Opinion ID: 163539
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The continued detention and search

Text: Next, Mr. Velasco challenges his continued detention at the secondary inspection area. “Further detention of an individual beyond the scope of a routine checkpoint stop must be based upon reasonable suspicion, consent, or probable cause.” Massie , 65 F.3d at 848; see also Preciado , 966 F.2d at 598 (stating that “even [w]hen the questions asked at the primary inspection area satisfy all concerns about a person’s citizenship or immigration status, an agent may still direct a vehicle to a secondary inspection area and further question the occupants on the basis of reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed”). -7- The Supreme Court has explained that this reasonable suspicion standard reflects a balancing of “the importance of the governmental interest at stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975). Reasonable suspicion may be based on “a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together warranted further investigation.” United States v. Lopez-Martinez , 25 F.3d 1481, 1484 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)). Although “the necessary level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires some minimal level of objective justification.” Cantu , 87 F.3d at 1121 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). The ultimate assessment of reasonable suspicion must be made in light of the experience of the border agent and based on the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Gandara-Salinas , 327 F.3d 1127, 1130 (10th Cir. 2003). Here, the record establishes that the border patrol agents possessed reasonable suspicion that Mr. Velasco had committed an immigration violation and were therefore authorized to detain him at the secondary inspection area and further question him there. In particular, Mr. Velasco’s passenger (Mr. Rios) had unquestionably violated the bounds of his border crossing permit and thus could have been taken into custody. This, combined with (1) the possibly fraudulent I- -8- 94 permit, 1 (2) the story about meeting the ailing aunt at a gas station, (3) Mr. Rios’s contention that he had lost all identification because of a recent robbery; (3) Mr. Velasco’s nervousness in handing over the receipt for the purchase of the vehicle, and (5) the presentation of a receipt for the sale of the vehicle (rather than the vehicle’s insurance and registration) justified Agent Bowcutt’s decision to continue the detention. We are not persuaded by Mr. Velasco’s contention that the border agent’s observations supported only the detention of Mr. Rios. Unquestionably, the suspicious behavior of a passenger is a factor that an agent may consider in deciding whether to detain the driver. See, e.g., United States v. Kopp , 45 F.3d 1450, 1453-54 (10th Cir. 1995) (considering the behavior of a passenger in the reasonable suspicion calculus). Moreover, we have noted above, some of Agent Bowcutt’s observations concerned Mr. Velasco himself (e.g., Mr. Velasco’s nervousness and Mr. Velasco’s handing Agent Bowcutt a receipt rather than proof of insurance and registration).