Opinion ID: 1192452
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Due Process/Double Jeopardy

Text: (4a) Defendant next contends that, to the extent section 969a permits the prosecutor to amend the information after the verdict to charge prior felony convictions, the statute violates his due process and double jeopardy rights under the state and federal Constitutions. Respondent argues defendant did not raise these issues in the trial court or in the Court of Appeal and thus waived them. Respondent's waiver claim is incorrect as to the double jeopardy claim. ( People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 592 [20 Cal. Rptr.2d 638, 853 P.2d 1093].) To the extent defendant is claiming section 969a violates due process on its face, and the amendment thus led to additional punishment in violation of the federal Constitution, that claim arguably is also properly raised. (Cf. In re King (1970) 3 Cal.3d 226, 229-230, fn. 2 [90 Cal. Rptr. 15, 474 P.2d 983] [the constitutionality of legislation is always open to challenge on habeas corpus].) In any event, even assuming the constitutional claims were preserved for appeal, they are meritless. Defendant rather vaguely contends that to satisfy due process concerns, he was entitled to written notice of the charges against him. This claim begs the question, for the amendment to the information was in writing. Thus, the real question is whether a written postverdict  but presentencing  amendment to the information gives a criminal defendant sufficient notice, thereby satisfying federal due process concerns. We conclude that it does. (5) Due process of law requires that an accused be advised of the charges against him in order that he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at his trial. ( In re Hess (1955) 45 Cal.2d 171, 175 [288 P.2d 5]; People v. Thomas (1987) 43 Cal.3d 818, 823 [239 Cal. Rptr. 307, 740 P.2d 419] [quoting Hess ]; see also 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law, supra, Proceedings Before Trial, § 2060, pp. 2426-2427.) For the reasons discussed below, the postverdict amendment procedure permitted by section 969a does not, in itself, deny a criminal defendant such an opportunity to prepare. To begin with, circumstances may entitle a defendant to a continuance to prepare to meet any newly charged allegations of prior felony convictions. (§ 1050, subd. (e).) The availability of a continuance undercuts the claim that a postverdict amendment, by itself, denies an accused the opportunity to prepare to meet the new charge or charges. In addition, as the omission of priors from the information in this case was apparently due to a clerical error, we need not decide whether it would be permissible for a prosecutor intentionally to delay charging prior felony conviction enhancements until after the verdict. Such a prosecutorial decision would raise additional issues of statutory interpretation, as well as ethical considerations not presented on the facts of this case. Moreover, such a prosecutorial decision obviously carries the potential to have an unfair and detrimental impact on an accused's trial tactics and would change significantly the evaluation of the due process issue. Section 969a expressly gives discretion to our trial judges to permit or deny the amendment (see, ante, at p. 606, fn. 3), and we rely in such matters on the prudent exercise of that discretion to ensure the due process rights of criminal defendants are adequately protected. In exercising such discretion, courts should scrutinize (i) the reason for the late amendment, (ii) whether the defendant is surprised by the belated attempt to amend, (iii) whether the prosecution's initial failure to allege the prior convictions affected the defendant's decisions during plea bargaining, if any, (iv) whether other prior felony convictions had been charged originally, and (v) whether the jury has already been discharged (see § 1025). [4] This list, of course, is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive, and we reiterate the matter is best left to the discretion of our trial judges. (4b) In this case, the record reveals defendant was not actually surprised by the new charges. The original felony complaint charged the three prior felony convictions. Furthermore, defendant's defense counsel discussed the priors at the preliminary examination. At the outset of the trial, defendant himself referred to the cases that I have been charged with, and noted the People are accusing me of three cases, apparent references to the three prior felony conviction allegations. After the verdict was received and the parties discovered the information did not actually charge the three priors, defense counsel stated: I'm not saying I didn't have notice or anything of that nature. Later, counsel opined: I would never try to mislead the court and suggest that there was any surprise in this case. In addition, nothing in this case suggests the prosecution intentionally held back the prior felony conviction allegations to gain some tactical advantage, or that the delay had a detrimental impact on defendant's decision to accept an offered plea. Significantly, at the time of amendment the jury had not yet been discharged. Under the circumstances, we find no due process violation. (See People v. Wilson (1929) 101 Cal. App. 376, 381 [281 P. 700] [construing the 1927 version of § 969a, finding no due process violation because statute provides for supplemental pleading, a plea thereto, and a trial by jury].) (6) Assuming, without deciding, double jeopardy principles apply to allegations of prior convictions (see People v. Saunders, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 593), we reach a similar conclusion with regard to defendant's double jeopardy claim. He argues that because he had not entered a plea to the prior felony convictions by the time the jury returned a verdict on the present narcotics charges, all jeopardy terminated before the prior convictions were alleged. As we recently explained, the constitutional prohibition against being placed twice in jeopardy is designed to prevent an accused from being placed at risk more than once on a single charge; it is not concerned with whether, in a bifurcated trial, a single jury or multiple juries are utilized. ( People v. Saunders, supra, at p. 595.) Moreover, [d]efendant was not at risk, during trial of the current charges, that the jury would find true the prior conviction allegations.... ( id., at p. 594), and at the time the information was amended, `criminal proceedings against [defendant had] not run their full course' ( Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon (1984) 466 U.S. 294, 308 [80 L.Ed.2d 311, 325, 104 S.Ct. 1805], quoting Price v. Georgia (1970) 398 U.S. 323, 326 [26 L.Ed.2d 300, 304, 90 S.Ct. 1757]). Thus, [t]he evils against which the double jeopardy clause is directed were absent in the present situation. ( People v. Saunders, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 595.) Indeed, it would not necessarily violate the state or federal constitutional provisions against double jeopardy for the state to prescribe a new jury be impaneled to try any felony conviction allegations. ( Id., at pp. 595-596.) That being the case, to permit an amended filing and have the same jury determine the truth of the prior felony conviction allegations cannot violate double jeopardy.