Opinion ID: 1881490
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statements of Mark Downey.

Text: Appellant asserts that out-of-court statements by Mark Downey, testified to by Sharon Downey and Kim Long, should have been excluded because the statements were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Statements made by a coconspirator after the goal of the conspiracy has been accomplished are not in furtherance of the conspiracy and, thus, are not competent against any other party. Napier v. Commonwealth, Ky., 515 S.W.2d 615, 616 (1974); Thacker v. Commonwealth, 219 Ky. 789, 294 S.W. 491, 492 (1927). Sharon Downey was, herself, a coconspirator, and she testified to statements Mark Downey made to her before and after the commission of the burglary. The defense objection to this testimony was overruled on the basis of the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. KRE 801A(b)(5). In order to fall within this exception, the proponent of the statement must show (1) there was a conspiracy; (2) the defendant was a part of that conspiracy; and (3) the statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Clark, 18 F.3d 1337, 1341 (6th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 852, 115 S.Ct. 152, 130 L.Ed.2d 91 (1994). There is no doubt that there was a conspiracy to burglarize the Fink residence and that Appellant and both Downeys were engaged in that conspiracy. Prior to the commission of the burglary, Mark Downey relayed his plans to Sharon, including the fact that Appellant would be a participant in the burglary. He also told her of an aborted first attempt to burglarize the home and obtained her agreement to drive Appellant, Richard Strode, and himself to the Fink residence in furtherance of the burglary. Thus, Sharon Downey was a coconspirator, and any statements concerning the conspiracy made to her by Mark Downey prior to the completion of the offense were admissible under KRE 801A(b)(5). Much of Sharon's testimony as to events that occurred after the completion of the burglary came from personal observation. For example, she testified that she and the other three conspirators, along with some other people, stayed in Cincinnati, Ohio, for several days and that Appellant was with them during much of that time. Her testimony as to what she observed during that time was competent testimony, not hearsay. KRE 602; Mills v. Commonwealth, Ky., 996 S.W.2d 473 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1083, 120 S.Ct. 1712, 146 L.Ed.2d 513 (2000). She also testified to statements Mark Downey made in the halls of the hotel in Cincinnati, particularly his declaration of I killed the motherfer. Any such statements Mark made to Sharon after the objectives of the conspiracy were accomplished were not made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Napier, supra, at 616; Thacker, supra, 294 S.W. at 492. However, Downey's statement implicated only himself, not Appellant. Therefore, the admission of this statement at Appellant's trial was only harmless error. RCr 9.24. Defense counsel also objected to the testimony of Kim Long, Richard Strode's girlfriend. Long testified to events and conversations that took place at Strode's residence after the crimes were committed. Much of her testimony was based upon personal observation. For example, she saw the perpetrators burn their clothing and divide the money. Since this testimony was based on personal knowledge, not hearsay, it was admissible. KRE 602; Mills, supra . Long also testified to a conversation she had with Mark Downey, Richard Strode and Appellant after the burglary. During that conversation, Appellant admitted kicking Mr. Fink and knocking him out of his chair. He also admitted that he became upset when Mr. Fink kept looking at him. These statements made by Appellant, himself, were admissible as admissions under KRE 801A(b)(1). Long also testified that all three men discussed the details of the burglary and that Mark Downey did most of the talking. Declarations that are simply narratives of what has already occurred are not made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 61 S.W. 735, 739 (1901); Lawson, supra, § 8.30, at 404-05. Although much of what Downey said to Long served only to corroborate other evidence and was, thus, merely cumulative, one statement made by Downey was particularly damaging to Appellant's case. During the course of the above conversation, Mark Downey related to Long that prior to the shooting of the Finks, Appellant told him that he did not want to be there when the victims were shot. As noted, supra, the significance of this statement is that it indicates knowledge from which an intent can be inferred that the Finks would be killed during the course of the burglary. Appellant's statement to Downey arguably was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of the assertion, i.e., that Appellant did not want to be present when the Finks were killed, but only to prove that the statement was made, from which it could be inferred that Appellant intended that the Finks would be killed. See Lawson, supra, § 8.05, at 364-65, discussing the admission of nonhearsay statements tending to prove the state of mind of the declarant. But even if Appellant's statement to Downey had been, e.g., I want you to kill the victims, such would have been admissible as an admission under KRE 801A(b)(1) (party's own statement), KRE 801A(b)(5) (statement of coconspirator), or KRE 803(3) (hearsay exception for statements as to the declarant's then existing state of mind). The real issue here is whether the second layer of hearsay, i.e., Downey's statement to Long, was also admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule so as to satisfy the requirements of KRE 805. When incriminating statements are made in the presence of an accused under circumstances that would normally call for his denial of the statements, and it is clear that the accused understood the statements, yet did not contradict them, the statements are admissible as tacit, or adoptive, admissions. KRE 801A(b)(2); Hodge v. Commonwealth, supra ; Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 366 S.W.2d 902, 905 (1962); Griffith v. Commonwealth, 250 Ky. 506, 63 S.W.2d 594, 596 (1933), overruled on other grounds, Colbert v. Commonwealth, Ky., 306 S.W.2d 825 (1957). Downey's statement was made in Appellant's presence and implicated Appellant as an accomplice to murder. If the statement was incorrect, Appellant could have corrected it. Yet, he remained silent, and, thereby, acquiesced in the statement. Thus, Downey's statement to Long was admissible against Appellant under KRE 801A(b)(2).