Opinion ID: 2497361
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: This Court's Decision in Cooper II

Text: In Cooper II, this Court considered the interpretation of a marital settlement agreement along with the contract for a life insurance policy. There, the husband designated his wife, Karin, as the primary beneficiary on two life insurance policies purchased during the marriage. Cooper II, 682 So.2d at 77-78. They divorced, and the separation agreement mutually released each party from any and all claims of the other, but did not mention the life insurance policies. Id. at 78. After the divorce, the husband changed the primary beneficiary on one of the policies to his stepdaughter. Id. However, he left the other policy with Academy Life Insurance Company unchanged, with Karin as the primary beneficiary and his wife, Sandra, as the secondary beneficiary. Id. Approximately a year after the divorce, the husband died and both Karin and Sandra claimed the proceeds of the policy. Id. Academy filed an interpleader to determine who was entitled to the proceeds. Id. The trial court ruled that Karin was entitled to the proceeds. Id. On appeal, the Second District held that without specific reference in a property settlement agreement to life insurance proceeds, the beneficiary of the proceeds is determined by looking only to the insurance contract. Id. (quoting Cooper v. Muccitelli ( Cooper I ), 661 So.2d 52, 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)). The district court recognized conflict with Davis v. Davis, 301 So.2d 154 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. White, 242 So.2d 771 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970), and Raggio v. Richardson, 218 So.2d 501 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969), wherein the courts looked beyond the life insurance policies to the settlement agreements. Cooper II, 682 So.2d at 78. This Court granted review, approved Cooper I, and disapproved Davis, Aetna, and Raggio. The Court reviewed the language of the settlement agreement, in particular the provisions entitled Mutual Release and Discharge of Claims in Estates and Mutual Release of General Claims. Cooper II, 682 So.2d at 78. The Court also reviewed the language of the Academy policy designating the wife as the primary beneficiary. Id. at 79. Then, the Court stated: We conclude that the plain language of the above documents controls. To the extent that Karin may have claimed a right to remain primary beneficiary under the Academy policy as a condition of the dissolution of marriage, she waived any such claim when she signed the above agreement. The agreement clearly states: [E]ach party hereby waives . . . all claims . . . which he or she . . . might have . . . against the other. Thomas was free to designate whomever he wished as beneficiary. To determine whom Thomas intended as beneficiary, we need look no further than the plain language of the policy itself: The primary beneficiary is Karin Pasquino. After signing the separation agreement, Thomas did just what he needed to do to ensure that the proceeds would go to Karinhe did nothing. The analysis urged by Sandra, i.e., that the general language in the separation agreement trumps the specific language in the policy, would place Academy in an impossible positionthe carrier could never be certain whom to pay in such a situation without going to court, in spite of what the policy said or how clearly it was worded. Id. In a footnote, the Court noted: Of course, a settlement agreement that specifically requires one of the parties to maintain a named individual as beneficiary will control the disposition of proceeds upon notice to the insurer. Id. at 79 n. 1. In Cooper II, this Court looked to the language of the marital settlement agreement and the life insurance contract, stating that the plain language of the documents controls. We held that general language in a marital settlement agreement, which did not mention the disputed policy, could not trump the specific language in the policy, which clearly designated the ex-wife as the beneficiary. Further, we recognized that without a specific requirement in the settlement agreement that he maintain a named individual as the beneficiary, the ex-husband had full control over the policy and could designate whomever he wished as the beneficiary.