Opinion ID: 2999780
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Semaji Warren

Text: Warren responded to counsel’s Anders brief, see Cir. R. 51(b), and so we confine our review to the potential issue he raises and the issues identified in counsel’s facially adequate brief. See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973–74 (7th Cir. 2002). Both Warren and counsel explore the sufficiency of the evidence on his convictions under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, specifically the Act’s jurisdictional requirement. Knocking over a few neighborhood convenience stores is a federal offense only if it in some “way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects” interstate commerce, § 1951(a), and Warren suggests that he could argue that insufficient evidence was introduced to meet this jurisdictional requirement for the Colonial Pantry robbery. He also asserts that there was no testimony that the Newport cigarettes he stole actually moved in interstate commerce. Meeting the jurisdictional requirement of the Hobbs Act is not as onerous as Warren assumes, however. Given the broad language in the Act, even a de minimis effect on interstate commerce is sufficient. See United States v. Peterson, 236 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2001). Under the “depletion of assets” theory, commerce is affected when a business that usually purchases goods from out-of-state has any of its assets stolen, limiting its future ability to transact business. See United States v. Re, 401 F.3d 828, 835 (7th Cir. 2005). Thus, there was no need for the government to show that the particular cigarettes that were taken had been purchased from out-of-state; it was enough that the government introduced evidence that Colonial Pantry customarily purchased some items, like gasoline, beer, and other cigarette brands, from out-of-state distributors. Courts have routinely found the Hobbs Act’s jurisdictional element met in similar robbery cases. See United States v. Sutton, 337 F.3d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Curtis, 344 F.3d 1057, 1070–71 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Elias, 285 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2002). Any potential argument on this point would be frivolous. Nos. 05-1645 & 05-1666 Page 6 Counsel also explores whether any sentencing issues could be raised. Warren received a total sentence of 50 years, or 600 months: 92 months for his three Hobbs Act convictions and for his conviction of possession of a firearm by a felon, U.S.S.G. §§ 2B3.1, 2K2.1(a)(6), 3D1.4, 4A1.1; seven years (84 months) for his first conviction of using a firearm during a robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), to run consecutively; 25 years (300 months) for his second such conviction, id. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i), to run consecutively; and 124 months for his third such conviction, to run consecutively. The last conviction, Warren’s third for using a firearm during a crime of violence, carries a statutory minimum sentence of 25 years, but the court granted the government’s motion for a downward departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) because of Warren’s substantial assistance (his testimony against Thacker). The guideline range was calculated correctly, and he was sentenced at the low end of it. No evidence in this record indicates that this sentence was unreasonable. Compare United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that sentence within guidelines range enjoys a presumption of reasonableness), with Rita v. United States, 177 Fed. Ap’x 357 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 2006 WL 2307774 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2006) (No. 06-5754) (grant of certiorari on question of whether a sentence within guidelines range is presumptively reasonable). Warren did not oppose the presentence report’s recommendations. He initially challenged a two-level upward adjustment to his guideline range for bodily injury to one of the victims of the robbery—the customer who was pistolwhipped—but dropped this objection at the sentencing hearing. Any renewal of this challenge would be frivolous. The guidelines define “bodily injury” as “any significant injury,” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(B), and being struck with a pistol qualifies. See United States v. Ledford, 218 F.3d 684, 690–91 (7th Cir. 2000). There is undisputed evidence that the customer was struck: both he and the Casey’s store clerk testified, and the customer ended up seeking medical treatment. Any challenge to this or any other aspect of Warren’s sentence would be frivolous. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment in Thacker’s case and grant the motion to DISMISS the appeal in Warren’s case.