Opinion ID: 169583
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Liberty Interest: Name-Clearing Hearing

Text: Darr arguably has a liberty interest in his good name and reputation as it related to his employment with Telluride. See Melton v. City of Okla. City, 928 F.2d 920, 927 (10th Cir.1991) (stating that a public employee has a claim for relief [w]hen a public employer takes action to terminate an employee based upon a public statement of unfounded charges of dishonesty or immorality that might seriously damage the employee's standing or associations in the community and foreclose the employee's freedom to take advantage of future employment opportunities . . . ). But to state a claim for relief, Darr must show how the government infringed upon his alleged liberty interest. We have established a four-prong test for resolving this question: first, the statements must impugn the employee's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity; second, the statements must be false; third, the statements must occur in the course of terminating the employee or must foreclose other employment opportunities; and fourth, the statements must be published. Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475, 481 (10th Cir.1994). But see Renaud v. Wyoming Dept. of Family Services, 203 F.3d 723, 728 n. 1 (10th Cir.2000) (suggesting that Workman's third element should have been phrased conjunctively: the statement must occur in the course of terminating the employee and must foreclose other employment opportunities, contrary to Workman's disjunctive phrasing). [4] Darr does not assert, nor could he plausibly, that the chief marshal or any other Town representative (with the possible exception of the CAB members) made stigmatizing statements about him. The chief marshal's only comment to the public about Darr was that he was no longer a Telluride employee, Appx., vol. I, at 112-113, a comment which is not sufficient to support Darr's claim because, for one thing, it is not a false statement. Thus, the threshold question is whether CAB's statements constituted state action redressable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as opposed to private conduct by private citizens. Unless Telluride can be held liable for CAB's conduct, we need not address whether Darr has satisfied the four Workman factors or whether Darr requested a name-clearing hearing. To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Darr must show that CAB acted under color of state lawa test identical to the Fourteenth Amendment's state-action requirement. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 929, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) (stating that it is clear that in a § 1983 action brought against a state official, the statutory requirement of action `under color of state law' and the `state action' requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment are identical); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966) (stating that [i]n cases under § 1983, `under color' of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the `state action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment). We have applied this state-action requirement in suits against local governments ever since the Supreme Court plucked these municipalities' shields against § 1983 liability. The reason for doing so stems from § 1983's purpose: to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992). Thus, private conduct, no matter how atrocious, cannot ground § 1983 liability against a state entity. The parties stake out opposite positions on whether Telluride may be liable for CAB's conduct. Telluride outlines several facts tending to show that CAB's conduct may not be attributed to Telluride. In response, Darr identifies evidence allegedly demonstrating that although CAB did not have authority over Telluride, Telluride had authority over CABsuggesting that CAB's conduct may be attributed to the Town. But putting aside the merits of these positions, we need not decide whether CAB acted under color of law because even if Telluride could be held responsible for CAB's conduct, Darr's legal theory does not support his claim for relief. Specifically, Darr asserts that [u]nder § 1983, the Town is responsible for actions of its representatives that result in the violation of an individual's constitutional rights when the Town has negligently failed to take steps to prevent or correct the constitutional violation. Aplt. Reply Br. at 25 (citing Rogers v. Board of Trustees, 859 P.2d 284, 287-88 (Colo.App.1993)). Yet Rogers explicitly rejected this theory: The Supreme Court has . . . ruled . . . that negligence cannot form the basis of a money damages liability claim under § 1983. Rogers, 859 P.2d at 287 (citation omitted). We too have stated this rule and rejected Darr's position. In Jojola v. Chavez, we stated that [l]iability under § 1983 must be predicated upon a ` deliberate ' deprivation of constitutional rights by the defendant, and not on negligence. 55 F.3d 488, 490 (10th Cir.1995) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court has described the correct standard for subjecting a municipality to liability under § 1983: [A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead it is when execution of a government's policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). A plaintiff may prove the existence of an official policy or custom in at least five ways: (1) the municipality may be liable for a decision by its properly constituted legislative body; (2) an official policy exists when the municipal board or agency exercises authority delegated to it by a municipal legislative body; (3) actions by those with final decision-making authority for the municipality constitute official policy; (4) the municipality may be liable for a constitutional violation resulting from inadequate training when its failure to train the lawless employee reflects a deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutionally-protected rights; or (5) the municipality's custom caused the constitutional violation. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (inadequate training); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 481-82, 481 n. 10, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (municipal legislative action, individual with final decision-making authority, and custom); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (agency exercising delegated authority). Darr has not identified evidence demonstrating that CAB or its chairman's conduct reflects Telluride's official policy or custom. CAB is not a legislative body. Telluride never imbued CAB with authority to speak on its behalf or to discuss personnel issues. CAB did not have any input into Telluride's personnel decisions, and so CAB was not the final decision-making authority for the Town. And there is no evidence that Telluride was deliberately indifferent to Darr's constitutional rights or that Telluride created a custom that caused the alleged constitutional violation. Instead, Darr asserts that his claim rests upon a negligence theory. Aplt. Reply Br. at 25. For example, Darr states that Telluride's liability is predicated on its negligent supervision of CAB, which is evidenced by its failure to draft a mission statement or charter governing CAB. Aplt. Reply Br. at 26. In sum, Darr argues, [a]s a result of the Town's negligent oversight of its own agency, Darr's liberty interest was violated when he was defamed by the Board at public meetings. Id. We disagree with Darr's misstatement of the law and with the erroneous conclusion he reaches by applying it. Negligence is not a basis for liability under § 1983, so Darr's arguments must fail. Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's decision to dismiss Darr's liberty-interest claim, but we affirm on the alternative ground that Darr's arguments to us were limited to proving the Town's negligencean insufficient basis for liability under § 1983.