Opinion ID: 2600307
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Merger of Unlawful Penetration with a Foreign Object with the Resulting Homicide Within the Meaning of People v. Ireland

Text: The trial court instructed the jury that it could base a first degree felony-murder conviction and a special circumstance finding on an unintentional or accidental killing that occurred during the commission or attempted commission of kidnapping (§ 207) or unlawful penetration with a foreign object (§ 289). (CALJIC No. 8.21.) Defendant contends the instruction was improper because the commission of section 289 in the present case merged with the resulting homicide within the meaning of People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580 ( Ireland ). On that basis, defendant claims unlawful penetration of Wong with a foreign object could not serve as the predicate felony for a felony-murder conviction or a special circumstance finding. We conclude the underlying felony proscribed by section 289 did not merge with the homicide in this case. In Ireland, we adopted the merger rule that had been developed in other jurisdictions as a shorthand explanation for the conclusion that the felony-murder rule should not be applied in circumstances where the only underlying (or `predicate') felony committed by the defendant was assault. (People v. Hansen (1994) 9 Cal.4th 300, 311, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609. 885 P.2d 1022 ( Hansen ).) The defendant in Ireland shot and killed his wife. The jury was instructed that it could return a second degree felony-murder verdict based on the underlying felony of assault with a deadly weapon. We reversed the defendant's conviction for second degree murder on the basis that an assault with a deadly weapon which was an integral part of and included in fact  within the homicide could not support a second degree felony-murder instruction. ( Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 539, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580.) We reasoned that [t]his kind of bootstrapping was not permissible because [t]o allow such use of the felony-murder rule would effectively preclude the jury from considering the issue of malice aforethought in all cases wherein homicide has been committed as a result of a felonious assaulta category which includes the great majority of all homicides. ( Ibid. ) Two years later, we clarified that an Ireland inquiry must extend to an investigation of the purpose of the [underlying] conduct that resulted in a homicide and that the felony-murder rule could apply when there is an independent felonious purpose apart from the intent to inflict[ ] bodily injury. ( People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 387, 99 Cal.Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793 ( Burton, ); see also People v. Mattison (1971) 4 Cal.3d 177, 185, 93 Cal.Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d 193.) Hansen, which was decided after the offenses in this case, explained that, while many cases properly have applied Ireland's merger rule to other felonies that involve assault or assault with a deadly weapon, with respect to certain inherently dangerous felonies, their use as the predicate felony supporting application of the felony-murder rule will not elevate all felonious assaults to murder or otherwise subvert the legislative intent. ( Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 315, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 885 P.2d 1022.) In holding that discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house (§ 246) did not merge with the resulting homicide, we concluded that application of the second degree felony-murder rule would not result in the subversion of legislative intent. Most homicides do not result from violations of section 246, and thus, unlike the situation in People v. Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d 522, 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580, application of the felony-murder doctrine in the present context will not have the effect of `precluding] the jury from considering the issue of malice aforethought ... [in] the great majority of all homicides.' [Citation.] Similarly, application of the felony-murder doctrine in the case before us would not frustrate the Legislature's deliberate calibration of punishment for assaultive conduct resulting in death, based upon the presence or absence of malice aforethought.... [Application of the felony-murder rule, when a violation of section 246 results in the death of a person, clearly is consistent with the traditionally recognized purpose of the second degree felony-murder doctrinenamely the deterrence of negligent or accidental killings that occur in the course of the commission of dangerous felonies. ( Hansen, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 315, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 885 P.2d 1022.) In the present case, we find the reasoning in Hansen equally persuasive when a violation of section 289 results in the death of a person. Similarly, applying the Burton analysis, we conclude a violation of section 289 does not merge with a resulting homicide within the meaning of the Ireland doctrine because unlawful penetration with a foreign object has an independent felonious purpose, namely, to sexually arouse, gratify or abuse. We reject defendant's attempt to compare unlawful penetration with a foreign object (§ 289) to felony abuse involving willful infliction of physical pain on a child under circumstances likely to produce great bodily harm or death. (§ 273a.) A violation of section 273a merges with a resulting homicide because the offense is a close variant of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury or death, which is similar to a violation of section 245 (assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury or death or assault with a deadly weapon), the traditional Ireland merger situation. ( People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 201 Cal.Rptr. 311, 678 P.2d 886.) In Smith, we reasoned that [i]t would be wholly illogical to allow this kind of assaultive child abuse to be bootstrapped into felony murder merely because the victim was a child rather than an adult, as in Ireland. (Id. at p. 806, 201 Cal.Rptr. 311, 678 P.2d 886.) Here, by contrast, a violation of section 289 embodies a separate felonious purpose apart from the intent to injure or kill, and the evidence that defendant exposed Wong's breasts and bit one of her nipples amply supports a finding that defendant penetrated her genital area with at least one of the three sexual intents set forth in the statute. Under either the rationale set forth in Hansen or that set forth in Burton, we conclude the offense of unlawful penetration of a foreign object does not merge with a resulting homicide within the meaning of the Ireland doctrine, the offense will support a conviction of first degree felony murder, and the trial court properly instructed the jury on a first degree felony-murder theory based on the underlying felony of unlawful penetration with a foreign object. These conclusions undermine defendant's remaining claims that his state and federal rights to due process of law and a fair trial were violated because the jury was allowed to convict him of a nonexistent crime, he was arbitrarily deprived the benefit of the merger doctrine, and the jury received an erroneous instruction that permitted it to convict [him] of first degree murder without finding malice. (See U.S. Const., Amends. 6, 14, & 16; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 14, & 15.) We do not find that Hansen established a more restrictive standard than existed at the time of defendant's offenses; in any event, we rely independently on Burton, a 1971 case, in reaching our conclusion that the Ireland merger doctrine does not apply. Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim that application of Hansen to him may violate the prohibition against ex post fact laws (U.S. Const., art. I, § 10; Cal. Const., art. I, § 9), and deny him due process of law (U.S. Const., art. I, § 14; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7 & 15).