Opinion ID: 2747138
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of unconditional plea

Text: ORS 135.335 was originally enacted in 1973 to per- mit pleas of guilty, not guilty, and no contest. See Or Laws 1973, ch 836, § 159. The statute was amended in 1999 to add a further provision permitting a defendant to enter a conditional guilty plea. See Or Laws 1999, ch 134, § 1. The statute now provides, in part: “With the consent of the court and the state, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or no contest reserving, in writing, the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of an adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion. A defendant who finally prevails on appeal may withdraw the plea.” ORS 135.335(3). The 1999 enactment of subsection (3) of ORS 135.335 has two primary effects. First, for criminal defendants who plead guilty or no contest, it gives them a statutorily recognized path to obtain appellate review of a pretrial ruling. See Or Laws 1999, ch 134, § 1. Previously, a defendant who had pleaded guilty or no contest to a criminal charge had no procedural way to challenge a trial court’s ruling on a pretrial motion. As this court observed in State v. Dinsmore, 342 Or 1, 6-7, 147 P3d 1146 (2006), before 1999, a defendant who, for example, was unsuccessful in pretrial efforts to suppress evidence was typically required to enter a plea of not guilty and proceed to trial—often a trial on stipulated facts—to preserve the ability to contest the adverse pretrial ruling on that motion. Second, the enactment of ORS 135.335(3) provides a statutory mechanism for a criminal defendant to later withdraw a guilty plea if that defendant prevails in challenging the pretrial ruling reserved for review. As the last sentence of that subsection states, a defendant who is successful on appeal may withdraw his or her plea and enter a new plea of guilty, not guilty, or no contest. If a defendant withdraws the plea and enters a plea of not guilty, then that defendant may proceed to trial with the benefit of a successful challenge to an earlier pretrial ruling. See also Dinsmore, 342 Or at 7 (“[W]hen a conditional plea is entered 446 State v. McAnulty as an expediency under ORS 135.335(3), the parties begin anew on the charges subject to the plea if the defendant’s appeal is successful and the defendant opts to withdraw the conditional plea.”). But, by providing a mechanism to obtain review on a pretrial ruling and later withdraw a guilty or no contest plea, the text of ORS 135.335(3) carries with it an implicit limitation. Specifically, if a criminal defendant does not enter a conditional plea, the provisions of subsection (3) do not apply. Thus, a defendant does not have the benefit of a statutorily recognized path for appellate review. Even if a separate provision of law nonetheless permits appellate review, the defendant would have no statutorily recognized right to later withdraw her guilty or no contest plea on the basis that a particular pretrial ruling constituted reversible error. Thus, the plea would remain intact, effectuate a waiver of the right to trial, and result in a conviction of the offense for which the plea was entered. See also ORS 135.345 (regarding effect of no contest plea). Here, in entering her guilty plea, defendant did not attempt to reserve in writing her ability to challenge the trial court’s adverse determination on any specified pretrial ruling. Although this court may review defendant’s assignment of error pursuant to ORS 138.012(1), defendant’s failure to comply with ORS 135.335(3) precludes a withdrawal of her plea. Defendant’s conviction therefore remains intact, effectuates a waiver of the right to trial, and results in a conviction on the charged offenses. The state, however, advances a further effect of ORS 135.335(3) in relation to defendant’s claim of error. In the state’s view, defendant’s unconditional guilty plea amounted to a complete waiver of any claims relating to the adverse pretrial rulings. Because defendant did not renew her objection to the admission of the evidence during the penalty trial, the state maintains that defendant cannot now challenge the admission of those statements during the penalty phase. We disagree. Although the functional effect of defendant’s unconditional plea precludes her from obtaining a reversal of her conviction through a challenge to the trial court’s pretrial ruling on her motion to suppress, Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 447 we find nothing in the text or context of ORS 135.335(3) that prevents her from challenging, on automatic and direct review, the ruling as it relates to the imposition of her death sentence.7 Moreover, ORS 163.150(1)(a) prohibits the admission, during penalty proceedings, of “any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Oregon.” In other words, the merits of the arguments made in defendant’s pretrial motion also apply to the penalty-phase proceedings. As the state points out, during the penalty phase, defendant did not object to the admission of defendant’s statements that were the subject of defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress. On review, however, we find applicable the rule of preservation that permits a reviewing court to consider issues previously litigated and decided notwithstanding a lack of relitigation at trial. See State v. Foster, 296 Or 174, 183-84, 674 P2d 587 (1983) (concluding that pretrial motion preserved issue notwithstanding lack of relitigation at trial because a sufficient offer of proof was made “to permit the court to rule intelligently” and “the judge gave a final ruling”); see also State v. Pitt, 352 Or 566, 574-75, 293 P3d 1002 (2012) (same); Acremant, 338 Or 302 (death penalty case where defendant pleaded guilty and the court considered the defendant’s challenge to an adverse pretrial ruling when defendant had made no objection at the penalty trial and scope of review was not contested). Defendant argued in her pretrial motion to suppress that her statements were inadmissible because they were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights. The trial court held a hearing on the issue, considered the evidence, and made findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thus, 7 Aggravated murder trials are typically divided into two proceedings: the guilt phase and the penalty phase. State v. Pratt, 309 Or 205, 210, 785 P2d 350 (1990). In most cases, guilt and penalty proceedings “are merely separate phases of the same trial in which the same jury decides, first, whether the defendant is guilty and, second—if the defendant is guilty—whether the defendant should receive the death penalty.” State ex rel Carlile v. Frost, 326 Or 607, 613, 956 P2d 202 (1998) (citing State v. Montez, 324 Or 343, 348-49, 927 P2d 64 (1996), cert den, 520 US 1233 (1997)). If a defendant pleads guilty, a jury is impaneled and sworn for only a penalty-phase proceeding. ORS 163.150(1)(a) (“If the defendant has pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose.”); see also ORS 138.012(2) (regarding procedure for penalty phase when on remand for resentencing). 448 State v. McAnulty defendant alerted the trial court to the purported error, and the court considered the merits of defendant’s motion and ruled on it. After defendant entered her plea, the trial court empanelled a jury for a penalty-phase trial. At the time the evidence was admitted during the penalty phase, the trial court was on notice of defendant’s position regarding that evidence. See Foster, 296 Or at 183-84; Pitt, 352 Or at 574. See also ORS 163.150(1)(a) (prohibiting the admission of “any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Oregon”). We therefore conclude that we may consider defen- dant’s first assignment of error on automatic and direct review under ORS 138.012(1).8 However, as a result of defendant’s unconditional plea, she cannot now withdraw her plea, and her conviction remains intact. Accordingly, we examine her challenge to the trial court’s ruling on her pretrial motion to suppress only as it relates to the penalty phase of her trial. We now turn to the merits of defendant’s suppression argument.