Opinion ID: 430578
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effective Assistance at the Sentencing Hearing.

Text: 23 Alvord contends that Meyers failed to provide effective assistance at his sentencing hearing because he failed to collect and present as mitigating evidence Alvord's extensive history of mental illness; failed effectively to cross-examine Robey, who testified for the state, because of Meyers' unfamiliarity with Alvord's background; failed to produce other psychiatrists as rebuttal witnesses; and failed to produce witnesses to testify favorably regarding Alvord's character. The record demonstrates that Meyers called no witnesses at the sentencing hearing; however, Meyers testified before the district court that, had the state not called Robey, he would have called him because Robey would testify to the existence of the two mitigating circumstances found by the jury and judge. The district court stated that it was prepared to conclude that Meyers rendered ineffective assistance because of his failure adequately to investigate Alvord's background; however, the court denied the writ on this issue because it found that Alvord suffered no prejudice. We also conclude that Alvord suffered no prejudice; we therefore need not decide whether Meyers' assistance was ineffective. 13 3] See Washington, 693 F.2d at 1264 n. 33 (no need to address ineffectiveness if no prejudice). 24 At the sentencing hearing, Robey testified to the existence of the two mitigating circumstances found in this case. He stated that Alvord had been previously adjudicated insane and asserted strongly that Alvord's mental illness was not of the type that Alvord could not be rehabilitated. The state called Robey, so Alvord cannot blame Meyers for any testimony by Robey that he now considers damaging. 14 As the district judge noted, Alvord offered at neither the state nor the federal habeas evidentiary hearings evidence that Meyers could have produced had he conducted an investigation and called other witnesses; he also did not explain how Meyers could more effectively have cross-examined Robey. Alvord has called our attention to no evidence that Meyers should have produced at the sentencing hearing but did not; Alvord has not, therefore, carried his burden of establishing prejudice. 15 25 Alvord contends that he deserves a new sentencing hearing despite our conclusion that he has not been prejudiced because in this case the ineffectiveness of counsel is so pervasive that a particularized inquiry into prejudice would be 'unguided speculation.'  Washington, 693 F.2d at 1259 n. 26 (quoting United States v. Porterfield, 624 F.2d 122, 125 (10th Cir.1980)). We are mindful that actual prejudice need not be demonstrated in some cases. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978) (state improperly requires single attorney to represent multiple defendants at same trial); Adams v. Balkcom, 688 F.2d 734, 739 n. 1 (11th Cir.1982) (representation functionally equivalent in every respect to having no representation at all). We recognized in Washington v. Strickland that prejudice need not always be demonstrated, 693 F.2d at 1259; however, Washington clearly implies that prejudice must be shown in this case. In both this case and Washington, the alleged inadequacy stems from a failure adequately to investigate, and we required the petitioners to show prejudice in Washington. We sit as a habeas corpus tribunal to grant relief to persons harmed because their constitutional rights have been violated. In some cases, we will infer harm because, although it is difficult or impossible to prove, the circumstances of the petitioner's conviction are inherently prejudicial. In some cases, the harm is so obvious it would be a waste of resources to prove it. This case presents neither situation; the district court correctly held that Alvord must prove prejudice to obtain the writ. 26