Opinion ID: 4579841
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Appoint Counsel

Text: Muho argues that the district court erred by allowing him to proceed pro se—that is, by not sua sponte reinstating counsel for Muho—after he invoked his right to self-representation. 4 USCA11 Case: 18-11248 Date Filed: 10/22/2020 Page: 5 of 26 Muho cycled through a number of attorneys before moving for leave to proceed pro se with his then-attorney, David Harris, as standby counsel, in January 2017. The government responded by requesting a Faretta hearing.1 There, the court informed Muho that he lacked a constitutional right to standby counsel. Muho reiterated his desire to push forward, confirming that he understood the risks, believed himself capable, and had no diagnoses of mental illness. The court found that Muho had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel and was competent to proceed pro se. Muho did. Although he periodically appeared to reconsider, Muho reaffirmed (and the court recognized, after correctly questioning Muho to confirm) his desire to represent himself on numerous occasions. On appeal, Muho does not contest that he validly waived his right to counsel. Rather, he argues that he “was deprived of his right to a fair trial when he was allowed to continue to represent himself, even after he vacillated about selfrepresentation . . . .” Muho is wrong. 1. Faretta urged that a defendant be “made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). Our Circuit has understood this language “to mean that ideally a trial court should hold a hearing to advise a criminal defendant on the dangers of proceeding pro se and make an explicit finding that he has chosen to represent himself with adequate knowledge of the possible consequences.” Nelson v. Alabama, 292 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002). These hearings are often referred to as “Faretta hearings.” 5 USCA11 Case: 18-11248 Date Filed: 10/22/2020 Page: 6 of 26 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees familiar rights to a criminal defendant: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” But “[t]he Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (emphasis added). Accordingly, a criminal defendant has a “constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.” Id. at 807. Faretta protects an individual’s right to self-representation despite the possible downsides. “It is the defendant . . . who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.’” Id. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350–351 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). Faretta and subsequent caselaw make clear that, while a court may terminate a defendant’s self-representation, that action is discretionary. See, e.g., id. at 834 n.46 (“[T]he trial judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.”). On the other hand, this Court has explicitly recognized that “a trial court can commit reversible constitutional error . . . by denying a proper assertion of the right to represent 6 USCA11 Case: 18-11248 Date Filed: 10/22/2020 Page: 7 of 26 oneself, and thereby violating Faretta.” Cross v. United States, 893 F.2d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir. 1990). Put simply, the trial court’s failure to override sua sponte the defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel—where, as here, the waiver’s validity was clear, uncontested on appeal, and repeatedly reaffirmed after signs of uncertainty—is due to be affirmed.2 To find otherwise would contradict a “nearly universal conviction, on the part of our people as well as our courts, that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do so.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 817. Muho’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. He is not entitled to relief on this issue.