Opinion ID: 2352390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Next, Appellant argues there was insufficient evidence to convict him of being a persistent felony offender pursuant to KRS 532.080. Specifically, he contends the Commonwealth failed to prove that he was over the age of eighteen at the time the prior offenses were committed and that the outcome of the fact situation in this case is directly controlled by the holding in Hon v. Commonwealth, 670 S.W.2d 851 (Ky.1984). We disagree. In Hon , the Commonwealth attempted to prove the defendant was over the age of eighteen at the time a prior offense was committed by submitting evidence of the following: (1) the defendant's birth date; and (2) the year of the prior conviction. Id. at 852. This evidence established that the defendant was twenty-two years old at the time of his prior conviction. Id. Pursuant to Kendricks v. Commonwealth, 557 S.W.2d 417 (Ky.1977), the Commonwealth argued that since he was twenty-two years old at the time of his prior conviction, it could be reasonably inferred by the jury that he was over the age of eighteen at the time the underlying offense was committed. Id. This Court overruled Kendricks, holding that such indirect evidence was not sufficient to prove the age element of KRS 532.080. Id. at 853. Rather, the Hon Court ruled that in a proceeding under the persistent felony offender statute, the Commonwealth must prove by direct evidence that the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time he committed the previous offenses . . . . Id. (emphasis added). However, sixteen years later, this Court overruled the strict direct evidence standard of proof enunciated in Hon and reinstated the general standards set forth in Kendricks. [2] Martin v. Commonwealth, 13 S.W.3d 232, 235 (Ky.2000). Accordingly, it is now acceptable for an offender's age at the time he committed prior offenses to be proven by both (1) direct evidence; and (2) indirect evidence so long as the indirect evidence is sufficient to create a reasonable inference that the offender was eighteen at the time he committed the underlying offense. Id. In this case, Appellant simply states that the Commonwealth attempted to prove his age by submitting a certified copy of a judgment of conviction which contained his birth date and the date of conviction. He argues that such evidence is per se insufficient, pursuant to Hon , to prove his age at the time he committed the underlying offense. We disagree. As we just explained, Hon was overruled to the extent that it required direct evidence regarding proof of age at the time the offender committed the underlying offense. Accordingly, such indirect evidence can be sufficient to withstand a motion for directed verdict so long as it meets the minimum standards of proof set forth in Kendricks (which is simply the standard of proof for determining the sufficiency of the evidence in any criminal case, see Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187-88 (Ky. 1991)). Pursuant to the general standards re-established in Martin, we must review the evidence in each case to determine whether it is sufficient, when considered in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, for a reasonable jury to fairly find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Benham, supra , at Id.; see also Howell v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 442, 448 (Ky.2005). Yet, once again, neither the Commonwealth nor Appellant saw fit to designate the certified judgments for our review as part of the record in this appeal. In Commonwealth v. Thompson, 697 S.W.2d 143, 145 (Ky.1985) this Court warned: We will not engage in gratuitous speculation as urged upon us by appellate counsel, based upon a silent record. It has long been held that, when the complete record is not before the appellate court, that court must assume that the omitted record supports the decision of the trial court. Accordingly, because we are provided with no evidence to suggest otherwise, we will assume the judgments do create a reasonable inference that Appellant was eighteen at the time he committed the prior offenses. [3] Moreover, despite the absence of this evidence in the appellate record, Appellant himself testified at trial, admitting that he had been convicted of three prior felonies in federal court and stating that the felonies stemmed from activities which occurred between the years 1990 and 1999. The Christian Circuit Court judgment in this case indicates that Defendant's date of birth is December, 1970, and thus, by Appellant's own testimony, the earliest felony occurred no earlier than 1990, when he was nineteen or twenty years old. This evidence alone, without consideration of the certified judgments not contained in the appellate record, is sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Appellant was at least eighteen years old at the time the prior felonies were committed. Appellant also argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for trafficking in cocaine. The standard for determining the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case is set forth in Benham, supra . After careful review, we believe the record before us is sufficient to support Appellant's conviction for trafficking in cocaine.