Opinion ID: 2022193
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court's Consideration of the Jury Recommendation

Text: Saylor argues that the trial court failed properly to consider the jury's recommendation that the death penalty not be imposed. Pursuant to the death penalty statute, [t]he court shall make the final determination of the sentence, after considering the jury's recommendation, and the sentence shall be based on the same standards that the jury was required to consider. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(e) (Supp.1990). Our legislature specifically declared that the court is not bound by the jury's recommendation. Id. This Court has stated that when the trial court has a jury recommendation against death before it, the single essential feature of this part of the sentencing process is that at the point of final decision the court reflect upon the jury recommendation against imposing death. Roark v. State, 644 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Ind.1994), reh'g denied. Saylor asserts that the trial court's sentencing order lacks a clear statement of the weight the trial court gave to the jury's recommendation. The United States Supreme Court recently rejected a defendant's suggestion that a trial judge must give great weight to the jury's advice. Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 511-12, 115 S.Ct. 1031, 1035-36, 130 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1995). In addressing the defendant's claim that the advisory jury scheme violates the Eighth Amendment, the Court held: The Constitution permits the trial judge, acting alone, to impose a capital sentence. It is thus not offended when a State further requires the sentencing judge to consider a jury's recommendation and trusts the judge to give it the proper weight. Id. at 515, 115 S.Ct. at 1037. The Court also recognized that there is no reason to expect that advisory verdicts will be treated uniformly in every case. Id. at 514, 115 S.Ct. at 1036-37. The disparate treatment of jury verdicts simply reflects the fact that, in the subjective weighing process, the emphasis given to each decisional criterion must of necessity vary in order to account for the particular circumstances of each case. Id. at 515, 115 S.Ct. at 1037 (citation omitted). In Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528 (Ind. 1996), reh'g denied, where the defendant had been convicted of two killings, we said that the jury recommendation against death is particularly significant because this is the same jury that unanimously found the defendant guilty of two murders and were prepared to accept their role in rejecting the State's request for the death penalty. The jury's recommendation reflects a statement by the conscience of the community. Id. at 543 (citation omitted). Just as in Peterson, the trial court is obliged to recognize the particular significance of the jury recommendation against death here. However, as in Peterson, the trial court gave careful and extensive consideration to the jury's recommendation and articulated reasons for not following it. Furthermore, the trial court's sentencing proceeded in strict conformity with the standards applicable to capital cases and the jury here made a finding of intentional killing. In this case, the sentencing order reflects that the trial court specifically noted the critical role of juries in Indiana's death penalty proceedings and the invaluable nature of a jury recommendation. The order demonstrates the court's understanding that the recommendation was important but not dispositive. In the trial court's view, given the nature and circumstances of this offense the jury's recommendation that the death penalty should not be imposed was an insufficient response in this case and clearly unreasonable. The trial court's approach conforms to both (a) the Indiana statutory requirement of trial court consideration of the jury's recommendation, IND.CODE § 35-50-2-9(e); Roark, 644 N.E.2d at 570; and (b) the federal constitutional requirement of an individualized sentencing determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2743-44, 77 L.Ed.2d 235, 251 (1983) (citing cases). Accordingly, we find the trial court's carefully drafted sentencing order, in declining to follow the jury's recommendation and imposing the death penalty, demonstrates compliance with Indiana's death penalty law and the decisions of this Court.