Opinion ID: 403539
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Psychiatric Evaluation

Text: 37 The Army's concern about petitioner's mental stability was based on petitioner's psychiatric examination and evaluation in Frankfurt, West Germany. That evaluation, a four-page handwritten letter, concludes that petitioner has an obsessive-compulsive neurosis. App. 30-33. The evaluation provides no explanation of the term obsessive-compulsive neurosis, and the vague, tentative and conclusory statements that comprise the rest of the evaluation provide no guidance as to the practical significance of that diagnosis. The evaluation states, for example, that Hoska was tense and guarded, though he attempted to be open, friendly, and cooperative. App. 31. Similarly, the psychiatrist states in the evaluation that he had the sensation that somehow (Hoska) did not quite understand the reality of our interview together so that his behavior seemed the slightest bit inappropriate. My surmise is that this is a constant characteristic of his interpersonal relations. Id. The report concludes that 38 Mr. Hoska appears to be a person whose personality is grossly intact and appears to be, on the surface, convential (sic), but who is somewhat out of touch with powerful motivating feelings within himself and not quite in tune to the feelings and thoughts of others in his environment. This situation would make it almost inevitable that he would frequently become involved in misunderstanding (sic) with others and seem to do inappropriate things. 39 Id. at 32. No psychiatrist or psychologist testified at the hearing to explain the significance of the evaluation. Nor did the Army offer any evidence to indicate that the psychiatrist's hearsay evaluation was credible or reliable. It offered no evidence of the psychiatrist's qualifications or of the nature of the examination he conducted. Indeed, Lt. Colonel Koslosky testified that he knew nothing about the qualifications of the psychiatrist or the conditions under which the examination took place. Tr. 15-16. 40 Moreover, petitioner's testimony about the circumstances surrounding the psychiatric examination-the only such testimony-cast serious doubt upon the resulting evaluation. Petitioner explained that he was ordered, with little explanation, to go to Frankfurt for a psychiatric examination because questions about his stability had been raised. He was told that a brain scan and some other tests might be involved. He testified that he was perplexed as to why he was required to take an eleven-hour train ride to Frankfurt when he was stationed in Berlin. Petitioner explained that, under the circumstances, he was concerned that he might have been set up, that the examination might have been a put-up job. Indeed, upon arrival for the examination, the doctor told him that he had no knowledge of petitioner's case and that petitioner's appointment had been made under a fictitious name. Tr. 89-90. Certainly the circumstances described by petitioner at least suggest a rational explanation of why he might have appeared tense and guarded or why the psychiatrist had the sensation that somehow (Hoska) did not quite understand the reality of (the) interview .... 41 The Army acknowledged that the psychiatric evaluation alone could not justify the revocation of petitioner's security clearance. Tr. 99, 125. It is clear from the record, however, that, even in conjunction with other evidence, the psychiatric evaluation could not provide that additional amount of evidence that would justify a conclusion that there was substantial evidence in the record supporting the Army's decision. As noted above, the Army offered no evidence to bolster the ambiguous and entirely unsubstantiated hearsay conclusions in the evaluation, nor did it offer evidence to explain how the evaluation demonstrated a significant defect in the judgment or reliability of petitioner. AR 604-5, P 3-1a (20). Moreover, although in some circumstances evidence of psychological problems surely might provide a rational nexus to an individual's ability to safeguard classified information, the psychiatric evaluation in this case clearly did not. The Army simply did not demonstrate how, as a practical matter, the evaluation indicated that petitioner was unable to protect the classified information to which he was entrusted. Finally, the testimony of Lt. Colonel Koslosky indicated that the Army failed to comply with its Regulation, which states that security clearance determinations must be based upon all available information, both favorable and unfavorable. Id. P 3-1a. Koslosky testified that, in deciding whether to revoke petitioner's clearance, no consideration was given to petitioner's medical records and career appraisals, all of which apparently concluded that he was mentally fit and stable. See Tr. 17-25. 42