Opinion ID: 2070301
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: petition against the city of portland

Text: [¶ 10] The hearing officer denied UPS's petition for award against the City of Portland, finding that [w]hile [McAdam's] bus driving duties aggravated the continuing effects of the 1990 injury, they themselves `did not ... independently produce the employee's disability.' [¶ 11] In reaching that conclusion, the hearing officer relied on Poole v. Statler Tissue Corp., 400 A.2d 1067, 1069 (Me. 1979). Poole was decided prior to the enactment of 39-A M.R.S.A. § 201(4) (Pamph.2000), which is applicable to the facts here. Subsection 201(4) provides: If a work-related injury aggravates, accelerates or combines with a preexisting physical condition, any resulting disability is compensable only if contributed to by the employment in a significant manner. 39-A M.R.S.A. § 201(4). This section provides the standard for determining liability in cases when an alleged work-related injury combines with a preexisting condition. [¶ 12] UPS alleged that McAdam's employment as a bus driver for the City either entirely caused his current shoulder problems or significantly contributed to the shoulder injuries that McAdam previously suffered in his employment at UPS and as a professional athlete. The task of the hearing officer, therefore, was to determine (1) whether McAdam suffered any work-related injury while working for the City, and if so, (2) whether that injury contributed to the preexisting shoulder condition in a significant manner. Thus, the hearing officer's conclusion that McAdam's employment as a bus driver for the City did not independently cause the shoulder injuries missed the point. When apportionment issues arise in the context of consecutive employment, if the second employment results in a work-related injury, there exists no requirement that the second injury constitute an independent cause of the employee's disability in order for the second employer to be responsible for a portion of the benefits to an employee. [4] We therefore vacate the hearing officer's denial of UPS's petition for award against the City and remand for consideration of the petition pursuant to 39-A M.R.S.A. § 201(4).