Opinion ID: 1866125
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Heading: Retroactive Application of Coy v. Iowa.

Text: The first issue we address is whether Coy v. Iowa applies retroactively to Morgan's conviction. The answer depends on several Supreme Court holdings dealing with retroactive application of constitutional decisions to cases on collateral review. New constitutional rules of criminal procedure apply retroactively to all casesstate or federalpending on direct review or not yet final. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 716, 93 L.Ed.2d 649, 661 (1987). Final refers to all cases in which a judgment of conviction has been rendered, appeals have been exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari has elapsed before the new rule is announced. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 295, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1066-67, 103 L.Ed.2d 334, 345-46 (1989). So, generally, such new rules do not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. Id. at 311-16, 109 S.Ct. at 1075-78, 103 L.Ed.2d at 356-60; Brewer v. State, 444 N.W.2d 77, 81 (Iowa 1989). There are two exceptions. New rules are applied to cases on collateral review if the rule change (1) places certain types of individual, private conduct beyond the ability of the lawmakers to proscribe, or (2) creates a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating issues of fundamental trial fairness. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-12, 109 S.Ct. at 1075-76, 103 L.Ed.2d at 356-57; Brewer, 444 N.W.2d at 81. Generally, a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. at 1070, 103 L.Ed.2d at 349. Stated another way, a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final. Id. at 301, 109 S.Ct. at 1070, 103 L.Ed.2d at 349. If the constitutional decision merely applies settled precedents to new and different factual situations, no real question of retroactive application arises in cases on collateral review. This is because the new decision has not in any way changed the rule of earlier cases. Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 216 n. 3, 108 S.Ct. 534, 538 n. 3, 98 L.Ed.2d 546, 554 n. 3 (1988) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 2586-87, 73 L.Ed.2d 202, 213 (1982)). So the decision has not announced a new rule. In these circumstances the decision applies automatically to all caseseven cases on collateral review. As to cases on collateral review, [t]he `new rule' principle ... validates reasonable, good faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, ____, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 1217, 108 L.Ed.2d 347, 356 (1990). In short, a state court's reasonable and good faith interpretation of existing precedents is a factor to consider in determining whether a new rule has been established. The reason for the Butler holding is obvious: To the extent possible, state court convictions should be upheld. Simply put, Butler puts a premium on finality.
In Morgan's case we are dealing with a postconviction challenge to a prior conviction, a case on collateral review. Clearly Morgan's conviction was final when the Supreme Court decided Coy v. Iowa. By then Morgan had been convicted, we had denied his application for further review, and the time for certiorari to the Supreme Court had expired. That leads us to the question whether Coy v. Iowa announced a new rule. Morgan relies heavily on the majority's analysis in Coy v. Iowa to support his contention that the case did not establish a new rule. The majority maintains that prior Supreme Court precedents establish the sixth amendment had always guaranteed criminal defendants the right to physically face those who testify against them. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. at 1016, 108 S.Ct. at 2800, 101 L.Ed.2d at 864. The majority stops short of saying that there are no exceptions and expressly leaves open that question. Id. at 1021, 108 S.Ct. at 2803, 101 L.Ed.2d at 867. The State had argued that Iowa Code section 910A.3(1) was necessary to further an important public policy: to protect children who are victims of sexual abuse from the trauma of in-court testimony. The Court rejected this argument because the trial court had held no hearing and had made no individualized findings that these particular witnesses needed protection. Id. at 1021, 108 S.Ct. at 2803, 101 L.Ed.2d at 867. Recently, the exception question was squarely presented in a case involving a statutory procedure similar to the one used here. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. ____, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990). In Craig, the defendant was charged and convicted of sexually abusing a six-year-old child. Relying on expert testimony presented by the State, the trial court found that the child would suffer serious emotional distress such that [she could not] reasonably communicate if required to testify in the courtroom. Over the defendant's confrontation objection, the trial court allowed the child to testify by one-way closed circuit television outside the defendant's physical presence. Because the trial court had made these individualized findings, the Supreme Court was directly confronted with the question reserved in Coy v. Iowa. The majority in Craig observes that there are four components to the confrontation clause. These include physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier of fact. Id. at ____, 110 S.Ct. at 3163-64, 111 L.Ed.2d at 678-79. Citing to an impressive array of prior Supreme Court decisions, the majority notes that the Court has never held that the confrontation clause guarantees a defendant the absolute right to the first element: physical presence or face-to-face confrontation. Id. at ____, 110 S.Ct. at 3162-65, 111 L.Ed.2d at 677-80. What the precedents do establishthe majority points outis that the confrontation clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial. Id. at ____, 110 S.Ct. at 3165-66, 111 L.Ed.2d at 681. And face-to-face confrontation may be denied so long as denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured. Id. at ____, 110 S.Ct. at 3166, 111 L.Ed.2d at 682. The Court held that protecting a child from the trauma of in-court testimony constitutes the necessary important public policy underlying the challenged statutory procedure. Id. at ____, 110 S.Ct. at 3169, 111 L.Ed.2d at 682. And the preservation of the other three components in the procedureoath, cross-examination, and demeanorassures the reliability of the child's testimony. Id. at ____, 110 S.Ct. at 3166, 111 L.Ed.2d at 682. Did Coy v. Iowa announce a new rule? We think so. As the majority in Craig points out, several Supreme Court decisions before this case emphasized cross-examinationnot face-to-face confrontationas the essence of confrontation. In addition, as long as cross-examination was available, face-to-face confrontation was not essential. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2537, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 606 (1980) (The Court has emphasized that the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, and that `a primary interest secured by [the provision] is the right of cross-examination'); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 (1974) (The opponent demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 80, 91 S.Ct. 210, 215, 27 L.Ed.2d 213, 222 (1970) (confrontation clause does not prohibit introduction of all hearsay evidence); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1076, 13 L.Ed.2d 934, 937 (1965) (an adequate opportunity for cross-examination may satisfy the [confrontation] clause even in the absence of physical confrontation). Coy v. Iowa elevates face-to-face confrontation to the level of cross-examination. This is the essence of the new rule. Craig rounds out this new rule. Face-to-face confrontation would continue to be essential except in limited cases and under very stringent requirements. There is another reason why we think Coy v. Iowa announced a new rule. Before Coy v. Iowa, we reasonably and in good faith had determined that face-to-face confrontation was not an absolute sixth amendment guarantee. Before State v. Coy we had already faced a similar confrontation challenge. The challenge was to the use of a screen between a sexual abuse victim and the defendant during the victim's testimony. See State v. Strable, 313 N.W.2d 497, 500-01 (Iowa 1981). In Strable, the defendant argued that the confrontation clause guaranteed his right to face-to-face confrontation with the victim witness. Id. at 500. Rejecting this argument, we said: The confrontation clause has two purposes. The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination, which cannot be had except for the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers. Id. (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 (1974) (emphasis added) (in turn citing 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1395, at 123 (3d ed. 1940))). In short, cross-examination was essential; face-to-face confrontation was not. We also decided that the confrontation clause served a second purpose: to allow judge and jury to view the demeanor of the witness. Id. at 501. But we concluded that this purpose was dispensable. Id. In State v. Coy, we cited a third purpose served by the confrontation clause: insuring that the witness will testify under oath. Coy, 397 N.W.2d at 734. The oath, of course, impresses upon the witness the seriousness of the matter and guards against lies through the ever-present threat of prosecution for perjury. Id. It is true that in the past we did not give face-to-face confrontation as much importance as cross-examination. But Morgan receives no benefit from this. We reach this conclusion because in this collateral review case, the new rule principle validates our previous reasonable, good-faith interpretation that the sixth amendment does not absolutely guarantee face-to-face confrontation. See Butler, 494 U.S. at ____, 110 S.Ct. at 1217, 108 L.Ed.2d at 356. This is so even though our past interpretation may have been contrary to a later Supreme Court decision. See id. In short, our past interpretation of the face-to-face confrontation issue supports the conclusion that Coy v. Iowa established a new rule. As we said, the essence of the new rule is that face-to-face confrontation has been elevated to the level of cross-examination.
We earlier noted that Teague recognizes two exceptions to the rubric that new rules do not apply retroactively to collateral review cases. So our remaining task is to determine whether Morgan's case fits either exception. Morgan concedes the first exception does not apply. He argues, however, that the second one does. For reasons that follow, we disagree. The second exception permits retroactive application of a new rule to collateral review cases when the change creates a watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating issues of fundamental trial fairness. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310-11, 109 S.Ct. at 1075-76, 103 L.Ed.2d at 356-57; Brewer, 444 N.W.2d at 81. As the State correctly notes, Teague recognizes that few constitutional decisions would qualify as watershed criminal rules. Such rules would be limited to those the violation of which would undermine the fundamental fairness that must underlie a conviction or seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction. Teague, 489 U.S. at 290, 109 S.Ct. at 1064, 103 L.Ed.2d at 359. So fundamental fairness and accuracy are the hallmarks of watershed rules. The Court gave examples of what it was talking about: We are ... of the view that [watershed criminal rules] are best illustrated by recalling the classic grounds for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus that the proceeding was dominated by mob violence; that the prosecutor knowingly made use of perjured testimony; or that the conviction was based on a confession extorted from the defendant by brutal methods. Id. at 313, 109 S.Ct. at 1077, 103 L.Ed.2d at 358. As we said, before Coy v. Iowa several Supreme Court decisions emphasized that face-to-face confrontation was not essential for sixth amendment purposes. In additionas the State correctly notesan exception to the requirement of face-to-face confrontation underlies every hearsay question in a criminal case. Given these cases, we can scarcely say that using one-way closed circuit television is on par with obtaining a flawed conviction by mob violence, perjured testimony, or a confession obtained through the use of brute force. Use of the procedure would notin our viewundermine the fundamental fairness that must underlie a conviction. Nor would it seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction. See Craig, 497 U.S. at ____, 110 S.Ct. at 3159, 111 L.Ed.2d at 682 (holding that similar procedure adequately ensures that the testimony [of the child] is both reliable and subject to vigorous adversarial testing in a manner functionally equivalent to that accorded live, in-person testimony). In sum, we find no error in the district court's refusal to apply Coy v. Iowa retroactively to Morgan's conviction.