Opinion ID: 1112493
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: how should the issue of juror misconduct be properly brought to the attention of the court in which it occurred and how should this court balance the need for attorney inquiry when there is juror misconduct or a tainted verdict against the jurors' rights to be secure in their verdict?

Text: With the alleged extra-record, extraneous material improperly brought to influence the jury now disposed of in favor of Clarksdale Beverages, this Court can now tackle the task of formulating a systematic method by which attorneys in this state can inquire into juror verdicts under the principles of M.R.E. 606(b). Unfortunately for this Court, we are without our own precedent and therefore must look to the guidelines from the federal courts which have interpreted Fed.R.Evid. 606(b) to implement a procedure by which the attorneys, litigants and courts of this state can proceed with uniformity through the issue of improper outside influence. As an overview on this question, Wright and Gold have noted that: In the absence of rules clearly regulating the propriety of post-verdict juror interviews, the courts have sought to exercise control. Some courts have denied permission to conduct posttrial interviews of jurors unless there is a proper preliminary showing of likely jury misconduct and witness competency. Some courts enjoin post-verdict interviews of jurors as a matter of course, lifting the injunction only after the requisite showing has been made. Other courts require counsel give the court and opposing parties notice before the interviews occur. This permits the court to supervise the interview process so as to minimize the potential for harassment. Other courts regard giving notice and seeking the court's leave to conduct interviews as merely preferred, not required, practices. Wright & Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6076 (1990). In United States v. Infelise, 813 F. Supp. 599 (N.D.ILL. 1993), a Federal District Court in Illinois was called on to interpret Fed. R.Evid. 606(b) in the context of whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant juror interviews regarding extraneous prejudicial information. The facts indicated that numerous jurors appeared on the local news several days after the verdict and stated that a mistake had been made with respect to Count one of the defendant's verdict form. Id. at 603. Immediately thereafter the court, sua sponte, scheduled an in-chambers status hearing in which counsel for both sides met with the court and determined that the jurors should be questioned regarding this new information, which later occurred in the judge's chambers with all attorneys involved and a court reporter present. Id. Months thereafter, another juror wrote the court and commented on the events of jury deliberation and prosecutor comments during the in-chambers interview process. Id. at 604. The court then turned to Fed.R.Evid. 606(b) to resolve the issue, noting that the Advisory Committee Notes explained that [t]he values sought to be promoted by [the rule] include freedom of deliberation, stability and finality of verdicts, and protection of jurors against annoyance and embarrassment. Id. Furthermore, the court asserted that there is a general reluctance to haul jurors in after they have reached a verdict in order to probe for potential instances of bias, misconduct, or extraneous influences. Id. at 605; United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1234 (2d Cir.1983). The duty to investigate arises only when the party alleging misconduct makes an adequate showing of extrinsic evidence to overcome the presumption of jury impartiality. Infelise, 813 F. Supp. at 605; United States v. Barshov, 733 F.2d 842, 851 (11th Cir.1984). In addition, the court concluded that under Rule 606(b), a post-trial hearing is mandated only upon a litigant's showing with clear, strong, substantial, and incontrovertible evidence ... that a specific, non-speculative impropriety has occurred[.] Infelise, 813 F. Supp. at 605; Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234. This same standard for review was cited by the Eleventh Circuit in Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1561 (11th Cir.1991), and United States v. Cuthel, 903 F.2d 1381, 1382 (11th Cir.1990) [quoting United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir.1989)]. The court cited the Seventh Circuit, in Haugh v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 949 F.2d 914, 917 (7th Cir.1991), for its approval of a limited inquiry into the effect of extraneous influences upon juror verdicts, finding the appropriateness of the court's questioning to be: Rule 606(b) of the evidence rules, far from giving a judge carte blanche in questioning a jury about its verdict, forbids him to inquire into the jurors' beliefs, opinions, discussions, grounds, etc. save as necessary to determine the existence and content of any unauthorized communication made to the jury. The proper procedure therefore is for the judge to limit the questions asked the jurors to whether the communication was made and what it contained, and then, having determined that the communication took place and what exactly it said, to determine  without asking the jurors anything further and emphatically without asking them what role the communication played in their thoughts or discussion  whether there is a reasonable possibility that the communication altered their verdict. Cited in Infelise, 813 F. Supp. at 611-12; See United States v. Fozo, 904 F.2d 1166, 1171 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Schwartz, 787 F.2d 257, 261 (7th Cir.1986). A similar holding was reached by a Texas Federal Court in United States v. Cauble, 532 F. Supp. 804, 808-809 (E.D.Texas 1982) [where the court concluded that the trial court has the inherent power and duty to supervise inquiries into alleged juror misconduct and to ensure that any inquiry does not extend beyond testimony admissible under Rule 606(b)]. In United States v. Griek, 920 F.2d 840, 841 (11th Cir.1991), the issues of juror misconduct surrounded an anonymous telephone call to a co-defendant in which the caller stated that the jury was pressed into making our decision, and a letter from an alternate juror to the participating assistant United States attorney stating his trial performance and attire were extravagant. Griek challenged the constitutionality of an applicable local rule of the Southern District of Florida, and also Fed.R.Evid. 606(b), which permitted juror polling after the jury had been discharged, upon application in writing and for good cause shown ... to determine whether the verdict is subject to legal challenge. Id. at 842. The court construed this local rule in light of the Federal Rules of Evidence, concluding that good cause under the local rule may be shown only by satisfying the requirements of the exception stated in Fed.R.Evid. 606(b); essentially a showing of either improper outside influence or extraneous prejudicial information. Id. The Ninth Circuit, in Hard v. Burlington Northern Railroad, 812 F.2d 482, 485 (9th Cir.1987), stated in a footnote that when faced with allegations of jury misconduct, the better practice is for the attorney to seek leave of the court to approach the jury. See Maldonado v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 798 F.2d 764, 769 (5th Cir.1986). The conclusion has also been reached by several federal courts that the trial court has the discretion to determine whether evidence of premature deliberation warrants an evidentiary hearing. See Cuthel, 903 F.2d at 1382; Bolton v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 871 F.2d 1266, 1275 (5th Cir.1989) (how to best gather information regarding alleged jury misconduct is a matter of trial court discretion); Cauble, 532 F. Supp. at 808-809. In Big John, B.V. v. Indian Head Grain Co., 718 F.2d 143, 150 (5th Cir.1983), the Fifth Circuit reiterated its requirement that a necessary showing of specific instances of misconduct be made prior to allowing juror interrogation. The Fifth Circuit further explained that: the very cogent reasons for requiring parties to make a showing of likely misconduct before allowing such an inquiry: protecting the jury from post-verdict misconduct and the courts from time consuming and futile proceedings; reducing the chances and temptations from tampering with the jury; and increasing the certainty of civil verdicts.... We continue to decline to denigrate jury trials by afterwards ransacking the jurors in search of some ground ... for a new trial unless some preliminary showing is made. Id. quoting Wilkerson v. Amco Corp., 703 F.2d 184, 185-186 (5th Cir. 1983). The Second Circuit, in United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654 (2nd Cir.1978), discussed the relationship between Rule 606(b) and other rules which govern post-trial jury contact. The court stated as follows: A serious danger exists that, in absence of supervision by the court, some jurors, especially those who were unenthusiastic about the verdict or have grievances against fellow jurors, would be led into imagining sinister happenings which simply did not occur or into saying things which, although inadmissible, would be included in motion papers and would serve only to decrease public confidence in verdicts. Thus, supervision is desirable not only to protect jurors from harassment but also to insure that the inquiry does not range beyond subjects on which a juror would be permitted to testify under Rule 606(b). It is well established in this Circuit that in order to insure that jurors are protected from harassment, a district judge has the power, and sometimes the duty, to order that all post-trial investigation of jurors shall be under his supervision. Id. at 665; Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77, 81-82 (2d Cir.1968). Moten also suggests that a preliminary showing of juror misconduct be made before leave is granted to interview the witnesses. Moten, 582 F.2d at 666; See also United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir.1988) (without a threshold showing of improper outside influence, defendant's request is a mere fishing expedition); Big John, 718 F.2d at 150. In sum, the Second Circuit suggested that, at a minimum, notice to opposing counsel and the court should be given in all cases where post-verdict interviewing of jurors is sought. Moten, 582 F.2d at 665, 666. When there has been a showing which warrants investigation, barring all interviewing, even under the auspices of the court, is improper. Id. Furthermore, in Gravely, the Fourth Circuit cited Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987), applying the Supreme Court's reasoning that in the absence of a threshold showing of external influence, Fed.R.Evid. 606(b) does not require an inquiry into the juror verdict.