Opinion ID: 1704762
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: equal pay provision

Text: MacDonald asserts that the equal pay provision in the agreement governing the parties' practice after July 1, 1988, was ambiguous, and should be strictly construed against Habeck, who drafted the agreement. The trial court found no ambiguity in the equal pay provision, and neither do we. The primary goal of the court when interpreting a contract is to give effect to the mutual intentions of the parties. National Bank of Harvey v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.W.2d 799, 803 (N.D.1988). We attempt to ascertain the parties' intent from the writing alone, if possible. Red River Human Services Foundation v. State, 477 N.W.2d 225, 227 (N.D.1991). If the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, and the intent is apparent from its face, there is no room for further interpretation. Schmitt v. Berwick Township, 488 N.W.2d 398, 400 (N.D.1992); Stuhlmiller v. Nodak Mutual Insurance Co., 475 N.W.2d 136, 138 (N.D. 1991). An ambiguity exists only when rational arguments can be made in support of contrary positions about the meaning of a term, phrase, or clause of the contract. Schmitt v. Berwick Township, supra, 488 N.W.2d at 400. The determination whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. Schmitt v. Berwick Township, supra, 488 N.W.2d at 400. The parties' second agreement provided, in pertinent part: Starting 7/1/88 both associates shall earn equal pay. Such equal pay shall be the result of allocating the available work load equally between the two associates. This division of work and pay may be changed from the one to one formula at a later time if both associates agree in writing. MacDonald argues that this provision is ambiguous, asserting that the parties' true intent was to provide income on a pro rata basis, based upon the net revenues generated by each as shown through patient billings. This is not a rational construction of the contract language. The agreement clearly and unambiguously provides that both associates shall earn equal pay, and characterizes it as a one to one formula. This language cannot rationally be interpreted to require pro rata income based upon revenue generated by each doctor. The only qualifying language provides for equal allocation of the available work load; it does not mention allocation based upon revenues. We conclude that the contract language in question is not ambiguous and was correctly construed by the trial court.