Opinion ID: 3011106
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: failure to state a claim under section 1983

Text: As the District Court observed, the standard for personal liability under section 1983 is the same as that for municipal liability. See Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989). That standard was enunciated in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978): when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts and acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury . . . the government as an entity is responsible under S 1983. Where, as here, the policy in question concerns a failure to train or supervise municipal employees, liability under section 1983 requires a showing that the failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom those _________________________________________________________________ the investigative stages of a criminal proceeding. See 31 F.3d at 1253, citing Burns, 500 U.S. at 496. In addressing the question left open in Imbler, and resolving a subsequent split among the courts of appeals, the Burns Court expressly rejected argument that a prosecutor's directory role in police investigations is sufficiently related to her advocate function. The Supreme Court explained that [a]lmost any action by a prosecutor . . . could be said to be in some way related to the ultimate decision whether to prosecute, but we have never indicated that absolute immunity is that expansive. Burns, 500 U.S. at 495. The Court also rejected the government's argument that adequate checks on prosecutorial misconduct in this context exist, observing that one of the most important . . . checks, the judicial process, will not necessarily restrain a prosecutor's out-of-court activities that occur prior to the initiation of a prosecution. Id. Thus it concluded that neither common law nor policy considerations support an extension of absolute immunity, which applies only for actions that are connected with the prosecutor's role in judicial proceedings, not for every litigation-inducing conduct. Id. at 494. 29 employees will come into contact. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). The Court in Canton observed that failure to train may amount to deliberate indifference where the need for more or different training is obvious, and inadequacy very likely to result in violation of constitutional rights. See id. at 389. For example, if the police often violate rights, a need for further training might be obvious. See id. at 390 n.10. See also Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118 (deliberate indifference may be established where harm occurred on numerous previous occasions and officials failed to respond appropriately, or where risk of harm is great and obvious). Once again, the factually similar Walker case is instructive. The Walker court analyzed Canton's discussion of the deliberate indifference requirement and formulated a three-part test: in order for a municipality's failure to train or supervise to amount to deliberate indifference, it must be shown that (1) municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a particular situation; 59 (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling; and (3) the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights. See Walker, 974 F.2d at 297-98. In the present case, as in Walker, elements (1) and (3) are plainly met: city policymakers know to a moral certainty that police officers will be presented with opportunities to commit perjury or proceed against the innocent. Moreover, a failure by police officers to resist these opportunities will almost certainly result in deprivations of constitutional rights. Id. at 299. As for element (2), although it may usually be appropriate to assume employees will obey their oaths and the perjury laws, where there is a history of conduct rendering this assumption untenable, city policymakers may display deliberate indifference by doing so. Id. at 300. _________________________________________________________________ 59. Although the Walker Court, adopting language from Canton, indicated that the policymaker's knowledge should beto a moral certainty, it does not appear that this qualifying phrase adds anything other than emphasis to the requirement of ordinary knowledge. 30 The Court of Appeals concluded that Walker should be allowed to pursue discovery in order to determine whether there was a practice of condoning perjury (evidenced perhaps by a failure to discipline for perjury) 60 or a pattern of police misconduct sufficient to require the police department to train and supervise police officers to assure they tell the truth. Id. The same result should apply to Carter.61 The District Court's insistence that Carter must identify a particular policy and attribute it to a policymaker, at the pleading stage without benefit of discovery, is unduly harsh.62 Carter is not engaged in a mere fishing expedition. Carter alleges that he spent ten years in prison as a result of a pervasive pattern of egregious, unconstitutional conduct by Philadelphia's police. He surmises, reasonably, that such misconduct reflects inadequate training and supervision. He cannot be expected to know, without discovery, exactly what training policies were in place or how they were adopted.63 _________________________________________________________________ 60. Cf. Gentile, 926 F.2d at 152 n.5 (predicating liability on long history of negligent disciplinary practices regarding law enforcement personnel . . . .). 61. If Carter is able to demonstrate that the DA's failure to adopt a policy amounts to deliberate indifference, he must of course then establish that his conviction was actually caused by that failure. Canton, 489 U.S. at 391; see also Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118 (requiring plaintiff to prove his injury resulted from the failure to adopt a policy). The Canton Court explained that actual causation turns on whether the injury [would] have been avoided had the employee been trained under a program that was not deficient in the identified respect. 489 U.S. at 391. 62. The District Court read the Complaint as asserting only passive adoption by the DA's Office defendants of a policy imposed by the City. See Carter, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 394-95. Nonetheless, an appropriately generous reading would indicate that the DA's Office defendants were the policymakers who adopted the inadequate training, supervision and discipline policies on behalf of the City. 63. Cf. Gentile 926 F.2d at 152 (Plaintiffs were not obliged to produce particular evidence that defendants had specific knowledge of a declared policy of the County . . . .). 31