Opinion ID: 561283
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutor's Improper Comments

Text: 24 Wicker claims four groups of comments by the prosecution, separately or cumulatively, constitute reversible error. Comments Regarding Other Loan Transactions 25 Wicker objects to references in the prosecutor's opening statement and closing argument concerning other loans First Financial made to Wicker which ultimately went bad. The prosecutor stated that Wicker had obtained literally millions of dollars from Crow, or through Crow as his loan officer and that [j]ust about all of the loans that Mr. Wicker made or was involved in at First Financial went broke.... The record indicates that the prosecutor made references throughout both the opening and closing statement to defaulted loans, the fact that First Financial failed, and that taxpayers were footing the bill for First Financial's bailout. The prosecution also put on testimony about the defaulted loans. Wicker's counsel objected on two occasions to these comments pointing out that such information was irrelevant to crimes charged and highly prejudicial. The district court interrupted both the prosecutor's opening statement and closing argument to admonish her for these comments. In a further effort to correct any misperception by the jury the district court instructed the jury as follows: 26 Also, while you have heard testimony concerning whether certain financial institutions benefited, or suffered losses, monetary, or otherwise as a result of transactions involving the defendant and others, this fact alone is not determinative of the defendant's guilt or innocence in this case. In other words, you may find the defendant not guilty, even if you find that a financial institution suffered a loss as a result of one or more of these transactions. Such is not evidence of a crime. 27 On the other hand, you may find the defendant guilty even if you find that a financial institution benefited from one or more of the transactions, so long as you find that the government has proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 28 So, whether the financial institution lost money, or gained money isn't the issue in this case. The issue in the case, in a conspiracy charge is whether the two people got together to violate the law. That's what we are here about. 29 Wicker argues that the prosecutor's comments are reversible error because they effectively put him on trial for the default of these loans and, in the current savings and loan crisis, could only have inflamed the jury and allowed the jury to convict Wicker for actions which were not criminal and for which he was not criminally accountable. While we agree that the comments were improper they do not amount to reversible error in this case. 30 A prosecutor's comments to the jury constitute reversible error only when they are both 'inappropriate and harmful.'  United States v. Lowenberg, 853 F.2d 295, 301 (5th Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Chase, 838 F.2d 743, 749 (5th Cir.) cert. denied sub nom. Mesa v. United States, 486 U.S. 1035, 108 S.Ct. 2022, 100 L.Ed.2d 609 (1988)). Wicker must also show that the prosecutor's remarks affected his substantial rights. Lowenberg, 853 F.2d at 302. To determine whether the prosecutors comments affected Wicker's substantial rights we consider: (1) the magnitude of the prejudicial effect of the statements; (2) the efficacy of any cautionary instruction; and (3) the strength of the evidence of the defendants guilt. Id. 31 The government argues that the prosecutor's comments about the defaulted loans and about First Financial's failure were responses to Wicker's assertion that his loans were beneficial to First Financial and that he only made gifts to Crow for legitimate non-First Financial work. The government also argues that the testimony about the defaulted loans was necessary to prove Wicker's intent to defraud. Despite the admissibility of the testimony about the defaulted loans, the prosecutor's comments in opening and closing might have misled the jury into thinking that Wicker was on trial for defaulting on his loans or for causing First Financial's ultimate failure. However, the court's curative instruction and the weight of the evidence against Wicker more than compensate any prejudicial effect that these comments might have had. 32 The court's instruction was effective and thorough. Its clarity effectively minimized any harmful inferences which might have flowed from the prosecutor's comments. Contrary to Wicker's assertion, the documentary evidence and direct testimony introduced at trial was strong and persuasive. We cannot say that any of Wicker's substantial rights were affected by these comments. Comment on Wicker's Laughter During Trial 33 During her closing argument, the prosecutor made the following statement: 34 And, you know, if you notice Mr. Wicker sat here yesterday and laughed during some of the testimony. I don't know if any of you all noticed that. He found something about this funny. While the evidence shows that he contributed to the downfall of this institution, he laughs. We are not laughing, ladies and gentlemen, because we know who's had to foot Mr. Wicker's bill. You might laugh, too, though, if you walked away with $199,000 .... 35 Wicker's counsel did not object to these comments. At this point, the district judge interrupted the prosecutor, called a bench conference, and admonished the prosecutor for making an improper argument about the taxpayers footing the bill. The district judge asked the defense counsel if he had an objection to which the counsel replied that he thought the prosecutor's comment about taxpayers footing the bill was improper. At the conclusion of the bench conference, the district judge noted that he was going to give a precautionary instruction to the jury and that he would deny any motion for mistrial, even though Wicker's counsel had made no such motion. The court instructed the jury that consideration of who ultimately picks up the loss when a savings and loan institution insured by the federal government becomes insolvent was not a proper consideration in their decision as to whether Wicker was or was not guilty. The district court did not instruct the jury as to how to treat the prosecutor's comments on Wicker's laughter. 36 Wicker relies primarily on United States v. Schuler, 813 F.2d 978 (9th Cir.1987) in arguing that the prosecutor's remarks about his laughter at trial constitute misconduct in that they (1) introduce character evidence solely to prove guilt in violation of FED.R.EVID. 404(a), (2) violate Wicker's Fifth Amendment right not to be convicted except on the basis of evidence adduced at trial, and (3) violate Wicker's Fifth Amendment rights by indirectly commenting on his failure to testify at trial. Schuler is distinguishable and we conclude prosecutor's comments are not plain error. 37 Wicker's trial counsel did not object to the comments about Wicker's laughter. Nor did counsel request a curative instruction or in any way apprise the district court that he felt the prosecutor's comments were improper. Thus, our review is under the plain error standard. FED.R.CRIM.P. 52(b). Plain error may be recognized 'only if the error is so obvious that our failure to notice it would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings and result in a miscarriage of justice.'  United States v. Montemayor, 684 F.2d 1118, 1124 (5th Cir.1982) (quoting United States v. Graves, 669 F.2d 964, 971 (5th Cir.1982)). The burden of showing plain error is a heavy one, United States v. Pool, 660 F.2d 547, 559 (5th Cir.1981), and this court will notice plain error only in exceptional circumstances. United States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830, 836 (5th Cir.1981). There is no miscarriage of justice when proof of the defendant's guilt unaffected by the prosecutor's misconduct is so strong and convincing that the verdict would be unchanged. See United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979, 100 S.Ct. 480, 62 L.Ed.2d 405 (1979). 38 Wicker's reliance on Schuler is misplaced. In Schuler, the Ninth Circuit held that the prosecutor's comments in closing argument about Schuler's laughter during testimony about threats Schuler made against the President, violated FED.R.EVID. 404(a). The Ninth Circuit found that the prosecutor's remarks suggested to the jury that Schuler's laughter was relevant to show that he was of bad character because he considered charges of threatening the life of the President to be a joke. The Ninth Circuit further found that Schuler's behavior off the witness stand was legally irrelevant to the question of his guilt of the crime charged and amounted to a comment on his failure to testify in violation of the fifth amendment. Schuler, 813 F.2d at 982. 39 The defendant in Schuler, however, made a clear objection to the prosecutor's comment which was overruled by the district court. By overruling the objection, the district court reinforced the jury's impression that the defendant's behavior off the witness stand was appropriate evidence of guilt. Schuler, 813 F.2d at 981. In today's case not only was there no objection, but also the district court interrupted the prosecutor sua-sponte immediately after these comments were made to remind her that she was making an improper argument about taxpayers bailing out failed savings and loans. While the district court did not call the prosecutor to task for commenting on Wicker's laughter, the cautionary comments that followed mitigated the impact of her remarks. The case against Schuler was not as strong as the case against Wicker. The prosecutor's improper comments do not rise to level of plain error. 40 The Prosecutor's Personalizations did not Constitute Plain Error 41 Wicker claims that the prosecutor made improper personalizations in argument to the jury. Wicker cites, for example, the prosecutor's statement to the jury: 42 What real estate broker have you ever heard of that pays $25,905 for his clients in a real estate transaction? I don't know of anybody that would do that.... She also said: 43 the reason he writes checks and a 1099 is not because it is, in fact, a legitimate payment, because we wouldn't be here....; Could you and I do that?; We are not laughing, ladies and gentlemen, because we know who'd had to foot the bill. 44 Since Wicker's attorney did not object to any of these statements at trial, our review is, again, for plain error. We find these comments, although improper, not so egregious as to rise to the level of plain error. The comments were primarily rhetorical. None could fairly be understood to express a personal belief by the prosecutor in Wicker's guilt. In addition, the district judge gave a cautionary instruction negating the prosecutor's inference that the jury could consider the possibility that they, as taxpayers, would foot the bill for the failure of the savings and loan in determining Wicker's guilt. Comments on Crow's Guilty Plea 45 Wicker claims that the prosecutor made an improper comment about Crow's guilty plea. In closing argument, the prosecutor said: 46 If it was a legitimate fee for brokering that Malcolm Crow did, why did Malcolm Crow plead guilty to two felony counts if he had gotten this $25,905.00 when he did some real work for Mr. Wicker. 47 At this point the Court interrupted and told the jury: 48 Now, counsel, that's an improper argument, the fact that Malcolm Crow has pled guilty has nothing to do with whether or not this man is guilty. The prosecutor's next remark was: 49 Did Agent Herndon appear to you when he testified to be the type of person that threatened Mr. Crow into confessing? 50 The court again instructed the jury that Crow's plea was not evidence of Wicker's guilt. 51 The government argues that these comments were intended to rebut the defense's claim that Crow had been coerced into his testimony against Wicker by threats of prosecution. In opening argument, the defense counsel stated: 52 It wasn't until the Federal Bureau of Investigation showed up and threatened him, after he had been in the grand jury for an hour or two that he decided maybe he did something wrong. 53 The government argues that they were entitled to a fair response to defense counsel's assertion. See United States v. Binker, 795 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir.1986). They also argue that since defense counsel did not object to these comments we should review only for plain error. We find without elaboration that the district court's immediate and clear curative comments eliminated any effect these comments might have had on Wicker's substantial rights. Cumulative Error 54 Wicker claims alternatively that, if no individual instance of prosecutorial misconduct reaches the level of reversible error, taken together they cumulate to require reversal. We do not agree. 55 There may be instances where improper statements, which are not individually prejudicial enough to require reversal, could cumulate to affect the defendant's substantial rights. United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659 (5th Cir.1979). However, such instances are rare in this circuit. United States v. Iredia, 866 F.2d 114 (5th Cir.1989). Wicker's case is not one of those instances. 56 Most of the comments complained of went without objection. Others received curative instructions. The remainder were noted by the court sua sponte and corrected immediately. Taken with the clear proof of guilt, the record shows none of Wicker's substantial rights were affected.