Opinion ID: 1898079
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Failure to Define the Mitigating Factors

Text: Defendant alleged three mitigating factors during the penalty phase of trial: (1) that he was under extreme emotional or mental disturbance at the time of the murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(a); (2) that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired as the result of mental disease or defect, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(d); and (3) that there were other factors relevant to his character or record or the circumstances of the offense that justified mitigating his sentence, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h). He now argues that the trial court's definition of the first two factors was inadequate because the court merely read the applicable statutory language without further explanation. Concerning the other factors, defendant asserts that the court did not instruct how the evidence might mitigate defendant's sentence. Our review of the record, however, reveals that the court undertook to explain those factors in light of the circumstances of the case. The trial was held before our decision in State v. Bey (II), 112 N.J. 123, 548 A. 2d 887 (1988), in which we discussed sentencing procedures required in capital cases. In Bey II, we held that it was insufficient to read the statutory language when describing mitigating factors. The trial court's duty is to assure that a reasonable juror will understand the meaning and function of [the] mitigating factors. Id. at 169, 548 A. 2d 887; see Williams, 113 N.J. at 457, 550 A. 2d 1172. Even without the benefit of Bey II, the trial court undertook to explain the general meaning of the mitigating factors and the particular factors relied on by defendant. 112 N.J. at 170, 548 A. 2d 887. Concerning the general meaning of the mitigating factors, the court stated: [A] mitigating factor    is something which in fairness or mercy can be considered as extenuating or mitigating or reducing or lessening in some way the degree of blame or the degree of moral culpability. The circumstance[s] which in your human experience may warrant the exercise of compassion, mercy, sympathetic understanding, or which for any other reason may move you to conclude that prison for at least thirty years is a more appropriate sentence here than death. Any sympathy or compassion or mercy, if you will, which you may feel for any of these mitigating factors can be taken into consideration by you in coming to your decision as to the appropriate penalty but please be aware that the sympathy and compassion I'm speaking of is something which arises from consideration of the mitigating factors involved, not some vague and unchanneled sympathy which has nothing to do with any of those facts. Concerning defendant's claim that he was under extreme emotional or mental disturbance at the time of the murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(a), the court distinguished that factor from the insanity defense and reviewed its previous definition of mitigating factors. Without summarizing the evidence, the court then instructed the jury to consider the evidence presented by both sides. Thus, the court did more than simply read the statutory definition of this factor. As to the second alleged mitigating factor, that defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as the result of mental defect or disease, N.J. S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(d), the trial court again emphasized that this factor differs from the insanity defense and again instructed the jury to consider all the evidence submitted by both sides. In discussing whether any other factors would mitigate defendant's penalty, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h), the court noted that the jury could consider defendant's childhood, family, upbringing, military record, and anything else    deem[ed] appropriate. Thus, unlike the trial courts in Bey II and Williams, the court sought to explain the statutory definitions of the relevant mitigating factors. On retrial, the court would be well-advised to provide a more detailed explanation in understandable terms related to the evidence in the case. Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 432, 548 A. 2d 1022. As previously indicated, however, the charge was adequate.