Opinion ID: 68137
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Plea for Leniency

Text: Diaz also contends, for the first time on appeal, that the district court imposed a higher burden of proof than appropriate when considering Diaz’s plea for leniency. At sentencing, Diaz contended that he was coerced into the drug trade after he borrowed money from a drug cartel and was kidnaped on two occasions for ransom to repay the debt. The district court found that Diaz had not previously raised the issue of coercion and duress and was offering little in the way of actual evidence that his actions were the product of duress. Diaz now 8 No. 07-10977 objects to the district court’s comment: “I am not supposed to make decisions at sentencing on preponderance of the evidence.” A “‘sentencing judge is entitled to find by a preponderance of the evidence all the facts relevant to the determination of a Guideline sentencing range and all facts relevant to the determination of a non-Guidelines sentence.’” United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 793, 798 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005)); see also United States v. Farias, 469 F.3d 393, 399–400 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 2006). Diaz contends that the district court erred in applying a higher standard of proof to his coercion and duress claims. The government responds that the district court’s comment was “a slip of the tongue that did not reflect the district court’s true intentions or application of the law.” Diaz urged the kidnaping claim as a mitigating factor under § 3553(a). Diaz’s counsel argued at the sentencing hearing that the “genesis” of Diaz’s participation in the drug trade was Diaz’s decision to borrow money from a drug cartel. According to Diaz’s counsel, Diaz was kidnaped once, held for $20,000 in ransom, and released after his family paid. Diaz was then kidnaped a second time, tortured, threatened with death, and “forced into th[e] criminal enterprise” when his family could not pay the second ransom demand. Diaz’s counsel conceded, however, that Diaz did not withdraw from the criminal enterprise for a “several-year period” after the kidnapings, “even in unsupervised times when he could have gotten his family and moved away.” In an unsworn statement, Diaz described the kidnapings, torture and ransom demands. Diaz also stated that he had “embarrassed” his family by committing a crime, and that he took “full and total blame and responsibility for 9 No. 07-10977 [his] crime and actions.” 2 Diaz’s wife testified under oath that he was kidnaped on two occasions, that she received threatening phone calls demanding ransoms, and that she did not believe he would have entered the drug trade but for the threats and kidnapings. When the district court asked why none of this information had been raised earlier in the proceedings or formalized in a motion for downward departure from the Guidelines, Diaz’s counsel responded that Diaz had instructed him not to do so to protect his family’s safety. The district court expressed skepticism about this explanation, pointing out that “[s]ooner or later it [wa]s going to have to come to light if you want the Court to consider it.” The government, when asked for its position, stated that it had discussed the kidnaping issue with defense counsel “on several occasions,” and had “no doubt [Diaz] was kidnaped when he was a drug trafficker,” but contended that it was not clear that the second kidnaping had preceded Diaz’s participation in drug trafficking. The government also pointed out that Diaz had engaged in “unsupervised criminal conduct” for a “long period of time,” even after most other members of the conspiracy were arrested, and made “thousands and thousands of dollars.” The government opined that Diaz had not earlier raised the kidnaping issue for “tactical” reasons. The district court concluded: “[I]f the Court is going to properly take this into consideration, then the Court needs facts to support the argument not statements of Counsel. I mean, a lot of what you told me was statement of Counsel. It may be one percent true. I do not have any evidence to support it 2 It is not clear from Diaz’s testimony whether his statements of remorse referred to his decision to borrow money from a drug cartel or his subsequent participation in drug trafficking activity. 10 No. 07-10977 is.” While making this and other comments, the district court also commented: “I am not supposed to make decisions at sentencing on preponderance of the evidence.” In rendering Diaz’s sentence, the district court stated that it had considered the coercion and duress issue under § 3553(a) but that the “information or evidence on that appear[ed] to be mixed at best”: The bottom line is the Court is not convinced that Mr. Diaz’s criminal conduct was the result of—was necessarily the result of coercion or duress at all times. Mr. Diaz himself admitted that he engaged in certain criminal conduct and, frankly speaking, the record is not fully developed to convince the Court that it should make some type of adjustment under 3553(a)(1). If the record were more fully developed that Mr. Diaz was, in fact, forced to engage in the criminal activity with which he has been charged, then perhaps the Court would see this in a different light insofar as the sentence is concerned. That showing has not been made. Diaz relies solely on the district court’s statement that “I am not supposed to make decisions at sentencing on preponderance of the evidence” to support his contention that the district court incorrectly imposed a higher burden of proof. But the district court’s comments show that it did not impose a higher burden of proof. The court did not decline to reduce the sentence because there was not “[e]vidence by ‘fifty-one percent,’ or to the extent of ‘more likely than not,’” as the preponderance of the evidence standard requires. See In re OCA, Inc., 551 F.3d 359, 372 n.41 (5th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The court declined to reduce the sentence because there was almost no evidence (as opposed to argument) of coercion or duress. The district court did not apply an incorrect burden of proof. While the district court did apparently make an inaccurate comment about the burden of proof, the record makes clear that it did 11 No. 07-10977 not apply an incorrect burden. In this respect, there was no error, plain or otherwise.