Opinion ID: 769431
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Angel Morales

Text: 24 On appeal, Morales argues that he was denied: 1) his right to an interpreter in violation of the Court Interpreter's Act; 2) his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when he appeared to testify at Santos's sentencing hearing; and 3) his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. 25
26 Morales argues that since English is not his primary language, he was denied his right to an interpreter in violation of the Court Interpreter's Act, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1827. The Act requires the court to provide an interpreter for a defendant who primarily speaks a language other than English, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1827(d)(1)(A); its purpose is to ensure that the defendant can comprehend the proceedings and communicate effectively with counsel. United States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450, 1455 (6th Cir. 1991). Since this issue hinges on a variety of factors, including the defendant's knowledge of English and the complexity of the proceedings and testimony, the trial judge, who is in direct contact with the defendant, must be given wide discretion. Valladares v. United States, 871 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Sanchez, 928 F.2d at 1455. 27 Morales first contends that he was unable to comprehend his plea colloquy without an interpreter, and thus he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to appeal his sentence. According to Morales, the following exchange demonstrates that it was difficult for him to comprehend his waiver: 28 Q And if I [the district court] sentence you within the appropriate range, are you giving up or waiving your right to appeal your sentence on any ground and also agreeing not to contest your sentence in any post-conviction proceeding? 29 A No. 30 Q You're not. Read paragraph M and see if you want to change that answer. (Conference between counsel and client, not within hearing) 31 A Yeah, I--my right to appeal. 32 (Tr. 23-24.) 33 The complete transcript of his plea hearing, however, shows that he understood the proceedings. At the start of the hearing, the court asked Morales whether he can speak, read, write and understand English, and he answered, I get by. He also confirmed that he fully discussed his indictment and guilty plea with his counsel. When the court asked him if he wanted to review the plea agreement with his attorney once more before the court proceeded with further questions, he declined the opportunity. After Morales consulted with his attorney, the court carefully reviewed the waiver with him again to confirm that he understood that provision: 34 Q Okay. If you're sentenced within the appropriate guideline range, as I understand this agreement, you are expressly giving up your right to appeal your sentence and you're also giving up your right to contest your sentence under any post-conviction proceeding, is that true? 35 A Yes, sir. 36 Q Okay. Do you understand what all that means? 37 A Yes. 38 (Tr. 24.) The court continued: 39 Q Do you fully understand the terms of this plea agreement that we went over? 40 A Yes, sir. 41 Q No doubt about it? 42 A No doubt about it, sir. 43 (Tr. 25-26.) Again, the court confirmed that Morales understood that he was waiving his right to appeal 44 Q Now, normally, under certain circumstances, you or the Government would have the right to appeal any sentence that I impose. But you do understand, sir, that by entering into your plea agreement with the Government and entering your plea of guilty here today, you are giving up your right to appeal your sentence? 45 A Yes, sir. 46 Q We've gone over that before. Just want to make sure you understand that? 47 A Yes, I understand. 48 (Tr. 30.) And the following exchange occurred at the conclusion of the court's thorough colloquy: 49 Q Do you have any questions of me about anything you and I talked about here this morning? 50 A No, sir. 51 Q You understand everything? 52 A I understand. 53 Q Fully and completely? 54 A No doubt about it. 55 Q No doubt about it? 56 A No doubt about it. 57 (Tr. 44-45.) 58 Morales's clear and responsive answers throughout the colloquy demonstrate that he comprehended the proceedings, communicated effectively with his counsel, and knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his sentence. Thus, the district judge did not abuse his wide discretion by failing to appoint an interpreter to assist Morales at his plea hearing. 59 At the subsequent trial, however, the government ensured that Morales testified through an interpreter after he stated that it was difficult for him to speak English, which he could understand only a little bit. But when he later testified for the government at Santos's sentencing hearing, he did so without an interpreter; and according to Morales, that caused him to become confused, and to inadvertently testify inconsistently with his prior statements and thus squander his downward departure. 60 At his plea hearing and at the trial, Morales testified that he began collecting bets for Santos in his bolita in 1984. But at Santos's sentencing hearing, Morales testified that it was Roberto Febus (not Santos) who hired him to work in the bolita in 1984, and that Santos did not get involved until late 1987 or early 1988. Moreover, when Morales testified in English at Santos's sentencing hearing, he affirmed that he was positive that Santos started with the bolita in late 1987 or early 1988, because he recalled that it was after the date of his daughter's wedding on March 28, 1987. The government concluded that Morales's testimony was inconsistent, untruthful, 5 and material to the issue of Santos's sentencing, and thus moved to withdraw its sec.5K1.1 recommendation, which the district court granted. 61 The record demonstrates that Morales's testimony at Santos's sentencing hearing was deliberate, and not the result of confusion or mistake. His testimony that Santos was involved in the bolita in 1984 was consistent at his plea hearing (without the aid of an interpreter) and at the trial (with an interpreter). At Santos's sentencing hearing, the fact that Morales's testimony linked Santos's involvement with the bolita to sometime after his daughter's wedding day in 1987 (a special and memorable occasion for Morales) shows that his testimony was intentional, and not the result of a misunderstanding. And finally, when Morales claimed that he had difficulty speaking and understanding English at his own sentencing hearing (which occurred after Santos's sentencing hearing), the district judge (who also presided at Morales's plea hearing, at the trial, and at Santos's sentencing hearing) responded that he and Morales have understood each other from the get-go. Every time I see him, he speaks English and he understands me. I have had no indication in the past that was not the case. While we acknowledge that the conflicting evidence on this issue makes it difficult to resolve, we conclude that Morales had a sufficient command of English to comprehend his proceedings and to testify effectively, and thus was not entitled to an interpreter under the Court Interpreter's Act. 6 62
63 Morales next argues that his attorney's failure to appear and represent him at Santos's sentencing hearing violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the defendant the right to counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings against him, Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)), including, for example, the indictment, arraignment, preliminary hearing, and sentencing. 64 United States v. O'Leary, 856 F.2d 1011, 1014 (7th Cir. 1988). 65 According to Morales, his appearance at Santos's sentencing hearing was a critical stage in his proceedings because the government required his testimony under the plea agreement, and thus his downward departure was still at risk. But Morales was merely a witness at Santos's sentencing hearing, which was not an adversarial process against him. And while he faced losing his downward departure if he testified falsely, that does not entitle him to his counsel's assistance, for the Sixth Amendment is inapplicable to other types of proceedings, even though they may have a critical impact on the destiny of the individual. Ganz v. Bensinger, 480 F.2d 88, 89 (7th Cir. 1973) ([The Sixth Amendment] does not broadly encompass every proceeding which may result in a deprivation of liberty or property.). Id. 66
67 For the first time on appeal, Morales raises several reasons why he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. While it is not our province as an appellate court to make findings regarding counsel's performance when, unlike the district court, we have not had the benefit of actually having observed it, we will resolve this issue when, as here, both parties ask us to resolve the matter, the question has been briefed and argued, and we have the entire trial record before us. United States v. Reiswitz, 941 F.2d 488, 495 (7th Cir. 1991). 7 In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance, we apply the familiar two-pronged test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): First, the defendant must prove that his counsel's performance 'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,' and second that but for counsel's deficiency, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. United States v. Alex Janows & Co., 2 F.3d 716, 721 (7th Cir. 1993) (internal citations omitted). 68 Morales first contends that his counsel was ineffective by failing to refresh his recollection of his prior testimony before Santos's sentencing hearing, and thus he mistakenly testified to the wrong date of Santos's involvement in the bolita, and squandered his downward departure. But since Morales had already testified consistently at his plea hearing and at the trial that he began working as a collector for Santos in the bolita in 1984, his counsel had no reason to believe that he would need to refresh his recollection. Additionally, the record does not indicate that Morales informed his counsel that he needed to review his prior testimony, or that he intended to change his testimony. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions.). Rather, the record demonstrates that Morales's contradictory testimony at Santos's sentencing hearing was deliberate, and not the result of confusion or mistake. And since the Sixth Amendment does not require defense counsel to take all possible precautions to protect a defendant from testifying falsely and breaching his plea agreement, this claim fails. 8 69 Morales next argues that his counsel was ineffective by failing to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea after the government withdrew its sec.5K1.1 motion. A defendant needs a fair and just reason to withdraw a guilty plea. Schilling, 142 F.3d at 398. The plea agreement in this case conditioned the government's obligation to file the sec.5K1.1 motion on Morales's complete, truthful, and candid testimony. Since Morales's testimony was contradictory, untruthful, and material to the issue of Santos's sentencing, he failed to fulfill his part of the bargain, which allowed the government to withdraw its sec.5K1.1 recommendation. Ramunno, 133 F.3d at 484. With no fair and just reason to withdraw his guilty plea, Morales's counsel reasonably decided not to file the motion. 9