Opinion ID: 2976626
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Assault on Morales

Text: The government relied on Rule 404(b) to admit evidence that Morales called the police on Christmas Day 2003 reporting that the defendant had assaulted her over two or three days. Morales testified that she reported it to the police, and that the defendant was arrested coming out of the apartment. Although Morales said this happened on Christmas 2001, Officer Gulas testified that he responded to the call on Christmas 2003. Defense counsel objected, but the district court allowed the testimony and gave a limiting instruction. Arguing essentially that Morales was not worthy of belief, defendant argues that there No. 06-4333 12 was insufficient evidence that the assault even occurred. The government is not required to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the other acts occurred. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988). Under Rule 404(b), the evidence is relevant “if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the defendant was the actor.” Id. at 689. It was not clear error to find there was sufficient evidence of such “other acts.” Ganier, 468 F.3d at 925. The district court found the evidence was probative of both the defendant’s intent and Morales’s motive and intent, and commented that the “same type of intent and credibility issues are certainly present in this case that were probably present back at that time.” The government’s purpose in offering 404(b) evidence must be “to prove a fact that the defendant has placed, or conceivably will place, in issue, or a fact that the statutory elements obligate the government to prove.” Merriweather, 78 F.3d at 1076. As defendant points out, necessity or duress is a justification defense to the felon-in-possession charge that does not negate the intent necessary to establish the offense. Dixon v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2437, 2441-42 (2006). Nonetheless, defendant squarely placed at issue the question of whether he or Morales was the aggressor on June 5. The evidence was relevant on this issue and to rebut defendant’s claim that he reasonably believed that Morales posed an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. The evidence was also relevant to Morales’s motive and intent, and, as the district court emphasized, the evidence could “cut either way” because Morales was either consistently telling the truth or consistently lying. In fact, defense counsel made much No. 06-4333 13 of the fact that Officer Gulas contradicted Morales’s testimony regarding the arrest in several respects. It was not error to conclude that evidence concerning the Christmas incident was probative of a material issue other than character, nor an abuse of discretion to find that the probative value was not outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect.