Opinion ID: 1402588
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Requested Instruction on the Standard with which to View the Defendant's Actions

Text: {14} Coffin also requested that the trial court give the following instruction to the jury relating to his claim of self-defense: An accused's actions are to be viewed from the standpoint of a person whose mental and physical characteristics are like the accused's and who sees what the accused sees and knows what the accused knows. Coffin contends his requested instruction is an accurate statement of the law because it is simply a verbatim recitation of the standard articulated by the Court of Appeals in State v. Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, 249, 719 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Ct.App.1986), abrogated in part on other grounds by State v. Alberico, 116 N.M. 156, 167, 861 P.2d 192, 203 (1993). Additionally, Coffin claims that he is entitled to instructions on his theories of the case that are supported by the evidence, State v. Chamberlain, 112 N.M. 723, 728, 819 P.2d 673, 678 (1991), and that the trial court therefore erred in denying the instruction. We have previously rejected a similar argument, see State v. Vigil, 110 N.M. 254, 257, 794 P.2d 728, 731 (1990), and for the following two reasons, we reject Coffin's argument as well. {15} First, Coffin misapplies Gallegos. As indicated by the self-defense instruction given to the jury in this case, we have established three requirements for self-defense in New Mexico: (1) an appearance of immediate danger of death or great bodily harm to the defendant, (2) the defendant was in fact put in fear by the apparent danger, and (3) a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have reacted similarly. State v. Abeyta, 120 N.M. 233, 239, 901 P.2d 164, 170 (1995), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Campos, 1996-NMSC-043, n. 4, 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266. The first two requirements, the appearance of immediate danger and actual fear, are subjective in that they focus on the perception of the defendant at the time of the incident. By contrast, the third requirement is objective in that it focuses on the hypothetical behavior of a reasonable person acting under the same circumstances as the defendant. Thus, ours is a hybrid test, combining both, the subjective and the objective, standards. . . . Gallegos, 104 N.M. at 250, 719 P.2d at 1271. {16} Coffin's proffered instruction quotes language from Gallegos that the Court of Appeals used to describe the subjective standard applicable to the first requirement of self-defense that there be the appearance of immediate danger of death or great bodily harm to the defendant. See Gallegos, 104 N.M. at 249, 719 P.2d at 1270. The Court of Appeals did not use this language to describe the objective requirement of self-defense. This language, if applied to the third requirement of self-defense, whether a reasonable person would have acted similarly, would nullify the objective aspect of the law of self-defense in New Mexico. Therefore, because we believe that Coffin's instruction would have unduly confused the jury with respect to the combined subjective/objective nature of self-defense, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Coffin's requested instruction. {17} Second, Coffin's requested jury instruction represents an amplification of the first element articulated in the self-defense instruction given. While it is true that a defendant is entitled to instructions on defense theories supported by the evidence, see Chamberlain, 112 N.M. at 728, 819 P.2d at 678, it is error to refuse a requested instruction defining or amplifying an element only if the element was not adequately covered by the instructions given. State v. Mankiller, 104 N.M. 461, 468, 722 P.2d 1183, 1190 (Ct.App.1986) (discussing additional considerations for assessing error in such instances), see State v. Magby, 1998-NMSC-042, ¶¶ 15-16, 126 N.M. 361, 969 P.2d 965 (concluding that the trial court erred in refusing a requested instruction defining reckless disregard due to the ambiguity of the phrase in the instruction given). In this case, the self-defense instruction adequately informed the jury that the first requirement of self-defense, an appearance of immediate danger of death or great bodily harm to the defendant, was based on Coffin's subjective assessment of the incident. See Vigil, 110 N.M. at 257, 794 P.2d at 731 (concluding that the trial court's refusal to give a similar requested instruction concerning subjective factors to be considered by the jury did not constitute error because the self-defense instruction adequately explained the law to be applied in this case). Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to give Coffin's requested amplification of the first requirement of self-defense.