Opinion ID: 2997559
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether a Seizure Occurred

Text: We begin our review of the district court’s decision to deny Deputy Shelnutt qualified immunity for the seizure by asking whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the Leafs, show that Deputy Shelnutt violated the Constitution. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991). In order to determine whether Deputy Shelnutt seized Mr. Leaf in violation of the Fourth Amendment, we must engage in a two-part inquiry. See White v. City of Markham, 310 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 2002). We first consider whether Mr. Leaf was seized in his bedroom on May 5, 2001; if we conclude that he was seized, we then must determine whether the seizure was unreasonable. See id. A seizure has been defined as a “governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (emphasis in original). A person is seized “only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person [in the subject’s position] would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). As well, for a seizure to have taken place, “the subject [must] actually yield to a show of authority from the police or be physically touched by the police.” Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 957 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626). In concluding that Mr. Leaf was seized, the district court determined that a reasonable person in Mr. Leaf’s situation would have believed that he was not free to leave. The Supreme Court has noted that a reasonable person might not believe he was free to leave when faced with “the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon 34 No. 04-1318 by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. Furthermore, this court has noted some other factors that might influence a reasonable individual to believe that he was not free to leave: “whether the encounter occurred in a public or private place; whether the suspect was informed that he was . . . free to leave; . . . whether there was physical touching, display of weapons, or other threatening conduct; and whether the suspect eventually departed the area without hindrance.” United States v. Scheets, 188 F.3d 829, 836-37 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1096 (2000). In light of the fact that two police officers had their guns and tactical lights pointed at Mr. Leaf, while he lay in his bed in his own residence in the middle of the night, we agree with the district court that a reasonable person would not have believed that he was free to leave. However, this issue is not dispositive of the ultimate question of whether a seizure occurred. “[T]he objective test of Mendenhall states a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for seizure.” Tom, 963 F.2d at 957. We must also consider whether Mr. Leaf was physically touched by the officers or whether he submitted to their authority, before we may conclude that a seizure occurred. Id. The district court thought that the question of seizure turned on whether or not Mr. Leaf submitted to the officers’ show of authority. However, because a seizure must be accomplished “through means intentionally applied,” it is not the case that a seizure occurs every time there is a “governmentally desired termination of an individual’s freedom of movement.” Brower, 489 U.S. at 597 (emphases in original). Where police seek to stop someone, but the subject is “in fact stopped . . . by a different means,” no seizure occurs. Id. If Mr. Leaf’s failure to flee can be attributed to the fact that No. 04-1318 35 he was asleep or otherwise unconscious, we think that it cannot be said that the officers terminated his freedom of movement through their show of authority. Thus, the fact that Mr. Leaf did not flee, taken alone, cannot establish that he was seized. In determining that a seizure had occurred, the district court did not make a finding as to whether or not Deputy Shelnutt actually touched Mr. Leaf. In fact, in its January 6, 2004 order denying Deputy Shelnutt qualified immunity, the district court stated that whether Deputy Shelnutt had touched Mr. Leaf was “irrelevant to the present motion.” R.219 at 4. We may not reconsider the district court’s apparent conclusion that there was a question of fact as to whether any touching occurred, nor may we express an opinion about which facts the parties may ultimately be able to establish at trial. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313. The Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he word ‘seizure’ readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful.” Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626; see id. (“An arrest requires . . . physical force . . . .”). However, the Court has also said that, when a person merely is tapped on the shoulder by law enforcement agents attempting to get that person’s attention, no seizure occurs. See INS v. 25 Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 220-21 (1984). This observation conforms to the Court’s directive that a seizure is a “governmental termination of freedom of movement.” Brower, 489 U.S. 25 See also Martinez v. Nygaard, 831 F.2d 822, 826-27 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that man was not seized when officers grabbed him “to get his attention” and then released him); cf. United States v. Sokolow, 808 F.2d 1366, 1369 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that man was seized when officers grabbed him and moved him to a seat for questioning before releasing him), rev’d on other grounds, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (assuming, without deciding, that a seizure occurred). 36 No. 04-1318 at 597 (emphasis added). Here, Deputy Shelnutt sought to get Mr. Leaf’s attention, not to terminate his freedom of movement. Thus, the Leafs have not alleged the first part of a Fourth Amendment violation; on these facts, they cannot show that Mr. Leaf was seized. Therefore, we must conclude that there was no unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that Deputy Shelnutt is entitled to qualified immunity as a defense against the Leafs’ illegal seizure claim.