Opinion ID: 1670616
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Reasonableness of Classification under Article I, Section 8 of the State Constitution

Text: If review of the classification created by T.C.A. § 6-54-114 is not appropriate under Article XI, Section 8, it nevertheless remains open under Article I, Section 8, set out fully in Section I of this opinion. As this Court has recognized, Citizens may be classified under article 1, § 8, of the constitution, when the object of the legislature is to subject them to the burden of certain disabilities, duties, or obligations, not imposed upon the community at large. And citizens may be classified under article 11, § 8, of the constitution, when the object of the legislature is to confer upon them certain rights, privileges, immunities, or exemptions not enjoyed by the community at large. The Stratton Claimants v. The Morris Claimants, supra, 89 Tenn. at 522, 15 S.W. at 92. The core concern expressed in this constitutional provision is that legislative classification, to the extent that it exists, not be unreasonable or unfair. Moreover, the provisions of Article I, Section 8, protect cities and counties as well as individuals. See, e.g., White v. Davidson County, 210 Tenn. 456, 464, 360 S.W.2d 15, 19 (1962). Hence, to the extent that the provisions of § 6-54-114 create classifications within the legislation, those classifications must be reasonable. The courts of this state have consistently held that a legislatively-created classification within a statute that is natural and reasonable is constitutional and valid, but class legislation whose classification is arbitrary and capricious is unconstitutional and invalid. See, e.g., City of Chattanooga v. Harris, 223 Tenn. 51, 57, 442 S.W.2d 602, 604 (1969). As noted above, legislation need not, on its face, contain the reasons for a certain classification. Stalcup v. City of Gatlinburg, supra, 577 S.W.2d at 442. Reasons eminently wise and provident might control the law-making body, which do not appear upon the face of a statute, and for the Courts to strike it down, because not readily perceptible, might well be criticized as an act of judicial usurpation. Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board v. Lively, 692 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Tenn. 1985), citing Condon v. Maloney, 108 Tenn. 82, 96, 65 S.W. 871, 874 (1901). If any possible reason can be conceived to justify the classification, it will be upheld and deemed reasonable. Stalcup v. City of Gatlinburg, supra , citing Knoxtenn Theatres v. McCanless, 177 Tenn. 497, 151 S.W.2d 164 (1941). Contrary to the plaintiffs' contentions, a legitimate justification can be envisioned for the different treatment of civil service boards in municipalities located within counties with populations greater than 300,000. In fact, this Court has previously found that the mere number and complexity of personnel in more populous areas is sufficient to justify certain statutory classifications. Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board v. Lively, supra, 692 S.W.2d at 19. The plaintiffs argue, however, that the classification made in § 6-54-114 was not between populous and less populous counties but rather among municipalities within those counties, regardless of the size of the municipality. Thus, they argue, municipalities of equal size will be treated differently under the statute based upon their location, resulting in an arbitrary classification. The mere statement of this argument emphasizes its weakness, however. As the plaintiffs note, the legislature sought to differentiate among municipalities not based upon their populations, but based upon their locations either within or without a populous county. The General Assembly could have rationally believed that populous counties, with their large cities, and even with their smaller municipalities in close proximity to those large cities, would have a greater number of civil service jobs available to citizens in order to effectuate the daily provision of services in such areas. The classification of municipalities in populous counties is thus reasonable, not arbitrary, and not violative of the provisions of Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. T.C.A. § 6-54-114 also classifies municipalities with civil service boards based upon whether or not the municipalities are governed by a mayor-aldermanic form of government. We conclude that this distinction, too, can be supported as reasonable under § 6-54-114(b). A member of an affected civil service board must be appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the municipal legislative body. When that local legislative body is aldermanic in form, T.C.A. § 6-1-406(9) makes the mayor a voting member of the board of mayor and aldermen, thus creating a potential conflict of interest and diluting the separation-of-powers aspect of § 6-54-114. We cannot say that the exemption is arbitrary or unreasonable under such circumstances. Likewise, we conclude that the statute does not violate equal protection simply because it is, by its terms, applicable to civil service boards created by ordinance or charter, as opposed, say, to those created by private act of the legislature. The provisions of § 6-54-114 are, by definition, intended to make uniform certain practices and procedures of municipal civil service boards across the state. Hence, both subsections of the statute begin with the language notwithstanding any provision of any municipal charter [or ordinance] to the contrary... . We fail to find that by specifying the purpose and thus the reach of the provision, the legislature has engaged in arbitrary or unreasonable classification under the state constitution.