Opinion ID: 1593307
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Impeachment of State Witness

Text: In his first claim on appeal, Eaglin asserts that the trial court erred in prohibiting defense counsel from impeaching fellow inmate Jesse Baker with a disciplinary report filed against him for lying to a corrections officer. Eaglin claims the impeachment was relevant because the lie for which Baker had previously been disciplined would have been important to the jury in assessing the trustworthiness of his trial testimony. This Court has repeatedly recognized that [t]he right of cross-examination is `implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation' guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions. Garcia v. State, 816 So.2d 554, 561 (Fla.2002) (quoting Conner v. State, 748 So.2d 950, 955 (Fla.1999)). Eaglin relies on section 90.610, Florida Statutes (2006), as a basis for his claim that the impeachment should have been permitted. Section 90.610 states: (1) A party may attack the credibility of any witness, including an accused, by evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year under the law under which the witness was convicted, or if the crime involved dishonesty or a false statement regardless of the punishment.... § 90.610(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). In the context of section 90.610(1), this Court has defined a conviction as an adjudication of guilt or judgment of conviction by the trial court. State v. McFadden, 772 So.2d 1209, 1216 (Fla.2000). In Eaglin's case, it is clear that the report was not a conviction administered through a judicial court process as defined by this Court, but instead was an internal reprimand. See Jackson v. State, 545 So.2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1989) (concluding that a police department reprimand was not a criminal conviction as contemplated by section 90.610). In support of his argument of trial court error, Eaglin also cites to the decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal in Williams v. State, 386 So.2d 25 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), and Cliburn v. State, 710 So.2d 669 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). In both cases, the Second District held that the trial court erred in precluding the defense from cross-examining the main prosecution witness on the basis of a prior false report to the police. Yet, even assuming that a false reporting exception to section 90.610 should be recognized, an issue we do not address in this case, [3] the trial court did not err in refusing to allow the impeachment of Baker with his prior disciplinary report. At trial, Eaglin did not establish the circumstances underlying the disciplinary report or whether the lying involved circumstances similar to the facts in Williams or Cliburn which could conceivably be relevant for impeachment purposes. Any limitation on cross-examination is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See McDuffie v. State, 970 So.2d 312, 314 (Fla.2007). In this case, the trial court properly allowed cross-examination as to the fact that Baker suffered from severe depression and had previously been housed in the psychiatric ward and the crisis unit of the prison. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting additional cross-examination as to the prior disciplinary report. Moreover, the jury was aware through direct examination that Baker had been convicted of nine prior felonies. Accordingly, we reject the claim of reversible error on this issue.