Opinion ID: 340972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: decisional framework.

Text: 17 The statute with which we deal, as noted above, was enacted in 1940. 6 At that time Congress was concerned principally with the growing danger of world war, and not with the distant problems of demobilization. Section 8 was, in the words of a contemporary commentator, an afterthought. See Comment, Veterans' Reemployment Rights Under Selective Service Interpretations, 54 Yale L.J. 417, 418-19 n.8 (1945). It is not surprising that the statute is ambiguous, guaranteeing returning veterans against any loss of seniority without defining what seniority is. At least two sensible interpretations are possible. Congress may have intended to restore the veteran to the same relative seniority that he held before induction vis-a-vis fellow employees who did not serve in the Armed Forces, implicitly counting time in uniform as time on the job. On the other hand, the language might as easily be read as protecting only against the forfeiture of absolute seniority accumulated before induction. See Haggard, Veterans' Reemployment Rights and the Escalator Principle, 51 B.U.L.Rev. 539, 541-44 (1971). 18 The Supreme Court first faced this problem in Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 1946, 328 U.S. 275, 66 S.Ct. 1105, 90 L.Ed. 1230, where Mr. Justice Douglas chose the first alternative: 19 (The veteran) does not step back on the seniority escalator at the point he stepped off. He steps back on at the precise point he would have occupied had he kept his position continuously during the war. 20 328 U.S. at 284-85, 66 S.Ct. at 1111. 21 However, in answering one question, the Court created a second: What is seniority? In Accardi v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 1966, 383 U.S. 225, 86 S.Ct. 768, 15 L.Ed. 717, Mr. Justice Black attempted this explanation: 22 The term seniority is not to be limited by a narrow, technical definition but must be given a meaning that is consonant with the intention of Congress as expressed in the 1940 Act. That intention was to preserve for the returning veterans the rights and benefits which would have automatically accrued to them had they remained in private employment rather than responding to the call of their country. 383 U.S. at 229-30, 86 S.Ct. at 771. 23 In general, then, we may define seniority benefits as those which reward longevity, not those which compensate for work actually performed. See also Foster v. Dravo Corp., 1975, 420 U.S. 92, 97, 95 S.Ct. 879, 43 L.Ed.2d 44; Austin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 Cir., 1975, 504 F.2d 1033, 1035. 24 However, even the best definition is not a solution. It may be obvious that a physician who leaves an internship to serve in the Armed Forces is not entitled to return as head resident, but most of the problems which courts have confronted are not as easily solved. Cf. Earls v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 9 Cir., 1976, 532 F.2d 133. The statute assumes that there exists a distinct line between rewards for status and compensation for work. In reality many benefits combine the two; they recompense employees for both status and work. These hybrids are out of place in a system which recognizes only purebreds. Hence, we must unmix the benefit in a way never foreseen by the contracting parties or the Congress, to determine which characteristics trace their lineage to seniority. Accardi, supra, 383 U.S. 229-31, 86 S.Ct. 768; Haggard, Veterans' Reemployment Rights and the Escalator Principle, 51 B.U.L.Rev. at 577. 25