Opinion ID: 1730855
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: unlawful taking without just compensation

Text: [15] The Scofields next argue that the district court erred in dismissing their claim that the regulations effected an unlawful taking of their property without just compensation in violation of the Nebraska and U.S. Constitutions. [16] The Nebraska Constitution provides that the property of no person shall be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. [51] The 5th Amendment to the federal Constitution, made applicable to the states through the 14th Amendment, provides: [N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. [52] Nebraska's constitutional right to just compensation includes compensation for damages occasioned in the exercise of eminent domain and, therefore, is broader than the federal right, which is limited only to compensation for a taking. [53] We have noted, however, that notwithstanding the difference between the federal and state Constitutions, we have analyzed the state constitutional issue of whether there has been a regulatory taking or damage for a public use by treating federal constitutional case law and our state constitutional case law as coterminous. [54] The U.S. Supreme Court in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. [55] clarified the law surrounding regulatory takings claims and provided a framework under which such claims are to be addressed. The Court identified two types of regulatory actions that constitute categorical or per se takings: First, where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her propertyhowever minorit must provide just compensation. [56] Compensation is required for physical takings however minimal the economic costs [they] entail[], because they eviscerate[] the owner's right to exclude others from entering and using her property perhaps the most fundamental of all property interests. [57] The second categorical rule applies to regulations that completely deprive an owner of ` all economically beneficial us[e]' of her property. [58] The complete elimination of a property's value is the determinative factor in this category because the total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation. [59] [17] The Court in Lingle stated that outside these two relatively narrow categories, and the special context of land-use exactions, regulatory takings challenges are governed by the standards set forth in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City (Penn Central). [60] Thus, under a Penn Central inquiry, relief is possible from a regulatory taking which does not deprive the owner of all economic use of the property. The standards set forth in Penn Central are designed to allow careful examination and weighing of all relevant circumstances. [61] The Court in Lingle explained that the [p]rimary Penn Central factors included `[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.' [62] Another relevant factor in discerning whether a taking has occurred is the `character of the governmental action'for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely affects property interests through `some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.' [63] The Penn Central analysis turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the magnitude of a regulation's economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests. [64] [18] In the present case, the Scofields do not allege that the DNR has effected any permanent physical invasion of their property. Nor do they allege that all economically beneficial use of their property has been taken as a result of the regulations at issue. Thus, in order for their takings claims to survive the DNR's motion to dismiss, they must have sufficiently alleged in their complaint that, despite neither permanent physical invasion of their property nor a complete deprivation of all the economically beneficial use of their property, they are nevertheless entitled to compensation based upon the factors discussed in Penn Central. In light of the allegations presented in the Scofields' complaint, and because we must accept as true all facts which are well pled and the proper and reasonable inferences of law and fact which may be drawn therefrom, [65] we conclude that the Scofields have, at least, stated a claim under the Penn Central factors. [19] The district court, in granting the DNR's motion to dismiss, found that because the Scofields do not have property rights in wild game on their land, the prohibition on hunting as a result of their land's being designated as a refuge did not constitute an unconstitutional taking. The court was correct in that there is no property right generally in wild game, for the ownership therein is lodged in the state. [66] However, the court incorrectly construed the allegations raised in the Scofields' complaint. As noted by the Scofields in their brief, it is not the right in the wild game or the right to hunt [67] for which they are seeking compensation. Rather, they are seeking compensation for the deprivation of their right to make economically viable use of their property. [68] [20] In this regard, we have held that `[t]he right to full and free use and enjoyment of one's property in a manner and for such purposes as the owner may choose, so long as it is not for the maintenance of a nuisance or injurious to others, is a privilege protected by law.' [69] And in their complaint, the Scofields alleged, among other things, that the regulations have significantly denied [them] their enjoyment and beneficial (or economically viable) use of a portion of [their] [p]roperty. Furthermore, the Scofields claimed that the regulations have deprived [them] of recreational income and have resulted in a diminishment of the fair market value of such property. The question at this point is not whether the Scofields will be able to prove these allegations sufficiently to establish a taking, as we do not test the claim's substantive merits under § 6-1112(b)(6). Assuming that these allegations are true, and construing them in the light most favorable to the Scofields, we find that the Scofields have stated a claim for relief under a Penn Central theory of recovery.