Opinion ID: 764164
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Attempts to Limit EEOC Authority

Text: 24 On the basis of both the clear language and legislative background of Title VII, the Court has rejected attempts to characterize the EEOC as an ordinary plaintiff, or to bind the EEOC to the procedural requirements that private litigants under Title VII face. In Occidental Life, the Court observed that the EEOC alone possesses the discretion as to how and when it shall carry out its administrative duties and thus does not function simply as a vehicle for conducting litigation on behalf of private parties. 432 U.S. at 368. Thus, the Court held that even where the EEOC seeks monetary and injunctive relief on behalf of a single aggrieved individual, state statutes of limitations cannot bind the EEOC. See id. at 368-73. Significantly, the Court thereby rejected the notion that [i]nsofar as the EEOC seeks to recover backpay for individuals, it stands in the shoes of the individuals and is not suing in its sovereign capacity. See id. at 381 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 25 The Court again addressed a proposed limitation on the EEOC's ability to maintain an action on behalf of aggrieved individuals in General Telephone. See 446 U.S. at 318. In that case, the Court recognized that by its 1972 amendments to Title VII, Congress sought to implement the public interest as well as to bring about more effective enforcement of private rights. Id. at 326. The Court further observed that congressional authorization of both a private cause of action and an EEOC cause of action suggests that the EEOC is not merely a proxy for the victims of discrimination and that [w]hen the EEOC acts, albeit at the behest of and for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to vindicate the public interest in preventing employment discrimination. Id. Accordingly, the Court rejected the claim that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure binds the EEOC when it seeks classwide relief as it would bind a private Title VII class action litigant. 5 See id. at 322. In particular, the Court noted the fact that the EEOC may not be an adequate representative of aggrieved employees because the EEOC's obligation to secure the public interest may well conflict with individual interests. See id. at 331. 26 Similarly, numerous lower courts have acknowledged the independent authority and responsibility of the EEOC to bring suit against an employer whom the EEOC has reasonable cause to believe has engaged in unlawful employment discrimination. We ourselves have recognized that the EEOC represents the public interest when it sues to enforce Title VII, not solely the interests of the private charging parties. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d at 1359. While the EEOC acts, in some respects, as the representative of an aggrieved individual when it sues on that individual's behalf, the EEOC never ceases to represent the public interest as well. Indeed, whenever the EEOC sues in its own name, it sues both for the benefit of specific individuals and the public interest. See EEOC v. Harvey L. Walner & Assocs., 91 F.3d 963, 968 (7th Cir.1996). The EEOC may thereby, in the public interest, provide relief which goes beyond the limited interests of the charging parties. Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355, 358 (6th Cir.1969). 27 Therefore, the plain language of Title VII, the legislative history and purpose of the 1972 amendments, and the interpretation of the statute by courts illustrate that Congress granted to the EEOC the right to represent an interest broader than that of a particular individual when it exercises its authority to sue. To empower a private individual to take away this congressional mandate, by entering into arbitration agreements or other contractual arrangements, would grant that individual the ability to govern whether and when the EEOC may protect the public interest and further our national initiative against employment discrimination, and to thereby undo the work of Congress in its 1972 amendments. Accordingly, we conclude the district court erred in dismissing the EEOC's claim for monetary relief on behalf of Adams by relying on principles of preclusion and waiver, and on the FAA. Moreover, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the EEOC's claim for general injunctive relief against further racial discrimination at Frank's by impermissibly holding the EEOC to procedural requirements that restrain only private Title VII litigants.