Opinion ID: 1864465
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Intervention by the trial court. Preliminarily, we must determine whether the intervention by the trial court, on its own motion, was proper under the circumstances.

Text: The presiding judge is not restricted to the functions of a mere umpire or a referee in a contest between opposing parties or counsel. A trial court has the duty to control and conduct its court in an orderly, dignified and proper manner. Schroedl v. McTague, 169 N.W.2d 860, 867 (Iowa 1969). We have also observed: In fulfilling its role, occasions will arise when a trial judge is constrained to intervene on its own volition to protect a witness from abusive treatment or unnecessary humiliation, to stay the pursuit of a patently irrelevant line of inquiry particularly when it may obfuscate the issues and mislead the jury, to act to avert unnecessary repetition, to require that the proceedings move forward without undue delay and to take reasonable measures to insure that the evidence is intelligibly presented to the jury. State v. Cuevas, 288 N.W.2d 525, 531 (Iowa 1980). In Cuevas, the trial court intervened during the defendant's cross-examination of the State's expert witness. The intervention followed a series of repetitious questions to which the witness repeatedly responded that he was unable to answer. On review we noted that the transcript reflected that the exchange between the witness and questioner was intense and that the trial court acted within its discretionary authority when it intervened. Id. at 531-32. In the present case, as in Cuevas, some intensity can be discerned from the record. The dialogue from the record further implies that the witness sought instruction or protection from the trial court judge. Based upon this record, we conclude the trial court did not exceed its authority by intervening during the cross-examination. 2. The restriction of defendant's impeachment of the State's witness. Given our conclusion above, that the court acted within its discretionary authority when it intervened during defendant's cross-examination of Hester, we must next determine whether the court's ruling restricting defendant's examination was proper. A defendant's right to cross-examine a witness is secured by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment, State v. Durrell, 300 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Iowa 1981), and made applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068, 13 L.Ed.2d 923, 926 (1965). We have recognized, however, that the Constitution `guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way and to what ever extent, the defense might wish.' In re J.D.S., 436 N.W.2d 342, 348 (Iowa 1989) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674, 683 (1986)). A defendant is given reasonable latitude in cross-examining a State's witness. State v. Martin, 385 N.W.2d 549, 552 (Iowa 1986). The trial court, however, still exercises its sound discretion in determining the scope of cross-examination. Id. citing Durrell, 300 N.W.2d at 134. A witness's credibility is placed in issue when that witness testifies. State v. O'Connell, 275 N.W.2d 197, 203 (Iowa 1979). Therefore, a defendant may question the credibility of a State's witness by attempting to impeach the witness by proper cross-examination. State v. Droste, 232 N.W.2d 483, 489 (Iowa 1975). Proper cross-examination may include impeachment by inquiry into specific instances of conduct. Iowa Rule of Evidence 608(b) allows such inquiries, in the discretion of the court, if probative of the witness's truthfulness or untruthfulness. See Martin, 385 N.W.2d at 552. We disturb a trial court's rulings bearing on these questions only when the broad discretion accorded the court has been obviously abused. Id. citing State v. Clark, 325 N.W.2d 381, 383 (Iowa 1982). The witness, Hester, left the employ of JI Case approximately ten years before trial in the present action. This span of time alone substantially erodes the probative value of cross-examination concerning these events. Cf. Iowa R.Evid. 609(b) (limiting the admission of evidence of a witness's prior conviction which occurred more than ten years before the time of trial). Hester was neither charged nor convicted of any unlawful conduct that resulted in discharge. Furthermore, as defendant's offer of proof bore out, Hester denied that he was involved in the theft at the plant. Under the facts of this case, defendant's proposed inquiry into the termination of Hester's employment at JI Case had minimal probative value. Defense counsel's accusations, on the other hand, obviously imported a substantial prejudice against the witness. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting this line of cross-examination. III. The burglary and possession trial. The second trial concerned defendant only and involved the two offenses of second-degree burglary (Iowa Code sections 713.1 and 713.5) and possession of burglar's tools (Iowa Code section 713.7). In his appeal from this proceeding, defendant contends (1) that the trial court erroneously overruled his motion to sever and try separately the individual charges, and (2) that the trial court erroneously admitted into evidence certain objects without a proper showing of the chain of custody of those items. A. Joinder of charges. Initially, defendant contests the trial court's ruling denying his motion to sever the burglary and possession charges. He contends that joinder of the counts in a single proceeding violated his constitutional and statutory rights to a fair trial. Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(1) permits the joinder of offenses in a single complaint, information or indictment when the offenses charged are based on (1) the same transaction or occurrence, or (2) a common scheme or plan. State v. Lam, 391 N.W.2d 245, 249 (Iowa 1986). In Lam, we construed for the first time the common scheme or plan language of the rule. We noted that this language was part of an amendment to our former rule which served to liberalize and broaden charging practices in Iowa. In that case we adopted the approach utilized by the Missouri courts when determining whether separate acts are to be considered part of a common scheme. Id. at 250. Under this test, all the offenses charged must be products of a single or continuing motive. Id. (citing State v. Garrette, 699 S.W.2d 468, 493 (Mo.Ct.App.1985)). Applying this test in Lam, we held that two burglary charges were properly tried together where both offenses were alleged to have occurred within a period of several hours on the same day in the same general location and using the same method of operation. These facts were found to establish that both offenses were products of a single and continuing motive for obtaining small portable objects from apartments for money. Lam, 391 N.W.2d at 250. The allegations in the present action asserted that the burglary and possession of burglar's tools offenses were also products of a single or continuing motive. One pair of wire cutters retrieved from defendant's truck were linked to the Durant burglary. Furthermore, markings in the plat book found in defendant's truck clearly indicated that a series of thefts were planned in a number of the cemeteries in rural Muscatine county which included the Durant cemetery. Based upon these facts, the trial court correctly denied defendant's motions to sever and proceeded to try both counts together. B. Chain of custody. Defendant lastly asserts the trial court erred in overruling his chain-of-custody objections to admission into evidence of a pair of wire cutters and a length of the Durant cemetery fence. Admission of evidence over a chain-of-custody objection is a matter within the trial court's discretion, and reversal is warranted only when a clear showing is made that the discretion was abused. State v. Gibb, 303 N.W.2d 673, 681 (Iowa 1981). When the trial court has determined that the identity of the exhibit has been sufficiently determined, any contrary indication or speculation affects the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Id. We have consistently held that where the exhibits consist of solid objects which are not easily susceptible to undetected alteration, the exhibits may be admitted into evidence despite a break in the chain of custody. State v. Limerick, 169 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Iowa 1969). Where the possibility of alteration of an exhibit is slight, the materiality of the alteration remote, and the exhibit has otherwise been properly identified we have dispensed with a showing of continuous custody. Id. (concerning admission of a gun); see also State v. Ford, 259 Iowa 744, 749, 145 N.W.2d 638, 640-41 (1966) (admitting a gun and hammer over chain-of-custody objection). The seized wire cutters and the portion of the cemetery fence which the State offered into evidence at trial were clearly of the variety of hard evidence which requires no detailed showing of its chain of custody. Defendant's objections in this regard were properly overruled. Other issues presented by defendant in this appeal have been examined and found to be without merit. IV. Disposition. We conclude the trial court correctly overruled defendant's objections relative to valuation of the stolen property and the cross-examination of Carrell Hester in defendant's theft trial. Defendant's objections to the joinder of the burglary and possession offenses and his evidentiary objections were also correctly overruled in the second trial. Therefore, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, and affirm the judgments of the district court. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED.