Opinion ID: 2452988
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Superior Court Correctly Denied Reimbursement Of Private Tutoring Costs.

Text: J.P. and L.P. also argue that the superior court erroneously reversed the hearing officer's award of partial tutoring costs. In support of this part of their appeal, they argue the superior court: (1) failed to recognize that the award of partial tutoring costs was an appropriate remedy within the hearing officer's authority; (2) failed to recognize that P.P. was protected by the IDEA during the evaluation process even though he was eventually found ineligible to receive special education services; and (3) failed to recognize that J.P. and L.P. had independent parental rights, which were violated when the school district did not timely respond to their request for evaluation and failed to provide them with procedural safeguards or prior written notice that the district did not intend to assess P.P. in a timely manner. These arguments are discussed separately in the parents' briefs, but they amount to a single legal argument: that the IDEA provided procedural protection to P.P. and that the district's failure to abide by the IDEA's procedural protections during the evaluation process entitles P.P.'s parents, who acted on his behalf, to reimbursement for tutoring costs. [27] The first, narrow question on appeal is whether the district's procedural violations entitle P.P. to relief in the form of reimbursement for tutoring expenses, even though P.P. was not found to be a child with a disability eligible for special services. We conclude that they do not.
The IDEA defines child with a disability as a child: (i) with intellectual disabilities, hearing impairments (including deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious emotional disturbance (referred to in this chapter as emotional disturbance), orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and (ii) who, by reason thereof, needs special education and related services. [28] The need for special education services is determined by a child's ability to keep up with (or access) the curriculum, without mandatory consideration of whether a child has a severe discrepancy between achievement and intellectual ability. [29] As the school district reiterates in its briefing, P.P. failed to meet the two-part test set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) for eligibility; he was found to have a specific learning disability but he did not meet the second requirement of needing special education and related services to access the school curriculum. The district determined that P.P. was ineligible for special education services because he was able to sufficiently access the school curriculum. P.P.'s parents do not challenge this determination on appeal. We therefore conclude that P.P.'s learning disability does not entitle him to private tutoring at school district expense. [30]
Other courts have upheld or granted private tuition reimbursement under the IDEA where there have been procedural violations and children were ultimately determined to be eligible for services. [31] But in R.B. ex rel. F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified School District, the Ninth Circuit held that [a] child ineligible for IDEA opportunities in the first instance cannot lose those opportunities merely because a procedural violation takes place. [32] The United States Supreme Court reached a similar result in Forest Grove School District v. T.A. [33] There, the Court affirmed its prior holding that parents `are entitled to reimbursement [for private educational expenses] only if a federal court concludes both that the public placement violated IDEA and the private school placement was proper under the Act.' [34] The Court cautioned that parents who `unilaterally change their child's placement during the pendency of review proceedings, without the consent of state or local school officials, do so at their own financial risk.' [35] Despite the holdings of R.B. and Forest Grove, some language in federal case law implies that a procedural violation could make IDEA remedies available if the procedural violation itself results in a denial of a free appropriate public education. For example, in R.B. the Ninth Circuit wrote: A procedural violation does not constitute a denial of a [free appropriate public education] if the violation fails to result in a loss of educational opportunity. [36] And the Seventh Circuit has held that a so-called technical violation (involving the qualifications of an occupational therapist engaged to provide special education services) required compensatory relief because [a free appropriate public education], surely, is an education provided by qualified personnel. [37] But notwithstanding this language, the child in each of these cases was determined to be eligible for special education services, unlike P.P., and R.B. suggests that eligibility for services is a necessary condition for reimbursement under the IDEA. [38] Here, because there is no appeal of the school district's determination that P.P. was ineligible for special education services due to his ability to access the curriculum, we conclude that any procedural delays caused by the district up to the point of its testing did not deny P.P. a free appropriate public education. Because the district's procedural violation did not give rise to a remedy under the IDEA, P.P.'s parents enrolled him in private tutoring at their own financial risk, [39] and the law does not require the district to reimburse them for the cost of tutoring.