Opinion ID: 2383219
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the prosecutor's comment on hunter's post-indictment silence

Text: In order to place in context Hunter's claim of improper closing argument, it is necessary to set out in full the relevant portion of the prosecutor's remarks: PROSECUTOR: Now the indictment comes down, and we know from our own general knowledge, do we not, that indictments usually come down before the trials, and sometimes long before the trials and sometimes DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection. PROSECUTOR: not so long before the trials. THE COURT: It's not relevant. Let's not belabor it. PROSECUTOR: And here we are on trial day, and Mr. Credibility [4] once again tells us this afternoon, on the last day of trial, that, oh, here's what happened. See, I hit him with the stick, but it was on 3-14-89, but it was between five and six in the evening at Teresa's house. And it was not as the Government says, at eight in the morning on March 14th; it was later, at five and six p.m. at night. Now, here's a man charged with an indictment. At the time this indictment came down, it's got armed robbery in here, it's got BRA. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection. THE COURT: Overruled. PROSECUTOR: And it has an unauthorized use of a vehicle count. Here's somebody charged in an indictment by the District of Columbia grand jury, which normally you would not take lightly. You'd get yourself an able lawyer. He has an able lawyer. And, yet, he doesn't tell the Government, didn't tell the police, doesn't tell anybody, hey, you don't understand how this all came about. You know. We're going to wait to the last day of trial, and then we're going to tell the world.... (Emphasis added). The prosecutor's apparent point, as reflected in the italicized portion of his argument, was that after Hunter had been indicted, he and his attorney should have come to the United States Attorney's office to lay bare their defense for the prosecutor or the police. Such an argument is, to put it charitably, laden with mischief. The use for impeachment purposes of [a] petitioner's silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth [5] Amendment. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). Hunter did make a statement to the police at the time of his arrest, and prosecutorial comment on any inconsistency between that statement and his trial testimony is permissible. Dixon v. United States, 565 A.2d 72, 79-80 (D.C.1989). In this case, however, the prosecutor's argument did not focus on any such purported inconsistency. Rather, the prosecutor asked the jury to draw an unfavorable inference as to Hunter's credibility because Hunter did not volunteer his account to the government after he had obtained the advice of counsel and after he had been indicted. He suggested that Hunter had not taken the indictment seriously enough. No authority has been cited to us on the precise question whether a prosecutor's negative comment on an accused's silence after he has been indicted, and after he has received the assistance of counsel, runs afoul of the constitutional doctrine articulated in Doyle. Although we think that the vice in what the prosecutor said in this case is as serious as that in Doyle, we need not reach the constitutional question, for we can readily dispose of the issue on nonconstitutional grounds. See Olevsky v. District of Columbia, 548 A.2d 78, 81 (D.C. 1988). The Supreme Court has stated that each jurisdiction may formulate its own rules of evidence to determine when prior silence is so inconsistent with present statements that impeachment by reference to such silence is probative. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 2129, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980). In the federal courts, prior silence cannot be used for impeachment where silence is not probative of a defendant's credibility and where prejudice to the defendant might result. Id. at 239, 100 S.Ct. at 2129; see also Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 423-24, 77 S.Ct. 963, 983-84, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957). Hunter's failure following his indictment to disclose his defense to the prosecutor was not at all probative as to his credibility. As this court pointed out in Walker v. United States, 402 A.2d 424, 427 (D.C.1979), [k]nowing that one is the focus of a criminal action serves to make one more cautious about the advisability of discussing one's defense with others than [one's] attorney. Presumably, an attorney would advise his client not to do so. Accord, Grunewald, supra, 353 U.S. at 423, 77 S.Ct. at 983 ([i]t was thus quite consistent with innocence for [Grunewald] to refuse to provide evidence which could be used by the Government in building its incriminating chain); People v. Conyers, 52 N.Y.2d 454, 458, 420 N.E.2d 933, 935, 438 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (1981) (defendant's pretrial failure to speak to law enforcement officers is of extremely limited probative worth because, among other reasons, he may be aware that he is under no obligation to speak and that anything he says might later be used against him). Moreover, the use of an accused's pretrial silence to impugn his credibility has a significant potential for prejudice. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 2138, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975). This is especially true where, as here, we are dealing with post-indictment silence at a time when the accused was represented by counsel. For good or ill, criminal trials in this country are conducted pursuant to the adversary system. A litigant who can keep his own evidence under wraps until trial has an obvious tactical advantage over an adversary who has disclosed all. Discovery, and especially discovery of the defendant's case, is very limited in criminal prosecutions. See Super.Ct.Crim.R. 16. A competent attorney will ordinarily provide information about his or her client's evidence to the prosecutor only where there appears to be a reasonable probability that such disclosure will result in the dismissal of charges, a favorable plea offer, or some other tangible benefit. This is reality, known to judges and lawyers who participate in our criminal justice system. Most jurors, on the other hand, are not schooled in the law. They are unlikely to be familiar with the intricacies of pretrial discovery in criminal cases. Not being acquainted with the perils and pitfalls of premature disclosure of one's case to one's adversary, a fair-minded juror might well perceive a good deal of common sense in an argument of the kind with which the prosecutor attempted to skewer Hunter in this caseif he had an innocent explanation, why didn't he tell the United States Attorney and get him to dismiss the charges? If prosecutors were allowed to make tactical hay out of a defense attorney's prudent decision not to present the government with unreciprocated impeachment materials and free discovery, the exercise of a wise and constitutionally based strategy would be severely chilled. Indeed, the pressure on defendants and their attorneys to tell all to the prosecutor in advance of trial might often be irresistible, to the prejudice of the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial. Recognizing these principles, the government commendably conceded at argument that the prosecutor's remarks in this case were impermissible. We now so hold.
In determining whether the prosecutor's argument and the trial judge's response or lack thereof require reversal of Hunter's conviction, we must first identify the applicable standard of review. If there was a sufficient and timely objection, the question is whether we can say with fair assurance, after all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error. ( Philip) Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C.1980). If the point was not preserved, on the other hand, we review for plain error. The defendant's burden in plain error cases is, and should be, a formidable one; we will reverse a conviction for error not complained of below only in an extreme situation in which the defendant's substantial rights were so clearly prejudiced that the very fairness and integrity of the trial was jeopardized. See Mills v. United States, 599 A.2d 775, 787 (D.C. 1991). A clear miscarriage of justice must be shown. Adams, supra, 302 A.2d at 234; see also McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 41 (D.C.1991) (standard for reversal is far more stringent in absence of proper objection). We conclude that the plain error standard applies. Objections must be made with reasonable specificity; the judge must be fairly apprised as to the question on which he is being asked to rule. [P]oints not asserted with sufficient precision to indicate distinctly the party's thesis will normally be spurned on appeal. Miller v. Avirom, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 367, 369-70, 384 F.2d 319, 321-22 (1967); see also Williamson v. United States, 445 A.2d 975, 980 n. 5 (D.C.1982). The purpose of requiring a specific objection is to enable the prosecution to respond to any contentions raised and to make it possible for the trial judge to correct the situation without jettisoning the trial. Dixon, supra, 565 A.2d at 80; Adams, supra, 302 A.2d at 234. Litigants should not be permitted to keep some of their objections in their hip pockets and to disclose them only to the appellate tribunal; [o]ne cannot take his chance on a favorable verdict, reserving a right to impeach it if it happens to go the other way. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Patouillet, 42 A.2d 273, 274 (D.C.1945); see also Hopkins v. United States, 595 A.2d 995, 996 n. 3 (D.C.1991) (quoting Patouillet ). Repeated or prolonged objections during counsel's argument to the jury may disrupt the flow of the trial and enable a boisterous lawyer to reap an advantage from his or her lack of civility. See United States v. Briggs, 457 F.2d 908, 911-12 (2d Cir.1972). We have therefore relaxed, in the context of closing argument, the conventional requirement that a defendant take his objection at the earliest possible opportunity when, by doing so he can enable the trial judge to take the most efficacious action, id. at 911 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), and have held that an appropriate objection or motion at the bench at the conclusion of the prosecutor's presentation is sufficient to preserve the point for appeal. Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 32 n. 13 (D.C. 1989); Hawthorne v. United States, 476 A.2d 164, 169-70 (D.C.1984). The ultimate objection must, however, be reasonably specific. See Irick, supra, 565 A.2d at 34 n. 22. As Judge Friendly stated for the court in Briggs, supra, 457 F.2d at 912, even in ... extreme cases there would seem to be no reason why [counsel] should not be required to bring the matter to the judge's attention, outside the presence of the jury, at the end of the summation, so that the court can consider whether to attempt curative instructions or to declare a mistrial, see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 237-243 [60 S.Ct. 811, 853, 84 L.Ed. 1129] ... (1940), rather than gamble on obtaining an acquittal. In the present case, defense counsel objected twice. See pages [142-143], supra. Her first objection was, in effect, sustained; the second was overruled. As the quoted portion of the transcript reveals, see page [143], supra, both objections were made before the prosecutor mentioned or implied that Hunter failed to disclose his defense to the government after being indicted. Unless Hunter's attorney was clairvoyant, she could not have been directing her objection to the prosecutor's remarks about her client's post-indictment silence, because nothing had been said about that subject at the times that she objected. [6] Moreover, on the morning following the closing argument, defense counsel made a motion for a mistrial on two grounds; first, that the prosecutor had shifted the burden of proof by commenting on Hunter's failure to present certain documentation, and second, that the trial judge had inappropriately intervened during her argument on the failure to appear count. Counsel made no mention whatever of the prosecutor's comment on Hunter's post-indictment reticence. In her post-trial motion for a new trial, counsel added still further grounds, but remained silent on the issue of the prosecutor's alleged misuse of Hunter's post-indictment silence. Under these circumstances, we hold that the principal issue which Hunter presents for our consideration was not preserved in the trial court, and fashion our review accordingly.
In determining whether Hunter's conviction should be reversed, it is our function to review the record for legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge, not by counsel. Irick, supra, 565 A.2d at 33. Applied to the present case, this means that we must decide whether the judge compromised the fundamental fairness of the trial, and permitted a clear miscarriage of justice, by not intervening, sua sponte, when the prosecutor made his impermissible remarks about Hunter's post-indictment failure to disclose his version of events to the government. Id.; see also Dixon, supra, 565 A.2d at 78. Although the judge might well have nipped the problem in the bud by calling counsel to the bench when the prosecutor made his unorthodox argument, we cannot say that it was unreasonable for the judge not to do so. The lack of any reaction from defense counsel might have suggested that she did not perceive any prejudice, a fact which is itself suggestive in some measure of lack of prejudice. See Parks v. United States, 451 A.2d 591, 613 (D.C.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945, 103 S.Ct. 2123, 77 L.Ed.2d 1303 (1983). The allegedly offending remarks consisted of but a few lines in a lengthy closing. Defense counsel could easily have responded to them, at the bench or in her own closing argument. The judge could thus reasonably conclude, in the absence of a defense objection, that the situation was not extreme enough to warrant his uninvited intrusion into the adversary process. Unless the reasons for intervention are compelling, a judge generally acts within his discretion when he declines to inject himself unilaterally into the controversy or to take measures which counsel have not asked him to take. Mack v. United States, 570 A.2d 777, 782 (D.C. 1990). In her own comparatively forceful closing argument, Hunter's attorney made no mention at all of the issue presently under discussion. As we have previously noted, she also demanded first a mistrial and then a new trial on other grounds, but eschewed any reliance on this one. In Parks, supra, this court found it significant, in holding that improper prosecutorial argument had not prejudiced the defendants, that counsel first raised the issue in a post-verdict memorandum supporting a motion for a mistrial. In the present case, Hunter first raised the issue even later, on appeal. Reversal for plain error in cases of allegedly improper prosecutorial argument should be confined to situations which can fairly be characterized as particularly egregious. Mills, supra, 599 A.2d at 787, quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). We view the prosecutor's argument in this case as a significant departure from permissible advocacya departure, indeed, that we trust will not be repeated. Nevertheless, viewing the offending remarks in the context of the case as a whole, see Young, supra, 470 U.S. at 15, 105 S.Ct. at 1046, we think it most unlikely that a few lines of impermissible comment, to which neither counsel nor the judge again alluded, compromised the fairness or integrity of the entire trial or threatened such a clear miscarriage of justice that the plain error doctrine may properly be invoked.