Opinion ID: 2630520
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-Sentencing Competency Evaluation

Text: ¶ 55 More than two years after Arguelles was sentenced to death, he attempted suicide while in prison. The court then ordered competency evaluations of Arguelles and a hearing to determine whether he was still competent to proceed. After hearing from several experts, the court determined that Arguelles was competent. ¶ 56 The court assistant claims that the competency evaluations of Arguelles were patently inadequate and that the court erroneously found Arguelles competent to proceed. [13] He asserts that Arguelles should be deemed incompetent to direct his appeal.
¶ 57 We review for plain error whether the trial court should have deemed the competency evaluations inadequate. The court assistant first claims that the evaluations were not thorough enough. He complains that none of the examiners were familiar with Arguelles prior to his suicide attempt, that the evaluators interviewed Arguelles too briefly, and that only one of the evaluators used formal testing techniques with Arguelles. Citing Hays v. Murphy, 663 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir.1981), the court assistant claims that Arguelles's background of mental illness mandated a more in-depth examination. ¶ 58 In Hays, the court held that, where there was significant evidence that defendant had a serious mental disease, it was error for the trial court to base its ruling upon competency evaluations that were clearly inadequate. Id. at 1005. The facts of Hays, however, are quite different from the current case. First, there is not as much evidence of incompetence in the current case as there was in Hays. In Hays, there was uncontradicted evidence that defendant had been the subject of several mental commitment proceedings in the preceding years, that he had attempted suicide, that he had suffered lengthy alcoholism, and that he had possibly sustained a concussion. Id. at 1009. In addition, the defendant had exhibited bizarre behavior in court proceedings, had been diagnosed with schizophrenia while in prison, and expressed obviously delusional thinking. Id. at 1009-10 & n. 10. In the current case, by contrast, while Arguelles has manifested suicidal tendencies and possibly some mild paranoia, [14] there is no reason to presume that he is delusional. ¶ 59 Second, the evaluations relied upon in Hays were much less thorough than the ones relied upon in this case. In Hays, the trial court's finding of competence was based primarily upon the report of a single, 30-minute interview conducted by four staff members, three of whom had never before interviewed defendant. Id. at 1011 & n. 12. During the interview, the evaluators did not ask questions standard in the diagnosis of schizophrenia, but engaged in only a superficial inquiry into matters such as the time of day. Id. The interview took place on a noisy prison cell block, and no psychological tests were administered. Id. at 1011-12 & n. 12. In the current case, on the other hand, the evaluators studied Arguelles's past mental and physical history and then spent a total of eight hours with him, [15] inquiring into his thought processes and evaluating his capabilities. Thus, unlike Hays, we do not find that the evaluations were so haphazard, or the evidence of Arguelles's mental illness so overwhelming, that we are compelled to question the conclusions of trained experts and the superior vantage point of the trial court. ¶ 60 Next, the court assistant claims that the evaluators focused on the wrong criteria in considering competency and overlooked factors suggesting incompetency. The assistant claims that the evaluators investigated three questions: whether Arguelles was competent to waive his appeal and proceed to execution, whether he was capable of understanding his decision to represent himself, and whether he suffered brain damage from the attempted hanging. These three questions, the assistant asserts, were not the proper inquiry for the evaluators; rather, they should have considered whether Arguelles was competent to participate in his appeal. ¶ 61 To decide whether a person is competent to stand trial or assist in his appeal, the court must determine whether the person has a mental disorder that results in (1) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him or of the punishment specified for the offense charged; or (2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 (2002). By contrast, to decide whether a person is competent to waive the right to appeal, the court must determine whether he has capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises. Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966). ¶ 62 The court assistant fails to identify how the questions the evaluators focused upon were inadequate to the task of determining Arguelles's competence to participate in his appeal. Surely, in determining that Arguelles was competent to waive his appeal and proceed to execution, that he was capable of understanding his decision to represent himself, and that he had suffered no significant brain damage from the attempted hanging, the evaluators could also conclude that Arguelles was competent to participate in his appeal. The ultimate conclusion of the evaluatorsthat Arguelles had a sufficient present ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against himis precisely the test for competence to assist in one's own appeal. ¶ 63 Further, we cannot see how Arguelles's competence to participate in his appeal was placed in question. Arguelles repeatedly stated, both before and after the hanging, that he wished to forego his right to appeal and move directly to imposition of his sentence. Since capital appeals are mandated by statute, Arguelles could not forego the appeal but could only waive his involvement in the appeal. The question at issue, therefore, was whether Arguelles continued to be competent to waive his right to participate in his appealthe very issue the evaluators addressed. ¶ 64 The court assistant also complains that the evaluators failed to address all of the criteria set forth in Utah Code section 77-15-5. [16] The court assistant does not identify, however, which criteria the evaluators overlooked or how Arguelles was prejudiced. In State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ¶¶ 40-42, 20 P.3d 342, we held that it was harmless error where the written competency reports did not specifically address all of the factors listed in section 77-15-5 but all the relevant factors were addressed through the reports and subsequent hearing. Such is the case here. Although the written reports do not use the precise language of the statute or organize their analysis by the statutory factors, the reports, in combination with the testimony offered at the competency hearing, specifically address Arguelles's abilities in such a way that all the relevant statutory factors are considered. The fact that the reports do not address the effects of psychoactive medication on Arguelles is of no consequence since Arguelles was not on such medication. ¶ 65 Finally, the court assistant states that the evaluators overlooked Arguelles's complaints that someone had tampered with his cell and the coercive effects that being on death row has upon an inmate. The record reveals, however, that the evaluators considered Arguelles's complaints of tampering. While in prison, Arguelles complained that there were toxic fumes in his cell and that someone had placed substances in his shampoo and toothpaste. The record suggests there may have been a factual basis for these concerns. However, even if Arguelles's concerns had no basis in reality, one of the evaluators stated that such notions would not rise to the level of delusions that would affect Arguelles's competency. It is quite apparent, therefore, that the evaluators did not overlook this issue. ¶ 66 The court assistant argues that the evaluators failed to take into consideration the coercive effects of death row on Arguelles. The assistant suggests that Arguelles's desire to not participate in his appeal is merely the result of the uncomfortable environment of the prison. As the assistant notes, a number of commentators have suggested that being on death row has deleterious effects on the human psyche. The court assistant fails to explain, however, what effect death row had upon Arguelles. Arguelles made clear his intent to seek the death penalty long before he was placed on death row, and, indeed, before he had even pled guilty. When asked, Arguelles insisted that his environment on death row had not affected his desire to seek the death penalty. Given this statement and the lack of any evidence to the contrary, we see no cause to presume Arguelles had been rendered incompetent by his stay on death row or that he was incapable of waiving involvement in his appeal.
¶ 67 Next, the court assistant claims that the trial court's findings of fact concerning competency are replete with legal errors. To challenge the factual findings of the trial court, the court assistant must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding[s]. Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9). A trial court's factual findings will not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ¶ 45, 20 P.3d 342. In addition, since this claim was not preserved, the court assistant must show that there was an error in the findings, that the error was obvious, and that it was prejudicial. ¶ 68 The court assistant identifies a number of factors he feels the trial court failed to consider in making its factual findings. The assistant, however, fails to marshal the evidence supporting the findings he attacks. Instead, he avoids addressing the weight of evidence supporting the court's findings by prefacing his analysis with an admission that there is evidence to marshal in support of the trial court's findings. Acknowledging the existence of evidence to marshal is a far cry from actually marshaling the evidence. See State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 668 (Utah 1997) ([Defendant] must marshal the evidence in a light most favorable to the findings of the trial court and show that evidence to be insufficient.). Having reviewed the record with regard to the court assistant's claims, we determine that the factual findings of the trial court are not replete with legal errors, and by no means are against the great weight of the evidence. Rather, the findings contain only a few slight misstatements that cannot be presumed prejudicial. Reversal of the trial court's finding of competency therefore is not in order.