Opinion ID: 2594806
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Serial Killer Testimony

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial based on testimony by Dr. Wilkinson, the court-appointed psychiatrist, that defendant was a serial killer. He alternatively argues that the trial court erred in overruling his Evidence Code section 352 objection to the testimony. As he did in the trial court, defendant contends that serial killer is not a known classification of mental disease or disorder but a popular culture term that had a tendency to inflame the jury's prejudices and passions against him. Denial of a motion for a mistrial is reviewed for abuse of discretion and the motion should be granted only when a party's chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged. ( People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 284, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193.) The trial court's rulings under Evidence Code section 352 are, of course, also reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 724, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) The issue at the sanity phase was whether defendant was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his . . . act and of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense. (§ 25, subd. (b).) As we have elsewhere observed, in assisting the jury to make this determination, [n]o precise legal rules dictate the proper basis for an expert's journey into a patient's mind to make judgments about his behavior. ( People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1154, 265 Cal.Rptr. 111, 783 P.2d 698 [defense expert testimony that defendant displayed no signs of sexual deviance or abnormality admissible to prove lack of disposition to commit lewd and lascivious acts upon a child]; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 406, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708 [`Psychiatry is not . . . an exact science, and psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness, on the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms, on cure and treatment, and on likelihood of future dangerousness'].) Thus, the trial court must be given wide berth in its assessment of the probative value of expert testimony on the issue of defendant's sanity. In this case, the prosecutor elicited testimony from Dr. Wilkinson as to whether defendant was a serial killer to explain that certain bizarre aspects of defendant's behavior were not necessarily indicative of insanity. Dr. Wilkinson testified that a serial killer is someone for whom killing releases, frequently, internal tensions. They'll feel a terrible turmoil, and by doing the murder, they get not only a thrill, but some internal calming. Thus, he explained, the tape recording defendant made memorializing his crimes and the notation he made on his belt with the names and dates of the murders of Carol Spadoni and Eva Petersen fit the pattern of serial killers who collect mementos that help [them] relive the experience and retouch some of the gratification that they gained by doing the acts. When asked whether this behavior was indicative of insanity, Wilkinson replied: Insanity has a legal definition that must be met in order to apply that label. It doesn't matter how sick someone is, they have to meet the legal criteria. [¶] So, you know, it may or may not be an indication of insanity. Wilkinson also testified that other aspects of defendant's conduct, like the ritualistic way in which the murders were committed, indications that he wanted to exercise control over his victims, and his interest in police procedure were also consistent with patterns of serial killers. In his subsequent testimony outside the presence of the jury on the prosecution's offer of proof, Wilkinson testified that in arriving at these opinions regarding the behavior of serial killers, he had consulted psychiatric literature including articles in the Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law and the Journal of the American Psychiatric Association. In seeking a mistrial, the defense argued that serial killer was a media term, not a classification of mental disease, and whether or not [defendant] was a serial killer has nothing to do with sanity. The defense argued that the characterization of defendant as a serial killer might lead the jury to link him with other notorious serial killers like the Zodiac killer or John Wayne Gacy and was highly prejudicial to his right to an individualized determination of his sanity. The prosecutor responded: I think it is important for the jury to understand that there have been studies done of serial murderers, that this is a common thing that they do and not necessarily indicative of insanity but of a need for power and control. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial and the defense's alternative claim that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. We find no abuse of discretion. Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that the only expert evidence admissible on the issue of a defendant's sanity must be confined to classifications of mental disease or disorder found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. As Dr. Wilkinson testified, the phenomenon of serial murderers has been the subject of professional interest in the psychiatric community, and his testimony regarding the behavior of serial murderers and its relation to defendant's conduct as it bore on the question of his sanity was undoubtedly relevant to that issue. Nor do we find that either his testimony or the characterization of defendant as a serial killer was more prejudicial than probative. In relation to the testimony the jury heard regarding the shocking circumstances of defendant's crimes, Dr. Wilkinson's testimony was relatively innocuous. [8] Finally, we reject as a mischaracterization of Dr. Wilkinson's testimony defendant's assertion that it implied that all serial killers are legally sane.