Opinion ID: 1577251
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellate Review Standard

Text: Grange claims that a denial of a writ of prohibition is examined on appeal under the de novo standard of review where the factual underpinning for application of an articulated legal rule is so wanting as to equal, in reality, a distortion of the legal rule. Grange cites Lexington Public Library v. Clark [11] for this standard, but it does so by taking the qualifying language in its brief  where the factual underpinning for application of an articulated legal rule is so wanting as to equal, in reality, a distortion of the legal rule  out of context. The language that Grange cites reads in context as follows: Where the challenge involves matters of fact, or application of law to facts, however, an abuse of discretion should be found only where the factual underpinning for application of an articulated legal rule is so wanting as to equal, in reality, a distortion of the legal rule. Application of any lesser standard for interlocutory intervention would ignore the extraordinary nature of the writs of prohibition and mandamus. [12] The cited language supports an abuse of discretion standard rather than de novo review. And the cited language actually relates the standard to be applied by the court hearing the initial petition when it reaches the merits of the case, i.e., after applying the practical and convenient formula [13] of no adequate remedy on appeal and great and irreparable injury  not the standard applied in an appeal of the grant or denial of a writ to yet a higher court. But we must review this matter under an appellate standard. The petition for this writ was filed in the Court of Appeals, which acted as a trial court because it heard the matter as an original action. And this case is now before us as a matter of right appeal, not an original action. Since the passage of the Judicial Article in 1976, the Court of Appeals has been the appropriate forum for the original action in a petition for a writ of prohibition applicable to a circuit court, and the Supreme Court is limited to appellate review. [14] But what appellate standard  de novo, abuse of discretion, or clear error  to apply to which class of writ case is not perfectly clear because we have, unfortunately, failed to make an unambiguous distinction among the three standards in our recent writ cases. This is perhaps a result of the fact that many of the seminal opinions on the subject of writs are from original writ actions in our predecessor Court  i.e., when there was no intermediate appellate court that would hear the original writ action and from which an appeal could be taken. Those opinions did not need to consider the standard on appeal because there was no higher court that could entertain an appeal. But it could also be that no party has framed the issue so as to require careful attention on our part as to the standard of review that we ought to apply. By claiming that de novo is the proper standard of review, however, Grange has placed this issue squarely before us. Though our previous decisions have not dealt with this question extensively, the basic rule is simple: Issuance of, or a refusal to issue a writ of prohibition is in the sound discretion of the court. [15] But in other cases, we have noted that appellate review of that decision is limited to an abuse-of-discretion inquiry, except for issues of law which are reviewed de novo. [16] Thus, it is apparent that the proper standard actually depends on the class, or category, of writ case. De novo review will occur most often under the first class of writ cases, i.e., where the lower court is alleged to be acting outside its jurisdiction, because jurisdiction is generally only a question of law. De novo review would also be applicable under the few second class of cases where the alleged error invokes the certain special cases exception [17] or where the error involves a question of law. But in most of the cases under the second class of writ cases, i.e., where the lower court is acting within its jurisdiction but in error, the court with which the petition for a writ is filed only reaches the decision as to issuance of the writ once it finds the existence of the conditions precedent, i.e., no adequate remedy on appeal, and great and irreparable harm. `If [these] procedural prerequisites for a writ are satisfied, whether to grant or deny a petition for a writ is within the [lower] court's discretion.' [18] But the requirement that the court must make a factual finding of great and irreparable harm before exercising discretion as to whether to grant the writ then requires a third standard of review, i.e., clear error, in some cases. This is supported by the fact that the petition for a writ is an original action [19] in which the court that hears the petition, in this case the Court of Appeals, acts as a trial court. And findings of fact by a trial court are reviewed for clear error. [20] Therefore, if on appeal the error is alleged to lie in the findings of fact, then the appellate court must review the findings of fact for clear error before reviewing the decision to grant or deny the petition.