Opinion ID: 4391884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicial Function & Standard of Review

Text: By statute, foreign nations with whom the United States has extradition treaties may seek the extradition of a person within the United States by ﬁling a request through the proper diplomatic channels. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184−3195; Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1981). The terms of the bilateral treaty govern the document requirements. After the United States government receives a formal extradition request through diplomatic channels, the request will be forwarded to a U.S. Attorney’s Oﬃce, which will typically ﬁle a formal complaint and seek an arrest warrant from a judge. Eain, 641 F.3d at 508. Upon the ﬁling of such a complaint, an extradition oﬃcer—“any justice or judge of the United States, or any magistrate authorized … by a court of the United States, or any judge of a court of record of general jurisdiction of any State”—will conduct a hearing. 18 U.S.C. § 3184. “At an extradition hearing, the ‘judicial oﬃcer’s inquiry is conﬁned to the following: whether a valid treaty exists; 8 No. 18-2723 whether the crime charged is covered by the relevant treaty; and whether the evidence marshaled in support of the complaint for extradition is suﬃcient under the applicable standard of proof.’” Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 154−55 (2d Cir. 2011), quoting Cheung v. United States, 213 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2000). Extradition treaties “should be liberally construed so as to eﬀect the apparent intention of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity between them.” Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933); see also Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 63 (2012) (Canon 4: “A textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs the document’s purpose should be favored.”). If the judge ﬁnds that the requested person is extraditable, the judge must certify the extradition to the Secretary of State. See Santos, 830 F.3d at 992; In re Mathison, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 1304. The discretion in the process belongs to the executive branch, not the judiciary. The Secretary of State has “sole discretion to determine whether or not extradition should proceed further with the issuance of a warrant of surrender.” Eain, 641 F.2d at 508; see 18 U.S.C. § 3186. Judicial oﬃcers’ extradition orders are not considered ﬁ- nal decisions appealable as of right under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Skaftouros, 667 F.3d at 157. Courts have long recognized an alternative path for appellate review, through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 368−69 (1920); Eain, 641 F.2d at 508; In re Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237, 1240 (7th Cir. 1980). The scope of this habeas corpus review is narrow. In Fernandez v. Phillips, the Supreme Court clariﬁed that only three categories of issues are open to inquiry. 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925). Reviewing courts generally may consider “whether No. 18-2723 9 the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the oﬀence charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the ﬁnding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty,” i.e., probable cause. DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110, 1112 (7th Cir. 1997) (reversing writs of habeas corpus), quoting Fernandez, 268 U.S. at 312. In addition, though, “federal courts undertaking habeas corpus review of extraditions have the authority to consider not only procedural defects in the extradition procedures that are of constitutional dimension, but also the substantive conduct of the United States in undertaking its decision to extradite if such conduct violates constitutional rights.” In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1484 (7th Cir. 1984). “The probable cause standard applicable to an extradition hearing is the same as the standard used in federal preliminary hearings,” which means that “the magistrate’s role is ‘to determine whether there is competent evidence to justify holding the accused to await trial, and not to determine whether the evidence is suﬃcient to justify a conviction.’” Hoxha v. Levi, 465 F.3d 554, 561 (3d Cir. 2006), quoting Sidali v. I.N.S., 107 F.3d 191, 199 (3d Cir. 1997), quoting in turn Peters v. Egnor, 888 F.2d 713, 717 (10th Cir. 1989). A United States court dealing with an extradition request for an accused is obliged to resist any temptation to judge the guilt or inno- cence of the accused. “It is fundamental that the person whose extradition is sought is not entitled to a full trial at the magistrate’s probable cause hearing.” Eain, 641 F.2d at 508. The foreign government making the request is not required to try its case in a United States court. Santos, 830 F.3d at 991. And in the habeas corpus proceeding for review, “Our scope of review on this issue is limited to determining whether there is 10 No. 18-2723 ‘any evidence’ to support the magistrate’s ﬁnding of probable cause.” Eain, 641 F.2d at 509. Because an extradition hearing “is not a trial,” the rights of the accused are more limited. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 461 (1913). Extradition hearings “embody no judgment on the guilt or innocence of the accused but serve only to insure that his culpability will be determined in another and, in this instance, a foreign forum.” Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1976). “[W]hat is at issue in the proceeding…is not punishability but prosecutability.” Skaftouros, 667 F.3d at 155, quoting In re McMullen, 989 F.2d 603, 611 (2d Cir. 1993) (alterations in original). Neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to the extradition proceeding. See Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3); Fed. R. Crim. P. 1(a)(5)(A). An accused person facing extradition does enjoy due process rights, but the process due is conﬁned by additional evidentiary rules that restrict the defense. In re Burt, 737 F.2d at 1484; see also Martinez v. United States, 793 F.3d 533, 556 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Courts have unanimously held that the government is bound by principles of due process in its conduct of extradition proceedings.”), rev’d on other grounds, 828 F.3d 451 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc). In particular, “An accused in an extradition hearing has no right to contradict the demanding country’s proof or to pose questions of credibility as in an ordinary trial, but only to oﬀer evidence which explains or clariﬁes that proof.” Eain, 641 F.2d at 511; see Charlton, 229 U.S. at 461 (“To have witnesses produced to contradict the testimony for the prosecution is obviously a very diﬀerent thing from hearing witnesses for the purpose of explaining matters referred to by the witnesses for the government”); Collins v. No. 18-2723 11 Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316–17 (1922) (explaining and reaﬃrming distinction drawn in Charlton). Many courts have applied this distinction between permissible “explanatory” evidence and impermissible “contradictory” evidence, though it is often easier to describe this distinction than to apply it. See Santos, 830 F.3d at 992.