Opinion ID: 726165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 33 Huynh is entitled to habeas corpus relief if, upon the record evidence adduced at the trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2791-92, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The findings of fact by a state court of competent jurisdiction evidenced by reliable indicia are presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994). 7 The conclusions of the state court and district court as to whether the evidence was sufficient to satisfy federal due process standards is a mixed question of fact and law subject to plenary review. Wilcox v. Ford, 813 F.2d 1140, 1143 n. 3 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 925, 108 S.Ct. 287, 98 L.Ed.2d 247 (1987). 34 Huynh was convicted of having intentionally aided and abetted Hong Binh Thai and Sam Van Ngo in the murder of C.A. Nguyen (Nguyen). 8 At trial, Huynh contended that he was coerced to participate in events subsequent to Nguyen's murder; in essence, Huynh claimed (and continues to claim) that his participation was exclusively after-the-fact. Huynh correctly notes that under Georgia law, a defendant must be an accessory before-the-fact to be found guilty as an aider or abettor to a crime. Purvis v. State, 208 Ga.App. 653, 433 S.E.2d 58, 59, cert. denied, 208 Ga.App. 910 (1993). The following facts presented at trial are undisputed: the police found a .25 caliber bullet casing in the apartment of the victim, and Huynh owned a .25 caliber weapon. Huynh drove Hong Binh Thai and Sam Van Ngo, with the victim's body in the back seat, to a wooded area where they disposed of the dead body. Hong Binh Thai subsequently gave Huynh $2,000.00, representing half of the money Sam Van Ngo gave to Hong Binh Thai after robbing Nguyen. Huynh and Hong Binh Thai were apprehended shortly thereafter in California. In a search conducted prior to his arrest, Huynh was found carrying thirteen one hundred dollar bills. 9 Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that this evidence was sufficient to support Huynh's conviction. 10 C. Double Jeopardy 35 Finally, Huynh asserts that he received multiple punishments for the same offense, thereby subjecting him to double jeopardy, when he was convicted and sentenced to consecutive life sentences for the greater offense of malice murder and the lesser included offense of armed robbery. He asks that we reverse his conviction and sentence for armed robbery. The State avers that (1) Huynh has never raised this particular double jeopardy claim in either state or federal court, (2) his state pleadings and original federal habeas petition stated only that he had been subjected to double jeopardy by being retried for felony murder, and (3) the claim presented in this appeal therefore is unexhausted. The State does not argue the merits of Huynh's double jeopardy challenge, but asks that we decline to entertain the claim. We review Huynh's double jeopardy claim de novo. Mars v. Mounts, 895 F.2d 1348, 1351 (11th Cir.1990). 36 The State correctly notes that in his pro se petition before the district court, Huynh stated that since he was not found guilty of felony murder in his first trial, he has been subjected to double jeopardy. R1-1. Huynh also stated that he would like to use the brief filed in Georgia Supreme Court by trial attorney on this issue. Id. That brief contained as one ground for appeal a request that the conviction for felony murder be reversed based on double jeopardy. 11 Exh. 6B at 22. In its answer to Huynh's petition, however, the State argued: 37 To the extent the Petitioner argues that his conviction for felony murder and malice murder in the second trial constitutes double jeopardy, that argument is moot because the Georgia Supreme Court reversed and vacated the felony murder conviction ... The remaining offenses for which Petitioner stands convicted, the offenses of malice murder and armed robbery, do not merge as a matter of law or fact in this case. Thus, the prohibition against double jeopardy is not implicated. 38 R1-7-11. We acknowledge that it is neither clear nor obvious that Huynh explicitly raised in his federal habeas petition the issue of whether his malice murder and armed robbery convictions merge in violation of double jeopardy; yet, the State apparently understood that there were several possible distinct interpretations of Huynh's double jeopardy claim. The answer indicates that the State afforded the pro se petition a liberal construction and expressly responded to the claim argued by Huynh in this appeal. Although the State now suggests that the brief discussion of the merger issue was inadvertent and gratuitous, we decline to find a claim to be unexhausted after the State has argued the merits of that same claim in its answer brief. Pennington v. Spears, 779 F.2d 1505, 1506 (11th Cir.1986) (where State declined to raise exhaustion defense, instead requesting the district court to deny petition on the merits, court found State had waived exhaustion as a defense: Although it is not clear from the record whether [petitioner] has in fact exhausted state remedies, it is clear that the state does not assert a defense of lack of exhaustion.). 39 We also conclude that Huynh's malice murder and armed robbery convictions merge under Georgia decisional law. The Georgia Supreme Court has construed Georgia statutory law as mandating that although a defendant may be prosecuted for each crime arising from the same conduct, he may not be convicted of more than one crime if one crime is included in the other. Addison v. State, 239 Ga. 622, 238 S.E.2d 411, 412-13 (1977). The court has further held that armed robbery may be a lesser included offense of malice murder where a defendant is a conspirator in an armed robbery scheme and a murder occurs as a probable consequence of that armed robbery. Id. Specifically, the court has vacated an armed robbery conviction after finding that [w]here the defendant is not the killer, and where the only method by which malice may be imputed to defendant is by showing his participation in the armed robbery, the armed robbery is an included offense as a matter of fact[.] Id. 238 S.E.2d at 413. 40 Here, the State has never contended that Huynh was the triggerman, and he was never charged with this offense; rather, it consistently has been the State's theory that Huynh was an accomplice who aided Sam Van Ngo in committing murder. As we have addressed in depth in the preceding discussion, the robbery of the victim in this case was the critical evidence in allowing the jury to impute the malice and intent of Sam Van Ngo to Huynh. Proof of the robbery therefore was essential in supporting Huynh's conviction for malice murder. Burke v. State, 234 Ga. 512, 216 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1975). Our precedent dictates that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the state from punishing a person twice for the same offense, and a greater offense and lesser included offense are considered the same offense for purposes of Double Jeopardy Clause protection. United States v. Kaiser, 893 F.2d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir.1990). The specific facts of this case dictate that, under Georgia law, the armed robbery for which Huynh was convicted was a lesser included offense of the malice murder for which he was convicted. 12 Accordingly, we vacate the district court's order and direct that the writ issue with respect to Huynh's conviction and sentence for armed robbery.