Opinion ID: 699602
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mardini's Claim

Text: 9 Mardini challenges the district court's application of U.S.S.G. Secs. 4A1.1(a) and 4A1.2 (Nov. 1989). Mardini argues that his California state convictions for transportation and sale of marijuana, transportation and sale of cocaine, and possession of marijuana for sale are related to the offense of maintaining a stash house, and should therefore be considered part of the offense of maintaining a stash house rather than criminal history. We disagree. 10 Section 4A1.1(a) directs the court to add three points to a defendant's criminal history score for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month. Section 4A1.2(a)(1) defines a prior sentence as one previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt ... for conduct not part of the instant offense. Section 1B1.3 indicates that relevant conduct is the conduct that is part of the instant offense. This interpretation is confirmed by subsequent clarifying amendments to the guidelines. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.11(b)(2) (Nov. 1993). The commentary to the 1993 version of Sec. 4A1.2 provides [c]onduct that is part of the instant offense means conduct that is relevant conduct to the instant offense under the provisions of Sec. 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct). U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2 comment. (n. 1) (Nov. 1993). 11 Conduct that is a severable, distinct offense is not part of the offense of conviction for purposes of Sec. 4A1.1. United States v. Blumberg, 961 F.2d 787, 792 (8th Cir.1992). To make the factual determination whether the conduct is part of the instant offense, the district court considers several factors, including temporal and geographical proximity, common victims, and a common criminal plan or intent. Id. Here, although there is temporal and geographical proximity, the stash house offense occurred over an extended period of time. As the district court rightly observed, a defendant is not entitled to merge all criminal activities simply because these activities occurred over a single span of time, or out of a common base of operations. Moreover, the victims of the stash house violation and the distribution violations, to the extent that there are any, are distinct. The victims of the stash house count are Mardini (as a cocaine user) and the purchasers of cocaine through transactions facilitated by Mardini. The victim of Mardini's distribution activity was the purchaser (who was actually a narcotics agent). Additionally, Mardini's plan and intent in maintaining the stash house appears to have been to enable himself and his friends to party with an adequate supply of cocaine. This intent differs entirely from the intent accompanying the narcotics sale. 12 Mardini consistently characterized his activities relating to the stash house as either turning a blind eye to the distribution activities of others, or as the maintenance and storage of relatively small amounts (ones, two ounces) of cocaine for personal use to party. This type of activity differs substantially from the distribution-related activities that resulted in Mardini's state convictions. Thus, the distribution activity cannot be said to be in furtherance of the stash house offense. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a) (Nov. 1989). Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not clearly err when it concluded that Mardini's distribution activities are not relevant conduct with respect to his stash house offense, and therefore considered the sentence stemming from the distribution activities to be a prior sentence under Sec. 4A1.1. See Blumberg, 961 F.2d at 792 (standard of review). 4 13 Moreover, we hold that any error by the district court was harmless: 14 If the sentence imposed falls within the guideline range urged by the appellant and if it is clear that the sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of whether the appellant's argument for a lower guideline range ultimately prevailed, then the matter is not reviewable and will not be remanded for resentencing. The error in calculating the guideline range is deemed harmless because the appellant faces the same sentence, win or lose. 15 United States v. Simpkins, 953 F.2d 443, 446 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 928, 112 S.Ct. 1988, 118 L.Ed.2d 585 (1992). Were Mardini to prevail, the applicable guidelines range would be 15-21 months instead of 21-27 months. Mardini's 21-month sentence falls within both guidelines ranges. Since the government made a Sec. 5K1.1 motion, the district court was free to depart downward, yet it chose not to. The district court's stated reasons for refusing to depart downward make it clear that Mardini faces the same sentence win or lose.