Opinion ID: 1042011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Olson’s Remaining Claims

Text: A. Olson’s Claims that the Fee-shifting Provision and $50 Reporting Threshold Are Unduly Burdensome Olson’s only remaining substantive claims involve provisions of the Ordinance that were not affected by the 2010 Amendment. Specifically, Olson argues that (1) the 2010 Amendment left intact the Ordinance’s unduly burdensome $50 reporting threshold; and (2) the 2010 Amendment left intact the Ordinance’s unduly burdensome Fee-shifting Provision. It is not entirely clear from Olson’s briefing whether she challenges these provisions facially or as they apply to her, but the Supreme Court recently stated that the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges “goes to the breadth of the remedy employed by the Court, not what must be pleaded in a complaint.” Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 893 (2010). Thus, we have recognized that for both facial and asapplied challenges, “[t]he relevant constitutional test . . . remains the proper inquiry.” Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1127 (10th Cir. 2012). In cases such as this one, which involve challenges to the constitutionality of disclosure requirements, the relevant constitutional test is “exacting scrutiny,” which “requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest.” Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2818 (2010) (quoting Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 914)). ______________________________________ Cont. repetition, yet evading review” is “inapplicable . . . where the Ordinance has been amended to cure the alleged constitutional problem”). 11 “To withstand this scrutiny, the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, however, we are not presented with an occasion to apply exacting scrutiny to the two remaining provisions Olson identifies. That is because Olson never raised properly her disputes to these provisions before the district court. “Whether to address [an] argument despite the litigant’s failure to raise it below is subject to this court’s discretion based on the circumstances of the individual case.” United States v. Jarvis, 499 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2007). We will exercise our discretion to hear such issues “only in the most unusual circumstances.” Id. at 1202. Usually, this will be “where the argument involves a pure matter of law and the proper resolution of the issue is certain.” Id. (“[I]n these situations . . . no additional findings of fact or presentation of evidence [are] required for the issue’s disposition . . . .”). And that is not our case. Olson raised her undue-burden argument as to the Ordinance’s $50 reporting threshold—which Olson characterized at oral argument as her “primary” qualm with the Ordinance as amended—for the first time in her Response to Golden’s Supplemental Briefing Regarding Mootness, several years after Olson filed her complaint and the parties agreed to the pretrial order and filed their opening and response briefs before the district court. See Olson, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 1131. Olson has not offered any explanation for her failure to raise this argument sooner, in spite of the fact that it was available and should have been apparent to her at the time she filed her complaint. Importantly, at oral 12 argument, the City pointed out that because Olson raised her challenge to the $50 threshold after the close of discovery, the City had never been given a sufficient opportunity to develop the record on the appropriate tailoring or substantiality of its interest in such a threshold. The City maintains that, given the opportunity, it could show that the $50 threshold is appropriate in the context of small-scale, local elections like those that take place in Golden. We agree that in this case, the record is not sufficiently developed, and the proper resolution of the issue too uncertain, to justify making an exception to our general rule that arguments not raised properly below will not be considered on appeal. See Jarvis, 499 F.3d at 1201. As to Olson’s argument that the Municipal Code’s Fee-shifting Provision is unduly burdensome, the district court construed this argument as outside of the scope of the pretrial order. Olson, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 1126 (acknowledging that Olson’s opening brief included argument on the constitutionality of the Fee-shifting Provision, but declining to address that argument because it “was not included in the Proposed Final Pretrial Order”); see also Wilson v. Muckala, 303 F.3d 1207, 1215 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[C]laims, issues, defenses, or theories of damages not included in the pretrial order are waived even if they appeared in the complaint . . . .”). In the Tenth Circuit, a “definitive pre-trial order reflecting the agreement of the parties, having been entered into after full discovery, must, of course, control the subsequent course of the action.” Trujillo v. Uniroyal Corp., 608 F.2d 815, 817 (10th Cir. 1979) (citing, e.g., F.R.Civ.P. 16(6)). And “[i]f there is a properly drawn, detailed pretrial order, a trial court’s determination that 13 certain facts or issues must be excluded from trial on the basis of a pretrial order may be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 817-18. Here, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Olson’s Fee-shifting Provision argument fell outside of the scope of the pretrial order. The pretrial order contains no mention of the Fee-shifting Provision, or of any other portion of the Golden Municipal Code except for its “campaign finance regulations.” Importantly, the Fee-shifting provision is not a part of Golden’s campaign finance regulations, which are found at Golden Municipal Code § 1.05 (entitled “Local Campaign Finance – Reporting Requirements”). Instead, the Fee-shifting Provision is located at Golden Municipal Code § 1.01.150 (entitled “Civil enforcement”), and it applies to all violations of the entire municipal code “except the provisions of Title 8 pertaining to public peace and safety.” While we might have reached a different conclusion as to whether Olson’s Fee-shifting Provision argument fell within the scope of the pretrial order than did the district court, we cannot say the district court’s construction of the pretrial order was an abuse of the court’s discretion. In sum, we conclude that, at this time, an exacting-scrutiny analysis of the Ordinance is inappropriate, because Olson’s only remaining non-moot substantive arguments—regarding the $50 reporting threshold and the Fee-shifting Provision—were not presented properly to the district court, and we see no reason to make an exception to our general rule that arguments not raised below will not be considered on appeal. See Jarvis, 499 F.3d at 1201; see also Trujillo, 608 F.2d at 817-18; ACORN v. Municipality 14 of Golden, 744 F.2d 739, 746 (10th Cir. 1984) (“[D]uly enacted laws are ordinarily presumed constitutional. . . .”). B. Olson’s Claim for Attorney’s Fees Under § 1988 Olson’s only remaining claim is that her claim for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 “is not moot even if all of her pre-amendment claims are moot,” Aplt. Br. at 21; see Davidson, 236 F.3d at 1183 (“[T]he expiration of the underlying cause of action does not moot a controversy over attorney’s fees already incurred.”). Where, as here, a district court makes no determination on the merits of a claim due to a defendant’s voluntary act, “a plaintiff may prevail for attorneys fee purposes if he can . . . show (1) that [the] lawsuit is causally linked to securing the relief obtained and (2) that the defendant’s conduct in response to the lawsuit was required by law.” Collins v. Romer, 962 F.2d 1508, 1512 (10th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). A plaintiff can meet the “required by law” prong by showing that the defendant’s act was “not a wholly gratuitous response to an action that in itself was frivolous or groundless.” Id. at 1513 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, Olson admits she never moved for attorney fees in connection with the City’s amendment to the Ordinance. See Aplt. Br. at 22 (“By surprisingly entering judgment on even claims that Golden admitted were live, the district court prevented Olson from seeking her pre-amendment attorney fees, which covered the significant summary-judgment briefing and discovery that occurred nearly two years before Golden asserted that Olson’s claims were moot.”). We disagree that the district court’s entry of 15 judgment was “surprising[],” and Olson offers no explanation for why she failed to move for attorney’s fees after she discovered that the City had amended the Ordinance. See Davidson, 236 F.3d at 1183 (“Our jurisdiction is based on our power to review ‘final decisions of district courts.’ 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Without a final decision from the district court as to whether Plaintiffs are entitled to fees, the question is not before this court.”).