Opinion ID: 1637248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Re-Mirandization

Text: Grillot's principal argument concerning the voluntariness of his confession deals with the concept of re- Mirandizing.  When Jackson was first reported missing, Grillot told the police a rendition of events that placed Jackson in Alabama. The sheriff's deputies later found Jackson's body in the Fairfield Bay area, which indicated that Jackson had never returned to Alabama and, therefore, Grillot was lying. Officers transported Grillot to the sheriff's office to answer questions about Jackson's death. Grillot started out telling officers the same story he had told earlier. Then, the interviewing officers told Grillot they knew he was lying because they had found the victim's body. According to Grillot, at the moment this change in the interview's focus and nature occurred, that is, when the officers asked him do you want to start again, they should have re- Mirandized him. Moreover, he asserts the Miranda warnings provide a bright line test for officers. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000). This court applied the Miranda ruling soon after it was announced by the United States Supreme Court, and early on, we held that a suspect need not be re- Mirandized during continuous interrogation. See, e.g., Sossamon v. State, 245 Ark. 306, 432 S.W.2d 469 (1968) ( Miranda warnings need not be repeated after an overnight stay at the police station). Moreover, our court has also held that Miranda warnings must only be repeated when the circumstances have changed so seriously that the accused's answers are no longer voluntary, or the accused is no longer making a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of his rights. Jones v. State, supra. Recently, we addressed an analogous situation with strikingly similar facts. See Upton v. State, 343 Ark. 543, 36 S.W.3d 740 (2001). In Upton , the defendant was asked to come to the police station and give a statement. Id. He was Mirandized and during questioning gave two statements. Id. At first, following the Miranda warnings, the defendant disavowed any knowledge of or complicity in the murder. Id. Later, after he was told that his friend had placed him at the crime scene, he confessed to the murder. Id. That interview process lasted approximately two hours. Id. In the Upton case, this court concluded that the defendant's status changed from that of a voluntary witness to that of a suspect. Id. Nonetheless, we held that the initial Miranda warnings were sufficient and there was no Fifth Amendment violation. Id. In so holding, this court first noted that a statement made voluntarily after a two-day hiatus from the Miranda warnings was constitutional. Id. We also relied upon a decision by the Supreme Court of Connecticut involving similar facts and quoted the following language with approval: The disclosure that Miranda requires must be made no later than the time when an accused is taken into custody. When the police are conducting a good faith precustodial investigation at police headquarters, they may have difficulty in determining the precise moment when questioning turns into custodial interrogation and Miranda warnings are required. Although the uncertain line between questioning and custodial interrogation does not excuse late warnings, it does provide justification for the validity of good faith early warnings which are sufficiently proximate to formal custody to alert the person being questioned to the importance of these constitutional rights. Id. (quoting State v. Burge, 195 Conn. 232, 247-49, 487 A.2d 532, 543 (1985)). It therefore follows that in the instant case, where the interview lasted approximately two and one-half hours and took place without a break in time, the initial Miranda warnings were sufficient.