Opinion ID: 1735196
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Andersons' and IMT's Appeal (the Reillys Join): Whether Naughton is Jointly and Severally Liable.

Text: Because the court's decision was based on the interpretation of a statute, we review the court's refusal to enter judgment against the Andersons and Naughton jointly and severally for correction of errors at law. See In re Detention of Cubbage, 671 N.W.2d 442, 444 (Iowa 2003) (Our review of the district court's construction and interpretation of the statute is for correction of errors at law. (citing In re Detention of Swanson, 668 N.W.2d 570, 575 (Iowa 2003))). Similarly, [o]ur scope of review on objections to [jury] instructions is on assigned error. State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 1997).
Naughton first argues error was not preserved on this issue because IMT and Anderson failed to object to jury instruction No. 24. That instruction read, If you assign to a Defendant less than fifty percent of the total fault, that Defendant will only be liable to the extent of the percentage of fault assigned by you. Naughton claims the appellants' argument in favor of joint and several liability is essentially an argument against instruction No. 24 because Naughton was not found fifty percent or more at fault. Therefore, Naughton claims this objection was not preserved for appeal because neither IMT nor Anderson objected to instruction No. 24. As such, Naughton argues, it became the law of the case. State v. Taggart, 430 N.W.2d 423, 425 (Iowa 1988) (Failure to timely object to an instruction not only waives the right to assert error on appeal, but also `the instruction, right or wrong, becomes the law of the case.' (quoting Froman v. Perrin, 213 N.W.2d 684, 689 (Iowa 1973))). Even assuming the appellants' claim for joint and several liability is really an objection to instruction No. 24, we believe the appellants sufficiently objected to that instruction so that error was preserved and instruction No. 24 did not become the law of the case. To properly preserve error, the appellants must have specif[ied] the subject and grounds of the objection. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d at 8 (citing State v. Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Iowa 1995)). Furthermore, the objection must [have] be[en] sufficiently specific to alert the district court to the basis for the complaint so that if there is error the court can correct it before submitting the case to the jury. Id. Otherwise, [a] party's general objection to an instruction preserves nothing for review. Id. It is true the Andersons and IMT did not specifically object to instruction No. 24. But they did object to instruction No. 20, and counsel for IMT made the following record at trial when the court heard the parties' objections to jury instructions: I want to be sure that we are not agreeing to the fact that joint liability is not an issue in this cause by our objections to the instructions because I think that the way the court has submitted this issue, that in post-trial motions we will still be able to identify that and can correct it. And I just don't want anything that we're saying about the instructions to preclude a post-trial motion. And what I mean is that if they would find Anderson 40 percent at fault and Naughton 30 percent at fault, the only if the doctrine of joint liability would apply, under the instructions that have been given a post-trial motion could be made where the court would make them jointly and severally liable for that combined fault. And I want to make sure that that issue is preserved by the objections that we've made to these instructions. Counsel for the Reillys and the Andersons joined in these remarks. We believe this is sufficiently specific to alert the district court to the basis for the[ir] complaint. Id. The appellants made known the subject for their complaintthe application of joint and several liability, and also the grounds for their complaintthat joint and several liability could still apply despite the defendants being found less than fifty percent at fault. This is the same argument they make on appeal. Cf. id. (finding the appellant's present contention on appeal, and the arguments in support of it, were not the same as the objections made at trial). Even if the objection was not ideal and defective, it was not an inadequate general objection. See Froman, 213 N.W.2d at 689-90 (To be adequate an objection [to a jury instruction] must advise the court of the basis for complaint and the real criterion is whether the objection alerted the trial court to the claimed error. Even a defective objection may accomplish that purpose.). The objection was adequate and the error was preserved.
All parties save Naughton argue that jury instruction No. 20, because it was based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(b) and our decision in Heick v. Bacon, 561 N.W.2d 45 (Iowa 1997), required the district court to enter judgment against Naughton jointly and severally. Naughton rejects this argument in several ways: (1) the principles allowing imputation of negligence in section 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts are trumped by Iowa's CFA, (2) Iowa courts have not recognized the concept of joint drivers, (3) the Restatement does not require joint and several liability, and (4) the cases from other states that have employed joint and several liability in this area are distinguishable. Finally, Naughton argues that if we disagree with him on this issue, we must grant a new trial rather than ordering the district court to impose joint and several liability upon Naughton. Instruction No. 20 read: Before the Plaintiffs can recover any damages from Alan Naughton, they must first prove all of the following propositions: 1. That Christopher Anderson was negligent in one or more of the following ways: a. In failing to have his vehicle under control, or b. In failing to keep a proper lookout. 2. That Alan Naughton knew that Christopher Anderson would not have control of the vehicle and/or that Christopher Anderson would not keep a proper lookout if Christopher Anderson removed his hands from the steering wheel in order to light the marijuana pipe. 3. That Alan Naughton gave substantial assistance to Christopher Anderson to enable Christopher Anderson to so conduct himself. 4. That Alan Naughton's conduct was a proximate cause of the Plaintiffs' damages. 5. The amount of damage. If the Plaintiffs failed to prove any of these propositions, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover damages from Alan Naughton. If the Plaintiffs did prove all of these propositions, you will consider the defense of comparative fault. . . . As the appellants point out, the district court based this instruction on section 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and our decision in Heick. This section of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, entitled Persons Acting in Concert, reads: For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he (a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him, or (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876, at 315 (1979). In Heick, we specifically referred to paragraph (b) as a theory of recovery for aiding and abetting. 561 N.W.2d at 51; see Ezzone v. Riccardi, 525 N.W.2d 388, 398 (Iowa 1994). A comment to paragraph (b) reads, If the encouragement or assistance is a substantial factor in causing the resulting tort, the one giving it is himself a tortfeasor and is responsible for the consequences of the other's act.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 cmt. d, at 317 (emphasis added); see Heick, 561 N.W.2d at 51-52 (quoting comment d ). Thus, the Restatement (Second) of Torts specifically provides for joint and several liability when the other person gives substantial encouragement or assistance. [3] Because the jury assigned Naughton a percentage of fault and this was the only instruction given governing his fault, the jury must have believed the plaintiffs proved all of the propositions in the instruction. Moreover, instruction No. 20 sets forth all the elements necessary to prove aiding and abetting. Furthermore, we have long recognized concert of actionand the more specific theory of aiding and abettingas a theory of recovery in civil cases. [4] See, e.g., Heick, 561 N.W.2d at 51-52; Schultz v. Enlow, 201 Iowa 1083, 1088, 205 N.W. 972, 974 (1925) (The evidence quite conclusively shows that appellants acted in concert, aiding and abetting each other both in the commission of the alleged assault and in the false imprisonment of appellee.). Thus, the jury found Naughton liable under the principles of aiding and abetting under section 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The jury, however, only found Naughton twenty percent at fault. Under the CFA this presumably means Naughton cannot be jointly and severally liable. See Iowa Code § 668.4 (providing for joint and several liability only when persons are found at least fifty percent at fault). The remaining question, then, is whether Iowa's CFA trumps the theory of liability encompassed in section 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This question has never before been decided by this court. In 1984 the General Assembly enacted Iowa's CFA. See Iowa Code ch. 668. The CFA provides a modified form of comparative fault and replaced the pure comparative fault principles we announced in Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982). See Fox v. Interstate Power Co., 521 N.W.2d 762, 764 (Iowa App. 1994). Under the CFA, a plaintiff cannot recover damages if he or she is more than fifty percent at fault. Iowa Code § 668.3(1). The CFA also provides that joint and several liability attaches only to those personsexcluding the plaintiff, of course who are found fifty percent or more at fault. Id. § 668.4. We have noted that this provision regarding joint and several liability substantially modified its common-law equivalent. See Slager v. HWA Corp., 435 N.W.2d 349, 351 (Iowa 1989). The common law rule regarding joint and several liability allowed a plaintiff to recover the total judgment against any defendant who was liableno matter how much fault was attributable towards him or her. See id. But under Iowa's CFA, this rule is modified so that a defendant is jointly and severally liable for economic damages only when their fault is fifty percent or more. See Iowa Code § 668.4; Slager, 435 N.W.2d at 351; Estate of Pearson v. Interstate Power & Light Co., 700 N.W.2d 333, 348 (Iowa 2005) (Our comparative fault act modified the common-law rule. . . .). Because of changes like this, we have recognized that Iowa's Comparative Fault Act represents a truly comprehensive and far-ranging modification and consolidation of Iowa tort law. Johnson v. Junkmann, 395 N.W.2d 862, 865 (Iowa 1986). Although comprehensive, the plain text of our CFA does not provide the answer to the question before us. This makes it unlike the statute involved in Hurt v. Freeland, 589 N.W.2d 551 (N.D. 1999), which specifically provided joint and several liability for concerted actors. [5] Hurt, 589 N.W.2d at 556-57. Nevertheless, we hold today that our CFA does not extinguish joint and several liability in circumstances such as these. Comment d to section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts specifically requires joint and several liability when the third person gives substantial assistance. Under instruction No. 20, the jury obviously concluded that Naughton gave substantial assistance. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability says [w]hen persons are liable because they acted in concert, all persons are jointly and severally liable for the share of comparative responsibility assigned to each person engaged in concerted activity. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 15, at 128 (2000). Specifically, comment a to this section provides: [T]he rule applies when governing law determines that concerted activity took place. . . . The provision for joint and several liability for persons engaged in concerted action applies regardless of the rule regarding joint and several or several liability for independent negligent tortfeasors in the jurisdiction. . . . [I]n jurisdictions that have modified or abolished joint and several liability, the rule adopted in this Section imposes joint and several liability on all persons engaging in concerted action and, to that extent, supersedes the abolition or modification of joint and several liability. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 15 cmt. a, at 129. In this case the governing lawinstruction No. 20 outlining the elements required for concerted action or aiding and abetting under section 876(b)determined that concerted activity took place. As a result, and despite Iowa's CFA, Naughton is jointly and severally liable for the share of fault attributable to the concerted actors i.e. Anderson and Naughton. [6] We do not believe the legislature's silence regarding concerted action means our CFA meant to override the common law rule regarding concerted action. Other courts have faced similar circumstances and come to the same conclusion. See Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill.2d 512, 230 Ill.Dec. 204, 693 N.E.2d 333, 337 (1998) (holding apportionment statute inapplicable when persons act in concert under section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts); Kesmodel v. Rand, 119 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1145, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 118 (Cal.Ct.App.2004) (holding apportionment statute that eliminated joint and several liability for non-economic damages inapplicable when damages caused by joint tortfeasors who act in concert to cause the plaintiff's harm). Moreover, we have previously created judicial exceptions to the CFA in the areas of intentional torts, dramshop actions, and fraud. See Tratchel v. Essex Group, Inc., 452 N.W.2d 171, 180-81 (Iowa 1990) (noting actions based on fraud, dramshop liability and intentional torts are not mentioned in the CFA, and holding such actions inapplicable to the CFA because, inter alia, had the legislature intended for the [CFA] to cover such actions, it could have easily done so). Of course, our holdings excluding the CFA from these causes of action are fundamentally different from what we hold today regarding concerted action. They are different because the jury may still apply the CFA and apportion fault in cases where concerted action is a theory of recovery. See Slager, 435 N.W.2d at 352 (noting Iowa's Dramshop Act provides the exclusive remedy and [t]hus, no common-law cause of action . . . exists). But if they find concerted action between defendants then each concerted actor is jointly and severally liable for the total responsibility apportioned to concerted actors, despite the fifty percent rule regarding joint and several liability in the CFA. Thus, unlike dramshop, fraud and intentional tort actions, we do not exempt concerted action theories of recovery from the CFA. Instead, we create a judicial exception regarding the applicability of the CFA's joint and several liability provisions where the legislature has not spoken. In this same respect our holding today is fundamentally different from the decisions of the highest courts in Illinois and Maryland. In Woods, the Illinois Supreme Court stated: A determination that a tortfeasor has acted in concert with other individuals establishes a legal relationship with those individuals. By virtue of this relationship, the tortfeasor becomes liable for the actions of those with whom he acted in concert. . . . Thus, while the tortfeasors who act in concert in causing a plaintiff's injury may all engage in some affirmative conduct relating to that injury, the legal relationship which exists among them eliminates the possibility of comparing their conduct for purposes of apportioning liability. Indeed, if an apportionment of liability were permitted, the act of one tortfeasor would no longer be the act of all, and the essence of the doctrine of concerted action would be destroyed. 693 N.E.2d at 337. The court concluded that it is legally impossible to apportion liability among tortfeasors who act in concert. Id. at 337. Because of this they held the comparative negligence statute inapplicable to tortfeasors acting in concert. Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 874 A.2d 919, 953 (2005) (citing Woods, 693 N.E.2d at 337). Maryland's highest court agree[d] with the Illinois Supreme Court and similarly found [t]ortfeasors acting in concert legally are responsible for the tortious actions each commits. In such situations, there is no apportionment of liability between them. Morgan, 874 A.2d at 953. The court cited to Prosser, who stated in cases of concerted action `[t]he jury would not be permitted to apportion the damages.' Id. (quoting William L. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 Cal. L. Rev. 413, 414 (1936)). The court also noted commentary that explained joint and several liability for concerted action as based on the difficulty of apportioning damages. Id. at 414 n. 26 (citing John Henry Wigmore, Joint-Tortfeasors and Severance of Damages; Making the Innocent Party Suffer Without Redress, 17 Ill. L. Rev. 458, 458 (1923); Roy D. Jackson, Jr., Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 Tex. L. Rev. 399, 420-21 (1939)). We agree that apportioning fault among concerted actors is a difficult proposition. We, however, disagree with these courts in their ultimate position that it is legally impossible to apportion liability among concerted actors. This case is demonstrative that it is certainly factually possible: the jury found Naughton and Anderson guilty as concerted actors, and yet apportioned fault between them. Where this remains factually possible, we decline to say it is legally impossible where the legislature has not clearly said it is. Accord Hurt, 589 N.W.2d at 556-57 (quoting a North Dakota statute that allows the jury to apportion fault and yet also allows the court to enter judgment jointly and severally for the combined percentages of fault attributable to concerted actors). In other words, if the legislature had clearly said principles of joint and several liability regarding concerted actors cannot operate in conjunction with our CFA, then we would certainly hold it is legally impossible to apportion liability among concerted actors. However, our legislature has voiced no opinion on the subject other than the directive in section 668.4: In actions brought under this chapter, the rule of joint and several liability shall not apply to defendants who are found to bear less than fifty percent of the total fault assigned to all parties. Iowa Code § 668.4. For reasons we have already discussed, this does not eliminate joint and several liability among concerted actors for their concerted share of responsibility, and it says nothing about the legal impossibility of apportioning liability among concerted actors. We additionally note that our holding makes Naughton and Anderson jointly and severally liable for both economic and non-economic damages. The common law rule providing for joint and several liability among persons acting in concert does not distinguish between economic and non-economic damages. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 15, at 128. While our CFA makes this distinction by providing those found fifty percent or more at fault are only jointly and severally liable for plaintiff's economic damages, it does not change the common law result when persons act in concert. Thus, Naughton and Anderson are jointly and severally liable for Reilly's economic and non-economic damages. See Kesmodel, 119 Cal.App.4th at 1142-45, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 118 (finding apportionment statute that limited defendants to several liability for non-economic damages was inapplicable when persons act in concert, and thus defendants acting in concert are jointly and severally liable for all damages).
Naughton's argument that joint and several liability does not attach because we have not recognized the concept of joint drivers is misplaced. Whether joint and several liability applies in this case, as it relates to Naughton, depends upon whether he was acting in concert with Anderson. Naughton does not have to be a joint driver to be acting in concert. Under jury instruction No. 20, which contained all the elements of concerted action under an aiding and abetting theory, the jury found Naughton guilty. As such, he was acting in concert and joint and several liability applies to the concerted responsibility. Naughton's argument that the Restatement does not require joint and several liability is not only misplaced, but erroneous. Naughton bases his argument on section 17 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, but fails to realize that section 17 only applies to the independent tortious conduct of two or more persons. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 17, at 147. Concerted actors do not commit independent tortious conduct. IMT correctly points out in its brief that section 15 of the Restatement (Third) Torts: Apportionment of Liability requires joint and several liability when persons act in concert. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 15 cmt. a, at 129 (The provision for joint and several liability for persons engaged in concerted action applies regardless of the rule regarding joint and several liability for independent negligent tortfeasors in the jurisdiction.). Finally, Naughton is correct the cases in which other states have recognized joint and several liability for concerted actors are somewhat distinguishable from the present case. Some, for example, dealt with intentional torts, see Kesmodel, 119 Cal.App.4th at 1128, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, and Iowa has explicitly stated the principles of comparative fault do not apply to intentional torts, see Tratchel, 452 N.W.2d at 180-81. Thus, the argument goes, if this were a case of an intentional tort it would be easy to apply joint and several liability because such is the case in intentional tortsIowa's CFA does not apply. The Restatement, however, makes no distinction between intentional and unintentional torts based on concerted action theories of recovery. The relevant inquiry is whether there is concerted action.