Opinion ID: 2818666
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant

Text: Redacting the words she believes are not in substantive dispute, Appellant presents the text of 53 P.S. § 55207 as follows: At the first . . . election occurring, at least ninety days after the ascertainment [that the township has the minimum population density], and after a petition [meeting its requirements] has been filled with the . . . court, the question . . . shall be submitted to the voters of the township . . . . Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant maintains that the grammatical structure of “. . . at least ninety days after the ascertainment . . . , and after the petition . . . has been filed” indicates both requirements must be met before determining the timing of “the first general or (Jcontinued) shall become a township of the first class shall be submitted to the voters of the township . . . . A special election for such purpose shall be held . . . upon petition signed by at least five per centum of the registered voters of the township. . . . . Id. (emphasis in published statute to denote changes from original). [J-110-2014] - 5 municipal election occurring at least ninety days after.” Id (emphasis in original). Appellant adds that Appellees’ interpretation “fundamentally alters the statute’s language, adding a restrictive ‘only’ and changing the ‘and after’ phrasing for the petition prerequisite to ‘and if.’” Id. at 15. In addition to its plain text, Appellant avers the statutory history of 53 P.S. § 55207 and related statutes are favorable to her position. Appellant argues that although the original statute called for the automatic addition of the referendum question to the next eligible ballot, its 1941 revision, which added the petition signature filing requirement, “unambiguously tied both prerequisites to the determination of timing for which election the question would be submitted to voters.” Appellant’s Brief at 16. Appellant adds that the new option of a special election, placed as a clause between the generally scheduled elections and “at least ninety days after” clauses, indicates the legislature’s intent that the petition signatures be filed at least ninety days before either type of election.6 Appellant also believes that the ninety-day period was necessary for the county board of elections to adequately prepare the ballots and ballot instructions, especially in 1941. Appellant additionally cites 53 P.S. § 55208, which controls where a second- to first-class township referendum question fails to obtain a majority vote.7 Appellant first 6 Appellant notes that although the legislature removed the special election provision when it amended the statute for the last time in 1949, it left the petition signature filing requirement in conjunction with the “after . . . and after” grammatical structure. Appellant’s Brief at 18. 7 See 53 P.S. § 55208 (returns of election and effect thereof). . . . . If a majority of the votes cast at any such election shall be in favor of remaining a township of the second class, no further proceedings shall be had for a period of two years, after which period the supervisors, by unanimous action, may, or, upon petition of ten per centum of the registered voters of the township, shall, through the County Board of Elections, (continuedJ) [J-110-2014] - 6 notes that the statute mandates a two-year wait before the question may be resubmitted “in the manner hereinbefore provided,” meaning that second- to first-class referendum questions were never meant to be tethered to the first election immediately following the census. Appellant’s Brief at 19. Appellant also claims that prior to this case, many former second-class townships; including Pocono, Monroe County (2013), 8 Lower Macungie, Lehigh County (2007), and Whitemarsh, Montgomery County (1956); approved and passed first-class referendums well beyond the first ballot available ninety-plus days after the most recent census. Appellant further claims the lower courts’ holding that a strict time limitation ensures the township’s population density remains above the statutory threshold is faulty policy reasoning. Appellant argues that while “it is possible that a township with [a] population density just above the minimum might later fall below it, . . . given the unrelenting historic trend toward growing population, it is impossible . . . to justify an argument that the legislature had that overriding concern.” Appellant’s Brief at 22.9 (Jcontinued) resubmit the question to the electors of the township in the manner hereinbefore provided. Id. 8 The Pocono Township referendum was actually timely under the opposing parties’ reading of the statute, since the full results of the 2010 census were not accepted by the Commonwealth until August 17, 2011. See Holt v. 2011 Legislative Reapportionment Comm’n, 614 Pa. 364, 378, 38 A.3d 711, 719 (2012) (noting that the Legislative Data Processing Center’s acceptance of the complete 2010 census data package as “usable” triggered, in that case, “the ninety-day period for filing a preliminary redistricting plan”). 9 Appellant’s sole citation in support of this claim is the general (though easily verifiable) statement that “Pennsylvania’s population has continued to grow with every census since this statute was passed, up to and including the census of 2010.” Appellant’s Brief at 22-23 n.6. See Census of Population and Housing, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.census.gov/prod/www/decennial.html. [J-110-2014] - 7 Appellant also remarks that 53 P.S. §§ 55209-55209(a) already address the scenario where a first-class township’s population density falls below 300 IPSM.10 In that case, voters may (but are not required to) revert to second-class status via a referendum question that is automatically placed on the next ballot. 53 P.S. § 55209(a).