Opinion ID: 1118319
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: administration of water rights on the reservation

Text: Concerning administration of water rights on the reservation the district court determined: The Tribal agency which regulates reserved water matters shall have the authority to administer all water rights within the stipulated boundaries of the reservation. Non-Indian rights will be administered according to state water law by the Tribal agency, with appropriate judicial review in state district court pursuant to Title 41 of the Wyoming statutes. Judge Hartman, Judgment and Decree (March 11, 1991). Appellants allege error by the district court in substituting the Tribal Water Resources Agency in place of the state engineer to administer all water rights within the reservation. The state claims, inter alia, violations of the Wyoming Constitution and the law of this case and that the United States Constitution and federal law convey no such authority to the Tribes. It is helpful to review the appellants' claims on appeal and the district court's disposition of the several issues: (1) whether the district court's decision removed the state engineer from his administrative duties under Wyo. Const. art. 8, § 5; (2) whether removal of the state engineer was an abuse of discretion; (3) whether the district court's decision is consistent with this court's decision in Big Horn I regarding administration; (4) whether the Tribes may administer state water rights on the reservation in light of recent United States Supreme Court decisions.
The duties of the state engineer are prescribed by the Wyoming Constitution, which states in part: There shall be a state engineer who shall be appointed by the governor   . He shall be president of the board of control, and shall have general supervision of the waters of the state   . Wyo. Const. art. 8, § 5 (emphasis added). The general supervisory powers granted the state engineer under Wyo. Const. art. 8, § 5, were not intended to give unlimited and uncontrolled authority. State By and Through Christopulos v. Husky Oil, 575 P.2d 262, 264 n.6 (Wyo.1978). Justice Macy argues that to allow the Tribal Water Resources Agency to administer water useage on the reservation violates the Wyoming Constitution: The water of all natural streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water, within the boundaries of the state, are hereby declared to be the property of the state. Wyo. Const. art. 8, § 1 (emphasis added). However, in Big Horn I, this court stated: The decree does not violate state law. The provision in the Amended Judgment and Decree does not purport to give full ownership of the reserved water to the State. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 114 (emphasis added). Justice Macy cites the following sentence, providing his own emphasis, to lend support to his argument for restriction of the Tribes' reserved water right in Big Horn I: The government may reserve water from appropriation under state law for use on the lands set aside for an Indian reservation. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 94 (emphasis added by Justice Macy). The Big Horn court, however, provided no such emphasis in this cite which was originally taken from Winters. The Winters' Court specifically stated: The power of the Government to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could not be. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577, 28 S.Ct. at 212, 52 L.Ed. at 346-47 (citing United States v. Rio Grande Ditch & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 702, 19 S.Ct. 770, 774, 43 L.Ed. 1136, 1141 (1899); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 25 S.Ct. 662, 49 L.Ed. 1089 (1905)). Justice Macy chooses not only to conveniently ignore the clear intent of the United States Supreme Court in Winters from which these words are taken, but to portend an interpretation from Big Horn I that is clearly in error and did not exist. I reject the argument that the reserved water is the property of the state and the state engineer thus must have control. The reserved water rights of the Tribes are not within the boundaries of the state but are within the boundaries of the reservation. The characteristics and nature of Indian reserved water rights are different from state water rights. The determination of the priority date of Indian reserved water is not based on actual use by the Indians. Montana ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 219 Mont. 76, 712 P.2d 754, 767 (1985). Nor can these rights be abandoned for non-use. Id., 712 P.2d at 768. The right to reserved water by the Tribes vested at the time of creation of the reservation and title to the right is held in trust by the federal government for the benefit of the Indians. Joseph R. Membrino, Indian Reserved Water Rights, Federalism and the Trust Responsibility, 27 Land & Water L.Rev. 1, 2 (1992). Indian ownership of the reserved water rights is supported by the Wyoming Constitution: Ownership of certain lands disclaimed; restriction on taxation of nonresidents. The people inhabitating this state do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof, and to all lands laying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, and that until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United States and that said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress of the United States   . Wyo. Const. art. 21, § 26 (emphasis added). These Indian reserved waters are not state property. The state does not claim ownership of the federal reserved waters of Yellowstone which lay within the boundaries of Wyoming, nor can it assert such ownership to the reserved waters of the reservation. Despite Justice Macy's assertion, this claim is not supported by the Wyoming Constitution: Water being essential to industrial prosperity, of limited amount, and easy of diversion from its natural channels, its control must be in the state, which, in providing for its use, shall equally guard all the various interests involved. Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 31 (emphasis added). This section was intended to confer control over those waters in which the state has a role in providing for its use. The state does not provide for the use of reserved water rights on the reservation; thus, the application of this constitutional provision to the Indian reserved rights is inapposite. In Big Horn I, we looked to the state engineer to provide incidental monitoring of Indian reserved water rights on the reservation and cautioned against reference to this conduct as constituting administration. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 115. The clear intent of Big Horn I was to permit the state engineer to monitor the use of water on the reservation, not to administer state law to the use of reserved rights by the Indians. Big Horn I, at 115. We stated: The decree entered in the instant case does not require application of state water law to the Indian reservation. The decree recognizes reserved water rights based on federal law. The role of the state engineer is thus not to apply state law, but to enforce the reserved rights as decreed under principles of federal law. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 115 (emphasis added). It is unequivocal from this earlier discussion that the state engineer is not to act in his constitutionally appointed role as the state engineer but to provide monitoring or oversight of the reserved rights awarded by decree. We stated that an independent water master might properly be appointed at this time to administer the decree and in light of the state engineer's limited authority. The Treaty of 1868 prohibits only unauthorized persons from entering the reservation, but the state engineer would be an authorized person upon his appointment to monitor the decree and could properly enter the reservation. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 115 (emphasis added). The district court appointed the state engineer as an officer of the court to act, in essence, as a water master to monitor the reserved rights decree. The prerogative of the district court to appoint a master is not only established in general law, but is expressly provided by W.R.C.P. 53. Palm v. Palm, 784 P.2d 1365, 1369 (Wyo. 1989) A master by definition is a person very skilled and able in some work, profession, science, etc; expert. A master in the legal context becomes any of several court officers appointed to assist the judge by hearing evidence, reporting on certain matters, etc. Webster's New World Dictionary 873 (2d College ed. 1978). As water master of the water rights on the reservation, the state engineer is to monitor the reserved rights and contemplate neither the application of state law nor the authority to deprive the Tribes of water without the assistance of the courts in a suit for the administration of the decree. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 115. The state's response to the Tribes' Motion For Order to Show Cause Why Further Relief Should Not Be Granted attached an affidavit of the state engineer which concluded that the Tribes' instream flow permit could not be recognized for failure of the Tribes to request approval of the state engineer for a change of use. Report and Recommendation of the Special Master, October 4, 1990, at 3. The special master noted in his Conclusions of Law, as did the district court in its Findings of Fact, that the role of the state engineer was to enforce the Tribes' reserved water rights under principles of federal law. Id. at 20; Judge Hartman, Judgment and Decree at 15 (March 11, 1991). Though finding that the state engineer's acts were not contemptuous, the district court's act authorizing the Tribes to administer the water rights on the reservation effectively removed the state engineer from those duties. Judge Hartman, Judgement and Decree at 17 (March 11, 1991). The district court's decision to replace the state engineer in his role as water master with the Tribal Water Resources Agency removed him not from his constitutionally protected duties to apply state law as a state engineer, but from his duties as a water master to monitor the decree. The broad discretion granted the district court to appoint a master under Wyo.R.Civ.P. 53 must confer discretion to remove the master if the law is not applied as decreed. I would hold that the state engineer did not act as instructed by Big Horn I and that removal was appropriate exercise of the district court's discretion. I find it difficult to fathom how the state engineer could have sufficiently executed the role of impartial water master while acting as the state's chief negotiator in talks with the Tribes over water issues and at the same time retaining the constitutional duty to protect the waters of the state.
The district court granted the Tribal Water Resources Agency the authority to administer all water rights within the stipulated boundaries of the reservation specifying that non-Indian rights were to be administered according to state water law by the Tribal agency, with appropriate judicial review in state district court pursuant to Title 41 of the Wyoming statutes. Judge Hartman, Judgement and Decree, March 11, 1991 (emphasis added). This decision implicates two distinct concerns: the issue of administration of water rights under Big Horn I and regulation of the water rights of non-Indians on the reservation in light of recent decisions in this area. As mentioned above, in Big Horn I we were careful to distinguish monitoring of the decree from administration. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 115. It is not merely a question of semantics to make this distinction. To administer is to manage or direct as opposed to monitor, which means to watch or check on. Webster's, supra, at 18. It is no accident that this court meant to affirm only the lesser powers of monitoring to the state engineer in Big Horn I. That authority permitted the state engineer to enforce the reserved rights under federal law principles by turning to the court for enforcement against the Tribes if violations were noted. We said: The role of the state engineer is thus not to apply state law, but to enforce the reserved rights as decreed under principles of federal law.    Should the state engineer find that it is the Tribes who are violating the decree, it is clear that he must then turn to the courts for enforcement of the decree against the United States and the Tribes and that he cannot simply close the headgates. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 115. Under the decree, the Tribes were required to first seek protection against state water users from the state engineer before pursuing court assistance. We stated: The decree only requires the United States and the Tribes first to turn to the state engineer to exercise his authority over the state users to protect their reserved water rights before they seek court assistance to enforce their rights; it does not preclude access to the courts. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 115. In the instant case, the Tribes, following the guidelines of Big Horn I, requested that the state engineer enforce their federal reserved water rights by ensuring that their instream flow dedication was fulfilled. Report and Recommendation of the Special Master, October 4, 1990, at 2. The state engineer failed to apply federal reserved water right principles and insisted on applying state water law to the Tribes' request. As a result, the Tribes received no relief and no protection from the state engineer in his role as water master. Their relief came only after bringing suit in district court. The reluctance of the state engineer to enforce the federal reserved water rights has placed an unnecessary burden on the Tribes. I see no reason to continue to insist that the Tribes request relief from the state engineer before pursuing a remedy in district court. The Tribes, in monitoring their reserved rights and all water rights on the reservation, must turn to the court for enforcement against violations by state water users and protection of their federal reserved rights.
The very earliest case considering jurisdiction on Indian reservations recognized the rights of Indian tribes based on their inherent sovereign authority. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 6 Pet. 515, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832). Subsequent cases have characterized this inherent sovereignty as so deeply engrained in our jurisprudence as to create a backdrop on which to hang the rights acquired by treaties and against which vague or ambiguous federal enactments must always be measured. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143, 100 S.Ct. 2578, 2583, 65 L.Ed.2d 665, 672 (1980) (citing McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973)). Ambiguities in federal law have been construed generously in order to comport with these traditional notions of sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal independence. White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 144, 100 S.Ct. at 2578, 65 L.Ed.2d at 673. The conflict over whether state law could be applied to activities on the reservation has evolved from the initial consideration of infringement on the right of Indians to govern themselves, Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959), and progressed to include preemption by federal law by way of a comprehensive federal scheme that would be frustrated by state regulation. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 85 S.Ct. 1242, 14 L.Ed.2d 165 (1965). The tradition of Indian sovereignty over the reservation and tribal members must inform the determination whether the exercise of state authority has been pre-empted by operation of federal law. White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 143, 100 S.Ct. at 2583, 65 L.Ed.2d at 672 (citing Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 475, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976)). Tribal rights are abrogated only if Congress `has clearly expressed its intent to do so,' keeping in mind that `doubtful expressions of intent must be resolved in favor of the Indians.' State of S. D. v. Bourland, 949 F.2d 984, 990 (8th Cir.1991) (quoting Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 711 F.2d 809, 827 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1042, 104 S.Ct. 707, 79 L.Ed.2d 171 (1984)). In White Mountain the Court considered the barriers to assertion of state regulatory powers over an Indian tribe to include the Williams v. Lee infringement test, preemption analysis under Warren and whether the resultant regulation would burden the tribe. The Court recognized the firm federal policy of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development, noting that no express congressional statement is needed to find a particular state law to have been preempted. White Mountain, 448 U.S. at 144, 100 S.Ct. at 2584, 65 L.Ed.2d at 673. The district court has authorized the Tribal Water Resources Agency to administer all water rights on the reservation, including those of non-Indians holding land in fee with state water permits. Administration of water rights does not comport with this court's previous decision in Big Horn I. However, the question now becomes whether the Tribes may engage in the lesser regulatory activity of monitoring the use of water on the entire reservation. Big Horn I did not address the issue of tribal regulation or the regulation of non-Indian water rights on the reservation. We stated only that [t]his court is also cognizant of the fact that exercise of the reserved water rights are [sic] intimately bound up with the state water rights of off-reservation users. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 115. It is obvious to any observer that exercise of reserved rights must also be intimately bound up with the state water rights of non-Indians on the reservation as well. The Tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory and as such have the authority to monitor reserved water rights on the reservation. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557, 95 S.Ct. 710, 717, 42 L.Ed.2d 706, 716 (1975). Recognizing this inherent authority, I turn now to the issue of Indians regulating use by non-Indians on the reservation. In Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981), the Supreme Court considered whether the Crow Tribe could regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on fee owned land within the reservation. The Court held that inherent tribal sovereignty was not in itself enough to support regulation in this instance and the exercise of tribal power beyond that necessary to protect tribal self-government or control internal affairs needed congressional delegation to survive. However, the Court also stated that a tribe may    retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 565-66, 101 S.Ct. at 1258, 67 L.Ed.2d at 511. In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 109 S.Ct. 2994, 106 L.Ed.2d 343 (1989), the Court considered a conflict between the Yakima tribe and the county over which entity had the power to regulate zoning on two distinct types of lands within the reservation: areas closed to non-Indians and areas open to the general public. The open area included fee owned lands held by non-Indians as a result of the General Allotment Act of 1887. Though the Court discussed the tribe's power to exclude non-Indians from the reservation, it concluded that the Allotment Act took away the exclusive power to exclude those with fee title, leaving a lesser power to regulate. However, the Court was reluctant to find that the tribe had retained its inherent sovereignty in this area by refusing to employ the principles of Montana, without a showing by the tribe that the circumstances constituted a demonstrably serious impact by the challenged uses that imperils tribal political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare. Following Brendale, the Court considered tribal jurisdiction over a non-member criminal defendant and acknowledged that our decisions recognize broader retained tribal powers outside the criminal context.    As distinct from criminal prosecution, this civil authority typically involves situations arising from property ownership within the reservation or consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. Montana v. United States, [450 U.S.] at 565 [101 S.Ct. at 1258]    The exercise of criminal jurisdiction subjects a person not only to the adjudicatory power of the tribunal, but also to the prosecuting power of the tribe, and involves a far more direct intrusion on personal liberties. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 688, 110 S.Ct. 2053, 2061, 109 L.Ed.2d 693, 705 (1990). I would hold, as the court did in Colville Confederated Tribes, that regulation of water on the reservation is critical to the lifestyle of its residents and development of its resources. The cultural vitality of tribes is tied to the application of tribal values to guide the use of reservation resources. David H. Getches, Management and Marketing of Indian Water: From Conflict to Pragmatism, 58 Colo.L.Rev. 515, 527 (1988). Water regulation is an important sovereign power. Colville, 647 F.2d at 52. It is hard to imagine a resource more critical to the economic security or health and welfare of the Wind River Reservation Tribes. In light of the unwillingness of the state engineer to date to protect these important reserved right interests of the Tribes, it is imperative that the Tribes have the authority to do so. By avoiding multiple jurisdiction of water rights on the reservation, I would hope to avert needless duplication, expense and continued conflict. Getches, supra, at 530. I would hold monitoring to be a lesser intrusive oversight and not as restrictive or controlling as the regulation of water rights proposed by the tribe in United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir.1984) or the zoning regulations in Brendale. (The Anderson court limited the state's regulatory authority over non-Indian fee owners to the use of excess water.) Competing interests between the state and Tribes over this limited grant of control need not be weighed. Safeguards are in place to ensure that the result of tribal monitoring of non-Indian water rights will not subject non-Indians to the jurisdiction of the Tribal Water Resources Agency but will be referred to district court for resolution.