Opinion ID: 2795687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant’s Waiver of Counsel

Text: We review a district court’s conclusions regarding the constitutionality of a defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel de novo. United States v. Spencer, 995 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1993). A defendant faced with a choice between retaining his current court-appointed counsel and proceeding pro se is entitled to choose the latter option, as “the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel implicitly embodies a correlative right to dispense with a lawyer’s help.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 814 (1975) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Before a defendant makes this decision, however, “he must be given a full and fair opportunity to consider his options before waiving his Sixth Amendment right in a knowing and voluntary manner.” United States v. Culbertson, 670 F.3d 183, 193 (2d Cir. 2012). Importantly, the District Court is not required to “resort to any particular talismanic procedures” in order to ensure that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are not violated. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, the District Court must only ensure that 4 “the defendant understood that he had a choice between proceeding pro se [or] with assigned counsel, . . . understood the advantages of having one trained in the law to represent him, and . . . had the capacity to make an intelligent choice.” United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 583 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, defendant claims that his right to counsel was violated because the District Court failed to obtain a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of counsel after he decided to proceed pro se. This challenge fails as well. The District Court “engage[d] the defendant in an on-the-record discussion to ensure that [ ]he fully underst[ood] the ramifications of h[is] decision.” Torres v. United States, 140 F.3d 392, 401 (2d Cir. 1998). The District Court patiently and thoroughly warned defendant as to the disadvantages of proceeding pro se and even encouraged defendant to take some time to think about the decision and consult with his family. Defendant then knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Finally, defendant suggests that his waiver of his right to counsel was not truly voluntary because the District Court’s refusal to appoint substitute counsel gave him ‘no choice’ but to proceed pro se. This argument fails in light of defendant’s failure to establish that the District Court erred in denying his motion for substitution. See United States v. Schmidt, 105 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1997).