Opinion ID: 1846429
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether there was sufficient evidence to support Murray's conviction.

Text: ¶ 35. Murray maintains that he never denied being intoxicated; however, he did deny driving the truck. Murray and Carr testified that Peanut was driving the truck and [t]he State was not able to provide any conclusive evidence that [he] was driving the truck when it ran off the road and hit a tree[,] Murray argues that the circuit court should have granted his motion for directed verdict. The State responds that [i]t was reasonable to infer from Falvey, Deputy Cole and [Deputy] Chandler's testimony about what they saw before and after the accident that Murray was driving the truck. Furthermore, Ervin testified that she was sure that Peanut was at home with her the night of the wreck and took a call from the hospital about Murray being in a wreck. Taking this evidence as true with reasonable inferences, the State asserts that there was more than sufficient, credible . . . corroborated evidence in support of the jury's verdict. ¶ 36. As Murray made three separate motions for directed verdict and each requires consideration of the evidence before the court when made, this Court properly reviews the ruling on the last occasion the challenge was made in the trial court. McClain v. State, 625 So.2d 774, 778 (Miss. 1993). This Court previously has stated that: [i]n judging the sufficiency of the evidence on a motion for a directed verdict . . . the trial judge is required to accept as true all of the evidence that is favorable to the State, including all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, and to disregard evidence favorable to the defendant. If, under this standard, sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict of guilty exists, the motion for a directed verdict . . . should be overruled. Noe v. State, 616 So.2d 298, 302 (Miss. 1993) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). ¶ 37. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 63-11-30(1) provides, in part, that: [i]t is unlawful for any person to drive or otherwise operate a vehicle within this state who (a) is under the influence of intoxicating liquor; (b) is under the influence of any other substance which has impaired such person's ability to operate a motor vehicle; (c) has an alcohol concentration of eight one-hundredths percent (.08%) or more for persons who are above the legal age to purchase alcoholic beverages under state law. . . . Miss.Code Ann. § 63-11-30(1) (Rev.2004) (emphasis added). Regarding the relevant penalty, Mississippi Code Annotated Section 63-11-30(2)(c) states, in part, that: for any third or subsequent conviction of any person violating subsection (1) of this section, the offenses being committed within a period of five (5) years, such person shall be guilty of a felony and fined not less than Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) nor more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), shall serve not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years in the custody of the Department of Corrections. . . . Miss.Code Ann. § 63-11-30(2)(c) (Rev. 2004) (emphasis added). As Murray concedes being intoxicated, the only issue is whether sufficient evidence was presented that he was driv[ing] or otherwise operat[ing] the truck. [15] Miss.Code Ann. § 63-11-30(1) (Rev.2004). ¶ 38. When there is other sufficient evidence of impaired operation, no eyewitness testimony of impaired operation is needed to sustain a conviction. Turner v. State, 910 So.2d 598, 601 (Miss. Ct.App.2005) (citing Holloway v. State, 860 So.2d 1244, 1246-47 (Miss.Ct.App.2003)). As in Turner, we conclude that there was sufficient credible evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that Murray was operating the truck at the time of the accident. Turner, 910 So.2d at 601. First, Murray's claim that Peanut was driving the truck conflicts with the testimony of Peanut's wife, Ervin, who testified that Peanut was home with her during the entire evening of April 9, 2004, and was in no way involved in the accident. Next, when driving within four car lengths of the truck before the accident, Falvey observed only one individual inside. Upon arriving at the scene, Falvey testified that Murray was the only individual present. Furthermore, according to Falvey, Murray admitted that he was the driver of the truck at the scene. Both Deputies Cole and Chandler concluded that Murray was driving under the influence, based upon Falvey's statement, the absence of any other occupants at the scene, the presence of scattered open beer cans, and the distinct scent of alcohol on Murray's breath. Finally, Deputy Chandler testified that Murray admitted to driving the truck later that evening at the jail. [A]ccept[ing] as true all of the evidence that is favorable to the State, including all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, this Court finds that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that Murray was driving or otherwise operating the truck, in finding him guilty of felonious operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Noe, 616 So.2d at 302. Accordingly, this Court will not disturb the jury's verdict and finds that the circuit court did not err in denying Murray's motion for directed verdict.