Opinion ID: 852089
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard Governing P-C.R. 2 Counsel's Performance

Text: This Court has set out different standards for evaluating the performance of appellate counsel and for evaluating the performance of post-conviction counsel. Appellate counsel's performance, like trial counsel's performance, is governed by the two-part test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). E.g., Miller v. State, 702 N.E.2d 1053, 1058 (Ind.1998). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a defendant must show (1) that appellate counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for appellate counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 1058-59. Effective assistance of appellate counsel is a right rooted in both the federal and state constitutions. See id. at 1058 (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 13). On the other hand, there is no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction, or collateral review, proceedings under either the federal or the state constitution. Graves v. State, 823 N.E.2d 1193, 1196 (Ind.2005). Accordingly, this Court has explicitly declined to apply the well-known standard for trial and appellate counsel. Id. Thus, instead of using the rigorous standard set forth in Strickland, courts instead judge post-conviction counsel by a lesser standard based on due-course-of-law principles. Baum v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1200, 1201 (Ind.1989). When evaluating post-conviction counsel, courts inquire whether counsel in fact appeared and represented the petitioner in a procedurally fair setting which resulted in a judgment of the court. Id. This standard for judging post-conviction counsel, commonly referred to as the  Baum standard, has been applied routinely in the context of counsel's performance during Post-Conviction Rule 1 (P-C.R.1) proceedings. See, e.g., Matheney v. State, 834 N.E.2d 658, 661-63 (Ind.2005); Graves, 823 N.E.2d at 1197; Waters v. State, 574 N.E.2d 911, 912 (Ind.1991). The question remains: which standard Strickland or Baum is appropriate for judging the performance of counsel in conjunction with P-C.R. 2 petitions and proceedings? The answer, unfortunately, is not straightforward as P-C.R. 2 straddles two distinct legal spheres: direct review and collateral review. On one hand, P-C.R. 2 deals with direct appeals of convictions of sentences (albeit belated ones); on the other hand, P-C.R. 2 is grouped with the collateral review rules. In determining which standard applies to the performance of P-C.R. 2 counsel, [2] the Court of Appeals concluded that [b]ecause Hill is seeking post-conviction relief premised upon Attorney Reed's representation, and not his trial counsel's representation, the Baum standard is applicable in this case, not the Strickland standard employed by the post-conviction court. Hill II, slip op. at 5. We agree with the Court of Appeals that P-C.R. 2 counsel's performance should be measured under the Baum, and not Strickland, standard. We write to explain the underlying bases for this conclusion. First, a P-C.R. 2 petition and hearing are distinct from the filings and proceedings on direct appeal. [3] It is true that P-C.R. 2 deals with belated notices of appeals, among other things. P-C.R. 2(1). In fact, once a defendant files a belated notice of appeal following a meritorious P-C.R. 2 petition, the defendant is in the same position as he would have been had he filed a timely notice of appeal. See Gallagher v. State, 274 Ind. 235, 239, 410 N.E.2d 1290, 1292 (1980); see also Gutermuth, 868 N.E.2d at 434 (stating that defendants who filed belated notices of appeal should be neither rewarded nor penalized for their delay). But the focus of P-C.R. 2 is whether a defendant should be granted permission to file a belated notice of appeal, and the trial court inquires into the defendant's lack of fault and his diligence to make that determination. P-C.R. 2(1)(a)(2), (3). The P-C.R. 2 petition or hearing, on the other hand, should not include the underlying merits of the appeal itself. For example, the trial court conducting a P-C.R. 2 hearing would not address a substantive challenge to the defendant's sentencethat issue, if the P-C.R. 2 petition is granted, is left for the appellate court to decide. Notably, this Court has described P-C.R. 2 as a vehicle or avenue to obtain a direct appeal. Howard v. State, 653 N.E.2d 1389, 1390 (Ind.1995). This signifies that although P-C.R. 2 is a means or a way of getting a direct appeal, its proceedings are not equal to those of a direct appeal. See Greer v. State, 685 N.E.2d 700, 702 (Ind.1997) (P-C.R. 2(1) provides a method for seeking permission for belated consideration of appeals. . . . (emphasis added)). Second, this Court's decision in Kling v. State, 837 N.E.2d 502 (Ind.2005), demonstrates that P-C.R. 2 is more of a collateral review, versus direct review, rule. In Kling, this Court addressed the relative roles and responsibilities of County Appellate Public Defenders and the State Public Defender in handling belated appeals of sentences imposed following open pleas. 837 N.E.2d at 504 (emphases omitted). We first noted, as a background matter, that County Appellate Public Defenders represent indigent criminal defendants in direct appeals whereas the State Public Defender handles post-conviction relief. Id. In determining who was responsible for providing representation in P-C.R. 2 proceedings, this Court ultimately decided on the State Public Defender. Id. at 507. Specifically, this Court held that when the State Public Defender is representing a defendant in a P-C.R. 1 proceeding, the State Public Defender shall assess which issues may be raised in a P-C.R. 1 petition and which issues should be raised in a P-C.R. 2 petition and consult with the defendant accordingly. Id. If a person so advised by the State Public Defender decides to seek relief immediately under P-C.R. 2. . ., the State Public Defender should represent the defendant in filing that P-C.R. 2 petition, at any hearing on that petition, and, if relief is denied, in the appeal of that decision. Id. We further held that if a P-C.R. 2 petition is granted, the County Appellate Public Defender then takes over and handles the belated direct appeal. Id. at 508. Thus, P-C.R. 2 proceedings are treated as collateral review, at least in terms of who handles those cases. Finally, the responsibilities required of P-C.R. 2 counsel and direct appellate counsel differ in one very important respect. In Mosley v. State, 908 N.E.2d 599, 608 (Ind.2009), this Court held that in any direct criminal appeal, as a matter of right, counsel must submit an advocate brief. This is true even if counsel regards the defendant's claims as frivolous. Id. In contrast, this Court has held that the State Public Defender does not have to file a P-C.R. 2 petition if he determines that the petition is not meritorious or in the interest of justice. Kling, 837 N.E.2d at 507. We believe that the greater responsibility imposed on direct appellate counsel correlates to the more rigorous Strickland standard governing direct appellate counsel's performance. Likewise, we believe the lesser responsibility of P-C.R. 2 counsel parallels the less cumbersome Baum standard governing collateral review counsel. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the correct standard to judge P-C.R. 2 counsel is under Baum, and not under Strickland. [4]