Opinion ID: 2081366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Motion to Suppress Defendant's Statements

Text: The defendant also contends that the trial justice committed reversible error in denying the pretrial motion to suppress two statements that he made to the police just after he was taken into custody. The first of the contested statements by Victor related to his mother. After Officer Deschamps asked him about the last time that he had seen his mother, Victor replied that he had not done anything to her. Victor's second statement to the police involved his explanation about the cause of his obvious injuries. In that statement, Victor indicated that he had received his injuries during a fight in downtown Providence. [22] Victor asserts that, because of the chaotic and confusing circumstances surrounding his arrest, the prosecution failed to prove both that he understood his Miranda rights and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived them when he gave those challenged statements. Before a criminal defendant's custodial statements may be admitted into evidence, the state must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the statement was voluntary and that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Garcia, 643 A.2d at 188; see also State v. Espinosa, 109 R.I. 221, 230, 283 A.2d 465, 469-70 (1971). As we have stated, [i]n reviewing a trial justice's decision on a motion to suppress a confession that is claimed to be involuntary, we perform a two-step analysis. State v. Humphrey, 715 A.2d 1265, 1273 (R.I.1998). The first step is to review the trial justice's findings regarding the historical facts relevant to the voluntariness of the challenged confession. Id. The next step is to apply those historical facts and review the trial justice's determination as to the voluntariness of the challenged confession [on a] de novo [basis]. Id.; see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-97, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); State v. Kryla, 742 A.2d 1178, 1183 (R.I.1999). Before we will reverse a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, our independent review of the conclusions of the trial court that are drawn from the historical facts must establish that the defendant's constitutional rights were denied. State v. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d 491, 513 (R.I.2004). We have previously stated that [t]he findings of historical fact by the trial justice are given great weight and will not be set aside unless they are clearly wrong. State v. Bailey, 677 A.2d 407, 410 (R.I.1996); see also State v. Werner, 831 A.2d 183, 191 (R.I.2003); Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1273; State v. Pemental, 434 A.2d 932, 935 (R.I.1981). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the basis of the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. State v. LaRosa, 112 R.I. 571, 576, 313 A.2d 375, 377 (1974); see also Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1273; State v. Baton, 488 A.2d 696, 701 (R.I.1985). At the hearing on Victor's motion to suppress, Officer Deschamps testified that he recited the Miranda warnings to Victor while the other police officers in the apartment were attempting to subdue him. He further testified that, Victor was extremely cocky, very belligerent towards police and that, at one point, [he] attempted to fight us   . After he informed Victor of his Miranda rights, Officer Deschamps asked him when had he last seen his mother and how he had received the injuries to his leg and hand. Officer Deschamps further testified at the suppression hearing that Victor told him that he didn't do anything to [his mother] and that he had gotten into an argument, or fight, downtown, downtown area. In denying the motion to suppress, the trial justice found that Victor was not disoriented at the time of his arrest and that: He certainly was hostile. He certainly was belligerent. Indeed, he was threatening officers with a knife. Guns were pointed at the defendant, certainly not to extract a confession but, more importantly, to extract a knife from his possession which he was menacing the officers with. The trial justice additionally found that, even though Victor was injured when Officer Deschamps read his Miranda rights to him, his injuries could not have been very serious because of the level of resistance that Victor demonstrated during his arrest. The trial justice further found that, Victor's demeanor was cocky and that such a demeanor was indicative of his understanding of the circumstances that were occurring and of what Officer Deschamps had said to him about his rights under Miranda. After carefully reviewing the record and bearing in mind the due deference that this Court gives to the trial justice's findings of historical fact, we cannot say that the trial justice's findings were clearly erroneous. Having determined that the trial justice's findings of historical fact were not clearly erroneous, we must next exercise our independent judgment to establish whether Victor was deprived of his constitutional rights. Grayhurst, 852 A.2d at 513. The definitive test of the voluntariness of a statement is whether, after taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, it was the product of the defendant's free will or was instead the result of coercion that overcame the defendant's free will at the time that it was made. See State v. Amado, 424 A.2d 1057, 1062 (R.I.1981); see also State v. Girard, 799 A.2d 238, 250 (R.I.2002); State v. Torres, 787 A.2d 1214, 1224 (R.I.2002). A valid waiver of Miranda rights cannot be presumed from the silence of the accused after the Miranda warnings have been issued, nor can it be presumed from the fact that the accused has actually made a confession or a statement. Amado, 424 A.2d at 1062; see also State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22, 35 (R.I.1982). In denying the motion to suppress, the trial justice reviewed the totality of the factual circumstances, and he then ruled that defendant had been apprised of his constitutional rights and that he had made the challenged statements voluntarily    with all the awareness of [the] rights that had been administered to him. [23] Our de novo review of the voluntariness issue in light of the trial justice's findings of historical fact leads us to the same conclusion as that reached by the trial justice: Victor Perez was apprised of his rights under Miranda, and he knowingly and voluntarily made the two above-referenced statements to the police after being so apprised. [24]
In circumstances where an involuntary statement has been erroneously admitted, this Court reviews both the statement and the remainder of the evidence against the defendant to determine whether the admission of the statement constituted harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. Humphrey, 715 A.2d at 1275-76; see also State v. Bettencourt, 763 A.2d 636, 637 (R.I.2000). In this case, even if defendant's statements were admitted into evidence erroneously (and we do not believe that they were), any error in such admission would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming additional evidence indicative of defendant's guilt. [25] The first of the challenged statements of defendant was made in response to a question posed by Officer Deschamps with respect to the last time that he had seen his mother. Victor told Officer Deschamps that he had not done anything to her. The record discloses that there was an overwhelming amount of evidence implicating Victor in the murder of his mother and that this statement by Victor was, in effect, cumulative evidence. Indeed, before she died, Rosa herself stated that it was Victor who had attacked her. Furthermore, despite the fact that, when he made his first statement to the police, Victor denied having done anything to his mother, by the time his case came to trial, he no longer denied that it was he who had caused her death. Assuming arguendo that this first statement was obtained in violation of defendant's Miranda rights, its relevance to the trial was extremely attenuated. We are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that its admission would have been harmless error. Victor's second statement to the police related to the cause of his obvious injuries; he said that he had incurred those injuries during a fight in downtown Providence. It is clear from the record, however, that the admission of Victor's statement in response to Officer Deschamps' inquiry constituted merely cumulative evidence, because Mr. Rivera had already testified that Victor told him that he had received the injuries as the result of a problem downtown. We are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of this second statement, also would have constituted harmless error.