Opinion ID: 2996796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kramer’s Right to a Jury Trial

Text: Because Kramer was not entitled to recover compensatory and punitive damages, she has no statutory or constitutional right to a jury trial. The only remedies Kramer (or any plaintiff bringing a claim of retaliation against an employer under the ADA) was entitled to seek were equitable in nature. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (stating that where an employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, a court may issue an injunction, reinstate the plaintiff employee, order back pay, or award “any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate”) (emphasis added). There is no right to a jury where the only remedies sought (or available) are equitable. See, e.g., Marseilles Hydro Power, LLC v. Marseilles Land and Water Co., 299 F.3d 643, 648 (7th Cir. 2002) (“If the only relief sought is equitable . . . neither the party seeking that relief nor the party opposing it is entitled to a jury trial.”). We need not, therefore, address Kramer’s argument that it was reversible error for the district court to strike her demand for a jury trial; Kramer had no statutory right to a jury trial. We need, however, to address Kramer’s argument that, independent of whether she was entitled to recover compensatory and punitive damages, she was entitled to a jury trial based on BOA’s consent as evidenced by its demand for a jury trial in its answer to the Complaint and Amended Complaint. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c) addresses jury trials by consent. 10 No. 02-3662 (c) Advisory Jury and Trial by Consent. In all actions not triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or, except in actions against the United States when a statute of the United States provides for trial without a jury, the court, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right. Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(c). This court has held that issues of back pay and front pay are not beyond the scope of parties’ consent to a jury trial. Pals v. Scheipel Buick & GMC Truck, Inc., 220 F.3d 495, 501 (7th Cir. 2000). Kramer claims that BOA consented to a jury trial when it included a demand for a jury trial in its answer to her Complaint and Amended Complaint. Once BOA consented, Kramer argues, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d), it could not withdraw such consent without Kramer’s permission. Because she did not consent to such a withdrawal—she opposed BOA’s motion to strike her jury demand—she claims the court erred in granting BOA’s motion. The district court disagreed. The court doubted that BOA had actually consented to a jury trial on the issues of front and back pay, but regardless, found that it was not too late for BOA to withdraw its consent to a jury trial. The court also declined to impanel an advisory jury. The court saw “no point to the expense and time of an advisory jury, particularly on an issue that I suspect I need no advice.” In order to determine whether BOA properly withdrew its consent to a jury trial it is important to review the events leading up to and including BOA’s motion. Kramer’s Complaint and Amended Complaint included a request for remedies (compensatory and punitive damages) that, had she been entitled to recover such remedies, would have entitled her to a jury trial as a matter of right. See 42 U.S.C. No. 02-3662 11 § 1981a(c)(1) (“If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this section any party may demand a trial by jury.”). By including a demand for a jury in her Complaint and Amended Complaint, Kramer successfully exercised her right to have her claim heard by a jury. Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b). BOA also made a demand for a jury trial in its answer to the Complaint and the Amended Complaint, though strictly speaking, such a demand was not necessary. The demand for a jury by one party is generally sufficient where the jury trial is of right. Shortly before trial, BOA made a motion to exclude compensatory and punitive damages. The district court granted this motion. In this opinion we affirm the district court’s decision. After the district court granted the motion, Kramer had no right to a jury trial. As we have discussed, Kramer was entitled to have her claim of retaliation (for which she was entitled only to equitable remedies) heard by a jury only if BOA consented and the district court agreed. BOA also moved at the same time to strike Kramer’s jury demand. In light of the district court’s decision that there was no statutory right to a jury trial, this motion was proper. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(a) provides that when a jury trial has been demanded and designated on the docket as a jury trial, the trial shall be heard by a jury, “unless . . . (2) the court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that a right of trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not exist under the Constitution or statutes of the United States.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(a)(2) (emphasis added). Kramer’s reliance on Rule 38(d) for the proposition that BOA could not withdraw a demand for a jury trial without her consent, is misplaced. Rule 38, as is made clear by its caption, is concerned with jury trials of right. Rule 38(d)’s 12 No. 02-3662 requirement that the other parties consent to a withdraw of a demand permits those other parties to rely on the jury demand to protect their right to a jury trial. See Partee v. Buch, 28 F.3d 636, 636 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he plaintiff . . . was entitled to rely on the defendant’s jury demand and was not required to file a separate jury demand on his own.”); 9 Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2318 (3d. ed. 1995). Assuming Kramer had a right to a jury trial (for instance, if she was actually entitled to recover compensatory and punitive damage), BOA could not withdraw a demand for a jury trial. But Kramer had no right to a jury trial and there is no restraint in the text of Rule 39 on the ability of a party to withdraw its consent to a jury trial that is not of right. See Thaler v. PRB Metal Products, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 49, 50 (E.D. N.Y. 1993) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that Rule 38(d) prohibits a party from withdrawing its consent to a jury trial that is not of right and noting that “plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that . . . consent cannot be withdrawn prior to trial”). The question then is whether BOA properly withdrew its consent to a jury trial. The district court expressed some doubt as to whether BOA had ever consented to a jury trial on Kramer’s claims of front and back pay. We need not address this question, however, because it is clear that, to the extent BOA did consent to a jury trial, it withdrew that consent with its motion to strike Kramer’s jury demand. BOA filed its motion to strike Kramer’s jury demand two weeks prior to the trial. The district court determined that this was not too late in the litigation process and Kramer has provided no reason why she was prejudiced by a bench trial rather than a jury trial. See CPI Plastics, Inc. v. USX Corp., 22 F. Supp. 2d. 1373, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (granting motion to strike jury demand two weeks before a trial and noting no No. 02-3662 13 prejudice because there was no right to a jury, and a bench trial would require less preparation than a jury trial). We conclude that BOA properly withdrew its consent to a jury 2 trial. Compensatory and punitive damages are not available to a plaintiff bringing a claim of retaliation by an employer under the ADA. Without the right to recover compensatory and punitive damages, Kramer did not have a right to a jury trial and she was entitled to a jury trial only with the consent of BOA and the court. BOA properly withdrew its consent to a jury trial. For these and the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM. 2 Of course not even the consent of BOA would have guaranteed Kramer a jury trial. A district court is not obligated to use a jury where one is not required even if both parties agree to use a jury. Rule 39(c) clearly contemplates a role for the court in deciding to use a jury where one is not required. Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Systems, Inc., 29 F.3d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[W]hen both parties consent, Rule 39(c) invests the trial court with the discretion—but not the duty—to submit an equitable claim to the jury for a binding verdict. While the litigants are free to request a jury trial on an equitable claim, they cannot impose such a trial on an unwilling court.”). 14 No. 02-3662 A true Copy: Teste: _____________________________ Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit USCA-02-C-0072—1-20-04