Opinion ID: 488026
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: class members' objections to the settlement

Text: 85 We now address the various objections to the maintenance and settlement of the class action made by some class members. 1) Subject Matter Jurisdiction 86 The third amended complaint alleged that its class action claims were governed, inter alia, by federal common law and that the district court therefore had federal question jurisdiction. Judge Pratt agreed. In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 506 F.Supp. 737, 749 (E.D.N.Y.1979). We reversed, In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128, 102 S.Ct. 980, 71 L.Ed.2d 116 (1981), and the class action was thereafter maintained solely on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Appellants, members of the plaintiff class, now contend that a diversity class action cannot be brought in federal court absent complete diversity of citizenship between all class members and all defendants. It goes without saying that such complete diversity is lacking in this case. 87 Although we understand the need to preserve issues for further review, we confess a certain surprise at the vigor with which this argument was pressed in this court and the amount of time that was devoted to it at oral argument. It is hornbook law, based on 66 years of Supreme Court precedent, that complete diversity is required only between the named plaintiffs and the named defendants in a federal class action. 13B C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 3606, at 424 (2d ed. 1986) ([t]he courts look only to the citizenship of the representative parties in a class action). As the Supreme Court noted in Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 89 S.Ct. 1053, 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969): 88 Under current doctrine, if one member of a class is of diverse citizenship from the class' opponent, and no nondiverse members are named parties, the suit may be brought in federal court even though all other members of the class are citizens of the same State as the defendant and have nothing to fear from trying the lawsuit in the courts of their own State. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 [41 S.Ct. 338, 65 L.Ed. 673] (1921). 89 394 U.S. at 340, 89 S.Ct. at 1059. See also United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1129 (2d Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 921, 95 S.Ct. 1587, 43 L.Ed.2d 789 (1975). Thus, if appellants' theory of class action jurisdiction is to become law, this must be done by the Supreme Court. 90 Appellants also argue that even if Snyder v. Harris is good law, three of the named plaintiffs were co-citizens of three of the defendants. They contend that: (1) named plaintiff Michael F. Ryan and defendant Hooker Chemical were citizens of New York; (2) named plaintiff Brian T. Quinn and defendant Riverdale Chemical were citizens of Illinois; and (3) named plaintiff Dan G. Jordan and defendant Diamond Shamrock were citizens of Texas. 91 Both Hooker Chemical and Riverdale Chemical effectively ceased to be parties to the case before the filing of the final amended class complaint against the Agent Orange manufacturers. Hooker was granted summary judgment in February 1982, on the ground that it did not manufacture Agent Orange. In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 534 F.Supp. 1046, 1052 (E.D.N.Y.1982). Riverdale's unopposed motion for summary judgment was granted in May 1983. See In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 565 F.Supp. 1263, 1272 (E.D.N.Y.1983). 92 Appellants argue that because no Rule 54(b) 3 certification of dismissal was issued as to either Hooker or Riverdale, both defendants remain in the case for purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction. We believe that their view misconstrues Rule 54(b). The Supreme Court has noted that the obvious purpose of Rule 54(b) is to provide an opportunity for litigants to obtain from the District Court a clear statement of what that court is intending with reference to finality, and if such a direction is denied, the litigant can at least protect himself accordingly. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 512, 70 S.Ct. 322, 324, 94 L.Ed. 299 (1950). Because the purpose of the rule is thus only to clarify the appealability of an order, a dismissed defendant who fails to obtain a Rule 54(b) certification does not remain a party to the case for purposes of determining diversity. 93 Appellants' allegation regarding the citizenship of Diamond Shamrock is equally meritless. At the time the action was initiated against Diamond Shamrock, its principal place of business was in Ohio. The fact that it has since moved to Texas, the domicile of named plaintiff Dan Jordan, is irrelevant for diversity purposes. See Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93 n. 1, 77 S.Ct. 1112, 1113 n. 1, 1 L.Ed.2d 1205 (1957) (jurisdiction, once attached, is not impaired by a party's later change of domicile). Thus, all of appellants' claims that diversity of citizenship is lacking are without merit. 94 Finally, appellants contend that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the class action because not all members of the class met the $10,000 jurisdictional requirement. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301, 94 S.Ct. 505, 512, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973) ([e]ach plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be dismissed from the case). However, unless the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89, 58 S.Ct. 586, 590, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938) (footnotes omitted). Appellants do not argue that any class members made bad faith damage claims. Nor do they offer us any basis for determining whether such claims clearly are for less than the jurisdictional amount. Instead, they claim the district court failed to carry out an obligation to police the damage claims. No such affirmative obligation exists, however, absent some apparent reason to make inquiry. Plaintiffs made what must be assumed to have been good faith allegations that each of them was entitled to at least $10,000 in damages. Defendants did not challenge the bona fides of these claims, and the district court thus had no reason to inquire further. 2) In Personam Jurisdiction 95 Appellants contend that the district court was barred by the due process clause of the fifth amendment from exercising personal jurisdiction over class members who lack sufficient contacts with New York as defined in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and its progeny. However, appellants concede, as they must, that Congress may, consistent with the due process clause, enact legislation authorizing the federal courts to exercise nationwide personal jurisdiction. See Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442, 66 S.Ct. 242, 245, 90 L.Ed. 185 (1946) (Congress could provide for service of process anywhere in the United States). One such piece of legislation is 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1407 (1982), the multidistrict litigation statute. In the instant case, the district court was acting pursuant to a valid transfer order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation that was created by that statute. As the Panel has recognized, 96 Transfers under Section 1407 are simply not encumbered by considerations of in personam jurisdiction and venue.... Following a transfer, the transferee judge has all the jurisdiction and powers over pretrial proceedings in the actions transferred to him that the transferor judge would have had in the absence of transfer. 97 In re FMC Corp. Patent Litigation, 422 F.Supp. 1163, 1165 (J.P.M.D.L.1976) (citations omitted). See also In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litigation, 399 F.Supp. 1397, 1400 (J.P.M.D.L.1975) (rejecting due process challenge similar to that raised by appellants in the instant case). Appellants' argument therefore fails. 3) Class Certification 98 Appellants argue that the district court erred in certifying the Rule 23(b)(3) class action. They make the same arguments made by the defendants in petitioning for a writ of mandamus seeking decertification of the class action. See In re Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067, 104 S.Ct. 1417, 79 L.Ed.2d 743 (1984). In denying the mandamus petition, we expressed doubt as to the existence of any issue of fact, let alone a common issue, regarding general causation. See 725 F.2d at 860. We also stated, however, that it seems likely that some common issues, which stem from the unique fact that the alleged damage was caused by a product sold by private manufacturers under contract to the government for use in a war, can be disposed of in a single trial. The resolution of some of these issues in defendants' favor may end the litigation entirely. Id. at 860-61. Therefore, we denied the petition. We stressed, however, that our scope of review in the mandamus proceeding was limited to the redress of a calculated disregard of governing rules, id. at 860, not the correction of ordinary error, and that the propriety of a class certification might be fully reviewed on a later appeal. Id. at 862. This is that appeal. Rule 23(a) states: 99 One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 100 Existence of the first prerequisite in this case is undisputed. Whether there are problems regarding typicality and adequacy of representation depends upon the nature of the questions of law or fact common to the class. Our view of the existence of the third and fourth prerequisites is thus influenced by our view of the second. 101 We must also look to the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) that: 102 the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 103 The comment to Rule 23(b)(3) explicitly cautions against use of the class action device in mass tort cases. See Advisory Committee Note to 1966 Revision of Rule 23(b)(3) (A 'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways.). Moreover, most courts have denied certification in those circumstances. See, e.g., In re Northern Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Products Liability Litigation, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171, 103 S.Ct. 817, 74 L.Ed.2d 1015 (1983); Payton v. Abbott Labs., 100 F.R.D. 336 (D.Mass.1983); Yandle v. PPG Industries, Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D.Tex.1974); Boring v. Medusa Portland Cement Co., 63 F.R.D. 78, 83-85 (M.D.Pa.), appeal dismissed, 505 F.2d 729 (3d Cir.1974). 104 The present litigation justifies the prevalent skepticism over the usefulness of class actions in so-called mass tort cases and, in particular, claims for injuries resulting from toxic exposure. First, the benefits of a class action have been greatly exaggerated by its proponents in the present matter. For example, much ink has been spilled in this case over the distinction between generic causation--whether Agent Orange is harmful at all, regardless of the degree or nature of exposure, and what ailments it may cause--and individual causation--whether a particular veteran suffers from a particular ailment as a result of exposure to Agent Orange. It has been claimed that the former is an issue that might appropriately be tried in a class action, notwithstanding that individual causation must be tried separately for each plaintiff if the plaintiff class prevails. 105 We do not agree. The generic causation issue has three possible outcomes: 1) exposure to Agent Orange always causes harm; 2) exposure to Agent Orange never causes harm; and 3) exposure to Agent Orange may or may not cause harm depending on the kind of exposure and perhaps on other factors. It is indisputable that exposure to Agent Orange does not automatically cause harm. The so-called Ranch Hand Study of Air Force personnel who handled and sprayed the herbicide proved that much beyond a shadow of a doubt in finding no statistically significant differences between their subsequent health histories and those of similar personnel who had not been in contact with Agent Orange. Further, defendants have conceded that some kinds of exposure to Agent Orange may cause harm. They stated at both the argument of the mandamus petition and the argument of the appeal that Agent Orange, like anything else, including water and peanuts, may be harmful. The epidemiological studies on which defendants rely so heavily prove no more than that Vietnam veterans do not exhibit statistically significant differences in various symptoms when compared with other groups. They in no way exclude the possibility of injury, and tend at best to prove only that, if Agent Orange did cause harm, it was in isolated instances or in cases of unusual exposure. 106 The relevant question, therefore, is not whether Agent Orange has the capacity to cause harm, the generic causation issue, but whether it did cause harm and to whom. That determination is highly individualistic, and depends upon the characteristics of individual plaintiffs (e.g. state of health, lifestyle) and the nature of their exposure to Agent Orange. Although generic causation and individual circumstances concerning each plaintiff and his or her exposure to Agent Orange thus appear to be inextricably intertwined, the class action would have allowed generic causation to be determined without regard to those characteristics and the individual's exposure. 107 The second reason for our skepticism is that, with the exception of the military contractor defense, there may be few, if any, common questions of law. Although state law governs the claims of the individual veterans, see In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 635 F.2d at 993-95 (rejecting cause of action under federal common law), Chief Judge Weinstein decided that there were common questions of law because he predicted that each court faced with an Agent Orange case would resort to a national consensus of product liability law. Chief Judge Weinstein's analysis of the choice of law issues in this action, see In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 580 F.Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y.1984), with which we assume familiarity, is bold and imaginative. However, in light of our prior holding that federal common law does not govern plaintiffs' claims, every jurisdiction would be free to render its own choice of law decision, and common experience suggests that the intellectual power of Chief Judge Weinstein's analysis alone would not be enough to prevent widespread disagreement. 108 Third, the dynamics of a class action in a case such as this may either impair the ability of representative parties to protect the interests of the class or cause the inefficient use of judicial resources. These undesirable results stem from the fact that potential plaintiffs in toxic tort cases do not share common interests because of differences in the strength of their claims. Before the class is certified, it is usually some of the plaintiffs who seek certification and defendants who resist. This is so because many of the plaintiffs' counsel will perceive in a class action efficiencies in discovery, legal and scientific research, and the funding of expenses. When counsel can reasonably expect to become counsel for the class and to share in a substantial award of fees, the incentive to seek certification is greatly enhanced. Defendants will resist certification, hoping to defeat the plaintiffs individually through application of their greater resources. 109 All plaintiffs may not desire class certification, however, because those with strong cases may well be better off going it alone. The drum-beating that accompanies a well-publicized class action claiming harm from toxic exposure and the speculative nature of the exposure issue may well attract excessive numbers of plaintiffs with weak to fanciful cases. For example, notwithstanding the grave doubt surrounding the factual basis of the plaintiffs' case, some 240,000 veterans and family members alleging hundreds of different ailments, including many that are both minor and commonplace, have filed claims for payment out of the settlement fund. 110 If plaintiffs with strong claims remain members of the class, they may see their claims diluted because a settlement attractive to the defendants will in all likelihood occur. Weak plaintiffs, who may exist in very large numbers, stand to gain from even a small settlement. Moreover, once a significant amount of money is on the table, the class attorneys will have an incentive to settle. They may well anticipate that the percentage of this money likely to be awarded as counsel fees will decline after a certain point. If they go to trial, on the other hand, they run the risk of losing the case and receiving no compensation for what may have been an enormous amount of work. There is thus great pressure to settle. Indeed, a settlement in a case such as the instant litigation, dramatically arrived at just before dawn on the day of trial after sleepless hours of bargaining, seems almost as inevitable as the sunrise. Such a settlement, however, is not likely to lead to a fund that can be distributed among the large number of class members who will assert claims and still compensate the strong plaintiffs for the value of their cases. 111 Moreover, the ability of the district court to scrutinize the fairness of the settlement is greatly impaired where the legal and factual issues to be determined in the class action are as numerous and complex as they were under the district court's order in the instant case. Similarly, the fashioning of a distribution plan that is both fair to the strong plaintiffs and efficient in adjudicating the large number of claims may be impossible. Only the weakness of the evidence of causation as to all plaintiffs and the strength of the military contractor defense enabled the district court to evaluate the settlement accurately and to fashion an appropriate distribution scheme in the instant matter. We regard those factors as largely coincidental and not to be expected in all toxic exposure cases. 112 If the strong plaintiffs opt out, however, the efficiencies of a class action may be negative. The class would then consist largely of plaintiffs with weak cases, many or most of which should never have been brought. The defendants would be unlikely to settle with the class because such a settlement with the class would not affect their continuing exposure to large damage awards in the individual cases brought by strong plaintiffs. Both the class action and the strong cases would then have to be tried. 113 Were this an action by civilians based on exposure to dioxin in the course of civilian affairs, we believe certification of a class action would have been error. However, we return to the cardinal fact we noted in denying the petition for writ of mandamus, namely that the alleged damage was caused by a product sold by private manufacturers under contract to the government for use in a war. In re Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 725 F.2d at 860. In that regard, Chief Judge Weinstein noted that: 114 Unlike litigations such as those involving DES, Dalkon Shield and asbestos, the trial is likely to emphasize critical common defenses applicable to the plaintiffs' class as a whole. They will include such matters as ... that if any injuries were caused by defendants' product it was because of the particular use and misuse made by the government; and that the government, not the manufacturers were wholly responsible because the former knew of all possible dangers and assumed full responsibility for any damage.... It is anticipated that a very substantial portion of a prospective four-month trial will be devoted to just those defenses. Certification would be justified if only to prevent relitigating those defenses over and over again in individual cases. 115 Class Certification Opinion, 100 F.R.D. at 723. 116 In our view, class certification was justified under Rule 23(b)(3) due to the centrality of the military contractor defense. First, this defense is common to all of the plaintiffs' cases, and thus satisfies the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). See Port Authority Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey, 698 F.2d 150, 154 (2d Cir.1983) (Since plaintiff has satisfied the requirement of a common question of law or fact, Rule 23(a)(2), the denial of class certification must be reversed.) (emphasis added). Second, because the military contractor defense is of central importance in the instant matter for reasons explained in our subsequent discussion of the fairness of the settlement and in our separate opinion affirming the grant of summary judgment against the opt-outs, this issue is governed by federal law, and a class trial in a federal court is a method of adjudication superior to the alternatives. Fed R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3). If the defense succeeds, the entire litigation is disposed of. If it fails, it will not be an issue in the subsequent individual trials. In that event, moreover, the ground for its rejection, such as a failure to warn the government of a known hazard, might well be dispositive of relevant factual issues in those trials. 117 Appellants argue that the diverse interests of the class make adequate representation virtually impossible. We disagree. If defendants had successfully interposed the military contractor defense, they would have precluded recovery by all plaintiffs, irrespective of the strengths, weaknesses, or idiosyncrasies of their claims. Similarly, the typicality issue disappears because of the virtual identity of all of the plaintiffs' cases with respect to the military contractor defense. 118 It is true that some of the dynamics that generate pressure for an undesirable settlement will continue to operate in a class action limited to the military contractor defense. We believe, however, that a district court's ability to scrutinize the fairness of a class settlement is greatly enhanced by narrowing the legal and factual issues to this defense. We are confident, moreover, that such scrutiny will be informed by the court's awareness of the danger of such a settlement occurring. It is also true that the difficulty in fashioning a distribution scheme that does not overcompensate weak claimants and undercompensate strong ones is not alleviated by limiting the class certification to the military contractor defense. However, on balance we believe use of the class action was appropriate, although many potential difficulties were avoided only because all plaintiffs had very weak cases on causation and the military contractor defense was so strong. 119 We thus conclude that certification of the Rule 23(b)(3) class action was proper. Because our disposition of the appeals from the approval of the settlement and from the grant of summary judgment against the opt-outs excludes any possibility of an award of punitive damages, we need not address the propriety of the certification of a mandatory class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). 120 4) Adequacy of the Notice of the Class Action 121 In addressing the defendants' petition for a writ of mandamus, we noted only that Chief Judge Weinstein's conclusion that the notice ordered was the best practicable under the circumstances was if not inexorable, ... arguably correct, at least before the full results [of the notice plan] are known. In re Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 725 F.2d at 862. Full review is now necessary. 122 Appellants argue that both the notice required by the district court, see Class Certification Opinion, 100 F.R.D. at 729-34, and the notice actually given were insufficient to inform the class members of their rights, most importantly their right to opt out. They contend therefore that the notice failed to meet the requirements of due process and Rule 23(c)(2) and seek an additional notification period as well as an additional opt-out period. 123 The portion of the order that dealt with notice, set out in full in the appendix, adopted a creative approach appropriate to this unique case. It required that letter notice be sent to the 92,275 veterans listed in the Agent Orange Registry established by the Veterans' Administration in 1978 to identify potential victims as well as to the 11,256 persons who had filed or intervened in lawsuits or had counsel affiliated with the PMC. The court concluded that these were the only class members who could be identified and located through reasonable effort. Id. at 729-31. The court also required various forms of substitute notice, including announcements in various servicepersons' and national publications and on radio and television. In addition, the court directed that a letter be sent to every governor requesting that notice of the lawsuit be provided to any state agencies that might have lists of veterans. 124 Rule 23, of course, accords considerable discretion to a district court in fashioning notice to a class, see Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2334, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979), and our standard of review is the familiar one of whether the District Court was 'clearly erroneous' in its factual findings and whether it 'abused' its traditional discretion. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2374-75, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975) (discussing abuse of discretion standard in award of back pay under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964). See generally Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-76, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511-12, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (elaborating on clearly erroneous standard). 125 Rule 23(c)(2) requires only that members of a Rule 23(b)(3) class be given the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. Relying principally upon Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), appellants nonetheless contend that actual notice to each and every class member was essential. We disagree. 126 In Mullane, the Supreme Court held that notice by publication of pending settlements of accounts was constitutionally sufficient as to trust beneficiaries whose names and addresses were unknown to the trustee. Noting the state's interest in bringing any issues as to its fiduciaries to a final settlement, id. at 313, 70 S.Ct. at 657, and the beneficiary's interest in being apprised of the pendency of settlements in order to choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest, id. at 314, 70 S.Ct. at 657, the Court concluded that notice by publication was permissible as to persons whose whereabouts or interests could not be determined through due diligence or whose interests were either conjectural or future. Id. at 317-18, 70 S.Ct. at 658-59. It noted that where the performance of a trustee was the issue, the interests of unknown beneficiaries were likely to be protected by the known and notified beneficiaries, who had to be provided with mailed notice. The Court stated: 127 This type of trust presupposes a large number of small interests. The individual interest does not stand alone but is identical with that of a class. The rights of each in the integrity of the fund and the fidelity of the trustee are shared by many other beneficiaries. Therefore notice reasonably certain to reach most of those interested in objecting is likely to safeguard the interests of all, since any objection sustained would inure to the benefit of all. We think that under such circumstances reasonable risks that notice might not actually reach every beneficiary are justifiable. 128 Id. at 319, 70 S.Ct. at 359. Appellants contend that, unlike Mullane, the interests of Agent Orange class members who were unaware of the instant litigation would not be protected by those class members who did receive notice. 4 129 It is true that the claims of the plaintiffs are highly individualistic in a number of respects. The interests of all of the plaintiffs are identical, however, with regard to the facts and the law relevant to the military contractor defense. The class members with actual notice therefore would have represented the interests of the class members unaware of the action. 130 Moreover, Chief Judge Weinstein found that many of the members of the class were unknown and could not be located through reasonable efforts. That conclusion is a finding of fact, and must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. In re Franklin National Bank Securities Litigation, 599 F.2d 1109, 1110-11 (2d Cir.1979). We cannot agree with appellants that all 2.4 million Vietnam veterans should have been sent letter notice. First, it is undisputed that far fewer than that number were exposed to Agent Orange. A requirement that notice be given to all Vietnam veterans would thus have been considerably overbroad. Second, there is no assurance that such a list could have been compiled through reasonable efforts. Appellants claim that some records kept by the government would have facilitated individualized notice. They concede, however, that there was no easily accessible list of veterans, as there must have been of royalty holders in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985), and of odd-lot trading customers in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). We cannot find, therefore, that such a comprehensive list could reasonably have been compiled. 131 We also note that the second phase of the plan enlisted the aid of the mass media and state governments, an effort that ultimately resulted in letter notice to 20,000 class members in addition to the more than 100,000 given notice in the first phase of the plan. We also take judicial notice of the widespread publicity this litigation has received. Given the great doubt as to whether anyone at all was injured by Agent Orange, the fact that some 240,000 claims have been filed suggests that no practical problem exists as to the adequacy of the notice. 132 Appellants offer no feasible alternative to the notice plan adopted by the district court for identifying and contacting persons actually exposed to Agent Orange. In this regard, we are informed by the statement of our late colleague Judge Friendly that it is inappropriate to second-guess a district court's class notice procedure, particularly [where] no alternative method of ascertaining class members' identities has been suggested to us. Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 71 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818, 104 S.Ct. 77, 78 L.Ed.2d 89 (1983). In sum, the notice plan adopted by Chief Judge Weinstein was fully adequate under the circumstances. 133 Appellants also raise numerous objections to the content of the notice given. They contend, for example, that there were discrepancies among the various notices as to whether the class consisted of persons who claim injury, were injured, or can claim injury from Agent Orange. Such objections provide no basis for us to require the sending of new notice, however, because the essential goal of the notice requirement would have been accomplished by any of the above formulations. Anyone who believed that he or she had suffered injury as a result of exposure to Agent Orange in Vietnam was on notice of the pendency of a lawsuit and was thus alerted to seek advice from counsel. 134 Finally, appellants point out that a large number of mailed notices were returned undelivered. In litigation of this sort, such returns must be regarded as inevitable. They also note the alleged failure of class counsel to ensure that all of the publication and broadcast notices were provided in a timely fashion. These omissions occurred in part because of a clerical misunderstanding regarding a stay we granted after denial of the defendants' mandamus petition. See Settlement Opinion, 597 F.Supp. at 756. Moreover, a major effort was made to disseminate notice through the media, and we are convinced that the omissions noted were of little consequence in light of the actual notice and widespread publicity. 5) Adequacy of Post-Settlement Procedures 135 Appellants argue that Chief Judge Weinstein should have conducted hearings to evaluate the adequacy of the settlement prior to ordering notice of the settlement to the class. We have previously noted in addressing a similar argument that [t]he question becomes whether or not the District Court had before it sufficient facts intelligently to approve the settlement offer. If it did, then there is no reason to hold an additional hearing on the settlement or to give appellants authority to renew discovery. Grinnell I, 495 F.2d at 462-63. Although appellants have stated in attacking the settlement that Chief Judge Weinstein was too involved in its negotiation, they argue here that he did not know enough about the settlement to assess its reasonableness. Their argument is totally frivolous. Chief Judge Weinstein was thoroughly informed of the strengths and weaknesses of the parties' positions. No hearing was necessary, therefore. 136 Appellants also challenge the validity of the notice of settlement sent to class members. They allege, inter alia, that the notice was defective because it failed to detail a distribution plan. There is, however, no absolute requirement that such a plan be formulated prior to notification of the class. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 643 F.2d 195, 223-24 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998, 102 S.Ct. 2283, 73 L.Ed.2d 1294 (1982). 137 The prime function of the district court in holding a hearing on the fairness of the settlement is to determine that the amount paid is commensurate with the value of the case. This can be done before a distribution scheme has been adopted so long as the distribution scheme does not affect the obligations of the defendants under the settlement agreement. The formulation of the plan in a case such as this is a difficult, time-consuming process. To impose an absolute requirement that a hearing on the fairness of a settlement follow adoption of a distribution plan would immensely complicate settlement negotiations and might so overburden the parties and the district court as to prevent either task from being accomplished. Moreover, if a hearing on a settlement must follow formulation of a distribution plan, then reversal of any significant aspect of the plan on appeal, as has occurred in the instant case with regard to the establishment of a foundation, would require a remand for reconsideration of the settlement, followed by yet another appeal. There is no sound reason to impose such procedural straitjackets upon the settlements of class actions. Finally, we note that Chief Judge Weinstein's approval of the settlement was subject to formulation of and hearings on a plan for distribution. 6) Adequacy of the Settlement 138 As required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e), Chief Judge Weinstein carefully reviewed the proposed settlement, and gave his approval subject to hearings on attorneys' fees and approval of a settlement fund distribution plan. See Settlement Opinion, 597 F.Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y.1984). He stated: 139 The court has been deeply moved by its contact with members of the plaintiffs' class from all over the nation and abroad. Many do deserve better of their country. Had this court the power to rectify past wrongs--actual or perceived--it would do so. But no single litigation can lift all of plaintiffs' burdens. The legislative and executive branches of government--state and federal--and the Veterans Administration, as well as our many private and quasi-public medical and social agencies, are far more capable than this court of shaping the larger remedies and emotional compensation plaintiffs seek. 140 Within the sharply limited judicial role we must ask whether the settlement of the litigation proposed by the parties' representatives is acceptable. For the reasons indicated below we tentatively hold that it is. It gives the class more than it would likely achieve by attempting to litigate to the death. It provides funds to help at least some men, women and children whose hardships will be reduced in some small degree. It does represent a major step in the essential process of reconciliation among ourselves. 141 Id. at 747. 142 Our role in scrutinizing the approval of the settlement is limited in light of the district court's extensive knowledge of the parties and their respective cases. As we stated in Grinnell I, so much respect is accorded the opinion of the trial court in these matters that this court will intervene in a judicially approved settlement only when objectors to that settlement have made a clear showing that the District Court has abused its discretion. 495 F.2d at 455 (citations omitted). We also noted that [t]he proposed settlement cannot be judged without reference to the strength of plaintiffs' claims, and that [i]f the settlement offer was grossly inadequate ... it can be inadequate only in light of the strength of the case presented by the plaintiffs. Id. 143 Appellants argue that the $180 million settlement approved by the district court is woefully inadequate. They contend that the PMC underestimated the strength of the class' case, the total number of claimants, the number with serious claims, and the value of these claims had they been presented to juries. They assert that the principal PMC negotiator estimated that there were only about 20,000 claims, 3,000 of which were serious in nature. Appellants' own estimate is that there are at least 20,000 serious claims, each worth at least $500,000. Appellants seek to bolster their position by noting that 240,000 veterans have filed claims against the settlement fund. 144 We view the lack of hard information as to the number of serious claims--apparently a reference to the amount of damage suffered since no individual Agent Orange claim is strong on liability--as a sign of the weakness of the plaintiffs' case. Those who challenge the settlement, including counsel who have been involved in the litigation for many years, continue merely to speculate about the number of serious claims. That fact supports rather than undermines the settlement. 145 We are also unimpressed by the use of the total number of claimants as a means of attacking the settlement. The 240,000 claimants specify hundreds of different ailments, some of which, such as anxiety or fatigue, are so common that causation by Agent Orange simply cannot be proved. Moreover, the existence of such a large number of claimants proves nothing. For example, thousands of birth defects in the children of Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange would not statistically differentiate that group from the population generally. See Settlement Opinion, 597 F.Supp. at 789 (quoting JAMA editorial by Bruce B. Dan, M.D.). The irrelevance of the number of claimants results from the fact that every Vietnam veteran who might have been exposed to Agent Orange was invited to file a claim regarding any and all adverse health effects. 597 F.Supp. at 869. 146 Nevertheless, tort law accords juries wide discretion, and the existence of any substantial number of serious plaintiffs would create a dangerous exposure for the chemical companies. It is true that $180 million is a lot of money. If even a small number of plaintiffs had gone on to prevail at trial, however, the actual exposure of the chemical companies might well have been measured instead in the billions of dollars. Jury verdicts of several million dollars for disabling ailments or injuries to children are not uncommon. If, in the present litigation, each serious claim had a settlement value of $500,000, the $180 million would cover only 360 plaintiffs. Indeed, the $180 million is at best only a small multiple of, at worst less than, the fees the chemical companies would have had to pay to their lawyers had they continued the litigation. However large a sum $180 million may be, therefore, we must conclude that in the circumstances it was essentially a settlement at nuisance value. 147 We believe, however, that the PMC had good reason to view this case as having only nuisance value. Chief Judge Weinstein's opinion sets out the various weaknesses of plaintiffs' case in great and persuasive detail, Settlement Opinion, 597 F.Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y.1984), and our discussion assumes familiarity with that opinion. 148 The difficulties begin with the conceded fact that all of the various ailments afflicting the plaintiffs occur in the population generally and have known and unknown causes other than exposure to dioxin. Id. at 782-83. Studies based on industrial accidents and experiments with animals suggest that exposure to dioxin may cause various of those ailments. Id. at 780. However, these studies involve different dosages and different species than are involved in this litigation. Studies of Vietnam veterans themselves fail to demonstrate ailments occurring among them at a statistically abnormal rate. See id. at 787-88. The weight of present scientific evidence thus does not establish that personnel serving in Vietnam were injured by Agent Orange. See III Review of Literature on Herbicides, Including Phenoxy Herbicides and Associated Dioxins, II-8 to II-10 (1984) (Joint Appendix Vol. XIII at 5828-29). 149 The Ranch Hand Study compared health records of Air Force personnel involved in handling and spraying Agent Orange with those of Air Force personnel who performed other tasks. It concluded that there is little difference in the health histories of the two groups. See 597 F.Supp. at 782, 784, 788. Other studies, including many done by federal, state, and foreign governments, compared the incidence of various ailments among Vietnam veterans to their incidence among civilian populations. These studies also concluded there are no statistically significant differences. See id. at 787-95. 150 Such studies are, of course, not conclusive. The Ranch Hand Study, for example, involved personnel who ate and slept at their home bases and were able to take regular showers, whereas the plaintiffs were predominantly infantry alleging exposure to Agent Orange through spraying or ingestion of local food and water. Id. at 788. Although it is by no means clear that the plaintiffs suffered greater exposure than did the Air Force personnel who actually handled the herbicide, the circumstances of exposure were clearly different. There are, moreover, some inconclusive anomalies in the Ranch Hand findings. Id. 151 Conclusions as to the effects of Agent Orange reached by studies comparing Vietnam veterans with civilians are weakened by the fact that portions of the civilian population may also have been exposed to dioxin. See id. at 782 (as one expert put it, 'all of us have probably been exposed to dioxin at some time' ). The similar incidence of diseases in the two groups thus does not absolve Agent Orange. Nevertheless, the facts that the studies do not exclude the possibility of injury and that evidence of such injury may someday be found cannot obscure the paucity of present evidence that Agent Orange injured the plaintiffs. Indeed, plaintiffs' own evidence of dioxin's toxicity partly undermines their case. That evidence establishes that chloracne is a leading indicator of harmful exposure to dioxin, yet verified cases of chloracne among Vietnam veterans are rare. Id. at 794-95. 152 At bottom, the individual veterans' cases would consist of oral testimony that each had been in an area where Agent Orange was used, that studies of industrial accidents and animal experiments show that dioxin is harmful, and that the plaintiff suffers from a particular ailment. Medical testimony would indicate a causal relationship. The defendants' case would consist largely of evidence that each of these ailments has many unknown causes, that most of the ailments usually cannot be attributed to a particular cause, and that each exists among many persons not exposed to Agent Orange. As a concrete example, a plaintiff might testify to presence in an area in South Vietnam where Agent Orange was used and development of a cancer some years later. Medical testimony would again indicate a causal relationship. The defendants would show that thousands of similar cancers without traceable cause are statistically predictable among persons not exposed to Agent Orange and that no greater incidence of such cancers has been found among Vietnam veterans than among the population generally. 153 The problems of proving causation are thus substantial. This is illustrated by the scientific evidence offered by the opt-outs in response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 5 See Opt-Out Opinion, 611 F.Supp. 1223; In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation (Lilley v. Dow Chemical Co.), 611 F.Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y.1985) (individual opt-out claim brought by veteran's widow). Their experts relied heavily upon studies of industrial accidents and animals that are of marginal relevance to this case. See Opt-Out Opinion, 611 F.Supp. at 1236, 1238. Also, some of the expert opinions as to individual causation were often highly tentative or subject to impeachment. See Lilley v. Dow Chemical Co., 611 F.Supp. at 1273; Opt-Out Opinion, 611 F.Supp. at 1236-38, 1252-54, 1265-66. 154 The factual weakness of the plaintiffs' case is further revealed by the difficulty of proving details about exposure to Agent Orange. The events in question occurred many years ago, and exposure through ingestion of water or food is a matter of considerable speculation. Nevertheless, given the nature of the scientific evidence, the character of exposure is a critical element. 155 Plaintiffs also face formidable legal problems in establishing liability. Each plaintiff would encounter a choice of law issue that might be resolved adversely to his or her claim. As Chief Judge Weinstein recognized, the substantive law of product liability varies from state to state, and the question of which state's law would apply to a particular case is not easily answered. See 580 F.Supp. 690, 693-701 (E.D.N.Y.1984). See also Class Certification Opinion, 100 F.R.D. 718, 724 (E.D.N.Y.1983). No single state has an overriding interest in this litigation because the alleged injuries resulted from exposure to toxic materials in a foreign country while the veteran plaintiffs were serving in the armed forces. Chief Judge Weinstein concluded that each tribunal addressing a claim by an individual plaintiff would apply a national consensus law. 580 F.Supp. at 713. Viewed as an academic discussion of an interesting choice of law problem, his analysis is, as we noted, bold and imaginative. Viewed as a prediction of what particular jurisdictions would do in individual cases, however, his conclusion is patently speculative. Moreover, even if a national consensus law were developed and applied, there is no guarantee that it would be favorable to the plaintiffs. 156 Other legal problems facing the plaintiffs concern the applicability of various state statutes of limitations. These were discussed in detail by Chief Judge Weinstein in his opinion approving the settlement, 597 F.Supp. 740, 800-816 (E.D.N.Y.1984), and we have little to add to that discussion other than to express skepticism that all plaintiffs would overcome the defense that their claims were time barred. 157 Finally, the plaintiffs might have difficulty establishing the liability of any particular defendant because each defendant's version of Agent Orange contained different amounts of dioxin and because the government mixed the products of the various manufacturers in unmarked barrels. It is therefore impossible to attribute the exposure of an individual to Agent Orange to the product of a particular company. It is possible, moreover, that only the herbicide with the greater amounts of dioxin was hazardous. As Chief Judge Weinstein noted in his opinion, id. at 819-33, various legal theories might enable plaintiffs to establish liability against each manufacturer, but there is no guarantee that any of these theories would be adopted. 158 The plaintiffs had a final and in our view impossible, hurdle to surmount, namely the military contractor defense. The detailed elaboration of our views of that defense can be found in the opinion that discusses the opt-outs' appeal from the grant of summary judgment. We need note here only that in affirming the grant of summary judgment against the opt-outs, we act on our belief that defendants clearly did not breach any duty to inform the government of hazards relating to Agent Orange. First, we agree with Chief Judge Weinstein that a reasonable trier of fact would have to have found that during the time when the defendants had a duty to inform the government of known hazards, the government had as much knowledge as the defendants of the dangers of dioxin, then relating largely to chloracne and a rare liver disease. See Opt-Out Opinion, 611 F.Supp. at 1263. Second, we believe that the military contractor defense shields defendant contractors from liability where the hazard is wholly speculative. Even if this were a case in which causation was now clear and the issue was whether the hazard was known when Agent Orange was sold to the government, the plaintiffs would have difficulty establishing a breach of a duty to inform. Establishing such a duty on the facts here is impossible, however. In the light of hindsight, some 15 to 20 years after the fact, the weight of present scientific evidence does not establish that personnel in Vietnam were injured by Agent Orange, and there cannot have been a breach of an earlier duty to inform the government of known hazards. 159 We conclude that all the plaintiffs in this litigation faced formidable hurdles. The settlement was therefore reasonable. We reach this conclusion even though we recognize that the PMC's fee agreement created a conflict of interest that generated impermissible incentives on the part of class counsel to settle, as set forth in Judge Miner's companion opinion. Whatever effect the invalidation of that agreement might have had on a settlement in a strong liability case, it does not affect the instant settlement because of the grave weaknesses in plaintiffs' case. 160 Affirmed.