Opinion ID: 415577
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the james challenge

Text: 51 Extrajudicial statements made by one member of a conspiracy in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible in evidence against other members of the conspiracy. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Under the rules established in United States v. James, supra, the trial judge is responsible for determining whether an extrajudicial statement meets the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 590 F.2d at 577-80. Thus, before such a statement is made known to the jury, the trial judge should determine that there is substantial evidence, independent of the extrajudicial statements, that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) that the co-conspirator and the defendant against whom the statement is to be offered were members of the conspiracy, and (3) that the statement was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy[.] United States v. Alvarez, 696 F.2d 1307, 1310 (5th Cir.1983); United States v. James, 590 F.2d at 580-81. In addition, on appropriate motion at the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial judge should reconsider his initial James ruling and decide whether the prosecution has established the three facts listed above by a preponderance of the independent evidence. United States v. Alvarez, at 1310; United States v. James, 590 F.2d at 582-83. 52 Appellants contend that the trial judge did not make the necessary James findings in this case, erroneously allowing the jury to decide the admissibility issue. Further, appellants contend that they were prejudiced by this alleged failure to make James findings because the government had not satisfied the second and third prongs of James. Specifically, appellants argue that the second prong of James was not satisfied because there was no independent proof that Nadaline was a co-conspirator. They also argue with respect to one of the statements Manfredi attributed to Nadaline, that the third prong of James was not satisfied because the statements were not made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. We disagree with all three of appellants' contentions. 53 Although the trial judge did not expressly determine that Nadaline's extrajudicial statements were admissible before Manfredi testified, we believe that he implicitly ruled that there was substantial evidence to support the admission of the statements under James. Appellants had alerted the court to the possible James problem before Manfredi testified, and the judge, after hearing some arguments on the issue, stated that he would try to carefully watch for it and would rule on it as the testimony comes in. Record on Appeal, vol. 12, at 16-17. Subsequently, during Manfredi's testimony, appellants made several objections to the admissibility of extrajudicial statements made by co-conspirators. Id., vol. 12, at 28, 39-40, 53. The trial judge overruled all of these objections, and in response to one objection he stated: I was listening carefully because of the objections that had been made, had there been any question in my mind in this case. It's obvious it would be admissible. Id., vol. 12, at 40. Thus, the record indicates that the trial judge implicitly made the necessary James findings when he overruled appellants' objections. Cf. United States v. Horton, 646 F.2d 181, 186 (5th Cir.1981) (Although the trial judge did not specifically say that there was sufficient independent evidence, it is clear that his comments during the government's case and his overruling of the defendant's various motions involving the hearsay objection, show that the trial court found there to be sufficient independent evidence of the conspiracy and that [the defendant] and [the declarant] were involved in it.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 970, 102 S.Ct. 516, 70 L.Ed.2d 388 (1981) & 455 U.S. 919, 102 S.Ct. 1274, 71 L.Ed.2d 459 (1982). 29 54 Nevertheless, appellants contend that the court erroneously applied pre-James law when ruling on the admissibility of Nadaline's statements. According to appellants, certain comments the judge made during the trial, see note 25 supra, indicate that the court merely made a preliminary ruling on the admissibility of Nadaline's statements, finding that the statements could be presented to the jury because the government, as required by pre-James law, had presented prima facie evidence of admissibility. Subsequently, appellants argue, the court erroneously instructed the jury in accord with the pre-James law, submitting to the jury the question of whether Nadaline's statements were admissible under the co-conspirator rule. Thus, appellants contend that the trial court never actually determined that there was substantial evidence to support the admission of Nadaline's statements. 55 We admit that some of the trial judge's comments during the trial can be read to suggest that the court erroneously believed that the jury was to play a role in determining whether Nadaline's extrajudicial statements could be considered under the rule governing co-conspirator statements. Careful examination of the record as a whole, however, indicates that the trial judge recognized the proper James procedures and applied them in this case. In fact, immediately after the judge made the comments cited by appellants to support their argument that the court failed to follow James, an exchange took place between appellant Monaco's attorney, Mr. Weinstein, and the trial judge which confirms our view that the judge was applying James properly. 56 MR. WEINSTEIN: I just would refer your Honor to the last closing words on page 583 of the James opinion. 57 THE COURT: Which say? 58 MR. WEINSTEIN: Which seem to me to say it is not a jury issue. You have got to make specific findings, first.THE COURT: I have got to determine whether or not there is substantial evidence of his involvement in the conspiracy. 59 MR. WEINSTEIN: Mr. Nadaline's? 60 THE COURT: Mr. Nadaline's. 61 MR. WEINSTEIN: Okay. Then we are in complete harmony on that. 62 Record on Appeal, vol. 13, at 108-09. This colloquy indicates that, despite the judge's earlier comments, the court was using the proper James standard of substantial evidence when ruling that Nadaline's statements were admissible. 63 The fact that the trial judge instructed the jury in accord with pre-James law, see note 28 supra, does not compel a different conclusion. A review of the record reveals that both the parties and the court relied heavily on the instructions from the previous trial, which took place before James was published, when they prepared the instructions for the second trial. Thus, the fact that the jury instructions on co-conspirator statements followed pre-James law was simply an oversight, to which neither appellants nor the government objected, rather than an indication that the trial judge had applied the wrong standard when ruling on the admissibility of co-conspirator statements. Certainly, appellants cannot argue that they were prejudiced by the erroneous instruction, which informed the jury that it could not consider co-conspirator statements until after it found certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt, a higher standard of proof than that required for admissibility under James. By giving this instruction, the judge merely gave the jury an opportunity to overturn his own ruling that Nadaline's statements were admissible against appellants. Thus, appellants were afforded even greater protection than James requires. Cf. United States v. Noll, 600 F.2d 1123, 1128 (5th Cir.1979) (no error when judge required the Government to demonstrate twice the admissibility of the hearsay, once to the court under the James panel decision and once to the jury pursuant to [United States v.] Apollo, [476 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.1973) ] and thereby afforded [the defendant] even greater protection than either decision contemplated). 64 As noted previously, the court did not expressly reconsider its James ruling at the close of all the evidence and determine whether the government had established the three prongs of James by a preponderance of the evidence. However, a court need not reconsider its initial determination unless the defendants make an appropriate motion, see United States v. Bulman, 667 F.2d 1374, 1380 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 2305, 73 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1982); United States v. James, 590 F.2d at 582, and we do not believe appellants made an appropriate motion in this case. See note 26 supra. 30 In any event, we conclude that there was ample evidence supporting the admission of the disputed statements; thus, any error by the court [at the close of the trial] in failing to state that it found that the James requirements were met would be harmless. United States v. Bulman, 667 F.2d at 1380. See also United States v. Alvarez, at 1310 (Although defense counsel did not ask the court at the close of all the evidence to reconsider its tentative decision allowing the co-conspirators' statements into evidence, we nevertheless conclude that the preponderance of the evidence established the predicate facts of the existence of the conspiracy. Therefore, the judge correctly admitted the statements of appellants' co-conspirators.); cf. United States v. Strauss, 678 F.2d 886 at 891 (11th Cir.1982) (although the trial judge used the wrong standard in making the James ruling at the close of the trial, this court made an independent review and found that a preponderance of the evidence supported the admission of the co-conspirators' statements). 65 Obviously, if the government had introduced Nadaline's prior testimony as substantive evidence, there would have been compelling evidence of Nadaline's participation in the conspiracy. Even without considering Nadaline's prior testimony, however, we believe that there was sufficient evidence in Manfredi's testimony, independent of the disputed extrajudicial statements, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Nadaline was a co-conspirator. According to Manfredi's testimony: Nadaline was the person who called him in late 1975 or early 1976 and asked him to locate a boat suitable for offloading marijuana; Nadaline participated in the initial meeting between Monaco and Whitaker, and accompanied Monaco, Whitaker, Manfredi and another person on an inspection of the DISPATCH III; 31 Nadaline later called Manfredi and informed him that someone had accused Manfredi of working for the government; 32 Nadaline then directed Manfredi to a prearranged location, met Manfredi there, and took Manfredi to the meeting at Pier 66 at which Hicks offered Whitaker $200,000 for the use of the DISPATCH III, Hicks told Manfredi he would have to participate in the offloading to prove his innocence, and the conspirators agreed on a plan to send three boats out to pick up marijuana; Nadaline invited Manfredi to his house on the day after the conspirators agreed to send boats out and showed Manfredi a vanload of marijuana; 33 Nadaline then negotiated with Manfredi about the price of the marijuana, and the price went up significantly immediately after Monaco and Hicks arrived at Nadaline's house and had a private conversation with Nadaline. When all of these factors are added together, we believe there is more than sufficient evidence to satisfy the government's burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Nadaline was a member of the conspiracy. Cf. United States v. Mesa, 660 F.2d 1070, 1074-75 (5th Cir.1981) (Unit B) (relying on similar evidence to link a defendant to a conspiracy and justify the use of co-conspirator's statements against him); United States v. Horton, 646 F.2d at 185 (relying on far less circumstantial evidence to prove the existence of a conspiracy for the purpose of admitting co-conspirator statements). 66 There also was sufficient evidence that Nadaline's statements were made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy, thus satisfying the third prong of James. The only statement which appellants contend did not meet this requirement was Nadaline's statement that they indeed did go out with two smaller boats, picked up roughly 1,200 pounds of marijuana and brought it back. Record on Appeal, vol. 12, at 54, 178. See note 21 and accompanying text supra. Appellants argue that this statement was made after the marijuana was imported, and thus that it could not have been made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The record indicates, however, that the conspiracy to import had not been completed when Nadaline made the disputed statement to Manfredi. Steel testified that the conspirators were to offload 50,000 pounds of marijuana from the CINA IV. Manfredi testified that the conspirators planned to send three vessels to pick up the marijuana, the DISPATCH III and two smaller vessels, but that the DISPATCH III had engine problems and returned before reaching the CINA IV. The evidence indicates that the conspirators would not have been able to offload 50,000 pounds of marijuana onto the two remaining smaller vessels, 34 and thus it is clear that the conspirators had not finished offloading the CINA IV by the following morning, when Nadaline made the disputed statement to Manfredi. Moreover, the former Fifth Circuit has held in another context that importation of a controlled substance is a continuous crime that is not complete until the controlled substance reaches its final destination point. See United States v. Gray, 626 F.2d 494, 497-98 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1038, 101 S.Ct. 616, 66 L.Ed.2d 500 (1980), 449 U.S. 1091, 101 S.Ct. 887, 66 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981) & 450 U.S. 919, 101 S.Ct. 1367, 67 L.Ed.2d 346 (1981). In this case, the marijuana had not reached its final destination point because the conspirators anticipated that Manfredi would be responsible, at least in part, for delivering the marijuana to buyers. 35 67 We thus conclude that the Nadaline hearsay was properly admitted into evidence.