Opinion ID: 1189662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Status of imperfect self-defense and diminished capacity doctrines in 1981

Text: Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), italics added.) By contrast, Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. (Pen. Code, § 192, italics added.) The vice is the element of malice; in its absence the level of guilt must decline. ( People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 680 [160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1] [ Flannel ].) The doctrines of imperfect self-defense and diminished capacity arose from this principle. (2) We explained imperfect self-defense in Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668. It is the honest belief of imminent peril that negates malice in a case of complete self-defense; the reasonableness of the belief simply goes to the justification for the killing. ( Id., at p. 679.) We concluded that An honest but unreasonable belief that it is necessary to defend oneself from imminent peril to life or great bodily injury negates malice aforethought, the mental element necessary for murder, so that the chargeable offense is reduced to manslaughter. ( Id., at p. 674, some italics omitted.) (Although Flannel and other opinions referred to an honest belief we shall use the more precise term  actual belief  because it avoids the confusing suggestion inherent in the phrase honest belief that a person could have a dishonest belief, i.e., that a person could believe something he does not believe.) [1] (1b) This principle had common law antecedents ( Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 679) but was not a purely common law defense. Rather, because malice is a statutory requirement for a murder conviction (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), the statute required courts to determine whether an actual but unreasonable belief in the imminent need for self-defense rose to the level of malice within the statutory definition. The doctrine thus had statutory as well as common law roots. We observed in Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 681, that the doctrine had been obfuscated by infrequent reference and inadequate elucidation and thus, before the trial in that case, had not become a general principle of law requiring a sua sponte instruction. More important for our present purpose, though, is Flannel's conclusion that in future cases imperfect self-defense would be deemed to be so well-established a doctrine that it should be considered a general principle for purposes of jury instruction. ( Id., at p. 682.) Thus, by 1981 imperfect self-defense was demonstrably and firmly established. Diminished capacity was also well established by that time. [M]alice aforethought could be negated by showing that a person who intentionally killed was incapable of harboring malice aforethought because of a mental disease or defect or intoxication. [Citation.] To explain how diminished capacity negated malice, we redefined and expanded the mental component of malice aforethought beyond that stated in [Penal Code] section 188 to include a requirement that the defendant was able to comprehend the duty society places on all persons to act within the law, i.e., that he had an `awareness of the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating society.' ( People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1110 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588], fn. omitted, quoting People v. Conley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 310, 322 [49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911].) Absent this awareness by the defendant, a court could not find malice. Because imperfect self-defense and diminished capacity were firmly established by 1981, we assume the Legislature was aware of both doctrines and would have made clear any intent to abolish either doctrine. ( Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 303 [216 Cal. Rptr. 443, 702 P.2d 601]; Estate of McDill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 831, 839 [122 Cal. Rptr. 754, 537 P.2d 874].)