Opinion ID: 852913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Helsley's Sentence

Text: With this framework in mind, it seems to me the majority's rationale for sustaining Helsley's sentence is not sufficient. Until the beginning of the penalty phase of the trial, the judge had concluded that the jury's recommendation would not be a recommendation at all, but would be a decision. In other words, the recommendation would be binding. The parties were so advised. Then, at the outset of the penalty phase the judge announced he would treat the jury's recommendation as just that, a recommendation, and would reserve final decision to himself. At that point the defendant unsuccessfully moved for a continuance. It surely is error to give the parties the wrong standard by which the jury's findings will be evaluated. Thus, the majority's view is in substance a holding of harmless error. The majority reasons that because Helsley chose not to present evidence before the jury at the penalty phase, he was precluded from presenting it to the trial judge at the sentencing, and therefore there is no error in denying the continuance of the sentencing phase and refusing to receive additional evidence. I think there are two problems with this analysis. First, as already noted, I do not believe the statute should be construed to eliminate the judge's ability to consider matters contained in a sentencing report that may not be presented to the jury. But even if I am wrong in this view, and the recommendation is binding, it is not clear that the evidence at a guilt phase that may bear on the weighing would be the same whether the jury's recommendation is binding or not. A defendant preparing for the guilt phase under the belief that the recommendation will be advisory only might well withhold evidence from the guilt phase in the belief that the sentencing will present an additional opportunity to present matters to the judge. I therefore do not agree that it is in every instance necessarily harmless error if the trial court reverses its ruling as to the binding effect of the jury's recommendation, and denies the defendant a continuance to adjust to the newly announced standard. But Helsley does not point to anything he claims he would have presented or developed if he had been given a continuance, so he has not established reversible error in denial of the continuance. Nor does he identify any matter that was presented to the jury, but would have been omitted if he had time to adjust to the new procedure. He thus fails to show any prejudice from the confusion. For that reason, and that reason alone, I agree with the majority that Helsley has not established reversible error. RUCKER, J., concurring in part. Except for that portion expressing the view that the weight to be given aggravators and mitigators is not subject to a reasonable doubt standard, I fully concur with Justice Boehm's separate opinion. I continue to believe that before capital punishment can be imposed a jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. See Ritchie v. State, 809 N.E.2d 258, No. 49S00-0011-DP-638 (Ind. May 25, 2004) (Rucker, J., dissenting in part).