Opinion ID: 168663
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: As part of the appeal of her conviction, M s. Crook claims the government failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove elements required for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 666 “beyond a reasonable doubt.” W hile she acknowledges the evidence presented established money was missing from the Stilwell Housing Authority rental deposits, she suggests no evidence pointed to her as the source of 7 (...continued) vast sums of money distributed through federal programs from theft, fraud, and undue influence by bribery.’” 170 F.3d 1026, 1030 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 370 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3182, 3511). -15- the disappearance, or, in other words, no witness submitted “any proof [she] comm itted the alleged acts of theft, embezzlement or conversion.” Apt. Br. at 1819. Instead, she claims the government’s case consisted solely of “speculation and conjecture” and that a H UD “case agent admitted to having nothing but a theory as to [her] guilt ....” 8 Apt. Br. at 4, 18-19. She also notes the government did not attempt to rehabilitate the same agent’s testimony after he admitted the theft of money stopped occurring almost a year before she left the housing authority and that he had no information she acquired expensive items, had taken expensive trips, or otherw ise changed her lifestyle. W e review de novo the issue of the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction. See United States v. Weidner, 437 F.3d 1023, 1032 (10th Cir. 2006); M cPhilomy, 270 F.3d at 1307. “In doing so, we consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the government.” Weidner, 437 F.3d at 1032. This court will not reverse a conviction if, “‘after view ing the evidence in the light most favorable to 8 Specifically, the HUD Inspector General special agent answered the following question: Q: And I understand you have got a theory, but then that is what you do, isn’t it? A: Yes. R., Vol. 2 at 208. From the context of the discussion, we assume the question pertained to a theory that M s. Crook took the missing money. -16- the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” M cPhilomy, 270 F.3d at 1307 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). In so doing, we do not question the jury’s credibility determinations or its conclusions about the weight of the evidence. Weidner, 437 F.3d at 1032. In considering evidence sufficient to prove theft or conversion under 18 U.S.C. § 666, “we said that even though so-called direct evidence may be lacking, a criminal conviction can be sustained solely on circumstantial evidence,” and “circumstantial evidence is entitled to the same weight as that given to direct evidence in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support a guilty verdict.” United States v. Neighbors, 23 F.3d 306, 308-10 (10th Cir. 1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted) (holding circumstantial evidence, resulting in part from an audit, sufficiently established defendant was the only pharmacist who converted drugs for his own purposes, even though evidence did not include any eyewitnesses or admissions by the defendant). In this case, the fact the government did not provide direct evidence M s. Crook took money from the Stilwell Housing Authority does not mean insufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict. Instead, circumstantial evidence offered by the government established M s. Crook and only one other employee physically received money from tenants, M s. Crook was the only -17- person who made the bank deposits which did not reconcile with the amount received, and that the theft of money and cover-up continued in the same w ay after the other employee left. This evidence was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find the essential element of the crime of theft by M s. Crook beyond a reasonable doubt. The fact the agent who conducted the investigation admitted to certain circumstances weighing in M s. Crook’s favor, such as the fact she did not appear to have purchased any expensive items, does not change our conclusion. W e assume the jury weighed this evidence, together with the government’s much more inculpatory evidence, in rendering its guilty verdict. W hile M s. Crook may not have changed her lifestyle or spent money on expensive items or trips, the jury reasonably concluded this evidence did not exonerate her as the thief. Similarly, we assume the jury considered the fact no money was taken from the housing authority for approximately a one-year period before M s. Crook left its employment and concluded, as would we, that this evidence does not establish she was not culpable for the prior theft of money. For these reasons, we conclude sufficient evidence supports the jury’s guilty verdict and M s. Crook’s conviction.