Opinion ID: 781398
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to grant a downward departure due to the methamphetamine's dilution

Text: 17 Gori challenges the District Court's failure to depart downward from the U.S.S.G. due to the low purity (as noted, 2.7 percent on average) of the methamphetamine mixture he sold. We may review a claim for downward departure only when the District Court was not aware of its authority to grant a downward departure. United States v. Georgiadis, 933 F.2d 1219, 1222 (3d Cir.1991) (If we determine the district court was aware of its authority to depart from the Guidelines, and chose not to, we are without power to inquire further into the merits of its refusal to grant [appellant's] request.); United States v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 272 (3d Cir.1989); see also Miele, 989 F.2d at 668 n. 11. In this case we have jurisdiction because the District Court did not believe it had the authority to depart downward. 18 The District Court was correct in refusing to depart downward, because to do so based on the low quality of a drug is an improper exercise of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Beltran, 122 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (8th Cir.1997); United States v. Upthegrove, 974 F.2d 55, 56-57 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Davis, 868 F.2d 1390, 1393 (5th Cir.1989); cf. United States v. Benish, 5 F.3d 20, 27-28 (3d Cir.1993) (stating that the District Court lacked discretion to depart downward based on the age and sex of marijuana plants, which made them possibly weak). 19 Downward departures are proper only if the court finds `that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.' U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). In this case, as the Upthegrove Court noted, the Sentencing Commission explicitly decided to make a defendant's sentence turn on a drug's weight, not its purity. Upthegrove, 974 F.2d at 56. If district courts could depart from the Drug Quantity Table anytime they are faced with drugs of less than `average' purity, the Sentencing Commission's decision to focus on the weight of the drugs in sentencing would be eviscerated. Id. 20 E. Claim that methamphetamines are a Schedule III drug rather than a Schedule II drug 21 Finally, Gori argues that 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) classifies powdered methamphetamine as a Schedule III drug, for which the maximum punishment is five years, rather than the ten years he received for a Schedule II drug. Gori acknowledges that 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(d) reclassifies methamphetamine as a Schedule II drug, but nonetheless contends that the statute's classification must take precedence over that in the regulation. 22 Whatever the validity of this argument, it is irrelevant here. Section 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) imposes a minimum ten-year penalty for illegal activity involving 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, or salts of its isomers. The clear language of § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) indicates that its ten-year minimum penalty depends on whether a defendant has dealt in more than 500 grams of a methamphetamine mixture and not at all on the schedule in which methamphetamine belongs. 23 Moreover, Gori is wrong that § 812's classification of methamphetamine supersedes the subsequent regulation. 21 U.S.C. § 811(a)(1) expressly authorizes the Attorney General to transfer between such schedules any drug or other substance upon making findings and in accordance with typical notice and comment rulemaking procedures. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(d) was properly promulgated. See, e.g., United States v. Roark, 924 F.2d 1426, 1428 (8th Cir.1991). Therefore the Attorney General validly reclassified methamphetamine as a Schedule II drug. 24