Opinion ID: 186262
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Foster Documents Matter

Text: 13 Concerning the matter of the alleged removal of documents from Foster's office following his death, the only dispute among the parties appears to be whether Livingstone has satisfied the but for requirement. 14 Livingstone argues that he fulfils the but for requirement in this particular matter under three circumstances previously recognized by the court. First, he invokes the duplication of investigations. Livingstone acknowledges that this circumstance, as previously decided by the court, must involve the IC's duplication of the Department of Justice's (DOJ) preliminary investigation. Livingstone nevertheless claims that he meets the but for requirement because the IC's investigation substantially duplicated Mr. Fiske's investigation of th[e] issue. He attempts to equate Fiske's investigation with that of a DOJ preliminary investigation by arguing that Fiske's investigation was conducted at the request of the Justice Department. 15 The second but for circumstance which Livingstone claims he satisfies is when, absent the Act, the case would have been disposed of at an earlier stage of the investigation. His argument is premised on the seven years the Independent Counsel kept the matter open, versus the less than six months that Fiske took to make his conclusions concerning Foster's death. He asserts that no ordinary prosecutor would have spent the time or money that the IC spent investigating the Foster documents matter absent any evidence that documents were in fact missing. 16 Third, Livingstone claims that he was investigated under circumstances in which a private citizen would not have been investigated. According to Livingstone, these circumstances involved only his leaving the building in which he works carrying a briefcase... at an unusual hour. He further argues that there was an absence of any evidence that documents were, in fact, missing; and that in any event there was irrefutable proof that he was not there at [the stated] hour. Such circumstances, according to Livingstone, would not likely give rise to a criminal investigation of a private citizen. 17 In her evaluation, the IC argues that Livingstone's circumstances do not fit into any of those found by the court to fulfill the but for requirement. With respect to Livingstone's claim that the IC's investigation duplicated that of special counsel Fiske, the IC first notes that Fiske's investigation with respect to the Foster documents matter was not completed before the investigation was transferred to the IC. Therefore, the IC did not duplicate Fiske's investigation, but rather completed it. The IC further notes that, in any event, the but for requirement is met under this circumstance only when there is duplication by the IC of the DOJ's preliminary investigation, and that that was not the situation here. 18 With respect to Livingstone's argument that, absent the Act, the case could have been disposed of at an earlier stage of the investigation, the IC asserts that although the OIC was conducting various investigations for seven years, Livingstone's attorneys' billing records show that the time period he was billed for totaled only 13 months. Furthermore, concerning Livingstone's claim that he was investigated under circumstances that a private citizen would not have been, the IC argues that this investigation involved the question of whether a White House employee had tried to remove documents that were potentially incriminating to the President, the First Lady, and the Deputy White House Counsel from the office of the latter, and that a rigorous investigation would have resulted regardless of who had conducted it. Finally, the IC argues that Livingstone cannot show that this matter would not have been investigated in the absence of the Act, because special counsel Fiske did exactly that. 19 In its evaluation, the DOJ also argues that Livingstone does not meet the but for requirement concerning the Foster documents matter. First, as did the IC, the DOJ disputes Livingstone's argument that the but for requirement is met because the IC duplicated Fiske's investigation. The DOJ also claims that any such duplication must be of the DOJ's preliminary investigation pursuant to the Act, and that here Mr. Fiske's investigation was not a preliminary investigation under the Act. The DOJ further contends that Livingstone invokes an incorrect legal standard when he argues that he fulfils the but for test because he would not have been investigated had he been a private citizen. For its part, the DOJ states that the correct legal standard is whether someone similarly situated would have been investigated in the absence of the Act. Here, according to the DOJ, the preceding investigation of the matter conducted by special counsel Fiske proves Livingstone fails to satisfy the correct standard. 20 We agree with the IC and the DOJ that in this instance Livingstone has not passed the but for test. As noted above, Livingstone argues that he passes the test because duplicate investigations were conducted; because in the absence of the Act the case could have been disposed of sooner; and because he would not have been investigated if he had been a private citizen. The duplicate investigations argument is without merit, as we have consistently stated that for the but for test to be met the IC's investigation must be a duplication of the Attorney General's preliminary investigation. See, e.g., In re Babbitt (Babbitt Fee Application), 290 F.3d 386, 393 (D.C.Cir., Spec. Div., 1999) (per curiam). Livingstone puts forth no argument that such duplication occurred. 21 His argument that in the absence of the Act the case could have been disposed of sooner is also without merit. The circumstances surrounding this matter, i.e., the suspicious death of the deputy White House counsel and the alleged immediate removal from his office of documents potentially incriminating to the President and First Lady, would in all likelihood have been vigorously investigated by any ordinary prosecutor. In In re Pierce (Kisner Fee Application), 178 F.3d 1356, 1360-61 (D.C.Cir., Spec. Div., 1999) (per curiam), the fee petitioner made the similar claim that the IC's investigation far exceeded anything that would have been undertaken by the DOJ. In rejecting this argument, we noted that the nature of the allegations and the prominence of those involved would no doubt have resulted in a complex and lengthy investigation with or without the appointment of an independent counsel. Id. at 1361. Here, Livingstone is in the same situation. 22 As for Livingstone's private citizen argument, the fee applicants in In re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan (Clinton Fee Application) also made this claim. In rejecting the claim, we noted that the test is not what would have happened if the fee applicant had been a private citizen, but rather what would have happened if there had been no independent counsel statute. In re Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan (Clinton Fee Application), 334 F.3d at 1126. Here, when indeed there was no independent counsel statute, the matter was nevertheless investigated by regulatory counsel Fiske, who at the end of his investigation transferred the matter to the OIC. As such, in the absence of the Act, a similar investigation of the matter would likely have been conducted. 23 As the but for requirement has not been met, no reimbursement for fees incurred in the Foster documents matter will be awarded.