Opinion ID: 1109219
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: were the district's allegedly negligent acts discretionary?

Text: ¶ 13. Lang alleges [t]he defendant is liable for the plaintiff's damages and her son's injuries because it breached its duty to exercise the necessary supervision on the defendant's premises during a school function to avoid assaults by other students or interlopers. Additionally, Lang alleges [t]he defendant is also liable for the plaintiff's damages and her son's injuries because it breached its duty to provide a safe place for [her son] to attend school and school sponsored functions. According to Lang, the question before this Court is whether any of the numerous provisions of Section 11-46-9, and specifically subsections (1)(d) and (1)(g), protect the Bay St. Louis/Waveland School District from liability for failing to protect her son or to provide him with a safe place to attend school functions. ¶ 14. Lang claims the problem that arises from exempting governmental entities from liability for negligence because of performance of discretionary functions is that any act of any entity is ultimately traceable back to some arguably discretionary function. Lang argues that if the law is construed in such a manner, then this Court will be saying that the government has discretion to be negligent, or that its choice to be negligent is a discretionary act under the sovereign immunity statutes. ¶ 15. Lang further argues that while the statutory provisions that grant governmental entities and their employees an exemption from liability for certain acts may be broad, the law does not shield school districts of this state from an obligation to protect students from reasonably foreseeable harm or an obligation to provide them with safe places to attend school. In support of this argument, Lang cites to the common law of Mississippi. See Board of Trustees v. Doe, 508 So.2d 1081, 1085 (Miss.1987) (As always, the schools retain the responsibility in insuring a safe school environment). Accord, L.W., 754 So.2d at 1143, at ¶¶ 24-29. ¶ 16. Lang also asserts that because it is not always easy to determine whether a public official or public body's conduct is ministerial or discretionary, Poyner v. Gilmore, 171 Miss. 859, 158 So. 922, 923 (Miss.1935) and T.M. v. Noblitt, 650 So.2d 1340, 1345, the Court should carefully analyze the underlying differences between conduct which should be protected by sovereign immunity and conduct which should not be protected. Lang asks this Court to enunciate a workable standard for deciding questions concerning the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity. ¶ 17. Lang offers for this Court's consideration the following definition of discretion, with a caveat for its use: Definition: Discretion implies the exercise of discriminating judgment within the bounds of reason. It involves the choice of exercising of the will, a determination made between competing and sometimes conflicting considerations. Discretion imparts that a choice of action is determined, and that action should be taken with reason and good conscience in the interest of protecting the rights of all parties and serving the ends of justice. It has been defined as the power and privilege to act unhampered by legal rule, or the capacity to distinguish between what is right and wrong, lawful and unlawful, wise or foolish. Caution: The test for a discretionary function is not a test for whether the function involved traditional governmental functions, since the exercise of choice and judgment and the making of responsible decisions take place daily in all human activities without respect to the government context. Moreover, since virtually all human endeavors involve some type of discretion as commonly defined, the discretionary function exception does not include functions which merely involve any element of choice, judgment, or ability to make responsible decisions. Otherwise, every function would fall within the exception. 57 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 119, at 132 (1988). (footnotes omitted). ¶ 18. In support of her argument, Lang also cites Womble v. Singing River Hosp., 618 So.2d 1252 (Miss.1993), in which this Court considered, among other things, whether doctors employed by a public entity hospital should be protected by qualified immunity. [1] In Womble, the Court held these doctors did not implement policy and were, therefore, not protected by immunity. The Court stated: None of the considerations undergirding common law qualified immunity are applicable to medical treatment decisions. First of all, there is nothing inherently governmental about decisions regarding individual medical treatment. They do not involve the formulation of public policy in any respect. Therefore, the notion of promoting governmental decisions that are in the public good is completely inapplicable. Second the fact that a physician or other medical provider is employed by the State does not expose that physician to any greater threat of suit than he would otherwise face in private practice. He therefore will be no more discouraged by the threat of suit from taking actions he thinks are prudent, then he ordinarily would be as a private physician. Furthermore, the threat of suit will not discourage physicians from seeking and accepting the government employment, because they will face the exact same potential exposure to liability that they would as private physicians. Finally, the judicial system is perfectly capable of adjudicating the reasonableness of medical treatment decisions. Our courts do it every day in medical malpractice actions heard across this state. The medical treatment decisions made by medical personnel at state health institutions are no different from the private medical care decisions that are currently being judged. Womble, 618 So.2d at 1263-64. ¶ 19. Lang claims the same arguments can be made for school districts and their employees. She argues there is nothing inherently governmental about decisions regarding care and safety of children. Lang argues private schools are held to standards of reasonableness concerning the safeguarding of their students, as public schools should be. She claims public schools will not go out of business because of the potential for liability for the manner of performance of their duties; but they will, however, perform those duties as if their financial future depends on it. Likewise, says Lang, public school districts will do the same things to protect themselves that private schools do (for e.g., they will purchase insurance to make certain that if their negligent acts injure students or others, the victim will be compensated). Lang further asserts the judicial system is qualified to assess the liability of school districts. ¶ 20. Additionally, Lang warns that when a governmental employee or entity is cloaked with immunity based on a discretionary act, then citizens have no recourse from the act and no remedy for injuries received as a result of that discretion. ¶ 21. Lang asks this Court to consider a set of criteria, consisting of four questions, for determining whether conduct is discretionary. (1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a basic governmental policy, program, or objective? (2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization or accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as opposed to one which would no to change the course or direction of the policy, program or objective? (3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental agency involved? (4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite constitutional, statutory, or local authority and duty to do or make the challenged act, omission, or decision? See Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash.2d 246, 407 P.2d 440, 445 (1965). ¶ 22. Finally, Lang argues that if a duty is statutory, then the act is not discretionary under Mississippi law. Lang cites several statutes concerning actions of school employees: (1) Section 37-11-29 requiring superintendents, principals and teachers shall hold pupils to strict account for disorderly conduct at school, on the way to and from school, on the playgrounds, and during recess; (2) Section 37-11-53 requiring schools distribute, and obviously maintain, a discipline plan; and (3) Section 37-11-55 requiring schools to develop and disseminate a student code of conduct; and finally (4) Section 37-11-29 requiring school staff to report to the superintendent unlawful activity by a student. Lang surmises that because care for public school students is not discretionary, no protection should be afforded the school district by the exemptions from the waiver of sovereign immunity. ¶ 23. The school district argues the trial court's dismissal in the case sub judice was proper because all discretionary functions or duties involving employees of a governmental entity are protected by the MTCA. The school district asserts that any duty arising out of Lang's allegations with respect to providing necessary supervision and a safe place for Lang would be characterized as a discretionary function or duty, thereby absolving the school district from liability. In support of this argument, the school district refers the Court to T.M. v. Noblitt, 650 So.2d 1340, 1344 (quoting the trial court's finding with approval which stated that [t]he duty to hire and supervise employees is necessarily and logically dependent upon judgment and discretion); Mohundro v. Alcorn County, 675 So.2d 848, 854 (Miss.1996) (summarizing a series of cases which held that road maintenance and repair are discretionary rather than ministerial functions); Glover ex rel. Glover v. Donnell, 878 F.Supp. 898, 899-901 (S.D.Miss.1995) (characterizing allegations that the activity director of a governmental program failed to properly supervise youth participating in the program and generally failed to act to prevent the plaintiff from being raped at a summer program by other participants as discretionary); English v. Thorne, 676 F.Supp. 761 (S.D.Miss.1987) (interpreting the Federal Torts Claims Act and stating [w]here there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion). The school district further argues the Legislature expressly provided in Subsection (1)(d) that a governmental actor may abuse his discretion and still remain immune. According the school district, it is beyond doubt that Lang can show no facts that would overcome the immunity provided to the school district by Subsections 11-46-9(1)(d) and (1)(g).