Opinion ID: 2582466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Count 1 Assault

Text: ¶ 12 Perez-Pena does not specifically challenge the findings of fact for count 1 but instead argues that the hearing officer erred in relying upon his municipal court conviction for assault as conclusive evidence of his guilt of that crime. See Fernando Perez-Pena's Br. in Opp'n to Decision of the Disciplinary Bd. of WSBA (Br. in Opp'n) at 8. ELC 10.14(c) states that if a formal complaint against an attorney is based upon criminal conduct of which the attorney has been convicted, then the court record of the conviction is conclusive evidence at the disciplinary hearing of the respondent's guilt of the crime and violation of the statute on which the conviction was based. However, RCW 9.96.060(3) provides that [o]nce the court vacates a record of conviction under subsection (1) of this section, the person shall be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense. . . . For all purposes . . . a person whose conviction has been vacated under subsection (1) of this section may state that he or she has never been convicted of that crime. Perez-Pena argues that because RCW 9.96.060(3) expressly released him from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense upon the vacation of his conviction and because he obtained a vacation of his judgment and sentence and a dismissal of the original complaint, the hearing officer erred in relying upon his conviction as conclusive evidence of his guilt. Br. in Opp'n at 8-12. ¶ 13 We first discern whether the dismissal of the complaint and vacation of the judgment and sentence constitute a vacation of a person's conviction. RCW 9.96.060(1), to which 9.96.060(3) refers, states that to vacate a misdemeanor criminal conviction, the court must  set [] aside the verdict of guilty; . . . dismiss[] the information, indictment, complaint, or citation against the applicant and vacat[e] the judgment and sentence. (Emphasis added.) Here, the trial judge expressly refused to set aside the guilty verdict  the verdict form is still in the court record, and the docket still reflects the jury's finding of guilt. CP at 30, 49. Therefore, we need not answer the question of whether a vacated conviction may be used as conclusive evidence of guilt in a disciplinary proceeding, for Perez-Pena still has a record of his conviction. ¶ 14 Perez-Pena also argues that the hearing officer improperly allowed the Garcias to testify as to the events surrounding the assault, but prohibited him from doing so. Reply Br. of the Resp't (Reply Br.) at 1. We first note that the hearing officer did allow Perez-Pena to testify as to his version of the events, over the objection of the WSBA. Tr. (Mar. 14, 2006) at 94-95. The hearing officer stated that the jury's findings make it conclusive that he committed an assault but that he's got a right to give his characterization of this and I think to define. Id. at 95. The hearing officer also allowed the Garcias to testify, correctly noting that that part of the purpose of disciplinary hearings is to determine the extent of the injury. Id. at 46. The American Bar Association's (ABA) comments to the Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (2007) explain: The issue to be determined in a disciplinary proceeding predicated upon the finding of guilt of a lawyer for a crime is whether the conduct established by the determination of guilt and subsequent conviction warrants discipline, and if so, the extent of discipline to be imposed. The respondent may offer evidence of mitigating circumstances not inconsistent with the essential elements of the crime whose existence is conclusively established by the finding of guilt. Rule 19 cmt. Although this comment does not expressly apply to evidence presented by the WSBA association, the logical inference is that, in order for the hearing officer to determine whether the conduct warrants discipline, the WSBA may present evidence consistent with the guilty verdict. The hearing officer allowed both the Garcias and Perez-Pena to testify as to their version of the events so that he could determine the extent of the discipline to be imposed; however, he properly considered the jury's verdict as conclusive evidence that Perez-Pena committed the assault. Tr. (Mar. 14, 2006) at 95. Therefore, we find that the hearing officer did not err in this regard.