Opinion ID: 2675558
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alternate Juror #35

Text: Young also contends that the government wrongfully struck Juror #35. Young's argument fails because the government provided a sufficient race-neutral justification for the strike. Juror #35's mother worked at a nonprofit organization that helped transition people from prison to outside employment. The government argued that -32- Juror #35 was relatively young and lived with her mother, making her susceptible to potential bias from her mother's occupation. This reason is race neutral. We hold the use of a peremptory strike for Alternate Juror #35 was not improper. H. Sufficiency of the Evidence Regarding a Bargain-for Exchange Finally, Young and Mock both contend that the district court erred by denying their motion for judgment as a matter of law because, according to them, the evidence failed to establish that either party received valuable consideration for commission of the offense. This court reviews questions as to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the government, resolving conflicts in the government's favor, and accepting all reasonable inferences that support the verdict. United States v. Gray, 700 F.3d 377, 378 (8th Cir. 2012) (quotations and citations omitted). This court will not weigh the evidence or witnesses' credibility, for the jury alone resolves conflicts in the testimony. Gray, 700 F.3d at 378. We reverse only if no reasonable jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (quotation and citation omitted). The standard that this court applies to determine the sufficiency of the evidence is a strict one, and the finding of guilt should not be overturned lightly. United States v. Hyles, 521 F.3d 946, 954 (8th Cir. 2008) (quotation and citation omitted). The defendants' crime of conviction provides, Whoever . . . uses or causes another (including the intended victim) to use the mail or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce, with intent that a murder be committed in violation of the laws of any State or the United States as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value, or who conspires to do so, shall be . . . imprisoned for not more than ten years . . . and if death results, shall be punished by death or life imprisonment .... -33- 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). The defendants challenge whether the government provided sufficient proof that Young promised to pay Mock for her assistance in murdering Griesbauer. The defendants do not challenge whether the government proved any other elements of this crime. The government must prove three elements to convict a defendant for violating the substantive portion of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). These include that the defendant: (1) used or caused another to use the mail or a facility in interstate commerce, (2) with the intent that murder is committed, (3) for hire. United States v. Mueller, 661 F.3d 338, 345 (8th Cir. 2011). The for hire element typically requires consideration or some form of bargained-for exchange. A quid pro quo contractual arrangement can satisfy the for hire element. United States v. Washington, 318 F.3d 845, 854 (8th Cir. 2003). Thus, the payment for the murder could consist, theoretically, of a promise to give a peppercorn. See, e.g., United States v. Acierno, 579 F.3d 694, 701 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that a promise of giving $100 is sufficient consideration). The defendants cite United States v. Wicklund for the proposition that the for hire element requires something more than a mere expectation of receiving pecuniary value, for the statute requires consideration. 114 F.3d 151, 153–54 (10th Cir. 1997). Thus, consideration under the statute means either payment of consideration or a promise to pay it. Id. at 154. As a result, the defendants posit that the jury must speculate that Young paid Mock or promised to pay Mock money as consideration for Griesbauer's murder. However, in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a verdict, circumstantial evidence must be treated no differently than direct evidence. United States v. Lam, 338 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 2003). Here, the government provided significant circumstantial evidence to support a jury verdict that Young promised to pay Mock money in consideration for Griesbauer's murder. First, Keri's and Thomas's testimony reveal that Mock solicited others to murder Griesbauer for money on -34- Young's behalf. Second, Young insisted on receiving an extra $10,000 from her lender above that needed to pay off her debts on the farm mere hours before Griesbauer's death. Third, Young had previously solicited Newlin to murder an ex-husband for exactly $10,000. Fourth, despite Mock's financial hardships, she informed Ballard that she would soon be able to settle her debts with interest. Fifth, the defendants' presence at the crime scene and overlapping alibis demonstrate the presence of a scheme to murder Griesbauer. Consequently, when one considers the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, this evidence leads to the reasonable inference that Young promised to pay Mock $10,000 to murder Griesbauer. Thus, the defendants' argument must fail.