Opinion ID: 165834
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reverse Racial Discrimination Claim.

Text: Lyons’ claim that she was subjected to disparate treatment because she is white is subject to a reverse discrimination analysis. As a result, in evaluating Lyons’ prima facie showing under the McDonnell Douglas paradigm, the magistrate judge was required to apply the standards that this court adopted in -10- Notari v. Denver Water Dep’t , 971 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992). Under Notari , for a reverse discrimination claimant to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the claimant must “establish background circumstances that support an inference that the defendant is one of those unusual employers who discriminates against the majority.” Id. 589. “Alternatively, a reverse discrimination plaintiff may satisfy the first prong of McDonnell Douglas by presenting ‘indirect evidence sufficient to support a reasonable probability, that but for the plaintiff’s status the challenged employment decision would have favored the plaintiff.’” Stover v. Martinez , 382 F.3d 1064, 1076 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Notari , 971 F.2d at 590). We agree with the magistrate judge that Lyons failed to put forth sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of reverse racial discrimination, as Lyons “has produced insufficient evidence from which a jury could find that Red Roof engaged in a pattern of terminating white employees because of an anti-white bias.” R., Doc. 29 at 19. As a result, we agree with the magistrate judge that Lyons “has failed to point to evidence to demonstrate that Red Roof is one of those unusual employers who discriminates against the majority.” Id. We also agree with the magistrate judge that Lyons has not produced any “indirect evidence sufficient to support a reasonable probability, that, but for her -11- status as a white person, she would not have been disciplined or terminated.” Id. at 17. In particular, we agree with the following analysis of the magistrate judge: It is clear that plaintiff believes she was being singled out for unfair treatment. However, there is a difference between unfair treatment and illegal treatment. Plaintiff fails to provide content sufficient evidence of any pattern that Red Roof treated similarly situated African American or Hispanic employees more favorably than white employees, including Lyons. Rather, the evidence allows only the inference that plaintiff believed that she was being picked on and that she believed she was unfairly disciplined and then terminated because she believed that [her supervisor] was biased against white women. Id. at 18. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of RRI on Lyons’ reverse racial discrimination claim. D. Document Requests Related to Disparate Treatment Claims. In her opening brief, Lyons claims that the district court erred by “denying her pertinent evidence to help her further prove pretext and [that] discriminatory adverse employment actions did occur.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 4. Specifically, Lyons argues that the district court erred by failing “to order Red Roof Inns to supply her with all Room Rack Reports of all employees in the years 2001 and 2002.” Id. Having carefully reviewed the record (in particular, the motion to compel that Lyons filed in the district court, see R., Doc. 19), we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order RRI to produce the requested room rack reports in the context of RRI’s motion for summary -12- judgment. 6 See Soma Med. Int’l v. Standard Chartered Bank , 196 F.3d 1292, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999) (“We review discovery rulings for an abuse of discretion.”). First, Lyons failed to move for a discovery continuance under Rule 56(f) during the proceedings before the magistrate judge. Consequently, Lyons waived any issues under Rule 56(f). See Marshall v. Chater , 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation are deemed waived.”). Second, even if the arguments set forth in Lyons’ motion to compel had been submitted to the magistrate judge as part of a proper Rule 56(f) motion and affidavit, it would have been an abuse of discretion for the magistrate judge to grant a discovery continuance under Rule 56(f). See Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency of Sandy City , 998 F.2d 1550, 1553 (10th Cir. 1993) (“We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 56(f) motion for an abuse of discretion.”). To be entitled to a discovery continuance under Rule 56(f), a party must show precisely how additional discovery will lead to a genuine issue of material fact. See Jensen , 998 F.2d at 1554; Price ex rel. Price v. W. Res., Inc. , 232 F.3d 779, 783 (10th Cir. 2000). Here, Lyons claims that the room rack reports for 2001 are “relevant and needed . . . to name all other employees who committed 6 Because they are relevant to the discovery issues raised by Lyons in this appeal, we have supplemented the record before this court with the following district court documents: Docs. 19, 20, 21, 28, 30. -13- the same or similar offense as Eva Lyons in the year 2001.” R., Doc. 19 at 1-2. We disagree. As the exhibits attached to Lyons’ summary judgment response brief demonstrate, the room rack reports do not contain enough information to make that determination. Id. , Doc. 26, Exs. 19, 20, 21. As a result, even if Lyons had obtained the room rack reports for 2001, the reports would have been insufficient for purposes of defeating RRI’s motion for summary judgment. Lyons’ claim that she needed the room rack reports for 2002 to oppose RRI’s motion for summary judgment is also without merit. As set forth above, Lyons argues that “[d]ocuments of room rack reports in the year 2002 [are] needed to prove that after Red Roof Inns employer set up and terminated Eva Lyons for not completing a room rack report, the employer no longer expected employees to complete room rack reports.” Id. , Doc. 19 at 2 (emphasis added). However, to the extent that the alleged elimination of the room-rack requirement was applied across the board to all RRI employees as Lyons alleges, then it has no relevance to her claim that RRI treated its white female employees less favorably than other employees. Finally, we note that the discussion set forth herein concerning the abovereferenced discovery issues is limited to the context of RRI’s motion for summary judgment. Consequently, the district court is free to address any additional discovery issues that may arise in connection with the remand of Lyons’ gender -14- discrimination claim. That said, we express no opinion as to whether any additional discovery would be appropriate on remand, and we leave the matter of discovery to the discretion of the district court. E. Retaliation Claim. Title VII forbids retaliation against an employee because she “has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because [s]he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). In cases such as this one, “[w]here there is no direct evidence of retaliation, we analyze a retaliation claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.” Stover , 382 F.3d at 1070. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, an employee must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Id. “To state a prima facie case of retaliation, [Lyons] must demonstrate that: (1) she engaged in protected opposition to discrimination; (2) [RRI] took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) there exists a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Id. at 1071. Lyons claims that she has put forth sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because: (1) she was listed as a witness on Harley Lyons’ Colorado Civil Rights Division intake form, see R., Doc. 26, Ex. 16 at 2; (2) “Red Roof Inn and Shane DeVilbiss . . . had access to Harley Lyons[’] CCRD intake -15- form” and were “100% aware that [she] gave assistance to Harley Lyons in support of his charge of discrimination,” id. , Doc. 26 at 8; and (3) “the adverse actions [taken] against her [by RRI] were related to her relationship with Harley Lyons and her involvement with his case of discrimination against Red Roof Inn,” id. As noted by the magistrate judge, “[t]estifying for an employee who has filed a charge or a lawsuit claiming a violation of Title VII is a protected activity under Title VII, but an employer cannot engage in unlawful retaliation if it does not know that the employee has opposed or is opposing a violation of Title VII.” Id. , Doc. 29 at 22 (citing Petersen v. Utah Dep’t of Corr. , 301 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002)). According to the magistrate judge, Lyons “[f]ail[ed] to meet the employer knowledge first element of a prima facie case of retaliation,” because “[p]laintiff . . . fail[ed] to provide any evidence that Red Roof knew that she was a listed witness for her husband in his discrimination case at any time between the time he filed his charge, or his lawsuit in May of 2001, and the date plaintiff was fired in December of 2001.” Id. at 23. The magistrate judge is correct that “an employer cannot engage in unlawful retaliation if it does not know that the employee has opposed or is opposing a violation of Title VII.” Petersen , 301 F.3d at 1188. We also agree with the magistrate judge that there is no specific factual evidence in the record -16- showing that Lyons’ supervisor knew at the time he terminated her that she was listed as a witness in Harley Lyons’ discrimination case or was otherwise assisting him with his discrimination case. 7 Instead, the record indicates only that there are disputed factual issues concerning when Lyons’ supervisor became aware of Lyons’ romantic involvement with Harvey Lyons. The latter factual issues, while tangentially relevant, are insufficient to defeat RRI’s motion for summary judgment. 7 In her affidavit, Lyons claimed that “[t]he [Colorado Civil Rights Division] intake form remained in the files which Red Roof Inn had access to and Red Roof Inn ultimately knew I was assisting Harvey Lyons.” R., Doc. 26, Ex. 1 at 2, ¶ 7. Lyons failed to set forth specific facts to support this conclusory allegation, however. As a result, even if Lyons had been “actively helping [Harvey Lyons] with his lawsuit” and had “agreed to be a witness for him,” id. , ¶¶ 5, 7, she failed to put forth specific evidence showing that RRI was aware of those facts at the time of her termination. -17- The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED and REMANDED IN PART for further proceedings. 8 Lyons’ motion requesting oral argument is DENIED. Entered for the Court Stephen H. Anderson