Opinion ID: 1748512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Estoppel in Pais

Text: One other exception to the statutes requiring a writing is the doctrine of estoppel in pais. The owner of land, under some circumstances, may be estopped to deny the existence of an easement by making representations which have been acted upon by a purchaser to his detriment. While the Court of Civil Appeals held there was no evidence of authority to make the representations by the person who made them, there is testimony that representations were made to purchasers that they would have the run of the ranch; that the easements would exist on the entire ranch; and that one or more of the purchasers understood that these rights came with the land and were not dependent (entirely) on membership in the club. The exact nature and extent of the doctrine of estoppel in pais have not been clearly defined. It has been applied in some definite categories of suits involving land. Outside of these particular groups, however, the authority for its application is rare and nebulous. Most frequently the doctrine has been referred to in those cases arising out of dedication of a street, alley, or square. It is the dedication to the public which gives the rights in streets, parks, and similar areas the degree of certainty and permanency. But estoppel in pais is not dependent upon a dedication and may arise and exist independent of it. Harrison v. Boring, 44 Tex. 255, at 266 (1875); Wolf v. Brass, 72 Tex. 133, 12 S.W. 159 (1888); 3 Tiffany, Real Property (3rd ed.), 312 et seq., Easements, § 800. The areas of land involved in these cases, however, are generally well defined as are the servitudes sought to be imposed on them. The doctrine has also been used or referred to in opinions dealing with situations in which the owner sells land with reference to a map or plat upon which are shown and designated streets, alleys, squares and similar areas. It has been held that when a purchaser, relying upon such representations, buys with reference thereto and spends money to make improvements, the seller will not be heard to say that such easements do not exist. Oswald v. Grenet, 22 Tex. 94 (1858); Harrison v. Boring, 44 Tex. 255 (1875); Lamar County v. Clements, 49 Tex. 347 (1878). These cases involved a single lot or block of city land. In other cases, the land purchased is described in the deed as bounded by a street or way, and the grantor is estopped to deny the existence of the street or way. Because of the failure of the courts clearly to explain the true nature of estoppel in pais, Tiffany suggests that many of these cases would be based more properly on a construction of the grant in the light of the surrounding circumstances and upon the doctrine of implied easements, discussed above. 3 Tiffany, Real Property (3rd ed.), 315, § 800, Easements; and see 3 Powell, Real Property (1952), 413, § 409, Easements. The doctrine of estoppel in pais has been applied when the seller allows the purchaser to expend money on the servient tract, as for example a drainage ditch across the grantor's land, or a house or other structure which encroaches on the land of the servient estate. The lot owners here made no improvements on the servient estate. While estoppel cases are not limited to situations involving this type of expenditure, this group does form a large part of the cases affixing easements appurtenant by estoppel. The doctrine has also been applied in some instances to restrictions in subdivisions as to the type of structure to be built and its location on the land. 5 Powell, Real Property (1956), 148 et seq., § 672. In commenting on these cases involving equitable servitudes and promises concerning the use of land, Powell says that the extension of this doctrine has caused some judicial hesitance. Some courts have refused such an extension   . Other courts swallow the `promissory estoppel' without a gulp   . 5 Powell, Real Property (1956), 151, § 672. While the above does not purport to list all of the situations, pertinent here, in which estoppel in pais has been applied to real estate to circumvent the Statutes of Frauds and of Conveyances, it does illustrate the rather narrow band of cases in which the doctrine has been applied. We find no Texas authority for an extension of the doctrine to the broad facts here shown. Such authority as exists outside of Texas greatly preponderates against its extension. The case most strongly urged by the lot owners is McCleary v. Lourie, 80 N.H. 389, 117 A. 730 (1922). The case is discussed at length in the dissent hereto. It is clearly distinguishable because the plat of the subdivision was placed of record, and each deed recited that the lot thereby conveyed was a part of such plat or plan as duly recorded, thereby incorporating the plat or part of the grant to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. There is no corresponding plat of the 1000-acre ranch here or any reference in any deed to any such plat. The only plats of record were separate plats of the particular Subdivisions 1, 2, and 3. As we construe the plats of Eagle Rock Ranchitos 2 and 3, there is no corresponding area over which we could imply an easement by construction of the recorded plat or the individual deeds. The plat of Subdivision 1 is of 31.0 acres, and this would include only the lots and streets. There is shown on that plat the 19-acre club tract with areas marked as golf course, playground, etc. But the lot owners requested no issue as to this 19-acre tract. They treated it as part of the whole 1000 acres over which they sought easements for pleasure and recreation. And they have no point of error in this Court on this 19-acre club tract. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the authorities do not support an easement by estoppel in pais for pleasure and recreation to such an area as is involved here. We have further concluded that we should not extend the authorities. Our reasons follow. There are some preliminary considerations. Thompson states the rule to be that it is essential to the creation of estoppel that the representation be communicated to him [the promisee], that it be believed, and relied upon. 5 Thompson, Real Property (3rd ed.), 406 and 426, §§ 2616 and 2626. Here, nine plaintiffs sue as individuals and purport to represent other unnamed plaintiffs and the class of [all] lot owners. The jury found that representations were made to one or more of the plaintiffs. The evidence shows a variety of representations and reactions thereto. No issue was submitted to the jury on estoppel as to any individual. The respondents argue that the basis of estoppel is a personal matter: representations to, and proof of reliance by, the individual. We shall assume, without deciding, however, that this is a proper suit for a class action. The evidence, as pointed out above, was that brochures exhibited to purchasers said that members of the club have all the pleasure rights over the entire ranch property; that lot owners also became club members; and that the application for membership, signed by the lot owners, said, This application is made with the distinct understanding that    I acquire no interest whatsoever of any kind or character in or to the club property   . Respondents therefore contend that there is, therefore, no basis for estoppel. We shall assume, however, that other representations were made to one or more of the plaintiffs' sufficient to satisfy this feature of the case. The easement sought by estoppel is an easement appurtenant. Yet the rights sought have many of the characteristics of an easement in gross; i. e., privileges over the ranch which could be and were enjoyed by persons other than lot owners; privileges which were personally enjoyable but not necessary for the use of the purchased lots. Membership in the club was available to persons other than lot owners. As said in the Restatement under Promises Respecting the Use of Land, For a promise to run with the land of the promisor it is not enough that the performance of the promise operates to benefit either the promisor or the beneficiary of the promise in the use of the land but it must operate to benefit him in the physical use of the land. 5 Restatement, Property, 3220, § 537, Servitudes (1944). The main difficulties, however, with the lot owners' case is the nature and extent of the easements claimed, their indefiniteness, and enforcement of the rights claimed to have been obtained. As indicated above, easements for pleasure and recreation create grave problems even when expressly granted in writing. To say the least, they were not favored at common law. First, rights to go upon land to hike, camp out, study nature and the like were classed as licenses and not interests in land. Licenses to hunt and fish are common even today. This is not to say that such an easement or interest in land could not be created. But the authorities for the imposition by the courts of an easement appurtenant to land for such purposes are meager. The privileges sought here as an easement appurtenant to land by estoppel are indefinite. The run of the ranch, 1000 acres of land, contains no description of rights. Rights for pleasure and recreation over such an area is likewise indefinite. Some degree of definiteness in the scope or extent of an interest is essential to its recognition as a property interest. As set out above, the Restatement illustrates the point in this way: a right of way over a prescribed area is definite, but the privilege of strolling at pleasure through a field is too indefinite. 5 Restatement, Property, 2910, § 450 Servitudes (1944). And see Conard, Easement Novelties, 30 Calif.L.Rev., 125 at 138 (1942). A by-product of the indefiniteness of easements for recreation and pleasure, not contained in a writing, is the problem of their enforcement. If the court is to decree the easements, it must fix their terms and be in a position to see that they are enforced. Doing this for all of the various forms of recreation and pleasure over 1000 acres of land for years to come would be difficult indeed. If the airstrip, golf course, and the like are to retain their usefulness, they must be kept in repair. This problem relates to one of the requirements for the implication of an easement: that nothing be required of the grantor to perpetuate the easement. The easement which is implied is a negative one: that the grantor simply not interfere. In McCleary v. Lourie, 80 N.H. 389, 117 A. 730, discussed above and in the dissent hereto, no act was required of the grantor except to allow people to walk through a designated grove to the lake. Much more difficult problems are presented here. While it is not a controlling question here, the question as to who is to pay taxes on this 1000-acre area indefinitely is a consideration. The alternative to the land's being kept in repair is that it simply be left vacant and unkept for the use of lot owners. There is a rather strong public policy in favor of land use rather than non-use. The policy is also in favor of the free alienation of property, particularly as the title to the property is reflected on the public records. Viewing the problem from the State as a whole, to impose indefinite servitudes for pleasure and recreation on so large an area would tend to fetter estates, retard building and improvements thereon, and hinder the use of the land. 5 Powell, Real Property (1956), 153, § 673; Conard, An Analysis of Licenses in Land, 42 Columbia Law Review, 809, at 826 to conclusion (1942); 17-A American Jurisprudence, 646-647, § 37, Easements; 5 Restatement Property, 3179, Servitudes, § 526. As to the policy on alienability of land and unencumbered land titles, see 5 Restatement, Property, 3160. Again, this is not to say that parties could not make a definite agreement in writing for the use of land for pleasure and recreation. No such question is before us. But we do hold that under the facts presented here, the authorities do not support the fixing of easements by estoppel in pais, and we are unwilling to extend the doctrine to the extent necessary to affix them here. In an appropriate case, a purchaser may have relief by reformation of his deed or in a suit for damages. The lot owners here do not seek reformation; and except as to an alternative suit for damages against James, discussed below, they did not bring a suit for damages.