Opinion ID: 1110731
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of motion for mistrial due to improper and prejudicial cross-examination

Text: ¶ 37. Flora next argues it was error for the trial court to overrule his motion for mistrial after the prosecution asked him on cross-examination if he had screamed where's the money, where's the money? when he entered Subrenda Levy's apartment on the night of the murder. The defense objected, claiming the State had no proof that Flora had asked this question. The prosecutor responded, saying there are statements that have been taken by witnesses just before being cut off by another defense objection. The trial judge properly excused the jury and discussed he matter outside their presence. ¶ 38. Flora asserts this Court's holding in Flowers v. State, 773 So.2d 309 (Miss. 2000), should apply in this situation. In Flowers, the State questioned a defense witness about the witness purchasing a pair of shoes worn at the murder scene, and the witness denied buying the shoes for the defendant. On rebuttal, the State offered no proof of a basis in fact for asking whether the witness had purchased the shoes for the defendant, and this Court held that it was plain error for the State to leave an impression in the minds of the jurors that the prosecutor actually had such facts in hand and that the insinuations through questioning contained some truth. Id. Flora's reliance on Flowers is misplaced, however, because it is clearly distinguishable. The testimony in Flowers involved key evidence that would help to place the defendant at the scene of the murders, while Flora's testimony pertained to a collateral matter. There was already evidence, including his own direct testimony, that Flora was at Levy's apartment when Ray Spann was shot. The question of where's the money? is not key to the ultimate issue in this case, which is whether Milton Flora was guilty of murder. ¶ 39. This Court has held that [s]pecific instances of conduct under our rules of evidence may not be proved by extrinsic evidence for impeachment purposes; they may only be inquired about on cross-examination. Pinson v. State, 518 So.2d 1220, 1223 (Miss.1988); see also Lewis v. State, 580 So.2d 1279, 1287 (Miss.1991). This subject arose in Ball v. Sloan, 569 So.2d 1177 (Miss.1990), when the defendant sought to impeach the credibility of the plaintiff by asking her if it was true that she had altered a prescription given to her by a doctor. The plaintiff denied having done so, and in its case in chief, the defense called a pharmacist who testified that he refused to fill the prescription for the plaintiff. Id. at 1179. On appeal, this Court held it was error for the trial court to allow, for impeachment purposes, the extrinsic evidence of the pharmacist's testimony on the collateral matter of the plaintiff altering her prescription. Id. (Citing 608(b), M.R.E.). In the present case, however, Levy had given the police a written statement, of which the prosecution and the defense were both aware, stating that Flora pointed a gun at me, saying `bitch, where is the money' when he entered her apartment. The defense saying, in the presence of the jury, that they have no proof when objecting to the questioning on this matter was in bad faith, and the State had every right to question Flora as to whether he said where's the money? when he entered Subrenda Levy's apartment, and Flora had the right to admit or deny. When a lawyer seeks to impeach a witness in this risky manner, they must accept the answer given by the witness. ¶ 40. Flora denied the accusation, and that should have been the end of the matter. When the prosecutor improperly repeated the question several times, the defense objected, and the trial court properly sustained the objection. The attempted impeachment was proper. As to the comment by the prosecutor alluding to the existence of witness statements to corroborate the accusation, the trial judge had wide discretion to determine whether the comment was so prejudicial as to merit a mistrial. Spann, 771 So.2d at 890. There was no abuse of discretion in denying Flora's motion for mistrial based on this issue. ¶ 41. Flora also argues it was error for the trial court to allow the State to ask questions alluding to Flora's having kidnapped and beaten Levy, crimes for which Flora was not on trial. While this issue may have some merit, the defense never objected to the allegedly inflammatory and prejudicial questions, and did not move for a mistrial after this line of questioning. ¶ 42. If no contemporaneous objection is made at trial, a party must rely on the plain error rule to raise the assignment of error on appeal. Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1289 (Miss.1994) (citing Gray v. State, 487 So.2d 1304, 1312 (Miss.1986)). The plain error doctrine requires that there be an error and that the error must have resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Williams v. State, 794 So.2d 181, 187 (Miss.2001) (citing Gray v. State, 549 So.2d 1316, 1321 (Miss.1989)). The plain error rule will only be applied when a defendant's substantive or fundamental rights are affected. Grubb v. State, 584 So.2d 786, 789 (Miss.1991). ¶ 43. The questions asked by the prosecutor on cross-examination of Flora were questions about the events that took place on the night of the murder. Flora was able to answer all of the questions. It is the jury's job to weigh the credibility of Flora's testimony. Turner v. State, 726 So.2d 117, 125 (Miss.1998). The trial court's ruling was not error.