Opinion ID: 1299399
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: BROWN v. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION

Text: On July 1, 1993, plaintiff's next friend was struck and injured while attempting to cross the intersection of M-119, West Bluff Street, and State Street in the city of Harbor Springs, Michigan. M-119 is a part of the state trunkline in Harbor Springs that runs in an east-west direction. State Street runs north-south and West Bluff Street runs east-west until it deadends into M-119, which, at the intersection in dispute, angles in a northerly direction into West Bluff Street. At all times relevant to this appeal, State and West Bluff streets were under the jurisdiction of the city of Harbor Springs. As plaintiff's next friend and her companion approached the intersection on M-119 while heading toward downtown Harbor Springs, they intended to cross the intersection by way of the crosswalk installed as part of the traveled portion of the M119 highway. [1] As plaintiff's next friend attempted to traverse the M-119 crosswalk, she was struck by an automobile traveling westbound on M-119. Plaintiff alleges that the intersection design was unreasonably dangerous because it is necessary for vehicular traffic heading south on State Street and attempting to turn left on eastbound M-119 to proceed into the intersection to adequately view oncoming traffic. Plaintiff claims the state owed a duty to plaintiff's next friend because it was foreseeable that an injury to a pedestrian would occur as a result of the negligently designed intersection. Plaintiff filed the instant action against the city of Harbor Springs in the Emmet Circuit Court and against the Department of Transportation in the Court of Claims. The two cases were consolidated in the circuit court. The city and department moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8), which the trial court denied. [2] The Court of Appeals reversed by peremptory order, relying on this Court's decision in Mason, supra . We granted leave to appeal in both cases, [3] consolidated for the purpose of this appeal, to address whether the Legislature intended to include pedestrians within the highway exception to governmental immunity.

It is well settled in this state that governmental agencies are immune from tort liability while engaging in a governmental function unless an exception applies. M.C.L. § 691.1407; M.S.A. § 3.996(107); Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing), 420 Mich. 567, 618, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984). It is also well settled that the exceptions are to be narrowly construed. Id. ; Reardon v. Dep't of Mental Health, 430 Mich. 398, 411, 424 N.W.2d 248 (1988). Here, this Court is again faced with the task of interpreting the highway exception to governmental immunity. M.C.L. § 691.1402(1); M.S.A. § 3.996(102)(1). [4] In Suttles, the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). In Brown, the lower court granted defendant's motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C) (7) and (8). In determining whether a plaintiff's claim is barred by governmental immunity, we must consider all documentary evidence, including any pleadings, depositions, admissions, or any other documentary evidence submitted by the parties. Wade v. Dep't of Corrections, 439 Mich. 158, 162, 483 N.W.2d 26 (1992); Gibson v. Grand Rapids, 162 Mich.App. 100, 412 N.W.2d 658 (1987). In order to survive a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), the plaintiff must allege facts in the complaint justifying application of an exception to governmental immunity. 439 Mich. at 163, 483 N.W.2d 26. A motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint and allows only consideration of the pleadings. Id. Under both (C)(7) and (8) motions, courts must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe them in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 162-163, 483 N.W.2d 26. A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may only be granted where the claims alleged are so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery. Id. at 163, 483 N.W.2d 26.
We acknowledge that the notion of governmental immunity, its interpretation, and its practical application have been difficult at times, stemming in part from the decisions of this Court and from the confusing nature of the statute itself. [5] The history of governmental immunity has been well documented in prior decisions of this Court, but, we believe, the facts of these cases require a brief look at the history once again. This Court concisely set forth the history underlying the highway exception to governmental immunity in Scheurman v. Dep't of Transportation, 434 Mich. 619, 629, 456 N.W.2d 66 (1990): The cases before us today center on the highway exception statute, M.C.L. § 691.1402; M.S.A. § 3.996(102). The origin of the statute is the enactment of 1879 P.A. 244; 1 How Stat. 1442, which imposed liability upon municipalities in favor of any person `sustaining bodily injury upon any of the public highways or streets in the state, by reason of neglect to keep such public highways or streets, and all bridges, cross-walks and culverts on the same in good repair, and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel....' Roy v. Dep't of Transportation, 428 Mich. 330, 336-337, 408 N.W.2d 783 (1987). With the passage of 1887 P.A. 264; 3 How Stat 1446c, the Legislature amended the statute and expanded its scope of liability to include sidewalks. Id. at 337, 408 N.W.2d 783. However, when the Legislature codified governmental immunity in 1964, it specifically reduced the purview of the highway exception statute. Section 2 of the governmental immunity act expressly excludes the state and the counties from liability for sidewalks, crosswalks or any other installation outside of [sic] the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. M.C.L. § 691.1402; M.S.A. § 3.996(102). Furthermore, the duty of the state and the counties created under § 2, shall extend only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.... [Emphasis in original.] We find this synopsis of the history underlying the highway exception instructive. The 1879 enactment articulated a broad exception to immunity that allowed any person a cause of action for an injury sustained on or by any of the areas listed. The 1887 amendment increased the scope of the liability to include sidewalks, perhaps the only area not provided for in the original exception. With the codification of governmental immunity in 1964, the highway exception was significantly narrowed and no longer allowed liability for the state and county for injuries incurred in three specific areas: (1) sidewalks, (2) crosswalks, or (3) any other installation outside the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. The import of this specific limitation indicates, we believe, the Legislature's intent to significantly limit a pedestrian's ability to recover. With this background in mind, we proceed with these cases, while keeping to our mandate of interpreting the exceptions to governmental immunity narrowly. See Ross and Reardon, supra .
Today we address the specific question whether pedestrians are covered by the highway exception to governmental immunity. A review of M.C.L. § 691.1402(1); M.S.A. § 3.996(102)(1) and previous decisions of this Court lead us to conclude that pedestrians may come within the exception in limited situations. Recent decisions of this Court provide guidance in this area. In Roy v. Dep't of Transportation , the plaintiff [6] was injured while riding his bicycle on a bicycle path adjacent to a portion of I-275. Id. at 332, 408 N.W.2d 783. The plaintiff's bicycle hit a bump that allegedly posed a danger to bicyclists and which was covered by weeds that had been previously cut and piled by the defendant. As a result, the plaintiff suffered severe injuries. Id. The issue presented in Roy was whether a bicycle path that ran parallel to, but detached from, the traveled portion of the roadway was part of the highway, so as to fall within the highway exception to governmental immunity. We held, under the facts of that case, that the plaintiff's claim was barred by governmental immunity. In reaching that result, we noted: Section 2 [M.C.L. § 691.1402(1); M.S.A. § 3.996(102)(1) ] does not reveal a legislative purpose to protect bicyclists in general, as suggested by the Court of Appeals. Indeed, the statute does not offer general protection to pedestrians or motorists without regard to location. The statute announces a duty to repair and maintain the highway so that the improved portion designed for vehicular travel is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. The criterion used by the Legislature was not based on the class of travelers, but the road on which they travel. [ Id. at 341, 408 N.W.2d 783 (emphasis added).] A case that presented both an issue and set of facts similar to Roy was Gregg v. State Hwy. Dep't, 435 Mich. 307, 458 N.W.2d 619 (1990). The plaintiff in Gregg was injured when his fourteen-speed racing bicycle hit a pothole and overturned. Again, we considered whether the bicycle path in that case was part of the highway so as to fall within the highway exception to governmental immunity. We held that because the bicycle path in Gregg was part of the west shoulder of [the] highway, unlike Roy where the path was not a part of, but ran parallel to, the roadway, the plaintiff's claim fell within the exception. Id. at 310, 458 N.W.2d 619. Justice Brickley utilized the following rationale from Roy to support this Court's finding that the plaintiff's claim in Gregg was not barred by governmental immunity: [T]he exception to immunity found in § 2 of the governmental immunity act does not apply to bicycle paths. The [highway exception to immunity] does not apply to `an installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.' A bicycle path is not designed for vehicular travel, in the common sense of `vehicular' as relating to motor vehicle. [428 Mich. at 340, 408 N.W.2d 783.]       [T]he statute does not offer general protection to pedestrians or motorists without regard to location. The statute announces a duty to repair and maintain the highway so that the improved portion designed for vehicular travel is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. The criterion used by the Legislature was not based on the class of travelers, but the road on which they travel. [428 Mich. at 341, 408 N.W.2d 783.] [ Gregg, supra at 312, 458 N.W.2d 619.] We concluded in Gregg: [N]ot only did Roy concern a bicycle path that was separate and apart from the roadway and the shoulder of the highway, but it concerned a path on which motor vehicles would have no occasion to enter for any reason. Furthermore, our analysis of Roy supports the different result in this case. In concluding our analysis in Roy, we said: This interpretation fits within each of the interpretative clues identified above. It satisfies the express wording of § 2 which limits the duty created there to less than the full highway. It does not frustrate the policy announced in other statutes of protecting bicyclists by requiring them to use bicycle paths, where provided, in preference to roads, because bicycles on bicycle paths are not exposed to the hazards which arise from mixing bicycle and vehicular means of travel. [ Id. at 316, 458 N.W.2d 619, quoting Roy, supra at 341, 408 N.W.2d 783 (emphasis in original).] The crux of the analysis we utilized in Roy and Gregg applies to the facts of these cases as well. We noted that `the statute does not offer general protection to pedestrians or motorists without regard to location.' Gregg, supra at 312, 458 N.W.2d 619, quoting Roy, supra at 341, 408 N.W.2d 783. [7] We more recently addressed the applicability of the highway exception to an injured pedestrian in Mason v. Wayne Co. Bd of Comm'rs . There, the plaintiff alleged that the county was liable for failing to install school warning signs near an elementary school in Detroit. A majority of this Court rejected that argument because [t]he plaintiffs' action ... [did] not present a special danger to vehicles. The highway exception abrogates governmental immunity at `points of special danger to motorists....' Id. at 135, 523 N.W.2d 791, quoting Grof v. Michigan, 126 Mich.App. 427, 434, 337 N.W.2d 345 (1983); Comerica Bank of Kalamazoo v. Dep't of Transportation, 168 Mich.App. 84, 86, 424 N.W.2d 2 (1987). We noted that because the limiting sentence of the highway exception [8] excluded specific installations whose only rational purposes narrowly service the unique needs of pedestrians, it indicated a [legislative] conclusion that pedestrians and users of these installations have been sufficiently protected by the separation of them from motorists, without any need to impose a duty of maintenance and repair enforced by liability for resultant injuries. Mason, supra at 136-137, 523 N.W.2d 791. The following analysis from Mason supports this interpretation: [T]he phrase designed for vehicular travel can only be reasonably interpreted to mean  intended for vehicular travel. The explicit removal of exclusively pedestrian installations from the highway exception, coupled with the express language of the provision itself, permits but one conclusion: Pedestrians who trek upon Michigan highways must and do venture beyond the protective mandates of M.C.L. § 691.1402(1); M.S.A. § 3.996(102)(1). The exclusion of crosswalks from the highway exception is consistent with the idea underlying the highway exception that drivers of vehicles should be able to keep their minds on the traffic, and should not have to worry that dangerous surprises lie ahead. Pedestrians are situated differently than vehicular traffic, which may approach obstacles in the highway too quickly to avoid them, or may avoid obstacles only by jeopardizing traffic in the adjoining lanes. This legislative line drawing is also explicable on the ground that expanding the right to sue past a certain point does not prevent accidents, and amounts to nothing more than an expanded obligation to pay. The Legislature may well have concluded that governmental liability for injuries to pedestrians crossing the street will not enhance vehicular safety. [ Id. at 137-138, 523 N.W.2d 791.] In Roy and Gregg, we indicated that we examined not the class of individual, but the area on which the individual traveled. As long as the individual was injured on the improved portion of the highway and was not injured in any of the three areas listed in M.C.L. § 691.1402(1); M.S.A. § 3.996(102)(1), we have consistently held that that individual stated a cause of action so as to avoid governmental immunity. In light of this, we now turn to the facts of these combined cases in an effort to further the legislative purpose underlying the highway exception to governmental immunity, keeping in mind our mandate to construe the conditions and restrictions of the statute narrowly. [9]
Plaintiff Suttles contends that as long as a person is on the improved portion of the highway and is not within the specifically exempted areas of crosswalks, sidewalks, or other pedestrian installations, the government is not entitled to immunity. Plaintiff Brown alleges that because of a design defect at the intersection in question, the defendant breached its duty to maintain the improved portion of the highway safe for vehicular travel.
Plaintiff Suttles got out from the passenger's side of the vehicle in which she was traveling and was injured when she allegedly slipped and fell on an unnatural accumulation of ice and snow. The record is replete with varying accounts regarding the specifics surrounding plaintiff's injury. For example, in her deposition taken before her death, the plaintiff indicated, at one point, that she was on the improved portion of the highway at the time she fell. Later, she indicated that she was on the curb or sidewalk when she was injured. There was also conflicting testimony regarding the location of the ice and snow. The plaintiff indicated the accumulation was both on the sidewalk and on the improved portion of the highway. The plaintiff's personal representative testified in his deposition that he found the plaintiff laying on the sidewalk next to the ice and snow that had been piled on the sidewalk and spilled over onto the curb. The accounts regarding snowfall on the day in question also conflicted. Finally, the maintenance workers and the security personnel from the office building located immediately adjacent to the area where plaintiff was injured also testified. The city of Flint's street maintenance supervisor testified as well. These individuals gave different accounts regarding whose responsibility it was to remove snow and ice, and the origin, size, and location of the snow accumulation in this case. To the extent the answers to these and other issues relate to the duty, if any, owed to plaintiff by defendant at the time of her injury, they must be resolved by the trial court on remand. [10] If plaintiff is found to have been injured on the sidewalk, then neither the county nor the state owed her a duty under the highway exception to governmental immunity. M.C.L. § 691.1402(1); M.S.A. § 3.996(102)(1). If, however, plaintiff was injured in the traveled portion of the highway because of defendant's negligence, then she may have pleaded a cause of action within the highway exception to governmental immunity. [11] The record indicates the vehicle in which the plaintiff was traveling parallel parked along the curb in a portion of the highway that had been specifically designated for parking by an alcove-like curbed area. This Court's holding in Mason provided that if a plaintiff is injured on a sidewalk, in a crosswalk, or on any other installation outside the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel, no duty is owed to that plaintiff by the state or a county. If, on remand, it is determined that plaintiff was on the sidewalk when she fell, the analysis is simple: The defendant did not owe a duty to her. If, however, it is found that the plaintiff fell and was injured by a defect in the improved portion of the highway, then she may have pleaded a cause of action so as to avoid governmental immunity. [12] Hence, we would reaffirm the analysis adopted in Gregg, which allowed suit by a nonvehicular traveler who was injured on the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. We would leave it to the trial court on remand to ascertain the answers to these questions. We reiterate, however, that the immediately preceding discussion should not be interpreted to mean the defendant is automatically liable to the plaintiff even if it is found that she was injured on the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. Plaintiff must still demonstrate the requisite elements of a negligence cause of action. If on remand the trial court determines that the plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a cause of action so as to avoid governmental immunity, the existence of a duty owed to plaintiff by defendant has been established. Plaintiff must then prove defendant breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate and factual cause of her injury.
Plaintiff Brown's next friend was injured when she was struck by an automobile while crossing M-119 on a crosswalk. The mandate of M.C.L. § 691.1402(1); M.S.A. § 3.996(102)(1) is clear: Neither the state nor a county owe a duty to a pedestrian while the pedestrian is in a crosswalk. This issue was decided by this Court in Mason, and we would specifically reaffirm that holding today. [13] Because it is undisputed that plaintiff's next friend was injured while she was in the crosswalk, neither the state nor the county owed her a duty. Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8) was therefore proper. [14]
For the foregoing reasons, we would reverse Suttles and remand the case to the trial court with instructions for further factual development, and we would affirm the Court of Appeals decision in Brown. [15]