Opinion ID: 624293
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Adequacy of Loughner's Staff Representative

Text: Quite aside from the exclusion of counsel, the staff representation in this case was a charade, and violated even the majority's lax due process standards. [16] Throughout the successive administrative involuntary medication hearings, Loughner's staff representative consistently failed to seek out or present any witnesses, cross-examine or challenge the prison's witnesses, or advocate in any other meaningful way against forced medication. What he did was sit in the room and, after the hearing concluded, see that Loughner's appeal form was filed. No more. Such anemic representation falls well below the standard demanded by due process and 28 C.F.R. § 549.46(a)(3). See Morgan, 193 F.3d at 266; Humphreys, 148 F.Supp.2d at 953; Weston, 55 F.Supp.2d at 26-27. Judge Bybee (but not Judge Wallace) recognizes the troubling deficiencies in the representation afforded by Loughner's staff representative. But he regards them as effectively harmless because, he insists, the district court's September 28 commitment hearing provided Loughner sufficient opportunity to challenge the prison's involuntary medication decision. Majority Op. at 764-65. Not so, as review of the district court's orders and statements surrounding the September 28 hearing demonstrates. The district court reiterated, in its September 30 order, the position it had taken consistently theretoforethat its only role with respect to the institution's medication for dangerousness decisions was to review for adequacy of procedures, not to entertain evidence or arguments substantively challenging the determination. The evidentiary aspect of the September 28 hearing was therefore restricted to the specific question whether Loughner's prior treatment that is, involuntary medicationwould, if continued, likely result in his timely restoration to competency, not whether that treatment was needed to mitigate Loughner's dangerousness to himself or medically appropriate for that purpose. Judge Bybee's suggestion to the contrary has no basis in the sequence of events leading up to the September 28 hearing or in the record of that hearing. First, in its July 1 order reviewing the prison's Harper I determination, the district court held that Loughner was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing to contest the administrative determination of dangerousness. Instead, the court adopted the holding of Morgan, 193 F.3d at 262-63, and reviewed the prison's Harper I determination for arbitrariness and compliance with 28 C.F.R. § 549.46. The district court then consistently reaffirmed this holding, stating in its August 30 order that [t]he defense's motion for a post-deprivation [judicial] hearing is denied. Consistent with the district court's settled view of its extremely limited role as to the involuntary medication decision, its September 1 order scheduling Loughner's § 4241(d)(2)(A) commitment hearing gave no indication that the court intended to reverse its prior practice and hold an evidentiary hearing on the involuntary medication issue. Instead, the court stated quite clearly that the scope of the [commitment] hearing will be limited to the question of whether an additional period of time should be granted to actually restore the defendant to competency. Although the court also suggested that the parties should be prepared to state their positions regarding the necessity of scheduling a Sell involuntary medication hearing at some later point, the court never suggested allowing an evidentiary hearing on the prison's involuntary medication for dangerousness determination as part of its commitment hearing. During the pre-hearing telephonic conference, the district court further explicated its concern that a Sell hearing may be required where a court orders a pretrial detainee recommitted for restoration through the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication. I think it is a game changer and a significant event that Iif I do extend him, the purpose for the extension is for restoration, the court stated, Knowing that he is being involuntarily medicated, I think it is incumbent upon the court at that point to conduct a Sell hearing. The court, however, reiterated its decision to focus on the commitment decision and leave the involuntary medication issue for another day, stating: As I forecast, I think [the necessity of a Sell hearing is] an issue that is timely now and that we have to get to. But the immediate issue is whether there is enough evidence to support an extension on the substantial probability that [Loughner] can be restored. How they restore him and what due process rights he has during that period is a secondary issue. It's one I intend to get to ultimately. But the immediate issue is just this question of whether an extension is warranted. At the September 28 hearing, the district court repeatedly declared its intention to restrict the evidentiary hearing to the commitment issue. Doctor Pietz provided detailed testimony concerning Loughner's condition and his prospects for restoration. When defense counsel attempted to cross-examine Dr. Pietz regarding Dr. Sarrazin's diagnosis and its relation to the prescribed antibiotics, however, the government objected on relevance grounds and the court sustained the objection, reminding the defense that the limited focus here is whether an extension is likelysubstantially probable to restore [Loughner]. The court further stated: I'm well familiar with all of the background reports. I've read them myself. You'll have the opportunity, obviously, at some point when that's relevant to go over those. But the questions should focus on going forward. Doctor Ballenger provided generalized testimony about the likelihood and duration of psychiatric restoration through involuntary medication, gave an opinion as to Loughner's prospects for restoration based on his medical history and medication regimen, and passed on the propriety of Loughner's current medication. But when defense counsel attempted to cross-examine Dr. Ballenger regarding the medical appropriateness of Loughner's involuntary medication regimen, the court chided the digression. [T]he appropriateness of the treatment is a matter for a Sell hearing or some later hearing, the court said, It's not the subject of this hearing. Defense counsel responded that [t]he restoration depends upon the treatment that's going to be given. The court, however, persisted in its refusal to expand the scope of the evidentiary hearing, stating that [t]he question here is whether he's likely to be restored with an extended commitment to Springfield. I'd like both sides to keep focused on that. . . . I want to focus on the issue of the day, which is whether he's to be extended and whether the standard of proof is met by the evidence. Then, in response to defense counsel's request for a ruling on its motion to stay Loughner's involuntary medication, the court responded that its view continues to be . . . that because [the involuntary medication order is] predicated on the ground of dangerousness and really has nothing to do with [Loughner's] competency to stand trial, that that's an issue with the Bureau of Prisons and the physicians there, and for good reason. Following the approach adopted in its July 1 order, the court applied Morgan's arbitrariness standard and concluded that there's no arbitrariness in the third Harper hearing and that the medication going forward, at least of today, is authorized pursuant to the Harper case. The Court reaffirmed this holding in its written order, which appropriately characterized its review of the administrative Harper III determination as minimal. In short, the district court's pre-hearing orders, the statements it made during the September 28 hearing itself, and its written post-hearing order, all demonstrate, without doubt, that the evidentiary aspect of the hearing was restricted to a specific questionwhether Loughner's current treatment will likely result in his timely restoration, assuming the continuation of involuntary medication. No evidentiary challenge to that treatment was permitted. Instead, following the approach outlined in its July 1 Order, the court conducted a minimal review of the prison's Harper III determination and concluded that the decision was not arbitrary. Nowhere did the court contemplate or suggest a reversal of its previous holdings that Loughner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of his involuntary medication for dangerousness. Indeed, when defense counsel argued that the district court had simply deferred to the Bureau of Prisons on the Harper determination, the district court responded: What I've said is that there is another basis for him being medicated that has nothing to do with me. It has to do with dangerousness. In light of the district court's strict limitations on the scope of its evidentiary hearing and the extraordinary deference it accorded the prison's involuntary medication decisions, the majority's conclusion that the September 28 hearing provided Loughner an adequate opportunity to challenge his involuntary medication rests on air, nothing more.