Opinion ID: 1058113
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Joinder and Admissibility of Other Crimes Evidence

Text: In his fourth assignment of error, Angel contends that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court's joinder of the offenses against V.L. and S.P. for trial and the admission of other crimes evidence were harmless error. While Angel spends considerable time discussing why joinder was error, we need not address that issue because the Court of Appeals, as reflected in Angel's assignment of error, assumed without deciding that the joinder was error. See also Angel, Op. at 2009 WL 743046, -5. The issue before us with regard to joinder is directed to the Court of Appeals' holding that such joinder, if error, was nevertheless harmless error. The Court of Appeals concluded that the joinder of separate offenses was harmless error because (1) the evidence of other crimes admitted in the joint trial would have been admissible in each trial had the offenses been tried separately, and (2) assuming without deciding that the evidence relating to the attack on V.L. would not be admissible in a trial of charges relating to the assault of S.P., and that the evidence relating to the assault of S.P. would not be admissible in the trial of charges relating to the attack on V.L., the impact of that evidence in the joint trial was harmless error because the other evidence of Angel's guilt relating to the respective attacks was overwhelming. Id., Op. at 2009 WL 743046, -9. We agree.
The evidence of other crimes at issue in this case involves sexual assaults against three other women. These three assaults took place on Sunday, July 9, 2006, within one hour of the same time of day as the assault on V.L. The first crime involved an assault on K.G. who testified that a man wearing a bike helmet approached her from behind and touched her between her legs and around her buttocks as she started up the steps to her apartment in western Alexandria. She had observed the man kneeling behind a motorbike with green and red swirls tinkering with something just before the attack. The man fled on the motorbike after the assault. K.G. identified Angel as her attacker. At trial, Detective Ignacio testified as to the two other assaults that also occurred in western Alexandria on July 9 just prior to the assault on V.L. In those instances, the attacker grabbed or slapped the buttocks of two women. By the time of trial, Angel had pled guilty to sexual battery in all three incidents. Angel argues that the admission of proof relating to these crimes was improper because the facts of the incidents were not nearly identical to the crimes for which he was on trial in any distinctive aspect, particularly with regard to the attack on V.L., and the admission of these crimes was more prejudicial than probative. Evidence of other crimes generally is not admissible to show a defendant's propensity to engage in bad acts or crimes. Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970). However, there are exceptions to this general rule. Evidence of other crimes is admissible in cases of disputed identity to prove the probability of a common perpetrator if the other crimes bear sufficient marks of similarity to the crime charged. Turner v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 645, 651, 529 S.E.2d 787, 791 (2000) (quoting Chichester v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 311, 327, 448 S.E.2d 638, 649 (1994)). To be admissible, other crimes need not be virtual carbon copies of the crime on trial. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 90, 393 S.E.2d 609, 616 (1990). The similarity must be such that the probative value outweighs any prejudicial effect. Id. at 90, 393 S.E.2d at 617. Applying these principles, we consider whether the other crimes evidence would have been admissible in a separate trial of the charges based on the July 9 attack of V.L. as well as in a separate trial of the charges based on the June 18 attack on S.P. The other crimes evidence involved three sexual assaults, each of which occurred on July 9 within one hour's time and within one and one-half to three miles of each other. As noted by the Court of Appeals, the attacks involved a sexual touching of the victims just below the waist from the rear. The attacker was a male, identified by two victims as young and Hispanic, who fled on a motorbike with green coloring. The evidence indicated that the attacker traveled by motorbike in a northeasterly path from Alexandria into Arlington as he committed the series of offenses leading up to his attack on V.L. Angel, Op. at 2009 WL 743046, . The attack on V.L., although significantly more violent, shared idiosyncratic features with the attacks committed in the other crimes-a sexual attack initiated from the rear; use of a green motorbike by the attacker; and Hispanic appearance. Additionally, the attacks in the other crimes occurred just prior to the attack on V.L. and all of the attacks, including the attack against V.L., occurred within three miles of each other. In the trial court Angel contested his identity as the perpetrator of the July 9 attack on V.L. K.G. positively identified Angel as her attacker and Angel pled guilty to the other two attacks. Consequently, the other crimes evidence met the criteria of relevance on the issue of identity. Based on this record, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the other crimes evidence would have been admissible in a trial of the charges against Angel based on the July 9 attack against V.L. Angel, Op. at 2009 WL 743046, . We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the other crimes evidence would have been admissible in a trial on the charges based on the June 18 attack on S.P. Id., Op. at 2009 WL 743046, . We have already discussed the similarities between the other crimes evidence. Like those attacks, the June 18 attack on S.P. occurred on a Sunday in the early evening within three miles of the places where the July 9 attacks occurred and the attack against S.P. was executed in the same manner as the attacks described in the other crimes evidence. As the Court of Appeals stated, in these attacks, the perpetrator said nothing, used his hands to make brief contact with the woman's buttocks or the clothing covering her buttocks, and fled quickly after making the contact that constituted sexual battery. Id., Angel, Op. at 2009 WL 743046, . Because the evidence of other crimes would have been admissible had the charges against Angel for the attacks on V.L. and S.P. been tried separately, Angel suffered no prejudice from their admission in the single trial of those charges in this case.
The joinder of the two trials also allowed the jury to hear evidence of both the July 9 attack on V.L. and the June 18 attack on S.P. Angel argues that if the cases had not been joined it is less likely that the subsequent July 9 acts would have been permitted to be heard by the [S.P.] jury. With regard to the impact on the offenses against V.L., Angel asserts that if the jury did not hear the evidence relating to the June 18 attack, it would think differently about the issue of intent in connection with the July 9 attack because the only criminal history revealed would be a series of assaults in a short time frame on a single afternoon, rather than a man who also had performed the same act a month earlier. For these reasons, Angel says the joinder of the two trials was not harmless error. A non-constitutional error is harmless if it plainly appears from the record that the parties had a fair trial on the merits and substantial justice has been reached. Code § 8.01-678. If other evidence of guilt is so overwhelming and the error insignificant, by comparison, supporting a conclusion that the error did not have a substantial effect on the verdict, the error is harmless. United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 450, 106 S.Ct. 725, 732, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986). In concluding that the joinder was harmless error, the Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that the evidence of crimes against V.L. would not have been admitted in a separate trial involving the offense against S.P. Angel, Op. at 2009 WL 743046, . With regard to the offense against S.P., Angel challenged only the evidence identifying him as the perpetrator. The admissible evidence included Angel's admission that he committed misdemeanor sexual batteries against other women on July 9 using methods similar to those utilized in the June 18 attack as discussed above. Additional admissible evidence included Angel's admission that he previously had committed another offense near T.J. School similar to the July 9 misdemeanor sexual batteries. S.P. was attacked near Thomas Jefferson Middle School in Alexandria. S.P.'s description of her attacker was consistent with Angel's appearance and her description of the shirt worn by her attacker matched a shirt that was found in Angel's clothes hamper at his residence. Based on this record, we agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the admissible evidence constitutes overwhelming evidence that [Angel] was the perpetrator of the June 18 misdemeanor sexual battery against S.P., and thus, any error in joining for trial that offense with the offenses against V.L. was harmless on the issue of guilt or innocence. Id., Op. at 2009 WL 743046, . We also agree with the Court of Appeals that joinder, if error, was harmless error with regard to Angel's sentence for the June 18 misdemeanor offense. The trial court, not the jury, sentenced Angel, pursuant to Code § 16.1-272. The nature and severity of Angel's crimes against V.L. were admitted for purposes relating to those crimes and, absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court did not consider this evidence in determining Angel's sentence for the misdemeanor sexual battery offense against S.P. Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 978, 234 S.E.2d 286, 291 (1977). Finally, we address Angel's contention that evidence of the June 18 offense heard by the jury in relation to the July 9 offenses was not harmless error because it would impact the issue of intent with regard to the July 9 offenses. It is not clear whether Angel is contending that, without evidence of the June 18 offense, the evidence would not support the element of intent or that the sentence would be different. Either contention is without merit. At trial, and in the Court of Appeals, Angel conceded that there was no issue as to motive or intent with respect to either the July 9 or June 18 offenses. Thus, the June 18 offense evidence would not cause a different result with respect to guilt based on the issue of intent. With respect to an impact on sentencing, as discussed above, the sentence was imposed by the court, not the jury, and we presume the court considered only relevant admissible evidence in sentencing Angel for the July 9 offenses. Id. In summary, there was no error in the admission of evidence of other crimes because such evidence would be admissible in each trial had the charges based on the attacks on S.P. and V.L. been tried separately. Furthermore, in assuming without deciding that the joinder of the trials was error, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that any such error was harmless.