Opinion ID: 2227557
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Disclose Negative Urinalysis

Text: [¶ 13.] Sometime after his arrest, Rodriguez provided a urine specimen for analysis. Although trial counsel had filed a motion for discovery of any scientific test results, the urinalysis (UA) result was not provided. Rodriguez argues that his rights under both the United States and the South Dakota constitutions were violated by the State's failure to disclose his negative UA. As the result was exculpatory evidence, he contends, the State's suppression of it violated due process. To Rodriguez the result proved that he was not using drugs. The habeas court concluded that the test result was neither exculpatory nor material because proof that Rodriguez did not use drugs had no tendency to disprove knowing possession of such a large amount of marijuana. [¶ 14.] Due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article VI, § 2 of the South Dakota Constitution, requires the State to reveal exculpatory evidence to the defense. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 218 (1963); State v. Hanson, 278 N.W.2d 198, 200 (S.D.1979). We use a four-part test to decide whether a due process violation occurred when the State fails to disclose evidence. Black v. Class, 1997 SD 22, ¶ 16, 560 N.W.2d 544, 548 (citations omitted). If all four of the following elements are established, then the court must grant a new trial: 1. Was the defense unaware of the evidence? 2. Is the evidence favorable to the defense? 3. Is the evidence material to the defense? 4. Did the defense make a request for the evidence? Id. (citations omitted). [¶ 15.] Under the first question, Rodriguez asserts that defense counsel was unaware of the negative result of the UA during the criminal proceedings. However, Rodriguez knew that he had given a urine sample and made his counsel aware of that fact. Testimony in the habeas hearing verified that counsel was aware at the time of trial that a UA had been performed. If a defendant knows or should know of the allegedly exculpatory evidence, it cannot be said that the evidence has been suppressed by the prosecution. State v. Wilde, 306 N.W.2d 645, 647 (S.D.1981)(citing United States v. Brown, 628 F.2d 471, 473 (5thCir.1980)). The Brady rule requiring disclosure does not abrogate the responsibility of the defense to discover and develop evidence. Id. Rodriguez had notice of the essential facts that would have permitted him to take advantage of the allegedly exculpatory evidence. See id. The first element has not been met, and as all four inquiries must be answered affirmatively, this disposes of the issue. Nonetheless, we examine the remaining questions. [¶ 16.] Addressing the second and third questions, Rodriguez argues that the results from the test were both favorable and material to his defense. In his view, people involved in drug trafficking are more likely to use illegal drugs, and the negative result would have been useful to distance himself from the marijuana found in the Blazer, especially as his defense was lack of knowledge. He points to our decision in State v. Buchholz, 1999 SD 110, 598 N.W.2d 899, where we discussed the seizure of the defendant's urine for the purpose of having it tested for the presence of drugs after methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia were found in the defendant's vehicle. There, although the question before us was the constitutionality of the seizure, we explained that Buchholz's positive UA tended to show a knowing possession of drugs. Id. ¶ 24, 598 N.W.2d at 904. [¶ 17.] Buchholz can be distinguished. In that case, the drugs and paraphernalia were found in a fanny pack in the defendant's vehicle. Id. ¶ 4, 598 N.W.2d at 901. The nature of the items found suggested that they belonged to a user, as opposed to simply a transporter. In that situation, the presence of drugs in the defendant's body would tend to show that the items were knowingly in her possession. We discussed the use of a positive UA as well in State v. Hanson, 1999 SD 9, 588 N.W.2d 885. There, evidence of a positive UA for drug consumption was crucial to establishing the defendant's knowing possession of marijuana as distinct from the two other occupants of the vehicle where the drugs were found. 1999 SD 9, ¶ 40, 588 N.W.2d at 894. [¶ 18.] Here, in contrast, Rodriguez was transporting ninety-four pounds of marijuana. Trooper Shafer did not report that he detected the odor of burnt marijuana in the Blazer. No marijuana and no drug paraphernalia were found in the passenger area of the vehicle, nor were there any indications that Rodriguez was under the influence of any substance. More important, the amount and condition of the marijuana found in the hidden compartment suggested that it was not ready for immediate personal use. It was compressed into hard bricks and securely wrapped, so it obviously was intended for further processing before it could be used. [¶ 19.] [E]vidence is favorable where it creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist ... [and] `material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' Black, 1997 SD 22, ¶ 18, 560 N.W.2d at 548 (quoting State v. Fowler, 1996 SD 79, ¶ 22, 552 N.W.2d 391, 395)(other citations omitted) (alterations in original). We conclude that the negative test result would not have created a reasonable doubt on knowledge of the presence of marijuana in the Blazer. One need not be a drug user to be a drug courier. [¶ 20.] We think it highly unlikely that the result of the trial would have been different had the UA result been disclosed to the jury. The defense of lack of knowledge relied in great part on whether the jury found credible Rodriguez's explanation for how he came to be driving a vehicle with almost one hundred pounds of marijuana. His credibility came under considerable attack with evidence, for example, that he lied repeatedly when stopped for speeding, and in his words, lied only because someone told him to; that he had two driver's licenses issued in his name and one in an assumed name; that he obtained a license in an assumed name even when by his own rationale it was no longer necessary to do so; and that the pager he said he always carried had been rented only two days earlier. After so much evidence of dishonesty, proof that he had no illicit substances in his body at the time of his arrest creates no reasonable probability of a different result. Accordingly, the second and third prongs of the Brady test are not met. While the defense did make a request for the evidence by its motion for discovery, meeting the fourth element, because the other three questions cannot be answered affirmatively, there was no Brady violation. We affirm the habeas court's decision on this issue.