Opinion ID: 1122500
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: evidentiary stipulations to penalty-related allegations

Text: (2) Evidentiary stipulations have long been recognized as tactical trial decisions which counsel has discretion to make without the express authority of the client. (See Linsk v. Linsk (1969) 70 Cal.2d 272, 277 [74 Cal. Rptr. 544, 449 P.2d 760].) Counsel's authority to stipulate to evidentiary facts exists in criminal as well as civil cases. (See People v. Frank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 718, 731-732 [274 Cal. Rptr. 372, 798 P.2d 1215]; People v. Reeves (1966) 64 Cal.2d 766, 772-773 [51 Cal. Rptr. 691, 415 P.2d 35]; People v. Fisk (1974) 50 Cal. App.3d 364, 371 [123 Cal. Rptr. 414].) The Court of Appeal first addressed the impact of Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. 238, on evidentiary stipulations by counsel in People v. Chasco (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 271 [80 Cal. Rptr. 667] [ Chasco ].) In Chasco, defendant claimed that his attorney denied him the right to confront witnesses and exceeded his authority when the attorney stipulated that a substance contained in balloons sold to an informant by defendant was heroin. Addressing the authority of an attorney to stipulate to a crucial fact, the Court of Appeal held that while counsel may not stipulate away his client's only interest in the litigation, Boykin did not affect other evidentiary stipulations. Speaking for the court, former Justice Kaus explained: If it really follows from Boykin that every purported waiver of every constitutional right must be affirmatively shown to have been personally and intelligently made by the client, it would be necessary to stop the proceedings and have a hearing on that question every time the attorney declines to cross-examine a witness or fails to object to inadmissible evidence.... [¶] .... [¶] In this case we deal with a simple stipulation of fact, not fatal to the defense or even contradictory to the defendant's position at trial. We are convinced that in such a case the Constitution does not demand affirmative demonstration that it has not been violated. Just where the line between a guilty plea and a stipulation of fact such as ours should be drawn, we need not attempt to determine. There may be stipulations of fact so destructive of the accused's position at the trial that to permit them to be made without a showing of his intelligent consent is to court reversal. This is not such a case. (276 Cal. App.2d at pp. 274-276, fns. omitted.) In People v. McCoy (1974) 40 Cal. App.3d 854 [115 Cal. Rptr. 559], the Court of Appeal concluded that none of this court's intervening decisions cast doubt on the Chasco holding. In McCoy counsel had stipulated to the narcotic content of capsules seized from the defendant. The composition of the seized material was not critical to McCoy's defense to the charge that he offered to sell restricted drugs, but was essential to the possession offense of which he was convicted. The Court of Appeal nevertheless found no error in the trial court's acceptance of the stipulation without Boykin-Tahl advice and waivers. The court concluded that absent a basis for attacking the accuracy of the test or error in connection with determining the composition of the evidence, neither defendant nor defense counsel had anything to gain by refusing to stipulate. The decision by counsel to enter into the type of stipulation here in question parallels the type of tactical decisions which counsel must make as to which witnesses to call ... and to what extent the People's witnesses are to be cross-examined. These aspects of counsel's professional discretion do not lend themselves to the strictures attendant to a guilty plea or its equivalent. (40 Cal. App.3d at p. 859.) In People v. Stuckey, supra, 199 Cal. App.3d 876, on which the People rely for their argument that the Boykin-Tahl requirements are inapplicable to a defendant's admission that he was out on bail when he committed new offenses, the court reasoned that the defendant had stipulated only to one element of the section 12022.1 enhancement, the fact that he was out on bail. Because the People would still have to prove the other elements necessary to impose the enhancement  that the defendant was guilty of the primary and secondary offenses  before the enhancement would apply, the Court of Appeal concluded that the case resembled Chasco ( supra, 276 Cal. App.2d 271) and McCoy ( supra, 40 Cal. App.3d 854) more than Yurko ( supra, 10 Cal.3d 857). [6] In the instant case, however, the Court of Appeal found itself unable to distinguish Yurko, supra . It concluded that the stipulation by the defendant that he was out on bail was an admission of all of the evidentiary facts necessary to imposition of the enhancement since there was nothing left for the People to prove except that he had committed the primary and secondary offenses. The stipulation was, therefore, more than a mere factual or evidentiary admission  it was tantamount to a plea of guilty insofar as the enhancement allegation was concerned and the court was required to give Boykin-Tahl advice and obtain waivers of his rights from the defendant. (3) We do not agree that when a section 12022.1 enhancement is alleged a stipulation to the defendant's bail or own recognizance status is tantamount to a plea of guilty, or that the Boykin-Tahl requirements are applicable to an evidentiary stipulation which does not admit the truth of the allegation itself or every fact necessary to imposition of the additional punishment other than conviction of the underlying offense. Unless the stipulation or admission is that broad, it does not have the definite penal consequences necessary to trigger the Boykin-Tahl requirements. An admission or stipulation of facts alleged in most enhancement allegations will lead to imposition of increased punishment on conviction of the underlying offense. [7] The enhancement provided by section 12022.1 differs, however, since the enhancement is not applicable if the defendant is not convicted of the primary offense. Unless he stipulates both to the bail/own recognizance element of the enhancement and that he is guilty of or has been convicted of the primary offense, his stipulation to the former will not necessarily lead to imposition of the enhanced penalties authorized by section 12022.1. It is clear that Boykin does not mandate the rule adopted by the Court of Appeal. Boykin proceeded in three steps: 1. Recognition that [a] plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction.... (395 U.S. at p. 242 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 279].) 2. Reasoning that a confession may not be admitted in evidence unless there is a `reliable determination on the voluntariness issue which satisfies the constitutional rights of the defendant.' ( Ibid. ) 3. Applying the standard for waiver of the constitutional right to counsel which the court had held ( Carnley v. Cochran (1962) 369 U.S. 506, 516 [8 L.Ed.2d 70, 77-78, 82 S.Ct. 884]) may not be presumed from a silent record. The record must show that the defendant was offered counsel and intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. ( Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 242 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 279].) But the high court required that the record reflect the voluntary and intelligent nature of a guilty plea, not admission of a fact or facts which, if proved, would, with proof of other facts, support a conviction: [A] plea of guilty is more than an admission of conduct; it is a conviction. Ignorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, subtle or blatant threats might be a perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality. ( Boykin, supra, 395 U.S. 238, 242-243 [23 L.Ed.2d at pp. 279-280], fn. omitted.) The court was concerned with determination of guilt of a criminal offense without trial and the danger that the guilty pleading defendant's constitutional rights might not have been adequately protected. It was unwilling to assume that representation by counsel ensured that the defendant was pleading guilty voluntarily and intelligently. That was the limit of its concern. When a defendant who has asserted and received his right to trial, and has waived none of his constitutional rights, elects to stipulate to one or more, but not all, of the evidentiary facts necessary to a conviction of an offense or to imposition of additional punishment on finding that an enhancement allegation is true, the concerns which prompted the Boykin holding are not present. No Supreme Court decision in which the voluntariness of a defendant's plea was in question suggests that the court's concern in Boykin extended beyond the issues of voluntariness which arise when a defendant admits a charge and, as a result, no trial on his guilt or innocence of the charge is held. The court expressly acknowledged that this was the focus of its concern in Brady v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 742 [25 L.Ed.2d 747, 90 S.Ct. 1463], stating: The importance of assuring that a defendant does not plead guilty except with a full understanding of the charges against him and the possible consequences of his plea was at the heart of our recent decisions in McCarthy v. United States, supra , and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). (397 U.S. at p. 749, fn. 6 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 757].) [8] In Brady itself the court emphasized the nature of a guilty plea as a grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and discernment.... [I]t is the defendant's consent that judgment of conviction may be entered without a trial  a waiver of his right to trial before a jury or a judge. ( Brady v. United States, supra, 397 U.S. 742, 748 [25 L.Ed.2d 747, 756]. See also, Henderson v. Morgan (1976) 426 U.S. 637, 645 [49 L.Ed.2d 108, 114-115, 96 S.Ct. 2253] [And clearly the plea could not be voluntary in the sense that it constituted an intelligent admission that he committed the offense....].) The federal circuits are in substantial agreement that where a defendant has pleaded not guilty and stipulates to evidentiary facts, even facts crucial to a conviction, Boykin and its rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure counterpart are not applicable. While the stipulation must be voluntary and intelligent, it is not mandatory that the court ensure that this appears on the face of the record, and the reviewing court does not apply a test which mandates reversal if the record fails to include Boykin-Tahl or equivalent advice. ( Adams v. Peterson (9th Cir.1992) 968 F.2d 835, 841. See also, United States v. Lyons (1st Cir.1990) 898 F.2d 210, 215; United States v. Shuster (9th Cir.1984) 734 F.2d 424, 425; United States v. Robertson (5th Cir.1983) 698 F.2d 703, 705; United States v. Stalder (8th Cir.1982) 696 F.2d 59, 60; Witherspoon v. United States (6th Cir.1980) 633 F.2d 1247, 1250. But see United States v. Lawson (D.C. Cir.1982) 682 F.2d 1012, 1015 [221 App.D.C. 63], distinguishing United States v. Brown (D.C. Cir.1970) 428 F.2d 1100, 1102-1103 [138 App.D.C. 398].) The defendant here did not, as the Court of Appeal concluded, stipulate to all of the evidentiary facts necessary to imposition of the additional penalty provided by section 12022.1. He stipulated only that he had been released on bail when the offense charged against him was committed. Before the enhanced penalty authorized by section 12022.1 could be imposed the People not only had to prove that defendant committed the secondary offense, but also convict him or demonstrate that he had been convicted of the primary offense. Thus, defendant's stipulation that he was on bail was an ordinary evidentiary stipulation. The Court of Appeal erred, therefore, in concluding that this stipulation was the equivalent of an admission of the truth of the enhancement allegation which called into play the Boykin-Tahl and Yurko requirements. Nothing in those cases obliges the court to advise a defendant of the right to jury trial, and to confrontation and cross-examination, and of the privilege against self-incrimination prior to accepting a stipulation that does no more than relieve the People of the burden of offering evidence of the existence of an element of a sentence enhancement. This is true regardless of whether the stipulation is made by counsel or by the defendant personally. Since the stipulation is not an admission of the truth of the enhancement allegation or of all the facts necessary to find the allegation true and impose the penalty, Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d 857, does not mandate that the stipulation be accompanied by Boykin-Tahl advice and waivers or that defendant be advised of the penal consequences of a finding that the allegation is true.