Opinion ID: 2070589
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Estoppel Against the Municipality

Text: As a general rule, courts are reluctant to invoke estoppel against the government on the basis of an action of one of its officers. Lerner v. Gill, 463 A.2d 1352, 1362 (R.I.1983). Indeed, any party dealing with a municipality `is bound at his own peril to know the extent of its capacity.' Vieira v. Jamestown Bridge Commission, 91 R.I. 350, 358, 163 A.2d 18, 23 (1960) (quoting Austin v. Coggeshall, 12 R.I. 329, 332 (1879)). Thus, for Mario's to establish that it was entitled to the benefits of the equitable estoppel doctrine against the town, it would have had to show that one or more duly authorized representatives of the town affirmatively represented to it by word or deed that  notwithstanding the town's future enactment of ordinances outlawing such conduct  it still would be allowed to offer nude dancing at its liquor-serving establishment; that such representations were designed to induce plaintiff's reliance thereon; and that plaintiff actually and justifiably relied thereon to its detriment. El Marocco Club, Inc., 746 A.2d at 1234. (Emphases added.) Here, the only evidence Mario's adduced in support of its estoppel argument was that the town solicitor, one or more individual council members, and/or the town clerk allegedly assured Mario's attorney and another representative of Mario's that it would be grandfathered against application of any of the town's present and future anti-nudity ordinances that were then in effect, under consideration, or that might be enacted in the future. But neither the solicitor's alleged representations nor those of any individual council members or other town officials were those of duly authorized representatives of the town vis-à-vis the alleged promise of grandfathered status. Cf. Providence Teachers Union v. Providence School Board, 689 A.2d 388, 392 (R.I.1997) (holding that union was not allowed to rely upon representations of school board concerning the validity of a collective bargaining agreement because the board lacked the capacity to bind the municipality without the city council's ratification of the agreement); see also Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers v. State Department of Corrections, 707 A.2d 1229, 1237-38 (R.I.1998) (holding that, because Director of State Department of Corrections had no authority to modify collective bargaining agreement by orally agreeing to past practice allowing paid full-time leave for employees to work on union business, Governor was not precluded from defining what grounds might exist to withhold state approval for such paid-leave requests). None of them possessed any actual or apparent authority to make such statements because, absent special circumstances not present here, a city or town council acts through a majority vote of those members who are present at a duly convened meeting of the council. See, e.g., Johnston Town Charter, § 3-9(a) (authorizing council to act by rule, ordinance, or resolution). Here, as in Technology Investors v. Town of Westerly, 689 A.2d 1060, 1062 (R.I.1997) (holding that a municipality cannot enact an ordinance in contravention of state law), [t]he significant policy that undergirds this rule cannot be set aside by estoppel.    Such an estoppel cannot beapplicable when the municipality's acts were clearly ultra vires. Thus, any putative detrimental reliance by Mario's on the town's alleged past practice of settling lawsuits via its solicitor without specifically authorizing him to do so and on the representations of any individual council members, the solicitor, or the town clerk concerning whether the council would grandfather Mario's against enforcement of the town's present and future anti-nudity ordinances would not have been justified. See id. See also Ferrelli v. Department of Employment Security, 106 R.I. 588, 594, 261 A.2d 906, 910 (1970) (stating that a public agency or its officers must be acting within their authority before the doctrine of estoppel can be applied against them). Hence, the trial justice properly rejected Mario's estoppel claim.