Opinion ID: 2633651
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to instruct on the definition of second degree murder with express malice

Text: We agree with defendant's contention that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the definition of second degree murder committed with express malice. Regarding the Clark charge, the court gave the jury the options of convicting defendant of first degree murder, second degree murder, or voluntary manslaughter. It instructed the jury on the elements of murder and on the principle that murder may be committed with either express or implied malice. (CALJIC Nos. 8.10 and 8.11.) It explained that first degree murder is a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. (CALJIC No. 8.20.) It also instructed that [m]urder of the second degree is also the unlawful killing of a human being as a direct, causal result of an intentional act involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death, which act is done for a base, antisocial purpose and with wanton disregard for human life, or the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another, and who acts with conscious disregard for human life. (See CALJIC No. 8.31.) It did not, however, instruct the jury that second degree murder also occurs when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human being but the evidence is insufficient to establish deliberation and premeditation. (CALJIC No. 8.30.) The prosecution initially requested this instruction, but withdrew that request. We agree the trial court erred by omitting an instruction that second degree murder includes an intentional but unpremeditated murder. The trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on all general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence, whether or not the defendant makes a formal request. ( People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 744, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145; see People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094 [sua sponte duty]; People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1 [duty upon request].) That obligation encompasses instructions on lesser included offenses if there is evidence that, if accepted by the trier of fact, would absolve the defendant of guilt of the greater offense but not of the lesser. ( People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 745, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145; People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 871, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305.) Although defendant's jury was instructed on second degree murder with implied malice, the trial court had a duty to instruct on all theories of a lesser included offense which find substantial support in the evidence. ( People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094 [defendant was entitled to instruction on voluntary manslaughter committed as a result of heat of passion, in addition to instruction on voluntary manslaughter arising from an honest but unreasonable belief in the need for self defense].) Defendant's own testimony provided sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude the killing was not premeditated. Defendant testified that when he killed Clark, he was not making any calculated judgment or weighing considerations for and against killing her; rather he felt only fear and pulled the trigger without thinking. Defendant's experts likewise testified defendant did not premedicate or deliberate in the killing of Clark. In Dr. Glaser's opinion, at the time of the killing defendant was overwhelmed with emotion stemming from his sexual dysfunction and the volley of expletives that followed such dysfunction from Miss Clark, and the actual shooting and killing was an impulsive heat of passion event that was done without planning. Dr. Glaser believed that in this emotional state, defendant was incapable of premeditating and deliberating. Dr. Bird agreed the killing of Clark was an impulsive, emotional act of passion and fear, and opined there was no thoughtful advance planning or anticipation of doing what he did, no reasoning or thinking, and no weighing of consequences. In Dr. Franz's opinion as well, defendant killed Clark in a very emotional, anxious state in which he did not have the skills available to premeditate and deliberate. The killing was not a weighing or a balancing, but simply a defense mechanism to protect himself. The jury could have concluded the emotional, impulsive nature of the killing precluded a finding of premeditation and deliberation but that defendant nevertheless intended to kill. Based on this evidence, the trial court should have given CALJIC 8.30. Indeed, the trial court did include references to both express malice and implied malice in the definition of murder. Although it explained that murder with implied malice is also second degree murder, and that implied malice does not require an intent to kill, it failed to explain that a murder committed with express malice could constitute second degree murder. The omission of CALJIC 8.30 created an obvious gap in the instructions that was not filled by any of the other instructions given.
The erroneous failure to instruct on a lesser included offense generally is subject to harmless error review under the standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, at pages 836-837, 299 P.2d 243. [16] Reversal is required only if it is reasonably probable the jury would have returned a different verdict absent the error or errors complained of. ( People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 165-179, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094; see also People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 667, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175.) In the present case, it does not appear reasonably probable that the jury would have elected to convict defendant of second degree murder had it been instructed that an intentional but unpremeditated murder was a second degree murder. Defendant's jury was clearly instructed that first degree murder required not only an intentional killing, but one that is deliberate and premeditated. (CALJIC No. 8.20.) It also was told [i]f you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder has been committed by the defendant, but you have a reasonable doubt whether that murder was of the first or of the second degree, then you have to give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict affixing the murder as of the second degree. (See CALJIC No. 8.71.) Defendant's claim that the error was prejudicial is premised upon the supposition that the jury may have concluded the killing was intentional but not premeditated, yet convicted defendant of first degree murder despite the clear instruction that first degree murder required premeditation, because the instructions permitted no viable option for a conviction on a lesser offense. We disagree, for two reasons. First, if the jury found that defendant shot Clark several times with the intent to kill her, we see no reasonable probability it would have believed that his conduct and state of mind did not fit the definition of second degree murder committed with implied malice, as it was explained to them. The jury was told, in the language of CALJIC No. 8.31, that second degree murder is a killing that results from an intentional act involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death, which act is done for a base, antisocial purpose and with wanton disregard for human life, or an act the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another, and who acts with conscious disregard for human life. Defendant's act of shooting Clark certainly could be characterized as one involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death or the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life. Nothing in the instructions precluded the logical conclusion that if defendant intended to kill, he acted with wanton disregard for life or knew that his conduct endangered the life of another and acted with conscious disregard for human life. Thus, the instructions, reasonably understood, did not preclude a finding of second degree murder if the jury believed the killing was intentional. (Cf. United States v. McCullah (10th Cir.1996) 76 F.3d 1087, 1111-1112 [holding two aggravating factors in the federal death penalty statute are duplicative because [a]ny intentional conduct aimed at producing death is by definition conduct done with knowledge of grave risk of death].) We have stated that implied malice and intent to kill cannot coexist. ( People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 58, 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388; People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 764-765, 175 Cal.Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446.) This statement was made in the context of issues raised when instructions are given on implied malice and the offense  such as attempted murder or assault with the intent to kill  requires the specific intent to kill. (See also People v. Lee (1987) 43 Cal.3d 666, 673-674, 238 Cal.Rptr. 406, 738 P.2d 752.) In the present context, however, the issue is not whether instructions on implied malice might have caused the jury to convict defendant without the required finding of intent to kill, but instead whether instructions on implied malice would have prevented the jury from convicting defendant of second degree murder if it did find intent to kill. Nothing in the instructions told the jury that an intentional killing precluded a finding of implied malice. Rather, the jury was instructed that when implied malice is established, it is not necessary to establish that a defendant intended that his act would result in a death of a human being. In other words, the jury would have understood the instruction to indicate that intent to kill was sufficient to establish implied malice, although such intent was not required. Nothing in the arguments of the parties would have created the impression that the jury could not return a verdict of second degree murder if it found the killing was intentional but not premeditated. The prosecutor argued the murder of Benintende was second degree rather than first degree murder because there's no question there was malice, that intent was there, but it was not clear whether defendant had adequate time to premeditate and deliberate. The prosecutor thus highlighted premeditation and deliberation as the critical factor distinguishing first and second degree murder, and indicated that malice without premeditation and deliberation would establish second degree murder. In addition, in discussing the second count involving Benintende, the prosecutor clearly stated second degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human being but the evidence is insufficient to establish deliberation and premeditation. She thus provided the jury with the definition of express malice second degree murder lacking in the instructions. Although the arguments of counsel cannot substitute for correct instructions from the court ( Carter v. Kentucky (1981) 450 U.S. 288, 304, 101 S.Ct. 1112, 67 L.Ed.2d 241), the arguments here support our conclusion that the jury was not misled (see People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1111, 31 Cal. Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36). Second, even assuming the jury did not believe that an intentional killing could be a second degree murder, we find it unlikely the jury concluded the killing was intentional but not premeditated. In determining whether a failure to instruct on a lesser included offense was prejudicial, an appellate court may consider whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result. ( People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 177, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094; see also People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 621, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152 [error harmless when evidence supporting lesser offense was weak].) Here, the evidence supporting the jury's verdict of guilt of first degree premeditated murder was relatively strong. In his confession, defendant said he killed Clark to prevent her from reporting him. Defendant said that after he shot Clark the second time, she ran up the road and I realized I was  if she turned me in I was going to be arrested and go to jail, so I shot her four more times. Later, defendant said I knew she couldn't testify against me if she was dead, and that was the bottom line. Defendant had time to contemplate his course of action; he had to pull up his pants and then get out of his truck to pursue Clark after he shot her the first time. Defendant's account of the events was strong evidence establishing that he weigh[ed] and consider[ed] the question of killing and the reasons for and against such a choice and, having in mind the consequences, decided to kill Clark. (CALJIC No. 8.20.) It also was strong evidence demonstrating that the killing was not impulsive or emotional, but rather a calculated decision made only after Clark threatened to make a report and defendant had adequate time to contemplate the consequences of allowing her to live and be able to report him. Moreover, the physical evidence corroborated defendant's confession. For example, the pattern of gunshot wounds on Clark's body matched the description of the killings in defendant's confession. The pathologist testified Clark had one gunshot entry wound on the right side of the ribcage, the bullet passing through her body and lodging on the left side of her torso; one entry wound to her back; and four wounds more or less to the front of her torso, two of which had entered the body and two of which were graze wounds or abrasions. The jury could have inferred those wounds corresponded to the shots defendant confessed to having fired: one shot in the cab of the truck after Clark had been on her knees orally copulating him, one shot while Clark was running around in front of the truck's headlights (the only time she could have been shot in the back), and four shots while Clark was leaning against the embankment facing defendant. By contrast, the evidence suggesting defendant did not premeditate and deliberate came largely from defendant and his experts and was comparatively weak. The experts based their opinions in large part on the account of the Clark killing described in defendant's sodium amytal interview conducted 10 months after the crime. Thus, in order to credit defendant's expert testimony on his state of mind, the jurors would have had to conclude that the account of the murders given by defendant in his trial testimony, which was based on his sodium amytal interview, was more accurate than the confession he made a few days after the crime occurred. We do not believe it is reasonably probable the jury so concluded. At trial, defendant stated he shot Clark once as she was walking toward him, pointing her finger; there was a brief second or two when Clark backed up into a canal bank, and defendant immediately shot her five more times. Defendant's testimony did not explain why Clark had a gunshot wound going from the right side of her torso to the left, as well as an entry wound in her back. If defendant's testimony was accurate, one would expect all of the wounds to have been to the front of her torso. Moreover, the defense claimed that, until his memory was revived in the amytal interview, defendant could not remember anything that happened after he pushed Clark out of the truck. The defense further claimed defendant, in a suicidal state and mindful of the legal requirements for various offenses, concocted the confession to ensure he would be convicted of capital murder. That theory did not explain how defendant was able to confess to details  such as seeing blood on Clark's right ribcage when she was in front of the headlights  that could have been known only to a person who consciously witnessed the shooting. Further, in his confession defendant lied about how he obtained the murder weapon, denied killing Benintende, and claimed he first shot Clark accidentally. Those statements undermine the claim that his confession was an attempt at legal suicide. [17] In sum, given the relative strength of the evidence of premeditation and the relative weakness of the evidence to the contrary, we do not find it reasonably probable that had the jury been accurately instructed, it would have concluded defendant intended to kill Clark but did not premeditate or deliberate.
Defendant contends that because the instruction on the express malice form of second degree murder embodied the defense theory of the case, the trial court's instructional failure deprived him of his right to present a complete defense guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant relies on cases in which federal courts have held that a trial courts failure to give a requested instruction (whether on a lesser included offense, or on some other subject) embodying the defense theory of the case and around which the defendant had built his or her defense, violated the defendant's due process right to present a complete defense. ( Clark v. Brown (9th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 708, 713-718 [instruction on felony-murder special circumstance]; Conde v. Henry (9th Cir.2000) 198 F.3d 734, 739-740 [instruction on simple kidnapping as lesser included offense of kidnapping for robbery]; United States v. Monger (6th Cir.1999) 185 F.3d 574, 576-577 [instruction on lesser included offense]; see also Bradley v. Duncan (9th Cir.2002) 315 F.3d 1091, 1098-1099 [instruction on defense of entrapment].) In these cases, unlike the present one, the instruction at issue was requested by the defense. The cases do not support the proposition that a trial court's failure to instruct on a lesser included offense sua sponte denies due process. Further, nothing in the record suggests the trial court would not have given the express malice second degree murder instruction had the defense asked for it. Nor can it be said that the omitted instruction embodied the defense theory of the case. Rather, in closing argument the only lesser-included-offense verdict that defense counsel asked the jury to return was manslaughter. Although the defense presented evidence of lack of premeditation and deliberation and argued the prosecution's evidence did not support a finding of premeditation, defense counsel did not ask the jury to return a verdict of second degree murder. [18] Because defendant was allowed to present the defense he chose, followed by jury instructions he agreed to, he was not denied due process by being deprived of the opportunity to present a complete defense.