Opinion ID: 39527
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Refusal To Give Requested Jury Charge

Text: 9 O'Keefe contends that the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that in order to convict on a charge of seaman's manslaughter pursuant to § 1115, the Government had to prove gross negligence or heat of passion, as is required for a conviction of common law manslaughter. 10 We review a district court's refusal to give a requested jury charge for an abuse of discretion. United States v. John, 309 F.3d 298, 304 (5th Cir.2002). We will reverse a district court's rejection of a proposed jury instruction only if the requested jury instruction (1) was a substantially correct statement of law, (2) was not substantially covered in the charge as a whole, and (3) concerned an important point in the trial such that the failure to instruct the jury on the issue seriously impaired the defendant's ability to present a given defense. United States v. Richards, 204 F.3d 177, 204 (5th Cir.2000). Where no objection is made or no request for a jury instruction is given, the Fifth Circuit reviews such claims for plain error. See United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 467 (5th Cir.2004). See United States v. Daniels, 252 F.3d 411, 414 (5th Cir.2001). Because O'Keefe requested a particular jury instruction that was subsequently rejected by the district court, we review this claim for an abuse of discretion. 11 Section 1115 of Title 18 reads in pertinent part: Every captain ... by whose misconduct, negligence, or inattention to his duties on [a] vessel the life of any person is destroyed ... shall be ... imprisoned not more than ten years.... 12 O'Keefe's proposed jury instruction reads in part: [T]he government must prove that Mr. O'Keefe engaged in misconduct, negligence or inattention to his duties. That is a term of art. It means gross negligence, which in turn has two subparts: that the defendant (a) acted with wanton or reckless disregard for human life; and (b) had knowledge that his conduct was a threat to the life of another or knowledge of such circumstances as could reasonably have enabled him to foresee the peril to which his act might subject another. 13 As noted, the district court rejected this proposed jury instruction, and instead charged the jury, in relevant part, that, 14 [f]or you to find the Defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the Government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt: 15 .... 16 ... [I]f a person lost his or her life, the loss of life was proximately caused by the misconduct, negligence or inattention of the Defendant to his duties upon the vessel, upon which he was employed. 17 The district court then defined the term negligence, stating that [t]he term `negligence' is defined as a breach of duty. A breach of a duty is defined as an omission to perform some duty, or it is a violation of some rule or standard of care, which is made to govern and control one in the discharge of some duty. 18 O'Keefe argues that under the common law definition of manslaughter and the companion statutory definition for general manslaughter, 18 U.S.C. § 1112, the government is required, in the absence of malice, to prove gross negligence or heat of passion to sustain a conviction under § 1115. Citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999), O'Keefe further contends that Congress is presumed to have incorporated common law meanings in the terms it uses in the statutes. 19 The district court, after conducting a historical analysis of how other courts have applied § 1115, concluded that Congress did not intend that proof of negligence or heat of passion would be required for a conviction under § 1115. The court cited at least five early cases, all strongly suggesting that Congress did not intend a requirement of the heightened mens rea that O'Keefe seeks. See, e.g., United States v. Warner, 28 F.Cas. 404, 407 (D.Ohio, 1848); United States v. Farnham, 25 F.Cas. 1042, 1044 (S.D. New York, 1853); United States v. Collyer, 25 F.Cas. 554, 578 (S.D.N.Y.1855); United States v. Keller, 19 F. 633, 638 (D. West Virginia, 1884); and Van Schaick v. United States, 159 F. 847, 850 (2d Cir.1908). After conducting its analysis concerning these cases, the district court stated, [i]t appears clear from the purpose of the statute, its legislative history and the available case law interpreting it that any degree of negligence is sufficient to meet the culpability threshold. 1 O'Keefe's attempt to distinguish the cases relied on by the district court is to no avail. Indeed, the two cases he relies on, United States v. Fesler, 781 F.2d 384, 392-93 (5th Cir.1986) and United States v. Browner, 889 F.2d 549, 553 (5th Cir.1989), are inapposite because they both track the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1112, for involuntary manslaughter. 20 This court has consistently held that when the plain meaning of the statute is clear on its face, courts are required to give effect to the language of the statute according to its terms. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685, 105 S.Ct. 2297, 2301, 85 L.Ed.2d 692 (1985); see also Dial One of Mid-South, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 269 F.3d 523, 525 (5th Cir.2001). 21 After evaluating § 1115, we hold that its terms are unambiguous and therefore must be given their plain meaning. As such, we find nothing in the statute's terms suggesting that the words misconduct, negligence or inattention, were ever meant to imply gross negligence or heat of passion, as argued by O'Keefe. Because we find that the plain language of the statute is clear, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting O'Keefe's claim.