Opinion ID: 2508333
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: testimony concerning lost laboratory evidence

Text: ¶ 43 The final issue we are asked to consider on appeal is whether the district court properly allowed the State to offer testimony concerning laboratory evidence lost at the State Crime Lab. During Nurse Crockett's initial examination of the victim's anus shortly after one of the alleged offenses occurred, she discovered two pubic hairs on the victim that were not his own. She removed the hairs, sealed them in a bag and gave them to the police officer who was present during the examination. She later obtained pubic hair samples from Gulbransen and his brother because they were both alleged to have committed the offenses. However, since the State Crime Lab lost the hairs that Nurse Crockett originally obtained from the victim, she was unable to make a definitive comparison with the hairs obtained from Gulbransen and his brother. ¶ 44 The day before trial, defense counsel filed a motion in limine to suppress any reference at trial to the two pubic hairs collected by Nurse Crockett, arguing that allowing the testimony absent the evidence would violate Gulbransen's due process rights. The district court denied Gulbransen's motion and allowed the testimony during trial, where Nurse Crockett testified that the two hairs found on the victim, in her opinion, were similar to those of the defendant and his brother. ¶ 45 On appeal, Gulbransen claims for the first time that the State acted in bad faith in losing the evidence, in violation of his constitutionally guaranteed right to access to evidence. He further claims that the district court's admission of the evidence thereby constitutes reversible error.
¶ 46 Under United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, when the State suppresses or fails to disclose material exculpatory evidence, the good or bad faith of the prosecution is irrelevant: a due process violation occurs whenever such evidence is withheld. Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 547, 124 S.Ct. 1200, 157 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2004) (per curiam) (emphasis added). However, the Due Process Clause `requires a different result when we deal with the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.' Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988)). [T]he failure to preserve this `potentially useful evidence' does not violate due process ` unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police. ' Id. (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58, 109 S.Ct. 333). ¶ 47 The pubic hairs in this case fall into the category of potentially useful evidence that, depending on testing, might have exonerated Gulbransen. This triggered his burden to produce evidence showing that the police acted in bad faith in losing the evidence, if he wanted to successfully show that his due process rights were violated. However, Gulbransen made no such allegations. While he did contest that he was deprived of his ability to analyze the evidence himself, he never raised the issue of bad faith in the district court. Nor did either party present evidence as to the intentions of the police officers or the State Crime Lab with regard to the evidence. ¶ 48 We have held that, [a]s a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346. We have further determined that the requirement of raising a claim at trial before bringing it on appeal applies to every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can demonstrate that `exceptional circumstances' exist or `plain error' occurred. Id. In this case, Gulbransen failed to raise his claim before the district court and is thereby barred from making such a claim before us. In addition, since he has made no allegation of exceptional circumstances or plain error, his failure to raise the issue at trial deprives him of any exceptional remedy before this court.