Opinion ID: 2022935
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the Appellate Court Exceed Its Jurisdiction When It Modified the Circuit Court's Order?

Text: Neither Rule 604(a)(1) nor its federal counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 3731, permit a defendant to appeal from an order of a trial court denying a motion to suppress evidence. See, e.g., People v. Kepi 65 Ill.App.3d 327, 331, 22 Ill.Dec. 322, 382 N.E.2d 642 (1978); United States v. Shameizadeh, 41 F.3d 266, 267 (6th Cir.1994). Thus, when the government appeals an order of the trial court granting a motion to suppress evidence, the appeal brings before the appellate court only that evidence which was actually suppressed by the trial court. The reviewing court has no jurisdiction over evidence not suppressed by the trial court and may not entertain arguments by a defendant to suppress evidence which was not suppressed by the trial court in the first instance. See, e.g., Kepi 65 Ill.App.3d at 331, 22 Ill.Dec. 322, 382 N.E.2d 642; Shameizadeh, 41 F.3d at 267 (a defendant may not raise any arguments as to evidence not ordered suppressed by the district court); United States v. Becker, 929 F.2d 442, 447 (9th Cir.1991) (What we may not consider is any defense argument seeking suppression of additional evidence which the district court did not suppress); see generally 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 328 (1995). Applying the foregoing principles here, it is clear that the appellate court erred in modifying the circuit court's order so that all of defendant's statements were suppressed. The State appealed from the order of the circuit court which suppressed the two statements defendant made to Rickert. As discussed, under established principles of appellate law, the appellate court could rely on any argument of record raised by defendant in support of affirming the circuit court's order suppressing those two statements. However, the appellate court had no jurisdiction over the 1:30 p.m. and 5 p.m. statements defendant made to Krakausky since those statements were never suppressed by the circuit court. Thus, the appellate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it modified the circuit court's order to suppress the two statements defendant made to Krakausky. Defendant contends, however, that the appellate court did not exceed its jurisdiction when it modified the circuit court's judgment. In support, defendant points to article VI, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6). That provision states, The Appellate Court may exercise original jurisdiction when necessary to the complete determination of any case on review. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6. Defendant maintains that, once the State appealed the suppression of the two statements made to Rickert, the appellate court obtained original jurisdiction of the case and that this original jurisdiction included the authority to suppress the two statements defendant made to Krakausky. We disagree. For purposes of this appeal, the significant language in article VI, section 6, is not the phrase original jurisdiction but is, instead, the language which states that the appellate court obtains original jurisdiction of any case on review. The constitution authorizes this court to promulgate rules for appeals to the Appellate Court from other than final judgments. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6. The case on review mentioned in article VI, section 6, is defined by our Rule 604(a)(1). That rule, in turn, limits the case on review to the evidence actually suppressed by the circuit court. In other words, under article VI, section 6, the appellate court obtains original jurisdiction over the evidence suppressed by the circuit court when the State files an appeal. The appellate court does not, however, obtain jurisdiction over evidence that was not suppressed by the circuit court. Such evidence is simply not part of the case which may be reviewed pursuant to Rule 604(a)(1). Finally, defendant argues that principles of judicial economy would permit the appellate court to modify the circuit court's judgment. Defendant notes that the appellate court's holding that defendant was arrested without probable cause is the law of the case and is binding on the circuit court. Thus, based on the appellate court's holding, defendant could return to the circuit court and obtain a ruling suppressing the 1:30 p.m. and 5 p.m. statements defendant made to Krakausky. See, e.g., People v. Enis, 163 Ill.2d 367, 387, 206 Ill.Dec. 604, 645 N.E.2d 856 (1994) (a trial court retains jurisdiction to reconsider an order it has entered, as long as the cause is pending before the trial court). Accordingly, defendant maintains that judicial economy would be served by permitting the appellate court to suppress the two statements made to Krakausky, rather than requiring defendant to-go through additional proceedings in the circuit court. The difficulty with this argument is that the bar to the' appellate court suppressing the two statements defendant made to' Krakausky is jurisdictional. Under Rule 604(a)(1), the appellate court has no jurisdiction to suppress evidence that was not suppressed by the circuit court in the first instance. Allowing the appellate court to modify the judgment in the case at bar would subvert this principle.' Principles of judicial economy may not trump the jurisdictional barrier erected by Rule. 604(a)(1) in this case.