Opinion ID: 2102504
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Doctor Trone

Text: Dr. James Trone was an employee of Sibley Hospital and in March of 1996 examined Velasquez for the specific purpose of determining her ability to continue work. Yet the hearing examiner does not make mention of Trone anywhere in the Compensation Order, although Chardack, Lopez, Dr. Philip Assatourians [2] , Dr. Easton L. Manderson, [3] and Dr. David Johnson [4] are all discussed. Lack of acknowledgement of the Trone evidence is difficult to understand, especially given the fact that counsel for Velasquez identified the Trone report as a smoking gun in his opening statement. Trone's report, though brief, clearly links Velasquez's injury of August 13, 1995, to his assessment of her current status as indefinitely disabled for purposes of work. The entirety of his conclusions are as follows: I have reviewed Teresa's records and examined her this afternoon (March 29, 1996.) In August, 1995, she injured herself on the job and was seen in the Emergency Room at Sibley and referred to an orthopedic surgeon. Subsequently, she changed physicians. Despite follow-up, physical therapy and medication, she is unable to perform her usual work. In my opinion, Teresa will remain disabled for an indeterminate period. This statement's bearing on the compensation disposition must be addressed. At best, the evidence receives only backhand acknowledgment; without ever mentioning the report or the name Trone, the hearing examiner disposes of the wrongful discharge claim by stating that termination due to physical incapacity is not prohibited under the Act. The problem is not with the hearing examiner's conclusion that evidence of work incapacity is not enough to establish wrongful termination. See Lyles v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 572 A.2d 81, 82 (D.C.1990) (firing someone who insists he or she is disabled from working does not by itself satisfy the `animus' requirement for a finding of wrongful termination). The error is in omitting such evidence from the compensation determination. Trone's conclusions need to be directly confronted and either discredited or reconciled with the rest of the evidence. Instead, the hearing examiner somewhat contradictorily asserts that the claimant fails to demonstrate that the employer's proffer [sic] legitimate reason, i.e., that the claimant is medically unable to perform her duties, is pretext, presumably relying on Trone's report, while ultimately finding, without addressing the report, that the claimant was not entitled to further disability compensation. Sibley asserts that workers' compensation proceedings and employment termination proceedings could lead to different conclusions using different criteria, but that posture is problematical in the circumstances here. Weight must be given to the Trone report in the disability determination because we require the hearing examiner to make factual conclusions based on the record as a whole. Robinson v. Smith, 683 A.2d 481, 487 (D.C.19965). The relevance of the report should be heightened by the fact that Trone is Sibley's own medical employee chosen by the hospital to examine Velasquez; under an agency theory, the report then becomes something akin to a party-opponent admission in the workers' compensation proceeding. See Short v. District of Columbia Dept. of Employment Servs., 723 A.2d 845, 851 n. 5 (D.C.1998).