Opinion ID: 276959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Cross-Appeal of Mrs. Furumizo.

Text: 27 Her cross-appeal is limited to the claim that the damages awarded are inadequate. What we have said about Baker's attack upon the damages awarded is equally applicable here. 28 First, Mrs. Furumizo says that it was error for the court to decline to take into account a probable future decline in the value of the dollar, in line with what has happened to it in recent years. We think that the record does not support the contention. It is true that the court made no computation of probable decline. But in making its other computations, it gave Mrs. Furumizo the benefit of the doubt in computing probable income taxes, in assuming the continuance of the cost of living allowance for federal employees in Hawaii, in omitting computation of state income taxes, and in allocating to her a high portion of the award (paragraph 70, subparagraphs (d), (e), (i), (j)). Moreover, the period here in question is 34.6 years (paragraph 70(a)) and this court knows that less than that long ago there was a period of severe deflation. We agree with the court's finding 70(g). 29 Second, it is claimed that the court erred in not allowing prejudgment interest. But the court allowed this, in effect, by not discounting the award for the period from death to judgment. See Sisson v. Weathermon, 1961, 252 Iowa 786, 108 N.W.2d 585. Moreover, no Hawaii case has been cited that allows such interest. The Hawaii statute speaks only of interest on the judgment. R.L.H. 1955, § 191-2. In any event, the United States is not liable for such interest. 28 U.S.C. § 2674. 30 Third, it is argued that Mrs. Furumizo's loss should not be computed as a portion of after tax earnings. Reliance is upon Kawamoto v. Yasutake, 1966, 49 Haw. 42, 410 P.2d 976. But it is not in point. It dealt with an attempt to have a jury told, in fixing damages for personal injury, that the award is not taxable. Here, the question is, what support would have been available to Mrs. Furumizo from her husband's earnings, if he had lived. The old saw about the certainty of taxes is still good. It is reasonably certain that what would have been available would have been after-tax dollars, not pre-tax dollars. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Guthrie, 9 Cir., 1951, 186 F.2d 926. We think that, at the least, the court could take this fact into consideration, although it might not have erred if it had refused to do so. See United States v. Becker, 9 Cir., 1967, 378 F.2d 319, decided May 16, 1967, involving Arizona law. We come back to the basic proposition that the total award is but an estimate based on a series of predictions, and that the ultimate question as stated in the Hawaii statute, R.L.H.1955, § 246-2 is, what is fair and just compensation, with reference to the pecuniary injury   . 31 Fourth, it is said that the court should not have deducted, from the award to the decedent's estate, the $250 burial cost paid by the Veterans Administration (paragraph 71(a)). The short answer is that Mrs. Furumizo, in her capacity as administratrix, has not appealed. 32 Fifth, it is said that the judge, in awarding damages for loss of consortium, etc. (paragraph 71(d)), abdicated his function because he thought it proper to try to put himself in the place of average citizens and jurymen, and try to reach an amount that he has reason to believe would approximate what such a jury in his community, without undue emotional influence, would award as reasonable. The argument is without merit. We daresay that many a judge makes the same effort, the only difference here being that in this case the judge said so. The fact remains that the decision is that of the judge, and of no one else. We are not here to fly-speck his mental processes. 33 Finally, it is argued that the general damages are too low, because the judge took into account Mrs. Furumizo's health, attractiveness, youth, prospect of remarriage, and earning capacity (paragraph 71(d)). All of these, and many more, are things that either a judge or a jury might think about, and that the judge did think about, in awarding general damages for loss of love and affection, including (a) loss of society, companionship, comfort, consortium or protection, (b) loss of marital care, attention, advice or counsel (R.L.H.1955, § 246-2). What we have just said about the fifth contention is equally applicable here. 34 Affirmed.