Opinion ID: 2626414
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Foreseeability in the Context of Duty

Text: [I]t is fundamental that a negligence action lies only where there is a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Bidar v. Amfac, Inc., 66 Haw. 547, 551-52, 669 P.2d 154, 159 (1983) (citations omitted). The existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, that is, whether . . . such a relation exists between the parties that the community will impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the otheror, more simply, whether the interest of the plaintiff which has suffered invasion was entitled legal protection at the hands of the defendant, is entirely a question of law. Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 69 Haw. 376, 385, 742 P.2d 377, 383 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (ellipsis in original). Regarding the imposition of a duty of care, this court has stated that, generally, [i]n considering whether to impose a duty of reasonable care on a defendant, we recognize that duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. Legal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done. In determining whether or not a duty is owed, we must weigh the considerations of policy which favor the [plaintiff's] recovery against those which favor limiting the [defendant's] liability. The question of whether one owes a duty to another must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Blair, 95 Hawai`i at 259-60, 21 P.3d at 464-65 (citations omitted) (format altered). In addition to the aforementioned principles, this court has also regarded several factors in determining whether to impose a duty: [W]hether a special relationship exists, the foreseeability of harm to the injured party, the degree of certainty that the injured party suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendants' conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendants, the policy of preventing harm, the extent of the burden to the defendants and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. Id. at 260, 21 P.3d at 465 (ellipsis and citation omitted) (format altered). Regardless of the source of a particular duty, [however,] a defendant's liability for failing to adhere to the requisite standard of care is limited by the pr[o]position that the defendant's obligation to refrain from particular conduct [or, as the circumstances may warrant, to take whatever affirmative steps are reasonable to protect another] is owed only to those who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct [or omission] unreasonably dangerous. Thus, if it is not reasonably foreseeable that the particular plaintiff will be injured if the expected harm in fact occurs, the defendant does not owe that plaintiff a duty reasonably to prevent the expected harm. Doe Parents No. 1 v. State Dep't of Educ., 100 Hawai`i 34, 72, 58 P.3d 545, 583 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (first set of brackets and bold emphases added); see also Janssen v. Am. Hawai`i Cruises, Inc., 69 Haw. 31, 34, 731 P.2d 163, 166 (1987) (stating that a defendant owes a duty of care only to those who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Hulsman v. Hemmeter Dev. Corp., 65 Haw. 58, 68, 647 P.2d 713, 720 (1982) (same). The test of foreseeability is whether there is some probability of harm sufficiently serious that a reasonable and prudent person would take precautions to avoid it. Knodle, 69 Haw. at 388, 742 P.2d at 385 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). It does not mean foreseeability of any harm whatsoever, and it is not sufficient that injury is merely possible. Henderson v. Prof'l Coatings Corp., 72 Haw. 387, 396, 819 P.2d 84, 90 (1991) (quoting 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 5(5) (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lee v. Corregedore, 83 Hawai`i 154, 167, 925 P.2d 324, 337 (1996) ([T]here are clear judicial days on which a court can foresee forever and thus determine liability but none on which that foresight alone provides a socially and judicially acceptable limit on recovery of damages for that injury. (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.)). [T]he concept of `duty[,]' [however,] involves more than mere foreseeability of harm. Taylor-Rice v. State, 91 Hawai`i 60, 71-72, 979 P.2d 1086, 1097-98 (1999). [A] court's taskin determining dutyis not to decide [merely] whether a particular plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular defendant's conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed on the negligent party. Id. at 72, 979 P.2d at 1098 (citing Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal.3d 644, 257 Cal.Rptr. 865, 771 P.2d 814, 819 n. 3. (1989)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).