Opinion ID: 1130099
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenge to First Confession.

Text: (1a) Defendant argues here, as below, that his statements to Leffel were inadmissible because they were obtained in violation of Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436. We disagree. Miranda assumed that incommunicado interrogation in a police dominated atmosphere is inherently coercive, and that any statement made under such circumstances is not the product of free choice unless certain procedural safeguards are followed. (2) Thus, to ensure protection of the United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, any person who is suspected or accused of a crime and who has been taken into custody or otherwise restrained may not be interrogated by the police unless he first knowingly and intelligently waives his right to silence, to the presence of an attorney, and to appointed counsel if indigent. Statements obtained in violation of Miranda are not admissible to prove the accused's guilt in a criminal prosecution. (384 U.S. at pp. 444-445, 458, 467, 476 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 706-707, 714, 719-720, 724-725].) For purposes of Miranda, custodial interrogation involves a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself. ( Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 300 [64 L.Ed.2d 297, 307 100 S.Ct. 1682].) In other words, Miranda safeguards are required only where the suspect is interrogated, that is, subjected to words or actions ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. (446 U.S. at p. 301 [64 L.Ed.2d at p. 308].) No interrogation occurs where the purpose behind Miranda is not implicated  preventing government officials from exploiting the coercive nature of confinement to extract confessions that would not [otherwise] be given. ( Arizona v. Mauro (1987) 481 U.S. 520, 530 [95 L.Ed.2d 458, 468, 107 S.Ct. 1931].) (3) It follows that not all statements obtained by the police from a suspect who is incarcerated or otherwise confined are the product of interrogation. Nothing in Miranda is intended to prevent, impede, or discourage a guilty person, even one already confined, from freely admitting his crimes, whether the confession relates to matters for which he is already in police custody or to some other offense. As Miranda itself recognized, [c]onfessions [are] a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment or subject to the prophylactic requirements of Miranda. ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 478 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 726], fn. omitted; accord, Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. 291, 299-300 [64 L.Ed.2d 297, 306-307].) (1b) Here, as in other cases, we conclude that defendant's incriminatory statements were not elicited as the result of interrogation. (E.g., People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 815-816 [1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436]; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 651 [286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84]; People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 274-275 [266 Cal. Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892]; People v. Siegenthaler (1972) 7 Cal.3d 465, 470 [103 Cal. Rptr. 243, 499 P.2d 499].) First, defendant initiated contact with prison officials in Michigan in order to discuss crimes that had occurred in Bakersfield and about which they were unaware. At the time of such contact, the crimes were two years old, and defendant was already imprisoned for life in an unrelated case. As defendant had correctly surmised before speaking with Leffel, he had never been identified as a suspect in the Bakersfield crimes, and the investigation had long since stalled. It is reasonable to infer that defendant might have escaped prosecution had he not come forward and admitted his guilt. Second, defendant volunteered this information for reasons that were entirely personal. Defendant, a twice convicted murderer, was familiar with the criminal justice system and undoubtedly knew that any incriminating statements he made would be forwarded by prison officials to the appropriate law enforcement agency. Indeed, Leffel warned defendant of this possibility. Defendant nonetheless chose to confess as the result of an apparent religious conversion in prison and the need to clear his conscience. Thus, prison officials exerted no influence on him to discuss or admit the crimes charged in this case. Defendant suggests that even though he voluntarily initiated contact with prison officials, the encounter with Leffel became coercive at some unspecified point because Leffel asked questions. Defendant contends that statements made by a person in custody are not volunteered and exempt from Miranda unless the police remain completely silent and merely listen. Defendant is mistaken. Just as custodial interrogation can occur in the absence of express questioning ( Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301 [64 L.Ed.2d 297, 307-308]), not all questioning of a person in custody constitutes interrogation under Miranda. ( People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 637 [20 Cal. Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80]; e.g., People v. Lewis, supra, 50 Cal.3d 262, 274-275; People v. Claxton (1982) 129 Cal. App.3d 638, 647, 653-655 [181 Cal. Rptr. 281].) Here, Leffel did not influence the manner in which defendant reported the crimes. The entire confession was given in narrative, almost rambling form. To the extent Leffel interrupted and asked questions, they were merely neutral inquir[ies] made for the purpose of clarifying [statements] or points that [he] did not understand. ( People v. Claxton, supra, 129 Cal. App.3d 638, 647, 653.) Nothing in the substance or tone of such inquiries was reasonably likely to elicit information that defendant did not otherwise intend to freely provide. Thus, the trial court properly found that defendant's first confession in Marquette was not obtained in violation of Miranda and that such evidence could be admitted at trial. [11]