Opinion ID: 1766883
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether judge harkey should have recused himself.

Text: ¶ 9. The rule concerning disqualification of a judge in effect at the trial of this case was Canon 3, subdivision C, of the Code of Judicial Conduct. It states, A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.... [6] In conjunction with this canon, we have held consistently that the objective reasonable person knowing all of the circumstances is the proper standard by which we determine if a judge should have recused himself. Farmer v. State, 770 So.2d 953, 956 (Miss.2000); Tubwell v. Grant, 760 So.2d 687, 688 (Miss. 2000); Beyer v. Easterling, 738 So.2d 221, 228 (Miss.1999); Walls v. Spell, 722 So.2d 566, 571 (Miss.1998); Garrison v. State, 726 So.2d 1144, 1152 (Miss.1998); Duplantis v. State, 708 So.2d 1327, 1345 (Miss. 1998); Evans v. State, 725 So.2d 613, 677 (Miss.1997); Bredemeier v. Jackson, 689 So.2d 770, 774 (Miss.1997); Hunter v. State, 684 So.2d 625, 630 (Miss.1996). ¶ 10. It is clear that the standard for recusal is a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances. It is also clear that judges are presumed to be qualified and unbiased. Farmer, 770 So.2d at 956; Upton v. McKenzie, 761 So.2d 167, 172 (Miss. 2000); Tubwell, 760 So.2d at 688; Norton v. Norton, 742 So.2d 126, 131 (Miss.1999); Beyer, 738 So.2d at 228; Garrison v. State, 726 So.2d 1144, 1152 (Miss.1998); Evans, 725 So.2d at 677; Walls v. Spell, 722 So.2d 566, 571 (Miss.1998); Duplantis, 708 So.2d at 1345; Hunter, 684 So.2d at 630; Green v. State, 631 So.2d 167, 177 (Miss.1994); Collins v. Joshi, 611 So.2d 898, 901 (Miss. 1992). ¶ 11. These cases are inconsistent regarding the burden of proving the presumption has been rebutted. We have held in numerous cases that the evidence presented must produce a reasonable doubt as to a judge's impartiality. Farmer, 770 So.2d at 956; Tubwell, 760 So.2d at 688; Beyer, 738 So.2d at 228; Garrison, 726 So.2d at 1152; Evans, 725 So.2d at 677; Walls, 722 So.2d at 571; Duplantis, 708 So.2d at 1345; Hunter, 684 So.2d at 630; Green, 631 So.2d at 177. We have likewise held that the presumption is overcome only by showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the judge was biased or unqualified. Upton, 761 So.2d at 172; Norton, 742 So.2d at 131; Collins, 611 So.2d at 901. ¶ 12. Surely, it could not have been intended that the standard for recusal be so stringent as to warrant the criminal law beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof. Quoting Turner, we stated in Collins that [t]o overcome the presumption, the evidence must produce a `reasonable doubt' (about the validity of the presumption). 611 So.2d at 901. However, in the very next paragraph we stated, This presumption may only be overcome by evidence showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the judge was biased or not qualified. Id. (emphasis added). In Norton, we quoted Collins in applying the beyond a reasonable doubt burden. 742 So.2d at 131. Also, in Upton, we cited Bredemeier and Turner as the sources of the beyond a reasonable doubt burden when both of those cases clearly applied the produces a reasonable doubt burden. Upton, 761 So.2d at 172. See Bredemeier, 689 So.2d at 774 (quoting Turner ); Turner, 573 So.2d at 678 (applying must produce a reasonable doubt burden). ¶ 13. The stringent beyond a reasonable doubt burden is, in our opinion, incompatible with the standard of a hypothetical reasonable person knowing all the circumstances. The proper standard is that recusal is required when the evidence produces a reasonable doubt as to the judge's impartiality. The misapplication of the beyond a reasonable doubt burden in the above-discussed cases was nothing more than a minor oversight and would have led to the same conclusion. We now clarify the burden of proof from what was previously stated in Upton, Norton, and Collins. ¶ 14. In our opinion, a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances here would have a reasonable doubt regarding Judge Harkey's impartiality in this case. James Heidelberg, a Colingo Williams partner, served as treasurer in Judge Harkey's election campaign. Another Colingo Williams lawyer served as attorney of record in the estate proceedings of Judge Harkey's mother. Other Colingo Williams lawyers represented Judge Harkey and his wife for four years in a defective residential construction case. At no time was Judge Harkey or his wife charged for the services rendered in the residential construction case. Judge Harkey also recused himself in the Wesley v. Jackson County Bd. of Supervisors case when it was disclosed that Heidelberg served as Harkey's campaign treasurer. Judge Harkey also met with Heidelberg at the Colingo Williams law office to discuss the issue of recusal in that case. At that meeting, remarks were made by Colingo concerning future campaign contributions although both sides strenuously contest the exact meaning and tenor of those remarks. Similar remarks were also made at another meeting attended by Colingo Williams lawyers and plaintiff's counsel in another case. What is compelling about Judge Harkey's recusal in Wesley v. Jackson County Bd. of Supervisors is at the time he recused himself from that case, he had taken Dodson's case under advisement and had not yet rendered a decision. When viewed as a whole, an objective reasonable person knowing all of these circumstances would harbor doubts as to Judge Harkey's impartiality in this case. ¶ 15. Justice Banks's concurring opinion in Collins v. Joshi 611 So.2d 898 (Miss. 1992), supports this position. In Collins, the trial judge had represented the trustees of Neshoba County General Hospital, one of the defendants in the subject suit, for four years. 611 So.2d at 900. Neshoba General hired Dr. Joshi, another defendant, during the judge's representation of the hospital. Id. The judge had also sued Dr. Soriano, the plaintiff's expert witness, on behalf of the hospital. Id. The majority concluded that the judge should have recused himself. Justice Banks wrote separately and stated, In my view, while none of the factors standing alone would necessarily dictate recusal in the instant case, in combination they create reasonable doubt as to impartiality.... Id. at 903. He also found a totality of circumstances which compel the conclusion that `a reasonable person might harbor doubts' about the judge's impartiality. Id. (emphasis added). That same totality of circumstances inquiry is appropriate in this case, and a reasonable person, not a lawyer or judge, might very well have harbored the same doubts about Judge Harkey's impartiality in this case. ¶ 16. We are in no way questioning the integrity of Judge Harkey who has earned an outstanding reputation over his many years of public service. We likewise do not question the motive or integrity of the lawyers of Colingo Williams. But, we must be forever mindful of our duty to guard jealously the public's confidence in the judicial process. Id. (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988)). We must be vigilant to avoid the appearance of impropriety in any and all of our proceedings as judges. See Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2. Judge Harkey should have granted Dodson's motion to alter or amend and recused himself.