Opinion ID: 187129
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Regarding Constructive Possession

Text: To convict Bryant of unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the Government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Bryant knowingly possessed a firearm, (2) the firearm was transported in or affected interstate commerce, and (3) at the time of his possession, Bryant had been previously convicted of a felony. See United States v. Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 127 n. 18 (D.C.Cir.2003). Conviction under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) obligated the Government to prove that (1) Bryant knowingly possessed a firearm (2) whose registry in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record was required. The parties agreed that both guns were firearms within the definitions of the relevant statutes, that both guns were possessed, shipped, and transported in interstate commerce, that the Harrington and Richardson shotgun was not properly registered, and that both appellant and Walker previously had been convicted of a felony. Thus, all that remained for the Government to prove was that appellant possessed the guns. Criminal possession of a firearm may be either actual or constructive. Alexander, 331 F.3d at 127. Moreover, possession need not be exclusive in a single person; joint possession is possible in the criminal law. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.1(e) (2d ed.). In order to prove that appellant constructively possessed the guns, the Government was required to show that Bryant knew of, and was in a position to exercise dominion and control over, the contraband, `either personally or through others. ' United States v. Byfield, 928 F.2d 1163, 1166 (D.C.Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Raper, 676 F.2d 841, 847 (D.C.Cir.1982)). When evaluating whether Bryant had dominion and control over the firearms, [t]he essential question is whether there is `some action, some word, or some conduct that links the individual to the [contraband] and indicates that he had some stake in them, some power over them.' Byfield, 928 F.2d at 1166 (quoting United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 549 (D.C.Cir.1980)). In other words, the Government's case must rest on something more than [the defendant's] mere presence at the scene of a criminal transaction. Pardo, 636 F.2d at 549; see also Littlejohn, 489 F.3d at 1338-39; Alexander, 331 F.3d at 127; In re Sealed Case (Sentencing Guidelines' Safety Valve), 105 F.3d 1460, 1463 (D.C.Cir.1997). However, proximity plus another factor may well be enough to prove that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the contraband. [E]vidence of some other factor  including connection with a gun, proof of motive, a gesture implying control, evasive conduct, or a statement indicating involvement in an enterprise  coupled with proximity may suffice [to prove constructive possession]. Alexander, 331 F.3d at 127 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Sealed Case, 105 F.3d at 1463. On appeal, counsel for appellant concedes that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there was sufficient evidence that [Bryant] knew of the existence of both guns, and sufficient evidence that he and Walker were doing something in concert. Br. for Appellant at 34. However, counsel argues that there was no evidence that [Bryant's] gestures implied control over the gun Walker was carrying or that any of his evasive actions related to the gun. Id. at 35. Appellant also contends that the prosecutor's suggestion that Bryant was covering or otherwise exerting control over the car gun is purely speculative. Id. at 37. We disagree. First, the Government established that appellant had been in close proximity to both guns during the events in question: Appellant remained close to Walker (and therefore close to the Stevens .12-gauge shotgun on Walker's person) from the time they exited the SUV until they were approached by police officers and Walker ran away. In addition, the Harrington and Richardson firearm was found on the passenger's side floorboard of the SUV  the same SUV in which appellant was seen sitting in the passenger's seat. However, the Government's case was not dependent on proximity alone. Both men were walking in Chinatown at 3:00 a.m., wearing bulky winter jackets and ski masks on a relatively mild evening. The jury heard testimony that Walker had concealed the Stevens .12-gauge gun in his oversized coat. Jurors reasonably might have assumed that Bryant wore similar outerwear in case he decided to carry one of the guns. Jurors also could have inferred from the testimony about Bryant's and Walker's behavior that they were preparing to rob the bus driver or passengers, supplying a possible motive for their actions. Similarly, as counsel for appellant conceded, the nonverbal communication signals between Walker and appellant demonstrated that the two men were acting in concert. Finally, appellant and Walker engaged in evasive conduct. The jury heard testimony that when the two men first observed the police car carrying Officers Burgess and Greene, they began walking in the opposite direction from the police car and, after turning a street corner, they began walking at a much faster than normal pace. The Government's constructive possession case against Bryant certainly is not overwhelming. Nonetheless, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government in determining whether  any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, Wahl, 290 F.3d at 375 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781). Given this deferential standard of review, we hold that a reasonable jury could have concluded from the totality of the circumstances that Bryant exercised dominion and control over both firearms sufficient to support a conviction under both 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Appellant's proximity to both guns, coupled with his suspicious attire, his initial evasive conduct towards the police officers, and the evidence that Bryant was acting in concert with an individual who was actually carrying one of the weapons on his person, provided adequate evidence for a juror to conclude that Bryant constructively possessed both firearms.