Opinion ID: 1475663
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: The Question of Formal Demand

Text: The court found that the appellant has not caused a demand to be made upon said defendants that said defendants desist and discontinue the use of said trade name `Stork Club', and that the appellant has not heretofore caused a demand to be made upon said defendants that said defendants desist or discontinue the use of said trade name, `Stork Club' or the aforesaid related insignia. We do not believe that the exhibits or the appellees' pleaded admissions support these findings. Although the appellees do not mention in their brief this asserted lack of formal demand, the point requires some attention. Among the exhibits in this case are carbon copies of two letters signed by the appellant's attorneys, the first of which contains a formal demand that the appellees discontinue the use of the name The Stork Club and related insigne in connection with the appellees' establishment. The second letter is in the nature of a follow-up. Each letter is addressed to The Stork Club, 200 Hyde Street, San Francisco, California, and the second is marked for the Attention of the appellees. The first letter is dated May 4, 1945, and the second, May 15, 1945. In their verified answer, the appellees admit that on or about April 6, 1945, they became the operators of and ever since have operated and conducted the San Francisco bar here in question. The lower court so found. Nicholas M. Sahati testified that on May 4, 1945, the appellees' address was 410 Loew Building, San Francisco, but that on May 15, 1945, it was at 200 Hyde Street, where the appellees' bar is situated. He later testified, however, that he and his associates were not in possession of the Hyde Street premises at the latter date. He had previously testified that the appellees had the actual ownership but not actual possession of the premises on April 6, 1945, and had been receiving a percentage of the profits since March 15, 1945. The record shows that the onsale beer and wine and distilled spirits licenses were issued to the appellees on April 6, 1945; that a sales tax permit was issued to them on March 16, 1945, and that the last date for which their predecessor paid a sales tax to the State of California was April 11, 1945. While Sahati testified that he did not receive either of the letters in question, there is no evidence that none of the other appellees received them. Notice to one partner is notice to all. Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet 16 Shop, supra, 8 Cir., 15 F.2d 920, at page 924. Teresa Gilligan, the secretary for one of the appellant's attorneys, testified that she typed, addressed, stamped, and mailed each of the letters in question. The addresses on the envelopes corresponded with the addresses on the letters themselves. The envelopes contained return addresses. Section 1963 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides in part as follows: § 1963. [Disputable presumptions.] All other presumptions are satisfactory, if uncontradicted. They are denominated disputable presumptions, and may be controverted by other evidence. The following are of that kind: