Opinion ID: 775389
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence

Text: 34 Reviewing the question de novo, see United States v. Soliz, 129 F.3d 499, 503 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), we conclude that because the government's evidence of a lack of physical or emotional reaction was tantamount to evidence of silence, the district court erred in admitting it. The admission of this evidence violated Velarde's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 35 The Fifth Amendment provides that[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. U.S. Const. amend. V. This right to remain silent carries an implicit . . . assurance that silence will carry no penalty. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618; United States v. Foster, 985 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966) ([I]t is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation.). Although Miranda warnings are required to reduce the risk that suspects subject to the inherent coercion of custodial interrogation will be compelled to incriminate themselves, see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984), [t]he warnings mandated by [Miranda are] a prophylactic means of safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights,  Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617,-they are not the genesis of those rights. Therefore, once the government places an individual in custody, that individual has a right to remain silent in the face of government questioning, regardless of whether the Miranda warnings are given. Id. Moreover, the government may not burden that right by commenting on the defendant's post-arrest silence at trial. Griffin v. California , 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) ([C]omment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the `inquisitorial system of criminal justice,' which the Fifth Amendment outlaws.) (citation omitted); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 n.37 (The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that [the defendant] stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.). 36 This principle was affirmed in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). Defendants Doyle and Wood were arrested and charged with selling ten pounds of marijuana to a local narcotics bureau informant. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 611. Following the arrest, Agent Beamer read both defendants their Miranda rights and began questioning them. During this interrogation, neither defendant offered an exculpatory story, choosing instead to remain silent. Id. at 617. At trial, however, both defendants offered an exculpatory story, which presented some difficulty for the prosecution, as it was not entirely implausible and there was little if any direct evidence to contradict it. Id. at 613. The State argued that the discrepancy between [the] exculpatory story at trial and silence at [the] time of arrest [gave] rise to an inference that the story was fabricated somewhere along the way. Id. at 616. In response, the Court held that it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. Id. at 618 (footnote omitted). 1 37 In United States v. Whitehead , 200 F.3d 634 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 885 (2000), we recognized that because the right to remain silent derives from the Constitution and not from the Miranda warnings themselves, regardless of whether the warnings are given, absent waiver, comment on the defendant's exercise of his right to silence violates the Fifth Amendment. There, Whitehead was charged and convicted with importation of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. &#167 &#167 952 and 960 and possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. &#167 841(a)(1). Id. at 637. Whitehead and his brother were arrested after attempting to smuggle 54.85 pounds of marijuana from Mexico into the United States underneath the rear bumper of a red 1988 Hyundai Excel. Id. at 636. After the United States Customs Service Inspector Robert Garcia and another official[ ] escorted Whitehead and his brother to the secondary office, placing the two in custody for the purposes of Miranda, Whitehead remained silent. Id. 636-37 (footnote omitted). Despite not being read his Miranda rights, Whitehead continued to remain silent as Inspector Garcia searched the car and the clothes of Whitehead and his brother. Id. at 637. During the government's case-in-chief, the prosecutor solicited testimony from Inspector Garcia affirming that Whitehead remained silent during the pre-Miranda interrogation at the border. Id. at 637-38. At closing, the prosecutor argued to the jury that Whitehead remained silent because he knew he was guilty. Id. at 638. We held that the government may not comment on a defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence in its case-in-chief because such comments would act[ ] as an impermissible penalty on the exercise of the . . . right to remain silent. Id. (citation omitted) (alterations in original). We concluded that regardless whether the Miranda warnings [are] actually given, comment on the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent [is] unconstitutional. Id. at 638 (citing Douglas v. Cupp, 578 F.2d 266, 267 (9th Cir. 1978)). 38 Here, Velarde seeks to protect the very right at issue in Whitehead -his right to remain silent after he was placed in police custody but before he received his Miranda warnings. The government attempts to distinguish Whitehead on two grounds: (i) the bulk of the government's evidence was a comment on Velarde's demeanor -not his silence; and (ii) because, once informed of his Miranda rights, Velarde waived them, his pre-Miranda silence should be considered waived. We disagree.
39 Although the government concedes that it improperly elicited some testimony that commented on Velarde's silence, it contends that this was only a passing reference and that this brief reference was simply a shorthand way of saying that Velarde's demeanor did not change in reaction to this news. The government does not specify which testimony it concedes was a comment on silence, and which it contends was a comment on demeanor. It argues, however, that the bulk of Agent Salazar's testimony and the entirety of the government's closing arguments commented on Velarde'sdemeanor, not his silence. We agree that the government may offer evidence of demeanor, see United States v. Barbosa, 906 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir. 1990), and may also offer physical evidence, see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). At issue here, however, is neither demeanor nor physical evidence. Agent Salazar's testimony about Velarde's lack of response when confronted with the sixty-three pounds of marijuana in his gas tank was testimony about Velarde's silence during the pre-Miranda questioning. 40 The Supreme Court has distinguished physical and demeanor evidence from testimonial evidence, holding that evidence of the former does not engender Fifth Amendment protection. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 592 (1990). Demeanor evidence often involves the admission of evidence concerning a defendant's slurr[ed ] speech, Muniz, 496 U.S. at 592, apparent nervousness, Barbosa, 906 F.2d at 1368, or a defendant's demeanor during a polygraph test, even though the results may not be admissible, Rothgeb v. United States, 789 F.2d 647, 651 (8th Cir. 1986). Likewise, physical evidence includes one's fingerprints, handwriting, vocal characteristics, stance, stride, gestures, or blood characteristics. See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764 (blood test was physical, not testimonial evidence and thus not protected by the Fifth Amendment). 41 Here, however, Velarde did not physically or emotionally react when confronted with incriminating evidence; in the words of Agent Salazar, he just sat there. From this lack of response, otherwise known as silence, derives the entirety of the government's pre-Miranda demeanor  evidence. In describing Velarde's pre-Miranda non-responsiveness, Agent Salazar testified that Velarde didn't look surprised or upset; that [t]here was no response; that he did not say anything; and that he did not deny knowledge. Each of these comments described the same thing -that Velarde did not react at all, but remained silent in the face of confrontation. 42 Silence is defined as the fact of abstaining from speech (altogether, or on a particular subject); a state or condition resulting from this; muteness, taciturnity. The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary 2861 (4th ed. 1993). The non-reaction the government seeks to introduce as demeanor evidence is not an action or a physical response, but a failure to speak. There was no outward physical manifestation to comment upon other than Velarde's state or condition of silence. 43 The prosecutor did not ask Agent Salazar, What was Velarde's physical response (to being confronted with the sixty-three pounds of marijuana in his car)? The word physical appears nowhere in the colloquy at issue. Rather, the prosecutor's question, and what was his response  called for a statement as to Velarde's testimonial response, and the answer he just sat there was a figure of speech connoting silence. We do not quarrel with the notion that the prosecutor could have asked about Velarde's non-testimonial physical response, but that was not the question asked. For example, testimony that Velarde was sweating or vomiting would have been admissible. On the other hand, the prosecutor could not have asked about Velarde's communicative physical response. For example, testimony that Velarde shook his head to signify no would have been inadmissible. 44 The similarity between the government's use of testimony about Velarde's non-response and the government's use of testimony about Whitehead's silence to incriminate each defendant is striking. In Whitehead, testimony elicited in the government's case-in-chief and closing argument relied upon Whitehead's failure to respond to his arrest: 45 Inspector Garcia leads him in there, pats him down-you know, T.V.-takes off his shoes and his belt and puts him in a cell. What do you do at that point? What do I do? What would anyone of us do? What is going on here? What the heck is going on? Why am I being treated like this? Why am I being arrested? But you don't say that, if you know; and the defendant didn't say a word because he knew. He knew there were drugs in the car. 46 Whitehead, 200 F.3d at 638 (closing arguments). We held that this use of the defendant's failure to respond to his arrest plainly infringed upon Whitehead's privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 639 (citation omitted). 47 The government attempts to distinguish Whitehead by arguing that the majority of the disputed evidence in Whitehead was silence and the bulk of the evidence in the present case is demeanor evidence. We cannot place constitutional significance on the government's post-hoc characterization of the evidence. Whether the government argues that a defendant remained silent or describes the defendant's state of silence, the practical effect is the same -the defendant's right to remain silent is used against him at trial. To hold otherwise would circumvent the constitutional protection against self-incrimination: introducing evidence at trial that the defendant remained silent in the face of incriminating evidence would violate the Fifth Amendment, but describing what a defendant looked like in remaining silent would not. This distinction would undermine our well-established rule that the government may not use evidence of a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence at trial, for impeachment or during its case-in-chief, because such evidence penalizes the exercise of a constitutional right. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618 ([I]t would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 n.37 ([I]t is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation.); Whitehead, 200 F.3d at 637 (noting that the government may not comment on post-arrest silence because such comments would constitute a penalty on the right to remain silent); Veloria, 136 F.3d at 652 (The right to remain silent carries an implicit assurance that silence will carry no penalty.); Douglas, 578 F.2d at 267 (The introduction of such testimony [regarding silence] acted as an impermissible penalty on the exercise of the petitioner's right to remain silent.). 48 Moreover, if we were to permit the use of silence in the face of questioning about incriminating evidence, we would be allowing the government to manufacture additional incriminating evidence for later use at trial. When confronted with evidence of a large quantity of drugs in his car, Velarde was faced with a Catch 22: if he remained silent, the government could use, as it did, his silence as powerful and persuasive evidence that Velarde was the consummate drug carrier -hired for his lack of emotion, and fully knowledgeable about the drugs he carried. If, on the other hand, Velarde denied the existence of the drugs, a response wholly consistent with innocence, the government would be able to impeach him with the physical or other evidence tending to discredit him. Thus, whatever Velarde's response, the government would now have available to it additional cumulative evidence of guilt to be argued to the jury. It is the self-incriminating nature of this evidence that the Fifth Amendment protects against. 49 The only other circuit to directly address whether it is permissible for the government to characterize silence or non-responsiveness as demeanor evidence is in accord. United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 537-38 (1st Cir. 1985); cf. United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991) (suggesting in dicta that it may be impermissible to characterize non-responsiveness or silence as demeanor in some contexts, but declining to reach this issue). The First Circuit held that admitting evidence of a defendant's non-responsiveness as demeanor evidence is a derogation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Elkins, 774 F.2d at 536-38. In Elkins, the government argued that admitting testimony as to a defendant's non-responsiveness does not constitute a Fifth Amendment violation because the testimony should be treated as demeanor evidence that is not protected by the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 536 n.4, 537. Relying on Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618, the First Circuit squarely rejected this argument: 50 Doyle cannot be avoided simply by treating testimony as to a defendant's non-responsiveness after receiving Miranda warnings as demeanor  evidence. Doyle has been strictly applied so that any description of a defendant's silence following arrest and Miranda warning, whether made in the prosecutor's case in chief, on cross-examination, or in closing arguments, constitutes a violation of the Due Process Clause. 51 Id. at 537. The court concluded that [a] Doyle violation occurs not only when the objectionable comments explicitly refer to a defendant's failure to answer questions put to him or her, but when the reference to defendant's silence is more oblique. Id. 52 Although Elkins involved post-arrest, post-Miranda silence, its rationale supports our conclusion. We reaffirm our decision in Whitehead and hold that the district court erred by allowing the government to comment on Velarde's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence.
53 The government further argues that Whitehead is not controlling because, unlike the defendant in Whitehead, Velarde subsequently waived his right to remain silent and confessed to the offense. Therefore, the government contends that any passing reference the prosecution made regarding Velarde's silence could not have been construed as a comment on his right to remain silent, because Velarde's post-Miranda waiver also waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent prior to receiving the Miranda warnings. We disagree. 54 Although we have not precisely held that a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda waiver does not act as a waiver of his post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence, we find such a rule to be implicit in the Supreme Court's decision of Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), and to logically follow from our decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043 (9th Cir. 1990). In Oregon v. Elstad, the defendant made several incriminating statements after he was placed into custody, but before he was read his Miranda rights. When his rights were eventually read to him, however, he waived them, providing statements that the government then used against him at trial. The Court held that although the law enforcement officers' failure to immediately administer Miranda warnings did not taint the admissions made after the defendant received and waived his Miranda rights, the pre-Miranda statement must be excluded. Oregon, 470 U.S. at 309, 318 (stating that Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, despite the fact that the defendant's subsequent, post-Miranda waiver statements were admissible). According to the Court: 55 [T]he dictates of Miranda and the goals of the Fifth Amendment proscription against use of compelled testimony are fully satisfied in the circumstances of this case by barring use of the unwarned statement in the case in chief. No further purpose is served by imputing taint to subsequent statements obtained pursuant to a voluntary and knowing waiver. 56 Id. at 318. Implicit in this rule is the principle that the waiver of Miranda rights renders only subsequent statements admissible. Those statements made before the receipt of Miranda warnings remain inadmissible, despite a later waiver of Fifth Amendment rights. Id. 57 In United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, we addressed whether pre-Miranda statements, as opposed to silence, were admissible. There, Gonzalez was arrested by the Border Patrol for being present illegally in the United States. 894 F.2d at 1046. Before he received Miranda warnings, the Agent interrogating Gonzalez asked where he was born and whether he had documents verifying his legal entry into the United States. Id. at 1046. Not until the Agent ran a records check and learned of Gonzalez's previous deportation did he advise Gonzalez of his Miranda rights. Id. Subsequently, Gonzalez waived those rights and admitted to having been previously deported. Id. at 1049. Although we concluded that Gonzalez's post-Miranda waiver confession was admissible, we further held that despite his subsequent waiver of his Miranda rights, Gonzalez's pre-Miranda responses to[the] Agent['s] questions about his place of birth, immigration status, and use of aliases were obtained in violation of Miranda and therefore were inadmissible. Id. at 1047. 58 On similar facts, the Seventh Circuit has held that a subsequent waiver of Miranda rights has no effect on the admissibility of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence. United States v. Hernandez, 948 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1991). In Hernandez, the prosecution elicited testimony from the arresting officer as to the defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence, asking whether at the time [the defendant] was placed under arrest, did he make any immediate response? Id. at 322. The witness answered No. Id. The Seventh Circuit concluded that irrespective of his subsequent waiver and later statements, the prosecutor's reference to defendant's pre-Miranda silence violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 322-23. 59 We also hold that a subsequent waiver of Miranda rights does not render admissible comment on the defendant's pre-waiver silence. Therefore, Velarde's eventual waiver of his Miranda rights was irrelevant to the question of admissibility of his post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence.
60 Because Velarde's counsel properly objected by motion in limine and at trial to the admission of testimony regarding Velarde's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence, we must next consider whether the district court's erroneous decision to admit the evidence of silence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)([B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.); United States v. Kallin, 50 F.3d 689, 693 (9th Cir. 1995) (Whether improper references to a defendant's silence . . . are harmless is reviewed under a `harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt' standard.) (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. App. P. 52; cf. Whitehead, 200 F.3d at 638-39 (finding the same constitutional violation as here, but affirming the conviction under the plain error standard of review). 61 Under the harmless error standard, we must determine whether absent the prosecutor's allusion to [Velarde's silence and demeanor], is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510-11 (1983) (citation omitted). In the context of comments on silence, we consider three factors: [1] the extent of comments made by the witness, [2] whether an inference of guilt from silence was stressed to the jury, and [3] the extent of other evidence suggesting defendant's guilt. United States v. Newman, 943 F.2d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying harmless error review); see also Kallin, 50 F.3d at 693 (quoting and following Newman); Scarborough v. Arizona, 531 F.2d 959, 962 (9th Cir. 1976) (relied upon by Newman). The burden of proving a constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt rests upon the government. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. 62 Upon consideration of the Newman factors, we cannot conclude that the government has met its burden. The first Newman factor requires us to consider the extent of comments made by the witness regarding the defendant's silence. Here, the quantitative extent of Agent Salazar's testimony about Velarde's pre-Miranda silence and demeanor was not great in relation to the remainder of his testimony. The government correctly notes that the bulk of Agent Salazar's testimony related to a variety of other matters, notably the discovery of marijuana, the inconsistencies in Velarde's stories, and the other results of his investigation. However, the qualitative extent, i.e., the manner of questioning and the repeated nature of the questions, endowed the fact of Velarde's silence with great significance and laid the foundation for the prosecutor's closing where his silence was heavily relied upon. Thus, this factor weighs against a finding of harmless error. 63 The second Newman factor also weighs against the harmlessness of the error. The government used Agent Salazar's testimony to its full potential, drawing a direct inference of guilt during its closing argument. It argued that Velarde's non-reaction in the face of arrest demonstrated that he was the perfect guy to bring drugs across the border. If he was hired by a sophisticated drug organization to transport the drugs, the government argued he would necessarily have known of that fact. Thus, the government used the testimony about Velarde's silence as its principal means of meeting its burden on the critical element of knowledge. See 21 U.S.C. &#167 &#167 952, 960 (1994) (requiring that the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew that he brought a prohibited drug into the United States). 64 Finally, the government's remaining evidence was not so strong as to warrant a conclusion that the error was harmless. As the government itself concedes, faced with a lack of direct evidence, it relied entirely upon circumstantial evidence to convict Velarde. In a case involving even greater circumstantial evidence of guilt, United States v. Foster, 227 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2000), we concluded that the improper admission of a prior conviction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. There, the defendant was caught attempting to enter the United States with over sixty-eight pounds of marijuana hidden in his vehicle. Id. at 1098. The defendant's car, which he did not own, smelled strongly of fabric softener, a substance often used to disguise the smell of narcotics, and the defendant wore poorly fitting clothes and shoes given to him by a person with an unknown last name. Id. at 1100. Furthermore, as here, the defendant gave various inconsistent statements to Customs officials that were introduced against him at trial. Id. at 1098-99. We concluded, however, that because the defendant offered plausible, innocent explanation[s] for his presence in the automobile and for the inconsistencies in his statements to Customs officials, Foster's credibility was of utmost importance. Id. at 1101. Thus, the erroneous admission of his prior offense for impeachment purposes damaged his credibility and therefore could not be harmless error. Id. 65 Velarde's theory of the defense, while not necessarily compelling, is equally plausible. Velarde testified that he met a prostitute in a bar and told her that he planned to return to Hemet, California the following day. He testified that he was apart from her for twenty minutes while he was in the shower. Although the government contends that this was insufficient time for a member of a drug organization to copy Velarde's key, copying Velarde's keys was not a necessary prerequisite to obtaining access to his car. Someone would only need to know that Velarde was returning to California the following day and which car was his, information that the prostitute could have easily imparted to someone in twenty minutes. Nor did the fact that Velarde's gas tank only held two gallons of gas render his story implausible. Someone knowledgeable of the drugs in the car could have followed Velarde across the border, planning to retrieve the drugs as soon as Velarde ran out of gas. 66 Furthermore, although a jury could rely solely on Velarde's inconsistent statements to reach a guilty verdict, those inconsistencies do not lead us to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted Velarde. Velarde offers an equally plausible explanation that the inconsistencies resulted from difficulties he had in communicating with Agent Salazar. Velarde testified that: The officer told me that he knew a little Spanish, but I didn't understand him in some occasions what he would tell me. Thus, Velarde suggested, between what's been heard and what I said, there are some things that he didn't understand what I was trying to tell him. 67 Finally, the four-day jury deliberations were relatively lengthy for this two-count drug importation and possession case. Longer jury deliberations weigh against a finding of harmless error [because l]engthy deliberations suggest a difficult case. United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 126 (1st Cir. 2000); Dallago v. United States, 427 F.2d 546, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (The jury deliberated for five days, and one would expect that if the evidence of guilt was overwhelming the jury would have succumbed much sooner.) (footnote omitted); see also United States v. Williams, 212 F.3d 1305, 1313 (D.C. Cir.) (Silberman, J., dissenting) ([W]e are willing to take into consideration the length of jury deliberations in our harmless error review.), cert. denied , 531 U.S. 1056 (2000). 68 Given that each of the Newman factors weighs against a finding of harmlessness, that the jury reasonably could have believed Velarde's explanations, and the length of the jury deliberations, we hold that the admission of Velarde's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was not harmless error. We therefore reverse Velarde's conviction.