Opinion ID: 1903149
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether the trial court erred in refusing the defendant's jury instruction 6.

Text: ¶ 25. Whittington argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant jury instruction D6. The trial court found the instruction cumulative and refused to grant the instruction. ¶ 26. However, Whittington made only a general objection that the instruction was an improper jury instruction. This Court stated in Oates v. State that [e]rrors based on the granting of an instruction will not be considered on appeal unless specific objections stating the grounds are made in the trial court. Collins v. State, 368 So.2d 212 (Miss.1979); Miss.Sup.Ct. Rule 42. Oates v. State, 421 So.2d 1025, 1030 (Miss.1982). Because no specific objection was raised, this issue is not properly before the court. However, procedural bar notwithstanding, the issue will be addressed on the merits. ¶ 27. Instruction D6 states: The Court instructs the jury that you are bound, in deliberating upon this case, to give the defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt that arises out of the evidence or want of evidence in this case. There is always a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt when the evidence simply makes it probable that the defendant is guilty. Mere probability of guilt will never warrant you to convict the defendant. It is only when on the whole evidence you are able to say on your oaths, beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty that the law will permit you to find him guilty. You might be able to say that you believe him guilty, and yet, if you are not able to say on your oaths, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is guilty, it is your sworn duty to find the defendant Not Guilty. ¶ 28. Whittington cites Christmas v. State to support his proposition that it was error to not grant Instruction D6. However, Christmas demonstrates why the denial of this instruction was not error. In Christmas, this Court stated: This Court does not review jury instructions in isolation; rather, they are read as a whole to determine if the jury was properly instructed. Peoples Bank and Trust Co. v. Cermack, 658 So.2d 1352, 1356 (Miss.1995). [A]n instructional error will not warrant reversal if the jury was fully and fairly instructed by other instructions. Collins v. State, 594 So.2d 29, 35 (Miss.1992); Laney v. State, 486 So.2d 1242, 1246 (Miss.1986). This Court assumes that juries follow the instructions given to them by the trial court. Id.; Payne v. State, 462 So.2d 902, 904 (Miss.1984). Christmas v. State, 700 So.2d 262, 269-70 (Miss.1997). ¶ 29. The trial court ruled that jury instruction D6 was cumulative. As this Court has stated, the trial court is not required to instruct on the same issue in different language. Cunningham v. State, 467 So.2d 902, 906 (Miss.1985); see also Jones v. State, 381 So.2d 983 (Miss.1980). ¶ 30. Whittington argues that by not granting jury instruction D6, his theory of the case was thwarted: the State failed to prove every element of the crime of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon examination, this Court finds that several instructions addressing the reasonable doubt issue were given. Instruction 7A states that the State's ... burden is simply to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was present at the time and place testified about and that he murdered Timothy Hodges. ¶ 31. Interestingly, Whittington had several jury instructions granted that focused on reasonable doubt. Instruction 2(D1) states that the State must ... prove by competent and relevant evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty.... Instruction 5(D4) says that the jury must be convinced by the evidence alone that Whittington is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Instruction 7(D5) instructs the jury that if reasonable doubt arises, they must acquit Whittington. Instruction 6(D8) tells the jury that if the evidence or lack thereof raises a reasonable doubt as to Whittington's guilt, they must acquit him of the murder. ¶ 32. Instruction 3(D3) plainly states the theory of Whittington's case. The instruction states: The Court instructs the jury that the law presumes every person charged with the commission of a crime to be innocent. The presumption places upon the State the burden of proving the Defendant guilty of each and every material element of the crime with which he is charged. The presumption of innocence attends the Defendant throughout the trial and prevails at its close, unless overcome by relevant and competent evidence which satisfies the jury of the Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Defendant is not required to prove anything. This instruction speaks to every element of the crime as well as the required proof to be beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 33. After reviewing the instructions given, it is clear that the instruction denied, jury instruction D6, was cumulative and correctly denied by the trial court. This issue is without merit.