Opinion ID: 2599164
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of Evidence of the Victim's Marijuana Use

Text: Lonnie testified that while he and defendant were driving Schultz to their eventual fatal encounter, Schultz asked where they were going. Defendant replied that they were going to his wife's house to get some pot. On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited that Lonnie had earlier told an investigator that Schultz had responded, far out, although Lonnie could not recall that response at trial. Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel represented that the toxicology report showed the presence of marijuana in [the victim's] system. He argued that in light of Lonnie's testimony, this evidence was admissible as relevant to show that they were traveling some place for that express purpose rather than some other purpose. The court excluded the evidence the next day as unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352. Later, the defense sought to question Lonnie regarding marijuana use the night of the crime. Outside the presence of the jury, Lonnie testified he did not smoke marijuana and did not see Schultz or defendant do so. He denied telling anyone anything different. The court ruled the defense could ask the same questions in front of the jury. Defense counsel also represented that Lonnie had made inconsistent statements to a defense expert. The next day, the prosecutor represented that the defense expert had told her he had not asked Lonnie anything regarding marijuana use. Defense counsel argued that Lonnie's testimony and the alleged inconsistent statements tended to corroborate the whole subject matter of the plan for marijuana, reference of marijuana during the course of that evening.... [I]t tends to corroborate or make more valuable the information that we have that Mr. Schultz had some marijuana metabolites within his blood system after his death. The court ruled the defense could question Lonnie regarding marijuana use and impeach him with any inconsistent statement, but it could not present evidence of marijuana in Schultz's system. In front of the jury, defense counsel asked Lonnie if he or defendant had smoked marijuana that night and whether he had told the defense expert that he and defendant had shared a joint, eliciting a negative response to each question. The defense did not present any inconsistent statement. Defendant contends the court erred in disallowing evidence that the toxicology report showed the presence of marijuana in the victim's system. He argues the evidence was relevant to show that the purpose of the drive was, indeed, to get some marijuana rather than something more nefarious. However, the ruling comes within the broad discretion the trial court enjoys under Evidence Code section 352 in assessing whether the probative value of particular evidence is outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice, confusion or consumption of time. ( People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) Specifically, the court is not required to admit evidence, such as cocaine or marijuana use, that merely makes the victim of a crime look bad. ( People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 523, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385.) Contrary to defendant's argument, these basic rules of evidence do not violate a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. ( People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 238, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 58, 991 P.2d 145.) Here, Lonnie testified that defendant told Schultz they were driving to get some marijuana. Evidence of actual marijuana in Schultz's system may have explained why defendant would try to reassure him by saying they were going to get some marijuana. It may further have helped show that Schultz liked the idea and maybe even that getting marijuana was his purpose for the trip. But Schultz's purpose was of little significance. Defendant's purpose was important, not Schultz's. Schultz's marijuana use had little relevance, if any, to show defendant's purpose. Moreover, whether defendant actually intended to get marijuana, rather than merely saying so to reassure Schultz, was itself of little significance. Because the trip in the truck was consensual, it did not form part of the prosecution theory of kidnapping. Moreover, any assumed intent to get marijuana would not negate the other evidence of intent to rob or kill, which easily could have coexisted with that assumed intent. We see no abuse of discretion.