Opinion ID: 172431
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Kidnapping Conviction

Text: As noted above, Mr. Juarez-Galvan was convicted of kidnapping under Cal.Penal Code § 207(a). The version of that statute in effect in 1988 stated: Every person who forcibly steals, takes, or arrests any person in this state, and carries the person into another country, state, or county, or into another part of the same county, is guilty of kidnapping. Cal.Penal Code § 207(a) (West 1988). [5] The PSR did not explain why the kidnapping conviction should be considered a crime of violence, and because Mr. Juarez-Galvan did not object to the PSR's recommendation, the district court also provided no reasons. On appeal, the parties' sole disagreement regarding the kidnapping issue is whether Cal.Penal Code § 207(a) is broader than the generic definition of kidnapping. Our analysis focuses on the second prong of the plain error test. The district court did not commit plain error because, if it erred at all, the error was not clear or obvious. See Gonzales, 558 F.3d at 1200. Mr. Juarez-Galvan cites, and our research has uncovered, only one federal case addressing this issue. In United States v. Moreno-Florean, 542 F.3d 445 (5th Cir.2008), the Fifth Circuit looked to the Model Penal Code (MPC) to determine the generic definition of kidnapping, concluding that the current version of § 207(a) is broader than that generic definition. Id. at 452-56. Specifically, the court reasoned that § 207(a) contained only two elements(1) the removal or confinement of a person (2) by force, threat or fraudwhereas the MPC's definition contained an additional aggravating element such as a specified purpose in the taking. [6] Id. at 454. Other authority, however, suggests a contrary conclusion. In United States v. De Jesus Ventura, 565 F.3d 870 (D.C.Cir. 2009), the District of Columbia Circuit observed that a critical distinction between generic kidnapping and broader state definitions of the offense is the element of intent or severityan element that the court deemed present in § 207(a)'s requirement that the victim be taken to another location. Id. at 877-78 & n. 11. In addition, the Fifth Circuit in Moreno-Florean arrived at the uniform generic definition of kidnapping by considering only the MPC and a variety of kidnapping statutes from other states. Moreno-Florean, 542 F.3d at 452. But courts have noted that the generic definition of an enumerated offense should be formulated after consulting a variety of sources, including Black's Law Dictionary. See United States v. Iniguez-Barba, 485 F.3d 790, 793 (5th Cir.2007) (relying on Black's definition of kidnapping in determining whether kidnapping under New York law was a crime of violence under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)); United States v. Fierro-Reyna, 466 F.3d 324, 327 (5th Cir. 2006) (To establish the generic contemporary meaning of an enumerated offense, we consider, inter alia, the Model Penal Code, Professors LaFave's and Scott's treatises, modern state codes, and dictionaries.). Black's Law Dictionary, in turn, defines kidnapping in terms comparable to the elements of § 207(a). See Black's Law Dictionary 886 (8th ed.2004) (kidnapping is [t]he crime of seizing and taking away a person by force or fraud....). Given the lack of clear authority on the issue, we cannot say that it would have been plainly erroneous for the district court to support the § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) enhancement on the basis that § 207(a) corresponds to the generic definition of kidnapping. An error in a ruling is `plain' only if the ruling violates `well-settled law.' United States v. Baum, 555 F.3d 1129, 1135-36 (10th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1274 (10th Cir.2005)). We have found no plain error in similar circumstances. See Gonzales, 558 F.3d at 1200 (finding no plain error in determining that the defendant's conviction constituted a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act in part because there was no Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit authority that directly addressed the issue). Mr. Juarez-Galvan's cited authorities and our own research have not convinced us that the law is well-settled as to whether Cal.Penal Code § 207(a) corresponds to the generic definition of kidnapping. Accordingly, we conclude that Mr. Juarez-Galvan has not met his burden to establish plain error.