Opinion ID: 576646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: procedures for punishing criminal contempt in general

Text: 27 A. Must the court first pursue civil contempt proceedings before resorting to punishment for criminal contempt? 28 Weinfeld argues that his conviction must be reversed because no attempt was made to impose civil contempt sanctions before resorting to criminal contempt proceedings. The government responds that the district court was not required to pursue civil contempt sanctions first. We agree. 29 The contention that courts must resort first to civil contempt sanctions before initiating a criminal contempt proceeding stems from a footnote in Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 16 L.Ed.2d 622 (1966). There the defendants were convicted of criminal contempt for refusing to testify before the grand jury after having been granted immunity. They argued that their convictions should be reversed because they had not been indicted and tried by jury. Finding that the contempt proceedings had been civil rather than criminal because the defendants' release from custody had been conditioned upon their willingness to testify, the Supreme Court concluded that they were not entitled to indictments and jury trials. The Court also held, however, that when the purpose of confining contemnors is to coerce them to testify, the confinement cannot continue after the grand jury has been discharged. In explaining that this restriction on confinement arises from the well-established doctrine that only  '[t]he least possible power adequate to the end proposed'  should be used in contempt cases, 384 U.S. at 371, 86 S.Ct. at 1536 (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 204, 231, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821)), the Court announced a procedural rule restricting the exercise of the judicial contempt power. The Court stated: 30 [The least possible power] doctrine further requires that the trial judge first consider the feasibility of coercing testimony through the imposition of civil contempt. The judge should resort to criminal sanctions only after he determines, for good reason, that the civil remedy would be inappropriate. 31 384 U.S. at 371 n. 9, 86 S.Ct. at 1536 n. 9. See also Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 801, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 2134, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987). 32 We have not read Shillitani as establishing a rule that must be followed every time criminal contempt sanctions are imposed. 8 The least possible power doctrine on which the Court relied in Shillitani explicitly acknowledges that the appropriate sanction depends upon the court's reason for initiating contempt proceedings. Shillitani, 384 U.S. at 371, 86 S.Ct. at 1536 (Only [t]he least possible power adequate to the end proposed should be used in contempt cases.) (emphasis added). Significantly, the key distinction between civil and criminal contempt lies in the court's purpose. Civil contempt sanctions are intended to coerce or to compensate; criminal contempt sanctions to punish. See, for example, Harrisburg Grand Jury, 658 F.2d at 217. Criminal contempt, more specifically, is reserved for those instances where the court must vindicate its authority. Waste Conversion, 893 F.2d at 612. 33 Nor do we interpret the least possible power doctrine to mean that courts must always attempt to coerce a contemnor before they may punish him or her. Otherwise, the court's ability to deal with situations where punishment is necessary to vindicate the court's authority would be greatly circumscribed. In United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 95 S.Ct. 1802, 44 L.Ed.2d 186 (1975), for example, the Supreme Court upheld the summary imposition of criminal contempt sanctions against a witness who refused to testify. Implicitly assuming that criminal sanctions were appropriate, the Court instead focused on whether it was permissible to impose those sanctions in a summary manner. See also In re Boyden, 675 F.2d 643, 644 (5th Cir.1982) (not error to impose summary criminal contempt sanctions even though refusal to testify was also cognizable as civil contempt). In addition, the well-established practice of imposing both civil and criminal contempt for the same conduct contradicts the idea that courts must always attempt civil contempt sanctions before resorting to criminal contempt sanctions. When a party refuses to obey a court order, for example, civil sanctions may be used to coerce compliance and criminal sanctions to punish the disobedient conduct. See, for example, In re Irving, 600 F.2d 1027, 1031 (2d Cir.1979) (In responding to a single contemptuous act, a court may well impose both civil and criminal sanctions--wishing to vindicate its authority and to compel compliance.). 34 We conclude therefore that the Court's admonition in Shillitani was intended to apply only when a judge initiates contempt proceedings for the purpose of coercing compliance with a court order, and not when the court's purpose is to punish past violations of its orders. Accord United States v. Armstrong, 781 F.2d 700, 70506 (9th Cir.1986). See also Wilson, 421 U.S. at 321 n. 2, 95 S.Ct. at 1809 n. 2 (Although the use of civil contempt, as opposed to the more drastic criminal contempt, is usually to be preferred as a remedy, I am aware of no requirement that the less drastic sanction must be employed in all cases.) (Blackmun concurring). The propriety of using criminal contempt sanctions thus does not depend upon whether the contemnor could be coerced to comply with the court's order through civil sanctions; instead, as we recognized in Waste Conversion, the propriety of imposing criminal contempt sanctions depends upon whether punishment is necessary to vindicate the court's authority. 893 F.2d at 612. 35 The district judge's order makes clear that the purpose of imposing criminal contempt sanctions on Weinfeld was to punish him for his past failures to obey the magistrate judge's orders to appear, and not to coerce him to comply with an order in the future. The power to punish those who refuse to obey the court's order to appear is essential to maintenance of the court's authority. When the other requisites of criminal contempt are present, refusal to obey an order to appear may be punished through the imposition of criminal contempt sanctions. See In re LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753, 756 (6th Cir.1974). 36 B. Is obstruction of the administration of justice an essential element of criminal contempt? 37 Weinfeld contends that the district court erred by finding him in criminal contempt because there was no evidence that his conduct impeded the administration of justice. Weinfeld's argument necessarily assumes that obstruction of the judicial process is always an element of criminal contempt, but this court has not so held. Indeed, in Waste Conversion, we declined to decide whether a showing of obstruction was necessary to sustain the defendants' criminal contempt convictions, although we did state that the absence of obstruction may have some significance in a given fact situation. 893 F.2d at 609. 38 The first subsection of the federal statute governing punishment of contempts, 18 U.S.C. § 401, expressly requires a showing of obstruction. The other two subsections do not mention the obstruction requirement. 9 In United States v. Martin, 525 F.2d 703 (2d Cir.1975), the Second Circuit declined to extend subsection 401(1)'s obstruction requirement to contempts prosecuted pursuant to subsection 401(3). The court reasoned that each subsection states separate and independent grounds for contempt adjudication, and concluded that the statute cannot reasonably be read as incorporating into § 401(3) the requirements of § 401(1). Id. at 709. 39 Following the lead of the Second Circuit, we decline to extend the obstruction requirement to this case. Although Weinfeld's conduct is best described by subsection 401(3), which concerns [d]isobedience or resistance to court orders, 10 our reason for declining to require a showing of obstruction differs from that given in Martin. The following, somewhat extended analysis of section 401's legislative history convinces us that the three subsections of the statute were intended to define the types of contumacious behavior that courts could punish summarily 11 and that Congress intended the obstruction requirement to be a means of narrowing the circumstances in which contempts may be punished summarily. We therefore decline to require a showing of obstruction in this case because Weinfeld's conduct was not punished summarily. 40 The obstruction requirement was first codified in section 401's predecessor, the Act of March 2, 1831, 4 Stat 487 (the 1831 Act). Congress's purpose in drafting the 1831 Act was to curb the power to punish contempt summarily. In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 233, 82 S.Ct. 1288, 1291, 8 L.Ed.2d 434 (1962). A few years earlier, the Supreme Court had recognized the possibility that the summary contempt power might be abused and suggested that the proper remedy lay with Congress. The Court stated: 41 Wherever power is lodged, it may be abused; but this forms no solid objection against its exercise. Confidence must be reposed somewhere; and if there should be an abuse, it will be a public grievance, for which a remedy may be applied by the legislature, and is not to be devised by courts of justice. 42 Ex parte Kearny, 20 U.S. (7 Wheaton) 38, 45, 5 L.Ed. 391 (1822). 43 Abuses did occur, culminating in the case of Luke Lawless, an attorney from Missouri who was summarily imprisoned and disbarred by United States District Judge James H. Peck for publishing an article criticizing an opinion written by the Judge. The House of Representatives impeached Judge Peck, but the Senate acquitted him by a vote of 22-21. 12 The next day, the House instructed its Committee on the Judiciary to inquire into the expediency of defining, by statute, all offences which may be punished as contempts of the courts of the United States, and also to limit the punishment of the same. House Journal, 21st Cong, 2d Sess 245 (1831) (emphasis in original). See also 7 Cong Deb, 21st Cong, 2d Sess, cols 560-61 (Feb. 1, 1831). One month later, Congress passed the 1831 Act, which limited the federal courts' power to inflict summary punishments to the same three categories of contempt described in the current statute. 13 44 The word summary was, for some reason, omitted from the statute during the Revision of 1873. Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 276, 9 S.Ct. 699, 701, 33 L.Ed. 150 (1889). That Revision was undertaken to codify the Statutes at Large and to arrange them into titles. See Report of the Commissioners Appointed Under Act of June 27, 1866 to Provide for the Revision and Consolidation of the Statute Laws of the United States, S Misc Doc No 101, 40th Cong, 2d Sess (1868). The revisors made numerous mistakes, see Ralph H. Dwan & Ernest R. Feidler, The Federal Statutes--Their History and Use, 22 Minn L Rev 1008, 1013-14 (1938), some of which were later corrected by Thomas Jefferson Durant, but his report is not available, and he clearly did not fully correct the earlier mistakes, Dan B. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 Cornell L Rev 183, 222 n. 153 (1971). Despite the omission, the Supreme Court continued to interpret the statute as specifying the circumstances in which courts may punish contempt summarily. Savin, 131 U.S. at 276, 9 S.Ct. at 701. See also United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 687, 84 S.Ct. 984, 988, 12 L.Ed.2d 23 (1964) (In 1831, ... Congress restricted the power of federal courts to inflict summary punishment for contempt.... These provisions are now codified in 18 U.S.C. § 401 without material difference.) (emphasis added); Green, 356 U.S. at 186-87, 78 S.Ct. at 644 (Congress has consistently preserved the summary nature of the contempt power in the Act of 1831 and its statutory successors ...) (emphasis added). By continuing to interpret section 401 as limiting the power to punish contempt summarily, despite the omission of the word summary, the Court evidently assumed that the omission was inadvertent. See Dobbs, 56 Cornell L Rev at 222 n. 153 (concluding that section 401 was probably intended to restrict the summary contempt power only). 45 Moreover, if the omission were not inadvertent, then section 401's language limits the court's contempt power to the three categories of behavior defined in the statute and none other, 18 U.S.C. § 401. Such a limitation would be inconsistent with the well-established principle that the contempt power is inherent in the courts. As early as 1812, the Supreme Court stated: 46 Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution.... To fine for contempt--imprison for contumacy--inforce the observance of order, [etc.] are powers which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.... 47 United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812). Since that early statement, the Court has consistently adhered to the view that the contempt power is inherent in the courts. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2132, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (quoting Hudson ); Young, 481 U.S. at 795, 107 S.Ct. at 2131 (power to punish contempts inherent in all courts) (quoting Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 65-66, 45 S.Ct. 18, 19-20, 69 L.Ed. 162 (1924)); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2463, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980) (citing Hudson ). 48 The Court has, however, upheld legislative efforts to regulate the sanctions that may be imposed for contempt and the procedures that must be followed when punishing contempt. For example, in Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 22 L.Ed. 205 (1873), the Court explained that the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat 83, which provided that the federal courts shall have the power ... to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempts of their authority in any cause or hearing before the same, imposed a limitation on the modes of punishment for contempt. 86 U.S. at 512. And in Michaelson, the Court held that Congress could require certain contempts to be tried by jury because the requirement of a jury trial does not, in our opinion, invade the [inherent] powers of the courts as intended by the Constitution. 266 U.S. at 67, 45 S.Ct. at 20. 49 The Court has cautioned that although [t]he manner in which the court's prosecution of contempt is exercised ... may be regulated by Congress ... 'the attributes which inhere in that power and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated nor rendered practically inoperative.'  Young, 481 U.S. at 799, 107 S.Ct. at 2133 (quoting Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 66, 45 S.Ct. at 20). The power to define what does and does not constitute contempt is an attribute that inheres in the contempt power. If Congress can exhaustively define the conduct that courts may punish as contempt, then the court's ability to vindicate its authority is completely dependent upon Congress, in violation of the principle that the contempt power is regarded as essential to ensuring that the Judiciary has a means to vindicate its own authority without complete dependence on other Branches. Young, 481 U.S. at 796, 107 S.Ct. at 2131-32. Therefore, interpreting section 401 as an exhaustive definition of the conduct courts may punish as contempt, rather than as a limitation on the types of contempts that may be punished summarily, is inconsistent with the inherent nature of the contempt power because such an interpretation allows Congress to declare what constitutes contempt. The inherent nature of the contempt power supports our conclusion that section 401's obstruction requirement applies only to contempts that are punished summarily. 50 Supreme Court case law also supports our conclusion that the obstruction requirement is not an element of all contempts, but merely a method of narrowing the circumstances in which contempt may be punished summarily. See Young, 481 U.S. at 798, 107 S.Ct. at 2132 (making same point about distinction between in-court and out-of-court contempts). The Court has long required a showing of obstruction as a way to narrow the summary contempt power. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275, 68 S.Ct. 499, 508, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536, 45 S.Ct. 390, 395, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925). See also Vaughn v. City of Flint, 752 F.2d 1160, 1167 (6th Cir.1985) (explaining obstruction requirement as limitation on summary contempt power). A comparison of two particular Supreme Court cases illustrates that the obstruction requirement is meant to determine when contempt may be punished summarily. In Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 86 S.Ct. 352, 15 L.Ed.2d 240 (1965), the Supreme Court held that summary punishment pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(a) was inappropriate. 14 In contrast, the Court upheld the imposition of summary punishment pursuant to Rule 42(a) in United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 95 S.Ct. 1802, 44 L.Ed.2d 186 (1975). The Court explained that the crucial difference between the cases ... is that Harris [unlike Wilson ] did not deal with a refusal to testify which obstructed an ongoing trial. 421 U.S. at 318, 95 S.Ct. at 1807-08 (emphasis added). 15 51 Because of the danger that the summary contempt power will be abused, both Congress and the Court have narrowed its scope by requiring a showing of obstruction before contempt may be punished summarily. [A] summary contempt proceeding dispenses with the procedural safeguards ordinarily deemed essential to fair criminal trials, Jessup v. Clark, 490 F.2d 1068, 1071 (3d Cir.1973). It combines the otherwise inconsistent functions of prosecutor, jury, and judge in one individual and dispenses with the usual guarantees of notice and hearing. In re Gustafson, 650 F.2d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir.1981) (en banc). Weinfeld was not punished summarily and thus these dangers are not present here. Therefore, we hold that the government was not required to prove that Weinfeld obstructed the administration of justice. 16 52