Opinion ID: 2587760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Smith's failure to admit guilt and express remorse

Text: [¶ 38] Smith contends the sentences were the product of the trial court's abuse of discretion because they were based upon Smith's failure to admit guilt and express remorse toward the victims and the victims' families and about the harm he had caused. He points to the trial court's reading of that part of the PSI report which comments upon Smith's showing no remorse and maintaining his innocence. In support of this contention, Smith argues for the applicability of the holding in Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999), that in determining facts about the crime which bear upon the severity of the sentence, a trial court may not draw an adverse inference from the defendant's silence. [¶ 39] In response, the State, while acknowledging these comments from the probation officer and the prosecutor and the trial court's reading of these comments before declaring the sentences, maintains that the trial court placed no emphasis on these particular comments. What the trial court did emphasize, the State asserts, was the probation officer's comment that Smith, in his interview with that officer, was adamant of his innocence, stating he was set up. Responding to those expressions of innocence and of having been set up, the trial court, as the State argued, addressed Smith, saying, if you were set up, you were set up by two different persons on incidents that had a spread of some four years, from 1997 to 2001. The jury didn't believe you, obviously. As argued by the State, the trial court was referring not to Smith's silence but to Smith's own expressions. We agree with the State. Moreover, we also find it significant that the trial court, immediately before declaring the sentences, said: We heard enough from [DH] today to realize the importance and necessity of removing you from society for a long time, not only for the protection of [DH] and [RT], but for the protection as well of other potential future victims. [¶ 40] We also find Smith's contentions without merit for another reason. Having carefully read Mitchell, relied on by Smith, we believe that Mitchell does not apply here. To correctly understand the holding in Mitchell, one must understand the particular facts from which the holding emerged. Mitchell and twenty-two others were indicted for offenses arising from a conspiracy to distribute cocaine over a five-year period. Mitchell was charged with three counts of distributing cocaine within 1000 feet of a school or playground and one count of conspiring to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine. Id. at 317, 119 S.Ct. at 1309-10. Without a plea agreement, Mitchell pleaded guilty to all four counts but reserved the right to contest the drug quantity attributable to her under the conspiracy count. The trial court advised her that the drug quantity would be determined at her sentencing hearing. Before accepting Mitchell's plea, the trial court informed her of the penalties for her offenses. In this regard, the trial court informed her that the punishment range was very complex because it was as yet not known what the prosecutor's proof of drug quantity was going to be in her case. The trial court told her that, for distributing cocaine near a school or playground, she faced a mandatory minimum of one year in prison; and for the conspiracy, she faced serious punishment depending on the drug quantity involved. In that regard, the trial court informed her that if the prosecutor's proof was at least five but less than fifteen kilograms of cocaine, then she faced a mandatory minimum of ten years in prison. The trial court explained to her that she would waive the right at trial to remain silent if she pleaded guilty. Id. at 317-18, 119 S.Ct. at 1310. The prosecution then explained the factual basis for the charges against Mitchell but withheld drug quantity proof until the sentencing hearing to be held later. Mitchell told the trial court that she had done some of what the prosecution explained and she confirmed her intention to plead guilty. The trial court accepted her plea. Later, at Mitchell's sentencing hearing, one of Mitchell's codefendants furnished information on the drug quantity attributable to Mitchell. According to this witness, from April to August 1992, Mitchell worked two to three times a week, selling one and a half to two ounces of cocaine a day; and from August 1992 to December 1993, Mitchell worked three to five times a week, and from January to March 1994, she was one of those in charge of cocaine distribution. Another witness's trial testimony indicated that Mitchell had sold him a total of two ounces in the course of three purchases. Mitchell offered no evidence at sentencing and she did not testify to rebut the prosecutor's drug quantity evidence. Id. at 318-19, 119 S.Ct. at 1310. The trial court ruled that Mitchell had no right to remain silent about the details of her crimes because of her guilty plea. The trial court found credible the prosecution's drug quantity evidence that put Mitchell over the five kilogram threshold, thus mandating a minimum sentence of ten years. That Mitchell had not testified to the contrary of the prosecution's drug quantity evidence was one of the factors which persuaded the trial court to rely on the prosecution's evidence. Id., The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Mitchell's statutory minimum sentence of ten years, ruling that Mitchell's declination to testify on drug quantity could properly be held against her. Id. at 319, 119 S.Ct. at 1310-11. [¶ 41] On Mitchell's appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court held that (1) neither Mitchell's guilty plea nor her statements at the plea colloquy functioned as a waiver of her right to remain silent at sentencing, id. at 321-25, 119 S.Ct. at 1311-13, and (2) at the sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution when the trial court is determining facts about the crime which bear upon the severity of the sentence, the government bears the burden of proving those facts, and the trial court may not draw an adverse inference from the defendant's silence. Id. at 327-30, 119 S.Ct. at 1314-16. The critical fact about Mitchell's crime bearing upon the severity of her sentence was the drug quantity attributable to her. If the drug quantity was at least five but less than fifteen kilograms of cocaine, she faced a mandatory minimum of ten years in prison. That critical fact was contested at sentencing. An adverse inference as to the existence of that critical fact could not be drawn from Mitchell's silence about that critical fact. [¶ 42] In this case before us, however, at Smith's sentencing hearing the trial court was not making a determination of facts about the crimes bearing upon the severity of the sentences to be imposed on Smith. The jury which had found Smith guilty of crimes against DH and RT had already determined the critical facts which had bearing upon the severity of the sentences. No contested critical fact about those crimes which had bearing upon the severity of the sentences remained for the prosecution to prove. Mitchell is inapposite and of no value to Smith in this aspect of his appeal.