Opinion ID: 2546657
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State-Based Equal Protection Claim Alleging Discrimination Against Off-Road Communities in Providing Police Protection

Text: Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action asserted an equal protection violation based on allegations that the state, in providing police protection, treats residents of off-road communities less favorably than residents of on-road communities. [78] We assume with respect to this geographic discrimination claim that, as plaintiffs contend and the superior court concluded, police protection is an important right for purposes of equal protection analysis. Following trial, the superior court concluded that plaintiffs have not proven that the State's existing system of allocating trooper resources deprives them of law enforcement services that are provided to similarly situated Alaskans. [79] Plaintiffs contend that it was error to reject their geographic discrimination claim at trial. Most of their appellate argument addresses the issue of disparate treatment and the analysis required after disparate treatment is found. They contend that the superior court erred in finding that police protection in off-road communities was equal or superior to that in on-road communities. Although the state's appellate brief discusses the disparate treatment issue, it also argues that plaintiffs failed to prove that the comparison groups were similarly situated and that plaintiffs failed to meet their threshold burden of proving similarly situated classes and systematic deprivation. In considering state equal protection claims based on the denial of an important right we ordinarily must decide first whether similarly situated groups are being treated differently. [80] If they are, we apply a sliding scale of scrutiny to the challenged practice. [81] In conducting that analysis, we first determine the importance of the constitutional right at stake. [82] This is the most important variable in determining the applicable level of scrutiny. [83] We then examine the state's interests. [84] These interests may range from merely legitimate to compelling, depending on the burden that the challenged regulation places on the exercise of constitutional rights. [85] Finally, we consider the means the state uses to advance its interests. [86] Depending on the importance of the right involved, the means-to-ends fit may range from a substantial relationship, at the low end of the sliding scale, to the least restrictive means available to achieve that interest at the highest end of the scale. [87] But in clear cases we have sometimes applied in shorthand the analysis traditionally used in our equal protection jurisprudence. [88] If it is clear that two classes are not similarly situated, this conclusion necessarily implies that the different legal treatment of the two classes is justified by the differences between the two classes. [89] Whether two entities are similarly situated is generally a question of fact. [90] The superior court found that plaintiffs failed to prove that the state's existing system of allocating trooper resources deprives them of law enforcement services that are provided to similarly situated Alaskans. It appears that the superior court concluded that the comparisons the plaintiffs drew were fundamentally deficient. It found significant differences between the Plaintiffs' home communities and many of the `off-road' communities that Plaintiffs have characterized as `places in the complaint.' It noted the wide range in populations among the 165 places, the range of accessibility to nearby communities where APSC-certified police were stationed, and the presence or absence of VPSOs and VPOs in some of the places. Similarly, it also found that [t]here are also significant differences among the `on-road' communities ... to which Plaintiffs have compared the `places in the complaint.' The court again noted the wide range in populations of the communities on the road system, and the range in distance and accessibility to trooper posts. Because there was ample credible evidence to support them, these findings were not clearly erroneous. The court also found that any discrepancies between the police protection received by off-road communities without local police and that provided by troopers to on-road communities are due principally to the geographic isolation, weather conditions and transportation difficulties inherent in the location of many off-road communities.... This finding accurately identifies significant and relevant physical differences between on-road communities and off-road communities. These non-trivial differences are inconsistent with a claim that on-road and off-road communities are similarly situated in ways that are relevant here. The plaintiffs argue that the superior court's findings on similarly-situatedness were limited. They claim that the superior court did not rule that the off-road and on-road communities were not similarly situated for equal protection purposes. They note that the superior court continued to conduct an equal protection analysis after making its findings on similarly-situatedness. They argue that the court would have had no reason to reach these issues if it had found that the off-road and on-road places were not similarly situated. We do not infer from the superior court's willingness to address other issues that it thought it was not resolving the similarly situated issue. It appears that the court was diligently and commendably addressing all issues that might be subject to appeal. Its thorough findings and conclusions leave no doubt that it was ruling that plaintiffs did not prove that they are similarly situated to others allegedly being treated more favorably. There is no basis for thinking that the court reasoned that it was not necessary to decide the issue. It flagged the issue in denying summary judgment to the state, and noted it again in Paragraph 116 of its post-trial decision, where it referred to the issue as [a] critical threshold inquiry. The superior court's findings and conclusions permissibly distinguish on-road from off-road communities. The vast size of Detachment C, the geographical isolation of the off-road villages, the impossibility of traveling to them by road vehicle, and the greater susceptibility of non-road forms of transportation to the influences of weather, terrain, and distance all underscore the correctness of the superior court's findings on this issue. In other words, Alaska's physical realities dictate the result on this claim. Plaintiffs claim that such differences would automatically justify all disparities no matter how invidious if the state prevailsbut these differences are founded in physical reality; the state did not create them. [91] And although plaintiffs assert that the police protection the troopers provide must be reallocated, it is difficult to imagine how any reallocation could overcome the factors found by the superior court. Stationing a trooper in any given isolated village may give that village lower response times and benefit its residents, but will make it no easier for that trooper to reach other isolated communities and their residents as need requires. The state cannot realistically post a trooper in every remote village, and indeed plaintiffs conceded below that this is constitutionally unnecessary. It is therefore inevitable that troopers must travel to communities and that their ability to respond in person depends on such neutral and physical considerations as weather, daylight, and distance, and whether the community is accessible by road vehicle, or whether some more problematic form of transportation must be used. Plaintiffs argue that although there may be some differences between on-road and off-road places, all Alaska communities, whether on or off the road grid, are similarly situated in the only two relevant waystheir basic need for and right to equal access to adequate police protection. (Emphasis in original.) They contend that if differences in size and isolation rendered off-road residents dissimilar for equal protection purposes, rural residents would find themselves entirely outside of equal protection guarantees. But the physical dissimilarities here are directly relevant and material to the issue of how Alaska State Troopers are to provide on-location law enforcement services. These dissimilarities show that the superior court did not clearly err in finding that the two asserted similarities are not the relevant, much less the only relevant, points of comparison for determining the issue of similarly-situatedness.