Opinion ID: 74654
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: But For Test

Text: 50 The district court summarily stated that a finding in Plaintiff's favor on the third part of the Bryson test compels a finding in favor of Plaintiff on the fourth part as well. This was error because a defendant may still obtain summary judgment on the affirmative defense set out in Bryson's fourth step, even if a plaintiff presents a factual issue on the third prong. Chadwick may still prevail by showing that there is no question of fact as to whether he would have taken the same action in the absence of the speech. See Harris v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 99 F.3d 1078, 1086 (11th Cir. 1996) (granting summary judgment for the defendant on a first amendment retaliation claim, despite the assumption that the plaintiff could show that his speech was a substantial factor in his failure to be promoted, because the defendant showed that the same decision would be made even absent the protected speech); Marshall v. City of Cape Coral, 797 F.2d 1555, 1561 (11th Cir. 1986) (same). 21 Rather than remanding this issue, we address it in light of our independent review of the record on other issues. 51 Bryson's fourth step involves an affirmative defense that is derived directly from the Supreme Court's decision in Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). Plaintiff Doyle claimed that he had been discharged as a public school teacher for exercising his free-speech rights under the First Amendment. Because the Court did not wish to place an employee in a better position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had he done nothing, id. at 285, the Court concluded that such an employee ought not to be able, by engaging in such conduct, to prevent his employer from assessing his performance record and reaching a decision not to rehire on the basis of that record. Id. at 286. As a result, the Court in Mt. Healthy held that once the plaintiff shows that his constitutionally protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in his or adverse treatment by the employer, the employer should be given an opportunity to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to [the plaintiff] even in the absence of the protected conduct. Id. at 287, 97 S.Ct. 568. 52 To fulfill this burden, a government employer must show that the legitimate reason would have motivated it to make the same employment decision. See Holley v. Seminole County Sch. Dist., 755 F.2d 1492, 1505 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that the issue under Mt. Healthy is not whether the Board had objective reason not to renew Holley-it apparently did-but, rather, what in fact motivated the Board in light of Holley's political activity.). An employer must show by a preponderance of the evidence, that, in light of [its] knowledge, perceptions, and policies at the time of the termination, [it] would have terminated [the employment] regardless of [the protected] speech. Board of County Comm'rs, Wabaunsee Cty., Kansas v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 685 (1996). 53 In cases where we affirmed summary judgment for the employer under this fourth prong, we found no liability despite the employer's partial reliance upon protected speech in taking an adverse employment action. In each case, we focused on the particular evidence in the summary judgment record. For example, in Harris v. Shelby County Board of Education, 99 F.3d 1078 (11th Cir. 1996), the plaintiff, an assistant high school principal, alleged that he was not selected as principal due to his comments to a newspaper regarding racial and criminal tensions at the school. There was strong evidence that speech was a substantial factor in the decision because the main decisionmaker stated that she was mad as hell about the newspaper article, she intended to ask the plaintiff about it, and that the plaintiff was too controversial for the position. Id. at 1081. We concluded, however, that even if the plaintiff succeeded on Bryson's first three prongs, the defendant presented sufficient evidence that the same decision would have been made absent the protected speech to warrant summary judgment. Specifically, the successful candidate had nine years' experience as a principal, while the plaintiff had none, and was certified for school administration while the plaintiff was not. The successful candidate had been named the Outstanding Secondary School Principal in Alabama and President of the Alabama Association of Secondary School Principals. Also, the plaintiff himself expressed uncertainty as to whether he was ready to assume a high school principalship. Id. at 1085-86. 54 Similarly, in Marshall v. City of Cape Coral, 797 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1986), the plaintiff was Superintendent of the Water Production Division of the Cape Coral Utilities Department and oversaw two water plants where water quality standards were not observed. The plaintiff's supervisor discharged him for insubordination and failing to perform certain duties relating to the violations of water quality standards. The plaintiff alleged that the true reason for his discharge was his memorandum criticizing his supervisor, which he sent to the City Manager directly (instead of through proper channels). This court found that, even assuming the memorandum was protected speech and the insubordination charge was improper, it was not disputed that water quality standards were violated and plaintiff failed to report the violations. The City Manager affirmed the plaintiff's discharge based solely on deficient performance, and felt he had no choice but to fire the plaintiff given the admitted violation of water standards. As a result, we stated that [w]e cannot say that summary judgment is never appropriate for these employee speech claims where the defendant so clearly had compelling independent reasons for not continuing employment. Id. at 1561 (quoting Montgomery v. Boshears, 698 F.2d 739, 743 (5th Cir. 1983)). 55 This same fact intensive approach has been followed in retaliation cases in the employment setting where we affirmed the denial of summary judgment. 22 Thus, in evaluating summary judgment involving Bryson's fourth step, we have engaged in a case-by-case approach based upon the particular facts of each case in order to determine whether the defendant would have fired the plaintiff absent the protected speech. 56 Chadwick attempts to prevail by proffering evidence of the polygraph results indicating deception, the Coker and Cooper incidents, and Stanley's history of similar outbursts. Stanley, however, still disputes the Coker incident and parts of the Cooper altercation. There is deception in Stanley's polygraph results. Lies by a police officer can alone be sufficient to support termination and can carry the day under the fourth prong in certain circumstances. However, here, Stanley's deception concerned whether he used profanity and lost his temper with Coker, rather than any form of criminal activity or sexual harassment of other employees. Thus, while Chadwick has presented sufficient evidence to create a jury issue on the fourth step's affirmative defense, his evidence is not strong enough to warrant judgment as a matter of law. While the deception alone was an adequate lawful basis to terminate Stanley, we cannot say as a matter of law that Chadwick necessarily would have done so absent Stanley's having accused him of theft.