Opinion ID: 2789949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Aggregation of Claims

Text: Petitioners’ final question asks us to consider whether the Court of Special Appeals concluded correctly that all of Petitioners’ survivorship and wrongful death claims should be reduced to one claim for the purposes of the LGTCA cap because the family’s wrongful death claims were derivative of the decedent’s estate’s claims. In this case, the Circuit Court originally reduced the jury’s verdict as to the County from $11,505,000 to $805,000,19 but, after the Court of Special Appeals issued its opinion in Leake v. Johnson, 204 Md. App. 387, 40 A.3d 1127 (2012), it aggregated the wrongful death claims of the family with the survivorship claims of the decedent’s estate to further reduce the verdict as to the County to $405,000: $200,000 for the survivorship/wrongful death claims, $200,000 for Manuel’s claim for violation of his own constitutional rights, and $5,000 in non-economic damages. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the Circuit Court “properly applied Leake when it found that Estela and Manuel’s wrongful death claims were derivative of Espina’s survival claim and limited recovery to $200,000.” Id. In addition, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the Circuit Court was correct in “finding that Manuel’s constitutional claim 19 The $805,000 amount represents the total of: $200,000 for the estate’s survivorship claims, $200,000 for Estela’s wrongful death claim, $200,000 for Manuel’s wrongful death claim, $200,000 for Manuel’s constitutional claim, and $5,000 in non-economic damages. 37 was separate and not derivative[,]” therefore, Manuel’s claim was properly reduced to $200,000. Espina, 215 Md. App. at 647, 82 A.3d at 1262. Finally, the Court of Special Appeals determined that the trial court erred in awarding $5,000 in economic damages, because “the LGTCA damages cap does not differentiate between economic and noneconomic damages[,]” and, therefore, the total damages award should have been reduced to $400,000. Id. The answer to the question of aggregation of claims turns on the interpretation of the phrase “per an individual claim” as used in the LGTCA. CJP § 5-303(a)(1) provides that “the liability of a local government may not exceed $200,000 per an individual claim, and $500,000 per total claims that arise from the same occurrence for damages resulting from tortious acts or omissions.” This Court already addressed the interpretation of this section in Board of County Commissioners v. Marcas, L.L.C., 415 Md. 676, 4 A.3d 946 (2010). Marcas involved the application of the LGTCA damages cap in a negligence case brought by a property owner against the Board of County Commissioners of St. Mary’s County. In that case, the plaintiff alleged multiple tort counts arising out of the alleged contamination of the plaintiff’s property that occurred over an extended period of time. Marcas, 415 Md. at 678, 4 A.3d at 947. The Board of County Commissioners argued that, though the complaint included numerous counts, the complaint only asserted one “individual claim,” whereas the property owner argued that each day that the property was contaminated gave rise to an “individual claim.” Marcas, 415 Md. at 684-85, 4 A.3d at 951. 38 In Marcas, we began by noting that “[t]he terms, ‘individual claim,’ and ‘same occurrence,’ are not defined in the LGTCA.” 415 Md. at 684, 4 A.3d at 951. In defining “individual claim,” we looked to Black’s Law Dictionary and determined that “[c]laim is synonymous with ‘cause of action[.]’” Marcas, 415 Md. at 689, 4 A.3d at 953. A “cause of action,” in turn, is defined as “a set of facts sufficient to justify a court in rendering judgment for the plaintiff.” Id. (citing Paul Mark Sandler and James K. Archibald, Pleading Causes of Action 2 (4th ed. 2008)). In the context of that case, we concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint, although it asserted numerous tort counts, contained one cause of action, arising from the contamination of the property caused by the county’s negligence, and therefore constituted one “individual claim” for the purposes of the LGTCA damages cap. Marcas, 415 Md. at 689, 4 A.3d at 954. We also noted, more broadly, that “if a local government negligently fails to comply with applicable state and federal regulations pertaining to a particular landfill, and that negligence is the proximate cause of contamination to one or more adjacent properties, each adjacent property owner’s claim for money damages would constitute an ‘individual claim,’ regardless of how many theories of recovery are asserted.” Marcas, 415 Md. at 688, 4 A.3d at 953. Therefore, we held that if there were multiple affected properties, each property owner’s claims for damages would constitute one “individual claim.” 20 20 In addition, as to the definition of “same occurrence,” we concluded that “(1) the ‘cause’ test is applicable to the determination of what does, or does not, constitute the ‘same (continued...) 39 In Marcas, we also discussed the legislative history of the LGTCA, referring specifically to the difficulties of local governments in purchasing liability insurance. We explained that “the General Assembly intended that courts would use the insurance industry’s definitions of ‘individual claim’ and ‘same occurrence’ when applying [the LGTCA damages cap].” 415 Md. at 687, 4 A.3d at 952. For that reason, our cases discussing insurance caps on wrongful death claims are instructive in wrongful death cases involving the LGTCA. The Court of Special Appeals applied that reasoning in Leake v. Johnson, a case involving claims against police officers by the decedent’s estate, wife, and son, after the decedent died as a result of injuries sustained during an arrest and subsequent transportation in a police vehicle. 204 Md. App. at 389, 40 A.3d at 1128. After trial in that case, the jury found for the plaintiffs and awarded damages “to the estate of Mr. Johnson in the amount of: (1) $87,000 for compensatory, economic damages; and (2) $5,000,050 for compensatory, non-economic damages, including pain and suffering[; and] . . . to both [sons], individually, in the amount of: (1) $34,000 for loss of financial support; and (2) $1,100,000 for non-economic damages.” (...continued) occurrence’ as that term is used in [CJP] § 5-303(a), and (2) continuous and repeated acts of negligence may constitute the ‘same occurrence.’” Marcas, 415 Md. at 692, 4 A.3d at 955. Thus, in the context of that case, we held that “if a local government negligently fails to comply with applicable state and federal regulations pertaining to a particular landfill, and that negligence is the proximate cause of contamination to one or more adjacent properties, each adjacent owner’s claim for money damages would arise out of the ‘same occurrence,’ even if the local government was negligent (1) in several different ways, and (2) for an extended period of time.” Marcas, 415 Md. at 689-90, 4 A.3d at 954. We ultimately decided that “the individual claim cap contained in [CJP] § 5-303(a) [was] applicable to [a]ppellee’s multiple claims seeking money damages.” Marcas, 415 Md. at 692, 4 A.3d at 955. 40 Leake, 204 Md. App. at 399, 40 A.3d at 1134-35. For purposes of applying the LGTCA damages cap, the trial court decided that there were three individual claims arising out of one occurrence, and therefore reduced the verdict from $7,405,000 to $416,500. Leake, 204 Md. App. at 401-02, 40 A.3d at 1136. Both parties in Leake took issue with the trial court’s reduction of the verdict, based upon the unique issues presented by wrongful death claimants. The question on appeal, therefore, was “whether wrongful death claims are aggregated with a survivor claim, or considered separately, with respect to the LGTCA limitation of liability ‘per an individual claim.’” Leake, 204 Md. App. at 412, 40 A.3d at 1142. Relying on this Court’s opinions in Daley v. United Services Automobile Association, 312 Md. 550, 541 A.2d 632 (1988), and Surratt v. Prince George’s County, 320 Md. 439, 578 A.2d 745 (1990), two wrongful death cases, the Court of Special Appeals explained that wrongful death claims are derivative from the claim based on the injury to the decedent. Leake, 204 Md. App. at 412, 40 A.3d at 1142. In Daley, this Court determined that where an insurance policy set a maximum recovery for bodily injury to one person, “consequential or derivative damages are computed together with the claim for injury of which they are a consequence.” Daley, 312 Md. at 554, 541 A.2d at 634. As explained in Leake, this Court applied the conclusion in Daley regarding aggregating derivative damages in Surratt to conclude that “wrongful death claims were derivative of the claim based on the injury to the [decedent], and therefore, all three claims presented a single claim under [the County Charter’s] ‘per individual’ limit of liability.” 41 Leake, 204 Md. App. at 415, 40 A.3d at 1144. Thus, applying this Court’s analysis in Daley and Surratt, the Court of Special Appeals in Leake held that “a wrongful death claim will be aggregated with the claim of the injured person in applying the LGTCA limitation of liability of a local government to $200,000 per an ‘individual claim.’” Leake, 204 Md. App. at 417, 40 A.3d at 1145. Petitioners in this case contend that the lower courts’ reliance on Leake to aggregate their wrongful death claims for the purposes of the LGTCA damages cap is inconsistent with the Court of Special Appeals’s opinion in Goss v. Estate of Jennings, 207 Md. App. 151, 51 A.3d 761 (2012). In Goss, filed shortly after Leake, in which the court refused to aggregate wrongful death and survivorship claims for the purposes of applying the general noneconomic tort damages cap contained in CJP § 11-108. Goss, 207 Md. App. at 173-74, 51 A.3d at 773-74. In that case, Jennings, a prison inmate, was struck and killed by a dump truck owned and operated by Goss during a highway litter pickup detail. Goss, 207 Md. App. at 157, 51 A.3d at 764. Following his death, Jennings’s estate, the estate of his mother, and three beneficiaries filed a wrongful death/survival action. Id. The jury found for the plaintiffs and awarded damages in both the survival and wrongful death actions. Id. On the defendant’s post-trial motion, the trial court reduced only the wrongful death award pursuant to CJP § 11-108, and left the jury’s survival award intact. Goss, 207 Md. App. at 163, 51 A.3d at 768. On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, relying on the key provisions of CJP § 11-108 relating specifically to damages in wrongful death actions. Goss, 207 Md. 42 App. at 172-73, 51 A.3d at 773-74. In Goss, the Court of Special Appeals specifically distinguished Leake, stating “that conclusion turned on the particular language of the LGTCA, where the cap was keyed to claims that arise from ‘the same occurrence.’ Quite simply, Leake’s holding flowed from the extremely narrow language of the LGTCA.” Goss, 207 Md. App. at 173-74, 51 A.3d at 774 (citations omitted). This statement is not exactly an accurate characterization of the court’s holding in Leake because the Leake court concluded that the wrongful death and survival claims should be aggregated because they constitute “an individual claim” as used in the LGTCA, rather than arising from “the same occurrence.” Nevertheless, we agree with the Goss court’s ultimate conclusion that Leake is distinguishable from Goss based on the difference between the LGTCA and CJP § 11-108. As explained in Goss and in our own cases, CJP § 11-108 was amended in 1994 “to make clear that, from and after October 1, 1994, the cap applied to non-economic damages awarded in wrongful death actions. See 1994 Md. Laws, ch. 477.” Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., 433 Md. 137, 163, 70 A.3d 328, 343 (2013). In doing so, the General Assembly also provided a damages cap specifically for wrongful death plaintiffs, as compared to plaintiffs in personal injury cases. See CJP § 11108(b)(3)(ii); Goss, 207 Md. App. at 173, 51 A.3d at 774 (“While the 1994 legislature . . . focused in part on [the difference between multiple claimants in a personal injury case and multiple claimants in a wrongful death case] in capping wrongful death damages, the State made no fundamental change to damage awards in personal injury cases, including a survival 43 action.”).21 The LGTCA makes no such distinction. In other words, the LGTCA contains “extremely narrow language” applicable to all claims brought under it. Goss, 207 Md. App. at 174, 51 A.3d at 774. Petitioners also contend that Leake is inconsistent with our opinion in Marcas, which they assert stands for the principle that each legally cognizable plaintiff may bring a separate “claim” for purposes of calculating the LGTCA damage cap. We disagree. First, Marcas involved a single plaintiff who filed numerous tort claims against the county arising out of contamination of the plaintiff’s property. 415 Md. at 679, 4 A.3d at 947-48. Second, our statement in that case that “if a local government[’s] . . . negligence is the proximate cause of contamination to one or more adjacent properties, each adjacent property owner’s claim for money damages would constitute an ‘individual claim,’” 415 Md. at 688, 4 A.3d at 953, does not mean that any “legally cognizable plaintiff” in any action would have an “individual 21 With regard to the distinction between a “normal” personal injury case and a wrongful death case, we have explained: In a normal personal injury action based on injuries to more than one person, each plaintiff, whether suing separately or joining with other plaintiffs, represents a separate case. Any judgments are awarded separately, on an individual basis. The plaintiffs do not share in one gross award. That is not the case with a wrongful death action. Only one wrongful death action is permissible with respect to the death of a person. All beneficiaries seeking a recovery are required to join in that action, and one award is made, which is divided among the plaintiffs as directed by the verdict. Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., 433 Md. 137, 166, 70 A.3d 328, 345 (2013). See also CJP § 3- 904(f) (“Only one action under this subtitle lies in respect to the death of a person.”). 44 claim” for purposes of the LGTCA. Rather, an “individual claim,” as we defined it in Marcas, will depend on the cause of action and the set of facts necessary to create that cause of action. See 415 Md. at 689, 4 A.3d at 953. We are mindful of our longstanding principle that wrongful death and survival actions are “separate and distinct.” Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 537 n.23, 682 A.2d 1143, 1161 n.23 (1996) (“Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power, 104 Md. 332, 65 A. 49 (1906) . . . . stands for the proposition that survival actions are separate and distinct from wrongful death actions.”). At the same time, however, “it is not wholly incorrect to state that a wrongful death claim is derivative of the decedent’s claim in some sense. The two actions stem from the same underlying conduct[.]” Mummert v. Alizadeh, 435 Md. 207, 222, 77 A.3d 1049, 1058 (2013). As explained above, for the purpose of damage awards, “consequential or derivative damages are computed together with the claim for bodily injury of which they are a consequence.” Daley, 312 Md. at 554, 541 A.2d at 634. Based on our review of Marcas, Daley, Surratt, and Leake, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals’s conclusion that, for the purposes of the LGTCA damages cap, “wrongful death claims, which are derivative of another person’s claim of injury [the survival claim], are considered collectively as one individual claim.” Leake, 204 Md. App. at 416, 40 A.3d at 1144. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals aggregating Estela and Manuel’s wrongful death claims with the estate’s survivorship claims for the purpose of limiting recovery to $200,000. Like the Court of Special Appeals, we leave intact 45 the $200,000 award for Manuel’s claim for violation of his constitutional rights. Manuel’s claim arises out of Jackson’s treatment of him during the confrontation. It is not derivative of the estate’s survivorship claims, which arise out of the fatal shooting of Espina. Therefore, Manuel’s claim constitutes “an individual claim” under the LGTCA separate from the survivorship/wrongful death claims. Thus, Petitioners’ recovery against the County is limited to $400,000. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. PETITIONERS TO PAY COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS. 46