Opinion ID: 2344370
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: presumption of life instruction.

Text: Equating a presumption of life in a death penalty phase trial with the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence in criminal cases, defendant urges that we overrule that portion of State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 545, 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988), where we held that there was no basis in the Capital Punishment Act, or in any principle of federal or state constitutional law, that would require the instruction approved in [ State v.] Biegenwald [(II), 106 N.J. 13, 524 A. 2d 130 (1987),] to be supplemented by a statement that the defendant is entitled to a `presumption' against the death penalty. See also State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 484, 585 A. 2d 864 (1991) ([N]o principle of state or federal constitutional law requires an instruction on any such presumption against the death penalty. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed. 2d 435 (2000), Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed. 2d 556 (2002), and State v. Fortin (II), 178 N.J. 540, 843 A. 2d 974 (2004), defendant asserts that evolving Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and recent developments in both federal and State constitutional law . . . supply the `basis' that was missing at the time of the Rose and Moore decisions, and necessitate the instruction. The State responds by noting that defendant neither requested such an instruction below nor objected to its absence from the jury charge. For that reason, the State contends, defendant's late insistence that the trial court had a sua sponte obligation to charge the penalty phase jury that defendant was entitled to a presumption of life must be gauged under the plain error standard. Finally, the State observes that no New Jersey case, and no jurisdiction in the United States that has not otherwise statutorily incorporated it, has required a presumption of life instruction. Earlier, in State v. Marshall (I), 123 N.J. 1, 152, 586 A. 2d 85 (1991), supplemented by, 130 N.J. 109, 613 A. 2d 1059 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929, 113 S.Ct. 1306, 122 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1993), we rejected the argument defendant advances here: Defendant raises as plain error the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that defendant was entitled to a presumption against the death penalty. We considered and rejected the identical argument in State v. Rose, [112 N.J. 454, 545, 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988)], and adhere to our ruling in that case. However, Apprendi, Ring and Fortin may have changed how aggravating factors are to be viewed by the finder of fact. In State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 225, 619 A. 2d 1208 (1993), we held that that aggravating factors are the functional equivalents of elements of a crime that, therefore, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The question then becomes whether, just as a presumption of innocence applies to the elements of a crime, a presumption of life attaches to a death penalty phase jury's consideration of aggravating factors. [T]he presumption of innocence and the equally fundamental principle that the prosecution bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt [are] logically separate and distinct. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 1934, 56 L.Ed. 2d 468 (1978) (citing Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 458-61, 15 S.Ct. 394, 404-05, 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895)). We also adhere to the view that an instruction on the presumption [of innocence] is one way of impressing upon the jury the importance of [reaching its verdict based solely on the proofs adduced at trial,] id. at 486, 98 S.Ct. 1930, and that it serves as a safeguard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt[,] id. at 487, 98 S.Ct. 1930 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We also have explained that [a]n instruction to the jury on the presumption of innocence is often required in order to keep the State's burden of proof fully weighted and firmly in place. State v. Ingenito, 87 N.J. 204, 214, 432 A. 2d 912 (1981). That said, we need not reach the question whether a presumption of life instruction is required in a death penalty phase case. Even assuming such an instruction was either advisable or compulsory, the trial court, in addition to its charge to the jury that the State bore the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically instructed the jury that our Legislature has given you as a jury, and to each of you individually, the responsibility of deciding whether [defendant] is to be put to death or is to be subjected to imprisonment in the New Jersey State Prison System. That term will be either life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or life imprisonment of which a minim[um] of 60 years must be served before [defendant] is eligible for parole. The term of years to be imposed will be based on whether you find any aggravating factors to exist. If you find that an aggravating factor exists, and [defendant] is not sentenced to death, then the punishment will be life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Although the trial court did not, in so many words, instruct the jury that it must presume a sentence of life imprisonment, it did instruct the jury that a death sentence could be reached only if (1) the jury found the existence of an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) the aggravating factor outweighed any mitigating factors. Moreover, defendant neither requested a presumption of life instruction nor objected to the instructions as given. Considering the jury charge as a whole, as we must, it cannot be said that the State's burden of proof ever shifted; it remained squarely with the State. Thus, under these circumstances, we see nothing in defendant's submission to justify the prophylactic change defendant seeks. In the end, we reject defendant's claim that he was entitled to a sua sponte instruction on the presumption of life.