Opinion ID: 2013848
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Applying the Barker Balancing Test

Text: The four Barker factors, which we have reviewed above, have no talismanic qualities. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118. They are merely the criteria which have been found relevant and useful to an evaluation of a defendant's constitutional speedy-trial claim. As observed earlier, the factors are interrelated and a constitutional speedy-trial violation will not be conditioned on the presence or absence of any single factor. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118. Once the factors have been considered, courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118. Our initial observation is that the posture of the case at bar differs from most cases that have come before the courts on constitutional speedy-trial claims. Generally, courts have been concerned with prolonged delays between indictment and trial or indictment and arrest. See Barker, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (five years between indictment and trial, 10 months of which defendant was incarcerated); Doggett, 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (8½-year lag between indictment and arrest); People v. Prince, 242 Ill.App.3d 1003, 183 Ill.Dec. 252, 611 N.E.2d 105 (1993) (12 years between indictment and trial); People v. Williams, 299 Ill.App.3d 143, 233 Ill.Dec. 225, 700 N.E.2d 753 (1998) (six-year delay between indictment and arrest); People v. Belcher, 186 Ill.App.3d 202, 134 Ill.Dec. 240, 542 N.E.2d 419 (1989) (29 months between indictment and arrest); People v. Yaeger, 84 Ill.App.3d 415, 40 Ill.Dec. 549, 406 N.E.2d 555 (1980) (31 month delay between indictment and arrest). In several instances, the defendants were not even aware that charges had been brought against them. In this case, however, defendant received a trial and was found guilty of murder and aggravated arson. On appeal from those convictions, the reviewing court found that the evidence of probable cause for defendant's arrest was lacking and, as a result, the fruit of that arrestdefendant's confessionshould not have been admitted into evidence at his trial. Defendant's convictions were reversed and a new trial was ordered. While awaiting retrial, defendant remained incarcerated. A period of 24 months passed before defendant demanded retrial and another two months passed before he objected to the delay and sought dismissal of the charges against him, claiming he had been denied his right to speedy retrial. When the appellate court performed its balancing test, it gave no consideration to the fact that defendant failed to assert his right to a speedy retrial in the 26 months subsequent to the reversal of his convictions. Consequently, once the appellate court found that defendant had been incarcerated for an 11-month period of unjustified delay, it found little to balance. This is where the appellate court erred. Like the appellate court, we have analyzed the 26 month delay and found that more than half of this period of time15 monthswas justified and should not be used as the basis for finding a denial of defendant's speedy-trial rights. The remaining 11 month period of delay was not justified, but was due to administrative oversight. Because of the seriousness of the crime involved, we do not find an 11-month delay extraordinary. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117 (To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge). We agree with the appellate court that defendant demonstrated prejudice because he remained incarcerated throughout the period of delay. This factor is a significant consideration in the speedy-trial analysis since the Speedy Trial Clause's core concern is impairment of liberty. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 312, 106 S.Ct. at 654, 88 L.Ed.2d at 652. Nevertheless, unlike the appellate court, we find the prejudice defendant suffered cannot be properly assessed unless we also consider defendant's failure to assert his speedy-trial right. Although defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial, we merely observe that an earlier assertion of his right could have corrected the error that occurred here and prevented some of the delay. The circumstances of this case are unique. Upon the completion of appellate proceedings, the reviewing court clerk failed to reissue the mandate. Under the particular circumstances of this case, dismissal of the charges is too severe a remedy for the negligence which occurred, especially in light of the defendant's inaction and the seriousness of the offenses involved. The balancing we are required to perform here is more than an abstract computation of individual factors. It must take into account the rights of the defendant, but does not preclude the rights of public justice. Barker, 407 U.S. at 522, 92 S.Ct. at 2188, 33 L.Ed.2d at 112. In our view, when balancing the competing concerns in this case, the prejudice suffered by defendant due to his unjustified incarceration for an 11-month period does not warrant a finding that defendant's speedy-trial right was denied. The indictment against defendant should not have been dismissed.