Opinion ID: 1385256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standard Before the Supreme Court on Review

Text: When a disciplinary action is reviewed by this Court, different standards apply. The standards of judicial review applicable in such matters reflect the respective roles and responsibilities of the Committee and this Court in cases involving lawyer discipline. In Daily Gazette Co., Inc. v. Committee on Legal Ethics, 174 W.Va. 359, 326 S.E.2d 705 (1985), we emphasized that Section 3 of Article VIII of the West Virginia Constitution vests in this Court the exclusive authority to regulate and control the practice of law in this State. Syllabus Point 1, in part. [2] In the exercise of this plenary authority to regulate and control the practice of law, we have delegated to the State Bar and to the Committee certain administrative, investigative, and adjudicatory functions. In carrying out those functions, the State Bar and the Committee act as an administrative arm of the Court. Syllabus Point 2, in part, Daily Gazette, supra, Thus, our power to control the lawyer disciplinary process is constitutional in origin. When we act pursuant to that power our touchstone must be vindication of the public's interest in the integrity of the administration of justice. [3] In every case involving a review of the results of a Committee disciplinary proceeding, we are cognizant of this solemn responsibility owed to the citizens of this State and to the rule of law. In our prior decisions, however, we have not always been clear as to the standard of judicial review applicable to lawyer disciplinary actions. We have vacillated between the independent assessment and substantial deference standards. Moreover, we have said that both legal and factual findings of the Committee are entitled to substantial consideration. [4] Although we believe that these standards are not necessarily incompatible when properly applied, we recognize that when not applied with precision they lack clarity and may cause confusion. Therefore, we take this opportunity to resolve any doubt as to the applicable standard of judicial review. Different standards apply when we review the Committee's conclusions of law, the application of the law to the facts, and the appropriate discipline as opposed to the Committee's factual findings. This Court reviews de novo questions of law and the appropriateness of a particular sanction. However, with respect to the findings of fact, the appropriate standard of judicial review requires that we defer to the Committee unless the findings are not supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record. [5] With regard to this standard, we have said in In re Brown, 166 W.Va. 226, 236, 273 S.E.2d 567, 572 (1980): [M]ost courts will give some weight to the recommendations of the Ethics Committee that conducts the reinstatement hearing simply because the Committee, having heard the witnesses, is in a better position to evaluate their testimony. This does not mean that the court is foreclosed from making an independent assessment of the record but it does mean absent a showing of some mistake of law or arbitrary assessment of the facts such recommendations made by the Ethics Committee in regard to reinstatement of an attorney are to be given substantial consideration. Tardiffv. State Bar, 27 Cal.3d 395, 612 P.2d 919, 165 Cal.Rptr. 829 (1980); In re Wigoda, 77 Ill.2d 154, [32 Ill.Dec. 341] 395 N.E.2d 571 (1979); In re Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 333 N.E.2d 429 (1975); In re Freedman, 406 Mich. 256, 277 N.W.2d 635 (1979); Petition of Harrington, 134 Vt. 549, 367 A.2d 161 (1976). (Emphasis added). Simply stated, independent assessment requires us to engage in what is essentially a de novo review of the record. Even here, we accord due weight to the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee. To ignore these recommendations and conclusions would render the Committee's important adjudicatory role a useless gesture and deprive this Court of the most important benefit of its collective and evaluative judgment. However, while the Committee's conclusions and recommendations are given respectful consideration, [6] they are not binding on this Court. Consistent with the supervisory function mandated by Section 3 of Article VIII of our Constitution, this Court independently examines each case on its own merits in determining what, if any, disciplinary action is warranted. Thus, with regard to the conclusions of law, the application of the law to the facts, and the appropriate discipline, the de novo standard of judicial review applies. [7] Factual findings of the Committee are reviewed under a different standard. Unlike issues of law, the application of the law to the facts, and a determination of appropriate discipline, we realize that the Committee is in a better position than this Court to resolve the factual disputes which may arise in a case. The Committee hears the testimony of the witnesses firsthand and, being much closer to the pulse of the hearing, is much better situated to resolve such issues as credibility. [8] As observed above, we have said in prior cases that substantial consideration must be given to the factual findings and factual conclusions of the Committee. Committee on Legal Ethics v. Hobbs, 190 W.Va. 606, 439 S.E.2d 629 (1993). To be clear, in the context of our review of the Committee's findings of fact, substantial consideration means that such factual findings and conclusions are to be given substantial deference by this Court. [9] The burden is on the attorney at law to show that the factual findings are not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole adjudicatory record made before the Committee. In summary, a de novo standard applies to a review of the adjudicatory record made before the Committee as to questions of law, questions of application of the law to the facts, and questions of appropriate sanctions; this Court gives respectful consideration to the Committee's recommendations while ultimately exercising its own independent judgment. On the other hand, substantial deference is given to the Committee's findings of fact, unless such findings are not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.