Opinion ID: 2632488
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failings Related to Cody's Statements

Text: Floyd urges us to recognize five errors of his counsel with regard to Cody's statements: (1) failure to obtain Floyd's consent to introduce Cody's statements; (2) failure to request examination of Cody to determine his competence as witness; (3) failure to present expert testimony concerning child suggestibility and the reliability of Cody's statements; (4) failure to object to the statements as hearsay; and (5) failure to object to the prosecutor's questioning concerning the statements as evidence that Cody was an eyewitness. Kurth testified at the 60-1507 hearing that he was aware of Cody's Daddy did it statement, weighed the risk, and thought it would be to Floyd's benefit to have the Tom did it statement come in, even if that meant the Daddy did it statement also would come in. It is for this reason that he did not object to the prosecution's use of the Daddy did it statement. Kurth had previously determined he was going to try to get [the Tom did it statements] in through [Heidi's testimony], thought they would be admissible, and thought any attendant risk would be worth it. Floyd first argues that Kurth was ineffective for failing to secure his consent to the admission of Cody's statements, and that this failure violated his right to confront the witnesses against him. The admissibility of Cody's statements in relation to the Confrontation Clause was addressed by this court in Floyd's direct appeal; we determined there was no violation where the defense put these statements into evidence. That question need not be addressed again. We need only address the constitutional necessity or lack of necessity for Floyd's consent. Kurth testified at the 60-1507 hearing that he talked to Floyd about Cody's inconsistent statements, and that he informed Floyd of his strategic decision that it was more worthwhile to get the Tom did it statement in than to keep the Daddy did it statement out. Floyd, on the other hand, testified that he did not know his son had incriminated him until the prosecutor's opening statement. He also testified that Kurth never sat down with him to explain the ramifications of admitting Cody's statement, and that, if Kurth had told him about the Daddy did it statement, he would not have agreed to admission of the Tom did it statements. Regardless, certain decisions relating to the conduct of a criminal case are ultimately for the accused: (1) what plea to enter; (2) whether to waive a jury trial; and (3) whether to testify. Others are ultimately for defense counsel. The decisions on what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be made, and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with his or her client. See State v. Ames, 222 Kan. 88, 100, 563 P.2d 1034 (1977). Kurth was not required to obtain Floyd's consent before introducing Cody's statement that Tom did it. Floyd's next two arguments are intertwined. He asserts that Kurth was required to hire an expert child psychologist and challenge Cody's competence under K.S.A. 60-417 because, had the district court found Cody was incapable of expressing himself or incapable of understanding his duty to tell the truth, his highly prejudicial `Daddy did it' statements would not have been able to come into evidence. Kurth did not hire a psychologist, request to interview Cody, or otherwise attempt to determine his competence to testify, because Kurth had no intention of calling Cody as a witness. On the contrary, Kurth testified that it was his intention to have Bolinger or Heidi relate Cody's statement about Tom, and that he did not even consider consulting a child psychologist. It is obvious that, had Kurth challenged Cody's competence in regard to the Daddy did it statement, he would have undermined his ability to get the Tom did it statement into evidence. As discussed previously, the decision to admit the statement against Tom was part of Kurth's strategy. Putting aside for the moment the reasonableness of that strategy overall, once that strategy had been selected, Kurth did not act unreasonably in failing to seek or introduce testimony that might undermine the impact of the Tom did it statements. Finally, with regard to Cody's statements, Floyd cites as error Kurth's failure to object to questioning that elicited Bolinger's and Heidi's testimony that Cody was a probable eyewitness to the crime. Kurth testified that he had no reason for not objecting, and that he didn't foresee the prosecutor capitalizing on this suggestion that Cody was present when C.A. was killed by introducing evidence that Cody could only have been with his dad. Again, putting aside for the moment the reasonableness of Kurth's strategy regarding Cody's statements, his failure to object to this questioning does not constitute error. Having made the decision to admit Cody's statements that Tom did it, Kurth had no reason to object to the prosecutor's further inquiry implying Cody was an eyewitness to Tom's crime. We now return to the question of whether Kurth's strategy concerning Cody's statements was objectively reasonable. See Ferguson v. State, 276 Kan. 428, 446, 78 P.3d 40 (2003). It is true, as the State reminds us, that `[w]here experienced attorneys might disagree on the best tactics, deliberate decisions made for strategic reasons may not establish ineffective counsel.' Crease v. State, 252 Kan. 326, 338, 845 P.2d 27 (1993) (quoting State v. Kendig, 233 Kan. 890, 896, 666 P.2d 684 [1983]). However, even if each of Kurth's actions was logical and consistent with his chosen strategy, the strategy itself must still pass muster. Phillips testified at the 60-1507 hearing that the failure of defense counsel to object to the Daddy did it statement, even if that meant being unable to present the Tom did it statement, fell below the due care required of a reasonably competent defense attorney, and, in her opinion, was a huge mistake. Floyd urges us to agree with Phillips that Kurth's performance falls short when measured against the yardstick of objective reasonableness. See Gleason, 277 Kan. at 644, 88 P.3d 218; see also Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000). According to Kurth, Cody's initial statement that Tom did it was an integral element of proof that Tom, rather than Floyd, committed the crime. Kurth testified at the 60-1507 hearing that the decision not to object to Cody's later statement that Daddy did it was a risk he weighed, and that he concluded the risk was worth taking. Considering, as we must, all of the circumstances at the time and granting Kurth all the deference he is due, we nevertheless conclude that his strategy regarding Cody's statements was objectively unreasonable. Cody was only 2 years old when he implicated first his uncle, then his father. In addition, even without Cody's statements, there was considerable evidence pointing to Tom as the perpetrator: His gun was the murder weapon; he had purchased the bullets; he initially confessed to having killed C.A.; and he led police to the body, which was buried behind the house where he lived. Kurth could have relied on this evidence to support the defense theory. Instead, he doggedly pursued a strategy that he knew would reveal that Floyd's own son eventually pointed his small finger at Floyd. We agree with Phillips that this strategy was a huge mistake, particularly when it included no plan to mitigate Cody's damaging Daddy did it statement. Such mitigation might have taken the form of expert testimony on the likelihood that Cody's original statement implicating Tom was more accurate than his later statement implicating Floyd, perhaps because the latter was a product of hearing others discuss his father's arrest. Had such testimony been introduced, Kurth could have argued this implication in closing, particularly after the State made its closing argument suggesting that Cody was an eyewitness who originally said Tom did it because his father told him to. But Kurth did none of these things. He put the exculpatory statement in front of the jury, knowing that the inculpatory statement would follow, and did nothing to explain the difference or its significance. Under these circumstances, the mere invocation of the word strategy does not insulate Kurth's performance from constitutional criticism. Compare Mullins v. State, 30 Kan. App.2d 711, 717-18, 46 P.3d 1222, rev. denied 274 Kan. 1113 (2002) (counsel cannot insulate ineffective assistance by labeling it strategy; where outcome of trial depended on child sexual abuse victim's statements, failure to investigate, employ expert to attack testimony constituted deficient performance). Having determined that Kurth's performance was deficient in regard to introduction of Cody's statements, we now discuss Floyd's other assertions of error on Kurth's part.