Opinion ID: 200745
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant Capelton's Claims

Text: 26 Capelton moved the district court for a severance after White disclosed in a pre-trial hearing that he would be presenting a defense of entrapment. Anticipating that White would implicitly concede his participation in the course of presenting this defense, Capelton argued that White's entrapment defense would undermine his own strategy of denying participation in the conspiracy and putting the government to its proof. 27 We review the denial of a severance motion for manifest abuse of discretion. United States v. DeLeon, 187 F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1030, 120 S.Ct. 551, 145 L.Ed.2d 428 (1999). Capelton acknowledges on appeal that the standard for severance is a strict one and the defendant must show that he could not have received a fair trial. Indeed, we have previously recognized the general rule that defendants charged in the same indictment should be tried together, United States v. Houle, 237 F.3d 71, 75-76 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1074, 121 S.Ct. 2234, 150 L.Ed.2d 224 (2001), and expressed reluctance to reverse a denial of severance where the defenses at issue are only somewhat antagonistic, United States v. Serafino, 281 F.3d 327, 329 (1st Cir.2002), and not so irreconcilable as to involve fundamental disagreement over core and basic facts, United States v. Pena-Lora, 225 F.3d 17, 34 (1st Cir.2000) (internal quotations omitted). 28 Without elaborating at pointless length, we conclude that Capelton's skeletal argument for reversal on this ground is unavailing in light of 1) his failure to point to any specific testimony at trial that prejudiced his own defense, and 2) the court's explicit instruction to the jury that 29 you must consider the counts and the defendants separately. Mr. White and Mr. Capelton are charged with several different counts in the indictment. The counts, and the defendants, have been joined for trial. However, the counts and the defendants must be considered separately.
30 At 3:00 p.m. on August 23, 2000, Connecticut State Troopers Jeffrey Campbell and John Tollis received a cell phone call in their police cruiser from a federal surveillance team monitoring Capelton's movements. DEA agents provided the officers with a description of Capelton's vehicle, and informed the troopers that the defendant was traveling south on Interstate 91, having just left the scene of a drug transaction in Springfield. The officers positioned their vehicle behind Capelton, and pulled the defendant over after observing him switch lanes without using his turn signal. A pat frisk of the defendant revealed a large wad of money in his front pocket that matched, upon examination, the serial numbers of the buy money that Fisher had earlier used to purchase crack cocaine from White. Because the government's surveillance tapes failed to record Capelton actually exchanging drugs for money, the marked bills found on defendant's person were the linchpin of the government's circumstantial case against Capelton. 31 Not surprisingly, Capelton argues on appeal that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress this physical evidence. We will review this claim by considering whether the Connecticut State Police had sufficient cause, apart from the traffic violation, 2 to stop Capelton's vehicle and whether they had probable cause to search his person and to seize the serialized money. 32 Our review of the ultimate determinations of probable cause and reasonable suspicion on a motion to suppress is de novo. Review of subsidiary factual findings is for clear error. United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 39 (1st Cir.2001) (citations omitted). The Connecticut State Police needed an articulable and reasonable suspicion that [Capelton] was engaged in criminal activity to justify a Terry stop of his car. United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79, 92 (1st Cir.2001) (upholding a Terry stop of a pickup truck). While this involves more than a mere hunch, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than for probable cause. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). 33 Detective Fisher's detailed testimony during the pretrial evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress recounted the DEA agents' close surveillance of Capelton before, during and after the August 23 drug transaction. The knowledge may be imputed from the DEA agents to the state police who actually effectuated the stop under the fellow officer rule. United States v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 555 (1st Cir.1999) ([T]he focus is upon the collective knowledge possessed by, and the aggregate information available to, all the officers involved in the investigation.) In a case very similar to this one, we concluded that there [was] no doubt that the police were justified under Terry in stopping the defendant's vehicle after observing him sell drugs to an undercover officer, United States v. Schiavo, 29 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir.1994), and we reach the same conclusion here. The police observed Capelton engage in illegal drug sales and then pulled him over. As was the case in Schiavo, there is no doubt that the Terry stop was justified. 34 The next inquiry is whether the officers' warrantless search of Capelton's front pocket and their seizure of the serialized currency was justified. While it would have been permissible for the police to search Capelton's car incident to the stop, [t]he search of one's person is more intrusive on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than the search of an automobile. Schiavo, 29 F.3d at 9. Therefore, we will only uphold the search if the police demonstrated that they had probable cause and that exigent circumstances justified the search in the absence of a warrant. 35 We can easily dismiss the second factor. The district court concluded that the officers did not need a warrant to conduct this search in light of the exigent circumstance that Capelton was mobile at the time the police developed probable cause. This created a risk that the evidence would be spirited away, Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 565, 119 S.Ct. 1555, 143 L.Ed.2d 748 (1999), if the officers delayed the search until a proper warrant could be secured. On appeal, Capelton does not question the existence of exigent circumstances. Thus, we will confine our review to the issue of probable cause. 36 Probable cause for a search can be demonstrated by `facts and circumstances... sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' he was observing criminal activity and the fruits of criminal activity. United States v. Ferrara, 539 F.2d 799, 801 (1st Cir.1976) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)). The district court felt that the police surveillance on August 23 provided sufficient probable cause to execute the search: 37 The defendant was positively identified by two officers, both of whom had an ample opportunity to observe him and who had seen him on previous occasions. Further, he was identified by Gary White as the source of the drugs, and the pattern of activity clearly indicated that it was the defendant who provided White with the crack cocaine given the undercover agent that day. 38 Teams of surveillance agents continuously followed Capelton after the sale. Other than getting out to pump his gas, he did not leave the car between the time of the sale and when he was stopped by the officers. Therefore, the police were justified in believing that the fruit of his criminal activity, the serialized currency, was in his possession. This belief provided them with sufficient probable cause to justify the search. 39
40 Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) excludes from the category of hearsay statement[s] by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). As a predicate for admitting evidence under this rule, the trial court must conclude that it is more likely than not that the declarant and the defendant were members of a conspiracy when the hearsay statement was made, and that the statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir.1977). In our circuit, this determination is referred to as a Petrozziello ruling. Significantly, the trial court is not required to decide the Petrozziello question prior to admitting hearsay statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), but may admit the statement[s] provisionally, subject to its final Petrozziello determination at the close of all the evidence. United States v. Isabel, 945 F.2d 1193, 1199 n. 10 (1st Cir.1991). Generally, we review the trial court's determination that statements were coconspirator statements under the clear error standard. United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 25 (1st Cir.2002) (citing United States v. Mojica-Baez, 229 F.3d 292, 304 (1st Cir.2000)). This deferential standard of review places a heavy burden on a defendant seeking to overturn a trial court's Petrozziello ruling. Reich v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 44 F.3d 1060, 1080 (1st Cir.1995). 41 In United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161 (1st Cir.1993), we held that a coconspirator's statement, standing alone, is insufficient to meet the preponderance standard of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) ... [A]dmitting the statement into evidence requires some extrinsic proof of the declarant's involvement in the conspiracy. Id. at 1181-82. Capelton unpersuasively argues that the government failed to produce any extrinsic proof linking the co-defendants. Marked bills from the August 23, 2000 transaction between Fisher and White were found on Capelton's person when he was arrested. The record also indicates that surveillance videos introduced by the government depict Capelton arriving at White's residence, and show White walking back and forth between Fisher's car and Capelton's car during the July 24 and August 23 drug transactions. This evidence easily satisfies the extrinsic proof requirement of Sepulveda, and we accordingly find no clear error in the district court's Petrozziello ruling. 3
42 Capelton claims that the district court erroneously denied him a downward departure under § 5H1.6 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and argues that this provision allows for a downward departure for unusual family circumstances. At Capelton's sentencing hearing, the court took note that the defendant grew up with drug addicted parents, and was forced to live on the streets and provide for his younger brother from the time he was twelve years old. The court commented that it had rarely encountered a childhood as horrendous as this, and acknowledged that the defendant's situation, as he was growing up, [was] almost unimaginably difficult. 43 The judge nonetheless rejected Capelton's motion for a downward departure citing the defendant's extensive criminal background and his failure to take advantage of numerous opportunities to rehabilitate himself: I am persuaded ... that the defendant has had an awfully large number of bites of the apple and, unfortunately, this is the time when the chickens come home to roost.... [U]nfortunately, I don't think there's any basis for downward departure in this case. 44 Our prior jurisprudence establishes that we lack jurisdiction to review a discretionary decision not to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Mejia, 309 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir.2002); see United States v. Louis, 300 F.3d 78, 81 (1st Cir.2002). We may review a sentencing court's conclusion that it does not have legal authority to depart from the sentencing guidelines, Mejia, 309 F.3d at 69-70; however, the court recognized that it had such authority here. Therefore, we will not review the court's discretionary decision.