confession. [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 1217.) In a second case, `[t]he trial ... had been conducted in a circus atmosphere, due in large part to the intrusions of the press, which was allowed to sit within the bar of the court and to overrun it with television equipment. Similarly, [in a third case, prejudice] arose from a trial infected not only by a background of extremely inflammatory publicity but also by a courthouse given over to accommodate the public appetite for carnival. The proceedings in these cases were entirely lacking in the solemnity and sobriety to which a defendant is entitled in a system that subscribes to any notion of fairness and rejects the verdict of a mob. They cannot be made to stand for the proposition that juror exposure to ... news accounts of the crime with which he is charged alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due process.' [Citation.] The reviewing court instead must look for `indications in the totality of the circumstances that [the defendant's] trial was not fundamentally fair.' [Citation.] ( Id. at pp. 1217-1218.) The present case does not fall within the limited class of cases in which prejudice would be presumed under the United States Constitution. ( Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1217.) The publicity adduced at the second change of venue motion, as at the first, was largely factual and noninflammatory. Nor is there evidence in the record that the jury selection process lacked solemnity. ( Murphy v. Florida, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 799.) Moreover, the seated jurors, who were questioned on voir dire individually, either recalled nothing of the case or remembered few details. The trial court, which observed the jurors' demeanor, expressly found they had demonstrated an ability to set aside any preconceived impressions derived from the media. Thus, no extraordinary circumstances are presented. We conclude the trial court did not err in denying the second motion for change of venue.