Opinion ID: 686730
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: District Court's Refusal to Hear Defense's Entire Case

Text: 38 Both defendants contend that the district court refused to hear their whole case and thereby violated their fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendment rights to due process and trial by jury. Specifically, they complain that the district court (1) limited the number of witnesses Holmes's attorney was allowed to call and (2) restricted counsel's examination of Mazzella. 39 (1) Limitation on the Number of Witnesses 40 After Holmes's counsel had examined eight witnesses on his defense case, the court inquired how many more witnesses he planned to call. Counsel said he planned to call twelve or fifteen more witnesses. The court told him to choose his best witnesses and [p]are it down. 41 Ultimately, the judge permitted counsel to call eight more witnesses, but declined to hear five others. Three of the five were to testify that Holmes had cashed checks for them and had managed their money because they were unable to control their own funds. The other two, relatives of Holmes, were to testify that Holmes had received or inherited about $150,000 from family members. Defendants argue that their witnesses were prevented from testifying about substantive things that have been raised by Miss Robidoux as far as the members were concerned. 42 While [f]ew rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1049, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), this right does not preclude a judge from placing reasonable restrictions on the admission of evidence based on the concerns as to prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). Absent a clear abuse of discretion, a trial judge retains a wide latitude to exclude irrelevant, repetitive, or cumulative evidence. Id.; see also United States v. Edwards, 631 F.2d 1049, 1051 (2d Cir.1980) (district court has broad discretion to exclude evidence that is irrelevant or cumulative); United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 31, 37 (2d Cir.1987) ([t]he permissible scope and extent of cross-examination lie within the discretion of the trial judge). 43 We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's excluding Holmes's additional witnesses. As to three of the witnesses, the government objected on relevancy grounds, arguing that their testimony would explain neither the depositing into Holmes's personal bank accounts of any checks that the government claimed were fraudulently issued nor the disposition of funds related to those checks. When the court inquired as to the relevance of the witnesses' testimony, Holmes's counsel responded that it was offered to prove that the cash withdrawals that the government claimed constituted the structured withdrawals of the embezzled money could have been the withdrawal of the three witnesses' money. However, when the court inquired whether the witnesses would testify to specific transactions within the relevant time frame or to the specific dates that they had received money from Holmes, counsel responded that [t]hey could not testify [as to] a particular date. Absent some connection between the testimony and the transactions at issue in this case, there was no abuse of discretion in excluding the testimony. 44 The court also properly excluded the testimony of the other two witnesses, the two relatives who would testify that Holmes had inherited about $150,000 from another relative. Counsel explained that the purpose of the testimony was to show that Holmes was not in need of financial assistance and thus, had no motive to commit the crime. However, one of the gifts was received 2-4 years before the alleged crimes began, and the other was 11-12 years before so the court ruled that this was too remote. We find no reversible error here, either. 45 (2) Limitation of Mazzella's Examination. 46 During trial, the defense called Agent Mazzella, who testified that he had suggested to Robidoux that she tape-record telephone conversations with Holmes. On direct, Mazzella confirmed that he knew the defendants were targets of a criminal investigation, that subpoenas had already been issued seeking documents from the union in connection with the investigation that led to this trial, that he was aware that there was a motion to quash the subpoena, and that he had seen the papers for the motion. When counsel asked if Mazzella knew whether the defendants' motion to quash was made pro se or through counsel, the district court sustained the government's objection and asked, What does this line of questioning have to do with anything? When Holmes's counsel started to answer, Judge if they were represented by counsel at that time    , the court interrupted and prohibited counsel from continuing this line of questioning. Defendants now contend that further questioning would have revealed that Mazzella intentionally violated their fifth and sixth amendment rights by seeking to obtain incriminating evidence from Holmes when Holmes was a target of a criminal investigation and was represented by counsel. 47 Defendants also argue that further cross-examination would have demonstrated Mazzella's bias. Defendants contend that Mazzella's credibility was fundamental to the prosecution's case and that attacking his credibility was important to the defense's case. 48 The sixth amendment guarantees an accused the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1109-10, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). An accused may cross-examine a witness to reveal possible biases, prejudices, or motives. Id. at 316, 94 S.Ct. at 1110 (partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial and is 'always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony' ). However, it is the trial judge [who] is in the best position to weigh competing interests in deciding whether or not to admit certain evidence, and [a]bsent an abuse of discretion, the decision of the trial judge to admit or reject evidence will not be overturned by an appellate court. United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1232 (2d Cir.1983). 49 In this case, the trial court's limitation of Agent Mazzella's examination was within its discretion. The subpoenas had been issued for documents of the union. Nothing showed that Holmes, individually, had any direct involvement in the motion to quash. Thus, further inquiry of Agent Mazzella about the motion was irrelevant. To the extent that Holmes claims that the inquiry could have undermined Mazzella's credibility, this claim is speculative, for there is no necessary connection between Holmes' being represented by counsel and either the union's motion to quash or the fact that the union had to be represented by counsel on the motion. Moreover, as discussed in detail later, in this opinion, Holmes's right to counsel did not attach until later, when specific charges were filed against him. In short, there was no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to preclude further examination of Mazzella on this point. 50