Opinion ID: 772926
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Likelihood of Attracting Similar Counsel

Text: 19 The District Court found that by the time Raishevich obtained his current counsel, the facts in his case were so favorable that other counsel could easily have been obtained. 6 Raishevich challenges this conclusion, arguing that the facts at the time he brought his complaint were not nearly as favorable as the District Court indicated. Raishevich's current counsel did not file this complaint but was hired after the defendant conceded liability. Although counsel asserted at oral argument before us that his firm was seeking fees for Raishevich's former attorney's work, this assertion is belied by the record. In his memorandum of law in support of his application for attorneys' fees and costs, Raishevich, through his counsel, explicitly forfeited the opportunity to seek fees for his prior counsel's work. Pl.'s Mem. of Law submitted to the District Court at 18. 20 The District Court did not exceed its allowable discretion in concluding that the merits were strong and that a high award was probable at the time Raishevich's current counsel was obtained. As the District Court noted, Foster had conceded liability before Raishevich's current counsel was hired. Thus, only the amount of damages to be awarded was at issue. Moreover, at the time current counsel was obtained, the only existing expert witness report evaluating the value of Raishevich's transparencies was that of Raishevich's expert. This report stated that Raishevich had suffered damages of no less than $261,000 and as much as $522,000. At that time, no competing expert report had been undertaken. Thus, although Raishevich's counsel now argues that the amount of damages was still hotly contested and, therefore, the concession of liability alone could not satisfy Kerr's first prong, the record does not support his argument. Hence, the District Court did not exceed its allowable discretion here because attorneys who generally take such cases on a contingent basis would [have] readily appreciate[d] the value of the case and agree[d] to pursue it. Kerr, 692 F.2d at 878. 7