Opinion ID: 1987358
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of administrative regulation.

Text: In Rietze v. Williams, 458 S.W.2d 613 (Ky.1970), our predecessor court held that because KRS 13.081 provided that all administrative regulations have the force and effect of law, they had the same effect as statutes or ordinances enacted directly by the General Assembly; thus, the violation of an administrative regulation is the equivalent of a violation of a statute, and a person injured by a violation may recover from the violator such damages as he or she sustained by reason of the violation. Id. at 617. However, KRS 13.081, the foundation for that holding, was subsequently repealed, 1974 Ky. Acts, ch. 73, § 7, and has not been reenacted or replaced by a general statute of similar import. In Centre College v. Trzop, 127 S.W.3d 562 (Ky.2003), we overruled Rietze to the extent that it relied on KRS 13.081 for the proposition that KRS 446.070 allows recovery for violation of an administrative regulation. Id. at 566. In Lomayestewa v. Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, 589 S.W.2d 885 (Ky.1979), the Court equated the violation of an administrative regulation with the violation of a statute. [I]t is crystal clear there was a violation of the regulation and, of course, no inspector had any authority to relieve the hospital of compliance with the statutory standard. Having determined there was a violation of the statutory standard, we have no trouble in determining that Jessica was one of the class of persons intended to be protected by the regulation, and her jump from the window was an event that the regulation was designed to prevent. Id. at 887. It is unclear whether the violation in Lomayestewa occurred prior to the repeal of KRS 13.081. In Britton v. Wooten, 817 S.W.2d 443 (Ky.1991), the violation clearly occurred after the repeal of KRS 13.081; nevertheless, the Court reiterated that violations of administrative regulations, like statutory violations, constitute negligence, per se, and the basis for liability if found to be a substantial factor in causing the result. Id. at 447 (citing only Rietze and Higgins Inv., Inc. v. Sturgill, 509 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1974), another case in which the violation occurred prior to the repeal of KRS 13.081). Because KRS 446.070 was not mentioned in any of the Rietze line of cases, it is unclear whether the decisions were premised upon that statute, as this Court has previously stated. Centre College, 127 S.W.3d at 567 (concluding that KRS 446.070 allows for a private right of action only for the violation of regulations that are consistent with their enabling legislation). Another possibility is that the Lomayestewa and Britton Courts were recognizing a common law cause of action based on the violation of an administrative regulation, assuming that such a common law cause of action exists. Cf. Phoenix Amusement Co. v. White, 306 Ky. 361, 208 S.W.2d 64, 67 (1948) (suggesting but not deciding that the violation of an administrative regulation would give rise to a common law right of action if the injury was of a type that the regulation was designed to prevent). We need not decide here whether such a common law cause of action exists; for KRS 338.031(1)(b), the statute under which the KOSHA regulations were promulgated, specifically provides that [e]ach employer. . . [s]hall comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this chapter. Since those standards are promulgated in the regulations adopted by the Kentucky Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board, KRS 338.051(3); KRS 338.061(1), the violation of a KOSHA regulation would constitute a violation of KRS 338.031(1)(b), thus triggering the right of action created by KRS 446.070.