Opinion ID: 2738502
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d 618, 628 (1989), aff'd, 127 N.J. 286, 604 A.2d

Text: 110 (1990). Pinigis v. Regions Bank, 977 So. 2d 446, 450-51 (Ala. 2007). In Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Seven Up Bottling Co. of Jasper, Inc., 746 So. 2d 966, 969 (Ala. 1999), this Court stated: [W]hen circumstances surrounding the enactment of a statute cast doubt on the otherwise clear language of the statute, we must look to other factors in determining legislative intent. This Court further stated in Archer Daniels: As the plaintiff correctly points out, § 6–5–60[, Ala. Code 1975,] is not, on its face, limited to transactions involving intrastate commerce. We hasten to add, however, that there is no language in § 6–5–60 that conclusively indicates an intent on the Legislature's part to regulate transactions involving the shipment of goods through interstate commerce. Because the language of § 6–5–60, standing alone, is not conclusive on the question of legislative intent, and because other factors, including the legislative history of Alabama's antitrust statutes, as well as the state of the law at the time of their enactment, cast doubt on the original intent of the Legislature, we find it necessary to look beyond the language of the statute. 746 So. 2d at 973. The foregoing rationale applies to this Court's determination of legislative intent with respect to § 12-1514 1121462 114. As our earlier discussion of the history of the 2008 AJJA indicates, it was well settled prior to the enactment of the 2008 AJJA that juvenile courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over all termination-of-parental-rights petitions. This included a petition filed by a parent seeking to terminate the parental rights of the other parent of the child, based on our decision in Ex parte Beasley in which we held that a finding of dependency was not required in such a case. We stated in Beasley that it would be illogical for a parent, who is adequately caring for the child, to have to prove that he or she is not providing adequate care (i.e., that the child is dependent) in order to bring such an action, because the petitioning parent would then be estopped from bringing the action. In light of the history of the 2008 AJJA, if the legislature had intended for the circuit court, as a court of general jurisdiction, to now have jurisdiction over termination petitions filed by one parent against the other parent, it would not have done so by legislative silence. Additionally, it is unlikely that the legislature would place jurisdiction over termination petitions in two different courts. 15 1121462 It is also unlikely that the legislature, in providing that the juvenile court has jurisdiction of termination petitions arising out of dependency, delinquency, or child-inneed-of-supervision proceedings intended to prohibit one parent from filing a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of the other parent. As Judge Pittman noted in his dissent in C.C. v. L.J., the legislature, in adopting the entirety of the 2008 AJJA, provided that a parent may bring a petition to terminate the parental rights of the other parent of the child. § 12-15-317. If the legislature intended to foreclose a parent from bringing a termination petition by first requiring an allegation of dependency, it would not have also provided for the right to bring such a termination petition in the 2008 AJJA. It is also unlikely that the legislature intended to foreclose a parent from filing a termination petition against another parent, but then to allow a parent to file a termination petition against the other parent when a stepparent wants to adopt the child. In S.N.W. v. M.D.F.H., 127 So. 3d 1225 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013), the stepfather of the child filed a petition in the probate court seeking to adopt 16 1121462 the child. After the case was transferred to the juvenile court, the mother filed a petition to terminate the biological father's parental rights in order for the stepfather to adopt the child. The father argued that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under § 12-15-114 to terminate his parental rights because the underlying action did not begin as a dependency, delinquency, or child-in-need-of-supervision proceeding. Without referring to § 12-15-115(a)(4), which provides the juvenile court with original jurisdiction over proceedings transferred from the probate court, the Court of Civil Appeals held that § 26-10A-3, Ala. Code 1975, a provision of the Alabama Adoption Code, provides that the probate court has jurisdiction over adoption proceedings and that it has jurisdiction to transfer a case to the juvenile court for the limited purpose of terminating parental rights. The Court of Civil Appeals held that because § 26-10A-3 does not mandate that the termination-of-parental-rights proceeding be predicated on a dependency proceeding or a finding of dependency, the juvenile court had jurisdiction to entertain the mother's petition to terminate the father's parental rights so as to allow the stepfather to adopt the child. We 17 1121462 see no reason for the legislature to have provided that a parent be allowed to terminate the parental rights of the other parent simply because a stepparent adoption is involved, but not allow a parent to bring a termination proceeding when there is no pending stepparent adoption. It is unlikely that the legislature intended for a noncustodial parent to able to bring a termination petition against the custodial parent while not allowing a custodial parent to bring such a petition. In T.K. v. M.G., 82 So. 3d 1 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011), a majority of the Court of Civil Appeals held that a father, who was not the custodial parent, could bring a dependency petition against the custodial mother invoking the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under § 12-15114. The Court of Civil Appeals concluded that for the purpose of jurisdiction of the juvenile court, having a fit noncustodial parent who is willing and able to care for the child does not preclude a juvenile court from finding that the child is dependent. It does not follow that the legislature would prohibit a custodial parent from filing a termination petition while allowing a noncustodial parent to do so. The 2008 AJJA defines a dependent child to include a child who 18 1121462 is in need of care or supervision and [w]ho is without a parent, legal guardian, or legal custodian willing and able to provide for the care, support, or education of the child. § 12–15–102(8)a.2., Ala. Code 1975. So long as the parent is fit, it should make no difference whether that parent currently has custody. We note that, in the present case, the mother filed a petition in the juvenile court seeking to determine paternity of the child. Section 12-15-115(a)(6) provides that the juvenile court has original jurisdiction over petitions to establish parentage pursuant to the Alabama Uniform Parentage Act, § 26-17-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. Section 12-15-317 of the 2008 AJJA allows a parent to file a petition to terminate parental rights, and § 12-15-319 sets out the grounds for termination, which include abandonment, which the mother alleges here. If the juvenile court had jurisdiction over the paternity petition under § 12-15-115 and § 12-15-317 allows a parent to file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the other parent, then the juvenile court should have jurisdiction to address the mother's termination petition 19 1121462 without a finding of dependency. See S.N.W. v. M.D.F.H., supra. While this appeal was pending, the legislature adopted Act No. 2014-350, Ala. Acts 2014, which amended § 12-15-114 to read as follows: (c) A juvenile court shall also exercise exclusive jurisdiction over each of the following: .... (2) Proceedings for termination of parental rights. In enacting Act No. 2014-350, the legislature stated: Section 2. The Legislature finds that its original intent in the adoption of Act 2008–277, the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act, was for a juvenile court to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all termination of parental rights proceedings. The amendatory language to Section 12–15–114, Code of Alabama 1975, provided in Section 1, is intended to be curative and shall apply retroactively for the purpose of ratifying and confirming the exercise of original jurisdiction of the juvenile court to hear and adjudicate termination of parental rights cases filed in juvenile court on and after January 1, 2009, and prior to the effective date of this act [April 8, 2014]. Any order of a juvenile court issued while exercising jurisdiction pursuant to this section during that time shall be deemed valid in absence of an adjudication on appeal to the contrary. Section 3. The provisions of this act are severable. If any part of this act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, that declaration shall not affect the part which remains. 20 1121462 Section 4. This act shall become effective immediately following its passage and approval by the Governor, or its otherwise becoming law. The 2014 amendments to § 12-15-114 bear out the legislature's intent to not change the juvenile court's jurisdiction over all termination-of-parental-rights cases. 'When statutes are amended or replaced by succeeding legislation, the Legislature often seeks to clarify previously ambiguous provisions. These subsequent acts by the Legislature must be considered in trying to determine the intent of the legislation. 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, § 178.' McWhorter v. State Bd. of Registration for Prof'l Eng'rs & Land Surveyors, 359 So. 2d 769, 773 (Ala. 1978). T-Mobile South, LLC v. Bonet, 85 So. 3d 963, 979 (Ala. 2011). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that a juvenile court may exercise jurisdiction under § 12-15-114 over a termination-of-parental-rights claim when the subject of the termination was not a child alleged to have committed a delinquent act, to be dependent, or to be in need of supervision. As Judge Pittman noted in his dissent, the 2008 AJJA did not alter the formerly prevailing law under which a parent could seek termination of parental rights in the juvenile court. Moreover, the legislature clearly expressed its intent in its 2014 amendments that under the 2008 AJJA the 21 1121462 juvenile court have exclusive original jurisdiction over all termination-of-parental-rights proceedings. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remand the cause for that court to consider any arguments that may have been pretermitted by the Court of Civil Appeals' analysis. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Moore, C.J., and Parker, Main, Wise, and Bryan, JJ., concur. Stuart and Murdock, JJ., concur specially. Bolin and Shaw, JJ., concur in the result. 22 1121462