Opinion ID: 751140
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Constructive Discharge Claims

Text: 21 Mr. and Mrs. Drake also argue that they were constructively discharged from their jobs. To state a claim for constructive discharge, a plaintiff needs to show that his working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would have been compelled to resign. Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir.1996). Not only must conditions be intolerable; for a Title VII constructive discharge claim to succeed, they must be intolerable because of unlawful discrimination. See Chambers v. American Trans Air, Inc., 17 F.3d 998, 1005 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1001, 115 S.Ct. 512, 130 L.Ed.2d 419 (1994). More than ordinary discrimination is necessary to establish a constructive discharge claim; in the ordinary case, an employee is expected to remain employed while seeking redress. See Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir.1997). 22 Both of the Drake's allegations fall well short of this high standard. At most, the shunning that each of the Drakes received suggests that their experience in the workplace was unpleasant; nothing suggests that this treatment was so intolerable that it should have caused either of them to resign. The fact that Mr. Drake felt compelled to resign after being shunned for a few days does not demonstrate that a reasonable employee would have acted similarly. While Mrs. Drake suggests that she retired out of fears for her safety, she has presented no evidence to suggest that this fear was reasonable. More significantly, she has not presented evidence suggesting that this fear was the result of discrimination by 3M. In fact, the record indicates that on the only occasion in which Mrs. Drake discussed her shunning with 3M management, she told Dean Coleman, the Human Resources manager, that she did not want him to intervene. Summary judgment, therefore, was appropriately granted on the Drakes' constructive discharge claims. 23 4. The Magistrate Judge's Exclusion of Evidence 24 Mr. and Mrs. Drake also argue that the magistrate judge erred in disregarding portions of affidavits that they submitted in opposition to summary judgment and that this evidence, if admitted, would have gone even further in establishing genuine issues of material fact. The affidavits in question were those of Dave Shevely, Hawkins, and Hamilton, three of the Drakes' co-workers. 3M argues that the district court correctly ignored portions of these affidavits because the affiants' statements lack the factual foundation and personal knowledge required by Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(e) requires that affidavits offered in opposition to summary judgment be made on personal knowledge, ... set[ting] forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and ... show[ing] affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Although personal knowledge may include inferences and opinions, those inferences must be substantiated by specific facts. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Chicago, 841 F.2d 186, 189 (7th Cir.1988). 25 The district court was correct to strike these portions of the affidavits. While we will not delve into each statement individually, the portion of the Shevely affidavit that was stricken stated that: Management, especially Dean Coleman, took a scapegoat approach in dealing with employee problems and generally tended to cover up matters. Similarly, Hawkins stated that: Every time I, or any other African American employee went to Dean Coleman with a problem involving another employee, who was white, Dean Coleman would never conduct an investigation or take any action against that white employee. These are exactly the type of conclusory allegations that Rule 56 counsels should be disregarded on summary judgment. Rule 56 demands something more specific than the bald assertion of the general truth of a particular matter, rather it requires affidavits that cite specific concrete facts establishing the existence of the truth of the matter asserted. Hadley v. County of Du Page, 715 F.2d 1238, 1243 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006, 104 S.Ct. 1000, 79 L.Ed.2d 232 (1984). 26 While the Drakes argue that Shevely's long tenure at 3M's plant qualifies him to make the assertions contained in his affidavit, this argument misapprehends Rule 56(e)'s requirements. Instead, Sheveley's affidavit should have recounted factual instances, based upon Sheveley's personal knowledge, that demonstrated Dean Coleman's tendency to cover up matters. Without these substantiating facts, under Rule 56 we cannot make the reasonable inferences that the Drakes assert militate against summary judgment. See Davis, 841 F.2d at 189 (Because Davis substantiates his allegations of a longstanding custom or policy solely on the basis of his one conclusory sentence in his affidavit, we cannot reasonably infer that such a custom did indeed exist without more.). The district court correctly disregarded these conclusory statements in deciding whether to grant summary judgment.