Opinion ID: 776160
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Programmatic EIS

Text: 51 Plaintiffs argue that, in refusing to prepare a programmatic EIS, the Department of the Interior and its sub-agencies, notably the Fish and Wildlife Service, violated NEPA's requirement that [p]roposals or parts of proposals which are related to each other closely enough to be, in effect, a single course of action shall be evaluated in a single impact statement. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.4(a). They maintain that several of the directives contained in the Settlement Act will impose cumulative and synergistic impacts on water allocation and water quality within the Newlands Project and Lahontan Valley. As water supply concerns are at the core of the Settlement Act, they contend, the Department of the Interior was required to assess in a single EIS the combined effects of reallocations away from the Newlands Project (i.e., from Churchill County and Fallon). 52 Although NEPA does not address the question, the CEQ regulations do call for preparation of a programmatic EIS in appropriate circumstances: 53 Environmental impact statements may be prepared, and are sometimes required, for broad Federal actions such as the adoption of new agency programs or regulations (§§ 1508.18). Agencies shall prepare statements on broad actions so that they are relevant to policy and are timed to coincide with meaningful points in agency planning and decisionmaking. 54 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.4(b). The regulations specify the Major Federal actions that are subject to NEPA's EIS requirement. The adoption of programs constitutes one category ofFederal action and is defined by the regulations as follows: a group of concerted actions to implement a specific policy or plan; systematic and connected agency decisions allocating agency resources to implement a specific statutory program or executive directive. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.18(b)(3). The regulations suggest that agencies may find it useful  to evaluate those broad actions (including proposals by more than one agency) in one of three possible ways: 55 (1) Geographically, including actions occurring in the same general location, such as body of water, region, or metropolitan area. 56 (2) Generically, including actions which have relevant similarities, such as common timing, impacts, alternatives, methods of implementation, media, or subject matter. 57 (3) By stage of technological development including federal or federally assisted research, development or demonstration programs for new technologies which, if applied, could significantly affect the quality of the human environment. 58 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.4(c), 59 Moreover, through a process called tiering, agencies can relate broad and narrow actions and . . . avoid duplication and delay. Id. §§ 1502.4(d). Tiering enables an agency to cover 60 general matters in broader environmental impact statements (such as national program or policy statements) with subsequent narrower statements or environmental analyses (such as regional or basinwide program statements or ultimately site-specific statements) incorporating by reference the general discussions and concentrating solely on the issues specific to the statement subsequently prepared. 61 Id. §§ 1508.28. The regulation endorses tiering when the agency moves from the general to the specific or from the specific to a supplement. Id. 62 In Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409 (1976), the Supreme Court acknowledged that NEPA may require a comprehensive EIS in certain situations where several proposed actions are pending at the same time. In Kleppe, several environmental organizations sued the Department of the Interior for failing to prepare a programmatic EIS on coal mining-related actions such as issuing coal leases, approving mining plans, and otherwise enabling private companies and public utilities to develop coal reserves on federally owned or controlled land located in the North Great Plains region. 8 The Department of the Interior had prepared a programmatic EIS on the entire proposed national coal-leasing program and had prepared EISs for individual actions in the region, including approval of mining plans and issuance of right-of-way permits. Plaintiffs maintained that NEPA required a comprehensive EIS for the region before officials could allow further development. Id. at 395. 63 The Court held that §§ 102(2)(C) of NEPA did not require a regional EIS in the absence of a proposal for action of regional scope. Id. at 399. In addition, the Court found that Plaintiffs' desire for a regional environmental impact statement [could not] be met for practical reasons.  Id. at 401. Because a regional proposal would define fairly precisely the scope and limits of the proposed development, id. at 402, the Court concluded that in the absence of such a proposal, there would be no factual predicate for the production of an environmental impact statement of the type envisioned by NEPA. Id. 64 Further, the Court held that [a] court has no authority to . . . determine a point during the germination process of a potential proposal at which an impact statement should be prepared. Id. at 406. A final EIS is required only at the time the agency makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for federal action. Id. (quoting Aberdeen & Rockfish R.C. v. SCRAP, 422 U.S. 289, 320 (1975)). 65 Finally, the Court recognized that when several proposals . . . that will have cumulative or synergistic environmental impact upon a region are pending concurrently before an agency, their environmental impacts must be considered together. Id. at 410. According to the Court, [o]nly through comprehensive consideration of pending proposals can the agency evaluate different courses of action. Id. However, the Court stated that the determination of whether cumulative environmental impacts exist so as to require a comprehensive impact statement is a task assigned to the special competency of the appropriate agencies. Id. at 413-14. Therefore, a party challenging an agency's refusal to prepare a comprehensive EIS must show that the agency acted arbitrarily in making that determination. Id. at 412. 66 Since Kleppe, numerous litigants have urged courts to require that an agency prepare a programmatic EIS. In Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Appalachian Reg'l Comm'n, 677 F.2d 883, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1981), for example, the court addressed whether NEPA required a programmatic EIS for an ongoing, but mostly completed, federally assisted highway development project. In that case, a number of highways still needed to be built to finish the Appalachian system, but the court noted that these fragments only fill in disjointed gaps left in a highway network thoroughly defined now by old roads in place plus new roads already completed or under construction. Id. at 887. Although site-specific EISs were planned for most of the remaining roads, the plaintiffs sought to require the defendant to first prepare a programmatic EIS for the entire project. 67 The D.C. Circuit noted that a multi-phase federal program like a major highway development is a probable candidate for a programmatic EIS, as the CEQ guidelines confirmed. Id. at 888. Reviewing whether an agency's environmental vision was arbitrary or capricious, the court listed two inquiries that were particularly helpful in the analysis:(a) Could the programmatic EIS be sufficiently forward looking to contribute to the decisionmakers' basic planning of the overall program? and, (b) Does the decisionmaker purport to`segment' the overall program, thereby unreasonably constricting the scope of primordial environmental evaluation?  Id. at 889; see also Heckler, 756 F.2d at 159 ([A] programmatic EIS should be prepared if it can be forward-looking and if its absence will obstruct environmental review.). NEPA does not require an EIS to supply an after-the-fact justification for a project. NEPA does prohibit an agency from breaking up a large or cumulative project into smaller components in order to avoid designating the project a major federal action. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 677 F.2d at 890 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The court explained that an agency could not escape the existence of a comprehensive program with cumulative environmental effects by disingenuously describing it as only an amalgamation of unrelated smaller projects. Id. Decisionmakers could, however, reduce a once vast and variegated program to a few uncompleted, smaller-scale enterprises. Id. The court found a programmatic EIS unnecessary given the reality of the existing 1700 miles of decentralized highway construction in Appalachia and the absence of any indication of arbitrary action in using site-specific EISs for the remaining projects. Id. at 891-92. 68 In Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985), we examined the Forest Service's decision not to prepare a comprehensive EIS analyzing the combined effects of construction of a timber road in a formerly roadless area of the Nez Perce National Forest in Idaho and the resulting timber sales that the road would facilitate. We acknowledged the considerable discretion afforded agencies in defining the scope of an EIS and affirmed NEPA's requirement that an agency consider the effects of several related actions in a single EIS in appropriate circumstances. Not to require this would permit dividing a project into multiple `actions,' each of which individually has an insignificant environmental impact, but which collectively have a substantial impact. Id . at 758. 69 The CEQ regulations require that so-called connected or cumulative actions be considered in a single EIS. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.25(a)(1), (a)(2); cf. City of Tenakee Springs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1402, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985) (Where there are large-scale plans for regional development, NEPA requires both a programmatic and a site-specific EIS. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.28, 1502.20[.]) (additional citations omitted). Plaintiffs here do not argue that the sections of the Settlement Act regarding water rights, usage, and allocations areconnected actions within the meaning of the regulations. Rather, they maintain that the actions are cumulative. Cumulative actions are defined as actions, which when viewed with other proposed actions have cumulatively significant impacts. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.25(a)(2). A cumulative environmental impact results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency . . . or person undertakes such other actions. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.7. The regulatory definition includes impacts resulting from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time. Id. 70 In Thomas, we found sufficient evidence in the record to suggest that the road and timber sales would have significant cumulative effects, including sediment deposits in the Salmon River (detrimental to fish) and destruction of critical habitat for the endangered Rocky Mountain gray wolf. The Fish and Wildlife Service had submitted comments regarding these impacts to the Forest Service, and we found that the comments raised substantial questions about the cumulative effects of the road and timber sales, thus requiring an EIS analyzing the potential impact. Thomas, 753 F.2d at 759. Considering the cumulative effects after the road was already approved, moreover, would not satisfy NEPA. Id. at 760. We also rejected the Forest Service's argument that the timber sales were too uncertain and too far in the future to analyze their impacts together with those of the road. [I]f the sales are sufficiently certain to justify construction of the road, then they are sufficiently certain for their environmental impacts to be analyzed along with those of the road. Id. 71 In City of Tenakee Springs v. Clough, 915 F.2d 1308, 1312 (9th Cir. 1990), we stated that an agency must prepare both a programmatic EIS and a site-specific EIS [w]here there are large scale plans for regional development. At least when the projects in a particular geographical region are foreseeable and similar, NEPA calls for an examination of their impact in a single EIS. Id. Thus, we held that the Forest Service's failure to analyze the effects of the timber harvesting plans scheduled over the life of the contract between the Forest Service and Alaska Pulp Company raised serious questions about the adequacy of a supplemental EIS. 72 In this case, Plaintiffs argue that NEPA required the Service to prepare a programmatic EIS analyzing the Settlement Act components affecting future water allocations to the Newlands Project. Plaintiffs maintain that Congress's integrated mandate in the Settlement Act constitutes a regional plan addressing the use of water from two rivers, the Truckee and Carson. S. Rep. No. 101-555, at 8. Plaintiffs are correct; acquisition and allocation of water rights are the core goals of several Settlement Act provisions. The Senate Report states that the Act concerns the apportionment and use of water from [the Truckee and Carson] rivers.  Id. at 8. The text of the Act, moreover, purports to resolve long-standing issues in this particular region involving this scarce resource. In addition, in 1992, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Interior, William Bettenberg, discussed formulating an overall strategy to implement the Settlement Act in a memorandum to the relevant sub-agencies, stating that the issues are complex and interrelated and in some cases the objectives of the law are at cross purposes with one another and place substantial competing demands on scarce water resources.  Mr. Bettenberg indicated that strategic planning was then feasible because enough experience has been gained under the Act to appreciate its many nuances. Furthermore, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Bureau of Reclamation had built up considerable expertise regarding the law, the water resource situation in the area, and other problems with which we must deal. 73 The Pyramid Lake fisheries and Lahontan Valley wetlands both require Newlands Project water. Id. at 10. It is not readily apparent how the Service proposed to get a complete picture of the cumulative environmental impacts without including in its analysis the water-related actions and activities already underway or anticipated. It would seem quite reasonable, in fact, for the responsible agencies to analyze the actions required under the Settlement Act and their cumulative impacts in one document. Early in the implementation process, the agencies indicated that they would attempt a broad analysis, taking into account those Settlement Act directives aimed at water usage. Ultimately, however, they rejected this approach. The Service offers several arguments in support of its course of action. 74 The Service contends that it did not prepare a programmatic EIS because it had no obligation under NEPA to do so. None of the actions contemplated under sections 205, 207, and 209 of the Act had ripened into proposals.  As Plaintiffs respond, however, the regulations do not require a final proposal. Rather, under 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.23, a proposal exists at that stage in the development of an action when an agency subject to the Act has a goal and is actively preparing to make a decision on one or more alternative means of accomplishing that goal so that the effects can be meaningfully evaluated. (Emphasis added.) Reasonable forecasting and speculation is thus implicit in NEPA . . . . City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 676 (9th Cir. 1975). Indeed, NEPA requires that the agency evaluate a project's environmental consequences early in the planning process. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323, 327 (9th Cir. 1975). This requirement is tempered, though, by the statutory command that we focus upon a proposal's parameters as the agency defines them. Block, 690 F.2d at 761 (citing Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 406-07). It simply makes sense to defer detailed analysis until a concrete development proposal crystallizes the dimensions of a project's probable environmental consequences. Id. 75 Plaintiffs further maintain that a number of the actions contemplated under the Settlement Act had matured intoproposals. For example, in 1995, the Department of the Interior published a Notice of Intent to Prepare an EIS on a broad-based water management program. The program was intended to consolidate three closely related activities contemplated in Public Law 101-618, notably, the wetlands management plan under Section 206(a), recovery of the Pyramid Lake fish under Section 207(a), and modifications to the Newlands Project Operating Criteria and Procedures (OCAP). The Notice cited an extensive list of proposed and active Federal and non-Federal projects that may have cumulative impacts, which would also be considered in the EIS, including: 76 the proposed TROA; a revised O&M agreement; water rights acquisitions to enhance water quality of the lower Truckee River; water rights acquisitions to sustain on a long term average of 25,000 acres of wetlands in Lahontan Valley; interim changes to the existing OCAP for the Newlands Irrigation Project; Lahontan Reservoir storage agreements; a pilot project to acquire Truckee Division water to enhance populations of endangered cui-ui, and any Upper Carson water acquisitions. 77 The Department itself characterized the actions as proposals. As Plaintiffs note, the Department has called the TROA a proposal since at least 1996, despite delays in producing the EIS. In short, Plaintiffs have submitted sufficient evidence to show that many of the actions required under the Settlement Act met NEPA's definition of a proposal. Defendants' contention that it was not obligated to prepare a programmatic EIS because other projects required by the Settlement Act were not sufficiently definite to permit meaningful review is unpersuasive. 78 But whether or not the actions and activities anticipated as a result of the Settlement Act were proposals  is somewhat off-point. Plainly, the officials responsible for implementing the Settlement Act believed for at least several years that it made good sense to analyze several provisions of the Act as a whole, especially the sections requiring water rights acquisitions and allocations. It also appears that a programmatic EIS was the vehicle for the analysis. It is just as evident that the officials changed their minds. Defendants offer many reasons why NEPA did not require them to proceed by way of a programmatic EIS, many of which Plaintiffs adeptly refute. The regulations and case law would support a decision by the Service to prepare a programmatic EIS, had it decided to prepare one. Indeed, had we been charged with the decision, we may have elected to prepare a programmatic EIS first. The problem, of course, is that it was not our decision to make. 79 Although we can see that the Service's decision was a close call, the record does not support a conclusion that the agency's goal was to minimize the possible cumulative environmental impacts by segmenting the wetlands water rights acquisition program from the analysis of other foreseeable actions. The Settlement Act is unwieldy and potentially contradictory in its various requirements. In addition, agricultural interests will unavoidably feel much of the impact of the changes that Congress has ordered. We cannot, as Plaintiffs may wish, sanction the use of NEPA's EIS requirements to challenge the policy goals served by the Settlement Act. See, e.g., Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 777 (1983) (The political process, and not NEPA, provides the appropriate forum in which to air policy disagreements.). The fact that we might proceed differently does not compel us to order the Service to prepare a programmatic EIS instead of, or along with, the WEIS. We agree with the district court that the Service took a hard look and that its decision not to proceed with a programmatic EIS was not arbitrary.