Opinion ID: 1060631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instruction on criminal responsibility for facilitation of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated robbery

Text: In State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 466-67 (Tenn.1999) we adopted the following test for lesser-included offenses: An offense is a lesser-included offense if: (a) all of its statutory elements are included within the statutory elements of the offense charged; or (b) it fails to meet the definition in part (a) only in the respect that it contains a statutory element or elements establishing (1) a different mental state indicating a lesser kind of culpability; and/or (2) a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property or public interest; or (c) it consists of (1) facilitation of the offense charged or of an offense that otherwise meets the definition of lesser-included offenses in part (a) or (b); or (2) an attempt to commit the offense charged or of an offense that otherwise meets the definition of lesser-included offenses in part (a) or (b); or (3) solicitation to commit the offense charged or of an offense that otherwise meets the definition of lesser-included offenses in part (a) or (b). After adopting this test, we set forth a two-part inquiry in which a trial court must engage when determining whether a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense is warranted: First, the trial court must apply the new test to determine whether a particular lesser offense is included in the greater charged offense. If a lesser offense is not included in the offense charged, then an instruction should not be given, regardless of whether evidence supports it. If, however, the trial court concludes that a lesser offense is included in the charged offense, the question remains whether the evidence justifies a jury instruction on such lesser offense. . . . Whether or not a particular lesser-included offense should be charged to the jury depends on whether proof in the record would support the lesser charge. Id. at 467-68. The court makes this determination viewing the evidence liberally in the light most favorable to the existence of a lesser-included offense. See id. at 469. An offense is a lesser-included offense if . . . it consists of facilitation of the offense charged. . . . Id.; see also Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 39-11-403, -12-107 (1997). Accordingly, facilitation of aggravated robbery and especially aggravated robbery are lesser-included offenses of especially aggravated robbery. Flemming, however, is entitled to a jury instruction only if the evidence justifies a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of facilitation of a felony. See Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 467. A person is criminally responsible for the facilitation of a felony if, knowing that another intends to commit a specific felony, but without the intent required for criminal responsibility under § 39-11-402(2), the person knowingly furnishes substantial assistance in the commission of the felony. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-403(a) (1997). Thus, the trial court, viewing the evidence liberally in the light most favorable to the existence of a lesser-included offense, should have instructed the jury on facilitation if the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for facilitation. Having reviewed the record, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the parties presented legally sufficient evidence to support a conviction of criminal responsibility for facilitation of especially aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery. The Sentencing Commission Comments to section -403 state that application of the facilitation statute is appropriate where an offender participates substantially in a felony but lacks the intent to promote, assist or benefit from the offense. Under the facts of this case, and in the light most favorable to the existence of the lesser-included offense, a jury could reasonably have concluded that, while Flemming participated substantially by kicking and beating the victim, he did not intend to promote, assist or benefit from the offense, because he took no property from the victim. The State concedes that its proof rests on the testimony of Juanita Smith and Antonio Batey. At trial, Juanita Smith testified that Batey and Terrance Robinson were the individuals who removed property from the victim. She did not testify that she saw Flemming take property from the victim. Moreover, when Antonio Batey was asked by counsel for the State whether he knew what, if anything, Flemming took from the victim, Batey responded that he did not. If the jury accredited that testimony, it might have concluded that Flemming substantially assisted in the robbery of the victim but did not intend to benefit from the crime. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser-included offenses of facilitation, and its failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Whether an instruction on facilitation will be warranted at Flemming's new trial will depend, of course, on the evidence developed at that trial.