Opinion ID: 1706157
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Pope's 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment was timely.

Text: ¶ 14. Kirk asserts that Pope's 60(b) motion was not filed within a reasonable time from October 28, 2002, or from November 19, 2003the dates on which the final judgment and remittitur were entered, respectively. Kirk contends that the trial court erred in calculating the time from the May 24, 2005, order denying reconsideration, because Pope did not seek relief from that specific order and relief from that order would not have relieved Pope from the judgment. ¶ 15. Pope filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment on September 14, 2005, and asked the trial court to vacate the October 28, 2002, judgment pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), (4) and (6). [8] Under Rule 60(b), a court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding when (4) the judgment is void or for (6) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment. Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), (6). A motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) or (6) must be made within a reasonable time. Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(b). ¶ 16. Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary remedy and is not an escape hatch for lawyers and litigants who had procedural opportunities afforded under other rules and who without cause failed to pursue those procedural remedies. Bruce v. Bruce, 587 So.2d 898, 904 (Miss.1991). Accordingly, a litigant should pursue other available remedies before requesting relief under Rule 60(b). ¶ 17. On November 5, 2002eight days after the entry of final judgmentPope filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial. Pope's motion alleged errors in the denial of jury instructions, ineffective assistance of counsel, and error in allowing perjured testimony regarding Kirk's bankruptcy. The motion also incorporated by reference every objection made during trial and pre-trial motions. [9] On November 19, 2003, the trial court overruled Pope's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and for New Trial. Subsequently, on November 25, 2003, Pope filed a Motion for Reconsideration and requested a stay of judgment. It was not until May 24, 2005, that the trial court entered an order denying Pope's Motion for Reconsideration and lifting all injunctions. Pope then filed his Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) on September 14, 2005. ¶ 18. Pope properly pursued all other remedies prior to requesting the exceptional relief afforded under Rule 60(b). While both parties had chosen not to proceed any further on all motions pending at the time of the May 24, 2005, order, a Rule 60(b) motion proceed[s] on the assumption that the trial court has entered a valid and enforceable judgment which has become final. Id. Pope resorted to filing his Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment only after the trial court's May 24, 2005, order in which his post-trial motions were denied and the final judgment became fully enforceable. Accordingly, the trial court correctly calculated the reasonable time period from the May 24, 2005, order. ¶ 19. The trial court ultimately granted Pope's Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), holding the final judgment null and void. While a Rule 60(b)(4) motion must be made within a reasonable time, federal authority has interpreted this to mean that there is no effective time limit. Overbey v. Murray, 569 So.2d 303, 306 (Miss.1990) (citing 7 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 60.25[4] 2d ed.1987). The rationale for having no effective, time limit for a Rule 60(b)(4) motion is that no amount of time or delay may cure a void judgment. Id. Even so, Pope filed his 60(b) motion approximately four months after the court's May 24, 2005, orderwell within the six-month time frame applicable to other provisions under Rule 60(b). See Miss. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Accordingly, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that the 60(b) motion was timely. II. Whether the circuit court erred in finding that because Kirk was no longer the real party in interest when he filed his bankruptcy petition, he lacked standing to pursue the claim. ¶ 20. Kirk asserts that the trial court failed to recognize the distinction between standing and real party in interest. Kirk argues that the simple fact that a party no longer is the real party in interest does not necessarily cause that party to lose standing in the traditional, jurisdictional sense.
¶ 21. A real-party-in-interest defense must be timely and may be waived if tardily asserted. Gogolin & Stelter v. Karn's Auto Imports, Inc., 886 F.2d 100, 102 (5th Cir.1989); see also Rogers v. Samedan Oil Corp., 308 F.3d 477, 483-84 (5th Cir.2002) (failure to raise the assertion that plaintiff was not the real party in interest until day before trial constituted waiver); United HealthCare Corp. v. American Trade Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir.1996) (assertion at pretrial conference constituted waiver); Hefley v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1383, 1388 (10th Cir.1982) (assertion sixteen days before trial is untimely). Because the earliest Pope alluded to a possible real-party-in-interest defense was after jury selection and just prior to the start of the trial, we find that Pope waived any real-party-in-interest defense.
¶ 22. While Pope waived any real-party-in-interest defense, standing is a jurisdictional issue which may be raised by any party or the. Court at any time. City of Madison v. Bryan, 763 So.2d 162, 166 (Miss.2000) (citing Williams v. Stevens, 390 So.2d 1012, 1014 (Miss.1980)). ¶ 23. To have standing, this Court has stated, there must be a present, existent actionable title or interest which must be completed at the time the cause of action is filed. Id. at 165 (quoting Crawford Commercial Constructors, Inc. v. Marine Indus. Residential Insulation, Inc., 437 So.2d 15, 16 (Miss.1983)). Kirk had a valid cause of action for breach of contract when he first filed suit and therefore initially had standing to pursue the claim. However, once Kirk filed his bankruptcy petition, he could have standing only if there was a proper ratification by the bankruptcy trustee. ¶ 24. A debtor's cause of action that existed at the time of the filing of the bankruptcy petition is property of the bankruptcy' estate. Pruitt v. Hancock Med. Ctr., 942 So.2d 797, 801 (Miss.2006) (quoting Lawrence v. Jackson Mack Sales, Inc., 837 F.Supp. 771, 779 (S.D.Miss.1992)). Property of the bankruptcy estate that is not abandoned and that is not administered in the bankruptcy proceeding remains property of the bankruptcy estate. 11 U.S.C. § 554(d). More specifically, the [f]ailure to list an interest on a bankruptcy schedule leaves that interest in the bankruptcy estate. Pruitt, 942 So.2d at 802 (quoting Parker v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir.2004)). ¶ 25. When Kirk filed his bankruptcy petition on August 27, 1998, Kirk's suit against Pope and Dixieland became property of the bankruptcy estate. See Pruitt, 942 So.2d at 801. Because Kirk's claim is property of the bankruptcy estate, the Trustee is the real party in interest with exclusive standing to assert the claim. Wieburg v. GTE Southwest Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir.2001) (emphasis added); accord Pruitt, 942 So.2d at 802 (an unscheduled cause of action remains property of the bankruptcy estate with the bankruptcy trustee having  exclusive standing to assert the claim.). ¶ 26. While Kirk lacked standing, in his own right, to pursue the claim, a trustee may confer standing by proper ratification. Wieburg, 272 F.3d at 307. A valid ratification requires the ratifying party to authorize continuation of [the] action and agree, to be bound by the result. Jenkins v. Wright & Ferguson Funeral Home, 215 F.R.D. 518, 522 (S.D.Miss.2003) (quoting Wieburg, 272 F.3d at 307). A ratification also must satisfy the purpose of Rule 17(a), [10] which is to assure that the judgment will be final and that res judicata will protect the defendant from having to defend a separate action. [11] Id. ¶ 27. The Motion to Employ Special Counsel and Approve Contingency Agreement approved by the bankruptcy court stated that [i]n order for the Trustee to effectively pursue the claim against [defendants], it is necessary of the Debtor to retain special counsel to pursue the claim on behalf of the bankruptcy estate. This language authorizes continuation of the action on behalf of the bankruptcy estate and therefore meets the first requirement for a valid ratification. However, the agreement does not expressly state that the trustee will be bound by the result or that Pope and Dixieland will be protected from having to defend a later lawsuit. Typically, this would invalidate the ratification. Wieburg, 272 F.3d at 307 (ratification invalid because it did not give any assurance to the defendant that res judicata would protect the defendant from having to defend against later claims by the trustee). ¶ 28. Despite its deficiencies, the trustee's Motion to Employ Special Counsel constitutes a valid ratification due to the status of the case at the time the bankruptcy court approved the motion. When the bankruptcy court approved the motion to employ special counsel on January 23, 2003, Kirk already had obtained a judgment on the suit. The trustee's motion noted that a judgment already had been entered and, thus, implicitly agreed to be bound by the result. The trustee's acceptance of the judgment also protected Pope and Dixieland from having to defend a later, separate lawsuit. ¶ 29. While ratification did not occur until after the judgment had been entered, the trial court retained jurisdiction to enter a valid judgment in the subject case. Standing is an aspect of subject matter jurisdiction. Breeden v. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart LLP (In re The Bennett Funding Group, Inc.), 336 F.3d 94, 102 (2d Cir.2003) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). The Fifth Circuit has stated that if subject matter jurisdiction exists among the original parties, it remains intact after substitution. Ransom v. Brennan, 437 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904, 91 S.Ct. 2205, 29 L.Ed.2d 680 (1971). The rationale is that [a] substituted party steps into the same position of the original party. Id. Under Rule 17(a), ratification is given the same treatment as substitutioneach has the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest. Miss. R. Civ. P. 17(a). Accordingly, the ratifying party steps into the shoes of the original party so that subject matter jurisdiction remains intact. Moreover, post-judgment ratifications have been deemed valid by other courts. See Knight v. New Farmers Nat'l Bank, No. 90-6071, 946 F.2d 895, 1991 WL 207056, 1991 U.S.App. LEXIS 24819, slip op. (6th Cir. Oct. 15, 1991); Arabian American Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 939 F.2d 1472, 1477 (11th Cir.1991); Sun Refining & Marketing Co. v. Goldstein Oil Co., 801 F.2d 343, 345 (8th Cir.1986). ¶ 30. Given that the ratification was valid, we must consider whether judicial estoppel applies.