Opinion ID: 2827194
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the chancellor erred in the equitable

Text: DISTRIBUTION ON REMAND. ¶17. When dividing a couple’s assets, a chancellor initially must classify those assets as marital or separate property. Fisher v. Fisher, 771 So. 2d 364, 447 (Miss. 2000). Then, the chancellor must proceed with equitable distribution guided by the factors set forth in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994). Those factors include: 1. Substantial contribution to the accumulation of the property. Factors to be considered in determining contribution are as follows: a. Direct or indirect economic contribution to the acquisition of the property; b. Contribution to the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationships as measured by quality, quantity of time spent on family duties and duration of the marriage; and c. Contribution to the education, training or other accomplishment bearing on the earning power of the spouse accumulating the assets. 2. The degree to which each spouse has expended, withdrawn or otherwise disposed of marital assets and any prior distribution of such assets by agreement, decree or otherwise. 12 3. The market value and the emotional value of the assets subject to distribution. 4. The value of assets not ordinarily, absent equitable factors to the contrary, subject to such distribution, such as property brought to the marriage by the parties and property acquired by inheritance or inter vivos gift by or to an individual spouse; 5. Tax and other economic consequences, and contractual or legal consequences to third parties, of the proposed distribution; 6. The extent to which property division may, with equity to both parties, be utilized to eliminate periodic payments and other potential sources of future friction between the parties; 7. The needs of the parties for financial security with due regard to the combination of assets, income and earning capacity; and, 8. Any other factor which in equity should be considered. Id. at 928. If, after the equitable distribution of the marital estate, one spouse is left with a deficit, then the chancellor should consider alimony based on the value of nonmarital assets. Gutierrez, 153 So. 3d at 711 (citing Lauro v. Lauro, 847 So. 2d 843, 848 (Miss. 2003)). ¶18. Drake argues that the chancellor committed several errors in the equitable distribution. First, Drake argues that the chancellor erred as a matter of law by failing to make a detailed analysis of all the Ferguson factors on remand. In the judgment on remand, the chancellor discussed only the Ferguson factors pertaining to separate property. The chancellor specifically articulated a finding that his analysis of all other Ferguson factors remained the same. ¶19. This Court has reversed and remanded a property division for failure to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the Ferguson factors. Fisher v. Fisher, 13 771 So. 2d 364, 367 (Miss. 2000). Here, the Court of Appeals ordered the chancellor to “make an equitable distribution of the marital estate, taking into account the new value of Legacy and any other property which has undergone a change in marital status.” Lewis, 54 So. 3d at 244. The judgment after remand indicates that the chancellor reconsidered all of the Ferguson factors and that his findings on the factors not specifically discussed remained the same. It is clear that the chancellor performed a new equitable distribution on remand, and we find that the chancellor did not err by incorporating by reference some of his findings from the divorce judgment. ¶20. Drake appears to argue that the chancellor erred in his valuation of Legacy. Drake avers that the chancellor erred by including Legacy as “a valued asset.” He contends that he proved that Legacy had no value. This argument is perplexing, because, in the award of Legacy to Drake, the chancellor clearly stated that Legacy had no value except for accounts receivable. Because the chancellor found Legacy had no value, the chancellor subtracted the previously determined value of Legacy from Drake’s allotment of assets in the recalculated equitable distribution. Drake points to no specific error in the chancellor’s valuation of Legacy, and this Court finds no error. ¶21. Drake also argues that he showed that Tonia’s submission, at the divorce trial, of the three exhibits deemed unreliable by the Court of Appeals was an attempt to mislead the chancellor that should have weighed against Tonia in the equitable distribution. But Tonia testified that, when she submitted the exhibits, she believed them to be true. The chancellor 14 was within his discretion in rejecting Drake’s contention that Tonia had attempted to mislead the chancery court. ¶22. Next, Drake argues that the chancellor erred by classifying the proceeds from the parties’ sale of the Richland Road property as marital. After the separation, Drake and Tonia sold their interests in the Richland Road property and signed a purchase agreement stating that the sale proceeds of $265,624 would be divided equally between them and would be the separate property of each seller. In the divorce judgment, the chancellor found that the sale proceeds were marital. The judgment stated that $132,812 was awarded to Tonia, but failed to make an award of the remaining $132,812. In an order granting Tonia’s motion to alter and amend the divorce judgment, the chancellor awarded the entire $265,624 to Tonia and amended Tonia’s total award to $865,733 to include the entire proceeds from the sale of Richland Road. But in a subsequent order denying in part Drake’s motion to alter or amend the judgment, the chancellor failed to recognize this holding, stating that “[a]s to the proceeds of Richland Road, the Court notes that the parties had equally divided those proceeds, and that each had received a distribution of some $132,000.00 each. It is only this amount that the Court noted in its distribution to Tonia.” That statement was incorrect, because the chancellor already had amended the judgment to provide that the entire $265,624 was Tonia’s. But in the order on modification and contempt, the chancellor clarified that the entire $256,624 was Tonia’s according to the order altering and amending the judgment. ¶23. Drake argues that, because the parties had agreed to share the Richland Road proceeds equally as their separate property, the chancellor erred by classifying the proceeds as marital. 15 Because Drake did not include this issue in his appeal from the divorce judgment, this issue implicates the law-of-the-case doctrine. This Court has stated that: The doctrine of the law of the case is similar to that of former adjudication, relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the case. Whatever is once established as the controlling legal rule of decision, between the same parties in the same case, continues to be the law of the case, so long as there is a similarity of facts. This principle expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has previously been decided. It is founded on public policy and the interests of orderly and consistent judicial procedure. Moeller v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 812 So. 2d 953, 960 (Miss. 2002). “[A] mandate issued by this Court ‘is binding on the trial court on remand, unless the case comes under one of the exceptions to the law of the case doctrine . . . , such as ‘material changes in evidence, pleadings or findings’ . . . . or the need for the Court to ‘depart from its former decision’ ‘after mature consideration’ so that ‘unjust results’ will not occur . . . .’” Id. (citations omitted). Here, the Court of Appeals reviewed the equitable distribution and remanded with specific instructions to revalue Legacy, reclassify two properties, remove Lot 13 Hickory Hills, and equitably divide the assets. Lewis, 54 So. 3d at 243-44. Otherwise, the Court of Appeals affirmed the property division. Id. Accordingly, on remand, the chancellor revalued Legacy, reclassified the two properties, removed Lot 13 Hickory Hills, and adjusted the equitable division in light of those specific changes after considering the Ferguson factors. Because the classification of the Richland Road proceeds was outside the scope of the Court of Appeals’ instructions on remand, the chancellor properly did not consider the issue. This is because the chancellor’s previous holding that the Richland Road property was marital was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and had become the law of the case. 16 ¶24. Drake also argues that the chancellor failed to consider the tax consequences attendant to Legacy as required by Ferguson in the judgment on remand. Contrary to Drake’s argument, the chancellor specifically addressed the tax consequences of awarding Legacy to Drake. The chancellor recognized that Drake had a capital loss carryover of $314,187 from the closing of Legacy that he could use to offset against future ordinary income. The chancellor held that Drake should indemnify Tonia of all tax liability from Legacy based upon the 2008 tax return. Because the chancellor did consider the tax consequences of distributing Legacy to Drake, Drake’s argument fails. ¶25. Finally, Drake argues that the chancellor abused his discretion by awarding Tonia substantially more assets. After determining that Legacy had no value, reclassifying Swamp Road and St. Martin as Drake’s separate property, and removing Lot 13 Hickory Hills, the chancellor revisited the Ferguson factors. The chancellor removed St. Martin from Tonia’s distribution, leaving her with $665,733 in assets. The chancellor removed Lot 13 Hickory Hills from Drake’s distribution and valued Legacy at zero, leaving Drake with $649,100 in assets. Otherwise, the equitable distribution of assets remained the same. Then, the chancellor addressed the value of assets not subject to distribution, finding that this factor had been affected by the redistribution of assets. The chancellor found that, because Drake had separate property gifted by his father valued at $210,000, his assets outweighed Tonia’s to the extent that lump-sum alimony should be awarded. The chancellor found Tonia had no separate assets and that, “in light of all the Ferguson and Armstrong factors, and in order to equitably divide the property,” Drake was to pay Tonia $100,000 in lump-sum alimony. 17 ¶26. Contrary to Drake’s argument, Tonia did not receive substantially more assets. Including the lump-sum alimony award to Tonia and Drake’s separate property of $210,000, the distribution left Drake with $759,100 and Tonia with $755,733. Drake argues that he received only $462,545 in assets, leaving Tonia with substantially more assets, because the values of certain assets changed after the divorce judgment. In his calculation, Drake subtracts the $156,555 loan to Legacy and the $30,000 Swamp Road property from his share. Drake argues that, because he never received repayment of the $156,555 loan to Legacy after Legacy’s dissolution, the loan should not have been included in the property division. He also complains that, after the divorce, Tonia sold property she was awarded for more than the amount of her equity in the property. ¶27. It is well-established that “an equitable division of property does not necessarily mean an equal division of property.” Chamblee v. Chamblee, 637 So. 2d 850, 863-64 (Miss. 1994). “[F]airness is the prevailing guideline in marital division.” Lowery v. Lowery, 25 So. 3d 274, 285 (Miss. 2009) (quoting Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 929). Here, the chancellor’s division of the property was approximately equal. Drake’s argument that he received substantially less than Tonia relies on circumstances that occurred after the divorce judgment. However, the date for determination of equitable distribution is, at the earliest, the date of separation, or, at the latest, the date of divorce. Lowery, 25 So. 3d at 285. Additionally, an order of equitable division is a nonmodifiable judgment. East v. East, 493 So. 2d 927, 931 (Miss. 1986). Therefore, when the Court of Appeals remanded for the chancellor to revisit 18 the equitable distribution, the chancellor properly redetermined the equitable distribution as of the date of the divorce. II. WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN AWARDING LUMPSUM ALIMONY. ¶28. In the divorce judgment, the chancellor reviewed Tonia’s request for periodic alimony under the factors from Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993).The chancellor awarded Tonia $24,000 in rehabilitative periodic alimony. In the order on modification and contempt, the chancellor granted Drake’s request to terminate rehabilitative alimony as of the date of Tonia’s remarriage. In the judgment after remand, the chancellor redetermined the equitable distribution and addressed alimony. The chancellor found that, due to the fact that Tonia had no separate assets and Drake had a separate estate valued at $210,000, Drake should pay Tonia $100,000 in lump-sum alimony. ¶29. “Lump-sum alimony has been described as ‘a means of adjusting financial inequities that remain after property division.’” Rogillio v. Rogillio, 57 So. 3d 1246, 1250 (Miss. 2011) (quoting Deborah H. Bell, Mississippi Family Law § 9.02[2][a][ii] (2005)). Drake argues that, in awarding lump-sum alimony, the chancellor erred by failing to apply Cheatham v. Cheatham, 537 So. 2d 435, 438-40 (Miss. 1988), which predates Ferguson and sets out factors for determining whether lump-sum alimony is appropriate. This Court has held that, when “lump-sum alimony is awarded as a mechanism to equitably divide the marital assets, then chancellors may conduct their analysis under the Ferguson factors.” Davenport v. Davenport, 156 So. 3d 231, 241 (Miss. 2014) (citing Haney v. Haney, 907 So. 2d 948, 955 (Miss. 2005)). This is because “the Cheatham factors are really nothing more than an earlier 19 version of the Ferguson factors, and both are used for the same purpose.” Haney, 907 So. 2d at 954. But when the chancellor awards lump-sum or periodic alimony after equitably dividing the estate, the chancellor should consider the Armstrong factors. Davenport, 156 So. 2d at 241. Here, the chancellor, relying on Armstrong, awarded Tonia $100,000 in lumpsum alimony after equitably dividing the marital estate. The chancellor properly relied on Armstrong and not Cheatham in making the lump-sum alimony award. ¶30. Drake also argues that the chancellor manifestly erred by awarding lump-sum alimony because Tonia received more marital assets than Drake in the equitable distribution. As previously stated, Tonia and Drake received substantially the same amount of marital assets, plus Drake had separate property totaling $210,000. The award of $100,000 in lump-sum alimony left the parties with substantially the same amount of assets. “Whether or not to award alimony and the amount of alimony is largely within the discretion of the chancellor.” Parsons v. Parsons, 678 So. 2d 701, 702 (Miss. 1996). This Court finds that the chancellor was within his discretion in determining that, considering the needs and assets of the parties, Tonia should be awarded lump-sum alimony.