Opinion ID: 2135631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Minnesota Lawsuit

Text: Kunnanzes contend that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that a jury found in favor of Dr. Hulbert in their Minnesota lawsuit. We agree. The trial court allowed Dr. Edge to introduce Kunnanzes' summons and complaint in their Minnesota action, but refused to allow Kunnanzes to introduce evidence of the defense verdict in that lawsuit and, instead, instructed the jury: OTHER LITIGATION Evidence has been introduced in this case of previous litigation between the Plaintiffs Ernest and Alouise Kunnanz against John C. Hulbert, David Hunter, and the Regents of the University of Minnesota. This litigation was brought in the District Court in Hennepin County, Minnesota. You are instructed and admonished to give no consideration or speculation as to the outcome or disposition of this litigation. After the court decided to give this cautionary instruction, the court refused Kunnanzes' requested instruction that [t]he law does not allow Mr. and Mrs. Kunnanz to receive double recovery and they are not seeking double recovery in this lawsuit. Kunnanzes argue that the exclusion of the result in their Minnesota lawsuit allowed the jury to believe that the injuries happened at the University of Minnesota Hospital and that Kunnanzes were seeking double recovery here. Subject to relevancy, a party's factual statements in another pleading are generally received as an evidentiary admission by that party. Vincent v. Louis Marx & Co., Inc., 874 F.2d 36 (1st Cir.1989); Enquip, Inc. v. Smith-McDonald Corporation, 655 F.2d 115 (7th Cir.1981); Continental Insurance Co. of New York v. Sherman, 439 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir.1971). See 2 McCormick, Evidence ¶ 257 (4th ed. 1992); 4 Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 801(d)(2)(A)[01] (1993); 4 Louisell & Mueller, Federal Evidence, § 425 (1980); 29 Am. Jur.2d, Evidence §§ 687, 695 (1967). However, the party against whom the pleading is used must be allowed to explain the admission. Vincent; Enquip; see 30 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence § 1099 (1967). That requirement corresponds to the rule of completeness in N.D.R.Ev. 106, directing that [w]henever a writing ... is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which in fairness ought to be considered contemporaneously with it. The rule of completeness is a rule of fairness (N.D.R.Ev. 106, explanatory note) that applies to the introduction of writings such as admissions in prior pleadings. 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence § 689. In this case, the Kunnanzes were not afforded a fair opportunity to provide a full and complete explanation of their prior pleading. Courts have recognized an exception to the general rule of evidentiary use of prior pleadings as admissions where claims are pleaded alternatively in multiple-party litigation. Garman v. Griffin, 666 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1981); Continental; see Enquip. See generally 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence § 692. In Continental, 439 F.2d at 1298, the court explained: Strictly applied, however, this rule [of admissibility of prior pleadings] would place a litigant at his peril in exercising the liberal pleading and joinder provisions of the Federal Rules of Procedure in that inconsistent pleadings under Rule 8(e)(2) could be used, in the proper circumstances, as admissions negating each other and the allegations in third-party complaints and cross-claims seeking recovery over in the event of liability in the principal action could be used in that action as admissions establishing liability. Thus, as a necessary exception to the general rule, there is ample authority that one of two inconsistent pleas cannot be used as evidence in the trial of the other. Although Kunnanzes separately sued Dr. Edge and Dr. Hulbert in different jurisdictions, the procedural posture of these two lawsuits is essentially like alternative and inconsistent pleading. On retrial, the trial court is free to consider excluding the Minnesota pleadings, if otherwise practical, in lieu of extending the trial by their use and explanations. The evidence demonstrates that Ernest's injuries arose after he received medical care. Dr. Edge's own expert, Dr. Irving Thorne, testified that the damage to Ernest's ureter was caused by a doctor. Kunnanzes' position in this lawsuit was that Ernest's injuries were caused by Dr. Edge, or by both Dr. Edge and Dr. Hulbert. Dr. Edge repeatedly asserted that Ernest's injuries occurred at the University of Minnesota Hospital. Once Kunnanzes' pleadings from their Minnesota lawsuit were introduced into evidence in this case, basic fairness entitled them to an opportunity to provide a complete explanation of those pleadings to avoid misleading the jury about the effect of the prior litigation. Rules of evidence shall be construed to secure fairness in administration ... to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined. N.D.R.Ev. 102. Although the trial court gave a cautionary instruction about the other lawsuit, the posturing of this case without letting the jury know about the outcome of the Minnesota claim presented an incomplete picture of that action and resulted in an unfair advantage to Dr. Edge. See Slaubaugh v. Slaubaugh, 466 N.W.2d 573 (N.D.1991) (unfair posturing of case required retrial). We believe the trial court's refusal to allow Kunnanzes to introduce evidence of the result in the Minnesota lawsuit deprived them of a fair opportunity to fully explain their prior pleading. We hold that the trial court's refusal to allow Kunnanzes to introduce evidence of the outcome in the Minnesota lawsuit was reversible error. We reverse and remand for a new trial. Kunnanzes raise additional questions about admission of evidence and jury instructions, and we consider those that are likely to arise on retrial. See Oanes v. Westgo, Inc., 476 N.W.2d 248 (N.D.1991). Next, we examine other evidentiary rulings that Kunnanzes complain about.