Opinion ID: 2605155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The California Approach

Text: People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913), contains a comprehensive analysis of the public trust doctrine. That case involved a sale of swamp and tidelands by the California legislature without any consideration of the public trust pursuant to which the state holds the tidelands. The court held that the grant was subject to the public trust: statutes purporting to authorize an abandonment of .. . public use will be carefully scanned to ascertain whether or not such was the legislative intention, and that intent must be clearly expressed or necessarily implied. It will not be implied if any other inference is reasonably possible. And if any interpretation of the statute is reasonably possible which would not involve a destruction of the public use or an intention to terminate it in violation of the trust, the courts will give the statute such interpretation. 138 P. at 88. In order to uphold the tidelands grant, the court construed the statute in light of public trust requirements: [The statutes] can be given some effect if construed to authorize the sale of such land subject to the public easements, the purchaser to be without authority to interfere with such use, or with the further administration thereof by or on behalf of the state. They are reasonably susceptible of that interpretation; hence they will be so construed. The holder of a patent from the state under these laws will have the naked title to the soil. Id. The development of the public trust doctrine in California is discussed at length in City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda, 26 Cal.3d 515, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 606 P.2d 362 (1980). Basically, two rules developed in California: (1) The state may make an absolute grant of tidelands to private parties when to do so is to promote navigation and commerce; and (2) Grants to private persons not for this purpose do not pass title free of the trust, but rather title is taken subject to the trust. City of Berkeley followed the California Fish Co. rule. The property in City of Berkeley was granted pursuant to an 1870 statute which authorized the sale of tidelands to private parties. The court overruled two earlier cases which had held that these grants were in fee simple and not subject to the rights of the public. The court held that since the grants were not made in aid of navigation, the grantees took title subject to the public trust. In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal.3d 419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709 (1983), the California court has provided a comprehensive statement of the current status of the public trust doctrine. That case, commonly referred to as the Mono Lake case, involved an interplay between the public trust doctrine and the scope of the public trust vis a vis established appropriated water rights. Mono Lake, the second largest lake in California sits at the base of the Sierra Nevada escarpment near the eastern entrance to Yosemite National Park and is fed by five freshwater streams. Los Angeles had obtained a permit to divert virtually the entire flow of four of the five streams and construct facilities to divert the water to the city. It diverted approximately one-half of the flow in the 1940's and in 1970 completed further diversion works taking virtually the entire flow of the four streams. As a consequence, by October 1979, the lake level had shrunk from a prediversion area of 85 square miles to an area of 60.3 square miles and its surface level had dropped 43 feet with the expectation that future diversions would lower the level another 43 feet and reduce its surface area by about 22 square miles over the next 80 to 100 years. The California court, in ruling that the public trust doctrine takes precedent even over vested water rights, enunciated the following principles: [T]he continuing power of the state as administrator of the public trust ... extends to the revocation of previously granted rights or to the enforcement of the trust against lands long thought free of the trust. 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360, 658 P.2d at 723. Any licenses granted by the statute, moreover, [remain] subject to the trust: `The state may at any time remove [the] structures ..., even though they have been erected with its license or consent, if it subsequently determines them to be purprestures or finds that they substantially interfere with navigation or commerce.' 189 Cal. Rptr. at 359, 658 P.2d at 722. Except for ... rare instances ... the grantee holds subject to the trust, and while he may assert a vested right to the servient estate (the right of use subject to the trust) and to any improvements he erects, he can claim no vested right to bar recognition of the trust or state action to carry out its purposes. 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360, 658 P.2d at 723. [T]he public trust is more than an affirmation of state power to use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of the trust. 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360-361, 658 P.2d at 723-724. Under the California rule statutes alienating public trust resources will be construed in light of the public trust doctrine requirements. The public trust doctrine takes precedent even over vested water rights. Grants, even if purporting to be in fee simple, are given subject to the trust and to action by the state necessary to fulfill its trust responsibilities. Grants to individuals of public trust resources will be construed as given subject to the public trust doctrine unless the legislature explicitly provides otherwise. This case involves the granting of a permit for an encroachment, and not the grant of property in fee simple, to private parties. The property has not been placed entirely beyond the control of the state and the legislature has not given away or sold the discretion of its successors. The Department of Lands has determined that the use of the public trust property by the yacht club for the purpose of constructing sailboat slips does not violate the public trust in the resource at this time. After a thorough examination of the record in this case and a review of the evidence before the Department, we agree. However, the grant remains subject to the public trust. Under the California rule herein adopted, the state is not precluded from determining in the future that this conveyance is no longer compatible with the public trust imposed on this conveyance.