Opinion ID: 1406018
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: attorney's fees imposed

Text: Taylor-Ritchie argues that the superior court abused its discretion in awarding URS attorney's fees in a greater amount than would have been allowed by the schedule set forth in Civil Rule 82(a). Rule 82 clearly gives the trial court discretion to award fees in an amount different from that prescribed by the schedule. Rule 82(a) (1) provides: Unless the court, in its discretion, otherwise directs, the following schedule of attorney's fees will be adhered to in fixing such fees for the party recovering any money judgment therein: [table set forth] Should no recovery be had, attorney's fees may be fixed by the court in its discretion in a reasonable amount. (Emphasis added.) Civil Rule 82(a)(2) further authorizes the court to exercise its discretion in certain cases: In actions where the money judgment is not an accurate criteria [sic] for determining the fee to be allowed to the prevailing side, the court shall award a fee commensurate with the amount and value of legal services rendered. We have repeatedly recognized the trial court's broad discretion in awarding attorney's fees. Tolstrup v. Miller, 726 P.2d 1304, 1307 (Alaska 1986); Palfy v. Rice, 473 P.2d 606, 613 (Alaska 1970); Dale v. Greater Anchorage Area Borough, 439 P.2d 790, 793 (Alaska 1968). We have required only that the trial court specify its reasons in the record when it departs from the fee schedule of Rule 82(a). Hayes, 718 P.2d at 938-39; Patrick v. Sedwick, 413 P.2d 169, 179 (Alaska 1966). This the superior court did: Applying the formula of Rule 82(c)(1) [sic] to the net award of $86,900 would result in a fee award of $11,190. This sum does not provide an accurate criterion for the fee to be allowed, being insufficient to be commensurate with the amount and value of the legal services rendered. The trial lasted approximately five weeks (in excess of 24 trial days) and involved a very substantial number of witnesses, including experts on all sides. There was a large mass of exhibits, many of which were lengthy and detailed construction records. Attorney fees should accordingly be set under Rule 82(a)(2) rather than by the schedule in sub-paragraph (1) of the Rule. [4] BURKE, J., not participating. COMPTON, Justice, joined by MOORE, Justice, would reverse the decision of the superior court. For the following reason, they decline to express the basis of their disagreement with that decision: In the past, when this court has affirmed a lower court's decision by an evenly divided vote, our practice was to issue an order stating only that the decision was affirmed. There was neither publication nor statement of an expression of the reasons for affirmance or reversal of the lower court's decision. We believe this practice to be based upon sound, reasonable and necessary policy considerations involving litigants, the bar, the bench and the public. Since this order is not precedent, reasons for affirmance or reversal of the superior court decision are immaterial. Accordingly, we adhere to our prior practice and decline to express reasons for reversal.