Opinion ID: 794138
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Class arbitration

Text: 132
133 The 2002/2003 arbitration agreements clearly prohibit any type of class or consolidated action: 134 THERE SHALL BE NO RIGHT OR AUTHORITY FOR ANY CLAIMS TO BE ARBITRATED ON A CLASS ACTION OR CONSOLIDATED BASIS OR ON BASES INVOLVING CLAIMS BROUGHT IN A PURPORTED REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY ON BEHALF OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC (SUCH AS A PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL), OTHER SUBSCRIBERS, OR OTHER PERSONS SIMILARLY SITUATED UNLESS YOUR STATE'S LAWS PROVIDE OTHERWISE. 135 Comcast cites Bazzle for the proposition that class actions are a procedural issue left properly for an arbitrator to decide. However, as with its interpretation of the Court's holding in PacifiCare, Comcast misreads the decision. 136 As explained earlier, the Court in Bazzle was faced at the outset with a problem concerning the contracts' silence. Are the contracts in fact silent, or do they forbid class arbitration ...? Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 447, 123 S.Ct. 2402. Since the literal terms of the agreement did not resolve the class arbitration question, the Court concluded that the question — whether the agreement forbids class arbitration — is for the arbitrator to decide. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451, 123 S.Ct. 2402. However, we do not confront that situation here. Unlike the arbitration agreement in Bazzle, the 2002/2003 arbitration agreements unmistakably forbid the use of class procedures in arbitration. In other words, Pacificare's holding did not apply to Plaintiffs' attorney's fees and costs claim because of the clarity of the conflict between the arbitration provisions and the state and federal antitrust statutes. Similarly, Bazzle does not apply here because of the clarity of the prohibition against class arbitration. 137 We recognize that the arbitration agreements' class mechanism prohibition is not in direct conflict with the relevant antitrust statutes, state and federal, which do not mention class actions or the like. However, the arbitration agreements' language ostensibly conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide for class actions. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. We say ostensibly because the Policies & Practices explicitly forbids only class arbitration, and not class actions. However, because the Policies & Practices creates a mandatory arbitration regime, a ban on class arbitration effectively forecloses the use of any class-based mechanism. 138 The bar has substantial implications for the enforceability of the arbitration agreements. We have said that the legitimacy of the arbitral forum rests on the presumption that arbitration provides a fair and adequate mechanism for enforcing statutory rights. Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 14. The Supreme Court has stated this same premise. In Mitsubishi, the Court held that [s]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the [federal substantive] statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function. 473 U.S. at 637, 105 S.Ct. 3346. The bar on class arbitration threatens the premise that arbitration can be a fair and adequate mechanism for enforcing statutory rights. Rosenberg, 170 F.3d at 14. 139 In Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997), the Supreme Court stated that [t]he policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights, id. at 617, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir.1997)). In Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir.2004), the Seventh Circuit stated the proposition even more bluntly: It would hardly be an improvement to have in lieu of this single class action 17,000,000 suits each seeking damages of $15.00 to $30.00.... The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17,000,000 individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.00. While Comcast is correct when it categorizes the class action (and class arbitration) as a procedure for redressing claims — and not a substantive or statutory right in and of itself — we cannot ignore the substantive implications of this procedural mechanism. 140 Here, the putative class would consist of Comcast's Boston area subscribers. According to the factual information contained in the unopposed expert declarations Plaintiffs submitted to the district court below, each putative class member's estimated recovery — assuming the damage award was trebled pursuant to the applicable antitrust statute — would range from a few hundred dollars to perhaps a few thousand dollars. By contrast, the expert fees alone are estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars; and attorney's fees could reach into the millions of dollars. To say that each potential class member is unlikely to have or make available the up-front costs needed to prosecute this costly antitrust suit is a large understatement. The class mechanism ban — particularly its implicit ban on spreading across multiple plaintiffs the costs of experts, depositions, neutrals' fees, and other disbursements—forces the putative class member to assume financial burdens so prohibitive as to deter the bringing of claims .... And these costs ... will exceed the value of the recovery she is seeking. Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 Mich. L.Rev. 373, 407 (2005). In Randolph, the plaintiff asserted that: 141 the arbitration agreement's silence with respect to costs and fees creates a risk that she will be required to bear prohibitive arbitration costs if she pursues her claims in an arbitral forum, and thereby forces her to forgo any claims she may have against petitioners. Therefore, she argues, she is unable to vindicate her statutory rights in arbitration. 142 531 U.S. at 90, 121 S.Ct. 513. In response, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum. Id. Here, there is no doubt about these large arbitration costs. 143 Although neither the Supreme Court nor the First Circuit has decided a case that presents the exact issue we face here, other courts of appeals have. These courts concluded that there was a question of arbitrability presented by the bar on class arbitration. See, e.g., Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Georgia, 400 F.3d 868 (11th Cir.2005); 18 Livingston v. Associates Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553 (7th Cir.2003). We see no reason not to do the same here. The class arbitration bar is unmistakable. Because the denial of class arbitration in the pursuit of antitrust claims has the potential to prevent Plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights, Plaintiffs present a question of arbitrability with respect to the 2002/2003 arbitration agreements' class arbitration prohibition. 144
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146 On the merits, the decisions of other courts of appeal appear to weigh against Plaintiffs, although not overwhelmingly so. Four of our sister circuits — the Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh — enforce consumer arbitration clauses barring the use of class mechanisms (class action and/or class arbitration). See Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir.2000) (Because there is no irreconcilable conflict between arbitration and the goals of the TILA [Truth in Lending Act], we similarly hold that claims arising under the EFTA [Electronic Fund Transfer Act] may also be subject to arbitration notwithstanding the desire of a plaintiff who previously consented to arbitration to bring his or her claims as part of a class.); Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir.2002) (We also reject [the plaintiff's] argument that the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable as unconscionable because without the class action vehicle, she will be unable to maintain her legal representation given the small amount of her individual damages.); Livingston, 339 F.3d at 559 ([H]aving found the Arbitration Agreement enforceable we must give full force to its terms.... The Arbitration Agreement at issue here explicitly precludes ... class claims or pursuing `class action arbitration'); Randolph II, 244 F.3d at 819 ([W]e hold that a contractual provision to arbitrate TILA claims is enforceable even if it precludes a plaintiff from utilizing class action procedures in vindicating statutory rights under TILA.). 147 These four decisions have two important commonalities. First, attorney's fees and costs were either recoverable by the plaintiffs who contested the arbitral forum on the basis of the class arbitration ban, or the fees and costs issue was moot. For example, in Johnson, the court stated [n]or will arbitration necessarily choke off the supply of lawyers willing to pursue claims on behalf of debtors. Attorneys' fees are recoverable under the TILA. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 374. In Livingston, the defendant agreed to pay all costs associated with arbitration. Livingston, 339 F.3d at 557. Here, too, because of the general savings clause in the Policies & Practices, we have ruled that attorney's fees and costs must be available in the arbitral forum. 148 Second, in all four decisions, the plaintiffs raised claims against banks or other financial lenders primarily under the TILA. 19 This is not the case here, where we are dealing with federal and state antitrust claims. That is a potentially important distinction. Therefore, we must examine the rationale for these decisions more closely. For this purpose, we will discuss the Third Circuit's Johnson decision. Each of the other circuits relies on Johnson. See Snowden, 290 F.3d at 638-39 (citing Johnson, 225 F.3d at 374); Livingston, 339 F.3d at 559 (citing Johnson, 225 F.3d at 369); Randolph II, 244 F.3d at 818 (Our thinking in this respect is consistent with the Third Circuit's decision that `[arbitration] clauses are effective even though they may render class actions to pursue statutory claims under the TILA... unavailable.') (quoting Johnson, 225 F.3d at 369). In supporting the bar on class arbitration, Johnson also contains the most extensive analysis for that position. See generally Johnson, 225 F.3d at 370-77. 149
150 The Johnson decision begins its analysis of the validity of a class mechanism bar with the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer. In Gilmer, the plaintiff brought an age discrimination claim, and then contested arbitration of that claim because, inter alia, the arbitral forum did not offer all of the procedures a judicial forum would, such as full discovery and class actions. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29-33, 111 S.Ct. 1647. Gilmer's holding — that an ADEA plaintiff can be compelled to arbitrate his ADEA claim — is based on the proposition from Mitsubishi that so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28, 111 S.Ct. 1647 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637, 105 S.Ct. 3346)(internal quotation marks omitted). 151 Johnson extends Gilmer to the TILA context and enforces a class action bar in arbitration, based on three assertions. First, class actions do not necessarily give plaintiffs better incentives to bring private enforcement actions: 152 [t]he sums available in recovery to individual plaintiffs are not automatically increased by use of the class forum. Indeed, individual plaintiff recoveries available in a class action may be lower than those possible in individual suits because the recovery available under TILA's statutory cap on class recoveries is spread over the entire class. 153 Johnson, 225 F.3d at 374. 154 Second, plaintiffs will still be able to find representation without the class action mechanism because of the availability of attorney's fees and costs: 155 Nor will arbitration necessarily choke off the supply of lawyers willing to pursue claims on behalf of debtors. Attorneys' fees are recoverable under the TILA, see 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3), and would therefore appear to be recoverable in arbitration, as arbitrators possess the power to fashion the same relief as courts. 156 Johnson, 225 F.3d at 374-75 (internal citations omitted). According to the Johnson court, though pursuing individual claims in arbitration may well be less attractive than pursuing a class action in the courts, we do not agree that compelling arbitration of the claim of a prospective class action plaintiff irreconcilably conflicts with TILA's goal of encouraging private actions to deter violations of the Act. Id. 157 Third, Johnson asserts that even if TILA plaintiffs are discouraged from bringing private enforcement actions, administrative enforcement exists to fill the void. Our conclusion that there is no irreconcilable conflict between the TILA's social policy goals and arbitration of claims that could have been heard as part of a class action is bolstered by the statute's administrative enforcement provisions. These provisions offer meaningful deterrents to violators of the TILA if private enforcement actions should fail to fulfill that role. Id. at 375. 158 In our view, these rationales drawn from the TILA context do not support the validity of a bar to class arbitration of Plaintiffs' antitrust claims. 159
160 As an initial matter, prosecuting a typical TILA claim is vastly different from prosecuting an antitrust claim because of the sheer complexity of the latter. For example, in Snowden, the plaintiff engaged in deferred deposit transactions, where a customer tenders a check to the store that is cashed for a service fee with the understanding that the check will not be negotiated until some later, agreed upon time. 290 F.3d at 633. The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that: (1) the deferred deposit transactions with [the defendant] were loans; and (2) that the service fee charged by [the defendant] for such transactions constituted interest. Id. at 635. As a result, the plaintiff asserted that the defendant had violated, inter alia, the TILA. 161 In a cases such as Snowden, there is a specific transaction at issue. Whether there is a TILA violation usually hinges on whether the facts about that transaction do or do not establish a violation of the TILA. This is not a particularly difficult analysis. As one commentator has summarized, in TILA cases, one must be cognizant of the type of credit being extended as well as the terms of the credit contract to determine which disclosures, in addition to the APR and finance charge, are required under TILA and any other applicable Federal and state laws. Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclosure: Socioeconomics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 199, 216 (2005). By contrast, whether a company's action constitutes an antitrust violation is usually a complicated question of fact. The law that then applies to those facts is equally complex. This complexity of prosecuting an antitrust claim is confirmed by the unopposed experts' affidavits provided by Plaintiffs, which describe the great expense and labor required by such a case. 162 Three of Plaintiffs' experts — Howard J. Sedran, an attorney with twenty-six (26) years of experience litigating class actions including antitrust actions; J. Owen Todd, a former justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court; and John C. Beyer, an economist — agree that to prosecute their antitrust claims successfully, Plaintiffs will have to undertake an elaborate factual inquiry that includes: 163 defining the relevant product market, defining the relevant geographic market, establishing the market power of defendants and the manner in which they exercised such power; the effects of potential competition within the relevant markets; the impact of conduct on any non-incumbent cable providers in the relevant market; analyzing the swapping agreements alleged in the Complaint, as well as merger and purchase of asset transactions that defendants may have been involved in relating to the alleged monopolization conduct; reviewing and analyzing the increases in cable subscription rates over time; establishing Comcast's alleged monopoly overcharges in relevant markets; and further calculating the named plaintiffs' damages. 164 Beyer estimates that expert witness fees alone will cost a minimum of $300,000, which could exceed in excess of $600,000 depending on the implementation of the factual inquiry. Beyer avers that [d]irect costs (travel, communications, computer analysis, etc.) would be an additional expense, which generally is 12-15 percent of professional service costs. Sedran avers that based on my experience in complex antitrust cases, it is reasonable to expect that competent attorneys would be required to expend several million dollars of attorneys' time and hundreds of thousands of dollars in expenses, including expert witness fees. Additionally, as stated earlier, according to Plaintiffs' expert affidavits, an individual recovery here will range from a few hundred dollars to a few thousand dollars at most. 165 The complexity of an antitrust case generally, and the complexity and cost required to prosecute a case against Comcast specifically, undermine the Johnson court's rationales for supporting a bar to class arbitration. Johnson first asserts that a class action does not necessarily provide greater incentives for private enforcement actions in the TILA context. Yet, Plaintiffs have provided uncontested and unopposed expert affidavits demonstrating that without some form of class mechanism — be it class action or class arbitration — a consumer antitrust plaintiff will not sue at all. For example, Todd avers that [d]ue to the small value of the individual consumer/subscriber's claim, retaining expert witnesses is completely unrealistic and impractical on an individual claim basis. Furthermore, due to the complexity of antitrust cases, including a case of this kind, the individual consumer/subscriber's cases would be extremely compromised, and effectively precluded, without the testimony of expert witnesses. 166 Johnson's second assertion — that the availability of attorney's fees provides the necessary incentive for private enforcement actions — similarly finds little to no purchase in the antitrust context. A plaintiff's attorney in the consumer antitrust context would be required to invest a large initial outlay in time and money, including opportunity costs 20 — estimated in the hundreds of thousands of dollars — for only a portion of an individual plaintiff's recovery, which at most is a few thousand dollars. Then, factoring in the uncertainty of success, the appeal for an attorney to take on an individual plaintiff's antitrust claim shrinks even further. As two commentators have noted: 167 [t]he court decisions striking class action prohibitions have all emphasized that many small-dollar claims are simply not feasible if brought individually. In essence, these cases recognize ... that by increasing plaintiffs' transaction costs, defendants can induce them to accept lower settlements or even drop their claims altogether. Citing the Supreme Court's oft-stated justification for supporting class actions, courts invalidating class action prohibitions explain that it is often not rational for individual consumers or attorneys to bring small claims, whether through litigation or arbitration. 168 Jean B. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67-SPG Law & Contemp. Probs. 75, 85-86 (2004). In his affidavit, Sedran succinctly puts it this way: [i]t should not surprise anyone that a qualified attorney would not pursue a few individual cases on a contingent basis where even a victory would result in the loss of millions of dollars of time and expense. 21 169 If, as a practical matter, there will be no inventive for private enforcement of antitrust claims by consumers, the Johnson court's third assertion — that any decrease in private enforcement actions will be redressed by administrative enforcement — becomes even more suspect. When Congress enacts a statute that provides for both private and administrative enforcement actions, Congress envisions a role for both types of enforcement. Otherwise, Congress would not have provided for both. Weakening one of those enforcement mechanisms seems inconsistent with the Congressional scheme. Eliminating one of them entirely is surely incompatible with Congress's choice. 170 In summary, we find Johnson's rationale for allowing arbitration to move forward in the TILA context despite a bar on the use of class mechanisms unpersuasive when applied to Plaintiffs' antitrust claims. Because of the presence of the bar on class mechanisms in arbitration, Plaintiffs cannot be compelled to arbitrate their antitrust claims, both state and federal, if that bar remains in place. 171
172 There is support for this conclusion in the holdings of other courts. Although these courts — be they state courts or federal courts applying state law — have generally refused to compel arbitration on state unconscionability grounds, these decisions contain reasoning that mirrors our own. 22 These decisions emphasize that a class mechanism bar can impermissibly frustrate the prosecution of claims in any forum, arbitral or judicial. As the California Supreme Court has observed, class actions and arbitrations are, particularly in the consumer context, often inextricably linked to the vindication of substantive rights. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.4th 148, 161, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal.2005). 173 In Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1130 (2003), the Ninth Circuit confronted an arbitration agreement in a consumer service agreement that barr[ed] customers from, among other things, pursuing claims against AT & T on a classwide basis. Deciding the case on the basis of California state unconscionability doctrine, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's conclusion that the class-action ban violates California's unconscionability law on the basis of this persuasive reasoning: 174 [i]t would not have been economically feasible to pursue the claims in these cases on an individual basis, whether the case was brought in court or in arbitration. If the Legal Remedies Provisions contained in AT & T's new CSA had governed customers' rights in these situations, it is highly unlikely any of the claims would have been prosecuted. It is undisputed that the lawyers who represented the plaintiffs in these cases would not have taken them if the only claim they could have pursued was the claim of the individual plaintiff. The reasons for this are not hard to see. The actual damages sought by the named plaintiffs are relatively insubstantial.... Consequently, it would not make economic sense for an attorney to agree to represent any of the plaintiffs in these cases in exchange for 33 1/3 % or even a greater percentage of the individual's recovery. The lawyer would almost certainly incur more in costs and time charges just getting the complaint prepared, filed and served than she would recover, even if the case were ultimately successful. Simply put, the potential reward would be insufficient to motivate private counsel to assume the risks of prosecuting the case just for an individual on a contingency basis. While retaining counsel on an hourly basis is possible, in view of the small amounts involved, it would not make economic sense for an individual to retain an attorney to handle one of these cases on an hourly basis and it is hard to see how any lawyer could advise a client to do so. The net result is that cases such as the ones listed above will not be prosecuted even if meritorious. Thus, the prohibition on class action litigation functions as an effective deterrent to litigating many types of claims involving rates, services or billing practices and, ultimately, would serve to shield AT & T from liability even in cases where it has violated the law. 175 Ting v. AT & T, 182 F.Supp.2d 902, 918 (N.D.Cal.2002). 176 The parallels between the effect of the class action ban in Ting and the class mechanism bar in the Policies & Practices is impossible to ignore. If the class mechanism prohibition here is enforced, Comcast will be essentially shielded from private consumer antitrust enforcement liability, even in cases where it has violated the law. Plaintiffs' will be unable to vindicate their statutory rights. Finally, the social goals of federal and state antitrust laws will be frustrated because of the enforcement gap created by the de facto liability shield. 23 177
178 In its appellate reply brief, Comcast states: [n]eedless to say, any terms other than the class arbitration limitation, are severable. Comcast reiterated this position at oral argument, stating: 179 With respect to the class action bar, the company has taken and it is our position that it is not severable from arbitration. In other words if it goes to arbitration, it goes with the bar. If the court were to find that the class action bar would have to be severed from the clause in order to make it enforceable, we would say that the whole arbitration clause would go down, and none of it would be enforceable. 180 However, this position is in stark contrast to the plain language of the arbitration agreements. In addition to the general savings clause, which we applied to sever the provision preventing the recovery of attorney's fees and costs, the class arbitration bar — much like the remedies limitation provision — contains its own savings clause. That provision states: THERE SHALL BE NO RIGHT OR AUTHORITY FOR ANY CLAIMS TO BE ARBITRATED ON A CLASS ACTION OR CONSOLIDATED BASIS ... UNLESS YOUR STATE'S LAWS PROVIDE OTHERWISE  (emphasis added). This savings clause was explicitly added to the 2002/2003 version; the 2001 iteration contains no savings clause specific to the class arbitration bar. Comcast never acknowledged this additional language in its briefing on appeal or at oral argument. 181 Contrary to Comcast's position on appeal, the language of the 2002/2003 Policies & Practices anticipates the possible severance of the class arbitration bar. Although the savings clause refers to a conflict between the class arbitration bar and state law — and we have found an impermissible conflict between the class arbitration bar and federal law — the basis for the conflict is irrelevant to the severance analysis. What matters for that analysis is an unmistakable expression in the savings clause that the class arbitration bar is not an indispensable condition of the arbitral forum. This disparity between the language of the arbitration agreements and Comcast's position on appeal raises an unusual quandary: do we disregard the plain language of the Policies & Practices in favor of Comcast's ex post disavowal? 182 We answer this question in the negative. Apparently, Comcast has simply changed its mind about the severability of the class arbitration bar. We are unaware of any principle of contract law that permits disregard of a contract provision on the basis of second thoughts by a contracting party. Moreover, as the district court correctly noted, we are dealing with a contract of adhesion, which is usually construed against the drafting party. 24 It would be particularly incongruous to allow Comcast to disavow the plain language of the contract in such a circumstance. 183 In the context of our retroactivity analysis, we noted that the tenet of contra proferentem does not apply in situations where the scope of an arbitration agreement is at issue. See also Paul Revere, 226 F.3d at 25. In those instances, the federal policy in favor of arbitration trumps the tenet allowing courts to construe ambiguity in an agreement strictly against the drafter. But the application of the class arbitration bar's savings clause does not raise a question about the scope of the arbitration agreement. Indeed, by applying the savings clause and severing the class arbitration bar, we are actually saving the arbitral forum-an outcome consistent with the federal policy favoring arbitration. 184 We acknowledge that by severing the class arbitration bar from the arbitration agreements, as applied to Plaintiffs' antitrust claims, we are excising a major provision of the arbitration agreements. The class arbitration bar comprises the second full paragraph of the section in the Policies & Practices describing the terms of the mandatory, binding arbitration regime. It establishes an arbitration regime that handles individual claims only. Typically, courts prefer declaring an arbitration agreement unenforceable rather than using severance as a remedy when fundamental elements of the arbitration regime are at issue. See Booker v. Robert Half Intern., Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 84-85 (D.C.Cir. 2005) (A critical consideration in assessing severability is giving effect to the intent of the contracting parties.... If illegality pervades the arbitration agreement such that only a disintegrated fragment would remain after hacking away the unenforceable parts ... the judicial effort begins to look more like rewriting the contract than fulfilling the intent of the parties.). Since the premise of arbitration is the contractual agreement of the parties to the arbitral forum, drastic rewriting is particularly inappropriate. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Exalon Indus., Inc., 138 F.3d 426, 428-29 (1st Cir.1998) ([T]here is no general legal duty to arbitrate private commercial disputes; instead, such proceedings are strictly the product of voluntary contractual obligations.). In the absence of a savings clause specifically affixed to the class arbitration bar, severing that bar would be difficult to justify. 185 However, here, the arbitration agreements do anticipate specifically the severance of the class arbitration bar. Therefore, Comcast cannot claim that it did not foresee the possibility that, despite its strong preference for individual arbitration, it would have to arbitrate on a class basis because the contractual bar on class arbitration might, in its application to particular claims, run afoul of controlling law. This is precisely what has happened here. 25