Opinion ID: 408092
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Legal Criteria

Text: 30 Article VI of the United States Constitution provides: 31 This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme law of the land ..., anything in the Constitution or law of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. 32 The determination of whether a challenged state statute is contrary to the Constitution or a federal law and thus preempted is an inexact task. The tests to be applied in adjudicating questions of preemption have been summarized by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309-10, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977) (citations omitted). 33 The first inquiry is whether Congress, pursuant to its power to regulate commerce, U.S.Const., Art. 1, § 8, has prohibited state regulation of the particular aspects of commerce involved in this case.... (W)hen Congress has unmistakably ... ordained, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217, 10 L.Ed.2d 248) (1963), that its enactments alone are to regulate a part of commerce, state laws regulating that aspect of commerce must fall. This result is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose. 34 Congressional enactments which do not expressly exclude state legislation in the field nevertheless override state laws with which they conflict. U.S.Const., Art. 1, § 8. In deciding whether state and federal laws are so inconsistent that state law must give way, we must determine whether, under the circumstances of this particular case (the state's) law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). Accord, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363, 96 S.Ct. 933, 940, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 1711, 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (1971); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. at 141, 83 S.Ct. at 1216. 35 Congress has not chosen to expressly or impliedly bar states from regulating tender offers. As noted by the Supreme Court in Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182, 99 S.Ct. 2710, 2715, 61 L.Ed.2d 464 (1979), § 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was plainly intended to protect, rather than to limit, state authority. In the absence of explicit or implicit preemption, the issue is whether under the circumstances of this particular case the Missouri Act stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in passing the Williams Act. A careful comparison of the two Acts is necessary. 36