Opinion ID: 1060830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: arrest and extradition from mexico

Text: Appellant Quintero argues that imposition of the death penalty violates his due process rights under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions because he was unlawfully seized without a warrant or other process in Juarez, Mexico, and transported to El Paso, Texas, by Mexican officials acting in concert with F.B.I. agents in Texas. Consequently, appellant Quintero asserts that his death sentence is the fruit of an illegal action by agents of the United States government. Although his habeas corpus petitions filed in Texas and in Kentucky were denied, he claims that the findings of these courts support his claim that his seizure in Mexico and transport to the United States violated his rights to judicial process and the appointment of counsel under the Mexican Constitution and under Mexico's obligation under the American Convention on Human Rights. Moreover, appellant Quintero argues that the means by which his presence was acquired so that he could be sentenced to death shocks the conscience in violation of due process. We find this issue to be without merit. In order to determine whether due process requires that an extradited defendant must be returned, a two-prong test must be applied: (1) was the extradition procedure challenged in advance of trial, and (2) did an evidentiary hearing establish that the conduct of governmental authorities was so illegal and outrageous as to shock the conscience of the court. Sneed v. State, 872 S.W.2d 930, 937 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993). In affirming the denial of appellant Quintero's habeas corpus petition, the Texas Court of Appeals acknowledged the illegality of the action taken by Mexican and F.B.I. agents: The case law proffered by the State and relied upon by this Court in previously upholding these denials of habeas corpus relief stand only for the proposition that isolated, spontaneous illegal seizures of the person, absent abusive treatment shocking to the conscience, will not support a challenge to the Court's personal jurisdiction over the fugitive, Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2nd Cir.1974). We do not construe these cases and others cited in Day and Quintero as affirmative, prospective sanctions for the F.B.I. or any other state or federal law enforcement agency, either directly or through surrogates, to establish a regular policy and practice of engaging in such activity of illegally seizing United States citizens in a foreign country. We uphold the denial of relief in this case because the four seizures which we have been presented, in fact, reflect but two transactions. A third occurrence will in all probability necessitate consideration of whether we are not, in fact, seeing the results of an organized, coordinated program of international kidnapping which has become a policy of at least this regional branch of the F.B.I. That agency and any other law enforcement agency acting in concert in such activity would be well-advised not to rely upon this Court's resolutions of the Day - Day and Quintero -Blanton cases. This caveat applies to any such seizure occurring after the date of this opinion. Otherwise, Appellant's four points of error are overruled. Day v. State, 763 S.W.2d 535, 536 (Tex.App.El Paso 1988). See Quintero v. State, 761 S.W.2d 438 (Tex.App.El Paso 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 826, 110 S.Ct. 90, 107 L.Ed.2d 55 (1989); Blanton v. State, 753 S.W.2d 504 (Tex.App.Beaumont 1988). Once extradited to Kentucky, appellant Quintero filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Lyons County, Kentucky, which was denied and then affirmed on appeal. The trial court's factual findings were, in part, as follows: [9] 1. Petitioners, James Blanton, William Hall, and Derrick Quintero escaped from the Kentucky State Penitentiary on June 16, 1988. 2. Petitioner Hall was apprehended in the United States and returned to Kentucky State Penitentiary on July 9, 1988. 3. On July 10, 1988, Eric Benson and other FBI agents went to Juarez, Chihuahua, Mexico, and arrested James Blanton and Derrick Quintero in a room at the Santa Fe Hotel. 4. There were no arrest warrants issued in Mexico authorizing the arrest of Petitioners Blanton and Quintero. 5. There was no formal extradition request made by authorities of the United States to apprehend and arrest the Petitioners and have the Petitioners extradited from Mexico to the Untied States for trial. 6. Petitioners Blanton and Quintero were brought from Juarez, Mexico, to El Paso, Texas, by FBI agents acting in joint concert with Mexican Federal Judicial Police, without benefit of having any judicial process in Mexico used to aid in their apprehension. 7. Petitioners Blanton and Quintero were not brought before any Judge in Mexico for purposes of having any hearing regarding their arrest. 8. Petitioners Blanton and Quintero were neither formally deported from Mexico nor afforded any deportation hearing in Mexico. 9. On January, 25, 1980, Mexico and the United States entered into a Treaty regarding extradition. 10. Officials of the United States did not go through diplomatic channels to extradite Petitioners Blanton and Quintero. 11. Officials of the United States did not send the following documents to Mexico: a description of the offense; a statement of facts; text of legal provisions describing essential elements of the offense; text of legal provisions describing the punishment for the offenses; time limitations on prosecution or execution of sentence; identification information; certified copies of arrest warrants; and evidence justifying apprehension. 12. Mexico does not have a death penalty. 13. All three of the Petitioners were arrested pursuant to fugitive warrants issued by the U.S. District Court, Western District of Kentucky. While the order of the Kentucky court is not contained in the record, it is implicit that it did not find these facts to be sufficiently shocking so as to grant the appellant's writ of habeas corpus. Before trial in this case, appellant Quintero filed a Motion to Bar the State From Seeking the Death Penalty, alleging that his illegal seizure by government agents prevented the Mexican government from receiving assurances that he would not be subjected to the death penalty, and that kidnapping him from Mexico violated his state and federal constitutional rights, including those guaranteed by Article I, § 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. This motion was summarily denied by the trial court. In Sneed v. State , this Court stated: In our view, Swaw [v. State, 3 Tenn.Crim.App. 92, 457 S.W.2d 875 (1970)] stands for the proposition that after a fair trial and conviction, there is simply no remedy available irrespective of the nature of the governmental action bringing the defendant into this jurisdiction. The Ker-Frisbie doctrine would prevail. The failure to assert any due process violation before trial would serve as a waiver of personal jurisdiction. If, however, the procedure is challenged in advance of trial and an evidentiary hearing establishes that the conduct of governmental authorities, as opposed to that of any private individual, is so illegal and outrageous as to shock the conscience of the court, the law of the land clause provides a measure of relief. See Tenn. Const. art. I, § 8. The accused must be returned to the asylum state pending the initiation of the extradition procedure. 872 S.W.2d at 937. In the present case, the issue of whether appellant Quintero's extradition violated his due process rights has been reviewed by the courts in Texas and Kentucky. The courts have agreed that the actions of the F.B.I. were illegal, yet neither court found that such action shocked the conscience. Appellant Quintero argues that this Court should find that extradition to execute shocks the conscience. However, in this state, our Supreme Court has determined that the death penalty is not cruel and unusual punishment. See State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 179 (Tenn.1991). Thus, the fact that appellant Quintero received a death sentence does not suggest that the Texas and Kentucky courts incorrectly held that the illegal actions of the F.B.I. were not so outrageous as to demand relief.