Opinion ID: 202888
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Individualized Suspicion and Conditional Release

Text: The Fourth Amendment guarantees that the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Unquestionably, the extraction of blood for DNA profiling constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989)(We have long recognized that a compelled intrusion into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search. (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted)); see also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). The fact that a search occurred, however, is not dispositive of the Fourth Amendment inquiry. Rather, [t]he touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always `the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.' Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977)(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Establishing that a search is reasonable ordinarily requires that the government demonstrate probable cause to a neutral magistrate and obtain a particularized warrant authorizing the search. United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 315-16, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972). However, the Court has authorized certain exceptions to these requirements, including, relevant to our purposes, in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable. New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325, 351, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985)(Blackmun, J., concurring). The so-called special needs doctrine has been used to analyze searches in a variety of contexts where the government has neither obtained a warrant nor established individualized suspicion. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423-28, 124 S.Ct. 885, 157 L.Ed.2d 843 (2004) (upholding a highway checkpoint designed to enable police to question citizens about a recent crime); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828-30, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002) (upholding a program that required all students participating in extracurricular activities to submit to random, suspicionless drug testing); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 77-84, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001) (holding unconstitutional a public hospital's non-consensual drug testing of maternity patients); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-47, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000)(invalidating a roadside checkpoint designed to detect illegal drugs); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660-65, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995)(upholding a program subjecting student athletes to random, suspicionless drug testing). In determining whether a suspicionless search qualifies for the special needs exception, a critical issue is whether the search is designed to further ordinary law enforcement objectives. The Court has invalidated programs whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, explaining that this type of general interest in crime control could not qualify as a special need. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42, 121 S.Ct. 447 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83, 121 S.Ct. 1281 (holding the program invalid because the immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes). The Court previously has applied the special needs doctrine in evaluating the constitutionality of a law targeted at individuals on conditional release. [4] In Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987), the Court upheld a Wisconsin law permitting any probation officer to search a probationer's home without a warrant so long as there were reasonable grounds to support a search. The Court explained that the special needs of Wisconsin's probation system make the warrant requirement impracticable and justify replacement of the standard of probable cause by `reasonable grounds.' Id. at 876, 107 S.Ct. 3164. Requiring probation officials to obtain a warrant would set[] up a magistrate rather than the probation officer as the judge of how close a supervision the probationer requires, delay probation officials' response to evidence of misconduct, and reduce the deterrent caused by the possibility of prompt searches. Id. Likewise, compliance with the probable cause requirement would reduce the deterrent effect of the supervisory arrangement, id. at 878, 107 S.Ct. 3164, and would prevent the probation office being able to intervene before a probationer does damage to himself or society, id. at 879, 107 S.Ct. 3164. Given the state's interest in assuring that the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by the probationer's being at large, id. at 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164, the Court found the Wisconsin law constitutional. Subsequently, however, in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001), the Court did not apply the special needs doctrine in upholding a warrantless search of a probationer that was supported by reasonable suspicion. Rather, the Court held that the search was reasonable under [the] general Fourth Amendment approach of `examining the totality of the circumstances.' Id. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996)). In explaining its decision, the Court noted that the probationer had signed a probation order agreeing to submit to a search of his person and property by a law enforcement officer at any[ ]time, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause. Id. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 587. Thus, the probationer's status informed both sides of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness balance. Probationers inherently have a decreased expectation of privacy, and the agreement to the search condition further decreased that expectation. Id. at 119-20, 122 S.Ct. 587. The government also has a greater interest in preventing recidivism, and is quite justified in concluding that a probationer will be more likely to engage in criminal conduct than an ordinary member of the community. Id. at 121, 122 S.Ct. 587. The Court concluded that the balance of these considerations requires no more than reasonable suspicion, ultimately holding that the warrantless search . . ., supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation, was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 121-22, 122 S.Ct. 587. Most recently, in Samson v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 2197, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006), the Court applied a totality of the circumstances analysis in upholding a suspicionless search of a parolee conducted pursuant to a California law stating that, as a condition for release, every prisoner eligible for state parole must agree to be subject to a search or seizure by a parole officer with or without a search warrant and with or without cause. [5] After reiterating Knights 's holding that probationers `do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled,' id. (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587), the Court explained that, [e]xamining the totality of the circumstances pertaining to petitioner's status as a parolee, . . . including the plain terms of the parole search condition, . . . petitioner did not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate, id. at 2199 (citations omitted). The Court also deemed the state's interests substantial, citing the need to reduce recidivism and promote reintegration among those on conditional release. Id. at 2200. Given the number of parolees and the high likelihood of recidivism, a requirement that searches be based on individualized suspicion would undermine the State's ability to effectively supervise parolees and protect the public from criminal acts by reoffenders. Id. at 2200-01. Thus, the Court concluded, a condition of release can so diminish or eliminate a released prisoner's reasonable expectation of privacy that a suspicionless search by a law enforcement officer would not offend the Fourth Amendment. Id. 2196.