Opinion ID: 2638406
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: clean water act: section 401 water quality certification

Text: The District maintains that the Board erred in ruling that Ecology has authority to impose conditions on the water quality certification for the Sullivan Creek Project which require that the District leave specified minimum flows in the creek. The District maintains that contrary to the Board's conclusion, Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 114 S.Ct. 1900, 128 L.Ed.2d 716 (1994) ( Elkhorn II ), does not control this issue, because unlike the circumstances there, the District has existing water rights. The District also contends that Ecology does not have authority to limit and restrict existing water rights as part of a water quality certification. Further, the District contends, Ecology may not establish minimum stream flows as a condition to a water quality certification without complying with procedures set forth in chapters 90.22 and 90.54 RCW. Ecology, on the other hand, maintains it has authority to require the conditions in order for the certification to comply with federal and state water quality standards. Both Ecology and the Center for Environmental Law and Policy argue that Elkhorn II controls. The issue of Ecology's authority under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, known as the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, and under the state Water Pollution Control Act, chapter 90.48 RCW, is a matter of statutory construction that we review de novo. The Clean Water Act is a comprehensive water quality statute designed to `restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.' Elkhorn II, 511 U.S. at 704, 114 S.Ct. 1900 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)). The act also seeks to attain `water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife.' Id. at 704, 114 S.Ct. 1900 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)). Under § 303 of the Clean Water Act, each state must establish, subject to federal approval, comprehensive water quality standards setting water quality goals for intrastate waters. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1313. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A) provides that a state water quality standard shall consist of the designated uses of the navigable waters involved and the water quality criteria for such waters based upon such uses. Further, state water quality standards must protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality of water and serve the purposes of this chapter. Such standards shall be established taking into consideration their use and value for public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational and other purposes. Id. Section 303 also contains an antidegradation policy, ensuring that state standards are adequate to maintain existing beneficial uses of navigable waters and prevent their further degradation. Elkhorn II, 511 U.S. at 705, 114 S.Ct. 1900. Thus, state water quality standards must include `a statewide antidegradation policy' to ensure that `[e]xisting instream water uses and the level of water quality necessary to protect the existing uses shall be maintained and protected.' Elkhorn II, 511 U.S. at 705, 114 S.Ct. 1900 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (1993)). Under the Clean Water Act, states may impose more stringent water quality controls. Elkhorn II, 511 U.S. at 705, 114 S.Ct. 1900 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(1)(C), 1370; 40 C.F.R. § 131.4(a) (1993)). Pursuant to RCW 90.48.260, Ecology is the designated state agency for purposes of securing the benefits of and meeting the requirements of the Clean Water Act. RCW 90.48.260 states that [t]he department of ecology is hereby designated as the State Water Pollution Control Agency for all purposes of the federal clean water act ... and is hereby authorized to participate fully in the programs of the act as well as to take all action necessary to secure to the state the benefits and to meet the requirements of that act. [7] In accord with this grant of authority, and as required by the Clean Water Act, Ecology promulgated comprehensive, specific water quality standards for regulating state navigable waters, as well as a statewide antidegradation policy. These provisions, set forth in the administrative code, were reviewed and approved by the federal Environmental Protection Agency as required by the Clean Water Act. Elkhorn II, 511 U.S. at 707, 114 S.Ct. 1900 (citing 33 U.S.C. 1313(c)(3); 42 Fed.Reg. 56,792 (1977)). The State's antidegradation policy is presently set forth in WAC 173-201A-070, which provides, among other things, that [e]xisting beneficial uses shall be maintained and protected and no further degradation which would interfere with or become injurious to existing beneficial uses shall be allowed. WAC 270-201A-070(1). Ecology inventoried the state waters, and placed them within five categories. WAC 173-201A-030. Sullivan Creek is classified as AA, extraordinary. Designated beneficial uses include salmonid migration, rearing, spawning and harvesting, wildlife habitat, recreation, and commerce and navigation. WAC 173-201A-030. Ecology acted to impose the instream flow conditions in this case to ensure that designated uses listed in this standard would not be degraded by operation of the Sullivan Creek project, in accord with § 303 of the Clean Water Act. Under the Clean Water Act, the state is required to enforce water quality standards on intrastate waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B). In addition, the state is responsible for providing water quality certificates under § 401 of the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. 1341. These duties fall to Ecology under RCW 90.48.260. Generally, under § 401, any applicant for a federal license must obtain a state water quality certificate if the applicant's activities may result in discharge into intrastate waters. 33 U.S.C. 1341. The proposed Sullivan Creek project requires a license from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and will result in discharge of diverted water back into Sullivan Creek. Accordingly, the project requires a § 401 state water quality certification. Section 401(d) requires that [a]ny certification ... shall set forth any effluent limitations and other limitations, and monitoring requirements necessary to assure that any applicant for a Federal license or permit will comply with any applicable effluent limitations and other limitations, under section 1311 or 1312 of this title ... and with any other appropriate requirement of State law set forth in such certification, and shall become a condition on any Federal license or permit subject to the provisions of this section. 33 U.S.C. 1341(d). In State Department of Ecology v. Public Utility District of Jefferson County, 121 Wash.2d 179, 849 P.2d 646 (1993) ( Elkhorn I ) (the decision reviewed in Elkhorn II ), this court addressed the propriety of conditions in a § 401(d) water quality certification that required that the applicants maintain certain minimum instream flows in the Dosewallips River, also classified as AA. The applicants there were a city and a local utility district that wanted to build a dam, and applied for a hydroelectric license from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. A § 401 water quality certification was therefore required. The proposed site would reduce streamflow on a stretch of the river between the initial diversion and the place downstream where the water would be returnedthe bypass reach and would adversely affect the salmonid population in that portion of the river. This court upheld the streamflow conditions imposed by Ecology, reasoning that they were necessary to assure compliance with state water quality standards prohibiting the degradation of the state's waters, and specific standards prohibiting degradation of fish habitat and spawningdesignated uses for the Dosewallips. [8] The United States Supreme Court affirmed in Elkhorn II. The Court first held that once the threshold condition of existence of a discharge exists, then § 401(d) authorizes additional conditions and limitations on the applicant's activities as a whole. Elkhorn II, 511 U.S. at 711-12, 114 S.Ct. 1900. The Court then determined that ensuring compliance with § 303 is a proper function of the § 401 certification. Id. at 712-13, 114 S.Ct. 1900. Therefore, the Court concluded, state water quality standards adopted pursuant to § 303 are among the limitations that a state may use to ensure compliance in the § 401 certification process. Id. at 713, 114 S.Ct. 1900. Moreover, the Court held, limitations necessary to ensure compliance with state water quality standards are also permitted by § 401(d)'s reference to `any other appropriate requirement of State law.' Elkhorn II, 511 U.S. at 713-14, 114 S.Ct. 1900. [9] The Court then turned to the question whether a minimum flow condition is a limitation necessary to ensure compliance with state water quality standards or any other appropriate requirement of state law, concluding that it is. The Court rejected the argument that § 401(d) conditions could be based only on specific chemical or numeric criteria. The Court reasoned that criteria can include broad, narrative terms, and that this state's water quality standards applicable to the Dosewallips are of this type. Elkhorn II, 511 U.S. at 715-16, 114 S.Ct. 1900. The Court upheld the minimum streamflow conditions as conditions necessary to meet the state's requirements that activities comport with designated usesfish spawning and habitat in the Dosewallips. The Court also held that the minimum flow conditions were necessary to comport with antidegradation policies. The Court observed: [The Environmental Protection Agency] has promulgated regulations implementing § 303's antidegradation policy, a phrase that is not defined elsewhere in the [Clean Water] Act. These regulations require States to develop and adopt a statewide antidegradation policy and identify the methods for implementing such a policy. 40 CFR § 131.12 (1993). These implementation methods shall, at a minimum, be consistent with the ... [e]xisting instream water uses and the level of water quality necessary to protect the existing uses shall be maintained and protected. Ibid. [The Environmental Protection Agency] has explained that under its antidegradation regulation, no activity is allowable ... which could partially or completely eliminate any existing use. ... Thus, States must implement their antidegradation policy in a manner consistent with existing uses of the stream.... [Washington State's] minimum stream flow condition is a proper application of the state and federal antidegradation regulations, as it ensures that an [e]xisting instream water us[e] will be maintained and protected. 40 CFR 131.12(a)(1) (1993). Elkhorn II, 511 U.S. at 718-19, 114 S.Ct. 1900. Thus, the minimum instream flow conditions were authorized under both state and federal antidegradation regulations promulgated under authority of the Clean Water Act. As to the argument that the Clean Water Act is concerned only with quality, and not quantity, the Court termed the distinction an artificial one, noting that in many cases water quantity is closely related to water quality. Id. at 719, 114 S.Ct. 1900. That is, a sufficient lowering of the water quantity in a body of water could destroy all of its designated uses, be it for drinking water, recreation, navigations or, as here, as a fishery. Id. Moreover, the Court held, the definition of pollution in the Clean Water Act encompasses the effects of reduced water quantity. [10] Id. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) defines pollution as the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water. Elkhorn II thus holds that a state may impose minimum instream flow conditions as part of § 401 water quality certification where necessary to enforce a designated use and conform to state and federal antidegradation policies. The District contends, however, that Elkhorn II does not apply here because the District has existing water rights, unlike the applicants in Elkhorn II. The District argues that in light of § 101(g) and § 510(2) of the Clean Water Act, deferring to state law on water allocation, a condition that may affect the quantity of water available to one who holds an existing water right must be authorized by state law. There is no such state authorization, in the District's view. The District also contends that minimum flow requirements cannot be imposed without compliance with procedures set out in chapters 90.22 and 90.54 RCW. We do not agree that Elkhorn II is distinguishable. In Elkhorn II, the Court rejected the argument that § 101(g) and § 510(2) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) and § 1370(2), excluded regulation of water quantity from the Clean Water Act. The Court said that these sections give the states the authority to allocate water rights as between users, but they do not limit the scope of water pollution controls that may be imposed on users who have obtained, pursuant to state law, a water allocation. Elkhorn II, 511 U.S. at 720, 114 S.Ct. 1900. The Court also said that a § 401 certification merely determines the nature of the use to which that proprietary right may be put under the Clean Water Act if and when a water right was obtained by the applicants in the case. Elkhorn II, 511 U.S. at 721, 114 S.Ct. 1900. The Court said that its view was supported by legislative history of a 1977 amendment to the Clean Water Act that added § 101(g). The District, maintains, however, that the court's conclusion is dicta, because there were no existing water rights involved in Elkhorn II. Section 101(g) provides: It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this chapter. It is the further policy of Congress that nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water which have been established by any State. Federal agencies shall co-operate with State and local agencies to develop comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with programs for managing water resources. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g). Section 510(2) states that nothing in the Clean Water Act shall be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters ... of such States. 33 U.S.C. § 1370. The District reasons that under § 101(g), conditions affecting the right to use water under a state water right, i.e., conditions relating to water quantity, may be imposed only if allowed under state law. Thus, in the District's view, a condition imposed pursuant to the Clean Water Act alone, without additional state authorizing legislation, may not be imposed if it limits the amount of water a water right holder may use under an existing water right. We are convinced that § 101(g) and § 510(2) do not preclude legitimate regulation under the Clean Water Act that affects existing water rights. As noted, the Court in Elkhorn II referred to the legislative history of § 101(g), also known as the Wallop Amendment. Senator Wallop's statements, quoted by the Court, are that [t]he requirements [of the Act] may incidentally affect individual water rights.... It is not the purpose of this amendment to prohibit those incidental effects. It is the purpose of this amendment to insure that State allocation systems are not subverted, and that effects on individual rights, if any, are prompted by legitimate and necessary water quality considerations. Elkhorn II, 511 U.S. at 721, 114 S.Ct. 1900 (quoting COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977, SERIAL NO. 95-14, at 532 (Comm. Print 1978)). The Wallop Amendment came about as a compromise between the House and the Senate on the jurisdictional reach of § 404 of the Clean Water Act, which concerns permitting for the discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1344. The controversy arose between passage of 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the 1977 Clean Water Act, and involved the propriety of requiring § 404 permits for projects that affected `waters of the United States,' as opposed to waters that were traditionally navigable. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., & Bennett W. Raley, Water Rights Protection in Water Quality Law, 60 U. COLO. L.REV. 841, 846 (1989). Among other things, this debate involved the issue of protection of wetlands. Id. Also during this time, the court in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 392 F.Supp. 685 (D.D.C.1975) held that the Corps of Engineers, having administrative responsibilities under § 404, had to promulgate regulations concerning all waters of the United States, and not just traditionally navigable waters. Hobbs & Raley, 60 U. COLO. L.REV. at 846. Concern arose that farming practices, irrigation, and municipal water projects might be barred or restricted by § 404 permitting jurisdiction. Id. at 847. By 1977, a standoff existed between the House and Senate as to the reach of § 404, and Senators Wallop and Hart were key in a series of compromises that became lawamong them, § 101(g). Hobbs & Raley, 60 U. COLO. L.REV. at 853-54. Senator Wallop explained, in addition to the comments quoted above: Water quality and interstate movement is an acceptable Federal role and influence. But the States [sic] historic rights to allocate quantity, and establish priority of usage remains inviolate because of this amendment. The Water Pollution Control Act was designed to protect the quality of water and to protect critical wetlands in concert with the various States. In short a responsible Federal role. 123 Cong. Rec. 39,212 (1977) (remarks of Senator Wallop). The Senator also said that the amendment will reassure the State that it is the policy of Congress that the Clean Water Act will not be used for the purpose of interfering with State water rights systems.... This amendment came immediately after the release of the Issue and Option Papers for the Water Resource Policy Study now being conducted by the Water Resources Council. Several of the options contained in that paper called for the use of Federal water quality legislation to effect Federal purposes that were not strictly related to water quality. Those other purposes might include, but were not limited to, Federal land use planning, plant siting and production planning purposes. This State's jurisdiction amendment reaffirms that it is the policy of Congress that this act is to be used for water quality purposes only. 123 Cong. Rec. 39, 211 (1977). Legitimate water quality measures authorized by this act may at times have some effect on the method of water usage. Water quality standards and their upgrading are legitimate and necessary under this act. The requirements of section 402 and 404 permits may incidentally affect individual water rights. Management practices developed through State or local 208 planning units may also incidentally affect the use of water under an individual water right. It is not the purpose of this amendment to prohibit those individual effects.... This amendment is an attempt to recognize the historic allocation rights contained in State constitutions. It is designed to protect historic rights from mischievous abrogation by those who would use an act, designed solely to protect water quality and wetlands, for other purposes. It does not interfere with legitimate purposes for which the act was designed. 123 Cong. Rec. 39,212 (1977). As this history shows, § 101(g)'s policy statement does not mean that the Clean Water Act has no applicability where an effect on existing water rights would result from application of the act. Section 101(g) is intended to preclude use of the Clean Water Act as a vehicle for federal purposes for which the act was not intended and which could subvert or abrogate state water allocation. Section 101(g) expresses the policy that allocation of a state's water resources is a matter within state jurisdiction. It also has as its purpose that federal agencies must cooperate with state and local agencies in achieving water quality. [11] However, water quality issues under the Clean Water Act, which include, as Elkhorn II holds, water quantity issues, i.e., instream flow levels affecting designated uses, are properly within the scope of the Clean Water Act. Conditions imposed to protect water quality fall within the legitimate purposes for which the Clean Water Act was designed. Courts addressing the impact of § 101(g) generally conclude, consistent with its history, that it does not preclude legitimate regulation under the Clean Water Act. It has been viewed as a general policy statement that requires the federal government accommodate state interests in the permit process to the extent possible consistent with the objectives of the regulatory program, but ... it is not a blanket immunization of state water rights holders from federal regulation. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, § 5:91, at 5-162 (2001). In Riverside Irrigation District v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir.1985), the court said with regard to § 101(g) that Congress did not want to interfere any more than necessary with state water management. National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 178 (D.C.Cir.1982). A fair reading of the statute as a whole makes clear that, where both the state's interest in allocating water and the federal government's interest in protecting the environment are implicated, Congress intended an accommodation. Such accommodations are best reached in the individual permit process. In United States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.1986), a farmer owning wetlands through which a river tributary flowed [12] challenged an order enjoining him from depositing dredged or fill material into certain waters, channels or wetlands, specified by the Corps of Engineers, without a permit (unless a permit was determined to be unnecessary or he did not receive a timely decision on whether a permit was not required). The farmer built a dike across the wetlands, and he argued the dike was an exempt irrigation facility for purposes of § 404's dredge and fill permit requirements. He also argued that under § 101(g) the irrigation exemption should be applied so as to avoid impairment or abrogation of his state allocated irrigation rights, which he claimed were rendered virtually meaningless otherwise. The court disagreed, reasoning that any incidental effect on [the farmer's] rights to state-allocated water from [the river] is justified because protection of [the wetlands] is the type of legitimate purpose for which the [Clean Water] Act was intended. Akers, 785 F.2d, at 821. See also Water Works & Sewer Bd. v. U.S. Dep't of Army, 983 F.Supp. 1052, 1078 (1997) (policy announced in the Wallop amendment is that the Corps not make its permitting decisions on the basis of water supply, thereby overruling state law water allocation determinations). We conclude that § 101(g) does not prohibit conditioning a § 401 water quality certification on maintenance of specified instream flows necessary to meet the state's water quality standards promulgated under the Clean Water Act and necessary to protect designated uses, and to meet the federal and state antidegradation policies, regardless of whether the applicant has existing water rights. Nor does § 510(2), which does not contain anything substantive that § 101(g) does not contain. Accordingly, the decision in Elkhorn II applies here, and requires that we affirm the Board's decision that Ecology has authority under the Clean Water Act to condition the District's water quality certificate on maintenance of the specified instream flows. See RCW 90.48.260. Bypass flow requirements as conditions in a water quality certificate do not reflect or establish an applicant's proprietary right to water, but merely determines the nature of the use to which that proprietary right may be put under the Clean Water Act. Elkhorn II, 511 U.S. at 721, 114 S.Ct. 1900. Under the Clean Water Act, reduced stream flow can constitute pollution where it affects the physical or biological integrity of the water, as the Court reasoned in Elkhorn II. Id., 511 U.S. at 719, 114 S.Ct. 1900; see 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19). Ecology has authority under the Clean Water Act to prevent and control this kind of pollution, as Elkhorn II establishes. Ecology has been granted authority to take all action necessary to ... meet the requirements of the Clean Water Act. RCW 90.48.260. The bypass flow conditions imposed in this case are reasonably calculated to protect existing fisheries habitat in Sullivan Creek, and thus meet water quality standards that include salmonid migration, rearing, spawning, and harvesting designated uses. Final Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order PCHB No. 97-177, at 17 (2000); see WAC 173-201A-030(2)(b)(iii); WAC 173-201A-120(6). We do not agree with the District that under state law Ecology may impose instream flow conditions in a § 401 state water quality certificate only in accordance with procedures in chapters 90.22 and 90.54 RCW for setting minimum instream flows. Two entirely separate spheres of regulation are involved. We are here concerned with Ecology's authority to regulate water quality under the Clean Water Act. Instream flow conditions in a § 401 certification operate to ensure that a project will not violate lawful water quality standards. They apply only to the individual water right holder. They do not apply to other water right holders or applicants for water. Moreover, conditions in a § 401 water quality certificate are effective during the term of a federal license, and may be reevaluated or revised when a project is up for relicensing. In contrast, minimum instream flows under the state's water resources statutes constitute an appropriation, and have a priority date applicable to all water right holders and applicants in a water basin. RCW 90.03.345; Postema v. Pollution Control Hr'gs Bd., 142 Wash.2d 68, 80-82, 11 P.3d 726 (2000). It is for this reason that RCW 90.03.247 requires that [w]henever an application for a permit to make beneficial use of public waters is approved relating to a stream or other water body for which minimum flows or levels have been adopted and are in effect at the time of approval, the permit shall be conditioned to protect the levels or flows. As noted, the state Water Pollution Control Act grants authority to Ecology to take all action necessary ... to meet the requirements of the Clean Water Act. RCW 90.48.260. There is no restriction in chapter 90.48 RCW that prohibits Ecology, when carrying out this broad grant of authority, from imposing conditions that may affect an existing water right. This in sharp contrast to other areas of Ecology's regulatory authority. See, e.g., RCW 90.03.030; RCW 90.44.040. In this connection, we disagree with the District's contention that the absence of a savings clause in chapter 90.48 RCW has no significance. The District says that the state Water Pollution Control Act, chapter 90.48 RCW, simply authorizes the discharge of material into water that causes or tends to cause pollution, and authorizes cooperation with the federal government under the Clean Water Act. The District maintains that the withdrawal and use of water is not the same as the discharge of pollutant(s) under the state Water Pollution Control Act or the Clean Water Act. Therefore, the District says, neither the Congress nor the Legislature authorized regulation of the use of water under existing water rights. Of course, Elkhorn II clearly holds to the contrary as far as the Clean Water Act is concerned, since it expressly holds that water quantity is not distinguishable from water quality where impact on designated uses is concerned: reduced stream flow, i.e., diminishment of water quantity, can constitute water pollution. Elkhorn II, 511 U.S. at 719, 114 S.Ct. 1900 (citing 33 U.S.C. 1362(19)). As for the state act, we repeat once again that Ecology is authorized to take all action necessary to satisfy the Clean Water Act. We also note that RCW 90.48.030 states that [t]he department shall have the jurisdiction to control and prevent the pollution of streams, lakes, rivers, ponds, inland waters, salt waters, water courses, and other surface and underground waters of the state of Washington. Pollution is defined broadly as such contamination, or other alteration of the physical, chemical or biological properties, of any waters of the state, including change in temperature, taste, color, turbidity, or odor of the waters, or such discharge of any liquid, gaseous, solid, radioactive, or other substance into any waters of the state as will or is likely to create a nuisance or render such waters harmful, detrimental or injurious to the public health, safety or welfare, or to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational, or other legitimate beneficial uses, or to livestock, wild animals, birds, fish or other aquatic life. RCW 90.48.020. This definition is, if anything, broader than the definition of pollution in the Clean Water Act. We similarly view the Water Pollution Control Act as encompassing man-induced reduction of water quantity as pollution where it has the negative effects outlined in RCW 90.48.020. Accordingly, the District's argument respecting the lack of a savings clause in chapter 90.48 RCW is without merit. Finally, on this issue, we note that the Legislature has in fact expressly recognized Ecology's authority to set instream flow conditions in a state water quality certification under § 401 of the Clean Water Act. Chapter 90.82 RCW concerns cooperative watershed planning, and RCW 90.82.080 pertains to minimum instream flow components of such planning. According to RCW 90.82.020, minimum instream flow means a minimum flow under chapters 90.03 and 90.22 RCW, or a base flow under chapter 90.54 RCW. However, RCW 90.82.080(4) expressly provides that nothing in the chapter (a) [a]ffects the department's authority to establish flow requirements or other conditions under RCW 90.48.260 or the federal clean water act (33 U.S.C. Sec. 1251 et. seq.) for the licensing or relicensing of a hydroelectric power project under the federal power act (16 U.S.C. Sec. 791 et seq.); or (b) affects or impairs existing instream flow requirements and other conditions in a current license for a hydroelectric power project licensed under the federal power act. Thus, the Legislature has distinguished between minimum instream flows under chapters 90.03, 90.22, and 90.54 RCW, and instream flow conditions in a § 401 certification under the Clean Water Act and the Water Pollution Control Act, chapter 90.48 RCW. We hold that Ecology has authority to impose instream flow conditions in a state water quality certification under § 401 of the Clean Water Act regardless of whether the applicant for the federal license has existing water rights. The Board's summary judgment in favor of Ecology on this issue is affirmed. [13]