Opinion ID: 1444402
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Count Three: Alteration of Court Records

Text: The record contains three documents entitled Notice, Sentence, Commitment Form that purport to memorialize Henderson's September 20 diversion hearing. As to disposition, the first, exhibit No.17, is blank. The second, exhibit 18, appears to be a copy of the first with addition of the following handwritten entry for Henderson's sentence: Formal Diversion granted. Father to find counselling program. [6] The third, exhibit 19, appears to be a copy of the second with a handwritten addition indicating, per Dan Pursell, who was the district attorney on the case. Toward the bottom of the form, the following phrase was added to exhibit 19: Judge Fletcher Disqualifies himself for any violation of Diversion Hearings. Finally, a handwritten Post-it note attached to exhibit 19 stated: Judge Fletcherdisq. himself. On October 26, one of the court clerks, Fran Saunders, faxed exhibit 18 to the probation department to inform it of the diversion disposition. On October 25, the Commission sent petitioner a letter of inquiry regarding the ex parte contacts and the grant of diversion in the Henderson matter. Petitioner's December 30 response to the Commission letter attached a copy of exhibit 19, but did not inform the Commission that the exhibit contained entries that did not appear on exhibit 18. On November 2, the Commission obtained a copy of exhibit 18 from the probation department as part of the investigation of petitioner. In January 1995, the Commission asked petitioner to comment on allegations that, between October 26, 1994, and his December 30 response to the Commission, during the Commission's investigation, he directed alteration of the original minute order. Saunders testified as follows regarding preparation of these documents: On September 20, 1994, or sometime after that date but before October 26, she prepared a minute order in the form of exhibit 18. [7] She received a telephone call from the probation department regarding the status of the case. In response to the inquiry, on October 26, she faxed the probation department a copy of the then-existing minute order, which was in the form of exhibit 18. [8] A few days later, petitioner approached Saunders and directed her to change the minute order to reflect that he had disqualified himself from future hearings in the case and that diversion was granted per Dan Pursell. She asked petitioner whether he wanted her to prepare an amended minute order, because the court's policy was to prepare amended orders when existing orders were changed. Petitioner said no, he didn't, just to change it. Saunders did not recall petitioner's stating in court on September 20 that he was disqualifying himself from hearings on diversion violations. She testified that the minute order she originally prepared would have reflected that disqualification had she heard petitioner make that statement. On this record, we agree with the Commission's unanimous conclusion that petitioner committed willful misconduct in his handling of the minute orders. Petitioner directed the clerk to alter a minute order and, contrary to court policy, not to indicate she had changed the order. The evidence strongly suggests he took this action after receiving the Commission's inquiry about his ex parte communications in the case. Petitioner told the Commission he received the inquiry within 48 hours of an October 26 telephone conversation with Henderson's father, and Saunders testified that petitioner directed her to alter the minute order within a few days of that date. In any event, petitioner submitted a copy of exhibit 19 to the Commission with his December 30 response without disclosing that he had directed alteration of the minute order to support his explanation of the events in the Henderson case. Petitioner's actions in this regard constituted willful misconduct. (See Wenger v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1981) 29 Cal.3d 615, 643-645, 175 Cal.Rptr. 420, 630 P.2d 954 ( Wenger ) [back-dating affidavit was willful misconduct].) In defense of his actions, petitioner argues that he did not commit willful misconduct because the alterations simply conformed the minute orders to the docket entry for the September 20 hearing, which petitioner asserts was completed contemporaneously with the court session and constituted the court's official minutes. This docket entry, petitioner maintains, was the source of all of the material added to Exhibit No.17, to make Exhibits 18 and 19 in order to accurately reflect what had occurred. This being so, petitioner continues, Exhibits No.17, 18 and 19 are merely draft documents that cannot be `altered' and would not mislead experienced readers. According to petitioner, [t]he editing of a draft document cannot be an impermissible alteration if the draft document is, as yet, incomplete. For several reasons, petitioner's response is unpersuasive. First, regardless of the docket entry, the fact remains that, during the Commission's investigation of the Henderson matter, including petitioner's role in granting diversion, petitioner directed alteration of the order, directed that the order not indicate that it had been altered, and sent the Commission a copy of the altered order without detailing the circumstances. By forwarding only the altered order, petitioner presented the Commission with a grossly incomplete and misleading response. (See Adams, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 910-911, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 606, 897 P.2d 544 [judge's inaccurate and incomplete responses to the Commission constituted willful misconduct].) Second, the record contradicts petitioner's contention that the docket entry reflects all of the information added to the orders. The entry states: Diversion granted; Judge Fletcher disq. himself for any violation of Diversion hrgs. Although this entry reflects petitioner's disqualification on future diversion violation hearings, it does not indicate that diversion was granted per Dan Pursell. This alteration of the order was important to support petitioner's claim that, because he had disqualified himself, he let the prosecutor make the initial diversion decision. Third, the record also does not support petitioner's claim that the docket entry was completed contemporaneously with the September 20 hearing. The initials of the supervising clerk, Velma Dee Buchanan, appear beside the docket entry, indicating that she made it. However, Buchanan was not the clerk for the September 20 hearing; Saunders was. Moreover, Buchanan learned about petitioner's alleged disqualification sometime alter September 20, when petitioner discovered that the case file did not reflect disqualification and informed Buchanan of the situation. The record thus suggests that Buchanan made the docket entry sometime after, and not contemporaneously with, the September 20 hearing. Fourth, a conflict exists between the docket entry and the reporter's transcript of the September 20 hearing. Unlike the docket entry, but consistent with Saunders's recollection, the hearing transcript does not reflect that petitioner disqualified himself from future diversion violation hearings. On the contrary, it shows that petitioner Ordered the parties to appear before him again on March 21, 1995, for a compliance review hearing. Consistent with the transcript, on March 21, 1995, Henderson appeared before petitioner for a diversion review hearing. [9] Given all of the circumstances we have detailed, and the court reporter's certification that the transcript comprise[d] a full, true, and correct transcript of the September 20 hearing, we afford the reporter's transcript more credence than the docket entry. (See People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599, 189 Cal.Rptr. 862, 659 P.2d 1152.) Finally, petitioner's current contention that it was unnecessary to mark the altered orders as corrected stands in stark contrast to his position and the uncontradicted testimony before the special masters. In addition to Saunders's testimony regarding court policy, which we have already discussed, petitioner testified that Saunders should have followed court procedures for preparing an amended minute order in complying with his order to make the alterations. While cross-examining Saunders, he reiterated that court policy required her to indicate on the altered order that it was corrected or amended, and he challenged her testimony that he told [her] to break that policy and violate the law. And, in closing argument to the Commission, petitioner again stressed that, if [clerks] add anything to a minute order after the defendant signed, they are supposed to mark it amended and supposed [to] get the defendant to agree to it. Buchanan, the court's supervising clerk, confirmed petitioner's position, testifying that court policy prohibits clerks from altering signed minute orders like exhibit 18 without indicating across the top that they are corrected orders and distributing copies to all parties. She also testified that petitioner's policy was to ask for preparation of a corrected minute order if he discovered that a minute order did not reflect his verbal, order. Thus, petitioner's current position is directly contrary to the uncontradicted evidence in the record. Indeed, petitioner's newly minted explanation is just another example of his vague and contradictory representations throughout these disciplinary proceedings regarding these documents. Petitioner maintains that Saunders faxed exhibit 18 to the probation department at his request after he learned from Henderson's father on October 26 that Henderson was not complying with diversion requirements. In his February 1995 response to the Commission's January 1995 inquiry about the matter, petitioner stated: I don't recall looking at the minute order or the file on 10-26-94. Regarding the differences between exhibits 18 and 19, he stated: The only explanation I can offer is that Ms. Saunders sent a FAX copy to the probation department and then added the rest at some later time. In his answer to the Commission's notice of formal proceedings, petitioner gave a different account. He there maintained that, after receiving the call from Henderson's father on October 26, he pulled the file, discovered that the minute order did not correctly reflect that Henderson had been granted diversion pursuant to the district attorney's decision and that petitioner had disqualified himself, and ordered Saunders to make the necessary corrections and send it to the probation department. Petitioner's testimony before the special masters was initially consistent with this latter account, although he additionally noted that the minute order he found in the file on October 26 was in the form of exhibit 18. [10] However, after being confronted with his previous position in his February response, petitioner began to waver as to whether he looked at the file after the October 26 phone call. Later, in arguing his case to the Commission, petitioner changed his account once again. He told the Commission that his only order to Ms. Saunders was to fax the minute order to the probation department. Contrary to his testimony before the special masters, petitioner told the Commission that he had not ordered Saunders to amend the minute order. When asked whether he direct[ed] her to change it in any way, petitioner replied, No, I did not, and he suggested that Saunders made the changes on her own initiative. [11] Of course, as we have explained, petitioner has shifted his position yet again in this court, conceding that he directed Saunders to prepare a corrected minute order, but arguing that this action did not constitute misconduct because the altered documents were merely incomplete draft orders. Petitioner's representations regarding his disclosures to the Commission on this topic are similarly confused and inconsistent. Petitioner initially testified that, with his December 30 response to the Commission's inquiry about ex parte communications, he sent copies of both exhibits 18 and 19 to show that the order had been altered. He then explained that he obtained a copy of exhibit 18 on October 26 when he reviewed the file after talking with Henderson's father. Later, however, he testified that he copied exhibits 18 and 19 when he received the Commission's inquiry about the matter. He also later testified that he sent the exhibits, not with his December 30 response, but with his February 1995 response to the Commission's January 1995 inquiry about the altered minute orders. Regarding his submission of minute orders to the Commission, he then testified: I'm sorry. I don't recall now.... I remember sending two minute orders, but I don't remember which they were and when I looked at them.... Later, petitioner again testified that he sent the two minute orders in response to the Commission's January 1995 inquiry, but he could not recall how he got a copy of the order in the form of exhibit 18. Before the Commission, however, petitioner appeared to state that he first received a copy of the minute order in the form of exhibit 18 from the Commission as part of its January 1995 inquiry. This last statement was consistent with the Commission's position that petitioner never submitted a copy of a minute order in the form of exhibit 18 and that he had only submitted a copy of exhibit 19. Petitioner's continually shifting explanations regarding these exhibits are further evidence of his willful misconduct in attempting to deceive the Commission. (See Adams, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 910-911, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 606, 897 P.2d 544 [judge's inaccurate and incomplete responses to the Commission constituted willful misconduct].)