Opinion ID: 1643910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Give a Special Instruction on Heat of Passion

Text: Wheeler contends the trial court committed reversible error in denying a special instruction on heat of passion. We disagree and affirm the trial court's denial of the special instruction. The instruction sought by the defense stated: It is a defense to 1st degree murder, if you find the killing of Wayne Koester was done by Jason Wheeler in the heat of passion. The killing of a person in the heat of passion is a legal concept which recognizes the temporary suspension and overthrow of the reason or judgment of the defendant by the sudden access of passion. In such case the heat of passion negates the requirement of 1st degree murder that the act be done with premeditation. Passion is the state of mind when it is powerfully acted upon and influenced by something external to itself. It is one of the emotions of the mind known as anger, rage, sudden resentment, or terror. The emotion must be present in the mind of the defendant as a result of such adequate and immediate provocation as might obscure the reason or dominate the volition of an ordinary reasonable person. If you find that Jason Wheeler's acts caused the death of Wayne Koester and that he acted in the heat of passion, you should find the defendant guilty of manslaughter. At the charge conference, defense counsel argued that the instruction should be given based on inferences from the State's evidence that Wheeler was acting oddly, rushing in on the deputies, and later had a noose around his neck, which counsel said indicated that Wheeler was acting in the heat of passion. Defense counsel stated that he was not suggesting that just finding people on the property justifies a heat of passion instruction, but that the jury could infer that [Wheeler] at least saw no reason for the officers to be there, no reason to be complained of by his wife, et cetera. This is a provocation. Wheeler supports the heat of passion instruction on appeal by citing the fact that he acted strangely and irrationally in carrying out the crime, was under stress, and was angry about Heckerman's sabotage of his repairs to the doublewide. The trial court denied the special instruction on the basis that there was no evidence justifying it. The judge stated: Passion is a state of mind which when it is powerfully acted upon and influenced by something external, the emotion must be present in the mind of the defendant as a result of adequatesuch adequate and immediate provocation as might obscure the reason or dominate the volition of an ordinarily reasonable person. I find no evidence to support that. The judge did give the standard jury instruction on excusable homicide, which includes a reference to heat of passion in its definition, and the standard jury instruction on premeditation. Florida law is clear that a defendant is entitled to have a jury instruction on any valid defense supported by the evidence, but a trial judge is not required to give an instruction where there is no nexus between the evidence in the record and the requested instruction. Mora v. State, 814 So.2d 322, 330 (Fla. 2002). Moreover, [i]n order to be entitled to a special jury instruction, [the defendant] must prove: (1) the special instruction was supported by the evidence; (2) the standard instruction did not adequately cover the theory of defense; and (3) the special instruction was a correct statement of the law and not misleading or confusing. Stephens v. State, 787 So.2d 747, 756 (Fla.2001) (footnotes omitted). In this case, no evidence was presented by the defense or the State to support the special heat of passion instruction. Indeed, the only provocation for the shooting that was cited by defense counsel to the trial court was the fact that Heckerman had called 911 and that deputies were on the property. The trial judge essentially found, and we agree, that the presence of deputies on the property was not evidence of adequate and immediate provocation as might obscure the reason or dominate the volition of an ordinary reasonable person, as specified in the special requested instruction. Accordingly, we conclude that there was no error in failing to give the special instruction and further find that the standard instructions given by the court adequately advised the jury on the issue of premeditation.