Opinion ID: 2616182
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion In Limine Granted to the Prosecution

Text: The court determines that reversible error did not occur from the prosecutor's use of the motion in limine to exclude reference to the arrest or charges against the State's witness, Mark Koenig, which arose from the same transaction as the charges against Mrs. Lindsey. The court justifies the exclusion by determining that the appellant had failed to show that the evidence was relevant or that its exclusion prejudiced her right to a fair trial. The court discusses whether the charges against Koenig justified or excused appellant's conduct, but that is not the problem. Appellant's confrontation-clause rights [1] have been violated, because she was prevented from developing on cross-examination the possible or probable bias of the State's witness, who had faced criminal charges arising from the same incident in which appellant was charged. After all, Koenig without question violated the criminal law by impersonating an officer before any contested conduct of appellant occurred. This court most recently discussed the confrontation issue in Story v. State, Wyo., 721 P.2d 1020 (1986): Rule 611(b), W.R.E., allows cross-examination that exceeds the scope of direct as long as it goes to the credibility of the witness. And, under some circumstances, the confrontation clause guarantees the defendant's right to engage in cross-examination on credibility issues. [Citations] In order to preserve error under Rule 611(b) or the confrontation clause, the defendant must make an offer of proof showing how his proposed cross-examination will impeach the witness's credibility. 721 P.2d at 1034. We went on to explain in Story v. State, supra, that an offer of proof is not always necessary. Once [the State's witness] had testified on rebuttal, it became `apparent from the context within which [the] questions were asked' that defense counsel's inquiry into [the witness'] employment history was intended to attack her credibility. The trial court would have erred if it had prevented this inquiry even though appellant made no offer of proof. See Rule 103(a)(2), W.R.E. (Emphasis added.) 721 P.2d at 1034. In this case the purpose of questioning Koenig about the charges against him was clear to the judge. Both counsel and the judge discussed in some detail whether or not the State's witness, Mark Koenig, was biased because he had been charged with impersonating an officer in connection with the incident for which Mrs. Lindsey was on trial. Rule 103, W.R.E., states in part: (a) Effect of erroneous ruling.  Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and       (2) Offer of Proof.  In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked. The Wyoming committee note which appears as a footnote to Rule 103, W.R.E., specifically provides that an offer of proof at trial is not necessary in this case: Under Rule 103(a), it is not necessary to re-offer evidence which has been suppressed by action of the court on a pre-trial motion, such as a motion in limine or a motion to suppress   . (Emphasis added.) The trial court determined in discussion of his decision to grant the State's motion in limine that [t]he fact of there having been an arrest or charge against a witness neither makes that witness any more or less credible. [2] But Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), holds otherwise: The partiality of the witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony, 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence, § 940, p. 775 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). We have recognized that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. at 1110. In Davis v. Alaska, supra, the fact that the witness was on probation for a prior juvenile crime was sufficient to invoke the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation on that issue. In this case, the fact that Koenig was charged with a crime arising from the same incident for which Mrs. Lindsey was on trial is even more supportive of her constitutional right to cross-examine Koenig. The Wyoming Supreme Court has previously accepted the view that the Davis v. Alaska holding is limited to the showing of bias or prejudice, Salaz v. State, Wyo., 561 P.2d 238 (1977); Connor v. State, Wyo., 537 P.2d 715 (1975), but bias and prejudice are the precise concerns involved in Koenig's testimony. The State's motion in limine should have been denied, and appellant allowed to exercise her Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine Koenig about his arrest for impersonating an officer in connection with the incident for which she was on trial (which was, in effect, for making a citizen's arrest of two people, one of whom was impersonating an officer and both of whom were in a hassle with her teen-age relatives).