Opinion ID: 1941856
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lineups vs. Lineup Photos

Text: In this case, appellants challenge the identification testimony given, not only by persons who attended the lineup of the person they identified, but also by persons who never attended the actual lineup and merely viewed a photograph of that lineup. Appellants contend that the trial court should have suppressed these photo identifications as fruits of an illegal lineup. As appellants appear to concede, they cannot base this claim upon the absence of counsel when witnesses viewed the lineup photos. The Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel does not apply when a witness is merely viewing a photograph of the accused. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 321, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 2579, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973). Following Ash, we have concluded that it makes no difference if the photo portrays a lineup; the right to counsel still does not apply to the viewing of the photo. See ( Clyde) Thomas v. United States, 382 A.2d 24, 27 (D.C.1978); (Daniel) Williams v. United States, 379 A.2d 698, 699 (D.C.1977). Appellants argue, however, that the absence of counsel at the lineup itself necessarily tainted any identification based upon the later viewing of a photo of that lineup, even if the person making the identification never attended the original lineup. We reject this argument. The Supreme Court has deemed counsel's presence at a lineup indispensable in large part due to the accused's inability effectively to reconstruct at trial any unfairness that occurred. Wade, 388 U.S. at 231-32, 87 S.Ct. at 1934; see also Ash, 413 U.S. at 312-13, 93 S.Ct. at 2575. The same difficulty does not inhere in a photographic identification. As Justice Stewart noted in his concurring opinion in Ash, there is a fundamental difference between a photographic identification and a lineup identification, insofar as defense counsel can more readily reconstruct the identification procedure when it involves the viewing of photographs: A photographic identification is quite different from a lineup, for there are substantially fewer possibilities of impermissible suggestion when photographs are used, and those unfair influences can be readily reconstructed at trial. It is true that the defendant's photograph may be markedly different from the others displayed, but this unfairness can be demonstrated at trial from an actual comparison of the photographs used or from the witness' description of the display. Similarly, it is possible that the photographs could be arranged in a suggestive manner, or that by comment or gesture the prosecuting authorities might single out the defendant's picture. But these are the kinds of overt influence that a witness can easily recount and that would serve to impeach the identification testimony. In short, there are few possibilities for unfair suggestivenessand those rather blatant and easily reconstructed. Accordingly, an accused would not be foreclosed from an effective cross-examination of an identification witness simply because his counsel was not present at the photographic display. Ash, 413 U.S. at 324-25, 93 S.Ct. at 2581-82 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also id. at 319, 93 S.Ct. at 2578 (majority opinion) (Although we do not suggest that equality of access to photographs removes all potential for abuse, it does remove any inequality in the adversary process itself and thereby fully satisfies the historical spirit of the Sixth Amendment's counsel guarantee.) (footnote omitted). We believe that this distinction between lineups and photos similarly forecloses appellants' argument in this case. With the exception of Mitchell, who attended Poole's lineup, no witnesses who made identifications based on lineup photos had previously attended the original lineup of the same defendant they identified. [24] Thus, except in the case of Mitchell, the situation was entirely comparable to the viewing of a photo array. See People v. Curtis, 113 Ill.2d 136, 100 Ill.Dec. 735, 739, 497 N.E.2d 1004, 1008 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014, 107 S.Ct. 1890, 95 L.Ed.2d 497 (1987). Any impropriety that may have occurred in the absence of counsel at the original lineups could have tainted a later photographic identification only insofar as the photos themselves may have been suggestive. These photos, however, were readily available for counsel's inspection. Counsel's absence from the lineups did not, therefore, hinder appellants from reconstructing the identification process or from making a suggestivity argument to the court; the attorneys' ability to cross-examine the witness would not have been any greater if they had been present when the lineup pictures were taken. Id. Consequently, identifications based upon the lineup photos alone did not implicate appellants' right to counsel, notwithstanding counsel's absence at the actual lineups. See id.; cf. Edwards v. Butler, 882 F.2d 160, 164 (5th Cir.1989) (right to counsel does not apply when police photograph suspect). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting identifications, whether in-court or out-of-court, by witnesses who had only seen photographs of the lineups, rather than attending the lineups themselves. See Curtis, 100 Ill.Dec. at 739, 497 N.E.2d at 1008 (no error in admission of testimony concerning identification of accused from photo of lineup, notwithstanding fact that lineup was conducted without counsel).