Opinion ID: 1976261
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: charge relating to life imprisonment.

Text: At 9:20 P.M., on May 22, 1958, the jury retired to deliberate upon its verdict. At 11:00 P.M. they returned to the courtroom where the following ensued: The Court: Members of the jury, I have a note from you which reads: `Your Honor'  question number one: `What is a life sentence in New Jersey?' Question number two: `The question of a life sentence has arisen and we would like to know when the defendant would be eligible for parole.' Signed: `The Jury.' Is that your question, Mr. Foreman? Mr. Foreman: Yes, sir. The Court: I will instruct the jury that if you bring in a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree with a recommendation of life imprisonment, the Court must sentence the defendant to life imprisonment. With regard to the power of the New Jersey State Parole Board, I will read you the statute. Revised Statute, titled `30:4-123.11' and I quote from that statute: `Any prisoner serving a sentence of life shall be eligible for consideration for release on parole after having served twenty five years of his sentence, less computation time for good behavior and time credits earned and allowed by reason of diligent application to work assignments.' Of course, in your continued deliberation you will consider all of my charge as heretofore made. The jury may now retire. No objection was made to this charge by the defense. The jury again retired to the jury room for further deliberation at 11:05 P.M. At 12:15 A.M., on May 23, 1958, they returned to the courtroom, having agreed upon a verdict. Three days later, on May 26, 1958, this court decided State v. White, 27 N.J. 158 (1958). There can be no doubt that the charge here in question is not compatible when measured against the model charge set forth by Mr. Chief Justice Weintraub in the White case, to be given upon inquiry of the jury concerning the meaning of a sentence of life imprisonment. The question is: Is it plain error within the context of the present case? We are of the opinion that it is not. In White Mr. Chief Justice Weintraub commented on the core of the problem in addressing the argument that the charge given was not harmful, as follows: We cannot agree the error is harmless, for if a jury, doubtful as to whether the penalty should be death or satisfied that it should be life imprisonment, should withhold a recommendation because the death sentence may be commuted or because another agency may grant parole on a life sentence, it is difficult to comprehend how it can be maintained that there is no harm to a defendant. (27 N.J., at page 177) Here the jury did not withhold a recommendation of life imprisonment, so that the charge, even if erroneous, was not prejudicial to the defendant in the final analysis. But the defendant argues, here the jury was not deliberating on the question of life or death, but on the question of acquittal or life imprisonment. The argument is too speculative. We have no appellate yardstick to gauge the state of the proofs in order to determine whether the jury, in inquiring as to the meaning of life imprisonment, was at that time deliberating between life imprisonment and acquittal. The only legitimate inference from the inquiry is that the jury is at least considering a recommendation of mercy. Where, after an erroneous charge, they return with a verdict of guilty without recommendation, the further inference can be drawn that the error may have helped sway them towards the harsher verdict. But where, as here, they return with recommendation of life imprisonment, the probability is just as great, if not greater, that the erroneous instruction did not operate to dissuade them from a recommendation than it is that it operated to persuade them that an acquittal should not be had. What is even more important, the defendant's argument rests on the underlying premise that the jury, if they believed that a sentence of life imprisonment really meant life imprisonment, would have acquitted the defendant. The White model charge was intended to change the type of charge here given by the addition of statutory language indicating that parole is not automatic. To that extent the charge here was more beneficial to defendant's thesis than that in White.