Opinion ID: 6111054
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ark. Code Ann. section 5-1-104Extraterritorial Jurisdiction

Text: Turning to the merits of Torres's first basis for reversal, Torres asserts that  the circuit court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict on rape felony murder for two reasons. First, the circuit court erred because the alleged acts did not meet the elements of rape as rape was defined in Missouri when the alleged offense occurred. Second, the alleged acts did not occur in Arkansas; therefore, Arkansas law could not have applied. We will focus on Torres's second argument. The crux of his argument is that the State did not have jurisdiction over the alleged rape. Accordingly, Torres contends that because the rape felony murder is legally insufficient, and we are unable to discern whether the jury convicted Torres of rape or child abuse, or both, we must reverse and remand the case for a new trial. The State responds that the circuit court correctly denied Torres's motion for directed verdict and contends that there is a statutory presumption that the state in which the charges are filed has jurisdiction and that there is substantial evidence to support the circuit court's territorial jurisdiction pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-104 . The State further responds that the death was the result of the rape, which establishes a sufficient connection for the State to establish jurisdiction.
Torres's argument on appeal requires us to interpret the statute at issue. This court reviews issues involving statutory construction de novo, as it is for this court to decide the meaning of a statute. State v. Britt , 368 Ark. 273 , 244 S.W.3d 665 (2006). We also adhere to the basic rule of statutory construction, which is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Newman v. State , 2011 Ark. 112 , 380 S.W.3d 395 ; State v. Havens , 337 Ark. 161 , 987 S.W.2d 686 (1999). [T]he first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Potter v. City of Tontitown , 371 Ark. 200 , 209, 264 S.W.3d 473 , 481 (2007). Further, penal statutes are to be strictly construed, and all doubts are to be resolved in favor of the defendant. Williams v. State , 364 Ark. 203 , 217 S.W.3d 817 (2005). However, even a penal statute must not be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intent of the legislature. Id. Additionally, in construing any statute, we place it beside other statutes relevant to the subject matter in question and ascribe meaning and effect to be derived from the whole. Singleton v. State , 2009 Ark. 594 , 357 S.W.3d 891 ; Bush v. State , 338 Ark. 772 , 2 S.W.3d 761 (1999). We now apply these principles to the statute under review. Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-1-104, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, states in its entirety: (a) A person may be convicted under a law of this state of an offense committed by his or her own or another person's conduct for which he or she is legally accountable if: (1) Either the conduct or a result that is an element of the offense occurs within this state; (2) Conduct occurring outside this state constitutes an attempt to commit an offense within this state; (3) Conduct occurring outside this state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an offense within this state and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs within this state; (4) Conduct occurring within this state establishes complicity in the commission of, or an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit, an offense in another jurisdiction that is also an offense under the law of this state; (5) The offense consists of the omission to perform a legal duty imposed by  a law of this state based on domicile, residence, or a relationship to a person, thing, or transaction in the state; or (6) The offense is defined by a statute of this state that expressly prohibits conduct outside the state and the conduct bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of this state and the person knows or should know that his or her conduct is likely to affect that legitimate interest of this state. (b) When the offense is homicide, either the death of the victim or the physical contact causing death constitutes a result within the meaning of subdivision (a)(1) of this section. Torres concedes that the State had jurisdiction to try him for murder pursuant to subsection (b) because the death occurred in Arkansas. However, Torres contends that the statute is void of language that would authorize a rape prosecution. The plain language of subsection (a)(1) provides that a person may be convicted under Arkansas law of an offense committed by his own conduct for which he is legally accountable if either the conduct or a result that is an element of the offense occurs within this state. In other words, based on the plain language of the statute, to establish jurisdiction over the predicate felony of rape, there are two options: Option One: Either the conduct-the alleged rape-occurs within Arkansas, or Option Two: A result that is an element of the offense-the alleged rape-occurs within Arkansas. Here, it is undisputed that the conduct alleged to have supported rape occurred entirely in Missouri; thus, the first option fails. The second option is if a result that is an element of the offense-the alleged rape-occurs within this state. The result here was death, and death is not an element of rape. Accordingly, based on the plain language, the extraterritorial-jurisdiction statute does not extend to the alleged rape. However, the State urges us to affirm the circuit court and contends that territorial jurisdiction as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-104 does not restrict jurisdiction to those crimes committed entirely within the territory of the state and argues that there is a sufficient connection between Arkansas and the death to support the circuit court's jurisdiction over the rape. Relying on Kirwan v. State , 351 Ark. 603 , 96 S.W.3d 724 (2003), and Findley v. State , 307 Ark. 53 , 818 S.W.2d 242 (1991), the State contends that our case law supports its interpretation of section 5-1-104. In Kirwan , the defendant, a Texas resident, sent to Arkansas sexually explicit pictures depicting children. We held that the conduct and the result of the conduct occurred in Arkansas and we therefore had jurisdiction. In Findley , a robbery was planned in Arkansas, but it led to a murder in Tennessee. There, we said that it is generally accepted that if the requisite elements of the crime are committed in different jurisdictions, any state in which an essential part of the crime is committed may take jurisdiction. Findley , 307 Ark. at 59-60 , 818 S.W.2d at 246 . Thus, in Findley , the robbery scheme that was initiated in Arkansas was an element of the capital murder that occurred in Tennessee. Accordingly, neither Kirwan nor Findley supports the State's position. Finally, in oral argument, the State contended that Cousins v. State , 202 Ark. 500 , 151 S.W.2d 658 (1941), supports the jury's verdict. In Cousins , C.H. Cousins was alleged to have knowingly written checks from a Missouri bank account that had insufficient funds to cover the checks and then deposited them in a bank in Arkansas. The Logan County Circuit Court convicted Cousins of issuing an insufficient-funds  check. We reversed and dismissed Cousins's convictions, explaining that our statute is violated when an overdraft is drawn on a bank in this state. To construe it otherwise is to give it extraterritorial effect. Id. at 503 , 151 S.W.2d at 660 . We went on to explain that [a] case illustrative of this principle, and one frequently cited, is that of State v. Chapin , 17 Ark. 561 , 65 Am. Dec. 452 , in which Chief Justice English said: For example, if a man standing beyond our boundary line, in Texas, were, by firing a gun, or propelling any other implement of death, to kill a person in Arkansas, he would be guilty of murder here, and answerable to our laws, because the crime is regarded as being committed where the shot, or other implement propelled, takes effect. At § 134 of the chapter on Criminal Law, 22 C.J.S., page 219, it is said: If a crime covers only the conscious act of the wrongdoer, regardless of its consequences, the crime takes place and is punishable only where he acts; but, if a crime is defined so as to include some of the consequences of an act, as well as the act itself, the crime is generally regarded as having been committed where the consequences occur, regardless of where the act took place, and under a statute so providing a person who commits an act outside the state which affects persons or property within the state, and which, if committed within the state, would be a crime, is punishable as if the act were committed within the state. This, we think, is a sound statement of the law, and is the law of this state[.] Id. at 502-03 , 151 S.W.2d at 660 . Therefore, Cousins does not support the State's position, but it does support our interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-104 -our extraterritorial jurisdiction does not encompass the alleged rape that occurred entirely outside this state. If rape was defined to include death as a consequence, Cousins would support Arkansas' jurisdiction. As discussed above, it does not. In sum, the State's reliance on these cases and its interpretation of the statute are misplaced. Further, the State conceded in oral argument that it could not have charged Torres with rape in Arkansas. If Torres could not have been charged in this state, that necessarily means that the elements of rape could not have been met in this state. If the elements of rape cannot be met, rape cannot serve as an element of capital murder. Based on our discussion above, we are unpersuaded by the State's position. Simply put, based on the plain language of the statute, extraterritorial jurisdiction does not extend to the alleged rape that occurred in Missouri. 1 Here, the death is  the consequence or result of the rape, but death is not an element of the rape offense. The flaw in the State's argument is that regardless of whether Torres was charged with rape, pursuant to our law regarding felony-murder, the State must prove that an element of the underlying felony occurred in this state. The State cannot establish that Arkansas had jurisdiction to reach the conduct alleged to have been rape. Because of this, the rape felony murder is insufficient, which in turn taints the entire verdict because the jury completed a general verdict form. Stated differently, as in Griffin , because of the general-verdict-form formulation, we are unable to determine which formula-rape felony murder or child-abuse-murder-the jury based its conviction on. Because we find merit in Torres's first point and reverse and remand for a new trial, we do not reach Torres's remaining points on appeal. Reversed and remanded for a new trial. Hart, J., concurs. Kemp, C.J., and Wood and Womack, JJ., dissent.