Opinion ID: 2762647
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment: ERISA Estoppel

Text: We review summary judgment orders de novo. Riley v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 744 F.3d 241, 244 (1st Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that could potentially affect the outcome of the case. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). A genuine dispute is one that could be resolved in favor of either party. Id. In other words, summary judgment is inappropriate if a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B) authorizes a plan participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to bring a civil action for appropriate equitable relief to redress violations of or enforce any provision of ERISA or the Plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B). Although many of our sister circuits have recognized equitable estoppel claims under § 502(a)(3)(B), see Livick, 524 F.3d at 30-31 (listing cases from the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits); Mello v. Sara Lee Corp., 431 F.3d 440, 444 n.4 (5th Cir. 2005) (listing other cases from those same circuits, plus cases from the Seventh and Eighth Circuits), we have not yet had occasion to do so. In each of the cases raising the issue, we have concluded that, even if such a claim were cognizable, the facts specific to -12- that case would not support it. See Livick, 524 F.3d at 31; Mauser v. Raytheon Co. Pension Plan for Salaried Emps., 239 F.3d 51, 57-58 (1st Cir. 2001); City of Hope Nat'l Med. Ctr. v. HealthPlus, Inc., 156 F.3d 223, 230 n.9 (1st Cir. 1998); Law, 956 F.2d at 370 n.9; see also Todisco v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 497 F.3d 95, 99 n.4 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting cases). We continue that approach here. An equitable estoppel claim consists of two elements: (1) the first party must make a definite misrepresentation of fact with reason to believe the second party will rely on it, Law, 956 F.2d at 368 (internal quotation marks omitted); and (2) the second party must reasonably rely on that representation to its detriment, id.; Mauser, 239 F.3d at 57. We have in the past assumed that any such claim under ERISA is necessarily limited to statements that interpret the plan and cannot extend to statements that would modify the plan. See Law, 956 F.2d at 369-70 (discussing the notion that estoppel applies to interpretations but not modifications of ERISA plans). Two reasons support this limitation. First, because an ERISA plan must be established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument, 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1), a plan cannot be modified orally. Law, 956 F.2d at 370 n.9. Therefore, it would be inherently unreasonable to rely on an oral statement purporting to modify the plan. Second, ERISA plans must provide a procedure for amending [the] plan, 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3), and modifications -13- made in contravention of the plan's stated procedure violate that requirement. Law, 956 F.2d at 370 n.9. It would be unreasonable to rely on an informal statement that departed from that procedure. Livick, 524 F.3d at 31. However, representations that interpret rather than modify the plan may provide a narrow window for estoppel recovery. Law, 956 F.2d at 370. We have observed that a plan beneficiary might reasonably rely on an informal statement interpreting an ambiguous plan provision; if the provision is clear, however, an informal statement in conflict with it is in effect purporting to modify the plan term, rendering any reliance on it inherently unreasonable. Livick, 524 F.3d at 31. We have explained that [t]his is why courts which do recognize ERISAestoppel do so only when the plan terms are ambiguous. Id. In this case, Guerra argues that ERISA estoppel applies because the terms of the Plan are ambiguous. Whether the terms of a contract are ambiguous is a question of law, subject to plenary review. Smart v. Gillette Co. Long-Term Disability Plan, 70 F.3d 173, 178 (1st Cir. 1995). We will usually find ambiguity if the terms are inconsistent on their face or the language can support reasonable differences of opinion as to [its] meaning. Id. (quoting Fashion House, Inc. v. K mart Corp., 892 F.2d 1076, 1083 (1st Cir. 1989)). Guerra has identified three alleged ambiguities in the Plan. We take each in turn. -14-
Guerra argues that an ambiguity exists in the Plan's definition of Years of Service. Years of Service are defined in § 1.35 of the Plan as the period of employment for BPPR or an affiliated company measured in years and months. In addition, Years of Service include years of active participation or employment with a handful of specified companies during limited periods when those companies were not affiliates of BPPR. Guerra argues that § 1.35 is ambiguous insofar as it leaves open the possibility that there may be other, unspecified exceptions. We rejected such thinking in Riley, when we reaffirmed our commitment to the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 744 F.3d at 249. The [expressio unius] maxim instructs that, when parties list specific items in a document, any item not so listed is typically thought to be excluded. . . . While this interpretive maxim is not always dispositive, it carries great weight . . . . Id. (quoting Smart, 70 F.3d at 179) (alteration and first omission in original). Here, the mere inclusion of specifically articulated exceptions does not render § 1.35 of the Plan ambiguous.
Reprising the same argument in a slightly different context, Guerra contends that the definition of Years of Credit is ambiguous because credit may be given for time employed with a closed set of unaffiliated employers. The argument fails here for -15- the same reason it failed in the preceding discussion on Years of Service.
Finally, Guerra maintains that there is a clear irreconcilable conflict between section 1.34 [Years of Credit] . . . and section 10.01. Section 10.01 gives BPPR the power to amend the Plan, retroactively or otherwise, at any time. Guerra insists that the power to amend is at odds with a non-fluid definition of Years of Credit for specified companies that were not affiliated with BPPR. In effect, he argues that because BPPR can change the Plan at any time, the otherwise clear provisions of the Plan are unstable or, to use a word more useful to his estoppel claim, ambiguous. But the bare power to amend a plan does not upset the clarity of its terms. Otherwise, every term in a plan subject to amendment would be ambiguous. The untenability of that argument is plain. Since Guerra has not shown any ambiguity in the Plan, his equitable estoppel claim necessarily fails.7 7 Guerra also argues that he has vested rights in the Banco de Ponce pension plan and that BPPR became liable for that pension when it acquired Banco de Ponce in 1990. The argument was not raised below until Guerra's post-judgment Rule 60(b) motion. The district court denied the motion and Guerra did not appeal that decision. Consequently, the issue was not preserved for appellate review. -16-