Opinion ID: 2392151
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hit and Run

Text: Two subtitles of the newly renumbered Article 66 1/2 come into play in attempting to define hit and run. It should be immediately noted that in neither subtitle 7 (Financial Responsibility and Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund) nor subtitle 10 (Accidents and Accident Report) does the term hit and run appear as official statutory language. In the controlling statute in this case, § 7-620, the critical term only appears in quotation marks in the section heading, a practice which is consistently followed in the two other hit and run provisions of subtitle 7, §§ 7-622 and -623. The term does not appear at all in §§ 10-102 through -105, and -109, the sections which attempt to define the criminal aspects of what is commonly described as a hit and run. Section 7-620 seeks to isolate the one factor which differentiates a hit and run from other accidents. The words the legislature has chosen to do this make it clear that their concern, at least in terms of compensating innocent victims, is not with flight per se but with the determination that the identity of the motor vehicle and of the operator and owner thereof cannot be ascertained. It would indeed be a rare exercise of statutory construction to allow a quoted term from a section title to override the clear and precise definitional terminology appearing in the body of the statute. This identical issue, dealing with a comparable statute, has been before every level of the New York court system and decided adversely to the appellee's suggested interpretation of the law. [1] Riemenschneider v. Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 47 Misc.2d 549, 262 N.Y.S.2d 950 (1965), aff'd, 26 A.D.2d 309, 274 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1966) (App. Div. divided 3-2), aff'd, 20 N.Y.2d 547, 285 N.Y.S.2d 593, 232 N.E.2d 630 (1967) (Ct. of App. divided 4-3). In that case the claimant was a passenger in a car struck from the rear at a highway toll booth. Riemenschneider's driver immediately got out of his car, inspected both vehicles, found no damages and asked if the passengers were all right. Upon receiving an affirmative answer to this inquiry he saw no reason to jot down any vehicle information. By the time the claimant arrived at home lower back injury symptoms appeared. The New York uninsured motor vehicle statute in that case used the phrases whose identity is unascertainable and cannot be ascertained to define accidents where the identity of the offending driver and vehicle remains unknown. The majority opinion in the New York Court of Appeals viewed this language as much more inclusive than the colloquialism hit and run, noting that the precise terminology in the statute: encompasses situations where the operator is unidentified and has left the scene of the accident because there was then no reason to identify him, as well as an operator who actually prevents identification by leaving the scene. 285 N.Y.S.2d at 595. While recognizing the strong reluctance expressed in the minority appellate opinions in Riemenschneider to apply a general concept of hit and run to a situation where there has not been immediate flight from the scene of the accident, we think the reasoning of the majority is much more sound in not placing restrictive definitional burdens on victims of motor vehicle accidents who are unable to identify the offender, whether it be the case of a colloquially technical hit and run or a dishonest Good Samaritan who renders aid but does not identify himself as required by law. Art. 66 1/2, § 10-104; Luke 10: 30-37. The claim made under the general provisions of § 7-620 by the injured party that the identity of the motor vehicle and the operator and owner thereof cannot be ascertained is basically a statement of fact, not a categorical imperative. It only calls, at the initial stage of the proceedings, for a preliminary determination that the claimant has been injured by an anonymous car. Whether he has made all reasonable efforts to discover the identity of the offending driver, both at the time of the accident and afterwards, is a question to be asked under subsection (5) of § 7-620. In this regard, counsel for the Fund has urged that what Jones has done was neither reasonable nor enough.