Opinion ID: 2330517
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Daubert Claim

Text: Finally, Spencer contends that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of her proposed expert witness, Pereira. [25] Spencer argues that Pereira was qualified to testify about whether Wal-Mart had properly maintained its parking lot, that Pereira's opinions were based upon reliable principles and methods, and that his testimony would have assisted the jury in understanding the evidence or determining a fact. A trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. [26] This deferential standard of review merely recognizes that trial judges perform an important gatekeeping function and, thus, `must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable.' [27] Further, [w]hen an act of judicial discretion is under review, the reviewing court may not substitute its own notions of what is right for those of the trial judge, if his judgment was based upon conscience and reason, as opposed to capriciousness or arbitrariness. [28] The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Delaware Rule of Evidence 702. [29] In Goodridge v. Hyster Co., [30] this Court articulated a five-step test to determine whether expert testimony is admissible under that Rule. Specifically, the trial judge must find: (1) the witness to be a qualified expert; (2) the testimony to be relevant and reliable; (3) the testimony to be based upon information reasonably relied upon by experts; (4) the testimony will assist the trier of fact; and (5) the testimony will not create unfair prejudice or confuse or mislead the jury. [31] Spencer first argues that Pereira had sufficient education, experience and training to opine on snow and ice control. Pereira's curriculum vitae, however, reveals that Pereira did not possess the experience necessary to qualify him as expert in that field. Pereira was trained as an architect. Except for a two-day course addressing snow and ice abatement procedures, Pereira's other formal education and professional seminars included no training related to snow and ice removal. Pereira was then currently employed as a forensic architect for the consulting firms Robson Forensic and Fornier Ross and Associates. Before that time, Pereira was employed as an architect or consultant for various architectural firms and real estate developers. Pereira was not a member of any professional organizations in the field of snow and ice removal, and his experience in relation to snow removal was limited to helping his father, who operated a snow plowing company, when he was a teenager. Consequently, the trial court did not err in finding Pereira not qualified as an expert on ice and snow removal. Second, Spencer contends that Pereira's report should have been admitted because his opinions were based upon reliable principles and methods. As noted above, trial courts have a gatekeeping obligation to ensure that all expert testimony is reliable and relevant. [32] In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, [33] the United States Supreme Court established the following non-exclusive list of factors in assessing expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702:(1) whether a scientific theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation; and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted. [34] In Goodridge v. Hyster Co., [35] this Court held that taking phrases from various trade journals and piecing them together to develop an opinion is not a satisfactory basis or technique to be used to form an expert opinion in the Delaware courts. [36] After reviewing Pereira's report, the Superior Court found that the majority of Pereira's opinion was based simply on his culling potentially favorable snippets from various snow plowing and safety publications, instead of an opinion based on the application of facts to a scientific theory, or adequate experience and special training. [37] That finding is solidly grounded in the record. Pereira failed to perform a sound analysis of the facts and theories, and to show how he reached his conclusions from his observations. The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony of Spencer's expert witness. Lastly, Spencer contends that Pereira's testimony would have helped educate the jury that Wal-Mart's efforts to clear snow and ice from the parking lot fell below the standard of care owed to the invitee in light of relevant industry standards. We find that argument unpersuasive, because Pereira's proffered opinion did not provide any additional understanding of the issues of fact confronting the jury. Rather, most of Pereira's opinions consisted of quotations pulled from building codes. These quotations essentially provided a code based duty of care for landowners, [38] which was embodied in the jury instructions given by the Superior Court. It is for the jury, not the expert witness, to determine whether Wal-Mart met the appropriate standard of care in maintaining its parking lot. In the form as proffered, Pereira's opinion would have usurped the trial court's function to instruct the jury on the law. Pereira's expert opinions were more common sense than formulated opinions. As the Superior Court pointed out, expert testimony is [not] required to argue to a jury that a pile of snow in a parking lot is going to melt. [39] The trial judge properly exercised her discretion in excluding Pereira's testimony.