Opinion ID: 158202
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Strength of Plaintiff's Mark

Text: 39 The stronger a trademark, the more likely that encroachment upon it will lead to sponsorship confusion. See First Sav. Bank, 101 F.3d at 653. A strong trademark is one that is rarely used by parties other than the owner of the trademark, while a weak trademark is one that is often used by other parties. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To assess the relative strength of a mark, one must consider the two aspects of strength: (1) Conceptual Strength: the placement of the mark on the [distinctiveness or fanciful-suggestive-descriptive] spectrum; and (2) Commercial Strength: the marketplace recognition value of the mark. McCarthy, supra, 11:83. 40 Under the conceptual strength prong, the categories, in descending order of strength, are: fanciful; arbitrary; suggestive; descriptive; and generic. See id. 11:1; see also Heartsprings, 143 F.3d at 555. 'Fanciful' marks consist of 'coined' words that have been invented or selected for the sole purpose of functioning as a trademark. McCarthy, supra, 11:5. Arbitrary marks comprise those words, symbols, pictures, etc., that are in common linguistic use but which, when used with the goods or services in issue, neither suggest nor describe any ingredient, quality or characteristic of those goods or services. Id. 11:11. Suggestive marks are those that suggest some quality or ingredient of the goods. See id. 11.62. Often the line between arbitrary and suggestive is difficult to distinguish, see id. 11:12, but for our purposes, no reason exists to make the distinction. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, its stylized mark is at least suggestive on the conceptual strength spectrum. Moreover, again drawing all inferences in favor of plaintiff, we assume that the mark has great commercial strength in the hunting apparel market. Therefore, plaintiff's mark is quite strong. 41 The strength of plaintiff's mark cannot outweigh the other factors, however. Given the great dissimilarity between its mark as a whole and the ways in which defendants have used the phrase, king of the mountain, as well as our above analysis of the other factors, we find that no reasonable juror could find likelihood of confusion between plaintiff's and defendants' marks. Accordingly, we hold that there exists no genuine issue of material fact as to the likelihood of confusion.