Opinion ID: 902614
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Motion for Appointed Counsel

Text: “[T]he appointment of counsel in a civil case is a privilege and not a constitutional right.” Lopez v. Reyes, 692 F.2d 15, 17 (5th Cir. 1982). Title VII provides for the appointment of counsel “in such circumstances as the court may deem just.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). In determining whether to appoint counsel in a Title VII case, a court should consider “(1) the merits of the plaintiff’s claims of discrimination; (2) the efforts taken by the plaintiff to obtain counsel; and (3) the plaintiff’s financial ability to retain counsel.” Gonzalez, 907 F.2d at 580. No one factor is conclusive. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the appointment of counsel is justified. Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305, 1310 (5th Cir. 1977). It is undisputed that Paskauskiene is of limited financial means and that she made significant efforts to retain counsel by contacting several attorneys, albeit unsuccessfully. However, by adopting the findings of the FWCRD, the EEOC found no evidence of discrimination underlying Paskauskiene’s claims. Determinations by the EEOC are “highly probative” of the merits of a plaintiff’s case when considering a motion to appoint counsel. See Gonzalez, 907 F.2d at 580. This court is also permitted to consider Paskauskiene’s ability to represent herself alongside the factors listed above, as they are “simply ingredients in the total mix of relevant information which should guide the discretion of the district court.” Caston, 556 F.2d at 1310; see Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that a court may consider a plaintiff’s ability to represent herself, among other factors, when evaluating whether to appoint counsel under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Paskauskiene is highly educated, familiar with Title VII law and procedure, and was pursuing a straightforward case. For these reasons, as 6 Case: 12-11243 Document: 00512274732 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/14/2013 No. 12-11243 well as those stated above, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Paskauskiene’s motion for the appointment of counsel.