Opinion ID: 1159934
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: were the damages awarded excessive?

Text: The jury awarded Movin' On $329,558.17 in compensatory damages and $988,674.51 in punitive damages. AIC contends that these damages were excessive and the result of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. They ask this court to order a new trial because the prejudice may have infected all the decisions of the jury. Alternatively, they request remittitur.
The record shows that the replacement cost of the collapsed house was $80,217.50. An accountant testified that Movin' On incurred another $100,000 to $150,000 in damages as a result of lost business while the collapsed house was reconstructed, and of the forced sale of an investment property to cover rebuilding costs. Testimony also was presented relating to loss of rental income and tax credits on the investment unit, and harm to Movin' On's credit rating and business relationships due to its cashflow problems. However, Movin' On did not attempt to place any monetary value on these losses. In actions based on misrepresentation, damages must be established with reasonable certainty. They may not be speculative or contingent. Orsini v. Bratten, 713 P.2d 791, 794 n. 6 (Alaska 1986); Transamerica Title Insurance Co. v. Ramsey, 507 P.2d 492, 497 (Alaska 1973). We believe that the maximum award the jury could have made, based on the evidence presented at trial, is the sum of the replacement cost of the house ($80,217.50) and damages from lost business ($150,000), or $230,217.50. Remittitur of compensatory damages to that amount is therefore required. [2]
AIC gives two reasons to support its contention that the punitive damages were excessive. First, AIC argues that there is really not even evidence which would support a finding of fraud in this case. As noted above, AIC cannot challenge the fraud verdict directly because it failed to raise the issue in its motion for a new trial below. Arguing that issue under a claim of excessive damages is merely an impermissible attempt to relitigate the fraud verdict through the back door. Second, AIC contends that the punitive damage award is excessive because it is three times the compensatory damage award. Although comparison of actual and punitive damages is a factor which may enter into a determination of excessiveness, Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 615 P.2d 621, 624 n. 3 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894, 102 S.Ct. 391, 70 L.Ed.2d 209 (1981), no definite ratio between them is prescribed. Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 48 (Alaska 1979) ( citing Taylor v. Williamson, 197 Iowa 88, 196 N.W. 713 (1924)), modified, 615 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894, 102 S.Ct. 391, 70 L.Ed.2d 209 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1985). Simply pointing to the ratio does not establish excessiveness. Although the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages does not establish excessiveness, that ratio is important in this case for another reason. We believe that to effectuate the jury's evident intent in awarding punitive damages equaling three times the amount of compensatory damages, we must reduce the punitive damages awarded in proportion to the reduction we have ordered in compensatory damages. It is generally for the jury to decide the proper proportion of compensatory to punitive damages. Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal. App.2d 628, 286 P.2d 474, 478 (1955). Here the jury did not pick a random, round number as its award of punitive damages. Rather, it awarded exactly three times the amount it had determined Movin' On was entitled to as compensation for its losses. Our goal in reviewing damages in the context of remittitur is to approximate as closely as possible the decision made by the jury, within the limits of a proper award. Exxon Corp. v. Alvey, 690 P.2d 733, 742 (Alaska 1984). The jury's decision in this case was to award treble punitive damages. Since we have determined that the maximum amount of compensatory damages sustainable by the evidence in this case is $230,217.50, we hereby order punitive damages to be reduced to three times that amount, or $690,652.50. AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED for modification consistent with this opinion. BURKE, J., not participating.