Opinion ID: 1860995
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Rebuttal Closing Argument

Text: Darling argues that the trial court erred in not allowing defense counsel to make a rebuttal closing argument in this case. When defense counsel concluded the initial closing argument, the prosecutor stood before the jury, thanked them, and stated: I don't feel it's necessary to do a closing argument. We will ask the jury to rely upon the evidence they've heard, the court's instruction on the law. We'd ask the court to proceed to jury instruction. Defense counsel then attempted to argue in rebuttal, and the prosecutor objected, contending that, according to case law, his statement was not argument, and there was nothing to rebut. The trial court, agreeing with the State, proceeded to instruct the jury on the law. In reviewing this argument, the case which most clearly applies is Dean v. State, 478 So.2d 38 (Fla.1985). In Dean, the Court found unconvincing the petitioner's argument that he was not allowed to make the concluding argument before the jury as required by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.250, id. at 44, observing: The record shows that petitioner's counsel opened final argument. Counsel for the co-defendant followed with his final argument. Upon the conclusion of co-defendant's argument, the prosecutor stood up in open court, before the jury and asserted, I think I can save the court some time. The evidence speaks for itself. We rest. The trial court concluded that this did not constitute final argument on the part of the state, and the district court affirmed. We agree. In Menard v. State, 427 So.2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 434 So.2d 888 (1983), the fourth district court, when faced with a similar situation, stated: Every now and again, in the tragic world of criminal appeals, comes a case that brings involuntary smile to otherwise grim lips. This is one of those, though it cannot be expected to afford any amusement to the defendant. At the end of the initial final argument presented by the defense, the State's entire response was: The State of Florida is going to rely on the evidence and testimony before the court and juror's common sense, and we will waive our argument. The defense, discomforted by this tactic, pressed for the right to conclude on the basis that the comment relying on the evidence and common sense did not constitute a waiver and actually was final argument. (Cite omitted). We disagree. The remark did [not] address the evidence in particular nor any other testimony. Nor did they dwell unnecessarily on the level of intelligent consideration to be extended by the jury. Moreover, unlike the discourse in Andrews [v. State, 99 Fla. 1350, 129 So. 771 (Fla. 1930)], supra, the comments were but a very few words and in our opinion did not rise to the level of final argument. 427 So.2d at 400. Similarly, the prosecution's waiver of final argument in the instant case provided no reason for defense counsel's further argument to the jury. Accordingly, we hold there was no error in the instant case. Dean, 478 So.2d at 44. Here also, the prosecutor merely referred generally to reliance upon the evidence presented and the trial court's instructions, without further comment. [15] Furthermore, even if preclusion of further closing argument was error here, it has not been shown to be prejudicial. Defense counsel made a contemporaneous proffer, indicating that, had he been given the opportunity to make additional closing comments, he would have questioned whether other persons whose names were mentioned during the State's case in chiefthe maintenance men, Christopher Powell and Jean Marcushad been eliminated as suspects by DNA analysis or other means. However, in defense counsel's initial closing remarks, he had already attempted to direct attention to other potential perpetrators in the case, remarking that there were 75 unidentified prints, and suggesting that there's some evidence missing. Later, he admonished the jury to [r]emember that Raminski told the police that Grace's husband threatened to kill her. Think about the fact that Raminski said Grace was afraid of the maintenance men. Lastly, this particular line of summationthat there was no evidence that these witnesses, Powell, and Marcus was also mentioned, that their prints were checked, had already been alluded to by the defense in its initial closing statement, when counsel stated: There are a lot of things that you don't know that are important. Who is Christopher Powell? Why was he a suspect? Where was his DNA? [16] Therefore, here, as in Dean, even if the trial court erred in precluding further closing argument, such error would be harmless.