Opinion ID: 2204178
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Significance of Hampton

Text: The final section of the Court of Appeals decision in this case is reserved for its discussion and dismissal of State v. Hampton, No. 91,092, 2004 WL 2160787, an unpublished opinion filed by another Court of Appeals panel on September 24, 2004. In that case, defendant Andrew A. Hampton, who had been charged but not convicted in a felony prosecution and who was on a $10,000 personal recognizance bond, was released to a community corrections residential facility. When he left the facility and failed to return, he was charged with and pleaded guilty to aggravated escape. Five years later, Hampton argued that he should be permitted to withdraw his plea because he had not been in the custody necessary to support the aggravated escape charge. The Court of Appeals panel agreed with his argument on the factual impossibility of an aggravated escape. See Hampton, slip op. at 16-17. Custody as defined in 21-3809(b)(1) does not include actions which are a part of general supervision of a person on parole or probation or constraint incidental to release on bail. By this definition, it appears clear that the legislature did not intend to include walking away from a community corrections residential center before conviction and while on bond to be an aggravated escape from custody as opposed to bail jumping. The legislature could have included such a walk away as escape or aggravated escape, but it has not done so. Hampton, slip op. at 11. The Court of Appeals panel in this case first pointed out a factual distinction between Urban and Hampton, i.e., that Urban had been convicted while Hampton had not; but it acknowledged that such a distinction was of no moment under the first sentence of K.S.A. 21-3908(b)(1). It also said that it found Hampton less helpful than Garrett, because it did not discuss the court order section of the first sentence of the statute while Garrett did. Urban, 40 Kan.App.2d at 522-23, 193 P.3d 515. As we have discussed in the preceding section, Garrett focused on an earlier version of the statutory language on detention pursuant to court order, and that makes its pronouncements on that language of little use. Although the Court of Appeals panel also criticized Hampton's lack of discussion of the meaning of incidental to, Garrett also did not discuss this wording choice, or, for that matter, anything related to the second sentence of K.S.A. 21-3809(b)(1). The main problem with the Court of Appeals panel's discussion of Hampton is that it ignored the critical factual similarity between Urban and Hampton. Each was on felony bond at the time of the charged escape. Unlike conviction status under the first sentence of K.S.A. 21-3809(b)(1), the existence of each bond and the relationship between it and the residential constraint placed on the defendant under the second sentence of K.S.A. 21-3809(b)(1) has dispositive legal significance. Each defendant was subject to detention that could qualify as custody under the first sentence of K.S.A. 21-3809(b)(1), but the bond and the constraint incidental to it excluded each defendant's situation under the second sentence of the statute. As a result, neither Hampton nor Urban could be charged with aggravated escape. Finally, we must comment on the stare decisis value of Hampton The Court of Appeals panel was correct that it had the right to disagree with a previous panel of the same court. See K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (Supreme Court may review Court of Appeals decision when in conflict with another). And the State is correct that unpublished decisions are generally afforded little precedential authority; indeed, they are not to be cited to a court unless they are significant for issue or claim preclusion or for law of the case or there is no published case on the same point of law. See Supreme Court Rule 7.04(f)(2) (2009 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 54). We are not compelled today, and the district court was not compelled when it dismissed Urban's charge for aggravated escape, to decide this case as we do because of the Hampton decision. Rather, our result is demanded by the plain language of the governing statute. Hampton is merely persuasive authority arising out of factually similar circumstances. We read it, as always, with interest and respect; but we are not bound to follow it. The Court of Appeals is reversed. The district court is affirmed.