Opinion ID: 68611
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Aguirre-Orozco

Text: We review a district court’s jury instructions under an abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Williams, 541 F.3d 1087, 1089 (11th Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Mar. 27, 2009) (No. 08-10821). District courts have broad discretion in crafting jury instructions as long as the charge accurately reflects the law and the facts. United States v. Kennard, 472 F.3d 851, 854 (11th Cir. 2006). An error in jury instructions does not mandate reversal unless there is a 18 reasonable likelihood that the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Williams, 541 F.3d at 1089. “Evidence of flight is admissible to demonstrate consciousness of guilt and thereby guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted). In United States v. Myers, former Fifth Circuit held that the probative value [of flight] as circumstantial evidence of guilt depends upon the degree of confidence with which four inferences can be drawn: (1) from the defendant’s behavior to flight; (2) from flight to consciousness of guilt; (3) from consciousness of guilt to consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged; and (4) from consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged to actual guilt of the crime charged. United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1977). An instruction on flight is proper if the evidence supports all four of the necessary inferences. Id. at 1050. “The more remote in time the alleged flight is from the commission or accusation of an offense, the greater the likelihood that it resulted from something other than feelings of guilt concerning that offense.” Id. at 1051. In addition, “[t]he probative value of such evidence obviously is diminished if the defendant has committed several unrelated crimes . . . .” United States v. Blakey, 960 F.2d 996, 1000 (11th Cir. 1992). Here, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to infer that Aguirre-Orozco’s flight resulted from his consciousness of guilt for the crimes for 19 which he was being tried. First, the evidence shows that Freeman informed Aguirre-Orozco, by telephone, that police were looking for Aguirre-Orozco in connection with methamphetamine trafficking. Later that same day, Aguirre-Orozco fled from law enforcement and ultimately was arrested. In addition, 5.4 grams of pure methamphetamine was found in connection with Aguirre-Orozco’s arrest. Canales testified that 1 gram could supply at least 10 to 20 hits, that 1 hit was all it took to get high for several hours, and that Aguirre-Orozco shared methamphetamine with him and others. This evidence supports that, at the time Aguirre-Orozco fled from law enforcement, he was aware that law enforcement officers were pursuing him in connection with methamphetamine trafficking and was in possession of a significant quantity of methamphetamine, which the jury could conclude was intended for distribution. This was sufficient for a jury to infer that Aguirre-Orozco fled because he was conscious that he was committing the crime of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, such that the flight instruction was proper. See Williams, 541 F.3d at 1089 (“Because a reasonable jury could conclude, based on the evidence presented, that Defendant fled the police to avoid the charged crime, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to give the flight instruction.”). 20 Although Aguirre-Orozco attempts to use his status as an illegal alien to negate the permissible inferences to be drawn from the evidence, the fact that he was in the country illegally did not forbid the jury from concluding that the evidence supported that he fled based on his consciousness of guilt for the methamphetamine offense. See United States v. Martinez, 83 F.3d 371, 377 (11th Cir. 1996) (“That Gallo knew he had also committed a burglary does not detract from the evidence that Gallo was attempting to evade arrest for committing a drug offense and for being a felon in possession of a firearm.”). Furthermore, the “district court correctly cautioned the jury that it was up to them to determine whether the evidence proved flight and the significance, if any, to be accorded such a determination.” Kennard, 472 F.3d at 855 (quotation omitted). Thus, Aguirre-Orozco cannot show that the district court abused its discretion in instructing the jury that it could consider his flight in determining whether he was guilty of the crimes for which he was being tried. See Williams, 541 F.3d at 1089.
We apply plain-error review when a defendant fails to object to an evidentiary ruling. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that a Bruton claim should be reviewed for plain error when a defendant failed to contemporaneously object to the admission of the evidence). 21 To establish plain error, a defendant must show an “(1) error, (2) that is plain and (3) that affects substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1276 (quotation omitted). “Where errors could have cut either way and uncertainty exists, the burden is the decisive factor in the third prong of the plain error test.” Id. (quotation and ellipsis omitted). In Bruton, the Supreme Court “held that despite a limiting instruction, the admission of a ‘powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statement’ of a non-testifying co-defendant violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine an adverse witness.” Id. at 1277 (citing Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135-36, 88 S.Ct. at 1628). “A statement is ‘powerfully incriminating’ under Bruton if it directly implicates the defendant.” Id. It follows that testimony that does not implicate a codefendant directly does not violate Bruton. See id. at 1278 (“Thorp’s testimony initially did not violate Bruton, because it did not directly implicate Turner.”). Furthermore, to violate Bruton, a statement must be “facially incriminating,” and a statement is not facially incriminating if it has to be linked to other evidence in order to be inculpatory. United States v. Adams, 74 F.3d 1093, 1099 (11th Cir. 1996). 22 Here, the statements and topics about which Aguirre-Orozco complains do not implicate Aguirre-Orozco directly, and he cannot show that his substantial rights were affected by their admission. First, with respect to the nine statements and topics Aguirre-Orozco identifies, Carden mentions Aguirre-Orozco in only two, and none of the others implicates Aguirre-Orozco on their face. United States v. Beard, 775 F.2d 1577, 1581 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding no Bruton violation when a defendant’s “question to the F.B.I. agent did not directly name the defendant Roberts, nor d[id] it necessarily implicate Roberts in the commission of the bank robbery”). In the first statement that mentions Aguirre-Orozco, Carden states that Aguirre-Orozco was in the cell next to him and that law enforcement was trying to build a case on them. This was not facially inculpatory, and other testimony established that Carden and Aguirre-Orozco knew each other and that Aguirre-Orozco had been arrested. The next statement that mentions Aguirre-Orozco was Carden’s statement that Aguirre-Orozco had “done all he is going to do.” In order for this statement to make sense, it had to be linked with other testimony that Aguirre-Orozco paid Carden’s attorney a certain amount of money in a previous state case. This statement also was not facially incriminating, as it required other evidence in order to make sense, and did not suggest that Aguirre-Orozco was guilty of the charges for which he was then being tried. See 23 id. (noting that, to show a violation of Bruton, the defendant must show that “the out-of-court statement by his co-defendant [] directly implicated him and that the statement standing alone was clearly inculpatory”). Thus, Aguirre-Orozco failed to show that the district court committed an error under Bruton. Furthermore, even if the statements were admitted in violation of Bruton, Aguirre-Orozco cannot show that his substantial rights were violated because of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. The statements were unrelated to Aguirre-Orozco’s possession charge, and, with respect to the conspiracy charge, the evidence at trial supported that Aguirre-Orozco was involved in a methamphetamine-distribution conspiracy. Canales testified that he bought pounds of methamphetamine from Aguirre-Orozco, and that Canales was a part of a conspiracy with Aguirre-Orozco and Carden. Fallin testified that he knew that Aguirre-Orozco was Carden’s source of supply and had seen Aguirre-Orozco and Carden exchange money in the presence of large amounts of drugs. Gilmore testified that Carden sold drugs that he got from Aguirre-Orozco. Freeman testified that Aguirre-Orozco was his supplier and that Aguirre-Orozco shared methamphetamine with him. Finally, Luker testified that Aguirre-Orozco supplied Carden with drugs. This evidence of Aguirre-Orozco’s guilt was overwhelming apart from the admitted statements, such that Aguirre-Orozco cannot show that any 24 Bruton error affected his substantial rights. See Turner, 474 F.3d at 1278 (holding that Turner did not show that Bruton error affected her substantial rights because, “independent of the challenged testimony, the government presented overwhelming evidence in support of Turner’s convictions”). Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings under an abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Brannan, 562 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009). Under this deferential standard, we must affirm unless we find the district court made “a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard.” Id. (quotation omitted). Rule 404(b) provides, Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . .” Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). We have stated that “Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, and that accordingly 404(b) evidence, like other relevant evidence, should not lightly be excluded when it is central to the prosecution’s case.” United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). 25 In reviewing 404(b) decisions, we apply a three-part test for admissibility of such evidence: (1) the evidence must be relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character; (2) there must be sufficient proof so that the factfinder could find that the defendant committed the extrinsic act; and (3) the evidence must possess probative value that is not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice. United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 779 (11th Cir. 2006). Here, Aguirre-Orozco does not challenge the second prong of the three-part test. We have stated that “in every conspiracy case, a not guilty plea renders the defendant’s intent a material issue” and that “[e]vidence of such extrinsic evidence as may be probative of a defendant’s state of mind is admissible unless the defendant affirmatively takes[] the issue of intent out of the case.” United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation, alterations, and ellipsis omitted); see also United States v. Butler, 102 F.3d 1191, 1195 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Intent is always at issue when a defendant pleads not guilty to a conspiracy charge.”). Under the third prong of the balancing test, “the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1282 (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). This determination lies within the district court’s discretion and involves an assessment of all of the circumstances surrounding the prior acts, including the government’s need, the similarity between the prior acts and the charged offense, and the temporal 26 remoteness between the events. Id. We have noted that “temporal remoteness is an important factor” and stated that a defendant “bears a heavy burden in demonstrating an abuse of the court’s broad discretion in determining if an extrinsic offense is too remote to be probative.” Matthews, 431 F.3d at 1311 (quotation omitted). Here, under the first prong of our Rule 404(b) test, Aguirre-Orozco’s prior convictions for controlled-substance offenses were relevant to show Aguirre-Orozco’s intent with respect to the instant drug-conspiracy charges, as both offenses involved drugs. See id. (holding that an “arrest for distribution of cocaine was relevant to the intent at issue in the charged conspiracy to distribute cocaine”). Although Aguirre-Orozco challenges the introduction of the convictions because they did not identify the specific controlled substance involved, we have stated that its “precedent regards virtually any prior drug offense as probative of the intent to engage in a drug conspiracy.” Id.; cf. United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1207 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that evidence of a prior murder was unrelated to the drug- or firearm-related charges, such that it was inadmissible under Rule 404(b)). Thus, Aguirre-Orozco’s prior convictions were relevant under the first prong of our Rule 404(b) test. See Perez, 443 F.3d at 779. 27 Under the third prong of the test, Aguirre-Orozco has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in determining that the probative value of his prior convictions was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. See id. First, Aguirre-Orozco’s prior convictions for possession of a controlled-substance with intent to sell and possession of a controlled substance were similar to the drug-conspiracy and drug-possession charges for which Aguirre-Orozco was being tried. See Matthews, 431 F.3d at 1311; see also United States v. Lampley, 68 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 1995) (determining in a trial for cocaine trafficking that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of evidence of prior marijuana deals was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice). In addition, Aguirre-Orozco was arrested in connection with the earliest prior conviction in 1999, which was approximately nine years before the grand jury handed down the indictment on the instant charges, and this Court has held that longer periods did not render admission improper. See Lampley, 68 F.3d at 1300 (holding that a time period of approximately 15 years was not too remote); see also United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1346 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing cases that held that 5-, 6-, and 15-year time gaps were not too remote for proper consideration). 28 In addition, the court gave the jury a limiting instruction after admitting the evidence of the prior convictions, informing the jury that it could not consider the convictions as evidence that Aguirre-Orozco committed the acts charged in the indictment, but could consider them to determine whether he had the state of mind or intent necessary to commit the charged crimes. This limiting instruction further supports that the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence to be admitted. See United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251, 1267 (11th Cir.) (“Any prejudicial value was further reduced by the limiting instruction given by the district court during the jury charge.”), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 524 (2008). Therefore, because Aguirre-Orozco’s prior convictions were relevant to an issue other than his character and their probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, the district court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 404(b) in admitting the prior convictions into evidence. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.