Opinion ID: 1090851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: assistance of counsel during the guilt phase.

Text: ¶ 101. Russell argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase, and that we must review the totality of the circumstances and the cumulative effect of counsel's lapses. Russell cites, along with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the Ninth Circuit and Texas opinions in Harris ex rel. Ramseyer v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir.1995); Wenzy v. State, 855 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.Ct. App.1993); and Ex parte Welborn, 785 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). The State answers that some errors will have isolated effect and others may be pervasive, and the test Russell suggests is simply wrong. ¶ 102. The proper standard for determining if counsel was constitutionally ineffective is as follows: In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove that his attorney's performance was deficient, and that the deficiency was so substantial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. This Court looks at the totality of circumstances to determine whether counsel's efforts were both deficient and prejudicial. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance [is] highly deferential. There is a strong but rebuttable presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Only where it is reasonably probable that but for the attorney's errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different, will we find that counsel's performance was deficient. Holly v. State, 716 So.2d 979, 989 (Miss. 1998) (citations omitted).
¶ 103. Russell states that both defense counsel were trying their first capital case when defending Russell, and therefore there is a presumption of prejudice. Russell cites Copas v. Comm'r of Correction, 234 Conn. 139, 662 A.2d 718 (1995); Rose v. State, 675 So.2d 567 (Fla. 1996); Commonwealth v. Perry, 537 Pa. 385, 644 A.2d 705 (1994). None of these cases stand for the proposition that counsel can be presumed ineffective because of lack of experience in trying a particular kind of case. The charge of ineffective assistance of counsel must be tested against established legal precedent set out in Issue X.A., supra. This issue is without merit.
¶ 104. We will not presume to determine whether defense counsel's relationship with Russell was meaningful or not. We cannot know whether Russell told defense counsel everything he should have told them, but this course of action is finally in the hands of Russell. Russell is raising once again the issue of violation of privilege previously discussed under IX.A., and for that reason this issue is also without merit.
¶ 105. Russell argues that his defense counsel should have secured adequate funds to investigate his case. Russell cites the affidavits of defense counsel, which both state: The degree of funding in capital cases in my district was very limited in 1990. Russell then apparently acknowledges that the lack of investigative funds is in large part attributable to the lack of funding in the district at the time. Russell next says that defense counsel spent only approximately twenty hours total on the investigation for both phases of this criminal trial. Russell gives no source for this allegation. Russell next alleges that what investigation defense counsel did was inadequate and incompetently done, but once again this allegation has no source. Absent more detailed evidence as to what was available in the district in question versus what defense counsel actually requested or got in expert funds, we find this issue without merit.
¶ 106. Russell states that the Mississippi Supreme Court has held that, upon a proper showing of need, the defense is entitled to all experts reasonably necessary for an effective defense. Russell cites Johnson v. State, 529 So.2d 577 (Miss.1988), where we found no error in the trial court's denial of funds for a fingerprint expert to challenge the State's fingerprint evidence.