Opinion ID: 4567449
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Franklin County Defendants

Text: Griffith also asserts claims against (1) Jailer Rogers under a theory of supervisory liability, and (2) Franklin County under a theory of Monell liability. 12 We have also held in a similar context that a healthcare provider cannot be liable under such a Monell theory without proving an underlying constitutional violation by an employee. See Rouster, 749 F.3d at 453–54. We did not impose such a requirement in Shadrick, but we need not determine which approach is correct because Griffith cannot prevail even under Shadrick given that he has failed to introduce any evidence of training deficiencies by SHP. Nos. 19-5378/5438/5439/5440 Griffith v. Franklin County, Ky., et al. Page 32
Griffith brings a claim against Jailer Rogers under a supervisory liability theory. As discussed, Griffith cannot prevail under this theory without establishing an underlying constitutional violation by a supervised employee. Because Griffith has failed to establish Griffith’s constitutional rights were violated by any deputy jailer or other prison official, the claim against Jailer Rogers fails as well. See, e.g., McQueen, 433 F.3d at 470. We therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Jailer Rogers.
Griffith argues that Franklin County is liable because the County (1) had unofficial detox policy of deliberate indifference to detoxing detainees; and (2) failed to train deputy jailers on EMS policies. “A municipality may not be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory—in other words, ‘solely because it employs a tortfeasor.’” D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 388–89 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). Instead, a plaintiff must show that “through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” Alman v. Reed, 703 F.3d 887, 903 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)). A plaintiff does this by showing that the municipality had a “policy or custom” that caused the violation of her rights. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. And when a plaintiff seeks to hold a municipality liable on the basis of a facially lawful municipal action which led an employee to violate her rights, she “must demonstrate that the municipal action was taken with ‘deliberate indifference’ as to its known or obvious consequences.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 407. There are four methods of proving a municipality’s illegal policy or custom. The plaintiff may prove “(1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005)). Nos. 19-5378/5438/5439/5440 Griffith v. Franklin County, Ky., et al. Page 33 As the Franklin County Defendants point out, Griffith does not articulate any theory of an underlying constitutional violation for which the county could be liable. The County cannot be liable unless Griffith establishes an underlying constitutional violation. See, e.g., Baker v. City of Trenton, 936 F.3d 523, 535 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[W]here there has been no showing of individual constitutional violations . . . there can be no municipal liability.”); Winkler 893 F.3d at 899–902; Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 687 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)). Griffith appears to argue that even if no individual municipal employee violated his constitutional rights, the collective actions of the municipality still rose to the level of a constitutional violation. He relies on Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1985), which held that the municipality could be liable for a policy of failing to adequately monitor an unconscious inmate who had ingested a lethal amount of narcotics. The Tenth Circuit explained that even if no individual employee was deliberately indifferent to his medical condition, “the cumulative effect of what they did pursuant to the practice or policy of the County could be a violation . . . by the County.” Id. at 309–10. This circuit has expressed a willingness to entertain this theory of municipal liability. See Winkler, 893 F.3d at 899–902 (assuming without deciding that municipality may be liable even if no individual employee violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights); Epps v. Lauderdale County, 45 F. App’x 332, 334–35 (6th Cir. 2002) (Cole, J., concurring) (“A given constitutional violation may be attributable to a municipality’s acts alone and not to those of its employees—as when a government actor in good faith follows a faulty municipal policy.”); see also North v. Cuyuahoga County, 754 F. App’x 380, 390–93 (6th Cir. 2018) (assuming Garcia’s theory of municipal liability applies but finding plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation). However, even under that theory, the plaintiff still must establish that he suffered a constitutional violation. See Epps, 45 F. App’x at 334 (Cole, J., concurring); North, 754 F. App’x at 391 (“[B]ecause North has not demonstrated that any individual jail employee violated his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care by acting with deliberate indifference, he must show that the municipality itself, through its acts, policies, or customs, violated his Eighth Amendment rights by manifesting deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.”). Nos. 19-5378/5438/5439/5440 Griffith v. Franklin County, Ky., et al. Page 34 As explained, Griffith has failed to do so here, so we need not decide whether such a theory of municipal liability may be viable.
Griffith contends that the deputy jailers should have reported Griffith’s vomiting to the SHP nurses in addition to monitoring his condition every twenty minutes. He asserts that the deputy jailers’ practice in attending to detoxing detainees—in particular, monitoring only for “living, breathing flesh”—was “in complete derogation of the language of and duties imposed by the Jail’s written EMS policy.” But, as we have already explained, the violation of an internal policy does not establish a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Winkler, 893 F.3d at 891–92; Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347–48 (6th Cir. 1992). Moreover, although the deputy jailer’s testimony that they were monitoring for “living, breathing flesh” is troubling, the deputy jailers actually monitored Griffith’s condition every twenty minutes throughout his forty-eight hours in detox and took detailed notes of his condition each time—including whether he had eaten and how much, whether he was experiencing physical symptoms such as vomiting, and whether he had spoken to the deputy jailer. The deputy jailers testified that they would alert medical staff if a detainee was vomiting excessively or if their condition was deteriorating. Furthermore, Griffith was seen by the medical staff at least two times a day during his stay in detox, and the deputy jailers were entitled to rely on the assessments made by medical professionals. See, e.g., Winkler, 893 F.3d at 901 (“[I]t is not unconstitutional for municipalities and their employees to rely on medical judgments made by private medical professionals responsible for prisoner care[.]” (cleaned up)); Spears v. Ruth, 589 F.3d 249, 255 (6th Cir. 2009) (explaining that officer was entitled to rely on assessments of medical professionals). Griffith does not contest that the deputy jailers promptly alerted the medical staff every time he submitted a sick call slip. To be sure, there does appear to have been a miscommunication with regard to Griffith’s status—medical staff indicated that he did not seem to be at risk for drug withdrawal while the deputy jailers and prison staff seemed to believe he was being held in a segregated cell because he was detoxing. But there is no evidence that this Nos. 19-5378/5438/5439/5440 Griffith v. Franklin County, Ky., et al. Page 35 was anything other than a single miscommunication in an otherwise functioning system. See North, 754 F. App’x at 392 (“While imperfect, the apparent problems . . . seem to consist of ‘one or two missteps’ rather than the kind of widespread, gross deficiencies that would support a finding of deliberate indifference.” (quoting Daniel v. Cook County, 833 F.3d 728, 734–35 (7th Cir. 2016)). Griffith also could not prevail on a theory that the constitutional violation arose out of the deputy jailers’ inaction. For such a claim, he would need to prove (1) “a clear and persistent” pattern of unconstitutional conduct by [County] employees; (2) the municipality’s “notice or constructive notice” of the unconstitutional conduct; (3) the municipality’s “tacit approval of the unconstitutional conduct, such that [its] deliberate indifference in [its] failure to act can be said to amount to an official policy of inaction”; and (4) that the policy of inaction was the “moving force” of the constitutional deprivation . . . . Winkler, 893 F.3d at 902 (second and third alterations in original) (citing D’Ambrosio, 747 F.3d at 387–88). Griffith “discusses only [his own] treatment, and therefore cannot establish that the County had a custom of deliberate indifference to the serious healthcare needs of all the inmates [detained at FCRJ].” Id.; see also Thomas, 398 F.3d at 433 (“[A plaintiff] cannot rely solely on a single instance to infer a policy of deliberate indifference.”).
Griffith also argues that the County is liable on a failure-to-train theory. Specifically, he argues that the deputy jailers were not trained on EMS policy or on how to handle detainees suffering withdrawal. “In order to show that a municipality is liable for a failure to train its employees, a plaintiff must establish that: 1) the City’s training program was inadequate for the tasks that officers must perform; 2) the inadequacy was the result of the City’s deliberate indifference; and 3) the inadequacy was closely related to or actually caused the injury.” Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 834 (6th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up) (quoting Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 469 (6th Cir. 2006)). Nos. 19-5378/5438/5439/5440 Griffith v. Franklin County, Ky., et al. Page 36 Griffith contends that the training program was inadequate because deputy jailers did not receive training on EMS policy. However, this claim is belied by the record. As the Franklin County Defendants point out, Jailer Rodgers and the deputy jailers all testified that they did receive training on EMS policy, including on drug addiction, including an eighty-hour training upon hiring and an additional annual training period of either sixteen or twenty-four hours. To be sure, many of the deputy jailers were unclear about their obligations under the EMS policy, and many acknowledged that they were not sure what to do in the event of a severely detoxing inmate.13 But, “[e]ven assuming that [Griffith] could show that the County’s training of its jail personnel was inadequate, []he presented no proof to show that this inadequacy resulted from deliberate indifference.” Winkler, 893 F.3d at 902. To establish that the inadequate training resulted from deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must establish (1) “prior instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the County . . . was clearly on notice that the training in this particular area was deficient and likely to cause injury,” Plinton v. County of Summit, 540 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Fisher v. Harden, 398 F.3d 837, 849 (6th Cir. 2005)), or (2) “a single violation of federal rights, accompanied by a showing that a municipality has failed to train its employees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a violation,” id. (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 409). Griffith does not claim a widespread pattern of similar conduct and instead argues that the County’s deliberate indifference to its failure to train can be established under a singleviolation theory. The Supreme Court explained in City of Canton v. Harris that, in some circumstances, “it may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be 13 For example, Deputy Jailer Fultz testified that he did not know whether the EMS policy identifies drug and alcohol withdrawal as a medical emergency, and that he did not know what the policy said he should do if he observed someone going through drug or alcohol withdrawal. R. 76-8 at PageID 2702. And Deputy Jailer Carender testified that she was not aware of the signs and symptoms of somebody going through detox that indicate that the person’s condition may be life-threatening. R. 76-9 at PageID 2718. Deputy Jailer Culbertson testified that he did not receive any instruction about at what point he needs to report to medical personnel regarding the extent of someone’s vomiting, and he stated that “I just use my judgment. If they’re not lying in a puddle of vomit on the floor and they’re not able to get up and move around, then yes, I would notify somebody.” R. 76-11 at PageID 2794. Nos. 19-5378/5438/5439/5440 Griffith v. Franklin County, Ky., et al. Page 37 said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). Griffith therefore argues that this is such a case because FCRJ is in a county with a serious drug problem, yet the jailers were unaware of what they were required to do in the event of a severely detoxing detainee. We find this argument unpersuasive because Griffith failed to demonstrate that Franklin County failed to train its employees “to handle a recurring situation presenting an obvious potential for [the constitutional violation at issue].” Plinton, 540 F.3d at 464. As indicated, the evidence demonstrates that the County does provide training on EMS policy, and Griffith has introduced no evidence of any additional training that would been necessary beyond the initial eighty-hour training and subsequent annual training on EMS policy. See Winkler, 893 F.3d at 903 (“But [the plaintiff] does not identify what other medical training she believes that the jail personnel should have received. Nor does she explain how the quality of the medical training provided put the County on notice of the likelihood that jail personnel would respond inadequately to an inmate’s medical emergency.”). Moreover, although Griffith contends that his injury was the result of a “recurring situation”—withdrawal from drugs—there is no evidence that he was vomiting from drug withdrawal or that his vomiting led to his seizure. Griffith also cannot demonstrate that any training inadequacy “was closely related to or actually caused [his] injury.” Jackson, 925 F.3d at 834. At its core, his claim is that jailers should have been better trained as to when they needed to alert medical professionals about a particular inmate’s deteriorating condition. However, Griffith saw medical staff multiple times per day during his time in detox, and the Deputy Jailers testified that this is the standard practice during detox. Because nothing in the record suggests that the deputy jailers would have done anything other than report to Nurses Trivette and Sherrow, both of whom evaluated Griffith multiple times during his detox period, he cannot demonstrate causation. For these reasons, we find Griffith’s reliance on Stefan v. Olson unconvincing. See No. 1:10 CV 671, 2011 WL 2621251 (N.D. Ohio July 5, 2011), aff’d, 497 F. App’x 568 (6th Cir. 2012). In that case, the detainee informed jail staff that he would experience severe alcohol withdrawal and would suffer seizures when withdrawal symptoms began. See id. at –6. His condition soon deteriorated, but jail staff failed to adequately monitor his condition and did not Nos. 19-5378/5438/5439/5440 Griffith v. Franklin County, Ky., et al. Page 38 inform medical staff when he began experiencing withdrawal symptoms. See id. The district court found that the County was liable for failure to train because the evidence demonstrated that the jail staff “spent no money on training its corrections officers” on drug and alcohol withdrawal, even though it had been identified as an area in which there was a “gap in care.” See id. at  (alteration in original); see also Rice v. Montgomery County, No. 5:14-181-KCC, 2016 WL 2596035 (E.D. Ky. May 5, 2016) (finding County liable for failure to train when jail employees received no training on drug withdrawal). Moreover, the on-duty nurse in Stefan testified that she would have entered the inmate’s cell to begin administering withdrawal protocol if she had known he had vomited. See 2011 WL 2621251 at . In contrast, Nurses Sherrow and Trivette were aware that Griffith was vomiting, and there is no evidence that hearing the duplicative information from deputy jailers would have led them to come to a different conclusion. Indeed, Sherrow testified that she would have made the same treatment decisions even if the deputy jailers had reported Griffith’s vomiting. We therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Franklin County.