Opinion ID: 184422
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Disparate Treatment Complaint

Text: The disparate treatment complaint alleges that the SBAcommitted an unfair labor practice in violation of 5 U.S.C.s 7116(a)(1) by inundating Wildberger with memoranda, byprohibiting him from using various agency resources (such ase-mail) for personal reasons, and by imposing a number ofother restrictions on him. Complaint and Notice of Hearing(Case No. 21060), J.A. 331-32. In addition, the complaintalleged that the SBA committed an unfair labor practice inviolation of 5 U.S.C. s 7116(a)(2) (prohibiting federal employees from discouraging membership in any labor organizationthrough discrimination in working conditions) by imposing theitemized restrictions on Wildberger while not applying thesame restrictions to other bargaining unit employees. Id. When this complaint was initially considered by the FLRA,the General Counsel for the FLRA emphasized the discriminatory nature of the restrictions imposed upon Wildberger,see J.A. 79-80, and the FLRA-ALJ decided the claim againstWildberger on the merits, not on jurisdictional grounds. SeeJ.A. 120-27. The Authority, however, rejected the ALJ'sdetermination and dismissed this claim under section 7116(d). Wildberger [FLRA], 1995 WL 648828, at -9. Although the MSPB-ALJ's determination that Wildberger's use of agency resources for union organizing purposeswas not statutorily-protected activity might be construed as apreclusive determination of Wildberger's claim that SBA orders prohibiting such use violated section 7116(a)(1), theMSPB never addressed Wildberger's allegations of discriminatory treatment in violation of section 7116(a)(2). Moreover,the record does not clearly indicate that these issues necessarily came into play in the affirmative defenses consideredby the MSPB. Thus, although to some extent the factualpredicate underlying Wildberger's disparate treatment com- plaint was addressed by the MSPB, the MSPB did notconsiderCand indeed declined jurisdiction overCone of thelegal theories raised in this complaint. Accordingly, thiscomplaint is remanded to the Authority for a decision on themerits. 4.Wildberger's Complaints Focus on Individual, not Institutional, Interests Significantly, the FLRA maintained that it will assertjurisdiction over unfair labor practice charges which affectunion organizing on a larger scale, as opposed to the activitiesof a single individual who brings unfair labor practicecharges, subsequently suffers an adverse action, and raisesthe same issues underlying the unfair labor practice chargesin appealing the adverse action to the MSPB. Wildberger[FLRA], 1995 WL 648828, at . Whether or not a particularunfair labor practice charge fits within this exception in anygiven case is for the Authority to determine in the firstinstance. Although Wildberger suggests that he has institutional interests as National President of SOLIDARITYU.S.A., see, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 27, the unfair laborpractice complaints were filed in Wildberger's name, notSolidarity's, and assert only Wildberger's individual rights to 'form, join, or assist any labor organization ... freely andwithout fear of penalty or reprisal ...,'  not Solidarity'sinstitutional interests per se. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. s 7102). Cf. Local 1411, 960 F.2d at 179 ( '[Section 7116(d)] does notpreclude a union in its institutional capacity as an aggrievedparty from filing an unfair labor practice charge to enforce itsown independent rights merely because an employee hasinitiated an appeal or grievance ... based on the same factualsituation to enforce his individual rights.' ) (quoting Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648, 665 n.20 (1985) (alterations inoriginal)). Thus, the Authority's determination that Wildberger's unfair labor practice complaints do not come within itsstated exception for charges filed by labor organizationsasserting their own institutional interests was not arbitraryand capricious. D. Matters Not Reached As noted above, our holding in this case does not purport toresolve how section 7116(d) might be applied in other situations which do not closely comport with the facts of this case. In particular, this case should not be interpreted to mean thatall unfair labor practice charges involving an employee whosubsequently appeals an adverse action to the MSPB shouldnecessarily be subsumed into the MSPB proceeding. Forexample, suppose an employee who allegedly suffered harassment from his employer for engaging in union organizingactivities and filed unfair labor practice charges alleging suchharassment was subsequently removed for alleged theft. If,in appealing the termination to the MSPB, the employeeargues only that the employer's claim of theft cannot besustained, not that the action was taken in retaliation for hisunion organizing activities, it is not clear whether section7116(d) should apply. Where the employee did not raise theissues underlying his unfair labor practice charges before theMSPB, the question of whether his unfair labor practicecharges could be or should be subsumed into his MSPBappeal, or whether instead they are sufficiently separate topreserve the FLRA's jurisdiction over them notwithstandingthe MSPB appeal, are questions that must be addressed bythe FLRA in future cases. We also want to make it clear that our holding here is notintended as either an endorsement or a rejection of theFourth Circuit's holding in Department of Commerce, Bureauof the Census v. FLRA, 976 F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 1992) (Commerce). The Authority's judgment in this case appears torest on Commerce; this is hardly surprising, given that thedecision in Commerce is broad enough to support the resultreached by the FLRA here. But, on this record, we are notprepared to venture beyond the facts at hand. The Commerce court held that, under section 7116(d), oncean employee had commenced a MSPB appeal, he was constrained to bring all his administrative claims in the MSPBproceeding and the FLRA was barred from adjudicating anyunfair labor practice charges which are not sufficiently dis- crete from his challenge to his ultimate removal. Id. at 888. Both the facts and the holding in Commerce are distinct fromthe case before us. The issues underscoring the unfair laborpractice charges in Commerce were adjudicated by the FLRAafter a related MSPB appeal was filed but before the MSPBhad adjudicated the appeal. See id. at 886. Therefore, theCommerce court could not frame its opinion in terms of issuesactually presented to and considered by the MSPB, butinstead reached the question of whether the issues underlyingthe unfair labor practice charges were necessarily subsumedinto the pending MSPB proceeding. See id. at 890 (notingthat, while the MSPB is barred from adjudicating ULPcharges per se, the issues underlying the employee's ULPcharge may be raised in an MSPB procedure as affirmativedefenses) (emphasis added); cf. id. (Only where [ ] initialdisciplinary actions ripen into full-blown 'adverse employmentactions' will sole jurisdiction vest in the MSPB under the firstsentence of s 7116(d).). The fact that the Fourth Circuitreached a question that this court reserves does not makethis court's decision inconsistent with that in Commerce; theFourth Circuit had a different case before it.