Opinion ID: 469994
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 5 At the outset, we are faced with a challenge to the jurisdiction of the district court and thus this court. 1 The issue is whether actions of this sort may properly be brought in federal district court or whether they must in all cases be initiated in the Court of International Trade, with appellate jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit. In a recent case, the Federal Circuit held that by virtue of a provision of the Customs Courts Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1581 (1982), the Court of International Trade has exclusive jurisdiction over claims based upon Section 526. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed.Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 791, 88 L.Ed.2d 769 (1986). 6 Absent that enactment there could be no doubt of the district court's power to adjudicate this action under the grant of general federal-question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 (1982), and under the grant of jurisdiction for actions arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, ... copyrights and trade-marks. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1338(a) (1982). Jurisdiction over the Section 42 claim is also conferred by the Lanham Act's jurisdictional provision, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1121 (1982). Because the Customs Courts Act did not create any new substantive law, but merely provided for exclusive jurisdiction over certain categories of cases in the Customs Court (the predecessor of the Court of International Trade), it follows that the Act divests the district courts of some of their preexisting jurisdiction. See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1559-60. Specifically, it would seem that the district courts are without jurisdiction over any of the cases enumerated in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1581. 2 7 The Federal Circuit in Vivitar held that two subsections of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1581 apply to an American trademark owner's challenge to the Customs regulations in question. First, it maintained that the Court of International Trade has exclusive jurisdiction over such actions as a corollary to protest jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1581(a). Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1560. Under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1581(a), the Court of International Trade has exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to Customs' denial of protests filed under Section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1515 (1982). Protests are administrative complaints available to importers challenging certain actions by Customs, including the exclusion of merchandise from entry or delivery under any provision of the customs laws. 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1514(a)(4) (1982). The case before the Vivitar court concerned an American trademark owner's challenge to Customs' decision not to exclude the merchandise in question, and there is no provision for administrative protests by such interested third-parties. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit maintained that the case involved a subject matter that would have given rise to a protest (by the importer), if the goods had been excluded rather than admitted. 3 It then concluded that the case fell within 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1581(i)(4), which creates jurisdiction over actions against federal agencies arising under laws of the United States providing for administration and enforcement with respect to the matters referred to in ... subsections (a)-(h) of this section. The court reasoned that a challenge to Customs regulations permitting importation of the goods at issue implicated administration and enforcement of the matter--i.e., a protestable subject matter--referred to in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1581(a); it viewed 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1581(i)(4) as providing a residual basis for jurisdiction over cases not literally covered by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1581(a). See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1557-60. 8 We are of the opinion that the language of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1581(a) and (i)(4) will not bear the Federal Circuit's construction. We think, rather, that a sound reading indicates that the matter[] referred to in Section 1581(a) is the denial of protests, or simply protests. Because no right to protest arises from Customs' admission of goods--in contrast to its exclusion of goods--in such cases there is no administration and enforcement of this matter (protests). The Federal Circuit apparently felt that this straightforward construction of the statute would render Section 1581(i)(4) duplicative of Section 1581(a). See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1559. We disagree: whereas Section 1581(a) only provides for jurisdiction over cases contesting the denial of a protest--in other words, challenging the basis of the denial--Section 1581(i)(4) (as applied to Section 1581(a)) provides additional jurisdiction over cases challenging the procedures --that is, the administration and enforcement--generally governing such protests. 9 The Federal Circuit alternatively held that the Court of International Trade had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1581(i)(3), which relates to actions against federal agencies arising under any law of the United States providing for embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of merchandise .... See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1559-60. Again, we must respectfully disagree with the Federal Circuit's view. Although Section 526 undoubtedly prevents certain goods from entering the country (those with trademarks identical to American trademarks), we think it is not an embargo contemplated by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1581(i)(3). The other categories of cases enumerated in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1581(i) all specifically deal with traditional Customs matters (and thus lie within the Court of International Trade's expertise): cases arising under laws providing for revenue from imports or tonnage, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1581(i)(1), or for tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of merchandise ..., id. Sec. 1581(i)(2). Thus, the structure of the statute belies any expansive reading of the term embargo. Rather, it indicates that Section 1581(i)(3) only extends to quotas and embargoes arising out of trade policy, the sort of measures that have traditionally limited the importation of shoes, textiles, automobiles, and the like. Whereas subsection (i)(2) covers restrictive measures aimed at the price of imports (tariffs, duties, etc.), subsection (i)(3) covers restrictions on the quantity of imports. 10 In sum, we conclude that this action does not fall within any of the specific provisions of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1581. We find nothing in the purpose or legislative history of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1581 justifying a departure from its literal terms. Congress' overriding purpose was to consolidate jurisdiction over certain matters involving international trade in a single specialized court, bringing uniformity and expertise to the area. But those ends would not be served in this case. Regardless of which court takes jurisdiction over actions commenced against the Government, the district courts would still have jurisdiction over actions under Section 526(c) against private parties. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1581 being no bar, we hold that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1338(a), and 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1121.