Opinion ID: 787907
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constructive amendment of, or fatal variance from, the indictment

Text: 35 O'Connor argues that the government's evidence showed that monthly reports incorrectly reported the number of uses, rather than incorrectly reporting the rental activity and income as alleged in the indictment. She also contends that the government strayed from the indictment by failing to show that the owners were deprived of income by unauthorized uses. An indictment may not be broadened by amendment, either literally or constructively, except by the grand jury. United States v. Adamson, 291 F.3d 606, 614 (9th Cir.2002). `An amendment of the indictment occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are altered, either literally or in effect, by the prosecutor or a court after the grand jury has last passed upon them.' Id. (quoting United States v. Von Stoll, 726 F.2d 584, 586 (9th Cir.1984)). On the other hand, a variance occurs where the facts presented at trial materially differ from those alleged in the indictment. Id. Although the line between the two can be difficult to draw, the distinction is critical: a constructive amendment requires reversal, whereas a variance requires reversal only if it affects the defendant's substantial rights. Id. at 615. 36 At trial the government sought to prove that defendants fraudulently used the owners' statements to conceal the occupancies that did not generate rent. Only paragraph twelve of the indictment discussed how the mail was used. It charged defendants with mailing owners' statements that knowingly withheld information such as rental dates, number of nights units were rented, total amount of money received from such rentals and net rents due the owners. Before trial the district court restricted the government to proving these specific inaccuracies in the statements. Paragraph fourteen of the indictment, on the other hand, charged defendants with stay[ing] or allow [ing] others to stay in units without notice and payment to owners. However, failing to provide notice does not constitute mail fraud unless it can be linked to the mails, which, as noted, paragraph twelve does not do. The government acknowledged the distinction in its response to defendants' motion for acquittal: [I]t was entirely reasonable for the jury to conclude that, with regard to `freebies,' the monthly statements were technically accurate as to `rentals,' but were intended to create the false impression in the minds of the owners that their property had not otherwise been used. 37 We conclude that the disconnect between paragraphs twelve and fourteen of the indictment constituted at most a non-fatal variance. The omitted information from the owners' statements was relevant to the same charge — mail fraud — and the grand jury indicted defendants for unauthorized stays without notice or payment to the owners. See Adamson, 291 F.3d at 616 (finding a variance, rather than a constructive amendment, where only the content of the misrepresentation differed). There is little danger of double jeopardy because defendants were charged with their unauthorized uses of the units. Defendants were not caught off-guard; they examined the owners about whether the contract obligated defendants to disclose their use of the units. Cf. Adamson, 291 F.3d at 616. 38 We also conclude that the government was not required to prove that the unauthorized uses deprived the owners of rent from legitimate renters, as alleged in paragraph fourteen of the indictment. Establishing that the owners were deprived of rental proceeds because legitimate renters were excluded was not necessary to prove the existence of a fraudulent scheme or a mailing. Thus, the language was surplusage because it did not go to an element of the offense. See United States v. Jenkins, 785 F.2d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir.1986) (Insofar as the language of an indictment goes beyond alleging elements of the crime, it is mere surplusage that need not be proved.).