Opinion ID: 203905
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suffolk Superior Court Conviction

Text: Bryant also challenges the Suffolk Superior Court conviction on the grounds that the government has failed to prove that he pleaded guilty to acts that would constitute a career offender predicate. In 1992, Bryant was initially charged with one count of trafficking in cocaine in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 32E(b)(1), and one count of conspiracy to violate the drug laws of the Commonwealth (specifically, to traffic in cocaine) in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 40. The trafficking charge was dismissed and Bryant pleaded guilty only to the conspiracy charge. Where the predicate offense involves a conspiracy, the sentencing court must determine whether the object of the conspiracy falls within the scope of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). See Piper, 35 F.3d at 619 (To determine the status of a conspiracy conviction vis-a-vis the career offender rubric, the key question is `conspiracy to do what?'). Bryant correctly argues that the statute of conviction encompasses both conduct that would constitute a predicate offense and conduct that would not. [11] Therefore, the sentencing court is required to determine whether the guilty plea, defined by a more expansive statute, necessarily admitted the elements of a controlled substances offense for career offender purposes. See Shepard 544 U.S. at 20-21, 125 S.Ct. 1254. As noted above, to make this determination in a case involving a guilty plea, the sentencing court may review the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented. Id. at 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254. In this case the indictment underlying the Suffolk Superior Court conviction demonstrated that the object of the conspiracy fell within the scope of a controlled substances offense under U.S.S.G § 4B1.2(b). It stated that Bryant did conspire ... to unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute a net weight of fourteen grams or more of a mixture containing cocaine .... (emphasis added). Reliance upon the indictment is also consistent with our precedent. See Santos, 363 F.3d at 24 (Where the charging instruments are instructive on the issue of whether a predicate offense [falls within the scope of § 4B1.2], we need not look further.) (citation omitted); United States v. Leavitt, 925 F.2d 516, 517-18 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing to the Sentencing Guidelines commentary to justify looking to the indictment to decide whether conduct can be a predicate offense for career offender purposes if it falls under a statute broad enough to encompass other conduct that would not be a predicate offense for career offender purposes). We conclude that since the indictment clearly narrowed the charge to a crime that qualifies as a controlled substances offense for career offender purposes and Bryant pleaded guilty to the same, the Suffolk Superior Court conviction qualifies as a career offender predicate offense.