Opinion ID: 2335616
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cross-Examination of the Co-Conspirator

Text: The first issue before us is whether the Superior Court erred by not allowing a co-conspirator's (Wilkinson's) unredacted plea agreement to be admitted into evidence. [3] Wilson contends that by redacting the sentence recommendation from Wilkinson's plea agreement, Wilson's right to effectively cross-examine Wilkinson about his potential bias was infringed, in violation of Wilson's constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. [4] We review claims of constitutional violations de novo. [5] This Court has held that [i]t is well-established that the bias of a witness is subject to exploration at trial and is `always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.' Moreover, `cross-examination on bias is an essential element of the constitutional right of confrontation.' [6] As we stated: In Weber this Court set forth a two-part test for determining whether limitations imposed by the trial judge on a relevant line of cross-examination violate the accused's right of confrontation. Specifically, we said that we would look to the cross-examination permitted to ascertain (1) if the jury were exposed to facts sufficient for it to draw inferences as to the reliability of the witness and (2) if defense counsel had an adequate record from which to argue why the witness might have been biased. Clearly, the trial court's decision to prohibit all questioning concerning the dismissal of charges against [the witness] . . . prevented the jury from considering facts from which it could have drawn inferences about [the witness'] testimonial reliability. Under the circumstances, the defense had a right to introduce such testimony. [7] Although there is no Delaware case directly on point ( i.e., where the witness was a co-conspirator who had entered into a plea agreement with the State), the federal courts have decided the issue now before us. The Third Circuit held in almost identical circumstances that a defendant may inform the jury not only of the fact that the witness received prosecutorial leniency for his testimony, but also of the concrete details of [the witness'] agreement with the government. [8] Because Wilkinson's unredacted plea agreement is not in the record, the extent of his sentence reduction is not known. The magnitude of a witness' sentence reduction could significantly impact a jury's impression of the witness' credibility. [9] Had the jury been told of the extent of the benefit Wilkinson received, it might have developed a different impression of Wilkinson's credibility. In our view, the specifics of Wilkinson's plea agreement would have been an appropriate subject of inquiry during his cross-examination. The State argues that a jury should not be told of the consequences of its verdict [10] and that the trial court has discretion to limit the cross-examination of a witness. It is the law that a trial judge may limit cross-examination to preserve the witness' constitutional immunity from self-incrimination, to prevent attempts to harass, humiliate or annoy him, or where the information sought might endanger the witness' personal safety. [11] But, prohibiting the jury from learning about Wilkinson's sentence recommendation in this case did not serve any of these purposes. Moreover, the State's interest in withholding the sentencing information was outweighed by Wilson's constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause. [12] Therefore, Wilson's right to cross-examine Wilkinson about his sentencing was unconstitutionally limited. The inquiry does not end at this point. Even where (as here) there is a constitutional error, a reversal is required only if the reviewing court cannot conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [13] In applying the harmless error test, the factors we must consider include: (1) the importance of the testimony of the challenged witness; (2) whether his testimony was cumulative; and (3) the presence or absence of overwhelming evidence of guilt. [14] Wilkinson was Wilson's co-conspirator and was the State's key witness against him. Especially where the witness is an accomplice of the defendant or may have some other substantial reason to cooperate with the government, the defendant should be permitted wide latitude in the search for the witness' bias. [15] Wilkinson's testimony was the only evidence of motive for the robberies and was also the most persuasive identification of Wilson. Although Stanton also identified Wilson from the surveillance tapes, her identification was burdened by the fact that those tapes showed the robbers wearing bandanas, and that the police had informed Stanton before she proceeded to viewing the tapesthat the suspects were connected to her apartment. For these reasons, Wilkinson's testimony as a coconspirator was critical to the State's case and it cannot be said that his testimony was merely cumulative. Because Wilkinson's credibility was an important factor at trial, additional information about his motive to testify could have decisively influenced the jury. [16] For these reasons, precluding Wilson from exploring Wilkinson's reduced sentence recommendation during cross-examination was not harmless error. We therefore on this claim reverse and remand for a new trial.