Opinion ID: 467519
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Chappell

Text: 32 The first special factor considered by Chappell is the unique disciplinary structure of the military establishment. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304, 103 S.Ct. at 2367, 76 L.Ed.2d at 593. Unlike Chappell, this case does not present a situation where [t]he special nature of military life, the need for unhesitating and decisive action by military officers and equally disciplined responses by enlisted personnel, would be undermined by a judicially created remedy exposing officers to personal liability at the hands of those they are charged to command. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304, 103 S.Ct. at 2367, 76 L.Ed.2d at 593. 33 Stanley was a volunteer participant in the chemical warfare program. He had been released from his regular duties to participate in this program, administered by both military and civilian personnel. Stanley was not subject to direct military orders, but was free to leave the program at any time. 34 Most importantly, however, Stanley ingested the LSD when he was instructed to drink a clear substance which, unbeknownst to him, contained the hazardous drug. Because he was surreptitiously administered the drug, Stanley could not possibly have challenged his orders to drink the clear substance. The inescapable demands of military discipline and obedience to orders are not implicated by the facts of this case. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300, 103 S.Ct. at 2365, 76 L.Ed.2d at 590. There is no concern here that the peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors might be disrupted. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. at 112, 75 S.Ct. at 143. 35 The other special factor which the Court in Chappell considered compelling is Congress's plenary authority over the military and its extensive activity in the field. 462 U.S. at 304, 103 S.Ct. at 2367, 76 L.Ed.2d at 593. We conclude that this factor also does not militate against permitting Stanley's Bivens claim. Those intramilitary administrative procedures which the Court found adequate to redress the servicemen's racial discrimination complaints in Chappell are clearly inadequate to compensate Stanley for the violations complained of here. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 303, 103 S.Ct. at 2367, 76 L.Ed.2d at 592-93. The Board for the Correction of Naval Records is not available to Stanley, nor can Stanley avail himself of the remedies provided under article 138 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.A. Sec. 938 (West 1983). Article 138 is not available to veterans. 36 Neither of the special factors which the Supreme Court deemed dispositive in Chappell are present in this case. We hold, therefore, that Stanley's action is not precluded by Chappell. Our inquiry is not at an end, however. We must now consider whether Stanley's action is precluded under the adequate alternative remedy Bivens exception. 4 37 Appellants argue that the Veterans Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C.A. Secs. 301-362 (West 1979) (VBA), is a sufficiently adequate alternative remedy to a Bivens action to preclude Stanley's claim. Bivens requires that the appellants show that Congress explicitly declared the Veterans Benefits Act to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and that Congress viewed the Act as equally effective as a Bivens action. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005; Carlson, 446 U.S. at 16-19, 100 S.Ct. at 1470-1472. As the Supreme Court explained in Carlson, 38 our inquiry at this step in the analysis is whether Congress has indicated that it intends a statutory remedy to replace, rather than to complement, the Bivens remedy. Where Congress decides to enact a statutory remedy which it views as fully adequate only in combination with the Bivens remedy, e.g., 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(h) [28 U.S.C.S. Sec. 2680(h) ], the congressional decision should be given effect by the courts. 39 Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19 n. 5, 100 S.Ct. at 1472 n. 5. 40 We do not find, nor has any other court which has addressed this issue found, any expression of congressional intent that the VBA constitute a serviceman's exclusive remedy for injuries incurred incident to military service. 41 Appellants rely upon Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 672-73, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 2058, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977), to support their argument that the VBA is an adequate alternative remedy to a serviceman's Bivens action. The serviceman in Stencel sued the manufacturer of the egress life-support system in his fighter aircraft for the injuries he sustained when the system malfunctioned. The third-party claimant cross-claimed against the United States for indemnity. The Supreme Court considered the same factors which it considers under a claim brought directly by a serviceman to preclude the third-party claimant's indemnity claim. 431 U.S. at 670-74, 97 S.Ct. at 2057-59. 42 The serviceman in Stencel was receiving benefits under the VBA. In rejecting the third-party claimant's argument that the availability of the VBA to the serviceman barred its indemnity action for damages which it might be required to pay the serviceman, the Supreme Court concluded that the VBA serves a dual purpose. It provides a remedy for injured servicemen and it clothes the government in the protective mantle of the Act's limitation-of-liability provisions. See Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 115, 94 S.Ct. 2174, 2179, 40 L.Ed.2d 694 (1974). Stencel concluded, without further analysis, that the military compensation scheme provides an upper limit of liability for the Government as to service-connected injuries. To permit [the third-party claimant's] claim would circumvent this limitation, thereby frustrating one of the essential features of the Veterans Benefits Act. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673, 97 S.Ct. at 2059. 43 We conclude that Stencel is not binding precedent on the issue of whether the VBA is the exclusive remedy for servicemen injured while acting incident to military service. First, that issue was not expressly before the Court in Stencel. The third-party claimant in Stencel merely argued that it may be fair to prohibit direct recovery by servicemen under the Act, since they are assured of compensation regardless of fault under the Veterans Benefits Act. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 672, 97 S.Ct. at 2058 (emphasis added). Moreover, as the dissent in Stencel noted, the Veterans Benefits Act does not even contain an explicit declaration that it is the exclusive remedy against the Government for a serviceman's injury. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 675, 97 S.Ct. at 206. (Marshall, J., dissenting). 44 Most recently in Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 202, 103 S.Ct. 1033, 1040, 74 L.Ed.2d 911 (1983), the Supreme Court acknowledged that [w]e affirmed the dismissal of Stencel's cross-claim even though no limitation of liability statute applied to the case, because we found that the limitation of liability principle of Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 95 L.Ed. 152, 71 S.Ct. 153 (1950), precluded Stencel's indemnity claim. Thus, as Lockheed explains, the Stencel discussion of the VBA relates only to the VBA as a Feres factor or a special factor under the first Bivens exceptions. The Stencel discussion of the VBA is not relevant to an analysis of the VBA as a sufficiently adequate alternative remedy to preclude a Bivens claim under the second exception to Bivens. We relied upon Lockheed in concluding in Cole v. United States, 755 F.2d 873, 880 (11th Cir.1985), that [t]he VBA ... is best regarded as an additional reason for barring a claim [under the FTCA] based on an injury which is already determined to be 'incident to service,' rather than a dispositive factor [barring the FTCA claim]. Similarly, we hold that the VBA is not a sufficiently adequate alternative to a Bivens action to bar Stanley's claim.