Opinion ID: 2977011
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Duress as Defense to Conspiracy Offenses

Text: Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying her Rule 29 motion in light of her duress defense, and further argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that she willingly became a member of the conspiracies alleged in the indictment. However, the defense of duress presents an issue which is separate and apart from the elements of the conspiracy offenses. The elements of a drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 are: (1) an agreement to violate drug laws; (2) knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy; and (3) participation in the conspiracy. United States v. Caver, 470 F.3d 220, 232-33 (6th Cir. 2007). In order to convict defendant for conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, the government was required to prove: (1) the existence of an agreement to violate the law; (2) the defendant’s knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy; and (3) an overt act constituting actual participation in the conspiracy. United States v. Hughes, 505 F.3d 578, 593 (6th Cir. 2007). The duress defense “does not negate a defendant’s criminal state of mind when the applicable offense requires a defendant to 17 have acted knowingly or willfully; instead, it allows the defendant to ‘avoid liability ... because coercive conditions or necessity negates a conclusion of guilt even though the necessary mens rea was present.’” Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 7 (2006)(quoting Bailey, 444 U.S. at 402). Thus, the fact that defendant claimed to have acted involuntarily while under duress does not undermine the government’s proof on the issue of whether defendant knowingly and intentionally joined the conspiracies. The government produced evidence sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to conclude that defendant knowingly and intentionally became a part of the charged conspiracies. Personne McGhee testified that he approached defendant and asked her if she would like to make some money. He told her that she would “just have to bring some in through the institution” and offered her a price, and defendant agreed. Defendant admitted picking up packages on three occasions and smuggling the first two packages into the institution in her lunch cooler. There was also testimony that defendant was paid for her part in the conspiracy. The testimony of Clady McGhee and Kim Halliburton establishes that defendant was paid $800 for the first delivery and $1,000 for the second and third deliveries. There was also evidence that defendant admitted receiving $800 for one delivery, and that she was found to be in possession of $1,000 after picking up packages on the third occasion. The jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that the defendant participated in the conspiracies knowingly and intentionally. As previously stated, defendant did not produce sufficient evidence to establish a duress defense, and the district court 18 properly determined that defendant had failed to proffer evidence sufficient to establish the defense of duress or to warrant an instruction on that defense. Even if defendant had successfully proffered sufficient evidence to warrant a jury instruction, the issue of duress would have presented a fact question for the jury; defendant was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on her duress defense. The district court did not err in denying defendant’s Rule 29 motions on the conspiracy counts based on her duress defense.