Opinion ID: 1988547
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wilson's Request for a Writ of Mandamus

Text: In this case, the Court of Special Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's ruling granting the State's motion to dismiss. As we have stated, normally in order for a mandamus action to lie, a clear and undisputable legal right and corresponding duty must be present. Buchholtz, 178 Md. at 288, 13 A.2d at 352. In Wilson's case, ALJ Avery's Order clearly and indisputably conferred upon her the legal right to have her employment reinstated, as he reversed the Department's determination that Wilson had resigned without notice and expunged the November 2 letter informing her as such. It is much less clear, however, as to whether the Order conferred upon Wilson the legal right to receive back pay, accrued leave, and retirement benefits for the period she was wrongfully terminated.
Wilson urges that ALJ Avery's Order reinstating her to her position necessarily includes by implication back pay, accrued leave, and retirement benefits. Because ALJ Avery's Order does not refer to such, Wilson's argument is only tenable if there is legal authority clearly providing that reinstatement necessarily includes back pay, accrued leave, and/or retirement benefits. Our review of the State's employee grievance process suggests otherwise. As we explained in Robinson v. Bunch, 367 Md. 432, 788 A.2d 636 (2002), the General Assembly established a statutory administrative and judicial review remedy for state employees who claim that they have not been compensated in accordance with applicable legal requirements. Id. at 445, 788 A.2d at 644. Maryland Code, Sections 12-101 through 12-405 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article provide a detailed administrative grievance procedure for state employees working in the executive branch. Id. Section 12-103 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article establishes the exclusivity of the employee grievance proceeding remedy, providing that [u]nless another procedure is provided for by this article, the grievance procedure is the exclusive remedy through which a non-temporary employee in the State Personnel Management System may seek an administrative remedy for violations of the provisions of the article. Id. at 445, 788 A.2d at 645. In a grievance proceeding, an administrative law judge or final decision maker is authorized by Section 12-303 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article (1993, 1997 Repl.Vol.) to grant any appropriate remedy available under Section 12-402(a), which provides: Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the remedies available to a grievant under this title are limited to the restoration of the rights, pay, status, or benefits that the grievant otherwise would have had if the contested policy, procedure, or regulation had been applied appropriately as determined by the final decision maker. Section 12-402(a) defines the remedies that may be provided to aggrieved state employees; it does not guarantee them. Rather, under Section 12-402(b), the ALJ, depending upon the circumstances, may order an appointing authority to grant back pay. [8] In order for a grievant such as Wilson to be entitled to these remedies, the ALJ or decision maker must clearly and indisputably determine them because, although the statute allows those remedies to be provided, it does not explicitly command it. See Robinson, 367 Md. at 445, 788 A.2d at 644-45 (`[B]ack pay' is expressly stated to be one of the remedies which a decision maker can award under the grievance procedure.); Comptroller v. Nelson, 345 Md. 706, 716, 694 A.2d 468, 473 (1997)(concluding that the grievance procedure includes addressing pay disputes); Briscoe v. Health Department, 323 Md. 439, 454, 593 A.2d 1109, 1116 (1991). See also Williams v. Fitzhugh, 147 Md. 384, 388, 128 A. 137, 138 (1925)(noting, in a case where a schoolteacher sought pay for a period during which he was dismissed due to no fault of his own, that an action for a writ of mandamus might lie [i]f it could be shown that there is in the custody of state officials, not amenable to suit at law, a salary fund to which the appellant is entitled, and the payment of which is a clear legal duty, not involving the exercise of discretion); Frosburg v. State Dept. of Personnel, 37 Md.App. 18, 33, 375 A.2d 582, 591, cert. denied, 281 Md. 737 (1977) (holding that mandamus did not lie because the appellants have shown neither a clear legal duty on the part of the Department of Personnel to pay back pay under the circumstances of this case, nor have they indicated to the trial court a specific sum or fund from which they are entitled to be paid). Because the statute does not require Wilson to be granted back pay, accrued leave, or retirement benefits, Wilson's mandamus action does not lie to compel performance of a statutory duty. Eck v. State Tax Commission, 204 Md. 245, 255, 103 A.2d 850, 855 (1954); see also Cahill v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 173 Md. 450, 455, 196 A. 305, 307-08 (1938)(explaining the limitation of purpose on the writ is a means by which we exercise discipline when we use our power to issue the writ, doing so only when there is an ascertainably clear legal right and duty). Wilson also attempts to show that she had a clear right to back pay, accrued leave, and retirement benefits because ALJ Avery's intent to grant her such is evidenced by his August 17, 2000, letter to the Department that expressed his concern that the Department had not implemented his Order in a timely fashion or made Wilson whole as if the termination had never happened. This letter, as the State correctly points out, is not an exercise of ALJ Avery's authority under COMAR 28.02.01.28 to reconsider or correct his Order. [9] Moreover, in the very letter Wilson relies on, it is evident that ALJ Avery concedes that his Order may have been less than clear and that the time period for judicial review or correcting his Order had passed. As the State points out, ALJ Avery's May 15, 2000 Order was a final Order. See Code, § 12-205(c)(2)(ii) of the State Personnel and Pensions Article (stating that the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings is the final administrative decision). Consequently, the ALJ's later letter explaining his earlier Order is to no effect. Finally, we observe that, in her argument, Wilson incorrectly conflates what are really two different types of mandamus actions: one for the judicial enforcement of non-discretionary acts, the other for the judicial review of adjudicatory administrative decisions. Requiring a public official to perform a non-discretionary duty or functionto enforce the law is the original common-law function of mandamus. City of Seat Pleasant, 364 Md. at 673, 774 A.2d at 1172. Mandamus may also issue, however, for the purpose of judicial review of administrative decisions where there is both a lack of an available procedure for obtaining review and an allegation that the action complained of is illegal, arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Goodwich, 343 Md. at 146, 680 A.2d at 1048. As we explained in Heft v. Maryland Racing Comm'n, 323 Md. 257, 273, 592 A.2d 1110, 1118 (1991), mandamus actions often served as a means to obtain judicial review of administrative actions prior to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). After the APA was enacted, most mandamus actions in this regard became unnecessary. Id. When Wilson argues that her mandamus action lies to enforce ALJ Avery's Order because the Department's actions were arbitrary and capricious, she merges two different lines of analysis.
Although we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that Wilson received what the ALJ ordered, her mandamus action was not nugatory or moot as the appellate court suggested because she sought to use the writ to seek remedies other than that which was granted to her. While the Court of Special Appeals was correct in pointing out that a mandamus writ will not lie where the petitioner seeks to enforce a duty that already has been performed, Mahoney, 205 Md. at 334-35, 108 A.2d at 147, it incorrectly applied this principle to Wilson's action. Wilson's mandamus action was not for the purpose of reinstatement; rather, she sought to use the writ to receive back pay, accrued leave, and retirement benefits. Because these were not remedies that had already been given to her, the Court of Special Appeals incorrectly concluded that her mandamus action did not lie because the Department already had performed its duty to Wilson by reinstating her. As we described supra, Wilson's mandamus action failed because she had no clear right to the remedies she sought.