Opinion ID: 1910318
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: enforceability of merger agreement

Text: The parties do not dispute the terms of the merger agreement. They agree paragraph IV(A) provides that the school district maintain a school in Decatur for grades kindergarten through six unless one of two voting requirements were satisfied. Either the school board could vote unanimously to discontinue the school or a majority of the school board and voters from the former Decatur School District could vote to discontinue it. The parties also do not dispute that the school board's action was taken without obtaining a unanimous vote of the school board or a majority vote of the electors from the former Decatur School District. The Coalition argues that the court incorrectly determined that paragraph IV(A) was unenforceable. It claims merger petitions have the effect of law and school districts are bound by their terms. But the school district argues that the merger petition conflicts with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-402.07 (Reissue 1981), which authorized school districts to require only a vote by a majority of all legal voters served by a school in the reorganized district and only when a school board seeks to discontinue a school. The court did not state its reasons for granting summary judgment to the school district on the Coalition's claim that the school district had breached the merger petition. We conclude, however, that the court could have properly granted summary judgment for the school district only if paragraph IV(A) is unenforceable. [3-7] We have long acknowledged that school boards are creatures of statute, and their powers are limited. [9] Any action taken by a school board must be through either an express or an implied power conferred by legislative grant. [10] School boards can bind a school district only within the limits fixed by the Legislature. [11] A school board's actions exceeding an express or implied legislative grant of power are void. [12] And whether a school board acted within the power conferred upon it by the Legislature presents a question of law. [13] [8] The Coalition argues that State ex rel. Fick v. Miller, [14] supports its claim that paragraph IV(A) was enforceable. In State ex rel. Fick, we held that reorganization petitions have the effect of law and create duties owed to the public. We compared the petition to statutes, city charters, city ordinances, regulations, code of ethics rules, and public franchise contracts. [15] Because they have the force of law, ministerial acts required under the petition can be enforced through a writ of mandamus if the provision is valid. Specifically, we held that an affiliated high school had an enforceable ministerial duty to provide transportation to rural students because two conditions were satisfied. This provision was included in the affiliation petition, and the school board was statutorily authorized to bind the district to such terms. In State ex rel. Fick, we explicitly stated: Section 79-611(4) grants affiliated school districts the authority to provide free transportation [to students residing in an affiliated Class I district], but neither creates any ministerial legal duty nor provides for the enforcement of any duty. This provision is necessary to provide school boards with the authority to bind their districts to terms like the . . . affiliation petition's [transportation provision]. [16] So when the Legislature has delegated authority to school boards to exercise their discretion, a school board's promise to do so in a reorganization petition can bind the school district. Thus, we look to whether the school board had statutory authority to impose the voting restriction in paragraph IV(A). We first note that school boards are under no statutory duty to maintain a school in their district. The school board of any district maintaining more than one school may close any school or schools within such district and may make provision for the education of children either in another school of the district, in the school of any other district, or by correspondence instruction for such children as may be physically incapacitated for traveling to or attending other schools, with the permission of the parent. [17] Further, the Legislature has given school boards the discretion to establish and classify grades, with the consent and advice of the State Department of Education. [18] [9] When the school boards petitioned for reorganization in 1984, § 79-402.07, in relevant part, provided: The [reorganization] petition may contain provisions for the holding of school within existing buildings in the newly reorganized district and that a school constituted under the provisions of this section shall be maintained from the date of reorganization unless the legal voters served by the school vote by a majority vote for discontinuance of the school. [19] (Emphasis supplied.) Statutes covering substantive matters in effect at the time of a transaction govern. [20] This language, however, is nearly identical to that used in the current codification at § 79-419(2). [10-12] In interpreting § 79-402.07, we are guided by familiar canons of statutory construction. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. [21] Absent anything to the contrary, we will give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning. [22] We will not read a meaning into a statute that the language does not warrant; neither will we read anything plain, direct, or unambiguous out of a statute. [23] Section 79-402.07 unambiguously allowed school districts to require a majority vote by all the legal voters served by a school because that is the only restriction on legal voters. It did not, however, explicitly state whether the legal voters must be part of the reorganized district or could be part of the former district. [13-15] When confronted with a statutory interpretation issue, we resolve the issue independently and irrespective of the trial court's conclusion. [24] Our role, to the extent possible, is to give effect to the statute's entire language, and to reconcile different provisions of the statute so they are consistent, harmonious, and sensible. [25] When possible, we will try to avoid a statutory construction that would lead to an absurd result. [26] Here, several factors weigh against interpreting § 79-402.07 to support the voting restrictions placed in the reorganization petition. First, interpreting § 79-402.07 as allowing merging school boards to require a majority vote in a former school district would lead to an absurd result. We would have to conclude that the Legislature intended the surviving school board's decision to discontinue a school to be conditioned upon approval from a school district that has ceased to exist. [27] Second, the statutory provision at issue consists of a single sentence. The Legislature unambiguously referred to the holding of school within existing buildings in the newly reorganized district.  [28] It would be inconsistent to interpret a reference to legal voters served by the school in the same sentence to mean voters from the former school district. Third, we do not read § 79-402.07 as authorizing merging school boards to impose any voting restrictions on the surviving school district's discretion. We acknowledge that the disputed sentence provides that [t]he petition may contain provisions for the holding of school within existing buildings in the newly reorganized district . . . . But if the Legislature had intended to permit merging school boards to impose any voting restrictions on the surviving school board's discretion, it would not have specified the type of voting restriction that could be imposed. That is, the disputed sentence specifically authorizes a majority vote by the legal voters served by a school for the discontinuance of the school. Reading § 79-402.07 to authorize any voting restrictions renders the Legislature's stated restriction meaningless. Unlike the school transportation statute at issue in State ex rel. Fick, [29] § 79-402.07 neither expressly nor impliedly authorized the Decatur and Lyons school boards to require a majority vote by legal voters in the former Decatur School District. Nor did it authorize a unanimous vote by the surviving school board as a condition for discontinuing the Decatur school. Further, § 79-402.07 affirmatively described the circumstance in which a school board could exercise its power to require a vote: the discontinuance of the school. The plain and ordinary meaning of discontinuance is cessation or closure. [30] As the school district points out, other courts have specifically held that moving particular grades from one school to another is not the discontinuance or closing of a school. [31] In sum, § 79-402.07 authorized the former school boards to require a vote only if the surviving school board for the reorganized district intended to close a school. It did not authorize the voting restrictions placed in paragraph IV(A). Because the school boards did not have authority to impose the voting requirements in paragraph IV(A), they were void and unenforceable. The Coalition does not allege, nor does the record reflect, that the school board acted in bad faith to circumvent the voting requirement. Instead, it reflects that the school board, faced with budget deficits, acted to maintain the Decatur school to the extent the district had resources to do so. The district court did not err in determining that paragraph I IV(A) of the reorganization petition was unenforceable.