Opinion ID: 2103477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brady Material Recorded Statements

Text: Lilly's first argument is that the State violated its obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) ( Brady ). The Brady doctrine requires disclosure of evidence that is both favorable to the accused and `material either to guilt or to punishment.' United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3379, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1197). Thus, when a violation of the Brady rule is alleged, two questions must be addressed: First, was the non-disclosure at issue a violation of Brady? Second, if the non-disclosure was contrary to the dictates of Brady, what was the nature of the error? Michael v. State, Del.Supr., 529 A.2d 752, 755 (1987). According to Lilly, the prosecutor violated Brady by waiting until the day of trial to provide defense counsel with transcripts of the recorded statements the police obtained soon after the accident. When the witnesses' statements were produced, Lilly's attorney moved for a mistrial, arguing the State should have disclosed the statements earlier. Lilly asserts on appeal that the recorded statements contained favorable evidence. The State's failure to disclose the statements until the morning of the first day of trial, Lilly submits, prevented him from developing an alternative reconstruction of the accident to counter the State's head-on collision theory. According to Lilly, the police report misled his expert into believing that Lutte and Brown had seen the Lilly and Motter cars collide. Lilly also contends that the statement of Stephen Brzozowski provided favorable evidence. According to Brzozowski, two vehicles approached the bridge from the same direction, not opposite directions. Lilly submits this statement would tend to contradict the State's theory of a head-on collision. Thus, Lilly claims that Brzozowski's statement should also have been disclosed earlier. In addressing Lilly's alleged Brady violation, it must first be determined if the statements of the witnesses were, in fact, favorable. If so, this Court must then consider the question of materiality. If the information was both favorable and material, we must assess whether the delayed disclosure precluded Lilly's effective use of the information at trial. The record reflects that the witnesses' trial testimony was consistent with their transcribed statements, rather than the police report. Brown and Lutte confirmed they had not observed the Lilly and Motter cars collide. Both women also testified, consistent with their recorded statements, that they had not seen Motter's car pass in front of them prior to the accident. The Superior Court decided Lilly's Brady argument on several independent alternative grounds. The trial judge noted that although no witness saw the Lilly and Motter vehicles actually collide, and Brzozowski testified that a car followed Lilly's vehicle onto the bridge, that evidence did not suggest in any way that this mysterious car, rather than [Lilly's] car, was in fact the one that struck [Motter's] car. The Superior Court also ruled that the witnesses' statements did not have any bearing on the other facts of the case, including the fact that [Lilly] was travelling in excess of 100 miles per hour  more than 60 miles above the speed limit  when he struck [Motter's] car. The record supports the Superior Court's conclusion that the witnesses' statements did not provide favorable evidence on the issue of Lilly's guilt or innocence. The determination that the witnesses' statements were not favorable, as that term is used in Brady, obviated the Superior Court's need to determine whether the evidence was material to Lilly's case. However, in ruling on Lilly's motion for a new trial, the Superior Court assumed, arguendo, that the statements did provide favorable evidence. It then concluded that the delayed disclosure did not result in a Brady violation. [R]egardless of the nature of the Brady violation, the test for determining the materiality of the nondisclosed matters is the same. Michael v. State, 529 A.2d at 756 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 667, 105 S.Ct. at 3375). [E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383; Michael v. State, 529 A.2d at 756. The record reflects Lilly has failed to establish that, absent the delayed disclosure, the outcome of the trial would have been different. The statements were available to Lilly's attorney when the witnesses testified at trial. The trial transcript indicates that, on cross-examination, the witnesses' testimony revealed the inconsistencies between the recorded statements and the police report. Thus, the trial included a presentation and consideration of the evidence at issue. Consequently, Lilly received the benefit of the recorded statements, and whatever doubt they cast on the State's case, through the witnesses' testimony at trial. Lilly contends, nevertheless, that the delayed disclosure prevented effective use of the evidence at trial and that, with timely disclosure, proper use of that evidence may have provided an opportunity to change the outcome. According to Lilly, his accident reconstruction expert relied on the police report's recitation that Lutte and Brown witnessed the Motter and Lilly cars collide. Lilly posits that, had his expert known the two women did not see the cars collide, and had not seen Motter's car beforehand, the expert might have been able to reconstruct an accident scenario to challenge the State's head-on collision theory. After the verdict, Lilly made the same argument to the Superior Court in a motion for a new trial. The Superior Court granted Lilly an additional month to file his motion for a new trial. The purpose of the extension was to enable Lilly to present the evidence contained in the witnesses' statements to the accident reconstruction expert and to demonstrate that the evidence was material to the outcome of the case. When the motion for a new trial was filed, however, it was not accompanied by an affidavit, or any other evidence, indicating that the expert's conclusion would have differed had the statements been disclosed earlier. Instead, Lilly's motion simply re-asserted the legal argument that the statements would have potentially altered the Defendant's reconstruction report. When a defendant is confronted with delayed disclosure of Brady material, reversal will be granted only if the defendant was denied the opportunity to use the material effectively. Rose v. State, Del.Supr., 542 A.2d 1196, 1199 (1988) (citations omitted). No reversible error exists where the defense has not demonstrated that the tardy disclosure prevented it from effectively presenting the evidence. Dickens v. State, Del.Supr., 437 A.2d 159, 162 (1981). [1] See also Stokes v. State, Del.Supr., 402 A.2d 376, 378-81 (1979). Not only did Lilly have the witnesses' statements for use at trial, but the Superior Court provided Lilly with an opportunity to use the statements effectively after the trial concluded. The record reflects that even assuming the witnesses' statements were favorable Brady evidence, no violation was created by the State's delayed disclosure. First, Lilly was not precluded from effectively using the statements at trial. The evidence was available for Lilly's cross-examination of the witnesses. Second, the Superior Court extended the time for Lilly to file his motion for a new trial. Even so, Lilly was unable to demonstrate that the witnesses' statements were favorable. The record, therefore, supports the Superior Court's alternate holding that the [d]efendant cannot show that the production of these statements at an earlier time would have enabled him to make better use of them.