Opinion ID: 1200797
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Improper Argument Under Booth v. Maryland.

Text: (17) Defendant next contends that during closing argument, the prosecutor improperly urged the jury to return a death verdict on the basis of the crimes' purported impact on the families of the victims. The prosecutor argued as follows: Now, I'm sure defense counsel will argue to you, and if he doesn't, you're still entitled to consider, some basis for sympathy for Mr. Nicolaus. And you might feel some sympathy for him, but I urge you to consider that sympathy works both ways. And consider the consequences that Mr. Nicolaus has inflicted on not only the people that he killed, but on the other people. First of all, he took Jean Laras' two children from her, and he took Heidi from Lisa. Lisa had to live with that for 21 years. She ended up in a mental institution for a month and a half following the killing of Heidi. [¶] And now, Mr. Nicolaus has taken Lisa from her children. Genesis [one of Lisa's surviving children] has no mother. So when you consider sympathy for Mr. Nicolaus, consider that it goes both ways. And if you weigh that factor, there's really no comparison. In Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496 [96 L.Ed.2d 440, 107 S.Ct. 2529], the high court held that the admission of so-called victim impact statements in capital sentencing proceedings violated the principle that a sentence of death must be related to the moral culpability of the defendant. In South Carolina v. Gathers (1989) 490 U.S. 805, 810-812 [104 L.Ed.2d 876, 882-884, 109 S.Ct. 2207], the court followed Booth in concluding that the presentation of prosecutorial argument relating to such matters might likewise violate a defendant's Eighth Amendment rights. Recently, however, the high court overruled both Booth and Gathers in Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. ___ [115 L.Ed.2d 720, 111 S.Ct. 2597]. Even before Payne v. Tennessee , the court in Booth took care to note that [s]imilar types of information may well be admissible because they relate directly to the circumstances of the crime. (482 U.S. at p. 507, fn. 10 [96 L.Ed.2d at p. 451].) This court also recognized that  Booth and Gathers [did] not extend to evidence or argument concerning the nature and circumstances of the capital offense or the effect of that offense on the victim.... [Nor do they] extend to ... other criminal activity involving the use or threat of force or violence or the effect of such criminal activity on the victims .... ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 797 [276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330], citing People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 929 [269 Cal. Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676].) Here, the jurors might reasonably infer that defendant's act of killing his three children in 1964 was indeed motivated, in one sense, by his desire to impact upon the life-style of his ex-wife Lisa. Similarly, it is a circumstance of the instant crime that defendant at one point weighed or considered the impact of Lisa's murder on her children. He initially drew up alternate plans for the manner in which he would kidnap or kill Lisa, depending upon whether her children were with her during the confrontation. Ultimately, he fatally shot Lisa as she sat in her Volkswagen with her three-year-old son in the backseat. In any event, the prosecutor's brief comments, referring as they did to factual matters of which the jury was already fully apprised through properly admitted evidence, could not possibly have diverted the jurors from their task of determining the appropriate penalty. (See People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 537 [268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640].)