Opinion ID: 160399
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructing the jury on venue

Text: 32 Mr. Cryar next argues that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on venue, specifically by failing to give his proffered venue instruction. Venue is a fact question, normally decided by the jury. See United States v. Miller, 111 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir. 1997). Venue must be proved, as it is an element of the offense, but it need only be proved in this circuit by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 749-50. Failure to instruct on venue is not reversible, however, if the jury verdict by necessity incorporated the findings of venue. United States v. Byrne, 171 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999); Miller, 111 F.3d at 751 (stating that failure to instruct on venue, when requested, is reversible error unless it is beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's guilty verdict on the charged offense necessarily incorporates a finding of proper venue). 33 The defendant's proposed jury instruction in this case was improper. 1 Mr. Cryar suggests that the definition of the essential elements of counts one and three includes [t]hat the offense of crossing the state line occurred in the Western District of Oklahoma. Rec. vol. I, doc. 44. This is simply a replay of his first argument. 34 The government is correct that the last clause of the defendant's proffered instruction carried the implicit direction that the crossing referred to in the statute was a venue-setting event, which we have already shown is incorrect. Thus, the district court was correct to refuse giving this erroneous instruction. As noted above, the government is also correct that the facts establishing the attempted completion of the continuing crime in Oklahoma City were not, in fact, contested. Thus, the verdict by necessity incorporated the findings of venue, and is not reversible error.