Opinion ID: 3064718
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: applies for such adjustment,

Text: (2) has been physically present in the United States for at least one year after being granted asylum, (3) continues to be a refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title or a spouse or child of such a refugee, (4) is not firmly resettled in any foreign country, and (5) is admissible . . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b). 6248 ROBLETO-PASTORA v. HOLDER humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest.” 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c). The BIA rejected petitioner’s claim for relief under section 209, reasoning that it made “no sense” in light of 8 U.S.C. § 1001.1(p), which provides that LPR status remains intact until issuance of a final order of removal. The BIA determined that petitioner retained his LPR status, not asylee status, and as such, could not avail himself of section 209(b) and (c). [11] Not surprisingly, we can find no case squarely addressing the issue of whether an alien who has adjusted status from asylee to LPR may seek relief from removal under section 209. The statute provides for an asylee’s adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident, a process petitioner completed in 1988. Accordingly, section 209(b) would appear to be inapplicable. Further, the waiver of inadmissibility in section 209(c) appears to be designed for consideration of inadmissibility when the issue is first considered, i.e., soon after the alien’s entry into the United States. Thus, we agree with the BIA that the petitioner’s invocation of section 209 “makes no sense” because it does not apply to lawful permanent residents seeking relief from removal. We find support for our perspective in cases from our sister circuits, which have held that refugees who adjust status to lawful permanent resident are ineligible for relief from removal under section 209(a) in connection with a waiver of inadmissibility under section 209(c). Gutnik v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 683, 692 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that an alien who adjusted status from refugee to LPR was no longer eligible to apply for a waiver of inadmissibility in connection with an adjustment of status under section 209); Kholyavskiy v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 555, 569 n.16 (7th Cir. 2008) (“We have held that, when an individual adjusts his status to that of lawful permanent resident, he still may meet the definition of a refugee under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); however, he no longer ROBLETO-PASTORA v. HOLDER 6249 retains his refugee status under 8 U.S.C. § 1157.”); Saintha v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 243, 252-53 (4th Cir. 2008) (applying Chevron deference to the BIA’s determination that a refugee who had already acquired LPR status was precluded from subsequently re-adjusting to LPR status). While these cases involve section 209(a), which concerns adjustment of status from refugee to LPR, they are nonetheless instructive. In Gutnik, the Seventh Circuit deferred to the BIA’s determination that relief under section 209 was unavailable to a removable refugee who had previously adjusted his status to that of LPR. Gutnik, 469 F.3d at 692. The BIA adopted the IJ’s reasoning that Gutnik was ineligible to apply for the waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c) because his prior adjustment of status to LPR terminated his refugee status. Id. at 685, 689. The BIA also noted that allowing Gutnik to apply for a waiver under section 209(c) would place “him at an unfair advantage over other aliens and would improperly insulate him from his criminal misconduct which occurred many years after his arrival as a refugee.” Id. at 689. The BIA’s reasoning appears to reflect a concern that non-refugee aliens who had previously adjusted status and were facing removal would not have similar opportunities to “readjust” under section 209.12 This reasoning echoes the concern we voiced in Kaganovich in deciding that refugee status should not be used to insulate aliens from the otherwise applicable removal statute. See Kaganovich, 470 F.3d at 898 (finding persuasive the BIA’s holding in In re Smriko, 23 I. & N. Dec. 836 (BIA 2005) that 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4) should not be read to shield refugees from the INA’s general removal provision). Similarly, in Saintha, the Fourth Circuit deferred to the 12 Although section 245(a) of the INA allows an alien to apply for adjustment of status, that section, unlike section 209, requires the alien to have a nonimmigrant visa immediately available. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). 6250 ROBLETO-PASTORA v. HOLDER BIA’s interpretation of section 209(a)(1) as precluding relief from removal for a refugee who had previously acquired LPR status.13 Saintha, 516 F.3d at 247, 253. The BIA rejected Saintha’s application to adjust status a second time under section 209(a) in connection with a waiver of inadmissibility under section 209(c), concluding that the plain language of section 209(a)(1) precluded “a refugee who has already acquired LPR status . . . from subsequently re-adjusting to LPR status.” Id. at 247. Specifically, the BIA read section 209(a)(1) as providing three criteria for adjusting status, one of which requires the alien not to have already “acquired permanent resident status.” Id. at 253. Because Saintha had already acquired LPR status, he could not satisfy this criterion, and therefore was ineligible to adjust status a second time. Id. The Fourth Circuit agreed with the BIA’s interpretation, noting that it was “logical to conclude that an alien . . . who has previously acquired permanent resident status but was later rendered removable by the commission of multiple crimes, is ineligible to acquire LPR status again under § 1159.” Id. 13 Section 209(a)(1) provides in relevant part: a) Criteria and procedures applicable for admission as immigrant; effect of adjustment. (1) Any alien who has been admitted to the United States under section 1157 of this title — (A) whose admission has not been terminated by the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General pursuant to such regulations as the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may prescribe, (B) who has been physically present in the United States for at least one year, and (C) who has not acquired permanent resident status, shall, at the end of such year period, return or be returned to the custody of the Department of Homeland Security for inspection and examination for admission to the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the provisions of sections 1225, 1229a, and 1231 of this title. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1) (emphasis added). ROBLETO-PASTORA v. HOLDER 6251 We find the Fourth and Seventh Circuits’ interpretation of section 209(a) to be persuasive. It is consistent with our conclusion that petitioner was a lawful permanent resident and not an asylee during the removal proceedings, and we see no reason why we should read 209(b) in a contrary manner with respect to asylees who have acquired lawful permanent resident status.14 Although section 209(a) explicitly provides that adjustment under that section is unavailable to refugees who have already “acquired permanent resident status,” see 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1)(C), and section 209(b) contains no such provision, the language of section 209(b) is nonetheless clear. It provides the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General with discretion to “adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence the status of any alien granted asylum . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b). It does not provide for “re-adjustment” of status for asylees who have already acquired LPR status, and we decline to expand the statute’s coverage to such individuals. To do so would provide unique relief to asylees who have acquired LPR status, while precluding such relief for similarly situated refugees, many of whom, unlike petitioner, will not have been convicted of an aggravated felony. 14 Petitioner cites several BIA cases in which a lawful permanent resident was permitted to seek relief from removal by “re-adjusting” status to that of LPR pursuant to section 245(a) of the INA in connection with section 212’s various waiver provisions. Those cases are inapposite as they concern distinct statutes whose requirements the aliens met. See In re Mendez-Moralez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 296 (BIA 1996); Matter of Gabryelsky, 20 I. & N. Dec. 750 (BIA 1993). More precisely, section 245(a) applies to any alien “who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States” and who has a nonimmigrant visa immediately available. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). By contrast, section 209(b) is much narrower, and only provides for an asylee’s adjustment of status to LPR. As set forth above, petitioner is no longer an asylee. Petitioner’s reliance on In re K-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 661 (BIA 2004) is also inapposite. In that case, although the BIA determined that an asylee could apply for relief from removal under section 209(b) and (c), that asylee had not previously acquired LPR status. 6252 ROBLETO-PASTORA v. HOLDER Significantly, the legislative history of the INA’s asylum provisions supports our reluctance to treat refugees and asylees disparately, as it indicates that the two classes of aliens were to have essentially “equivalent status” under the law. The INA’s asylum provisions were enacted into law pursuant to the Refugee Act of 1980. The Refugee Act, in addition to “regulariz[ing] the procedures governing the admission of refugees into the United States,” INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 425 (1984), required the Attorney General to establish procedures for “determining asylum claims filed by aliens who are physically present in the United States.” Refugee Act of 1980, S. Rep. No 96-256, at 9 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 149. The legislative history shows that Congress saw asylees and refugees as having similar status under the law, indicating that those granted asylum were to be “placed into a conditional admission status equivalent in most respects to that provided under current law to refugees.” Id. (emphasis added). Nothing in the legislative history indicates that asylum status was so distinct that it conferred an exemption from statutes governing the conduct of other aliens admitted to the United States, or otherwise provided additional relief from removal that was unavailable to refugees. See Kaganovich, 470 F.3d at 898 (agreeing with BIA’s determination that INA’s refugee provisions could not be read to immunize refugees from the INA’s removal provision). Consistent with this history, we decline to read section 209(b) as providing asylees who have acquired LPR status with additional avenues for avoiding removal that are otherwise foreclosed to similarly situated refugees. [12] As set forth above, at the time of his request for “readjustment” Robleto was, in fact, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. He retained that status until a final order of removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(p). Section 209(b), by its terms, contemplates an asylee’s adjustment of status to LPR, and does not extend relief to aliens who have already ROBLETO-PASTORA v. HOLDER 6253 acquired LPR status. This plain reading of section 209(b) is consistent with decisions of the Seventh and Fourth Circuits holding that relief from removal under 209(a) is unavailable to refugees who have adjusted status. Based on the foregoing, we deny Robleto’s petition and hold that an alien who acquired lawful permanent resident status based on a prior grant of asylum may not “re-apply” for LPR status and relief from removal under section 209(b). D. Due Process Claim Finally, petitioner asserts that the IJ denied him due process by denying his request for a continuance to obtain his immigration records. [13] “[A]n alien who faces deportation is entitled to a full and fair hearing of his claims and a reasonable opportunity to present evidence on his behalf.” Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2002). In order to show a due process violation, an applicant must show prejudice. Cano-Merida, 311 F.3d at 965. Prejudice is shown where the violation potentially affected the outcome of the proceedings. Id. [14] Petitioner fails to establish prejudice. Although the IJ conducted the removal proceedings in the absence of petitioner’s full immigration file, petitioner was able to present his claims for relief without it. Moreover, the BIA had the full record before it when examining petitioner’s appeal. As set forth above, nothing in petitioner’s file changes the fact that he is currently ineligible for asylum. Moreover, even after examining petitioner’s full immigration file, the BIA determined that petitioner failed to establish that his prior grant of asylum was based on actual, past persecution or that he was likely to suffer persecution upon return to Nicaragua. We find that the record supports this view. Accordingly, petitioner has failed to show that a continuance would have affected the outcome of the proceedings. 6254 ROBLETO-PASTORA v. HOLDER