Opinion ID: 2184913
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: limitations based on time

Text: We must next consider the time limits which the Justice did impose on the officers' right to search. In reviewing this ruling we must bear in mind that, as noted above, the Justice found such limitations implicitly imposed by law rather than expressly by the defendant herself. Since this conclusion represents an erroneous view of the law, we must go further and examine the record for any evidence which would have supported a finding that the defendant herself imposed time limitations which the officers exceeded. In this endeavor, we are unable to find any evidence to justify a finding of any such limitation. In State v. Brochu, supra, we held that the defendant's consent given one day did not extend to the next where, in the intervening period, the consenting party had been arrested and accused of murdering his wife. For several reasons Brochu is inapplicable to the present facts. Most importantly, unlike the defendant in Brochu, Mrs. Koucoules had not been arrested during the interval between her consent and the continuation of the search. It was the supervening factor of arrest which controlled the decision in Brochu, and not the mere lapse of time between the permission and the actions of the police. As we stated there: By nightfall, however, the defendant had ceased to be the husband assisting in the solution of his wife's death and had become the man accused of his wife's murder by poison held under arrest for hearing.       The consent of December 5 in our view should be measured on the morning of the 6th by the status of the defendant as the accused. 237 A.2d at 421. Here, Mrs. Koucoules' ostensible role as the wife assisting in the solution of her husband's death had not changed. She had not been arrested and, on the contrary, had departed from the house with relatives to go wherever she desired. Moreover, in State v. Chapman, 1969, Me., 250 A.2d 203, this Court's opinion points out that in Brochu the police had left the premises after the first search with no intention to return (250 A.2d at 212), which is just the opposite of the case here presented. Here, it cannot be said that the resumption of the search was an after-thought or a completely new and unrelated effort. It would be unrealistic to conclude that the officers, knowing where the gun was, adjourned their investigation with no intention thereafter to continue the interrupted search and take possession of the weapon that same afternoon. Brochu may also be distinguished in that it involved an independent second-day search, while the search in the instant case was a continuous, although temporarily recessed, search executed during the course of a single day during which the police were at all times in complete control of the residence. In People v. Chism, supra, the Michigan Court of Appeals, although holding invalid the search of a residence on a day following the initial consensual search, distinguished the situation where there is a  continuing or subsequent search on the same day . . . 189 N.W.2d 435 (Emphasis added). On further appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court found the second search valid on other grounds, and in reaching its decision, the Court discussed the issue of the scope of the defendant's consent. The Court first noted that the admissibility of evidence seized in the second search depends upon the actual scope of the consent given. The written consent form signed by the defendant authorized `a complete search of my residence. . . to take from my residence any letters, papers, materials or other property which they may desire.' 211 N.W. 2d at 204. After aptly characterizing this consent as broad, the Court said: The officers were merely completing the search which had begun on the previous day. The defendant's consent, under these narrow facts, might be construed to be broad enough to authorize the seizure on October 12, [the next day] but it is unnecessary for this Court to so hold, because it is clear that the wife had the power to consent to, and did consent to, the second search. 211 N.W.2d at 204. Justice Levin, concurring, was of the opinion that the original consent was in fact sufficiently broad to sustain the second seizure which occurred some 30 hours after the consent. 211 N.W.2d at 213. In the present case, it is also unnecessary for this Court to decide, whether the defendant's consent would have been broad enough to sanction a new or continued search on the day following the consent. Here the question is only whether it was broad enough to sanction a search during the afternoon of October 1, within a few hours of the consent itself. We hold that it was. The mere lapse of time between the consent and the search does not require a reaffirmation of the consent as a condition precedent to a lawful search. People v. Fasbinder, 1971, 133 Ill.App.2d 322, 273 N.E.2d 249. Nor does a consent search of extended duration automatically lose its validity at some arbitrary and unspecified hour. See, Steigler v. State, 1971, Del. Supr., 277 A.2d 662 (15 hour search sustained), modified as to death penalty, 408 U.S. 939, 92 S.Ct. 2872, 33 L.Ed.2d 760. [5] In the present case, there is no testimony whatsoever indicating that the defendant expressly or implicitly imposed any temporal limitations on her consent to search. Nor did she withdraw it at any time, and her departure from the residence, coupled with her failure to return for at least several days, supports the view that she was at best apathetic to the continued police presence in her home. Had the police in fact remained for several days, a different question might be presented. As it is, we must hold that their search during the afternoon of October 1 was well within the broad scope of the consent which, by her words and actions, the defendant herself defined. The defendant contends, however, contrary to the express finding of the Justice below, that the defendant's apparent consent to the search of the dwelling was invalid, and, therefore, the fruits of the warrantless search should have been suppressed. The claim of error is articulated in this fashion: (1) the Justice erred in applying a preponderance of the evidence standard to determine that Mrs. Koucoules had the capacity to consent and in concluding therefrom that she in fact consented freely, understandingly and intelligently to the search of her home; (2) in any event the finding of sufficient capacity is clearly erroneous; (3) most of the police testimony was so incredible as to be unworthy of belief as a matter of law; and (4) even if there was a valid consent, nothing seized was seized pursuant thereto.