Opinion ID: 2263137
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judgment Against Gerard, Shane, Thompson, and York

Text: [¶ 11] An oral surgeon has a duty to warn a patient of learned dangers of implanted devices. Brawn I, 2003 ME 11, ¶ 17, 819 A.2d at 1023 (citing Welch v. McCarthy, 677 A.2d 1066, 1069 (Me.1996)). There is no duty to warn of obvious dangers. See Lorfano v. Dura Stone Steps, Inc., 569 A.2d 195, 197 (Me.1990). Therefore, once a patient discovers the risks associated with the implants, the surgeon's duty to warn expires, and any notice of claim filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations is barred. Brawn I, 2003 ME 11, ¶ 29, 819 A.2d at 1027. The applicable statute of limitations is 24 M.R.S. § 2902, which states: Actions for professional negligence shall be commenced within 3 years after the cause of action accrues. For the purposes of this section, a cause of action accrues on the date of the act or omission giving rise to the injury. [¶ 12] The only remaining cause of action left to these four patients after Brawn I is that described as a Category E claim: a breach of the duty to adequately advise the patient as to the risks to his/her health of leaving the implants in place. 2003 ME 11, ¶ 19, 819 A.2d at 1025. Regardless of when that cause of action accrued, there was no longer a cause of action once the patient knew about the dangers of leaving the implants in place. This is precisely what we stated in Brawn I: [T]he defendants' duty to warn expired when these plaintiffs became aware of the problem. Id. ¶ 29, 819 A.2d at 1027. [¶ 13] Gerard, Shane, Thompson, and York all became aware of the risks of leaving their implants in place at some point prior to having them removed. The court did not have to determine the exact date that these patients learned of the danger of leaving the implants in place because these patients all had their implants removed, and they waited more than three years after the removals to file notices of their claims. Gerard's implants were removed on June 17, 1992. She filed her notice of claim on June 19, 1995. Shane's implants were removed in October 1994, and she filed her notice of claim in December 1997. Thompson's implants were removed in 1987, but she did not file a notice of claim until 1995. York's implants were removed in February 1993, and she filed her notice of claim in December 1997. The Superior Court did not err in concluding that the duty to warn claims of Gerard, Shane, Thompson, and York are barred by the statute of limitations. [¶ 14] Brawn I disposed of any other claims that Gerard, Shane, and York may have had against the surgeons. [5] Therefore, the granting of the summary judgment motion against Gerard, Shane, and York was not in error. [¶ 15] Thompson, who was not a party in Brawn I, does not argue that she has any claim other than a Category E claim that remains viable under the reasoning of Brawn I. As to her Category E claim, she is in the same position as Gerard, Shane, and York with regard to the surgeons' duty to warn about the dangers of leaving the implants in place. Thus, the grant of summary judgment against her was also appropriate.