Opinion ID: 3188713
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “Unit of Prosecution”

Text: The petitioner asserts a double jeopardy challenge directed to the sufficiency of the State’s evidence against him. Arguing that the “unit of prosecution” is “any material” under West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3 (2010),43 irrespective of the number of images, the petitioner asserts insufficiency in the State’s evidence to prove multiple instances of possession of material depicting children engaged in sexually explicit conduct. He contends 42 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part, that no person “shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]” The Fifth Amendment is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See State v. McGilton, 229 W.Va. 554, 560 n.8, 729 S.E.2d 876, 882 n.8 (2012) (“The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States is applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Parallel language is found in article III, section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution, which provides that no person in any criminal case shall “be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offence.” 43 West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3(b) (2014) is quoted, in full, in section F., infra. 29 that the twenty images–one for each count of the indictment–were collectively “any material” such that the State proved only a single instance of possession. In this regard, the petitioner asserts that Detective Lockhart’s trial testimony reflects that he possessed all twenty images at one particular time in March 2010 such that he should only have been charged with one possession under West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3 (2010). Accordingly, the petitioner argues that his sentencing on twenty counts constitutes multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of double jeopardy, and that he should be resentenced on a single count of violating West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3 (2010). The State counters that the petitioner’s focus on the statutory words “any material” in West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3 (2010) for his double jeopardy argument is misplaced. Rather than referencing quantity, the State contends that “any material” refers to the medium on which the image is contained, such as a photograph, a video, a compact disc, etc. The State further argues that the statutory language in West Virginia Code § 61­ 8C-3 at the time of the petitioner’s conduct and convictions in 2012, as well as our prior case law, make clear that each image constituted a separate act. Consequently, the State maintains that its evidence was sufficient to prove multiple instances of possession of material visually portraying a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct since each of the twenty images constituted a separate act for purposes of sentencing under West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3 (2010). 30 In addressing the parties’ arguments, we are informed by our prior case law. “A claim that double jeopardy has been violated based on multiple punishments imposed after a single trial is resolved by determining the legislative intent as to punishment.” Syl. Pt. 7, State v. Gill, 187 W.Va. 136, 416 S.E.2d 253 (1992). As we explained in State v. McGilton, 229 W.Va. 554, 729 S.E.2d 876 (2012), “[a] claim that double jeopardy has been violated based on multiple punishments imposed after a single trial is resolved by determining the legislative intent as to punishment.” Syllabus Point 7, State v. Gill, 187 W.Va. 136, 416 S.E.2d 253 (1992). . . . As helpful as the various rules of statutory construction may be in determining legislative intent, perhaps the soundest guidance comes from the Supreme Court’s admonition that we give the language of a statute a “commonsensical meaning.” United States v. Universal Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221, 73 S.Ct. 227, 229, 97 L.Ed. 260 (1952). McGilton, 229 W.Va. at 562, 729 S.E.2d at 884. More recently, we held that “[t]he analysis of whether a criminal defendant may be separately convicted and punished for multiple violations of a single statutory provision turns upon the legislatively intended unit of prosecution.” Syl. Pt. 4, State v Goins, 231 W.Va. 617, 748 S.E.2d 813 (2013). At the time of the petitioner’s criminal conduct in the case at bar, West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3 provided, in part: “Any person who, with knowledge, sends or causes to be sent, or distributes, exhibits, possesses or displays or transports any material visually portraying a minor engaged in any sexually explicit conduct is guilty of a felony[.]” The petitioner does not assert, nor do we find, any ambiguity in this statutory language. See Syl. 31 Pt. 2, State v. Elder, 152 W.Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968) (“Where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation.”); see also Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W.Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951) (“A statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full force and effect.”). In addressing the plain meaning of the statutory words “possesses” and “any material,” we find guidance in State v. Green, 207 W.Va. 530, 534 S.E.2d 395 (2000). In Green, the defendant asserted a double jeopardy violation in relation to her convictions on ten separate counts of uttering that arose from her contemporaneous presentment of ten forged money orders. The Court examined the phrase “any writing” in the uttering statute44 in determining the legislatively-intended unit of prosecution. Reasoning that the term “any” in the context of the singular noun “writing” reflected a singular unit of prosecution, the Court found that, without violating double jeopardy, the defendant could be charged with separate offenses based upon each document uttered. Id. at 538, 534 S.E.2d at 403. 44 See W.Va. Code § 61-4-5(a) (emphasis added) (“If any person forge any writing, . . . to the prejudice of another’s right, or utter or attempt to employ as true such forged writing, knowing it to be forged, he shall be guilty of a felony . . . .”). 32 Similarly, in the case at bar, rather than utilizing the plural word “materials,” the Legislature chose to use the word “material” in West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3. We agree with the State that as used in this statutory context, “material” refers to the particular media that is “visually portraying a minor engaged in any sexually explicit conduct[,]” whether it be a photograph, digital image, video, etc. Moreover, the use of the singular “minor,” rather than the plural “minors,” reflects the Legislature’s intent to protect each and every child victim. Similar reasoning was expressed in Commonwealth v. Davidson, 938 A.2d 198 (Pa. 2007). In Davidson, the court addressed the defendant’s double jeopardy challenge to his multiple convictions for violating Pennsylvania’s child pornography statute.45 Concluding that “[t]he General Assembly’s use of the term ‘any,’ which could mean one or more items, suggests a lack of restriction or limitation[,]” the court found there was no violation of double jeopardy in the defendant’s convictions on multiple counts of violating the child pornography statute. Id. at 219. Explaining further, the court stated it is not difficult to discern why the General Assembly would target individual instances of possession. Each use of a minor to create a visual depiction of child pornography constitutes a 45 The Pennsylvania statute provided that “it is a violation of the law for ‘[a]ny person who knowingly possesses or controls any book, magazine, pamphlet, slide, photograph, film, videotape, computer depiction or other material’ which depicts a minor ‘engaging in a prohibited sexual act or in the simulation of such act.’” Davidson, 938 A.2d at 218-19 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 33 separate and distinct abuse of that child, and thus represents an individual violation of the statute. . . . We conclude that each image of child pornography creates a permanent record of a child’s abuse, which results in continuing exploitation of a child when the image is subsequently viewed. Id. We agree with the reasoning of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Indeed, we recently expressed similar reasoning in Morgan v. Ballard, No. 11-1677, 2013 WL 149602 (W.Va. Jan. 14, 2013) (memorandum decision). In Morgan, the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a double jeopardy argument in relation to his multiple convictions of violating West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3 (2010). He asserted that his convictions on ten counts should have been considered in the aggregate as one count. In upholding the circuit court’s denial of habeas relief, this Court “adopt[ed] and incorporat[ed] the circuit court’s well-reasoned findings and conclusions,”46 which included the lower court’s conclusion that “our statutes protecting children from exploitation are interpreted to mean that possession of each photograph is a separate act and is a distinct and separate unit of prosecution allowing the State of West Virginia to charge separate counts and prosecute each act of possession.” Id. at ; see also State v. Richard D., No. 13-1250, 2015 WL 3751819 (W.Va. June 15, 2015) (memorandum decision) (affirming defendant’s convictions 46 We appended a copy of the circuit court’s order to the Court’s memorandum decision. Id. at  34 on five counts of possession of material depicting minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct in violation of West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3). Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,47 we find the State’s evidence was sufficient to prove that each of the twenty images depicted a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct and, for the reasons stated above, each image constituted a separate violation of West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3 (2010). Accordingly, we find no violation of double jeopardy.