Opinion ID: 1351466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Adequacy of the Trial Judge's Findings Under Section 190.4, Subdivision (e)

Text: (56) Defendant next contends the trial judge failed to perform her duty under section 190.4, subdivision (e), because she failed to sufficiently state her reasons for upholding the jury's verdict of death. Under that statute the defendant is deemed to apply automatically for a sentence modification under section 1181, subdivision (7). In ruling on the application the judge must conduct an independent review of the evidence and determine whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, and The judge shall state on the record the reasons for his findings. Failure of the judge to specify the reasons for upholding the jury verdict may be grounds for remanding the case to the judge for reconsideration. ( People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 794.) Here the judge announced her support for the verdict, stating that the court finds the following circumstances in aggravation, which greatly outweigh the circumstances in mitigation and, therefore, denies the request for modification of the verdict imposing the death penalty for the following reasons. The judge then proceeded to describe at some length three aggravating factors she found in the case, and stated there were no factors in mitigation. Defendant now argues that her findings concerning both the aggravating and mitigating factors were inadequate. We disagree. The three aggravating factors found by the trial judge were (1) the circumstances of the crime, an apparent reference to section 190.3, factor (a); (2) defendant's prior felony convictions under section 190.3, factor (c); and (3) the fact that defendant had the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and was not impaired by intoxication. Defendant finds fault with the judge's treatment of the first factor. In support of her finding that the circumstances of the crime were an aggravating factor, the judge recounted at length the facts of the crime as introduced at trial. The findings are not a model of clarity; it would have been preferable for the judge to identify more clearly which circumstances of the crime she found aggravated defendant's culpability. Nonetheless, embedded in the narrative were several circumstances  the evidence of prior sexual molestation of the victim, the brutality of the murder, and the relationship of the victim and the murderer  that supported a finding that the circumstances of the crime did indeed constitute an aggravating factor. The judge committed Davenport error, however, in making her third finding of aggravation. She appears to have treated the absence of a particular mitigating factor as an aggravating factor. As we stated in People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 289, the fact that while committing the crime the defendant did not have a mental impairment within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (h), does not constitute an aggravation of that crime. The absence of mental impairment and lack of intoxication is not a circumstance above and beyond the essential constituents of a crime which increases its guilt or enormity or adds to its injurious consequences. (41 Cal.3d at p. 289.) Nonetheless, as we shall explain, the error was harmless. Defendant also argues it was improper for the judge to conclude there were no factors in mitigation. During the penalty phase of the trial, defendant presented three factors in mitigation: (1) the testimony of correctional authorities that defendant would not be able to escape, (2) the plea of sympathy by his mother, and (3) the lingering doubt that should exist in the minds of the jurors that defendant committed the crime. From our review of the record we conclude that the judge could appropriately find that none of these factors were substantially mitigating. Defendant points some other mitigating factors that he contends made the finding erroneous, i.e., the fact that he surrendered himself to the police, substantial evidence of intoxication at the time he committed the crime, and character evidence such as testimony that he had been a good father prior to the murder. None of these points were presented by defense counsel in mitigation at the penalty phase of the trial, and we therefore need not consider them in determining the validity of the judge's findings. Because there were two substantial aggravating factors  the aggravated circumstances of the crime itself and the prior felony convictions  and little was presented in mitigation, we conclude that the Davenport error ( supra, 41 Cal.3d 247) was nonprejudicial. Even if the judge had not considered defendant's lack of mental impairment as aggravating, there is no reasonable possibility that her ruling on the motion to modify the sentence would have been different.