Opinion ID: 582662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Requested Self-Defense Instruction

Text: 10 Streit argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense. A criminal defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on any theory which provides a legal defense to the charge against him and which has some foundation in the evidence, even though the evidence may be weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility. United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1541 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866, 109 S.Ct. 171, 102 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). A trial judge must instruct the jury on self-defense if there is evidence upon which the jury could rationally sustain the defense. United States v. Jackson, 726 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.1984). The merest scintilla of evidence, however, will not suffice. Id. 11 The district court concluded that Streit was not entitled to an instruction on self-defense because there was not sufficient evidence in the record to support Streit's theory that he did not hear the FBI agents identify themselves and did not realize that the men he was struggling with were law enforcement officers. We agree. 12 Streit first suggests that there is no evidence to indicate that he was aware of the official status of Agents Oldham and English. The record contains ample evidence indicating that the men clearly identified themselves as FBI agents and that Streit was aware of their official status. Streit concedes that Dana Jensen, who was standing near Streit when the agents arrived, heard English and Oldham yell FBI, freeze as they approached Streit's car. During the standoff with Peoria police officers, Streit indicated that he was aware of the agents' official status when he referred to the gun he was wielding as a police gun. 13 The only evidence in the record that might tend to support Streit's self-defense theory is Dana Jensen's testimony that Streit was getting into his car when she heard the initial FBI identification, and the statement, contained in Detective Tellef's police report, that Streit asked, That is what they yelled at me? after he heard one of the Peoria police officers mention the FBI. This evidence is simply not enough to justify a self-defense instruction. The fact that Streit was getting into his car when the agents yelled FBI, freeze from a distance of approximately 20 feet does not tend to prove that Streit was unable to hear the identification which Jensen heard clearly. Likewise, Streit's statement to Detective Tellef does not indicate that Streit was unaware that Agents Oldham and English were law enforcement officers. The statement suggests only that Streit was uncertain about which law enforcement agency the men worked for, and at best constitutes only a scintilla of evidence in support of Streit's self-defense theory. See Jackson, 726 F.2d at 1468. 1 14 Relying on United States v. Gometz, 879 F.2d 256 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1033, 110 S.Ct. 752, 107 L.Ed.2d 768 (1990), Streit next argues that he was entitled to a self-defense instruction even if he knew Oldham and English were FBI agents because he was resisting an unreasonable use of force by the agents. Streit's reliance on Gometz is misplaced. Gometz was charged with assaulting a federal officer while he was an inmate in prison. In contrast to the present case, the defendant in Gometz presented testimony from other inmates as to the abuse he suffered at the hands of prison officials. See 879 F.2d at 258. In the present case, Streit has presented no evidence to support his argument that the FBI agents employed unjustifiable force in their attempt to arrest Streit. Once the agents had identified themselves and Streit had attempted to flee, the agents were justified in using force in an attempt to restrain Streit.