Opinion ID: 452180
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discovery of Appellant's Statement

Text: 28 Prior to trial, Garmany asked the court to order the prosecution to turn over a copy of the statement he made to prison officials while he was recovering from his wounds. The government responded by agreeing to provide all relevant portions of this statement, but notified Garmany that it would seek a protective order to prevent disclosure of the balance of the statement. This protective order was sought and granted ex parte on December 20, 1983. The prosecution did not introduce any portion of appellant's statement during the case-in-chief. When defense counsel announced Garmany's intention to take the stand, the government gave him a copy of this entire statement, stating that it intended to use it for cross-examination purposes. Upon reading the statement, defense counsel returned to court the next day claiming that revelation of Garmany's entire statement caused a complete change in strategy. No longer would Garmany testify in his own defense. In fact, the defense rested. 29 Appellant claims that prior to trial, the court should have permitted discovery of the entire statement. Assuming that the statement should have been produced to the defense under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(A), 9 we note that the government announced its intention to secure a protective order as to a portion of the statement. Though the government obtained this order ex parte, it should have been obvious to Garmany that the prosecution had produced only a portion of his statement. Yet, Garmany made no objection until the government revealed the remainder of the statement during trial. Even now, appellant does not challenge the basis for the protective order. Further, even if the statement should have been discovered at an earlier date, appellant's bare allegation that the postponed discovery caused him to redesign completely his defense does not fulfill his burden of establishing prejudice. See United States v. Pascual, 606 F.2d 561, 565 (5th Cir.1979).