Opinion ID: 1116120
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: hearsay statements in conspiracy cases

Text: Defendants raise a number of issues pertaining to hearsay statements that were admitted under the coconspirator exception to the Rules of Evidence, ER 801(d)(2)(v). First, they note that the trial court failed to determine whether the evidence showed that they were members of the conspiracy to engage in illegal gambling. They point out that the trial court apparently felt that such a determination was to be made by the jury. [2] They assert that ER 104(a) [3] requires the trial judge to make an independent determination as to whether the evidence is sufficient. We agree. [5] In State v. Dictado, 102 Wn.2d 277, 687 P.2d 172 (1984), we held that before hearsay statements can be admitted under ER 801(d)(2)(v), the trial judge must find that there is evidence, other than the hearsay statements, that shows that the defendants were members of a conspiracy. If the trial court determines that there is sufficient evidence showing defendants were members of the conspiracy, then hearsay statements may be admitted if they satisfy the requirements of ER 801(d)(2)(v). In making its independent determination, we hold that the trial court should use the preponderance of the evidence standard when deciding whether a defendant is a member of the conspiracy. This is the standard employed by many federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. James, 576 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir.1978). This standard is the proper one for a trial court to follow since ER 104(a) allows the trial court to use inadmissible evidence, as well as admissible and admitted proof in its determination. Although the trial court failed in not making an independent determination of a conspiracy, we hold that the record here provides substantial evidence which shows that defendants were members of the conspiracy to promote illegal gambling. Many witnesses testified that the defendants were known Tulisan members who had worked at gambling houses for which Tulisan provided protection. In addition, defendants were able to get dispatched immediately to another cannery after being fired from the Egegik cannery in Alaska even though such dispatching was not within union procedures. The undisputed evidence that the defendants were members of the conspiracy was the fact that they implemented one of its primary objectives: they murdered both victims. Defendants were specifically identified by the dying Domingo as being his assailants. They were seen fleeing the union hall immediately after the shootings. We hold that there was substantial evidence which showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendants were members of the conspiracy. [6, 7] Defendants' claim that the trial court erred by not weighing the probative value of the gambling conspiracy evidence against its prejudicial impact as required by ER 403. [4] The defendants, however, never made an objection on that basis at trial. This court has steadfastly adhered to the rule that a litigant cannot remain silent as to claimed error during trial and later, for the first time, urge objections thereto on appeal. Bellevue Sch. Dist. 405 v. Lee, 70 Wn.2d 947, 950, 425 P.2d 902 (1967). Moreover, the balancing test contemplated by ER 403 is left to the discretion of the trial court whose decision will not be overturned except for abuse. State v. Valladares, 31 Wn. App. 63, 639 P.2d 813 (1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 99 Wn.2d 663, 664 P.2d 508 (1983). In State v. Dictado, 102 Wn.2d 277, 687 P.2d 172 (1984), we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing in coconspirator statements in order to prove that a conspiracy existed. Accordingly, we reject defendants' contention. Defendants' final evidentiary challenge to the admission of hearsay testimony is predicated on ER 801(d)(2)(v). They contend that the following four statements should not have been admitted into evidence at trial: (a) Dictado saying the statement, Mother I'll get rid of you where the subject of the statement was Viernes; (b) Dictado's statement on May 31 that he was going to kill Viernes; (c) Ramil's statement to San Pablo that Dictado said he was going to kill Viernes; and (d) Boy Peli's post-murder statement concerning the use of a silencer, the test firing of the gun, and the motive for killing Domingo made to San Pablo while both were in Alaska. All four hearsay statements were introduced through San Pablo. ER 801(d)(2)(v) provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is made by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The State asserts that defendants' objections made at trial concerning the statements were not sufficiently specific and hence such objections were waived. [8] Regarding statements (a) and (d), we find that the objections made at trial were inadequate for purposes of an appeal. As to statement (a), counsel objected but did not state what his objection was based on. He merely said that he objected to what Dictado said. An objection which does not specify the particular ground upon which it is based is insufficient to preserve the question for appellate review. State v. Boast, 87 Wn.2d 447, 553 P.2d 1322 (1976). As to statement (d), counsel objected but on the basis that it was not proper impeachment nor was it within the scope of redirect. A party may only assign error in the appellate court on the specific ground of the evidentiary objection made at trial. State v. Boast, supra . Since the specific objection made at trial is not the basis the defendants are arguing before this court, they have lost their opportunity for review. As to statements (b) and (c), counsel requested and was allowed a continuing objection: MR. GRUBB: Your Honor, I would like to have a continuing objection to this line of inquiry because it calls for blatant hearsay from what Tony Dictado is supposed to have said. MISS MAIDA: It's an exception to the hearsay rule, your Honor. MR. GRUBB: None that I know of. THE COURT: The objection's overruled, and a continuing one will be allowed as to what was said by others other than the defendants in this phase of the testimony. Report of Proceedings, at 1552. This objection, while not ideal, is sufficiently specific so as to allow the defendants the opportunity to have this court review the issue. We find that the trial court properly admitted statements (b) and (c) under the coconspirator exception, ER 801(d)(2)(v). Both statements were made during the pendency of the conspiracy. The conspiracy started before the murders occurred and long before the statements were made. The conspiracy had been in existence since the time Tulisan had been involved in promoting illegal gambling in Alaska. The conspiracy did not end with the killing of Viernes and Domingo. Instead, it was in existence until at least the time Boy Peli went to Alaska and asked San Pablo to pay a $1,500 gambling commission. Further, both statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Such statements were made to San Pablo in order to prove to him that Tulisan would be able to send its members to Alaska to run the gambling operation. In summary, we find that defendants waived their opportunity to contest the admission of statements (a) and (d). No objection was made to statement (a) and an objection not based on hearsay was made as to statement (d). As to statements (b) and (c), we find that both statements were made during the pendency of the conspiracy and, hence, were admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay prohibition.