Opinion ID: 1927470
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: exclusion of dna testimony

Text: Appellant next argues that the trial court erred when it precluded appellant's forensic expert from testifying about DNA testing on substances found underneath the victim's fingernails. Appellant asserts that his expert would have testified that the DNA material found underneath the victim's fingernails was not consistent with that of either appellant or the victim. The trial court here precluded this expert testimony because it found that no facts of record which supported a conclusion that any substance was found underneath the fingernails of the victim. However, the record demonstrates that prior to the testimony of appellant's expert, the victim's father testified that he had observed particles underneath the victim's fingernails when he identified the victim's body at the hospital. Thus, the trial court incorrectly found that there were no facts of record which would support appellant's line of questioning regarding the victim's fingernails and DNA evidence. See Tobash v. Jones, 419 Pa. 205, 212, 213 A.2d 588, 590 (1965) (expert testimony may be based on testimony adduced by one of the parties made known to the expert either by the expert having heard it or by having it read to him, and for which, for purposes of his expert opinion, he assumed to be true). Even though the trial court should have allowed the questioning concerning DNA evidence discovered from the victim's fingernails, we find this error to be harmless in light of the fact that other DNA testing results were admitted which resulted in similar findings by appellant's expert witness. The record demonstrates that the trial court allowed into evidence the testimony of appellant's expert that he concluded with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that his other DNA testing demonstrated that neither appellant nor the victim was the donor of any DNA material extracted from swabs of the victim's breasts and thighs. Moreover, appellant does not demonstrate how the exclusion of this evidence caused him to suffer prejudice. Appellant's counsel was able to argue the lack of the fingernail evidence to the jury and to use the Commonwealth's failure to analyze such evidence as a reason for reasonable doubt in closing argument to the jury. Not only would the excluded evidence have been cumulative, but appellant was able to turn the exclusion of this evidence to his advantage. Therefore, we conclude that any error in the trial court's ruling on this issue was harmless. Accordingly, this issue must fail.