Opinion ID: 514584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kale's Procedural Shortcomings.

Text: 51 Combined argues that Kale's filing of a facially time-barred complaint and his continued prosecution of the claim even after the untimeliness was revealed to him warrant sanctions. It asserts that Rule 11 requires an attorney to undertake an investigation of his claims before making any filings. Since a rudimentary examination of the ADEA would have revealed that Kale's complaint was time-barred, Combined concludes that Kale's attorney has transgressed the Rule 11 standards. We disagree. 52 Combined is correct in asserting that the new Rule 11 imposes a duty on counsel to investigate their clients' claims before making any filings and to reassess them throughout the litigation. See Shrock v. Altru Nurses Registry, 810 F.2d 658, 661 (7th Cir.1987); Woodfork By And Through Houston v. Gavin, 105 F.R.D. 100, 104 (N.D.Miss.1985); Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 advisory committee's note. It is also correct that the standard to be applied to filings in light of that requirement is one of objective reasonableness under the circumstances existing at the time. See Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1556; Thomas, 836 F.2d at 873. It is in the application of these principles to the facts of this case, however, where our analysis diverges from that of Combined. 53 We believe, as did the district court, that while Kale's complaint was facially time-barred, his argument for equitable modification removed any element of frivolousness regarding that issue. Although the plaintiff was asking for a more liberal equitable tolling doctrine than exists in any other circuits, the fact that there was no First Circuit precedent on point allowed such an argument. Indeed, even if we had previously decided in favor of a conservative equitable tolling doctrine, Kale's argument might have qualified as a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.... Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. Cf. Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1542 (9th Cir.1986) (A lawyer should not be able to proceed with impunity in real or feigned ignorance of authorities which render his argument meritless.). 54 What Combined appears to be arguing is that Kale's attorney had no knowledge of the doctrine of equitable tolling at the time he filed the complaint, and that, therefore, his lack of timely and reasonable investigation should trigger Rule 11 sanctions. See Alvarado-Morales v. Digital Equipment Corp., 843 F.2d 613, 618 (1st Cir.1988). At first blush, this argument has some appeal. Kale's original complaint fails to mention the doctrine of equitable tolling, and it is arguable that Kale's attorney learned of the equitable tolling doctrine when doing research well after the initial filing of the complaint. Whether an equitable tolling argument was possible under the circumstances, Combined contends, is immaterial to a Rule 11 inquiry; where an attorney has failed to properly investigate facts and legal theories and then files an otherwise time-barred complaint, there are grounds for sanctions. 55 We believe the objective nature of the inquiry requirement of Rule 11 defeats Combined's argument. Sanctions may be imposed where, after reasonable inquiry, a competent attorney could not form a reasonable belief that the pleading is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law. Eastway Construction Corp., 762 F.2d at 254. Looking at this case objectively, then, a reasonable inquiry would have revealed the possibility of making an equitable tolling argument such as the one proffered by Kale. Since the subjective knowledge of the attorney is no longer the relevant inquiry under Rule 11, we agree with the district court that Kale's equitable tolling argument was objectively sound. We also note that if we were to agree with Combined's view, we would be telling Kale that his argument did have some merit but that since he was not fully aware of that fact at the initial filing, he has violated Rule 11. 56 It is easy to imagine a myriad number of satellite litigations arising if this were our holding. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 advisory committee's note (counselling against such atomization). Anytime an attorney did not fully flesh out an argument he would be subject to a charge that he had not engaged in a reasonable investigation. While this is proper where an inquiry would have revealed the lack of merit in an argument, it is not where that inquiry would have instead bolstered counsel's contentions. Sanctions should not be imposed where a plausible good faith argument can be made.... Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 833 (9th Cir.1986). 57