Opinion ID: 2582697
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Would Judicial Intervention in Reberger's Appointment Violate the Doctrine of Separation of Powers?

Text: The district court also held that Reberger's appointment was a non-justiciable political question not subject to the court's review. This issue is based upon the doctrine of separation of powers embraced in Article II, § 1, of the Idaho Constitution. [3] Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989). The question is whether this Court, by entertaining review of a particular matter, would be substituting its judgment for that of another coordinate branch of government, when the matter was one properly entrusted to that other branch. Id. at 639, 778 P.2d at 761. Idaho Code § 1-2101(1) provides that the Governor shall appoint, with the consent of the Senate, three of the seven permanent members of the judicial council. Article IV, § 6, of the Idaho Constitution provides, The governor shall nominate and, by and with the consent of the senate, appoint all officers whose offices are established by this constitution, or which may be created by law, and whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided for. The framers of our Constitution understood that gubernatorial appointments are part of the political process. In Article IV, § 6, they provided Senate confirmation as the check on the Governor's absolute grant of appointive authority. The legislature can create positions to be filled by gubernatorial appointments without requiring that they be subject to Senate confirmation. In re Inman, 8 Idaho 398, 69 P. 120 (1902). When creating the Judicial Council, however, the legislature expressly required that permanent members of the Council can be appointed only with the consent of the Senate. That requirement brought such appointments within the ambit of Article IV, § 6, which gives the Senate the sole authority to pass upon the nominee's qualifications. Whether or not Reberger's appointment violated Idaho Code § 1-2101(1) was an issue that the Senate could, and did, debate prior to his confirmation vote. It would violate the separation of powers guaranteed by Article II, § 1, of the Idaho Constitution for this Court to substitute its view for that of the Senate regarding whether Reberger was qualified to be appointed to the Judicial Council. We must appreciate and respect the allocation of power to another branch of government. Indeed, if a court could second-guess Senate confirmation regarding whether or not Reberger's appointment resulted in more than three permanent members of the Council being from one political party, it could also decide whether the appointment was made with due consideration for area representation. The district court did not err in holding that judicial review of the Senate confirmation would violate the doctrine of separation of powers. In his opinion, Justice Jones relies upon Ingard v. Barker, 27 Idaho 124, 147 P. 293 (1915), for the proposition that there can always be judicial review of gubernatorial appointments. In Ingard, the Secretary of State had refused to issue a commission to a person appointed by the Governor to the State Board of Horticulture on the ground that in making that appointment the Governor had not complied with the statutory requirement to first consider the recommendations of the State Horticultural Association. The person appointed sought a writ of mandate from this Court requiring the Secretary of State to issue the commission. This Court declined to issue the writ immediately, holding that the State Horticultural Association would have sixty days in which to make recommendations to the Governor. At the expiration of sixty days, the Governor could appoint anyone he desired, regardless of whether the person had been recommended by the Association, and the Secretary of State must issue a commission to that person. Ingard is inapposite for two reasons. First, that case was not brought by some person whose sole interest was a belief that the Governor had not complied with the statute. It was brought by the injured party the man who had been appointed and whose commission was denied by the Secretary of State. Second, the statute under which that man had been appointed did not require the consent of the Senate. Therefore, the effect of Senate confirmation pursuant to Article IV, § 6, of the Idaho Constitution was not an issue in the case.