Opinion ID: 2614919
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Analysis of the Suitability Exception

Text: The first point to be noted about the suitability requirement is its origin; it is a purely judicial construct, without any basis or support in the statutory language. Indeed, as earlier discussed, the text of section 846 is extremely broad; the immunity applies to the owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or nonpossessory.... (Italics added.) The Legislature made no distinction between developed and undeveloped property or between urban and rural land, and imposed no requirement that the site be in a natural or unaltered state. As we have previously observed, section 846 is by no means limited to land in its natural condition  it specifically mentions `structures'  it obviously encompasses improved streets. ( Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 706-707; see also Valladares v. Stone, supra, 218 Cal. App.3d at p. 370 [The Legislature did not limit section 846 to rural as opposed to urban land.].) Thus, assuming the requisite interest in land, the plain language of the statute admits of no exceptions, either for property unsuitable for recreational use or otherwise. (6) Courts may, of course, disregard even plain language which leads to absurd results or contravenes clear evidence of a contrary legislative intent. ( California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 844 [157 Cal. Rptr. 676, 598 P.2d 836].) (5b) As noted earlier, several Courts of Appeal have concluded the Legislature could not rationally have intended to immunize owners of property unsuited for recreation, even if in fact the property was used for such a purpose at the time of the accident. Reason and logic do not, however, compel such a conclusion. The Legislature could reasonably determine that a landowner  any landowner  should not in fairness be held liable for injuries sustained by a trespasser from the recreational use of the owner's property. (7, 8)(See fn. 8.), (5c) The statute, in short, may be read to mean precisely what it says. [8] One of the first Court of Appeal decisions to consider the scope of section 846 reached this very conclusion. In Lostritto v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. (1977) 73 Cal. App.3d 737 [140 Cal. Rptr. 905], the court considered an equal protection challenge to section 846 on the basis that it improperly included land unsuited for recreation. ( Id. at p. 749.) The Court of Appeal rejected the claim, observing that the statute was not designed ... to absolve from the charge of simple negligence only the owners of such properties ordinarily entered by persons seeking recreation [or those] ... who would be enticed to refrain from fencing or guarding their property.... The Legislature probably decided not only that freedom of recreation should be encouraged, but also that it is unfair to permit claims for negligence in favor of persons who choose to enter the lands of others for the described activities. ( Ibid., italics added.) A graded housing tract is certainly not designed for recreational purposes, but when it is used as such, within the meaning of section 846, it is reasonable to put the user at risk. The public policy balance achieved by the statute is clear: landowners are broadly encouraged to allow access to their property; recreationists who take advantage of this access waive their right to sue for ordinary negligence. The determination as to whether the land is suitable for recreation is placed on the user, not the courts. As the court observed in Stout v. U.S. (D. Hawaii 1987) 696 F. Supp. 538, 539 (holding a nearly identical Hawaii statute to be applicable to a debris and litter ridden piece of woods on a military base): The statute does not create a qualitative factor as to what land can be deemed recreational and what cannot. The statute encompasses any land that is used for recreation, rather than what some court may determine is recreational land. ( Ibid., original italics.) Our conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to confine section 846 immunity to land suitable for recreational use is also supported by practical considerations. As the instant case illustrates, the concept of suitability is elusive and unpredictable. As a purely judicial construct it has engendered disparate application. One court, for example, focused on the acute need for recreational areas in urban settings to conclude that a vacant, weed-covered lot adjacent to a residential center was suitable for recreation. ( Valladares v. Stone, supra, 218 Cal. App.3d at pp. 369-370.) Another has implied that section 846 immunity is intended primarily for large tracts of rural or semirural land. ( Paige v. North Oaks Partners, supra, 134 Cal. App.3d at p. 865.) Some have suggested that the suitability exception is limited to active construction sites. ( Domingue v. Presley of Southern California, supra, 197 Cal. App.3d at p. 1070; Valladares v. Stone, supra, 218 Cal. App.3d at pp. 370-371; Colvin v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., supra, 194 Cal. App.3d at p. 1312.) Here, however, undisputably agricultural property was ruled unsuitable, suggesting that immunity may turn not only on the existence of development, but on other, unspecified criteria such as the presence of old equipment. [T]he tendency of the law, Holmes said, must always be to narrow the field of uncertainty. (Holmes, The Common Law (1881) p. 127.) The suitability exception expands it. Even assuming that landowners are able generally to assess their properties against this uncertain standard, however, they are still not safe. Some properties may be appropriate for particular recreational activities (e.g., hang gliding) and inappropriate for others (bicycling, for example). Rather than permit access to some users, the prudent owner is more likely to deny access to all. Thus, the suitability exception can only thwart the laudable goal of inducing owners to make their properties available for recreation. The rule has also resulted in the perverse anomaly that landowners who make the most effort to safeguard their property are the least likely to benefit from the statute. In Wineinger v. Bear Brand Ranch, supra, 204 Cal. App.3d 1003, the Court of Appeal denied section 846 immunity to the owner of a housing tract under development on the ground that the owner had attempted to restrict access to the property by erecting barricades, no trespassing and road closed signs. Notwithstanding the owner's efforts, the plaintiff and several friends drove a converted land cruiser onto the property and over a cliff. The Wineinger court reasoned that by its attempt to restrict access the owner had evidenced an intent to withdraw the property from recreational use, thus acknowledging its unfitness for recreation and waiving any claim to the statutory immunity. ( Id. at pp. 1008-1010; accord, Myers v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., supra, 224 Cal. App.3d at pp. 759, 761.) The injustice of such a result is evident. The statute reasonably applies to lands that are fenced as readily as those that are open. The dissent's arguments to the contrary do not bear scrutiny. It is claimed that by amending section 846 to include additional activities within the meaning of recreational purpose, while failing to overrule the suitability rule adopted by the Courts of Appeal, the Legislature impliedly adopted the lower courts' construction. The argument overlooks the fact that at least one court effectively declined to engraft a suitability exception on the statute. ( Lostritto v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co., supra, 73 Cal. App.3d 737.) (9) Moreover, as we have repeatedly observed, `Legislative silence after a court has construed a statute gives rise at most to an arguable inference of acquiescence or passive approval.... But something more than mere silence is required before that acquiescence is elevated into a species of implied legislation....' [Citations.] In the area of statutory construction, an examination of what the Legislature has done (as opposed to what it has left undone) is generally the more fruitful inquiry. `[L]egislative inaction is `a weak reed upon which to lean.'' ( Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1156 [278 Cal. Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873]; accord, People v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 751 [12 Cal. Rptr.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100]; Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 300-301 [250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58]; Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 923 [221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 710 P.2d 375].) (5d) A judicially created suitability exception is also necessary, the dissent argues, because the Legislature could not have intended to immunize the owner of a construction site from suit by children coming to play on the property, while leaving the developer unprotected from suit by a thief injured on the same site while stealing lumber. The same disparity of treatment would exist, however, on property deemed suitable for recreational use. Moreover, the claimed incongruity is largely illusory, as Civil Code section 847 immunizes landowners against suits by most trespassing felons. In any event, the fact that the Legislature has extended a somewhat broader immunity to the property owner against suits by recreational users than felons (Civ. Code, § 847) does not invalidate the statutory scheme. Although we may question the Legislature's priorities, we may not  absent clear evidence of a contrary intent  thwart its plainly expressed judgment. In sum, we conclude that the so-called suitability exception to section 846 is not compelled by law or logic. On the contrary, assuming, as we must, that the Legislature chose its words carefully, the broad language of the statute suggests that the Legislature consciously eschewed any restrictions on the property subject to the statute in order to provide clear guidance to landowners, to encourage access to recreationists, and to fairly balance the interests of both. One who avails oneself of the opportunity to enjoy access to the land of another for one of the recreational activities within the statute may not be heard to complain that the property was inappropriate for the purpose. The Court of Appeal erred, therefore, in holding defendant's property to be outside the scope of section 846. [9]