Opinion ID: 2091620
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior Michigan Standing Cases

Text: Historically, the earlier Michigan standing cases used a possessory test. People v Norwood, supra, p 272 (rights in the premises); People v Oaks, supra, p 255 (merely a tenant of a stall in [another's] garage  not defendant's home insufficient); People v Bartoletta, 248 Mich 499, 501; 227 NW 763 (1929) ([w]hether the officers were in and at the saloon in violation of the constitutional right of its proprietor to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures is no concern of defendant driving a car full of beer to a saloon); People v Azukauckas, 241 Mich 182, 184; 216 NW 408 (1927) ([t]he protection accorded homes may well be left to the householder to assert and we can see no reason for letting the `guests' raise the question of immunity); People v Anscomb, 234 Mich 203, 206; 208 NW 45 (1926) (difficult to see how this defendant could complain of an act unlawfully committed in the search of another's home). All these cases arose during the era of Prohibition and demonstrate two things. First, standing is related to ownership. Second, standing is a personal right that cannot be exercised vicariously. These cases parallel the contemporary federal case law to a considerable extent. See Jones v United States, supra, pp 265-267. However, it is a parallel development rather than a following of precedent, because the Michigan cases were decided at a time when the states were free to fashion their own rules as to the exclusion of evidence. Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643; 81 S Ct 1684; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961); Wolf v Colorado, 338 US 25; 69 S Ct 1359; 93 L Ed 1782 (1949). See also 78 ALR2d 246, 250-251. The next significant and only other search and seizure standing case is People v Gonzales, 356 Mich 247; 97 NW2d 16 (1959). In Gonzales an automobile was stopped by two police officers after they observed that a headlamp was not burning. The driver was taken back to the scout car by one of the officers for purposes of issuing a citation. Meanwhile, the second officer ordered the passengers, one of them the defendant, out of the car so he `could check it.' People v Gonzales, supra, p 251. He then saw the butt of a pistol sticking out from under the front seat and picked it up. The defendant admitted ownership of the gun, and a search of his person uncovered a .38 caliber cartridge. On the merits, the Court held that under these facts the police had no right to search the car in which defendant was riding. With reference to defendant's standing to attack the constitutionality of the search and seizure, and without citation of authority, this Court stated: Further, we believe that on the facts in this case defendant had the right to raise the constitutional objection. There is no showing of any waiver of the objection by anyone. And though defendant apparently had only the status of a passenger, when the first requirement of the search (and a material one to its outcome) was that defendant remove himself from the seat in the automobile where he had a right to be, we regard the search as directly affecting him. People v Gonzales, supra, p 257. It is clear from its language that this Court was particularly impressed with defendant's right to be in the car. See People v Sims, 23 Mich App 194, 198-200; 178 NW2d 667 (1970), aff'd 385 Mich 621; 189 NW2d 41 (1971). [16] Gonzales preceded the federal Jones case by a year, but its holding was similar to that of Jones in rejecting the refusal to grant standing to guests and invitees. Jones, supra, p 265. Thus, Gonzales, without expatiating on the subject, moved away from the narrow ownership test for standing of the previous cases. Jones, however, did speak more fully to what Gonzales had in fact indicated. Jones spoke as follows: We are persuaded    that it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due consideration has led to the discarding of these distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz 2, c 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd 9305. Distinctions such as those between `lessee,' `licensee,' `invitee' and `guest,' often only of gossamer strength, ought not to be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards. Jones v United States, supra, pp 266-267. See Rakas v Illinois, supra, p 143; People v Sims, supra, pp 198-200.