Opinion ID: 4533284
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: trial rulings and judgment

Text: Pearson’s Title VII retaliatory termination claim went to trial. She challenges two of the district court’s evidentiary rulings during trial and the judgment as a matter of law it entered. First, she contends that the district court abused its discretion by excluding all evidence from before October 23, 2012 as not relevant to whether the defendants had retaliated against Pearson for filing the 9 Pearson also makes a mixed-motive argument, see Quigg v. Thomas Cty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2016), and a mosaic theory argument, see Smith v. Lockheed–Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011), for her Title VII sex discrimination claim. Because we find that a genuine issue of material fact exists about whether the City discriminatorily demoted her under the McDonald Douglas framework, we need not consider those other arguments. 22 Case: 17-15275 Date Filed: 05/11/2020 Page: 23 of 33 EEOC charge on that date. Second, she challenges the court’s exclusion of a December 2012 email from Shanahan that Pearson tried to put into evidence during the trial. Finally, Pearson contends that the district court erred by granting the defendants judgment as a matter of law after her close of evidence. We consider each contention in turn.
The sole claim that made it to trial was that Pearson was terminated in retaliation for filing the October 23, 2013 EEOC charge. The court excluded as irrelevant evidence about anything that occurred before she filled out a questionnaire on October 23, 2012 prefatory to filing the EEOC charge. The parties and the district court treated that date as the beginning of her protected conduct, and so will we. The court excluded evidence of any conduct by the defendants before that date because it could not have been evidence of retaliation for protected conduct that had not yet happened. We review that evidentiary ruling only for an abuse of discretion. Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1103 (11th Cir. 2005). We will not reverse a district court’s decision to exclude evidence “unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous.” Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997)). And even if the decision is manifestly erroneous, we will not reverse if 23 Case: 17-15275 Date Filed: 05/11/2020 Page: 24 of 33 the error was harmless. United States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1323 (11th Cir. 2011). According to Pearson, the district court erred by ruling any and all preOctober 23 evidence per se irrelevant instead of considering each piece of proffered evidence individually to determine its relevance. We disagree. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. The alleged events or conduct that occurred before October 23, 2012 that Pearson argues were relevant to the question of whether Shanahan had a retaliatory intent when he fired her, include: Shanahan’s August 2012 false accusation of worker’s compensation fraud against Pearson, Shanahan’s July 2012 false accusation against Pearson of losing a radio, Shanahan’s May 2012 leak of Pearson’s personnel records to the media, Shanahan’s prior retaliation and leak of information in 2010 when employed by the city of St. Mary’s, Shanahan’s manipulation of the H.R. process to get Sam [Smith] to replace Pearson as manager after her demotion, and the retaliatory hostile work environment suffered by Pearson . . . . None of that evidence has any tendency to make it more probable that Shanahan retaliated against Pearson based on her October 2012 EEOC activities and filings, instead of for some other reason, because all of that evidence relates to incidents that occurred before she did the first protected act. See Fed. R. Evid. 401. 24 Case: 17-15275 Date Filed: 05/11/2020 Page: 25 of 33 Pearson’s evidence of pre-October 23, 2012 events and conduct actually tends to prove the lack of a retaliatory motive stemming from her protected conduct on and after that date. It shows that Shanahan had taken adverse actions against Pearson before she took the first step to filing the EEOC charge. Which tends to show there were other motives behind her termination. No matter how bad the motive for terminating Pearson may have been, if it was not in retaliation for her protected conduct in connection with the EEOC charge, it is not relevant –– at least not in a direction that helps Pearson. If anything, the evidence would have harmed Pearson’s retaliation case, which means that any error in excluding it would have been harmless to her. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of pre-October 23, 2012 conduct against Pearson.
Pearson contended at trial that Shanahan was the decisionmaker and there was evidence he knew about her EEOC claim before he fired her. The defendants contended that Mike Blanchard, who became human resources director after Shanahan, was the actual decisionmaker, and that Pearson submitted no evidence that Blanchard knew about her EEOC claim before he fired her. The district court denied Pearson’s motion to admit an email from Shanahan to a City human resources employee. She contends that email would have shown that Shanahan, not Blanchard, was the decisionmaker. Pearson offered the email 25 Case: 17-15275 Date Filed: 05/11/2020 Page: 26 of 33 as a business record under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) during the testimony of Starina Styles, who was the human resources employee who allegedly received the email, but Styles did not recognize it. The defendants objected to the admission of the email due to lack of foundation, and the trial court sustained the objection. “The touchstone of admissibility under the business records exception to the hearsay rule is reliability, and a trial judge has broad discretion to determine the admissibility of such evidence.” United States v. Bueno-Sierra, 99 F.3d 375, 378 (11th Cir. 1996). A document is admissible as a business record under Rule 803(6) if it was “made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by — someone with knowledge[,] . . . [and] kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business,” and if it was the “regular practice” of the business to make that record. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)(A)–(C). The party submitting the evidence must lay the foundation that those elements have been met, which requires “the testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness.” Id.; accord City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., 158 F.3d 548, 559 n.12 (11th Cir. 1998). The only person Pearson called for that purpose was Styles. Because she did not remember or recognize the email, Styles was not a sufficient “custodian” or other “qualified witness” under Rule 803(6). Pearson failed to lay the proper foundation for 26 Case: 17-15275 Date Filed: 05/11/2020 Page: 27 of 33 admission of the email, so the district court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the defendants’ objection to it. Pearson contends that even though she didn’t lay the proper foundation, the email should have been admitted. She points to a pretrial order saying that “[i]tems not objected to will be admitted when tendered at trial,” notes that the email was listed in that order, and notes that the defendants did not object to it being included in the order. 10 Based on that, Pearson argues that the defendants should not have been able to object to the admission of the email at trial. Pearson provides no authority for the proposition that boilerplate language in a pretrial order relieves her of the burden of laying a foundation for evidence as required by Rule 803(6). The only authority that she cites for the proposition that the evidence should have been admitted is a not-entirely-on-point, unpublished district court opinion from the Southern District of Indiana. That decision, of course, is utterly non-binding on us. See United States v. Johnson, 921 F.3d 991, 999 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Nor can we overlook that the opinion of a district court is not precedential.”). We are not convinced that the language in the pretrial order compelled the trial court to accept into evidence everything that was listed, 10 Pearson also claims that Styles should have been able to refresh her recollection before answering whether she recognized the email. But Styles was holding and reading the email when she stated that she did not recognize it. It is unclear what more could have been done to refresh Styles’ recollection. 27 Case: 17-15275 Date Filed: 05/11/2020 Page: 28 of 33 regardless of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 11 Again, the court did not abuse its discretion. 12
Finally, Pearson contends that the district court erred by granting the defendants judgment as a matter of law, a ruling which we review de novo. Wilcox v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 892 F.3d 1283, 1286 (11th Cir. 2018). In doing so, “[w]e view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in [Pearson’s] favor, and we may affirm only if we conclude that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for her.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). “To make out a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) that she engaged in an activity protected under Title VII; (2) she suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Kidd v. Mando Am. Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1211 11 Pearson also makes two other cursory arguments for allowing the email in as evidence. First, she argues that under Federal Rule of Evidence 1003(a) the defendants failed to raise a genuine issue of authenticity, so a “duplicate [was] admissible.” But the evidence was excluded for lack of foundation under Rule 803(6), not because it was a duplicate. Second, Pearson argues that under Federal Rule of Evidence 1008(b) the question of “genuineness” is a question for the jury. But the evidence was excluded for lack of foundation, which is firmly within the province of the court. United States v. Arias-Izquierdo, 449 F.3d 1168, 1183 (11th Cir. 2006). 12 The evidence excluded under these rulings is the subject of a motion Pearson filed in this Court to supplement the record on appeal. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence, the motion is DENIED AS MOOT. 28 Case: 17-15275 Date Filed: 05/11/2020 Page: 29 of 33 (11th Cir. 2013). “To establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must show that the decision-makers were aware of the protected conduct, and that the protected activity and the adverse actions were not wholly unrelated.” Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted). Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of retaliation the burden shifts to the defendant to show a legitimate reason for the adverse action. Id. at 715. Then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the proffered legitimate reason was pretextual. Id. The district court based its judgment for the defendants on two grounds. First, it found that Pearson had failed to establish a causal link between the protected activity (filing an EEOC charge) and the materially adverse action (termination). Second, it found that she failed to rebut the legitimate reason provided by the defendants for her termination — that she could not return to work and had no additional leave. Pearson contends that the evidence at trial showed that Shanahan was the person who decided to terminate her employment, he was aware of her EEOC activities including filing a charge, and the purported reason for her termination was pretextual. We disagree. Viewed in the light most favorable to Pearson, the evidence at trial established the following. She suffered a work-related back injury in May 2012. 29 Case: 17-15275 Date Filed: 05/11/2020 Page: 30 of 33 Because of that injury, she was out of work on approved medical leave beginning on May 31, 2012. She was out on leave for eight months until mid-February 2013. While on medical leave, she filed an EEOC charge in October 2012. Shanahan became aware of the EEOC charge sometime that fall. In December 2012 Pearson’s doctor wrote a note to the City saying that she would have to remain out of work until further notice and that he would update the City about her ability to return to work in March 2013. Under the City’s policy, the only leave she had left to take was leave without pay. To qualify for it, she had to get the approval of her department director, of the human resources director, and of the city administrator. To get their approval for leave without pay, she had to show either that she was applying for long-term disability or that the doctor could confirm she would be able to return to work within six months. Pearson showed neither. Her application for leave was approved by the director of the recreation department, Shanahan. But it was not approved by the head of the HR department at that time, Mike Blanchard. Instead, an HR department employee put a sticky note on the bottom corner of Pearson’s final leave application that said “DENY + SEND FFD LETTER AFTER XMAS” (FFD meaning fit for duty). Blanchard later drafted a letter to Pearson explaining that she was “ineligible for any additional leave of absence” because she had “exhausted any eligible FMLA leave, 30 Case: 17-15275 Date Filed: 05/11/2020 Page: 31 of 33 accrued sick and vacation leave, and the unpaid leave of absence granted” to her. The letter also warned that “if you are unable to return to work by February 13, 2013, we must regrettably separate you from service with Augusta, Georgia.” She received that letter when she met with human resources on February 7. There was some confusion about the precise date of Pearson’s termination. As a result, three Requests for Personnel Action (RPA) were created for Pearson, all with different dates. 13 Each RPA was requested by human resources and signed by Shanahan as the parks and recreation department director. On February 6, 2012, the day he signed the first RPA, Shanahan told a group of City employees that Pearson had been “terminated” and “doesn’t work here anymore.” The next day Shanahan told a parks and recreation employee that Pearson “don’t [sic] work here anymore. She’s terminated.” 13 Pearson was first marked in the system as resigning. Human resources requested that the Request for Personnel Action (RPA) be dated February 13, 2013, but there was an error and the parks and recreation department dated it February 1. Pearson was granted a one-week extension to get a doctor’s note, so human resources requested a new RPA with a termination date of February 20; it received a new RPA with a February 15 termination date. Finally, human resources requested a third RPA, reflecting retirement instead of resignation (human resources did not specify the effective date, and the parks and recreation department dated it February 18). Pearson testified during her deposition that the human resources employees she met with discovered on February 13, 2013 that she was listed as retired (and thus terminated) in the City’s system as of February 1, 2013. At trial the human resources representative testified that Pearson’s “termination date” was January 31st and her “retirement date” was an unknown date in February. 31 Case: 17-15275 Date Filed: 05/11/2020 Page: 32 of 33 Pearson contends that the evidence at trial shows that it was Shanahan who made the decision to terminate her employment. But she points only to Shanahan’s approval of the RPA on February 6, 2012, and his statements that day and the next that she had been terminated. She ignores the evidence about what led up to that RPA. It was Blanchard, not Shanahan, who denied Pearson’s request for leave from January 3 until March 8, 2013, a request Shanahan had approved. It was Blanchard, not Shanahan, who drafted the January 30, 2013 letter informing Pearson that her employment would be terminated if she could not return to work by February 13, 2013. And it was Blanchard’s, not Shanahan’s, department of human resources that requested the RPAs. The trial evidence shows that Blanchard, not Shanahan, made the decision to terminate Pearson, and Pearson presented no evidence that Blanchard was aware of her EEOC charge. As a result, she failed to establish the causation element of her Title VII retaliation claim. “[A] reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for her.” Wilcox, 892 F.3d at 1286 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendants.