Opinion ID: 349481
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Disclosure of the Data Collected by Form 64

Text: 45 The FPC's position on the disclosure of the data collected by Form 64 has changed markedly. The initial Notice of Proposed Rulemaking did not discuss the extent to which the information submitted by producers on the proposed questionnaire would be available for public inspection. In response to numerous expressions of concern about the dangers of unrestricted disclosure which it received in written comments, the FPC addressed the confidentiality problem in Order No. 543. There it announced that although it recognized that complete disclosure of the information submitted might prove detrimental to the interests of some producers, it had determined that the public right to the information outweighs the (producers) proprietary interest (in non-disclosure). In the ordering paragraphs of its opinion, the FPC went on to say: Information filed pursuant to this order shall be made available at the Commission's offices for public inspection. The adoption of this explicitly wide-open disclosure policy provoked heightened criticism from producers. As a result, on petition for rehearing, the FPC softened its stance. It agreed to utilize the data yielded by Form 64 in composite or aggregate form where appropriate. But it then went on to say: 46 We shall also make Form No. 64 information public but shall delete the name of each independent producer from the heading. If there is need for the identification of any individual independent producer or group of independent producers, we shall consider that question when it arises in the context of a specific case. 47 Finally, in the ordering paragraphs of its opinion in Order No. 543-A, the FPC stated: 48 Information contained in Form No. 64 shall be made public without further notice to the following extent only: 49 Composite or aggregate data or data submitted by any party, if his name and any information permitting identification by reference to other public records is deleted. Continental Oil Company v. F. P. C., 519 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1975). 50 The petitioners object to the disclosure policy established by Order No. 543-A on the ground that since the data sought by Form 64 falls within exemptions (4) and (9) 20 of the Freedom of Information Act, that statute bars the FPC from making the data public. We think that this argument has been conclusively answered by our decision in Pennzoil Co. v. FPC, 534 F.2d 627, 629-31 (5th Cir. 1976), which held that the mere fact that . . . information is encompassed within the exclusions of the Freedom of Information Act does not prohibit its disclosure. 534 F.2d at 632. 51 The petitioners seek to avoid the impact of our ruling in Pennzoil by suggesting that it is inconsistent with an earlier decision rendered by another panel of this court 21 which the Pennzoil panel was obliged to follow under this circuit's rule that one panel may not disregard an earlier decision by another. See Fed.R.App.P. 35; Miller v. San Sebastian Gold Mine, Inc., 540 F.2d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lewis, 475 F.2d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 1973). We are not required to reconcile Pennzoil with Continental. We adhere to the latest decision because the Pennzoil panel had before it the Supreme Court's decision in Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976), handed down after the decision in Continental Oil, to aid it in resolving this difficult question of statutory construction. 22 Rose dealt with whether the exceptions to the Freedom of Information Act prohibit agency disclosure of information falling within their terms. In describing the provisions and purposes of the Act, the Court stated: 52 There are, however, exemptions from compelled disclosure. They are nine in number and are set forth in § 552(b). But these limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act. 53 425 U.S. at 361, 96 S.Ct. at 1599, 48 L.Ed.2d at 21. The Pennzoil panel quoted this remark, emphasizing the word compelled, and relied upon it as authority for the proposition that various statements of the Supreme Court strongly suggest that the statute is not an absolute bar to disclosure. See 534 F.2d at 630. Rose reaffirmed Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 93 S.Ct. 827, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973), a case not mentioned in Continental Oil but cited repeatedly in Pennzoil, by quoting with approval its earlier statement that (s)ubsection (b) . . . represents the congressional determination of the types of information that the Executive Branch must have the option to keep confidential, if it so chooses. 425 U.S. at 361, 96 S.Ct. at 1599, 48 L.Ed.2d at 21, quoting Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. at 80, 93 S.Ct. at 832, 35 L.Ed.2d at 128. In light of the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Rose, the Pennzoil panel's refusal to follow the decision in Continental Oil was fully justified. 54 Section 14 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 717m(a) (1976), authorizes the FPC to publish the information gathered in the course of discharging its regulatory responsibilities. But as we recognized in Pennzoil and as counsel for the FPC conceded during oral argument, disclosure of all or portions of such information might nonetheless be barred if the decision to make it public would constitute abuse of agency discretion. 534 F.2d at 631. In Pennzoil, we held that a decision to reveal confidential information to the public cannot withstand judicial scrutiny unless the FPC considers the following factors and explains why they support its decision: (1) The extent to which disclosure will significantly aid the FPC in fulfilling its statutory functions; (2) the extent of the harm that disclosure might cause (a) producers, and (b) the public generally; and (3) the availability of alternatives to full disclosure that would adequately inform those who seek to knowledgably participate in the FPC's decision making process but would at the same time eliminate or mitigate the injury that unrestricted disclosure would cause to producers. 534 F.2d at 632. Because Orders Nos. 543 and 543-A were issued prior to delineation of the procedures set out in Pennzoil, we decline to remand Order No. 543-A to the FPC with directions that it now make the determinations that Pennzoil requires. 55 Insofar as Order No. 543-A permits public disclosure of data in composite or aggregate form, or in such a way that attribution of the information to individuals is not possible, it is affirmed. This type of disclosure reflects a reasonable balance of the producers' interest in secrecy and the public's right to know how they conduct their business. See Halverson, An Analysis of the Oil and Natural Gas Reserve Reporting Problem: The Government's Need to Know Versus the Private Company's Need to Protect the Confidentiality of its Sensitive Business Information, 27th Institute on Oil and Gas Law 119, 134 (1976); cf. Continental Oil Co. v. FPC, 519 F.2d at 36 (disclosure of data in composite or aggregate form does not violate the FOIA). In Order No. 543-A, the FPC also stated that it would make the completed questionnaires themselves available to the public after the names of the producers have been deleted, and might under some circumstances identify particular producers. The producers assert it would readily be possible to identify the individual producers furnishing the information from the configuration of responses on their questionnaires and the information given. Neither of these latter two types of disclosure gives those filing Form 64 the same degree of protection afforded by the disclosure of data solely in composite or aggregate form. Should the FPC determine that it should make completed questionnaires available for public inspection or disclose the identities of individual producers, it must first comply with the procedures prescribed by our decision in Pennzoil, then inform the producers involved of its determination, and finally, withhold publication of the data until the producers have had an opportunity to secure judicial review.