Opinion ID: 1861064
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying summary judgment in favor of the malones?

Text: ¶ 15. Much of the discussion concerning the first issue applies to this issue as well. The same principles apply. The Malones cite cases from other jurisdictions, which interpret statutes that are essentially the same as the disputed Mississippi statutes, in support of their argument that the circuit court should have granted summary judgment in favor of the Malones. Their authority is found in two Iowa cases, one New Hampshire case and one Indiana case. In 1957, the Supreme Court of Iowa imposed vicarious liability on the owner of an aircraft for the negligent conduct of those whom he allowed use of the aircraft. Lamasters v. Snodgrass, 248 Iowa 1377, 85 N.W.2d 622, 625-26 (Iowa 1957). This holding was reaffirmed as recently as 1995 by the Iowa Supreme Court in Estate of Dean v. Air Exec., Inc., 534 N.W.2d 103, 104 (Iowa 1995) (although the key issue in Dean was the question of whether co-employee immunity should be extended to the airplane's owner when the negligence of the pilot who had rented the plane caused the death of the pilot's co-employee). ¶ 16. Similarly, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire interpreted that state's statute to place responsibility on the owner, even though he would be without control, for the conduct of one to whom he entrusts the plane. Hoebee v. Howe, 98 N.H. 168, 97 A.2d 223 (1953). The Malones also cite Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir.1974), where the Seventh Circuit applied the Indiana statutes and held the owner of an aircraft responsible for the negligent conduct of an individual to whom he granted use. Id. at 114. ¶ 17. CCRI and Brewer argue that these are older cases and do not reflect the modern trend against holding the owners vicariously liable. They note the analysis of these older cases contained in Brown v. Astron Enters., Inc., 989 F.Supp. 1399 (N.D.Ala.1997). In Astron, the federal district court refused to hold the owner of an aircraft vicariously liable for the negligence of a student pilot who rented the plane and crashed into a house in Alabama causing considerable damage. Id. at 1401. The court in Astron discussed and rejected a series of older cases including Hoebee v. Howe, 98 N.H. 168, 97 A.2d 223, 223-26 (1953); Hays v. Morgan, 221 F.2d 481, 482-83 (5th Cir.1955); Lamasters v. Snodgrass, 248 Iowa 1377, 85 N.W.2d 622, 625 (Iowa 1957); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104, 114-15 (7th Cir.1974); and Ross v. Apple, 143 Ind.App. 357, 241 N.E.2d 872 (1968), noting the following: All these early cases were decided during a period when operation of an aircraft was considered ultra-hazardous activity, a view that no longer exists. (citations omitted). According to the common law relating to ultra-hazardous activities, existing at the time, an owner was liable for a bailee's negligence. Restatement Torts § 520, comment b, clause a (1938). Consequently, these early decisions did not stretch the language of an unrelated state statute to alter the common law; rather they held that the statute was consistent with the common law at that time. 989 F.Supp. at 1407-08. ¶ 18. Prior to Astron, Alabama courts had not addressed this issue. Thus, the federal district court attempted to determine how an Alabama court would rule. The court noted three more recent cases it concluded represented a modern trend on this issue. First, the court in Astron noted the decision of the Montana Supreme Court in Haker v. Southwestern Ry., 176 Mont. 364, 578 P.2d 724, 728 (1978). The pilot was negligent, but no liability attached to the corporate owner of the airplane because the pilot was acting outside the scope of his employment. Id. at 729. ¶ 19. Next, the court in Astron discussed the refusal of an appellate court in Illinois to impute liability to the owner of a plane for the negligence of the pilot who rented the plane. Ferrari v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 131 Ill.App.2d 747, 268 N.E.2d 558, 559-60 (1971). The Illinois court concluded that authoriz[ing] use did not impose liability on the bailor for the negligent operation of a bailee. Id. Finally, the Astron court also noted a federal district court in North Carolina which based its decision on the modern trend reflected in Haker and Ferrari and held that its state's statute did not impute liability to the bailor of an aircraft for actions of its bailee. Broadway v. Webb, 462 F.Supp. 429 (W.D.N.C.1977). ¶ 20. Astron also noted the similarity of these state statutes to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301(26), and that the federal statute has never been interpreted to create a private cause of action against absent owners of aircraft. Astron, 989 F.Supp. at 1408. (citations omitted). The court also noted the Fifth Circuit refused to apply its own 1955 ruling in Hays ... to the similar federal statute. Id. (citing Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Serv., Inc., 435 F.2d 1389, 1391-95 (5th Cir.1970)). ¶ 21. Here, the key distinction between Astron and our case at hand is that Astron is a federal district court case out of the Eleventh Circuit. Astron does not overrule the Fifth Circuit decision in Hays which has been followed by this Court. See Cannon, 377 So.2d at 1057; Brunt, 243 Miss. at 618-19, 139 So.2d at 386. The Legislature adopted the decision announced in Hays in drafting Miss.Code Ann. § 61-1-3. Therefore, following the same rationale in Issue I, we find that the lower court erred in determining that the owner of the plane was not liable.