Opinion ID: 6335130
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Washington’s Vehicle Search

Text: In the context of a search, probable cause requires only “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. We need only ask “whether a nexus exists between a crime and the place to be searched and whether information -5- Case No. 21-5745, United States v. Washington in an affidavit is sufficiently timely to think that the sought-after evidence still remains at the identified location.” Baker, 976 F.3d at 646 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, “police officers may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.” United States v. Smith, 510 F.3d 641, 647 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “A positive indication by a properly-trained dog is sufficient to establish probable cause for the presence of a controlled substance.” United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 393–94 (6th Cir. 1994). Here again, officers had probable cause to search Washington’s vehicle. Officers knew Washington was coming to the motel in a black BMW with Indiana plates for the purpose of selling methamphetamine to Belcher. Officers observed the vehicle as it arrived, and they subsequently identified Washington as he exited the vehicle and walked to Room 202. When they found no drugs on Washington’s person, the police dog on-site alerted to the presence of drugs in his vehicle. Under these circumstances, the officers had probable cause to search Washington’s car. See id. Still, Washington resists this conclusion, arguing the automobile exception is inapplicable when the driver is detained because the car is not readily mobile. This argument, however, is foreclosed by controlling precedent. As we have previously recognized, the Supreme Court has been clear that a “lesser expectation of privacy” applies to vehicles “[e]ven in cases where an automobile was not immediately mobile[.]” Smith, 510 F.3d at 647 (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985)). Because the dog sniff gave the officers probable cause to search Washington’s vehicle, the automobile exception applies even though Washington’s detention made it unlikely to move. See Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 334 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Smith, 510 F.3d at 647); see also United States v. Nigro, 727 F.2d 100, 106 (6th Cir. 1984) (en -6- Case No. 21-5745, United States v. Washington banc) (“The automobile exception has always depended on the inherent mobility of the vehicle to be searched, not on whether it could in fact be used immediately to effect a removal of evidence[.]”). Officers had probable cause to search Washington’s vehicle. Accordingly, the district court properly denied his motion to suppress.