Opinion ID: 2802763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The FOIA’s Personal Privacy Exemption

Text: The FOIA’s “personal privacy” exemption permits the withholding of “information of a personal nature such as that kept in a personal, medical or similar file[.]” W.Va. Code § 29B-1-4(a)(2). In syllabus point six of Hechler v. Casey, 175 W.Va. 434, 333 S.E.2d 799 (1985), we held: “The primary purpose of the invasion of privacy exemption to the Freedom of Information Act, W.Va.Code, [§ 29B-1-4(a)(2)],22 is to protect individuals from the injury and embarrassment that can result from the unnecessary disclosure of personal information.” Id. (footnote added). We employ a twopronged inquiry in deciding whether the public body has correctly withheld records under 22 The syllabus point cites West Virginia Code § 29B-1-4(2) (1977), which contains the same language as West Virginia Code § 29B-1-4(a)(2) (2012). 29 this exemption. First, we determine whether the records in question are “personal,” “medical,” or “similar” files. Second, if so, we then balance or weigh the individual’s right of privacy against “the public’s right to know.” Hechler, 175 W.Va. at 444, 333 S.E.2d at 810. Our analysis is consistent with case law interpreting the federal FOIA counterpart. The federal FOIA exemption provides that government can withhold “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2009). See Martin E. Halstuk, When Is An Invasion of Privacy Unwarranted Under the FOIA? An Analysis of the Supreme Court’s “Sufficient Reason” and “Presumption of Legitimacy” Standards, 16 U.Fla.J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 361, 371 (2005) (“When an agency makes a determination in a privacy-interests case[,] . . . it first must decide whether the requested records fall within the definition of ‘personnel,’ ‘medical,’ or ‘similar’ files. Second, the agency must balance the invasion of the individual’s personal privacy against the public’s interest in disclosure to determine whether the disclosure is justified.”) (footnotes omitted). Here, the circuit court concluded WVU properly withheld 740 documents on the basis of “academic freedom,” a concept which it incorporated into the FOIA’s 30 23 “personal privacy” exemption. The circuit court conceded that its ruling was unprecedented. The circuit court’s holding rested upon three distinct considerations: (1) the First Amendment encompasses an “academic freedom” privilege that is “transcendental, applicable to both constitutional law and to FOIA”; (2) the guarantee set forth in the West Virginia Constitution that provides all citizens have a right to a thorough and efficient educational system; and (3) the determination that individual peer reviewers have an expectation of privacy that will be harmed by the release of their comments, even though such comments are submitted anonymously. We summarily reject the first two considerations outlined above. First, the West Virginia Freedom of Information Act does not provide an “academic freedom” exemption to its general disclosure provision, West Virginia Code § 29B-1-3 (2012). Although the First Amendment has been held to apply to protect colleges and universities against undue interference by the government,24 First Amendment jurisprudence does not 23 The circuit court noted, however, that the “deliberative process” exemption would shield the same documents from disclosure. 24 The primary case cited by WVU on this issue, Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), is not relevant to the instant case. Sweezy was decided on the basis of a denial of due process, in the form of an open-ended, unlimited investigation of the personal conduct and affairs of a faculty member. The Supreme Court in Sweezy dealt with a challenge to the use of a New Hampshire statute to hold a university professor in contempt for failing to answer questions posed to him (by the New Hampshire Attorney General, on behalf of the Legislature) concerning his belief in Communism and involvement with the Progressive Party. Id. at 242-244. This case did not involve the federal FOIA or any similar statute, nor did it involve the professor’s research activities/scientific publications. 31 support its application in the context of this case. Because the exemptions to the Act are required to be strictly construed, this Court declines to create an “academic freedom” exemption not specifically set forth in the FOIA. See Syl. Pt. 5, Queen, 179 W.Va. 95, 365 S.E.2d 375. In Banker v. Banker, 196 W.Va. 535, 474 S.E.2d 465 (1996) we stated, “[i]t is not for this Court arbitrarily to read into [a statute] that which it does not say. Just as courts are not to eliminate through judicial interpretation words that were purposely included, we are obliged not to add to statutes something the Legislature purposely omitted.” Id. at 546-47, 474 S.E.2d at 476-77. This Court has further cautioned that “[a] statute, or an administrative rule, may not, under the guise of ‘interpretation,’ be modified, revised, amended or rewritten.” Syl. Pt. 1, Consumer Advocate Div. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 182 W.Va. 152, 386 S.E.2d 650 (1989). Therefore, we find the broad principle of “academic freedom” would not justify WVU’s wholesale avoidance of the plain language of the FOIA. 25 Second, the guarantee of a “thorough and efficient system of free schools” under the West Virginia Constitution does not extend to institutions of higher education such as WVU. See W.Va. Const. art. XII, § 1; Syl. Pt. 7, Randolph Co. Bd. of Educ. v. Adams, 196 W.Va. 9, 467 S.E.2d 150 (1995) (“Whatever items are deemed necessary to 25 Likewise, WVU wrongly suggests we should recognize an “academic freedom” exemption from FOIA to mirror “the justification for First Amendment protections afforded to journalists.” The principles that support the extension of First Amendment protections to journalists and their confidential sources have no application to the matter before us. 32 accomplish the goals of a school system and are in fact an integral fundamental part of the elementary and secondary education must be provided free of charge to all students in order to comply with the constitutional mandate of a free school system pursuant to Section 1 of Article XII of the West Virginia Constitution.”). Our Constitution does not establish a right to a higher education; the circuit court’s reliance on this principle was entirely misplaced. We now turn to the third consideration set forth above. The pertinent issue here is whether Highland’s request for “[a]ll comments by peer reviewers concerning drafts of the documents” constitute “information of a personal nature” within the meaning of the privacy exemption at West Virginia Code § 29B-1-4(a)(2). WVU asserts the peer reviewers’ privacy expectations would be violated by the release of their anonymous, confidential comments. The identity of peer reviewers is traditionally kept confidential in order to facilitate a candid exchange regarding a proposed article and its research. WVU maintains that to subject a reviewer’s comments to public scrutiny, even while keeping the identity of the reviewer withheld, would render a reviewer more reluctant to challenge traditional ideas and propose unconventional concepts. Highland responds that WVU’s argument “stands the notion of ‘personal’ information on its ear.” Applying the plain meaning of the word “personal,” Highland argues this exemption cannot apply to peer review comments, submitted anonymously to 33 an academic or scientific journal, that are not kept in a “personal, medical, or similar file” pertaining to the person who prepared them. We agree. This Court finds that WVU fails to meet the first prong of Hechler because the records in question are not “personal, medical or similar file[s]” that fall under the FOIA’s “personal privacy” exemption. W.Va. Code § 29B-1-4(a)(2). In fact, these anonymous peer review comments contain no personal identifying information at all. Therefore, the only case relied upon by WVU on this issue is distinguishable from the instant case. In Cook v. National Archives & Records Administration, 758 F.3d 168 (2nd Cir. 2014), the court held records pertaining to research requests made on behalf of former President and former Vice President for records from their own administration were “similar files” to “personnel” files exempt under the federal FOIA “personal privacy” exemption, because “they contain[ed] detailed records containing personal information identifiable to the former officials and their representatives.” Id. at 175. Because WVU fails to meet the first prong of Hechler, our analysis stops here; we need not proceed to address the second prong to balance or weigh the individual’s right of privacy against “the public’s right to know.” 175 W.Va. at 444, 333 S.E.2d at 810. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the circuit court insofar as it found that WVU properly withheld documents on the basis of “academic freedom,” as it incorporated into the FOIA’s “personal privacy” exemption set forth in West Virginia Code § 29B-1-4(a)(2). 34 We do, however, agree with the circuit court’s finding that the same documents would fall under the FOIA “internal memoranda” exemption. As previously discussed, disclosure of the anonymous peer review comments submitted to Professor Hendryx, as he was drafting the articles, would undercut the decision-making process embodied by the FOIA’s exemption and discourage open discussion necessary for scientific/academic research. See Daily Gazette I, 198 W. Va. at 572, 482 S.E.2d at 189 (stating that “in the spirit of further promoting frank and open discussions during an agency’s deliberative process, courts have interpreted the deliberative process privilege to include opinions and recommendations to a governmental agency by outside consultants and experts so long as such opinions or recommendations are obtained during the government agency’s deliberative, predecisional process”).