Opinion ID: 1667146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Avoiding or Preventing a Lawful Arrest or Effecting an Escape from Custody Aggravator

Text: ś 16. One of the aggravating circumstances limited by statute is that the capital offense must be committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5)(e) (Rev.2000). Thorson argues that (1) the aggravating factor should not have been submitted to the jury because there was insufficient evidence to do so, (2) the evidence fails to support the finding of this aggravating factor, and (3) the jury failed to find the avoiding arrest aggravating circumstance.
ś 17. The standard of review for the legal sufficiency of evidence is well-settled: [W]e must, with respect to each element of the offense, consider all of the evidence â not just the evidence which supports the case for the prosecution â in the light most favorable to the verdict. The credible evidence which is consistent with the guilt must be accepted as true. The prosecution must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Matters regarding the weight and credibility to be accorded the evidence are to be resolved by the jury. We may reverse only where, with respect to one or more of the elements of the offense charged, the evidence so considered is such that reasonable and fair-minded jurors could only find the accused not guilty. Sheffield v. State, 749 So.2d 123, 125 (Miss.1999) (quoting Gleeton v. State, 716 So.2d 1083, 1087 (Miss.1998)). The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support an avoiding lawful arrest instruction is also well-settled: [i]f there is evidence from which it may be reasonably inferred that a substantial reason for the killing was to conceal the identity of the killer or killings to cover their tracks so as to avoid apprehension and eventual arrest by authorities, then it is proper for the court to allow the jury to consider this aggravating circumstance. Under this construction the Court properly submits this aggravator to the jury if evidence existed from which the jury could reasonably infer that concealing the killer's identity, or covering the killer's tracks to avoid apprehension and arrest, was a substantial reason for the killing. Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 152-53 (Miss.1991). See also Manning v. State, 735 So.2d 323, 350 (Miss.1999); Woodward v. State, 726 So.2d 524, 541 (Miss.1997); Carr v. State, 655 So.2d 824, 853-54 (Miss.1995); Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 856-58 (Miss.1994); Lanier v. State, 533 So.2d 473, 490 (Miss.1988); Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d at 651 (Miss.1983). [J]urors are entitled to make the logical connection between the injuries suffered and finding an inference that the defendant murdered his victim to avoid arrest. Holland v. State, 705 So.2d 307, 355 (Miss.1997). The defendant's efforts to avoid arrest after the murder may also be considered in connection with this aggravator. Id. at 355-56. Thus, it is this Court's role to inquire into whether there is any credible evidence upon which the jury could find the aggravating circumstance in question. Carr v. State, 655 So.2d 824, 854 (Miss.1995) (citing Lanier v. State, 533 So.2d 473, 490 (Miss.1988)). ś 18. When the State offered its sentencing instruction, it included three separate elements to consider in aggravation: (1) engaged in kidnapping, (2) especially heinous, atrocious and cruel, and (3) for the purposes of avoiding and preventing arrest. Thorson objected to the avoiding arrest aggravator. In overruling this objection and granting the avoiding arrest aggravator, the trial court stated: COURT: I think that based upon his testimony alone, if they wish to accept that as being beyond a reasonable doubt, that after he had had the sexual encounter with the defendant â I mean, the victim at the scene and had cut her throat, that he said that he started to leave at that point in time, and then determined that he would not, and that's when he killed her. Taking that along with the fact that he tried to wipe all identification or all fingerprints off the car and so forth, that that could be considered as evidence of his attempt to escape prosecution. I'll give that one. ś 19. The trial court's ruling is supported by the evidence presented at trial. In his video taped confession, Thorson states that after raping McKinney, he took a towel and wiped her car down to remove any traces of fingerprints that he might have left on the car. He then asked McKinney if she would tell anyone what had happened. After indicating that she would not, Thorson, not believing her answer, slit her throat. Thorson then removed several items from McKinney's car and threw them into the woods to make it appear as if someone else where responsible for the crime. Upon returning home, he washed his hands and the knife in bleach and buried several items of which would tie him to the crime scene. ś 20. We have held that: If there is evidence from which it may be reasonably inferred that a substantial reason for the killing was to conceal the identity of the killer or killers or to cover their tracks so as to avoid apprehension and eventual arrest by authorities, then it is proper for the court to allow the jury to consider this aggravating circumstance. Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d 645, 651 (Miss.1983). In Wiley v. State, 750 So.2d 1193 (Miss.1999), this Court found that the granting of the instruction on this aggravator was proper. This Court determined that the victims knew Wiley and his efforts to dispose of and/or conceal the evidence of his crime were sufficient to support the avoiding arrest instruction. That is, there is evidence from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that a substantial reason for the murder was to conceal Wiley's identity, or cover his tracks, so as to avoid apprehension and eventual arrest. In Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829 (Miss.1994), this Court, finding both testimony and physical evidence which justified the avoiding arrest circumstance, stated: The cases ... clearly indicate that the key to resolving this question of avoidance of arrest lies squarely on whether or not evidence existed within the record which would have allowed the jury to make reasonable inferences therefrom that the concealing of Chase's identity, and the covering of his tracks in order to avoid detection, apprehension and arrest, was a substantial reason for the killing of Elmer Hart. Id. at 858. ś 21. Similarly in the case sub judice, we find that there is sufficient evidence in the record which would have allowed the jury to make reasonable inferences that Thorson killed McKinney in an attempt to conceal his identity and cover his tracks to avoid arrest. Therefore, we find this issue to be without merit.
ś 22. Thorson next argues that the jury's finding of the avoiding arrest aggravator was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. In the preceding section of this opinion, a factual basis for granting this instruction has been set forth, thus determining that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the finding of this aggravator by the jury. Our standard of review regarding claims that a jury's verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence is: In determining whether a jury verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, this Court must accept as true the evidence which supports the verdict and will reverse only when convinced that the circuit court has abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial. Only in those cases where the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice will this Court disturb it on appeal. As such, if the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, then a new trial is proper. Pruitt v. State, 807 So.2d 1236, 1243 (Miss.2002) (citing Dudley v. State, 719 So.2d 180, 182 (Miss.1998)). In Maiben v. State, 405 So.2d 87 (Miss.1981), this Court stated: We have held in numerous cases that the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be attached to their testimony. We have further said that we will not set aside a guilty verdict, absent other error, unless it is clearly a result of prejudice, bias or fraud, or is manifestly against the weight of credible evidence. 405 So.2d at 88 (citations omitted). ś 23. After a thorough review of the record before this Court, we find that there is ample evidence to support the jury's finding of the avoiding arrest aggravator. Therefore, this claim is without merit.
ś 24. Thorson next contends that the jury failed to properly find the avoiding arrest aggravator. The language contained in the instruction given to the jury read: COURT: Consider only the following elements of aggravation in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed:       3. The capital offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody. The jury returned its verdict finding that [t]he offense was committed with the purpose of covering up and hiding evidence.  (emphasis added). Thorson contends that this aggravator, found by the jury, does not exist under Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5). Thorson further argues that this verdict was unresponsive to the instructions submitted to the jury and, therefore, convicted Thorson of a non-existent offense. ś 25. When the jury returned to the courtroom with its verdict, the trial court reviewed the written finding of the jury. After reviewing the verdict, the trial court invited counsel to approach the bench and examine the verdict. After the verdict was examined by counsel, the trial court asked the clerk to read aloud the verdict. Thorson was then formally sentenced by the trial court. Thorson made no objection to the form of the verdict returned by the jury. Thorson also made no objection to the form of the verdict as to this aggravator in either of the written motions for new trial. Therefore, this claim is procedurally barred. Notwithstanding any procedural bar, this issue has no merit. ś 26. This Court has held that: [t]he general rule, as found in the texts, is that ordinarily the verdict is sufficient in form if it expresses the intent of the jury so that the court can understand it, or that the test of the validity of a verdict is whether or not it is an intelligible answer to the issues submitted to the jury. Wilson v. State, 197 Miss. 17, 19 So.2d 475, 475 (1944) (citations omitted). In Jordan v. State, 786 So.2d 987 (Miss.2001), the defendant argued that the jury's verdict was ambiguous because it did not state that the aggravator existed beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court determined that the claim was procedurally barred because an objection was not made when the verdict was returned. Id. at 1003 (citing Edwards v. State, 737 So.2d 275, 306-07 (Miss.1999); Smith v. State, 729 So.2d 1191, 1216-17 (Miss.1998)). However, in addressing the merits of the claim, this Court stated: we note that the jury verdict in this case is not in ideal form. Apparently, the jury did not take the time to reword aggravator number 3 into a responsive and affirmative statement, as opposed to a suggestion or question. However, the entire verdict leaves no doubt as to what the jury found. Jordan, 786 So.2d at 1003. ś 27. Here, there can be no doubt that the jury found the avoiding arrest aggravator to exist in this case. Evidence was presented that Thorson wiped McKinney's car clean of all fingerprints so as to hide his identity. He threw items into the woods in the attempt to cast doubt on the true perpetrator. Thorson, immediately upon returning home, washed his hands and the knife used to slit McKinney's throat in bleach. ś 28. Pursuant to URCCC 3.10: When the jurors have agreed upon a verdict they shall be conducted into the courtroom by the officer having them in charge. The court shall ask the foreman or the jury panel if an agreement has been reached on a verdict. If the foreman or the jury panel answers in the affirmative, the judge shall call upon the foreman or any member of the panel to deliver the verdict in writing to the clerk or the court. The court may then examine the verdict and correct it as to matters of form.       If a verdict is so defective that the court cannot determine from it the intent of the jury, the court shall, with proper instructions, direct the jurors to reconsider the verdict. No verdict shall be accepted until it clearly reflects the intent of the jury. If the jury persists in rendering defective verdicts the court shall declare a mistrial.... The trial court and counsel all examined the verdict once returned by the jury. After finding the verdict to be in proper form, the verdict was read into the record, and the defendant was formally sentenced by the trial court. A fair reading of the verdict convinces us that the jury's decision is unambiguous, and Thorson's claim is without merit. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 197 Miss. 17, 20, 19 So.2d 475 (1944) (Ordinarily, [a] verdict is sufficient in form if it expresses the intent of the jury so that the court can understand it.).