Opinion ID: 1723051
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suitable provision

Text: In Edgewood III, we recognized that local ad valorem taxes now are expected to provide most of the basic needs of education. 826 S.W.2d at 494. This fact, we wrote, does not in itself signify a constitutional violation: [L]ocal revenue may play a role in achieving an efficient system of free public schools.... We have not attempted to dictate to the Legislature what part local revenue should play in funding public education, viewing that decision as properly the Legislature's prerogative in the first instance. Although the Constitution requires the Legislature to establish and make suitable provision for free public schools, it contains no specific requirement that public education be funded completely with state revenue. Id. at 503. The property-rich districts argue, however, that the State's reliance on local revenue is so great that it violates the Constitution. Under Senate Bill 7, locally-generated revenue accounts for about 57 percent of all state and local spending on education, as compared with about 54 percent at the time of Edgewood III. [19] By providing only 43 percent of education costs, the property-rich districts argue, the State has violated its duty to make suitable provision for the public school system, as required by article VII, section 1 of the Texas Constitution. Article VII, section 1, imposes a mandatory duty on the Legislature to establish an education system. Mumme v. Marrs, 120 Tex. 383, 40 S.W.2d 31, 35 (1931). In Edgewood I, we reaffirmed that the requirement of suitability is a judicially-enforceable mandate: By express constitutional mandate, the legislature must make suitable provision for an efficient system for the essential purpose of a general diffusion of knowledge. While these are admittedly not precise terms, they do provide a standard by which this court must, when called upon to do so, measure the constitutionality of the legislature's actions.... If the system is not efficient or not suitable, the legislature has not discharged its constitutional duty and it is our duty to say so. 777 S.W.2d at 394. We have not, however, attempted to dictate to the Legislature the means by which this duty is to be fulfilled: Since the Legislature has the mandatory duty to make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools, and has the power to pass any law relative thereto, not prohibited by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it has a choice in the selection of methods by which the object of the organic law may be effectuated. The Legislature alone is to judge what means are necessary and appropriate for a purpose which the Constitution makes legitimate. The legislative determination of the methods, restrictions, and regulations is final, except when so arbitrary as to be violative of the constitutional rights of the citizen. .... The word suitable, used in connection with the word provision in this section of the Constitution, is an elastic term, depending upon the necessities of changing times or conditions, and clearly leaves to the Legislature the right to determine what is suitable, and its determination will not be reviewed by the courts if the act has a real relation to the subject and object of the Constitution. Mumme v. Marrs, 40 S.W.2d at 36. The property-rich districts argue that the Legislature itself has established standards for measuring suitability and has failed to meet those standards. In particular, the districts point to two general provisions in the Texas Education Code: section 16.001 (State Policy), which provides that the education system is to be substantially financed through state revenue sources; and section 16.002 (Purpose of Foundation School Program), which states that Tier 1 guarantees sufficient financing for all school districts to provide a basic program of education that meets accreditation and other legal standards. As the district court correctly noted, the Legislature's funding obligations are generally limited to what it appropriates, regardless of what it promises in other statutes. See Mutchler v. Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety, 681 S.W.2d 282, 284-85 (Tex. App.Austin 1984, no writ). We accordingly reject the property-rich districts' arguments that Senate Bill 7, under the present circumstances, has failed to make suitable provision for the public school system. In a related argument, the Humble group of appellants asserts that the present finance system is unconstitutional because it fails to fund mandates imposed on local districts by state law. The district court rejected this argument on legal grounds, and severed related factual matters as so-called adequacy questions to be decided in a later trial if necessary. [20] Even so, as noted in Part III, supra, the district court found that every district can meet accreditation and other legal standards from Tier 1 and Tier 2 funding. On this record, therefore, we reject Humble's argument. On the same basis, we reject the corollary argument that the Legislature's mandates are void until such time as the Legislature provides additional funding. Certainly, if the Legislature substantially defaulted on its responsibility such that Texas school children were denied access to that education needed to participate fully in the social, economic, and educational opportunities available in Texas, the suitable provision clause would be violated. The present record, however, does not reflect any such abdication. Total state aid has risen dramatically since 1988-89, from $4.9 billion to over $7 billion; and while the wealthiest districts are now receiving substantially less from the State than in 1988-89, total state and local revenue has grown significantly for all districts. Given these facts, we hold that the Legislature has not violated its constitutional duty to make suitable provision for the public school system.