Opinion ID: 1196972
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was Glaser an Original Source of the Allegations in Her Complaint?

Text: Glaser may avoid the public-disclosure bar if she can show that she was an original source of the information upon which the allegations in her complaint were based. See Rockwell, 549 U.S. at 470-72, 127 S.Ct. 1397. She is an original source if she (1) has direct knowledge of the information on which her allegations are based; (2) has independent knowledge of the information on which her allegations are based; and (3) has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing a complaint based on her information. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). We question whether Glaser can show she has direct knowledge of the information supporting her allegations. We have never precisely defined the term direct, and we need not do so today. [8] But we note that the only knowledge Glaser has of Wound Care's billing practices comes from her attorney. At oral argument Glaser made much of the fact that she had direct knowledge that she had been treated by a physician's assistant and not a doctor. But the fraud alleged pertains to the billing, not the treatment. Glaser's only knowledge that Wound Care's billing practices were improper came from Lapointe, with whom Glaser had no prior relationship and who contacted her out of the blue. It would be one thing to say that an FCA relator has direct knowledge of the information supporting her allegations because she is personally aware of at least one instance of fraudulent conduct and her attorney's subsequent investigation uncovers other fraudulent behavior. See Paranich, 396 F.3d at 336. It would be quite another to say that an FCA relator has direct knowledge for purposes of the original-source exception even though she had no knowledge whatsoever of the fraudulent conduct before hearing from an attorney. Ultimately, it does not matter whether Glaser could have been deemed to have direct knowledge under the statute because she has not met her burden of proving she has independent knowledge. To establish this element, we have required that the relator be someone who would have learned of the allegation or transactions independently of the public disclosure. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d at 865. Glaser thinks she can establish this simply by providing (1) her own testimony that she had no knowledge of the CMS investigation and that her only knowledge of Wound Care's billing practices came from her attorney and (2) an affidavit from her attorney who swears she first learned of the problems with Wound Care's billing practices by 2003 and had no knowledge of the CMS investigation. The problem is that Glaser has asserted the attorney-client privilege to prevent us from learning how her attorney first learned of Wound Care's billing practices. If a relator says all her knowledge of fraudulent activity comes from a third party (even if the third party is her attorney) but refuses to explain how that third party learned of the fraud, she cannot meet her burden of proving she has independent knowledge just by claiming she had no knowledge of public disclosure. Because Glaser has the burden of proving the jurisdictional facts, she has not established her independent knowledge of improprieties in Wound Care's billing practices and therefore she cannot be an original source of the allegations in her complaint. [9] See United States ex rel. Houck v. Folding Carton Admin. Comm., 881 F.2d 494, 505 (7th Cir.1989).