Opinion ID: 1402408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: WMWA Claims

Text: The parties raise three issues regarding the WMWAthe measure of damages for its violation, the applicability of exemptions under the statute, and the statute of limitations for claims under the WMWA. The employees argue the Court of Appeals correctly held the WMWA entitles them to their regular or agreed rate of pay as compensation for the time spent at orientation. We disagree. The Court of Appeals and the employees are laboring under an erroneous interpretation of the law. In United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 1001 v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 84 Wash.App. 47, 51, 925 P.2d 212 (1996), review denied, 133 Wash.2d 1021, 950 P.2d 478 (1997), the Court of Appeals mistakenly interpreted the WMWA when it wrote: [u]nder that statutory scheme, an employee has a right to be paid either his or her regular wage or, when appropriate, overtime for all time worked. While the Court of Appeals was correct with regard to overtime pay, it erred as to minimum wage claims. The WMWA directs an employer to pay an employee not less than the minimum wage. RCW 49.46.020. [4] Nowhere does it guarantee an employee be paid his or her regular wage, nor does it provide any remedy for an employer's failure to pay an employee for all time worked. [5] RCW 49.46.090(1) instead sets the statutory measure of damages for minimum wage violations by mandating that an employer who pays an employee less than the wages to which he or she is entitled shall be liable to that employee for the full amount of such wage rate, less any amount actually paid to such employee by the employer, and for costs and such reasonable attorney's fees as may be allowed by the court. [6] The WMWA does not assure payment of contractually agreed wage rates; it only requires that an employer pay the minimum wage for straight time. RCW 49.46.020(1). This is consistent with the concept of a minimum wage statute. The statute merely sets the floor below which the agreed rate cannot fall without violating the statute. Thus, the employees' recovery under the WMWA is limited to the statutory minimum wage. As previously noted, RCW 49.52.050 and.070, not the WMWA, provide the statutory remedy for unpaid wages owing under a contract. Chapters 49.48 and 49.52 RCW reinforce contract obligations to pay above minimum wage rates. Although RCW 49.48.010 applies only to wages due upon termination, RCW 49.52.050 is not so limited. See Pope v. University of Wash., 121 Wash.2d 479, 489, 852 P.2d 1055, 871 P.2d 590 (1993). In fact, the purpose of RCW 49.52.050 is to see that the employee shall realize the full amount of the wages which by statute, ordinance, or contract he is entitled to receive from his employer, and which the employer is obligated to pay[.] Schilling v. Radio Holdings, Inc., 136 Wash.2d 152, 159, 961 P.2d 371 (1998). This is far broader than establishing the minimum wage and minimum standards of employment set out in the WMWA. The employees next argue an employee is exempt from the WMWA only when paid on a salary basis, and because they were not employed at the time they attended the orientation sessions, they were not employed in an executive, administrative, or professional capacity; therefore, they do not fall within the exemption. The employees are correct that RCW 49.46.010(5)(c) specifically exempts any individual employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity[.] However, their concluding inference is incorrect. If the employees were not employed when they attended the orientation sessions, then they were not covered by the WMWA at all because an employee under the act is any individual employed by an employer. RCW 49.46.010(5). Furthermore, the trial court correctly ruled the mandatory pre-employment orientation sessions were work. The employees cannot claim relief under the WMWA and then simultaneously argue they were not employed within the meaning of the statute. The trial court correctly held Boeing employees hired into executive, administrative, and professional positions were not entitled to statutory relief under the WMWA. Finally, the parties disagree about the applicable statute of limitations for WMWA claims. The employees argue the three-year statute of limitations of RCW 4.16.080(2) applies. Boeing contends an action under the WMWA is subject to the two-year catch-all statute of limitations provided under RCW 4.16.130, citing Cannon v. Miller, 22 Wash.2d 227, 155 P.2d 500, 157 A.L.R. 530 (1945). In siding with the employees, the courts below held such a suit is governed by the three-year statute applicable to actions for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated[.] RCW 4.16.080(2). Accord Sorey v. Barton Oldsmobile, 82 Wash.App. 800, 919 P.2d 1276 (1996), review granted, 131 Wash.2d 1001, 932 P.2d 643 (1997). Although this holding seems contradictory to Cannon, the trial court cited a host of cases that question Cannon's continued viability. In particular, these cases addressed that portion of RCW 4.16. 080(2), unaddressed in Cannon, regarding actions to vindicate rights. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bond v. State, 59 Wash.2d 493, 368 P.2d 676 (1962) (mandamus action to compel veteran's preference in state employment); Stenberg v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 104 Wash.2d 710, 718, 709 P.2d 793 (1985) (the relevant issue is whether the claim is for an injury to the rights of another irrespective of its basis in statutory law); Lewis v. Lockheed Shipbuilding & Constr. Co., 36 Wash.App. 607, 676 P.2d 545 (1984) (action under law against discrimination, chapter 49.60 RCW governed by three, not two, year statute); Sorey v. Barton Oldsmobile, 82 Wash.App. 800, 806, 919 P.2d 1276 (1996) (That proposition [that a claim based upon wage and hour statutes is not a contract claim] does not in any way diminish the argument that violation of a wage and hour statute is an invasion of a personal right subject to the three-year statute of limitations[.]). The trial court concluded we had not addressed in Cannon the rights vindication language found in RCW 4.16.080(2). We hold the three-year statute of limitations of RCW 4.16.080(3) applies to WMWA claims and take this occasion to overrule Cannon. Cannon not only failed to address the rights vindication language of RCW 4.16.080(2), it also failed to address the rationale we articulate here. Boeing did not contract with the employees to pay for orientation; therefore, the six-year statute of limitations set forth in RCW 4.16.040(1) for written contracts does not apply. Moreover, RCW 4.16.080(2), the statute the employees contend applies, has generally been applied to torts and tort-like claims, not labor and employment claims. We decline to adopt the employees' suggestion that a claim under the WMWA is akin to a civil rights action or tort action because this approach essentially eviscerates RCW 4.16.130. Any action in court upholds a right of some sort. But we note that Washington case law has applied a three-year statute of limitations to claims involving unjust enrichment. RCW 4.16.080(3). [7] See Dam v. General Elec. Co., 265 F.2d 612, 614 (9th Cir.1958) (quoting Halver v. Welle, 44 Wash.2d 288, 295, 266 P.2d 1053 (1954)); Cain v. Source One Mortgage Servs. Corp., 1999 WL 674776, 97 Wash.App. 1014 (Wash.App.Div.I, Aug. 30, 1999). The employees' WMWA claims are more analogous to claims for unjust enrichment than to tort claims. Although Boeing did not contract with the employees to pay for orientation, there is still a legal obligation imposed in law that an employer must pay an employee at least the minimum wage for work. And because its mandatory pre-employment orientation sessions were deemed work, under the WMWA, Boeing is required to pay the employees not less than the minimum wage for that work, which it did not do. See RCW 49.46.020(1). Thus, in instituting this action, the employees are in essence seeking recovery under an obligation imposed by law, and the WMWA, for Boeing's unjust enrichment (i.e., receiving the benefit of the employees' work without paying for the work.) As such, the employees' claims are subject to the three-year statute of limitations applicable to implied contracts, as provided under RCW 4.16.080(3).