Opinion ID: 2774634
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: restriction on closing argument

Text: Prior to closing arguments, the district court granted Walker’s motion for acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, and then granted the Government’s motion in limine preventing Plato from argument based on Walker’s dismissal. The transcript of the ruling is as follows: THE COURT: All right. Number one, the motion in limine is granted in part, denied in part. It’s granted you may not argue anything about conspiracy, not even mention him not being here. However, I will do what I always do in civil and criminal cases: Say, “Ladies and gentlemen, as you will note, Mr. Walker is no longer part of this case”; and that’s all I will say. MR. COGDELL [Defense Counsel]: To be clear, your Honor, you are precluding me from arguing that it’s unlikely or impossible for Mr. Plato to have engaged in a conspiracy with Mr. Walker? THE COURT: That’s correct. MR. COGDELL: Okay. On appeal, Plato challenges this ruling as a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, asserting that it restricted him from asserting a valid defense theory.
A component of the right to effective assistance of counsel is the right to make a closing summation to the jury. 23 This court reviews preserved Sixth 23 See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858 (1975). 13 Case: 13-20222 Document: 00512919459 Page: 14 Date Filed: 01/29/2015 No. 13-20222 Amendment claims de novo. 24 In this context, “[t]he presiding judge must be and is given great latitude in . . . limiting the scope of closing summations.” 25
The parties’ dispute is two-fold: (1) whether the scope of the ruling itself unreasonably curtailed Plato’s closing argument, and (2) whether Plato was practically prejudiced by not being allowed to address the conspiracy charge. Though the parties dispute whether Plato argued against the conspiracy charge in his closing argument, and thus avoided prejudice, the scope inquiry resolves the prejudice inquiry. We conclude that the district court’s ruling reasonably curtailed Plato from arguing against the conspiracy charge on the basis of Walker’s dismissal, such that Plato was able to argue against conspiracy as to co-conspirators other than Walker, regardless of whether he actually availed himself of that ability. In the motion in limine, the Government sought to prevent Plato from arguing that Walker’s acquittal prevented Plato’s conviction for conspiracy, which, it argued, would assert an improper legal conclusion for the reasons explained above. 26 In his first argument, Plato does not challenge whether a district court can impose such restrictions, but instead broadly interprets the language of this ruling as preventing argument against the conspiracy count regarding any potential co-conspirator. In doing so, Plato relies on the broad phrasing of the initial component of the district court’s ruling (i.e., “you may not argue anything about conspiracy[] . . . .”). 24See United States v. Njoku, 737 F.3d 55, 75 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Templeton, 624 F.3d 215, 223 (5th Cir. 2010)). 25 Herring, 422 U.S. at 862. 26 See supra Part II.C. 14 Case: 13-20222 Document: 00512919459 Page: 15 Date Filed: 01/29/2015 No. 13-20222 However, the context and language of the ruling reasonably limits the restriction to Walker alone, and Plato’s characterization of the ruling is overbroad. The subject motion only pertained to Walker and the broad phrasing is immediately followed by language referencing Walker. Most weightily, the district court subsequently clarified that its ruling only prevented Plato from arguing against the likelihood or possibility of Plato conspiring “with Mr. Walker.” Plato attempts to attribute the qualification “with Mr. Walker” to the Government’s brief; however, as the transcript excerpt above makes clear, those words originated from defense counsel’s question, which both immediately followed the ruling and clarified the scope thereof. The cases cited by Plato in support are distinguishable in two critical respects. First, given the limited scope of the ruling, Plato was not entirely prevented from making closing arguments, as was the case in Herring v. New York. 27 Second, Plato was also not restricted from presenting a valid theory of defense since the Government did not assert the Plato–Walker theory during closing argument. We find no error or abuse of discretion shown with regard to the district court’s grant of the motion in limine.