Opinion ID: 2607272
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Customary Rights under Hawai`i law

Text: The Kalipi court properly recognized that all the requisite elements of the doctrine of custom were [not] necessarily incorporated in § 1-1. 66 Haw. at 10, 656 P.2d at 751.83101883 Accordingly, HRS § 1-1 represents the codification of the doctrine of custom as it applies in our State. One of the most dramatic differences in the application of custom in Hawai`i is that passage of HRS § 1-1's predecessor fixed November 25, 1892 as the date Hawaiian usage must have been established in practice. Compare State v. Zimring [ Zimring II ], 58 Haw. 106, 115 n. 11, 566 P.2d 725, 732 n. 11 (1977) (citing State v. Zimring [ Zimring I ], 52 Haw. 472, 479 P.2d 202 (1970)), with Oni, 2 Haw. at 90 (implying that the time immemorial standard is entitled to great weight but declining to express a conclusive opinion). [39] Other differences in the doctrine's applicability are readily discernible. For example, under English common law, a custom for every inhabitant of an ancient messuage [meaning [d]welling-house with the adjacent buildings and curtilage[,] see Black's Legal Dictionary 990 (6th ed.1990)] within a parish to take a profit a prendre in the land of an individual is bad. Blackstone's Commentaries, at 78 n. 18. Strict application of the English common law, therefore, would apparently have precluded the exercise of traditional Hawaiian gathering rights. As such, this element of the doctrine of custom could not apply in Hawai`i. See supra note 21 (discussing the prominent status of custom throughout Hawaiian legal history). In light of the confusion surrounding the nature and scope of customary Hawaiian rights under HRS § 1-1, the following subsections of this opinion discuss applicable requirements for establishing such rights in the instant case.
Nansay argues that the recognition of rights exercised by persons who do not actually reside in the subject ahupua`a represents such a departure from existing law ... [that Pele ] should be overruled or strictly limited to its specific facts. Nansay's Third Supp. Brief, at 2-3 n. 1. Nansay contends further that Pele is inconsistent with the fundamental nature of Hawaiian land tenure, which allegedly recognizes only three classes: government, landlord, and tenant. Id. at 3-4; see Principles adopted by Land Commission (1847), reprinted in 2 Revised Laws of Hawai`i (RLH), at 2124-37 (1925). We decline Nansay's invitation to overrule Pele; on the contrary, we reaffirm it and expressly deem the rules of law posited therein to be applicable here. In Pele, we held that article XII, section 7, which, inter alia, obligates the State to protect customary and traditional rights normally associated with tenancy in an ahupua`a, may also apply to the exercise of rights beyond the physical boundaries of that particular ahupua`a. Pele, 73 Haw. at 620, 837 P.2d at 1272; see also Palama v. Sheehan, 50 Haw. 298, 300-01, 440 P.2d 95, 97 (1968) (noting that Hawaiians did not necessarily reside in the same place that they exercised traditional rights). Although it is not clear that customary rights should be limited by the term tenant, see supra note 27, we are nonetheless aware that the tenant class includes at least one sub-class. See 2 RLH (1925), at 2124, 2126 (mentioning a lowest class of tenants, lower orders and sub-tenants, apparently from the Hawaiian terms l&omacr;p&amacr; ma lalo, hoa`&amacr;ina ma lalo, and l&omacr;p&amacr;). Therefore, we hold that common law rights ordinarily associated with tenancy do not limit customary rights existing under the laws of this state.
In the context of an argument challenging the Pele Defense Fund's (PDF) standing to bring its claim, as raised on appeal in Pele, we made passing reference to the circuit court's finding that PDF's membership included persons of fifty percent or more Hawaiian blood[.] 73 Haw. at 615 n. 28, 837 P.2d at 1269 n. 28; see also 73 Haw. at 620 n. 34, 837 P.2d at 1272 n. 34 (citing affidavits of persons with at least one-half native Hawaiian blood). Because the lower court's relevant factual determination was not challenged on appeal, we did not disturb this finding in Pele. Nevertheless, these references in Pele were not intended to imply our endorsement of a fifty percent blood quantum requirement for claims based upon traditional or customary Hawaiian rights. The definition of the term native Hawaiian in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA) [40] is not expressly applicable to other Hawaiian rights or entitlements. Furthermore, the word native does not appear in HRS § 1-1. Because a specific proposal to define the terms Hawaiian and native Hawaiian in the 1978 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified, the relevant section was deleted from the 1985 version of the HRS. See Kahalekai v. Doi, 60 Haw. 324, 342, 590 P.2d 543, 555 (1979). Consequently, those persons who are  descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the islands prior to 1778, and who assert otherwise valid customary and traditional Hawaiian rights under HRS § 1-1, are entitled to protection regardless of their blood quantum. Haw. Const., art XII, § 7 (emphasis added). [41] Customary and traditional rights in these islands flow from native Hawaiians' pre-existing sovereignty. The rights of their descendants do not derive from their race per se, and were not abolished by their inclusion within the territorial bounds of the United States. See Organic Act, § 83; Act of April 30, 1900, c. 339, 31 Stat. 141, 157, reprinted in 1 HRS 36, 74 (1985) (as amended).
The court in Kalipi suggested that the Hawaiian usage exception in § 1-1 may be used as a vehicle for the continued existence of those customary rights which continued to be practiced[.] 66 Haw. at 11-12, 656 P.2d at 751-52. See also id. at 10, 656 P.2d at 751 (indicating the court's belief that retention of a Hawaiian tradition should in each case be determined by balancing the respective interests and harm once it is established that the application of the custom has continued in a particular area ) (emphasis added); Pele, 73 Haw. at 619, 837 P.2d at 1271 (reading Kalipi as upholding the right to practice continuously exercised rights ... so long as no actual harm [is] done by the practice) (emphasis added). The court in Zimring II noted further that although usage must be based on actual practice and not on assumptions or conjecture, the establishment of traditional usage would be of little weight because the practice would not have carried over into a private property regime within the framework of a private enterprise economic system. 58 Haw. at 116-18, 566 P.2d at 732-33. On the other hand, the Kalipi court also indicated that the traditional practices enumerated under HRS § 7-1 remain available to those who wish to continue those ways. Id. at 9, 656 P.2d at 750 (emphasis added). Contrary to the dictum in Zimring II, supra, the ancient usage of lands practiced by Hawaiians did, in fact, carry over into the new system of property rights established through the Land Commission. Compare Zimring II, 58 Haw. at 116-18, 566 P.2d at 732-33, with Kukiiahu v. Gill, 1 Haw. 54 (1851), and Kekiekie, 1 Haw. at 43 (recognizing that ahupua`a tenant's rights were secured by the constitution and could not have been conveyed away even if the King had not made [the kuleana] reservation[s,] see supra note 24). See also supra notes 21, 33, and 36 (citing statutory authority and case law that supports this conclusion). Furthermore, the reservation of sovereign prerogatives, see supra section IV.B.4 (citing Reppun, 65 Haw. at 543-44, 656 P.2d at 66; McBryde, 54 Haw. at 184-86, 504 P.2d at 1337-38), in conjunction with limitations on the Land Commission's authority, see supra section IV.B.4 (citing L. 1847, at 70-72), [42] confirms that fee simple title in Hawai`i is specifically limited by the sovereign authority to regulate its use. In other words, the right of each ahupua`a tenant to exercise traditional and customary practices remains intact, notwithstanding arguable abandonment of a particular site, although this right is potentially subject to regulation in the public interest. See supra note 26 (citing Blackstone's Commentaries for the proposition that continuous exercise is not absolutely required to maintain the validity of a custom).
We have stated previously that rights of access and collection will not necessarily prevent landowners from developing their lands. Pele, 73 Haw. at 621 n. 36, 837 P.2d at 1272 n. 36 (reiterating the early holding that article XII, [section] 7 does not require the preservation of ... [undeveloped] lands in their natural state and that  Kalipi rights only guarantee access to undeveloped lands); see also Kalipi, 66 Haw. at 8 n. 2, 656 P.2d at 749 n. 2. Our analysis in the instant case is consistent with these cases. [43] The Kalipi court justified the imposition of a non-statutory undeveloped land requirement by suggesting that the exercise of traditional gathering rights on fully developed property would conflict with our understanding of the traditional Hawaiian way of life in which cooperation and non-interference with the well-being of other residents were integral parts of the culture.  66 Haw. at 9, 656 P.2d at 750 (emphasis added). The court also stated that, without the undeveloped land limitation, there would be nothing to prevent residents from going anywhere within the ahupua`a, including fully developed property, to gather the enumerated items. Id. at 8, 656 P.2d at 750 (emphasis added); but see supra note 23. However, the court did not expressly hold that the exercise of customary gathering practices would be absurd or unjust when performed on land that is less than fully developed. For the purposes of this opinion, we choose not to scrutinize the various gradations in property use that fall between the terms undeveloped and fully developed. Nevertheless, we refuse the temptation to place undue emphasis on non-Hawaiian principles of land ownership in the context of evaluating deliberations on development permit applications. Such an approach would reflect an unjustifiable lack of respect for gathering activities as an acceptable cultural usage in pre-modern Hawai`i, see HRS § 5-7.5 (Supp. 1992), [44] which can also be successfully incorporated in the context of our current culture. Contrary to the suggestion in Kalipi that there would be nothing to prevent the unreasonable exercise of these rights, article XII, section 7 accords an ample legal basis for regulatory efforts by the State. See also supra note 23 (citing evidence suggesting that ancient Hawaiian usage was self-regulating). In other words, the State is authorized to impose appropriate regulations to govern the exercise of native Hawaiian rights in conjunction with permits issued for the development of land previously undeveloped or not yet fully developed. Depending on the circumstances of each case, once land has reached the point of full development it may be inconsistent to allow or enforce the practice of traditional Hawaiian gathering rights on such property. However, legitimate customary and traditional practices must be protected to the extent feasible in accordance with article XII, section 7. See supra note 43. Although access is only guaranteed in connection with undeveloped lands, and article XII, section 7 does not require the preservation of such lands, the State does not have the unfettered discretion to regulate the rights of ahupua`a tenants out of existence. Thus, to the extent feasible, we hold that the HPC must protect the reasonable exercise of customary or traditional rights that are established by PASH on remand.