Opinion ID: 1985109
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Correctness of Court's Order Directing a Verdict in Favor of the Defendants.

Text: A. Standard of review. We review the trial court's decision to direct a verdict for the correction of errors of law. See Tomka v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 528 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa 1995). A defendant's motion for directed verdict should be denied if there is substantial evidence to support the plaintiff's claim. See Bangs, 585 N.W.2d at 268. Evidence is substantial when a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach a conclusion. Johnson v. Dodgen, 451 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Iowa 1990). Thus, we must decide whether the trial court correctly determined that there was insufficient evidence to submit the issue of proximate cause to the jury. B. Sufficiency of evidence of proximate cause. Dennis' claim against his father and brother was based on negligence. In order to recover on a claim of negligence, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury or damage. See Hartig v. Francois, 562 N.W.2d 427, 429 (Iowa 1997) (including proximate cause as an element of a negligence claim); Blackhawk Bldg. Sys., Ltd. v. Law Firm of Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner & Engberg, 428 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Iowa 1988) (Even though negligence has been established, proximate cause must be determined separately.); Bickford v. American Interinsurance Exch., 224 N.W.2d 450, 455-56 (Iowa 1974) (stating negligence is actionable only if it is a proximate cause of injury). The element of proximate cause has two components: (1) the defendant's conduct must have in fact caused the plaintiff's damages, and (2) [t]he policy of the law must require the defendant to be legally responsible for the injury. Gerst v. Marshall, 549 N.W.2d 810, 815 (Iowa 1996). Our focus in the present case is on the first component, commonly known as causation in fact. See id. To prove causation in fact, the plaintiff must at a minimum establish that, but for the defendant's negligence, the plaintiff's injury would not have occurred. See id. at 815, 817. In other words, `there must be some causal relationship between the defendant's conduct and the injury or event for which damages are sought.' Id. at 818 (quoting Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 862 (Mo.1993) (en banc)). Before reviewing the evidence of causation, it is helpful to note the specifications of negligence that were claimed to have caused the plaintiff's injury. The defendants' alleged negligence took two forms: (1) Doug's failure to extend the ladder to the proper height with the extension ladder properly seated, and (2) Doug's placement of the ladder in such a position and such a manner that it was unsafe to climb. We now summarize the evidence that arguably supports the plaintiff's claim that these negligent acts caused his injuries. The ladder from which Dennis fell was at the demolition site when the Hasselmans began their salvage work. No one knew its prior history, and it could not be located for examination after the accident. The ladder was an extension ladder that was secured in an extended position by latches or C-shaped clamps that fit over the rungs. Dennis testified that although he did not visually examine the clamps prior to ascending the ladder, he believed he would have noticed if they were not properly secured because the rungs of the ladder would not have been aligned. He further testified that had he noticed that the clamps were not in proper position, he would not have proceeded up the ladder. No other witness had any information with respect to the position or condition of the clamps on the ladder or the ladder itself. Dennis recalled that the ladder went down vertically when he fell. From this evidence, he concludes that the clamps failed. The deficiency in this inference is that it still leaves the jury to speculate on the cause of this failure. There is no evidence that the clamps failed because Doug did not properly secure them. It is just as likely under the evidence presented to the jury that they failed because some component of the clamp mechanism was worn and gave out. When a jury is left to speculate on whether the defendant's conduct in fact caused the plaintiff's damages, the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of proximate cause. See Gerst, 549 N.W.2d at 818-19 (holding district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants when plaintiffs' evidence required the jury to speculate as to whether the plaintiffs' damages would not have occurred but for the defendants' conduct); Blackhawk Bldg. Sys., 428 N.W.2d at 291 (A jury cannot be left to speculate, but rather, must be provided with facts affording a reasonable basis for ascertaining the loss.). We conclude, therefore, that the evidence in this case is insufficient to support a finding of proximate cause with respect to the defendants' alleged negligence in failing to properly extend and seat the ladder. The same conclusion is warranted with respect to the plaintiff's allegation that Doug placed the ladder in an unsafe position. There was no testimony or circumstances that indicated the ladder fell because of the position in which it was placed. Therefore, the jury was left to speculate on whether anything the defendants did with respect to the placement of the ladder caused it to move and fall. In summary, after reviewing the evidence produced at trial on the issue of causation, we concur in the trial court's conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that but for any negligence of the defendants the plaintiff's injury would not have occurred. Therefore, the trial court did not err in directing a verdict for the defendants in this case. AFFIRMED.