Opinion ID: 508816
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellants' Request for a Hearing on Good Faith Under Freitas.

Text: 16 The warrant to search Unit 39 was a surreptitious entry, or what is known as a sneak-and-peek warrant. It allowed the agents to enter the unit, examine and take an inventory of the unit's contents, and then leave without disturbing the contents or notifying the owner of the unit. 2 See E.R. at 40 (warrant). 17 The defendants argue that the warrant violated Fed.R.Crim.P. 41 3 and the Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir.1986), we reviewed a similar warrant. We held that the warrant violated Rule 41. Id. at 1455-56. Violation of Rule 41, however, does not lead to suppression of evidence unless: (1) it is a fundamental violation--that is, a violation that in effect, renders the search unconstitutional under traditional fourth amendment standards, United States v. Vasser, 648 F.2d 507, 510 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 928, 101 S.Ct. 1385, 67 L.Ed.2d 360 (1981); (2) the search might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the Rule had been followed, United States v. Ritter, 752 F.2d 435, 441 (9th Cir.1985); or (3) there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision of the Rule, id. 18 Freitas did not reach the question of whether the evidence had to be excluded under one of these standards. Rather, it held that the warrant's lack of any notice requirement violated the Fourth Amendment. It held that time allowed for notice should not exceed seven days except upon a strong showing of necessity. Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1456. The court went on to say that the agents' reliance on the warrant might have been objectively reasonable, thus allowing the evidence to be admitted under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1457; see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). The district court had found that the agents could not have acted in good faith. This court, however, remanded to the district court for further fact finding on the subject of the agents' good faith, and on whether the violation of Rule 41 required exclusion of the evidence. Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1457-58. 19 Johns, at the time he made his Freitas motion, had only the district court opinion in Freitas for support. That court had simply struck down the covert warrant as unconstitutional. United States v. Freitas, 610 F.Supp. 1560, 1571 (N.D.Cal.1985). Our decision in Freitas was handed down after Johns' motion but before that motion was considered by the district court. The district court, however, merely stated that [i]n view of the Ninth Circuit's reversal, the Court declines to reconsider its prior ruling as to the availability of an evidentiary hearing. E.R. at 244. 20 It must be presumed that the district court denied the request for an evidentiary hearing for one of two reasons. First, it might have believed that the warrant in question did not violate either the Fourth Amendment or Rule 41(d). This would be an incorrect conclusion. This warrant is indistinguishable from the warrant in Freitas. 21 Second, the district court might have believed that the officers had acted in good faith in relying on the warrant. The record does not unequivocably support this conclusion. Our standard of review is de novo. See Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1454. The defendants insist that the agents did not act in good faith. In particular, they argue that the true source of information on which the search warrant was based was an informant, and that the failure to inform the magistrate of this informant is evidence of bad faith. Appellant's Brief at 32. The defendants, to support their contention, point to a probation report that refers to the existence of an informant. E.R. at 239. They also allege that a government attorney admitted the informant's existence to one of the defendants' attorneys. 4 And, of course, they point to the allegations of their experts to the effect that the agents could not have smelled what they claim to have smelled. Their allegations are difficult to review on appeal. The government has not explained how it came to suspect illegal activity within Unit 39 before any smells were detected. Nor does it flatly deny the existence of an informant. Under these circumstances, we must hold that sufficient doubt as to the agents' good faith exists, requiring us to remand the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the good faith issue. 5 22