Opinion ID: 3011622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: a prisoner's right to privacy in medical

Text: RECORDS Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. S 1983. This section does not create any new substantive rights, but it provides a remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right conferred elsewhere. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). _________________________________________________________________ prison prior to appeal). The Sixth Circuit r eached the merits to dismiss the privacy claim of an HIV-positive prisoner , but, as discussed in footnote six, infra, the substantive law of privacy in the Sixth Circuit conflicts with that of the Third Circuit. 3. While the District Court did not consider the effect of S 803(d)(e) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. S 1997e(e), on Doe's claims, we have since recognized that S 1997e(e) prohibits compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury absent allegations of physical injury. Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2000). However, S 1997e(e) does not bar claims seeking nominal damages to vindicate constitutional rights, nor claims seeking punitive damages to deter or punish egregious violations of constitutional rights. Id. Therefore, while Doe's claims for compensatory damage are barr ed by S 1997e(e), his claims for nominal damages survive. Moreover , to the extent that Doe's punitive damages claims stem solely from the violations of his right to medical privacy, and not from any emotional or mental distress suffered, those claims are not barred by S 1997e(e). See id. at 252. 7 When the defendant in a S 1983 action claims qualified immunity, a court must first determine if the plaintiff 's allegations are sufficient to establish the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right. W ilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999), citing Conn v. Gabbert , 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999).4 If the plaintif f 's allegations meet this threshold, a court must next determine whether the right that the defendant's conduct allegedly violated was a clearly established one, about which a reasonable person would have known. Id. If the plaintiff 's allegations fail to satisfy either inquiry, then a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity and dismissal of the case. Deciding this purely legal question permits courts expeditiously to weed out suits which fail the test without requiring a defendant who rightly claims qualified immunity to engage in expensive and time consuming preparation to defend the suit on its merits. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991). With this framework in mind, we must deter mine whether an HIV-positive inmate has a right to privacy in his medical information. If so, we must deter mine whether that right was clearly established in 1995. _________________________________________________________________ 4. Notwithstanding the fact that the Supr eme Court has twice stated in mandatory, unqualified language that [a] court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity must first deter mine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all . . . Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609 quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. at 290 (internal