Opinion ID: 392171
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the case against the district of columbia

Text: 18 Though the appellant's complaint alleged several violations of fifth and eighth amendment rights, the only argument he presses on this appeal is that the District violated his eighth amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, appellant argues that placement in a dormitory at Lorton Youth Center in which violent prisoner assaults frequently occurred, and the District's subsequent failure to take reasonable precautions to protect him from such assaults, violated his constitutional right to be free from an unreasonable risk of assault. Brief for the Appellant With Respect to Appellee D.C. at 20. 19 The Supreme Court has laid out the standard of proof necessary to establish an eighth amendment violation. The Court has held that deliberate indifference of prison authorities to a prisoner's serious medical needs may constitute such wanton infliction of unnecessary pain as to be  'repugnant to the conscience of mankind,'  or incompatible with  'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-05, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290-91, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). The Court took pains in that opinion to distinguish between negligen(ce) or an inadvertent failure, which does not invoke constitutional protections, and deliberate indifference, which does. Id. at 105-06, 97 S.Ct. at 291-92. The district court here correctly concluded, and the appellant does not now challenge, that 20 (t)here is no indication ... from any of the testimony here that the police (sic) officers deliberately did anything or willfully violated any of their responsibilities to protect Murphy(.) 21 Tr. 5/9/79 at 428. 22 However, as appellant correctly points out, this conclusion does not end the constitutional inquiry because the existence of deliberate indifference can be inferred from evidence that assaults are sufficiently pervasive to reasonably apprise prison officials of the need for protective measures. Under these circumstances the failure to institute protective measures can rise to the level of a constitutional violation. While a prisoner has no right to demand the level of protection necessary to render an institution assault-free (he is only entitled to reasonable protection from assaults, see note 18 supra ), commitment to an institution where terror reigns, or even where the risk of ... assault (is) a serious problem of substantial dimensions, may violate the eighth amendment. See Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 at 1373 (5th Cir. 1981); Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 161 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 136, 66 L.Ed.2d 59 (1980). But to prevail under such a constitutional theory, the prisoner must show thatviolence and sexual assaults occur ... with sufficient frequency that the ... prisoners ... are put in reasonable fear for their safety and to reasonably apprise prison officials of the existence of the problem and the need for protective measures. 23 Id. Not all prisoners need be subject to this fear. It is enough that an identifiable group of prisoners do, if the complainant is a member of that group. Id. 28 24 However, we must agree with the district court that no such showing was made here. The sole evidence proffered, again, was the raw number of assaults (twenty) that occurred in Lorton Youth Center I (population 344), and the number (six) in Dormitory # 3 (population 100) where Murphy was housed during the 1976 calendar year, numbers we have already found insufficient in this case to prove unreasonableness. See p. 642 supra. Furthermore, the appellant made no attempt to show that the rate of assaults in this facility exceeded the norm for like institutions or that one identifiable group of inmates was especially susceptible to attack. See notes 19 & 20 supra. Particularly in view of the appellant's stipulation that he did not fear for his safety prior to the attack, 29 we cannot find in this record any support for appellant's contention that so escalated a level of violence existed that the prison officials must have been deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's need for reasonable protective measures. 30 Hence, we uphold the trial court in its refusal to submit the constitutional count to the jury.
25 The appellant's last argument was that the Lorton Youth Center staff's negligence in three areas proximately caused his injury, thereby rendering the District liable for that injury. He alleged: 1) the staff failed to follow applicable count regulations in ways that facilitated the movement of at least one of Murphy's attackers into his dormitory wing; 31 2) the staff failed to properly perform and/or record the required room and inmate searches and tool inventories so that no adequate system of tool control existed to prevent inmates' easy access to weapons such as those which may have been used in Murphy's assault; and 3) the staff released one of Murphy's attackers from the Center's Adjustment Unit, despite a lengthy record of verbal threats of violence and disciplinary infractions, without taking special security precautions to ensure the protection of other inmates, and failed to recommit him following a more recent disciplinary infraction. After the trial court initially denied the District's motion for a directed verdict on all three theories, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The trial court then granted a judgment n. o. v. against the appellant because(p)laintiff failed to present evidence from which the jury could reasonably have found that the conduct of Defendant's employees was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries .... (I)mmediately after an inmate count is completed, the inmates are free to move around Youth Center I and mingle in the recreation areas of their respective wings. Given that fact, the failure to prevent all movement of inmates during the count cannot be said to have proximately caused Plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff's other allegations of negligence were not supported by the evidence and thus also cannot sustain the jury's verdict. 26 Murphy v. United States, Civ. No. 78-251 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1980) (order granting judgment n. o. v.); R. 92 at 2. 27 We disagree with the court's decision to grant the judgment n. o. v. on two of the three theories of liability. Though we would not characterize the appellant's case on any of the three theories of negligence as strong, he did present expert testimony as to the applicable standard of care and the staff's alleged deviation from that standard in two of the three alleged areas of negligence. 32 We conclude that the jury could have found that expert evidence along with the testimony of Lorton correctional officers sufficient from which to infer that the staff's negligence proximately caused Murphy's injury on these two theories of liability. However, we agree with the trial judge and the appellee that the appellant presented insufficient evidence to allow the jury to consider the third theory of liability, that relating to the classification of Vaughn Pugh. Because we cannot determine on which theory of liability the jury relied when finding in favor of the appellant, leaving open the possibility that it may have relied on the impermissible one, the case must be remanded for retrial. See Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U.S. 60, 79, 27 S.Ct. 412, 419, 51 L.Ed. 708 (1907); Glass v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 457 F.2d 1387, 1389 (5th Cir. 1972).
28 Prison officials count inmates several times each day to ensure that no one has escaped. 33 During such counts, inmates are required to remain stationary in certain areas of the prison, usually their cells, until all inmates are accounted for. 34 Murphy's assault occurred sometime during the mid-afternoon count. His theory of liability is that the staff prematurely released inmates from their wings into the porch and communal areas before the institutional count had been cleared, and one of the four guards assigned to guard the dormitory was consequently on the porch with several inmates rather than on patrol inside the dormitory 35 at the time of the attack. Both actions, allegedly in violation of the applicable regulations, permitted at least one of his attackers to leave his wing and cross over to Murphy's dormitory to perpetrate the assault. Such unauthorized cross-overs, a recognized security hazard, 36 were prohibited by institutional regulations. 37 29 No one disputed the fact that on November 28, 1976, the staff allowed the residents of Dormitory # 3 off their wings following the completion of the dormitory count, 38 without waiting for the institutional count to clear. 39 Considerable dispute did exist at trial, however, as to whether this procedure violated the applicable standard of care. The inmate handbook containing the Youth Center's official regulations said merely that (a)ll residents must stay in their rooms until the count is cleared by the Dormitory Officer. (Emphasis in original.) 40 The appellant's expert witness testified that this meant, or should have meant, that inmates were to remain in their rooms until the institutional count cleared. 41 The officers on duty testified variously that the expert's interpretation of the regulation was correct and that the regulation meant only that residents were to stay in their rooms until the dormitory count cleared; after that they could go into the dormitory's communal rooms or on the porch 42 until the institutional count cleared. 30 There was also contradictory testimony over whether the officer who went out on the porch after calling in the count violated his duty to stay inside the dormitory and ensure that inmates also stayed on their wings. According to the appellant's expert, each officer should have been patrolling one wing of the dormitory to ensure that no inmate left his wing during the count. 43 The Youth Center officers testified, on the other hand, that placing an officer on the porch was the appropriate security technique for ensuring that youths, allowed in the common areas of the dormitory following completion of the dormitory count, did not leave the dormitory prematurely. 44 31 There was thus no question, and the trial judge did not conclude otherwise, that sufficient evidence existed to go to the jury on the issue of whether it was a negligent deviation from the prevailing standard of care 45 to conduct the count as the staff at Lorton admittedly did on the day of Murphy's assault. The judge granted the judgment n. o. v. because he found as a matter of law that the failure to prevent movement of inmates off the wings during the count could not be considered a proximate cause of Murphy's injury given the fact that a few minutes later, when the count was completed, the inmates were legitimately allowed to move around in communal areas of the dormitory and outside in the Youth Center compound. In other words, he appeared to conclude that because the attack could as easily have taken place later when movement was freer, any negligence in allowing out of wing movement before the count procedures were completed merely accelerated the timing of, rather than caused, the attack. 32 However, we do not find this reasoning satisfactory as a justification for overturning the jury's finding of negligent liability. There was testimony that the placement of both the officers 46 and inmates 47 was different during count and non-count periods. Thus, even if Murphy's assailants could have illegitimately entered into his wing during free time, a jury could nonetheless have inferred that the attack would have been more difficult to perpetrate when Murphy was not as likely to be in his room and when dormitory guards were not occupied with the count. The possibility that an attack might have taken place later under different circumstances does not excuse officers' irregular actions during the count which may have created an unreasonable danger of attack during that period of time and therefore proximately caused the attack. 48
33 Murphy's attackers stabbed him 16 times and beat him; a doctor testified that the beating may have been administered with a blunt instrument. Tr. 5/8/79 at 333. There is no question but that the inmates should not have had access to such weapons; there is also no question that prison inmates typically strive and often manage to find, steal, or create many such weapons. 49 Appellant argued that the officials at Lorton Youth Center I did not use their best efforts to prevent inmates from possessing weapons, but in fact violated both their own regulations and the prevailing standard of care by failing to maintain adequate tool control, search, and shakedown procedures. The resultant access to weapons, he claimed, proximately caused his injuries. 50 34 The Youth Center had detailed regulations governing tool access, tool return, and tool inventories to prevent inmates from utilizing tools as weapons. 51 The appellant's expert testified that these regulations were adequate; 52 however, he also testified that as far as he could tell from the correctional officers' preceding testimony, the staff had failed to follow them. He repeatedly stressed the need for, 53 and in this institution apparent lack of, a tool inventory as the linchpin of an adequate tool control system. Appellant had requested in his interrogatories the records of all tools listed as missing during the years 1973-78. However, the District responded that it had no such records. 54 At trial, it was argued that this response meant only that the information did not exist in the form requested; 55 one officer testified that lists of missing tools had been kept for these years but had since been destroyed as obsolete. 56 Two other officers denied all knowledge of a tool inventory or any other record of tools extant at or missing from the institution. 57 The court refused to issue a subpoena for any existing tool inventories, in whatever form, at trial. 58 Hence there was evidence before the jury that no inventory existed and no definitive proof that it did. The absence of such an inventory might well have been relied upon by the jury as evidence of the lack of an adequate tool control program, a program necessary, according to appellant's expert, to reasonably insure inmates' safety. 35 The expert witness also testified that regular searches and shakedowns of the institution were essential for adequate tool control. 59 He specifically stated that for a search to be effective, inmates must be searched along with their rooms. 60 However, one correctional officer testified that when he conducted searches at Lorton Youth Center I, he searched only rooms, and allowed the inmate to stand in the hall where it was possible for him to pass contraband to his fellow inmates. 61 One correctional officer testified that he did not remember conducting the number of room searches and shakedowns required by the Center's regulations. 62 36 The attack on Murphy was perpetrated by armed inmates; without weapons of some sort, his attackers could not have inflicted the multiple stab wounds. Evidence existed from which a reasonable jury could have concluded that Lorton Youth Center's tool control program, designed to keep weapons out of inmates' hands precisely to forestall this type of attack, had been ignored by several guards in Murphy's dormitory. Where evidence of the failure to adhere to a reasonable standard of care exists, and the injury which has in fact occurred is precisely the sort of thing that proper care on the part of the defendant would be intended to prevent, not only is the existence of proximate cause a jury question, but the court can ... allow a certain liberality to the jury in drawing its conclusion. W. Prosser, Law of Torts 243 (4th ed. 1971).
37 The third and final allegation of negligence resulted from the Center's decision to release one of Murphy's attackers, Vaughn Pugh, from the Center's Adjustment Unit. 63 Appellant argued that Pugh's release subjected him to an unreasonable risk of attack. However, we agree with the trial judge's conclusion that this theory of negligence was not supported by the evidence and thus also cannot sustain the jury's verdict. Murphy v. United States, Civ. No. 78-251 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1980) (order granting judgment n. o. v.); R. 92 at 2. 38 In contrast to his testimony regarding appellant's other allegations of negligence, appellant's expert did not state that anything about the decision to mainstream Pugh violated a penological concept. 64 The process by which the decision was made was admittedly adequate; 65 the decision itself was not off the wall. 66 The strongest term of criticism Mr. Miller was willing to utter against the decision was inappropriate. 67 As the District's counsel made clear on cross-examination, the disagreement between Mr. Miller and the officer who had made the decision was one of professional judgment. 68 39 We are unwilling to hold under the circumstances here that evidence of a difference in judgment between experts as to the assaultive possibilities of an inmate constitutes evidence of negligence. When a decision requiring a difficult prediction of future behavior is shown to have been made in accordance with proper procedural safeguards and is substantively within a range of reasonableness, the burden of proving negligence cannot be said to have been met. 69 Appellant presented no evidence to support his claim that the officials negligently classified Pugh aside from the testimony of Mr. Miller. Pugh's disciplinary reports showed a pattern of verbal, not physical abuse; there was no evidence that he had assaulted an inmate prior to the attack on Murphy. Pugh's release from the Adjustment Unit followed 90 days of, and behavioral improvement during, treatment; release was conditioned on his participation in a special counseling program. 70 In short, appellant presented no evidence that Lorton Youth Center's handling of Pugh was unreasonable, and the trial court could properly direct a verdict against Murphy on that theory of liability.