Opinion ID: 2633570
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: 1. Tortious interference with a contract A prima facie case of tortious interference with a contract exists where a plaintiff establishes: (a) the existence of a contract, (b) knowledge of the contract on part of the defendant, (c) intentional interference causing breach of the contract and (d) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the breach. Barlow v. Int'l Harvester Co., 95 Idaho 881, 893, 522 P.2d 1102, 1115 (1974). The problem with Thirsty's cause of action and argument is that both the district court below and this Court on appeal have had difficulty identifying with exactly which contractual relationship Thirsty's is claiming interference. At oral argument, Thirsty's attorney argued that the Tolericos either expressly, or at least impliedly, assumed the motor fuel supply contracts between Thirsty's and Powell when they purchased the gas stations and that Thunderbird tortiously interfered with those contracts. The record reveals no evidence of an express assumption by the Tolericos of the motor fuel supply contracts between Thirsty's and Powell. Thunderbird was aware there was no express agreement for the purchase of fuel from Tesoro and therefore, clearly did not interfere with such a contract. Regarding the Tolericos implied assumption of the contract, it is Thirsty's obligation to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact that the Tolericos had some implied agreement to purchase Tesoro products. The only facts Thirsty's points to are that on one occasion, the Tolericos acknowledged Powell thought they had agreed to purchase motor products from Tesoro and, indeed, the Tolericos did so for approximately a year. These facts alone, however, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact that would support Thirsty's contention that the Tolericos were under some implied obligation to purchase motor fuel from Tesoro. Again, there is no contract with which Thunderbird could interfere. Thirsty's also appears to argue the Agreements have been breached by virtue of the Tolerico's agreement to sell Conoco products and that Thunderbird has some responsibility for that. Because Thirsty's is still obligated on the Agreements with Powell and Tesoro, Thirsty's may face some liability and is obviously concerned about holding someone accountable. It is clear that the Tolericos agreed to assume the amortized debts owed by Thirsty's to Powell under the Agreements. By the terms of the Agreements, however, they only came due if an event of default occurred. The Agreements are for a ten year term and payments due Powell are amortized over the entire ten year period, with the amount owed decreasing over the life of the Agreements. If the Agreements are fully complied with, no amounts ever become due and payable at the conclusion of ten years. However, if an event of default occurs, the Agreements become immediately due and payable. An event of default is defined by the Agreements as including the failure to sell exclusively Tesoro fuel products. Thus, when the Tolericos began selling Conoco fuel, the remaining balances owed under the Agreements became immediately due. Although Thunderbird was a facilitating factor in causing the amortized debt to become due, nothing Thunderbird did prevented the Tolericos from honoring any obligations under the Agreements with Powell and paying back the amortized debt. The decision not to pay Powell was entirely within the Tolericos' control and had nothing to do with Thunderbird. Thunderbird did not intentionally interfere with whatever contractual obligation the Tolericos have under the Agreements  it simply participated in making those obligations due. Therefore, we conclude the district court was correct that there was no genuine issue of material fact and, as a matter of law, Thunderbird did not intentionally interfere with any contractual agreement between Thirsty's or Tolericos and Powell. 2. Attorney fees Both parties request attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3). I.C. § 12-120(3) mandates an award of attorney fees in any civil action to recover on a contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction. . . . Tortious interference with a contract is not an action to recover on a contract, nor a commercial transaction, but rather an action in tort. Thus, a prevailing party on a claim for tortious interference is not entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). Northwest Bec-Co. v. Home Living Ser., 136 Idaho 835, 41 P.3d 263 (2002).