Opinion ID: 1133464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Manard's Statements to Officer Vargo

Text: Manard next argues that the district court erred in refusing to suppress his statements to Officer Vargo. Two days after Manard was arrested and invoked his right to counsel, he initiated contact with Officer Vargo. Manard left a telephone message stating he wanted to talk to Vargo. Vargo went to the detention facility and spoke with Manard. The prosecutor questioned Vargo at a hearing on a motion to suppress as follows: Q. [PROSECUTOR] And did you spend some time at the beginning talking about why you were there? A. [OFFICER VARGO]: Yeah. First weI asked him how he was doing and he said he washe didn't like being alone, he was sorry for running the previous few nights before, that he didn't like being in jail. He told me he wanted to tell me his side of the story. Q. Did you at any time preliminarily make it clear to him as to why you were there? A. Yeah. I told him that the only reason I could talk with him is because he initiated the contact with me. Q. Did he acknowledge that? A. Yes. he [did]. Q. Okay. And so, then you're telling us he also said he wanted you to hear his side of the story? A. Right. Q. Did you also tell him about what your role in this was in terms of what might happen to the things that he told you? A. Yes, I did. I told him I was still a police officer and I had to make a report on anything he told me and I would have to testify to that in court, and that if he asked for his attorney. I wouldn't ask him anymore questions. Q. Okay. Did he acknowledge that? A. Yeah. He said he understood and he wanted to cooperate. Q. Okay. And then I guess my question would be: After that, did he let you know... that he wanted to talk to you and tell you about what had happened the night of this killing? A. Yes, he did. Vargo left to discuss Manard's confession with the district attorney and see if a plea bargain could be arranged. During this time, Manard sought the attention of a sergeant in the detention unit. Manard said he was upset. He was crying and wanted to call both his mother and Vargo. When Vargo returned, Manard made additional incriminating statements. We affirm admissibility of an accused's extrajudicial statement if the district court's ruling is supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Bailey, 256 Kan. 872, 882, 889 P.2d 738 (1995). Manard does not deny that he initiated the conversation with Vargo. He questions whether there was a valid waiver of his previously asserted Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Manard correctly points out that the voluntary initiation of conversation does not constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to have counsel present. Once an accused invokes the right to counsel, further interrogation should not take place unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 68 L. Ed.2d 378, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981). However, if a conversation initiated by the accused takes place after invoking the right to counsel, the burden remains upon the State to show a waiver of the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044, 77 L. Ed.2d 405, 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983). Manard received Miranda warnings upon his initial arrest July 22, 1996. Vargo did not re-read the Miranda warnings before the July 24 conversation. However, he did tell Manard that he (Vargo) would have to make a report on anything Manard said, and testify to it. Vargo also testified that he told Manard that if he asked for his attorney, I wouldn't ask him anymore questions. The July 24 warnings were given by Vargo before taking statements from Manard. Manard argues the July 24 warnings were not enough. He reasons the lapse of time from the initial Miranda warnings to the time of the confession to Officer Vargo (2 days) was too long. Manard asserts the July 24 warnings did not fully inform him that he still had the right not to speak to Vargo or have an attorney present. Contrary to Manard's argument, warnings given by Officer Vargo were sufficient to alert Manard to the fact that he had a continuing right to have counsel present. This conclusion is borne out by Manard's later statement that he would tell his attorney to fuck-off if his attorney did not let him talk to Vargo again. Manard was aware that he had the right to have an attorney present. The district court's ruling is supported by substantial competent evidence.