Opinion ID: 2380623
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Postcommitment Treatment Availability Is Irrelevant

Text: ¶ 15 The State argues that the Court of Appeals erred by holding that evidence about treatment available at the SCC but not yet undergone by the respondent is inadmissible at the SVP determination trial. The question before this court is a narrow one. The Court of Appeals held that evidence about the content of the SCC treatment voluntarily undergone by Post at the time of trial and Post's performance in treatment were relevant and admissible. Post, 145 Wash.App. at 741-42, 187 P.3d 803. Post did not appeal this holding. Our review is therefore limited to the admissibility of evidence about the content of SCC treatment programs in which Post had not yet participated and the admissibility of evidence that Post could later be released to a less restrictive alternative if he were committed. Because that disputed evidence was not relevant to the jury's determination, we affirm the Court of Appeals. ¶ 16 It is a fundamental rule of evidence that [e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible. ER 402. To be relevant, evidence need only have any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. ER 401. ¶ 17 If the disputed evidence is relevant, it must be to the second or third elements of the SVP definition. The State does not argue, nor could it, that treatment not yet undergone but available to committed SVPs makes any more probable the existence of convictions for crimes of sexual violence. Our inquiry is properly limited, then, to whether the existence and content of treatment programs at the SCC, as well as the possibility of future release to a less restrictive alternative, make it any more or less probable that Post has a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes him likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility. RCW 71.09.020(18). On the face of the question, the answer plainly appears to be no. Post's opportunities if committed have no obvious bearing on his actions if he is not committed, as those two potential realities are mutually exclusive. ¶ 18 This is not the first time we have been called upon to determine whether the consequences of commitment are relevant to the determination of whether a person is an SVP. In In re Detention of Turay, 139 Wash.2d 379, 986 P.2d 790 (1999), a respondent to an SVP determination trial sought to introduce evidence about the conditions of confinement at the SCC. Id. at 403, 986 P.2d 790. Affirming the trial court's motion in limine to exclude such evidence, we made it explicit that in an SVP determination trial, [t]he trier of fact's role ... is to determine whether the [respondent] constitutes an SVP; it is not to evaluate the potential conditions of confinement. Id. at 404, 986 P.2d 790. That statement applies with equal force in the present case. If the conditions of confinement are not relevant when offered by the respondent to an SVP proceeding, they are not relevant when offered by the State. ¶ 19 We are not alone in concluding that the consequences of a finder of fact's determination that a person is an SVP are not relevant to making that determination. In People v. Rains, 75 Cal.App.4th 1165, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 737 (1999), the California Court of Appeal addressed a similar question. In Rains, as here, the respondent to the SVP determination trial conceded the existence of prior sexually violent offenses so the only two issues for the jury were whether Rains had `a diagnosed mental disorder' and ... if so, whether that disorder `makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.' Id. at 1168, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 737 (quoting CAL. WELF. & INST.CODE § 6600(a)). The trial court admitted evidence that if the jury found Rains to be an SVP, he would be committed to a hospital and receive treatment. Id. at 1167, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 737. The Court of Appeal, however, held that this evidence had no relevance to either of the issues before the jury. Id. at 1170, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 737. This is the same conclusion we reach today. ¶ 20 The State advances three arguments in favor of the disputed evidence's relevance: (1) it is expressly permitted by the SVP definition's inclusion of the phrase if not confined in a secure facility, (2) it is probative of Post's mental condition and dangerousness, and (3) it is relevant to rebut Post's voluntary treatment plan. The first of these arguments is easily rebutted. The language if not confined in a secure facility appears in RCW 71.09.020(18), which defines the term `[s]exually violent predator.' In context, it is part of the requirement that the person's mental abnormality or personality disorder makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility. RCW 71.09.020(18). Far from making the conditions of a secure facility relevant, this clause operates to define the relevant inquiry as not including such conditions. The opposite reading would be painfully strained and violate our duty to strictly construe statutes involving deprivations of liberty. In re Cross, 99 Wash.2d 373, 379, 662 P.2d 828 (1983). ¶ 21 The State next argues that the treatment available at the SCC is relevant to the determination of Post's mental state and dangerousness. Insofar as the State's argument pertains to SCC treatment already undergone by Post, that question is not before us and we assume, as the Court of Appeals held, that such evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible. As for the phases of treatment not yet undergone by Post, the fact that those phases are available at the SCC does not make it any more or less probable that Post has a mental abnormality or a personality disorder or that he is dangerous. The same is true for potential future release from the SCC to a less restrictive alternative. With respect to dangerousness, the question for the finder of fact is whether Post is likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence if released immediately; it is not whether Post would be more likely to commit such an act if immediately released than if he were confined and subsequently released. ¶ 22 The State's final argument in favor of the SCC treatment program evidence is that it was necessary to rebut the efficacy of Post's voluntary treatment plan. Post's plan for unconditional release into the community, which he presented to the jury, consisted of regular individual treatment and marital counseling with Dr. Sally Wing and group therapy with one of her colleagues. He would be living with his wife in the downstairs area of his mother's home, working for a family friend, keeping a daily log of all his activities, and continuing to participate in a nonviolent communications group he had joined while in prison. In addition, numerous witnesses testified that they would support him in the community. This evidence was all relevant to the likelihood that Post would reoffend, as it has some tendency, if believed, to show that Post was less likely to do so. See Thorell, 149 Wash.2d at 751, 72 P.3d 708 (Because this goes to whether the definition of SVP is met, the individual may bring [voluntary treatment] evidence in defense of commitment.). As the Court of Appeals recognized in this case, the State was free to attempt to discredit the efficacy of the proposed program and the true level of Post's commitment to successful completion thereof. Post, 145 Wash.App. at 744, 187 P.3d 803. This could be accomplished in any number of ways, including by highlighting elements of treatment the State's experts believed were necessary for Post but not present in his treatment plan. Here, however, the State went substantially further by introducing evidence of the components of treatment that would be available to Post if he were committed. That evidence does not rebut Post's treatment plan but instead presents an alternative to it, an alternative that is irrelevant to whether Post's plan will be successful. It may be that commitment is more likely to prevent Post from committing another predatory act of sexual violence than is Post's voluntary treatment program, but this is entirely irrelevant to the likelihood that Post will reoffend if unconditionally released. ¶ 23 In sum, it is manifest that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing testimony about the treatment that would be available to Post if he were committed and the possibility of release to a less restrictive alternative following commitment. The State's arguments that the evidence is relevant are unavailing, and the admission violated ER 402 and Turay.