Opinion ID: 2521820
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶ 10] Eres challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. The benchmark for reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether the evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from it, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, are adequate to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Granzer, ¶ 23, 193 P.3d at 273; Statezny v. State, 2001 WY 22, ¶ 15, 18 P.3d 641, 645 (Wyo.2001). We have consistently held that it is the jury's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw reasonable inferences from the facts. Sotolongo-Garcia v. State, 2002 WY 185, ¶ 11, 60 P.3d 687, 689 (Wyo.2002). We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury but will only determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have found the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Conine v. State, 2008 WY 146, ¶ 5, 197 P.3d 156, 159 (Wyo.2008); Grissom v. State, 2005 WY 132, ¶ 24, 121 P.3d 127, 136 (Wyo.2005). [¶ 11] Eres was charged with felony receipt of stolen property under § 6-3-403(a)(i). Under that statute as set forth in the jury instructions, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Eres received stolen property with a value in excess of $1,000.00. The district court instructed the jury, as noted above, that value meant the market value of the property... at the time and the place the property was stolen. The district court further defined market value as the price a willing buyer would pay, and which a willing seller would accept. In attacking his conviction, Eres claims the trial evidence was insufficient to establish the stolen property in question had a market value in excess of $1,000.00. We disagree. [¶ 12] Initially, we note that Eres' insufficiency claim is premised, in part, on his contention that the State was required to establish the property's value at the time he received it. As already discussed, the value of the stolen property as between the date of theft and the date of receipt was not an issue at trial. Consequently, we need only determine whether the trial evidence was sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that the stolen property, as instructed by the district court, was worth $1,000.00 or more during the time in question. [¶ 13] At trial, Gonzales, the owner of the property, gave specific opinions, accompanied by photographs, regarding the market value of many of the stolen items. For example, Gonzales testified that the Sony stereo receiver depicted in Exhibit 1, which he had purchased seven months before the burglary for $1,450.00, was worth half the purchase price, i.e., $725.00. He also testified about the market value of the Sony PlayStation, a graphic equalizer, stereo speakers, various DVD players, and a television, whose combined market value was $665.00. The values Gonzales expressed on these items were based on his knowledge of the amount he had paid for them, as well as his knowledge of the market. Altogether, Gonzales' testimony established a combined market value of $1,390.00 for certain stolen items, well in excess of the $1,000.00 threshold for the charged felony offense. [¶ 14] Eres does not contend that Gonzales' testimony was not competent evidence of the property's market value. As the owner of the property, Gonzales is presumed to have special knowledge of the property's value and is qualified to express an opinion about it. Weathers v. State, 652 P.2d 970, 973 (Wyo.1982). The weight to be given his testimony was for the jury to decide. Id. [¶ 15] In addition, Gonzales provided specific testimony about the purchase price of several stolen items and the dates he had purchased them. The district court instructed the jury that it could consider the purchase price in assessing the market value of the property. The district court also instructed the jury to consider the evidence in the light of your experience and knowledge of human affairs. In accord with the district court's instructions and using its experience and knowledge of human affairs, the jury could have drawn reasonable inferences from each item's purchase date and price in deciding the market value of the stolen property. See 50 Am.Jur.2d Larceny § 140 (2006); see also Hebron v. United States, 837 A.2d 910, 914 (D.C.2003) (holding that a jury may draw reasonable inferences from an item's purchase date and price when determining whether the government has met its burden of proving value under the theft statute); State v. Holmes, 830 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Mo.App. E.D.1992) (jury may consider purchase price and age in determining value). [¶ 16] Viewing the evidence as a whole, and affording the State all favorable inferences which may be fairly and reasonably drawn from it, we have no trouble concluding the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the stolen property exceeded $1,000.00. Although Eres presented contrary evidence indicating a lesser market value for the property, it was the jury's responsibility to evaluate that evidence and assign it the weight it deemed appropriate in determining Eres' guilt or innocence on the charged crime. The jury apparently found the State's evidence more compelling. We will not second guess the jury's determination. In sum, we find ample evidence to sustain Eres' conviction. Affirmed.