Opinion ID: 75958
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Florida Supreme Court's Rulings

Text: 99
100 We first conclude that the Florida Supreme Court's decision in this case was not contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. Under the `contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495. The `contrary to' clause in § 2254(d)(1) `suggests that the state court's decision must be substantially different' from the relevant Supreme Court precedent. Fugate, 261 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495). Although a state court's decision that `applies a rule that contradicts' the governing Supreme Court law is `contrary,' a state court decision that applies `the correct legal rule' based on Supreme Court law to the facts of the petitioner's case would not fit within the `contrary to' clause even if the federal court might have reached a different result relying on the same law. Id. (citing and quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495). 101 Here, the Florida Supreme Court correctly identified the principles set forth in Strickland as those governing the analysis of Robinson's claim of ineffectiveness during resentencing. See Robinson III, 707 So.2d at 695 (To merit relief, Robinson must show not only deficient performance, but also that the deficient performance so prejudiced his defense that, without the alleged errors, there is a `reasonable probability that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances would have been different.') (quoting Bolender, 16 F.3d at 1556-57). And Robinson does not cite to, nor are we aware of, any decision in which the United States Supreme Court, faced with materially indistinguishable facts, reached a decision different from that reached by the Florida Supreme Court in this case. 40 102
103 We next conclude that the Florida Supreme Court's decision did not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. Under the `unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495. In Williams, [t]he Supreme Court clarified that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the federal court may not issue the writ unless it finds that the state court applied Supreme Court law unreasonably. Fugate, 261 F.3d at 1216 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495). 104 In deciding this issue, the federal court should consider whether the state court's application of the law was objectively unreasonable and should not apply the subjective all reasonable jurists standard. Id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495) (internal quotation marks omitted). Recently, the Supreme Court adhered to its pronouncements in Williams, stating that we stressed in Williams that an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one. Cone, 122 S.Ct. at 1850. The Supreme Court further noted that a federal habeas court may not issue a writ under the unreasonable application clause `simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.' Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495). 41 105 Here, for several reasons, the Florida Supreme Court's application of Strickland 's prejudice prong to Robinson's claim of ineffectiveness during resentencing was not objectively unreasonable. More specifically, its decision — that Robinson was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's alleged failure to investigate mitigation — was not objectively unreasonable. 42 106 First, none of the mitigation evidence presented in the 3.850 proceedings changes the fact that no statutory mitigating circumstances exist in this case. 43 Nothing in the mitigation evidence suggests that Robinson has an extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Indeed, Krop has never retreated from his testimony before the resentencing jury that Robinson has no such disturbance. Robinson's counsel also offered nothing in the 3.850 court suggesting that St. George consented to the kidnapping, robbery, rape, or murder, or that St. George was otherwise a participant in Robinson's conduct, except of course as a victim. Nothing suggests that Robinson's ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. Nor does anything offered in the 3.850 court indicate (1) Robinson was only an accomplice in the kidnapping, robbery, rape, and murder of St. George and that Robinson's role in those offenses were relatively minor, or (2) that Robinson acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person. Indeed, the resentencing evidence indicating that Robinson was the key player in the offenses remains unchanged. In short, even if Robinson's trial counsel had uncovered and presented the mitigation evidence that Robinson contends he should have, neither the resentencing jury nor the trial judge would have had any ground upon which to find a single statutory mitigating circumstance in this case. 44 107 Second, the new mitigation evidence also leaves unaltered the five valid statutory aggravating circumstances surrounding Robinson's offenses, all of which were presented to the resentencing jury and found by the trial court. Robinson was on parole for a prior rape conviction at the time of the offenses in this case. That prior rape conviction remains a violent felony. Nothing pointed to in the 3.850 proceedings changes the fact that Robinson committed this murder in the course of both a kidnapping and sexual battery, or that Robinson murdered St. George to avoid arrest for that kidnapping and sexual battery. And nothing presented by way of mitigation alters, or casts doubt upon, the evidence that Robinson committed this murder in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner. The new mitigation evidence casts no doubt upon, much less disproves, any of the five valid statutory aggravating circumstances presented to the resentencing jury and found by the trial judge. See Grayson, 257 F.3d at 1226 (concluding that petitioner failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland, in part, because none of the [mitigation] evidence developed in connection with the state habeas proceedings served to alter in any way the aggravating circumstance[s] ... that supported the imposition of the death penalty in this case). 108 Third, most of the new mitigation evidence is cumulative of the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances presented during resentencing. 45 The resentencing jury and trial judge heard, inter alia, (1) that Robinson was both physically and sexually abused as a child, (2) that he worked in migrant labor camps, (3) that his childhood was generally difficult, (4) that he did not know his natural mother, (5) that he behaved well in prison, and (6) that he had done certain good deeds. While the additional mitigation witnesses procured by Robinson's 3.850 counsel could have presented the resentencing jury and trial judge with more details, or different examples, of these aspects of Robinson's life, these aspects of his life were nonetheless known to the resentencing jury and trial judge. By way of example, Troy Hester testified in the 3.850 court proceedings that Robinson had done good deeds for him in that Robinson took care of Troy's family and business while Troy was in the hospital. Although the resentencing jury and trial judge did not hear that specific good deed evidence, they did hear evidence of other good deeds by Robinson, namely Robinson tutoring others in prison. 46 109 We also note that some potential mitigation witnesses might have harmed Robinson's case. For instance, during the 3.850 proceedings, Warner Byrd's direct testimony did present a more detailed picture of Robinson's poverty and poor living conditions as a child. On cross-examination, however, Warner agreed that his situation growing up was essentially as bad as Robinson's, and yet neither he nor his siblings had ever been convicted of murder or sexual battery. The State probably would have similarly examined Warner had he testified during resentencing. And this reminder to the resentencing jury would have reinforced the notion that it was not necessarily Robinson's background that led to these criminal acts, a point not helpful to Robinson's case for a life sentence. 110 We recognize that the resentencing jury and trial judge heard the evidence of mitigation through only Krop. However, Krop testified during resentencing that some of Robinson's self-reported history had been corroborated by persons with whom Krop spoke, thereby adding credibility to Robinson's reports. 47 For example, Coreen and Earl Smith corroborated certain physical abuse, and Robinson's biological father corroborated Robinson's lack of contact with his natural mother. A probation officer with whom Krop spoke, as well as Krop's review of Robinson's prison records, also corroborated Robinson's report that he functions well in prison. Indeed, despite the fact that much of the mitigation evidence came only from Robinson's self-reports to Krop, the trial court specifically found in its sentencing order, as nonstatutory mitigating factors, that Robinson had a difficult childhood and suffered physical and sexual abuse during that childhood. 111 Moreover, even 3.850 counsel, with the benefit of time and hindsight, did not present to the 3.850 court any evidence tending to corroborate Robinson's stories of sexual abuse. Thus, we cannot say that the resentencing jury was deprived of hearing corroborating evidence in that regard. 112 In any event, while the State questioned Krop about who had corroborated certain aspects of his testimony, the State did not allude to, much less argue, lack of corroboration during its closing arguments to the resentencing jury. The State also did not comment on the weight or amount of nonstatutory mitigating evidence presented by the defense. Instead, the State focused on the aggravating circumstances in this case and argued that those factors warranted the ultimate punishment and nothing less. 48 Additionally, as we discuss infra, calling additional character witnesses to corroborate Krop's testimony could have been particularly harmful to Robinson's case for life, as it may have opened the door to damaging information. 113 The mitigating evidence presented in the 3.850 proceedings also falls short of proving the two nonstatutory mitigating factors rejected by the trial judge as unsupported by Krop's testimony during resentencing: (1) intoxication at the time of the offenses, and (2) incarceration as a child in an adult prison. 114 The additional mitigation evidence is not probative of intoxication at the time of the offenses. Generally, that evidence deals only with Robinson having been raised around drinking and his drinking while a youth. No new witness saw Robinson on the day or night of the murder or indicated any knowledge of the amount of alcohol Robinson reported drinking prior to the murder. Indeed, the majority of the mitigation witnesses had not seen Robinson for several years, much less at any point close in time to St. George's murder. And Maddox, the man who employed Robinson in the years before St. George's murder, testified only as to what he had heard about Robinson's general drinking habits, and acknowledged that he had never once seen Robinson take a drink. The 3.850 mitigation evidence simply does not show what Robinson drank before committing murder. 49 115 In any event, emphasizing intoxication at the time of St. George's murder, or a history of drinking in general, could have damaged Robinson's case for life before the resentencing jury. See Grayson, 257 F.3d at 1227 ([W]e note that emphasizing [the petitioner's] alcoholic youth and intoxication may also have been damaging to [the petitioner] in the eyes of the jury.); Tompkins v. Moore, 193 F.3d 1327, 1338 (11th Cir.1999) ([A] showing of alcohol and drug abuse is a two-edged sword which can harm a capital defendant as easily as it can help him at sentencing.) (citing Waldrop v. Jones, 77 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir.1996)); Clisby, 26 F.3d at 1056 (Precedents show that many lawyers justifiably fear introducing evidence of alcohol and drug use.); Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 388 (11th Cir.1994) (noting reasonableness of lawyer's fear that defendant's voluntary drug and alcohol use could be perceived by the jury as aggravating instead of mitigating) (emphasis in original). 50 116 Probative evidence in the 3.850 proceedings with regard to Robinson's allegedly having been incarcerated in an adult prison as a child is similarly lacking. Robinson's 3.850 counsel did proffer a police report dated at a time when Robinson would have been 14, and that police report lists Robinson's age as 19. At best, however, that police report corroborates Krop's testimony during resentencing that Robinson had lied about his age when he was arrested during his childhood. But that police report is not proof that Robinson actually was sent to an adult prison for that offense (or any other offense), much less that Robinson served any substantial time in an adult prison as a minor. 51 117 Fourth, much of the information presented in the 3.850 proceedings may have been harmful to Robinson's case and tipped the scales further in favor of the death penalty. 52 The new mitigation evidence that Robinson had loving relationships with women would have opened the door to evidence that was particularly damaging. Indeed, had Robinson's trial counsel presented this mitigation evidence, it would have allowed the State to present evidence that only five days after murdering and raping St. George, Robinson allegedly raped and robbed another woman, Jennifa Bashford, in similar circumstances. 53 118 Discussing this subsequent robbery and rape, the Florida Supreme Court noted that Jennifa Bashford and three others were robbed in the early morning hours five days after St. George's murder, and after that robbery, Ms. Bashford was allegedly raped by Robinson. Robinson III, 707 So.2d at 697 n. 11. Some of the articles stolen from the victims were later found in a search of Robinson's vehicle, but the charges in that case against Robinson were later dropped after he was convicted of murder in this case. Id. In part because the witnesses did not testify as to their belief that Robinson was loving and respectful towards women, then, the resentencing jury never heard about this subsequent rape and robbery. 54 Given that this alleged robbery and rape happened only days after St. George's rape and murder, and that Robinson had another, prior conviction for rape, this mitigation evidence would certainly not have helped Robinson; indeed, it would have been devastating to his request for a life sentence. 55 119 Finally, given the particularly egregious facts surrounding St. George's murder, the limited, noncumulative mitigation evidence (which is primarily Robinson's formal history of employment), would not have been so powerful as to affect the sentence in this case. As this Court has noted, `[m]any death penalty cases involve murders that are carefully planned, or accompanied by torture, rape or kidnapping. ' Dobbs v. Turpin, 142 F.3d 1383, 1390 (11th Cir.1998) (emphasis added) (quoting Jackson, 42 F.3d at 1369). In these types of cases, this court has found that the aggravating circumstances of the crime outweigh any prejudice caused when a lawyer fails to present mitigating evidence. Id. (citing Francis, 908 F.2d at 703-04 (concluding that the failure to present mitigating evidence of a deprived and abusive childhood did not prejudice capital defendant at trial for torture-murder of government informant); Thompson v. Wainwright, 787 F.2d 1447, 1453 (11th Cir.1986) (concluding that nothing trial counsel could have presented [during the penalty phase] would have rebutted the testimony concerning Thompson's participation in the brutal torture murder)). 120 Here, the capital offense was committed in the course of both a kidnapping and repeated rapes, and the resentencing jury and trial judge heard evidence that St. George was handcuffed from the start. Those handcuffs were removed when Robinson and Fields had sex with St. George, but even then, according to Fields, Robinson kept his hand on his gun. Fields also testified that St. George was asking whether she would be killed and begging not to be killed. This Court need not resolve what qualifies as a torture murder. But we are certain that, at least in the eyes of the resentencing jury, the taking at gunpoint, handcuffing, raping three times, and then being shot twice in the head at point-blank range, were collectively acts that tortured St. George. 121 The rape, kidnapping, and other particular circumstances surrounding St. George's murder, then, lend further support for the Florida Supreme Court's determination that Robinson's sentence would have been the same, even if certain evidence of Robinson's formal work history, or other troubling aspects of his childhood, had been presented to the resentencing jury and trial judge. See Grayson, 257 F.3d at 1230 ([W]e are confident that Grayson's sentence would have been the same despite the presentation of mitigating circumstances in light of the brutality of the crime against an elderly widow who had been nothing but nice to him.); Tompkins, 193 F.3d at 1339 (concluding that there was no prejudice in capital case because aggravating circumstances surrounding strangulation of 15-year-old girl in the course of a sexual assault outweighed additional mitigating circumstances that could have been presented at sentencing concerning defendant's physical abuse as a child, substance abuse problems, and mental deficiencies); Clisby, 26 F.3d at 1057 (concluding that there was no prejudice from failure to present additional mitigating evidence at capital sentencing and stating, [W]e are aware that, in reality, some cases almost certainly cannot be won by defendants. Strickland and several of our cases reflect the reality of death penalty litigation: sometimes the best lawyering, not just reasonable lawyering, cannot convince the sentencer to overlook the facts of a brutal murder — or, even a less brutal murder for which there is strong evidence of guilt in fact.) (emphasis in original) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052); Daugherty v. Dugger, 839 F.2d 1426, 1432 (11th Cir.1988) (concluding that given the severity of the aggravating circumstances, failure to present psychiatric testimony was not prejudicial); Thompson, 787 F.2d at 1453 (The testimony indicated that ... Thompson ... beat[ ] the victim with a chain, his fist, a chair leg, and a billy club.... [and] raped the victim with the chair leg and billy club. After hearing testimony that Thompson committed these atrocities, the jury heard nothing from Thompson himself in reply.... We do not believe that there is a reasonable probability that evidence of a difficult youth, an unsavory codefendant, and limited mental capacity would have altered this jury's decision.). 56