Opinion ID: 402058
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Nature of the Hearing Requirement Under Section 316

Text: 40 The requirement of a public hearing under section 316, see note 5 supra, is the result of an amendment, made on July 16, 1952, to what was formerly section 312(b) of the Communications Act. The amended statute is recorded at Pub.L.No.554-879, 66 Stat. 711, 718 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 316 (1976)). Former section 312(b), as does the present section 316, authorized the FCC to modify a station license; however, section 312(b) provided that 41 No such order or modification shall become final until the holder of such outstanding license or permit shall have been notified in writing of the proposed action and the grounds or reasons therefore and shall have been given reasonable opportunity to show cause why such an order or modification should not issue. 42 Communications Act of 1934, Pub.L.No.416 § 312(b), 48 Stat. 1064, 1087 (1934) (amended 1952) (emphasis added). Thus, in enacting section 316, Congress made explicit the right of a license holder to show cause by public hearing why an order of modification should not issue. Communications Act Amendments, 1952, H.R.Rep.No.1750, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1952). 43 Over the past four decades, the courts have had occasion in a series of cases to construe the statutory show cause requirement with respect to license modifications, first under the former section 312(b) and then under the present section 316. An examination of this case law will help to amplify the nature of the hearing requirement under section 316. 44 The first case of note concerned a claim of an indirect modification, i.e., an extension of the broadcast facilities of one station resulting in objectionable interference to another existing station within its lawfully protected contour. In FCC v. National Broadcasting Company (KOA), 319 U.S. 239, 63 S.Ct. 1035, 87 L.Ed. 1374 (1943), the Supreme Court ruled that such an indirect modification raised a legally cognizable claim under former section 312(b): 45 To alter the rules so as to deprive KOA of what had been assigned to it, and to grant an application which would create interference on the channel given it, was in fact and substance to modify KOA's license. This being so, § 312(b) requires that it be made a party to the proceeding. We can accord no other meaning to the proviso which requires that the holder of the license which is to be modified ... must be given reasonable opportunity to show cause why an order of modification should not issue.... A licensee cannot show cause unless it is offered an opportunity to participate in (a) hearing.... 46 Id. at 245-46, 63 S.Ct. at 1037-38. 47 The Court in KOA left undecided the issue of whether the FCC was required under former section 312(b) to afford a hearing to a party to determine whether in fact an indirect modification would result from a grant of increased or changed facilities to another station. This question was squarely posed and decided in L.B. Wilson, Inc. v. FCC, 170 F.2d 793 (D.C.Cir.1948). There the court ruled that former section 312(b) 48 must be held to contemplate hearings before the Commission on the issue (of) modification vel non of an outstanding license by the granting of facilities to another station. 49 170 F.2d at 803. Thus, even before the passage of the current section 316, providing for a public hearing, this court held in L.B. Wilson that an outstanding licensee must be accorded a hearing on the issue of whether or not the extension of facilities to another station will indirectly modify the outstanding license through objectionable interference. 50 The decision in L.B. Wilson also discussed the possibility of a summary disposition, without a hearing, of a claim of objectionable interference under former section 312(b). The petition for reconsideration in L.B. Wilson raised the issue of objectionable interference. In response, an argument was advanced that, whether or not there was interference, appellant's claim did not cite any objectionable interference within the meaning of the term as prescribed by the Commission's Rules and Standards of Good Engineering Practice. 170 F.2d at 804. The Commission thus contended that it could treat appellant's claim as if upon demurrer and rule on the pleadings as a matter of law. The court in L.B. Wilson found this contention not supportable, and noted that it was out of the ordinary for the Commission, in defense of its denial of hearing to the appellant, to seek refuge in such a common law 'formality' as a demurrer. Id. The court added that: 51 (W)e do not rule that the Commission may not, at the threshold of consideration of an issue (of) modification vel non of an outstanding license by the proposed operations of another station, treat the petition asserting such modification as if upon demurrer and thereby avoid the necessity of hearing proof of the truth of the allegations of objectionable interference if as a matter of law they do not show such interference within the Commission's rules and standards. 52 On the issue presented, however, the court concluded that 53 included within the question of law raised by (appellant's petition for reconsideration) is one of fact, to wit, as to the nature of the measurements or data in the Commission's files, and one of mixed fact and law as to the bearing of this data upon the meaning of the term objectionable interference as used in the Commission's rules and standards. 54 Id. A hearing was thus found to be requisite in order to dispose of appellant's claim of interference. 55 In FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 69 S.Ct. 1097, 93 L.Ed. 1353 (1949), station WJR objected to the grant of a license to a new station on the ground that the new station would cause objectionable interference with the WJR broadcast signal. The applicant station challenged the legal sufficiency of WJR's petition, claiming that WJR had not set forth facts which, if accepted as true, would constitute interference with WJR's normally protected contour. The Commission agreed with the applicant station and denied the WJR petition without oral argument. In upholding the Commission's action, the Court first ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not require that the Commission afford WJR an opportunity for oral argument on its claim of interference. More significantly, however, the Court held that Congress had committed to the Commission's discretion, by the terms of § 312(b) and § 4(j) of the Communications Act, the questions whether and under what circumstances it will allow or require oral argument, except where the Act itself expressly requires it. 337 U.S. at 281, 69 S.Ct. at 1106. Further, the Court ruled that the requirement in former section 312(b) of a reasonable opportunity to show cause was not to be construed as always including an opportunity for oral argument. Id. at 282, 69 S.Ct. at 1106. 56 Thus, for a time, the decision in WJR raised serious questions about whether and under what circumstances a hearing would be required with respect to claims of interference in cases of indirect modification. In 1952, however, after Congress amended section 312(b) and enacted the present section 316, requiring an opportunity ... to show cause by public hearing, many of the questions raised by WJR were put to rest. 57 In 1954, following the passage of section 316 in its present form, this court, in Harbenito Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 218 F.2d 28 (D.C.Cir.1954), reaffirmed the decision in L.B. Wilson, supra, as good law. Id. at 31. The court held, in particular, that if a petition for reconsideration of a construction permit states facts which raise a substantial question as to objectionable interference with an existing license, the petitioner is entitled to a hearing. Id. The court added, however, that the Commission may 58 as a first step, test the validity of the petition as if upon demurrer and, after oral argument, rule upon its sufficiency as a matter of law assuming its allegations to be correct. 59 Id. (emphasis added). 60 In Hecksher v. FCC, 253 F.2d 872 (D.C.Cir.1958), the court adhered to the holding of Harbenito, that the Commission may, as an initial step, subject a petitioner's claims to a test as a matter of law upon oral argument. Id. at 874. The court in Hecksher added that, (i)f it then appears that there are disputes as to material facts, an evidentiary hearing limited to those facts should be ordered. Id. 61 Probably the most significant of the decisions concerning the nature of the hearing requirement under section 316 is National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 362 F.2d 946 (D.C.Cir.1966). In National Broadcasting, the court recognized the cardinal importance of the right to be heard where one's interests are acutely affected by the actions of an administrative agency. Id. at 953. In adhering to the principles enunciated in KOA and L.B. Wilson, the court held that 62 the licensee of a station with a specified frequency and power has a right to participate in an evidentiary hearing under Section 316 where another broadcaster seeks a grant to operate on the same frequency (where the effect of the new grant may be to create objectionable electrical interference to the existing licensee) since this would bring about an indirect modification of the existing licensee's license. 63 Id. at 954-55 (emphasis added). Because the issue of indirect modification in National Broadcasting had been resolved in an earlier clear channel proceeding, the court found that no additional hearing was required under section 316. The court made it clear, however, that but for the prior hearing on the same issue in the clear channel proceeding, the case would have been remanded to the Commission for an evidentiary hearing on the petitioner's claim of indirect modification. 64 In considering the foregoing cases, the following principles emerge regarding the procedural rights due a licensee alleging indirect modification attributable to objectionable interference. First, an existing licensee of a station with a specified frequency has a right to participate in a hearing under section 316 where another broadcaster seeks a grant to operate on the same frequency and where it is alleged that the effect of the new or changed grant may be to create objectionable, electrical interference to the existing licensee. 65 Second, the type of hearing required depends upon the facts of an individual case and the type of question to be resolved. If, for example, the facts are stipulated and the sole issue involves a question of law (such as, whether petitioner's claim falls within any applicable legal definition of objectionable interference), the Commission may rule on the basis of written pleadings and oral argument. If, however, as in the instant case, there are questions of fact to be resolved, then an evidentiary hearing is mandated by section 316. 66 Applying these principles to the facts of the case at bar, the conclusion is inescapable that appellant had a right to an evidentiary hearing on its claim of destructive interference. As noted above, appellant's petition, alleging that the grant of the KSRF application would create objectionable interference, raises a legally cognizable claim of modification under section 316. Since we have found that appellant's claim is not barred either by the Fourth Report and Order (or any other proceeding related to Docket 14185), see notes 6 and 7 supra, or by any existing Commission rule, we hold that appellant was entitled to notice and an opportunity to show cause in an evidentiary hearing why the proposed order of modification should not issue. 67 Nothing in this opinion should be taken to suggest any conclusions concerning the accuracy of appellant's engineering reports or the legitimacy of its claims of destructive interference. We will leave these questions to be resolved by the Commission, in appropriate findings, after an evidentiary hearing on the disputed factual issues. 12 68