Opinion ID: 852693
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Section 1 to the School Activity Fee

Text: Despite delegate Bryant's comments that the committee did not intend to insert anything that would have the effect of preventing or postponing the establishment of free schools (emphasis added), the text of the provision itself was far short of such a declaration. Rather than completely subsidizing education, which would fall within the meaning of a free school system, the framers pursued a more modest, and perhaps less controversial, route: a uniform statewide system of public schools that would be supported by taxation. Indeed the term common school was widely understood to mean public school. See State v. O'Dell, 187 Ind. 84, 118 N.E. 529, 530 (1918) (declaring that the phrase common schools is synonymous with public schools and includes high schools); Embry v. O'Bannon, 798 N.E.2d 157, 162 n.4 (Ind.2003) (quoting Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 988 (Springfield, Mass., Merriam 1856) [hereinafter Webster 1856 ]) (noting that a common school is one that is open to the children of all the inhabitants of a town or district); see also Goldin & Katz, supra, at 11 (observing that the term common school was not so much a phrase meant to imply a free school but rather was a term used in opposition to a private school, either secular or denominational). In fact, [t]he original common schools in America were not `free,' since parents had to pay tuition in the form of `rate bills.' Edwin G. West, The Rise of the State in Education, Policy: A Journal of Public Policy and Ideas 59, 60 (1991). The rate bill was a fee charged to parents for sending their children to public school. By the mid-19th century, American fee-paying common schools had become numerically dominant partly because of land grants that enabled them to charge lower tuition fees than private schools. The latter, being largely denominational establishments, were precluded from such publicly-provided advantages. Enjoying this differential cost advantage, the common schools eventually became widespread and numerous .... [T]heir access to tax revenues ultimately enabled them to abolish the fees. Id. at 61. The rate bill was abolished in Indiana in 1852, shortly after the 1851 constitution was ratified. See Goldin & Katz, supra, Table 4.1. We observe that other than arguments concerning the funding of public schools there is nothing in the Journal or Debates of the second constitutional convention concerning what the framers meant by the use of the term tuition. [8] However this is not surprising in that the historical record suggests that the term was neither technical nor particularly controversial. For example a period dictionary defines tuition as: 1. Guardianship; superintending care over a young person; the particular watch and care of a tutor or guardian over his pupil or ward. 2. More especially, instruction; the act or business of teaching the various branches of learning. We place our children under the preceptors of academies for tuition. [ This is now the common acceptation of the word. ] 3. The money paid for instruction. In our colleges, the tuition is from thirty to forty dollars a year. Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 1181 (Springfield, Mass., Merriam 1854) (emphasis in original). [9] The common understanding of the term tuition by those who framed the constitution as well as those who ratified it would have been consistent with the forgoing definition. Arguing that tuition contemplates only fees for instruction, EVSC insists that [e]xpenses incidental to credited, academic instruction such as heat, light, facility maintenance, non-instructional salaries/stipend do not fall within the commonly understood definition of `tuition.' Br. of Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 13. EVSC suggests that other than legislatively-mandated curriculum requirements all other educationally related expenses may be assessed against students and their parents. We agree in principle with EVSC's understanding of tuition as the term is used in Article 8, Section 1. This understanding is also consistent with the definition of tuition expressed in Chandler v. South Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 160 Ind.App. 592, 312 N.E.2d 915, 920 (1974). However the analysis does not end there. It is certainly the case that at the time the 1851 constitution was adopted the expenses associated with a public education were modest by today's standards, consisting primarily of school buildingsusually one-room school-housestheir maintenance, desks, textbooks, supplies, and teacher salaries. By the express terms of the Constitution, tuition shall be without charge. Obviously tuition was to be subsidized through public funding sources. But to suppose that all remaining educational expense would be placed on the shoulders of parents whose children were attending public schools loses sight of the entire free school movement debatea central and key element of which was that public schools would be operated largely at public expense. Indeed within three years of the Constitution's ratification this court noted that the evils of the old system which were intended to be avoided by the new constitution [were] inequality in education, inequality of taxation, lack of uniformity in schools, and a shrinking from legislative responsibilities.... Greencastle Twp. in Putnam County v. Black, 5 Ind. 557, 564 (1854), overruled in part by Robinson v. Schenck, 102 Ind. 307, 1 N.E. 698 (1885). [10] It is of course true that what constitutes a public education has dramatically expanded over these several decades. We doubt for example that the framers could have had in their contemplation such cost items as computer labs, athletic departments, and media specialists. But it is equally true that determining the components of a public education is left within the authority of the legislative branch of government. Article 8, Section 1 imperatively places upon the legislature, by all suitable means ... to provide, by law, for a general and uniform system of Common Schools. But this imperative leaves to that branch considerable discretion in determining what will and what will not come within the meaning of a public education system. The duty rests on the legislature to adopt the best [school] system that can be framed; but they, and not the courts, are to judge what is the best system. There is this limitation on the legislative power: the system must be `a general and uniform one,' and tuition must be free and open to all; but the extent of this limitation is this, and nothing more. Robinson, 1 N.E. at 705. Consistent with its constitutional mandate, the Indiana General Assembly has enacted a body of law directed at providing a general and uniform system of public schools. It is detailed, comprehensive, and includes among other things provisions for revenue and funding sources, curriculum requirements, and an assortment of special programs and projects. See generally Titles 20 and 21 of the Indiana Code. In addition, the legislature has delegated to the State Board of Education the authority to adopt rules concerning several matters, including the distribution of funds and revenues appropriated for the support of schools in the state, I.C. § 20-19-2-8(a)(7), and has authorized the State Board to [e]stablish the educational goals of the state, developing standards and objectives for local school corporations. I.C. § 20-19-2-14. [11] Under this grant of authority the State Board of Education has promulgated numerous rules outlining those components of education in Indiana that are a part of public education. They too are detailed and comprehensive. See generally Title 511 of the Indiana Administrative Code. Where the legislatureor through delegation of its authority the State Boardhas identified programs, activities, projects, services or curricula that it either mandates or permits school corporations to undertake, the legislature has made a policy decision regarding exactly what qualifies as a part of a uniform system of public education commanded by Article 8, Section 1 and thus what qualifies for funding at public expense. And of course the legislature has the authority to place appropriate conditions or limitations on any such funding. [12] However, absent specific statutory authority, fees or charges for what are otherwise public education cost items cannot be levied directly or indirectly against students or their parents. Only programs, activities, projects, services or curricula that are outside of or expand upon those identified by the legislaturewhat we understand to be extracurricularmay be considered as not a part of a publicly-funded education. And thus a reasonable fee may be assessed, but only against those students who participate in or take advantage of them. In this case the $20 fee that EVSC imposes on all students is deposited into its general fund and is used to offset the costs of such things as: a coordinator of student services, nurses, media specialists, alternative education, elementary school counselors, a drama program, a music program, speech and debate programs, academic academies, athletic programs, and a police liaison program. See Appellant's App. at 21. But either the legislature or the State Board has already determined that all such items are part and parcel of a public school education and by extension qualify for public funding. For example public schools are required to provide student assistance services and to employ a qualified coordinator, see 511 IAC 4-1.5-5, provide health services and employ at least one registered nurse, see 511 IAC 4-1.5-6, and have a media program and employ a licensed media specialist, see 511 IAC 6.1-5-6. A school corporation is authorized to establish an alternative education program. See I.C. § 20-30-8-1 to -14. Elementary schools must have a school counselor for every six hundred students enrolled in grades one through six in the school corporation. See 511 IAC 4-1.5-2(b)(1). Public schools are encouraged to develop comprehensive plans to improve arts education, which includes programs in drama and music, see I.C. § 20-20-24-1 to -6, and are permitted to offer speech and debate as a part their language arts area of study, see 511 IAC 6.1-5.1-2. As for the academic academies the record shows these are after-school enrichment programs most of which deal with the same type of information that's worked in through the school day, Appellant's App. at 143-44, and we have already recognized that athletics are an integral part of this constitutionally-mandated process of education. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d at 229. See I.C. § 21-2-11-4(b) (permitting athletic coaches to be paid from a school corporation's general fund); I.C. § 20-26-14-1 (permitting interscholastic high school athletic events); I.C. § 20-30-15-6 (permitting schools to employ personnel to supervise athletics). Concerning the Police Liaison Program, it is not altogether clear from the record exactly what this program entails. We know that it is designed to improve safety and security at schools. See Appellant's App. at 130-31 (under the police liaison program, schools work ... in conjunction with the city police and the juvenile division, who are not employees of the school corporation and who assist and help with problems that are law enforcement related at the schools.). But the legislature has established an Indiana safe schools fund to allow public schools to promote school safety by designating a school safety specialist, training school personnel, purchasing security equipment, and using dogs trained to detect firearms and illegal substances. See generally I.C. § 5-2-10.1-0.3 to -12. In essence, the very programs, services, and activities for which EVSC charges a fee already are a part of a publicly-funded education in the state of Indiana. However, this conclusion does not preclude EVSC from offering programs, services or activities that are outside of or expand upon those deemed by the legislature or State Board as part of a public education. The Indiana Constitution does not prohibit EVSC from charging individual students for their participation in such extracurriculars or for their consumption of such services. However the mandatory fee EVSC imposed generally on all students, whether the student avails herself of a service or participates in a program or activity or not, becomes a charge for attending a public school and obtaining a public education. Such a charge contravenes the Common Schools mandate as the term is used in Article 8, Section 1 and is therefore unconstitutional.