Opinion ID: 540108
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Error.

Text: 60 We touch now briefly on defendant's other contentions of error.
61 Appellant argues that the district court erred in failing to order a new trial, or alternatively, to strike Benson's testimony, because Benson had destroyed some rough notes he had made during his investigation of Simtob, arguably in violation of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500 (the Act). It is the responsibility of the district court to determine whether such notes constitute statements within the meaning of the Act, United States v. Johnson, 521 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir.1975), and, if so, to determine whether and what sanctions might be appropriate. United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 430 U.S. 971, 97 S.Ct. 1659, 52 L.Ed.2d 365 (1977). We therefore review a trial court's ruling on Jencks Act issues for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d 1543, 1552 (9th Cir.1986). 62 The evidence was conflicting on whether Benson's notes could be considered statements for purposes of the Act. Counsel for Simtob elicited on cross-examination that the notes were written by Benson himself contemporaneously with events described, and contained at least one reference to Simtob. They therefore related, in small part, to the subject matter of direct examination, and arguably were statements under the Act. See Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94, 96 S.Ct. 1338, 47 L.Ed.2d 603 (1976); Polizzi, 801 F.2d at 1552 (9th Cir.1986). Other testimony indicates, however, that Benson's notes were merely bits and pieces of information which he collected and reduced to writing to refresh his recollection during discussions with DEA agent Mountsier concerned various suspects, not merely involving Simtob. A government agent's rough notes will not be Jencks Act statements when they are not complete, are truncated in nature, or have become an unsiftable mix of witness testimony, investigator's selections, interpretations, and interpolations, United States v. Griffin, 659 F.2d, 932, 937 (9th Cir.1981) cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949, 102 S.Ct. 2019, 72 L.Ed.2d 473 (1982), quoting United States v. Spencer, 618 F.2d 605, 606 (9th Cir.1980). 63 But even if the notes do amount to statements which would have been producible under the Jencks Act, the trial court correctly considered both the possibility of government culpability as well as the degree of injury to the defendant. United States v. Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir.1977); see also United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1233 (9th Cir.1985) (harmless error doctrine applies to Jencks Act decisions). Appellant concedes that the record indicates that the case agent did not direct the destruction of the notes, and that they were destroyed by Benson--apparently concerned about maintaining his cover and personal safety--without any impropriety on the part of the government. 64 Under these circumstances, even though the trial judge did not clearly rule that the notes constituted statements under the Act, we find no abuse of discretion in its refusal to strike Benson's testimony or order a new trial as a result of their destruction.
65 Simtob also argues, as he did before the trial court, that the government's conduct in its investigation was so outrageous as to violate his due process rights, warranting dismissal of the indictment against him. We review such contentions de novo. United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir.1986). In evaluating such a charge, we look only to the government's conduct, without regard to the defendant's criminal predisposition. Id. at 1125, citing United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir.1986) reh'g granted, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir.1986). 66 Law enforcement conduct becomes constitutionally unacceptably under the Due Process Clause only when it shocks the conscience of the court. Bogart, 783 F.2d at 1438. Appellant cites as examples of the government's allegedly outrageous conduct 1) Benson's use of Simtob's friend as an intermediary, 2) Benson's exploitation of Simtob's sympathy in convincing him that he, Benson, desperately needed the money from resale of the cocaine, 3) Benson's tampering with witness Nesbo by cautioning him against changes in his testimony, and 4) Benson's alleged destruction of evidence (referring to Benson's notes), which interfered with the validity and sanctity of the judicial process. 67 While the acts of Benson were sometimes reprehensible, we conclude that they do not rise to a level that denied Simtob due process. Benson did not create the crime, or otherwise act in so central a fashion as to fall within the narrow doctrine of outrageous government conduct. See United States v. So, 755 F.2d 1350, 1353 (9th Cir.1985). Benson's use of Simtob's friend and his appeals to sympathy do not shock the conscience if we assume, as the jury found, that they did not entrap Simtob into committing a crime he was not already disposed to commit. Benson appears to have destroyed the notes in order to maintain his cover, rather than to deprive Simtob of a fair trial. Benson's approach to witness Nesbo on the eve of trial is far more troubling. It was not done at the instance of the prosecution, however, and we have little doubt that if the case is retried, adequate precautions will be taken to minimize the effect of the past and to prevent its recurrence.