Opinion ID: 2382224
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: pre-trial and trial identifications

Text: Appellant next claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress all pre-trial photographic identifications of him. A reversal of the judgment of sentence is appropriate only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Commonwealth v. Martin, 481 Pa. 515, 520, 393 A.2d 23, 26 (1978) (citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968)). In Commonwealth v. Moore, 534 Pa. 527, 633 A.2d 1119 (1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1114, 115 S.Ct. 908, 130 L.Ed.2d 790, reh'g denied, 514 U.S. 1010, 115 S.Ct. 1329, 131 L.Ed.2d 208 (1995), this Court stated that: We recognize that in response to this challenge, the Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that any identification testimony to be offered at trial is free from taint of initial illegality. Commonwealth v. Turner, 454 Pa. 520, 314 A.2d 496 (1974); Pa.R.Crim.P. 323(h)... In making this determination, the court should normally consider the manner in which the identification procedure was conducted, the witness' prior opportunity to observe, the existence of any discrepancies between the witness' description and the defendant's appearance, any previous identification, any prior misidentification, any prior failure of the witness to identify the defendant, and the lapse of time between the incident and the court identification. Commonwealth v. Fowler, 466 Pa. 198, 352 A.2d 17 (1976); United States v. Higgins, 458 F.2d 461 (3d Cir.1972). Id. at 540, 633 A.2d at 1125-1126. Appellant first alleges that the pre-trial identifications should have been suppressed because of the impermissibly suggestive manner in which photographs of appellant and the other conspirators were shown to witnesses. [13] He argues that the police did not use a traditional photographic line-up which would test the witnesses' ability to identify a suspect. The evidence at the suppression hearing demonstrated that approximately seventeen photographs were shown to the various witnesses eleven were photographs developed from a camera that was retrieved from the victim's bedroom loaded with film and six photographs were police identification photos of the four individuals originally charged with the murder. Appellant claims that his photograph was suggestive of guilt since it was a mug shot photograph taken in 1995, while the other photographs shown to the witnesses were taken in 1981 and depicted outdoor, casual or group scenes. Contrary to appellant's claims, the record supports the trial court's finding that the purpose of the photographic display was not to place the defendants at the scene of the homicide, but rather, to determine if the potential witnesses knew the individuals depicted in the various photographs, to identify the individuals depicted in the photographs retrieved from the victim's camera, and to determine whether persons displayed in the photographs attended the party on the night of the killing or went to the Pines following the party. Appellant also claims that the pre-trial identification was flawed because the police failed to ascertain, prior to showing the witnesses the photographs, whether drug or alcohol consumption at the time of the murder precluded the potential witnesses from being able to remember accurately the events on the night of the killing which occurred fourteen years earlier. The trial court properly prohibited appellant from questioning a police officer about this subject at the suppression hearing by sustaining an objection by the Commonwealth on the basis that this issue would not have a direct relationship to the issue of whether the identification procedure was suggestive and should be suppressed. [14] Finally, appellant alleges the pre-trial identifications should have been suppressed because of the unavailability of numerous photographs shown to witnesses since 1981 and the failure of police to keep records of all photographs shown to witnesses from 1981 to 1995. Although the better practice for police would have been to keep accurate records of any photographs shown to each witness for identification purposes, the photographs in question were shown to ascertain general information about the victim and the night of the murder, rather than to establish the identity of appellant as the perpetrator, hence, we do not find a new trial is warranted for the failure of the police to do so in this matter. Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain in-court identifications of him since they were tainted by the suggestive nature of the pre-trial photographic identifications and there was no adequate, independent basis for the witnesses to identify appellant at trial. However, appellant fails to develop this argument; nor does the record support this claim. Since the witnesses were acquainted with appellant prior to the commission of the crime, there is an independent corroboration that the in-court identification was not tainted. [15] See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 538 Pa. 485, 502, 649 A.2d 435, 444 (1994) ([A]n in-court identification following a suggestive out of court identification will be admissible only if, considering the totality of the circumstances, it is determined that the in-court identification had an origin sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 850, 116 S.Ct. 145, 133 L.Ed.2d 91 (1995). Therefore, in viewing the totality of the evidence, appellant has failed to establish that pre-trial and trial identifications were so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification and hence, this claim affords appellant no relief.