Opinion ID: 2551099
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sengupta's Claim of Retaliation for Free Speech

Text: Sengupta moved for partial summary judgment on his malpractice claim against Wickwire, asserting that he could have prevailed in his first appeal to this court if Wickwire had argued at the Parrish hearing that UAF retaliated against Sengupta in violation of his First Amendment rights. Sengupta also argued that Wickwire should have raised the retaliation for free speech claim in the administrative appeal before Judge Hodges. The superior court denied Sengupta's motion for partial summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Wickwire on Sengupta's retaliation for free speech malpractice claim on the ground that Sengupta's claim was time-barred. As the superior court correctly noted, a six-year statute of limitations applies to professional malpractice actions accruing before August 7, 1997, as long as the action claims economic loss. [25] For actions accruing after August 7, 1997 and claiming economic loss, a three-year statute of limitations applies. [26] Malpractice actions claiming personal or reputational injury are governed by a two-year statute of limitations. [27] The superior court determined that Sengupta's complaint primarily alleged economic harm, applied the six-year statute of limitations to Sengupta's retaliation for free speech malpractice claim, and concluded that it was time-barred. We agree that the six-year statute of limitations applies, but we conclude that even if Sengupta's claim is time-barred because the limitations period did not accrue until Sengupta learned from his new attorney that he had a potential malpractice claim, any error was harmless. The statute of limitations ordinarily begins to run on the date the plaintiff is injured. However, we apply the discovery rule to professional malpractice actions. [28] Under the discovery rule, the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff has information sufficient to alert a reasonable person to the fact that he has a potential cause of action. At that point, he should begin an inquiry to protect his ... rights and he is deemed to have notice of all facts which reasonable inquiry would disclose. [29] The limitations period begins to run when a client discovers or reasonably should have discovered all the elements of the cause of action, and suffers actual damages. [30] This standard raises the question whether Sengupta should have begun to inquire about Wickwire's conduct when Sengupta was terminated, or whether the statute of limitations was tolled until Sengupta learned from another attorney that Wickwire might have neglected to pursue certain claims. The superior court determined that Sengupta knew of the facts upon which he bases his free speech malpractice claim prior to March 26, 1996, six years before Sengupta filed his complaint. [31] The superior court therefore concluded that Sengupta's claim was time-barred by the six-year statute of limitations. Sengupta argues that he did not discover that Wickwire had failed to raise his retaliation for free speech claim until his new attorney, Robert Sparks, advised him of the potential claim in January 1997. He relies on Preblich v. Zorea , in which we observed that the date on which a client should reasonably discover the existence of a cause of action depends upon all of the surrounding circumstances. [32] We reasoned that the circumstances include consideration of [the client's] sophistication in the particular area of knowledge and noted that Preblich [was] not an attorney and could not be expected to immediately recognize the inadequacy or consequences of [her lawyer's] poor representation or lack of action. [33] Sengupta's argument is that because as a layman he could not reasonably have been expected to know that he had a potential retaliation for free speech claim prior to learning about it from Sparks, it follows that he could not have known until then that he had a potential malpractice action against Wickwire for failing to raise the claim. But we need not decide this question. Even if the superior court erred when it determined that Sengupta's claim was time-barred, the error was harmless because the only retaliation claim Wickwire could have raised at the Parrish hearing related to UAF's denial of Sengupta's request for a raise, which is not an issue in this appeal. At Sengupta's initial grievance hearing, Parrish found that Sengupta had made false allegations about colleagues in a letter he sent to a state representative, the Governor, and the state board of engineering. Sengupta claims that Wickwire should have argued that Sengupta's letter was protected by the First Amendment. But Sengupta argues only that UAF retaliated against him when it terminated him following the Parrish hearing. As the superior court notes, UAF did not take action to terminate Sengupta until after the Parrish hearing. Thus, the logical forum for raising the retaliation for free speech claim would have been at the Rice pre-termination hearing, where Sengupta appeared pro se. Although Wickwire could have raised the retaliation claim in connection with Parrish's decision to deny Sengupta's grievances regarding pay and promotions, these grievances are not issues in this appeal. [34] Sengupta's argument that Wickwire should have raised the retaliation issue during the administrative appeal before Judge Hodges is similarly without merit. This issue would have been considered waived in the appeal before Judge Hodges because Sengupta did not raise it when he appeared pro se during the Rice hearing. [35] Because Wickwire could not have raised Sengupta's retaliation for free speech claim in connection with his termination at either the Parrish hearing or during the Hodges appeal, we affirm the superior court's grant of summary judgment to Wickwire on this issue. [36]