Opinion ID: 2587254
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's shackling during trial

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering that defendant be shackled. This court has held that a defendant cannot be subjected to physical restraints of any kind in the courtroom while in the jury's presence, unless there is a showing of a manifest need for such restraints. ( People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290-291, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322; People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 943-944, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574.) A defendant's record of violence, or the circumstance that he or she is a capital defendant, does not by itself justify shackling. ( Hawkins, at p. 944, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574; People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 293, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322.) The decision of a trial court to shackle a defendant will be upheld by a reviewing court in the absence of an abuse of discretion. ( People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 731, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2; People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 231-232, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643.) When the record does not reflect violence or a threat of violence or other nonconforming conduct by the defendant, a trial court's order imposing physical restraints will be deemed to constitute an abuse of discretion. ( People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 291, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322; People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th 900, 995, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) In the present case, following commencement of the trial and testimony by the first three witnesses and outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel sought permission to have defendant excused from the proceedings for an hour in order to sleep because, upon discovery the previous evening that defendant was in possession of a handcuff key, defendant had been kept awake, apparently for questioning on that matter. In the course of discussion between the court and counsel it was observed that the courtroom was not equipped with a lock on the door to prevent any escape attempt, and the bailiff at times had to turn away from defendant when preoccupied with various tasks. The trial court inquired of the bailiff, who reported that the sergeant downstairs preferred that defendant be shackled with leg irons. The trial court ordered that leg restraints will be permitted. Defense counsel objected on the basis that the trial court had made the order without holding any hearing on the matter. The trial court initially performed a visual test, by having a shackle placed upon defendant's leg and sitting in each of the juror chairs in the front row. The court determined that the chain was visible only from one chair and ordered that the chain and shackles be placed behind defense counsel's briefcase to impede the observation by that juror. The trial court then held a hearing. The deputy sheriff assigned to monitor prisoners being transported to the central jail in the evening testified that he had received a tip from another inmate riding the bus with defendant that morning, who had observed defendant locking and unlocking his handcuffs. The deputy sheriff conducted a search and retrieved a handcuff key placed inside a candy wrapper included with other candy in a plastic bag within a red cardboard briefcase in defendant's possession. Defendant testified that the previous morning, he had carried the plastic bag containing candy bars and cigarettes with him to court, leaving the bag in the holding cell with other prisoners to offer those items for sale. At the noon recess, he returned to the holding cell and found two candy bars had been sold. Before returning to the courtroom he was stripsearched. At the end of the day, when transported on the bus, he was handcuffed in such a manner that another inmate had to carry the bag. That evening at the jail, the deputy sheriff searched defendant and discovered the handcuff key. The trial court ordered that one of defendant's ankles be shackled to one arm of his chair. In subsequent proceedings, defense counsel noted for the record several times that when defendant shifted position, the jurors could hear his chains, and that when defendant walked across the room with chains clanking, several jurors observed the scene. As part of the jury instructions, the trial court advised the jurors that they could not discuss or consider defendant's restraints and that no connotation of guilt arose from the presence of such restraints. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Although, as the trial court recognized, defendant had not acted in a violent manner during his prior courtroom appearances, a trial court properly may order the imposition of restraints when there is evidence of other nonconforming conduct. ( People v. Duron, supra, 16 Cal.3d 282, 291, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322.) The trial court implicitly found that defendant had deliberately rather than inadvertently obtained a key to his handcuffs, indicating he might attempt to escape. That circumstance, together with the circumstance that the courtroom assigned for trial was not equipped with a lock, support the trial court's finding that restraints during courtroom sessions were necessary. (See People v. Stankemtz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 95-97, 270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23; People v. Sheldon (1989) 48 Cal.3d 935, 945-946, 258 Cal.Rptr. 242, 771 P.2d 1330.) The trial court also did not err in instructing the jury not to consider the restraints. In People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pages 291-292, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322, we advised that such instruction should not be given if the restraints have been concealed, unless the defendant so requests, because the instruction tends to draw attention to the very circumstance not to be considered by the jury. In the present case, however, the instruction was requested by the defendant, and it appears that several jurors may have become aware that some form of restraint was being employed. In view of that circumstance, the court was prudent to instruct on that assumption, rather than to assume the jurors were completely unaware of the restraints. Even assuming the trial court erred, however, there was no prejudice. Brief glimpses of a defendant in restraints have not been deemed prejudicial. ( People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th 569, 584-585, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142; People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d 282, 287, fn. 2, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322.) The record suggests that some members of the jury had glimpses of defendant's leg shackle, rather than protracted viewing of him in more extensive chains.