Opinion ID: 196811
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Tapes' Relevancy

Text: 47 Evidence is excludable under Fed.R.Evid. 403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 16 After reviewing the transcript, 17 we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to not exclude the tapes in their entirety. In support of his argument, Appellant claims that (i) none of Appellant's statements prove any element of the alleged crimes or show consciousness of guilt; (ii) the recorded conversations took place two years after the predicate offenses occurred; (iii) many of Appellant's arguments were made in response to questions instigated by the government witness; and, (iv) any relevant conversations were intertwined with others that were not relevant. We find none of these arguments persuasive. 48 As the district court found, the tapes included highly probative evidence regarding Appellant's consciousness of guilt, including admissions. The tapes were directly relevant to the government's theory regarding both Appellant's involvement in the attempted arson and the conspiracy. Indeed, we note that Appellant's counsel conceded as much during the hearing on the tapes' admissibility: I concede, Judge, that there were parts that, given the Government's position and its interpretation, are relevant. (Transcript, Vol. 2 at 12). 49 For example, the February 24, 1994, tape includes a conversation regarding the payment of Schaller's legal fees. Not only did it corroborate Schaller's testimony that Appellant assisted in the payment of Schaller's legal fees, this conversation included evidence from which the jury could draw an inference that this money is being paid because these gentlemen were in on the deal together. (Transcript, Vol. 4 at 9). The March 1, 1994, tape includes an admission by Appellant that he threw matches to light the fire during the first attempt: You weren't there when I threw the [expletive] matches the first time. The March 4, 1994, tape includes an adoptive admission by Appellant regarding his attempts to burn the restaurant during a conversation about whether Appellant had told anyone about those efforts. While Appellant denies telling anybody else about his efforts, he responds to Schaller's questions directly without ever disputing the veracity of what Schaller's questions imply--that Appellant tried to burn it. The May 25, 1994, tape provides evidence of the conspiracy between Schaller and Appellant. The conversation demonstrates that, although they were confused as to their recollection of what they believed to be their respective roles, they clearly had conspired to burn the restaurant. This sampling of each of the four tapes clearly shows that, contrary to Appellant's claims, the recordings include statements by Appellant that are directly probative of both attempts and the conspiracy. 50 Appellant also points to the fact that the recorded conversations occurred two years after the alleged offenses, arguing that the recordings are neither closely intertwined with the charged offenses nor helpful in establishing Appellant's intent to commit the crimes charged. Appellant cites to three cases addressing the admissibility of evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). See United States v. Huff, 959 F.2d 731, 736 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. Brookins, 919 F.2d 281, 286 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Hodges, 770 F.2d 1475, 1480 n. 4 (9th Cir.1985). We agree with these cases that proximity in time is a factor to be considered in determining relevancy under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 871 F.2d 188, 197 (1st Cir.1989) (Probative value must be considered in light of the remoteness in time of the other act and the degree of the resemblance to the crime charged.); United States v. Currier, 836 F.2d 11, 17 (1st Cir.1987) (noting that the prior bad acts were both close in time and in nature to the crime charged). 18 In addition, Appellant also points out that the tapes here are distinguishable from those admitted in Currier, based on the fact that the recorded conversations in that case occurred immediately prior to and after the crime charged and were, thus, found to help[ ] establish appellant's intent to commit the crime charged. Id. Because the conversations here occurred two years after the predicate offenses, Appellant contends that the tapes cannot be said to be so closely intertwined with the predicate offenses so as to help establish Appellant's intent to commit the crimes charged. 51 We are unswayed by Appellant's arguments. Here, as we discuss below, no evidence of prior bad acts was admitted in this case; and, because Appellant has not cited to any cases holding that proximity in time is a prerequisite for determining relevance under Fed.R.Evid. 403, and because we have not found any, we are unconvinced that the timing of the conversations is of any consequence or otherwise undermines their strong relevance. See, e.g., United States v. Perkins, 926 F.2d 1271, 1279-80 (1st Cir.1991) (finding no error in admission of post-conspiracy statements made to a government informant where court found statements were an admission corroborating trial testimony and reflected complicity and consciousness of guilt). Even assuming, arguendo, that proximity must be considered in determining relevance, we nonetheless find that even though the conversations occur two years after the attempt and conspiracy, they are closely intertwined with the charged offense[s] ... [and] [ ] provid[e] ... significant contextual material for the jury. Currier, 836 F.2d at 17 (citations omitted). As discussed above, while they do not necessarily show Appellant's intent to commit the attempted arson or to enter into a conspiracy, they do show Appellant's consciousness of guilt and complicity as well as the existence of a conspiracy. See Perkins, 926 F.2d at 1279-80. 52 While not all evidence with probative value is admissible, we do not find that its value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed.R.Evid. 403. In reviewing the balancing undertaken by the district court, we give great deference to the district court's judgment, and [o]nly in exceptional circumstances will we reverse the exercise of a district court's informed discretion vis-a-vis the relative weighing of probative value and unfairly prejudicial effect. Currier, 836 F.2d at 18 (quoting United States v. Griffin, 818 F.2d 97, 101-02 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 844, 108 S.Ct. 137, 98 L.Ed.2d 94 (1987)). Based on our review of the record, we do not find that the probative value of the tapes--as edited 19 --was outweighed by unfairly prejudicial evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz, 36 F.3d 1229, 1233 (1st Cir.1994) (noting that the question under Rule 403 is one of unfair prejudice, not prejudice alone); Currier, 836 F.2d at 18 (Unfairly prejudicial evidence is evidence ... that 'triggers [the] mainsprings of human action [in such a way as to] cause the jury to base its decision on something other than the established proposition in the case.' ) (quoting 1 Weinstein's Evidence § 403, 36-39 (1986)). Neither the fact that many of Appellant's remarks were made in response to questions or comments by the government witness, nor that relevant conversations were intertwined with non-relevant ones, persuades us to reach a different conclusion. Even the fact that the recordings reveal that Appellant had initially wanted to hire a guy from organized crime so to speak to burn the restaurant, (Transcript, Vol. 4 at 32), or that Appellant tells Schaller what to say about pouring the gasoline, (Transcript, Vol. 4 at 44), does not make them unfairly prejudicial. Finally, we do not find that any exceptional circumstances 20 exist which warrant reversal of the district court's rulings. 21