Opinion ID: 3010675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Government's Motion to Maintain the

Text: Confidentiality of the Bristol-Myers Trade Secrets Shortly after the indictment was returned, the defense requested in discovery a copy of the Bristol-Myers documents disclosed to Hsu and Ho at the June 14 meeting. However, on August 12, 1997, the government filed a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 1835 and Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1) for a protective order to prevent the disclosure of the Bristol-Myers trade secrets allegedly contained in those documents.3 The government proposed that the district court enter an order under which the trial judge would review the documents and the proposed redactions by Bristol-Myers in camera, and would then permit redactions of proprietary secret information. The documents as redacted would be used at trial. The gravamen of the government's contention was that the defendants had no need for the actual trade secrets themselves, because they had been charged only with attempt and conspiracy to steal trade secrets, rather than with the actual theft of trade secrets, under the EEA. The defendants maintained, though, that unique constitutional and procedural requirements of criminal prosecutions dictated full access to the documents shown to them during the investigation. The defendants also contended that they needed the documents to establish the defense of legal impossibility, arguing that they could not be convicted of attempting to steal trade secrets if the documents did not actually contain trade secrets. Therefore, they proposed an order under which the proprietary information in the Bristol-Myers documents would be disclosed, but only to select members of the _________________________________________________________________ 3. Section 1835 is part of the EEA and provides, inter alia, that [i]n any prosecution or other proceeding under this chapter, the court shall enter such orders and take such other action as may be necessary and appropriate to preserve the confidentiality of trade secrets, consistent with the requirements of the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and all other applicable laws. Rule 16(d)(1) provides in relevant part that [u]pon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that the discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate. 6 defense team, such as the defendants' attorneys and trial experts, and under which the documents would befiled under seal and returned or destroyed at the end of the case. The district court agreed with the defendants and adopted their version of the proposed protective order. See United States v. Hsu, 982 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1997). The court held that legal impossibility is not a viable defense to the crime of attempted theft of trade secrets under the EEA, and it thus rejected the defendants' argument that they needed the documents to establish that claim. Id. at 1028-29. Nevertheless, it ordered the government to divulge the alleged trade secrets, because it found that the existence of a trade secret is an essential element of the crime of the theft of trade secrets, and that the existence of a trade secret in that prosecution is a question of fact which the defendants have the right to have a jury decide. Id. at 1024. Believing the defendants to be charged both with actual theft and attempted theft of trade secrets, the court concluded that if during discovery we deny to the defendants complete access to the Taxol technology, we inhibit their constitutional right to effective cross-examination as well as their right to have a jury, rather than a judge, determine whether a `trade secret' exists. Id. at 1025. Therefore, the court held, the defendants are entitled to review the June 14th documents to the extent of their constitutional rights. Id. at 1029. The district court's opinion encourage[d] the government to file an interlocutory appeal to clarify the unsettled and important questions of law raised by this case. Id. at 1022 n.1. Accordingly, the government appealed the district court's Order on November 25, 1997, pursuant to a section in the EEA providing that [a]n interlocutory appeal by the United States shall lie from a decision or order of a district court authorizing or directing the disclosure of any trade secret. 18 U.S.C. S 1835. We now have jurisdiction under that section, and we exercise plenary review over the novel legal questions presented by 7 the government's appeal. In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d 1066, 1069 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997).4 We note at the outset that we disagree with the district court as to the offenses charged. The indictment is limited to charging the defendants with attempt and conspiracy and contains no charge of actual theft of trade secrets. As we will discuss below, we believe this changes the analysis greatly. We begin, though, with an overview of the EEA and an analysis of the relevant statutory provisions.