Opinion ID: 1239218
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether substantial evidence supported the pesticide board's decision

Text: As an administrative agency, the Pesticide Board is subject to the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (APA), codified at chapter 150B of the General Statutes. See Amanini v. N.C. Dep't of Human Resources, 114 N.C.App. 668, 673, 443 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1994). Under the APA, a reviewing court may reverse or modify an agency's decision if the petitioner's substantial rights may have been prejudiced by findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions which are arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence. See N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(b) (1991). Under N.C.G.S. § 150B-51(b), the proper standard of review depends upon the issues presented on appeal. In re Appeal by McCrary, 112 N.C.App. 161, 165, 435 S.E.2d 359, 363 (1993). When the reviewing court is determining whether an agency's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence, as we are in the instant case, it must apply the whole record test. See Amanini 114 N.C.App. at 674, 443 S.E.2d at 118. The `whole record' test requires the reviewing court to examine all competent evidence (the `whole record') in order to determine whether the agency decision is supported by `substantial evidence.' Id. (quoting Rector v. N.C. Sheriffs' Educ. & Training Standards Comm'n, 103 N.C.App. 527, 532, 406 S.E.2d 613, 616 (1991)). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. State ex rel. Comm'r of Ins. v. N.C. Fire Ins. Rating Bureau, 292 N.C. 70, 80, 231 S.E.2d 882, 888 (1977). Therefore, if we conclude there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's decision, we must uphold it. See McCrary, 112 N.C.App. at 168, 435 S.E.2d at 365. We note that while the whole-record test `does require the court to take into account both the evidence justifying the agency's decision and the contradictory evidence from which a different result could be reached,' id. at 167-68, 435 S.E.2d at 364 (quoting Lackey v. N.C. Dep't of Human Resources, 306 N.C. 231, 238, 293 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1982)), the test does not allow the reviewing court to replace the Pesticide Board's judgment as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though the court could justifiably have reached a different result had the matter been before it de novo, Thompson v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 292 N.C. 406, 410, 233 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1977). As stated, the Pesticide Board concluded that Meads violated 2 NCAC 9L.1005(b), (c), and (e) and N.C.G.S. §§ 143-443(b)(3), 143-456(a)(2), and 143-469(b)(2). We address each violation respectively. Under 2 NCAC 9L .1005(b), it is unlawful to aerially apply a pesticide within threehundred feet of an occupied business. The Pesticide Board, in concluding that Meads violated this rule, initially noted that Meads aerially applied Pounce on Duncan's soybean field at some point between 9:30 and 11:00 a.m.a time during which the nearby business Royster Clark, Inc., was occupied. The Pesticide Board found that vegetation samples collected approximately 234 feet from Royster Clark, Inc., contained .10 ppm of Permethrin. From these facts, the Pesticide Board concluded that Meads improperly applied pesticide within three-hundred feet of an occupied business in violation of 2 NCAC 9L .1005(b). We conclude that this evidence provides sufficient support for the Pesticide Board's ruling. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision that the Pesticide Board's holding with respect to this issue was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence. Under 2 NCAC 9L .1005(c), pesticide may not be aerially applied within twentyfive feet of a roadway. The Pesticide Board, in determining that Meads violated this rule, found that a vegetation sample taken four feet from the pavement along the east side of S.R. 1148 contained .17 ppm of Permethrin, while a vegetation sample taken three feet from the pavement along the west side of S.R. 1148 contained .54 ppm of that same substance. This evidence constitutes substantial evidence to support the Pesticide Board's decision that Meads violated this rule. Thus, we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision to the extent that it found that the Pesticide Board's holding with respect to this rule was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence. Under 2 NCAC 9L .1005(e), pesticide may not be aerially applied within one-hundred feet of a residence. In ruling that Meads violated this rule, the Pesticide Board noted that two vegetation samples collected within forty-seven and sixty feet of Ms. Windley's residence contained .10 ppm and.44 ppm of Permethrin, respectively. Moreover, the Pesticide Board noted that the Pounce label provides that the product [c]auses moderate eye irritation. The Pesticide Board concluded that the evidence showing that Ms. Windley's eyes burned and her lips tingled showed that there were traces of Pounce within the restricted area. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision that the Pesticide Board's holding with respect to this rule was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial evidence. We next address the Court of Appeals' holding that the Pesticide Board's conclusion that Meads violated certain statutes was unsupported by substantial evidence. The Pesticide Board found that Meads violated N.C.G.S. §§ 143-443(b)(3), 143-456(a)(2), and 143-469(b)(2), which make it unlawful for any person to use any pesticide inconsistent with its label. At the time of Meads' aerial application, the Pounce label read in pertinent part: Do not apply this product in such a manner as to directly or through drift expose workers or other persons. As stated, the Pesticide Board concluded that Ms. Windley was exposed to Pounce upon exiting her home, as evidenced by her irritated eyes and tingling lipssymptoms associated with Pounce exposure. This evidence, combined with the undisputed fact that Meads aerially applied Pounce to land adjoining Ms. Windley's lot, provides substantial evidence to support the Pesticide Board's conclusion that Meads violated these statutes. Therefore, to the extent that the Court of Appeals overturned the Pesticide Board's decision with respect to these statutory sections, we reverse. Lastly, we address the Pesticide Board's conclusion that Meads violated N.C.G.S. § 143-456(a)(4), which provides that the Pesticide Board may revoke a license upon finding that the licensee has operated in a faulty, careless, or negligent manner. The preceding evidence, standing alone, provides substantial evidence that Meads' aerial application of Pounce was faulty, careless, or negligent. Additionally, we note that the Pesticide Board further supported its conclusion by pointing to the numerous traces of Permethrin found outside of the target area. Thus, these facts provide substantial evidence to support the Pesticide Board's conclusion regarding this issue.