Opinion ID: 3038863
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Voting Rights Act and Recall Petitions

Text: Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act requires translation into the jurisdiction’s minority language(s) whenever a state 11570 PADILLA v. LEVER or political subdivision “provides any registration or voting notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials or information relating to the electoral process, including ballots.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(c). Thus, the essential questions here are: (1) whether recall petitions are “other materials or information relating to the electoral process,” and (2) whether the Orange County Elections Department “provided” the recall petitions. As a remedial statute, the Voting Rights Act is to be construed broadly so as to achieve the Act’s objectives. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (“[W]e are guided by the familiar canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes.”). The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he Voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race.” Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565 (1969) (footnote omitted). Thus, in Allen, the Supreme Court “reject[ed] a narrow construction . . . to § 5 [of the Voting Rights Act]” and concluded that “the [Voting Rights] Act gives a broad interpretation to the right to vote, recognizing that voting includes ‘all action necessary to make a vote effective.’ ” Id. at 565-66.1 It is this well-established canon of statutory construction that must guide the analysis here. 1 The Court further explained that Congress knew that some of the States covered by § 4(b) of the Act had resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees. Congress had reason to suppose that these States might try similar maneuvers in the future in order to evade the remedies for voting discrimination contained in the Act itself. Id. at 565 n.30 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966)). PADILLA v. LEVER 11571
Section 203 defines “voting materials” to “mean[ ] registration or voting notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials or information relating to the electoral process, including ballots.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(b)(3)(A). It does not, however, define what constitutes “other materials or information relating to the electoral process.” Id. Where a statute fails to define a key term, this court’s “duty, in matters of statutory construction, is to give effect to the intent of Congress.” San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting A-Z Int’l v. Phillips, 323 F.3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 2003)). “To this end, ‘it is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’ ” Id. (quoting Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 2003)). “When a statute does not define a term, a court should construe that term in accordance with its ‘ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.’ ” Id. (quoting A-Z Int’l, 323 F.3d at 1146 (citation omitted)). “Only if an ambiguity exists in the statute, or when an absurd construction results, does this court refer to the statute’s legislative history.” Id. “To determine the ‘plain meaning’ of a term undefined by a statute, resort to a dictionary is permissible.” Id. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “related” to mean “to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connection with.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1289 (6th ed. 1991). Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent suggest that this broad definition of “related” is an appropriate one to use here. See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (noting that ordinary meaning of “relating to” is “a broad one”); Aloha Islandair Inc. v. Tseu, 128 F.3d 1301, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The phrase ‘relating to’ should be construed broadly to mean ‘has a connection with or reference to.’ ”). Based on this reading, 11572 PADILLA v. LEVER recall petitions clearly have some “bearing or concern” and are “connected with” an election. Indeed, recall petitions serve no other purpose than to trigger an election. As this court has explained, The election itself is merely the culmination of th[e electoral] process. It includes those acts that a citizen must perform to establish his eligibility as a voter, as well as those acts that a candidate must perform to place his name on the ballot. The range of conduct “relating to the elector[ ]al process” includes, for example, compliance by a would-be voter with statutes regulating registration and compliance with other statutes to place a name or an issue on the ballot. That the state or a political subdivision has mandated by law that certain preliminary steps be taken by the would-be voter, the candidate for office, or the proponents of an issue does not in any sense absolve the governmental entity of its responsibility under the Voting Rights Act. Such compelled acts are far removed from those voluntarily undertaken by a candidate, such as the printing of campaign literature. Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 833. Zaldivar rejected “[t]he argument that a recall notice is only a preliminary step to voting and therefore is unaffected by the bilingual provisions of the [Voting Rights] Act.” Id. at 833 n.11. Looking beyond the statutory text, in the Department of Justice’s regulations implementing section 203, the U.S. Attorney General has defined “written materials” to “include, for example, ballots, sample ballots, informational materials, and petitions.” 28 C.F.R. § 55.19(a) (emphasis added). While the Attorney General’s views are not binding on this court, they are persuasive and bolster the conclusion that recall petitions are “other materials relating to the electoral process.” Furthermore, it is important to note that courts owe considerPADILLA v. LEVER 11573 able deference to the Attorney General’s construction of the Voting Rights Act, particularly where the language of that interpretation mirrors the Act’s own language. See United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131-32 (1978); City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 468 (1987) (noting that the Attorney General’s interpretation of the Voting Rights Act is entitled to considerable deference and that “Congress was aware of the Attorney General’s view in this regard, and implicitly approved it, when it reenacted the Voting Rights Act in 1982”).2 The Attorney General’s inclusion of the word “petition” in the definition of “written materials” is consistent with the Justice Department’s position that the Voting Rights Act’s purpose is to “enable members of applicable language minority groups to participate effectively in the electoral process.” 28 C.F.R. § 55.2(b).3 2 In Sheffield, the Court explained, What is perhaps a more compelling argument concerning the original, and subsequent, congressional understanding of the scope of § 5 is that the Attorney General has, since the Act was adopted in 1965, interpreted § 5 as requiring all political units in designated jurisdictions to preclear proposed voting changes. This contemporaneous administrative construction of the Act is persuasive evidence of the original understanding, especially in light of the extensive role the Attorney General played in drafting the statute and explaining its operation to Congress. In recognition of the Attorney General’s key role in the formulation of the Act, this Court in the past has given great deference to his interpretations of it. Sheffield Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. at 131 (footnotes and citations omitted). 3 Defendants argue that these regulations are not a “requirement” because the same regulations also provide that “[t]he determination of what is required for compliance with section . . . 203[(c)] is the responsibility of the affected jurisdiction. These guidelines should not be used as a substitute for analysis and decision by the affected jurisdiction.” 28 C.F.R. § 55.2(c). But, Defendants place too much importance on this language. First, nothing in the record suggests that Defendants engaged in any analysis regarding the applicability of section 203 to the recall petition in this case. Second, the language cited by Defendants does not diminish that regulation’s minimum requirement that affected jurisdictions are “required to publish in the language of the . . . minority group materials distributed to . . . the electorate generally . . . for example . . . petitions.” 28 C.F.R. § 19(a) (emphasis added). 11574 PADILLA v. LEVER The district court’s conclusion that the Voting Rights Act applies only when a vote is cast between two or more alternative choices relies on too restricted a reading of Congress’s intent in requiring bilingual voting materials. Such a narrow reading of this statute is contrary to the general rule that such remedial statutes are to be broadly construed. See Allen, 393 U.S. at 565-66; see also Tcherepnin, 389 U.S. at 336. The Supreme Court’s decision in Allen is instructive here. There the Court concluded that the petition process to place a candidate’s name on an electoral ballot constituted a “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Allen, 393 U.S. at 569-70. The recall petition process is comparable to the nomination process at issue in Allen as both are preliminary steps to an election. While we are concerned with section 203 of the Voting Rights Act, the language specifically at issue here — “materials . . . related to the electoral process,” 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(c) (emphasis added) — is at least as broad as that of section 5 — “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting,” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (emphasis added) — construed by the Court to include the nomination process. The district court’s reasoning also ignores the simple fact that recall petitions do implicate a decision between two alternatives, i.e., a choice between (1) recalling the officeholder by signing, and (2) not recalling the officeholder by not signing the petition. California election law requires that a certain percentage of registered voters join in a call to recall an official by signing a valid, pre-approved petition. See Cal. Elec. Code § 11221. An effective way to choose to keep a challenged incumbent in office is to refuse to sign the proffered petition, thereby reducing the likelihood that the recall election will occur.4 Thus, the choice whether to sign or not sign a recall 4 The majority notes that people who circulate recall petitions have an incentive to “gather as many signatures as they can.” Maj. Op. at 11561. By the same token, however, signature gatherers have an incentive to fraudulently induce individuals to sign a recall petition, for political reasons or because their compensation for circulating the petition is based on the number of signatures gathered. See below, Part IV. PADILLA v. LEVER 11575 petition can have a tremendous impact on the fate of the incumbent. Indeed, in the First Amendment context, the right to vote is inextricably tied to the right to petition and petition signatures are treated the same as votes for constitutional purposes. See Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 893 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 186 (1999) (noting that under First Amendment, petition circulation “is core political speech because it involves interactive communication concerning political change” (internal quotations omitted)); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421 (1988) (“The circulation of an initiative petition of necessity involves both the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion of the merits of the proposed change.”). Given the importance of petitions to recall procedure, they should be deemed “voting materials” that a person solicited has a right to understand.
Department Although I believe that recall petitions relate to the recall process, the recall petitions would only fall under the Act’s bilingual requirements if they were “provided by” the Orange County Elections Department. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a(c). Because the state’s acquiescence in the content of recall petitions is a condition precedent to its circulation, I believe the state provides recall petitions to the public. Recall petitions in California are subject to extensive regulations that go beyond imposing mere ministerial duties upon election officials. See Cal. Elec. Code § 11000-11047. Under these regulations, the state, or in this case the Orange County Elections Department, has the authority and obligation to authorize and approve the form and content of proposed recall petitions, verify collected signatures, and set election dates. See Cal. Elec. Code § 11042, 11043. No signatures may be collected on a recall petition unless and until the Orange County Elections Department notifies the petition’s propo11576 PADILLA v. LEVER nents that the form and wording of the proposed petition comply with the Elections Code. See Cal. Elec. Code § 11042(d). California’s Elections Code mandates a specific format for recall petitions that must be used by recall proponents. See Cal. Elec. Code § 11041(a) (“[P]roponents shall use the recall petition format provided by the Secretary of State.”). While private persons may print the actual recall petitions, the form must adhere to the statutory requirements, which regulate the content and even the typeface to be used on such petitions. See id. The proponents must file, within ten days of receipt the recall target’s answer, two blank copies of the recall petition with the jurisdiction’s election officials. See Cal. Elec. Code § 11042(a). Election officials are charged with ensuring that the proposed petition conforms to the requirements of the Election Code in both form and content. See id. If election officials determine that a proposed petition does not comply, they must issue written findings. See Cal. Elec. Code § 11042(b). In such cases, officials must notify the proponents of the alterations necessary for the petition’s approval. See Cal. Elec. Code § 11042(c). The Elections Code also dictates the contents of a recall petition, requiring that each page of the petition include: (1) a request that an election be called to recall an officeholder; (2) a copy of the Notice of Intention; (3) a written statement of the grounds for the recall; (4) the names of at least ten recall proponents that appear on the Notice of Intention; (5) any answer filed by the officer sought to be recalled or a statement that the official did not answer; and (6) the name and title of the officer sought to be recalled. See Cal. Elec. Code §§ 11020(a)-(d), 11023(a), 11041(a). California election officials must also approve the content of the recall petition. See Cal. Elec. Code § 11042(a) (charging election officials with “ascertain[ing] if the proposed form and wording of the petition meets the requirements of this chapter” (emphasis added)). Indeed, recall proponents are statutorily required to change their recall petition as directed by election officials PADILLA v. LEVER 11577 until the officials are satisfied that no further alterations are required. See Cal. Elec. Code § 11042(c). California law prohibits any private party from circulating a recall petition until the petition receives state approval. See Cal. Elec. Code § 11042(d) (“No signature may be affixed to a recall petition until the elections official or, in the case of the recall of a state officer, the Secretary of State, has notified the proponents that the form and wording of the proposed petition meet the requirements of this chapter.”). Signed petitions must be submitted to the proper election officials for certification. See Cal. Elec. Code §§ 11222, 11224, 11227. If enough signatures have been collected, the recall election is called and scheduled by election officials. See id. Considering this extensive regulation, I can only conclude that recall petitions are not the same as fliers or candidate literature wholly created and controlled by private parties. See Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 833 (“That the state or a political subdivision has mandated by law that certain preliminary steps be taken by the would-be voter, the candidate for office, or the proponents of an issue does not in any sense absolve the governmental entity of its responsibility under the Voting Rights Act. Such compelled acts are far removed from those voluntarily undertaken by a candidate, such as the printing of campaign literature.”). Rather, they are more akin to ballots or initiative materials that are distributed by voting districts or to the nomination petition at issue in Allen. Here, the recall petitions, in English only, were submitted to the Orange County Elections Department as required by California law. By reviewing and approving the Recall Petition for circulation, the Orange County Elections Department officially sanctioned the content and format of the petition, including its English-only printing.5 Election officials could 5 Defendants argue that the recall petition was not “provided by” the Orange County Elections Department because the recall proponents here 11578 PADILLA v. LEVER have altered the text of the petition or demanded that the recall proponents publish it in Spanish as well as English, but chose not to do this and instead approved the petitions in their English-only form. This state approval, together with the extensive state regulation of the form of the petitions is sufficient state involvement to trigger application of the bilingual requirements and to conclude that the state “provided” the Recall Petition within the meaning of the Voting Rights Act.