Opinion ID: 2386870
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was Mrs. Emma Hutchinson a member of the same household, the Kincaid household, within the exclusionary provisions of the policies?

Text: Garnishee contends the trial court erred in finding that Mrs. Hutchinson was not a member of the same household as Michael and Mrs. Kincaid within the meaning of the exclusionary provisions of the policies. Garnishee stresses testimony to the following effect: Mrs. Kincaid thought her mother was a member of her family and was living in the Kincaid home when plaintiff was injured, and plaintiff's counsel's statement We will admit she was a member of the family. (Mrs. Kincaid also considered her cousin, who lived in Tulsa, a member of the family.) Mrs. Hutchinson voluntarily gave her daughter $40 a month. Garnishee says that she became a member of the family; that when she was at the Kincaids' she ate her meals with the rest of the family; that she enjoyed the same privileges of the home as were enjoyed by the Kincaid family; that while at the Kincaid home she considered herself a legal resident of Kansas, having made application for and collected Kansas social security and having registered to vote in Kansas, preferring to live in Kansas; that she made application for social security in Missouri after she moved from the Kincaids' to Missouri in September, 1956. Garnishee argues that the depositions established beyond any reasonable doubt that Mrs. Hutchinson was a member of the Kincaid household on January 5, 1956; and it was not necessary that Mrs. Hutchinson intended to reside permanently in the Kincaid home to be a member of the same household within the meaning of the exclusionary clause, the clause not making any such requirement. Other testimony is stressed by the garnisher: The Kincaids, father, mother, Michael and twins, Suzan and Larry, lived on Nall Street, Roeland Park, Kansas. Mrs. Hutchinson's husband, Howard E. Hutchinson, died in March, 1955. Mrs. Hutchinson was financially unable to continue to reside in their furnished apartment in Kansas City, Missouri. After failing to find a suitable place to live, Mrs. Kincaid, her only living child, invited her mother to stay with them until she found a place. Mrs. Hutchinson agreed to this, conditioned upon being allowed to give her daughter $40 a month until she found a suitable place to live. The Kincaids applied the $40 on their household expenses. Mrs. Hutchinson owned no furniture, and brought her wearing apparel, a few pictures, grips, a trunk and the Chrysler sedan to the Kincaid home. The Kincaids had converted a garage, attached to the house just off the kitchen, into a recreation room. The sleeping arrangements had to be rearranged upon Mrs. Hutchinson's arrival. Michael was moved into the recreation room and Mrs. Hutchinson was given his downstairs bedroom. The recreation room was not used in the winter time because of the cold and the arrangement for Michael's sleeping there was not satisfactory. All considered this a temporary arrangement. Asked whether everybody used the living room when they wanted to, Mrs. Hutchinson testified: With the exception of myself, II didn't have the freedom only at times of the whole house, they had their guests and up to a certain point I guess at times I sat in there. Mrs. Hutchinson usually prepared her own breakfast, which she ate late. She generally ate her lunch by herself, but sometimes her daughter and she had lunch together. She ate her evening meal with the family when she was at the house, but when she was working for the evening, she had the meal with the children where she was baby sitting. Mrs. Hutchinson's income consisted of social security payments and earnings from baby sitting. She was employed as a baby sitter several nights a week. Mrs. Hutchinson considered herself a citizen of Kansas. She preferred to find a place to live nearby because she had acquired many baby sitting customers there. She applied for and collected social security in Kansas and, as she wanted to be able to vote, she registered to vote in Kansas. Mrs. Hutchinson rented a combination living and sleeping room, with kitchen privileges, in Kansas City, Missouri, in September, 1956, paying $40 monthly therefor. She made application for social security in Missouri. Mr. and Mrs. Kincaid testified that the arrangements made with Mrs. Hutchinson were temporary and were brought about by her not finding a suitable place to live. Mrs. Hutchinson testified: I had no intentions of living with my family, the Kincaids; that her daughter told her to stay with them until she could find a suitable place; that she never intended to live there permanently, and that she never considerd her occupancy of a room at the Kincaids' as being permanent. While Mrs. Hutchinson was at the Kincaids' she was continuously looking for a place to live. She and her daughter were constantly answering advertisements. Mrs. Hutchinson could not drive an automobile, and practically every week Mrs. Kincaid would drive her around to inspect different places in an effort to find a suitable place for her. We think it is well stated in Varble v. Stanley, Mo.App., 306 S.W.2d 662, 665 [2] (citing authority):    [A]n insurance policy, being a contract designated to furnish protection, will, if reasonably possible, be construed so as to accomplish that object and not to defeat it. Hence, if the terms are susceptible of two possible interpretations and there is room for construction, provisions limiting, cutting down, or avoiding liability on the coverage made in the policy are construed most strongly against the insurer. See also State ex rel. Mills Lumber Co. v. Trimble, 327 Mo. 899, 39 S.W.2d 355, 358 [4]; Mathews v. Modern Woodmen of Am., 236 Mo. 326, 139 S.W. 151, 155(1), Ann.Cas.1912D, 483; Schmidt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 353 Mo. 213, 182 S.W.2d 181, 183 [2], 154 A.L.R. 1088. In Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., v. Pulsifer, D.C.Me.1941, 41 F.Supp. 249, 250, a father's policy use of any other private passenger automobile insuring agreement provided, so far as essential here, that: The insurance does not apply (a) to any automobile (1) owned in full or in part by    the named insured or any member of the household thereof   . A married son, his wife and child, because of slender resources, returned to his parents' home, a single family farm house, in December, 1940, while the son sought employment in nearby Lisbon, the arrangements being made between the son's wife and his mother. The son obtained employment in Lisbon in two weeks, but was unable to rent a place therein until the following June. The living expenses were shared by the two families and the two women shared the shopping and household duties. The parents exercised no control over the young people. Neither family used the other's automobile without consent. The accident involved occurred on March 13, 1941, while the father, at the son's request, was using the son's car for the first time on an errand for the son. In holding the exclusionary provision did not relieve insurer of liability, the court said (251): Whether the term `household' or `family' is used, the term embraces a collection of persons as a single group, with one head, living together, a unit of permanent and domestic character, under one roof; a `collective body of persons living together within one curtilage, subsisting in common and directing their attention to a common object, the promotion of their mutual interests and social happiness.' Here two families came together temporarily until the newcomer could find another place of abode, which was expected to be a matter of only a few weeks. There was no one head of both groups; no permanence; no pursuit of a common object; no such union of the two families as would make them one. It was a temporary arrangement for the convenience of the son and his family while getting located elsewhere. Each family retained its own organization under its own head and did not merge to make one family or one household in any such way as the word is used in the policy. It should not be overlooked that the language of this endorsement was framed by the Company itself which, by definition or otherwise, could have made the term `member of the household' less ambiguous. See Island v. Firemen's Fund Indem. Co., 30 Cal. 2d 541, 184 P.2d 153, 173 A.L.R. 896, 900, 901, 173 A.L.R. 896. Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d Ed., defines household: 2. Those who dwell under the same roof and compose a family; a domestic establishment; family. Family is defined: 2. The body of persons who live in one house, and under one head or manager; a household, including parents, children, and servants, and, as the case may be lodgers or boarders. 5. A group comprising immediate kindred; esp., the group formed of parents and children, constituting the fundamental social unit in civilized societies. See Ferbrache v. Grand Lodge, 81 Mo.App. 268, 271. Garnishee stresses cases involving provisions excluding from coverage the injury or death of a member of the family or household of the insured. The purpose of such clauses has been considered to safeguard the insurer against collusion and the natural partiality of an insured to members of the insured's household or family circle. The first cases cited are: State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. James, 4 Cir., 80 F.2d 802, 803; Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Cir., 252 F.2d 158, 160 [3-5]; Kelso v. Kelso, Mo., 306 S.W.2d 534, 536 [3]; Senn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., Ky., 287 S.W.2d 439, 440; Tomlyanovich v. Tomlyanovich, 239 Minn. 250, 58 N.W.2d 855, 857 [3, 4], 50 A.L.R.2d 108; Cartier v. Cartier (Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.), 84 N.H. 526, 153 A. 6, 7. In the Kelso, Senn, Tomlyanovich, and Cartier cases the plaintiff and the insured defendant were brothers. In the Johnson case the plaintiff was the daughter of the insured defendant and the evidence was viewed in the most favorable light for the prevailing party. In the James case the plaintiff was a boarder in insured's home and was treated in all respects as a member of the family group, living on the most intimate terms with the other members who were connected by ties of blood or marriage (80 F.2d loc. cit. 803). The Cartier (supra) and like cases are distinguished in the Pulsifer case (supra, 41 F.Supp. loc. cit. 252), in that the purpose of the two exceptions differed, the purpose of the provision in the Cartier and like cases being to exclude liability for accident to one who was so closely associated with the insured that a certain degree of collusion, or non-resistance, could be expected and was guarded against. The facts distinguish the Aler (92 F.Supp. 620) and Leteff (91 So.2d 123) cases, discussed supra, on the instant issue. Rathbun v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 144 Conn. 165, 128 A.2d 327, 329 [4], involving a brother and sister, lends support to garnishee's contention. Mindful that insurance policies are to be construed, if reasonably possible, to accomplish the designated protection, and provisions avoiding liability on the coverage afforded are construed most strictly against the insurer, we conclude the facts of record did not exclude garnishee's liability as a matter of law. The garnishee's agent, who wrote and countersigned both of the policies involved, was informed when the policy on the Chevrolet was obtained that Michael drove other automobiles, including the 1948 Chrysler, and assured the policyholders that the policy would cover that. All the testimony on the issue is that Mrs. Hutchinson was only temporarily living at the Kincaids' and no one considered this arrangement a permanent one. See the Pulsifer case, supra. We think an ordinary insured, who had a once-in-a-while occasion to use the automobile of a person temporarily residing in his house, would consider this Use of Other Automobiles insuring agreement in his policy to protect him upon such occasions. The word family, synonymous with household, is of varied signification and may have a narrow or broad meaning. Ferbrache v. Grand Lodge, 81 Mo.App. 268, 271. Mrs. Hutchinson was not treated in all respects as a member of the Kincaid family group, and the evidence does not establish that her social intercourse was merged with that of the Kincaid domestic circle or that she became subservient to the head of the Kincaid family. We conclude Mrs. Hutchinson was not a member of the same household as Michael and Mrs. Kincaid and sustain the trial court's finding on this issue under a view of the testimony most favorable to the insured when construing the term most strictly against the insurer. If garnishee intended to exclude coverage to the extent of the defense under consideration, it should have used lan guage clearly stating that defense. Island v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., supra, 30 Cal.2d 541, 184 P.2d 153, 173 A.L.R. 900, 901. III. Was Mrs. Hutchinson's Chrysler furnished for regular use to Mrs. Kincaid, a member of the same household as Michael? Garnishee cites Rodenkirk v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App. 421, 60 N.E.2d 269, 274 [3], and Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marr, D.C. N.J., 128 F.Supp. 67, 70 [3, 4]; and relies upon testimony that Mrs. Hutchinson and Mrs. Kincaid each had a set of keys to the Chrysler; that Mrs. Hutchinson could not drive, and that Mrs. Kincaid drove her wherever she wanted to go. We do not develop garnisher's contention that garnishee did not timely present this issue to the trial court. We find no affirmative testimony that the Chrysler was regularly used by Mrs. Kincaid. The testimony was that the Chrysler was used when Mrs. Hutchinson wanted to go some place, primarily in looking for places for her to live, and, since she could not drive, Mrs. Kincaid would drive the Chrysler for her. The day plaintiff was injured was the first time Michael used the Chrysler after his grandmother's arrival at their home and her permission for its use was asked for and obtained. This was substantial testimony supporting the trial court's finding on this issue, which we affirm. IV. The Temporary Substitute Automobile insuring agreement of the policy on the Plymouth provided, so far as material: III. Automobile Defined. (a) Automobile. Except where stated to the contrary, the word `automobile' means: (1) Described Automobilethe motor vehicle    described in the declarations;    (3) Temporary Substitute Automobileunder coverages A, B and C, an automobile not owned by the name insured or a member of the same household while temporarily used as a substitute for the described automobile when withdrawn from normal use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction. Garnishee contends in its brief that Mrs. Hutchinson, who owned the Chrysler used by Michael as a substitute for his brokendown Plymouth, was a member of the same household as Michael, and plaintiff may not recover. Our holding that Mrs. Hutchinson was not a member of the same household as insured, Michael E. Kincaid, sufficiently disposes of the issue adversely to garnishee. The foregoing disposes of all issues presented for determination upon this appeal. The judgment is affirmed. BARRETT and STOCKARD, CC., concur.