Opinion ID: 1129339
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Punitive Damages and Jury Trial.

Text: ¶ 29. ERA argues that because the majority of Mathis' claims seek both compensatory and punitive damages, this case is essentially legal in nature and should be heard in circuit court. See Crosby, 870 So.2d at 1179 (noting that where plaintiff sought actual and punitive damages, the remedy is clearly legal rather than equitable in nature.) (citation omitted). While Crosby and similar cases do speak of circuit courts as being the proper courts to adjudicate a claim for punitive damages, we have also previously held that chancery courts have the discretion to award legal and even punitive damages as long as the chancery court's jurisdiction has attached. RE/Max, 840 So.2d at 712 (citing Southern Leisure Homes, Inc. v. Hardin, 742 So.2d 1088, 1090 (Miss.1999)). See also Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So.2d 454, 459 (Miss.1983) (holding that chancery courts have the discretionary power to assess punitive damages according to the same substantive standards as apply to our circuit courts.). Because chancery court jurisdiction attached to Mathis' claims for an accounting, constructive trust, and specific performance, it follows that the chancery court has authority to award both compensatory and punitive damages in the instant case. ¶ 30. ERA also argues that jurisdiction is only appropriate in circuit court because chancery court does not adequately preserve its right to a jury trial. In Crosby, this Court found that the defendant's right to a jury trial, under Miss. Const. Art. 3, § 31, would be infringed upon if this case were heard in chancery court. Id. at 1181. This finding was based on the fact that [i]n `[c]hancery court, with some few statutory exceptions, the right to jury is purely within the discretion of the chancellor, and if one is empaneled, its findings are totally advisory.' Id. at 1181-82 (quoting Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Hasty, 360 So.2d 925, 927 (Miss.1978)). The Crosby Court further reasoned that the public policy of allowing a plaintiff to choose his or her forum does not outweigh [a defendant's] constitutional right to a jury trial. Id. at 1182. ¶ 31. Although the right to a jury trial in this state is substantial, as recognized by Crosby, Hardin, and other cases, this right is not absolute. See RE/Max, 840 So.2d at 713 (Though it is true, as defendants assert, that the right to a jury trial shall remain inviolate, this right is not absolute.). The plaintiff in RE/Max asserted a claim for an accounting, which is properly heard in chancery court, in addition to a damages claim for breach of contract. Id. at 711. Because chancery court jurisdiction attached to the accounting claim, jurisdiction remained proper in that court, even though the defendant would not be entitled to a jury. Id. at 713-14. See Poole v. Gwin, Lewis & Punches, LLP, 792 So.2d 987, 990 (Miss. 2001) (recognizing that there is no right to trial by jury in chancery court.). This Court also stated in RE/Max that a defendant's right to a jury trial is balanced against a plaintiff's choice of forum and that [t]his right is limited only by rules of procedure and fair play, ultimately finding that the plaintiff could properly bring suit in chancery court and that the defendants were not prejudiced by such action. [7] RE/Max, 840 So.2d at 713. ¶ 32. Copiah, Crosby, Briggs, and other recent cases make it clear when a claim is legal in nature and the plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, jurisdiction is appropriate in circuit court; however, Re/Max holds that when a plaintiff asserts a claim that is based in equity, such as an accounting or constructive trust, not only may the chancellor retain jurisdiction over the equitable claims, but he may also adjudicate the pendent legal claims. In the instant case, Mathis sufficiently pleaded facts which, if proven, would entitle him to relief in the form of an accounting, constructive trust, and/or specific performance. ¶ 33. Because the equitable claims pleaded by Mathis clearly conferred original jurisdiction upon the chancery court, the chancellor also had the authority to retain pendent jurisdiction over the legal claims, including the punitive damages claim, despite that Mathis will not get the benefit of a jury trial. I find that the chancellor did not commit reversible error in denying ERA's motion to transfer, so I must respectfully dissent. DIAZ, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.