Opinion ID: 2978017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suppression Motion (Lewis)

Text: The first claim of error relates to a pretrial suppression motion filed by defendant Lewis in relation to evidence seized by the police in a traffic stop on February 17, 2005. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion in a twenty-page opinion. The court held the scope of the temporary detention following the traffic stop was not unreasonably extended in awaiting the arrival of a drug detection canine unit because the officer had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and the delay was minimal. Lewis insists the facts known to City of Wyoming Police Sergeant John McCaw did not amount to reasonable suspicion and that he was subject to an unreasonable seizure based on a mere hunch. Lewis does not dispute McCaw’s testimony that he validly pulled-over the Plymouth Breeze Lewis was driving based on an observed traffic violation. He contends, however, that after the purpose of the traffic stop had been completed, he should have been released. We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 582, 587 (6th Cir. 2008). Once the purpose of a traffic stop is completed, an officer may not further detain the vehicle or its occupants unless he has made observations which, under the totality of the circumstances known to the officer, give rise to reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. United States v. Perez, 440 F.3d 363, 370 (6th Cir. 2006). While reasonable suspicion must be based on more than an “ill-defined hunch,” an officer may draw on his own experience and specialized training to draw inferences and -2- Nos. 07-1652, 07-1711 United States v. Manjate and Lewis deductions from the cumulative information available that might well elude an untrained person. Id. at 371. Any continued detention must be temporary and the investigative means used should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time. Perez, 440 F.3d at 372. The district court identified the following circumstances as legitimately contributing to Sergeant McCaw’s formation of reasonable suspicion: First, Sergeant McCaw observed Lewis’ vehicle at a known drug house at an unusual time of the morning [4:20 a.m.], parked toward the rear of the driveway with its lights on, and the vehicle left a short time later. . . . Second, during the stop, Lewis gave information to Sergeant McCaw regarding his destination that was inconsistent with common sense. . . . Third, Lewis stated during the stop that he was visiting his friend, Paula. While this information alone would not suggest criminal activity, given Sergeant McCaw’s prior knowledge that Paula Nice lived at and sold drugs from the residence, it served to strengthen the suspicion that Lewis had engaged in a drug transaction and that Paula Nice was still engaged in the sale of drugs. Fourth, Sergeant McCaw observed an ‘old-fashioned’ hard-sided briefcase in the back seat of Lewis’ vehicle. Sergeant McCaw testified that the briefcase had locks on it and that he found it odd that a younger person such as Lewis [24 years old] would be carrying an older-style briefcase. . . . Finally, Sergeant McCaw noticed that throughout the traffic stop, Lewis was very short with his answers and avoided eye contact, indicating that he was nervous. ... Opinion Dec. 27, 2005, pp. 9-12, JA 150-53. Considering that McCaw had received substantial specialized training in narcotics trafficking and had several years’ experience in narcotics investigations, we concur in the district court’s -3- Nos. 07-1652, 07-1711 United States v. Manjate and Lewis determination that these known facts, viewed under the totality of the circumstances, were sufficient to justify the inference drawn by McCaw that Lewis may have been involved in drug trafficking. Lewis argues that McCaw’s information regarding drug trafficking at the residence was stale (i.e., over six months old) and that every other listed circumstance could have an innocent explanation. Circumstances comprising a particularized and objective basis for reasonable suspicion need not be uncommon or especially unique. United States v. McCauley, 548 F.3d 440, 444 (6th Cir. 2008). Although each particular act in a series of acts may be innocent in itself, taken together, they may substantiate suspicion of wrongdoing warranting further investigation. United States v. Marxen, 410 F.3d 326, 329 (6th Cir. 2005). Lewis’s argument is based on an improper parsing of the information available to McCaw. See United States v. Orsolini, 300 F.3d 724, 728 (6th Cir. 2002) (district court held to have erred by analyzing suspicious circumstances individually rather than in their totality). We therefore reject it.1 Considering the totality of the circumstances, and giving due deference to the fact findings of the district court, which conducted the hearing and observed the testimony of the witnesses, see Branch, 537 F.3d at 587 (acknowledging that district court has institutional advantage in addressing reasonable suspicion inquiry), we find no error in the determination that Sergeant McCaw had 1 Moreover, as the district court noted, the degree of intrusion entailed in waiting for the canine unit to arrive was minimal, five to ten minutes. To the extent Lewis argues the traffic stop was excessively intrusive in that he was forcibly removed from the vehicle and placed under arrest, this argument, too, is unavailing. It is well-established that an officer is justified as a matter of course in ordering the driver of a lawfully stopped car to exit the vehicle. United States v. Montgomery, 377 F.3d 582, 585-86 (6th Cir. 2004). It is undisputed that Lewis was removed from the car and arrested only after and because he repeatedly refused to comply with McCaw’s lawful order to exit the car. -4- Nos. 07-1652, 07-1711 United States v. Manjate and Lewis reasonable suspicion justifying a brief investigative detention. Accordingly, defendant Lewis’s motion to suppress was properly denied.2 II. Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking (Lewis) Under Count 13 of the indictment, defendant Lewis was found guilty of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and § 924(c)(1)(C)(1). The verdict was based on the seizure of a handgun during execution of a search warrant at Lewis’s residence on March 22, 2005. Lewis admits that he was involved in drug trafficking and admits that he possessed the handgun found in the bedroom closet of his apartment. Yet, he contends the government presented no evidence to support a finding that he possessed the gun in furtherance of drug trafficking. Lewis argues that the district court erred when it denied his Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the government’s case-in-chief. We review the denial of a Rule 29 motion de novo. We must affirm the denial, however, “if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, would allow a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. McGee, 529 F.3d 691, 2 Lewis also argues perfunctorily that the manner in which the dog-sniff and ensuing search of his vehicle were conducted was unreasonable. These arguments are not properly before us because they were not raised in the district court, see United States v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557, 560 (6th Cir. 2006), and because the arguments are not developed but are mentioned only in a perfunctory manner, see United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 846 (6th Cir. 2006). We therefore give them no consideration. We note that the Supreme Court recently clarified the circumstances under which officers may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle incident to a lawful arrest. Arizona v. Gant, — S.Ct. — , 2009 WL 1045962 at  (April 21, 2009). Gant has no bearing on this case, as the warrantless search of Lewis’s vehicle and its contents was, irrespective of Lewis’s arrest, justified by probable cause after the drug detection dog alerted positively for narcotics. See Perez, 440 F.3d at 374-75. -5- Nos. 07-1652, 07-1711 United States v. Manjate and Lewis 696 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Solorio, 337 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2003)). Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict, and the evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis except guilt to be sufficient. United States v. Reed, 167 F.3d 984, 992 (6th Cir. 1999).3 In denying the motion, the district court noted that the handgun was found in Lewis’s bedroom closet in reasonably close proximity to a significant amount of cash and drugs, i.e., within a few feet. The court further noted that, even though the gun was unloaded, ammunition was kept nearby with the drugs in the bedroom dresser. The district judge recognized it as the kind of weapon, a .38 caliber pistol, commonly used by drug traffickers. This evidence was sufficient, the court concluded, to permit a reasonable inference by the jury that Lewis possessed the gun in furtherance of his admitted drug trafficking activities. We agree. A firearm is possessed in “furtherance of” a drug trafficking offense if there is a nexus between the firearm and the crime; if it advances, promotes, or facilitates the crime. United States v. Paige, 470 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2006). The standards under which we evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence are summarized as follows: [T]he possession of a firearm on the same premises as a drug transaction would not, without a showing of a connection between the two, sustain a § 924(c) conviction. In order for the possession to be in furtherance of a drug crime, the firearm must be strategically located so that it is quickly and easily available for use. 3 Lewis purports to specifically challenge the district court’s denial of his Rule 29 motion at the close of the government’s case-in-chief, rather than its denial of the same motion at the close of all the proofs. Yet, because he introduced evidence at trial, he is deemed to have waived this specific objection and, on review, we must evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence based on the record as a whole. United States v. Wagner, 382 F.3d 598, 611 n.2 (6th Cir. 2004). -6- Nos. 07-1652, 07-1711 United States v. Manjate and Lewis Other factors that may be relevant to a determination of whether the weapon was possessed in furtherance of the crime include whether the gun was loaded, the type of weapon, the legality of its possession, the type of drug activity conducted, and the time and circumstances under which the firearm was found. United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 462 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). The Mackey court noted that these other factors may help to distinguish possession in furtherance of a crime from innocent possession of a wall-mounted antique or an unloaded hunting rifle locked in a cupboard. Id. Although mere possession of a firearm in the same premises where drug trafficking takes place is insufficient, “a jury can reasonably infer that firearms which are strategically located so as to ‘provide defense or deterrence in furtherance of the drug trafficking’ are used in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.” United States v. Swafford, 385 F.3d 1026, 1028-29 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Couch, 367 F.3d 557, 561 (6th Cir. 2004)). Applying these standards, we conclude, on viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, that a rational jury, properly instructed in accordance with the Mackey standards summarized above (as this jury was), could reasonably infer that Lewis possessed the handgun found in his bedroom closet in defense of his admitted drug trafficking activities. It was located in close proximity to drugs and cash and ammunition, so as to be quickly and easily accessed for use. It was not a collector’s piece prominently displayed, nor a hunting weapon stored under lock and key. Moreover, it was the same type of weapon Lewis was found to have possessed along with drugs in the Plymouth Breeze one month earlier. The facts that the gun was not loaded and that it was not unlawful for Lewis to possess it weigh against a finding that Lewis possessed it in furtherance of drug trafficking. Lewis testified -7- Nos. 07-1652, 07-1711 United States v. Manjate and Lewis that he had never fired a gun, did not like to have a loaded firearm in his home, and did not use the .38 caliber handgun in furtherance of his admitted drug trafficking. He explained that he had loaned money to a man from New York whom he did not know, “Derrick,” to invest in internet gambling, and he “guessed” that Derrick had given him the handgun to hold as collateral for the loan. The jury had the opportunity to hear Lewis’s explanation and assess his credibility. The jury also heard Lewis admit that he owned the briefcase that was found to contain drugs and a .38 caliber pistol one month earlier. The jury also heard Lewis’s responses to questions on cross-examination as to whether it was pure coincidence that the two handguns he possessed were similar and that the ammunition found in his dresser drawer happened to fit both weapons. In sum, considering the record as a whole in the light most favorable to the government, we cannot hold that the evidence presented was not reasonably sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict. The instant evidence is analogous to that found to be sufficient in other recent Sixth Circuit rulings. See e.g., Swafford, 385 F.3d at 1029; Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462; Smith v. United States, 285 F. App’x 209, 217 (6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished). III. Variance Between Indictment and Evidence (Manjate) Defendant Manjate was convicted under Count 1 of participating in a heroin trafficking conspiracy “beginning about September, 2004 and continuing to on or about December 20, 2005.” Under Count 2, he was convicted of participating in a cocaine trafficking conspiracy “beginning about in or before the Spring of 2004 and continuing to on or about March 22, 2005.” He challenges both convictions, contending the government presented evidence of drug trafficking activities that -8- Nos. 07-1652, 07-1711 United States v. Manjate and Lewis predated both charged conspiracies, creating the possibility that the jury convicted him based on uncharged conduct, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to be informed of the charges against him. Manjate acknowledges that, because he is raising this issue for the first time on appeal, it is reviewed only for plain error. He must therefore show that “(1) an error occurred; (2) the error was obvious or clear; (3) the error affected his substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Mayberry, 540 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Cline, 362 F.3d 343, 348 (6th Cir. 2004)). To obtain a reversal of a conviction based on a variance between the indictment and evidence so serious as to be considered a constructive amendment of the indictment, Manjate must show both a variance and that his substantial rights were affected. United States v. Budd , 496 F.3d 517, 52122 (6th Cir. 2007). To satisfy this second requirement, Manjate must demonstrate “that the important functions of the indictment were undermined by both the evidence presented and the jury instructions.” Id. at 522 (quoting United States v. Hynes, 467 F.3d 951, 962 (6th Cir. 2006)). This requirement reflects the rule that “once the indictment presents a factual basis for an element of a crime, the prosecution may not rest its proof of that element of the crime at trial on other facts.” Id. (quoting United States v. Caldwell, 176 F.3d 898, 902 (6th Cir. 1999)). Whereas Manjate objects to testimony of drug trafficking activities attributed to him that predated the December 2006 trial by some two years, most of these activities actually fell well within the periods of the two charged conspiracies, allegedly occurring from September 2004 to December -9- Nos. 07-1652, 07-1711 United States v. Manjate and Lewis 2005, and Spring 2004 to March 2005. Moreover, to the extent some of the testimony related to transactions between Brandon Hankins and Manjate prior to the charged conspiracies, this represented legitimate background evidence, admissible to explain the source of their relationship as it continued during the periods of the charged conspiracies. The evidence was properly admitted as res gestae evidence, i.e., evidence of “other acts that are inextricably intertwined with the charged offense or those acts, the telling of which is necessary to complete the story of the charged offense.” United States v. Hardy, 228 F.3d 745, 748 (6th Cir. 2000). It represented background evidence having a “causal, temporal or spatial connection with the charged offense” and helped define the scope of the charged conspiracies. Mayberry, 540 F.3d at 514 (quoting Hardy, 228 F.3d at 748). Manjate’s convictions can hardly be deemed invalid merely because the prosecutor failed to charge other crimes which could have been proven by the evidence presented. Id. Although Manjate argues that the jury’s consideration of evidence of activities outside the charged conspiracies resulted in unfair prejudice, he has failed to specifically identify what the unfair prejudice is. He has failed to demonstrate that any variance undermined the purposes of the indictment. He has not demonstrated that any of the evidence was admitted in clear error, and has shown neither that his substantial rights were affected nor that “the fairness, integrity or public reputation” of the trial was seriously impugned. Manjate has not made the requisite showing of plain error. - 10 - Nos. 07-1652, 07-1711 United States v. Manjate and Lewis