Opinion ID: 24822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: exemptions from federal preemption

Text: 28

29 In Cardinal Towing, this court applied the municipal- proprietor exemption (also known as the market-participant exemption) to the preemptive language of 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). See 180 F.3d at 694-95. We need not reiterate the careful analysis of this doctrine set forth by the Cardinal Towing court, see id. at 691-95, except insofar as to emphasize the primary legal conclusions necessary to our decision. 30 First, the Cardinal Towing court recognized that preemption policies apply only to state regulation and not to actions that the state takes in its proprietary capacity. See id. at 691 (The law has traditionally recognized a distinction between regulation and actions a state takes in a proprietary capacity - that is to say, actions taken to serve the government's own needs rather than those of society as a whole.); see also Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Assoc. Builders & Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 227 (1993) (recognizing, in National Labor Relations Act cases, that [o]ur decisions . . . support the distinction between government as regulator and government as proprietor); cf. Wis. Dep't of Indus. Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 289 (1986) (holding, in the Commerce Clause arena, that attempt to use spending power in a manner tantamount to regulation is subject to federal preemption); Petrey, 246 F.3d at 558; Tocher, 219 F.3d at 1049-50. 31 Second, the Cardinal Towing court determined that this distinction between a state acting in its regulatory capacity in contrast to its proprietary capacity is most readily apparent when the government purchases the goods and services that its operations require in the open market. See Cardinal Towing, 180 F.3d at 691, 692 (Most government contracting decisions do not constitute concealed attempts to regulate . . . [because i]n order to function, government entities must have some dealings with the market.). The court cautioned that while the government can exert substantial leverage through its spending power and while this power may create a temptation to take advantage of these interactions to pursue policy goals, id. at 692, that at the same time, the fact of government involvement cannot be assumed to be motivated by a regulatory impulse. Id. 32 Third, the court applied a two-part analysis to aid in distinguishing between proprietary action that is immune from preemption and impermissible attempts to regulate through the spending power. Id. at 693. The court suggested asking two questions to evaluate the government action: 33 First, does the challenged action essentially reflect the entity's own interest in its efficient procurement of needed goods and services, as measured by comparison with the typical behavior of private parties in similar circumstances? Second, does the narrow scope of the challenged action defeat an inference that its primary goal was to encourage a general policy rather than address a specific proprietary problem? 34 Id. The court explained that [b]oth questions seek to isolate a class of government interactions with the market that are so narrowly focused, and so in keeping with the ordinary behavior of private parties, that a regulatory impulse can be safely ruled out. Id. 35 Finally, the court applied this two-part analysis to the nonconsent towing ordinance at issue, and held that Bedford's action of contracting with a single towing service for nonconsent tows was a proprietary action and, therefore, not preempted by federal law. See id. at 697 ([T]he City's actions here did not constitute regulation or have the force and effect of law. Accordingly, they are not preempted by section 14501(c).). 36 As to the first question, whether Bedford acted in its own interest in obtaining services comparable to a private entity in similar circumstances, the Cardinal Towing court recognized that because the ordinance involved only true nonconsent tows where the owner of the vehicle was unwilling or unable to specify a towing company, id. at 694, Bedford was purchasing services from the market in place of the consumer. In this situation, the owner of the vehicle will by necessity be unable to choose a towing company and the only party that can make the type of merit selection inherent in market transactions is the party ordering the tow, namely the City of Bedford. See id. at 695. Because Bedford was purchasing towing services for an incapacitated or unwilling individual, it was in no different position than any other private actor. Thus, the court recognized that the need to purchase towing services in the nonconsent situation was not motivated by a regulatory impulse, but instead was motivated by the need for a service to be performed: 37 [N]onconsensual tows do not involve any opportunity for market interaction on the part of the owner of the vehicle. The real decision is made by the party who ordered the tow, who chooses both to remove the vehicle and the party to perform the service. And whether the ordering party is the City or a private property owner, it seeks out this service in the pursuit of its own interests. 38 Id. at 696. 39 Regarding the second question, the Cardinal Towing court recognized that because the scope of the ordinance was narrow, focused on a single contract covering only a portion of the towing services market, the primary goal of the ordinance was to address a specific problem and not to encourage a general policy. The court distinguished situations involving licensing schemes and ordinances that affect industries as a whole, see id. at 693 n.2. (citing Harris County Wrecker Owners for Equal Opportunity v. City of Houston, 943 F. Supp. 711, 726 (S.D. Tex. 1996)), and held that the limited scope here decisively forecloses an inference that the City sought to change the tow truck industry as a whole, let alone influence society at large. Id. at 694. 40
41 Both parties agree that Cardinal Towing controls our analysis. Stucky argues that the consent/nonconsent distinction is dispositive because it defines the consumer of the towing service and thus clarifies whether the City is acting as a consumer or as a regulator. Stucky concedes that in a nonconsent tow situation, because the driver of the vehicle is, by definition, not available, the City becomes the consumer and plays the market-participant role of choosing a towing service. Stucky contends that, by contrast, in a consent tow situation, the driver of the disabled vehicle is the market actor, and when the City by statute chooses a towing service for that individual, it is regulating, not purchasing services in a proprietary manner. 42 Applying Cardinal Towing's two-part analysis, Stucky argues that there is no need for the City efficiently to procure services in the consent tow situation because private parties are capable of contracting with a towing services themselves. Further, Stucky asserts that the City's decision to define all accident tows as nonconsent tows 11 demonstrates the regulatory, as opposed to the proprietary, nature of the ordinances. As Stucky argues, it is only through its police power to regulate that the City is able to classify all accident tows as nonconsensual, thus empowering itself with the authority to direct which towing service will perform the tow. 43 As to the second part of the Cardinal Towing analysis, Stucky argues that the regulatory policy affects the competitive environment for the entire consent towing industry. Specifically, Stucky contends that the City is preventing all towing companies (except for Texas Towing) from competing in the City-authorized consent towing market. Further, the City is frustrating existing contracts that towing companies may have with vehicle owners (through dealerships, insurance carriers, or automobile organizations). Stucky contends that such regulatory power, which can exclude other competitors from the market, is not a characteristic shared by private economic parties in similar circumstances. 44 In response, the City 12 argues that, as in Cardinal Towing, it shares a similar propriety interest in contracting with a single towing service for all (i.e., consent and nonconsent) City-authorized tows. The City points to issues of efficiency of service, guaranteed response time, twenty-four hour service, training, safety records, a clarification of responsibility, and easier administrative duties as reasons why the City has a proprietary interest in a single contract system. The City does not differentiate between consent tows and nonconsent tows, arguing that the issues of efficiency and safety do not depend on whether the driver is present to make a decision. The City contends that it is a market participant because the City's responsibility to control the public streets, and to ease traffic congestion resulting from car wrecks remain, regardless of whether the tow is a consent or nonconsent tow. Further, the City contends that San Antonio, as the ninth largest city in the United States, spanning 417 square miles, requires a towing service that can address its needs. The City contends that its proprietary interest is heightened because of the large-scale operation involved in providing towing services to such a large city. 45 Regarding the second part of the Cardinal Towing analysis, the City argues that the Ordinances are narrowly drawn to address a single proprietary problem. For example, the challenged Ordinances do not restrict towing services involving customers who request towing from private property or towing services involving consensual tows from accidents in which the car was legally parked prior to the accident (provided it was not a traffic hazard). 46 While we concede that the City has a compelling practical argument for its need for efficient and safe towing services, we cannot ignore the express mandate of Congress to preempt such regulation of towing services. See 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). As has been demonstrated and will be discussed further infra, § 14501(c)'s purpose was to encourage competition in the intrastate towing services market. See Petrey, 246 F.3d at 554; Tocher, 219 F.3d at 1046; Ace Auto, 171 F.3d at 772; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-677 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1715, 1758-59. Accident towing, broadly defined as responding to any disabled vehicle on any public street, is without question a significant portion of the towing services market. Thus, a single contract system, which prevents consumers from consenting to hiring a towing service other than the one authorized by the City, does little to foster that market competition. 47 Further, the logic of Cardinal Towing compels us to find that a different market situation exists in the consent towing market than in the nonconsent towing market. Had this distinction not been critical to the court's holding in Cardinal Towing, much of the court's analysis would have been unnecessary. 13 Therefore, applying the two-part analysis, we must agree with Stucky that the City, in enacting and enforcing the Ordinances that control consent tows, cannot be said to be acting as a market participant and, thus, cannot be exempted from § 14501(c)(1) under the municipal-proprietor exemption. 48 First, in the consent tow situation, unlike the nonconsent tow situation, there are two competing market actors attempting to purchase services. Each market actor may wish to obtain towing services in keeping with the ordinary behavior of private parties. Cardinal Towing, 180 F.3d at 693. The challenged Ordinances, however, frustrate the normal working of private decisionmaking in a market. Under the Ordinances, if a private party wishes to employ the services of Towing Company A and the City wishes to employ the services of Towing Company B, the City's choice controls. This is so, not because the City needs to purchase the service for its own proprietary interest (i.e., to serve the government's own [towing] needs), but for the related safety interests of society as a whole (i.e., controlling public streets and easing traffic congestion). See id. at 691. Thus, if we are to compare the City's actions to the typical behavior of private parties, as Cardinal Towing instructs us to do, the conflict is readily apparent. In the consent tow situation, by countermanding a private party's choice of towing company, the City is acting at cross-purposes with the private party's market decision. 49 Furthermore, the City's market power cannot be said to be typical of similar private actors. In utilizing its police power to control a significant portion of the towing industry, the City's actions have the direct economic effect of contracting the market. This effect does not speak to a private proprietary purchase, but rather to a public regulatory plan. See Tocher, 219 F.3d at 1049 (In analyzing the [municipal-proprietor] exception, it is vital to examine the substance of the transaction because a city may not use the guise of privity of contract to conduct otherwise forbidden regulatory activity. (citations and internal quotations omitted)). 50 Second, this court in Cardinal Towing relied on the narrow scope of the ordinance whereby the City limited itself only to true nonconsent tows. Id. at 694. 14 Also important, was the fact that the ordinance involved a single discreet [sic] contract. See id. at 693; see also Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 507 U.S. at 227 ([T]he challenged action in this litigation was specifically tailored to one particular job.). 51 In the instant case, the scope of the Ordinances is obviously broader than the ordinance involved in Cardinal Towing because the Ordinances encompass all City-authorized (consent and nonconsent) tows. This scope, however, does not reach the level of industry licensing schemes and other industry-wide regulations previously held to be preempted by § 14501(c)(1). See Petrey, 246 F.3d at 564; Tocher, 219 F.3d at 1050. The scope of the Ordinances, therefore, falls somewhere in between these two established poles of existing precedent. Because we are unable to determine, based on an analytically satisfying continuum, 15 whether the instant Ordinances are within Cardinal Towing's narrow scope, we turn to evaluate the purpose of the regulation. See Cardinal Towing, 180 F.3d at 692 (recognizing that courts have looked to whether government entities seek to advance general societal goals rather than narrow proprietary interests through the use of their contracting power). 52 As originally conceived, the Ordinances were a response to safety concerns affecting the City at large and were intended to be regulatory, and not proprietary, in nature. The enabling language of the original Ordinance No. 31977 (now codified as § 19-391), provides that the reason for enacting the Ordinances was to regulate and control the practice of tow truck drivers from racing to the scenes of accidents. 16 Ordinance No. 31977 explicitly stated that the City was acting as the guardian of the public rights in the public streets, ways and public property and that its purpose was to protect the public peace, safety and welfare of the City of San Antonio. Ordinance No. 31977 then explicitly provided that the City deemed it expedient, desirable and necessary to adopt regulations controlling the operation of automobile wreckers upon the public streets and ways of the City (emphasis added). 53 The original Ordinance No. 31977 has been amended and codified, but nothing in the record contradicts the conclusion that safety considerations to benefit general societal interests controlled all subsequent amendments to the Ordinances. Affidavits from the Chief of Police, the Police Captain in charge of vehicle storage, and the Deputy Chief of Police of the Support Services Division, in charge of overseeing the Vehicle Storage Unit, all support the understanding that the reason the City chose to regulate towing and selected a single-vendor system was to improve public safety. 17 In both the City's and Texas Towing's briefs and at oral argument, the parties agreed that safety was the primary consideration behind the passage and continued enforcement of the Ordinances. 18 Thus, unlike the proprietary-focused ordinance at issue in Cardinal Towing, the City's Ordinances have a broader regulatory purpose. 19 54 Therefore, because the Ordinances restrict market competition, because the primary goal of the Ordinances is to regulate and improve the safety of the towing services on City streets, and because the Ordinances affect a significant portion of the towing industry in San Antonio, we conclude that the challenged actions of the City are regulatory in nature and cannot escape federal preemption under § 14501(c)(1) by way of the municipal-proprietor exemption. Simply stated, the government interaction with the market is not so narrowly focused that we can safely rule out the regulatory impulse of the City. See Cardinal Towing, 180 F.3d at 693. 55 Having determined that the municipal-proprietor/market- participant rationale applied in Cardinal Towing cannot be applied to the consensual towing situation in the City of San Antonio, we next turn to whether the Ordinances can be exempted under the statutory safety exception provided for in § 14501(c)(2)(A). 56
57 The second relevant exception to the preemption doctrine is the safety exemption contained in § 14501(c)(2)(A), which provides: 58 (2) Matters not covered.-- Paragraph (1) [§ 14501(c)(1)]-- 59 (A) shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles, the authority of a State to impose highway route controls or limitations based on the size or weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous nature of the cargo, or the authority of a State to regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance authorization. 60 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). The City argues that even if it cannot be considered a market participant in the consent tow situation, because the Ordinances were enacted to address safety concerns arising from the towing practices in the City, § 14501(c)(2)(A) should be interpreted to exempt the Ordinances from federal preemption. The City asserts that because § 14501(c)(2)(A) provides that the safety regulatory authority of a State shall not be restricted with respect to motor vehicles, this reserves the authority of the State to delegate its regulatory power to municipalities like the City. 20 The City contends that because states have traditionally redelegated regulatory powers to municipalities, and because Congress did not clearly or manifestly preempt this redelegation authority, § 14501(c)(2)(A) covers municipal safety ordinances that are enacted pursuant to a delegation of state authority. 61 Stucky, in contrast, argues that § 14501(c)(2)(A) does not save the City's towing Ordinances from preemption because § 14501(c)(2)(A) is directed only at the authority of the state and not the political subdivision of the state. Stucky points to the fact that the general preemption language in § 14501(c)(1) covers a state [or] political subdivision of a State, but that the text of § 14501(c)(2)(A) omits the phrase political subdivision of the State. Stucky asserts that this omission was intentional and that it furthers the deregulatory purpose of the statute. Therefore, Stucky contends that the City cannot circumvent the express language of the statute by relying on a redelegation of state authority. 62 This court was not required to address this provision in Cardinal Towing; however, other courts have confronted the safety exemption in § 14501(c)(2)(A) and have disagreed on its application to municipal ordinances such as the ones at issue. The Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have each held that § 14501(c)(2)(A) does not exempt municipal ordinances from the general preemptive reach of § 14501(c)(1). See Petrey, 246 F.3d at 563; Tocher, 219 F.3d at 1051; Mayer, 158 F.3d at 545-47. However, the Second Circuit and several district courts in this circuit have come to the opposite conclusion, finding that § 14501(c)(2)(A) explicitly exempts safety-focused municipal towing ordinances from § 14501(c)(1). See Ace Auto, 171 F.3d at 774-75; Northway Towing, Inc. v. City of Pasadena, Tex., 94 F. Supp. 2d 801, 802 (S.D. Tex. 2000); Harris County Wrecker Owners for Equal Opportunity v. City of Houston, 943 F. Supp. 711, 726 (S.D. Tex. 1996); New Orleans Towing Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, No. Civ.A.99-3131, 2000 WL 193071, at  (E.D. La. Feb. 12, 2000); AJ's Wrecker Serv., Inc. v. City of Dallas, No. Civ.A.3:97-CV-1311D, 1998 WL 185521, at  (N.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 1998). 63 Because of the closeness of the issue and the soundness of the arguments on either side, we set forth the contrasting arguments below. As is our practice in questions of statutory interpretation, we look to the text, structure, and legislative history of the provision in question. See City of Dallas, Tex. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 118 F.3d 393, 396 (5th Cir. 1997). We also address the determinations made by our sister circuits and the district courts in this circuit that have confronted this difficult issue.
64 Interpretation of the statutory language is key to construing its preemptive force. Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, in order to discern Congress's intent, we must examine the language of § 14501(c)(2)(A) in the context of the legislation of which it is a part. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 173 (1997) (recognizing that statutory provisions must be examined in the context of the entire statute). 65 In reviewing the text and structure of § 14501(c)(2)(A), the express statutory language does not provide for municipalities or other political subdivisions of a State to be exempted from the preemptive reach of § 14501(c)(1). For this reason, several circuit courts of appeals have found that Congress did not intend for municipalities to be exempted from preemption, even for safety reasons. The language of § 14501 provides fairly convincing evidence that the safety regulation exception to preemption was not meant to apply to a state's political subdivisions. . . . [W]ithin § 14501, 'political subdivision[s]' are mentioned seven times, yet the term is not mentioned at all in § 14501(c)(2)(A). Petrey, 246 F.3d at 561. Similarly, as the Eleventh Circuit recognized in Mayer: 66 [Section] 14501 contains no fewer than seven express references to the regulatory authority of the political subdivisions of the states in its other subsections, §§ 14501(a), 14501(b), 14501(c)(1), 14501(c)(2)(C), 14501(c)(3)(A), 14501(c)(3)(B), and 14501(c)(3)(C), but omits any references to political subdivisions in § 14501(c)(2)(A). . . . In fact, § 14501(c)(2)(A) is the only subsection of the statute that mentions the regulatory authority of a state without also mentioning the regulatory authority of the state's political subdivisions. 67 Mayer, 158 F.3d at 545; see also Tocher, 219 F.3d at 1051 ([S]ection 14501 contains no less than seven references to the regulatory authority of political subdivisions, but is conspicuously silent in section 14501(c)(2)(A).). 68 These courts have relied on the general presumption that when Congress omits certain language in a particular subsection of a statute and includes the language in other subsections, the omission is intentional rather than accidental. Mayer, 158 F.3d at 545; see also Tocher, 219 F.3d at 1051 ('Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.' (quoting in parenthetical Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). These courts have concluded that the omission of the statutory language was deliberate and not a drafting error: We cannot say that Congress simply made a mistake by failing to include political subdivisions in the exception to preemption in § 14501(c)(2)(A). Instead, Congress's silence in failing to include political subdivisions in § 14501(c)(2)(A) clearly indicates that municipal safety regulation was not meant to be exempted from preemption. Petrey, 246 F.3d at 563; Mayer, 158 F.3d at 545-46 (We find it unlikely that this omission reflects a drafting error, because a similar preemption provision contained in the Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(4)(B)(I), contains the same omission.). 69 These courts have also recognized that [t]he Act itself defines the term 'State' to 'mean[] the 50 States of the United States and the District of Columbia,' and therefore provides no justification for reading the term 'State' to include its political subdivisions. Mayer, 158 F.3d at 545; see also Tocher, 219 F.3d at 1051 (The term 'State' under the FAAA is defined as 'the 50 States of the United States and the District of Columbia' . . . and a plain reading of this provision indicates that municipalities are not included within that definition.). Further, the statutory language of § 14501(c)(2)(A) only addresses State regulation of motor vehicles and not the motor carriers at issue under the towing Ordinances. 21 As a result, based on the text and structure of § 14501(c)(2)(A), these courts have declined to apply the safety exemption to municipal ordinances. 70 In contrast, the Second Circuit and certain federal district courts in this circuit have come to an opposite conclusion based on their interpretation of the statutory language. In Ace Auto, the Second Circuit concluded that, while the text of § 14501(c)(2)(A) does not preserve the regulatory authority of political subdivisions of the state, we see no reason to construe this language to prevent the state from delegating its regulatory authority to a municipality. Ace Auto, 171 F.3d at 765. In similar fashion, a district court in the Southern District of Texas found that congressional delegation of regulatory authority to a state may well mean that it is permitted to redelegate its authority to a political subdivision either specifically or by leaving undisturbed existing statutes that would otherwise provide a local government with ample authority to regulate. Harris County Wrecker, 943 F. Supp. at 726 (citations, internal quotations, and alterations omitted). 71 Both courts relied on Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 607-08 (1991), for their interpretation of § 14501(c)(2)(A). See Ace Auto, 171 F.3d at 765; Harris County Wrecker, 943 F. Supp. at 726. In Mortier, the Supreme Court held that under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), states were permitted to redelegate authority to political subdivisions even without explicit statutory language so providing. See 501 U.S. at 607-09. The FIFRA statute only permits a State to regulate pesticides, see 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a), and defines a State as a State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and American Samoa. 7 U.S.C. § 136(aa). The Mortier Court held, however, that the statute's silence with regard to local governments could not be read to establish a clear and manifest purpose to preempt local authority. Id. at 607 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court stated further: 72 The principle is well settled that local governmental units are created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them . . . in [its] absolute discretion. The exclusion of political subdivisions cannot be inferred from the express authorization to the State[s] because political subdivisions are components of the very entity the statute empowers. Indeed, the more plausible reading of FIFRA's authorization to the States leaves the allocation of regulatory authority to the absolute discretion of the States themselves, including the option of leaving local regulation of pesticides in the hands of local authorities. 73 Id. at 607-08 (citations and some internal quotations omitted) (alterations in original). Based on the language in Mortier, these courts found that § 14501(c)(2)(A)'s failure to mention a political subdivision of a state did not control the preemption analysis. 74 The Second Circuit also relied on the interpretation given to § 14501(c)(2)(A) by the United States Department of Transportation. In a document entitled Intrastate Trucking Deregulation: An Analysis and Interpretation of Title VI, Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, the Department stated: 75 We believe that State or local regulations governing the towing of damaged or abandoned vehicles that are public safety hazards would fall within this exemption, assuming again that such regulations are not a guise for broader economic restrictions. 76 See Ace Auto, 171 F.3d at 775 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. Dep't of Transp., Intrastate Trucking Deregulation: An Analysis and Interpretation of Title VI, Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, P.L. 103-305 (Mar. 1995)). 77 Furthermore, consistent with the decisions on this side of the debate and with the City's argument, we note that the statutory language at issue is phrased in the negative -- stating that the federal statute shall not restrict a state from regulating the safety of motor vehicles. See 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). As the City argues, if we were to find that the State of Texas cannot redelegate its authority to municipalities such as the City, we would, by necessity, be restricting that state's ability to regulate. 22 78 Faced with this difficult task of statutory interpretation, we ultimately conclude that we must adopt a plain reading of the language and structure of § 14501(c)(2)(A). We thus join the majority of circuits in interpreting the omission of the phrase political subdivision of a State as Congress's clear and manifest intent to preempt municipal safety regulation of the towing industry. As three of our sister circuits have found, foundational principles of statutory construction guide us to presume that Congress intended the language contained within the statute. See Petrey, 246 F.3d at 561; Tocher, 219 F.3d at 1051; Mayer, 158 F.3d at 545-46; see also BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994) ([I]t is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely when it includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another. (alteration in original)). Because Congress did include the language political subdivision of a State in seven other provisions of the statute and did not include it in § 14501(c)(2)(A), we are unwilling to interpret the statute against its plain meaning. 23 79 We also find reliance on Mortier misplaced. Those courts that have relied on Mortier to conclude that § 14501(c)(2)(A)'s statutory silence as to local governments permits the delegation of state safety authority to municipalities have failed to recognize that the statutes at issue are quite different. FIFRA, in contrast to § 14501(c), does not contain express preemption language. More specifically, as both the Mayer and Petrey courts have recognized, the specific FIFRA provision interpreted in Mortier made no reference to political subdivisions whatsoever, and FIFRA as a whole contains only scattered mention of political subdivisions in its other parts. Petrey, 246 F.3d at 562 (citing Mayer, 158 F.3d at 547) (internal quotations omitted). In contrast, § 14501 contains seven references to political subdivisions overall, a reference to political subdivisions in the general preemption provision, and a reference to political subdivisions in one of the exceptions to the general preemption provision. Petrey, 246 F.3d at 562. Thus, Congress's almost complete silence throughout FIFRA concerning political subdivisions simply cannot be equated with the language of § 14501 and the particular omission in § 14501(c)(2)(A). 80 Finally, we agree with the Eleventh Circuit that Mortier . . . falls short of establishing a rule that the word 'State' must be interpreted to include political subdivisions in all circumstances. Mayer, 158 F.3d at 547. Such an interpretation, we recognize, would have perverse consequences: 81 [Such a] reading of the safety exception would lead to the absurd result that Congress can never preempt local regulations and simultaneously leave a state's ability to regulate intact. If this Court were to hold that a state can always delegate its responsibility to municipalities, Congress would always be required to preempt both state and local laws, or preempt neither. That result would violate fundamental principles of federalism and lead to a distorted interpretation of the Supremacy Clause. 82 Tocher, 219 F.3d at 1051. Thus, we cannot agree with those courts that have, based on Mortier, allowed municipalities to avoid preemption through a redelegation theory. 83 It is this final point that also aids us in resolving the most difficult argument presented by the City -- namely, how to square the negatively phrased shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles language, with the determination that states may not redelegate their safety authority over motor carriers to municipalities. As an analysis of the legislative purpose and history of § 14501(c)(2)(A) demonstrates, Congress's decision to permit regulation of certain facets of the transportation industry at the state level, but not at the local level, was a deliberate action intended to further competitive markets. We now turn to that analysis.
84 As with the textual analysis, courts have differed regarding how best to interpret the legislative history of the safety exemption in § 14501(c)(2)(A). Again, the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the legislative history supports the argument that municipalities were not intended to benefit from the safety exemption. The legislative purpose and history of § 14501 . . . support the notion that Congress's failure to include political subdivisions in § 14501(c)(2)(A) was deliberate. See Petrey, 246 F.3d at 563; see also Tocher, 219 F.3d at 1051; Mayer, 158 F.3d at 546. 85 First, these courts point to the ICCTA's conference report, which expressed Congress's intent to promote greater competition: 86 [T]he conferees believe preemption legislation is in the public interest as well as necessary to facilitate interstate commerce. State economic regulation of motor carrier operations causes significant inefficiencies, increased costs, reduction of competition, inhibition of innovation and technology and curtails the expansion of markets. . . . The sheer diversity of these regulatory schemes is a huge problem for national and regional carriers attempting to conduct a standard way of doing business. 87 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-677, at 87 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1715, 1759; see also Petrey 246 F.3d at 563; Mayer, 158 F.3d at 546. 24 These courts recognize that a strict reading of § 14501(c)(2)(A) furthers the policy of deregulation underlying the enactment of section 14501. Allowing both states and municipalities to escape preemption under the guise of regulating safety could lead to widespread, diverse regulation of motor carriers, precisely what Congress sought to avoid in promulgating a broad preemption statute. Tocher, 219 F.3d at 1051; see also Mayer, 158 F.3d at 546. 88 The legislative purpose, therefore, was to increase competition by eliminating overlapping and potentially inconsistent local regulations, without undermining the states' ability to regulate motor vehicle safety, highway route controls, hazardous cargo, or motor carrier insurance requirements. See 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). Stated differently, it is reasonable to assume that Congress decided that safety and insurance ordinances must be enacted on a statewide level, in order to minimize the disturbance to the motor transportation industry that a patchwork of local ordinances inevitably would create. Mayer, 158 F.3d at 546. 89 The Second Circuit, however, has interpreted the legislative history in broader terms, allowing for the delegation of state safety authority to municipalities. In evaluating the same ICCTA conference report on which Stucky and the other circuits have relied, the court stated: [W]e see no reason to construe this language to prevent the state from delegating its regulatory authority to a municipality. To the contrary, the legislative history indicates that state safety regulatory authority (including, presumably, the authority to delegate) was to be 'unaffected' by the preemption statute. Ace Auto, 171 F.3d at 775 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-677, at 84, 85, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1756, 1757). The Second Circuit further stated: 90 [A]lthough the legislative history clearly illustrates Congress' deregulatory purpose, the history is ambiguous as to the scope of that purpose. More particularly, the reports issued in connection with § 14501 suggest that its primary purpose was to eliminate local economic regulation, not local safety regulation. To the extent that the scope of Congress' purpose is unclear, we hesitate to construe the text of § 14501 so as to frustrate unnecessarily the ability of municipalities to respond to the local safety concerns created by local towing industries. 91 Ace Auto, 171 F.3d at 775 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 103-677, at 86-87 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1758-59) (internal citation omitted); Harris County Wrecker, 943 F. Supp. at 727 ([T]here is no evidence or congressional findings that municipal safety regulations would interfere with Congress's concern for competitiveness in tow trucking.). 92 After our own review of the legislative history, we are compelled to agree with the conclusions of the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. While acknowledging the closeness of the question, we hold that any ambiguity in the legislative history must be resolved consistent with our plain reading of the statute. 93 Primarily, our reasoning rests on three interrelated factors. First, all courts addressing this issue have recognized that § 14501(c) was enacted with a deregulatory purpose. By interpreting the legislative history consistent with the plain language of the exemptions in § 14501(c)(2)(A), we further that purpose. 94 Second, we find it reasonable that in mentioning only States in § 14501(c)(2)(A), Congress intended to permit regulation of certain components of the transportation industry at the state level and preclude those same regulations at the local level. See Mayer, 158 F.3d at 546 n.6 (By requiring that safety and insurance ordinances must be enacted on a statewide basis, the costs associated with complying with the ordinances are reduced dramatically, which is an outcome that is consistent with the policy objectives of the ICCTA.). This partial preemption preserves state control over state interests and yet fosters deregulation by preventing a patchwork of municipal and county safety and insurance regulations from impeding the competitive development of the towing services industry. 95 Finally, we are unconvinced by the distinction relied on by the Second Circuit, that Congress intended to eliminate local economic regulation, but not local safety regulation. Ace Auto, 171 F.3d at 775-76. While the statement of intent may be accurate, the instant case proves the fragility of the distinction, as the single-vendor system, if exempted as a safety regulation, would result in an economically noncompetitive market for all City-authorized consent and nonconsent tows. Thus, under the guise of safety regulation, the economics of the intrastate towing market would be shifted away from the competitive market envisioned by Congress. As was recognized in oral argument, under the City's argument there is no stopping point for the potential reach of the safety exemption. Pursuant to § 14501(c)(2)(A), municipalities potentially could designate all tows in the City as implicating safety concerns and thus regulate the entire towing industry under the safety exemption. We do not believe Congress created § 14501(c)(2)(A) to be a loophole through which local governments could avoid the general preemptive reach of § 14501(c)(1). 96 Therefore, we hold that the City's Ordinances involving consent towing cannot escape federal preemption under the safety exemption of § 14501(c)(2)(A). The plain reading of the statute, supported by its legislative history, demonstrates Congress's clear and manifest intent not to include political subdivisions of the state within that exemption.