Opinion ID: 877940
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Are the charges made against Daniel J. Shea included in the constitutional phrase willful misconduct in office?

Text: The District Court, in its opinion, seemed to recognize that Rule 9(a) of the Judicial Standards Commission was broader than the constitutional provision empowered. Nevertheless, because the Judicial Standards Commission might still find that the conduct charged against Daniel J. Shea constituted willful misconduct in office, the District Court refused to issue a writ of prohibition. We come now to consider whether either the language used by Daniel J. Shea in the McKenzie decision, and/or the parking tickets incident may nevertheless constitute willful misconduct in office, and so be subject to discipline through the Judicial Standards Commission and the Supreme Court. The words in office in the constitutional phrase are significant. Their use seems to indicate an intent on the part of the constitutional convention that the misconduct must be related to the office which the judge occupies. The cases support this inference. We have pointed out that in the 1889 Constitution, Art. V, § 18, provides that officers not liable to impeachment were subject to removal for misconduct or malfeasance in office. The term misconduct in office used in the 1889 Constitution had received judicial construction by this Court. State v. Examining and Trial Board of Police Dept. (1911), 43 Mont. 389, 117 P. 77, involved the action of a board to remove a Butte police chief for wrongfully collecting mileage fees. In passing, the court defined misconduct in office as Any act involving moral turpitude, or any act which is contrary to justice, honesty, principle, or good morals, if performed by virtue of office or by authority of office, is certainly included therein. (Emphasis added) 43 Mont. at 393, 117 P. at 78. In State v. District Court (1911), 44 Mont. 318, 324, 119 P. 1103, 1106, removal of a police judge was sought. The charge was that he had collected compensation for which he was unentitled, even though the compensation had been received by him under the advice of the attorney general. There the court decided that a willful or corrupt misconduct or malfeasance was not necessary. In State v. Board of Aldermen of Town of Conrad (1912), 45 Mont. 188, 122 P. 569, removal was sought of an alderman, a lawyer, for accepting fees from a client who had licensing problems before the Board of Aldermen. There the Court, in passing, quoted with approval the following passage: ... `Cause for removal' means some substantial shortcoming which renders continuance in office or employment in some way detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service, and something which the law and a sound public opinion will recognize as a good cause for his no longer occupying the place. The misconduct for which an officer may be removed must, in general, be found in his acts and conduct in the office from which his removal is sought. But to treat misconduct or incompetency in the performance of official duties as the only ground of removal is to give too rigid and narrow an application to the principles governing the subject. A cause for removal may exist for acts and conduct of a public officer at a time when he is not acting in the performance of a public duty, if these acts and conduct are such as to fairly show that he is unfit for the place. 45 Mont. at 195, 122 P. at 571. The Court also found in State v. Board of Aldermen, supra, that it was not necessary to prove that the actions undertaken were willful. 45 Mont. at 196, 122 P. at 572. The latest case before the adoption of the 1972 constitutional provision was State v. O'Hern (1937), 104 Mont. 126, 65 P.2d 619. In that case, the question involved was the removal by the governor of members of the State Highway Commission who had received compensation for duties in office in excess of what was then provided by law. The Supreme Court then reaffirmed the definition of misconduct in office as set forth in State v. Examining and Trial Board of Police Dept., supra, and concluded that the misconduct need not be willful in order to justify the removal of an officer. However, the decision turned upon the power of the governor to dismiss highway commissioners and the court did not rely on the misconduct charge in upholding the dismissal of the members of the highway commission. This was the state of the judicial construction of misconduct in office at the time of the adoption of the 1972 constitutional provision. It is generally held that the embodiment in a constitution of provisions found in previous constitutions, without change of verbiage, precludes the court from giving their language a meaning different from that ascribed to the previous constitutional provisions, unless there is something to indicate an intention of the framers in the new constitution to alter the accepted construction. 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law, at 474-475, § 120. This Court said in Johnson v. City of Great Falls (1909), 38 Mont. 369, 372, 373, 99 P. 1059-1060: ... At the time our constitution was adopted the rule was quite uniform, so far as established by judicial decisions, that in the house originating a bill the vote on amendments proposed by the other house need not be by ayes and noes, and the names of those voting need not be entered on the journal, and, in the absence of anything indicating a contrary view, we must assume that the framers of our Constitution, in adopting section 24 of article 5, did so intending that the rule of interpretation then in vogue should be applied to it... Thus, all the cases preceding the 1972 Montana Constitution regarding removal of officers on the grounds of misconduct, related on the facts to misconduct in office. Admittedly there is a quoted passage in one Montana case, State v. Board of Aldermen of Town of Conrad, supra, relating to conduct outside of office, but it is entirely obiter dictum and cannot be said to be included in the law of this State at the time of the adoption of the 1972 Montana Constitution. The addition, the Constitutional Convention's use of the word willful in describing the conduct which subjects a judicial officer to discipline, evinces an intent on the part of the convention to move away from the judicial constructions in the earlier cases that intent was not necessary to constitute misconduct in office. Thus, the new constitutional provision would distinguish the holding of this Court in State v. Board of Aldermen of Town of Conrad, supra. In the Geiler case, supra, the California court was careful to emphasize in its footnote that conduct outside the office would constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. The court's footnote said: The lesser charge of `conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute' would also apply to wilful misconduct out of office, i.e. unjudicial conduct committed in bad faith by a judge not then acting in a judicial capacity. It should be emphasized that our characterization of one ground for imposing discipline as more or less serious than the other does not imply that in a given case we would regard the ultimate sanction of removal as unjustified solely for `conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute.' 515 P.2d at 9, fn. 11. In reaching our decision here that misconduct in office, as required by the 1972 constitution means conduct in or arising out of the duties or responsibilities of office and does not apply to alleged misconduct outside of the office, we determine that the 1972 constitutional convention apparently intended to omit the lesser charge by not adopting the same. As noted above, the convention reserved to the legislature, either through impeachment or through further legislative action, the removal of public officers, including judicial officers, for misconduct outside office: Section 13. Impeachment. (1) The governor, executive officers, heads of state departments, judicial officers, and such other officers as may be provided by law are subject to impeachment, and upon conviction shall be removed from office. Other proceedings for removal from public office for cause may be provided by law. Art. V, § 13. (Emphasis added.) If the words in office contained in Art. VII, § 11, 1972 Montana Constitution are to have any significance in this case, we must conclude that the parking ticket incidents, whatever the facts may be, are not matters arising from or growing out of the office of a justice of this Court. There remains the question whether the language used by Daniel J. Shea in his dissenting opinion in McKenzie constitutes willful misconduct in office. We conclude it does not. It is characterized by the Commission as intemperate but the language quoted is not profane or vulgar. It may not have been pleasant for the majority in McKenzie to have been called intellectually dishonest or to have been told that they were slippery with the facts. Yet it seems nearly every day newspaper editors say something equally derogatory about our decisions. As long as a justice, or a judge, in writing opinions, does not resort to profane, vulgar or insulting language that offends good morals, it may hardly be considered misconduct in office. More important than to censure, suspend or remove Daniel J. Shea from office for his intemperate language is to preserve an independent judiciary in this State. The judicial power of a district judge is sovereign, in the name of the State, and the judicial power of a justice of the Supreme Court is likewise sovereign, provided the decision is in and with the opinion of the majority of the Court (excluding those few cases where the constitution allows a single justice to act). The requirement of a majority for any opinion of the Supreme Court (Art. VII, § 3(1), 1972 Montana Constitution) does not mean that one in the minority is throttled and may not speak his piece. The right of a minority justice to voice his individual opinion is equal to that of any in the majority, indeed is vital to collegiality among the justices, and proper to furnish for later cases a standard or rule to which the Court may eventually adhere. There is moreover, in extreme cases, the sovereign power of this Court to remove or strike scandalous language which is deemed inappropriate for judicial decisions ( Nadeau v. Texas Co. (1937), 104 Mont. 558, 576-577, 69 P.2d 593, 595-596), which inherent power has not been removed from us by the establishment of the Judicial Standards Commission. Disciplinary proceedings should not apply to the decisional process of a judge. Otherwise judges would be as concerned with what is proper in the eyes of the Commission as with what is justice in the cause. On the ground therefore that the charges against Daniel J. Shea do not amount to misconduct in office under the constitutional provision, the Judicial Standards Commission is acting in excess of its jurisdiction in this case, and a writ of prohibition should issue. Moreover, in the absence of a verified complaint against Daniel J. Shea, the proceedings against him must be barred, since such lack of verified complaint violates a validly enacted statute and the Commission's own rule. In such case a writ of prohibition may issue. Accordingly, this opinion shall be and constitute a writ prohibiting the Judicial Standards Commission from proceeding further in its pending action against Daniel J. Shea. DALY and MORRISON, JJ., concur. HASWELL, C.J., did not participate in this decision. WEBER, Justice, specially concurs in the Opinion of the Court on the following basis: The Opinion of the Court described the dispositive issues in this cause to be as follows: 1. Is the Judicial Standards Commission subject to the power of the Supreme Court to issue writs of prohibition, mandamus, certiorari, or alternative writs? 2. Does Rule 9(a) of the Judicial Standards Commission exceed the constitutional power of the Judicial Standards Commission? 3. Is a verified complaint a requisite for Judicial Standards Commission proceedings? 4. Are the charges made by the Judicial Standards Commission against Daniel J. Shea included in the phrase willful misconduct in office? I agree to and join in the holding of the Court with regard to issues 1, 2 and 3. Because of our holding on those three issues, I agree with the conclusion of the Court that the proceedings against Daniel J. Shea must be barred since the lack of a verified complaint violates a validly enacted statute and the Commission's own rule. Accordingly, I join in the Opinion of the Court which constitutes a writ prohibiting the Judicial Standards Commission from proceeding further in its pending action against Daniel J. Shea. Because of the Court's holding on the first three issues, we do have an adequate basis for the issuance of a writ of prohibition. Having reached that conclusion, I do not find a necessity or reason for this Court making any determination on issue 4. Therefore, I do not join in that portion of the Opinion of the Court pertaining to issue 4.