Opinion ID: 359861
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Relevance of the Accused's Reasons for Wanting New Counsel

Text: 87 The accused's side of the balance can feature either subjective or objective grounds for a requested continuance. Instances of subjective dissatisfaction with the original choice a recent loss of confidence in counsel, for example frequently call upon the court to decide whether the accused seeks the continuance in good faith. In analyzing any given situation for a determination on that score, the court obviously must often inquire into the reasons for the request and for not having acted earlier. Those advanced for the asserted need for substitute or additional counsel might, of course, depend on facts that the court recognizes as false or so frivolous as to cast a shadow on the accused's sincerity. 33 But to say that the court may examine the accused's subjective reasons for wanting to replace his existing counsel is not to say that the court may exert control over his selection of particular counsel if qualified. 34 If the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel means anything, it certainly means that it is the actual choice of the defendant which deserves consideration; 35 resultantly, the court has no general power to approve or disapprove the accused's reasons for picking to-be-retained counsel. 36 Only when a fair opportunity to engage counsel of choice seemingly has already been provided the case when new counsel is being sought late in the pretrial period and when the proposal will entail a substantial imposition on the Government are the accused's motives for wanting a change at all relevant. 88 This distinction is well illustrated by one of our own decisions. In dealing with an effort to replace appointed counsel with retained counsel, 37 (w)e presume(d) that in ordinary circumstances an accused who finds that funds have become available may, For reasons sufficient unto him, conclude that he prefers to have his own paid counsel without necessarily claiming that appointed counsel is inadequate. 38 Since, however, the circumstances were not ordinary in the sense that the request was made just four days before trial was to begin we held that the substitution could be refused because the accused did not bother to explain either the basis of his dissatisfaction or why he had not utilized his ample prior time to secure retained counsel. 39 In sum, the inquiry into the reasons was indulged only to accommodate the exigencies of ascertaining good faith. 89 The accused who has had an adequate chance to secure counsel, and who on the very eve of trial seeks a postponement to obtain a substitute or additional counsel, needs a strong showing of sincerity to overcome a natural inference of bad faith. 40 On the other hand, where, as here, the accused effectively loses an attorney shortly before trial due to events beyond his control, the inference of sincerity rings loud and clear. 41 The ground for continuance is wholly objective the original choice of counsel was frustrated not by a change of the accused's mind but by a change in external circumstances. Because the validity of the accused's claim that the situation has been altered can be objectively examined, no inquiry into the accused's mental state is normally required or permissible. The accused so situated need establish only that the reason for withdrawal is not a pretext and that the time remaining before trial is insufficient to obtain an adequately-prepared replacement without a continuance.