Opinion ID: 1318434
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Status of Wyoming Law

Text: It is recognized that with passage of Senate Enrolled Act No. 4 by the 48th Legislature in 1986, Ch. 24, S.L. of Wyoming 1986, any decision we make at this time is limited to this case and causes of action that accrue before June 11, 1986. [4] To reconstitute the argument that divided the court in Board of County Commissioners of Campbell County v. Ridenour, Wyo., 623 P.2d 1174, reh. denied 627 P.2d 163 (1981), or the argument which was considered in great detail in Kirby Building Systems v. Mineral Explorations Co., Wyo., 704 P.2d 1266 (1985), will serve little purpose in this case where the jury found no negligence, unless something in the nature of the instruction confused the factfinders as they assessed fault on the case submitted which only involved occurrences on March 7 and 8, 1977, resulting in the injury incurred. Whatever might be the proclivity of the majority of the present court, we will leave for the legislature that which they have done and continue the law of Kirby and Ridenour for the interim period. Those rules are: 1. All actors' (participants') fault, by percentage, shall be calculated by the factfinder, which was, in this case, a twelve-member jury. 2. The negligence of the nonparty as an actor from whom no recovery is sought is not directly compared separately by percentage with any party for the litigants' liability determination. The percentage is jointly allocated within the total scope of fault responsibility for the purpose of determining whether the plaintiff may recover from any defendant or defendants by direct numerical comparison between parties. Otherwise defendants would be subject to a mathematically allocated responsibility for actors omitted from the total percentage computation. 3. Once the percentage of each actor's fault is known, within a total for all participants of 100 percent, the defendants from whom the plaintiff may recover, if any there may be, become apparent. 4. Allocation and offset factors which were the substantive issue in Kirby need not now be addressed in view of the jury decision of no negligence of any participant. Plaintiff submitted proposed additional Instructions Nos. 1, 6, and 2G, which were rejected, and a proposed verdict form. Instruction No. 1 was inaccurate and incomplete in a most significant fashion in addressing Fisher Controls and not Pierce. Instruction No. 6 was inaccurate and incomplete in addressing only Burton and defendants and disregarding requirements of Kirby that enumeration and allocation of other actors was also required. Instruction No. 2G was inaccurate and incomplete in disregarding Pierce and by failure to accurately establish the relational responsibility of the fault computation for the determination of all potential liability for the remaining defendants among variant actors. The verdict forms require comparison to assess possible jury confusion: Proposed by the plaintiff: WE, the Jury, duly empaneled and sworn to try the above cause, do find as follows: (In answering the questions, check the appropriate line, or insert a percentage or amount, as indicated.) 1. Q. Was Defendant Olman-Heath negligent? Yes ____ No ____ 2. Q. Was Defendant A.J. Deans grossly negligent? Yes ____ No ____ 3. Q. If you have not found Defendant A.J. Deans to be grossly negligent, do you find that Defendant A.J. Deans was negligent? (DO NOT ANSWER THIS QUESTION IF YOU HAVE ANSWERED QUESTION #2 ABOVE `YES'.) Yes ____ No ____ 4. Q. Was Fisher Controls Company negligent? Yes ____ No ____ If your answers to the questions above are `Yes' as to Questions # 1 or Question # 2, you will answer Question # 5. However, if your answer is `No' as to both Questions # 1 and # 2, you will proceed no further, sign the Verdict and return to Court.    Used by the trial court: WE, the Jury, duly empaneled and sworn to try the above cause, do find as follows: (In answering the questions, check the appropriate line, or insert a percentage or amount, as indicated.) 1. Q. Were any of the following Defendants negligent? A. Fisher Controls Company Yes ____ No X Olman-Heath Yes ____ No X A.J. Deans Yes ____ No X G. Wayne Pierce Yes ____ No X If your answer to Question 1 is `Yes' as to any Defendant, except as hereinafter instructed in this paragraph, you will answer Question 2. However, if your answer is `No' as to all Defendants, or `No' as to all Defendants except Deans, and is `Yes' as to Deans you will proceed no further, sign the Verdict and return to Court.    The direct question for us to determine is whether the result would have been changed if the word defendant had been deleted and the word actors or participants substituted. Secondly, the question is raised whether the arrangement of the verdict was contrary to the requirement of Kirby. Burton premises the question in terms of basic trial fairness. Excepting that the verdict form as given by the court to accommodate the directed verdict of gross negligence for Deans, not contemplated by the plaintiff's verdict form, and that for unknowable reasons Pierce was omitted by plaintiff, the forms are nearly identical except for the designation difference. Preferring as we might even with the settlements and dismissals occurring on the date of trial commencement, that the characterization of defendant for those for whom pretrial settlement is made or who otherwise are not actual litigants during the trial would have been better replaced by actor, participant, antagonist, doer, taker, sharer, participator, or partaker, we cannot find any prejudicial confusion. [5] However, to the extent that this opinion may be of value in other cases, it is recommended that the designation used in the future be actor, as is now specified in the newly enacted legislation. Obviously, under Kirby, the percentage participation of each actor must be established in order for the liability, if any, of the remaining defendant parties to be mathematically computed. We do not find that either the submitted form of Burton or the used form of the court was inappropriate as a general form whereby the jury could determine the required percentage participation. [6] To avoid repetition by reiteration in this opinion, we determine that Justice Brown correctly analyzed the facts and properly applied the law in his consideration of the case in his dissenting remarks to the prior opinion, supra, 713 P.2d at 1146 et seq. Lacking error in the directed verdict on gross negligence for Deans, or prejudicial confusion, or an erroneous statement of the law in the submission of the question of negligence to the jury resulting in their determination that the four listed participants were not negligent, Cervelli v. Graves, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1032 (1983), and Ivinson v. Althrop, 1 Wyo. 71 (1872), we reverse and vacate the prior decision, and affirm the jury verdict and resulting trial court judgment.