Opinion ID: 2634763
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The boundaries mere suspicion and certainty.

Text: We have stated that probable cause requires more than a mere suspicion but less than a certainty. $10,447.00, 104 Hawai`i at 331, 89 P.3d at 831 (quoting Detroy, 102 Hawai`i at 18, 72 P.3d at 490); see also State v. Brighter, 63 Haw. 95, 101, 621 P.2d 374, 379 (1980) (stating that probable cause requires more than a mere suspicion but less than a certainty); State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142, 433 P.2d 593, 597 (1967) (It is clear that the term probable cause, according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Certainty, of course, is considerably greater than a mere preponderance of the evidence, which means that the existence of a fact is more likely than not. This court's formulation of the quantum of proof necessary to establish probable cause is thus more demanding than that suggested by the ICA, which would lower the bar for the presence of probable cause to less than a preponderance of the evidence as a per se matter. The ICA, in support of its formulation, cites to the plurality opinion in Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983), which states that probable cause does not demand any showing that [a belief that a crime has been committed] be correct or more likely true than false. [4] While it is helpful to look at United States Supreme Court precedent when interpreting a provision of the Hawai`i Constitution that is parallel to the federal constitution, [5] this court has emphasized that federal decisions do not... prevent this court from extending greater protection in interpreting the state constitution where we determine it to be appropriate. Texeira, 50 Haw. at 142, 433 P.2d at 597. This court has also repeatedly insisted that as the ultimate judicial tribunal with final, unreviewable authority to interpret and enforce the Hawai`i Constitution, we are free to give broader protection under the Hawai`i Constitution than that given by the federal constitution. State v. Wallace, 80 Hawai`i 382, 398, 910 P.2d 695, 711 n. 14 (1996) (quoting State v. Hoey, 77 Hawai`i 17, 36, 881 P.2d 504, 523 (1994)). Thus, because this court's interpretation of probable cause affords more expansive protection under the Hawai`i Constitution, to the extent that the plurality holding in Brown is in conflict with this interpretation, we reject it. The ICA also cites Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), for the proposition that the probable cause standard is less demanding than the preponderance of the evidence standard. The ICA, however, misinterprets Gates. The Gates Court said that [f]inely-tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal trials, have no place in the probable cause decision. 462 U.S. at 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317. Contrary to the ICA's characterization, this statement does not imply that probable cause is less demanding than proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, it merely states that probable cause is a less finely-tuned standard. Gates, therefore, does not address the requisite quantum of proof in the establishment of probable cause; rather, it addresses how the probable cause determination should be made, which will be discussed next.