Opinion ID: 2276759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Admission of Evidence of Unadjudicated Bad Acts (Strong's point 3)

Text: Strong alleges that the trial court erred and plainly erred during the penalty phase in overruling his objections and not sua sponte excluding evidence of non-statutory aggravating circumstances, letting the jury consider that evidence in reaching its penalty phase verdict without proper instruction, and accepting the jury's guilt and penalty phase verdicts. Strong specifically argues it was error for the trial court to permit testimony of prior assaults he committed against Eva, his ex-wife, and a former coworker of Strong's.
Strong's claim of error as to the four witnesses' testimony about his assaults is unpreserved. He filed a motion in limine to exclude the admission of the police reports and orders of protection entered against him after these assaults. He did not, however, object to the admission of these witnesses' testimony about these incidents. See State v. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d 83, 94 (Mo. banc 1998) (defendant's allegation of error on appeal that differed from his argument at trial was not preserved). This claim of error will be reviewed only for plain error. Rule 30.20. Strong's ex-wife testified that when she was four-and-a-half months pregnant with her second child by Strong, she met Strong to exchange custody of their son since they were separated. She testified that Strong started striking her at that time. The police were called. After the police left, she again attempted to leave with her son in her arms. This time, Strong began pushing and hitting and then struck her from behind a couple of times in different places. She said he hit her on the ear and almost caused her to lose consciousness. A former coworker of Strong's testified that when she worked with Strong, she and her boyfriend would occasionally socialize with him and his ex-wife. The coworker said that she and Strong were close and even went out alone a few times. She was driving a car with Strong in the passenger seat when she told him of her decision to terminate their social relationship. She testified that, while she was telling him they could no longer associate, he got upset and grabbed the steering wheel and took [the car] into oncoming traffic. While she attempted to regain control of the car, he was yelling and cursing and proceeded to hit [her] in [her] face and wherever he could. She said the next thing she recalled was being awakened by the police. The car had hit the sidewalk, hopped the curb, and stopped. When she awoke, she was bloody and in a lot of pain. Photographs of her face after this incident were admitted into evidence. Two different witnesses testified as to prior assaults on Eva. The previous section of this opinion included the testimony of the police officer who responded to the 911 call on November 10, 1999, at 11:30 p.m., when Eva was assaulted. A friend of Eva's also testified as to that same incident. The friend said that Eva called her at 7 a.m. the next day and asked her to come over. The friend stated that Eva's forehead was busted open, her left eye was closed shut, she had welts around her neck and handprints on her neck, and she had bruises on her arms. The friend also testified that she had heard Strong on two occasions threaten to kill Eva. The second threat, according to the friend, occurred when Eva was pregnant with Strong's daughter. She testified she had overheard Strong say he was going to get a chance to kill [Eva] and her baby. Strong contends State v. Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. banc 1993), supports his claim that admitting unadjudicated bad acts constitutes error. This argument is unpersuasive as the error in Debler was lack of notice. State v. Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496, 517 (Mo. banc 2004); State v. Christeson, 50 S.W.3d 251, 269-70 (Mo. banc 2001); State v. Ervin, 979 S.W.2d 149, 158 (Mo. banc 1998). The trial court has discretion during the punishment phase of trial to admit whatever evidence it deems helpful to the jury in assessing punishment. Glass, 136 S.W.3d at 517; State v. Six, 805 S.W.2d 159, 166 (Mo. banc 1991). The trial court did not err, plain or otherwise, in admitting the testimony about Strong's prior assaults on Eva, his ex-wife, or his former coworker.
Strong contends on appeal that instructions 17 and 22, modeled after MAI-CR3d 313.41A, were improper because they let the jury decide what burden of proof it would apply and on whom to place that burden. At trial, however, he objected to these instructions because they were not supported by the evidence and vague and unconstitutional. Because these allegations of error differ, this argument is unpreserved and will be reviewed solely for plain error. Bucklew, 973 S.W.2d at 94; Rule 30.20. This Court has repeatedly rejected the claim that the admission in the penalty phase of unadjudicated bad acts violates due process because the state is not required to prove those acts beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Ferguson, 20 S.W.3d 485, 500 (Mo. banc 2000); State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 331 (Mo. banc 1996). The trial court did not err, plain or otherwise, in submitting instructions 17 and 22 to the jury.