Opinion ID: 429819
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Magistrate's Dependence on the District Court

Text: 76 The majority in this case and the Third Circuit panel in Wharton-Thomas acknowledge that consent of the parties alone does not cure all of the constitutional ills created by transfer of Article III powers to magistrates who lack Article III protections. See majority op. at 543-44; Wharton-Thomas, 721 F.2d at 930. They conclude, however, that the district judges' control over magistrates cures any remaining ones. In doing so they focus only upon the threat of erosion of the power exercised by Article III judges and ignore other separation of powers issues. They thus satisfy themselves that the district judges retain their judicial power because district judges maintain, in the words of the majority in this case, the appearance and the reality of control over civil cases. Majority op. at 544. That control, we are told, is sufficient, even without statutory guidance as to when and how it is to be exercised, to ensure that withdrawals of references will be made when appropriate. This, according to the majority, is a better system than the district court review of magistrate recommendations approved in Raddatz. In my opinion, this control makes a bad matter worse. 77 The majority assumes that district judges will be able to tell when magistrates are making mistakes. The purpose of the consensual reference provision, however, was to relieve district court judges from some of their decisional responsibilities. If it were possible for district judges to supervise all civil cases to the extent the majority contemplates, there would be no need for magistrates. District judges should be making these decisions in the first instance. 78 What control by the district court does do is create a severe conflict of interest for the magistrate who is compelled to choose between what the magistrate concludes is right and the result the magistrate thinks will please the district court. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of greater restraints on the exercise of independent judgment than the provisions in the Act that permit a magistrate to be dismissed, or assignment of a case vacated at any time, by the district court under undefined procedures and malleable standards. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(c)(6) (1976 and Supp. V 1981). If there is a greater disincentive to independent action, it is fear that a particular decision, though legally correct, might lead Congress to lower the pay of all magistrates. That situation, of course, is also possible under this Act. 79 The constitutional implications of judges controlling other judges outside the appellate process are not unique to this Act. They also have surfaced during the debate of the last twenty years over judicial discipline, removal, and other regulation of conduct by judges. 80 Strong voices have argued that under our Constitution, no judge should be accountable to any other judge. Judge Irving Kaufman of the Second Circuit, arguing that permitting judges to remove other judges from office frustrates judicial individualism, stated: Judicial independence, like free expression, is most crucial and most vulnerable in periods of intolerance, when the only hope of protection lies in clear rules setting forth the bright lines that cannot be traversed. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 Yale L.J. 681, 715 (1979). Judge Wallace, of this Circuit, referring to a threat of overzealous programs for judicial efficiency, has written that it is incumbent upon the judges themselves to fight back if these programs interfere with 'total and absolute independence of judges in deciding cases or in any phase of the decisional function.'  Wallace, Judicial Administration in a System of Independents: A Tribe With Only Chiefs, 1978 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 39, 56 (quoting J. Covington, Autonomy v. Efficiency--The Continuing Debate on Judicial Supervision of Federal Trial Judges 43 (July 23, 1973) (unpublished paper)). Professor Kurland declared himself in wholehearted agreement with Justice Black's dissent from the denial of a stay in Chandler v. Judicial Council, 382 U.S. 1003, 86 S.Ct. 610, 15 L.Ed.2d 494 (1966) (mem.), which stated: 81 One of the great advances made in the structure of government by our Constitution was its provision for an independent judiciary--for judges who could do their duty as they saw it without having to account to superior court judges or to anyone else except the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment.... We should stop in its infancy, before it has any growth at all, this idea that United States district judges can be made accountable for their efficiency or their lack of it to judges just over them in the federal system.... 82 Chandler, 382 U.S. at 1005-06, 86 S.Ct. at 611, quoted in P. Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes from History, 36 U.Chi.L.Rev. 665, 667 (1969). 83 Some Supreme Court consideration of the issue came in Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 90 S.Ct. 1648, 26 L.Ed.2d 100 (1970). The recognition of the need to preserve the decision making function independent of the influence of any other judge is reflected in all three opinions in the case. The majority denied a district judge's petition for extraordinary relief from a judicial council order, in which the district judge had acquiesced, withdrawing case assignments. The Chief Justice wrote: There can, of course, be no disagreement among us as to the imperative need for total and absolute independence of judges in deciding the cases or in any phase of the decisional function. Id. at 84, 90 S.Ct. at 1653. Justice Harlan's concurrence, as well, noted the basic responsibility of judges for final adjudication of law suits. Id. at 110, 90 S.Ct. at 1667. Justice Douglas' dissent sounded a stronger chord: Once a federal judge is confirmed by the Senate and takes his oath, he is independent of every other judge. He commonly works with other federal judges who are likewise sovereign. Id. at 136, 90 S.Ct. at 1680. 84 The majority in the present case, without reference to any of the concerns expressed by all of these judges and scholars, has concluded that the provisions in the Magistrates Act for district judges to control the appointment of magistrates, their reappointment, their assignment of cases, and even the withdrawal of assignments, somehow preserve the independence of decision making. I submit that in reality, the control by the district judges prevents it. If judges are to possess the freedom from political influences of any kind necessary to ensure their ability to decide cases impartially, then, in addition to the express protections of Article III, review of their actions must occur only in accordance with appeal procedures developed under standards of due process.