Opinion ID: 1811743
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First Larrison Prong

Text: In its order denying postconviction relief, the court stated that Quantez had no disincentive to recant his trial testimony. Therefore, the court concluded that it was not convinced that Quantez's testimony at trial was false. [1] Turnage argues that the court abused its discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing to determine Quantez's credibility before drawing conclusions about Quantez's trial testimony. The showing a postconviction petitioner must make in order to receive an evidentiary hearing is lower than the showing required for a new trial. Opsahl v. State (Opsahl II), 677 N.W.2d 414, 423 (Minn.2004). A hearing is required unless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2006). Any doubts by the court about whether to hold an evidentiary hearing should be resolved in favor of the party requesting the hearing. Ferguson, 645 N.W.2d at 446. In Wilson v. State, 726 N.W.2d 103 (Minn.2007), we reversed the district court's denial of an evidentiary hearing based, in part, on a witness's recantation of trial testimony. We determined that an evidentiary hearing was appropriate because it was difficult if not impossible to test [the recanting witness's] conflicting statements without examining [the recanting witness] under oath. Id. at 107. We concluded that absent a hearing, the postconviction court cannot make a judgment about which story is true and which is false. Id. We reiterate here what we said in Wilson and in Ferguson regarding the necessity of an evidentiary hearing to resolve credibility issues. But because our analysis of the second Larrison prong is dispositive of this appeal, we do not decide whether the postconviction court abused its discretion under the first Larrison prong.