Opinion ID: 1298187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Meaning of the term inherently dangerous to human life

Text: For the guidance of the trial court on remand, we shall elaborate on the meaning of the term inherently dangerous to life for purposes of the second degree felony-murder doctrine. The felony-murder rule generally acts as a substitute for the mental state ordinarily required for the offense of murder. We observed in People v. Satchell, supra, 6 Cal.3d at page 43: Under well-settled principles of criminal liability a person who kills  whether or not he is engaged in an independent felony at the time  is guilty of murder if he acts with malice aforethought. The felony-murder doctrine, whose ostensible purpose is to deter those engaged in felonies from killing negligently or accidentally, operates to posit the existence of that crucial mental state  and thereby to render irrelevant evidence of actual malice or the lack thereof  when the killer is engaged in a felony whose inherent danger to human life renders logical an imputation of malice on the part of all who commit it. Ordinarily, when a defendant commits an unintentional killing, a murder conviction requires a showing that he acted with implied malice. (Pen. Code, § 188.) With the felony-murder rule, however, such malice need not be shown. (See People v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d 441, 475.) (5) Implied malice, for which the second degree felony-murder doctrine acts as a substitute, [8] has both a physical and a mental component. The physical component is satisfied by the performance of an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life. ( People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 300 [179 Cal. Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279].) The mental component is the requirement that the defendant knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and ... acts with a conscious disregard for life. ( Ibid., internal quotation marks omitted.) The second degree felony-murder rule eliminates the need for the prosecution to establish the mental component. The justification therefor is that, when society has declared certain inherently dangerous conduct to be felonious, a defendant should not be allowed to excuse himself by saying he was unaware of the danger to life because, by declaring the conduct to be felonious, society has warned him of the risk involved. The physical requirement, however, remains the same; by committing a felony inherently dangerous to life, the defendant has committed an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life ( Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 300), thus satisfying the physical component of implied malice. (2b) The definition of inherently dangerous to life in the context of the implied malice element of second degree murder is well established. An act is inherently dangerous to human life when there is a high probability that it will result in death. ( People v. Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 300, italics added; see also People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 262 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861]; People v. Poddar (1974) 10 Cal.3d 750, 757 [111 Cal. Rptr. 910, 518 P.2d 342]; People v. Conley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 310, 321 [49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911]; People v. Washington, supra, 62 Cal.2d 777, 782; People v. Thomas (1953) 41 Cal.2d 470, 480 [261 P.2d 1].) We therefore conclude  by analogy to the established definition of the term dangerous to life in the context of the implied malice element of second degree murder (see People v. Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d 290)  that, for purposes of the second degree felony-murder doctrine, an inherently dangerous felony is an offense carrying a high probability that death will result. A less stringent standard would inappropriately expand the scope of the second degree felony-murder rule reducing the seriousness of the act which a defendant must commit in order to be charged with murder. [9] We share the concern Chief Justice Lucas has expressed in his dissent regarding the tragic effects that the abuse of illegal drugs, particularly crack cocaine, has on our society. However, it is the Legislature, rather than this court, that should determine whether expansion of the second degree felony-murder rule is an appropriate method by which to address this problem. In the absence of specific legislative action, we must determine the scope of the rule by applying the established definition of inherent dangerousness.