Opinion ID: 854301
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The ALJ’s Standard

Text: Bechtel’s central argument on appeal is that, even after the ARB remanded the case, the ALJ persisted in applying an erroneous legal standard. He argues that, for this reason, the ARB’s second and final decision, affirming the ALJ’s determination, ought to be reversed. In the words of the ARB, the ALJ’s second decision “is not easily deciphered.” Bechtel, 2011 WL 4889269, at . In that decision, the ALJ, relying upon the ARB’s 2008 remand order, stated clearly and accurately the correct legal framework for evaluating a claim under § 1514A. See Joint App’x at 114. Unfortunately, the ALJ then proceeded to make further elaborations. She explained that until the employee meets his or her burden of proof, the employer “need only articulate a legitimate business reason for its action.” Id. According to the ALJ, if the employer presents evidence of a legitimate reason for the adverse action, the employee may prevail by proving “by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s articulated legitimate reason is pretext for discrimination,” id.—apparently an alternative to proving the four elements of the complainant’s prima facie case, as required under the statute and relevant regulations. If the employee proves pretext, the ALJ asserted, the employer may avoid liability by presenting clear and convincing evidence that it had a nondiscriminatory justification for the adverse employment action. Id. In other words, the ALJ seems to have thought that, in addition to the framework specified by the statute and regulations, there existed a second burden-shifting system that applied when the complainant failed to prove a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. The ALJ’s alternative burden-shifting scheme has no basis in any relevant law or regulation, and is simply incorrect. See note 4, ante. Indeed, the ARB observed as much. Bechtel, 2011 WL 4889269, at  & n.91. As noted above, Bechtel’s sole burden was to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his protected activity contributed to the adverse employment action. If he had 8 successfully made such a showing, the burden would then have shifted to CTI to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken the same action absent Bechtel’s protected activity. The ALJ’s error is beside the point, however, because the ARB recognized that error and explained why it did not affect the outcome of the case. Cf. Nat’l Assoc. of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 659 (“The federal courts ordinarily are empowered to review only an agency’s final action, see 5 U.S.C. § 704, and the fact that a preliminary determination by a local agency representative is later overruled at a higher level within the agency does not render the decisionmaking process arbitrary and capricious.”). In particular, the ARB concluded, relying on the evidentiary findings of the ALJ, that Bechtel had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse employment action. Bechtel, 2011 WL 4889269, at –10. Because Bechtel’s failure to prove this element was a sufficient reason to rule against his claim, the ALJ’s legal error with respect to an additional aspect of his claim is immaterial.6 In these circumstances, there was no need for the ARB to remand a second time to the ALJ when the correct outcome was clear. Indeed, the Administrative Procedure Act itself includes “the same kind of ‘harmless-error’ rule that courts ordinarily apply in civil cases.” Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 406 (2009); see 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“[A] court shall review the whole record . . . and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error”); cf. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 338 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[A]n error does not require a remand if the remand would be pointless because it is clear that the agency would adhere to its prior decision in the absence of error.”). The ARB did not, therefore, act arbitrarily or capriciously, or abuse its discretion, in finding that the ALJ’s error was harmless and in affirming the dismissal of the complaint. 6 It is worth noting that the ALJ’s determination that Bechtel had failed to prove that CTI’s asserted business reason for the adverse action was pretextual, while beside the point, only underscores the conclusion by the ALJ and ARB that Bechtel did not carry his burden of proving that his protected activity was a contributing factor in his discharge. 9