Opinion ID: 1427790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Funeral Protest Provision Leaves Open Alternative Channels of Communication

Text: Finally, we consider whether the Ohio statute leaves open ample alternative channels of communication. The district court found that the statute provides [Phelps-Roper] with alternative channels of communication through which she can deliver her message because she is free to express her message outside of the times and places set forth in the statute, and the statute does not create a barrier to [Phelps-Roper]'s use of other means to deliver her message to the public. Phelps-Roper, 523 F.Supp.2d at 620. In Frisby, the Supreme Court held that an ordinance prohibiting picketing in front of someone's home afforded ample alternative channels of communication because [p]rotestors have not been barred from the residential neighborhoods. They may enter such neighborhoods, alone or in groups, even marching. They may go door-to-door to proselytize their views. They may distribute literature in this manner or through the mails. They may contact residents by telephone, short of harassment. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483-84, 108 S.Ct. 2495 (alterations omitted). Phelps-Roper not only has available the same channels of communication as the protestors at issue in Frisby, she actually has more channels of communication. Unlike the around-the-clock blanket ban on focused residential picketing at issue in Frisby, the Funeral Protest Provision only restricts picketing for a limited temporal durationfrom one hour before until one hour after a funeral or burial service. Phelps-Roper may protest at the funeral site during times of her choosing that are outside of the proscribed time period. She may also engage in targeted protests of the funeral site at all times outside of the 300-foot buffer zone. Furthermore, Phelps-Roper is not entitled to her best means of communication. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981) (It is [] common ground ... that the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one's views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.). Phelps-Roper readily admits in her brief that she can share her message through her church's website or other means, and she does not claim that funeral protests are her most effective channels of communication. Moreover, mourners at a funeral are not her primary audience, as she openly admits in her brief that a funeral is the occasion of her speech, not its audience. See Prime Media, Inc. v. City of Franklin, 181 Fed. Appx. 536, 541 (6th Cir.2006) (holding that ample alternative channels of communication existed where the plaintiff's intended audience-persons who drive on I-65-can obviously be reached through a variety of means when they are not on the interstate); cf. Bay Area Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 1229 (9th Cir. 1990) (An alternative is not ample if the speaker is not permitted to reach the intended audience.) (internal quotation marks omitted). As Respondents argue, Phelps-Roper has an international audience with her website, where her message is seen by millions and she has appeared on national radio and television. In short, there is no merit to any contention that the Funeral Protest Provision leaves her without ample alternative channels of communication. Accordingly, the Funeral Protest Provision affords Phelps-Roper ample alternative channels of communication. As the Frisby Court has remarked, we need not further consider obscure hypothetical applications of the challenged provision to find it valid on its face. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 488, 108 S.Ct. 2495 (Of course, this case presents only a facial challenge to the ordinance. Particular hypothetical applications of the ordinance-to, for example, a particular resident's use of his or her home as a place of business or public meeting, or to picketers present at a particular home by invitation of the resident-may present somewhat different questions.) This is especially true in light of the limited factual record before us in the pre-enforcement facial challenge to the statute. See Washington State Grange, 128 S.Ct. at 1191; (stating that facial challenges are also disfavored because the principle of judicial restraint counsels against a constitutional ruling in advance of the necessity of deciding it and to avoid a broader constitutional ruling than necessary). Finally, to rule otherwise at this juncture would short circuit the democratic process, because as written, the statute can be applied in a constitutional manner. See id.
Because we find that the Funeral Protest Provision is content-neutral, serves an important governmental interest, is narrowly tailored, and affords ample alternative channels of communication, we hold that it is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction that does not violate the First Amendment. Because Phelps-Roper's overbreadth claim is premised on the allegation that the Funeral Protest Provision is not a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction on speech, her overbreadth claim likewise fails. For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.