Opinion ID: 776902
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Of Impermissible Discretion

Text: 25 The City does not dispute that City Hall Plaza is a public forum as defined by the Supreme Court: a place[] which by long tradition or by government fiat ha[s] been devoted to assembly and debate. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is well settled that the First Amendment protects the free use of such a public place for rallies of the sort conducted by Housing Works. 26 The protection afforded for such use is not absolute, however, because expressive activity, even in a quintessential public forum, may interfere with other important activities for which the property is used. Id. at 197, 112 S.Ct. 1846. Therefore, 27 even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. 28 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984)). 29 Government-imposed restrictions on time, place, or manner of speech in a public forum will fail the neutrality requirement if they confer overly broad discretion on the regulating officials. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992). Without proper standards to apply, there exists a potential that official discretion will be exercised to suppress a particular point of view. Id. Accordingly, regulations governing speech in a public forum must contain `narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority.' Id. at 131, 112 S.Ct. 2395 (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969)). 30 The regulation at issue in Forsyth County provided for payment in advance of a fee of not more than $1,000 per day for a permit to conduct a parade, procession, or open-air meeting. Id. at 126, 112 S.Ct. 2395. It empowered a Forsyth County government official to set the fee in an amount deemed necessary to meet administrative expenses as well as expenses relating to the maintenance of public order. Id. at 127, 112 S.Ct. 2395. The Supreme Court analyzed Forsyth County's interpretation and implementation of its regulation and noted that there were no objective factors provided for the guidance of the administrator charged with issuing the permits in regard to the fees to be charged. Id. at 133, 112 S.Ct. 2395. The Court concluded that in order to assess the cost of maintaining public order, it was necessary for the administrator to examine the content of the message, an examination prohibited by the First Amendment. The Court put it this way: The costs to which [Forsyth County] refers are those associated with the public's reaction to the speech. Listeners' reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation. Id. at 134, 112 S.Ct. 2395. 31 In Shuttlesworth, the municipal ordinance provided for the granting of a permit for a parade, procession, or public demonstration unless in [the City Commission's] judgment the public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience require that it be refused. 394 U.S. at 149-50, 89 S.Ct. 935. The Court determined that the ordinance conferred virtually unbridled and absolute power upon the City Commission and concluded that the 32 ordinance as it was written, therefore, fell squarely within the ambit of the many decisions of this Court over the last 30 years, holding that a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional. 33 Id. at 150-51, 89 S.Ct. 935. The ability of the City Commission members to apply their own concepts to such matters as convenience, morals, good order, decency, health, safety, peace, and public welfare presented an irremediable defect in the ordinance. 34 The policy of the City regarding amplified sound in City Hall Plaza does not confer unfettered or unbridled discretion upon City officials. The policy simply provides that amplified sound may not be used in the City Hall Plaza except for those limited and celebratory occasions when City Hall is closed. The reason for the policy is clear: the noise level of amplified sound so close to the City Hall building is a distraction to the executive and legislative officials who work inside the building as well as to the members of the public who have business to transact there. The control of noise level is a legitimate public concern. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949). Legitimate government functions must be carried out without excessive noise interference, and even the regulations governing the use of sound permits in places other than City Hall Plaza prohibit the issuance of a permit when physical conditions are such that the public would be deprived of the peaceful use of a public facility such as City Hall. See N.Y.C.Code § 10-108(g)(3). 35 The very limited discretion afforded to City officials in conducting a public ceremony during which City Hall is closed and sound amplification permitted cannot in any way be said to be comparable to the content-based restrictions found objectionable in the cases examined by the Supreme Court. The district court thought that the ticker-tape parade exemption to the sound amplification ban did not provide the definite, narrow, and objective standards necessary to dispel impermissible discretion. In fact, ticker-tape parades, which traditionally wind up at City Hall Plaza, have occurred only twelve times in the past twenty years. City officials have not exercised their discretion beyond the limits announced by the City policy, and have designated ticker-tape parades only for the limited purpose of honoring heroes, athletes, soldiers, visiting dignitaries, and statesmen. These affairs do not involve content-based messages of any sort. They are instead dedicated to the celebration of the kind of accomplishment and achievement recognized by all. City officials have very limited discretion in regard to the designation of these events, and to say that they have undue discretion is a gross exaggeration. 36 The Supreme Court teaches that [t]he principal inquiry in determining content neutrality ... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746. Underlying the City policy at issue here is a purpose to bar generally the use of amplified sound so as to avoid interruption of essential government functions. Accordingly, it constitutes [a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression and therefore is deemed neutral even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others. Id. 37 To the extent that the City policy confers discretionary authority upon City officials to select those commonly understood to be deserving of honor for their accomplishments and therefore entitled to ticker-tape parades that entail the closing of City Hall, the policy has, at best, an incidental effect on those, like Housing Works, who desire to advance specific viewpoint-based speech. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the City's policy banning amplified sound in City Hall Plaza, except for the very occasional celebratory ticker-tape parades when City Hall is closed, provides on its face a sufficiently narrow, objective, and definite standard to pass constitutional muster in regard to the requirement of content neutrality. Cf. MacDonald v. Safir, 206 F.3d 183, 193 (2d Cir.2000) (remanding for consideration of actual practices where language of ordinance vests overbroad discretion in Police Commissioner).