Opinion ID: 4533836
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Picket Lines Clause

Text: “Federal substantive law applies in suits under § 301, but we may look to consistent common law rules of contractual interpretation for guidance as long as their application is consistent with federal labor policies.” Allied Sales Drivers, Local No. 289 v. Sara Lee Bakery Grp., 746 F.3d 342, 346 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 571 v. Hawkins Constr. Co., 929 F.2d 1346, 1349 (8th Cir. 1991)). When interpreting a collective bargaining agreement, “we begin by examining the language of the documents which form the basis of the agreement.” -7- Hawkins, 929 F.2d at 1349. We construe the agreement as a whole giving meaning to all its terms and reading them in context. Sara Lee, 746 F.3d at 346. “When the intent of the parties is unambiguously expressed in a [collective bargaining agreement], that expression controls, and the court’s inquiry should proceed no further.” CNH Indus. N.V. v. Reese, 138 S. Ct. 761, 766 (2018) (quoting M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 574 U.S. 427, 443 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)). Article 24’s Picket Lines clause states “no employee shall be requested or instructed to go through a primary picket line where a union is on primary strike,” and Local 120 maintains this clause allowed its members to refuse to cross Local 41’s picket line. The district court rejected Local 120’s position, concluding Local 41’s picket line was not a primary picket line where a union was on primary strike. On appeal, Local 120 argues the district court misinterpreted the term “primary.” Sysco Minnesota and Sysco KC are distinct entities that separately bargain with Local 120 and Local 41 respectively. Local 41 struck Sysco KC and had no dispute with Sysco Minnesota; it only picketed Sysco Minnesota to gain leverage in bargaining with Sysco KC. Local 120 contends Local 41’s picket line outside Sysco Minnesota’s facility was nevertheless “a primary picket line where [it] [was] on primary strike” because Sysco Minnesota and Sysco KC are both wholly-owned subsidiaries of Sysco, Inc. In other words, Sysco Minnesota and Sysco KC are effectively the same employer due to their common-ownership, making Local 41’s labor actions against Sysco Minnesota primary. We disagree. The terms “primary picketing” and “primary strike” come from section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(B), which legalizes primary strikes and primary picketing by labor unions2 but prohibits secondary activity intended “to 2 A primary strike is “directed against the employer with whom the union has the dispute concerning terms of employment,” and primary picketing involves -8- enmesh neutral secondary employers in primary labor disputes between the union and another employer.” Ruzicka Elec. & Sons, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1, 427 F.3d 511, 519 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting NLRB v. Constr. & Gen. Laborer’s Union Local 1140, 577 F.2d 16, 18 (8th Cir. 1978)). Distinguishing between lawful primary activity and unlawful secondary activity can be difficult, see id. at 519–20, but federal courts have long rejected Local 120’s argument that picketing an otherwise neutral employer is primary activity simply because the neutral employer and the primary employer with whom the union has a labor dispute are commonly owned. See, e.g., Bachman Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 266 F.2d 599, 605 (8th Cir. 1959); see also Am. Fed’n of Television & Radio Artists, Washington-Baltimore Local v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 887, 888, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The inquiry is more fact intensive than that. See Bachman Mach. Co., 266 F.2d at 605; see also Am. Fed’n of Television & Radio Artists, 462 F.2d at 892. Here, the only fact Local 120 relies on to establish that Local 41’s picket line outside Sysco Minnesota was a primary picket line where it was on primary strike is that Sysco Minnesota and Sysco KC are commonly owned. But because common ownership alone is insufficient to establish Local 41’s picket line was a primary picket line where it was on primary strike, Local 120 has failed to demonstrate that Article 24’s Picket Lines clause allowed its members to refuse to cross Local 41’s picket line. “picketing, generally at the situs of the primary employer, that attempts or is intended to increase the direct economic pressure on the primary employer by inducing others to honor the strike.” Landgrebe Motor Transp., Inc. v. Dist. 72, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 763 F.2d 241, 245 (7th Cir. 1985); see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492, 499 (1964). -9-