Opinion ID: 1311766
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Federal Claim[19]

Text: (24) The Church alleged that Maxwell conspired with others to deprive it and its members of equal protection of the laws and of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. It contended Maxwell's purpose was, inter alia, to prevent Church members from freely exercising their religious beliefs through interstate travel. The Church sought injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. In its appeal to the Court of Appeal it abandoned its contention that it could assert free exercise claims under section 1985(3), but continued to assert it had representational standing to sue for a violation of its members' constitutionally guaranteed right to travel. ( Zobel v. Williams (1982) 457 U.S. 55 [72 L.Ed.2d 672, 102 S.Ct. 2309].) The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the dismissal on that ground. Maxwell offers three arguments why his demurrer to the Church's federal claim was properly sustained. As will appear, none is persuasive. First, he contends the Church failed to meet the second of three requirements for representational standing set forth in Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n (1977) 432 U.S. 333, 343 [53 L.Ed.2d 383, 394, 97 S.Ct. 2434]. The requirement in question is that the interests [that the organization] seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose. ( Ibid. ) Maxwell asks us to infer from that requirement a test of the Church's status as a bona fide religious organization: apparently he wishes to argue that the Church is a political rather than religious organization, and that its members' right to travel is somehow not germane to the organization's true purpose. But the contention has no support in the law, and we decline to adopt such a novel reading of a federal statute. Second, Maxwell contends his demurrer was properly sustained because a conspiracy to infringe First Amendment rights does not violate section 1985(3) unless either a state is involved in the conspiracy or the conspiracy aims to influence the state's activity. While the contention correctly states the Supreme Court's holding in Carpenters v. Scott (1983) 463 U.S. 825, 830 [77 L.Ed.2d 1049, 1055, 103 S.Ct. 3352], it overlooks the court's further statement in Carpenters that in accordance with Griffin v. Breckenridge (1971) 403 U.S. 88 [29 L.Ed.2d 338, 91 S.Ct. 1790], section 1985(3) does reach purely private conspiracies aimed at depriving persons of the constitutionally guaranteed right to travel. ( Carpenters v. Scott, supra, 463 U.S. at pp. 832-833 [77 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1056-1057].) The Church alleges just such a conspiracy here. [20] Third, Maxwell contends the Church's federal cause of action was barred by the state statute of limitations because it was subject to the one-year limitation period for personal injury claims set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (2). However, as the Court of Appeal correctly held, the Church seeks to amend its complaint to seek injunctive relief only as to what it alleges to be an ongoing conspiracy among Maxwell and the other cross-defendants. The statute of limitations does not begin to run in civil conspiracy cases until the last overt act of the conspiracy has been completed. ( Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 773, 787 [157 Cal. Rptr. 392, 598 P.2d 45].) Thus, if a continuing conspiracy is proved, the action is obviously timely; if no conspiracy is proved, injunctive relief will be denied. The determinative issue is factual and cannot be resolved by demurrer.