Opinion ID: 2772759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Accident And Initial Complaint

Text: This action arises out of a single-car accident in early July 2010. The driver was 16-year-old Bradley Luke, who was not licensed to drive in Alaska. Bradley crashed a car owned by Monte Luke, which was insured by Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) under a policy held by Coral Frank. Craig Elkins is the GEICO employee in Alaska who handled claims arising from the accident. Frank Bush, an adult passenger in the car, suffered severe injuries in the accident. Frank Bush, his mother, his father, and his sister filed a civil complaint against Bradley Luke as the driver of the car and against Bradley’s mother Arlene Luke; Monte Luke, the owner of the car; Coral Frank, the policy holder; GEICO, the insurer; and its employee, Elkins. The plaintiffs proceeded without representation. Frank Bush’s father, James Bush, is the sole appellant in this case. The complaint alleged seven causes of action including four claims against Bradley Luke, Arlene and Monte Luke, and Coral Frank (collectively, “the Luke defendants”) for negligent driving, negligent supervision, negligent entrustment, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The complaint also alleged three claims against GEICO and its employee Elkins for contractual interference, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent supervision. On the claim of contractual interference, the complaint alleged that GEICO “improperly interfered with contractual relations betwee[n] the plaintiff(s) and various health care providers,” resulting in increased physical and economic injuries to Frank Bush and “sever[e] emotional distress and anxiety” to “the plaintiff(s).” Whether this language effectively pleaded a claim for contractual interference on James’s behalf is central to the subsequent proceedings before the superior court and to this appeal. -3- 6980 B. Procedural History: Motion To Dismiss, Motions For Summary Judgment, And Motions To Amend The Complaint GEICO answered the complaint and moved to dismiss all claims raised against it for failure to state a claim. It admitted that the vehicle involved in the accident was insured by GEICO and argued that it could not, as a matter of law, be held directly liable for the wrongdoing of the Luke defendants. GEICO contended that the three causes of action brought against it — intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, and contractual interference — were “really claims handling type claims” that might apply were the plaintiffs insured by GEICO but could not apply absent a contractual relationship between GEICO and Frank Bush, his parents, or his sister. The plaintiffs responded that GEICO was misreading the three causes of action, arguing that those claims against GEICO were for torts whose viability is unaffected by the existence of a contractual relationship. The superior court granted in part and denied in part GEICO’s motion to dismiss. The order specified that the “direct actions against [the Luke defendants] . . . may not be brought against [GEICO] based on its role as the insurer for these individuals.” But the superior court denied GEICO’s motion to dismiss the claim for intentional interference with contractual relations, reasoning that the claim provided GEICO with “fair notice of the grounds on which Plaintiffs’ claim rests,” and it denied GEICO’s motion to dismiss the negligent supervision claim, noting that it did not “fully understand the basis” of the claim and that the claim might better be addressed after it was “more fully developed.” Finally, the superior court denied GEICO’s motion to dismiss the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, “except for that portion pertaining to GEICO’s failure to contact James Bush” which it granted because “fail[ing] to contact Plaintiff James Bush as the family’s designee . . . is not outrageous and is not actionable.” Thus, the superior court’s ruling -4- 6980 on GEICO’s motion dismissed James’s only individual claim: intentional infliction of emotional distress. The other plaintiffs — Frank Bush, his mother, and his sister — retained their first four claims against the Luke defendants, as well as their three claims against GEICO. Before resolution of its motion to dismiss, GEICO moved for summary judgment on all remaining claims against it and its claims handler, Elkins, reiterating the arguments raised in its motion to dismiss. The Luke defendants moved for summary judgment against James because he “ha[d] not stated a claim against the defendants,” requested that James’s “name [be] removed from the caption,” and requested “an order prohibiting him from the unauthorized practice of law,” stating their view that James “should not be allowed to continue to sign any type of pleading on behalf of any of the parties or make appearances in court for the parties” once dismissed from the lawsuit. GEICO joined the Luke defendants’ motion for summary judgment against James and their motion for an order removing James from the case caption. In response to these motions, James acknowledged that he “[brought] no claim against [the Lukes].” In his response to GEICO’s motions for summary judgment, James for the first time stated, with regard to the contractual interference claim, his view that he “was . . . a thirdparty beneficiary to the contracts involved” and that he remained “a viable party” in that claim. He further argued that the motions were “insufficient as a matter of law” because “[n]owhere in any of the pleadings proffered by GEICO . . . do they allege [James Bush] would not be a proper party to the action against them under a theory of intentional interference with contractual relations.” In June 2012 the superior court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment against James. The superior court read the complaint as indicating that James had brought a single claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against GEICO and that this claim had been rejected when the superior court granted -5- 6980 GEICO’s motion to dismiss. The superior court also concluded that “James Bush should be removed from the caption of this case and is not allowed to file pleadings on behalf of other parties, as he is not a licensed attorney in the State of Alaska.” On the same day that it granted complete summary judgment against James, the superior court granted some of the remaining plaintiffs’ motions for leave to amend their complaint. Frank Bush, his parents, and his sister had each moved to amend their complaint. All four motions were identical, asking only to add a defendant and two plaintiffs to the action.1 The Luke defendants did not oppose the motions, and the superior court granted the motions made by Frank’s mother and sister, while overlooking Frank’s and James’s identical motions.2 Shortly after the superior court granted the motions for summary judgment, James filed a motion “seeking clarification and/or reconsideration upon the issue of his status as a plaintiff.” He argued that the superior court’s order denying GEICO’s motion to dismiss as to the contractual interference claim had “ruled that all plaintiffs,” including James, “may have an actionable complaint against [GEICO] for interference with contractual relations,” and he reiterated the position he took in his opposition to the motion for summary judgment that he was “a third party beneficiary” of Frank’s attempts to contract with health care providers because he “was paying all costs associated with achieving performance of these contracts.” Accordingly, James argued that the court had 1 James contends that he sought leave to amend “to add additional parties and to solidify his third-party beneficiary claim.” The record on appeal does not support this assertion. He sought leave to amend only to add additional parties. 2 James contends that the superior court “granted his motion seeking leave to amend the complaint.” Once again, the record on appeal does not support this assertion. -6- 6980 no authority to remove his name from the caption and that the removal would improperly interfere with James’s right to appeal. The superior court denied James’s motion for clarification and reconsideration, explaining that its order granting GEICO’s motion to dismiss entirely disposed of James’s role in the case by dismissing his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The superior court ruled that “[t]he original complaint d[id] not set forth” a claim by James for contractual interference and did not allege that James “is a third party beneficiary to contracts entered by Frank Bush.” After denial of James’s motion, the plaintiffs, including James, submitted a first amended complaint. Along with adding another defendant and two new plaintiffs, the amended complaint also revised the contractual interference claim to state that James “invest[ed] personal funds for the express purpose of obtaining medical care for his son,” that James “invested these funds with the expressed intent . . . of assisting [Frank] in contracting with various health care providers to receive treatment,” that James “sought no other, no[r] did he receive any other, consideration for having provided these funds,” and that “to date [James] has not received the contractual consideration he had expected when investing these funds and as a result has sustained economic loss and personal injury in the form of emotional distress.” The superior court rejected James’s first amended complaint, ruling that James “can’t be added back in; I’ve already dismissed him out.” The superior court returned the amended complaint for re-filing without James as a plaintiff. C. Settlements, Final Judgment, And Attorney’s Fees All of the plaintiffs and defendants, except James, reached a settlement and agreed to dismiss the action with prejudice and bear their own litigation expenses. James separately agreed to dismiss with prejudice any claims against the Luke defendants, but he did not agree to a settlement with GEICO. Having failed to reach a settlement, -7- 6980 GEICO filed a motion for entry of final judgment against James, which the superior court granted in light of its prior orders dismissing all of James’s claims. GEICO then moved for attorney’s fees from James pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 82. GEICO stated that its actual costs were $24,700 and sought an award of $7,410.3 James did not respond to the motion for attorney’s fees. Instead, in his points on appeal filed with this court a month before the superior court’s order awarding attorney’s fees to GEICO, James expressed his view that the superior court erred by “removing [James’s] name from the caption” while “continu[ing] to accept and rule upon pleadings offered by other parties seeking procedural decisions and judgments against [him] and not permitting him to file any sort of responsive pleadings.” GEICO filed a motion requesting a ruling on its motion for an award of attorney’s fees, and the superior court awarded GEICO $3,533.68 in attorney’s fees from James, noting that it had deducted fees incurred after James’s claims were dismissed, and that it awarded only 20% of the actual reasonable fees, per Rule 82(b)(2), because the case did not go to trial.