Opinion ID: 30583
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Alleged Fact Issues on Termination

Text: 11 We agree with BSI that, by asking the jury about the sole reason that NDTC terminated the Satellite Lease, the jury interrogatory assumed that the Satellite Lease was terminated. The district court's decisions of what to ask the jury and what not to ask 2 were consistent with the court's earlier ruling on cross motions for summary judgment. There the court had declared, Based on the summary judgment proof presented by the parties, the Court finds that the underlying [Satellite] Lease was terminated by PanAmStat and TCI/NDTC in late 1998. It denied summary judgment to both parties, however, because the purpose of termination was genuinely at issue: the summary judgment evidence ... presents a material question of fact regarding whether TCI/ NDTC's `sole reason' for terminating the underlying [Satellite] Lease was a financial decision designed to avoid paying BSI the Assignment Fee due under the Galaxy VII [Fee] Agreement. Submitting the interrogatory on the sole purpose of the termination and refusing the predicate question on termination were consistent with this summary judgment ruling. 12 The questions for this Court then become 1) whether the trial court validly found termination of the Satellite Lease as a matter of law; and 2) if so, whether the court submitted an appropriate interrogatory to assess how that termination of the Satellite Lease affected the Fee Agreement. 13 (1) Termination of the Satellite Lease. 14 NDTC and PanAmStat terminated the Satellite Lease by an agreement on 31 December 1998 which declares: As of January 1, 1999, the [Satellite Lease] Agreement is fully, effectively and finally terminated, along with all associated rights and obligations of Lessee and PanAmSat under the [Satellite Lease] Agreement.... Ex. D-14 (the Termination Contract). BSI argues that the evidence nevertheless revealed fact issues whether the Satellite Lease had actually terminated. 15 BSI recites the circumstances around the termination of the Satellite Lease, focusing on a switch of leases on Transponders 13 and 15 with NDTC's discontinued use of Transponder 15 and continued use of Transponder 13 after the switch and termination. 3 BSI contends that the swap-termination with continued use of Transponder 13 left a fact issue whether the Satellite Lease was terminated so as to cause termination of the Fee Agreement. 16 To the extent BSI is arguing that unresolved fact issues bear on whether the Satellite Lease itself terminated, the contention is meritless. Under the undisputed facts, a termination occurred, as unambiguously set forth in the Termination Contract between the parties to the Satellite Lease. The fact of NDTC's continued use of Transponder 13 under a new arrangement with PanAmSat does not invalidate that termination. We will not disturb the district court's finding as a matter of law on summary judgment that the Satellite Lease terminated nor its refusal to submit the issue to the jury as a matter of fact. 4 17 (2) Effect of Termination of the Satellite Lease on the Fee Agreement. 18 BSI's next argument is that fact issues bear on, not whether the Satellite Lease itself terminated, but whether that termination of the Satellite Lease terminated the Fee Agreement. BSI offered as evidence that the parties did not intend such events to terminate the Fee Agreement a) testimony that a PanAmSat representative had never heard of a satellite lease termination with continued use of the transponder; and b) an admission by one of NDTC's representatives that losing a customer on a transponder was not a valid reason to stop paying the assignment fee. BSI argues that the Fee Agreement fails to clearly and unambiguously define what constitutes a termination, and that the question of contractual intent was a necessary predicate question for the jury. The district court denied BSI's requested jury interrogatory asking whether the parties intended that the term of the Fee Agreement would end if NDTC were still using Transponder 13. 19 The question whether a contract is ambiguous is properly decided by the court and not a jury. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983); R & P Enterprises v. LaGuarta, Gavrel & Kirk, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 517, 518 (Tex.1980). We review de novo a district court's determination that a contract is not ambiguous. Fuller v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 872 F.2d 655, 657 (5th Cir.1989). The Fee Agreement, in the Term paragraph (§ 3), provides unambiguously for termination when the Satellite Lease terminates. The Fee Agreement also provides an unambiguous covenant of NDTC (§ 6) not to voluntarily terminate the Satellite Lease for the sole purpose of avoiding its obligations under [the Fee] Agreement. This contract alone expresses the intent of the parties; from these simple words we objectively determine the contractual intent. Fuller, 872 F.2d 655, 657. 20 We find no ambiguity in the meaning of termination. The covenant in § 6 of the Fee Agreement leaves a single question for the factfinder: whether the sole purpose of NDTC's entering the termination agreement with PanAmSat was to avoid NDTC's obligations under the Fee Agreement. 5 We agree with the district court's determination that contractual intent of the parties was not an appropriate fact question for the jury. Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 394 (unambiguous contract is to be construed by a court as a matter of law). 21 In sum, the court's finding that the Satellite Lease terminated in 1998 was a proper legal interpretation of the Termination Contract. The court's decision not to allow the jury to construe the Fee Agreement was correct. The court appropriately identified the fact question presented by the sole purpose provision of the Fee Agreement. 22