Opinion ID: 2231771
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Finally, Barth relies on virtually identical arguments to argue that the jury verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence and that his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted. He correctly notes the standard of review for a ruling on a motion for judgment n.o.v. This court must determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, so overwhelmingly favors the moving party that no other verdict based on the evidence could stand. Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill.2d 494, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504 (1967). As the factual bases for his claims, Barth cites his physical and financial condition as well as his conduct during State Farm's investigation. At the time of the fire, he was 58 years old, wheelchair-bound, and required a ventilator because he had polio in his youth. Nonetheless, Barth states he was financially stable, with a net worth of over $70,000, with $44,000 in home equity and $27,000 in liquid assets. Barth argues that State Farm offered no plausible theory for why he would have been involved in the burning of his home over disputed credit card bills under these circumstances. Barth contends instead he was victimized by two convicted felons, William Penn and William Burmeister, who misappropriated his credit cards as well as the cash he gave them to pay his bills. When he made the misstatements, he was unaware of the extent and full effect of those misappropriations. In addition, he simply forgot during his recorded statement to mention his American Express account, one of the credit cards misused by the two felons. He claims the error was timely corrected when he provided State Farm with a copy of his credit report noting the account and its balance. State Farm then deprived him of an opportunity to correct his prior omission orally by not asking about the account during his examination under oath. Similarly, Barth corrected his original statement that he could not get a cash advance the evening of the fire because he used the wrong PIN after he found out the real reason: Penn and Burmeister had overdrawn his card with fraudulent cash advances. At his first recorded statement, Barth accurately told State Farm his satellite television service had been disconnected due to nonpayment. Barth also believed at that time that his mortgage payments were current because he did not yet know that Penn had misused the money Barth had given him for the payment. Moreover, State Farm already knew from its contacts with Barth's bank that the mortgage payment was at least a month late. Barth claims that he was not required to prove who committed the arson and that State Farm did not meet the burden of proving its second affirmative defense. Based on this evidence and argument, Barth concludes that the jury's verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence and that his motion for judgment n.o.v. the verdict should have been granted. On the merits of these issues, State Farm counters that the materiality of Barth's statements and actions are questions of fact for the jury ( Passero v. Allstate Insurance Co., 196 Ill.App.3d 602, 610, 143 Ill.Dec. 449, 554 N.E.2d 384 (1990)) and argues that additional evidence presented at trial supports the verdict. The record reveals that, at the scene of the fire, the fire investigator from the sheriff's office immediately suspected arson and approached Barth, Penn, and Burmeister, who were in Barth's car. The three men indicated that they needed to leave because they had some things to do, without identifying those things. The fire investigator described Barth as agitated and upset with somebody in the car and with everybody else around him. He did not interview Barth later due to restrictions imposed by Barth's attorney that the investigator believed were unacceptable. The bank employee working on Barth's mortgage account also testified, stating that he began calling Barth about late payments in November 2002 and made numerous calls throughout that winter and spring. At the time of the fire on June 2, 2003, Barth was two months behind on his mortgage payments. He was also behind on his utility payments. In contrast, Barth told State Farm his financial situation had stabilized by that time, after he had experienced financial problems the prior fall. Barth also misstated the status of his American Express account, opened in February 2003. He had authorized Penn to use the card for specific purchases at that time and knew Penn had not returned the card. Nonetheless, Barth did not make any payments on the account before the fire. Although American Express called him in late May about the large account balance, Barth did not mention the account in his June recorded statement. Moreover, Barth never reported any misuse of his credit cards to the police. The special verdict submitted by the jury found, in relevant part, that State Farm proved by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) Barth concealed or misrepresented a fact or circumstance, or made a false statement, relating to the insurance at issue    or misrepresented any material fact to State Farm either before or after the claim; (2) the fact concealed or misrepresented, or the subject of the false statement, was material; (3) the concealment, misrepresentation, or false statement was made to State Farm or their agents; (4) the concealment, misrepresentation, or false statement was made knowingly, willingly, and with intent to deceive State Farm.  (Emphasis added.) To reverse a jury verdict as against the manifest weight of the evidence, we must find that: (1) it is unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based on the evidence; or (2) the opposite conclusion is readily apparent. Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill.2d 445, 454, 177 Ill.Dec. 438, 603 N.E.2d 508 (1992). Here, the evidence supports conflicting inferences about Barth's intentions in making the misrepresentations as well as about their materiality to State Farm's investigation. The jury is free to accept some evidence and reject others, as well as to determine the credibility of the witnesses and weigh their testimony. Maple, 151 Ill.2d at 452, 177 Ill.Dec. 438, 603 N.E.2d 508. We cannot say that the jury's determination in this case was unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based on the evidence presented or that the opposite conclusion is readily apparent. Thus, the verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and was properly affirmed by the appellate majority. As for Barth's alternative argument that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment n.o.v., we note that the test for that claim is even more stringent. Under Pedrick, a court may not grant the motion unless the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, so overwhelmingly favors the moving party that no other verdict based on the evidence could stand. Pedrick, 37 Ill.2d at 510, 229 N.E.2d 504. Having already decided that the jury's verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we are confident that the appellate court did not err in affirming the trial court's denial of Barth's motion for judgment n.o.v.