Opinion ID: 852197
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Exclusion of TRW's Evidence Regarding Spool-out

Text: Ford also adopts TRW's appellate assertion that the trial court erroneously excluded two items of evidence relating to whether a spool-out occurred in the seatbelt retractor during this Ford Explorer rollover ejection. One item was TRWs expert's video of rollover crash testing of a Lincoln Navigator vehicle allegedly with a similar seatbelt assembly using a test dummy that was the same size and weight as the plaintiffs decedent. TRW stresses that it offered this video only as demonstrative evidence. TRWs second claim challenges the trial court's exclusion of photographs and related testimony regarding hundreds of similar seatbelt assemblies. The rollover video was proffered during the testimony of TRW design engineer Jeffery Pearson, who testified that the video would illustrate and clarify his testimony and serve as a useful demonstrative aid. Demonstrative evidence is ordinarily admissible if it is sufficiently explanatory or illustrative of relevant testimony to be of potential help to the trier of fact, but it is subject to the balancing of probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice. Wise v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1192, 1196 (Ind.1999). A trial court's evidentiary rulings are presumptively correct. Anderson v. State, 681 N.E.2d 703, 706 (Ind.1997). Appellate challenges of trial court determinations regarding the relevancy of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Marcum v. State, 725 N.E.2d 852, 862 (Ind.2000). In this case, after considerable argument of counsel, the trial judge excluded the video, expressing his objective of trying to be fair and impartial to both sides and observing that the video doesnt meet [the standard of substantial similarity] particularly, noting issues of the distances the depicted vehicle travelled while airborne and the location of the dummies used. Tr. at 2386. TRW argues that because the video was offered merely as demonstrative evidence, not reconstructive evidence, the trial court misapplied the substantial similarity standard. We agree that the considerations regarding admissibility of demonstrative evidence are less rigorous than those used for evidence that attempts to reenact or reconstruct an event. Nevertheless, we entrust considerable latitude to trial judges in making such determinations, which as here may have been informed and interwoven in the context of lengthy, complicated, and vigorously contested trial and pre-trial proceedings. In addition to evaluating whether the video was sufficiently explanatory or illustrative to help the jury, deciding whether to permit its use as demonstrative evidence also appropriately entailed consideration of relevancy and the balance of its probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice. In the context of this litigation, TRW and Ford have not persuaded us that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the video. TRW also disputes the trial court's limitations on its attempt to present testimonial and photographic evidence that Pearson had personally inspected hundreds of seatbelts similar to the one involved in the fatal rollover except that they had never been in an accident and that the belts all exhibited the same type of webbing marks as those claimed by the plaintiffs expert, Meyer, were caused in this rollover and ejection. TRW asserts that the exclusion of this evidence was clearly erroneous, prejudiced its substantial rights, and was inconsistent with substantial justice. As to Pearson's proposed testimonial and photographic evidence comparing numerous seatbelts he had observed with the one involved in this case, the plaintiffs trial objection raised various grounds but primarily alleged the failure of the proffered evidence to comply with pre-trial discovery and disclosure requirements that had been imposed by the trial court. After hearing robust arguments regarding the nature and extent of pre-trial discovery compliance and disclosure, and after specifically reviewing the content of Pearson's pre-trial report, the trial court ruled that Pearson would be permitted to testify as to his opinion regarding the cause of the marks on the seatbelt involved in the accident and on two other exemplar seatbelts that were in evidence. Id. at 234647, 2353. Limiting the testimony, however, the trial court ruled that references to his, to the specific testing that may have been done or his analysis of that would be excluded under the standing order of this Court. Id. at 2347. Also excluded was Pearson's testimony about having seen a hundred other spools, Id. at 2354-55. Our reliance upon and deference to trial courts in matters of discovery compliance is well established. The trial court must be given wide discretionary latitude in discovery matters since it has the duty to promote the discovery of truth and to guide and control the proceedings and will be granted deference in assessing what constitutes substantial compliance with discovery orders. Absent clear error and resulting prejudice, the trial court's determinations as to violations and sanctions should not be overruled. Braswell v. State, 550 N.E.2d 1280, 1283 (Ind.1990) (internal citations omitted). These principles are particularly germane in the present case, which involved very contentious and protracted litigation and extensive discovery disagreements. Neither TRW nor Ford has convinced us that the trial court's rulings limiting Pearson's testimony were clearly erroneous. We defer to the court's discretion in controlling and guiding these proceedings and decline to find error on this issue.