Opinion ID: 3013254
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Santore Testimony

Text: We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Elk Lake School District, 283 F.3d 138, 156 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). “Where, however, the district court fails to explain its grounds for denying [an evidentiary objection] and its reasons for doing so are not otherwise apparent from the record, there is no way to review its discretion. . . . In those circumstances, we need not defer to the district court’s ruling, and we may undertake to examine the record and perform the required balancing ourselves.” Becker v. Arco Chemical Co., 207 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). 5 Defendants made a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Mark Santore on the grounds that the evidence would be irrelevant and highly prejudicial. Following oral argument, the District Court denied the motion without explanation and ruled that it would allow Santore’s testimony. (App. Vol. II, p. 113) Because the District Court did not explain its reasoning in denying Defendants’ motion, we will examine the record and perform our own analysis. Defendants argue that Santore’s testimony should have been excluded because it was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. Defendants assert that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law or a new trial because the admission of Santore’s testimony “improperly and irreparably tainted the entire case since the jury was asked by plaintiff to conclude and in fact concluded that Mr. Whittaker was terminated for political reasons because Santore was.” (Def.’s Brief, p. 18) The first question is whether Santore’s testimony was relevant. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as that which tends “to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” In this case, Whittaker testified that Brownfield fired him for political reasons, while Brownfield testified that he fired Whittaker because of his poor work performance and because he wanted to reorganize the Sheriff’s Department. The conflicting testimony raised the consequential factual issue of Brownfield’s intent in firing Whittaker. Santore’s testimony was offered by Whittaker to prove that it was more probable than not that Brownfield fired him for political reasons. Accordingly, Santore’s testimony fits within the Rule 401 definition of relevance. 6 Next, we must determine whether the evidence was otherwise admissible. Santore’s testimony pertained to an act by Brownfield other than the firing of Whittaker. “Other act” evidence falls under the rubric of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which provides that: “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. . . .” As we explained above, Santore’s testimony that Brownfield fired him for political reasons was offered to prove that Brownfield was firing Sheriff’s Department employees for political reasons. In other words, the “other act” evidence was offered to prove Brownfield’s motive or intent, and to rebut his asserted nondiscriminatory reasons for firing Whittaker. See Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t., 174 F.3d 95, 110 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding, in the context of a Title VII action, that “evidence of harassment of other women and widespread sexism is also probative of ‘whether one of the principal nondiscriminatory reasons asserted by [an employer] for its actions was in fact a pretext for ... discrimination.’”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1074 (2000); Burks v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 81 F.3d 975, 981 (10th Cir. 1996) (As a general rule, the testimony of other employees about their treatment by the defendant is relevant to the issue of the employer's discriminatory intent.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 931 (1996). The proximity in time and similarity of circumstances between Brownfield’s firing of Whittaker and Santore militate in favor of admission of the Santore testimony to prove Brownfield’s motive or intent. Whittaker and Santore were both Deputies in the Sheriff’s Department. Brownfield fired Whittaker and Santore on the same day. He offered “politics” 7 as a reason for both firings. Both men were replaced by Brownfield’s campaign supporters. These similarities warrant the admission of the “other act” evidence. See Duckworth v. Ford, 83 F.3d 999, 1001-1002 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that, in civil rights action alleging defendant had violated plaintiff’s first amendment rights by spreading rumors in retaliation for supporting another candidate, court did not err in admitting evidence about jury verdict in favor of a different plaintiff against same defendant because of factual similarity between the cases). The last remaining question with respect to the admissibility of the evidence is whether the probative value of the Santore testimony is “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. . .” Fed. R. Evid. 403. We have already discussed the probative value of the Santore testimony. Defendants contend that the possible prejudice from this evidence is that it leads to an impermissible inference that Whittaker was terminated for the same reasons as Santore. Defendants also express concern that Santore’s testimony “likely confused the issues and misled the jury.” (Def.’s Brief, p. 23) Defendants’ arguments with respect to prejudice and confusion, however, amount to an assertion that Santore’s testimony tends to prove Whittaker’s case. After all, the reason Whittaker sought to admit Santore’s testimony was to prove that Brownfield intended to “clean house” after his election to the office of Sheriff, and that included terminating employees who did not support his candidacy. The fact that relevant evidence is damaging to Defendants’ case does not lead to the conclusion that it is unfairly prejudicial. Accordingly, we find that the Santore testimony need not have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.