Opinion ID: 1975073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Milton Widem, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Text: SPEZIALE, J. The principal issue on this appeal is whether § 49-14 [1] of the General Statutes, Connecticut's deficiency judgment statute, is unconstitutional because it fails to safeguard a person's constitutional right not to be deprived of his property without due process of law. We now decide that § 49-14 of the General Statutes is unconstitutional because it does not comply with the procedural due process of law requirements of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution. This appeal presents an attack by the defendant Vincent Osowiecki on the constitutionality of General Statutes § 49-14. Osowiecki, who cosigned a mortgage note with the defendant Chestnut Estates, Inc., has appealed the deficiency judgment rendered for the plaintiff-mortgagee, Society for Savings, claiming that the procedure set out in § 49-14 fails to satisfy the requirements of due process under the state and federal constitutions. Conn. Const., art. 1, § 10; U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. On September 22, 1976, the plaintiff brought this action against the defendants Chestnut Estates, Inc., Vincent Osowiecki, and Westwood Park, Inc., claiming, inter alia, strict foreclosure of a mortgage on forty-one parcels of land, with buildings and improvements, located in Tolland. On November 5, 1976, the plaintiff filed its motion for judgment by strict foreclosure and for appointment of appraisers pursuant to § 49-14. The defendants filed no plea or answer and the court found for the plaintiff in the sum of $231,316.62, including $1500 in attorney's fees. The law day was set for December 14, 1976, by which time the defendants were to pay the sum owed, with interest from November 12, 1976, and costs of the suit taxed at $738.10, failing which their equity of redemption would be foreclosed. Pursuant to § 49-14, the plaintiff had moved for appointment of three disinterested appraisers to return their written report of appraisal within ten days after the time limit for redemption had expired. The defendant Osowiecki objected to that motion on the ground that the statute is unconstitutional because it does not provide him with any meaningful hearing during which he can give testimony or present evidence or testimony of third persons; it fails to provide a proper mechanism for the selection of appraisers; the appraisers lack any authority whatsoever to conduct a meaningful hearing to determine the value of the subject property; and it fails to provide him with an opportunity to examine or cross-examine the bases upon which the premises are to be valued and upon which the appraisers will base their conclusion and their appraisal price. The court appointed three appraisers, who filed their report in which they found the value of the property to be $152,000. The defendant Osowiecki filed an objection to the report, citing, inter alia, the statute's failure to provide for notice, hearing, and cross-examination. He also complained that the report of the appraisers lacked findings of fact upon which they based their conclusion as to the value of the property. The plaintiff thereafter moved for a deficiency judgment in the amount of $88,614.83, plus reasonable appraisal fees. The defendant Osowiecki objected to the motion for deficiency judgment for the same reasons cited in his objection to the report of the appraisers, the plaintiff demurred to the objection, and the court sustained the plaintiff's demurrer and denied Osowiecki's objection, finding no due process violation and, moreover, finding that the defendant had waived his right to due process protection when he refused to speak with respect to the appointment of the appraisers. The motion for deficiency judgment was then granted and judgment was rendered for $90,697.42, plus costs of appraisal in the amount of $450. Subsequently the judgment was opened to allow $9500 in attorney's fees in a supplemental judgment. Osowiecki, hereinafter the defendant, appealed from the deficiency judgment. The assignments of error that have been briefed and argued by the defendant are that the court erred: (1) in upholding the constitutionality of § 49-14; and (2) by deciding that the refusal of the defendant to participate in the nomination of the appraisers constituted a waiver of his constitutional rights.