Opinion ID: 2223503
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court's Failure to Retain Jurisdiction.

Text: Because he was worried about Betsy's threats to remove the children from Iowa, Marvin asked the trial court to retain jurisdiction indefinitely in order that custody of the children could more readily be shifted to him if she moved. He now appeals the trial court's refusal of that request, arguing that the children need the stability of their present Des Moines neighborhood and school district. We agree that stability is very important in the lives of young children, but stability can be nurtured as much by leaving them with the same custodial parent as by requiring that they live in the same neighborhood. The heavy burden upon a party seeking to modify custody stems from the principle that once custody of the children has been fixed it should be disturbed only for the most cogent reasons. In Re Marraige of Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 160 (Iowa 1983); In Re Marriage of Mikelson, 299 N.W.2d 670, 671 (Iowa 1980). We have repeatedly stressed that the question of child custody should be settled once and thereafter little disturbed. In Re Marriage of Melton, 256 N.W.2d 200, 205 (Iowa 1977). Our cases generally hold that removal of children from the state, in our highly mobile society and for good economic reasons, provides no justification in itself for a custodial change. In Re Marriage of Day, 314 N.W.2d 416, 420 (Iowa 1982); In Re Marriage of Lower, 269 N.W.2d 822, 826-27 (Iowa 1978). For Marvin, the only adverse effect of the trial court's refusal to retain jurisdiction is that if he hereafter seeks modification of the custodial provisions of the decree he will have the usual burden of proof to show (1) substantial change of circumstances and (2) conditions making it essential and in the children's best interest that custody be changed. In Re Marriage of Frederici, 338 N.W.2d at 158; In Re Marriage of Hobson, 248 N.W.2d 137, 139-40 (Iowa 1976). This case is not so exceptional as to warrant a departure from our general rule, frequently applied, that trial courts should make final disposition of dissolution cases on the circumstances then existing. See, e.g., In Re Marriage of Schlenker, 300 N.W.2d 164, 165-66 (Iowa 1981); In Re Fenchel, 268 N.W.2d 207, 209 (Iowa 1978). The trial court did not err in refusing to retain jurisdiction of the parties.