Opinion ID: 1790691
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Plaintiffs' Additional Evidence Presented to Prove a Defect

Text: The plaintiffs argue that they presented the trial court direct evidence of a defect in the master cylinder, i.e., their own testimony concerning how the accident occurred and testimony about the circumstances of a prior similar brake failure they say the automobile had experienced; photographs of the brake pedal completely depressed to the floorboard of the automobile; and testimony by the mechanics that the master cylinder was engaged and the wheels were rolling freely before they removed the master cylinder and that the wheels locked when the same master cylinder was reinstalled. The plaintiffs contend that this constituted substantial evidence that entitled them to present the issue of defectiveness to a jury. See § 12-21-12, Ala.Code 1975. To determine whether this evidence is sufficient to warrant sending this case to a jury, we must consider what is required to prove a prima facie case under the AEMLD. See Brooks v. Colonial Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., supra . In Brooks, while this Court held that expert testimony was not always required in AEMLD cases, we recognized that ordinarily, expert testimony is required because of the complex and technical nature of the commodity. Id., 579 So.2d at 1332 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Haven Hills Farm, Inc., 395 So.2d 991, 995 (Ala.1981)). Moreover, in Brooks, which also concerned an alleged brake failure, this Court stated: [A]n automobile brake system is composed of, among other parts, [calipers,] rotors, disks, rear wheel cylinders, brake shoes, and master cylinders; it is a system composed of parts that would not be familiar to the lay juror, and the lay juror could not reasonably be expected to understand that system and determine if it was defective, without the assistance of expert testimony. In essence, it is a system that appears to be precisely the type of complex and technical commodity that would require expert testimony to prove an alleged defect. 579 So.2d at 1333. Both of the mechanics who inspected the automobile for the plaintiffs stated in deposition that they could not say that an internal defect in the master cylinder was the only factor that could have caused the brakes in Verchot's automobile to fail as they did. They acknowledged other factors, such as excessive heat, leakage of brake fluid, and contamination of brake fluid, as possible causes. The affidavit of David Buist, the staff project engineer for General Motors, provided additional reasons that could have caused the brakes to fail, reasons that would not have depended upon an internal defect in the master cylinder. They included general driver error, driver pedal error, a driver's failure to understand and appropriately apply anti-lock brake systems..., driving with an engaged parking brake, air in the brake system, ..., and improper repair, replacement, or maintenance of the brake system and its component parts. C.R. at 113. Thus, both the plaintiffs' mechanics and the defendants' engineer agreed that other events could have caused the brakes in Verchot's automobile to fail. Proof of an accident and injury alone is insufficient to establish fault under the AEMLD. Brooks, 579 So.2d at 1332. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the plaintiffs' evidence indicating that the accident could have been attributable to an internal defect in the master-cylinder is necessarily speculative and nonselective and does not constitute substantial evidence indicating that a master cylinder defect caused the accident. See, e.g., Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 707 So.2d 198 (Ala.1997). Such speculative evidence does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the brakes failed because of a defect. The plaintiffs also offered over 200 1241 Reports [3] of allegedly similar occurrences of brake failure that had been reported to General Motors. The plaintiffs attached these reports as an exhibit to their motion in opposition to the defendants' motion for a summary judgment. Generally, the admission of such reports is within the trial court's discretion. See General Motors Corp. v. Johnston, 592 So.2d 1054 (Ala.1992) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 251 reports of similar occurrences of engine stalling and idling). The defendants argued to the trial judge, and now they argue to this Court, that these reports did not possess the requisite reliability to be considered as evidence to rebut their motions for summary judgment. The defendants directed the trial court's attention, and now they direct our attention, to Uitts v. General Motors Corp., 411 F.Supp. 1380 (E.D.Pa. 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 626 (3d Cir.1975), in support of their position. In Uitts, the federal district court held that 1241 Reports produced by the defendant General Motors in response to a discovery order were properly excluded from evidence when the plaintiff sought to introduce them to prove causation. Concerning the admissibility of the reports, that court stated: The reports offered in the present case do not have [the required] indicia of reliability [to be admitted as business records]. They include statements by owners concerning the occurrence of an accident and reports by General Motors personnel concerning inspection of the involved vehicle, when possible. In addition, some of the reports contain letters of owners and police reports. The 1241 reports offered by plaintiffs were not the result of a continued and detailed investigation, but rather served merely as a preliminary investigation involving only the taking of a statement from the driver and if possible an inspection of the vehicle in question. The persons compiling these reports were not required to assemble all the factual data, or determine the cause or extent of the damage. They were charged with merely reporting the statements of the owners without any duty to cross examine or investigate further. The purpose of these reports was to alert defendant to possible difficulties with its product. They were not intended to commit the defendant in any way and as such were not intended to be final or amount to a complete analysis of a particular accident or its cause.... . . . . Proof of prior accidents or occurrences are not easily admitted into evidence, since they can often result in unfair prejudice, consumption of time and distraction of the jury to collateral matters. See McCormick on Evidence, § 200 (2d ed.1972); United States v. Kearney, 136 U.S.App. D.C. 328, 402 F.2d 170 (1969). The introduction of these reports into evidence in this case would have had this very result.... With respect to these reports plaintiff is attempting to introduce proof of accidents involving similar, not necessarily identical, vehicles. An examination of these reports reveals that some of them contain either highly inflammatory letters of owners or police reports relating to details of the accident, which would clearly be inadmissible. Plaintiffs made no attempt to limit or delete the hearsay portions of these reports. Rather, plaintiffs insisted that each of the reports without exception be admitted into evidence.... If plaintiffs were attempting to prove the existence of a specific defect or malfunction it is clear that the admission into evidence of the occurrence of similar accidents would require a showing that those accidents were caused by the same malfunction or defect.... Since these reports are being introduced by plaintiffs merely to corroborate the testimony of Elva Uitts we believe the prejudicial nature of them far outweighs any probative value they might have.... Id., 411 F.Supp. at 1382-83. The United States District Court in Guild v. General Motors Corp., supra, relied on Uitts in connection with that court's consideration of a similar offering of 1241 Reports. The court in Guild held that [n]one of the 1241 reports may be received at trial as evidence of a defect because they constitute inadmissible hearsay. 53 F.Supp.2d at 368. We consider the federal court's decision in Uitts as persuasive authority on the issue whether the trial court in this case erred in entering the summary judgments for the defendants. While the trial court did not indicate what reasoning it used when it granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, we conclude that the trial court could have properly refused to consider the 1241 Reports as evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to the plaintiffs' AEMLD claims. We can affirm a judgment on a basis not asserted to the trial court, and we can affirm a judgment if we disagree with the reasoning of the trial court in entering the judgment, as long as the judgment itself is proper. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v. Hammonds, 551 So.2d 333, 337 (Ala.1989)(citing Smith v. Equifax Servs., Inc., 537 So.2d 463, 465 (Ala.1988)). See also Cove Properties, Inc. v. Walter Trent Marina, Inc., 702 So.2d 472 (Ala.Civ.App.1997). Accordingly, the summary judgments are affirmed. AFFIRMED. MOORE, C.J., and SEE, BROWN, and STUART, JJ., concur.