Opinion ID: 387100
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Griffin v. Breckenridge

Text: 19 Section 1985(3) was originally enacted by Congress as a part of the Ku Klux Klan Act in order to enforce the Civil War amendments to the Constitution and to provide a means of redress for persons victimized by the Klan's acts of terror and intimidation. The statute imposes civil liability on persons conspiring to deprive another person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. 4 Narrow judicial construction made section 1985(3) a seldom-used remedy during the first century after its enactment. See, e. g., Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 71 S.Ct. 937, 95 L.Ed. 1253 (1951). However, the Supreme Court decided in 1971 to accord to the words of the statute their apparent meaning and held section 1985(3) provided a civil remedy for damages against wholly private infringements of constitutionally protected rights. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338, 345 (1971). In Griffin, a group of whites assaulted three black men along a Mississippi highway in the mistaken belief that their victims were the associates of a civil rights worker. The blacks brought an action under section 1985(3) to redress violations of the laws of the United States and of Mississippi, including the rights of free speech, assembly, association, interstate travel, liberty, and security of their persons. The Supreme Court first held that the text of the statute, recent judicial interpretations given to related civil rights provisions, the complementary relationship of the various civil rights statutes, and the legislative history surrounding section 1985(3) all point unwaveringly to § 1985(3)'s coverage of private conspiracies. 403 U.S. at 101, 91 S.Ct. at 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d at 347. 20 While eliminating the state action requirement, the Griffin court was concerned that the statute, if applied too broadly, would displace many areas of tort law that have traditionally been reserved to the states and thereby violate constitutionally-based principles of federalism. That the Statute was meant to reach private activity does not ... mean that it was intended to apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others. 403 U.S. at 101, 91 S.Ct. at 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d at 347. Accordingly, the Court read section 1985(3) to apply only to actions which are inspired by some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. 403 U.S. at 102, 91 S.Ct. at 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d at 348. It then delineated four elements necessary for a plaintiff to establish a § 1985(3) cause of action: 21 (1) the defendants must conspire or go in disguise on the highway or premises of another; 22 (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and 23 (3) one or more of the conspirators must commit some act in furtherance of the conspiracy; whereby 24 (4) another is either (a) injured in his person or property or (b) deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. 25 See id. at 102-03, 91 S.Ct. at 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d at 348. Subsequently, this court has added a fifth element,(5) that the conspirators' conduct must be unlawful independent of the section 1985(3) violation. 26 See McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc). 27 The Griffin court, having concluded that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action under section 1985(3), then sought to locate a source of congressional power to reach the private conspiracy alleged. The sources identified in Griffin were the Thirteenth Amendment and the constitutional right to travel. 403 U.S. at 104-06, 91 S.Ct. at 1799-1800, 29 L.Ed.2d at 349-50. The Court observed, however, that other provisions of the Constitution, including section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, might empower Congress to reach other conspiracies by private persons. Id. at 107, 91 S.Ct. at 1801, 29 L.Ed.2d at 351. However, the Court found the facts of that case made it unnecessary to look beyond the Thirteenth Amendment and the right to interstate travel.