Opinion ID: 2073303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standing to Object to Search and Seizure

Text: The majority opinion also deals with appellant's attempt to suppress the fruits of an inventory search of the car after it had been impounded. The opinion asserts that appellant lacks standing to object to the inventory because he had no ownership interest in the car and was no longer in it. On the facts of this case, I cannot agree. Ordinarily, a guest does not have standing to object to a search after he has moved on. However, that rule is based on the fact that he has abandoned the place that he left. Under Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969) a person has standing to object to a search if he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched. A guest has such an interest in the private place he occupies. Though this interest ends when the guest leaves in the natural course of events, there is no reason why the interest should cease when the guest is compelled to leave by an arresting police officer. In addition, appellant may also have been entitled to automatic standing under Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). But see Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973). The automatic-standing cases grant standing when the person is charged with personally possessing the challenged evidence. Here it appears that the evidence was used against appellant to establish his possession in order to justify an inference of burglary from the possession of recently burgled goods. Since, in my opinion, appellant had standing to suppress the fruits of an illegal search of the car, the legality of the search must be examined. Testimony at the suppression hearing which the trial justice was entitled to credit tended to support the following conclusions of fact: Appellant and his companion were arrested when the car they were riding in was stopped on Forest Avenue in Portland. After the arrest the police had the car towed to police headquarters. The police were unable to get the car into the police garage, and it was determined that the car would have to be stored on an open lot. Before moving the car to the storage lot the police removed items which were sitting on the front seat and put them in the property room. They did not then search the car or secure any items that were not visible from outside the car. In his motion to suppress, appellant objected to the introduction of the items removed from the front seat of the car. Securing of property in a lawfully impounded automobile in accordance with standard police procedures is not an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). The trial court was justified in finding that the impoundment was lawful and that the items were removed in a legitimate attempt to secure the car. They were properly admitted in evidence.