Opinion ID: 2444991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: federal precedent

Text: As the majority observes, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), the United States Supreme Court rejected the very same claim under the fourth amendment to the federal constitution that the defendant in the present case raises under the state constitution. Specifically, the court in Schneckloth concluded that the question [of] whether a consent to a search was in fact `voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an effective consent. Id., at 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041. For the reasons that follow, I am unpersuaded by the court's analysis in Schneckloth, at least in the context of a request for consent during a routine traffic stop. [5] In Schneckloth, the court commenced its analysis by observing that [t]he most extensive judicial exposition of the meaning of `voluntariness' has been developed in those cases in which the [c]ourt has had to determine the `voluntariness' of a defendant's confession for purposes of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment. Id., at 223, 93 S.Ct. 2041. A review of these cases, the court explained, reveals no talismanic definition of `voluntariness,' mechanically applicable to the host of situations [in which] the question has arisen.... It cannot be taken literally to mean a `knowing' choice. (Citation omitted.) Id., at 224, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Rather, `voluntariness' has reflected an accommodation of the complex of values implicated in police questioning of a suspect. At one end of the spectrum is the acknowledged need for police questioning as a tool for the effective enforcement of criminal laws.... At the other end of the spectrum is the set of values reflecting society's deeply felt belief that the criminal law cannot be used as an instrument of unfairness, and that the possibility of unfair and even brutal police tactics poses a real and serious threat to civilized notions of justice. (Citations omitted.) Id., at 224-25, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The court further explained that, in light of these competing concerns, it traditionally has framed the test for voluntariness as whether the confession [is] the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.... Id., at 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041. In making this determination, the court made clear that the totality of the circumstances must be considered, and, although the accused's awareness of his constitutional rights is one of several factors relevant to that determination, it is not a dispositive factor. Id., at 226-27, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The court in Schneckloth reasoned that a similar analysis should apply to the determination of whether a suspect voluntarily has given consent to search. As with police questioning, two competing concerns must be accommodated in determining the meaning of a `voluntary' consent the legitimate need for such searches and the equally important requirement of assuring the absence of coercion. Id., at 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041. In reaching this conclusion, the court observed that, in cases in which the police may have some evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, consent searches serve a vital purpose because they may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence. Id. These searches, the court stated, may [provide] some assurance that [third parties], wholly innocent of the crime, [will] not [be] mistakenly brought to trial. Id., at 228, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The court then stated that requiring the state to prove affirmatively ... that the subject of the search knew that he had a right to refuse consent would, in practice, create serious doubt [about] whether consent searches could continue to be conducted. Id., at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041. In support of this assertion, the court explained: There might be rare cases [in which] it could be proved from the record that a person in fact affirmatively knew of his right to refuse.... But more commonly where there was no evidence of any coercion, explicit or implicit, the prosecution would nevertheless be unable to demonstrate that the subject of the search in fact had known of his right to refuse consent. Id., at 229-30, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The very object of the inquirythe nature of a person's subjective understandingunderlines the difficulty of the prosecution's burden under [a] rule [that would require proof of such knowledge]. Any defendant who [is] the subject of a search authorized solely by his consent could effectively frustrate the introduction into evidence of the fruits of that search by simply failing to testify that he in fact knew [that] he could refuse to consent. And the near impossibility of meeting this prosecutorial burden suggests why [the] [c]ourt has never accepted any such litmus-paper test of voluntariness. Id., at 230, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The court in Schneckloth acknowledged that the police officer seeking consent to search the vehicle in that case simply could have informed the subject of the traffic stop that he had the right to withhold such consent. The court, however, rejected that approach, reasoning as follows: One alternative that would go far toward proving that the subject of a search did know [that] he had a right to refuse consent would be to advise him of that right before eliciting his consent....[I]t would be thoroughly impractical [however] to impose on the normal consent search the detailed requirements of an effective warning. Consent searches are part of the standard investigatory techniques of law enforcement agencies. They normally occur on the highway, or in a person's home or office, and under informal and unstructured conditions. The circumstances that prompt the initial request to search may develop quickly or be a logical extension of investigative police questioning. The police may seek to investigate further suspicious circumstances or to follow up leads developed in questioning persons at the scene of a crime. These situations are a far cry from the structured atmosphere of a trial where, assisted by counsel if he chooses, a defendant is informed of his trial rights.... And, while surely a closer question, these situations are still immeasurably far removed from `custodial interrogation' where, in Miranda v. Arizona, [384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)], we found that the [c]onstitution required certain now familiar warnings as a prerequisite to police interrogation. (Citation omitted.) Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, 412 U.S. at 231-32, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The court in Schneckloth also rejected the respondent's contention that, because `consent' is a waiver of a person's rights under the [f]ourth and [f]ourteenth [a]mendments, to establish waiver, the state must be required to demonstrate `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' Id., at 235, 93 S.Ct. 2041. In so concluding, the court observed that a knowing and intelligent waiver is not required whenever a subject declines to invoke a constitutional protection; instead, waiver analysis applies only to those rights needed to protect the fairness of a trial or trial-type proceeding. Id., at 237-38, 93 S.Ct. 2041. By way of example, the court observed that, in Miranda, it had found that custodial interrogation by the police was inherently coercive, and consequently held that detailed warnings were required to protect the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. The [c]ourt [in Miranda ] made it clear that the basis for [its] decision was the need to protect the fairness of the trial itself: `That counsel is present when statements are taken from an individual during interrogation obviously enhances the integrity of the fact-finding processes in court.... Without the protections flowing from adequate warnings and the rights of counsel, all the careful safeguards erected around the giving of testimony, whether by an accused or any other witness, would become empty formalities in a procedure where the most compelling possible evidence of guilt, a confession, would have already been obtained at the unsupervised pleasure of the police.' [ Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602]. (Emphasis in original.) Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, 412 U.S. at 240, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The court continued: [T]here is a vast difference between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the [f]ourth [a]mendment. Id., at 241, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Thus, the court concluded that there was no reason to extend the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver to consent searches. See id. The fourth amendment, the court explained, was not designed to protect the accuracy of the truth determining process at trial; instead, it protects an individual's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police. Id., at 242, 93 S.Ct. 2041. In support of this assertion, the court relied on its prior determination that there is no likelihood of unreliability or coercion present in a search-and-seizure case.... (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Consequently, the court maintained, it cannot be said [that] every reasonable presumption ought to be indulged against voluntary relinquishment.... [I]t is no part of the policy underlying the [f]ourth and [f]ourteenth [a]mendments to discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the apprehension of criminals.... Rather, the community has a real interest in encouraging consent, for the resulting search may yield necessary evidence for the solution and prosecution of crime, evidence that may [e]nsure that a wholly innocent person is not wrongly charged with a [crime]. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 243, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The court further explained that it would be next to impossible to apply to a consent search the standard of `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' Id. According to the court, in determining whether one knowingly and voluntarily has waived a right, a trial judge in the structured atmosphere of a courtroom must conduct an examination into whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused. Id., at 243-44, 93 S.Ct. 2041. This detailed examination would be unrealistic in the informal, unstructured context of a consent search.... And if, for this reason a diluted form of `waiver' were found [to be] acceptable, that would itself be ample recognition of the fact that there is no universal standard that must be applied in every situation [in which] a person forgoes a constitutional right. Id., at 245, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Finally, the court explained that Miranda does not compel a knowledge requirement in the context of a consent search. Id., at 246, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The court asserted that, unlike the inherent coerciveness of custodial interrogation that requires safeguards to ensure voluntariness, consent searches normally occur on a person's own familiar territory... [and thus] the specter of incommunicado police interrogation in some remote station house is simply inapposite. There is no reason to believe ... that the response to a policeman's question is presumptively coerced; and there is, therefore, no reason to reject the traditional test for determining the voluntariness of a person's response. Miranda, of course, did not reach investigative questioning of a person not in custody, which is most directly analogous to the situation of a consent search, and it assuredly did not indicate that such questioning ought to be deemed inherently coercive. Id., at 247, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The court thus concluded that a consent search following a routine traffic stop may pass muster under the fourth amendment even though the police have not informed the subject of the stop that he or she may decline to give consent to the search. See id., at 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041. In separate opinions, Justices William O. Douglas, William J. Brennan, Jr., and Thurgood Marshall dissented from the opinion of the majority in Schneckloth. Justice Douglas concluded that a suspect should be informed of his right to withhold consent because, `[u]nder many circumstances a reasonable person might read an officer's [m]ay I as the courteous expression of a demand backed by force of law.' Id., at 275-76, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In the same vein, Justice Brennan stated that [t]he [c]ourt holds ... that an individual can effectively waive this right even though he is totally ignorant of the fact that, in the absence of his consent, such invasions of his privacy would be constitutionally prohibited. It wholly escapes me how our citizens can meaningfully be said to have waived something as precious as a constitutional guarantee without ever being aware of its existence. Id., at 277, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's dissent has been celebrated by commentators and scholars. See, e.g., A. Loewy, Knowing `Consent' Means `Knowing Consent': The Underappreciated Wisdom of Justice Marshall's Schneckloth v. Bustamonte Dissent, 79 Miss. L.J. 97, 104-108 (2009). Justice Marshall begins his dissent with the observation that, [s]everal years ago, [Justice Potter Stewart, the author of the majority opinion in Schneckloth ] reminded us that `[t]he [c]onstitution guarantees ... a society of free choice. Such a society presupposes the capacity of its members to choose.' Ginsburg [Ginsberg] v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 [88 S.Ct. 1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 195] (1968) ([Stewart, J.] concurring in result). I would have thought that the capacity to choose necessarily depends [on] knowledge that there is a choice to be made. But ... the [majority in Schneckloth ] reaches the curious result that one can choose to relinquish a constitutional rightthe right to be free [from] unreasonable searcheswithout knowing that he has the alternative of refusing to accede to a police request to search. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, 412 U.S. at 277, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Justice Marshall's view, because the United States Supreme Court always had scrutinized with great care claims that a person has forgone the opportunity to assert constitutional rights, there is no reason why that analysis should not apply with equal force to the issue of whether a simple statement of assent to search, without more, should be sufficient to permit the police to search and thus act as a relinquishment of [that person's] constitutional right to exclude the police. Id., at 278, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (Marshall, J., dissenting). After concluding that cases involving coerced confessions are inapposite in the context of a consent search, [6] Justice Marshall rejected the assertion of the majority in Schneckloth that consent `cannot be taken literally to mean a knowing choice.' Id., at 284, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice Marshall explained that he had difficulty in comprehending how a decision made without knowledge of available alternatives can be treated as a choice at all. Id. Furthermore, [i]f consent to search means that a person has chosen to forgo his right to exclude the police from the place they seek to search, it follows that his consent cannot be considered a meaningful choice unless he knew that he could in fact exclude the police.... I can think of no other situation in which we would say that a person agreed to some course of action if he convinced us that he did not know that there was some other course he might have pursued. I would therefore hold, at a minimum, that the prosecution may not rely on a purported consent to search if the subject of the search did not know that he could refuse to give consent.... Where the police claim authority to search yet in fact lack such authority, the subject does not know that he may permissibly refuse them entry, and it is this lack of knowledge that invalidates the consent. [7] (Citations omitted.) Id., at 284-85, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also rejected the majority's assertion that, if an officer paused to inform the subject of his rights, the informality of the exchange would be destroyed. I doubt that a simple statement by an officer of an individual's right to refuse consent would do much to alter the informality of the exchange, except to alert the subject to a fact that he surely is entitled to know. It is not without significance that for many years the agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation have routinely informed subjects of their right to refuse consent, when they request consent to search.... The reported cases in which the police have informed subjects of their right to refuse consent show, also, that the information can be given without disrupting the casual flow of events.... What evidence there is, then, rather strongly suggests that nothing disastrous would happen if the police, before requesting consent, informed the subject that he ha[s] a right to refuse consent and that his refusal would be respected. (Citations omitted.) Id., at 287-88, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall concluded that when the [majority in Schneckloth ] speaks of practicality, what it really is talking of is the continued ability of the police to capitalize on the ignorance of citizens so as to accomplish by subterfuge what they could not achieve by relying only on the knowing relinquishment of constitutional rights.... I find nothing in the [majority] opinion [in Schneckloth ] to dispel my belief that... `[u]nder many circumstances a reasonable person might read an officer's [m]ay I as the courteous expression of a demand backed by force of law.' ... Most cases, in my view ... [reflect that] consent ordinarily is given as acquiescence in an implicit claim of authority to search. Permitting searches in such circumstances, without any assurance at all that the subject of the search knew that, by his consent, he was relinquishing his constitutional rights, is something that I cannot believe is sanctioned by the [c]onstitution. (Citations omitted.) Id., at 288-89, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Schneckloth in Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996). In Robinette, the state of Ohio appealed from the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio, which had adopted the following rule under the United States and Ohio constitutions: `[C]itizens stopped for traffic offenses [must] be clearly informed by the detaining officer when they are free to go after a valid detention, before an officer attempts to engage in a consensual interrogation. Any attempt at consensual interrogation must be preceded by the phrase [a]t this time you legally are free to go or by words of similar import.' Id., at 36, 117 S.Ct. 417. The United States Supreme Court rejected the rule announced by the Supreme Court of Ohio as a matter of federal constitutional law. [8] Remarking that the touchstone of the [f]ourth [a]mendment is reasonableness... [which is] measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances; (citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted) id., at 39, 117 S.Ct. 417; the court observed that it consistently [has] eschewed bright-line rules.... Id. Indeed, relying on the conclusion of the court in Schneckloth that it would be thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal consent search the detailed requirements of an effective warning; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, 412 U.S. at 231, 93 S.Ct. 2041; the court concluded that it similarly would be unrealistic to require police officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary. [9] Ohio v. Robinette, supra, at 39-40, 117 S.Ct. 417. Before addressing the merits of the court's reasoning in Schneckloth, it bears emphasis that, in considering the value of applicable federal precedent in the context of a Geisler analysis, it is necessary to consider that precedent's persuasive value. See Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 230-31, 957 A.2d 407 (2008) ([we examine federal] precedent for guidance and analogy [in construing our own constitution but only] when [those] authorities are logically persuasive and well-reasoned [internal quotation marks omitted]); cf. State v. Brunetti, 276 Conn. 40, 115, 883 A.2d 1167 (2005) ( Palmer, J., dissenting) (a judicial opinion must be judged not on the number of votes that it has garnered but on its reasoning), superseded by State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn. 39, 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212, 127 S.Ct. 1328, 167 L.Ed.2d 85 (2007). Thus, when this court undertakes an independent analysis of the meaning of article first, § 7, of the state constitution, it may reject as lacking in persuasive force, for state constitutional purposes, precedent of the United States Supreme Court construing the analogous provisions of the fourth amendment to the federal constitution. Indeed, not infrequently, this court, in interpreting article first, § 7, has rejected the reasoning and holding of a majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court and, instead, expressly or implicitly adopted the reasoning employed by one or more dissenting justices of that court. See, e.g., State v. Miller, supra, 227 Conn. at 377, 630 A.2d 1315 (declining to adopt rule in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 [1970], as matter of state constitutional law, and holding, in accordance with rationale of concurrence and dissent of Justice John M. Harlan in Chambers, that warrantless search of automobile impounded by police that is not performed for inventory purposes is violation of article first, § 7); State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 649-52, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992) (declining to adopt restrictive definition of seizure adopted in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 [1991], for purposes of article first, §§ 7 and 9, relying in part on reasoning of dissent of Justice Stevens in Hodari D. ); State v. Geisler, supra, 222 Conn. at 682-83, 687-90, 610 A.2d 1225 (declining to follow New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 18, 21, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 109 L.Ed.2d 13 [1990], for purposes of state constitution and holding, in accordance with reasoning of dissent of Justice Marshall in Harris, that, under article first, § 7, evidence derived from arrest of suspect following unlawful warrantless entry into home must be suppressed, despite probable cause for arrest, unless taint of illegal entry is attenuated by passage of time or intervening circumstances); State v. Marsala, supra, 216 Conn. at 168-71, 579 A.2d 58 (rejecting good faith exception to exclusionary rule adopted in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 [1984], for purposes of article first, § 7, relying in part on reasoning of dissent of Justice Brennan in Leon ); State v. Stoddard, 206 Conn. 157, 166-67, 169, 537 A.2d 446 (1988) (rejecting holding of Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 [1986], and concluding, in accordance with reasoning of dissent of Justice Stevens in Moran, that due process clause of article first, § 8, of state constitution requires police promptly to inform suspect of his attorney's attempt to provide legal assistance during interrogation). In the foregoing cases, as in other cases, we have rejected United States Supreme Court precedent in interpreting our state constitution because, as this court previously has observed, decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining fundamental rights are persuasive authority to be afforded respectful consideration, but they are to be followed by Connecticut courts only when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by Connecticut law. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marsala, supra, 216 Conn. at 160, 579 A.2d 58, quoting Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 642, 376 A.2d 359 (1977). For the reasons that follow, Schneckloth also is such a case. The analysis employed by the court in Schneckloth has been widely criticized by legal scholars. See, e.g., United States v. Gagnon, 230 F.Supp.2d 260, 269 n. 8 (N.D.N.Y.2002) ([t]he judicially created framework of the consent doctrine has been severely criticized, with no small measure of merit, as ignoring the practical realities of encounters between police and citizens), rev'd on other grounds, 373 F.3d 230 (2d Cir.2004); Brown v. State, 182 P.3d 624, 632 (Alaska App.2008) (noting that legal commentators have been widely critical of the United States Supreme Court's consent-search jurisprudence); 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure (4th Ed.2004) § 8.2(i), p. 111 (Perhaps the most telling criticism of ... Schneckloth ... is that the [c]ourt misapprehended the potential for psychological coercion in the context of consent searches.... [T]here is much to be said for the conclusion that ... [the] right to withhold consent [should be communicated to a suspect]. [Internal quotation marks omitted.]); R. Simmons, Not `Voluntary' but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for Understanding the Consent Search Doctrine, 80 Ind. L.J. 773, 775 (2005) ([i]t is no exaggeration to say that the nearly unanimous condemnation of the [c]ourt's rulings on consensual searches is creating a problem of legitimacy [that] threatens to undermine the integrity of judicial review of police behavior); R. Ward, Consensual Searches, The Fairytale That Became a Nightmare: Fargo Lessons Concerning Police Initiated Encounters, 15 Touro L.Rev. 451, 457 (1999) (many of the suppositions underlying [ Schneckloth ] are false); A. Barrio, note, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating Obedience Theory into the Supreme Court's Conception of Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. Ill. L.Rev. 215, 218 ( Schneckloth misapprehended the potential for psychological coercion in the context of consent searches). This criticism is based on certain flaws in several of the assumptions that underlie the reasoning of the majority opinion in Schneckloth. First, Schneckloth has been criticized for overlooking the coercive effect that an officer's request for consent is likely to have on a motorist who has been detained in connection with a traffic stop. As one commentator has stated, [w]hat is remarkable... is the ever-widening gap between [f]ourth [a]mendment consent jurisprudence, on the one hand, and scientific findings about the psychology of compliance and consent on the other. Ever since the [c]ourt first applied the `totality of the circumstances' standard to consent search issues in Schneckloth ... in 1973, it has held in case after case, with only a few exceptions, that a reasonable person in the situation in question either would feel free to terminate the encounter with [the] police, or would feel free to refuse the police request to search. By contrast, empirical studies over the last several decades on the social psychology of compliance, conformity, social influence, and politeness have all converged on a single conclusion: the extent to which people feel free to refuse to comply is extremely limited under situationally induced pressures. J. Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 Sup.Ct. Rev. 153, 155. It therefore has been argued that the United States Supreme Court should incorporate the empirical findings on compliance and social influence into ... consent [search] jurisprudence... to dispel the `air of unreality' that characterizes current doctrine. Id., at 156-57; see also W. LaFave, The `Routine Traffic Stop' From Start to Finish: Too Much `Routine,' Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 Mich. L.Rev. 1843, 1902 (2004) ([i]t is ... nonsensical for courts to continue their embrace of the ... position that a reasonable motorist, having been seized, would conclude he was free to leave [even though not told so] in the face of ongoing police interrogation); T. Maclin, The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the Supreme Court, 39 McGeorge L.Rev. 27, 28 (2008) (everyone... knows ... [that] a police `request' to search a bag or automobile is understood by most persons as a `command'); M. Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 211, 219 n. 29 (2001) (Except [when] consent is required in a person's home, it is often sought in areas unfamiliar and intimidating. How many of us feel like we are on `familiar territory' when pulled over to the side of the road by a police car or two?); M. Strauss, supra, at 235 ( Schneckloth ignor[es] the most significant factor of all: the inevitability that individuals will feel coerced simply by virtue of dealing with an authority figure like the police); R. Weaver, The Myth of `Consent', 39 Tex. Tech L.Rev. 1195, 1199 (2007) (The Schneckloth decision is ... troubling because it ignores the realities of police-citizen encounters and the inherent pressures on individuals to comply with police requests.... [W]hen a police officer requests permission to search, the police officer inevitably retains a distinct psychological advantage over the suspect.); A. Barrio, supra, 1997 U. Ill. L.Rev. at 233 ([t]he most baffling aspect of the [United States] Supreme Court's conception of voluntary consent is that it virtually ignores the well-documented observation that most people mechanically obey legitimate authority); cf. G. Dery, `When Will This Traffic Stop End?': The United States Supreme Court's Dodge of Every Detained Motorist's Central Concern  Ohio v. Robinette,  25 Fla. St. U.L.Rev. 519, 559-60 (1998) (observing that United States Supreme Court's statements regarding relative positions of power between police officer and citizen are simply incorrect in context of routine traffic stop). Indeed, drawing on relevant empirical studies, several commentators have concluded that the dissenting justices in Schneckloth were correct in that individuals tend to see an officer's request for consent as a demand. See M. Strauss, supra, 92 J.Crim. L. & Criminology at 236-42. For example, it seems evident, on the basis of empirical research regarding obedience to authority and uniform, that individuals attribute legitimacy to the police officer's uniform [and] that they obey police authority reflexively. A. Barrio, supra, 1997 U. Ill. L.Rev. at 243; see also J. Burkoff, Search Me?, 39 Tex. Tech L.Rev. 1109, 1138 (2007) (most people do not expect that they have the right not to accede a police officer's request that a search be authorized [internal quotation marks omitted]). Consequently, the weight of scientific authority suggests that a suspect's ignorance of fundamental [f]ourth [a]mendment rights must be viewed as a state of mind that renders a suspect's consent involuntary. A. Barrio, supra, at 247; see also id., at 240 ([the] obedience theory casts serious doubt on the continued vitality of what Schneckloth characterized as Miranda's central holding: that custody is a necessary prerequisite for a finding of psychological coercion). Thus, [t]o curb the coercive power of police authority, the police officer should be required to advise the suspect of his right to withhold consent prior to requesting his permission to search. Such a warning would combat the obedience phenomenon by assuring the suspect both that he is under no obligation to give consent and that the investigating officer is `prepared to recognize his privilege.' Id., at 247; see also 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure (4th Ed.2004) § 8.2(i), pp. 111-12 (expressing support for such approach). The factual scenario in the present case provides a good example of why the court in Schneckloth was wrong in concluding that a motorist stopped for a traffic violation is not likely to feel compelled to agree to a police officer's request for permission to search his or her vehicle. According to the court in Schneckloth, there is no reason to believe that the subject of such a stop will view the encounter as coercive because the search occur[s] on [the driver's] own familiar territory [where] the specter of incommunicado police interrogation in some remote station house is ... inapposite. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, 412 U.S. at 247, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Of course, there can be no doubt that police interrogation of a person held incommunicado and far from home gives rise to a legitimate concern about the voluntariness of any statement obtained as a result of such interrogation, and so, too, is the voluntariness of the defendant's consent to search open to serious doubt. The defendant, an African-American from out of state and traveling alone, was stopped by Detective Morgan shortly before midnight and pulled over in a dark area of the Berlin Turnpike. Morgan operated an unmarked car but was dressed in full police uniform and possessed a firearm, a utility belt with handcuffs, pepper spray and a flashlight, all in plain view. While preparing the traffic citation in his cruiser, Morgan called for a backup police officer because, unbeknownst to the defendant, Morgan intended to request that the defendant consent to a search of his vehicle. That backup officer, Sergeant Derrick Sutton, who also was in full police uniform, arrived before Morgan had returned to the defendant's vehicle. At that point, ten to fifteen minutes had passed since the defendant had been stopped. Morgan then approached the defendant and told him to exit his car. Morgan explained the citation to the defendant but did not give it to him at that time. Rather, Morgan asked the defendant whether he had anything illegal on his person, and, when the defendant said that he did not, Morgan patted him down. Morgan then asked the defendant if he had anything illegal in the vehicle, and the defendant responded that all he had in the car was some beer on the floor in front of the passenger seat. When the defendant told Morgan that he could go ahead and check, Morgan conducted a search of the defendant's vehicle. It is fanciful to think that the circumstances that led to the search of the defendant's vehicle did not give rise to a substantial element of compulsion. The defendant, an African-American who does not reside in this state, was pulled over in a dark area of the highway, late at night, by an armed police officer, and detained there, in his car, for up to fifteen minutes, at which point a second armed police officer arrived at the scene in a separate cruiser. Morgan then directed the defendant to exit his vehicle, questioned him about contraband on his person, conducted a patdown search, and asked him whether he had any contraband in the vehicle. It is difficult to see how anyone held under such circumstances would not feel vulnerable as a result of the encounter with the police, and there is little doubt that, in light of that vulnerability, the average person in that situation also would feel the need to accommodate, if not placate, the police officers involved in the encounter. A second criticism of Schneckloth, which also is based on empirical evidence, concerns the assertion that a knowledge requirement could jeopardize the continued viability of consent searches. In fact, studies suggest just the opposite, that is, that it appears that persons subjected to traffic stops give consent to vehicle searches at the same rate regardless of whether they are aware that such consent may be withheld. See, e.g., I. Lichtenberg,  Miranda in Ohio: The Effects of Robinette on the `Voluntary' Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights, 44 How. L.J. 349, 370, 373 (2001) (study demonstrated that between approximately 75 and 95 percent of motorists agree to police search of vehicle and that rates were very similar regardless of whether motorists were apprised of their right to refuse such consent, and, consequently, assertion of court in Schneckloth that such advisement would jeopardize continued viability of consent searches was [c]learly ... unfounded); M. Phillips, Note, Effective Warnings Before Consent Searches: Practical, Necessary, and Desirable, 45 Am.Crim. L.Rev. 1185, 1201 (2008) (citing study demonstrating that approximately 88 percent of motorists agree to consent search after being advised verbally and in writing of right to refuse consent). These findings should not be surprising in light of the fact that approximately 84 percent of suspects who have been advised of their rights in accordance with Miranda nevertheless waive their right to remain silent and comply with a request by the police for a statement. See S. Chanenson, Get the Facts, Jack! Empirical Research and the Changing Constitutional Landscape of Consent Searches, 71 Tenn. L.Rev. 399, 442 (2004). Although this data indicating that the provision of warnings has little effect on the rate at which consent is granted may suggest that such warnings are ineffective, it fairly may be argued that warnings nevertheless serve a salutary purpose insofar as they are likely to reduce the compulsion that people feel on the basis of an inaccurate belief that the police have the legal right to compel them to [agree to the requested] search. R. Simmons, supra, 80 Ind. L.J. at 819. To be sure, motorists undoubtedly have a multitude of reasons for granting consent to search, not all of which are the product of the inherently coercive nature of the police stop and following encounter; see People v. James, 19 Cal.3d 99, 114, 561 P.2d 1135, 137 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1977) ([T]here may be a number of `rational reasons' for a suspect to consent to a search even though he knows the premises contain evidence that can be used against him: for example, he may wish to appear cooperative in order to throw the police off the scent or at least to lull them into conducting a superficial search; he may believe the evidence is of such a nature or in such a location that it is likely to be overlooked; he may be persuaded that if the evidence is nevertheless discovered he will be successful in explaining its presence or denying any knowledge of it; he may intend to lay the groundwork for ingratiating himself with the prosecuting authorities or the courts; or he may simply be convinced that the game is up and further dissembling is futile.); and, consequently, warnings may have an impact on what may be considered negative forms of compulsion, such as acquiescence to a show of authority. See R. Simmons, supra, at 820; see also R. Ward, supra, 15 Touro L.Rev. at 477 ([t]he combined forces of obedience to authority, the power of the uniform and lower expectations of privacy make it imperative that citizens be told from the outset that they do have a choice). Indeed, the importance of Miranda warnings is widely accepted even though the large majority of suspects who are advised of their rights under Miranda nevertheless give a statement to the police. There also seems to be little or no basis for the assertions of the court in Schneckloth that it would be unreasonable to burden the state with having to prove that a motorist who gives consent to search during the course of a routine traffic stop was aware of his or her right to refuse consent; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra, 412 U.S. at 229-30, 93 S.Ct. 2041; and that requiring the police to advise motorists of their right to withhold consent to search would adversely affect the informality of the encounter, thereby impairing the ability of the police to use the consent search as a standard investigatory technique. See id., at 231-32, 93 S.Ct. 2041. With respect to the court's first assertion, I see no reason why the state could not meet its burden of proving knowledge simply by demonstrating that the officer at the scene had advised the motorist of the right to withhold consent and that he or she was free to leave upon choosing that option. Indeed, in the ordinary case, the state's burden would be readily satisfied by testimony from the police officer that the subject of the stop was so advised. The court's second assertion, namely, that it would be thoroughly impractical to require the police to give such an advisement; id., at 231, 93 S.Ct. 2041; also is dubious. The advisement would take but a few seconds and easily could be given at the same time that the officer seeks the motorist's consent to search. See, e.g., M. Phillips, supra, 45 Am.Crim. L.Rev. at 1185-86 (observing that high courts of several states have required police to provide warnings before seeking consent to search and asserting that [a] review of the experience[s] of these states indicates that a warning requirement is practical); E. Smary, note, The Doctrine of Waiver and Consent Searches, 49 Notre Dame L.Rev. 891, 903 (1974) (criticizing as straw-man logic court's assertion in Schneckloth that it would be thoroughly impractical for police officer to engage in detailed examination needed to ensure valid waiver); cf. J. Adams, Search and Seizure as Seen By Supreme Court Justices: Are They Serious or Is This Just Judicial Humor?, 12 St. Louis U. Pub.L.Rev. 413, 446-47 (1993) (criticizing court's consideration in Schneckloth of practical considerations of police in assessing whether advisement of right to withhold consent should be required). Finally, the court in Schneckloth has been criticized for essentially ignoring the issue of how a consent to search fairly may be deemed to be truly voluntary when the person giving consent does not know that he or she has an absolute right, protected by the constitution, to refuse to do so. Thus, as one commentator has stated, [a]ny competent person can give up rights at the request of the government. But it is hard to comprehend a theory of individual rights that permits that decision to be made by someone unaware that he is relinquishing a fundamental civil liberty. M. Cloud, Ignorance and Democracy, 39 Tex. Tech L.Rev. 1143, 1169 (2007). In sum, because the reasons underlying the court's holding in Schneckloth ultimately are not persuasive, the holding of the court is itself not persuasive. [10] Indeed, the dissenting opinions in Schneckloth are significantly more convincing than the opinion of the majority in Schneckloth. This court therefore is not bound to adopt the holding of the majority opinion in Schneckloth for purposes of the state constitution.