Opinion ID: 199558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Consent Decrees

Text: Ashland's appeal focuses on Consent Decree I, the primary settlement between the United States and UTC, which began consent decree negotiations with the United States as an alternative to pursuing an appeal of the judgment in Davis I. In discussions with UTC, the EPA assigned possibly settling PRPs (generators and transporters of waste) to two groups, carve-out and non-carve-out. The carve-out entities were deemed primarily responsible for the waste at the Davis site, and so were compelled to negotiate individual settlements with the United States. Non-carve-out third parties were encouraged to negotiate a possible global settlement among themselves, with the assistance of liaison counsel. On July 14, 1995, following the Phase I settlement with four parties, the United States offered to settle with all remaining parties for about $16 million plus the performance of site soil cleanup using low-temperature thermal desorption technology. UTC provisionally agreed to the United States's settlement offer and pursued its contribution claims. Ultimately, UTC, carve-outs Olin Hunt and - 16 - American Cyanamid, and about fifty other parties joined this settlement. The parties paid a total of $13.5 million to the United States, plus $440,000 in oversight costs. Of that amount, Olin Hunt and American Cyanamid paid $2.75 million each (with some portion going to resolution of state claims), non-carve-out parties paid a total of $7.2 million, and UTC paid the remaining balance, about $2.8 million.15 Furthermore, UTC took responsibility for the entire expense of site soil remediation, an estimated cost of about $14 million. Under the settlement, UTC and the United States each receive half of future contribution recoveries, with UTC's recovery capped at $5.364 million after deducting 15 percent of contribution recoveries for attorneys' fees incurred in contribution litigation after March 1996. Finally, the settling parties received complete contribution protection from claims by other PRPs. Separate recoveries by the United States would not be subject to contribution sharing. While the predicted cost of cleaning up the Davis site has varied over the years, the most recent estimate, from 1997, took into account new remediation technology and set the total at $55 million. This amount guided the United States in determining the settlement amounts. In addition, the allocations to Clairol and the other parties 15The allocation among the non-carve-outs was initially confidential, though the payment amounts have now been disclosed. - 17 - in the earlier Phase I, $5.625 million settlement provided a benchmark for the amounts requested from potential settlors in the later consent decrees. Davis II, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 191.
The remaining consent decrees included 27 additional parties and involved UTC's settlement of claims for contribution from other PRPs, resulting in some additional payments to the United States pursuant to UTC's agreement with the United States in Consent Decree I. In Consent Decree II, 23 parties paid a total of $4.135 million, with individual party liability detailed in briefs to the district court. Consent Decree III involved National Starch, which paid $5 million. Consent Decree IV involved a $150,000 payment by Swan Engraving and a $50,000 payment by Power Semiconductors. All parties to these settlements received complete contribution protection from future claims. Finally, Capuano Brothers paid $200,000 to the government, plus a like amount for settlement of cleanup costs at another Superfund site.
To assist in its assessment of Consent Decree I, t he district court held a two-day hearing to determine whether the proposed settlement was fair, both procedurally and substantively, reasonable, and consistent with CERCLA's objectives. United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 1990). Procedurally, the court - 18 - found that [t]he negotiations were conducted openly and all parties were given an opportunity to participate. Davis II, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 189. Substantively, the court concluded that the consent decree met all requirements because the proposed settlement reflects a rational method of allocating liability in a manner that reasonably approximates each party's share of responsibility; the method is applied evenhandedly with respect to all PRP's and sufficient information is presented to enable the Court to determine whether that has been done. Id. at 192. In assessing the reasonableness of the consent decree, the court's chief concern was whether the public can be adequately compensated by a settlement in which the United States receives only a portion of the remediation cost from a party previously adjudged liable for the entire cost, id. at 186, a reference to the release of UTC from the Phase I judgment. According to the district court, under the terms of the settlement the United States would receive $27.5 million, plus the $5.8 million from the original defendants, leaving a $21.7 million shortfall in compensation for the projected cost of the cleanup. This issue distinguished the Davis case from others in which the United States settled before judgment. In those cases, compromising for a fraction of the response costs with a PRP that is potentially liable for the entire cost usually is justifiable on the ground that litigation might result in the United States recovering no - 19 - response costs at all. Id. at 192. The court thus framed the reasonableness question in terms of whether the amount by which the judgment has been discounted reasonably reflects the risk of reversal [on appeal], and called this a very close question. Id. at 193. The court acknowledged some remaining, albeit diminished, litigation risk associated with the claim against UTC. Id. The court also suggested that concern about releasing UTC from the judgment was mitigated by the fact that the United States could still sue the non-settlors for the $21.7 million shortfall, but recognized that this course of action seemed to involve much greater litigation risk than simply pursuing the judgment against UTC. Id. In resolving the issue, the court considered factors beyond an assessment of litigation risks. The court noted that the financial obligations imposed on UTC are considerably greater than the obligations assumed by the other 'carve-out' settlors, reinforcing UTC's substantial responsibility. Id. It also noted that given the deference accorded to the EPA's judgment in such matters, it cannot be said that the proposed discount is unreasonable. Id. The court said that the consent decree avoided an unduly harsh result for UTC, whereas the judgment would have saddled [it], unfairly, with liability for remediation costs that far exceed its fair share. Id. Acknowledging that UTC could pursue contribution actions against other PRPs, the - 20 - court still concluded that the consent decree was reasonable given the great difficulty of establishing entitlement to contribution. Id. Finally, the court found the consent decree to be consistent with the statute because it advanced the overriding goal of promptly and efficiently cleaning up hazardous waste sites. Id. Pursuant to its thorough opinion, the district court approved Consent Decree I on February 13, 1998, and entered final judgment on December 9, 1999. Consent Decrees II, III, IV and the Capuano decree were each summarily approved subsequently. Final judgment was also entered on these decrees in December 1999. On appeal, Ashland, a nonsettling PRP, lodges numerous objections to the approval of the consent decrees, including a jurisdictional objection. We assess these arguments.

Considerable deference is involved in the review of CERCLA consent decrees. Indeed, appellate review is encased in a double layer of swaddling. Cannons, 899 F.2d at 84. First, there is deference to the administrative agency's construction of the settlement. That so many affected parties, themselves knowledgeable and represented by experienced lawyers, have hammered out an agreement at arm's length and advocate its embodiment in a judicial decree, itself deserves weight in the ensuing balance. Id. at 84. Second, the - 21 - appellate court can only review a district court's approval of a consent decree for abuse of discretion, characterized by a serious error of law or a meaningful lapse of judgment. United States v. Charles George Trucking, 34 F.3d 1081, 1085 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. DiBiase, 45 F.3d 541, 544 (1st Cir. 1995). Because an appellate court ordinarily cannot rival a district court's mastery of a factually complex case -- a mastery often, as in this instance, acquired through painstaking involvement over many years -- the district court's views must also be accorded considerable respect. Charles George, 34 F.3d at 1085. This double deference places a heavy burden on those who purpose to upset a trial judge's approval of a consent decree. Cannons, 899 F.2d at 84.
As a preliminary matter, Ashland contends that the district court had no jurisdiction under Article III to approve the consent decrees because, with the exception of UTC, the U.S. never sued any of the third or fourth-party defendants settling in Consent Decrees I-IV. Moreover, approximately 34 entities who were signatories to Consent Decree I were never sued by any party to this action. In Ashland's view, this circumstance means that there was no case or controversy to be resolved by the district court. We conclude that, even if there were parties not sued by the United States involved in the consent decrees, their inclusion would be permissible because the Supreme Court - 22 - has allowed unpleaded claims to be part of consent decrees, and thus, there is no case or controversy concern. In Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986), the Supreme Court ruled that a consent decree must (1) spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court's subject matter jurisdiction; (2) come within the general scope of the case based on the pleadings; and (3) further the objectives of the law on which the claim is based. Although Firefighters involved a challenge to the scope of a consent decree rather than an Article III case or controversy argument, satisfying the criteria set forth in that case resolves any case or controversy claim. The district court found that the criteria were satisfied by Consent Decree I: The United States's claims against the settling third and fourth-party defendants spring from and fall well within the scope of the controversy described in the pleading; . . . Furthermore, the United States and all of the settling PRP's are parties to the action16 and the consent decree resolves the dispute among them. Finally, . . . approval of the consent decree also furthers the objectives of CERCLA by facilitating the prompt and efficient remediation of a major hazardous waste site. Davis II, 11 F.Supp. 2d at 188. 16We understand the court's reference to parties to the action to include those initially sued by the United States, defendants to the UTC contribution claims, as well as the numerous parties named in suits among the third and fourth-party defendants. - 23 - We have applied the Firefighters test in the CERCLA context before. In Charles George, we found that claims not expressly set out in the pleadings may be addressed in a consent decree as long as they fall within the pleadings' general scope. 34 F.3d at 1089-91. Likewise, unpleaded claims that could not be brought against thirdparty defendants pursuant to a case management order (CMO) were appropriately included in the consent decree. Id. at 1091. Here, the purported failure to file complaints contemporaneous with the consent decrees does not defeat the legitimacy of the settlements. As we wrote in Charles George: [T]he Supreme Court has made clear that there is no per se prohibition against consent decrees that exceed the possible bounds of a decision issued directly by the trial court. Because a consent decree is animated not only by the parties' legal claims but also by the parties' consent, a court is 'not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court could have awarded after trial.' Id. at 1091 (quoting Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 525). The district court allowed the inclusion of parties not sued by the United States in the consent decrees, finding that UTC's contribution claims are based on the same body of evidence and raise the same issues as the United States' claims against the settling third and fourth-party defendants. Davis II, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 188. Like a settlement that is greater in scope than the originally pled claims, the inclusion of various third and fourth-party defendants, as well as - 24 - interested non-parties, is permissible pursuant to Firefighters.17 Indeed, any conclusion to the contrary would disrupt the goals of CERCLA, which seeks early settlement with as many PRPs as possible to further expeditious remediation.

Assessing fairness in the CERCLA settlement context has both procedural and substantive dimensions. To measure procedural fairness, a court should ordinarily look to the negotiation process and attempt to gauge its candor, openness, and bargaining balance. Cannons, 899 F.2d at 86. The EPA has ample authority to structure its settlement negotiations, including broad discretion to structure classes of PRPs. Id. A finding of procedural fairness may also be an acceptable proxy for substantive fairness, when other circumstantial indicia of fairness are present. See Charles George, 34 F.3d at 1089. Ashland asserts that the consent decrees failed to meet the criteria of procedural fairness because the establishment of party categories inhibited the openness of negotiations; discovery relating to the settlement terms was inadequate; and the United States abdicated to UTC its responsibility to conduct the negotiations under CERCLA. 17 Ashland further contests the inclusion of successors in interest and corporate affiliates within the scope of Consent Decree I. Given the potential liability of such entities, this inclusion is appropriate. - 25 - Ashland also argues that information fundamental to evaluation of the consent decrees was not disclosed by the United States, including: (1) the United States' total past and estimated future costs of remediation; (2) the strength of the United States' case against each settlor; (3) the type, volume and toxicity of the waste for which each settlor was responsible and a correlation to site cleanup costs; (4) the formula by which the settlement amounts were calculated, and evidentiary support for the formula. These arguments are unpersuasive. All identified players in the hazardous waste site were notified of early opportunities for settlement with the United States, and later, with UTC. There is no reason to doubt that the consent decrees were the result of arm's length, good faith bargaining between sophisticated parties. United States v. Comunidades Unidas Contra la Contaminacion, 204 F.3d 275, 281 (1st Cir. 2000). PRPs were offered the assistance of a magistrate judge and an alternative dispute resolution administrator in the negotiation of their settlements. In addition, the early classification of carve-outs and non-carve-outs was an attempt at settlement management within the discretion of the United States. The district court also found no breach of the requirement for public disclosure, concluding that the parties offered facts sufficient to enable one to determine whether the terms of the agreement were fair. Davis II, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 194. The proposed - 26 - decrees lodged with the court set[] forth, at length, all of the terms of the settlement. Id. They were published in compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 9622(d)(2)(A)-(B), making the decrees available to non-parties and the public for comment in a timely manner. Furthermore, the district court noted that there is no indication that the United States misrepresented or withheld any material facts. Id. at 189. There is no error in any of these findings. Ashland's argument that the identified information had to be available is not supported by the law, which makes significant allowances for gaps in information, given the sometimes impossible task of deriving this data.
Substantive fairness involves concepts of corrective justice and accountability, concentrating on the proposed allocation of responsibility as between settling and non-settling PRPs. Charles George, 34 F.3d at 1088. [T]he proper way to gauge the adequacy of settlement amounts to be paid by settling PRPs is to compare the proportion of total projected costs to be paid by the settlors with the proportion of liability attributable to them. Id. at 1087. Ashland asserts that the formula used by the government to assess liability among the carve-out and non-carve-out parties, settling or not, was arbitrary and capricious, unrelated to comparative fault and inconsistently applied across consent decrees. The law on this issue is clear. The EPA formula should be - 27 - upheld so long as the agency supplies some plausible explanation for it, welding some reasonable linkage between factors it includes in its formula or scheme and the proportionate shares of the settling PRPs. Cannons, 899 F.2d at 87. In assessing the formula applied, the quality of the information available to the government and settling parties informs the fairness analysis because data on the total extent of harm and the respective liabilities of various PRPs are often unavailable. See id. at 88. Such difficulties will not preclude a court from entering a consent decree. See Charles George, 34 F.3d at 1089. The calculation of liability and the allocation of that responsibility is specially within the scope of the Agency's and parties' expertise. As long as the data the EPA uses to apportion liability for purposes of a consent decree falls along the broad spectrum of plausible approximations, judicial intrusion is unwarranted . . . . Having selected a reasonable method of weighing comparative fault, the agency need not show that it is the best, or even the fairest, of all conceivable methods. Cannons, 899 F.2d at 88. In this case, the EPA assessed liability based on its estimate of the volume of waste attributable to each PRP. Davis II, 11 F. Supp. at 190. The EPA also considered the strength of the cases against the respective PRPs, taking into account that there was direct and credible evidence linking some of the PRP's to the Site and that the evidence with respect to other PRP's was almost entirely - 28 - circumstantial and varied in probative value. Id. The district court found the interplay of these factors in this case to be rational and especially appropriate in cases like this where the wastes have been intermingled and it is virtually impossible to attribute discrete portions of the cleanup costs to particular wastes. Id. The court further observed that, in accord with the precedent, assessing relative responsibility is an imperfect process because it requires subjective judgments based on evidence that is not completely developed and may be disputed. However, . . . the evidence need not be exhaustive or conclusive in order to determine whether a proposed settlement is substantively fair. Id. at 191. We agree with the district court's analysis supporting the substantive fairness of the liability allocation among carve-outs and non-carve-outs, settlors and non-settlors alike. In arguments before the district court, the government attorney and others noted that the settlements involved roughly half of the parties paying somewhat more than half of the costs. In its decision, the district court stressed the parity of the amounts paid by settling PRPs and non-settling PRPs, both carve-outs and non-carve-outs. Davis II, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 191. The court wrote: Comparing the amounts paid by the settling 'carve-out' PRP's to the Clairol benchmark and to the demands made upon the non-settling 'carve- out' PRP's supports the conclusion that the proposed settlement apportions liability in a manner that roughly approximates a rational - 29 - estimate of the relative responsibilities borne by both the settling and non-settling PRP's. Id. at 190. The court proceeded to compare the settlement offered to American Cyanamid and Olin Hunt with the settlements paid in the Clairol agreement and demands made of eight non-settling carve-out PRPs, all of which fell between $2.75 million and $3 million. See id. at 191. Interestingly, the court also noted that the government demanded $8.25 million from the State of New Jersey, BFI and Ashland, averaging to a total of $2.75 million each, though Ashland was expected to pay a larger share because EPA determined that Ashland produced a high volume of hazardous waste and that a significant amount of evidence existed linking Ashland to the Davis site. Id. at 191 n.7. Finally, the court noted an even closer correlation between the amounts paid by settling 'non-carve-out' PRP's and the amounts demanded from non-settling 'non-carve-out' PRP's -- $13.5 million demanded of eighty-five non-carve-out PRPs, averaging $158,800 apiece, compared with the $7.2 million proposed settlement with forty-seven non-carveout PRPs, amounting to $152,200 each. Id. at 191. The court also pointed out that the allocation assessed to UTC was a considerably greater financial obligation than that imposed on any non-settling carve-out party. See id. In addition, the ultimate measure of accountability is the extent of the overall recovery, not the amount of money paid by any - 30 - individual defendant. Charles George, 34 F.3d at 1086. Accordingly, a consent decree need not specify each generator's or transporter's degree of culpability. It is appropriate for classes of PRPs to be assigned aggregate settlement amounts to allocate among themselves. See id. In Charles George we said: Realistically, a government agency, in the midst of negotiations, is in no position to put so fine a point on accountability. We, therefore, endorse, in general, EPA's practice of negotiating with a representative group of PRPs and then permitting the group members to divide the burden of the settlement among themselves. Id. Ashland's challenge to the group allocations in these settlements is meritless. Our prior observation remains pertinent: [A]s is true of consent decrees generally, they are built upon compromise and compromise in turn is a product of judgment. Comunidades Unidas, 204 F.3d at 282. We agree with the district court's conclusion that a rational method of allocating liability was evenhandedly applied. Davis II, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 192.
In considering the reasonableness of Consent Decree I, the district court addressed the novel issue of whether the public can be adequately compensated by a settlement in which the United States receives only a portion of the remediation cost from a party previously adjudged liable for the entire cost. See Davis II, 11 F. Supp. 2d at - 31 - 186. Arguing that adequate compensation is not possible under such circumstances, Ashland asserts that the consent decrees do not comport with the objectives of CERCLA. The assessment of reasonableness focuses on several elements: the effectiveness of the decree as a vehicle for cleaning the environment; providing satisfactory public compensation for actual (and anticipated) costs of remediation; and accounting for the relative strength of the parties' litigating positions and foreseeable risks of loss. See Cannons, 899 F.2d at 89-90. In making these assessments, a court must once again allow for the agency's lack of mathematical precision, as long as the figures derive from a plausible interpretation of the record. Id. at 90. Furthermore, effective remediation demands a more pragmatic meaning than whether the settlement meets a scientific ideal or approximates the projected costs of cleanup. See Charles George, 34 F.3d at 1085; United States v. Charter Int'l Oil Co., 83 F.3d 510, 521 (1st Cir. 1996) (A district court's reasonableness inquiry, like that of fairness, is a pragmatic one.); Comunidades Unidas, 204 F.3d at 281. Although the UTC allocation in Consent Decree I does not pay for the entire expense of the cleanup, UTC assumed the full cost of soil remediation (mitigated by contribution from later settlors), even if that estimated cost ultimately exceeds projections. Furthermore, the consent decrees staved off litigation risks associated with the - 32 - settling parties, including a possible appeal by UTC of the judgment against it. See Davis II, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 192. In addition, as the district court observed, fundamental fairness prohibits the imposition of liability that is totally disproportionate to UTC's share of responsibility. Id. at 193. Discounts on maximum potential liability as an incentive to settle are considered fair and reasonable under Congress's statutory scheme. See DiBiase, 45 F.3d at 546; see also Interim CERCLA Settlement Policy, Environmental Protection Agency, 50 F.R. 5034 (February 5, 1985). A PRP's assumption of open-ended risks, such as the full cost of a component of the cleanup, may merit a discount. See Cannons, 899 F.2d at 88. Also, party-specific discounts may reflect the chances of the United States's success in litigation against a given PRP. See id. It is appropriate to factor into the equation any reasonable discounts for litigation risks, time savings, and the like that may be justified. Charles George, 34 F.3d at 1087. The United States received a significant sum from the initial settlors, Consent Decree I settlors and contributions from settlors in Consent Decrees II-IV and Capuano. Indeed, the United States fulfilled 60 percent of its $55 million claim through the consent decrees, including the earlier $5.625 million settlement with Clairol and other parties. The United States also retains the option of pursuing future cost-recovery actions against other non-settling PRPs. In light of the - 33 - role of the consent decrees in expediting the remediation work, the substantial cost recovery by the United States, and the strength of the cases against the various PRPs, we agree with the district court that the consent decrees met the test of reasonableness.
The purposes of CERCLA include expeditious remediation at waste sites, adequate compensation to the public fisc and the imposition of accountability. [I]t would disserve a principal end of the statute -- achievement of prompt settlement and a concomitant head start on response activities -- to leave matters in limbo until more precise information [is] amassed. Cannons, 899 F.2d at 88; see also DiBiase, 45 F.3d at 545 ([S]ettlements reduce excessive litigation expenses and transaction costs, thereby preserving scarce resources for CERCLA's real goal: the expeditious cleanup of hazardous waste sites.). Additionally, there is a strong public policy in favor of settlements, particularly in very complex and technical regulatory contexts. Comunidades Unidas, 204 F.3d at 280. Importantly, even though it was not obligated to do so, UTC began the process of remedial soil treatment in July 1997, well before the approval of Consent Decree I. This task included: excavation, removal and proper disposal of more than 1,000 drums of waste and 10,000 small jars, containers and vials; removal of more than 750,000 tires; and sampling and chemical analysis of over 65,000 cubic yards of soil. This head-start on repair of a - 34 - hazardous waste site is the sort of good-faith cooperation that CERCLA seeks to encourage via settlement. To find this progress inadequate would frustrate the statute's purpose. In asserting that the consent decrees are not faithful to the purposes of CERCLA, Ashland focuses on the contribution protection afforded the parties to the consent decrees, fearing that a handful of non-settlors (i.e., Ashland and the other appellants), foreclosed from contribution actions because they did not join the consent decrees, could be held liable for a disproportionate share of the $21.7 million in as-yet unrecovered costs if the United States pursued them in cost recovery actions. CERCLA provides that [a] person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2); see also 42 U.S.C § 9622(f)(2). Despite this matters addressed in the settlement language of the statute, Ashland says that the matters addressed language of the decrees here is overreaching because they include, quoting the consent decrees, response costs incurred and to be incurred by any person or entity other than the United States for response actions related to the site or identified in the remedy. Ashland complains that, [a]s written, the 'matters addressed' provision of three partial consent decrees have been expanded to include all costs, whether the costs are incurred by the - 35 - U.S. or by a private party. This is clearly impermissible under CERCLA. Facing exposure to performance of the groundwater remedy, which may represent 40 percent of the total site costs, Ashland worries that parties like itself will bear disproportionate liability because they are unfairly barred from seeking contribution from earliersettling parties. The practice of encouraging early settlements by providing broad contribution protection is provided by statute. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2); see also Charter, 83 F.3d at 522; UTC v. Browning-Ferris Ind., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 103 (1st Cir. 1994) (This paradigm is not a scrivener's accident.). CERCLA also seeks to induce settlements at higher amounts by allowing settlors to seek contribution from those who have not yet settled. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B); Charter, 83 F.3d at 522. Still, EPA policy encourages the court reviewing a consent decree incorporating contribution protection to seek a demonstration that this result is fair to potential contribution plaintiffs whose rights would be extinguished. DOJ/EPA Memorandum, Defining Matters Addressed in CERCLA Settlements, March 14, 1997. In a case such as this, where UTC assumes an open-ended cost for soil remediation, and takes the lead in coordinating settlements and beginning the cleanup effort, the benefit of contribution protection is appropriate. Also, as UTC points out in its brief, Ashland's preoccupation with the potential of disproportionate liability ignores the fact that UTC, - 36 - which was allocated responsibility for 1.54 percent of the liability by the trial court, will perform the source control remedy, which will amount to over one-fourth of the total costs of remediating the site. UTC draws from this fact an appropriate conclusion: This comparison shows that CERCLA can impose harsh results on PRPs; it also shows that these contribution defendants [Ashland and other non-settlors] may bear a burden roughly comparable to that of UTC. The point we made in an earlier decision remains apt: As to the extinguished contribution claims of non-settlors or later round settlors, protection against those claims was a reasonable benefit [the settlor] acquired in exchange for settling before those others. Charter, 83 F.3d at 522. The result of non-settlors possibly bearing disproportionate liability for the open-ended cost of remediation is therefore consistent with the statute's paradigm, which encourages the finality of early settlement. See Browning-Ferris, 33 F.3d at 103.
To the extent that CERCLA authorizes the contribution protection to which Ashland objects, Ashland asserts that this protection could result in an unconstitutional taking of the protectable property interests of non-settling parties because they will be prohibited from seeking contribution from earlier-settling parties. Indeed, Ashland points out, CERCLA recognizes that in a settlement limiting any person's right to obtain contribution from any - 37 - party, the result could be a taking without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. 42 U.S.C. § 9657. Ashland's argument in support of this takings claim is so perfunctorily developed that we deem it unworthy of response. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ([I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.). In support of its takings argument, set forth in two-and-a-half pages at the end of an 85-page brief, Ashland relies entirely on a brief description of the recent Supreme Court decision in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), a case in which a deeply divided Supreme Court struck down retroactive application of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992. The takings analysis put forth by the plurality opinion in that case did not command a majority of the court, a fact which, as the government notes in its brief, severely limits the precedential value of that takings analysis. See Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1910) ([T]he principles of law involved not having been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting prevents the case from becoming an authority for the determination of other cases, either in this or in inferior courts.) As Justice Kennedy noted in his concurring opinion in Eastern Enterprises, where he disavowed the takings analysis of the plurality: Cases attempting to decide when a regulation becomes a taking are among the most litigated and perplexing in current law. - 38 - 524 U.S. at 541. We will not assay the takings issue on the basis of the insubstantial argument put forth by Ashland.18