Opinion ID: 2581379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Standing/Collateral Attack

Text: [¶ 17] Appellees urge that this court recognize that appellants lack standing to collaterally attack the 1989 proceedings, arguing that they stand in no different posture with respect to this guardianship than do complete strangers off the street. They further assert: Their relatively recent beneficiary status under a deed executed in violation of state statute cannot confer standing to retroactively attack the propriety of proceedings leading to the establishment of the guardianship in 1989. In regard to standing, this court has said: At its most elementary level, the standing doctrine holds that a decision-making body should refrain from considering issues in which the litigants have little or no interest in vigorously advocating. Accordingly, the doctrine of standing focuses upon whether a litigant is properly situated to assert an issue for judicial or quasi-judicial determination. A litigant is said to have standing when he has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. This personal stake requirement has been described in Wyoming as a tangible interest at stake. The tangible interest requirement guarantees that a litigant is sufficiently interested in a case to present a justiciable controversy. Schulthess v. Carollo, 832 P.2d 552, 556-57 (Wyo.1992) (citations omitted). [¶ 18] In the instant case, appellants' property interest in having their warranty deed declared valid by the court as a proper conveyance and quieting title to the residence in them is a tangible interest sufficient to give them a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. We further note, in fact, it was appellees who summoned the appellants into this litigation when they petitioned the district court to void the appellants' deed. Appellees cannot now assert that appellants have no standing to defend their deed and urge that it be recognized as valid. [¶ 19] The question, then, remains whether appellants may assert that the 1989 proceedings are void and thus subject to collateral attack. This court has defined a collateral attack as an attack on a judgment in any manner other than by action or proceeding whose very purpose is to impeach or overturn the judgment, or, stated affirmatively, a collateral attack upon a judgment is an attack made by or in an action or proceeding that has an independent purpose other than impeaching or overturning the judgment.... Hume v. Ricketts, 69 Wyo. 222, 240 P.2d 881, 883 (1952) (quoting L.R.A. 1918D 470, 472). We discussed the doctrine as follows: Jurisdiction of the court over the parties is an essential to the validity of any judgment and a personal judgment rendered without such jurisdiction is void. However, the judgment is presumed to be valid and the presumption in favor of jurisdiction extends to jurisdiction of the parties. By the general rule, a collateral attack may not be made upon a judgment where the absence of jurisdiction over the parties does not appear upon the record. It seems to be the general rule that a void judgment, such as one wherein the court lacks jurisdiction over the parties, can be attacked collaterally only where the invalidity appears on the face of the record. Where the invalidity does not appear on the face of the record, the proper action is a direct attack. Id. (citations omitted); see also Osborn v. Painter, 909 P.2d 960, 963 (Wyo.1996). [¶ 20] In Travis v. Estate of Travis, 79 Wyo. 329, 334 P.2d 508 (1959), a probate court vacated and set aside as void a district court's earlier decree of divorce. On appeal, the Travis appellants asserted that the decree had been attacked collaterally in violation of law. The Travis appellees, relying on Wyoming cases, asserted that a judgment affirmatively appearing on the face of the record to be void may be attacked collaterally or otherwise. In deciding the issue, this court then necessarily undertook to decide whether or not the record, on its face, showed the divorce decree to be void. Ultimately, the court determined that the record did not make that showing sufficiently to overcome the presumption of jurisdiction recited in the district court's order. Id. [¶ 21] As to who may assert that a judgment is void and thus subject to collateral attack, we think that 47 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 916 (1995) aptly states the general rule which this court has followed in the course of its jurisprudence: A void judgment or final order is subject to collateral attack at the instance of any person affected by it, at any time and in any proceeding in another court of equal jurisdiction. In the instant case, appellants indisputably have been affected by the 1989 judgment appointing the guardian and establishing the conservatorship because it was enforced against them to render their 1998 deed invalid. Therefore, we find they are proper parties to assert that the 1989 proceedings were void ab initio. Nonetheless, ultimately whether this or any judgment is subject to collateral attack must begin with a determination of whether or not the record on its face shows the judgment to be void.