Opinion ID: 2972882
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Young’s Speedy Trial Claim1

Text: Young’s final argument on appeal is that the unreasonable delay between his conviction and sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. On November 21, 2000, Young was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to commit escape and attempted escape. He was not sentenced by the district court until September 9, 2003–more than 33 months later. The Sixth Amendment states in pertinent part, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment right to a 1 To support its position on this issue, the United States requests that we take judicial notice of the district court proceedings in Young’s drug case (No. CR-3-00-034(1)). Because Young does not challenge the reference to these court documents, which appear to be important to understanding some of the reasons for the lengthy delay in sentencing, we hereby GRANT the motion to take judicial notice of the district court proceedings. 16 speedy trial also applies to sentencing. See United States v. Thomas, 167 F.3d 299, 303 (6th Cir. 1999). In determining whether the delay was unreasonable, we review legal questions de novo and factual questions for clear error. See id. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), the Supreme Court established four factors for determining whether a trial delay is unconstitutional: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. The Court determined that none of these factors alone was a necessary or sufficient condition to a finding that the Sixth Amendment had been violated. See id. at 533. Rather, those factors should be balanced in such a way so that the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed. See id. at 530. Because the length of the delay in this case was more than one year, it is considered to be “presumptively prejudicial,” requiring us to consider the remaining Barker factors. See Thomas, 167 F.3d at 304. Next, in assessing the reasons for the delay, a deliberate attempt to hinder the defense should weigh heavily against the government while more neutral reasons such as negligence or a crowded docket should be weighted less heavily, even though the government bears the ultimate responsibility for such delays. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. The United States argues that the delay in this case was justified because the bulk of the delay was caused by 17 Young. Following his conviction on November 21, 2000, Young requested and received an extension of time to file a motion for a new trial, which he then filed on December 18, 2001. On that same date, as described by the district court, Young “went berserk” in court and directed profanity at the court and the prosecutor.2 He was held in contempt for his behavior and the district court considered whether he was competent to stand trial. Young, 199 F. Supp.2d at 698-700. On April 20, 2001, the district court ordered that Young undergo a mental evaluation locally. 2 After becoming angry at what Young perceived as a delay in scheduling his drug trial, the following exchange occurred: Defendant: This is wrong, your Honor. This is wrong. This is wrong. Court: Mr. Young? Defendant: This is wrong. It’s bull shit too. Court: All right. Mr. Young, you have just earned yourself another six months. Defendant: I’ve got 52 fucking years coming man. I mean, what does another fucking day mean? Court: Get this man out of here, immediately. Defendant: The bitch has me pinned in a five-by-seven box for nine fucking months. This is bull shit. Court: We are in recess. Defendant: Hateful bitch. Courtroom Deputy Clerk: All rise. Defendant: Fuck this court. Fuck this court. Fuck you and I won’t be back, you bitch. You’re playing goddamn games. Marshal: Calm down. Defendant: Fuck the constitution, you assholes. Fucking wipe on a mother fucker. That’s what you can use it for–(Defendant continued screaming “F” word comments as leaving courtroom and into the hall). United States v. Young, 199 F. Supp.2d 697, 699 (S.D. Ohio 2001). 18 After receiving the results of Young’s evaluation, the district court entered an order directing Young to appear on July 17, 2001, and scheduling the sentencing for his escape convictions for July 24, 2001. After engaging in the necessary colloquy with Young on July 17, 2001, the district court determined that it would allow him to represent himself at trial on the pending drug charges. On July 20, 2001, Young appeared in court again to discuss topics such as discovery procedure in preparation for his drug trial. During this appearance, Young engaged in what the district court deemed “nothing less than a psychotic rage,” for which he was held in contempt.3 As a result of this outburst, Young was not sentenced on July 24, 2001. On October 18, 2001, the district court vacated its ruling permitting Young to proceed pro se and its 3 After the district court explained that Young would have full access to discovery materials but only at the U.S. Marshal’s office, the following exchange occurred: Defendant: You Honor, can I go back to the jail? I am about to have an anxiety attack. I can’t go on with this shit. Have the marshals take me back before I do something stupid. I’m being nice. Can I please go back? Court: Well, I appreciate the advance warning. Defendant: I’m telling, your Honor, I know myself. Court: Marshals, if you would. Defendant: I know myself. This is crazy. I can’t have my fucking discovery packet. What kind of shit is that? Shit. God. You mother fuckers. Court: Once again Mr. Young– Defendant: You fucked-up asshole. You Jew bitch and bastard. Court: You’ve earned yourself another six months. Defendant: Fuck you. Kiss my dick. I’m not going to have my discovery packet. You’ve got me fucking bent, you bitch, mother fucker. Kiss my ass. Young, 199 F. Supp.2d at 699-700. 19 finding that Young was competent to stand trial. The court ordered Young to undergo a more thorough psychological evaluation at the Federal Medical Center. See Young, 199 F. Supp.2d at 698. On February 15, 2002, the district court received Young’s mental evaluation and deemed him competent to stand trial. In February 2002, Young filed two motions without the aid of counsel, wherein he requested that all motions filed on his behalf by his previous counsel be withdrawn. On March 27, 2002, Young submitted a letter to the court in which he stated that he was still waiting for his transcripts so that his lawyer could file a motion for a new trial. On April 4, 2002, the district court reappointed Young’s original attorney to represent him in filing the motion. The briefing was completed on May 30, 2002. Based on the foregoing, it appears that the United States is correct that at least some of the delay is attributable to Young. Most of the delay between Young’s conviction on November 21, 2000 and the completion of the briefing on Young’s motion for a new trial on May 30, 2002 resulted from his outbursts in court which caused the district court to question his competency, his filing of numerous inconsistent motions, and by several changes of defense counsel. It appears that the United States is responsible for most of the fifteen-month period from May 31, 2002 until September 10, 2003. Young acknowledges, however, that “the government took 20 no affirmative action to create this extraordinary delay.” He blames the delay on the district court’s inattention to the case. Unintentional delay of this type should be weighed less heavily against the government. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. The third factor under Barker involves whether the defendant invoked his right to a speedy trial. 407 U.S. at 533. We conclude that Young asserted his right to a speedy trial. In corresponding with the district court, Young on multiple occasions invoked his right to be sentenced in a timely manner. After he was deemed competent to stand trial the second time, Young sent the court a letter on March 27, 2002, wherein he correctly stated that “sentencing is a part of fast and speedy trial.”4 The final factor involves whether the delay resulted in prejudice to the defendant. In making this determination, we consider the following interests of the defendant: “(1) prevention of oppressive incarceration pending appeal; (2) minimization of anxiety and concern of those convicted awaiting the outcome of their appeals; and (3) limitation of the possibility that a convicted person’s grounds for appeal, and his or her defenses in case of reversal and retrial, might be impaired.” Thomas, 167 F.3d at 303 n.4. Young argues that the delay worsened his conditions of confinement, caused anxiety, made an appeal of his sentence pointless, and 4 During a later sentencing hearing, the district court erroneously stated that “there is no speedy trial right to a sentencing.” 21 impaired his ability to present a defense if a new trial is ordered because of fading memories and passing time. However, we are unable to conclude that Young suffered any cognizable prejudice. Young complains about various conditions of confinement. However, these appear to be the same conditions under which he was imprisoned prior to his conviction for attempted escape and the record indicates that he was subjected to somewhat harsher conditions at least in part because of his reputation as a “difficult inmate.” Moreover, an incarcerated federal felon has no right to be imprisoned in a particular institution, even when another prison offers longer visitation hours and more educational and vocational opportunities. See Thomas, 167 F.3d at 305. We conclude that any error in the delay was harmless because Young was in prison awaiting trial on federal drug charges, to which he pled guilty to on September 25, 2003–fifteen days after he was sentenced for the escape plot. He would have been in prison the entire time anyway. Moreover, the district court gave Young a one-level decrease in his net offense level to account for the delay in sentencing. There is no evidence that Young suffered more anxiety than any other individual would have suffered under the same circumstances. See Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314, 328 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[A]ll involuntary detention will undoubtedly engender some amount of anxiety”). During a hearing in his drug case, Young did 22 state that he was “about to have an anxiety attack.” However, that July 20, 2001 hearing did not concern his sentencing. Moreover, Young would have been sentenced for his escape convictions only four days later if he had not disrupted court proceedings. Finally, the most important interest in the prejudice inquiry concerns whether the defense was impaired by the delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. Because we have determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Young’s motion for a new trial, however, Young’s arguments that he is prejudiced because of the difficulty of locating witnesses and because of the possibility of fading memories are moot. We are unable to conclude that the delay between Young’s conviction and sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.