Opinion ID: 2144472
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Necessity of Prior Conviction

Text: Sec. 346.65(2) (a), Stats., provides civil penalties for the first offense only and criminal penalties for all subsequent violations of sec. 346.63(1), Stats. (OMVWI) within a given five-year period. [2] Both the trial court and the court of appeals interpreted this statute as being essentially a general repeater statute. Based upon this determination, they construed the penalty provisions of sec. 346.65(2) (a) in a manner consistent with other constructions of general repeater statutes made by this court. The courts recognized that this court's prior rulings have placed Wisconsin among the majority of jurisdictions which regard general repeater statutes as applicable only to offenses committed subsequent to a conviction for a prior offense. State v. Midell, 40 Wis. 2d 516, 527, 162 N.W.2d 54 (1968). Faull v. State, 178 Wis. 66, 189 N.W. 274 (1922). See also: Annot., 24 A.L.R.2d 1247. The trial and appellate courts' application of the construction this court has made of general repeater statutes to the provisions of sec. 346.65(2) (a), Stats., is inappropriate, however, because the language of sec. 346.65(2) (a), differs in nature from that of the general repeater statutes construed by this court. It is evident that the clear and unambiguous language of sec. 346.65 (2) (a) clearly manifests the legislature's specific intent that the sanctions of sec. 346.65(2) (a) be applied in a manner substantially different from repeater penalties in general. The fact that sec. 346.65(2) (a), Stats., differs considerably from general repeater statutes can best be demonstrated when comparing its provisions to the definition of a repeater as found in the criminal statute (sec. 939.62) entitled Increased penalty for habitual criminality. Sec. 346.65(2) (a)2, uses the following language in describing when criminal penalties should be imposed upon a person violating sec. 346.63(1): . . . 2. Shall be fined not less than $250 nor more than $1,000 and imprisoned not less than 5 days nor more than 6 months if the total of revocations under s. 343.305 and convictions for violation of s. 346.63(1) or local ordinances in conformity therewith equals 2 within a 5-year period, ... Whereas, sec. 939.62(2), Stats., sets out the following definition of a repeater subject to enhanced penalties: Increased penalty for habitual criminality. . . . (2) The actor is a repeater if he was convicted of a felony during the 5-year period immediately preceding the commission of the crime for which he presently is being sentenced, or if he was convicted of a misdemeanor on 3 separate occasions during that same period, which convictions remain of record and unreversed. It is immaterial that sentence was stayed, withheld or suspended, or that he was pardoned, unless such pardon was granted on the ground of innocence. In computing the preceding 5-year period, time which the actor spent in actual confinement serving a criminal sentence shall be excluded. (Emphasis supplied.) Sec. 939.62(2), Stats., is unambiguous, clear and restrictive and requires that an actor must have been convicted of any felony or any three misdemeanors prior to the commission of the crime for which he is being sentenced. The statute expressly requires an earlier conviction within a like five-year period for any type of crime prior to the commission of the crime for which the enhanced penalties are to be imposed and this court has consistently construed this statute in that manner. State v. Midell, supra at 527. Similar language mandating or requiring a prior conviction before the commission of the new crime does not appear in the provisions of sec. 346.65(2) (a)2, although the statute is more restrictive in another way in that it imposes criminal penalties only for additional drunken driving offenses. It is a well established rule of statutory construction that, where a legislative act has been construed by this court, the legislature is presumed to know that in the absence of a change in the law, the court's construction will remain unchanged. Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 471, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980): `. . . The legislature is presumed to know that in absence of its changing the law, the construction put upon it by the courts will remain unchanged; for the principle of the courts' decisions  legislative intent  is a historical fact and, hence, unchanging.' Id. citing Zimmerman v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 38 Wis. 2d 626, 634, 157 N.W.2d 648 (1968). Since we have construed sec. 939.65(2) (a), Stats., as a general repeater statute and the legislature did not adopt the language used in sec. 939.65(2) (a) in describing when a drunken driver is subject to criminal penalties under sec. 346.65(2) (a)2; it is clear that they intended that sec. 346.65(2) (a) be construed in a manner substantially different from the traditional general repeater-type statutes. (Sec. 939.65(2) (a).) [7] The provisions of the drunken driver penalty statute (sec. 346.65(2) (a)) do not express the requirement of a prior conviction found in sec. 939.62(2), Stats. Rather, they require criminal penalties based upon more than one drunken driving conviction or license revocation within a five-year period at the time of sentencing, regardless of the order in which the convictions were entered. The statutes construed by this court in State v. Midell, supra , and Faull v. State, supra , are also distinguishable from the provisions of sec. 346.65(2) (a) in that each requires a conviction between the commission of offenses. [3] The statutory provision discussed in Faull v. State, supra , provided an additional penalty for a second or any subsequent conviction and is an example of this requirement of a prior conviction before the commission of other offenses. Id. at 71. The absence of any language in sec. 346.65(2) (a) requiring a prior conviction before the commission of a second offense supports our conclusion that the criminal penalties of this statute apply where there have been two or more convictions for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated during a five-year period regardless of the order in which the offenses were committed and the convictions were entered. The appellate court recognized the difference in the language of sec. 346.65(2) (a), Stats., in its opinion, but determined that applying the criminal penalties of the statute in a manner distinct from general repeater statutes would raise administrative problems. There is force to the state's argument. The language of sec. 346.65(2) (a) (2), Stats., is distinctly different from the repeater statutes construed in Midell and Faull. The statute may reasonably be construed as the state contends it must be construed. The legislature has demonstrated an increasingly harsh attitude towards drunk drivers in recent years. . . . Ct. App. Slip Op. at 5. (May 29, 1981). We do not agree with the appellate court's reasoning that the administrative difficulties which may arise from the application of the criminal penalties of sec. 346.65 (2) (a), Stats., to a repeat offender regardless of the sequence of his violations are insurmountable. In any event, the potential difficulties referred to certainly do not and should not provide a justification for interpreting this statute in a manner other than that specifically intended by the legislature, especially where a construction of that nature only serves to defeat the very intent of the legislation. The conclusion that the legislature intended the criminal penalties of sec. 346.65(2) (a), Stats., to be applied to a driver who repeatedly violates sec. 346.63(1), regardless of the sequence of offenses is consistent with the recognized nationwide and state legislative objective of removing drunken drivers from the highways. In State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 289 N.W.2d 828 (1980), we recognized that removing drunken drivers from the highways was one of the objectives of the implied consent law (sec. 343.305): Because the clear policy of the statute is to facilitate the identification of drunken drivers and their removal from the highways, the statute must be construed to further the legislative purpose. . . . Id. at 193-94. The same objective of removing drunken drivers from the highways is the underlying premise of the criminal penalties of sec. 346.65(2) (a), Stats., and our construction of that statute supports that legislative purpose. Under the construction of the statute advocated by the defendant, it would serve the interests of habitual drunken drivers to delay the trial of an offense through the filing of timely substitution of judge motions, through controlled adjournments, etc. Such a result would clearly frustrate the obvious legislative intent. [4] This court has recognized that the purpose of general repeater statutes is to increase the punishment of persons who fail to learn to respect the law after suffering the initial penalties and embarrassment of conviction. While one might think that a two-year sentence is excessive punishment for a misdemeanor, it must be remembered the repeater statute was passed for the very purpose of increasing the punishment of those persons who do not learn their lesson or profit by the lesser punishment given for their prior violations of the criminal laws. . . . Block v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 205, 212-13, 163 N.W.2d 196 (1968). Our construction of sec. 346.65(2) (a), Stats., imposing criminal penalties on a repeat drunken driver regardless of whether he is convicted of a prior offense before committing subsequent offenses furthers this legislative policy, along with the underlying objective of removing the drunken driver from the highways. It is clear from the legislative history of sec. 346.65(2) (a) that the legislature is trying to confine those persons who have the dangerous propensity to drive while drunk and, thus, prevent them from endangering the lives of themselves and others. [8] Thus, we hold that the trial court and the court of appeals erred. We conclude that the criminal penalties of sec. 346.65(2) (a), Stats., are applicable to violations of sec. 346.63(1) (OMVWI) committed prior to conviction for a first offense within a five-year period. Because we do not agree with the holdings of the trial court and the court of appeals, we address the remaining issues raised by the defendant on this appeal. [9] The defendant contends that a construction of sec. 346.65(2) (a)2, Stats., as providing criminal penalties for any second drunken driving conviction within a five-year period, will violate the constitutional principles of due process. He argues that this construction renders the statute unconstitutionally vague in that it does not give the actor notice at the time he commits the offense whether or not his conduct is criminal or what the range of punishment his conduct will subject him to. The test of vagueness of a penal statute is whether it gives reasonable notice of the prohibited conduct to those who would avoid its penalties. State v. Driscoll, 53 Wis. 2d 699, 701, 193 N.W.2d 851 (1972), cited also in State v. Tronca, 84 Wis. 2d 68, 86, 267 N.W.2d 216 (1978). [10] The express language of sec. 346.65(2) (a), Stats., providing that any person violating sec. 346.63(1) (OMVWI) shall be fined or imprisoned if the total of license revocations and convictions for drunken driving equals 2 within a five-year period, gives ample notice to a driver who wishes to avoid criminal penalties that a second offense of driving under the influence of intoxicants subjects a driver to criminal penalties. Thus, applying the standard quoted above to sec. 346.65(2) (a), it is clear that the statute satisfies the due process requirements as it gives ample notice of the prohibited conduct and penalties. [11] Banks also contends that our construction of sec. 346.65(2) (a) is unconstitutional as it gives the statute an ex post facto effect. He argues that at the time of the commission of the second drunken driving offense he could not determine whether his conduct was criminal. We disagree with this argument for: An ex post facto law is one which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed or imposes an additional punishment to that then prescribed. Wisconsin Bingo Supply & Equipment Co. v. Bingo Control Bd., 88 Wis. 2d 293, 304, 276 N.W.2d 716 (1979). [12] The applicable criminal penalties of sec. 346.65(2) (a), Stats., became effective on July 1, 1978. Thus, they existed a year and one-half and, thus, some time prior to Banks' initial and subsequent arrests for drunken driving and at that time they clearly provided criminal punishment for a drunken driving violation which results in a second conviction during a five-year period. Therefore, we reject the defendant's contention that sec. 346.65(2) (a) has an ex post facto effect and hold it is without merit. By the Court.  The decisions of the court of appeals and the trial court are reversed and cause remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.