Opinion ID: 886659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Analytical Model

Text: 32 ¶71 Again, Article II, Section 4 provides: Individual dignity. The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas. Clifford and Huff point out that this provision of the Constitution is composed of three clauses: the individual dignity clause (after which the entire section is named); the equal protection clause; and the anti-discrimination clause. Clifford, at 304. ¶72 However, our canons of constitutional construction require that we treat each separate clause as both substantively meaningful and not redundant. “In construing a constitutional provision it is our duty to give meaning to every word, phrase, clause, and sentence therein, if it is possible so to do.” State ex rel. Diederichs v. State Highway Comm’n (1931), 89 Mont. 205, 211, 296 P. 1033, 1035. Clifford and Huff suggest that the plain language of Article II, Section 4 be interpreted as a cohesive whole so as to fulfill this canon of construction: [T]he language of the dignity provision moves in a logical progression from the general to the specific. The title of the provision itself is “Individual Dignity;” thus, we must presume that all the language in the provision treats this topic in some respect. The first sentence, the dignity clause, obviously addresses dignity by declaring that human dignity is inviolable. The second sentence, we believe, goes on to declare one way in which human dignity can be violated-- by denying someone the equal protection of the law based on some sort of arbitrary classification. . . . The third sentence of Article 4 [sic], the anti-discrimination clause, we believe, fleshes out the meaning of the equal protection right by enumerating certain types of classifications which the authors of the dignity provision believed to be arbitrary. . . . Clifford, at 305-06. 33 ¶73 Using this analytical model, I address the issue before us: Whether the Montana University System’s policy prohibiting homosexual employees from receiving insurance coverage for their same-sex domestic partners violates their rights under the Montana Constitution. 34
¶74 Article II, Section 4 is entitled “Individual dignity.” The first clause of Article II, Section 4, the “individual dignity clause,” provides: “The dignity of the human being is inviolable.” As to this clause, Clifford and Huff state: The title of the provision itself is “Individual Dignity;” thus, we must presume that all the language in the provision treats this topic in some respect. The first sentence, the dignity clause, obviously addresses dignity by declaring that human dignity is inviolable. Clifford, at 305. ¶75 Under this part of the model, we must necessarily start by acknowledging the obvious: pursuant to Article II, Section 4, the right of human dignity is “inviolable.” That means that this right is “incapable of being violated.” Black’s Law Dictionary 832 (7th ed. 1999). As Clifford and Huff observe: “To say, as the Montana Constitution does, that ‘[t]he dignity of the human being is inviolable’ is thus to assert that the intrinsic worth, the basic humanity, of persons may not be violated.” Clifford, at 303. ¶76 This statement strikes at the heart of the issue before us. The intrinsic worth and the basic humanity of gays and lesbians--i.e., their human dignity--has not been recognized to date.9 Indeed, as already demonstrated, this fundamental, core value is, in many instances, denied gays and lesbians through laws and policies enacted by the government, as here. 9 Gryczan was decided on privacy grounds under Article II, Section 10. Gryczan, 283 Mont. at 456, 942 P.2d at 126. However, then Chief Justice Jean A. Turnage would have reached the same result in Gryczan on the basis of equal protection. Gryczan, 283 Mont. at 456-58, 942 P.2d at 126-28 (Turnage, C.J., concurring and dissenting). 35 ¶77 That human dignity is described as being “inviolable” is significant, as this right is the only Article II guarantee that carries this absolute prohibition: Human dignity may not be violated--no exceptions. ¶78 Article II, Section 4 is consistent with this Country’s historical treatment of human dignity as a central, foundational ideal at the root of our concept and system of ordered liberty and of our ethical tradition. See Clifford, at 308-14. There is nothing in the record or debates of Montana’s Constitutional Convention which would demonstrate that the delegates had any other view of the scope of human dignity. Indeed, Delegate Wade Dahood, chair of the Committee, stated: “[t]he intent of Section 4 is simply to provide that every individual in the State of Montana, as a citizen of this state, may pursue his inalienable rights without having any shadows cast upon his dignity through unwarranted discrimination.” Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, March 7, 1972, p. 1643. ¶79 Laws and policies which single out, degrade and demonize persons based on their gender or sexual orientation--i.e., for simply being who they are--casts a shadow on the individual dignity of such persons and devalues those persons basic humanity and the intrinsic worth that all people possess. See Walker, ¶¶ 81-82. Such treatment repudiates the “essential equality” of all people before the law and the “moral basis for democratic government.” Jackson, at 23. Gays and lesbians have the moral right and moral responsibility to confront the most fundamental questions about the meaning and value of their own lives, to answer to their own consciences and convictions, see Armstrong, ¶ 72, and, as autonomous human beings, the inherent right to form relationships with whomever they choose. These rights are no more nor less than heterosexuals enjoy. Indeed, they are precisely the same rights that 36 those representing and supporting the Respondents rightly enjoy and demand. Unequal treatment based on sexual orientation is an affront to the inviolable right of human dignity. Government policies that allow or require such treatment are, in my view, per se unlawful under the dignity clause of Article II, Section 4. Such is the University’s policy at issue here- -it treats gay and lesbian couples unequally in terms of employment; equal work does not merit equal benefits based on nothing else than gender and sexual orientation.
¶80 The second clause of Article II, Section 4, the “equal protection clause,” provides: “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.” As to that clause, Clifford’s and Huff’s model provides: The second sentence, we believe, goes on to declare one way in which human dignity can be violated--by denying someone the equal protection of the law based on some sort of arbitrary classification. Clifford, at 305-06. ¶81 Again it must be noted at the outset, that the equal protection clause states that “No person” shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. The language is clear and unambiguous. “No person” means simply that--there is no language in this clause excepting out of this guarantee gays and lesbians. At least our society has not come to the position that homosexuals are not even to be considered as persons. ¶82 As has already been pointed out, neither federal jurisprudence nor this Court’s case law recognizes gender or sexual orientation as an arbitrary classification or “suspect class” for equal protection purposes. This view, however popular, is inherently illogical when one acknowledges that the entire focus of laws directed at gays and lesbians is sex. Majoritarian 37 morality and prevailing political ideology are offended by the fact that people of the same sex have sexual relations with each other. This offense translates into laws and policies that explicitly or implicitly demonize homosexuals and make them a disfavored class. Heterosexuals, on the other hand, are a favored class because their sexual relations are with persons of the opposite sex. Homosexuals are a disfavored class because their sexual relations are with persons of the same sex. Regardless, however, the defining criteria of either class is plainly and simply sex--or, to be more specific, with which sex one is having sex. To paraphrase an old adage, “When they say it isn’t about sex, it’s about sex.” ¶83 Laws based on gender orientation are palpably sex-based and are, therefore, suspect classifications under conventional equal protection analysis. ¶84 Andrew Koppelman, an associate professor of law and political science at Northwestern University, makes this point in two starkly simple syllogisms: First syllogism: (1) Laws that make people’s legal rights depend on their sex are sex-based classifications. (2) Laws that discriminate against gay people are laws that make people’s legal rights depend on their sex. . . . Therefore, (3) Laws that discriminate against gay people are sex-based classifications. Second syllogism: (1) Sex-based classifications are subject to heightened scrutiny. (2) (from the first syllogism) Laws that discriminate against gay people are sex-based classifications. Therefore, (3) Laws that discriminate against gay people are subject to heightened scrutiny. Andrew Koppelman, The Gay Rights Question in Contemporary American Law 53-54 (2002) (hereinafter Koppelman). 38 ¶85 Moreover, it has been the law in Montana for two decades that [a] suspect class is one “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.” In re C.H. (1984), 210 Mont. 184, 198, 683 P.2d 931, 938 (quoting San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez (1973), 411 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1294, 36 L.Ed.2d 16). Given the discussion with which I began this separate Opinion, it cannot reasonably be argued that gays and lesbians do not fit within this definition of suspect class. ¶86 Therefore, I conclude that gays and lesbians constitute a suspect class under conventional equal protection analysis. Unequal treatment based on sexual orientation denies the person equal treatment, equal justice, and equal protection under the law. ¶87 In the case at bar, heterosexual couples are entitled to more and better employment benefits than are homosexual couples. This unequal treatment is based on gender and sexual orientation and is, therefore, sex-based--it is a classification which is inherently arbitrary and suspect, because it violates the inviolable human dignity of the persons so classified and those persons’ fundamental right to equal protection of the laws.
¶88 The third clause of Article II, Section 4, the “anti-discrimination clause,” provides: “Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas.” The final part of Clifford’s and Huff’s model states: 39 The third sentence of Article 4 [sic], the anti-discrimination clause, we believe, fleshes out the meaning of the equal protection right by enumerating certain types of classifications which the authors of the dignity provision believed to be arbitrary. . . . Clifford, at 306. ¶89 The arbitrary classifications enumerated in the discrimination clause of Section 4 are race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, and political or religious ideas. But, as Clifford and Huff point out, this list is not exhaustive of arbitrary classifications, because if that were the case, then the second clause, the equal protection clause, would be surplusage. Presumably the framers of the Constitution included the more general equal protection clause so as to leave open the possibility of other prohibited classifications beyond those recognized at that time. Moreover, the inclusion of the more general provision protecting the right of human dignity must presume that dignity can be violated in ways that do not involve arbitrary classifications. Clifford, at 306. Were that not the case, then the individual dignity clause would be surplusage as well; it would have no independent significance in the scheme of Article II, Section 4. ¶90 Notwithstanding my conclusion that discrimination based on sexual orientation is sexbased under conventional equal protection analysis, infra, I agree with Clifford and Huff that the list of arbitrary classifications in the third clause of Article II, Section 4 is not--and, indeed, should not--be exhaustive. I would hold that homosexuals comprise a suspect class in their own right. I reach that conclusion by reference to another important, but virtually ignored, section in the Declaration of Rights. ¶91 The Delegates’ intention that our Constitution’s Declaration of Rights not be interpreted as limiting civil rights, but, rather, as the enumeration of basic guarantees that a 40 free and sovereign society--“We the people”--should enjoy is best exemplified in the Committee’s proposal of Article II, Section 34 to the Convention delegates and in the subsequent adoption of this provision. Article II, Section 34 states: Unenumerated rights. The enumeration in this constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny, impair, or disparage others retained by the people. ¶92 In proposing the adoption of this section, the Committee did two things. First, it recognized that the rights enumerated in Montana’s Constitution were not exclusive--i.e., that there are unenumerated rights or “rights beyond those specifically listed” which are retained by the people. Proposal, p. 645. Second, and important to my discussion here, the Committee considered this section to be “a crucial part of any effort to revitalize the state government’s approach to civil liberties questions. [And that this section] may be the source of innovative judicial activity in the civil liberties field.” Proposal, p. 645. ¶93 The proceedings of the Constitutional Convention reveal no debate on Article II, Section 34. Rather, it was adopted unanimously on the straightforward, yet eloquent recommendation of Delegate Dorothy Eck, who stated: “I think that [this section] is completely self-explanatory. There are rights which are not enumerated which the people of Montana should not be denied.” Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, March 9, 1972, p. 1832. ¶94 Elison and Snyder observe that the Committee’s belief that Article II, Section 34 could be the source of “innovative judicial activity” in the area of civil liberties has not been realized; that there are no cases referencing or interpreting this section. Elison, at 86. While technically inaccurate that no cases have referenced this section, see Dorwart, n.3 (Nelson, 41 J., concurring), it is true that this Court has not applied Article II, Section 34 in any substantive context. ¶95 Elison and Snyder suggest: The section could be used as the basis for the introduction of a theory of natural law or an expansion of the use of substantive due process or judicial finding of unstated individual rights hidden in the self-reliant, free-thinking, idiosyncratic Montanan mythology. Presumptively, this could limit state police power and enlarge existing rights or create new rights. . . . While plenary state legislative power and unenumerated rights might appear to be in conflict or contradictory, they are not. In a state constitution a provision on unenumerated rights as a balance against state police power is a potentially useful idea, but something of an anomaly. Historically, within the context of state governments in a federal system, the limitations on plenary legislative power are the specific prohibitions and restrictions found in a constitutional declaration of rights. Adding unenumerated rights to specific prohibitions and restrictions could transfer to the people indirectly, and to the courts directly, additional means of checking plenary legislative power. Elison, at 87. ¶96 Given that Article II, Section 34 was specifically adopted as a Constitutional source by which “to revitalize the state government’s approach to civil liberties questions,” Proposal, at 645, it is entirely appropriate that the enumerated protections afforded by Article II, Section 4 be interpreted in that broader context in the case at bar. In point of fact, it is entirely appropriate that we hold, under Article II, Section 34, that one of the unenumerated prohibited classifications beyond those recognized at the time the Constitution was adopted is the classification of individuals based on gender or sexual orientation. ¶97 In summary, applying the Clifford and Huff model, I would hold that: (a) laws and policies that make people’s rights dependent on gender or sexual orientation violate the inviolable human dignity clause of Article II, Section 4; (b) classifications of persons on the basis of gender or sexual orientation are sex-based and are therefore arbitrary and suspect 42 under conventional equal protection analysis; and, in what I believe to be a better approach, (c) reading Article II, Sections 4 and 34 together, it is appropriate to establish, as a matter of Montana constitutional law, that classifications based on gender or sexual orientation are suspect classifications in their own right and are in addition to those enumerated in the third clause of this State’s equal protection provision. ¶98 Pursuant to this analysis, I would hold that applying strict scrutiny, the Respondents have failed to demonstrate a compelling state interest for treating heterosexual and homosexual couples differently in terms of the benefits relating to employment. See Gryczan, 283 Mont. at 449, 942 P.2d at 122. I reach this conclusion for the following reasons. ¶99 The Respondents’ arguments are framed in terms of who can be married and who cannot--heterosexuals can and homosexuals cannot. Amici supporting the Respondents focus their arguments on family values, majoritarian concepts of morality, religious doctrine and preserving the sanctity of marriage both as a civil and as a sectarian institution. These arguments are red herrings. They miss the mark and ignore the core issue here--whether gays and lesbians have the right to individual human dignity, equal protection of the laws and freedom from discrimination under Article II, Section 4 of the Montana Constitution with respect to obtaining the same economic benefits of employment that heterosexuals receive for the same work. ¶100 Certainly, secular organizations and religions have the right to define for their own members their beliefs, doctrines, moral tenets, rules and rituals. Individuals have the right to hold whatever personal opinions they choose. That is not to say, however, that these institutions, groups and persons may impose their philosophies and values on minorities and 43 on others who ascribe to a different view and whose conduct and life styles cause no harm. We stated in Gryczan: James Madison decried the potential for a tyranny of the majority, pointing out that it was as important in our system of government to guard the minority in our society against injustice by the majority, as it was to guard society from the oppression of its rulers. The Federalist, No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). . . . . . . [Despite governmental laws and policies and perceived societal notions of what is acceptable in a moral sense] there are certain rights so fundamental that they will not be denied to a minority no matter how despised by society. Gryczan, 283 Mont. at 455, 942 P.2d at 125-26. As individual privacy was such a right in Gryczan, the fundamental rights to human dignity, to equal protection of the laws and to freedom from invidious discrimination, are in the case at bar. ¶101 The University in particular and employers in general are perfectly capable of providing gays and lesbians and gay and lesbian couples with the same economic benefits of employment that heterosexuals enjoy. And that is all this case is about--providing similarly situated employees the same economic benefits from employment. This case is not about gay marriage or gay unions, as the Court’s Opinion clearly acknowledges. ¶102 As already noted, because providing gay and lesbian couples with the same employment benefits that heterosexual couples receive can be accomplished without additional cost or administrative burden to the employer, there is no legitimate economic rationale for the Respondents’ position, much less that of Amici. As this case shows, employers are able to determine partner benefits on criteria generally applicable to all people. ¶103 Here, the criteria arbitrarily chosen is marriage. But, as the Court’s Opinion demonstrates, marriage can be proven by the simple expedient of two people signing an 44 affidavit. However, if the underlying rationale of providing partner benefits is to insure that the partners are residing together and have accepted mutual commitments of financial support, that can be satisfied by affidavit, declaration, contract or some other writing in addition to proof of marriage. Even assuming one can create a common law marriage by signing an affidavit (which as our Opinion shows is a false premise, see In re Estate of McClelland (1975), 168 Mont. 160, 164-65, 541 P.2d 780, 783), the employer has no real basis for insuring that such persons are, in fact, married, or that their arrangement is simply not one of convenience to acquire important health insurance benefits. Indeed, there is nothing stopping such persons from simply walking away from the whole arrangement when it suits their circumstances to do so. ¶104 Furthermore, the only basis for the argument that granting gay and lesbian couples equal employment benefits will destroy the institution of marriage is that the employer has made an arbitrary decision to use marriage as the defining criteria for granting these benefits. Were the defining criteria different--as it could easily be--the whole issue of marriage, religion and morality would cease to exist. Paying homosexual workers the same as their heterosexual counterparts has not destroyed any important institutions in or the moral fabric of our society, and there is no evidentiary basis for concluding that extending health insurance benefits to gay and lesbian couples will have that effect either. Indeed, that has not occurred in those states and with those many employers and institutions that have extended such benefits already. 45 ¶105 Additionally, there are three reasons why the preserving-the-institution-of-marriage argument fails. First, this is not a gay marriage case. This case is about providing equal financial benefits to similarly situated employees of the same employer. ¶106 Second, the premise that extending economic employment benefits to gay and lesbian couples will somehow harm marriage is itself without merit. There is no actual evidence in the record here to support that conclusion. Indeed, arguably, heterosexuals have done more to denigrate the institution of marriage than gay and lesbian couples ever have or likely ever will. In the years since 1998, the divorce rate in Montana has averaged nearly 40%.10 Moreover, this rate does not take into account any number of heterosexuals “living in sin,” without the benefit of any marriage, nor does it take into account married heterosexuals who are engaged in extra-marital affairs. Our society lionizes professional athletes, entertainers, and high-profile politicians despite (although one would sometimes think, because of) marital infidelity and divorces. One need simply turn on the television to understand that the “Ozzie and Harriet” and “Leave it to Beaver” genre of television shows are historical artifacts which have no popularity with the American viewing public. I submit that those championing the preservation-of-marriage argument accord a good deal more to the sanctity of the institution than do a substantial percentage of Montanans and other Americans as evidenced by their actual conduct. ¶107 Third, and importantly for our discussion here, the preservation-of-marriage argument is, transparently, little more than a convenient vehicle through which to condemn and to discriminate against gays and lesbians because of their lifestyles and gender orientations. See 10 National Center for Health Statistics at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs. 46 Clifford, at 334-35. To be sure, homosexuality offends many people’s sense of morality and the teachings of many religions. However, we live in a pluralistic society, and, as we said in Gryczan: With respect to regulation of morals, the police power should properly be exercised to protect each individual’s right to be free from interference in defining and pursuing his own morality but not to enforce a majority morality on persons whose conduct does not harm others. . . . Indeed, what is considered to be “moral” changes with the times and is dependent upon societal background. Spiritual leadership, not the government, has the responsibility for striving to improve the morality of individuals. Campbell [v. Sundquist (Tenn.Ct.App. 1996)], 926 S.W.2d [250,] 265-66 (quoting Commonwealth v. Bonadio (1980), 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47, 50). . . . Our Constitution does not protect morality; it does, however, guarantee to all persons, whether in the majority or in a minority, those certain basic freedoms and rights which are set forth in the Declaration of Rights. . . . Gryczan, 283 Mont. at 454, 942 P.2d at 125. Again, as the right of individual privacy was one of those basic freedoms and rights in Gryczan, the right of human dignity, equal protection of the laws and freedom from discrimination are, likewise, basic freedoms and rights which must be protected in the case at bar. A policy of classifying persons for its own sake cannot be justified. Romer v. Evans (1996), 517 U.S. 620, 635, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1629, 134 L.Ed.2d 855. There is no compelling state interest for the Respondent’s policy at issue here. 47