Opinion ID: 1671209
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Heading: Constitutionality of Iowa Code Section 235B.2(5)(b)(3).

Text: Smith also argues the district court erred in failing to find the definition of sexual exploitation under Iowa Code section 235B.2(5)( b )(3) facially unconstitutional based on her claim that the language of the statute impermissibly includes caretakers who are nonconsensual victims of sexual conduct perpetrated by a dependent adult. Importantly, Smith does not challenge section 235B.2 as applied to her. [3] We first recognize that we can remedy a claim of a constitutional infirmity in a statute by interpreting the statute to avoid the constitutional claim. See State v. Abrahamson, 696 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Iowa 2005) (If the law is reasonably open to two constructions, one that renders it unconstitutional and one that does not, the court must adopt the interpretation that upholds the law's constitutionality.). Yet, we also recognize that a person lacks standing to make a facial challenge to a statute, if a statute can be constitutionally applied to that person's conduct. State v. Bower, 725 N.W.2d 435, 443 (Iowa 2006); accord State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 746 n. 7 (Iowa 2006); State v. Price, 237 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Iowa 1976). The rationale behind this principle was explained by the United States Supreme Court: Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not before the Court. A closely related principle is that constitutional rights are personal and may not be asserted vicariously. These principles rest on more than the fussiness of judges. They reflect the conviction that under our constitutional system courts are not roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation's laws. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-11, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915, 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 839 (1973); accord Price, 237 N.W.2d at 816. Of course, our principles of standing are not constitutional strictures, but are self-imposed rules of restraint. Hawkeye Bancorp. v. Iowa Coll. Aid Comm'n, 360 N.W.2d 798, 802 (Iowa 1985). Yet, the principle at issue is firmly entrenched within our rules of judicial restraint. See, e.g., State v. Willis, 218 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Iowa 1974) ([O]ne to whom application of a statute is constitutional, with exceptions not involved here, lacks standing to attack the statute on the ground it might be susceptible of unconstitutional application to other persons or other situations.); Upper Mo. River Corp. v. Bd. of Review, 210 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Iowa 1973) (Generally, one attacking the constitutionality of a statute is not the champion of any rights except his own.); Lee Enters., Inc. v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n, 162 N.W.2d 730, 740 (Iowa 1968) (As a general rule the constitutionality of a statute is to be considered in the light of the standing of the party who seeks to raise the question and of its particular application.). We do not waiver from this rule today, and Smith makes no claim that any recognized exception to the rule applies to this case. See Price, 237 N.W.2d at 816 (recognizing exceptions when First Amendment rights are implicated or when persons who are not parties to the suit stand to lose by its outcome, but have no effective avenue for preserving their rights). We conclude Smith does not have standing to challenge the facial constitutionality of the statute.