Opinion ID: 2277556
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ambiguity and the Maxim of Interpretation Expressio Unius.

Text: It is a familiar and general rule of statutory construction that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.... [26] This basic tenet of statutory construction is usually referred to by the Latin phrase expressio unius est exclusio alterius. [27] Often that maxim is shortened to expressio unius. Of course, like all canons of construction, expressio unius is not useful in every case. And we do not resort to canons of interpretation if the meaning of the law is clear. [28] As explained, however, the relevant portion of § 93 is ambiguous, at least as applied to situations like the one at hand. So we will use expressio unius, but only as an aid in arriving at [legislative] intention, and not to defeat it. [29] Because the expressio unius maxim is only a rule of construction, and not substantive law, we must use it only `when ... that which is expressed is so set over by way of strong contrast to that which is omitted that the contrast enforces the affirmative inference that that which is omitted must be intended to have opposite and contrary treatment.' [30] In other words, expressio unius is most helpful when there is a strong, unmistakable contrast between what is expressed and what is omitted. Use of the expressio unius maxim is particularly appropriate in this case because, even under an expansive reading of § 93, a very small number of possibilities existsthree, to be exactregarding how the General Assembly may determine how appointees such as Fox may be confirmed. [31] First, § 93 could be construed to provide that the General Assembly may pass legislation providing that the Senate alone is vested with the power to confirm a particular type of appointee. [32] Second, § 93 could be interpreted to provide that the General Assembly could pass legislation providing that the House alone could be vested with the power to confirm a particular type of appointee. [33] Third, § 93 could be interpreted to provide that the General Assembly could pass legislation requiring both the Senate and the House each to confirm a particular type of appointee. An unmistakable difference appears among those three possibilities. Use of one approach necessarily precludes use of one of the remaining two because a statute cannot, for example, provide in one section that an appointee should be confirmed by the Senate alone while stating somewhere else that that same appointee is subject to both House and Senate confirmation. The limited number of possible constructions of § 93 and the exclusivity and vast difference among the other possible constructions makes this case an ideal situation to apply the expressio unius maxim. We recognize, as the Governor argues, the United States Supreme Court has held that phrases such as may include are not well-suited to interpretation by use of expressio unius because the phrase may include is expansive.... [34] But the differences between what was expressed and what was not were not as clear in the authorities relied upon by the Governor. The Supreme Court itself recognized that expressio unius was inapplicable in Chevron USA, Inc., because, among other reasons, the range of possibilities if expressio unius were used was vast. In fact, the Court held that that there is no apparent stopping point if it applied expressio unius to the statute under construction. [35] Likewise, our decision in Cornelison v. Commonwealth, [36] greatly relied upon by the Governor, is similarly distinguishable. In Cornelison, a defendant argued that error occurred when a police officer was permitted to testify during a sentencing hearing about the effect good-time credit would have on a potential sentence. [37] On appeal, Cornelison argued the officer's good-time-credit testimony was improper because KRS 532.055 listed several items of evidence that the Commonwealth could offer relevant to sentencing; but that statute did not mention good-time credit. We rejected Cornelison's argument that the expressio unius maxim should apply, holding that the list [in KRS 532.055] is illustrative rather than exhaustive. [38] But, as with Chevron USA, Inc., our decision in Cornelison seems to have been at least partly based upon the potentially vast array of evidence that could properly be relevant to a sentencing determination. We held that good-time-credit-related evidence was no less relevant nor more speculative than another type of evidence listed in the statute. [39] In other words, the inclusion of types of evidence expressly deemed admissible by the statute did not lead to the logical conclusion that all other types of evidence were inadmissible, especially in light of the fact that one of the purposes of KRS 532.055 was to ensure a well-informed jury. In the case at hand, however, the list of potential, rational interpretations of § 93 is very short; and, accordingly, the inclusion of language permitting the Senate to confirm nominees leads to a strong presumption that the House was intentionally excluded from the confirmation process. Also, Chevron USA, Inc., relied upon by the Governor, is distinguishable because the Supreme Court found in that case that language suggesting exclusiveness is missing from the statute being construed (part of the Americans with Disabilities Act). [40] In the case at hand, since there are only, at most, three rational interpretations of the pertinent language of § 93, the express language setting forth one of those three possibilities gives rise to a strong presumption that the other two possibilities were intentionally excluded. In short, the fact that there are only three rational, yet completely discrete, ways of interpreting the relevant language of § 93 means that the expression of one of those choices (confirmation by the Senate) carries great weight in implying that the other choices (confirmation by the House, either alone or acting along with the Senate) were intentionally excluded. As one esteemed treatise on statutory construction notes, [t]here is generally an inference that omissions are intentional. This rule is based on logic and common sense. It expresses the concept that when people say one thing they do not mean something else. [41] Another leading treatise agrees, stating, the enumeration of certain specified things in a constitutional provision will usually be construed to exclude all things not enumerated. [42] We conclude, therefore, that the application of the expressio unius interpretive maxim works logically in this case and that the application of that maxim leads to a reasonable conclusion that the Senate alone has the constitutional confirmation power under § 93. We may not properly infer from utter silence a concomitant power for the House. This conclusion does not end our inquiry because the Governor raises several arguments that he contends do, nevertheless, afford the House a role in the confirmation process even though that body is not expressly mentioned in § 93.