Opinion ID: 464799
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Legal Sufficiency of a Policy of Deliberate Indifference

Text: 37 In support of their argument that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the City defendants make essentially two arguments. First, pointing to the ruling in Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037, precluding the imposition of Sec. 1983 liability on a city for the act of a lower echelon employee in the absence of proof of a municipal policy that caused the injury, and to the observation in the Supreme Court's recent decision in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985), that the word 'policy' generally implies a course of action consciously chosen from among various alternatives, id., 105 S.Ct. at 2436 (footnote omitted), they argue that it defies logic and common sense to suggest that a municipality can intentionally pursue a course of negligent supervision since negligence is by definition unintentional. Second, they rely on a footnote in the plurality opinion of Tuttle to argue that a policy that is not itself unconstitutional can never provide the basis for Sec. 1983 liability against a municipality. We find neither argument persuasive. 38 First, Fiacco's theory is not that the City intended to engage in unintentional conduct. Rather it is that the City was knowingly and deliberately indifferent to the possibility that its police officers were wont to use excessive force and that this indifference was demonstrated by the failure of the City defendants to exercise reasonable care in investigating claims of police brutality in order to supervise the officers in the proper use of force. We see no logical flaw in such a hypothesis, and we reject the notion advanced by the City defendants that a municipality may not be held liable under Sec. 1983 on the basis of a policy of deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons within its domain. 39 Nor are we persuaded by the City defendants' suggestion that a municipal policy that is not itself unconstitutional but that merely permits or tolerates unconstitutional acts by city employees cannot be the basis for municipal liability under Sec. 1983. For this argument the City defendants rely on a footnote in the plurality opinion in Tuttle, in which four Justices express[ed] no opinion on whether a policy that itself is not unconstitutional, such as the general 'inadequate training' alleged here, can ever meet the 'policy' requirement of Monell. Id. at 2436 n. 7. Notwithstanding this reservation of view, we think the text of the plurality opinion implies that a policy that is not itself unconstitutional may provide the basis for municipal liability. The question resolved in Tuttle was whether the existence of a policy could be inferred solely from evidence of the occurrence of a single incident, and the Court held that more evidence was required. In reaching this conclusion, the plurality opinion noted the plaintiff's contention that there was in the record additional evidence of an official policy of inadequate training but stated that unfortunately for [plaintiff], the court had instructed the jury that it could infer the existence of such a policy solely from evidence of the occurrence of the single incident, without any additional evidence. Id. at 2435. The implication of the word unfortunately would seem to be that if the jury had not been allowed to infer the existence of the alleged policy--itself not unconstitutional--solely from the occurrence of the single incident, the four Justices who joined this opinion would have upheld the judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Further, in emphasizing that proof of the occurrence of a single incident is not sufficient to establish the existence of an official policy, the plurality opinion went on to state that where the policy relied upon is not itself unconstitutional, considerably more proof than the single incident will be necessary in every case to establish ... the requisite fault on the part of the municipality.... Id. at 2436 (footnote 7 omitted). The concurring opinion in Tuttle indicates that three other Justices would have upheld the judgment for the plaintiff if it had been clear that the jury's finding that there was a policy of inadequate training was based at least in part on the other evidence and not just on the evidence of the occurrence of the single incident there at issue. See id. at 2438 (Brennan, J., concurring). Thus, notwithstanding the plurality's reservation, it is difficult to conclude that the Court would rule that, as a matter of law, a policy that is not itself unconstitutional may not be a premise for municipal liability under Sec. 1983. 40 Nor do we think there is a sound basis for a rule of law that would preclude the premising of municipal liability under Sec. 1983 on any policy that is not itself unconstitutional. A municipality that has the responsibility to keep order and to protect the rights of those within its boundaries to be free from physical violence gives its policemen considerable power to subdue persons who would violate those rights. It cannot responsibly condone police officers' use of that power in a way that is itself lawless. It should not take a laissez-faire attitude toward the violation by its peace officers of the very rights they are supposed to prevent others from violating. A principle that would give a municipality immunity from Sec. 1983 liability for injury caused by its deliberate indifference to its police officers' use of excessive force in violation of constitutional principles would foster the denial--both by policemen and by civilians--of the very rights the city is responsible for safeguarding. See, e.g., Traynor, Lawbreakers, Courts, and Law-Abiders, 41 Cal.St.B.J., 458, 478 (1966) ( 'The great advantage of police compliance with the law is that it helps to create an atmosphere conducive to a community respect for officers of the law that in turn serves to promote their enforcement of the law.' ), quoted in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S.Ct. at 2447 n. 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 41 In sum, we reject the City defendants' contentions that as a matter of logic or law their deliberate indifference, if proven, to the possible use of excessive force by City police officers was insufficient to satisfy the requirement under Sec. 1983 that Fiacco prove that she was injured as a result of a City policy. 42