Opinion ID: 7089211
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Impeachment with Prior Inconsistent Statement

Text: {¶ 195} In his eighth proposition of law, Tench contends that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to impeach a prosecution witness with extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement. Although we agree that the trial court erred, we hold that the error is harmless. {¶ 196} In its case-in-chief, the state called Kathleen McGuire, a nurse who worked on the assisted-living side of Ennis Court, where Mary also worked. On  November 11 to 12, 2013, McGuire was working the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift. She testified on direct examination that if anyone had telephoned Ennis Court that night, the call would have gone either to her or to the nurse working on the nursing-home side. McGuire testified that she answered only one phone call that night and that the call was from the Brunswick police. She specifically testified that she never answered a call from Tench. {¶ 197} On cross-examination, McGuire testified that a detective-Detective Hosta, she thought-had interviewed her by telephone after Mary's disappearance. Defense counsel asked McGuire, So you didn't advise her that James had called two times? McGuire answered no. {¶ 198} Later, Brunswick police detective Sarah Merhaut, formerly Sarah Hosta, testified for the state. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Merhaut, So if you wrote [in a report] that when you went to Ennis Court and Kathleen McGuire answered- [.] The state objected to the question as calling for hearsay; the trial court sustained the objection. Defense counsel continued: And you learned [from McGuire] that several calls were answered- [.] Again the state objected, and again the trial court sustained the objection. {¶ 199} At sidebar, defense counsel explained that Merhaut's report contained a statement by McGuire that two calls were answered from James Tench, which was inconsistent with McGuire's direct-examination testimony that Tench had not called Ennis Court. The state argued, and the trial court agreed, that questioning Merhaut about McGuire's statement called for hearsay. {¶ 200} The trial court erred; the defense was entitled to impeach McGuire by eliciting Merhaut's testimony about the prior inconsistent statement. Evid.R. 613 addresses impeachment by self-contradiction, that is, the use of a witness's prior inconsistent statements to impeach the witness. Evid.R. 613(B) provides: Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is admissible if both of the following apply: (1) If the statement is offered solely for the purpose of impeaching the witness, the witness is afforded a prior opportunity to explain or deny the statement and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness on the statement or the interests of justice otherwise require; (2) The subject matter of the statement is one of the following: (a) A fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action other than the credibility of a witness   .  The rule specifically contemplates the admission of extrinsic evidence of a prior statement under the circumstances outlined in Evid.R. 613(B).  State v. McKelton , 148 Ohio St.3d 261 , 2016-Ohio-5735 , 70 N.E.3d 508 , ¶ 125. {¶ 201} The subject matter of McGuire's alleged statement was whether Tench had telephoned Ennis Court during the night of November 11 or morning of November 12, 2013. This was a fact    of consequence to the determination of the action within the meaning of Evid.R. 613(B)(2)(a). Accordingly, once McGuire denied making the statement, the rule entitled Tench to adduce extrinsic evidence-Merhaut's testimony-to show that she had made it, for the limited purpose of impeaching her credibility. {¶ 202} The state argues that Evid.R. 613(B) does not apply, because the defense did not attempt to impeach McGuire with McGuire's statement to Detective Merhaut when McGuire testified. This is simply wrong. In cross-examining McGuire, the defense gave her the opportunity to explain or deny the statement, Evid.R. 613(B)(1), as the following passage from the trial transcript shows: Q. [Defense counsel]    [Y]ou were asked on direct if you received any phone calls that evening from James Tench. A. No, I didn't. Q. Did you interview with Detective Hosta? A. I had a detective call me on the phone but I'm not sure if that was the last name. I think it was. Q.    Was that after Mary's disappearance? A. Oh, yeah. Q. Okay. So you didn't advise her that James had called two times? A. No . (Emphasis added.) {¶ 203} The state also argues that McGuire's statement to Merhaut was classic hearsay that could be used to impeach McGuire only during McGuire's testimony. This argument simply ignores Evid.R. 613(B). The rule does not limit inconsistent-statement impeachment to cross-examination, but specifically contemplates the use of extrinsic evidence. McKelton , 148 Ohio St.3d 261 , 2016-Ohio-5735 , 70 N.E.3d 508 , at ¶ 125. {¶ 204} And the state's hearsay concerns are misplaced, because extrinsic evidence of the prior inconsistent statement was admissible only to impeach McGuire. The defense could not have used her prior inconsistent statement as  hearsay, i.e., as substantive evidence that the matter asserted in the statement was true. See id. at ¶ 128 ; State v. Bethel , 110 Ohio St.3d 416 , 2006-Ohio-4853 , 854 N.E.2d 150 , ¶ 182-184. Furthermore, the trial court could have given a limiting instruction to ensure that the jury would not improperly consider the prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence. {¶ 205} Because Evid.R. 613(B) entitled the defense to use extrinsic evidence of McGuire's prior inconsistent statement to impeach McGuire, the trial court erred by sustaining the state's objection to the attempted impeachment. However, as we discuss above, the evidence of Tench's guilt is overwhelming. We therefore hold that the error was harmless. Tench's eighth proposition of law is overruled.