Opinion ID: 1120076
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the prior burglary

Text: The last three witnesses called by the state gave testimony concerning a burglary of the Anchorage Fur Factory committed by Oksoktaruk in January, 1976. The evidence showed that the defendant and one accomplice had cut a hole in the roof of the store, and had lifted furs out without actually setting foot on the premises. The prior burglary was offered by the state to prove that when Oksoktaruk entered Kelly's Photo Lab, he did so with the intent to steal required to sustain a conviction under AS 11.20.100, [2] and the evidence was admitted for that purpose. The danger inherent in informing a jury that a defendant has committed a prior criminal act is self-evident: it is all too likely that a determinative inference of present guilt will be drawn from the fact of the prior act, thus diluting the requirement that present guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [3] As a result, even though a prior crime may show a propensity on the part of a defendant to commit crimes, which in turn is relevant to the question of present guilt, it is a presumption in our law that the prejudicial effect of introducing a prior crime outweighs what probative value may exist with regard to propensity. No case by case balancing is permitted; a prior crime may not be admitted to show propensity. [4] When a prior act is relevant to prove a material fact, however, we have recognized that in certain instances its probative value may be greater than its value in proving propensity, and may then outweigh its prejudicial impact. [5] In such cases the trial court must balance the competing interests. [6] In this case the trial judge found that intent was a contested issue, that the state needed the relevance of the prior burglary in light of the reasonable doubt created by the other evidence going to intent, and that the prejudicial impact of the prior burglary would not be such that the jurors' passions would be aroused against the defendant. We are in substantial disagreement with this assessment. This court's decisions have consistently been in accordance with the view that, notwithstanding its many exceptions, the rule regarding evidence of prior crimes is a rule of exclusion of evidence and not one of admission... . See United States v. Burkhart, 458 F.2d 201, 204 (10th Cir.1972). If prior crimes were found admissible whenever offered to prove a fact classified as material to the prosecution's case, the underlying policy of protecting the accused against unfair prejudice . . [would] evaporate through the interstices of the classification. E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 453 (2d ed. 1972). Thus, in Eubanks v. State, 516 P.2d 726, 731 (Alaska 1973), when the prosecution introduced details of the defendant's prior conviction for burglary to demonstrate that on the occasion in issue the defendant was not innocently pawning merchandise as he had claimed, we reversed, holding that such details are relevant for the purpose of ... showing the requisite guilty knowledge, only [i]f the prior crimes are nearly identical to the crime at issue, [and are] performed in an unusual or distinctive fashion ... . 516 P.2d at 731. In Gould v. State, 579 P.2d 535, 539 (Alaska 1978), we reversed a conviction because the state had failed to show any affirmative link between the defendant's addiction to heroin and his alleged robbery, 579 P.2d at 539. [7] And in Freeman v. State, 486 P.2d 967, 979 (Alaska 1971), we held that at least where a defendant does not affirmatively deny culpable intent, a prior crime may be admitted only where there is a particularly close similarity and proximity between the facts of a prior offense and the facts of the offense charged. 486 P.2d at 978. Conversely, we have upheld the admission of evidence of prior crimes when a defendant's credibility as a witness has been in issue, Buchanan v. State, 599 P.2d 749 (Alaska 1979); Richardson v. State, 579 P.2d 1372, 1376-77 (Alaska 1978); Lowell v. State, 574 P.2d 1281, 1283-84 (Alaska 1978); when the prior acts have involved either the victim or complaining witness of the alleged acts, Frink v. State, 597 P.2d 154, 169 (Alaska 1979); Braham v. State, 571 P.2d 631, 640 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct. 2246, 56 L.Ed.2d 410 (1978); Ladd v. State, 568 P.2d 960, 967 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928, 98 S.Ct. 1498, 55 L.Ed.2d 524 (1978); Nicholi v. State, 451 P.2d 351, 357 (Alaska 1969); Gafford v. State, 440 P.2d 405, 408 (Alaska 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1120, 89 S.Ct. 996, 22 L.Ed.2d 125 (1969); Watson v. State, 387 P.2d 289, 293 (Alaska 1963); when the prior act occurred contemporaneous in time with and set the stage for the crime charged, Kugzruk v. State, 436 P.2d 962, 967 (Alaska 1968); or when the prior act was committed in a similar manner, under almost identical circumstances, as the crime charged. Demmert v. State, 565 P.2d 155, 158 (Alaska 1977). Our cases are thus in accord with the orientation of a leading treatise-writer, who urges that a prior crime be so related to the crime charged in point of time or circumstances that evidence thereof is significantly useful in showing the defendant's intent in connection with the crime charged, [8] before evidence of the prior crime is judged more probative than prejudicial. [9] The nexus between Oksoktaruk's burglary of the fur store and his alleged burglary of the photo lab two years later does not meet the standard of relevance we have previously demanded. The only characteristic shared by the proven and alleged crimes is that both involve an intent to steal. The inference to be drawn by the jury, therefore, was simply that since Oksoktaruk once before intended to steal, he was capable of formulating the intent to steal from Kelly's Photo Lab; the forbidden guilt by propensity could be stated no differently. [10] Since we are unable to state with any certainty that the prejudicial evidence did not have a substantial influence on the jury's decision, Gould v. State, 579 P.2d 535, 540 (Alaska 1978), we cannot permit the defendant's conviction to stand. We will briefly discuss those additional points raised by Oksoktaruk that may surface again should there be a second trial.