Opinion ID: 786761
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the ina's jurisdictional provisions

Text: 31 In 1996, as part of IIRIRA, Congress passed several amendments to the INA circumscribing the availability of judicial review. Three of the amendments may affect the district court's jurisdiction over Wong's claims. Keeping in mind the twin background principles that there is a strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative decisions and that ambiguities in deportation statutes should be construed in favor of the alien, see Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 277 F.3d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir.2002), we consider in turn, de novo, the effect of each relevant provision on subject matter jurisdiction. See United States v. Peninsula Communications, Inc., 287 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir.2002). 32
33 Section 1252(a)(2)(B) reads in pertinent part: 34 Denials of Discretionary Relief. — Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review — 35 (i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under [various provisions of the INA, including that governing adjustment of status, § 245], or 36 (ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General the authority for which is specified under this title to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.... 37 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). The government maintains that this provision precludes jurisdiction in this Bivens action over Wong's challenges to the decisions regarding adjustment of status, advance parole or permission to depart without advance parole, and revocation of parole. 38 In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) ( AADC ), the Supreme Court interpreted § 1252(g). In the course of doing so, the Court cautioned that we must be careful not to read broadly language in the INA affecting court jurisdiction that is subject to a much narrower interpretation. See id. at 478-82, 119 S.Ct. 936. Consistent with that admonition, we have recognized that the § 1252(a)(2)(B) jurisdictional bar is not to be expanded beyond its precise language. 39 For example, decisions made on a purely legal basis may be reviewed, as they do not turn on discretionary judgment. See Zazueta-Carrillo v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 1166, 1169-70 (9th Cir.2003) (decision that alien was statutorily barred from petitioning for adjustment of status was not discretionary and could be reviewed notwithstanding § 1252(a)(2)(B)); Montero-Martinez, 277 F.3d at 1143-44 (§ 1252(a)(2)(B) does not preclude jurisdiction over purely legal, and hence non-discretionary, questions). Moreover, decisions that violate the Constitution cannot be discretionary, so claims of constitutional violations are not barred by § 1252(a)(2)(B). See Torres-Aguilar v. INS, 246 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir.2001); see also Sanchez-Cruz v. INS, 255 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir.2001). In addition, § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes jurisdiction only over decisions as to which discretionary authority is specified by statute, not all discretionary decisions. See Spencer Enterprises, Inc., 345 F.3d at 689-90. 40 Under these precedents, the bar on review of discretionary decisions does not apply to Wong's claims. Her claims raise only constitutional or purely legal, nondiscretionary challenges to the decisions in question. Specifically, Wong's complaint alleges that the INS officials' handling of the advance parole, adjustment of status, and revocation of parole decisions was infected by various kinds of discriminatory animus in violation of the Constitution's guarantees against such bias. Her complaint also alleges that the INS officials' handling of these decisions violated RFRA and the due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. Section 1252(a)(2)(B) does not preclude the district court from entertaining such claims. 41 B. Section 1252(g) — Review of Decisions or Actions by the Attorney General to Commence Proceedings, Adjudicate Cases, or Execute Removal Orders 42 Section 1252(g) limits judicial review of certain decisions or actions of the Attorney General regarding removal. 15 That provision states: 43 Exclusive Jurisdiction. — Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this Act. 44 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). 45 AADC held that § 1252(g) applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her `decision or action' to ` commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.' 525 U.S. at 482, 119 S.Ct. 936. Section 1252(g), consequently, does not bar all claims relating in any way to deportation proceedings. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. INS, 232 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc). As AADC noted, [t]here are of course many other decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation process — such as the decisions to open an investigation, to surveil the suspected violator, to reschedule the deportation hearing, to include various provisions in the final deportation order ..., and to refuse reconsideration of that order. AADC, 525 U.S. at 482, 119 S.Ct. 936. 46 Following AADC, we have narrowly construed § 1252(g). For example, we have held that the reference to `executing removal orders' appearing in [§ 1252(g)] should be interpreted narrowly, and not as referring to the underlying merits of the removal decision. Maharaj v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 963, 965 (9th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). Similarly, in Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 236 F.3d 1115, 1120-21 (9th Cir.2001), we held that § 1252(g) does not bar judicial review of decisions or actions that occur during the formal adjudicatory process, because they are separate from the decision to adjudicate. Sulit v. Schiltgen, 213 F.3d 449 (9th Cir.2000), determined that § 1252(g) does not bar the due process claims of aliens alleging that their green cards were improperly seized without a hearing, that the INS failed to provide them with notice requiring them to surrender for deportation, and that their counsel failed to notify them of the issuance of the court's decision. See id. at 452-53 & n. 1; see also Catholic Soc. Servs., 232 F.3d at 1150 (concluding that § 1252(g) does not limit jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief in a class action challenging the INS's advance parole policy). But see Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft, 291 F.3d 594, 599 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that § 1252(g)'s bar to judicial review of decision whether to commence proceedings precludes review of the decision when to commence proceedings). 47 Characterizing Wong's claims primarily as removal-based, the government urges that they are for the most part barred by § 1252(g). Although her complaint could be read to challenge the constitutionality of the removal itself, Wong has renounced such a broad reading of her ambiguous allegations, stating in her brief that: 48 Plaintiffs' claims [do] not amount to a challenge of the decision of the INS to `commence proceedings,' `adjudicate cases,' or `execute removal orders.' Rather, ... Plaintiffs' claims arise from the discriminatory animus that motivated and underlay the actions of the individual defendants which resulted in the INS's decision to commence removal proceedings and ultimately to remove Plaintiff Wong from the United States. 49 . . . 50 The instant case ... involves claims arising prior to any INS decision `to commence proceedings against Wong, as well as claims that the Defendants placed Wong in a detention situation where she suffered constitutional injury at the hands of third parties. 51 (emphasis added). Wong thus disclaims any challenge to the execution of the removal itself, but rather asserts that her claims implicate only actions other than that removal, or the commencement of proceedings, if any, leading to that removal. 16 52 Wong is correct that § 1252(g) does not bar review of the actions that occurred prior to any decision to commence proceedings, if any, against her or to execute the removal order, such as the INS officials' allegedly discriminatory decisions regarding advance parole, adjustment of status, and revocation of parole. See Humphries v. Various Fed. USINS Employees, 164 F.3d 936, 944 (5th Cir.1999) ([W]e would defy logic by holding that a claim for relief somehow `aris[es] from' decisions and actions accomplished only after the injury allegedly occurred.) (second alteration in original). None of these decisions involves the discrete actions enumerated in § 1252(g). 53 C. Section 1252(a)(2)(A) — Jurisdiction to Review Any Cause or Claim Arising From or Relating to Implementation or Operation of an Expedited Removal Order 54 Similarly, the government asserts that § 1252(a)(2)(A), which deals directly with the expedited removal procedure under which Wong was removed, may also be implicated by Wong's claims. Section 1252(a)(2)(A) reads in relevant part: 55 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review — 56 (i) except as provided in subsection (e), any individual determination or to entertain any other cause or claim arising from or relating to the implementation or operation of an order of removal pursuant to section 235(b)(1) [setting forth procedures for expedited removal], 57 (ii) except as provided in subsection (e), a decision by the Attorney `General to invoke the provisions of such section, [or] 58 (iii) the application of such section to individual aliens, including the determination made [as to eligibility for asylum]. 59 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A). Subsection (e) provides that no court may enter declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief in any action pertaining to an [expedited removal order], unless certain exceptions not applicable here apply. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(A). 60 Like § 1252(g), § 1252(a)(2)(A) does not preclude Wong's claims concerning events that occurred prior to the decision to initiate her expedited removal — namely, the claims challenging the adjustment of status, advance parole, and revocation of parole decisions. None of these claims implicates actions covered by § 1252(a)(2)(A). And, as we explained above, Wong has expressly disclaimed interpreting her complaint to include a challenge to her expedited removal, maintaining instead that the complaint challenges only the decisions described above, which preceded her removal. 17 61 We conclude that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over Wong's claims regarding advance parole, adjustment of status, and parole revocation, as well as over her detention-related claims.