Opinion ID: 854849
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bray’s Fraud in the Inducement Claim

Text: To state a cognizable claim for fraud in the inducement, Florida law requires that a plaintiff plead an injury “[r]esulting [from] acting in justifiable reliance on [a 7 Case: 12-14797 Date Filed: 03/11/2013 Page: 8 of 11 fraudulent] representation.” See Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Savage, 570 So. 2d 306, 308 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). The district court dismissed Bray’s fraud in the inducement claim for failure to plead “a resulting injury.” Specifically, the district court determined that because the written agreement with Odyssey “changed only the consideration due” for services that Bray already rendered, “[t]he written agreement was simply a modification and produced no legal detriment.” Here, Bray argues that the district court’s analysis was mistaken because it failed to consider the fact that his interest in the recovery of the Merchant Royal was alienable and could have been sold to investors, presumably for an amount greater than the £11,000 he received from Odyssey. Nowhere in Bray’s complaint, however, did he plead facts sufficient to establish that a market exists for such a speculative commodity, let alone facts sufficient to establish that even if such a market did exist, his contingent recovery share would command a sum greater than that which he already received from Odyssey. Therefore, in keeping with the decision of the district court, we conclude that Bray has failed to plead “a resulting injury” and his claim was properly dismissed. And, as before, because Bray had already been allowed to amend his counseled complaint, and did not request to amend his complaint further upon Odyssey filing its motion to dismiss, the district court properly dismissed this claim with prejudice. See Wagner, 314 F.3d at 542. B. FAILURE TO STATE AN ARTICLE III CASE OR CONTROVERSY 8 Case: 12-14797 Date Filed: 03/11/2013 Page: 9 of 11 Bray’s final claim was for a declaratory judgment rescinding his written agreement with Odyssey, and reinstating the prior oral agreement. The district court dismissed this claim without prejudice, determining that Bray had “fail[ed] to establish an Article III ‘case or controversy’” as required to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. Bray argues that the district court was mistaken in this assessment. The Declaratory Judgment Act provides, in relevant part: In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (emphasis added). The Declaratory Judgment Act’s “actual controversy” requirement is jurisdictional and, thus, “a threshold question in an action for declaratory relief must be whether a justiciable controversy exists.” U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Co., 931 F.2d 744, 747 (11th Cir. 1991). To establish a case or controversy sufficient to invoke a court’s jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, a party must, “[a]t an irreducible minimum,” show: “(1) that they personally have suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the alleged conduct of the defendant; (2) that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action; and (3) that it is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id.; cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992) (same). Where, as here, a district court dismissed a 9 Case: 12-14797 Date Filed: 03/11/2013 Page: 10 of 11 request for declaratory relief for lack of an Article III case or controversy, our review is de novo. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 931 F.2d at 747. Bray’s argument that the district court erred in dismissing his declaratory judgment action reduces to an assertion that “a real, substantial controversy [exists] between adverse parties” because it is “sufficiently likely that . . . Odyssey has already or will soon find and salvage the Merchant Royal.” We are not persuaded. As explained by the district court, until such time that Odyssey (1) discovers the wrecked Merchant Royal and (2) refuses Bray’s attempts to collect on the alleged oral agreement guaranteeing him a share of the salvage, Bray’s request for a declaratory judgment remains “a premature and hypothetical [attempt] to pre-empt Odyssey’s contingent defense in Bray’s contingent lawsuit to establish Bray’s contingent entitlement to a 7.5% share in the event of the contingent salvage of the Merchant Royal.” This piling-on of contingencies falls far short of the requirements for establishing an actual case or controversy for purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act, see U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 931 F.2d at 747, and would render an attempt on our part to adjudicate the merits of Bray’s claim an impermissible advisory opinion. See Friends of the Everglades v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 699 F.3d 1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Hypothetical jurisdiction produces nothing more than a hypothetical judgment—which comes to the same thing as an advisory opinion, disapproved by this Court from the beginning.” 10 Case: 12-14797 Date Filed: 03/11/2013 Page: 11 of 11 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1016 (1998)). Thus, the district court properly dismissed this claim without prejudice, subject to future developments sufficient to create an actual case or controversy. 4