Opinion ID: 1379546
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Detective Viduya's mention of more than one gun in the place.

Text: Tolliver next argues that, by declaring that he needed to know whether there was more than one gun in the place, Detective Viduya was attempting to elicit information from Tolliver and so engage in the functional equivalent of express questioning within the meaning of Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, and Muniz, 496 U.S. at 600-01, 110 S.Ct. 2638. Viduya's statement closely followed Tolliver's statement that he would remain silent once he was informed that he had that right: THE DEFENDANT: I am not of sound mind or  I am not capable of waiving anything right now. . . . It was my fault for bringing the gun out. But I was in the bathroom by myself when she came in. I was getting the other gun out, and I was taking them out of the house. She had not taken her medication. She was upset about her family and their dislike for me and that she might be pregnant. And beyond that  and beyond that, we had no problems. We were out with friends. We were discussing our wedding, and I just lost my whole world.    THE OFFICER: I understand that you don't want to give a statement, but for the record I am going to go over it with you. Who knows, you might change your mind. I am going to advise you of it, okay? THE DEFENDANT: You can advise me. I am telling you right now, that  THE OFFICER: I am just going to do the procedure and then, you know, after that, you can decide on what you are going to do. THE DEFENDANT: You say that I have the right to remain silent. I will be silent. You can get any information that you need for this investigation. Before that. The minute you say it, I have nothing more to say to you. THE OFFICER: I can't ask you anything pertinent to the investigation without me advising you of your rights first (inaudible). You just mentioned a gun. I don't know if it's more than one gun in the place, stuff like that I need to ask you but  THE DEFENDANT: I am willing to share all this information with you because I have nothing to hide; however, I am not of sound mind. She was in the middle of a sentence when she accidently shot herself. I feel it was my fault, because she didn't know the gun was loaded. She said, What do you want me to  pow. I turned around and she was falling at my feet. I have nothing  (JA 47-48 (emphasis added).) The line between impermissible interrogation and permissible follow-up questions to volunteered statements is a fine one. Police may listen to volunteered statements, and need not interrupt a suspect who is volunteering information in order to deliver a Miranda warning. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Police may even interrupt a volunteered statement to ask clarifying or follow-up questions. See, e.g., U.S. v. Rommy, 506 F.3d 108, 132-33 (2d Cir.2007) (collecting cases); Andersen v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 526, 532 (7th Cir.1990) (rejecting custodial interrogation challenge when, in response to suspect's volunteered statement, I stabbed her, police asked, Who?). That said, when asking a suspect about volunteered information, police may at times cross the line from asking clarifying or follow-up questions into the express questioning or its functional equivalent, Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, barred by Miranda. See, e.g., United States v. Crowder, 62 F.3d 782, 785-86 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that police officer interrogated suspect when, after suspect stated that shotgun was in the wood, officer asked clarifying question about location). The Supreme Court, while not explicitly clarifying the distinction between permissible follow-up questions and impermissible interrogation, has stated in a different context that, even at meetings with the police initiated by a suspect, [i]f, as frequently would occur . . . the conversation is not wholly one-sided, it is likely that the officers will say or do something that clearly would be `interrogation.' Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (addressing whether police questioning of a suspect constitutes interrogation where the suspect first invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel but then arranged a meeting with investigators and volunteered information). Again, as the Supreme Court has made clear repeatedly, [w]ithout obtaining a waiver of the suspect's Miranda rights, the police may not ask questions ... that are designed to elicit incriminatory admissions. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 602 n. 14, 110 S.Ct. 2638. The difference between permissible follow-up questions and impermissible interrogation clearly turns on whether the police are seeking clarification of something that the suspect has just said, or whether instead the police are seeking to expand the interview. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 2 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.7(a), at 567 (2d ed. 1999) (the part of defendant's statement given after the follow-up questions is volunteered only if the questions are neutral efforts to clarify what has already been said rather than apparent attempts to expand the scope of the statement previously made.). In this case, Tolliver volunteered information about getting the other gun out, and then entered into a discussion with Viduya regarding Tolliver's intention to invoke the right to remain silent. According to the Ohio Court of Appeals: The detective's comment about the gun was a follow-up to defendant's previous spontaneous statement that it was his fault for bringing out the gun. In addition, we note that in offering the voluntary statement, defendant interrupted the detective's attempt to advise defendant of his Miranda rights. As noted in Miranda, the police need not interrupt a suspect's volunteered statements to give the warnings. Tolliver, 2004 WL 625683, at . Viduya's statement, which was interrogative in nature, see Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, was the equivalent of asking, is there more than one gun in the apartment? Tolliver, however, had just volunteered to Viduya that he was getting the other gun out[.] We find that, in determining that Viduya's statement was a follow-up question and thus did not constitute interrogation, the Ohio Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply clearly established Federal law and did not unreasonably apply the correct governing legal principles to the facts of this case. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 411-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495. The Ohio Court of Appeals' holding on this issue  that Viduya's statement about additional guns did not represent a violation of Tolliver's Fifth Amendment rights  therefore did not exceed the latitude afforded a state court's decision on habeas review.