Opinion ID: 1122539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: court of appeals' paraphrase of rcw 9a.72.160

Text: Finally, Hansen argues that the Court of Appeals impressibly broadened the scope of RCW 9A.72.160 in footnote 3 of its opinion. The Court of Appeals there stated: Clearly, Hansen's threat was motivated by his belief that, in discharging his official role as a judge, Judge Dixon was a participant in the wrong inflicted upon him. Hansen, 67 Wn. App. at 516 n. 3. Hansen contends that the discharging his official role as a judge language has the effect of expanding RCW 9A.72.160 beyond its allowed scope. The majority of case law pertaining to the paraphrasing of statutes applies to the paraphrasing of statutory language in jury instructions. See State v. Faucett, 22 Wn. App. 869, 593 P.2d 559 (1979); State v. Toliver, 6 Wn. App. 531, 494 P.2d 514 (1972). A jury instruction containing a paraphrased statute is sufficient if the instruction, when construed as a whole, correctly states the law. Faucett, 22 Wn. App. at 872. We conclude the Court of Appeals correctly stated the law since the language discharging his official role as a judge similarly reflects the ruling or decision of the judge in any official proceeding element from RCW 9A.72.160(1). Therefore, footnote 3 of the Court of Appeals' opinion does not broaden or make impressibly vague RCW 9A.72.160.