Opinion ID: 1188766
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The BIA incorrectly identified the elements of ง 268

Text: I turn to the first step of the inquiry: identifying the elements of Canada Criminal Code ง 268 (aggravated assault). As the majority notes, the mens rea required for a conviction under ง 268 is the same as the mens rea required for simple assault: (1) The force must be intentionally applied; and (2) the force must be applied without the victim's consent, with the perpetrator intentionally or recklessly[disregarding the lack of consent] or being wil[l]fully blind to the fact that the victim does not consent. R. v. Williams, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 134, ถ 22 (Can.). In addition to the mens rea requirement, a conviction for aggravated assault requires that the risk of bodily harm resulting from the application of force must be objective[ly] fores[eeable.] Id. Finally, to establish aggravated assault, the application of force must actually result in wound[ing], maim[ing], disfigur[ing], or endanger[ing] the life of the victim. Can.Crim.Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, s. 268 (1985). The majority, quoting this statutory language, jumps to the conclusion that ง 268's actus reus requires `infliction of significant injury. ' Maj. Op. at 1018 (emphasis added and brackets omitted). Not so. The statute requires either significant injury or the endanger[ment] of the life of the victim, and so can be satisfied even if no actual injury occurs. Were this fact not clear from the language of the statute itself, Canadian case law interpreting ง 268 leaves no doubt. As the Canadian Supreme Court explained: There is no prerequisite that any harm must actually have resulted. This first requirement of ง 268(1) is satisfied by the significant risk to the li[fe] of the [victim] occasioned by the [application of force]. R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371, ถ 95 (Can.). Although it is difficult to tell for sure from the BIA's terse analysis whether the BIA correctly identified the elements of ง 268, the only reasonable conclusion is that it did not. The BIA's decision quotes the statute's actus reus language โ wound[ing], maim[ing], disfigur[ing], or endanger[ing] the life of the complainant โ correctly, but it then goes on to paraphrase the statute as requiring willfulness of the action which inflicts the serious injury  (emphasis added), suggesting that it has overlooked the endangerment alternative. I therefore conclude that the BIA misapprehended the elements required for a conviction under ง 268. Because the BIA failed to identify the elements of ง 268 correctly, its CIMT analysis โ in which it compares the elements it has identified to the generic definition of moral turpitude โ is misdirected and so merits no deference from this Court. See Morales-Garcia, 567 F.3d at 1066 n. 4. Given the BIA's error, we should remand to the BIA to consider whether, on a proper understanding of the elements of the crime, a Canadian aggravated assault conviction is categorically a CIMT.