Opinion ID: 771935
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Enhancement for Permanent or Life-Threatening Bodily Injury

Text: 32 If the victim of a car jacking sustains bodily injury, the sentencing court may increase the offense level by four if the injury is serious, and by six if the injury is permanent or life-threatening. U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(3). Here, the government requested the six-level enhancement, but the district court imposed the four-level enhancement instead. The government argues, on cross-appeal, that the district court should have imposed the six-level enhancement. 33 The Guidelines define permanent or life-threatening bodily injury as 34 injury involving a substantial risk of death; loss or substantial impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty that is likely to be permanent; or an obvious disfigurement that is likely to be permanent. In the case of a kidnapping, for example, maltreatment to a life-threatening degree (e.g., by denial of food or medical care) would constitute life-threatening bodily injury. 35 U.S.S.G. 1B1.1(h), cmt. n.1(h). A district court's determination whether a victim has sustained a permanent or life threatening bodily injury is a determination of fact that we review for clear error. United States v. Hinton , 31 F.3d 817, 825-26 (9th Cir. 1994). A district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed de novo. United States v. Kakatin, 214 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 2000). 36 The district court stated that it is a close call whether the six-level enhancement applies, but ultimately decided that it does not apply. Specifically, the court found that Klein's injuries themselves were not life-threatening, but that Klein's situation was life-threatening because he was buried in snow in a remote gully on a freezing night. The court stated: It probably was more likely a life-threatening injury because of the circumstances of kicking Mr. Klein down into this gully than the injuries which he had suffered before that was done. 3 37 It is clear from its discussion that the court believed that the life-threatening enhancement applies to only two types of injuries: (1) injuries that are severe enough to be life threatening, regardless of the circumstances in which they are inflicted; and (2) injuries that are less severe, but are nevertheless life-threatening because of the circumstances in which they are inflicted. It also is clear that the district court believed that this enhancement does not apply when the circumstances themselves are life-threatening, irrespective of any other injury that the victim might have suffered. With this understanding, the court asked whether it was the circumstances or whether it was really the injury that made this life threatening. Because the court found that Klein's circumstances were more dire than his injuries, it concluded that it could not grant the enhancement for life-threatening injury. 38 We do not agree that the court's authority is so limited. The Guideline that applies to carjacking states:In the case of a kidnapping, for example, maltreatment to a life-threatening degree (e.g., by denial of food or medical care) would constitute life-threatening bodily injury. U.S.S.G.S 1B1.1(h), cmt. n.1(h). In other words, the Guideline explicitly contemplates that, during a kidnapping, deprivation of the essentials of life or similar maltreatment may by itself be a life-threatening bodily injury, whether or not the perpetrator also has inflicted other injuries. 39 Klein was locked in the trunk of a car in freezing weather for many hours. During that time he was denied fresh air, food, water, medical care, and heat. Then he was dumped in a ditch in a remote area on a freezing night and covered with snow and debris; the same deprivations continued. Although the district court considered those acts to be the circumstances in which the beatings took place, the court considered only the beatings, but not the deprivations, to be the relevant injuries. We conclude, however, that the deprivations themselves were maltreatment of the sort contemplated in the Guideline. If they were maltreatment to a life threatening degree, then they would justify a six-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(3), irrespective of the other injuries that Klein suffered. By concluding that it lacked the authority to depart upward based solely on that form of maltreatment, the district court erred as a matter of law. 40 Although the district court appears to have believed that the circumstances in which Defendant and Johnson placed Klein were life-threatening, we cannot be sure on this record. Accordingly, we remand for the district court to consider whether Defendant's maltreatment of Klein was life threatening. 41 Our remand is limited to that question. The district court's other findings with respect to this Guideline are not clearly erroneous. Specifically, we hold that the district court did not clearly err in finding that (1) Klein's other injuries (cuts, fractured skull, etc.) were not life-threatening; and (2) those injuries were not permanent. 42 Judgment of conviction AFFIRMED; sentence VACATED and REMANDED on cross-appeal.