Opinion ID: 6317349
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: e., rebutting, the presumption.

Text: ¶42 One of our well-established contextual canons of statutory construction—the surplusage canon—helps illuminate the problem with the Tax Commission‘s view. Under the Commission‘s approach, the ―rebuttable presumption‖ provision in subsection (2) carries no water. Scrap it altogether, and taxpayers could still put on evidence of their action or inaction regarding the residential exemption. In other words, taxpayers could still put on evidence indicating they did not ―claim[] a residential exemption.‖ UTAH CODE § 59-10-136(2)(a). This outcome puts subsection (2) on the same footing with subsection (1), which creates a ―categorical‖ or non-rebuttable presumption, as the Tax Commission concedes.11 Such an interpretation violates the surplusage canon and, under our jurisprudence, is anathema. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 174 (2012) (―If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect . . . . None should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it . . . to have no consequence‖). ¶43 We think it inconceivable that the Utah Legislature labored to create a rebuttable presumption that, in effect, is irrebuttable. Hence, we conclude that Tax Commission‘s interpretation is not reasonable, and we reject it. ¶44 The Bucks, on the other hand, read subsections (1), (2), and (3) together in a common-sense way that gives meaning to each section of the Domicile Provision. In the Bucks‘ view, the Tax Commission would first determine if an individual or the individual‘s spouse or dependent is enrolled in an educational ___________________________________________________________ 11 Even though the subsection (1) presumption is categorical, there is no doubt that taxpayers could put on evidence they are not subject to it. For example, taxpayers could introduce facts showing their dependents were not ―enrolled in a public kindergarten . . . in this state‖ during the tax year in question. UTAH CODE § 59-10136(1)(a)(i). 12 Cite as: 2022 UT 11 Opinion of the Court institution in this state in a way that triggers subsection (1). See supra ¶ 37. If so, and absent application of subsection (4), which has no perch in this case, the individual is domiciled in Utah for purposes of IITA. Full stop. ¶45 If subsection (1) does not apply, the Tax Commission would turn to subsection (2) and determine if the individual claimed the residential exemption or otherwise triggered the application of this subsection. See supra ¶ 38. Unlike under subsection (1), however, the individual may rebut this presumption. ¶46 Subsection (3), in the Bucks‘ view, serves as IITA‘s catchall domicile provision. Pursuant to this subsection, individuals not subject to the situation-specific rules of subsections (1) and (2) may still be considered domiciled in Utah if, after ―taking into consideration the totality of the . . . facts and circumstances‖ set forth in subsection (3)(b), the ―preponderance of the evidence‖ weighs in favor of domicile. See supra ¶¶ 35–36. And these so happen to be many of the same facts and circumstances the Bucks presented evidence on before the Tax Commission in their bid to overcome the subsection (2) presumption. ¶47 With the benefit of hindsight and focused briefing, it is often the case that we perceive ways in which statutory language could be improved. Section 136 is no exception: The legislature could have explicitly said taxpayers are not barred from relying on some or all of the subsection (3) factors in overcoming the subsection (2) presumption. But clairvoyance and perfection have never been the benchmarks by which we measure ambiguity. No, we focus on if, in reading the relevant provisions together, there are competing reasonable interpretations. Here, there are not. For the reasons we have expressed, only the Bucks‘ take survives our reasonableness inquiry. ¶48 What is more, even if we were to stretch and credit the Commission‘s interpretation as a reasonable one, resulting in an ambiguity, the Commission would still lose. As the Bucks and amicus curiae the American College of Tax Counsel ably point out, the Commission‘s interpretation raises several constitutional issues.12 And the Attorney General‘s decision not to offer a defense ___________________________________________________________ The Bucks contend the Tax Commission‘s application of the 12 Domicile Provision (1) denies them due process because ―it doesn‘t (continued . . .) 13 BUCK v. TAX COMMISSION Opinion of the Court of the statute in light of this briefing provides us with a sufficient basis to conclude that there are serious problems attendant to the Commission‘s view. Accordingly, one of our prime expectedmeaning canons—the constitutional-doubt canon—would heavily favor the Bucks‘ read of the Domicile Provision and cause us to reject the Commission‘s position.