Opinion ID: 487205
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Classification of Methamphetamine

Text: 27 The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. Secs. 801-970 (the Act), established five schedules of controlled substances and specified the initial classification of substances in each schedule. 21 U.S.C. Sec. 812(a). The Act gives authority to the Attorney General to add substances to the schedules transfer substances between schedules, or remove substances from the schedules in accordance with certain statutorily specified procedures and criteria. 21 U.S.C. Sec. 811(a). In 1973, the Attorney General delegated all of these functions under the Act to the DEA. 28 C.F.R. Sec. 0.100(b). Subsequently, the DEA reclassified methamphetamine from a Schedule III controlled substance to a Schedule II controlled substance. As a result, the maximum penalty under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b) for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute increased from five years' imprisonment and a $25,000 fine to fifteen years imprisonment and a $125,000 fine. 28 Burnes contends that the Act authorizes only the Attorney General himself to schedule and reschedule controlled substances. Burnes relies in part on the language of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 811(a), which provides in pertinent part: 29 [T]he Attorney General may by rule-- 30 (1) add to such a schedule or transfer between such schedules any drug or other substance if he-- 31 (A) finds that such drug or other substance has a potential for abuse, and 32 (B) makes with respect to such drug or other substance the findings prescribed by [21 U.S.C. Sec. 812(b) ] for the schedule in which such drug is to be placed; or 33 (2) remove any drug or other substance from the schedules if he finds that the drug or other substance does not meet the requirements for inclusion in any schedule. 34 Burnes argues that the specific use of the word he demonstrates Congress' intent to restrict this authority to the Attorney General. 35 Burnes relies on United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). In Giordano, the Supreme Court held that the power to authorize wiretapping was vested exclusively in the Attorney General or his specifically designated Assistant Attorney General and that the power could not be delegated. Id. at 512-23, 94 S.Ct. at 1825-30. The Court found a Congressional intent to limit the Attorney General's ability to delegate the power to authorize wiretapping in the language of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2516, which confers such power to the Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specifically designated by the Attorney General. Id. at 514, 94 S.Ct. at 1826. 36 Burnes' reliance on Giordano is misplaced. The statutory scheme involved in this case is not as restrictively drafted as the wiretap provisions. In fact, under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 871(a), the Attorney General is authorized to delegate any of his functions under [the Act] to any officer or employee of the Department of Justice. This section echoes the generalized statement concerning delegation of authority contained in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 510. 2 37 Appellant asserts, however, that the Attorney General's delegation power is limited by 21 U.S.C. Sec. 878, which provides: 38 Any officer or employee of the Drug Enforcement Administration designated by the Attorney General may-- 39 (1) carry firearms; 40 (2) execute and serve search warrants, arrest warrants, administrative inspection warrants, subpenas [sic], and summonses issued under the authority of the United States; 41 (3) make arrests without warrant (A) for any offense against the United States committed in his presence, or (B) for any felony, cognizable under the laws of the United States, if he has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a felony; 42 (4) make seizures of property pursuant to the provisions of this subchapter; and 43 (5) perform such other law enforcement duties as the Attorney General may designate. 44 Burnes contends that section 878 is an exclusive statement of the powers of the DEA, that section 878 restricts the powers of the DEA to law enforcement, and thus that the delegation of legislative powers to the DEA contravenes federal law. 45 When resolving a question of statutory interpretation, courts must give effect to the plain meaning of the language used. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. American Guar. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 1498, 1500 (9th Cir.1984). See also 2A J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction Sec. 47.29 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1984). The power of the Attorney General to delegate his authority under the Act in question is clearly conferred by 21 U.S.C. Sec. 871(a), which allows the delegation of any of his functions under the Act. (emphasis added). Moreover, no provision expressly limits the powers of the DEA to those found in 21 U.S.C. Sec. 878. 46 The courts which have addressed contentions similar to those advanced by Burnes have uniformly concluded that the Attorney General may lawfully delegate his authority to classify controlled substances. United States v. Lippner, 676 F.2d 456, 461 (11th Cir.1982); United States v. Gordon, 580 F.2d 827, 840 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1051, 99 S.Ct. 731, 58 L.Ed.2d 711 (1978) (Congress' delegation to Attorney General and his subdelegation to DEA is not unconstitutionally vague nor does it violate the doctrine of separation of powers). Although this court has not directly considered the subdelegation of authority from the Attorney General to the DEA, it has held the Act to be a valid delegation of authority by Congress. United States v. Davis, 564 F.2d 840, 844 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015, 98 S.Ct. 733, 54 L.Ed.2d 760 (1978). In Davis, the court implicitly approved subdelegation to the DEA, stating that the defendant had challenged the delegation of authority to the Attorney General (and to the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration.) Id. at 843 (emphasis added). Again, in United States v. Alexander, 673 F.2d 287, 289 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 876, 103 S.Ct. 168, 74 L.Ed.2d 139 (1982), this court reiterated its holding in Davis and referred to the Attorney General as the head of the DEA. 47 Under well-established principles of statutory interpretation, it is clear that the delegation of authority to reclassify controlled substances to the DEA is a proper exercise of the Attorney General's authority. Our holding is consistent with the prior holdings of this court and other courts. Burnes' contention that the district court could not impose a penalty in excess of five years imprisonment or a $25,000 fine is without merit.