Opinion ID: 1436074
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Disposition in District Court.

Text: The Civil Service Commission in its decision of June 13, 1977, determined that the firefighters were not discharged for political or religious reasons; that the city acted in good faith in discharging the firefighters; and that the firefighters were discharged for cause in that they had been absent from work while conducting an illegal strike. The district court conducted a review of the whole record and concluded that the Civil Service Commission order up-holding the discharge of the firefighters, was not based on substantial evidence, was arbitrary, an abuse of discretion and was not made in good faith and for cause. On appeal, it is our task to make the same review of the commission's action as did the district court in order to determine whether, on the whole record, the commission's decision was substantially supported by the evidence and by applicable law. The district court, addressing the legality of the strike, felt obliged to conclude: Under the authority of the case of [ School District No. 351 Oneida County v. Oneida Education Ass'n, 98 Idaho 486, 567 P.2d 830 (1977)], it is the Court's conclusion that the firefighters did not have the right to strike on May 6, 1977. Regardless of whether the Oneida case is relevant here, [4] the district court was correct in observing that it was still faced with the decision of whether or not the Civil Service Commission (and the City) abused its discretion and did not make its decision to discharge the firefighters in good faith and for cause. As the district court noted, neither the City nor the firefighters had access to the Oneida opinion (which was not released until July 22, 1977) when the strike occurred on May 6, 1977. The all-important statute is I.C. § 44-1811, which reads in full: Strikes prohibited during contract.  Upon consummation and during the term of the written contract or agreement, no firefighter shall strike or recognize a picket line of any labor organization while in performance of his official duties. At the time of the strike, the office of the Attorney General had twice written its advice on the subject and each side could point to a letter supporting its own interpretation of the above language. On April 18, 1975, an Assistant Attorney General had written to a union official interpreting I.C. § 44-1811 to mean that, If the contract has expired, there exists an implicit assumption that firefighters have a right to strike and picket. On September 24, 1976, a different Assistant Attorney General reached the opposite conclusion in another letter to the same union official: it is not proper to draw from Idaho Code, § 44-1811, prohibiting strikes during the term of a contract, an authorization to strike after the termination of such a contract and during negotiations on a new contract. [5] Our own interpretation of this statute is guided by the established principles of statutory construction: In construing a statute, it is the duty of this court to ascertain the legislative intent, and give effect thereto. In ascertaining this intent, not only must the literal wording of the statute be examined, but also account must be taken of other matters, such as the context, the object in view, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and of the legislation upon the same subject, public policy, contemporaneous construction, and the like. In re Gem State Academy Bakery, 70 Idaho 531-541, 224 P.2d 529, 535 [1950]. Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 29-30, 382 P.2d 913, 915 (1963). To begin with, then, the literal wording of the statute must be examined. In all candor, it must be stated that the statute is not a model of clarity. [6] Literally, of course, the statute expressly prohibits strikes upon consummation and during the term of the written contract or agreement. Regarding the period after expiration of the contract or agreement, the statute is silent. In such circumstances, this jurisdiction has generally subscribed to the rule of statutory construction which states, expressio unius est exclusio alterius: Furthermore, It is a universally recognized rule of the construction that, where a constitution or statute specifies certain things, the designation of such things excludes all others. Peck v. State, 63 Idaho 375, 120 P.2d 820, 822; Drainage Dist. No. 2 v. Ada County, 38 Idaho 778, 786, 226 P. 290; People v. Goldman, 1 Idaho 714. Poston v. Hollar, 64 Idaho 322, 330-331, 132 P.2d 142, 146 (1942). In the present case, application of that rule leads to the conclusion that by expressly prohibiting strikes by firefighters during the term of a contract, the legislature either impliedly recognized their right to strike after expiration of the contract or, at a minimum, opened the door to such contractual agreement as the parties might reach in that regard. That the literal wording of the Idaho statute lends itself readily to such an interpretation is seen from a comparison with those of other states. Those states which have an absolute ban against strikes by public employees have made that position unmistakably clear. The Revised Statutes of Kentucky, for example, contain the following language: Sec. 345.130. Fire Fighter or Labor Organization Not to Participate in Strike.  No fire fighter shall engage in, and no fire fighter labor organization shall sponsor or condone any strike. Oklahoma also states its strike ban policy unequivocally, though in somewhat more expanded form: The protection of the public health, safety and welfare demands that the permanent members of any paid fire department or police department in any city, town or municipality not be accorded the right to strike or engage in any work stoppage or slowdown. Okl.Stat. tit. 11, ch. 13F, § 548.2. States which have an absolute strike ban frequently combine this with elaborate procedures for resolving unfair labor practice disputes, Ky.Rev.Stat. § 345.070, as some form of binding arbitration, Okl.Stat. tit. 11, ch. 13F, § 548.9. The language adopted by the Idaho legislature in I.C. § 44-1811 stands in stark contrast to the language contained in absolute strike ban statutes. By refusing to enact an absolute no-strike statute, with its correlative provision for conflict resolution by way of compulsory arbitration, Idaho might be said to have thus cast its lot with those states which are said to have recognized or granted their public employees a limited strike right, including Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Vermont. See Public Employee Bargaining ¶ 6500 et seq. (CCH 1977). Such a reading of I.C. § 44-1811 is reenforced by the legislative history of the present statute, which was given to the commission and in the appeal record for review by the district court. The history is illuminating both with regard to what the statute includes and what it omits. In their presentation to the commission, both parties were cognizant of the importance of evidence bearing upon legislative intent as a factor for consideration in determining the construction and interpretation of a statute. Arlen James Martinez testified as to legislative intent, having been called to the stand by the firefighters. He had been president of the Idaho State Council of Firefighters for 7 years, and prior to that he was president of a local unit in Boise. At the time of his testimony, he was an international vice-president for the district encompassing Idaho, Montana, Washington and Alaska. According to his unchallenged testimony, Mr. Martinez, as president of the Idaho Council, in 1969 was the lobbyist in charge of the 1969 push for collective bargaining legislation; he identified Senate Bill 1059, which is a part of the record. This bill prohibited any striking, [7] but provided for binding compulsory arbitration in the event of an impasse. According to his testimony, the bill passed in the Senate by a 30-0 vote, but failed to get out of committee in the House. He stated that in 1970 the bill was changed so as to eliminate the provision for compulsory and binding arbitration, and a new bill containing the present language of I.C. § 44-1811 was submitted to the legislature and duly enacted. He testified to the following exchange which took place between an inquiring senator and the proponent of the 1970 bill: The question was asked by one of the senators, I notice that the no-strike clause was removed from the original law that the firefighters had before this legislature, and the present wording is different. And the introducer of the legislation said, That is correct. And they discussed it at some length. I can't give you the word-for-word verbatim discussion, but I in my mind am quite sure that the legislative intent was there because they knew the no-strike clause was removed and this wording was added in place of it. The City indicated to the commission that it would supplement the record as to legislative intent with the testimony or deposition of Gary Ingram, State Representative from District Two, to which there was no objection and only the response that Mr. Ingram might not have been a member of the legislature in 1970. However, the City did not call Mr. Ingram, nor did it seek to supplement the record with his deposition testimony. Hence, the commission and, in turn, the trial court and this Court are left with testimony indicating that the legislature passed I.C. § 44-1811 after the failure of a previous bill which contained an absolute strike ban. Such testimony is entitled to serious consideration. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 94 S.Ct. 690, 38 L.Ed.2d 646 (1974). See also Data Access Systems, Inc. v. State, Bur. of Securities, 63 N.J. 158, 305 A.2d 427, 432 (1973), where, as to the extrinsic material which was offered to aid in the interpretation of a particular statute, the Supreme Court of New Jersey said: Our conclusion as to the meaning and true intent of the statute is reached without reference to any extrinsic materials. There is really no ambiguity in the enactment and hence no compelling need to resort to interpretative aids. The value of these materials in this case lies in the confirmation which they bring. Not only may extrinsic aids be used to resolve legislative ambiguities, N.J. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Furman, 33 N.J. 121, 130, 162 A.2d 839 (1960); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Board of Review, 25 N.J. 221, 226, 135 A.2d 489 (1957); Fisher-Stevens, Inc. v. Director, Division of Taxation, 121 N.J. Super. 513, 517-518, 298 A.2d 77 (App.Div. 1972), certif. den. 62 N.J. 575, 303 A.2d 328 (1973), they may also appropriately supply reassuring confirmation of literally apparent meaning, as is here the case. Deaney v. Linen Thread Co., 19 N.J. 578, 585, 118 A.2d 28 (1955). Nor do we think it is improper to consider materials which may never have met the legislative eye. While a proposed enactment may first see the light of day in legislative chambers, its conception and preparation have frequently taken place elsewhere. This is normally true of administration proposals. Of course such materials must be carefully scrutinized and their weight and authenticity evaluated, but we see no merit in a rule demanding their total exclusion from judicial consideration. All the lines of analysis converge. The literal wording of I.C. § 44-1811, the general rules of statutory interpretation, and the legislative history strongly suggest that the present statutory wording is a result of the above-mentioned compromise. Strikes are prohibited after consummation and during the term of a written contract. In that period of time after the old contract expires and before the new one is consummated, they are not prohibited and the parties are free to negotiate one way or another depending upon their relative economic strengths. In the present case, it is clear that both parties understood that they could so contract and that they did so. Article V of the 1976 collective bargaining agreement between the City of Coeur d'Alene and Local 1494 of the International Association of Firefighters contained the following provision: During the term of this Agreement no fire fighters shall strike or recognize a picket line of any labor organization while in the performance of his official duties. Failure to sign subsequent agreement is only cause for strike. (Emphasis added.) During negotiations for the 1977 contract, a similar provision was approved by both sides, and of singular interest here provided that the City would not engage in lockouts: The Union and the Employees agree that during the term of this Agreement, they will not cause, encourage, participate in or support any strike or picketing against the City or on any slowdown or other interruption of or interference with the normal functions of the City, nor will there be any lockouts by the City, concerning any matter which is subject to the grievance procedure. The Union and the Employees further agree, that during the term of this Agreement no firefighters will recognize a picket line of any labor organization while in the performance of his/her official duties. Failure to sign subsequent agreement, shall be the only grounds for a strike. (Emphasis added.) The above provisions make it clear that, in the contemplation of the parties, after expiration of the collective bargaining agreement between the City and the union on December 31, 1976, the firefighters had a residual right to strike. To hold the contrary, we would have to hold that the firefighters were without any right to strike. Such a holding would be tantamount to saying that the legislature was engaged in a meaningless and useless endeavor when it enacted I.C. § 44-1811, and this we decline to do. We conclude that the controlling statutes do not prohibit the firefighters from striking. That being so, the door was open for the City and the firefighters to contractually recognize a right to strike, which they did. We hold, therefore, that the district court erred in ruling that the firefighters were engaged in an illegal strike. The strike was not illegal and, if challenged in court by the City, would not have been enjoinable. A final question remains as to whether the firefighters' right to strike includes, as one of its elements, a right not to be discharged in the event a strike occurs. This question has not been addressed by either the City or the firefighters, although it was subjected to argument when Mr. Martinez was on the stand under cross-examination. [8] Its answer is not to be gleaned from the language of the statutes. Nor is the intent of the parties clear from the language of their contract. In the absence of the protective language of a contract, it would appear to follow that the firefighters' refusal to report to work when ordered to do so gave, the City cause for discharge under I.C. § 50-1609. Assuming without deciding that such cause existed, we turn to the district court's ruling that there was no substantial evidence to support the commission's finding that the discharge had been made in good faith. The district court stated that the City had not acted in good faith in the following particulars: A. By withdrawing benefits, especially food allowances from the Firefighters during the fact finding process. B. By advising the Firefighters that even if a new contract were entered into, the same would not be retroactive to January 1, leaving the Firefighters to believe that the withdrawn benefits would be forever lost. C. The long delay of the Fact Finding Commission to return a report cannot be considered the fault of the City. However, it is obvious that the City used such delay to its advantage in steadfastly refusing to pursue any negotiations without a written report and refusing to accept even a verbal report from the Fact Finders to be used as a basis for continuing the negotiations. D. In anticipation of a strike, the City determined that the only course of conduct was to discharge the Firefighters in order to hire new ones. Injunctive relief was not considered as a valid, alternative solution. The court also made reference to the numerous procedural errors at the time of the first attempted discharge of the firefighters in early May as an index of the bad faith that permeated the entire affair. Our review of the record in this case leads us to conclude that the district court, acting in its appellate capacity, was correct in ruling that there was no substantial evidence to support the Civil Service Commission's finding that the discharge of the firefighters was made by the City in good faith. The district court's summary of the City's dealings coincides with our own reading of this record: that the City, making an early determination that the Firefighters, as public employees, did not have the right to strike, did not act in good faith in the bargaining process, but pursued a hard line approach to the problem, the effect of which drove the Firefighters to the wall and into a strike that the Firefighters believed not only to be justified, but also legal in Idaho. To summarize: We reject the approach of the City that it could refuse to bargain in good faith, secure in the belief that the firefighters had no right to strike. We find no such prohibition in the relevant statutes. We likewise reject the extreme viewpoint at the opposite end of the spectrum, namely, that the firefighters were, absent their having contractual provisions to that effect, insulated from discharge if they chose to exercise their right to strike. In our view, neither side holds all the cards, and that is as it should be. If the City refuses to bargain in good faith, it cannot discharge the firefighters even in face of a strike. If there are no contractual provisions to the contrary, the City would have cause to discharge strikers, and the firefighters could not themselves refuse to negotiate in good faith, secure in the knowledge that they had a fully protected right to strike. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Costs to respondents. McFADDEN and BAKES, JJ., concur.