Opinion ID: 2346556
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Summary Judgment and Standing Issues

Text: We review a grant of summary judgment de novo to ensure that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the prevailing parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Colbert v. Georgetown Univ., 641 A.2d 469, 472 (D.C. 1994) (en banc). In ascertaining whether any material facts are in dispute, we view the entire record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Ferrell, 691 A.2d at 646. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting PMA's motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether PMA negligently failed to supervise the repairs to the roof of the house after PMA paid for the damages caused by Boyd. Appellant states that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether PMA had undertaken responsibility for the repairs, but had allowed Myrna Fawcett to hire Hoffman, and neglected to supervise Hoffman's work. We agree with the trial court that there is no evidence that PMA took responsibility to supervise the work performed by Hoffman. In answering interrogatory No. 22, PMA stated that Myrna Fawcett hired P.N. Hoffman. Appellant provides no additional information or argument in her brief to demonstrate that PMA had a responsibility to oversee Hoffman. The statements in her own affidavit that Myrna Fawcett . . . selected Hoffman to do the repairs, and that PMA issued a check to Myrna Fawcett who in turn paid Hoffman further undercut appellant's claim. Thus we agree with the trial court that there is no evidence that PMA, an insurer that paid a claim against its insured, had responsibility for supervising the contractor hired by the claimant or negligently delegated any duty it might have had to oversee the repairs to Myrna Fawcett. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to PMA. The grant of summary judgment to Hoffman and Boyd presents a closer question, specifically on the issue of appellant's standing to bring suit. Both Boyd and Hoffman claimed that appellant lacked standing to bring a cause of action for damages to the property because they had entered into agreements with Fawcett, who represented the estate. The trial court held that appellant lacked standing because the agreements concerned the property, and as the personal representative of the estate which owned the property, Myrna Fawcett was the only one who could bring an action on behalf of the estate. It noted that even though appellant was an heir to the estate, and may have benefitted from the agreements, she had no legal interest in the contracts. The trial court further ruled that appellant did not provide sufficient evidence that she had a life estate in the property and that, even assuming appellant was a life tenant, the agreements were entered into between the estate and appellees, and the only intended beneficiary was the estate, not appellant. Thus, the trial court held that appellant could not bring any action against Boyd, as it had been released by Fawcett, nor against Hoffman, because its contract was with Fawcett, not appellant. However, the trial court ruled that, to the extent that appellant was legally residing in the property, she had a right to claim damages for personal injury or lost personal property against Boyd and Hoffman. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment motion with respect to real property damages, based on her lack of standing to bring suit. Appellant does not dispute that Myrna Fawcett had legal ownership to the property, but claims that she was entitled to sue based on her life estate and tenancy. See Gaetan v. Weber, 729 A.2d 895, 898 (D.C.1999) (holding that tenants have standing to sue third parties for personal damages arising from negligence).
Appellant claims that she had a life estate and thus is entitled to sue Hoffman for damages to the real property. From the record, it is difficult to discern what exactly appellant's legal interest in the estate might be. Appellant did not provide any evidence that she maintained a life estate in the house other than Fawcett's testimony that appellant and her sisters had an informal agreement that she would live in their mother's house. As the trial court noted, under D.C.Code § 45-306(b) (1981) a life estate may be granted only by a deed signed and sealed by the grantor, lessor, or declarant, in person or by power of attorney or by will. Thus, we agree that appellant has not provided sufficient evidence that she had a life estate in the property. Moreover, even if she had a life estate, appellant indicated in the answers to the interrogatories that she was part owner of the property with her sisters, and has not provided information as to why she did not join them in this action. See Flack v. Laster, 417 A.2d 393 (D.C.1980) (A party is indispensable when he has an interest in the proceeding not distinct and severable, and a final decree cannot be made in the party's absence without having an injurious effect on that interest ....). [8] Thus, we hold that on this record summary judgment was appropriate with respect to the real property claims as appellant could not maintain a suit for damages to the real property based on her asserted but unsupported life interest in the property. We agree as well with the trial court that appellant, as an heir to the estate, does not have standing to bring suit as a third party beneficiary to Fawcett's contract with Hoffman. The personal representative is vested with legal title to both real and personal property owned by the decedent at the time of her death and has the same standing to sue as the decedent had at death. Rearden v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 677 A.2d 1032, 1038 (D.C.1996) (citing D.C.Code § 20-701(c) (1981)). Here, that person was Fawcett who, as personal representative, entered into the contract with Hoffman on behalf of the estate. We have held that a beneficiary cannot bring an action directly against a third-party wrongdoer ... [r]ather, his relief is an action in equity against the trustee to compel the trustee to proceed against the third-party .... Rearden, 677 A.2d at 1037. Therefore, as concerns property of the estate, appellant must assert her interest as a beneficiary of the estate by proceeding against the entit[y] with whom [she has] a fiduciary relationship: the personal representative[], not appellees. Id.
We also agree with the trial court's determination that, as the occupier of the premises, appellant had the right to sue in tort only for personal injury or loss of personal property and not for real property damage. We have recognized that [w]hile a tenant lacks the requisite ownership interest to recover damages to real property ... a tenant may nonetheless bring suit against third parties to recover damages which he or she has incurred. Gaetan, 729 A.2d at 898. In addition, while reaffirming that a tenant cannot recover damages for real property, we have held that the legal occupier of the premises has standing to sue for injuries personal to her or resulting from negligence which caused the loss of use and enjoyment of personal property. See Souci v. William C. Smith & Co., 763 A.2d 96, 100 (D.C. 2000). With regard to a tenant's suit for negligence, [t]he duty to safeguard that probable user's interests can grow out of the common law and need not be based on a contract and nothing else. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the trial court did not err in recognizing appellant's standing to sue Hoffman in negligence limited to claims for personal injury and lost personal property. [9]