Opinion ID: 1156159
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: PRECEDENT OF BYRD v. COUNTY OF FLORENCE

Text: The Circuit Court based its invalidation of Act 50, in part, upon Byrd, supra . We granted the Authority's petition to argue against the precedent of that decision. The majority opinion in Byrd (Byrd majority), in a divided 3-2 Court, held invalid Florence County Ordinance No. 14-82-83 (Ordinance 14-82-83) providing for the issuance of general obligation bonds. The bond moneys were to foster development of high technology industries through the construction of a development park. Ordinance 14-82-83 permitted County Council to borrow $5,500,000 by way of general obligation bonds to be repaid over a period of years from proceeds derived from ad valorem taxes imposed on Florence County property owners. The proceeds were to be used to purchase acreage to be improved and offered for sale to private parties for industrial use. The effect of Byrd is to nullify at state, county and municipal levels any legislation which authorizes the expenditure of public funds for industrial development. In short, Byrd holds that industrial development does not pass constitutional muster as a public purpose, within the meaning of S.C. Const. art X, § 14(4). Our reconsideration of the precedent in Byrd involves (1) the scope of judicial review of legislative statutes, (2) a definition of public purpose, (3) the determination of public purpose, and (4) a review of the trial court record in Byrd.
Where legislative statutes are challenged for constitutionality, the scope of judicial review is prescribed and limited. It is an axiom in American jurisprudence that a statute is not to be pronounced void on this ground, unless the repugnancy to the constitution is clear and the conclusion that it exists inevitable.... The judicial function involving such result is one of delicacy and to be exercised always with caution. Township v. Talcott , 19 Wall. 673 [22 L.Ed. 227 (1873)]. Pelzer, Rodgers and Co. v. Campbell and Company , 15 S.C. 581, 583 (1880). Every legislative act must be presumed constitutional and should be declared unconstitutional only when its invalidity is manifest beyond a reasonable doubt. Poulnot v. Cantwell , 129 S.C. 171, 176, 123 S.E. 651, 653 (1924), citing Battle v. Willcox , 128 S.C. 500, 122 S.E. 516 (1924). [T]he Constitution of the State is a restraint of power, and the Legislature may enact any law not prohibited thereby. Fripp v. Coburn , 101 S.C. 312, 85 S.E. 774 (1914). Deference to the presumption of constitutionality of legislative acts has been long recognized by this Court. It was eloquently expressed by Chancellor Thomas Waties, writing for the Court in Byrne's Adm'rs v. Stewart's Adm'rs , 3 S.C. Eq. (3 Des.) 466, 476-477 (1812): This confidence in the wisdom and integrity of the legislature, is necessary to ensure a due obedience to its authority; for if this is frequently questioned, it must tend to diminish that reverence for the laws which is essential to the public safety and happiness. I am not, therefore, disposed to examine with scrupulous exactness the validity of a law. It would be unwise to do so on another account. The interference of the judicial power with legislative acts, if frequent or on dubious grounds, might occasion so great a jealousy of this power, and so general a prejudice against it, as to lead to measures which might end in the total overthrow of the independence of the judiciary, and with it this best preservative of the constitution. See also cases collected in West's Decennial Digest, Constitutional Law , at Key Nos. 26 and 48.
Since the early days of the republic, a legal definition of public purpose has been the constant subject of judicial commentary in this and all other states. The term has been variously defined. Courts and legal scholars alike agree that a public purpose has for its objective the promotion of the public health, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity and contentment of all the inhabitants or residents within a given political division. See Caldwell v. McMillan , 224 S.C. 150, 157, 77 S.E. (2d) 798, 801 (1953) (quoting other authority). Public purpose is a fluid concept which changes with time, place, population, economy and countless other circumstances. It is a reflection of changing needs of society. [Emphases supplied]. Bauer v. S.C. State Housing Authority , 271 S.C. 219, 227, 246 S.E. (2d) 869, 872 (1978). This concept of fluidity was earlier approved in Caldwell, supra . [T]he courts also recognize that customs and usages may change so that a purpose which was formerly conceded to be private may now be public; and therefore the novelty of purpose does not render it the less a public purpose. Caldwell , 224 S.C. at 158, 77 S.E. (2d) at 801, quoting 73 C.J.S. Public , p. 334 (1983). Times change. The wants and necessities of the people change ... On the one hand, what could not be deemed a public use a century ago may, because of changed economic and industrial conditions , be such today. [Emphasis supplied]. State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum , 59 Wis. (2d) 391, 208 N.W. (2d) 780, 798 (Wis. 1973). The concensus of modern legislative and judicial thinking is to broaden the scope of activities which may be classed as involving a public purpose. 37 Am. Jur., Municipal Corporations, Sec. 132. It reaches perhaps its broadest extent under the view that economic welfare is one of the main concerns of the city, state and the federal governments. [Emphasis supplied]. State ex rel. Jardon v. Industrial Development Authority of Jasper County , 570 S.W. (2d) 666 (Mo. 1978). The views we express here reflect the decisions of multiple other jurisdictions which recognize industrial development as a public purpose. See Lerch v. Maryland Port Authority , 240 Md. 438, 214 A. (2d) 761 (1965); City of Frostburg v. Jenkins , 215 Md. 9, 136 A. (2d) 852 (1957); State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, supra ; Laughlin v. City of Portland , 111 Me. 486, 90 A. 318 (1913); State v. Jardon, supra. Finally, legislation may subserve a public purpose even though it (1) benefits some more than others and, (2) results in profit to individuals. Legislation does not have to benefit all of the people in order to serve a public purpose. At the same time legislation is not for a private purpose merely because some individual makes a profit as a result of the enactment. Anderson v. Baehr , 265 S.C. 153, 162, 217 S.E. (2d) 43, 47 (1975).
It is uniformly held by courts throughout the land that the determination of public purpose is one for the legislative branch. This has been made manifest in a long line of decisions of this Court. The question of whether an Act is for a public purpose is primarily one for the Legislature. Park v. Greenwood County , 174 S.C. 35, 41, 176 S.E. 870, 872 (1934), citing Poulnot, supra ; See also McNulty v. Owens , 188 S.C. 377, 199 S.E. 425 (1938); Caldwell, supra ; Park, supra ; State ex rel. McLeod v. Riley , 276 S.C. 323, 278 S.E. (2d) 612 (1981); Elliott v. McNair , 250 S.C. 75, 156 S.E. (2d) 421 (1967). Decisions of this Court in which public or corporate purpose has been held to pass constitutional muster involve a wide variety of subjects. See Haesloop, supra . (Hotel); Chapman v. Greenville Chamber of Commerce , 127 S.C. 173, 120 S.E. 584 (1923) (Office building site); Battle, supra , and Cathcart v. City of Columbia , 170 S.C. 362, 170 S.E. 435 (1933) (Stadium); Davis v. Saluda , 147 S.C. 498, 145 S.E. 412 (1928); Green v. Rock Hill , 149 S.C. 234, 147 S.E. 346 (1929), and Roach v. City of Columbia , 172 S.C. 478, 174 S.E. 461 (1934) (Waterworks and sewerage); South Carolina Farm Bureau Marketing Association v. South Carolina Ports Authority , 278 S.C. 198, 293 S.E. (2d) 854 (1982) (Grain elevators).
The record in Byrd abounds with evidence of economic underdevelopment in Florence County, for which 6,000 unemployed citizens had no job in the work place. The unemployment rate for the Pee Dee area, of which Florence is the pivotal county, greatly exceeded that of the State. A disastrous plummet in Florence's relative per capita income in the State from 9th in 1974 to 19th in 1980 was stark evidence of the need for industrial development. The ability of the County to locate only three new industries over the prior ten years was a devastating statistic. Other evidence in Byrd underscored the need for industrial development in Florence County. Ordinance 14-82-83 was enacted by County Council to address these critical economic conditions.