Opinion ID: 2330570
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Brady Violations: General Principles of Law

Text: In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that prosecutors have a positive duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused when the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194; see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); accord State v. Gonzalez, 290 Kan. 747, 766, 234 P.3d 1 (2010); State v. Francis, 282 Kan. 120, 150, 145 P.3d 48 (2006); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678-81, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (discussing discovery, after trial, of information favorable to the accused that had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense); In re Jordan, 278 Kan. 254, 261, 91 P.3d 1168 (2004) (discussing prosecutor's duty to disclose negating and mitigating evidence under Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct [KRPC]); KRPC 3.8(d) (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 578). Further, because law enforcement's knowledge of evidence is imputed to the State, a Brady violation can occur when the prosecutor withholds material evidence that is not known to the prosecutor but is known to law enforcement. See Francis, 282 Kan. at 150, 145 P.3d 48 (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 [1995]). Evidence that is favorable to the defendant encompasses both exculpatory and impeachment evidence. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). For Brady purposes, there is no distinction between these two types of evidence that are favorable to accused; thus, impeachment evidence is considered exculpatory. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281, 119 S.Ct. 1936; see Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375. There are three components or essential elements of a Brady violation claim: (1) `The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching' [citation omitted]; (2) `that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently' [citation omitted]; and (3) the evidence must be material so as to establish prejudice. Wilkins v. State, 286 Kan. 971, 989, 190 P.3d 957 (2008); Haddock v. State, 282 Kan. 475, 506, 146 P.3d 187 (2006); see Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004); see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (prejudice encompasses the materiality requirement of Brady ). In the present case, the first two Brady elements are not at issue. It is undisputed that the evidence in question was exculpatory in the sense that it bore upon the credibility of Moore, a key witness for the prosecution. Further, it is undisputed that the State, for whatever reason, failed to timely produce the evidence of Moore's juvenile burglary adjudication. Thus, our analysis requires the consideration of only the third element, materiality.