Opinion ID: 2509476
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Case Law Considering Limitations on Collateral Attack

Text: Our case law has also acknowledged the importance of curbing delayed postconviction motions. We have recognized section 16-5-402 as one means of precluding stale or repetitive attacks on criminal convictions. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d at 433. The majority of Colorado cases applying section 16-5-402 have done so without comment on the alternative doctrine of laches. See Duran v. Price, 868 P.2d 375, 378 (Colo.1994) (stating that according to section 16-5-402 there is no limit on the time period in which to challenge any class one felony), People v. Shackelford, 851 P.2d 218, 221 (Colo.App.1992) (holding that expiration of limitation period does not divest trial court of subject matter jurisdiction). At least two modern cases have considered laches as a time bar to postconviction relief. In Bravo, the court of appeals applied laches as a bar to the defendant's challenge to his 1955 robbery conviction. 692 P.2d at 326. [2] In Bravo, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial in 1981. Id. The trial court denied his motion holding that his request was time barred under the doctrine of laches. Id. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that since a motion for relief under Crim. P. 35 was governed by equitable principles, laches was applicable. Id. at 327. Following Bravo, a trial court again considered laches as a possible bar to postconviction relief. See Fagerholm, 768 P.2d at 691 (assuming applicability of laches to criminal cases, trial court found no evidence of unconscionable delay; issue was not addressed on appeal). Finally, we note that when the general assembly wishes to abrogate the common law in other areas of criminal law, it has done so explicitly. See, e.g., § 18-1-104(3), C.R.S. (2004). We have found no such statement here with regard to equitable defenses such as laches. Moreover, our courts have relied on common law for amplification of the criminal code where necessary. Id.; see also People v. Berry, 703 P.2d 613, 614 (Colo.App.1985) (court of appeals found no merit in People's argument that courts are precluded from reliance on common law in amplification of sections of the criminal code) overruled on other grounds by Beckett v. People, 800 P.2d 74 (Colo.1990). Our legislature and courts have evinced a strong desire to curb stale postconviction claims in order to ensure finality of convictions in our criminal justice system, give force to repeat offender statutes, and alleviate the difficulties of litigating stale claims. The preservation of laches as a time bar against stale claims comports with that intent. We now hold there is no express implication that the equitable doctrine of laches was abrogated by the enactment of section 16-5-402. Crim. P. 35(c) is a postconviction remedy grounded in equitable principles, and under certain circumstances, laches may work to bar the defendant's claim for relief where section 16-5-402 otherwise would not.