Opinion ID: 2630325
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the trial court properly instructed the jury regarding the meaning of acting recklessly as the term is used in the child abuse homicide statute

Text: ¶ 20 Killpack first argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the meaning of acting recklessly as an element of child abuse homicide. The Utah Code defines acting recklessly as being aware of but consciously disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that ... the result will occur. [7] The question raised here is which risk must a defendant be aware of and consciously disregard: the risk of inflicting serious physical injury or the risk of inflicting death? ¶ 21 We hold that acting recklessly, as used in the child abuse homicide statute, means that a defendant is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that her actions will result in child abuse by inflicting serious physical injury on the child. It does not require the State to prove that the defendant is aware of but consciously disregards the risk that her actions will result in the child's death. Therefore, the trial court properly included the jury instruction at issue. ¶ 22 Determining the meaning of recklessness is an issue of statutory interpretation. And we have long held that the primary rule in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. [8] The best evidence of the legislature's intent is the plain language of the statute itself. When examining the statutory language, we assume the legislature used each term advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary meaning. [9] If, in reading the statute, the meaning of the language is clear, we need look no further to discern the legislature's intent. In this case, the meaning of the child abuse homicide statute, when read in harmony with the child abuse statute, which it references, is clear. ¶ 23 The contested jury instruction stated that the jury could convict Killpack of child abuse homicide only if, among other things, it found that Cassandra's death was the result of child abuse committed recklessly as provided in subsection 76-5-109(2), a subsection of the child abuse statute. Because the child abuse homicide statute explicitly references the child abuse statute, determining the meaning of recklessness as used in the former statute requires an interpretation of the latter. [10] Read together, the plain language of these two statutes leads us to conclude that the contested jury instruction correctly stated the law and was thus properly allowed. ¶ 24 Our analysis necessarily begins with the definition of recklessness. In its part entitled Culpability Generally, the Utah Criminal Code defines acting recklessly as being aware of but consciously disregard[ing] a substantial and unjustifiable risk that ... the result will occur. [11] The question in this case is which result: serious physical injury or death? The child abuse homicide statute provides that a person commits child abuse homicide if she causes the death of a child, and the death results from child abuse ... if done recklessly as provided in subsection 76-5-109(2)(b). [12] Subsection 76-5-109(2)(b) of the child abuse statute provides that a person is guilty of child abuse if she inflicts upon a child serious physical injury. [13] The only act the statute references is committing child abuse by inflicting serious physical injury. It does not mention causing the child's death. Read together, these two statutes clearly provide that a person is guilty of child abuse if she inflicts serious physical injury on a child. If she inflicts that serious physical injury recklessly and the injury results in the child's death, she has committed child abuse homicide. Because there is no requirement under the statute that the defendant act recklessly as to causing the child's death, the contested jury instruction correctly stated the law and was appropriately proffered to the jury.