Opinion ID: 578165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Considering Suppressed Evidence at Sentencing

Text: 17 Although it remains clear that illegally seized evidence may not be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief, societal interests have led the Supreme Court narrowly to cabin the reach of the exclusionary rule. The issue before us now is whether the exclusionary rule prevents judges from considering illegally obtained evidence at sentencing. 18 Prior to the Guidelines, we answered this question in the negative. See United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983, 91 S.Ct. 1198, 28 L.Ed.2d 334 (1971). In Schipani, we stated that [w]here illegally seized evidence is reliable and it is clear, as here, that it was not gathered for the express purpose of improperly influencing the sentencing judge, there is no error in using it in connection with fixing sentence. 435 F.2d at 28. Because the Guidelines remove a great deal of judicial discretion and the consideration of illegally seized evidence at sentencing is likely to result in increased penalties, the consideration of such evidence at sentencing now takes on greater significance. Accordingly, we now will examine whether under the Guidelines sentencing judges may consider illegally seized evidence. 19 A search that violates the Fourth Amendment does not confer on its victim a personal right to suppression of the illegally seized evidence. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1444, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960) (exclusionary rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3048, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48, 94 S.Ct. 613, 619-20, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved). Although a victim of an illegal search benefits from the exclusion of evidence that links him to an illegal act, the admission of the evidence does not itself invade the privacy of the search victim, which is a fait accompli. We suppress evidence only because doing so will deter future violations of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347-48, 94 S.Ct. at 619-20. In fact, the Supreme Court has refused to apply the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations where deterrence will not ensue. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (exclusionary rule inapplicable if officers relied in good faith on warrant); Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 Yale L.J. 906, 935 (1986) (Dripps) (The Leon majority announced that [the Fourth Amendment] could be violated but that nothing would happen.); see also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987) (exclusionary rule inapplicable when officers act in objectively reasonable reliance on a statute). 20 Moreover, the Supreme Court has instructed us not to suppress evidence solely because doing so might deter illegal searches. Rather, the likelihood of increased deterrence must be balanced against the considerable cost of excluding reliable information. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 347, 107 S.Ct. at 1166 ([T]he Court has examined whether the rule's deterrent effect will be achieved, and has weighed the likelihood of such deterrence against the costs of withholding reliable information from the truth-seeking process.); see also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 2445, 65 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980) ([U]nbending application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury.). 21 Calandra, which dealt with a grand jury witness who had refused to answer questions based on illegally seized evidence, provides some guidance on the proper analysis of exclusion under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Dripps at 908-09 (discussing Calandra and the cost-benefit approach to exclusion). In Calandra, the district and appellate courts both refused to compel the defendant to answer questions he had been asked. Both courts found support in the exclusionary rule case law. See In re Calandra, 332 F.Supp. 737 (N.D.Ohio 1971), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir.1972), rev'd, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561. 22 The Supreme Court reversed, Justice Powell writing that the application of the [exclusionary] rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348, 94 S.Ct. at 620. Employing a balancing test, the Court held that the speculative deterrent effects of exclusion did not justify substantially impeding the role of the grand jury. Id. at 351-52, 94 S.Ct. at 622. It is from within this framework of cost-benefit analysis that we approach whether to prohibit sentencing judges from considering evidence seized in violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 23 Physical evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment--unlike an involuntary confession taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment--is inherently reliable. See United States v. Schipani, 315 F.Supp. 253, 257-58 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 435 F.2d 26, cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983, 91 S.Ct. 1198, 28 L.Ed.2d 334. As a result, balancing requires that we invoke the exclusionary rule only where our doing so will provide the systemic remedy of substantial deterrence. 24 The defendants and amici argue that allowing sentencing judges to consider illegally seized evidence will give police an incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment. They posit that police and prosecutors with enough lawfully obtained evidence for a conviction of a relatively minor offense that has a broad sentencing range could guarantee a heavier sentence by seizing other evidence illegally and introducing it at sentencing. They argue that as a result nothing will deter police from making illegal searches, especially in those situations where a conviction of a greater crime would lead to a similar sentence. 25 Defendants and amici do not explain why this supposed incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment will prove incrementally stronger than the rewards that already exist. Illegally seized evidence long has played a role in our legal system, and many of its uses might motivate a police officer to violate the Fourth Amendment. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984) (exclusionary rule does not apply in a civil deportation proceeding); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 1916-17, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980) (illegally obtained evidence may be used for impeachment in a criminal case); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3032, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) (exclusionary rule does not apply to federal civil proceedings); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349-52, 94 S.Ct. at 620-21 (allowing introduction of illegally obtained evidence before the grand jury). The Supreme Court has held that these uses for illegally seized evidence do not diminish deterrence sufficiently to justify the exclusion of probative evidence. We see no reason why this additional use of illegally seized evidence justifies different treatment. 26 The argument also has been put before us that requiring the consideration of previously suppressed evidence at sentencing is the last step in wholly gutting the exclusionary rule, the other steps having been taken by the Supreme Court in its more recent Fourth Amendment opinions. We do not agree that this case is the straw that breaks the camel's back where Fourth Amendment concerns are at stake. 27 Great rewards still exist for following accepted police procedures. Here, for example, the government could have brought a more concrete case, supported by all the evidence, had the officers searched apartment 3k pursuant to a search warrant. Instead, suppression of the evidence found in apartment 3k forced the government to drop the firearms count of its indictment and the additional sentence that it could have carried. Having had the firearms charge would have allowed the prosecution to have made a strong case based on concrete evidence; instead, it had to proceed on the more circumstantial conspiracy case.
28 Whether to consider illegally seized evidence at sentencing requires us also to consider the latitude given to judges to consider other evidence at sentencing. United States courts historically have permitted a sentencing judge [to] exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1082, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949). Because [a] sentence reflects a prediction of future events based largely upon the defendant's past, Schipani, 315 F.Supp. at 255, a judge's inquiry traditionally has been largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446, 92 S.Ct. 589, 591, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972). 29 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, codified the traditional purposes of sentencing, both recognizing the importance of imposing individual sentences, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)--(2), and displaying a desire to allow a broad inquiry into relevant information concerning a defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.); Guidelines § 6A1.3(a) (In resolving any reasonable dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility.). Moreover, the Supreme Court recently has evinced a continued desire to provide courts with as much information as possible at sentencing. See Payne v. Tennessee, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (capital sentencing juries may take into account evidence of the murder victim's character and the impact of the crime on the victim's family). 30 The tradition of providing complete information at sentencing blossomed in a judicial system that granted a district judge enormous flexibility in assessing a suitable penalty. Obviously, such flexibility has been limited by the Guidelines. District judges do retain some limited discretion in imposing sentences, however, and only a showing of significant countervailing values--which has not been made in this case--would convince us to limit the information that district judges may or should consider in calculating Guidelines sentences.
31 We must determine whether consideration of illegally seized evidence is mandatory, discretionary or prohibited. Obviously, we reject the latter. Instead of compelling the consideration of all evidence at sentencing, we could leave the decision to the judgment of the district courts. The argument supporting this position asserts that district judges would gain greater discretion if we were to allow them to disregard illegally seized evidence. By not considering suppressed items, a judge could impose a more lenient sentence. 32 We have given this argument serious consideration and, while we do not disagree with its underlying premise, we conclude that it represents a fundamental misunderstanding of our task. The Guidelines evince a clear desire for uniformity, and ad hoc determinations would create disparities in sentences in the absence of differences in conduct. To allow judges to decide whether to consider illegally seized evidence at sentencing without factoring in the Fourth Amendment--by excluding evidence only where a systemic remedy of substantial deterrence will ensue--would sidestep Congress and violate Separation of Powers principles. We will not overstep the proper bounds of our judicial role. 33 We conclude that the benefits of providing sentencing judges with reliable information about the defendant outweigh the likelihood that allowing consideration of illegally seized evidence will encourage unlawful police conduct. Absent a showing that officers obtained evidence expressly to enhance a sentence, a district judge may not refuse to consider relevant evidence at sentencing, even if that evidence has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Consistent with our holding are the recent decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit and the Third Circuit holding that district judges normally should consider illegally seized evidence at sentencing. See United States v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226 (11th Cir.1991) (district judge should consider illegally seized evidence at sentencing), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63 (D.C.Cir.1991) (same), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 788 (1992); United States v. Torres, 926 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.1991) (same); but see United States v. Jewel, 947 F.2d 224, 238-40 (7th Cir.1991) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). We believe that to avoid disparity in sentencing, which is one of the goals of the Guidelines, sentencing judges must consider relevant illegally seized evidence. 34
35 Tejada argues that even if Schipani remains good law, Judge Walker acted mistakenly when he stated that he had to consider the gun at sentencing. The argument is premised on the assumption that Judge Walker ignored Schipani 's exception for cases where evidence was seized expressly for the improper purpose of influencing the sentencing judge. We disagree with the foundation of this argument. Although Judge Walker did state that I must consider the gun under Schipani, we interpret his statement as evincing his compulsion to consider the evidence in light of the circumstances. The record makes clear that Judge Walker properly familiarized himself with Schipani. 36 Judge Martin, on the other hand, made it clear that he did not consider Schipani valid in light of the Guidelines. On remand, he should consider whether the NYDETF acted with the intent of enhancing sentencing rather than under the misinformed assumption that Cabrera had consented to the search. If the illegal search was not motivated by a desire to enhance sentencing, then Judge Martin must consider the gun at sentencing. 37