Opinion ID: 2325777
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prejudicial Remark in Prosecutor's Closing Argument

Text: Brooks' final contention is that it was error for the trial court to have denied his motion for a mistrial following the government's rebuttal argument, in which the prosecutor appealed to the jury to judge the case as though the deceased victim were your son, your husband, your brother. Brooks argues that this was an improper attempt to influence the jury. We hold that, even assuming it was, reversal is not warranted. We have stated that prosecutors should adhere to standards which `uphold the dignity of the Government,' Sellars v. United States, D.C.App., 401 A.2d 974, 977-78 (1979), quoting Taylor v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 188, 189, 413 F.2d 1095, 1096 (1969), and, in particular, that it is wrong for the prosecutor to urge the jurors to place themselves in the shoes of the victim. Clarke v. United States, D.C.App., 256 A.2d 782, 786-87 (1969). Nevertheless, we have also abided objectionable prosecutorial remarks when they came in response to arguments made by the defense. See, e.g., Khaalis v. United States, D.C.App., 408 A.2d 313, 346 (1979); Reed v. United States, D.C.App., 403 A.2d 725, 730 (1979); Christian v. United States, D.C.App., 394 A.2d 1, 33 n.86 (1978), cert. denied sub nom. Clark v. United States, 442 U.S. 944, 99 S.Ct.2889, 61 L.Ed.2d 315 (1979); Medina v. United States, D.C.App., 315 A.2d 169, 170 (1974). In this case, the prosecutor's remark was responsive to the closing argument of counsel for appellant Turner, in which he said to the jury: You must sit here and judge Mr. Turner, just as if you were in that seat or if a member of your family was in that seat. And, that's the justice I ask from you, ladies and gentlemen, to judge Mr. Turner, just as you would want to be judged, or if a member of your family is being judged here today.... I ask you to return to this courtroom and bring in the one and only verdict of not guilty for Mr. Turner and send him home with his wife and five children. We need not decide, however, whether these remarks are fairly imputable to Brooks as well as Turner, or whether the prosecutor's argument that the jury should judge the case as if the deceased victim were a family member would be unobjectionable. For, even assuming arguendo that Brooks can properly complain of the prosecutor's remark, we are convinced that it did not infect the verdict. See Dyson v. United States, D.C.App., 418 A.2d 127, 132 (1980); Johnson v. United States, D.C.App., 386 A.2d 710, 713 (1978). Although not in the best traditions of government, the misconduct was not egregious, was not directly related to the question of appellant's guilt, and was soon followed by the court's charge that the jury should judge the evidence without prejudice or sympathy. See, supra at 731; Smith v. United States, D.C.App., 315 A.2d 163, 166, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896, 95 S.Ct. 174, 42 L.Ed.2d 139 (1974); Gaither v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 154, 172, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (1969). Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the prosecutor's remark so prejudiced appellant as to entitle him to a new trial. Affirmed.