Opinion ID: 2284287
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mother's conduct after the alleged abandonment period

Text: A parent's conduct after a petition is filed can be relevant to determining whether the parent intended to abandon a child. See In re Adoption of H.M.C., 11 S.W.3d 81, 87 (Mo.App.2000) (When determining whether abandonment has occurred, the parent's intent, an inferred fact, is determined by considering all the evidence of the parent's conduct, both before and after the statutory period). In this case, the mother's conduct after the petition was filed is also inconsistent with a finding of abandonment. To find abandonment, the parent must have the ability to communicate and visit the child but choose not to do so. § 211.447.2(2)(b), RSMo Supp.2009. Further, a finding of abandonment is incompatible with a situation where a child has been taken from a parent involuntarily. In re C.J.G., 75 S.W.3d 794, 801 (Mo.App. 2002). Specifically, the forced separation operates to create the very circumstances, i.e., lack of communication and visitation, complained of in the termination proceeding. Id. Here, the mother was separated involuntarily from her son when she was incarcerated. Additionally, the mother wanted to visit her son and contacted the adoptive parents' attorney regarding visitation. Because the mother was incarcerated, she had to rely on third parties to bring her child to the prison for visitation or to permit communicative access to him. Neither the adoptive parents nor their attorney attempted to find the mother in the federal system despite their knowledge that the mother was convicted of a federal crime and the name under which she was incarcerated. Neither Mr. Walter nor Ms. Davenport had any trouble locating the mother under that name. But none of the court notices were sent to that name, and none found the mother. The mother did the one thing she could do to communicate with her child. When Mr. Walter visited her in late October 2007, she sent a letter to the court, discussed above, telling the court she wanted to visit with her son while she was in prison. Though filed with the court, and addressed to it, this letter simply was ignored. This letter also is entirely consistent with the mother's September 9, 2007, statement to Ms. Davenport in which the mother rejected outright Ms. Davenport's suggestion that the child be placed for adoption. Additionally, in August 2008 and again in September 2008, the mother repeated her opposition to adoption. Therefore, both during and after the alleged but unproven 60-day abandonment period, the mother consistently maintained her conviction that she wanted to raise her son. Again, the principal opinion's choice not to consider these facts is inconsistent with this Court's duty in termination cases to examine the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law closely. K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 12. Finally, here, the Court is aware because of the showing made on appeal in support of the claim of ineffective assistance that there is specific documentary evidence showing that the evidence presented at the trial by Ms. Davenport, and which almost entirely forms the basis of the findings, simply is untrue. A transcript of her conversation with the mother shows that the mother did not show surprise at the fact that her son had moved from the brother's house to the sister's house, that in fact she spoke with her sister weekly and was making arrangements for her son to return to Guatemala before the adoption petition was filed, and that the telephone records from the jail confirm these calls. The facts repeated with such starkness by the principal opinion simply are not accurate. Shutting this Court's eyes to the contrary evidence when deciding whether the judgment results in a manifest injustice does not negate its existence. The circuit court's issuance of a judgment that contains so many factual misstatements is undoubtedly in large part due to its wholesale adoption of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared by counsel for the adoptive parents. It is not unusual for one party to present the court with proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and as `long as the court thoughtfully and carefully considers the parties' proposed findings and agrees with the content, there is no constitutional problem with the court adopting in whole or in part the findings of fact and conclusions of law drafted by one of the parties.' Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 192 (Mo. banc 2009), quoting State v. White, 873 S.W.2d 590, 600 (Mo. banc 1994). Here, however, it is evident that such thoughtful and careful consideration of the party's proposed findings did not occur, for the record in this case simply does not support the findings made concerning what reports were made, what process was provided and what the evidence showed. The record does not contain clear, cogent and convincing evidence supporting the circuit court's decision to terminate the mother's parental rights. For this reason alone, the judgment should be reversed.