Opinion ID: 725072
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: application of the barker

Text: FRAMEWORK 15 In determining whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated, an appeals court reviews questions of law de novo and questions of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. Clark, 83 F.3d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir.1996). The standard for evaluating cases of appellate delay is the same. Notwithstanding a substantial delay and some singular misfortune for Smith, application of the modified Barker framework to the instant case reveals that there was no constitutional violation.
16 The length-of-delay factor is actually a double enquiry. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2690, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). First, the length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism, and unless there is a period of delay that appears, on its face, to be unreasonable under the circumstances, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. Second, if the constitutional inquiry has been triggered, the length of delay is itself balanced with the other factors and may, in extreme circumstances, give rise to a strong presumption of evidentiary prejudice affecting the fourth Barker factor. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655-57, 112 S.Ct. at 2692-94. 17 Barker instructs that the length of delay that will provoke [a constitutional] inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case, 407 U.S. at 530-31, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, although the Supreme Court in Doggett has also observed that courts have generally found trial delays approaching a year or more to be enough to trigger the Barker analysis. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. at 2691 n. 1. Appellate delays are yet another matter, and most courts evaluating such delay have continued to apply the first factor on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., United States v. Mohawk, 20 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir.1994) (ten-year delay is 'extreme' by any reckoning); Simmons v. Reynolds, 898 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir.1990) (six years was clearly excessive); United States v. Johnson, 732 F.2d 379, 382 (4th Cir.) (two-year delay is in the range of magnitude for triggering inquiry), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1033, 105 S.Ct. 505, 83 L.Ed.2d 396 (1984). The Tenth Circuit, though, has taken the bold approach, holding that a two-year appellate delay will create a rebuttable presumption that the constitutional threshold has been crossed. See Harris, 15 F.3d at 1559-60. Although following the Tenth Circuit would create a clear benchmark for courts in this circuit, we find it unnecessary to do so at this time. The government concedes that the three-year delay in Smith's case was sufficient to trigger further inquiry, and we agree. 18 As for the weight to be assigned to the appellate delay, we should note that three years, while unusual and unfortunate, is still shorter than some of the more egregious documented instances. In Muwwakkil v. Hoke, 968 F.2d 284 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1024, 113 S.Ct. 664, 121 L.Ed.2d 589 (1992), the appellate delay lasted thirteen years; in Mohawk, it was ten years; in Simmons, it was six. Although the delay here was certainly significant, we must look further into the reasons for such delay, the next Barker criterion.
19 The government puts forth a rather unassailable reason for the delay: to allow the appellate panel to have waited for the more authoritative decisions of the en banc Sixth Circuit and then the Supreme Court. As explained in Barker, different weights should be assigned to different reasons: 20 A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay. 21 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192 (citation omitted). Following these guidelines, we hold that the court's deferral of action while a more authoritative decision was pending counts as a valid reason justifying appropriate delay, and we conclude that the amount of delay in this case was appropriate. Certainly, it was prudent for the prior panel to postpone its decision until the en banc court and Supreme Court had ruled. By the time Smith's case was argued, on November 10, 1992, the Sixth Circuit had already granted rehearing en banc in McGlocklin (on July 21). Then, by the time the prior panel issued its original, December 7, 1993 order in this case, two and a half months after the decision in McGlocklin, the Supreme Court had already granted certiorari in Custis. Although these successive deferrals combined to create a period of almost three years between the government's notice of appeal and the Sixth Circuit's final opinion, it cannot be said that such period was unjustified, given the unusual flux in the case law on point. 22 We recognize that Smith may believe he has been the victim of some uncommonly bad fortune. If the prior panel had issued its original order immediately following McGlocklin--i.e., within the narrow three-and-a-half-week window between the date McGlocklin was decided and the date certiorari was granted in Custis--and if the prior panel had correctly read the district court's sentencing determination, it is possible that Smith would have emerged victorious. Instead, the panel did not act right away. While this may have been unfortunate from Smith's standpoint, it certainly provides no basis for finding fault with the court. It was entirely reasonable for the panel to take more than three and a half weeks to revisit and reevaluate Smith's case after McGlocklin. The fact that the Supreme Court granted certiorari so soon afterwards merely constitutes unlucky timing for Smith. 23 Smith goes on to argue that the prior panel's erroneous reading of the district court's sentencing order contributed to the delay in this case, but this is not necessarily so. First, had the panel properly read the district court's treatment of Smith's Boykin v. Alabama claims, it might well have disagreed with the decision on the merits. Instead, because the panel incorrectly interpreted the sentencing order as having avoided the issue, it never actually discussed the substance of the issue. Second, even if the panel might have agreed with the district court on the merits of the Boykin claim, there is still no guarantee it would have affirmed the district court, because it was obviously aware of the grant of certiorari in Custis. Knowing of Custis, the panel's wisest course of action would have been to hold Smith's case pending resolution of the identical issue in the Supreme Court, rather than risk issuing an incorrect and potentially final affirmance. This is in fact what it did, when it later realized the error of its original remand. By contrast, the grant of certiorari in Custis posed no problems in connection with the panel's original decision to remand to the district court, because either party could subsequently have appealed the district court's decision in light of Custis. In other words, there was danger of finality in an affirmance but not in a remand. Finally, the government asserts that even if the panel had affirmed the district court, it would likely have sought certiorari, asked the Supreme Court to hold the case pending Custis, and then had the case remanded for resentencing. There is no reason to doubt this claim. Consequently, notwithstanding the prior panel's incorrect interpretation of the district court's sentencing order, it is extremely improbable that this error contributed to the delayed resolution of the government's appeal. It was Custis that would have had the last word in any of the likely scenarios, and the Supreme Court's timing in Custis was not affected in any way.
24 At no point during the appeal did Smith protest the delay. Although such a protest might not have produced any results, it would at least have indicated to the court that Smith was dissatisfied with the pace of proceedings. As the Supreme Court explained in Barker, defendants should normally assert the right to a speedy trial if they want to take advantage of it. While rejecting the rule that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial forever waives his right, the Barker Court also noted that [t]he defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right ... is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right. 407 U.S. at 528, 531-32, 92 S.Ct. at 2191, 2192-93. In this case, by contrast, there is no evidence that Smith was unhappy with the duration of the appeal. 25 In some circumstances, it might be possible to presume that defendants desire a timely appeal--for example, when a defendant-appellant is in custody and has little or no incentive to delay the outcome. Harris, 15 F.3d at 1563. In this case, however, no such presumption is appropriate, because Smith was afforded a temporary release pending resolution of the appeal. In general, a temporary release should provide strong evidence that a defendant has benefited from delay, rather than been burdened by it. In the absence of any assertion of the right, then, the third Barker factor does not weigh in favor of defendants like Smith, who have no apparent incentive to hurry the appellate process.
26 As noted earlier, several circuits have adapted the trifurcation of Barker 's prejudice analysis into the following considerations: (1) prevention of oppressive incarceration pending appeal; (2) minimization of anxiety and concern of those convicted awaiting the outcome of their appeals; and (3) limitation of the possibility that a convicted person's grounds for appeal, and his or her defenses in case of reversal and retrial, might be impaired. Harris, 15 F.3d at 1559 (quoting Rheuark, 628 F.2d at 303 n. 8). From the outset, we can see that the first factor, preventing oppressive incarceration pending appeal, does not help Smith at all. Indeed, it appears to us that Smith's benefit from temporary release acted as a counterweight to the prejudice stemming from the second factor, the anxiety of awaiting the outcome of the appeal. The degree to which delay increased Smith's agony over his uncertain fate was directly proportional to the degree to which that delay extended his temporary freedom from incarceration. The district court found that Smith was prejudiced because he assumed additional familial responsibilities by fathering a child, something which falls within the second factor of the prejudice inquiry. Order, No. 1:91CR0096, at 2 (N.D.Ohio Mar. 15, 1995). Yet, we should also realize that Smith profited from the delay to the extent that it gave him the opportunity to live with his family and father the child in the first place. Of course, these first two factors of the prejudice analysis do not necessarily cancel each other out in every instance involving temporary release--each case will depend upon its own particular facts. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that, in Smith's case, these factors weigh in like manner on opposite sides of the balance. 27 According to Barker and Harris, the most serious factor in analyzing prejudice is the third one, prejudice to the ability of defendant to assert: (i) his arguments on appeal and (ii) his defenses in the event of retrial or resentencing. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193; Harris, 15 F.3d at 1563. On this score, Smith's position is also weak. First, the dispositive issue before the prior panel--whether a defendant may collaterally challenge prior state convictions for federal sentencing purposes--was one of pure law; thus, the delay did not have any effect on Smith's argument in favor of allowing such collateral challenges. Second, the panel ultimately decided the issue against Smith, following Custis; thus, since Smith was effectively left with nothing to argue upon resentencing (except his new speedy appeal claim), there was no danger of prejudice to any of his arguments. Unlike the situations in Harris or Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528 (9th Cir.1990), where defendants brought habeas corpus actions in federal court while state appeals were still pending, we have the benefit of hindsight on the appeal in Smith's case. In these circumstances, the standard for evaluating prejudice to a retrial or resentencing, therefore, is not whether the defendant has credible grounds for reversal and retrial and can show that the delay impaired her defense on retrial or resentencing. Harris, 15 F.3d at 1564. The standard here is whether the appellate court's delayed ruling actually preserved any arguments to assert on retrial or resentencing, and whether the defendant's ability to assert these arguments was affected. In the instant case, it is apparent that Smith cannot bring forward a jot of evidence showing this type of prejudice against him. 28 Our final consideration is whether any significant amount of presumptive prejudice should figure into the Barker analysis. In Doggett v. United States, the Supreme Court held that extreme cases of delay would produce a strong presumption of prejudice to the ability of a party to defend itself at trial, and the extraordinary eight-and-a-half-year delay there was found to be one such case. 505 U.S. 647, 655-58, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2692-94, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). According to the Court: 29 [W]e generally have to recognize that excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify. While such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria, it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay. 30 Id. at 655-56, 112 S.Ct. at 2693 (citation omitted). This language, though commonly misread, states quite clearly that any excessive delay--that is, any delay triggering the Barker analysis--will generally give rise to a presumption of prejudice, and the only question is how much importance to assign to that prejudice. Under such direction, we hold that the presumptive prejudice arising out of the three-year delay in this case, if any, is negligible at best. Because the three-year period does not approach the extraordinary eight-and-a-half-year delay in Doggett, or approach the periods found in many other cases involving appellate delay, e.g., Muwwakkil; Mohawk, we believe that the prejudice here would be overcome by the other Barker factors if balanced against them. Moreover, we conclude that the prejudice does not even make it as far as the balancing test, because the government has successfully rebutted any discernible presumption in this case: there can be no doubt that Smith's ability to defend himself at resentencing has remained wholly unimpaired. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 658 n. 4, 112 S.Ct. at 2694 n. 4. 31 Notably, the circuits have sent conflicting signals as to whether Doggett should even be deemed pertinent to the sphere of appellate delay. In Harris, 15 F.3d at 1564, and Taylor v. Hargett, 27 F.3d 483, 486 (10th Cir.1994), the Tenth Circuit appeared to indicate in dicta that Doggett would be applicable to speedy appeal cases. By contrast, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Mohawk, 20 F.3d 1480, 1487-88 (9th Cir.1994), went to considerable lengths to explain why Doggett 's speedy trial rationale should be found inapposite. See also Heiser v. Ryan, 15 F.3d 299, 304 (3d Cir.) (uncertain as to Doggett 's relevance), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 926, 115 S.Ct. 313, 130 L.Ed.2d 276 (1994); Elcock v. Henderson, 28 F.3d 276, 279 (2d Cir.) (conclusorily dismissing Doggett considerations as not relevant), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 977, 115 S.Ct. 456, 130 L.Ed.2d 364 (1994). In our view, there is no reason why Barker 's speedy-trial analysis should apply to cases of appellate delay but Doggett 's speedy-trial presumption of prejudice should not. The Mohawk opinion states that it is much easier to identify and combat prejudice to one's ability to retry a case than to one's ability to try a case for the first time, because: 32 If important witnesses have become, for one reason or another, unavailable, their former testimony may be introduced at the second trial. See Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(1). If memories have faded, they can be refreshed, using the record compiled in the first trial. See Fed.R.Evid. 612. If key testimony unaccountably changes, it can be impeached by the same means. See Fed.R.Evid. 613. As for the opportunity to collect exculpatory evidence, a defendant is in no sense deprived of this by a delay before retrial, so long as he was able to pursue this opportunity in connection with his original trial. See id. 33 20 F.3d at 1488 (citation omitted). The problem with this analysis is that it assumes safe reliance on the evidence obtained during the original trial. Yet the whole point of a retrial is that something was materially wrong with the original one. If the trial court erroneously excluded a defense theory (e.g., insanity, self-defense, alibi), or evidence material to the defense, there is nothing in the original trial that will assist the defendant in presenting that theory or evidence on retrial. Similarly, if the defendant prevails on appeal via a Brady claim, the wrongfully withheld exculpatory evidence will still only be presented for the first time on retrial. Hence, the so long as in the last sentence of the quoted passage is a rather large so long as. To be sure, there will be numerous instances in which the evidence at the original trial shall be considered reliable, but the availability of a reliable record in a given case only means that it will be easy to rebut any presumption of prejudice arising out of excessive delay. There is no reason why it should have any bearing on whether the presumption should apply in the first place. We deem Doggett relevant, but we hold that the presumption of prejudice, if any, in this case of three-year appellate delay, has been clearly rebutted. 34 Because we discern no due process violation in Smith's case, we do not need to reach the question of the appropriate remedy.