Opinion ID: 3032441
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Challenges to Scope of Injunctive Relief

Text: [9] The intervenors scatter a number of challenges to the scope of relief that amount to the contention that, although the district court could order the agency to comply with the ESA, it had to permit the continuing use of the pesticides during consultation. The purpose of the consultation process, however, is to prevent later substantive violations of the ESA. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d at 1389. The remedy for a substantial procedural violation of the ESA — a violation that is not technical or de minimis — must therefore be an injunction of the project pending compliance with the ESA. Id.; Peterson, 753 F.2d at 764. It is well-settled that a court can enjoin agency action pending completion of section 7(a)(2) requirements. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d at 1389; Peterson, 753 F.2d at 765. ESA section 7(d) also belies the intervenors’ contention that further injunctive relief could not be granted during consultation. Section (7)(d) states: 7742 WASHINGTON TOXICS COALITION v. EPA After initiation of consultation required under subsection (a)(2), the Federal agency and the permit or license applicant shall not make any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources with respect to the agency action which has the effect of foreclosing the formulation or implementation of any reasonable and prudent alternative measures which would not violate subsection (a)(2) of this section. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d). Section 7(d) was enacted to ensure that the status quo would be maintained during the consultation process, to prevent agencies from sinking resources into a project in order to ensure its completion regardless of its impacts on endangered species. See, e.g., Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 936 F. Supp. 738, 745 (N.D. Idaho 1996). There is no irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources at issue in the present case. Rather, it is the very maintenance of the “status quo” that is alleged to be harming the endangered species. The intervenors also argue that the district court erred by assigning EPA the burden of showing that its actions were non jeopardizing to endangered or threatened species, and instead should have made the plaintiffs demonstrate “imminent irreparable harm” or “substantial and immediate irreparable injury.” The intervenors alternatively argue that the district court did not properly balance the interest in protecting endangered species against the costs of the injunction when crafting the scope of the injunction. [10] We have held that the appropriate remedy for violations of the ESA consultation requirements is an injunction pending compliance with the ESA. See Peterson, 753 F.2d at 764. We have also allowed non-jeopardizing agency actions to continue during the consultation process. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d at 1376. We have not expressly stated who bears the burden of showing that the action is nonWASHINGTON TOXICS COALITION v. EPA 7743 jeopardizing, but the burden should be on the agency, the entity that has violated its statutory duty. Placing the burden on the acting agency to prove the action is non-jeopardizing is consistent with the purpose of the ESA and what we have termed its “institutionalized caution mandate[ ].” Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d at 1389. We said as much in Thomas v. Peterson, where the defendant, the U.S. Forest Service, urged the district court to conclude that absent proof by the plaintiffs to the contrary, a proposed project was not likely to affect an endangered or threatened species. 753 F.2d at 765. We held that this was an inappropriate finding for the district court to make. Id. “It is not the responsibility of the plaintiffs to prove, nor the function of the courts to judge, the effect of a proposed action on an endangered species when proper procedures have not been followed.” Id. The district court correctly assigned EPA the burden of proving that its actions were non-jeopardizing. The district court was not required to balance interests in protecting endangered species against the costs of the injunction when crafting its scope. Congress has decided that under the ESA, the balance of hardships always tips sharply in favor of the endangered or threatened species. See Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 1996). Finally, the EPA challenges protective measures for urban pesticide sales. The district court concluded that for the use of certain pesticides in urban areas, buffers alone are an insufficient remedy to ensure that jeopardy to endangered salmonids will be avoided. Rather than completely banning those pesticides in urban areas, the district court required EPA to develop and distribute point-of-sale notifications detailing pesticide harm to salmonids. EPA nevertheless argues this portion of the injunction impermissibly impinges on its authority. [11] The injunctive relief granted was well within the district court’s discretion to require compliance with the ESA 7744 WASHINGTON TOXICS COALITION v. EPA and to tailor a remedy pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. See United States v. Olander, 584 F.2d 876, 88081 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 443 U.S. 914 (1979).