Opinion ID: 2747908
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Solid Waste Act

Text: [¶20] The purposes of the Solid Waste Act are stated in 38 M.R.S. § 1302. These include pursuing and establishing an “integrated approach to hazardous and solid waste management,” with a preference for “implementation on a regional and state level,” and preferring “waste management options [that carry] lower health and environmental risk[s].” 38 M.R.S. § 1302; E. Perry Iron & Metal Co., 2008 ME 10, ¶ 16, 941 A.2d 457. The Solid Waste Act promotes waste composting. 38 M.R.S. § 1302. [¶21] The Solid Waste Act establishes a “comprehensive regulatory scheme” of solid waste management laws. Smith v. Town of Pittston, 2003 ME 46, ¶ 26, 820 A.2d 1200. However, title 38 M.R.S. § 1310-U9 of the Solid Waste Act 9 Title 38 M.R.S. § 1310-U was amended by P.L. 2011, ch. 655, § GG-15 (effective July 1, 2012), after the 2011 conditional use permit was issued pursuant to Ordinance § 8.10.B.1, but the amendment does not affect the legal analysis of this case. 13 states that, under home rule authority, a municipality “may enact ordinances with respect to solid waste facilities that contain standards the municipality finds reasonable . . . provided that the standards are not more strict than those contained in [the Solid Waste Act] and the rules adopted [thereunder].” (Emphasis added.) Additionally, “[m]unicipal ordinances must use definitions consistent with those adopted by the [Board of Environmental Protection].” 38 M.R.S. § 1310-U (emphasis added). Therefore, despite the Solid Waste Act’s stated preferences for regional and state level solid waste management implementation and for waste composting, “[t]he Legislature could not state more clearly its intention not to occupy the field” in waste management matters as long as the local regulation meets section 1310-U’s requirements. Int’l Paper Co., 665 A.2d at 1002-03 (interpreting similar language in 38 M.R.S.A. § 597 (1989), now 38 M.R.S. § 597 (2013)). [¶22] To determine whether the Ordinance’s standards are stricter than those established in the Solid Waste Act and the DEP regulations promulgated thereunder, we directly compare the standards established in the Ordinance and in the Act. See E. Perry Iron & Metal Co., 2008 ME 10, ¶ 21, 941 A.2d 457. “The word ‘standard’ in the context of section 1310-U relates to the quantitative levels, distances, practices, and other measurable criteria deemed necessary to prevent and contain pollution and contamination.” Id. ¶ 22. Ordinance § 8.10.F.2.a provides 14 that all “processing facilities,” which includes Dubois, must be “designed, located and operated in strict compliance with” the standards set forth in the rules promulgated pursuant to the Act that are applicable to all solid waste facilities, see 2 C.M.R. 06 096 400 (2011), and those that are applicable specifically to processing facilities, see 2 C.M.R. 06 096 409 (2011). Therefore, the standards set out in the Ordinance are the same as, and not stricter than, those imposed under the Solid Waste Act for solid waste facilities that are processing facilities.10 [¶23] Further, the Ordinance’s definitions are consistent with the Solid Waste Act and DEP definitions. Ordinance § 8.10.B.1 requires that all “solid waste facilities” obtain conditional use permits, just as solid waste facilities are required to obtain licenses under the Act and DEP regulations. See 38 M.R.S. § 1310-N; 2 C.M.R. 06 096 400-10 to -11 § 2 (2010). The Ordinance defines “solid waste facility” and solid waste “processing facility,” and terms incorporated therein, nearly identically to, or in some cases less stringently than, the definitions in the Act and rules promulgated under the Act. Compare Ordinance § 2.2, with 10 Contrary to Dubois’s contentions, the Ordinance’s requirement that a facility have its conditional use permit reissued every three years is not a stricter standard, and is not evidence that the Ordinance does not comply with 38 M.R.S. § 1310-U. See E. Perry Iron & Metal Co. v. City of Portland, 2008 ME 10, ¶¶ 20-23 & n.6, 941 A.2d 457. Although such a process may be more expensive for Dubois, such factors of “generalized hardship” or of more rigorous procedure are not evidence that the Ordinance conflicts with State law and is therefore preempted. Id. ¶ 23 & n.6. 15 38 M.R.S. § 1303-C(29), (31), (32-A), and 2 C.M.R. 06 096 400-6 § 1(Gg) (2010), and 2 C.M.R. 06 096 400-8 § 1(Kkk) (2011). [¶24] In sum, the Solid Waste Act does not preempt the Ordinance because (1) the standards in the Ordinance are not stricter than those in the Act; (2) the Ordinance’s definitions are not inconsistent with those in the Act; and (3) the Ordinance’s provisions do not frustrate the purpose of the Act. [¶25] Because state law does not preempt the Ordinance, the Ordinance is presumed valid, the Town had jurisdiction to act, and the Town’s action taken pursuant to the Ordinance in regulating Dubois and issuing Dubois a notice of violation for failure to comply with the conditional use permit is not ultra vires. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. On the briefs: Scott D. Giese, Esq., Law Office of Scott D. Giese, Biddeford, for appellant Dubois Livestock, Inc. Leah B. Rachin, Esq., Bergen & Parkinson, LLC, Kennebunk, for appellees Town of Arundel et al. 16 At oral argument: L. Clinton Boothby, Esq., Boothby Perry, LLC, Turner, for appellant Dubois Livestock, Inc. Leah B. Rachin, Esq., Bergen & Parkinson, LLC, Kennebunk, for appellees Town of Arundel et al. York County Superior Court docket number AP-13-4 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY