Opinion ID: 891654
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether Commissioners King and Jones Improperly Failed to Recuse Themselves in Violation of the Due Process Clause

Text: {37} NMIEC claims that Commissioners King and Jones prejudged the outcome of the case prior to receiving all the evidence and, therefore, improperly failed to recuse themselves in violation of NMIEC's procedural due process right to a fair and impartial hearing. {38} The following additional facts are relevant to NMIEC's claim. At a hearing conducted on April 24, 2008, Commissioner King proposed that PNM should be granted interim relief on its application for an Emergency FPPCAC. Commissioner Jones responded that, in lieu of interim relief, the PRC should render a final decision on PNM's application for an Emergency FPPCAC immediately following the conclusion of the public hearings. Commissioner Jones explained that I just fear that we get in  here's what my concern is. We're really not giving them a decision [on their request for a FPPCAC in the rate case]. I think all of us understand that the possibility exists that we could be convinced that they need a fuel clause. That's about as easy a way to say I'm not convinced yet. If we go to a  if we go to May 15th [for the public hearings], take several days to render a decision and it's adverse and gets appealed, then I think that we've tied our hands into putting into any kind of an interim relief pending appeal. I could see this thing going on a year. I don't think  my opinion is . . . PNM doesn't have a year. I've seen enough stuff from Standard & Poors. These people have been in here begging, pleading and crying. There's no question in my mind PNM needs some relief here. How do we keep from killing a company if this goes through an appeal process and is there a way that in the event of an appeal that we can provide interim relief? That's my question. Because that's a question that I'm weighing right now is whether or not to give them an interim fuel clause. {39} Commissioner Jones acknowledged that his alternate proposal might have dilute[d] or muddied Commissioner King's motion for interim relief and, therefore, he moved for consideration of Commissioner King's original motion. Commissioners King and Jones voted in favor of granting PNM interim relief. Commissioner King explained that We're not crying wolf. We have a very, very serious situation today. That's not going to gloss over. It's going to get worse in the days ahead if we don't take decisive action today. There's not any debate in my mind about that. I think we're going to see in the next few days when Moody comes forward, it's going to be worse still and so I think we need to take action. However, the remaining Commissioners did not vote in favor of the motion and, consequently, interim relief was not granted. {40} Thereafter, NMIEC filed a motion requesting Commissioners King and Jones to recuse themselves from the present case, claiming that they had prejudged the outcome of this case in favor of [PNM] before the full evidentiary record [had] been developed. In support of its motion, NMIEC argued that the Commissioners's votes in favor of interim relief, as well as their accompanying statements, clearly establish that [they] have already made up their minds about the emergency fuel clause. {41} Commissioners King and Jones denied NMIEC's motion, explaining that they could and would make a fair and impartial decision based on the record to be developed. They believed that NMIEC may have completely misunderstood Commissioner Jones' comments during the April 24 meeting. Contrary to NMIEC's assertions, neither Commissioner Jones nor Commissioner King voted to approve, on its merits, the Emergency Fuel Clause proposed by PNM in this case. Rather, we both supported granting PNM an INTERIM rate clause that would be in effect until a final decision were issued in this case on PNM's Emergency Fuel Clause. . . . We supported giving PNM an interim fuel clause solely as a way to give PNM some interim relief until we and the rest of the [PRC] had the opportunity to determine, based on the record in this case, whether a more permanent fuel clause or some other relief should be given to PNM. {42} It is well established that adverse rulings do not constitute a valid basis for disqualification based on personal bias or prejudgment of a disputed factual issue. See, e.g., Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 541, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) ([J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias or partiality recusal motion.); State v. Hernandez, 115 N.M. 6, 20, 846 P.2d 312, 326 (1993) (holding that [p]ersonal bias cannot be inferred from an adverse ruling); United Nuclear Corp. v. Gen. Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 249, 629 P.2d 231, 325 (1980) (Rulings adverse to a party do not necessarily evince a personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge against it even if the rulings are later found to have been legally incorrect.). Accordingly, we reject NMIEC's claim that Commissioners King's and Jones's votes in favor of interim relief mandated their disqualification from all further proceedings. {43} Nonetheless, NMIEC claims that the Commissioners's comments during the April 24 hearing demonstrated that they had already made up their minds about the merits of the present case. We recognize that comments by a Commissioner which constitute prejudgment may constitutionally taint any subsequent hearing so as to invalidate the ensuing order of the [PRC]. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Corp. Comm'n, 99 N.M. 1, 7, 653 P.2d 501, 507 (1982) (per curiam); see also NMSA 1978, § 8-8-18(A)(1) (1998) (A commissioner or hearing examiner shall recuse himself in any adjudicatory proceeding in which he is unable to make a fair and impartial decision or in which there is reasonable doubt about whether he can make a fair and impartial decision, including . . . when he has . . . prejudged a disputed evidentiary fact involved in a proceeding prior to hearing.). However, not all allegations of bias or prejudice are of the type that render a proceeding fundamentally unfair or require the disqualification of a decisionmaker. U S West Commc'ns, Inc., 1999-NMSC-016, ¶ 41, 127 N.M. 254, 980 P.2d 37. {44} To determine whether a Commissioner's remarks constitute prejudgment sufficient to violate the constitutional right to due process of law, [t]he inquiry is not whether the [commission]ers are actually biased or prejudiced, but whether, in the natural course of events, there is an indication of a possible temptation to an average [person] sitting as a judge to try the case with bias for or against any issue presented to him [or her]. This inquiry measures allegations of bias or prejudice by an objective standard.. . . Id. ¶ 42 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In conducting this inquiry, we are mindful that [o]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of the trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. Id. ¶ 44 (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147). {45} The timing of Commissioners King's and Jones's remarks indicate that they were based on the evidence adduced in the rate case, as well the direct testimony filed by PNM in the present case. Absent evidence to the contrary, we will not presume that these remarks were based on information obtained . . . outside the course of the proceedings. Id.; see also Siesta Hills Neighborhood Ass'n v. Albuquerque, 1998-NMCA-028, ¶ 19, 124 N.M. 670, 954 P.2d 102 (upholding a city councilor's refusal to disqualify herself because the appellant had failed to produce any evidence indicating that the councilor prejudged the merits of the case). Because these remarks do not `display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible,' U S West Commc'ns, Inc., 1999-NMSC-016, ¶ 44, 127 N.M. 254, 980 P.2d 37 (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147), we conclude that Commissioners King and Jones properly declined to recuse themselves.