Opinion ID: 2318671
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Defendant's Assertion of the Privilege Against Self-incrimination

Text: Lastly, defendant argues that he should not have been put in a position of forfeiting his privilege against self-incrimination and rendering it meaningless by admitting guilt in order to engage in sex offender counseling, and thus he asserts that the trial justice erred when he faulted [defendant] for not doing so. The record, however, does not support this contention. The trial justice explicitly explained his consideration of defendant's failure to participate in the Sex Offender Treatment Program as follows: Now, lastly I come to the issue of whether or not the defendant's failure to admit that he committed the crime is somehow something I should consider. And I state right now that I don't consider it at all. It's a neutral fact. It's a fact that I not consider    because it is true that first the defendant had an appeal pending; then he had a review to the United States Supreme Court, which [was] ultimately denied; he has a pending postconviction relief. And thus, I think he can make a good-faith argument that he shouldn't have to admit a crime while these legal proceedings are ongoing. But as has been said in case, after case, after case, sometimes you have to give up certain rights, certain constitutional rights, in order to afford yourself of other rights, constitutional or otherwise. And so it may be that [defendant] has a right, to the extent that every other prisoner has a right, to participate in the Sex Offender Program and he can't be denied that right. But if he chooses to exercise a constitutional right which he believes he had with respect to the Fifth Amendment and not admit to any criminal acts, then he is certainly not in a position to complain that he hasn't been allowed to the Sex Offender Program and any benefit he might    directly or indirectly obtain as a result of participating. The trial justice made it abundantly clear that he treated defendant's failure to participate in treatment as a neutral fact. The trial justice's own words reveal that he accepted defendant's good-faith assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and did not hold such an assertion against defendant. At the same time, the trial justice acknowledged that, in light of this averment, defendant could not reap the potential benefits of the Sex Offender Treatment Program. This is entirely different from the trial justice punishing defendant for asserting a constitutional right. Cf. State v. Tiernan, 645 A.2d 482, 485-86 (R.I.1994) (To exact a price or impose a penalty upon a defendant in the form of an enhanced sentence for invoking [the privilege against self-incrimination] would amount to a deprivation of due process of law, and that we shall not condone.). Although a defendant's participation in a treatment program might well be credited by a trial justice, a defendant's lack of participation in such a program cannot be construed as a positive factor such as would support a request for leniency. Here, defendant was not punished for failing to admit his crime; rather, the trial justice simply exercised his discretion not to bestow upon defendant the leniency he requested. We are completely satisfied that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in doing so. The defendant bore a weighty burden in this case and ultimately failed to shoulder it because he is unable to demonstrate that this matter is among those rarest of cases that would justify altering our strong policy against interference with the ruling of the trial justice. Dyer, 14 A.3d at 228. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial justice was well within his discretion to give and then confirm defendant's sentence.