Opinion ID: 585824
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Hanley: Jury Instruction More than Adequate

Text: 75 Co-defendant Hanley's defense at trial was that he had a good faith belief that he was acting as a government informant, and thus did not possess the requisite criminal intent to support his conviction. His attack here is on the court's failure to give a good faith instruction. 20 He urges that the court's instruction was insufficient to convey his good faith defense: 76 You may consider evidence that Defendant Craig Hanley was, or in good faith believed himself to be, a government informant in determining whether he had the requisite intent to become a conspirator. 77 Specifically, Hanley argues that the jury was wrongfully permitted to consider his good-faith belief defense only as one factor in determining whether he intended to conspire. Instead, he contends that his good faith defense should have been conclusive on the issue of intent and that the following proposed jury instruction should have been granted: 78 Our law provides that a person does not have the criminal intent required for conviction if he acts as government informant or in the honest, good-faith belief that he is a government informant. 79 A district court's refusal to include a defendant's proposed jury instruction is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, and the trial court is afforded substantial latitude in formulating its instructions. United States v. St. Gelais, 952 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir.1992); United States v. Rochester, 898 F.2d 971, 978 (5th Cir.1990). 80 In determining whether the court abused its discretion, we must determine whether the requested instruction (1) is a correct statement of the law; (2) was substantially given in the charge as a whole; and (3) concerns an important aspect of the trial so that the failure to give it seriously impaired the defendant's ability to effectively present a given defense. United States v. Daniel, 957 F.2d 162, 170 (5th Cir.1992); St. Gelais, 952 F.2d at 93; Rochester, 898 F.2d at 978. 81 In United States v. Welch, 810 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.1987), the defendant requested that the trial court give an instruction almost identical to the one requested by Hanley. 21 Reviewing for plain error, we concluded that the charge, read as a whole, sufficiently suggested to the jury that they must find specific intent before the defendants could be convicted. 82 In the recent case of United States v. Daniel, 957 F.2d at 170, the defendant also requested an instruction on good faith. Because the jury was properly instructed on the elements of the offense, including the requisite mental state, we held that a good faith instruction was not necessary. 22 83 Similarly, the trial court in this case gave more than adequate instructions on the specific intent terms of knowingly and willfully. 23 Hanley was also given full latitude to testify concerning his good faith and to argue good faith to the jury. Accordingly, we hold that taken as a whole, the good faith instruction to the jury was adequate. 24 84 In conclusion, we reverse Greig's conviction and remand for a new trial, and affirm Hanley's conviction and sentence. 85 AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.