Opinion ID: 1133683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury as to the testimony on other alleged prior bad acts.

Text: ś 86. Rubenstein argues testimony from Page, Kelly, and Bellow concerning Annie's alleged sex with him for money and Denham's testimony about the insurance scam, were inadmissible as prior bad acts, [12] and that the trial court should have conducted a balancing test pursuant to M.R.E. 404(b) and 403. He further argues the trial court erred by failing to give a limiting instruction to the jury concerning this testimony about his prior bad acts. ś 87. Rubenstein used the testimony by Page, Kelly, and Bellow to his advantage by implying Annie slept around for money. Additionally, Rubenstein never objected to these statements on the basis of prior bad acts. Carter, 722 So.2d at 1261 (objection on one ground waives all other grounds on appeal). In fact, he failed to object at all to these statements, as well as to Landrew's statement about Rubenstein's escape plan. Therefore, Rubenstein is barred from asserting these errors on appeal. Walker, 671 So.2d at 597. ś 88. Rubenstein did vaguely object to Denham's testimony that Annie went to Mississippi to perform an insurance scam by stating, [t]his has no place in this trial. Under 403 and 404, 402, under any imagination. Even given this general objection, the trial court conducted an extensive on-the-record finding pursuant to M.R.E. 404(b). The trial court then engaged in the appropriate M.R.E. 403 balancing analysis and found the testimony to be admissible. The relevancy and admissibility of evidence are largely within the discretion of the trial court and this Court should only reverse where it is clear that discretion has been abused. Simmons v. State, 805 So.2d 452, 487-88 (Miss.2001). There was no abuse in this case. ś 89. Rubenstein's argument that the trial court failed to issue a limiting instruction is also without merit because he never raised the issue before the trial court. This Court in Brown v. State, 890 So.2d 901, 913 (Miss.2004), held a trial court is not obligated to give a sua sponte limiting instruction on evidence pursuant to M.R.E. 404(b). Rubenstein argues this issue should be analyzed under Smith v. State, 656 So.2d 95, 100 (Miss.1995), because Brown was handed down after his trial. In Smith, we held that after 404(b) evidence is admitted pursuant to a 403 balancing test, the trial court must give a limiting instruction. 656 So.2d at 100. Brown overruled Smith and returned to the M.R.E. 105 rule requiring counsel to request a limiting instruction. Brown, 890 So.2d at 913. ś 90. An established principle of appellate review is that [i]ssues not brought before the trial court are deemed waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Tate v. State, 912 So.2d 919, 928 (Miss.2005) (citing Wilcher v. State, 479 So.2d 710, 712 (Miss.1985)). Rubenstein neither objected to the trial court's action nor questioned the omission, and only now upon review does he claim error. ś 91. In Tate, we confronted the Smith/Brown rule change and its effect on a pre-2004 trial. 912 So.2d at 927-28. In that case, the defendant objected to the admission of two drug arrests on M.R.E. 404(b) grounds. Id. at 927. Defense counsel did not request a limiting instruction, and the trial court did not issue one sua sponte. Id. at 928. Although the subsequent discussion of Brown might have obscured the ultimate issue, we clearly stated that because Tate failed to request an instruction or raise the issue before the trial court, he was procedurally barred from doing so on appeal. Id. ś 92. Rubenstein similarly failed to raise this issue before the trial court, and we find the alleged error to be procedurally barred and without merit.