Opinion ID: 216172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Cruz Plaintiffs' Reasonable Modification Claim

Text: We now turn to the Cruz plaintiffs' contention that defendants' failure to modify the Able-Ride program so as to permit plaintiffs to continue to use the service beyond the ADA service area violated 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7), the reasonable modifications provision promulgated pursuant to the ADA. The resolution of this question depends on whether the ADA requires a public entity to make reasonable modifications to additional services. As previously mentioned, the Attorney General has the exclusive authority to promulgate regulations to implement Part A of Title II of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a). One such regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7), requires a public entity to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity. The Secretary of Transportation has the authority to issue final regulations implementing Part B of Title II, including regulations governing the provision of paratransit services. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12143(b), 12149, 12164. To date, the Secretary of Transportation has not promulgated regulations requiring public entities to make reasonable modifications to avoid discriminating against disabled individuals. See 49 C.F.R. pt 37. The district court held that because the provision of paratransit services is covered by Part B, public entities that provide paratransit services are not subject to the reasonable modifications regulation issued by the Attorney General. As the district court also noted, two other circuits have reached the same conclusion, albeit in the context of required services. See Boose v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist. of Or., 587 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir.2009); Melton v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 675 (5th Cir.2004). The Cruz plaintiffs argue that this analysis fails because paratransit rides to areas outside the ADA service area qualify as additional services, which are not governed by 42 U.S.C. § 12143(c). Therefore, the Cruz plaintiffs assert, the provision of additional services is not under the exclusive regulatory authority of the Secretary of Transportation. They contend that DOT regulations, specifically 49 C.F.R. § 37.21(c), support this conclusion. The regulation provides: Entities to which this part applies also may be subject to ADA regulations of the Department of Justice (28 CFR parts 35 or 36, as applicable). The provisions of this part shall be interpreted in a manner that will make them consistent with applicable Department of Justice regulations. In any case of apparent inconsistency, the provisions of this part shall prevail. 49 C.F.R. § 37.21(c). Because the requested modification to Able-Ride is not inconsistent with DOT regulations, the argument goes, the MTA is subject to the DOJ's reasonable modifications requirement. We are not persuaded. The conclusion that paratransit services, including additional services, are covered by the DOJ regulations would be incompatible with 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a), the statute under which the DOJ reasonable modifications regulation was promulgated. Section 12134 provides that the DOJ regulations shall not include any matter within the scope of the authority of the Secretary of Transportation. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (emphasis added). The additional service in question clearly falls under that Secretary's authority. [8] See 42 U.S.C. § 12143(c)(5). Accordingly, we read § 12134 to mean that the DOJ's reasonable modifications regulation does not apply to public entities providing paratransit services outside the ADA service area. In addition, consistent with § 12134's statutory limitation on the scope of DOJ authority, the DOJ specifically provides that its regulations do not apply to areas that are covered by subtitle B of title II of the ADA. 28 C.F.R. § 35.102(b). [9] Although it is true that the DOT regulations at least acknowledge that public entities that provide transportation services  may be subject to ADA regulations of the Department of Justice and that the DOT regulations shall be interpreted to be consistent with  applicable Department of Justice regulations, 49 C.F.R. § 37.21 (emphasis added), we find this language too conjectural and imprecise to demonstrate actual incorporation. On other occasions the DOT has promulgated regulations requiring private entities to compl[y] with the requirements of the rules of the Department of Justice concerning eligibility criteria, making reasonable modifications, providing auxiliary aids and services, and removing barriers (28 C.F.R. §§ 36.301-306). 49 C.F.R. § 37.5(f). If the DOT wishes to incorporate by reference DOJ regulations, we are confident that it knows how to do so. See Boose, 587 F.3d at 1004. [10]