Opinion ID: 2265144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Trial Court's Comments Concerning Defendant's Incarceration

Text: Defendant argues that he was deprived of his state-and federal-constitutional rights to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence because the trial court informed prospective jurors that he was incarcerated. We do not agree. On the first day of jury selection, the trial court informed prospective jurors that defendant was incarcerated in the county jail. The court stated: Now, there's one other thing that I must address. On occasion you will see Mr. Martini in the company of Sheriff's Officers. The reason for that, in a capital case such as this where the charge is murder, our law does not provide for bail. The law does not provide for bail, so Mr. Martini is being held in the County Jail. That is the only reason he's being held in the County Jail. The jurors are not to infer that because he is being held, that he is guilty. He is presumed innocent until he's proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. You should draw no adverse inference from the fact that he is in custody. He's only in custody at this point because of the law. The Legislature has made it such. They do not allow for bail in a capital case, and that's not to be held against him. No adverse inferences are to be drawn. That's just the way it is. There was no defense objection to the instruction. A similar instruction was given to the second panel of prospective jurors: You may notice during the course of the proceeding that Mr. Martini's accompanied by a Sheriff's officer. The reason for that is because the law in this State states that bail shall not be set where someone is charged with murder where the State is seeking the death penalty. The fact that that is the law and that he is incarcerated should not in any way influence your thinking about his guilt or innocence. No inferences are to be drawn because of that. That is simply the law, and please keep that in mind. I'll address that again later. Defense counsel objected a short time after the second set of instructions had been given: While we're waiting, Judge, I would like to enter an objection for the record about my client being arrested by guards or being surrounded by guards earlier, and I think it would prejudice the entire panel against my client knowing that he is being patrolled by guards and not subject to bail and, consequently, I think that the burden has shifted to the defense to prove his innocence. The prosecutor responded by suggesting that defense counsel had agreed previously to the charge. The trial court answered: Well, I don't know if it was agreed, but I'm sure the argument, if I hadn't instructed the jury and he was seen in the company of the Sheriff's officers, would be that the jury's now going to speculate, and I think the instruction was clear. It was a proper instruction. We'll repeat that and make sure the jury is not to draw any inferences, and that its only because of the Legislature and the law passed that he is in custody and for no other reason. Defendant argues that the instructions denied him his rights to due process, equal protection, and a fair trial under both the federal and state constitutions. Defendant makes an analogy to instances in which a defendant is compelled to appear for trial in a prison uniform or handcuffs. The United States Supreme Court condemned that practice in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed. 2d 126 (1976). In Estelle, the defendant appeared at trial in prison garb after his request for civilian clothes had been denied. The Supreme Court noted that [c]ourts have, with few exceptions, determined that an accused should not be compelled to go to trial in prison or jail clothing because of the possible impairment of the presumption [of innocence] so basic to the adversary system. Id. at 504, 96 S.Ct. at 1693, 48 L.Ed. 2d at 130. The Court held, however, that the error could be harmless. Where a defendant was being tried for an offense committed while in confinement or for an escape, compelled prison attire would be harmless because `[n]o prejudice can result from seeing that which is already known' or that would become known in any event. Id. at 507, 96 S.Ct. at 1694, 48 L.Ed. 2d at 132 (quoting United States v. Henderson, 472 F. 2d 556, 557 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 971, 93 S.Ct. 2166, 36 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1973)). The policy of compelling defendants to appear in prison garb was also condemned in State v. Carrion-Collazo, 221 N.J. Super. 103, 112-13, 534 A. 2d 21 (App.Div. 1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 171, 540 A. 2d 171 (1988). As in the case of the federal rule, the court held that such an error could be harmless. [W]e are satisfied that the due process rights of a defendant can be sufficiently safeguarded,    even when a defendant's incarceration is apparent to the jury, by a proper voir dire of the jurors and a cautionary instruction   . Id. 221 N.J. Super. at 112, 534 A. 2d 21. In Carrion-Collazo, defense counsel requested an instruction warning potential jurors not to draw any inferences from the defendant's clothing, and the matter was discussed during voir dire. Id. at 106-07, 534 A. 2d 21. In Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed. 2d 525 (1986), a defendant seeking reversal of his conviction invoked Estelle after he had been compelled to go through trial with four uniformed state troopers sitting in the front row of the spectators' section. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected his claim, holding that not every practice tending to single out the accused from everyone else in the courtroom must be struck down. Id. at 567, 106 S.Ct. at 1345, 89 L.Ed. 2d at 533. The Court recognized that jurors are quite aware that the defendant appearing before them did not arrive there by choice or happenstance. Ibid. [W]e have never tried, the Court continued, and could never hope, to eliminate from trial procedures every reminder that the State has chosen to marshal its resources against a defendant to punish him for alleged criminal activity. Id. at 567, 106 S.Ct. at 1345, 89 L.Ed. 2d at 533-34. The Court held that the presence of security officers was not inherently prejudicial because of the wider range of inferences that a juror might reasonably draw from the officers' presence. Id. at 569, 106 S.Ct. at 1346, 89 L.Ed. 2d at 534. Although the presence of guards may be taken as a sign that a defendant is dangerous or culpable, it need not be. Jurors may just as easily believe that the officers are there to guard against disruptions emanating from outside the courtroom or to ensure that tense courtroom exchanges do not erupt into violence. Id. at 569, 106 S.Ct. at 1346, 89 L.Ed. 2d at 534-35. Courts have not been as sensitive to references to a defendant's incarceration as they have been to the forced wearing of prison garb. In State v. Childs, 204 N.J. Super. 639, 651-52, 499 A. 2d 1041 (App.Div. 1985), the court found no error as a result of a passing reference to a defendant's incarcerated status. On direct examination, the defendant in Childs indicated that she kept money hidden in her bra because she had been robbed since I have been here. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked, [y]ou stated that you started keeping money in your bra because money has been taken since you have been here. You mean in custody? Id. at 651, 499 A. 2d 1041. The trial court refused to grant a mistrial, finding the error too insignificant to warrant a mistrial. Ibid. The Appellate Division affirmed. The court noted that the reference to custody was fleeting and inadvertent. Id. at 651-52, 499 A. 2d 1041. The court continued, It cannot have surprised the jury to hear about [the defendant] being in custody because they knew she had been stopped on the road, taken to the police station and searched. Id. at 652, 499 A. 2d 1041. Significantly, the court also noted that the prejudicial effect of the remark must not have been too great, as the defendant was acquitted of the most serious of the charges that she faced. Ibid. Defendant argues that if the courts actively discourage the mere suggestion that a defendant is incarcerated, then specifically telling the jurors that defendant is in jail can never be countenanced, at least not without a waiver from defendant. In addition, defendant asserts that the range of possible inferences that a jury could draw from the presence of Sheriff's officers was negated by the court's instructions, leaving jurors with only one possible inference: that he is both dangerous and guilty. We disagree for several reasons. The trial court did more than merely alert the potential jurors that defendant was incarcerated. The reason that the court addressed the jurors was to instruct them not to draw any negative inferences from defendant's status. That the trial court concluded that the presence of officers could have undermined the fairness of the trial is clear. Steps were then taken to ensure that no unfairness would ensue. The trial court's instructions were not only permissible, they were the preferable course of action. We also note that defendant's objection is curious in light of subsequent developments at trial. During direct examination, defense counsel elicited from Dr. Greenfield, one of defendant's expert witnesses, that Martini had been incarcerated since his arrest. Dr. Greenfield testified that he had given defendant three psychological screening tests at the county jail. In addition, during cross-examination of Alice Martini she made an unsolicited reference to her husband's incarceration. Defense counsel did not object. At any rate, the trial court's instructions did not harm defendant. To the extent that his incarceration was brought to the attention of prospective jurors, it was done for the purpose of ensuring that defendant would not be prejudiced.