Opinion ID: 1162628
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Court's Response to a Question Asked by the Jury

Text: (19) Defendant contends that a response given by the court to a question asked by the jury during deliberations amounts to prejudicial error. To properly address the point, we must place the response under challenge in its context. Following the prosecutor's closing argument, defense counsel opened his with the following statement: Ladies and gentlemen, ... I would point out to you at this point that if you did absolutely nothing at this time, Mr. Hamilton spends the rest of his life in prison. That's the law. Reiterating that statement, counsel closed as follows. [A]s I said in the beginning, that if you do absolutely nothing now, Billy Hamilton goes to prison for the rest of his life until he dies.... He will be within those walls for the rest of his life. That's what I am asking you to do. I am asking you to in effect do nothing and let Billy Ray Hamilton stay behind the walls of that prison for the rest of his life. I think nothing can be done by going ahead with the request of the District Attorney and asking you to pull the lever that releases the pellet because that too would be an outrage and I don't want you to commit an outrage. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. As the jury was being excused at the end of the first day of deliberations, the following colloquy ensued between the court and the jury foreman, David McCauley. THE COURT: ... Well then, I am going to excuse the jury at this time and ask that you all return at ten o'clock sharp.... The jury is  yes, sir? MR. McCAULEY: Some of us had asked the question as to whether you could say anything about what would happen if we were not to reach a decision. THE COURT: Well, let me suggest this to you, since I want to have a chance to show your inquiry to the attorneys before I answer it, why don't you, in the morning, if you want, write out a note that you have in mind as to what the jury is asking and then I don't know if I am going to be able to answer your question or not, but you certainly have a right to ask me any question that's bothering the jury and I will do my best to help you if I can. MR. McCAULEY: Okay. THE COURT: All right. The jury is excused until ten o'clock tomorrow morning.... On the second day of deliberations, the jury sent the court a note with the following question: What would the law of the State of Calif. require you (the court) to do if the jury is undecided on the penalty phase of this trial? The court responded: The best answer that I can give you is this, you shouldn't concern yourself with the consequences if the jury is unable to reach a verdict on the penalty phase of the case. That is a matter which shouldn't enter into your consideration. You should continue deliberating for as long as you feel it to be productive and I will be glad to help you in any way that I can in your deliberations. Later that day, the jury sent the court another note: The defense attorney stated that ... `if we do nothing Billy Ray Hamilton will go to prison for life.' Is that statement true? As the court directed itself to that question, there ensued the following colloquy, in which the response defendant now challenges is contained. [THE COURT:] I will answer your question but first let me ask, did you interpret that or did someone on the jury, Mr. McCauley, interpret that to mean by if we do nothing that if we do not agree upon a verdict  MR. McCAULEY: Yes. THE COURT: Well  MR. McCAULEY: That's what we  THE COURT: I think the problem is that you misinterpreted what [defense counsel] said or meant. And his argument was entirely proper and what he argued was that if the jury did not impose the death penalty in their verdict but instead selected the other alternative, that he would still be imprisoned in a state prison for the rest of his life. He did not argue nor would it be true that he would automatically go to prison for life if the jury did not agree upon a verdict. You see the distinction that I make, Mr. McCauley? MR. McCAULEY: Yes. THE COURT: All right. Does that answer the question that the jury had? MR. McCAULEY: Yes, it does. One additional item. We expect to reach a decision within fifteen or twenty minutes. THE COURT: Very well. I am glad you alerted that, alerted us to that. So the jury may now retire and resume their deliberations. (Italics added.) Shortly thereafter, the jury returned with a verdict of death. Defendant claims that the italicized portion of the court's response to the jury's question was objectionable. In support he first argues that the statement invited the jurors to consider matters foreign to their task of determining whether death was the appropriate penalty in this case. As defendant himself acknowledges, the success of his argument depends on how a reasonable juror would have interpreted the court's response. We believe that such a juror would have understood the statement as we do  i.e., it is not the case that if the jury were irreconcilably divided defendant would automatically be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Interpreted in this fashion, the statement is of course correct. Penal Code section 190.4, subdivision (b), provides in relevant part:  If the trier of fact is a jury and has been unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall be, the court shall dismiss the jury and shall order a new jury impaneled to try the issue as to what the penalty shall be. If such new jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to what the penalty shall be, the court in its discretion shall either order a new jury or impose a punishment of confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole. (Italics added.) We also believe that a reasonable juror would have found nothing else in the statement  certainly not the invitation to speculate on irrelevant matters that defendant claims he has discovered. In reliance on United States v. McCracken (5th Cir.1974) 488 F.2d 406, defendant next argues in substance that it was improper for the court to give even a correct answer to the jury's question on the consequences of failure to reach a verdict. McCracken, however, is inapposite. In that case the court held only that it was error for the trial judge to inform jurors, in the general charge, of the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. ( Id. at pp. 424-425.) It did not state or imply that it was error to answer a question on the matter raised by the jurors. In any event, the law in this state is contrary to defendant's position. (Cf. People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 159, fn. 12 [207 Cal. Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430] [question by jury on commutability of sentences of death and life imprisonment without possibility of parole].) In conclusion, we are of the opinion that the court's response was not objectionable, and hence reject defendant's point. [8]