Opinion ID: 2067285
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arrest and Car Search

Text: Jackson argues that his arrest and the search of his car following his arrest, both without a warrant, violated his rights under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. He claims the trial court improperly admitted evidence gathered during that search. An arrest without a warrant is proper when it is supported by probable cause. Poore v. State (1986), Ind., 501 N.E.2d 1058. Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the person being arrested has committed or is in the process of committing an offense. Heffner v. State (1988), Ind., 530 N.E.2d 297, 300 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979)). Information obtained by one officer may be relied upon by other law enforcement officials who are called upon to assist in the investigation and arrest of a suspect, as long as the officer who obtained the information possessed probable cause to make the arrest. Heffner, 530 N.E.2d at 300 (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985)). When officers Whalen and VanGundy arrested Jackson, they were relying on information known to Sergeant Jim Theobald of the Indiana State Police and Detective James Longerbone of the Columbus Police Department Robbery Squad. From talking with witnesses and other preliminary research, the investigating officers had amassed a great deal of information. They knew that the Peoples Bank of Moores Hill had been robbed by two armed, masked men and that the bank manager's description of the smaller robber roughly fit the description of Donald Lee Jackson. They also knew that the taller robber had called the smaller robber Jack, and that Jackson had a prior conviction for armed bank robbery. Finally, the police had interviewed witnesses who had seen: (1) Jackson's white Corvette following a blue Granada in the Moores Hill area earlier in the day, (2) Jackson's Corvette parked by the railroad tracks shortly before the robbery occurred, (3) the robbers driving away in a blue Granada, (4) a blue Granada disappearing over a hill immediately before a white Corvette drove away from the same spot, and (5) a blue Granada parked by the railroad tracks. These facts and circumstances were sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that Jackson had committed armed robbery. The police had probable cause to arrest Jackson. Jackson argues that even if his arrest was legal, the scope of the car search exceeded the permissible bounds for a search incident to arrest. This, too, must fail, for when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981). Because the police had probable cause to arrest Jackson, they may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search his automobile. Id. That Skaggs conducted his search after Jackson had been removed from the scene is of no moment. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1981, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); see also California v. Acevedo, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991). The trial court properly refused to suppress the evidence seized incident to Jackson's arrest during the search of his automobile.