Opinion ID: 1111213
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Disproportionate Penalty Claim

Text: (10) In a related argument, defendant asserts the application of the multiple-murder special circumstance to the crimes of killing a pregnant woman and her fetus constitutes a disproportionate penalty violating the state and federal Constitutions. Although we rejected this argument in People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1239-1241 [249 Cal. Rptr. 71, 756 P.2d 795] ( Bunyard ), defendant contends that case is distinguishable. We disagree. In Bunyard, a jury convicted the defendant of the first degree murders of his wife and her healthy full-term fetus. The jury also found true a multiple-murder special circumstance and imposed the death penalty. The defendant contended that application of the multiple-murder special circumstance to situations in which one of two victims was a fetus would be unconstitutional as a disproportionate penalty under the state or federal Constitution. We rejected the argument. We observed in Bunyard that In determining whether a particular sentence constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under the state Constitution (art. I, § 17), we must determine whether the penalty `is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.' ( In re Lynch [(1972)] 8 Cal.3d [410,] 424 [105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921]; People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 183 [158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587].) Defendant presents no evidence or argument regarding two of the factors we held relevant in determining disproportionality under Lynch  the nature of the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree of danger both present to society, and whether more serious crimes are punished in this state less severely than the offense in question. The offense at issue  willful, deliberate and premeditated murder  creates the utmost danger to society. The fact that the victim murdered is an unborn child does not render defendant less culpable, or the crime less severe, in light of the Legislature's determination that viable fetuses receive the same protection under the murder statute as persons. ( Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1240.) As for the federal Constitution, Bunyard held that Defendant's arguments suggesting a potential Eighth Amendment violation also fail. Our high court has established that one of the objective factors for reviewing the proportionality of sentences under the Eighth Amendment is the `gravity of the offense.' Murder is the gravest of all, a crime `so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.' ( Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 184 [96 S.Ct. 2909, 2930, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 881].) Since the evidence in this case was sufficient to establish that defendant acted with express malice towards [the fetus], this case raises no questions of death-eligibility under Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 [107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127]. `A critical facet of the individualized determination of culpability required in capital cases is the mental state with which the defendant commits the crime. Deeply engrained in our legal tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished.' ( Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 156 [95 L.Ed.2d at p. 143, 107 S.Ct. at p. 1687].) Additionally, defendant fails to present any evidence or argument concerning other relevant criteria for reviewing a claim of Eighth Amendment violation  the sentencing decisions made by juries, and the charging practices of prosecutors  with respect to the imposition of the death penalty for the murder of a pregnant woman and her viable fetus. [¶] ... [¶] In sum, we find no federal or state constitutional infirmity in applying the multiple-murder special circumstance to the circumstances in this case. ( Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1240-1241.) Defendant observes that although Bunyard concerned two first degree murders, he was convicted of first degree murder of Doreen, but only second degree murder of her fetus. Defendant notes the jury made no express finding of his premeditation, deliberation, or intent to kill the fetus, and he suggests the jury's verdict may even imply a finding he was unaware of the fetus's existence. We disagree. The jury's verdict of second degree murder necessarily found that at the very least, defendant bore implied malice toward the fetus. (See People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 102-103 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 864, 840 P.2d 969].) The jury was so instructed. The Legislature has provided that the multiple-murder special circumstance applies whenever the defendant has been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), italics added.) Although we stressed in Bunyard that the willful and malicious nature of the defendant's murders amply qualified him for the death penalty ( Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1240), we did not suggest that imposing that penalty for a multiple murder involving the first degree murder of a woman and the second degree murder of her fetus would be constitutionally suspect. Special circumstances accompany many kinds of first degree murder involving only one victim, such as murder of a peace officer, firefighter, prosecutor, judge, juror, elected official, or witness to a crime, as well as single victims killed by explosive device, or because of race, color or religion, or while defendant was avoiding arrest, escaping from custody, lying in wait, or engaged in certain felonies. (See § 190.2.) We see nothing disproportionate or constitutionally suspect about also imposing the death penalty in cases involving the intentional first degree murder of a pregnant woman accompanied by the murder, whether of first or second degree, of her fetus. Under the circumstances of this case, the death penalty neither shocks the conscience nor offends fundamental notions of human dignity. ( In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 [105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921].) Contrary to defendant's argument, the facts that he had no prior criminal record and previously had been a productive member of society, although relevant to the jury's penalty determination, do not themselves render the sentence disproportionate. (11) Defendant claims to be the sole person within California to receive the death sentence for a first degree murder of a pregnant woman and a second degree murder of a fetus. This claim may reflect the past tendency of juries to find first degree murder of the fetus in these cases. Fortunately, as compared to many other forms of murder, dual murders of this kind appear to be rare, but rarity does not equal disparity. In any event, as the Attorney General observes, our decisions do not mandate intercase proportionality review, and the possibility that other persons who committed similar crimes may have received lesser sentences does not establish disproportionate punishment. (See People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 156-157.) Defendant further contends that by enacting section 12022.9, the Legislature punishes less severely the same fetal killing that made him eligible for the death penalty. Here again he relies on his mistaken view of the import of section 12022.9. As we have already discussed, section 12022.9 imposes a five-year enhancement for any person who, during the commission of a felony, knowingly and intentionally inflicts injury causing the termination of the victim's pregnancy. The enhanced punishment is imposed for the particular injury to which a pregnant woman is uniquely vulnerable. This provision may offer prosecutors in an appropriate case a charging option different from charging feticide, but it does not demonstrate the disproportionality of the special circumstance charged in the present case. (See People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 157.)