Opinion ID: 2602361
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Error was Harmful

Text: ¶ 50 Having concluded the trial court erred in its interpretation of Margulies, we now address whether that error requires reversal. Even if a trial court erroneously grants a motion for partial directed verdict, we will not reverse a judgment merely because there may have been error; reversal occurs only if the error is such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a result more favorable to the complaining party. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 431 (Utah 1998). `A reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome exists when the appellate court's confidence in the verdict actually reached is undermined.' State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ¶ 17, 999 P.2d 7 (quoting State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 781 (Utah Ct.App. 1991)). We conclude the trial court's ruling constituted reversible error. ¶ 51 Plaintiffs argue that any error on this issue is harmless because, even if Wiley Rein did not have an implied attorney-client relationship with the MWT, limited partners from 1988 to 1991, it still had continuing duties of loyalty and confidentiality to those plaintiffs as former clients, and the jury's conclusion that one or both of these duties were breached remains unaffected. However, as further explained below, this argument presupposes that Wiley Rein did, in fact, have an attorney-client relationship with each plaintiff at some time, an issue the jury was never able to decide because of the trial court's partial directed verdict ruling. ¶ 52 Plaintiffs assert that the jury's verdict was based on defendants' breaches of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and/or confidentiality. They correctly contend that the duty of confidentiality is a continuing one owed to former clients. Further, relying on the federal case of Damron v. Herzog, they contend that the duty of loyalty also continues after the termination of representation. See 67 F.3d 211, 213 (9th Cir.1995) ([W]e find in the common law a continuing duty owed by attorneys to former clients not to represent an interest adverse to a former client on a matter substantially related to the matter of engagement. When such a duty is breached, the former client may bring a cause of action at law.). Therefore, plaintiffs contend, the trial court's ruling was harmless because even if there was no attorney-client relationship during the time period in question, defendants still had duties of loyalty and confidentiality to plaintiffs as former clients. ¶ 53 We agree with plaintiffs that the duty of confidentiality continues after the termination of representation and that the duty of loyalty also prohibits an attorney from represent[ing] an interest adverse to a former client on a matter substantially related to the matter of engagement. Id. However, we disagree with the plaintiffs conclusion that, in light of this, the trial court's error was harmless. ¶ 54 We disagree because such a conclusion presupposes that, at some time, defendants did have an attorney-client relationship with those plaintiffs. While defendants admit that until 1986, Wiley Rein had an attorney-client relationship with MWT Company, they deny they ever had an attorney-client relationship with plaintiffs, and the testimony of David Wood supported this claim. Certainly, there was evidence presented below that would allow the jury to reject defendants' claims on this point. Plaintiffs presented evidence that Wood was retained by plaintiffs Kilpatrick, Gonzales, Joseph Lee, David Lee, Sidney Foulger, and Pratt to create MWT Company and that Wood continued to represent their interests after creating MWT Company and joining Wiley Rein. [11] Nevertheless, the key point is that the jury was never able to determine whether this was the case in light of the trial court's decision to grant plaintiff's motion for a partial directed verdict on this issue. This being so, our `confidence in the verdict actually reached is undermined,' Kohl, 2000 UT 35 at ¶ 17, 999 P.2d 7 (quoting Harrison, 805 P.2d at 781), and we conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in [the] absence [of the trial court's error], there would have been a result more favorable to the complaining party. Child, 972 P.2d at 431. Accordingly, we reverse the jury's verdict and remand for a new trial.