Opinion ID: 2002011
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Testimony by the Victim's Husband.

Text: Defendant's first assignment of error concerns the exclusion by the trial court of certain testimony by the victim's husband on the ground of the marital privilege found in Iowa Code section 622.9 (1981). The defendant asserts that this evidentiary ruling constitutes reversible error. The victim testified that at the time of the crime she was in the process of a marriage dissolution proceeding with her husband who had only recently been released from prison. She indicated in her testimony that child custody was an issue in the dissolution action. Both the victim and the defendant testified that on the morning in question the defendant had entered the victim's residence through a door located at the rear of the mobile home near the bedroom where the sexual activity took place. During cross-examination the victim testified that at the time of the attack one of her children was awakened and became aware of defendant's presence in the mobile home. She further testified as follows: Q. Were you concerned on the date of this occurrence about any accusations that might arise concerning your sexual behavior or sexual promiscuity as they might relate to the issue of custody? A. No. Q. Had no reason or no cause for concern? A. No. Q. Within one week or two weeks at most of this occurrence, did you have a conversation with [your husband] concerning this event? A. It was about a week after it happened. Q. You talked with [him]? A. Yes. Q. Where did that take place? A. At Sheryl's. Q. And you advised him or described at that time, did you not, that Darrel Blackford had arrived at your trailer, entered through the front door and that the acts of intercourse had taken place on the living room floor? A. No. Q. You never made those statements? A. No. Q. Did you make anything close to those statements? A. All I said was that he had raped me and I didn't go into detail with him, because I didn't think it was any of his concern. The victim's husband was called as a witness by the defendant, and the following colloquy took place: Q. Have your desires to place in issue the question of custody about the children been motivated in whole or in part by your knowledge of any promiscuous sexual behavior on the part of [your wife]? A. Yes. .... Q. [A]pproximately a week after the occurrence in this case did you have occasion to discuss the matter with [your wife]? A. No, sir. Q. Did you have a discussion with her about what had happened? A. Yes. Q. And what did she advise you had occurred? MR. CRISWELL: Your Honor, the State is going to object to this question. It calls for incompetent testimony and this witness is incompetent under Section 622.9 of the Code. This matter has already been gone into in chambers outside the presence of the jury. THE COURT: Sustained. MR. DOPF: Your Honor, since this would be the final question of the witness, I would request to make an offer of proof. THE COURT: Very well. In his offer of proof, the defendant inquired of the victim's husband as to what she had told him about the alleged attack. He responded that she told him she had admitted the defendant through the front door of the mobile home and that the sexual attack had taken place in the living room near the front door. The defendant urges as grounds for reversal that because no objection was made when the victim testified as to what she had or had not told her husband about the attack, both the victim and the State waived any basis for relying on the marital privilege as a basis for excluding the husband's version of the conversation. In its brief, the State tacitly concedes that the defendant is correct with respect to this contention but it urges that the trial court's ruling excluding the evidence was nonetheless correct for other reasons. We are committed to the view that when an objection is sustained to testimony properly excludable for any reason, a reversal will ordinarily not result from the fact that the wrong objection was made. State v. McCowen, 297 N.W.2d 226, 227 (Iowa 1980); State v. Pepples, 250 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Iowa 1977); State v. Rush, 242 N.W.2d 313, 320 (Iowa 1976); State v. Kidd, 239 N.W.2d 860, 864 (Iowa 1976). The result may be otherwise, however, if it appears that the correct objection, if stated, could have been obviated at trial. See McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 52, at 117-18 n. 61 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). The State urges in the present case that even if the proffered testimony of the victim's husband in regard to her prior inconsistent statements was not excludable on the ground of privilege, it was nonetheless inadmissible as attempted impeachment on a collateral matter. We agree with this conclusion and do not believe that exclusion on this ground could have been obviated at trial. If the excluded testimony is viewed solely as an attempt at impeachment based upon the subject matter of the prior inconsistent statement, the testimony is clearly collateral to the issues in the case. This is because there was no issue at trial concerning which door the defendant entered or the room in which the sexual encounter took place. Defendant contends, however, that the purpose of the excluded testimony was not to impeach the victim's testimony concerning the subject matter of the prior inconsistent statement. Rather, he urges, it was offered to show that the victim was inclined to falsify the circumstances of the encounter so as to minimize any negative effect it might have in her child custody dispute with her husband. Assuming that the excluded testimony would aid the suggested theory of impeachment, we believe it is nevertheless too collateral to provide a basis for reversal. Probably the most thorough review which we have undertaken concerning the limits of impeaching witnesses based on prior inconsistent statements is contained in State v. Gilmore, 259 N.W.2d 846, 853-58 (Iowa 1977). We there approved the rule found in several authorities discussed in the opinion that the true test as to collateralness is could the fact, as to which error is predicated, have been shown in evidence for any purpose independently of the contradiction. Gilmore, 259 N.W.2d at 853. In explanation of this principle we identified two categories of evidence which fall within the rule: (1) facts relevant to some issue in the case, and (2) facts discrediting the witness in respect to bias, corruption, skill, knowledge, or motive to falsify. We have already concluded the subject matter of the contradiction in the present evidentiary squabble is clearly not relevant to any issue involving the merits of the criminal charge against the defendant. It therefore does not fall under the first category approved in Gilmore. To the extent that the excluded evidence supports defendant's theory of discrediting the witness based on a motive to falsify, it is not evidence which would be admissible independently of the contradiction. See IIIA Wigmore Evidence § 1020, at 1011 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1970); Gilmore, 259 N.W.2d at 853. It therefore fails to qualify as to either category of evidence which is not collateral under the Gilmore standards. We conclude that although the objection which was sustained was not based on a proper ground, the evidence was nevertheless properly excluded. As a result, no reversible error may be predicated on this ruling by the trial court.