Opinion ID: 574322
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: violations of the mutual assistance treaty

Text: 80 Reuben and David Sturman both raise objections to the use of records obtained from Switzerland under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 209, T.I.A.S. 8302. The Treaty (Treaty) states that Switzerland agrees to provide information and access to bank records in Switzerland only for a specifically defined list of criminal offenses. Reuben Sturman asserts that the United States government submitted false information concerning the defendant's connection with organized crime in order to obtain his records under the Treaty. He claims that these submissions and the resultant release of records violated his fourth amendment privacy and fifth amendment due process rights. David Sturman objects to the use of the records obtained under the Treaty provisions in the case against him since the government did not provide evidence to Switzerland concerning David Sturman when they sought the records. 81 The United States requested assistance from the government in Switzerland in obtaining the bank records of Reuben Sturman. In acquiring these records, the United States government must submit evidence to Switzerland that shows the requested records relate to one of a select list of criminal offenses. The United States government submitted evidence to Switzerland which indicated that Reuben Sturman had some relationship to organized crime. The evidence submitted to Switzerland was never disclosed to Reuben Sturman despite his discovery request. The District Court, after a in camera review of the evidence, ruled that the defendant had failed to show the government misrepresented the facts. Both David and Reuben Sturman assert that the records obtained as a result of the United States' action under the Treaty should not be admissible. They further argue that should this evidence be found inadmissible, the convictions based on the evidence should be reversed. 82 Article 37 of the Treaty provides that, 83 [t]he existence of restrictions in this Treaty shall not give rise to a right on the part of any person to take any action in the United States to suppress or exclude any evidence or to obtain other judicial relief in connection with the requests under this Treaty.... 84 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 209, T.I.A.S. 8302. 8 This language indicates that neither David nor Reuben Sturman have standing to raise a claim under the Treaty. Relying on the decision of the D.C. Circuit Court in Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909, 917-19 (D.C.Cir.1984), defendants claim that the Treaty cannot deprive them of constitutional rights. Id. at 919. 9 Because we find the defendants have not been deprived of their constitutional rights, we do not consider whether they have standing to raise such claims.
85 Reuben Sturman maintains that, because of Switzerland's strict banking secrecy laws, he has a reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the fourth amendment. In support of his assertion of an expectation of privacy, he relies on the Swiss penalties of imprisonment or fine for revealing information and on the Treaty's goal of preserving the integrity of Swiss banking law. In essence, the defendant argues a constitutional right created by the statutory rights granted him by a foreign country to records in that country. No such right of privacy in banking records is recognized in the United States. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976). 86 Any privacy right conferred on Reuben Sturman by Switzerland and any remedy given for a violation of that right is limited by the terms of the Treaty. The Treaty clearly indicates that the Swiss government has agreed that an American citizen's right to privacy can be curtailed under certain circumstances. The Treaty also evidences a decision by the Swiss government to limit the remedy available once bank records are released. The Swiss government has limited the right to privacy given by its laws and denied to depositors any expectancy that, if records were disclosed to the United States, they could be suppressed or excluded from evidence. This intent is plainly stated in the language of Article 37 which is part of the law of Switzerland as well as the United States. 87 Even if Article 37 does not foreclose a fourth amendment claim for suppression of evidence, Reuben Sturman had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the documents for fourth amendment purposes. The Treaty makes any expectation of privacy limited through its terms. If no such expectation exists, then his ability to raise a fourth amendment claim is limited by the holdings of the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has held that there is no privacy interest in the records and documents of third parties. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); Miller, 425 U.S. at 435, 96 S.Ct. at 1620. Further, the fourth amendment does not justify exclusion of evidence when the defendant is not the victim of the challenged practices. The supervisory power of the federal courts does not allow it to suppress evidence that has been seized unlawfully from a person not before the court. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 100 S.Ct. 2439, 65 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980). Thus, since an individual has no privacy interest in his bank records, he cannot make a motion for exclusion once they are obtained. Only the holder of the records, for example the bank, can raise an objection.
88 Reuben Sturman asserts that the submission of false statements linking him to organized crime in order to obtain information from a foreign country is the type of governmental misconduct which violates substantive due process. He also claims that he was denied any reasonable opportunity to respond to the charges in the documents submitted to the Swiss government and has thus been denied his procedural due process rights. These claims are without merit. 89 A review of the submissions to the Swiss government reveals that the documents contain no serious misrepresentations concerning the defendant. The District Court's review of the documents generated the same opinion. Even if misrepresentations were found, a reversal of conviction is not automatic. A federal court's supervisory power allows the court to remedy cases of serious governmental misconduct. Payner, 447 U.S. at 727, 100 S.Ct. at 24; United States v. Gjieli, 717 F.2d 968 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1101, 104 S.Ct. 1595, 80 L.Ed.2d 127 (1984). Reversals of convictions using this power should not be granted readily. Id. at 978. This Court has held that the reversal of a conviction should be granted only when the following prerequisites are met: 90 (1) there must be a constitutional injury which is personal to the complaining defendant, (2) the injury must harm the defendant in a legally significant way, (3) there must be an injury to the judicial system, (4) the remedy selected by the Court to preserve judicial integrity and deter future misconduct may not exceed established limitations on the court's power, and (5) the remedy selected must be narrowly tailored. 91 Id. at 978-79. 92 In Gjieli, the government improperly released defendant, Zeff Lulgjuraj, from prison. His release signalled his codefendants that a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agent was ready to deliver Lulgjuraj to them. The government officials submitted a false writ to a district judge in order to obtain the prisoner's release. One agent posed as a United States Marshal in order to secure custody of the prisoner. Applying the test above, this Court held that the government's misconduct did not entitle the defendants to reversal of their convictions. Id. at 979. 93 In this case, Reuben Sturman has suffered no identifiable constitutional injury. The defendant has no constitutional right to review submissions to the Swiss government made in the course of an investigation. Even if such a right existed, the defendant received adequate protection through the in camera review of the documents by the District Court and this Court. As discussed above, no right arises from any expectation of privacy asserted by the defendant. Reuben Sturman also urges that this Court find a deprivation of a liberty interest due to the stigmatization of his name. The documents submitted to the Swiss government have never been released or made public. This Court has held that in order to establish a protectable liberty interest, the plaintiff must demonstrate ... that the defendants publicly and voluntarily disclosed stigmatizing charges or information.... Yashon v. Gregory, 737 F.2d 547, 556 (6th Cir.1984). 94 Misconduct, if any, committed by the government in this case is not as serious as that committed in Gjieli where a reversal of conviction was denied. We find that the defendant has failed to satisfy the test articulated in Gjieli.
95 David Sturman obtained a decision from the Swiss Federal Supreme Court which held that no Swiss evidence could be used against him in a case for tax evasion. Notice of Ruling by the Swiss Supreme Court That No Evidence Obtained from Switzerland May be Used Against David Sturman, October 13, 1989. Using this decision, David Sturman objected to the use of the evidence in the District Court. The District Court overruled his objection. We agree. The Swiss Central Authority advised the United States government that the Swiss documents could only be used against the codefendants if they were participants in Reuben Sturman's criminal activities. Article 5 para. 2(b) of the Treaty provides that evidence obtained under the Treaty can be used against persons accused of participating in the criminal activity and accessories. Evidence produced during this trial shows David Sturman's participation in Reuben Sturman's criminal activity. The admission of the Swiss evidence was thus permissible under the Treaty. 96