Opinion ID: 1622782
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: the testimony of the attorneys

Text: The unsigned affidavit of Mr. Edmund (attached to the instant Motion as Exhibit R-1) was not admitted in evidence at the hearing. The proposed affidavit resulted from an interview between investigator Marc Nezer and Mr. Edmund which lasted only about thirty minutes and was followed by a few telephone conversations of short duration. The affidavit itself was later prepared by two attorneys who had never met with Mr. Edmund, and was quite detailed considering the short length of the interview. It is more than likely, therefore, that the two attorneys who prepared the affidavit characterized Mr. Edmund's trial conduct inaccurately. In any event, Mr. Edmund chose not to sign this document, and instead prepared and signed an affidavit which he felt more closely portrayed his trial conduct. The defendant's claim that this affidavit represents what Mr. Edmund told Mr. Nezer at the interview is rejected insofar as it differs from the affidavit signed by Mr. Edmund. Both trial counsel testified at the hearing that they made mistakes during the trial, and would have approached certain matters differently given another chance. As the State correctly pointed out, an attorney's own admission that he or she was ineffective is of little persuasion in these proceedings. See Johnson v. Wainwright, 463 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1985); Francis v. State, [529 So.2d 670] No. 71,443 (Fla. June 2, 1988) [13 FLW 369]. The court is also cognizant of the need to avoid the distorting effects of hindsight, and defer to the strong presumption in favor of effectiveness. But most important, this court, as trial court, observed the actions and conduct of both defense attorneys in the course of the two trials, and found their representation of the defendant to be capable and effective. The court does recognize that Mr. Edmund and Mr. Kunstler disagreed at the hearing in regard to which attorney acted as lead counsel at trial and other matters. Mr. Kunstler has strong feelings against the death penalty. Apparently those feelings have affected his perception of the attorneys' actions at the trial. However, he conveniently finds the greatest fault to be with co-counsel, not himself. He remained silent at trial and for four years thereafter. A large part of his testimony is not credible. Based on demeanor, and the court's own observations in the courtroom, the court accepts Mr. Edmund's version insofar as any conflict exists. After careful consideration, the court now finds that none of the acts or omissions complained of in the defendant's motion rises to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. While on the witness stand, Mr. Edmund expressed his belief in the unfairness of imposing the death penalty in a case such as this, where much of the physical evidence was destroyed prior to trial. The issue of the destroyed evidence was raised on appeal and rejected by the Florida Supreme Court in Kelley v. State, 486 So.2d 578 (Fla. 1986). This court is aware of the argument that `death is different', and therefore errors of a fundamental constitutional nature should be cognizable in a 3.850 proceeding, even though they were, or should have been, raised on appeal. However, the law in Florida clearly mandates that the same rules apply in capital cases as in non capital cases, at least in regard to the procedural bar. Spenkelink v. State, 350 So.2d 85 (Fla. 1977) (England, J., concurring). In summary, the court finds that there were no Brady violations committed by the State, nor was there the slightest hint of prosecutorial misconduct. In addition, both defense counsel effectively represented the defendant. As a final comment, the court, who conducted the trial also, notes that at the close of the hearing, it was left with a strong conviction that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, that he received a fair trial, and that justice was done in this case. It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that defendant's Motion to Vacate Judgment of Conviction and Set Aside Sentence of Death is denied. DONE AND ORDERED at Bartow, Florida, this 11th day of August, 1988. There was competent substantial evidence to support the conclusion that there was no Brady violation and that defense counsel was not ineffective. Further, even if the defense had had in its possession the items it claimed it should have had, it is clear that the result of the trial would not have probably been different. While the order denying the motion for postconviction relief was on appeal, Kelley filed a motion to interview the jurors who sat on his original trial. He asserted that two attorneys had recently reported that one of the jurors told them of certain misconduct by another juror during the course of the trial. This Court relinquished jurisdiction to permit the judge to interview the jurors. The judge conducted a hearing in which all twelve jurors were interviewed together with the two attorneys who had reported the incident. The accusing juror backed off some of the accusatory statements attributed to him by the attorneys but continued to maintain that another juror told him that she had read a newspaper during the trial which reported that Kelley had a large sum of money in his possession when he was arrested. The accused juror emphatically denied having watched, read, or listened to any media account of the case or the defendant. She said she knew of no one on the jury bringing in any kind of outside information either by newspaper or any other source. She also denied the conversation testified to by the accusing juror. None of the remaining jurors were aware of any outside information having come to the attention of the jury. In light of the conflicting evidence, the judge's finding of no juror misconduct must be sustained. We also agree that the judge properly refused to inquire into the assertions that the accused juror also may have been playing tic-tac-toe and may have changed her vote in order to meet a social engagement on the ground that such matters inhered in the verdict. Finally, we reject Kelley's contention that the judge erred in denying the motion to recuse which was filed shortly before the jury interview. The asserted grounds did not set forth a legal basis for recusal. We affirm the order denying Kelley's motion for postconviction relief. It is so ordered. SHAW, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH and GRIMES, JJ., concur. BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur in result only. McDONALD, J., recused.