Opinion ID: 548937
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Availability of Qualified Immunity Defense Against an Excessive-Force Claim

Text: 27 We take this opportunity to consider an issue decided by the district court and almost certain to appear again on re-trial: whether qualified immunity is generally available as a matter of law as a defense against a claim of excessive force by a law enforcement officer in effecting an arrest. 7 While one federal court of appeals has concluded that it is not, see Holt v. Artis, 843 F.2d 242, 246 (6th Cir.1988), others have concluded that the defense is available. See Brown v. Glossip, 878 F.2d 871, 873-74 (5th Cir.1989); Thorsted v. Kelly, 858 F.2d 571, 573 (9th Cir.1988). 8 The Supreme Court meanwhile has expressly reserved judgment on this issue. See Graham, 490 U.S. at ---- n. 12, 109 S.Ct. at 1873 n. 12. To avoid a second appeal on this issue, we decide it now and conclude that the qualified immunity defense is generally available against excessive-force claims. 9 28 To establish a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim, a plaintiff must show that the force used by the officer was, in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him, objectively unreasonable under Fourth Amendment standards. See Graham, 490 U.S. at ----, 109 S.Ct. at 1873. The reasonableness of the force used is judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene and takes into account factors such as the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id. (citation omitted). By comparison, to establish the qualified immunity defense, a police officer must satisfy one of two tests: either that his conduct did not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known, or that it was objectively reasonable to believe that his acts did not violate these clearly established rights. See Warren, 906 F.2d at 74; Calamia, 879 F.2d at 1035. 29 Finnegan argues that the immunity defense is unavailable, because if the finder of fact concludes that an officer has intentionally employed excessive force, knowledge that his actions violate Constitutional rights is implied. Appellant's Br. at 6. We read Finnegan's argument to state that any use of constitutionally excessive force violates clearly established rights, so that the qualified immunity may not shield one who has used excessive force. See Holt, 843 F.2d at 246. We do not agree. 30 Although it can be said that the right of an individual not to be subjected to excessive force is clearly established in the conventional sense, the Supreme Court in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987), has cautioned against framing what is a clearly established right at this level of generality: 31 The Court of Appeals' brief discussion of qualified immunity consisted of little more than an assertion that a general right Anderson was alleged to have violated--the right to be free from warrantless searches of one's home unless the searching officers have probable cause and there are exigent circumstances--was clearly established. The Court of Appeals specifically refused to consider the argument that it was not clearly established that the circumstances with which Anderson was confronted did not constitute probable cause and exigent circumstances.... [T]his refusal was erroneous. 32 Id. at 640-41, 107 S.Ct. at 3039. 33 In other words, to say that the use of constitutionally excessive force violates a clearly established right, according to the Supreme Court, begs the open question whether the particular degree of force under the particular circumstances was excessive. This is not to say that no act violates a clearly established right unless a factually identical action has been previously held unlawful. See id. at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3039. Rather, Anderson advises that a middle approach is to be taken: the facts and circumstances of each case must be examined to determine whether [t]he contours of the right ... [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.... [I]n the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. Id. Accordingly, even if the jury finds Fountain to have used constitutionally excessive force, it is for the district court to determine whether the unlawfulness of his conduct should have been apparent to Fountain at the time. See Brown, 878 F.2d at 874-75. 10 34 Because we find that the clearly established rights inquiry under the first prong of the qualified immunity defense is not foreclosed by a finding that constitutionally excessive force was used, we need not take up the knottier issue whether a finding that a law enforcement officer acted objectively unreasonably in the use of force forecloses a finding under the second prong of the defense that it was objectively reasonable for him to believe his actions were lawful. 11