Opinion ID: 2774178
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court Erred in Seating Juror #8

Text: Sells’ second claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in ruling that his peremptory challenge of a juror violated Batson v. Kentucky,17 and erred in ordering the juror to be seated. Sells claims that the State failed to make a prima facia case that his peremptory challenge constituted racial discrimination. We agree. In objecting to a peremptory challenge, the moving party bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case that the use of the peremptory strike constitutes the defendant’s use of peremptory strikes in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, it is known as a “reverse Batson challenge.” 16 While we do not reach the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Sells’ motions to sever, we note that the trial court properly weighed the various factors to be considered and initially appeared inclined to grant the severance motion until the State inquired about whether Grimes would be raising an affirmative defense. In first applying the Butler factors, the Court found that Grimes’ proffer had the potential to completely exonerate Sells. Thus, the fourth factor -- whether Grimes would in fact testify if the cases were severed -- was the lynchpin for determining whether the trial court should grant the Second Motion to Sever. If the trial court believed that severance should have been granted based upon Grimes’ signed affidavit, it should have granted the motion at the outset. Instead, the State entered the colloquy and persuaded the Court that since Grimes was intending to offer an affirmative defense, he would therefore need to take the stand in the joint trial. It was only after this development that the trial court concluded that a severance was unnecessary. When, on the eighth day of trial, Grimes decided that he was not going to testify, Sells promptly renewed his motion to sever. At that point, given the trial court’s prior conclusion that Grimes’ proffered testimony could potentially exonerate Sells, and that Grimes had stated in an affidavit that he was prepared to so testify in a severed trial, the trial court should have set forth its reasons rather than summarily deny the renewed motion. 17 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 13 racial discrimination.18 The burden then shifts to the proponent of the strike to present a race-neutral explanation.19 If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must decide whether the opponent of the peremptory strike has proved purposeful discrimination by the proponent of the strike.20 As to the first step of the Batson analysis, we review the trial court’s factual findings for an abuse of discretion, but we review legal conclusions de novo.21
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution recognize a defendant’s “fundamental right to trial by an impartial jury.”22 A peremptory strike safeguards that fundamental right.23 Juror impartiality must be maintained not only in the interest of fairness to those accused, but also to assure the integrity of the judicial process.24 However, a peremptory strike may not be used by the State or the defendant in violation of the 18 Barrow v. State, 749 A.2d 1230, 1238 (Del. 2000). 19 Id. (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995)). 20 Barrow, 749 A.2d at 1238 (citing Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767). 21 See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005) (“[A] defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.”); Jones v. State, 938 A.2d 626, 632 (Del. 2007) (considering whether the evidence supported the conclusion that the State established a prima facie case of a Batson violation); Outten v. State, 650 A.2d 1291, 1299 (Del. 1994) (deferring to the trial court’s findings that the defendants did not establish a prima facie case). 22 Knox v. State, 29 A3d 217, 223-24 (Del. 2011). 23 Schwan v. State, 65 A.3d 582, 588 (Del. 2013). 24 Id. 14 Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.25 In Batson v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court established a three-step process to analyze claims that a party utilized peremptory strikes in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.26 First, the opponent of the strike must make a prima facie case of discrimination “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.”27 Second, once the opponent makes a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike to present a neutral, non-discriminatory explanation “related to the particular case to be tried.”28 Third, if a neutral, non-discriminatory explanation is tendered, the trial court must determine if the opponent of the strike has established purposeful discrimination by the proponent.29 In this case, the State made a Batson challenge during jury selection because it claimed that the defendant had stricken three white jurors. As a preliminary matter, the factual premise of the State’s challenge was not correct. Sells exercised one of his peremptory challenges to strike a black juror and two peremptory 25 See Burton v. State, 925 A.2d 503 (Del. 2007) (applying the Batson three-step process to an objection made by the State to the defendant’s use of a peremptory challenge). 26 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986). 27 Id. at 93-94 (citation omitted). 28 Id. at 98. 29 Id. 15 challenges to strike two white jurors.30 Moreover, Sells argues that his strikes of two white jurors and one black juror were consistent with the racial demographics of Kent County.31 Accordingly, he argues that there was an insufficient factual basis for the State’s challenge. Sells’ counsel objected on the record during the trial that the State had failed to establish a pattern of racial discrimination. As this Court recently explained in McCoy v. State, “[a] State’s Batson objection to the defendant’s exercise of a peremptory challenge is known as a reverse Batson claim.”32 In McCoy, we set forth the following test to be applied in analyzing a reverse Batson claim: When the State makes a reverse Batson challenge to a peremptory strike a three-step inquiry is required. First, the trial judge must determine whether the State has made a prima facie showing that the defendant exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the defendant to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question. Although the defendant must present a comprehensible reason, “[t]he second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible”; so long as the reason is not inherently discriminatory, it suffices. Third, the trial judge must then determine whether the State has carried its burden of proving purposeful discrimination. This final step involves evaluating “the 30 Sells’ fourth peremptory challenge was exercised to remove a white female juror. This strike occurred after the State raised its Batson challenge. Sells offered two reasons for exercising this peremptory challenge: that the prospective juror was a cashier and was employed by law enforcement. The trial court held that the latter ground was a valid race-neutral reason for the strike. 31 He notes that according to the most recent census data, Kent County is 68.8% white and 24.97% African American. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Estimates Program, available at http://www.census.gov/poptest/index.html. 32 McCoy v. State, 2015 WL 292575, at  (Del. Jan 20, 2015). 16 persuasiveness of the justification” proffered by the [defendant], but “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike,” which is usually the State in a reverse Batson challenge.33 Thus, a reverse Batson claim arises upon the prosecution arguing that a minority defendant is engaging in racial discrimination because he is striking white jurors. In responding to the State’s reverse Batson challenge, the Superior Court stated: As counsel for Mr. Sells know [sic] and as Mr. Grimes may well not, while these strikes are peremptory and can be made for any reason or no reason, basically, they cannot be exercised on the basis of race. I think I will not change anyone seated to this point, but I would simply say to counsel for Defendant Sells and to Mr. Grimes that from this point forward, because of the pattern that has emerged, that any excusal of a Caucasian juror will have to be for an express reason other than race.34 The Superior Court stated that it was not requiring the defendants to provide reasons for jurors that had already been excused, but that going forward, a stated reason would be necessary. Grimes then attempted to use a peremptory strike on Juror #8, a white male. The following exchange occurred: Court: Mr. Grimes, this is your strike. What is your nonraciallybased reason? 33 Id. at -18 (internal citations omitted). 34 App. to Opening Br. at A21-22 (emphasis added). 17 Grimes: The nonracially-based reason is because he’s employed by Kent County Levy Court. I guess he’s employed by law enforcement through them. Court: Levy Court is not law enforcement. Grimes: Well, I don’t know. Court: Well, I do, and it’s not. Grimes: I don’t know if that’s the reason he’s saying he’s employed by law enforcement or not. I’m saying he’s employed by the court, and it says he’s employed by law enforcement. Court: He’s not employed by this court. Grimes: Okay. I understand what you’re saying, your Honor. I’m going by what it says on the jury profile, and on the jury profile, it says specifically that he’s employed by law enforcement. So when I see “law enforcement,” and this is a case involving law enforcement, the neutral racial bias -- I mean the base reason -- Court: I understand. Grimes: -- is that he’s employed by law enforcement, whether it’s the court or not. I just see that he’s employed by law enforcement, and this is a case involving law enforcement. State: But so is Juror 11 . . . who happens to be a black male, yet this defendant has only struck whites. Your Honor, and just for the record, While [Juror #8] does indicate he’s employed in Kent County Levy Court, his occupation is a mechanic. The Court allowed Juror #8 to remain seated. Sells then exercised a peremptory challenge with respect to the same juror for the same reasons.35 The following exchange occurred between the Court and Sells’ counsel: 35 App. to Opening Br. at A30 (“Your Honor, the reason for the strike is according to the information we have from the court, he was employed or he is employed by law enforcement.”). 18 Court: Okay. You heard everything that was said two minutes ago, and you heard my ruling on that. You have nothing to add to that; is that correct? Counsel: Except, your Honor, that now it’s our motion to strike. Court: No, no. It’s no different, yours or Mr. Grimes. Counsel: Well, there is a difference. Court: Mr. Grimes made the same motion and it was denied. He’s seated. Now unless you have something new to add, then I’m going to be really concerned about why we’re going through this exercise at all. Counsel: I’m establishing a record, in that, we believe he’s employed by law enforcement. Court: Okay. Fine. He’s going to be seated. Sells now argues on appeal that the trial court erred in finding a pattern of racial discrimination in the exercise of his three peremptory strikes, and that Juror #8’s response to the jury questionnaire indicating that he was a member of law enforcement was a valid race-neutral basis to permit his removal by the defense. In this case, the State had the burden of establishing a prima facie case that the non-moving party (Sells) intentionally used his peremptory challenges to discriminate against a cognizable group. The trial court found a pattern of racial discrimination after Sells struck two Caucasian jurors and one African American juror. As we stated in McCoy, “[a]lthough there are no fixed rules, we acknowledge that ‘a pattern of strikes against jurors of a particular race could be 19 prima facie evidence of racial discrimination.’”36 But here, the State engaged in no analysis to support its claim that a pattern of racial discrimination existed -- other than aggregating Grimes’ and Sells’ peremptory challenges and stating that a pattern existed because the defendants, collectively, used five of six strikes on white jurors.37 “It is the opponent of the strike’s burden to set forth ‘facts and other relevant circumstances’ to support an inference of discrimination.”38 We do not believe that the State established a prima facie case of discrimination based upon Sells’ attempt to strike two white jurors. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Batson, “[w]e have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to 36 McCoy, 2015 WL 292575, at -20 (quoting State v. Mootz, 808 N.W.2d 207, 217 (Iowa 2012)). 37 See App. to Opening Br. at A21-23: State: Your Honor, the State is making a Batson change [sic]. Both defendants have -- three jurors that they have each stricken have all been white. Court: As counsel for Mr. Sells know [sic] and as Mr. Grimes may well not, while these strikes are peremptory and can be made for any reason or no reason, basically, they cannot be exercised on the basis of race. I think I will not change anyone seated to this point, but I would simply say to counsel for Defendant Sells and to Mr. Grimes that from this point forward, because of the pattern that has emerged, that any excusal of a Caucasian juror will have to be for an express reason other than race. ... We’re talking five for six at this juncture. All that’s necessary is a stated reason. 38 McCoy, 2015 WL 292575, at  (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986)). 20 decide if the circumstances concerning the . . . use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against . . . jurors.”39 A trial court is within its discretion to determine that there is a prima facie case of discrimination so long as there is sufficient evidence to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.40 While the first step of the Batson analysis was not intended to be an onerous one,41 we are confident that there is insufficient evidence here to permit the trial court to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred. The State presented no evidence as to what the overall racial composition of the venire was, for example. The fact that Sells struck only two white jurors is an insufficient evidentiary basis for the trial court to draw an inference that a “pattern” of racial discrimination has occurred. 39 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. 40 Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 169 (2005). In Johnson v. California, a number of prospective jurors were removed for cause until forty-three eligible jurors remained, three of whom were black. The petitioner was a black male convicted of second degree murder and assault on a nineteen-month old Caucasian child. The prosecutor used three of his twelve peremptory challenges to remove the three prospective black jurors. The resulting jury, including alternates, were all white. Upon the petitioner’s challenge, the trial court found that petitioner had failed to make a prima facie case. The United States Supreme Court made clear that a prima facie case of discrimination can be made out by offering a wide variety of evidence “so long as the sum of the proffered facts gives rise to an inference of a discriminatory purpose.” Id. The Supreme Court emphasized that it “did not intend the first step to be so onerous that a defendant would have to persuade the judge -- on the basis of all the facts, some of which are impossible for the defendant to know with certainty -- that the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination. Instead, a defendant satisfies Batson’s first step requirements by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.” Id. 41 Id. 21 Moreover, the trial court erred in aggregating the peremptory strikes of Grimes and Sells. Superior Court Criminal Rule 24(b) provides that “[i]n noncapital cases, the State shall be entitled to 6 peremptory challenges and the defendant or defendants shall be entitled to a total of 6 peremptory challenges.”42 Rule 24(b)(2) further provides that “[i]f there is more than one defendant, the court may allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.”43 Here, Sells and Grimes were exercising their peremptory challenges separately.44 In McCoy, this Court reiterated that “‘[o]ne of the primary safeguards for impaneling a fair and impartial jury is a defendant’s right to challenge prospective jurors, either peremptorily or for cause.’”45 The importance of peremptory strikes is highlighted by our recognition that “a new trial is required when a juror is erroneously allowed to remain on the jury despite the defendant’s valid peremptory challenge to that juror’s presence.”46 We explained our rationale as follows: 42 DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). 43 DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(2). 44 The record presented to this Court does not show how many peremptory strikes each defendant was given. Our review of the record suggests that Grimes attempted to exercise his fourth peremptory challenge and Sells’ attempted to exercise his fifth peremptory challenge to remove Juror #8. 45 McCoy, 2015 WL 292575, at  (quoting Schwan v. State, 65 A.3d 582, 587 (Del. 2013); Banther v. State, 823 A.2d 467, 482 (Del. 2003)). 46 McCoy, 2015 WL 292575, at . 22 In Riley v. State, this Court held that “peremptory challenges, when appropriately executed, are an essential tool for eliminating potential jury bias and must be available to any party, within constitutional limits.” The improper denial of a peremptory challenge forces the defendant to be judged by a jury that includes a juror that is objectionable to him. When this occurs, and the defendant properly objected to seating the juror by attempting to exercise his Rule 24(c) right to use a peremptory challenge, and that objection is overruled by an erroneous finding of a reverse Batson violation, prejudice must be presumed.47 Each defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial jury. Because there is no basis in the record before us to attribute any motives Grimes may have had in exercising his strikes to Sells, it was error to conclude that Sells was engaging in a pattern of racial discrimination in striking two white jurors and one black juror. Further, because African Americans like Sells48 are members of a minority group in Kent County, the pattern of peremptory strikes against only Caucasian members of the venire may provide less of an inference of discrimination. If a super-majority of the venire is Caucasian, a pattern of striking white jurors is less telling evidence that race was a factor, because the mathematical odds would be that most potential jurors questioned for the parties to strike would be Caucasian. Thus, trial courts should be cautious about inhibiting the use of peremptory strikes 47 Id. (quoting Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1012 (Del. 1985) (emphasis added)) (citing DEL. CONST. art. I § 4; DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 24(c); State v. Mootz, 808 N.W.2d 207, 225 (Iowa 2012)). 48 Sells notes in his brief that he is of “mixed race, both Caucasian and African-American.” Thus, Sells contends that regardless of whether he was removing an African American juror or a Caucasian juror, he was removing a juror of his race. This argument, however, was not presented to the trial court. 23 by a defendant except after careful application of Batson. Because here there was an insufficient basis for the trial court’s conclusion that there was a “pattern” of discrimination, prejudice must be presumed and a new trial is required. After finding that a prima facie case of impermissible discrimination had been established, the trial court proceeded to the second step of the Batson analysis. It then found that Sells had not articulated a “non-discriminatory” reason for attempting to remove Juror #8 since Sells’ proffered reason turned out to be erroneous.49 Sells argues that the challenge to Juror #8 was based on a valid race-neutral reason because Juror #8 was employed by “law enforcement.” We have held that to rebut the prima facia case, “the [proponent of the strike] must provide a ‘clear and reasonably specific’ explanation of ‘legitimate reasons’ for his use of the challenges that are ‘related to the particular case.’”50 As the Superior Court explained, Juror #8 was actually employed by the Levy Court as a mechanic.51 The court noted that Juror #8 was a mechanic; but the form the juror submitted also indicated that he was a member of law enforcement. 49 The third step in the analysis -- whether the opponent of the strike has made a record that would support a finding of pretext -- was not reached. 50 Dixon v. State, 673 A.2d 1220, 1224 (Del. 1996) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.20 (1986)); see also Jones v. State, 938 A.2d 626, 632 (Del. 2007). 51 See App. to Opening Br. at A28-30 (“[State]: Your Honor, and just for the record, while [Juror #8] does indicate that he’s employed in Kent County Levy Court, his occupation is a mechanic.”). 24 Regardless of this discrepancy, because the State never established a prima facie case for a reverse-Batson violation, it was error for the trial court to shift the burden to Sells to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for exercising his peremptory challenge. As a result, Juror #8 was improperly seated and participated in the trial.52 Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Superior Court for a new trial.