Opinion ID: 1240701
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Quantum Meruit Issue.

Text: Trial court also found Harder liable to Chariton Feed on the ground of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit, relying on section 40 of the Restatement of Restitution: A person who has rendered services to another or services which have inured to the benefit of another or who has affixed chattels to the land or chattels of another is entitled to restitution therefor if the services were rendered or the chattels were affixed: (c) in the mistaken belief, of which the other knew or had reason to know, that the services would inure to the benefit of the one giving them or of a third person or that the other promised to pay for them. (Emphasis added.) In the circumstances of this case, the above section is inapplicable. It is couched in terms of services, not goods sold and delivered. Second, Restatement of Restitution, section 40 comment d makes clear that section 40 was designed to provide for restitution by one who accepts services from another with knowledge that the other is under a mistaken belief that the recipient, or a third party, has promised compensation. Where he knows that the other is under a mistake as to the terms of payment, his conduct in permitting the continuance of the services subjects him to liability for their value. Id. This rule assumes that the recipient enjoys greater knowledge of the circumstances under which the service is rendered than does the provider of the service. The facts of the instant appeal do not conform to that model. Harder knew no more of Davidson's precarious finances than did Chariton Feed. Similarly, Chariton Feed made no mistake as to the party with whom it dealt. Davidson ordered the grain, accepted delivery and promised to pay. Chariton Feed did not mistakenly deliver the goods to Harder, who, knowing of Chariton Feed's error, accepted them in bad faith. It is also clear that Harder did not benefit from the grain in a way that would distinguish his position from that of any landlord who has stock-share leased a farm to a financially strapped tenant. The trial court found Harder benefitted from the feed because he received credit for a portion of the milk and calf crop. These receipts were, however, rent to Harder, not payments to him as an owner of the enterprise. Any landlord benefits by continued receipt of rent from a tenant whose creditors do not press their claims. Moreover, the feed was consumed by livestock in which Harder had no interest. The conclusion that Harder was unjustly enriched in any way through his lease with Davidson must be viewed by the former with more than a little irony. Finally, Chariton Feed is confronted by the principle that the remedy of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit is based upon the concept of implied contract, and that in this jurisdiction the law will not imply a contract where there is an express contract. Vischering v. Kading, 368 N.W.2d 702, 712 (Iowa 1985); Guldberg v. Greenfield, 259 Iowa 873, 878, 146 N.W.2d 298, 301 (1966). An express contract and an implied contract cannot coexist with respect to the same subject matter, and the former supersedes the latter. Vischering, 368 N.W.2d at 712; Maasdam v. Estate of Maasdam, 237 Iowa 877, 887, 24 N.W.2d 316, 321 (1946). Here the record is uncontroverted that Chariton Feed had an express contract with Davidson for the price of the feed. Therefore no claim based on implied contract will lie. We hold trial court erred in holding Harder liable on Chariton Feed's account on the basis of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment. We vacate the court of appeals disposition, reverse the district court judgment and remand for judgment for defendant Harder. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED AND JUDGMENT OF DISTRICT COURT REVERSED.