Opinion ID: 729223
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion for Acquittal, or in the Alternative, to Strike Allegations from the Indictment

Text: 34 Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motions for acquittal, or in the alternative, to strike allegations in the indictment. Defendant made a motion for Total and/or Partial Acquittal at the close of the Government's case and at the close of all the evidence. (R. 38; Tr., 3/6/95, at 88; Tr., 3/14/95, at 95; R. 47). However, in none of these instances did defendant request that the trial court strike allegations from the indictment other than Count 11. Defendant consistently requested that a judgment of acquittal be entered as his sole requested relief. Thus, defendant is not entitled to judicial review on this issue. 35 Defendant argues that if the allegedly deficient allegations were struck from the indictment, it would have diminished the prejudice of a patchwork verdict based upon multiple theories of fraud not established at trial. (Appellant's Brief at 37.) As stated earlier, there was no danger of a patchwork verdict posed by the Government's theories. Moreover, because defendant does not argue that a rational trier of fact would be unable to convict based upon the remaining allegations in the indictment, the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for acquittal was not in error. Expert Testimony 36 In United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 676, 681-82 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1558 (1996), 37 [a]ppellate review of trial court rulings on the admissibility of expert opinion testimony under Fed.R.Evid. 702, depending upon the assignment of error, may involve as many as three separate standards of review. First, we review the trial court's preliminary factfinding under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) for clear error. Second, the trial court's determination whether the opinion the expert will offer is properly the subject of scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge is a question of law, which we review de novo. Third, the trial court's determination whether the proffered expert opinion will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue is a determination of relevance, which this court reviews for abuse of discretion. In addition, the balancing of probative value against the potential for unfair prejudice under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is also reviewed only for abuse of discretion. 38 Id. (citations omitted). 39 In the instant case, defendant argued that the opinion of Dr. Shirley Austin was inadmissable because Dr. Austin was not qualified as an expert in sampling procedures, and that her testimony therefore lacked foundation and was unhelpful to a jury due to its unreliability. Dr. Austin is a dentist with twenty years experience who serves as Dental Program Administrator for BCBSM. Her responsibilities at BCBSM include final approval authority on dental claims and the creation and review of dental policy. At trial, Dr. Austin testified that she had been requested to audit the patient records seized from defendant's office. Dr. Austin reviewed in detail the fifteen patient charts which formed the basis of the indictment for the benefit of the trier of fact. When asked if these fifteen files were representative of the types of things she found in the larger audit sample, Dr. Austin replied in the affirmative. (Tr., 3/14/95, at 57.) However, she never testified as to who performed the sampling, the sampling procedure, or what percentage of the total number of patient charts seized were represented by the sampling. 40 The trial court judge held that Dr. Austin was clearly qualified as an expert on the billing records and that defendant's objection went to the weight the jury should accord Dr. Austin's testimony rather than to admissibility. The trial court judge acted appropriately in allowing Dr. Austin to testify at trial about the fifteen files introduced by the Government. Defendant does not deny that Dr. Austin is an expert in reviewing billing practices, and these files were all admitted into evidence. Furthermore, it was appropriate for the trial court to allow Dr. Austin to testify that these files were representative of the other files she examined. Because she testified with respect to those files she actually examined, this Court need not address the issue of whether she was an expert in sampling at all. The trial court judge was correct: whether her answers were credible or not was an issue for the trier of fact. See United States v. August, 745 F.2d 400, 407 (6th Cir.1984) (jury may determine the weight and credibility to be given to this testimony). Defendant was able to utilize cross examination and closing argument to convince the jury that Dr. Austin's opinions regarding the representativeness of the sample lacked a firm factual foundation. United States v. L.E. Cooke Co., Inc., 991 F.2d 336, 342 (6th Cir.1993). Thus, we believe that the trial court judge ruled correctly on defendant's objections to Dr. Austin's testimony. Tax Returns 41 The trial court's decision to admit evidence over defendant's objections based upon Fed.R.Evid. 403 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Carter, 969 F.2d 197, 200 (6th Cir.1992). Defendant objected to the introduction of his professional corporation's tax returns during the years at issue. Defendant contends that because his total professional compensation ranged between $390,000 and $880,000 a year, but the charges focused on less than 5% of his practice, the probative value of evidence regarding defendant's total income is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The Government argues that the tax returns were highly probative because defendant's insurance billings and payments were made through his professional corporation and the tax returns showed that defendant was president and 100% shareholder of the corporation. Thus, the Government argues, the tax returns were proof of defendant's financial incentive to commit fraud and are therefore evidence of specific intent to deceive. 42 We agree with the Government. It is within a trial court's discretion to admit tax returns in a mail fraud prosecution as proof of motive, and motive is evidence of specific intent to deceive. See United States v. Schnabel, 939 F.2d 197, 202 (4th Cir.1991). Furthermore, it is not clear that the tax returns were the least bit prejudicial to defendant's case. A juror may well conclude that someone making a large income but deriving little from allegedly fraudulent practices had little incentive to commit fraud. Thus, the trial court judge properly exercised his discretion in admitting into evidence defendant's tax returns for the years in question. Sentencing Considerations 43 The trial court's factual findings for sentencing purposes are reviewed for clear error, with due deference given the trial court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the facts of the case. United States v. Jackson, 25 F.3d 327, 330 (6th Cir.) (citing United States v. Peters, 15 F.3d 540, 546 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 219 (1994)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 344 (1994). A defendant must carry the heavy burden of persuading this Court that the evaluation of the loss was not only inaccurate, but was outside the realm of permissible computations. Jackson, 25 F.3d at 330 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment. (n. 8) (sentencing court need only make a reasonable estimate of the range of the loss, given the available information)). 44 In the instant case, the trial court judge was required to determine the amount of loss pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b). The amount of loss for sentencing purposes must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Kohlbach, 38 F.3d 832, 841 (6th Cir.1994). In sentencing the defendant, the trial judge accepted the figure contained in the revised presentence report, $378,334.33. 45 [A] defendant who challenges factual allegations in the PSR [presentence report] has the burden of producing some evidence beyond a bare denial that calls the reliability or correctness of the alleged facts into question. The burden of convincing the court that the PSR facts are true only shifts back to the prosecutor if the defendant carries his burden of production. 46 United States v. Rivera, 6 F.3d 431, 444 (7th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1130, 114 S.Ct. 1098 (1994); see United States v. Leal, 75 F.3d 219, 229 (6th Cir.1996) (in order for [defendant] to obtain any reduction in his sentence, he would have to demonstrate that [a number contained in the presentence report was] erroneously ascribed to him by the district court). 47 Defendant Dolan argues that the proposed loss amount contained in the amended presentence report was not established by a preponderance of the evidence at the sentencing hearing. Defendant contends that the $378,344.33 figure was premised upon two theories: (1) that no endodontic procedure could ever be billed to BCBSM medical/surgical insurance; and (2) that even if billing to this insurance were proper, defendant had not performed any of the endodontic procedures that could be properly billed to medical insurance. Defendant argues that the first premise was disproven by the Government's expert witnesses, Drs. Austin and Lanier, who testified that certain procedures performed by an endodontist could properly be billed to medical insurance. Defendant maintains that the second premise was disproven by Dr. Austin, who admitted that defendant may have performed procedures properly billed to medical insurance. 48 The Government contends that the $378,344.33 figure, like the figure in the original presentence report, was a conservative estimate calculated with respect to losses suffered by BCBSM only, and that the $378,344.33 figure represents an accurate compilation of the amounts billed to BCBSM over this period. The Government also notes that Dolan testified at trial that his billing practices with respect to BCBSM were consistent from 1982 onward. (Tr., 3/9/95, at 15.) The Government argues that while Dr. Austin testified that defendant is qualified to perform surgeries properly billed to medical insurance, there was no evidence that any of defendant's billings were proper despite defendant's complete access to his files, all of which were introduced as evidence at trial. 49 Given that defendant has been unable to produce evidence that even a single one of his billings was legitimate, we decline to hold that the trial court's factual findings were clearly erroneous.