Opinion ID: 1598888
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Distinguishing Adams v. Robertson

Text: In Adams v. Robertson, supra, 676 So.2d 1265, this Court determined that the trial court could certify the plaintiff's claim as a Rule 23(b)(2) class action. It stated that the relief requested on the plaintiffs' fraud claim was primarily equitable. The fraud claim in that case is distinguishable from the fraud claim in this present case. In Adams v. Robertson , the plaintiff filed an action against an insurance company, complaining that it had persuaded holders of its cancer policies to trade their old policies for new improved policies. However, the plaintiff claimed that the benefits of the new policies were actually of less value to the policyholders than the benefits of the old policies. This Court stated: We note that simply because equitable relief has a `value' based on money or has `worth' does not make it monetary relief. For example, if a person is ordered to execute a conveyance of land based on a contract, the land has a money `value,' although the relief granted is equitable, i.e., equity acts on the person, by compelling him to fulfill his contract. In this case, the `reformed' policies have an increased `value' to the insureds, but the relief granted was forcing Liberty National to restore the benefits. More importantly, the benefits of a reformed policy are not enforceable unless the insured contracts cancer. 676 So.2d at 1271. In Adams v. Robertson , the fraud claim was fairly clear in the complaint and it resulted in an equitable result, the reformation of the insurance contract. However, in this present case, it is not at all clear what kind of fraud GEICO may have engaged in, if it did engage in a fraud, because it did not persuade its policyholders to switch to a new policy, as Liberty National was alleged to have done in Adams v. Robertson . The contested provision in GEICO's policy, to which Mr. Kenney, the representative of the plaintiff class, apparently agreed, has remained unchanged since the time Mr. Kenney originally agreed to purchase a policy from GEICO. However, the central question that controls this case is whether GEICO's reduction in payment of benefits is lawful under the Uninsured Motorist Statute. The typicality requirement for this claim is satisfied by a common questionwhether the setoff provision of GEICO's contract with its policy-holders violates Alabama law. That question is present in more than 36,000 policies. However, we cannot agree that Mr. Kenney's fraud and breach-of-contract claims are typical of claims held by the entire class. The typicality requirement of Rule 23 is satisfied as to one question, but that typicality does not include the fraud and breach-of-contract claims under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2).