Opinion ID: 2823791
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Errors in Recollection at Batsonâs Third Step

Text: Â¶14Â Â Â Â Â Â At step three, âthe critical questionâ becomes âthe persuasiveness of the prosecutorâs justification for h[er] peremptory strike.â Miller-El v. Cockrell (Miller-El I),537 U.S. 322, 338â39 (2003). The trial court must gauge the prosecutorâs credibility by evaluating her demeanor, how reasonable or improbable her explanations are, and whether her âproffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.â Id. at 339. If the prosecutorâs asserted race-neutral reasons do not hold up, and âthe racially discriminatory hypothesisâ better fits the evidence, then the trial court must uphold the Batson challenge. See Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 231, 265â66 (2005) (concluding, based on historical patterns of practice and the disparate treatment of black and white veniremembers during jury selection, that the prosecutor struck black potential jurors because of their race). Though the trial court must evaluate all relevant facts, âthe ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.â Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). Â¶15Â Â Â Â Â Â It is true that a prosecutorâs mischaracterization of a prospective jurorâs voir dire estimony may indicate an ulterior, racial motive. See, e.g., Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 244 (concluding that counsel misrepresented a venirememberâs inability to vote for death toÂ disguise âan ulterior reason for keeping [him] off the juryâ). Yet dissonance between a prosecutorâs race-neutral explanation and the transcript of voir dire does not prove that the prosecutor lied to conceal racial discrimination. See, e.g., Ford v. State, 1 S.W.3d 691, 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that proof that an explanation was incorrect is insufficient to satisfy a Batson challengerâs burden of persuasion). Most courts find other indications of racial motivation before concluding that race-neutral explanations belied by the record are pretextual. See, e.g., Johnson v. Vasquez, 3 F.3d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1993). Â¶16Â Â Â Â Â Â For example, in Johnson, the Ninth Circuit observed that the prosecutor initially justified his strike of a minority veniremember by pointing to defense counselâs strike of another minority veniremember, suggesting that race factored into the prosecutorâs decision-making. Id. at 1330. The prosecutor also gave four, facially race-neutral reasons for his strike. Id. Only after the court noted that the prosecutorâs initial explanation raised âa strong indicationâ of racial bias did it compare the record to the prosecutorâs other stated reasons. Id. at 1329, 1330. Then, concluding that the record either undermined or did not support each of the prosecutorâs four race-neutral reasons, the court held that those reasons were pretext for racial discrimination. Id. at 1330; see also Flowers v. State, 947 So. 2d 910, 923â26 (Miss. 2007) (holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendantâs Batson challenge where the prosecutorâs main reason for striking a black veniremember applied with equal force to a white veniremember whom the prosecutor accepted and the record refuted another of the prosecutorâs reasons for striking the black veniremember). Â¶17Â Â Â Â Â Â Standing alone, however, proffered reasons that are contradicted by the record do not imply pretext but can instead reflect mistaken recollection. In Hurd, the Tenth Circuit explained that a shortcut linking a mistaken reason to a pretextual reason conflates the second and third steps of the Batson analysis. 109 F.3d at 1547. To pass muster at step two, the strike proponentâs explanation need not be âpersuasive, or even plausible,â as long as it is race-neutral. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. But at step three, the challenger must âconvince the [trial] court that the reason proffered for the strike was unworthy of belief and that the strike was racially motivated.â Hurd, 109 F.3d at 1548. In Hurd, counsel justified his strike of the only black veniremember by stating that the man previously found for a railroad employee in a civil case. Id. at 1546â47. As opposing counsel and the trial court immediately pointed out, however, the veniremember had stated that he served on a civil jury that reached a verdict, but he never said that the jury had rendered a verdict for the plaintiff. Id. at 1547. The trial court, having observed the attorneyâs demeanor âat length,â determined that, despite the attorneyâs error in recollection, âhe had truthfully represented his belief . . . and had not struck the [prospective] juror because of the color of his skin.â Hurd v. Pittsburg State Univ., 892 F. Supp. 245, 248 (D. Kan. 1995). The Tenth Circuit deferred to the trial courtâs finding that counsel for the university made an honest mistake and held that the plaintiff had not proved facts sufficient to establish purposeful discrimination. Hurd, 109 F.3d at 1548. Â¶18Â Â Â Â Â Â The court of appealsâ contrary view in this case, which labels as pretext any justification unsupported by the record, elevates an appellate courtâs review of a coldÂ record above the trial courtâs firsthand observation of the proceedings and the attitude of the participants. Only the trial court can assess non-verbal cues, such as hesitation, voice inflection, and facial expressions, that are not recorded on a transcript. The court of appealsâ method also creates a presumption that arrogates the trial courtâs step-three duty to distinguish between sham excuses that violate the Equal Protection Clause and bona fide, race-neutral explanations for a peremptory strike. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365; Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21. Such a regime is at odds with the U.S. Supreme Courtâs Batson jurisprudence, which acknowledges the âpivotal roleâ of the trial court in evaluating the credibility and demeanor of both the prosecutor and the prospective juror. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477; see also Valdez, 966 P.2d at 599 (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (âDiscrimination is as sly as it is insidious. It lives in inference, tone, and gesture as much as in action.â). The Batson analysis exists to expose and prevent racial discrimination in jury selection, ânot to test [a] prosecutorâs memory.â People v. Jones, 247 P.3d 82, 99 (Cal. 2011). When an appellate court presumes racial motivation any time a prosecutor misremembers a prospective jurorâs voir dire testimony, it discounts the possibility that the error was a result of an innocent transpositionâand that race did not motivate the strike.