Opinion ID: 1441429
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Definition of Terms

Text: The next allegation of penalty phase error concerns the fact that the trial court did not define the phrase grave risk of death. During the penalty phase, the Commonwealth argued that it established the aggravating circumstance contained in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(7), which provides that it shall be an aggravating circumstance if the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to a person other than the deceased. In Commonwealth v. Wharton, 530 Pa. 127, 607 A.2d 710 (1992), this Court held that juries can understand the meaning of grave risk and to apply their common sense and experience to the facts to determine whether a grave risk of death existed. The Commonwealth argued that the Appellant created a grave risk of death to Tia Seidle when he and Lee fired six shots at Stewart while he was driving and Tia Seidle was sitting next to him in the front seat of the car. The bullets shattered the windows of the car and Stewart lost control of the vehicle, which collided with another automobile. Based on these facts, there is no reason to conclude that the jury was unable to understand the meaning of grave risk or apply that term to the facts of this case and therefore no relief is due. In a similar claim, the Appellant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase because counsel did not request a definition of the term extreme duress. Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(5), it is considered to be a mitigating circumstance if the defendant committed the killing while acting under extreme duress. For the same reasons we expressed in Wharton, we believe that juries can understand the term extreme duress and that no additional instructions are necessary to define this term. The next allegation of error during the penalty phase is troubling because the attorney representing the Appellant in this appeal has misstated the record. The Appellant avers that the trial court erred because it did not adequately define the phrase preponderance of the evidence as it pertains to the burden of proof applicable to mitigating factors. The Appellant's brief to this Court states the following: The only mention by the [trial] court of the burden of proof applicable to the jury's consideration of mitigating circumstances appears in the following phrase: Aggravating circumstances must be proven by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania beyond a reasonable doubt while mitigating circumstances must be proven by the Defendant by a preponderance of the evidence; that is, by a greater weight of the evidence. Brief of Appellant, p. 57 (citation omitted). This is not true. The trial court later gave the jury the following instruction: Aggravating [circumstances] must be proven by the Commonwealth beyond a reasonable doubt. The mitigating only have to be proven by the Defense by a preponderance of the evidence; that is, more likely than not of the evidence. [sic] It's a different standard.    [E]ach of you is free to regard a particular mitigating circumstance as present despite what the other jurors may believe. This different treatment of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is one of the law's safeguards against unjust death sentences. It gives a defendant the full benefit of any mitigating circumstances. It's closely related to the burden of proof requirement. Remember, the Commonwealth must prove any aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt while the Defendant only has to prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. N.T. April 11, 1995, p. 47, 62 (emphasis added). This Court has expressly approved the use of the phrase more likely than not when defining the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof. Commonwealth v. Williams, 532 Pa. 265, 615 A.2d 716 (1992). Hence, the trial court did not err and trial counsel was not ineffective for not requesting further definition of this burden of proof.