Opinion ID: 2549771
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Requirements When An Individual Has Been Subject to Involuntary Administration of Medications

Text: [¶ 17] Christopher H. contends that when a trial court conducting an involuntary commitment hearing learns that the individual who is the subject of the hearing has been involuntarily medicated, the court must engage in a colloquy with the individual to determine whether a fair hearing can be conducted and, if it concludes that a fair hearing cannot be conducted that day, the hearing should be postponed. The Department responds that Christopher H.'s due process rights were protected by the statutory procedural protections including the appointment of independent examiners, the right to be present at the hearing, and the right to be represented by court-appointed counsel. See 34-B M.R.S. § 3864(4)(A), (5)(B), (5)(C), (5)(D). Both parties acknowledge that no other court has previously addressed the precise constitutional question presented here, although some have addressed some aspect of the issue in dicta. [3] [¶ 18] We find it unnecessary to decide this question based on the constitutional guarantee of due process. Before we reach directly any constitutional issue, prudent appellate review requires that we first determine whether the issue may be resolved on a basis that does not implicate the constitution. Bates v. Dep't of Behavioral & Developmental Servs., 2004 ME 154, ¶ 85, 863 A.2d 890, 911-12 (citing Hannum v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME 123, ¶ 18, 832 A.2d 765, 770; Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 15, 761 A.2d 291, 298); see also Alexander, Maine Appellate Practice § 415 at 227-28. As this case demonstrates, effective appellate review is not possible if the court, having been made aware that an individual subject to a commitment hearing may have been rendered less able to participate in the hearing as a result of having been involuntarily medicated, makes no inquiry or mention of the issue on the record or in its judgment. [¶ 19] We now conclude that in the interests of fairness and to ensure effective appellate review, trial courts should address this issue on the record or in the resulting judgment. This does not mean that the trial court must engage in an extended colloquy on the issue as suggested by Christopher H. It will suffice if the record reflects that the court asked the individual, his or her attorney, or an expert medical witness to discuss whether and to what extent the effects of the medications involuntarily administered to the individual interfere with the individual's ability to be present and participate in the hearing. If the court determines that the medications leave the person no less capable of being present and participating in the hearing than he or she would have been without having received the medications, there is no reason to postpone the hearing. [4] If the court concludes that a continuance is required, it must account for the mandatory time requirements for conducting the hearing set forth in 34-B M.R.S. § 3864(5)(A) (2009). [5] [¶ 20] Because each case is different, we leave it to the sound discretion of the trial court to determine the extent and nature of the inquiry to be made in a particular case. At a minimum, however, the record should establish that the question was considered by the court. [¶ 21] In this case, the court was made aware that Christopher H. had been involuntarily administered medications prior to the hearing, and the court's comments on the record indicate the medications had rendered Christopher H. visibly sedated. The court did not expressly consider, however, whether Christopher H.'s sedated condition left him less capable of participating in the hearing than if he had not been sedated. Because we have not, prior to today, required that this issue be addressed on the hearing record or in the court's judgment, and Christopher H. is no longer subject to the commitment ordered by the court, there is no reason to upset the underlying judgment. [¶ 22] Although not raised by Christopher H., we also note that the judgment entered by the court did not state that it applied the clear and convincing evidence standard in determining that Christopher H. could be subjected to involuntary commitment. Title 34-B M.R.S. § 3864(6)(A) requires a statement on the record of [c]lear and convincing evidence that the person is mentally ill and that the person's recent actions and behavior demonstrate that the person's illness poses a likelihood of serious harm. We hold that in the future, courts must explicitly state that the clear and convincing evidence standard was applied in involuntary commitment cases; we will not infer that the standard was applied where it is not expressed in the court's judgment. Cf. In re Amanda H., 2007 ME 43, ¶ 3, 917 A.2d 1120, 1120-21 (holding that [a] court may not enter an order terminating parental rights in the absence of an explicitly stated finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the best interest of the child.... This finding cannot be inferred from the court's decision .... (quotation marks omitted)). The entry is: Judgment affirmed.