Opinion ID: 1058362
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Liability of Dana Biscan for Furnishing Alcohol

Text: Moving to the merits of this issue, we next consider whether Tennessee Code Annotated sections 57-10-101 and -102 apply to Dana Biscan. In interpreting a statute, we begin with the words of the statute itself, applying their ordinary and plain meaning. Blankenship v. Estate of Bain, 5 S.W.3d 647, 651 (Tenn.1999). The first section of the statute provides: The general assembly hereby finds and declares that the consumption of any alcoholic beverage or beer rather than the furnishing of any alcoholic beverage or beer is the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person. Tenn.Code Ann. § 57-10-101 (2002) (section 101). The effect of section 101 is to make it impossible for one who has been injured by an intoxicated person to state a claim for negligence against the person or entity who furnished the alcoholic beverage or beer because the statute removes, as a matter of law, the required element of legal causation. See, e.g., Turner v. Jordan, 957 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tenn.1997) (a claim for negligence requires a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; a breach of that duty; an injury or loss; causation in fact; and legal, or proximate, causation). In other words, there can be no cause of action resting on the allegation that one person furnished alcohol to another because it is impossible to prove proximate cause. The statute does not merely provide immunity from suit where one has furnished alcohol to another; rather, the statute constitutes the legislative determination that persons who furnish alcohol are not at fault for injuries inflicted by an intoxicated person. The second part of the statute carves out an exception to the first part. It provides that a seller of alcohol may be liable to a third party for injuries if the seller sold alcohol to a minor or if the seller sold alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person and the sale was a proximate cause [3] of the injuries suffered by the third party: Notwithstanding the provisions of § 57-10-101, no judge or jury may pronounce a judgment awarding damages to or on behalf of any party who has suffered personal injury or death against any person who has sold any alcoholic beverage or beer, unless such jury of twelve (12) persons has first ascertained beyond a reasonable doubt that the sale by such person of the alcoholic beverage or beer was the proximate cause of the personal injury or death sustained and that such person: (1) Sold the alcoholic beverage or beer to a person known to be under the age of twenty-one (21) years and such person caused the personal injury or death as the direct result of the consumption of the alcoholic beverage or beer so sold; or (2) Sold the alcoholic beverage or beer to an obviously intoxicated person and such person caused the personal injury or death as a direct result of the consumption of the alcoholic beverage or beer so sold. Tenn.Code Ann. § 57-10-102 (2002) (section 102). We agree with the trial court and with the Court of Appeals that the plain language of section 101 precludes allocation of fault to Dana Biscan. Section 101 clearly states that the furnishing of alcohol or beer is not a proximate cause of injuries inflicted by an intoxicated person. Moreover, the only exceptions to section 101 are for sales of alcohol under the circumstances set forth in section 102. As we explained when we first had occasion to interpret this statute,  `[w]hen the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous, the assumption is that the legislature intended what it wrote and meant what it said. The pertinent language must be applied without any forced or subtle construction extending its import.' Worley v. Weigels, Inc., 919 S.W.2d 589, 593 (Tenn.1996) (quoting McClain v. Henry I. Siegel Co., 834 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Tenn.1992) (alterations omitted)). The clear language of the statute admits of only one conclusion: that the legislature intended to shield persons such as Dana who furnish alcohol in a social setting. Although the defendants argue strenuously that the statute is intended to apply only to traditional dram shop defendants, i.e., commercial sellers, their argument turns the statute on its head. Section 101, which comes first, sets forth the general rule; section 102, which comes second, creates two narrow exceptions applicable only to sellers. The specific exceptions to the general rule, however, must be confined to their terms and cannot be read to somehow limit the broad rule stated in section 101. Where a general rule has been established by statute, with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication. Burns v. City of Nashville, 132 Tenn. 429, 178 S.W. 1053, 1054 (1915). Section 101 applies without limitation to the furnishing of alcoholic beverages or beer. Had the legislature intended section 101 to apply only to the sale of alcoholic beverages or beer, it would most certainly have chosen the word sale over the word furnish, as it did in section 102. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals discussed, the legislative history of sections 101 and 102 reveals that the statute was intended to codify the common-law rule that an individual who furnishes alcohol to another is not liable for any damages resulting from the other's intoxication, even if those damages are foreseeable. See, e.g., Cecil, 575 S.W.2d at 271. Thus, although the legislative history reflects much debate and concern over the extent to which sellers of alcoholic beverages and beers should be covered, the starting point was that the mere furnishing of alcohol, whether gratuitously or for commercial gain, is not a basis for liability. See Worley v. Weigels, 919 S.W.2d at 593-94. Defendant Brown argues that Dana Biscan should not be protected by section 101 because she was not a social host and because she collected money from the other minors to cover the cost of the beer. There is nothing in section 101, however, limiting its scope to one who hosts a social function. In Cecil , for example, a passenger furnished alcohol to a driver. The driver became intoxicated and struck and killed a bicyclist. We held that the passenger was not liable under the common-law rule. 575 S.W.2d at 271. There, as here, the defendant did not host anything. Similarly, the mere fact that the other minors reimbursed Dana for the beer she purchased for them is not sufficient to make her a seller to whom section 102 of the statute applies. She did not sell the beer to the other minors; she merely performed an errand (albeit an illegal errand) on their behalf. See, e.g., Childress v. Sams, 736 S.W.2d 48 (Mo.1987) (holding one does not lose one's position as a social host if merely repaid for an alcohol purchase rather than having a commercial motive); accord Elizondo v. Ramirez, 324 Ill.App.3d 67, 257 Ill.Dec. 497, 753 N.E.2d 1123, 1130 (2001), and Koehnen v. Dufuor, 590 N.W.2d 107, 112-13 (Minn.1999). Moreover, there is simply no statutory language that indicates section 102 applies under such circumstances. In sum, we hold that Dana's conduct in furnishing beer to the defendant Brown did not proximately cause Jennifer Biscan's injuries under the explicit terms of section 101. Dana did not sell alcohol to Brown within the meaning of section 102, so the exceptions contained in that part do not apply. Because the statute mandates the conclusion that Dana was not a proximate cause of Jennifer's injuries, the trial court was correct in directing a verdict. Since Dana cannot, as a matter of law, be at fault for Jennifer's injuries, it would have been error to allow the jury to apportion fault to her. We note that this result would be different if Dana were protected by a statute making her immune from suit. Under our system of comparative fault, a jury may apportion fault to an immune party notwithstanding the party's immunity from liability. Carroll v. Whitney, 29 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Tenn.2000). We have also held that a jury may apportion fault to persons who are effectively immune, such as those protected by a statute of repose. Dotson v. Blake, 29 S.W.3d 26, 29 (Tenn. 2000). However, in enacting Tennessee Code Annotated section 101, the legislature did not make persons or entities who furnish alcohol immune from suit; rather, the legislature determined that furnishing alcohol is not a proximate cause of injuries inflicted by an intoxicated person. Thus, the effect of the provision is not merely to restrict the remedy for a cause of action, but to remove that cause of action entirely, making a person or entity who furnishes alcohol immune from fault as well as immune from liability. Although we held in Carroll that the attribution of fault was not limited to persons against whom the plaintiff has a cause of action in tort, 29 S.W.3d at 18, that holding referred to a plaintiff's ability to prosecute a suit, not to the very existence of a cause of action based on the underlying conduct. The Dissent argues that our decision undermines the goal of our comparative fault system: achieving fairness by linking liability with fault. On the contrary, our decision is entirely consistent with that goal. In enacting section 57-10-101, the General Assembly made the public policy determination that persons within the purview of the statute are not at fault for injuries resulting from another's intoxication. It would be plainly inconsistent with the principles of comparative fault to apportion fault to one who is, by law, without fault. Moreover, we should defer to the legislature's policy decision to eliminate the fault of persons covered by section 57-10-101 irrespective of that decision's effect on our comparative fault scheme. Although it is the province of this Court to prescribe rules for practice and procedure in the state's courts, where a decision of the legislature chiefly driven by public policy concerns infringes on that power we will generally defer to the judgment of the legislature. See, e.g., Martin v. Lear Corp., 90 S.W.3d 626, 631-32 (Tenn.2002); see also, e.g., Tenn.Code Ann. § 55-9-604 (2004) (excluding from most civil actions evidence of a party's failure to wear a seatbelt). Additionally, we believe the Dissent reads Dotson more broadly than the language of that opinion permits. The Dissent argues that Dotson rejected the notion that fault may be apportioned only to a nonparty tortfeasor who is protected by an immunity statute (as opposed to some other type of statutory shield). Although it held that fault may be apportioned to those who are immune or effectively immune from liability, Dotson was silent on the issue of whether liability may be apportioned to one who is statutorily without fault. Moreover, the Dissent argues that because the end result is the same whether Dana is protected by an immunity statute or by a statute removing fault, we should simply follow Carroll and Dotson and permit fault to be attributed to her. This argument puts the cart before the horse and ignores the central question at issue, namely, whether or not the jury should be permitted, at the intermediate step of apportioning fault prior to the assessment of liability, to assign fault to one who is statutorily without fault. As we have explained, the answer to that question is no. Finally, the Dissent argues that this case will muddy the area of comparative fault by requiring courts and juries to make difficult distinctions between parties who are immune from suit and parties who are statutorily without fault. However, our decision in no way creates an unworkable rule, because it applies only to statutes that eliminate fault, rather than to statutes that merely eliminate liability. Compare, e.g., Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-103(a) (1999) (Every employer and employee subject to the Workers' Compensation Law shall, respectively, pay and accept compensation ... without regard to fault . . . .) with Tenn.Code Ann. § 9-8-307(h) (1999) (State officers and employees are absolutely immune from liability for acts or omissions within the scope of the officer's or employee's office or employment. . . .) (emphases added). Additionally, our decision is consistent with our decisions in Ridings v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 914 S.W.2d 79 (Tenn.1996), and Snyder v. LTG Lufttechnische GmbH, 955 S.W.2d 252 (Tenn.1997), that employers who are statutorily without fault under the workers' compensation laws cannot be included in apportioning fault. As the Dissent points out, in the workers' compensation arena, as here, the legislature has already determined that for policy reasons an employer may not be the proximate, or legal, cause of an employee's work-related injuries. See also Curtis v. G.E. Capital Modular Space, 155 S.W.3d 877, 884 (Tenn.2005) (Simply put, the issue of fault never enters the picture in a workers' compensation case.). Similarly, because the issue of fault never enters the picture when one furnishes alcohol to another within the purview of section 57-10-101, that section precludes the allocation of fault to Dana Biscan.