Opinion ID: 1101570
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Action to Compel a State Official to Perform a Legal Duty

Text: River Road argues that the doctrine of State immunity does not bar its claim against Lyons because, it says, its action seeks to compel a State officer to perform a duty prescribed by law. In its brief to this Court, River Road contends that Alabama caselaw is clear that if a state agency or official purchases goods or services on behalf of a state agency pursuant to lawful authorization, then an action may be maintained to require payment for those goods or services. See Gunter, 414 So.2d at 47 (holding that the comptroller had a legal duty, as mandated by the Legislature, to make payments to a former lieutenant governor); Department of Indus. Relations v. West Boylston Mfg. Co., 253 Ala. 67, 42 So.2d 787 (1949) (holding that the State agency was required to distribute funds comprised of contributions by employees and employers and to perform its duties pursuant to the statute); State of Alabama Highway Dep't v. Milton Constr. Co., 586 So.2d 872 (Ala.1991); State Bd. of Admin. v. Roquemore, 218 Ala. 120, 117 So. 757 (1928). In Milton Construction, the State Highway Department contracted with Milton Construction, a private entity, to perform various highway construction projects. 586 So.2d at 873. The Highway Department withheld funds from Milton Construction based upon a disincentive clause in the contract, even though the disincentive clause had been declared void by this Court in Milton Construction Co. v. State Highway Department, 568 So.2d 784 (Ala. 1990). The Highway Department based its refusal to pay, in part, on the doctrine of State immunity. This Court disagreed and stated: Once the Highway Department has legally contracted under state law for goods or services and accepts such goods or services, the Highway Department also becomes legally obligated to pay for the goods or services accepted in accordance with the terms of the contract. It follows that this obligation is not subject to the doctrine of [State] immunity and is enforceable in the courts. 586 So.2d at 875 (emphasis added). Because the Highway Department had contracted with Milton Construction and had accepted its services, this Court held that the action was not barred by the doctrine of State immunity, because it is in the nature of an action to compel state officers to perform their legal duties. 586 So.2d at 875. In Roquemore, supra, the State Highway Department, acting through the State Board of Administration, contracted with the plaintiff for the purchase of hay. 218 Ala. at 122, 117 So. at 758. The Highway Department later refused to accept any further deliveries of hay and refused to pay for the hay it had already received. 218 Ala. at 122, 117 So. at 758. This Court acknowledged that the Highway Department was authorized by statute to purchase necessary materials and that the statute mandated payment for the materials from the State highway fund. 218 Ala. at 123, 117 So. at 759. This Court held that the action was not barred by the doctrine of State immunity because a clear legal duty existed on behalf of the Highway Department to pay for the hay it had already accepted under the contract. 218 Ala. at 123, 117 So. at 759. River Road incorrectly asserts that the facts in the present action are almost identical to the facts presented in Milton Construction and Roquemore. In Milton Construction and Roquemore, this Court addressed the statutory duties of the Highway Department as those duties related to the actions at issue in those cases, just as River Road cites the statutory authority allowing Lyons to enter into contracts with private entities on behalf of the port authority. Milton Construction, 586 So.2d at 875, Roquemore, 218 Ala. at 123, 117 So. at 759. However, the fundamental difference between the present action and Milton Construction and Roquemore is the existence in those cases of a contract to establish a clear legal duty on behalf of the State. Unlike Milton Construction and Roquemore, no contract exists between the port authority and River Road, a subcontractor of Radcliff, the prime contractor, to bind the State to make any payments to River Road. River Road has failed to provide authority for the proposition that an entity with no contract with the State and a statutory mandate providing for payment can sue the State for money damages. [5]