Opinion ID: 793591
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Calculation of Gibbs's Eligible Earnings

Text: 25 We must next determine whether the District Court erred in holding that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding (1) whether Gibbs was a CFA Associate in 1994, and (2), even assuming that he was not a CFA Associate, whether he received a salary. 26
27 We need not determine whether Gibbs falls under the definition of a CFA Associate in the 1995 SPD because CIGNA admitted in its answer that Gibbs was not a CFA Associate. Facts admitted in an answer, as in any pleading, are judicial admissions that bind the defendant throughout this litigation. See Bellefonte Re Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 757 F.2d 523, 528 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Western World Ins. Co. v. Stack Oil, Inc., 922 F.2d 118, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that a fact admitted by the defendant in its amended answer was thereby conclusively established against the defendant). Having agreed on a set of facts, the parties [who adopted the stipulation], and this Court, must be bound by them; we are not free to pick and choose at will. PPX Enters., Inc. v. Audiofidelity, Inc., 746 F.2d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498, 506 (2d Cir. 1972) (alteration in original)). 28 The District Court, therefore, erred by disregarding this admission and relying on contrary evidence to determine whether Gibbs was a CFA Associate. CIGNA's argument that its admission was limited to the fact that Gibbs did not work for CIGNA Financial Advisors is belied by the definition of the term CFA Associates in paragraph 20 of the complaint as those employees whose benefits are determined under the CIGNA Financial Advisors Associates and Staff People method for calculating eligible earnings. Therefore, it has been conclusively established that Gibbs is not a CFA Associate under the policy, and the District Court erred by concluding to the contrary. 10 29
30 The application of the non-CFA Associate formula to Gibbs does not necessarily mean that the $150,000 [g]uaranteed minimum compensation was a salary. An ERISA-regulated plan is construed in accordance with federal common law. Critchlow v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 378 F.3d 246, 255-56 (2d Cir. 2004). [U]nambiguous language in an ERISA plan must be interpreted and enforced in accordance with its plain meaning. Language is ambiguous when it is capable of more than one meaning when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who has examined the context of the entire integrated agreement. Aramony v. United Way Replacement Benefit Plan, 191 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting O'Neil v. Ret. Plan for Salaried Employees of RKO General, Inc., 37 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 1994)) (internal citations omitted). 31 The meaning of the term salary in the non-CFA Associate formula is straightforward. A salary is a fixed compensation paid regularly . . . for services. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2003 (1961). But the term [g]uaranteed minimum compensation in the Compensation Agreement could indicate either a salary or a guaranteed draw against commissions earned. Therefore, whether Gibbs and CIGNA intended that he would receive a salary should be left to the trier of fact to determine from extrinsic evidence. See Devlin, 274 F.3d at 90 (vacating and remanding district court's grant of summary judgment to allow the presentation of extrinsic evidence to clarify the ambiguous terms of an ERISA welfare plan). As we find there is sufficient evidence supporting each side's interpretation of [g]uaranteed minimum compensation to create a genuine issue of material fact, the grant of summary judgment was inappropriate.