Opinion ID: 2623451
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Balancing Open Government with the Privacy of Public Officials

Text: Placing a greater burden on a party requesting a document that may not be a public record is in harmony with both the intent of CORA and with our previous cases protecting individuals' private documents. Generally, the intent behind CORA is stated in the legislative declaration: It is declared to be the public policy of this state that all public records shall be open for inspection by any person at reasonable times.... § 24-72-201. CORA limits disclosure requirements, however, to public records, which the Act defines: `Public records'  means and includes all writings made, maintained, or kept by the state, ... or political subdivision of the state ... for use in the exercise of functions required or authorized by law or administrative rule or involving the receipt or expenditure of public funds. § 24-72-202(6)(a)(I). Although generally CORA favors broad disclosure, the General Assembly recognized that not all documents should be subject to public disclosure. First, the definition of public record limits which documents are subject to disclosure under the statute. Further, that definition is limited by exceptions for certain documents that the General Assembly deemed inappropriate for disclosure such as work product, criminal justice records, and trade secrets. § 24-72-202(6)(a)(II), (6)(b); see also City of Westminster v. Dogan Constr. Co., 930 P.2d 585, 589 (Colo.1997) (Although the general purpose of the Act is to provide access to public records, the General Assembly qualified that purpose by providing specific exceptions to the statutory disclosure requirements.). Thus while the general purpose of CORA is to provide open government through disclosure of public records, CORA's purpose is not to disclose information that is not held by the government or that otherwise falls under an exception. In sum, CORA was not intended to cover information held by a government official in his private capacity. See Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 85 F.3d 489, 493 (10th Cir.1996) (When a governmental official is sued in his official and individual capacities for acts performed in each capacity, those acts are `treated as the transactions of two different legal personages.'). Consistent with the General Assembly's definition of public records, we have recognized the distinction between private and public records. Our prior case law demonstrates that our decision today is in keeping with the greater protection we have traditionally afforded private documents. First, we have previously distinguished between writings made in a public versus a private capacity. In Downing v. Brown, 3 Colo. 571, 590-91 (1877), a forgery case, we held that a probate judge's memorandum-book was a convenient book of reference and was not a book of or belonging to any public office. The judge used the memorandum-book to record notes concerning applications about lots for which he was acting as the trustee. Id. at 590. We noted that the judge was not required to keep such a book, it was not evidentiary, and there were other documents that were deposited that served as pleadings in the contested cases. Id. As such, we concluded that the book had no official character. Id. at 591; accord Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Workers of America v. Voinovich, 100 Ohio App.3d 372, 654 N.E.2d 139 (1995) (Governor's personal calendar which was made for his own convenience, to which he had sole access, and could destroy at any time, was not a public record, and to allow access would intrude on his subjective thoughts); cf. Herald Ass'n, Inc. v. Dean, 816 A.2d 469 (Vt. 2002) (Governor's calendar considered a public record because the calendar was created by his staff and was an essential part of the functioning of the Governor's office). Similarly, in People v. Trujillo, 185 Colo. 14, 17, 521 P.2d 769, 770 (1974), another forgery case, we interpreted public records to include only those records which were prepared by, and in, the custody of a public agency. Consequently, we held that an official could not have forged his application for promotion as that document did not fall within the ambit of public records. Id. at 771. Thus, we again distinguished between documents made in a public versus private capacity. Our case law therefore reveals the distinction we have made between private and public documents made by public officials. Merely because a document is made during one's tenure as a public official does not render it a public record. While not applicable here, other provisions of CORA support this distinction. § 24-72-202(6.5)(a) (CORA exception to disclosure for documents that are work product and are deliberative in nature); see also City of Colorado Springs v. White, 967 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Colo.1998) ([M]aterials falling within the ambit of the deliberative process privilege are not subject to disclosure in the context of a request for public records under the Colorado open records laws.). Additionally, our prior case law illustrates the high value we have placed on the privacy of private papers. A diary is the foremost example of one's private papers. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine what `papers and effects' should be more entitled to privacy than one's personal diary. People v. Williams, 192 Colo. 249, 254, 557 P.2d 399, 403 (1976). While we made that statement in the context of a search and seizure case, the sentiment is no less valid here. The highly personal nature of one's diary would cause even inspection by a court to be far too intrusive. See Martinelli v. Dist. Court, 199 Colo. 163, 173, 612 P.2d 1083, 1091 (1980) (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977)) (right of privacy protects the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters). [4] In short, both CORA and our prior case law demonstrate that while we deem the disclosure of public records and the creation of an open government important goals, we steadfastly guard against disclosure of private papers. The purposes behind CORA, open government and citizen access, generally are not furthered by disclosing public officials' every thought and feeling. Were we to allow such unfettered access, we would not only discourage public service, we would create an arena of gossip and scandal instead of facilitating a forum of open and frank discussion about issues concerning public officials and the citizenry they serve.