Opinion ID: 1745399
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the crime of attempted rape was committed.

Text: Hanson claims the crime of attempted rape in the first degree could not be committed under the facts of this case as a matter of law. SDCL 22-4-1 provides in part that: Any person who attempts to commit a crime and in the attempt does any act toward the commission of the crime, but fails or is prevented or intercepted in the perpetration thereof, is punishable[.] In other words, the statute makes criminal any unequivocal act toward the commission of a crime that would result in the accomplishment of the crime unless frustrated by intervening circumstances. State v. Martinez, 88 S.D. 369, 220 N.W.2d 530 (1974). Hanson claims the facts of this case show neither an unequivocal act nor an intervening force preventing the commission of the crime. He claims one of the parties would have to have clothes removed before conduct could be deemed an unequivocal attempt to rape. Such a requirement would construe the statute too narrowly. An unequivocal act is an act that no longer strike[s] the jury as being equivocal but unequivocally demonstrate[s] that a crime is about to be committed. Id., 88 S.D. at 372, 220 N.W.2d at 531. In this case, the jury was justified in concluding that the act of grabbing the girl, throwing her to the ground, and pawing at her clothes demonstrated that the crime of rape was about to be committed. Hanson also argues that the abandonment of the crime was not caused by intervening circumstances required by the statute. He claims the intervening circumstances that frustrate an attempted crime must be more than the usual resistance expected from someone being attacked. Hanson again construes the statute too narrowly. As we explained in State v. Judge, 81 S.D. 128, 131 N.W.2d 573 (1964), the intervening circumstance frustrating the commission of the crime need only be independent of the will of a defendant. Indeed, the statute provides that it is sufficient if the attempt simply fails. Therefore, the resistance of a victim is sufficient to constitute an intervening circumstance frustrating the commission of a crime.