Opinion ID: 2638950
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment Regarding Informed Consent

Text: Foster alleged in his complaint that the Defendants failed to fully inform Plaintiffs and otherwise make disclosures to them consistent with their affirmative fiduciary duty as an anesthesiologist and medical center and sufficient to allow for a requisite informed consent. Defendants Dr. Traul and PRMC moved for summary judgment, asserting they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The district court granted judgment to both defendants because it struck the affidavit of Dr. Patton. Thus, without the expert affidavit it appeared Foster could not support either his claim for informed consent or his claim for medical malpractice. Foster argues his claim for informed consent was not before the district court on motion for summary judgment because it was not argued by either defendant in their briefs on summary judgment, it was not included in their affidavits, and the district court did not specifically rule on the issue.
In Foster's complaint, he twice raised the issue of informed consent. First, as part of the medical negligence count of the complaint, Foster alleged the hospital's nurse anesthetist was professionally negligent in failing to assure Foster gave his informed consent to surgery. We have already held that summary judgment was appropriately granted to the Defendants regarding Foster's professional negligence claim, and so this allegation of professional negligence is extinguished with it. Next, Foster alleged in the second count of his complaint that the Defendants failed to fully inform him and make disclosures allowing him to give his informed consent. This allegation regarding informed consent is separate from Foster's professional medical negligence claim. Informed consent is a statutory cause of action. See I.C. § 39-4301 et seq. Idaho Code § 39-4306 places the duty to obtain informed consent with the attending physician, but a licensed hospital, acting with the approval of such a physician, may perform the ministerial act of documenting such consent by securing the completion and execution of a form or statement.... In performing this ministerial act, a hospital is not deemed be engaged in the practice of medicine. Foster alleges PRMC failed to fully inform him and make appropriate disclosures of the risks of surgery. However, under I.C. § 39-4306 the duty to inform and to disclose facts is not the duty of the hospital. Consequently, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of PRMC regarding the informed consent claim.
The issue of informed consent is entirely separate from that of negligence. Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 251, 805 P.2d 452, 457 (1991). A physician may be held liable under the doctrine of informed consent even if there was no negligence in the actual treatment of the patient. Id. As a result, the dismissal of Foster's medical negligence claim does not in itself defeat his informed consent claim. Moreover, here Foster's informed consent claim was never challenged. Only after the party moving for summary judgment meets its burden does the burden shift to the nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. Smith, 128 Idaho at 719, 918 P.2d at 588. [T]he party responding to a summary judgment motion is not required to present evidence on every element of his or her case at that time, but rather must establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the element or elements challenged by the moving party's motion. Thomson, 126 Idaho at 530, 887 P.2d at 1037. As a result, unless the Defendants challenged Foster's informed consent claim he was not obligated to present evidence supporting the claim. Without an obligation to present such evidence on summary judgment, Foster's presentation of expert testimony on his informed consent claim need not be offered until his case-in-chief. The Defendants' motions for summary judgment did not specifically mention the issue of informed consent. Review of the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits does not reveal any attempt by the Defendants to establish informed consent was given, nor to otherwise challenge Foster's informed consent claim. Absent such a challenge, Foster was under no burden to present evidence regarding informed consent in order to forestall summary judgment on that count of his complaint. Id. As Foster's informed consent claim was not challenged, any failure by Foster to present expert testimony regarding that claim could not justify the district court's grant of summary judgment. The district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Dr. Traul and Anesthesia Associates on the informed consent claim is therefore vacated.