Opinion ID: 1259709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Infinger, et al. v. Edwards, et al.

Text: This case arises out of the following stipulated facts. Late in 1975, petitions were first circulated calling for a referendum as to the method of election and form of government for Charleston County pursuant to the Home Rule Act. Section 14-3701 (a), Code of Laws (1975 Cum. Supp.). Thereafter the Election Commission contingently set a referendum date, scheduled the requisite public hearings, and established a deadline of May 14, 1976, for receiving petitions. All parties agreed to the deadline due to the required public notices and hearings, and the necessary preliminary preparations attendant to any public election. The petitions were timely tendered. On May 31, 1976, it was discovered that there were insufficient valid signatures to constitute the statutory ten per cent of the electors. [2] Accordingly, the scheduled public meetings and referendum were canceled. On June 9, 1976, additional petitions were submitted but they were not accepted by the Election Commission as the deadline had elapsed. On June 19, 1976, the Election Commission, apprised that the ten per cent required signatures had been verified, decided to institute an action to acquire court approval of a referendum beyond the July 1, 1976, deadline incorporated in the Home Rule Act. [3] The trial court granted an extension of the deadline for the referendum and tentatively set July 20, 1976, as the date for the initial election. That order was superseded by this Court on July 1, 1976. The parties concede that the sole issue raised by this suit is the propriety of the trial court's extension of the July 1, 1976 deadline. [4] We find the trial court was in error and reverse. The Home Rule Act provides in part: Each county, after at least two public hearings which shall have been advertised in a newspaper of general circulation in the county and wherein the alternate forms of government provided for in this chapter are explained by the legislative delegation of the county, may prior to July 1, 1976 conduct a referendum to determine the wishes of the qualified electors as to the form of government to be selected or become subject to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section. The referendum may be called by an act of the General Assembly, resolution of the governing body, or upon petition of not less than ten percent of the registered electors of the county ... Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, unless otherwise determined by referendum prior to July 1, 1976 , the county concerned shall, beginning on that date , have the form of government ... most nearly corresponding to the form in effect in the county immediately prior to that date ... After the initial form, number and composition has been adopted and selected, the adopted form, number and composition shall not be changed for a period of two years from the date such form becomes effective and then only as a result of a referendum as hereinafter provided for ... § 14-3701, Code of Laws (1975 Cum. Supp.) (Emphasis added). There is no constitutional right to a referendum to select a form of county government; the legislative authorization of such a right renders it purely statutory. Duncan v. York , S.C. 228 S.E. (2d) 92 (1976). The statutory right to a referendum was clearly circumscribed by the time allowed to exercise the right. Not only did the legislature contemplate and specifically provide for the contingency of counties not selecting a form of government, it further specified that the initial form could not be changed for a period of two years after its inception. When as here, the statute is plain and unambiguous, it becomes the duty of the court to apply it literally because the legislative design is unmistakable. Martin v. Ellisor , 266 S.C. 377, 381, 223 S.E. (2d) 415, 417 (1976). Henderson v. Evans , S.Ct., 232 S.E. (2d) 331 (Smith's 1977). The right to a referendum expressly existed only if exercised prior to July 1, 1976. The deadline was thus mandatory and jurisdictionally prohibited a judicial extension by the lower court.