Opinion ID: 2624500
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prospective Juror S.B.

Text: The prosecutor stated he challenged S.B. because she was young and single. The record reveals S.B. was 22 years old and unmarried. The prosecutor explained he did not want unsophisticated, immature jurors, since he thought the case would definitely appeal more to married people and particularly married people with children. His ideal juror would be between the ages of 40 and 65, although he would accept otherwise acceptable jurors who were over 30 years of age. (9) We need not examine the objective reasonableness of the prosecutor's stated basis for the challenge of S.B., namely his desire to exclude younger jurors. The proper focus of a Batson/Wheeler inquiry is on the subjective genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given for the peremptory challenge, not on the objective reasonableness of those reasons. (See People v. Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 917, citing Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 769 [131 L.Ed.2d 834, 115 S.Ct. 1769] [the prosecutor's reason for thinking a prospective juror would not make a good juror in the casethat the prospective juror had long, unkempt hair, a mustache, and a beard constituted a valid nondiscriminatory reason for exercising the challenge].) What matters is that the prosecutor's reason for exercising the peremptory challenge is legitimate. A `legitimate reason' is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection. [Citations.] (514 U.S. at p. 769.) Neither the United States Supreme Court nor this court has held that the exercise of peremptory strikes on the basis of age violates the Constitution. ( U.S. v. Maxwell (6th Cir. 1998) 160 F.3d 1071, 1075; People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 278 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193].) There is nothing in the record to indicate that the prosecutor's desire for a more mature jury was not genuine. Substantial evidence also supports the prosecutor's contentions that S.B. was opposed to the death penalty and harbored a wholly naïve view of the criminal mind, and the trial court reasonably could conclude they were race neutral. S.B. wrote in her questionnaire that she opposed the death penalty because she felt it is the easy way out for a person who committed a crime. If one is guilty then I believe that he or she should get life in prison. So they can remember for the rest of their lives, the crime that he or she has committed. In voir dire, she elaborated, I think either way it would be the easy way out, whether he was in jail or if he died, because if he had no conscience he really wouldn't care where he was at the time. Thus, S.B.'s questionnaire and voir dire answers suggested she was not in the prosecutor's ideal age group, and might not be inclined to agree with his argument that the death penalty was the most severe of punishments. The comparative juror analysis defendant suggests does not further his claim. He points out the prosecutor did not challenge Alternate Juror J.S. even though, at age 23, she was only a year older than S.B., whom the prosecutor found objectionable at age 22. The record, however, reveals that unlike S.B., J.S. had characteristics apart from her age that were positive factors in the prosecutor's assessment of an ideal juror: J.S. was married and supported the death penalty. Comparing S.B. to J.S., therefore, does not show that the prosecutor challenged a Black juror who possessed the same characteristics as did a non-Black juror he did not challenge. Thus, substantial evidence supports the trial court's determination that the prosecutor challenged S.B. for reasons not related to her race.