Opinion ID: 1451182
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Departure and Variance

Text: Jenners also challenges the district court's decision to sentence Jenners to a term in excess of his advisory Guidelines range. The district court justified this higher sentence as either permissible under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 or as a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We agree with the district court and conclude that a variance under § 3553(a) was warranted. [T]he [sentencing] court has a range of choice, and ... its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law. United States v. Rouillard, 474 F.3d 551, 556 (8th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir.2005)). A court abuses its discretion and imposes an unreasonable sentence when it `fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; ... gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or ... considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.' Mousseau, 517 F.3d at 1048 (quoting Rouillard, 474 F.3d at 556). Post Booker, [4] a district court may vary from the otherwise applicable Guidelines range based on several factors including: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed ... (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; [and] (3) the kinds of sentences available.... 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see also United States v. Mosqueda-Estevez, 485 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir.2007) (laying out the three-step procedure that district courts should follow when sentencing a defendant). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Jenners to 96 months' imprisonment. Here, when examining Jenners's criminal history, the district court was permitted to consider that under the plea agreement, 24 of the 25 counts in the indictment were dismissed. See United States v. Yahnke, 395 F.3d 823, 826 (8th Cir.2005) (recognizing that the district court is not limited to only convictions when deciding whether to depart; it may consider uncharged misconduct provided that there is sufficient proof of the misconduct). Considering these 24 uncharged offenses along with Jenners's lengthy history of criminal conduct, we conclude that the district court's decision to vary from the Guidelines based upon an understated criminal history was supported by several § 3553(a) factors, including the need for the sentence to promote respect for the law, provide adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.