Opinion ID: 2123530
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the requirement of individual culpability for criminal responsibility

Text: If one had to choose the most basic principle of the criminal law in general    it would be that criminal liability for causing a particular result is not justified in the absence of some culpable mental state in respect to that result   . [86] The most fundamental characteristic of the felony-murder rule violates this basic principle in that it punishes all homicides, committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of proscribed felonies whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, without the necessity of proving the relation between the homicide and the perpetrator's state of mind. This is most evident when a killing is done by one of a group of co-felons. The felony-murder rule completely ignores the concept of determination of guilt on the basis of individual misconduct. The felony-murder rule thus erodes the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability. People v Washington, 62 Cal 2d 777; 44 Cal Rptr 442; 402 P2d 130 (1965). The felony-murder rule's most egregious violation of basic rules of culpability occurs where felony murder is categorized as first-degree murder. All other murders carrying equal punishment require a showing of premeditation, deliberation and willfulness while felony murder only requires a showing of intent to do the underlying felony. Although the purpose of our degree statutes is to punish more severely the more culpable forms of murder, People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250, 258; 247 NW2d 547 (1976), an accidental killing occurring during the perpetration of a felony would be punished more severely than a second-degree murder requiring intent to kill, intent to cause great bodily harm, or wantonness and willfulness. [87] Furthermore, a defendant charged with felony murder is permitted to raise defenses only to the mental element of the felony, thus precluding certain defenses available to a defendant charged with premeditated murder who may raise defenses to the mental element of murder (e.g., self-defense, accident). Certainly, felony murder is no more reprehensible than premeditated murder. LaFave & Scott explain the felony-murder doctrine's failure to account for a defendant's moral culpability as follows: The rationale of the doctrine is that one who commits a felony is a bad person with a bad state of mind, and he has caused a bad result, so that we should not worry too much about the fact that the fatal result he accomplished was quite different and a good deal worse than the bad result he intended. Yet it is a general principle of criminal law that one is not ordinarily criminally liable for bad results which differ greatly from intended results. [88] Termed as a somewhat primitive rationale [89] it is deserving of the observation made by one commentator that the felony-murder doctrine gives rise to what can only be described as an emotional reaction, not one based on logical and abstract principles. [90] Another writer states: It is an excuse based on the rough moral notion that a man who intentionally commits a felony must have a wicked heart, and therefore `ought to be punished' for the harm which he has done accidentally. It is to guard against this kind of reasoning that our modern rules of evidence exclude in most cases any communication to the jury of a prisoner's previous misdeeds. [91] This Court has previously recognized this principle in a context analogous to the felony-murder situation: Every assault involves bodily harm. But any doctrine which would hold every assailant as a murderer where death follows his act, would be barbarous and unreasonable. Wellar v People, 30 Mich 16, 20 (1874). While it is understandable that little compassion may be felt for the criminal whose innocent victim dies, this does not justify ignoring the principles underlying our system of criminal law. As Professor Hall argues in his treatise on criminal law: The underlying rationale of the felony-murder doctrine โ that the offender has shown himself to be a `bad actor,' and that this is enough to exclude the niceties bearing on the gravity of the harm actually committed โ might have been defensible in early law. The survival of the felony-murder doctrine is a tribute to the tenacity of legal conceptions rooted in simple moral attitudes. For as long ago as 1771, the doctrine was severely criticized by Eden [Baron Auckland], [92] who felt that it `may be reconciled to the philosophy of slaves; but it is surely repugnant to that noble, and active confidence, which a free people ought to possess in the laws of their constitution, the rule of their actions.' [93] The United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed on several occasions the importance of the relationship between culpability and criminal liability. [T]he criminal law    is concerned not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract but also with the degree of criminal culpability. Mullaney v Wilbur, 421 US 684, 697-698; 95 S Ct 1881; 44 L Ed 2d 508 (1975). The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil. A relation between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory `But I didn't mean to,' and has afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution. Morissette v United States, 342 US 246, 250-251; 72 S Ct 240; 96 L Ed 288 (1952). Whether a death results in the course of a felony (thus giving rise to felony-murder liability) turns on fortuitous events that do not distinguish the intention or moral culpability of the defendants. Lockett v Ohio, 438 US 586, 620; 98 S Ct 2954; 57 L Ed 2d 973 (1978) (Mr. Justice Marshall's concurring opinion). The failure of the felony-murder rule to consider the defendant's moral culpability is explained by examining the state of the law at the time of the rule's inception. The concept of culpability was not an element of homicide at early common law. [94] The early definition of malice aforethought was vague. The concept meant little more than intentional wrongdoing with no other emphasis on intention except to exclude homicides that were committed by misadventure or in some otherwise pardonable manner. [95] Thus, under this early definition of malice aforethought, an intent to commit the felony would in itself constitute malice. Furthermore, as all felonies were punished alike, it made little difference whether the felon was hanged for the felony or for the death. [96] Thus, the felony-murder rule did not broaden the concept of murder at the time of its origin because proof of the intention to commit a felony met the test of culpability based on the vague definition of malice aforethought governing at that time. Today, however, malice is a term of art. It does not include the nebulous definition of intentional wrongdoing. Thus, although the felony-murder rule did not broaden the definition of murder at early common law, it does so today. We find this enlargement of the scope of murder unacceptable, because it is based on a concept of culpability which is totally incongruous with the general principles of our jurisprudence [97] today. As Professor Hall observed in his treatise on criminal law: The modern tendency has been to oppose policy-formation such as that embodied in or extended from the felony-murder doctrine. It has insisted on a decent regard for the facts and on sanctions that represent fair evaluation of these facts and not of the supposed character of the offender. Most emphatically the progressive tendency has been to repudiate the imposition of severe penalties where bare chance results in an unsought harm. [98] V. THE FELONY-MURDER DOCTRINE IN MICHIGAN A. Murder and Malice Defined In order to understand the operation of any state's felony-murder doctrine, initially it is essential to understand how that state defines murder and malice. In Michigan, murder is not statutorily defined. This Court early defined the term as follows: Murder is where a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully kills any reasonable creature in being, in the peace of the state, with malice prepense or aforethought, either express or implied. People v Potter, 5 Mich 1 (1858). See, also, People v Scott, 6 Mich 287, 292 (1859); Maher v People, 10 Mich 212, 218 (1862); People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250, 258; 247 NW2d 547 (1976). Thus, malice aforethought is the grand criterion [99] which elevates a homicide, which may be innocent or criminal, [100] to murder. However, [t]he nature of malice aforethought is the source of much of the confusion that attends the law of homicide. People v Morrin, 31 Mich App 301, 310-311; 187 NW2d 434 (1971), lv den 385 Mich 775 (1971). See, also, Moreland, Law of Homicide (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1952), pp 205-206. Overbroad and ill-considered instructions on malice have plagued appellate courts for decades. See, e.g., People v Morrin, supra ; People v Borgetto, 99 Mich 336; 58 NW 328 (1894); Nye v People, 35 Mich 16 (1876). We agree with the following analysis of murder and malice aforethought presented by LaFave & Scott: Though murder is frequently defined as the unlawful killing of another `living human being' with `malice aforethought', in modern times the latter phrase does not even approximate its literal meaning. Hence it is preferable not to rely upon that misleading expression for an understanding of murder but rather to consider the various types of murder (typed according to the mental element) which the common law came to recognize and which exist today in most jurisdictions: (1) intent-to-kill murder; (2) intent-to-do-serious-bodily-injury murder; (3) depraved-heart murder [wanton and willful disregard that the natural tendency of the defendant's behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm]; and (4) felony murder. [101] Under the common law, which we refer to in defining murder in this state, each of the four types of murder noted above has its own mental element which independently satisfies the requirement of malice aforethought. [102] It is, therefore, not necessary for the law to imply or for the jury to infer the intention to kill once the finder of fact determines the existence of any of the other three mental states because each one, by itself, constitutes the element of malice aforethought. [103] Our focus in this opinion is upon the last category of murder, i.e., felony murder. We do not believe the felony-murder doctrine, as some courts and commentators would suggest, abolishes the requirement of malice, nor do we believe that it equates the mens rea of the felony with the mens rea required for a non-felony murder. [104] We construe the felony-murder doctrine as providing a separate definition of malice, thereby establishing a fourth category of murder. The effect of the doctrine is to recognize the intent to commit the underlying felony, in itself, as a sufficient mens rea for murder. This analysis of the felony-murder doctrine is consistent with the historical development of the doctrine. [105] The question we address today is whether Michigan recognizes the felony-murder doctrine and, accordingly, the category of malice arising from the underlying felony. The relevant inquiry is first whether Michigan has a statutory felony-murder doctrine. If it does not, it must then be determined whether Michigan has or should have a common-law felony-murder doctrine. B. Statutory Felony Murder Michigan does not have a statutory felony-murder doctrine which designates as murder any death occurring in the course of a felony without regard to whether it was the result of accident, negligence, recklessness or willfulness. Rather, Michigan has a statute which makes a murder occurring in the course of one of the enumerated felonies a first-degree murder: Murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, or other wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration, or attempt to perpetrate arson, criminal sexual conduct in the first or third degree, robbery, breaking and entering of a dwelling, larceny of any kind, extortion, or kidnapping, is murder of the first degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment for life. MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548. The Michigan Legislature adopted verbatim the first-degree murder statute of Pennsylvania, the statute we have today. [106] In creating the statutes which divided murder into degrees, it was the intention of the Pennsylvania Legislature to reform the penal laws of that state by making punishment more proportionate to the crime and, in particular, to narrow the category of capital offenses. It was not its apparent intention to adopt by statute the common-law felony-murder rule. The provision covering murder in the course of the enumerated felonies was added when the bill creating the degree statutes was being debated on second reading by a motion on the floor. [107] In Commonwealth ex rel Smith v Myers, supra, 224, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: Clearly this statutory felony-murder rule merely serves to raise the degree of certain murders to first degree; it gives no aid to the determination of what constitutes murder in the first place. Michigan case law also makes it clear that the purpose of our first-degree murder statute is to graduate punishment and that the statute only serves to raise an already established murder to the first-degree level, not to transform a death, without more, into a murder. The statute does not undertake to define the crime of murder, but only to distinguish it into two degrees, for the purpose of graduating the punishment. People v Doe, 1 Mich 451, 457 (1850). See, also, People v Samuel Scott, supra, 293. It speaks of the offense as one already ascertained and defined, and divides it into degrees   . People v Potter, supra, 6 (emphasis added). Neither murder nor manslaughter is defined in our statutes. The [first-degree murder statute] simply classifies a murder perpetrated in a particular manner as murder in the first degree. It has no application until a murder has been established. People v Charles Austin, 221 Mich 635, 644; 192 NW 590 (1923) (emphasis added). Examples of decisions from other states which have murder statutes identical or similar to Michigan's first-degree murder statute in that they also use the term murder and which have concluded that the statute is merely a degree-raising device include the following: Commonwealth ex rel Smith v Myers, supra ; Commonwealth v Exler, 243 Pa 155; 89 A 968 (1914); State v Millette, supra ; Warren v State, 29 Md App 560, 565; 350 A2d 173, 178 (1976); Evans v State, 28 Md App 640; 349 A2d 300 (1975), aff'd 278 Md 197; 362 A2d 629 (1976); State v Galloway, supra ; Grant v State, 60 Tex Crim 358; 132 SW 350 (1910); Pharr v State, 7 Tex Crim 472, 477 (1879); State v Shock, 68 Mo 552 (1878). In Evans, the Court said: It is sometimes falsely asserted that [Md Code Ann, art 27,] งง 408-410 constitute the felony-murder doctrine in Maryland. That is not true. The felony-murder doctrine    is the common law rule โ defining one of the at-least three varieties of implied malice โ which raises a homicide resulting from the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony to the murder level generally. It is only at that point, after the felony-murder rule has already operated, that งง 408-410 come into play to provide further that in the case of certain designated felonies, the already established murder shall be punished as murder in the first degree. 28 Md App 640, 686, fn 23. Galloway is particularly noteworthy as it is a 1979 Iowa Supreme Court case concerning a question similar to the one involved here. [108] The defendant there requested that an instruction be given which would require the jury to find that he shot the victim with malice aforethought while attempting to perpetrate the crime of robbery. The trial court refused to give the instruction and the Supreme Court reversed. The Galloway court said: Under the rule at common law the instruction given by the trial court would have been correct.    But the Iowa statute differs from the common law and differs from the statutes of many other states.    The effect of the Iowa statute is to make murders which occur in connection with the perpetration of the named felonies first-degree murder. This has been our rule for many years. [Citation omitted.]