Opinion ID: 4108554
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Jury Instructions and the Verdict Form

Text: Williams claims on this appeal that the jury instructions constructively amended the indictment by broadening the “possible bases for conviction from that which appeared in the indictment.” Appellant’s br. at 29 (quoting United States v. Lee, 359 F.3d 194, 208 (3d Cir. 2004)). He argues that the instructions impermissibly omitted the causal link that 18 18 U.S.C. § 1591 requires between force, fraud, or coercion and the commercial sex act. Id. at 29-32. He therefore argues that the instructions allowed the jury to convict him for using force or coercion, and, separately, causing the women to engage in commercial sex acts, perhaps voluntarily, and thus not requiring the jury to find, as the statute requires, that he used force to cause the women to engage in commercial sex acts. Id. Though, as we have stated, in a plain error analysis, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice, a constructive amendment of an indictment creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. United States v. Syme, 276 F.3d 131, 154 (3d Cir. 2002). At the time of the offense,5 the relevant part of the sex trafficking statute involved here, 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2008), provided that:
(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce . . . recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any means a person; or (2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph (1), knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, . . . shall be punished . . . . To violate this statute, a perpetrator must know or recklessly disregard that “means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion, . . . or any combination . . . will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act.” Id. (emphasis added). The statute defines “coercion” as 5 The statute was amended after Williams committed his offenses but we are not concerned with the amendments. 19 (A) threats of serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; (B) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; or (C) the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process. Id. § 1591(e)(2). The statute defines “serious harm” as used in the definition of “coercion” to mean “any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing commercial sexual activity in order to avoid incurring that harm.” Id. § 1591(e)(4). The District Court provided the following instructions to the jury: “The second element of each of these Counts . . . is that ‘the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion would be used with respect to this person. . . . Third, ‘that the defendant knew or was in reckless disregard of the fact that this person would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act.’” App. at 616-17 (emphasis added). Williams makes a plausible argument that, in an interpretation of these two statements in isolation, “would be caused” is not directly linked with force, fraud, or coercion.6 But we hold that, viewing the jury instructions as a whole, the District Court 6 18 U.S.C. § 1591 does not require that there be a direct temporal nexus between the threats, force, fraud, or coercion and the commercial sex act although the closer the coercive conduct is to the acts of prostitution, the more likely the causation element of the offense will be satisfied. Accordingly, a person may be guilty under the statute for 20 did not commit plain error or error at all in giving the instructions.7 As the jurors examined the verdict forms, the Court informed them that “Count 1 charges both sex trafficking by force, and also the attempted sex trafficking. . . .” Id. at 604. The Court told the jurors that the indictment alleged that Williams committed “the offense of sex trafficking of [sic] force by [sic] Person 1” and connected that to the jury verdict slip, stating that “you are to first make a determination as to whether or not the government has proven him guilty of sex trafficking by force of Person 1.” Id. at 605. The verdict form stated that Count 1 was “[s]ex trafficking by force of Person 1.” Id. at 788. The portion of the verdict form describing the elements of attempt also used the term “sex trafficking by force.” Id. at 789. The same applied to Count 2. Id. at 789-90. The Court read those parts of the verdict form to the jurors. Id. at 607-610. Furthermore, contrary to Williams’s assertion that the District Court told jurors not to pay attention to the indictment, the Court alerted the jurors to its exact terms. Id. at 612. The Court told the jury that Williams was charged with two counts of “sex trafficking by force” and read the statutory language included in the indictment: “that knowingly creating a pattern of behavior that coerces a victim into committing commercial sex acts. See United States v. Todd, 627 F.3d 329, 331-34 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended Nov. 15, 2010 (stating that “[w]hat the statute means to describe, and does describe awkwardly, is a state of mind in which the knower is familiar with a pattern of conduct” and upholding a conviction when the defendant imposed rules about daily earnings and requested that they be given to him, the victim testified that she believed the defendant would beat her if she kept any earnings from him, the defendant beat a woman in front of the victim, and the defendant beat the victim for violating the rules). 7 We agree with both parties that the defense instruction was “a bit clearer” by eliminating the passive voice in the third element. Appellee’s br. at 28. 21 means a [sic] force, threat of force, fraud or coercion, or any combination of such means, will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act . . . .” Id. at 613-14. The District Court recapitulated that “it is a federal crime for anyone in or affecting commerce” to engage in a number of activities “knowingly or in reckless disregard of the facts that means of force, threat of force, fraud, or coercion would be used to cause that person to engage in a commercial sex act.” Id. at 615. Immediately after that, the Court read the elements at issue here for Counts 1 and 2. Id. at 615-17. Then the Court explicitly linked language showing causation with the language at issue: If, as in Count 1 and 2, the government alleges that the defendant engaged in sex trafficking while knowingly or in reckless disregard of the fact that force, threat of force, fraud, or coercion would be used to cause a person to engage in a commercial sex act, then the second element of the offense, which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, is that the defendant knew or acted in reckless disregard of the fact that force, threats of force, fraud or coercion would be used. Id. at 619. The Court also advised the jury that the third element “is that the defendant knew that the victim would be engaged in a commercial sex act.” Id. at 620. Despite the ambiguity in the two elements, the instructions as a whole focused the jury on the government’s burden to prove the causal link between the unlawful means described and the commercial sex acts. Williams argues that Rosemond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 1240 (2014), a case in which the elements of the jury instruction were unclear, should inform our decision. Rosemond concerned jury instructions for aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which criminalizes the use or carrying of a gun “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.” 134 S.Ct. at 1243. The Supreme Court held that 22 liability for aiding and abetting that offense must include “advance knowledge of a firearm’s presence.” Id. at 1251. The district court in that case gave the instruction that the defendant was guilty of aiding and abetting that offense if “(1) [he] knew his cohort used a firearm in the drug trafficking crime, and (2) [he] knowingly and actively participated in the drug trafficking crime.” Id. Thus, the additional instruction that a defendant must “willfully and knowingly seek[] by some act to help make the crime succeed” did not remedy the absence of “advance knowledge” in that jury instruction.8 Id. at 1252. The aiding and abetting “umbrella instruction” failed to provide any context to alert the jury that advance knowledge of the gun’s presence was needed. But the situation in Rosemond differs from that here. Here, the surrounding instructions require a causal link between the threats of force, force, fraud, or coercion and the commercial sex acts for Williams to be convicted. In the circumstances, we need 8 The Supreme Court also recognized that the issue with the jury instructions was further compounded by the prosecutor’s statement to the jury that “a person cannot be present and active at a drug deal when shots are fired and not know their cohort is using a gun,” which sent “the message to the jury . . . that it need not find advance knowledge.” Rosemond, 134 S.Ct. at 1252. That is not the situation here because both parties focused extensively on the causation element of the sex trafficking offenses in their opening and closing arguments. See App. at 51, 56-57, 61-62, 545, 548-49. In particular, the government in closing told the jury to consider if Williams knew “that force, threats or force of [sic] coercion would be used to cause a person . . . to engage in a commercial sex act, not every commercial sex act, not the beginning commercial sex act, not most commercial sex acts, just one. You only have to find that that caused them to engage in just one commercial sex act.” Id. at 545-46. Williams’s counsel made that element the crux of his closing: “But under the law, members of the jury, the force, the threats, the coercion has to cause somebody, a person, to commit a commercial sex act. There has to be a cause and effect. The force, the beatings, the threats, the coercion, has to cause that.” Id. at 548-49. 23 not determine whether the use of the special verdict form compounded any error, inasmuch as there was not a plain error or an error at all. B. The Sufficiency of the Evidence Williams contends that the evidence was insufficient to support either of his two convictions for sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion. He makes three primary arguments: the evidence of his acts of violence toward the two women happened “in the context of complex relationships,” Appellant’s br. at 42, the evidence at trial at most showed a temporal but not causal connection between the violent acts and the women’s commercial sex acts, id. at 44, and the evidence failed to show that he made any threats or used fraud or coercion that caused the women to engage in commercial sex acts. Id. at 46. The government responds that the evidence was sufficient for a rational juror to determine that Williams knew that his use of force, threats of force, or coercion would cause Talia and Erika to engage in commercial sex acts. Appellee’s br. at 45. It is well established that we must uphold a jury’s verdict if after our review of the record we conclude that the jury rationally could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (quoting United States v Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)). This standard is “particularly deferential” and we are cautious not to “act as a thirteenth juror.” Id. at 430-31. In reviewing a claim concerning the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, we “do not weigh evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses in making [our] determination.” United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 60 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 24 170 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, a defendant must “clear a high hurdle to prevail on [a] challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 110 (3d Cir. 2016). As we detailed above, the statute in relevant part at the time of Williams’s offense provided that “whoever knowingly . . . recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any means a person” or “benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged” in one of these acts, “knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion . . . , or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act . . . .” is guilty of a criminal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2013). Applying the standard that we set forth above, we hold that beyond any question the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict convicting Williams on the two sex trafficking offenses. According to Talia’s testimony, Williams hit Erika in front of her the same night he convinced Talia to work as a prostitute for him. Talia testified that she felt at the time that she had few other options because she was in an unfamiliar location with people she did not know and had been required to leave the residence at which she had been staying. Talia turned over to Williams all the money that her “dates” paid her, and he usually allowed her to keep only some money for food. Williams gave her strict quotas to meet, dictated how long she could talk to others, determined whether she would have breaks or days off from work, and prohibited her from talking to certain people. When she talked to one of Williams’s associates, Williams threatened to punch her in the 25 face if she did it again. Talia described much of the abuse she witnessed, including how Williams would hit Erika when Erika disagreed with him. In response to a work-based issue with a prospective client, Williams physically abused Talia and Erika and immediately sent them back outside to solicit clients on the street. This testimony itself provided sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable juror could have found proof that, on that particular day, Williams’s use of force was causally linked to their commercial sex acts. According to Talia, Williams used physical violence and threats of violence to ensure that they continued to do what he wanted and to keep them together. Talia lied to the police about Williams’ conduct because she felt that the consequences of telling the police the truth about Williams would be worse than the consequences if she lied to them. When Talia tried to leave Williams, she testified that he “kind of coerced [her] not to” do so. Talia finally left Williams when her mother came from Atlanta because she knew she had a chance to leave. There was more than enough evidence to support the verdict finding Williams guilty on Count 1, the count involving Talia. The evidence also supported a conviction with respect to Erika on Count 2, the count involving her. Although Erika stated that she chose to work for Williams of her own volition, her testimony showed that of all the women that Williams controlled he abused her the most. Williams required Erika to meet a monetary quota every day and demanded that she turn over all the money she received from her acts of prostitution to him. He abused Erika numerous times for disagreeing with him, cut Erika deeply with hair clippers because he held her responsible for the arrest of a friend of his, and he beat 26 her after a prospective client acted strangely towards her. Erika often suffered physical injury from Williams’s abuse and as a result had black eyes, swollen lips, and missing teeth. Immediately after many of these assaults Williams sent Erika out to solicit clients on the streets. Erika’s mother testified that Williams told her he had to beat or restrain Erika because she had “gotten them both in trouble.” Williams also yelled at Erika that he “got to come over there and put a slave trader over top of [her] to do anything,” which Erika testified meant that he would send someone to be with her in a physical way. She acknowledged that her relationship with Williams was verbally abusive and detailed Williams’s abuse of other women, including his whipping one of them with a telephone cord he pulled out of the wall. This evidence more than sufficed for a jury to determine that Williams’s use of force, threats of force, or coercion caused Erika to engage in acts of commercial prostitution. C. The Exclusion of Evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 412 Williams contends that the District Court’s exclusion of evidence concerning Erika’s prior years of prostitution in accordance with Fed. R. Evid. 412 deprived him of the right to present a defense under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution. Appellant’s br. at 52-53. Rule 412 prohibits the admission of “evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual behavior” and “evidence offered to prove a victim’s sexual predisposition.” He claims that this evidence was admissible under an exception to the general rule of inadmissibility in Rule 412 for “evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.” Rule 412(b)(1)(C). He proposes three different theories why evidence of Erika’s prior acts of prostitution should have been 27 admitted: (1) the evidence was relevant to show that force was unnecessary to cause her to engage in commercial sex acts; (2) it rebutted any claims that he created Erika’s and Talia’s advertisements online; and (3) it provided a logical chain of inference that Erika chose willingly to work with Williams. Appellant’s br. at 53-54; Appellant’s Reply br. at 17. We apply an abuse-of-discretion standard on this exclusion of evidence issue but to the extent that the District Court interpreted the Federal Rules of Evidence our review is plenary. United States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 348 (3d Cir. 2011). In applying an abuse-of-discretion standard, we “afford district courts ‘broad discretion on evidentiary rulings’” because they are familiar “‘with the details’ of the cases in front of them” and have “‘greater experience in evidentiary matters.’” Bailey, 840 F.3d at 117 (quoting United States v. Finley, 726 F.3d 483, 491 (3d Cir. 2013)). A reversal is only justified when the district court’s decision is “arbitrary” or “irrational.” Id. (quoting United States v. Schneider, 801 F.3d 186, 198 (3d. Cir. 2015)). Rule 412 applies in cases involving “alleged sexual misconduct,” conduct that is within the terms of the sex trafficking statute at issue here. See, e.g., United States v. Roy, 781 F.3d 416, 420 (8th Cir. 2015). The evidence ordinarily barred by Rule 412 is only admissible “in designated circumstances in which the probative value of the evidence significantly outweighs possible harm to the victim.” See Rule 412 advisory committee’s note to the 1994 amendment. There are three exceptions to Rule 412 that can be applicable in criminal cases, one of which Williams argues applies here: a court 28 may admit “evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.” Rule 412(b)(1)(C). Other courts of appeals in precedential opinions have upheld the exclusion of evidence of an individual’s prior acts of prostitution in trials for commercial sex trafficking notwithstanding defendants’ arguments similar to those that Williams advances here.9 These opinions have held either that the evidence is irrelevant in the context of the circumstances in which it was offered or that its relevance is so outweighed by its prejudicial effect with respect to the victim that its exclusion does not violate a defendant’s constitutional rights. See United States v. Gemma, 818 F.3d 23, 34 (1st Cir. 2016), petition for certiorari docketed, No. 16-6207 (Sept. 27, 2016) (holding that evidence of prior acts of prostitution “is either entirely irrelevant or of such slight probative value in comparison to its prejudicial effect that a decision to exclude it would not violate [the defendant’s] constitutional rights”); United States v. Rivera, 799 F.3d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that evidence of women’s prior prostitution was irrelevant as it “does not suggest that appellants did not later threaten them with violence or deportation in order to coerce them into commercial sex”); Roy, 781 F.3d at 420 (holding that prior acts of prostitution are irrelevant to “whether [the defendant] beat her, threatened her, and took the money she made from prostitution in order to cause her to engage in commercial sex”); United States v. Cephus, 684 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012) 9 Williams cites a number of cases that indicate courts have permitted evidence of prior sex acts, noting that defendants would not appeal a successful motion to admit evidence of prior sex acts under Rule 412. Appellant’s br. at 56. Those cases provide little guidance for us because the propriety of the admission of evidence of prior sex acts was not at issue in any of them. 29 (holding that testimony about a victim’s prior prostitution to show that she was not coerced or deceived into working for the defendant was irrelevant because it would not show “that she consented to be beaten and to receive no share of the fees paid by the johns she serviced” or “suggest that [the defendant] didn’t beat and threaten her”). We need not determine whether the constitutional exception under Rule 412 applies here because, if the District Court erred on this issue, the error would have been harmless. After all, Erika admitted that she had been a prostitute for 12 years prior to her involvement with Williams, stated numerous times that she voluntarily worked as a prostitute for Williams, and testified that she was not motivated by his use of force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion to engage in prostitution. Williams’s counsel then capitalized on her admission of prior acts of prostitution in his closing. The exclusion of evidence concerning her prior acts therefore did not prevent Williams from making a defense based on her conduct. See Rivera, 799 F.3d at 189 (noting that even though the court prohibited cross-examining a witness on her prior commercial sex acts, defendant’s counsel still was able to use the defense that the victims were not defrauded based on their testimony).10 D. The Absence of a Sua Sponte Charge on an Affirmative Defense Williams finally argues that he had a defense to the charge of witness tampering because his sole intent in sending his letter to Erika on which the tampering charge was 10 We do not discuss Rule 412 with respect to Talia because there was no evidence at trial that prior to her involvement with Williams that she had engaged in the conduct with which Rule 412 is concerned. 30 based was to encourage her to testify truthfully. He therefore contends that he was entitled to an affirmative defense instruction on the witness tampering pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e) which instructs that a defendant has an affirmative defense if his “conduct consisted solely of lawful conduct and that the defendant’s sole intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully.” Inasmuch as his counsel did not request this instruction, he argues that the District Court should have given this instruction sua sponte. He contends that the Court committed plain error when it did not give the instruction, and that we should reverse his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 for witness tampering. Appellant’s br. at 60. The tampering statute under which the jury convicted Williams provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so,” intending to “influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding” is guilty of witness tampering. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b). 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e) provides an affirmative defense to a tampering charge but the defendant bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to show “that the conduct consisted solely of lawful conduct and that the defendant’s sole intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e). We review the circumstance that the District Court did not sua sponte provide an affirmative defense in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e) for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d); Gov’t of V.I. v. Lewis, 620 F.3d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 2010). We therefore determine whether the Court made a “clear” or “obvious” error when it did not give an 31 affirmative defense charge. See Lewis, 620 F.3d at 364 (quoting United States v. Turcks, 41 F.3d 893, 897 (3d. Cir. 1994)). Next, we consider whether the claimed error affected substantial rights, i.e., whether it prejudiced the defendant by “affect[ing] the outcome of the trial proceedings.” Id. Moreover, even if a court commits such an error, an appellate court exercises discretion to correct the error “sparingly” and only will do so if the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting Tann, 577 F.3d at 535). In general, “a defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S.Ct. 883, 887 (1988). In determining whether a court plainly erred in not instructing the jury on an affirmative defense, an appellate court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to the defendant and considers whether there had been sufficient evidence presented at trial to support the claim of error. See Lewis, 620 F.3d at 364. But “trial courts generally are under no duty to raise affirmative defenses on behalf of a criminal defendant.” Id. at 370 n.10. “Indeed, by raising affirmative defenses sua sponte, a trial court might actually harm a criminal defendant by undermining defense counsel’s strategic decisions.” Id. (citing United States v. Van Kirk, 935 F.2d 932, 934 (8th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Tyson, 653 F.3d 192, 212 (3d Cir. 2011) (“A defendant’s strategy is his own. It is not for the district court to sua sponte determine which defenses are appropriate under the circumstances. In short, if [the defendant] wished to mount [a relevant affirmative defense], it was incumbent upon him to take the initiative to do so.”). 32 The District Court did not err when it did not sua sponte charge the jury that Williams was advancing an affirmative defense. After examining the evidence on the affirmative defense issue in the light most favorable to Williams, we conclude that the evidence did not require the Court to give an affirmative defense instruction. Williams testified that he sent Erika the letter to encourage her to tell the truth because the government was pressuring her to lie. App. at 463-64. We are aware that Erika claimed that she told the government that Williams had harmed her because the Federal Bureau of Investigation had threatened to arrest her if she did not do so. Id. at 309. But there was no other evidence to indicate that Williams was attempting to persuade her to testify truthfully. Further, the evidence makes it clear that Williams did not have the “sole” intention when he wrote Erika to encourage her to tell the truth at trial. After all, Williams testified that he sent the letter because he was “in a really bad situation and [he] need[ed] some help.” Id. at 464. Moreover, in his letter to Erika, Williams wrote “you r [sic] my last hope,” and “[Talia] & you are their case.” Id. at 812. That language implies that his real concern in sending the letter was his own fate. The evidence does not show that he wanted Erika to tell the truth even if it harmed his case. Therefore, the District Court did not commit a plain error or any error at all when it did not give the affirmative defense instruction sua sponte. See Roper v. United States, 403 F.2d 796, 798 (5th Cir. 1968) (a district court’s failure to charge an alibi defense sua sponte was not plain error “especially where as here the factual foundation” for it “seems obscure, to say the least”). 33 Williams’s counsel was free to ask the District Court to include an affirmative defense instruction in its charge to the jury if he considered it wise to do so. See Lewis, 620 F.3d at 370 n.10; United States v. Atkins, 487 F.2d 257, 259 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that the trial court did not commit plain error when it did not give an alibi instruction sua sponte because “[a] trial court need not give such an instruction in the absence of a request therefor”); United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69, 71 (7th Cir. 1954) (“[A]ppellate courts will not, generally speaking, pass upon defenses which have not been previously brought to the attention of the trial court.”). After our review of the record, we conclude that the evidence gave little, if any, support for giving the affirmative defense. We can understand that counsel may have made the determination that it would have been unwise to ask the Court to charge the jury to consider the affirmative defense as the charge would have placed the burden of proof on that issue on Williams. In this regard, counsel might have deemed it strategically wise to keep the jury solely focused on the force or coercion issues in determining whether the government had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly on the sex trafficking charges. We, of course, recognize that we are speculating on counsel’s motives in not advancing the affirmative defense. But with or without the speculative possibilities, the Court did not err, let alone commit plain error, when it did not give an instruction on the affirmative defense sua sponte.