Opinion ID: 1318244
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: leon's good faith exception

Text: We acknowledge that the case of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), has created what is termed a good faith exception which may salvage an otherwise defective warrant. It is based on the premise that the exclusion of evidence under the Fourth Amendment is not warranted where a police officer acts in good faith reliance on the warrant issued by the magistrate. Leon states that this good faith exception is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization. In making this determination, all of the circumstances  including whether the warrant application had previously been rejected by a different magistrate  may be considered. 468 U.S. at 922-23, n. 23, 104 S.Ct. at 3421 n.23, 82 L.Ed.2d at 698 n. 23. The Supreme Court in Leon also pointed out that it is clear that in some circumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued. 468 U.S. at 922-23, 104 S.Ct. at 3421, 82 L.Ed.2d at 698. (Footnote omitted). Furthermore, Leon states that the good faith exception is not applicable in certain situations and that in these circumstances, suppression of the evidence is the appropriate remedy where: (1) the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 [98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667] (1978); (2) the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role thus becoming a rubber stamp for the police; (3) the affidavit is `so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.' Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. [590, 610-11, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2265, 45 L.Ed.2d 416, 431 (1975)] (Powell, J., concurring in part); see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 260, 103 S.Ct. at 2344, 76 L.Ed.2d at 563 (White, J., concurring in the judgment)]; and (4) the warrant is so facially deficient  i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized  that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3421-22, 82 L.Ed.2d at 698-99. Finally, Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 n. 24, 104 S.Ct. at 3421 n. 24, 82 L.Ed.2d at 698 n. 24, makes it clear that the good faith exception would not sanction a bare bones affidavit: Nothing in our opinion suggests, for example, that an officer could obtain a warrant on the basis of a `bare bones' affidavit and then rely on colleagues who are ignorant of the circumstances under which the warrant was obtained to conduct the search. See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568, [91 S.Ct. 1031, 1037, 28 L.Ed.2d 306, 313] (1971). [18] In the present case, notwithstanding Leon, we are led to the same conclusion that we earlier stated with regard to the Gates' analysis. The affidavit in question is so conclusory with regard to its probable cause information as to render it a bare bones affidavit. Even under Leon, a bare bones affidavit is not subject to rehabilitation by the good faith exception. [19] This is true because no reasonably well-trained officer could have concluded that there were sufficient facts stated in the warrant and affidavit to justify a conclusion of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. [20] For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Harrison County is reversed and the case is remanded. Reversed and Remanded.