Opinion ID: 487205
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Refusal to Hold a Franks Hearing

Text: 17 In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2676, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), the Supreme Court held: 18 [W]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. 19 In Franks, the Court expressly recognized that there is a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant, and also that if, when material that is the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, no hearing is required. Id. at 171-72, 98 S.Ct. at 2684 (footnote omitted). 20 In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the Supreme Court held that a totality of circumstances test should be applied in determining whether the affidavit established probable cause, id. at 230-31, 103 S.Ct. at 2328-29, and that so long as the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more. Id. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 736, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960)). 21 In applying the rules of Franks and Gates, this court has recognized that where a substantial preliminary showing is made, the court must hold a hearing to determine if any false statements deliberately or recklessly included in the affidavit were material to the magistrate's finding of probable cause. United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 780, modified, 769 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir.1985)). If the affidavit is insufficient to establish probable cause without the false material, the court must set aside the search warrant and suppress the fruits of the search. United States v. Foster, 711 F.2d 871, 879 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103, 104 S.Ct. 1602, 80 L.Ed.2d 132 (1984). These rules also apply to the omission of facts from the affidavit. Stanert, 762 F.2d at 781. 22 We have also held that [i]n doubtful cases, preference should be given to the validity of the warrant. United States v. McQuisten, 795 F.2d 858, 861 (9th Cir.1986). Moreover, opinions and conclusions of an experienced agent regarding a set of facts are properly a factor in the probable cause equation under the Gates totality of the circumstances approach. United States v. Michaelian, 803 F.2d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir.1986). 23 Burnes alleges that agent Dickerson's affidavit contains several false statements or omissions. Burnes raises four issues with respect to the validity of the affidavit. First, Burnes claims that there was an insufficient basis for the affiant to conclude from his observation of the bottle that it probably contained ephedrine. Second, Burnes claims the affiant's opinion that the woman left the chemicals at Burnes' residence is too speculative. Third, Burnes claims the statements relating to the observed traffic at Burnes' residence are false. Relying on the Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement investigation report, Burnes points out that, contrary to the statements in the affidavit, most of the observed traffic stayed at Burnes' residence for more than twenty minutes. Finally, Burnes claims that the statements in the affidavit concerning counter-surveillance are misleading. 24 Only one of the alleged false statements or omissions could be said to be deliberate or reckless. The affidavit states that, during the surveillance of Burnes' residence, agents observed numerous vehicles make short, five to twenty minute, stops at the residence. Dickerson stated further that such activity is consistent with and exclusive to trafficking in controlled substances. The Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement investigation report, however, indicates that occupants of only four vehicles stayed at the residence between five and twenty minutes. The occupants of nine of the remaining vehicles stayed between twenty minutes and fifty minutes. The occupants of two vehicles stayed for more than one hour. 25 The other alleged false statements and omissions do not justify a Franks hearing either because Burnes has not demonstrated the requisite degree of culpability or because they are not false statements or omissions. While further investigation by the officers might have revealed that the chemical bottle obtained by the woman at Chem-Lab is not unique to ephedrine, the most that can be said of the officers' failure to further investigate is that they were negligent. There is no indication in the record that their failure was deliberate or reckless or that the statements made were deliberately or recklessly false. Rather, the record demonstrates that the conclusion as to the contents of the bottle was made based on the observations and the combined experience of two veteran narcotics investigators. Mere negligence in checking or recording the facts relevant to a probable-cause determination is not sufficient to warrant a Franks hearing. Franks, 438 U.S. at 170, 98 S.Ct. at 2683. See also United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1221 (9th Cir.1982). Burnes' claim with respect to the two minute gap and the counter-surveillance are equally unavailing. The facts underlying the officers' conclusions were set forth in the affidavit. The affiant's conclusions with respect to those facts were reasonable and based on experience. The mere fact that the affiant did not list every conceivable conclusion does not taint the validity of the affidavit. The conclusions with respect to the two minute gap and the counter-surveillance cannot be considered either a false statement or an omission. 26 Therefore, Burnes' only legitimate claim is that the affidavit contained a reckless and false statement about the duration of the cars' visits to his residence. However, elimination of this false statement from the affidavit does not preclude a finding of probable cause. As the investigation report demonstrates the affidavit correctly states that several vehicles made relatively short stops at Burnes' residence. There is a strong inference that a woman left chemicals, purchased from a chemical supply house known to supply manufacturers of illegal substances, at Burnes' residence. The affidavit also recites counter-surveillance activity consistent with drug trafficking. Information from several informants regarding Burnes' prior trafficking of methamphetamine was corroborated by contemporary activity consistent with drug trafficking. Moreover, [t]he passage of time is not necessarily a controlling, factor in determining the existence of probable cause. Foster, 711 F.2d at 878. Even when purged of the statements concerning the length of the car visits to Burnes' residence, the affidavit contains a substantial basis on which the magistrate could determine that the totality of circumstances established probable cause. The district court did not err in refusing to hold a Franks hearing.