Opinion ID: 219723
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kentucky Murder Statute's Failure to Define EED

Text: The Kentucky murder statute under which Petitioner was tried stated that a person commits murder when, with the intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution a person shall not be guilty under this subsection if he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Ky.Rev.Stat. § 507.020(1)(a). As previously indicated, the statute did not define extreme emotional disturbance. It is true that just months after the Kentucky Supreme Court decided Petitioner's appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court provided a definition for EED. Extreme emotional disturbance may reasonably be defined as follows: Extreme emotional disturbance is a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one's judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from the impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes. It is not a mental disease in itself, and an enraged, inflamed, or disturbed emotional state does not constitute an extreme emotional disturbance unless there is a reasonable explanation or excuse therefor, the reasonableness is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under circumstances as defendant believed them to be. McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Ky.1986). In defining EED, the Kentucky Supreme Court admitted its error in previously failing to provide a definition for EED. To say that we know it when we see it, overlooks the fact that it is not the court but a jury that must make a factual determination of whether a particular defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. Without some standard or definition a jury is left to speculate in a vacuum as to what circumstances might or might not constitute extreme emotional disturbance. Id. at 467. However, under AEDPA, this Court may only grant a petition for habeas corpus under § 2254 if a conviction (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A mistake of state law is not itself a basis for habeas relief. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. ____, 131 S.Ct. 13, 16, 178 L.Ed.2d 276 (2010) (per curiam); Baze, 371 F.3d at 322. In reviewing this ground for habeas relief, the relevant question is whether Kentucky's failure to define EED rendered the statute void for vagueness under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Quoting the Supreme Court, this Court has held that an element of a state murder statute is not unconstitutional if it has some common-sense core of meaning that criminal juries should be capable of understanding. Carter, 218 F.3d at 608 (quoting Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994)). Kentucky law at the time of Petitioner's crimes did not require the trial court to instruct the jury regarding the definition of EED, stating, suffice [it] to say that we know [EED] when we see it. Edmonds, 586 S.W.2d at 27. In Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 257, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an undefined EED instruction. The Supreme Court maintained that [w]hile ... questions and decisions regarding whether a defendant was suffering from EED may be hard, they require no more line[]drawing than is commonly required of a factfinder in a lawsuit. Id. Therefore, although the undefined EED element under which Petitioner was tried could have been clearer, and may have been error under Kentucky law, it does not appear that the Supreme Court would consider it so egregiously vague as to violate due process.