Opinion ID: 1900997
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Request for further instruction on excessive speed

Text: In his instructions to the jury, the trial justice told them in relevant part: As regards to statutory duties, one of our laws provides that any person driving a vehicle on a way, or any other place, shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed not greater than is reasonable and proper having due regard to the traffic, surface, and width of the way or place or of any other conditions then existing.       Driving an automobile in violation of law, if you find a violation of law, or of the rules of the road as I have been announcing here, raises a presumption of negligence. When it is a proximate cause of the accident, and if it is unexplained and uncontrolled, it is exclusive evidence of carelessness. On the court's inquiry, whether there were any objections to the charge as given, the plaintiffs' attorney responded that there were none on behalf of the plaintiffs. On the court's inquiry, whether there were any other requested instructions, the plaintiffs' attorney addressed the court as follows: Just for the record, I would like to voice the fact that I think excessive speed should be used here, because I don't think excessive speed goes only to the fact that it's over opposed to (sic) the limit, but that it's excessive to the particular conditions on that day. Assuming, without deciding, that counsel's stated suggestion may be considered as a specific request for further instructions to the effect that there may be negligent conduct even though the motor vehicle was not being operated at a rate of speed over or beyond the posted speed limit, the presiding justice's refusal to further instruct the jury on excessive speed in reference to posted speed limits was not reversible error. [4] Respecting the speed at which due care requires the driver of an automobile to operate the vehicle in order to negate negligent conduct, the court had properly instructed the jury in the general terms of the statute. The jury was told, as provided by 29 M.R.S.A. § 1252(1), that any person driving a vehicle on a way or in any other place shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed not greater than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic, surface and width of the way or place, and of any other conditions then existing. The statute articulates the all-inclusive duty owed at common law by motorists on our public ways, irrespective of penal statutes specifically prohibiting speeds in excess of particular speed limits under described circumstances enacted for highway safety purposes. The speed of an automobile, even if not prohibited under the regulatory limits enacted by subsection 2 of section 1252, may, by reason of other conditions then existing, become excessive speed or, in other words, a violation of the common law principle mandating the operation of vehicles at careful and prudent speed not greater than is reasonable and proper. The statute, § 1252(1), reiterates it, as did the court in its instruction. In the instant case, the posted speed limit in the area of the accident had no material bearing as such upon the defendant's duty of due care, since her operation was presumably under the posted speed limit. Despite the existence of higher posted speed limits, it is such conditions as the traffic on the way, its ice-patched surface in this case, its grade, and all other conditions then present, which may dictate the speed at which an individual exercising reasonable care may travel; in fact, a lesser speed than the otherwise authorized posted one. See Reed v. Rule, 376 A.2d 445, 447 (Me.1977). So, the jury was informed. If the instructions as given are substantially correct, and the legal situation was apparently made clear to the jurors, there is no need to further elaborate the point. When the jury has been properly instructed on the legal principle involved in the case, its amplification in application or otherwise is left to the discretion of the presiding justice. Desmond v. Wilson, 143 Me. 262, 267, 60 A.2d 782, 785 (1948), and cases cited. It may be that the presiding justice thought the giving of an amplified instruction, as suggested by the plaintiffs, to the effect that excessive speed need not be a violation of the posted speed limit, where there was no evidence of any violation of the posted speed limit, would unduly emphasize an insubstantial particular state of facts. As stated in Towle v. Aube, 310 A.2d 259, 266 (Me.1973), any amplification or illustration in the manner of applying the stated principles of law to the various aspects of the facts in a case is a matter subject to the control and sound discretion of the presiding justice. There was no abuse of discretion in relation to the court's refusal to instruct on the point suggested by the plaintiffs. The entry will be: Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed. All concurring.