Opinion ID: 1496299
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: finding of an aggravator

Text: There was no error, as appellant states, when the crime of attempted rape was used as an aggravator for the imposition of the death penalty. KRS 532.025(2) provides: In all cases of offenses for which the death penalty may be authorized, the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the following statutory aggravating or mitigating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence. KRS 532.025(3) provides: The jury, if its verdict be a recommendation of death, . . . shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman of the jury, the aggravating circumstances or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 599 S.W.2d 900 (1980), provides that the trial court is not limited by the statutory definition of mitigating circumstances, but all evidence that would tend to excuse or alleviate appellant's responsibility is competent. The purpose of the section aforesaid is to allow evidence of all relevant and pertinent information so that the jury can make an informed decision concerning the appropriate sentence in a particular case. Templeman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 785 S.W.2d 259 (1990). The Court in Stanford v. Commonwealth, supra , held that KRS 532.025 says that the judge or jury shall consider any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the eight statutory circumstances of mitigation. KRS 532.025 is more expansive in that it spells out eight circumstances of mitigation that are relevant, and it contains a catchall provision, any mitigating circumstances otherwise authorized by law. This provision would permit the trial court to submit redeeming evidence to the jury. However, we believe the evidence must contain facts or a qualified opinion bearing on the defendant's character, prior record or circumstances of the offense, or relative to one of the specified statutory mitigating circumstances. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), sets the constitutional parameters for dealing with the reception into evidence before a trier of fact of mitigating circumstances. Lockett, supra , requires that the sentencing body consider any relevant evidence offered by the defense in mitigation of capital punishment. In Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 793 S.W.2d 802 (1990), the question was whether appellant's aggravated sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years for kidnapping was error in that the jury did not find one of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in KRS 532.025(2). The court there held that the record showed that the aggravating circumstance which the jury found beyond reasonable doubt and designated in writing was that in the course of the commission of the kidnapping, Harris murdered the victim. Further, the court found that although such aggravator is not among the seven listed in KRS 532.025(2), the introductory language of that very subsection, which expressly authorizes the judge and jury to consider any aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law is provided by the penalty section of the kidnapping statute, KRS 509.040(2), which makes kidnapping a capital offense when the victim is not released alive. KRS 532.025(3) states that: In all cases unless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection 2 of the section is so found, the death penalty or the sentence to imprisonment for life without benefit of probation or parole until the defendant has served a minimum of 25 years of his sentence, shall not be imposed. We hold such subsection to be inartfully drafted. The literal language of the last sentence in subsection 3 is in apparent conflict with the statute's general purpose, as gathered from all parts of the statute. The literal language must surrender. Harris, supra . Therefore, the jury's consideration of aggravating circumstances was not limited to one exactingly and specifically enumerated in this statute. Notice of the aggravating circumstances was not in issue. The fact that the Commonwealth does not prosecute a murder offense by alleging or offering to prove any of the aggravating circumstances that would authorize imposition of aggravated punishment does not transform the offense of capital murder into a Class A felony. Berry v. Commonwealth, Ky., 782 S.W.2d 625 (1990). Therein, the Court pointed out that murder is to be prosecuted as a capital offense pursuant to statute. KRS 532.010(1) provides that capital offenses are specific type felonies and have a specific sentencing statute, KRS 532.030(1). That statute provides that when a person is convicted of a capital offense, punishment may be fixed at death, imprisonment for life without the benefit of probation or parole for 25 years, life imprisonment or imprisonment for not less than 20 years. The jury's penalty verdict in this case states: We the jury as to the murder of Judy Ann Howard find the following aggravating circumstance listed in Instruction No. 3 to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: that at the time he killed Judy Ann Howard, the defendant, Clawvern Jacobs, was engaging in the commission of rape in the first degree. Therefore, the jury made the finding required by KRS 532.025(2)(a). Although the jury found appellant only guilty of attempted rape during the guilt phase, and first-degree rape as an aggravator in the penalty phase, this does not infer that the jury acquitted appellant of first-degree rape during the guilt phase, as the instructions did not require them to make such a determination at that time.