Opinion ID: 1891351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Residual or Lingering Doubt

Text: Reynolds also asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to consider residual doubt in its sentencing order. In its sentencing order, the trial court noted that `residual' or `lingering' doubt is not an appropriate mitigating circumstance, and that any evidence offered at the Spencer [3] hearing with respect to residual or lingering doubt [would] not be considered by the Court as a non-statutory mitigator for purposes of sentencing. Reynolds asserts that the trial court's refusal to consider residual doubt when sentencing Reynolds rendered his sentences of death unconstitutional. Reynolds' claim has been repeatedly rejected by this Court. See Darling v. State, 808 So.2d 145, 162 (Fla.2002) (We have repeatedly observed that residual doubt is not an appropriate mitigating circumstance.); Sims v. State, 681 So.2d 1112 (Fla.1996) (same); Bogle v. State, 655 So.2d 1103, 1107 (Fla.1995) (same); Preston v. State, 607 So.2d 404, 411 (Fla.1992) (same); Downs v. State, 572 So.2d 895, 900 (Fla.1990) (same); Aldridge v. State, 503 So.2d 1257, 1259 (Fla.1987) (same); King v. State, 514 So.2d 354, 358 (Fla.1987) (same). Notwithstanding our rejection of this claim, Reynolds asserts that the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), requires that lingering doubt be considered as relevant mitigating evidence. However, this claim itself has been rejected by the High Court. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 174, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (plurality opinion) (Our edict that, in a capital case, `the sentencer . . . [may] not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense,' Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964), in no way mandates reconsideration by capital juries, in the sentencing phase, of their `residual doubts' over a defendant's guilt. . . . This Court's prior decisions, as we understand them, fail to recognize a constitutional right to have such doubts considered as a mitigating factor.). Based on the above, we conclude that the trial court appropriately excluded evidence offered to establish residual or lingering doubt from consideration when making its sentencing determination.