Opinion ID: 3036357
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Primary Significance Test

Text: and the Limited Circumstances in Which Canfield’s Alternative Test Applies This appeal raises the initial question of the proper test under which to evaluate whether the term “Cocoa Butter Formula” is generic and thus not protectable as a trademark. “The jurisprudence of genericness revolves around the primary significance test, which inquires whether the primary significance of a term in the minds of the consuming public is the product or the producer.” Canfield, 808 F.2d at 292–93. We ask “whether consumers think the term represents the generic 10 name of the product [or service] or a mark indicating merely one source of that product [or service].” Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs., 967 F.2d at 859 (alterations in original) (quotation marks and citation omitted). If the term refers to the product (i.e., the genus), the term is generic. If, on the other hand, it refers to one source or producer of that product, the term is not generic (i.e., it is descriptive, suggestive, or arbitrary or fanciful). To give an example, “Cola” is generic because it refers to a product, whereas “Pepsi Cola” is not generic because it refers to the producer. To repeat, Cococare contends that “Cocoa Butter Formula” is generic whereas Browne argues it is descriptive. The District Court did not apply the primary significance test. It instead applied an alternative test stated in Canfield.3 3 The District Court treated this question in a somewhat confusing manner. It first stated that it is a “fundamental question in this case . . . whether ‘cocoa butter’ or ‘cocoa butter formula’ is the relevant product genus for evaluating genericness.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 7. It then acknowledged that “the product genus in this action, however, is not in dispute.” Id. This accorded with its previous statements that Browne describes the genus as “skin care products in the cocoa butter category” and that Cococare describes it as “personal care and beauty aid products in the cocoa butter market,” id. at 5 (quotation marks omitted), and that any distinction between “skin care products” and “personal care and beauty aid products” is one without a difference, id. The Court continued in apparent agreement with the 11 Neither party disputed that approach. We conclude, however, that the District Court should not have ventured beyond the primary significance test to any alternative gloss. Canfield addressed situations in which a manufacturer created a new product and it was not clear if it also had created a new product genus. It involved a dispute over the term “Diet Chocolate Fudge Soda.” 4 “[A] fundamental question . . . [was] whether chocolate soda or chocolate fudge soda is the relevant product genus for evaluating genericness.” Id. at 298–99. The primary significance test5 could not answer that question, we parties, reasoning that the products bearing the term at issue “are part of [a] new genus; consisting of personal care and beauty aid products, including creams, lotions, skin moisturizers and soaps, formulated with cocoa butter.” Id. at 7. It then departed from the submissions of the parties and its own prior recognition of their agreement, however, by stating that “cocoa butter formula is the relevant product class.” Id. at 8. 4 We varied in our inclusion and exclusion of the word “Diet” in Canfield. We use that word throughout for consistency but attach no significance to that choice. 5 Canfield refers to the primary significance test as if it differs from the consumer understanding test. See id. at 299 (referring to “the primary significance test and its related test of consumer understanding”). More recently, we have treated the concept of consumer understanding as included in primary significance. See Berner, 987 F.2d at 982 (referring to the primary 12 reasoned, since it applied “only after we have determined the relevant genus.” Id. at 299. Our Court concluded that the following rule would help us fill in this gap of identifying the appropriate genus for analysis: “If a producer introduces a product that [1] differs from an established product class in a particular characteristic, and [2] uses a common descriptive term of that characteristic as the name of the product, then the product should be considered its own genus.” Id. at 305–06. In those circumstances, “[w]hether the term that identifies the product is generic then depends on the competitors’ need to use it. At the least, if no commonly used alternative effectively communicates the same functional information, the term that denotes the product is generic.” Id. at 306 (internal citation omitted). See generally Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 1977) (discussing Canfield and describing its test as a complement to, rather than a rejection of, the primary significance test when a court cannot readily determine the genus of a new product). significance test as focusing on “consumer understanding”). Either way, the primary significance test remains the central test of genericness in our Circuit. See Canfield, 808 F.2d at 299. Yet we see nothing in the record indicating that either party has asked that we or the District Court use the consumer understanding test to gauge whether a term is generic. 13 Canfield does not control here for a simple reason: this case does not pose the question addressed in Canfield. The “question . . . at the core” of Canfield was whether “the relevant product category or genus for purposes of evaluating genericness is chocolate soda or chocolate fudge soda.” Id. at 293. We do not face a comparable question, as the parties before us do not dispute whether we should use an existing genus or a new genus in our analysis. They instead agree, with only insignificant quibbles over wording, that “Cocoa Butter Skin Care Products” or an equivalent term defines the category. To understand why this distinction matters, we return to the principles underlying Canfield. It addressed a weakness in the primary significance test – the presumption that a court knows the product’s genus. In most cases, that genus will be obvious, even for new products. A slight change in a detergent’s formula, for example, likely will not create a new product genus. Problems may arise, however, if a product differs from existing products in what Canfield calls a “particular characteristic.” Examples may include the addition of a new flavor or a new featured ingredient (such as honey in the “Honey Brown Ale” at issue in Genesee Brewing Co.). The manufacturer then likely has created a new type of product. That manufacturer may well need to use descriptive terms in the product name to identify the product to consumers. This raises the question of the proper genus for the Court’s genericness analysis: the established product class or a new product class that modifies the established product class with the new 14 characteristic. Canfield addressed this problem by articulating a test that supplies the proper genus for a genericness analysis. Its test applies when a manufacturer uses the following equation: name of new product = name of the established product class (“Diet Chocolate Soda” in Canfield) + name of the new characteristic (“Fudge” in Canfield). See id. at 305–06. The established product class in our case is “Skin Care Products” or “Lotion.” The new characteristic is “Cocoa Butter.” Browne could have called its new products “Cocoa Butter Skin Care Products” or “Cocoa Butter Skin Care Lotion.” Use of these terms would have satisfied Canfield’s equation (name of the new characteristic + name of the established product class) and triggered its test. Canfield stated that the primary significance test would not have been useful because the genericness determination would have depended on the unresolved threshold definition of the genus (“Cocoa Butter Skin Care Products” vs. “Skin Care Products”). Of course, when it introduced skin-care products containing cocoa butter (i.e., adding a new characteristic), Browne did not label those products with the term “Cocoa Butter Skin Care Products” or “Cocoa Butter Lotion.” Instead, it used “Cocoa Butter Formula.” This term does not frustrate the application of the primary significance test because it does not raise the question whether to use “Cocoa Butter Formula” or 15 “Formula” as the proper genus for our analysis. Cococare also has not suggested that “Formula” identifies the established product class. Browne does not make baby formula after all, or sell algorithms or recipes. Nor does any record evidence suggest that consumers use “Formula” to describe the skin care product category. Browne’s use of a different equation to name its product (“Cocoa Butter Formula” = name of the new characteristic (“Cocoa Butter”) + a term not describing the established product class (“Formula”)) does not bring into play the weakness in the primary significance test that Canfield addressed because it does not raise the question of the proper genus for our analysis. Applying Canfield here amounts to attempting to remedy a non-existent problem. We therefore will evaluate the genericness of the term “Cocoa Butter Formula” under the primary significance test only.