Opinion ID: 2626390
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's Forcible Sodomy of his Daughters

Text: A week or so before the cause was called to trial on July 7, 1992, the prosecution advised the defense both orally and in writing about witnesses who might describe criminal activity involving defendant's use or threatened use of violence under section 190.3, factor (b) (factor (b)). The list included defendant's daughter, S., and his ex-wife, Deborah. The prosecutor also disclosed his ongoing investigation of a 1981 arrest in Texas for sexual assault. The search had been hampered, he said, by the lack of any record of conviction and the difficulty obtaining interstate police reports. While he did not know who accused defendant of the Texas crimes, the prosecutor promised to immediately disclose that information if it involved the daughters or someone I believe I can use at the penalty phase. On July 17, 1992, the day after the jury was sworn, the prosecutor told both the court and counsel that he had just received police records faxed from Texas confirming that defendant's 1981 arrest involved rape and/or sodomy against both daughters. The prosecutor said that he had not yet located either victim. Nonetheless, he gave notice of his intent to introduce their testimony about violent sex crimes prompting the 1981 arrest. The prosecutor gave the defense copies of the faxed material. Counsel responded by accusing the prosecutor of delay in disclosing the circumstances of the Texas sex crimes. Counsel sought exclusion of this evidence under both section 190.3 and due process principles, because adequate notice was not given until after trial had begun. However, the motion failed. The court determined that the prosecution had acted diligently and fulfilled all notice requirements. Finding no unfair surprise, the court cited preliminary hearing testimony in which Valery C. said that S. had mentioned being sexually abused by defendant. Shortly before the penalty phase, the court considered the admissibility of the Texas sex crimes on grounds other than notice. The prosecutor said he had not yet located S., and that only M. and Deborah might testify at trial. He called both witnesses at the hearing as part of his offer of proof. (See Evid.Code, § 402.) Specifically, M. testified that defendant threatened, frightened, and sodomized both her and S. as children in Texas. According to M., the abuse of both girls began when M. was five and ended when she was eight, and occurred once or twice a week when their mother was not home. Deborah testified, in turn, that M. told her and others about the abuse. The parties stipulated that these accusations led to defendant's 1981 arrest, and ended in a no bill grand jury proceeding in Texas. It was further established by stipulation and judicial notice that such a proceeding occurs when an insufficient number of grand jurors (i.e., fewer than nine of 12) find probable cause of a crime, and means the suspect is not indicted or held for trial. Also, the grand jury may reconsider the case and issue an indictment later. The defense moved to exclude the Texas sex crimes on two grounds. First, defendant claimed he had been acquitted by the grand jury, and that the evidence was thus barred under factor (b). Second, defendant insisted the acts were stale and prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352. He argued their admission would be abusive and unfair. These claims were rejected. The trial court declined to view the Texas grand jury's failure to indict as a final adjudication on the merits. The court also refused to exclude the Texas sex crimes under Evidence Code section 352. However, defendant was allowed to tell penalty jurors about the favorable outcome of the Texas case. As noted, M. and Deborah testified at the penalty phase consistent with their accounts at the evidentiary hearing. The defense established that the Texas grand jury did not indict defendant for sodomy against M. and S. An instruction prevented penalty jurors from considering any violent criminal acts in aggravation under factor (b) unless they were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, defendant contends use of the factor (b) sex crimes violated state statutory law in several respects, and impaired his federal and state constitutional rights to due process and a reliable verdict. We now address each claim. [22]
Defendant argues here, as below, that the trial court should have excluded the factor (b) sex crimes because the prosecution did not timely disclose certain details before trial, like the victims' identities. We disagree. The defense generally must receive notice of aggravating evidence prior to trial. (§ 190.3.) Depending upon the circumstances, we have defined this concept to mean either before the case is called to trial ( People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 879, 277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906) or before the start of jury selection. ( People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 51, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673.) In any event, notice given later in time does not require exclusion of the evidence where it is newly discovered, and the delay is not unreasonable, unexcused, or prejudicial. ( People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 619, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) At no point must the section 190.3 notice recite every circumstantial fact surrounding a factor (b) crime. The purpose of the statute is met where the defendant has a reasonable chance to defend against the charge. ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th 92, 166, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 258, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643.) The trial court properly applied these rules here. The prosecution informed the defense well before trial that at least one daughter, S., would describe factor (b) crimescrimes that logically included the incest S. had revealed to Valery C. At the same time, the prosecution disclosed that the factor (b) evidence might include sex crimes underlying defendant's 1981 Texas arrest, and that his two daughters might be the victims. While the prosecutor did not confirm the latter fact until after the jury was sworn, he shared such information as soon as it arrived from out of state. Only a few weeks passed between the first and second notifications. Even the latter notice came near the start of trial, before any guilt evidence was introduced. Thus, defendant was adequately apprised of the prosecution's intent to admit evidence of the sodomy involving his daughters.
Defendant contends he was prosecuted and acquitted for the factor (b) sex crimes in Texas, and that such acts were therefore barred under section 190.3. According to this theory, the grand jury's failure to indict defendant under a probable cause standard constituted an implied determination that he was not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant is mistaken. Section 190.3 expressly permits proof of any violent criminal activity, whether or not it led to prosecution and conviction, except as to any offense resulting in an acquittal. ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 754, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741.) We have strictly limited this statutory notion of an acquittal to a judicial determination on the merits of the truth or falsity of the charge. ( People v. Bacigalupo, supra, 1 Cal.4th 103, 133-134, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559; People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 390, 279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009.) Thus, an acquittal after prosecution does not occur for purposes of section 190.3 where the trial court dismissed the case under section 995 for lack of probable cause as to guilt. ( People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 774, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250.) We have reached the same result even where a statutory bar prevents refiling of the dismissed charge. ( People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 907, 274 Cal.Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282.) Here, there was no judicial determination on the merits as to whether defendant forcibly sodomized his daughters. The Texas proceeding involved a discretionary charging decision by the grand jury. Indeed, it seems even further removed from an acquittal than a section 995 proceeding in which pending criminal charges are dismissed by a judge. Nothing in the grand jury proceeding itself prevented defendant from being later charged, prosecuted, and convicted of the same crimes. None of the features commonly associated with acquittals exist here. (Cf. People v. Hatch (2000) 22 Cal.4th 260, 271, 92 Cal. Rptr.2d 80, 991 P.2d 165 [double jeopardy principles bar retrial if court finds evidence at trial was insufficient to support conviction as matter of law].) The trial court properly reached the same result.
According to defendant, Evidence Code section 352 virtually compelled exclusion of the factor (b) sex crimes because they were too remote and prejudicial, and because M.'s testimony was untrustworthy. However, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. The prosecution may offer, in aggravation, violent criminal acts committed at any time in the defendant's life. ( People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1158, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1; People v. Bacigalupo, supra, 1 Cal.4th 103, 134, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559.) The time gap between the forced serial sodomy of defendant's daughters and the present trial is not unusually long by capital standards. (E.g., People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 585, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347, and cases cited.) Also, because factor (b) expressly permits admission of criminal violence at the penalty phase, the trial court cannot exclude all such evidence as unduly prejudicial. ( Id. at p. 586, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) This information shows the defendant's propensity for violence, and helps jurors decide whether he deserves to die. ( People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 349-350, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846.) As for M.'s credibility, this issue affects the weight, not the admissibility, of her factor (b) testimony. It was for the jury to decide, based on proper instruction, whether she properly recalled and recounted defendant's violent acts. ( People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th 81, 172, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357; People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 587, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.)