Opinion ID: 2039833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sudarsky v DHCR

Text: On April 19, 1994, Peter Sudarsky's landlord sent him an ICF, advising him that he was required to return the completed form within 30 days of service. On June 9, 1994, the landlord filed a petition for deregulation with DHCR, stating that Sudarsky had failed to return the ICF. The Division sent Sudarsky a notice on August 4, 1994, informing him of the petition and stating that he was required to provide income verification information within 60 days. On January 31, 1995, the Rent Administrator issued an order of deregulation, on the grounds that Sudarsky did not answer the petition and failed to provide income verification information. Sudarsky filed a PAR on February 21, 1995, alleging that he had sent the income verification information to DHCR several weeks ago, and that he and his wife had a combined income of about $20,000. The landlord opposed the PAR, arguing that Sudarsky had defaulted by not timely supplying the information. In response, Sudarsky stated that he had returned the ICF to the landlord with a rent payment in May 1994 and that his initial answer to DHCR's notice had been mistakenly sent to the landlordrather than DHCRin late July 1994. In addition, Sudarsky enclosed tax returns demonstrating that the combined household income was below the statutory threshold and, in fact, that his real estate business had suffered a net loss of over $500,000. DHCR denied the PAR, ruling that Sudarsky had defaulted by failing to file a timely response. The Division rejected both of Sudarsky's explanations for his default, stating that a response filed several weeks before February 21, 1995 would still have been untimely, and that he could not have mistakenly mailed the response to the landlord in late July, because the notice was not mailed to him until August 4, 1994. Sudarsky then filed the instant article 78 petition, alleging that DHCR's decision was arbitrary and capricious. In addition to the claims raised in his PAR, Sudarsky argued that he had not timely responded to DHCR's notice because he had been suffering from clinical depression in August 1994, and because his wife, a concert pianist, had been away on tour; he further asserted that DHCR's procedures violated the Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions. Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that DHCR's decision was arbitrary and capricious because the Division had failed to address the issue[] of excusable default. Thus, Supreme Court remanded the case to DHCR to determine whether [Sudarsky's] default was justified or excusable, and if so, whether the decision terminating the rent protections should be affirmed or reversed. Finally, Supreme Court declined to determine that Sudarsky's due process rights had been violated, calling such a finding unnecessary and unwarranted. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the requirement that the tenant respond to DHCR's notice within 60 days is mandatory and explicit, and that it require[s] deregulation of a stabilized apartment where the tenant fails to supply the requisite certification of household income within the 60-day period. Further, the Appellate Division held that Sudarsky had been provided with ample notice, and agreed with DHCR's finding that Sudarsky had failed to provide a valid excuse for the failure to timely submit the income certification form to DHCR. The Appellate Division refused to consider his belated excuses proffered    before Supreme Court (258 AD2d 405, 407-408). Sudarsky appealed as of right to this Court pursuant to CPLR 5601 (b) (1), arguing that his due process rights had been violated. We dismissed the appeal, because no substantial constitutional question was involved ( see, Matter of Sudarsky v New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 93 NY2d 998). We granted leave to Sudarsky on the issue whether DHCR's decision was arbitrary and capricious.