Opinion ID: 176179
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Plain Meaning of the Parties’ Agreement

Text: This dispute is governed by principles of contract interpretation. See Bito Bucks in Potter, Inc. v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp., 449 A.2d 652, 654 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (“It is settled that the same rules of construction apply to deeds granting easements as to contracts generally.”). With respect to easements, “[i]n the case of an express grant or reservation, the extent of the right depends upon the terms of the instrument conveying the interest, as interpreted by applying general principles of contract law.” Hann v. Saylor, 562 A.2d 891, 893 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). In particular, in determining the scope of an easement, courts should look to the parties’ intent, as demonstrated by the language of the grant. Sigal v. Mfg. Light & Heat Co., 299 A.2d 646, 649 (Pa. 1973). Accordingly, if the language of the Agreement is unambiguous, our analysis needs to proceed no farther. Murphy v. Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Ghost, 777 A.2d 418, 42930 (Pa. 2001) (“When a writing is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined by its contents alone . . . . In the absence of an ambiguity, the plain meaning of the agreement will be enforced.” (internal citations omitted)). As explained in Commonwealth Department of Transportation v. L.C. Anderson & Sons, Inc., [t]he question of whether an ambiguity exists is to be determined by the Court as a question of law. A contract is ambiguous if, and only if, it is reasonably or fairly susceptible of different constructions and is capable of 6 being understood in more senses than one and is obscure in meaning through indefiniteness of expression or has a double meaning. 452 A.2d 105, 106 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982). On their face, the Agreement and the Easement terms are unambiguous. We therefore agree with the District Court that they are subject only to one reasonable interpretation. Pocono Realty, 2009 WL 1109837, at . Section 1.1 of the Agreement belies Plaintiffs’ attempt to separate the right to access the boards from the right to use the land under the boards. That provision explicitly provides that “the real property upon which the Boards are now located shall be subject in perpetuity to such Easements.” Moreover, the Easement terms make reference to the “Billboard located on the Easement.” See App. at 28 (emphasis added). They also refer to the rights of ingress and egress, for the purposes of maintaining the billboards, as “ancillary” rights. App. at 28. If the parties did not intend for the land under the billboards to be included under the easement agreement, to what else could these rights be ancillary? Plaintiffs incorrectly state that Lamar’s easements are limited to rights of passage over the land. Here, Plaintiffs granted Lamar easements in gross, as compared to easements appurtenant. Easements in gross are personal to the grantee; they do not run with the land, as do easements appurtenant. Easements in gross thus confer certain benefits on the grantee, including the right to use the land for a particular purpose. See Ariel Land Owners, Inc. v. Dring, No. Civ.A. 3:01-CV-0294, 2005 WL 2416123, at  (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2005). As the District Court pointed out, the plain, dictionary 7 meaning of “use” is “a long-continued possession and employment of a thing for the purpose for which it is adapted.” Pocono Realty, 2009 WL 1109837, at  (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1577 (8th ed. 2004)) (quotation marks omitted). We thus agree with the Court that “it is evident that the parties contemplated that the Easements were for the particular purpose of displaying billboards—meaning, placing the billboard structures on the property in question in order to advertise.” Id. 3