Opinion ID: 1396355
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Finding of Prejudice

Text: We turn first to a consideration of the circuit court's finding that the cumulative effect of the prosecution's conduct before the grand jury was to prejudice the appellees in their substantial constitutional right to a fair and impartial grand jury proceeding. [1] Article I, section 8 of the Constitution of the State of Hawaii provides in pertinent part: No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury... . Although the requirement of a grand jury indictment as a prerequisite to criminal prosecution has been limited by statute, see HRS §§ 705-4, 711-6 et seq., and court rule, see H.R.Cr.P., Rule 7, where the indictment mechanism is employed, it must be through a grand jury which is not only legally constituted, but also unbiased. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956). At least two courts have held that the requirement that an indictment be returned by an unprejudiced grand jury emanates from the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See United States v. Whitted, 325 F. Supp. 520, 522-523 (D.Neb. 1971), and State v. Good, 10 Ariz. App. 556, 559-560, 460 P.2d 662, 665-666 (1969). Cf. Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641, 645 (1st Cir.1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 971, 85 S.Ct. 669, 13 L.Ed.2d 563 (1965), relating to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. But see United States v. Sweig, 316 F. Supp. 1148, 1153-1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). A tendency to prejudice may be presumed when, in presenting cases to the grand jury, the trial court finds that the prosecutor or his deputies have engaged in words or conduct that will invade the province of the grand jury or tend to induce action other than that which the jurors in their uninfluenced judgment deem warranted on the evidence fairly presented before them. Commonwealth v. Favulli, 352 Mass. 95, 106, 224 N.E.2d 422, 430 (1967). See also, Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 307-308, 134 N.E. 407, 419 (1922). [2] In the case at bar, the circuit court found that the grand jury might not have returned an indictment if the prosecution had not made the statement that the individual originally charged with the same offense had now decided to make a clean breast. Such a finding certainly establishes a tendency to prejudice. It is unnecessary that the appellees prove that the grand jury was in fact influenced by the statements. State v. Good, 10 Ariz. App. 556, 559, 460 P.2d 662, 665 (1969). Such a burden might well be impossible to meet. We cannot second guess the grand jury by assuming that it would have returned an indictment against the appellees even if the character of the proceeding had been other than what it was. See Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 10, 7 S.Ct. 781, 30 L.Ed. 849 (1887). [3] We hold that the conduct of the prosecutors was contrary to those `fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions', see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328, 58 S.Ct 149, 153, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937), and therefore violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and article 1, section 4 of the Hawaii Constitution.