Opinion ID: 1920680
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Regina's requested Jury Instructions D-5 and D-6

Text: ¶ 15. Regina's second assignment of error is that the trial court erred in refusing her requested Jury Instructions D-5 and D-6, as submitted. Both of these jury instructions, which relate to circumstantial evidence, instruct the jury that the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of any reasonable hypothesis of innocence in order to convict. Instruction D-5 as submitted by the Defendant required the jury to find the defendant guilty to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis. The State objected to this language, contending that this was not a purely circumstantial evidence case. The trial court agreed, and we find no error. ¶ 16. Instruction D-6, as submitted, instructed the jury regarding the two theory circumstantial evidence case. The court refused this instruction, again noting that this was not a circumstantial evidence case. This Court has stated that the so-called two theory instruction' ... should be granted only in a case based entirely upon circumstantial evidence. State v. Rogers, 847 So.2d 858, 863 (Miss.2003), citing Kitchens v. State, 300 So.2d 922, 926 (Miss.1974) citing Coward v. State, 223 Miss. 538, 78 So.2d 605 (1955). ¶ 17. A circumstantial evidence case is one where the State is without a confession and wholly without eyewitnesses to the gravamen of the offense charged, Kniep v. State, 525 So.2d 385, 392 (Miss.1988). But where the accused has made an admission on an element of the offense, it is no longer a circumstantial evidence case. Lynch v. State, 877 So.2d 1254, 1256 (Miss.2004); Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1256 (Miss.1993); Mack v. State, 481 So.2d 793, 795 (Miss.1985). The defendant is not entitled to a circumstantial evidence instruction where both circumstantial and direct evidence are admitted at trial. Gilleylen v. State, 255 So.2d 661, 663-64 (Miss.1971). ¶ 18. In addition to direct scientific evidence such as fingerprints and DNA, direct evidence has been held to include evidence such as eyewitness testimony, the defendant's confession to the offense charged, or the defendant's admission to an important element thereof. Lynch, 877 So.2d at 1265-66; Conner, 632 So.2d at 1256; Mack, 481 So.2d at 795. ¶ 19. Regina admitted three times to having shot her husband, causing his death. This qualifies her as an eyewitness to the homicide. Also, several witnesses testified that, on numerous occasions, Regina discussed her desire to kill her husband and the possibility of hiring someone to kill him for money. ¶ 20. Regina's statements to the four people about her desire to kill her husband and her requests for others to kill him constitute an admission of deliberate design which is an element of the crime. This Court has held that a defendant's statement to the police that he thought his partner was going to carjack somebody was an admission against interest, and thus, the capital murder case was not purely circumstantial even though the statement did not constitute a confession. See Lynch, 877 So.2d at 1254. See also Swinney v. State, 829 So.2d 1225 (Miss. 2002) (confession to a shooting could be direct evidence to an underlying felony for capital murder purposes where defendant admitted to pointing the gun at the victim and stated the gun accidently fired). Our precedent consistently adheres to the rule that any direct evidence presented at trial is sufficient to preclude a circumstantial evidence instruction. ¶ 21. Accordingly, the trial court judge was correct in striking the circumstantial evidence language in Jury Instruction D-5 and in refusing to submit the circumstantial evidence instruction D-6. Regina's second assignment of error is also without merit.