Opinion ID: 4587745
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Aggravators

Text: Next, Craft argues that the trial court fundamentally erred by failing to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors were sufficient to justify the death penalty. However, in cases where the defendant did not waive the right to a penalty-phase jury, we have repeatedly held that this determination is 6. We note that Robinson and other similar cases applying the harmlesserror standard of review to trial court errors respecting mitigation, see, e.g., Ault, 53 So. 3d at 187, address mitigation proposed by the defendant. In contrast, here, the two items of mitigation that the trial court failed to consider were not part of the limited mitigation that Craft presented during the penalty phase proceeding. Rather, they were contained in the PSI, and Craft expressly stated at the Spencer hearing that he did not wish to be heard on any of the information contained in the PSI. However, the State has not asked us to apply a fundamental-error standard of review to Craft’s argument that the trial court erred in failing to consider mitigation that he did not propose below. Cf. Fennie v. State, 855 So. 2d 597, 608-09 (Fla. 2003) (holding trial court’s failure to assign weights to the individual aggravating and mitigating circumstances did “not constitute fundamental error because the sentencing order was otherwise thorough and detailed, addressed all of the matters claimed in mitigation and aggravation, and contained a proper weighing analysis even though individual weights were not assigned,” allowing this Court “to conduct a meaningful review of [the defendant’s] case on direct appeal”) (emphasis added); see generally Hayward v. State, 24 So. 3d 17, 42 (Fla. 2009) (explaining that unpreserved errors are reviewed for fundamental error). We are not aware of a decision expressly addressing the proper standard of review on facts similar to those at issue in this case. Nevertheless, our holding that the errors respecting mitigation in Craft’s case are harmless makes it unnecessary to resolve this issue because error that is harmless cannot be fundamental. See Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 370 (Fla. 2002) (“If the error was not harmful, it would not meet our requirement for being fundamental.”). - 22 - “not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.” Newberry v. State, 288 So. 3d 1040, 1047 (Fla. 2019) (citing Rogers, 285 So. 3d at 886); see also McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 707-08 (2020) (explaining that “[u]nder Ring [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),] and Hurst [v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016)], a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible” but that “Ring and Hurst did not require jury weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances”); State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487, 505, 507 (Fla. 2020) (concluding that “only one of the findings . . . identified in Hurst v. State [202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016)]—the finding of the existence of an aggravating circumstance—qualifies as an element, including for purposes of our state constitution” and “reced[ing] from Hurst v. State except to the extent it requires a jury unanimously to find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt”). Recently, in Lawrence v. State, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S277, S282 n.8 (Fla. Oct. 29, 2020), we confirmed that the same claim is equally meritless where, as here, the defendant waived the right to a penalty-phase jury. See also § 921.141(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2019) (subjecting only the trial court’s finding of the existence of at least one aggravating factor to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof). Accordingly, because the trial court did not err, let alone fundamentally so, Craft is not entitled to relief. - 23 -