Opinion ID: 2549875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Closing argument and reasonable doubt instruction

Text: Appellant claims that the district court improperly limited his closing argument regarding reasonable doubt. He maintains that as long as his counsel did not quantify or analogize reasonable doubt, counsel had a right to explain its meaning and to quote case law from this court discussing it. This claim is patently meritless: appellant ignores long-standing and unequivocal case law to the contrary. This court has repeatedly cautioned the district courts and attorneys not to attempt to quantify, supplement, or clarify the statutorily prescribed standard .... [60] [T]he defense bar and prosecutors alike [are] not to explain, elaborate on, or offer analogies or examples based on the statutory definition of reasonable doubt. Counsel may argue that evidence and theories in the case before the jury either amount to or fall short of that definition nothing more.  [61] This stricture is unqualified and cannot be avoided by offering explanations of reasonable doubt taken from judicial opinions. Appellant also contends that the district court erred in refusing to give a proposed jury instruction quoting from cited cases discussing the propriety of the death penalty. The district court allowed defense counsel to argue that death is an inappropriate punishment for a substantial portion of convicted first-degree murderers, but the court refused to instruct the jury on this proposition or to allow counsel to cite its source, the United States Supreme Court. [62] We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion to determine which jury instructions are necessary and pertinent [63] and to limit argument by counsel. [64]