Opinion ID: 1096587
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether stack received effective assistance of counsel.

Text: ¶ 20. Stack next contends that his convictions and sentences should be overturned because he was not afforded effective assistance of counsel during the trial. Under three separate assignments of error Stack contends that his counsel failed to prepare for trial, failed to have Stack evaluated by the local psychologist or psychiatrist, and failed to argue selfdefense. The standard for determining if a defendant received effective assistance of counsel is well settled. The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness [of counsel] must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 477 (Miss.1984), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. The focus of the inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. Id. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. (citation omitted) ... A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Stringer, 454 So.2d at 477, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Defense counsel is presumed competent. See Finley v. State, 725 So.2d 226, 238 (Miss.1998), quoting Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1130 (Miss.1996). See also Johnson v. State, 476 So.2d 1195, 1204 (Miss.1985). Then, to determine the second prong of prejudice to the defense, the standard is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss.1991). This means a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome. Id. The question here is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencerincluding an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidencewould have concluded that the balance of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. There is no constitutional right then to errorless counsel. Cabello v. State, 524 So.2d 313, 315 (Miss.1988); Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss. 1991) (right to effective counsel does not entitle defendant to have an attorney who makes no mistakes at trial; defendant just has right to have competent counsel). If the post-conviction application fails on either of the Strickland, prongs, the proceedings end. Neal v. State, 525 So.2d 1279, 1281 (Miss.1987); Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426 (Miss.1991). Davis v. State, 743 So.2d 326, 334 (Miss. 1999), citing Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1130 (Miss.1996). Woodward v. State, 843 So.2d 1, 7 (¶ 14) (Miss.2003). ¶ 21. Stack contends that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if defense counsel were prepared to try the case, if defense counsel had Stack evaluated by a local psychiatrist, and if counsel had made an argument for self-defense. However, Stack fails to make a showing as to why this is so. Stack relies on Reed v. State, 536 So.2d 1336, 1339 (Miss.1988) (citing Cabello v. State, 524 So.2d 313, 315 (Miss.1988)), for the proposition that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. However, neither of those cases found counsel to be ineffective. In denying the assignment of error, we held that since there is `no single, particular way to defend a client or to provide effective assistance,' and courts are `reluctant to infer from silence an absence of strategy,' this Court finds defense counsel's performance neither deficient nor prejudicial. Id. at 317 (citing Leatherwood v. State, 473 So.2d 964, 969 (Miss. 1985)). ¶ 22. In the instant appeal, Stack has failed to show any probability that the outcome would have been different. Rather, Stack relies on conclusory statements. Stack failed to provide this Court with any evidence that counsels' actions were anything other than trial strategy. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.