Opinion ID: 6323022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: As an initial matter, district courts must sentence defendants without unnecessary delay. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(1). But district courts may delay sentencing for good cause. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(2). “The matter of a continuance is within the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion.” United States v. Martin, 740 F.2d 1352, 1360 (6th Cir. 1984) (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964)). To determine whether a court abused its discretion in denying a motion for continuance, we evaluate whether the district court reached its decision based on an arbitrary “insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.” Sarafite, 376 U.S. at 589. We also consider whether the defendant suffered “any actual prejudice as a result of the denial, whether additional time would have . . . added something to the defendant’s case.” Martin, 740 F.2d at 1361. Gooden argues the district court abused its discretion when it denied his final motion for a continuance. According to Gooden, the district court abused its discretion because the denial was motivated by expediency in the face of his “justifiable request for delay.” And Gooden contends -4- Case No. 21-5751, United States v. Gooden that the denial resulted in actual prejudice to his defense. We conclude, however, that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gooden’s motion to continue. First, the district court’s denial was not motivated by an arbitrary insistence on expediency. When defense counsel moved for a continuance in August 2021, the court had already twice exercised its discretion to delay Gooden’s sentencing. In granting these continuances, the court wanted to ensure Gooden could receive his liver transplant and receive the necessary aftercare. “I want to make the best decision that I can make. I’m concerned about Mr. Gooden’s health . . . so we want to give Mr. Gooden every opportunity to present his case.” (Report Date Tr., R. 62, Page ID 412–413.) The district court also stated it would be helpful if the government would assist in getting “more insight from the Bureau of Prisons about how they handle” prisoners with the kinds of medical needs Gooden had. (Id. at PageID 413.) Thus, the district court had no objection to delaying sentencing on two occasions to ensure Gooden could access the healthcare he needed, best present his defense, and ensure the BOP could provide adequate aftercare for Gooden. These actions by the district court suggest it was not concerned with expediency. Also, in denying Gooden’s motion, the district court provided three defensible reasons for its decision. First, the court noted that Gooden’s defense counsel would be leaving the Office of the Federal Defender, meaning someone less knowledgeable about his case and medical condition would have to step in if sentencing were further delayed. Second, the court cited to the BOP’s letter stating it could address any medical problems that might arise while Gooden was incarcerated. Gooden took issue with the adequacy of BOP healthcare services, but the court found no reason to doubt the BOP’s letter. Third, the court noted that the earlier reasons for a continuance had been addressed. Specifically, Gooden received his liver transplant and aftercare. And although defense counsel argued Gooden might also require a kidney transplant, the district court -5- Case No. 21-5751, United States v. Gooden had not been provided with any medical records to support this. None of the three reasons suggests that the denial was motivated by a desire to speed up sentencing arbitrarily. Gooden also failed to point to any actual prejudice. Gooden argues that a third continuance would have given him time to produce medical records in support of a noncustodial sentence. According to Gooden, a noncustodial sentence would have been appropriate because the BOP is incapable of providing the medical care he needs. Since being sentenced, Gooden has collected medical documents confirming he has stage four kidney disease and hypertensive kidney disease. For these reasons, Gooden claims he was prejudiced. We are not unsympathetic to Gooden’s concerns given his medical history. Nothing in the record, however, indicates that the BOP cannot provide Gooden with adequate medical services. The letter from the BOP is clear and unchallenged: the BOP can provide adequate and proper care. Further, when the district court sentenced Gooden, it also granted him leave to self-report and extended that leave. Thus, even with a custodial sentence, Gooden was able to attend his followup appointment. For these reasons, Gooden has failed to show actual prejudice. Because the district court denied Gooden’s motion for three justifiable reasons independent of expediency, and because Gooden’s defense was not prejudiced by the denial, the district court did not abuse its discretion.