Opinion ID: 1614413
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the voluntary intoxication defense

Text: Every jurisdiction in this country recognizes the general principle that voluntary intoxication is not any excuse for crime. [1] This is in accord with the common-law rule dating back to the sixteenth century which allowed no concession to a defendant because of his intoxication. [2] However, by the early nineteenth century, the English courts began to fashion a doctrine to mitigate the harshness and rigidity of the traditional rule. [3] The doctrine, which has come to be known as the exculpatory rule, was stated by Judge Stephen as follows: [A]lthough you cannot take drunkenness as any excuse for crime, yet when the crime is such that the intention of the party committing it is one of its constituent elements, you may look at the fact that a man was in drink in considering whether he formed the intention necessary to constitute the crime. [4] It is said that the theory behind this exculpatory doctrine is that it does not hold that drunkenness will excuse crime; rather, it inquires whether the very crime which the law defines has in fact been committed. [5] Almost every state, by statute or by common law, has adopted the exculpatory rule, [6] and Michigan is no exception. [7] While it is true that drunkenness cannot excuse crime, it is equally true that when a certain intent is a necessary element in a crime, the crime cannot have been committed when the intent did not exist. People v Walker, 38 Mich 156, 158 (1878). See, also, People v Crittle, 390 Mich 367; 212 NW2d 196 (1973). The applicability of the exculpatory rule rests entirely on the determination whether the offense involved is categorized as a general- or specific-intent crime. It is important in this decision to emphasize that intoxication may only negative the existence of specific intent. Examination of the cases reveals that where the rule was applied, it was done so in cases where the crime charged also involved a specific intent. People v Guillett, 342 Mich 1, 6; 69 NW2d 140 (1955). See, also, Roberts v People, 19 Mich 401 (1870). Thus, if a crime is determined to require only a general intent, the defendant's voluntary intoxication during the commission of an offense may not be asserted as a defense to the existence of the mental element of that crime. The general intent-specific intent dichotomy arose as a compromise between the perceived need to afford some relief to the intoxicated offender whose moral culpability was considered less than that of a sober person who committed the same offense and the view that a person who voluntarily becomes drunk and commits a crime should not escape the consequences. [8] Although the rule seems logical on the surface, it has proven to be far from logical in application. While specific intent can easily be defined as a particular criminal intent beyond the act done [9] (whereas general intent is the intent simply to do the physical act), the ease of stating the definition belies the difficulty of applying it in practice. In order to appreciate the problem, one need only note the divergence of opinion among the jurisdictions as to which crimes require a specific intent and, therefore, to which crimes the exculpatory rule applies. [10] It has been noted that the law with respect to voluntary intoxication and criminal responsibility has shown little tendency to change or develop despite advances socially and medically in this area; [11] and, we might add, despite strong criticism from treatise writers, [12] law review commentators, [13] case law, [14] and the drafters of the Model Penal Code. [15] My Brother LEVIN summarized the major criticisms of the exculpatory rule while on the Court of Appeals: It has also been maintained that the availability of the intoxication defense should not depend on whether a court chooses to characterize an element of the crime charged as separate from the element of general intent. It has been observed that neither common experience nor psychology knows of any such phenomenon as `general intent' distinguishable from `specific intent.' It does seem incongruous to make the admissibility of mitigating evidence depend on whether the statutory definition of a crime includes a separately stated intent, and other methods of defining specific intent are highly manipulable. The clumsiness of the exculpatory device has been criticized. A defendant who is charged with a specific intent crime may go free if he can prove he was intoxicated; this result contrasts sharply with the absolute denial of relief to the intoxicated offender charged with a crime of general intent. If the function of the general/specific intent distinction is to eliminate the defense as to lesser included offenses, e.g., assault and battery, but to retain it for the more serious offenses, e.g., armed robbery, and in that manner mitigate the general rule that intoxication is not a defense, then manifestly this should be done on a consistent basis. The right to interpose this defense should depend on something more substantial than a technical distinction that was seized upon by a judge 130 years ago and adopted by other judges to reach results thought sound in the cases then before them. People v Kelley, 21 Mich App 612, 628-630; 176 NW2d 435 (1970). While we recognize the illogic and incongruity of the general intent-specific intent dichotomy, the remedy is not clear-cut. One solution, of course, would be to join the ranks of those few states which do not allow the voluntary intoxication defense even where a specific intent is required. We agree, however, with Professors LaFave and Scott that this view is clearly wrong. [16] It would require us to ignore basic concepts of criminal culpability as well as modern scientific views on alcoholism. The alternative would be to allow the intoxication defense to be asserted against any charge of crime which traditionally has required general or specific intent. Although this Court has the power to so modify the common-law rule, [17] we believe that it would be imprudent to take that step at this time. While abolishing the general intent-specific intent distinction may rid the courts of an illogical rule, it would do nothing to help solve the problem of the intoxicated offender, both from the standpoint of the offender and from the standpoint of society which suffers from the acts of the intoxicated offender. Moreover, because the parties before us did not specifically address the issue of abolishing the exculpatory rule, we do not have the benefit of an adversarial presentation of the pros and cons of such an action. This Court should be hesitant to abolish an established common-law rule without a fully developed presentation of both sides of the question. The problem of alcoholism and crime is complex, requiring studies and policy considerations beyond the ability of any judicial body. Various solutions which have been proposed would require legislative action. [18] We urge the Legislature to consider the intoxicated-offender problem and to modernize Michigan law on this subject. Until the Legislature takes action or until we are persuaded to modify the common-law rule in an appropriate case in the future, we shall continue to struggle with applying the rule case by case.