Opinion ID: 2451811
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Superior Court's Factual Findings Regarding The Value Of Davis's Property Appear Inconsistent And Require Clarification.

Text: We first discuss the superior court's findings regarding inventory and storage. In light of the apparent inconsistency in the findings, we remand for clarification.
Foster first claims PGSC's cursory inventory breached AS 13.26.250. Though Foster cited to AS 13.26.250, the superior court did not explicitly interpret the statute, which requires a conservator to complete an inventory of the ward's property within 90 days of the conservator's appointment. PGSC's initial inventory listed two vehicles and made the following statement: PGSC's staff have not completed the personal property inventory, but found no significant personal property during our initial review. PGSC's CEO testified that he did not individually list the small items of personal propertythose less than $400 in valuebecause it would not have been a cost-effective use of the guardian's funds to pay an appraiser to do so. Although PGSC did not respond to this appeal, it appears that PGSC claimed in the superior court that National Guardianship Association Standards require an inventory only of items valued over $400a contention disputed by Foster. PGSC's decision not to list anything under $400 is not supported by any language in AS 13.26.250. In fact, PGSC's own inventory form suggests listing any item over $200. As the superior court persuasively suggests, PGSC could have cost-effectively inventoried the property by video or by listing contents by genre (cooking ware, flatware, and so on). We thus affirm the superior court's conclusion that PGSC's cursory personal property inventory, which listed only two vehicles, was not sufficient to satisfy the standards of AS 13.26.250. But this does not settle the issue of whether the inventory caused harm to Davis's estate.
Foster claims that PGSC's failure to inventory harmed the estate because it is now uncertain whether a fur coat, bible, or other unspecified sentimental items were lost during PGSC's control of the property. [5] The superior court found that the evidence does not support a conclusion that PGSC lost those items. Among other possibilities, the court noted that Davis could have lost or given away the items before PGSC took control. Viewed in isolation, the superior court's finding is adequately supported. The court noted that Foster had been through the house before PGSC's involvement, and again after PGSC took over, and that Foster couldand didtake any items she wanted. The court found it was reasonable for PGSC to conclude that Foster had gotten what she thought was important to keep. Further, based on this finding, the court found it likely that the items in question were not present in the home when PGSC took over. Foster's appeal disputes none of these assertions. Thus the record contains support for the court's findings that Foster had not demonstrated PGSC was responsible for the loss of any items, and that the items in question may have been gone before PGSC took over. Based on these findings, the court's conclusion that PGSC's inadequate inventory caused no damage to the estate, standing alone, might not have been clearly erroneous. The problem with the court's finding lies in its relation to the court's findings on the issue of storage, as described below.
Asserting that free storage was available at her own house, Foster claims it was unreasonable for PGSC to pay storage fees for Davis's items. Foster claims PGSC's use of paid storage created unnecessary expense and breached PGSC's fiduciary duties. The superior court found storage reasonable, writing that given family contention, it was appropriate to store these items at a neutral locale. Foster does not dispute the superior court's assertions regarding contentiousness in the family or the litigiousness of the situation. It appears that the strife between Foster and Bryant was so strong that staff at Davis's assisted living facility had to intervene between them a number of times, and considered evicting Davis due to the strife between her children. Viewed in isolation, there would thus be adequate support in the record for the superior court's finding that PGSC's use of paid storage was reasonable.
We will not disturb the factual findings of a trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. One sign of such error is an inconsistency between two factual findings even if each one, standing alone, would be sufficiently supported by the record so as not to constitute clear error. [6] In this case, the trial court found both that PGSC could reasonably conclude ... that [Foster] had gotten what she thought was important to keep, and that PGSC reasonably believed that Ms. Foster wanted some of that stuff and that, therefore, it was necessary to retain it. The first finding supports the superior court's conclusion that PGSC's statutorily inadequate inventory did not result in damages to Davis's estate. The second finding supports the court's conclusion that PGSC's use of paid storage did not breach its duty to Davis. But it may not have been reasonable for PGSC to have believed that there was nothing in the house of value to Foster while placing the items in costly storage because of their high value. PGSC cannot be allowed to present its failure to inventory as harmless by asserting there was nothing valuable in the house and then, in the next breath, defend its use of a costly storage facility by asserting that the valuable items in the house required preservation. On remand, the superior court must clarify or otherwise resolve this apparent inconsistency.