Opinion ID: 200493
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Discrimination Under ADA and Chapter 151B

Text: 32 Benoit next argues that the district court erred in granting TMC summary judgment on his disability discrimination claims. To prevail on such a claim under the ADA or its Massachusetts analogue, Chapter 151B, Benoit must establish that he (1) suffered from a disability as defined by the statutes; (2) was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his employment with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) was subject to an adverse employment action. Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 237 (1st Cir.2002). Benoit fails to satisfy the first element. 33 In order to be considered disabled or handicapped under the statutes, Benoit must demonstrate a physical or mental impairment that substantially limited one or more of his major life activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 1(17); See Carroll, 294 F.3d at 237 n. 3 (stating that, with some exceptions, the definitions of disability under the federal law are virtually identical to the definitions of handicap under Massachusetts law, and as such the state has looked to federal case law in interpreting the statute). 3 34 The Supreme Court has held that these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002). A substantial limitation cannot include any impairment which interferes in only a minor way with the performance of manual tasks, and the phrase major life activities refers to only those activities which are of central importance to daily life. Id. The impact of the impairment must also be permanent or long term. Id. at 198, 122 S.Ct. 681; Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 30-31 (1st Cir.1996). 35 Benoit complained of back pain beginning in late 1991, but the injury was insufficiently severe to merit a doctor's appointment until March 26, 1998. After his first doctor's appointment, Benoit was diagnosed as having low back strain and a strain of the knees. The doctor added that the cause of these strains could have been improper lifting techniques or the fact that Benoit had gained weight. A follow-up visit on March 31, 1998, revealed that Benoit had back and shoulder sprains. The subsequent medical reports indicate that Benoit had a physical impairment. 36 This impairment, however, does not rise to the level of disability or handicap as defined by the statutes, because no major life activity was impaired. Benoit claims that he was substantially limited in the major life activity of working. However, the inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute the required substantial limitation. Lebron-Torres v. Whitehall Labs., 251 F.3d 236, 240 (1st Cir.2001)(citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). The only activity that Benoit was advised by his doctor to avoid was heavy lifting, and Benoit has not demonstrated that this precluded him from working in a substantial class or broad range of jobs. Id. Benoit had continued working as a finisher throughout the years despite his complaints of back pain, and returned to work as a grinder the day after his doctor's appointment. 37 Further, there is no indication that the impairment was permanent or long term. Benoit's medical records indicate that the impairment was temporary, and the treatment for the injury was limited to a prescription for anti-inflammatory drugs and pain relievers. Benoit did not seek further medical attention for his injury until after a little more than a month had passed, and he did not indicate to any subsequent employers or prospective employers that he had any physical restrictions. 38 Benoit alternatively contends that TMC regarded him as disabled. Thus, he argues, he should be protected, as someone who whether actually impaired or not, may be the victim[ ] of stereotypic assumptions, myths, and fears regarding such limitations. Dahill v. Police Dept., 434 Mass. 233, 748 N.E.2d 956, 962-63 (2001). The evidence does not support this argument. A plaintiff claiming that he is `regarded' as disabled cannot merely show that his employer perceived him as somehow disabled; rather, he must prove that the employer regarded him as disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1169 (1st Cir.2002)(emphasis in original). Although Benoit requested simple stands to assist with lifting, he at no point indicated to TMC that he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA. The fact that TMC assigned Benoit to the lighter work of grinding after Benoit sustained a work injury and visited a doctor shows no more than TMC's possible awareness of a temporary injury. See Champagne v. Servistar Corp., 138 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 1998)(That [defendant] voluntarily decided to [accommodate plaintiff] for a period of time does not establish that [plaintiff] was disabled or that [this] was a required reasonable accommodation.); Katz, 87 F.3d at 31 (listing examples of impairments that are usually not disabilities because they are temporary, non-chronic, and of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, including sprains)(internal quotations omitted). The evidence shows that TMC believed, at most, that Benoit was temporarily unable to meet the requirements of one particular job, that of finishing. This is not enough. See Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1170. 39