Opinion ID: 202647
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Elements of a Takings Violation

Text: 69 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. V. Takings claims involve a two-step inquiry. To make a cognizable claim of a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, the plaintiffs must first show that they possess a recognized property interest which may be protected by the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs must point to credible sources for their claimed property interest . . . `such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.' Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 973 (1st Cir.1993) (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)); see also Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Employees' Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 58 (1st Cir.1999) ([P]laintiffs must first establish an independent property right before they can argue that the state has taken that right without just compensation.). 70 Assuming that the plaintiff can establish a constitutionally protected property interest, the plaintiff must next show that the challenged action cause[d] an illegal taking of th[at] interest[]. Wash. Legal Found., 993 F.2d at 974. The Supreme Court has recognized two types of takings: physical takings and regulatory takings. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 233, 123 S.Ct. 1406, 155 L.Ed.2d 376 (2003). As already noted, the JUA asserts a physical taking, and we therefore confine our analysis to that strand of takings law. 29 71 A physical taking occurs either when there is a condemnation or a physical appropriation of property. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir.2002) (en banc). Physical takings challenges involve[] the straightforward application of per se rules, which means that [w]hen the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322, 122 S.Ct. 1465, 152 L.Ed.2d 517 (2002); see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876 (2005) (The paradigmatic taking requiring just compensation is a direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private property.). Temporary [physical] takings . . . are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 318, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987) (quotation marks omitted). 72 For purposes of satisfying the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the JUA need not prove the taking of a constitutionally protected property interest; it need only allege such a taking. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (stating that the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis is satisfied where a constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established); Mihos v. Swift, 358 F.3d 91, 98 (1st Cir. 2004) (For a plaintiff to overcome a qualified immunity defense, he must show that his allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation....). In accordance with our two-step approach to takings claims, the JUA must first allege a constitutionally protected property right to the funds in dispute. The JUA argues that, pursuant to Law 253 and the 2002 Amendment, [t]he premiums collected and withheld by [Flores Galarza], the interest derived from the withheld premiums, and the Overstated Reserve Funds and Out-of-Pocket Funds—are the private property of the [JUA]. Second, the JUA must allege a taking of that property. The JUA argues that Flores Galarza's appropriation of the funds in dispute is equivalent to a permanent physical occupation and a per se taking for which just compensation must be paid. 73 Flores Galarza, on the other hand, argues that the JUA's takings claim fails both prongs of the takings analysis. According to Flores Galarza, the JUA cannot establish that it has a recognizable property interest in any of the funds in dispute or that Flores Galarza's appropriation of these funds constitutes a taking. 74 Taking all facts in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, as we must at this threshold stage of the qualified immunity analysis, Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, we find that the JUA alleges the taking of a constitutionally protected property interest in most, but not all, of the funds in dispute under Law 253 and the 2002 Amendment.