Opinion ID: 65780
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution: May 2006 Arrest

Text: Plaintiffs next argue that the district court erroneously granted summary judgment to defendants on their alleged constitutional violations stemming from the May 2006 arrest. We disagree. This court has held that the federal Constitution does not include a freestanding right to be free from malicious prosecution. See Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 945 (5th Cir.2003) (en banc). Instead, it must be shown that the officials violated specific constitutional rights in connection with a malicious prosecution. For example, the initiation of criminal charges without probable cause may set in force events that run afoul of the . . . Fourth Amendment if the accused is seized and arrested . . . or other constitutionally secured rights if a case is further pursued. Id. at 953-54. However, these are not claims for malicious prosecution. Id. at 954. Accordingly, plaintiffs' claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution in respect to the May 2006 arrest is not independently cognizable, and defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on that claim. Turning to plaintiffs' May 2006 unlawful arrest claim, plaintiffs offer two theories of liability: (1) that there was not probable cause to support the second arrest, and (2) that Marcantel failed to conduct a reasonable investigation prior to the arrest. Even if we assume that Marcantel made the May 2006 arrest without probable cause, he nevertheless made the arrest pursuant to a valid arrest warrant signed by a justice of the peace. It is well settled that if facts supporting an arrest are placed before an independent intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediary's decision breaks the chain of causation for false arrest, insulating the initiating party. Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir.1994); see also Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2005) ([W]hen a neutral intermediary, such as a justice of the peace, reviews the facts and allows a case to go forward, such an act `breaks the chain of causation.' (quoting Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1428 (5th Cir.1988))). Despite review by an independent intermediary, the initiating party may be liable for false arrest if the plaintiff shows that the deliberations of that intermediary were in some way tainted by the actions of the defendant. Hand, 838 F.2d at 1428. Plaintiffs have not argued that defendants somehow tainted the justice of the peace's deliberations, meaning that review by that independent intermediary relieves them of liability for the alleged false arrest, and the district court thus properly granted summary judgment to them on this claim. Finally, plaintiffs have not pointed to any legal basis for asserting a claim under § 1983 that Marcantel violated Deville's constitutional rights by failing to undertake a reasonable investigation. Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this unreasonable investigation claim. See Shields v. Twiss, 389 F.3d 142, 150-51 (5th Cir.2004) (Regarding Shields's `unreasonable investigation' claim, Shields has pointed to no legal basis for a § 1983 action of this sort, and the court knows of none. Hence, this claim also fails.).