Opinion ID: 780740
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lack of unanimity required for mitigating circumstances

Text: 58 The court is also troubled because the jury was never told, either expressly or impliedly, that individual jurors may consider mitigating circumstances in the weighing process regardless of the lack of agreement with other jurors as to the presence of that factor. Pages 689-690. This also purportedly violates the dictates of Mills. 59 The Supreme Court in Mills vacated the petitioner's death sentence and remanded the case to the Maryland Court of Appeals for resentencing. The Court took issue with the structure of the Maryland sentencing scheme. In that scheme, the verdict forms provided to the jury listed each aggravating circumstance the prosecution was attempting to prove. The jurors then collectively had to write yes or no next to each factor, indicating whether they unanimously believed that the prosecution had proved each aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. A similar form was presented to the jury for mitigating factors. After filling out the forms, the jurors would proceed to the weighing stage, at which time they would decide, unanimously, whether the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. The Supreme Court concluded that the risk was too great that, in Maryland, a juror would believe that in order for a mitigating factor to be considered in the weighing process, that it would have to be unanimously found present. 60 This is a far cry from the situation presented in this case. There is no indication anywhere in the instructions that each mitigating factor had to be agreed to unanimously. The judge instructed the jury that they were to weigh the evidence presented and determine whether the aggravating factors were sufficient to outweigh any mitigating factor or factors you find that are present in this case. Transcript, p. 1888. The judge then instructed the jury that if the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors, then they were to return a verdict reflecting this finding. Transcript, p. 1889. 61 Nowhere in the instructions did the judge state, or even imply, that jurors were restricted to considering mitigating factors that all the jurors had agreed were present. Such an instruction would violate McKoy v. North Carolina, in which the Supreme Court found unconstitutional any requirement that prevents the jury from considering, in deciding whether to impose the death penalty, any mitigating factor that the jury does not unanimously find. 494 U.S. at 435, 110 S.Ct. 1227. However, that is all that McKoy says. Nowhere does it state that silence in instructions on the lack of a unanimity requirement for mitigating circumstances violates the Eighth Amendment. 62 The instructions in this case are very similar to those found unobjectionable in Coe and Roe. In Coe, the court found that nothing in the instructions could reasonably lead a juror to believe that unanimity was required as to the presence of a mitigating factor. The court stated that the instructions require[d] unanimity as to the results of the weighing, but this is a far different matter than requiring unanimity as to the presence of a mitigating factor. 161 F.3d at 338. As in the instructions here, it was clear that the unanimity requirement applies to the weighing process, and not the presence of a mitigating factor. 63 The trial court here instructed the jury that [i]t is not only the quantity of the aggravating circumstances versus the quantity of mitigating factors which is to be the basis of your decision. It is the quality or importance of the mitigating factors and the aggravating circumstances which must be considered. Transcript, p. 1887. This strongly implies that each juror was to make his or her own independent judgment regarding each factor. While the jury was instructed on the unanimity requirement in finding aggravating factors, there was no parallel instruction regarding mitigating factors. The jury was specifically instructed as to those decisions in which unanimity was required. Any reasonable juror would understand that where unanimity is not specifically instructed, those decisions should be made independently. 64 The state courts never reached the issue of any alleged unanimity requirement regarding the mitigating factors, as this claim was never presented to the state courts, the district court, nor to this court. But in failing to strike down this instructional system, the state court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent. 65 The court likens this case to Frey v. Fulcomer, 132 F.3d 916 (3d Cir.1997). The court in Frey found particularly objectionable a portion of a sentence in the jury instructions that read if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance.... Id. at 923. It was the propinquity, in the same sentence, within seven words, of unanimously and the mitigating circumstances clause that led the court to conclude that a juror might believe that a unanimous finding was required as to mitigating circumstances. Ibid. However, the court in Frey distinguished the instructions from another set of instructions that it had found unobjectionable in Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1991). In Zettlemoyer, the court found that the instructions only required unanimity in the ultimate conclusion, and not in the interim findings leading to that conclusion. Frey, 132 F.3d at 923. The separation between unanimously and the mitigating circumstances clause in Zettlemoyer was seventeen words, even though it was still in the same sentence. Ibid. Here, the court also contends that the absence of an instruction notifying the jury that a unanimous finding is not required as to mitigating circumstances makes this case like Frey. In fact, the court in Frey specifically stated that the absence of such an express statement is not dispositive and stated that such an instruction is only one means that a trial court could use to clarify its instructions to the jury. Id. at 923 n. 5. 66 This court has held that a trial court may instruct the jury that it must be unanimous in finding an aggravating factor, and may be silent as to the lack of a unanimity requirement in finding mitigating circumstances. Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091, 1120 (6th Cir.1990) (en banc) (Judge Kennedy, announcing the holding of the court with respect to the jury instructions on unanimity). The court in Kordenbrock stated that since the trial court announced a unanimity requirement as to aggravating factors, but was silent as to mitigating factors, it cannot be reasonably inferred that silence as to finding a mitigating factor would likely cause the jury to assume that unanimity was also a requirement. Indeed it would indicate the opposite. 919 F.2d at 1121. Judge Merritt wrote, contra to the majority holding on this issue, that the verdict of death may not have been imposed had they understood that one juror could block the death sentence if he or she believed there were sufficient mitigating circumstances. Id. at 1110. This is essentially the same position he takes in the instant case. However, as the court held in Kordenbrock, it is not constitutionally required that the jury be so instructed. 67 The court states that the instruction you must find that the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances which the defendant was found guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating factors was followed [i]mmediately thereafter by the instruction since this is a criminal case the law requires that in order for you to reach a decision all twelve of you must be in agreement. Page 689. In fact, these two instructions are separated by about 70 lines of the transcript, and, additionally, by a recess taken by the court because the verdict forms were not in order. Compare Transcript p. 1889, line 18 with Transcript p. 1892, line 18.