Opinion ID: 2802967
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Federal Civil Rights Claim.

Text: The Bakers brought their action against the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This section of the United States Code allows redress for individuals “whose constitutional rights were deprived by persons acting under color of state law.” Minor v. State, 819 N.W.2d 383, 393 (Iowa 2012). To be successful on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim a plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the constitution and laws of the United States, (2) that the defendant acted under color of state law, (3) that the conduct was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s damage, and (4) the amount of damages. Leydens v. City of Des Moines, 484 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Iowa 1992). The fighting issue between the Bakers and the City is whether the City violated the Bakers’ federal constitutional rights by enforcing the ordinance. The district court concluded in its ruling on the City’s motion for summary judgment that the City’s enforcement of the ordinance that failed to contain an exemption for small employers from the City’s employment discrimination laws did not violate the Bakers’ constitutional rights. A. Freedom of Association. The First Amendment embodies the freedom of association, the right to “enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships [without] undue intrusion by the State.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3249, 82 L. Ed. 2d 462, 471 (1984). [T]he constitutional shelter afforded such relationships reflects the realization that individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others. Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one’s identity that is central to any concept of liberty. 9 Id. at 619, 104 S. Ct. at 3250, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 472. This court has recognized the notions of freedom of association guided the general assembly’s policy decision behind the exemption for small employers found in Iowa Code section 216.6(6)(a) (2003). See Baker I, 750 N.W.2d at 101–02. In Baker I, however, we did not hold that the Iowa City ordinance, which failed to exempt small employers, violated the right of freedom of association under the Federal Constitution. Rather, we held the ordinance was unconstitutional under the home rule provision of the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 99–102. Iowa Code section 216.6 exempts employers employing fewer than four individuals from the state employment discrimination laws, while the exemption found in federal law exempts employers employing fewer than fifteen individuals. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b), 2000e–2(a) (2012), with Iowa Code § 216.6(6)(a). The purpose of the federal exemption “is to spare very small firms from the potentially crushing expense of mastering the intricacies of the antidiscrimination laws, establishing procedures to assure compliance, and defending against suits when efforts at compliance fail.” Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 447, 123 S. Ct. 1673, 1678, 155 L. Ed. 2d 615, 624–25 (2003) (“[T]he congressional decision to limit the coverage of the legislation to firms with 15 or more employees has its own justification that must be respected—namely, easing entry into the market and preserving the competitive position of smaller firms.”). In Iowa, the general assembly chose to exempt fewer employers. This policy decision granting exemptions is a reflection of the state’s determination that the costs to those employers with fewer than four employees would be prohibitive and reflects the legislative body decision 10 that “notions of freedom of association should preponderate over concepts of equal opportunity in these situations.” Arthur Bonfield, State Civil Rights Statutes: Some Proposals, 49 Iowa L. Rev. 1067, 1109 (1964) [hereinafter Bonfield] (emphasis added). The Bakers assert the City’s ordinance as applied to them violated their freedom of association as a small employer. While it is true the ordinance was in direct conflict with the state law, the ordinance as applied to the Bakers does not rise to the level of violating federal constitutional rights. The First Amendment protection of freedom of association is not absolute and as the Supreme Court recognized in Roberts, the Constitution does not afford protection to those associations lacking in the qualities intrinsic to the freedom of association. 468 U.S. at 619–20, 104 S. Ct. at 3250–51, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 472–73. The exemption for small employers exists “because the smallness of the employer’s staff is usually likely to mean for him a rather close, intimate, personal, and constant association with his employees.” Bonfield, 49 Iowa L. Rev. at 1109. However, the Bakers employ a resident manager for the property they own in Iowa City because the Bakers live out of state and are not able to manage the property remotely. We do not believe the City’s application of its antidiscrimination ordinance to this primarily nonpersonal relationship between parties who reside hundreds of miles apart violates the Bakers’ First Amendment right of freedom of association. Mr. Baker attempts to create a constitutionally protected relationship with his resident manager because he has close intimate ties with the property, his childhood home. However, the freedom of association protects personal relationships, not sentimental feelings towards one’s property. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619–20, 104 S. Ct. at 3250–51, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 472– 11 73. The Bakers do not have close, intimate, personal, and constant contact with their employee from across the country. Therefore, the City’s ordinance did not deprive the Bakers of their right to freedom of association. B. Commercial Speech. The Bakers next argue the City violated their First Amendment right to freedom of speech because they feared additional enforcement of the ordinance by the City if they posted a job opening for a resident manager and then declined to hire an individual. In other words, they claim the City’s ordinance directly regulated their speech. However, the City did nothing to prevent the Bakers from posting the job opening for a new resident manager. The City has a right to prevent discrimination by enacting an antidiscrimination ordinance or enforcing the state statute. As long as the Bakers comply with a constitutional ordinance, such as the state statute, they would not be subject to future enforcement actions. Even if we were to find the Bakers’ argument has some merit, we reject it. The Supreme Court has recognized advertisements for employment are commercial speech. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385, 93 S. Ct. 2553, 2559, 37 L. Ed. 2d 669, 677 (1973). However, the Constitution affords commercial speech less protection than other forms of protected speech. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–63, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 2350, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341, 348–49 (1980). If the state forces a person to modify his or her speech to avoid prosecution, the law in question may violate the person’s First Amendment rights. See St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Gaertner, 439 F.3d 481, 487 (8th Cir. 2006). An individual can establish injury by proving he or she would have engaged in protected speech but that the 12 existence of the statute prevented it. 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 627 (8th Cir. 2011). The City was in the process of enforcing the ordinance when the Bakers filed this claim. Thus, it was reasonable for the Bakers to believe if they discriminated against another applicant, the City would again enforce the ordinance, as the ordinance did not contain an exemption for small employers. Therefore, the Bakers have standing to challenge the ordinance on First Amendment grounds. See Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 392–93, 108 S. Ct. 636, 642–43, 98 L. Ed. 2d 782, 793–94 (1988). The Supreme Court in Central Hudson lays out a four-part test to determine if a state action deprives the right to commercial speech. [W]e must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566, 100 S. Ct. at 2351, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 351. We agree with the Bakers that the speech in question concerns the posting of a job opening, a lawful and nonmisleading communication. Thus, the Bakers’ job posting is a type of protected speech. See id. Next, we must determine if the City’s interest is substantial. Id. As one author noted, “Antidiscrimination law is the primary means by which organized society protects individuals against disadvantageous treatment on the basis of their membership in certain groups, archetypally racial or ethnic minority groups.” Peter J. Rubin, Equal 13 Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature of Antidiscrimination Law, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 564, 568 (1998). We find the City has a substantial interest in ensuring all its citizens receive equal treatment in the area of employment. Finally, we must determine if the ordinance advances the City’s goal of ending discrimination, and if so, whether it is more extensive than necessary. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566, 100 S. Ct. at 2351, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 351. The City did not place requirements on employers regarding who they must hire or attempt to dictate how the employer must run his or her business. The City was only telling its employers that if they were going to hire a person for a position, the employer could not discriminate based on age, color, creed, disability, gender identity, marital status, national origin, race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation. The employer still has the prerogative of employing the best person qualified for the position as long as his or her employment decision does not discriminate based on the age, color, creed, disability, gender identity, marital status, national origin, race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation of the employee. For this reason, we find the ordinance was not more extensive than necessary to serve the interest of prohibiting discrimination. Therefore, when we apply the Central Hudson test to the City’s ordinance, we find it did not deprive the Bakers of their exercise of commercial speech. C. Due Process. The Bakers also argue the City violated their procedural and substantive due process rights under the United States Constitution. 1. Procedural due process. The Constitution provides no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. In deciding what process is due a 14 party, we balance three competing interests. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 33 (1976). The Supreme Court has stated these interests are: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail. Id. We have previously said even though an alternative procedure may be wiser or fairer, the procedure the government entity provides does not necessarily violate due process. Ghost Player, L.L.C. v. State, 860 N.W.2d 323, 330 (Iowa 2015). The private interest affected by the enforcement of the ordinance through the administrative hearing gives the Bakers substantial due process throughout the proceedings. The City first engaged in an impartial probable cause hearing prior to bringing the action against the Bakers. After finding probable cause, the Bakers were entitled to a hearing in which the City would have to prove a violation of the ordinance. At that hearing, the Bakers could have raised their constitutional arguments. If the ordinance was unconstitutional and the City attempted to enforce it after the administrative hearing, the Bakers had a meaningful right of appeal to contest the administrative findings. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(a) (acknowledging a party to an administrative proceeding can raise the constitutionality of an agency action or rule). The probable cause hearing, followed by a hearing on the merits and a meaningful right of appeal process, satisfies the Bakers’ procedural due process rights. 15 The Bakers chose not to let the administrative proceedings play out, but instead chose to shortcut the administrative process set up by our legislature and file their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Just because the Bakers chose to file their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim before the administrative proceedings concluded, does not mean the Bakers’ procedural due process rights were violated. 2. Substantive due process. The Bakers next argue that the City’s enforcement of the ordinance violated their substantive due process rights of association and free speech under the First Amendment. We have already determined in this opinion that the City’s enforcement of the ordinance did not violate the Bakers’ rights of association and free speech under the First Amendment. Thus, the right to hire a person in violation of the City’s antidiscrimination ordinance is not a fundamental right. Because the rights implicated are not fundamental, the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the City’s ordinance is rational basis. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S. Ct. 939, 942–43, 59 L. Ed. 2d 171, 176 (1979). Under the rational basis test, the ordinance is valid so long as “it is rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest.” Id. at 97, 99 S. Ct. at 943, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 176 (internal quotation marks omitted). The City’s purpose in enacting the ordinance was to prevent employment discrimination in the city. The City has a legitimate interest in attempting to eradicate discrimination in employment so that its citizens do not receive disadvantageous treatment because of their identification within certain groups. The City’s antidiscrimination ordinance furthered the City’s legitimate interest to eradicate 16 employment discrimination in Iowa City. Thus, the enforcement of the ordinance did not violate the Bakers’ due process rights. D. Equal Protection. Lastly, the Bakers argue the City violated their equal protection rights under the United States Constitution because the ordinance includes an exemption for religious institutions,3 employers hiring persons to work within the employers’ home, 4 and employers hiring persons to perform personal services, 5 but did not include an exemption for small employers in the ordinance. The Federal Equal Protection Clause provides no state may “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The first step in determining whether a statute violates equal protection is to determine whether the statute creates different classifications between similarly situated persons. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439–40, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313, 320 (1985). For the purposes of this appeal, we will assume the Bakers are similarly situated to other small employers in the 3TheIowa City ordinance provides an exemption from the ordinance to an employer who meets the following: Any bona fide religious institution or its educational facility, association, corporation or society with respect to any qualifications for employment based on religion when such qualifications are related to a bona fide religious purpose. A religious qualification for instructional personnel or an administrative officer, serving in a supervisory capacity of a bona fide religious educational facility or religious institution shall be presumed to be a bona fide occupational qualification. Iowa City, Iowa, City Code § 2-3-1(F)(1). 4The Iowa City ordinance provides an exemption from the ordinance for “[t]he employment of individuals for work within the home of the employer if the employer or members of the family reside therein during such employment.” Id. § 2-3-1(F)(3). 5The Iowa City ordinance provides an exemption from the ordinance for “[t]he employment of individuals to render personal service to the person of the employer or members of the employer’s family.” Id. § 2-3-1(F)(4). 17 City who receive an exemption under the ordinance. See LSCP, LLLP v. Kay-Decker, 861 N.W.2d 846, 860 (Iowa 2015) (assuming without deciding the two proffered groups were similarly situated for the purposes of an equal protection claim). If the statute treats similarly situated persons differently, we must then determine what level of scrutiny is required. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2394, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786, 799 (1982) (“[W]e would not be faithful to our obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment if we applied so deferential a standard to every classification.”). Therefore, it is necessary to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the ordinance. The Supreme Court has stated that [u]nless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S. Ct. 2513, 2516–