Opinion ID: 1191597
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the use of the terms

Text: Historically, the clear and convincing standard of proof was first applied in equity to claims which experience had shown to be inherently subject to fabrication, lapse of memory, or the flexibility of conscience. Conceding the validity of policies which the parol evidence rule and the Statutes of Wills and Frauds were designed to carry out, the chancery courts compromised between becoming a mecca for the trumped-up prayer for relief and refusing altogether to mitigate the stern fulfillment of these policies in the law courts, by granting relief only in cases where the evidence in support of this type of claim was `clear and convincing'    Note, Appellate Review in the Federal Courts of Findings Requiring More than a Preponderance of the Evidence, 60 Harv.L.Rev. 111, 112 (1946). The author of the above-quoted law review article notes that in jury trials of civil actions at law, the clear and convincing rule was applied to actions for fraud or deceit as well as to equitable defenses based on fraud or mistake. He concludes that one method of enforcing the demand for clear and convincing evidence available in appeals from jury verdicts is the approval of a charge to the jury which directs them to apply that level of proof or reversal for error where the charge does not incorporate it. Id. at 116-17, nn 43 & 44 (citing Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Genova, 90 F.2d 874 (C.C.A. 6th 1937); Kuhn v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 118 F.2d 400 (C.C.A. 4th 1941)). Many courts have recognized that the intermediate standard of clear and convincing evidence is applicable in appropriate civil cases. Then Chief Justice Warren Burger, in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), wrote that this `intermediate standard, which usually employs some combination of the words clear, cogent, unequivocal, and convincing, is less commonly used, but nonetheless is no stranger to the civil law.' One typical use of the standard is in civil cases involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the defendant. The interests at stake in those cases are deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to defendant of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiff's burden of proof. Citing Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285, 87 S.Ct. 483, 487, 17 L.Ed.2d 362 (1966); McCormick Evidence § 320 (1954); 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2498 (3d ed 1940). Application of this intermediate standard permeates a line of United States Supreme Court decisions declaring that clear and convincing evidence is required in various quasi-criminal proceedings or where the proceedings threaten the individual involved with a significant deprivation of liberty or with a stigma. [6]