Opinion ID: 2181505
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Serious Health Condition

Text: The DCFMLA was designed to ensure job security and health benefits to an employee during a temporary period of absence resulting from a ... serious health condition[ ]. COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1990, BILL 8-82, at 2 (May 30, 1990) (REPORT). In order to accomplish these ends, the DCFMLA provides employees of a covered employer [10] with sixteen weeks of protected medical leave during any twenty-four-month period. D.C.Code § 36-1303(a) (1997), recodified at D.C.Code § 32-503(a) (2001). The act guarantees that an employee returning from medical leave will be restored to the same position which that employee held when the leave began, or to an equivalent position. Harrison v. Children's Nat'l Med. Ctr., 678 A.2d 572, 575 (D.C.1996); see also D.C.Code § 36-1305(d) (1997), recodified at D.C.Code § 32-505(d) (2001). Moreover, to the extent that employment benefits were provided prior to the temporary leave period, an employer is required to continue providing those benefits after an employee takes protected leave. See D.C.Code § 36-1305(a) (1997), recodified at D.C.Code § 32-505(a) (2001). The DCFMLA was intended to address many of the same policy concerns as its federal counterpart, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000). Both federal and local legislators recognized that many employers had failed to provide job security to employees who were forced by illness to take time off from work. In response, the DCFMLA and the federal FMLA were crafted to provide this needed job security while accommodating the legitimate interests of the workplace. See REPORT at 2, 5, supra; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(4), (b)(1) (2000). Under both the DCFMLA and the FMLA, an employee of a covered employer is entitled to take protected medical leave when unable to perform his or her job functions because of a serious health condition. D.C.Code § 36-1303(a) (1997), recodified at D.C.Code § 32-503(a) (2001); 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (2000). The DCFMLA definition of serious health condition is nearly identical to the FMLA definition of the same term. The D.C. statute defines serious health condition as: a physical or mental illness, injury, or impairment, that involves: (A) Inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential health care facility; or (B) Continuing treatment or supervision at home by a health care provider or other competent individual. D.C.Code § 36-1301(9) (1997), recodified at D.C.Code § 32-501(9) (2001). Similarly, the FMLA defines serious health condition as: an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves  (A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11) (2000). Therefore, under both acts, the existence of a serious health condition depends on the nature of care that is required to treat the illness. In the instant case, we are called upon to decide whether Ms. Chang suffered from a serious health condition entitling her to DCFMLA protection. Ms. Chang's treatment for hypertension did not involve inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or residential health care facility. Therefore, in order to find that she had a serious health condition within the meaning of the DCFMLA, we must determine whether she received continuing treatment for hypertension. See D.C.Code § 36-1301(9) (1997), recodified at D.C.Code § 32-501(9) (2001). Although the DCFMLA does not define continuing treatment, FMLA regulations and case law provide some insight into the meaning of this term. Because both statutes define serious health condition in the context of continuing treatment, we may properly look to FMLA regulations and case law as persuasive authority in interpreting our own statute. See, e.g., Grant, 786 A.2d at 583-84 (stating that we rely on case law construing the ADA as persuasive authority when assessing disability claims under the DCHRA because both acts contain similar definitions of disability); see also Walker v. District of Columbia, 656 A.2d 722, 725 (D.C.1995) ([b]ecause the Superior Court's Rule 11 is virtually identical to its federal counterpart, FED. R. CIV. P. 11, this court looks to federal cases interpreting the federal rule as persuasive authority in interpreting [the local] rule) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). Under the FMLA regulations, continuing treatment may include any one or more of the following: (a)(2)(i) a period of incapacity ( i.e., inability to work, attend school or perform other regular daily activities due to the serious health condition, treatment therefor, or recovery therefrom) of more than three consecutive calendar days, and any subsequent treatment or period of incapacity relating to the same condition, that also involves: (A) Treatment two or more times by a health care provider, by a nurse or physician's assistant under direct supervision of a health care provider, or by a provider of health care services ( e.g., physical therapist) under orders of, or on referral by, a health care provider; or (B) Treatment by a health care provider on at least one occasion which results in a regimen of continuing treatment under the supervision of the health care provider. . . . 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2) (2003) (italics in original). Treatment by a health care provider includes examinations to determine if a serious health condition exists and evaluations of the condition, while a regimen of continuing treatment includes, for example, a course of prescription medication. . . . 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(b). Courts have interpreted these regulations to mean that an employee who is (1) incapacitated for more than three days, (2) seen once by a doctor, and (3) prescribed a course of medication, such as an antibiotic, [] has a `serious health condition' worthy of FMLA protection. Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 163 (1st Cir.1998) (plaintiff with symptoms of angina and hypertension who took three days leave for purposes of diagnosis had a serious health condition because he had seen a physician at least once and been placed on a treatment regimen of medication); Brannon v. OshKosh B'Gosh, Inc., 897 F.Supp. 1028, 1037 (M.D.Tenn. 1995) (holding that child's throat and upper respiratory infection constituted serious health condition under FMLA where child had visited health care provider, was given a course of prescription medication, and was advised by doctor to stay home for more than three days). Ms. Chang has presented both medical records and testimony from her physician indicating that during her absence from work, she visited her physician, was diagnosed with hypertension, was given prescription medication to treat her hypertension and was told to stay home from work for more than three consecutive days. As a result, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found that Ms. Chang had a serious medical condition within the meaning of the DCFMLA.