Opinion ID: 1096927
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Cross Assignments.

Text: On February 20, 1964, the court rendered final decree wherein the court decreed that complainant recover of respondents $1,987.50. On March 2, 1964, Waters filed application for rehearing which was presented to the trial judge and by him set for argument on March 25, 1964. On March 19, 1964, the Union filed its application for rehearing and presented it to a different judge of the same circuit who set the application for hearing before the trial judge on March 26, 1964. On March 25, 1964, the trial judge continued both applications to April 3, 1964. We find in the record no subsequent order of continuance. On April 27, 1964, the trial court rendered decree modifying the decree of February 20, 1964, by eliminating the allowance to the complainant of the attorneys' fee of Seven Hundred and Fifty (750) Dollars, and overruling the applications for rehearing in all other respects. The result of the modification would be to reduce the money awarded to complainant by the amount of $750.00. Complainant cross assigns for error that the court erred in entering its decree on application for rehearing. § 119, Title 13, Code 1940, provides that after the lapse of thirty days from the date on which a judgment or decree was rendered, the court shall lose all power over it, as completely as if the end of the term had been on that day, unless a motion to set aside the judgment or decree, or grant a new trial, has been filed and called to the attention of the court and an order entered continuing the motion for hearing to a future day. Equity Rule 62 provides that a party must file application for rehearing with the register and present same to the judge who rendered the decree within thirty days from the date of said decree. By its terms, § 119, Title 13, applies to decrees in equity as well as to judgments at law. This court has said that: A motion for the rehearing of a modified final decree may be made under section 119, Title 13, Code within thirty days after such decree is rendered.... Evett v. Mitchell, 251 Ala. 22, 26, 36 So.2d 98. In so far as the requirements for timely filing, presentation to the judge, and orders of continuance are concerned, we hold that § 119, Title 13, applies equally to judgments at law and decrees in equity. So far as the instant record discloses, by order made on March 25, 1964, the applications for rehearing were regularly continued to April 3, 1964, but no order was made on or prior to that date continuing the applications to any later date or showing that the applications were heard, or submitted, and taken under advisement by the court on April 3, 1964. The next entry with respect to the applications is the decree of modification made on April 27, 1964. When a motion for a new trial or rehearing is now continued to a future date beyond the time limit fixed by § 119, Title 13, there is no further limitation or impediment arising from a term of court. The motion or application, when submitted on the date to which it is continued as authorized in § 119, is in the breast of the court and no further continuance is necessary to suspend the finality of the original judgment or decree. But the record must contain some showing or statement of submission. Greer v. Heyer, 216 Ala. 229, 113 So. 14; Shelley v. Clark, 267 Ala. 621, 103 So.2d 743; Holman v. Baker, 277 Ala. 310, 318, 169 So.2d 429, on rehearing, paragraph [10, 11]. The instant record contains no showing or statement of submission, or order of continuance, made prior to or on April 3, 1964, which is the latest date to which the hearing on the applications was regularly continued. Because of the absence of such a proper showing, or order of continuance, the applications were discontinued after April 3, 1964. We have found nothing in the record which shows that complainant thereafter waived the discontinuance. Greer v. Heyer, supra. Because the applications had beeri discontinued, the court erred in rendering the decree of modification on April 27, 1964, and that decree is reversed and held for naught, and the decree of February 20, 1964, stands as the final decree in the cause. In answer to this cross assignment, appellants state in brief that on April 3, 1964, the trial judge advised that it was not his custom to hear oral argument on application for rehearing and that all parties, through their counsel, consented that argument be presented in writing; that Waters presented argument in memorandum on that day; that the Union presented argument by memorandum on April 6, 1964; that appellee presented argument by memorandum dated April 9, 1964; and that, by memorandum dated April 11, 1964, Waters presented argument in reply. Appellants say that it is their position that the applications for rehearing were submitted April 3, 1964. It has long been the rule that the appellate court will not consider matters found in the brief, but not in the record, where, to avail, it must be. Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Ashley, 159 Ala. 145, 158, 48 So. 981, 985. We cannot consider a matter which does not appear in the record on appeal. Cash v. Usrey, 278 Ala. 313, 315, 178 So.2d 91, 93. See cases cited in Ala. Digest, Appeal and Error, Appellants say that . . . . this Court has recognized that successive continuances are unnecessary to preserve the jurisdiction of the court where the motion has been heard, and taken under consideration. Cooper v. Owen, 230 Ala. 316, 161 So. 98; Ex parte Drivers, Inc., Horne v. Drivers, Inc., 138 So. 427, 24 Ala.App. 557. In Cooper , this court said: Since this record shows that the motion was submitted and taken under consideration at a time when the court had the right to do so, and was not carried beyond that term before action was taken by it, the court had the power to act on the motion when it was overruled..... (230 Ala. at page 318, 161 So. at page 99) In Drivers, the plaintiff applied for mandamus to require the trial judge to vacate an order granting a new trial. The answer of the judge stated that the motion had been submitted and taken under advisement by agreement of counsel for both parties on the day to which the motion had been regularly continued. The Court of Appeals sustained the action of the trial judge in granting the new trial and denied the writ. Without deciding whether the decision in Drivers is correct, we distinguish it, from the instant case in that the Court of Appeals, in Drivers, had before it the trial judge's answer stating that the motion had been submitted on a day when the court had the power to take the motion under submission. The cases cited do not support the argument as appellants seek to apply it to the instant case where the record does not show that the applications were submitted at a time when the court had a right to have the applications submitted. We are of opinion that, according to the instant record, the court erred in rendering the decree of modification on April 27, 1964, because the applications for rehearing had been discontinued. Other cross assignments have been considered. We are not persuaded that further error is shown which requires reversal or which would justify further extension of this lengthy opinion. The decree of April 27, 1964, on rehearing is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions that decree be rendered dismissing the applications. The decree of February 20, 1964, is affirmed. Affirmed in part. Reversed and remanded in part with directions. LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.