Opinion ID: 1129992
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Miscellaneous Postconviction Rulings

Text: On January 2, 1991, Rodriguez filed a Crim.P. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence. Am.R., v. 4 at 788-808. On that same day, the district court granted Rodriguez an extension until February 11, 1991, to file an amended Crim.P. 35(b) motion. Id. at 780. On February 11, 1991, Rodriguez filed an amended Crim.P. 35(b) motion, and, on February 21, 1991, the district court denied the motion. Id. at 823. In Issues 15, 16, and 18, Rodriguez challenges the district court's denial of his Crim.P. 35(b) motion. [57]
In Issue 15, Rodriguez contends that the district court's failure to conduct a hearing on his Crim.P. 35(b) motion constitutes reversible error. Rodriguez concedes that normally the court need not conduct a hearing on a Crim.P. 35(b) motion, but asserts that, because he is a capital defendant, he is entitled to a hearing. Rodriguez' Opening Brief at 112. A defendant seeking postconviction relief pursuant to Crim.P. 35 is entitled to a prompt evidentiary hearing unless the motion, the files and record clearly establish that the allegations presented in the defendant's motion are without merit and do not warrant postconviction relief. People v. Trujillo, 190 Colo. 497, 499, 549 P.2d 1312, 1313 (1976) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see White v. Denver Dist. Court, 766 P.2d 632, 634 (Colo.1988). Here, the district court determined that the facts asserted as a basis for relief did not warrant a reduction in sentence. Rodriguez offers only a bare assertion that his status as a capital defendant mandates a hearing and fails to identify any specific facts which show that he was entitled to a reduction in sentence. Accordingly, we uphold the district court's refusal to conduct a hearing.
Prior to Rodriguez' filing of either his original or amended Crim.P. 35(b) motion, the district court stated that its  primary concern in a Crim.P. 35 proceeding would be with changes in Mr. Rodriguez' circumstances since the sentencing trial and with information not then reasonably available through the exercise of due diligence. Am.R., v. 3 at 690. In its order denying Rodriguez' Crim.P. 35(b) motion, the court noted that the information contained in the motion relating to Rodriguez' background was available to the jury at the sentencing trial and that the information supplied in the Crim.P. 35(b) motion which was not available to the sentencing jury did not warrant a reduction in sentence. Am.R., v. 4 at 823. In Issue 16, Rodriguez contends that the district court erred in refusing to consider any reasons for reducing his sentence which were available at the penalty phase. In reviewing a Crim.P. 35(b) motion, the court must consider all relevant and material factors which could affect its decision to modify a defendant's sentence, including new evidence and facts known at the time the original sentence was imposed. Spann v. People, 193 Colo. 53, 55, 561 P.2d 1268, 1269 (1977). A court must then exercise its discretion in deciding whether to modify a previously imposed sentence and, absent an abuse of such discretion, its decision will not be disturbed on review. Id. Here, the district court properly exercised its discretion in stating that it would focus primarily on evidence not available at the sentencing trial. Am.R., v. 3 at 690. The motion included evidence available to the jury at the penalty phase and the district court stated that it examined the entire motion before denying it. Am.R., v. 4 at 823. Rodriguez fails to show that the district court confined its review to evidence that was not available to the jury at sentencing, and, accordingly, we reject Issue 16.
Rodriguez contends the district court files did not contain a copy of Rodriguez' Crim.P. 35(b) motion when the court denied the motion on February 21, 1991. [58] In Issue 18, Rodriguez states: [t]he court did not have that motion before it at that time, and it did not exercise its discretion appropriately because it did not know what the arguments and evidence in support of the motion were. Rodriguez' Opening Brief at 118. In its February 21, 1994, order, the district court specifically denied Rodriguez' motion for reconsideration of sentence of February 11, 1994, and stated that it had examined the motion. Am.R., v. 4 at 823. The district court's order shows that it reviewed the motion and considered the arguments contained therein in refusing to reduce Rodriguez' sentence. Accordingly, we conclude that the alleged absence in the record of Rodriguez' amended Crim.P. 35(b) motion constitutes harmless error.
In Issues 17 and 19, Rodriguez collectively claims that the district court erroneously denied him assistance in the investigation and preparation of his Crim.P. 35 motions. Specifically, he contests the district court's denial of (1) his motions for release of records relating to his background and upbringing, see, e.g., Am.R., v. 4 at 778; and (2) his motions relating to investigative expenses which he requested the state to incur to research his childhood. See, e.g., Am.R., v. 3 at 679. Our review of the record reveals no error. In Rodriguez' motions for release of records, he requested information relating to his childhood that had already been presented at the penalty phase of trial. Furthermore, Rodriguez' motions to incur investigative expenses failed to establish either that the funds requested would be used to gather any new mitigating evidence or to indicate what evidence defense counsel hoped to uncover by such investigation. Accordingly, the district court had an adequate basis upon which to conclude that Rodriguez' motions sought cumulative information and were not relevant to the determination of his postconviction motions. Rodriguez also contends that the district court's refusal to conduct hearings on these motions constitutes reversible error. The record supports the district court's determination that Rodriguez' motions did not allege facts sufficient to warrant a hearing, and we find no error. See Trujillo, 190 Colo. at 499, 549 P.2d at 1313-14.
In Issue 12, Rodriguez asserts that the district court's denial of his motion to strike the death penalty and appoint a special prosecutor requires that his death sentence be vacated. We conclude that the district court properly exercised its discretion. On March 17, 1994, Rodriguez filed a Motion to Strike the Death Penalty, for Appointment of a Special Prosecutor, and for Additional Appropriate Relief based on a newspaper article written by former Colorado Governor Richard Lamm which criticized the judiciary for its failure to enforce the death penalty. R., v. 1 at 261-272. The article used Rodriguez' case as an example of the protracted length of death penalty litigation and criticized certain Colorado Supreme Court justices as well as certain district court judges based on their involvement in Rodriguez' case. In his motion, Rodriguez alleged that prosecutor Craig Silverman served as a primary source for Lamm's article and that the article was an attempt by the prosecution to intimidate the judiciary regarding delays in Rodriguez' case. Id. Rodriguez also claimed that the prosecution's overt attempts to influence the judiciary irreparably tainted the entire legal process and necessitated that his death sentence be vacated. Id. at 261-62. After hearing counsel's arguments, the district court denied Rodriguez' motion. [59] R., v. 67 at 18-22. Section 20-1-107, 8B C.R.S (1986) provides that [i]f the district attorney is interested or has been employed as counsel in any case which it is his duty to prosecute or defend, the court ... may appoint a special prosecutor. In People v. Garcia, 698 P.2d 801 (Colo.1985), we set forth the standard for evaluating a motion to disqualify a district attorney: [T]he determination of whether a district attorney and his staff should be disqualified is a matter largely within the discretion of the district court. The trial court should consider whether disqualification appears reasonably necessary to insure the integrity of the fact-finding process, the fairness or appearance of fairness of trial, the orderly or efficient administration of justice, or public trust or confidence in the criminal justice system. The goal of the court should be to shape a remedy which will assure fairness to the parties and the integrity of the judicial process. Among the relevant factors to be considered by the court are the nature, relevance and necessity of the testimony, the size and degree of integration of the district attorney's staff, and the degree to which the testimony is contested. Id. at 806-07 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). At the hearing on newly discovered evidence on March 17, 1994, Silverman informed the district court that former Governor Lamm wrote the article at issue on his own initiative, without influence or pressure from the prosecution, and that any information Silverman provided Lamm was a matter of public record. Am.R., v. 67 at 16-17. We conclude that Lamm's article expressed his personal beliefs regarding the propriety of actions taken by the judiciary and did not establish that the prosecution held an interest in Rodriguez' case apart from its professional responsibility of upholding the law. See People v. District Court, 189 Colo. 159, 162, 538 P.2d 887, 889 (1975) (holding that paid political advertisement which contained editorial indicating a belief that district attorney, who was candidate for mayor, was properly prosecuting criminal case against named defendant did not warrant disqualification of district attorney from continuing to prosecute that defendant's case). In his motion and argument to the district court, Rodriguez failed to demonstrate that the prosecution's continued involvement would deny him a fair trial, and, accordingly, we uphold the district court's order denying relief. See Wheeler v. District Court, 180 Colo. 275, 279, 504 P.2d 1094, 1096 (1973). Rodriguez also contends that the denial of his motion without a hearing violated due process of law. A court may rule on a motion without a hearing if the facts contained in the motion fail to establish a sufficient basis for relief. Trujillo, 190 Colo. at 499, 549 P.2d at 1314. The district court properly refused to conduct a hearing based on its determination that Rodriguez' motion did not establish a sufficient basis for disqualifying the prosecution, and, accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.
In Issue 14, Rodriguez contends that he was denied his right to counsel due to the state's obstruction of the attorney-client relationship. Rodriguez filed numerous motions with the district court concerning the conditions surrounding his imprisonment and his inability to communicate confidentially with his attorney. See Rodriguez' Opening Brief at 100-112. He also asserts that the district court's denial of these motions without a hearing constitutes reversible error. See id. We conclude that Rodriguez is not entitled to any relief. The supervision and management of the internal procedures of correctional institutions is within the discretion of institutional officials and is not subject to judicial scrutiny absent exceptional circumstances. See Johnson v. Heggie, 362 F.Supp. 851, 853 (D.Colo.1973). In denying one of Rodriguez' numerous motions, the district court properly held that, I'm going to continue to allow the custodian and law enforcement authorities to determine the appropriate procedures for the confinement of [Rodriguez]. R., v. 67 at 24-25. In addition, the district court noted that the Colorado State Public Defender's Office had already brought a civil action in the Eleventh Judicial District on behalf of Rodriguez and another death row inmate, alleging that prison procedures in Fremont County prevented free and effective contact between the inmates and their attorneys. R., v. 1 at 220-21; see R., v. 67 at 27-29. The district court concluded that the issues repeatedly presented in Rodriguez' numerous motions had been previously litigated in the Eleventh Judicial District and that it could not properly review another judicial district court's action. R., v. 1 at 220-21; R., v. 67 at 24-26; see People ex rel. Wyse v. District Court, 180 Colo. 88, 94, 503 P.2d 154, 157 (1972). We hold that the district court properly analyzed and disposed of Rodriguez' claims regarding the state's alleged obstruction of his right to counsel. We also reject Rodriguez' assertion that the district court's denial of these motions without a hearing constitutes reversible error. A defendant is not entitled to a hearing on a postconviction claim under Crim.P. 35 if the motion, the files and record clearly establish that the allegations presented in the defendant's motion are without merit and do not warrant postconviction relief. Trujillo, 190 Colo. at 499, 549 P.2d at 1313. Based on its recognition that it should not intervene in matters of prison administration and its determination that Rodriguez had previously litigated such claims in the Eleventh Judicial District, the district court properly found that Rodriguez' claims lacked merit and did not warrant a hearing. We refuse to disturb this decision.