Opinion ID: 771369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sentencing Calculation Pursuant to Sentencing Guidelines 2D1.1(a)(3)

Text: 6 United States v. Petty, 992 F.2d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1993), establishes the standard to determine the quantity of narcotics to be attributed to an individual member of a conspiracy for sentencing purposes: 7 Under the Guidelines each conspirator, for sentencing purposes, is to be judged not on the distribution made by the entire conspiracy, but on the basis of the quantity of drugs which he reasonably foresaw or which fell within `the scope' of his particular agreement with the conspirators. 8 See also United States v. Ladum, 141 F.3d 1328, 1346 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying Petty); United States v. Diaz-Rosas, 13 F.3d 1305 (9th Cir. 1994) (a defendant need not have person-ally possessed the narcotics so long as the narcotics possessed or sold were foreseeable to him); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (2000) (in the case of a conspiracy, base offense level shall be determined on the basis of all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity). 9 The district court found that Seesing was convicted of distributing at least three but less than ten kilograms of methamphetamine. The Presentence Investigation Report (PIR), the sole source of facts before the district court at sentencing, stated that the actual amount was 4.049 kilograms. Seesing argues that, contrary to Petty, no factual findings were made by the court to support this determination. 10 The PIR based its amount determination on two facts-$70,000 in Comcheck transfers made among the coconspirators and a purchase price of $8,500 per pound of methamphetamine. According to the PIR, the $70,000 in Comcheck transfers relate to the amount of money received by co-defendant John Girsch (Girsch) in over sixty transactions between November 1994 and early 1997, fourteen involving Seesing and twenty-four involving two other coconspirators. Girsch sent the methamphetamine to the coconspirators via Federal Express. The co-conspirators, including Seesing, then sent payments to Girsch via Federal Express or Comcheck. 11 In most cases, the government bears the burden of proving factors enhancing a sentence by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Romero-Rendon, 220 F.3d 1159, 1160 (9th Cir. 2000). Under a preponderance of the evidence standard in sentencing determinations, the relevant facts must be shown to be more likely true than not. United States v. Lawrence, 189 F.3d 838, 844 (9th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Mezas de Jesus, 217 F.3d 638, 643 (9th Cir. 2000) ([T]he preponderance of the evidence standard is a meaningful one that requires the judge to be convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the fact in question exists.) (internal quotations omitted). 12 The preponderance of the evidence standard was not met here because the district court failed to find that Seesing reasonably foresaw all the transactions that comprised the $70,000 figure upon which the amount of methamphetamine attributed to Seesing was based. The relevant facts were not shown to be more likely true than not. The district court made no reference to the PIR, including whether it was convinced by the PIR's findings. Accordingly, this portion of Seesing's sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded to the district court for a determination on the amount of methamphetamine reasonably foreseeable to Seesing. 1 13