Opinion ID: 1330397
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Safe Schools ActFacial Constitutional Analysis

Text: Syllabus Point 3 of Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979), states: The mandatory requirements of a thorough and efficient system of free schools found in Article XII, Section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution, make education a fundamental, constitutional right in this State. Syllabus Point 6, Randolph County Bd. of Educ. v. Adams, 196 W.Va. 9, 14, 467 S.E.2d 150, 155 (1995); Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. Board of Education for Grant County v. Manchin, 179 W.Va. 235, 366 S.E.2d 743 (1988). [3] [I]f the state takes some action which denies or infringes upon a person's fundamental right to an education, then strict scrutiny will apply and the State must prove that its action is necessary to serve some compelling State interest. Furthermore, any denial or infringement of the fundamental right to an education for a compelling State interest must be narrowly tailored. Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier County Board of Education, 199 W.Va. 400, 409, 484 S.E.2d 909, 918 (1996) (McHugh, J., concurring, in part, and dissenting, in part) (citations omitted). For example, in Syllabus Point 4 of Pauley v. Kelly, supra we determined that any discriminatory classification in the school financing system must serve a compelling state interest. In Phillip Leon M., supra, we held that providing a safe and secure environment wherein our children can learn is implicit in the constitutional guarantee of a thorough and efficient school system under W.Va. Const. art XII sec. 1. Syllabus Point 4 of Phillip Leon M. states, in pertinent part: Implicit within the West Virginia constitutional guarantee of a thorough and efficient system of free schools is the need for a safe and secure school environment. Without a safe and secure environment, a school is unable to fulfill its basic purpose of providing an education. Well before the passage of the Safe Schools Act, this Court recognized that a child may be constitutionally removed from the classroom environment when he or she engages in disruptive conduct. In Keith D. v. Ball, 177 W.Va. 93, 350 S.E.2d 720 (1986), four pupils were expelled for a period of one calendar year based on their conduct of falsely reporting over two dozen bomb threats. We held in Keith D. that the pupils were not entitled to reinstatement because the pupils' behavior involved substantial disorder and invasion of the rights of others. [4] We stated: Conduct by a student, whether in class or out, whether it stems from the time, place, or type of behavior, which materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others, is not constitutionally immunized. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513, 89 S.Ct. 733, 740, 21 L.Ed.2d 731(1969) (First amendment); see generally Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 864, 868 (1970). An individual does not have the right to exercise his fundamental constitutional rights at all times, under all circumstances, and by all methods. 177 W.Va. at 95, 350 S.E.2d at 722-23 (1986) (footnote omitted). The United States Supreme Court has recognized that if forbidden conduct would materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school, the discipline may be sustained. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509, 89 S.Ct. 733, 737-38, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.1966). The same reasoning would apply to consideration of the Safe Schools Act. The 12-month expulsion period which the Safe Schools Act sets forth may seem to be a severe penalty. But the Legislature is entitled to believe that only such a penalty would serve as an effective deterrent to further the important goal of a strict weapons-free environment in our schools, and would remove those children who defied a no weapons policy from school for a substantial period of time. [5] If West Virginians cannot have a reasonable degree of confidence that the schools that their children, grandchildren, nieces, nephews, friends and neighbors attend and work in are safe and secure, the survival of the thorough and efficient public school system which our Constitution itself mandates is in question. Indeed, a school system that did not take rigorous steps to eliminate violence and weapons could find itself in serious liability problems if a child or teacher were injured by the presence of conditions that the school could have detected and prevented. We conclude that the Safe Schools Act's 12-month expulsion period [6] sends a strong message that we think the Legislature was entitled to believe needs to be sent to further a compelling state interest. Because we conclude in Part II.D. of this opinion that in all but the most extreme cases a child who is on the receiving end of the Act's penalty will still have reasonable state-funded basic educational opportunities and services available, it is our judgment that the Safe Schools Act's requirement of removing children who commit certain offenses from a regular school setting for up to twelve months is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Because the State has a compelling interest in providing a safe and secure environment to the school children of this State pursuant to W.Va. Const. art. XII, section 1, and because expulsion from school for as much as 12 months pursuant to the provisions of the Productive and Safe Schools Act, W.Va.Code, 18A-5-1a(g)[1995] is a reasonably necessary and narrowly tailored method to further that interest, the mandatory suspension period of the Act is not facially unconstitutional.