Opinion ID: 2070572
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Matter of Hynes v Tomei

Text: In United States v Jackson (390 US 570 [1968]), the Supreme Court struck the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnaping Act (18 USC § 1201 [a]) [13] because it authorized the death penalty only on the recommendation of a jury, while a defendant convicted of the same offense on a guilty plea or by a Judge escaped the threat of capital punishment ( Hynes, 92 NY2d at 621). In a series of 1971 cases in which death sentences were imposed after trial under a constitutionally defective North Carolina statute, the Supreme Court summarily reversed the death sentences, relying on Jackson. In those cases ( see Atkinson v North Carolina, 403 US 948; Childs v North Carolina, 403 US 948; Hill v North Carolina, 403 US 948; Roseboro v North Carolina, 403 US 948; Sanders v North Carolina, 403 US 948; Williams v North Carolina, 403 US 948), the Supreme Court succinctly stated: Judgment, insofar as it imposes the death sentence, reversed, United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) ( see also Funicello v New Jersey, 403 US 948 [1971] [construing a New Jersey statute]; Thomas v Leeke, 403 US 948 [1971] [construing a South Carolina statute]). In Matter of Hynes v Tomei (92 NY2d 613), this Court held that it was unconstitutional for a defendant charged with first degree murder to plead guilty to capital murder under a statute that permitted a death sentence after a jury trial but did not permit a death sentence on a plea of guilty ( id. at 629 n 7). The Court found that the statute explicitly provides two levels of penalty for the same offense, imposing death only on those who assert innocence and proceed to trial ( id. at 620). The Court struck the plea provisions [14] so that a defendant [could] not plead guilty to first degree murder while a notice of intent to seek the death penalty is pending ( id. at 629). The same issue operates in the present case as defendant was made to choose between entering a plea or going to trial, a scheme that was declared violative of Jackson in Hynes. Assuming a new trial occurred, a relevant question would be whether the defendant could again face the death penalty. While a retrial leading to death would raise constitutional questions, the focus of the arguments before the Court was not on retrial. Several options are available. First, prior to a retrial, this Court could direct further argument limited to that issue. Second, this Court could hold this appeal in abeyance and remand the case for argument on this issue, with any decision of the trial court being immediately appealed to this Court. Third, we could vacate the judgment and direct the District Attorney to state whether, on retrial, he would seek the death penalty. If he does, defendant could bring a CPLR article 78 proceeding. In that way, the parties would know whether the death penalty could be imposed and the retrial conducted under the heightened scrutiny applicable to death cases. Accordingly, I would reverse both the conviction and the sentence. Judgment modified by vacating defendant's sentence and remitting to Supreme Court, Kings County, for resentencing in accordance with the opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed. Appeal from Supreme Court order dated June 10, 1999, dismissed as academic.