Opinion ID: 2026681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defense Counsel's Use of the Word Jail

Text: Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to admit evidence that defendant had escaped from custody in Michigan six days before the shootings at the Extra Value liquor store and had taken Deputy Sheriff Zelko's .40-caliber Glock handgun. In its ruling on this motion, the circuit court stated that the evidence tended to aid in the identification of the perpetrator of the subject crimes in that it shows that the Defendant had access to or possession of a handgun, or the .40 caliber Glock he's alleged to have stolen from the Sheriff's Deputy, which is similar to the handgun used in the liquor store crimes. The circuit court conducted a balancing test and concluded that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed its potential prejudicial effect. Accordingly, the court granted the State's motion to admit the evidence. At the same time, however, the circuit court also ruled that the evidence of defendant's escape must not become the focal point of the trial. To that end, the court ordered that the State would be limited to establishing that the Defendant was in the custody of the Sheriff Deputy, overpowered the Deputy, and fled from the Deputy Sheriff's custody with her gun. The court further ordered that the State would not be allowed to present details of the escape from custody that were irrelevant to the identification issue, including the fact that the defendant was a jail inmate at the time of this other offense. Thereafter, during the course of defense counsel's opening statement to the jury, counsel stated that a person by the name of Ricardo Harris had escaped from a jail in Michigan and he had escaped with a gun. In the next sentence, counsel again stated, Ricardo Harris did escape from a jail in Michigan. Later, during the cross-examination of Deputy Sheriff Zelko, defense counsel elicited testimony that defendant was wearing jail-jump greens at the time of his escape. The court sustained an objection by the State to the use of the word jail-jumps but did not inform the jury that the objection was sustained. Before this court, defendant argues that defense counsel's use of the word jail during his opening statement, and the elicitation of the word jail-jumps from a witness, amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant contends that defense counsel's errors revealed that defendant had at least allegedly committed prior bad acts and that he had been arrested as a result. According to defendant, counsel's errors were prejudicial and require reversal of his convictions. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are generally evaluated under the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984) (adopted by this court in People v. Albanese, 104 Ill.2d 504, 525-26, 85 Ill.Dec. 441, 473 N.E.2d 1246 (1984)). To prevail under Strickland, a defendant must show that his attorney's assistance was both deficient and prejudicial. More precisely, a defendant must show that his attorney's assistance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693, 698. The failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test will preclude a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Shaw, 186 Ill.2d 301, 332, 239 Ill.Dec. 311, 713 N.E.2d 1161 (1998). In this case, defendant has not established prejudice. As noted, in its ruling on the motion in limine, the circuit court held that the State could introduce evidence that defendant escaped from the custody of Deputy Sheriff Zelko. Defendant does not contest this ruling. Thus, defendant's contention regarding prejudice is quite narrow: he contends he was prejudiced by the statements that he escaped from custody in jail rather than from the custody of a deputy sheriff. This is a de minimis distinction. The jury knew that defendant was in custody and could infer, logically, that he was being held in custody somewhere. Further, on the three occasions when the word jail was mentioned it was not stressed or emphasized in any way. Finally, and most important, the three mentions of the word jail occurred within the context of a lengthy trial in which the jury heard extensive ballistics evidence as well as the compelling testimony of two eyewitnesses who repeatedly and unequivocally identified defendant as the gunman. Given these facts, we conclude there is no reasonable probability that, absent the appearance of the word jail and jail-jumps, the result of defendant's trial would have been different. Accordingly, defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.