Opinion ID: 2566323
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Cleppe's Interpretation of the Mere Possession Statute is Constitutional

Text: Defendants argue that Cleppe's interpretation of the mere possession statute is unconstitutional because the statute is vague, criminalizes innocent behavior, and adversely affects the right to intrastate and interstate travel. Defendants also contend that the doctrine of dominion or control is unconstitutionally vague. The party asserting that a statute is unconstitutionally vague must prove vagueness beyond a reasonable doubt. City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wash.2d 22, 26, 759 P.2d 366 (1988). Defendants fail to meet this standard and offer little analysis to support any of their constitutional arguments. As the Court of Appeals stated: Bradshaw and Latovlovici also assert that without a scienter element, RCW 69.50.401 is unconstitutionally vague and violative of substantive due process principles. But they have not adequately briefed these arguments. They fail to explain how persons of ordinary intelligence would not understand what the statute prohibits, nor do they cite any relevant authority to show how the statute violates substantive due process. Such naked castings into the constitutional sea are not sufficient to command judicial consideration and discussion. Bradshaw, 117 Wash.App. 1019, 2003 WL 21322200, at  (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Rosier, 105 Wash.2d 606, 616, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986) (quoting United States v. Phillips, 433 F.2d 1364, 1366 (8th Cir.1970))).