Opinion ID: 150945
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fifth Amendment Right to Meaningful Access to the Courts

Text: Sykes next argues that his pretrial detention in the Kankakee prison violated his Fifth Amendment right to meaningful access to the courts under Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). Bounds held that the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law. 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491. The Court made clear, however, that while adequate law libraries are one constitutionally acceptable method to assure meaningful access to the courts, our decision here ... does not foreclose alternative means to achieve that goal. Id. at 830, 97 S.Ct. 1491. We have long interpreted Bounds to give the government the choice to provide either access to a law library or access to counsel or other appropriate legal assistance. United States ex rel. George v. Lane, 718 F.2d 226 (7th Cir.1983); accord United States v. Byrd, 208 F.3d 592, 593-94 (7th Cir.2000); United States v. Chapman, 954 F.2d 1352, 1362 (7th Cir.1992); Martin v. Davies, 917 F.2d 336, 340 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 742-43 (7th Cir.1988); Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639, 643 (7th Cir.1987). We have further held that a defendant who declines appointed counsel and instead invokes his constitutional right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), does not have a right to access to a law library. Byrd, 208 F.3d at 593; accord Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d at 743; Lane, 718 F.2d at 227. The rule is that [the defendant] has the right to legal help through appointed counsel, and when he declines that help, other alternative rights, like access to a law library, do not spring up. Byrd, 208 F.3d at 593. Insofar as Sykes contends that access to a law library is mandated under Bounds, our caselaw squarely forecloses his claim. Sykes maintains, however, that his right to access the courts was violated because he could not reach his appointed standby counsel during the time he was incarcerated in the Kankakee prison. This argument fails as a matter of fact; the record does not support Sykes's claim that he was deprived of access to the courts. While he was incarcerated at the Kankakee prison, Sykes filed three separate motions to dismiss, each of which quotes relevant legal authorities at length. Sykes admitted that he and the other prisoners who were assisting him called his claimed alibi witnesses but that the witnesses would not answer the calls. He claimed that he called his standby counsel on numerous occasions but for some unexplained reason, the calls would not go through. This five-week inability to reach stand-by counsel is mitigated by the fact that he had access to Korenkiewicz during the first 18 months of his incarceration. Moreover, when Sykes complained to the court about his inability to reach either his standby counsel or his alibi witnesses, the judge asked him whether he wanted a continuance to allow counsel or a court-appointed investigator to track down these witnesses. Sykes twice answered no, insisting that [t]he damage has already happened. Sykes left the district court with little choice but to proceed, having expressly rejected the only obvious cure for any possible Bounds violation. Under the circumstances here, Sykes was not deprived of his constitutional right to access the courts.