Opinion ID: 2791580
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Right to cross-examination

Text: The Supreme Court has long recognized the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses as an essential component of due process. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294–95 (1973). But “the right to confront and to crossexamine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” Id. at 295. “[T]rial judges retain 3 wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). The cases where the Supreme Court has found a violation of the right to cross-examination establish that the right primarily protects the defendant’s ability to attack a witness’s credibility. See Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231(1988) (reversing state court decision excluding evidence that alleged rape victim and corroborating witness lived together and were involved in romantic relationship because it was critical to showing witness’s potential bias); Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 (where state dismissed pending charges, prohibition of all inquiry into possible witness bias violated defendant’s right to cross-examination); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 317–21 (1974) (exclusion of evidence tending to show witness’s bias violated defendant’s right to cross-examination). The constitutional right to cross examination as interpreted by the Supreme Court was not violated by the trial court’s refusal to admit evidence that O. previously directed undercover police officers to drive to secluded locations because this evidence would have had little additional impact on the jury’s perception of O.’s general credibility. The jury heard evidence that O. had 4 convictions for prostitution, that O. used drugs, and, despite her testimony she was not working as a prostitute on the evening she was assaulted, that O. had the DNA of someone other than herself or Foy in her underwear. These facts generally call O.’s credibility into question, and defense counsel used this evidence to strenuously attack O.’s credibility.