Opinion ID: 1179927
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Claims against Smith

Text: Appellant relies on Case v. Goss to support her claim that summary judgment was improper in this instance. In that case, appellant was permanently injured after slipping on a hidden grease spot. Appellant had previously complained of the unsafe condition to the safety coordinator and other co-employees, and we reversed summary judgment as to those who had knowledge of the unsafe conditions. Smith, as chief executive officer, was responsible for the management and supervision of the Cheyenne Steam Laundry. It is undisputed that Smith knew perc was a dangerous chemical and purchase of the Multimatic machine was an acknowledgment or knowledge within the industry that perc was much more dangerous to handle and that there were requirements to meet certain levels of emission. He stated he was not responsible for employee safety at the Laundry; when the Laundry was cited for OSHA violations, he instructed the plant supervisor to inform employees about hazardous materials. Smith was aware of the amount of perc permitted in the atmosphere to meet acceptable standards, but the Laundry did not have a formal measuring device to gauge the amount of perc emitted in the plant. Smith stated that he did not know what level of perc in the atmosphere would cause death, lightheadedness, eye or nose irritation, dizziness or could be detected by smell nor did he know of other symptoms indicating an overdose of perc. In Poulos, we reversed summary judgment for an employee acting as an on-site supervisor of the deceased who had himself entered the tanks containing highly dangerous fumes and became aware of their dangerous nature. Poulos, 765 P.2d at 367. We reasoned that a jury could find a known or obvious risk presenting a high probability of harm. Id. Comparing these facts to Poulos, we find that Smith had not engaged in the same procedure that was the apparent cause of appellant's injury, though he had previously inhaled perc in a confined space. Smith was not present at the plant when appellant's injury occurred on December 5, 1986; indeed, he was not even employed by the Laundry at that time. Though he may have been aware of the possibility of harm from perc, the evidence does not suggest that he knew the degree of danger presented to appellant by operating the Multimatic machine nor did he know that appellant was doing anything other than what she had been hired to do, the job of a marker/assembler. As in Poulos, we find that though OSHA violations may be evidence of ordinary negligence, they do not demonstrate a state of mind consistent with culpable negligence, which requires knowledge or obviousness of a high probability of harm. Poulos, 765 P.2d at 366. As in Case, Smith did not have direct supervisory control over appellant, but had only a general duty to supervise and maintain a safe workplace. Case, 776 P.2d at 194. Smith did not possess the state of mind required to show culpable negligence, that approaching intent to do harm. There is no evidence that Smith knew that perc, in the way it was used at the Laundry, could cause injury to appellant nor did he know that the Multimatic machine's cycle was being interrupted and clothes wet with perc removed to the dryer. We find that our discussion in Calkins is appropriate here: If appellant in this case is to avoid a summary judgment, he must come forth with evidence that [appellees] had actual knowledge that the pump was unguarded and that their failure to provide a guard was done willfully. It is not sufficient for appellant to show that the [appellees'] failure to maintain the pump in a safe condition was careless, inadvertent or an error in judgment. Barnette, 622 P.2d 1349 [1981]. It is not sufficient for appellant to show that in failing to place a guard on the drive shaft the [appellees] violated OSHA regulations, breached a duty to provide a safe workplace or acted ineffectually or unreasonably. See Poulos, 765 P.2d at 365 [Wyo.1988]; Stephenson [v. Pacific Power & Light Co. ], 779 P.2d 1169 [Wyo.1989]; and Baros, [ v. Wells ], 780 P.2d 341 [Wyo.1989]. The case law is clear that appellant must show that the [appellees] knew of the risk of harm or that the risk was obvious and yet they willfully disregarded the risk. The evidence in the record fails to make such a showing. Calkins, 796 P.2d at 456 (emphasis added). Following our reasoning in Calkins, we do not find evidence to show that the risk of harm to appellant was obvious, or that Smith willfully disregarded this risk. Though Smith may have been aware generally of the possibility of harm, there is no evidence that he was aware of the degree of danger presented by using the Multimatic in the manner employed by appellant, that the Multimatic was being used in that fashion, or that appellant was operating it. Calkins, 796 P.2d at 456. We affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Smith.