Opinion ID: 666003
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal Preemption Doctrine

Text: 27 It is unquestioned that Congress has the authority, in the exercise of its Article I powers, to preempt state laws by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100, 109 S.Ct. 1661, 1664, 104 L.Ed.2d 86 (1989). Determining when such preemption has in fact occurred, however, is not always a simple task. Preemption is, of course, most easily recognized when Congress displaces state law by so stating in express terms. Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 203, 103 S.Ct. at 1722. Federal preemption also occurs when an actual conflict develops between federal and state law. Id. at 204, 103 S.Ct. at 1722. The Supreme Court has described actual conflict as including situations in which compliance with both federal and state law is a physical impossibility and cases in which state law obstructs the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Id. (citations omitted). A third variety of preemption arises when a scheme of federal legislation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. Id. 28 In approaching a preemption question, we must keep in mind that all three types of preemption are premised on a determination of congressional intent to displace the police power of the states. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369, 106 S.Ct. 1890, 1899, 90 L.Ed.2d 369 (1986) (The critical question in any pre-emption analysis is always whether Congress intended that federal regulation supersede state law.). When Congress legislates in a field of activity traditionally regulated by the states, we must start with a presumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. ARC Am., 490 U.S. at 101, 109 S.Ct. at 1665. Real property law has been recognized by the Supreme Court as a matter of special concern to the states. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 3022, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982). Although the Court has said that the general principles governing the three types of preemption analysis are applicable even in areas of the law that are matter[s] of special concern to the States, id., the Court has also indicated that a kind of heightened scrutiny in the form of a plain statement rule is required before we may find federal preemption of state power in traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance, Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, ----, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 2401, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) (citations omitted). It has been noted that federal courts are generally reluctan[t] to infer preemption in ambiguous cases. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Sec. 6-25 (2d ed. 1988). 29 State law can be preempted by regulations promulgated by federal agencies acting within the scope of their congressionally delegated authority as well as by federal legislation. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 369, 106 S.Ct. at 1898; de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153, 102 S.Ct. at 3022. A pre-emptive regulation's force does not depend on express congressional authorization to displace state law; moreover, whether the [agency] failed to exercise an option to promulgate regulations which did not disturb state law is not dispositive. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 154, 102 S.Ct. at 3023. Agency decisions to preempt state law are entitled to judicial deference, and if an agency's choice to preempt represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned. City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 64, 108 S.Ct. 1637, 1642, 100 L.Ed.2d 48 (1988) (citing United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383, 81 S.Ct. 1554, 1560, 6 L.Ed.2d 908 (1961)). In de la Cuesta, the Court made clear that cases of administrative preemption require consideration of two questions: (1) did the agency intend to preempt the state law in question, and (2) if so, was that action within the scope of the agency's delegated authority? de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 154, 102 S.Ct. at 302. 30 The state of Texas strongly urges that we should apply the plain statement rule of Gregory to the instant case. We cannot agree. In Gregory, the Supreme Court held that the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) did not preempt a provision of the Missouri Constitution providing for mandatory retirement of Missouri state judges at age seventy. Gregory, --- U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2408. Because Congress did not unambiguously intend to include state judges within the ambit of the ADEA, the Court declined to find any intent to preempt on Congress' part. Id. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2406. Although the Court did not clearly define the circumstances under which this plain statement rule should be applied, it did state that Missouri's law regarding the qualifications of state judges goes beyond an area traditionally regulated by the States; it is a decision of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity. Id. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2400; see also id. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2402 (describing the power to determine the qualifications of state officials as lying at the heart of representative government). Although the regulation of real property may be a matter of special concern to the states, de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153, 102 S.Ct. at 3022, it does not seem to us to strike at the heart of representative government in the same way that the ADEA did in Gregory. See Reich v. New York, 3 F.3d 581, 589-90 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that a federal requirement that states pay overtime to their police officers did not strike at the heart of representative government (internal quotations omitted)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1187, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (1994); Gately v. Massachusetts, 2 F.3d 1221, 1230 (1st Cir.1993) (holding that Gregory's plain statement rule did not apply to state mandatory retirement laws pertaining to police officers). 31 Our holding that Gregory is inapposite to the instant case, however, in no way changes the presumption that historic police powers of the States are not superseded by federal law unless preemption is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress, or, in this case, of the rule-making agency. ARC Am., 490 U.S. at 101, 109 S.Ct. at 1665. With this general principle in mind, we turn to the legal materials on which the banks rely as preempting the homestead law of Texas. 32