Opinion ID: 3153949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ohio Law

Text: {¶ 31} The Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9, contains its own prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. While it contains the same language as the United States Constitution (“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, 11 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”), it provides unique protection for Ohioans: The Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force. In the areas of individual rights and civil liberties, the United States Constitution, where applicable to the states, provides a floor below which state court decisions may not fall. As long as state courts provide at least as much protection as the United States Supreme Court has provided in its interpretation of the federal Bill of Rights, state courts are unrestricted in according greater civil liberties and protections to individuals and groups. Arnold v. Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 616 N.E.2d 163 (1993), paragraph one of the syllabus. Thus, Article I, Section 9 of the Ohio Constitution provides protection independent of the protection provided by the Eighth Amendment. {¶ 32} We have recognized that cases involving cruel and unusual punishments are rare, “limited to those involving sanctions which under the circumstances would be considered shocking to any reasonable person.” McDougle v. Maxwell, 1 Ohio St.2d 68, 70, 203 N.E.2d 334 (1964). As with the Eighth Amendment, lack of proportionality is a key factor: “A punishment does not violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, if it be not so greatly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the sense of justice of the community.” State v. Chaffin, 30 Ohio St.2d 13, 282 N.E.2d 46 (1972), paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 33} Our review is focused on the portion of Blankenship’s sentence that imposes an obligation on him to comply with the registration and addressverification requirements for Tier II sex offenders. We have established that the 12 January Term, 2015 enhanced sex-offender reporting and notification requirements enacted by S.B. 10 are punitive in nature, Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, ¶ 16, and violate the Eighth Amendment when applied to certain juveniles, In re C.P., 131 Ohio St.3d 513, 2012-Ohio-1446, 967 N.E.2d 729. But we have not considered whether the punishment is cruel and unusual when applied to adults. {¶ 34} Blankenship cites In re C.P., in which we were asked to address whether lifetime registration for a new class of juvenile sex-offender registrants constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the federal and state Constitutions. We examined each separately, and in holding that R.C. 2152.86 violated the Ohio Constitution, we stated, S.B. 10 forces registration and notification requirements into a juvenile system where rehabilitation is paramount, confidentiality is elemental, and individualized treatment from judges is essential. The public punishments required by R.C. 2152.86 are automatic, lifelong, and contrary to the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile system. We conclude that they “shock the sense of justice of the community” and thus violate Ohio’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. While In re C.P. was pending, the First District Court of Appeals determined that the Tier II registration requirements associated with a conviction for unlawful sexual conduct with a minor did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. State v. Bradley, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-100833, 2011-Ohio-6266. As a point of comparison, the First District relied upon State v. Hairston, 118 Ohio St.3d 289, 2008-Ohio-2338, 888 N.E.2d 1073, a case in which we upheld a prison 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO sentence of 134 years against a claim of cruel and unusual punishment. After examining the facts in its own case, the First District concluded, We cannot say that the requirement that Bradley register as a sexual offender for 25 years and verify his information every 180 days constitutes one of those rare cases where the punishment is so extreme as to be grossly disproportionate to the crime or that it is shocking to a reasonable person and to the community’s sense of justice. Id. at ¶ 13. {¶ 35} In similar fashion, Blankenship has not overcome the hurdle of showing that his punishment is cruel or unusual. The concerns that led us to conclude that the requirement of lifetime registration for certain juvenile offenders violated Ohio’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in In re C.P. are largely absent when dealing with an adult who engaged in unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. {¶ 36} We are also mindful that “reviewing courts should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes.” Weitbrecht at 373. The General Assembly has seen fit to impose registration sanctions in cases involving sex offenses to protect the public. Indeed, such sanctions now are the norm. People v. Temelkoski, 307 Mich.App. 241, 262, 859 N.W.2d 742 (2014) (“all 50 states and the federal government have enacted some form of sex offender registration and notification provisions”). They cannot be said to be shocking to the sense of