Opinion ID: 1789370
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendant's Admissions Before Trial.

Text: In addition to the arguments originally advanced before this court in support of the contention that defendant's admissions before trial to police officers should have been excluded, defendant now relies upon Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), 378 U. S. 478, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. (2d) 977. It is contended that this case requires that any such admission be excluded from evidence in the absence of (1) either representation by counsel before making such admissions or the intelligent waiver of counsel; and (2) the police officers informing defendant of his constitutional right to remain silent and not say anything in response to questions. A careful reading of Escobedo convinces us that it does not lay down any such sweeping strictures. At the beginning of the Escobedo majority opinion, Mr. Justice GOLDBERG stated the issue to be decided (378 U. S., at p. 479): The critical question in this case is whether, under the circumstances, the refusal by the police to honor petitioner's request to consult with his lawyer during the course of an interrogation constitutes a denial of `the Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as `made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,' Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 342, and thereby renders inadmissible in a state criminal trial any incriminating statement elicited by the police during the interrogation. (Emphasis supplied.) The pertinent circumstances in that case were that during the interrogation after Escobedo's arrest he repeatedly asked to speak to his lawyer and such request was denied; his lawyer came to the police station and asked the officer in charge for permission to see Escobedo; this also was denied; and the police never advised Escobedo of his constitutional right to remain silent. The only similarity between those facts and the facts present here is that defendant Browne was not advised of his constitutional right to remain silent. He made no request to consult with an attorney nor did any attorney seek to confer with him. We deem that this fully distinguishes Escobedo and that it does not control the result here. With respect to the failure to advise defendant of his constitutional right to remain silent, Holt v. State (1962), 17 Wis. (2d) 468, 479, 117 N. W. (2d) 626, held that there is no hard-and-fast rule that an accused must be informed of his constitutional right not to incriminate himself as a condition precedent to admission into evidence of any admissions or confessions made to the police. The most that Escobedo holds in this respect is that the failure to so inform a criminal suspect under arrest, when coupled with other circumstances, may be sufficient to require exclusion of any admission made by him. We find here a total lack of any other circumstances which require exclusion of the instant admissions.