Opinion ID: 457786
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the appropriate standards of review

Text: 9 On April 6, 1982, Murray had yet to be indicted; his case had not been officially assigned to a District Judge in the Eastern District. Judge Crocker, the duty judge, heard the government's ex parte application for a sixty day continuance on a contingent basis; he was not familiar with the facts of the investigation beyond the representations made by the government. Judge Crocker granted the exclusion of time (hereinafter referred to as the Crocker Exclusion) without the benefit of a complete factual record. The Crocker Exclusion of April 12 was implicitly conditioned on a complete review by the presiding judge assigned after Murray's indictment was filed. 10 Judge Price's Order of June 9, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the Price Order) purports to overturn the factual findings of the Crocker Exclusion relating to Counts III, XV, and XVI as against Murray. The government argues that, in so doing, Judge Price violated this Court's clearly erroneous standard for factual findings. See, e.g., United States v. Pollock, 26 F.2d 1456, 1464 (9th Cir.1984). As we noted in United States v. Nance, 666 F.2d 353, 356 (9th Cir.1982), on appellate review of a trial court ruling that the ends of justice exception [of Section 3161(h)(8) ] is grounds for continuance, we do not disturb [the] factual findings underlying the district court's determination unless they are clearly erroneous.... (citation omitted). 11 In the proceeding below, Judge Price was the trial judge; in the ordinary situation he need not comply with any standard of review when overseeing a referral from the duty judge. As United States v. Murray, et al. became his case for trial, it was permissible and proper for Judge Price to consider all of the facts surrounding the Murray investigation, arrest and indictment and to conduct a factual review in determining matters arising under the Speedy Trial Act. Yet, the ends of justice concept embedded within the Act is implicated when a second review of the time exclusions is conducted. As we have noted elsewhere, it is important that the court and the parties know when the clock stops running under the Act. It is even more important that they know when it starts again. United States v. Henderson, 746 F.2d 619, 623 (9th Cir.1984). 12 An exclusion of time from speedy trial computations effectively stops the speedy trial clock. It is axiomatic that the government relies on the permanence of such an order in its preparation of an indictment and for trial. A subsequent factual review and reversal of an earlier ruling would wreak havoc on the government's schedule of prosecution. Further, the subsequent revocation of a lengthy continuance may effectively dismiss with prejudice the charges against the defendant. Consistent with the ends of justice purpose of the Speedy Trial Act, it is not fair to free a defendant simply because in a subsequent review of the facts another judge disagreed with the order which stopped the clock. See United States v. Carlone, 666 F.2d 1112, 1115-16 (7th Cir.1981). 13 Of course, when the government improperly procures an order excluding time under the Speedy Trial Act, it may suffer the sanction of retroactive revocation by the trial judge of the time extension previously granted. Yet, to avoid confusion and to prevent undue prejudice to the government and to the public, the factual findings of an ends of justice continuance should not be disturbed retroactively by the trial judge unless clearly erroneous. 14 Our review of the June 9, 1983 Price Order discloses not only an omission to find the prior order clearly erroneous, it is also devoid of all findings required to support the dismissal of Counts III, XV and XVI. The Price Order is, hence, clearly erroneous. Nance, supra; United States v. Fielding, 645 F.2d 719, 721-22 (9th Cir.1981).