Opinion ID: 425952
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: goodwin to the rescue

Text: 46 In United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982), the Supreme Court finally brought coherence to the field by harmonizing the two competing interests of free exercise of legal rights and the need for prosecutorial discretion. Goodwin accomplished this feat not by holding that one interest was of greater virtue than the other, but by recognizing that each interest has an area of primacy. Goodwin articulated a pretrial/posttrial distinction and held that in the pretrial context, the need for prosecutorial discretion was foremost. 47 Goodwin involved a criminal defendant facing misdemeanor charges for assault. Goodwin refused to plead guilty to the misdemeanor and requested a trial by jury. The prosecutor then reindicted Goodwin for a felony charge for the same incident. The Court in Goodwin squarely held that in the pretrial context the prosecutor has the discretion to increase charges after a defendant's exercise of a right except for the purpose of punishing that exercise. The question we must now face is what constraints remain on a prosecutor's discretion to increase charges outside the pretrial context. Though Goodwin does not explicitly address that question, when it is viewed in the context of Blackledge and Bordenkircher it provides an implicit but ample answer.
48 Goodwin contributed a phrase to the judicial vocabulary at least as unfortunate as Blackledge 's prosecutorial vindictiveness: Goodwin described Pearce and Blackledge as creating a presumption of vindictiveness. Thus, another way of stating the question implicitly answered by Goodwin is: When does a presumption of vindictiveness arise? 49 A compelling answer to this question can be found by looking to the rationale Goodwin used to avoid a presumption in the pretrial context. The Court relied on Blackledge for the proposition that a presumption of vindictiveness should arise only in instances that pose a realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness.'  Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27, 94 S.Ct. at 2102. With that in mind, the Court explained Pearce and Blackledge as follows: 50 Both Pearce and Blackledge involved the defendant's exercise of a procedural right that caused a complete retrial after he had been once tried and convicted. The decisions in these cases reflect a recognition by the Court of the institutional bias inherent in the judicial system against the retrial of issues that have already been decided. The doctrines of stare decisis, res judicata, the law of the case, and double jeopardy all are based, at least in part, on that deep-seated bias. While none of these doctrines barred the retrials in Pearce and Blackledge, the same institutional pressure that supports them might also subconsciously motivate a vindictive prosecutorial or judicial response to a defendant's exercise of his right to obtain a retrial of a decided question. 51 Goodwin, 102 S.Ct. at 2490-91. In distinguishing the pretrial context, the Court noted all of the compelling reasons a prosecutor might have for increasing charges pretrial. The court then stated, Thus, a change in the charging decision made after an initial trial is completed is much more likely to be improperly motivated than is a pretrial decision. Id. at 2493. It is certainly true that once a prosecutor has finalized his charges enough that he or she is willing to go to trial on them, the needs for charging discretion tend to be much less, see, Michigan Note, supra, at 212-13, and the likelihood of vindictiveness much greater. 52 Finally, the Court distinguished the burden to the government from asserting the right at stake in Goodwin --the right to a jury trial instead of a bench trial--from that in Pearce and Blackledge: 53 [B]efore either a jury or a judge the State must present its full case against the accused and the defendant is entitled to offer a full defense. As compared to the complete trial de novo at issue in Blackledge, a jury trial--as opposed to a bench trial--does not require duplicative expenditures of prosecutorial resources before a final judgment may be obtained. Moreover, unlike the trial judge in Pearce, no party is asked to do over what it thought it had already done correctly. A prosecutor has no personal stake in a bench trial and thus no reason to engage in self-vindication upon a defendant's request for a jury trial. Perhaps most importantly, the institutional bias against the retrial of a decided question that supported the decisions in Pearce and Blackledge simply has no counterpart in this case. 54 102 S.Ct. at 2494 (footnotes omitted). The factors justifying a presumption in Blackledge and Pearce certainly exist in any posttrial assertion of a legal right. 55 Another answer to the question of when a presumption arises can be found by looking to the holding in Goodwin; no presumption of vindictiveness arises in the pretrial context. The obvious negative inference from this holding is that such a presumption does arise in the posttrial context. This conclusion is bolstered by looking at Goodwin relative to Pearce, Blackledge, and Bordenkircher. As the Court explained in Goodwin, it granted certiorari to clarify the scope of Pearce and Blackledge. 102 S.Ct. 2487. Pearce and Blackledge were cases involving a presumption of vindictiveness, and as Goodwin repeatedly noted, they were posttrial cases. Bordenkircher declined to apply a presumption and, as Goodwin noted, it was a pretrial case. Thus we have something considerably more powerful than a mere negative inference. Goodwin claimed to be partitioning the procedural universe between Pearce and Blackledge, the posttrial presumption cases, and Bordenkircher, the pretrial prosecutorial discretion case. Because Goodwin drew the partitioning line at trial, I can only conclude that Goodwin mandates a presumption of vindictiveness in the posttrial context. 56 In short, though Goodwin does not explicitly so hold, I believe it clearly stands for a dual proposition. Pretrial, no presumption of vindictiveness is justified. Posttrial, any upping the ante by the prosecutor after a defendant's exercise of a legal right gives rise to a presumption of vindictiveness. Goodwin harmonized Blackledge and Bordenkircher by drawing a bright line at trial. Pretrial, Bordenkircher reigns supreme; posttrial, Blackledge holds sway. This dual sovereignty should obviate the need to apply an unclear, unpredictable, unpalatable case-by-case analysis.
57 The final question is what to do with a presumption of vindictiveness once it arises. How can it be rebutted? It is at this point that the two misnomers in this doctrine combine forces to wreak havoc on careful analysis. The presumption is no more an evidentiary presumption than the parol evidence rule is an evidence rule. And vindictiveness refers not to the actual motive, but rather to the perception of a defendant considering asserting a legal right. The question in determining whether a presumption should arise might be stated: Would a criminal defendant trying to decide whether to assert a legal right look at the facts of the instant case and presume the prosecutor had acted vindictively? Thus, the question in dispelling a presumption is whether an unrelated party looking at the facts of the instant case would be persuaded that the prosecutor did not act vindictively. The question most emphatically is not whether the prosecutor was actually vindictive. 58 This conclusion gains firm support from Goodwin. First, Goodwin endorses the continuing vitality of the deterrence goal of Pearce and Blackledge, which makes the prosecutor's actual motive irrelevant. Second, in discussing rebuttal, Goodwin calls for objective evidence, also making actual motive irrelevant. I will discuss these two points briefly. 59 1. Deterrence Lives After Goodwin.--Pearce and Blackledge were seeking to articulate a rule that would prevent prosecutors from deterring exercises of legal rights by criminal defendants by making them fearful of retaliation. In a deterrence scheme, the prosecutor's actual motive is irrelevant; the operative question is not the state of the prosecutor's mind, but rather, the state of mind of a defendant contemplating the exercise of a legal right. Bordenkircher recast this motivation as one solely of avoiding actual vindictiveness. Goodwin, while acknowledging the importance of actual vindictiveness in the Bordenkircher -ruled pretrial context, see, e.g., 102 S.Ct. at 2492 n. 12; id. at 2494, also acknowledged that the deterrence rationale of Pearce and Blackledge survives in the posttrial context. 60 The most evident support for this position is the simple fact that Goodwin as a whole supports a Blackledge presumption in the posttrial context. See supra Part II.B. More specifically, the Court described the purpose of a Blackledge presumption as one that would free defendants of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the prosecutor. 102 S.Ct. at 2490. Apprehension of a retaliatory motive can certainly exist in the factual absence of such a motive. 61 2. Rebutting the Nonpresumption.--The Court's view of the true nature of the presumption is made most clear by its discussion of what will, and will not, suffice to rebut the presumption. First, the Court repeatedly emphasized the irrelevancy of actual motive when a presumption of vindictiveness arises. 62 Unlike Bordenkircher, however, there is no evidence in this case that could give rise to a claim of actual vindictiveness; the prosecutor never suggested that the charge was brought to influence the respondent's conduct. The conviction in this case may be reversed only if a presumption f vindictiveness--applicable in all cases--is warranted. 63 102 S.Ct. 2493 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted). The Court further stated: 64 In this case, however, the Court of Appeals stated: On this record we readily conclude that the prosecutor did not act with actual vindictiveness in seeking a felony indictment. [U.S. v. Goodwin ] 637 F.2d at 252. Respondent does not challenge that finding. Absent a presumption of vindictiveness, no due process violation has been established. 65 Id. at 2494-95. Thus, even in the face of a factual finding, supported by the record, of no actual vindictiveness, a presumption of vindictiveness would still establish a due process violation. No mere evidentiary presumption concerned with the presence or absence of actual vindictiveness would function in that manner. 66 This conclusion is further reinforced by the indications the Court gave of what would rebut the presumption. The presumption when it arises is based on Pearce and Blackledge. As the Goodwin Court noted, the Pearce Court applied a presumption of vindictiveness, which may be overcome only by objective information in the record justifying the increased sentence. Id. at 2489. In discussing Blackledge, the Court noted that [t]he presumption again could be overcome by objective evidence justifying the prosecutor's action. Id. at 2490 n. 8. The Goodwin Court also quoted Blackledge 's example of Diaz, where it was impossible to proceed in the more serious charge at the outset. Id. (quoting Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 29 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. at 2103 n. 7). The Goodwin Court summarized Blackledge and Pearce as establishing a presumption that could not be rebutted unless the prosecutor comes forward with objective evidence to show that the increased charges could not have been brought before the defendant exercised his rights. Id. at 2488. 67 If the presumption of vindictiveness were intended to be a mere evidentiary presumption of actual vindictiveness, it would relate to that very subjective, complex and difficult to prove, id. at 2489, question of motive. In that case, there would be no point in restricting rebuttal evidence to objective evidence--subjective evidence is perfectly acceptable to establish subjective motive. There certainly would be no point in requiring a showing that the increased charges could not have been brought before the defendant exercised his rights. Id. at 2488 (emphasis added). The only point of such restrictions would be to dispel any apprehension of vindictiveness. Indeed, I believe such a conclusion to be inescapable after Goodwin.
68 In short, the rule for the posttrial context can be easily stated after Goodwin. In the posttrial context, a so-called presumption of vindictiveness arises any time the prosecutor ups the ante after a defendant exercises a legal right. Upping the ante certainly includes a possibility of increased sentence, but need not be limited to that. See Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 29 n. 6, 94 S.Ct. at 2103 n. 6. The presumption may be rebutted only by objective evidence showing that the increase charges could not have been brought until after the defendant exercised the legal right. 69 With this rule in mind, it is a simple matter to dispose of this case. Appellee Krezdorn successfully appealed his first conviction. The prosecutor then upped the ante by reindicting for a more serious crime. Thus a presumption arises. The only explanation for the increased charges was that the panel opinion in Krezdorn's first appeal, in dicta, reminded the prosecutor of a long-standing rule of evidence. This certainly and definitely does not constitute objective evidence that the charges could not have been brought before Krezdorn's first successful appeal. Due process, therefore, requires that the additional charges be dismissed and the decision of the district court be affirmed.