Opinion ID: 1664341
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plain Language of 1993 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 473, section 16.

Text: Before addressing the constitutional issues presented with respect to the propriety of this instruction, we first observe that the plain language of the statute applies only to cases in which the offense was committed after July 1, 1993, and therefore, the appellant was not statutorily entitled to the instruction. We have previously addressed this issue in State v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d 726, 734-36 (Tenn.1998), in which we first held that the statutory language prohibited a jury from considering life without the possibility of parole as a sentencing option where the offense was committed before July 1, 1993. In denying the defendant relief on this basis, we first noted that according to the plain language of the statute, the instruction was not available to the defendant because his offense was committed well before July 1, 1993. Id. at 735. We also held that the specific provisions of this act governed over the more general provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated sections 39-13-204(k) (Supp.1996) and 39-11-112 (1991), which the defendant argued made the instruction a viable possibility for sentences imposed after July 1, 1993. [4] We concluded by finding no indication that the legislature intended that the option of life without parole apply retrospectively to offenses occurring before July 1, 1993. The appellant in this case argues that Cauthern cannot directly resolve this issue because the statute is ambiguous as to whether it applies to sentencing hearings occurring after the effective date of the act. As such, the appellant contends, any ambiguity should be weighed in favor of allowing the life without parole instruction. We disagree. First, the statute is not ambiguous. Although the statute does not mention sentencing hearings specifically, the statute is clear that it applies only to offenses committed on or after that date. We will not construe the plain, unambiguous language of the statute to give any forced or subtle construction which would extend or limit its meaning. State v. Butler, 980 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tenn.1998); see also State v. Davis, 940 S.W.2d 558, 561 (Tenn.1997). Second, as evidenced by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-117(b) (1997), the General Assembly could have drafted the statute so as to apply the life without parole instruction to sentencing hearings if it had so desired. In stark contrast to the language of the statute at issue in this case, the language of section 40-35-117(b) specifically states that [u]nless prohibited by the United States or Tennessee constitution, any person sentenced on or after November 1, 1989, for an offense committed between July 1, 1982 and November 1, 1989, shall be sentenced under the provisions of this chapter [the 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act]. (emphasis added). We have recently reaffirmed that this language requires sentencing according to the 1989 Act, absent any violation of due process, even if the offense was committed before the effective date of the act. See McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795 (Tenn.2000). Because the General Assembly has demonstrated its ability to draft statutes that apply sentencing changes to sentencing hearings, its failure to do so in this case must work against allowing the appellant to receive the life without parole instruction. Having reviewed our discussion of this issue in Cauthern , we see no justification to depart from the reasoning of that case. [5] The plain language of the statute permits the life without parole instruction to be given only in cases in which the offense was committed after July 1, 1993. The importance of the use of this language is reinforced by the fact that the corresponding language of the 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act applies to all sentences imposed after its effective date. We further note that the General Assembly has made no effort to amend the life without parole statute since Cauthern to correct any apparent misunderstanding. Accordingly, we hold that the appellant was not entitled to receive an instruction on the punishment of life without the possibility of parole according to the plain language of the statute.