Opinion ID: 2979998
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Harris’s Violent Conduct

Text: Harris next criticizes the district court for considering his record of violence in the context of the § 3553(a) factors. In light of the government’s acknowledgment that the § 3553(a) factors are irrelevant when the district court considers a substantial-assistance downward-departure motion atop a mandatory-minimum sentence—and the considerable amount of time the district court spent discussing the § 3553(a) factors—we construe Harris’s claim as a challenge to the district court’s consideration of these factors generally. Because this argument was not raised before the district court, we review for plain error. See United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Plain error requires that (1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected [his] substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). -7- No. 07-5845 USA v. Harris Courts have a “limited ability [to issue] downward departures when a statutory mandatory minimum is involved.” Bullard, 390 F.3d at 416. Sections 3553(e) and (f) “are the exclusive means by which a court may depart below the statutory minimum.” United States v. McIntosh, 484 F.3d 832, 835 (6th Cir. 2007). And “a [§ 3553(e)] departure . . . must be based solely upon the substantial assistance rendered by the defendant.” Bullard, 390 F.3d at 416 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Grant, 636 F.3d at 813–14 (“We have rejected the notion that factors not related to cooperation may be considered in connection with a § 3553(e) motion.”); United States v. Cecil, 615 F.3d 678, 695 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[A] district court’s wish to impose a sentence beneath the mandatory minimum cannot be effectuated through resort to § 3553(a).”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1525 (2011). The district court thus erred in considering the § 3553(a) factors before imposing Harris’s sentence. And this error qualifies as plain. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (granting the district court authority to impose a sentence below a mandatory minimum only “so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense” (emphasis added)); Bullard, 390 F.3d at 416. This consideration, moreover, appears to have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings and the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. The court invited counsel “to speak to the Court regarding an appropriate sentence,” and then told counsel “to bring to the Court’s attention any 3553(a) factors that counsel believes would warrant a sentence above or below the guidelines in this case.” After hearing the attorneys’ arguments, the court discussed several § 3553(a) factors individually, including the need -8- No. 07-5845 USA v. Harris for specific and general deterrence and Harris’s history and characteristics. It then stated that it decided Harris’s sentence “by taking into account all the factors in Section 3553(a), the facts and circumstances of this case, and [Harris’s] unique personal circumstances and background.” The court further noted that, even “if [it] had decided the 5K motion differently or if the Court had decided that the guideline range was different, the Court still would have reached the [same] conclusion” regarding Harris’s sentence. The court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors thus qualifies as plain error. See Marcus, 130 S. Ct. at 2164.