Opinion ID: 2382056
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Comments Warrant Reversal According to Plain Error Review

Text: The responsibility for judging the effect of a prosecutor's improper actions first falls to the trial court, for the trial judge is in the best position to assess potential prejudicial impact. See Harris, 888 P.2d at 265. On appeal, a reviewing court may conduct its own review of the record and, if necessary to prevent injustice, order a new trial. Id. A deferential standard of review applies, but the analysis remains subject to the maxim that the trial court is best positioned to evaluate whether any statements made by counsel affected the jury's verdict. Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1049-50. In determining whether to reverse for prosecutorial impropriety, the standard of review varies depending on the circumstances and requires the appellate court to proceed through multiple analytical steps. First, error automatically warrants reversal only if the error is structural, affecting the very framework within which the trial proceeds. Arteaga-Lansaw v. People, 159 P.3d 107, 110 (Colo.2007). Such structural errors directly impinge upon a defendant's right to a fair trial and cannot be permitted in any circumstances. Id. There is no structural error, however, when the prosecutor mistakenly oversteps the bounds of proper advocacy but does not influence the actual framework of the trial, so there is no structural error here. We are also particularly attuned to errors that directly prejudice a defendant's constitutional rights. Although any prosecutorial error can implicitly affect a defendant's right to a fair trial, we refuse to impose any broad rule finding all prosecutorial misconduct to be of constitutional magnitude. Crider, 186 P.3d at 42. Instead, we follow U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence and hold that only errors that specifically and directly offend a defendant's constitutional rights are constitutional in nature. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24-25, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (applying a harmless beyond a reasonable doubt test for constitutional errors). For instance, impermissible comment on a defendant's exercise of a specific constitutional right, such as his right not to testify, his right to be tried by a jury, or his right to post-arrest silence, have been addressed as constitutional error. Crider, 186 P.3d at 42 (citations omitted). Because the word lie as used here impermissibly affected the impartiality of the jury but did not directly impact Wend's constitutional rights, this is not a case of constitutional error. See id. ; see also id. at 45 (Bender, J., dissenting). When the misconduct fails to reach constitutional magnitude, the next step in our analytical framework asks if there was a contemporaneous objection at trial. See Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1053. If defense counsel registered an objection at trial, we subject the error to general harmless error review. Crider, 186 P.3d at 43. If there is no contemporaneous objection to the statement, a plain error standard of review applies. Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1053; Harris, 888 P.2d at 267; Wilson, 743 P.2d at 419; see also Crim. P. 52(b). Here, Wend did not object to the opening or closing statements, so we apply a plain error standard of review. [5] Plain error review maximizes deference to the trial court, but it does not excuse the appellate court from its responsibility to address errors that prejudice the defendant. To apply the plain error standard, [a] reviewing appellate court must inquire into whether the errors seriously affected the fairness or integrity of the trial. Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1053 (Only prosecutorial misconduct which is flagrantly, glaringly, or tremendously improper warrants reversal. (internal citations omitted)). While [t]he lack of an objection may demonstrate defense counsel's belief that the live argument, despite its appearance in a cold record, was not overly damaging, People v. Rodriguez, 794 P.2d 965, 972 (Colo.1990), such deference must be tempered to allow an appellate court to correct particularly egregious errors. Wilson, 743 P.2d at 420. For, above all, it is the appellate court's responsibility to avoid a miscarriage of justice for a defendant even when defense counsel seriously lapses at trial. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). Ensuring fundamental fairness in trial is the beacon of plain error review. Id. ; Wilson, 743 P.2d at 419-20 (and cases cited therein). Thus, plain error review depends on the particular facts and context of the given case, because only through an examination of the totality of the circumstances can the appellate court deduce whether error affected the fundamental fairness of the trial. Crider, 186 P.3d at 43; Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1053. We focus on the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's statements using factors including the exact language used, the nature of the misconduct, the degree of prejudice associated with the misconduct, the surrounding context, and the strength of the other evidence of guilt. Crider, 186 P.3d at 43; Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1053. Using these factors to guide our plain error review here, we find the exact language usedspecifically the words lies, lied, and liarto be obviously deficient. The context surrounding the statements failed to mitigate their impact in any substantial way because the prosecutor continually stressed the theme that Wend simply could not be trusted. While the other evidence against Wend clearly indicates that she shot Adamson, that fact is not disputed as Wend has argued self-defensea defense that depends largely on the defendant's credibility in the eyes of the jury. Thus, the prosecutor's personal attacks on the defendant's veracity represent a heightened degree of prejudice because the prosecution, with its inflammatory and extraneous language, improperly led the jury to distrust Wend. The cumulative effect of these factors calls into question the fundamental fairness of a jury verdict against Wend. We have applied plain error review to instances of prosecutorial misconduct before, and these cases inform our opinion today. This court in Domingo-Gomez found no plain error despite improper prosecutorial conduct during trial. 125 P.3d at 1055. In his closing statement, the prosecutor stated that the defendant and other defense witnesses had lied. Id. at 1050. The trial judge immediately responded by sustaining his own objection and informing the jury to disregard the prosecutor's statement. Id. The prosecutor rephrased his argument, stating that the defendant did not tell you the truth. Id. at 1051. Furthermore, the prosecutor alluded to a screening process for charging cases that ensured that only strong cases went to trial. Id. at 1052. We held that all of these actions constituted prosecutorial misconduct but determined that the cumulative effect fell short of plain error. Id. at 1055. We based our conclusion on four factors: (1) [t]he trial court eradicated the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's use of the word `lied' by sustaining the judge's own objection to the word's use; (2) the prosecutor used weaker language like did not tell you the truth in the other improper statements; (3) the context surrounding the screening process comment mitigated its effect; and (4) the defense counsel failed to object. Id. at 1054. Three of those four factors are absent as applied to Wend. Only the failure to object parallels this case, but under closer examination the circumstances surrounding the failure are quite different. After the one instance in Domingo-Gomez when the prosecutor said that the defendant lied, objection by defense counsel was unnecessary and would have been rendered moot by the trial judge's decision to immediately object and offer curative instructions himself. And the did not tell you the truth comment quickly followed the judge's sua sponte objection, so it was quite reasonable for defense counsel to assume that the judge would address inappropriate comments if necessary. More importantly, none of the other three factors so important in Domingo-Gomez exist in any form here. There was no weaker language like did not tell you the truth in the Wend opening and closing statements. There was no context surrounding the statements that could ameliorate the prejudicial impact of repeating the word lie. Although defense counsel also used the word, he did so only in response to the interrogation video, which the prosecution had stressed throughout the trial and repeatedly raised in opening and closing statements. Moreover, there certainly was no sua sponte objection or curative instruction to minimize the impact of a statement like you'll hear lie after lie after lie after lie from Jennifer Wend. Thus, contrasting Domingo-Gomez with this case highlights exactly when plain error review does or does not require a mistrial. Conversely, in Wilson, sexual assault charges depended primarily on conflicting testimony from the victim, the defendant, and the defendant's wife. 743 P.2d at 420-21. Throughout closing arguments, the prosecutor flatly stated that the defendant and his wife had lied in testimony. Id. at 417. Because there was no contemporaneous objection, we applied a plain error standard of review, concluding that the prosecutor's comments so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction. Id. at 421. We concluded that, despite a jury instruction noting that the jury should make all conclusions about truthfulness itself, there was plain error in not addressing the prosecutor's use of the word lie. Id. We emphasized that the issue of credibility was particularly crucial in a sexual assault charge pitting the defendant's word against the victim's. Id. at 420. An obvious analogy can be made to the claim of self-defense at issue in this case because it too depends on the jury believing the defendant. Again, the beacon of plain error review must be to ensure basic fairness in the trial and the resulting conviction. Wilson, 743 P.2d at 419-20. As we have already held in Wilson, the State calling the defendant a liar particularly offends basic fairness in any trial where the defendant's credibility is an integral part of the defense strategy. Id. Although plain error review affords considerable deference, we will not blindly cling to such deference in order to uphold an unjust conviction where prosecutorial misconduct has contaminated the jury's impartiality. In this case, the improper conduct permeated the opening and closing statements, [6] making its cumulative effect on the jury all the worse. The prosecutor predicted in his opening statement that you'll hear lie after lie after lie after lie from Jennifer Wend. Unlike defense counsel's use of lie only in relation to the interrogation video, the prosecutor's statement opened the trial by informing jurors that the defendant would tell lie after lie after lie after lie, which implicitly would include her entire self-defense story. Such indiscriminate use of the word was even more pervasive in the closing statement with comments like [Wend] does lie, the defendant [confessed] ... after weeks of games,... of lies and lies and lies and lies, all the lies in the second interview, and the defendant realized she couldn't keep lying. Finally, there was the imprecise language in the closing statement when the prosecutor said, That fucking liar. The reference is unclear at best, but the prejudicial impact of such imprecise and sloppy use of language is apparent regardless of the intent behind it. Repeatedly invoking the words lies, lied, and liar on behalf of the State and in relation to the defendant in a case largely dependent on the defendant's credibility undoubtedly affects the jury's impartiality, which in turn corrupts the fundamental fairness of the trial.