Opinion ID: 3066064
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: NDEP Was Entitled to Summary Judgment

Text: Against the Operator, SBIC, on the CERCLA and State Law Claims NDEP sued SBIC under CERCLA because SBIC operated the dry cleaning facility and disposed of the PCE. Among the categories of entities that CERCLA holds liable are operators of a facility where there was a “disposal” of hazardous substances. CERCLA liability may be assessed against “any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2). “Disposal” means the “discharge, . . . spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters.” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3). SBIC’s principal challenge to its CERCLA liability is that it did not operate the facility “at the time of disposal” because it leaked the contaminant onto the floor, not into the natural environment. VOGGENTHALER V. MARYLAND SQUARE 31 SBIC does not dispute the facts. It operated the dry cleaning facility at the Site between 1969 and August 31, 1984. SBIC’s lease agreement for the facility called for it to be built with a trench style “sewage drain adequate for [SBIC’s] business.” SBIC admits that it used PCE in its operations and that it regularly spilled PCE on the concrete floor, and once spilled roughly 100 gallons of PCE during a filter change in 1982. SBIC argues that spilling PCE onto the floor, rather than directly onto the land or water, does not count as a “disposal.” SBIC’s argument, therefore, is that the statute must be interpreted to require a disposal directly into the groundwater or onto the land. This interpretation is contrary to the language of the statute. A “disposal” under the statute includes any discharge or spill of waste “into or on any land or water so that [the waste] may enter the environment . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (emphasis added). Because the phrase “enter the environment” is qualified by the word “may” in the definition of “disposal,” the statute cannot be interpreted to cover only spills that go directly and immediately into the groundwater. The statute contemplates that some spills may never enter the environment. The definition covers more than direct spills. SBIC’s interpretation conflicts with our practice of construing CERCLA liberally to achieve the goals of cleaning up hazardous waste sites promptly and ensuring that the responsible parties pay the costs of the clean up. Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 881 (9th Cir. 2001). The only other courts to consider an interpretation like SBIC’s requiring “disposal” to be directly onto the land or into the water have rejected it. See Amland Props. Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784, 791–92 (D.N.J. 32 VOGGENTHALER V. MARYLAND SQUARE 1989) (concluding that a disposal inside a plant was a disposal “on any land”); Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, No. S-91-760DFL/GGH, 1993 WL 217429, at –20 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 1993) (stating that a release into the environment need not be direct). Their reasoning is sound. SBIC cites no contrary authority on point. Because we conclude that NDEP has established SBIC’s liability for past costs under CERCLA, NDEP is also entitled to a declaratory judgment for future costs. City of Colton v. Am. Promotional Events, Inc.–W., 614 F.3d 998, 1007 (9th Cir. 2010). In City of Colton, we held that a plaintiff who establishes liability for past response costs under CERCLA is entitled to a declaratory judgment on liability for future costs. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)). SBIC also, and on a similar basis, challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment on NDEP’s state law claim under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 445A.695, which authorizes injunctive relief to prevent the continuation or reoccurrence of other statutory violations. SBIC contends that it did not operate the facility at the time the PCE actually touched the soil or groundwater. This fact is not relevant. NDEP has charged that SBIC violated Nev. Rev. Stat. § 445A.465, which makes it unlawful to “[d]ischarge from any point source any pollutant into any waters of the State . . . .” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 445A.465(a), (d). A drain pipe is a point source. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 445A.395. SBIC spilled PCE into the drain of the facility. The PCE was thus discharged through the drains as the point sources. SBIC is therefore liable for the resulting contamination of the groundwater. VOGGENTHALER V. MARYLAND SQUARE 33