Opinion ID: 2552228
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Proposition 115 and Whitman.

Text: Defendant Miranda argues that use of Canela's statement at his preliminary examination to implicate him in the murders violated the state hearsay rule as well as his state and federal due process and confrontation rights. To evaluate these claims, we first turn to the provisions of Proposition 115, as we construed it in Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1063, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 160, 820 P.2d 262. Among other things, Proposition 115, enacted in 1990, adopted article I, section 30, subdivision (b), of the California Constitution, declaring hearsay evidence admissible at preliminary examinations in criminal cases, as may be provided by law. ( Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1070, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 820 P.2d 262.) In addition, the measure amended Penal Code section 872, subdivision (b), to provide that a probable cause determination at a preliminary examination may be based on out-of-court declarants' hearsay statements related by a police officer with certain qualifications and experience. ( Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1070, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 160, 820 P.2d 262.) Additionally, the measure added Evidence Code section 1203.1 to provide a preliminary examination exception to the general requirement that all hearsay declarants be made available for cross-examination. ( Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1070, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 820 P.2d 262.) Further, the 1990 measure amended Penal Code section 866, subdivision (a), to give magistrates discretion to limit defendants' right to call witnesses on their behalf. ( Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1070-1071, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 820 P.2d 262.) Finally, the measure added Penal Code section 866, subdivision (b), explaining that `It is the purpose of a preliminary examination to establish whether there exists probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed a felony. The examination shall not be used for purposes of discovery.' (See Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1071, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 820 P.2d 262.) In Whitman, the prosecution had relied on these provisions of Proposition 115 to present, over the defendant's objection, certain hearsay testimony at a preliminary examination. On appeal, we held that testimony by a noninvestigating officer or reader who related the contents of a police report prepared by an investigating officer in circumstances unknown to the reader could not provide probable cause to hold a defendant to answer. ( Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1072-1075, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 160, 820 P.2d 262.) However, we rejected the defendant's various constitutional challenges to Proposition 115 and construed the measure to allow a qualified law enforcement officer to relate single-level hearsay such as is involved in this case, if the officer had sufficient knowledge of the crime or the circumstances under which the out-of-court statement was made so as to provide meaningful assistance to the magistrate in assessing the reliability of the statement. We opined that the latter, more limited, form of hearsay evidence satisfies federal requirements of reliability [citation], and thus properly may be admitted at preliminary hearings despite the defendant's inability to confront and cross-examine the declarant witness.... ( Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1074, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 820 P.2d 262, second italics added.) Whitman also discussed the impact of the state and federal confrontation clauses on testimony made admissible by Proposition 115. We observed that the measure permitted the admission of hearsay at preliminary examinations and thus amounted to a state constitutional exception to the right to confrontation enunciated in the state Constitution. ( Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1076-1077, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 820 P.2d 262.) As for the federal confrontation clause, and the federal case law requiring reliable hearsay testimony, Whitman observed that Proposition 115 amply guaranteed reliability because ... the experience and training requirements of [Penal Code section 872] help assure that the hearsay testimony of the investigating officer will indeed be as reliable as appropriate in light of the limited purpose of the preliminary hearing.... [Citation.] Although the underlying reliability of the ... witness may remain untested until trial, we think the evaluation and cross-examination of the testimony of the qualified investigating officer provides sufficient basis for a pretrial probable cause determination. ( Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1078, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 820 P.2d 262, italics added.) We also observed in Whitman that it was doubtful that the federal confrontation clause operates to bar hearsay evidence offered at a preliminary hearing held to determine whether probable cause exists to hold the defendant for trial. ( Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1078, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 820 P.2d 262.) We noted that the United States Supreme Court had never so held, and we quoted United States Supreme Court authority that `[t]he right to confrontation is basically a trial right' [Citations]. ( Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1079, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 820 P.2d 262.) Whitman also discussed the probable cause hearing required under the Fourth Amendment by Gerstein v. Pugh (1975) 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54, as a condition of an arrestee's continued detention pending trial. Whitman concluded that the new, limited form of preliminary hearing in this state sufficiently resembles the Fourth Amendment probable cause hearing examined in Gerstein, ... to meet federal confrontation clause standards despite reliance on hearsay evidence. ( Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1082, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 820 P.2d 262, italics added.) Finally, Whitman rejected the argument that admission of single-level hearsay at the preliminary examination constituted a violation of due process. (See Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1082, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 820 P.2d 262.) We observed that Proposition 115 provides the defendant with a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine and evaluate the testimony of a qualified law enforcement officer relating single-level hearsay, and to call specified defense witnesses to rebut or qualify that testimony. We concluded these opportunities amply satisfied the demands of due process. ( Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1082, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 820 P.2d 262.) 2. Hearsay, Confrontation, and Due Process. Defendant argues that use of Canela's statement at the joint preliminary examination to implicate defendant in the charged offenses violated the state hearsay rule as well as his state and federal due process and confrontation rights. He asserts that the testimony at issue here is not ordinary hearsay such as was involved in Whitman, but presumptively] unreliab[le] hearsay because of Canela's status as a confessed accomplice and his probable motivation to implicate defendant and exonerate himself. (See Lilly, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 132-133, 119 S.Ct. at p. 1898; Lee v. Illinois (1986) 476 U.S. 530, 541, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514; Bruton v. United States, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 136, 88 S.Ct. at p. 1628; People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 567, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928 [accomplice testimony subject to distrust]; People v. Campa (1984) 36 Cal.3d 870, 882, 206 Cal.Rptr. 114, 686 P.2d 634 [accomplice statements, being inherently suspect, cannot support arrest warrant]; Pen.Code, § 1111 [requiring corroboration of accomplice testimony to sustain conviction].) Under Lilly, according to defendant, an accomplice's custodial confession is inadmissible at any phase of a criminal proceeding for two reasons: The confession is both presumptively untrustworthy, and it falls within no firmly rooted hearsay exception. ( Lilly, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 132-138 & fn. 5, 119 S.Ct. at pp. 1898-1900 & fn. 5.) Lilly and most of the other authorities defendant cites as finding an accomplice's custodial confession unreliable involved the proposed admission of the confession at trial. In Bruton, for example, the court held that because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining [the defendant's] guilt, admission of [the codefendant's] confession in this joint trial violated the defendant's federal confrontation right. ( Bruton v. United States, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 126, 88 S.Ct. 1620; see also People v. Aranda, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 528-531, 47 Cal.Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265; People v. McRae (1947) 31 Cal.2d 184, 186-187,187 P.2d 741 [uncorroborated accomplice testimony may support probable cause finding at preliminary examination].) In McRae, the court, in an opinion written by then Associate Justice Traynor, ruled that despite the untrustworthy source of such testimony, A committing magistrate may nevertheless believe the testimony of an accomplice and conclude that there is probable cause to believe defendant guilty of a public offense to which he should be held to answer. ( People v. McRae, supra, 31 Cal.2d at p. 186, 187 P.2d 741.) Similar reasoning would permit a magistrate to consider accomplice Canela's statements in this case. We observe that, despite its presumed unreliability, such evidence represents an accusation of criminal conduct made to a law enforcement officer and ordinarily warranting consideration in preliminary proceedings designed to determine whether formal charges should be brought. As previously noted, Whitman observed that under the high court cases, the right to confrontation is `basically a trial right' ( Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1079, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 820 P.2d 262, italics added by Whitman.) Whitman concluded that at a preliminary examination conducted under Proposition 115, testimony by a qualified law enforcement officer such as Lillienfeld relating single-level hearsay is, as to the defendant, admissible as against hearsay, confrontation clause, and due process objections. We see no good reason for applying a different rule to qualified officer testimony relating out-of-court hearsay statements by nontestifying accomplices, despite defendant's claim of the general unreliability of such statements. Judges and magistrates are presumably well equipped to consider and weigh the possible unreliability of an accomplice's statement in determining whether to hold the defendant for trial. As we pointed out in an earlier case, Accomplice testimony is generally suspect because it may have been proffered in the hope of leniency or immunity, and thus greater weight may be accorded such testimony than is warranted. [Citation.] However, when a judge rather than a jury is trier of fact it is not unreasonable to assume he is more critical of accomplice testimony and more likely to accord it appropriate weight. ( In re Mitchell P. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 946, 951, 151 Cal.Rptr. 330, 587 P.2d 1144; see People v. McGavock (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 332, 339-340, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 600 [[Experienced trial judges, unlike lay jurors, are well familiar with the possible risks inherent in accomplice testimony.].) The same observation can be made of magistrates conducting preliminary examinations. As the Court of Appeal in this case observed, The fact finder at a preliminary hearing is a magistrate, not a jury. A judge, unlike a jury, is presumed to be able to avoid the risks of prejudice posed by testimony of limited or questionable value. Our holding may allow admission at the preliminary examination of qualified officer testimony regarding an accomplice's confession, but we leave it to the magistrate in each case to decide the weight to be given to that testimony, based on such considerations as the circumstances surrounding the confession, the relative reliability of its source, and the extent to which it is corroborated. Committing magistrates, of course, should continue to treat with care and caution an accomplice's statements that incriminate the defendant, whether admitted directly or through the hearsay testimony of a qualified law enforcement officer. (See People v. Guiuan, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 569, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928; People v. McRae, supra, 31 Cal.2d at p. 186, 187 P.2d 741.) Care and caution regarding accomplice statements are especially appropriate if the accused lacks opportunity to cross-examine the accomplice regarding his or her incriminatory statements. But we find no reasonable basis for recognizing an exception to Whitman in cases involving an accomplice's confession or other incriminating statement. (See also Ruiz v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 935, 940-941, 31 Cal. Rptr.2d 741 ( Ruiz ) [distinguishing People v. Campa, supra, 36 Cal.3d 870, 206 Cal. Rptr. 114, 686 P.2d 634].) As stated in Ruiz,  Whitman instructs us that an opportunity to cross-examine a qualified peace officer [relating accomplice testimony] is sufficient at a pretrial probable cause hearing under United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. ( Ruiz, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 941, 31 Cal. Rptr.2d 741.) Defendant argues that we should adopt a rule barring hearsay evidence recounting an accomplice's statements, at least to the extent those statements are not specifically disserving to the accomplice's interests. (See People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 441, 124 Cal.Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 296 ( Leach ).) In Leach, we were concerned with Evidence Code section 1230, which had created a hearsay exception for declarations against interest. Observing that the reliability of such statements was limited to that portion of the statement that was indeed disserving to the interests of the declarant, we held the hearsay exception inapplicable to collateral, nondisserving assertions within the declaration. ( Leach, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 441, 124 Cal.Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 296.) Significantly, in Leach, we noted that our construction of the statute was made [i]n the absence of any legislative declaration to the contrary. ( Ibid. ) In the present case, however, the framers of Proposition 115 adopted a broad hearsay exception applicable to all preliminary examination testimony presented by a qualified law enforcement officer. We decline defendant's invitation to adopt a more restrictive construction of the measure seemingly inconsistent with its plain meaning. In short, we find no basis in the language of Proposition 115 as construed by Whitman, or in the federal decisions applying confrontation clause principles, for creating an accomplice confession exception to the general rule permitting admission of hearsay evidence at preliminary examinations. Defendant cites one case, Kentucky v. Stincer (1987) 482 U.S. 730, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 ( Stincer) , applying confrontation principles to a hearing to determine two child witnesses' competency to testify at trial, but nothing in that case supports the view that confrontation rights attach to a pretrial probable cause hearing held to decide whether to hold the defendant for trial. In Stincer, the court observed that the distinction between trial and pretrial proceedings was not controlling in that case because a competency hearing may well be a `stage of trial.' In this case, for instance, the competency hearing was held after the jury was sworn, in the judge's chambers, and in the presence of opposing counsel who asked questions of the witnesses. Moreover, although questions regarding the guilt or innocence of the defendant usually are not asked at a competency hearing, the hearing retains a direct relationship with the trial because it determines whether a key witness will testify. Further, although the preliminary determination of a witness' competency to testify is made at this hearing, the determination of competency is an ongoing one for the judge to make based on the witness' actual testimony at trial. ( Id. at pp. 739-740, 107 S.Ct. 2658, fn. omitted.) Stincer also stated that rather than concentrating on the trial or pretrial nature of the competency hearing at issue there, a more useful inquiry was whether the proceeding interfered with the defendant's right to cross-examine the child witnesses. ( Stincer, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 740, 107 S.Ct. 2658.) Defendant suggests this language indicates the high court's willingness to apply confrontation principles to any stage of a criminal proceeding in which defendant lacks the right to cross-examine his accusers. We do not read Stincer that broadly. In the present case, by reason of Proposition 115 and the nature of the probable cause hearing, defendant had a right to cross-examine Detective Lillienfeld, a right that he exercised. He will also have the right to cross-examine Canela at trial, should Canela testify against him. But he had no right to cross-examine Canela at the preliminary examination, because Canela did not testify in that proceeding. We think it doubtful the high court would extend the right of confrontation to the out-of-court statements of accomplices admitted in the course of a probable cause hearing. Defendant argues that it is unfair, and a violation of his confrontation rights, to permit him to be held for trial on the basis of statements made by an accomplice not likely to be available for cross-examination at trial by reason of the accomplice's assertion of his self-incrimination privilege. He observes that even probable cause hearings must comprise a fair and reliable determination of probable cause. ( Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 125, 95 S.Ct. 854.) The argument is speculative, as Canela, who has already been tried and convicted of the offenses for which defendant is also charged (see People v. Canela (Super.Ct. L.A.County, 1997, No. VA039704)), might well testify at defendant's trial. Moreover, the self-incrimination privilege is a two-edged sword, both hurting and helping defendant, for if Canela successfully invokes it at defendant's trial, his extrajudicial confession implicating defendant would be inadmissible hearsay at that trial. (See, e.g., Lilly, supra, 527 U.S. at pp. 132-138 & fn. 5, 119 S.Ct. at pp. 1898-1900 & fn. 5.) Although the contents of Canela's confession may afford probable cause to detain defendant pending trial, the prosecutor must ultimately rely on evidence other than these out-of-court statements to obtain a conviction. As the prosecutor candidly observed to the magistrate in this case, if Canela refuses to testify at trial, I don't have a case against the other defendants [but] ... I may be able to develop it and at a later point in time. Defendant also contends that use of Canela's confessions to establish probable cause at the preliminary examination violates federal and state due process principles by allowing the prosecutor to admit inherently untrustworthy hearsay statements at the preliminary examination. We reject the contention. As we observed in Whitman, new Penal Code section 872, subdivision (b), makes no broad grant of authority to the prosecutor to rely on hearsay evidence, but instead merely specifies a further, limited exception to the general hearsay exclusionary rule of Evidence Code section 1200, by allowing a probable cause finding to be based on certain hearsay testimony by law enforcement officers having specified experience or training. ( Whitman, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1082, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 160, 820 P.2d 262.) But Proposition 115 imposes no requirement that the underlying hearsay evidence itself be reliable or trustworthy. Instead, the measure provides the defendant with opportunities at the preliminary examination to cross-examine and evaluate the testimony of a qualified law enforcement officer relating single-level hearsay, and to call specified defense witnesses to rebut the prosecution's case. As the Court of Appeal in this case concluded, These procedures adequately ensure factfinding reliability, and provide the defendant with all the process that is due. In light of our holding in Whitman and the protections afforded by Proposition 115 as construed in that case, we find no reasonable basis for holding that Canela's confessions are, as to defendant, and for purposes of their use at a preliminary examination, inadmissible hearsay violating the confrontation or due process clauses of the state or federal Constitution.