Opinion ID: 1192309
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Third-party Standing to Challenge a Protective Order to Access Unfiled Discovery

Text: Article III standing requires an injury-in-fact capable of being redressed by a favorable decision of the court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). An injury-in-fact is a `concrete and particularized' invasion of a `legally protected interest,' Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2531, 2535, 171 L.Ed.2d 424 (2008) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130), and must be actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical, Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, standing exists only if it is `likely,' as opposed to merely `speculative,' that the injury will be `redressed by a favorable decision.' Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976)). Although standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention, standing does turn on the nature and source of the claim asserted. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197; see also McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 227, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003) (standing requires a claim of injury . . . to a legally cognizable right). We have noted that the Supreme Court's standing doctrine requires litigants to establish an injury to an interest that the law protects when it is wrongfully invaded, and this is quite different from requiring them to establish a meritorious legal claim. Aurora Loan Servs., Inc. v. Craddieth, 442 F.3d 1018, 1024 (7th Cir.2006); see also DH2, Inc. v. SEC, 422 F.3d 591, 597 (7th Cir.2005); Clay v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 76 F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir.1996). However, while a litigant need not definitively establish that a right of his has been infringed, he must have a colorable claim to such a right to satisfy Article III. Aurora Loan, 442 F.3d at 1024; see also DH2, 422 F.3d at 597. Many of our decisions  as well as decisions from other circuits  speak broadly about a presumption of public access to discovery materials. Citizens First Nat'l Bank, 178 F.3d at 946; see also Public Citizen, 858 F.2d at 788-89; In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 146 (2d Cir.1987) (referring to the public's presumptive right of access to discovery materials). To the extent that this language suggests the existence of a general public right to access the materials that litigating parties exchange in response to discovery requests, it sweeps too broadly. As we will explain, while the public has a presumptive right to access discovery materials that are filed with the court, used in a judicial proceeding, or otherwise constitute judicial records, the same is not true of materials produced during discovery but not filed with the court. Generally speaking, the public has no constitutional, statutory (rule-based), or common-law right of access to unfiled discovery. It is beyond dispute that most documents filed in court are presumptively open to the public; members of the media and the public may bring third-party challenges to protective orders that shield court records and court proceedings from public view. See, e.g., Jessup, 227 F.3d at 997 (`[T]hose who seek access to [sealed court] material have a right to be heard in a manner that gives full protection to the asserted right.' (quoting Associated Press, 162 F.3d at 507)); Citizens First Nat'l Bank, 178 F.3d at 945-46 (regarding filing of appellate appendix under seal); Associated Press, 162 F.3d at 507 (regarding press access to sealed court records). This right is derived from the common-law principle that courts are public institutions that operate openly  a principle codified at 28 U.S.C. § 452  and judicially imposed limitations on this right are subject to the First Amendment. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct. for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 603-06, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982); Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978) (It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents. (footnote omitted)); see also Smith v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Ill., 956 F.2d 647, 650 (7th Cir.1992) (recognizing that although this principle originally stemmed from a need to ensure access to criminal proceedings, the right of access has subsequently been expanded to civil proceedings). While the public's right to access court records is not unlimited, see Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598, 98 S.Ct. 1306; Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Riverside County, 464 U.S. 501, 510, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984), and Rule 26(c) allows a court to shield certain documents from the public when there is good cause to do so, Citizens First Nat'l Bank, 178 F.3d at 945 (public interest in observing judicial process can be overridden if the property and privacy interests of the litigants. . . predominate in the particular case), the general right of public access to judicial records is enough to give members of the public standing to attack a protective order that seals this information from public inspection. See Jessup, 227 F.3d at 997-98; Grove Fresh, 24 F.3d at 897-98; Associated Press, 162 F.3d at 506-09. This case is different. Here, Kalven is seeking access to discovery materials that have never been filed with the court and have never influenced the outcome of a judicial proceeding. The Supreme Court has held that the public's right of access is limited to traditionally publicly available sources of information, and discovered, but not yet admitted, information is not a traditionally public source of information. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984); accord Grove Fresh, 24 F.3d at 897-98 ([U]ntil admitted into the record, material uncovered during pretrial discovery is ordinarily not within the scope of press access.). At common law, pretrial proceedings were closed to the public, see Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 389, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979), and the federal discovery rules have not changed this common-law tradition. As the Court noted in Seattle Times, [d]iscovery rarely takes place in public, 467 U.S. at 33 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 2199, and the system created by Rule 26 contemplates that the exchange of information in discovery will occur with minimal judicial involvement. See FED. R.CIV.P. 26(a)(1)(A), (2), (3) (requiring parties to disclose certain material automatically, regardless of whether other litigants have requested it); id. 26(c)(1) (party seeking a protective order must certify that it has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolved the dispute without court action); see also N.D. ILL. L.R. 37.2 (providing that courts shall hereafter refuse to hear any and all motions for discovery and production of documents under Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless the motion includes a statement (1) that after consultation in person or by telephone and good faith attempts to resolve differences they are unable to reach an accord, or (2) counsel's attempts to engage in such consultation were unsuccessful due to no fault of counsel's). There are good reasons to treat the public's right to access filed and unfiled discovery materials differently. For starters, pretrial discovery, unlike the trial itself, is usually conducted in private. Citizens First Nat'l Bank, 178 F.3d at 944. Pretrial discovery  depositions, interrogatories, and the production of documents  are not public components of a civil trial, were not open to the public at common law, and in general, are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 33, 104 S.Ct. 2199. That the court's discovery processes and rules are used to require litigants to produce otherwise private information to an opposing party is not enough to alter the legal rights of the general public. Discovery rules are a matter of legislative grace, and [l]iberal discovery is provided for the sole purpose of assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated disputes. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32, 34, 104 S.Ct. 2199. We have said that [s]ecrecy is fine at the discovery stage, before the material enters the judicial record. Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir.2002). The rights of the public kick in when material produced during discovery is filed with the court. See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 33 & n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 2199 (recognizing that the public has a right to access anything that is a traditionally public source of information and observing that courthouse records could serve as a source of public information). At this point, the documents have been used in [a court] proceeding, FED.R.CIV.P. 5(d), and consequently the possibility exists that they could influence or underpin the judicial decision and they are therefore presumptively open to public inspection unless they meet the definition of trade secret or other categories of bona fide long-term confidentiality. [8] Baxter Int'l., 297 F.3d at 545; see also Citizens First Nat'l Bank, 178 F.3d at 945. It is true that some cases suggest that Rule 26(c) creates a substantive right of public access to discovery. See San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist., 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999); Public Citizen, 858 F.2d at 787-90; Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 145-47. These cases, however, were based on a prior version of Rule 5(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that generally required all discovery materials to be filed with the court unless the court ordered otherwise. See, e.g., Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 146 (citing a prior version of Rule 5(d)). The drafters of a 1980 amendment to Rule 5(d) considered establishing a rule that discouraged the filing of all discovery but decided not to; such materials are sometimes of interest to those who may have no access to them except by a requirement of filing, such as members of a class, litigants similarly situated, or the public generally. FED.R.CIV.P. 5(d), advisory committee note (1980). Accordingly, some courts read the prior Rule 5(d) together with Rule 26(c) and concluded that these rules implied the existence of a public right to access discovery even if the discovery was not filed with the court. E.g., Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 145-46. Whatever force these decisions had was destroyed by the 2000 amendment to Rule 5(d), which reversed the longstanding rule generally requiring discovery to be filed with the court. Since 2000, information exchanged in discovery must not be filed until it is used in the proceeding or until the court orders filing. FED.R.CIV.P. 5(d) (emphasis added). In its present form, then, Rule 5(d) separates discovery material  regardless of whether it is subject to a Rule 26(c) protective order  into two categories: (1) that which is filed with the court (because it is used in a court proceeding or is ordered to be filed); and (2) that which remains unfiled and therefore not part of the public court record. As the Second Circuit has recognized, this amendment eliminated any implied right of public access to unfiled discovery emanating from the procedural rules. See SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 233 n. 11 (2d Cir.2001) (observing that the 2000 amendment to Rule 5(d) provides no presumption of filing of all discovery materials, let alone public access to them) (abrogating Agent Orange). Accordingly, nothing in Rule 26(c)  either standing alone or when read in conjunction with the current version of Rule 5(d)  confers substantive rights upon third parties seeking access to the fruits of discovery. [9] The district court's analysis indicates that the judge thought Rule 26(c) conferred a right on third parties to challenge a protective order at any time and under any circumstances; the court seized upon language from some of our caselaw that refers to a presumption in favor of public access. E.g., Citizens First Nat'l Bank, 178 F.3d at 946 (Most cases endorse a presumption of public access to discovery materials. . . .); In re Cont'l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1309-10 (7th Cir.1984). The presumption mentioned in these cases simply refers to the general right of the public to access material contained in court files and the limited right of litigants under the First Amendment to disseminate information discovered in advance of trial, Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 34, 104 S.Ct. 2199. It is a mistake to conclude, as the district court did, that Rule 26(c) creates a freestanding public right of access to unfiled discovery. Kalven's standing thus cannot be grounded in Rule 26(c). [10] Nor can it be grounded in the First Amendment. Kalven appears to concede this point; he does not assert a constitutional right of access to the unfiled discovery. The only First Amendment concern raised by a protective order limiting disclosure of unfiled discovery is the effect such an order may have on a litigant's free-expression rights, which the Supreme Court has said are limited by the context through which the information is acquired. Seattle Times made it clear that [a] litigant has no First Amendment right of access to information made available only for purposes of trying his suit. 467 U.S. at 32, 104 S.Ct. 2199. As such, judicial limitations on a party's ability to disseminate information discovered in advance of trial implicate[] the First Amendment rights of the restricted party to a far lesser extent than would restraints on dissemination of information in a different context. Id. at 34, 104 S.Ct. 2199; see also Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L.REV. 427, 487 (1991) (describing the interest in accessing information produced by discovery as a side effect of  and therefore subordinate to  the judicial system's central concern of resolving disputes between litigants). Where, as here, the litigants themselves agreed to the protective order and do not seek its modification, this (limited) interest simply is not in play. Accordingly, Kalven cannot claim standing based on a derivative First Amendment right to receive information; this doctrine requires the existence of a willing speaker. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976) (Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, . . . the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both. (footnote omitted)); accord Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972) (acknowledging a First Amendment right to receive information and ideas and that freedom of speech necessarily protects the right to receive). Media challenges to trial-court gag orders have been allowed where the orders interfere with the right to receive information from parties and their attorneys who wish to disseminate it. See, e.g., In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.1988); CBS Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 237-38 (6th Cir.1975). But a stipulated protective order involves selfimposed secrecy and is therefore not the equivalent of a gag order. We have said in another context that a First Amendment right-to-receive claim lies only where there is a willing speaker because [a] precondition of the right to receive . . . is the existence of a `willing speaker.' Ind. Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 507 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir.2007) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756, 96 S.Ct. 1817). Every circuit to have considered the question of standing in the context of a right-to-receive claim has reached the same conclusion: [I]n order to maintain a `right to listen' claim, a plaintiff must clearly establish the existence of a `willing speaker.' In the absence of a willing speaker, an Article III court must dismiss the action for lack of standing. Pa. Family Inst., Inc. v. Black, 489 F.3d 156, 166 (3d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Stephens v. County of Albemarle, Va., 524 F.3d 485, 490-93 (4th Cir.2008); Competitive Enter. Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 856 F.2d 1563 (D.C.Cir.1988); Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203, 1211-12 (5th Cir.1982) (Recipients of protected communication have standing only if there is a speaker who wishes to express himself or herself.). Thus, to satisfy Article III on this type of claim, an intervenor must do more than simply assert that a protective order interferes with his inchoate, derivative right to receive discovery information. See Okla. Hosp. Ass'n, 748 F.2d at 1424-26. Imagining the existence of a willing speaker runs contrary to the Supreme Court's command that injuries-in-fact must be actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, the litigants have voluntarily bound themselves to keep certain discovery confidential and do not themselves seek relief from the requirements of the protective order, there is no willing speaker on which to premise a First Amendment right-to-receive claim. In short, Kalven has no injury to a legally protected interest and therefore no standing to support intervention. Neither do the aldermen; in all material respects, they are in the same position as Kalven.