Opinion ID: 1343596
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Custom-Designed Policy

Text: Appellees submit for the first time on rehearing that the policy issued to the county commission is not a custom-designed tailor-made policy. In Eggleston, we recognized that policies of insurance issued under the Act are often custom designed and accordingly, differ from the type of insurance policy routinely issued to private individuals. 189 W.Va. at 233, 429 S.E.2d at 639. As we explained in Eggleston, the hallmark of a so-called custom-designed policy is that [i]t [i]s different from the usual insurance policy that is prepared and printed by an insurance company and delivered to the insured, whose only input ordinarily is not as to its language, but as to the amount and type of coverage. Id. It is a term of art, perhaps not well chosen in Eggleston, because its common usage suggests a sophisticated level of negotiations and specific reasoning that preceded the governmental entity's purchase of the subject insurance contract. The term custom-designed policy actually implies nothing more than a policy whose terms stand in contrast in some manner to those of standardized insurance policies. While there may have been merit to the issue of whether the insurance policy issued to the county commission is truly a custom-designed policy, the parameters of appellate jurisdiction prohibit us from addressing this non-jurisdictional issue: [T]he Supreme Court of Appeals is limited in its authority to resolve assignments of nonjurisdictional errors to a consideration of those matters passed upon by the court below and fairly arising upon the portions of the record designated for appellate review. Syl. Pt. 6, in part, Parker v. Knowlton Const. Co., Inc., 158 W.Va. 314, 210 S.E.2d 918 (1975); accord Powderidge Unit Owners Ass'n v. Highland Properties, Ltd., 196 W.Va. 692, 700, 474 S.E.2d 872, 880 (1996) (noting that Supreme Court's review is limited to the record as it stood before the circuit court at the time of its ruling). Without reaching an express finding on the custom-design issue, we conclude only that it is presumptively a custom-designed policy since this issue was never raised below and because the insurance policy is substantially similar to the one analyzed in Cook and determined therein to be custom-designed. See Cook, 191 W.Va. at 260, 445 S.E.2d at 201. We recently exhorted in Parkulo v. West Virginia Board of Probation and Parole, ___ W. Va. ___, 483 S.E.2d 507 (1996), that the text of the applicable insurance coverages afforded, including any applicable contractual exceptions or limitations contained in the policies, should be included in the record at an early stage of the proceedings.... Id., slip op. at 14, ___ W. Va. at ___, 483 S.E.2d at ___. While the pertinent policy provisions were made a part of the record below, Appellees failed to make any argument while they were before the circuit court regarding the inclusion or exclusion of any policy language that would permit the policy to be designated as custom-designed within the meaning of Eggleston. See 189 W.Va. at 233, 429 S.E.2d at 639. Just as we required relevant insurance policy information be promptly made a part of the record in Parkulo, we require that any party wishing to challenge the legality of an insurance policy issued to a governmental subdivision, where its terms differ from the general requirements of law, must develop a record at the trial level on the issue of whether the governmental entity chose not to acquire the level of coverage generally required by law. If such can be demonstrated, then it can properly be characterized as custom-designed within the meaning of Eggleston. See 189 W.Va. at 233, 429 S.E.2d at 639. Accordingly, we hold that the issue of whether an insurance policy, issued to a governmental subdivision pursuant to West Virginia Code § 29-12A-16(a), [11] is a custom-designed policy must be raised, developed and preserved for review at the trial court level. It is undisputed that the policy was procured by a governmental entity pursuant to the Act. Accordingly, just as the State Board of Risk in Cook limited liability by restricting the total amount of coverage to $1,000,000, the State Board of Risk in the instant case acted in accordance with its legitimate powers in limiting the State's liability for underinsurance to individuals in, upon, getting in, on, out or off a covered auto, even if the limitation otherwise violated the provisions of West Virginia Code § 33-6-31. Given Appellee's concession that he was not occupying a covered auto at the time of the accident, underinsured motorist coverage is not available under the terms of Appellant's policy and, accordingly, the circuit court erred in its ruling regarding this matter.