Opinion ID: 359575
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: power of courts to authorize break-ins to plant bugging devices

Text: 18 We next turn to the most troublesome issue in this case: the validity of that portion of the first intercept order that purports to authorize FBI agents to break into the premises of the AAA Appliance Company for the purpose of planting a bug. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, Et seq., permitting, under restricted circumstances, a court order authorizing interception of oral communications, contains no provision purporting to empower district courts to authorize break-ins for the purpose of installing listening devices. The statute is entirely silent on the subject. 1 19 The question whether power to authorize break-ins can be implied from Title III's silence is one that has sharply divided the Circuits. The Second and Third Circuits have held that Title III implicitly authorizes break-ins without specific judicial approval. (United States v. Scafidi (2d Cir. 1977) 564 F.2d 633; United States v. Dalia (3rd Cir. 1978) 575 F.2d 1344.) The Fourth Circuit has held that Title III implicitly authorizes break-ins, but only with specific judicial approval. (Application of United States (4th Cir. 1977) 563 F.2d 637.) The Eighth Circuit has not accepted the argument that Title III implicitly authorizes break-ins, but it has upheld judicially-approved break-ins on a different theory. (United States v. Agrusa (8th Cir. 1976) 541 F.2d 690 (opinions by divided court, rehearing en banc denied over four-judge dissent).) The District of Columbia Circuit has declined to read Title III as implicit authority for break-in orders. (United States v. Ford (1977) 180 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 553 F.2d 146.) And the Sixth Circuit has held that no authority exits, in Title III or any other statute, to empower district courts to authorize break-ins. (United States v. Finazzo (6th Cir. 1978) 583 F.2d 837.) This Circuit has yet to pass on the question.
20 The Government contends that Congress simply neglected to address the obvious and that authority to sanction break-ins is implicit in the provision of Title III permitting bugging. Appellants contend that Title III's attempts carefully to circumscribe invasions of privacy are inconsistent with congressional intent to legalize break-ins. A meticulous review of the legislative history of Title III convinces us that the appellants are correct. 21 Title III constitutes a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of wiretapping and electronic surveillance. (Gelbard v. United States (1972) 408 U.S. 41, 46, 92 S.Ct. 2357, 33 L.Ed.2d 179.) As Chief Justice Burger noted in his concurring opinion in United States v. Donovan (1977) 429 U.S. 413, 441, 97 S.Ct. 658, 675, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (Burger, C. J., partial concurrence): 22 Congress drafted this statute with exacting precision. As its principal sponsor, Senator McClellan, put it: '(A) bill as controversial as this . . . requires close attention to the dotting of every i and the crossing of every t . . . .' Under these circumstances, the exact words of the statute provide the surest guide to determining Congress' intent, and we would do well to confine ourselves to that area. (Citation omitted.) 23 We have also recognized the significance of Title III's specificity. In Application of United States (9th Cir. 1970) 427 F.2d 639, 643, we observed that Title III purports to constitute a comprehensive legislative treatment of the entire problem of wiretapping and electronic surveillance, complete with extensive introductory Congressional findings. The provisions contained in Title III state, in precise terms, what wiretapping and electronic surveillance is prohibited, and what is permissible. As to the latter, meticulous provision is made with respect to the necessity and manner of obtaining prior or subsequent judicial approval, the use which may be made of intercepted information, the way in which aggrieved persons may test the validity of the interception, and the collection and transmission to Congress each year of information concerning such activity. (See also United States v. King (9th Cir. 1973) 478 F.2d 494.) 24 Congressional intention to delineate explicitly the extent to which the courts were empowered to grant orders permitting electronic surveillance is evidenced throughout the legislative history of Title III. Nowhere in the provisions of Title III, the Committee Reports, or the debates in Congress is authority for surreptitious entries permitted. In the entire history of the statute, the conclusion is inescapable that the omission was purposeful and that congressional silence cannot be filled by implication of such authority. 2 (T)he protection of privacy was an overriding congressional concern (in enacting Title III). (Gelbard v. United States, supra, 408 U.S. at 48, 92 S.Ct. at 2361.) The congressional will was expressed in no uncertain terms in the Senate Committee Report on Title III: 25 Title III has as its dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized. To assure the privacy of oral and wire communications, title III prohibits all wiretapping and electronic surveillance by persons other than duly authorized law enforcement officers . . . (with) a court order obtained after a showing and finding of probable cause. 26 (S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1968), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1968, pp. 2112, 2153.) 27 The bulk of Title III's provisions are efforts to restrict very narrowly the use of electronic surveillance to safeguard privacy. (See, e. g., United States v. United States District Court (1972) 407 U.S. 297, 301-02, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752; Application of United States, supra, 427 F.2d at 643; United States v. King, supra, 478 F.2d at 498. See also S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1968).) 28 In enacting Title III, Congress was fully aware that legislative safeguards to protect privacy were essential if electronic surveillance by law enforcement officers was to pass constitutional muster. (See, e. g., Application of United States, supra, 427 F.2d at 643; United States v. Kalustian (9th Cir. 1975) 529 F.2d 585, 589.) Title III was enacted, in part, as a response to decisions of the Supreme Court in Berger v. New York (1967) 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 and Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576. Before the Berger decision, wiretapping was prohibited by the Federal Communications Act of 1934, but bugging was legal as long as it was not accomplished by an unauthorized physical trespass. 3 (No federal statute prohibited bugging, but bugging accomplished by a physical trespass was held to violate the Fourth Amendment. Silverman v. United States (1961) 365 U.S. 505, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734. Evidence obtained by bugging accomplished without a physical trespass was admissible in federal courts. Goldman v. United States (1942) 316 U.S. 129, 62 S.Ct. 993, 86 L.Ed. 1322. Congress knew the state of the law in this area. See S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 67-69 (1968), and President's Commission of Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 202-03 (1967).) 29 Implicit in the Berger decision was the notion that Fourth Amendment protections applied not only to physical trespasses, but also to conversations. Berger struck down New York's electronic surveillance statute because the statute on its face permitted the seizure of conversations without sufficiently narrow warrant procedures. Six months later in Katz v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court held for the first time that the Fourth Amendment protected conversations as well as premises, and that eavesdropping by non-parties to private conversations could be constitutionally conducted only when authorized by a court order. Congress knew that Berger and Katz established that even evidence obtained by non-trespassory bugging was inadmissible in absence of carefully circumscribed procedure for the issuance of court orders. Title III was a congressional attempt to provide such procedure. 30 The history of Title III is revealing. The original bill that was the foundation for Title III was S. 675, a bill introduced by Senator McClellan on January 25, 1967. (S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 225 (1968) (Individual views of Senators Dirksen, Hruska, Scott, and Thurmond).) Under the McClellan bill, federal law enforcement officers could apply for a court order to wiretap; the bill did not attempt to legislate with respect to bugging. (See 114 Cong.Rec. 13209 (1968).) At the time the McClellan bill was introduced, the Supreme Court had not decided Berger, and thus evidence obtained by non-trespassory bugging was still admissible in the federal courts. As initially drafted, S. 675 would have legalized law enforcement wiretapping under some circumstances, and it would have left the law on bugging unchanged. Thus, S. 675, the foundation of Title III, deliberately left intact the pre-Berger law that permitted only non-trespassory bugging. 31 After S. 675 was introduced, the Court handed down Berger. The initial legislative response was a bill introduced by Senator Hruska, S. 2050, called The Electronic Surveillance Act of 1967. (See Controlling Crime through More Effective Law Enforcement: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 958 (1967) (Statement of Senator Hruska).) As the committee report explained: S. 2050 was introduced in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision of Berger v. New York. It was tailored to meet the constitutional requirements imposed by that decision. (S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (1968) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1968, p. 2274. (Individual views of Senators Dirksen, Hruska, Scott, and Thurmond).) 32 Title III is almost a verbatim combination of the provisions of the McClellan and Hruska bills. The McClellan bill did not deal with bugging. However, the Hruska bill permitted law enforcement officials to engage in bugging, but it contained no provision authorizing trespasses or break-ins to plant bugging devices. Senator Hruska's intent was to expand the legislation to cover bugging in order to ban private bugging altogether, while establishing very strict controls on the use of bugging by state and local law enforcement officers. He told Senator McClellan: Your wiretapping bill, S. 675, gets at the difficult problem of wiretapping. I have co-sponsored it and generally support it. However I feel the ban contained in this bill should also apply to eavesdropping. I now feel it should be prohibited generally with well-defined exceptions with adequate and effective controls on its authorization and use at state and local levels. (Controlling Crime through More Effective Law Enforcement, supra, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7.) There is not the slightest suggestion in Senator Hruska's remarks to indicate any intent on his part to overturn the long-established Silverman doctrine that evidence obtained by trespassory bugging was inadmissible as a violation of the Fourth Amendment. On the contrary, his explanation of his bill showed his intent to conform to all of the Supreme Court authorities controlling electronic surveillance, including both the Silverman doctrine and Berger. 33 None of the Berger and Katz restrictions grafted onto Title III indicate an intent to authorize break-ins in the course of law enforcement bugging operations. Although Katz moved the Fourth Amendment away from wooden trespassory concepts, nothing in Katz implied any constitutional blessing upon trespassory buggings. Congress correctly read Berger and Katz as proscribing unwarranted bugging even when conducted by non-trespassory means. The authors of Title III sought to permit law enforcement bugging under such stringent safeguards that a very limited class of law enforcement eavesdropping could resume. (E. g., S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, 66, 74, 75, 88-108 (1967). See also 114 Cong.Rec. 14728 (1968) (Sen. Tydings, Co-manager of Title III: The Katz case does provide limited and rigid restrictions. The intent of this bill is to conform to the principles of the Katz case . . ..).) Senator McClellan, during the floor debates on Title III stated: Every safeguard that is practical and necessary to protect the legitimate rights of privacy is incorporated in the bill. The committee took guidance from the Supreme Court decisions and had the wisdom to ferret out, construct it, and make it a part of the provisions of this title. They are all in there. (114 Cong.Rec. 11231 (1968).) 34 The Government argues that Congress intended to authorize break-ins to plant bugging devices because (1) Congress was well aware of the Supreme Court decisions on electronic surveillance, including Berger and Katz, which it says impliedly permit trespasses to implant bugging devices if authorized by court order, and (2) Congress knew that break-ins were necessary to plant bugging devices and thus must have intended to authorize break-ins. The Government's argument rests upon misreadings of the legislative history and Katz and Berger. 35 Congress knew that the Fourth Amendment protected both conversations and premises. Congress correctly read Katz and Berger as lending Fourth Amendment protection not only to intrusions accomplished by technical trespasses and the seizure of tangible items, but also the seizure of oral statements without any breaking-in or technical trespass. (The entire text of the Katz decision was read into the record during the legislative debates on Title III. 114 Cong.Rec. 14725 (1968). Detailed analyses of the meaning of the Berger and Katz decisions were also a part of the legislative record. 114 Cong.Rec. 12986-12988 (1968). See also S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 74-75, 88-108 (1967).) See also United States v. United States District Court, supra, 407 U.S. at 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125. Neither Berger nor Katz overruled that part of the Silverman doctrine proscribing electronic bugging accomplished by trespass. Although Berger involved a situation in which a trespass had been used to plant a bugging device, the Court did not address the break-in question because it decided that the New York statute was unconstitutional on its face. (Berger v. New York, supra, 388 U.S. 41, 44, 64, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040.) The facial nature of the Berger decision was emphasized by then Circuit Judge John Paul Stevens in United States v. Ramsey (7th Cir. 1974) 503 F.2d 524, 528-30. Katz extended, rather than restricted, constitutional protection against electronic surveillance. As the Supreme Court noted in Alderman v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 165, 180, 89 S.Ct. 961, 970, 22 L.Ed.2d 176: 36 Nor do we believe that Katz, by holding that the Fourth Amendment protects persons and their private conversations, was intended to withdraw any of the protection which the Amendment extends to the home or to overrule the existing doctrine, recognized at least since Silverman, that conversations as well as property are excluded from the criminal trial when they are found to be the fruits of an illegal invasion of the home. 37 Congress was fully aware that not all bugging required trespasses, let alone break-ins. The most common form of electronic eavesdropping is participant electronic surveillance, in which an informant equipped with hidden recording devices gains access to the home or office by non-trespassory means and surreptitiously records conversations. (E. g., United States v. White (1971) 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453; Lopez v. United States (1963) 373 U.S. 427, 83 S.Ct. 1381, 10 L.Ed.2d 462; On Lee v. United States (1952) 343 U.S. 747, 72 S.Ct. 967, 96 L.Ed. 1270). Moreover, Katz itself involved entries neither into a home nor an office, but rather the affixing of a bugging device to the outside of a public telephone booth. 38 We agree with the Government that Congress was aware of the entry problem. But we disagree that from that awareness Congress chose to grant authority to permit either break-ins or technical trespasses to install bugging devices by implications derived from its silence. In support of its contention that Congress intended otherwise, the Government cites one phrase from the language of Title III, two excerpts from the legislative debate, and one excerpt from the Senate Committee Report. First, the Government notes that Title III requires the intercept application to describe the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted. (18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (b)(ii).) We cannot infer from this language any congressional intent to permit trespasses or break-ins. The place where the communication is to be intercepted could be a telephone booth, as it was in Katz, or some other public place, as well as the outside of a dwelling or an office building. Next, the Government cites the Senate Report on Title III that mentioned that bugging devices may take several days to install. (S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1967).) If any implication concerning trespass is appropriately drawn from this passage, it is that Congress had in mind the difficulty of gaining consensual entry to premises that the Government wanted to bug. The mechanics of installing a bugging device can be performed very quickly; the difficulty encountered is gaining entry by legal means. 39 The Government next cites the statement of Senator Tydings, Co-manager of Title III: 40 Second, surveillance is very difficult to use. Tape (Sic ) must be installed on telephones and wires strung. Bugs are difficult to install in many places since surreptitious entry is often impossible. Often, more than one entry is necessary to adjust equipment. Static and room noise interfere. Devices can be discovered. Wireless transmission can be intercepted. 41 (114 Cong.Rec. 12989 (1968).) When Senator Tydings' statement is read in context, it is evident that he did not use surreptitious entry as a synonym for burglary, break-ins, or trespass. Rather, he was referring to the reasons why the New York County District Attorney's office had averaged only 75 wiretaps and 19 bugs per year under the New York eavesdropping law which was struck down in Berger. Senator Tydings' total statement was an argument that invasions of privacy would be minimized because Title III heavily safeguarded rights of privacy and because legitimate entries under the legislation were nevertheless difficult. Senator McClellan repeatedly told the Senate how much tighter the Title III scheme was than New York's legislation. The statute we propose here (Title III) is much stricter than the New York statute. . . . The proposal before us today is more strict, there are more requirements, and it is more difficult to meet the test to get the order than it was in New York. (114 Cong.Rec. 11231 (1968).) Congress was not trying to replicate the New York bugging scheme which had been invalidated by the Supreme Court. 42 The Government also cites a statement by Senator Morse, an opponent of the bill, when he argued: 43 I know that elaborate efforts are made to distinguish between a real wiretap, or bug, which requires someone to intrude upon private premises to install. That kind of invasion is truly a search, requiring a warrant under conditions set forth in article 4. But electronic surveillance, whereby conversations can be picked up from scores of feet away, without any physical intrusion upon the premises involved, is a far more insidious invasion of privacy, and one which I do not believe should be tolerated at all. 44 (114 Cong.Rec. 11598 (1968).) 45 The Government's argument that Senator Morse's statement indicates a congressional belief that break-ins are essential to any bugging operation eludes us. As nearly as we can ascertain from his Delphic statement, Senator Morse expressed his distaste for electronic surveillance, his belief that an intrusion upon private premises to install a bug required issuance of a search warrant (something not addressed in Title III), and suggested that he understood the bill only to authorize non-trespassory bugging. As we read Senator Morse's argument, together with arguments propounded by other opponents of the bill, none of them read Title III as permitting burglaries or break-ins. Rather, they launched broad-gauged attacks on non-trespassory means of electronic surveillance. (E. g., see 114 Cong.Rec. 14482 (1968); 114 Cong.Rec. 14732 (1968).) 46 Other passages in the legislative history strongly support the conclusion that Congress did not intend to permit court-ordered break-ins to install bugging devices. Congress knew that existing federal law prohibited police from breaking into private premises to conduct a search without knocking first. (18 U.S.C. § 3109 permits officers to break into homes to execute a search warrant only if they have knocked and have been refused permission or when necessary to liberate the officer or a person aiding him.) Senator Hugh Scott explicitly mentioned this legislation during the debates on Title III. He discussed his support for the then pending bill permitting forcible entry without knocking, but he did not advocate its use in connection with eavesdropping orders. (114 Cong.Rec. 13200 (1968).) 4 Both Senator Scott and other members of the Senate knew that federal law prohibited surreptitious entries by police executing search warrants, but Congress did not amend 18 U.S.C. § 3109 to authorize surreptitious entries to plant bugging devices. Nor can we assume that Congress was ignorant of Miller v. United States (1958) 357 U.S. 301, 313, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332: The requirement of prior notice of authority and purpose before forcing entry into a home is deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging application. Congress, codifying a tradition embedded in Anglo-American law, has declared in § 3109 the reverence of the law for the individual's right of privacy in his house. (See also Sabbath v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 585, 88 S.Ct. 1755, 20 L.Ed.2d 828.) 5
47 We agree with the holding of the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Finazzo, supra, that neither Title III, nor any other statute, empowers district courts to authorize break-ins to plant bugging devices. As the Finazzo court noted: It simply does not make sense to imply Congressional authority for official break-ins when not a single line or word of the statute even mentions the possibility, much less limits or defines the scope of the power or describes the circumstances under which such conduct, normally unlawful, may take place. (United States v. Finazzo, supra, 841.) 48 Although we agree with the Sixth Circuit's holding, we do not concur in that portion of its reasoning that equates an eavesdrop order with a search warrant for Fourth Amendment purposes. 6 But we do not reach the constitutional issues because we hold that the break-in order violated Title III, and evidence obtained pursuant to the invalid portion of the order was excluded by Title III itself. 49 The reasoning of the opinions from the Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits does not commend itself to us. The Second and Third Circuit panels reached their conclusions without any review or analysis of the legislative history of Title III, the impact of Section 3109, or the Supreme Court authorities which were an integral part of the legislative history of Title III. The analysis in United States v. Scafidi, supra, 564 F.2d 633, consists almost entirely of the court's conclusions that Title III left the means of installing a bug to the discretion of law enforcement personnel after a judicial officer had decided that an electronic surveillance will aid in the detection of crime and that the installation of a bug, of necessity would require surreptitious entry for no self-respecting police officer would openly seek permission from the person to be surveilled to install a 'bug' to intercept his conversations. (564 F.2d at 640.) The opinion in United States v. Dalia, supra, 575 F.2d 1344, follows Scafidi with virtually no independent analysis. 50 Application of United States, supra, 563 F.2d 637, recognized that Title III is completely devoid of any explicit language authorizing surreptitious entries of private premises for the purpose of installing bugs. The court nevertheless implied authority for court-authorized break-ins on the theory that trespassory entries were necessary to implement congressional intent to control organized crime. (T)he fact that Title III does not expressly limit the manner of installing listening devices is, in the light of the announced legislative intent (to combat organized crime), consistent with the conclusion that Congress implicitly commended the question of surreptitious entry to the informed discretion of the district judge, subject to the commands of the Constitution. (563 F.2d at 643.) 7 51 Although the legislative history of Title III reveals that Congress was concerned about the control of organized crime, the history demonstrates that the overriding concern was the protection of privacy. The legislative history simply does not support the inference that Congress intended by its silence implicitly to authorize an order permitting a break-in to install a listening device because it believed that such authority was required to detect illegal activities by members of organized crime. 52 The majority of the court in United States v. Agrusa, supra, 541 F.2d 690, held that a forcible entry into the appellant's business premises to plant a bug violated neither federal statutory law nor the Constitution. The statutory discussion focused entirely upon 18 U.S.C. § 3109. The court concluded that law enforcement officers, pursuant to express court authorization to do so, could forcibly and without knock or announcement break and enter business premises in the nighttime to install an electronic surveillance device. Non-compliance with the knock and announce requirements of the statute was justified by exigent circumstances. As interpreted in Agrusa, exigent circumstances were present because an announcement preceding the officers' entry would permit the person under surveillance to avoid any incriminating statements. The court equated the imminent destruction of existing evidence with the non-creation of incriminating evidence. Adoption of this extraordinary reasoning would destroy the fundamental protections of the Fourth Amendment, as well as the values that Section 3109 was intended to protect. 8 The Agrusa court did not consider the question whether a break-in to plant a bug was a violation of Title III. 9 53 The language of Title III, together with its legislative history, convincingly demonstrates that Congress did not intend to authorize break-ins to implant listening devices within private premises. 10 54
55 Both the legislative history and the text of Title III also convincingly demonstrate Congress' intent that interception of conversations, by wiretapping or by bugging, which was not authorized by the legislation was illegal and that the fruits of such illegal interceptions must be excluded from evidence. Title III directs that (w)henever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court . . . of the United States . . . if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this Chapter. (18 U.S.C. § 2515.) 56 As the Supreme Court explained in Gelbard v. United States, supra, 408 U.S. at 46, 92 S.Ct. at 2360: If a wire or oral communication is intercepted in accordance with the provisions of Title III, the contents of the communication may be disclosed and used under certain circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 2517. Except as expressly authorized in Title III, however, all interceptions of wire and oral communications are flatly prohibited. . . . Title III also bars the use as evidence before official bodies of the contents and fruits of illegal interceptions, 18 U.S.C. § 2515, and provides procedures for moving to suppress such evidence in various proceedings, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9)-(10). The officers' breaking and entry of Santora's office to implant the bug was unauthorized by Title III, and any and all conversations that were intercepted by the bugging operation and evidence derived from those interceptions should have been suppressed, in accordance with Title III. 57 Our conclusion that the evidence should be suppressed is based solely on statutory grounds. In reaching that conclusion, however, we are not unmindful that a contrary reading of the statute would raise serious Fourth Amendment questions. (Silverman v. United States, supra, 365 U.S. 505, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 L.Ed.2d 734 Eavesdropping accomplished by means of such a physical intrusion is beyond the pale of even those decisions in which a closely divided Court has held that eavesdropping accomplished by other electronic means did not amount to an invasion of Fourth Amendment rights. (Id. at 509-10, 81 S.Ct. at 682.).) In Irvine v. California (1954) 347 U.S. 128, 74 S.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561, a pre-Mapp decision, the Court noted that state officers' entry of the petitioner's home without a search warrant for the purpose of planting a listening device would be almost incredible if it were not admitted. Few police measures have come to our attention that more flagrantly, deliberately, and persistently violated the fundamental principle declared by the Fourth Amendment . . . . (347 U.S. at 132, 74 S.Ct. at 383.) 11 58 Our examination of the entire record of this case, including all of the sealed reports of the Strike Force attorney to the district court, reveals that the Government's harvest of incriminating evidence from its break-in and bugging was very modest. Santora is the only appellant who has standing to challenge the use of this evidence. None of the other appellants had any interest in the premises broken into, nor were they parties to any conversation intercepted by the bug. 59 The bug picked up three conversations in which Santora made incriminating statements. While none of these conversations was admitted into evidence against Santora, they were used to obtain two additional interception orders: Order No. 4700, which authorized the tapping of five additional phones, and Order No. 4719, which extended the period of authorized surveillance of Santora's office. We are unable to separate the conversations obtained from the illegal bugging operation from evidence obtained pursuant to the legal wiretapping, both of which were relied upon to supply probable cause for these additional intercept orders. Therefore, the evidence secured against Santora by surveillance pursuant to Orders No. 4700 and 4719 should have been suppressed. Court Order No. 4676, which permitted tapping of a public phone outside of Santora's office, was obtained without any use of the fruits of the illegal bug. Thus, the conversations intercepted by this tap, together with the fruits of those interceptions, were admissible against Santora. 60 This does not mean that the untainted evidence may be inadequate to convict him. The record indicates that much of the Government's evidence against Santora was obtained by the initial, legal wiretapping of Santora's phones. However, we cannot from the record before us separate the untainted from the tainted evidence. The district court did not have occasion to do so because it upheld the legality of all of the interceptions. Accordingly, we vacate Santora's conviction and remand the case to the district court. On remand, the parties may reopen the stipulation upon which the conviction was founded, including the stipulated dismissal of other counts charged against Santora. Santora may renew his suppression motion based on the principles announced in this decision. All evidence against Santora that is the fruit of the illegal bugging or intercept Orders No. 4700 and 4719 (including the products of search warrants supported by such evidence) must be suppressed on remand. 61