Opinion ID: 2571646
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: It Was an Abuse of Discretion To Permit Dr. Borden To Testify at Trial on Topics He Refused To Discuss at His Deposition.

Text: The estate argues that it was an abuse of discretion to allow Dr. Borden's trial lawyer to question him at trial about topics his attorney instructed him not to discuss at his deposition. We agree, [6] and remand to the superior court to determine the effect of this error.
At Dr. Borden's pre-trial deposition, the estate's lawyer asked Dr. Borden, Did Margaret Zaverl die because the connection between the massive hemoptysis and her history of prior aortic repair was not diagnosed? Dr. Borden's attorney objected and instructed Dr. Borden not to answer: I object to the form of the question. He's not an expert in that area.... He's not going to testify as an expert in that area, and I won't allow him to testify on thison the speculation of something nobody will ever know and he's not a cardiovascular surgeon, cardiac thoracic surgeon, so he's not going to answer that question. When the estate's attorney asked Dr. Borden what treatment he would have provided if the aortobronchial fistula [7] had been diagnosed, Dr. Borden's attorney stated: I'm going to instruct him not to answer. He's not going to speculate on something which he did not do.... He's not an expert. I'm not going to offer him as an expert in the area of cardiovascular treatment and handling of aortic breakdown, I mean breakdowns of coarctation repairs of the aorta. Dr. Borden did not answer these questions at his deposition. At trial, near the end of Dr. Borden's direct testimony, his trial attorney asked Dr. Borden if he had a fairly good understanding of what's necessary to repair ... an aortobronchial fistula such as Margaret Zaverl had. The estate's attorney objected. He argued that when he asked Dr. Borden the same question at the deposition, Dr. Borden's deposition attorney instructed Dr. Borden not to answer and not to speculate about something he did not do and something that did not occur. When the trial court stated that a motion to compel would have been the way to deal with the attorney's instruction, the estate's attorney indicated that he had understood counsel's statement at the deposition to mean that Dr. Borden would not be offered as an expert on these topics. The trial court overruled the estate's objections. The court reasoned that Dr. Borden was a general surgeon, not a cardiovascular surgeon who does such repairs or who is an expert in repairing such conditions. The court stated that Dr. Borden's knowledge in 1994 is an important issue and to the extent he's a defendant in this case, as to the standard of care he gave, it appears to the court relevant and admissible for those issues to be discussed with him, by both sides. The court also noted that the estate would have an opportunity to cross-examine. Dr. Borden then testified that he did have a reasonably good understanding of aortobronchial fistulae. He proceeded to testify at some length about particular nuances of diagnosing and treating this condition. Dr. Borden testified that he wished he had thought of this particular kind of fistula, even though these other smart guys wouldn't have thought about it. Nonetheless, he concluded that his treatment of Margaret, including his failure to detect the fistula which may have caused her hemoptysis, did not fall below the applicable standard of care.
The estate argues on appeal that it was error to permit Dr. Borden to testify at trial about matters he was instructed not to discuss at his deposition. [8] The estate asserts that discovery was thwarted when Dr. Borden's attorney instructed him at his deposition not to respond to questions concerning detection and repair of aortobronchial fistulae, stated that he would not offer him as an expert on the detection and repair of aortobronchial fistulae, and then questioned him on precisely those areas at trial without giving advance notice of his changed intentions. The estate relies on Yukon Equipment, Inc. v. Gordon, [9] which upheld a trial court's exclusion of testimony not described in interrogatory answers. Dr. Borden responds that he was not qualified to give testimony on aortobronchial fistulae when the estate took his deposition in August 1997, but was qualified to do so when he testified at trial in May 1999. Dr. Borden distinguishes Yukon Equipment on the theory that he did not fail to disclose information, as the witness did in Yukon Equipment. Dr. Borden asserts that he simply did not have the information to answer at his deposition but did at trial. We conclude that the estate was affirmatively led to believe that Dr. Borden would not express opinions at trial on matters beyond the expertise of a general surgeon, and more specifically, that Dr. Borden would not testify about the treatment of aortobronchial fistulae. Dr. Borden never disclosed his intention to testify at trial about what he had learned since his deposition, about surgery a general surgeon would not perform, or in reliance on expertise he acquired after his lawyer disclaimed that expertise at Dr. Borden's deposition. [10] Assuming that Dr. Borden's inconsistent positions were the result of an innocent misstep not meant to unfairly disadvantage the estate, [11] we nonetheless agree with the estate that the purpose of discovery was thwarted. The opportunity to cross-examine at trial was no substitute for pretrial discovery in this case. [12] Dr. Borden asserts that the estate should have raised any objection to the deposition by filing a motion to compel. But no pretrial motion to compel was necessary to preserve the estate's trial objection that Dr. Borden could not testify about things he refused to discuss at his deposition. The estate was not obliged to anticipate that Dr. Borden might claim at trial that he now knew more than he did when he treated Margaret Zaverl or when he was deposed. Only if the estate had been given reason to think Dr. Borden intended to address the foreclosed topics at trial would it have been required to file a motion to compel. So far as we can determine, Dr. Borden apparently did not reveal that intention until his trial lawyer began asking him the disputed questions at trial. Having followed his lawyer's deposition instruction not to testify about certain topics, Dr. Borden had to live with that decision absent fair notice to the estate. The issue is not whether Dr. Borden was eligible to express any opinions, but whether he could do so on topics he refused to discuss at his deposition. [13] In Miller v. Phillips , a medical malpractice case, we thought it significant that the Millers had received Dr. Newton's affidavit setting out the substance of his opinions well before trial. [14] Here, the estate had no advance notice that Dr. Borden would offer the disputed testimony or rely on expertise he had disclaimed at his deposition. There is no reason in this situation to permit such undisclosed opinions. Under the circumstances, it was error to permit Dr. Borden to testify at trial about relevant topics he declined to discuss at his deposition. [15]
The circumstances that convinced the trial court that the disputed evidence was relevant and not redundant or speculative preclude us from saying as a matter of law that the error of allowing the testimony was harmless. Dr. Borden's testimony was important evidence bearing on liability. It was offered by a treating physician who was also a defendant and whose credibility and candor may have been critical to the jury trying to decide whether he breached the applicable standard of care. He described the quality of his care favorably, apparently applying the knowledge he acquired after his deposition. This permitted him to address the medical issues in a light most favorable to himself and to increase his stature as a witness. The effect of this error is not clear. We consequently asked the parties for supplemental briefing on how the testimony affected the case against each defendant physician. The estate argues that the error was not harmless because the jury could have relied on Dr. Borden's testimony to decide that Dr. Borden's treatment was not negligent. The estate also contends that because Dr. Borden testified that Margaret Zaverl's overall treatment was not substandard, the jury could have relied on Dr. Borden's testimony to absolve Dr. Hanley of liability. Dr. Borden's supplemental response is two-fold: the jury was not misled, because he admitted that he did not have knowledge of these fistulae when he treated Margaret Zaverl; and his testimony about the standard of care only echoed the testimony of his expert witness, Dr. Joseph Stapleton Coselli. Dr. Borden implies that because the estate's attorney was prepared to cross-examine Dr. Coselli, the estate's attorney also must have been prepared to cross-examine Dr. Borden. Further, Dr. Borden asserts that the jury could have found and was encouraged to find an absence of negligence in reliance on Dr. Coselli's testimony, without considering Dr. Borden's testimony on the standard of care. Dr. Borden also contends that his own testimony was relevant because he was the only witness who could discuss what he knew when he treated Margaret Zaverl and that his testimony was not speculative because he spoke from his own knowledge. He also argues that the estate was not prejudiced by the testimony because the estate's lawyer was given wide latitude to examine Dr. Borden on exactly when he acquired his knowledge and could easily emphasize to the jury that Dr. Borden did not have this knowledge when he treated Margaret Zaverl. Finally, Dr. Borden concludes that the testimony only affected himself, not Dr. Hanley, and that even if the testimony had been excluded, there was more than enough evidence regarding the relevant standard of care to support the jury's verdict. Dr. Hanley simply argues that he was not affected by Dr. Borden's testimony because the jury was instructed that Dr. Hanley was to be held to a distinct standard of care and because he had his own experts to establish that standard. He consequently asserts that he did not rely on Dr. Borden's testimony at all. We cannot say, even after the supplemental briefing, that the error was harmless. We therefore remand to the trial court to determine the effect of admitting the disputed testimony. Having heard the evidence admitted at trial, the trial court is in the best position to consider the effect of Dr. Borden's disputed trial opinions in the context of the other evidence, those deposition passages submitted to the jury, the opinions of other experts, and other trial events, including the parties' arguments to the jury. Remand will give the parties the best opportunity to explore whether the error prejudiced the estate's claims against either defendant or was harmless. This may be a fact-intensive inquiry that requires more flexibility than the appellate forum permits. It may depend on the tactics the parties employed at trial.