Opinion ID: 1829631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Haynes's Prior Consistent Statement

Text: At trial, Haynes testified that the brakes of the burro crane failed, thereby causing the collision. The railroad impeached his testimony by using an accident report in which Haynes had stated that the cause of the accident was: fail[ed] to see [the] cut of cars on the main line counter. He also stated in the accident report that there were no defects in the equipment. On redirect examination, Haynes explained why he had stated in the accident report that there was not a problem with the brakes. He claimed that an official at the railroad had told him that if he said the brakes were defective he would lose his job. On redirect examination, Haynes also introduced a claims agent's report on the accident in which Haynes had stated that the brakes on the burro crane were not working properly. The railroad objected, claiming that Haynes was using the report to rehabilitate himself with a prior consistent statement. We hold that on redirect examination it was proper for Haynes to explain why he had previously made a statement contradicting his present testimony. C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 159.03(1) (1991), citing Johnson v. State, 49 Ala.App. 356, 272 So.2d 282 (1972) and Hairrell v. State, 16 Ala.App. 110, 75 So. 702 (1917). The extent to which the impeached witness may go into the reasons why he made the prior inconsistent statement is largely within the sound discretion of the trial court. Wright v. State, 420 So.2d 823, 826 (Ala.Crim.App.1982), citing C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 159.03(1) (3d ed. 1977). However, rehabilitation of a witness by evidence of a prior consistent statement has been held to be improper. See Long v. Whit, 197 Ala. 271, 72 So. 529 (1916); C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 177.01(2) (1991). Professor Gamble summarizes the rule this way: As a general rule, the impeachment of a witness by the introduction of evidence that he has made a statement which is inconsistent with his testimony does not authorize the proponent of the witness to support his credibility by evidence that the witness has made a statement on another occasion of the same tenor as his present testimony. This is true whether or not the witness is a party, whether or not the witness admitted the making of the prior inconsistent statement, whether the witness denied making such statement and testimony that he made it came from the mouth of another witness and whether or not the prior similar statement was made before or after the time of the claimed inconsistent statement. C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 177.01(2) (1991) (citations omitted). Haynes has properly stated the rule in his brief: The plaintiff could testify about his fear of losing his job, engendered by a supervisor's remarks. Starr v. Starr, 293 Ala. 204, 210 [301] So.2d 78 (1974). Once this evidence of coercion and duress was before the court, the court widened the scope of inquiry very properly and allowed into evidence the transcript of a statement about the same subject matter and made the same day. The propriety of the court's action is hornbook law: `Whenever issues of duress, undue influence, fraud, and good faith are raised, the evidence must take a rather wide range and may embrace all the facts and circumstances which go to make up the transaction, disclose its true character, explain the acts of the parties, and throw light on their objects and intentions ... and in all such cases, great latitude of proof is allowed and every fact or circumstance, from which a legal inference of the fact in issue may be drawn, is competent.' 29 Am.Jur. Evidence § 358 (1967). `When one's state of mind ... in doing or omitting to do certain acts becomes an issue in a civil action, his acts, statements, and conduct on other occasions which have a bearing on his state of mind upon the occasion in question are relevant and competent evidence.' 29 Am.Jur. Evidence § 365. See State ex rel. Attorney General v. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 126, 63 So. 559 (1913). .... It is axiomatic that rulings as to the admissibility of evidence rest largely within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial judge is guilty of `gross' abuse of discretion. Russellville Flower Craft v. Searcy, 452 So.2d 478 (Ala. 1984), Dorcal, Inc. v. Xerox, 398 So.2d 665 (Ala.1987 [1981]). Even assuming that the admission of the prior consistent statement was error, we hold that it was not prejudicial. Rule 45, Ala.R.App.P.