Opinion ID: 1219182
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: board of bar examiners review

Text: The Board reviewed the hearing panel's opinion and recommendation and applicant's exceptions thereto. The Board recommended that applicant's application be denied. The Board explained: In evaluating whether Applicant is `rehabilitated and presently possesses the necessary good moral character for admission,' the Board is concerned with the Applicant's present moral character. Applicant has presented considerable evidence of his good moral character in the form of testimony and written submissions from character witnesses who have known Applicant since he was granted an early termination of his probation in 1988. Although this evidence was presented, for the most part, in Applicant's two previous hearings before the Board, the evidence is incorporated in to the record of the Board's present recommendation and has been reviewed and given appropriate weight and consideration by the Board. What is troubling to the Board, however, is Applicant's explanation of his past conduct. Specifically, the Board is not convinced that the Applicant has been truthful in explaining his past conduct. In reaching this conclusion, the Board recognizes that an application for admission should not be denied `on mere suspicion.' In re Tobiga, [supra, 310 Or. 46 at 52, 791 P.2d 830.] (Emphasis added.) The Board concluded: After a careful review of all of the evidence presented, the Board concludes that Applicant has not shown himself a truthful and credible person and, therefore, has not established by clear and convincing evidence that he now has the good moral character required to practice law. The Board's conclusion is based primarily upon Applicant's statement about his past acts. Pointing specifically to applicant's testimony about his marijuana crop and his probation violation, the Board concluded: [T]hat Applicant has not been fully truthful in his testimony and that he does not presently possess the good moral character to be a member of the Bar. Applicant's testimony before the Hearing Panel, and his prior testimony before the Board, were under oath. There may be no requirement more central to the idea of good moral character, as it applies to those who seek to practice law, than truthful testimony under oath. Applicant has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence his present good moral character. Although the Board has reviewed the evidence of rehabilitation and good character submitted by Applicant, the Board, viewing the evidence as a whole, concludes that applicant has failed to meet his burden. Accordingly, the Board recommends that Applicant's reapplication for admission be denied. Four members of the Board dissented. Although the Board's dissenters argue that applicant's testimony about his intent to distribute marijuana is not facially implausible, the dissenters concede that the circumstantial evidence [i.e., the quantity of marijuana, applicant's possession of drug related items (scales, books, needle kit), applicant's then unemployed status and his uncertain means of support] certainly permits a reasonable inference that Mr. Jaffee had some commercial distribution intention. (Emphasis added.) The dissenters continue: Although we are thus inclined to accept the majority's conclusion that [applicant] has not established by clear and convincing evidence that he did not intend to distribute some of the marijuana, we do not believe that the majority's conclusion in this respect is highly certain. The dissenters, thus, have mistakenly shifted the burden of proof from applicant to the Board, a legal error that completely undermines the validity of their ultimate conclusion. Moreover, the Board's dissenters close their opinion with this astonishing confession to a result-oriented conclusion: Even if we agreed with the majority's conclusion of the probation terms issue (which is overall a fairly insignificant concern, even if the majority's conclusion is correct), and even if we attached more importance to the majority's conclusion with respect to commercial distribution of the marijuana, we would still reach the same ultimate conclusion: [applicant] has established his good moral character by clear and convincing evidence. In other words, the dissenters conclude that, even if applicant was not candid on the probation terms and commercial distribution of the marijuana issues relied on by the Board, nevertheless, he is a person of good moral character who should be admitted to practice in Oregon. I could not disagree more. See In re Nash, 317 Or. 354, 362, 855 P.2d 1112 (1993) (The question is whether in all respects [the applicant] is a person who `possesses the sense of ethical responsibility and the maturity of character to withstand the many temptation which [he] will confront in the practice of law' quoting In re Taylor, 293 Or. 285, 296, 647 P.2d 462 (1982) (emphasis in original). Present untruthful statements to a hearing panel about past conduct constitute evidence of a lack of good moral character. In re Gortmaker, 308 Or. 482, 488, 782 P.2d 421 (1989); In re Fine, supra, 303 Or. at 324, 736 P.2d 183. [11] Applicant agrees that his prior misconduct shows that, at the time of that misconduct, he lacked the requisite good moral character and fitness to practice law in Oregon. He testified, I think my criminal activity substantiates that very strongly. [12] Applicant argues, however, that his more recent conduct and actions demonstrate that he presently possesses the good moral character needed for admission to practice law in this state. The Board responds that applicant's present untruthful statements about his prior conduct constitute evidence of a lack of present good moral character. Specifically, the Board argues that applicant has not been candid in his testimony about his intentions in growing large quantities of marijuana, and that his testimony about his probation violation was, at best, misleading. The Board further argues that applicant's evidence of rehabilitation does not outweigh his lack of candor and truthfulness and, therefore, that he has not sustained his burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that he is a person of good moral character. Applicant has the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is a person of good moral character and fit to practice law. ORS 9.220(2)(a); RFA 9.45(6); Jaffee II, supra, 311 Or. at 163, 806 P.2d 685; In re Rowell, supra, 305 Or. at 588, 754 P.2d 905. Clear and convincing evidence means that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable. In re Monaco, 317 Or. 366, 370 n. 4, 856 P.2d 311 (1993); In re Nash, supra, 317 Or. at 357, 855 P.2d 1112. ORS 9.220(2)(b) provides: For purposes of [ORS 9.220(2)(a)]   , the lack of `good moral character' may be established by reference to acts or conduct that reflect moral turpitude or to acts or conduct which would cause a reasonable person to have substantial doubts about the individual's honesty, fairness and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of the state and the nation. The conduct or acts in question should be rationally connected to the applicant's fitness to practice law. Although present character is the issue in this proceeding, In re Tobiga, supra, 310 Or. at 52, 791 P.2d 830, prior wrongdoing reflecting adversely on an applicant's character is relevant. Id. Any significant doubt about an applicant's present moral character must be resolved in favor of protection of the public by denying admission to the applicant. In re Nash, supra, 317 Or. at 362, 855 P.2d 1112; In re Easton, 298 Or. 365, 367-68, 692 P.2d 592 (1984) (citing In re Alpert, 269 Or. 508, 518, 525 P.2d 1042 (1974)), cert. den. 472 U.S. 1012, 105 S.Ct. 2711, 86 L.Ed.2d 726 (1985). This court has recognized, at least in theory, that an applicant guilty of unlawful or unprofessional conduct may establish present good moral character through sufficient proof of rehabilitation. In re Rowell, supra, 305 Or. at 588, 754 P.2d 905. [13] In a recent proceeding denying admission to an applicant seeking admission to practice of law, this court stated: A person who continues to misstate facts about prior dishonest conduct that could constitute a crime and about his involvement in it, in order to gain admission to practice law, does not show himself to be a credible person and does not establish that he had good moral character required to practice law. In re Parker, 314 Or. 143, 154, 838 P.2d 54 (1992). In Parker, this court emphasized: Lawyers must be honest. Truth-speaking is requisite in this profession. Id. at 154-55, 838 P.2d 54. See also In re Fine, supra, 303 Or. at 330, 736 P.2d 183 (we base our decision on applicant's present statements about his past acts. We recognize that persons can and do reform. However, in this proceeding applicant's deceitful, self-serving conduct persisted at the time of the hearing.). [R]eformation is a very difficult matter for a petitioner to prove and for [this court] to judge. In re Bernard Jolles, 235 Or. 262, 275, 383 P.2d 388 (1963). But reformation can be proved, as this court's past decisions attest. See, e.g., In re Rowell, supra (illustrating proposition). As evidence of reformation, this court has looked to (1) character testimony from those who know and have had an opportunity to observe the applicant, In re Bernard Jolles, supra, 235 Or. at 275-76, 383 P.2d 388; (2) participation in activities that benefit society, In re Rowell, supra, 305 Or. at 591, 754 P.2d 905; and (3) and applicant's forthright acknowledgement of the wrongfulness of his or her past actions, In re Fine, supra, 303 Or. at 314, 736 P.2d 183.