Opinion ID: 168139
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Divide w arrant

Text: Because Naugle requires us to evaluate the “valid portions of the warrant,” id. (emphasis added), our first step in determining whether the severability doctrine is applicable is to divide the w arrant into individual phrases, clauses, 3 (...continued) Christine, 687 F.2d at 758; see also 2 LaFave, supra, § 4.6(f) (“[I]t would be harsh medicine indeed if a warrant which was issued on probable cause and which did particularly describe certain items w ere to be invalidated in toto merely because the affiant and magistrate erred in seeking and permitting a search for other items as well.”). - 12 - paragraphs, or categories of items. See id. at 820-21 & 821 n.1 (separating the warrant at issue into “categories of items”); 4 see also Christine, 687 F.2d at 758 (referring to “valid severable phrases or clauses”) (emphases added); Rosemarie A. Lynskey, Note, A M iddle Ground Approach to the Exclusionary Remedy: Reconciling the Redaction Doctrine with United States v. Leon, 41 V AND . L. R EV . 811, 812 n.5 (1988) (stating that, in redacting a warrant, the court should first 4 Specifically, the warrant in Naugle stated: Letters, papers, documents, checks or envelopes inscribed or printed upon with the Utah County Constable, the U tah C ounty Constable Star, or any such insignia which gives the appearance or represents a government agency, or anything else that in its nature could be used to imply an affiliation with such an agency, any surveillance equipment including electronic listening and recording devices, cameras, binoculars, radios, telephone hardw are and records, business records, personnel files, payroll records, computer, both hard and software, contracts, tapes or video equipment, and any other articles used in the support or furtherance of. 997 F.2d at 821 n.1 (quotation omitted). However, we concluded that the warrant authorized officers to search for the follow ing four categories of items: (1) letters, papers, documents, checks or envelopes inscribed or printed upon with the Utah County Constable or Utah County Constable Star; (2) letters, papers, documents, checks or envelopes inscribed or printed upon any such insignia which gives the appearance or represents a government agency, or anything else that in its nature could be used to imply an affiliation with such an agency; (3) any surveillance equipment including electronic listening and recording devices, cameras, binoculars, radios, telephone hardware and records; (4) business records, personnel files, payroll records, computer, both hard and software, contracts, tapes or video equipment. Id. at 820-21 (quotation omitted). - 13 - “divide the warrant into separate clauses”); M ark S. Halpern, Comment, Redaction— The Alternative to the Total Suppression of Evidence Seized Pursuant to a Partially Invalid Search W arrant, 57 T EMP . L.Q. 77, 93 (1984) (same). In doing so, we apply the general rule that courts should interpret warrants in a “commonsense and realistic fashion,” rather than a “hypertechnical” manner. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965); see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 236. Although the proper division of any particular warrant must be determined on a case-by-case basis, we agree that “[c]ommon sense suggests that a particular division is appropriate so long as it does not distort the meaning of the severed clause” or the warrant. Halpern, supra, at 93; see also State v. Perrone, 834 P.2d 611, 622 (W ash. 1992) (“[T]here must be some logical and reasonable basis for the division of the warrant into parts which may be examined for severability.”). Here, Sells argues that the commas used in the warrant provide a dividing point each time one is used and thus provide a commonsense means of severing the parts of the warrant. W e reject that approach in this case as “hypertechnical.” W e believe the most logical interpretation of the warrant indicates that it authorized officers to search for the following five categories of evidence: (1) any .223 caliber Firearm or rifle, (2) .223 caliber ammunition, (3) footw ear, - 14 - (4) clothing, and (5) any other related fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of the crime. 5 B. Examine each part to determine w hether it complies w ith the Fourth Amendment and w hether any valid portion is sufficiently particularized After dividing the warrant into comm onsense parts, we may then determine whether the requirements for severability set out in Naugle are met. Under Naugle, the doctrine applies only if, first, a part of the warrant describes w ith sufficient particularity items to be seized for which there is probable cause. See 997 F.2d at 822 (“[T]he valid portions of the warrant must be sufficiently particularized . . . .”). “O therwise, there is nothing for the severability doctrine to save.” State v. M addox, 67 P.3d 1135, 1141 (W ash. Ct. App. 2003), aff’d 98 P.3d 1199 (W ash. 2004); see also United States v. Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred Tw enty-Two Dollars and Fifty-Seven Cents ($92,422.57), 307 F.3d 137, 159 (3d Cir. 2002); George, 975 F.2d at 79-80; Cardwell, 680 F.2d at 78; Christine, 687 F.2d at 758; Leary, 846 F.2d at 606 n.25 (declining to employ the severance doctrine, recognized in dicta, where “no portion of the . . . warrant . . . adequately define[d] the items to be seized”). 5 Arguably footwear and clothing could be included into a single category. If we did so, it would only strengthen our conclusion to apply the severability analysis to this warrant. - 15 - W e examine each part separately in a non-hypertechnical, commonsense fashion, Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 108, to determine whether it complies with the Fourth Amendment. See Christine, 687 F.2d at 754 (“Each part of the search authorized by the warrant is examined separately to determine whether it is impermissibly general or unsupported by probable cause.”). Here, Sells does not challenge the first or second categories— that is, the categories authorizing officers to search for (1) any .223-caliber Firearm or rifle or (2) .223-caliber ammunition. W e agree that the affidavit in this case provides a “substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed,” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 (quotation, alteration omitted), to search for these categories of items. Furthermore, we agree that these two categories meet the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. W e therefore turn our focus to the other three categories of items. As the Government concedes, the affidavit does not provide any reason to authorize a search for and seizure of footwear or clothing— the third and fourth categories of items. Additionally, the warrant provides no description of or limitation on the footwear or clothing to be seized, and thus allows officers to search for and seize any sort of footwear and clothing. Although footwear is a somewhat narrowing term, we accept for the purpose of this case the governm ent’s concession that that term, by itself, is too broad. Accordingly, w e conclude that these categories do not satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s warrant - 16 - requirements because they fail to “ensure that [the] search is confined in scope to particularly described evidence relating to a specific crime for which there is demonstrated probable cause.” Leary, 846 F.2d at 600 (quotation omitted). The final category of items under the w arrant— “any other related fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of the crime”— has some characteristics of both a valid warrant provision and one that is too broad. Compare George, 975 F.2d at 74, 76 (concluding that a warrant authorizing officers to search for and seize “any other evidence relating to the commission of a crime” was overbroad) with Andresen, 427 U.S. at 479, 480-82 (holding that the phrase “together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this (time) unknown” appended “at the end of a sentence containing a lengthy list of specified and particular items to be seized, all pertaining to Lot 13T . . . , did not authorize the executing officers to conduct a search for evidence of other crimes but only to search for and seize evidence relevant to the crime of false pretenses and Lot 13T”) (quotations omitted); United States v. Robertson, 21 F.3d 1030, 1032, 1033 (10th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a warrant “authorizing the agents to search for and seize the four items that the agent specifically mentioned ‘and other instrumentalities and fruits of the crime of armed carjacking’” was sufficiently particular). This catch-all warrant provision refers only to “the crime,” without - 17 - identifying the crime in any manner in the warrant itself. 6 On the other hand, the entire clause is limited by the word “related,” w hich refers back to the previously enumerated provisions of the warrant. Thus, the provision takes on the characteristics of the preceding provisions of the warrant. Thus, applying only a simple numerosity evaluation, the warrant is approximately equally divided between valid and invalid provisions. However, as we explain later, the Naugle test is not a mere counting of provisions. It requires a qualitative analysis of whether the valid provisions or the invalid ones constitute the greater weight of the warrant. C. Determine w hether valid parts are distinguishable from invalid parts The mere fact that one or more parts of a search warrant are valid, however, does not mean that the severance doctrine is automatically applicable. Instead, under Naugle’s second requirement, some part of the warrant must be both constitutionally valid and “distinguishable from the invalid portions” in order for severability to apply. 997 F.2d at 822; see also Christine, 687 F.2d at 754 (“Redaction is inappropriate when the valid portions of the warrant may not be meaningfully severable from the warrant as a whole.”). W here, as here, each of the categories of items to be seized describes distinct subject matter in language 6 The affidavit in this case cannot remedy the warrant’s lack of particularity because it was neither incorporated by express reference in the warrant nor attached to the warrant. See Leary, 846 F.2d at 603. - 18 - not linked to language of other categories, and each valid category retains its significance when isolated from rest of the warrant, then the valid portions may be severed from the warrant. Naugle, 997 F.2d at 821-22 (concluding that the requirements for severability were met in a case where “three categories in the search warrant were specific and supported by probable cause”); Brown, 984 F.2d at 1078 (“[A]lthough one sentence in the warrant may have been overbroad, the infirm portion may be isolated and severed from the constitutionally adequate part.”); see also United States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566, 574, 578 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that “[t]he portions of the warrant limited to fruits and evidence of bingo can be severed from the part of the w arrant which is not so limited” w here the warrant “contained ten clauses listing items to be seized”). The first and second categories of items (guns and ammunition) to be searched for and seized under the warrant are valid and distinguishable from the third and fourth categories of the warrant (clothing and footwear) that are invalid. D. Determine w hether valid portions make up “the greater part of the w arrant” Total suppression may still be required even where a part of the warrant is valid (and distinguishable) if the invalid portions so predominate the warrant that the w arrant in essence authorizes “a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.” Coolidge , 403 U.S. at 467. Under such circumstances, application of the severance doctrine would defeat rather than effectuate the protections of - 19 - the Fourth Amendment and the purpose of the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 942, 952 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[S]everability is not always possible, and should be granted only where the circumstances of the case reveal that legitimate fourth amendment interests will not be jeopardized.”). As a result, although articulated in varying forms, every court to adopt the severance doctrine has further limited its application to prohibit severance from saving a warrant that has been rendered a general warrant by nature of its invalid portions despite containing some valid portion. W e have specifically held that severance is only applicable where the “valid portions . . . make up the greater part of the warrant,” Naugle, 997 F.2d at 822. In a later case, we characterized Naugle’s holding more generously to prohibit severability only when the valid portion of the warrant is not substantial. Soussi, 29 F.3d at 568 n.3 (“[I]n . . . Naugle, we limited somewhat the severability concept to allow it only when at least a substantial part of the warrant is valid.”) (citation omitted). Other circuits seem, for the most part, to follow the Soussi articulation of the severability test. United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 428 (9th Cir. 1995) (severance inapplicable where the valid part is a “relatively insignificant part of an otherwise valid search”); United States v. Diaz, 841 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[Severance] is an especially appropriate measure . . . where the bulk of the warrant and records seized are fully supported by probable cause.”); Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 967 (severance inapplicable where the valid part is a “relatively insignificant part of - 20 - the sweeping search”); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Dec. 10, 1987, 926 F.2d 847, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); Freeman, 685 F.2d at 952 (severance inapplicable where “the warrant is generally invalid but as to some tangential item meets the requirements of probable cause”); Cook, 657 F.2d at 735 n.6 (applying severance where “th[e] appeal [did] not disclose a situation in which the warrant, when read with the affidavit, [was] essentially general in character but as to some tangential items [met] the requirement of particularity.”); M addox, 67 P.3d at 1141 (“[T]he severability doctrine applies only when . . . the part of the warrant that includes particularly described items supported by probable cause [is] significant when compared to the warrant as a whole.”); Aday v. Superior Court, 362 P.2d 47, 52 (Cal. 1961) (“W e recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained which are essentially general in character but as to minor items meet the requirements of particularity . . . . Such an abuse of the warrant procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.”). Although there may be some nuanced differences among these various articulations, we will use the Naugle articulation as it was the first case to define this element of the severability test. The “greater part of the warrant” analysis focuses on the warrant itself rather than upon an analysis of the items actually seized during the search. See Brown, 984 F.2d at 1078 (basing its severability holding purely on the language of the warrants at issue); see also 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.7(d) (“If severability is - 21 - proper (there may be instances in which it is not), it would seem the rule w ould be more sensible if expressed not in terms of what was seized, but rather in terms of what search and seizure would have been permissible if the warrant had only named those items as to which probable cause was established.”) (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, we reject the proposition that the extent of the actual search or the number of items seized is the relevant criteria to determine whether the valid portions of the warrant make up “the greater part of the warrant.” This is not to say that a search that grossly exceeds the scope of the warrant may not be suppressed in its entirety, but that is a separate inquiry that we address later in this opinion. See United States v. M edlin, 842 F.2d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 1988). Certainly, the number of valid versus invalid provisions is one element in the analysis of which portion makes up the “greater part of the warrant.” N augle 997 F.2d at 822; see also Kow, 58 F.3d at 428 (concluding that severance was not available because only two of fourteen categories of seizable documents were even arguably not overbroad and thus “the valid portion of the w arrant [was] a relatively insignificant part of an otherw ise invalid search”) (quotation omitted); United States v. Gomez-Soto, 723 F.2d 649, 654 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that severance was “practicable” when “only one of thirteen descriptions” was insufficiently particularized). However, merely counting parts, without any evaluation of the practical effect of those parts, is an improperly “hypertechnical” interpretation of the - 22 - search authorized by the warrant. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 236. W e conclude that it is not an adequate basis by itself for determining whether a warrant’s invalid parts render a warrant, as a whole, general, which is the underlying consideration in our “greater part of the warrant” analysis. A warrant’s invalid portions, though numerically fewer than the valid portions, may be so broad and invasive that they contaminate the whole warrant. Conversely, the invalid portions, though numerically greater than the valid portions, may qualitatively contribute less than the valid portions to the overall scope of the authorized search. Common sense indicates that we must also evaluate the relative scope and invasiveness of the valid and invalid parts of the warrant. See Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 406 (10th Cir. 1985) (declining to employ the severance doctrine where “[t]he bulk of the warrant’s provisions . . . simply allow[ed] for the seizure of evidence, whether or not related to tax fraud, and largely subsume[d] those provisions that would have been adequate standing alone”) (emphasis added); see also Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 967 (“[T]he cash and keys sought were not related in the warrant to specific crimes but rather were only a relatively insignificant part of the sweeping search for evidence of any violation of the thirteen statutes [listed in the warrant].”); 2 LaFave, supra, § 3.7(d) n.214 (stating that severability is not applicable “if probable cause existed as to only a few of several items listed, or as to a few very particularly described items but not as to other items described in much more general terms”) (emphasis added). Thus, in determining whether - 23 - severance applies, we employ a holistic test that examines the qualitative as w ell as the quantitative aspects of the valid portions of the warrant relative to the invalid portions to determine w hether the valid portions “make up the greater part of the warrant.” W e first address the scope and weight of the catchall provision authorizing officers to search for and seize “all related fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence of the crime.” Reviewing the warrant as a whole in a commonsense, practical manner indicates that the word “related” in that catchall provision corresponds primarily to the .223 firearms and ammunition rather than to the more innocuous clothing and footwear. A common sense reading of this warrant reveals, and would reveal to a reasonable officer, that the firearms and ammunition provisions were the main subject of the warrant. Turning then to the third and fourth categories of items to be seized under the warrant in this case, we note that they authorize officers to search for and seize only one distinct type of item— either footwear or clothing. As a result, the executing officers’ discretion is to some extent limited, and there is a decreased risk that the officers would mistakenly seize an item not within this description. Finally, the search for footwear and clothing does not implicate additional constitutional concerns under, for example, the First Amendment. See Voss, 774 F.2d at 405 (“The warrants’ overbreadth is made even more egregious by the fact that the search at issue implicated free speech and associational rights.”). - 24 - In light of these factors, we conclude that the valid portions of the warrant— the firearms and ammunition— and fruits, instrumentalities and evidence related to the firearms and ammunition make up “the greater part of the warrant,” Naugle, 997 F.2d at 822, and, in the terms of our sister circuits, those valid portions are therefore not an “insignificant or tangential part of the warrant,” George, 975 F.2d at 80 (citing Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 967-68; Freeman, 685 F.2d at 952) (cited with approval in Naugle, 997 F.2d at 822). E. Sever valid portions from invalid portions and partially suppress evidence accordingly Having concluded that the valid portions of the w arrant in this case were “sufficiently particularized, distinguishable from the invalid portions, and ma[d]e up the greater part of the warrant,” Naugle, 997 F.2d at 822, we agree with the district court that severance was appropriate in this case. 7 Under the severance doctrine, evidence seized pursuant to the invalid portions of the warrant must be 7 W e note that a number of courts have concluded that the severance doctrine is not applicable where the Government has added particularized descriptions of items to be seized for w hich probable cause exists as a pretext to support an otherw ise unlawful search and seizure under the severance doctrine. See Cook, 657 F.2d at 735 n.6; United States v. Pitts, 173 F.3d 677, 681 n.5 (8th Cir. 1999); Fitzgerald, 724 F.2d at 637; Freeman, 685 F.2d at 952; Naugle v. W itney, 755 F. Supp. 1504, 1517 (D . Utah 1990); Aday, 362 P.2d at 52. However, there is no evidence in this case that the officers added particularized, probable-cause supported items as a pretext to conduct a general search; nor does Sells make such an argument. W e therefore need not determine w hether a showing of pretext eliminates application of the severance doctrine even where the valid portions of the warrant satisfy the requirements laid out in Naugle. - 25 - suppressed, but evidence seized pursuant to the valid portions of the warrant or lawfully seized during execution of the valid portions is admissible. Soussi, 29 F.3d at 572; Brown, 984 F.2d at 1077. Properly redacted, the w arrant in this case permitted officers to search for and seize .223 firearms and .223 amm unition and related instruments, fruits and evidence, and the district court therefore properly upheld the seizure of these items. Under the plain view doctrine, the district court also upheld the seizure of the “shotgun shells, pipe bomb, velcro, squibs, drill press, welding equipment, and flux.” Unnamed items and “items named in an impermissibly broad portion of a w arrant may nevertheless be seized pursuant to the plain view doctrine so long as the government’s plain view seizure scrupulously adheres to the threeprong Horton test.” Soussi, 29 F.3d at 572; see also George, 975 F.2d at 80; Fitzgerald, 724 F.2d at 637. The Horton test requires that: (1) the officer was lawfully in a position from which to view the object seized in plain view; (2) the object’s incriminating character was immediately apparent— i.e. the officer had probable cause to believe the object was contraband or evidence of a crime; and (3) the officer had a lawful right of access to the object itself. Soussi, 29 F.3d at 570 (citing Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37). On appeal, Sells’s only argument that the plain view doctrine does not apply in this case to permit seizure of the warrantless items is that “the invalidity of [the] warrant le[ft] no set of circumstances justifying the officer’s presence on the premises” because the warrant constituted a general warrant that could not be - 26 - redacted. Having rejected, for the reasons stated above, the argument that severance was inappropriate in this case because the warrant constituted a general warrant, we decline to disturb the district court’s conclusion upholding seizure of the warrantless items under the plain view doctrine. See Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d at 1112 (refusing to disturb the district court’s suppression ruling under the fruits of the poisonous tree doctrine where the appellant rested its entire challenge on another ground which the court rejected).