Opinion ID: 1897763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Drug addiction defense

Text: We next examine Grant's contention his drug addiction is a defense to his criminal contempt. Grant contends that his addiction to heroin compelled him to violate the court's order and therefore his conduct was not willful. [6] Grant does not cite any authority in support of his argument, nor do we know of any. [7] Although we have never squarely addressed the issue appellant raises, we have previously stated in dictum that addiction to heroin would not constitute a defense to the charge of contempt based upon violating a condition of pretrial release not to use drugs. Thompson v. United States, 571 A.2d 192, 194 n. 2 (D.C.1990). We now follow that dictum as a holding here. The Bail Reform Act, D.C.Code § 23-1321 (1996), specifically authorizes a trial court to impose on an arrestee otherwise subject to pretrial detention release conditions necessary to reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community .... Id. § 23-1321(c)(1)(B). Such release conditions may include the requirement that the releasee [r]efrain from ... any use of a narcotic drug or other controlled substance without a prescription.... Id. § 23-1321(c)(1)(B)(ix). The Council [of the District of Columbia] has thus determined that prevention of drug use may be a significant factor in preventing pretrial criminality and nonappearance in court. Oliver v. United States, 682 A.2d 186, 189 (D.C.1996). Further, as already discussed above, the Council has specifically provided that courts may punish violations of pretrial release orders by contempt sanctions. There is nothing in this statutory scheme to evidence a legislative intent to exclude drug addicts from the purview of these statutory provisions. In Gorham v. United States, 339 A.2d 401 (D.C.1975) (en banc) this court rejected the argument that addiction to heroin, which allegedly compelled the defendants to use heroin so that they had no choice or control regarding such conduct, may be invoked as a defense in a prosecution for the possession of heroin. We concluded, based on a review of statutory provisions criminalizing possession of heroin, D.C.Code § 33-402 (1973), and providing treatment for drug addicts, D.C.Code § 22-601 et seq. (1973), that Congress intended to prosecute habitual drug users as well as other persons for violations of the criminal laws. 339 A.2d at 408. We concluded that, absent impelling constitutional considerations, it was not our role to supplant the legislative judgment. Id. As the appellants in Gorham sought, so here Grant in essence asks us to adopt a rule of permissible conduct on pretrial release that would exempt drug addicts from certain criminal sanctions that are clearly authorized by statute. For reasons similar to those set forth in Gorham, 339 A.2d at 410-14, we cannot formulate such a rule here. [8] Affirmed.