Opinion ID: 2714926
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jigsaw Puzzles

Text: Regarding puzzles, the prosecutor stated: 3 See, e.g., Crock, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/ browse/crock?s=t (last visited Mar. 28, 2014) (defining crock in part as a lie; exaggeration; nonsense). 11 State v. Lindsay (James Leroy)/State v. Holmes (Jennifer), No. 88437-4 [O]ne of the simplest [ways to explain reasonable doubt] is the idea of a jigsaw puzzle .... [T]he first thing you do is you get all the pieces that have edges on them, start to lock them together, you're trying to get the outline .... [Y]ou put a few more pieces in ... and you start to get a better idea of what that picture is .... And then you put in about 10 more pieces and see this picture of the Space Needle. Now, you can be halfway done with that puzzle and you know beyond a reasonable doubt that it's Seattle. You could have 50 percent of those puzzle pieces missing and you know it's Seattle. 95 VRP at 8726-27. Several cases from the Court of Appeals have examined whether puzzle analogies are improper. In State v. Johnson, a Division Two case, the prosecutor made an argument nearly identical to the one above, stating, 'You add a third piece of the puzzle, and at this point even being able to see only half, you can be assured beyond a reasonable doubt that this is going to be a picture of Tacoma.' 158 Wn. App. 677, 682, 243 P.3d 936 (2010). The court held that the prosecutor's arguments discussing the reasonable doubt standard in the context of making an affirmative decision based on a partially completed puzzle trivialized the State's burden, focused on the degree of certainty the jurors needed to act, and implied that the jury had a duty to convict without a reason not to do so. !d. at 685. The court reversed the conviction, stating that a misstatement about the law and the presumption of innocence due a defendant, the 'bedrock upon which [our] criminal justice system stands,' constitutes great prejudice because it reduces the State's burden and undermines a defendant's 12 State v. Lindsay (James Leroy)/State v. Holmes (Jennifer), No. 88437-4 due process rights. !d. at 685-86 (quoting State v. Bennett, 161 Wn.2d 303,315, 165 P.3d 1241 (2007)). In State v. Curtiss, Division Two reached a different conclusion regarding a similar jigsaw puzzle argument. 161 Wn. App. 673, 250 P.3d 496 (2011). There, the prosecutor stated, 'There will come a time when you're putting that puzzle together, and even with pieces missing, you'll be able to say, with some certainty, beyond a reasonable doubt what that puzzle is: The Tacoma Dome.' !d. at 700. The court did not mention Johnson but held that the State's comments about identifying a puzzle before it was complete were not improper. !d. at 700-01. In State v. Fuller, Division Two explained the difference between Johnson and Curtiss. 169 Wn. App. 797, 282 P.3d 126 (2012), review denied, 176 Wn.2d 1006, 297 P.3d 68 (2013). The Fuller court explained that the quantification by the prosecutor of the number of pieces and percentage of completion required for reasonable doubt in Johnson was entirely different from the prosecutor's general reference to being able to discern the subject of a puzzle with some pieces missing in Curtiss. !d. at 825-28. The former statement introduced elements of specific quantification into the reasonable doubt analysis, while the latter did not. !d. This case is plainly analogous to Johnson, not Curtiss. The prosecutor stated that you put in about 10 more pieces and see this picture of the Space Needle. Now, you can be halfway done with that puzzle and you know beyond a reasonable doubt 13 State v. Lindsay (James Leroy)/State v. Holmes (Jennifer), No. 88437-4 that it's Seattle. You could have 50 percent of those puzzle pieces missing and you know it's Seattle. 95 VRP at 8727. That is almost identical to the comments held prejudicial misconduct in Johnson. It is not analogous to the comments in Curtiss or Fuller, which made no reference to any number or percentage and merely suggested that one could be certain of the picture beyond a reasonable doubt even with some pieces missing. We agree that the quantifying of the standard of proof by means of this jigsaw puzzle analogy is improper.