Opinion ID: 887287
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the District Court abuse its discretion by limiting the testimony of Riggs' expert witness and by excluding the expert from the courtroom during the victims' testimony?

Text: ¶ 18 This Court has often observed that a district court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony, and without a showing of abuse of discretion, the district court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Crawford, 2003 MT 118, ¶ 30, 315 Mont. 480, ¶ 30, 68 P.3d 848, ¶ 30; State v. Hocevar, 2000 MT 157, ¶ 54, 300 Mont. 167, ¶ 54, 7 P.3d 329, ¶ 54. A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice. State v. Weldele, 2003 MT 117, ¶ 72, 315 Mont. 452, ¶ 72, 69 P.3d 1162, ¶ 72. ¶ 19 Riggs argues that the District Court ruled in such a way that the State was able to bolster the credibility of its complaining witnesses with expert testimony, while the defense was barred from attacking their credibility with expert testimony, and that this violated Riggs' rights to the effective assistance of counsel, to due process, and to present his defense. ¶ 20 As a factual matter, this claim is erroneous. The record clearly reflects that the District Court prohibited the defense from offering expert testimony on the subject of the complaining witnesses' credibility on the specific grounds that the State would not be offering such testimony, either. The record further reflects that the State in fact did not offer expert testimony on the credibility of its witnesses, but only as rebuttal to the defense's expert testimony which criticized the interview techniques employed during the investigation. The defense was put at no disadvantage in this regard. ¶ 21 In State v. Geyman (1986), 224 Mont. 194, 729 P.2d 475, we held that expert testimony is admissible for the purpose of helping the jury to assess the credibility of a child sexual assault complainant, Geyman, 224 Mont. at 200, 729 P.2d at 479, a narrow exception to the general rule that judgment as to the credibility of witnesses is the exclusive province of the jury in criminal trials, Geyman, 224 Mont. at 196-97, 729 P.2d at 477. In carving out this exception, we reasoned that an adult's reaction to being sexually assaulted is likely to be within reach of the jury's empathic imagination, so as to enable the jury to assess the complainant's truthfulness. A child's emotional reactions to such abuse, on the other hand, especially given the circumstances in which the child may find herself, and the familial relation that she may have to the alleged abuser, are likely to be outside the ken of the jury, which may find those reactions mystifying without the guidance of expert testimony. Geyman, 224 Mont. at 196-201, 729 P.2d at 477-80. ¶ 22 Having affirmed Geyman in State v. French (1988), 233 Mont. 364, 760 P.2d 86, in State v. Harris (1991), 247 Mont. 405, 808 P.2d 453, we restated the rule as follows: In cases involving sexual abuse of a minor child, we will allow expert testimony on the credibility of the alleged victim. This exception applies, however, only when the victim testifies at trial, and credibility is brought into question. Harris, 247 Mont. at 410, 808 P.2d at 455 (citations omitted). ¶ 23 Riggs has entirely failed to show how the District Court's rulings in this regard, which resulted in neither party's being able to offer expert testimony on the subject of the complaining witnesses' credibility, unfairly prejudiced him in the presentation of his defense. ¶ 24 On the other hand, the District Court permitted Riggs to present extensive expert testimony critical of the interviewing techniques employed in the investigation. As part of her preparation for giving this testimony, Dr. Sarah Baxter, the defense's expert, was provided with the entire police file on the investigation, and prepared a full report thereon. The District Court did not, however, permit Dr. Baxter to listen to the testimony of the complaining witnesses, reasoning that to do so would only be useful preparation for credibility testimony  testimony which had been prohibited by the court in limine. Given the general preference, expressed in Rule 615, M.R.Evid., for excluding witnesses, whether lay or expert, from the courtroom, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Baxter.