Opinion ID: 362303
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hemby's Complaint

Text: 37 Whether Hemby adequately met the requirements of Section 717 is a more difficult question. Our review is facilitated somewhat by the fact that we need only ascertain whether he did so as to any one instance of discrimination. If he did, the District Court erred in dismissing his suit; and whether Hemby can gain a remedy for any of the other episodes must be determined originally in the District Court. 101 38 There is at least one instance of sufficient compliance with Section 717. In December, 1973, a trial board recommended that Hemby be removed from the police force. Before the Mayor acted upon this recommendation 102 perhaps to finalize it, or perhaps to order reinstatement and backpay Hemby complained to the Mayor that the Department was in violation of Title VII 103 by retaliating against him for having brought his lawsuit. 104 This was sufficient notice of Hemby's discrimination claim, for it identi(fies) precisely the substance of the cause of action subsequently asserted and the factual basis of that claim. 105 If the complaint should have been addressed elsewhere, the Mayor, we think, had an obligation to refer Hemby to the proper forum. 106 39 Though the Mayor had not disposed of the charge, Hemby amended his complaint in the District Court to include his allegation of discrimination. Since, at that point, there was no final administrative decision on that allegation, appellee could have successfully moved for dismissal. Now, however, 180 days have elapsed since the Mayor first learned of Hemby's discrimination grievance without any action thereon, and Hemby is free to sue in the District Court despite the lack of a decision by the Mayor. 107 We will not require Hemby to take the purely formal step of dismissing his complaint in the District Court and then refiling it just to gain a filing date more than 180 days later than that upon which he presented the charge to the Mayor.