Opinion ID: 1891321
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Smith's Claims Against Mark Dodge are Arbitrable

Text: It appears undisputed that a valid contract calling for arbitration exists and that that contract evidences a transaction involving interstate commerce. Smith argues only that his dispute with Mark Dodge concerning its repairs to the truck in 2003 and its refusal in 2004 to repair the truck under the warranty falls outside the scope of the arbitration agreement because, he argues, that agreement pertained to any and all incidences surrounding the purchase of Smith's vehicle from Mark Dodge and did not contemplate any future transactions involving any of the parties. (Smith's brief, at 11.) Given the limited nature of this argument, we consider Smith to have conceded that he bears the burden to prove that the arbitration agreement is inapplicable to his claims. A threshold issue is which forum should decide the question of the scope of the arbitration agreement. In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995), the United States Supreme Court stated: Just as the arbitrability of the merits of a dispute depends upon whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute, see, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., [514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995)]; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985), so the question `who has the primary power to decide arbitrability' turns upon what the parties agreed about that matter. 514 U.S. at 943, 115 S.Ct. 1920. However, the Court warned, [c]ourts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is `clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]' evidence that they did so. 514 U.S. at 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920 (quoting AT & T Techs. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986)). This Court has similarly required that trial courts order arbitration of the issue of arbitrability when the plain language of the agreement unquestionably shows that the parties agreed to arbitrate the issue of arbitrability. Polaris Sales, Inc. v. Heritage Imports, Inc., 879 So.2d 1129, 1133-34 (Ala.2003); and Ex parte Perry, 744 So.2d 859, 866-67 (Ala.1999). The concluding sentence of the arbitration agreement, which is sometimes referred to as a  First Options clause and which is quoted above, unquestionably demonstrates that the parties agreed to arbitrate the arbitrability of any controversy. Consequently, any question whether Smith's claims against Mark Dodge are arbitrable is itself for an arbitrator to determine. Polaris, 879 So.2d at 1133. Despite this Court's usually faithful adherence to the First Options rule, we note that Smith cites Capitol Chevrolet & Imports, Inc. v. Payne, 876 So.2d 1106 (Ala.2003), in which we affirmed a trial court's order denying a motion to compel arbitration because there was no `legal and logical nexus between the source of the dispute and the arbitration provision at issue.' 876 So.2d at 1109 (quoting Kenworth of Dothan, Inc. v. Bruner-Wells Trucking, Inc., 745 So.2d 271, 275-76 (Ala. 1999)). The plaintiff in Payne had purchased an automobile from the defendant dealer but sued as the result of a second, although related, transaction between them. In conjunction with the purchase of the automobile, the plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement. The plaintiff alleged that approximately one month after she purchased the automobile, she was told by one of the dealer's salesmen that the dealer had a buyer for the automobile, and she therefore relinquished possession of it to the dealer for resale. The salesman's representation was false, according to the plaintiff, and he converted the automobile to his own use. The plaintiff sued him and the dealer, alleging fraud and conversion. The defendants argued that the plaintiff's claims fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement relating to the sale ... or financing of the vehicle, whereas the plaintiff argued that her claims were outside the scope of the arbitration clause. We agreed with the plaintiff. After reviewing the briefs submitted in Payne, however, we note that that case is distinguishable from the present one on the basis of its procedural posture. Although the arbitration agreement in Payne contained a First Options clause, the appealing defendants in that case failed to argue that its presence in the agreement required submitting to arbitration the question regarding the scope of the agreement. In Payne, by not addressing the First Options clause issue, this Court was simply following the well-settled rule that we do not reverse a trial court's judgment on a ground not raised on appeal. Robino v. Kilgore, 838 So.2d 366, 370 (Ala.2002). Conversely, however, this Court will affirm a judgment for any reason supported by the record that satisfies the requirements of due process, Taylor v. Stevenson, 820 So.2d 810, 814 (Ala.2001), even where the ground upon which we affirm was not argued before the trial court or this Court. Ex parte CTB, Inc., 782 So.2d 188, 191 (Ala.2000). The applicability and enforceability of a First Options clause was brought to the Court's attention by DaimlerChrysler, which extensively argues that we should enforce the First Options clause; Smith has chosen not to respond to this contention by way of a reply brief. The arbitration agreement contains a First Options clause, which has been brought to this Court's attention by one of the parties, and we reaffirm prior holdings that an arbitration agreement containing a First Options clause, clearly and unmistakably manifesting the intention of the parties to arbitrate the question whether a particular dispute or controversy is arbitrable, requires that such a dispute or controversy be submitted to arbitration. We therefore conclude that the trial court was correct in granting Mark Dodge's motion to compel arbitration.