Opinion ID: 796039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: claims relating to the capital specification

Text: 32 Joseph attacks his death sentence on several grounds, arguing that the state violated his constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause (in three different ways), the Sixth Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment. Yet the facts underlying these claims are really just variations on the same theme: every participant in the trial—the prosecution, Joseph's counsel, the trial judge, and the jurors—operated under a mistaken view of the single capital specification with which Joseph was charged. Thus, before addressing Joseph's individual claims, we present the following brief summary of the specification and how it was misconstrued during the state proceedings. 33 Ohio law makes a defendant convicted of aggravated murder eligible for the death penalty only if one or more specifications is included in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(A) (1987); see also id. § 2929.03(A). The statutory text of the capital specification at issue in this case provides in relevant part: 34 The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary, and either the offender was the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder or, if not the principal offender, committed the aggravated murder with prior calculation and design. 35 Id. § 2929.04(A)(7) (italics and underline added). As will be discussed further below, the Ohio Supreme Court has interpreted the element of being the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder to mean that the defendant actually killed the victim. 36 Joseph's indictment included the following specification: 37 The Grand Jurors further find and specify that the offense was committed while the offenders were committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, and the offenders were the principal offenders in the commission of the kidnapping . . . . 38 3 J.A. at 962 (Indictment) (italics and underline added). 4 To be explicit, the indictment substituted the word kidnapping in place of the word aggravated murder in the principal offender phrase. Thus, although the statute requires that the defendant be the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder, Joseph's indictment alleged that Joseph was the principal offender in the commission of the kidnapping. In other words, the indictment's version of the capital specification did not include the critical requirement that Joseph actually killed the victim. Joseph's counsel did not object to the error in the indictment. 39 During the guilt-phase trial, counsel for both the state and Joseph adopted the indictment's mistaken formulation of the specification. In its opening statement, the state said the following: 40 This case is an aggravated murder case with a specification of kidnapping. That makes it a capital case. The State of Ohio needs to prove to you folks that Jose Bulerin and Richard Joseph jointly purposely caused the death of another, to wit: Ryan R. Young, while committing or while fleeing immediately after committing kidnapping. The State of Ohio needs to prove these elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 41 8 J.A. at 3107-08 (Trial Tr. at 1201-02) (emphases added). Thus, in explaining the specification that it need[ed] to prove in order to make[ ] it a capital case, the state mentioned the kidnapping element but omitted the requirement that Joseph be the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder. The state referred to a specification of kidnapping  again in its rebuttal. 11 J.A. at 3980 (Trial Tr. at 2049) (emphasis added). 42 The state's failure to understand the specification was perhaps most evident in the following part of its closing argument: 43 Another thing the State of Ohio doesn't know and can't tell you, and it doesn't make any difference as long as you find the two people, Jose Bulerin and Richard E. Joseph, jointly committed these crimes, or this crime, the law is very clear in Ohio that if one person is an aider and abetter, no matter what part he has in it, if he plays a part in the commission of that crime then he's as guilty as the other guy. The State of Ohio can't tell you. I wish I could. I wish I could tell you exactly what happened. I don't know who struck the death blow. But, I believe the evidence is very clear that it was one of the two that's charged here. If you find one of them did it, or the other one did it, they're both just as guilty as if each of them had their hands around the hilt of that knife when it was stuck in Ryan Young. 44 11 J.A. at 3907 (Trial Tr. at 1976). The state made the same point in its rebuttal: We don't have to show that this defendant was the one who administered the fatal blows. He was with him. We don't know which one did it. We don't have to prove that. 11 J.A. at 3973 (Trial Tr. at 2042). In other words, the state conceded that it could not prove that Joseph actually killed Young, but it also erroneously told the jury that this shortcoming did not matter. Joseph's counsel did not object to any of these statements by the state. In fact, Joseph's counsel made the same mistake in his own opening statement and closing argument, referring to the specification of kidnapping  without mentioning the principal-offender-in-the-aggravated-murder (i.e., actual-killer) requirement. 9 J.A. at 3128, 3130, 3963 (Trial Tr. at 1222, 1224, 2032) (emphasis added). 45 The incorrect specification also found its way into the trial court's instructions to the jury at the close of the guilt phase. The court incorrectly described the specification as requiring that Joseph be the principal offender[] in the commission of the kidnapping.  11 J.A. at 3998 (Trial Tr. at 2067) (emphasis added). On several other occasions, the court did not explicitly recite the incorrect specification, but it referred to the specification in the indictment, which was, of course, independently incorrect as discussed above. 11 J.A. at 3996-97, 4003, 4004 (Trial Tr. at 2065-66, 2072, 2073). The court also once read from the verdict form, which included a correct version of the specification. 11 J.A. at 4005-06 (Trial Tr. at 2074-75). At no point did the court instruct the jury that the principal-offender provision of the specification requires that the defendant actually killed the victim. 5 Joseph's counsel did not object to the incorrect aspects of the jury instructions. 46 The penalty phase also saw numerous instances of the erroneous capital specification. The trial court began the mitigation hearing by reminding the jury that it had found Joseph guilty of the specification and instructing them that this specification was the only aggravating circumstance. In doing so, the court read the incorrect version of the specification, using the phrase principal offender[] in the commission of the kidnapping.  11 J.A. at 4069 (Mitigation Tr. at 26) (emphasis added). The state equated the aggravating circumstance with kidnapping in both its closing and rebuttal arguments. 6 11 J.A. at 4333 (Mitigation Tr. at 282); 12 J.A. at 4366, 4371 (Mitigation Tr. at 315, 320). In its instructions to the jury at the close of the penalty phase, the court read the correct version of the specification. 12 J.A. at 4377 (Mitigation Tr. at 326). However, the court also referred to the specification in the indictment, which was, of course, incorrect. 12 J.A. at 4375 (Mitigation Tr. at 324). Moreover, throughout its instructions, the court consistently used some version of the phrase the aggravating circumstance which the defendant was found guilty of committing (during the guilt phase). 12 J.A. at 4371-72, 4373, 4374, 4377, 4380 (Mitigation Tr. at 320-21, 322, 323, 326, 329). This phrase was also used in the verdict forms, which the court read to the jury. 12 J.A. at 4381-82 (Mitigation Tr. at 330-31). Thus, the jury instructions and the verdict form implicitly incorporated the erroneous version of the specification that had been repeatedly invoked during the guilt phase. Joseph's counsel did not object to either the court's or the state's statements. Instead, Joseph's counsel himself referred to the aggravating circumstance as kidnapping—three times during his opening statement, 11 J.A. at 4073-74 (Mitigation Tr. at 30-31), and twice during his closing argument, 12 J.A. at 4353-54 (Mitigation Tr. at 302-03). 47 Finally, during the trial court's independent review of the jury's death-penalty recommendation, see OHIO REV.CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(3) (1987), both Joseph's counsel and the court referred to the aggravating circumstance of kidnapping. 7 12 J.A. at 4411, 4412, 4414, 4416 (Mitigation Tr. at 360, 361, 363, 365).
48 We first address Joseph's sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. See, e.g., United States v. Aarons, 718 F.2d 188, 189 n. 1 (6th Cir.1983) (Where the sufficiency of the evidence is properly before us, we consider that issue first because it is determinative of whether the appellant may be retried.). In a due-process challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, clearly established Supreme Court precedent provides that the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 49 Joseph argues that the state court unreasonably applied Jackson in that there was no evidence of the critical element of the capital specification: being the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder. In the habeas context, [t]he Jackson standard must be applied `with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law.' Brown v. Palmer, 441 F.3d 347, 351 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 2781). Thus, we turn to the Ohio courts' definition of the capital specification at issue here. 50 As we have already noted, the correct version of the single capital specification with which Joseph was charged requires the defendant to be the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2929.04(A)(7) (1987). The Ohio Supreme Court has consistently interpreted this element to require the defendant to be the actual killer. State v. Taylor, 66 Ohio St.3d 295, 612 N.E.2d 316, 325 (1993); State v. Wiles, 59 Ohio St.3d 71, 571 N.E.2d 97, 122 (1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 99, 121 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992); State v. Penix, 32 Ohio St.3d 369, 513 N.E.2d 744, 746 (1987); see also Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18, 124 S.Ct. 7, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003) (acknowledging this interpretation). Other formulations of actual killer are that the defendant personally performed every act constituting the offense of aggravated murder, State v. Sneed, 63 Ohio St.3d 3, 584 N.E.2d 1160, 1168 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 983, 113 S.Ct. 1577, 123 L.Ed.2d 145 (1993); see also State v. Goodwin, 84 Ohio St.3d 331, 703 N.E.2d 1251, 1264-65 (1999) (approving a similar instruction), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 846, 120 S.Ct. 118, 145 L.Ed.2d 100 (1999); State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 702 N.E.2d 866, 884 (1998) (same), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1042, 119 S.Ct. 2407, 144 L.Ed.2d 805 (1999), or directly caused the death, State v. Stallings, 89 Ohio St.3d 280, 731 N.E.2d 159, 173 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 836, 122 S.Ct. 89, 151 L.Ed.2d 51 (2001). However, it is not enough that the defendant simply ha[d] hands-on involvement in a homicide. State v. Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195, 819 N.E.2d 215, 240-41 (2004); see also State v. Skatzes, No. 15848, 2003 WL 24196406, at  (Ohio Ct.App. Jan.31, 2003) (unpublished opinion) (explaining that it is not enough for the defendant to be an escort or a mere provider of a weapon.). 51 There have been many cases where the evidence has been sufficient to show that the defendant was the actual killer. When the victim died of gunshot wounds, there was evidence that the defendant fired the shots. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 107 Ohio St.3d 300, 839 N.E.2d 362, 370, 377 (2006); State v. Noling, 98 Ohio St.3d 44, 781 N.E.2d 88, 96-97, 105 (2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 907, 123 S.Ct. 2256, 156 L.Ed.2d 118 (2003); State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 776 N.E.2d 1061, 1073, 1093 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1037, 123 S.Ct. 2079, 155 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2003); State v. Yarbrough, 95 Ohio St.3d 227, 767 N.E.2d 216, 241 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1023, 123 S.Ct. 533, 154 L.Ed.2d 433 (2002); Stallings, 731 N.E.2d at 173; State v. Chinn, 85 Ohio St.3d 548, 709 N.E.2d 1166, 1177 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1120, 120 S.Ct. 944, 145 L.Ed.2d 820 (2000). When the victim died of head trauma, there was evidence that the defendant struck the blows. See Skatzes, 819 N.E.2d at 231-32, 241. When the victim died of knife wounds, there was evidence that the defendant stabbed the victim. See State v. Stojetz, 84 Ohio St.3d 452, 705 N.E.2d 329, 337 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 999, 120 S.Ct. 455, 145 L.Ed.2d 376 (1999). Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the principal-offender/actual-killer element to mean that the defendant personally inflicted the death blow(s). 8 52 In rejecting Joseph's Jackson claim, the Ohio Supreme Court cited the following evidence. Joseph II, 653 N.E.2d at 293. First, there was evidence of motive, as Joseph was jealous of the relationship between Wireman and Young. Second, Joseph admitted that he and Bulerin were out driving Forest's white Cutlass on the night of the murder, and a matching vehicle was seen near Wireman's house. Third, Young's body was found buried on Joseph's grandparents' property, wrapped in material (Visqueen) available to Joseph, near a mask like one owned by Joseph. Fourth, [Young] suffered two stab wounds, either of which could have been fatal, and the knife always kept in the car was missing the morning of the disappearance. The state points to no additional evidence in its briefs before this court, and there is none apparent in the record. 53 It is immediately apparent, however, that none of this evidence shows that Joseph personally inflicted either stab wound. This fact does not present an obstacle to conviction in a case where the defendant was the only person either present when the victim was murdered or otherwise involved in the crime, the logic being that he is the only person who could have actually committed the murder. But when the defendant and a coconspirator are present at the time and place of the murder, there must be evidence showing that the defendant struck the fatal blow(s). See State v. Cunningham, 105 Ohio St.3d 197, 824 N.E.2d 504, 512, 531 (2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 110, 163 L.Ed.2d 122 (2005); Taylor, 612 N.E.2d at 325. 54 All indications are that Joseph was neither alone with Young on the night of the murder nor the only person involved in the crime; Bulerin was both present and involved in other ways. Indeed, the very evidence cited by the Ohio Supreme Court to implicate Joseph also implicates Bulerin. The evidence that placed Joseph at the scene (witnesses saw Forest's car in front of Wireman's home) also put Bulerin at the scene, as the two men were driving around together in Forest's car the night of Young's disappearance and murder. 9 Joseph II, 653 N.E.2d at 289. The fact that Young's body was wrapped in Visqueen implicates Bulerin as well as Joseph, as both had access to the material. Id. at 289. And the fact that Young's body was discovered on Joseph's grandparents' property also implicates Bulerin as well as Joseph, as two days after the murder, both men talked to a coworker about hauling trash to that property. Id. at 290. There was other evidence of Bulerin's involvement, too: both Joseph and Bulerin often borrowed Forest's car and kept items in it, id. at 288, 289, and Bulerin changed the tires of Forest's car the day after Young's disappearance even though they were new, id. 55 There was also evidence that Joseph and Bulerin, who shared a residence, id. at 288, were close. As Chief Justice Moyer demonstrated in dissent, their relationship supplied Bulerin with ample motive to kill Young: 56 [T]estimony was presented that the co-defendant Bulerin . . . was highly involved with martial arts, and protective of his kid (Joseph). Forest confirmed that Bulerin had indicated that he would either snap your neck or put a bullet through your head and throw you out alongside the road if you ever screwed with or messed with him or Joseph. Joseph's mother testified that, on one occasion when her son was ill, Bulerin told her not to waste [her] time in attempting to take Joseph home with her because she wasn't going to get [her] son. She testified that Bulerin had threatened to break into her home and take something, or kill her dogs. At Joseph's mitigation hearing, Bulerin's ex-wife testified that, while she could not believe Joseph actually killed Young, she could believe that behavior of Bulerin. 57 Id. at 301 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (second and third alterations in original). 10 In light of all this evidence connecting both Joseph and Bulerin to the murder, it is not surprising that the two men were jointly indicted. Id. at 290. Indeed, the state's entire theory of the case was that the two acted together. 58 Of course, the evidence of Bulerin's presence at the scene and other involvement does not rule out the possibility that Joseph was the actual killer. It means, however, that actual killing cannot be attributed to Joseph simply because he was involved and present at the scene. See Cunningham, 824 N.E.2d at 512, 531; Taylor, 612 N.E.2d at 325. Because either of the two knife wounds in Young may have been fatal, the state had to prove that Joseph personally inflicted at least one of the wounds, but it offered no evidence of this whatsoever. In fact, the state conceded this very point during its closing argument: The State of Ohio can't tell you. I wish I could. I wish I could tell you exactly what happened. I don't know who struck the death blow. 11 J.A. at 3907 (Trial Tr. at 1976). Thus, the evidence showed at most that Joseph ha[d] hands-on involvement in a homicide, Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195, 819 N.E.2d 215, 240-41, which is insufficient to prove that he was the actual killer. 59 In light of the clear line of precedent requiring proof that Joseph was the actual killer, the equally clear precedent that the actual-killer element requires proof that the defendant personally inflicted the death blows in a situation where (as here) the defendant and a coconspirator are both present at the scene, and the total absence of such proof (accompanied by the state's concession that it could not offer such proof, to boot), we conclude that the Ohio Supreme Court's decision was an unreasonable application of the due-process standard of Jackson v. Virginia. 11
60 Joseph also claims that his death sentence violates the Eighth Amendment, which forbids the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Specifically, Joseph contends that because he was not properly convicted pursuant to a correct capital specification, his death sentence fails to satisfy the Eighth Amendment's narrowing requirement. The Supreme Court has summarized this requirement as follows: 61 To pass constitutional muster, a capital sentencing scheme must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983); cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). Under the capital sentencing laws of most States, the jury is required during the sentencing phase to find at least one aggravating circumstance before it may impose death. Id., at 162-164, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (reviewing Georgia sentencing scheme); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247-250, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976) (reviewing Florida sentencing scheme). By doing so, the jury narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty according to an objective legislative definition. Zant, supra, 462 U.S., at 878, 103 S.Ct. 2733 ([S]tatutory aggravating circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty). 62 Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). The Ohio Court of Appeals, which was the last state court to issue a reasoned opinion on the issue, rejected Joseph's claim because it concluded that the jury had properly found Joseph guilty of the principal-offender specification. Joseph I, 1993 WL 531858, at -. 63 We recently granted habeas relief on the basis of a violation of the Eighth Amendment narrowing requirement. In Esparza v. Mitchell (Esparza I), 310 F.3d 414 (6th Cir.2002), we reviewed an Ohio conviction in which a death sentence was imposed even though the indictment did not charge a capital specification, the trial court did not instruct the jury on a capital specification, and the jury did not return a verdict on a capital specification. Id. at 416. Instead, the state courts, on their own initiative, after the jury trial and verdict, found the petitioner Esparza guilty of the [specification] that made him eligible for the death penalty, i.e., being the `principal offender' in committing an aggravated murder while committing a robbery. 12 Id. at 417. We concluded that imposing a death sentence even though the jury never found the statutorily required [capital specification] . . . . is unquestionably a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 420. We further held that the Eighth Amendment error was not subject to harmless-error analysis. Id. at 421-22. 64 The thrust of Joseph's argument is that his case is materially indistinguishable from Esparza I. We agree. Given the pervasive misunderstanding of the capital specification at Joseph's trial, it is clear that Joseph's death sentence was imposed pursuant to a jury verdict that he was the principal offender in the commission of the kidnapping rather than a jury verdict that he was the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder. In other words, Joseph's death sentence was imposed pursuant to a jury finding of an invented-on-the-fly capital specification that does not exist in Ohio's statutory code rather than a jury finding of the statutory capital specification in OHIO REV.CODE § 2929.04(A)(7). As in Esparza I, the jury never found the statutorily required [capital specification], so the imposition of the death penalty is unquestionably a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 310 F.3d at 420. 65 We recognize, of course, that the Supreme Court reversed Esparza I. See Mitchell v. Esparza (Esparza II), 540 U.S. 12, 124 S.Ct. 7, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003). Yet that reversal was in response to our holding that the Eighth Amendment violation was not subject to harmless-error analysis. See Esparza II, 540 U.S. at 16-17, 124 S.Ct. 7. The Supreme Court did not disturb our conclusion that a constitutional violation occurred. Thus, we follow Esparza I's Eighth Amendment analysis and conclude that the narrowing requirement was violated here. 66 We now turn to the harmless-error analysis mandated by the Supreme Court in Esparza II. The Court's analysis in that case is instructive. The Court reasoned that the jury would surely have returned a guilty verdict on a principal-offender specification because Esparza was the only defendant charged in the indictment and [t]here was no evidence presented that anyone other than [Esparza] was involved in the crime or present at the [scene of the murder]. Esparza II, 540 U.S. at 18, 124 S.Ct. 7. Thus, the state court's conclusion that the errors were harmless was not objectively unreasonable under AEDPA. Id. at 19, 124 S.Ct. 7; accord Biros v. Bagley, 422 F.3d 379, 388 (6th Cir.2005) (stating in dictum that an Eighth Amendment violation was harmless because it was undisputed that the petitioner acted alone), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 125, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2006) (No. 05-11394). Both factors in the Court's analysis cut the other way here: another person (Bulerin) was charged in the indictment, and there was significant evidence that another person (Bulerin) was involved in the crime and present at the scene of the murder. Thus, Esparza II itself strongly supports the conclusion that the Eighth Amendment error was not harmless in the instant case. 67 Accordingly, we conclude that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in concluding that Joseph's sentence satisfied the Eighth Amendment narrowing requirement. 68
69 In addition to the Jackson claim already discussed above, Joseph argues that his due process rights were violated in two other ways: by being tried pursuant to an indictment and jury instructions that incorrectly stated the only capital specification with which he was charged. Joseph did not, however, object at trial to either the indictment or the jury instructions. Accordingly, the Ohio Supreme Court deemed these claims waived and reviewed only for plain error. Joseph II, 653 N.E.2d at 291, 294. We recently held in similar circumstances that a prisoner had procedurally defaulted his claims. See Biros, 422 F.3d at 386-87. Thus, Joseph has procedurally defaulted his indictment and jury-instruction claims, and federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless [Joseph] can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). 70
71 We note at the outset that [s]o confident is the government of the correctness of its [cause-and-prejudice] argument that it has not deigned to respond to the merits of the appeal. This was a tactical error. The government's confidence is unwarranted. Pasha v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 530, 532 (7th Cir.2005). For the following reasons, Joseph has established cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default. 72 Constitutionally [i]neffective assistance of counsel . . . is cause for a procedural default. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986); see also Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 120 S.Ct. 1587, 146 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000) (Not just any deficiency in counsel's performance will do . . .; the assistance must have been so ineffective as to violate the Federal Constitution. In other words, ineffective assistance adequate to establish cause for the procedural default of some other constitutional claim is itself an independent constitutional claim. (citation omitted)). Joseph argues that his procedural default should be excused because his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to the flawed indictment and erroneous jury instructions. Joseph also claims the ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) as an independent claim for habeas relief. 13 Although Joseph must satisfy the AEDPA standard with respect to his independent IAC claim, he need not do so to claim ineffective assistance for the purpose of establishing cause. See Fischetti v. Johnson, 384 F.3d 140, 154-55 (3d Cir.2004). For the reasons discussed below, Joseph has established his IAC claim under the AEDPA standard, which necessarily means that he has also established ineffective assistance for the purpose of establishing cause. 73 IAC claims are governed by the test enunciated in the clearly established Supreme Court precedent of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Performance is measured against an objective standard of reasonableness, under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The second component of a Strickland claim is a show[ing] that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability is less than a preponderance of the evidence, as a defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case. Id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Instead, [a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 74 The Ohio Court of Appeals, which was the last state court to issue a reasoned opinion on the issue, gave the following reasons for rejecting the argument that Joseph's counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the flawed indictment and erroneous jury instructions: 75 The flaw in the specification is very technical in nature, albeit the effect of this flaw has been an issue of significant importance to the case. This flaw in the precise wording of the specification was so subtle that neither the attorneys for the State nor the trial judge noticed it. Defense counsel's failing to notice this flaw does not rise to the level of deficient performance. 76 . . . 77 . . . Simply failing to object to an alleged error is insufficient to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, unless it is also shown that counsel violated an essential duty owed the client. The [failure to object to the jury instructions] do[es] not amount to deficient conduct resulting in prejudice affecting the fairness of [Joseph's] trial. Joseph I, 1993 WL 531858, at . 14 78 A number of recent cases have emphasized that defense attorneys have a constitutional duty to conduct adequate factual investigations. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). Yet it can hardly be doubted that defense lawyers have a constitutional obligation to investigate and understand the law as well. See, e.g., Williams, 529 U.S. at 395, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (noting that counsel failed to conduct an investigation . . . not because of any strategic calculation but because they incorrectly thought that state law barred access to such records.); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ([S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable . . . . (emphasis added)); Smith v. Dretke, 417 F.3d 438, 442-43 (5th Cir.2005) ([Defense counsel] failed to achieve a rudimentary understanding of the well-settled law of self-defense in Texas. By doing so, he neglected the central issue in his client's case. . . . This misunderstanding could have been corrected with minimal legal research. (footnote omitted)). 79 Here, the principal-offender specification was the only capital specification with which Joseph was charged and therefore was the only reason Joseph faced the death penalty. Thus, it was obviously the critical issue in the case. Simply reading the statute would have revealed that the specification requires the defendant to be the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder, not of the kidnapping. And minimal case research would have revealed that being the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder means that the defendant must have actually killed the victim. Yet Joseph's trial counsel failed to grasp either of these two basic points, as evidenced by his failure to object to the flawed indictment and erroneous jury instructions. The complete lack of understanding was further confirmed by counsel's own repeated mis-statements of the specification. And it was topped off by his failure to notice that the state conceded that it could not prove that Joseph actually killed the victim. 80 Understanding the elements of the specification that makes a defendant eligible for the death penalty is perhaps the most basic aspect of representing a capital defendant. We think this proposition obvious, but in any event it finds support in the standards for capital defense work articulated by the American Bar Association (ABA)—standards to which [the Supreme Court] long ha[s] referred as `guides to determining what is reasonable.' Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052). The ABA Guidelines provide that [c]ounsel should conduct independent investigations relating to the guilt/innocence phase and to the penalty phase of a capital trial. ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES § 11.4.1(A) (1989). Counsel must procure [s]ources of investigative information, the first of which are the charging documents, which should be obtained and examined in the context of the applicable statutes and precedents, to identify . . . the elements of the charged offense(s), including the element(s) alleged to make the death penalty applicable . . . . Id. § 11.4.1(D)(1)(A). 15 In failing to understand even the basic elements of the principal-offender specification, the performance of Joseph's trial counsel was constitutionally deficient. 81 The state court attempted to diminish the failures of Joseph's counsel by calling the error in the specification technical and subtle. We think it inconceivable that a reasonable criminal defense attorney would find the difference between kidnapping and aggravated murder too technical and subtle, especially when this distinction provides the sole basis for receiving the death penalty rather than a life sentence. Under the state court's unreasonably low performance standard, criminal defense lawyers might also be permitted to confuse misdemeanor and felony, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, or even guilty and not guilty. Fortunately for Joseph and other criminal defendants, the prevailing professional norms under which Strickland performance is judged are not as low as the state court would have them. 82 The state court also attempted to minimize the deficiency of Joseph's counsel by noting that he was not the only one to misunderstand the specification—the prosecution and the trial judge similarly erred. We fail to see how the pervasiveness of the error excuses Joseph's counsel's performance. After all, Joseph was represented— and consequently was owed a constitutionally sufficient level of performance—by his counsel, not by the prosecution or the trial judge. Furthermore, when the prosecution and the trial judge are operating under a mistaken view of the law, the performance of defense counsel becomes more important, because he is then the only one left to correct the misunderstanding. Accordingly, we conclude that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland in concluding that the performance of Joseph's trial counsel was constitutionally adequate. 83 The prejudice inquiry is similarly straightforward. If Joseph's trial counsel had objected to the flawed indictment and erroneous jury instruction, then the players at trial would not have labored under an incorrect understanding of the capital specification, and there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different (i.e., that Joseph would not have received a death sentence), in at least three identifiable ways. First, there is a reasonable probability that the prosecution, which conceded that it could not prove that Joseph actually killed the victim, would have declined to charge Joseph with the specification. Second, there is a reasonable probability that, given the prosecution's concession that it could not prove that Joseph actually killed the victim, a properly instructed jury would have found Joseph not guilty of the specification. Third, even if the jury still found Joseph guilty of the specification, there is a reasonable probability that a trial judge with a proper understanding of the specification would have intervened, either by setting aside the verdict after the guilt phase or by rejecting the jury's recommendation of a death sentence after the penalty phase. Thus, we have little trouble concluding that Joseph's defense was prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient performance, and that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland in concluding otherwise. 84 Having determined that habeas relief is warranted on Joseph's independent IAC claim, it necessarily follows that Joseph has established cause to excuse the procedural default of his indictment and jury-instruction claims. Of course, Joseph must also establish the prejudice component of cause and prejudice. The Supreme Court has declined to provide a general definition of prejudice for purposes of cause and prejudice. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982). Nevertheless, the Court has given some instructive content to the term by explaining that one way to establish the prejudice component of cause and prejudice is to establish Brady materiality. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691, 698, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). Given that Strickland prejudice is governed by a standard worded similarly to the Brady materiality standard, compare Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) ([F]avorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. (internal quotation marks omitted)), with Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.), 16 it follows that establishing Strickland prejudice likewise establishes prejudice for purposes of cause and prejudice. Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1147 n. 86 (11th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 926, 121 S.Ct. 1369, 149 L.Ed.2d 297 (2001); Prou v. United States, 199 F.3d 37, 49 (1st Cir.1999). Thus, Joseph has established cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default. 85 We may now turn to the merits of Joseph's indictment and jury-instruction claims. As we noted above, the state declined to argue the merits of these claims. Therefore, it is not clear that the state is even appealing the district court's resolution of the merits in Joseph's favor. Accordingly, we discuss the merits (which we affirm) only briefly.
86 No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among the constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding in all courts, state or federal. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201, 68 S.Ct. 514, 92 L.Ed. 644 (1948); see also Valentine v. Konteh, 395 F.3d 626, 631 (6th Cir.2005) ([A]n indictment is only [constitutionally] sufficient if it (1) contains the elements of the charged offense, (2) gives the defendant adequate notice of the charges, and (3) protects the defendant against double jeopardy.). 17 These fundamental principles of procedural fairness apply with no less force at the penalty phase of a trial in a capital case than they do in the guilt-determining phase of any criminal trial. Presnell v. Georgia, 439 U.S. 14, 16, 99 S.Ct. 235, 58 L.Ed.2d 207 (1978). Joseph claims that he was denied due process because the flawed indictment failed to give him adequate notice of the capital specification. The Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged the error in the indictment, but it concluded that Joseph had received sufficient notice of the correct capital specification and that the error had not prejudiced his defense. Joseph II, 653 N.E.2d at 291-92. 87 Joseph principally relies on Lucas v. O'Dea, 179 F.3d 412 (6th Cir.1999). There, a person was shot and killed in the course of a robbery committed by Lucas and two other men. Lucas was indicted for intentional murder, which required proof that he shot the victim. The only witness testified that he did not know which of the robbers fired the fatal shot, and Lucas's entire defense was that he did not shoot the victim. Despite the intentional-murder charge in the indictment, the jury was given instructions for wanton murder, for which it was immaterial who fired the shot. The state supreme court upheld the conviction, characterizing it as a conviction for wanton murder. We concluded that in these circumstances, Lucas had been deprived . . . of his Fourteenth Amendment right to notice of the charges against him. Id. at 417. We conclude likewise here: much as Lucas was indicted for one crime (intentional murder) but convicted of another (wanton murder), Joseph, too, was indicted for one asserted capital specification (being the principal offender in commission of the kidnapping) but convicted of another (being the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder). Indeed, the lack of notice is arguably even worse here, as Joseph was initially indicted under a specification that did not even exist. 88 In granting relief on this claim, the district court, relying on United States v. Ford, 872 F.2d 1231, 1235-36 (6th Cir. 1989) (explaining that an amendment to an indictment is prejudicial per se), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 843, 111 S.Ct. 124, 112 L.Ed.2d 93 (1990), held that the error in Joseph's indictment was not subject to harmless-error review. The district court held in the alternative that the error was not harmless in this case. Given the Supreme Court's decision in Esparza II (discussed above), we think it prudent to engage in the harmless-error analysis. 18 For the reasons similar to those that have already been discussed above, we conclude that the due-process violation had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted), and therefore was not harmless. Moreover, it was objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude otherwise.
89 Supreme Court precedent clearly establishes that [i]n a criminal trial, the State must prove every element of the offense, and a jury instruction violates due process if it fails to give effect to that requirement. Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437, 124 S.Ct. 1830, 158 L.Ed.2d 701 (2004) (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520-21, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979)). The only question . . . is `whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.' It is well established that the instruction `may not be judged in artificial isolation,' but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (citations omitted) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973)). Joseph's jury-instruction claim is based, of course, on the erroneous principal-offender instruction. 90 The Ohio Supreme Court's rejection of Joseph's claim was premised on the idea that because the trial court read the correct specification once, it cured any error in the instructions. Joseph II, 653 N.E.2d at 294-95. We conclude that this decision is both contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The decision is contrary to Supreme Court precedent in that it ignored the approach that the Court has explicitly articulated for this type of claim. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to our clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases.). By excusing the error solely on the basis of the single instance in which the trial court read the correct specification, the state court judged in artificial isolation that one correct reading, virtually ignoring the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record, i.e., the countless times that the incorrect specification was stated or referenced. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72, 112 S.Ct. 475 (internal quotation marks omitted). 91 The state court also unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. The jury instructions repeatedly and incorrectly stated (either explicitly or by reference to earlier misstatements) that the capital specification required proof that Joseph was the principal offender in the commission of the kidnapping. Thus, the instructions omitted the element of being the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder, i.e., that Joseph actually killed the victim, which means that they fail[ed] to give effect to th[e] [due-process] requirement that the State must prove every element of the offense. McNeil, 541 U.S. at 437, 124 S.Ct. 1830. The rest of the trial record, McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, compounded the error in the jury instructions, as both the prosecution and Joseph's counsel repeatedly misstated the specification in their opening statements and closing and rebuttal arguments. The single instance in which the trial court correctly read the specification to the jury was insufficient to cure the pervasive errors elsewhere in the instructions and the rest of the proceedings. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 322, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) (Language that merely contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally infirm instruction will not suffice to absolve the infirmity. A reviewing court has no way of knowing which of the two irreconcilable instructions the jurors applied in reaching their verdict.); Laird v. Horn, 414 F.3d 419, 427-28 (3d Cir.2005) ([W]e can not conclude that such a brief reference to the required mens rea for first-degree murder remedies the incorrect and misleading portion of the instruction.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1143, 163 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2006); Everett v. Beard, 290 F.3d 500, 512 (3d Cir.2002) (The mere fact that the law was correctly stated in one part of the charge will not automatically insulate the charge from a determination of error.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1107, 123 S.Ct. 877, 154 L.Ed.2d 777 (2003). Once again, for reasons that have been discussed at length, the due-process violation was not harmless. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710. 92