Opinion ID: 1711873
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Contract of Adhesion and Reasonable Expectations

Text: Alternatively, Hofmeyer attempts to void the contract arguing it is a contract of adhesion and is subject to the reasonable expectations doctrine. In general, the concept of contracts of adhesion has been addressed primarily within the context of insurance contracts. The determination of whether a contract is a contract of adhesion involves the issue of unconscionability. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Campney, 357 N.W.2d 613, 619 (Iowa 1984). Standardized contracts ... drafted by powerful commercial units and put before individuals on the `accept this or get nothing' basis, are carefully scrutinized by the courts for the purpose of avoiding enforcement of `unconscionable' clauses. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 180 (Iowa 1975) (quoting 6 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1376, at 21 (1963)). However, the contract Hofmeyer signed does not have any of the characteristics of a contract of adhesion. Nothing requires a lawyer to sign this contract. The district court may appoint non-contract attorneys in certain situations. Iowa Code § 13B.9(5). Unlike most insurance contracts, we do not have before us a contract offered on a take it or leave it basis between two parties of unequal bargaining power. The contract was not adhesive. Even if Hofmeyer could successfully argue the contract is adhesive, the reasonable expectations doctrine would not save him. Courts in construing and applying a standardized contract seek to effectuate the reasonable expectations of the average member of the public who accepts it. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211 cmt. e (1979). The doctrine of reasonable expectations will assist Hofmeyer only if the terms of the referenced document are (1) bizarre or oppressive; (2) eviscerate terms explicitly agreed to; or (3) eliminate the dominant purpose of the transaction. Campney, 357 N.W.2d at 620. There is nothing in this contracting circumstance remotely bizarre or oppressive. The travel limitations do not eviscerate terms explicitly agreed to by the parties. Nor does this term eliminate the dominant purpose of the transaction. Hofmeyer desired to be a contract attorney to do courtappointed indigent defense work for the State of Iowa. The dominant purpose of the contract was to provide legal services to people accused of crimes and to pay attorneys for providing those services. The disputed terms of the Iowa Administrative Code only operate to the extent they define the limits of compensation. Hofmeyer may still function as a courtappointed attorney and receive compensation for his services. As such, the terms incorporated by reference do not eviscerate the dominant purpose of the contract. In trying to effectuate the reasonable expectations of a contracting party we will seek to determine if a reasonable person would accept the same contract attorney Hofmeyer signed. The reasonable person presumably understands the consequence of signing a contract and the import of the terms being assenting to. See Cronbaugh v. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 475 N.W.2d 652, 654 (Iowa Ct.App.1991) ([w]here a party to a written contract is able to and has had the opportunity to read the contract, he or she cannot claim later in an attempt to defeat the contract that he or she did not understand the contract terms or conditions); see also Wilmotte & Co. v. Rosenman Bros., 258 N.W.2d 317, 323 (Iowa 1977). Hofmeyer contracted with knowledge of there being terms incorporated by reference. Neither Hofmeyer, nor any reasonable person reading this contract could understand the document to not include the terms of the Iowa Administrative Code as they were clearly reflected within the four corners of the contract. Hofmeyer had no reasonable expectation that would justify the nullification of the terms incorporated by reference. WRIT ANNULLED.