Opinion ID: 2789212
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Evidence Supporting Materiality

Text: With these standards in mind, it is clear that the government's evidence of materiality was sufficient. Our review is de novo. United States v. Conley, 186 F.3d 7, 19 (1st Cir. 1999). When examining sufficiency of the evidence,12 we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, and resolve all credibility disputes in the verdict's favor. Id. (quoting United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 974 (1st Cir. 1995)). We then ask whether, based on the 12 To be precise, Kantengwa claims the district court erred in denying her Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. See United States v. Marin, 523 F.3d 24, 27 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008). For our purposes, there is no analytical distinction. Id. (citing United States v. Hernández, 218 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2000)). -19- evidence so viewed, a rational factfinder could find that the government proved the essential elements of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Godin, 534 F.3d at 61 (quoting United States v. Marin, 523 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants challenging convictions for insufficiency of evidence face an uphill battle on appeal. United States v. Hernández, 218 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2000). The record establishes that the evidence provided the jury with an adequate understanding of the issues before the immigration judge and the role of the immigration judge in the proceedings so as to analyze materiality. Cf. United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 702 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding evidence sufficient to find materiality despite absence of evidence [introduced] specifically for the purpose of establishing . . . materiality). The government provided evidence about the basic decisions facing the immigration judge through the testimony of Dorothy Michaud, the Boston Director of USCIS. The jury heard that, to obtain asylum, an applicant must show that she fears persecution in her home country on the basis of one of five protected grounds, and that she is not otherwise barred from admission.13 The jury also learned that there are factors that may 13 Kantengwa suggests that this testimony was inapposite because Michaud presented much of this information in discussing refugee status. Her argument is unavailing. Michaud made clear -20- render an applicant ineligible for admission even if the applicant satisfies the other requirements for asylum relief, and that one was relevant: having assisted in the persecution of others. The jury heard testimony about what information was relevant to these determinations, and how such information should frame what is asked of the applicant. Finally, that the immigration judge could and did ask follow-up and clarification questions was evident in the excerpted transcript the jury received. It is not a reach to conclude that Kantengwa's lies about the roadblock, alleged in Counts 11 and 13, were material to the immigration judge's decision about the persecutor's bar. At the very least, the jury could conclude that this lie would have a natural tendency to cut off important lines of inquiry about the roadblock, about her relationship with those involved, and about what did or did not happen at the roadblock (including her participation, if any), that are directly relevant to ensuring that that these standards also apply to asylum. This testimony is also not undermined by Michaud's expressed uncertainty as to the exact legal standards governing removal proceedings in immigration court. Michaud confirmed that the definition of asylum (including bars to admissibility) that she used as a USCIS officer to process affirmative asylum applications was the same definition used by immigration judges to adjudicate defensive asylum claims during removal hearings in immigration court. This was sufficient for the jury to understand the essential point: the immigration judge needed to decide whether Kantengwa was barred from remaining. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 512 (noting that the jury must first determine the decisions to be made). -21- she was not implicated in the genocide.14 What is more, the jury had direct evidence that Kantengwa's false statements about the roadblock not only had this tendency, but actually did cause the immigration judge to prevent government counsel from pursuing these questions. The evidence was also sufficient to conclude that Kantengwa's false statements alleged in Count 3, that she had been truthful in her asylum application and all other documents, were material to the persecutor bar. The jury heard testimony about how even seemingly insignificant details, like family ties or travel history, could raise red flags about an applicant's implication in the genocide. But these were the very details that had formed the basis of Kantengwa's visa fraud: her membership in the MRND, and her husband's role in the Service de Renseignment, both organizations implicated in the genocide. A jury could easily find that lying about having committed visa fraud, where the purpose of that fraud was to conceal these red flags, was material to the persecutor bar. We cannot conclude that this evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, could not have persuaded 14 Kantengwa does not argue, and so we need not decide, whether a statement that cuts off lines of inquiry is material only if a truthful answer would have led to further fruitful investigation. See United States v. Freedman, 445 F.2d 1220, 122627 (2d Cir. 1971). We are doubtful it would make a difference in any event, assuming that fruitful is properly defined. -22- any trier of fact of [Kantengwa]'s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Hernández, 218 F.3d at 64 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). And so, we must affirm the district court's denial of Kantengwa's Rule 29 motion. Id.