Opinion ID: 78401
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jefferson's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

Text: Jefferson's central claim is that his trial attorneys were ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial because they failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of mitigating evidence and because they failed to present evidence of his claimed organic brain damage. We are not persuaded.
To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Jefferson must show that: (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052; accord Knowles v. Mirzayance, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 1420, 1422, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521-22, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). Since Jefferson's claim stems from his lawyers' decision to limit the scope of their investigation into potentially mitigating mental health evidence, we view the deference owed these strategic judgments through this prism: [S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052; accord Knowles, 129 S.Ct. at 1420. Thus, even when trial counsel's investigation and presentation is less complete than collateral counsel's, trial counsel has not performed deficiently when a reasonable lawyer could have decided, under the circumstances, not to investigate or present particular evidence. Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 1225 (11th Cir.2001); see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523, 123 S.Ct. 2527 ([O]ur principal concern ... is not whether counsel should have presented a mitigation case. Rather, we focus on whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of [the petitioner's] background was itself reasonable.) (emphasis omitted). If we conclude that declining to investigate further was a reasonable act, we do not look to see what a further investigation would have produced. Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 388 (11th Cir. 1994). In reviewing a lawyer's professional judgments, [a] decision to limit investigation is `accorded a strong presumption of reasonableness.' Mills v. Singletary, 63 F.3d 999, 1021 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Armstrong v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1430, 1433 (11th Cir.1987)); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment). Indeed, our standard is a high one  [e]ven if many reasonable lawyers would not have done as defense counsel did at trial, no relief can be granted on ineffectiveness grounds unless it is shown that no reasonable lawyer, in the circumstances, would have done so. Rogers, 13 F.3d at 386 (emphases added); Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir.2000) ( en banc ) (And because counsel's conduct is presumed reasonable, for a petitioner to show that the conduct was unreasonable, a petitioner must establish that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.). The standard is even higher where experienced counsel is involved. See Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1316 (When courts are examining the performance of an experienced trial counsel, the presumption that his conduct was reasonable is even stronger.). Moreover, the Supreme Court has emphasized that [t]he reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions ... [and] what investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. As a result, when a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable. Id. Reasonableness is assessed objectively, measured under prevailing professional norms, id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, and includes a context-dependent consideration of the challenged conduct as seen from counsel's perspective at the time, id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. See also Hannon v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 562 F.3d 1146, 1151 (11th Cir.2009) (The standard we apply in assessing the first prong is that of a reasonable attorney, not a paragon of the bar.) (quotations omitted); Williams v. Head, 185 F.3d 1223, 1236 (11th Cir.1999) (`[I]n retrospect, one may always identify shortcomings,' but perfection is not the standard of effective assistance.) (quoting Cape v. Francis, 741 F.2d 1287, 1302 (11th Cir.1984)); Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 958, 960 (11th Cir.1992) (Most important, we must avoid second-guessing counsel's performance.... Nothing is so easy as to be wise after the event.... A lawyer can almost always do something more in every case. But the Constitution requires a good deal less than maximum performance.) (quotations omitted). As we have said: In reviewing counsel's performance, a court must avoid using the distorting effects of hindsight and must evaluate the reasonableness of counsel's performance from counsel's perspective at the time.... The widespread use of the tactic of attacking trial counsel by showing what might have been proves that nothing is clearer than hindsight  except perhaps the rule that we will not judge trial counsel's performance through hindsight. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1316-17 (quotations and citation omitted). In other words, we recognize that the trial lawyers, in every case, could have done something more or something different. So, omissions are inevitable. But, the issue is not what is possible or what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled. Id. at 1313 (quotations omitted).
When measured against these standards, we conclude that the decision of Jefferson's trial counsel not to conduct neuropsychological testing or to present a mental health defense at the penalty phase of trial was not constitutionally ineffective. As the record establishes, both of Jefferson's attorneys were seasoned criminal defense lawyers, and during the ten months they had to prepare their defense, they conducted an extensive investigation into both the details of the crime and Jefferson's life history. They visited the crime scene, as well as Jefferson's apartment complex, and his place of employment. They interviewed the State's witnesses and identified important weaknesses in the prosecutor's case. And they traveled to Jefferson's hometown in Kentucky to meet with his family members. Throughout this period, counsel also interacted frequently with Jefferson himself. During these meetings, Jefferson's demeanor was invariably calm; he was articulate and appeared intelligent; and he was always helpful to counsel, for example, providing them with the details of his employment history and military service. Notably, however, counsel's investigation did not end there. They consulted with at least four other attorneys with extensive death penalty experience at the trial and appellate levels, including specialists at the Southern Poverty Law Center and the ACLU. And despite the fact that Jefferson had adamantly proclaimed his innocence all along, and despite the fact that counsel saw no evidence of any mental health problems in their many interactions with Jefferson, counsel took the additional precaution of requesting a psychological evaluation of Jefferson. Indeed, this motion was one of some thirty motions they filed with the trial court. [7] After prevailing on their motion for psychological testing, counsel sought out recommendations from the ACLU for psychologists, and selected Dr. Dudley, one of the three experts recommended to them. After meeting with Jefferson on four occasions, Dr. Dudley drafted an expert report. However, the report, and their conversations with Dr. Dudley, gave Jefferson's counsel precious little to work with. The report concluded that Jefferson was in the middle range of intelligence, that the magnitude of his deficiencies was quite mild, and in no way impaired his judgment or decision-making capacity, and that he was not psychotic. The report also mentioned sequelae to head injury experienced during childhood as a possibility that Dr. Dudley was unable to explore, and said that it would be worthwhile to conduct neuropsychological evaluation of [Jefferson] to rule out an organic etiology. But as the state court found, when counsel spoke directly with Dr. Dudley specifically about whether to explore that possibility, he led Mr. Schuster to believe that further investigation would simply be a waste of time. State Habeas Order at 16-17. [8] In conversation, Dr. Dudley also remarked upon his experience as a psychologist in a Florida prison and stated that, in his opinion, Jefferson was just a criminal. Ex. 39 at 174-75. In light of their conversations with Dr. Dudley, Jefferson's counsel elected not to conduct further testing, and instead presented an innocence defense at trial. Based on these factual findings of the state habeas courts  all of which are fairly supported by the record  we believe that Jefferson's counsel were reasonable in deciding not to pursue neuropsychological testing. The most that can be said in support of Jefferson's position is that counsel were presented with two contradictory statements from Dr. Dudley  a statement in his written report and his oral statements in response to specific questions by counsel. Jefferson effectively asks us to discard the state habeas court's finding of fact that defense counsel were led by Dr. Dudley's oral statements to believe that further inquiry into neuropsychological testing would be a waste of time. This we are not prepared to do, especially where our inquiry focuses on whether it was reasonable under the circumstances not to inquire further. Jefferson suggests, nevertheless, that when confronted with this contradiction, his attorneys had a duty to explore the issue further in order to definitively determine whether or not neuropsychological testing would be helpful to his case. We cannot agree. Counsel's decision not to explore the matter further was based on several sound reasons rooted in the facts and circumstances of this case. First, Dr. Dudley's suggestion that neuropsychological testing be conducted in order to explore the possibility of sequelae to head injury is mentioned only briefly and at the very end of his report. All of the report's other conclusions and observations  e.g., that Jefferson was in the middle range of intelligence, that he was not psychotic, and that he had mild deficiencies that did not affect his judgment or decision-making  indicated that Jefferson did not suffer from any significant psychological impairment. When taken together with Dr. Dudley's statements to them in discussions designed to address this very issue, it was reasonable for Jefferson's counsel to accord little weight to the statement in the written report regarding neuropsychological testing. In addition to Dr. Dudley's report and his oral statements, Jefferson's counsel had other substantial reasons for deciding not to pursue neuropsychological testing or to present a mental illness defense. As we have noted, for example, neither Schuster nor Cella witnessed anything in their frequent and extensive dealings with Jefferson to indicate that he was afflicted with any mental disorder that might have been relevant to the murder. Cf. Housel v. Head, 238 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir.2001) (counsel not ineffective for failing to pursue mental health investigation where counsel knew the defendant had suffered a head injury in an automobile accident, but observed nothing unusual about the defendant's behavior, testifying that he was one of counsel's most intelligent clients); Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1252 (11th Cir.2000) (counsel not ineffective for failing to pursue mental health investigation where the petitioner did not tell counsel of his stay at a mental hospital and counsel found the petitioner to be cooperative, articulate, and affable); Williams, 185 F.3d at 1239 (counsel not ineffective for failing to pursue mental health investigation where counsel had no problems communicating with the petitioner, found the petitioner to be intelligent, attentive, cooperative, polite, and interested in what was happening, to ask intelligent questions and to respond intelligently to counsel's questions). Two other important elements in the calculus were that Jefferson had unwaveringly proclaimed his innocence, and that the State's case against him suffered from many weaknesses: there was no physical evidence of Jefferson's guilt; there were no eyewitnesses to the crime; Jefferson was a friend of the victim and stood to benefit from a continued relationship with him; and the testimony from Jefferson's neighbors, on which the State relied, was patchy, volatile, and self-serving. Jefferson's insistence on his innocence, together with the vulnerabilities in the State's case, made it reasonable for Jefferson's counsel to focus their energies on presenting a defense of innocence. Moreover, presenting an innocence defense would not have meshed easily with the presentation of a mental illness defense at the penalty phase. We have repeatedly recognized the difficulty that defense counsel face in arguing to the jury at the guilt phase that their client is undeniably innocent, only to switch gears at the penalty phase, admit that the defendant committed the crime, and argue that the defendant's mental impairment caused him to have done so. See Collins v. Francis, 728 F.2d 1322, 1349 (11th Cir.1984) (Counsel, having chosen a reasonable strategy to portray [another person] as the villain, should not be found ineffective because he did not push a line of defense that his client actually contributed to the victim's death but did so only because he was under psychological duress. Counsel's strategic choice as to the defense in this case was reasonable.); see also Jones v. Dugger, 928 F.2d 1020, 1028 (11th Cir. 1991); Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1319 (Considering the realities of the courtroom, more is not always better. Stacking defenses can hurt a case. Good advocacy requires `winnowing out' some arguments, witnesses, evidence, and so on, to stress others.). Presenting a mental illness defense during the penalty phase of the trial would have placed Jefferson's counsel in just such a precarious position, maintaining that Jefferson had not committed the crime, and then presenting testimony that if indeed Jefferson had committed a particularly violent murder, it would have been due to an organic brain injury. We have also previously observed that residual doubt is perhaps the most effective strategy to employ at sentencing. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1320 n. 28 (citing Tarver, 169 F.3d at 715-16). This is especially true where, as here, [t]he reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions... [and] what investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Viewed in this light, we think that counsel's decision to present an innocence defense at the guilt phase of the trial, and to reference it, among other things, in the penalty phase  for example, by emphasizing during closing argument that there were no eye witnesses to the crime, no guilty plea, and no evidence of any consciousness of guilt, Ex. 25 at 1380, 1401  was reasonable. While it may have been possible to argue the case in the alternative during distinctive phases of a death case, we cannot say that counsel were constitutionally ineffective for opting not to present a mental illness defense during the penalty phase. Nor are we persuaded by the suggestion that it was unreasonable for Jefferson's counsel to decide against neuropsychological testing because they had nothing to lose by doing so. The mere fact that there was nothing to lose by pursuing a defense does not, by itself, mean that counsel's performance was deficient. As the Supreme Court has recently observed, it has never found counsel to be deficient simply because he abandon[ed] [a defense] [when] there was nothing to lose by pursuing it. Knowles, 129 S.Ct. at 1419 & n. 3. Moreover, we cannot accept the underlying premise that nothing was in fact to be lost by pursuing the neuropsychological evidence. On the contrary, pursuing such a strategy would have come with several costs. First, as the record shows, Jefferson's counsel spent a significant amount of time traveling and interviewing witnesses in building their strategy of innocence. Because it is undeniable that attorneys in these cases have finite resources to expend, seeking funds for and gathering additional mental health evidence may have hampered the ability of Jefferson's counsel to work on establishing his innocence. Housel, 238 F.3d at 1296. Beyond concerns over resource allocation, however, counsel also had significant strategic concerns about presenting multiple defense theories. For example, as we have explained above, there was a distinct possibility that presenting a mental illness defense during the penalty phase could have backfired. Moreover, adopting another strategy might have affected Jefferson's ability to testify, which also could have harmed his case. Not only did Jefferson testify at the penalty phase in order to explain his past crimes and deny the statement that he wanted to be executed, but he was able to explore his positive characteristics, including his employment history and relationship with his family. In addition, his mother, sister, and girlfriend testified about his contributions to his family and how much they loved each other, and his mother asked for mercy. See Callahan v. Campbell, 427 F.3d 897, 935 (11th Cir.2005) (recognizing mercy as a reasonable defense in the penalty phase). In sum, since the state habeas courts' findings of fact are fairly supported by the record, and according them, as we must, a strong presumption of correctness, and evaluating the reasonableness of counsel's performance from counsel's perspective at the time, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1316-17, we conclude that the performance of Jefferson's counsel at the penalty phase of his trial was reasonable. Counsel's decision not to pursue neuropsychological testing was, as the state courts unambiguously found, a considered judgment, made only after substantial inquiry, not an oversight or the result of an arbitrary whim. Jefferson's counsel carefully weighed various options, and, based on their substantial experience as criminal law practitioners, exercised their professional judgment about the most promising route to pursue. This mode of calculation and deliberation embodies the essence of reasonableness. In the words of the Supreme Court, Jefferson's counsel made strategic choices... after less than complete investigation that were supported by reasonable professional judgments, and were determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements that he was innocent. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Even if another lawyer might have taken a different tack, we cannot say that no reasonable lawyer would have made the decisions Schuster and Cella made. Rogers, 13 F.3d at 386. We, therefore, conclude that the state habeas courts were correct in holding that Jefferson's counsel were not constitutionally ineffective. [9]
Accordingly, we cannot accept the federal district court's conclusion that Jefferson's counsel performed unreasonably, nor with several underpinnings of that decision. First, contrary to the district court's suggestion that trial counsel must always have full information, 490 F.Supp.2d at 1326, our en banc decision in Chandler makes clear, as Strickland recognized from the outset, that the law does not require counsel always to investigate extensively every conceivable defense: [C]ounsel need not always investigate before pursuing or not pursuing a line of defense. Investigation (even a nonexhaustive, preliminary investigation) is not required for counsel reasonably to decline to investigate a line of defense thoroughly.FN22 For example, counsel's reliance on particular lines of defense to the exclusion of others  whether or not he investigated those other defenses  is a matter of strategy and is not ineffective unless the petitioner can prove the chosen course, in itself, was unreasonable. FN22. As we have recognized, Strickland 's approach toward investigation reflects the reality that lawyers do not enjoy the benefit of endless time, energy or financial resources. Rogers, 13 F.3d at 387. How a lawyer spends his inherently limited time and resources is also entitled to great deference by the court. See White, 972 F.2d at 1224 ([G]iven the finite resources of time and money that face a defense attorney, it simply is not realistic to expect counsel to investigate substantially all plausible lines of defense. A reasonably competent attorney often must rely on his own experience and judgment, without the benefit of a substantial investigation, when deciding whether or not to forego a particular line of defense....). Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1318 & n. 22 (citations omitted); Foster v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 402, 405 (11th Cir.1987). Rather, Jefferson's counsel were required only to make a reasonable decision that further investigation into Jefferson's mental health was unnecessary, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052, and Jefferson's counsel did just that. Nor do we think this case is at all like Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1500 (11th Cir.1991), or Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491, 493 (11th Cir.1988). In Blanco and Middleton, counsel performed no investigation into mitigating evidence, or no investigation at all into certain mitigating factors, and provided no explanation for their failure. See Blanco, 943 F.2d at 1500-03 (counsel informed the court that he was not prepared for the penalty phase and needed a continuance to locate witnesses, and after the continuance, counsel nonetheless failed to put on any mitigation evidence, primarily a result of counsels' eagerness to latch onto Blanco's statements that he did not want any witnesses called); Middleton, 849 F.2d at 493-94 (Middleton's trial counsel conducted almost no background investigation, despite discussions with Middleton concerning the existence of such mitigating evidence, and counsel testified that they had no tactical reasoning behind their failure to perform a background investigation for possible mitigating evidence). Here, in sharp contrast, counsel performed an investigation into Jefferson's background and mental health, and obtained an expert on this issue before intentionally abandoning the defense in favor of others that seemed more promising. In fact, this case more closely resembles the facts in Rogers. There, Rogers's counsel conducted an investigation and presented evidence about mitigating circumstances, but after failing to investigate the effects of PCP on users, presented no evidence or argument about Rogers's PCP use. Rather than focusing on what counsel could have learned through further investigation, the Court held: Once we conclude that declining to investigate further was a reasonable act, we do not look to see what a further investigation would have produced. Nor do we need to decide whether the information that would have resulted from further investigation would have necessarily been used at trial by every reasonable lawyer who was armed with such information. If the act of conducting no investigation of a particular defense is reasonable, the matter is closed; there can be no question about the reasonableness of having failed to present evidence of which the lawyer was unaware as a result of a reasonable decision to investigate no further. Cf. Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491, 493 (11th Cir.1988) (where lack of investigation is inadequately explained, court looks at information that more investigation would have produced and determines whether a reasonable trial counsel might not have used it). Rogers, 13 F.3d at 388 (emphasis added); see also Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1317 n. 20 (basing the inquiry on whether an investigation (if one had been undertaken) would have uncovered mitigating evidence (or witnesses) is an example of judging counsel's acts from the benefit of hindsight). Here, notwithstanding the district court's suggestion to the contrary, it cannot fairly be said that Jefferson's counsel had no reasonable basis for not investigating further, nor was the rationale inadequately explained, nor finally did counsel fail to appreciate the possible value of further investigation. Quite simply, counsel engaged an expert psychologist to evaluate Jefferson, and the psychologist expressly discouraged them from pursuing the matter further. For all of these reasons, we hold that Jefferson has not established that counsel's performance at the penalty phase was unreasonable under Strickland. Since Jefferson has failed to meet the first prong of Strickland, we need not address the second prong of the analysis  whether his defense was prejudiced. Dingle v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 480 F.3d 1092, 1100 (11th Cir.2007) (Because Dingle has failed to establish the deficient performance prong of his Strickland claim, we need not address the prejudice prong.); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The state habeas courts properly denied relief on the Petitioner's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.