Opinion ID: 179722
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to disclose the Nelson impeachment materials

Text: Brooks argues that impeaching evidence concerning Nelson, the jailhouse snitch, was withheld by the prosecution in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). In Brady, the Supreme Court held that a defendant's due process rights are violated where the government withholds evidence favorable to a defendant that is material either to guilt or to punishment. Id. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. To demonstrate a Brady violation, a habeas petitioner must establish three elements: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). A habeas petitioner demonstrates prejudice by showing that the suppressed evidence is material. Id. at 282, 119 S.Ct. 1936. A state's suppression of Brady evidence constitutes cause under the procedural-default doctrine. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004). The prejudice prong for both analyses is the same. Id. Thus, a petitioner who proves a Brady violation demonstrates cause and prejudice to excuse procedural default of the Brady claim. Id. Brooks contends that the prosecution failed to disclose to defense counsel significant impeaching materials concerning Nelson, either prior to or during Brooks's trial in the Montgomery County Criminal Court. He identifies two categories of evidence that purportedly constitute Brady materials concerning Nelson: (1) his Tennessee Department of Corrections records showing his chronic mental illnesses, his recurrent service as a snitch, and some perks of snitching; and (2) the Montgomery Country records showing his prior felony convictions for forgery and perjury. Brooks concedes that this claim is procedurally defaulted because he failed to raise it before the state courts, but argues that he has demonstrated cause and prejudice by setting forth a meritorious Brady claim. He also argues that the only aspect of Brady at issue on appeal is the materiality of the suppressed evidence. The State disagrees with Brooks. It contends that the suppression prong of the Brady analysis is also an issue on appeal. According to the State, Brooks has not demonstrated cause for his procedural default because he is unable to show that the Nelson impeachment materials were in fact suppressed by the State. The State also asserts that, in any event, the purportedly suppressed impeachment evidence is not material. Accordingly, the State reasons that Brooks has neither demonstrated a valid Brady claim nor excused his procedural default. Because this claim was not previously raised before or adjudicated by the state courts, we review it under pre-AEDPA standards. Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441, 469 (6th Cir.2006) (explaining that this court reviews a Brady claim based on evidence disclosed during federal habeas proceedings under pre-AEDPA standards because no state court reviewed the merits of that claim (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). We therefore will not set aside the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, but will review an alleged Brady violation de novo because whether a Brady violation occurred is a mixed question of law and fact. Id. Brooks does not provide any substantive argument that the State withheld evidence of Nelson's recurrent service as a snitch, and some perks of snitching, and therefore this argument is deemed waived. See Spirko v. Mitchell, 368 F.3d 603, 612 (6th Cir.2004) (It is a settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Regarding the evidence for which Brooks provides substantive argumentNelson's history of mental illness and his convictions for forgery and perjurythe State does not dispute that this evidence is favorable to Brooks as impeachment material that could have been used to discredit Nelson's testimony about Brooks's putative jailhouse confession. And, for the purposes of this analysis, we will assume without deciding that the evidence was suppressed. This leaves the third Brady factor of prejudice, also described as the materiality of the evidence. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (describing the third component of the Brady analysis as whether petitioner has established the prejudice necessary to satisfy the `materiality' inquiry). The standard for Brady materiality was set forth by the Supreme Court in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). As the Court there held, suppressed evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 433-34, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (citation omitted). The reasonable-probability standard does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal (whether based on the presence of reasonable doubt or acceptance of an explanation for the crime that does not inculpate the defendant). Id. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555. As the Supreme Court explained, [t]he question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A reasonable probability of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). In making this determination, we review the evidence collectively, not item by item. Id. at 436, 115 S.Ct. 1555. The documents discovered by Brooks during the federal habeas proceedings below and provided to this court demonstrate that, while incarcerated, Nelson (1) engaged in multiple suicide attempts, heard voices, suffered from insomnia, hallucinations, and alcohol abuse; (2) was diagnosed with malingering, antisocial personality disorder, self-mutilation, borderline mental retardation, schizophrenia, and [o]rganic mental disorder with hallucinations; and (3) was prescribed antipsychotic medications. In fact, in the two months before Nelson testified as a State witness at Brooks's trial in August 1996, Nelson refused to take his recommended medication for an infection in his leg, and he ingested paper clips. During the three months following the trial, Nelson was prescribed major tranquillizers and was placed on a 30-minute monitoring schedule. These documents also reveal that Nelson informed prison authorities about the smuggling of drugs and other impermissible items by other inmates, that he requested to be isolated from these inmates, and that he once testified falsely against an inmate, resulting in that inmate's conviction. Nelson's convictions in Montgomery County for passing forged instruments (August 1977 and April 1979) and perjury (August 1981) were also among the materials provided. The indictment for the perjury charge states that Nelson falsely swore that a man shot him, which resulted in the man being arrested and charged with attempted murder. In the present case, the materiality question is a close one. As a professional and ethical matter, the prosecution should have discovered this important background information about Nelson before calling him as a witness. This is particularly true regarding Nelson's prior convictions for forgery and perjury, which were obtained by the very same prosecutor's office as was trying Brooks's case. Moreover, Nelson gave inaccurate testimony at trial concerning the extent of his prior criminal history, which the prosecution failed to correct. This was a serious professional failing. Nevertheless, the Brady standard for materiality is less demanding than the ethical obligations imposed on a prosecutor. See Cone v. Bell, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1769, 1783 n. 15, 173 L.Ed.2d 701 (2009) (Although the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by Brady, only mandates the disclosure of material evidence, the obligation to disclose evidence favorable to the defense may arise more broadly under a prosecutor's ethical or statutory obligations.). As previously explained, under Brady, we look to the undisclosed evidence as a whole to determine whether there is a reasonable probability that, had this evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34, 115 S.Ct. 1555. Evidence that is merely cumulative to evidence presented at trial is not material for purposes of Brady analysis. Carter v. Mitchell, 443 F.3d 517, 533 n. 7 (6th Cir.2006). At trial, both the prosecution and the defense introduced evidence that impeached Nelson's credibility. The prosecution elicited testimony from Nelson about his convictions for larceny from a person, grand larceny, and jail escape. Nelson admitted that he first went to prison when he was 18-years old and had spent about 10 years in prison. During cross-examination, Nelson also testified that he had been convicted for breach of trust. He further admitted that he had gathered information and helped out the authorities ... several times in prison. Nelson in fact acknowledged that he had testified as a jailhouse informant in at least one other criminal case. And he stated that he considered himself a professional snitch who received special privileges in prison for his assistance. In his closing argument, Brooks's trial counsel vigorously attacked the credibility of Nelson as a witness, arguing that this professional snitch was dishonest and had ulterior motives for testifying. He emphasized the testimony of Lieutenant Tackett, who had known Nelson for fifteen years. As counsel argued: Can we understand why a high-ranking official with the Montgomery County Sheriff's Department may be a little reluctant to testify for a Defense Attorney? Yes. A Defense Attorney, probably not something they are in the habit of doing[.] But when he gets on the stand and he gets under oath, he tells you what his opinion is[.] He wouldn't believe anything Mr. Nelson tells him. The jury therefore heard evidence that Nelson was a professional snitch, that he received benefits from snitching, that he had an extensive criminal history, and that he was unworthy of belief. This impeaching evidence was highlighted for the jury by defense counsel in his closing argument. As the district court recognized, if no impeachment evidence had been disclosed concerning Nelson, this lack of impeachment would certainly have been material. See Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441, 472 (6th Cir.2006) (We have little trouble assuming that, if all five items [of impeachment evidence] had been completely undisclosed, they certainly would have been material/prejudicial under Brady. ). But here substantial evidence impeaching Nelson's credibility was disclosed and presented at trial. The Supreme Court has long recognized the serious questions of credibility informers pose. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 701, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This court has similarly concluded that an informant-witness is sufficiently impeached, rendering the undisclosed impeachment materials nonmaterial, where [t]he jury was apprised of [the informant's] status and the possible other reasons for his decision to testify, namely, that he wished to secure early parole as a result of his participation in the [defendant's] case. Bell v. Bell, 512 F.3d 223, 237 (6th Cir.2008) (en banc). As was the case in Bell v. Bell, the disclosure of the additional Nelson impeachment materials in the present case would not have permitted the development of alternate theories or different lines of argument. See id. Nelson's credibility was effectively impeached at trial. Evidence of his history of mental illness would have provided additional reasons not to credit his testimony, but would have been cumulative to the evidence already in the record. Moreover, under Tennessee evidentiary law, Nelson's convictions for perjury and forgery were presumptively inadmissible due to the fact that they were over 15-years old at the time of Brooks's August 1996 trial. See Tenn. R. Evid. 609(b). We therefore conclude that, although this issue is uncomfortably close to the constitutional line, the undisclosed evidence was not material under Brady.