Opinion ID: 216585
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Third Sentencing Hearing

Text: On September 25, 2009, the district court sentenced Gapinski for a third time, again to a term of 120 months. At the outset, Gapinski’s attorney “ask[ed] the Court to reconsider the initial [§] 5K1.1 motion,” which resulted in this exchange: The Court: I’ve already ruled on the presentence substantial assistance, haven’t I? Ms. Lasker: Yes, Your Honor, I believe that you did. But my understanding of-- The Court: And I gave two points to that, didn’t I, rather than four? Ms. Lasker: You did give two points rather than four. The Court: Why should I reconsider? Ms. Lasker: Because my understanding is that that’s one of the things that the Court of Appeals asked you to review. The Court: Okay. I’ve reviewed it, I’ve reconsidered it, and I’m not going to change. R. 218 (3d Sent. Tr. at 3). Later in the hearing, the district court explained its belief that it lacked authority to reconsider the § 5K1.1 motion: In order for the Court to go down below the guidelines on a substantial departure, the Court has to by statute -- and again, the Court of Appeals never mentioned this -- . . . have a motion before it by the government in which the government indicates that the government believes [the assistance] has been substantial and material. The government hasn’t done that since the initial downward departure of two. . . . 4 No. 09-2267 United States v. Gapinski [C]ontrary to what I think I see in this Court of Appeals hint, this Court doesn’t have the ability to go back and say, Well, you know, I think . . . I made a mistake the first time - - and that’s not good. That just isn’t good jurisprudence. This Court had everything before it [at the first sentencing]. Id. at 21–22. The district court also listened to a reading of a letter from Gapinski, who waived his appearance. In the letter, Gapinski explained that his fellow inmates view him as a snitch and he fears being “checked in,” which “means that other inmates want to run [the prisoner] off the compound” and results in the prisoner being sent to the “hole.” Id. at 7. The district court, however, said that making himself available to testify was “just part of [Gapinski’s] plea agreement.” Id. at 22–23. The district court found that a proffer of testimony is less substantial than trial testimony. Next, the district court declined to reduce Gapinski’s sentence based on his diminished capacity due to ADHD and his tendency to self-medicate with marijuana. The district court had previously denied a request for funds for expert evaluation because “this limited remand is not a competency issue.” R. 207 (Order Denying Request for Authorization of Expert Services). At sentencing, the district court found that there was no “clinical analysis” confirming that Gapinski has ADHD and no “nexus” between having ADHD and growing marijuana. R. 218 (3d Sent. Tr. at 19). It therefore declined to vary downward on account of ADHD. Finally, Gapinski raised the issue of codefendent disparities. His codefendant, Michael Jonathan Vinson, had orchestrated the marijuana-growing operation from state prison, while Gapinski organized the activity outside of prison. Vinson was still serving a four-to-twenty-year state sentence when the federal district court sentenced Vinson on this conspiracy to manufacture marijuana. Vinson had 21 criminal history points, while Gapinski had 14. Both numbers fall within 5 No. 09-2267 United States v. Gapinski Criminal History Category VI. Additionally, both defendants were career offenders under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, which mandates the use of Criminal History Category VI. The government filed a § 5K1.1 motion for Gapinski, but not for Vinson. As a result, Gapinski’s adjusted offense level was 29, while Vinson’s was 31. Both defendants received sentences of 120 months, but Gapinski argued that his sentence should be shorter than Vinson’s. The district court disagreed for two reasons. First, the district court found no substantial difference between Vinson and Gapinski based on their “extensive criminal records” and “their behavior in this particular conspiracy.” Id. at 25–26. Second, Vinson’s federal sentence will run consecutively with his unrelated state sentence. “So if we’re talking about who got the greatest sentence on this, . . . Mr. [Vinson] will in all likelihood have served one or two or three or four years longer when he is released on supervised release than” Gapinski will have served. Id. at 24. The district court concluded that the § 3553(a) factors “make[] this sentence reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. at 27. 6 No. 09-2267 United States v. Gapinski