Opinion ID: 1454621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Admission of Statements Made by Defendant to Nebraska Law Enforcement Officers

Text: Defendant challenges the trial court's admission, over his objection, of three statements he made to Nebraska law enforcement officers, one before and two after his arrest. He argues that the use of these statements violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. For convenience, the challenged statements will be referred to as: (1) the prearrest statement, (2) the prearraignment statement, and (3) the postarraignment statement. For the reasons stated below, we find no violation of defendant's rights in the admission of any of the statements.
Thomas Logan, a hitchhiker who was picked up by defendant and his two female companions in the van, left their company and placed a 911 call to Nebraska police about 10 p.m. on September 15, 1985. Logan reported that the van's occupants had killed the owner and that the van was full of marijuana. He described the van as a green Dodge camper with California license plates. Logan's report was relayed to state, county, and local police in the area where he was picked up. The green van was traced to a motel parking lot in Lexington, Nebraska. Police converged on the spot and verified that defendant, whose name had been reported by Logan, had rented room 238 and had indicated that he was driving a green van with California license plate number 231 NVL. Two officers, a state trooper and a chief deputy sheriff, approached the van and, with the aid of the lighting in the motel parking lot and their flashlights, observed four or five pounds of marijuana as well as stains on the curtains. The van's California license plate was 321 NVL. The officers proceeded to room 238. The state trooper knocked and identified himself as a peace officer. Defendant opened the door. The state trooper asked defendant if he was Bruce Morris and defendant answered affirmatively. When the chief deputy asked if the officers could come in, defendant stood back and motioned for them to enter. The state trooper then asked defendant if he was driving the green Dodge van in the lot; defendant responded affirmatively. The state trooper then told defendant that he was under arrest for possession of marijuana. (22a) Although no Miranda warnings ( Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974]) had been given at this point, the trial court admitted evidence of defendant's answers to the officers' questions. It committed no error. (23) Miranda requires that a criminal suspect be admonished of specified Fifth Amendment rights. But in order to invoke its protections, a suspect must be subjected to custodial interrogation, i.e., he must be taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way. ( Id. at p. 444 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 706].) [T]he ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is `a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest. ( California v. Beheler (1983) 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 [77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279, 103 S.Ct. 3517], quoting Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492, 495 [50 L.Ed.2d 714, 719, 97 S.Ct. 711].) Whether custody has occurred short of a formal arrest depends upon the totality of the circumstances, including such factors as: (1) the site of the interrogation; (2) whether the investigation has focused on the suspect; (3) whether the indicia of arrest are present; and (4) the length and form of the questioning. No one factor is dispositive. ( People v. Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d 247, 272.) And, contrary to defendant's argument, the mere fact that he was a suspect does not establish custodial interrogation. As the Supreme Court observed in Oregon v. Mathiason, supra : [P]olice officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the ... questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him `in custody. ' (429 U.S. at p. 495 [50 L.Ed.2d at p. 719], italics added.) (22b) In this case, the police questioning was brief and nonaccusatorial  two yes-or-no questions designed to elicit only defendant's identity and his relationship to the van. The inquiry did not take place in jail or on police premises, but in defendant's own motel room with his two female friends present. (See People v. Butterfield (1968) 258 Cal. App.2d 586, 590 [65 Cal. Rptr. 765].) It was not accompanied by traditional indicia of arrest, i.e., defendant was not physically restrained or directed to say or do anything. The officers asked whether they could enter, and defendant consented. In view of the confusion concerning the license number of the vehicle, a routine question on that subject did not amount to an accusation or a restraint on defendant's freedom. In light of these factors, the initial police questioning of defendant and his prearrest statement in response to their questions were noncustodial (or, in effect, precustodial). Therefore, defendant's statements were properly admitted into evidence. (See also People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 38 [188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279] [asking a murder suspect if an automobile linked to a homicide was his did not violate Miranda ]; People v. Valdivia (1986) 180 Cal. App.3d 657, 661-662 [226 Cal. Rptr. 144] [police contact with suspect at his brother's home; questioning brief and nonaccusatorial]; In re Danny E. (1981) 121 Cal. App.3d 44, 50 [174 Cal. Rptr. 123] [questioning of suspect at home; no objective indicia of arrest or detention; questioning brief and nonaccusatorial].) (24) Our holding in this regard recognizes the value of routine and nonintrusive police inquiry before arrests and accusations are made. Such inquiry serves to minimize mistakes and protect the innocent. As the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has stated: One of the primary purposes of preliminary questioning is to separate a group of persons possibly involved in a crime into those who should and those who should not be arrested  to decide whether all, some, or none should be charged. To turn all such questioning into custodial interrogation, requiring Miranda warnings in all cases, may help those eventually charged. But, it could also seriously interfere with the process of information gathering and on occasion force the police to cast their net of arrest too wide, significantly interfering with the liberty of the innocent. ( Podlaski v. Butterworth (1st Cir.1982) 677 F.2d 8, 10.) (22c) But even if error could be predicated on the admission of defendant's prearrest statement, it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The information elicited  defendant's name and the fact that he was driving the van  were undisputed throughout the trial. The defense was that defendant's female companions did the killing; defendant never maintained that he did not drive the van. Insofar as the trial was concerned, defendant's answers to the officers' questions represented simple and uncontested facts that could not have prejudiced his defense or influenced the outcome.
Defendant and his two female companions were arrested shortly after midnight. Defendant invoked his right to remain silent in response to a Miranda warning given at the county jail at 1:45 a.m. on September 16, 1985. He was not interrogated at that time and was placed in a jail cell. Defendant's companions waived their Miranda rights and gave statements at 1:45 and 2:44 a.m. The record is not clear as to when the two women were arraigned, but it appears that it was around the noon hour on the 16th. Defendant was arraigned at 4:34 p.m. that day. Each of them was arraigned solely on the Nebraska marijuana charges. Shortly after noon on September 16, defendant asked to speak with an officer. A sheriff's investigator met with defendant in the jailhouse library and asked him what he needed. Defendant replied that he wanted to talk about his California crimes, but wanted some concessions. He requested, among other things, that his companions not be prosecuted and that he be allowed to speak with his girlfriend, Avette Barrett. The investigator responded that he had no power to grant any concession and that he would have to speak with the county attorney. He then contacted the county attorney, who arrived at the jail library 15 to 20 minutes later. The investigator and the county attorney were also joined by a state trooper and the chief deputy sheriff, the officers who had arrested defendant. The chief deputy sheriff turned on a tape recorder at 2:39 p.m., immediately after his arrival. The state trooper gave defendant a Miranda warning and defendant signed a waiver form. At this point, the chief deputy arranged for Barrett to be brought into the library and allowed defendant to speak with her for about five minutes. Defendant told Barrett that he would not allow her to suffer for something she did not do. About 2:45 p.m., the group moved across the street to the courthouse because that building had a better recording system and was less noisy. The interview recommenced at 2:52 p.m. and continued for approximately an hour. During the interview, the investigator told defendant that the investigator could make no concessions and had no jurisdiction over California charging decisions. He also stated that although defendant had requested and been permitted to speak with Barrett, that permission was not an inducement offered by the officers to obtain a statement. Defendant expressed agreement with the investigator's statement. During the interview, defendant confessed to the robbery and murder of Rickey Van Zandt. He admitted his plan to steal Van Zandt's van. He admitted hitting Van Zandt over the head numerous times with a rock the size of a softball, and with a stick. He stated the women were not present when he hit Van Zandt. He admitted telling Logan, the hitchhiker he had picked up, that he had knocked out Van Zandt. He professed that he did not intend to kill Van Zandt, but only to render him unconscious. (25a) Defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the Miranda admonition or the adequacy of his waiver. He maintains, however, that his statement was involuntary and should have been suppressed because of a delay in arraignment and because he was improperly induced to confess by being permitted to speak with Barrett, a conversation which he now calls a direct benefit or inducement. We reject his contention. The prosecution must prove the voluntariness of defendant's confession by a preponderance of the evidence. ( Lego v. Twomey (1972) 404 U.S. 477, 489 [30 L.Ed.2d 618, 627-628, 92 S.Ct. 619]; People v. Markham (1989) 49 Cal.3d 63, 71 [260 Cal. Rptr. 273, 775 P.2d 1042].) Delay in arraignment is but one factor in determining the voluntariness of a confession. ( People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935, 953-954 [171 Cal. Rptr. 679, 623 P.2d 240]; People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 329 [165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883].) To justify exclusion of a statement, defendant must show that delay in arraignment produced his admissions or that there was an essential connection between illegal detention and admissions of guilt. (27 Cal.3d at pp. 329-330.) Here defendant was arrested in the early morning hours and arraigned late the following afternoon. This was well within the two-day period allowed by California statute. (§ 825.) Acting within 12 hours of his arrest, defendant himself initiated the interview during which he made the incriminating statements. There were no circumstances indicating involuntariness resulting from delay or any other cause. Defendant cites no controlling authority that would justify suppressing a voluntarily given statement merely because defendant was arraigned a few hours after his companions and on the same day as his arrest. We decline to create any such authority. Similarly, we find no merit in defendant's claim of improper inducement because he was allowed to speak with his girlfriend for five minutes. (26) A confession is voluntary if the accused's decision to speak is entirely `self-motivated' [citation], i.e., if he freely and voluntarily chooses to speak without `any form of compulsion or promise of reward....' [Citation.] ( People v. Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 327-328.) A confession, however, is involuntary where a person in authority makes an express or clearly implied promise of leniency or advantage for the accused which is a motivating cause of the decision to confess. ... ( People v. Boyde, supra, 46 Cal.3d 212, 238, italics added.) (25b) The officers expressly disclaimed any promises of leniency and told defendant they had no authority to make decisions about charges that would be prosecuted in California. Defendant cites no authority that would support a holding that a five-minute talk with a girlfriend is a sufficient inducement to render a murder confession involuntary. Such an ephemeral benefit cannot reasonably be regarded as sufficient to cause a person to admit against his will the killing of another human being. (See People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584, 591 [238 Cal. Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350] [providing accused person with whiskey and Bible did not improperly induce him to confess]; People v. Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 327-328 [accused person's hope that his statement would result in release of his girlfriend was self-motivated and did not induce his confession].) For these reasons, and based on our independent review of the record, we find defendant's prearraignment statement was wholly voluntary and properly received in evidence.
Defendant was arraigned on the marijuana charges on the afternoon of September 16. He requested counsel at the arraignment and the matter was continued for two days. Between 7:30 and 8 p.m. that day, the sheriff's investigator learned that California authorities had not been able to locate the victim's body from the information supplied by defendant in the prearraignment statement. The investigator went alone to the jail and met with defendant in the library. He reminded defendant generally of his Miranda rights. Defendant helped him draw a map with specific landmarks of the area where defendant had left the victim's body. The map and defendant's postarraignment statement were admitted at trial over his objection. Defendant now claims that, coming after his arraignment and request for counsel on the marijuana charge, this evidence should have been suppressed on both Fifth and Sixth Amendment grounds. (27a) In support of his Fifth Amendment argument, defendant relies principally on Arizona v. Roberson (1988) 486 U.S. 675 [100 L.Ed.2d 704, 108 S.Ct. 2093], in which a burglary suspect arrested at the scene of a crime responded to a Miranda warning with a request for counsel. After remaining in custody for three days without appointment of counsel, he was contacted and questioned by a different officer about a different burglary. The Supreme Court upheld suppression of his incriminating statements to the officer, holding that under the Fifth Amendment such interrogation could occur only if the accused initiated it. Roberson is distinguishable. There the defendant clearly and unequivocally cut off all police interrogation, specifically requested counsel, and did nothing to initiate the interview with the officer. Here defendant initially invoked only his right to silence and not to counsel; initiated the police questioning about Van Zandt's murder himself; and then expressly waived his right to counsel in making the prearraignment statement, a full confession to that crime. (28) The prosecution has the burden of establishing, upon the whole record, a knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights. Where, as here, there is no conflict in the evidence, we review the trial court's finding of waiver independently. ( People v. Duren (1973) 9 Cal.3d 218, 237-238 [107 Cal. Rptr. 157, 507 P.2d 1365].) (27b) In light of defendant's conduct, his request for counsel at the arraignment on the marijuana charge is not a clear expression of a desire that police interrogation on the murder charge cease until he had consulted with counsel. Because the officer was seeking merely to clarify defendant's earlier voluntary statement and reminded defendant of his Miranda rights, there was a continuing waiver of those rights extending to the postarraignment interview and statements and no Fifth Amendment violation. (See People v. Brockman (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 1002, 1006 [83 Cal. Rptr. 70].) (29) Defendant's Sixth Amendment claim fares no better. In People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543 [244 Cal. Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776], the defendant sought to suppress postarraignment statements he made to a fellow inmate, claiming that the inmate was a police agent whose conversation with him violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We rejected his argument on the alternative ground that the information procured by the inmate related to an offense other than the offense with which the defendant had been charged. [7] Quoting Maine v. Moulton (1985) 474 U.S. 159, 180, footnote 16 [88 L.Ed.2d 481, 499, 106 S.Ct. 477], we observed: `Incriminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth Amendment right has not yet attached, are, of course, admissible at a trial of those offenses.' (44 Cal.3d at p. 561.) The same rationale applies here. Defendant was arraigned and requested counsel in connection with a Nebraska marijuana charge that arose from a different incident and at a different time and place than the California murder and robbery charges. The latter charges were not pending at the time of the postarraignment interrogation and no attorney had been requested or appointed to represent defendant on those charges. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel arises from the fact that the suspect has been formally charged with a particular crime and thus is facing a state apparatus that has been geared up to prosecute him. ( Arizona v. Roberson, supra, 486 U.S. at p. 685 [100 L.Ed.2d at p. 716], italics added.) As a result: [ T ] he continuing investigation of uncharged offenses [ does ] not violate the ... Sixth Amendment right. ... ( Ibid. [100 L.Ed.2d at p. 716], italics added.) Because defendant had no Sixth Amendment right with respect to the uncharged crimes of robbery and murder, the use of his statement could not violate such a right. (See also In re Michael B. (1981) 125 Cal. App.3d 790, 795-798 [178 Cal. Rptr. 291], and cases cited therein; People v. Booker (1977) 69 Cal. App.3d 654, 663-665 [138 Cal. Rptr. 347].) Assuming error in the admission of the postarraignment statement, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Discovery of the body was not essential to the prosecution's case. ( People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 610-611 [244 Cal. Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854].) Defendant did not dispute that Van Zandt had been killed nor did he dispute the location of the body; he contended only that his companions had done the killing. Moreover, defendant had already indicated in his prearraignment statement the basic facts of the murder and the approximate location of the victim's body. In short, defendant had already convicted himself with his own voluntary statements, before the postarraignment interview. He was not prejudiced by the limited additional admissions he made there. ( People v. Nicholas (1980) 112 Cal. App.3d 249, 269-270 [169 Cal. Rptr. 497].)