Opinion ID: 2514340
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Newborn Adoption Cases

Text: Although Lehr and the other decisions of the Supreme Court provide guidance, none address a newborn adoption, leaving it to the state courts to determine how to measure whether a putative father of a newborn child has fully and completely grasped his opportunity to parent. See Note, He Said, She Said: Diverging Views in the Emerging Field of Fathers' Rights, 46 Washburn L.J. 163, 180 (Fall 2006) (Although the Supreme Court has offered guidance in cases involving unwed fathers and older children, it has been slow to address the rights of unwed fathers in newborn adoptions.... The Court's reluctance suggests that it is currently `unwilling to address the question of whether an unwed father has a legal interest inand thus the right to veto the adoption ofa child he sired out of wedlock and with whom he has not yet had an opportunity to develop a relationship.'); Resnik, Seeking the Wisdom of Solomon: Defining the Rights of Unwed Fathers in Newborn Adoptions, 20 Seton Hall Legis. J., 363, 389-90 (1996) (The Supreme Court has avoided addressing the issue of newborn adoptions in its past unwed father decisions.... [R]ecent refusals to grant certiorari in [such] cases ... indicate that the Supreme Court remains unwilling to address the question of whether an unwed father has a legal interest inand thus the right to veto the adoption ofa child he sired out of wedlock and with whom he has not yet had an opportunity to develop a relationship and [t]he Supreme Court's obstinacy has left the states wide latitude in crafting solutions to the dilemma posed by unwed fathers and newborn adoptions.). Two of the first newborn adoption cases to apply Lehr's requirement that the putative father must have taken some measure of the responsibility for the child's future were Matter of Baby Girl S., 141 Misc.2d 905, 535 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1988), aff'd without op. 150 A.D.2d 993, 543 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1989), aff'd sub nom. Matter of Raquel Marie X., 76 N.Y.2d 387, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, 559 N.E.2d 418, cert. denied sub nom. Robert C. v. Miguel T., 498 U.S. 984, 111 S.Ct. 517, 112 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990), and its companion, Matter of Raquel Marie X., 76 N.Y.2d 387, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, 559 N.E.2d 418. New York's highest court, considering the consolidated appeal of the two cases, first compared Caban with Quilloin and Lehr. From those cases, the New York court discerned that it is apparent that the biological parental interest can be lost entirely, or greatly diminished in constitutional significance, by failure to timely exercise it or by failure to take the available legal steps to substantiate it. 76 N.Y.2d at 402, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, 559 N.E.2d 418. Based upon this concept, the New York court concluded that the father of a newborn child is entitled to constitutional protection of his rights so long as he promptly avails himself of all the possible mechanisms for forming a legal and emotional bond with his child. (Emphasis added.) 76 N.Y.2d at 402, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, 559 N.E.2d 418; see also Matter of Robert O. v. Russell K., 80 N.Y.2d 254, 263, 590 N.Y.S.2d 37, 604 N.E.2d 99 (1992) (father must `promptly take[] every available avenue to demonstrate that he is willing and able to enter into the fullest possible relationship with his child'). In Matter of Baby Girl S. and Matter of Raquel Marie X., the court determined the putative fathers in both cases had met this standard. 76 N.Y.2d at 402-03, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, 559 N.E.2d 418. The tests formulated by other courts have been similar, although most have stopped short of the New York requirement that all available opportunities must have been seized. E.g., Adoption of Kelsey S., 1 Cal.4th 816, 849, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 823 P.2d 1216 (1992) (father must promptly come forward and demonstrate a full commitment to his parental responsibilities); In re Adoption of B.G.S., 556 So.2d 545, 550 (La.1990) (father of newborn child must demonstrate that he is fit and committed to the responsibilities of parenthood and show that he has taken concrete actions to grasp his opportunity to be a father); Heidbreder v. Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355, 372-73 n. 12 (Minn.), cert. denied 537 U.S. 1046, 123 S.Ct. 621, 154 L.Ed.2d 518 (2002) (father must affirmatively demonstrate a commitment to parenting responsibilities; merely maintaining contact with mother by e-mail, contacting attorney, and attempting to locate mother does not indicate an intent to rear the child); In re Dixon, 112 N.C.App. 248, 251, 435 S.E.2d 352 (1993) (father must discover birth of child and take statutory steps to demonstrate his commitment to child); In re Baby Boy K., 546 N.W.2d 86, 97 (S.D.1996) (Because children require early and consistent nurturing of their emotional as well as physical needs, an unwed father must act quickly to grasp the opportunity interest in his biological child.); In re Adoption of B.V., 33 P.3d 1083, 1086 (Utah App.2001) (unwed biological father `must fully and strictly comply' with statutory conditions or `is deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in relation to child'; he must initiate proceeding to establish paternity, and if he has knowledge of the pregnancy, pay reasonable amount of expenses); In re C.L., 178 Vt. 558, 560-61, 878 A.2d 207 (2005) (father must assume responsibilities in reasonable time and reasonableness judged from the perspective of the child's needs); Parness, Participation of Unwed Biological Fathers in Newborn Adoptions: Achieving Substantive and Procedural Fairness, 5 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 223, 229-30 (2003) (paternity standards often require that proof of biological ties be accompanied by some conduct prior to birth or around the time of birth that evinces `a settled purpose to assume parental duties'; unwed fathers who step up at birth to raise their children can be too late, as they may have failed to provide adequate prebirth support, at times even [though] their attempts were thwarted by unwed mothers); Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 313, 364 (1984) (The need for early assurance of permanence and stability is an essential factor in the constitutional determination of whether to protect a parent's relationship with his or her child. The basis for constitutional protection is missing if the parent seeking it does not take on the parental responsibilities timely.). The outcomes in these cases are not perfectly consistent, given variability in fact situations and state laws. See Parness, 5 J.L. & Fam. Stud. at 237. Some states limit the time period during which an adoption can be set aside, regardless of the circumstances; some require statutory compliance with procedures such as filing with a putative father registry; and others specify criteria to be used in judging motions to set aside. Despite these differences, as we synthesize these holdings, common factors emerge. In general, a putative father has a liberty interest affording a right to notice of proceedings to adopt his newborn child if he: (1) diligently took affirmative action that manifested a full commitment to parenting responsibilities and (2) did so during the pregnancy and within a short time after he discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the biological mother was pregnant with his child. Regarding the first factor, to determine if a natural father of a newborn child has taken diligent, affirmative action, courts measure the putative father's efforts to make a financial commitment to the upbringing of the child, to legally substantiate his relationship with the child, and to provide emotional, financial, and other support to the mother during the pregnancy. Following the holdings in Quilloin and Lehr, often courts have required the father to use those legal mechanisms within his control that would entitle him to notice under the state's statutes, i.e., acknowledge or prove paternity, agree to a support order, or file with a putative father registry, and have done so even if a statute does not specify that adherence is required. E.g., Allen v. Allen, 48 F.3d 259 (7th Cir. 1995) (no constitutional infirmity in state court proceedings in which biological father was excluded because he had failed to establish parentage according to state law); In re Adoption of S.J.B., 294 Ark. 598, 745 S.W.2d 606 (1988) (failure of father to inquire into possibility of pregnancy or bring paternity action meant no due process interest); D.L.G., Sr. v. E.L.S., 774 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. 1989) (due process did not require notice of adoption where biological father failed to legally establish paternity); Friehe v. Schaad, 249 Neb. 825, 545 N.W.2d 740 (1996) (failure to file notice of intent to claim paternity within 5 days of child's birth as required by statute curtailed father's rights in adoption proceedings). This principle has been applied in many cases where the father was unaware of the child's existence. See, e.g., In re Adoption of S.J.B., 294 Ark. 598, 600, 745 S.W.2d 606 (1988) (although father unaware of child, notice of adoption proceeding not constitutionally required when biological father was not interested enough in the outcome of his sexual encounter ... to even inquire concerning the possibility of her pregnancy); In re Zacharia D., 6 Cal.4th 435, 452-53, 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 751, 862 P.2d 751 (1993) (biological father unaware of paternity until child 15 months old not constitutionally entitled to reunification services); In re Tinya W., 328 Ill.App.3d 405, 409-10, 262 Ill.Dec. 606, 765 N.E.2d 1214, 1218 (2002) (court properly found father unfit based on failure to provide any financial or emotional support to child, despite father's lack of awareness of paternity); In re Paternity of Baby Doe, 734 N.E.2d 281 (Ind.App.2000) (State's interest in child's early permanent placement precludes father from contesting adoption when unaware of paternity, not timely included on putative father registry). The second factortimeliness or promptness of the father's actionhas been emphasized, often being cited as the most critical factor. In a newborn adoption, the father's opportunity to make a commitment to parenting must have been grasped during the pregnancy and in a prompt and timely manner as measured by the fleeting opportunity availed to the father under the circumstances of the case, in other words, within a short time after he discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the mother was pregnant with his child. The need for promptness reflects the reality of the newborn adoption situation, which provides the father with only a limited time in which to act. Petition of Steve B.D., 112 Idaho 22, 25, 730 P.2d 942 (1986). The necessity of promptness results from two primary considerations. First, in a newborn adoption case, the window of opportunity for a father to have grasped an opportunity interest is constrained by the biological reality that the mother bears the child during pregnancy. As one court noted, during a pregnancy a mother must make many important decisions including whether to have an abortion, prepare an adoption plan, or keep the child. Recognizing that the natural mother, in making these decisions, may well need emotional, financial, medical, or other assistance, the court concluded the natural father, as one of two people responsible for the pregnancy, must have `promptly' demonstrated a `full commitment' to parenthood during pregnancy and within a short time after he discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the biological mother was pregnant with his child. Adoption of Michael H., 10 Cal.4th 1043, 1054, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 445, 898 P.2d 891 (1995), cert. denied sub nom. Mark K. v. John S., 516 U.S. 1176, 116 S.Ct. 1272, 134 L.Ed.2d 219 (1996). While a father cannot assume the physical aspects of pregnancy, he may assist with the financial and emotional aspects of the pregnancy and assure the mother of his commitment to fully assume parenting responsibilities both during the pregnancy and throughout the child's lifetime, including being a sole parent if necessary. The second reason a natural father's actions must be timely was emphasized in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262-64 n. 20, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983): States have an interest in being able to determine as early as possible in a child's life the rights, interests, and obligations of all parties, in eliminating the risk of unnecessary controversy that might impair the finality of an adoption, in encouraging adoptions, in protecting the adoption process from unnecessary controversy and complication, and in protecting the privacy and liberty interests of the natural mother and all parties to the adoption. As the California court stated in Adoption of Michael H.: [I]f an unwed father is permitted to ignore his parental role during pregnancy but claim it after birth, it will often be very difficult to know with certainty whether he will be able to successfully contest an adoption until after the child is born. This uncertainty could well dissuade prospective adoptive parents from attempting to adopt the children of unwed mothers who ... have chosen for whatever reason not to keep their child and raise it themselves. And that result would frustrate the state's clear interest in encouraging such adoptions and providing stable homes for children. [Citations omitted.] 10 Cal.4th at 1056, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 445, 898 P.2d 891. In addition, the finalization of an adoption gives rise to a legal relationship between the adoptive parents and the child, creating liberty interests. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844 n. 51, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977) (adoptive parenthood is legal equivalent of biological parenthood); K.S.A. 38-1111 (parent and child relationship defined as the legal relationship existing between a child and the child's biological or adoptive parents). In this case, M.P. did not diligently take affirmative action that manifested a full commitment to parenting responsibilities during the pregnancy and within a short time after he discovered N.T. was pregnant with his child. In fact, M.P. does not suggest he took affirmative steps that demonstrated his commitment to parenting. His only suggestion regarding his assumption of parental duties is a statement in his brief that N.T. knew M.P. would have done anything N.T. asked to support her during her pregnancy. However, standing ready and being willing to provide support is insufficient; parenting responsibilities must be assumed; affirmative action must be taken. Furthermore, the record does not evidence any support, financial or otherwise, being provided, with the exception of some insignificant financial payments of $200 for airfare and $20 here, $20 there. Tellingly, M.P. offers no explanation of his failure to act during the time between his learning of the pregnancy and N.T.'s lie about the abortion, the period when N.T. was making decisions regarding adoption. Later, there was no attempt to locate N.T., confirm the pregnancy, substantiate his legal rights, or take other action even though the district court found that M.P. should have known and did suspect [N.T.] was still pregnant with his child and she gave birth to his child. M.P. failed to grasp the fleeting opportunity available to him to establish a firm commitment to parenting.