Opinion ID: 761718
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: damages referral

Text: 19 We now discuss the basis of authority for the damages referral. Section 636(b)(1)(A) may not be used as the basis for the referral due to the fact that a determination of damages is not normally a pretrial matter, as required by (A). See Estate of Conners v. O'Connor, 6 F.3d 656, 659 (9th Cir.1993); see also Homico Constr. & Dev. Co. v. Ti-Bert Sys., Inc., 939 F.2d 392, 394 n. 1 (6th Cir.1991); Bennett, 976 F.2d at 998 n. 5; Massey, 7 F.3d at 510; Paris v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 795 F.Supp. 513, 516 (D.R.I.1992), rev'd on other grounds by 988 F.2d 236 (1st Cir.1993); Pettyjohn v. Sullivan, 801 F.Supp. 503, 506 (W.D.Okla.1992), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds Pettyjohn v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 1572 (10th Cir.1994); West v. Redman, 530 F.Supp. 546, 547 (D.Del.1982) (all concluding that post-judgment motions, such as for attorney's fees or sanctions, cannot fall under § 636(b)(1)(A) because they are not pretrial matters). 9 Though § 636(b)(1)(B) could conceivably be used as the basis, and was explicitly cited by the district court as its basis of authority for this referral, we find it problematic to treat this reference as sufficiently analogous to the eight types of matters listed in (B), as required by Bennett, 976 F.2d at 997. Thus, we must turn to another basis of authority for the damages referral. 20 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) is a broad provision permitting assignment by the district court to the magistrate judge such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United States. The Supreme Court in Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989), discussed at some length the proper interpretation of this subsection: 21 Read literally and without reference to the context in which they appear, [28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) ] might encompass any assignment that is not explicitly prohibited by statute or by the Constitution.... The panel majority below and the dissenters in [United States v.] Ford [824 F.2d 1430 (5th Cir.1987)] (en banc) embraced this construction, despite abiding concerns regarding the constitutionality of delegating felony trial duties to magistrates. 22 It is our settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question. In these cases, such an alternative interpretation of the additional duties clause readily may be deduced from the context of the overall statutory scheme. When a statute creates an office of which it assigns specific duties, those duties outline the attributes of the office. Any additional duties performed pursuant to a general authorization in the statute reasonably should bear some relation to the specified duties. Thus in United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674-676, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980); Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 96 S.Ct. 549, 46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976); and Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 94 S.Ct. 2842, 41 L.Ed.2d 879 (1974), we interpreted the Federal Magistrates Act in light of its structure and purpose. 23 Declining to choose either extreme or to read the additional duties language literally, we examined the Act's structure and determined that limited, advisory review, subject to the district judge's ongoing supervision and final decision, fell among the range of duties that Congress intended magistrates to perform. 24 Id. at 863-65, 109 S.Ct. 2237 (1989) (citing Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270, 96 S.Ct. 549, 46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976) (footnotes and internal citations omitted)). 25 We believe the referral to the magistrate judge to determine damages, under the circumstances, falls within the purview of Gomez and Mathews as bearing a particular relationship to the other § 636 specified duties of the magistrate judge. The referral, furthermore, was subject to the district judge's ongoing supervision and final decision. There was no objection, we emphasize, and the magistrate judge afforded plaintiffs reasonable opportunities to be heard. 26 A number of courts have held that under analogous post-judgment circumstances, § 636(b)(3) is a proper basis for jurisdiction in referring such a matter to a magistrate judge. See Continental Bank, N.A. v. Everett, 861 F.Supp. 642, 643 (N.D.Ill.1994) (stating that a petition for attorneys' fees is not one of the enumerated duties assignable to a magistrate judge under the statute determining their jurisdiction, instead falling under the statute's catch all provision); Pettyjohn, 801 F.Supp. at 506 (stating that thereafter in that court, post-trial attorney fee applications shall be referred pursuant to § 636(b)(3)); Paris, 795 F.Supp. at 516. 27 We are not to be understood as approving the wholesale reference of claims and counterclaims for damages to magistrate judges, without consent of all parties concerned, by district judges in order to facilitate resolution of a case, even by means of a report and recommendation of a magistrate judge. Article III judges--and juries--are to be ultimate determiners of the facts and evidence, and are called upon, in the last analysis, to weigh credibility in the usual case, rather than the magistrate judge. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681-82, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980); Freeman v. County of Bexar, 142 F.3d 848, 851 (5th Cir.1998); United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261, 268-69 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1174, 140 L.Ed.2d 183 (1998). 28 In this case, however, we are convinced that the referral for determination of damages to the magistrate judge was proper under § 636(b)(3). 10