Opinion ID: 2018592
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Plaintiff Sufficiently Established a Promissory Estoppel Claim

Text: Having recognized that Illinois law allows promissory estoppel as an affirmative cause of action, we turn next to Kubota's alternative argument that Newton has not stated a promissory estoppel claim sufficient to survive summary judgment. Kubota has argued that even if promissory estoppel is a recognized cause of action, Newton has still failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact with respect to each of promissory estoppel's four elements. Specifically, Kubota contends that Newton has forfeited any argument as to elements (3) and (4) as a result of the trial court's reasoning regarding Newton's fraud claim brought in count II. Two elements of fraudthat the plaintiff justifiably relied on the false statements of the defendant, and that the reliance caused damageare similar to the third and fourth elements of promissory estoppel. Compare Doe v. Dilling, 228 Ill.2d 324, 342-43, 320 Ill.Dec. 807, 888 N.E.2d 24 (2008), with Quake, 141 Ill.2d at 310, 152 Ill.Dec. 308, 565 N.E.2d 990. The circuit court made rulings on each of these fraud elements. The circuit court found, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Newton, that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the two elements of reliance and detriment. The court concluded, [T]here can be no justifiable reliance or proximate causation of damages for allegedly fraudulent statements made after the [asset purchase agreement] was signed   . Further, because the asset purchase agreement could have been rescinded if Newton did not receive the Kubota dealership, the court found that Jacobson's statements could not have caused damage to Newton. Newton's appeal to the appellate court addressed the circuit court order granting summary judgment for Kubota on each of Newton's three counts. However, in its brief, Newton argued only its theory of promissory estoppel. Newton presented no argument on either the fraud or misrepresentation claims. Kubota asserts that the circuit court's reasoning and judgment that Newton lacked justifiable reliance must stand and that Newton has forfeited any argument on that point. At oral argument, counsel for Newton noted that on appeal it decided to move forward on what it thought was the best ground of appeal, and that Newton did argue to the appellate court that Newton justifiably relied on Jacobson's statements and that it did so to its detriment. Thus, although Newton forfeited any further consideration of its fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims as a whole, we conclude that it did properly preserve its argument in the appellate court against the circuit court's determination that Newton lacked detrimental reliance. Kubota asserts that even if the issue is not forfeited, Newton's claim nonetheless fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact on each of the four elements of promissory estoppel. However, neither the circuit court nor the appellate court has yet addressed whether there is any genuine issue of material fact with respect to Newton's promissory estoppel claim. Kubota argues that the circuit court did address the issues of reliance and damages when considering Newton's fraud claim. Reviewing the circuit court's decision on Newton's fraud claim, however, would require this court to determine whether the elements of fraud and promissory estoppel are identical for purposes of reviewing a grant of summary judgment. That issue has not been posed to this court or briefed by the parties. For that reason, we decline to address it, and instead remand to the circuit court for further consideration.