Opinion ID: 2392074
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: The Various Applications of the Accardi doctrine.

Text: As was noted in King and as we indicated supra, the Accardi doctrine has been applied in many different situations. The actual holding in Accardi was somewhat limited and our research reflects that there are two basic interpretations of the Accardi doctrine. On the one hand, there is a body of case law subsequent to Accardi which has held that an agency's failure to comply with its own rules always automatically nullifies its action where the regulation is promulgated to affect fundamental rights derived from the Constitution or a federal statute. On the other hand, there is a body of case law which has held the Accardi doctrine applicable to a wider variety of administrative regulations, i.e., regulations including and regulations beyond those promulgated to protect fundamental rights derived from the Constitution or a federal statute. This line of cases proposes a more general, more encompassing rule implicating the doctrine, thereby extending the scope of Accardi. In such cases some courts have held that violations of agency regulations generally are still per se violations of Accardi. However, most importantly, in this body of case law a large number of cases have held that when Accardi is implicated, and the Accardi exception does not apply, the agency decision may, even then, be overturned upon a showing of substantial prejudice on the part of the complainant as a result of the agency's violation of its procedure. As we have indicated, there are also cases subsequent to Accardi that involved less fundamental agency created rights and out of these cases, beginning with American Farm Lines, the general exception to Accardi has been formed. This exception, as we indicated supra, proposes that when purely internal agency procedures are departed from, there is no per se requirement that the agency action subsequently be set aside. Generally, the whole of the body of case law discussing Accardi supports that even when a lesser agency regulation is violated, the agency action can nonetheless be subject to invalidation if the complainant can show substantial prejudice as a result of the agency action. Subsequent to Accardi, in Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 77 S.Ct. 1152, 1 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1957), the Supreme Court applied the Accardi doctrine to vacate the discharge of a Foreign Service Officer because the Secretary of State had not followed the Department of State regulations gratuitously limiting the Secretary's review of State Department employment termination decisions to those that were adverse to an employee. The Secretary had reversed a decision favorable to John Service, whereupon Service challenged the Secretary's action on the grounds that it violated the Secretary's regulation. The Supreme Court stated that [R]egulations validly prescribed by a government administrator are binding upon him as well as the citizen, and ... this principle holds even when the administrative action under review is discretionary in nature. Service, 354 U.S. at 372, 77 S.Ct. at 1157, 1 L.Ed.2d at 1410. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Secretary of State was not obligated to adopt rigorous substantive and procedural standards ... [but] having done so he could not, so long as the Regulations remained unchanged, proceed without regard to them. Id. at 388, 77 S.Ct. at 1165, 1 L.Ed.2d at 1418 (alteration added). It appears that in Service, the Supreme Court held that an agency's failure to afford an individual safeguard required under its own gratuitous procedural regulations governing employee dismissals may result in the invalidation of the administrative determination, even if the regulation is not constitutionally mandated or when regulations are more generous than a statute requires. But, it should be noted, that the prejudice in Service was clear. In Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 79 S.Ct. 968, 3 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1959), the Supreme Court reinstated an employee of the Department of Interior, who had been discharged without receiving prescribed procedural safeguards, even though the agency could have dismissed him summarily had it not labeled the dismissal a security discharge. Vitarelli was an employee of the Department of the Interior and held a position not designated as sensitive. He had no protected Civil Service status, and therefore could have been discharged summarily without cause. Purporting to proceed under the Act of August 26, 1950, Executive Order No. 10450 and departmental regulations prescribing the procedure to be followed in security risk cases, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior suspended Vitarelli and served him with written charges that due to his sympathetic association with Communists or Communist sympathizers, and other similar alleged activities, his continued employment might be contrary to the best interests of national security. At a subsequent hearing before a security hearing board, no evidence was adduced in support of these charges on the grounds of him being a security risk and no witness testified against Vitarelli. However, Vitarelli himself and four witnesses who testified for him were subjected to an extensive cross-examination which went far beyond the activities specified in the charges. Subsequently, Vitarelli was sent a notice of dismissal stating that it was in the interest of national security and for the reasons set forth in the charges. In 1956, he filed a complaint for a Declaratory Judgment alleging that his discharge was illegal and requested an injunction directing his reinstatement. While the case was pending, a copy of a Notification of Personnel Action, dated September 21, 1954, stating that it was a revision of and replaces the original bearing the same date, was filed in the court and a copy was delivered to Vitarelli. This notification was identical with one issued September 21, 1954, except that it omitted any reference to the reason for Vitarelli's discharge, i.e., security reasons, and to the authority under which it was carried out. The Supreme Court held that having chosen to proceed against Vitarelli on security grounds, the Secretary was bound by the regulations which he had promulgated for dealing with such cases, even though Vitarelli could have been discharged summarily and without cause independently of those regulations. Moreover, the Court mentioned that the record reflected that the proceedings leading to Vitarelli's dismissal from Government service on grounds of national security violated his procedural rights in at least three material respects under the applicable departmental regulations. Id. at 540, 79 S.Ct. at 973, 3 L.Ed.2d at 1017. First, the statement of charges served upon Vitarelli was vague and not specific and detailed. Second, the regulations required that hearings before security hearing boards be orderly and that reasonable restrictions shall be imposed as to relevancy, competency, and materiality of matters considered. In Vitarelli's hearing this was not so, because as his hearing proceeded it developed into a wide-ranging inquisition delving into this his educational, social, political and religious beliefs. Third, the regulations gave the employee the right to cross-examine any witnesses offered in support of the charges, but at his hearing Vitarelli was questioned at length concerning information supplied by an informant who was not called to testify and thus not subject to cross-examination by Vitarelli. It was argued that Vitarelli's fundamental constitutional rights were violated. In Montilla v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 926 F.2d 162 (2nd Cir. 1991), the case petitioner heavily relies upon, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed Accardi in a case involving a resident alien who appealed an immigration judge's decision to deport him pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. It involved a failure by the agency to follow its regulations in respect to a fundamental constitutional rightthe right to counsel. Specifically, Mr. Montilla claimed that the immigration judge committed reversible error when he failed to follow the INS regulations regarding an alien's right to counsel in deportation proceedings. Mr. Montilla claimed that the judge failed to comply with 8 C.F.R. 242.16(a) because Mr. Montilla's response to the judge's inquiry into whether he wanted to have counsel present at the hearing demonstrated his complete ignorance of the nature of the privilege available to him and the record reflected that Mr. Montilla never faced and decided the question. The regulation required the judge to ensure that Mr. Montilla answered and understood the question. Ultimately, the court held that Mr. Montilla did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. The Second Circuit, after reviewing Accardi, adopted a strict application of Accardi and held that where the fundamental rights or interests of the objecting party are involved, any violation of agency regulations is a per se violation of the doctrine. In so holding the Second Circuit reasoned: As a practical matter, to remand for agency compliance with its own rules would actively encourage such compliance. Careless observance by an agency of its own administrative processes weakens its effectiveness in the eyes of the public because it exposes the possibility of favoritism and of inconsistent application of the law. Montilla, 926 F.2d at 169 (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969)). That Court went on to hold that For these reasons, we hold that an alien claiming the INS has failed to adhere to its own regulations regarding the right to counsel in a deportation hearing.... All that need be shown is that the subject regulations were for the alien's benefit and that the INS failed to adhere to them. Id. at 169. In other words, this holding of the Second Circuit reflects a finding of per se reversible error, even in the absence of proof of prejudice, when the agency rule in question affects individual fundamental and constitutional rights. [15] In United States v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809, 811 (4th Cir.1969), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit citing Accardi, said [a]n agency of the government must scrupulously observe rules, regulations, or procedures which it has established. When it fails to do so, its action cannot stand and courts will strike it down. The Fourth Circuit went on to hold that Nor does it matter that these IRS instructions ... were not promulgated in something formally labeled a `Regulation' or adopted with strict regard to the Administrative Procedure Act; the Accardi doctrine has a broader sweep. Id. at 812. In Heffner, Internal Revenue Service (IRS) special agents failed to follow their own procedures regarding the interrogation of taxpayers suspected of criminal tax fraud. On October 3, 1967, the IRS voluntarily issued instructions to all Special Agents of the Intelligence Division and those instructions were reported in IRS News Release No. 897, Oct. 3, 1967. With these instructions, the Fourth Circuit noted, the IRS took upon itself the obligation to give taxpayers, before interrogation, notice that they were suspected of criminal tax fraud and imposed the further obligation to give full Miranda warnings before seeking incriminating statements. Thus the regulations were designed to protect individuals' fundamental rights to be made aware of the nature of the charges against them and to be sure that individuals were apprised of their rights to be represented by counsel, their right to remain silent, etc., all fundamental rights. The defendant's interview occurred almost two months after these instructions had been announced, yet, twice, the Special Agent failed to comply with them during the investigation. First, the Special Agent never warned the defendant that as a special agent, I have the function of investigating the possibility of criminal tax fraud. Second, the defendant was never advised that he could `retain counsel.'  Id. at 811. Some states have specifically addressed Accardi at length. In Dugan v. Delaware Harness Racing Commission, 752 A.2d 529, 531 (Del.2000), the Supreme Court of Delaware, when discussing a Harness Racing Commission rule stated that: We assume that the Commission was not required by either the United States Constitution or by statute to adopt a prima facie rule of evidence that was conditioned on establishing certain other procedures. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has held that once an agency does adopt such regulations, `it does not necessarily follow ... that the agency has no duty to obey them. Where the rights of individuals are affected, it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures. `If an agency rule is designed `to afford... due process of law by providing safeguards against essentially unfair procedures,' the action which results from the violation of that rule is invalid. [Footnotes omitted.] It is this strict interpretation of Accardi that has been adopted and applied by the Court of Special Appeals in its cases to date. As we have indicated, the Court of Special Appeals has held that when a regulation affects individual rights and obligations, or confers important procedural benefits upon individuals, then Accardi is applicable and there is a per se violation when an agency fails to adhere to such regulations. As well, the Court of Special Appeals has held that prejudice, where Accardi is applicable and its exception is not, need not be shown. See Board of Educ. of Balt. Co. v. Ballard, 67 Md.App. 235, 239 n. 2, 507 A.2d 192, 194 n. 2 (1986). We shall modify this position.