Opinion ID: 1874397
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State ex rel. Brault v. Kyser

Text: The principal opinion concludes that State ex rel. Brault v. Kyser, 562 S.W.2d 172 (Mo.App.1978), is inapplicable, even though Brault expressly held that a petition to terminate parental rights is an independent civil action entitling a party to a new motion for change of judge. The reasoning in Brault is sound today, just as it was then. The Brault court first noted that petitions for protective custody and petitions for termination of parental rights are grouped together in separate subheadings within chapter 211. Id. at 174. That is still the case. Petitions to assume jurisdiction over children in need of care and treatment are covered by sections 211.031 to 211.431. The provisions pertaining to the termination of parental rights are grouped together in sections 211.442 to 211.490 and are specially marked off with the subheading Termination of Parental Rights. Although not dispositive, the retention of a separate subheading indicates the intent to classify petitions to terminate parental rights as independent actions. See, Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 94, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003)(noting that a separate subheading within the criminal code containing the statutory provisions for sex offender registration evidences some intent to classify the registration requirements as a criminal punishment). Second, Brault noted that protective custody petitions have a fundamentally different purpose than a petition to terminate parental rights. Id., at 174. The petition to assume jurisdiction contemplates only a temporary change of custody and leaves parental rights intact, whereas the petition to terminate parental rights seeks to nullify the parent-child relationship. Id. The petition to terminate parental rights represents a fundamental shift in the state's role from assisting a family in distress to dismantling the very existence of that family. Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody and nurturance of his or her child, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). A petition to terminate those fundamental interests is not merely supplemental. Finally, Brault noted that because the petition to terminate parental rights seeks a different result than the petition for juvenile division jurisdiction, it also requires different factual findings. Brault, 562 S.W.2d at 174. The principal opinion dismisses Brault because the decision is based upon chapter 211 as then constituted, but does not recognize that the fundamental differences between petitions for juvenile division jurisdiction and petitions to terminate parental rights remain unchanged. As Brault explained, a petition for termination of parental rights was, and still is, an independent civil action. Rule 126.01 is not inconsistent with Brault. Rule 126.01 does not mention petitions to terminate parental rights. Instead, the rule provides only that: a supplemental petition and a motion to modify a prior order of disposition under chapter 211, RSMo, shall not be deemed to be an independent civil action unless the judicial officer designated to hear the motion is not the same judicial officer that heard the previous action. Absent an express provision in Rule 126.01(c) that a petition to terminate parental rights is a supplemental petition, and in view of the continued applicability of the reasoning in Brault, it begs the question to conclude that the term supplemental petition must refer to petitions to terminate parental rights. Imposing such a significant limitation on the long-standing and vital right to disqualify a judge requires more than an inference.