Opinion ID: 2716451
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Identification Testimony of Eyewitness

Text: ¶ 19. At both trials, the State called an eyewitness who did not see the assailant’s face and was unable to describe the assailant in detail shortly after the incident but later told police, after seeing defendant’s picture broadcast on television news, that defendant was the assailant. Defendant claims that the admission of this testimony violated his right to due process under Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution because the court did not find that it was reliable despite the suggestive circumstances. Defendant also claims that the testimony should have been excluded under Rule of Evidence 403. ¶ 20. When faced with a claim that a defendant was denied due process by a suggestive eyewitness-identification procedure, this Court applies the standard set forth in Manson v. Brathwaite , 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). See State v. Kasper , 137 Vt. 184, 192, 404 A.2d 85, 90 (1979) (adopting Manson test). Under Manson and Kasper , a court first must examine whether an identification arranged by law enforcement was unnecessarily suggestive. Id . If it was, the identification may still be admissible if certain indicia of reliability outweigh the “corrupting effect of the suggestive identification.” Id . “ ‘These include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation.’” [3] Id . at 192-93 (quoting Manson , 432 U.S. at 114). ¶ 21. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not implicated where law enforcement did not arrange the suggestive circumstances surrounding an identification. See Perry v. New Hampshire , 132 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2012) (holding that “the Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification was not procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement”). Under Perry , defendant is precluded from bringing a due process challenge under the federal constitution to the eyewitness identification in this case. ¶ 22. Defendant asserts that this Court should reject the rationale of Perry and hold that all suggestive eyewitness identifications, not just those arranged by law enforcement, are subject to the equivalent due process guarantee of the Vermont Constitution, Vt. Const. Ch. I, Art. 10. Defendant offers no substantive analysis or argument to support the creation of a different standard under Article 10. As it is inadequately briefed, we will not address such an argument. Trudell v. State , 2013 VT 18, ¶ 30, 193 Vt. 515, 71 A.3d 1235 (“[A] party’s failure to present any substantive analysis or argument on state constitutional issues constitutes inadequate briefing, which we decline to address.”). ¶ 23. Defendant further argues that the eyewitness identification should have been excluded under Rule 403, which permits the trial court to exclude otherwise relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” ¶ 24. Defendant objected to the eyewitness’s testimony on Rule 403 and due process grounds during the first trial. The trial court held a preliminary hearing on the admissibility of the eyewitness’s testimony. The eyewitness testified that the assailant had a medium to stocky build and curly hair. He told police at the crime scene that he never saw the assailant’s face and could not identify him in a photo lineup. Later, after he saw defendant’s picture on television, he felt “ninety-nine percent sure” that defendant was the assailant. The court ruled that the witness could not testify that defendant was the assailant because the identification was made under “very, very suggestive” circumstances. However, it allowed the witness to testify that the picture of defendant that he saw was similar to the assailant. ¶ 25. At the second trial, defendant again objected to the eyewitness’s testimony on due process and Rule 403 grounds. The court reviewed the testimony from the first trial. The court ruled that it would be “unduly prejudicial, despite the ability of cross-examination, to allow the testimony as offered by the State.” It therefore limited the eyewitness’s testimony in the same manner as the first trial court. ¶ 26. The trial court has broad discretion to balance the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial effect, and we will reverse its decision only if discretion was withheld or exercised on grounds clearly unreasonable or untenable. State v. Brochu , 2008 VT 21, ¶ 51, 183 Vt. 269, 949 A.2d 1035. In this case, the trial court exercised discretion by reviewing the eyewitness’s testimony from the first trial and weighing the probative value of the identification against the danger of unfair prejudice. The court recognized that it would be unfair to allow the eyewitness to testify that defendant was the same person that he saw at the crime scene, given the amount of time that had passed and his statements to police at the scene that he did not see the assailant’s face and could not identify him in photo lineup. It accordingly limited the State to asking whether the picture of defendant was similar to the man he saw. The court noted that defendant could challenge the identification through cross-examination. The court’s ruling was not clearly unreasonable or untenable. The identification had probative value, and its prejudicial effect was lessened by the court’s ruling and the opportunity for cross-examination. On remand, defendant is free to offer expert testimony and advocate for a different legal standard, but on the record below, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony.