Opinion ID: 1058965
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutional Challenge to the Terrorism Statute

Text: In assignment of error 17, Muhammad maintains that the terrorism statutes, Code งง 18.2-31(13) and 18.2-46.4 are unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. We disagree. As the Supreme Court stated in Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982): In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court's first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail. The court should then examine the facial vagueness challenge and, assuming the enactment implicates no constitutionally protected conduct, should uphold the challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. A court should therefore examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law. Id. at 494-95, 102 S.Ct. 1186. See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999). The First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth requires proof that a law punishes a `substantial' amount of protected free speech, `judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118, 123 S.Ct. 2191, 156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). While Muhammad utilizes the term overbroad, he offers no evidence or argument in support of the requirements of this doctrine. Instead, Muhammad confines his argument to vagueness. A successful challenge to the facial validity of a criminal statute based upon vagueness requires proof that the statute fails to provide notice sufficient for ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits, or proof that the statute may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Morales, 527 U.S. at 56, 119 S.Ct. 1849; Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). But [o]ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 267 Va. 573, 580-81, 596 S.E.2d 74, 78 (2004); accord Gibson v. Mayor of Wilmington, 355 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir.2004); Fuller v. Decatur Public School Board of Education School District 61, 251 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir.2001); Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1359-60 (11th Cir.2000); United States v. Tidwell, 191 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir.1999); United States v. Hill, 167 F.3d 1055, 1063-64 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 872, 120 S.Ct. 175, 145 L.Ed.2d 148 (1999); Woodis v. Westark Community College, 160 F.3d 435, 438-39 (8th Cir.1998); United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 803 (10th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1133, 118 S.Ct. 1089, 140 L.Ed.2d 146 (1998); Love v. Butler, 952 F.2d 10, 14 (1st Cir.1991); Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d 91, 107 (D.C.Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014, 108 S.Ct. 1487, 99 L.Ed.2d 715 (1988); Hill v. City of Houston, 789 F.2d 1103, 1127 (5th Cir.1986), aff'd, 482 U.S. 451, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987); Gallaher v. City of Huntington, 759 F.2d 1155, 1160 (4th Cir. 1985). Capital murder pursuant to Code ง 18.2-31(13) is defined as the willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of any person by another in the commission of or attempted commission of an act of terrorism as defined in Code ง 18.2-46.4. Act of terrorism means an act of violence as defined in clause (i) of subdivision A of ง 19.2-297.1 committed with the intent to (i) intimidate the civilian population at large; or (ii) influence the conduct or activities of the government of the United States, a state or locality through intimidation. Code ง 18.2-46.4. The act of violence reference to Code ง 19.2-297.1 includes a list of certain specific aggravated felonies including murder, voluntary manslaughter, mob-related felonies, malicious assault or bodily wounding, robbery, carjacking, sexual assault and arson. The combination of these statutes defines criminal conduct that constitutes a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing in the commission, or attempted commission, of one of the designated felonies with the intent to intimidate the civilian population or influence the conduct of government through intimidation. Additionally, under Code ง 18.2-18 the General Assembly extended the reach of criminal conduct subject to the death penalty to include a killing pursuant to the direction or order of one who is engaged in the commission of or attempted commission of an act of terrorism under the provisions of subdivision 13 of ง 18.2-31. Muhammad raises questions about the definition of intimidation, civilian population at large, and influence the conduct or activities of government. He suggests that failure to statutorily define these phrases renders the statutes unconstitutional. He further complains that no distinction can be drawn between the newly defined crime and any `base offense' which carries with it the same hallmarks of intimidation and influence, and that this allows unguided and unbridled law enforcement discretion. Muhammad further maintains that extending the scope of the statute to reach those who order or direct a killing in the commission of or attempted commission of an act of terrorism somehow violates what he calls the triggerman rule. In a particularly exaggerated statement, Muhammad claims that extending the scope of the statute allows almost any violent criminal act to be classified as terrorism and thereby rendering any individual charged eligible for the death penalty. We disagree with each of Muhammad's contentions. By referencing established criminal offenses as acts of violence subject to the statutory scheme, the legislature included offenses with previously defined elements and mens rea requirements. Additionally, the term intimidate has been defined by case law. See Sutton v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 654, 663, 324 S.E.2d 665, 669 (1985) (defining intimidation as unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear). We have no difficulty understanding that population at large is a term that is intended to require a more pervasive intimidation of the community rather than a narrowly defined group of people. Examples are illustrative. When used in a descriptive sense referring to a prison, the prison population at large consists of everyone in the prison rather than a small subset of prisoners. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 210, 106 S.Ct. 496, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985). In a case involving the exclusion of certain people from capital juries, the term population at large meant the community from which the jury pool could be chosen. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 179, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986). It is significant to note that Muhammad offered a similar understanding of the term when he argued below that all potential jurors in his case were victims. We do not believe that a person of ordinary intelligence would fail to understand this phrase. Similarly, we do not believe that a person of ordinary intelligence needs further definition of the phrase influence the conduct or activities of government. Muhammad's argument on this point is essentially a strained legislative history argument. Quoting former Attorney General Jerry Kilgore's press releases, Muhammad claims that the statutes are designed to address al-Qaeda type attacks โ attacks motivated by a greater political purpose. Even if a press release could qualify as legislative history, it is quite a leap to impute, from the press releases of an Attorney General, the intent of the General Assembly. We find the intent of the General Assembly primarily in the words it employs in enacting legislation. Nothing in the words of these statutes evinces an intent to limit its application to criminal actors with political motives. Muhammad maintains that there is no distinction between the base offense and the capital offense based upon terrorism. What he appears to be arguing is that the terrorism statute is unnecessary on the one hand because a killing in the commission of one of the enumerated violent acts could result in the death penalty anyway, and on the other hand, its reach is extended too far by including those who order or direct such killings. Clearly, the General Assembly has the power to define criminal conduct even if statutes overlap in coverage. Whether a defendant can be simultaneously or successively charged with overlapping offenses implicates other questions not presented here. Muhammad's quarrel with the expansion of the potential imposition of the death penalty to those who order or direct another in a killing in the commission of or attempted commission of an act of terrorism is a policy question well within the purview of legislative power so long as it is not otherwise unconstitutional. In that respect, Muhammad argues in assignment of error 18 that the provisions of Code ง 18.2-18 allow the death penalty for a defendant with no demonstrated intent to kill the victim. Muhammad incorrectly characterizes the extension of the scope of the statute to reach traditional aiders and abettors. The provisions of Code ง 18.2-18 do not extend to aiders and abettors; rather, it extends only to those who direct or order the killing. The criminal actor who orders or directs the killing is not unlike the criminal actor who hires another to kill and is potentially subject to the death penalty under Code ง 18.2-31(2). The criminal actor who orders or directs the killing shares the intent to kill with the one who carries out the murder. The provisions of Code ง 18.2-18 do not have the effect imagined by Muhammad. Muhammad's argument concerning vagueness does not focus on his conduct. Indeed, Muhammad does not claim in his brief that his actions and those of Malvo were not acts of terrorism under the statutory provisions. Rather, Muhammad hypothetically poses questions about the applicability of the statute in other circumstances. As discussed above, the statutes provide notice sufficient for ordinary people to understand what conduct they prohibit, and do not authorize and/or encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. More importantly, Muhammad cannot and does not maintain that the statutes do not give him notice that his conduct and Malvo's conduct was prohibited. Nor does Muhammad allege that he has been subject to arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement of the statutes. One who engages in conduct that is clearly proscribed and not constitutionally protected may not successfully attack a statute as void for vagueness based upon hypothetical conduct of others. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494-95, 102 S.Ct. 1186.