Opinion ID: 527780
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: LIABILITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983: SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Text: 11 As the defendants' arguments turn on somewhat different factual and legal issues, we deal with them in two groups: the individual officers who were at the scene and their supervisors.
12 Soto and Gotay moved for directed verdicts at trial arguing that on the evidence presented, the jury could not have reasonably imposed liability under Sec. 1983. While they did not move for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, they did make a post-verdict motion for a new trial alleging that the verdict was contrary to the law and against the weight of the evidence. Gotay made a separate motion to alter or amend the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was the cause of plaintiff's injuries. 13 We note first the standards of review that guide our inquiry. In reviewing the denial of a motion for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict  'we must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and determine whether there are facts and inferences reasonably drawn from those facts which lead to but one conclusion--that there is a total failure of evidence to prove plaintiff's case.'  Mayo v. Schooner Capital Corp., 825 F.2d 566, 568 (1st Cir.1987) (quoting Fact Concerts, Inc. v. City of Newport, 626 F.2d 1060, 1064 (1st Cir.1980), vacated on other grounds, 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981)); see MacQuarrie v. Howard Johnson Co., 877 F.2d 126, 128 (1st Cir., June 2, 1989); Gonzalez-Marin v. The Equitable Life Assurance Society, 845 F.2d 1140, 1144 (1st Cir.1988); Robinson v. Watts Detective Agency, 685 F.2d 729, 732 (1st Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S.Ct. 728, 74 L.Ed.2d 953 (1983). As to the denial of a new trial motion: 14 [W]e will reverse a judge's decision not to grant a motion for a new trial 'only if the verdict is so seriously mistaken, so clearly against the law or the evidence, as to constitute a miscarriage of justice.' Levesque v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 832 F.2d 702, 703 (1st Cir.1987); see Mayo v. Schooner Capital Corp., 825 F.2d 566, 570 (1st Cir.1987). This strict standard of review is especially appropriate if the motion for new trial is based on a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Wells [Real Estate v. Greater Lowell Board of Realtors], 850 F.2d at 811 [ (1st Cir.1988) ]. Thus, our review is limited solely to determining if the court abused its discretion in making this decision. Freeman v. Package Machinery Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1334 (1st Cir.1988); Mayo, 825 F.2d at 568. 15 MacQuarrie, at 131. The standard in reviewing a denial of a Rule 59(e) motion is, likewise, one of abuse of discretion. See Earnhardt v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 744 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1984); Thomas v. Farmville Manufacturing Co., 705 F.2d 1307, 1307-08 (11th Cir.1983). 16 In assessing the imposition of liability under Sec. 1983, we must first ask (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under the color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986). There are two aspects to the second inquiry: (1) there must have been a deprivation of federally protected rights, privileges or immunities, and (2) the conduct complained of must have been causally connected to the deprivation. Woodley v. Town of Nantucket, 645 F.Supp. 1365, 1369 n. 4 (D.Mass.1986) (emphasis added). Since the defendants do not deny that they were acting under color of Commonwealth law, our inquiry focuses on whether there was sufficient evidence to establish both a constitutional deprivation and a causal connection between the defendants' conduct and the deprivation. 17 We have recently held that government officials may be held liable under Sec. 1983 for a deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process if their conduct reflects a reckless or callous indifference to an individual's rights. Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 18 (1st Cir.1989); 4 see also infra p. 562 (comparing standards of reckless indifference and deliberate indifference). Soto and Gotay assert that no evidence was presented that might reasonably establish that they had acted with reckless or callous indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights. We disagree. Pedro Soto 18 The jury could have found the following facts and drawn the following inferences against defendant Soto: 19 --He was in charge of the preventive round on December 9, 1983. 20 --The preventive rounds have no set guidelines and proceed as the officer in charge orders. That officer has direct responsibility for what occurs on the round. 21 --As the officer in charge, Soto would have determined the area of the patrol, against whom it would act, and how that action was to take place. 22 --On the night in question, Soto drove the police vehicle up to plaintiff's car. 23 --Under his direction, he and the other officers exited their vehicle with guns drawn. 24 --They proceeded to approach the Gutierrez vehicle without identifying themselves as police officers. 25 --As plaintiff began to drive away, he heard a number of shots. One shot was louder than all of the others. Soto was issued a shotgun for the patrol, the other officers carried revolvers. 26 --Officers under Soto's command discharged their weapons at plaintiff and Oquendo. 27 --At least five shots were fired before plaintiff was hit and his car went off the road. 28 --Since Soto was in command, the use of weapons by the officers involved was at his direction or, at least, was tacitly authorized by him. 29 These facts were more than sufficient to establish that Soto's actions amounted to a reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of Gutierrez. Edwin Gotay 30 Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the liability of defendant Gotay is a closer question. He was not in charge of the patrol and asserts that he was asleep in the police car when plaintiff was shot. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of liability against him. Although the evidence against Gotay was slim, we deem it sufficient. 31 Based on the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, the jury could have found that Gotay exited the vehicle along with the other three officers with his gun drawn and was thus an active participant in the event that caused plaintiff's injuries. The following evidence supports such a finding: 32 --On cross-examination, Margarita Oquendo testified that all of the officers exited the vehicle. 33 Q: Will you please describe the locations of the agents? 34 A: The driver was in the front, Pedro Soto, another person was off to his right. The other two were in the front seat--excuse me in the back seat. 35 Q: Which one of the officers went out of the car, if you can recall? 36 A: Could you repeat the question, please? 37 Q: Which one of the agents dismounted from the car? A: All of them got out of the car. 5 38 --On direct examination Oquendo testified that the officers carried guns and pointed them at Gutierrez and her. 39 --Following the shooting and the righting of Gutierrez' overturned vehicle, the first officer Oquendo saw was Gotay, who was standing at the window of the car. Since Oquendo testified that it took just seconds for the officers to arrive at her vehicle, Gotay's presence there raises an inference that he was not asleep during the shooting. If Gotay had been asleep in the car, it would have been difficult for him to be at the car window just seconds after the shooting. 40 Given this evidence, we cannot say that no reasonable jury could have found that Gotay's actions evidenced a reckless or callous indifference to plaintiff's constitutional rights. The jury was privileged to make such a finding, and it did so. 6 41 Both Gotay and Soto assert that the evidence did not establish that their actions were the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. They allege that since the bullet that entered plaintiff's body came from Officer Moreno's revolver, 7 his action must be seen as an intervening, superceding cause of the constitutional deprivation. This argument may be disposed of quickly. 42 Section 1983 imposes liability upon those who subject[ ] or cause[ ] to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.... This circuit has expanded upon the express words of the statute and stated that: 43 A person subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an affirmative act which he is legally required to do, that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made. [Citation omitted.] Moreover, personal participation is not the only predicate for section 1983 liability. Anyone who causes any citizen to be subjected to a constitutional deprivation is also liable. The requisite causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct personal participation in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury. 44 Springer v. Seaman, 821 F.2d 871, 879 (1st Cir.1987) (quoting Soto v. City of Sacramento, 567 F.Supp. 662, 673-74 (E.D.Cal.1983) (citations omitted) and Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir.1978)). The Springer court also noted that inquiries into causation under Sec. 1983 are cabined within common law tort principles. See id. at 876-79; see also Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305-06, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2541-42, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (noting that common-law principles control the issuance of damages under Sec. 1983). 45 We have no difficulty concluding that there was a firm evidentiary basis for finding that the actions of Soto and Gotay caused plaintiff's injuries. Soto was the man in charge. He directed and participated in the acts that led to the shooting. The jury could also have found that Gotay was a participant in those acts. Gotay exited the car with his gun drawn and moved toward the Gutierrez' vehicle along with the other officers. Under such a factual scenario, the actions of all four of the officers who participated in the intervention could be deemed to be proximate causes of plaintiff's injuries. Cf. Melear v. Spears, 862 F.2d 1177, 1186 (5th Cir.1989) (police officer liable under Sec. 1983 where he guarded a door during the commission of an illegal search by other officers). 46 Nor does Moreno's conduct constitute a superseding intervening cause that would relieve Soto and Gotay from liability. We have recently addressed the concept of superseding causes. In Marshall v. Perez Arzuaga, 828 F.2d 845, 848 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1027, 98 L.Ed.2d 991 (1988), we stated that an actor is responsible for 47 those consequences attributable to reasonably foreseeable intervening forces, including the acts of third parties. See Widow of Andino, 93 P.R.R. at 178 (defining intervening cause as a cause of an injury that comes into active operation in producing the result after the actor's negligent act or omission has occurred). A negligent defendant will not be relieved of liability by an intervening cause that was reasonably foreseeable, even if the intervening force may have directly caused the harm. Id. An unforeseen and abnormal intervention, on the other hand, breaks the chain of causality, thus shielding the defendant from liability. Id. 48 See Springer, 821 F.2d at 876-77 (similarly describing intervening causes in tort law). The question in the case at bar is whether Moreno's firing of his weapon--the direct cause of plaintiff's injuries--was a type of harm that Soto and Gotay could reasonably have foreseen. We believe that it was. 49 It was eminently foreseeable that an encounter with a civilian by four policemen with weapons drawn and ready to fire might result in a discharge of the firearms and an injury to the civilian. No matter whose bullet ultimately inflicted plaintiff's injury, the deprivation of Gutierrez' constitutional rights was the result of a team effort. The officers exited their vehicle with guns drawn. As plaintiff pulled away a number of shots, around five or six according to Gutierrez, were fired. That only one bullet found its mark was fortuitous, not exculpatory. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to hold Soto and Gotay liable under Sec. 1983.
50 The Director of the Carolina Division, Domingo Alvarez, and the Superintendent of the Police Department of Puerto Rico, Desiderio Cartagena, argue that the court erred in denying their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of supervisory liability under Sec. 1983. Our inquiry is governed by the same principles as those used in reviewing a denial of a motion for directed verdict. We discern no error in the judge's ruling. 51 We have addressed the limits of supervisory liability under Sec. 1983 in the past. We note first that liability may not be predicated upon a theory of respondeat superior. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 901-02 (1st Cir.1988); Guzman v. City of Cranston, 812 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir.1987); Woodley v. Town of Nantucket, 645 F.Supp. at 1372. A supervisor may be found liable only on the basis of her own acts or omissions. Figueroa v. Aponte-Roque, 864 F.2d 947, 953 (1st Cir.1989); see Guzman, 812 F.2d at 26. It must be shown that the supervisor's conduct or inaction amounted to a reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others. See Germany, 868 F.2d at 17-18. Finally, there must be an 'affirmative link' between the street-level misconduct and the action, or inaction, of supervisory officials. Woodley, 645 F.Supp. at 1372 (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371, 96 S.Ct. 598, 604, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976)); see Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 902. 52 Our earlier cases on supervisory liability have stated that a plaintiff must establish that the supervisor's conduct constituted gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference. See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 902; Guzman, 812 F.2d at 26; Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 820 (1st Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100, 106 S.Ct. 879, 88 L.Ed.2d 916 (1986). We believe there is no difference of moment between that standard and one of reckless or callous indifference. See City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 268-69, 107 S.Ct. 1114, 1120-21, 94 L.Ed.2d 293 (1987) (O'Connor, J. dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari) (stating that deliberate indifference or reckless disregard is necessary to establish municipal liability under Sec. 1983); Clipper v. Tacoma Park, 876 F.2d 17, 20 (4th Cir.1989) (same); Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir.) (discussing different definitions of deliberate indifference), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 68, 102 L.Ed.2d 45 (1988); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1390 (4th Cir.1987); Williams v. City of Boston, 784 F.2d 430, 434-35 (1st Cir.1986) (using standards of reckless disregard and deliberate indifference interchangeably); Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 474 (8th Cir.1984) (equating the two standards); Rondon Pinto v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 737 F.2d 130, 132 (1st Cir.1984) (using both standards as one); Layne v. Vinzant, 657 F.2d 468, 471, 474 (1st Cir.1981) (same); cf. Germany, 868 F.2d at 18 & n. 10 (noting distinction between gross negligence--standing alone--and recklessness). We see no reason to differentiate in this context between these standards. We hold that indifference that rises to the level of being deliberate, reckless or callous, suffices to establish liability under Sec. 1983. 8 Domingo Alvarez 53 The plaintiff provided more than sufficient evidence for the jury to impose Sec. 1983 liability upon Domingo Alvarez. Plaintiff established that: 54 --On December 9, 1983, Alvarez was Director of the Drugs and Narcotics Division for the Area of Carolina of the Police Department of Puerto Rico. 55 --Prior to this time Alvarez had supervised defendant Soto at the Metropolitan Drugs and Narcotics Division. 56 --Alvarez testified that during his time at the Metropolitan Drugs and Narcotics Division he was aware that Soto had been the subject of a number of citizen complaints charging him with mistreatment. 57 --Alvarez was also aware that Soto had a reputation for having a violent character in mistreating citizens. 58 --Based on these facts, Alvarez admitted that he was concerned about Soto's character and its effect upon him as a police officer. 59 --When Soto was being transferred to the Carolina Division, Alvarez expressed his concern about Soto's character to his captain. He suggested that a different assignment might be in order for Soto. He had also spoken with investigators from the Bureau of Investigations and Disciplinary Matters regarding the complaints against Soto. 60 --Alvarez admitted that he was aware that Soto had been the subject of ten citizen complaints charging abuse during his tenure with the Carolina Division. Soto and another officer in the department had the greatest number of civilian complaints lodged against them. 61 --Alvarez also knew that Soto had been suspended for five days in July, 1983. On that date Soto, as a round supervisor, stood by and pointed a gun while those under his command beat up a civilian doctor. Alvarez was on duty the day of that assault. 62 --Soto and Alvarez were friends and certain testimony indicated that Alvarez was less strict with him than with other officers. 63 --When Soto was moved to the Carolina Division, Alvarez was concerned for the safety of both the citizens and his own men. He feared that in response to Soto's actions a civilian riot might develop, which would threaten the safety of the officers under his command. 64 --As Director of the Carolina Division, Alvarez had the authority to assign Soto to a desk job. On the one or two occasions this was done, Soto demanded he be returned to the street. Alvarez complied. 65 --Although Alvarez testified that he wanted Soto to be transferred, Alvarez' immediate supervisor, Nelson Segarra, stated that Alvarez never filed a request for Soto to be transferred. 66 --Alvarez never initiated a complaint against Soto until after the Gutierrez shooting. 67 --Alvarez never requested that Soto be given a psychiatric evaluation. 68 --Despite all of his concerns and the large number of complaints against Soto, Alvarez continued to send him out to command as a round supervisor. 69 --On December 9, 1983, Alvarez assigned Soto to supervise the preventive round during which plaintiff sustained his injuries. Of the other officers assigned to the round, Moreno had a number of civilian complaints filed against him and Gotay was just returning to the force following a leave of absence to recuperate from an injury. 70 --As Director of the Carolina Division, it was Alvarez' duty to evaluate the police officers under his command every six months. Two of the categories evaluated are self-control and relations with the community. He had to rate the performance of the officers on a scale from one to five, with a score of four or five indicating above average achievement. 71 --Alvarez evaluated Soto five times between 1981 and 1983. He never gave Soto less than a ranking of four in the categories of relations with the community and self-control. 72 --In his final evaluation of Soto, in July, 1983, Alvarez gave Soto fours in the relations with the community and self-control categories. This evaluation was made despite Alvarez' knowledge that three complaints had been filed against Soto in the preceding six months and that Soto had held a gun on a civilian doctor while other officers assaulted him. Alvarez was also aware of a disciplinary suspension instituted against Soto for that incident. In the same evaluation Alvarez commended Soto for his performance as round supervisor. 73 --Plaintiff's expert in police practice, procedure administration and discipline, Lou Reiter, testified that, given Soto's conduct, Alvarez should have taken the following basic steps regarding Soto: (1) lowered his evaluation scores to the unsatisfactory level to signal to Soto that his behavior needed improvement; 9 (2) personally observed Soto in the field to determine how he dealt with civilians; (3) put in a formal, written request to his superiors requesting a transfer for Soto out of the Carolina Division; (4) have Soto undergo a psychiatric examination; (5) assigned Soto to special training classes that would have helped him better his relations with the community; (6) assigned Soto to be a Reten, i.e., an officer with a desk job; (7) started a file on Soto documenting past incidents of alleged misconduct and recording them in case future action was necessary; and (8) undertaken a personal review of Soto's arrest files and included any improper or questionable activities in Soto's file. 74 --Reiter believed that it was foreseeable, in 1983, that Soto might commit further acts of violence against civilians. He testified that proper and immediate supervision and discipline of Soto would likely have remedied the problem or, at the least, have resulted in Soto's dismissal from the force. 75 --Based on a review of the pertinent facts, Reiter concluded that Alvarez' supervision and discipline of Soto was totally deficient. 76 Alvarez' inaction concerning the Soto threat and his continued assignments of Soto as a round supervisor are a basis for finding that he possessed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of those with whom Soto would come into contact. The affirmative link between Alvarez' conduct toward Soto and the shooting of Gutierrez is plain. With even the minimal amount of proper supervision and discipline it is unlikely that Soto would have been in command on December 9, 1983. Had Alvarez not been recklessly indifferent to his duties, the Soto problem would have been remedied well before that date. Desiderio Cartagena 77 Cartagena maintains that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to impose liability upon him. Plaintiff argues that Cartagena is liable because: (1) he had knowledge of the numerous complaints against Soto yet took no action concerning them other than dismissing the charges; and (2) he employed a wholly inadequate and impotent disciplinary system that permitted officers like Soto to continue to employ their bullish methods without sanction. See, e.g., McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693, 697 (10th Cir.1979) (noting similar grounds for supervisory liability under Sec. 1983). 78 We believe the evidence adduced by plaintiff was sufficient to sustain the jury's imposition of liability upon Cartagena. The jury could have found the following: 79 --On December 9, 1983, Cartagena was the Superintendent of the Police Department of Puerto Rico and had held that position since December 11, 1978. He retired from that post on December 30, 1983. 80 --As Superintendent, he was responsible for establishing all policies and procedures of the Police Department. He had the authority to issue General Orders, which, along with the Personnel Regulations, served as the governing guidelines for the department. 81 --He was ultimately responsible for the supervision of all of the officers under his command. It was his duty to ensure that the General Orders and the Personnel Regulations were carried out by the police force. 82 --Cartagena was at the head of the department's disciplinary system. Every complaint filed against an officer went to Cartagena for disposition. He made the final decision, based upon the department's investigation of the matter, as to whether an officer was guilty or not guilty of misconduct. 83 --He was the only one with the authority to suspend, fire, or otherwise discipline a police officer. Any decision to sanction or not to sanction a particular officer was made by Cartagena. 84 --Under the rules and regulations governing the police disciplinary system, when a complaint was filed against an individual officer, the Bureau of Inspection and Disciplinary Matters would investigate. After a series of reviews, the Bureau would make a recommendation concerning the matter and forward it to the Legal Division. The Director of the Legal Division would then examine all of the materials related to the case and make a final recommendation to the Superintendent. 85 --Cartagena testified that that recommendation accompanied the file on the case when it came to his desk. 86 --He stated that he did not read the entire record in the majority of cases and, instead, relied upon the recommendation of the Legal Division. In close cases, he asked the Director of the Legal Division, who stood by as he went over the complaints, to fill in the background of the cases. When asked how he knew whether it was a close case, Cartagena stated that he relied on the Director to orient him to the cases. The jury could infer from this that Cartagena obtained at least the basic factual background on each complaint either from a discussion with the Director or from reading the file itself. 87 --Soto was the subject of at least 13 separate civilian complaints between 1980 and December 30, 1983. 88 --Cartagena personally signed letters dismissing the charges against Soto in twelve of the thirteen complaint cases. 89 --In 1983, the year Gutierrez was shot, Soto was the subject of five other complaints. On a single day, July 21, 1983, Cartagena dismissed one complaint against Soto and reaffirmed a five-day suspension that had initially been ordered against him on May 10, 1983 concerning a different matter. 90 --Cartagena testified that the volume and frequency of the complaints against Soto did not alarm him. He believed the complaints did not evidence any pattern of improper behavior. Cartagena did not order any special investigation of Soto nor did he personally attempt to check up on Soto. 91 --Despite his power to do so, Cartagena emphatically refused to consider an officer's past history of complaints when reviewing that officer's conduct. Indeed, the files which were brought to him for disposition did not even include the officer's prior history of complaints. 92 --The failure to consider officers' past histories when evaluating complaints made it very difficult to identify a pattern of misbehavior or misconduct. 93 --Reiter, plaintiff's expert on police matters, testified as to the need for considering past histories in assessing a particular officer's actions. He stated that the number of complaints levied against Soto alone should have signalled that he needed immediate attention. Jorge Collazo, Cartagena's successor as Superintendent, and Captain Julian Ortiz, Director of the Administrative Investigations Division for the Area of San Juan, agreed that the number of complaints against Soto was quite unusual and should have put his superiors on notice that some form of remedial action was necessary. 94 --Reiter maintained that there were other glaring inadequacies in the disciplinary system employed by Cartagena: 95 1. One of the most serious deficiencies, Reiter felt, was the provision that allowed officers who were the subject of an internal investigation to refuse to testify or give a statement to the investigating officers. Such a rule is a really serious handicap to an investigation of misconduct; it cuts off one of your main sources of investigation ... the officer that was involved. By invoking such a rule an officer could easily block the department from getting to the bottom of the matter. Soto asserted this privilege in a number of the department's investigations of him. 96 2. The investigations of complaints against officers required witnesses to come to the station house to give sworn written statements. Reiter professed that the effect of such a requirement was to frighten[ ] most of the average citizen[s], particularly minorities.... By its formality, the system discouraged people from coming forward with information. This hampered the department's ability to discover the truth surrounding alleged incidents of misconduct. As early as 1974, the Police Task Force Report, of which Reiter was a contributing author, denounced the requirement of taking sworn written statements at the investigation stage of a complaint action. 97 3. Under this disciplinary structure, when a citizen withdrew his complaint, the internal investigation was concluded. Reiter testified that that practice encouraged the intimidation of complainants by police officers and may have been too cumbersome to be effective. Six of the civilian complaints against Soto were withdrawn by the complainants. 98 4. The disciplinary system's sanctions were unduly limited. Reiter stated that, as written, the system did not allow an officer to be given additional remedial training or psychological exams as a response to findings of misconduct. Reiter believed that to function efficiently a disciplinary system must have at its disposal both remedial measures, which are designed to retrain an officer, and punishments, which are designed to sanction his or her conduct. 99 5. The failure to involve immediate supervisors in the disciplinary process was another flaw in the system. An officer's immediate supervisor is the department official closest to the situation. He has the most knowledge of the officer's temperament, strengths and weaknesses. His recommendation as to what type of sanction would be most effective in a particular officer's case is a valuable component of a proper disciplinary system. 6. Reiter next testified that: 100 There was no indication[ ], [in the disciplinary organization], that there was a system that would identify officers who had lots of complaints, whether they were founded or not. The reason you want to do that is because you want to identify those policemen, even if the complaint is unfounded, you want to say why is it that one officer gets more complaints than other officers, and then look at that person. Maybe he needs counselling, maybe he needs more supervision, maybe he needs--maybe he's burned out. 101