Opinion ID: 175612
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: District Court’s Trial Rulings

Text: Ferguson and Thompson challenge certain evidentiary-related rulings made by the District Court during the trial.

Ferguson argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion in limine to prevent former cellmate Arlando Crowe from testifying pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403.4 Specifically, Ferguson argues (for the first time on appeal) that Crowe’s testimony presented too high a risk of unfair prejudice given the District Court’s failure sua sponte to hold a hearing to inquire about the Government’s decision not to interview Crowe until January 27, 2006 – after the trial was already underway. Ferguson also claims (as he did at trial) that Crowe’s testimony itself – separate and apart from the circumstances surrounding it – was unduly prejudicial. As to the District Court’s failure to hold a hearing before allowing Crowe to testify, our case law does not obligate a district court to employ any particular means (such as a 4 We review the District Court’s resolution of motions in limine to admit or preclude evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Johnson, 199 F.3d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 1999). To the extent Ferguson’s arguments were not made to the District Court, we review for plain error. Rule 403 provides that “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. 13 hearing) in order to convince itself that Rule 403’s balancing test has been satisfied. Thus, the District Court’s failure sua sponte to hold a hearing to probe the circumstances leading up to Crowe’s testimony in performing its Rule 403 analysis was not error (much less plain error). In fact, the District Court did address the potential for Crowe’s testimony to generate unfair prejudice of the type with which Rule 403 concerns itself. Namely, it instructed the jury on how to consider Crowe’s self-interest in evaluating his testimony. App. 3461. And as to Crowe’s testimony itself, while Ferguson asserts that it was unduly prejudicial, he fails to explain why any such prejudice was undue. We hold that the District Court did not commit reversible error in denying Ferguson’s motions in limine.5
Ferguson next argues that the District Court plainly erred in admitting into evidence, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), a stipulation that Ferguson had been arrested in 1999 on several drug charges. 6 Specifically, Ferguson argues that the District Court’s jury instruction explaining that the evidence was admissible only for the limited purpose of impeachment was substantively inadequate and was given too late. Rule 404(b) provides: 5 Ferguson’s argument that the District Court’s decision to deny his motion in limine on these bases violated (apart from Rule 403) his Fifth Amendment right to due process is equally meritless. 6 We review the District Court’s decision to admit evidence of Ferguson’s prior criminal convictions pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) for plain error, because Ferguson never objected to this evidence at trial. See Gov’t of V.I. v. Archibald, 987 F.2d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 1993) 14 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). If a court decides to admit evidence of prior bad acts pursuant to Rule 404(b), it must give a limiting instruction concerning the purpose for which the evidence may be used. United States v. Mastrangelo, 172 F.3d 288, 295 (3d Cir. 1999). The instruction must be evaluated “not ‘in artificial isolation, but . . . in the context of the overall charge.’” United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 724 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674 (1975)) (alteration in Price). The instruction need not contain any particular language, as long as it adequately prevents unfair prejudice. See United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir. 2006). There is also no rigid rule about the timing of a limiting instruction; the focus, again, is on whether the instruction (at the time it was given and in the manner it was given) sufficed to prevent unfair prejudice. See United States v. Hakim, 344 F.3d 324, 326 (3d Cir. 2003). The District Court did not plainly err in giving its limiting instruction. That instruction provided: Evidence that an act was done or that an offense was committed by a Defendant at some other time is not, of course, any evidence or proof whatever that at another time a Defendant performed a similar act or committed a similar offense, 15 including the offense charged in the superseding indictment. Evidence of a similar act or offense may not be considered by the jury in determining whether a Defendant actually performed the physical acts charged in the superseding indictment. Nor may such evidence be considered for any other purpose whatsoever unless the jury first finds beyond a reasonable doubt from other evidence in the case standing alone that the Defendant physically did the acts charged in the superseding indictment. If the jury should find beyond a reasonable doubt from other evidence in the case that a Defendant did the act or alleged in the superseding indictment, the jury may then consider evidence as to an alleged earlier act of a like nature in determining the knowledge, intent, or motive of the Defendant. App. at 3465. We believe that this instruction is similar, in material respects, to the one we held satisfied Rule 404(b) in Daraio: You must not consider any of this evidence in deciding if the defendant committed the acts charged in this indictment. However, you may consider this evidence for other very limited purposes. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt from the other evidence in this case, that the defendant did commit the acts charged in the indictment, then you may consider the evidence of similar acts allegedly committed on other occasions, to determine, one, whether the defendant had the intent necessary to commit the crime charged in the indictment; two, whether the defendant had the motive to commit the act charged in the indictment; or, three, whether the defendant willfully committed the acts for which she is on trial, or rather committed them by accident, negligence, or mistake. 445 F.3d at 257. That instruction survived abuse-of-discretion review. Id. at 259 (indicating use of abuse of discretion standard of review of district court’s Rule 404(b) ruling). The one given by the District Court here, then, comfortably survives our more deferential plain error review. The District Court also did not plainly err in giving this instruction at the close of 16 trial rather than at the time the evidence was introduced. In our view, the lapse of time was not long enough to overcome the presumption that the jury follows the court’s instructions. See Hakim, 344 F.3d at 326; see also United States v. Fraser, 448 F.3d 833, 843 n.4 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that delayed limiting instruction was not error); United States v. Misle Bus & Equipment Co., 967 F.2d 1227, 1234 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that delayed limiting instruction does not amount to abuse of discretion).

By the time of the second trial, Government witnesses Gary Sloan and Raymond Moon had already received reduced sentences, pursuant to plea agreements, for their cooperation in the case. At trial, Thompson sought to cross-examine Sloan and Moon by eliciting their possible incentive to give false testimony based on their plea agreements and expectation of receiving reduced sentences. Thompson also requested that the District Court preclude the Government from adducing evidence of Sloan and Moon’s actual sentence reductions to avoid intimating that the witnesses had earned reduced sentences by telling the truth. In other words, defense counsel was concerned that if the jury learned that the District Court had reduced the witnesses’ sentences, it might believe that the court had given its imprimatur on the veracity of their testimony. The District Court denied the latter request. It gave Thompson the option of either: (1) allowing the Government to elicit testimony of the sentence reductions if he wished to challenge the witnesses’ bias based on 17 the plea agreements; or (2) foregoing inquiry into plea agreements altogether. Thompson chose the latter option, and now argues that the District Court violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment.7 The Confrontation Clause secures the right of a criminal defendant “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. By now it is axiomatic that inquiry into a witness’s motivation to testify – especially a cooperating witness testifying pursuant to a plea agreement with the Government – “is the principal means by which the believability of [the] witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). It is equally well settled, however, that “trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); see also Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam) (“the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”) (emphasis in original). Had the District Court prohibited outright all inquiry into Sloan’s and Moon’s plea 7 We review the District Court’s limitation on Thompson’s ability to cross-examine Sloan and Moon for an abuse of discretion; if we find such an abuse, we then must ask whether the abuse was harmless. United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 208 (3d Cir. 2005). 18 agreements, the ruling unquestionably would have run afoul of the Confrontation Clause. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 (“By . . . cutting off all questioning about an event that . . . a jury might reasonably have found furnished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution in his testimony, the court’s ruling violated . . . the Confrontation Clause.”). Of course, the District Court did not so rule, but instead posed to Thompson a choice between: (1) permitting the Government to elicit testimony from the witnesses that they had already received reduced sentences, if Thompson wished to probe the witnesses’ possible bias regarding their plea agreements; and (2) foregoing inquiry into the plea agreements altogether. While Thompson ultimately opted not to pursue it, we will review the less restrictive – the first – option to determine if the District Court unduly limited Thompson’s overall ability to cross-examine Sloan and Moon as to bias. If the option itself comports with the Sixth Amendment, Thompson’s considered decision not to select it cannot be assailed as the fault of the District Court. We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion, and that the choice it posed to Thompson satisfied the Sixth Amendment. In United States v. Chandler, two cooperating witnesses testified that they expected to receive reduced sentences in exchange for their testimony, but the district court did not permit the defendant to inquire about how much time the witnesses would have been facing absent their cooperation. 326 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2003). As we explained, this amounted to a significant limitation on the defendant’s right to examine the witnesses’ motive for testifying because their “mere acknowledgment that [they] hoped that the 19 government would move for a lesser sentence did not adequately enable a jury to evaluate [their] motive to cooperate.” Id. We set out the following test for challenges to a district court’s limitation on cross-examination: First, we must determine whether that ruling significantly inhibited Chandler’s effective exercise of her right to inquire into either witness’s “motivation in testifying”; and second, if the District Court’s ruling did significantly inhibit Chandler’s exercise of that right, [we must determine] whether the constraints it imposed on the scope of Chandler’s cross-examination fell within those “reasonable limits” which a trial court, in due exercise of its discretion, has authority to establish. Id. at 219. We continued in pertinent part: With respect to the cross-examination of cooperating witnesses who expect to obtain, or have obtained, a benefit from the government in exchange for their testimony, the “critical question . . . is whether the defendant is allowed an opportunity to examine a witness [sic] ‘subjective understanding of his bargain with the government,’ ‘for it is this understanding which is of probative value on the issue of bias.’” Id. at 220 (citation omitted, alterations in original). The first option posed by the District Court in this case in no way limited the scope of defense counsel’s inquiry into Sloan and Moon’s potential motivation to lie.8 Thompson 8 Thompson argues that the first option limited his constitutional right to crossexamine Sloan and Moon because introduction of their reduced sentences “absolutely would have resulted in improper vouching for the credibility of the witnesses.” Thompson Br. at 26. We disagree. Vouching occurs when two criteria are met: “(1) the prosecutor must assure the jury that the testimony of a Government witness is credible; and (2) this assurance [must be] based on either the prosecutor’s personal knowledge, or other information not contained in the record.” United States v. Harris, 471 F.3d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Walker, 155 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998)). Upon discussing the issue with counsel, the District Court clearly understood the dilemma Thompson faced, and emphasized to the Government its desire “to make sure that the 20 would have been free to question Sloan and Moon on the sentences they faced without the plea agreements, squarely within Chandler’s holding. The District Court simply conditioned Thompson’s inquiry on the preservation of the Government’s right to convey the entire account. According to the Government, any incentive to lie that Sloan and Moon might have had in order to curry favor with the prosecutor arguably vanished when they were sentenced. App. 651. Therefore, the Government argues, if Thompson was permitted to elicit testimony tending to demonstrate the witnesses’s ulterior motives, then the Government should have been allowed to rebut such a claim. We agree. In essence, Thompson asks us to interpret Chandler such that he had a constitutional right to challenge Sloan and Moon’s motivation to testify and simultaneously to hamstring the Government from rebutting such a challenge. But neither Chandler nor any of the cases upon which it rests provide authority for such a right. A defendant “states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness.” Chandler, 326 F.3d at 222 (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680). The District Court prescribed no such prohibition, and Thompson’s claim therefore fails.9 prosecutor doesn’t try to use the fact that the judge has made a determination that they’re believable so [the jury] should believe them.” App. 651-52. The prosecutor responded, “I won’t make that argument, Your Honor.” Id. In light this stipulation, we will not speculate that the prosecutor would nonetheless have used Sloan and Moon’s sentences to personally assure the jury of their credibility. 9 We note that, even if we were to find that the District Court’s choice violated the Confrontation Clause, we would hold the error harmless in light of the overwhelming 21 2. Preclusion of Good’s Recorded Telephone Calls with Means Thompson next argues that the District Court erred in refusing to allow him to play for the jury recorded conversations between his daughter, Monique Means, and Good. The calls demonstrated that before his arrest, Good had engaged in a secret sexual relationship with Means. Such evidence, Thompson says, would have demonstrated more clearly Good’s bias against him. The District Court granted the Government’s motion in limine to preclude admission of the calls, subject to Good’s acknowledgment of the sexual relationship with Means. App. 1429. The District Court did, however, rule that Good’s relationship with Means was an appropriate line of inquiry, and both the Government and defense counsel questioned Good about the relationship. App. 1433-34, 1445-47. Thompson now claims that he should have been permitted to play the calls for the jury.10 weight of the evidence proffered against Thompson. See Lore, 430 F.3d at 208. 10 The nature of Thompson’s challenge is unclear. He avers that under Rules 401 and 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the recordings were relevant evidence of Good’s bias, Thompson Br. at 31, and then intimates that the District Court erred in a Rule 403 analysis by finding that the inflammatory nature of the calls outweighed their probative value, id. at 34. The District Court instead conducted the two-part constitutional analysis set forth in Chandler, supra, although in doing so it necessarily weighed the relative prejudice of the tapes against their probative value. The Government assumes that the Chandler framework properly applies here, where the “limitation” was the preclusion of audio evidence possibly related to Good’s bias. We note that the issue in Chandler (as it was in Van Arsdall, upon which Chandler relied) was the actual “curtailment of [a defendant’s] inquiry” into a witness’s possible bias, rather than the refusal to admit extrinsic evidence that might complement such an inquiry. See 326 F.3d at 217-19, 223. We understand the nature of Thompson’s challenge to be evidentiary rather than constitutional. Indeed, Thompson cites three cases, none of which concerns the Confrontation Clause. See Thompson Br. at 31-33. And while the Government characterizes the District Court’s ruling as affecting “the interplay between cross 22 We will accept Thompson’s argument that the recorded calls between Good and Means were relevant to Good’s bias, see Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402, and will proceed directly to the District Court’s rationale for excluding them from the jury. As part of its analysis under Chandler, the District Court discussed the effect the tapes had on Good at the first trial: “[T]he Court has preliminarily advised the parties that . . . [it] would not permit the conversations to be played because the conversations . . . in the prior case . . . clearly affected the witness Michael Good, it caused him to be very agitated, concerned and he took that as a form of harassment . . . .” App. 1416. The District Court continued: “[s]o, in order to minimize the prejudicial effect, which the Court recognizes does occur because of the incestuous nature of the sexual relationship that would be coming out and . . . that could have the potential to affect the jury, the Court w[ill] not permit the conversations to be played . . . .” App. 1417. The District Court concluded as follows: I’m not going to permit the – unless Michael Good denies the relationship, I will not permit the conversations to be played. . . . [T]he tapes cannot be played because I think they are more inflammatory and they go more to harassing the defendant. I think what is important is for the defendant to be able to probe this line of inquiry, but I am going to impose those restrictions which I believe fall within the reasonable limits that a district court has the authority to impose, and examination for motive and [the] reasonable limitation thereupon,” Gov’t Br. at 53, the parties agree that the District Court did not limit the scope of Thompson’s inquiry into Good’s relationship with Means, but simply denied the admission of extrinsic evidence relating to such an inquiry. We will therefore analyze the claim under the familiar balancing test required by Rule 403. See Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 571. Whether falling under the aegis of Chandler or the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, we review the District Court’s refusal to play the recorded calls for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 76 (3d Cir. 2008), and we find none. 23 that would be for purposes of harassment, which would be the playing of the tapes . . . . App. 1428-29. Thompson argues that the District Court erred by precluding admission of the calls because the calls not only demonstrated the existence of Good’s relationship with Means, but also themselves demonstrated the extent of Good’s bias against him. Because, Thompson says, Good expressed his desire to keep the relationship secret during the calls, the substance of the calls demonstrated Good’s motivation to assist the Government in its case against Thompson (thus allowing Good to continue his relationship with Means uninterrupted). Whether this was so (and we have serious doubts that it was), we have steadfastly held that “if judicial self-restraint is ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 analysis of a trial court is reviewed by an appellate tribunal.” United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 767 (3d Cir. 1978). “Because the trial judge is present in the courtroom as the challenged evidence is offered, and is therefore in the best position to assess the extent of the prejudice caused a party, the trial judge must be given a very substantial discretion in balancing probative value on the one hand and unfair prejudice on the other.” United States v. Universal Rehabilitation Servs., 205 F.3d 657, 665 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we “accord great deference” to the District Court’s decision, mindful that “in order to justify reversal, a district court’s analysis and resulting conclusion [concerning the probative value or prejudicial effect of the challenged evidence] must be 24 ‘arbitrary or irrational.’” Id. (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 113 F.3d 444, 453 (3d Cir. 1997)). As its discussion set forth above demonstrates, the District Court’s determination that playing the calls to the jury would have been more prejudicial than their relative probative value was neither arbitrary nor irrational. We hold, therefore, that it was not an abuse of discretion.