Opinion ID: 2971805
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tape Recordings Made by Informant Eddie Goins

Text: Tapes were made by confidential informant Eddie Goins during several controlled buys from coconspirator Sarah Moss and defendant Romans. Under police supervision, the conversations were transmitted in real time with a hidden transmitter. This method allowed police to monitor Goins simultaneously as he spoke. It also allowed a recording to be made with a body recorder. The recordings were later reviewed and transcribed. In addition to implicating Romans, from whom Goins made two buys, the taped conversations implicate Sexton and Legg in the conspiracy. Most of the tapes, along with accompanying transcripts, were admitted into evidence over the objections of defendants, but Goins did not testify for the government when it was discovered that he lied to police and fabricated two tape-recorded conversations relating to the investigation. Goins was not named as a coconspirator. The government introduced the tapes through the participating police officers and questioned the officers about the circumstances surrounding the tape recordings. Defendants called Goins as a witness, but he refused to testify, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege. Defendants challenge the court’s admission of the tapes on the following grounds: (1) that Goins’ testimony was necessary to introduce the tapes into evidence and to allow them to crossexamine and impeach Goins; (2) the tapes were not properly authenticated and the voices on the tapes were not properly identified; (3) the tapes were inadmissible without the admission of the two -6- Nos. 02-5781/6292/6322 United States v. Sexton fabricated Goins tapes; (4) the admission of the tapes violated their Sixth Amendment confrontation rights because Goins was not available for cross-examination. 1. Authentication and Voice Identification under the Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 901(a) provides that “authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” The rule also states, by way of illustration, that the testimony of a witness that the item is what it purports to be is sufficient authentication under the rule. Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1). The admission of the tapes satisfied Rule 901. Law enforcement officers present during the tapings testified in detail about the procedures used when Goins was outfitted with the transmitter and recorder during the controlled buys. The fact that Goins did not testify to authenticate the tape recordings or identify the other voices does not render them inadmissible. It is not necessary for a participant of the conversation to testify to the authenticity of the recordings so long as other indicia of accuracy and reliability are established. Goins wore a transmitter and a body recording device, which recorded a second contemporaneous tape of the conversation. The recording devices were removed from Goins immediately after the conversations occurred, and the transmitter recordings were compared with the body recorder tapes to ensure that they were duplicates of the same conversations. Police witnesses adequately testified as to these procedures. This testimony is therefore sufficient under Rule 901. United States v. Batts, No. 91-5096, 1991 WL 230023,  (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 1991). Romans fails to point to anything in the record that would create a question as to the authenticity of this tape recording. -7- Nos. 02-5781/6292/6322 United States v. Sexton Romans also argues that the voices on the tape recording of Goins’ conversations with coconspirators have not been properly identified. Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(5) provides that a witness may identify or authenticate the voice or speaker on a tape if he has heard “the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it [the voice] with the alleged speaker.” Various witnesses, who heard the recorded conversations and were familiar with the voices therein, testified as to the identity of the speakers recorded on the tape, in conformance with Federal Rule 901. Although the defense disputed some of the identifications, there was sufficient proof of identity to admit the tapes. In sum, the government adequately demonstrated through testimony by the police who were monitoring the controlled buys and testimony of persons familiar with Goins’ and Moss’ voices that the tapes were in fact what they claimed to be, even without Goins’ testimony. It was not error to admit the tapes. 2. Hearsay Rules and the Confrontation Clause The district court did not admit Goins’ statements on the tape under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. The court admitted the Moss and Roman portions of the conversations pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) as an admission of a party opponent, and Goins’ statements were admitted because they were not offered for their truth, but rather to give meaning to the admissible responses of Romans and Moss. Goins’ statements were not hearsay because they were not “offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c). Their admission does not violate the hearsay rule. See United States v. McDonald, Nos. 97- 5339/5556/5338/5187/5196, 1999 WL 149658, at  (6th Cir. March 1,1999) (collecting cases); United States v. Johnson, 71 F.3d 539, 543 (6th Cir.1995); United -8- Nos. 02-5781/6292/6322 United States v. Sexton States v. Martin, 897 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1990). The district court properly instructed the jury that Goins’ statements on the tape could not be used as evidence. Romans and Sexton further erroneously contend that the admission of Goins’ tape-recorded statement violated their Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against them. When an out-of-court statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, as with Goins’ statements, the Confrontation Clause is not implicated. Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 413 (1985); United States v. Martin, 897 at 1372. The statements were clearly admissible under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (Mar. 8, 2004). Because Goins’ statements were not offered for their truth, they are not hearsay, and the other statements fall within wellestablished exceptions to the hearsay rule – either as admissions or statements of coconspirators. 3. Error to Allow Use of Transcript Romans asserts that the court erred when it permitted the jury to use transcripts as an aid while listening to the tape recordings of Goins and various coconspirators. Police witnesses testified that they had listened to the tapes and that the transcripts accurately reflected the content of the conversations and the identity of the speakers. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(a) (“The general requirement of authentication . . . as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”); United States v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 872, 877 (6th Cir.1983). The district judge also listened to the recordings and compared them with the transcripts. He concluded that the transcript was accurate and instructed the jury to use the transcript as an aid rather than as evidence. Moreover, Romans did not -9- Nos. 02-5781/6292/6322 United States v. Sexton specifically identify for the court any place where the transcript and the tape did not match. We find no error. 4. Exclusion of the Two Fabricated Tape Recordings Defendant Romans also contends that the district court erred in excluding the two fabricated tape recordings made by informant Eddie Goins because they would have demonstrated Goins’ lack of trustworthiness and impeached his credibility pertaining to the tapes of the controlled buys that were admitted. Romans asserts both error in the evidentiary ruling excluding the tapes, as well as Confrontation Clause problems arising from the lack of opportunity to cross-examine and impeach Goins on the fabricated tapes. The government stipulated to the fabrication, and the jury was told of the stipulation and fabrication. The jury was well aware of the existence of the fabricated tapes. Defense counsel reminded the jury on numerous occasions throughout the trial proceedings about Goins’ deception, driving home the point of his untrustworthiness. We fail to see how the failure to allow the playing of fabricated tapes could have affected the outcome of the trial or prejudiced the defendants. C.. Cross-Examination and Impeachment of Witnesses Defendant Sexton challenges a large number of evidentiary rulings concerning crossexamination of defense and government witnesses. First, Sexton argues that the district court impermissibly limited the scope of cross-examination of government witnesses by Sexton’s counsel, particularly those serving as informants or coconspirators who provided testimony in exchange for more favorable sentences, grants of immunity, or, in the case of Eddie Goins, received payment for his informant role. Sexton claims that he was not allowed to expose the “quid pro quos” and -10- Nos. 02-5781/6292/6322 United States v. Sexton inconsistent statements of various witnesses, nor was he able to cross-examine Sally Moss or Eddie Goins at all. A balance must be struck between permitting a trial court to exercise its sound discretion and affording a criminal defendant the opportunity to expose bias and prejudice. Clearly, cross-examination concerning the partiality of a witness is always relevant. United States v. Touchstone, 726 F.2d 1116, 1122 (6th Cir.1984). Therefore, a trial court may not prevent a criminal defendant from exploring a witness' bias, prejudice, or motive for testifying, or curtail cross-examination concerning whether testimony is given with the expectation of immunity or out of fear or coercion. In determining whether a trial court erred in allowing only limited cross-examination as to motive, bias, or prejudice, a reviewing court must decide “whether the jury was otherwise in possession of sufficient information concerning formative events to make a ‘discriminating appraisal’ of a witness’ motives and bias.” Touchstone, 726 F.2d at 1123 (quoting United States v. Campbell, 426 F.2d 547, 550 (2d Cir.1970)); United States v. Baker, 494 F.2d 1262, 1267 (6th Cir.1974). When a cross-examiner is not permitted reasonable latitude to develop facts that tend to demonstrate that the testimony in chief is biased and sufficient independent evidence of bias is not available to the jury, the trial court has abused its discretion. The district court allowed some cross-examination of all the witnesses that testified. In those circumstances where the trial judge did restrict cross-examination, it was generally because it was going beyond the scope of the direct, or was redundant. As for the Goins tapes that were admitted without the testimony of the declarant, Eddie Goins, Sexton was provided ample opportunity to -11- Nos. 02-5781/6292/6322 United States v. Sexton cross-examine the officers that testified about the procedures used when the tapes were made. In addition, other witnesses who authenticated the Goins’ tapes and identified the voices on the tapes were available for cross-examination. With regard to Elizabeth Sexton, Tim Sexton’s cousin, defense counsel objected when the court relied on Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) to prevent the defense from putting on extrinsic evidence in an attempt to impeach her on collateral matters; namely her alleged bias against Sexton for evicting her from the family home. Defense counsel attempted to put on extrinsic evidence to show that Elizabeth Sexton had made prior statements inconsistent with her court testimony. Rule 608(b) provides, “Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ credibility, other than conviction of a crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.” The court found that the prior statement was not inconsistent and that defense counsel wished to use it only for the purposes of impeachment, in violation of Rule 608(b). Defense counsel was able to cross-examine Elizabeth Sexton, as well as other witnesses with knowledge about the incident, including any bias by Elizabeth against Sexton for evicting her from their home. Sexton contends that certain defense witnesses were improperly cross-examined by the government. One witness was asked about his invocation of the Fifth Amendment before the grand jury, thus implying to the trial jury that the witness had something to hide; but the issue about which the witness invoked the Fifth Amendment before the grand jury was not relevant to the drug conspiracy at issue in the trial. Even if it was error, it was unlikely to have caused any prejudice to Sexton. Another defense witness was questioned about the federal prosecution of several family -12- Nos. 02-5781/6292/6322 United States v. Sexton members to show bias. No details of the offenses were placed before the jury. The government also attempted to impeach the character of the business manager at Sexton’s Rhode House bar when she was questioned about her failure to keep tax and other records documenting the business, the presence of illegal gambling machines in the bar and the fact that employees of the Rhode House were paid in cash. These were proper areas of questioning to impeach the business manager’s testimony that she and Sexton were operating a legitimate business. Finally, Sexton challenges the impeachment of his character witnesses, the fact that he was limited to introducing three character witnesses and the district court’s refusal to give the jury instruction he requested concerning character witnesses. The character witnesses testified as to Sexton’s reputation as a law-abiding citizen. The government cross-examined these witnesses about Sexton’s friendship with known cocaine dealers and users, which Sexton challenged as “guilt by association.” The questioning was permissible impeachment testimony to counter the testimony that Sexton was a law-abiding citizen. As to the number of character witnesses and the jury instruction, the court has discretion to limit the number of character witnesses, particularly where there are no extraordinary circumstances, such as here. The three witnesses testified as to Sexton’s law-abiding reputation in the community and the fact that he was a law-abiding citizen. Further witnesses testifying to these matters would have been redundant. Sexton requested that the court instruct the jury that “proof of good character, standing alone, is sufficient to generate reasonable doubt” as to defendant’s guilt. The court refused to give this instruction and instead gave the pattern jury instruction regarding character witnesses. This was not error. -13- Nos. 02-5781/6292/6322 United States v. Sexton D. Chain of Custody of Drug Evidence Romans also contests the admission of the cocaine obtained through the controlled buys with Goins, arguing that the government failed to establish a proper chain of custody. Physical evidence is admissible when the possibility of misidentification or alteration is “eliminated, not absolutely, but as a matter of reasonable probability.” See United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 700 (6th Cir.1997) (citations omitted); United States v. McFadden, 458 F.2d 440, 441 (6th Cir. 1972). Merely raising the possibility of tampering or misidentification, without more, is insufficient to render evidence inadmissible. United States v. Kelly, 14 F.3d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir.1994). Furthermore, “challenges to the chain of custody go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.” United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir.1990); see also United States. v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 938 (6th Cir. 2004). Given the consistent testimony of witnesses with knowledge about the events, the district court did not err where ample evidence supported a finding that the cocaine was obtained in the manner described by the government. Romans merely raises the unsupported claim that someone may have tampered with the evidence; he points to no evidence supporting such a claim. The challenge to the authenticity of the drugs seized during the controlled buys is pure conjecture, based on nothing more than the fact that Goins fabricated two tapes. E. Sarah (aka Sally) Moss Guilty Plea Sarah Moss was an original codefendant who pleaded guilty prior to trial. The government then called her to testify after requesting immunity for her pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6002. The district court called Moss to the stand outside the presence of the jury and confirmed that she -14- Nos. 02-5781/6292/6322 United States v. Sexton intended to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege. The court informed Moss it would grant the request for immunity and told her that she was compelled to testify. Once on the witness stand, Moss admitted to pleading guilty to the conspiracy but denied she had engaged in any drug trafficking with defendants and testified that she did not know anything about their involvement in a conspiracy. After being pressed by the government on direct examination, she acknowledged the existence of her recorded statements purporting to sell cocaine to Eddie Goins. She eventually refused to testify further. Because the court had granted the request for immunity, it informed Moss she could no longer rely on her Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to answer questions and ordered her to testify. After she continued to refuse to testify, the court cited her for civil contempt and incarcerated her. The government attempted to impeach Moss by entering her guilty plea into evidence, which established Moss’ involvement with the conspiracy. Generally, the guilty plea or conviction of a codefendant or coconspirator is not admissible at trial, and such guilty pleas and convictions are never admissible as substantive evidence of another defendant’s guilt. United States v. Blandford, 33 F.3d 685, 709 (6th Cir.1994). Evidence that a coconspirator has been convicted of conspiring with a criminal defendant is generally inadmissible because it might lead the jury to “regard the issue of the remaining defendant's guilt as settled and [conclude that] the trial is a mere formality.” United States v. Modena, 302 F.3d 626, 631 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Griffin, 778 F.2d 707, 711 (11th Cir.1985); Fed. R. Evid. 403 (providing that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice). -15- Nos. 02-5781/6292/6322 United States v. Sexton Nevertheless, guilty pleas and convictions may be introduced into evidence if the coconspirator or codefendant testifies at trial, so that the factfinder will have appropriate facts to assess the witness’ credibility. When a guilty plea or conviction is introduced into evidence, the district court is required to give a cautionary instruction to the effect that the jury may use the conviction or guilty plea only to determine the testifying witness' credibility. To address this turn of events, the court prepared, sua sponte, a jury instruction based on the Sixth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions § 7.08: You have heard the testimony of Sarah Moss. You have also heard that this individual was indicted for the same crime that the Defendants are charged with committing. You should consider the testimony of this witness with more caution than the testimony of other witnesses. Do not convict the Defendants based on the unsupported testimony of such a witness, standing alone, unless you believe her testimony beyond a reasonable doubt. You are also instructed that the fact that Sarah Moss has pleaded guilty to a crime is not evidence that the Defendants are guilty, and you cannot consider this against the Defendants in any way. Defense counsel objected to this instruction. Moss persisted in her refusal to testify, even after the judge brought her back to the courtroom before the close of the evidence. The judge indicated to counsel that he was inclined to strike her testimony; but because it was partially exculpatory to defendants, he would let defense counsel decide the issue. At defense counsels’ request, the court struck all of Moss’ testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it. Where the court strikes evidence and instructs the jury to disregard it, the normal rule is that the error is cured unless the testimony is “so prejudicial that the jury could not be trusted to disregard it.” United States v. Stines, 313 F.3d 912, 919 (6th Cir. 2002). Here, the testimony was -16- Nos. 02-5781/6292/6322 United States v. Sexton not “so prejudicial that the jury could not be trusted to disregard it.” Moss’ testimony was at least partially exculpatory. She claimed to have no knowledge of a conspiracy or of defendants’ participation in one. The jury did know, however, that she pleaded guilty to a conspiracy with the defendants and defendants never had an opportunity to cross-examine her. Given the mixed nature of Moss’ testimony, and the instruction by the court to disregard all of her testimony, any error was harmless.