Opinion ID: 1349730
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: there were insufficient facts asserted for the district court to exercise personal jurisdiction over coonrod under the long-arm statute.

Text: After construing the evidence most favorably for Mann, the district court ruled that it had personal jurisdiction over Coonrod based upon allegations that Coonrod did guarantee the sales contract; that the contract was entered into over the telephone with an Idaho participant; and that the guarantee was of a sales contract to be performed in Idaho. We disagree with the court's conclusion. In order for a court properly to exercise jurisdiction over an individual who is not subject to the general jurisdiction of the courts of the state of Idaho, there must be a legal basis for the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Houghland Farms, 119 Idaho at 75, 803 P.2d at 981. I.C. § 5-514 provides the basis needed for the courts of Idaho to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over an individual or business. Saint Alphonsus v. Washington, 123 Idaho 739, 743, 852 P.2d 491, 495 (1993). In order for an Idaho court to exert jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant ... the act[s] giving rise to the cause must fall within the scope of our long-arm statute.... Saint Alphonsus, 123 Idaho at 742, 852 P.2d at 494. Mann has asserted that the Idaho courts have jurisdiction over Coonrod under one provision of Idaho's long-arm statute: I.C. § 5-514(a). Thus on appeal we are concerned only with whether there was sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that Coonrod transacted business within the state of Idaho so as to subject him to the jurisdiction of the district court.
Any person, firm, company, association or corporation, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits said person, firm, company, association or corporation, and if any individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of said acts; (a) The transaction of any business within this state which is hereby defined as the doing of any act for the purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit or accomplishing or attempting to accomplish, transact or enhance business purpose or objective or any part thereof of such person, firm, company, association or corporation; .... For the purpose of the motion to dismiss it is important to note that Coonrod is being sued individually and thus we must examine his activities independently of those of High Country to determine if he was personally transacting business within Idaho for the purposes of the long-arm statute. While his acts may have been done to benefit the business in which he has an interest, it is nevertheless his actions with which we are concerned and not those of High Country. Based upon the affidavits presented on the motion to dismiss we cannot say Coonrod transacted business within the state of Idaho within the meaning of the long-arm statute. The facts as alleged in Kent Mann's affidavit demonstrate only that Cannon and Coonrod were in daily contact regarding the operation of High Country; that Coonrod was involved in the financial decisions of High Country; and that Coonrod stated during a telephone call to him in Minnesota, which was initiated by Cannon in Utah, that he would guarantee payment for the calves. Therefore, the only actions alleged by Mann that would indicate Coonrod transacted business in Idaho are the telephone call and the fact that Mann is located in Idaho. We cannot say Coonrod transacted business in Idaho based upon a telephone call which he did not even initiate. Likewise, we cannot say Coonrod transacted business in Idaho due to the mere fact that Mann is located in Idaho. Nowhere do we find allegations supporting an inference that Coonrod was acting for the purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit or that he was attempting to accomplish, transact or enhance his own business purposes. Based upon the record before us there is simply no evidence that Coonrod entered into a transaction of business within the state of Idaho. These facts were not a sufficient basis upon which the district court could assert jurisdiction. Because we hold that Coonrod did not transact business within Idaho so as to come within the scope of the Idaho long-arm statute, there is no need to discuss whether the exercise of jurisdiction would comply with the mandates of the United States Constitution. Likewise, based upon our holding that Coonrod is not subject to the jurisdiction of the district court, there is no need for us to address whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel properly barred Coonrod from raising the defense of the statute of frauds.