Opinion ID: 2639113
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Superior Court Erred in Denying Ruckle Leave To File an Amended Complaint.

Text: Ruckle sought to file an amended complaint in order to demonstrate an alternate basis for asserting standing. In her amended complaint, she alleged: Ruckle has standing to bring this action because she is the mother of two children who attend schools operated by the ASD. Her oldest child currently rides school buses contracted for by the ASD, the younger child will do so next year. She has suffered injury to cognizable interests by the acts and omissions of the ASD and Department as alleged herein, including, but not limited to, the facts that the ASD awarded the school bus contract to a proposer which failed to comply with the requirements of RFP2000-605 Request for Pupil Transportation Proposals, especially those relating to safety, and because that award was not in the best interests of the user population. The superior court did not explain why it denied Ruckle leave to amend her complaint. Ruckle argues that this denial without explanation constitutes an abuse of discretion. Absent a determination that amendment would be futile, Ruckle maintains, the superior court should have granted her the leave it assumed she had requested. [34] We have long held that leave to amend a pleading should be freely given and that, absent a showing that the amendment would have resulted in injustice, a trial court will be found to have abused its discretion in denying a motion to amend. [35] In Betz v. Chena Hot Springs Group, [36] we endorsed the reasons set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Foman v. Davis [37] for denying the amendment of a complaint. Specifically, the Foman Court instructed that: If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reasonsuch as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.the leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely given. [38] ASD focuses its argument on the alleged futility of amendment, maintaining that Ruckle should not be permitted to amend her complaint because her allegations of interest-injury standing are too generalized to survive a motion to dismiss. In response, Ruckle maintains that she has set forth sufficient facts to survive a motion to dismiss. As Ruckle explains: Ruckle's cognizable interest is that of assuring the safety of her children as they ride transportation provided by the ASD to and from school each day. The injury she suffered was the reasonable apprehension that her daughter was being placed at risk because the ASD awarded the school bus contract to a proposer, First Student, which failed to comply with numerous requirements of the RFP, most particularly those relating to safety. The fact that her daughter was subsequently involved in two separate school bus accidents, sustaining injuries in the second, only reinforced the reasonableness of Ruckle's apprehensions. The relief Ruckle sought, a declaration voiding the contract awarded by the ASD to First Student, would fully remediate the injury she suffered by eliminating the risk that her children will continue to be transported to and from school by a contractor which failed to meet the minimum safety and other operator requirements set forth in the RFP. (Emphasis in original, footnote and citations omitted.) Our jurisprudence has recognized interest-injury standing in a variety of contexts. In Moore v. State, [39] we set out our expansive interpretation of standing: Whether a party has standing to obtain judicial resolution of a controversy depends on whether the party has a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. In our recent decision of Wagstaff v. Superior Court, Family Division, 535 P.2d 1220, 1225 (Alaska 1975), we described this requirement in terms of injury-in-fact, and explained that its purpose is to assure the adversity which is fundamental to judicial proceedings. [40] At issue in Moore was whether a group of commercial fisherman and the owner of a lodge could bring a challenge against the State of Alaska and the lessees of tracts in or near Kachemak Bay regarding the legality of the sale of certain offshore oil and gas leases in the bay. [41] While defendants maintained that the plaintiffs' interest in the transaction in question was merely incidental or indirect, the plaintiffs argued that they would be adversely affected by oil exploration in the bay. [42] Agreeing with the plaintiffs, we determined that, because the plaintiffs' livelihoods depended on the biological productivity of the bay, they did in fact have a sufficient interest in the sale of the leases to establish standing. [43] In Johns v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, [44] we considered whether a group of fisherman who made their living seining for bait and roe herring in Southeast Alaska could challenge a regulation limiting the maximum number of limited entry permits the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC) would issue. [45] The CFEC claimed that the plaintiffs had not established standing to bring such a challenge since they could not point to any actual or inevitable injury suffered as a result of the maximum number regulation. [46] Because the question whether each plaintiff would receive a permit was unresolved, and each plaintiff retained an interim use permit at the time the suit was filed, the CFEC argued that the plaintiffs might never suffer any injury because of the regulation. [47] Plaintiffs countered that the threatened loss of their right to enter the fishery constituted a sufficient injury to justify standing. [48] Explaining that [a] party need not wait for anticipated harm to materialize before bringing an action to protect his rights, we endorsed the finding of standing based on anticipated future harm. [49] To instead adopt a rule of inevitability, as urged by the CFEC, would establish an unwarranted distinction between possible and certain harm for purposes of determining standing; such a rule would deny standing to parties who could demonstrate at the filing only the possibility of harm. That approach is not consonant with the thrust of Alaska law. We think it bad law and bad policy to approve a rule which shuts the courthouse doors until, in certain situations, it may be too late to obtain meaningful judicial relief. [50] We echoed these sentiments in Trustees for Alaska v. State, [51] in which we observed that the adverse interest required to establish interest-injury standing may be economic, or it may be intangible, such as an aesthetic or environmental interest. The degree of injury to the interest need not be great; `[t]he basic idea... is that an identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of principle; the trifle is the basis for standing and the principle supplies the motivation.' [52] Based on the expansive definition of adversity set out in earlier cases, we agree with Ruckle that amendment of her complaint in this case would not be futile. Ruckle alleged that she has two children who are or will be attending Anchorage schools and riding the buses of the transportation provider selected by ASD. Ruckle therefore has an interest in who that provider is. She also alleged that the selected school transportation provider, First Student, failed to provide an outline of its accident prevention program, as required by the RFP. While Ruckle may never suffer injury as the result of ASD's selection, the possibility that she might, in the form of harm to her children, and the possibility that ASD's selection process may have eliminated a safer transportation option, are of interest to Ruckle. Because her allegations do not on their face appear futile, we believe the superior court abused its discretion in denying Ruckle leave to amend her complaint. We therefore reverse the court's decision and remand for Ruckle's amended complaint to be reinstated. [53]