Opinion ID: 2994513
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Vulnerable

Text: Victim Sentencing Enhancement The defendant also challenges the district court’s decision to enhance his sentence two offense levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. sec. 3A1.1 based on the district court’s conclusion that the women the defendant targeted and preyed on were vulnerable victims. Section 3A1.1(b)(1) provides that a defendant’s offense level should be increased two levels [i]f the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim . . . . U.S.S.G. sec. 3A1.1(b)(1). The Sentencing Guidelines further interpret vulnerable victim to mean a person (A) who is a victim of the offense of conviction and any [relevant] conduct . . . ; and (B) who is unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or who is otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct. U.S.S.G. sec. 3A1.1, Application Note 2. Because the district court is in the best position to determine whether a victim is vulnerable, we review the district court’s conclusions in that regard for clear error. See United States v. Snyder, 189 F.3d 640, 649 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 839 (2000). The defendant argues that the district court erred in determining that he deliberately targeted the women whom he defrauded because of their vulnerability, but that argument is misplaced. Section 3A1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines was amended on November 1, 1995 to eliminate any targeting requirement, and the vulnerable victim enhancement no longer requires a showing of targeting. See U.S.S.G. sec. 3A1.1, Application Note 2; see also United States v. Bragg, 207 F.3d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 2000); Snyder, 189 F.3d at 649 (stating that the 1995 Amendments make clear that there is no targeting requirement). Although at least some of the defendant’s conduct took place prior to November 1, 1995, the defendant was properly sentenced under the amended version of the Guidelines because most of the defendant’s offenses occurred subsequent to the effective date of the 1995 amendments. See U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.11(b)(3) (If the defendant is convicted of two offenses, the first committed before, and the second after, a revised edition of the Guidelines Manual became effective, the revised edition of the Guidelines Manual is to be applied to both offenses.). As such, the government need only prove that the defendant’s victims were vulnerable to justify an enhancement under U.S.S.G. sec. 3A1.1. See United States v. Brawner, 173 F.3d 966, 973 (6th Cir. 1999). In addition to his targeting argument, the defendant contends that the district court erred in concluding that the women whom he defrauded were in fact vulnerable. According to the defendant, the district court based its findings of vulnerability on a stereotypical view of women, and not on any particular characteristics of the women the defendant defrauded. After a review of the record and the testimony given at trial, we believe that the defendant’s argument has some merit. Although we give due deference to the district court’s assessment of the witnesses who appeared before it, see United States v. Billingsley, 115 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 1997), the evidence of vulnerability in regard to some of the women is questionable. For instance, the district court found that the enhancement could be applied based on the fact that one of the victims was single and, because of the assistance she received from others during her childhood, made a point of reaching out to those in trouble. An enhancement based on this finding is dangerously close to the imposition of an enhancement merely because the victim was a woman. While we are not convinced that the evidence in this case is sufficient to support the conclusion that all of the defendant’s victims were vulnerable, the government is only required to establish vulnerability in regard to one of the victims. See U.S.S.G. sec. 3A1.1(b)(1) (noting that the enhancement applies [i]f the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim) (emphasis added). In this case, the district court did not merely rely on an overbroad generalization, but rather made particularized findings about some of the victims--including one woman who was a recently-divorced immigrant and one who was involved in a troubled marriage--in sufficient detail to justify a finding that these women were emotionally vulnerable and were therefore particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct. U.S.S.G. sec. 3A1.1, Application Note 2; see also United States v. Grimes, 173 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that [t]he ’vulnerable victim’ sentencing enhancement is intended to reflect the fact that some potential crime victims have a lower than average ability to protect themselves from the criminal). Because the district court based the vulnerable victim enhancement in this case at least in part on the particular characteristics of the defendant’s victims, and because the district court did not clearly err in its vulnerability determinations, we conclude that the district court properly applied a two level vulnerable victim enhancement to the defendant’s conduct.