Opinion ID: 1847698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether the trial court erred by allowing into evidence unauthenticated telephone calls and documents alleged to have been made and mailed by gatlin.

Text: ¶ 35. Gatlin argues that certain evidence should have been excluded because it was hearsay and did not come within an exception to the rule. He claims that the admission of a phone call to Gaillot where the caller identified himself as Gatlin was highly prejudicial because it was the basis for his conviction on Count One of the indictment. Gatlin also claims that the admission of a letter he purportedly sent to Gaillot was highly prejudicial in that it served as the basis for his conviction on Count Five. ¶ 36. This Court in its recent decision of Young v. City of Brookhaven, 693 So.2d 1355 (Miss.1997), restated its standard of review in determining the correctness of a trial judge's decision regarding the admission of evidence: Under the Supreme Court's standard of review, the admissibility of evidence rests within the discretion of the trial court. Baine v. State, 606 So.2d 1076, 1078 (Miss. 1992); Wade v. State, 583 So.2d 965, 967 (Miss.1991). However, this Court must also determine whether the trial court employed the proper legal standards in its fact findings governing evidence admissibility. Baine v. State of Mississippi, 606 So.2d at 1078. If in fact the trial court has incorrectly perceived the applicable legal standard in its fact findings, the Court applies a substantially broader standard of review. Id. However, a denial of a substantial right of the defendant must have been affected by the court's evidentiary ruling. Jackson v. State, 645 So.2d 921 (Miss.1994); Newsom v. State, 629 So.2d 611, 612 (Miss.1993); Collins v. State, 594 So.2d 29, 34 (Miss.1992). Furthermore, the trial court's discretion must be exercised within the scope of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence and reversal will be appropriate only when an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to the accused occurs. Parker v. State, 606 So.2d 1132, 1137-1138 (Miss.1992). Young, 693 So.2d at 1358 (quoting Peterson v. State, 671 So.2d 647, 655-56 (Miss.1996)). ¶ 37. Gatlin first argues that the testimony given by Gaillot regarding the contents written on a memo pad was inadmissible hearsay. The trial judge allowed the testimony over Gatlin's contemporaneous objection. Q. Is there a telephone number on that memo pad? BY MS. BUSH: Again I object to hearsay. BY THE COURT: Do you have the original of the document? BY MR. GAILLOT: Yes, sir, I do. BY THE COURT: The question is is there a telephone number on the document. I'll overrule the objection. You may answer the question. A. Yes, there is. Q. What is that telephone number? BY MS. BUSH: Again, I object to hearsay. BY THE COURT: Overruled. ¶ 38. Gaillot was allowed to testify as to the number that was listed on the memo pad as well as the fact that Gatlin was the name of the person who was supposed to be reached at that number. Gaillot was questioned by the State as to his conversation with the person who he called at the number listed on the telephone pad. Gatlin's attorney again objected. BY MS. BUSH: I object to this because there has been no predicate laid that it was in fact Larry Gatlin, and I don't believe he can testify if it's not proved that he was Larry Gatlin, because it's hearsay. BY THE COURT: I think the testimony, of course, will be subject to crossexamination. The witness is testifying about things that he has seen, such as the note pad and the phone number that he called. It's clear that the person, he does not know that the person was Larry Gatlin, but that the person identified himself as Larry Gatlin. All of this will be subject to cross-examination and the objection will be overruled. Gatlin contends that all this evidence was impermissible hearsay evidence that should have been excluded, especially where there was no authentication of the telephone call. ¶ 39. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing this evidence to be admitted. The trial judge states on the record that the witness is testifying to what he observed on the note pad and the name that was given to him by the person who he contacted at the number listed on the note pad. ¶ 40. There is no requirement of authentication as a condition precedent to admissibility where the evidence supports what the proponent claims. Miss. R. Evid. 901(a). Telephone conversations are authenticated when the evidence shows that a call was made to a number assigned at the time by the telephone company to a particular person and self-identification shows that the person answering is the person who was called. Miss. R. Evid. 901(b). In the case sub judice, Gaillot testified that the person with whom he talked on the telephone identified himself as Larry Gatlin. ¶ 41. If the significance of a statement is simply that it was made and there is no issue about the truth of the matter asserted, then, the statement is not hearsay. Miss. R. Evid. 801, cmt. To constitute hearsay, extra-judicial words must by some means present a statement, declaration, or assertion introduced for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter contained in or asserted by the item or thing. Lee v. State, 338 So.2d 395, 397 (Miss.1976). See Swindle v. State, 502 So.2d 652, 658 (Miss.1987); McGowan v. State, 375 So.2d 987, 990 (Miss. 1979). The testimony of Gaillot regarding the memo pad and the telephone conversation was not admitted to prove that Gatlin was the one who made the call. Rather, the testimony was offered to prove that a telephone number was taken down on a memo pad and when Gaillot called the number the person who answered identified himself as Gatlin. This does not constitute hearsay. See Alford v. State, 508 So.2d 1039, 1042 (Miss.1987). ¶ 42. When the State sought to ask Gaillot questions pertaining to the handwritten letter he had received, Gatlin objected as to hearsay. Q. Would you read that letter for us, please sir? A. It says this is a memo stating BY MS. BUSH: I object again. This is hearsay and there is no proof that Mr. Gatlin wrote this letter. BY THE COURT: How did you come in possession? It came in the same envelope? BY MR. GAILLOT: I'm fairly confident that it did, Your Honor, but not absolutely certain. BY THE COURT: I sustain the objection. Q. Does that letter contain information that would only have been known by the person you had been talking with over the telephone that had sent you the information that you testified to previously? A. Yes, sir, it's basically an explanation of the reason for sending the money to Los Angeles and it does refer to me by name. BY MR. LAMPTON: Your Honor, I believe the document would be self-authenticating. I believe the contents of the document are such that would reveal who had in fact sent the document. BY THE COURT: Are you offering it again into evidence, Mr. Lampton? BY MR. LAMPTON: Yes, sir. BY THE COURT: based on that qualification? BY MR. LAMPTON: Yes, sir. BY THE COURT: Let the document be received into evidence and marked Exhibit S-5. ¶ 43. Gatlin's attorney did not offer a contemporaneous objection to the admission of the letter into evidence based on the qualification laid by the State. Now on appeal, Gatlin argues that the letter was hearsay and was not self-authenticating according to Miss. R. Evid. 901. The letter was not hearsay for the same reasons Gaillot's testimony about the telephone calls were not hearsay. Further, Gatlin should not be able to argue to this Court on appeal that the letter was not self-authenticating. No objection was made by Gatlin at the time the letter was admitted into evidence based on the qualification by the State. Gatlin is procedurally barred for failing to raise a contemporaneous objection to the admission of the letter and has waived the argument for appeal purposes. Holly v. State, 671 So.2d 32, 37 (Miss. 1996); Holland v. State, 656 So.2d 1192, 1197 (Miss.1995). ¶ 44. Even if Gatlin was not procedurally barred, his claims that the letter were not self-authenticating are without merit. Gaillot was questioned by the State whether the letter contained information that would only have been known by the person with whom he had been talking over the telephone and had sent information to Gaillot. Gaillot responded that the letter was an explanation of the reason why the money was being sent to Los Angeles and that the letter referred to him by name. Based on this qualification, the trial judge admitted the letter into evidence. The letter was sufficiently authenticated by the evidence supporting what Gaillot claimed. Miss. R. Evid. 901(a). ¶ 45. There is also another basis supported by authority from this Court that holds the testimony by Gaillot was not hearsay. Gaillot talked to Gatlin on the telephone and received mail from him. Both of these acts were criminal according to the prohibitions of Miss.Code Ann. § 97-19-83. Because Gaillot's testimony was relating, first-hand, relevant acts in [a] criminal offense, it was not hearsay. McDavid v. State, 594 So.2d 12, 14 (Miss.1992) (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970)). ¶ 46. Although the above arguments support a finding that the testimony of Gaillot was not hearsay, Gatlin's objection to the testimony was later waived on cross-examination. Gatlin's attorney on cross-examination questioned Gaillot regarding the telephone calls and the letter to which Gaillot had previously testified on direct examination. Gatlin's attorney had previously objected to testimony surrounding the telephone calls and the letter. [W]hen an objection to testimony is interposed and the objection is overruled and the objecting party cross-examines the witness with reference to this same matter to which he had interposed an objection, the objection is waived. Dycus v. State, 440 So.2d 246, 255 (Miss.1983); See also Fielder v. State, 235 Miss. 44, 108 So.2d 590 (1959). ¶ 47. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting the testimony by Gaillot and the handwritten letter into evidence. Gatlin's clams of error as to this issue are without merit.