Opinion ID: 1506520
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Requested Instruction on Prior Inconsistent Statements

Text: Defense counsel requested two instructions explaining specifically impeachment of a witness through evidence of prior inconsistent statements. [2] Though the state argues forcefully that defense counsel failed to preserve for appeal the trial justice's refusal to instruct in accordance with the second of these instructions, any such failure would lend no support to the state in this case. Both requested instructions were substantially similar in content with respect to impeachment by prior inconsistent statement, and thus the proper preservation of one would allow us to address the question of whether the trial justice's failure to instruct in this regard constituted reversible error. There is no question, and the state concedes, that defense counsel properly preserved for appeal the trial justice's refusal to charge in accordance with the first of the two requested instructions. Prior inconsistent statements are admissible not for their substantive or independent testimonial value but only for the purpose of impeaching or neutralizing at-trial testimony. State v. Roddy, R.I., 401 A.2d 23, 35 (1979); State v. LaPlume, 118 R.I. 670, 680-81, 375 A.2d 938, 942-43 (1977); State v. Bowden, 113 R.I. 649, 661, 324 A.2d 631, 639 (1974). See Super.R.Crim.P. 26.1(c). [3] A witness's testimony at trial may be impeached or discredited by the admission into evidence, for the above-stated limited purpose, of prior statements made by the witness which are inconsistent with his trial testimony. State v. Cianci, R.I., 430 A.2d 756, 762 (1981); State v. LaPlume, 118 R.I. at 680, 375 A.2d at 942. A trial justice is not always required to instruct on the effect of impeachment by evidence of prior inconsistent statements. The Supreme Court of Connecticut has held that, in order for a requested instruction to be applicable to the issues in a case, there must be evidence to support defendant's assertion that the credibility of the witness is actually in question. State v. Cooper, 182 Conn. 207, 211-213, 438 A.2d 418, 421 (1980). We adopt that rationale and hold that a trial justice must charge, when requested, on the effect of impeachment by evidence of prior inconsistent statements only when the evidence so warrants. When a prior inconsistent statement is admitted, the trial justice is required to give a limiting instruction to the effect that the prior inconsistent statement can be considered by the jury not for its substantive content but only for evaluating the witness's credibility. State v. Vargas, R.I., 420 A.2d 809, 813 (1980). Such an instruction may be given either at the time of admission of the statement or in the charge to the jury at the close of all the evidence, at the discretion of the trial justice. Id.; see State v. Quattrochi, 103 R.I. 115, 123-24, 235 A.2d 99, 104 (1967). In the present case, defense counsel did not request an immediate limiting instruction, but instead submitted requested instructions in the belief that these adequately covered the prior inconsistent-statement issue. Counsel objected to the trial justice's denial of these requests on the ground that the charge as given included no specific mention of the use of prior inconsistent statements for witness impeachment. Either request, according to defendant, would have accomplished this. However, these requests were not specific enough, as they contained no language with regard to the limited use of prior inconsistent statements. As we concluded in State v. Vargas, supra , such a limiting instruction is required when a prior inconsistent statement is admitted to impeach the credibility of a witness. The requested instructions should have explained the limited purposes for which a prior inconsistent statement is admitted. Neither request contained any such language, and the charge as given, in effect, adequately covered the substance of defendant's requests. Accordingly, defendant's objection to the denial by the trial justice of defendant's requested instructions is without merit. It is true that the charge as given did not include language explaining the limited use of prior inconsistent statements. However, defense counsel's objection to the charge as given was grounded on the absence in that charge of language specifically instructing that a witness can be impeached by evidence of prior inconsistent statements. Defense counsel did not object to, and does not address in its brief, the trial justice's failure to include a limited use instruction. Thus, we will not raise the issue sua sponte on appeal. [4] We hold that (1) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant's Rule 48(b) motion to dismiss; and (2) the trial justice's denial of instructions requested by the defendant did not constitute reversible error. The defendant's appeal is denied and dismissed, the judgment of conviction appealed from is affirmed, and the papers in this case are remanded to the Superior Court.