Opinion ID: 2507697
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fault in Bringing about the Harm

Text: South Carolina recognizes a business proprietor's right to eject a trespasser from his premises. State v. Brooks, 252 S.C. 504, 510, 167 S.E.2d 307, 310 (1969) ( citing State v. Rogers, 130 S.C. 426, 126 S.E. 329 (1925)). If the proprietor is engaged in the legitimate exercise in good faith of his right to eject, he would in such case be without fault in bringing on the difficulty, and would not be bound to retreat. Id. ( citing Rogers, 130 S.C. at 426, 126 S.E. at 329). Therefore, to withstand a motion for directed verdict as to whether Petitioner, an agent of Cornell Arms, was at fault in bringing about the harm, the State had to disprove Petitioner's claim that he was ejecting Boot in good faith. Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the State, the State did not carry this burden. The court of appeals stated that a jury could have reasonably found Petitioner's decision to exit the building and brandish his loaded gun . . . was an act reasonably calculated to provoke a new altercation with Boot. . . . However, the testimony is consistent that Petitioner was not brandishing [5] his gun when they were outside, but rather, he pulled the gun from its holster when Boot and Stroud turned and began advancing toward him in an aggressive manner. The State did not produce any evidence to contradict Petitioner's testimony he routinely carried the concealed weapon, and did not deliberately arm himself in anticipation of a conflict that evening. The record establishes Petitioner did not know Boot prior to his attempt to eject him and only did so in his capacity as a security guard, and upon request of a tenant. It is undisputed that Petitioner called the police before ejecting Boot and Stroud, and then immediately called 911 after firing the shots. Petitioner's stated reason for walking outside was to inform the police, whom he thought had arrived, of the direction Boot and Stroud were walking. The State did not rebut Petitioner's stated reason for his exit and, in fact, the only evidence the State offered to prove Petitioner's fault in bringing about the harm was the act of following Boot and Stroud outside. As Petitioner had the right to eject the trespassers from the premises, his decision to exit the building and stand on the doormat to ensure their departure cannot, in and of itself, be construed as acting in bad faith. Had Petitioner accompanied the ejection with threatening words or posture, a jury question may have arisen. See State v. Wiggins, 330 S.C. at 547, 500 S.E.2d at 494 (testimony that appellant threatened to kick both [victim's and sister's] aes raised a jury question as to whether appellant was exercising good faith in ejecting victim). However, under these facts, we find Petitioner was exercising his right to eject trespassers in good faith and, as a matter of law, he was without fault in bringing about the difficulty.