Opinion ID: 1852436
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court erred in permitting the introduction of payton's statement because payton was denied his miranda warnings.

Text: ¶ 23. Over Payton's objection and outside the presence of the jury, the State presented testimony from law enforcement officers regarding two statements allegedly made by Payton. The officers testified that Payton told them he was with his girlfriend in Belzoni on the day of the robbery. The statements were not written or signed by Payton, nor were they tape recorded. Payton argues that the State failed to prove the statements were freely and voluntarily given. ¶ 24. FBI Agent Floyd Plummer (Plummer) testified that he and Jackson Police Department, Chief James French (French), interviewed Payton the day of the robbery. Plummer testified that he advised Payton of his Miranda warnings and that Payton understood and waived them. Plummer testified that no one threatened Payton, used force or violence, or offered promises of rewards or leniency, and that Payton did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. He said Payton did not ask for an attorney or to have the questioning cease. Plummer testified that Payton told them that in the early morning hours of [the day of the robbery], he had traveled with his girlfriend, Beverly Beard, to Belzoni and that he had remained with her in Belzoni virtually all day. This testimony was confirmed by French. ¶ 25. Conversely, Payton testified that he was not advised of his Miranda rights, was not offered an opportunity to sign that he understood his rights or to see a rights form, and that his requests for an attorney were ignored. Payton testified that he only told the officers that he had been with his girlfriend that morning and that evening. ¶ 26. The trial judge ruled that the testimony would be admissible, finding the officers' testimony to be more credible than Payton's. He reasoned that the statement was admitted in rebuttal to Payton's evidence that he had been in both Midway and Lena, Mississippi, on the day of the robbery inquiring about purchasing a car. [4] This testimony was in conflict with what Payton had allegedly told officers about being in Belzoni with his girlfriend the day of the robbery. The judge noted that Payton admitted that he made some statements to officers about being with his girlfriend both the morning and evening of the robbery, but that he disagreed as to exactly what was said. ¶ 27. Tim Palmer, Town Marshall of Walnut Grove, testified that he and Deputy Marshall Ricky Lewis traveled to Jackson to take custody of Payton. Palmer testified that he advised Payton of his Miranda rights, but asked him no questions. Palmer testified that no one threatened Payton, used force or violence, or offered promises of rewards or leniency, and that Payton did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Palmer said Payton did not request an attorney at that time. He testified that Payton volunteered the information that he was with his girlfriend in Belzoni all day and that he had returned home just before he was arrested. Payton denied that he told Palmer and Lewis anything but conceded that his Miranda rights were explained to him by Palmer. ¶ 28. The trial judge admitted the officers' testimony regarding this statement, finding that it was a spontaneous statement that was made by the Defendant, not subject to custodial interrogation as required by the case of Miranda.  The trial judge stated that while the best procedure may be to have the defendant waive his rights in writing, this is not an absolute requirement. He reasoned that it is not unusual for the testimony of one witness to be pitted against the testimony of another. Then the jury, as the trier of the facts, will decide who is telling the truth. ¶ 29. This Court will reverse the trial court's finding that a confession is admissible only when an incorrect legal standard was applied, manifest error was committed, or the decision is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Duplantis v. State, 644 So.2d 1235 (Miss.1994). Once the trial judge has determined, at a preliminary hearing, that a confession is admissible, the defendant/appellant has a heavy burden in attempting to reverse that decision on appeal. Applewhite v. State, 753 So.2d 1039, 1041 (Miss.2000). ¶ 30. The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary. The State meets its burden and makes a prima facie case when an officer or other person who has knowledge of the facts testifies that the confession was made voluntarily, without threats, coercion, or offer of reward. Dancer v. State, 721 So.2d 583, 587 (Miss.1998) (citing Morgan v. State, 681 So.2d 82, 86-87 (Miss.1996)). ¶ 31. In the case at bar, the State presented several officers who testified that no promises were made to Payton and that he was not forced to speak. These officers testified that Payton was given Miranda warnings, which he knowingly and voluntarily waived. Thus, based on Dancer and Morgan, this Court concludes that the trial judge committed no error in refusing to suppress these statements. ¶ 32. The limits of this Court's review on the admissibility of a confession were described in Alexander v. State, 610 So.2d 320 (Miss.1992), as follows: This is essentially a fact-finding function. So long as the court applies the correct legal standards, `we will not overturn a finding of fact made by a trial judge unless it be clearly erroneous [or contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence].' Id. at 326 (citations omitted). Where, on conflicting evidence, the lower court admits a statement into evidence this Court generally must affirm. McGowan v. State, 706 So.2d 231, 235 (Miss.1997); Morgan, 681 So.2d at 87 (citing Alexander, 610 So.2d at 326). Whether there was an intelligent, knowing and voluntary waiver is essentially a factual inquiry to be determined by the trial judge from the totality of the circumstances. McGowan, 706 So.2d at 235. ¶ 33. The trial judge's determination on the admissibility of this testimony was not erroneous. It was based on the totality of the circumstances and involved weighing the credibility of Payton's testimony versus that of distinguished officers. This manner of determining admissibility is proper for the trial judge when sitting as the trier of fact. See McGowan v. State, 706 So.2d at 235; Morgan, 681 So.2d at 87. ¶ 34. Additionally, the admission of an involuntary confession is subject to harmless error analysis. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-12, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). Payton has failed to demonstrate that admitting the statement was prejudicial to his case. He argues only that [i]t is obvious Payton was prejudiced by the introduction of the alleged statement. He did not present witness to corroborate he was in Belzoni with his girlfriend that day. Beyond this assertion, Payton offers no proof that he was prejudiced. There is a presumption that the judgment of the trial court is correct, and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate some reversible error to this Court. Pate v. State, 419 So.2d 1324, 1325-26 (Miss.1982); Branch v. State, 347 So.2d 957, 958 (Miss.1977). Payton has failed to meet that burden. Therefore, the admission of his statements, if erroneous, was harmless in light of Payton's impecunious argument. ¶ 35. This assignment is without merit.