Opinion ID: 2627702
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Trial Court Erroneously Admitted Evidence of Powell's Drug Use

Text: ¶ 30 On the merits, I find myself in agreement with Justice Sanders and the Court of Appeals below that the trial court erred in admitting Kincaid's testimony. Though it was not error to conclude the evidence had some probative value, the admission of Kincaid's testimony in the absence of competent expert testimony establishing how the use of methamphetamine affects a person was misleading at best. See dissent at 331-32; see also State v. Powell, 139 Wash.App. 808, 818, 162 P.3d 1180 (2007). ¶ 31 The conclusion that the trial court erred does not end the inquiry, however. This court will not reverse a conviction based on `unsubstantial error[ ].' State v. Jamison, 93 Wash.2d 794, 801, 613 P.2d 776 (1980) (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Martin, 73 Wash.2d 616, 627, 440 P.2d 429 (1968)). Where the error involves the violation of an evidentiary rule rather than a constitutional mandate, we apply the rule that error is not prejudicial unless, within reasonable probabilities, the outcome of the trial would have been materially affected had the error not occurred. State v. Tharp, 96 Wash.2d 591, 599, 637 P.2d 961 (1981). Here, the admission of Kincaid's testimony was not so prejudicial as to warrant reversal of his conviction. The evidence was briefa single sentence and of minor significance when compared to the evidence as a whole. [3] Cf. Maicke v. RDH, Inc., 37 Wash.App. 750, 754, 683 P.2d 227 (1984) (finding harmless error where improper evidence was minimal and not referenced in counsel's argument to the jury); see also Powell, 139 Wash.App. at 826-27, 162 P.3d 1180 (Hunt, J., dissenting) (listing other evidence in the record supporting Powell's conviction). I would hold, therefore, that the admission of Kincaid's testimony, while error, was harmless.