Opinion ID: 1838384
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: As heretofore disclosed, substantial compliance with the requirements of section 613A.5 is mandatory.

Text: Next, this court adopted the commonly accepted position in Heck v. City of Knoxville, 249 Iowa 602, 607, 88 N.W.2d 58, that the statutorily required claim notice provides a method by which prompt information as to time, place and circumstances of injury, may be conveyed to a municipality so an investigation may be had while the facts are fresh. See also editor's comment 93 A.L.R.2d 1385, 1386. Surely the foregoing purposeful element is equally involved whether liability be related to persons primarily injured or secondarily offended. The governmental body is equally affected in either event. V. Additionally, it is essential legislative intent be determined as shown by what is said in section 613A.5. See rule 344(f) (13), Rules of Civil Procedure, and section 4.1(2), Code, 1966. In this regard it is understood that no court, under the guise of construction, may extend, enlarge, or otherwise change the terms and meaning of a statute. Bergeson v. Pesch, 254 Iowa 223, 227-228, 117 N.W. 2d 431. Conversely we must, if reasonably possible, give meaning and effect to every part, and all words used in a legislative enactment. Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 257 Iowa 1277, 1288-1289, 136 N.W.2d 410; Monroe Community Sch. Dist., Marion and Jasper Counties v. Marion Co. Bd., 251 Iowa 992, 996, 103 N.W.2d 746; and Board of Directors v. Blakesley, 240 Iowa 910, 917-918, 36 N.W.2d 751. This means it it not within our province to read words or meaning out of a statute there clearly expressed. Significantly section 613A.5 states in material part: Every person who claims damages from any municipality for or on account of any wrongful death, loss or injury   . (Emphasis supplied) For, as thus employed, means with respect to, with regard to, or because of. Elmore-Schultz Grain Co. v. Stonebraker, 202 Mo.App. 81, 214 S.W. 216, 221; 36A C.J.S. For page 946; and Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Ed., page 772. Furthermore, use of the word or in this legislative enactment must here be accorded its natural and ordinary meaning as a disjunctive participle. See Bates v. United Security Insurance Company, Iowa, 163 N.W.2d 390, 398; In re Estate of Martin, Iowa, 155 N.W.2d 401, 405; Deur v. Local Board of Review, 232 Iowa 989, 991, 7 N.W.2d 39; State v. Smith, 46 Iowa 670, 673; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 335, page 672; and 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, section 281, page 267. From this it becomes evident the term on account of denotes some meaning separate and apart from that given above to the word for, since it would otherwise be redundant. And as disclosed by Kelly v. State Personnel Board of California, 31 Cal.App.2d 443, 88 P.2d 264, 266, this phraseology is to be equated with the term in consequence of. In any event, we find section 613A.5 is all inclusive, requiring notice be given regardless of what causes or remedy may arise or result therefrom. See Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. City of Evansville, supra. So, if the cross-petitioning Burts had any right to contribution or indemnity from this impleaded municipality, it was as a consequence of, arose out of, or on account of the injuries inflicted upon plaintiff's decedent. A study of chapter 613A, I.C.A., discloses to us the legislature thereby intended to: 1. Eliminate any common law immunity in tort previously accorded various designated governmental subdivisions within the state, including cities and towns. 2. At the same time provide for those units of local government reasonable opportunity to effectively investigate, marshal evidence, and settle or defend against all claims arising out of tort. 3. Afford this protective shield as to all demands made, and actions brought in tort, by requiring claim notices be given within prescribed periods of time, or stand forever barred. 4. Require that such notices be so given in every case premised on tort, regardless of kind or nature for or on account of, because of, or as a consequence of an injury, including primary or secondary claimants, contingent or otherwise. 5. Allow specified time variances for the giving of claim notices only with regard to incapacity or death due to injury, not here applicable. VI. We now conclude absence of a claim notice to the City of Iowa City, within 60 days after injury to plaintiff's decedent, as required by section 613A.5, I.C.A., precludes recovery of contribution or indemnity by defendants Barry O. Burt and Gregory W. Burt from the impleaded defendant City. That view is amply supported by White v. Johnson, supra, at 137 N.W.2d 676-677, where the court, referring to American Auto Ins. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, also supra, said: In that case the insurance company made a settlement of an action against its insured property owner for damages sustained by a person injured in a fall at a point where a private ramp met a defective city sidewalk. The injured party did not give notice of a claim against the city and neither did the property owner or its insurance company until after the settlement was made, some 3 years after the injury occurred. We held that the action involved a claim for injury based on negligence,    and that the failure to give notice within 30 days of injury as required    `prevented any liability on the part of the city from existing.' 259 Minn. 298, 107 N.W.2d 323. This result was necessarily based upon our conclusion that the wording of the statute applicable to this case is broad and inclusive and that notice is a prerequisite to maintaining an action for indemnity or contribution against a municipality even though such a claim is contingent at the time notice is required to be served. Touching on the matter of contingency is Fane v. Hootman, 254 Iowa 241, 247, 117 N.W.2d 435, where this court held, it is not essential that a defendant's cause of action against an impleaded third party defendant for contribution be at the time matured. It therefore follows, trial court erred in overruling the motion to dismiss filed by The City of Iowa City. This case must be accordingly reversed and remanded with instructions that the challenged order be set aside and for entry of an order consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded with instructions. MOORE, C. J., and LARSON and STUART, JJ., concur. LeGRAND, MASON, BECKER and UHLENHOPP, JJ., dissent. REES, J., takes no part. The members of this court being equally divided, the judgment of the trial court stands affirmed by operation of law. (Section 684.10, Code, 1966).