Opinion ID: 1953344
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Tugwell, 83 So.2d at 899.

Text: More recently, the court has declined jurisdiction over issues posed in the abstract, or actions generally not involving specific adversarial questions asserted by interested parties and based on existing facts. [18] In American Waste & Pollution Control Co. v. St. Martin Parish Police Jury, 627 So.2d 158 (La.1993), the court vacated the trial court's holding of unconstitutionality on certain state statutes authorizing zoning, land use, and siting for solid waste disposal within parishes because the lack of sufficient adversity prevented a justiciable controversy finding. The court once again relied on the basic requirement of justiciability to avoid sitting in an advisory capacity. Likewise, in Church Point Wholesale Beverage Co. v. Tarver, 614 So.2d 697 (La.1993), the court declined to exercise jurisdiction over a challenge seeking recovery of taxes paid under the Beer Tax Statute. The court found the petitioners lacked standing to seek declaratory relief because the refund claim had prescribed under applicable law. Therefore, the court refused relief because any opinion on the refund claim would be merely advisory for these parties. It is argued this case is moot or otherwise non-justiciable because any judgment by this court can have no practical effect upon the existing controversy, thus constituting an advisory opinion. Based on the fact no actual controversy exists, the argument continues, this court should refuse making a declaration as to the Act because such would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding. See La.C.C.P. art. 1876. We must disagree. If the case is moot, `there is no subject matter on which the judgment of the court can operate.' St. Charles Parish School Board, supra, 512 So.2d at 1171 (citing Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378, 390, 20 S.Ct. 673, 677, 44 L.Ed. 813 (1900)). A moot question connotes an issue that has been deprived of practical significance or made abstract or purely academic. Louisiana Associated General Contractors, Inc., supra, 95-2105 p. 10; 669 So.2d at 1193; American Waste & Pollution Control Co., supra, 627 So.2d at 162. A moot case is one in which a judgment can serve no useful purpose and give no practical effect. Robin v. Concerned Citizens for Better Education in St. Bernard, Inc., 384 So.2d 405, 406 (La.1980). The declaratory judgment articles are remedial in nature and must be liberally construed and applied so as to give the procedure full effect within the contours of a justiciable controversy. Stoddard, supra, 165 So.2d at 11. A court may declare the rights of parties in order to terminate an actual controversy [19] even if further relief is or could be claimed. La.C.C.P. arts. 1871 & 1875; Chauvet v. City of Westwego, 599 So.2d 294, 296 (La.1992) (per curiam). The instant case is distinguishable from previous cases by this court wherein we found various actions were moot or lacked a justiciable controversy. The present controversy places before the state system questions ripe for decision, not premature or abstract. This judgment serves the useful purpose and gives the practical effect of terminating the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding as far as the Louisiana state court system is able in this Pullman abstention context. In its abstention order, the federal district court recognized this effect, reasoning that submission of plaintiff's novel state law claims to the expertise of a Louisiana court would respect the values of federalism highlighted in Pullman and would in all likelihood moot or substantially alter the plaintiff's single federal constitutional claim. Perschall v. Louisiana, No. 95-1265, 1995 WL 396311,  (E.D.La. July 5, 1995). That further relief is or could be claimed in federal court at this proceeding's conclusion provides no support for finding this case is moot. The basis for abstention, proper in this case, requires such a result. We also find the facts presented in the instant abstention remand sufficiently present a justiciable controversy. This case addresses genuine rights between the parties, and it provides concrete relief by either (1) terminating the controversy completely by effectively mooting certain of the federal issues remaining if the Act were found constitutional, or (2) substantially altering the federal constitutional claim presently stayed in federal court if the Act were found unconstitutional. [20] Therefore, this case presents the issues with sufficient adversity to satisfy the requisites of justiciability. [21] The degree of adversity required to present the issues will vary from case to case, depending upon the issue presented. Louisiana Independent Auto Dealers, supra, 295 So.2d at 801. In this case, we are asked to declare whether Act 512 can survive under specific state constitutional provisions. The issue is purely legal. As in Louisiana Independent Auto Dealers, its resolution is not dependent upon the presentation of involved factual evidence. Id. Moreover, plaintiff's stated interests in conjunction with the State's duty to uphold the act represent truly adverse interests. [22] For the foregoing reasons, we find this case presents a justiciable controversy in the wake of a Pullman abstention remand that is not moot. We turn now to the merits of plaintiff's claim that Act 512 is unconstitutional under the Louisiana Constitution. Supreme Court Composition & Powers of Assignment Article V, section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides: The supreme court shall be composed of a chief justice and six associate justices, four of whom must concur to render judgment. The term of a supreme court judge shall be ten years. LA. CONST. art. V, § 3. The constitution currently provides that these seven seats be filled by election, [23] dividing the state into at least six supreme court districts, and at least one judge shall be elected from each. [24] LA. CONST. art. V, § 4. The prior constitutional document, in effect for over six decades, also provided for a seven-justice [25] supreme court. Article VII, section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 provided: Except when judges of other courts are called in, as elsewhere provided in this Constitution, the Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and six Associate Justices, four of whom shall concur to render judgment when the court is sitting en banc, and whenever so sitting, if four members cannot for any cause concur in any case, the court shall have authority to call on any judge of the Courts of Appeal, or District courts, whose duty it shall be, when so called upon, to sit in such case. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (1921). [26] Although the 1921 constitution increased the number of justices allowed to sit on the supreme court from the five allowed in the Louisiana Constitution of 1913, the constitutional history of articles regulating the supreme court's composition reveals the 1921 and 1974 documents were consistent in continuing a numerative limit of justices on this court, a provision the origins of which date to the Louisiana Constitution of 1812. [27] The 1974 Constitution also vested the supreme court, consistent with its general supervisory power over all other courts, with the authority to assign a sitting or retired judge to any court.... LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(A). This simple, broad-based provision represented an evident change from the 1921 Constitution's distribution of assignment powers throughout various articles. The convention recognized the provisions for temporary assignment to the supreme court, as well as to and between the lower courts, were unnecessarily detailed, Hargrave, supra, at 770; therefore, the redactors of the 1974 document omitted the various provisions and replaced them with the text of article V, section 5(A). In determining the constitutionality of Act 512, which creates an additional seat on the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit and orders the judge duly elected to such seat assigned to the supreme court as a justice, [28] we are faced with conflicting constitutional provisions regarding supreme court composition: (1) article V, section 3's numerative limit of seven supreme court justices, and (2) article V, section 5(A)'s investiture in the supreme court of power to assign sitting or retired judges to any court. When a constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, it must be applied as written without further interpretation in search of its intent. Louisiana Associated General Contractors, Inc., supra, 95-2105 p. 15-16; 669 So.2d at 1196. Constitutional provisions should be construed so as to give effect to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the language used, and in the event of conflict or inconsistency, provisions should be construed, if possible, to allow each provision to stand and be given effect. Eiche v. Louisiana Board of Elementary & Secondary Education, 582 So.2d 186, 189 (La.1991); State ex rel. Guste v. Board of Commissioners, 456 So.2d 605 (La.1984); Barnett v. Develle, 289 So.2d 129 (La.1974). If one constitutional provision addresses a subject in general terms, and another with the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible, but if there is any conflict, the latter will prevail. Arata v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition District, 254 La. 579, 225 So.2d 362, 372 (1969), cert. denied sub nom. Schwegmann v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition District, 396 U.S. 279, 90 S.Ct. 569, 24 L.Ed.2d 467 (1970). Where a constitutional aim is evident and explicit from the language used, courts need not consider the historical basis for a constitutional prohibition and may not, by separately considering related constitutional provisions, arrive at a construction that detracts from the effectiveness or manifest meaning and purpose of the related provisions. Barnett v. Develle, 289 So.2d 129, 146 (La.1974). The wording of article V, section 3, expressly imposing a numerative limit of supreme court justices, is clear and unambiguous and must be applied as written. By comparison to article V, section 5(A)'s assignment power, section 3 is the more specific provision concerning this court's composition. The constitutional aim is evident and explicit from the language used: There is a limit on the number of justices empowered to sit on this court. We may not, by separately considering the related constitutional provision authorizing this court to assign sitting or retired judges to any court, arrive at a construction that defeats the manifest purpose and meaning of that power. The State argues the additional judgeship created for the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit by enactment of La.R.S. 13:312.4 was properly ordered assigned to the supreme court pursuant to the court's power contained in article V, section 5(A). It contends the Chisom seat's assignment is similar to the temporary assignment of lower court judges to this court, arguing the power to assign judges to any court is explicit and unfettered, relying on State v. Bell, 392 So.2d 442 (La.1981) and its progeny. We agree with the State that the 1974 Constitution vested in this court plenary powers of assignment to assist courts ... in the judicial branch in the furtherance of the administration of justice. Bell, 392 So.2d at 442. This court's supervisory jurisdiction and assignment powers under the Constitution of 1921 were expressly retained and strengthened by the 1974 Constitution. Id. at 443. Moreover, we recognize this power authorizes assignment of lower court judges to any court, including this court. However, we must give the constitutional provisions in conflict herein a construction which will allow each to stand and be given effect, if possible. Although we agree the assignment power articulated by section 5(A) is express and plenary, the instant conflict with the numerative limit presents a circumstance in which the assignment power's full exercise leads to the absurd consequence of detracting from the more detailed or literal prohibition concerning this court's composition. Article V, section 3 is a clear and specific limitation, and the more general provision contained in article V, section 5(A) presents conflict. Nevertheless, in an effort to harmonize these provisions placed in conflict by the Act, we find it necessary, faced with these significant facts, to look to the intent behind the assignment power provision even though the more specific and detailed provision is usually held to prevail over a more general provision presenting conflict. [29] We are aided in determining the purpose and scope of section 5(A)'s power by reviewing the powers distributed throughout the prior constitution. Although expressly continuing the numerative requirement present in prior constitutions, the 1921 Constitution detailed the supreme court's assignment power in no less than four separate articles. LA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 4, 5, 7, 12 (1921). The exception referred to in article VII, section 4 of the 1921 Constitution, as amended, [30] allowed the temporary assignment of lower court judges to the supreme court. This provision anticipated the need for this court, from time to time, to call temporarily on lower court judges for reasons such as illness or vacancy. Section 4 also allowed the supreme court to elevate lower court judges if four members cannot for any cause concur in any case. [31] Additionally, section 4 contemplated the extent of the assigned judge's power, stating the appointee's duty shall be, when so called upon, to sit in any and all cases the court may direct.  LA. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (1921), as amended (emphasis added). The 1921 Constitution further authorized a system by which the court could sit in rotating divisions consisting of less than an en banc makeup. To facilitate this, the articles imposed a requirement different from the 1974 Constitution for concurrence in judgment, [32] authorizing the court to sit in three-judge panels; but to render judgment on the court's behalf, the constitution required complete unanimity among the three. This divisional framework also contained a second assignment procedure that allowed two court of appeal judges to be elevated to the supreme court to form a third division when necessary to dispose of a congested docket. Id. § 5. When these appellate court judges were called in, and the court was sitting en banc, which effectively enlarged the court to nine judges, the constitution required five judges to concur to render judgment. Id. A third assignment procedure, contained in article VII, section 12, consisted of rules of assignment between and among the lower courts under certain circumstances. It gave the supreme court the power to assign for any cause judges of one District Court to another District Court, and to provide for the interchange of judges of the District Courts, and it further allowed assignment of District Judges to the Courts of Appeal whenever the judges of said Courts of Appeal are called to sit with the Supreme Court. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 12 (1921). A final assignment power provided for the filling of vacancies depending on the time remaining in a justice's term. See id. §§ 4, 7. A clear purpose of the 1973 Constitutional Convention was to simplify the state's constitution. [33] As it relates to the judiciary article, a desire to present a drastically shortened article on the judiciary was consistent with that general mission. Hargrave, supra, at 768. To accomplish that goal, the committee proposed to the convention a simply worded provision which consolidated all of the powers of assignment vested in the supreme court by the 1921 Constitution in a single article. In explaining this revision to the convention, the judiciary committee chairman summarized that the provision allowing the Supreme Court to assign a sitting or retired judge to any court is not a change in the law.... This power is granted the Supreme Court in the present constitution. 6 RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS 721 (La. Constitutional Convention Records Comm'n ed., 1977) In the course of revising the assignment power provisions, however, the 1973 convention suppressed the authorization for the court to sit in divisions. Although an early committee working draft would have permitted the court to sit in divisions, Hargrave, supra, at 768 (citing Draft A, § 4), the supreme court did not use this reserved power with the exception of two years immediately following the adoption of the 1921 constitution. Id.; LA. ST. L. INST., 2 PROJET OF A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 596 (1954). Therefore, the convention's judiciary committee, consistent with the Law Institute proposal contained in the PROJET, 2 PROJET, supra, at 596, did not carry forward that authorization to the convention. From this review, we are convinced the section 5(A) assignment power, extended from the 1921 Constitution, is a plenary power intended to assist this court in supervising an efficient judicial administration of the statethe best efficient use of the manpower. CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, supra, at 731 (quoting Justice Tate debating the merits of article V, § 5(A)). Additionally, in convention floor debates, Justice Tate clarified the power's general purpose: [T]he assignment power is used in temporary situations .... [t]o permit temporary assignment without the expenses of creating a permanent new position, when it is only a temporary situation needing temporary help, or a sick judge for instance. CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, supra, at 724. Therefore, it is apparent the power to assign judges temporarily to this court or any lower court under our supervisory jurisdiction is broad, but always was intended to effectuate temporary assignment, as that term is generally understood, which judge would serve at this court's direction under our supervisory jurisdiction. With regard specifically to the power of assignment to this court under the 1974 Constitution, we find two actions of the convention particularly significant. First, as a general proposition, the judiciary committee intended no change in the law concerning the assignment power from the prior constitution. Secondly, the convention, consistent with the PROJET before it, suppressed in the 1974 document the prior authorization allowing this court to sit in rotating divisions, which process actually authorized the court to exceed its numerative limit under certain circumstances articulated in article VII, section 5 of 1921.