Opinion ID: 1190150
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Powers of the District

Text: Two of the provisions upon which the district relies as establishing its broad powers over air pollution are section 24262, which authorizes the district to make and enforce regulations to reduce air contaminants whenever it finds that the air is so polluted as to cause discomfort, and section 24260 which, as originally enacted, [2] authorized the district to make any orders necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of the act establishing the district. [3] The Mulford-Carrell Act, passed subsequently, granted broad powers over pollution to the ARB as well (see, e.g., § 39051, subd. (c)), including authority to adopt and implement emission standards for automobiles. (§§ 39052, subds. (m), (n), (o), 39052.2, 39052.5, 39052.6.) The scope of the district's authority over air pollution is expressed in section 39012 as follows: Local and regional authorities have the primary responsibility for the control of air pollution except for the emissions from motor vehicles. These authorities may control emissions from nonvehicular sources.  (Italics added.) [4] The power of the ARB to regulate fuel content was analyzed in Environmental Defense Fund, supra, 30 Cal. App.3d 829. In that case, the plaintiffs sought to compel the ARB to adopt rules limiting the lead content of gasoline. The ARB took the position that the Legislature had not given it the power to enact such regulations and that the authority to adopt emission standards for vehicles allowed it only to regulate what comes out of the car, but not what goes into it. The court agreed, holding that the power to control emissions does not permit the ARB to regulate fuel content. It also held that the only method the ARB may employ to regulate emissions is by developing, testing and approving mechanical devices or engine modifications to prevent or reduce the emission of lead. The district, relying upon this case, urges that the powers granted to it by the Legislature are sufficiently comprehensive to include the regulation of fuel content, and that since the Environmental Defense Fund case held that those powers were not reassigned to the ARB by the Mulford-Carrell Act, they remain intact. The district asserts also that the language of section 39012 that local and regional authorities have the primary responsibility for the control of air pollution reaffirms its residual power over fuel content and that the exception to the district's power for emissions from motor vehicles in that section does not, in the light of the holding in Environmental Defense Fund, impair the district's authority to regulate gasoline content. Stated another way, the district asserts that since the ARB may only govern what comes out of a car the district may regulate what goes into the vehicle. The district's argument is meritorious if the power to control emissions does not encompass the regulation of fuel content. The primary responsibility of the district to control air pollution (§ 39012) and its general power to reduce air contaminants (§ 24262) would appear to be sufficiently comprehensive to authorize the regulation in question unless the exercise of such power by the district is either prohibited by statute or has been granted to the ARB by the Mulford-Carrell Act. The oil companies, citing several provisions of the code which authorize the district to regulate emissions from nonvehicular sources of pollution (e.g., §§ 39057, 39078, 24260, 39012), contend that by this language the Legislature has forbidden the districts to regulate fuel content. We agree that by giving the district power to regulate emissions from nonvehicular sources, together with the prohibition in section 39012 against district regulation of emissions from motor vehicles, the Legislature intended to prevent local authorities from regulating automobile emissions. (See §§ 39007, 39008.) However, if the holding of Environmental Defense Fund is correct, then the fact that the district may not regulate automobile emissions does not prevent it from regulating fuel content. [5] Thus, the district's power to enact rule 74 would not be diminished by the provisions relied upon by the oil companies. Nevertheless, we are unable to attribute to the Legislature an intention to allow the district to regulate fuel content. It is undisputed that the ARB has the power to regulate pollutants which come out of a car, and rationality dictates that the Legislature did not intend to accord to the separate districts, formed along county lines, the power to decide the composition of the fuel which goes into these same cars. Moreover, the ARB has been authorized by the Legislature to regulate the composition of gasoline in two specific respects (§§ 39051.1, 39051.2), and without some solid basis compelling us to hold that the Legislature intended to divide authority over fuel content between the districts and the ARB, we should not presume such an intent. There are other factors as well which demonstrate the impracticability of regulating the ingredients of gasoline on a county-by-county basis. [6]