Opinion ID: 2997428
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jordan’s Claims Under the Indirect Method

Text: A plaintiff that has failed to establish discriminatory intent under the direct method may nonetheless ultimately prevail under the indirect, burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In order to survive a motion for summary judgment under the indirect method, Jordan must initially establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. Thereafter, it is incumbent upon the defendants-appellees (the “City”) to counter with a legitimate, nondisciminatory and nonpretextual reason for the employment action. This method of analysis is applicable whether the discrimination alleged is on the basis of sex, when proceeding pursuant to Title VII, or on the basis of age, under the ADEA. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2001).
Jordan alleges that the decision not to promote her to both the manager position (to which Parker was appointed) and the supervisor position (Carey) in the Health Department was discriminatory in nature. In addition, she contends that she has established a prima facie case of discrimination7 and that she has also successfully demonstrated that the justification for not promoting her offered by the City is 7 In the district court’s Memorandum of Decision and Order, Judge Springmann makes clear that, for the sake of brevity, the court “assumed, without deciding,” that Jordan had made out a prima facie case and moved right to Jordan’s pretext arguments. 12 No. 03-3772 pretextual, contrary to the findings of the trial judge. We disagree. In order to establish a prima facie case of sex or race discrimination for failure to promote Jordan would have to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she is qualified for the position; (3) she was rejected for the position sought; and (4) the position was granted to a person outside the protected class who is similarly or less qualified than Jordan. See Grayson v. City of Chicago, 317 F.3d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 2003), accord McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03. The first prong of Jordan’s argument is that she should have been promoted to the position of Health Clinic manager rather than Parker. In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination for failure to promote under the McDonell Douglas framework, Jordan is required to identify a person outside the protected class of which she is a member that was given the job instead of her. See id. However, it is undisputed that Parker is an African-American female over the age of 40. Therefore, because Parker is a member of the same protected class as Jordan, Jordan is precluded from successfully arguing that she was unfairly discriminated against when Thompson chose to assign Parker as the head of the Health Clinic instead of her. Stated differently, Jordan had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework as to this prong of her failure to promote claim. See, e.g., Ritter v. Hill ‘N Dale Farm, Inc., 231 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 2000). In the second prong of her failure to promote claim Jordan also argues that she should have been awarded the Health Clinic supervisor position instead of Carey. While Carey, unlike Parker, is outside of Jordan’s protected class, our analysis does not end there. In addition to identifying a person outside the protected class, Jordan must also No. 03-3772 13 establish that the person promoted in her place was similarly situated at the time of the alleged discrimination against her. Grayson, 317 F.3d at 748. In order for Jordan to establish that a fellow employee, like Carey, is a similarly situated person Jordan must demonstrate that Carey occupied the same job level and engaged in similar past misconduct, but as a result of his misconduct he (unlike Jordan) was treated differently (i.e., more favorably) for no legitimate reason. Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 939-40 (7th Cir. 2003). The record establishes that Jordan had an extensive track record of repeated and ongoing disciplinary problems prior to Thompson’s decision to appoint Carey as supervisor, while Carey did not. Indeed, Jordan has introduced no evidence into the record that would suggest that Carey had ever committed a work rules violation or even a breach of protocol while employed at the GHD. Therefore, Carey cannot be considered a “similarly situated person” within the meaning of McDonnell Douglas and Jordan has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under this prong of her failure to promote argument as well. See id. However, even if we were to assume, as did the trial court, that Jordan has made out a prima facie case under this prong of her argument, she has failed to establish that the legitimate business justification proffered by the defendantsappellees is pretextual. In order to meet her burden of proving that the City’s justification for promoting Carey in place of Jordan is pretexutal, she is required to establish that the City’s “explanation [was] designed to obscure the unlawful discriminatory employment action.” Emmel v. CocaCola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 95 F.3d 627, 629 (7th Cir. 1996). What’s more, in order to establish pretext, Jordan must establish that her credentials were “so superior to the credentials of the person selected for the job that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in 14 No. 03-3772 question,” which she has failed to do. Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1181 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). The record establishes that Carey’s qualifications for the supervisor (and later Health Clinic Manager) roles in the Health Clinic were objectively comparable, if not superior, to those of Jordan. Carey was at the same job classification level, DIS II, as Jordan at the time he was named supervisor. In addition, there is a wealth of un-refuted testimony in the record that suggests that Carey was a more desirable employee than Jordan despite his lack of relative job experience. For example, in support of his decision to name Carey acting supervisor, Thompson stated that his choice was “based . . . on his previous working relationship with Aleisa James and his case management skills.” In addition, James stated that when she was preparing to go on medical leave she was going to appoint Carey acting supervisor for three weeks due to his organizational skills; the very same reason Thompson gave for promoting him. Also, the Deputy Director of Health (and James’ superior) stated that she “approved the appointment of Roland Carey, II, as the appropriate candidate to assist with the ongoing case management,” and that the choice “was based solely on his case management skills.” Parker Aff. ¶¶ 9, 10. This evidence, when viewed in conjunction with Jordan’s lengthy and repetitive record of insubordination and violation of work rules, demonstrates that it was entirely reasonable for Thompson to conclude that Carey was the only qualified candidate for the position of acting supervisor and later Director of the Health Clinic. Indeed, Jordan has failed to establish that she was even as qualified as Carey for the position, much less “so superior” a candidate that the only reason for the denial of the promotion was discriminatory in nature. See Millbrook, 280 F.3d at 1181. Thus, because the evidence in the record clearly establishes the fact that Parker is a member of the same protected No. 03-3772 15 class, and that Carey was not a similarly situated person to Jordan within the meaning of Title VII or the ADEA, and because Jordan has failed to establish that the City’s justification for discharging her was pretextual, the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City on Jordan’s failure to promote claim falls far short of constituting a reversible error.
Jordan also argues she was being unlawfully discriminated against when she was disciplined on three separate occasions, outlined in detail above, for: (a) wearing a head covering after being warned not to on May 12, 2000; (b) being absent from work without leave on or about May 25, 2000; and (c) allegedly disclosing confidential information to the mother of a client sometime prior to May 26, 2000. The district court found that because Jordan failed to identify a similarly situated employee outside her class who was treated more favorably, the City’s motion for summary judgment was warranted as to this element of her claim as well. We agree. In order for Jordan to successfully claim that she was disciplined for a prohibited discriminatory reason she must establish that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was meeting her employer’s legitimate work expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that other, similarly situated, substantially younger, male employees were treated more favorably. See Grayson, 317 F.3d at 817-18; Franzoni v. Hartmarx Corp., 300 F.3d 767, 771-72 (7th Cir. 2002) (ADEA). In her brief, Jordan briefly addresses why she believes she has satisfied most of the elements of a prima facie case for discrimination, but she has overlooked one very important factor: she has failed to supply us with an example of a similarly situated 16 No. 03-3772 employee outside of her protected class who was treated differently.8 The only person that Jordan identifies who might be considered a similarly situated employee is Carey. However, on a number of occasions this court has made it clear that in order to be considered similarly situated an employee must be “directly comparable in all material respects.” Hudson v. Chicago Transit Auth., 375 F.3d 552, 561 (7th Cir. 2004), accord Patterson v. Avery Dennision Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002). “This court does not sit as a superpersonnel department that re-examines an entities business decisions.” Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1986). Carey was promoted to acting supervisor of the Health Clinic on or about March of 2000, prior to any of the alleged incidents of discrimination described by Jordan (which begin with her being disciplined a number of times two months later in May of 2000). Therefore, because Carey was her superior at all times relevant to this facet of Jordan’s claim, and because we have held that Carey’s promotion was not itself an act of discrimination, Carey cannot be considered to be “similarly situated” and Jordan’s claim must fail. See Ajayi v. Aramark Business Servs., Inc., 336 F.3d 520, 531-32 (7th Cir. 2003).9 8 Instead, Jordan extolls her virtues as an employee, points to three other older women in the Health Clinic whom she believes were discriminated against and eludes to Carey receiving the promotion in her place as based on a prohibited amicus, while downplaying her repeated insubordination and violation of work rules. However, other examples of alleged discrimination are superfluous to building a prima facie case and Carey cannot be considered a similarly situated employee under Title VII and the ADEA. 9 Furthermore, even if we were to assume that Jordan had made out a prima facie case for discrimination, the City would still be (continued...) No. 03-3772 17