Opinion ID: 2800180
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Suppression Was Prejudicial

Text: The suppression of favorable evidence is prejudicial if that evidence was “material” for Brady purposes. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282. Evidence is “material” if it “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. at 290 (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435). To establish materiality, a defendant need not demonstrate “that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in [his] acquittal.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. Rather, the defendant need only establish “a ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result.” Id. (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985)). A “reasonable probability” exists if “the government’s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” Id. (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678); see also United States v. Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d 885, 900 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In evaluating materiality, we focus on whether the withholding of the evidence undermines our trust in the fairness of the trial and the resulting verdict.”). The Nevada Supreme Court determined that Comstock had failed to show that the information in Street’s statement “was either exculpatory or material,” or that its disclosure would “have created a reasonable probability of a different verdict.” The court characterized the information as “mere speculation” with only “minimal” impeachment value, because it did “not contradict [Street’s] trial testimony or rise to the level of a recantation.” Those characterizations both understated the impeachment value of Street’s recollections and ignored their exculpatory value in light of the trial testimony and the prosecutor’s closing argument. COMSTOCK V. HUMPHRIES 17 At trial, Comstock attempted to elicit testimony to support his defense that the ring had been lost and later found outside Street’s apartment. Comstock’s cross-examination of Street was demonstrably ineffective. When Comstock’s counsel asked if Street had ever dropped the ring outside, Street replied, “Not that I’m aware of.” When asked if he could have dropped it unknowingly, he initially conceded that possibility but immediately added that it “would have never fallen off or dropped.” When asked if he had ever misplaced the ring, Street answered, “Within my home or establishment, sure.” When counsel posited that perhaps Street had left his ring in his pants pocket and it had fallen out by the laundry room in his apartment complex, Street responded, “I’ve never left it in my pants.” When counsel suggested that Street may have made a bet at a bar and given someone else the ring to hold as collateral, Street replied, “No, sir. Means too much.” The most counsel was able to establish was that Street could not be certain he had never before lost his ring “outside the apartment.” The disclosure of Street’s recollections would have transformed his cross-examination and the trial. Instead of having to ask open-ended questions exploring whether the ring might have been dropped or lost, counsel would have been armed with Street’s specific admission that he “may have placed [his] ring on the ground while outside [his] apartment washing [his] motorcycle.” Instead of groping blindly at hypothetical laundry mishaps or bar bets gone wrong, counsel could have deployed Street’s specific recollection of an occasion when he removed his ring, placed it on the ground or on an air conditioner outside, and did not recall putting it back on. Because the State suppressed Street’s recollections of these particular, relevant facts, “the 18 COMSTOCK V. HUMPHRIES defense was empty handed” during Street’s cross- examination. Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d at 900. We have held that impeachment evidence is material “if it could have been used to impeach a key prosecution witness sufficiently to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Paradis v. Arave, 240 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d at 900 (“[W]e zero in on whether the suppressed materials could have provided an effective means of impeachment.”). Because Street’s recollections would have undermined the State’s narrative of safekeeping—the very foundation of the State’s case—those recollections should have been disclosed for impeachment purposes. Exculpatory evidence is material if its introduction at trial “would have resulted in a markedly weaker case for the prosecution and a markedly stronger one for the defense.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 441. Without the information in Street’s statement, the jury was led to believe that Street would never have simply set his prized ring on the ground or somewhere else outside, and Comstock’s defense that the ring was found, not stolen, was therefore implausible. The fact that Street had told the State that he may have placed his ring on the ground, and that he did put it either on the ground or an air conditioner outside at some point, would have made the State’s case markedly weaker and Comstock’s defense markedly stronger. Street’s recollections therefore should have been disclosed for exculpatory purposes, too. Supreme Court case law also instructs that the “likely damage” from the suppression of Brady evidence “is best understood” by reference to the prosecutor’s closing arguments. Id. at 444. Here, the prosecutor relied on Street’s testimony to emphatically dispute Comstock’s found-ring COMSTOCK V. HUMPHRIES 19 defense. In her closing, the prosecutor argued that the ring could not possibly have been lost because Street kept it in a seashell in his apartment, knew exactly where it was, and testified as to its immense importance. The prosecutor paraphrased Street’s testimony as stating that the ring “can’t fall off,” “he’s never lost it before,” and “he did not put it in his pants pocket.” She suggested that the ring could not have been found outside Street’s apartment, because “[h]e keeps it in a seashell or he wears it. He would never lose anything with that significant of value.” The prosecutor’s arguments confirm that Street’s testimony was the linchpin of the State’s case. That case was built on circumstantial evidence and inference. As the State conceded in its brief to the Nevada Supreme Court, there was a “lack of direct evidence,” and “the State really had no direct proof establishing exactly how Comstock came into [possession] of the ring.” The prosecutor exhorted the jury to infer that the ring had to have been stolen because Street’s testimony established that it could not have been lost. Given that the State had no direct evidence of Comstock’s guilt, its suppression of Street’s expressed doubts and recollections was especially prejudicial. See Amado, 758 F.3d at 1140–41 (holding that Brady evidence was material where other evidence was weak); Aguilar, 725 F.3d at 985 (same). In short, because the information in Street’s impact statement would have substantially diminished, if not defeated, the State’s ability to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the ring was stolen, the State’s suppression of that information “‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678). Had the information been disclosed, there is at least a “reasonable probability” that the result would have been 20 COMSTOCK V. HUMPHRIES different. Id. The state court’s contrary conclusion was an unreasonable application of Brady and its progeny. We also reject the district court’s conclusion that Street’s recollections were immaterial because Comstock could have been charged, tried, and convicted on the theory that he had misappropriated lost property.4 It is true that under Nevada law, “theft” includes the misappropriation of lost property “without reasonable efforts to notify the true owner” when circumstances provide “means of inquiry as to the true owner.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.0832(1)(d). It is also true that the possession of stolen property offense for which Comstock was convicted encompasses possession of property that was lost and misappropriated. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.275(7). However, Comstock was specifically charged with possession of stolen property “obtained by means of larceny” (emphasis added).5 Larceny, unlike misappropriation, requires an intentional stealing, taking, and carrying away. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.220(1). We evaluate the materiality of Brady evidence based on the crimes charged, not based on the crimes that might have 4 We note that the Nevada Supreme Court does not appear to have relied on this argument, the State did not make this argument to the district court, and the State does not make this argument on appeal. Under the circumstances, we would be fully justified in holding that the argument was waived. See Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2009). We address it on its merits only because Comstock is entitled to relief even if the State is given every benefit of any doubt. 5 As Comstock points out, Nevada requires the State’s charging document to specifically identify which form of “theft” was allegedly committed. See State v. Hancock, 955 P.2d 183, 186 (Nev. 1998) (affirming dismissal of indictment for lack of specificity). COMSTOCK V. HUMPHRIES 21 been charged. See United States v. Mejia-Mesa, 153 F.3d 925, 927–28 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Strifler, 851 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1988); cf. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 270 n.8 (1991) (noting that the Supreme Court “has never held that the right to a jury trial is satisfied when an appellate court retries a case on appeal under different instructions and on a different theory than was ever presented to the jury. Appellate courts are not permitted to affirm convictions on any theory they please simply because the facts necessary to support the theory were presented to the jury.”). This makes sense. Brady requires prosecutors to disclose evidence that is “material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.” Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 630. Guilt or punishment cannot, of course, be premised on uncharged crimes, and evidence that directly undermines the prosecution’s theory of the charged crime is “plainly material” under Brady. Id.; see also Williams v. Ryan, 623 F.3d 1258, 1265, 1266 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that evidence was “classic Brady material” where it was “inconsistent with the State’s theory at trial” and provided the names of witnesses who could have “undercut the prosecution’s theory” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding the State violated Brady where it withheld evidence that “would have substantially undermined the state’s principal theory”). Just as a habeas petitioner alleging actual innocence need not establish that he was innocent of an uncharged crime, Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 624 (1998), a petitioner alleging a Brady violation need not establish that the suppressed evidence would have exculpated him from an uncharged offense. Furthermore, even if it were permissible to disregard the language of a charging document on the theory that the defendant was convicted of a variant of the charged crime, we 22 COMSTOCK V. HUMPHRIES disagree with the district court’s suggestion that Comstock might have been convicted of possessing lost and misappropriated property, rather than property that was actively and intentionally stolen. The district court reasoned that (1) the jury was instructed that “it is necessary to show that the property was the product of theft,” and the term “theft” includes the misappropriation of lost property, and (2) the prosecutor, in her rebuttal closing, suggested that even a found ring could be stolen. However, the jury instructions did not define “theft” or suggest in any way that Comstock could be convicted for merely possessing lost and found property, and the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing, like the rest of the State’s case, emphatically argued that the ring “was clearly stolen from [Street’s] apartment.” If Comstock had been charged and tried on the theory that he possessed a ring that had been lost and misappropriated, there would have been different arguments, evidence, and jury instructions. A case of “Finders Keepers, Losers Weepers” differs dramatically from the burglary of a dwelling (which was the government’s effective theory at trial). We need not speculate as to how Street’s recollections might have affected hypothetical proceedings. The statement was material because there is at least a reasonable probability that its disclosure would have altered the result of the proceeding that actually occurred. See Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 630; Banks, 540 U.S. at 699; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.