Opinion ID: 6343298
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: The following facts are supported by the record. In July 2018, the police stopped the defendant’s vehicle on a public way for a traffic violation. Following the stop, the defendant was arrested and charged with one class A misdemeanor count of driving after his license was suspended, among other things. See id. The complaint alleged that the defendant “knowingly [drove] a certain motor vehicle . . . after his operator’s privilege had been suspended by the director of motor vehicles for DWI-second offense, on 05/17/2010.” (Capitalization omitted.) In November 2020, the circuit court held a bench trial. At trial, the State introduced two certified DMV records: (1) the defendant’s “driver record report-driver history”; and (2) a notice of license suspension, which stated that the defendant’s license was suspended “as a result of [his] conviction in the Laconia District Court on 05/17/2010 for . . . [DWI] second offense.” (Capitalization omitted.) The defendant did not immediately object to the admission of these records. After the State rested, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, for the first time, that the complaint insufficiently alleged a class A misdemeanor pursuant to RSA 263:64. Specifically, the defendant argued that the complaint was insufficient because it alleged that his license was suspended “by the director of motor vehicles” (capitalization omitted), rather than by a court of competent jurisdiction. See RSA 263:64, IV-V. The circuit court took the matter under advisement and allowed the parties to submit post-trial memoranda. In his post-trial memorandum, the defendant iterated his argument that the complaint insufficiently alleged a class A misdemeanor pursuant to RSA 263:64. He also argued, for the first time, that the certified DMV records were inadmissible hearsay, and, therefore, the circuit court erred by admitting the records into evidence. In January 2021, the circuit court issued an order convicting the defendant on the class A misdemeanor count of driving after his license was suspended, among other charges. In reaching that decision, the court observed that RSA 263:64, IV required the State to prove that “the license suspension [was] from a court of competent jurisdiction, as opposed to a DMV license suspension without a conviction.” Nonetheless, the court concluded that the complaint sufficiently alleged a violation of RSA 263:64, IV because it stated that “the suspension was as a result of ‘DWI second offense’ and listed a 2 specific date.” The court construed the word “offense” in the complaint as alleging that the defendant was convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction, noting that this language was “enough to put the Defendant . . . on notice” of his prior DWI conviction. The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied. This appeal followed.