Opinion ID: 197450
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Recupero's Request for Reclassification of Benefits

Text: 152 We take note that plaintiff is not seeking Sickness Disability Benefits beyond those already paid to her. Rather, she is asking merely that we order, or direct the district court to order, that the benefits already paid to her as Sickness Disability Benefits be declared to be reclassified as Accident Disability Benefits. (Appellant's Br. at 1 n. 1.) 153 Recupero does not argue, nor do we know of any ground on which she could creditably do so, that she was entitled to such a reclassification decision by the district court, or is entitled to have this court declare such a reclassification. Instead, she asks this court, as a matter of discretion in the interests of justice, to declare the reclassification or order the district court to make a discretionary decision regarding reclassification. 154 We are not persuaded that we should exercise discretion in this way at this late stage in the development of proceedings regarding Recupero's claim for benefits, even if we were to determine that we have jurisdiction to do so. Recupero has failed to place before us, or before the district court, a record showing that she made a request that the Committees make a determination of this type. Nor has she called to our attention any good cause for determining that she should be allowed to present this request at this late point in the face of the apparent unfairness of allowing a claimant to proceed on one set of contentions to the threshold of final resolution and only then assert a new theory of claim. In these circumstances, without undertaking to resolve very substantial doubts about our jurisdiction to entertain such a late request for a declaration of reclassification of benefits she was paid and accepted as Sickness Disability Benefits, we conclude that her request must be denied as untimely. This conclusion is amply supported by precedent. See, e.g., United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027, 1034 (1st Cir.1997) (constitutional arguments not raised in the lower court cannot be advanced on appeal); Armstrong v. Jefferson Smurfit & Corp., 30 F.3d 11, 13 n. 4 (1st Cir.1994) (argument that reimbursement of taxes paid in lump-sum payments could be benefits under ERISA waived when made for the first time on appeal.)