Opinion ID: 2108691
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of the Inherently Dangerous Activity Doctrine to Third Parties

Text: Early cases giving rise to the inherently dangerous activity doctrine limited the exception to injuries to third parties. In Rogers v. Parker, 159 Mich. 278, 123 N.W. 1109 (1909), this Court first discussed an exception to the general rule of nonliability for damages caused to a third party by an independent contractor's performance of an act likely to do harm to that third party. The question before this Court was whether a landowner who employed an independent contractor to clear farmland was liable for damages to neighboring property resulting when a fire that the contractor had set spread to neighboring land. This Court resolved the issue on statutory grounds, but discussed in obiter dictum the common-law principles that would have applied, stating: [T]he rule relieving the employer where the work has been committed to an independent contractor is subject to the well-established exceptions that: If the thing to be done is in itself unlawful, or if it is per se a nuisance, or if it cannot be done without doing damage, he who causes it to be done by another, be the latter servant, agent, or independent contractor, is as much liable for injuries which may happen to third persons from the act done as though he had done the act in person. So it is the duty of every person who does in person, or causes to be done by another, an act which from its nature is liable, unless precautions are taken, to do injury to others, to see to it that those precautions are taken, and he cannot escape this duty by turning the whole performance over to a contractor.  [ Id. at 282-283, 123 N.W. 1109 (some emphases added).] In Inglis v. Millersburg Driving Ass'n, 169 Mich. 311, 136 N.W. 443 (1912), this Court elaborated on the above common-law exception. In that case, agents of the defendant association had set fires on fairgrounds property in the defendant's possession to clear it, and the fires spread to the plaintiff's adjoining land, causing damage. This Court held that the defendant was estopped to argue that independent contractors, rather than the unincorporated association itself, were responsible for the damage, because it had not pleaded that defense or argued it at trial. Id. at 317-318, 136 N.W. 443. This Court opined in obiter dictum, however, that an exception would have applied to the general rule of nonliability of landowners for the actions of independent contractors. While this Court cited its decision in Rogers and various other formulations of the rule, perhaps the best articulation of the principle was as follows: The doctrine of independent contractor, whereby one who lets work to be done by another, reserving no control over the performance of the work, is not liable to third persons for injuries resulting from negligence of the contractor or his servants, is subject to several important exceptions. One of these ... is where the employer is, from the nature and character of the work, under a duty to others to see that it is carefully performed. It cannot be better stated than in the language used by Cockburn, C.J., in Bower v. Peate, 1 Q.B. Div. 321, 326, a leading and well-considered case. It is, `that a man who orders a work to be executed, from which, in the natural course of things, injurious consequences to his neighbor must be expected to arise, unless means are adopted by which such consequences may be averted, is bound to see the doing of that which is necessary to prevent mischief, and cannot relieve himself of his responsibility by employing some one else  whether it be the contractor employed to do the work from which the danger arises, or some independent person  or to do what is necessary to prevent the act he has ordered done from becoming unlawful.' ... This does not abrogate the law as to independent contractor. It still leaves abundant room for its proper application. `There is,' as stated by Cockburn, `an obvious difference between committing work to a contractor to be executed, from which, if properly done, no injurious consequences can arise, and handing over to him work to be done from which mischievous consequences will arise unless precautionary measures are adopted.' The weight of reason and authority is to the effect that, where a party is under a duty to the public, or third person, to see that work he is about to do, or have done, is carefully performed, so as to avoid injury to others, he cannot, by letting it to a contractor, avoid his liability, in case it is negligently done to the injury of another. Covington, etc., Bridge Co. v. Steinbrock & Patrick, 61 Ohio St. 215, 55 N.E. 618 [1899], and cases cited. [ Inglis at 320-321, 136 N.W. 443 (citations omitted, emphasis added).] Thus, the above rule, which has come to be known as the inherently dangerous activity exception, is founded on the existence of a duty on behalf of the landowner, or employer of an independent contractor, and the duty must be of the type that is nondelegable. The employer or landowner must also be aware that the danger exists and that it necessarily involves danger to others. Notably, the type of danger contemplated by the Inglis Court was danger to third parties and not to those involved in the dangerous activity. Over the next several decades, this Court reaffirmed that, under this doctrine, the landowner must itself owe some duty to the specific third party, that the negligent act that causes the injury cannot be collateral to the work contracted for, and that the injury that occurs must be reasonably expected by the landowner. See Cary v. Thomas, 345 Mich. 616, 76 N.W.2d 817 (1956); Barlow v. Krieghoff Co., 310 Mich. 195, 16 N.W.2d 715 (1944); Grinnell v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp., 282 Mich. 509, 276 N.W. 535 (1937); Tillson v. Consumers' Power Co., 269 Mich. 53, 256 N.W. 801 (1934); Watkins v. Gabriel Steel Co., 260 Mich. 692, 245 N.W. 801 (1932); Wight v. H.G. Christman Co., 244 Mich. 208, 221 N.W. 314 (1928). Notably, under this Court's precedent, the doctrine applied only to third parties.