Opinion ID: 147191
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 6 The district court denied Sotto’s Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. We review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. See United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217, 1236 (11th Cir. 2001). “An appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility determinations in favor of the verdict.” United States v. Simpson, 228 F.3d 1294, 1299 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). In Count I, Sotto was charged with conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 to defraud the United States and violate 42 U.S.C. § 1320(a)-7b(b)(2)(B) by paying kickbacks to Medicare patients. The elements of a conspiracy under § 371 include (1) an agreement among two or more people to achieve an unlawful objective, (2) the defendant’s knowing and voluntary participation in the agreement, and (3) an overt act by a conspirator in furtherance of the agreement. See United States v. Adkinson, 158 F.3d 1147, 1153 (11th Cir. 1998). In Count II, Sotto was charged with participating in a conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, to execute a scheme to defraud the Medicare program, which is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347. The government presented a plethora of evidence supporting Sotto’s convictions. Sotto fronted half of the money to purchase PNH from its previous owner and remained part owner of PNH while she worked closely with Fernandez. Fernandez and Loriga had no medical training or experience prior to purchasing PNH 7 but managed to bill Medicare $262,000 in their first sixteen days of operations, and $10 million in their first year, while the previous owner billed Medicare for less than $26,000 in five months of operations. Sotto furthered the fraud by inflating Medicare claims for expenses above the amounts listed on PNH’s superbills. Moreover, in an undercover tape recording, Sotto told Lori Sanchez, an employee of All Medical whose husband was the corporate officer for one of Sotto’s sham corporations, that PNH paid kickbacks to patients and that Sotto was behind the whole scheme. Sotto’s role did not stop at this. Sotto also set up several sham companies, including Dade County Medical Consulting, Medical Consultants of Miami, and Seapointe Investments, through which Sotto cashed checks, evidenced by the ledger found in the search of Fernandez’s home. Finally, Sotto prepared false invoices to cover the money Sotto received from Unified Transport. Therefore, the government presented more than sufficient evidence to convict Sotto of Counts I and II.
Sotto waived her right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s guilty verdict on Count V. In her Rule 29 motion, Sotto’s counsel stated, “With respect to [Count V], I must honestly concede that in the light most favorable to the Government, they have put forth sufficient evidence that I think a reasonable and prudent jury could find the defendant guilty of that, so I’ll waive [Count V].” 8 (Tr. of Jury Trial Proceedings, docket no. 340, at 4.) Sotto thus failed to move for judgment of acquittal on Count V at the close of evidence, which “‘operates as a waiver of the motion for acquittal and forecloses any review of the sufficiency of the evidence except where a miscarriage of justice would result.’” United States v. Hernandez, No. 08-17207, 2010 WL 125847, at  (11th Cir. Jan. 14, 2010) (citing United States v. Tapia, 761 F.2d 1488, 1491-92 (11th Cir. 1985)). A miscarriage of justice results where “the evidence on a key element of the offense is so tenuous that a conviction would be shocking.” Tapia, 761 F.2d at 1492 (citation and quotations omitted). In Count V, Sotto was charged with conspiring to (1) conduct or attempting to conduct a financial transaction, (2) knowing that the property involved represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, (3) where the property was in fact the proceeds of an unlawful activity, and either (i) intending to promote the carrying on of the specified unlawful activity, or (ii) knowing that the transaction was designed to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of the unlawful activity, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Sotto has not shown that the evidence on a key element of her conviction is so tenuous that a conviction would be shocking and cause a miscarriage of justice. Indeed, as Sotto stated in her Rule 29 motion, “The Government put on plenty of 9 evidence . . . . They [the government] went through Scarlet Duarte, the bank accounts. . . . They went through all the companies, every single one of those companies, charts, everything went toward the money laundering counts.” (Tr. of Jury Trial Proceedings, docket no. 340, at 6.) There was overwhelming evidence to convict Sotto of Count V.