Opinion ID: 196233
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Just and Proper. We come finally to the question

Text: 3. Just and Proper. of whether the injunctive relief structured below can be deemed just and proper in light of the relevant factual and legal circumstances. We conclude that it can. The district court held that injunctive relief is just and proper in this case because of its relationship to two statutory goals: (1) to prevent disruptions in the flow of commerce, and (2) to protect innocent third parties from becoming embroiled in a labor dispute. See Pye, 875 F. Supp. at 928. This threshold determination rests on empirical and legal bedrock. It is indisputable that the statutory proscription of secondary boycotts contemplates both the maintenance of an unhindered stream of commerce, see, e.g., Hoeber, 939 F.2d at 122; Union de Tronquistas, 586 F.2d at 878, and the shielding of secondary businesses from unlawful intrusions, see, e.g., International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 456 U.S. at 223 n.20; Denver 11Of course, this ruling means only what it says, and does not speak to whether the Union's contrary view may prevail in the long run. That question is not before us at this time. See, e.g., Madden v. International Hod Carriers', Bldg. & Common Laborers' Union of Am., Local No. 41, 277 F.2d 688, 690 (7th Cir.) (explaining that [t]he ultimate determination on the merits as to whether a violation occurred is reserved exclusively for the Board, subject to judicial review at the appropriate time), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 863 (1960). 23 Bldg. & Constr. Trades, 341 U.S. at 692. After all, [a] union has a right to press a recalcitrant employer within the limits of the law; but, [a secondary business] has an equal and correlative right to be protected from becoming a union pawn in an end game directed at some other employer. Local Union No. 25, 831 F.2d at 1152. On this basis, then, temporary injunctive relief of some sort is clearly just and proper. Starting from this major premise, our focus necessarily becomes the scope of the decree that the lower court actually entered. The Union tells us that the decree is vague and overbroad. We reject this characterization. The injunction's prohibitory ambit is quite clear and its contours are rather specific. Short of cataloguing each and every potential violation, we do not see what further particularization the district court could reasonably have inserted. The requirement that temporary injunctions be clear and specific, Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d), does not mean that they must read like the working plans for building hydrogen bombs. See Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 517 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1975). We likewise fail to discern any merit in the Union's allegation of overbreadth. The injunction carefully proscribes certain types of activity, aimed at secondary businesses, undertaken by the Union and other denominated individuals, with a specific (unlawful) intent. No more is exigible. The Union's last-ditch argument is that the injunction 24 should be expressly limited in duration, particularly since it will remain operative until the Board acts, and that agency may not reach a decision on the merits for some time. In support of this argument, the Union cites Eisenberg v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 519 F.2d 138 (3d Cir. 1975), in which the court held that section 10(j) injunctions, absent extraordinary circumstances, should be confined to six months in duration. See id. at 144. The Union's reliance on Eisenberg is unavailing. For one thing, that case involves section 10(j), not section 10(l), and the differences between the two provisions are not insignificant. See supra note 7 (contrasting the two provisions); see also Maram, 722 F.2d at 957-58 (explaining why the range of considerations affecting the propriety of injunctive relief varies between sections 10(j) and 10(l)). For another thing, several other circuits have expressly declined to adopt the Third Circuit's inelastic six-month rule, instead leaving the matter of duration to be decided by individual district courts on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Sheeran v. American Commercial Lines, Inc., 683 F.2d 970, 980-81 (6th Cir. 1982); Kaynard, 633 F.2d at 1035; Dawidoff v. Minneapolis Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 550 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir. 1977); Squillacote, 540 F.2d at 860. Hendrix typifies the reasoning of those courts. There, the Eighth Circuit stated: We find the congressional history indicates that Congress was aware of the lengthy Board hearing procedures when Section 10(l) was enacted. Since Congress did not impose a time limit on a Section 10(l) injunction, we find no reason why this Court should 25 impose such a limit. Hendrix, 592 F.2d at 446. A measure of adjudicatory delay is one of the crosses that contemporary litigants must bear. See, e.g., Maram, 722 F.2d at 960 (A busy administrative agency cannot operate overnight. The very fact that it must exercise discretion, and that its decision is entitled to presumptive weight, indicate that it should have time to investigate and deliberate.) (footnote and citation omitted). Thus, we abjure the Third Circuit's rule and hold, instead, that the question of whether an injunction issued under section 10(l) should be temporally limited and, if so, to what extent is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court. We add an eschatocol of sorts. By declining the Union's invitation to sponsor a per se durational rule, we in no way intend to condone needless delay in the administrative adjudicatory process. We anticipate that the Board will proceed with dispatch to decide the merits of all section 10(l) cases. If this prediction proves to be overly optimistic in a particular instance, the Union may, if it can make a credible showing that the Board's delay is genuinely undue, ask the district court to modify or dissolve the temporary injunction. See, e.g., Asseo, 805 F.2d at 29 (suggesting that the Regional Director's request for a temporary injunction should be taken as a promise of a speedy [administrative] disposition, with the risk of dissolution, or modification, by the court, on motion . . ., if the promise is not kept); Solien, 593 F.2d at 88 (suggesting 26 that if agency action is unreasonably delayed in a section 10(l) case, a union may seek a modification or dissolution of the challenged injunction in the district court).