Opinion ID: 1190451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Miranda Warning and Requests for Counsel

Text: Defendant makes two related arguments in which he claims that his fifth and sixth amendment rights were violated. He first maintains that Hines's failure to read the Warning and Waiver of Rights portion of the Miranda form was intentional and thus compromised the protection afforded him under Miranda to ensure a knowing and intelligent waiver of his fifth and sixth amendment rights. [15] This argument is without merit. The record shows that defendant was adequately informed of his Miranda rights. Hines testified that he read the Miranda rights from the form and then more fully explained them. Defendant, a well-educated college graduate, responded that he would talk to Hines without an attorney but that he would choose which questions to answer. Defendant also testified at the suppression hearing that he understood that he need not answer any questions and that he told Hines that they could ask the questions, but I felt that if I didn't feel the question was right, that I didn't feel like  unless my attorney told me that I should respond, that I should respond. Sheriff Printz was also present during the interrogation, and he testified at the suppression hearing of defendant's willingness to speak to Hines. As the interrogation proceeded, defendant occasionally declined to answer a question, but he never requested that the interrogation cease. The interrogation spanned a period of an hour and a half, and not until the conclusion thereof did defendant inquire if an attorney would be provided in connection with extradition proceedings. Defendant argues that he explicitly and implicitly requested counsel at various times before and during his interview with Hines. Defendant points out that under Edwards v. Arizona, [16] the police were required to terminate further questioning until he was provided with or waived his right to counsel. Because the questioning was not terminated, he contends, his constitutional rights were violated. We are not persuaded. Defendant claims that he implicitly requested counsel by spontaneously shouting read me my rights and another time by telling an officer that he would not give his name but would talk to another officer. We simply do not think that these remarks can be reasonably construed to be a request for counsel. [17] Defendant also claims that a jailer told him that he could call an attorney and that he expressed a desire to do so. However, the jailer disagreed with this version of the facts, and the trial judge obviously believed that the jailer was more credible. In the face of a factual dispute which necessarily bears upon credibility, it was for the trial court to appropriately weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses. [18] There is nothing in the record to indicate that the judge was clearly in error in giving more credence to the jailer's testimony. Finally, defendant claims that during the interrogation, he requested counsel explicitly and implicitly by refusing to answer certain questions. Regarding his claim of explicitly requesting counsel during the interview, both Hines and Printz testified that such a request was not made. Again, it was for the trial court to believe Hines and Printz instead of defendant, and there is no indication in the record that the trial court erred in so concluding. Regarding his claim that his refusal to answer questions constitutes at least an equivocal request for counsel, [19] we disagree. Merely refusing to answer questions, without more, cannot reasonably be construed as a request for counsel.