Opinion ID: 741075
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The complaint in this action be dismissed on the ground of laches; and

Text: 48 2. The parties are directed not to proceed further with the arbitration of this matter before the American Arbitration Association. 49 By intervening into the administration of the arbitration process, however, the district court not only usurp[ed] a function which [ ] is entrusted to the arbitration tribunal 60 but also clearly contravened the clear spirit of the [Act]. 61 50 Defenses of laches, mere delay, 62 statute of limitations, and untimeliness constitute a broad category of waiver defenses that may be raised to defeat compelled arbitration. Laches, like its companion defenses, however, is a matter of procedural arbitrability solely for the arbitrators' decision and not for the court. Justice Brennan so held in Operating Engineers v. Flair Builders, Inc. 63 51 In Flair Builders, there had been no contact between the parties from the time they signed their arbitration agreement in 1964 until the summer of 1968. At that point, Flair Builders objected to arbitration on the ground of laches, alleging: 52 To require [it] to respond, through arbitration, to general charges of noncompliance with contract provisions allegedly beginning more than two years before this suit was filed would impose an extreme burden on its defense efforts.... [T]o compel arbitration would reward [the Union] for its own inaction and subject [Flair Builders] to the risk of liability because of actions taken or not taken in reliance on [the Union's] apparent abandonment. 64 53 Unpersuaded by Flair Builders' plea, Justice Brennan held: 54 [O]nce a court finds that ... the parties are subject to an agreement to arbitrate, and that agreement extends to any difference between them, then a claim that particular grievances are barred by laches is an arbitrable question under the agreement.... [And after] [h]aving agreed to the [arbitration] clause, the company is obliged to submit its laches defense ... to the arbitral process. 65 55 We reached the same conclusion that laches is a question for the arbitrators in In re Mercury Constr. Corp. 66 Our holding to this effect was neither questioned by the petition for certiorari filed by the appellant, nor disturbed by the Supreme Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. In Mercury, the hospital alleged that Mercury Construction had failed to make a timely demand for arbitration and had therefore waived its right to arbitrate. We held that any claim of untimeliness, waiver or laches ... is for the arbitrator and may not be an excuse for non-arbitrability. 67 Three years later, in County of Durham v. Richards & Assocs., we reaffirmed our position that questions of limitations raised to defeat a motion to compel arbitration are for the arbitrator and not for the courts to decide. 68 56 The decisions of the Second Circuit, which are preeminent in arbitration law, comport with our holdings. As early as 1952, District Judge Weinfeld wrote: the issue of whether or not the statute of limitations is a bar to the proceeding, is, nevertheless, within the competence of the arbitrators. 69 In Conticommodity Services, Inc. v. Philipp & Lion, 70 the Second Circuit, drawing upon its earlier decision in Trafalgar Shipping Co. v. International Milling Co., 71 ruled that all questions of delay which relate to issues which the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration [are to] be resolved by the arbitrators, not the court. 72 In Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. Wagoner, 73 the Second Circuit declared that in Conticommodity, they had emphatically [stated] that any limitations defense--whether stemming from the arbitration agreement, arbitration association rule, or state statute--is an issue to be addressed by the arbitrators. 74 57 It is clear, therefore, that under the Act, the district court is expressly limited to making only the pre-order determinations of identifying the arbitrable issues and reviewing the making and performance of the arbitration agreement. Questions regarding the arbitrability of an issue may not be revisited by the court. Additionally, the foregoing case law illustrates that questions of mere delay, laches, statute of limitations, and untimeliness raised to defeat the compelled arbitration are issues of procedural arbitrability exclusively reserved for resolution by the arbitrator. Kidder's plea of laches, therefore, cannot defeat the district court's order of arbitration. 58 Having stated the law of arbitration in this case, we now turn to the order of the district court.