Opinion ID: 1212177
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Basis of Action

Text: A District Court jury panel was selected Tuesday morning in Judge B. Mack Bryant's Court to hear the second appeal of a Kansas Turnpike condemnation award. In this hearing, Eugene, Nedwin and Ernest R. Randle, 14131 E. Central, are appealing the appraisers' award for land taken by the KTA right-of-way and for damages to the remainder of the Randle property. J. Ashford Manka represents the KTA and I.H. Stearns and E.P. Villepigue represents the Randles. The Turnpike crosses the Randle property in an oblique line dividing the land into almost two equal parts. Six plots of land are involved in the appeal totaling 29.75 acres. The Randles, racing greyhound breeders, are the second party to place their appeal before a jury. In the first appeal before a jury, G.M. Fisher won a higher award. Fisher, who owns property to the north of the Randles, was given $8,000 more than the original appraisal. Prior to the convening of court on the morning of the second day of trial the Authority moved for a mistrial because these newspaper items were prejudicial fact statements which were not admissible and could not have been introduced as evidence. The trial court overruled this motion and the Authority complains thereof, but we can find nothing in the record that would justify any other ruling than the one made by the trial court. On the hearing of the motion for new trial three jurors testified. One of them had cut out the news item from the Wichita Evening Eagle and brought it to court with him the next morning, May 2, 1956, but he had neither displayed nor discussed it with anyone. However, after the case was submitted to the jury for its answers to special questions and determination of a verdict on May 4, 1956, that juror had taken the newspaper item out of his pocket and had asked a fellow juror if he had read it. The second juror in turn read it and then a third juror also read it. Such conduct reflects adversely on our jury system for the reason that it may make possible a verdict not truly that of the triers of the facts, but a verdict influenced by the press, radio, and television. These news services have no place in a jury room while deliberations are going on. However, the particular article with which we are here concerned was not in and of itself of such caliber as to constitute prejudice and since the record does not show resulting prejudice to the losing party, it is not reversible error. ( Fields v. Dewitt, 71 Kan. 676, 81 Pac. 467; Pulkrabek v. Lampe, 179 Kan. 204, 293 P.2d 998.) The Authority cites Bryant v. Marshall, 135 Kan. 348, 10 P.2d 868, where a mother sought damages based on negligence on the part of her daughter in an automobile accident. A reading of the Bryant case shows that all the elements necessary to constitute misconduct of the jury and resulting prejudice were present (p. 354) but, as stated above, that is not true here. Furthermore, this court is bound to keep in mind that part of G.S. 1949, 60-3317, which provides: The appellate court shall disregard all mere technical errors and irregularities which do not affirmatively appear to have prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the party complaining, where it appears upon the whole record that substantial justice has been done by the judgment or order of the trial court.... The Authority complains that the trial court allowed one of the Randles to testify as to the market value of the land. We find very little help in the briefs on this point but our limited research has produced the rule that the owner of property is presumed to know its value and his opinion testimony concerning it is competent. ( Brenneisen v. Phillips, 142 Kan. 98, 45 P.2d 867; Sternbock v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 151 Kan. 81, 98 P.2d 162.) See, also, the rather recent case of Steck v. City of Wichita, 179 Kan. 305, 309, 295 P.2d 1068, where a landowner's testimony was admitted. Long ago in L.T. & S.W. Rly. Co. v. Paul, 28 Kan. 816, 821, this question was discussed and the court, with a reservation as to the use of caution therewith, established a trend that opinion testimony of witnesses as to the value of land in condemnation appeals is admissible. From a realistic standpoint in our case, we cannot ignore the fact there were other witnesses who were definitely expert real estate brokers and the jury determined the reasonable market value of the land from all the testimony admitted and not upon merely the landowner's determination of the value. Regarding a statement made by the trial court in ruling on an objection, which the Authority contends was prejudicial, the record fails to show any prejudice to the Authority thereby and we need not dwell thereon. It is further noted that the Authority claims it was unduly limited in the scope of its cross-examination of one of the Randles' expert witnesses. It cites Bourgeois v. State Highway Commission, 179 Kan. 30, 292 P.2d 683, but the situation here is not comparable to the one that existed in the Bourgeois case. We think the rule stated in Moore v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 181 Kan. 51, 310 P.2d 199, that the question of the extent to which cross-examination of a witness to impeach his credibility will be allowed is discretionary with a trial court, is clearly applicable to our present case. Contentions are raised by the Authority that counsel for the Randles made prejudicial remarks in his opening statement and argument to the jury. The record does not bear out these contentions and it is unnecessary to detail or discuss them here. On the question raised in the lower court and also on appeal as to instructions requested by the Authority and the instructions given by the court, all of them have been considered and in respect to those requested, they were either given in substance in the court's instructions or they involved issues not in the lawsuit. The instructions given by the trial court were clear, unbiased, and not prejudicial when all are considered together and in the light of each other. The Authority specifies the trial court erred in not granting a new trial upon evidence presented at the posttrial hearing. The newspaper clipping has been previously discussed herein and reiteration as to that is not necessary at this point. The evidence introduced as newly discovered was testified to by one of the Authority's experts at the trial of the case and by another well-qualified real estate broker of long standing in the community. It was to the effect that a comparable property consisting of 160 acres located a half mile south and a half mile east of the Randles' tract had, in the spring of 1955, been listed at a price of $100,000. During the ninety day period of listing, the property had not been sold although it had been advertised and shown to prospective purchasers a number of times. This property was also listed at about the same time with one of the expert witnesses called by the Randles but his efforts or success in selling it were not shown since he was not re-called at the post-trial hearing. While all or part of this testimony may have been proper in the original trial of the case ( Security Benefit Ass'n v. Swartz, 146 Kan. 267, 70 P.2d 16) we cannot now say a new trial should necessarily have been granted because of it. Considered in its best light, this testimony could rise to no higher degree of dignity than that of cumulative evidence which this court has many times held not to be sufficient to compel the granting of a new trial ( Turner v. City of Wichita, 139 Kan. 775, 33 P.2d 335) cited with approval in Bentrup v. Biehn, 171 Kan. 414, 417, 233 P.2d 529. We are unable to believe, and the record has not convinced us, that the evidence produced on the motion was such that with reasonable probability it would produce a different result. The Authority propounds a very interesting argument that the testimony of one, if not all, the experts would have been different had the fact been known that the listed property had failed to sell, but should such a rule be adopted, there would be no end to litigation because if a new trial were granted, what would prevent the Randles from obtaining another new trial by the same method should they be dissatisfied with the outcome? This is not the law nor is it practical. Another activity was brought out by some slips of paper found in the jury room but the record is void of any showing of a quotient verdict. The evidence of the juror who had first been shown the newspaper clipping further showed that the value of $1,350 per acre was brought up by the foreman and ultimately approved by the other jurors. This figure of $1,350 was nowhere to be found on any of the slips of paper. A new trial cannot be granted on this type of showing. Was the verdict so excessive as to shock the conscience of the court? This case was well and thoroughly tried by able counsel on both sides, as reflected in the record. The experts were well-qualified and prominent real estate brokers. Everything was brought before the jury for its consideration and the greater portion of, if not an entire day, was spent by the jury in its deliberations. There was an abundance of evidence of the reasonable market value of the property together with its highest, best, and most advantageous use, from and upon which the jury based its answers to special questions that were not only consistent with each other but were consistent also with the general verdict. The result is we do not deem it necessary to disturb the judgment. It is affirmed.