Opinion ID: 1601643
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis of the plaintiffs' defamation claims.

Text: An analysis of the plaintiffs' defamation by implication claims requires an examination of three interlocking factors: the elements of libel under Michigan law, constitutional requirements and principles informing and attenuating Michigan libel law, and the contours of defamation by implication as shaped by the two preceding factors. Our examination of the legal principles of libel law in Michigan, as informed by the First Amendment, leads us to conclude that defamation by implication in private-figure/public-interest media cases requires proof of both defamatory meaning and falsity, a burden not carried by plaintiffs under these facts.
Michigan law has traditionally defined a defamatory communication as one which `tends so to harm the reputation of [persons so] as to lower [them] in the estimation of the community or to deter [others] from associating or dealing with [them].' Nuyen v Slater, 372 Mich 654, 662, n []; 127 NW2d 369 (1964). A cause of action for libel encompasses four components: 1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, 2) an unprivileged communication to a third party, 3) fault amounting to at least negligence on the part of the publisher, and 4) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by publication. A cause of action for libel requires a plaintiff to show defamatory meaning as well as falsity, fault, and publication. Michigan law has also long recognized that the regime of libel law may not impose damages for injuries to reputation arising from a press report of materially true facts about a public figure on a matter of public interest. In Sanders v Evening News Ass'n, supra at 337, a former judge of the Common Pleas Court sued the Detroit News for two newspaper articles that exposed `the problem of overnight releases of persons arrested for misdemeanors  releases made by the police at the telephoned request of judges.' Both articles reported an incident where the plaintiff personally intervened to order the release of a person held in custody at a police station. The first article reported that `former Judge Joseph Sanders walked into Bethune Station one night, banged his gavel on the startled sergeant's desk and shouted: `Court's in session, the Honorable Joseph Sanders presiding. Bring in Joe Doakes!' Id. at 339. The second article, appearing the following day, stated that `[there has almost always] been a judge or two, bound to a bondsman or lawyer either by affection or campaign contribution, or overimpressed by judicial prerogatives, who has turned the order (of the head of the police department not to release on telephone request) into a farce. Witness the case of ... the impromptu court session held in Bethune Station by former Judge Joseph Sanders.' Id. The Sanders Court reviewed the record and concluded that no liability existed for the first article because in his amended declaration plaintiff admits the truth of the ... publication in so far as it could possibly tend to support an action for libel. Since that publication was true, it was not libelous. Id. at 340. The Court then reviewed the substance of the second article, under the venerable principle that `[t]o test its libelous quality, a publication is to be considered as a whole, including the character of the display of its headlines when the article is published in a newspaper....' Id. The Court first held that the plaintiff lacked authority to hold court in a police station to release a prisoner, and therefore had acted in his private, not official capacity. It concluded that [i]n doing so plaintiff acted without lawful authority and it was not libelous for defendants to publish an article to that effect ... [f]urther, it was not libelous to say in the alternative of plaintiff `or (he was) over-impressed by judicial prerogatives' since such appears to be the truth from plaintiff's own pleading. Id. at 342-343. The logic of Sanders, while instructive, does not foreclose every cause of action for defamation by implication. However, the Sanders rationale does prohibit imposing liability on a media defendant for facts it publishes accurately and without material factual omissions about public affairs.
In addition to satisfying Michigan libel law elements, this private-figure/public-interest subject matter libel case must also comply with the constitutional elements of libel law, including falsity and the burden of proof. The common-law roots of defamation have been fundamentally altered by a series of cases from the highest court in the land, beginning with Sullivan, supra . The Supreme Court's First Amendment analysis of libel cases since Sullivan has variously employed three important factors to define the parameters of libel liability: the public- or private-figure status of the plaintiff, the media or nonmedia status of the defendant, [22] and the public or private character of the speech. The Court has most consistently interpreted the First Amendment to accord maximum protection to public speech about public figures. [23] The Court has acted more ambiguously in the context of private-figure plaintiffs, as presented in this case. In Gertz, the Court focused on the status of the plaintiff and concluded that private-figure plaintiffs deserve more reputational protection than do public-figure plaintiffs for two reasons. First, the Court postulated that unlike public figures, private-figure plaintiffs lack access to channels of effective communication that would allow them a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements.... Id. at 344. Second, unlike public figures, private-figure plaintiffs do not voluntarily expose themselves to the risk of defamation by injecting themselves into public controversy. The Court concluded that [p]rivate individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater. Id. Just as the Court has postulated that private-figure plaintiffs deserve greater libel law protection vis-a-vis public-figure plaintiffs, it has also consistently recognized that speech on matters of public concern merits heightened protection under the First Amendment. The Court has declared, for example that the First Amendment embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly ... all matters of public concern, [24] and similarly that expression on public issues `has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.' [25] The Court's protection of speech on the basis of its public character reached its zenith in the plurality opinion of Rosenbloom v Metromedia, Inc, 403 US 29; 91 S Ct 1811; 29 L Ed 2d 296 (1971). The plurality in Rosenbloom suggested that the actual-malice standard articulated in Sullivan should extend to both private- and public-figure plaintiffs if the defamatory statement involved matters of public or general concern. Id. at 44. The Court repudiated this position in Gertz, and instead focused on the plaintiff's public or private status to set the standard of liability. However, in Hepps, the Court again emphasized the public character of the speech (and the danger of media self-censorship) to set the applicable burden of proof with regard to falsity. Similarly, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc v Greenmoss Builders, Inc, 472 US 749, 759; 105 S Ct 2939; 86 L Ed 2d 593 (1985), the Court emphasized that speech on matters of public concern lies at the heart of the First Amendment, while, [i]n contrast, speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern. While Gertz prohibited the imposition of punitive damages in private-figure/public-interest cases absent a showing of actual malice, Dun & Bradstreet held that permitting recovery of presumed and punitive damages in defamation cases absent a showing of `actual malice' does not violate the First Amendment when the defamatory statements do not involve matters of public concern. Id. at 763. The United States Supreme Court has also consistently sought to ensure that liability does not arise from true speech on public matters. [26] In Sullivan, supra at 271, the Court stated unequivocally: Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth ... and especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker. Similarly, in Garrison v Louisiana, 379 US 64, 74; 85 S Ct 209; 13 L Ed 2d 125 (1964), the Court noted that [t]ruth may not be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions where discussion of public affairs is concerned. More recently, [b]oth [ Hepps ] and [ Dun & Bradstreet ] evince a special solicitude for speech of public concern and desire to ensure such speech adequate breathing space, the one by its allocation of burden of proof, the other by its limitation on damages. [27] In parallel fashion, this Court has long recognized, as in Sanders, that Michigan law prohibits libel liability for true speech on matters of public concern. Although the Court has stated clearly that true speech about matters of public concern may not subject a speaker to libel sanctions, it has paradoxically more extensively elucidated the standard of fault than it has the quantum or quality of falsity in libel cases. [28] At best, it can be said that the Court has struggled analytically to balance private reputational interests against public free expression in the context of falsity. On the one hand, the Court has asserted that [f]alse statements of fact are constitutionally valueless because such statements interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas, and they cause damage to an individual's reputation that cannot easily be repaired by counterspeech, however persuasive or effective. [29] On the other hand, the Court has also asserted that [t]he First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters. Gertz, supra at 341. The more recent decision in Hepps clearly indicates adherence to the latter paradigm of protecting some degree of falsity to ensure greater First Amendment protection of speech on public interest matters. The Court in Hepps, supra at 776, recognized that forcing the plaintiff to bear the burden of showing falsity [will result in some cases where] plaintiffs cannot meet their burden despite the fact that the speech is in fact false. Nevertheless, the Court ultimately concluded that the Constitution requires us to tip [the scales] in favor of protecting true speech, despite the dispositive nature of burden of proof in cases presenting ambiguous evidence regarding falsity. Id. In this connection, it seems clear that claims of defamation by implication, which by nature present ambiguous evidence with respect to falsity, face a severe constitutional hurdle. As noted previously, the requirement that a private plaintiff suing a media defendant for libel in a public interest matter would have to prove as part of his case, in addition to defendant's fault, that the statements at issue are false comprised an important factor for our decision in Rouch to strip public interest statements of heightened actual malice protection from liability. Rouch, supra at 204. However, although Hepps stands for the proposition that a statement on matters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation law ... where a media defendant is involved, [30] neither Hepps (nor our decision in Rouch ) specified whether the standard of proof with regard to falsity is `clear and convincing evidence' or some lesser standard. [31] We need not address that issue in this case because the record does not reveal that the plaintiffs proved any material falsity by even a preponderance of the evidence.