Opinion ID: 3156439
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of State Conviction

Text: Mr. Brown first argues that admitting his state conviction for distribution of cocaine violated Federal Rules of Evidence 410 and 803. As evidence of Mr. Brown’s participation in the drug conspiracy, the government introduced evidence that he pled guilty to the November 6, 2010 offense in state court (in actuality he entered a nolo contendere plea) and submitted the journal entry reflecting this state conviction. At trial, Mr. Brown objected that the government had not sufficiently connected the November 6, 2010 sale to the conspiracy. On appeal, Mr. Brown argues for the application of a harmless error analysis. Aplt. Br. 15; Aplt. Reply Br. 9. But because Mr. Brown did not object at trial on the same grounds now raised on appeal, the correct standard of review is for plain error. United States v. Ramirez, 348 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th Cir. 2003). The government argues that Mr. Brown’s failure to assert plain error review “marks the end of the road” for his argument. United States v. De Vaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1159 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir. 2011)). Though the government has the better argument, it is apparent that Mr. Brown could not make the necessary showing for plain error. To show plain error, Mr. Brown would have to -4- demonstrate that admitting the evidence of his state conviction was: (1) error, (2) that was plain, (3) that affected his substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of his judicial proceedings. United States v. McBride, 633 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. McComb, 519 F.3d 1049, 1054 (10th Cir. 2007)). Defendant must show all four of these elements and fails to do so. The Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly prohibit the use of a nolo contendere plea. Fed. R. Evid. 410(a)(2); see also Fed. R. Evid. 803(22)(a) (nolo contendere pleas excluded by rule against hearsay); United States v. RosalesMiranda, 755 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2014) (defining “plain” as “clear or obvious under current law” (quoting United States v. McGehee, 672 F.3d 860, 876 (10th Cir. 2012))). Thus we clearly have an error that is plain. But Mr. Brown must also show that the admission of the evidence affected his substantial rights—that the error prejudiced him. To do so, he must demonstrate with reasonable probability—“sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome”—that if the evidence had been correctly excluded, the outcome of the proceeding would have differed. Rosales-Miranda, 755 F.3d at 1258 (quoting United States v. Hasan, 526 F.3d 653, 665 (10th Cir. 2008)). Mr. Brown cannot meet this burden. The government introduced overwhelming evidence to independently establish the November 6, 2010 sale and Mr. Brown’s involvement in the conspiracy. Mr. Brown’s arguments simply do not undermine confidence -5- in the outcome, given the remaining evidence pointing to his guilt.