Opinion ID: 203236
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Marin argues, as he did at trial, [2] that the government's evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to prove that he possessed the recovered firearm in furtherance of his admitted drug dealing. Specifically Marin notes the uncontroverted evidence that he was not seen carrying a gun at any of the arranged deals. Thus, he argues, the only connection between the firearm and the cocaine was the gun's mere presence in the bedroom, which, Marin points out, did not even hold the lion's share of the stash. While Marin accurately recounts the two facts he relies on  he was not seen carrying the gun during the subject drug deals, and the significantly greater share of the cocaine was located in another part of the residence  his legal conclusion misses the mark by a wide margin. In analyzing Marin's sufficiency claim, [3] we must affirm the conviction if after de novo review of the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that a rational factfinder could find that the government proved the essential elements of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Stark, 499 F.3d 72, 79 (1st Cir.2007). Marin was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which prescribes various mandatory punishments for any person who, during and in relation to any ... drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm.... To obtain a conviction, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant: 1) committed a drug trafficking crime; 2) knowingly possessed a firearm; and 3) possessed the firearm in furtherance of the drug trafficking crime. United States v. Delgado-Hernandez, 420 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir.2005). Here, there is no dispute that Marin committed a drug trafficking crime and knowingly possessed a firearm. Marin's appellate argument is aimed at the in furtherance of requirement. The in furtherance of element does not have a settled, inelastic, definition. See id. (meaning is fluid); United States v. Felton, 417 F.3d 97, 104 (1st Cir.2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1048, 126 S.Ct. 1639, 164 L.Ed.2d 349 (2006) (meaning is not well-settled). Our cases, however, do provide sufficient guidance for the task here. In the context of a drug trafficking predicate, we have understood in furtherance of to demand showing a sufficient nexus between the firearm and the drug crime such that the firearm advances or promotes the drug crime. United States v. Grace, 367 F.3d 29, 34-35 (1st Cir.2004); United States v. Garner, 338 F.3d 78, 81 (1st Cir.2003). For example, we have held that possession of a firearm to protect drugs or sales proceeds can establish such a nexus. United States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 387, 399 (1st Cir.2007); Delgado-Hernandez, 420 F.3d at 31-32; Garner, 338 F.3d at 81. We have also analyzed in furtherance of evidence from both subjective and objective standpoints. Felton, 417 F.3d at 104-5. [4] In applying an objective analysis, we have often considered the proximity of the firearm to the contraband. In Grace, for example, we found evidence sufficient where an unloaded firearm was found in the same residence as drugs and sales proceeds. 367 F.3d at 34-35. And in United States v. Luciano, 329 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2003), we affirmed a conviction where the firearms were located in a crawl space also containing heroin and drug paraphernalia. Marin argues that the objective evidence consisted only of the presence of the handgun a few feet from an amount of drugs far smaller than what was found in the basement. This, he claims, in combination with the fact that there was no evidence of him carrying the gun while actually engaging in the drug deals, proves no more than mere presence of the firearm, insufficient to support a conviction. But there was much more to the evidence, which, taken in sum, supports a different conclusion. As noted, DEA agents discovered a loaded gun in Marin's bedroom where it would be easily accessible to him if surprised in the night. The weapon was found, with a loaded spare clip, under Marin's mattress, in the same room as  and only a few feet from  75 grams of cocaine and a digital scale, and in the same house as an additional 700 grams of cocaine and proceeds from drug sales. [5] We have little doubt that a jury could have reasonably inferred from this evidence that Marin possessed the firearm to protect his drug trafficking activities. Moreover, the jury also heard testimony that drug traffickers often possess firearms for protection of their trafficking activities. And, as we have noted, The cases dealing with weapons used in drug dealings regularly uphold `in furtherance' findings based on a weapon's capacity to counter resistance. Actual use may be more common in drug deals, but there is no requirement that actual use be proved. Felton, 417 F.3d at 105 (footnote omitted). Our conclusion is no different with respect to the evidence of Marin's subjective intent to possess the firearm in furtherance of his drug trafficking. Where direct evidence of subjective intent is lacking, the jury is free to infer intent from objective circumstances. Id. Here, in addition to the objective facts as noted above  the proximity of the gun to the cocaine, cash and paraphernalia, as well as it being easily accessed by Marin when he was otherwise vulnerable  the facts that the gun had an obliterated serial number and that Marin admitted that he purchased the gun from another cocaine dealer also support an inference that he subjectively intended to possess the weapon in furtherance of the underlying drug crime. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Marin's motion for judgment of acquittal.