Opinion ID: 307719
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial Court's Own Belief as to Truth of Witness'

Text: 32 Testimony Is No Part of Jencks Act Rationale 33 After the trial judge gave his personal evaluation of the witness Middleton's testimony, he stated, But normally that would be a matter for the jury, not for me. But Jencks says you must have this material. 41 If the trial judge had omitted the word normally -But that would be a matter for the jury, not for me-he would have been on sound ground. He erred in thinking that this was an abnormal case in which he was required to evaluate the witness' credibility, because . . . Jencks says you must have this material. (Emphasis supplied.) 34 The trial judge thus confused two entirely separate matters, his belief as to the truth of the witness' testimony and the obligation of the Government to produce Jencks material or incur the penalty provided by the Jencks Act. This was reasoning from a false premise, because there is nothing in the rationale behind the penalty which may be imposed under the Jencks Act that has anything to do with the trial judge's own belief (or lack of belief) in the witness' testimony. 35 As we discussed the rationale of the Jencks Act, The command of the statute is thus designed to further the fair and just administration of criminal justice, a goal of which the judiciary is the special guardian. 42 The lever provided by the Jencks Act to further the fair and just administration of criminal justice is to penalize the Government, if it elects not to produce the statements. There is nothing in the Act or the background of the Act which implies that the trial judge's action in striking or barring a witness' testimony is to be influenced in any way by his opinion of the veracity of the particular witness involved. Logically there is no reason why the trial court's opinion on the witness' veracity should relate to the Government's obligation to produce or incur the penalty. 36 Bear in mind that in the case at bar the trial judge took up the Jencks Act question in a preliminary hearing held to inquire under Wade-Gilbert-Stovall as to the admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony. 43 As this court en banc has recently had occasion to observe, in connection with pre-trial suppression hearings on identification, In considering the admissibility of identification evidence at trial, constitutional infirmities will bar its admission, but testimonial infirmities go only to the weight of the evidence. We start with the principle, well phrased by Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger in a different context but thoroughly applicable here: 'When an eyewitness is willing to give testimony, under oath and subject to all the rigors of cross-examination and penalties of perjury, he must be heard.' 44 In that case as here, we recognized that a witness' veracity should be considered by the jury and not by the trial judge.