Opinion ID: 1691189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Prospective Jurors Martin Brown and Ezekiel Jewett, Jr.

Text: The defendant argues that the state's explanations that Brown and Jewett were challenged based on their perceived disinterest in the case, dissatisfaction with the jury selection process, or lack of attentiveness toward the prosecutor are merely pretextual and belie the prosecutor's discriminatory intent to preclude black venire members from serving on the petit jury. We do not disagree that the generality of an explanation such as inattentiveness for the striking of venire members merits concern. [6] However, a peremptory challenge based on the body language of a prospective juror does not violate Batson when accepted by the trial judge, who possesses broad discretion in making the ultimate factual determination regarding purposeful discrimination. See, e.g., United States v. Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d 1368, 1375 (5th Cir.1993). [7] Here, nothing in the record undermines the determination of the district court that the prosecutor's stated reasons for exclusion were legitimate grounds for exercise of the challenges against Brown and Jewett. In this case, where the prima facie showing was presumed because the state was asked to tender explanations for the challenges, defendant cannot simply rest on a written record and require that we second guess the trial judge's credibility determinations, which are necessarily based on his visual observations. Notably, trial counsel neither disputed the explanations of inattentiveness given by the prosecutor nor developed a record of evidence contradicting those explanations. In determining whether there was purposeful discrimination, the trial judge may consider the legitimacy of the state's race-neutral reasons for excluding other prospective jurors. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 370, 111 S.Ct. at 1872. With regard to the remaining black prospective jurors, the state gave reasons not based on lack of attentiveness. As to Sandra Brew, the state explained that, although Brew indicated she could vote for the death penalty, she had some hesitation about doing so. As to Claude Brooks, the state explained that it had initially accepted Brooks as a juror, but the state later struck him, because he had vacillat[ed] back and forth on the presumption of innocence and whether he would want to hear the defendant testify. The record contains support for both of these explanations. Also, we have carefully reviewed the transcript of voir dire and can find no questions or statements by the prosecutor in exercising his challenges that support an inference of purposeful discrimination. See State v. Collier, 553 So.2d 815, 819 (La.1989). Accordingly, the defendant has failed to carry his burden of proving purposeful discrimination with regard to prospective jurors Brown and Jewett.