Opinion ID: 2197540
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: habeas corpus and best-interests hearing

Text: It should be noted at the outset that throughout its opinion, the majority fails to discern the significant legal difference between the termination of parental rights in an adoption proceeding and the lesser interference with parental rights in a custody proceeding. Termination of parental rights in an adoption proceeding is regulated by the terms of our Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 1992)) and may occur either upon the voluntary consent of the biological parent (750 ILCS 50/8 (West 1992)) or involuntarily, upon a finding that the parent is unfit (750 ILCS 50/1, 8 (West 1992)). Adoption of the child by a third party signifies a total, complete and permanent severance of all parental rights, duties and interests that the biological parent has or may have with respect to the child. An award of custody and visitation, in contrast, derives from the Illinois Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/601 et seq. (West 1992)). Orders of child custody and visitation under the Marriage Act do not effect a permanent termination of parental rights. Instead, custody and visitation orders provide a lawful avenue for judicial supervision over the exercise of parental rights because of a judicial determination that such custodial arrangements will serve the best interests of the child. See 750 ILCS 5/601 through 610 (West 1992). The majority opinion begins its analysis of this case under the heading Jurisdiction to Entertain the Habeas Corpus Petition. The majority first considers Kirchner's standing to petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus over the objections of Richard's guardian ad litem. According to the majority, Kirchner has an exclusive right, presumably based on biological paternity, to act on behalf of Richard in pursuing the writ of habeas corpus to transfer custody without a best-interests hearing. The majority finds that because Kirchner's paternal rights were improperly terminated by the adoption, no one, not even Richard's guardian ad litem, stands in a better position than Otto to represent the interests of his son.    [Kirchner] has equal if not greater standing to assert what is in his son's best interests. To the extent that [Kirchner] disagrees with Richard's guardian ad litem, not to mention Richard's current custodians, Otto speaks for Richard and is entitled to file a writ of habeas corpus on Richard's behalf. 164 Ill.2d at 478-80, 208 Ill.Dec. at 273-74, 649 N.E.2d at 329-30. These quoted statements, and the analysis proceeding therefrom, contain several legal and logical errors. First, the statements reveal the majority's misconception of the role assigned by law to the child's court-appointed guardian ad litem. That role is to represent, in a court of law, no other person than Richard. Kirchner represents his own interests. The Does represent their own and Richard's interests, based on their family relationship. Second, the majority's presumption that Kirchner, as biological father, acts in Richard's best interests fails in the context of a custody battle. In child custody litigation a child of the parties    becomes a ward of the court [citation] and the court has the authority and the responsibility to act for the child's care, custody and support until it reaches majority. In discharging this responsibility the court's primary concern obviously is not the wishes of the parents but rather the best interests of the child. (Emphasis added.) ( Sommer v. Borovic (1977), 69 Ill.2d 220, 233, 13 Ill.Dec. 1, 370 N.E.2d 1028.) When Daniella terminated her parental rights four days after Richard's birth, she effectively placed Richard in the care of the State of Illinois. When this court vacated the adoption, the child became a ward in the court-ordered temporary custody of the Does. Third, the majority's statements reveal its fundamental misunderstanding of the historical role of habeas corpus in child custody matters, which was to furnish the procedure by which persons in Kirchner's position could invoke the jurisdiction of the circuit court and obtain a hearing on custody. Such hearing required the taking of evidence to determine what placement would be in accord with the child's best interests. Typically, a petition for habeas corpus was the procedural mechanism for deciding custody outside of divorce or adoption proceedings (see Giacopelli v. Florence Crittenton Home (1959), 16 Ill.2d 556, 158 N.E.2d 613 (dispute between natural father and adoptive parents); People ex rel. Elmore v. Elmore (1977), 46 Ill.App.3d 504, 5 Ill.Dec. 292, 361 N.E.2d 615 (dispute between unwed parents)). A natural parent who sought to obtain his or her child after the child had been living in the custody of others was required to file a habeas corpus action in the circuit court and participate in a best-interests hearing. (See, e.g., People ex rel. Strand v. Harnetiaux (1970), 46 Ill.2d 424, 263 N.E.2d 30 (dispute between natural mother and paternal grandparents); People ex rel. Edwards v. Livingston (1969), 42 Ill.2d 201, 247 N.E.2d 417 (dispute between natural father and his parents).) Although Kirchner styled his pleading to invoke this court's original jurisdiction as a complaint for writ of habeas corpus, his objective was not to obtain a hearing for Richard but to prevent one. In People ex rel. Bukovich v. Bukovich (1968), 39 Ill.2d 76, 233 N.E.2d 382, this court observed, While decisions of this court are infrequent in child custody matters, it is apparent from both our opinions and those of the appellate court that it is proper in this State for a court in a habeas corpus proceeding to look into the question of child's best interest before awarding custody. [Citations.] ( Bukovich, 39 Ill.2d at 79, 233 N.E.2d 382; see also Mahon v. People ex rel. Robertson (1905), 218 Ill. 171, 75 N.E. 768 (in habeas corpus proceedings for child custody, best interests of child must be considered).) I am aware of no Illinois precedent that supports the action of the majority in using its habeas powers to transfer custody of a child from an established home and family into a new, unfamiliar, and possibly even harmful environment, without any court investigation of facts or supervision of the transfer. Fourth, no person has challenged Kirchner's standing to participate in a custody hearing; but by framing the issue as whether Kirchner has superior standing to procure his son's custody by plenary writ, the majority seems to believe that Kirchner is entitled to an irrebuttable presumption, based solely on biology, that he, alone, represents Richard's best interests. Under this newly minted law, unsupported by cases, the majority grants Kirchner unfettered power to dictate the terms and conditions under which the child he has never seen shall be taken from his current home and family. The impropriety of such a novel holding is exposed by a long line of Illinois cases which emphasize that when custody of child is in issue, the guiding legal principle is not the so-called superior right of natural parents over third parties. Rather, such right only obtains when it is in accord with the best interest of the child. [Citations.] ( Giacopelli, 16 Ill.2d at 565, 158 N.E.2d 613; see also, e.g., Sullivan v. People ex rel. Heeney (1906), 224 Ill. 468, 477, 79 N.E. 695 (holding that vacation of an adoption for lack of notice to biological father did not require vesting of custody in father if contrary to child's best interests).) The Giacopelli court posed this key question, Giving full consideration to the primary and superior right of the natural parents to the custody of their child, what does the best interest of the child demand? Giacopelli, 16 Ill.2d at 566, 158 N.E.2d 613. Because Giacopelli obviously contradicts the majority's newly created law of biological determinism, the majority overrules Giacopelli. Not only is the holding of Giacopelli declared unconstitutional under Federal law but also wrongly decided. (164 Ill.2d at 482, 208 Ill.Dec. at 274-75, 649 N.E.2d at 330-31.) The majority cites Quilloin v. Walcott (1978), 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 555, 54 L.Ed.2d 511, 520, in support of its reasoning that Kirchner need not be subjected to a best-interests hearing without first being found unfit. As will be shown in a later portion of this dissent, United States Supreme Court cases do not support Kirchner's biologically based claim of immediate and exclusive entitlement to Richard without regard for the rights Illinois law grants to the Does and to Richard. The majority also misstates the holding of Giacopelli, by characterizing it as a case which allows the termination of parental rights in adoption proceedings without a finding of unfitness. (164 Ill.2d at 484, 208 Ill.Dec. at 276, 649 N.E.2d at 332.) Giacopelli was a custody hearing in which the mother who had voluntarily given up her child for adoption joined in her husband's attempt to reclaim the baby several months later. Evidence at a best-interests hearing to consider the father's claim for custody revealed that he had committed crimes and was of questionable character. Giacopelli upheld the trial court's custody decision, based on the evidence. Giacopelli did not hold that an adoption may proceed without the termination of a parent's rights. The majority manifests further confusion with its erroneous assertion that Giacopelli does not comport with In re Custody of Townsend (1981), 86 Ill.2d 502, 56 Ill.Dec. 685, 427 N.E.2d 1231. In Townsend, this court recognized that the superior right doctrine in custody cases was but one factor in the best-interests determination. Significantly, in Townsend, as in Giacopelli, and Sullivan, this court's review was from evidentiary hearings relating to the child's best interests. In such hearings, the circuit courts considered facts relating to the natural parent's fitness at the time of the hearing on custody. In the case at bar, this court has precluded the circuit court from examining any evidence about anything pertinent to custody, including Kirchner's fitness at the present time and the placement of Richard in a home with the mother who voluntarily gave him up for adoption while having her uncle tell Kirchner the child died. In People ex rel. Edwards v. Livingston (1969), 42 Ill.2d 201, 247 N.E.2d 417, this court reviewed the evidence adduced in a habeas corpus action brought by a natural father to remove his son from the care of the paternal grandfather. On behalf of a unanimous court, Justice Ward wrote: The best interest of the child is the standard and it is not necessary that the natural parent be found unfit or be found to have legally forfeited his rights to custody, if it is in the best interest of the child that he be placed in the custody of someone other than the natural parent. (Emphasis added.) ( Livingston, 42 Ill.2d at 209, 247 N.E.2d 417, citing Giacopelli, 16 Ill.2d 556, 158 N.E.2d 613.) In Livingston, the trial court heard evidence, which included the opinion of an expert that it would be emotionally and psychologically harmful to remove the boy from his grandfather's home, where he had lived virtually all of his life. Notwithstanding this evidence, the trial court ruled that it was in the boy's best interests to be given to the natural father. This court reversed, holding that the trial court's conclusion was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Noting that the boy and his father were strangers to each other and the child was happy and well-adjusted in his grandfather's home, this court held that the child should be returned to the paternal grandfather's custody, but that the father should be given liberal visitation rights with the view toward developing a relationship with his 12-year-old son. The majority purports to distinguish Livingston from the case at bar as being a probate case rather than an adoption case, and therefore subject to different statutory provisions. The majority's protestations ring hollow. As previously stated, the case at bar is no longer an adoption case but has become a custody matter. The reason for a custody hearing is not to circumvent this court's vacation of the adoption; instead, it is to ensure that a child who became a ward of the State upon the birth mother's relinquishment of her rights is accorded the protections afforded the child by Illinois law and constitutional due process. More recently, this court unanimously rejected the use of summary judgment procedure to restore a natural parent's custody rights when the child had been in the care of another for years. ( In re Estate of Whittington (1985), 107 Ill.2d 169, 90 Ill.Dec. 892, 483 N.E.2d 210.) In Whittington, the legal guardian of a young boy was the child's great aunt. The guardian cared for the boy during the natural mother's confinement in a mental institution after being acquitted, by reason of insanity, of killing her husband. The mother sought the return of her child after she was released from treatment, married, and obtained a court order terminating the conservatorship of her estate. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the mother, who sought to terminate the guardianship and take her child back. The appellate court reversed and this court affirmed, stating, The paramount standard, then, for determining a custody dispute under the applicable statute and case law is the best interest of the child.    Of obvious importance in the present case is the capacity of the parties to care for a child appropriately; the length of time Richard has been in the respondent's custody; his adjustment to home, school, and community; the mental and physical health of all the parties involved; and the potential for physical violence and alcohol abuse in the homes in which he might be placed. Clearly, a custody decision in a case such as this requires a careful determination of the relevant facts and a sensitive weighing of a series of factors. A summary judgment proceeding is ill suited to such a determination.    These facts [raised in the pleadings and affidavits], as well as the effect of removing seven-year-old Richard from the home in which he has been cared for since he was two months old, can only be established and weighed at a hearing on the merits at which both parties are free to present evidence and to cross-examine each other's witnesses. (Emphasis added.) Whittington, 107 Ill.2d at 177-78, 90 Ill.Dec. 892, 483 N.E.2d 210. In Whittington, the mother's rights to her child had not been terminated, but this court recognized that the child could not be restored to the mother's care without a best-interests hearing. In the case at bar, the majority expressly rejects the need for a hearing before ordering the child to be turned over to the biological father, about whom this court knows nothing, and the biological mother, whose alleged deceit of Kirchner caused this lengthy litigation to commence. The law in Illinois cannot accommodate such disparate and unequal treatment of its smallest citizens. Today, the majority of this court chooses to disregard, overrule, and abandon long-standing child custody precedent of this court. The majority also omits discussion of the myriad appellate court cases which squarely embrace the best interests of the child principle as determining custody, even if it means that a natural parent who is not found to be unfit temporarily may lose custody to third parties. See, e.g., Rose v. Potts (1991), 217 Ill.App.3d 661, 160 Ill.Dec. 486, 577 N.E.2d 811 (while the fact that a nonparent has physical custody of a child for a substantial length of time does not neutralize the superior rights doctrine, it may, in a given case, be the determining factor in custody decisions); In re Custody of Piccirilli (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 621, 43 Ill.Dec. 953, 410 N.E.2d 1086 (affirming custody to grandparents of eight-year-old child who preferred staying with grandparents; father would be entitled to liberal visitation); Baehr v. Baehr (1978), 56 Ill.App.3d 624, 626, 14 Ill.Dec. 401, 372 N.E.2d 412 (evidence supported trial court's determination that it would certainly be detrimental to the psychological adjustment of this 10-year-old boy to have the intrusion of his biological father into his life at this time). This court has recognized that where a father's rights have not been terminated but it is found that the child's best interests lie in remaining in the custody of others, the father may still seek liberal visitation privileges and the opportunity to develop the parent-child relationship. ( Livingston, 42 Ill.2d 201, 247 N.E.2d 417; Bukovich, 39 Ill.2d at 81, 233 N.E.2d 382, quoting Hohenadel v. Steele (1908), 237 Ill. 229, 235, 86 N.E. 717 (in considering modification of custody rights, `decree respecting the custody of a child is exceptional in its character and is always regarded as temporary').) Our courts have demonstrated considerable creativity in balancing the respective custodial rights of various people. (See, e.g., In re S.J.K (1986), 149 Ill.App.3d 663, 103 Ill.Dec. 75, 500 N.E.2d 1146 (foster parents awarded temporary custody of child where visitation by biological mother caused child considerable anxiety; court noted that mother could petition for restoration of rights in future); In re P.F. (1994), 265 Ill.App.3d 1092, 202 Ill.Dec. 848, 638 N.E.2d 716 (grandmother awarded custody; order did not terminate rights of biological parents, who could later petition for restoration of custody).) The majority opinion fails to grasp that subjecting Kirchner to a best-interests hearing on behalf of his son would not divest him of his parental status or his right to develop a relationship with Richard. In the case at bar, the majority wrongly assumes that whenever an adoption is set aside, upon a reviewing court's holding that the trial court erred in terminating the biological father's rights, the adoptive parents become legal nonentities and the child, no matter his age, ipso facto becomes the rightful property of the biological father. In such a view, the child's welfare, and the familial ties between him and the adoptive family, become totally subordinated to the biological father's wishes. In its haste to restore Richard to his biological parents, the majority denies a voice to the couple who are the only parents Richard knows. By awarding the writ, the majority of this court compels the Does to turn Richard over to virtual strangers, without any assurances that the needs of the boy will be met.