Opinion ID: 629046
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Standard for Admissibility

Text: 18 For many years, the admissibility of novel scientific evidence has been tested under the standard first announced in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). The court stated: 19 Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. 20 Frye, 293 F. at 1014. The majority of jurisdictions, including the Eighth Circuit, 8 adopted the Frye test of general acceptance in the ensuing years, discussing, defining, and attempting to refine it as new and more complex forms of novel scientific evidence surfaced in the legal arena. 9 See McCormick Sec. 203 at 869-70. 21 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence supersede the Frye test: the admissibility of expert opinion testimony concerning novel scientific evidence no longer is limited solely to knowledge or evidence generally accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific community. The Court did not, however, sanction the wholesale abandonment of standards for admission of expert opinion based upon a scientific evidence or knowledge; on the contrary the Court stated: 22 That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence does not mean, however, that the Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening such evidence. To the contrary, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. 23 Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2794-95. 24 Thus, according to the Court, Rule 702 mandates that the district court act as gatekeeper for the admission of novel scientific evidence. Before admitting scientific expert testimony, the court must conclude, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) 10 that the proposed testimony constitutes (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. Id. at ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2794-95. This requires the court to make a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology ... is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. 25 The Court first considered the requirement that the expert testify concerning scientific knowledge. According to the Court, the subject of scientific testimony does not have to be known to a certainty; however, in order to qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation--i.e. 'good grounds,' based on what is known. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. 26 The Court further stated that Rule 702 requires that expert testimony must assist the trier of fact. According to the Court, this condition is primarily one of relevance. In order to satisfy the precondition that the testimony assist, or be helpful to the jury, the proponent of the testimony must demonstrate that the evidence bears a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry. Id. 27 In assessing the reliability of novel scientific evidence, courts should consider the following non-exclusive list of factors: 28 (1) Whether the scientific technique can be (and has been) tested. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. 29 (2) Whether the technique or theory has been subjected to peer review and publication. While not a sine qua non of admissibility, [t]he fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer-reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is premised. Id. 30 (3) The known rate of error of the technique and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation. Id. 31 (4) Whether the technique is generally accepted. A 'reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that community.' Widespread acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible, and 'a known technique that has been able to attract only minimal support within the community,' may properly be viewed with skepticism. Id. (citations omitted). 32 The Court noted that other portions of the Rules of Evidence give trial courts the power to control expert testimony. First, the Court noted that Rule 703 requires that if experts rely on otherwise inadmissible hearsay, that expert's opinion may be admitted only to the extent that the facts or data  'are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.'  Second, the Court also noted that Rule 403 is of special import, because  '[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses.'  Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2798. (quoting Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)). 33 Finally, the Court stated that [t]he inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one. Its overarching subject is the scientific validity--and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability--of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate. Id. 34 We must now consider what effect Daubert has on the admissibility of DNA evidence. The Second Circuit recently examined the general theory underlying DNA fingerprinting as well as the specific techniques employed by the FBI, and concluded that in the future courts could take judicial notice of their reliability. See United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 799-800 (2d Cir.1992). Although Jakobetz was written before Daubert, the court employed a reliability approach to Rule 702 similar to that taken in Daubert. We conclude that the Second Circuit's conclusions as to the reliability of the general theory and techniques of DNA profiling are valid under the Supreme Court's holding in Daubert, and hold that in the future courts can take judicial notice of their reliability. If new techniques are offered, however, the district court must hold an in limine hearing under the Daubert standard as set out above. 35 The fact that we have taken judicial notice of the reliability of the technique of DNA profiling does not mean that expert testimony concerning DNA profiling is automatically admissible under Daubert. A number of courts have required that the trial court further inquire into whether the expert properly performed the techniques involved in creating the DNA profiles. See People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup.Ct.1989) (holding that admissibility conditioned on a finding that the expert properly performed the protocols underlying DNA profiling); United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir.1990) (same), vacated and dismissed as moot, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir.1991); but see Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 800 (court should inquire as to whether the protocols were properly performed, but this issue should generally go to the weight rather than admissibility of the evidence). We must consider whether such a requirement exists after Daubert. 36 We believe that the reliability inquiry set forth in Daubert mandates that there be a preliminary showing that the expert properly performed a reliable methodology in arriving at his opinion. The Daubert Court stated that under the Rules, the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. This suggests that the inquiry extends beyond simply the reliability of the principles or methodologies in the abstract. In order to determine whether scientific testimony is reliable, the court must conclude that the testimony was derived from the application of a reliable methodology or principle in the particular case. 37 At the same time, the Court specifically counseled courts to respect the differing functions of judge and jury. It stated that the focus of the foundational inquiry must be upon the principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2797. The Court further noted that [v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burdens of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. Id. 38 Thus, we conclude that the court should make an initial inquiry into the particular expert's application of the scientific principle or methodology in question. The court should require the testifying expert to provide affidavits attesting that he properly performed the protocols involved in DNA profiling. If the opponent of the evidence challenges the application of the protocols in a particular case, the district court must determine whether the expert erred in applying the protocols, and if so, whether such error so infected the procedure as to make the results unreliable. 39 We emphasize, however, that this inquiry is of necessity a flexible one. Not every error in the application of a particular methodology should warrant exclusion. An alleged error in the application of a reliable methodology should provide the basis for exclusion of the opinion only if that error negates the basis for the reliability of the principle itself. We agree with the Third Circuit that an allegation of failure to properly apply a scientific principle should provide the basis for exclusion of an expert opinion only if a reliable methodology was so altered [by a particular expert] as to skew the methodology itself.... In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 858 (3d Cir.1990).