Opinion ID: 2159212
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion for Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court's refusal to permit defense counsel to interrogate the jury during voir dire was prejudicial error. He argues that neither our decision in State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259 (1969), nor Rule 1:8-3(a) [9] should be construed to prohibit attorney-conducted voir dire in capital cases. We recently decided this issue in State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 27-30, where we held that our decision in State v. Manley was intended to apply in capital cases. In State v. Manley , we announced our adoption of the predecessor of Rule 1:8-3(a), which in its current form leaves the conduct of voir dire to the trial court, and grants it the discretion to permit or restrict supplemental questioning by counsel. State v. Biegenwald , 106 N.J. at 28 (citing State v. Manley, supra, 54 N.J. at 281-83). As we stated in State v. Biegenwald , our decision to extend the decision in State v. Manley to death penalty cases was based on the Manley opinion's `call[] for a much more guarded discretion than previously announced in State v. Sullivan, 43 N.J. [at] 239-40; 54 N.J. at 283, a capital case, and the text of Rule 1:8-3(a).' Id. 106 N.J. at 28-29. Given our holding in State v. Biegenwald , the issue in the instant case is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for attorney-conducted voir dire. As we explained in State v. Biegenwald , [o]ur present Court rule is intended to see that voir dire is conducted to the extent reasonably possible by the court. The trial court is given discretion to permit counsel to supplement the court's interrogation of jurors by submitting questions to the court and, where the court approves, by additional personal questioning by counsel. Id. at 29 (citing R. 1:8-3(a) and State v. Manley, supra, 54 N.J. at 282-83). In the instant case, the trial court adhered to this procedure, showing itself to be very responsive to questions proposed by counsel. As in State v. Biegenwald , [n]o instances have been cited to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow questions to jurors. Id. 106 N.J. at 29. We also note that the trial court's voir dire was sufficiently thorough and probing to assure the selection of an impartial jury. Ibid. We therefore hold that the trial court's refusal to permit the voir dire interrogation to be conducted by counsel was within the limits of our decision in State v. Manley, supra, 54 N.J. 259, and of Rule 1:8-3(a).