Opinion ID: 2629325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Reliance on Advice From Counsel

Text: [¶ 14] The first question raised by Mr. Reichert's claim is whether he entered his plea knowingly and intelligently. A guilty plea is valid only when it represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to a defendant. Ingersoll, 2004 WY 102, ¶ 15, 96 P.3d at 1051, fn. 1. Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(b), the district court was required to inform Mr. Reichert of: the nature of and penalties for the charges filed against him; his right to be represented by an attorney, plead not guilty, be tried by a jury, and choose not to testify; his right to plead guilty and waive his right to trial; and the fact that any statements made by him in court under oath could be used against him. Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(d), the district court was required to ensure Mr. Reichert's plea was voluntary. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty . . . without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty . . . results from prior discussions between the attorney for the state and the defendant or the defendant's attorney. With the W.R.Cr.P. 11 requirements in mind, we begin our analysis of Mr. Reichert's claim by reviewing what occurred at the arraignment. [¶ 15] Mr. Reichert appeared in district court for his arraignment on October 27, 2004. The district court asked Mr. Reichert whether he had been able to talk with his attorney about the case and if he was satisfied with his representation so far. Mr. Reichert responded affirmatively to both questions. The district court reviewed the charges and the maximum possible penalty for each and asked Mr. Reichert whether he understood the charges and penalties and had any questions about them. Mr. Reichert said he understood and had no questions. The district court inquired whether Mr. Reichert understood everything up to that point in the hearing. Mr. Reichert said he did. [¶ 16] The district court then explained the presumption of innocence, the State's burden to prove each of the elements of the crimes charged and Mr. Reichert's right to plead not guilty, go to trial, confront the witnesses against him, present his own witnesses, have legal representation, testify or not testify and appeal. The district court asked Mr. Reichert if he understood these rights, whether they made sense to him and whether he had any questions. Mr. Reichert stated he understood his rights and had no questions. The district court advised Mr. Reichert he also had the right to plead guilty and by doing so would give up his right to a trial, the presumption of innocence and his right to silence. The district court stated: No one can ever make you plead a certain way. You always have the right to plead not guilty. If anyone should try to coerce you or force you into how you are going to plead, you should let [counsel] know or let me know. That would be improper. Do you feel that anyone has tried to do that to you up to this point in the case? Mr. Reichert responded, No. [¶ 17] The district court then asked about the terms of the plea agreement. The State explained Mr. Reichert agreed to plead guilty to all three counts and provide a factual basis for each count. In exchange, the State agreed not to file additional charges and to obtain the agreement of the United States not to file additional charges against Mr. Reichert. Defense counsel concurred in the State's description of the agreement. The district court repeated the essential terms of the agreement and stated: Mr. Reichert, under this plea agreement, there is no guarantee of what the sentence will be; and you will have a felony conviction on three counts.    Is that the agreement as you understand it, sir? MR. REICHERT: Yes. THE COURT: Is that satisfactory to you? MR. REICHERT: Yes. THE COURT: Has anyone forced you or coerced you to enter into this agreement? MR. REICHERT: No. Mr. Reichert then pleaded guilty to the three counts. [¶ 18] As the factual basis for his plea, Mr. Reichert testified on the dates identified in the information he, in his capacity as the owner and operator of Mountain States Commodities, acquired beans worth over $500 from customers, sold the beans and converted the money to his own use. He also testified on the dates in question he wrote checks totaling more than $3,000 on his bank account without having sufficient funds in the account to cover the checks. [¶ 19] The record does not indicate Mr. Reichert's pleas and the factual basis for them were given other than voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The district court fully informed him concerning the maximum penalties for the charged offenses and advised him no one could make him plead a certain way and if anyone tried to do so he should inform the court. He was further specifically advised there were no guarantees about sentencing. [¶ 20] Likewise the transcript of the January 10, 2005, sentencing hearing contains nothing suggesting Mr. Reichert wished to withdraw his pleas, was coerced into entering them or entered them without being advised of his rights. The first suggestion the pleas were coerced or made unknowingly and unintelligently came after the district court imposed a more severe sentence than either Mr. Reichert or defense counsel expected. Then, represented by substitute counsel, Mr. Reichert moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, claiming he did not enter them knowingly and intelligently because defense counsel failed to adequately explain the potential consequences of the pleas. Specifically, he claimed defense counsel promised he would receive probation if he pled guilty, he relied on defense counsel's promise in pleading guilty and manifest injustice occurred when he was sentenced not to probation as defense counsel promised but instead to a lengthy prison term. [¶ 21] In addition to the district court's advisements, Mr. Reichert testified defense counsel discussed the maximum sentences with him before the arraignment. Mr. Reichert also testified defense counsel informed him early on he believed probation was likely because Mr. Reichert had no prior criminal history, was a long-standing member of the community, and saved the court a lengthy trial and associated expense. He testified defense counsel advised him he thought the district court would look upon him favorably and sentence him to probation if he cooperated fully with the State and federal agents and agreed to convey all of his assets as restitution to the victims. Mr. Reichert testified defense counsel later told him he was concerned the district court might impose a prison sentence of eighteen to twenty-four months. Consistent with his discussions with Mr. Reichert, however, defense counsel argued for probation at sentencing. [¶ 22] Defense counsel's testimony at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas was consistent with Mr. Reichert's testimony as far as the latter testimony went. Like Mr. Reichert, defense counsel testified he initially believed his client would receive probation because he had no prior criminal record, had long-standing involvement in the community and seemed willing to cooperate. Defense counsel also testified, as did Mr. Reichert, he only later became concerned the court might impose a prison term. Defense counsel further testified the reason for his concern was, over the course of his representation, the seriousness of the allegations giving rise to the charges grew. Specifically, defense counsel testified a much greater amount of money was involved than Mr. Reichert initially had told him. [¶ 23] Defense counsel testified Mr. Reichert told him at first he had the assets to fully re-pay his customers. As the case progressed, it became apparent the amount was much greater than Mr. Reichert had indicated and he did not have the financial resources to pay the people back. Defense counsel testified: Early on in my representation of Mr. Reichert, when I thought we were dealing with 13,000 bags of beans or 20,000as it progressed, there was a point in time when we were dealing with criminal charges. But I still believedbecause he told me he had the ability to do something about thisI still believed that if he did the things I asked him to do there was a very good chance of him getting probation. And I'm sure I told him that. But the case continued to change, dramatically. And there came a point in time when it was obvious that he hadn't told me everything. And I was dealingby the time this case was over, I was dealing with a far more serious set of facts than I ever imagined at the beginning. [¶ 24] Despite the increasing seriousness of the charges, defense counsel testified he personally did not believe Mr. Reichert would be sentenced to a lengthy period of incarceration; it was his hope if Mr. Reichert did as he recommended in terms of pleading guilty, repaying the victims, cooperating with the State and acknowledging his wrongdoing, the district court would be lenient in sentencing. Defense counsel testified, however, Mr. Reichert did not do as he recommended and as the sentencing approached, he became more convinced Mr. Reichert would spend time in jail. Defense counsel testified he told Mr. Reichert the State's case against him was mounting and becoming more and more serious. Defense counsel testified both he and the district court advised Mr. Reichert a prison sentence was possible. Still, defense counsel argued for probation at sentencing. Defense counsel testified he was shocked when the district court imposed sentence and believed it was excessive. [¶ 25] In Hicklin v. State, 535 P.2d 743 (Wyo.1975), we held the receipt of erroneous advice from counsel concerning the likely sentence was not a sustainable ground for withdrawing a guilty plea where there is no showing of actual reliance on statements of the prosecutor or judge in entering the plea. We adhere to that holding now. Although defense counsel's early belief that the sentence would likely be probation may have had some influence on Mr. Reichert's decision to plead guilty, the record shows Mr. Reichert's primary reason for pleading guilty was to avoid other charges. [¶ 26] Mr. Reichert testified he told the judge at the arraignment his plea was voluntary because he believed if he did not plead guilty the United States would bring additional charges against him. He testified: [T]he plea agreement was based primarily on the factor solely on the fact that the prosecution would keep the federal charges at bay. He also testified: [defense counsel] also indicated to me verbally in his office several times that if I don't accept the plea as it was stated, that it could go back to the drawing board andand [the prosecutor] could go back to the day when he was stating that there could be a possible 150 counts and this and that, and that if I didn't accept it that it could be changed just that fast. Q. Okay. And are you stating now that for some reason you believe that that was not true? A. Oh, I'm not saying that at all. That's why I plead guilty. He said: I was agreeing to those terms [of the plea agreement] again, only to avoid additional charges that I felt were were looming or lurking overhead if . . . I changed my mind. That's how [defense counsel] described it to me, that this was a one-shot deal, that the charges couldn't be negotiated here at sentencing, and that if I didn't go along with it now that it could upset the whole thing and additional charges could be filed. (emphasis added). [¶ 27] Thus, the record clearly shows Mr. Reichert entered into the plea agreement, having been fully informed of the charges to which he was pleading and the maximum penalties, expressly for the purpose of avoiding additional state and federal chargescharges which had the potential to result in an even lengthier sentence than the one ultimately imposed. The fact that Mr. Reichert agreed to plead guilty to avoid more serious charges and in the hope of receiving probation only to have the district court impose a more severe penalty than Mr. Reichert and defense counsel expected does not give rise to a fundamental defect resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice or an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. Reyna, ¶ 27, 33 P.3d at 1137-38. [¶ 28] We conclude Mr. Reichert has failed to meet his burden of showing the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion. Having carefully examined the record before us, we hold Mr. Reichert has not demonstrated the district court's ruling resulted in manifest injustice. He has not shown a fundamental defect resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice or an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. Considering all of the circumstances, the district court's imposition of a more severe penalty than defense counsel believed was appropriate and advised Mr. Reichert was likely does not constitute manifest injustice.