Opinion ID: 3019403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Koehler argues that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the contempt order since the 4 11 U.S.C. § 350 (b) provides that “[a] case may be reopened in the court in which such case was closed to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause.” 5 debtor’s bankruptcy case was closed before the contempt hearing.5 Jurisdiction is primarily a creature of statute. Bankruptcy courts derive their jurisdiction from 28 U.S.C. § 1334. This statute confers jurisdiction on bankruptcy courts to hear proceedings “arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).6 The court’s jurisdiction does not end once a plan is confirmed or the case is closed. In fact, it is well-established that courts retain jurisdiction to enforce their own orders. Ex 5 On a related note, Koehler argues that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction because the debtor did not affirmatively allege a basis for jurisdiction in his motion. Jurisdiction exists independent of the parties’ pleadings. Parties cannot, through mutual agreement, confer jurisdiction which is otherwise lacking, nor can a court be deprived of jurisdiction simply because a litigant fails to plead it. Furthermore, a party’s failure to plead jurisdiction does not relieve a court of its obligation to determine its jurisdiction sua sponte. For his part, Grant argues that the court possessed jurisdiction because the plan contained a provision which authorized the court to exercise jurisdiction. The debtor’s argument is similarly offtrack. A court cannot invest itself with jurisdiction beyond that jurisdiction which is provided for under law. See Harstad v. First Am. Bank, 39 F.3d 898, 902 n.7 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that plan provision “cannot and does not confer jurisdiction upon the court, as only Congress may do that.”); Walnut Assocs. v. Saidel, 164 B.R. 487, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that court cannot retain jurisdiction simply “by inserting a provision in the plan or order of confirmation. . . .”). 6 11 U.S.C. § 1334 actually confers jurisdiction on the district courts. Jurisdiction is passed on to the bankruptcy courts under 28 U.S.C. § 157. 6 parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873) (“The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts. . . .”); Brown v. Ramsay (In re Ragar), 3 F.3d 1174, 1179 (8th Cir. 1993) (“If a bankruptcy court can decide the qualification of attorneys to represent parties before it . . . and if such decisions are necessary or appropriate in the execution of the court’s duties under Title 11 . . . it is likewise necessary or appropriate for the court to enforce its own orders.”); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966) (“There can be no question that courts have inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through civil contempt.”). The bankruptcy court’s contempt power issues specifically from 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).7 Section 105(a) provides, in part: 7 Rule 9020 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure implements the bankruptcy court’s contempt power. See Mayex II v. Du-An Prod., Inc. (In re Mayex II Corp.), 178 B.R. 464, 469 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) (holding that court’s authority to enter civil contempt orders is “expressly provided for” in Rule 9020). Rule 9020 entitles a party to de novo review in the district court: The order shall be effective 10 days after service of the order and shall have the same force and effect as an order of contempt entered by the district court unless, within the 10 day period, the entity named therein serves and files objections prepared in the manner provided in Rule 9033(b). In this case, Koehler did not avail himself of de novo review by the district court, but instead allowed the order to become final. Therefore, the contempt order is subject to ordinary 7 The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); Brown v. Ramsay (In re Ragar), 3 F.3d at 1179; Mountain Am. Credit Union v. Skinner (In re Skinner), 917 F.2d 444, 447 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[S]ection 105(a) empowers bankruptcy courts to enter civil contempt orders.”); Burd v. Walters (In re Walters), 868 F.2d 665, 669 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that 11 U.S.C. § 105 authorized court to enter contempt order against attorney who failed to comply with court order requiring him to remit attorney’s fees). We therefore conclude that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction. Contempt Koehler also argues that the bankruptcy court erred because the disqualification order which formed the basis for its contempt finding was ambiguous. A court cannot issue a contempt order unless a party has violated a specific order of which he or appellate review. 8 she is aware. See United States v. Di Mauro, 441 F.2d 428, 439 (8th Cir. 1971) (“[I]n order to cite a person for contempt, it must be shown that the alleged contemnor had knowledge of the order which he is said to have violated and that order must be specific and definite.”); United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 834 (2d Cir. 1995) (“A defendant cannot be held in contempt absent a ‘definite and specific’ order of which he had notice.”). In a proceeding for civil contempt, the movant must establish both elements by clear and convincing evidence.8 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Wellington Precious Metals, Inc., 950 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1992). Once the plaintiff has made this prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that he or she was unable to comply with the court’s order. Id. We review the bankruptcy court’s issuance of the contempt order under an abuse of discretion standard. Wright v. Nichols, 80 F.3d 1248, 1250 (8th Cir. 1996). In this case, it is undisputed that Koehler was on notice of the disqualification order since he was the party to whom the order was directed and attended the hearing in his own defense. 8 Willfulness is not an element of a civil contempt claim. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Crowley, 74 F.3d 716, 720 (6th Cir. 1996). Therefore, Koehler’s intent in violating the disqualification order is irrelevant. 9 Additionally, the disqualification order was both direct and specific. The order identified the conflict and prohibited Koehler from representing the debtor. Bias Koehler also alleges a host of vague and ill-supported accusations of gender bias as the basis for reversal. We find no support in the record or any basis for these contentions. Defenses On appeal, Koehler offers several defenses for his failure to comply with the disqualification order. First, Koehler contends that his continued efforts on Grant’s behalf, particularly his consultations with Curry, were excusable, since he was already familiar with the bankruptcy file and therefore best situated to provide assistance. While Koehler’s desire to share his professional insight with his replacement might in some situations be considered laudable, it was impermissible in bankruptcy. Once disqualified, Koehler was categorically precluded from acting on Grant’s behalf. In addition, Koehler argues that he was encouraged, through the continued solicitations of the debtor, to disregard the 10 disqualification order.9 Koehler is again off the mark, since the debtor’s imprecations and understanding are irrelevant. As the party to whom the disqualification order was directed, Koehler was obligated to discontinue his representation of the debtor and simply should have refused to provide assistance.