Opinion ID: 1186235
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether respondents' action was timely filed pursuant to NRS 278.0235.

Text: Appellants contend that respondents' complaint and petition challenging the Board's decision was untimely filed pursuant to NRS 278.0235 because it was filed thirty-three days after the July 7, 1993 hearing. Appellants contend that this court's interpretation of an analogous statute in League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 93 Nev. 270, 563 P.2d 582 (1977), indicates that judicial review must be sought within 25 days of the hearing. NRS 278.0235 provides in pertinent part: No action or proceeding may be commenced for the purpose of seeking judicial relief or review from or with respect to any final action, decision or order of any governing body, commission or board ... unless the action or proceeding is commenced within 25 days after the date of filing of notice of the final action, decision or order with the clerk or secretary of the governing body, commission or board. This court has not previously considered what constitutes notice of a board's decision for purposes of triggering the twenty-five day statute of limitations under NRS 278.0235. In League to Save Lake Tahoe, this court analyzed what constitutes a final action under former NRS 278.027 (providing for judicial review of grants or denials of special use permits or variances). Former NRS 278.027 provided that judicial relief with respect to a final action of any governing body must be commenced within 25 days from the date of the filing of notice of such final action. This court stated that [i]f agency review ... does not occur, then the action of [the county] is the `final action' and judicial review, if desired, must be sought within 25 days thereafter. Id. at 274, 563 P.2d at 584. This statement suggests that final action and notice may be concurrent, but that issue was not squarely before the court. Under the statute applicable in this case and the statute applicable in League to Save Lake Tahoe, the legislature chose to specify that the limitations period runs from the date that notice of the final action is filed, rather than from the action itself. This suggests that something more than the decision itself is required; otherwise, such language is superfluous. No part of a statute should be rendered nugatory, nor any language turned to mere surplusage, if such consequences can properly be avoided. Paramount Ins. v. Rayson & Smitley, 86 Nev. 644, 649, 472 P.2d 530, 533 (1970). We therefore conclude that the limitation period does not begin to run when a final decision is rendered. Rather, the limitation period begins to run only when notice of the final decision is filed. To the extent that League to Save Lake Tahoe can be read as inconsistent with this conclusion, it is overruled. Alternatively, appellants contend that the Board's decision was filed with the clerk on the date of the hearing pursuant to NRS 278.0235 because a deputy clerk was present to record and note the Board's decision. In other words, appellants assert that statutory notice was filed with the clerk on the date of the hearing. We disagree with appellants' position. On appeal, questions of statutory construction are considered independently, and no deference is given to the district court's conclusion. See, e.g., Grand Hotel Gift Shop v. Granite St. Ins., 108 Nev. 811, 815, 839 P.2d 599, 602 (1992) (questions of law are reviewed de novo). The rules of statutory construction are straightforward. It is well settled in Nevada that words in a statute should be given their plain meaning unless this violates the spirit of the act. McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors, 102 Nev. 644, 648, 730 P.2d 438, 440 (1986). `Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous ... there is no room for construction, and the courts are not permitted to search for its meaning beyond the statute itself.' Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Boulder City, 106 Nev. 497, 503, 797 P.2d 946, 949 (1990) (quoting In re Walters' Estate, 60 Nev. 172, 183-84, 104 P.2d 968, 973 (1940)). Giving the words of the statute their plain meaning, the mere presence of the Board's clerk at the hearing for the purpose of recording the Board's decision does not constitute filing of notice of the decision with the clerk. Rather, NRS 278.0235 contemplates that something more must be done. We conclude that filing of notice of the final action under NRS 278.0235 is accomplished when someone or some entity provides separate, written notice of the final action to the secretary or clerk of the governing body, commission or board. Further, although the statute does not expressly require that notice be given to the applicant, to give effect to the statute of limitations the applicant must be informed that notice of the final action was filed with the clerk or secretary. Thus, any notice filed with the clerk or secretary should also be forwarded to the applicant and should include the date on which the notice was filed with the clerk or secretary. Because the record discloses no filing of written notice of the final action with the Board's secretary in this matter, it appears that the limitations period never began to run. Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that respondents' action and proceeding were timely filed under NRS 278.0235.