Opinion ID: 2333113
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: parol evidence and the statute of frauds

Text: The plaintiffs contend that the absence of a stated rate of commission is not destructive of the agreements involved in these actions. The plaintiffs rely, in part, upon the provision of the Statute of Frauds, R.S. 25:1-8, which reads as follows: The consideration of any promise, contract or agreement required to be put in writing, by sections 25:1-1 to 25:1-7 of this title, need not be set forth or expressed in such writing, but may be proved by any other legal evidence. The statutory exception contained in R.S. 25:1-8, supra, has existed since 1874 and it has been decided that the cases which previously hold the expression of consideration in writing in a contract a requisite of a valid contract under the Statute of Frauds must be read in the light thereof. Nibert v. Baghurst, 47 N.J. Eq. 201, 208 ( Ch. 1890). The Nibert case, supra, has been cited by the former Court of Errors and Appeals as authority for the holding that by the express terms of the Statute of Frauds consideration need not be stated in the memorandum or writing purporting to contain the terms of agreement. Cavanna v. Brooks, 97 N.J. Eq. 329, 334 ( E. & A. 1925). The question whether a rate of commission may be proved absent specific expression in the writing is in itself of substantially novel impression in New Jersey. The pertinent decisions however direct the conclusion that under the circumstances of this case the rate of commission need not be set forth in the agreement since the type of consideration is expressed. In Atlantic Northern Airlines, Inc., v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 305 (1953), this court held: Where the statement of a consideration is in itself `an operative part of a contractual act,  as when in the same writing the parties set out their mutual promises as considerations for each other,' the word `consideration signifies a term of the contract, and hence the writing alone can be examined'; a recital of consideration received is, like other admissions, disputable so far as concerns the thing actually received, but `so far as the terms of a contractual act are involved, the writing must control, whether it uses the term consideration or not, and therefore the terms are not disputable.' Wigmore on Evidence, section 2433. Further in the Atlantic Northern Airlines, Inc., case, supra, we approved the expression of the law in Baum v. Lynn, 72 Miss. 932, 18 So. 428, 430, 30 L.R.A. 441 ( Sup. Ct. 1895), that (see 12 N.J., at page 306): `The true rule is that a consideration recited to have been paid or contracted for may be varied by parol, while the terms of a contract may not be, though the contract they disclose may be the consideration on which the act or obligation of the other party rests.' (Emphasis supplied.) In the present matters the agreements expressed consideration in the following terms: In consideration of $1.00 and for other good and valuable consideration