Opinion ID: 2076498
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: merger issues

Text: The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars multiple punishments for a single offense. Wilson v. United States, 528 A.2d 876, 879 (D.C. 1987). Where a single act violates more than one criminal statute, however, a defendant may be convicted of each offense at a single trial, and may be sentenced for both (provided that the legislature intended that result) without transgressing the constitutional proscription. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 337-40, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1141-43, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981). If each statutory offense requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the legislature is presumed to have authorized multiple punishments unless there is clear evidence of a contrary legislative intent. Id.; see also the seminal case of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). We have previously had occasion to address double jeopardy issues in determining whether there was a merger between convictions for malicious disfigurement while armed and for ADW. In Curtis, supra, the weapon supporting the while armed element of the malicious disfigurement charge was also the weapon used in the assault. Noting that under recent holdings of this court, e.g., Arnold v. United States, 467 A.2d 136, 139 (D.C.1983) (per curiam), we may not simply consider elements of different crimes in the abstract, but must rather focus on the evidentiary context in the particular case, we held that the evidence which proved the offense of ADW was a component of the proof of the greater offense of disfigurement, and therefore merged into it. Curtis, supra, 568 A.2d at 1076. Just as ADW merges into malicious disfigurement while armed, so simple assaultwhich is all that remains of the ADW conviction in light of the discussion in Part II, supra merges into malicious disfigurement. The government correctly concedes that Curtis is controlling, [11] and the assault conviction must therefore be vacated. We conclude, however, that Edwards' convictions for malicious disfigurement and mayhem do not merge. The elements of mayhem are: (1) that the defendant caused permanent disabling injury to another; (2) that he had the general intent to do the injurious act; and (3) that he did so willfully and maliciously. Wynn v. United States, 538 A.2d 1139, 1145 (D.C. 1988). [12] The elements of malicious disfigurement are: (1) that the defendant inflicted an injury on another; (2) that the victim was permanently disfigured; (3) that the defendant specifically intended to disfigure the victim; and (4) that the defendant was acting with malice. Perkins v. United States, 446 A.2d 19, 26 (D.C.1982) (per curiam). Obviously, malicious disfigurement contains elements which mayhem does not; the government must prove that the defendant permanently disfigured his victim and specifically intended to do so. Whether mayhem contains an element which malicious disfigurement does not turns on whether its first elementthat the defendant caused permanent disabling injury to anotheris necessarily satisfied by proof of the second element of malicious disfigurementthat the victim was permanently disfigured. The question is whether a permanent disfigurement is by its very nature also a permanent disabling injury. Perkins holds that permanent disfigurement occurs when the victim is made appreciably less attractive or ... a part of his body is to some appreciable degree less useful or functional than it was before the injury. Id. One year after Perkins, this court held that the offense of mayhem is concerned with the preservation of the normal functioning of the human body, while malicious disfigurement focuses upon willful permanent disfigurement rather than disablement. Smith, supra, 466 A.2d at 431. We recognized in Perkins that a single harm, e.g., cutting off a person's nose, may constitute both a permanent injury and a permanent disfigurement. Smith, although distinguishing between the two terms, does not hold otherwise. Espousing what is known as the elements approach, the government contends that as long as there can be a permanent disfigurement which is not a disabling permanent injury for purposes of the statute, e.g., a facial scar, multiple convictions do not violate Blockburger. It is irrelevant, according to the government, that the actual harm involved in a particular prosecution is in fact one that satisfies both definitions. We have held on several occasions that proper multiple-punishment Blockburger analysis requires an examination of the evidence offered at trial, rather than the bare elements of the offenses. Curtis, supra, 568 A.2d at 1076; Kingsbury v. United States, 537 A.2d 208, 210-11 (D.C.1988); Worthy v. United States, 509 A.2d 1157, 1158-59 (D.C.1986); Arnold, supra, 467 A.2d at 139. The government points to what it views as substantial case support for the elements approach. See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716-22, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 1450-53, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989); Albernaz, supra, 450 U.S. at 338, 101 S.Ct. at 1142; United States v. Bridges, 230 U.S.App.D.C. 387, 392-93, 717 F.2d 1444, 1449-50 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1036, 104 S.Ct. 1310, 79 L.Ed.2d 708 (1984); Waller v. United States, 531 A.2d 994, 997 (D.C.1987); Wilson, supra, 528 A.2d at 880; and Perkins, supra, 446 A.2d at 26-27. In the present case, however, we are not obliged to determine whether these various authorities are reconcilable with one another. At trial, the government offered evidence that Mrs. Edwards had suffered permanent disabilities, i.e., impaired mental capacity and eyesight and restricted movement in her jaw, which do not involve permanent disfigurement. She also suffered disfigurement, e.g., a dented head, and other injuries to her appearance, which were not necessarily disabling injuries. Thus, the government proved mayhem which was not malicious disfigurement and malicious disfigurement which was not mayhem. Whether we look only to the elements of the offenses, as in Albernaz, or to the proof offered at trial, as in Curtis, the Blockburger test has been satisfied. We know of no overriding evidence that the legislature intended that a defendant may be prosecuted either for mayhem or for malicious disfigurement, but not for both. Accordingly, the dual convictions were constitutional.