Opinion ID: 2979084
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior criminal offenses

Text: Adams asserts numerous arguments to show the district court attributed an unreasonable amount of weight to his prior criminal offenses. To begin, Adams cites U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 8 Commentary Note 2(B), which states that departures from Criminal History Category VI are appropriate for an egregious, serious criminal record in which even the guideline range for Criminal History Category VI is not adequate to reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history . . . . In determining whether an upward departure from Criminal History Category VI is warranted, the court should consider that the nature of prior offenses rather than simply their number is often more indicative of the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal record. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3 cmt. 2(B) (2008). Adams argues that although his past offenses are numerous, they do not reveal him to be a violent offender, and they are neither egregious nor as serious as crimes typically seen in Criminal History Category VI.4 This argument fails because the district court applied a variance, rather than a departure, and “[a]lthough the standard for an upward departure under the Guidelines may be helpful in determining reasonableness, a district court does not necessarily abuse its discretion in considering criminal history that would not otherwise support a [U.S.S.G.] § 4A1.3 departure when that criminal history is directly relevant to the § 3553(a) factors.” Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d at 635. Indeed, Adams admits the district court is not, in applying a variance, bound by Commentary to the advisory Guidelines. Variance propriety is not based solely on the Guidelines, but rather on the consideration of the factors delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Whereas § 4A1.3(a)(1) permits an upward departure only where the defendant’s criminal history category “substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes,” the court’s authority under § 3553(a) more broadly permits consideration of “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” as well as “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to protect the public 4 Adams suggests the district court agreed with this assertion, but actually the district court found that although some of the offenses were minor, there was a pattern of increasing seriousness, and the minor crimes perhaps pointed to more serious future offenses. 9 from further crimes of the defendant.” A district court always can impose an aboveGuidelines sentence so long as it is reasonable in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). . . . The only requirement is that the court determine, “in light of all the facts and circumstances of the particular case before it, whether the range in question is appropriate to the case.” United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 589–90 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). Even so, if the district court placed an unreasonable amount of weight on any pertinent factor, the sentence would be substantively unreasonable. Conatser, 514 F.3d at 520. Next, Adams makes just such an argument. He asserts that although he had numerous convictions, his offenses were non-violent and not as serious as those commonly found in Category VI, thus the applicable Guidelines range adequately accounts for his past criminal behavior, making the district court’s upward variance unreasonable. The commentary to the Guidelines, although not controlling, is helpful in determining reasonableness. See Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d at 635. It directs the district court to consider whether “reliable information indicates the criminal history does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or likelihood of recidivism.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.3 cmt. background (2008). The district court, citing the steady stream of increasingly serious offenses, almost all of which involved the use of alcohol, marijuana, or methamphetamine, found Adams presented a high risk of recidivism. Furthermore, the district court noted that the threshold for Category VI is thirteen points, and Adams scored ten points more than that amount without the attribution of points to all of Adams’ convictions. Given the high number of increasingly serious convictions, and the fact that alcohol, marijuana, or methamphetamine were involved in many of the convictions, it was not unreasonable for the district court to determine, as 10 it did, that Adams was “spiraling out of control” (Sentencing Tr. 11:9–10), thereby presenting a high risk of recidivism. Thus, the district court did not attribute unreasonable weight to this factor.