Opinion ID: 1801025
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brady and Giglio Violations

Text: Melton next argues that the trial court erred in rejecting his claim that the State withheld material and exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Melton also claims that that the State presented misleading evidence that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of his trial in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Brady requires the State to disclose material information within its possession or control that is favorable to the defense. Mordenti v. State, 894 So.2d 161, 168 (Fla.2004). To establish a Brady violation, the defendant has the burden to show (1) that favorable evidence  either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999); Way v. State, 760 So.2d 903, 910 (Fla. 2000). To meet the materiality prong, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, had the suppressed evidence been disclosed, the jury would have reached a different verdict. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289, 119 S.Ct. 1936. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Way, 760 So.2d at 913 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)); see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289-90, 119 S.Ct. 1936. A similar standard is used to evaluate prejudice in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The remedy of retrial for the State's suppression of evidence favorable to the defense is available when the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)). Giving deference to the trial court on questions of fact, this Court reviews de novo the application of the law and independently reviews the cumulative effect of the alleged suppressed evidence. See Mordenti, 894 So.2d at 169; Way, 760 So.2d at 913. Melton's Brady allegations are in relation to evidence allegedly withheld in the Saylor murder case, specifically concerning the testimony of Officer Thomas O'Neal, who was assigned to investigate the homicide of Ricky Saylor. At the evidentiary hearing below, postconviction counsel asked Officer O'Neal numerous questions regarding his interviews with Bruce Frazier, Ben Lewis, and an individual thought to be named Summerlin, though he was later confirmed to be named Sumler, all three individuals being jail inmates and interviewed in reference to the Saylor murder. [7] Melton also asserts that the State failed to disclose evidence of negotiations and anticipated deals with Melton's codefendants in the Saylor case, which could have been used for impeachment purposes. Melton points to Terrell's testimony at the evidentiary hearing in which he states that, had he known of additional contact between Lewis and the State Attorney's Office in the Saylor case, he would have presented that information to the jury. Melton also argues that trial counsel was not made aware of the plea agreement between the State and Tony Houston, who testified against Melton at the Saylor trial, and the fact that Houston testified in exchange for a reduced sentence. Melton concludes that the jury never knew of this motive to possibly lie about Melton's involvement in Saylor's murder. In denying these Brady claims in the instant case, the trial court noted that the record from the Saylor trial clearly refutes Melton's claims that the State withheld a plea agreement between the State and Houston and allowed Houston to lie about it. In fact, the transcripts demonstrate not only that Terrell was in possession of Houston's plea document, but that he cross-examined Houston extensively about it and read the entire document aloud to the jury. The court also denied the claim that material evidence was withheld regarding the State's dealings with Lewis in the Saylor case, since Melton's trial counsel was also aware that there had been discussions between the State and Lewis and that although Lewis had no fixed deal, he did maintain an expectation of a benefit in exchange for his testimony against Melton. Furthermore, Terrell questioned Lewis's counsel on direct examination at the penalty phase in the Carter case regarding Lewis's relationship with the State and any plea deal he might be receiving. The trial court denied the claims regarding the statements Lewis made to other inmates in conjunction with its discussion regarding the lack of evidence of claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for discovering that these witnesses or statements existed. We conclude that error has not been demonstrated in the trial court's denial of this claim or in the reasoning of the trial court set out above. Further, we note that Melton raised this identical Brady argument in his postconviction appeal for the Saylor murder, and we have already noted that the First District recently approved the trial court's denial of all claims of relief for that crime. See Melton, 909 So.2d at 865. Regarding the alleged Giglio violations pertaining to false or misleading testimony advanced by the State, Melton points to different statements made during the State's closing argument at the Carter trial concerning Lewis's testimony during the guilt phase. A claim under Giglio alleges that a prosecutor knowingly presented false testimony against the defendant; a Giglio violation is demonstrated when (1) the prosecutor presented or failed to correct false testimony; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the false evidence was material. Guzman v. State, 941 So.2d 1045, 1049 (Fla. 2006). Once the first two prongs are established, the false evidence is deemed material if there is any reasonable possibility that it could have affected the jury's verdict. Id. at 1051. Under this standard, the State has the burden to prove that the false testimony was not material by demonstrating it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1052; see also Mordenti, 894 So.2d at 175. [8] Giglio claims present mixed questions of law and fact. Sochor v. State, 883 So.2d 766, 785 (Fla.2004). We thus defer to those factual findings supported by competent, substantial evidence, but we review de novo the application of the law to the facts. Id. Melton asserts that the following argument misrepresented the degree of coercion the State exerted on Lewis to testify at the trial: MR. SCHILLER: Thank you, Judge. Mr. Lewis was subpoenaed here yesterday. In other words, he didn't come voluntarily to the proceedings. You can see he was in custody anyway, but he was subpoenaed here. And under the law, if the State Attorney's Office, of course, that being Mr. Spencer and I in this case, subpoena a witness so he's compelled to give testimony under oath about the criminal conduct of his  his statement given at the time has what we'd call use immunity, that statement cannot be used against him. And the defense raised this issue yesterday and I want to be sure it's clear, Ben Lewis does not have immunity for this crime. He's under prosecution. The actual things he said yesterday cannot be used against him is all in that statement and he's here under subpoena. (Emphasis added by Melton.) Melton also points to the following argument as constituting a clearly false statement, again from the State's closing: Also as shown there's no deals for Mr. Lewis. Mr. Spencer very carefully developed the evidence and showed y'all that there's been no promises made to Lewis, there's no special deals, no plea negotiations with him. He stands on his own in this case. (Emphasis added by Melton.) In dismissing this claim, the trial court found that to the extent it was asserting improper argument by the State, it was procedurally barred and should have instead been raised on direct appeal. We agree. See Knight v. State, 923 So.2d 387, 393 n. 6 (Fla.2005) (rejecting a claim regarding improper prosecutorial comments made during closing arguments as procedurally barred in a postconviction motion for failure to raise on direct appeal); Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.2d 1253, 1256 (Fla. 1995) (stating that issues that could have been but were not raised on direct appeal or issues that were raised and rejected on direct appeal are not cognizable through collateral attack). Furthermore, aside from the procedural bar, we find these claims to be without merit. The record from Melton's original trial in the instant case indicates that the following exchange took place between Ben Lewis and the prosecutor when he was called to testify by the State: Q. [by the State] Mr. Lewis, have you been indicted by the grand jury for the murder of George Carter and robbery of George Carter: A. Yes. Q. On January 23rd of '91? A. Yes, sir. Q. Are those charges currently pending? A. Yes, sir. Q. Have any promises been made by the State Attorneys' Office, law enforcement or anyone concerning the disposition of your charges if you testify here today? A. No, sir. Q. No promises? A. No, sir. Q. Any threats been made to you? A. No. Q. Are you represented by counsel? Are you represented by a lawyer? A. Yes. Q. Does your lawyer know you're testifying here today? A. Yes, sir. Q. What's your lawyer told you to do? A. Just tell the truth. Q. Do you realize that  Has your lawyer explained to you that you're here under subpoena today? A. Yes. Q. Can what you say here today can be used against you in the trial of your case? A. Can it be used against me? Q. Can what you say here today be used in the trial against you in your case? A. I don't know. I believe it can. Q. You're here under subpoena? A. Yes, sir. On cross-examination, the trial records show that the following exchange took place regarding Lewis's arrangements with the State Attorney's Office: Q. [by defense counsel] Mr. Lewis, you told Mr. Spencer [prosecutor] that you thought what you testified to today could be used against you, didn't you? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay. And you're under subpoena here today, aren't you? A. Yes. Q. And when you're under subpoena by the State of Florida that means you get immunity, doesn't it? A. I guess. I don't know. Q. You don't know. Are you telling this jury you don't know what immunity is? A. Yeah, I know what immunity is. Q. And you've been subpoenaed here today? A. Yes. Q. [The prosecuting attorney is] listening to everything you're saying this morning, isn't he? A. Yes, he is. Q. And if you say something that hurts his case you don't think that's going to make [the prosecuting attorney] very happy, do you? A. I'm just up here to tell the truth. Q. What do you think, if you say something that hurts his case that's not going to make him happy, is it? You know that. Is that right? A. Yeah. Q. That could make him unhappy, couldn't it? A. Yes, it could. Q. And that could deny you a deal in the future, couldn't it, right? A. I guess so, yeah. Q. Okay. So you don't have a deal but I bet you're hoping for a deal, aren't you? A. I'm hoping for something. Q. You're hoping for probation, aren't you? A. Uh-huh. Q. You've been in jail ever since you were picked up on January 23rd, haven't you? A. Yes. Q. You're ready to get out of jail now, aren't you? A. I'm ready to get my time served with. Thus, his own testimony reveals that Lewis was subpoenaed by the State to testify, that he had obtained use immunity, and that he was currently under indictment for the Carter murder. While the State arguably downplayed Lewis's relationship with the State in its closing argument, the testimony makes clear that there was no formal plea agreement between the two parties. While Lewis may have had great expectations based upon his cooperation with the State, he testified only that he hoped to obtain a deal at some point in the future. Accordingly, on this record we conclude that relief was properly denied under Giglio, since the prosecutorial comments referenced by Melton only reiterate Lewis's own testimony given during the direct and cross-examination at trial.