Opinion ID: 1405704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: habeas corpus claim

Text: (22a) In the petition for writ of habeas corpus which he has filed in conjunction with this appeal, defendant claims that counsel rendered constitutionally inadequate assistance at the guilt phase of the trial in stipulating to the admission of the preliminary hearing testimony of defendant's brother, Kevin Jones. Although admissible over a hearsay objection as the testimony of a witness who was unavailable (Evid. Code, งง 1291, subd. (a)(2); 240 subd. (a)(3)), had an objection been made the evidence should have been excluded as irrelevant to any issue the People were required to establish. [32] The prosecutor had presented the evidence as a predicate for the subsequent introduction of Kevin's inconsistent statements to Officer Southern. [33] After the preliminary hearing testimony had been read to the jury and the statements to Officer Southern had been admitted, the prosecutor advised the court that he had since become aware of this court's decision in People v. Williams (1976) 16 Cal.3d 663 [128 Cal. Rptr. 888, 547 P.2d 1000]. In Williams, we had held that the hearsay exception of Evidence Code section 1235, for prior inconsistent statements, applies only to prior statements of a witness who actually testifies at the trial. (16 Cal.3d at p. 669.) The prosecutor then asked the court: (1) to instruct the jury to disregard a prior instruction that Kevin's statements to Officer Southern could be considered for their truth if the jury was satisfied that Kevin was not telling the truth in his testimony when he claimed not to recall his earlier statements, and (2) to advise the jury that Kevin's statements to Officer Southern could be considered only for impeachment. The court instructed defense counsel to draft an appropriate instruction, but before such an instruction was given defense counsel told the court that he did not wish to have the limiting instruction. He stipulated that Officer Southern's testimony could be used for all purposes, stating that he did so for tactical purposes. Defendant claims in his petition for writ of habeas corpus that his counsel's failure to object to the admission of Kevin's preliminary examination testimony, and his stipulation that the statements made by Kevin to Officer Southern should not be stricken, were not the product of a reasonable, informed tactical decision, but were a result of his ignorance of the rule of People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.3d 663. Although defendant claimed that this allegation was supported by declarations of his trial counsel, in fact the declaration of the lead counsel, the El Dorado County Public Defender, stated that counsel was aware of Williams at the commencement of trial and was aware that Kevin's inconsistent statements could have been kept from the jury. His purpose, he declared, was to put those statements before the jury in the hope that he could persuade the jury to believe at least one part of Kevin's testimony โ that defendant had arrived home from Placerville on July 8, 1981, by 10 a.m. He also wanted the jury to be fully aware of the conduct of the officers who interviewed Kevin, so that the jury could consider that conduct in eliciting his various statements. In his opinion the prosecutor's concession that the testimony of Detective Southern fell within the provisions of Evidence Code Section 1235 [ sic ] was an attempt by him to minimize what he considered might be damaging evidence about Kevin Jones' alibi for 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday. The declaration of defendant's second attorney was simply to the effect that he had not done research prior to commencment of trial regarding Kevin's statements and did not recall if he had discussed the  Williams issue with cocounsel. He did recall that he and cocounsel had discussed the limiting instructions with defendant, and that Kevin had corroborated the issue of defendant being home during the early morning hours. Notwithstanding the conclusory nature of the allegations of the petition with respect to counsel's awareness of the law and tactical decision, and the failure of the declarations of trial counsel to support those allegations, we issued an order to show cause. In the return, respondent alleges that lead trial counsel was aware of the legal authority pursuant to which the evidence from Kevin could have been entirely excluded, but decided to accede to its admission in order to provide corroboration for defendant's alibi defense. Respondent also argues that this decision was an informed and legitimate tactical decision, and that even if it was not so, defendant has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel's actions. The return is supported by additional declarations by defendant's lead trial counsel. The first of these declarations states that the initial declaration was in error in stating that the prosecutor had conceded that the testimony of Officer Southern came within Evidence Code section 1235, and he declared that it was error under Williams, supra, 16 Cal.3d 663. Another declaration states that counsel was aware before trial that defendant's mother had given police a version of facts inconsistent with defendant's testimony, had attempted to give an alibi for defendant in a rape case in another county, and had refused to testify at the guilt phase of the trial. As a result, the only possible corroborating witness for defendant's story was Kevin. Defendant filed a denial to the return. (See ง 1484.) He has not offered an affidavit or declaration controverting those of trial counsel. Instead he simply denies the allegations of the return that lead trial counsel was aware of legal authority which could have excluded Kevin's testimony and statements, and that the decision to admit them was an informed tactical decision. On the basis of his denials he asks that we order an evidentiary hearing to determine the material factual issues in dispute in this action. There are, however, no factual disputes the resolution of which is necessary to the disposition of this petition. In a habeas corpus proceeding the return to the writ or order to show cause alleges facts tending to establish the legality of the challenged detention and is analogous to the complaint in a civil proceeding. [Citations.] The traverse, and the petition where by stipulation or acquiescence it is treated as a traverse [citation], are analogous to the answer in a civil proceeding, and the petitioner `may deny or controvert any of the material facts or matters set forth in the return ... or allege any fact to show either that his imprisonment or detention is unlawful, or that he is entitled to his discharge ...' (Pen. Code, ง 1484; [citations].) (23a) The issues are joined in this manner, and `new matter set up in the petition [and traverse] which tends to invalidate the apparent effect of the process set forth in the return is deemed denied and must be proved by the party alleging it, namely the petitioner.' [Citation.] ( In re Saunders (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1033, 1047-1048 [88 Cal. Rptr. 633, 472 P.2d 921].) (24a) Where there are no disputed factual questions as to matters outside the trial record, the merits of a habeas corpus petition can be decided without an evidentiary hearing. ( In re Lewallen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 274, 278 [152 Cal. Rptr. 528, 590 P.2d 383, 100 A.L.R.3d 823].) (23b) Defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing may be based on his belief that his conclusionary assertion in the petition that counsel was unaware of Williams, supra, 16 Cal.3d 663, and did not make an informed, tactical decision to put Kevin's testimony before the jury, and his denial of the allegations of the return and declarations are sufficient to create a factual dispute. They are not. Unless controverted the allegations of the return are deemed true. ( In re Bower (1985) 38 Cal.3d 865, 873 [215 Cal. Rptr. 267, 700 P.2d 1269]; In re Lawler (1979) 23 Cal.3d 190, 194 [151 Cal. Rptr. 833, 588 P.2d 1257].) While defendant has denied the allegations, he has not and apparently cannot offer proof that the declarations of counsel are untrue. (25) When a habeas corpus petition is prepared by the defendant in propria persona, we require that he allege with particularity the facts upon which he would have a final judgment overturned. ( In re Swain (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300, 304 [209 P.2d 793].) This rule applies with even greater force when a petition is prepared by counsel. (24b) Conclusory allegations made without any explanation of the basis for the allegations do not warrant relief, let alone an evidentiary hearing. (22b) In this case, the only support defendant offers for his allegation that counsel was ignorant of the legal basis on which Kevin's testimony might have been excluded is speculative. [34] (26a) The burden of sustaining a charge of inadequate or ineffective representation is upon the defendant. The proof ... must be a demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter. ( People v. Stephenson (1974) 10 Cal.3d 652, 661 [111 Cal. Rptr. 556, 517 P.2d 820].) (22c) More importantly, however, neither the allegations of the petition, nor the denials of the allegations of the return, address the crucial decision of counsel that was made at the time the limiting instruction was to be given. We find nothing to suggest that counsel's decision at that point to permit the jury to consider Kevin's extrajudicial statements was made in ignorance of the law, or was not, in fact, a tactical decision. Therefore, even were we to consider the allegations of his petition to have been incorporated into the denial, or to assume that respondent has acquiesced in the treatment of the petition as a traverse, no dispositive factual question has been joined by the pleadings. A further consideration that persuades us that no evidentiary hearing is necessary in this case, is defendant's failure to demonstrate that counsel's decision to permit the jury to consider Kevin's testimony, if uninformed or unwise, demonstrates either that counsel's overall performance was such that it fell below reasonable professional standards or that the lapse resulted in prejudice to the defense. (26b) To establish that counsel's assistance was sufficiently ineffective to justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner must first demonstrate that counsel's performance `fell below an objective standard of reasonableness... under prevailing professional norms.' [Citation.] This determination generally must be made with deference to avoid the dual pitfalls of second-guessing counsel's tactics and chilling vigorous advocacy by tempting counsel `to defend himself against a claim of ineffective assistance after trial rather than to defend his client against criminal charges at trial ...' ( In re Cordero (1988) 46 Cal.3d 161, 180 [249 Cal. Rptr. 342, 756 P.2d 1370]. See also Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-694, 104 S.Ct. 1052]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215-218 [233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839].) Defendant must also show that if counsel's performance fell below acceptable standards in some respect, a reasonable probability exists that a more favorable outcome would have been reached absent the deficient performance. ( In re Cordero, supra, 46 Cal.3d 161, 180.) That probability must be one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. ( Ibid.; Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 692 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 696].) (22d) Having reviewed the entire record in this case we cannot accept defendant's premise that counsel's decision to permit the jury to hear Kevin's testimony and extrajudicial statements was one that no competent criminal defense attorney would make, nor do we believe that, even if the decision were questionable, counsel's overall performance was thereby rendered constitutionally deficient. We agree with the trial judge who presided over the proceedings that defendant was well and fully represented by counsel. Finally, we conclude in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt that there is no reasonable probability that had Kevin's testimony and/or his extrajudicial statements been excluded the outcome would have differed in any way.
The order to show cause is discharged and the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. The judgment is affirmed in all respects.