Opinion ID: 1923504
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Failure to Disqualify Judge Kuder and to Withdraw from Representation

Text: Kormondy alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to disqualify Judge Kuder in the trial proceeding. Kormondy contends that Judge Kuder should have been disqualified because the judge knew the victim, Mr. McAdams, and because the judge's wife worked in the State Attorney's Office. A hearing was conducted where Judge Kuder informed counsel and all three defendants that he had potential conflicts. The judge indicated that Mr. McAdams was a banker at the bank where he conducted business. After disclosing the potential conflicts, Kormondy's counsel stated that she did not object to Judge Kuder presiding over the trial. In addition, Judge Kuder asked each defendant individually whether he objected to the judge presiding over the case. Kormondy indicated that he had no objection. Kormondy now contends that he did not object to Judge Kuder presiding over the trial because trial counsel advised him against objecting. At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel said that she advised Kormondy not to move to disqualify the judge. Kormondy has failed to demonstrate either prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel as articulated in Strickland. What he has demonstrated is that he was given advice by counsel concerning how to proceed on a matter that was brought to the parties' attention by the trial judge himself. Counsel advised him not to try to disqualify the trial judge, and he followed that advice. The fact that counsel chose under these circumstances, where the mere fact of relationships did not demonstrate bias, to proceed with this trial judge does not demonstrate deficient performance. In addition, Kormondy has neither alleged nor demonstrated how he was prejudiced by the failure to recuse this judge. Kormondy also alleges that trial counsel should have withdrawn from representation because her relationship with the victim, Mr. McAdams, posed a conflict of interest that affected counsel's representation. Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that she went to high school with Mr. McAdams, but that he ran with a different crowd. She further testified that she did not have a close friendship with Mr. McAdams, that she considered their relationship in high school as nodding acquaintances. The trial court found counsel's testimony credible that she did not have a close friendship with Mr. McAdams. In Hunter v. State, 817 So.2d 786 (Fla. 2002), we outlined the standard to be applied to claims involving conflicts of interest. We said: A lawyer suffers from an actual conflict of interest when he or she actively represent[s] conflicting interests. To demonstrate an actual conflict, the defendant must identify specific evidence in the record that suggests that his or her interests were compromised. A possible, speculative or merely hypothetical conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction. [U]ntil a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance. If a defendant successfully demonstrates the existence of an actual conflict, the defendant must also show that this conflict had an adverse effect upon his lawyer's representation. Id. at 792 (citations omitted) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)). We agree with the trial court that counsel's knowledge of the victim in this case does not support a finding that there was an actual conflict of interest. While counsel was a nodding acquaintance of the victim in high school, this does not demonstrate an actual conflict of interest. Kormondy has failed to meet his burden in demonstrating that trial counsel actively represented conflicting interests. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's denial of postconviction relief on this claim.