Opinion ID: 2370680
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Ms. N.'s Appeal Was Properly Dismissed As Moot

Text: At the December 7, 2007 review hearing, the juvenile court reviewed reports from the Department saying that Ms N.'s psychiatrist reported that Ms. N. was attending her appointments and appeared to be taking her prescribed medication. The Department also related to the court that Ms. N.'s therapist reported she was compliant with her mental health treatment; her mood had improved; and that she was not having symptoms of depression, mania, or psychosis. The Department's own view was different, however. It asserted that Ms. N. had not consistently demonstrated mental stability during her visitation with Joseph. She [had] illustrated symptoms of delusion, irritability, mistrust and irrational behavior. A psychiatrist engaged by the Department, Dr. Haller, who interviewed Ms. N. twice, indicated in a June 14, 2007 report that during the interviews, she was alert, lucid, and fully oriented. There was no evidence of hallucinations nor current delusions. Her fund of information was adequate in that she was able to name the last three presidents. No deficits were noted in her memory. She was able to abstract appropriately. She denied any hallucinations. Dr. Haller also spoke with a social worker in the Department, who advised him that Ms. N. does not do well when she is off her medication, and with her treating psychiatrist, who indicated that Ms. N.'s mental state varies, and that she was taking Lexapro and Depakote as prescribed, but declined to take a prescribed antipsychotic medication. Dr. Haller concluded as follows: [Ms. N.'s treating psychiatrist] recommended treating her with an antipsychotic, a mood stabilizer and an anti-depressant, on a presumptive diagnosis of bipolar disorder NOS. Ms. [N.], apparently took the latter of two medications for a while although she takes only Lexapro currently according to what she told you. Moreover, your check of her medication bottle shows she is not taking the medication as frequently as prescribed. She has gotten well enough that she can at least verbalize that she was having problems with reality orientation in the past and that she now recognizes that the vents do not need to be covered. However, she has not improved to a degree where she is able to recognize her prior behaviors as being irrational. Rather, she attempts to rationalize what she did. This indicates her reality testing is still significantly impaired. Furthermore, she is not taking the medications which are necessary for her continued mental health It is not clear to me whether the thyroid disease caused, contributed to, or is irrelevant to her psychiatric condition Ms. [N.] should not have any contact other than supervised visitation with Joseph until she provides a letter from her endocrinologist stating that no further treatment is necessary or that Ms. [N.] is taking whatever medication is required on a regular basis. Another reason for only supervised contact is that Ms. [N.'s] condition of psychosis is a recurring one. It is treatable with medication. However, her attitude toward taking medication does not indicate an appreciation of her need for it. For example, she said she can't tolerate the anti-psychotic medications whereas [her treating psychiatrist] said Ms. [N.] has refused them. Regular use of psychiatric medications is absolutely necessary to control her delusional beliefs. If she will not take such, then her condition will likely eventually deteriorate again. If her psychosis is because of a bipolar disorder then Depakote might be sufficient. However, since she is not taking this medication, either, she is, again, at risk of further deterioration into psychosis in very short order. The one medication, she is taking, albeit irregularly, is Lexapro, which is an antidepressant. Taking this medication without concurrent use of a mood stabilizer, such as Depakote, or an antipsychotic can lead to an exacerbation of her illness, if she has bipolar disorder. If she has a paranoid disorder without mood symptoms, then she needs an antipsychotic. I did not see any mood symptoms during my examination but I did see evidence of partially compensated psychosis. Therefore, I believe Ms. [N.] needs to take an antipsychotic. In short, I find Ms. [N.] to still show signs of psychosis. She is better than when Joseph was removed from her care. However, she is not well enough grounded in reality to resume child care duties. In order to have any hope of regaining the sufficient degree of mental health necessary to resume her role as primary parent, she must be willing to take all the medications as prescribed by her physicians. If she continues to refuse to do so, consideration should be given to termination of parental rights. (Emphasis in original.) In its report to the juvenile court prepared for the December 7, 2007 review hearing, the Department recommended that [s]ince Ms. [N.] has not been mentally stable or consistently taking her medication as prescribed, that the child be placed in the care and custody of his father, and the case closed. The court rejected this recommendation, concluding that it would not be in the Child's best interest to terminate the Department's obligations and responsibilities before some family therapy occurred between mother and Child. The court continued Joseph's placement with his father, under the protective supervision of the Department. When the COSA dismissed Ms. N.'s appeal as moot, it reasoned that the June 20, 2007 review [had] been superseded by a subsequent order of [the juvenile court] finding that, in the ensuing period of June 21, 2007, until December 7, 2007, [Ms. N.] had still made insufficient progress to warrant restoring custody to her. It added that even if [it] were to agree with [Ms. N.] that the court below erred, [its] decision would not provide her with any `effective remedy,' as Joseph's current custodial status was decided by the December 7, 2007 review hearing, which is not under review. The court below then declined to review the merits of Ms. N.'s appeal under the mootness exception for cases involving matters of important public concern because it presented no legal issue of public importance. Ms. N. asserts that the court erred in dismissing her appeal on this basis because it was requiring her to appeal the December 7, 2007 order  an order that did not change the terms of Joseph's care and custody and consequently was not appealable under CJP Section 12-303(3)(x). [10] Ms. N. also argues that her appeal presents no question of mootness because [an] appellate ruling that the trial court erred on June 20, 2007, in refusing to return the child to the mother, would plainly require that upon appropriate motion the outcome of the December 7, 2007 hearing would be reversed as well, and remanded . . . for a new hearing guided by the reasoning of the appellate court. The Department asserts that the COSA properly dismissed Ms. N.'s appeal as moot because events that occurred after June 20, 2007 rendered unnecessary the resolution of the merits issue in the case, i.e. whether the juvenile court had sufficient evidence in June 2007 to support its conclusion that Ms. N. had made insufficient progress in resolving her mental health issues to permit returning the child to her care. It argues: Ms. N.'s mental health progress by December 2007 was nonexistent and, at that time, the court could not restore custody to her because of that lack of progress, and the fact that she was not taking her psychotropic medication. It would have served no purpose, therefore, for the intermediate appellate court to review the sufficiency of evidentiary support for an action of the juvenile court that occurred more than a year before, and which subsequent events (including a final ruling on custody) have now overtaken. We are a bit puzzled by this response. Ms. N.'s treating psychiatrist and treating therapist prepared a joint letter for the December 7, 2007 review hearing. This letter, submitted in conjunction with the Department's report to the juvenile court, stated: We are writing this letter at your request in order to assist with the Court hearing that is scheduled for December 7, 2007. Ms. [N.] regularly attends her therapy appointments and meets with her treating psychiatrist . . . for periodic evaluation and medication monitoring. As per her own report, and writer's clinical impression, she is taking the medication she is prescribed. Ms. [N.] has a history of mood disorder which has improved with medication and therapy. She is currently free of symptoms of depression, mania or psychosis. She is well kempt, makes good eye contact and is oriented to all spheres. She continues to be open, direct and honestly discusses her concerns in sessions. Ms. [N.] consistently expresses her wish to have her son live with her so that she can participate more closely in his education and life. She has been able to work so that she is self-supporting.[ ] In summary, we believe that Ms. [N.] is currently psychiatrically stable and asymptomatic. Thus, according to this report, and contrary to the Department's argument, Ms. N. was taking her prescribed psychotropic medications. [11] Dr. Haller, the psychiatrist engaged by the Department, did not negate this; he only reported that as of June 14, 2007  nearly six months prior to the December 2007 review hearing  Ms. N. declined to take the anti-psychotic medicine her doctor had recommended. The Department also inaccurately states that Ms. N.'s mental health progress by December 2007 was non-existent[.] Rather, as of the December 2007 review hearing, her treating psychiatrist and therapist reported that she had improved with medication and therapy and was currently free of symptoms of depression, mania or psychosis. Thus, Ms. N.'s compliance may have improved between June 2007 and December 2007. Moreover, contrary to the Department's suggestion, the court did not make any specific finding about her mental health in its December 7, 2007 order. The court just said that it would not be in the Child's best interest to terminate the Department's obligations and responsibilities before some family therapy occurred between mother and Child. [12] Thus, it does not appear as if the court undertook the task of revisiting everything that transpired at the June hearing or that was included in the June order. This may have been because the court sought to be careful not to interfere with any issue then pending in Ms. N.'s interlocutory appeal. [T]he doctrine of mootness applies to a situation in which past facts and occurrences have produced a situation in which, without any future action, any judgment or decree the court might enter would be without effect. Hayman v. St. Martin's Evangelical Lutheran Church, 227 Md. 338, 343, 176 A.2d 772, 775 (1962). A case is moot when there is no longer an existing controversy between the parties at the time it is before the court so that the court cannot provide an effective remedy and generally, a moot case is dismissed without our deciding the merits of the controversy. Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250, 674 A.2d 951, 954 (1996). We have confronted the issue of mootness in other CINA cases involving appeals from periodic review hearing orders. In In re Emileigh F., 355 Md. 198, 733 A.2d 1103 (1999), a child was placed with the maternal grandmother after being adjudicated a CINA. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court ordered that custody of Emileigh F. be given to her father. While the mother's appeal from this order was pending, the Department filed a motion to terminate the juvenile court's jurisdiction because the child had been placed with the father. The court granted that motion on the grounds that she was no longer a CINA because the father was `willing and able, and ha[d] proven since he' [d] had custody of Emileigh. . . about a year and three months. . . and there [were] absolutely no issues.' Id. at 201, 733 A.2d at 1104. On appeal, writing for the Court, Judge Irma S. Raker explained: To be sure, the State is correct that the juvenile court had fundamental jurisdiction, i.e., the power residing in a court to determine judicially a given action, or question presented to it for a decision, over the subject matter of the proceedings. We are not here talking about the concept of fundamental jurisdiction, but rather the propriety of the exercise of that jurisdiction. After an appeal is filed, a trial court may not act to frustrate the actions of an appellate court. Post-appeal orders which affect the subject matter of the appeal are prohibited. Id. at 202-03, 733 A.2d at 1105 (citations omitted, emphasis added). We determined that the closure of the CINA proceeding interfered with the appeal from the custody order: In the instant case, the action taken by the juvenile court addressed matters that were clearly involved in the pending appeal. The court's action in closing the CINA case and thereby terminating that court's jurisdiction, if permitted, would in essence defeat the right of [the mother] to prosecute her appeal with effect. We hold that the juvenile court's actions were inconsistent with the pending appeal and were prohibited. Accordingly, the juvenile court shall vacate the judgment closing the CINA proceedings, conduct a review hearing, and determine anew as of the time of the hearing the placement for the care and custody of Emileigh F. Id. at 204, 733 A.2d at 1105. The procedural difference between In re Emileigh F. and the present case is that here, the juvenile court conducted the December 7, 2007 review hearing while Ms. N.'s interlocutory appeal from the June 20, 2007 order was pending, but did not close the CINA case as a result of that hearing. This December review hearing, and the resulting order, gives the Department some comfort in advancing its argument that the review hearing order superseded and made moot the issues then on appeal from the June order. But, under Emileigh F., the appeal cannot be made moot by a subsequent order that usurped for the juvenile court the role properly reserved to the appellate court, i.e. to decide the issues raised by the appellant in the interlocutory appeal. See id. at 202-03, 733 A.2d at 1105. In In re Justin D., 357 Md. 431, 745 A.2d 408 (2000), a case relied upon by the COSA, in which two CINA proceedings had been consolidated, two mothers sought review of periodic review hearing orders issued in January 1999. At oral argument, we were advised that the juvenile court had entered similar orders in July 1999, following scheduled review hearings, from which no appeals were taken. The substantive issue in the appeal involved a challenge to the validity of orders that appeared to give DSS unfettered discretion to decide a child's visitation schedule. Id. at 434, 745 A.2d at 410. We recognized that the subsequent July orders presented a troublesome mootness issue: Notwithstanding appellants' assertion to the contrary at oral argument, we do not have some sort of inherent authority to vacate separate, independent orders or judgments from which no appeal has been taken. Appeals could have been filed from the later orders, which would have brought their validity before us. In the absence of such appeals, there is really no effective relief that we can grant with respect to the orders that are before us. They have been superseded and are no longer in effect; vacating them will provide no relief whatever to appellants. The appeals are clearly moot and, ordinarily, would be dismissed on that ground. Id. at 444, 745 A.2d at 415. We concluded, however, that it was appropriate to apply a limited exception to the mootness doctrine: It is clear from the record, however, and the parties have agreed, that it is common practice for the juvenile court. . . to enter orders of this kind, so the issue presented by appellants is a recurring and important one. With periodic six-month reviews, orders of this kind that are appealed will almost always be replaced by subsequent orders before this Court will have the opportunity to review them. We have recognized a very limited exception to the mootness doctrine in this kind of situation and have held that if the public interest clearly will be hurt if the question is not immediately decided, if the matter involved is likely to recur frequently, and its recurrence will involve a relationship between government and its citizens, or a duty of government, and upon any recurrence, the same difficulty which prevented the appeal at hand from being heard in time is likely again to prevent a decision, then the Court may find justification for deciding the issues raised by a question which has become moot, particularly if all these factors concur with sufficient weight. Id. at 444-45, 745 A.2d at 415-16 (quoting Lloyd v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore County, 206 Md. 36, 43, 111 A.2d 379, 382 (1954)). We do not view this case as one in which it is necessary to address the merits of the appeal by way of the limited exception to the mootness doctrine as in In re Justin D. This case is more appropriately resolved under the principles of In re Emileigh F. because here, we have the residual effect of the June 20, 2007 order, as discussed in Section I, on the ongoing and ultimate determination of custody. This CINA appeal is not moot because a controversy is alive when the subsequent review hearing order may have been influenced by an error made in the earlier review hearing order. The circumstances here are more like those in In re Kaela C., 394 Md. 432, 464-65, 906 A.2d 915, 933-34 (2006), a CINA case, in which we declined to find an appeal moot, even though the Maryland juvenile court had transferred the case to a California court, which had then assumed jurisdiction. The case was not moot, we said, because of the collateral consequences the mother continued to suffer from the erroneous Maryland judgment: the California court had relied upon the Maryland juvenile court's judgment awarding custody to the father because he was available, willing, and able to assume custody, when the mother was not, in making its own custody determinations adverse to the mother. Id. at 448-49, 463-65, 906 A.2d at 924-25, 933-34. Because California had assumed jurisdiction, we had limited remedies at that point, but we reversed the COSA, and remanded the case to it with instructions that the juvenile court decision be dismissed, thereby relieving [the mother] of the collateral consequences she continue[d] to suffer from the Maryland judgment. Id. at 476, 906 A.2d at 941. Applying the principles of In re Kaela C., we conclude that the June 20, 2007 review hearing order had consequences for Ms. N. that may well have affected the juvenile court in its December 7, 2007 and February 7, 2008 review hearing orders for the reasons we discuss in Section I. These consequences could be termed direct or collateral. Regardless of label, it is these consequences that preclude this appeal from being moot. Moreover, if we were to reach the opposite conclusion  that interlocutory appeals from orders changing the terms of an earlier order for care and custody of a CINA child would be rendered moot whenever the court conducted a subsequent review hearing  we would be violating the rule of In re Emileigh F. This is so because we would, in essence, authorize juvenile courts to act to frustrate the actions of an appellate court. In re Emileigh F., 355 Md. at 202, 733 A.2d at 1105. As we said there, [p]ost-appeal orders which affect the subject matter of the appeal are prohibited. Id. at 202-03, 733 A.2d at 1105. This rule applies whether the appeal is interlocutory or not.