Opinion ID: 147191
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Multiplicity of Counts I and II

Text: Sotto next argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to dismiss either Count I or Count II as multiplicitous. While we ordinarily review de novo whether counts in an indictment are multiplicitous, United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 807 (11th Cir. 2000), Sotto failed to raise her multiplicity challenge before trial. Our cases hold that when a defendant fails to object to multiplicitous counts prior to trial, she is procedurally barred from challenging her convictions. United States v. Mastrangelo, 733 F.3d 793, 800 (11th Cir. 1984); Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b). Sotto thus waived any objection with regard to any alleged error in the indictment. Id.2 2 While Sotto is barred from objecting to her convictions, she is not barred from challenging her separate sentences. United States v. Grinkiewicz, 873 F.2d 253, 255 (11th Cir. 1989). Although Sotto does not challenge her separate sentences on appeal, any error would be harmless, because Sotto received concurrent sentences on the counts she claims were multiplicitous. United States v. Langford, 946 F.2d 798, 804-05 (11th Cir. 1991) (noting that “the principal danger in a multiplicitous indictment . . . that the defendant may receive multiple sentences for a single offense” is not a concern where “the sentences for multiplicitous counts run concurrently”). 13