Opinion ID: 68633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: We review the BIA’s resolution of questions of law de novo, “giving considerable deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the legislative scheme it is 5 No. 07-60712 entrusted to administer.” Zhu v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 588, 594 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We review factual findings of the Board to determine if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Mikhael v. INS, 115 F.3d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 1997). Under this stringent standard, we will reverse the BIA’s decision “only when the evidence is ‘so compelling that no reasonable fact finder could fail to find’ the petitioner statutorily eligible for relief.” Roy v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 132, 138 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992)). Mere disagreement with the BIA’s factual findings is not a sufficient ground for reversal; we may reverse only if the evidence compels a conclusion opposite to that reached by the BIA. See Girma v. INS, 283 F.3d 664, 669 (5th Cir. 2002); Mikhael, 115 F.3d at 304; see also Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 622 (1966) (“[T]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.”). “Even though we have authority to review only the BIA’s decision, we may consider the IJ’s decision to the extent that it influenced the BIA.” Masih v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2008). “As a general matter, the determination that an alien is not eligible for consideration for asylum is a factual conclusion reviewed under the substantial-evidence standard.” Thuri v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 788, 791 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Zamora-Morel v. INS, 905 F.2d 833, 838 (5th Cir. 1990). The same is true of the more specific determination of whether the alien suffered persecution on account of a statutorily enumerated ground. Thuri, 380 F.3d at 791; see also Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 350-51 (5th Cir. 2002). We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to remand for abuse of discretion. Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 523 (9th Cir. 2000).