Opinion ID: 6348789
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: To enter or remain in a motor vehicle

Text: when the entrant is not authorized to do so. Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.205(3). This definition makes clear that “unlawfully” modifies both “enters” and “remains” in section 164.215. Furthermore, the generic definition of burglary encompasses situations in which an offender remains unlawfully within a building. See Quarles, 139 S. Ct. at 1877. There is no additional requirement that the unlawful presence be accompanied by an actual risk of violent confrontation. Thus, the first element of Oregon first-degree burglary of a dwelling is not overbroad. The second element of Oregon first-degree burglary of a dwelling is that the building be a dwelling. Generic burglary covers burglaries of traditional buildings or structures. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598. The definition also encompasses burglary of nonpermanent structures that have been “designed or adapted for overnight use.” Stitt, 139 S. Ct. at 405–07. Petitioner contends that Oregon first-degree burglary is overbroad because it covers burglary of non-structures, vehicles that are intermittently occupied at night, and structures used solely for business purposes. As recognized in Stitt, though, generic burglary encompasses nontraditional and nonpermanent structures that are “designed MENDOZA-GARCIA V. GARLAND 15 or adapted for overnight use.” Id. The definition of “building” under Oregon law imposes an almost identical qualification on non-traditional buildings. Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.205(1). The definition of “building” is further modified by the requirements that it be a “dwelling” and that it be “regularly or intermittently [] occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present.” Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 164.205(2), 164.225(1). The requirement of adaptation for overnight accommodation forecloses the applicability of the statute to vehicles or structures that might provide occasional shelter despite being designed for another purpose, such as a car in which a homeless person occasionally sleeps. See United States v. Jones, 951 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020) (applying Stitt to Colorado’s burglary statute, which defined “building” to include “structures” such as vehicles). The additional requirement that the building be regularly or intermittently occupied by a person lodging therein at night forecloses the statute’s applicability to buildings and vehicles used solely for business purposes or storage. See id. Petitioner has not demonstrated a realistic probability that the Oregon first-degree burglary statute, as it pertains to the burglary of a dwelling, would be applied to burglary of a structure or non-structure that would not be covered by generic burglary. See Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007) (“[T]o find that a state statute creates a crime outside the generic definition of a listed crime in a federal statute requires more than the application of legal imagination to a state statute’s language. It requires a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.”). 16 MENDOZA-GARCIA V. GARLAND Petitioner also argues that the Oregon first-degree burglary statute is overbroad because it covers curtilages, which are not buildings or structures under the generic definition of burglary. In support of this argument, Petitioner cites State v. Taylor, 350 P.3d 525 (Or. Ct. App. 2015), in which the Oregon Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of a defendant who attempted to steal cans from an area described in the case as a “breezeway.” But the court in Taylor noted that the location of the burglary was not a breezeway as the term is commonly understood. Id. at 526. The area was roofed, almost fully enclosed, and shared walls with both a house and a garage. Id. at 526–27. There was a door connecting the area to the garage, though no door to the house. Id. The only opening to the outside was an archway approximately the size of a door. Id. The Oregon Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that the breezeway in fact was part of the dwelling. Id. at 533. We are not convinced that there is a realistic probability that Oregon courts would extend first-degree burglary to curtilages or separate buildings. See Gonzales, 549 U.S. at 193. The text of the Oregon first-degree burglary statute clearly limits its application to buildings. Therefore, the second element of Oregon first-degree burglary of a dwelling is not overbroad. The final element of Oregon first-degree burglary of a dwelling is that the offender has the intent to commit a crime therein. Generic burglary also includes as an element that the offender possess intent to commit a crime. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599. These elements are consistent. Because all elements of first-degree burglary of a dwelling under Oregon law substantially correspond to, or are narrower than, the elements of generic burglary, the Oregon first-degree burglary statute is a categorical match to generic burglary. MENDOZA-GARCIA V. GARLAND 17