Opinion ID: 1867569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: congressional intent

Text: Reed argues that when scrutinized, 19 U.S.C. § 2291 provides no deadline for securing training waivers. She points to the language of § 2291(a) as requiring that TRA applications be filed no sooner than 60 days after the certification petition is filed. Brief for appellant at 8. She argues that failure to specify a no later than deadline means that no such deadline exists. Id. Although inventive, Reed's argument loses its luster on further scrutiny. Reed points us to federal regulations interpreting the Trade Act to bolster her claim. She argues that 20 C.F.R. § 617.10 (2005) provides the controlling time limit. It provides: (a) Before and after certification. An individual covered under a certification or a petition for certification may apply to a State agency for TRA. A determination shall be made at any time to the extent necessary to establish or protect an individual's entitlement to TRA or other [trade adjustment assistance], but no payment of TRA or other [trade adjustment assistance] may be made by a State agency until a certification is made and the State agency determines that the individual is covered thereunder. (b) Timing of applications. An initial application for TRA, and applications for TRA for weeks of unemployment beginning before the initial application for TRA is filed, may be filed within a reasonable period of time after publication of the determination certifying the appropriate group of workers under section 223 of the [Trade] Act. However, an application for TRA for a week of unemployment beginning after the initial application is filed shall be filed within the time limit applicable to claims for regular compensation under the applicable State law. For purposes of this paragraph (b), a reasonable period of time means such period of time as the individual had good cause for not filing earlier, which shall include, but not be limited to, the individual's lack of knowledge of the certification or misinformation supplied the individual by the State agency. (Emphasis supplied.) Reed argues that this language provides a relaxed deadline for workers, like her, seeking retroactive benefitsbenefits for periods of unemployment that occurred before an eligible worker files his or her initial TRA application. As enticing as 20 C.F.R. § 617.10 seems, we cannot apply its terms. The federal Department of Labor adopted 20 C.F.R. § 617.10 on December 22, 1986, and last updated § 617.10 in 1994. The state Department of Labor argues that the 8/16 deadline enacted through the 2002 Trade Act superseded conflicting regulations like § 617.10. We agree. In addition to the 8/16 deadline, Congress added the following language through its 2002 amendments: (b) Withholding of trade readjustment allowance pending beginning or resumption of participation in training program; period of applicability . . . . (2) The provisions of subsection (a)(5) of this section and paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to any week of unemployment which begins (A) after the date that is 60 days after the date on which the petition that results in the certification that covers the worker is filed under section 2271 of this title, and (B) before the first week following the week in which such certification is made under subpart A of this part. 19 U.S.C. § 2291(b). In § 2291(b)(2), Congress excepted certain workers from the training requirements of § 2291(a)(5). But the enumerated exception in § 2291(b)(2) does not track with the retroactive/proactive distinction in 20 C.F.R. § 617.10. Instead, § 2291(b)(2) fails to mention the retroactive/proactive distinction recognized by the regulations. When Congress provides exceptions in a statute, it does not follow that courts have authority to create others. United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 120 S.Ct. 1114, 146 L.Ed.2d 39 (2000). The proper inference is that Congress considered the issue of exceptions and, in the end, limited the statute to the ones set forth. See id. We infer from the language of § 2291(b)(2) that Congress opted not to adopt the eligibility requirements as interpreted by the regulations. Further, legislative history for the 2002 Trade Act supports this reading. A House of Representatives conference report describes the decisionmaking process of the Trade Act. The report notes that § 114 of the 2002 Trade Act, now codified at § 2291(a)(5), establishes qualifying requirements that must be met in order for an individual worker within a certified group to receive Trade Adjustment Assistance. (Emphasis supplied.) H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-624, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 123, reprinted in 2002 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 653. Further, the report details the discrepancy between the approach preferred by the House of Representatives and that preferred by the Senate. The House favored requirements and deadlines for workers to enroll in training, while the Senate maintained the eligibility requirements in current law but revised provisions for granting waivers. Id. Ultimately, the Senate yielded to the House, adopting the training enrollment deadline. The two houses considered and expressly rejected the eligibility approach embodied in the regulations. The courts will not apply an administrative construction that has been prohibited by subsequent legislative enactments of the same nature. See, United States v. Gilmore, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 330, 19 L.Ed. 396 (1869); 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 81 (2004). See, generally, In re Invol. Dissolution of Battle Creek State Bank, 254 Neb. 120, 575 N.W.2d 356 (1998) (stating legislative act which is complete in itself and is repugnant to or in conflict with prior law repeals prior law by implication to extent of repugnancy or conflict.) Because Congress considered the issue of exceptions to its training requirement and explicitly rejected the approach embraced by the regulations, we, too, must reject that approach and adhere strictly to the language of the statute. While the regulatory approach seems more equitable, we are bound by Congress' words and intent. Thus, we reluctantly affirm the district court's conclusion that Workforce Development properly denied Reed's application as untimely.