Opinion ID: 2630897
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: colston's age as an element of the offenses

Text: Colston next claims that his convictions should be reversed because the district court failed to instruct the jury to determine his age as an essential element of each offense. The State argues that, while recent Kansas case law supports vacating Colston's sentence for this error, in those cases no evidence was presented to the jury of the defendant's age. Here, the State argues the jury heard undisputed testimony from which it could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Colston was at least 18 years old at the time he committed the crimes. Colston's arguments address both statutory and constitutional interpretation; therefore, this court's review is unlimited. Bello, 289 Kan. at 195-96, 211 P.3d 139 (citing State v. Bryan, 281 Kan. 157, 159, 130 P.3d 85 [2006]). Rape and aggravated criminal sodomy with a child under 14 years of age are severity level 1 person felonies under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act. K.S.A. 21-3502(c); K.S.A. 21-3506(c). Aggravated indecent liberties committed by lewd fondling or touching of a child under 14 years of age is a severity level 3 person felony. K.S.A. 21-3504(c). However, these same crimes are off-grid person felonies when the offender is 18 years of age or older. K.S.A. 21-3502(c); K.S.A. 21-3504(c); K.S.A. 21-3506(c). The sentences for the off-grid crimes are set forth at K.S.A. 21-4643. Colston argues that this court should reverse his convictions of rape, aggravated criminal sodomy, and aggravated indecent liberties with a child because the trial court failed to instruct the jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that he was at least 18 years old at the time the crimes were committed. Several recent cases have addressed this same issue and similar facts. See Bello, 289 Kan. 191, 211 P.3d 139; Gonzales, 289 Kan. 351, 212 P.3d 215; State v. Morningstar, 289 Kan. 488, 213 P.3d 1045 (2009). Colston is correct that based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the defendant's age at the time of the offense is an element of the crime if the State seeks to convict the defendant of the more serious, off-grid level of the offense. Bello, 289 Kan. at 199-200, 211 P.3d 139; Gonzales, 289 Kan. at 371, 212 P.3d 215. In Bello , Gonzales , and Morningstar , this court determined that the failure to instruct the jury to make a finding on the defendant's age was error, but the result of the error was to vacate the defendant's sentence under K.S.A. 21-4643 and to remand for resentencing under the Kansas sentencing guidelines as a grid offense. Bello, 289 Kan. at 200, 211 P.3d 139; Gonzales, 289 Kan. at 371, 212 P.3d 215; Morningstar, 289 Kan. at 495, 213 P.3d 1045. In Bello , Gonzales , and Morningstar , the State had presented no evidence of the defendant's age. Here, the State notes there was undisputed testimony of Colston's age presented at the trial. Donna testified that she was 31 years old and that Colston was almost 20 years older than she. Michael testified that he was 29 years old at the time of trial and his sister April was 31 years old and that Colston was their father. Based on this evidence, the State argues that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury to determine Colston's age was harmless error and his off-grid sentences under K.S.A. 21-4643 should be upheld. Whether an Apprendi violation is subject to a harmless error analysis was recently addressed by this court in State v. Reyna, 290 Kan. ___, 234 P.3d 761 (2010). In Reyna, the defendant was convicted of four counts of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. He was sentenced to life without possibility of parole for 25 years pursuant to K.S.A. 21-4643. The trial court did not instruct the jury that it needed to determine the defendant was at least 18 years old when the crimes were committed. However, the defendant testified at trial that he was 37 years old. 234 P.3d at 766. On appeal, this court recognized that in State v. Daniels, 278 Kan. 53, 56-63, 91 P.3d 1147, cert. denied 543 U.S. 982, 125 S.Ct. 485, 160 L.Ed.2d 361 (2004), we reviewed a case in which the district court had inadvertently omitted the element of bodily harm from the jury instruction on aggravated robbery. The element of bodily harm distinguished an aggravated robbery from a simple robbery. But because the trial evidence of bodily harm was undisputed and overwhelming, the Daniels court found the error to be harmless. 278 Kan. at 63, 91 P.3d 1147; see also State v. Redford, 242 Kan. 658, 671-72, 750 P.2d 1013 (1988) (omitted element that victim was overcome by force or fear in rape instruction was harmless error). In finding harmless error in Daniels , this court considered the United States Supreme Court decision in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). Neder was a pre- Apprendi case in which the trial court had taken the issue of materiality from the jury in a trial involving tax fraud. The Supreme Court concluded that refusing to instruct the jury on the element of materiality was erroneous and unconstitutional. Nonetheless, the Neder Court held the error was not the type that it had previously found to be structural error, i.e., that type of fundamental constitutional error which is so intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal. 527 U.S. at 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827. The Neder Court determined that where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless. 527 U.S. at 17, 119 S.Ct. 1827. This court in Reyna also relied on Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006), in which the United States Supreme Court addressed whether an Apprendi violation is structural error. In Recuenco , the defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon, specifically, a handgun. The special verdict form returned by the jury indicated the jury found a deadly weapon involved, but failed to make the specific finding of a handgun. The trial court imposed a 3-year sentence enhancement for use of a handgun instead of the 1-year enhancement that applied to the use of a deadly weapon. On appeal, the Court determined the case was indistinguishable from Neder except that Neder involved the failure to instruct the jury on an element of the crime rather than the failure to instruct the jury on a sentencing factor. 548 U.S. at 220, 126 S.Ct. 2546. The Court went on to conclude that failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element to the jury, is not structural error. 548 U.S. at 222, 126 S.Ct. 2546. Based on these decisions, this court determined in Reyna that we will apply harmless error analysis to the omission of an element from the instructions to the jury. Reyna, 290 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶ 9, 234 P.3d 761. When a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless. 290 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶ 10, 234 P.3d 761. We also determined that characterizing the omission of an element from the instructions to the jury as an Apprendi -type error, i.e., as judicial factfinding of the omitted element, when that element enhances the maximum applicable sentence, does not change the harmless error analysis. 290 Kan. ___, Syl. ¶ 11, 234 P.3d 761. In light of the undisputed evidence that the defendant was 37 years old, we held in Reyna that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury to determine the defendant's age at the time the crimes were committed was harmless error. 234 P.3d at 772-73. Our holding in Reyna controls the outcome of Colston's case. Here, the undisputed evidence presented at Colston's trial established beyond a reasonable doubt that he was at least 18 years old when the crimes were committed. We are convinced the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error in the instructions. Accordingly, we uphold Colston's off-grid sentences under K.S.A. 21-4643.