Opinion ID: 2537905
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Keenan Counsel and Removal of Counsel

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to appoint Keenan counsel, refusing to grant a reasonable continuance, and removing his counsel of choice, in violation of various constitutional rights. [3] ( Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424, 430 [180 Cal.Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108] ( Keenan ) [trial court has discretion under statutes governing appointment of counsel to appoint a second defense attorney to assist in defense of a capital case].) We disagree.
The capital crimes occurred on January 12, 1991. Defendant was apprehended on September 19, 1995, and initially represented by the Riverside County Public Defender. On June 21, 1996, after receiving numerous continuances of the preliminary hearing, the public defender declared a conflict, and was removed as counsel. The criminal defense panel was appointed, and the case was assigned to John Aquilina. The preliminary hearing was held on October 24, 1996, and defendant was arraigned in superior court on December 19, 1996. In December 1997, the parties agreed on an April 6, 1998 trial date, and trial was set for that date. On March 5, 1998, Aquilina informed the court that he was not ready to proceed to trial. He explained that he was assigned to two other cases, one of which, Hartsch, was ready to proceed to trial, and the other, Lee, nearly ready. Aquilina stated that earlier that week, the criminal defense panel had attempted to reassign the case to a different attorney who was more available, but that fell through the cracks. The prosecutor strongly objected to both protracted delay of the trial date past May 1998, and reassignment of the case to different counsel. He noted that he had grave concerns about the availability of one of his witnesses, a victim's parent, who had cancer. He also noted that the case had previously been assigned to different counsel. Aquilina stated that the reason for the attempt to re-assign this matter was to speed up the case, not to delay matters. The court responded that its experience, unfortunately, has been that when that happens, it usually has the opposite effect. At a subsequent hearing, the trial date was moved to April 13, 1998. On April 7, 1998, defendant filed a motion to continue the trial to a date after May 1, 1999, or more than eight years after the capital crimes occurred. (ง 1050.) In a declaration filed in support of the motion, counsel declared that based on his lack of investigation and preparation, he would not be ready for trial for at least 12 months. His efforts to obtain second counsel, or to have the case reassigned to counsel who would be ready for trial before May 1999, had been unsuccessful. At the April 9, 1998 hearing on the motion to continue, Aquilina stated that the prosecutor only recently had started to object to defense requests for a continuance or insist that the matter proceed to trial. He also said that he organized his capital caseload by working on each case in the order in which it was assigned to him. He received the assignment in Hartsch first, Lee second, and this case third, and had worked on them in that order. He found it impossible to work on more than one and one-half of these capital cases at any one time. As a result, he had devoted [his] full attention to the Hartsch matter, partial attention to the Lee matter, and very little, if any, attention to the Avila matter. He suggested that if the court wanted to discuss the Avila investigation with him, that discussion should occur in camera. The hearing continued in open court. The court inquired how long a delay would occur if the case was assigned to someone else on the criminal defense panel. Aquilina stated that it was his understanding that each panel attorney was already assigned at least two capital cases set for trial. He further noted that this caseload made it difficult for the attorneys to act as second counsel for each other's cases. He said that if he were able to devote his full-time attention to defendant's case, it was possible that the matter might be able to proceed to trial later this year. The court acknowledged Aquilina was busy. It also stated that the People have a point.... [Y]ou're representing to me here ... [that] you can't even begin to think about getting ready for this case until you've taken care of, in large measure, those other two cases; that you need at least a year, on top of all the time you've already had, and on top of the public defender's rather large amount of time before they were relieved.... [T]hese crimes occurred in 1991. While defendant's absence from the jurisdiction contributed to the delay, the court stated it nevertheless had to consider the date of the crimes when evaluating the problems that the People encounter and the victim's family's issues. The court stated that it needed to know if there was anyone on the panel who could work on the case right away, and how soon that person would be ready. The court was concerned that if we find somebody else to take over for you, it will make it go even longer than if we left it in your hands .... Aquilina responded, and the court agreed, that the delay also obviously affects the defendant. The court then heard from Mr. Finn, who apparently assisted in running the criminal defense panel. Finn described the panel's staffing and workload challenges, and then stated: [T]he answer to the Court is simply, no, not within our current people and within our current budget can we reassign this case. After further colloquy between the court and Finn, the court stated, From what you're telling me, I essentially only have two options here. I leave it with Mr. Aquilina and give him something approaching the time he says he wants, or we relieve Mr. Aquilina and appoint private counsel. The court stated that if private counsel were appointed, it had no idea whether they can be ready any sooner than Mr. Aquilina can be. If we leave him on the case, at least he has the advantage of familiarity with the case and the defendant.... The court subsequently stated that it needed to find out if anyone was available to take over the case and be ready any faster than Mr. Aquilina can. And I need to find that out before I can make a decision. The prosecutor stated that the delay was working a great injustice to the victims' families, and that it was incumbent upon the Court to ... find competent counsel. He noted defendant's case was not complicated, and mentioned other cases in which counsel had been obtained outside the criminal defense panel. After further argument by the prosecutor, and by the apparent prosecutor in the Hartsch case, Aquilina observed that one factor for the court to consider in determining whether to change counsel was whether the defendant consents to a change of counsel or objects. The court inquired of defendant whether he would like the court to relieve Aquilina and attempt to find someone who could get to trial faster, or retain Aquilina, hoping he can get to trial as fast as he can in light of his heavy caseload of complex homicides and death penalty cases. Defendant answered, I would like to keep Mr. Aquilina. The court asked, Even if it means going for a year or more waiting to get to trial? Defendant said, Yes. The court inquired of Aquilina whether appointment of second counsel would assist him in getting to trial any faster. Aquilina responded, Obviously second counsel would help. The court said, Let's assume for argument's sake that you had a second attorney to assist you on this case, not because it's a complex case, but in order to assist you to get it to trial faster.... [A]ssuming the case was prepared and ready with Keenan counsel, what's the earliest you could be available? Aquilina responded, [W]ith one proviso, I believe January [1999], because the Lee matter ... would probably go some time in November or December. Although yesterday I heard Lee may not go until January. Aquilina anticipated Hartsch would be tried in July 1998. Aquilina stressed that while he would be physically available to try defendant's case, he did not know of any defense counsel that has tried three capital cases in a 12-month period, and he was disinclined to be the first to do so. The court then inquired whether if Hartsch was tried in July 1998, and Lee tried in January 1999, Aquilina could, with extra help, be ready to try defendant's case between these trials, by October 1998. Aquilina responded, [I]t's possible. The court vacated the April 13, 1998 trial date, and the matter was put over so the court could research what attorneys might be available. On April 13, 1998, the trial court made findings on the record. In particular, it found that Aquilina has had a reasonable time to prepare the case, and that due to his ... heavy caseload and matters beyond his control, he's functionally unavailable to try the case, under Penal Code [s]ection 987.05. So as soon as private counsel can be found, I'm going to ask Mr. Aquilina to turn over all his discovery to new counsel and return any public funds received for preparation of the case. Aquilina did not object. The court noted that a new attorney had not yet been located and scheduled a hearing in two days. At the April 15, 1998 hearing, the court informed the parties that Bruce Cormicle was available to take the case and give it top priority. The court requested Aquilina bring all of his discovery to a hearing on April 17, 1998. Aquilina agreed, and again made no objection to the replacement of counsel. On April 17, 1998, Cormicle appeared, confirmed he was available, and stated he anticipated he would be ready for trial in less than 13 months. Aquilina was relieved and turned over his discovery, again without objection.
Defendant contends that Aquilina was removed over the objection of both Mr. Aquilina and [defendant] on the request of the prosecutor when Mr. Aquilina requested a five-month continuance with the assistance of Keenan counsel or a 12-month continuance if he tried the case alone. As the above factual recitation demonstrates, while defendant stated he would rather keep Aquilina and delay trial than obtain new counsel and go to trial more quickly, no objection was made either when the court found that Aquilina should be removed, or when he was actually removed. (1) Moreover, contrary to defendant's assertion, Aquilina never moved for Keenan counsel. Under section 987, subdivision (d), the court may appoint a second attorney in a capital case upon a written request of the first attorney appointed. The request shall be supported by an affidavit of the first attorney setting forth in detail the reasons why a second attorney should be appointed. No such written request was made in this case. Nor did Aquilina orally request second counsel. Rather, the possibility of Keenan counsel was simply discussed by Aquilina and the court as one option to accelerate the trial date. Indeed, Aquilina stressed to the court that while he might be physically available sooner with the appointment of Keenan counsel, he knew of no one who had tried three capital cases in a 12-month period, and he was disinclined to be the first. Hence, because Aquilina did not request Keenan counsel, the trial court never ruled on such a request. (2) Nor, contrary to defendant's assertion, did the trial court err in denying Aquilina's request for a continuance of at least 12 months, and removing him as defense counsel. `A court may remove appointed counsel both to prevent substantial impairment of court proceedings [citation] and when counsel, without good cause, does not become ready for trial (ง 987.05).' ( People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1188 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811] ....) A trial court's removal of appointed counsel for an indigent defendant is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1119 [81 Cal.Rptr.3d 614].) As noted above, defendant did not object to the removal of counsel, and the claim is therefore forfeited. Indeed, Aquilina had on his own initiative investigated whether another panel attorney could take over defendant's case. Nor, on the merits, is any abuse of discretion demonstrated. Under section 987.05, [i]n cases where counsel, after making representations that he or she will be ready for ... trial, and without good cause is not ready on the date set, the court may relieve counsel from the case .... Here, the parties agreed on an April 6, 1998 trial date, an agreement that implied counsel expected to be ready on that date. Section 987.05 further provides that in establishing a reasonable time to prepare for trial, a trial court shall not consider counsel's convenience, counsel's calendar conflicts, or counsel's other business. It seems appropriate to similarly exclude these factors in determining whether counsel has shown good cause for his lack of readiness for trial. Here, the only reason cited by Aquilina for his lack of readiness in April 1998, and need for a minimum 12-month continuance, was his competing capital caseload. (3) The trial court also properly removed counsel to prevent substantial impairment of the court proceedings. ( People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1188.) The capital crimes occurred in January 1991, defendant was not apprehended until September 1995 because he fled the jurisdiction, the public defender who first represented defendant sought continuances of the preliminary hearing for nearly a year before being conflicted out, and Aquilina, once appointed, did little work on the case for nearly two years, and then sought to delay trial for at least another year. Indeed, Aquilina sought to continue the trial to a date after May 1, 1999. Aquilina thus gave no assurance he would be prepared for trial on May 2, 1999, but rather only represented that he would be ready at some indeterminate point after a year had passed. In addition, a prosecution witness was battling cancer. While defendant expressed a preference for retaining Aquilina, that factor is not dispositive. ( People v. Mungia, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1124.) The `essential aim is to guarantee `an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.'' ( Ibid. ) [4] Nor, contrary to defendant's assertion, did the trial court err in failing to hold an in camera hearing on Aquilina's defense investigation. While Aquilina stated he did not feel comfortable discussing the details of the defense investigation in open court, he never requested a hearing. Nor was one necessary. Contrary to defendant's assertion, Aquilina never made an offer of proof that a thorough investigation was underway. Rather, counsel represented that, following the preliminary hearing, he had done little work on the case and would not be ready for trial for over a year because of competing capital case assignments. These were the pertinent facts the trial court considered in determining whether to remove Aquilina. Defendant asserts he is aware of no other capital case where defense counsel was removed over the objection of both defense counsel and the defendant on the motion of the prosecutor. As noted above, there was no objection, and defendant's stated preference for Aquilina was not dispositive in determining whether defense counsel should be removed. (4) Finally, defendant claims judicial bias in the court's comments and removal of Aquilina. We have rejected defendant's claims the trial court erred in failing to appoint Keenan counsel and in removing Aquilina as defense counsel, and our review of the court's challenged comments reveals no error, let alone evidence of bias. Moreover, a trial court's numerous rulings against a partyโeven when erroneousโdo not establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are subject to review. ( People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321].) Defendant fails to demonstrate any judicial misconduct or bias, let alone misconduct or bias that was so prejudicial that it deprived defendant of `a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.' ( Ibid. )