Opinion ID: 1881558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: woodall's assertion of his right to a speedy trial

Text: ¶ 20. Extremely critical to this issue is the fact that at no time between Woodall's arrest and indictment did Woodall demand a speedy trial. This argument was raised only in his brief on his first appeal to this Court. The trial court failed to give proper weight to Woodall's failure to assert his right to speedy trial. This factor should have been weighed against Woodall and in favor of the State. ¶ 21. This Court has stressed the importance of a defendant's request for a speedy trial. Perry, 419 So.2d at 199. We have repeatedly held that where a defendant fails to assert his right to speedy trial, that failure must be weighed against him. Watts v. State, 733 So.2d 214, 236 (Miss.1999); Stogner v. State, 627 So.2d 815, 819 (Miss.1993). ¶ 22. The Supreme Court in Barker emphasized that [t]he defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right ... is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right and that failure to assert that right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32, 92 S.Ct. 2182. In his concurring opinion in Barker, Justice White, joined by Justice Brennan, attributed the Court's affirmance of Barker's conviction chiefly to the defendant's failure to assert his right to speedy trial, commenting that it is apparent that had Barker not so clearly acquiesced in the major delays involved in this case, the result would have been otherwise. [4] Id. at 537, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (White, J., concurring). The Court, however, stopped short of requiring that the defendant specifically request a speedy trial, cautioning that: [w]hether and how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to the other factors we have mentioned. The strength of his efforts will be affected by the length of delay, to some extent by the reason for the delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice, which is not always readily identifiable, that he experiences. The more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain. Id. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182. As the Court reiterated, a defendant does not automatically and forever [waive] his right to speedy trial by not raising the issue, but that does not mean, however, that the defendant has no responsibility to assert his right. Id. at 528, 92 S.Ct. 2182. ¶ 23. In the case at bar, Woodall asserted his right to speedy trial only when the State appealed the trial court's first dismissal of this case on statute of limitations grounds. Naturally, upon remand, Woodall moved for a speedy trial hearing wherein he asserted that there was no means by which [he] could have forced the speedy trial issue. The State disagreed, claiming it received such demands regularly. Ultimately, the trial court dismissed the charges against Woodall, concluding that a defendant does not waive his right to a speedy trial by failing to assert it. Therefore, this factor ... [is] equally balanced against both the State and Woodall. While the trial court stands correct in its assertion that a defendant does not waive the right to speedy trial by failure to assert it, the factor should not have been weighed equally. Rather, as Watts and Stogner suggest, failure to assert this right in a timely fashion should be held against Woodall. Even though Woodall did not have to raise the matter to preserve his right to speedy trial, Woodall had a duty, according to Barker, to assert this right. Woodall, however, failed to do so in a timely manner and produced no proof to indicate an inability to raise the issue of speedy trial. In fact, Woodall made a number of motions, but not once did he claim any violation of his speedy trial right. As a result of Woodall's failure to raise this issue timely, this factor should have been weighed against him and in favor of the State.