Opinion ID: 884196
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: Did the District Court err by allowing into evidence letters written to Appellant by his spouse, Mary Jenkins? The standard of review for evidentiary rulings is whether the district court abused its discretion. State v. Gollehon (1993), 262 Mont. 293, 301, 864 P.2d 1257, 1263. The determination of whether evidence is relevant and admissible is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be overturned absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Gollehon, 864 P.2d at 1263. While Appellant was incarcerated and awaiting trial, he and his wife, Mary, corresponded by letter. After reading Mary's letters, Appellant tore them up into little pieces and put them in the trash. Investigators with the Lewis and Clark County Sheriff's Department picked up Appellant's trash from the jail and reassembled some of Mary's letters. The State attempted to introduce these letters into evidence, once at a pre-trial competency hearing, and again at trial. Appellant asserts that the District Court twice violated the spousal privilege when it admitted Mary's letters into evidence first at the pre-trial competency hearing and later at trial. We consider Appellant's specifications of error at the pre-trial and trial stages separately.
On February 7, 1995, the District Court held a pre-trial hearing to determine the competency of Mary Jenkins. During Mary's testimony, the State attempted to introduce her letters to show that she could express herself and communicate with others. Appellant objected to admission of the letters on the basis of spousal privilege. The District Court responded: I am going to reserve my ruling on those letters. I prefer being able to determine her competency based on her testimony today rather than something she has written in the past. Later in the hearing, when Officer McCormack took the stand, the State again attempted to introduce Mary's letters, and Appellant again objected on the ground of spousal privilege. The following exchange then took place: [Court]: Okay. The spousal privilege does not apply because the letters are not being introduced for the truth of the matters contained in the letters. The letters would only be introduced to show that Mary [can] communicate. . . . [Lawrence's Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, before you consider the letters I would just like the record to reflect that I didn't see these letters until yesterday. . . . I would like the ability to reserve any objection and your review of the letters until such time as we have had a chance to look at them. [Court]: All right. I will go ahead and take a look at the letters and after you have looked at the letters we will meet in chambers and discuss the exhibit. The court took the matter under advisement and ended the hearing. Later that afternoon, in chambers, the court ruled that Mary was competent to testify. As to the letters, the court ruled: I don't feel the need to consider those letters and I am refusing the admission of those letters as to evidence. I decided I could rule on Mary's competence without those letters. On appeal, the State contends that no error occurred because the District Court never admitted the letters. The State argues that Appellant mistook the court's statement, The spousal privilege doesn't apply . . . as the court's ruling on the matter, when in fact, at the request of Appellant, the court took the matter under advisement. We agree with the State. The portion of the record set out above reveals that the District Court refused admission of the letters, as they were not needed in determining Mary's competency. Therefore, we conclude that because the letters were never admitted at the competency hearing, no error occurred.
At trial, Appellant planned to call Dr. William Stratford to testify about his psychological examination of Mary and his diagnosis that she suffered from dementia. The State then filed a motion in limine asking the court to permit its use of Mary's letters in cross-examining Dr. Stratford. When the court discussed the motion with counsel in chambers, Appellant again objected to admission of the letters on the basis of spousal privilege. However, Appellant then conceded to admission of the letters for the limited purpose of showing that Mary could communicate. Appellant stated: I am willing to have Dr. Stratford read the letters and comment upon, you know, if she [sic] wants to say well she writes real nice letters, he can explain that. That is not inconsistent with his diagnosis. In ruling on the motion, the court permitted the State to use only one or two letters in cross-examining Dr. Stratford, and held that such use did not violate the spousal privilege because the letters were being admitted not through a spouse, but through a third party. After the court's ruling, the following exchange took place: [Jenkins' Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I would presume that the court's ruling only goes to those letters going in if they become relevant. [State]: Well I think the jury needs to make that decision. [Jenkins' Defense Counsel]: Well then we want to see which of these letters you produce because there are letters that are totally nonsense. [State]: We won't produce the one that says she has told the neighbors they were home in bed when this happened. I presume we can't get that one in. [Lawrence's Defense Counsel # 1]: Yeah you can. [Lawrence's Defense Counsel # 2]: Sure you can. [Lawrence's Defense Counsel # 1]: We don't care. [Jenkins' Defense Counsel]: So we want to know early on which ones [State]: Then I think we want that one. [Court]: Okay. Now what was the other issue? Later, when the State moved for admission of the letters, Appellant stated: Your Honor, I don't believe there has been a foundation laid on these, but because perhaps it is important for this witness to talk about them I won't object. The State argues that Appellant failed to preserve this issue for appeal. The State cites § 46-20-104(2), MCA, for the rule that [f]ailure to make a timely objection during trial constitutes a waiver of the objection, and points to the above excerpt from the transcript as evidence that Appellant failed to object to the letters when they were being admitted. Appellant counters that his failure to object at trial was not a waiver of the objection, but an appropriate trial tactic once the court's position on the spousal privilege was clear. Appellant urges this Court to focus on his objection made in chambers rather than his failure to object at trial. Appellant argues that the objection made in chambers satisfied § 46-20-104(2), MCA, as it was a timely, specific objection made in response to the State's motion in limine. Appellant's arguments are not persuasive. Whether Appellant's trial tactic was appropriate or not is not subject to our review. Applying the facts of this case to the law, we conclude that because Appellant failed to timely object when the letters were being admitted, he waived his objection for appeal. Appellant urges this Court to focus on the objection made to the State's motion in limine. We acknowledge recent Montana case law holding that a motion in limine preserves trial error for appeal. State v. Stuit (1996), 277 Mont. 227, 230, 921 P.2d 866, 868. See also State v. Weeks (1995), 270 Mont. 63, 85, 891 P.2d 477, 490. However, we refuse to apply Stuit to this case because Appellant's objection to the motion in limine was vitiated by his later agreement to admit the letters. The record shows that Appellant and the State agreed to have the letters admitted for the limited purpose of showing that Mary could communicate. The record also shows that the parties negotiated an agreement as to which letters the State would use. Moreover, it appears from the above excerpt of the transcript that Appellant thought the letter to be quite favorable. Indeed, Dr. Stratford's testimony regarding the letter, that it was childish, was favorable to Appellant's position. Under these facts, coupled with the fact that the letters contained no inculpatory evidence, we conclude that Appellant failed to preserve his objection for appeal. Accordingly, we do not reach the merits of Appellant's argument.