Opinion ID: 1462263
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Respondent's Attempt to Thwart His Client's Plea of Guilty.

Text: We part company with the Hearing Committee on the issue of respondent's handling of his client's attempt to plead guilty. In this case, complainant received contradictory advise from two different lawyers. One lawyer, Mr. Bright, urged complainant to accept a package plea of guilty in several cases, one of which was the case in which respondent was representing complainant. Respondent vigorously disagreed and urged his client not to accept the plea bargain. We believe that the Hearing Committee misconstrued its role in resolving the question whether respondent intentionally failed to pursue his client's lawful objectives in this matter. Our misgivings are based upon our view that the merits of respondent's opinion concerning the wisdom of the plea bargain are absolutely irrelevant to our determination of this case. Whether respondent was right or wrong in his views of the plea bargain has no place in our deliberations nor in our decision. We are therefore troubled by the discussion at pages 23 and 24 of the merits of the Hearing Committee's report concerning respondent's views of the plea offer as against those of Mr. Bright. We are particularly troubled by the following excerpt from page 25 of the Hearing Committee's thoughtful and carefully conceived report: Even if one assumes that Respondent's judgment on that point was erroneous, it was not so far fetched as to justify a finding of `neglect' or of `intentionally' failing to pursue a client's objectives. Frankly, we can hardly conceive of a good faith opinion of a lawyer concerning a legal matter which would be so far fetched as to justify a finding of `neglect' or of `intentionally' failing to pursue a client's objectives. A lawyer is duty-bound to exercise his best professional judgment on behalf of his client. Only where total inattention or incompetence is made out on the part of the lawyer in reaching the decision should we ever be in the business of assessing the correctness of the lawyer's advice to his client. Otherwise, we put ourselves in the position of a sort of court of appeals from lawyers' judgments. Any attempt on our part to do so would be the worst sort of second-guessing or Monday morning quarterbacking. Therefore, we conclude that the Hearing Committee was incorrect when it discussed the rightness or wrongness of respondent's views about the plea and purported to base its decision, at least in part, upon its view of the reasonableness of respondent's views. What is to us much more troubling concerning respondent's conduct in this matter is the fact that, after a full opportunity to urge his views upon a competent client who disagreed with those views, respondent persisted in pressing his views in open court in an attempt to thwart his client's rationally arrived at decision to accept the plea bargain. The facts show that respondent had had a full opportunity to argue to the complainant that she should not accept the plea bargain. In fact, respondent conceded at oral argument before the Board that he had had such an opportunity. Respondent further stated in argument before the Board that he had no doubt that the complainant was competent to make the decision that she made. Once a lawyer's client, after full consultation, has reached a decision that the client is competent to make, then it seems to us that the lawyer is bound by that decision unless the client's decision is to seek an unlawful objective. In this case, there is absolutely no question that the client's objective  to plead guilty  was a lawful one. At that point, we believe respondent had an obligation to do his best to effectuate his client's desires. At an absolute minimum, he should have remained mute in court while the other lawyers conducted the plea procedure. However, in this case respondent chose to take a more active role and to urge on the court his own personal views, which were in contradiction to the considered conclusion of his client. At page 4 of the transcript of the plea bargain, respondent interjected himself into the proceedings when no one had addressed him to say the following: MR. STANTON: Would your honor note that in [case number] 8520, I would  I would endorse the waiver of trial under protest. I advised the defendant but  that I think this plea arrangement is improvident and unwise, and I have so advised her. I ask your honor to consider that fact. Bar Counsel Exhibit 23 at page 4. The court correctly and accurately perceived the anomaly of what respondent was doing. The court responded as follows: THE COURT: Well, in what way can I consider it? She said she wished to plead guilty. I mean, the court hasn't a right to prevent a person from pleading guilty. She said she knows and understands fully what she is doing and wants to plead guilty. And, her attorney indicates the same. MR. STANTON: I just want the Court to be fully informed of all the facts in case 8520. THE COURT: Well, she is willing. There is nothing I can do, so long as she does it willingly and voluntarily. . . Id. Respondent's conduct, which is made out by the most clear and convincing evidence possible  his own words transcribed in open court  seems to us to be a serious violation of the Disciplinary Rules. No possible purpose of his client's was served by respondent's spreading his own personal views of the matter on the record after the client had decided to reject his advice. It is not a lawyer's place to seek to vindicate his own views, as opposed to those of his client, before a judge. Respondent's conduct was particularly serious in the context of the importance of the transaction to Mr. Stanton's client. She was entering a plea of guilty in a series of cases. That plea would determine the status of her personal liberty for many months into the future. She earnestly believed, after full consultation with all of her lawyers, that the steps she was taking were in her best interest and would minimize the amount of time that she would ultimately have to spend in jail. Despite the clear fact, conceded by respondent, that his client was rational and fully informed, he interjected himself into the court procedure in an attempt to thwart the client's achieving her lawful objective of pleading guilty. This conduct violates the Disciplinary Rules. Only the wisdom and vigilance of the presiding judge prevented respondent's intemperate behavior from frustrating his client's will. The fact that respondent did not succeed in frustrating his client's attempted plea does not weigh heavily in his favor. On two separate occasions in the instant case, respondent simply overruled his client's stated views on the grounds that he knew better than the client did. He did not have the right to do so. If his client had been wealthy, had been on release in the community, or had been better educated, she might simply have retained the services of another lawyer who would do her bidding. However, the appointed lawyer whose client is in jail has an almost entirely captive audience in his client. The client has neither the resources nor the ability quickly and easily to change lawyers, particularly in connection with a matter like bond review which must be acted upon speedily. For all these reasons, it seems to us that an appointed lawyer with an incarcerated indigent client has a particularly high duty of fidelity to that client's considered judgments. [5] When he breaches that duty in the high-handed manner that respondent breached his duty in this case, then his conduct rises to a considerable degree of severity. In short, we believe that respondent violated the disciplinary rules when he intentionally failed to pursue his client's lawful objective and interjected his personal views in a forum where they had no place.