Opinion ID: 1257787
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior Standard Governing Preindictment Delay

Text: To support his position that the delay between the alleged sexual offenses and the State's decision to prosecute him for those offenses is prejudicial, Petitioner looks to this Court's decision in State ex rel. Leonard v. Hey, 269 S.E.2d 394 (W.Va.1980). When the defendant in Hey became eligible for parole in 1979 following his conviction for offenses arising out of a robbery he committed in 1967, the government sought to charge him with another offense arising from that same robbery. [7] This Court was asked to consider whether a delay of eleven years between the identification, location, and connection of the defendant with an alleged criminal act and the formal accusation-trial process was prejudicial. Id. at 395. Recognizing that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is not implicated in cases where the delay at issue is preindictment, [8] we observed that [p]re-arrest or pre-accusatory delays are usually governed by statutes of limitations. Id. at 396. This general rule, however, is tempered by the recognition that a defendant's due process rights can be violated by a prosecution initiated within the statute [of limitations] but unjustifiably delayed by the government. [9] Id. at 396. In deciding Hey, this Court sought guidance from the United States Supreme Court and recognized that the high court had refrained from adopting a universally applicable test for resolving when due process is invoked by preindictment delay. 269 S.E.2d at 396; accord U.S. v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 796, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (confirming inability to identify in the abstract circumstances ... [under] which preaccusation delay would require dismissing prosecutions). Citing the seminal decision of U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971), we discussed how these cases require a balancing of interests: To accommodate the sound administration of justice to the rights of the defendant to a fair trial will necessarily involve a delicate judgment based on the circumstances of each case. Hey, 269 S.E.2d at 396 (citing Marion, 404 U.S. at 325, 92 S.Ct. 455). Despite the lack of a bright line test, the United States Supreme Court did identify what is often referred to as the Marion test in announcing that the dismissal of an indictment would be required if it were shown ... that the preindictment delay ... caused substantial prejudice to appellees' rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused. 404 U.S. at 324, 92 S.Ct. 455 (emphasis supplied). After noting the inherent limitation of federal precedent on this Court, [10] we proceeded to address the concerns prompted by a lengthy preindictment delay: One facet of a citizen's due process protections is the right to have the government accuse him of a crime within a reasonable time from discovery of its commission and determination reasonably reached, that he or she did the criminal act. It is the government's duty to proceed with reasonable diligence in its investigation and preparation for arrest, indictment and trial. If it fails to do so after discovering sufficient facts to justify indictment and trial, it violates this due process right. Of course, the right itself arises from the substantial prejudice that is presumed to affect a defendant's ability to respond to charges against him when the charges are time-worn and stale. Hey, 269 S.E.2d at 397-98.
Focusing on the importance of timely prosecutions, we held in syllabus point one of Hey that [a] delay of eleven years between the commission of a crime and the arrest or indictment of a defendant, his location and identification having been known throughout the period, is presumptively prejudicial to the defendant and violates his right to due process of law. Id. at 394. We remanded the matter to give the government an opportunity to justify the delay by proving its reasonableness. Hey, 269 S.E.2d at 398. Following a hearing on the reasons for the prosecutorial delay, we instructed that the indictment should be quashed if the government was unable to prove that it acted with reasonable diligence once it had sufficient information to do so. Id. at 399. We observed in Hey that the assertion of a due process violation based on preindictment delay will not always involve allegations of facially prejudicial delay. In those cases where the delay is not extreme, we held that a trial court must weigh[] the reasons for the delay against the impact of the delay upon the defendant's ability to defend himself. Hey, 269 S.E.2d at 394, syl. pt. 2, in part. In State v. Richey, 171 W.Va. 342, 298 S.E.2d 879 (1982), we determined that where the delay is not extreme the burden initially rests upon the defendant to demonstrate how such delay has prejudiced his case. Id. at 344, 298 S.E.2d at 881, syl. pt. 1, in part. Petitioner argues that under this Court's reasoning in Hey, there can be no question that the thirteen-year delay in his case was presumptively prejudicial. He maintains that the lengthy delay between the alleged offenses and the State's decision to prosecute him for those offenses has put him at an untenable disadvantage. Due to the passage of more than a decade, he posits that records have been destroyed and memories have faded. As a consequence, he asserts that he has been denied the right to successfully defend against the charges at issue.
In response to Petitioner's argument, the State looks to this Court's decision in Hundley v. Ashworth, 181 W.Va. 379, 382 S.E.2d 573 (1989). At issue in Hundley was the eight-year delay between the reporting of alleged child abuse to the Department of Human Services and the defendant's indictment. In addressing whether that delay constituted a due process violation, we recognized that the United States Supreme Court had apparently settled on a due process test for preaccusation delay. Id. at 381, 382 S.E.2d at 575. Relating the standard identified by the high court in U.S. v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984), we observed that the high court had borrowed language from its earlier decisions of Marion and Lovasco in ruling that the Fifth Amendment requires the dismissal of an indictment, even it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the Government's delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice in presenting his defense. Hundley, 181 W.Va. at 382, 382 S.E.2d at 576 (omitting citations). In light of the high court's seeming adoption of a due process standard for pre-accusation delay, [11] we reviewed our previous decision in Hey to employ a burden-shifting mechanism. Hundley, 181 W.Va. at 382, 382 S.E.2d at 576. That approach required that in those instances of extreme or gross delay where the prejudice was presumptive, the burden shifted to the prosecution to rebut the presumption by explaining the reason for the delay. This burden-shifting mechanism, as we stressed in Hundley, was invoked in those instances when the prosecution was aware of the defendant's location and identification ... throughout the period of delay. Id. at 382, 382 S.E.2d at 576 (quoting Hey, 269 S.E.2d at 394, syl. pt. 1, in part). And, in those limited factual instances where the Hey burden-shifting analysis was required, the State in rebutting the prejudice need only show that the delay was not deliberately designed to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant. Hundley, 181 W.Va. at 383, 382 S.E.2d at 577. Seeking to adopt a standard that flowed from our prior law and comported with the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Gouveia, we held in syllabus point two of Hundley: The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article III, Section 10 of the West Virginia Constitution require the dismissal of an indictment, even if it is brought within the statute of limitations, if the defendant can prove that the State's delay in bringing the indictment was a deliberate device to gain an advantage over him and that it caused him actual prejudice in presenting his defense. 181 W.Va. at 380, 382 S.E.2d at 574, syl. pt. 2. Applying this standard to the facts of Hundley, we found that because the state agency's knowledge was not imputable to law enforcement, the State did not have actual knowledge of the abuse until five months prior to the indictment's return. [12] Consequently, we ruled that the Hundley defendant did not clear the first hurdle by showing that the State had, by deliberate design, delayed the bringing of the charges. Id. at 383, 382 S.E.2d at 577. Like the defendant in Hundley, the State in the case before us argues that Petitioner is similarly unable to clear the first hurdle of the test we adopted for identifying when preindictment delay requires the dismissal of an indictment. See Hundley, 181 W.Va. at 380, 382 S.E.2d at 574, syl. pt. 2. The thirteen-year delay between the offenses and the indictment, according to the State, is solely attributable to the specific request of Ms. Nicholas' parents that the matter not be prosecuted due to the young age of their daughter. [13] Only when Trooper Portillo was investigating another instance of alleged sexual abuse against Petitioner did he uncover the earlier allegations of sexual abuse allegedly committed by Petitioner against Ms. Nicholas. Rather than the aftermath of calculated efforts designed to gain an advantage over Petitioner, the State maintains that the delay resulted solely from the State's decision to honor the request of the alleged victim's parents. Based on his inability to demonstrate that the delay involved in this case was tactical in nature, the State argues that Petitioner has failed to meet step one of the test we adopted in Hundley. See id. at 380, 382 S.E.2d at 574, syl. pt. 2.