Opinion ID: 198984
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Insufficiency of Evidence Arguments Raised by Ortiz-Figueroa and Ortiz-Santiago4

Text: 136 Ortiz-Figueroa argues that there is insufficient evidence to uphold his conviction on Counts 51, 53, and 65. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 848(e)(1)(A); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c). Specifically, he states that no evidence linked him to the planning of the caceria that resulted in the murder of Pacheco-Aponte, and no evidence linked the firearms seized from him at the time of his arrest with the actual murder or the drug conspiracy. 137 Similarly, Ortiz-Santiago raises an insufficiency of the evidence argument against his conviction on Count 53. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 2. He contends that (1) the Pacheco-Aponte murder was neither reasonably foreseeable nor in furtherance of the conspiracy to kill the Rosario-Rodriguez brothers, and consequently Pinkerton liability does not apply; and (2) the evidence did not show that he aided and abetted the Pacheco-Aponte murder because he did not assist with it or actively seek its occurrence. Neither appellant raises a colorable claim. 138 Hidalgo-Melendez testified that Ortiz-Santiago spoke to Colon-Miranda by telephone while Colon-Miranda and other co-conspirators planned the caceria that resulted in the murder of Pacheco-Aponte. At that time, Ortiz-Santiago agreed that he and Ortiz-Figueroa would act as scouts, informing Colon-Miranda of the location of the Rosario-Rodriguez brothers for the time that we were going to go into the housing project to kill them. This testimony was partially corroborated by David Martinez-Matta. Further testimony given by various government witnesses indicated that Ortiz-Santiago and Ortiz-Figueroa were present at the caceria and that fellow co-conspirator David Martinez-Matta mistakenly shot at them. In addition, Ortiz-Santiago and Ortiz-Figueroa were arrested as they fled from the crime scene. Appellants' clothing matched a bystander's description of the culprits, and the arresting officer seized firearms, ammunition, a cellular telephone, narcotics, and two masks (one stained with blood) from Ortiz-Figueroa. 139 Based on this evidence, Ortiz-Figueroa cannot show that no rational jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Rodriguez, 162 F.3d at 141. As we have already stated, the factfinder may decide among reasonable interpretations of the evidence. Scantleberry-Frank, 158 F.3d at 616 (quotation omitted). Here, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to raise a reasonable inference that Ortiz-Figueroa was a knowing and voluntary participant in the conspiracy to kill the Rosario-Rodriguez brothers. See id. Accordingly, we reject appellant's claim of mere presence and uphold his conviction on Count 51. See,e.g., United States v. Echeverri, 982 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1993) (The attendant circumstances tell the tale -- and the culpability of a defendant's presence hinges upon whether the circumstances fairly imply participatory involvement. In other words, a defendant's 'mere presence' argument will fail in situations where the 'mere' is lacking.); Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d at 18 ([I]t runs counter to human experience to suppose that criminal conspirators would welcome innocent nonparticipants as witnesses to their crimes.). 140 The evidence outlined above is equally conclusive as to both of these appellants' convictions on Count 53 for the murder of Pacheco-Aponte. While the government argues that aider and abettor liability is applicable, we rely on Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-48 (1946). In Pinkerton, the Supreme Court held that a conspirator may be held vicariously liable for a substantive crime committed by a co-conspirator if that crime is reasonably foreseeableand committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Seeid.; see also United States v. Shea, 150 F.3d 44, 50 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Tse, 135 F.3d 200, 206 (1st Cir. 1998);United States v. White, 116 F.3d 948, 951 (1st Cir. 1997). 141 Count 51 alleged an agreement to kill the Rosario-Rodriguez brothers and other individuals whom the defendants herein believed to be associated with [them]. Ortiz-Santiago concedes his participation in the Count 51 conspiracy. And, as we have just concluded, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to tie Ortiz-Figueroa to this conspiracy as well. The record, moreover, is conclusive that (1) the caceria that resulted in the murder of Pacheco-Aponte was undertaken to kill the Rosarios, (2) Ortiz-Santiago and Ortiz-Figueroa were present and participated in this caceria, (3) the murder victim, Pacheco-Aponte, was an associate of the Rosarios, and (4) during the caceria, appellants and their co-conspirators were heavily armed. (Witnesses for the prosecution testified that some co-conspirators were armed with AR-15 rifles, and police responding to the scene recovered over 100 casings fired from AR-15 rifles.) Under these circumstances, a rational jury could conclude that the Pacheco-Aponte murder was reasonably foreseeable and committed in furtherance of the conspiracy to kill the Rosarios and their associates. Accordingly, we uphold appellants' convictions on Count 53. 5 142 Finally, with respect to the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) charge, the record reflects that (1) the cacerias were undertaken as part of the drug war over the Davila drug distribution point, (2) Ortiz-Figueroa participated in the caceria that resulted in the murder of Pacheco-Aponte, and (3) Ortiz-Figueroa was arrested immediately after Pacheco-Aponte was murdered in the vicinity of the crime with multiple firearms on his person. Ortiz-Figueroa does not contest his possession of the firearms or challenge the sufficiency of the evidence linking him to the Count 1 drug conspiracy. Contrary to appellant's belief, it is irrelevant that the firearms in his possession were not used to kill Pacheco-Aponte. It is enough that appellant carried the firearms during the caceria and therefore used the weapons in furtherance of the drug conspiracy. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Accordingly, we affirm Ortiz-Figueroa's conviction under Count 65. 143 F. Merced-Morales and Collazo-Aponte's Sufficiency of the Evidence Arguments Regarding Pinkerton Liability under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 144 There is no dispute that Pinkerton liability may apply to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See, e.g., United States v.Shea, 150 F.3d 44, 50 (1st Cir. 1998) (Pinkerton liability attaches to the use-or-carrying-of-a-firearm offense proscribed in § 924(c).). Merced-Morales, however, alleges that the district court erred in denying his Rule 29 motion on Count 65 because there is no evidence that he used or carried a firearm at any time or that a co-conspirator did so during Merced-Morales' membership in the conspiracy. Similarly, Collazo-Aponte contends that there is no direct evidence that he possessed a firearm or was aware that any other co-conspirator used or carried a firearm. Collazo-Aponte raises two additional arguments against his conviction on Count 65: (1) Pinkerton liability violates his due process rights because he was a minor participant in the drug conspiracy, and (2) the trial judge improperly instructed the jury on aiding and abetting as an alternative theory of liability. Neither appellant raises a viable argument. 145 The record contains considerable evidence that both appellants belonged to the Santiago-Lugo drug conspiracy when other members of the organization carried firearms in furtherance of the conspiracy and that such conduct was reasonably foreseeable to appellants. First, Wilfredo Martinez-Matta testified that the organization began storing heroin and cocaine at Merced-Morales' bar when the Rosario conflict began in early 1993. The record is replete with evidence that various members of the organization were armed during the subsequent drug war that took place between May 19, 1993 and June 22, 1994. Second, both of the Martinez-Matta brothers testified that Merced-Morales was involved in routine drug deliveries and pickups. (Wilfredo also placed Merced-Morales at the bar with Santiago-Lugo on many occasions prior to the Rosario conflict and at the 1992 funeral of Santiago-Lugo's father.) Third, Wilfred Martinez-Matta testified that Collazo-Aponte was involved in various drug transactions that occasionally involved up to a kilogram of cocaine. 146 Unlike the stricter practical certainty standard applied in aider and abettor liability, under Pinkerton, the defendant need only have reasonably foreseen that one of his co-conspirators would use a firearm during the commission of the conspiracy. See Shea, 150 F.3d at 50. It is well settled that the illegal drug industry is, to put it mildly, a dangerous, violent business. United States v. Daz, 864 F.2d 544, 549 (7th Cir. 1988). As a corollary, the use of firearms is foreseeable in trafficking offenses involving substantial quantities of drugs. See id.; United States v. Cummings, 937 F.2d 941, 945 (4th Cir. 1991). 147 In this case, there is no evidence that appellants were unaware of the quantities of drugs delivered to Merced-Morales' bar. In contrast, Wilfredo and David Martinez-Matta testified that both Merced-Morales and Collazo-Aponte were frequently involved in drug transactions involving, for example, kilogram quantities of cocaine and crack. Further, at the time of his arrest in September 1994, Collazo-Aponte possessed over 1,000 decks of heroin. (Wilfredo Martinez-Matta testified that ten decks of heroin sold for $100; therefore, the 1,000 decks Collazo-Aponte possessed would have sold for $10,000.) Accordingly, we hold that the use of firearms was foreseeable to the appellants, and we affirm their convictions on Count 65. 6 148 In reaching this conclusion, we reject Collazo-Aponte's due process argument. We agree with appellant that due process constrains the application of Pinkerton where the relationship between the defendant and the substantive offense is slight. United States v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761, 766 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Chorman, 910 F.2d 102, 112 (4th Cir. 1990);United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 850-51 (11th Cir. 1985);United States v. Moreno, 588 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 1979). However, contrary to appellant's assertion, [t]he foreseeability concept underlying Pinkerton is also the main concern underlying a possible due process violation. Castaneda, 9 F.3d at 766 (quotingUnited States v. Christian, 942 F.2d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1991)). Accordingly, the relevant inquiry is, was it reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that a firearm would be used in relation to the predicate offense? Id. at 766. 149 In support of his argument, Collazo-Aponte relies onUnited States v. Castaneda. In Castaneda, the Ninth Circuit reversed appellant Leticia Castaneda's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) on due process grounds. There, as here, the § 924(c) conviction was based on Pinkerton liability. The court reasoned, a conspirator may be held vicariously responsible for her co-conspirator's carrying of a firearm in relation to a specified drug trafficking offense, id. at 765, however, given the specific facts of the case, we cannot conclude, without violating the fundamental precepts of due process, that Leticia could have foreseen the other conspirators' use of firearms in relation to the predicate offenses, id. at 768. The court's analysis is informative. 150 Where a defendant has little or no connection to the predicate drug offense, another conspirator's use of a firearm in relation to the predicate drug offense may, in some fact situations, be unforeseeable. In those cases, it would violate due process to find the defendant vicariously liable for the firearm's use under § 924(c). Leticia's situation is a paradigm example of such an unforeseeable use. 151 As the sentencing court emphasized, Leticia played, at best, a small part in the overall conspiracy. The government contends, however, that six telephone conversations between Leticia and other conspirators demonstrate that she acted as her husband's assistant or confidante in the conspiracy. Not so. Although she was married to Uriel, a major player, there is no evidence that she played more than a passive role in the drug operation. . . . 152 Taken together, [the] phone calls demonstrate that Leticia assisted Uriel only insofar as she acted as his spouse: answering her home phone, taking messages from callers and answering his questions when he called. The evidence does not show that she knew much about Uriel's or Barron's organizations, that she knew the low-level distributors involved, that she had any knowledge of Angulo-Lopez's organization, or that she ever had more than a marginal role in the conspiracy. 153 Id. at 767. 154 The dissimilarities between Castaneda and this case are readily apparent. Here, appellants were personally involved in numerous transactions involving large quantities of cocaine, crack, and other illegal drugs. Unlike Castaneda, this is not a case involving an attenuated relationship between the conspirator and the substantive crime. Accordingly, we hold that it was reasonably foreseeable to appellants that a firearm would be used in relation to the predicate drug trafficking offense, see Daz, 864 F.2d at 549, and reject Collazo-Aponte's due process argument, see, e.g.,United States v. Johnson, 886 F.2d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 1989). 155 Finally, Collazo-Aponte alleges that the jury could have erroneously convicted him under an aiding and abetting theory. The trial judge instructed the jury as to Count 65 on two alternate theories of liability: aiding and abetting and Pinkerton co-conspirator liability. Contrary to appellant's assertion, it is settled that where there is insufficient evidence with respect to one theory of liability, the jury's verdict is presumed to rest on the theory that the evidence supported. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 (1991); United States v. Nieves-Burgos, 62 F.3d 431, 434-35 (1st Cir. 1995). Since the evidence against Merced-Morales and Collazo-Aponte on the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) charge is sufficient pursuant to Pinkerton, we affirm their convictions. 156