Opinion ID: 3012034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fourth Amendment and Statutory Violations

Text: After Marshall recorded the tapes to his brother-in-law, who was also an attorney, and to his secretary and sons in his motel room at the Best Western, he put stamps on the envelopes and took two packages to the front desk and placed them in a container designated for outgoing mail.32 _________________________________________________________________ 31. New Jersey law appears more willing than federal law to assess the accumulation of errors without first evaluating each separately: The accused, no matter how abhorrent the offense charged nor how seemingly evident the guilt, is entitled to a fair trial surrounded by the substantive and procedural safeguards which have stood for centuries as bulwarks of liberty in English-speaking countries. This, of course, does not mean that the incidental legal errors, which creep into the trial but do not prejudice the rights of the accused or make the proceedings unfair, may be invoked to upset an otherwise valid conviction; . . . . Where, however, the legal errors are of such magnitude to prejudice the defendant’s rights or, in their aggregate have rendered the trial unfair, our fundamental constitutional concepts dictate the granting of a new trial before an impartial jury. State v. Orecchio, 106 A.2d 541, 542 (N.J. 1954) (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Rose, 548 A.2d 1058 (N.J. 1988) (finding prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty phase, in sum, sufficient to reverse a death sentence). But we are decidedly not in a position to review the New Jersey Supreme Court’s application of its own law. 32. In the record, there is much dispute as to whether the container in question was an open tray or a closed box with a slotted lid. The New 63 Alerted by hotel personnel, police who were surveilling Marshall awakened him, and he was taken to a hospital, and later to a psychiatric hospital. The police, claiming that the envelopes were in plain sight, with the topmost package bearing the words To be Opened Only in the Event of my Death, retrieved the packages and later secured warrants to examine their contents. The tapes that were found pursuant to those warrants were played at trial, over Marshall’s protest that the search of the mail depository and the seizure of the tapes violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Before the District Court, and now before us, Marshall also claims that the police actions violated federal statutes. The District Court concluded that the federal statutes and regulations Marshall cited were inapplicable because the United States Postal Service never had custody of the envelope. Marshall III, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 784. It further concluded that Marshall had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims before the state courts, and that habeas review was barred by the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Marshall III, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 785. Before we can reach the merits of these claims, we must determine whether we should address them at all. Two issues are presented to us: Are we barred from considering statutory, non-constitutional claims under AEDPA? And does Stone v. Powell, which prohibits us from examining Fourth Amendment claims that have been fully and fairly litigated in state courts, bar our consideration of the Fourth Amendment claims?
In his brief on direct appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, Marshall cited to the United States Postal Service’s Domestic Mail Manual in support of his argument that there was a Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in his letters and that the search warrant must have been executed by a federal (not a state) officer. The New Jersey _________________________________________________________________ Jersey courts found that the container was an open tray. Later evidence calls that conclusion into question, but for our purposes what depository was used is immaterial. 64 Supreme Court rejected those contentions because the envelope was not within the custody of the postal authorities at the time of the seizure and [t]he statute does not limit search warrants to those issued by federal judges or magistrates. Marshall I, 586 A.2d 118. The District Court appeared to extend this reasoning to the additional statutes cited by Marshall before it: 5 U.S.C. S 301, 39 U.S.C. SS 201, 404(a)(1) and 3623(d). See Marshall III, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 783-84. We conclude that we do not have jurisdiction to entertain Marshall’s complaint as to the District Court’s determination of his statutory claims. In Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000), the Supreme Court noted that 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)), that section of AEDPA that governs our ability to issue a COA to review a District Court’s adjudication of the claims of a habeas petition, states explicitly that a COA may not issue unless ‘the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.’  529 U.S. at 483. In that section, as Slack explains, Congress codified the standard of Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 894 (1983), except that Barefoot only required the denial of a federal right, while AEDPA requires the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 483. While the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has extended Slack -- and in our view, the explicit language of the statute as well -- to allow independently substantial statutory issue[s] to come along for the ride if there is a substantial constitutional question within the case, Ramunno v. United States, 264 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2001), we refuse to deviate from Congress’s express terms. In United States v. Cepero, 224 F.3d 256, 262-63, 267 (3d Cir. 2000), we construed Slack and the plain language of 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)) to deprive us of jurisdiction to hear statutory questions pursuant to habeas appeals. In response to the ad terrorem argument that the defendant is thereby totally denied the opportunity to appeal nonconstitutional issues, the short answer is that Congress has indicated that these issues must be presented in the direct appeal from the conviction. Id. at 265.33 Marshall did not, and he cannot now raise them here. _________________________________________________________________ 33. The premise that nonconstitutional claims are waived if not raised on direct appeal is, of course, unremarkable and well settled law. See, e.g., 65
In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Supreme Court examined the nature of the exclusionary rule, which it characterized as a judicially created means of effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment and balanced its utility as a deterrent against the risk of excluding trustworthy evidence and thus deflect[ing] the truthfinding process. Id. at 482, 490. Finding that, as to collateral review, the costs of the exclusionary rule outweighed the benefits of its application, the Court concluded that where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial. Id. at 494. While the federal courts are not thus deprived of jurisdiction to hear the claim, they are -- for prudential reasons -- restricted in their application of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 494 n.37. Seeking to avoid this restriction, Marshall seizes upon the qualifying phrase in Stone, where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation, and argues that he has not had an opportunity for full and fair litigation, and thus, that the bar of Stone v. Powell should not apply.34 Appellant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Application for Certificate of Appealability 131-143. _________________________________________________________________ Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 178-79 (1947) (cited in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 478 n.10 (1976)). 34. Marshall also raises two additional arguments: that Stone v. Powell should not be applied in a capital case, since the Supreme Court has consistently recognized that death is different, (App. Memorandum in Law in Support of Application for Certificate of Appealability at 129-31) and that the letter addressed to his brother-in-law, who was also an attorney, implicated his Sixth Amendment right, and thus was protected by attorney-client privilege and not governed by Stone by virtue of Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382-83 (1986) (refusing to apply Stone’s bar when Sixth Amendment claims were tied to a Fourth Amendment issue). But we find both of Marshall’s arguments unpersuasive here. 66 We have recognized that there may be instances in which a full and fair opportunity to litigate was denied to a habeas petitioner, but this is not one of them. This is not a case where a structural defect in the system itself prevented Marshall’s claim from being heard. See, e.g., Boyd v. Mintz, 631 F.2d 247, 250-51 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Gilmore v. Marks, 799 F.2d 51, 57 (3d Cir. 1986) (observing that a state’s failure to give at least colorable application of the correct Fourth Amendment constitutional standard might amount to a denial of the opportunity for full and fair litigation). An erroneous or summary resolution by a state court of a Fourth Amendment claim does not overcome the bar. Id. And, as the District Court correctly assessed, Marshall III, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 785-86, Marshall is at most _________________________________________________________________ There is nothing within the language of Stone v. Powell itself upon which to base a distinction between capital and non-capital collateral review. We have applied Stone without hesitancy to capital cases. See, e.g., Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1491 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1230 (1994). Indeed, the principles of comity that underlie Stone v. Powell, as well as the cost-benefit analysis postulated in Stone -- i.e., the deterrent value vis-a-vis those tempted to violate the proscriptions against illegal search and seizure weighed against the risk that risk that trustworthy evidence would be excluded -- militate against the distinction Marshall would have us draw. Here, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the relationship between Marshall and his brother-in-law was not primarily an attorneyclient relationship. Further, the legal relationship between the Sixth Amendment and Fourth Amendment claim are distinguishable from the situation in Kimmelman, on which Marshall relies. There, adjudication of the Sixth Amendment claim would have been foreclosed if there could be no determination whether the underlying Fourth Amendment claim was meritorious. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 375. Here, in contrast, Marshall seeks to demonstrate that the Fourth Amendment violation was more egregious because it also implicated a Sixth Amendment right. Additionally, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the tape was sent to his brother-in-law in a family capacity and that, although his brother-in-law had on occasion provided advice, the police were on notice that Marshall had retained counsel and that all legal representations in the investigation had been made by that counsel, not by Marshall’s brother-in-law. Given our deferential review of the state courts’ findings of facts, we will not disturb this conclusion. 67 alleging that the Fourth Amendment claims were decided incorrectly or incompletely by the New Jersey courts, allegations which are insufficient to surmount the Stone bar. Marshall tries to argue that a full and fair litigation would require consideration of the salient United States Supreme Court precedent, and he raises a very old decision that he argues should have controlled the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision. App. Br. at 140-41. See Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 468 (1918). We do not need to decide on these facts what would be sufficient to constitute a denial of opportunity for full and fair litigation, and because the holding of Rosen is clearly not controlling here we will not fault the New Jersey courts for failing to apply it. We are satisfied that there was no structural defect that prevented the full and fair litigation of Marshall’s Fourth Amendment claims in state court, and we are thus barred from reconsidering them here. In retrospect, and in light of our determination of the Fourth Amendment and related statutory claims, we acknowledge that the COA was improvidently granted as to those issues and it will therefore be dismissed. D. Murder for Hire: As both an element of the crime and an aggravating circumstance? Marshall brings an as-applied challenge to New Jersey’s death penalty statute, alleging that it violates the Eighth Amendment in its application to his crime. The aggravating factor relied on by the State -- that Marshall arranged the murder for pecuniary gain -- duplicated an element of the underlying offense. As Marshall correctly states, the United Supreme Court has held that the Constitution requires a capital sentencing scheme genuinely [to] narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and . . . reasonably [to] justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). As the New Jersey Supreme Court correctly noted, the United States Supreme Court held in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988), that it may be permissible for an aggravating factor to duplicate an element of the underlying offense. See Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 155. Although Marshall criticizes 68 the New Jersey Supreme Court for failing to reference Zant,35 we find no fault in the New Jersey Supreme Court’s evaluating more recent United States Supreme Court precedent, and referring to its own caselaw which interpreted the earlier United States Supreme Court precedent, including Zant, instead. More recently, we had the opportunity to consider a similar challenge to Delaware’s capital sentencing structure, and there we noted that, after Lowenfield, the courts of appeals have consistently held that a sentencing jury can consider an element of the capital offense as an aggravating circumstance even if it is duplicitous [sic]. Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1502 (3d Cir. 1994). Marshall alleges that the homicide statute itself is broadly drafted, encompassing virtually every murder committed either ‘purposely’ or ‘knowingly.’  App. Br. at 135. Marshall contends that since his conviction was for hiring someone to murder his wife, and since the aggravating factor duplicated the elements of the underlying crime itself, there was no possibility for narrowing or for channeling the jury’s discretion. The United States Supreme Court addressed a similar contention in Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993). _________________________________________________________________ 35. In fact, Marshall urges us not to apply AEDPA to our examination of this question, since the New Jersey Supreme Court did not engage in any meaningful analysis of this claim, failing even to cite to Zant. App. Br. at 138. Marshall misapprehends the duty of the state court. Its duty is to apply the correct governing legal principle reasonably. [Terry] Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). It does not have to recite a specific case name in order to apply the principles enunciated within that case. By referring to its earlier analysis of the precise issues raised by Marshall in State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 218-220 (N.J. 1987), an opinion that does discuss the requirements of Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983), in addition to other pertinent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, including Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and by considering the impact of the United States Supreme Court opinion rendered in the interim between its decision in Ramseur and its consideration of Marshall’s claims, Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988), the New Jersey Supreme Court did all that it was required to do for us to apply AEDPA deference. 69 When the purpose of a statutory aggravating circumstance is to enable the sentencer to distinguish those who deserve capital punishment from those who do not, the circumstance must provide a principled basis for doing so. If the sentencer fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm. Id. at 474 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). Applying Arave’s standard, however, it is clear that the New Jersey legislature had a right to establish a motive (for pecuniary gain) as more culpable than other motives, and to determine that a motive-specific factor would narrow the class of death-eligible murderers and would provide a principled consideration for jurors to weigh in making an individualized determination at the capital sentencing phase. That one of the means by which a person may commit murder with this motive is to hire someone else actually to execute the crime is immaterial to the limiting analysis. The strictures of the United States Constitution do not require New Jersey to assign a constitutionally mandated function to aggravating circumstances, but to design a scheme that both narrows the class of death-eligible defendants and channels the jury’s discretion to ensure that a death-eligible defendant is not sentenced to death arbitrarily or capriciously.36 Here there can be no question that the New Jersey legislature required sufficient culpability to withstand constitutional scrutiny. The New Jersey Supreme Court so held in Ramseur, and it was not unreasonable for the New Jersey Supreme Court to rely upon its detailed analysis in that opinion, and upon the more recent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, in its consideration of Marshall’s claim. _________________________________________________________________ 36. We note as well that Marshall did undergo a proportionality review, characterized in a Harvard Law Review article asan additional fail-safe. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 373 (1995). 70 E. Guilt Phase Ineffectiveness Marshall cites before us nine separate ways in which he contends his counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase of the trial. The State counters that Marshall’slitany of purported inadequacies is merely a lengthy series of inconsequential minutiae. Appee. Br. at 76. As both parties recognize, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and its progeny, although Marshall contends that, while the New Jersey Supreme Court correctly identified Strickland as controlling, it both misconstrued and unreasonably applied it. Marshall contends that he has been afforded virtually no process on his ineffectiveassistance claim. App. Br. at 99. As the State notes, Marshall originally raised claims of ineffectiveness in his direct appeal brief, and then raised more than 300 claims in all on appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. Appee. Br. at 77. The New Jersey Supreme Court found all of Marshall’s claims to be without merit. The District Court did not find the New Jersey Supreme Court’s conclusions unreasonable under AEDPA, but Marshall contends that it merely agreed, in summary fashion, with the conclusions of the New Jersey Supreme Court. App. Br. at 100-01. Actually, as discussed below, most of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s conclusions were based on a finding that Marshall could not demonstrate prejudice. The District Court instead concluded that Marshall had not established that the performance of his attorney was deficient: In hindsight, petitioner has compiled a long list of alleged errors and mistakes his counsel committed during his trial. The Court does not imply that defense counsel made no errors whatsoever, but that his performance was well within the required reasonable standard and his litigation strategy was based upon reasonable professional judgment. Marshall III, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 790. The nine areas of alleged ineffectiveness raised before us by Marshall are: 1. Counsel did not develop or present any defense to counter the State’s contention that the murder was financially motivated. App. Br. at 104-07. 71 2. Counsel did not develop or present evidence to refute much of the State’s circumstantial evidence about the events the night of the murder. App. Br. at 107-11. 3. Counsel did not provide independent evidence to refute McKinnon’s testimony. App. Br. at 111. 4. Counsel did not present evidence to refute the State’s allegations that Marshall’s attempted suicide was staged. App. Br. at 111-13. 5. Counsel did not present evidence to counter the prosecutor’s theatrics [which] were sensational, shocking, and quite effective. App. Br. at 113-15. 6. Counsel did not present the evidence that his own testimony -- at a limited PCR hearing -- cited as his primary trial strategy: character evidence. App. Br. at 11516. 7. Counsel had no coherent defense theory. App. Br. at 116-17. 8. Counsel did not present other evidence that was within his possession. App. Br. at 118-20. 9. Counsel did not object nor seek curative action when inadmissible testimony was admitted, or when the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. He also put irrelevant, prejudicial facts before the jury. App. Br. at 120-23. Under Strickland, courts are precluded from finding that counsel was ineffective unless they find both that counsel’s performance fell below an objectively unreasonable standard, and that the defendant was prejudiced by that performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. In order to establish prejudice, a defendant need not demonstrate that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different, but only that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.37 Id. at 694. Where prejudice is lacking, the court _________________________________________________________________ 37. As noted earlier, at A., supra, the Strickland prejudice standard is the same as the Brady materiality standard. 72 need not determine whether the performance was subpar. Id. at 697. Further, it is critical that courts be highly deferential to counsel’s reasonable strategic decisions and guard against the temptation to engage in hindsight. Id. at 689-90. In part, this is because the purpose of the rule is not to improve the standard of professional conduct, but only to protect a defendant’s right to counsel. Id. at 689. Thus, the court is not engaging in a prophylactic exercise to guarantee each defendant a perfect trial with optimally proficient counsel, but rather to guarantee each defendant a fair trial, with constitutionally competent counsel. In order to assess an ineffectiveness claim properly, the court must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury. Id. at 695. The deference accorded to counsel’s reasonable strategic decisions can be seen in numerous United States Supreme Court rulings following on the heels of Strickland. E.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794-95 (1987); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 185-86 (1986). Nonetheless, the Court has found the decisions of some attorneys to be objectively unreasonable. E.g., [Terry] Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385-87 (1986). It is rare for a court to review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, because the record is typically not adequately developed by that point to allow sufficient review. United States v. Cocivera, 104 F.3d 566, 570-71 (3d Cir. 1996); State v. Morton, 715 A.2d 228, 253 (N.J. 1998). The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized this in the appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. The PCR court had determined that all of Marshall’s ineffectiveness claims were procedurally barred, since some ineffectiveness claims had been raised on direct appeal, reasoning that ineffectiveness had been previously adjudicated, and that Marshall was thus barred from raising new instances of ineffectiveness before the court. The New Jersey Supreme Court specifically rejected the PCR court’s conclusion, explaining that its analysis on direct appeal was limited to the specific instances and the contours of the record that were before it at that time, and thus were not dispositive of the other instances of 73 ineffectiveness raised in Marshall’s application for postconviction relief; nor could the treatment of the specific issues raised on direct appeal be viewed as dispositive of a broader claim of ineffectiveness on appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. See Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 29-32. However, when specific issues were adjudicated on direct appeal and found to be without merit, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on its resolution on direct appeal in finding that counsel could not be constitutionally ineffective in those areas. Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 87. On direct appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court read many of Marshall’s contentions as suggesting trial strategies that, in hindsight, might have been more effective. Marshall I, 586 A.2d at 171-72. As the Court correctly concluded, the mere existence of alternative -- even preferable or more effective -- strategies does not satisfy the requirements of demonstrating ineffectiveness under Strickland. On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, the New Jersey Supreme Court prefaced its analysis of Marshall’s claims with the observation that this was the first appeal taken to it from a denial of post-conviction relief under the then-recently enacted Capital Punishment Act. Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 27. The New Jersey Supreme Court was clearly disturbed by the sheer magnitude of Marshall’s presentation, stating both that it question[ed] both the wisdom and the necessity for so massive a presentation and that [p]ost-conviction relief issues should be categorized broadly but coherently, and to the extent necessary illustrated by pertinent examples. No valid purpose is served when every minute example of trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness is offered as a separate ground for post-conviction relief. Id. Thus, while allowing Marshall to raise his ineffectiveness claims, the Court grouped them into more general categories and declined to analyze claims that, even if counsel had sought to proceed as Marshall suggested, would have been foreclosed or completely lacking in merit. In doing so, the Court reasoned from Strickland that if the claims would not have been meritorious if pursued, 74 Marshall could not have been prejudiced. In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court stated: Although we have discussed the performance component of an ineffectiveness claim prior to the prejudice component, there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one. In particular, a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. See Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 54, 87. Given the sheer volume of the claims, and the related nature of many of them, we do not think that the New Jersey Supreme Court was unreasonable in this approach.38 We note, as we discuss more fully below, that it is important here that we can focus on the prejudice analysis, because we do not have a complete record on which to assess some of the performance claims: while we have Zeitz’s trial preparation file, he has never been questioned as to whether some of his actions were the result of strategic decisions. Marshall has asked us to hold that it was error for the New Jersey Supreme Court not to acknowledge or apply the requirement that it look outside the trial record and examine the circumstances underlying the claimed deficiencies. App. Br. at 102. But the purpose of assessing counsel’s acts from an objective standpoint is to assess the reasonableness of counsel’s actions. We do not need to reach the question of whether the attorney’s actions fell below an objectively unreasonable standard if we can determine first that Marshall was not prejudiced. But Marshall claims as well that the New Jersey Supreme _________________________________________________________________ 38. In its opinion affirming the denial of post-conviction relief, the New Jersey Supreme Court included a chart that grouped the 548 grounds that Marshall had advanced for reversal into categories. On that chart, 267 issues related to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 25. 75 Court failed equally in its determination of prejudice under Strickland (and the United States Supreme Court’s more recent enunciation of how Strickland claims are to be evaluated under AEDPA, [Terry] Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)). Marshall urges that the New Jersey Supreme Court misapprehended its task under Strickland , misreading the explicit instruction to consider the totality of the evidence as requiring it only . . . to consider the strength of the State’s case against petitioner at trial. App. Br. at 103. Such an analysis, according to Marshall, cannot comport with the teachings of the United States Supreme Court, because an assessment of the omitted evidence is required, and, since it was not in the trial record, it was not susceptible to analysis. Id. at 103-04. He cites in support two passages from [Terry] Williams, one penned by Justice Stevens in his majority opinion, and the other by Justice O’Connor in her concurrence. In the passage quoted from Justice Stevens, the Court counters the Virginia Supreme Court’s finding that there was no prejudice because the mitigation evidence not uncovered by counsel barely would have altered the profile of this defendant that was presented to the jury by noting that in so concluding the court ignored or overlooked the evidence of Williams’ difficult childhood and abuse and his limited mental capacity. [Terry] Williams, 529 U.S. at 374 n.5. Justice O’Connor then notes that when the original trial judge was shown the newly unearthed mitigation evidence, he concluded that Williams was prejudiced and, despite earlier having found Williams’ death sentence justified and warranted, recommended a new sentencing hearing. Id. at 416 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor concluded that the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision not to grant the sentencing hearing thusreveals an obvious failure to consider the totality of the omitted mitigation evidence. Id. However, we conclude that counsel’s conduct during the guilt phase of Marshall’s trial does not reflect the same concerns that animated the United States Supreme Court in its consideration of the unpresented evidence in [Terry] Williams , as is evident upon closer examination of the specific claims Marshall raises before us. 76 1. Financial and Insurance Information Marshall contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to develop financial and insurance information to demonstrate that Marshall could reasonably expect to cover his expenses and satisfy his debts through future earnings, and that insuring Maria Marshall was based on a rational analysis of the family’s needs if she were no longer present. Further, he argues that proper psychiatric testimony would have revealed that his expressions of despair on the suicide tape were not probative of his actual financial situation. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the failure to develop those arguments was not prejudicial. As to the financial information, they found that it had been placed before the jury -- albeit pursuant to the questioning by codefendant’s, not Marshall’s counsel -- and other witnesses had testified that Marshall was an outstanding insurance salesman. Marshall had explained at length why and how he assessed the amounts of insurance needed on Maria. In [Terry] Williams, the jurors had no opportunity to consider the mitigating evidence at all; as Justice O’Connor noted, if the trial judge himself felt a new sentencing was warranted on the basis of the information, the total absence of that evidence before the jury was prejudicial. Further, it was not the fact of Marshall’s financial situation, nor the rationality of accruing insurance on Maria that was in dispute: it was whether his perception of his increasing indebtedness led him to consider the magnitude of the assets available from the insurance policies as a solution to an overwhelming debt. Thus, Marshall is incorrect when he argues that his own acts and expressions of despair as to his finances could have been explained away by proper psychiatric testimony. His statements on the suicide tape that he was worried about his debt led the New Jersey Supreme Court to conclude that Marshall could not demonstrate how trial counsel’s more comprehensive preparation and different trial strategy could persuasively have overcome defendant’s own perception that his debt was difficult to manage. Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 65. We note as well that Kraushaar’s testimony also portrayed Marshall as a man who was worried about finances and how to resolve his debt. It was 77 not unreasonable for the New Jersey Supreme Court to find that the presentation of objective data justifying either the level of debt or the level of insurance maintained on Maria had no reasonable probability of impacting how the jurors perceived Marshall’s response to his debt, nor to the insurance that indisputably would eliminate that debt. 2. Crime Scene Evidence Marshall contends that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to test the tire and to bring out other evidence that would tend to demonstrate that Marshall pulled off the road where he did because he was afraid of being hit -- as a friend of his recently had been-- and had himself been seriously injured. He urges that if the car trouble were shown to be legitimate, and the circumstances surrounding the crime cast in a more accurate light, the jury could have found that Maria was killed to prevent her from identifying thieves, rather than as the result of a carefully arranged plot between her husband and McKinnon. Here, the New Jersey Supreme Court did find that Zeitz’s performance was below objective standards of proficiency, but that there was no constitutional violation because there was but scant support for the alternate theory of the crime. Marshall II, 690 A. 2d at 60-61, 63. Under Strickland, the burden is on the defendant to establish that counsel’s performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. It was not unreasonable for the New Jersey Supreme Court to conclude that mere articulation of an alternate theory of the crime was not adequate to satisfy this burden.
Marshall’s counsel hired an investigator to go to Louisiana. While there, the investigator secured a statement, authored by McKinnon, suggesting an alternate and exculpatory explanation for his relationship with Marshall. At trial, despite repeated requests by the State, Marshall’s counsel claimed that he did not have the statement, averring that it was shown to him a long time ago, over a year ago, and I’ve been asking him to locate the thing since then and I said it over and over again, and I don’t think I have to continue defending myself about it. 78 Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 44. On cross-examination, the investigator read the statement into the record. Because neither McKinnon nor Marshall had been cross-examined on the statement, the trial court ruled that both could be recalled for cross-examination, although McKinnon could be recalled only by the co-defendant’s counsel, since he was faultless in having been unable to cross-examine on the statement. Id. at 44. Neither witness was recalled. Id. Marshall claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in not utilizing McKinnon’s prior statement to impeach his testimony on the stand, claiming that the omission revealed either incredible lack of preparation, or demonstrated highly questionable conduct on the part of the defense of which the jury was made aware. App. Br. at 111. In a conclusory fashion, Marshall claims that evidence that would cast doubt on McKinnon’s testimony would have been some of the most valuable impeachment evidence available and thereby cast doubt on the State’s entire case. Id. Marshall refers us to the determination of the New Jersey Supreme Court that, since the statement was ultimately before the jury, its late admission into evidence was immaterial. The jury had the benefit of the statement itself, and counsel had the opportunity to present arguments concerning McKinnon’s statement to the jury in summation. Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 45. Reading Marshall’s claim carefully, the prejudice that Marshall asserts would result from the jurors’ being denied access to the contents of the statement and the fact that it contradicted McKinnon’s testimony at trial. But, as Marshall’s counsel pointed out, since the jury had received both statements it could draw its own conclusions. Id. at 44-45. Thus, although counsel should have ensured that the document that was in the possession of his investigator was produced to the State and co-defendant’s counsel in a timely manner, it was not unreasonable for the New Jersey Supreme Court to conclude that Marshall was not constitutionally prejudiced since the contents of the inconsistent statements were indeed available for consideration by the jury.
As noted above, after his wife’s death, with the pressures of the investigation mounting and his relationship with 79 Kraushaar at an end, Marshall checked into the Best Western room where he and Kraushaar used to meet, and prepared tapes and a suicide drink, which he did not consume. At trial, the State intimated that the suicide attempt was staged, not genuine. Counsel did not present evidence to refute these allegations, except to elicit testimony from Marshall that the suicide attempt was genuine. App. Br. at 111-13. Although counsel had arranged for a psychologist, Dr. Atkins, to assess Marshall’s condition, the report was not obtained until mid-trial, and was not used. Nor was Dr. Atkins called as an expert. Id. at 112. Marshall contends that the psychological testimony is critical, because it would establish that the tape-- discussed above as reflecting Marshall’s despair over his finances -- was the result of a major depressive episode. Id. Marshall alleges that the New Jersey Supreme Court did not address these arguments in affirming the denial of post-conviction relief, even though he raised them, and that, as a consequence, we should not apply AEDPA deference.39 In response, the State contends that the court did address Marshall’s contention, albeit generally, and thus argues that Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2001), is inapplicable. See Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 73. Given the posture of Marshall’s claim, we do not need to address the level of deference owed, because Marshall has stated that the purpose for which the report would have been used is to demonstrate that Marshall was depressed when he produced the tape, which in turn would impact the reliability of the financial data. Those issues, as discussed above, were adjudicated on the merits by the New Jersey Supreme Court. We have already indicated that Marshall has misapprehended the New Jersey Supreme Court’s view of the significance of the tape: it is not that it reflects Marshall’s true financial status, but that it reflects Marshall’s reaction to and perception of his financial _________________________________________________________________ 39. As noted above, see supra note 18, where the state court does not adjudicate a federal claim on its merits, we will apply pre-AEDPA deference. Here the parties both discuss Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (2001). Everett v. Beard, cited above, is equally apt here. 80 status, and, indeed, his state of mind. Thus, adducing testimony to demonstrate that the finances and other stressors in Marshall’s life had caused him to enter a major depressive episode and attempt suicide could only bolster the image of Marshall’s finances as sufficiently worrisome to provoke Marshall to commit desperate acts. The information therefore could not have a reasonable probability of affecting the outcome. Further, courts are to be especially deferential to reasoned decisions by counsel. The fact that Marshall’s counsel was the one who arranged for the psychological examination indicates that he was sensitive to the possibility that the information may be valuable for trial, and that he asked for it, received it, and did not use it places his decision squarely in the realm of the myriad tactical decisions counsel must make during a trial, and which courts, with the benefit of hindsight, should not second-guess.
During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Marshall if he was wearing his wedding ring because he had been instructed to. Counsel objected, and the objection was sustained. Marshall volunteered the fact that he had had to surrender the ring when he was arrested, but, due to different policies in different locations, was now allowed to wear the ring. The prosecutor then asked whether the ring was a reflection of how much he loved and missed his wife, and, upon receiving an affirmative answer, asked why Maria’s ashes were still in a brown cardboard box at the funeral home in a desk -- . Cross-Examination of Robert Marshall, February 26, 1986, St. Ex. 29T at 84. Counsel objected, and after a discussion at sidebar, the objection was overruled. Id. at 84-89. Marshall claims that counsel had avenues open to him to neutralize the effect of the prosecutor’s questioning, and he suggests some options to us. But, as Strickland emphasizes, a trial does not have to be perfect to be constitutionally fair. Because reviewing courts are not seeking to enforce optimal attorney performance, they are not to question whether there was a better response possible -- only whether the attorney’s response was constitutionally adequate. The New Jersey 81 Supreme Court recognized that counsel did attempt to neutralize the testimony, by eliciting from one of Marshall’s sons the family’s plans to travel to Florida together to bury Maria, plans that had to be postponed when Marshall was arrested. Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 74. It concluded that the topic was peripheral and further testimonywould not have materially aided defendant’s chances of being acquitted of the charged offenses. Id. Such a conclusion is reasonable, and our review is only as to reasonableness. Even were we to disagree with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s conclusion, however, we would still hold that Marshall has not demonstrated performance that falls below the threshold set by Strickland. 6. Counsel’s Non-Adherence to His Stated Strategy Marshall claims -- without citation to the record-- that his trial counsel testified that his trial strategy was to present character evidence yet, for the witnesses that were called, he did not always interview them prior to their taking the stand, did not establish a proper foundation for their testimony, and did not elicit from them all of the information that should have been elicited. App. Br. at 11516. The New Jersey Supreme Court considered Marshall’s claims here in conjunction with other miscellaneous claims of ineffectiveness, and concluded that[i]rrespective of whether those and analogous pretrial omissions by counsel constituted deviations that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, we are convinced that defendant cannot demonstrate that counsel’s alleged pretrial deficiencies either individually or collectively had the capacity to change the result of the proceeding. Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 87. The claim Marshall raises has two aspects to it: first, were the witnesses in question adequately prepared to testify; and second, were they adequately prepared if, indeed, the character testimony was critical to his trial strategy. If the witnesses were not critical to counsel’s trial strategy, but were called merely to provide limited testimony, Marshall could not realistically satisfy either prong of Strickland. Thus, the critical question to assessing the reasonableness of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s conclusion is: Were the witnesses in question vital to counsel’s trial strategy? 82 The witnesses Marshall called who did provide -- or might have been expected to provide -- character testimony included his sons, his sister, and other members of the insurance industry and the Toms River community. As noted above, the character testimony elicited consisted primarily of brief affirmations that Marshall had a reputation for being law-abiding and a man of integrity, and that he was an excellent insurance salesman. At the limited remand hearing, Marshall’s trial counsel explained why he chose from the outset to have Marshall testify, distinguishing Marshall’s situation from one in which the defendant had an extensive criminal history, or one where the State’s case was particularly weak-- both of which were situations where a defense attorney would not want to commit the defendant to taking the stand from the outset. With Marshall, in contrast, the trial was expected to be lengthy, and counsel cited to jury studies that stated that eighty percent of a panel make up their mind preliminarily after the opening statements. Direct Testimony of Glenn Zeitz, December 1, 1994, St. Ex. 6PCT at 11-13. He then stated: In this particular case, the way we defended this case, was to let the Jury know right from the beginning that there was going to be character testimony. I wanted to personalize my client. There’s other references in the opening that deal with his background, the charitable things that he did, there were -- there was a reference to character testimony that they were going to hear from. And, in essence, what we were trying to accomplish in this case was to wait and have the Jury wait in their own minds until they heard his version, to give him an opportunity to tell them what happened here, rather than make up their minds preliminarily, notwithstanding the advice that we knew they’d be getting from the trial Court. Id. at 13. It cannot reasonably be inferred from counsel’s explanation as to why he felt it important to tell the jury from the outset that Marshall would testify what significance he accorded to any of the other witnesses’ testimony. Because their testimony accounted for only a tiny portion of the trial testimony adduced, and because 83 Marshall has not demonstrated to us that any of the testimony that would have been provided would have any bearing at all on the jury’s determination of guilt or innocence, it was not unreasonable for the New Jersey Supreme Court to conclude that ill preparation as to those witnesses, if it were found, would not be prejudicial to Marshall. 7. Counsel’s Lack of a Coherent Defense Theory. Although Marshall characterizes this claim as a failure to develop a coherent defense theory, his claim above would indicate that he thought that trial counsel had, indeed, formulated a coherent theory, one that focused on portraying Marshall as a good man, who would succeed by communicating directly with the jury. Further, the specific tactical decisions that Marshall cites in support of this contention40 amount to little more than a listing of things that, with the benefit of hindsight, counsel might have handled differently. 8. Counsel’s Failure to Present Certain Evidence All of the examples cited to us are tied to Marshall’s understanding of other parts of his defense that have been rejected by the New Jersey Supreme Court. For example, Marshall criticizes counsel for not contradicting a trooper’s statement at trial that Marshall had reported a flat tire, with the report the trooper prepared, indicating that the tire was half-flat. This is addressed by the reasoning in 2, above.41 _________________________________________________________________ 40. In this category, Marshall considers the fact that his trial counsel allowed co-defendant’s counsel to conduct crucial examination of witnesses, that he failed to object when co-defendant’s counsel elicited testimony that benefitted his client but harmed Marshall, that he placed Marshall on the stand abruptly in the middle of his case and that he fail[ed] to recognize that Kolins, his investigator, had engaged in such incriminating conduct that [counsel] needed to terminate their relationship or otherwise disassociate Kolins’ conduct from his client as evidence of trial counsel’s lack of a coherent theory of defense. App. Br. at 116-17. 41. The State also points out that most of what petitioner says should have been elicited was inadmissible hearsay under New Jersey law, Appee. Br. at 93, a point the New Jersey Supreme Court did not need to reach, since it evaluated this claim under the prejudice prong of Strickland. 84 Marshall also criticizes trial counsel for a witness’s exclusion. Counsel had put Henry Tamburin’s name on the witness list originally, then informed the court that his name was not on the list, and did not correct the error until he called Tamburin to the stand, at which point the court sustained the prosecutor’s objection and limited the scope of the witness’s testimony. Because Tamburin would have testified about the use of comps at casinos, and the gambling system he had taught to Marshall, Marshall now finds it baffling in view of the voir dire he had requested on comp abusers that he did not ensure that Tamburin was able to testify. Had he testified, however, all that would have become clear is what Marshall’s gambling strategy was. As noted above, the issue before the jury was whether Marshall’s perception of his financial circumstances was such that it could prompt a desperate act; explaining how he gambled would not address that issue, and thus the New Jersey Supreme Court reasonably concluded the omission of the testimony was not prejudicial. Marshall also faults trial counsel for not having Marshall’s secretary testify that Marshall had sent information on financial products to Robert Cumber. The jury knew that Marshall had met Cumber at a party in New Jersey,42 and that Marshall had sent him information on financial products. They also knew that Cumber introduced McKinnon and Marshall. But Marshall is asserting that the secretary’s verification that Marshall did send the financial records would have rebutted the inferences that the many calls Marshall placed to Cumber were to locate McKinnon to hasten his wife’s murder. App. Br. at 120. Even assuming that trial counsel had adduced testimony verifying that Marshall sent documents to Cumber, that testimony would not serve to verify that the numerous phone conversations over the course of the summer concerned those documents; the jury would still be compelled to determine whether it believed Marshall’s or McKinnon’s testimony as to the purpose of the telephone calls. Thus, the New Jersey Supreme Court was not _________________________________________________________________ 42. The State points out that at trial petitioner forgot ‘exactly how’ the conversation somehow led to the fact that I was looking for an investigator’ to track down missing casino money. Appee. Br. at 95. 85 unreasonable in determining that Marshall could not have been prejudiced by the failure to call Marshall’s secretary. Marshall also faults the New Jersey Supreme Court for evaluating each of counsel’s alleged failures individually, characterizing it as the divide-and-conquer approach of ruling on each individual Strickland error rather than assessing the joint prejudice from all the ineffectiveassistance claims. App. Br. at 120. Marshall cites to [Terry] Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397-98 (2000), for this proposition. We think that Marshall misapprehends the guidance of the United States Supreme Court. In Williams, the United States Supreme Court found fault forfailing to evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence -- both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding -- in reweighing it against the evidence in aggravation, thus erroneously concluding that Williams had not been prejudiced by his counsel’s errors at the sentencing phase. Id. But here, Marshall has not placed before us anything that would singly, or in combination, have had a reasonable probability of affecting the outcome of his trial. The New Jersey Supreme Court reasonably concluded precisely that. [F]ew of the allegations of ineffective assistance at trial involved significant deficiencies in the quality of counsel’s representation, and those that did were not material to the trial result. Marshall II, 690 A.2d at 90. 9. Failure to Object or Seek Curative Action Marshall alleges that trial counsel did not object nor seek curative action when inadmissible testimony was admitted, or when the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. He also put irrelevant, prejudicial facts before the jury. App. Br. at 120. The New Jersey Supreme Court reasonably determined that Marshall could not demonstrate ineffectiveness under Strickland as to these alleged faults of counsel. While we examine more fully the circumstances under which an evidentiary hearing is required below, we do conclude here that neither the New Jersey Supreme Court nor the District Court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing to develop the above claims of ineffectiveness at the guilt phase. 86 Volume 3 of 3 87 F. Cumulative Error Marshall contends that even if we do not find the errors in his trial43 individually so egregious that we would grant the writ of habeas corpus, the errors of all kinds that have been recounted are so invidious and numerous that we ought to aggregate them and find that, in sum, the constitutional error was sufficient to grant the writ. We addressed this issue in the habeas context in United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 631 F.2d 14, 17 (3d Cir. 1980), recognizing that errors that individually do not warrant a new trial may do so when combined.44 Here, even were we to cumulate all the claimed errors and superimpose them over the extensive trial proceedings, given the quantity and quality of the totality of the evidence presented to the jury, we could not conclude that the New Jersey Supreme Court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent or unreasonably determined the facts in making its ruling. G. Penalty Phase Ineffectiveness As we noted at the outset, counsel and the court discussed the procedures that would be followed in the penalty phase while Marshall was at the hospital, and the jury was at lunch. Within a few minutes of Marshall’s return, at 1:45 p.m., the court convened the penalty phase. _________________________________________________________________ 43. The errors Marshall asks us to aggregate are those he contends the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized as occurringin the course of [his] trial. App. Memorandum of Law in Support of Application for Certificate of Appealability at 194. However, Marshall includes a penalty phase statement by the prosecutor in that list, id. at 195, as well as pretrial and penalty phase additional problems. Id. We find persuasive the reasoning of the Western District of Pennsylvania that only errors occurring during trial should be considered in accumulation, a point made expressly in Pursell v. Horn, 187 F. Supp. 2d 260, 375-76 (W.D. Pa. 2002), and implicitly in the analysis of the other courts of appeals to have considered the issue. 44. Moreover unified consideration of the claims in the petition well satisfies the interests of justice because the cumulative effect of the alleged errors may violate due process, requiring the grant of the writ, whereas any one alleged error considered alone may be deemed harmless. United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 631 F.2d 14, 17 (3d Cir. 1980). 88 THE COURT: Gentlemen, we’re now prepared, I believe, to move on to the penalty phase of this matter. I did have a discussion with counsel in chambers regarding the procedure that we’re going to follow, and before we place that on the record, are counsel in agreement that that is the procedure that will be followed? ZEITZ: Yes, sir. KELLY: Yes, sir, your Honor. THE COURT: As I understand it, what will now occur is that I will now make the usual opening statement to the jury that is made in this proceeding. I believe that the law now is -- I know that the law now is, expressly, that any evidence which was introduced in the trial can be considered as evidence for purposes of this proceeding. Given that, I understand that neither counsel intend to introduce any further evidence in this proceeding.