Opinion ID: 3170010
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: evidence of prior suicidal events

Text: In order to bolster his theory that Vashti's death was a suicide, Seacat sought to testify that she had attempted or contemplated suicide on five prior occasions. The State filed a pretrial motion seeking exclusion of testimony about prior suicide attempts. At a motions hearing, the district court held that the previous suicide incidents were too remote in time to be relevant to the defense. Seacat argues on appeal that the district court erred to the prejudice of his defense when it excluded evidence of those incidents. When a criminal defendant claims that a district court interfered with his or her constitutional right to present a defense, this court reviews the issue de novo. State v. 20 Roeder, 300 Kan. 901, 927, 336 P.3d 831 (2014). In State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 138-40, 119 P.3d 1148 (2005), this court analyzed a mixed issue of admissibility both for abuse of discretion and de novo for violation of a constitutional right. Under either standard, we find no error. A defendant's right to present evidence in support of a defense is subject to certain restraints: the evidence must be relevant, and evidentiary rules governing admission and exclusion of evidence are applied. Roeder, 300 Kan. at 927. While the exclusion of evidence that forms an integral part of the defendant's theory of the case can violate the defendant's right to a fair trial, the defendant's right to present a defense is subject to the rules of evidence and caselaw on the subject. State v. Bridges, 297 Kan. 989, Syl. ¶¶ 2, 3, 306 P.3d 244 (2013). The district court granted the State's motion to exclude evidence of the oldest suicide ideations, in part because they were too remote in time to be relevant at all and in part because there was no independent verification of those incidents or objective proof of them. The court provisionally denied introduction of alleged 2007 and 2008 incidents, subject to further proffers by Seacat. In a subsequent order, the court concluded that the 2007 and 2008 incidents were too remote in time and the evidence was too tenuous to support the conclusion that Vashti was disposed to commit suicide on April 30, 2011. In State v. Baker, 281 Kan. 997, 135 P.3d 1098 (2006), this court considered a situation in which the victim had been on a suicide watch approximately 3 years before his death. The court reasoned: The security guard's testimony regarding Gerard's state of mind approximately 3 years before his death is too remote or tenuous to establish Gerard's state of mind at the time of 21 his death. Gerard had experienced a major change in his life since the security guard had observed him. Gerard had gotten married and moved out of the assisted care center into his wife's home. The security guard did not maintain contact with Gerard and could not testify about Gerard's state of mind at the time of his death. Because the security guard's testimony did not address Gerard's state of mind at or near the time of his death, we conclude that the testimony was not relevant to prove that Gerard was suicidal on the day he died. The trial court properly excluded the testimony from the security guard because it was irrelevant. (Emphasis added.) 281 Kan. at 1009. In State v. Drach, 268 Kan. 636, 1 P.3d 864 (2000), this court considered a similar case in which the defense argued that a death was the result of suicide, not murder. This court held: In prosecutions for homicide a deceased's declarations or threats indicating a suicidal disposition, if made within a reasonable time before his or her death, are not within the hearsay rule and are admissible unless the facts preclude the possibility of suicide. (Emphasis added.) 268 Kan. 636, Syl. ¶ 1. To be sure, Kansas law favors the admission of otherwise relevant evidence, and the exclusion of relevant evidence is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly. State v. Carr, 300 Kan. 1, 214, 331 P.3d 544 (2014). The evidence at issue here, however, is of such dubious relevance that it would not have aided the jury in reaching a verdict. The Baker and Drach courts held that antiquated suicidal behavior was not relevant to proving a suicidal state of mind. See Baker, 281 Kan. at 1009; Drach, 268 Kan. 636, Syl. ¶ 1. In the present case, Seacat would use purported suicidal ideations that were at least 3 years in the past to contest the abundant evidence presented by the State showing that Vashti's state of mind had improved dramatically over the course of the last year, that she was looking forward to her future and was making plans about which she 22 was excited, and that she explicitly stated, close to the time of her death, that she would not consider suicide because of her religious convictions and because of her concern for her children. Excluding evidence of past suicidal events did not prevent Seacat from testifying about Vashti's state of mind around the time of her death. He testified that she was depressed and that she asked him questions about how one might commit suicide using a firearm. This evidence was not excluded, because it was relevant to her current state of mind. It served to rebut the State's evidence showing that Vashti was optimistic, upbeat, and opposed to suicide in the months preceding her death. Seacat was not precluded from asserting his defense theory. Relevant evidence must be both probative and material. Whether evidence is probative is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. The trial court reasonably determined that Seacat's testimony regarding Vashti's prior suicide events was not probative because her past mental condition was not at issue. In light of Baker and Drach, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding that evidence. III. EVIDENCE THAT THE HORMONE HCG MAY INDUCE DEPRESSION Seacat sought to introduce evidence that a hormone that Vashti may have been taking had a side effect of depression. The district court refused to admit that testimony. Seacat contends on appeal that the exclusion of the medical opinion evidence was erroneous and it was prejudicial to his theory that Vashti's death was a suicide. The admission of expert testimony is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. In re Care & Treatment of Girard, 296 Kan. 372, 376, 294 P.3d 236 (2013). This standard is applied specifically with regard to the exclusion of expert 23 testimony relating to depression. State v. Bridges, 297 Kan. 989, 996, 306 P.3d 244 (2013). Several witnesses testified that Vashti had used a hormone called human chorionic gonadotropin (HCG) as part of a regimen through which she lost a significant amount of weight. Those witnesses did not testify about when she last took the hormone, the frequency with which she took it, or the dosage that she was ingesting. Seacat sought to introduce testimony through two different physicians that the Physicians' Desk Reference Manual (PDR) indicated that depression was a possible side effect of the hormone. The defense theory was that Vashti was depressed and committed suicide, and testimony regarding the hormone's side effect was intended to bolster Seacat's case by suggesting to the jury that it was likely that her use of the hormone made it more likely that she would be depressed. Seacat proffered evidence to the trial court that Vashti had prescriptions for the hormone during the year before her death. He was not able to demonstrate, however, what the frequency and the dosage was, or how close in time to her death her last use was. At the pretrial motion in limine, the trial court provisionally ordered that testimony relating to the hormone use or its possible depressive effects would be admitted, subject to the conditions that the defense lay appropriate factual foundations and provide relevant medical testimony. At trial, Seacat attempted to obtain testimony from the coroner during crossexamination that the PDR is a source on which physicians rely and that the PDR notes that depression can be a side-effect of the hormone that Vashti had received as a prescribed drug during the year before her death. 24 The court allowed an examination of the coroner outside the presence of the jury and then ruled that Seacat's line of questioning was improper. The court noted that the coroner had no expertise in endocrinology, had no specific expertise in the effects of the hormone, and had no information about Vashti's history of depression or moods. The court further noted that Seacat had provided no proof that Vashti actually used the hormones or when that usage might have taken place and had provided no link between the hormone's possible side effect and Vashti's actual mental state. The court then held the testimony inadmissible as irrelevant and not specific with respect to the coroner's findings about Vashti's death. The court informed Seacat's attorney that it would consider allowing evidence regarding the side effects of the hormone only if the defense provided an expert who would be qualified to testify about the specific effects of the hormone on Vashti. The court concluded, Without you telling me that there's a significant medical likelihood that she was on it and that it potentiated or exacerbated the alleged depression six months earlier, it's not coming in. Seacat did not comply with the court's conditions for admitting the evidence. He proffered no additional proof of what amount she might have used or how recently she might have used it. He also did not seek the testimony of an expert who would have been able to give the jury useful information about the likelihood that the hormone would have induced suicidal depression under the circumstances of Vashti's use. The only authority that Seacat sought to invoke at trial was the PDR. In Crooks v. Greene, 12 Kan. App. 2d 62, 736 P.2d 78 (1987), our Court of Appeals determined that the PDR was insufficient, standing alone and without supporting expert testimony, to establish consequences resulting from the ingestion of pharmaceuticals. We agree. 25 Speculative evidence is inadmissible. State v. Bornholdt, 261 Kan. 644, 666-67, 932 P.2d 964 (1997). A trial court has the responsibility of ensuring that speculative and problematical evidence does not reach the jury. Butler v. Westgate State Bank, 226 Kan. 581, 582-83, 602 P.2d 1276 (1979); see State v. Berriozabal, 291 Kan. 568, 588, 243 P.3d 352 (2010) (evidence of victim's prior sexual abuse was too vague, speculative, and uncorroborated to be probative; district court did not abuse discretion in excluding it); State v. Tyler, 251 Kan. 616, 631-32, 840 P.2d 413 (1992) (evidence of defendant's dreams too speculative to be admitted to show defendant's state of mind). The evidence of Vashti's hormone use and its effects on her mood was so lacking in foundation that it must be regarded as exceptionally speculative. Exclusion of the evidence did not constitute abuse of discretion by the trial court.