Opinion ID: 2197524
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Promissory Estoppel Claim

Text: Pickett also contends TRNB promised her the position of mortgage department manager for a fixed period and, as a result of her detrimental reliance on that promise, the FDIC should be estopped from denying the existence of a permanent employment contract. In order to find a party liable on a theory of promissory estoppel, there must be evidence of a promise, the promise must reasonably induce reliance upon it, and the promise must be relied upon to the detriment of the promisee. See Bender v. Design Store Corp., 404 A.2d 194, 196 (D.C.1979) (citation omitted). [D]emonstration of a promise is a prerequisite to invocation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. United States Jaycees v. Bloomfield, 434 A.2d 1379, 1384 (D.C. 1981) (citing Bender, supra, 404 A.2d at 195). Since Pickett offered no evidence of a promise addressing the conditions of discharge or the term of employment, we need go no further than the first element. See Bender, supra, 404 A.2d at 196. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Pickett, we conclude there is no genuine factual issue regarding whether TRNB and Fisher promised Pickett a permanent position. The language of the employment application and Fisher's uncontradicted testimony, that the terms and conditions of Pickett's employment were not discussed, negate any inference of a promise of employment for a fixed period as the mortgage department manager. Furthermore, the motions judge found, with respect to the letter offering employment, that there was no jury question on whether defendants promised the Mortgage Manager position for a specific period of time or promised that it would not be modified without just cause. Plaintiff's evidence presents to the court only the words of an employer who is coloring the future of his business as brightly as possible. We hold on this record that the motions judge could conclude as a matter of law that TRNB and Fisher should not be estopped from asserting that there was no promise of employment for a fixed period. See United States Jaycees, supra, 434 A.2d at 1384; see also Choate, supra, 14 F.3d at 77-78 (employer's statement `[t]he topic [of the employee's book] sounds wonderful, and I have no problems with it' was not a promise that employment would continue even in the face of negative reaction by employer's clients upon publication). Therefore, we need not address Pickett's contention that she reasonably relied on the purported promise of permanent employment as the mortgage department manager. [16] In sum, the only evidence offered by Pickett are statements of her own expectations of the position at TRNB. An employee's subjective belief that her employment is not terminable at will is not controlling because [m]ore than conclusive allegations in the pleadings or appellant['s] belief in the permanence of employment are necessary to raise a material issue of fact precluding the grant of summary judgment. Sullivan, supra, 399 A.2d at 859 (citation omitted). We hold, therefore, that there was no issue of fact regarding the parties' intent and that the motions judge did not err in granting summary judgment in No. 91-CV-1359. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in both appeals. So ordered.