Opinion ID: 1593623
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Gender-based Batson Claim

Text: After overruling the Plaintiff's first Batson objection, the trial court excused Ms. Sneed, who had been peremptorily challenged by the Defendants, and one venireperson challenged by the Plaintiff. With twelve jurors selected, the trial judge then called for a short recess. When the proceedings resumed, the Plaintiff's counsel made a second Batson challenge as follows: Plaintiff's Counsel: Your Honor, at this point I would renew my motion as to my previous Batson challenge as to the voir dire of this jury selection process by the defendant. I would say to the Court, out of the seven, I believe seven challenges that were issued, either all but one were females that they challenged during the peremptory challenges, and I would say on that basis there has been as a result a process of eliminating females from the jury systematically by the defendants in this case. Not necessarily African females. In retrospect, all females. So I would say the record speaks for itself. I would state to the Court out of the, I believe the number is seven that were challenged. I believe the only male they informed me of was Mr. Smith, who was a male. Aside from that, Your Honor, at this point I would move for, I don't know if the term is mistrial or have this jury dismissed, have a new jury empaneled to properly pick a jury which is a cross-section of the community including males and females, not purely a male-dominated jury involved in a case in which we have a female plaintiff alleging complications or a misdiagnosis of breast cancer, which will eventually lead to death. That's my basis, Your Honor. I would ask the Court to dismiss this jury and to reconvene the jury panel and select another jury to proceed to trial. The Court: I guess for the record I should say that there are currently four females and seven males empaneled. Does the defendant have any response? Defense Counsel: Well, I'm glad, Your Honor, that the Batson challenge has been I guess removed as far as race, and we did strike at least one male that I have notes on. We certainly were not that wasn't the determining factor. If the Court wants me to go back through each and every challenge, I think I can refer to my notes and come up with that. But we do have four female jurors on this jury. And we went through the same process [the Plaintiff's counsel] did. And I don't go back and take a look at his challenges, if they were all men or not. But we had a fair representation of the community here, and there was no systematic [sic] for race or sex factor, just all based on experience and body mechanics. The Court: I guess for the record the plaintiff exercised all four challenges, and they were all male. [6] Plaintiff's Counsel: Thank you, Your Honor. The Court: Okay. Is there anything else? Plaintiff's Counsel: No, Your Honor. The Court: Are you serious about your motion for a mistrial and to reconvene at another term? The case was set at this term after a continuance of a couple of weeks at your request due to the medical condition of your plaintiff. Plaintiff's Counsel: Yes, sir. The Court: Okay. If there is nothing else, we'll proceed. In J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. at 129, 114 S.Ct. 1419, the Court held that gender discrimination in the jury selection process also violates the Equal Protection Clause. The Court elaborated: Equal opportunity to participate in the fair administration of justice is fundamental to our democratic system. It not only furthers the goals of the jury system. It reaffirms the promise of equality under the lawthat all citizens, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender, have the chance to take part directly in our democracy. When persons are excluded from participation in our democratic processes solely because of race or gender, this promise of equality dims, and the integrity of our judicial system is jeopardized. Id. at 145-46, 114 S.Ct. 1419 (internal citation omitted). The Court stated that the analysis it had developed in Batson should also be applied to claims of gender discrimination in jury selection. Id. at 144-45, 114 S.Ct. 1419; Hugueley, 185 S.W.3d at 376. In this case, the trial judge did not explicitly find that the Plaintiff had established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. However, we conclude that the trial court did implicitly make that determination, given the fact that the trial court asked the Defendants to respond to the Plaintiff's Batson objection. See Woodson, 916 S.W.2d at 905 (While the procedure used by the trial judge created difficulties, we must conclude that the trial judge determined that a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination had been established. Otherwise, the court would not have required defendants to explain the challenge.). The trial court also failed to make a finding of whether the Plaintiff carried her burden of proving a discriminatory motive by the Defendants. Because the trial court empaneled the jury and allowed the trial to proceed after the Plaintiff's objection, we conclude that the trial court found the Defendants had provided a gender-neutral reason for their challenges. However, we stress again the importance of the trial court making detailed findings for the record; doing so would have clarified the basis for the trial court's implicit rulings in this case and simplified the review process on appeal. When asked to respond to the Plaintiff's Batson challenge, the Defendants denied any discriminatory motive in exercising their peremptory challenges, then stated that the challenges were all based on experience and body mechanics. As we discussed in the previous section, a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination may not be rebutted by a mere assertion of good faith or denial of a discriminatory purpose. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Thus, we are left to decide whether the trial court erred by concluding that experience and body mechanics were sufficient reasons under Batson to exercise peremptory challenges of six women on the venire. As an initial matter, we note that in order to meet the requirements of Batson , a race- or genderneutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge must be clear, reasonably specific, legitimate, and related to the particular case being tried. See id. Here, the record does not indicate whether the Defendants were referring to the experiences of particular jurors or the trial experiences of counsel when they gave experience as one of the justifications for challenging the six women who were the basis for the Plaintiff's second Batson objection. Even if we knew which of these two possible meanings the Defendants intended, this reason would still be too vague to justify the exercise of a peremptory challenge. See, e.g., People v. Reynoso, 31 Cal.4th 903, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 769, 74 P.3d 852, 858 (2003) (stating that a trial court should not relieve the opposing party of its burden to offer a neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge by readily accepting vague explanations). This leaves us to determine whether body mechanics is a sufficient reason under Batson to justify the Defendants' peremptory challenges of six women on the venire. We are aware that lawyers routinely take note of a venireperson's body language during voir dire and use that as a factor in exercising a peremptory challenge. See, e.g., Barfield v. Orange County, 911 F.2d 644, 646 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Ruiz, 894 F.2d 501, 506 (2d Cir.1990); State v. Seals, 684 So.2d 368, 375 (La.1996); State v. Carroll, 34 S.W.3d 317, 319 (Tenn.Crim.App.2000); State v. Butler, 795 S.W.2d 680, 687 n. 4 (Tenn.Crim.App.1990) (citing State v. Hood, 245 Kan. 367, 780 P.2d 160, 166 (1989)). However, in order to avoid a Batson violation, it is important that counsel specifically state the particular body language that forms the basis for a peremptory challenge: An impression of the conduct and demeanor of a prospective juror during the voir dire may provide a legitimate basis for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. The fact that a prosecutor's explanations in the face of a Batson inquiry are founded on these impressions does not make them unacceptable if they are sufficiently specific to provide a basis upon which to evaluate their legitimacy. Yet, because such after-the-fact rationalizations are susceptible to abuse, a prosecutor's reason for discharge bottomed on demeanor evidence deserves particularly careful scrutiny. Prosecutors would be well advisedwhen contemplating striking a juror for reasons of demeanorto make contemporaneous notes as to the specific behavior on the prospective juror's part that renders such person unsuitable for service on a particular case. Brown v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir.1992) (citing United States v. Sherrills, 929 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir.1991)). Although observations of a juror's body language may prompt a peremptory challenge, a trial court should evaluate such reasons thoroughly. Courts of this state and other jurisdictions have recognized that neutral explanations that are based on subjective assessments, such as the juror's demeanor, must be carefully scrutinized. State v. Scott, No. W2002-01324-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 21644414, at  (Tenn.Crim.App. July 8, 2003) (citing Jenkins, 52 F.3d at 746). See also Sherrills, 929 F.2d at 395. In State v. Hood , which has been cited with approval by our Court of Criminal Appeals, the Supreme Court of Kansas stated as follows regarding body language as a basis for peremptorily challenging a potential juror: Hostility toward the prosecution, as evidenced by oral responses, tone of voice, sitting with arms crossed, leaning forward when defense counsel conducts voir dire, or leaning back while the prosecution asks questions, is a matter which the trial court may take into consideration in determining whether the prosecutor has a valid and neutral reason for striking the juror. . . . Again, however, the trial judge must be particularly sensitive when body language, alone, is advanced as a reason for striking a juror. . . . 780 P.2d at 166. Courts have accepted a wide variety of body-language-related reasons for striking a juror from the venire, finding that they satisfied the requirements of Batson . See, e.g., Jenkins, 52 F.3d at 745 (challenged jurors scowled at government attorneys and agents during voir dire and their body language and facial expressions indicated disinterest in the proceedings); Barfield, 911 F.2d at 648 (juror displayed hostile facial expressions during voir dire); Ruiz, 894 F.2d at 506 (juror made facial expressions during voir dire suggesting that she really did not want to sit [on the jury] (internal quotation marks omitted)); Carpenter v. Michigan, No. 1:06-CV-500, 2006 WL 3446564, at  (W.D.Mich. Nov.28, 2006) (juror was evasive when answering questions, sat with arms crossed, and [h]er whole body language told [the attorney] she didn't want to be here); Carroll, 34 S.W.3d at 319 (juror was non-assertive and failed to make eye contact). [7] However, the Defendants' reliance on body mechanics as a reason for striking six of the ten women in the venire differs markedly from the explanations that have been found acceptable under Batson . The Defendants failed to describe particular displays of body languagesuch as scowling at the attorneys, failing to make eye contact, falling asleep during voir dire, and so forththat provided the basis for excusing the female jurors. As we have already noted, in order to satisfy the requirements of Batson , an attorney's justification for exercising a peremptory challenge must be clear, reasonably specific, legitimate, and related to the particular case being tried. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The Defendants' explanation in this case does not meet that standard. Therefore, we find that the trial court erred in overruling the Plaintiff's second gender-based Batson objection. Our rulings on the Plaintiff's Batson objections necessitate our remand of this case for a new trial. Tenn. R.App. P. 13(b) (2006); see also State v. Spratt, 31 S.W.3d 587, 598 (Tenn.Crim.App.2000). Therefore, we need not address the Plaintiff's remaining four issues on appeal.
By virtue of the United States Constitution and Tennessee law, Ms. Zakour was entitled to a fair and impartial jury to try her casea jury selected without regard to race or gender. After careful review, we find that she was denied this fundamental right when the trial court erroneously overruled her counsel's Batson objections during voir dire. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial. All costs of appeal are taxed against the Defendants, UT Medical Group, Inc., and Scott Craig, M.D., and their sureties, for which execution may issue if necessary.