Opinion ID: 836245
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: waiting period

Text: The second major issue concerns how long a plaintiff must wait after giving notice before filing his complaint. The relevant statutory provisions state: (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person shall not commence an action alleging medical malpractice against a health professional or health facility unless the person has given the health professional or health facility written notice under this section not less than 182 days before the action is commenced.    (7) Within 154 days after receipt of notice under this section, the health professional or health facility against whom the claim is made shall furnish to the claimant or his or her authorized representative a written response that contains a statement of each of the following: (a) The factual basis for the defense to the claim. (b) The standard of practice or care that the health professional or health facility claims to be applicable to the action and that the health professional or health facility complied with that standard. (c) The manner in which it is claimed by the health professional or health facility that there was compliance with the applicable standard of practice or care. (d) The manner in which the health professional or health facility contends that the alleged negligence of the health professional or health facility was not the proximate cause of the claimant's alleged injury or alleged damage. (8) If the claimant does not receive the written response required under subsection (7) within the required 154-day time period, the claimant may commence an action alleging medical malpractice upon the expiration of the 154-day period. [MCL 600.2912b.] After receiving plaintiff's notice, Shabahang responded, but his response did not satisfy the requirements of § 2912b(7). [14] Plaintiff then commenced his action 175 days after giving notice. I agree with the majority that a plaintiff can make a tentative determination regarding the sufficiency of a defendant's response pursuant to § 2912b(7), and I also agree with the Court of Appeals that plaintiff did not need to challenge the sufficiency of Shabahang's response before filing his complaint pursuant to the shortened waiting period established by § 2912b(8). A plaintiff can file his suit after 154 days if he does not receive the written response required under subsection (7) within 154 days after giving notice. MCL 600.2912b(8). Importantly, the response a plaintiff must receive is that required under subsection (7), which clearly states that the defendant shall furnish a response that contains specific statements. Thus, similar to the requirements for a plaintiff's notice, § 2912b(7) places the burden on the defendant to provide a written response that includes the requisite statements. See Roberts II, 470 Mich. at 686, 684 N.W.2d 711; Roberts I, 466 Mich. at 66, 642 N.W.2d 663. If the defendant does not provide those specific statements, then the response cannot be said to be the one required by § 2912b(7). Plaintiff, therefore, may file his complaint after 154 days, because he did not receive the proper response. However, to require a plaintiff to wait for a judicial determination regarding the sufficiency of defendant's response would effectively nullify the requirements of § 2912b(7). That is, a defendant could give a response that failed to comply with § 2912b(7) and suffer no consequences, because the only possible statutory consequence, plaintiff's early filing, would be unavailable until the court determined that the defendant's response was defective, and by that time, the 28 days between the 154-day period and the 182-day period would almost certainly have elapsed. Accordingly, plaintiff here properly filed his complaint against Shabahang based on his own determination that he never received the response required by § 2912b(7). [15] Rather than adopting this straightforward understanding of § 2912b(8), the majority feels the need to additionally read into the law an entirely concocted and gratuitous good faith standard in determining whether the defendant's response is sufficient. That is, rather than assessing the defendant's response, and comparing it to the requirements of the statute, a plaintiff must now consider whether defendant's response constituted a good-faith attempt to comply with the content requirements of the statute. Ante at 287. In the place of a clear rule of law, the majority interposes an obscure and vague standard by which a plaintiff, who probably desires nothing more than to know what is statutorily required of each party, must now assess the mindset of the defendant. The majority, of course, supplies no guidance for how to satisfy its new standard, which poses a particular conundrum for plaintiffs, because, if a court determines that a response was made in good faith, the majority holds that the trial court should allow defendant to amend his response. Ante at 287. This means that if the plaintiff relied on his own assessment that the response was defective, and filed before the 182-day period had expired, defendant's amendment could retrospectively make the complaint untimely. Doubtlessly, however, the majority will correct this problem in some later decision by a new word formula that is equally disregardful of the language of the statute. By contrast, I would simply hold that a plaintiff may avail himself of the 154-day filing option if the defendant's response does not comply with the requirements of § 2912b(7), without regard to whether the defendant has or has not made a good faith effort to comply with that provision.