Opinion ID: 739321
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Ultimate Issue Testimony

Text: 13 Appellant asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it prohibited her expert witness, Dr. Mintzes, from using the term deliberately indifferent to describe Tessmer's and Jabe's conduct. Federal Rule of Evidence 704(a) provides that testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. This court recently has stated that Rule 704 removes the 'general proscription against opinions on 'ultimate issues' and shift[s] the focus to whether the testimony is 'otherwise admissible.' '  United States v. Sheffey, 57 F.3d 1419, 1425 (6th Cir.1995) (quoting Torres v. County of Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 150 (6th Cir.1985)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 749, 133 L.Ed.2d 697 (1996). 14 As the advisory committee notes to Rule 704 indicate, the protections afforded by the other rules of evidence are far from hollow when ultimate issue testimony is being offered: 15 The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars so as to admit all opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence which wastes time. These provisions afford ample assurances against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach, somewhat in the manner of the oath-helpers of an earlier day. They also stand ready to exclude opinions phrased in terms of inadequately explored legal criteria. Thus the question, Did T have capacity to make a will? would be excluded, while the question, Did T have sufficient mental capacity to know the nature and extent of his property and the natural objects of his bounty and to formulate a rational scheme of distribution? would be allowed. McCormick § 12. 16 FED.R.EVID. 704 Advisory Committee Notes. It is, therefore, apparent that testimony offering nothing more than a legal conclusion--i.e, testimony that does little more than tell the jury what result to reach--is properly excludable under the Rules. It is also appropriate to exclude ultimate issue testimony on the ground that it would not be helpful to the trier of fact when  'the terms used by the witness have a separate, distinct and specialized meaning in the law different from that present in the vernacular.'  Sheffey, 57 F.3d at 1426 (citation omitted) (emphasis in Sheffey ). 17 In addition to Sheffey 's general pronouncements, two Sixth Circuit cases have confronted the ultimate issue problem as it relates to the term deliberate indifference. In Heflin v. Stewart County, 958 F.2d 709 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 998, 113 S.Ct. 598, 121 L.Ed.2d 535 (1992), an expert witness in a § 1983/Eighth Amendment case testified that, in his opinion, the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of a pretrial detainee. The court concluded that the district court did not commit reversible error by admitting this evidence. Id. at 715. Central to the court's conclusion was the fact that the witness used 'deliberately indifferent' in the way an ordinary layman would to describe such conduct--to state his opinion on the ultimate fact, not to state a legal conclusion. Id. In Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1111, 115 S.Ct. 902, 130 L.Ed.2d 786 (1995), a § 1983/municipal liability case, the plaintiff's expert witness testified that the Detroit Police Department was gross[ly] negligent in its training of its officers and that this gross negligence was comparable to deliberate indifference. Id. at 1353. The witness then defined deliberate indifference as [c]onscious knowledge of something and not doing anything about it. Id. at n. 12. Overturning a jury verdict for the plaintiff, this court held that the district court erred by admitting this testimony. We stated that  'deliberate indifference' is a legal term and that [i]t is the responsibility of the court, not testifying witnesses, to define legal terms. Id. 18 Berry and Heflin shed light on the difficulty district courts face when determining whether to admit testimony that arguably amounts to a legal conclusion. Although Heflin indicates that district courts can exercise some discretion in determining whether the proffered testimony is helpful to the jury, Berry teaches that a district court abuses its discretion when it allows a witness to define legal terms, especially terms that carry a considerable amount of legal baggage. 19 In the present case, the rationale relied on in Berry is much more applicable than that in Heflin. The following colloquy between Dr. Mintzes and counsel for appellant demonstrates this fact: 20 Q. Dr. Mintzes, did you form an opinion with respect to the actions or inactions of Mr. Tessmer as they relate to Larry Billups in this matter? 21 A. Yes, I do [sic]. 22 Q. And could you tell the jury what that opinion is? 23 A. It was my opinion that, in terms of looking at all the information, that Mr. Tessmer was what I considered, which is a legal term, deliberately indifferent to what was felt to be a known risk of harm to Mr. Billups. 24 Q. And when you say deliberately indifferent, what do you mean by that? 25 A. Well, somebody, when somebody is considered to be deliberate-- 26 THE COURT: I believe that you are asking the witness to testify to a legal conclusion at this point, Mr. Timm. 27 MR. TIMM: I'll withdraw the question, your Honor. J.A. at 512. 2 28 Testimony such as Dr. Mintzes's, which attempts to tell the jury what result to reach and which runs the risk of interfering with a district court's jury instructions, hardly can be viewed as being helpful to the jury. Moreover, as this opinion indicates in Part III, whether a prison official acted with deliberate indifference depends on that official's state of mind. Thus, by expressing the opinion that Tessmer was deliberately indifferent, Dr. Mintzes gives the false impression that he knows the answer to this inquiry, which depends on Tessmer's mental state. For a witness to stack inference upon inference and then state an opinion regarding the ultimate issue is even more likely to be unhelpful to the trier of fact. See Shahid v. City of Detroit, 889 F.2d 1543, 1547 (6th Cir.1989) (concluding that no abuse of discretion occurred when the district court determined that it would prejudicially confuse the jury to hear an expert witness base his opinion of the ultimate issue on facts that were for the jury to determine.). We thus believe that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Dr. Mintzes's testimony on deliberate indifference.