Opinion ID: 2199622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sentencing Hearing Issues Testimony of Victims' Relatives

Text: Defendant maintains that the circuit court violated his eighth amendment right to a fair sentencing hearing by allowing members of the victims' families to testify as to their belief that the death penalty should be imposed. Specifically, defendant cites as improper several questions posed by Special Assistant Attorneys General Keith Jensen and Duane Bailey to the three relatives of the victims called by the State during aggravation. Both Jensen and Bailey asked each witness which penalty he or she wanted the jury to impose. In response, each witness expressed the desire that the jury impose the death penalty. Defendant concedes that he has waived this issue because no contemporaneous objection was made during the hearing; however, he posits that defense counsel's failure to object constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we will review the claim on the merits. Generally, in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that a reasonable probability exists that, but for the error, the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill.2d 504, 85 Ill.Dec. 441, 473 N.E.2d 1246 (1984) (adopting Strickland ). However, we may resolve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by reaching only the prejudice component, for lack of prejudice renders irrelevant the issue of counsel's performance. People v. Erickson, 161 Ill.2d 82, 90, 204 Ill.Dec. 231, 641 N.E.2d 455 (1994). The State acknowledges in its brief that the testimony of David Thompson, Sr., Estella Buckles, and Christine Mosby regarding the appropriateness of the death penalty was improper under Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), rev'd in part, Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). Such a violation, however, is subject to a harmless error analysis, and, therefore, reversal is not mandated in every instance. See People v. Scott, 148 Ill.2d 479, 554, 171 Ill.Dec. 365, 594 N.E.2d 217 (1992). Contrary to defendant's contentions, we are unconvinced that the outcome in this case would have been different had the complained-of testimony been properly excluded. The remainder of the State's case in aggravation was remarkably strong. Indeed, the murders for which defendant stands convicted were cold-blooded and methodical. Three of the victims were bound hand and foot and summarily executed. Another victim, an unsuspecting neighbor who had no involvement with the drug money, was shot when he understandably acted confused when defendant came to his door, displaying a gun and demanding money. Additional testimony, which we can only characterize as disturbing, revealed that after police released defendant from questioning, he expressed regret over not killing the children who were in Mosby's trailer because they might identify him. Thus, defendant's remorse in the case stems not from the killing of five individuals (two of whom he personally shot), but stems from his not killing three young children. Defendant also told another State witness that he would live to kill again. These facts lead to the inescapable conclusion that defendant utterly lacked any remorse for his crimes or rehabilitative potential. In contrast, the evidence in mitigation was slightfamily members and friends testified that defendant came from a religious household and cared deeply for his children. Accordingly, the State's evidence, coupled with the circuit court's instruction to the jury that its decision was not to be swayed by sympathy, passion, or prejudice, compels our conclusion that the error in admitting the improper testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and that no prejudice resulted to defendant from its admission. Therefore, we cannot conclude that counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 692-93. That said, we stress that our resolution of this issue is derived from the particular facts of this case and the overwhelming nature of the State's aggravating evidence at the sentencing hearing. The case at bar was tried in 1995, some seven years after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Booth v. Maryland and four years after its decision in Payne v. Tennessee. As such, there is simply no reason for either Jensen or Bailey to have asked the members of the victims' families for their opinions in the manner revealed in this record. We, therefore, are obliged to alert the State that the future commission of such errors may not produce a similar result and caution it that a closer case in aggravation/mitigation may well result in reversal.