Opinion ID: 2621087
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: On remand, Forestry's allegedly negligent acts must be examined individually to determine if they are planning or operational decisions.

Text: Because not all firefighting decisions made by Forestry are automatically planning decisions subject to immunity, the particular decisions in this case that are alleged to be negligent must be examined to determine if they are planning decisions or operational decisions. The plaintiffs claim that the following Forestry decisions were negligent: (1) Forestry allowed its personnel to work at the fire site while under the influence of alcohol and/or illegal drugs. (2) Forestry failed to conduct any firefighting activities at all during the night of June 2-3. (3) Forestry's incident commander, as well as another Forestry crew boss, failed to investigate the column of smoke rising from the out-of-control burnout during the evening of June 3 while all Forestry personnel were away from the fire eating dinner. (4) Forestry failed to construct a fire line around the original sixty-acre fire. (5) Forestry used inadequate pumps, hoses, tanks, and water supplies to fight the fire instead of using superior available resources supplied by the local fire departments. (6) Forestry failed to conduct an adequate mop-up of the original fire. (7) Forestry started burnouts in improper places and in an improper manner and failed to control them (including the burnout that spread out of control and created the Miller's Reach Fire). (8) Forestry failed to post lookouts around the original fire (including, importantly, the evening of June 3, while the burnout started by Forestry was burning out of control and all Forestry employees were away from the fire eating dinner). The parties have not systematically addressed these individual allegations in their briefs, [45] and this case was decided below on a Civil Rule 12(b)(6) motion, with no factual development. Based on the limited factual record before us, we decline to decide whether each of these allegations concerns planning decisions or operational actions. On remand, the superior court should permit the parties to conduct discovery, and each of these allegations should be carefully considered in the context of any further summary judgment proceedings. The superior court should make a separate determination for each of these allegations following the principles announced in this opinion and in our other decisions concerning discretionary function immunity. To provide additional guidance, we note that at least some of the plaintiffs' allegations appear to concern non-immune, operational actions. We agree with the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which stated in Harry Stoller & Co. v. City of Lowell that [t]here are aspects of firefighting that can have an obvious planning or policy basis. [46] Such aspects include the number and location of fire stations, the amount of equipment to purchase, the size of fire departments, and other aspects involving the allocation of financial resources. [47] In addition, certain on-the-scene firefighting tactical decisions may be considered discretionary because they entail resource allocation decisions or considered decisions of firefighting policy that are properly vested in the officials in charge. A decision whether or not to use a backfire may be an example. [48] But not all conduct implementing tactical decisions should necessarily be immune. As noted by the Massachusetts court, other firefighting actions are clearly operational. The court in Harry Stoller & Co. noted that governmental immunity does not result automatically just because the governmental actor had discretion. Discretionary actions and decisions that warrant immunity must be based on considerations of public policy. [49] The Massachusetts court held that the decision to use lower water pressure that rendered a sprinkler system inoperable was a decision made at the operational level, because it was one that involved no policy choice or planning decision. [50] Forestry's alleged failure to prevent its employees from working under the influence of alcohol and illegal drugs clearly cannot be viewed as a policy choice or planning decision. Moreover, although we are without the benefit of a fully developed record, it is difficult to tell why certain firefighting decisions made in the field, such as the alleged failure to build a firewall, the failure to post lookouts to watch the burnout during the June 3 dinner, or the failure to conduct an adequate mop-up, should not be considered to be operational in nature. The superior court will benefit from further factual development of these allegations before determining if the plaintiffs' allegations concern conduct that is planning or operational in nature.