Opinion ID: 1345383
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Contentions Relating Only to the Penalty Phase of the Trial

Text: Robinson first contends that error occurred in the admission into evidence of certain testimony concerning a prior offense of sodomy committed by him in Ohio six years previous to the charged homicide. It is urged that the court erroneously refused to weigh the probative value of such testimony against its prejudicial effect prior to allowing its admission. It is further argued that the probative value of such testimony was in fact outweighed by its prejudicial effect, that it was introduced primarily to inflame the passions of the jurors ( People v. Love (1960) 53 Cal.2d 843, 856 [3 Cal. Rptr. 665, 350 P.2d 705]), and that it should have been excluded. It appears that the Ohio sodomy conviction to which the challenged testimony related was charged against Robinson as a prior conviction in the amended indictment; that the record of said conviction was before the court in connection with a pretrial motion to strike the prior; and that upon denial of that motion the prior was admitted by Robinson. It further appears that when the prosecution at the penalty phase commenced to offer testimony relating to the facts of the offense, defendant objected on the grounds that the record of conviction was available to the court and could be placed before the jury, that the offense had occurred at a time remote from that of the charged offense, and that the probative value of testimony outlining the facts of the offense was slight in comparison to its great prejudicial and inflammatory effect. The objection was overruled by the court in the following language: Well, the jury is charged with the responsibility of making a determination as to the type of punishment to be imposed and receive no assistance from the court or counsel. It is in their sole discretion. That is the reason why evidence of complete background, history, and all the facts in aggravation and mitigation are properly to be considered by the jury. So, the objection is overruled. The testimony in question was given by the girl who had been the victim of the Ohio sodomy offense six years prior to the homicide. The girl was 13 years old at the time of trial; she had been seven at the time of the offense. [19] She testified in general that on a date in 1960 defendant Robinson came to her house (where he was a frequent visitor because he was related through adoption to the girl's mother) when she was alone there with her two younger sisters, and that he then and there required her to perform an act of fellatio with him; it was also at least implied that defendant required one of the girl's younger sisters to submit to sexual abuse. The testimony described the act in vivid detail and even included a description of the taste of semen which entered her mouth. In the case of People v. Love, supra, 53 Cal.2d 843, we discussed the rule governing admission of allegedly inflammatory evidence at the trial on the issue of penalty. There the trial court admitted over the defendant's objection a photograph of the victim showing her facial expression in death and a tape recording of a conversation which the victim had with a member of the prosecutor's office shortly before her death. We there observed that the recorded conversation dealt with the basic facts of the shooting, which had been established at the trial on the issue of guilt, and that The sole purpose of playing the recording, therefore, was to let the jury hear the failing voice and the groans of the deceased as she was dying. (53 Cal.2d at pp. 854-855.) We then proceeded to set forth the following principles: [16] Allegedly inflammatory evidence is admissible only when its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. [Citations.] [17] Since the jury has complete discretion to choose between the alternative penalties in the light of the objectives of criminal law (Pen. Code, §§ 190, 190.1; see Michael & Wechsler, Criminal Law and Its Administration 6-17), the permissible range of inquiry on the issue of penalty is necessarily broad. [Citations.] [18] The determination of penalty, however, like the determination of guilt, must be a rational decision. Evidence that serves primarily to inflame the passions of the jurors must therefore be excluded, and to insure that it is, the probative value and the inflammatory effect of proffered evidence must be carefully weighed. [Paragraph.] [19] The remoteness in time of the events being proved, the availability of less inflammatory methods of imparting to the jury the same or substantially the same information, and the bearing of the evidence on the several objectives of punishment are among the many factors to be considered. [Citations.] (53 Cal.2d at p. 856.) Applying these principles to the facts of the Love case, we observed that the evidence in question had no significant probative value because the basic facts of the shooting had been established at the guilt phase, and the pain experienced by the victim, even if considered relevant, had been more than adequately described in medical testimony before the jury. We concluded that Both the photograph and the tape recording served primarily to inflame the passions of the jurors and both should have been excluded. (53 Cal.2d at p. 857.) Moving to the question of prejudice, we noted that the inflammatory effect of the erroneous admission was aggravated by the prosecutor's argument to the jury which made multiple references to the subject evidence. Concluding that the presence of such inflammatory evidence and argument before the penalty jury rendered impossible a reasonably accurate assessment of how the jury would have reacted to mitigating factors in its absence, we held that a new hearing on the issue of penalty was required. (See also, People v. Hines (1964) 61 Cal.2d 164, 173-174 [37 Cal. Rptr. 622, 290 P.2d 398]; People v. Terry (1964) 61 Cal.2d 137, 145, fn. 5 [37 Cal. Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381].) However, in People v. Bentley (1962) 58 Cal.2d 458 [24 Cal. Rptr. 685, 374 P.2d 645], and People v. Talbot (1966) 64 Cal.2d 691 [51 Cal. Rptr. 417, 414 P.2d 633], we upheld the admission at the penalty phase of certain allegedly inflammatory evidence. In Bentley the evidence in question related to crimes committed in Arizona subsequent to the murder of which defendant had been found guilty, and it showed that at the time of those later crimes defendant displayed a complete indifference to human life.... (58 Cal.2d at p. 460.) Although there was ample other evidence in the record of defendant's repeated criminal behavior, we held that the questioned evidence was admissible because The jury was entitled to know that he was not revulsed by that killing [of which he had been found guilty] but was willing to kill again. (58 Cal.2d at p. 461.) We distinguished Love in the following terms: [T]he People did not present inflammatory evidence of facts that were already in evidence and that were of doubtful relevance at best, but only eyewitness testimony necessary to establish what Bentley said and did in the course of the Arizona crimes. (58 Cal.2d at p. 461.) [20] In Talbot the trial court without objection at the penalty phase, received in evidence certain photographs of the deceased. It was contended for the first time on appeal that such photographs should have been excluded under the Love rationale. We rejected the contention, noting the absence of a proper objection and observing that the photographs were not illustrative merely of pain but were used in connection with the autopsy surgeon's testimony and helped clarify for the jury just what happened to the deceased. (64 Cal.2d at p. 708.) [20] In the instant case it is clear that defendant raised a timely and proper objection to the admission of the specific evidence in question on the ground that its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Moreover, it would appear that defendant, by making this objection, did not intend to withhold from the jury information relative to the prior sodomy conviction but rather sought to explore with the court the availability of less inflammatory methods of imparting to the jury the same or substantially the same information ( People v. Love, supra, 53 Cal.2d 843, 856), for he at that time made express reference to the fact that the certified record of conviction was available to the court and could be submitted to the jury. Although we must agree with the Attorney General that the simple submission to the jury of the record of conviction would not have conveyed to the jury all relevant aspects of the offense, [21] we cannot ignore the consideration that a preliminary examination of the subject evidence by the court might well have resulted in the presentation of all relevant information to the jury in a manner less inflammatory than that here utilized. The court's peremptory refusal to conduct such a preliminary examination operated in this case to eliminate this alternative. Although we do not approve of the court's refusal, upon proper objection, to examine and evaluate the proffered evidence in light of the standard enunciated in Love, it is clear that that refusal did not constitute error if the probative value of the evidence in fact outweighed its prejudicial effect and rendered its admission proper. [21] We need not dwell upon the prejudicial effect of the evidence and its tendency to appeal to the jury's sense of passion and outrage. On the other hand, it does appear that the evidence was of substantial probative benefit to the prosecution, for it showed the precise act which was the subject of the prior conviction (see fn. 22, ante ) and conveyed to the jury an idea of the manner in which it was performed. Further, the probative value of such evidence was not of a purely cumulative nature, as was the case in Love, for there was in the record no other evidence dealing with the prior sodomy conviction. Finally, it is notable that here, as in People v. Bentley, supra, 58 Cal.2d 458, the evidence in question related not to the circumstances surrounding the [charged] crime but rather to defendant's background and history. (See Pen. Code, § 190.1.) The prejudicial impact of evidence dealing with the latter subject matter must be considered less pervasive than that of evidence dealing with the former subject matter  as did the evidence in Love itself. In view of all of these considerations we have concluded that the probative value of the evidence was sufficient to outweigh its clear prejudicial effect, and that therefore the court did not err in admitting it. [22] [22] Robinson next contends that CALJIC No. 306.1 (New), [23] which was given to the jury herein on request of the prosecutor, is inconsistent with the legislative mandate of section 190.1 of the Penal Code in that that instruction informs the jury that the question of penalty lies within their absolute discretion, whereas the statute requires that that question lies within the discretion of the trier of fact. It is argued that the discretion referred to in section 190.1 is rational discretion of the sort generally referred to as legal discretion (see Bailey v. Taaffe (1866) 29 Cal. 422, 424), whereas the absolute discretion referred to in the instruction is subject to whim and caprice. We do not believe, however, that the use of the term absolute discretion in the challenged instruction can be construed to convey to the jury the meaning which defendant would attach to it. This is especially so when, as in the instant case, the penalty jury is instructed in the terms of CALJIC No. 11 (New) that the authority vested in it is not an arbitrary power, but must be exercised with sincere judgment, sound discretion, and in accordance with the rules of law stated to you. Further we do not believe that the indicated portion of CALJIC No. 11 (New) can reasonably be considered to conflict with CALJIC No. 306.1 (New). [23] Robinson contends that the trial court's modification of a certain portion of CALJIC No. 11 (New) was erroneous. The portion in question informs the jury that it is not to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. The instruction given, as modified by the court, informed the jury simply that it was not to be governed by public opinion or public feeling. The modification was properly made pursuant to our opinion in People v. Polk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 443, at p. 451 [47 Cal. Rptr. 1, 406 P.2d 641]. Robinson contends that sections 190 and 190.1 of the Penal Code are unconstitutional insofar as they permit the imposition of a sentence of death. This contention has been adequately treated by this court in In re Anderson and Saterfield, 69 Cal.2d 613 [73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 447 P.2d 117]. [24a] Finally Robinson contends that the court acted in violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 784, 88 S.Ct. 1770], when it excused for cause certain jurors expressing a conscientious objection to the death penalty. [25] The Witherspoon case makes it clear, however, that constitutional guarantees are not violated when the court excuses for cause those who [have] made unmistakably clear ... that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, ... (391 U.S. at p. 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 785].) [24b] We have examined the voir dire examination of each of the three jurors excused for cause in the instant case and have concluded that the indicated standard was here met. We set forth in the Appendix relevant portions of the voir dire examination upon which the claim of Witherspoon violation is based. Defendant Durham's attempted appeal from the order denying his motion for a new trial is dismissed. The judgments are affirmed.