Opinion ID: 1819058
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: WHETHER THE ROADBLOCK WAS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEIZURE OF McLENDON

Text: ¶ 14. We first consider whether the trial court erred in denying McLendon's motion to suppress evidence, or in the alternative to dismiss the DUI charge against McLendon. Our standard of review concerning a trial judge's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is clear. In Culp v. State, 933 So.2d 264 (Miss.2005), we stated: When reviewing a trial court's ruling on the admission or suppression of evidence, this Court must assess whether there was substantial credible evidence to support the trial court's findings. The admission of evidence lies within the discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only if that discretion is abused. Id. at 274 (citing Crawford v. State, 754 So.2d 1211, 1215 (Miss.2000); Magee v. State, 542 So.2d 228, 231 (Miss.1989)). ¶ 15. It is well-settled law that the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (quoting Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969)); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Additionally, the Fourth Amendment requires that such seizure be reasonable. Brown, 443 U.S. at 50, 99 S.Ct. 2637; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). Thus, in deciding whether the subject roadblock in today's case was an unconstitutional seizure of McLendon in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Miss. Const. art. 3, § 23 1890, we must consider the required balancing test in determining the issue of reasonableness outlined in Brown. The balancing test outlined in Brown weighs the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty. Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51, 99 S.Ct. 2637. See also Dale v. State, 785 So.2d 1102, 1104 (Miss.Ct.App.2001). In other words, [t]he reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest . . . depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.' Brown, 443 U.S. at 50, 99 S.Ct. 2637 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574). ¶ 16. In applying the balancing test, we must first consider the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure. Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51, 99 S.Ct. 2637; Dale, 785 So.2d at 1104. McLendon asserts that the underlying purpose of the roadblock violated his Fourth Amendment rights. McLendon argues that the purpose of the subject roadblock was to look for any violation of state law or any city ordinance. In addition, McLendon alleges WPD conducted several roadblocks for the sole purpose of gaining federal grant money. [8] Thus, according to McLendon, the roadblock was impermissible because it served the interest of general crime control and not to enhance the legitimate government interest of public safety. ¶ 17. Although McLendon is correct in asserting that this Court will not uphold the validity of a roadblock if the justification for the seizure was based on the general interest of crime control, the purpose of the subject roadblock was not based on the general interest of crime control, but rather the roadblock was set up for the primary purpose of checking driver's licenses and insurance cards. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S.Ct. 447, 454, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000); Dale, 785 So.2d at 1105. Thus, public concerns were served by the subject roadblock and the ultimate seizure of McLendon. ¶ 18. In Briggs v. State, 741 So.2d 986, 989 (Miss.Ct.App.1999), the Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of a roadblock. Briggs was stopped at a routine roadblock, the purpose of which was to check for driver's licenses and vehicle registration. Id. at 988. When an officer approached Briggs vehicle, the officer smelled alcohol. Id. As a consequence, Briggs was transported to the jail and administered an intoxilyzer test, which Briggs failed, and thereafter, Briggs was convicted of DUI, third offense. Id. ¶ 19. On appeal, Briggs contested the constitutionality of the roadblock. Id. at 989. The Court of Appeals explained that the State arguably has an interest in ensuring that drivers of vehicles are properly licensed and that vehicles are properly registered and periodically inspected. Id. Additionally, it is the primary purpose which determines whether a roadblock is constitutional. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44, 121 S.Ct. 447; Dale, 785 So.2d at 1105. We agree with the reasoning of Briggs and adopt this holding of the Court of Appeals. Since the primary purpose of the WPD roadblock was to check for driver's licenses and insurance cards, and since the primary purpose determines whether a roadblock is constitutional, we agree with the trial court that there was a public concern served by the seizure of McLendon. ¶ 20. We must also consider the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest. Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51, 99 S.Ct. 2637; Dale, 785 So.2d at 1104. In Dale, just as in today's case, the Court was required to apply the three-prong balancing test in Brown. Dale, 785 So.2d at 1104 (quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51, 99 S.Ct. 2637). With regard to the second prong of the balancing test, the Court of Appeals in Dale stated [t]he procedure of stopping each driver is a very effective means of determining whether drivers are properly licensed. By doing so, many people are stopped, and each person's license is examined. This is far more effective than the random stops the Supreme Court outlawed in the Prouse case. Dale, 785 So.2d at 1106 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). Therefore, the Court of Appeals in Dale determined that a roadblock which stops every vehicle passing through the roadblock was not random and served the government's interest in making sure the people on the State's roads are properly licensed. Id. at 1106. We likewise adopt this holding of the Court of Appeals. Dale, 785 So.2d at 1106. ¶ 21. Based on the sound reasoning of Dale, McLendon's argument that the subject roadblock should be considered random because several factors pertaining to the roadblock were solely within the officers' discretion lacks merit. Although no written policies regarding the procedure for setting up a roadblock were in place, the WPD officers were permitted to choose the destination, time, and length of the roadblock; and no logbooks were kept detailing how many cars were stopped or given tickets. Dale to stands for the proposition that when every vehicle traveling through the roadblock is stopped, as opposed to a random stopping of only some vehicles, the officers' discretion has been effectively removed, thus likewise removing as well any potential unconstitutionality of the subject roadblock. Dale, 785 So.2d at 1106. In today's case, he was not the unfortunate victim of a random stop at the roadblock, but instead McLendon was stopped because the officers were consistently and indiscriminately stopping every vehicle coming through the roadblock. ¶ 22. Finally we must consider the severity of the interference with [McLendon's] individual liberty. Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51, 99 S.Ct. 2637; Dale, 785 So.2d at 1104. McLendon relies on Prouse to assert his argument that to permit a field officer to determine, at his discretion, the location, time, or duration of a sobriety checkpoint without any legitimate bases for that determination would be to sanction the kind of unconstrained and standardless discretion which the United States Supreme Court sought to proscribe in Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661, 99 S.Ct. 1391. However, Prouse can be distinguished from the case at bar. Prouse involved a random license stop. Id. at 650, 99 S.Ct. 1391. An on-duty patrolman arbitrarily decided to pull over the respondent in Prouse without observing any violation of the law or suspicious activity. Id. The patrolmen testified he merely decided to stop the driver and check the driver's license and registration. Id. Not until the driver was already pulled over did the patrolman smell marijuana. Id. ¶ 23. The Supreme Court in Prouse held that a random stop of a motorist in the absence of specific articulable facts which justify the stop by indicating a reasonable suspicion that a violation of the law has occurred is constitutionally impermissible and violative of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 651, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (quoting 382 A.2d 1359, 1364 (1978)). The Court also noted that `the issue of the legal validity of systematic, roadblock-type stops of a number of vehicles for license and vehicle registration check is not now before the Court.' Prouse, 440 U.S. at 651, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (quoting 382 A.2d 1359, 1362 (1978)). In the instance case, McLendon was stopped during a systematic, stationary roadblock in which every vehicle passing through was stopped. ¶ 24. McLendon further asserts the WPD officers, along with the MHP officers, were given unbridled discretion, and that there was no particular standard of setting up roadblocks. McLendon claims the roadblock site had not been determined by policy-making officials and no logbooks were kept concerning the operation of the roadblocks. However, McLendon fails to recognize that while there were no written guidelines or set procedures in place, the officers stopped every single vehicle which came through the roadblock. Thus, there was no unbridled officer discretion since the officers did not choose who to stop and who not to stop. We also note that we have previously upheld the constitutionality of a roadblock where there were no set procedures or guidelines in place for the roadblocks. Drane v. State, 493 So.2d 294, 296-97 (Miss.1986). We held that by stopping every vehicle the officers' uncontrolled discretion was removed. Id. Therefore, we unquestionably classify the subject roadblock in today's case as routine and not random. ¶ 25. Accordingly, the intrusion did not severely interfere with McLendon's individual liberty. For the reasons discussed, we conclude that the State's interest in performing the subject roadblock on January 15, 2005, substantially outweighs the minimal intrusion on McLendon's individual liberty. Thus McLendon's seizure was not violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Miss. Const. art. 3, § 23 (1890). For the reasons stated, we find McLendon's assertion that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence is without merit. ¶ 26. As to the alternative prayer for dismissal found in McLendon's motion to suppress, we must consider the trial judge's denial of McLendon's request for a dismissal. We have recently reiterated our well-established standard of review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Scaggs v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 931 So.2d 1274, 1275 (Miss.2006), we stated: When considering a motion to dismiss, this Court's standard of review is de novo. When considering a motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint must be taken as true and the motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff will be unable to prove any set of facts in support of his claim. Lang v. Bay St. Louis/Waveland Sch. Dist., 764 So.2d 1234 (Miss.1999)(citing T.M. v. Noblitt, 650 So.2d 1340, 1342 (Miss.1995)). This Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court unless they are manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Bell v. City of Bay St. Louis, 467 So.2d 657, 661 (Miss.1985). Id. at 1275. This de novo standard of review is likewise applicable to a defendant's motion to dismiss in a criminal case. In adopting in toto our discussion concerning McLendon's claim of trial court error in denying his motion to suppress evidence, we find that the trial court did not err in denying McLendon's alternative prayer for dismissal. If we had found, consistent with McLendon's assertion, that the subject road block was unconstitutional, thus suppressing all evidence seized as a result of the roadblock, we could have stated with reasonable certainty that McLendon's motion to dismiss the DUI charge against him would have merit. However, inasmuch as we have found that the subject roadblock was not unconstitutional, it likewise logically follows that McLendon's alternative motion to dismiss is unquestionably devoid of merit. ¶ 27. In sum, having found the two sub-parts of this issue to be without merit, we now find that the issue, in its entirety, is without merit.