Opinion ID: 4690769
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Uncharged Incidents

Text: Acevedo argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting, under Rule 404(b), evidence of two uncharged prior incidents. He contends that the government failed to establish he committed the uncharged acts, that the acts were not relevant to establish his identity, and that the evidence was unduly prejudicial. We disagree. Under Rule 404(b), “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Such evidence may be admissible for another purpose, “such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). For evidence of other crimes or acts to be admissible under Rule 404(b), “(1) it must be relevant to an 11 USCA11 Case: 19-12208 Date Filed: 05/27/2021 Page: 12 of 22 issue other than defendant’s character; (2) there must be sufficient proof to enable a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the act(s) in question; and (3) the probative value of the evidence cannot be substantially outweighed by undue prejudice, and the evidence must satisfy [Fed. R. Evid.] 403.” United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007). The test for whether Rule 404(b) evidence should be admitted varies depending on the purpose for which it is offered. United States v. Phaknikone, 605 F.3d 1099, 1108 (11th Cir. 2010). Evidence offered to prove identity must satisfy a “particularly stringent analysis.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). When extrinsic evidence is offered to prove identity, the “crucial consideration” is the similarity between the charged crime and the prior act. United States v. Miller, 959 F.2d 1535, 1539 (11th Cir. 1992). “The physical similarity must be such that it marks the offenses as the handiwork of the accused. In other words, the evidence must demonstrate a modus operandi.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The extrinsic act must be a signature crime, and the defendant must have used a modus operandi that is uniquely his.” Phaknikone, 605 F.3d at 1108 (internal quotation marks omitted). The government must, therefore, show more than simply that the defendant has at other times committed the same “commonplace variety of criminal act.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 12 USCA11 Case: 19-12208 Date Filed: 05/27/2021 Page: 13 of 22 Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 404(b) evidence of the two prior incidents at the Valero and Chevron stations because the evidence was relevant to prove Acevedo’s identity and modus operandi. The two uncharged acts were strikingly similar to the incidents charged in the indictment. They both occurred within a year of the first incident charged in the indictment and within the same geographic area. What is more, the first uncharged incident was essentially identical to the two charged acts—a credit card skimmer was found inside a gas pump and Acevedo’s fingerprint was found on the pump’s broken seal. As to the second uncharged incident, Acevedo was identified by a witness as he was attempting to open a gas pump. The scheme marks Acevedo’s “handiwork” as it does not appear to be so “commonplace” such that anyone could have committed the uncharged acts. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, any potential prejudice caused by admitting this evidence was mitigated by the district court’s limiting instruction to the jury. Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1346.