Opinion ID: 889300
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prevent Oppressive Pretrial Incarceration

Text: ¶ 56 Whether an accused's pretrial incarceration was oppressive depends on the particular circumstances of that incarceration. Ariegwe, ¶ 90. We consider the duration of the incarceration, the complexity of the charged offense, any misconduct by the accused directly related to his incarceration, and the conditions of the incarceration, such as overcrowding, recreational opportunities, adequate food, climate control, proper medical care, cleanliness, and legal research capabilities. See Ariegwe, ¶¶ 90-93. ¶ 57 Couture was incarcerated for the entire 924-day period between arrest and trial, which the District Court stated would normally support a finding of prejudice but for three considerations: Couture never asked the court to set bond or otherwise consider releasing him before trial; Couture was responsible for the vast majority of the delay; and the conditions of his incarceration were not oppressive. While Couture challenges this analysis on several grounds, we conclude that the court's ultimate determination is supported by the record. ¶ 58 First, regarding the duration of the incarceration, 924 days (roughly two and a half years) is an extremely long time to be incarcerated on unproven charges. Indeed, the District Court repeatedly expressed concern during the pretrial period about the fact that Couture was incarcerated. The duration of Couture's incarceration, therefore, supports a finding of oppressiveness. ¶ 59 On the other hand, however, we have said that the length of pretrial incarceration that is oppressive is less for a relatively simple offense than it is for a complex charge. Ariegwe, ¶ 91. Thus, in Billman, we held that the lengthy incarceration of 278 days, coupled with the relatively simple charges (felony DUI and two misdemeanor driving offenses), established that the pretrial delay had prejudiced the defendant. Billman, ¶ 41. But here, as the State points out, the charges of deliberate homicide and tampering with evidence were more complex, as evidenced by the extensive defense investigations. Couture also obtained multiple mental health evaluations; and at the January 27, 2005 hearing, he agreed with Nistler, on the record, that obtaining a private psychiatrist to assist in his defense was in [his] best interest, even though he would remain in custody for a longer period of time. The complexity of the charged offenses and the need to explore plausible defenses to those charges justified a longer period in which to prepare for trial, a correspondingly longer period of pretrial delay, and therefore a longer period of pretrial incarceration, given that Couture was not out on bail. ¶ 60 In this connection, we agree with Couture that his failure to seek bail is not particularly significant. The reason he did not do so was because he did not have sufficient resources to meet any bail obligation imposed on a deliberate homicide charge. Nevertheless, we have previously indicated that bail and the defendant's inability to post it may be a relevant circumstance to consider under this prong of the analysisthough it is by no means a tipping point. There are various factors which go into the determination of bail. Among other things, the bail amount must be commensurate with the nature of the offense charged and sufficient to ensure the presence of the defendant in a pending criminal proceeding. Section 46-9-301(1), (5), MCA. Thus, in State v. Keyes, 2000 MT 337, ¶ 18, 303 Mont. 147, 15 P.3d 443, we held that [a]s to any prejudicial effects of Keyes' lengthy pretrial incarceration, there can be no doubt in this case that a high bail and resulting incarceration were necessary in light of the very serious offenses with which Keyes was charged and his demonstrated ability and willingness to abscond from justice. In other words, the fact that the accused remained incarcerated due to a high bail is less likely to be deemed oppressive when the record establishes that the high bail was necessitated by the nature of the offense charged or the accused's status as a high flight risk. In the present case, had Couture requested bail, he concedes that it would have been quite high, given the charge of deliberate homicide. Hence, his resulting incarceration, due to the serious nature of the offense with which he had been charged, weighs against a finding of oppressiveness. ¶ 61 Lastly, if the duration of a defendant's incarceration pending trial was due in part to a deliberate attempt by the prosecution to delay the trial, this fact would weigh in favor of the conclusion that the incarceration was unduly prolonged and, thus, was oppressive. Couture in fact makes this point on appeal, contending that his stay of roughly nine months in solitary confinement was oppressively lengthy due to the delays in getting his case to trial, which he contends were attributable to the State. We conclude below under Factor Two, however, that the majority of the pretrial delayand, correspondingly, the majority of Couture's pretrial incarcerationis attributable to the defense, not the State. This fact weighs against a finding of oppressiveness. ¶ 62 Aside from the duration of and the reasons for the incarceration, the other primary consideration here is the conditions of the incarceration. When analyzing the conditions of the incarceration to assess oppressiveness, we focus on the condition of the facilities and how they impact the accused, rather than solely on the condition of the accused. Billman, ¶ 41. As noted, Couture complains of his stay in solitary confinement. Yet, his placement in solitary was at his own request because he couldn't handle being around the other inmates in the general population. Moreover, he conceded at the speedy trial hearing that he had access to a recreation room, received three meals a day, and was provided hot water, showers, light, and other necessities, including medical treatment. Likewise, Michael Sargeant (Lake County Undersheriff during Couture's incarceration) testified at the hearing that the jail adhered to special dietary guidelines and provided bathing, laundry, television, board games, and recreational opportunitiesall of which weighs against a finding of oppressiveness. ¶ 63 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that while Couture's incarceration was quite lengthy, the circumstances of the incarceration were not oppressive. Therefore, this factor provides little support for a finding of prejudice resulting from the pretrial delay.