Opinion ID: 2995047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sec.1983 Claims Against Wargo

Text: As the majority has reported, the events that triggered this lawsuit began around 2:30 a.m. on March 22, 1997. Dye was driving his brother’s Chevrolet Corvette on Indiana Avenue, within the City of Elkhart, headed toward his mother’s house. He was obeying the speed limit and all other traffic laws when he observed that he was being followed by a police car, which turned out to be driven by Officer Wargo. Dye reached the intersection of Indiana Avenue and Sterling Avenue and, still in compliance with all traffic laws, came to a full stop. He then turned right onto Sterling Avenue. Nonetheless, after he made the turn, he saw that the police car had turned on its flashing overhead lights. Dye realized that the officer was signaling to him to pull over, but he continued driving in the short-sighted hope that he might be able to reach his mother’s house and get inside before the police officer could stop him. His motivation was simple: Dye was a convicted felon and he was carrying an unlicenced 9mm handgun. With Wargo now in pursuit, Dye turned into the alley behind his mother’s house, drove until he came to her yard, pulled in and stopped the car. The minute his car came to a halt, Dye opened the door and without looking back made a dash for the house. Wargo, who had pulled in behind him, saw Dye start running toward the house and released Frei. Wargo never ordered Dye to stop, nor did he warn Dye that he was about to release the dog. Frei overtook Dye before Dye reached the house. As he was trained to do, Frei bit Dye’s leg and held on. Wargo yelled to Dye that Frei would not release until Dye got down on the ground in a cross position. Dye did as he was told, and Frei released his grip. Wargo then told Dye to put his hands behind his back. As Dye attempted to comply, Frei attacked him again. Fearful and in pain, Dye stood up, attempting to get Frei to quit biting him and yelling to Wargo to call off the dog. Wargo did nothing, and Frei continued biting. Wargo told Dye that Frei would not stop biting him until he laid down again on the ground. Afraid of what the dog would do to him if he laid down again, Dye instead continued to fight the dog off. Wargo then sprayed Dye in the face with pepper spray and struck him in the back of the neck. Neither of these interventions brought Dye down. Instead, Dye lifted his shirt and pulled his gun from his waistband. Wargo yelled at Dye not to do it, but Dye fired at least twice. (He claims he was aiming for the dog, but I agree with the majority that this is beside the point for purposes of assessing Wargo’s conduct. Wargo obviously had no way of knowing whom or what Dye meant to be shooting.) Dye’s actions prompted Wargo to pull his own weapon. Once Dye began shooting, Wargo dropped to the ground and fired at Dye, striking him just under the left shoulder. Wargo’s initial shot at last caused Dye to fall to the ground and drop his gun. He wound up face down on the ground with Frei still biting at him. Despite the fact that Dye was now unarmed and on his stomach, Wargo continued to fire, pausing at one point to put a new clip in his weapon. An officer who arrived at the scene in the midst of the shooting reported that while he watched, Wargo shot at Dye five or six times from a standing position about ten feet from Dye. Dye suffered multiple gunshot wounds, most of them flesh wounds on the back or sides of his limbs. He had a wound on the rear of his right arm, just below the elbow, as well as on the back of his left arm. Two bullets passed through Dye’s right leg and he suffered a flesh wound to his right calf. Wargo suffered only a pinched nerve in his neck, and Frei was unscathed. Dye identifies four seizures during the course of these events that he contends were unreasonable for constitutional purposes: 1) Wargo’s dispatching Frei to capture Dye as he ran toward his mother’s house, without any warning or verbal command to Dye to surrender; 2) Frei’s attack on Dye as Dye tried to comply with Wargo’s command to put his hands behind his head; 3) Wargo’s use of the dog, pepper spray, and a hand strike in response to Dye’s refusal to get down on the ground; and 4) Wargo’s decision to continue firing at Dye as he lay on the ground, face down, and without a weapon. Wargo’s first defense to these claims is that the events of that evening did not occur as Dye claims, but this factual dispute cannot be resolved at the summary judgment stage. More productively, Wargo asserts that even if events transpired as Dye says they did, his use of force was at all times objectively reasonable and, to the extent it was not, he is entitled to qualified immunity because at the time of the incident there was no case law clearly establishing that his conduct was unconstitutional. The majority agrees that if Dye’s version of the events is correct, then at least the fourth of these allegations would be actionable under sec. 1983. That much seems indisputable to me. In fact, in my opinion Dye’s account of Wargo’s actions states at least two excessive force claims for which Wargo would not be entitled to qualified immunity. The first is the one the majority has identified: Wargo’s decision to continue shooting at Dye after he was face down on the ground without a weapon. Even if Dye initially fired at Wargo and not the dog, as Dye testified during his plea colloquy in state court, once Dye was down and no longer posed a threat to Wargo, no reasonable police officer in 1997 could believe that he was entitled to continue firing at the backside of an unarmed and disabled individual. In addition, I would find that Dye also has a claim related to the second point he has identified, Frei’s unprovoked attack on Dye once Dye had surrendered to Wargo and was attempting to place his hands behind his back. At that point, Dye was under control and was trying to do what Wargo had asked. It has long been well- established that a police officer may not continue to use force against a suspect who is subdued and complying with the officer’s orders. See Frazell v. Flanigan, 102 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 1996) (jury could reasonably conclude that officer who struck subdued suspect in back with nightstick used objectively unreasonable force and was not entitled to qualified immunity); Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 247 (7th Cir. 1993) (force that is reasonable while suspect poses threat is no longer reasonable once threat is no longer present); Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 927 (11th Cir. 2000) (denying qualified immunity to officer who in 1994 allowed his dog to attack suspect who was lying on the ground and not resisting). While Frei may not be a person, he certainly was an instrumentality of force that Wargo was using, and Wargo was responsible for the dog’s actions.