Opinion ID: 1654187
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court Erred By Replacing a Juror After Deliberations Had Begun.

Text: We must decide if the trial courts of this Commonwealth have the authority to engage in post-submission juror substitutions. We conclude that they do not. Having determined that such substitutions are erroneous, our next inquiry is whether those errors should be subject to harmless error analysis. Although previous cases did not use harmless error analysis, we conclude that such juror substitution errors are subject to harmless error analysis, but only if the error is properly preserved. Finally, we must decide whether the error in this case was harmless. We conclude that it was not.
Approximately fifteen minutes after the case had been submitted to the jury in the guilt phase, the trial court appeared on the record stating that one of the jurors had previously been excused from jury duty by the Chief Circuit Judge because the juror had advised the Chief Circuit Judge that he could not sit in judgment of another. After the trial court stated that an alternate juror was available, the Commonwealth suggested that the alternate should take the place of the juror in question. The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth and ordered the alternate juror to be located and returned to the courthouse so he could join the already deliberating jury. Shortly afterwards, the trial court called the jury back into the courtroom. At the bench, the trial court asked the juror who had previously been excused by the Chief Circuit Judge why he had not spoken up during voir dire. Unfortunately, the juror's answer was somewhat unintelligible. The trial court then dismissed that juror [7] and informed the remaining eleven jurors that something had happened, and the alternate juror was on his way back to join their deliberations. The trial court ordered the jury not to deliberate until the new juror arrived. As the trial court was leaving the bench, the Commonwealth Attorney asked if the new juror needed to be re-sworn; but the trial court's answer (if any) was not audible. The proceedings then went off the record. A little over an hour later, the proceedings came back on the record after the jury informed the trial court that it had reached a verdict. Before the jury was brought into the courtroom to announce its verdict and before Crossland's counsel apparently knew what the verdict would be, she objected to the post-submission substitution of the alternate juror. The Commonwealth stated the objection was belated, to which Crossland's attorney stated she planned to object when the alternate arrived and was re-sworn but did not make her objection then because there had been no additional proceedings on the record. The trial court overruled the objection, citing an unnamed federal case as authority for the replacement of the discharged juror with the alternate juror.
Kentucky precedent clearly holds that a trial court errs by replacing a juror with an alternate juror, who has been previously discharged, once the jury has begun deliberating. We believe that precedent is sound. In a case decided by our predecessor court, the jury had been deliberating for an unspecified amount of time when the trial court, over the defendant's objection, discharged one juror in order to permit that juror to attend his father's funeral, then substituted a thirteenth juror ( i.e., an alternate juror) in the discharged juror's place. [8] Our predecessor court held that the court had no right after the jury began its deliberations to substitute the thirteenth juror[,] even though the then-applicable Criminal Code of Practice permitted the selection and qualification of a thirteenth juror. And when the case has been finally submitted to the jury, the function of the thirteenth juror ceases and he should be discharged. [9] Our predecessor court did not address whether that erroneous juror substitution was a harmless error, perhaps because the Commonwealth had conceded on appeal that the substitution was a reversible error. [10] The Court of Appeals confronted a similar situation in Thurman . In that case, an alternate juror heard all of the evidence but was discharged after closing arguments. [11] Shortly after the discharge of the alternate, one of the jurors fell ill and needed to be hospitalized. The trial court called the discharged alternate juror back to the judge's chambers. In a notable departure from the present case, the trial court and counsel questioned the alternate juror about his activities and whereabouts since his discharge. [12] Over the defendant's objections, the trial court returned the discharged alternate to the jury. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the substitution of the discharged alternate juror was erroneous because the discharging of [the alternate juror] released him from his oath and relieved him of his responsibilities as a juror. [13] Although the Court of Appeals expressed empathy to the trial court's quandary, it found no procedure for augmenting a jury to increase its number to that required by law once the jury has begun deliberating. [14] The Court of Appeals recognized that Woods was based upon the former Criminal Code of Practice but believed that the then-applicable Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.32, which required the clerk randomly to reduce the number of jurors to the number required by law before the jury retired to consider its verdict, was an embodiment of the Woods holding.... [15] So [o]nce [the alternate juror] was discharged from the panel he could not be recalled[,] meaning that [t]he trial court should have granted Thurman's motion for mistrial. [16] The Court of Appeals, however, did not engage in any analysis of whether the erroneous substitution could have been a harmless error. RCr 9.32, the rule upon which Thurman was based, was abolished in 1981; and we have not enacted a similar provision in our Rules of Criminal Procedure. But Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 47.02 contains an express provision analogous to the former RCr 9.32. Since there is no criminal rule to the contrary, CR 47.02 applies to criminal cases. [17] Under CR 47.02, a trial court may empanel up to two additional jurors. Significantly, that rule provides only for a pre-submission substitution of an alternate. CR 47.02 provides that [i]f the membership of the jury exceeds the number required by law, immediately before the jury retires to consider its verdict the clerk, in open court, shall ... reduce the jury to the number required by law, whereupon the jurors so selected for elimination shall be excused. In the case now before us, the trial court's decision to order a post-submission juror substitution finds no support in CR 47.02. We are aware that when the trial court discharged the alternate juror and allowed him to leave the courtroom after closing arguments, it admonished the alternate juror not to discuss the case with anyone or to make any ultimate conclusions about the case. But this admonition to the discharged alternate was not effective for replacement purposes. Thurman specifically holds that discharging an alternate juror relieves him of his responsibilities as a juror. [18] Likewise, CR 47.02 requires the jury to be reduced to twelve members before retiring to consider its verdict, whereupon any additional jurors ( i.e., alternates) shall be excused. So when the twelve jurors retire to deliberate, any alternate jurors are necessarily discharged from further jury service regardless of any limiting oral instruction from the trial court. Even if we assume for argument that the juror had not been fully discharged from service because of the trial court's parting admonition, the trial court erred by simply permitting that juror to join the other eleven jurors without undertaking any colloquy with the returning alternate to ensure that he had not discussed the case with anyone or otherwise encountered any circumstance after leaving the courtroom that might have affected his ability to serve as an impartial juror. [19] The third and most recent time this post-deliberation substitution problem has been addressed by Kentucky's appellate courts was in our recent unpublished decision in Holland. [20] In Holland, the jury had deliberated for about two hours when a school principal notified the court that one of the juror's children had suffered a seizure and was in the hospital. The trial court then discussed its options with counsel, and defense counsel suggested substituting the dismissed alternate juror for the juror whose child had fallen ill. The trial court ultimately agreed, and the alternate juror was recalled and substituted. [21] On appeal, the appellant relied upon Thurman for the proposition that the post-deliberation substitution was erroneous. Nevertheless, we refused to reverse, instead holding that the appellant had waived the issue. [22] More specifically, we observed that defense counsel had expressed her support for recalling the alternate juror and that it was simply impermissible ... for defense counsel to advocate one course of action at trial, then appeal the trial court's decision to follow that very recommendation. [23] Admittedly, Woods , Thurman , and Holland are distinguishable in many respects. But we find nothing in any of the three cases that would authorize the post-submission substitution of a juror. Similarly, we find nothing in our procedural rules or statutes to authorize a post-submission substitution of a juror. CR 47.02 requires the alternate jurors to be excused immediately before the jury retires to consider its verdict.... We must conclude that a trial court simply lacks the authority under Kentucky law to order a juror substitution after the jury has begun deliberation. The trial court attempted to justify its decision to recall the alternate juror by discussing an unnamed federal case. But the trial court erred by relying upon federal law on this point for two reasons. First, as previously discussed, Kentucky law specifically forbids post-submission juror substitutions. Second, federal law specifically permits the post-submission substitution of a juror. [24] Similarly, other states have court rules or statutes that would permit post-submission juror substitutions. [25] In contrast, under Kentucky law, there must be twelve jurors in trials in circuit court; [26] but the parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less than twelve (12), except that no jury shall consist of less than six (6) persons. [27] However, such a stipulation can only be made at any time before the jury is sworn.... [28] So, unlike the law in federal court or the law in some other states, Kentucky's trial courts have no authority to force the parties to accept the verdict of a jury composed of less than twelve members or unilaterally to order the post-submission substitution of a juror. Reasonable minds could perhaps differ about whether we should provide a mechanism for the post-submission substitution of a juror. After all, we are empathetic to the quandary faced by trial courts and the parties who have invested time and resources in a jury trial only to discover during deliberation that a juror must be excused. But current Kentucky law does not authorize such post-submission substitutions.
None of the three Kentucky cases previously discussed addresses whether an improper post-submission juror substitution could be a harmless error. Upon reflection, however, we conclude that this type of error should be subjected to a harmless error analysis. Foremost in our reasoning is the inescapable fact that RCr 9.24 mandates that no error or defect in any ruling ... or in anything done or omitted by the court ... is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict ... unless it appears to the court that the denial of such relief would be inconsistent with substantial justice. RCr 9.24 further provides that we must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Virtually all errors, therefore, are subject to harmless error analysis. In addition, a seeming majority of other courts have held that juror substitution of this sort does not violate the constitution. [29] Similarly and significantly, neither Woods , Thurman , nor Holland concluded that post-submission juror substitution was an issue of constitutional import. In fact, none of those three cases even mentions in passing any constitutional dimension to this issue. Even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument alone, that this type of juror substitution error was one of constitutional import, our conclusion that a harmless error standard would apply would be unchanged. Errors of constitutional importthe most fundamental and serious type of errorsare generally analyzed under a harmless error standard. [30] As the Court of Appeals of Michigan noted, [t]he prevailing holding among the [federal] circuits is that reinstating a discharged alternate juror during deliberations, absent consent of the defendant, requires reversal of a conviction only when the defendant has been prejudiced by the procedure. We believe that this is the better, more reasonable rule. [31] Our decision to apply the harmless error standard to this issue should come as no great surprise since we refused to reverse an unpreserved juror substitution error in Holland. [32] After all, we would have had to reverse the conviction in Holland if juror substitution errors were structural errors, not subject to harmless error analysis. By contrast, non-constitutional errors will rarelyperhaps never rise to the level of being a structural error. [33] We reject Crossland's contention that this type of juror substitution error rises to the level of a structural error errors which are, per se, reversible because they undermine the fundamental legitimacy of the judicial process. [34] Structural errors are rare. Examples of errors that have been held to be structural (and, thus, compel reversal) are such fundamental errors as a complete denial of counsel, a biased trial judge, or denial of a public trial. [35] Although a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by jury under both the federal and Kentucky Constitutions, [36] we join many federal courts in concluding that generally, substitution of an alternate juror in place of a regular juror after deliberations have begun does not violate the Constitution.... [37] Because we have already determined that this error is not of constitutional dimension, we conclude that it is both permissible and appropriate to analyze a post-submission juror substitution error under the harmless error standard, provided the error is properly preserved. If the error is not properly preserved, it should be analyzed for palpable error under RCr 10.26.
Having determined that we can use harmless error analysis to examine a properly preserved post-submission juror substitution error, we must now determine whether the error in this particular case was preserved. We conclude it was. Crossland's attorney did not object to the juror substitution until after the trial court had been notified that the jury had reached a verdict. That objection was not, therefore, contemporaneous with the trial court's decision to substitute the discharged alternate. However, when Crossland's counsel made her objection, she explained that she had assumed the trial court would address the alternate juror on the record before dispatching the alternate to join deliberations; and she had intended to make her objection at that time. But that event did not occur on the record. We will not penalize Crossland because the trial court did not afford his attorney a proper forum in which to lodge a contemporaneous objection. Crossland's attorney objected at the first moment the trial court came back on the record after deciding to recall the alternate juror. Importantly, Crossland's counsel objected before knowing the jury's verdict. So we will apply the harmless error standard for preserved errors to this case. A preserved; non-constitutional error is harmless if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error..., [38] But [t]he inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand. [39] So we must determine whether the erroneous post-submission juror substitution had a substantial influence on the outcome, or whether we at least have a grave doubt as to whether the error substantially influenced the jury's guilty verdicts against Crossland. [40] We have a grave doubt about whether the jury's verdict was substantially influenced by the improper jury substitution for two reasons. First, as previously discussed, the trial court failed to ensure that the alternate juror had not been subjected to outside influences that would have compromised his ability to function as an impartial juror. [41] So we are left to speculate as to what the alternate juror did or said, or what was done or said to him, during the period between the submission of the case to the jury and the alternate's reentry into the trial. [42] The importance of jurors not being subjected to outside influences is highlighted by the fact that, absent stipulation of the parties and approval of the court, RCr 9.66 requires deliberating jurors in felony cases to be sequestered. As the Court of Appeals of Maryland held, [a]ssurance that the alternate juror remains qualified to serve is a prerequisite to a substitution and, unless waived by the defendant, must be established on the record. [43] Second, the trial court failed to instruct the newly reconstituted jury to begin its deliberations afresh once the alternate juror joined them. [44] It is well settled that even in jurisdictions that permit post-submission substitutions, a trial court must instruct the jury to begin deliberating anew; and the trial court's failure to do so is reversible error. [45] As the Supreme Court of California has noted, a judge must instruct the jury to set aside any past deliberations and to begin deliberating anew when a post-submission juror substitution occurs in order to insure that each of the 12 jurors reaching the verdict has fully participated in the deliberations, just as each had observed and heard all proceedings in the case. [46] In short, we agree with the Colorado Court of Appeals that a direction from the trial court for the jurors to begin their deliberations afresh is vital to the integrity of the deliberative process.... [47] The jury had not been deliberating Crossland's fate long when the improper substitution occurred. A brief deliberation time before substitution would tend to support a conclusion that the erroneous substitution was a harmless error. [48] Had the trial court examined the substitute and instructed the jury to begin deliberations afresh, we may have found the error to be harmless because Crossland has not pointed to any specific prejudice stemming from the alternate's ultimate participation in deliberating the issues in the case. [49] But the trial court did not engage in either of those prophylactic measures. So we are left to speculate about whether the recalled juror was free of outside taint and whether the newly reconstituted jury began its deliberations afresh or whether the newly recalled juror simply acceded to a decision already arrived at by the other eleven jurors who had begun their deliberations. [50] As the Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded in a similar case, on this record, we would be left to speculate whether the criteria we believe minimally necessary have been satisfied, and we are unwilling to engage in such speculation. [51] And the fact that the jury deliberated a very short time after being reconstituted is a factor that we may take into account in determining whether the erroneous jury substitution prejudiced Crossland. [52] Because we are left in grave doubt about whether the erroneous post-submission substitution had a substantial influence over the outcome of the proceedings, we must reverse Crossland's convictions. [53]