Opinion ID: 1819311
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony of Debra Lynn Driggers

Text: Hitchcock argues that his resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony by the victim's sister, Debra Driggers. The State called Debra Driggers as a penalty-phase witness. She testified that the victim had told her about inappropriate things that Ernie [James Hitchcock] was doing to her and that when Driggers was twelve years old, she and the victim confronted Hitchcock, who told the girls that he would rape and kill them if they told their mother about the inappropriate things that were going on. Driggers testified that as a result of this threat, she and the victim were scared. She stated that on the night prior to the murder, she told the victim that they must tell their mother about Hitchcock, but the victim said we can't and begged Driggers not to tell. Driggers testified that she did not tell authorities about these conversations in 1976 because she was scared that Hitchcock would kill her too. Resentencing counsel did not object to any portion of this testimony on any basis. In his postconviction motion, Hitchcock alleged that his resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this damaging and inadmissible testimony and for failing to move for a mistrial because the admission of the threats that James Hitchcock allegedly made to Debra Lynn Driggers and Cynthia Driggers and prior inappropriate sexual contact between James Hitchcock and Cynthia [Driggers] was unfairly prejudicial, improper character evidence, immaterial and irrelevant, and a non-statutory aggravator. Hitchcock asserted that the testimony invited the jury to consider uncharged crimes and acts as nonstatutory aggravation, instead of deciding whether the State had met its burden of proof of the statutory aggravators. Hitchcock did not allege that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to Driggers' testimony, which included several statements made by the victim, on hearsay grounds. [14] The circuit court denied the claim, holding that counsel's failure to object to the testimony was neither deficient nor prejudicial. The circuit court found that resentencing counsel's performance was not deficient because the testimony was admissible to establish the existence of two aggravating factors: commission in the course of the enumerated felony of sexual battery and HAC. See § 921.141(5)(d), (h) (1977), Fla. Stat. [15] The circuit court, citing to section 794.011(4)(c), Florida Statutes, found the testimony relevant to whether the murder was committed during the course of a sexual battery because sexual battery may occur when the offender coerces the victim to submit by threatening to retaliate against the victim or any other person. [16] The circuit court found the testimony relevant to the HAC aggravating factor because HAC can be proven by threats that cause the victim to experience fear leading up to the murder. We agree that resentencing counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to Driggers' testimony on the grounds that it was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. The sexual battery statute states that consent means intelligent, knowing, and voluntary consent and shall not be construed to include coerced submission.  § 794.011(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (1977) (emphasis added). The evidence of Hitchcock's threats and the ensuing fear experienced by the victim is directly relevant to the issue of consent. With respect to HAC, the circuit court correctly found that a threat on the victim's life contributes to the victim's apprehension prior to death and is thus relevant to the HAC aggravating factor. A threat need not be made contemporaneously with the murder in order to be relevant to the HAC aggravator if it causes the victim to experience fear, emotional strain, and terror in the moments leading up to her murder. See Pooler v. State, 704 So.2d 1375, 1378 (Fla. 1997) (finding evidence that victim was threatened by defendant two days before she was killed to be relevant to HAC aggravating factor even though threat was not delivered on day of murder). Moreover, the State's questioning of Driggers did not violate this Court's decision in Hitchcock V or the trial court's ruling on defense counsel's objection to the State's comment during opening statements that Hitchcock engaged in inappropriate conduct after moving in with his brother's family. The trial court overruled the defense's objection and decided that the State could present evidence of inappropriate conduct between Hitchcock and the victim so long as it was tailored to the aggravating factors but could not present evidence of inappropriate conduct between Hitchcock and Debra Driggers. This ruling was consistent with our direction in Hitchcock V, 673 So.2d at 863, that sexual attacks upon persons other than the victim not be the subject of the State's questions or evidence. At no time did Driggers testify that she was physically attacked by Hitchcock. Counsel was not deficient for failing to request that the court further limit the State by requiring it to parse out threats made against the witness from highly probative threats made against the victim. As the circuit court noted, the threats were made to both girls, and Ms. Driggers could hardly testify about her sister's fear without acknowledging her own. The threat to rape and kill the sisters was made simultaneously. Driggers necessarily had to convey that she too was threatened if she was to testify about the probative threats made to the victim. We also agree with the circuit court's conclusion that Hitchcock failed to demonstrate prejudice. Had counsel objected to Driggers' testimony and succeeded in having her testimony limited to threats made only to the victim, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. The Sentencing Order explained that Hitchcock's claim that the victim consented to intercourse was unsupported. An expert testified at the 1996 resentencing that the victim was a virgin when she was sexually assaulted by Hitchcock, and Hitchcock's initial statement following his arrest was inconsistent with his claim that the victim consented to sexual intercourse. As for HAC, the Sentencing Order explained that the victim endured a painful sexual assault, removal from her home, [and] beatings and chokings in order to secure her eventual silence. Hitchcock's initial statement supports this finding as well. He told police that he got up and grabbed her by the neck and made her quit hollerin', and that he just kept chokin' and chokin'. Sentencing Order at 4. Likewise, even if Hitchcock had asserted that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to portions of Driggers' testimony as hearsay, Hitchcock was not prejudiced by any of the statements which may have been inadmissible. The aggravating factors are supported without reference to Driggers' testimony that the victim was scared of Hitchcock before her murder and that the victim begged Driggers not to tell their mother about Hitchcock's behavior and threats. Given the totality of the evidence, our confidence in the sentence is not undermined by the scope of Driggers' testimony.