Opinion ID: 499806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: applicability of the first amendment

Text: 52 It is well established that freedom of association is an inseparable aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the first amendment and the liberty protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1171, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958). Moreover, it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters. Id. The protection of the Constitution extends to association for social as well as political ends. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1689, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (referring to the right of the people to gather in public places for social or political purposes). 53 The Supreme Court has said that constitutionally protected freedom of association has two categories. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3249-50, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). The first is freedom of intimate association, which is coextensive with the right of privacy. Id. at 618, 104 S.Ct. at 3250; see Fleisher v. City of Signal Hill, 829 F.2d 1491, 1499-1500 (9th Cir.1987). The second is freedom of expressive association, which is implicit in the first amendment's guarantees. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 618, 622, 104 S.Ct. at 3252. 54 It is in its construction of Jaycees that the majority makes its principal error. The majority bases its analysis of IDK's constitutional rights on the views expressed by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion. In that opinion, Justice O'Connor argued that association should lose its first amendment protection if it is primarily commercial in nature. See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 635, 104 S.Ct. at 3259 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); majority at 1193. The majority applies Justice O'Connor's test to the escort services and concludes that the escort services are primarily commercial enterprises, and their activities are not predominately of the type protected by the first amendment. Majority at 1195. 55 Contrary to the majority's assumption, the Supreme Court has never adopted the primarily expressive/primarily commercial distinction; nor has the Court ever said that an association must be primarily expressive in order to be constitutionally protected. However appealing this approach may seem at first blush, it is not the route the Court took in Jaycees and it is not one we should take here. 56 Justice O'Connor acknowledged the difficulties inherent in her proposed standard, see Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 635-37, 104 S.Ct. at 3259-60 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), and her discussion only serves to highlight the dangers of her analysis. She seems to look to the purpose of the activity in question, distinguishing for example between [l]awyering to advance social goals and [lawyering] for commercial ends. Id. at 636-37, 104 S.Ct. at 3259-60. But her focus on motive bears no relation to the goals the first amendment is designed to serve, and her dichotomy between expressive activity and commercial activity is, in my view, a false one. Many of the activities we consider at the heart of the first amendment are undertaken for purely commercial ends, but that fact is not dispositive in the constitutional analysis. Where activity is protected by the first amendment, the fact that it also has a commercial aspect does not and should not deprive the activity of its usual protection or reduce the degree of scrutiny required. See First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 n. 23, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1421 n. 23, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66, 84 S.Ct. 710, 718, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). The fact that IDK's judgment--like that of the New York Times or of Playboy magazine--is tempered by commercial considerations does not affect its first amendment rights or those of the escorts or their patrons. See Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1410 n. 10 (9th Cir.1985). To analyze the issue in terms of the expressive/commercial dichotomy thus invites the placing of serious limitations on heretofore protected first amendment rights. 57 Theater owners, booksellers, and concert promoters provide products to the public in exchange for monetary compensation. They are protected by the first amendment because the materials or activities they make available are protected. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 88 S.Ct. 1298, 20 L.Ed.2d 225 (1968); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 83 S.Ct. 631, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir.1985); Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054, 105 S.Ct. 2115, 85 L.Ed.2d 480 (1985). The fact that they are commercial operators is of no constitutional significance. 2 IDK acts to facilitate association between individuals. To the extent that association is constitutionally protected, the first amendment applies to IDK (as well as to the escorts and their patrons), despite the fact that IDK operates for commercial ends. 3 58 It may be that the majority is confusing the category of those who have a commercial interest in protected activity with the category of commercial speech. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 504 n. 11, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 2890-91 n. 11, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981). But the commercial speech that the Supreme Court has held deserving of a lesser degree of first amendment protection is not speech that is bought and sold; rather, it is speech that does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction.'  Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 106 S.Ct. 2968, 2976, 92 L.Ed.2d 266 (1986) (quoting Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1825, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976)). The primary example is pure commercial advertising. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 (1977) (advertising by attorneys); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976) (advertising by pharmacists). The commercial speech cases that the majority cites simply have no bearing on this case. See Chase v. Davelaar, 645 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir.1981) (like books, newspapers, and movies, topless dancing is not commercial speech even though it is a form of expression presented for pecuniary gain). 4 59 While I believe that the escort-patron relationship is protected by the first amendment by virtue of the right of expressive association, I also believe that it is constitutionally protected because it involves important elements of both expressive and intimate association. In prior cases, the Supreme Court has found that protected associations fell into one or the other category. See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 618-20, 104 S.Ct. at 3249-51; see also Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1940, 95 L.Ed.2d 474 (1987). I do not believe, however, that the Court intended to exclude from constitutional protection associations that combine elements from both categories. Relationships between people may be intensely personal without rising to the level of the deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares ... distinctively personal aspects of one's life. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 620, 104 S.Ct. at 3250. Those same relationships may also give rise to first amendment concerns, in that they help formulate individuals' political, religious, and cultural identities, without being directed explicitly or exclusively toward first amendment ends. Associations between two individuals often involve both a personal or intimate aspect and the exchange of views and ideas. It would make little sense to exclude such associations from constitutional protection simply because they do not fall clearly into either the intimate or the expressive category. The right of two individuals to choose to associate together for reasons short of marriage is, I believe, deserving of full constitutional protection. Nevertheless, for purposes of the remainder of the dissent, I will rely exclusively on the expressive association category. 5 60