Opinion ID: 1945963
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Victim-Impact Statement

Text: Defendant argues that the victim-impact statement presented to the jury by Loretta Giordano, Jeremy's mother, was unduly prejudicial and violated guidelines established by this Court for such statements in State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 678 A. 2d 164 (1996). Specifically, defendant argues that the statement was too long, inflammatory, emotional, non-factual, and was not sufficiently restricted to the impact that Jeremy's death had on his immediate family. In response, the State contends that the statement complied with the guidelines set forth in Muhammad. The State maintains that both the content and length of the statement were proper and that it did not abridge defendant's constitutional rights. At the conclusion of the penalty phase of the trial, the State proffered the victim-impact statement of Mrs. Giordano. Defendant objected to various portions of the statement and proposed editing the statement to approximately half its original length. The trial court conducted a Rule 104 hearing to consider defendant's objections. Specifically, defendant objected to references to the Giordano family's religion, Jeremy's relationship with his grandparents, references to the death of Jeremy's grandfather and the effect the grandfather's death had on Jeremy's sister, Mrs. Giordano's descriptions of Jeremy as an infant, and a poem that described Mrs. Giordano's feelings about Jeremy's death. The trial court made minor changes to the statement and rephrased certain portions of it, but for the most part rejected defendant's arguments and left the statement intact. (The statement as delivered to the jury by Mrs. Giordano is reprinted as an appendix to this opinion.) The trial court, concluding that the statement did not violate the standards promulgated in Muhammad, explained: There is nothing in the statement, with the minor additionsespecially with the minor editing, changes that I have made in the course of our discussion thus far, which is grossly inflammatory. There's nothing that's unduly prejudicial. And there's nothing extremely likely to divert the jury from its focus on the aggravating and mitigating factors. There is nothing in it containing opinions about the defendant, about the crime, in terms of theyou know, the nature of the crime, other than in terms of it's [a] hard thing that hit us. And there's nothing in it about the appropriate sentence. So thethe statement does not violate thewhat I'll call the negative restrictions of the Supreme Court as reflected in the [ Muhammad ] case and in other cases. Addressing the length of Mrs. Giordano's statement, the trial court observed: Now, I don't think the statement is unduly long in terms of it being burdensome on us. After all, the trial has taken 20 plus days to get to this point. Everybody else has had days and days to present evidence. When I say everyone, the State has had a chance for days to present evidence and Defense has, for days, presented evidence. And there's been much presented. And I think if the family wants to give some of the details of the background andwe shouldn't sit here with a stop watch and with aan editor's blue pencil and limit and edit in an undulyin an unduly controlled environment. So I think therethis is thethis is the family statement, this is Mrs. Giordano's statement, and so long as she meets the requirements of the Supreme Court rulings and of the statute, I think she should be able to say it in her own way and in the kind of detail that she feels comfortable with. We have recounted the history of the Victim's Rights Amendment in State v. Muhammad, supra, 145 N.J. at 32-35, 678 A. 2d 164, and need not repeat that history here. Following the passage of that amendment, the Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(6), which provides: When a defendant at a sentencing proceeding presents evidence of the defendant's character or record pursuant to subparagraph (h) of paragraph (5) of this subsection, the State may present evidence of the murder victim's character and background and of the impact of the murder on the victim's survivors. In State v. Muhammad, supra, 145 N.J. at 40, 678 A. 2d 164, we concluded that the victim-impact statute was constitutional under both the Federal and State Constitutions. Examining the Legislature's intent, we noted that the Legislature [has] determined that before a jury determines whether to sentence a defendant to death, the jurors should, in limited circumstances, be informed about the uniqueness of the victim as a human being and the particular harm caused by the crime. Id. at 45, 678 A. 2d 164. In addition to upholding the constitutionality of the statute, we provided guidance to lower courts in considering the admissibility of such evidence. We indicated that the victim-impact evidence had to be relevant and reliable and must satisfy the balancing test contained in N.J.R.E. 403. Id. at 47, 678 A. 2d 164. The Court suggested that, in evaluating the specific testimony under N.J.R.E. 403, there is a strong presumption that victim impact evidence that demonstrates that the victim was a unique human being is admissible. Id. at 55, 678 A. 2d 164. We noted that certain statements are impermissible, including the victim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the defendant, the crime, or the appropriate sentence. Id. at 47, 678 A. 2d 164. Likewise, the Court noted that statements that are grossly inflammatory, unduly prejudicial, or extremely likely to divert the jury from its focus on the aggravating and mitigating factors should be excluded. Ibid. We reasoned that evidence admitted under the victim-impact statute should be restricted to statements designed to show the impact of the crime on the victim's family and to statements that demonstrate that the victim was not a faceless stranger, but was a unique individual human being. There is no place in a capital case for unduly inflammatory commentary. Id. at 48, 678 A. 2d 164. The Court also cautioned against extensive use of victim-impact evidence and required strict adherence to the legislative provisions. Id. at 52-53, 678 A. 2d 164. Specifically, we noted that [v]ictim impact testimony may not be used as a general aggravating factor or as a means of weighing the worth of the defendant against the worth of the victim. Id. at 53, 678 A. 2d 164. Rather, we emphasized that the statute required that such evidence can be introduced for only one purpose, namely, to assist the jury in determining the appropriate weight to give the catch-all mitigating factor. Ibid. Importantly, we observed that victim-impact evidence may not be introduced in such a manner that would foster the arbitrary and unconstitutional imposition of a death sentence. Ibid. To protect the rights of capital defendants from that possibility, the Court outlined certain procedural safeguards. Id. at 54, 678 A. 2d 164. For example, we determined that absent special circumstances, only one survivor would be allowed to provide the jury with a glimpse of each victim's uniqueness as a human being and to help the jurors make an informed assessment of the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness. Ibid. Especially significant to the present case, the Court also emphasized that [t]he testimony can provide a general factual profile of the victim, including information about the victim's family, employment, education, and interests. The testimony can describe generally the impact of the victim's death on his or her immediate family. The testimony should be factual, not emotional, and should be free of inflammatory comments or references. [ Id. at 54-55, 678 A. 2d 164.] With those tenets in mind, we address defendant's arguments. Defendant first claims that the statement was too long and otherwise not appropriate in its tenor and content. As support, defendant points to State v. Timmendequas, supra, 161 N.J. 515, 737 A. 2d 55, in which the victim-impact statement encompassed only six pages. In contrast, Mrs. Giordano's statement comprised approximately fifteen pages. We reject defendant's argument. We find nothing in our capital jurisprudence that would require us to impose an artificial limit on victim-impact testimony. As the Court observed in State v. Muhammad, supra, 145 N.J. at 47, 678 A. 2d 164, the decision to admit specific victim impact statements will typically be in the discretion of the trial court[.] We should not restrict that discretion by requiring a trial court to measure a victim-impact statement with stop-watch precision. We do not retreat, however, from our reasoning in Muhammad that victim-impact evidence should provide only a glimpse of the murder victim's life and background, and the impact that his or her death has had on immediate family members. Within those parameters, trial courts retain wide discretion concerning the length of victim-impact testimony. In short, victim-impact evidence must be considered on a case-by-case basis, as no two witnesses will be affected by crime precisely in the same manner. The varying factual circumstances presented in capital cases counsel against our establishing a rigid limit on the time or length of such evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the present case. Defendant next claims that the victim's mother's use of poetry in her testimony was improper. Mrs. Giordano included the following poem in her statement to the jury: As time passes by and you're not here The days are long and the nights too much to bear I think most of those loving times, your great big smiles and your silly rhymes Oh how I wish you were here for a while I miss your hug and joking ways And I wish you were here to stay I know God's love is holding you tight I know God holds us in his sight So as time passes by and by I know you hear my awful sigh. Remember always that I care. And Mommy and all of us love you, oh, my Jer. Defendant contends that the poem was too emotional. Moreover, according to defendant, any statement containing poetry, not prose, violates Muhammad. In response, the State emphasizes the brevity of the poem and contends that the poem was not overly emotional. We decline to establish a per se prohibition against the inclusion of poetry in victim-impact testimony. Although we do not read Muhammad as requiring such a per se rule, we do share defendant's concern about the emotional nature of poetry and similar forms of expression. The Court is reluctant to infringe on the ability of victims to express themselves as they see fit, yet we are mindful that such unfettered expressions may be unduly prejudicial to defendants. As in so many other areas of the law, the Court must consider competing concerns in determining the propriety of victim-impact testimony. In considering those concerns here, we uphold the inclusion of the poetry in the present case but caution trial courts to be particularly vigilant in future cases in ensuring that such forms of expression do not breach the parameters established in Muhammad. In its cross-appeal, the State argues that allowing a family member of a murder victim to testify about the family's opposition to the death penalty violates the guideline established in Muhammad, supra, 145 N.J. 23, 678 A. 2d 164, which prohibits victim-impact witnesses from expressing their opinions about the appropriate sentence to be imposed. In response, defendant contends that victim-impact witnesses who do not support the imposition of the death penalty should be allowed to share that opinion with the jury because most jurors assume that the victim's family prefers the death penalty. On cross-examination, defense counsel, over the State's objections, questioned Mrs. Giordano about whether she and her family supported the imposition of the death penalty for defendant. Mrs. Giordano testified that she and her family, coming from a family of faith and Christians, wanted defendant to commit himself to Christ. As previously noted, Mrs. Giordano stated that [w]e are not in favor of the death penalty. I would like the jury to evaluate everything according to what they feel is their job to do according to the laws of the State of New Jersey, according to how they feel that they have to answer to their God. Immediately thereafter, the court explained that it allowed that testimony because it was useful for the jury to know. The court, however, cautioned the jurors that even though Mrs. Giordano and her family may not be supporters of the death penalty, as many people in our society are not, her views aren't controlling. We agree with the State's position. In Muhammad, supra, 145 N.J. at 55, 678 A. 2d 164, we barred victim-impact testimony concerning the victim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the defendant, the crime, or the appropriate sentence. The Court imposed that restriction to help ensure that victim-impact evidence did not inflame the jury or prevent it from deciding the appropriate punishment based solely on relevant factors. Although primarily motivated by a concern that family members would testify in support of the death penalty and thereby unduly prejudice the defendant, the Court's directive in Muhammad applies equally to testimony concerning a family's opposition to the death penalty. Just as victim-impact testimony supportive of the death penalty could inflame the jury and distract it from relevant evidence, so too could testimony in opposition to the death penalty. Moreover, in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed. 2d 720 (1991), the United States Supreme Court left undisturbed the holding in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed. 2d 440 (1987), that the admission of a victim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence violated the Eighth Amendment [of the United States Constitution]. Payne, supra, 501 U.S. at 830 n. 2, 111 S.Ct. at 2611 n. 2, 115 L.Ed. 2d at 739 n. 2 (emphasis added). We thus clarify that Muhammad's prohibition on victim-impact testimony concerning the appropriate penalty is intended to apply to testimony either in support of, or in opposition to, the death penalty. We are mindful of the possibility that some jurors will assume that a victim-impact witness prefers the death penalty when otherwise silent on that question. To guard against that possibility, trial courts should instruct the jury that a victim-impact witness is precluded from expressing an opinion on capital punishment and, therefore, jurors must draw no inference whatsoever by a witness's silence in that regard. In sum, viewing Mrs. Giordano's statement in its entirety, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in admitting it. Nothing contained in that statement had the capacity to affect the jury to such an extent that it would have acted arbitrarily in imposing the death sentence. Mrs. Giordano's opinion that she and her family were opposed to the death penalty, although inappropriate, did not prejudice defendant and actually may have been of some minor benefit to him. (Nor did Mrs. Giordano's opinion prejudice the State in view of the jury's disposition.) Aside from that aspect of Mrs. Giordano's testimony, the victim-impact evidence did not transgress the parameters established in Muhammad, and, therefore, we will not disturb the trial court's discretionary rulings.