Opinion ID: 1660312
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Negligence of Hamann.

Text: As to the first question of Hamann's causal negligence the standard of review invoked by this court is familiarly stated: The rule is well established that a verdict or a finding of a jury will not be set aside or disturbed, `if there is any credible evidence which under any reasonable view fairly admits of an inference that supports the jury's finding.' Van Galder v. Snyder (1948), 254 Wis. 120, 123, 35 N. W. (2d) 187. `The familiar rule, often declared by this court, that where there is credible evidence to support a finding of a jury we may not disturb it, needs no citation of authorities.' Mossak v. Pfost (1950), 258 Wis. 73, 75, 44 N. W. (2d) 922. [1] The record clearly establishes that there is credible evidence to support the jury's finding of negligence on the part of Hamann. This case is unique in that no witness actually saw the impact. Three potential witnesses who were involved in the accident (the plaintiff and Hamann's two passengers, schoolchildren he had just picked up at school) were not called to testify. The only testimony elicited during the trial which bore upon the negligence question was given by Hamann (who did not see the accident but said he heard only a thump near his rear wheel), Police Officer Albert Walters (who arrived at the accident scene twenty minutes after the collision), and Roy Jones (a friend of Hamann's who admittedly did not see the accident). Hamann's own testimony clearly establishes that he was negligent as to lookout. It is undisputed that he never saw the little girl until after the accident. The jury could have concluded that the reason why Hamann failed to see her was because he made no effort to look right or left or use his peripheral vision. Hamann, by his own admission, only looked straight ahead. Hamann knew that children were present. He was aware of the fact that all the schools in Columbus were located south of James street and that many children crossed at the intersection when returning home from school. Under these circumstances, this court has held that a motorist does not fulfill his lookout duty by looking only straight ahead. [2] Mr. Hamann was driving 20 miles per hour at the time of the accident. He did not attempt to slow down as he approached the intersection. As the trial judge indicated, Hamann's speed was too fast under the circumstances. Sec. 346.57 (2), Stats., provides that: No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard for the actual and potential hazards then existing. The speed of a vehicle shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any object, person, vehicle or other conveyance on or entering the highway in compliance with legal requirements and using due care. Sec. 346.57 (3), Stats., provides that: The operator of every vehicle shall, consistent with the requirements of sub. (2), drive at an appropriate reduced speed when approaching and crossing an intersection ... when passing school children, ... and when special hazard exists ... by reason of weather or highway conditions. As already stated, Hamann knew that many children cross James street while returning home from school. He knew that school was just getting out. He knew, or should have known, that small children returning from school might not be visible from behind the high snow-banks near the intersection. A motorist must exercise increased vigilance with respect to lookout and speed when he knows or should know that children are present. [3] Thus, as to both lookout and speed the record clearly supports the jury's determination that Hamann was negligent. The crucial question then becomes whether Hamann's negligence was causal. Defendant contends that such negligence, if any, was not causal as a matter of law. It is undisputed that Hamann never saw the plaintiff prior to the impact. It is also undisputed that the girl and the automobile collided while she was in the crosswalk, at a point about 10 feet north of the curb. There was some testimony that she was hurrying as she left the curb as distinguished from walking or running. The argument is made that there was nothing that Hamann reasonably could have been expected to do to avoid the accident, that the fact that he did not look to his right or left and did not see the plaintiff is of no consequence because she was going to collide with Hamann's car in any event. We must conclude, however, that a proper lookout, and a reasonable speed under the conditions, would have given Hamann time to apply his brakes and avoid the accident, or time to alert the plaintiff of his approaching vehicle. [4] A car going 20 miles per hour would cover at least four times the distance the plaintiff, even hurrying at five miles per hour, could go, or 40 feet to the plaintiff's 10. This is sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Hamann's negligence was a substantial factor in causing the accident. [5] The cases from other states cited by the defendant have been examined and are not applicable to the instant case. Most of the cases dealt with the question of whether an accident involving the defendant's car and the plaintiff had in fact occurred. In none of the cited cases was the defendant found negligent in the first instance (most cases expressly held that the defendant was not negligent). Therefore, the cause question never became material.