Opinion ID: 2621193
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior violent criminal activity

Text: Defendant contends that the introduction, at the penalty phase, of evidence of his assault on his first wife violated due process and the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He contends that the incident, which occurred between 1964 and 1966, was too remote in time to be relevant and that the only evidence came from a biased witnessthe victim. He claims that because the evidence was weak, the jury should not have been permitted to rely upon it. He adds that the jury may have placed too much reliance upon the incident because, at the penalty phase, they were not reinstructed concerning the credibility of a single witness. This claim is waived because defendant failed to object at trial. ( People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1188, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) In any event, defendant's contentions lack merit. The remoteness of the incident goes to its weight, not to its admissibility. ( People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 453, 476, 276 Cal.Rptr. 356, 801 P.2d 1107; see also People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 233, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710 [rejecting constitutional and statutory claims against the admission of penalty phase evidence of prior criminal activity that could not be prosecuted because of a statute of limitations]; People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1161, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1 [rejecting various constitutional claims regarding the admission of evidence of an assertedly remote prior offense].) Similarly, it was for the jury to consider whether the witness was too biased to be credible, and the jury was instructed to consider instructions that were given at the guilt phase that were relevant (which included those concerning the credibility of witnesses).