Opinion ID: 628279
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Speech a Matter of Public Concern.

Text: 31 We must first determine whether Glass' recorded comments to Wanish cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1690 (1983); Belk v. Town of Minocqua, 858 F.2d 1258, 1262 (7th Cir.1988). This question involves an examination of the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. at 1690. Of these considerations, content is the most important. Churchill v. Waters, 977 F.2d 1114, 1121 (7th Cir.1992); Yoggerst v. Hedges, 739 F.2d 293, 296 (7th Cir.1984). But see, Barkoo v. Melby, 901 F.2d 613, 618 (7th Cir.1990) (the employee's motivation and choice of forum are also as important; otherwise, every employment dispute involving a public agency could be considered a matter of public concern). Although the First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs, Connick, 461 U.S. at 149, 103 S.Ct. at 1691, matters of public concern do include speech aimed at uncovering wrongdoing or breaches of the public trust. See Knapp v. Whitaker, 757 F.2d 827, 840 (7th Cir.1985). 32 The Supreme Court has elevated speech on such public issues where debate is vital to informed decisionmaking by the electorate. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 572, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1736, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1961). Obviously, speech that focuses on police departments (and ultimately police protection and public safety) involve matters of great public concern. Auriemma v. Rice, 910 F.2d 1449, 1460 (7th Cir.1990). The fundamental question in this case is whether Glass sought to bring Folska's possible theft of the lawn mower and its sloppy investigation to the attention of the public. If he simply sought to vent his own feelings about Dachel's handling of the matter, or was guided by an interest in securing the job of sheriff, his speech would not be protected. Linhart v. Glatfelter, 771 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir.1985). 33 Dachel cites numerous cases where an employee was fired, not reprimanded, and argues that a reprimand does not rise to the level of constitutional significance. Not necessarily. If a reprimand letter addresses constitutionally protected speech, the plaintiff can establish an infringement of constitutional rights because of its deterrent effect. Yoggerst v. Stewart, 623 F.2d 35, 39 (7th Cir.1980); McGill v. Board of Educ., 602 F.2d 774, 780 (7th Cir.1979); Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901, 903 (7th Cir.1970) (the threat of sanctions can deter speech as much as actual sanctions). Whether the reprimand letter infringed speech does not even consider the degree of infringement. In some such cases damages would be nominal; but a minimal infringement nevertheless states a claim. Stewart, 623 F.2d at 39. See Zook v. Brown, 865 F.2d 887, 896 (7th Cir.1989). 34 Dachel also argues that Glass' telephone conversation with Wanish shows that Glass does not care for Dachel and is calling another co-employee to merely vent that dislike. As to content, however, we disagree. As the transcript of that conversation indicates, supra, we conclude as did the district court that Glass' comments concerning whether Folska had stolen a lawn mower and whether any departmental investigation would have been adequate can be fairly characterized as touching on matters of public concern. If Folska had stolen the lawn mower, his actions would have constituted wrongdoing and a breach of the public trust, Ohse v. Hughes, 816 F.2d 1144, 1151 (7th Cir.1987), and after remand, 863 F.2d 22, 24 (1988), which the Court in Connick recognized as protected. 461 U.S. at 148, 103 S.Ct. at 1690-91. See Knapp, 757 F.2d at 840; Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292, 317 (7th Cir.1983) (en banc). 35 As to form, Glass failed to take his complaints directly to the DCI and Enforcement Committee investigators; however, Glass apparently felt that by discussing the situation with Wanish, the DCI and Enforcement Committee would become aware of the situation. Glass also took his complaints to the Chippewa County district attorney (which Dachel did not criticize in the letter of reprimand). This lends a public air to the form of these complaints. Breuer v. Hart, 909 F.2d 1035, 1038 (7th Cir.1990). 36 As to context, Glass' comments arose after he had lost the sheriff's election. His comments may have attacked the winner, but the primary focus of Glass' comments were on Folska, a fellow deputy, not on the sheriff. A personal stake in exposing the wrongdoing is not alone sufficient to declare that the speech does not also involve matters of public concern. Motive may be relevant, but not dispositive. Id. at 1038-39. Glass also commented to Wanish while off duty and at home. In context, this could show that the conversation was more of a personal nature; but because Glass knew that Wanish was talking to DCI investigators the following day, the fact that Glass was off duty and at home seems more a matter of convenience. Had the conversation not been recorded, the content would probably not have been exposed. Wanish's secret recording would probably limit the context of the conversation had not Glass intended the information to be relayed to the DCI. 37 The test in Connick is not as heightened as the defendants would have us conclude. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 397, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 2903, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987) (summarizing speech cases on the question of matters of public concern); Hedges, 739 F.2d at 296 (the qualifications of the director of an Illinois state department would be a matter of public concern, such as whether he was an ineffective administrator, that he failed to discharge his duties, or that he had committed some wrongdoing or a breach of the public trust). Given the content, form and context of his telephone conversation, Glass' speech can be fairly characterized as touching on matters of public concern. 38