Opinion ID: 785958
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Allen's lack of diligence in pursuing her rights

Text: 40 Allen next contends that equitable tolling is appropriate because she was diligent in pursuing her rights. Using the district court's analysis of the date on which Allen's conviction became final, however, she filed her habeas petition approximately seven months late. Under the alternative analysis, her petition would have been filed approximately four years and six months late. Even giving Allen the benefit of the shorter period, she still has offered no adequate reason for the delay. 41 Allen contends, however, that one reason for her delay is that she received mistaken advice contained in two letters written to her by her attorney. The first is dated September 20, 1995, when the cases of Allen's codefendants were still pending in the Michigan Supreme Court. Allen's case had returned to the trial court, where she eventually pled nolo contendere to a charge of manslaughter. In the first letter, the lawyer advised Allen to wait and see how the Supreme Court decided her codefendants' cases before she decided whether to appeal a pretrial order in her remanded proceeding. 42 Assuming, once again, that Allen's conviction was not final until soon after the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed her manslaughter conviction and sentence, the attorney's advice to Allen in the first letter is not relevant to Allen's delay in filing her federal habeas petition. At the time the attorney wrote the letter, Allen had not yet pled guilty to manslaughter, much less started the process of direct review. AEDPA, however, clearly states that the statute of limitations runs from the conclusion of direct review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The advice of the attorney, therefore, could not have affected Allen's federal rights. Even if Allen had followed the attorney's suggestion and delayed her decision of whether to appeal the pretrial order, the federal statute of limitations still would not have started until the conclusion of both the trial proceedings and direct review. 43 The second letter to Allen from her attorney is dated March 24, 1997, which was after Allen was sentenced on the manslaughter charge, but before Allen had appealed that conviction and sentence to the Michigan Court of Appeals. In the second letter, Allen's attorney states: I know you have asked about federal habeas corpus relief. I'm not an expert on that procedure, but it would seem to me that you are a long way from exhausting your state court remedies, a prerequisite typically to federal relief. Allen contends that the attorney's lack of knowledge of the statute of limitations is a factor that supports the application of equitable tolling in this case. 44 This court has held, however, that a petitioner's reliance on the unreasonable and incorrect advice of his or her attorney is not a ground for equitable tolling. Jurado v. Burt, 337 F.3d 638, 644-45 (6th Cir.2003). Although not directly on point, Jurado suggests that equitable tolling is not appropriate in this case. In Jurado, the attorney (unintentionally) misled the petitioner; in the present case, Allen's attorney simply admitted that he was not an expert in federal habeas procedures. The advice that Allen's attorney did provide, moreover, was correct: Allen could not file a habeas petition until she had exhausted her state remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that — (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State....). 45 If equitable tolling was not appropriate in Jurado, where the petitioner detrimentally relied on the unintentionally incorrect advice from his attorney, then tolling is certainly not appropriate here, where Allen's attorney simply admitted that he lacked the relevant legal knowledge and gave Allen advice that was, in fact, correct. The attorney's second letter to Allen therefore provides no basis for the application of equitable tolling. 46