Opinion ID: 2365726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Award Specific Relief to Corporate Plaintiffs

Text: Frequently, challenges to a municipal zoning ordinance, such as in the instant case, are initiated (either singly or in cooperation with low and moderate income plaintiffs) by a corporate land developer which seeks to build a residential development contrary to the local ordinance. Often, as here, the corporate plaintiff will contend that the municipal zoning scheme is unreasonable, arbitrary and confiscatory with respect to its property. [23] I agree with the majority that in the instant case Oakwood at Madison, Inc. and Beren Corporation have not sustained this contention, and relief should not be granted on that basis. In particular, these plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they will be denied a reasonable return on their property if it is put to its assigned use. It is well established that landowners are not entitled to the most profitable utilization of their land. Bow & Arrow Manor v. West Orange, 63 N.J. 335, 350 (1973); Cobble Close Farm v. Middletown Tp. Bd. of Adjustment, 10 N.J. 442, 452 (1952). Nevertheless, specific relief may be available to corporate litigants on another ground. While it is not the function of courts to rewrite zoning ordinances, issue building permits or otherwise interfere with municipal control over zoning matters ( Bow & Arrow Manor v. West Orange, supra, 63 N.J. at 343), where there has been an adjudication of municipal abuse of the zoning power, the court may (and, in some cases, must) intervene to the extent necessary to provide effective relief. In the present context, granting the specific relief sought by the corporate plaintiff ( see note 23 supra ) will serve several important functions. First, as previously noted, even after an exclusionary zoning provision has been invalidated, a shrewd, intransigent community may rezone plaintiff's property in such a manner as to frustrate the proposed use. Towns may also require lengthy approval procedures or withhold from the corporate plaintiff permits necessary to proceed with a project. As one court has noted, such actions effectively grant the municipality a power to prevent any challenger from obtaining meaningful relief after a successful attack on a zoning ordinance. Casey v. Warwick Tp. Zoning Hearing Bd., supra, 328 A. 2d at 468. By affording the corporate plaintiff specific relief, a remedial order will effectively prevent this form of harassment and will obviate the need for further litigation with respect to the property involved. See Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, infra, 19 Ill. 2d 370, 167 N.E. 2d 406 at 411. Moreover, it will furnish an important incentive for developers to bring suits in the public interest. As our own Court has recognized, unless the immediate litigant can hope to gain, there [will] be no incentive to challenge existing practices or prior holdings which, in the public interest, ought to be reviewed. Goldberg v. Traver, 52 N.J. 344, 347 (1968). Second, this remedial device directly advances the fundamental objective of promoting actual construction of low and moderate income housing. By allowing the corporate landowner to proceed with his project without further delay it offers one of the fastest and surest ways of accomplishing this objective. Mytelka & Mytelka, supra, 7 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 26. Finally, issuance of a variance or building permit under these circumstances also serves to protect the interests of the municipality because it assures that the corporate plaintiff will undertake the proposed use and no other. As one court notes: ... [A] decree [invalidating a zoning provision] which was induced by evidence which depicted a proposed use in a highly favorable light would not restrict the property owner to that use, and he might thereafter use the property for an entirely different purpose. In our opinion, it is appropriate for the court to avoid these difficulties by framing its decree with reference to the record before it ... [T]he relief awarded may guarantee that the owner will be allowed to proceed with that use without further litigation and that he will not proceed with a different use. [ Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, infra, 167 N.E. 2d at 411.] In light of these considerations, numerous courts have awarded specific relief to successful corporate litigants in cases of this nature. Crow v. Brown, supra , 332 F. Supp. at 395; Dailey v. City of Lawton, supra, 296 F. Supp. at 269; Casey v. Warwick Tp. Zoning Hearing Bd., supra, 328 A. 2d at 469; Appeal of Girsh, supra, 263 A. 2d 395; Tp. of Williston v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 7 Pa. Cmwlth. 453, 300 A. 2d 107, 121-122 (Comwlth. Ct. 1973); Camp Hill Dev. Co., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, supra, 319 A. 2d at 201; Fiore v. City of Highland Park, supra, 221 N.E. 2d at 330: Franklin v. Village of Franklin Park, 19 Ill. 2d 381, 167 N.E. 2d 195 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Kavanewsky v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 160 Conn. 397, 279 A. 2d 567, 571 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Pascack Ass'n, Ltd. v. Mayor & Council of Washington Tp., supra, 131 N.J. Super. at 207-208; Brunetti v. Mayor & Council of Madison Tp., 130 N.J. Super. 164, 169 (Law Div. 1974). Cf. Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 Ill. 2d 370, 167 N.E. 2d 406, 411 (Sup. Ct. 1960); First Nat'l Bank v. Village of Skokie, supra, 342 N.E. 2d at 451; Duggan v. County of Cook, 17 Ill. App. 3d 253, 307 N.E. 2d 782 (App. Ct. 1974), modified on other grounds, 60 Ill. 2d 107, 324 N.E. 2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1975). [24] Naturally, if successful corporate litigants were to receive a building permit or other specific judicial relief as a matter of right, the community would be wholly unprotected against what in essence would be the unregulated development by the plaintiffs of their property. Pascack Ass'n, Ltd. v. Mayor & Council of Washington Tp., supra, 131 N.J. Super. at 207. Therefore, most courts have required that the corporate plaintiff satisfy all other municipal requirements and regulations (such as utility, building and health codes, environmental reviews and subdivision controls) before a building permit will issue. [25] See, e.g., Casey v. Warwick Tp. Zoning Hearing Bd., supra, 328 A. 2d 469; Dailey v. City of Lawton, supra, 296 F. Supp. at 269; Camp Hill Dev. Co., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, supra, 319 A. 2d at 201; Schere v. Freehold Tp., 119 N.J. Super. 433, 437 (App. Div. 1972), certif. den. 62 N.J. 69 (1972), cert. den. 410 U.S. 931, 93 S.Ct. 1374, 35 L.Ed. 2d 593 (1973). However, it should be emphasized that municipalities may not use these additional requirements and procedures to frustrate development or impede remedial efforts. Where this occurs, the trial court should intervene and either appoint an independent planning expert to review the developer's plans or issue an order requiring the municipality to show why the plan should not be approved. In the event of clearly arbitrary and bad faith tactics on the part of the town, the court could simply order the municipality to issue the necessary permits. See, e.g., Crow v. Brown, supra , 332 F. Supp. at 395; Mytelka & Mytelka, supra, 7 Seton Hall L. Rev. at 31; Rubinowitz, supra note 8, 6 Mich. J.L. Reform at 643-647. Under these circumstances, requiring the developer to comply with State building and safety standards ( see, e.g., State Uniform Construction Code Act, L. 1975, c. 217, N.J.S.A. 52:27D-119 et seq. ) might be sufficient to protect valid local interests.