Opinion ID: 4236001
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Government Overstepped in Moving To

Text: Excuse Second Defense Counsel A district court’s decision to grant or deny services under the Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Smith, 893 F.2d 1573, 1580 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, the relevant question is not whether we, as the reviewing court, would have reached the same result. See Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976); Krull v. S.E.C., 248 F.3d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 2001) (our task is “not to revisit the [issue] anew or impose our independent judgment on the merits” thereof). Applying this deferential standard, we do not find that the removal of Mr. Offenbecher was reversible error, but neither can we accept without comment the Government’s interference in the status of Wells’ representation. Mr. Offenbecher was appointed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3005. In this circuit, § 3005 does not require that two attorneys be, or continue to be, appointed whenever the Government indicts a defendant for a crime punishable by death but does not seek the death penalty. United States v. Waggoner, 339 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 2003). Acknowledging this Court’s precedent in Waggoner, Wells UNITED STATES V. WELLS 13 argues that this case is distinguishable, because Waggoner fails to address the impact of 18 U.S.C. § 3599(e), on which Wells relies to urge an enhanced statutory right to continuity of counsel. Because we find that Wells failed to properly present this statutory argument below, we decline to entertain it on appeal. See Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998). Instead, we address Wells’ assertion that Mr. Offenbecher’s removal constituted an abuse of discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. See Martel v. Clair, 565 U.S. 648, 659 (2012) (recognizing that “Congress enacted the legislation now known as § 3599 to govern appointment of counsel in capital cases, thus displacing § 3006A for persons facing execution (but retaining that section for all others)”). The CJA does not prohibit courts from appointing, or maintaining, a dual appointment in a non-capital case. Instead, § 3006A(c) generally governs the duration and substitution of all CJA appointments and directs the magistrate judge or the court to make such determinations in accordance with the “interests of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c). Section 630.30 of the Guide to Judiciary Policy (“the Guide”) specifically governs “Death Eligible Cases Where Death Penalty Is Not Sought,” and assists courts in determining whether a particular case supports continuation of a dual appointment. As recognized by the magistrate judge, § 630.30.10 directs a court to consider the questions of number of counsel and rate of compensation, once it is determined that the death penalty will not be sought. The Guide, Vol. 7, Ch. 6, § 630.30.10. Section 630.30.20 explains that a court “should, absent extenuating circumstances, make an appropriate reduction in the number of counsel.” Id. § 630.30.20(a) (emphasis added). The Guide then sets out the following four 14 UNITED STATES V. WELLS factors to consider in deciding whether extenuating circumstances exist:
proceedings; (2) whether the decision not to seek the death penalty occurred late in the litigation; (3) whether the case is unusually complex; and (4) any other factors that would interfere with the need to ensure effective representation of the defendant. Id. § 630.30.20(b). Here, the magistrate judge adequately considered the Guide’s directives and found that this case was not unusually complex, the parties were adhering to the pretrial motion schedule, the decision not to seek the death penalty was not delayed, and the continuation of FPD Curtner’s representation would conserve the District of Alaska’s CJA budget while protecting Wells’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel and preserve any attorneyclient relationship. In upholding the excusal of Mr. Offenbecher, we intentionally employ the word adequately, to emphasize the limitations placed on our review, and we offer a cautionary note. 2 First, problematically, we find no indication that the magistrate judge considered the candid statements of FPD Curtner, advising of the crippling effects of the unprecedented fiscal crisis as it related to his ability to serve as Wells’ sole counsel. Given FPD Curtner’s statements, the absence of any explicit consideration thereof sits in stark contrast to at least one other non-capital case, wherein the 2 The concurrence criticizes the inclusion of a cautionary note, in part, “because we ultimately conclude that the ruling was correct.” This opinion merely finds no abuse of discretion. UNITED STATES V. WELLS 15 same magistrate judge reconsidered his denial of dual- appointed counsel. See United States v. Kott, No. 3:07-CR056-JWS-JDR, 2011 WL 2357508, at  (D. Alaska June 13, 2011). There, the defendant was being retried, after an initial 15-day trial, involving two retained defense counsel. Id. at . In denying dual appointment for the re-trial, the magistrate judge, inter alia, found persuasive that the previously-retained attorneys would be available for consultation and that the original trial transcripts would provide appointed counsel with knowledge of the Government’s case. Id. Noting, first, that counsel had been appointed at her own request, the magistrate judge nevertheless recognized the attorney’s express concerns about serving as the defendant’s sole attorney. Id. at . The magistrate judge requested that the attorney “reassess her role” and advise accordingly, implying that her relative willingness to serve in that capacity would be taken into consideration. Id. In this Court’s opinion, the careful consideration given to the concerns of appointed counsel in Kott is highly preferable to the lack thereof afforded to FPD Curtner in this case. Second, and of much greater concern to this Court, is the means by which the question of Mr. Offenbecher’s continued appointment was placed before the magistrate judge. After contesting the initial dual appointment, the Government again placed itself in an ethically compromised position by challenging the continuation of Mr. Offenbecher’s appointment once the death penalty was eliminated. This strikes the Court as highly unusual. Indeed, it constitutes two improper insertions by the prosecution into a matter exclusively within the province of the judiciary. While such a motion would be disfavored in any setting, it is particularly so where a successful challenge would leave a uniquely beleaguered FPD battling against the unlimited 16 UNITED STATES V. WELLS resources of the Government, on behalf of a client whose liberty is at stake. See United States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254, 258 (9th Cir. 1975), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Sneezer, 900 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1990) (“If the fairness of our system is to be assured, indigent defendants must have access to minimal defense aids to offset the advantage presented by the vast prosecutorial and investigative resources available to the Government.”). The Government’s decision to insert itself into the important determination of Wells’ fair representation carries with it a reproachable air of stacking the deck, for which we cannot offer tacit acceptance. The administration of the CJA is a judicial function for which the Judicial Conference of the United States has approved official guidelines. In re Smith, 586 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2009). The prosecution is typically precluded from participating in the determination of a defendant’s eligibility for CJA-appointed counsel. See The Guide, Vol. 7, Ch. 2, § 210.40.20(e) (“Employees of law enforcement agencies or U.S. attorney offices should not participate in the completion of the Form CJA 23 (Financial Affidavit) or seek to obtain information from a person requesting the appointment of counsel concerning the person’s eligibility.”); id. § 230.26.20(c) (“Case budgets should be submitted ex parte and filed and maintained under seal.”); 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (directing that CJA applications for services other than counsel should be filed ex parte, and proceedings on such applications should be heard ex parte); see also United States v. Feldman, 788 F.2d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 1986) (declining to call on government to brief a novel CJA reimbursement claim because “the [CJA] excludes the government from participation in the Act’s compensation and reimbursement arrangements”); United States v. Gonzales, 150 F.3d 1246, 1257 (10th Cir. 1998) (the CJA UNITED STATES V. WELLS 17 process is non-adversarial and has “traditionally been closed to the prosecution”). The Government’s exclusion from the administration of the CJA is a significant contributing factor to the fairness of our system and the CJA’s role in redressing the imbalance of power between an indigent defendant and the Government. “A contrary position might well result in a system wherein the outcome of criminal trials would be determined by the poverty of the accused rather than the integrity of the factfinding process.” Hartfield, 513 F.2d at 258. While we find that that the jury’s fact-finding role was reversibly undermined by errors in this case, we do not find that Mr. Offenbecher’s removal constituted an abuse of discretion. Despite our disapproval of the Government’s interference, and regardless of whether we might have decided the question differently, the magistrate judge was within his discretion to find that FPD Curtner’s continued representation afforded Wells “adequate representation” under the CJA. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a). Nevertheless, in the future, the Government should tend to its own knitting.