Opinion ID: 3179278
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Prosecutorial Immunity

Text: Smith also described another theory by which due process may compel a defense witness to be immunized: If a defendant can show that the prosecutor refused to grant immunity ― ‗with the deliberate intention of distorting the factfinding process,‘ ‖ a retrial is necessary. (Smith, supra, 615 F.2d at p. 968.) When the prosecutor is found have committed misconduct by withholding immunity, the remedy is to set aside the conviction and permit a new trial, at which the prosecutor can be ordered ―to grant statutory use immunity,‖ so that the witness can testify, or else face ―a judgment of acquittal.‖ (Id. at p. 969.) Quinn adopted this theory as well as the five factors outlined in Smith to evaluate claims of prosecutorial misconduct: whether ―[1] [witness immunity was] properly sought in the district court; [2] the defense witness [is] available to testify; [3] the proffered testimony [is] clearly exculpatory; [4] the testimony [is] essential; and [5] there [are] no strong governmental interests which countervail against a grant of immunity.‖ (Quinn, supra, 728 F.3d at p. 251, quoting Smith, supra, 615 F.2d at p. 972.) If the test is satisfied, the remedy is for the court to set aside the conviction 34 and put the prosecution to the choice of granting immunity or facing dismissal of the charges. Quinn emphasized that the remedy is not for the court itself to grant immunity. (Quinn, supra, 728 F.3d at pp. 259–260.) In California, the law regarding prosecutorial misconduct is settled: ―When a prosecutor‘s intemperate behavior is sufficiently egregious that it infects the trial with such a degree of unfairness as to render the subsequent conviction a denial of due process, the federal Constitution is violated. Prosecutorial misconduct that falls short of rendering the trial fundamentally unfair may still constitute misconduct under state law if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the trial court or the jury.‖ (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 462.) With these considerations in mind, we read Masters‘s claim to include the contention that the prosecutor committed misconduct by not granting immunity to Richardson. As we will explain, this claim of prosecutorial misconduct fails. Even if we were to assume that Smith and Quinn state the appropriate test for evaluating a constitutional claim arising from the denial of witness immunity, Masters fails to satisfy the five factors articulated by the Third Circuit. Preliminarily, we note that Smith did not find the presence of prosecutorial misconduct or the need for judicially conferred immunity; rather, Smith found only that the evidence was sufficient to require the trial court to hold a hearing and inquire further. (Smith, supra, 615 F.2d at p. 974.) Here, by contrast, the trial court held a hearing, and it rejected Masters‘s motion on the merits. Moreover, it was undisputed in Smith that a group of four assailants assaulted and robbed the victim; that the proposed defense witness would have testified he was one of those assailants; and that the monikers associated with the other three assailants implicated only one of the four defendants and therefore would have exonerated the remaining three defendants. (Smith, supra, 615 F.2d at 35 pp. 966–967, 974.) Here, by contrast, we have no comparable indication that Richardson would have testified that Masters was not involved in the murder. Although Richardson‘s out-of-court statements named several conspirators and did not name Masters, at no point did Richardson imply or state his list of conspirators was exhaustive. Richardson‘s statements did not clearly exculpate Masters. In addition, other evidence demonstrated Master‘s guilt, including a note in his own handwriting admitting his involvement in the conspiracy. ―[D]efense evidence that is overwhelmingly undercut or undermined by substantial prosecution evidence in the record becomes so lacking in credibility that it cannot be clearly exculpatory.‖ (Quinn, supra, 728 F.3d at p. 263, italics in original; cf. ibid. [―This is not an instance where the defense witness‘s testimony (even assuming it were given as [the defendant] hopes) would make suspect the Government‘s case. . . . [W]e cannot conclude [the] testimony was clearly exculpatory.‖].) In other words, the evidence of Masters‘s involvement overwhelms any inferences that might have been drawn from Richardson not naming Masters as a conspirator. Finally, Masters has not shown that the prosecutor‘s treatment of Richardson was an intentional effort to distort the factfinding process. In Smith, three of the defendants sought to introduce the potentially exculpatory testimony of a minor who ―came within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile authorities in the Virgin Island Attorney General‘s office.‖ (Smith, supra, 615 F.2d at p. 967.) The record revealed that those juvenile authorities ―had offered to grant . . . use immunity on the condition, prompted only out of prosecutorial courtesy, that the United States Attorney consent.‖ (Ibid.) For reasons that were unexplained at trial, ―this consent was never granted.‖ (Ibid.) Thus, in Smith there was evidence in the record that there was no governmental interest against a grant of immunity. 36 (Id. at p. 969 [the evidence ―suggest[ed] that the prosecution deliberately intended to keep this highly relevant, and possibly exculpatory, evidence from the jury‖].) Here, by contrast, although the magistrate struck the prosecutor‘s testimony at the preliminary hearing, it does not help Masters because the prosecutor testified that the reason he did not offer Richardson immunity was that Richardson refused to give a tape-recorded statement. The prosecutor did not act on the basis of an improper motive in requiring Richardson to give a recorded statement before offering him immunity. Similarly, the prosecutor testified that another witness was offered immunity because his potential testimony was also corroborated by other evidence, but no evidence was presented to corroborate Richardson‘s statements. Masters failed to show there was no countervailing governmental interest against granting immunity to Richardson. In sum, we cannot characterize the prosecutor‘s decision not to grant immunity to Richardson as egregious, unfair, deceptive, or reprehensible. The prosecutor‘s decision was not misconduct.