Opinion ID: 2492640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying bailey's motion to dismiss for failure to grant a speedy trial.

Text: ¶ 42. Bailey contends that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial. The mandate in Bailey's Court of Appeals case was issued on March 22, 2007. Nine hundred and thirty-one days later, on October 8, 2009, at a pretrial status hearing, Bailey's counsel made an ore tenus motion to dismiss for failure to provide a speedy trial. On that same day, Bailey's trial was set for December 7, 2009. The trial court told Bailey's counsel that they would need to make a formal written motion to dismiss, and the motion was filed on October 26, 2009. On November 26, a pretrial hearing was conducted to determine the merits of this motion. The trial judge denied Bailey's motion. ¶ 43. Bailey's argument must be considered under the constitutional speedy-trial standards as laid out in Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182, because the 270-day rule in Mississippi Code Section 99-17-1 (Rev.2007) does not apply to retrial. Stevens v. State, 808 So.2d 908, 915 (Miss. 2002). ¶ 44. In Barker, the United States Supreme Court established a four-factor balancing test to be applied to determine if a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated: (1) length of the delay, (2) reason for the delay, (3) defendant's assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. These four factors should be weighed according to the facts of the case; no one factor is outcome-determinative. Thomas v. State, 48 So.3d 460, 475 (Miss. 2010) (citing Price v. State, 898 So.2d 641, 647 (Miss.2005)). In addition to the Barker factors, other circumstances may be considered in the balancing process. Thomas, 48 So.3d at 475 (citing Jefferson v. State, 818 So.2d 1099, 1106 (Miss.2002)).
¶ 45. This Court has held that the speedy trial clock begins to run for purposes of determining a violation of a defendant's right to speedy retrial on the date this Court reverses his first conviction. Duplantis v. State, 708 So.2d 1327, 1334 (Miss.1998) (citing State v. Ferguson, 576 So.2d 1252, 1254 (Miss.1991)). In today's case, the speedy-trial clock began to run on March 22, 2007, when the mandate was issued. Bailey was retried on December 7, 2009, a total of 991 daysor two years, eight months, and fifteen days after the reversal. A delay of eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial. Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss.1989). The delay in this case far exceeded the eight-month mark. As such, this factor weighs in favor of Bailey.
¶ 46. If the delay is presumptively prejudicial, as it is in this case, the burden shifts to the State to produce evidence justifying the delay. Stevens, 808 So.2d at 916. [T]hose delays which are not attributable to the defendant will count against the [S]tate, unless the prosecution can show good cause. Duplantis, 708 So.2d at 1335 (citing Vickery v. State, 535 So.2d 1371, 1377 (Miss.1988)). ¶ 47. The State claims that the reason for the delay was the confusion as to how a special prosecutor should be appointed. On January 8, 2009, the trial court entered an order to recuse the Hinds County district attorney because of a conflict. On October 8, 2009the same day as Bailey's ore tenus motionthe prosecutor and trial court discussed this confusion. Because of his conflict, the district attorney thought that the trial judge should appoint a special prosecutor. The trial court, on the other hand, thought that the district attorney should appoint the special prosecutor. Based on the colloquy between the trial court and the district attorney, it seems as if the nine-month delay between the recusal and the ore tenus motion stemmed from this confusion. In Manix v. State, 895 So.2d 167, 175 (Miss.2005), this Court found that there was good cause for delay associated with appointing a new prosecutor. The defense counsel also moved for a ninety-day continuance to refamiliarize itself with the case after it was returned to the circuit court. This portion of the delay would be attributed to Bailey. The State, however, provided no reason for the 658-day delay between the mandate (March 22, 2007) and the district attorney's recusal (January 9, 2009). See Brengettcy v. State, 794 So.2d 987, 993 (Miss.2001) ([W]here the record is silent as to the cause of a delay, this factor must weigh in favor of the defendant.) ¶ 48. Because the State failed to show good cause for the 658-day delay between the mandate and the district attorney's recusal, this factor also weighs in favor of Bailey, although there is no suggestion in the record that the State purposefully caused this delay to gain tactical advantage over or prejudice Bailey.
¶ 49. It is well settled that the State bears the burden of bringing a defendant to trial. Stevens, 808 So.2d at 917. Although the defendant has neither a duty nor an obligation to bring himself to trial, points are placed on his side of the ledger when . . . he has made a demand for a speedy trial. Id. (citing State v. Magnusen, 646 So.2d 1275, 1283 (Miss. 1994)). ¶ 50. This Court repeatedly has held that Section 99-17-1 does not apply to retrials, and that, in case of retrial, this Court reverts back to the constitutional standards as set out in Barker. See Stevens, 808 So.2d at 915. It is important that this distinction be made, because the trial judge in today's case analyzed Bailey's assertion of his right under the conditions used for the speedy-trial statute. Under the speedy-trial statute, this Court has held that a defendant may effectively waive his right to complain of not being tried within the 270-day period . . . when the defendant does not request or assert his right to a speedy trial or object to a delay. Guice v. State, 952 So.2d 129, 142 (Miss.2007) (citing Walton v. State, 678 So.2d 645, 650 (Miss.1996)). The trial judge repeatedly applied this standard in his ruling, stating that Bailey had failed to file a motion or request a speedy trial, which the trial judge stated was a prerequisite for a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. ¶ 51. However, the correct standard for the defendant's assertion of his right was laid out by the Barker Court when it rejected the rule that a defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial waives his right, and instead stated that the defendant's assertion, or failure to assert his right, is one of the factors to be considered. Barker, 407 U.S. at 528, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Further, the Barker Court stated [t]he defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight. . . . We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for the defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial. Id. at 531-32, 92 S.Ct. 2182. ¶ 52. Bailey first moved to dismiss the case for failure to provide a speedy trial on October 8, 2009931 days after the mandate was issued. He then filed a written motion asserting the same on October 26, 2009. Prior to October 8, 2009, Bailey made no attempt to demand a speedy trial or move for a dismissal. [9] [A] demand for a speedy trial is distinct from a demand for dismissal due to violation of the right to a speedy trial. Brengettcy, 794 So.2d at 994 (citing Perry v. State, 637 So.2d 871, 875 (Miss.1994)). See also Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165, 169-70 (Miss.1991) (Demand for dismissal coupled with demand for instant trial is insufficient to weigh third Barker prong in defendant's favor where motion came after bulk of delay had elapsed.). Because Bailey never demanded a speedy trial and waited 931 days until he moved to dismiss the case for failure to provide a speedy trial, we find that this factor weighs in favor of the State.
¶ 53. Under the Barker test, prejudice has two aspects: (1) actual prejudice to the accused in defending his case, and (2) interference with the defendant's liberty. Murray v. State, 967 So.2d 1222, 1232 (Miss.2007) (quoting Brengettcy, 794 So.2d at 994). When analyzing the last Barker factor, this Court should consider the following three interests: (1) preventing oppressive incarceration; (2) minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Jenkins v. State, 947 So.2d 270, 277 (Miss.2006). ¶ 54. Bailey contends that he was prejudiced by his incarceration and impairment of his defense. First, Bailey contends that his defense was impaired by Billy Donnerson's diminished memory. After the shooting, Donnerson stated that he saw Bailey reach into Evans's truck as if he was taking something. During the second trial, Donnerson stated that he could not remember whether Bailey had reached into Evans's truck. But the State counters Bailey's argument by noting that Donnerson's statement was entered into evidence at the second trial, and the defense was able to impeach him with the contradictory statement. ¶ 55. Bailey also claims that he was prejudiced by the loss of an audiotape of Pickens's statement to police. Bailey asserts that the audiotape was important to his defense because Pickens had changed his statement of the events, and the audiotape would corroborate some of his previous statements, as well as Bailey's statements to police. The State points out that the admission of the audiotape was the reason that the Court of Appeals reversed Bailey's first conviction. See Bailey, 952 So.2d at 236-38 (holding that admission of the audiotape as substantive evidence of Pickens's prior statement was error). Also, the State points out that, while the audiotape is missing, a transcript of the tape recording exists. ¶ 56. At the motion hearing, the trial court found no actual prejudice. We agree. This Court in Ross v. State, 605 So.2d 17, 23 (Miss.1992), acknowledged the possibility of prejudice that would be inherent in an extended delay, such as diminished memories, inaccessible witnesses, and lost evidence. However, in Ross, this Court stated that [t]he defendant must prove that this prejudice impaired a fair trial outcome; otherwise, such a claim is speculative. Id. (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325, 92 S.Ct. 455, 466, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)). Bailey is unable to offer any proof that the lost evidence or diminished memories like Donnerson's have impaired his ability to mount a defense or have impaired a fair-trial outcome. As to Bailey's claim of pretrial incarceration, this Court has held [a] defendant's assertion of prejudice attributable solely to incarceration, with no other harm, typically is not sufficient to warrant reversal. Ross, 605 So.2d at 23 (citing Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868, 877 (Miss.1987) (overruled on other grounds)). Accordingly, we find that this prong of the Barker analysis weighs in favor of the State. ¶ 57. Having reviewed the Barker factors, although two of the factors weigh in favor of Bailey, when considering the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court erred by denying Bailey's motion. Bailey failed to demand a speedy trial and did not show that he was prejudiced by the delay. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.