Opinion ID: 4216062
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: “Custody” in Hospitals

Text: ¶19 We have previously considered whether a person questioned by law enforcement in a hospital was in custody for Miranda purposes. See, e.g., People v. Theander, 2013 CO 15, ¶ 26, 295 P.3d 960, 968; Effland, 240 P.3d at 872; Minjarez, 81 P.3d at 357. ¶20 In Minjarez, we held the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes when two law enforcement officers questioned him while he was at a hospital with his injured 7 infant child. 81 P.3d at 351, 356. In reaching our conclusion, we relied on the following factors: (1) the questioning took place in a private room at the hospital; (2) the defendant was alone with the officers in the room and was seated at the chair farthest from the door while the officers sat between him and the door; (3) the officers initiated the contact with the defendant, who was emotionally distraught throughout the ensuing interview; (4) significant portions of the interview occurred in a “highly confrontational and accusatory atmosphere that was clearly aimed at obtaining a confession”; (5) the interrogating officer told the defendant he thought he was guilty; and (6) the interrogating officer’s questions provided all the details of the incident and “were designed essentially to force agreement from the defendant.” Id. at 356. We concluded the police created an atmosphere equivalent to that of a formal arrest. Id. at 357. ¶21 Likewise, in Effland, we found the defendant was in custody during an interrogation at a hospital. 240 P.3d at 875–76. Officers discovered the defendant lying on the floor of his home, near his dead wife and daughter, after a failed suicide pact. Id. at 871. The defendant was handcuffed and accompanied to the hospital by a police officer. Id. at 875. A police officer sat outside the defendant’s room, within the defendant’s view. Id. The emotionally distraught and crying defendant spoke with two officers alone, after the officers had excluded the defendant’s other daughter from the room. Id. The interrogation consisted of questions and short answers. Id. We described the custody determination in Effland as “a close one” because the police told the defendant he was not in custody, the police wore civilian clothing, the defendant 8 was not restrained by the police, his mobility was limited only for medical reasons, and the tone of the interrogation was conversational. Id. However, we found of “particular significance” that the defendant had done what he could to terminate the communication—he invoked his right to remain silent and asked to speak with his lawyer, and he attempted to end the encounter twice—but the officers ignored his attempts. Id. at 876. Thus, we concluded a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have considered himself deprived of his freedom of action to a degree associated with formal arrest. Id. at 875–76. ¶22 In contrast, in Theander, we concluded a defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes when police officers interviewed the defendant on two occasions in her hospital bed. ¶ 26, 295 P.3d at 968. In Theander, the police officer did not handcuff or restrain the defendant and told the defendant several times she wasn’t in custody. Id. at ¶ 27, 295 P.3d at 968. The officers, dressed in plain clothing, maintained a polite and conversational tone. Id. The defendant’s mobility was limited for medical reasons. Id. She cried during part of the interview, but never told police she didn’t want to talk, and when she requested an attorney, the questioning ended. Id. at ¶¶ 31, 34–36, 295 P.3d at 968–69. Weighing those facts, we concluded the circumstances in Theander did not constitute custodial interrogation. Id. at ¶ 37, 295 P.3d at 969. ¶23 With these cases as our guide, we turn to the facts of the case now before us.