Opinion ID: 1824380
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: summary denial of newly discovered evidence claim

Text: The first issue in this case is whether the Third District erred in affirming the trial court's summary denial of McLin's rule 3.850 motion alleging newly discovered evidence and incorporating an affidavit of an eyewitness to the murder stating that McLin did not commit the crime for which McLin was convicted. The trial court's order summarily denying relief on this claim states: The Defendant's final basis for this motion is that there exists newly discovered evidence that Jose Saldana lied in his deposition about the Defendant's involvement in the murder because Menzies threatened him. In order for evidence to qualify as newly discovered, the asserted facts must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel by the time of trial, and it must appear that the defendant or his counsel could not have known them by the use of diligence. Hallman v. State, 371 So.2d 482 (Fla.1979). Further, the evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911 (Fla. 1991). Even if Saldana had testified consistent with the Defendant's claim, it would not be likely to have caused the Defendant to be acquitted. Moreover, Saldana's testimony is probably untruthful as the Defendant implored Saldana to change his testimony in a letter the Defendant sent to Saldana while in custody. Since it is unlikely that Saldana's new testimony would produce an acquittal upon retrial, such testimony does not qualify as newly discovered evidence. (Emphasis supplied.) In other words, without an evidentiary hearing the trial court determined that the affidavit was probably untruthful based solely on the contents of the letter allegedly written by McLin. Further, the trial court summarily concluded, without a stated rationale or record attachments, that even if Saldana testified consistently with McLin's claim it would not be likely to have caused the Defendant to be acquitted. On appeal of this issue, the Third District stated: As his first argument on appeal, McLin contends that he was entitled to have Saldana personally testify at the evidentiary hearing below in order for the trial court to make its credibility determination. We disagree. First of all, the trial court correctly recognized that in order for evidence to qualify as newly discovered, [the asserted] facts... must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that the defendant or his counsel could not have known them by the use of diligence. See Hallman v. State, 371 So.2d 482 (Fla.1979). Moreover, where there is conflicting evidence of a defendant's guilt, the trial court must evaluate the weight of the newly discovered evidence against the evidence adduced at trial to determine whether the new evidence would probably have resulted in an acquittal. See Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911 (Fla.1991); Kendrick v. State, 708 So.2d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). Thus, the trial court was required to determine whether the averments of Saldana's affidavit were sufficient to create a probability of McLin's acquittal, notwithstanding all of the other evidence adduced at trial against McLin. Here, after reviewing Saldana's affidavit, the trial court concluded that it did not qualify as newly discovered evidence because it would not likely have changed the outcome of the trial given the other evidence adduced at trial. The court added, that in all likelihood, the affidavit was untruthful considering McLin's earlier letter to Saldana. We find no error in this determination and hence find no merit to McLin's first point on appeal. McLin, 781 So.2d at 476-77 (emphasis supplied). We begin with the legal principles governing when a trial court may properly deny a motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. This Court has explained that [t]o support summary denial without a hearing, a trial court must either state its rationale in its decision or attach those specific parts of the record that refute each claim presented in the motion. Anderson v. State, 627 So.2d 1170, 1171 (Fla.1993). This requirement is embodied in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(d), which permits summary denial only if the motion, files and records in the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief. Further, the rule requires that when the denial is not predicated on the legal insufficiency of the motion on its face, a copy of that portion of the files and records should be attached to the order. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(d). [3] This Court also has enunciated the proper standard of appellate review when an appellate court reviews a summary denial of a rule 3.850 claim, including a claim of newly discovered evidence: To uphold the trial court's summary denial of claims raised in a 3.850 motion, the claims must be either facially invalid or conclusively refuted by the record. Further, where no evidentiary hearing is held below, we must accept the defendant's factual allegations to the extent they are not refuted by the record. Foster v. State, 810 So.2d 910, 914 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Peede v. State, 748 So.2d 253, 257 (Fla.1999)). This requirement is embodied in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2)(D), which governs appeals of summary denials of motions for postconviction relief in non-death cases, and states that [o]n appeal from the denial of relief, unless the record shows conclusively that the appellant is entitled to no relief, the order shall be reversed and the cause remanded for an evidentiary hearing or other appropriate relief. [4] The legal sufficiency of the allegations is not in dispute in this case. Thus, in determining first whether the trial court erred when it summarily denied McLin's motion, and second whether the appellate court erred in affirming that denial, the sole focus of legal inquiry was whether the files and records conclusively refuted the allegations of the motion and the attached affidavit. See Foster, 810 So.2d at 914; Anderson, 627 So.2d at 1171. In Robinson, a similar case involving a newly discovered evidence claim where an affidavit was attached from a State's witness recanting his former testimony, the Fourth District reversed a trial court's summary denial and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. See 736 So.2d at 93. The Fourth District explained: Florida law treats recantations with suspicion, and requires a new trial only if the court is satisfied that the recantation is true and that the witness's testimony will change to such an extent as to render probable a different verdict. Armstrong v. State, 642 So.2d 730, 735 (Fla. 1994). An evidentiary hearing is usually required to make that determination. See e.g., Hilbert v. State, 666 So.2d 1059, 1059 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Venuto v. State, 615 So.2d 255, 256 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). Id. (emphasis supplied). This statement by the Fourth District also comports with a statement by the First District, which has correctly observed that summary denial is rarely appropriate if the trial court needs to assess the credibility of the new testimony. Murrah, 773 So.2d at 623. Likewise, in Lewis, the Second District stated that [i]n determining whether a new trial should be granted based on recanted testimony, the trial court must first determine if the recanting witness is testifying truthfully in the recantation. 725 So.2d at 1187. Thus, in Lewis the Second District held that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the testimony of the recanting witness because there was no opportunity for the trial court to evaluate the witness's demeanor. Id. Similarly, in Robinson, the Fourth District concluded: In this case, the trial court denied relief after reviewing the entire trial record and Sliwa's affidavit, but without hearing any evidence. After conducting the same review, we cannot conclude that Sliwa's affidavit was inherently incredible or that his trial testimony was obviously immaterial to the verdict, so as to allow the trial court to reject his recantation without holding an evidentiary hearing. 736 So.2d at 93 (emphasis supplied). We agree with the analysis in Robinson, which correctly applied our precedent as well as Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2)(D), mandating an evidentiary hearing unless the allegations are conclusively refuted by the record. In this case, because there was no evidentiary hearing to determine the truthfulness of Saldana's statements, the standard of review set forth by this Court in Foster and Peede required both the trial court and the Third District to accept the allegations of Saldana's affidavit as true. Instead, the trial court made a credibility determination that Saldana's affidavit was probably untruthful based solely on the letter and the fingerprint report attached to the State's response, and the Third District affirmed the trial court's determination. This basis for summary denial is in conflict with the standard that an evidentiary hearing is required unless the allegations are conclusively refuted. Foster, 810 So.2d at 914. The letter itself does not conclusively refute the affidavit. Further, because no evidentiary hearing was held and thus Saldana never testified, there was never an opportunity to question Saldana about whether his recantation was truthful, or merely a product of McLin's direction as to what to state. As the Fourth District pointed out, there may be cases where, from the face of the affidavit, it can be determined that the affidavit is inherently incredible. Robinson, 736 So.2d at 93. However, in this case the affidavit itself is not inherently incredible. Thus, because the trial court based its credibility determination upon the letter, but the letter does not conclusively refute the allegations in Saldana's affidavit, the trial court erred when it summarily denied McLin's motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. See Anderson, 627 So.2d at 1171. Because the Third District affirmed the trial court's summary denial on this record, the Third District misapplied this Court's precedent as to the standard of review of a summary denial of a newly discovered evidence claim, which requires that [t]o uphold the trial court's summary denial of claims raised in a rule 3.850 motion, the claims must be either facially invalid or conclusively refuted by the record. Foster, 810 So.2d at 914. Accordingly, on the basis of the allegations of McLin's motion in this case, an evidentiary hearing was required in order to resolve the credibility determination as to the truthfulness of Saldana's affidavit, at which time Saldana could be cross-examined about the letter and the truthfulness of his recanted testimony. The Third District also misapplied this Court's precedent and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.141(b)(2)(D), mandating an evidentiary hearing unless the allegations are conclusively refuted by the record, when it affirmed the trial court's alternative conclusory determination on McLin's newly discovered evidence claim that [e]ven if Saldana had testified consistent with the Defendant's claim, it would not be likely to have caused the Defendant to be acquitted. In Jones, this Court articulated a two-step inquiry for determining whether a defendant is entitled to relief for newly discovered evidence. See 591 So.2d at 915-16. First, the facts must have been unknown at the time of trial and be such that they could not have been known by the exercise of due diligence. See id. at 916. The second prong, which this Court referred to as the probability standard, see id., requires that in order to provide relief, the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. Id. at 915. Although correctly enunciating the legal standard applicable to the second prong of the newly discovered evidence claim under Jones, neither the trial court's order nor the Third District's opinion sets forth how this determination could be reached without an evidentiary hearing. As the Fourth District has correctly pointed out, there may be cases where the newly discovered evidence is obviously immaterial to the verdict. Robinson, 736 So.2d at 93. However, ordinarily an evidentiary hearing is required for the trial court to properly determine, in accordance with Jones, whether the newly discovered evidence is of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. Jones, 591 So.2d at 915. In making this determination, the judge will necessarily have to evaluate the weight of both the newly discovered evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the trial, so that the appellate court can fully evaluate the quality of the evidence which demonstrably meets the definition of newly discovered evidence. Id. at 916 (emphasis supplied). In this case, taking the affidavit as true, as the trial court and the Third District were required to do for the purpose of determining whether a summary denial was proper, Saldana's affidavit alleges that Menzies, who was the main witness against McLin, was in fact the shooter and that McLin was not even present at the time of the shooting. Saldana further states that Menzies and Saldana had agreed to lie to implicate McLin. Although the Third District's opinion refers to the testimony from Sylvester that implicates McLin and characterizes Sylvester as McLin's girlfriend, the record also reveals that Sylvester is the mother of Menzies' children and that she was the live-in lover of Menzies for ten years. Furthermore, not only was there no physical evidence linking McLin to the scene, but also the murder weapon was discovered in a car in which Menzies was the driver and McLin was merely the passenger. When stopped by the police, it was not McLin but Menzies who fled the scene before he could be arrested. The trial court failed to evaluate any of this evidence in its order so that the Third District could fully evaluate the quality of the evidence which demonstrably [met] the definition of newly discovered evidence. Id. Because the Third District affirmed the trial court's summary denial, the Third District misapplied this Court's precedent as to the standard of review of a summary denial of a newly discovered evidence claim, which requires that [t]o uphold the trial court's summary denial of claims raised in a rule 3.850 motion, the claims must be either facially invalid or conclusively refuted by the record. Foster, 810 So.2d at 914. Accordingly, because Saldana's affidavit was not conclusively refuted by the record as to the second prong of Jones, summary denial was improper on that basis as well. [5]