Opinion ID: 2423435
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Preclusion and Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Text: The District contends that the CMPA's remedial statutory scheme precludes the Superior Court's subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce an arbitration award under the Arbitration Act. Before we deal with the merits of the District's argument, it is necessary to dispatch AFGE's argument that the District waived its jurisdictional objection. AFGE argues that we should not entertain the District's objection to the Superior Court's lack of jurisdiction, because the District never presented to the Superior Court the specific argument that the UAA encompassed only arbitration awards made pursuant to a written agreement or contract, and therefore waived its objection to the court's jurisdiction. AFGE's argument evinces a flawed understanding of the law. We have recognized that parties cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction by their conduct or confer it ... and the absence of jurisdiction can be raised at any time. Chase v. Pub. Defender Serv., 956 A.2d 67, 75 (D.C.2008) (citing Customers Parking, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 562 A.2d 651, 654 (D.C.1989)). Moreover, appellee's argument mischaracterizes the facts in this case. The District did indeed argue that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over this matter. While the District may have based its jurisdictional objection on an exhaustion argument in Superior Court, that objection is sufficient to stave off any claim of waiver of the jurisdiction argument in this court. We now move to the merits of the District's claim. The trial court's order confirming the interest arbitration award concluded that jurisdiction existed because there was a final and binding agreement in existence within the required ninety-day statutory period for filing an action to confirm an arbitration award under the UAA. Though the Superior Court did not specifically refer to a section of the D.C.Code, its reliance on a ninety day statutory period seems to refer to § 16-4312 of the UAA, which requires applications to be made within ninety days after delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant.... The Superior Court's apparent reliance on a UAA provision assumes that the UAA conveys jurisdiction to Superior Court to confirm CMPA Arbitration awards. However, neither § 16-4312, nor any other portion of the UAA, specifically includes or even references awards made pursuant to the CMPA. On the other hand, the CMPA does reference the UAA. In § 1-605.02(6), the CMPA discusses PERB's power to consider appeals from arbitration awards pursuant to a grievance procedure and states that the provisions of this paragraph shall be the exclusive method for reviewing the decision of an arbitrator concerning a matter properly subject to the jurisdiction of the Board, notwithstanding provisions of §§ 16-4401 et seq [.] (Emphasis added). D.C.Code §§ 16-4401 et seq. is where the RUAA is codified. Here, the D.C.Code explicitly states that the UAA is not to be used to review CMPA grievance awards. We relied on that provision detailing PERB's exclusive jurisdiction in § 1-605.02(6), and extended it further, in FOP. In that case, this court reversed the Superior Court's enforcement of a grievance award to the local police union arbitrated under the CMPA. FOP, supra, 997 A.2d at 68. In FOP, we held that the CMPA precludes parties from obtaining enforcement of CMPA arbitration awards under the Arbitration Act. Id. at 78-79. We further held that the CMPA provides the exclusive remedy for seeking enforcement of CMPA grievance arbitration awards, and that the Superior Court lacks the jurisdiction to enforce such awards under the Arbitration Act. Id. at 77. Specifically, FOP interpreted the CMPA as stating the D.C. Council's intent that PERB and not the courts ... be the forum for proceedings after an award has been entered. Id. at 79. We reasoned that, Because the CMPA is the source of the award, it is natural for the CMPA to provide the avenue for its enforcement; a contrary reading would revive the disjointed, decentralized personnel system that the CMPA was designed to replace. Id. at 80 (quotation marks omitted). By so holding, we rejected the union's argument that while District of Columbia law mandated that the CMPA exclusively govern entry and appeals of grievance awards, it allowed for enforcement to be pursued via both the CMPA and the Arbitration Act. Id. We noted that even if the CMPA did not preclude the union's attempt to confirm the award under the Arbitration Act, the confirmation of their award still required reversal due to the union's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to coming to court. Id. The specific language of the CMPA grants the parties the ability to file an unfair labor practice complaint with PERB, and to petition PERB to seek enforcement of their award in the courts. Id. (citing D.C.Code §§ 1-605.02(3), (16)). We held that, notwithstanding our holding that the CMPA precludes resort to the Arbitration Act, the union's failure to avail itself of either remedy is an independent reason that its action fails. Id. The facts in the present case are quite similar to those in FOP. In the present case, AFGE sought enforcement of the CMPA arbitration award in Superior Court under the Arbitration Act. Moreover, AFGE did not fully avail itself of the specific remedies provided by the CMPA. [6] In the present case, the District makes the same two-tiered argument that the FOP appellant made: (1) the Superior Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce the award because the CMPA's remedial scheme precludes resort to Superior Court under the Arbitration Act; and (2) even if Superior Court generally has jurisdiction of these matters, the union did not exhaust the necessary administrative remedies before turning to the courts. The similarities in the facts and arguments present in this case and in FOP are clear. There is, however, one important difference in the present case. This case involves an interest award, governed generally by §§ 1-605.02(4) and (16), and -617.02(d) of the CMPA, whereas FOP involved a grievance award explicitly governed by § 1-605.02(6) of the CMPA. The similarities between this case and FOP lead us to follow our recent precedent and further extend the FOP ruling to interest arbitration awards. At oral argument, [7] AFGE argued against extending FOP to the present case on the grounds that FOP is distinguishable because the present case involves an interest arbitration award, and not a grievance arbitration award, which was at issue in FOP. Instead, AFGE argues that Vaughn, supra, 553 A.2d 1222, and not FOP, is the more persuasive case on this issue. This case does not fit squarely within either precedent because it involves an interest award pertaining to a non-compensation CBA. Vaughn, in contrast, involved an interest award pertaining to a compensation CBA, while FOP involved a grievance award pertaining to a non-compensation CBA. Because we conclude that the distinction between interest and grievance awards is not dispositive, we find our recent analysis of arbitration awards pertaining to non-compensation CBAs in FOP to control, and we apply that analysis in this case. In arguing that the distinction between a grievance award and an interest award is dispositive, AFGE relied upon our prior ruling in Vaughn, where we interpreted the CMPA to empower PERB to review only appeals from arbitration awards rendered pursuant to a grievance procedure.... 553 A.2d at 1225. However, appellee's reliance on Vaughn is misplaced. In Vaughn, the union was the appellant and was dissatisfied with the interest award it had won in CMPA arbitration. Id. at 1224. The union therefore asked PERB to review the award, which we interpreted the CMPA to allow only in the case of grievance awards. Id. at 1224-25. Here, however, appellee would not be seeking PERB review of its interest award, rather it would be petitioning PERB to enforce the interest arbitration award that it won. That distinction is crucial because if, as AFGE contends, Vaughn foreclosed all resort to PERB in the case of interest arbitration awards, then our ruling would deprive PERB of much, if not all, of its statutory power to facilitate and enforce the resolution of interest disputes within the realm of collective bargaining. Such a ruling is inherently contradictory to multiple CMPA statutory provisions. See, e.g., D.C.Code §§ 1-617.02(d), -617.13(b). Therefore, Vaughn does not prevent us from extending our holding in FOP to interest arbitration awards. FOP instead persuades us that the CMPA's statutory scheme precludes resort to the Arbitration Act. In FOP, we held that the text of the CMPA, as informed by the purposes it seeks to achieve and the history of which that Act was borne, shows that the CMPA precludes [the union] from obtaining relief under the Arbitration Act. 997 A.2d at 78-79. While we acknowledged that there is no provision on point so stating, we instead looked to textual clues that supported such a conclusion. Id. at 79. Only one of those textual clues, § 1-605.02(6), can be read to draw a distinction between grievance and interest arbitration awards. The other textual clues make no such distinction. Specifically, we relied on the language of §§ 1-605.02(3) and (16). Section 1-605.02(16) explicitly grants PERB the power to [s]eek appropriate judicial process to enforce its orders and otherwise carry out its authority under this chapter. (Emphasis added). Moreover, unlike the CMPA subsections at issue in Vaughn, § 1-605.02(16) does not limit its reach to grievance awards, but applies to all arbitration conducted under the CMPA. Section 1-605.02 (3) simply grants PERB the power to [d]ecide whether unfair labor practices have been committed and issue an appropriate remedial order. However, we interpreted that provision as showing that the CMPA provides a comprehensive scheme, because the provision establishes PERB's power of enforcement under the statute. See FOP, supra, 997 A.2d at 79-80. Apart from the textual clues, we based our analysis in FOP on policy grounds. We determined that preclusion better serves the purposes of the CMPA to provide for a centralized and organized personnel system. Id. at 80. Nowhere in our analysis of §§ 1-605.02(3) and (16), nor in our discussion of policy concerns, did we make any distinction between grievance and interest awards for purposes of enforcement. We are thus satisfied that our holding in FOP should not be limited to cases involving grievance arbitration awards. Instead, we conclude that our holding in FOP is applicable to interest arbitration awards, and the Superior Court lacks the subject-matter jurisdiction to grant relief for a CMPA interest arbitration award under the Arbitration Act. [8]