Opinion ID: 2085891
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The details of the prior murder were irrelevant

Text: Because the State alleged that Thompson stole the murder weapon from Crandall and subsequently used it to kill Hillis and Beeler, the theft of the gun was relevant to this trial. Thompson's access to the gun was an important piece of circumstantial proof increasing the likelihood that he was the killer (or at least not excluding that possibility). Although Thompson conceded that he was a passenger in the car in which the murder weapon was found three months after the killings, Thompson never offered to stipulate that he had access to the murder weapon before the crimes, or to the specific fact that he stole the weapon from Crandall in February 1991. Rather, he chose to attack Percy's credibility. As a result, the decision to admit evidence of Thompson's access to the gun, and the State's offer of corroborative evidence to support Percy's version of the events in New Castle, was within the trial court's discretion. See, e.g., Watson v. State, 540 N.E.2d 598 (Ind.1989) (testimony concerning prior robbery was admissible in murder trial because the defendant had stolen the same type of pistol used to kill the victim); United States v. Day, 591 F.2d 861 (D.C.Cir.1978) (evidence of prior robbery was properly allowed where the murder weapon was taken during the robbery and was later found in the house where the defendant was arrested). [9] The issue, however, is whether that discretion was abused in the quantity and quality of the evidence admitted to corroborate Percy's testimony on this collateral point. Percy did not testify that Crandall was killed in his presence, only that he assumed Thompson shot him in the head. The fact of a shotgun wound could perhaps have been established by a police officer or otherwise without getting into whether it was fatal. Whether it was necessary to show that Thompson shot Crandall is a closer question, but we need not decide that point because the other material admitted clearly went beyond the pale and requires reversal. Two witnessesthe forensic pathologist and Percy's friend Mike Featheringilltestified to how Crandall died. The pathologist opined that Crandall died from a gunshot wound to the head. Inexplicably, Featheringill was also permitted to relate Percy's account of an execution style shooting. [10] The fact that Crandall was killed, and how that occurred, was potentially as prejudicial as any fact can be and had no bearing on whether Thompson stole the murder weapon from Crandall that day. Most seriously, the information, witness list, and verdict form from the Crandall murder trial were admitted into evidence. The fact of Thompson's conviction for murdering Crandall was wholly irrelevant to establishing his access to the murder weapon. See, e.g., United States v. Currier, 821 F.2d 52 (1st Cir.1987) (in prosecution for unlawful gun possession, recorded conversation between a police informant and the defendant about sale of the gun was properly admitted, but it was error to admit subsequent exchange on the same tape concerning unrelated drug sale). The State's contention that the extra details of the Crandall murder helped prove identity is unpersuasive. The identity exception to the general prohibition on propensity evidence is crafted primarily for signature crimes with a common modus operandi. The exception's rationale is that the crimes, or means used to commit them, were so similar and unique that it is highly probable that the same person committed all of them. Lockhart v. State, 609 N.E.2d 1093, 1097 (Ind. 1993). The only similarity here between the Crandall murder and the Indianapolis killings was the use of firearms to kill the victims (and different guns were used in each crime). Indeed, the State does not contend that these were signature crimes. Citing several cases, the State nonetheless urges a more expansive view of the identity exception to include evidence of prior crimes in which an instrumentality used in the current crime was acquired. These authorities, e.g., Maldonado v. State, 265 Ind. 492, 355 N.E.2d 843 (1976), however, stand for nothing more than what we have already concluded was permissiblea showing, with reasonable factual context, of access to the murder weapon. They are far from justifying irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence that has no relation to that point or to any other material fact in dispute. The State's fallback position, advanced at oral argument in this Court, is that all evidence related to the Crandall murder was properly admitted because Percy's credibility was under attack. Although corroboration of collateral facts is sometimes permissible to show credibility, see, e.g., Ind.Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(B), corroborative proof is limited by several considerations: (1) whether the challenged witness actually testified to what is sought to be corroborated; (2) whether the corroboration helps prove a material fact (relevance); and (3) whether the corroborative evidence, assuming it is relevant, is nonetheless so prejudicial that it must be excluded under Evidence Rule 403. United States v. Burke, 948 F.2d 23 (1st Cir.1991) (bootstrapping testimony related to extrinsic acts is admissible but only to the extent it is relevant to a material fact). Indeed, our decisions have cautioned that evidence of prior misconduct offered to bolster a key witness's testimony as to the current charge, although often probative on that point, is also quite prejudicial. Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind.1992). The allegedly corroborative evidence here was irrelevant. The fact that Crandall died and the fact that Thompson was convicted of his murder did not bear on any aspect of Percy's credibility because Percy did not testify to either subject. The prosecutor's contention at trial that the Crandall jury verdict constituted validation of Percy is a stretch no court can make. It is valid as a logical proposition only if one has an understanding of all the dynamics of the Crandall trial. Conviction there could have been based on forensic or other evidence wholly independent of Percy's testimony. In any event, the jury in this case did not and could not know all of the record in the Crandall trial. Without that knowledge it is impossible to conclude what, if any, validation of Percy the conviction represents.