Opinion ID: 339201
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Ill Rev.Stat.1961, Ch. 38, Section 32-3

Text: 5 Cited with approval by this court in United States v. Cullen, supra, 454 F.2d at 391 n. 12 6 Although Patrick did not actually live at this house, he visited there daily and was in constant communication with his daughter. This house will be generally referred to as Patrick's home 7 Patrick presented testimony to the effect that O'Hara had a reputation for being a killer and quite dangerous. Patrick also suggested that although he was aware that grand jury proceedings are to be secret, O'Hara had ways of finding out the extent of Patrick's testimony 8 In the case of United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1971), which involved a prosecution for the willful destruction of public records, this court discussed the problem of equating motive with intent and stated: In a case such as this, if the proof discloses that the prohibited act was voluntary, and that the defendant actually knew, or reasonably should have known, that it was a public wrong, the burden of proving the requisite intent has been met; proof of motive, good or bad, has no relevance to that issue. 454 F.2d at 392. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit stated as follows in the case of United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910, 90 S.Ct. 908, 25 L.Ed.2d 91 (1970): To read the term willfully to require a bad purpose would be to confuse the concept of intent with that of motive. The statutory requirement of willfullness is satisfied if the accused acted intentionally, with knowledge that he was breaching the statute . . . (W)hatever motive may have led them to do the act is not relevant to the question of the violation of the statute, but is rather an element proper for the judge's consideration in sentencing. 417 F.2d at 1004. 9 If Patrick had made a verified motion for a change of judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 alleging facts sufficient to show bias, Judge Marshall would have been required to grant such motion even though he believed the allegations therein to be false. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 35-36, 41 S.Ct. 230, 65 L.Ed. 481 (1921); United States v. Sciuto, 531 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1976) 10 In Bernstein the court said: The rule of law, without belaboring the point, is that what a judge learns in his judicial capacity whether by way of guilty pleas of codefendants or alleged coconspirators, or by way of pretrial proceedings, or both is a proper basis for judicial observations, and the use of such information is not the kind of matter that results in disqualification. 533 F.2d at 785. 11 The government relies primarily on the case of United States v. Swift, 186 F. 1002, 1011, 1017-18 (N.D.Ill.1911) and other cases discussed therein. See also Maness v. Meyers, supra, wherein the Supreme Court stated: This Court has always broadly construed its (Fifth Amendment privilege) protection to assure that an individual is not compelled to produce evidence which later may be used against him as an accused in a criminal action. (Citations omitted). The protection does not merely encompass evidence which may lead to criminal conviction, but includes information which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence that could lead to prosecution, as well as evidence which an individual reasonably believes could be used against him in a criminal prosecution. 419 U.S. at 461, 95 S.Ct. at 592. The government also relies on cases recognizing the very broad discretion the judge possesses as to the type of information he may use in sentencing, see, e. g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972); United States v. Marines, 535 F.2d 552, 554 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Johnson, 507 F.2d 826, 828-30 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949, 95 S.Ct. 1682, 44 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975), and analogizes by citing various cases which hold that for sentencing purposes a judge may consider evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, provided the illegally seized evidence was not gathered for the purpose of improperly influencing the defendant's sentencing. See, e. g., United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26, 28 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983, 91 S.Ct. 1198, 28 L.Ed.2d 334 (1971); Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 610-12 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 961, 91 S.Ct. 1623, 29 L.Ed.2d 124 (1971). 12 See United States v. Bukowski, 435 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911, 91 S.Ct. 874, 27 L.Ed.2d 809 (1971); United States ex rel. Robson v. Malone, 412 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1969) 13 18 U.S.C. § 1621 14 18 U.S.C. § 1510 15 Apparently the two counts against O'Hara based on Patrick's testimony were dismissed by the government upon Patrick's refusal to testify at trial