Opinion ID: 2671522
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of continued killings of prostitutes

Text: Although unsuccessful in obtaining the records of police investigations of the murders of other prostitutes, defendant moved to present evidence of the murders of three prostitutes in Riverside County that occurred after he was arrested. He asserted the evidence was relevant in light of the view expressed by some prospective jurors that the murders had stopped when defendant was arrested, and also as third party culpability evidence. With respect to the latter purpose, he complained that the lack of discovery concerning other murders limited his ability to link a third person to the charged crimes. At the hearing, the defense stated that it learned from newspapers, from ―informal discussions with various people in law enforcement,‖ and from defense investigators that there were three killings of prostitutes who were drug users and whose bodies had been (footnote continued from previous page) but as defendant notes, it would have been futile to raise the issue because the trial court had ruled that the prosecution was not required to produce any profile. 64 dumped in ―alleys, hillsides, open area, or something like that.‖ The prosecutor confirmed that he had discussed two of the postarrest murders with the investigating detectives (the third murder had just occurred), and stated that there was no information that would exculpate defendant. He also stated the two victims were prostitutes and probably drug users, but ―[t]here were a lot of dissimilarities in the cases . . . with respect to the 13 charges that [defendant] has been accused of committing.‖ He added that he did ―not intend to argue to this jury that [defendant] is guilty because once he was arrested, the killing of prostitutes stopped in Riverside County. What I intend to argue is the weight of the evidence that points specifically to [defendant] as killing these 13 women.‖ The trial court denied the motion, stating that there was no link and there was nothing to show that the fact there were three other killings of prostitutes had any relevance to this case. We first consider whether the evidence was admissible as third party culpability evidence. ― ‗[T]o be admissible, evidence of the culpability of a third party offered by a defendant to demonstrate that a reasonable doubt exists concerning his or her guilt . . . must link the third person either directly or circumstantially to the actual perpetration of the crime.‘ ‖ (People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 580.) ―For evidence of an uncharged offense to be admissible to establish the third party‘s identity as the perpetrator of the charged crimes, ‗ ―[t]he pattern and characteristics of the crimes must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.‖ ‘ [Citations.] A large number of common marks may, when viewed in combination, establish the required distinctive pattern.‖ (Id. at p. 581; see People v. Page (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1, 39 [right to present all evidence of a significant probative value is not ―inconsistent with the rule . . . that third party culpability evidence is admissible only if it links a third party to the crime‖].) 65 The evidence that, after defendant was arrested, three prostitutes, at least two of whom abused drugs, were fatally stabbed and whose bodies were dumped like trash, does not establish a link between a third person and the crimes charged against defendant. None of these shared characteristics is unusual or distinctive. As the prosecutor noted, prostitutes are vulnerable and tend to be victimized. (See, e.g., People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899 [two and perhaps three homicide victims were prostitutes, and the three had been left in dumpsters]; People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 798 [six drug-abusing prostitutes murdered]; People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 400 [defendant murdered two prostitutes and attempted to murder four more prostitutes]; People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 835 [two prostitutes murdered]; see also People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 363 [noting that prostitutes ―could be seen as especially vulnerable‖].) Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence. We next consider whether the evidence was admissible to prove the bare fact that the murders of prostitutes did not end with defendant‘s arrest. Defendant asserts that the prosecutor, by arguing that defendant was guilty because he was the serial killer responsible for all of the charged killings, ―reinforced the jury‘s predisposition‖ to believe that the killings of prostitutes stopped when defendant was arrested. Therefore, he contends, the evidence of postarrest killings was relevant to rebut the jury‘s belief. We disagree. Because no evidence was presented that similar murders of prostitutes ended upon defendant‘s arrest, and no element of the charges otherwise raised an issue of whether the murder of prostitutes continued after defendant‘s arrest, the evidence was not relevant to the issue of guilt. The fact that a number of prospective jurors, none of whom was selected as a juror in this case, made statements in the course of jury selection that 66 reflected a belief that the murders had ended with defendant‘s arrest, does not render the evidence relevant to the issues litigated. Finally, we consider defendant‘s contention that the evidence was relevant to rebut the prosecutor‘s argument that defendant was guilty based on the pattern of killings. The prosecutor‘s theory was not based on the fact that the victims were all drug-abusing prostitutes whose bodies were dumped. Rather, his argument relied on the repeated patterns of evidence, including the tire impressions at multiple scenes that matched the tires that were on defendant‘s van at the time of the particular killing, the shoe impressions that were similar to two pairs of Pro Wings and a pair of Converse shoes defendant purchased over the course of these killings, and the various fibers associated with multiple victims that were similar to fibers in his van. As the prosecutor explained to the jury, ―It‘s this cross-association of evidence that in and of itself, if you look at in a vacuum, may not be that significant. But when you look at the big picture . . . we see continual patterns that repeat themselves with respect to many different types of evidence.‖ The fact that drug-abusing prostitutes continued to be killed and dumped did not rebut the prosecution‘s theory. b. Evidence of criminal charges against lead detective and her discharge from the police force The prosecution moved to exclude impeachment evidence related to crimes allegedly committed by Christine Keers, the lead homicide task force detective. Keers was indicted by a Riverside County grand jury in October 1994 on three counts of attempting to violate section 496, subdivision (a), receiving stolen property, a misdemeanor, and one count of violation of section 653f, soliciting the commission of a burglary, a felony. Keers was put on administrative leave in August 1994, and terminated from the Riverside Police Department in December 1994, but she had not been tried for the alleged crimes prior to defendant‘s trial, 67 which began in February 1995. According to the motion, Keers would be called by the prosecution to testify concerning (1) her recording of an interview with Kelly Whitecloud, the friend of Kelly Hammond, (2) her involvement in the taperecorded interview of defendant after his arrest, and (3) her recovery of items of clothing and jewelry that belonged to victims. The prosecution stated that her testimony was ―important to maintain the flow and continuity of the presentation of evidence,‖ but ―virtually every fact she will relate has a second percipient witness who can testify to the same facts.‖ It noted that if the defense sought to challenge the evidence Keers would convey, Kelly Whitecloud could be crossexamined, the recording of the interview of defendant could be played, and the individuals from whom Keers had collected personal belongings of the victims were available. At the hearing on the motion, the prosecution argued that because Keers had not been convicted of the alleged crimes, admission of the evidence would require a mini-trial of the allegations. It also stated that the primary witness against Keers had died, portions of the audio recordings of that witness‘s conversations with Keers were inaudible, and there might be an entrapment defense by Keers. The prosecution also noted that Keers‘s termination from the police department involved standards and factors different from the criminal charges, and that neither the prosecution nor the defense had knowledge of the internal affairs investigation that had been conducted. The prosecution asserted that admitting the evidence would lead to ―nitpicking wars over collateral credibility‖ of a witness who was ―simply a receiver of information in this case.‖ The defense stated that a trial of the charges was not necessary; instead, the defense should be allowed to ask whether Keers had been indicted by a grand jury for receiving stolen property and whether she had been terminated from the police department. 68 The court stated that in its view, presentation of the impeachment evidence would become a mini-trial on the issue, because the percipient witness in the Keers matter was deceased and multiple witnesses would be required to prove the charged event. It concluded that ―this would be so time consuming‖ when considered in the context of a witness who was not the sole witness as to the topics of her testimony, and hence the court granted the prosecution motion and excluded the impeachment evidence under Evidence Code section 352. The defense subsequently sought permission to introduce evidence that Keers had been terminated from her employment in the police department. The trial court stated that it did not know why Keers was terminated, and that the evidence, ―left dangling like that,‖ was irrelevant. Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the undue consumption of time required to prove wrongdoing by Keers. ―A trial court‘s exercise of discretion under section 352 will be upheld on appeal unless the court abused its discretion, that is, unless it exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner.‖ (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 806.) Defendant identifies various facts to highlight the importance of the impeachment evidence. He complains that Keers was allowed to testify regarding her career at the police department, leading the jury to believe that she was a trusted, upstanding officer who would not lie to the jury. He asserts that Keers‘s testimony concerning her interaction with Kelly Whitecloud was not corroborated, and that the jury had reason to doubt the veracity of Whitecloud because she was a prostitute, a drug user, and a felon who had admitted an intent to ―rip off‖ the driver of the van the night Kelly Hammond disappeared. He identifies various inconsistencies between Whitecloud‘s testimony at trial and statements she made to various police detectives and the grand jury. He asserts that if the jury had 69 known of the charges against Keers and the termination of her employment, it ―would have had reason to seriously consider that either Whitecloud or Keers, or both, were not telling the truth and that the police had arrested the wrong man.‖ The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that proof of the criminal charges against Keers would have required an undue consumption of time. Proof of the charges was complicated by the death of the percipient witness, and the value of the impeachment evidence was low, given that all of Keers‘s testimony could be corroborated. Any concern with Whitecloud‘s corroboration of Keers‘s testimony is mitigated by the fact that most of the information provided by Whitecloud to Keers about the man who picked up Hammond was memorialized by Keers before defendant was identified as a suspect. Following defendant‘s arrest, Keers presented two photographic lineups to Whitecloud, and Whitecloud picked defendant from each as the man who took her to McDonald‘s and then picked up Hammond, but at trial, the McDonald‘s manager also identified defendant as the man who was with Whitecloud that night. Finally, the unexplained fact that Keers had been terminated from the police department was irrelevant. 2. Failure to exclude evidence obtained during police questioning of defendant Defendant contends the police continued questioning him after he requested counsel, in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that evidence obtained as a result of that questioning should have been excluded. Defendant was arrested on January 9, 1992, between 10:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m., for a violation of parole, and transported to the Riverside Police Department. Detective Keers began interrogating him approximately two hours later, at 12:30 a.m. on January 10. She gave him the Miranda warning and waiver 70 (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda)), which he signed, and then he asked, ―Do I need a lawyer?‖ She responded, ―Well, I don‘t know. Do you need a lawyer?‖ He said, ―I don‘t know. For what I‘ve done, I don‘t see why I need a lawyer.‖ Keers then said, ―And all I‘m doing is asking you to talk to me. Do you want to do that?‖ He said, ―Okay.‖ The first phase of the interrogation continued until 1:10 a.m., at which time a technician arrived to collect hair and saliva samples. The interview resumed and continued until 2:45 a.m. During this early morning interrogation, Keers asked defendant for permission to search his home. By this time in the interrogation, the topics of prostitute killings, the knives in defendant‘s van, footprints, and defendant‘s Converse sneakers had been discussed. Defendant responded to the request to search his home by stating, ―I need to know, am I being charged with this, because if I‘m being charged with this I think I need a lawyer.‖ Keers stated, ―Well at this point, no you‘re not being charged with this,‖ and defendant then consented to a search of his apartment. Questioning resumed that afternoon at 2:50 p.m. and continued until 5:40 p.m. During this questioning, defendant admitted he had been in the orange groves and that there was a body in the orange groves. When pressed to tell them ―about the body you left there,‖ he said, ―I better get a lawyer now. I better get a lawyer, because you think I did it and I didn‘t.‖ Questioning continued, and defendant admitted taking a knife out of Casares‘s chest and putting it in his van. In May 1995, defendant moved to exclude ―defendant‘s admission that he was in the orange grove where Eleanor Casares‘ body was found, saw the body, and pulled the knife out of her chest and kept it . . . .‖ The trial court ruled that defendant invoked his right to an attorney when he stated, ―I better get a lawyer now. I better get a lawyer, because you think I did it and I didn‘t.‖ Therefore, his statements about removing the knife and putting it in his van were excluded. 71 Defendant contends that he invoked his right to counsel earlier, during the morning session when he stated, ―if I‘m being charged with this I think I need a lawyer.‖ ―In order to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege after it has been waived, and in order to halt police questioning after it has begun, the suspect ‗must unambiguously‘ assert his right to silence or counsel. [Citation.] It is not enough for a reasonable police officer to understand that the suspect might be invoking his rights. [Citation.] Faced with an ambiguous or equivocal statement, law enforcement officers are not required under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, either to ask clarifying questions or to cease questioning altogether.‖ (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 535; see Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452.) Because defendant‘s statements are undisputed, we independently determine whether he unambiguously asserted his right to counsel. (People v. Bacon (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1082, 1105.) Defendant contends that his statement — ―I need to know, am I being charged with this, because if I‘m being charged with this I think I need a lawyer‖ — was an unambiguous invocation of his right to counsel. He asserts that ―Keers simply could not have interpreted this as a conditional request because she knew that the condition was virtually certain to manifest itself.‖ He proposes that Keers could have asked the prosecutor, who was monitoring the interrogation from another room, whether defendant was going to be charged, and ―then could have explained [defendant‘s] status to him truthfully . . . .‖ Defendant acknowledges that in People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1111 (Gonzalez), we held that a similar statement was not an unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel. In Gonzalez, the defendant told the interrogating detectives that if he was going to be charged with anything, he wanted to talk to a public defender. One of the detectives informed Gonzalez that he would be booked that 72 evening, but if polygraph results indicated he was telling the truth, he would be released. Gonzalez asked, ― ‗Book me on what?‘ ‖ The detective responded ― ‗On murder. That doesn‘t mean you‘re going to be filed on.‘ ‖ (Id. at p. 1119.) The second detective gave a similar response, and also stated that ― ‗[a]n arrest is not a prosecution . . . .‘ ‖ (Id. at p. 1120.) We explained that, ―[o]n its face, defendant‘s statement was conditional; he wanted a lawyer if he was going to be charged. The conditional nature of the statement rendered it, at best, ambiguous and equivocal because a reasonable police officer in these circumstances would not necessarily have known whether the condition would be fulfilled since, as these officers explained, the decision to charge is not made by police. Confronted with this statement, a reasonable officer would have understood only that ‗the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel,‘ which is insufficient under Davis to require cessation of questioning. [Citation.] Here, moreover, the detectives responded to defendant‘s statement by explaining to him the difference between being arrested and booked and being charged, thus providing him with an opportunity to clarify his meaning, but at no point in this initial exchange did defendant unequivocally request the immediate presence of an attorney before he would answer any more questions. It is this type of statement Davis requires before the police must terminate the interrogation.‖ (Id. at p. 1126, citing Davis v. United States, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 459, 461-462.) Defendant attempts to distinguish Gonzalez based on the officers‘ explanation in that case of the difference between booking and charging, which, he asserts, ―tend[ed] to show that they truly did not know if he had invoked his rights.‖ He further notes that the defendant‘s subsequent conduct in Gonzalez established that he was not invoking his right to counsel. He contrasts these facts to what he characterizes as Keers‘s ―deceit and trickery to convince [defendant] to keep talking with her.‖ He notes the evidence of which she was aware as the lead 73 investigator — the gray van that matched Whitecloud‘s description, the matching tire treads, the matching shoe impressions — and concludes that ―[a] reasonable officer who knew what Keers knew could only have construed [defendant‘s] statements as an invocation of his right to counsel. She had evidence linking [defendant] to one murder and, by the line of questioning she pursued over the next several hours, it is obvious that she was deliberately buying time in an effort to keep him talking.‖ Therefore, defendant asserts, Keers ―responded deceptively‖ to his question by stating that he was not being charged ―at this time.‖ The focus of the test, however, is the clarity of the defendant‘s request, not the particular officer‘s belief, and there is no requirement that an officer ask clarifying questions. (Davis v. United States, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 459-462.) As we subsequently confirmed, ―a defendant does not unambiguously invoke his right to counsel when he makes that request contingent on an event that has not occurred. (See People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1111 [defendant‘s request for counsel was conditioned on whether he was going to be charged with any crimes].)‖ (People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 952.) Moreover, as in Gonzalez, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1111, the officer‘s response in this case provided defendant with an opportunity to clarify his meaning, but as in Gonzalez, defendant did not then unequivocally request the presence of an attorney. Instead, he consented to a search of his residence. Defendant also contends that Keers‘s failure to inform him of ―critical information‖ and ―the severity of his predicament‖ rendered his waiver of rights under Miranda involuntary and unknowing. Miranda requires that the person in custody be informed of the right to remain silent, the consequences of forgoing that right, the right to counsel, and that if the person is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed. (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 467-473.) There is no requirement that, before a person may validly waive his privilege against self74 incrimination, he must be apprised of the evidence against him, the ―severity of his predicament,‖ or the chances he will be charged. (People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 513.) Finally, defendant contends his Miranda waiver was limited because he ―placed a condition on his waiver‖ when he stated that he thought he needed a lawyer if he was being charged. He asserts that ―[a]n ‗ordinary understanding of [defendant‘s] statement requires the conclusion that his consent to waive his rights only existed if he were not being charged with the crime.‖ A person may invoke his Miranda rights selectively (Arnold v. Runnels (9th Cir. 2005) 421 F.3d 859, 864 [defendant clearly and unequivocally stated that he did not want to speak on tape]), but defendant did not state that he would speak to the detectives without the assistance of counsel only if he would not be charged with the crimes. As explained above, his statement concerning counsel was ambiguous and conditional, and did not constitute an invocation of his right to counsel. He cannot avoid the rule of Davis v. United States, supra, 512 U.S. 452, by characterizing an ambiguous reference to counsel as a limitation on his waiver of his Miranda rights. 3. Admission of photographs of the victims Defendant contends that a photo board containing photographs of the 13 homicide victims while they were alive should not have been admitted into evidence because it constituted an inappropriate emotional appeal to the jury. Near the end of the guilt phase, an investigator with the district attorney‘s office testified concerning an exhibit he had prepared, a four-and-one-half-foot square photo board, containing photographs of the 13 victims defendant was charged with killing. The board included the victims‘ names along with the dates and approximate locations where their bodies were discovered. The photographs 75 were obtained from the family members and friends of the victims. The investigator attempted to obtain the most recent photograph of each victim, but in some cases the photographs were taken a year or two before the subject‘s death, and at least one was taken at least five years before the subject‘s death. The sizes of the photographs vary slightly, but each generally fills an 8 1/2 by 11-inch sheet of paper. All the photographs, save for one, are cropped to show only the victim‘s head or head and upper body. Several court days later, at the close of the prosecution‘s case, defendant objected to admission of the photo board, asserting that the photos ―were taken of the victims under the best of all possible circumstances,‖ and arguing that the exhibit was ―an emotional appeal. It is abstract or distanced . . . from the nature of the victims that the prosecution has been . . . arguing all along, which is street and drug using prostitutes.‖ The prosecutor responded that the photographs had been obtained from family members, and in some cases there were not many photographs available. He stated that the defense could seek to introduce booking photos of the victims and could fairly comment on the issue in argument. Finally, he asserted that ―with this number of victims and the type of evidence that relates to each of these victims, it‘s important for the jury to identify a name with a face . . . .‖ The trial court first addressed the prosecutor‘s purpose — to assist the jury in keeping track of the victims and evidence — and stated that it was not admitting the photographs exclusively for the purpose of ―associating a name with a photograph,‖ which could be done ―with other things as well.‖ The court then stated that it would allow their admission, ―because [the jurors] can see the similarity between those photographs and those photographs of these women at their worst. It‘s not because they were put at their worst, someone put them at their worst. And I think it‘s appropriate to let them see them, these individuals not 76 necessarily at their best, but at least as you and I are seeing them on a daily basis and the jurors in associating or identifying those victims from various parts of our county.‖14 The trial court‘s comments are not entirely clear, but they appear to reflect that the court recognized that the photographs had some probative value to assist jurors in keeping track of the evidence, but it viewed their value for this purpose as insufficient by itself to warrant their admission. The court did not, however, reject this purpose on the ground that admission of the photographs would cause undue prejudice to defendant. The court‘s comments also identify a second purpose of the photographs — to show what the victims looked like while alive rather than as they appeared in crime scene and autopsy photographs admitted at trial. Finally, the comments reflect that the trial court rejected defendant‘s theory of undue prejudice. ―We have recognized that ‗[c]ourts should be cautious in the guilt phase about admitting photographs of murder victims while alive, given the risk that the photograph will merely generate sympathy for the victims. [Citation.] But the possibility that a photograph will generate sympathy does not compel its exclusion if it is otherwise relevant. [Citation.] The decision to admit victim photographs 14 The trial court stated in full: ―It seems to me that these, and I‘m not going to allow it to come in, because for the sake of having 24 photo boards associated with their names and strictly and that exclusively that is associating a name with a photograph, is they can do that with other things as well, so it‘s not, but I am going to allow it to come in, because they can see the similarity between those photographs and those photographs of these women at their worst. It‘s not because they were put at their worst, someone put them at their worst. And I think it‘s appropriate to let them see them, these individuals not necessarily at their best, but at least as you and I are seeing them on a daily basis and the jurors in associating or identifying those victims from various parts of our county. I think it‘s appropriate and it shall come in.‖ 77 falls within the trial court‘s discretion, and an appellate court will not disturb its ruling unless the prejudicial effect of the photographs clearly outweighs their probative value.‖ (People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1163 (Rogers).) Here, the court, in admitting the photos, implicitly determined the photos themselves did not generate sympathy. Our review of the photos is in accord. The photographs are ordinary, with no uniform emotion or quality. In seven, the victims are smiling, and in six, they have blank or sour expressions. The style of photograph is seemingly random, ranging from what appear to be school portraits to ―candids‖ to posed pictures. (See People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 571 [―photo, though perhaps ‗charming,‘ was nonetheless an ‗ordinary‘ one not likely to produce a prejudicial impact‖].) Due to the manner in which the photographs were cropped, their context is ambiguous, making the portraits appear neutral and detached. (See People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 821 [trial court ordered photograph cropped to remove family dogs in order to minimize prejudice]; People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 115 [photograph was not ―calculated to elicit sympathy,‖ such as a photograph taken at church or with small children].) Further, as we held in Rogers, subsequent to the trial in this matter, photographs may be admitted to assist jurors in keeping track of individuals in a case, if the photographs are not unduly prejudicial. In Rogers, the trial court admitted two photographs of the three victims, taken while they were alive. We concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion, noting that ―two of the victims were similar in appearance to two of the witnesses, all four had been girlfriends of defendant, and one victim and one witness had the same first name. Given these circumstances, admission of the photographs was proper to meet the prosecution‘s concern that the jurors might ‗lose track of who these individuals are‘ and also to help any witness ‗identify the people that they saw in this case.‘ ‖ (Rogers, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1163, fns. omitted.) 78 Similarly, in this case despite the trial court‘s statement, we find the photo board was useful to assist the jurors in keeping track of the 13 murder charges and the extensive array of evidence associated with the crimes. Also, as in Rogers, supra, 46 Cal.4th 1136, the photographs are ―neutral and unremarkable and would not have engendered an emotional reaction capable of influencing the verdict.‖ (Id. at p. 1163.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the photographs were not unduly prejudicial. Defendant‘s theory of prejudice is that the photographs aroused the jury‘s passion because they portrayed the victims more sympathetically than did the prosecutor‘s description of them as drug-abusing prostitutes. In other words, his argument speculates that the jurors imagined that the victims looked worse in their daily lives than they appear in these photographs, and evidence that the victims looked like ordinary people constitutes prejudice that would weigh against their admission. ―For purposes of Evidence Code section 352, evidence is considered unduly prejudicial if it tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and has a negligible bearing on the issues.‖ (People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1091.) To the extent the photo board portraying the victims in their daily lives tended to deprive defendant of any perceived advantage he might have gained as a result of jurors‘ mental images of drug-addicted prostitutes, such alleged detriment is not ―undue prejudice‖ within the meaning of Evidence Code section 352, as this effect cannot be characterized as evoking an emotional bias against defendant. As we have explained, the photo board was properly admitted. Although the trial court apparently rejected the prosecutor‘s argument that the exhibit was necessary to assist the jury in keeping track of the evidence, it did not find the photo board unduly prejudicial to defendant. Like the trial court, we have rejected defendant‘s theory of undue prejudice. 79