Opinion ID: 1175541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is Ratliff Limited to a Recovery Under the Schedule if His Knee Injury has Produced a Permanent Partial Disability?

Text: Ratliff contends that the board's finding that the effect of his knee injury did not extend to other parts of his body only constituted a finding that AS 23.30.190(a)(19)(B) was inapplicable. AS 23.30.190(a)(19)(B) provides for a scheduled award for loss of use of a body part not otherwise provided for in the schedule. Ratliff further argues that this did not constitute a finding that he did not suffer an unscheduled disability under AS 23.30.190(a)(20). Ratliff advances the additional argument that his knee injury should be considered a concurrent unscheduled injury because it has rendered him practically unable to work, thereby causing him extreme economic disability. Ratliff cites our decision in Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Grant, 693 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1985), as authority for his argument that a concurrent unscheduled disability should have been found in this case. We think, however, that the board in its decision and order unambiguously found that Ratliff did not suffer an unscheduled injury. The crux of the board's decision is that Ratliff injured only his knee and that therefore the statutory schedule applies exclusively, so that Ratliff is limited in his recovery to the benefits provided for in the schedule even were he to suffer extreme economic disability. We also agree with Wright Schuchart that although Grant allows for benefits for a scheduled injury to be awarded concurrently with benefits for an unscheduled injury, Grant does not control here. Grant involved, in addition to two scheduled injuries (leg and foot), another, separate injury that was clearly unscheduled (back injury). Id. at 875. It was in that context that both scheduled and unscheduled benefits were awarded concurrently. In the case at bar, it is apparent that there is but one injury. Ratliff seems to argue that the fact that the knee injury has greatly disabled him from working somehow constitutes a separate injury from the knee injury itself. This begs the question, which is whether the fact that the economic impairment from this injury exceeds the benefits provided for in the schedule enables the employee to have his injury classified as unscheduled, so that he can obtain benefits reflecting this greater economic impairment. The argument in favor of applying the schedule exclusively in cases of permanent partial disability is simple and persuasive  the statute means what it says. The United States Supreme Court applied this reasoning in interpreting the similarly worded Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) in Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 449 U.S. 268, 101 S.Ct. 509, 66 L.Ed.2d 446 (1980). [4] In Potomac, the Supreme Court, reversing the D.C. Court of Appeals, held that an employee who was permanently partially disabled due to a knee injury was limited to recovery under the schedule, and could not choose to recover under the non-schedule paragraph which measured benefits by loss of wage-earning capacity. The Court stated that the plain language of the statute indicated that Congress intended the benefits under the schedule to be exclusive when there was an injury that fell under the schedule. 449 U.S. at 273-74, 101 S.Ct. at 512. The Court noted that the schedule paragraphs and the non-schedule paragraph were all under the same section entitled permanent partial disability. Id. at 274, 101 S.Ct. at 513. The Court pointed out that the statutory direction that preceded the schedule provided that compensation under the schedule shall be paid to the employee, as follows. Id. at 274, 101 S.Ct. at 512 (emphasis in opinion). The Court also noted that the non-schedule, loss of wage-earning capacity paragraph was to apply in all other cases, and stated that this language foreclosed reading the statute to apply to all of the foregoing (i.e., scheduled) cases as well. Id. at 274, 101 S.Ct. at 512-13 (emphasis in opinion.). The Supreme Court then rejected the argument that such a construction would not fulfill the remedial purpose of the Act and that it would produce anomalous results that Congress probably did not intend. The Supreme Court pointed out that the Act represents a compromise between the interests of employers and employees. The Court stated that the use of fixed scheduled benefits as an exclusive remedy: [I]s consistent with the employees' interest in receiving a prompt and certain recovery for their industrial injuries as well as with the employers' interest in having their contingent liabilities identified as precisely and as early as possible. Id. at 282, 101 S.Ct. at 517. The Court also recognized the incongruous results which the schedule could produce by over or undercompensating an employee for his true wage-earning loss. The Court stated, however, that this fact did not give it license to disregard the compelling statutory language and that it was up to Congress to re-examine the statute if anomalies were occurring frequently. Id. at 283-84, 101 S.Ct. at 517. AS 23.30.190 contains the same compelling statutory language that was present in Potomac. AS 23.30.190(a) provides that scheduled benefits shall be paid as follows and AS 23.30.190(a)(20) applies in all other cases. In addition, we have recently stated, in another context, that the legislative policy behind the schedule was to place absolute limits on an employer's liability by awarding no more than specific amounts for specific disabilities. Grant, 693 P.2d at 878. Given the language of AS 23.30.190, and the reasoning of Potomac, we hold that in the case at bar the scheduled permanent partial disability benefits provided for under AS 23.30.190(a)(2) for Ratliff's knee injury are the exclusive benefits that Ratliff can recover. There is no language in the statute remotely suggesting that the schedule and section (a)(20) are alternative remedies. [5] Thus we conclude that the superior court's affirmance of the board's holding that Ratliff did not suffer an unscheduled injury under AS 23.30.190(a)(20) was correct, since the legislature intended that the scheduled award be the exclusive remedy whenever applicable.