Opinion ID: 1197013
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Serrato-Soto's 2004 Conviction

Text: The BIA has held that a criminal offense involves `moral turpitude' if the relevant statute defines the offense in such a manner that it necessarily entails conduct on the part of the offender that is inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general. Matter of Kochlani, 24 I. & N. Dec. 128, 129 (B.I.A.2007). And crimes that have a specific intent to defraud as an element have always been found to involve moral turpitude. Id. at 130. Moreover, as the Supreme Court has explained, fraud has consistently been regarded as such a contaminating component in any crime that American courts have, without exception, included such crimes within the scope of moral turpitude. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 229, 71 S.Ct. 703, 95 L.Ed. 886 (1951); see also Omagah v. Ashcroft, 288 F.3d 254, 260 (5th Cir.2002) (In the wake of Jordan, the courts of appeals have interpreted `moral turpitude' as including a wide variety of crimes that involve some fraud or deceit.). To determine whether Serrato-Soto's crime involves moral turpitude, this Court employs the categorical approach, whereby we consider not whether the actual conduct constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, but whether the full range of conduct encompassed by the statute constitutes a crime of moral turpitude. Cuevas-Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir.2005). See also Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 186-87, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). Accordingly, we look to the elements of the statutory state offense, not to the specific facts. We rely on what the convicting court must necessarily have found to support the conviction and not to other conduct in which the defendant may have engaged in connection with the offense. Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377, 381-82 (3d Cir.2003) (citation and quotation omitted); see also Matter of Short, 20 I. & N. Dec. 136, 137 (B.I.A.1989) (It is the inherent nature of the crime as defined by statute and interpreted by the courts and as limited and described by the record of conviction which determines whether the offense is one involving moral turpitude.). Serrato-Soto was convicted under Mississippi Code § 97-19-85. That section, titled Fraudulent use of social security number or identifying information to obtain goods, reads as follows: (1) Any person who shall make or cause to be made any false statement or representation as to his or another person's identity, Social Security account number, credit card number, debit card number or other identifying information for the purpose of fraudulently obtaining or with the intent to obtain goods, services or any thing of value, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof for a first offense shall be fined not more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) or imprisoned for a term not to exceed five (5) years, or both. For a second or subsequent offense such person, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) or imprisoned for a term not to exceed ten (10) years, or both. In addition to the fines and imprisonment provided in this section, a person convicted under this section shall be ordered to pay restitution as provided in Section 99-37-1 et seq. (2) A person is guilty of fraud under subsection (1) who: (a) Shall furnish false information wilfully, knowingly and with intent to deceive anyone as to his true identity or the true identity of another person; (b) Wilfully, knowingly, and with intent to deceive, uses a Social Security account number to establish and maintain business or other records; or (c) With intent to deceive, falsely represents a number to be the Social Security account number assigned to him or another person, when in fact the number is not the Social Security account number assigned to him or such other person; or (d) Knowingly alters a Social Security card, buys or sells a Social Security card or counterfeit or altered Social Security card, counterfeits a Social Security card, or possesses a Social Security card or counterfeit Social Security card with intent to sell or alter it. MISS.CODE ANN. § 97-19-85. Serrato-Soto's record of conviction does not cite any particular subsection under which he was charged and convicted. Even so, under any of the subsections, as defined in the statute, Serrato-Soto must have acted willfully, knowingly, or with intent to deceive. Id. Thus, Serrato-Soto was convicted of a crime that, in the ordinary case, involves dishonesty as an essential element. See Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193; Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 697-98 (A.G. 2008). A person convicted under this Mississippi statute must also have used the personal information in the course of some action with the intent of committing a crime involving moral turpitude, including furnishing said information to another to hide a person's true identity, using the personal information for business purposes, falsely portraying a social security number as his own, altering a social security card, or buying or selling a legitimate or counterfeit social security card. MISS.CODE ANN. §§ 97-19-85(2)(a)-(d). As such, Serrato-Soto's conviction under this statute is outside the scope of cases involving mere unlawful possession of illegal documents, which the BIA has held does not involve moral turpitude. See, e.g., Matter of Serna, 20 I. & N. Dec. 579, 585-86 (B.I.A. 1992) (holding that mere possession of illegal documents, without intent to use said documents fraudulently or unlawfully, is not a crime involving moral turpitude). Accordingly, because Serrato-Soto's crime has the intent to defraud and some affirmative action beyond mere possession as essential elements, his crime falls within this Circuit's understanding of moral turpitude. See, e.g., Kabongo v. INS, 837 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir.1988) (finding that alien's convictions for making false statements and obtaining government funds by fraud involved moral turpitude because the alien made dishonest statements); Zaitona v. INS, 9 F.3d 432, 437-38 (6th Cir.1993) (agreeing with a BIA determination that an alien's conviction for making false statements on a driver's license application, in violation of Michigan statute, involved moral turpitude because an element of the crime required the alien to knowingly make a false statement or knowingly conceal a material fact, which amounted to fraud). Serrato-Soto renews his argument, made unsuccessfully before the BIA, that we should exempt misuse of social security numbers from the category of crimes involving moral turpitude based upon the Ninth Circuit's decision in Beltran-Tirado v. INS, 213 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir.2000). [4] In Beltran-Tirado, Beltran was convicted of falsely representing a social security number in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(g)(2) (recodified at 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B)). Id. at 1182. The United States Immigration and Naturalization Service moved to deport her. Beltran sought lawful permanent residence by applying for registry under 8 U.S.C. § 1259. [5] The BIA denied her request on the ground that her use of a false social security number constituted a crime involving moral turpitude, which precluded her from demonstrating the statutory requirement of good character. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the use of a false social security number to establish credit and work in the United States did not involve moral turpitude. The court relied on the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 408(d) (recodified at 42 U.S.C. § 408(e)), which was added by amendment. That section provides that aliens who had been granted permanent resident status under the amnesty or registry statutes were exempted from prosecution for certain past use of social security numbers. 42 U.S.C. § 408(e); Beltran-Tirado, 213 F.3d at 1183. In explaining the purpose behind the exemption from prosecution, the Ninth Circuit cited Congress's conference committee report: The Conferees intend that this exemption apply only to those individuals who use a false social security number to engage in otherwise lawful conduct.... The Conferees believe that individuals who are provided exemption from prosecution under this proposal should not be considered to have exhibited moral turpitude with respect to the exempted acts for purposes of determinations made by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id. (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 101-964, at 948 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2374, 2653). The Ninth Circuit recognized that the amendment did not apply to Beltran but applied the conference committee's rationale behind the amendment to find that Beltran's crimes did not involve moral turpitude. 213 F.3d at 1184. The Fifth Circuit, in Hyder v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 388 (5th Cir.2007), recently addressed an analogous issue involving an alien convicted of misuse of a social security number obtained by fraud and declined to follow Beltran-Tirado. As that court, reasoned, Beltran-Tirado appears to have expanded a narrow exemption beyond what Congress intended. Id. at 393. The amendment and legislative history upon which the Ninth Circuit relied applies to aliens who have already been granted status as lawful permanent residents and only applies to future criminal prosecutions. 42 U.S.C. § 408(e). The mere fact that Congress chose to exempt a certain class of aliens from prosecution for certain acts does not necessarily mean that those acts do not involve moral turpitude in other contexts. Hyder, 506 F.3d at 393. We agree with the Fifth Circuit's decision and reasoning in Hyder and decline to follow Beltran-Tirado. Additionally, we note that Serrato-Soto is not a lawful permanent resident and, thus, does not fit within the classification of aliens described in 42 U.S.C. § 408(e) as contemplated in Beltran-Tirado. And in declining to follow Beltran-Tirado, we do not disturb established Sixth Circuit precedent finding crimes of fraud or dishonesty within the class of crimes involving moral turpitude. See, e.g., Kabongo, 837 F.2d at 758; Squires v. INS, 689 F.2d 1276, 1278 n. 3 (6th Cir.1982); Zaitona, 9 F.3d at 437-38.