Opinion ID: 1637489
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the divorce judgment based on habitual, cruel and inhuman treatment is void due to ann shavers's failure to offer corroborating evidence.

Text: ¶34. In the summary of the argument portion of his brief, John briefly mentions that Ann failed to meet her burden of proof with testimony of a corroborating witness and, therefore, Ann should not have been granted a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. John again has failed specifically to identify the issue in his statement of the issues. M.R.A.P. 28(a)(3). Further, John has failed to argue his position or cite authority on this issues. Although this claim is abandoned, such a claim, if meritorious, would amount to plain error. Therefore, we address it. ¶35. A chancellor may grant a divorce on the ground of habitual, cruel and inhuman treatment. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-1 (Rev.2004). Mississippi case law requires that the plaintiff prove this ground for divorce by a preponderance of the credible evidence. Cooper v. Cooper, 518 So.2d 664, 666 (Miss.1988). The party alleging cruel and inhuman treatment typically must corroborate the testimony. Gardner v. Gardner, 618 So.2d 108, 114 (Miss.1993); citing Chambers v. Chambers, 213 Miss. 71, 56 So.2d 33 (1952). ¶36. After two and one-half days of testimony regarding financial issues, the chancery court recessed to allow John and Ann to discuss settlement. The parties and counsel then returned, announcing a settlement agreement which resolved the financial issues and agreed that Ann would receive a divorce from John based on habitual, cruel and inhuman treatment, which John would not contest. Mississippi rules require that `[i]n all uncontested divorce cases, except irreconcilable differences, the testimony of the Plaintiff must be substantially corroborated.' Gardner, 618 So.2d at 114 (quoting Miss. Unif. Chan. Ct. R. 8.03 (1990)). ¶37. The chancellor called for an understanding of all present that the divorce was being settled on fault grounds, and indicated that if the parties brought him a no-fault judgment, with the property settlement as agreed, he would sign it; otherwise, the chancellor said he would enforce the judgment on the fault ground. ¶38. The transcript contains the following dialogue: THE COURT: Very Well. Mrs. Shavers, do you tell me that there have been problems, arguments, fights, disputes, disagreements and the like during the course of this marriage that now convince you that you want the marriage to be ended and over with. Is that true? MRS. SHAVERS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Do you feel that if you stayed in the marriage that it would be hazardous or injurious to your life, safety, health and that's either physically or emotionally. Do you feel that way? MRS. SHAVERS: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Do you now feel that it's in your best interest to be divorced, finally? MRS. SHAVERS: Yes, I do? THE COURT: All right. Okay. With that being said, I'm going to take into consideration all of the previous testimony that I have heard in the course of the trial including any and all motions in the temporary hearing and based on that and the facts contained therein, I do hereby grant the divorce on the statutory grounds of habitual, Cruel and Inhuman Treatment and that divorce is awarded to Wife. The parties have reserved the right to present me an Irreconcilable Differences Judgment and Property Settlement Agreement and I will allow them to do that. ¶39. In order to establish the basis for divorce on the ground of habitual, cruel and inhuman treatment, the claimant should produce evidence to prove conduct of the defendant that endangers life, limb, or health, or creates a reasonable apprehension of such danger, rendering it impossible for that spouse to discharge the duties of the marriage, thus destroying the basis for its continuance. Gardner, 618 So.2d at 113-14 (citation omitted). There is no question that Ann established the basis for a divorce on the ground of habitual, cruel and inhuman treatment through her own testimony. The question asked by John, however, is whether her testimony was corroborated. ¶40. The transcript from the temporary hearing held June 22 and 23, 1999, reveals testimony from both parties regarding physical altercations between John and Ann. Ann testified that John beat the crap out of her. On cross-examination, John admitted to hitting Ann with an open hand, although he disputed where and how hard he hit her. During the cross-examination of John on this point, the chancellor stated: Hang on just a second. I really don't want to hear anymore of this. It's obviously been established that for whatever reason or whoever's fault, there has been established some measure of domestic violence that took place. I don't need to hear anything else on that. ¶41. The chancellor considered the testimony from the temporary hearing in rendering his final judgment of divorce. It is clear from the transcript of that hearing that John corroborated Ann's testimony. As the trier of fact, the chancellor must evaluate the sufficiency of the proof based on the credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony. Rainey v. Rainey, 205 So.2d 514, 515 (Miss.1967). The issue here was a factual one and the chancellor's decision will not be disturbed since it was not manifestly wrong. This Court will defer to his determination. ¶42. We find that Ann's testimony was corroborated and John's assignment of error is without merit.