Opinion ID: 2184368
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legislative and judicial history of the protected person statute.

Text: IND.CODE § 35-37-4-6 has been amended several times since its enactment in 1984, often in response to judicial decisions. A cursory review of this history reveals that Pierce's argument about the timing of cross-examination is unpersuasive. Until 1990, the statute prescribed only that the protected person attend the hearing and imposed no explicit requirement that the child testify or be subjected to cross-examination at the hearing. In Miller I, we held that cross-examination was nonetheless implicit in the statutory scheme. Miller I, 517 N.E.2d at 72. We reaffirmed this holding a year later in Miller II, where we reiterated that if a pretrial statement of an unavailable child victim is to be used at trial, the defendant and defense counsel must be afforded full right to cross-examine and confront the witness. This would include the opportunity for a physical, immediate, face-to-face confrontation. Miller II, 531 N.E.2d at 470. The Court of Appeals in Shoup v. State, 570 N.E.2d 1298 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) dealt with a question left open by Miller I and Miller II: at what point in the proceeding must this opportunity for confrontation be afforded? In Shoup, the trial court conducted the hearing in two stages, the first dealing with competence and the second with admissibility of the reports of the child's statements. After the State examined the child as to competence the court gave the defendant the same opportunity, but his lawyer declined. The court then declared the child incompetent and held the admissibility stage of the hearing. Shoup held that some time after the court determines that the child is incompetent or unavailable for trial, the defendant must affirmatively be given the opportunity to cross-examine the child concerning the substance of the out-of-court statement or videotape. Id. at 1303. Pierce relies exclusively on Shoup and the Miller decisions to support his argument that he was denied his statutory right of confrontation. Pierce contends the trial court should have affirmatively offered him the chance to cross-examine K.D. after the competency determination. However, Pierce's reliance on Miller I, Miller II and Shoup is misplaced because all these decisions construed a version of the statute that was no longer in effect at the time of Pierce's trial. In 1990, the Legislature deleted the requirement that the child attend the hearing and instead prescribed that evidence could be admitted under the statute only if the unavailable child either testifies at the hearing or was available for cross-examination when the statement was made. See 1990 Ind. Acts, P.L. 37, § 22. The testifies language was changed in 1994 to provide that the child must be available for cross-examination either at the hearing or when the statement or videotape was made. See 1994 Ind. Acts, P.L. 142, § 7 (effective July 1, 1994); codified at IND.CODE § 35-37-4-6(e) (Supp.1994). To the extent Shoup 's reference to an opportunity to cross-examine at some time after the competency determination suggested that confrontation must take place after the combined hearing, that case is no longer good law. The 1994 amendment, which went into effect two months before Pierce's trial began, [12] effectively overruled Shoup in that respect. The statute clearly says the child must be available for cross-examination at the hearing described in subsection (d)(1). IND.CODE § 35-37-4-6(e)(1) (1993 & Supp.1994). This hearing is clearly the admissibility hearing, if separate hearings are conducted, or the combined hearing if that procedure is followed. A combined hearing was held without objection in this case. We do not find a requirement that K.D. should have testified more than once. Multiple examinations of the child are not only not required; they are to be avoided unless necessary: The goal of the statute is to reduce the child's emotional trauma caused by numerous court appearances, not to guarantee that the child will never have to face the defendant. Miller I, 517 N.E.2d at 73. These humanitarian considerations, as well as judicial economy, favor cross-examination of the child when the child takes the stand at the combined hearing, if there is one or at the admissibility hearing if not. If the child does not testify at the hearing, the child must nonetheless be available. Trial courts are of course free to determine the need for and appropriateness of separating the phases of the hearing or of recalling the witness. But the language of the current statute requires no more than one appearance.