Opinion ID: 2060561
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Instruction on mental conduct.

Text: Wilson contends the trial court committed prejudicial error in inadvertently instructing the jury that a person is not responsible for his mental conduct (rather than criminal conduct) if he had a mental disease or defect, etc., and that by his plea, the defendant is claiming he had such mental disease or defect so that he was not responsible for his mental conduct. Although defense counsel voiced no objection, the defendant now contends that this mistaken use of the word mental rather than criminal was such a plain and fundamental error as to affect his substantial rights and not require objection under Claybrooks v. State [35] and Lampkins v. State. [36] Whether this is the type of error as would affect a substantial right is doubtful. Claybrooks involved the trial court's total failure to instruct on essential elements of the crime. In Lampkins, the court did not discuss the objections not timely raised because the error was not so plain or fundamental as to affect substantial rights. We are therefore satisfied that here no substantial rights were affected and any objections were waived. Assuming that no objection was necessary to preserve error, the question then becomes whether the inadvertent use of the words mental conduct rather than criminal conduct is a ground for reversal. Not unless there is a showing that the jury was thereby misled. In the early case of Butler v. State [37] the trial court, in giving an instruction on reasonable doubt, inadvertently stated `A reasonable doubt is that state of the case which ... leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they can say that they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.' On appeal this court held the inadvertent use of the word can rather than cannot was no ground for reversal where the jury could not have been misled thereby, particularly in light of the other instructions on reasonable doubt. Because the judge's true meaning must have been apparent to the ordinarily intelligent mind no harm could be said to result from the mistake. Similarly, in civil cases, this court has held inadvertent errors not to be a ground for reversal where the jury was apparently not misled. [38] In the instant case, although the trial judge twice used the words mental conduct instead of criminal conduct, he thereafter correctly stated The defendant under the law has the burden that he was not responsible for the criminal conduct at the time of the crimes because he lacked substantial capacity.... In light of this and the absurdity of the instruction if the trial judge had actually meant mental conduct, it is inconceivable that an ordinarily intelligent mind would have been misled.