Opinion ID: 775822
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim 24: Alleged Caldwell Error

Text: 14 When the jury venire appeared for voir dire, the trial court said to the prospective jurors: 15 As far as the process is concerned, let me explain a little about that. You need not, and will not, have to worry about the death penalty in the event that you find, first of all, that there was not a murder or that the murder wasn't in the first degree. 16 . . . . . 17 You may never get to that point, but we still have to talk to you about how you feel about the death penalty. 18 The supreme court, for the last 56 cases that they have decided about the death penalty, and I'm sure all of you have read about the supreme court. There have been 56 cases, ladies and gentlemen, since 1972, I believe, that have talked about the death penalty cases. Fifty-three of them were reversed, three of them were affirmed. 19 In those cases, we were given guidelines. I, as a trial judge, was given guidelines as to how we talk to you about this matter. Those guidelines are still in effect. I'm still bound by them and so are you. None of us are above that law. 20 So I have to talk to you about how you feel about the death penalty. 21 Later, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel objected to that statement, arguing that it might cause some jurors to treat their death-penalty deliberations asan academic exercise in view of the possibility of reversal. The court agreed that the statement was inappropriate and asked defense counsel what he thought the court should do. Counsel responded: We would ask for an admonishment because with the new court [three members of the California Supreme Court recently had been recalled], death may very well mean exactly that. Counsel did not ask the court to replace the jury venire to which the statement had been made. 22 The court agreed to admonish the prospective jurors. When they returned, the court told them: 23 Ladies and gentlemen, I have been requested to admonish you a little bit about what I said in the beginning concerning the amount of cases heard by the supreme court, 56, I believe I mentioned in number and reversals thereon. 24 The Court, me, personally, did not mean to indicate to you one way or the other how I felt about that matter. The Court only wanted to indicate to you that those 56 cases gave us guidelines, which I am obligated -and I think I told you that, that I'm obligated to follow in cases of this nature. And that's all I intended to do. I did not intend to indicate my favor or disfavor of those decisions. I only indicated it was a threshold, the comment concerning the guidelines, that we have to follow. 25 And now I'm going to tell you about those guidelines. 26 Defense counsel did not object to the admonition, move for a mistrial, or otherwise indicate further concern about this matter until direct appeal. 27 On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the court's statement minimized the jury's sense of responsibility for the death sentence by improperly suggesting that such a sentence likely would be reversed. That improper suggestion, Petitioner contended, denied him due process under Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985) (holding that prosecutor's comments suggesting that appellate court, not jury, was final determiner of death sentence denied the petitioner due process). The California Supreme Court agreed that the statement was irrelevant and improper but concluded that it was not prejudicial in the light of the admonition, the remainder of the trial court's comments, and the jury instructions. People v. Morris, 807 P.2d 949, 963-64 (Cal. 1991). 28 Petitioner raised the issue again in claim 24 of his federal habeas petition. The magistrate judge concluded, as had the California Supreme Court, that the trial court'spotentially very serious mistake was not prejudicial in view of the court's subsequent admonition and the jury instructions. The district court adopted that conclusion. 29 In this appeal, Petitioner recounts the court's initial statement (without mentioning the later admonition) and argues: 30 The trial judge made this observation just months after the highly contentious general election in which the state supreme court's death penalty jurisprudence, and specifically the leadership of Chief Justice Rose [Bird] with respect to capital appeals, was at issue. Petitioner contends that these comments are a part of the cumulative prejudice requiring reversal of the judgments in this case. 31 We are not persuaded. 32 While unfortunate, the trial court's comment was relatively mild, especially when viewed in the context of the trial as a whole. The court recognized its mistake almost immediately, asked defense counsel how to cure the error, and did what counsel asked. Further, the jury was instructed during the penalty phase that a death verdict means exactly what it says. That the defendant will be executed. For you to conclude otherwise would be to rely upon speculation or conjecture and would be a violation of your oath as a juror. 33 In the circumstances, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment against Petitioner on claim 24. 34