Opinion ID: 495206
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The common law claim

Text: 89 Stevens next maintains that Harasek's failure to intervene on her behalf while Officer Stover was assaulting her constitutes an actionable breach of Harasek's duty to protect her from harm. This claim is met, first, by Harasek's assertion that he owed Stevens no such duty and that, as a result, no cognizable negligence claim has been stated. 58 90 As far as we can determine, this precise question--whether a law enforcement officer is answerable in damages for standing by and failing to protect a member of the public from an assault allegedly perpetrated by a fellow officer--has never been squarely addressed by the District of Columbia courts. We are satisfied, nonetheless, that Stevens' complaint, at the threshold, stated a cognizable claim under principles reflected in case law governing negligence actions against law enforcement officers in the District of Columbia. 91 In two recent cases, the D.C. Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, has considered a question bearing upon the one presented here: in what circumstances is a police officers' general duty to protect the public from harm a sufficient base on which to premise liability for a failure to protect an individual from harm caused by a third party? Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C.1983) (en banc); Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C.1981) (en banc). As these cases make clear, only where the police and the individual are in a special relationship different from that existing between police and citizens generally, Warren, 444 A.2d at 5, can a sufficiently particularized duty to protect arise rendering the officer potentially liable for a failure to act. See also Morgan, 468 A.2d at 1312-15. 59 Absent any such special relationship, the officer's duty is a public duty, for neglect of which the officer is answerable to the public and punishable by indictment only. Id. at 1311, quoting South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396, 403, 15 L.Ed. 433 (1856). 92 In determining whether the necessary special relationship exists in a given situation, the District of Columbia courts look to see whether the police have beg[un] to act in behalf of a particular citizen in such a way as to raise significantly the quotient of risk over and above the risks assumed by every other member of the community. Id. at 1312. Requiring some affirmative undertaking to protect a particular individual, id. at 1314, before a specific duty to the plaintiff will be recognized avoids conflict with the primary policy supporting the no-duty rule: the practical realization that individuals, juries and courts are ill-equipped to judge 'considered legislative-executive decision[s]' as to how particular community resources should be or should have been allocated to protect individual members of the public. Id. at 1311, quoting Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 579, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 240 N.E.2d 860 (1968). Once the police have exercised [their] discretion and chosen to act, imposing a duty to proceed with reasonable care to protect people whom they have particularly placed in peril  does not interpose the judgment of a jury for the discretion of the police. Morgan, 468 A.2d at 1313 (emphasis added). 93 We think Officer Stover's affirmative undertakings--forcibly removing Stevens from her car, handcuffing her and placing her in police custody--sufficient to establish a special relationship between Stevens and the police. Once Stevens was denied, by Stover's actions, the most basic means of self-protection, the quotient of risk to which she was exposed rose significantly; the officers thus incurred an obligation to take reasonable steps to insure that the physical harm to which Stevens was vulnerable did not materialize. 94 We express no opinion as to the extent of that obligation or the steps a reasonable officer in Harasek's position must take in order to satisfy it. We hold only that Stevens' allegations set forth a cognizable negligence claim which, if proved, and not met by a dispositive defense, could subject Harasek to liability. 95 This does not end our inquiry, however, for Harasek has asserted that, even assuming the threshold validity of Stevens' negligence claim, her entire case against him must be dismissed on the basis of an immunity from suit. Under the qualified immunity standard we have declared applicable to this claim, see supra pp. 251-254, we find Harasek's showing of the objective reasonableness of his actions sufficient to warrant entry of judgment in his favor. 96 Harasek's action, in failing to intervene on Stevens' behalf, must be placed in the context of the transpiring events and the information Harasek possessed. According to Stevens' own account, shortly after Officer Stover approached her vehicle, Stover began hysterically screaming to [Officer] Harasek[:] 'She's got a gun'. 60 At this stage of the encounter, again according to Stevens, while Stover was forcibly and brutally handcuff[ing] and press[ing] [Stevens] against the rear of her vehicle, Harasek [stood] there with his hands in his pockets. 61 97 Shortly thereafter, once more in Stevens' words, she was drag[ged] to [Stover's] unmarked police cruiser ... some 500 feet [away from Stevens'] car. 62 Once she was inside the cruiser, Stover allegedly intensified his attack on her. 63 Stevens does not claim that Harasek was involved in, or could even see, the alleged attack inside the cruiser. 64 According to Harasek's uncontradicted account, 65 after Stover took Stevens to the cruiser, Harasek radioed a request for assistance on his portable radio; he then went back and retrieved [Stevens'] pocketbook[,] which was lying in the street. 66 Harasek recalls looking through the pocketbook for the weapon to which Stover had referred, and finding nothing but Stevens' police ID badge and other non-incriminating material. 67 98 Given these facts, we are satisfied that the alleged unlawfulness of Harasek's failure to intervene on Stevens' behalf would not have been apparent, Anderson, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. at 3039, to a reasonable officer in Harasek's shoes. Harasek had a fully rational basis for anticipating that Stevens had a gun, possibly on her person, at the time Stover pulled her from her vehicle. Stover's attempts to subdue and handcuff Stevens could therefore have been viewed by Harasek as justified by the threat he could reasonably have thought she posed to the officers' safety. When Stover began his allegedly brutal and unprovoked attack on a handcuffed and defenseless suspect, he and Stevens were inside a police cruiser some 500 feet away from Harasek. We find no basis for inferring, even assuming the truth of Stevens' allegations, that Harasek could have seen that attack clearly enough to render his failure to come to Stevens' aid unreasonable. Our view on this matter is reinforced by the apparent failure of Stevens' passengers--who surely must have been at least as concerned with Stevens' treatment inside the cruiser as was Harasek--to see the alleged beating. 68 99 For these reasons, we hold that Harasek is immune from suit on Stevens' negligence charge, and we direct the district court to dismiss that last remaining claim against him. 100