Opinion ID: 65379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Failure to Request a Lesser-Included Offense Instruction

Text: The district court found that, given the opportunity, there is a probability that the jury would not have convicted Richards of murder if it had been given the option of convicting him of aggravated assault, and that Davis's failure to request such an instruction was not the result of any reasoned trial strategy. Richards, 578 F.Supp.2d at 868. In reaching this conclusion, the district court found that the state trial court would have committed error in refusing such an instruction, and that, based on her testimony at the evidentiary hearing, Davis erroneously believed that a lesser included offense instruction is not available unless the State raises the elements of the lesser offense. Under Texas law, there is a two-step test to determine whether a lesser included offense instruction should be given: first, the lesser included offense must be within the proof necessary to establish the offense charged; second, there must be some evidence in the record that if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of the lesser offense. Alexander v. McCotter, 775 F.2d 595, 600 (5th Cir.1985) (quoting Johnson v. State, 623 S.W.2d 654, 657 (Tex.Crim.App.1981)). An assault occurs when a person (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including the person's spouse . . . or (3) intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive or provocative. Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1). The assault is aggravated when, among other circumstances, the person (1) causes serious bodily injury to another, including the person's spouse; or (2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault. Id. § 22.02(a). In this case, although the State does not dispute that aggravated assault is a lesser included offense of murder, it argues that there was no evidence that Richards was guilty only of the lesser charge because Richards admitted to intentionally hitting Baker and, under Richards self-defense theory, he is guilty of nothing. Further, the State maintains, Davis's decision not to request a lesser included offense instruction was a conscious and informed decision: Davis testified at the evidentiary hearing that she did not think the State had enough evidence to convict Richards, and she did not want the jury to be able to convict him of the lesser charge. Once again, after a careful examination of the record, and in consideration of both the district court's opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility and the deference due to the state court's findings under AEDPA, we agree with the district court that Davis's failure to request a lesser-included offense instruction was deficient and not a strategic decision. In her affidavit and again at the evidentiary hearing Davis stated that such a request would have been frivolous. A request for a lesser-included offense instruction on the basis that another assault, subsequent to that described by Brown, Qualls, and Richards, caused Baker's death would clearly not have been frivolous, and any doubt as to whether it was supported by the evidence is due to Davis's failure to introduce exculpatory evidence as discussed above. This is true even though Richards asserted self-defense: it would be entirely possible for the jury to believe that Richards did not act in self-defense but also believe that he did not kill Baker. Davis's testimony strongly suggests that she both failed to recognize this possibility [7] and misunderstood the law governing lesser-included offenses. [8] In these circumstances, we are convinced that Davis's contention that she did not feel the jury would convict of murder and did not want to give the jury the option of convicting of the lesser offense is a  post-hoc rationalization rather than a genuine account of her decision-making process. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 526-27, 123 S.Ct. 2527. We are further convinced that Davis's performance in failing to request a lesser-included offense instruction fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the state court's conclusion to the contrary was an unreasonable application of Strickland.