Opinion ID: 742598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Hearsay Testimony as to Statements of Murdered Declarants

Text: 91 At trial, Meisner Suarez, the widow of homicide victim Fernando Suarez, testified, inter alia, that her husband, prior to being murdered, told her that on one occasion he had gone to Jamaica, Queens, to meet a group of black men, one of whom was big with a scar on his face, a description that fit Hale. In addition, Toni McGee, Rivera's girlfriend, testified that before his death, Rivera told her that [h]e had killed some Colombians and had taken from them two keys of coke. (Transcript of Miller Trial (Miller Trial Tr.) at 2512.) The district court admitted these hearsay statements against Hale and Arroyo notwithstanding defendants' inability to confront the declarants, on the basis that the declarants had been murdered by defendants and thus defendants had caused their unavailability. See, e.g., United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir.1982) (Mastrangelo ). Defendants challenge the admission of this testimony, contending (a) that the Mastrangelo rationale is applicable only to cases in which a witness is murdered to prevent his testimony at a proceeding that is underway, and that no proceeding was pending at the time of these two murders, and (b) that the court could not properly admit this testimony without having a hearing to determine whether or not the declarant's absence had been procured by defendants. Although we agree that the district court should have had a hearing before admitting the testimony, we conclude that the error in failing to do so was harmless. 92 The right to confront hostile witnesses may be constructively waived by a defendant's conduct. In Mastrangelo, we held thatif a witness' silence is procured by the defendant himself, whether by chicanery ... or by actual violence or murder ..., the defendant cannot then assert his confrontation clause rights in order to prevent prior grand jury testimony of that witness from being admitted against him. Any other result would mock the very system of justice the confrontation clause was designed to protect. 93 Id. at 272-73; see United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir.1992). In such circumstances, the defendant will be deemed to have 'waived his sixth amendment rights and, a fortiori, his hearsay objection' to the admission of the declarant's statements. United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 814 (2d Cir.) (quoting Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 977, 115 S.Ct. 456, 130 L.Ed.2d 364 (1994); see United States v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784, 788-89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 918, 105 S.Ct. 297, 83 L.Ed.2d 232 (1984). Although we first articulated this rule in admitting a murdered witness's prior grand jury testimony, see Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273, we have since extended it to allow evidence of unsworn statements made to a detective prior to the declarant's murder by the defendant, see United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d at 814-15, and of unsworn statements of a witness who was not murdered but whose planned testimony was withheld in response to the defendant's intimidation, see United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 47. 94 We have never indicated that Mastrangelo did not apply to a defendant's procurement of the unavailability of the declarant unless there was an ongoing proceeding in which the declarant was scheduled to testify, and we see no reason to do so now. Although a finding that [defendants'] purpose was to prevent [a declarant from] testifying, United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d at 815, is relevant, such a finding is not required. The relevant issue is 95 the [defendant]'s participation in [the deceased witness]'s murder. If the District Court finds that [the defendant] was in fact involved in the death of [the witness] through knowledge, complicity, planning or in any other way, it must hold his objections to the use of [the witness]'s testimony waived. Bare knowledge of a plot to kill [the witness] and a failure to give warning to appropriate authorities is sufficient to constitute a waiver. 96 Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273-74. 97 However, before the court admits evidence of statements by absent declarants on the ground of such a waiver, it must hold a hearing: an evidentiary hearing in the absence of the jury is necessary before a finding of [Confrontation Clause rights] waiver may be made. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273 (remanding for hearing); see also United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d at 814-15 (hearing held); United States v. Aguiar, 975 F.2d at 47 (same). Further, in order to avoid the admission of facially unreliable hearsay, the district court should undertake a balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect in accordance with Fed.R.Evid. 403. United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d at 814 (internal quotation marks omitted). At a Mastrangelo hearing, the government's burden is (1) to show that the declarant's unavailability was caused by the defendant's misconduct, and (2) to establish that fact by a preponderance of the evidence. See Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d at 273. 98 In the present case, when the defense moved at the outset of the trial to exclude hearsay statements attributed to deceased declarants, the district court declined to hold a hearing. Rather, the court stated that [t]he indictment establishes probable cause (Miller Trial Tr. at 109), and that in light of the finding inherent in the charging instrument, there is no need at this point to stop what we're doing, bring the witnesses out, have a little mini-trial as to the culpability of Mr. Hale and Mr. Arroyo relative to these homicides (id. at 114). The court stated that the Suarez and Rivera statements would be admitted subject to connection (id. at 112), indicated that it would review the matter using a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard (id. at 114), and warned that the government would be proceed[ing] at its peril (id. at 115). 99 This procedure did not comport with the requirements set forth in Mastrangelo. The district court's reliance on the fact that the indictment charged defendants with the murders of Suarez and Rivera was misplaced. A grand jury's indictment is based on probable cause, not on a preponderance of the evidence, and that body makes its judgment after an ex parte proceeding at which the target of its inquiry is normally not permitted to call or cross-examine witnesses. The grand jury's conclusion, after such a proceeding, that there is probable cause to indict a defendant for murder is not an acceptable surrogate for a court's finding, after a hearing at which both sides have the opportunity to be heard, that the defendant's responsibility for that murder is established by a preponderance of the evidence. If the government cannot persuade the court that it is more likely than not true that the defendant to whom the declarant's statement related was responsible for the declarant's unavailability, the basis for a finding of waiver of confrontation rights will not have been established. In that event, further inquiry will be required into other possible bases for admissibility, which may or may not be found. Admitting the statements as the district court did here, subject to connection, is not an adequate substitute for a hearing, for if the connection is not forthcoming, valuable constitutional and trial rights may be lost. 100 Nonetheless, we conclude that, in the circumstances of the present case, the district court's admission of the hearsay evidence without holding a Mastrangelo hearing was harmless error. At trial, there was ample evidence from Supreme Team members and associates as to the defendants' procurement of the deaths of Suarez and Rivera. Further, there was an abundance of evidence that the Supreme Team made it a practice to murder members whose cooperation with authorities was suspected or who posed a threat to the gang's operations. If presented with even a fraction of this evidence at a hearing, the district court could not fail to find it established by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants were responsible for the deaths of Suarez and Rivera. (See Parts I.A.2. and 3. above.) Further, any suggestion that defendants were prejudiced by the admission of the Rivera statement that [h]e had killed some Colombians and took two keys of coke from them is belied by the fact that each of the defendants charged with possession of the cocaine allegedly taken from the four unnamed Colombians slain in July 1989 was acquitted on that count. We conclude that the failure to hold a Mastrangelo hearing was harmless error. 101