Opinion ID: 1613628
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Exclusivity of the Chapter 441 Statutory Scheme.

Text: Ward next maintains that even if count II was not properly raised in the petition filed with the board, Ward was entitled to seek recourse from the courts without first exhausting their administrative remedies because count II involves allegations of constitutional dimensions that is, an alleged denial of equal protection and an alleged violation of the uniformity clause. Our review is for errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 4. We have granted taxpayers a direct right of review for claims involving the systematic and intentional valuation of a particular kind of property at a higher percentage of its actual value than that at which other kinds of property are valued, or the systematic and intentional assessment of taxes on a particular kind of property at a higher rate than that imposed on property of the same kind. Hanselman v. Humboldt County, 173 N.W.2d 75, 78 (Iowa 1969); accord Appanoose County Rural Taxpayers Ass'n v. Iowa State Tax Comm'n, 261 Iowa 1191, 158 N.W.2d 176, 180 (1968). However, in neither case did the taxpayer in question have the right to seek further administrative review of the disputed agency action. Hanselman, 173 N.W.2d at 79 (It is clear no administrative remedy was available to appellants; they were faced with a factual situation not foreseen or contemplated by sections 441.37 and 441.38....); Appanoose, 158 N.W.2d at 182 (It is clear there is no statutory appeal from the state board of review's action....). In contrast, where the administrative review scheme embodied in chapter 441 of the Code is applicable, the review process detailed therein is the exclusive means by which a taxpayer may contest an assessment. Farmers Grain, 334 N.W.2d at 299 ([the] process is an exclusive one). When faced with this same argument, a California court of appeals concluded as follows: The proposition that an ad valorem tax may be discriminatory in application or may otherwise deny equal protection of the law as applied does not excuse the taxpayer from pursuing his administrative remedy to correct the inequality where there is a remedy available to do so. If any question of valuation exists, it would be irrelevant [to the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedy] that plaintiff also challenges the assessment as `arbitrary' or void on constitutional grounds. If prior recourse to the board [of equalization] on the question of valuation might have avoided the necessity of deciding the constitutional issue, or modified its nature, the plaintiff's action was properly dismissed. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. County of Los Angeles, 42 Cal.App.3d 32, 116 Cal. Rptr. 742, 748 (1974) (citations omitted) (alterations in original). Similarly, we conclude that where, as here, the taxpayer had recourse to an administrative review board, that avenue must be fully pursued prior to seeking judicial review even on constitutional grounds. The failure to do so precludes judicial review of a property tax assessment on any basis, constitutional or otherwise.