Opinion ID: 667152
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: validity of the order

Text: 62 In Protexa Appeal I we held that the removal of the wreck was compulsory by law if directed by a valid order of the Port Captain. 954 F.2d at 141. Inasmuch as we have determined that the act of state doctrine does not apply and the removal was not compulsory by law under the objective balancing test, we must decide whether the removal order was valid. In this section of our opinion we cite to various provisions of Mexican and international law which we have reprinted in English in the appendix to this opinion. 22 63 Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.1, the determination of foreign law in the federal courts is a question of law to be resolved by reference to any relevant information, including that provided by expert witnesses. Merck & Co., 774 F.2d at 488. Consequently, we exercise plenary review on this question, and are not confined to information available to or considered by the district court. 23 64 We will begin, therefore, by reviewing certain facts relevant to determining the validity of the removal order. Prior to the HUICHOL's sinking in bad weather, it had been granted permission by the Port Captain of the Port of Carmen to anchor in an otherwise prohibited area within the Pemex oil exploratory zone. Anchorage is prohibited in this area because oil platforms and submerged oil pipelines are located in it. The HUICHOL sank approximately 45 miles from the Port of Carmen 24 --beyond the 12-mile limit which denotes Mexico's territorial sea. Protexa II at 14-15. Its wreck lay in waters that under UNCLOS comprise the Exclusive Economic Zone, an area of international waters, beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, in which the coastal state--here Mexico--may exercise sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources. 25 65 A port captain has limited jurisdiction over the EEZ and may perform police functions within this jurisdiction pertaining to health, sanitation and customs. Id. at 15, 49. But the Port Captain acknowledged in his testimony that there is a difference between the geographic supervision and the subject matter jurisdiction of his office. Although his jurisdiction exists by virtue of presidential decree, his authority and control within the EEZ are defined by law. Id. at 17. The Port Captain testified that he issued the removal order for several reasons, the principal one being that the wreck was located in a high safety zone from which, in his view, all wrecks must be removed. Moreover, he believed removal was required because the Mexican Attorney General had commenced his investigation, and a visual and physical inspection of the ship would facilitate this process. The Port Captain also believed that the location of the wreck was in an area that affected the Port of Carmen. Finally, due to the loss of life, there was tremendous pressure to recover the bodies of the crew immediately, and the Port Captain believed it important politically to commence removal without delay. Id. at 15-16. 66 Although the Port Captain testified as to his concern for safety and his opinion that the HUICHOL constituted an obstacle to maintenance activity in the oil field, he issued the order without procuring a technical analysis regarding potential movement of the wreck, its threat to oil pipelines and structures, and its potential environmental impact. Id. at 16. The district court also noted that even though oil companies normally prepare and maintain charts indicating the location of oil pipelines, there was no testimony that the Port Captain had sought access to such charts. Id. at 16 n. 6. Furthermore, Pemex did not exert any pressure for wreck removal; rather, the Port Captain attempted to pressure Pemex to enlist its cooperation. Id. at 16. Finally, the wreck lay more than 500 meters from any oil platform, and Protexa never told the captain before he issued the order that the wreck was rapidly sinking in the mud. Id. at 16-17. 67 The district court considered the validity of the order under Mexican statutory and constitutional law, for it believed that a due process inquiry under the Mexican Constitution was relevant to its final validity determination. 26 Ultimately, the district court held that the Port Captain's order requiring Protexa to raise a wreck outside Mexico's territorial waters was invalid because: (1) it was not authorized by Mexican statutory law; and (2) under Article 16 of the Mexican Constitution, the government cannot order a private party to raise a wreck at its own expense absent statutory authority. Finally, even though the removal order did not cite to principles of the international law of the sea for authority, and the district court believed that UNCLOS was not incorporated into Mexican law prior to the issuance of the order, the court nevertheless examined the relevant provisions of UNCLOS and found them to provide an insufficient basis for the order. 68 In reaching its conclusions, the district court considered testimony regarding the validity of the order under Mexican and international law from witnesses produced by both sides, and we consider such testimony integral to our present decision. 27 We therefore examine the statutes cited by the Port Captain in the order as authority for requiring Protexa to raise the wreck: Article 86 of the Law of Navigation and Maritime Commerce (Navigation Law), and Articles 262 and 263 of the Law of General Means of Communication (Means of Communication Law). Because the expert witnesses differed over the meaning of these statutes, the district court made reference to other portions of the statutes and we will consider them as well.
69 The Port Captain first cited Article 86 of the Navigation Law, enacted in 1963. The article is a wreck removal provision which states in part: 70 If a ship runs aground or sinks in a port, in an area considered as such in terms of the last paragraph of Article 33, or in a general waterway of communication, in a manner that constitutes a navigational obstacle or that affects navigation, it shall be removed within the period set forth by the Navy Department. 71 Clearly there are two requirements for Article 86 to be applicable. First, the ship must sink in a specific location, namely, a port, an area considered to be a port under Article 33 of the Navigation Law, or in a general waterway of communication. Second, the sunken ship must constitute an obstacle to navigation or affect navigation. 72 Although Protexa's expert on maritime law, Dr. Ignacio Melo, and the insurance companies' expert on maritime law, Ambassador Alberto Szekely, agreed that the HUICHOL sank outside of Mexico's territorial waters and in the EEZ, they disagreed on whether Article 86 granted the Port Captain the authority to order wreck removal at the expense of a private citizen where the HUICHOL sank. While they agreed that the HUICHOL did not sink in a port or in an area considered as such under Article 33, they disagreed as to whether the waters of the EEZ were waters of general means of communication. 28 The district court credited Ambassador Szekely's testimony that the EEZ was not a general waterway of communication within the meaning of Article 86. Protexa II at 43-45. The Ambassador pointed out that the phrase general waterway of communication is defined in Article 1 of the Means of Communication Law. Section I of that article refers to Mexico's territorial waters, and the three remaining sections refer to several types of federal waters capable of sustaining international commerce or commerce among the Mexican states. However, the article does not mention the EEZ. 73 Protexa's expert, Dr. Melo, testified that the EEZ could be considered a general waterway of communication because Article 9 of the Navigation Law, passed in 1963, derogated the definition of general waterway of communication contained in Article 1 of the Means of Communication Law, passed in 1940. Article 9 states in part: The general means of communication by water are the territorial seas and the other waters of federal jurisdiction, when they can be used for navigation. (emphasis added). On Dr. Melo's theory, use of the phrase other waters of federal jurisdiction in Article 9 was a statutory anticipation of Mexico's creation of the EEZ. 74 Ambassador Szekely, however, contended that Article 9 of the Navigation Law did not supersede Article 1 of the Means of Communication Law. Rather, he stated, the phrase other waters of federal jurisdiction in Article 9 of the Navigation Law was merely a shorthand expression for the waters enumerated in sections II-IV of Article 1 of the Means of Communication Law, as those delineated waters were all waters of federal jurisdiction as distinguished from the territorial waters of the first section. Thus, the entire sentence in Article 9 references all of Article 1. Moreover, Ambassador Szekely showed that Article 1 of the Means of Communication Law could not have been abrogated by Article 9 of the Navigation Law because Article 6 of the Navigation Law expressly mandates reference to the Means of Communication Law when questions arise regarding the interpretation of general ways of communication by water. Finally, the Ambassador also challenged Dr. Melo's view that Article 9 of the Navigation Law anticipated the concept of the EEZ in 1963, as he showed that the physical contours of the EEZ were not formed until 1971 and Mexico established its 200-mile zone in 1976 and ratified UNCLOS in 1982. Thus, in Ambassador Szekely's opinion, the EEZ is not included in the definition of a general waterway of communication, and under Article 1 of the Means of Communication Law, the outer limit of the general way of communication of water is the 12-mile limit of the territorial sea which is the property of Mexico. Accordingly, Ambassador Szekely reasoned that because the HUICHOL sank in the EEZ, an area beyond the territorial sea and not the property of Mexico, it did not sink in a general waterway of communication. 75 The district court found Ambassador Szekely's knowledge of the statute's language and his grasp of the legislative history ... compelling. Protexa II at 45. Consistent with the Ambassador's testimony, the district court held that Article 86 is territorially based, limited to the property of Mexico, bounded by a twelve-mile border and limited to a port or in an area considered as such, and its application is restricted to an obstacle to navigation or one which affects it. Id. Inasmuch as the HUICHOL sank outside of Mexico's territorial waters and did not affect navigation, the district court held that Article 86 of the Navigation Law could not supply a legal basis for the Port Captain's order. 29 76 We agree with the district court's conclusion. On appeal, Protexa raises essentially the same arguments it advanced in the district court, contending that the EEZ is included as a general waterway of communication, even if the concept was not formed fully in 1963, because the plain wording of the statute conclusively evidences the contemplation by the Mexican legislature of some maritime zone of federal jurisdiction distinct from territorial waters as early as 1963--and it intended Article 86 to have effect in those waters wherever they may be. Protexa Br. at 32. To bolster this claim, Protexa provides a history of the development of the EEZ concept and its enactment into Mexican law, and expressly points out that the Mexican Federal Law of the Sea, which incorporates UNCLOS into Mexican law and became effective in 1986, states in its preamble that it has federal jurisdiction, and it governs the EEZ among other maritime zones. 30 77 Yet, it remains the case that in 1963, when Articles 86 and 9 of the Navigation Law were enacted, the EEZ concept was at best in a period of gestation, and there were no contemplated waters of federal jurisdiction other than those described in Article 1 of the 1940 Means of Communication Law, which provided the definition of general waterway of communication, and to which explicit reference is made by Article 6 of the Navigation Law. We therefore reject the argument that although the Navigation Law was enacted against the backdrop of the 1940 Means of Communication Law, nevertheless the use of the phrase other waters of federal jurisdiction in Article 9 was intended by the Mexican Congress to provide for an ever-expanding definition of the general means of communication by water. 78 For several reasons, the fact that the international community later developed the EEZ concept and Mexico asserted jurisdiction over it as provided under UNCLOS does not alter the reasonable interpretation that under Mexican law the EEZ is not a general waterway of communication under Article 86. First, as Ambassador Szekely testified, Article 6 of the Navigation Law provides that the definition of general ways of communication by water is also consistent with the international treaties ratified by Mexico, and Article 9 of the same law implicitly makes all general ways of communication by water Mexican property. Therefore, to extend the concept of general ways of communication to include the EEZ would imply Mexican ownership over the EEZ, contrary to international law and to Mexico's treaty obligations, as Mexico does not and could not own the EEZ. 79 Protexa responds to this interpretation by arguing that the statutes cited in the removal order are not limited to the territory of Mexico, and even if they were, the removal order still would be valid under principles of international law. Protexa Br. at 46-47. Yet, here we are addressing merely the question of whether the EEZ can be included under the definition of general ways of communication as argued by Dr. Melo and not the broader question of whether the order is consistent with international law. We believe that the use of the phrase other waters of federal jurisdiction in Article 9, as passed in 1963, did not contemplate the later development of the EEZ, and Protexa has provided no grounds for believing that non-territorial general ways of communication were so contemplated. Consequently, we credit Ambassador Szekely's testimony as to the territorial constraints of Article 86 even if, for the purposes of this discussion only, Protexa is correct that the removal order could be considered valid under principles of international law. 80 Finally, although Protexa cites the language of the 1986 Federal Law of the Sea, it offers no satisfactory response to the fact that this law was enacted after the HUICHOL sank and that the law states not that the waters of the EEZ are waters of federal jurisdiction, but rather that the Law has federal jurisdiction. Nor does Protexa offer any rationale upon which to discredit Ambassador Szekely's testimony that the 1986 law was not intended to alter the definition of general ways of communication contained in Article 1 of the Means of Communication Law. AAMS App. at 123-24. As Ambassador Szekely drafted the 1986 law (AAMS App. at 60-61), we choose also to credit his testimony to this effect. Thus, like the district court, we are of the opinion that Article 86 could not have provided a legal basis for the Port Captain's removal order. 31 81
82 Article 262 of the Means of Communication Law, enacted in 1941, is the second statutory provision cited in the removal order. On its face, the article does not address wreck removal, but rather authorizes investigations into maritime casualties and provides for the appointment of two experts per investigation to accomplish this objective. The district court concluded that the article is not port-centered and conceivably could extend to a vessel located in the EEZ, as the Port Captain may perform police functions within his jurisdiction as they pertain to health, sanitation and customs. Furthermore, he serves as auxiliary to the public prosecutor. Protexa II at 49. However, although Article 262 permits the Port Captain to commence an investigation and appoint investigators, it does not address the question of whether the government may order a private citizen to pay for removal of a wreck to assist with this investigation, or whether the government must shoulder the removal expense itself. 83 Dr. Melo testified that Article 262 is sufficient legal basis in itself for a removal order if removal is reasonably necessary to complete the investigation. Protexa App. at 297, 306-10. However, the district court again credited the testimony of Ambassador Szekely, who stated that the 1986 Federal Law of the Sea governing Mexico's maritime areas is silent as to wreck removal and does not authorize wreck removal jurisdiction in the EEZ. Protexa II at 49-50. Consequently, the Ambassador concluded--and thus the district court held--that without such legal authority the government must pay for wreck removal incident to the investigation, for it otherwise would violate Article 16 of the Mexican Constitution, which requires a statutory basis for a government order against an individual. Id. at 50-51. 84 We agree with the district court's conclusion, as Protexa merely contends that we should give Dr. Melo's view greater weight due to his substantial experience with the law here. Our reading of Article 262 convinces us that the article simply cannot be understood to have the broad implications Dr. Melo attributed to it. Indeed, if it did, it would be difficult to limit the scope of the section, for all sorts of things could be justified as being in aid of an investigation. For example, Article 262 could justify the holding of witnesses incommunicado or the seizure of private property without legal process or redress. We cannot believe that the Mexican Congress could have contemplated such procedures. 85
86 Article 263 of the Means of Communication Law, enacted in 1941, is the remaining statutory provision cited in the removal order. Like Article 86 of the Navigation Law, Article 263 is a wreck removal statute, but it is not dependent on the wreck being a hazard to navigation. Rather, Article 263 compels the owner of a wreck to remove the vessel if it sinks within a port, or in the vicinity/proximity of a port provided it affects the port. But inasmuch as Protexa does not contend the HUICHOL sank within a port, we are concerned only with whether it sank within the vicinity/proximity of a port and affected the port. 87 Ambassador Szekely testified that the more restrictive word vicinity is the more appropriate interpretation. Thus, the phrase affects the port reflects a legislative determination that it is necessary to protect the interests of navigation within the port and navigation to and from the port. Protexa II at 46. The Ambassador focused on Article 33 of the Administrative General Regulations for the Police of Ports (the Port Regulations), promulgated in 1941, to support his view. Article 33 compels removal of a wreck which sinks within a port or which interrupts navigation. However, Dr. Melo interpreted the phrase affects the port in an economic sense, testifying that the law must be interpreted in light of the connection between the oil fields and the two ports servicing them. Protexa App. at 291-95. Consequently, Protexa argues that Article 263 is not limited to protecting navigational interests, but rather that it applies here because the sinking of the HUICHOL in the oil fields directly affected the commerce of the ports involved. Protexa Br. at 41. 88 The district court accepted Ambassador Szekely's view, adopting the navigational interest interpretation of the article and the more restrictive translation of vicinity. Protexa II at 47. Since the HUICHOL did not sink within a port or in the vicinity of a port, but rather 45 miles from the coast, its location could not interrupt navigation to and from the port. Consequently, the district court held that the Port Captain's order was not authorized by Article 263. Protexa II at 47. Protexa rejects this interpretation and argues that Article 33 should not be read to restrict the open-ended language of Article 236, and that common sense dictates that the legislature contemplated wrecks affecting the port in more ways than merely obstructing navigation in and to the port. Protexa Br. at 40-41. 89 We adopt the holding of the district court, however, as Protexa's reading of the article to comprise wrecks which affect the port in an economic sense surely is more strained and artificial than Ambassador Szekely's interpretation. In taking this position, we view Article 33 of the Port Regulations as illuminating the kinds of concerns behind Article 263. Moreover, we cannot believe that when the Mexican Congress passed Article 263 in 1940, it envisioned that it would be applied as Protexa would have us today, viz., to a wreck located some 45 miles off the coast in international waters. Indeed, we think that under Dr. Melo's interpretation, an order could be issued under Article 263 for removal of a wreck hundreds of miles from Mexico if such a wreck could affect a Mexican port in an economic sense. 90 Thus, our analysis of the Mexican statutes cited in the Port Captain's order as authority for requiring Protexa to raise the wreck leads us to conclude that the district court was correct in holding the order invalid under Mexican law. 32 As the order was not a valid order, Protexa's removal of the HUICHOL was not compulsory by law under the terms of the insurance contract between it and the insurance companies. Consequently, Protexa is not entitled to recover the expenses of raising the wreck from the insurance companies.