Opinion ID: 514598
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 49 Chapter XVI, Sec. 10 of the City Charter establishes the period of probation:

Text: 16 Appointments or promotions of city officers and employees in the Classified and Unclassified Service shall not be deemed completed until a period of six (6) months shall have elapsed. A probationer may be discharged or reduced at any time within said period by the City Manager, or the Head of the Department in which said probationer is employed. 17 1.50 Nevertheless, valid reasons must exist for such discharge or reduction, and the employee must be advised of these reasons. The purpose of the probationary period is to determine that the employee can and will perform satisfactorily. It provides a period of training wherein the supervisor may help the employee succeed. [emphasis added] 18 Additionally, the Charter of the City of Dallas provides that this discharge during the probationary period is without right of appeal. 18 Evans argues that the charter should not go into the calculus of considerations governing the question of whether he has a legitimate claim of entitlement. He observes that the personnel rules failed to quote the no-appeals provision, and argues that such provision is therefore not part of his mutually explicit understanding with the City. 19 We disagree. As this Court noted in Henderson, any personnel policy manual provision must be construed in accordance with the Charter and may not grant a right inconsistent with the Charter. 19 Consequently, Evans' urgings that we ignore the charter provisions must go unheeded. However, even without the no-appeal provision set out in the charter, we must ultimately determine that no property interest in continued employment exists. The personnel manual succinctly states that probationary employees may be discharged at any time. In light of this notation, the subsequent reference to valid reasons merely sets out the administrative procedures required to accompany such discharge. The existence of such procedures cannot be used as a bootstrap to aid the finding of an entitlement. 20 This interpretation is reinforced by the Charter's indication that no appeal may be taken from such a dismissal. 21 20 Taken as a whole, the personnel manual's language indicates that a probationary employee may be terminated without cause at any time. At most, Evans had a unilateral expectation of continued employment. Such an expectation is insufficient to create a property interest. 22 Having determined that the district court erred in finding that Evans had a legitimate claim of entitlement in his continued employment, we need not address Evans' contention that the district court erred in its determination that the requirements of due process were satisfied.B. 21 Having determined that Evans had no property interest in his continued employment sufficient to trigger due process concerns, we turn now to the remainder of the grounds which Evans relies upon for appeal. 22 Evans challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Dallas on several unrelated claims. Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and summary judgment evidence indicate that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and that as a matter of law the movant is entitled to judgment. 23 This standard authorizes the granting of a summary judgment against a party who, after adequate time for discovery, fails to establish an essential element of his case to which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. 24 The district court correctly applied this standard, and we hold that it committed no error in granting the City's motion for summary judgment as to each claim. We shall discuss each of Evans' contentions in turn. 23 Evans first argues that the district court erred in dismissing his liberty interest claim. Evans claims that the City placed false and stigmatizing material in his personnel file. Additionally, he asserts that the City maintains a policy of allowing other governmental agencies to inspect these files. 24 A party does not have a liberty interest in his reputation protected by the fourteenth amendment unless he can establish that the governmental employer's charges against him rise to such a level that they create a badge of infamy which destroys the claimant's ability to take advantage of other employment opportunities. 25 Additionally, the claims must be false 26 and the claimant must show that damage to his reputation and employment opportunities has in fact occurred. 27 Due process concerns are not triggered by the discharge, without more, of an employee for unsatisfactory performance. 28 25 The criticism of Evans' work included in his progress reports does not encompass accusations of dishonesty or immorality. 29 Furthermore, Evans in no way supports his contention that the allegations contained in his personnel file are false, nor does he indicate that his ability to seek employment has been impaired. 30 26 Although Evans asserted that his personnel file contains material so slanderous that he hesitated to present it to the district court initially, 31 this eleventh hour assertion does not preclude the granting of a summary judgment. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) states: 27 When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 28 The district court, concluding that Evans failed to provide support for either his allegations of falsity or harm to his reputation, did not err in granting summary judgment for the City on the liberty interest claim. 29 Evans also contends that he was fired in retaliation for statements he made about the Dallas Security Force which were published in the Dallas Times Herald in May of 1984. 32 30 The district court observed that a plaintiff may recover for resulting harm if he was terminated in retaliation for exercising his first amendment rights on matters of public concern. 33 This may be true even when the plaintiff has no property interest in continued employment. 34 31 As the Supreme Court noted in Celotex, 35 in the context of a motion for summary judgment, the movant is not required to present evidence negating the nonmovant's claim. Rather, the nonmovant must present evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to each element upon which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. In a retaliatory discharge case, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that his protected conduct was a motivating factor in the defendant's decision to terminate his employment. 36 32 Evans here failed to produce any evidence other than the actual article. The City denied having any retaliatory motive in discharging Evans. This denial of retaliation is strongly supported by the fact that Evans was not employed by the City of Dallas when the statements were made and that the City rehired Evans two months after the statement was published. We determine that the district court did not err in dismissing Evans' first amendment claim. 33 In his third objection 37 to the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, Evans alleges that the district court erred when it dismissed his claim brought under the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 38 Evans argues that he has a claim under the Act because one of the alleged reasons for his discharge was his excessive absenteeism resulting from a knee injury which required surgery. 34 The district court correctly concluded that Evans is not an individual with a handicap within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court, noting the transitory nature of the injury, stated that 35 Although the injury may have limited Plaintiff's life activities during his recuperation, Plaintiff does not allege that it continues to do so; nor does he contend that others regard him as having an impairment that continues to do so. At first glance Plaintiff might be supposed to have a record of such impairment. However, subsections (i) and (iii), cast in the present tense, ... contemplate an impairment of a continuing nature.... See, Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405-06, n. 6 [99 S.Ct. 2361, 2366-2367 n. 6, 60 L.Ed.2d 980] (1979). 36 We agree with the district court's determination that Evans' injury does not bring him within the scope of the Act. 39 37 The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the City on these individual claims, and the order of the district court on these claims is affirmed. C. 38 In his final point of error, Evans asserts that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to assume jurisdiction over Evans' pendent state claims. Pendent jurisdiction represents a discretionary case-management doctrine; it does not follow the plaintiff into federal court as a matter of right. 40 In the instant case, the district court dismissed all of plaintiff's federal claims except for the due process claim. Under Gibbs, the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to exercise jurisdiction over multiple state claims where only a single federal claim remained. The district court was merely exercising its jurisdictional prerogative, and acted well within its authority.