Opinion ID: 864456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the defendant was prejudiced by the

Text: TRIAL JUDGE'S DENIAL OF ADDITIONAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES. ¶32. Moody argues that he was prejudiced by having to use all of his peremptory challenges to strike jurors with knowledge of the case. The State argues that loss of a peremptory challenge does not constitute violation of a right to an impartial jury and that simply using peremptory challenges does not mean his constitutional rights have been violated. Additionally, the parties in their briefs concede, and the record reveals, that they were each graciously afforded “an additional [peremptory] challenge” by the trial judge. In 18 fact the record reveals that during jury selection, Judge McKenzie stated “I’ll even add one challenge per side...I’m going to give you 19 strikes.” Also, the trial judge, in accordance with the applicable rule, granted two additional challenges to each side for use during selection of the two alternate jurors. This is interesting because since this was a death penalty case, and since the trial judge had determined that two alternate jurors would be seated, each side pursuant to uniform rule, would have only been entitled to 14 peremptory challenges – 12 in selecting the regular trial jury members and 2 in selecting the alternate jurors. See URCCC 10.01 concerning the selection of the regular trial jury members in death/life cases, and URCCC 10.01(a) concerning the selection of alternate jurors in death penalty cases. (“In death penalty cases the peremptory challenges shall equal the number of alternate jurors the court has ordered to be selected.”). From the record in this case and the applicable law, Moody (and the State) received from the trial judge much more than that to which they were entitled – 21 peremptory challenges each instead of 14 each. In picking the 12-member trial jury, the State used 18 of its available 19 peremptory challenges and Moody used all 19 of his available peremptory challenges. In selecting the two alternate jurors, both the State and Moody each used one of their two peremptory challenges. ¶33. Again, Mu'Min is instructive: Voir dire examination serves the dual purposes of enabling the court to select an impartial jury and assisting counsel in exercising peremptory challenges. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 430; 111 S.Ct. at 1908. Mu'Min also held, as we stated supra, a juror is not required to be completely ignorant of facts and issues. 19 ¶34. This Court addressed this issue in Mettetal v. State, 615 So.2d 600, 603 (Miss. 1993): The loss of a peremptory challenge, however, does not constitute a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury. So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean that the defendant was denied his constitutional rights. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2278, 101 L.Ed.2d 80, 90 (1988). This Court has explained that a prerequisite to presentation of a claim of a denial of constitutional rights due to denial of a challenge for cause is a showing that the defendant had exhausted all of his peremptory challenges and that the incompetent juror was forced by the trial court's erroneous ruling to sit on the jury. Chisolm v. State, 529 So.2d 635, 639 (Miss. 1988). 615 So.2d at 603, also citing Mettetal v. State, 602 So.2d 864, 869 (Miss. 1992).10 ¶35. Keeping in mind the reasoning Mu’Min and Mettetal, Moody’s arguments become less persuasive. Through voir dire, the trial court's excusing jurors for cause, and the attorneys’ use of peremptory challenges, Moody benefitted from a jury which had only two members who had even vaguely heard anything about his case. ¶36. Moody argues that his jury was a peculiarly constituted jury panel, like the one we discussed in Mhoon v. State, 464 So.2d 77 (Miss. 1985). We opined that Mhoon was a statistical aberration where 12 members of a 39-member jury pool were policemen, or 10 Both Mettetal cases involved the same defendant, namely, Jerry Wayne Mettetal, but different murder victims. The 1992 decision of this Court involved Mettetal’s killing of Joe Cosby, a Panola County Deputy Sheriff, and this Court’s 1993 decision involved Mettetal’s killing of his grandmother, Georgia Mae Edwards. 20 related by blood or marriage to a current or former police officer. In Mhoon, the defendant had exercised all of his peremptory challenges and was still left with a jury foreman who was a uniformed police officer. Clearly, Moody’s jury did not suffer from such a statistical aberration. ¶37. Moody argues that the State takes refuge behind the juror's oath to be fair and impartial, and his promise to give no weight to matters heard outside the courtroom. He cites Porter v. State, 616 So.2d 899, 906 (Miss. 1993): These promises [to decide the case on the evidence and the law] of the venire members must be given considerable deference. Moody attempts to argue that this is a dubious state of the law -- that, simply because jurors state that they can follow the law does not necessarily mean they can or will. However, there is nothing in the record to even slightly infer that the jurors failed in their promises to the court and the parties. This issue is without merit.