Opinion ID: 6105491
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: Receivership Principles [5-8] Ordinarily the appointment of a receiver is an ancillary remedy, for the purpose of aiding the court in the granting of appropriate relief in the main suit upon which it is dependent. 6 A receivership serves to assist the court in safeguarding assets, suitably administering property, and achieving a final, equitable distribution of assets, accomplishing complete justice, as far as practicable, for the parties before the court. 7 Its purpose is to carry out the orders of the court. 8 A receivership receives and preserves the property or fund in 2 AVG Partners I v. Genesis Health Clubs, 307 Neb. 47, 948 N.W.2d 212 (2020). 3 O’Neill Production Credit Assn. v. Putnam Ranches, Inc., 198 Neb. 145, 251 N.W.2d 884 (1977). 4 Priesner v. Starry, 300 Neb. 81, 912 N.W.2d 249 (2018). 5 Id. 6 Bodge v. Skinner Packing Co., 115 Neb. 41, 211 N.W. 203 (1926). 7 65 Am. Jur. 2d Receivers § 5 (2021). 8 Id. See, also, Dickie v. Flamme Bros., 251 Neb. 910, 560 N.W.2d 762 (1997). - 632 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports SEID v. SEID Cite as 310 Neb. 626 litigation, and it preserves and properly disposes of the subject of litigation. 9 [9-11] A receivership will not be permitted to continue indefinitely. 10 Whenever the reason or necessity for a receivership ceases to exist, the property should be discharged therefrom although the mere coming into existence of this state of things does not ipso facto discharge the receiver. 11 A receivership may be terminated only by an order of the court, and a receivership should be closed and terminated without unnecessary delay. 12 The Nebraska Legislature has prescribed a process by which a district court may appoint and instruct a receiver. A statute authorizes appointment of a receiver by a district court in an action . . . by a creditor to subject any property or fund to his or her claim, or between . . . others jointly owning or interested in any property or fund on the application of any party to the suit when the property or fund is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured.” 13 Another statute dictates, “Every order appointing a receiver shall contain special directions in respect to his powers and duties, and . . . such further directions may be made in that behalf by the court or judge as may in the further progress of the cause become proper.” 14 [12,13] We pause to reconcile seemingly inconsistent case law regarding the source of a district court’s power to appoint a receiver. In Floral Lawns Memorial Gardens Assn. v. 9 See 65 Am. Jur. 2d, supra note 7. See, also, Vila v. Grand Island Electric Light, Ice & Cold Storage Co., 68 Neb. 222, 97 N.W. 613 (1903). 10 75 C.J.S. Receivers § 79 (2013). 11 Id. 12 Id. See, also, State, ex rel. Sorensen, v. Hoskins State Bank, 132 Neb. 878, 273 N.W. 834 (1937); 21A Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Receivers § 392 (2012). 13 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1081(1) (Reissue 2016). 14 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1087 (Reissue 2016). - 633 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports SEID v. SEID Cite as 310 Neb. 626 Becker, 15 we stated that “a court’s ability to appoint a receiver is governed by statute. The court can appoint a receiver only in specific situations . . . .” On the other hand, in State, ex rel. Sorensen, v. Nebraska State Bank, 16 we explained that the Nebraska Constitution conferred the power to appoint a receiver upon district courts. 17 We reaffirmed that a district court’s power to appoint a receiver is “beyond the power of the legislature to limit or control; that while the legislature may grant to the district courts such other jurisdiction as it may deem proper, it cannot limit or take from such courts their broad and general jurisdiction which the Constitution has conferred upon them.” 18 Accordingly, courts of equity have original power to appoint receivers and to make such orders and decrees with respect to the discharge of their trust as justice and equity may require. 19 Because the Legislature incorporated the district court’s inherent constitutional power to appoint receivers into § 25-1081(8), that subsection is declaratory of a power already existing under the constitution. 20 Here, the district court’s 2019 appointment of a receiver was premised upon § 25-1081(1). We now turn to the arguments attacking the 2021 order before us. Application Rita and Judy present three arguments in support of their assignments that the court abused its discretion by “appointing a [r]eceiver for 2021.” Rita and Judy argue that the court 15 Floral Lawns Memorial Gardens Assn. v. Becker, 284 Neb. 532, 537, 822 N.W.2d 692, 697 (2012). 16 State, ex rel. Sorensen, v. Nebraska State Bank, 124 Neb. 449, 247 N.W. 31 (1933). 17 See Neb. Const. art. 5, § 9. 18 State, ex rel. Sorensen, v. Nebraska State Bank, supra note 16, 124 Neb. at 454, 247 N.W. at 33. 19 See id. 20 See Smith v. White, 62 Neb. 56, 86 N.W. 930 (1901). - 634 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports SEID v. SEID Cite as 310 Neb. 626 abused its discretion by appointing the receiver for 2021 because (1) neither party requested the appointment, (2) the court never determined that the receiver was needed or necessary for 2021, and (3) the court failed to consider the evidence in affidavits presented by Rita and Judy. All three of Rita and Judy’s arguments are fundamentally flawed because they are premised upon the notion that the court “appoint[ed] a [r]eceiver for 2021.” It did not. The court appointed the receiver in 2019 and never discharged him—nor did Rita and Judy ever seek his discharge. There is no motion to discharge the receiver in our record. Nor does there appear any attempt by Rita and Judy to invoke any recognized procedure to dispose of the main action. [14-16] It is now too late to attack the 2019 appointment order. An order appointing a receiver is a final, appealable order. 21 Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020), an appeal must be filed within 30 days of the final order from which an appeal is taken. 22 Where a notice of appeal is not filed within 30 days after the entry of a final order, an appellate court obtains no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from that order, and an attempt to appeal from that order must be dismissed. 23 No appeal was taken from the 2019 order, and we lack jurisdiction to address its merits. [17] The court’s 2021 order did not “appoint” a receiver; it simply provided further instructions to the one who was previously appointed. During the 2021 hearing, the court asked whether Beverly had received her share of the income from the land in 2018 and related documentation—which was demanded in the complaint. Beverly’s attorney responded that she had 21 Floral Lawns Memorial Gardens Assn. v. Becker, supra note 15. 22 Goodman v. City of Omaha, 274 Neb. 539, 742 N.W.2d 26 (2007), overruled on other grounds, McEwen v. Nebraska State College Sys., 303 Neb. 552, 931 N.W.2d 120 (2019). 23 See State v. Reed, 226 Neb. 575, 412 N.W.2d 848 (1987). See, also, § 25-1912. - 635 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports SEID v. SEID Cite as 310 Neb. 626 received “moneys,” but that she was still reviewing the related documentation. Rita and Judy’s attorney protested Beverly’s assertion that she was still reviewing the documentation, but provided no evidence to the contrary. Further, Rita and Judy’s affidavits did not claim that Beverly’s complaint was resolved. Instead, the affidavits focused on Rita and Judy’s renewed request that the court order the parties to equally contribute to the maintenance and repair of the land. Because Rita and Judy did not seek a discharge of the receiver, they cannot premise error on the court’s failure to do so. A lower court cannot commit error in resolving an issue never presented and submitted to it for disposition. 24 Two other issues merit brief discussion. First, Rita and Judy urge that the February 2021 order was flawed because it was not based “upon application of any party to the suit.” 25 Second, they argue that the February 2021 order was void for lack of the notice required by a statute. 26 Both lack merit. [18,19] Although the receiver—who, we assume for purposes of discussion, was not a “party”—initially filed the motion for further instructions, at the hearing both sides requested interim relief from the court consistent only with further action by the receiver. While formal joinder in the receiver’s motion would have been preferable, equity looks through form to substance. Thus, a court of equity goes to the root of the matter and is not deterred by form. 27 In substance, the parties sought relief through the existing receiver. Moreover, a party cannot complain of error which the party has invited the court to commit. 28 24 See Eletech, Inc. v. Conveyance Consulting Group, 308 Neb. 733, 956 N.W.2d 692 (2021). 25 § 25-1087 (emphasis supplied). 26 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1089 (Reissue 2016). 27 Huffman v. Peterson, 272 Neb. 62, 718 N.W.2d 522 (2006). 28 See VKGS v. Planet Bingo, 309 Neb. 950, 962 N.W.2d 909 (2021). - 636 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 310 Nebraska Reports SEID v. SEID Cite as 310 Neb. 626 Rita and Judy’s reliance on lack of notice fares no better. First, the statute they cite applies to “[e]very order appointing a receiver . . . .” 29 But we have already exposed the flaw in their reasoning—the 2019 order and not the 2021 order “appointed” the receiver. But more fundamentally, they participated in the hearing. The requirements of the statute in regard to notice may be waived. 30 Having participated and requested affirm­ ative relief, they waived objection to notice of the motion for instructions. We find no merit to the assignments of error attacking the validity of the February 2021 order further instructing the receiver, and we find no abuse of discretion in the instructions given. Thus, we affirm the court’s order. Before concluding, we return to two basic principles cited above: Appointment of a receiver is an ancillary remedy 31 and a receivership will not be permitted to continue indefinitely. 32 Trial judges are encouraged to implement firm, consistent procedures for minimizing continuances to meet the case progression standards of the Nebraska Supreme Court. 33 Each member of the bar shall cooperate with the judiciary in meeting the case progression standards of the Nebraska Supreme Court. 34 The receivership here cannot be viewed as an end goal of the litigation.