Opinion ID: 185189
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Delegation of Legislative Authority

Text: 29 The Union's final contention is that 9 of the Shipping Act is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the Executive. Relying primarily upon our recent decision in American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, modified, 195 F.3d 4 (1999), cert. granted sub nom. Browner v. American Trucking Ass'ns, No. 99-1257, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3577 (May 22, 2000), and No. 99-1426, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3629 (May 30, 2000), the Union argues that neither the statute nor the MarAd's regulations provide an intelligible principle to guide the agency's decision making under 9. For its part, the MarAd contends there is an intelligible principle but, even were there not, the constraints upon the ability of the Congress to delegate its lawmaking authority do not apply in this case. Because we agree with the latter point, we do not address the former. 30 In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936), the Supreme Court held that the bar against excessive delegation of the Congress's lawmaking authority did not apply to a Joint Resolution authorizing the President to declare unlawful the sale of arms to certain countries if he determined such a ban would encourage peace between them. See 299 U.S. at 312. The Court offered two general rationales. First, it reasoned that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution, id. at 318, and, in the realm of external affairs, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. Id. at 319. The Court noted especially the need for the President to have wide discretion in order to avoid embarrassing our relations with foreign nations. See id. at 320. Second, the Court traced the long historical practice supporting the delegation of broad discretion to the Executive in external affairs. See id. 322-326. The legislation noted by the Court includes: (1) an act permitting the President to lay the embargo upon all ships and vessels in the ports of the United States, including those of foreign nations, whenever he determined the public safety so required, id. at 322;(2) an act authorizing the President, whenever an armed vessel entering the harbors or waters within the jurisdiction of the United States and required to depart therefrom should fail to do so, to forbid ... all intercourse with such vessel ... and the officers and crew thereof and to prohibit all supplies and aid from being furnished them, id. 323-24; and (3) numerous acts permitting the President to suspend the duties laid upon foreign vessels if he determined that duties laid upon ships of the United States were removed. See id. at 324-25 n.2. On the basis of these two lines of reasoning, the Court held that the uniform, long-continued and undisputed legislative practice just disclosed rests upon an admissible view of the Constitution which, even if the practice found far less support in principle then we think it does, we should not feel at liberty at this late day to disturb. Id. at 329. 31 The transfer of a vessel's registry from the United States to a foreign nation involves considerations and concerns similar to those operative in Curtiss-Wright. Little imagination is required to envision situations in which a request to transfer the registry of a vessel might involve delicate foreign policy and national defense concerns. Indeed, in the course of granting the application in this case, the MarAd consulted with the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy in an effort to gauge just those types of concerns. Furthermore, as the Court noted in Curtiss-Wright, there is a long tradition of permitting the Executive broad discretion in the area of international shipping; the Union has offered no reason to treat 9 differently. Instead, the Union simply asserts that [s]ection 9 does not involve delicate negotiations with other governments or any manner of interaction with other countries. In fact, however, the Union itself opposed the application below on the ground that the transfer would adversely affect the balance of trade with Japan and that the Republic of the Marshall Islands would not adequately regulate the safety of the vessels. In sum, because the whole aim of [ 9] is to affect a situation entirely external to the United States, it is not open to ... challenge [as] an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the Executive. CurtissWright, 299 U.S. at 315.