Opinion ID: 1858246
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Was Alleged Change in Circumstances Within Contemplation of Parties at Time of Dissolution?

Text: [4] Changes in circumstances which were within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the decree, or that were accomplished by the mere passage of time, do not justify a change or modification of an alimony award. Pope v. Pope, supra ; Desjardins v. Desjardins, 239 Neb. 878, 479 N.W.2d 451 (1992). Shan characterizes the change in circumstances upon which the modification order was based as the bankruptcy discharge of the First National Bank debt and the impact of that discharge on Kimberly. Brief for appellant at 12. Shan argues that these circumstances were within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the dissolution proceeding and thus cannot be considered a material change in circumstances justifying a modification of alimony. Shan's argument is based in part on the language of the decree which the district court subsequently declared was conditional and therefore void. Having successfully advanced the argument that these provisions were void, Shan cannot now claim that they lend substantive support to his position regarding the contemplation of the parties in this appeal. At Shan's request, the district court struck language from the decree which could be viewed as prejudging the issue of whether there was a change in circumstances sufficient for purposes of future modification of the alimony award. Striking the language did not preclude the court from subsequently considering a request for modification based upon events which transpired subsequently to the decree. See In re Marriage of Geil, 509 N.W.2d 738 (Iowa 1993). As the moving party, Kimberly bore the burden of proving a material and substantial change in circumstances which would justify modification of the alimony award. See Pope v. Pope, 251 Neb. 773, 559 N.W.2d 192 (1992). The record clearly establishes that Kimberly had notice of the bankruptcy filing which occurred in November 2001, and the district court specifically referred to the filing and the discharge of Shan's debts in the decree. However, the material change in circumstances upon which the district court modified the alimony award was neither the filing of the bankruptcy nor the resulting discharge of Shan's indebtedness to the bank; rather, the material change was Kimberly's subsequent liability to the bank for the deficiency judgment. The record in this case does not include evidence received at the trial of the dissolution proceeding. However, at the modification hearing, Shan testified that at the time of his bankruptcy filing, he assumed that the property which secured the bank loan was worth about what I owed on it. He acknowledged that this was also his testimony at the dissolution proceeding a few weeks after his filing. There is no indication that Kimberly had any different expectation. Although it is clear that the parties contemplated Shan's bankruptcy and the discharge of his personal indebtedness to the bank, it is likewise apparent that the parties expected that the unpaid balance of the loan would be satisfied by the bank's foreclosure and sale of the collateral. Thus, the record supports the district court's finding that the 2003 deficiency judgment against Kimberly was not within the contemplation of the parties at the time of trial in 2001.