Opinion ID: 4521869
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Government Evidence

Text: defendant Before trial, defendant filed an in limine motion to exclude evidence of the February 26, 2008, federal indictment against him for operating an unlicensed money transmitting business (18 U.S.C. § 1960), an indictment which was originally filed under seal. Defendant sought to specifically exclude any reference to him as a terrorist, which was purportedly included in an LAPD summary report and later shared with the FBI. The terrorist reference was not included in the one-sentence federal indictment. The federal government later dismissed the indictment on September 15, 2008, the same day the prosecution 56 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. filed a complaint against defendant and Moya for Pamela’s murder. Defendant’s in limine motion alleged that any evidence of uncharged conduct underlying the federal indictment constituted inadmissible character evidence (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (d)) and was not otherwise admissible to prove motive, common plan, or identity. (See People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 393.) Because it was undisputed that the federal indictment remained sealed until after Pamela’s murder, defendant argues that it could not have provided a motive to kill Pamela to prevent her from cooperating with federal authorities. The trial court denied defendant’s in limine motion to exclude evidence of the federal indictment and investigation. It concluded such evidence was relevant to defendant’s motive to kill Pamela. It further rejected defendant’s claim of prejudice under Evidence Code section 352, noting that the federal indictment “pales in comparison” to the murder for hire conspiracy charge and suggested that a limiting instruction would address defendant’s concerns. Focusing on the “lack of similarity of motive or direct connection” between the money licensing violation and the murder charge, defendant argues that evidence of the dismissed federal indictment constituted inadmissible character evidence. (See Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) He maintains that the prosecution failed to show that Pamela agreed to cooperate with federal authorities (and that defendant knew Pamela intended to cooperate), which the prosecution argued provided defendant’s motive to kill Pamela. For reasons that follow, we deny defendant’s evidentiary claim. 57 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. Though inadmissible to prove a defendant’s criminal propensity, evidence of a defendant’s prior uncharged misconduct is admissible if relevant to prove a material fact at issue in the case, “such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident.” (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) “In general, we have explained that ‘[t]he admissibility of other crimes evidence depends on (1) the materiality of the facts sought to be proved, (2) the tendency of the uncharged crimes to prove those facts, and (3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring exclusion of the evidence.’ ” (People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 783.) As pertinent here, “the probativeness of other-crimes evidence on the issue of motive does not necessarily depend on similarities between the charged and uncharged crimes, so long as the offenses have a direct logical nexus.” (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 15.) It is enough that the “ ‘motive for the charged crime arises simply from the commission of the prior offense.’ ” (People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1115 [evidence of wife’s financial fraud relevant to show motive for killing her husband].) Here, the federal indictment was a key piece of evidence that helped explain the development of defendant’s motive to kill Pamela. Along with the indictment, the investigation related important details of events leading up to Pamela’s murder. The prosecution first described Pamela becoming worried about Goldfinger’s future in light of the federal investigation. Despite defendant’s fierce opposition, she sought to obtain a money transmitting license and withdrew at least $400,000 from the company’s account. The prosecution explained how defendant was furious at Pamela for taking the money, trying to secure a money transmitting license despite 58 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. defendant’s insistence that they did not need it, and giving federal authorities a reason to closely scrutinize Goldfinger. After filing for divorce, defendant banned Pamela from Goldfinger, alleging that she had embezzled money from the company. Finally, in an e-mail defendant had sent to his friend, Melanie Jackman, complaining about Pamela, he wrote: “I have been letting her get away with this shit for years, and enough is enough.” The prosecution’s theory on why defendant killed Pamela, in short, was not based simply on her possible cooperation with federal authorities; rather, defendant’s increasing animosity and bitterness towards Pamela came to a head when Pamela’s actions threatened to upend their highly profitable business. The circumstantial evidence, as the prosecution underscored, was “overwhelming.” Furthermore, whether there was evidence of an actual agreement that Pamela would cooperate with the federal authorities or whether Pamela and defendant knew about the federal indictment itself are both beside the point. Defense counsel conceded that defendant and Pamela both were aware that federal authorities were investigating Goldfinger. And while there was no evidence that Pamela had an agreement she would testify against defendant, the prosecution argued that defendant killed Pamela “to prevent her from making an agreement, to prevent her from doing that. That’s our point.” Moreover, the record reveals evidence that Pamela at least intended to cooperate with federal authorities. Evidence further suggested that defendant was at least suspicious, if he did not actually know, of Pamela possibly incriminating him in the federal case. “ ‘[T]o be admissible, evidence need not absolutely 59 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. confirm anything. It is axiomatic that its weight is for the jury.’ ” (People v. Peggese (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 415, 420.) Finally, as a practical matter, because the jury heard defendant’s recorded jailhouse conversation with Smith, some mention of the federal indictment was required to explain why defendant was in federal custody in the first place. We conclude that the probative value of evidence of the dismissed federal indictment and related investigation outweighed any prejudice from admitting the evidence. Further, the trial court instructed the jury that evidence of uncharged misconduct may only be considered “for the limited purpose of determining, if it tends to show, that the defendant had a motive to commit the charged crimes.” (CALJIC No. 2.50.) We presume the jury followed the trial court’s instruction absent evidence to the contrary. (People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 821.)
Regarding evidence of Pamela’s intent to cooperate with federal authorities on the Goldfinger investigation, the prosecution proffered the testimony of witness Carol Neve, a longtime friend and confidante of Pamela’s. After the parties vigorously debated the issue, the trial court prohibited the prosecution from eliciting Neve’s testimony that Pamela told Neve she was going to cooperate with the federal authorities. The trial court concluded the prosecution failed to show the link between Pamela’s intent to cooperate and defendant’s knowledge of that intent, which the trial court described as a “pretty pivotal issue in this case.” However, the trial court permitted Neve, who had a similar e-currency business and 60 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. spoke to Pamela about it, to testify about Pamela’s intent to obtain a money transmitting license for Goldfinger. Over defendant’s hearsay objection, Neve testified that in September or October of 2007, she had advised Pamela that “her company [Goldfinger] was at risk” and told Pamela that she should get “money transmitter licenses,” even though such licenses were “very expensive” and had to be obtained through the federal government. The trial court ruled such statements did not constitute hearsay because they were not offered for their truth; rather, Neve’s testimony was “what Miss Fayed was advised.” Neve also testified that Pamela told her that “her intent was to obtain those money transmitter licenses.” Overruling defendant’s hearsay objection, the court concluded that Pamela’s hearsay statements were admissible under Evidence Code section 1250, subdivision (a)(2), as a statement of future intent “to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant.” On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing Neve’s testimony. Defendant again asserts that Neve’s statement regarding what she advised Pamela was hearsay. As the trial court concluded, however, Neve’s advisement to Pamela was not offered for the truth of the matter stated, i.e., to show that Pamela should have obtained the licenses, but was offered to show Pamela’s reaction and conduct in response to the statement. (See Evid. Code, § 1200; People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1162.) Likewise, we conclude that Pamela’s hearsay statement, i.e., that she told Neve she intended get the money transmitting license for Goldfinger, was admissible as a statement of the declarant’s future intent under Evidence Code section 1250, 61 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. subdivision (a)(2). Under this provision, “a statement of the declarant’s intent to do certain acts is admissible to prove that he did those acts.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., Deering’s Ann. Evid. Code (2004 ed.) foll. § 1250, p. 531; see People v. Alcalde (1944) 24 Cal.2d 177, 187-188.) Here, Pamela’s statement of future intent to purchase a money transmitting license was admissible to prove that she tried to obtain the license, which in turn was relevant to show why defendant was angry at Pamela and had a motive to kill her. Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, the statement was not admitted to prove Pamela’s existing state of mind under Evidence Code section 1250, subdivision (a)(1), which expressly requires that the declarant’s mental state be “itself an issue in the action.” (See People v. Noguera (1991) 4 Cal.4th 599, 621.)
As previously noted, the defense intended to call Mary Mercedes as a witness to question her on whether she attempted to solicit Taboga’s husband to kill Pamela Fayed. Though there was some uncertainty whether the prosecution would offer Mercedes immunity in exchange for her testimony, Mercedes ultimately invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, and the court declared her unavailable as a witness. Based on Mercedes’s unavailability, the trial court permitted the defense to elicit hearsay testimony from Taboga that Mercedes had offered to pay Taboga’s husband, Kurt, $200,000 to kill Pamela. (See Evid. Code, § 1230.) After Taboga’s direct testimony, the prosecution informed the trial court it intended to introduce the out-of-court statement of Mercedes pursuant to Evidence Code section 1202. In a recorded conference call between Mercedes, Detective 62 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. Abdul, and Prosecutor Jackson, Mercedes denied Taboga’s allegations. This telephone conversation took place on March 30, 2011, a month before Mercedes had asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege. Defense counsel objected, arguing in part that the prosecution “sprung” this evidence at the last minute and that they had not been given proper notice. The trial court, however, explained that “this is impeachment testimony, so they don’t have to give it to you in advance.” Defendant also claimed “fundamental unfairness” in being unable to cross-examine a witness whom, he asserted, the prosecution could have given immunity to prevent her unavailability. Rejecting defendant’s contention, the trial court found the tape admissible for purposes of impeachment. After substantially redacting the statement with input from both sides, the trial court admitted Mercedes’s statement into evidence. On appeal, defendant argues that even though this statement was used as impeachment evidence against Taboga, the prosecution sought admission of the tape itself as opposed to just using information on the tape; thus, defendant asserts, the tape constituted “real evidence” subject to timely disclosure under section 1054.1, subdivision (c). (See People v. Tillis (1998) 18 Cal.4th 284, 292-293; § 1054.7 [disclosure 30 days prior to trial generally required absent good cause].) Defendant maintains the trial court should have prohibited the tape’s admission as an authorized sanction under section 1054.5, subdivision (b). Even assuming that the tape constituted “real evidence” under section 1054.1, subdivision (c) that the prosecution thereby committed a discovery violation for failing to timely disclose it, and finally, that the trial court should have prohibited the presentation of this tape as a sanction, any error 63 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. was harmless. (See People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 280.) Describing Taboga as his “star witness,” defendant argues that because the prosecution delayed disclosure of this tape, it “was able to launch a devastating counterattack at the end of trial,” one that “gutted” their defense. Defendant overstates his case. As noted, Taboga came forward with the information about Mercedes a month before trial began, even though her telephone conversation with Mercedes took place three years earlier in May 2008, several months before Pamela was murdered. As Taboga testified, she did not believe she had information that “could free” defendant but wanted to get “the information out because it needs to be heard.” On crossexamination, the prosecution pointedly questioned Taboga why she never told anyone about Mercedes’s purported solicitation to kill Pamela. Taboga explained that she did tell Pamela to “just watch herself and be careful” but admitted she never told Pamela about her conversation with Mercedes. Making only a brief reference to Mercedes’s denial in closing argument, the prosecution thoroughly discredited Taboga’s testimony, criticizing it as nonsensical and implausible. We find that any improper admission of Mercedes’s taped statement to impeach statements Taboga attributed to Mercedes to be harmless. Based on the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt and in light of the discredited, implausible testimony of Taboga, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error, if any, in allowing such impeachment, did not contribute to the verdict. (See People v. Pokovich (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1240, 1255.) 64 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.
purse During the direct testimony of LAPD Detective Eric Spear, the prosecution displayed photographs of the crime scene, including a picture of Pamela’s bloody shirt and pants. Based on the amount of blood at the crime scene, Detective Spear opined it was a “violent attack, and just brutal.” He further concluded that because Pamela’s purse, wallet and money were still at the crime scene, it was not a robbery. The prosecution asked Detective Spear to show the actual shirt Pamela was wearing when she was killed, which he described as a shirt “which was white at one time that is obviously soaked in blood.” Detective Spear also showed the pair of pants Pamela was wearing at that time. Objecting under Evidence Code section 352, defense counsel pointed out there was no dispute that Pamela was stabbed to death and offered to stipulate that the bloody items belonged to Pamela, so that the prosecution would not “parade one bloody item after another.” He also maintained the evidence was cumulative and served only to inflame and prejudice the jury. The prosecution countered that the manner in which Pamela was killed was significant and showing the jury the actual blood-soaked items instead of pictures of them would “mak[e] the viciousness of the murder, premeditation, the deliberation, the intent to kill much more real to the jury by way of three or four minutes of testimony.” The trial court permitted the prosecution to demonstrate the remaining two items to the jury—Pamela’s eyeglasses and purse—during Detective Spear’s testimony. On appeal, defendant argues that the photographs of these bloody items were more prejudicial than probative under 65 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. Evidence Code section 352 because they were superfluous and served no purpose but to appeal to the jury’s emotions. Though the actual blood-stained items were presented in court and introduced into evidence through Detective Spear’s testimony, defendant’s focus is on the prejudicial effect of the admitted photographs. “ ‘As a rule, the prosecution in a criminal case involving charges of murder or other violent crimes is entitled to present evidence of the circumstances attending them even if it is grim’ (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 675 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640]), and even if it ‘duplicate[s] testimony, depict[s] uncontested facts, or trigger[s] an offer to stipulate.’ ” (People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 687.) Here, the prosecution explained that the blood-soaked shirt and pants depicted in the photographs showed the brutality of Pamela’s killing, which suggested she was killed by a hitman. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its considerable discretion in admitting the photographs of Pamela’s personal effects found at the murder scene. (See People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 477; People v. Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 687 [trial court abuses its discretion by acting “ ‘in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner’ ”].)
During the direct examination of Desiree, Pamela’s then 21-year-old daughter, the prosecution showed her various family photographs to identify. These included photographs of Desiree, her half-sister, J.F., and Pamela; some photographs of just Desiree and Pamela, photographs with J.F. and Pamela, and a photograph of defendant. At one point, the prosecution asked the trial court whether he could approach Desiree and 66 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. show her the photographs (instead of using a projector). Defense counsel replied that he had “no objection. If he wants to just show her, I have no objection.” Desiree explained when and where the various pictures were taken, which included Desiree’s high school graduation in June 2008, a month before Pamela was killed. On appeal, defendant for the first time claims the trial court erred in allowing the photographs of Pamela and her daughters into evidence at the guilt phase because the photographs were purportedly irrelevant and superfluous. Defense counsel, however, did not object below but instead stated he had “no objection” to showing Desiree the photographs. We conclude defendant has forfeited the issue.