Opinion ID: 1086983
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Deputy Highsmith

Text: Deputy Highsmith contends that Howard can prove neither a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights nor that Deputy Highsmith was the legal cause of his 2 Deputies Highsmith and Melton do not contend that Howard, a prisoner who was incarcerated at the time of the 2004 incident, could not be seized under the Fourth Amendment given that he was already seized as an inmate. They also do not contend that, when evaluating a public official’s right to qualified immunity, a standard other than arguable probable cause should apply to seizures initiated in the prison context. Because the deputies have not raised those issues, we will assume, for purposes of this appeal only, that Howard could be subjected to a Fourth Amendment seizure and that arguable probable cause, instead of some lesser quantity of suspicion, would be required to justify that seizure. 8 Case: 12-15687 Date Filed: 10/25/2013 Page: 9 of 15 prosecution. We disagree. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Howard, Deputy Highsmith violated Howard’s Fourth Amendments rights by filing a false incident report that led to Howard’s arrest and prosecution. See Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1285 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Constitution prohibits a police officer from knowingly making false statements in an arrest affidavit about the probable cause for an arrest . . . .”); Riley, 104 F.3d at 1253 (holding, in the context of a plaintiff’s § 1983 and state law malicious prosecution claims against police officers, that “fabricating incriminating evidence violate[s] constitutional rights”). Though Deputy Highsmith insists that Howard hit him with a chair, there is evidence in the record, including sworn testimony by other inmate-witnesses, that supports Howard’s version of events. Because at this stage we resolve disputed facts in favor of Howard, we must credit the evidence showing that no attack occurred and draw the inference that Deputy Highsmith’s report was false.3 As for the elements of the tort of malicious prosecution, Deputy Highsmith contests only whether he was the legal cause of Howard’s prosecution.4 Arguing 3 We recognize that at the conclusion of the case the evidence may show that Deputies Highsmith and Melton did not commit the offenses alleged. We do not ourselves suggest that the deputies engaged in fabrication or abuse, but we must accept Howard’s allegations as true for purposes of summary judgment. See Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1228 n.9. 4 Because Deputy Highsmith has not challenged Howard’s ability to satisfy the other elements of the tort of malicious prosecution, arguments on those elements are waived for purposes of this appeal. See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1242 n.10 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that issues not argued in a party’s brief on appeal are waived). That does not mean, however, that Deputy Highsmith is barred from making those arguments in further proceedings. 9 Case: 12-15687 Date Filed: 10/25/2013 Page: 10 of 15 that he is not, Deputy Highsmith notes that, in the context of a false arrest by a law enforcement officer, we have held that intervening acts by “the prosecutor, grand jury, judge and jury” can break the chain of causation. Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1195 (11th Cir. 1989). That rule stems from the common-sense rationale that “[o]nce someone is arrested and . . . substantial evidence of the suspect’s guilt comes to light, the police can do little or nothing to stop further proceedings.” Id. at 1196. It thus makes little sense to hold an officer responsible for the later decision to prosecute. Id. That choice is made by others and based on evidence that exists apart from the officer. Where those intervening acts result from an officer’s deception, however, the chain of causation is not broken. Id. at 1195 (citing Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988), which held that the decision of a prosecutor to charge and a grand jury to indict did not shield a police officer who deliberately supplied misleading information). That holds true in cases where the sole basis for a prosecutorial decision is an officer’s fabricated evidence. Unlike the officer mentioned above who uncovers evidence but cannot stop further proceedings, an officer who fabricates evidence may be the only one who can stop a prosecution. Applying that reasoning here and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Howard, we conclude that Deputy Highsmith was the legal cause of Howard’s prosecution. Under Howard’s evidence, Deputy Highsmith fabricated the sole 10 Case: 12-15687 Date Filed: 10/25/2013 Page: 11 of 15 evidence used to charge and indict him and then repeated those fabrications as the State’s principal witness at his trial. Finding that Howard has presented evidence from which a jury could find malicious prosecution and a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, we also conclude that the district court correctly denied qualified immunity to Deputy Highsmith.