Opinion ID: 2620446
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: opinion or statements of fact

Text: Dr. Cashion asserts the circuit court erred by sustaining the demurrers and pleas in bar as to the non-euthanasia statements and ruling that they were non-actionable expressions of opinion. As an initial matter, Dr. Smith and Carilion argue that he has withdrawn or waived this argument for appeal under Code § 8.01-384(A) because he endorsed the Demurrer Order “WE ASK FOR THIS.” They assert that endorsement stated his express written agreement with the rulings it contained. We disagree. Code § 8.01-384(A) provides in relevant part that No party shall be deemed to have agreed to, or acquiesced in, any written order of a trial court so as to forfeit his right to contest such order on appeal except by express written agreement in his endorsement of the order. Arguments made at trial via written pleading, memorandum, recital of objections in a final order, oral argument reduced to transcript, or agreed written statements of facts shall, unless expressly withdrawn or waived, be deemed preserved therein for assertion on appeal. We have on several occasions interpreted this statute to clarify the ambiguity of what constitutes a waiver by “express written agreement in [an] endorsement of [an] order.” We have 4 repeatedly held that “once a litigant informs the circuit court of his or her legal argument, in order for a waiver to occur within the meaning of Code § 8.01-384(A), the record must affirmatively show that the party who has asserted an objection has abandoned the objection or has demonstrated by his conduct the intent to abandon that objection.” Kellermann v. McDonough, 278 Va. 478, 491, 684 S.E.2d 786, 792 (2009) (quoting Helms v. Manspile, 277 Va. 1, 6, 671 S.E.2d 127, 129 (2009)) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted). We discussed waiver by endorsement at length in Chawla v. BurgerBusters, Inc., 255 Va. 616, 499 S.E.2d 829 (1998). In that case, the appellants assigned error to the circuit court’s ruling that they bore the burden of proof on the question of the reasonableness of a claim for attorneys’ fees. They noted objections to the interlocutory order effectuating that ruling but when the court restated it in a subsequent interlocutory order, they endorsed the second order as “SEEN AND AGREED.” They again noted their objection to the ruling on the final order. Id. at 621-22, 499 S.E.2d at 832. On appeal, the appellee argued the “SEEN AND AGREED” endorsement waived the issue. We disagreed, holding: Waiver is the voluntary and intentional abandonment of a known legal right, advantage, or privilege. Weidman v. Babcock, 241 Va. 40, 45, 400 S.E.2d 164, 167 (1991); Fox v. Deese, 234 Va. 412, 425, 5 362 S.E.2d 699, 707 (1987). The essential elements of waiver are knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right and intent to relinquish that right. Weidman, 241 Va. at 45, 400 S.E.2d at 167; Fox, 234 Va. at 425, 362 S.E.2d at 707. Waiver of a legal right will be implied only upon clear and unmistakable proof of the intention to waive such right for the essence of waiver is voluntary choice. Weidman, 241 Va. at 45, 400 S.E.2d at 167; May v. Martin, 205 Va. 397, 404, 137 S.E.2d 860, 865 (1964). In the present case, the [appellants] made clear to the trial court [their] objection to the ruling respecting the burden of proof issue and never abandoned or evidenced an intent to abandon the objection. Thus, [they] preserved the issue for appeal. Id. at 622-23, 499 S.E.2d at 833 (emphasis added). In short, the endorsement itself did not constitute a waiver. We reached the same result in Helms, even though the appellant never noted an objection on any order. In that case, the appellants assigned error to the circuit court’s ruling that they had failed to prove adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence. They endorsed as “Seen” the court’s final order effectuating that ruling. 277 Va. at 5-6, 671 S.E.2d at 129. Noting that the appellants had argued adverse possession in a written memorandum, we held that the court was thereby informed of their position, which they had not subsequently expressly withdrawn or waived. Id. at 7, 671 S.E.2d at 129-30. Again, the endorsement itself did not constitute a waiver. 6 We considered the endorsement “Seen and consented to” in Johnson v. Hart, 279 Va. 617, 692 S.E.2d 239 (2010). In that case, the appellee assigned cross-error in an appeal from the circuit court’s award of summary judgment in favor of the appellee. Considering whether the appellee’s endorsement waived the issue argued in the assignment of cross-error, we noted that the order contained elements favorable to both parties. We concluded that the appellee’s endorsement “Seen and consented to” indicated his consent only to the elements favorable to him, just as the appellant’s endorsement “Seen and objected to” objected only to the elements adverse to her. Id. at 624, 692 S.E.2d 243 (alterations omitted). We also again observed that the appellee’s legal argument had been presented to the court in written memoranda and acquiescence to the entry of an order partly in his favor did not affirmatively waive or abandon it. The most recent case in which we considered the effect of a “WE ASK FOR THIS” endorsement was Lamar Corp. v. City of Richmond, 241 Va. 346, 402 S.E.2d 31 (1991). 2 However, our 2 In Lamar Corp., the City of Richmond condemned a parcel of real property. Portions of the parcel had been leased to two billboard advertising companies. The lessees were not parties to the condemnation proceeding. To the contrary, they entered a special appearance to assert that the city was required to institute a separate condemnation proceeding against them to acquire their interests in the parcels. Id. at 348-49, 402 S.E.2d at 32. 7 analysis did not address Code § 8.01-384(A). The statute did not then include the provision, “[n]o party shall be deemed to have agreed to, or acquiesced in, any written order of a trial court so as to forfeit his right to contest such order on appeal except by express written agreement in his endorsement of the order.” The General Assembly amended Code § 8.01-384(A) The city and the landowners ultimately reached an agreement as to the value of just compensation. The circuit court entered a consent order awarding the landowners $360,000 for “all right, title and interest in the property and property rights acquired” in the condemnation proceeding. The order noted that the lessees appeared by special appearance, “without intending to subject either [of them] to the jurisdiction of th[e c]ourt in this action,” and further directed that “the compromise and settlement between the City and [the landowners] shall have no effect upon further proceedings by the City against [the lessees] and neither the City nor [the lessees] shall be prejudiced in any way by such settlement in subsequent proceedings between the City and” the lessees. Although the landowners and lessees endorsed the order “WE ASK FOR THIS,” the lessees included “(special appearance)” in their endorsement. When the city subsequently obtained permission from the court to remove the lessees’ billboards from the parcel, the lessees appealed. We held that a lessee is entitled by virtue of his lease to a portion of a landowner’s award of compensation following a condemnation proceeding. Id. at 350, 402 S.E.2d at 33. We also held that a lessee who improves a parcel by constructing a fixture annexed to it (such as the billboards) is entitled to a portion of the landowner’s award of compensation if the parcel is subsequently taken by condemnation. Id. at 352, 402 S.E.2d at 34. Nevertheless, we concluded that the lessees had waived any claim on the $360,000 awarded to the landowners because they had “asked for and consented to” the consent order, even though they had only entered a special appearance to argue that the city was required to commence a separate condemnation proceeding to acquire their interests. Id. 8 to add this language in its session following our Lamar Corp. decision. 1992 Acts ch. 564. Like the order in Johnson, the Demurrer Order contains elements favorable and unfavorable to Dr. Cashion. Although it sustains demurrers by Dr. Smith and Carilion to the noneuthanasia statements, it overrules their demurrers to the accusations of euthanasia. We have noted that “[i]t is entirely proper for a party to request that a court memorialize in an order a ruling made from the bench, even when that ruling is contrary to the party's interest.” Levisa Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 276 Va. 44, 56 n.4, 662 S.E.2d 44, 50 n.4 (2008). Dr. Cashion’s “WE ASK FOR THIS” endorsement on the Demurrer Order therefore reflects only his request that the court enter an order memorializing its ruling, not his agreement to the portion of the Demurrer Order adverse to him. It therefore does not constitute an “express written agreement” to waive this argument on appeal. The question of whether the non-euthanasia statements were expressions of opinion is a question of law. Hyland v. Raytheon Tech. Servs. Co., 277 Va. 40, 47, 670 S.E.2d 746, 750 (2009). We therefore review the circuit court’s ruling de novo. Board of Supervisors v. Davenport & Co. LLC, 285 Va. 580, 585, 742 S.E.2d 59, 61 (2013). 9 “When a statement is relative in nature and depends largely on a speaker's viewpoint, that statement is an expression of opinion.” Hyland, 277 Va. at 47, 670 S.E.2d at 750. However, statements may be actionable if they have a “‘provably false factual connotation’” and thus “are capable of being proven true or false.” Fuste v. Riverside Healthcare Ass'n, 265 Va. 127, 575 S.E.2d 858, 861-62 (2003) (quoting WJLA-TV v. Levin, 264 Va. 140, 156, 564 S.E.2d 383, 392 (2002)). The statements “[t]his was a very poor effort,” “[y]ou didn’t really try,” and “[y]ou gave up on him,” fall into the former class because they are subjective and wholly depend on Dr. Smith’s viewpoint. However, the statements that the patient “could have made it with better resuscitation” and “[y]ou determined from the beginning that he wasn’t going to make it and purposefully didn’t resuscitate him” do not. The statement that the patient “could have made it with better resuscitation” directly attributes the patient’s death to Dr. Cashion, insinuating that he either failed to perform some action necessary to the patient’s recovery or acted affirmatively to prevent it. Insinuations may constitute defamatory statements. Hyland, 277 Va. at 47, 670 S.E.2d at 751. The statement asserts that the patient was capable of surviving, but for the quality of Dr. Cashion’s treatment. 10 Whether the quality of Dr. Cashion’s treatment caused or even contributed to the patient’s death is an allegation of fact capable of being proven true or false, such as through expert opinion testimony. The second statement goes further, not only attributing the patient’s death to Dr. Cashion’s action or inaction but accusing him of purposefully causing the death by withholding treatment. Such a statement is indistinguishable from the alleged accusations of euthanasia. Accordingly, the circuit court erred by ruling that these two statements were non-actionable expressions of opinion. We therefore will reverse this portion of its judgment and remand for further proceedings.