Opinion ID: 4417118
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bradley’s Federal Due Process Claim

Text: Because the district court dismissed Bradley’s complaint on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) for failure to state a claim, we review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo, construing the factual allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to Bradley. E.g., Bishop v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 900 F.3d 388, 396–97 (7th Cir. 2018). The basic legal questions presented by due process cases like this are familiar: “(1) is there a property or liberty interest protected by due process; and (2) if so, what process is due, and when must that process be made available?” Simpson v. Brown County, 860 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2017); see generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–35 (1976). For public employees, a “protected property interest in employment can arise from a state statute, regulation, municipal ordinance, or an express or implied contract.” Crull v. Sunderman, 384 F.3d 453, 460 (7th Cir. 2004), quoting Johnson v. City of Fort Wayne, 91 F.3d 922, 943 (7th Cir. 1996). We need not dwell on this element. As noted, the village concedes that Bradley had a property interest in his job protected by procedural due process. His protections were not just procedural but substantive. Cf. Manley v. Law, 889 F.3d 885, 893 (7th Cir. No. 16-3456 9 2018) (purely procedural rules of state or local law do not support claim to federal due process rights), citing Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 221–22 (2011). When a public employee has a property interest in his or her job, the constitutional requirements for predeprivation procedures are well-established: notice of the proposed deprivation, a statement of reasons, and an opportunity to be heard in response. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569– 70 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602–03 (1972). As for “the specific dictates of due process” in any individual case, we are required to consider “three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be aﬀected by the oﬃcial action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Being fired from a job does not require a predeprivation hearing that approximates a full trial. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266–71 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits was such a substantial deprivation that plaintiﬀ was entitled to a predeprivation “evidentiary hearing”). But a job is nonetheless a substantial enough property interest that, absent extenuating circumstances such as an emergency, the basics of predeprivation due process must be provided. Thus, in the normal course of terminating a public employee who has a property interest in his or her job, “the root requirement of the Due Process Clause” is the provision of adequate notice and “some kind of a hearing” to a public employee “before he is deprived of any significant property 10 No. 16-3456 interest.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542, 546 (internal quotations omitted); accord, e.g., Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 929; Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 132 (“In situations where the State feasibly can provide a predeprivation hearing before taking property, it generally must do so regardless of the adequacy of a postdeprivation tort remedy to compensate for the taking.”). To be clear, Bradley is not complaining about the adequacy of his notice or the procedural details of a hearing. All parties agree: he received no process at all. In contrast, plaintiﬀs in public employee due process cases often argue that their rights to due process were violated when state or local oﬃcials failed to comply with additional procedural details set forth in state statutes or local ordinances. State and local governments are free to provide more robust protections and detailed procedures for firing and disciplining public employees than is constitutionally required. Many have done so. Those detailed procedural codes are easier to administer than having to devise ad hoc procedures in each case. As we have written for decades, however, those additional procedural details in state and local law should not be confused with the minimal federal constitutional requirements of predeprivation notice and an opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Schultz v. Baumgart, 738 F.2d 231, 236 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining that “it is not the task of this [federal] court to enforce in every procedural detail the elaborate requirements of [state law]”); accord, e.g., Linear, 887 F.3d at 844 (“We regularly disparage arguments … that procedures required by state law create property interests and hence lead to a federal No. 16-3456 11 requirement that state procedures be used.”), citing Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 11–13 (1944).3 Furthermore, “[j]ust as a violation of state law does not a constitutional claim make, so the [state law] violation does not protect oﬃcials from the federal consequences of their otherwise-unconstitutional conduct,” as Supreme Court precedent has “establish[ed] the indiﬀerence of constitutional norms to the content of state law.” Archie, 847 F.2d at 1217 n.6, citing Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913), and Snowden, 321 U.S. 1. This point has been clear since Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), which was overruled in part not relevant here by Monell, 436 U.S. at 664–89. Monroe held that the defendant police oﬃcers were acting “under color of” state authority and could be held liable under § 1983 for violations of the United States “Constitution and laws of Illinois,” despite the existence 3 Our cases reiterating this principle are legion. See, e.g., Martin v. Shawano-Gresham School Dist., 295 F.3d 701, 706 (7th Cir. 2002) (“the failure to conform with the procedural requirements guaranteed by state law does not by itself constitute a violation of federal due process”); Wallace v. Tilley, 41 F.3d 296, 301 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that “denial of state procedures in and of itself does not create inadequate process under the federal constitution” because constitutional requirements are satisfied with sufficient predeprivation notice and an opportunity for a hearing—even if plaintiff did not have an attorney present at the hearing, and such hearing was not conducted by an impartial decision-maker); Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1993) (“As we tirelessly but unavailingly remind counsel in this court, a violation of state law … is not a denial of due process, even if the state confers a procedural right. … The standard of due process is federal.”); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1216–17 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (“Once state law defines the substance [of the property right], constitutional law establishes the minimum procedures. … [But] violation of state law is not itself the violation of the Constitution.”). 12 No. 16-3456 of “a simple remedy” under Illinois law and the fact that “the courts of Illinois are available to give petitioners that full redress.”365 U.S. at 172 (emphasis added). This was so because § 1983 was designed to provide a remedy “against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law.” Id. at 176. Monroe explained: “It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked. Hence the fact that Illinois by its constitution and laws outlaws unreasonable searches and seizures is no barrier to the present suit in the federal court.” Id. at 183. In sum, the simultaneous violation of both federal and state law does not provide defendants with a defense to liability, nor does the existence of a state remedy bar aggrieved plaintiﬀs from pursuing federal claims.
The legal issues are undisputed until this point: Bradley had a protected property interest, which he lost without any due process. And since Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), a municipal corporation may be held liable under § 1983 in such circumstances. As we recently explained, “[t]he critical question under Monell, reaffirmed in Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29 (2010), is whether a municipal (or corporate) policy or custom gave rise to the harm (that is, caused it), or if instead the harm resulted from the acts of the entity’s agents.” Glisson v. Indiana Dep’t of Corrections, 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Determining what caused the violation is crucial because Monell held that “municipalities are not liable for the torts of their No. 16-3456 13 employees under the strict-liability doctrine of respondeat superior, as private employers are.” Vodak v. City of Chicago, 639 F.3d 738, 747 (7th Cir. 2011). Local governments are liable for damages under § 1983 only for violations of federal rights that occur “pursuant to oﬃcial municipal policy of some nature.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. The “oﬃcial policy” requirement for Monell claims is “intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality” and to limit liability to “action for which the municipality is actually responsible.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479–80 (1986). A plaintiﬀ might prove this essential element by showing that (1) “the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision oﬃcially adopted and promulgated by that body’s oﬃcers,” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690; or (2) the “constitutional deprivations [were] visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body’s oﬃcial decisionmaking channels,” id. at 690–91; or (3) the deprivation was “made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent oﬃcial policy,” id. at 694. See also Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 562 U.S. at 36; Board of County Com’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1997). The Monell requirement can be satisfied by “a single decision attributable to a municipality.” Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 405. “[I]t is plain that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers” to adopt “a course of action tailored to a particular situation … whether that action is to be taken only once or to be taken repeatedly.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480–81, 485 (municipality was liable 14 No. 16-3456 under § 1983 when county prosecutor acting as county’s final decisionmaker directed subordinates to engage in actions that violated plaintiﬀ’s rights); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 252,268 (1981) (municipal liability for compensatory—but not punitive—damages was appropriate under § 1983 when city council canceled performer’s concert license without due process). Contrary to defendants’ position here, such an unconstitutional act of municipal decisionmakers can result in municipal liability even if their act also violated state law. For example, in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), the Supreme Court made clear that both a city and its manager could be held liable under § 1983 for firing the city police chief without due process, even if the defendants’ actions also violated state law. Id. at 627 n.4 & 633 (holding qualified immunity does not apply to damage claims against municipal government itself). If a plaintiﬀ cannot prove, however, that a policy is attributable to the municipality itself—i.e., that the deprivation was due to “[e]ither the content of an oﬃcial policy, a decision by a final decisionmaker, or evidence of custom”—then there is no municipal liability. Glisson, 849 F.3d at 379. Any inquiry into whether the actions of a municipal employee may be attributed to the municipality can be answered by applying the Monell test for liability. In Bradley’s case, this component is also undisputed. The mayor and the board concede that they had sole discretion and authority to fire Bradley. “[P]roof that a municipality’s legislative body or authorized decisionmaker has intentionally deprived a plaintiﬀ of a federally protected right necessarily establishes that the municipality acted culpably.” Bryan No. 16-3456 15 County, 520 U.S. at 405. Under Monell, the actions of the mayor and village board in firing Bradley are, by virtue of the defendants’ authority as policymakers, automatically considered actions of the municipality itself under § 1983. Their decision to deprive Bradley of due process is the municipal policy that forms the basis for defendants’ liability.