Opinion ID: 1307092
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Question of vagueness.

Text: The most commonly accepted formula for determining whether a penal statute is too vague to give fair notice of what it prohibits is the one adopted by this court in State v. Zwicker (1969), 41 Wis. 2d 497, 507, 164 N. W. 2d 512: `. . . If the statute is so obscure that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applicability, it is unconstitutional.' Sec. 947.02 (2), Stats., defines a vagrant as: A person found in or loitering near any structure, vehicle or private grounds who is there without the consent of the owner and is unable to account for his presence; . . . While the appellant's attack is comprehensive in that each clause in the statute is alleged to be flawed by vagueness, it is nevertheless clear that the primary dispute revolves around the meaning of the word loiter. One line of cases which are relied upon by the state [4] concludes that the word loiter presents no problem of definition. These cases hold that everyone knows that the word loiter when used in its common and ordinary sense describes not simply one who stands, lingers or idles about but also one who stands, lingers or idles with some criminal purpose in mind. These cases hold that one whose physical conduct constitutes loitering is nevertheless not a loiterer within the ordinary meaning of the word, unless, in addition to such physical conduct, the loiterer is also harboring some criminal intent. These cases go on to hold that the word loiter is not impermissively vague because everyone understands that it invariably carries the connotation of criminality. There is a second line of cases relied on by the appellant. [5] These cases hold that in common and ordinary usage the word loiter has no sinister meaning and implies no intent to engage in criminal misconduct. The cases in this second series note that lay, as well as law, dictionaries contain no reference to the criminal connotation which the first series of cases contends is attached to the word loiter. In Seattle v. Drew, supra, at page 409, the following definitions were noted: Merriam-Webster Third New International Dictionary (1961) defines `loiter' as fritter away time . . . be . . . unduly slow in doing something . . . remain in or near a place in an idle or apparently idle manner and `wander' as to move about without a fixed course, aim, or goal . . . . Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) defines `loiter' as: To be dilatory; to be slow in movement; to stand around or move slowly about; to stand idly around; to spend time idly; to saunter; to delay; to idle; to linger; to lag behind. The cases finding no criminal connotation to the word loiter conclude that statutes using that word are unconstitutional because they are so vague as to fail to give fair notice of what is and what is not prohibited by their terms. These cases hold that a statute which fails to give fair notice of what it prohibits is simply not a valid law. There is a conflict among the authorities insofar as the meaning of the word loitering is concerned, but that conflict is explained when one reads the remaining portions of statutes which the cases discussed above have construed. The following cases cited by appellant contain examples of the kind of statute which is consistently found to be unconstitutional: (1) Seattle v. Drew, supra . It shall be unlawful for any person wandering or loitering abroad after dark to fail to give a satisfactory account of himself upon demand by any police officer; (2) People v. Diaz, supra. No person shall lounge or loiter about any street or street corner in the city; and (3) Scott v. District Attorney, supra . A vagrant is anyone found in or near any structure, vessel or private grounds without being able to account for his lawful presence. [6] A comparison of the above statutes with the following examples from the cases relied on by the state reveals that statutes which have been sustained have been limited in scope, directed at preventing specific conduct, and with fair warning: (1) Phillips v. Municipal Court, supra . A vagrant is anyone who loiters about a school or any place where school children are present; (2) People v. Merolla, supra. No person shall loiter on any vessel, dock or other waterfront facility; (3) State v. McCorvey, supra . A prostitute is guilty of vagrancy if found loitering in any saloon or other place where intoxicating liquors are sold; and (4) Anderson v. Shaver, supra . A vagrant is anyone who loiters about on any public, private or parochial school grounds. When the wording of the above statutes is compared with sec. 947.02 (2), Stats., it is apparent that Wisconsin's vagrancy law falls into that category of statute which has almost invariably been found to be unconstitutionally vague. The state has not cited a single recent case in which a statute as vague and broadly worded as sec. 947.02 (2) was upheld. The state's cases involve statutes which name with specificity and particularity the locations where loitering may not occur. Wisconsin's statute does not do that. We think sec. 947.02 (2), Stats., fails to meet the specificity requirements as to scope, place or purpose. Therefore, the use of the term loitering in sec. 947.02 (2) renders the statute vague as it fails to provide fair notice of the proscribed conduct, it classifies innocent conduct as criminal, and it is susceptible to arbitrary law enforcement. We encounter difficulty not only with loitering but equally with the mandate of sub. (2) that the person loitering explain his activity in a manner so as to comply with the phrase of accountability, to wit: unable to account for his presence. That provision fails to give any indication of whether a defendant's presence must be lawful or unlawful, how much of an explanation is needed to add up to an account, and whose demand for an account may be enforced by criminal penalties. Sec. 947.02 (2), Stats., contains no useful standards for the police officer or the private citizen to know when an account may be demanded. The phrase in or . . . near any structure, vehicle or private grounds is so sweeping and ambiguous as to render the statute unconstitutionally vague. The situation described by these words would be difficult for any person in a large community to avoid. In Scott v. District Attorney, supra , the court held substantially identical language was vague. At any point in time any individual is in or ... near at least one of the objects listed. The words could apply to window-shopping, waiting in a parking lot, or walking down any business or residential street. This sweeping applicability would result in arbitrary and standardless enforcement of sec. 947.02 (2), Stats.