Opinion ID: 2495393
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Were Borden's Juror-Misconduct Claims Preserved for Appellate Review?

Text: Borden alleged juror misconduct in his Rule 32 petition filed on October 18, 2001. On August 21, 2002, Borden filed a motion for leave to amend his Rule 32 petition, specifically to add more details in support of his juror-misconduct claims. The trial court did not rule on Borden's motion for leave to amend his Rule 32 petition. On March 14, 2003, the trial court entered its final order dismissing Borden's Rule 32 petition. With regard to Borden's juror-misconduct claims, the trial court stated: In his claim, Borden asserts error because, he alleges, his `right to a fair and impartial jury was violated due to several jurors' failure to respond truthfully to multiple questions on voir dire.' (Borden's Rule 32 pet. pp. 76-77.) The members of the jury were dismissed from serving on the jury on December 1, 1994, after recommending that Borden be sentenced to death. (C.R. 4, R. 1175-1177.) The hearing on Borden's motion for a new trial was conducted on, or about, June 22, 1995. (SR. 2.) Thus, Borden, or his counsel, had more than six months to interview members of the jury to discover whether anyone on the jury failed to respond truthfully to any questions during voir dire. As such, Borden could have, but did not, raise this claim at trial or on direct appeal. This claim is, therefore, summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 32.7(d), A.R. Cr. P., because it is procedurally barred. Rule 32.2(a)(3), (5), A.R. Cr. P. .... In his claim, Borden asserts error because, he alleges, the jury considered extraneous evidence during its deliberation. (Borden's Rule 32 pet., pp. 77-78.) The members of the jury were dismissed from serving on the jury on December 1, 1994, after recommending that Borden be sentenced to death. (CR. 4, R. 1175-1177.) The hearing on Borden's motion for new trial was conducted on, or about, June 22, 1995. (SR. 2.) Thus, Borden, or his counsel, had more than six months to interview members of the jury to discover whether anyone on the jury considered extraneous evidence during deliberations. As such, Borden could have, but did not, raise this claim at trial or on direct appeal. This claim is, therefore, summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 32.7(d), A.R. Cr. P., because it is procedurally barred. Rule 32.2(a)(3), (5), A.R. Cr. P. The trial court did not address Borden's amended petition in which he set out specific facts regarding the two claims of juror misconduct. On April 4, 2003, Borden filed a motion for reconsideration. In that motion, Borden stated that the trial court in its March 14, 2003, order failed to take into account any of the facts alleged in his amended Rule 32 petition. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that Borden had failed to preserve the issue of juror misconduct for appellate review. That court's unpublished memorandum states: The appellant contends that he was denied his right to a fair trial by virtue of several jurors' failure to disclose information and the jury's consideration of extraneous evidence. He argues, citing Ex parte Pierce, 851 So.2d 606 (Ala. 2000), and Ex parte Dobyne, 805 So.2d 763 (Ala.2001), that the trial court erred in finding that these claims were procedurally defaulted under Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (5), Ala. R.Crim. P. In his original petition, Borden asserted that `several' jurors failed to respond truthfully to `multiple ... critical questions' during voir dire.4 He also asserted that unidentified `extraneous information' was introduced into the jury deliberations.5 In addition to pleading that these claims were precluded under Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (5), the State specifically pleaded that the claims were insufficient under Rule 32.6(b). Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim. P., provides: `The petition must contain a clear and specific statement of the grounds upon which relief is sought, including full disclosure of the factual basis of those grounds. A bare allegation that a constitutional right has been violated and mere conclusions of law shall not be sufficient to warrant any further proceedings.' In his August 22, 2002, motion to amend his petition, Borden attempted to add the necessary factual basis for his juror-misconduct claims. However, in its order dismissing Borden's petition, the circuit court did not address the requested amendments,6 and Borden did not object to the court's failure to rule. Therefore, these matters are not properly before this court on appeal. Appellate review is limited to rulings invoked on the trial level. Cross v. State, 536 So.2d 155 (Ala.Crim.App.1988). `[T]he trial court may not be put in error in the absence of any attempt to invoke a ruling of the court in the matters complained of.' Bush v. State, 717 So.2d 438, 441 (Ala. Crim.App. 1998) (citations omitted). 4 Issue VII in the Rule 32 petition. 5 Issue VIII in the Rule 32 petition. 6 The State erroneously states in its appellate brief that `the trial court accepted Borden's amendments to both of the other claims he sought to amend.' The court's order of dismissal addresses the two claims as they were set out in the original petition, and it does not address Borden's requested new claim. It is well settled that an appellate court's review is limited to matters seasonably raised in the trial court. Ross v. State, 581 So.2d 495 (Ala.1991). The trial court may not be put in error for failure to rule on a matter which was not presented to it or decided by it. City of Rainbow City v. Ramsey, 417 So.2d 172, 174 (Ala.1982). [I]t is familiar law that an adverse ruling below is a prerequisite to appellate review. We generally cannot consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Day, 613 So.2d 883, 884 (Ala.1993). However, the Court of Criminal Appeals' reliance on this well-settled principle is misplaced in the present case; there is an adverse ruling from the trial court regarding Borden's juror-misconduct claims. The trial court clearly ruled that both of Borden's juror-misconduct claims were procedurally barred by Rule 32.2(a)(3) and (a)(5), Ala. R.Crim. P. Rule 32(a)(3) provides that a petitioner is precluded from postconviction relief if the ground the petitioner asserts as a basis for relief could have been, but was not, raised at trial, and Rule 32(a)(5) bars postconviction relief if the ground could have been, but was not, raised on appeal. Borden's brief to the Court of Criminal Appeals addresses the trial court's application of Rule 32(a)(3) and (a)(5) to his claims of juror misconduct. [2] Accordingly, there is an adverse ruling regarding Borden's juror-misconduct claims for the Court of Criminal Appeals to review. Further, the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding that appellate review of Borden's juror-misconduct claims is barred because Borden failed to obtain a ruling from the trial court on his motion to amend his Rule 32 petition appears to conflict with this Court's decision in Ex parte Rhone, 900 So.2d 455 (Ala.2004). In Rhone, the defendant sought postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., from his capital-murder conviction and his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. As grounds for relief, the defendant alleged that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel in several respects at trial and on appeal. He subsequently filed a motion to amend his Rule 32 petition. The amended petition presented 10 additional grounds to support his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The trial court entered no ruling on the defendant's motion to amend. The State filed a response, addressing only the allegations asserted in the original petition. The trial court entered a written order denying the petition; that order did not address the claims asserted in the proposed amendment. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial court had not exceeded its discretion in failing to address the claims in the defendant's amended petition because, it reasoned, the defendant failed to meet his initial burden of showing diligence in filing the amendment or that the facts underlying the amendment were unknown to him before filing his original petition. Rhone v. State, 900 So.2d 443, 448 (Ala.Crim.App.2004). This Court in Ex parte Rhone held that the Court of Criminal Appeals had erred in imposing upon a Rule 32 petitioner an initial burden to show that he had been diligent in filing an amendment or that the facts underlying the amendment were unknown when the original petition was filed. The defendant is entitled to amend his petition for postconviction relief to assert additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel when the amendment is necessary for a full determination on the merits and there would be no undue delay in the hearing because of the amendment or undue prejudice to the State by the filing of the amendment. In the present case, the Court of Criminal Appeals' unpublished memorandum places a burden on Borden to secure a ruling on his proposed amendment to his Rule 32 petition when the amendment should be freely allowed if it is necessary for a full determination on the merits and if the amendment does not unduly prejudice the opposing party or unduly delay the hearing.