Opinion ID: 2599781
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Crawford claim

Text: At trial, defendant objected to Dr. Cotton's testimony about the DNA analysis that resulted in the match between defendant's DNA and DNA extracted from the vaginal swabs on the grounds that Cotton didn't actually run the tests herself. He argued that the test results were inadmissible unless Paula Yates testified. The trial court stated that the results were a business record but also said that, even if Yates's analysis was hearsay, Dr. Cotton could nonetheless rely on it for purposes of formulating her opinion as a DNA expert. On appeal, citing Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ( Crawford ), defendant renews his claim that Dr. Cotton's testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Prior to Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177, the Supreme Court had held that an unavailable witness's out-of-court statement against a criminal defendant could be admitted consistent with the [Sixth Amendment's] confrontation clause if it bore `adequate indicia of reliability.` [Citation.] To qualify under that test, evidence had either to fall within a `firmly rooted hearsay exception' or bear `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' [Citation.] ( People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 711, fn. 25, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289, quoting Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597.) Crawford abandoned this approach to such statements, however, and held that testimonial out-of-court statements offered against a criminal defendant are rendered inadmissible by the confrontation clause unless the witness is unavailable at trial and the defendant has a prior opportunity for cross-examination. ( Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354.) Under Crawford, the crucial determination about whether the admission of an out-of-court statement violates the confrontation clause is whether the out-of-court statement is testimonial or nontestimonial. [T]he court reasoned [that] the clause's express reference to `witnesses' reflects its focus on those who `bear testimony,' which is `[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.' ( Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36, 51 [124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177] quoting Webster, An American Diet, of the English Language (1828).) `An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers,' said the court, `bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.' (541 U.S. at p. 51 [124 S.Ct. 1354].) Thus, the court explained, the constitutional text reflects an `especially acute concern with a specific type of out-of-court statement.' ( Ibid.) ( People v. Cage, (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 977-978, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789, 155 P.3d 205.) On the other hand, Crawford made it clear that not all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment's core concerns, ( Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354) and, in response to a point made in the dissent, acknowledged that certain exceptions to the rule against hearsay in existence at the time the confrontation clause was originally adopted fell outside the purview of the clause because there is scant evidence that the exceptions were invoked to admit testimonial statements against the accused in a criminal case. Most of the hearsay exceptions concerned statements that by their nature were not testimonial  for example, business records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy. ( Id. at p. 55, 124 S.Ct. 1354 italics & fn. omitted.) The court in Crawford declined to definitively state what constitutes a `testimonial' statement for purposes of its discussion but observed: Various formulations of this core class of `testimonial' statements exist: ` ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent  that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,' [citation]; `extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,' [citation]; `statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial [citation]. ( Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 51-52, 124 S.Ct. 1354.) Moreover, the court said, [s]ome statements qualify under any definition  for example, ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing, ( ibid ), and at a minimum, to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations. These are the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed. ( Id at p. 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354.) Defendant argues that the DNA report that was the basis of Dr. Cotton's testimony was a testimonial statement because it was a statement made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.. ( Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354.) We have not yet had occasion to decide whether the admission of scientific evidence, like laboratory reports, constitutes a testimonial statement that is inadmissible unless the person who prepared the report testifies or Crawford's conditions  unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination  are met. Courts that have addressed this issue disagree as to the answer. In the immediate aftermath of Crawford, some courts adopted a bright line test based on the language in that decision about the availability of the out-of-court statements for later trial and concluded that this is the defining characteristic of whether such statements are testimonial. Thus, these courts concluded that because such evidence  fingerprint analysis, autopsy reports, serology reports, drug analysis reports, DNA reports  is prepared for possible use at a criminal trial it is testimonial and inadmissible unless the conditions for its admission, outlined in Crawford, have been met. Typical of this line of cases is State v. Caulfield (Minn.2006) 722 N.W.2d 304. In Caulfield, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a laboratory (BCA) report that established a substance seized from defendant was cocaine was testimonial. We have said that the critical determinative factor in assessing whether a statement is testimonial is whether it was prepared for litigation. [Citations.] The BCA report was clearly prepared for litigation.... The BCA report was introduced by the state at trial for the purpose of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance was cocaine. ( Id., at p. 309; Roberts v. United States (D.C.2007) 916 A.2d 922 [admission of out-of-court statements of FBI forensic scientists via testimony of DNA expert violated the confrontation clause as construed by Crawford, but any error harmless]; People v. Lonsby (2005) 268 Mich.App. 375, 707 N.W.2d 610, 619 [serologist report was inadmissible because the author would reasonably expect [that it] would be used in a prosecutorial manner and at trial]; Las Vegas v. Walsh (2005) 121 Nev. 899, 124 P.3d 203, 208 [Nurse's affidavit that she drew defendant's blood for a blood-alcohol test was made for use at a later trial or legal proceeding. Thus, [its] admission, in lieu of live testimony, would violate the Confrontation Clause]; People v. Rogers (N.Y.App.Div.2004) 8 A.D.3d 888, 891, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393 [laboratory report giving results of testing of victim's blood was improperly admitted as a business record: Because the test was initiated by the prosecution and generated by the desire to discover evidence against defendant, the results were testimonial]; People v. Hernandez (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2005) 7 Misc.3d 568, 794 N.Y.S.2d 788, 789 [latent print report inadmissible where the officer who prepared the report was unavailable because the fingerprints were taken with the ultimate goal of apprehending and successfully prosecuting a defendant]; State v. Crager (2005) 164 Ohio App.3d 816, 844 N.E.2d 390, 398-399 [because a DNA report was testimonial and the analyst who prepared it did not testify, allowing a second analyst to testify to the contents of the report violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation]; State v. Miller (2006) 208 Or.App. 424, 144 P.3d 1052, 1058 [a laboratory report that established the presence of drugs in defendant's urine and a pipe seized from his person was testimonial because it was clearly intended to be used in a criminal prosecution to prove past events  the presence of controlled substances in defendant's urine at a specific time in the past and the presence of drug residue on a glass smoking device].) By contrast, a number of other courts have held that scientific evidence is not testimonial, even though it may have been prepared for possible use at trial. Some have done so on the grounds that the admission of such evidence does not implicate the abuses at which, according to Crawford, the confrontation clause was directed. Additionally, other courts have relied on the language in Crawford indicating that business records might fall outside the purview of confrontation clause concerns and held that such evidence is admissible as business or public records. Some courts also cite the practical difficulties that would ensue were Crawford applied to this type of evidence. These more nuanced readings of Crawford reject those readings that focus too narrowly on the question of whether a document may be used in litigation. This was but one of the several considerations that Crawford identified as bearing on whether evidence is testimonial [and][n]one of these factors was deemed dispositive. ( People v. So Young Kim (2006) 368 Ill.App.3d 717, 307 Ill.Dec. 92, 859 N.E.2d 92, 94 [certification of Breathalyzer machine used to determine blood-alcohol content not testimonial]. In People v. Johnson (2004) 121 Cal. App.4th 1409, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 230, the trial court admitted a laboratory report at defendant's probation revocation hearing identifying as rock cocaine a substance seized from defendant. On appeal, defendant argued the admission of the drug report violated his Sixth Amendment rights as construed by Crawford. The Court of Appeal concluded that, because [probation revocation proceedings are not `criminal prosecutions' to which the Sixth Amendment applies ..., Crawford's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment does not govern probation revocation proceedings. ( Id. at p. 1411, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 230.) Noting, however, that Sixth Amendment cases ... may provide helpful examples in determining the scope of the more limited right of confrontation held by probationers under the due process clause, the court addressed and rejected defendant's Crawford claim. ( Id. at p. 1412, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 230.) ... Johnson misapprehends Crawford's discussion of what amounts to `testimonial' hearsay. A laboratory report does not `bear testimony,' or function as the equivalent of in-court testimony. If the preparer had appeared to testify at Johnson's hearing, he or she would merely have authenticated the document. In [ People v. Arreola [(1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 631, 875 P.2d 736]], our Supreme Court explained: `There is an evident distinction between a transcript of former live testimony and the type of traditional documentary evidence involved in [ People v. Maki (1985) 39 Cal.3d 707 [217 Cal.Rptr. 676, 704 P.2d 743]] that does not have, as its source, live testimony. [Citation.] ... [T]he need for confrontation is particularly important where the evidence is testimonial, because of the opportunity for observation of the witness's demeanor. [Citation.] Generally, the witness's demeanor is not a significant factor in evaluating foundational testimony relating to the admission of evidence such as laboratory reports, invoices, or receipts, where often the purpose of this testimony simply is to authenticate the documentary material, and where the author, signator, or custodian of the document ordinarily would be unable to recall from actual memory information relating to the specific contents of the writing and would rely instead upon the record of his or her own action.' ( Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1157 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 631, 875 P.2d 736].) ( People v. Johnson, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1412-1413, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 230.) In Commonwealth v. Verde (2005) 444 Mass. 279, 827 N.E.2d 701, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts similarly held that certificates of chemical analysis identifying as cocaine a substance seized from defendant were not testimonial. Certificates of chemical analysis are neither discretionary nor based on opinion; rather, they merely state the results of a well-recognized scientific test determining the composition and quantity of a substance.... Accordingly, these drug certificates are well within the public records exception to the confrontation clause. ( Id., at p. 705, fn. omitted.) Moreover, this evidence did not implicate `the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed ... particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence of the accused.' Crawford, supra, [541 U.S.] at 50 [124 S.Ct. 1354]. The documentary evidence at issue here has very little kinship to the type of hearsay the confrontation clause was intended to exclude, absent an opportunity for cross-examination. [Citation.] Rather, it is akin to a business or official record, which the Court stated was not testimonial in nature. ( Commonwealth v. Verde, supra, 827 N.E.2d at p. 706.) In State v. Forte (2006) 360 N.C. 427, 629 S.E.2d 137, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in holding that a serology report was properly admitted notwithstanding the unavailability of the analyst, also differentiated this type of evidence from that which the Crawford court identified as the main concern of the Sixth Amendment. Under the Supreme Court's analysis, the reports at issue here are not testimonial. They do not fall into any of the categories that the Supreme Court defined as unquestionably testimonial. These unsworn reports, containing the results of Agent Spittle's objective analysis of the evidence, along with routine chain of custody information, do not bear witness against defendant. [Citation.] Instead, they are neutral, having the power to exonerate as well as convict. Although we acknowledge that the reports were prepared with the understanding that eventual use in court was possible or even probable, they were not prepared exclusively for trial and Agent Spittle has no interest in the outcome of any trial in which the records might be used. ( Id., at p. 143.) In State v. Lackey (2005) 280 Kan. 190, 120 P.3d 332, the Kansas Supreme Court, joining those jurisdictions that have concluded that an autopsy report is not testimonial under Crawford, cited the practical considerations that militated against the contrary conclusion. We believe the reason why these cases have not adopted the arguments and reasoning set forth by defendant is that it would have the effect of requiring the pathologist who performed the autopsy to testify in every criminal proceeding. If, as in this case, the medical examiner is deceased or otherwise unavailable, the State would be precluded from using the autopsy report in presenting its case, which could preclude the prosecution of a homicide case. We view this as a harsh and unnecessary result in light of the fact that autopsy reports generally make routine and descriptive observations of the physical body in an environment where the medical examiner would have little incentive to fabricate the result. ( Id. at pp. 351-352; see also People v. Durio (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2005) 7 Misc.3d 729, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 869[[C]ourts cannot ignore the practical implications that would follow from treating autopsy reports as inadmissible testimonial hearsay in a homicide case.... The passage of time can easily lead to the unavailability of the examiner who prepared the autopsy report. Moreover, medical examiners who regularly perform hundreds of autopsies are unlikely to have any independent recollection of the autopsy at issue in a particular case and in testifying invariably rely entirely on the autopsy report.... Certainly it would be against society's interests to permit the unavailability of the medical examiner who prepared the report to preclude the prosecution of a homicide case].) In State v. Craig (2006) 110 Ohio St.3d 306, 853 N.E.2d 621, the Supreme Court of Ohio also concluded that autopsy reports are not testimonial under Crawford but on the grounds that such reports are `quintessential business records.' The essence of the business record hearsay exception contemplated in Crawford is that such records or statements are not testimonial in nature because they are prepared in the ordinary course of regularly conducted business and are `by their nature' not prepared for litigation. ( Id. at p. 638.) Along these lines, in People v. Brown (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2005) 9 Misc.3d 420, 801 N.Y.S.2d 709, the trial court denied a new trial motion based on the claim that admission of DNA laboratory reports violated the confrontation clause as construed by Crawford. The notes and records of the laboratory technicians who tested the DNA samples in this case were not made for investigative or prosecutorial purposes but rather were made for the routine purpose of ensuring the accuracy of the testing done in the laboratory and as a foundation for formulating the DNA profile. [¶] ... [T]he notes of the many laboratory personnel who conducted the four steps of DNA profiling over several days were made during a routine, non-adversarial process meant to ensure accurate analysis and not specifically prepared for trial. Because DNA testing requires multiple steps done by multiple technicians over multiple days, all of the steps in the process must be documented for the benefit of supervisors and technicians who perform subsequent testing functions. ( Id at pp. 711  712.) The Supreme Court shed some further light on the question of what constitutes a testimonial out-of-court statement in Davis v. Washington (2006) ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224, ( Davis ) and introduced another factor to consider on this question, pertaining to the circumstances under which the statement was made. Davis consolidated two cases, Davis v. Washington , No. 05-5224, and Hammon v. Indiana, No. 05-5705. Both cases involved responses by the victim of domestic violence to police inquiries. In Davis, the prosecution introduced a 911 tape in which the victim, Michelle McCottry, described the attack on her by defendant to the 911 operator as it was, occurring and then, after he left, answered other questions. The police arrived within four minutes of the 911 call and observed McCottry's shaken state, the `fresh injuries on her forearm and her face,' and her `frantic efforts to gather her belongings and her children so they could leave the residence.' ( Davis, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___, 126 S.Ct. at p. 2271.) In Hammon, police responded to a domestic disturbance call and found the victim, Amy Hammon, alone on the front porch. She appeared `somewhat frightened' but told `police that `nothing was the matter.' ( Davis, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___, 126 S.Ct. at p. 2272.) Inside the house, Herschel Hammon told police there had been an argument, but it had never become physical, and it was over. Over his objection, police separated Amy from Herschel and questioned her. Based on her responses, police had her fill out and sign a battery affidavit in which she recounted that Herschel had physically assaulted her. Her affidavit was subsequently admitted against Herschel in his trial for domestic battery and probation violation as was the testimony of the officer who had questioned her. ( Id at pp. 2272-2273.) The question before the Supreme Court was when statements made to law enforcement personnel during a 911 call or at a crime scene are `testimonial' and thus subject to the requirements of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. ( Davis, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___, 126 S.Ct. at p. 2270). In this connection, the Supreme Court made clear that the confrontation clause applies only to testimonial hearsay statements and not to such statements that are nontestimonial. ( Id. at p. 2274 [A limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional provision must fairly be said to mark out not merely its `core,' but its perimeter].) On the specific question before it, the court concluded that Michelle McCottry's initial statements in response to questioning by the 911 operator were not testimonial while the statements made by Ann Hammon were. The general principle enunciated by the court was as follows: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. ( Davis, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___, 126 S.Ct. at pp. 2273-2274, fn. omitted.) In its opinion, the court emphasized the contemporaneity of McCottry's statement: In Davis, McCottry was speaking about events as they were actually happening, rather than `describing] past events [citation]. ( Davis, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___, 126 S.Ct. at p. 2276.) By contrast, [i]t is entirely clear that from the circumstances that the interrogation [of Ann Hammon] was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct  as, indeed, the testifying officer expressly acknowledged. ( Id. at p. ___, 126 S.Ct. at p. 2278.) The statements of both Hammons deliberately recounted, in response to police questioning, how potentially criminal past events began and progressed. And both took place some time after the events described were over. Such statements under official investigation are an obvious substitute for live testimony, because they do precisely what a witness does on direct examination; they are inherently testimonial. ( Ibid., fn. & italics omitted; People v. Cage, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 987, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789, 155 P.3d 205 [among the principles to be derived from Davis are the statement must have been given and taken primarily for the purpose ascribed to testimony  to establish or prove some past fact for possible use in a criminal trial, and, statements elicited by law enforcement officials are not testimonial if the primary purpose in giving and receiving them is to deal with a contemporaneous emergency, rather than to produce evidence about past events for possible use at a criminal trial (italics omitted)].) While Davis, like Crawford, does not directly address the question of whether scientific evidence like a DNA report is testimonial, courts on both sides of the question have nonetheless found support in Davis for their position. (Compare United States v. Feliz (2d Cir.2006) 467 F.3d 227 [autopsy report is a nontestimonial business record because a business record is fundamentally inconsistent with what the Supreme Court has suggested (in Crawford and Davis ) comprise the defining characteristics of testimonial evidence]; United States v. Ellis (2006) 460 F.3d 920, 926-927 [medical records establishing the presence of methamphetamine in defendant's system were nontestimonial business records became at the time the observations were made the medical professionals like the declarant reporting an emergency in Davis  were `not acting as ... witnesses] and were `not testifying']; with State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663 (Mo. 2007) [laboratory report identified substance possessed by defendant as cocaine base was testimonial under the definitions of `testimony' and `testimonial' in Crawford as well as the `primary purpose' test in Davis ]; State v. Kent (Ct.App.Div.2007) 391 NJ.Super. 352, 918 A.2d 626, 637 [the `primary purpose' of the blood certificate was to ... preserve evidence for a future anticipated DWI prosecution]; State v. Miller, supra, 208 Or.App. 424, 144 P.3d 1052 [lab reports indicating methamphetamine in defendant's urine and a glass smoking device were requested by police for the purpose of establishing or proving a fact in issue in this criminal prosecution].) While we have found no single analysis of the applicability of Crawford and Davis to the kind of scientific evidence at issue in this case to be entirely persuasive, we are nonetheless more persuaded by those cases concluding that such evidence is not testimonial, based on our own interpretation of Crawford and Davis. For our purposes in this case, involving the admission of a DNA report, what we extract from those decisions is that a statement is testimonial if (1) it is made to a law enforcement officer or by or to a law enforcement agent and (2) describes a past fact related to criminal activity for (3) possible use at a later trial. Conversely, a statement that does not meet all three criteria is not testimonial. Regarding the first point, as the court noted in Crawford it is the involvement of government officers in the production of testimonial evidence that implicates confrontation clause concerns. ( Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 53, 124 S.Ct. 1354.) In this respect, we use the term agent not only to designate law enforcement officers but those in an agency relationship with law enforcement. Regarding the third point, while the possible use of such statements at a later trial remains an important consideration, as we noted in our Cage decision, Davis now confirms that the proper focus [about whether an out-of-court statement is testimonial] is not on the mere reasonable chance that an out-of-court statement might later be used in a criminal trial. ( People v. Cage, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 984, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789, 155 P.3d 205, fn. 14; United States v. Ellis, supra, 460 F.3d at p. 926 [A reasonable person reporting a domestic disturbance, which is what [Michelle McCottry] in Davis was doing, will be aware that the result is the arrest and possible prosecution of the perpetrator. [Citation.] So it cannot be that a statement is testimonial in every case where a declarant reasonably expects that it might be used prosecutorially].) It is the second point, the distinction drawn in Davis between the circumstances under which Michelle McCottry's 911 statement was made  a contemporaneous description of an unfolding event  and the questioning of Ann Hammon  the purpose of which was to deliberately recount[ ], in response to police questioning, how potentially criminal past events began and progressed  that is critical here. ( Davis, supra, at p. ___, 126 S.Ct. at p. 2278.) There is no question that the DNA report was requested by a police agency. Even if the employees of Cellmark are not themselves members of law enforcement, they were paid to do work as part of a government investigation; furthermore, it could reasonably have been anticipated that the report might be used at a later criminal trial. Yates's observations, however, constitute a contemporaneous recordation of observable events rather than the documentation of past events. That is, she recorded her observations regarding the receipt of the DNA samples, her preparation of the samples for analysis, and the results of that analysis as she was actually performing those tasks. Therefore, when [she] made these observations, [she]  like the declarant reporting an emergency in Davis  [was] `not acting as [a] witness [ ]; and [was] `not testifying.' ( United States v. Ellis, supra, 460 F.3d at pp. 926-927.) We find support for this distinction even in the post- Crawford but pre- Davis decisions that concluded scientific evidence memorialized in routine forensic reports is not testimonial. A common theme that unites these decisions is that the circumstances in which these reports are generated involve the contemporaneous recordation of observable events. (See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Verde, supra, 827 N.E.2d at p. 705 [Certificates of chemical analysis ... merely state the results of a well-recognized scientific test determining the composition and quantity of a substance]; State v. Lackey, supra, 120 P.3d at p. 352 [Preclusion of autopsy report because of unavailability of medical examiner would be a harsh and unnecessary result in light of the fact that autopsy reports generally make routine and descriptive observations of the physical body ...]; People v. Brown, supra, 801 N.Y.S.2d at p. p. 711 [The notes and records of the laboratory technicians who tested the DNA samples in this case ... were made for the routine purpose of ensuring the accuracy of the testing done in the laboratory and as a foundation for formulating the DNA profile].) The post- Davis federal cases that have held such statements are not testimonial because they are business records are consistent with this theme since under the Federal Rules of Evidence a business record is defined as `[a] memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record or data compilation.' ( United States v. Feliz, supra, 467 F.3d at p. 234, quoting Fed. Rules Evid, rule 803(6), 28 U.S.C.; United States v. Ellis, supra, 460 F.3d at pp. 926-927.) [12] Thus, we find unpersuasive those cases, cited above, holding that under Davis various types of forensic evidence in the form of laboratory reports were testimonial because their primary purpose was to establish a fact at trial regarding the defendant's guilt of the charged crime. ( State v. March, supra, 216 S.W.3d 663 (Mo.2007); State v. Kent, supra, 391 N.J.Super. 352, 918 A.2d 626; State v. Miller, supra, 208 Or.App. 424, 144 P.3d 1052.) This reading of Davis equates a testimonial statement with any statement that it might reasonably be anticipated will be used at trial, an approach that, as we noted in Cage, Dams rejects. ( People v. Cage, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 984, fn. 14, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789, 155 P.3d 205.) In our view, under Davis, determining whether a statement is testimonial requires us to consider the circumstances under which the statement was made. As we read Davis, the crucial point is whether the statement represents the contemporaneous recordation of observable events. But, as we have also observed, even before Davis a number of courts had pointed to the circumstances under which statements were made in laboratory reports and other types of forensic evidence as a reason to find those statements nontestimonial under Crawford notwithstanding their possible use at trial. Those same circumstances are also present here. For example, Yates's report and notes were generated as part of a standardized scientific protocol that she conducted pursuant to her employment at Cellmark. While the prosecutor undoubtedly hired Cellmark in the hope of obtaining evidence against defendant, Yates conducted her analysis, and made her notes and report, as part of her job, not in order to incriminate defendant. Moreover, to the extent Yates's notes, forms and report merely recount the procedures she used to analyze the DNA samples, they are not themselves accusatory, as DNA analysis can lead to either incriminatory or exculpatory results. Finally, the accusatory opinions in this case  that defendant's DNA matched that taken from the victim's vagina and that such a result was very unlikely unless defendant was the donor  were reached and conveyed not through the nontestifying technician's laboratory notes and report, but by the testifying witness, Dr. Cotton. Thus, like the DNA analysis records in People v. Brown, supra, 9 Misc.3d 420, 801 N.Y.S.2d 709, Yates's notes were made during a routine, non-adversarial process meant to ensure accurate analysis. ( Id. at p. 712; see also Rollins v. State (Ct. Spec.App.2005) 161 Md.App. 34, 866 A.2d 926, 954 [findings in an autopsy report of the physical condition of a decedent, which are routine, descriptive and not analytical, held nontestimonial].) In simply following Cellmark's protocol of noting carefully each step of the DNA analysis, recording what she did with each sample received, Yates did not bear witness against defendant. ( State v. Forte, supra, 629 S.E.2d at p. 143.) Records of laboratory protocols followed and the resulting raw data acquired are not accusatory. Instead, they are neutral, having the power to exonerate as well as convict. ( Ibid. ) Accordingly, even under this earlier authority, the circumstances under which Yates's report and notes were generated, and not whether they would be available for use at trial, would have been determinative of whether they were testimonial, and pursuant to this authority they would not have been. Davis confirms that the critical inquiry is not whether it might be reasonably anticipated that a statement will be used at trial but the circumstances under which the statement was made. We conclude therefore that the DNA report was not testimonial for purposes of Crawford and Davis.