Opinion ID: 1111566
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: legislative authorization

Text: (4) We also reject Brent's claim that express legislative authorization should be required before a contempt sanction is permitted in these circumstances. This claim needs little discussion. Express statutory authorization for both contempt sanctions and criminal penalties already exists for any willful violation of a court order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1209 et seq.; Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (a)(4).) Inasmuch as the Legislature has expressly authorized the court to consider earning capacity in making a child support order if doing so is in the best interests of the child (Fam. Code, § 4058, subd. (b)), there can be no question but that the Legislature intends that that parental ability to work in order to support a child be considered in any enforcement action. We will not presume that the Legislature intended to leave the courts powerless to enforce orders expressly authorized by Family Code section 4058, subdivision (b). Rather, the presumption is that the Legislature is aware that violation of a court order is punishable as a contempt and intended that violation of an order made pursuant to Family Code section 4058, subdivision (b), be punished in the same manner as any other contempt based on violation of a court order. In Family Code section 4505 the Legislature has also expressed a clear intent that parents who default on a child support obligation be compelled to seek employment when necessary to meet that obligation. That section permits a court [to] require a parent who alleges that the parent's default in a child or family support order is due to the parent's unemployment to submit to the appropriate child support enforcement agency or any other entity designated by the court, including, but not limited to, the court itself, each two weeks, or at a frequency deemed appropriate by the court, a list of at least five different places the parent has applied for employment. ( Ibid. ) In addition, a court may require either parent to attend job training, job placement and vocational rehabilitation, and work programs ... in order to enable the court to make a finding that good faith attempts at job training and placement have been undertaken by the parent. (Fam. Code, § 3558.) A contempt penalty for violation of a child support order when inability to comply results from failure to seek and accept available employment consistent with the parent's abilities is, therefore, allowed by statute. No additional legislative action is needed to authorize the court to impose contempt sanctions. Moreover, imposition of contempt or criminal sanctions for violation of a child support order is not limited to cases in which a parent's refusal to seek or accept employment is for the purpose of disabling the parent from acquiring the ability to comply with parental support obligations. As we noted in In re Marriage of Simpson (1992) 4 Cal.4th 225, 233 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 411, 841 P.2d 931], the statutory authority to consider earning capacity when fixing the amount a parent should be ordered to pay for the support of a child does not restrict the trial court's discretion in that manner. While in Simpson it was unnecessary for the court to consider whether the court's authority to consider earning capacity was limited to cases in which a bad faith effort to avoid the parental obligation was established, the Court of Appeal has since done so and concluded that such a limitation would be contrary to public policy. A parent's motivation for reducing available income is irrelevant when the ability and opportunity to adequately and reasonably provide for the child are present. [Citation.] [¶] Public policy supports our conclusion. Because children's interests are a top priority (Fam. Code, § 4053, subd. (a)) and payment of appropriate support is a parent's primary obligation (Fam. Code, § 4053, subds. (a) & (d)), a child support obligation `must be taken into account whenever an obligor wishes to pursue a different lifestyle or endeavor.... [C]hild... support [is] an overhead which must be paid first before any other expenses.... [A payor does] not have the right to divest himself [or herself] of his [or her] earning ability at the expense of ... minor children.' ( In re Marriage of Ilas (1993) 12 Cal. App.4th 1630, 1635 [16 Cal. Rptr.2d 345]; see also In re Marriage of Muldrow (1976) 61 Cal. App.3d 327, 333 [132 Cal. Rptr. 48]; Baron v. Baron [(1970)] 9 Cal. App.3d 933 [88 Cal. Rptr. 404].) ( In re Marriage of Padilla (1995) 38 Cal. App.4th 1212, 1218 [45 Cal. Rptr.2d 555], fns. omitted.) We agree with the Padilla court and thus decline to read into Family Code section 4058, subdivision (b), any limitation on the discretion vested in the trial court to consider earning capacity in determining the appropriate amount of child support when doing so would be in the child's best interests. That being so, a contempt sanction or criminal penalty may be imposed for violation of a support order that is based on earning capacity when inability to comply with the order is caused in whole or in part by the parent's willful failure to seek and accept employment.