Opinion ID: 4529386
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Opinion Under Review and Standard of Review

Text: We independently review the bankruptcy court’s order and afford no deference to the district court’s intermediate ruling. Aviva Life & Annuity Co. v. White (In re Millennium Multiple Emp’r Welfare Benefit Plan), 772 F.3d 634, 638–39 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Miller v. Bill & Carolyn L.P. (In re Baldwin), 593 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2010); In re Miller, 666 F.3d at 1260)). We review de novo the bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions but examine its factual findings for clear error. Nelson v. Long (In re Long), 843 F.3d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 2016). When reviewing the bankruptcy court’s factual findings, we “must defer to facts found by the bankruptcy court unless ‘[they are] without factual support in the record’ or, after examining all the evidence, we are left with a ‘definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’” DSC Nat’l Props., LLC v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 477 B.R. 156, 168 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Yet if the bankruptcy court’s factual findings “are premised on improper legal standards or on proper ones improperly 13 applied, they are not entitled to the protection of the clearly erroneous standard, but are subject to de novo review.” Sender v. Johnson (In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., Inc.), 84 F.3d 1267, 1268 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A bankruptcy court’s evidentiary rulings to admit evidence—as opposed to its factual findings—are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Collins, 575 F.3d 1069, 1073 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Chavez, 229 F.3d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 2000)). But because Kim and Foster challenge hearsay rulings, they have a particularly heavy burden. See United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1142 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[H]earsay determinations are particularly fact and case specific, [so] our review of those decisions is ‘especially deferential.’” (quoting Chavez, 229 F.3d at 950; and citing United States v. Pulido-Jacobo, 377 F.3d 1124, 1132 (10th Cir. 2004))). Moreover, Kim and Foster’s hearsay challenges rely on the Federal Rules of Evidence; thus, the harmless-error standard applies, and we will reverse only if we have a “grave doubt as to whether” any errors had “a substantial influence on the outcome.” See Collins, 575 F.3d at 1073 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 873 (10th Cir. 1995)).