Opinion ID: 222594
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Classifying the Ready-Mix Concrete Business

Text: The nature of the employer's obligations following the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement depends on whether the agreement was constituted according to NLRA section 9(a) or section 8(f). If Irving Ready-Mix as a ready-mix concrete company qualifies under section 8(f) as an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry, then it is not subject to some of the NLRA's unfair labor practice restrictions in section 8(a) and was entitled to withdraw recognition from the union. See Engineered Steel Concepts, Inc., 352 N.L.R.B. 589, 600 (2008), citing John Deklewa & Sons, 282 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1987), enforced sub nom. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 3 v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988). If the employer does not qualify under section 8(f), then the union was entitled to a rebuttable presumption that a majority of drivers still supported it as the exclusive collective bargaining representative pursuant to section 9(a) even after the old agreement expired. Engineered Steel Concepts, 352 N.L.R.B. at 600; St. John Trucking, 303 N.L.R.B. 723, 729 (1991). The employer has made no attempt to rebut that presumption. Thus, if the employer is not covered by the section 8(f) exception, its withdrawal of recognition violated section 8(a). We turn now to this principal issue. Ready-mix concrete, involving the delivery of fresh wet concrete manufactured at a plant to a work site in a transit mixer truck, is not a recent innovation. [2] This court and the Board have had occasion to address the activities of ready-mix concrete companies in several cases. The Board has previously decided this very question under section 8(f) and concluded that a ready-mix concrete company is not an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry. Irving Ready-Mix does not contend that it presents a novel claim here. Rather, it suggests that the Board precedents on which the ALJ and the district court based their decisions were wrongly decided. The ALJ and district court relied on J.P. Sturrus Corp., 288 N.L.R.B. 668 (1988), in which the Board agreed with an ALJ's finding that ready-mix concrete delivery was not considered construction for purposes of section 8(f). There, the ALJ looked to prior Board precedent stating that ready-mix concrete delivery did not fall within the meaning of construction under NLRA section 8(e) and extended that line of reasoning to the building and construction industry under section 8(f). [3] The Board added that although the drivers occasionally, and at their own discretion, assist the contractor at the construction site with screeting and spreading of concrete, after they have poured it, such incidental tasks did not bring the company within the building and construction industry as required by section 8(f). 288 N.L.R.B. at 668. Since J.P. Sturrus, the Board has repeatedly held that ready-mix concrete delivery companies and similar businesses that deliver construction materials to job sites are not engaged in construction for purposes of section 8(f). See Engineered Steel Concepts, 352 N.L.R.B. at 602 (noting entire line of J.P. Sturrus cases and concluding that employers engaged in the transportation and delivery of scrap steel were not engaged primarily in the building and construction industry and, as a result, could not enter into a section 8(f) relationship); Mastronardi Mason Materials Co., 336 N.L.R.B. 1296, 1306-07 (2001) (relying on J.P. Sturrus for classifying agreement between ready-mix concrete employer and union); Techno Construction Corp., 333 N.L.R.B. 75, 81-83 (2001) (discussing the J.P. Sturrus holding and using it as guidance to refine the range of work comprised by the building and construction industry); St. John Trucking, 303 N.L.R.B. at 730 (acknowledging teaching of J.P. Sturrus and holding that an employer engaged in the transportation and delivery of stones, sand, and commodities at job sites was not engaged in the building and construction industry for purposes of section 8(f)). Like other construction material manufacturers and suppliers, ready-mix concrete falls in a grey area between construction labor, such as carpentry for framing homes, and manufacture of building materials, such as bricks or nails. But section 8(f) requires that a line be drawn somewhere and drawing that line is more the Board's job than it is ours. As a general matter, we defer to the Board's judgment with respect to such specialized issues of labor law. See Local 15, IBEW v. NLRB, 429 F.3d 651, 655-56 (7th Cir. 2005). Here, we follow the Board's consistent and reasonable judgment that ready-mix concrete suppliers, like other companies whose primary role is to deliver construction materials to a job site, do not fall within the building and construction industry for purposes of section 8(f). The employer here nevertheless insists that J.P. Sturrus was wrongly decided and that we should treat it as an aberration. To support this contention, the employer relies on the Board's earlier decision in Carpet, Linoleum and Soft Tile Local Union No. 1247 (Indio Paint & Rug Center), 156 N.L.R.B. 951 (1966). In Indio Paint, the Board held that the employer, a flooring installer, was primarily engaged in the building and construction industry within the meaning of section 8(f), as a special trade contractor. The Board noted that the legislative history of section 8(f) provided little guidance on what precise definition Congress intended the building and construction industry to encompass. 156 N.L.R.B. at 957. The Board adopted the traditional meaning of the terms as used in common parlance as well as in technical industrial parlance. Id. Through its detailed analysis, the Indio Paint decision gave ALJs guidance regarding the scope of the term building and construction industry. That industry includes employers engaged in the provision of labor whereby materials and constituent parts may be combined on the building site, but not those carrying out the manufacture and assembly of products installed by others at the construction site. Id. at 959. In this case, the employer's principal argument is that, under the methodology of Indio Paint, ready-mix concrete companies are building and construction companies. The employer contends that the Board's decision in J.P. Sturrus, which did not cite Indio Paint, was flawed because it broke from the Indio Paint precedent without explanation or justification. In our view, the employer's argument is undermined by the Board's favorable treatment of J.P. Sturrus in cases involving ready-mix concrete companies over the past twenty years. If later cases had adopted contradictory positions or questioned the discrepancy, the employer's argument might carry more weight. But its argument that J.P. Sturrus failed to properly apply section 8(f) runs head-on into the several cases consistently upholding and applying that decision. Contrary to the employer's contention, this pattern of Board precedent is not like the deviation we described in Milwaukee and Southeast Wisconsin District Council of Carpenters v. Rowley-Schlimgen, Inc., 2 F.3d 765 (7th Cir.1993). There, we found that the Board's decision in Chicago District Council of Carpenters (Polk Brothers, Inc.), 275 N.L.R.B. 294 (1985) was a departure from the Board's otherwise consistent treatment of section 8(e) in preceding and subsequent cases. 2 F.3d at 768. As a result, we attributed little precedential value to Polk Brothers, noting that when the Board fails to distinguish contradictory decisions rendered in similar cases, it forfeits `the deference we would otherwise show to its very considerable expertise in strictly labor matters.' Id., quoting Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 884 F.2d 34, 37 (1st Cir.1989). There was no such aberration here. The solid line of cases reiterating J.P. Sturrus ' holding supports the district court's conclusion that the Director is likely to succeed on the merits. We conclude that the district court did not err. We AFFIRM its order.