Opinion ID: 214348
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: On appeal, appellants contend that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear this case, and that we should therefore vacate the judgment below and remand the case, directing the district court to dismiss it without prejudice so that M.F. and B.C. can refile in state court. Appellants’ new-found jurisdictional argument is unavailing. As appellants themselves pointed out in their written submissions and acknowledged at oral argument, the complaint clearly presents a federal question: whether the Division violated enforceable rights of the plaintiffs under an interstate compact authorized by Congress under 4 U.S.C. § 112 and by the Compact Clause of the Constitution.2 Such a compact has the force of federal law. “[A]n interstate compact or agreement becomes federal law if it is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact within the meaning of the Compact Clause of the Constitution.” NYSA-ILA Vacation & Holiday Fund v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y., 732 F.2d 292, 297 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 440 (1981) (“[W]here Congress has authorized the States to enter into a cooperative 2 The Compact Clause provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 6 agreement, and where the subject matter of that agreement is an appropriate subject for congressional legislation, the consent of Congress transforms the States’ agreement into federal law under the Compact Clause.”). Furthermore, the Rules governing the Compact explicitly provide for federal judicial enforcement of the Compact in legal actions initiated by the Interstate Commission created by the Compact.3 Thus, there can be no question that this case arises under the laws of the United States. See U.S. Const. art. III; 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983) (a suit that “necessarily raises questions of substantive federal law at the very outset . . . clearly ‘arises under’ federal law, as that term is used in Article III”). The federal question at issue in this case was apparent from M.F. and B.C.’s complaint, which alleged that “[t]he terms and conditions set forth by [the Division] are in direct conflict with [ICAOS] Rule 4.101.” Compl. ¶ 18.4 3 ICAOS Rule 6.104 provides: The Interstate Commission may, by majority vote of the members, initiate legal action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or, at the discretion of the Interstate Commission, in the federal district where the Interstate Commission has its offices to enforce compliance with the provisions of the Compact, its duly promulgated rules and by-laws, against any compacting state in default. In the event judicial enforcement is necessary the prevailing party shall be awarded all costs of such litigation including reasonable attorneys’ fees. 4 It is of no consequence that the complaint erroneously alleged diversity jurisdiction where none exists. See Compl. ¶¶ 1-3, 5. We “must liberally construe 7 Accordingly, the district court had jurisdiction over the matter.