Opinion ID: 901347
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Whether Wedmore had the duty to seek the advice and assistance of a specialist.

Text: [¶ 56.] Behrens contended that Wedmore failed to adequately advise them about the risks of the installment transaction, and particularly about the risks of bankruptcy. An expert testified that Wedmore should have advised them of the risk of nonpayment, stating that there is no meaningful way to talk about risks without talking about bankruptcy. [21] Behrens further contended that Wedmore had no experience in bankruptcy, and that he used the same strict foreclosure and default language in his documents for over thirty years. Therefore, Behrens contended that Wedmore had a duty to refer Behrens to a specialist. Behrens argue that an attorney has a duty to refer his client to a specialist if under the particular circumstances a reasonable and prudent attorney would do so. [¶ 57.] Behrens unsuccessfully proposed a jury instruction, based on that used in medical malpractice cases, which imposed a qualified duty to refer to a specialist. Our standard of review for the refusal to give a proposed jury instruction in civil cases is abuse of discretion. Luke v. Deal, 2005 SD 6, ¶11, 692 NW2d 165, 168. Moreover, the trial court does not err if its instructions properly present the issue to the jury. See State v. Janklow, 2005 SD 25, 693 NW2d 685 (stating that, where the trial court rejected certain instructions because the principles were already covered by other instructions, the trial court did not abuse its discretion). [¶ 58.] Here, the trial court did not give Behrens' specific instruction, but it did instruct the jury on this issue by specifically instructing that an attorney has a duty to advise a client of all information an attorney knows or should know that a reasonable client would attach significance to in deciding to take a course of action. The trial court instructed: Instruction 47: An attorney must disclose to the client all material information necessary for the client to make an informed decision regarding the proposed course of action. Information is material if the attorney knows or should know that a reasonable client would attach significance to the information when deciding whether to take the proposed course of action. (Emphasis added). The trial court further instructed: Instruction 46: An attorney has a duty to disclose to the client the proposed course of action, the material benefits and risks, the likelihood those risks will occur and the consequences. If an alternative is reasonably appropriate, the attorney has a duty to disclose the material benefits and risks associated with that alternative as well. (Emphasis added). The trial court finally instructed the jury to determine whether Wedmore possessed and used the knowledge, skill and care which attorneys have a duty to provide based on the testimony and evidence given by members of the legal profession who testified as expert witnesses. [¶ 59.] Although the trial court's instructions did not specifically mention a duty to refer, they did allow the jury to decide this issue because they instructed that: (1) Wedmore had the duty to disclose a proposed course of action, including the material benefits and risks, and the likelihood those risks would occur and the consequences; (2) if alternatives were reasonably appropriate, Wedmore also had the duty to disclose the material benefits and risks associated with alternatives; (3) Wedmore had the duty to disclose all material information necessary for the client to make an informed decision, which information the attorney should know that a reasonable client would attach significance to, when deciding the proposed course of action ; and (4) the standard of skill and care should be determined by Behrens' experts who testified at trial. We believe that these instructions were adequate to allow the jury to decide this issue because, as Behrens concede, the duty to refer to a specialist arises if under the particular circumstances a reasonable and prudent attorney would do so. See Horne v. Peckham, 158 CalRptr 714 (CalCtApp 1979), disapproved on other grounds by ITT Small Business Finance Corp. v. Niles, 885 P2d 965 (Cal 1994). [¶ 60.] Under the trial court's instructions, Behrens were permitted to argue, and the jury was permitted to find, that Wedmore should have known that if the Initial Agreement was not binding, a reasonable client in Behrens position would attach significance to the consequences of a bankruptcy. If the jury so found, it was further permitted to find for Behrens if Wedmore failed to advise of those consequences and appropriate alternatives in the event of a bankruptcy. Therefore, although not specifically referring to a specialist, the trial court's instructions permitted the jury to find for Behrens if this transaction reasonably required service of a specialist, but that that level of skill and care was not provided. Because the instructions as a whole adequately explained the law to the jury, there was no prejudicial error. Parker, 2002 SD 29, ¶18, 641 NW2d at 120, declined to follow on other grounds by Martin, 2004 SD 82, 683 NW2d at 399.