Opinion ID: 419924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Motion for a Jury Trial on the ADEA Claim

Text: 34 Section 4(c) of the ADEA, as amended, provides that a person suing for redress of age discrimination in violation of the ADEA is entitled to a trial by jury. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981). See also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 585, 98 S.Ct. 866, 872, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978). Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs the procedure by which a demand for jury trial is to be made, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 35 (a) Right Preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate. 36 (b) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury by serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the commencement of the action and not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue. Such demand may be indorsed upon a pleading of the party. 37 .... 38 (d) Waiver. The failure of a party to serve a demand as required by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a waiver by him of trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties. 39 Washington made his first request for a jury trial on his ADEA claim many months past the deadline set by Rule 38(b). He contends that the district court erred in denying his belated request because there was no basis on which the court could find that he had waived his right to a jury trial knowingly and intelligently. This argument misperceives the test for waiver under Rule 38. 40 Rule 38 proceed[s] on the basic premise that a jury trial is waived unless a timely demand is filed, Cascone v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 702 F.2d 389, 391 (2d Cir.1983). When Rule 38(b) has not been followed, 41 it is clear that the test of waiver that is applied to other constitutional rights, that there must have been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, is not applicable to the right of trial by jury. 42 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2321, at 101 (1971) (footnotes omitted). Thus, a [w]aiver by failure to make a timely demand is complete even though it was inadvertent and unintended and regardless of the explanation or excuse. Id. at 102 (footnote omitted). 4 43 We are unpersuaded by Washington's argument that the application of Rule 38 to a pro se litigant is unfair absent some notification of its operation. 5 (Appellant's brief on appeal at 7.) The operation of the Rule imposes no greater burden on pro se litigants than on represented litigants, as the unintentional or unknowing failures of all litigants to comply with Rule 38 are dealt with equally. Thus, we have concluded that there was waiver where the party's attorney wrongly believed that a timely demand had been made, Noonan v. Cunard Steamship Co., 375 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.1967), and where the attorney's failure to make a timely demand resulted from the removal of the case from state court, where a written request was not required, to federal court where the different procedure of Rule 38 applied, Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 996-97 (2d Cir.1973). The same rule of waiver has been applied to pro se litigants. See Scharnhorst v. Independent School District, 686 F.2d 637, 641 (8th Cir.1982); McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 371 (4th Cir.1975) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 426 U.S. 471, 96 S.Ct. 2640, 48 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976). 44 Finally, we note that Federal Rule 39(b) provides that even if a jury demand has not been made in compliance with Rule 38, if the action is one in which such a demand might have been made of right, the court in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any or all issues. We see no abuse of discretion here in the district court's refusal to relieve Washington of his waiver on the ADEA claim. 6 Indeed, it has not been suggested that Washington had any desire for a jury trial, until his attorney entered the case. Certainly in proceeding for more than a year pro se Washington evinced no timidity about demanding from the court whatever relief he did desire. His pro se motions included requests for stays or adjournments; a motion to amend the complaint, as discussed in Part A above; a request, shortly after the Board filed its answer, that the court proceed with the action; a request for a trial; a request for the appointment of an attorney to represent him; a request that answers to his interrogatories be submitted under oath; a motion to compel the Board to respond to his unanswered interrogatories, his document demand, and his request for a list of trial witnesses; and a request that the court call a conference of all parties. Washington's pro se request for a trial did not mention a jury; nor did his attorney suggest that Washington had believed he was thereby seeking a trial by jury. Indeed, any such suggestion would apparently be belied by Washington's reaction to the Board's suggestion that a trial might be unnecessary because summary judgment might be appropriate: Washington responded that a summary judgment would not allow the court to get a total view of the situation .... (Document filed November 12, 1981 (emphasis added).)