Opinion ID: 1349697
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Leave for Union Business. There are seven types of leave for union business. The employee is compensated by the state in whole or in part.[[3]]

Text: 2. Jury Duty Leave. The employee is granted administrative leave for jury duty, with full pay. 3. Time off for Court Appearances. The employee is entitled to administrative leave with full pay. However, if an employee appears in court in any capacity other than as a witness for the People, he or she will not be considered as being on duty, nor will administrative leave be granted. 4. Sick Leave. The employee may use accrued sick time, annual leave, or lost time to cover periods of approved medical absence. All sick leave must be approved by the employer. 5. Annual Leave. Initial annual leave is available upon approval of the employer, for such purposes of voting, religious observances, and necessary personal business. 6. Paid Leave. The employee is authorized to use paid leave for education and systematic improvement of knowledge or skills required in the performance of their work. The State Personnel Director reviewed the objections filed by the employees; however, it found no basis for delaying the effective date of the enactment of the revised rule. Therefore, on July 14, 1988, the revised rule became effective. The employee unions commenced the instant action in Wayne Circuit Court for a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining enforcement of revised Rule 1-5.7, and for declaratory relief. The parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition. On October 28, 1988, the circuit court granted summary disposition for plaintiffs. It ruled that the plaintiff employee organizations had standing to assert the claims and that the commission had exceeded its authority and violated the Michigan political freedom act. The trial court did not reach the constitutional issues raised in counts I and III of the complaint. The commission appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. 191 Mich.App. 535, 478 N.W.2d 722 (1991) (hereinafter AFL-CIO I ). The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling that plaintiffs had standing to seek a declaratory judgment. Id. at 544-549, 478 N.W.2d 722. However, it reversed the ruling that the revised rule violated the political freedom act. Plaintiffs argued that union leave is off-duty time that is beyond the scope of regulation by the Civil Service Commission. However, the Court rejected plaintiffs' characterization of union leave as off-duty time because Rule 1-5.7 defines union leave time as actualduty. AFL-CIO I at 550-551, 478 N.W.2d 722. The Court stated that actual duty means on-the-job behavior related to job performance, including activities of classified employees during work hours for which they are being compensated. The Court relied on Council No. 11, AFSCME v. Civil Service Comm., 408 Mich. 385, 408, 292 N.W.2d 442 (1980), in which this Court stated that the commission's `sphere of authority' delimits its rule-making power and confines its jurisdiction over the political activity of classified personnel to on-the-job behavior related to job performance. The Court of Appeals held that a prohibition against political activity by classified employees is permissible under the political freedom act if three conditions are satisfied: (1) The classified employee receives some form of compensation for the time spent on leave, (2) The employee would be performing duties at the usual job site if the employee were not on leave, and (3) The employee is permitted to leave for a specific purpose approved by the employer. [ AFL-CIO I, supra at 550, 478 N.W.2d 722.] The Court concluded that the release of employees under union leave was part of the employees' duties for which they were compensated, therefore the union leave programs at issue did not implicate classified employees' off-duty activities. The Court remanded the case for consideration of plaintiffs' pending constitutional claims. Id. at 552, 478 N.W.2d 722. The parties again filed cross-motions for summary disposition with respect to the constitutional claims. Judge Hausner granted summary disposition for the commission, finding that the rule did not violate equal protection or due process, and further that there was no violation of free speech and association. After remand, plaintiffs appealed, and in a decision issued February 6, 1995, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs' constitutional claims. 208 Mich.App. 479, 528 N.W.2d 811 (1995) (hereinafter AFL-CIO II ). It held that the revised rule affects the Civil Service Commission's legitimate ban on partisan political activity during actual-duty hours. Nothing in this rule offends a recognized Michigan or federal constitutional right to free speech or assembly. The state government, as an employer, most assuredly may restrict the partisan political activity of its employees while they are on duty. Id. at 491, 528 N.W.2d 811. The Court also disagreed with the plaintiffs that the revised rule is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that it violates equal protection and due process. It affirmed the decision of the trial court on remand. Plaintiffs filed a delayed application for leave to appeal to this Court. In an order dated December 19, 1995, this Court remanded to the Court of Appeals to address plaintiffs' argument that Rule 1-5.7 unconstitutionally bans speech and association on the basis of the content of the speech. The Court of Appeals issued a supplemental opinion on remand on March 8, 1996, unpublished opinion per curiam (Docket No 191523), which stated in part, [t]he rule arose out of a specific incident of partisan political activities while employees were on union leave and the Commission amended the rule to address that problem. Unless and until evidence is adduced that the Commission fails to prevent other partisan political activity that comes to its attention in a similar fashion, we cannot identify a content-based abrogation of speech or association rights, much less a violation of equal protection. The plaintiffs again appealed to this Court, and this Court granted leave on May 22, 1996. 451 Mich. 898, 549 N.W.2d 578.