Opinion ID: 2520201
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: excessiveness of the prejudgment interest award

Text: ¶ 24 Having upheld the trial court's decision to award prejudgment interest, we now decide whether the trial judge erred in denying a new trial or remittitur on the amount of prejudgment interest awarded. Following the jury's verdict, Price attacked the compensatory award under rule 59(a)(5) and (6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, contending that the prejudgment interest component of the compensatory award was excessive and not supported by the evidence presented at trial. Under rule 59(a), a trial judge may grant a new trial or remittitur of damages when, inter alia, there are [e]xcessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice, or there is an [i]nsufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision. Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(5)-(6) (2003); see also Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 802-03 (Utah 1991). ¶ 25 We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a trial judge's decision to grant or deny a new trial or remittitur on the amount of compensatory damages. Crookston, 817 P.2d at 803-05 (distinguishing between the trial court's direct review of a jury's award under rule 59 and the appellate court's subsequent review of the trial court's actions). Under our rule 59, it is well settled that, as a general matter, the trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for a new trial. Id. at 804 (citations omitted). Under this standard of review, we will reverse only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision. Id. at 805. ¶ 26 Through the use of an expert witness, the Smiths presented detailed interest calculations at trial reflecting an interest amount due of $597,221. The interest rate used by the Smiths' accounting expert to calculate the interest due the Smiths was apparently derived from the partnership agreements. See Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2) (2002) (setting the legal interest rate at 10% per annum or, alternatively, any rate agreed upon by the parties). The jury, however, awarded $690,000 in prejudgment interest. [9] Because we find no evidence in the record to support the jury's addition of nearly $100,000 to the figures calculated by the Smiths' expert, we hold that the trial court's denial of remittitur constituted an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we remit the prejudgment interest award to $597,221. [10]