Opinion ID: 202348
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Facilitation of criminal purpose

Text: 120 Under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.9, [i]f the defendant committed the offense in order to facilitate or conceal the commission of another offense, the court may increase the sentence above the guideline range to reflect the actual seriousness of the defendant's conduct. In applying this departure provision, the court noted two factors: (1) that there is at least some passing reference to the involvement of the defendant and his brother with another brother and the involvement in other criminal activity and (2) that there can be no other purpose for stealing an arsenal of weapons than the facilitation of additional criminal activity .... [s]o the stealing of an arsenal of weapons is by its nature designed to facilitate the commission of other crimes. 121 The defendant argues that there is no factual basis supporting the application of this departure provision here and that the district court erred by relying on speculation that this crime was designed to facilitate some other crimes. We agree. The focus of a criminal facilitation departure from a guidelines range is on the specific criminal activity being facilitated or concealed and the nexus between that criminal activity and the offense charged. See United States v. Hawkins, 901 F.2d 863, 866 (10th Cir.1990). While the sentencing guidelines permit the court to consider uncharged conduct related to the offense of conviction in applying this departure provision, Figaro, 935 F.2d at 7, the specific criminal conduct relied upon here is unclear. A passing reference at trial to the fact that one of the stolen guns was found in the apartment of the defendant's brother Kamal does not establish that some other type of criminal activity was being facilitated or concealed by the robbery. And we cannot conclude that, in every conceivable factual scenario, the theft of multiple weapons is always designed to facilitate some other crime. Indeed, such a finding would be problematic here because the adjusted offense level for the underlying crime already accounts for the fact that a large number of guns were stolen. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C) (multiple weapons enhancement). 122 The district court needed to make a specific factual finding of the criminal conduct being facilitated in this case, and it did not do so. Without that finding, we cannot conclude that a proper nexus between the offense here and some other criminal conduct exists. See United States v. Ogbeide, 911 F.2d 793, 796 (D.C.Cir. 1990) (concluding that, in absence of an explanation of what other offense the sentencing court had in mind in upwardly departing under § 5K2.9, the sentencing court may have improperly relied on conduct already accounted for in the guidelines); see also Hawkins, 901 F.2d at 866 (Without a demonstration of [] a nexus [between the charged offense and the other criminal conduct], there is no factual support for an upward departure under § 5K2.9.). Thus, this was an invalid ground for departure in this case. 123