Opinion ID: 2968626
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Privileges and Immunities Clause

Text: The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the United States Constitution provides: The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.2 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. The object of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is to ‘strongly . . . constitute the citizens of the United States [as] one people,’ by ‘plac[ing] the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned.’ Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 296 (1998) (citing Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868)). The Clause thus provides important protections for nonresidents who enter a State, and while Amici supporting the Appellants on appeal constitute a number of media organizations and First Amendment public interest organizations. While they join the Appellants in arguing that the citizens-only limitation violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause, some of them also appear to represent different interests than the Appellants given that they may fall under the media exception to the VFOIA. Because the contours of the media exception are not at issue with regard to the Appellants, we need not consider it, nor do we consider whether Amici could raise distinct arguments as to the applicability of the citizens-only provision of the VFOIA to their own situations. This opinion considers only the arguments the Appellants raise regarding the constitutionality of the VFOIA. 2 In the Privileges and Immunities Clause context, citizen and resident are interchangeable terms. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 279 n.6 (1985). 12 MCBURNEY v. YOUNG [t]hose protections are not ‘absolute,’ . . . the Clause ‘does bar discrimination against citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502 (1999) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has articulated a two-step inquiry to determine whether claims that a citizenship or residency classification offends privileges and immunities protections. Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 64 (1988). First, the activity in question must be sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation . . . as to fall within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause . . . . Second, if the challenged restriction deprives nonresidents of a protected privilege, [the court] will invalidate it only if [it] conclude[s] that the restriction is not closely related to the advancement of a substantial state interest. Id. at 64-65 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Although the Privileges and Immunities Clause establishes a norm of comity, it does not specify[ ] the particular subjects as to which citizens of one State coming within the jurisdiction of another are guaranteed equality of treatment. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 660 (1975). It has been left to the Supreme Court and lower courts to define the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, as its contours . . . are not well developed. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1978). Significantly, the fundamental rights protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause are not identical to the fundamental rights protected by other constitutional provisions and cover a much narrower range of activity. The Privileges and Immunities Clause is geared toward MCBURNEY v. YOUNG 13 secur[ing] to citizens of each State in the [United] States . . . those privileges and immunities which are common to the citizens in the latter States under their constitution and laws by virtue of their being citizens. Special privileges enjoyed by citizens in their own States are not secured in other States by this provision. Paul, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 180. As a result, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has recognized that states are permitted to distinguish between residents and nonresidents so long as those distinctions do not hinder the formation, the purpose, or the development of a single Union of those States. Only with respect to those ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383 (emphasis added). Toward that end, the Supreme Court has held that certain rights are fundamental [under the Privileges and Immunities Clause], including the rights to: (1) practice a trade or profession; (2) access courts; (3) transfer property; and (4) obtain medical services. McBurney, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 447 (internal citations omitted). In arguing for reversal of the grant of summary judgment to the Appellees, the Appellants contend the VFOIA infringes on rights they identify as equal access to information, equal access to courts,3 and the ability to pursue their economic interests on equal footing. Separately, Hurlbert argues the VFOIA impermissibly burdens his right to pursue a common calling. McBurney also posits that the VFOIA infringes his ability to advocate for his [political] interests and the interests of others similarly situated. (Opening Br. 26.) Only two of these asserted rights — the right to access courts and the right to pursue a common calling — are among the limited 3 Although Appellants jointly raise this argument in the opening brief, it appears that McBurney was the only one to advance this claim in the district court. 14 MCBURNEY v. YOUNG fundamental rights the Supreme Court has previously identified as protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Hurlbert contends the VFOIA unduly burdens his right to pursue a common calling because it prevents him from practicing his trade, which he defines as obtaining records related to real property on behalf of his clients, in Virginia. Even though the VFOIA does not regulate professions, Hurlbert asserts the statute nonetheless burdens his right to pursue a common calling because it prevents him from using his primary means of acquiring government records, that is, by personally filing a freedom of information act request. He further asserts the district court erred in concluding VFOIA did not impermissibly infringe on his claimed fundamental right because any effect was merely incidental. This is so, Hurlbert contends, because upon showing any burden to a fundamental right protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the analysis shifts to whether the state can justify its action. The ability to pursue one’s profession or common calling is one of the limited number of foundational rights protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948); see also United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219 (1984) (Certainly, the pursuit of a common calling is one of the most fundamental of those privileges protected by the Clause.). Indeed, [m]any, if not most, of [the Supreme Court’s] cases expounding the Privileges and Immunities Clause have dealt with this basic and essential activity. Camden, 465 U.S. at 219. The Supreme Court has found the following provisions to impermissibly burden an individual’s right to pursue a common calling — requiring nonresidents to pay substantially more for annual licenses to trade in goods (Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870)); requiring nonresidents to pay substantially more to engage in a particuMCBURNEY v. YOUNG 15 lar profession (Toomer, 334 U.S. 385); requiring nonresident commercial fisherman to pay ten times more for commercial fishing licenses (Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952)); resident-based hiring preferences for employment in the field of oil and gas development (Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978)); limiting admission to the practice of law to residents (Piper, 470 U.S. 274); local rule limiting admission to the practice of law within a federal district court bar to individuals who lived in or maintained an office in the state, even if nonresidents could be admitted pro hac vice (Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987)); and limiting admission by motion to the practice of law to residents, even if nonresidents could be admitted by examination (Friedman, 487 U.S. 59). Similarly, in Tangier Sound Waterman’s Ass’n v. Pruitt, 4 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 1993), we held that a Virginia statute tripling the nonresident commercial fisherman’s harverster’s license fee effects a restriction on the right to earn a living. Id. at 265, 266. And in O’Reilly v. Board of Appeals, 942 F.2d 281 (4th Cir. 1991), we held that the county’s use of residency as a determining factor in awarding Passenger Vehicle Licenses, which were required for individuals to operate taxi services within the county, burdened nonresidents’ rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 282, 284. In each instance cited above, the provision at issue directly prohibited, restricted, or otherwise regulated the ability of a nonresident to engage in a certain profession or trade within the state. Each such regulatory enactment was specifically directed at a commercial activity and differentiated between residents and nonresidents solely as to the conduct of that commercial activity. This fact fundamentally distinguishes the typical provision that implicates the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the context of a common calling from the statute at issue here. The VFOIA does not regulate anyone’s qualifications or prerequisites to enter into or engage in any profession or trade 16 MCBURNEY v. YOUNG within Virginia. It does not act as a wholesale barrier to entering a business, nor does it establish a license, fee, or other burden to nonresidents entering or engaging in a profession. On its face, it is clear the VFOIA addresses no business, profession, or trade. Simply put, there is something inherently and qualitatively different about the VFOIA as compared to any of the provisions considered by the Supreme Court in the context of the Privileges and Immunities Clause’s right to pursue a common calling. Indeed, no Supreme Court case or precedent within this Circuit has ever held that a statute whose purpose and language is unrelated to engaging in a particular profession, trade, or livelihood implicates the right to pursue one’s common calling for purposes of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Hurlbert nonetheless contends that because he is unable to file VFOIA requests on behalf of his clients while Virginia residents could do so for their clients, the VFOIA’s citizens-only provision implicates nonresidents’ (and specifically his own) right to pursue a common calling. At bottom, Hurlbert argues that even if the multiple thousands of VFOIA requests annually are unrelated to a common calling, the single instance of a tangential effect on him is sufficient to invalidate the VFOIA’s citizens-only provision. We disagree. While it may be true that VFOIA coincidentally limits a method by which Hurlbert conducts some of his business, it does not follow that the VFOIA impermissibly burdens his ability to pursue his common calling within the Commonwealth in a Privileges and Immunities Clause context. As the district court found, [t]he statute’s effect on Hurlbert’s ability to practice his common calling is merely incidental. 780 F. Supp. 2d at 447. We agree. Nothing in the language of the VFOIA prohibits Hurlbert from pursuing his profession in Virginia, or regulates his ability as a noncitizen to enter or engage in business there. Any effect on Hurlbert by the VFOIA is by happenstance; a cirMCBURNEY v. YOUNG 17 cumstance never recognized by the Supreme Court in its Privileges and Immunities Clause case law. While the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence recognizes that burdens short of a wholesale restriction[ ] fall within the right to pursue a common calling, no case has ever struck down a statute or regulation with such an indirect and tangential relationship to the practice of a trade or profession. See Friedman v. Supreme Court of Va., 822 F.2d 423, 427 (4th Cir. 1987), aff’d by Friedman, 487 U.S. 59. Unlike the provision in Friedman, which restricted the method by which a noncitizen attorney could enter into the practice of law in the state, the VFOIA simply does not regulate Hurlbert’s ability to enter into or pursue his trade or profession in Virginia. At most, the VFOIA limits one method by which Hurlbert may carry out his business and thus has an incidental effect on his common calling in Virginia. But the ease or method of carrying out one’s work within a state is several steps removed from the right to work within the state on terms of substantial equality as residents in the first instance. See Toomer, 334 U.S. at 396. As such, we conclude the VFOIA does not implicate Hurlbert’s right to pursue a common calling under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the district court did not err in so holding. 2. Other Claimed Privileges and Immunities Clause Rights To support their contention that VFOIA infringes a protected right they enunciate as equal access to information, the Appellants rely on the Third Circuit’s decision in Lee v. Minner, 458 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2006). There, the Third Circuit held that Delaware’s Freedom of Information Act violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause by limiting access to public records to Delaware citizens. Id. at 195. The court concluded that [e]ffective advocacy and participation in the political process requires access to public records and thus is an ‘essential activity’ which ‘bear[s] upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity.’ Id. at 200. The Appellants assert that VFOIA similarly burdens their ability to obtain public 18 MCBURNEY v. YOUNG records and advocate for their interests on equal footing with Virginia citizens. (Opening Br. 23.) Appellants’ reliance on Lee is misplaced for at least two reasons. First, as out-of-circuit authority, it is not binding on this Court. Although the Third Circuit traced its analysis to general principles from Privileges and Immunities Clause jurisprudence, the specific right that Lee identified is not one previously recognized by the Supreme Court, or any other court, as an activity within the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Second, even were we to follow Lee’s rationale, that case is materially distinguishable from the situation presented by the Appellants. The right identified in Lee — to engage in the political process with regard to matters of both national political and economic importance, id. at 199 — is not the same right the Appellants advance. By contrast, the Appellants want access to information of personal import rather than information to advance the interests of other citizens or the nation as a whole, or that is of political or economic importance. Thus, the right the Third Circuit identified in Lee, and the basis for concluding it implicates the Privileges and Immunities Clause, does not apply to the case at bar. The Appellants assert a generalized right to access information that reaches far more broadly than even Lee set forth. For these reasons, we find Appellants’ argument that Lee’s rationale applies here unpersuasive. To the extent Appellants urge us to adopt the position that there is a broad right of access to information stemming from the policy of open government undergirding freedom of information acts generally and grounded in the First Amendment’s guarantees of free speech and free press, we are similarly not persuaded. (Cf. Opening Br. 25.) While the Appellants may well be correct that access to public records is of increasing importance . . . in the information age, that assertion misses the salient inquiry. (See Opening Br. 26 (citation omitted).) MCBURNEY v. YOUNG 19 The Supreme Court’s Privileges and Immunities Clause jurisprudence simply does not lead to the conclusion Appellants advance. As the Supreme Court in Baldwin observed: It has not been suggested . . . that state citizenship or residency may never be used by a State to distin- guish among persons. Suffrage, for example, always has been understood to be tied to an individual’s identification with a particular State. No one would suggest that the Privileges and Immunities Clause requires a State to open its polls to a person who declines to assert that the State is the only one where he claims a right to vote. The same is true as to qualification for an elective office of the State. Nor must a State always apply all its laws or all its services equally to anyone, resident or nonresident, who may request it to do so. Some distinctions between residents and nonresidents merely reflect the fact that this is a Nation composed of individual States, and are permitted; other distinctions are prohibited because they hinder the formation, the purpose, or the development of a single Union of those States. Only with respect to those privileges and immunities bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally. 436 U.S. at 383 (internal citations omitted). Access to a state’s records simply does not bear[ ] upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity such that VFOIA’s citizen-only provision implicates the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Cf. id. A sidebar to this argument is McBurney’s assertion that the VFOIA burdens his ability to advocate for his interests and the interests of others similarly situated. (Opening Br. 26.) McBurney claims on brief that the district court read his VFOIA request too narrowly and that because he sought documents regarding DCSE processing of child support cases 20 MCBURNEY v. YOUNG generally, and not just as related to his own case, he was not permitted to take part in an interstate dialogue regarding state child support practices that directly affect his life and income, as well as the life and income of others. (Opening Br. 27.) However, McBurney’s complaint belies his assertion on appeal that he was attempting to advance an interest beyond his personal one. In the complaint, McBurney only asserted a Privileges and Immunities Clause claim on his own behalf, noting that without the information he sought, he cannot participate in Virginia’s governmental and political processes, cannot advocate effectively on his own behalf, cannot invoke any of Virginia’s dispute resolution procedures for dispute resolution, and cannot resolve the issues surrounding his child support application. (J.A. 15A-17A.) McBurney did not purport to be acting on behalf of others similarly situated, and only contended that the VFOIA limited his ability to advance his own interests. McBurney never argued before the district court that he sought to advance the interests of those similarly situated. McBurney’s argument rests then on the assertion of a right to advocate for his interests, a right that has not directly been recognized under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. To the extent McBurney’s argument encompasses a general right of access to public records, that argument fails for the reasons set forth previously. To the extent it overlaps with a right to access to courts, that argument fails for the reasons set forth below. In addition, and contrary to McBurney’s contention, the VFOIA’s citizen’s-only provision does not bar him from engaging in the political process, advocating his own interests, or advancing his political or legal arguments within the Commonwealth. For all of these reasons, we also reject McBurney’s argument that VFOIA impermissibly restricts his ability to advocate his own and others’ interests. Appellants next contend that VFOIA implicates their right of equal access to courts because VFOIA denies noncitizens MCBURNEY v. YOUNG 21 access to public records needed to prepare and file meaningful legal papers in suits against Virginia public officials. (Opening Br. 28.) However, what the Appellants invoke is something much different than any court access right previously recognized under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Supreme Court has long held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects the right of a citizen of one state to access the courts of another state. Canadian N. Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 560 (1920) (recognizing the right of a citizen of one state . . . to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of another) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Nothing in VFOIA directly or indirectly speaks to the Appellants’ ability to file a proceeding in any court or otherwise enforce a legal right within Virginia. Access to courts has never been interpreted to mean that states must provide individuals with access to public records that may or may not lead to discovery of a potential legal claim. We decline to do so here. The Privileges and Immunities Clause is not a mechanism for pre-lawsuit discovery, and access to public records as part of the preparation for possible litigation is not sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation so as to fall within the protection of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Cf. Friedman, 487 U.S. at 65. Citing Pruitt, the Appellants also assert that VFOIA infringes on their ability to pursue their economic interests on equal footing with Virginia residents. (Opening Br. 29.) But Pruitt is a common calling case and does not set forth some novel generic right to pursue economic interests under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 4 F.3d at 266. Appellants’ arguments related to a right to pursue economic interests largely mirror the arguments they make with regard to other rights — for McBurney, the ability to access courts on equal footing as Virginia citizens, and for Hurlbert, the right to pursue a common calling. We find no support in the relevant case law to identify a new right to pursue economic 22 MCBURNEY v. YOUNG interests within the ambit of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Accordingly, this argument also fails. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court did not err in concluding that the VFOIA does not infringe on any of the Appellants’ fundamental rights or privileges protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Accordingly, we need not address the parties’ arguments regarding the rest of the Supreme Court’s test for whether a provision violates the Clause. Having failed to satisfy the first part of that test, Appellants’ claim that the VFOIA violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause cannot succeed as a matter of law.