Opinion ID: 2318576
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the AMA's Integration Clause Canceled the Letter Agreement

Text: WIP attacks the Integration Clause, arguing that this section of the AMA is ineffective to terminate the Letter Agreement. We are satisfied, however, based on the plain language of the AMA which explicitly extinguishes WIP's rights under the Letter Agreement, that the trial court did not err. We have held that where a contract's language is clear and unambiguous, its plain language is relied upon in determining the parties' intention. GLM P'ship v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 753 A.2d 995, 998 (D.C.2000). Moreover, where a contract contains language releasing another party from its obligations under a different contract, we must rely solely upon its language as providing the best objective manifestation of the parties' intent, and where the terms of the document leave no room for doubt, [its] effect... can be determined as a matter of law. Bolling Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 475 A.2d 382, 385 (D.C.1984). The integration clause in the AMA reads: [The AMA] embodies the entire understanding of the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof.... Without limiting the foregoing, that certain letter agreement, dated October 8, 2003, between the Asset Manager and Global Securities House is hereby terminated, and the Asset Manager agrees that it shall submit no further claim for the payment of any compensation or other amounts thereunder. (Emphasis added). This language expressly refers to the Letter Agreement and the parties thereto and unambiguously terminates WIP's rights thereunder. Accordingly, summary judgment on WIP's breach of contract claim based on the Letter Agreement was proper. Neither of WIP's arguments that the AMA's language is inoperative to cancel the Letter Agreement has merit. First, focusing on the integration clause's reference to the subject matter hereof, WIP argues that the two contracts concerned different subject matter, and therefore the AMA could not affect the Letter Agreement. [3] However, the extent of WIP's attempt to distinguish the subject matter of the two agreements is to conveniently italicize certain phrases in the Letter Agreement, but not similar phrases in the AMA. WIP goes on to recite provision after provision of the Letter Agreement, but does not distinguish this language from similar language in the AMA, or account for the contemplation of the AMA itself within the Letter Agreement. The Letter Agreement covers the purchase of the Building, its ongoing management, its refinancing or sale and the compensation to be paid to WIP and the Asset Manager in connection therewith. These are precisely the same subjects of the AMA at issue in this litigation, as the AMA sets forth in detail the duties and compensation of WIP in its management of the building. Moreover, as explained earlier, the Letter Agreement expressly contemplated the negotiation of a second agreement, the AMA, by the parties. Accordingly, nothing about the subject matter of the agreements undermines the effect of the AMA's integration clause. Second, WIP argues that the two agreements were signed by different companies, and therefore the AMA, signed by TBC, cannot effectively amend the terms of the Letter Agreement which, according to its language, could only be amended by a writing signed by GSH and WIP. This argument might have some force and effect if WIP by signing the AMA had not specifically agreed to terminate the Letter Agreement and release all claims it had to compensation thereunder. Here, it matters only that the AMA was executed by the party against whom it is sought to be enforced, GLM P'ship, supra, 753 A.2d at 998, and its language terminating WIP's rights is clear. See also Bolling, supra, 475 A.2d at 385 (contract, executed by adversary, providing that party was released from liability for all claims of any kind, acted as valid release of all claims). Accordingly, it was not error for the trial court to rely on the plain language of the AMA's integration clause in granting summary judgment to appellees. We turn now to WIP's assertions that the entire AMA was invalid due to a lack of consideration and, alternatively, fraud in the inducement.