Opinion ID: 3016340
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Malicious Use of Process Claim

Text: We note that it appears that the District Court erred in finding that Wyatt’s Fourth Amendment malicious use of process claim, insofar as he stated such a claim,5 accrued at the time Wyatt’s license was revoked. We have previously held “that a claim of malicious use of process may state a Section 1983 claim if it includes the elements of that common law tort as it has developed.” McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1088 (3d Cir. 5 Under the “Rights Violated” section of Wyatt’s complaint, he asserts that he “has a federally guaranteed right under the 4th Amendment not to be maliciously and improperly prosecuted.” Although, as stated, this appears to state a malicious prosecution claim, which is usually made with respect to criminal charges, we will interpret the claim as a malicious use of civil process claim. 8 1992). “[U]nder the Pennsylvania statute codifying this tort, a defendant may not be found liable unless . . . [t]he proceedings have terminated in favor of the person against whom they are brought.” Id. Because favorable termination is a necessary element of his § 1983 claim, Wyatt neither knew nor had reason to know of the injury that constituted the basis of his action until such termination. Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 349 (3d Cir. 1989). Accordingly, that claim did not accrue under federal law until the Commonwealth Court reversed the license revocation. Id. However, Wyatt does not allege this error in his brief, and it could therefore be considered waived. In any case, it is well understood that “[t]he first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Albright requires a violation of an explicit constitutional protection in order to support a § 1983 claim. See id. at 275 (holding that substantive due process, “with its scarce and open-ended guideposts,” cannot be used to support a § 1983 suit for malicious prosecution (quotations omitted)). Given that Wyatt would have to show violation of a textually rooted constitutional right, his claim was correctly dismissed on its face. Wyatt alleges a Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution. However, this Court has read Albright as rejecting such a broad right to be free from prosecution without probable cause, instead requiring “a deprivation of liberty accompanying the prosecution” in order to use the Fourth Amendment. Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 1998). 9 Additionally, Wyatt’s alleged rights under the First Amendment “to do business and to associate,” under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to “pursue his chosen profession,” and under the Commerce Clause to “further his business ends” do not find any support in the case law.6 Hence, the District Court correctly dismissed the malicious use of process claim, as Wyatt fails to allege adequately a specific constitutional violation to support a § 1983 claim. Finally, Wyatt’s malicious use of process claim is likely facially deficient because it does not appear that Keating actually instituted any “civil proceeding” against Wyatt. The Western District of Pennsylvania considered this issue: A proceeding is defined in Pennsylvania as “every declaration, petition or other application which may be made to a court under law or usage or under special statutory authority, but . . . not an action or an appeal.” Following [the zoning officer’s] letter, it was the Plaintiffs who appealed to the Zoning Board and then to the Court of Common Pleas. The tort of wrongful use of legal proceedings arises “when a party institutes a lawsuit with a malicious motive and lacking probable cause.” “The essence of the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings is the institution of a civil action for a malicious purpose and without probable cause.” In this case, there is no allegation of 6 This Court has alluded to substantive due process being a sufficient hook for civil malicious use of process claims. See Herr v. Pequea Township, 274 F.3d 109, 118 (3d Cir. 2001). However, the substantive due process standard employed in Herr, looking to whether the state actor acted with an “improper motive,” has been rejected as irreconcilable with the “shocks the conscience” standard. UA Theatre Circuit v. Township of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 400 (3d Cir. 2003). Substantive due process does not appear to provide a constitutional right to be free from civil suits filed without just cause. See Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 792 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that this Court read Albright as allowing § 1983 malicious prosecution claims “based on a constitutional provision other than the Fourth Amendment . . . so long as it was not based on substantive due process”). 10 a civil proceeding, and therefore we do not and cannot infer that the City Defendants initiated or continued a civil proceeding for a malicious purpose. We therefore dismiss this claim against the City Defendants. Pellegrino Food Prods. Co. v. City of Warren, 136 F. Supp. 2d 391, 406 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (quoting 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 102 and Rosen v. Am. Bank of Rolla, 627 A.2d 190, 191 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), respectively). Similarly, here Keating initiated an investigatory process within the Department resulting in the revocation of Wyatt’s license, and it was Wyatt who appealed that decision to the court system. Thus, under the definition of “proceedings,” it appears that Wyatt cannot state a claim. We have considered the remainder of Wyatt’s arguments and conclude that they are without merit.