Opinion ID: 754043
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Qualifications on the Right

Text: 23 Having explained the breadth of the right, we note some qualifications that have been placed upon it. First, the right to self-representation must be timely asserted, preferably before trial. See O'Reilly v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 867-68 (2d Cir.1982). Second, a party seeking to assert his statutory right to self-representation must clearly and unequivocally discharge any lawyer previously retained. A party does not have a right to self-representation and representation by counsel at the same time. See id.; United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, 1010-11 (2d Cir.1943). 24 Third, and key to this appeal, because pro se means to appear for one's self, a person may not appear on another person's behalf in the other's cause. A person must be litigating an interest personal to him. See Pridgen v. Andresen, 113 F.3d 391, 393 (2d Cir.1997). For example, a lay person may not represent a corporation or a partnership or appear on behalf of his or her own minor child, see id.; Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir.1990). Thus, the threshold question becomes whether a given matter is plaintiff's own case or one that belongs to another. See Phillips v. Tobin, 548 F.2d 408, 411 (2d Cir.1976) (The basic question raised by [28 U.S.C. § 1654] is whether this stockholder's derivative suit is the plaintiff's 'own case' or is a suit belonging to the corporation.). To that question, we focus our attention in resolving the issues presented on this appeal. II The Merits A. The Conversion Claim 25 With the origins of the right and its limitations and conditions in mind, we pass to the merits. To begin with, we are not persuaded by plaintiff's argument that because he was permitted to proceed pro se before the Commissioner and was consistently recognized by the Commissioner as the SSA Claimant/Estate's Non-attorney Representative at every stage of the administrative proceedings, he should be allowed to proceed pro se in the district court under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) & 406(a). Section 406(a) of Title 42, which permits non-attorneys to represent claimants, applies only to administrative proceedings before the Commissioner. Section 406, which is entitled Representation of claimants before Commissioner of Social Security, states in relevant part: 26 The Commissioner of Social Security may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of agents or other persons, other than attorneys as hereinafter provided, representing claimants before the Commissioner of Social Security .... 27 42 U.S.C. § 406(a)(1) (emphasis added). The plain language of the statute indicates that Congress only authorized the Commissioner to recognize non-attorneys representing claimants in proceedings held before the Commissioner. There is no parallel provision in the Act authorizing the Commissioner to permit non-attorney representation of claimants in proceedings before the courts. 28 Further, § 405(g), which establishes procedures for judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision, provides in relevant part: 29 Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party ... may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice.... 30 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This statutory provision does not address the specific procedural issue of whether a claimant may proceed pro se but simply grants a claimant the right to appeal a final decision of the Commissioner, as plaintiff has done here. 31 We agree with the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim, on behalf of Peter's estate against Marie Law, because clearly plaintiff was purporting to represent the estate in litigating an interest specific to the estate, that is, whether Law misappropriated social security benefits payments intended for Peter Iannaccone when he was living. In Pridgen we held that a representative of an estate may not proceed pro se in an action by the estate where the estate has beneficiaries or creditors other than the representative. 113 F.3d at 393. Under such circumstances, an action cannot be described as the litigant's own, because the personal interests of the estate, other survivors, and possible creditors, as here, will be affected by the outcome of the proceedings. A non-lawyer representative therefore would be litigating claims that are not personal to him. Because plaintiff admitted in his brief that there are creditors of the estate, i.e., the physicians who treated his father prior to his death, the rule we have adopted applies to his claim against Marie Law brought in his capacity as administrator of the estate and the district court properly dismissed it. 32 B. The Underpayment Claim Against the Commissioner 33 While plaintiff, as the administrator of the estate, does not have the right to proceed pro se with the estate's claim against Law, he, as the sole surviving child of the deceased beneficiary, has the statutory right to proceed pro se with his underpayment claim against the Commissioner. The record shows that this case was brought originally before the Commissioner by plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 404(d) for underpayment of social security benefits that were due his deceased father. 34 Section 404(d) and its implementing regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 404.503, authorize distribution of underpayment by the Commissioner to certain individuals according to an established order of priority when the eligible beneficiary dies before the payment due is made. The deceased beneficiary's surviving spouse is the first person on the priority list, the spouse is then followed by the child or children of the deceased beneficiary. The seventh and last individual in the statutory order of priority is the legal representative of the estate of the deceased beneficiary. But the estate is not entitled to receive the benefits unless there is no individual who falls under any of the preceding categories of eligible claimants. See 42 U.S.C. § 404(d); 20 C.F.R. § 404.503. 35 Peter Iannaccone's wife Mamie predeceased him. Plaintiff, as decedent's sole surviving child, and not the estate, is the only claimant entitled to receive the underpayment by the Commissioner that was due Peter Iannaccone, the deceased beneficiary. Although the pleadings filed in the district court indicate that this was an action brought by the Estate of Peter Iannaccone, by William Iannaccone, Administrator and Claimant, this claim was actually brought by plaintiff on his own behalf involving an interest personal to him because he is the only one entitled to receive the disputed underpayment under the Act. Cf. Cheung, 906 F.2d at 60 (finding that case was brought on behalf of the father's minor daughter under various civil rights statutes, even though the complaint was solely in the father's name, and holding that father could not bring the case pro se ). 36 Indeed, the Commissioner concedes in his brief that plaintiff's role in the administrative proceedings was that of a party in interest, rather than that of a non-attorney representative. The record also shows that when the Commissioner approved plaintiff's application for amounts due his father, it sent a notification letter to plaintiff in May 1992, which stated that [y]ou will soon receive a check for $4814.00 because we owed money to Peter Iannaccone deceased. The action commenced in the district court sought review of the Commissioner's final decision and involved essentially the same claim for underpayment that plaintiff litigated in the administrative proceedings below. Therefore, the action in the district court should have been deemed plaintiff's own case and not a suit belonging to the estate of plaintiff's father. 37 Unlike the estate's claim against Marie Law, where the interest of the estate was being litigated, here it is only plaintiff's own interest being litigated because the estate and its creditors are not entitled to the amount of underpayment in dispute. No other person's interests will be affected by the outcome of the proceedings. Hence, the fact that the estate has outside creditors in this case is irrelevant in determining whether plaintiff himself may proceed pro se in his own claim against the Commissioner in the district court. 38 Having decided that plaintiff may properly appear on his own behalf without counsel in this proceeding, we decline to address plaintiff's arguments regarding the merits, including the failure of the ALJ to fully develop the record and the issue of whether Law was a proper defendant in this case, because these issues are not properly before us.