Opinion ID: 2799378
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the sentence of death is excessive or

Text: disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. ¶106. This consideration “requires a review of similar cases in which the death penalty was imposed and reviewed by this Court since Jackson v. State, 337 So. 2d 1242 (Miss. 1976).” Manning v. State, 765 So. 2d 516, 521-22 (Miss. 2000) (citing Wiley v. State, 691 So. 2d 54 959, 966 (Miss. 1997)). In making this assessment, we must consider both the crime and the defendant. Wilcher v. State, 697 So. 2d 1087, 1113 (Miss. 1997) (citing Cabello v. State, 471 So. 2d 332, 350 (Miss. 1985)). ¶107. The Legislature’s inclusion of arson as a capitalizing felony represents a recognition of the extreme risk to human life associated with the commission of that felony. As the United States Supreme Court concluded, “reckless indifference to the value of human life may be every bit as shocking to the moral sense as an ‘intent to kill.’” Tison, 481 U.S. at 157 (citation omitted). The practical effect of this reasoning is exemplified in this case. The evidence reflects that Ronk stabbed an unarmed victim multiple times in the back, took the time to change clothes and search the victim’s house for items of value, poured a trail of gasoline through the victim’s house and into the room where the victim lay incapacitated, and left the victim to suffer in the blaze as he fled to another state, seemingly destroying any evidence of his crime. While Ronk contends that his culpability is diminished because he was unaware that Craite was still alive when he committed the arson, his conduct is nevertheless analogous to the Tison Court’s example of “the person who tortures another not caring whether the victim lives or dies, or the robber who shoots someone in the course of the robbery, utterly indifferent to the fact that the desire to rob may have the unintended consequence of killing the victim[.]” Id. ¶108. After considering the circumstances of Ronk’s crime and comparing it to the cases included in the appendix below, we find that the jury’s imposition of the death penalty in the instant case is not excessive or disproportionate. X. Whether any error can be considered harmless. 55 ¶109. “A criminal is not entitled to a perfect trial, only a fair trial.” McGilberry v. State, 741 So. 2d 894, 924 (Miss. 1999) (citing Sand v. State, 467 So. 2d 907, 911 (Miss. 1985)). Thus, even in a capital case, an error may be considered harmless “if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the verdict.” States v. State, 88 So. 3d 749, 758 (Miss. 2012). We have found two arguable errors in Ronk’s trial: the trial court’s instruction on arson as a lesser-included offense of capital murder, and the admission of Craite’s bank records. Because the jury convicted Ronk of the principal charge of capital murder, and not the lesser offense, this error had no effect on the jury’s verdict. See Conley, 702 So. 2d at 792-93. And Ronk failed to object to the admission of the bank records, so we cannot hold the trial court in error for an issue not raised at trial. Accordingly, even in light of our heightened standard of scrutiny in capital cases, we find that these alleged errors did not deprive Ronk of a fair trial. XI. Whether the cumulative effect of all errors mandates reversal or a new trial. ¶110. This Court has held that “individual errors, which are not reversible in themselves, may combine with other errors to make up reversible error, where the cumulative effect of all errors deprives the defendant of a fundamentally fair trial.” Ross v. State, 954 So. 2d 968, 1018 (Miss. 2007). Ronk urges this Court to find that the cumulative effect of the errors in this case requires reversal of his conviction and sentence. ¶111. We have found two arguable errors in the instant case, both of which are barred from consideration due to Ronk’s failure to object at trial. Thus, after considering each of Ronk’s 56 claims, we hold that the cumulative effect of all alleged errors was not such that Ronk was denied a fundamentally fair trial. See Wilburn v. State, 608 So. 2d 702, 705 (Miss. 1992).