Opinion ID: 185976
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Mandatory Minimum Sentence

Text: 33 Finally, Alexander challenges the district court's imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years of imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Specifically, Alexander argues that the district court erred in concluding that his 1991 conviction for attempted possession with intent to distribute qualifies as a serious drug offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) and that, as a result, the district court erred in imposing the mandatory minimum. 23 Reviewing Alexander's claim de novo, see, e.g., United States v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1518 (D.C.Cir.1997) (Legal questions relating to sentencing are reviewed de novo.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1082, 118 S.Ct. 865, 139 L.Ed.2d 763 (1998), we find no error in Alexander's sentence. 34 Section 924(e)(1), in pertinent part, directs that a defendant convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of fifteen years if he has three previous convictions ... for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). As used in section 924(e), a serious drug offense includes, inter alia, an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law. Id. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). 35 Emphasizing the fact that section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) does not expressly include attempts within the definition of serious drug offense, Alexander argues that his prior conviction for attempted possession with intent to distribute cannot be used as a qualifying conviction. Had [the] Congress intended to include[] attempted drug offenses within the definition of serious drug offenses, Alexander contends, [the] Congress would have specifically done so, as it did in the definition of violent felon[ies] under [section 924(e)(2)(B)]. Br. for Appellant at 30-31. Violent felonies are defined, in relevant part, as any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another[] or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 36 We reject Alexander's reading of the statute. See United States v. King, 325 F.3d 110 (2d Cir.2003) (prior conviction for attempt to commit third-degree possession of controlled substance qualified as serious drug offense). As the government correctly observes, the Congress defined the terms violent felony and serious drug offense in decidedly different manners. Unlike the definition of violent felony, the definition of serious drug offense does not speak in specifics; instead, it defines the term to include an entire class of state offenses involving certain activities, namely, manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Noting that [t]he word `involving' has expansive connotations, the Second Circuit recently observed that the term must be construed as extending the focus of § 924(e) beyond the precise offenses of distributing, manufacturing, or possessing, and as encompassing as well offenses that are related to or connected with such conduct. King, 325 F.3d at 113; see also United States v. Brandon, 247 F.3d 186, 190 (4th Cir.2001) ([T]he word `involving' itself suggests that the subsection should be read expansively. (internal citation omitted)). We find the Second Circuit's analysis to be sound. 37 Moreover, as the district court recognized, the use of attempted in section 924(e)(2)(B)(i) does not — by itself — indicate that the Congress intended to exclude attempt convictions from the definition of serious drug offense[s] in section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). 1/7/02 Tr. 47-48. Indeed, well-established principles of statutory construction counsel otherwise; if we were to adopt Alexander's reading of section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), the term involving would be rendered meaningless — distribution alone would qualify as a crime `involving' distribution and possession with intent to distribute alone would qualify as a crime involving possession with intent to distribute. United States v. Contreras, 895 F.2d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir.1990) (rejecting argument that possession with intent to distribute is not crime involving distribution). Because Alexander's earlier conviction of attempted possession involv[ed] possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance and, in addition, carried a maximum term of imprisonment of more than ten years, we conclude that the district court properly imposed a mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). 38 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that all of Alexander's contentions are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is 39 Affirmed.