Opinion ID: 1790315
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: liability of employer on disability claim

Text: The circuit court, while agreeing that the injury or disease was incurred on September 1, 1972 and that maximum medical recovery was reached on May 16, 1973, nevertheless held Magnavox liable for all awards up to March 16, and Singer liable for all awards thereafter. This apportionment of damages between successive carriers was apparently done on the theory that Magnavox and its insurer would have been liable had a claim been filed prior to the transfer of the company, thus they should be liable for all claims to that time. Conversely, applying the last injurious exposure rule the circuit court found Singer liable for all claims, including partial permanent disability, arising after March 16, the transfer date of ownership from Magnavox to Singer. Such an apportionment cannot stand. Our statutes make no provision for apportionment of awards except in the case of preexisting handicap or disease. Here, the apportionment involved is between successive employers or insurers. In Thyer Mortgage Company v. Mooney, 252 Miss. 629, 173 So.2d 652 (1965), we held that the apportionment provision of our statute refers only to the amount of compensation to which the injured employee will be entitled, not to how the payments of the compensation will be apportioned among those liable. (252 Miss. at 639, 173 So.2d at 656). We went on to point out in that opinion that the Workmen's Compensation Commission is an administrative agency, not a court of law and that there is no method provided by law by which it may adjust equities between insurance companies. The wisdom of such a decision is apparent here where the central conflict is between the two insurance companies rather than between claimant and employer. Absent statutory provisions, the resolution of contribution between successive carriers whether based on contract or equity should be resolved in an action at law or equity, apart from the workmen's compensation determination. Magnavox argues that the last injurious exposure rule should be applied to hold Singer totally liable since the last exposure was the period March 16 to April 11, during which Singer owned the plant. In the alternative, Magnavox argues that the rule to be applied where occupational disease is involved is that liability is determined as of the date the disability manifests itself, and that since the disease was not diagnosed until April 11, that is the date liability should attach. The last injurious exposure rule as set forth by Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 95 (1978) is: When a disability develops gradually, or when it comes as the result of a succession of accidents, the insurance carrier covering the risk at the time of the most recent injury or exposure bearing a causal relation to the disability is usually liable for the entire compensation. It is not necessary at this time to rule on the application of the rule in this state, since the facts do not present such a situation. The purpose or justification for such a rule is to set a definite and certain time for liability to attach and thus avoid the often difficult task of determining which of a series of injuries caused the disability or which of a series of exposures caused the disabling disease. In the absence of difficulty in locating a definite and certain time, the rule has no application. In the present case, the Workmen's Compensation Commission determined that Smith was disabled on September 1, 1972, the date of initial exposure to the abiruana wood dust. The circuit court concurred in that finding, and the medical history and testimony in the cause substantially supports this determination. Central Electric & Machinery Co. v. Shelton, 220 So.2d 320 (Miss. 1969). It is clear on the facts that the disease and resulting disability had manifested itself prior to the change of ownership of the factory and the degree of injury did not change. We also reject Magnavox's argument that liability should attach as of the date the disease was diagnosed. In many cases a person can be totally and helplessly disabled before a correct diagnosis can be obtained. Such a rule would totally defeat the purpose of the workmen's compensation statutes. See Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of Tupelo, Inc., and Federated Mutual Insurance of Atlanta v. Long, 362 So.2d 182 (No. 50,408, Miss. July 26, 1978). Magnavox further urges that there was a preexisting disease (asthma) for which apportionment should have been granted. However, the record taken as a whole substantially supports the Commission's finding adverse to Magnavox on this issue. We have also carefully considered Magnavox's claim that statutory penalties provided for in Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-3-37 (1972) should not be imposed, but find this contention to be without merit. That part of the order of the Commission finding Magnavox liable on the claim and dismissing Singer is reinstated. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED TO THE COMMISSION FOR DETERMINATION OF AMOUNT OF PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY AWARD. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, BROOM, LEE, BOWLING and COFER, JJ., concur.