Opinion ID: 2283422
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proof the Lack of Warning Caused the Injuries.

Text: Ford alternatively argues that the Moores did not provide substantial evidence that Ms. Moore was damaged as a direct result of the product being sold without an adequate warning. There are two aspects of proving causation in a failure to warn case. First, of course, the plaintiff must show causation in fact by showing that the product for which there was no warning caused the injuries. Here, there is no question that the seats did collapse and that Ms. Moore received her injuries in the accident. Experts for the Moores testified that those injuries were caused by the collapsing seats, while Ford presented contrary evidence. The evidence clearly presented a jury question whether the collapse of the seats caused Ms. Moore's injuries. Second, the plaintiff must show proximate cause. To do this, plaintiffs must show that a warning would have altered the behavior of the individuals involved in the accident. Arnold, 834 S.W.2d at 194; accord Tune, 883 S.W.2d at 14. To satisfy this burden, Missouri, like several other states, aids plaintiffs in proving this second part of causation by presuming that a warning will be heeded. Arnold, 834 S.W.2d at 194. But the presumption that plaintiffs will heed a warning assumes that a reasonable person will act appropriately if given adequate information. Thus, a preliminary inquiry before applying the presumption is whether adequate information is available absent a warning. Id. Moreover, [a]s causation is a required element of the plaintiffs' case, the burden is on plaintiffs to show that lack of [prior] knowledge. Id. Numerous cases have held that when the defense is raised that the injured plaintiff had adequate knowledge of the risks so as to obviate the duty to warn, the question of the adequacy of the knowledge is a question for the jury. Duke, 660 S.W.2d at 418. Here, Ford does not claim that either of the Moores knew at the time they purchased or used the Ford Explorer that the seats were designed to collapse backward in certain rear-end collisions or that Ms. Moore was at greater risk of injury in such a collision as a result. Accordingly, that part of the causation test is not at issue here. If there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that the plaintiff did not already know the danger, there is a presumption that a warning will be heeded. Tune, 883 S.W.2d at 14. [T]he term `presumption' is used to mean `makes a prima facie case,' i.e., creates a submissible case that the warning would have been heeded. Id. Such a presumption would make a prima facie case that had Ford given the Moores an adequate warning, the Moores would have heeded it. Ford nonetheless argues that the Moores' testimony about what Ms. Moore would have done had warnings been given was speculative. In support, they cite to Arnold v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 908 S.W.2d 757 (Mo.App.1995) ( Arnold II ), in which the plaintiff was prohibited from testifying that he would have taken greater precautions against an explosion had he received a more adequate warning of the risk of explosion because [t]estimony about what a plaintiff might have done under a hypothetical state of facts is speculative and immaterial. Id. at 763. In this case, Ford objected to the Moores' attempts to admit evidence of what they would have done had they received an adequate warning, arguing that such testimony simply constituted speculation about what they would have done in a hypothetical situation. The trial court sustained a number of these objections. The Moores contend this was error. Ford is correct that where, as here, no warning is given, then evidence of what a person would have done had a warning been given inherently is hypothetical in character. Yet, to show causation, a plaintiff must show that the absence of a warning was the proximate cause of the injury. As a matter of logic, to accomplish this a plaintiff must show that she did not have the information the warning would have imparted already and that, if she had the information, it would have affected her conduct. This creates a Catch-22 in which the plaintiff must prove what she would have done had a warning been given to prove causation, but evidence on this issue must be precluded as speculative. This dilemma is avoided in Missouri and other states by the use of a presumption that had an adequate warning been given, it would have been heeded. For that reason, the trial court did not err in holding during the direct examination of Ms. Moore that her testimony as to what she might have done had a warning been given was speculative. Arnold, 908 S.W.2d at 763. The heeding presumption is a rebuttable one, however. Tune, 883 S.W.2d at 14. Here, Ford chose to try to rebut it by obtaining concessions from Ms. Moore on cross-examination that she really did not look for warnings and that she would have driven the vehicle once purchased. She agreed that she did not look specifically at this manual or at prior vehicle manuals with the purpose of seeing whether there was a seat weight limit. The Moores did not attempt to question Ms. Moore further about whether she would have looked for or heeded the warning on redirect, after such evidence became relevant once Ford tried to rebut the presumption. [8] Nonetheless, earlier portions of her testimony that did come in without objection, set out at length above, supported the Moores' position that she would have heeded a warning about the risks the seats posed for persons of greater than normal weight. [9] It would be up to a jury to weigh all of this testimony. A jury may find persuasive the implication from Ford's questions that the Moores' testimony was self-serving and should not be accorded much weight. But a jury instead might find it entirely credible. Such a credibility determination is for the jury. Finally, Ford argues that the presumption or evidence that a warning would have been heeded has no relevance or application where, as here, the only way to heed the warning is not to buy or use the product. In such a case, Ford argues, the claim is not really a failure to warn claim but an improper marketing claim. In support, Ford cites the first decision in Arnold, 834 S.W.2d at 194, which it says held that allegations of failure to warn at the time of purchase are so remote and speculative that as a matter of law they cannot support a failure to warn claim. Ford's reading of Arnold is overbroad. In Arnold, the plaintiff, an automobile repair shop worker, sued the defendant in strict liability failure to warn when the defendant's air compressor ignited gasoline fumes that were not properly ventilated, resulting in injury to the plaintiff. 834 S.W.2d at 192-93. Mr. Arnold argued that had the manufacturer warned that the air compressor was not airtight, the third-party supplier would not have sold the air compressor to the plaintiff's employer, the automobile repair shop, and, therefore, Mr. Arnold would not have been using it. Id. at 193. Neither the supplier nor the repair shop was a party to the lawsuit. Arnold did hold that what the parties refer to as this time of purchase theory of failure to warn was too speculative to support submission. But it did so because the theory depended on the jury deciding what a third partythe shop owner would have done had a warning been given. As Arnold noted, such a piling of inference upon inference as to what persons in the chain of supply would have done ignores any reasonable concept of proximate cause. Id. But, while Arnold noted that the traditional approach to proximate cause in failure to warn cases focuses on the effect of giving a warning on the actual circumstances surrounding the accident, id., it did not purport to bar failure to warn claims involving a direct purchase by a plaintiff, and any such statement would have been dicta in any event. Where, as here, the evidence is sufficient to show that the product was unreasonably dangerous for use by the plaintiff without the additional warning and that had the warning been given at the time of purchase or before use on the day of the accident, it would have been heeded, a submissible case is made. As noted earlier, not only did the Moores testify that they did not know the Explorer seats yielded rearward for persons of Ms. Moore's weight much more readily than for persons of normal weight, they went further by presenting evidence that had they read a warning before purchase, they would not have purchased the Explorer, and had they learned of it later through reading the manual, Mr. Moore would have done everything in his power to prevent his wife from riding in the Explorer. This causation theory is straightforward, not speculative, and does not offend reasonable concepts of proximate cause.