Opinion ID: 433135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Expert Advice Instruction

Text: 18 The appellants first contend that the trial court erred in denying their request for an instruction on the defense of good faith reliance on an expert. They argue that they were entitled to such an instruction because their main defense at trial was that they had relied on their CPA, Nick Mason, as an expert in filling out SBA and FHA applications for loan guarantees. The trial court refused to give the instruction because it found that the defense was inapplicable to the facts of the case. We agree. 19 The defense of good faith reliance on expert advice is designed to refute the government's proof that the defendant intended to commit the offense. United States v. Miller, 658 F.2d 235, 237 (4th Cir.1981). To succeed, the defendant must show that (1) he fully disclosed all relevant facts to the expert and (2) that he relied in good faith on the expert's advice. United States v. Smith, 523 F.2d 771 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 59, 50 L.Ed.2d 76 (1976). 2 20 The flaw in the defendants' argument is that no expert advice was given to the defendants on which they relied. The charges against Hill, Johnson and Lister are not of the type where reliance on expert advice is relevant: 21 (1) Hill and Johnson do not contend that Mason advised them to lie about their past criminal records, 3 but simply that they were unaware that the false statements were included in the applications. 22 (2) The appellants also do not argue that they relied on Mason in calculating either theirs or Pamela Wells' financial assets, but instead claim that the statements were in fact substantially accurate and they did not know of any inaccuracies. 23 (3) Likewise, they do not claim that Mason advised them to falsely claim that down payments had been made, but rather that the down payments had either been made or that they did not knowingly claim that nonexistent down payments had been made. 24 (4) Finally, although Hill testified at trial that Mason advised him to transfer the stock of I & E Corporation to his father, the issue at trial was not whether such a transaction was legal (to which the defense would arguably apply), but whether the transfer of stock ever took place, which reliance on expert advice was not relevant. 25 The appellants' defenses at trial, therefore, are properly characterized as claims that they did not willfully and knowingly make false statements, 4 and not as contentions that they relied on expert advice in making such statements. 26 The district court was not required to grant a request that [did] not concern issues properly before the jury .... United States v. Goss, 650 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981). The court did not err, therefore, in denying the appellants' request for an instruction on the expert advice defense. 27