Opinion ID: 1792842
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: prior appeal

Text: Van Poyck contends that the trial court's error was compounded on direct appeal when his appellate attorney raised the juror qualification issue but identified the wrong two jurors, Bruschi and Abufaris, as objectionable. Appellate counsel's performance was patently incompetent, since Bruschi and Abufaris had both been excused from jury service for other reasons, thereby rendering any trial court error on challenges to them entirely moot. Nonetheless, based upon our established case law discussed above, this Court unanimously held in Van Poyck's first appeal that had jurors Bruschi and Abufaris not been released from jury service for other, personal reasons, the trial court would clearly have been in error in failing to excuse them for cause based on their responses to questions during the jury selection process. Van Poyck v. State, 564 So.2d 1066, 1071 (Fla.1990). Understandably, the appellant compared the responses of Bruschi and Abufaris to the responses of the other jurors he challenged for cause, now having the benefit of this Court's opinion as to the kind of responses that would disqualify a juror. Today, however, the majority opinion pulls the rug out from under the appellant by abruptly receding from our prior unanimous conclusion as to jurors Bruschi and Abufaris. Majority op. at 934. And, of course, this abrupt about-face is done with absolutely no analysis other than the fact that today's majority disagrees with our prior unanimous opinion. Kind of scary, isn't it? Contrary to the present majority's posture, an examination of the record demonstrates that our prior opinion was correct in concluding that both Abufaris and Bruschi indicated predisposed beliefs that premeditated murder automatically warrants the death penalty, which tainted those jurors' later affirmations to the court that they would follow the law. For example, Bruschi made the following statements during voir dire: THE COURT: ... Would you agree that you could sit as a juror in a case of this nature of first degree murder and if you listened to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that you would follow my instruction on the law disregarding your personal feelings? MR. BRUSCHI: Yes, I would. THE COURT: Would you agree that first degree murder is not the appropriate penaltythat death is not the appropriate penalty in all first degree murder cases? MR. BRUSCHI: Agree that it is. THE COURT: You think it is for all cases? MR. BRUSCHI: For all, for murder. THE COURT: Okay, what if I told you under Florida law it is not an appropriate penalty for all cases of first degree murder, only in certain cases? MR. BRUSCHI: It's hard because technically what I believe in, murder is basically punishable by death. THE COURT: Okay. Would you agree, though, that you would put that feeling aside and render a recommendation of a sentence in this case based on the instructions in the law I give you? MR. BRUSCHI: Yes, it would. Upon additional questioning by defense counsel, however, Mr. Bruschi indicated that premeditated murder warrants the death penalty: MR. KLEIN: Let's go back to premeditated murder if I could. Do you think somebody who committed premeditated murder doesn't deserve to live? MR. BRUSCHI: Yes, I do. I would agree with that. MR. KLEIN: How strongly do you feel about that, by the way? MR. BRUSCHI: I believe, you know, if he committed premeditated murder, thought out and committed murder, he should die for it. MR. KLEIN: You would not want the State, for instance, spending money to house and feed this guy the rest of his life? MR. BRUSCHI: No, I don't think so. MR. KLEIN: This is not something you just felt about recently? MR. BRUSCHI: I always felt that way. MR. KLEIN: You feel that way pretty strongly? MR. BRUSCHI: Yes, I do. MR. KLEIN: Do you feel strongly enough about it so you think it would color your judgment, whatever your judgment would be sometime down the road when you were to consider the issue of life or death in a premeditated murder case? MR. BRUSCHI: It possibly could. Although Mr. Bruschi told the prosecutor he believed he could set his personal views aside in rendering a recommendation, he later agreed with defense counsel that he was not one hundred percent sure. Moreover, Mr. Bruschi openly expressed his doubts or reservations about his ability to render an impartial verdict based on his belief that certain murders deserve the death penalty. Thus, Mr. Bruschi's response to the court that he would follow the law does not overcome his attitude regarding the death penalty or his admitted belief that his views possibly could taint his ability to render an unbiased recommendation. Williams; Hill. Likewise, Abufaris indicated that the death penalty is automatically warranted where a person is convicted of premeditated murder indicating a reasonable doubt as to her ability to render an unbiased recommendation. When asked by the prosecutor if she would follow the court's instruction, she responded, Yes. I think I would. Furthermore, when asked if she could recommend a life sentence if the court's instructions led her to so conclude, Mrs. Abufaris indicated she probably would recommend a life sentence in certain cases. In contrast, when asked whether the death penalty is the appropriate sentence where premeditated, intentional murder is proven, Mrs. Abufaris stated: Yes, I think I would. Despite Mrs. Abufaris's agreement to follow the law and recommend a life sentence where appropriate, her responses (I think and probably) were sufficiently unequivocal and arguably more in line with pleasing the party asking the questions by providing the obvious, sought after responses. See Williams. Accordingly, it is apparent that this Court did not err in its assessment in Van Poyck's direct appeal that Abufaris and Bruschi's responses were sufficiently equivocal to cast doubt on their ability to set aside any personal biases and render a recommendation based solely on the evidence presented and the law as instructed by the court. [6] In addition, and perhaps most unsettling of all, the majority opinion, in casually casting aside our prior holding, disregards the important and stabilizing legal doctrine of the law of the case without so much as a hint of explanation or justification. Under this doctrine, all points of law which have been previously adjudicated by a majority of this Court may be reconsidered only where a subsequent hearing or trial develops material changes in the evidence, or where exceptional circumstances exist whereby reliance upon the previous decision would result in manifest injustice. Henry v. State, 649 So.2d 1361, 1364 (Fla.1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 830, 116 S.Ct. 101, 133 L.Ed.2d 55 (1995); Preston v. State, 444 So.2d 939, 942 (Fla. 1984); see also U.S. Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So.2d 1061, 1063 (Fla.1983) (holding that doctrine of law of the case is limited to rulings on questions of law actually presented and considered on former appeal); Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1965) (noting that an exception to the general rule binding the parties to `the law of the case' at the retrial and at all subsequent proceedings should not be made except in unusual circumstances and for the most cogent reasonsand always, of course, only where `manifest injustice' will result from a strict and rigid adherence to the rule). One such exceptional circumstance is an intervening decision by a higher court contrary to the decision in the former appeal. Brunner Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 452 So.2d 550, 553 (Fla.1984). However, the exception to the rule should never be allowed when it would amount to nothing more than a second appeal on a question determined on the first appeal. Strazzulla, 177 So.2d at 4 (discussing exceptions to law of case doctrine). The bottom line in this case is that when our established case law is properly applied to the juror qualification issues raised here, it demonstrates that a number of challenges for cause were erroneously denied and the defendant, now a convicted and death-sentenced defendant, was substantially prejudiced thereby. KOGAN, C.J., and SHAW, J., concur.