Opinion ID: 206045
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Legal Standards

Text: To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Rose must show both (1) `that [his] counsel's performance was deficient,' and (2) `that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.' DeYoung v. Schofield, 609 F.3d 1260, 1283 (11th Cir.2010) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Jan. 14, 2011) (No. 10-8456, 10A451). [16] The performance prong always entails a deferential review of counsel's conduct. Reed v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 593 F.3d 1217, 1240 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 177, 178 L.Ed.2d 106 (2010); see Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 733, 740, 178 L.Ed.2d 649 (2011) (Even under de novo review, the standard for judging counsel's representation is a most deferential one.). [T]o establish deficient performance, a defendant must show that his counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in light of prevailing professional norms at the time the representation took place. Reed, 593 F.3d at 1240 (quotation marks omitted). In assessing the reasonableness of counsel's performance, courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. (quotation marks omitted). To overcome Strickland's, presumption of reasonableness, [Rose] must show that `no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.' Allen v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 611 F.3d 740, 751 (11th Cir.2010) (quoting Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) ( en banc )), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 14, 2011) (No. 10-9202, 10A524); accord Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 790, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) ( Strickland . . . calls for an inquiry into the objective reasonableness of counsel's performance, not counsel's subjective state of mind.). For prejudice, we ask whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. For penalty-phase ineffectiveness claims, the prejudice question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. DeYoung, 609 F.3d at 1284 (quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 787 (quotation marks omitted). In assessing prejudice under Strickland, the question is not whether a court can be certain counsel's performance had no effect on the outcome or whether it is possible a reasonable doubt might have been established if counsel acted differently. Id. at 791. The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable. Id. at 792. In determining whether the prejudice prong is satisfied, we consider the totality of the available mitigation evidenceboth that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceedingand reweigh it against the evidence in aggravation. Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 447, 453-54, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 383, 390, 175 L.Ed.2d 328 (2009) ([T]he reviewing court must consider all the evidencethe good and the badwhen evaluating prejudice.).