Opinion ID: 1172467
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Measure of Damages Excessiveness of Award for Compensatory Damages

Text: (12a) Defendants further contend that even assuming the existence of substantial evidence of compensatory damages as to each element thereof, the amount awarded is excessive. We have recognized that while the jury is entrusted with vast discretion in determining the amount of damages to be awarded, `... where the recovery is so grossly disproportionate as to raise a presumption that it is the result of passion or prejudice, the duty is then imposed upon the reviewing court to act.' ( Cunningham v. Simpson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 301, 308, 309 [81 Cal. Rptr. 855, 461 P.2d 39], quoting from Rosenberg v. J.C. Penney Co. (1939) 30 Cal. App.2d 609, 628 [86 P.2d 696]; see also Roedder v. Lindsley (1946) 28 Cal.2d 820, 823 [172 P.2d 353].) Initially, we note that a claim of excessive damages was raised in connection with a motion for a new trial and was denied, despite the fact that the trial court was not bound by the passion and prejudice language of former Code of Civil Procedure section 657, subdivision 5. (Amended Stats. 1967, ch. 72, § 1.) (13) And although the trial court's determination is not binding upon a reviewing court, it is to be accorded great weight because having been present at the trial the trial judge was necessarily more familiar with the evidence. ( Hickey v. Coschina (1901) 133 Cal. 81, 83 [65 P. 313]; see also, 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed.) Torts, § 930, pp. 3212-3214.) (12b) Scrutinizing the judgment in light of the above, we cannot say that the compensatory damages awarded reflect, as a matter of law, that the jury acted from passion or prejudice. It is noteworthy that, excluding attorneys' fees, the harm suffered by Bertero was solely to intangible interests  his reputation and emotional well-being. The fixing of such damages has long been vested in the sound discretion of the trier of fact ( Weaver v. Page (1856) 6 Cal. 681, 685) subject only to the passion and prejudice standard ( Scott v. Times-Mirror Co. (1919) 181 Cal. 345, 366-367 [184 P. 672, 12 A.L.R. 1007]). In view of the testimony elicited by Bertero on the issue of damages and considering the defendants' complete failure to attempt in any way to rebut such testimony, [11] we conclude that, except as to the award for attorneys' fees as noted, the compensatory damage award is not excessive. [12]