Opinion ID: 2277345
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does the Everglades Marina have certain minimum contacts with New Jersey?

Text: At this point, we must digress slightly to note that the Supreme Court varies the measure of minimum contacts depending on the nature of the case. If the cause of action relates directly to the contacts, as here, it is one of specific jurisdiction. When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum, the State has been said to be exercising `general jurisdiction' over the defendant. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872 n. 9, 80 L.Ed. 2d 404, 411 n. 9 (1984). Commentators have questioned the application of these distinctions between dispute-blind and dispute-specific jurisdiction concepts. Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 Harvard L.Rev. 610, 614 (1988) (encourag[ing] courts to think seriously about the meaning of the general/specific jurisdiction typology that they have so eagerly embraced before they commit themselves to an unnecessarily constrained view of the scope of their adjudicatory power.). Nevertheless, our Court in Gendler implicitly endorsed the Supreme Court's specific/general jurisdiction dichotomy. See Gendler, supra, 102 N.J. at 471-72. General jurisdiction subjects the defendant to suit on virtually any claim, even if unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the forum, but is unavailable unless the defendant's activities in the forum state can be characterized as continuous and systematic contacts. Helicopteros Nacionales, supra, 466 U.S. at 416, 104 S.Ct. at 1873, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 412. The greater measure of the contacts for general jurisdiction is deemed relevant because of the limited interest of the forum state in entertaining the coincidental litigation. Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F. 2d 370, 374 (5th Cir.1987). In the context of specific jurisdiction, the minimum contacts inquiry must focus on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2579, 53 L.Ed. 2d 683, 698 (1977) (mere presence in the forum state of defendant's property that is unrelated to the cause of action is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction), quoted in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 1478, 79 L.Ed. 2d 790, 798 (1984) (defendant's regular circulation of magazine in forum state is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over libel action); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 1486, 79 L.Ed. 2d 804, 811-12 (1984) (defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction based solely on alleged intentional and libelous conduct in Florida expressly aimed at California). The minimum contacts requirement is satisfied so long as the contacts resulted from the defendant's purposeful conduct and not the unilateral activities of the plaintiff. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567-68, 62 L.Ed. 2d 490, 501-02 (1980). This `purposeful availment' requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of `random,' `fortuitous,' or `attenuated' contacts. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed. 2d 528, 542 (1985) (quoting Keeton, supra, 465 U.S. at 774, 104 S.Ct. at 1478, 79 L.Ed. 2d at 797; World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at 299, 100 S.Ct. at 568, 62 L.Ed. 2d at 502). The question is whether the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. at 567, 62 L.Ed. 2d at 501. Of course, the mere foreseeability of an event in another state is not a `sufficient benchmark' for exercising personal jurisdiction. Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at 474, 105 S.Ct. at 2183, 85 L.Ed. 2d at 542 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at 295, 100 S.Ct. at 566, 62 L.Ed. 2d at 500). Thus, we must determine whether defendant purposely created contacts with New Jersey. We find that facts have been pled that support a finding that the defendant's activities in regard to the specific sale at issue established sufficient contacts with the forum state. (The parties have not sought to distinguish the various counts of the complaint. One count alleges only negligent repair of the yacht at the Florida marina.) This is not a situation in which the plaintiff unilaterally brought about the contacts. Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen, supra (out-of-state automobile distributor's only tie to the forum resulted from a customer's decision to drive there); Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 93-94, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1697-98, 56 L.Ed. 2d 132, 142 (1978) (personal jurisdiction in custody action cannot be based solely on plaintiff's residence in forum state) (dictum); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed. 2d 1283 (1958) (trustee's only connection with forum was the result of settlor exercising her power of appointment there); Northern Propane Gas Co. v. Kipps, 127 Ariz. 522, 622 P. 2d 469 (1980) ( en banc ) (Michigan company that had filled propane tanks had no relationship to Arizona other than that it knew tanks were destined there). Rather, this defendant allegedly telephoned the buyer in New Jersey to iron out the details of the contract, mailed the contract to the buyer in New Jersey for signing in New Jersey, and received payment from the plaintiff, who defendant knew was a New Jersey resident. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed. 2d 223 (1957) (forum was state where insured accepted insurance policy and paid premiums). We need not rely on the additional material submitted by the plaintiff supplementing the record below that attempted to demonstrate that the defendant sought to penetrate the New Jersey market by advertising in media that generally circulated in New Jersey. See Makopoulos v. Walt Disney World, Inc., 221 N.J. Super. 513 (App.Div. 1987) (matter remanded to Law Division to consider whether advertising in State drew plaintiff to Florida facility). Of course, the mere transmittal of messages by mail or telephone within the state is not the critical factor, it is the nature of the contact. Baron & Co. v. Bank of N.J., 497 F. Supp. 534 (E.D.Pa. 1980) (fact that defendant had made phone calls, mailed checks, and sent correspondence to plaintiff in Pennsylvania is not sufficient to draw defendant into Pennsylvania for purposes of personal jurisdiction); Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co. v. Township of Gloucester, 493 F. Supp. 1047 (E.D.Pa. 1980) (Pennsylvania insurer could not sue foreign municipality in forum state despite two complaint letters sent to insurer in forum state). But when a merchant uses the instrumentalities of commerce to tap an interstate market for its product, such wire and mail communications are relevant contacts to be considered. United Coal Co. v. Land Use Corp., 575 F. Supp. 1148, 1157 (W.D.Va. 1983) (fact that [t]elephone conversations, telexes and letters traveled to and from the state, establishing an agreement considered as part of the contacts sustaining jurisdiction of the forum); Hoster v. Monongahela Steel Corp., 492 F. Supp. 1249 (W.D.Okla. 1980) (defendants who made several telephone calls to plaintiff, corresponded twice with plaintiff, and sent agent to negotiate with plaintiff held to have sufficient contacts to establish jurisdiction in plaintiff's state). Remember that in this case it is alleged that the defendant's representations via mail and telephone to New Jersey were fraudulent. We would be closing our eyes to the realities of modern business practices were we to hold that a corporation subjects itself to the jurisdiction of another state by sending a personal messenger into that state bearing a fraudulent misrepresentation but not when it follows the more ordinary course of employing the United States Postal Service as its messenger.    Where a defendant knowingly sends into a state a false statement, intending that it should then be relied upon to the injury of a resident of that state, he has, for jurisdictional purposes, acted within that state. [ Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. v. Delta Int'l Corp., 696 F. 2d 1062, 1066 (4th Cir.1982) (quoting Murphy v. Erwin-Wasey, Inc., 460 F. 2d 661, 664 (1st Cir.1972) (citations omitted)).] Some confusion on the relevance of the use of mails, telephone, or other communication may arise from the qualitative nature of contacts required to establish the systematic and continuous course of business that sustains general jurisdiction. See Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614 F. 2d 1247, 1254 (9th Cir.1980) (holding isolated acts by the defendant in the forum state unrelated to the cause of action insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction). When, however, a non-resident defendant purposely directs its activities to the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities, the forum may assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Hughes v. Balemaster, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 1350, 1351-52 (E.D.Mo. 1987); see also Maglio & Kendro, Inc. v. Superior Enerquip Corp., 233 N.J. Super. 388 (App.Div. 1989) (finding personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant who telephoned plaintiff located in forum state to solicit performance of services). Contrary New Jersey cases dealing with the significance of telephone contacts are distinguishable. See DeLear v. Rozel Packing Corp., 95 N.J. Super. 344 (App.Div. 1967) (incidental telephone contacts from New York lender to New Jersey borrower not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction in trustee's suit to set aside preference); William Sternberg & Assoc. v. Litho Supply, Inc., 219 N.J. Super. 201, 205 (Law Div. 1987) (mere broker in sale of goods neither manufactured in nor destined for New Jersey cannot establish jurisdiction based on telephone negotiations and choice of law clause). We find that in this case of specific jurisdiction the pleadings support a finding that, at least for the purposes of this sale, the defendant purposely directed his activities at the forum state. The limited nature of those contacts does not defeat the jurisdiction of the court. Rather, it goes more properly to the second prong of the test, which would be to consider whether it would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to entertain the suit. In Burger King, the Court found specific jurisdiction based on relatively few contacts between the nonresident defendant and the forum state of Florida. Rudzewicz was a Burger King franchise owner who lived in Michigan and claimed he had dealt primarily with the Michigan office. 471 U.S. at 487-90, 105 S.Ct. at 2190-91, 85 L.Ed. 2d at 550-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, because his contract contained a Florida choice-of-law clause, required payments to be made in Florida, and was negotiated and supervised from Burger King's Florida Headquarters, there was a purposeful availment of Florida's laws and a reasonable basis on which to anticipate litigation in Florida. Id. at 479-82, 105 S.Ct. at 2185-87, 85 L.Ed. 2d at 545-47. In this case, defendant's alleged phone calls to New Jersey and use of the mails to solicit the contract would satisfy the minimum-contacts requirement. Moreover, given that the defendant knew that plaintiff was a New Jersey resident, as well as plaintiff's claim that defendant was informed that the boat would be shipped to New Jersey, this seems like the type of case referred to in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., supra , in which plaintiff's residence in the forum may, because of defendant's relationship with the plaintiff, enhance defendant's contacts with the forum. 465 U.S. at 780, 104 S.Ct. at 1481, 79 L.Ed. 2d at 801. The mere fact that neither defendant nor the boat was ever physically present in New Jersey does not preclude a finding that minimum contacts existed. As the Supreme Court stated in Burger King, supra, [a]lthough territorial presence frequently will enhance a potential defendant's affiliation with a State and reinforce the reasonable foreseeability of suit there, it is an inescapable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which business is conducted. So long as a commercial actor's efforts are purposefully directed toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there. [471 U.S. at 476, 105 S.Ct. at 2184, 85 L.Ed. 2d at 543.] There can be no doubt that defendant was well aware that this sale would have direct consequences in New Jersey such that it should have been aware of the possibility of litigation arising in that forum. See Calder v. Jones, supra, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed. 2d 804.