Opinion ID: 4538227
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: False Testimony from Cooperating Witnesses

Text: Conners alleges that the district court erred by permitting the government's cooperating witnesses to offer false testimony regarding her involvement in the conspiracy. This argument largely repeats arguments made in her Rule 33 motion, and thus we treat this aspect of her appeal as an appeal from the denial of her 7 Rule 33 motion. We review the denial of a Rule 33 motion for abuse of discretion. See United States v. McCourty, 562 F.3d 458, 475 (2d Cir. 2009). To challenge a conviction on the basis of a prosecutor's knowing use of false testimony, the defendant must demonstrate that there was false testimony, that the prosecutor knew or should have known it was false, and that there was a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury's judgment. See United States v. Helmsley, 985 F.2d 1202, 1205-06 (2d Cir. 1993). Simple inconsistencies in testimony are not perjury. See United States v. Monteleone, 257 F.3d 210, 219 (2d Cir. 2001). When such inconsistencies are revealed on cross-examination, it is for the jury to determine credibility. See United States v. Josephberg, 562 F.3d 478, 494 (2d Cir. 2009). Upon an independent review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the new trial motion based on alleged false testimony.