Opinion ID: 1673857
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: was the evidence of malice and want of probable cause legally insufficient to sustain a verdict against the defendants?

Text: Consideration of the issue implicates our limited scope of review of jury verdicts. Where, as here, the trial judge has refused to grant a motion for JNOV, we examine all of the evidence  not just evidence which supports the non-movant's case  in the light most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. All credible evidence tending to support the non-movant's case and all favorable inferences reasonably drawn therefrom are accepted as true and redound to the benefit of the non-mover. If the facts and inferences so considered point so overwhelmingly in favor of the movant that reasonable men could not have arrived at a contrary verdict, the motion should be granted. On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motion, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fairminded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the jury verdict should be allowed to stand and the motion denied, and, if it has been so denied, we have no authority to reverse. Royal Oil Co., Inc. v. Wells, 500 So.2d 439, 442 (Miss. 1986); Stubblefield v. Jesco, Inc., 464 So.2d 47, 54 (Miss. 1984); City of Jackson v. Locklar, 431 So.2d 475, 478 (Miss. 1983); Paymaster Oil Mill Co. v. Mitchell, 319 So.2d 652, 657 (Miss. 1975). The principles are as applicable in malicious prosecution cases as any other. Royal Oil Co., Inc., 500 So.2d at 443; Owens v. Kroger Co., 430 So.2d 843, 848 (Miss. 1983); Torabi v. J.C. Penney, Inc., 438 So.2d 1354, 1355-56 (Miss. 1983); Gaylord's of Meridian, Inc. v. Sicard, 384 So.2d 1042, 1044 (Miss. 1980). It is only when a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case and again at the close of the defendant's case, would have been proper that a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is proper. Such is not the standard where the trial court is required to use its discretion in granting a motion for a new trial. The variance in proof needed to support these motions is easily explained when one recognizes that a JNOV terminates the case, whereas a new trial simply gives both parties the opportunity to relitigate the controversy. Stubblefield, 464 So.2d at 55. Motions for JNOV are made pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Motions for a new trial are made pursuant to Rule 59. The concurring opinion in Jesco, Inc. v. Whitehead, 451 So.2d 706, 714-17 (Miss. 1984), points out the differences between the motions: A greater quantum of evidence favoring the party against whom the motion is made is necessary for that party to withstand a motion for a new trial as distinguished from a motion for j.n.o.v. Under our established case law, the trial judge should set aside a jury's verdict when, in the exercise of his sound discretion, he is convinced that the verdict is contrary to the substantial weight of the evidence. Mobile and Ohio Railroad Co. v. Bennett, 127 Miss. 413, 415, 90 So. 113 (1921); Columbus and Greenville Railway Co. v. Buford, 150 Miss. 832, 840, 116 So. 817 (1928); Odier v. Sumrall, 353 So.2d 1370, 1374 (Miss. 1978);       A new trial does not deprive a litigant of his right to trial by jury. It merely requires that he submit to trial before a second jury. Without going into an extended historical analysis, we regard it as accepted law that our trial courts have the authority to set aside a jury verdict, where, in the exercise of their sound discretion, they regard such a verdict as being contrary to the substantial weight of the evidence. See Rule 59(a)(1), M.R.C.P.       The motion for a new trial has long been an element of our procedural system. We regard it as a necessary component of procedural justice in civil actions. It is employed in those rare cases when there would be injustice either in allowing the verdict to stand or in granting a j.n.o.v.       [W]hile the rules regarding the trial judge's discretion and authority are well-established, the point on appeal is a bit trickier. We sit as an appellate court, not as a trial court. We do not consider these matters de novo. Rather, our review is limited to an inquiry whether the ruling of the trial judge may be fairly characterized as an abuse of discretion. See Dorris v. Carr, 330 So.2d 872, 873-74 (Miss. 1976); Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co., 409 F.2d 145, 147-48 (D.C. Cir.1969); Dupont v. Southern Pacific Co., 366 F.2d 193, 198 (5th Cir. 1966); Morinville v. Morinville, 116 R.I. 507, 359 A.2d 48, 52-54 (1976). Our review of a trial judge's exercise of discretion necessarily involves a substantial amount of discretion  and deference  on our part. In matters such as these we must always recognize that it is the trial judge who is on the scene. There is no way we could ever become as familiar with the proceedings at trial as the trial judge. Cf. Culbreath v. Johnson, 427 So.2d 705, 708 (Miss. 1983). We should give substantial weight, deference and respect to the decision of the trial judge in matters such as this. We proceed with application of our scope of review to the appellate issues.
We have, on several occasions, articulated the elements of malicious criminal prosecution as:

Strong v. Nicholson, 580 So.2d 1288, 1293 (Miss. 1991); Miss. Road Supply v. Zurich-American Ins. Co., 501 So.2d 412 (Miss. 1987); Royal Oil Co., Inc. v. Wells, 500 So.2d 439, 442 (Miss. 1986); Pugh v. Easterling, 367 So.2d 935, 937 (Miss. 1979). C & C and Lambert focus their attention on elements (4) and (5) conceding establishment of the remaining elements. In determining whether malice existed in the institution of the criminal proceedings, we note that the term malice in the law of malicious prosecution is used in an artificial and legal sense and is applied to prosecutions instituted primarily for a purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice. Benjamin v. Hooper Electronic Supply Co., 568 So.2d 1182, 1191 (Miss. 1990). It may be proved by circumstantial evidence or the jury may infer malice from the facts of the case. Moreover, absence of probable cause for the prosecution is circumstantial evidence of malice. Further, malice may be inferred from a finding that the defendant acted in reckless disregard of another person's rights. In Strong v. Nicholson, 580 So.2d 1288 (Miss. 1991), malice existed where the defendants freely conceded that their lone purpose in instituting criminal proceedings was to get their stuff back and that they really didn't care what happened to plaintiffs. We have emphasized that since the question of malice is a question of fact, it is to be determined by the jury unless only one conclusion may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Benjamin, 568 So.2d at 1191; Owens v. Kroger Co., 430 So.2d 843, 848 (Miss. 1983), [quoting Brown v. Watkins, 213 Miss. 365, 373, 56 So.2d 888, 891 (1952)]. In this case, the testimony of Sheriff Green established that C & C and Lambert weren't really interested in the warrant being served, they were interested in the load getting moved. The testimony was sufficient to undergird the jury's finding as a matter of fact that malice existed. This portion of the assigned error is without merit.
Probable cause requires the concurrence of an honest belief in the guilt of the person accused and reasonable grounds for such belief. Strong, 580 So.2d at 1294; Royal Oil Co., Inc. v. Wells, 500 So.2d 439, 443 (Miss. 1986); Harvill v. Tabor, 240 Miss. 750, 755, 128 So.2d 863, 865 (1961). While a malicious prosecution plaintiff has the burden of production and persuasion of showing lack of probable cause, proof of lack of probable cause on any one element of the crime charged and which forms the basis of the action is sufficient to establish this element of the tort. Strong, 580 So.2d at 1294-95. Lambert testified that he thought Smith was going to sell and dispose of the load as follows: My experience in the trucking business and with this load is that this stuff is packaged, processed and in the package and can go straight from that truck to any supermarket or store in the country. It's packaged and ready to go. He could've easily sold any amount of that load that he wanted to. And that's what I thought he was going to do. That's what he indicated that he was going to do. And it was at that point that I just simply gave up and I said, I believe the man is going to do what he is threatening to do. And that's what it was, a threat. And I had no other cause to believe that he wasn't going to do it because I had went through every possibility and offered to do everything that we could to keep him from doing that. But our conversation, when it moved from the point past insurance, past the truck broke down and couldn't be fixed, past the business about insurance, then for the critical point, you know, I didn't want to send a truck down there. It cost us, it cost us double to do that, but at that point I believed that he was going to keep the load. In fact, that's what he said he was going to do. I believed he was going to sell it because that's what he indicated he was going to do. At that point I called the Sheriff and asked the Sheriff if he knew Mr. Smith and told him what he was doing... .       [I] talked to the Sheriff and the Sheriff said  I asked the Sheriff  that I believed  I can't remember exactly our conversation but I believed he was going to do something with the load and asked him if he would help us with it. He said he would but he couldn't do anything unless we wanted to charge the man with something. At that point, I talked to Mr. Comer and we believed  he asked my opinion. I said, I believe the man is going to sell it or sell part of it if not all of it. ... On cross-examination, Lambert admitted Smith never said that he was converting the load to his own use. Smith testified that from day one he requested Lambert to send someone to get the load. It is apparent that neither Lambert nor Attorney Comer were in possession of facts from which it could be reasonably inferred that Smith had converted the load, a fact essential to the charge of embezzlement. Lack of probable cause on this one element of embezzlement is sufficient to establish this requisite of the tort. Strong, 580 So.2d at 1295. Moreover, the question is not whether Lambert thought probable cause existed, but whether the fact finders thought he did. Strong, 580 So.2d at 1294. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the finding by the jury of lack of probable cause for the criminal proceedings instituted against Smith. This portion of the assigned error is also without merit.