Opinion ID: 214892
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Counsel's Failure to Take Corrective Action at Voir Dire

Text: Finally, Breakiron argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to take corrective action after a venire member testified that Breakiron used to do a lot of robbing. During voir dire, a venire member (Charles Gerba, No. 67) testified under oath in front of the panel that he knew Breakiron and that Breakiron had committed robberies: I know the boy. I lived in the terrace and he used to do a lot of robbing there. (N.T. 448; A. 717.) Gerba also testified that, based on what he knew, he had a fixed opinion about the case and could not be an impartial juror, and the trial court excused him. ( Id. ) Breakiron's counsel did not object to Gerba's testimony or move to strike the venire panel or for a mistrial, and the trial court took no corrective action sua sponte. One of the venire members on the same panel who was in the room at the time (Paul Manges, No. 114) ended up serving on Breakiron's jury. The trial court opened voir dire by questioning the venire members regarding their general knowledge of the parties and the case. Before reaching Gerba, the trial court conducted its initial questioning of Manges. The trial court asked him whether he had formed any opinion about the case from what he had read in the newspaper. Manges testified that he had not and agreed that he could decide the case solely on the basis of what transpires in this room[.] (N.T. 444-45; A. 713-714.) The trial court later questioned Gerba, who testified that Breakiron used to do a lot of robbing. After the trial court excused Gerba, counsel questioned the venire members left on the panel, including Manges, but neither counsel nor the trial court asked Manges about Gerba's statement. (N.T. 512-20; A. 781-89.) Breakiron argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move to strike the venire panel, seek a mistrial, or take other corrective action to insure that no one exposed to Gerba's statement served on the jury. Breakiron raised this claim during his first PCRA proceeding. The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing, at which his counsel testified. It then denied the claim on the merits, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. See Breakiron-2, 729 A.2d at 1093-94. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court based its ruling solely on the issue of counsel's performance. The District Court deferred to that ruling under AEDPA, but also explained that it would deny the claim on de novo review of the issue of prejudice as well.
As the Supreme Court recently emphasized, the standard for evaluating counsel's performance under Strickland is a most deferential one that, under AEDPA, becomes `doubly' deferential when a state court already has found counsel's performance constitutionally sufficient. Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 788 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 1420, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009)). Thus, we may not grant relief on this claim unless we conclude, not only that counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable, but that there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree[.] Id. at 786. Even under this doubly deferential standard, we conclude that counsel's failure to take corrective action was objectively unreasonable and that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland in concluding otherwise. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that counsel's decision not to move to strike the venire panel or for a mistrial was part of a reasonable trial strategy. Its reasoning reads in full: Under these circumstances, a motion to strike the jury panel may have been an appropriate course of action. Nonetheless, trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to do so. At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel testified that he did not make a motion to strike or move for a mistrial because the seated juror had stated that he could render an unbiased opinion, and consequently there was no basis to strike the panel or move for a mistrial. The PCRA court found that this was a plausible trial tactic, and therefore Breakiron failed to meet his burden that counsel's actions were not reasonably based. After reviewing the jury voir dire of the juror in question, we agree with the PCRA court, and find that trial counsel had a reasonable basis for his actions. The juror stated that he could be a fair and unbiased juror, and that no one spoke of the case in his presence. The PCRA court did not err in denying Breakiron's petition. Breakiron-2, 729 A.2d at 1094 (citations and footnotes omitted). Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that counsel's belief that Manges could be fair and impartial was a strategic reason for allowing him on the jury and that counsel's belief was reasonably supported by the record. Breakiron argues that this ruling was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court misread the PCRA and voir dire transcripts. He also argues that its ruling was an unreasonable application of Strickland. We agree that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's characterization of the record is not entirely accurate. It based its ruling on two factual determinations. First, it concluded that counsel testified at the PCRA hearing that the reason he did not take corrective action was that the seated juror had stated that he could render an unbiased opinion. Breakiron-2, 729 A.2d at 1094. Counsel did not actually testify that he took no corrective action because Manges stated that he could render an unbiased opinion. Counsel's actual testimony, in relevant part, was: A. Why didn't I ask for a mistrial at that point? Q. Yes, sir. A. Well, he wasthat juror [apparently Gerba] was excused and      A. I don't know why there was no request for a mistrial at that time, other than the fact that this guy [apparently Gerba] was excused, and I believe that we questioned all of the jurors individually after that. The court had asked several questions based on what Mr. Manges said, number 114, after consultation with Mr. Breakiron, we felt that he would be a fair and impartial juror toward Mr. Breakiron. (N.T. PCRA 7/17/97 P.M. at 75-76; A. 1897-98.) Thus, counsel testified merely that he felt Manges would be a fair and impartial juror, not that Manges actually said he could or that he declined to take corrective action on that basis. Second, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that Manges's testimony at voir dire made counsel's decision reasonable because its own review of the voir dire transcript confirmed that [t]he juror stated that he could be a fair and unbiased juror[.] Breakiron-2, 729 A.2d at 1094. Manges actually never testified that he could be a fair and impartial juror, either in the abstract or in light of Gerba's statement. Under initial questioning by the trial court, Manges testified merely that he had not formed a fixed opinion from what he read in the newspapers and agreed that he could judge the case solely on the basis of what transpires in this room[.] (N.T. 444-45; A. 713-14.) That questioning referred only to Manges's exposure to newspaper articles, and it occurred before Gerba made the statement at issue here (which, of course, transpire[d] in th[at] room). Manges also did not state that he could be a fair and impartial juror in response to counsel's questioning after Gerba testified. Manges did testify that he had not formed an opinion as to Breakiron's guilt or innocence, but only when asked whether he had done so on the specific bases of reading the newspaper or discussing the case with his wife. (N.T. 512-13; A. 781-82.) And again, neither counsel nor the trial court asked him about Gerba's statement. Even if we assume that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's factual findings are entitled to deference under AEDPA, however, we still conclude that its ultimate ruling is objectively unreasonable. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that counsel's decision to allow Manges on the jury was a reasonable strategic decision because counsel believed that Manges could be fair and impartial. The primary problem with that conclusion is that counsel could have had no reasonable basis for that belief because neither he nor the trial court questioned Manges about Gerba's statement. Counsel's feeling that Manges could be fair and impartial despite that statement thus was insufficiently informed. Cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ([C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.). In addition, counsel's testimony does not explain why he took no action when Gerba made the statement in the first place. His initial testimony on that point was I don't know why there was no request for a mistrial at that time[.] (N.T. PCRA 7/17/97 P.M. at 75; A. 1897.) Manges's answers to the trial court's questioning provided no basis not to do so because the trial court questioned Manges before Gerba made his statement. Counsel later testified that he did not move for a mistrial because he did not think that anything egregious had occurred during jury selection. (N.T. PCRA 7/18/97 A.M. at 36; A. 2021). That statement could mean that counsel did not believe anything egregious had occurred in light of his and the trial court's questioning of Manges, in which case it suffers from the same deficiencies just discussed. That statement could also mean that counsel did not believe that the panel's exposure to Gerba's testimony itself was sufficiently egregious to warrant corrective action. Either way, there is no reasonable basis to conclude that counsel's performance in this regard was constitutionally adequate. Manges was exposed to sworn testimony that Breakiron used to do a lot of robbingi.e., that Breakiron had a history of committing the very same crime of which he was accused at trial. Federal courts have long recognized that evidence suggesting a propensity to commit crimes is patently prejudicial. See, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) (explaining that propensity evidence `is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge') (quoting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 476, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948)); Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 127 (3d Cir.2007) (Evidence that a defendant has committed prior criminal acts is highly prejudicial.). As we have explained, when evidence suggesting a propensity or disposition to commit crime. . . reaches the attention of the jury, it is most difficult, if not impossible, to assume continued integrity of the presumption of innocence. A drop of ink cannot be removed from a glass of milk. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283 (3d Cir.1976). Such evidence is all the more prejudicial where, as here, it reveals that the defendant previously committed the very kind of crime of which he or she stands accused. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 185, 117 S.Ct. 644 (Where a prior conviction was for a. . . crime . . . similar to the other charges in a pending case, the risk of unfair prejudice would be especially obvious[.]); United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir.1985) (To allow evidence of a prior conviction of the very crime for which a defendant is on trial may be devastating in its potential impact on a jury. . . . [W]here, as here, the prior conviction is sufficiently similar to the crime charged, there is a substantial risk that all exculpatory evidence will be overwhelmed by a jury's fixation on the human tendency to draw a conclusion which is impermissible in law: because he did it before, he must have done it again.). The Pennsylvania courts have long recognized the prejudicial nature of propensity evidence as well. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harkins, 459 Pa. 196, 328 A.2d 156, 157-58 (1974) (When the jury learns that the person being tried has previously committed another crime, the prejudicial impact cannot be considered insignificant. `The presumed effect of such evidence is to predispose the minds of the jurors to believe the accused guilty, and thus effectually to strip him of the presumption of innocence.') (citation omitted). The situation in Harkins was similar to that presented here. In Harkins, a potential juror testified during voir dire that the defendant had stolen his car, and the defendant's counsel moved to strike the venire panel. The trial court denied the motion and, though it excused that venire member, other members of the same panel went on to serve on the defendant's jury, which ultimately convicted him. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, explaining that `[t]he fact that a reasonable inference of a prior criminal record is present in the minds of the jurors in and of itself mandates a new trial.' Id. at 158 (quoting Commonwealth v. Allen, 448 Pa. 177, 292 A.2d 373, 376 (1972)). Thus, as Breakiron argues, it would have been obvious to any reasonably competent counsel that corrective action was both available under Pennsylvania law and essential to preserve Breakiron's presumption of innocence. [15] Counsel, however, took no such action. He declined to do so, he testified, because he felt that Manges could be fair and impartial and did not believe that anything egregious had occurred. But avoidance of egregiousness is not the standard for constitutionally adequate performance; the standard is one of objectively reasonable performance under the circumstances. No objectively reasonable counsel would fail to recognize the patently prejudicial nature of testimony that Breakiron used to do a lot of robbing (which certainly qualifies as egregious in any event), and counsel provided no legitimate explanation for failing to take corrective action following that testimony. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court nevertheless accepted counsel's explanation at face-value without recognizing that it was insufficiently informed and without acknowledging the patently prejudicial nature of Gerba's testimony. For these reasons, we conclude both that counsel's performance was deficient under Strickland and that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's conclusion to the contrary was objectively unreasonable. [16]
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not reach the issue of prejudice, so the District Court reviewed it de novo and we will do the same. See Porter, 130 S.Ct. at 452. The District Court concluded that Breakiron had not shown prejudice because, after Gerba made the statement at issue, Manges testified that he had not formed any opinion regarding Breakiron's guilt and that he understood that Breakiron was presumed innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (Dist. Ct. Op. at 35.) The District Court further reasoned that nothing in these responses led counsel or the trial court to question Manges's impartiality. ( Id. ) Thus, the District Court concluded that Breakiron has failed to show that Juror 114 [Manges] was anything but a fair and impartial juror or that his presence on the jury prejudiced him. ( Id. ) Although the parties have not squarely addressed it, this claim raises the threshold issue of how prejudice should be assessed in this context. The District Court appeared to require some indication that Gerba's statement actually rendered Manges biased or partial as a subjective matter, and the Commonwealth too argues that Breakiron failed to establish that Manges was anything other than fair and impartial. Thus, the District Court's reasoning and the Commonwealth's argument assume that a subjective approach to prejudice is appropriate in this case. Breakiron, by contrast, focuses on the prejudicial nature of the statement in question and assumes that its probable effect should be determined objectively. See Hummel v. Rosemeyer, 564 F.3d 290, 303 (3d Cir.2009) (It is not necessary that the defendant show that the deficient conduct `more likely than not altered the outcome in the case,' but only that there is a ` reasonable probability ' that it did.) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, and adding emphasis). We agree that Strickland requires an objective inquiry here. The parties have not cited, and we have not located, any authority squarely addressing the standard for prejudice when counsel is alleged to have rendered ineffective assistance in connection with statements made during voir dire that potentially rendered one or more actual jurors biased or partial. Claims of juror bias or partiality themselves generally require a showing of actual or legally implied bias. See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (This Court has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.). Some courts have required petitioners to show actual or legally implied juror bias in similar contexts in order to satisfy the Strickland standard as well. See, e.g., Sanders v. Norris, 529 F.3d 787, 790-94 (8th Cir. 2008) (no prejudice from counsel's likely deficient voir dire questioning where no actual or legally implied juror bias); Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 775-76 (9th Cir.2007) (citing Strickland standard but holding that defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's deficient questioning during voir dire where habeas evidentiary hearing revealed that juror was not actually biased). The District Court and the Commonwealth both assume without explanation that this subjective approach is the proper one in this case. Evidence of a juror's subjective bias or lack thereof may well be relevant in some cases involving allegations of ineffective assistance at voir dire. The narrow question presented here, however, is the standard for assessing prejudice when a panel member who ultimately serves on the jury is exposed to sworn testimony that the defendant previously committed crimes. Applying a subjective rather than an objective standard of prejudice in this context would conflict with Strickland. The proper inquiry under Strickland is not whether Gerba's statement actually rendered Manges biased or partial, but whether there is a reasonable probability that a juror who had not been exposed to that statement would have voted to acquit Breakiron of robbery. See Saranchak v. Beard, 616 F.3d 292, 309 (3d Cir.2010) (holding that state court improperly considered likely effect of evidence on the particular [trial] judge . . . rather than considering, more abstractly, the effect the same evidence would have had on an unspecified, objective fact-finder, as required by Strickland ) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Indeed, evidence about the actual process of decision, if not part of the record of the proceeding under review, . . . should not be considered in the prejudice determination. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Thus, Breakiron was not required to show that Manges was actually influenced by Gerba's statement, but had only to show a reasonable probability that any given juror would have been. [17] Although we have not applied Strickland in this precise context, determining the objectively probable effect of prior-crimes evidence is hardly a novel task. We have applied Strickland's reasonable probability standard in assessing the effect of counsel's failure to object at trial to testimony revealing that the defendant had a criminal record, see Carpenter v. Vaughn, 296 F.3d 138, 150-51 (3d Cir.2002), counsel's failure to object to evidence concerning a defendant's prior crimes, see Buehl, 166 F.3d at 175-76, and counsel's failure to request a limiting instruction regarding evidence of a defendant's prior crimes, see Albrecht, 485 F.3d at 128-29. We also have applied an objective standard in assessing the effect of references to a defendant's prior crimes in a variety of other contexts. See, e.g., United States v. Morena, 547 F.3d 191, 194-97 (3d Cir.2008) (prosecutor's reference to defendant's uncharged criminal activity); Toto, 529 F.2d at 283 (evidence of prior crimes). [18] The case before us thus calls for nothing more than a straightforward application of Strickland's reasonable probability standard. Having clarified the proper standard, we have no difficulty in concluding that it is satisfied in this case. As explained above, the prosecution's case on the robbery charge, though sufficient, was far from overwhelming. There was little evidence of record to rebut Breakiron's testimony and argument that he decided to commit theft only after the assault was complete and thus was not guilty of robbery. One of his jurors, however, had been exposed to sworn testimony that Breakiron used to do a lot of robbing. As explained above, such propensity evidence is patently prejudicial. Indeed, exposure to such testimony may be so prejudicial that it cannot be cured even by a proper limiting instruction, which was neither requested nor given here. See Morena, 547 F.3d at 196-97; Toto, 529 F.2d at 283. Given the dearth of evidence on the robbery charge and the patently prejudicial nature of Gerba's sworn testimony that Breakiron used to do a lot of robbing, there is a reasonable probability that corrective action by counsel would have produced a different result. Cf. Albrecht, 485 F.3d at 128-29 (although issue was a very close one, defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to request a limiting instruction regarding evidence of prior crimes because there was ample evidence of his guilt).