Opinion ID: 836418
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Admission of Prosecutor's Allegedly Inflammatory Statements During Closing Arguments

Text: Defendant also assigns error to other statements that the prosecutor made during his closing argument. Specifically, defendant objects to the following statements: (1) a life sentence would laugh [defendant's] crime off; (2) [a]ll [the prosecutor wants] in this case is justice, a punishment that fits the crime according to the law; (3) defendant should not walk away from the crime and go to the Oregon State Penitentiary, which [s]ounds kind of like a racquetball club, to [the prosecutor]; and (4) the jurors' duty was to sentence defendant to death. Defendant admits that he failed to object to any of those statements before the trial court. He argues, however, that the prosecutor's arguments were so prejudicial that the trial court had a duty to declare a mistrial sua sponte. In other words, defendant argues that the trial court legally was obliged to declare a mistrial on its own motion. It was not. Indeed, as we explain below, we hold that the trial court would not have erred in denying such a motion, even had such a motion been timely made. We review a trial court's failure to grant an ordinary motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion. In such cases, [e]ven if we find the prosecutor's remarks to be improper, tasteless, or inappropriate, we will not find an abuse of discretion    unless the effect of the prosecutor's remarks is to deny a defendant a fair trial. State v. Smith, 310 Or. 1, 24, 791 P.2d 836 (1990). The prosecutor's remarks here did not violate that standard. Defendant relies on two cases as support for his assertion that they do: Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 63 S.Ct. 561, 87 L.Ed. 734 (1943), and State v. Blodgett, 50 Or. 329, 92 P. 820 (1907). In Viereck, a case that occurred during World War II, the defendants were prosecuted for failing to register as agents of foreign principals, as was required by statute at the time. In his closing arguments, the prosecutor in that case made the following statements: This is war. It is a fight to the death. The American people are relying upon you ladies and gentlemen for their protection against this sort of a crime, just as much as they are relying upon the protection of the men who man the guns in Bataan Peninsula, and everywhere else. They are relying upon you ladies and gentlemen for their protection. We are at war. You have a duty to perform here. As a representative of your Government I am calling upon every one of you to do your duty. Viereck, 318 U.S. at 247-48 n. 3, 63 S.Ct. 561 (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendant did not object. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court, after reversing on other grounds, stated in dictum that the prosecutor's statements prejudiced petitioner's right to a fair trial, and    might well have placed the judgment of conviction in jeopardy. Id. at 247, 63 S.Ct. 561. Defendant asserts that the prosecutor's statements in this case were of the same inflammatory character as those in Viereck. We disagree. Viereck involved a blatant appeal to the jurors' sense of patriotism during a time of war. The prosecutor, in effect, equated convicting the defendants with contributing to the war effort. Here, we are confronted with an entirely different situation. The prosecutor's arguments, even if verging on sensational, were not so prejudicial that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to declare a mistrial sua sponte. Defendant's reliance on State v. Blodgett also is misplaced. Unlike in this case, the defendant in Blodgett objected to the questionable statements. 50 Or. at 342, 92 P. 820. The dispute in that case centered around the trial court's failure to respond to the timely objection. By contrast, defendant in this case never raised any objection before the trial court. For the foregoing reasons, we reject defendant's argument under this assignment of error.