Opinion ID: 1218704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: bargain enforced at defendant's request

Text: Following a United States Supreme Court decision, the Oregon Court of Appeals stated: Recently the United States Supreme Court held the practice of plea bargaining to be an `essential' and `desirable' part of the administration of criminal justice when `properly administered.' Santobello v. New York, 404 US 257 [260], 92 S Ct 495 [498], 30 L Ed 2d 427, 432 (1971). One element of proper administration is: `   [W]hen a plea [of guilty] rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.' Santobello v. New York, supra, 404 US at 262 [92 S.Ct. at 499].' Stewart v. Cupp, 12 Or. App. 167, 168, 506 P.2d 503 (1973). The Santobello decision is still the law of the land. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2547, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984) (on federal habeas corpus concerning a state court sentence entered on a guilty plea, where the exact bargain made prior to the plea was expressly enforced in the sentence entered, holding that there is no due process right to withdraw plea in no sense induced by the prosecutor's withdrawn offer of a lesser sentence offered two years before the plea at issue was entered). The effect of Santobello has been explained, in language apt to this case, as follows: We must lastly observe, because of the government's argument here, that a prosecutorial failure to fulfill a promise or to make a proper promise is not rendered harmless because of judicial refusal to follow the recommendation or judicial awareness of the impropriety. In Santobello, supra, the trial judge had explicitly stated that `It doesn't make a particle of difference what the District Attorney says he will do, or what he doesn't do.' 404 U.S. at 259, 92 S.Ct. at 497, and the Supreme Court saw `no reason to doubt that', id. at 262, 92 S.Ct. 495. It nevertheless concluded that the defendant was entitled to relief. The reason is obvious; it is the defendant's rights which are being violated when the plea agreement is broken or meaningless. It is his waiver which must be voluntary and knowing. He offers that waiver not in exchange for the actual sentence or impact on the judge, but for the prosecutor's statements in court. If they are not adequate, the waiver is ineffective. We reach then the question of remedy. The right is to have the promise fulfilled. In Santobello, the Court listed the remedies as either `specific performance of the agreement' or `the opportunity to withdraw his plea', 404 U.S. at 263, 92 S.Ct. at 499. Appellant now seeks only the former. Correale v. United States, supra, at 949. Other courts enforce the plea agreement, even though a guilty plea has not yet been entered, where a defendant has acted in reliance on the plea bargain. United States v. Garcia, 519 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir 1975); People v. Reagan, supra , (agreement not to prosecute); see also Ex Parte Yarber, supra , (defendant who had not yet detrimentally relied on unwritten negotiated plea agreement could not bind trial court to accept it but could compel tender of agreement to trial court); Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea Bargains, 66 Cal L Rev 471, 536 (1978). Defendant relied upon the agreement and attempted to have the unlawful-as-against-public-policy condition deleted with the aid of the court. Before trial, he told the trial judge [8] that he considered himself guilty as charged. He also agreed to, and did, stipulate that he caused the death of Mrs. Keever by cutting her with a knife. That stipulation was introduced in the subsequent jury trial. His defense counsel's energy and time were expended in the weeks just prior to trial toward working out the stipulated guilty plea and enforcing it, as the record discloses. He could have been working on issues related to a trial on the merits. These detriments suffered in fact should be balanced by providing defendant the benefit of the bargain. His guilty plea should be entered as of the procedural stage of the case when he sought to compel enforcement, i.e., before trial commenced. ORS 163.150, in effect in 1988, mandates the result of life imprisonment defined under the terms of that statute. I would reverse and remand to the circuit court for acceptance of plea as stipulated and resentencing as provided in the statute.