Opinion ID: 1918280
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Commonwealth v. Williams

Text: As noted above, Williams' appeal presents several distinct issues requiring this Court's consideration. Accordingly, our disposition of Torres' appeal does not necessarily control our disposition of Williams' appeal, despite the fact that a practically identical affidavit of probable cause was used to obtain the warrants to search Apartments C-2 and C-5 at the Rippey Street apartment complex. First, Williams' appeal requires this Court to consider the propriety of the Superior Court's decision reversing the suppression of the evidence found at Apartment C-5 at the Rippey Street Apartment Complex. In addition, Williams' appeal raises a question concerning the propriety of the Superior Court's decision reversing the suppression of the evidence seized from his residence at Apartment 305 at 6315 Fifth Avenue and Dennison Street in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court concerning both searches. Upon executing the warrant to search Apartment C-5 at the Rippey Street apartment complex, the police found a bag of suspected crack cocaine, a scale, plastic bags, scissors, two bags of suspected marijuana, a brown bottle containing an unknown liquid, two bundles of money totaling $2,702.00 in U.S. currency, a broken cellular phone and opened and unopened mail addressed to Williams. Following the searches of the Rippey Street apartments, the police applied for and obtained a warrant to search Williams' residence at 6315 Fifth Avenue and Dennison Street, Apartment 305. Upon executing the warrant, the police found tax records, personal telephone books, prison records, a digital scale, two pagers and numerous plastic bags. Williams was subsequently arrested and charged with three counts of homicide. Williams' counsel filed an Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion seeking, inter alia, suppression of the evidence seized from Apartment C-5 at the Rippey Street apartment complex and Apartment 305 at 6315 Fifth Avenue and Dennison Street. Following a hearing, the suppression court granted Williams' motion to suppress the evidence seized from both Apartment C-5 and Apartment 305, concluding that the affidavits filed in support of the applications for the warrants to search the apartments were insufficient to establish probable cause. The Commonwealth subsequently filed an interlocutory appeal to the Superior Court pursuant to Rule 311(d) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the Superior Court reversed the order of the suppression court by order and memorandum opinion dated June 12, 1998. Williams' instant appeal followed. On appeal to the Superior Court, the Commonwealth argued that the suppression court erred in finding that Williams had standing to contest the validity of the Rippey Street apartment complex. In the alternative, the Commonwealth argued that the affidavit provided the issuing authority with a substantial basis to conclude warrant to search Apartment C-5 at the that there was probable cause to search the apartment. Although the Superior Court disagreed with the Commonwealth's standing argument, it agreed, in accordance with its prior decision in the companion case of Commonwealth v. Torres, 714 A.2d 416 (Pa.Super.1998), that the affidavit established probable cause for the search. Therefore, the Superior Court reversed the order of the suppression court. In accordance with our above disposition of Torres' appeal, we agree with Williams' contention that the Superior Court erred in concluding that the affidavit supplied the issuing authority with a substantial basis to conclude that there was probable cause to search Apartment C-5. However, we affirm the decision of the Superior Court on an alternative basis-that Williams has failed to demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in the premises searched. See, e.g., E.J. McAleer & Co. v. Iceland Products, Inc., 475 Pa. 610, 613 n. 4, 381 A.2d 441, 443 n. 4 (1977) (noting that this Court may affirm a lower court's decision on any basis, regardless of the specific basis on which the lower court relied). The lower courts concluded that Williams had standing to contest the validity of the warrant to search Apartment C-5 at the Rippey Street apartment complex because he testified at the pre-trial motions hearing that his name was on the lease for the apartment as of the date of the search. The lower courts' legal conclusion in this regard is proper under Pennsylvania law, as the traditional formulation for standing to contest a search based on an alleged violation of privacy rights under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is satisfied when a defendant demonstrates that he has a proprietary or possessory interest in the premises searched. [10] Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 511 Pa. 299, 309, 513 A.2d 373, 378 (1986). However, having standing based on a proprietary or possessory interest in the premises searched merely entitles a defendant to an adjudication of the merits of his/her suppression motion. Commonwealth v. Peterson, 535 Pa. 492, 497-98, 636 A.2d 615, 617-18 (1993). In order to actually prevail on such a motion, the defendant must also separately demonstrate that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the premises at the time of the search and that such an expectation is objectively reasonable, i.e., that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy. Id. at 498, 636 A.2d at 618. [11] In the instant case, the lower courts failed to recognize the legal significance of the fact that Williams, by his own testimony at the pre-trial motions hearing, expressly disavowed having had any subjective expectation of privacy in Apartment C-5 on the date of the search. Williams testified in relevant part as follows at the pre-trial motions hearing during cross-examination: Q: Did you control an apartment on Rippey Street? A: No, I did not. I lived on Rippey Streetyou said Rippey. That is one apartment. Q: The Rippey Gardens. A: There is one apartment I used to have. That was a long time ago. That is not an updated apartment that I had. I moved to Dennison. That was prior to that. I did not have control over another apartment. I only had one apartment. Q: You didn't have control over the apartment at Rippey Street, is that what you are telling us? A: I don't own an apartment on Rippey Street. Q: Excuse me? A: I don't own that apartment at Rippey Street. At one point in time, but that was six months prior. Q: You were still the leaseholder of that apartment, were you not? A: It was a co-lease. Q: So you were a co-leaseholder of that apartment on the day of this murder, is that right? A: I did not own the apartment. I did not live there. Someone else lived there. Q: Your name was on a lease though, is that correct? A: Yes, it is because it has to be signed over. It was signed over to another person. (Pre-trial Motions Hrg. N.T., 9/17/97, at 41-42.) Given this testimony, it is clear that Williams had no subjective expectation of privacy in Apartment C-5 on the date of the search. As noted above, a subjective expectation of privacy in a place or thing, while not a necessary prerequisite for standing to contest a search or seizure under Article I, Section 8 jurisprudence, is essential to a finding of a constitutionally protected, legitimate expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Hawkins, 718 A.2d at 267-68. Therefore, having failed to establish that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the premises as of the date of the search, Williams could not properly prevail on the claim presented in his motion to suppress (which was namely that the police search of Apartment C-5 at the Rippey Street apartment complex violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania State Constitution and/or the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America). Thus, albeit on a different basis, we affirm the decision of the Superior Court reversing the suppression of the evidence seized from Apartment C-5. [12] Williams also claims in his appeal to this Court that the Superior Court erred in reversing the suppression of the evidence seized from his residence 6315 Fifth Avenue and Dennison Street, Apartment 305. For the reasons that follow, we find that Williams' claim of error is without merit and therefore affirm. The affidavit of probable cause filed in support of the application for a warrant to search Williams' Dennison Street apartment provided as follows: On 2-18-96 three men were shot and killed in Wilkinsburg Pa. The investigation led to a residence at 5631 Rippey St. Pgh. Pa. 15206. A search of three apartments led to discovery of crack cocaine, and firearms and ammunition. One of the weapons matched the bullets removed from the body of the victim (Timothy Moore). One Bobby Torres AKA Elijah Bobby Williams was identified as one of the suspects in this case and a[sic] arrest warrant was obtained. On 2-24-96 a call was received from a parole officer stating that Bobby Torres was living at 6315 Fifth Ave. & Dennison St's in Pgh. Pa. The agent stated that he had been to an apartment at that address and this was the apartment that Torres/Williams informed state parole that he was living in. The agent stated that as of three days ago (Wed.2-22-96) he had interviewed Williams at apartment 305 at the aforementioned address. County and City police went to the residence this date and varified [sic] that Torres/Williams was living at this address with a b/f named Carol Johnson. The suspect and Johnson have resided at this address since 9-1-95. A search warrant is being requested to search the apartment for the above noted items. It is believed that information related to this crime and to the location of others involved may be found in this residence. Since the apart. at Rippey St. was being rented by Bobby Torres/Williams and others associated with him and there was crack and firearms found at that residence it is the belief of your affiants that this is another residence used for drug related activity. An issuing authority signed the warrant on February 24, 1996, and the police executed it that same day, seizing assorted photographs, papers, letters and tax records, personal telephone books, probation and prison records, a digital scale, personal pagers for Williams, additional telephone pagers, a canister of pepper mace and numerous plastic bags from Williams' Dennison Street apartment. In granting Williams' pre-trial motion to suppress the evidence seized from his Dennison Street apartment, the suppression court found that the affidavit filed in support of the application for the warrant failed to provide the issuing authority with a substantial basis to find that there was probable cause to search. In support of its determination, the suppression court noted that the affidavit contains general information and essentially authorizes a fishing expedition. Furthermore, the suppression court found that the affidavit provided an insufficient basis for the issuing authority to conclude that the items sought would be found at the place to be searched. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, concluding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit provided the issuing authority with a substantial basis to find that there was probable cause to believe that evidence tending to link Williams to the triple murder and/or illegal drug-related activity would be found at his Dennison Street apartment. While Williams contends on appeal to this Court that the Superior Court erred in reversing the suppression of the evidence found in his Dennison Street apartment, he does not attempt to echo the reasoning of the suppression court in doing so. Instead, Williams argues that if this Court finds that the Superior Court erred in reversing the suppression of the evidence seized from Apartment C-5 at the Rippey Street complex, then, pursuant to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, any references to that evidence in the affidavit of probable cause to search his Dennison Street apartment would also have to be stricken. Without such references, Williams argues that the redacted affidavit would no longer establish probable cause to search his Dennison Street apartment. [13] Williams' argument is certainly creative. Nevertheless, it is entirely unavailing, as this Court has found that the Superior Court did not err in reversing the suppression of the evidence seized from Apartment C-5 at the Rippey Street Apartment complex. Since Williams' only argument is that the affidavit would be insufficient to establish probable cause if the information obtained from the search of Apartment C-5 at the Rippey Street apartment complex were to be stricken from it, his claim that the Superior Court erred in reversing the suppression of the evidence seized from his Dennison Street apartment must necessarily fail. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court reversing the order of the suppression court.