Opinion ID: 1169839
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Option One

Text: Option One i.e., that HRS § 286-261(b) now accords the Director no discretion at all regarding periods of administrative revocationis an unacceptable reading of the statute. HRS § 286-261(b) retains the prefatory phrase [t]he periods of administrative revocation which may be imposed (emphasis added), which Act 188 substituted for the phrase [t]he periods of license revocation... shall be as follows without the possibility of exemption (emphasis added) for the sole purpose of empowering the Director to exercise discretion regarding the duration of administrative revocations imposed pursuant to subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) thereof. See section III.B.2.d. of this opinion, supra. In the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to divest the Director of this discretion, see sections III.B.2.e. and f. of this opinion, supra, a mandatory and nondiscretionary reading of the verb may, juxtaposed with the obviously mandatory and nondiscretionary meaning of the verb shall as employed in HRS § 286-261(c), would (1) do violence to the inference that the legislature realized the difference in meaning and intended that the verbs used should carry with them their ordinary meanings, In re Tax Appeal of Fasi, 63 Haw. at 626-27, 634 P.2d at 101, (2) change the essential meaning[ ] of... may, Modern Legal Usage at 553 (emphasis in original), and (3) transform the statute into a horrific muddle, see id. at 939. Construing HRS § 286-261(b) in pari materia with HRS § 286-261(c), see HRS § 1-16 (1993), supra at note 15, we are unwilling to read the verb may in such a fashion.