Opinion ID: 4561241
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Officer Hernandez

Text: “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “When a defendant raises the qualified-immunity defense, the plaintiff must . . . establish (1) the defendant violated a federal statutory or constitutional right and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s conduct.” Ullery v. Bradley, 949 F.3d 1282, 1289 (10th Cir. 2020). The court has discretion to decide which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis to address first. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
“We review the grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds de novo. Generally, summary judgment is warranted where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Kapinski v. City of Albuquerque, 964 F.3d 900, 904 (10th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). “But our review of summary judgment orders in the qualified immunity context differs from that applicable to other summary judgment decisions.” Id. (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]here a defendant asserts 4 qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established.” Id. at 905 (internal quotation marks omitted). “If, and only if, the plaintiff meets this two-part test does a defendant then bear the traditional burden of the movant for summary judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

According to Ms. Holmes, Officer Hernandez violated her Fifth Amendment rights during her arrest because he failed to inform of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). But even if this allegation is true, a Miranda violation “requires, at most, only that any confession made in the absence of such advice of rights be excluded from evidence. No rational argument can be made in support of the notion that the failure to give Miranda warnings subjects a police officer to liability under [§ 1983].” Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1976). Therefore, we affirm summary judgment on Ms. Holmes’s Fifth Amendment claim.
Although constitutional torts are not based on any specific state’s tort law, “courts have used the common law of torts as a starting point for determining the contours of claims of constitutional violations under § 1983.” Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1286 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under New Mexico law, there is no claim for false arrest when the “facts available to [a] 5 detaining officer would warrant [a] person of reasonable caution to believe [the] detention [is] appropriate.” Romero v. Sanchez, 895 P.2d 212, 215 (N.M. 1995). In other words, the inquiry on a false arrest claim is whether the officer had a reasonable basis for the detention. “Reasonable grounds or probable cause exists when, at the moment the arrest was made the facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the accused had committed or was committing an offense.” State v. Johnson, 930 P.2d 1148, 1153 (N.M. 1996) (ellipses, brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). We agree with the district court that “when Officer Hernandez observed [Ms. Holmes’s] vehicle did not have a valid license plate, and when Officer Hernandez discovered that [Ms. Holmes] had no vehicle registration, no valid driver’s license, and no proof of insurance, he was entitled to either arrest or issue citations for those traffic offenses,” R. at 118-19 (citing N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 66-5-16, 66-5-229(C), & 66-3-13). Further, although Officer Hernandez initially determined to issue Ms. Holmes citations for these offenses, once she continued to write “UCC1-308,” instead of simply signing her name as instructed, Officer Hernandez had probable cause to arrest her for obstructing an officer in the lawful discharge of his duties in violation of New Mexico law. See N.M. Stat. Ann § 30-22-1(D). There was no false arrest and summary judgment was proper on this claim.
“A malicious prosecution claim brought under the Fourth Amendment requires a showing that (1) the defendant caused the plaintiff’s continued . . . prosecution; 6 (2) the original action terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) no probable cause supported the original arrest . . . or prosecution; (4) the defendant acted with malice; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damages.” Stonecipher v. Valles, 759 F.3d 1134, 1146 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). As explained infra, there was probable cause to arrest Ms. Holmes, and therefore her malicious prosecution claim also fails.
The Ninth Amendment provides: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. Const. amend. IX. But “[t]he Ninth Amendment is not an independent source of individual rights; rather, it provides a rule of construction that we apply in certain cases.” Jenkins v. Comm’r, 483 F.3d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). As such, Ms. Holmes cannot pursue a claim for an alleged violation of the Ninth Amendment in a suit under § 1983, so summary judgment was proper.
We also agree with the district court that summary judgment was proper on Ms. Holmes’s claim under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Ms. Holmes asserts that she is not a United States citizen but rather a diplomat of the foreign state of the Bradford Republic. Even if we accepted those claims as true, however, Ms. Holmes cites no authority, and we are aware of none, that FSIA confers on her a private right of action against Officer Hernandez. 7