Opinion ID: 1892409
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: manslaughter at common law

Text: As this court observed in State v. Hutter, 145 Neb. 798, 801-02, 18 N.W.2d 203, 206-07 (1945): An historical approach seems necessary to secure an adequate discussion of the subject. There were no degrees of murder or manslaughter at common law. All criminal homicide was either murder or manslaughter, but the latter was included in the former as a constituent element thereof, or it might exist as a distinct offense where there was no malice aforethought. At common law, murder is the unlawful killing of a person with malice aforethought, either express or implied, and manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another without malice express or implied. Manslaughter differs from murder in the want of malice, a condition of the blood or mind at the time of the act. This distinction is the only one that the accumulated wisdom of the common law deemed it advisable to make. Hence, at common law, two types of criminal homicide existed: murder and manslaughter. Under common law, murder was the unlawful killing of another human being with malice aforethought and was punishable by death, while manslaughter was the unlawful killing of another without malice and carried a penalty less than death. Consequently, the element of malice, the intention to do a wrongful act without just cause or excuse, distinguished murder from manslaughter at common law. 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §§ 7.1(a), 7.9, and 7.10(h) (1986). Accordingly, under common law, malice was necessary for murder, and the absence of malice was necessary for manslaughter. Although the common-law crime of murder was accompanied by an intent to kill and was, therefore, characterized as a voluntary homicide, courts began to recognize an intentional homicide committed under extenuating circumstances which mitigate, but do not justify or excuse, the killing, that is, adequate legal provocation which causes a reasonable individual to lose his or her normal self-control, thereby reducing the homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter. 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra, § 7.10. The usual type of voluntary manslaughter involves the intentional killing of another while under the influence of a reasonably-induced emotional disturbance (in earlier terminology, while in a heat of passion) causing a temporary loss of normal self-control. Except for this reasonable emotional condition, the intentional killing would be murder. 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra, §7.10(a) at 254. Voluntary manslaughter is an intentional killing in the heat of passion as a result of severe provocation. As a concession to human frailty, a killing, which would otherwise constitute murder, is mitigated to voluntary manslaughter. Although, given severe provocation, the impairment of a defendant's capacity for self-control may be substantial, the offense is only mitigated, not excused; if there were no punishment at all, there would be no incentive for an enraged person to make an effort to control his emotions. It must be remembered that this is not a killing in self-defense; it is not necessary for the provoker to be killed. The provoker is not completely innocent of wrongdoing, but the law cannot tolerate the taking of his life. 2 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 153 at 236-38 (14th ed.1979). In the Model Penal Code § 210.3(b) at 43 (1962), criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. As noted in the Model Penal Code, murder and manslaughter were distinguished at common law because homicide, even if intentional, was said to be without malice and hence manslaughter if committed in the heat of passion upon adequate provocation. Model Penal Code, § 210.3, comment 1 at 44 (1962). Concerning provocation which reduced the criminal homicide from murder to manslaughter, [p]rovocation nevertheless survived as a rule of mitigation for intentional homicides committed in certain extenuating circumstances.... A sudden rage, however engendered, does not necessarily or even probably negate an intent to kill. More likely it reinforces the firmness of the actor's resolve to take the life of another. At most, therefore, provocation affects the quality of the actor's state of mind as an indicator of moral blameworthiness. Provocation is thus properly regarded as a recognition by the law that inquiry into the reasons for the actor's formulation of an intent to kill will sometimes reveal factors that should have significance in grading. It is a concession to human weakness and perhaps to non-deterability, a recognition of the fact that one who kills in response to certain provoking events should be regarded as demonstrating a significantly different character deficiency than one who kills in their absence. Model Penal Code § 210.3, comment 5(a) at 54-55 (1962). Thus, under common-law principles, adequate legal provocation eliminated malice from murder and reduced an unlawful homicide from murder to manslaughter. See State v. Cooper, 273 N.C. 51, 159 S.E.2d 305 (1968). See, also, Barrett v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 102, 341 S.E.2d 190 (1986) (malice and heat of passion are mutually exclusive). For that reason, the phrase without malice, in reference to voluntary manslaughter, does not mean without intention, but means a willful act, characterized by the presence of an intent to kill.... People v. Brubaker, 53 Cal.2d 37, 44, 346 P.2d 8, 12 (1959). In Boche v. State, 84 Neb. 845, 854, 122 N.W. 72, 75 (1909), this court mentioned a definition for common-law manslaughter:  `The unlawful killing of another, without malice ... upon a sudden heat; or inadvertently, but in the commission of some unlawful act.' Another type of criminal homicide which occurred without malice, but which courts sought to punish at common law, was involuntary manslaughterthe defendant's unintentionally killing another during the commission of an unlawful act. Malice was absent from the homicide characterized as involuntary manslaughter because the defendant did not intend to kill the victim. However, the defendant's intention to commit the underlying unlawful act supplied the mens rea in a crime for the misdemeanor manslaughter analog to the felony murder rule. 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 7.13 (1986).