Opinion ID: 2507854
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructions Concerning Multiple Special Circumstances

Text: The trial court also refused to give defendant's proposed Special Instruction No. 10, which provided in part: Although all special circumstances have been found to be true, for purposes of determining the penalty to be imposed, the multiple special circumstances should be considered as one. [¶] You must not consider as an aggravating factor[] the existence of any special circumstance if you have already considered the facts of the special circumstance as a circumstance of the crime for which the defendant has been convicted. In other words, do not consider the same factors more than once in determining the presence of aggravating factors. The first part of the instruction  i.e., that the multiple special circumstances should be considered as one  misstated the law. ( People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 165, fn. 35, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990; accord, Spann v. State (Fla. 2003) 857 So.2d 845, 856-857.) As we have previously explained, a sentencer may legitimately conclude that a death-eligible murderer is more culpable, and hence more deserving of death, if he not only robbed the victim but also committed an additional and separate felonious act, burglary, to facilitate the robbery and murder. ( Ibid.; accord, Thomas v. State (2004) 120 Nev. 37, 83 P.3d 818, 825; see also Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 767-768, 244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741 [§ 654 is inapplicable].) It does not matter whether the burglary is residential or commercial. The second part of the instruction  i.e., that the jury should not double-count the robberies or burglaries, once as circumstances of the murder and again as special circumstances  correctly stated the law. A trial court should, when requested, instruct the jury against double-counting these circumstances. ( Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 768, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741.) However, the trial court's failure to do so here was not prejudicial. The jury was instructed in accordance with CALJIC No. 8.85, which instructed the jury to consider, take into account, and be guided by, inter alia, the circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true. As we observed in Melton, even without a clarifying instruction, the possibility that a jury would believe it could `weigh' each special circumstance twice on the penalty `scale' is remote. ( Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 769, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741.) Thus, in the absence of any misleading argument by the prosecutor or an event demonstrating the substantial likelihood of `double-counting,' reversal is not required. ( People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 550, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100.) In the present case, the prosecutor did not suggest the circumstances of the robberies or the burglaries be considered dually as special circumstances and as acts making the murder more heinous. He simply highlighted the facts demonstrating the brutality of the crimes. [11] Moreover, as CALJIC No. 8.85 provided, the jury properly could consider both the facts of each murder as well as the existence of the special circumstances  just not the ` circumstances of the special circumstances.' ( People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 997, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214.) The jury instructions made that distinction.