Opinion ID: 2077155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Claims Arising from Certain Remarks by the Prosecutor during Closing Arguments

Text: The defendant next claims that, during closing arguments, the prosecutor improperly expressed her personal opinion regarding the victim's character and veracity and, ultimately, what the evidence at trial demonstrated. It is well settled that unpreserved claims that prosecutorial impropriety deprived a defendant of a fair trial are reviewed in two separate steps, the first of which is to ascertain whether impropriety occurred in the first instance, and the second of which is to determine whether that impropriety deprived the defendant of his due process right to a fair trial. See, e.g., State v. Angel T., 292 Conn. 262, 274-75, 973 A.2d 1207 (2009); State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 523, 540, 529 A.2d 653 (1987). The defendant first challenges the prosecutor's observations regarding the victim's courage, namely, that, I would submit she testified bravely ; and (2) [w]hen you look at [the victim's] testimony, I submit to you that it will show you not only is she a courageous girl to have stood up within her family and pointed an accusing finger at her uncle, but that her testimony's credible and it is corroborated.. . . (Emphasis added.) The state effectively concedes that these two comments were improper emotional appeals to the jury's sympathies. See, e.g., State v. Ceballos, 266 Conn. 364, 395-96, 832 A.2d 14 (2003). Accordingly, we consider subsequently their impact on the fairness of the defendant's trial. See part III C of this opinion. The defendant next challenges the propriety of the prosecutor's statement during rebuttal argument that, I don't ask for any excuses for [the victim's] testimony. I don't believe she needs any. I believe she told you what happened. She was accurate here in the courtroom. She was as accurate as she could be in her written statement and her story remains the same. The defendant contends that this statement was an improper expression of the prosecutor's personal belief about the veracity of the victim as a witness. We disagree. It is well settled that [a] prosecutor may not express his own opinion, directly or indirectly, as to the credibility of the witnesses. . . . Nor should a prosecutor express his opinion, directly or indirectly, as to the guilt of the defendant. . . . Such expressions of personal opinion are a form of unsworn and unchecked testimony, and are particularly difficult for the jury to ignore because of the prosecutor's special position. . . . Moreover, because the jury is aware that the prosecutor has prepared and presented the case and consequently, may have access to matters not in evidence. . . it is likely to infer that such matters precipitated the personal opinions. . . . It is not, however, improper for the prosecutor to comment upon the evidence presented at trial and to argue the inferences that the jurors might draw therefrom. . . . Although prosecutors generally should try to avoid using phrases that begin with the pronoun I, such as I think or I believe, we recognize that the use of the word I is part of our everyday parlance and . . . because of established speech patterns, it cannot always easily be eliminated completely from extemporaneous elocution. . . . Therefore, if it is clear that the prosecutor is arguing from the evidence presented at trial, instead of giving improper unsworn testimony with the suggestion of secret knowledge, his or her occasional use of the first person does not constitute [impropriety]. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Luster, 279 Conn. 414, 435-36, 902 A.2d 636 (2006). Viewing the prosecutor's comment in context, we agree with the state that, it is clear that the prosecutor is arguing from the evidence presented at trial, instead of giving improper unsworn testimony with the suggestion of secret knowledge. . . . Id., at 436, 902 A.2d 636. This statement simply operated to rebut the portion of the defendant's summation emphasizing the inconsistencies between the victim's statement and her trial testimony, and is consistent with the rule permitting [a] prosecutor . . . properly [to] comment on the credibility of a witness where . . . the comment reflects reasonable inferences from the evidence adduced at trial. [42] (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 438, 902 A.2d 636.