Opinion ID: 2549762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scope of the Remand Order

Text: On remand, the Court of Judicial Discipline unanimously construed this Court's order, and its reference to recently revealed corruption, to be limited to the informations and indictments against Ciavarella, Conahan, and Sharkey, and Moran's Stipulation of Compromise. Lokuta III, at 949. The court determined there would be no discovery, but permitted appellant 90 days to investigate her claims and present additional evidence. Id., at 946. Appellant argues the court improperly limited the scope of its review to the court filings. Appellant claims she should have been able to place her case in the context of this corruption, as explained by the reports of our special masters and the Interbranch Commission. Appellant contends such a context would allow her to prove Conahan and Ciavarella manipulated witnesses into testifying against her. The Board contends it was reasonable for the court to construe recent revelations of corruption as limited to the corruption known at the time this Court issued its remand order. The Board observes the court allowed appellant to investigate, and she was unable to provide evidence showing witnesses conspired to bear false witness against her. The issue of whether the Court of Judicial Discipline properly interpreted this Court's remand order is a matter of law; accordingly, our scope of review is plenary. See Pa. Const. art. V, § 18(c)(2) (scope of review for questions of law is plenary); In re Milton Hershey School, 590 Pa. 35, 911 A.2d 1258, 1261 (2006) (As this is a purely legal question, our standard of review is de novo and scope of review is plenary.). We remanded appellant's case for the limited purpose of that court considering [appellant]'s claims in the nature of after-discovered evidence, arising from the recent revelations of corruption in Luzerne County. Lokuta II, at 227. Appellant was able to offer evidence based on the corruption revealed shortly before our remand order. Nonetheless, she seeks to introduce evidence of Luzerne County corruption discovered after our remand order. However, our order did not refer to future, potential, or soon-to-be revealed allegations of corruption. Further, appellant does not indicate at which point future revelations of corruption would be irrelevantshe cannot seek a new trial with every new indictment or newspaper report? Such potentially unlimited reexamination of appellant's case would destroy the public interest of finality. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (One of the law's very objects is the finality of its judgments.). Further, allowing appellant to repeatedly reopen her case would frustrate Luzerne County's interest in filling the currently vacant judicial seat. Therefore, because our remand order explicitly referred to evidence arising from the then-recently revealed corruption, the Court of Judicial Discipline did not err in construing it to exclude evidence arising from later discovered allegations of corruption.