Opinion ID: 844287
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Accident and Duty to Provide Sua Sponte Instruction on Accident

Text: We turn now to the question of whether trial courts generally have a duty to instruct on accident, sua sponte, when the issue is raised by the evidence. We conclude they do not. (5) Penal Code section 26 states the statutory defense: All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: [¶] ... [¶] FivePersons who committed the act or made the omission charged through misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was no evil design, intention, or culpable negligence. The defense appears in CALCRIM No. 3404, which explains a defendant is not guilty of a charged crime if he or she acted without the intent required for that crime, but acted instead accidentally. That the law recognizes a defense of accident does not, however, establish that trial courts have a duty to instruct on accident sua sponte. In criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury's understanding of the case. ( People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 953 [105 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 224 P.3d 877].) That duty extends to `instructions on the defendant's theory of the case, including instructions as to defenses `that the defendant is relying on ..., or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.'' ( People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 824 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 225, 200 P.3d 847].) But `when a defendant presents evidence to attempt to negate or rebut the prosecution's proof of an element of the offense, a defendant is not presenting a special defense invoking sua sponte instructional duties. While a court may well have a duty to give a pinpoint instruction relating such evidence to the elements of the offense and to the jury's duty to acquit if the evidence produces a reasonable doubt, such pinpoint instructions are not required to be given sua sponte and must be given only upon request.' ( People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1117 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588].) One commentator opines that statutory provisions codifying a defense for an actor who commits the act or omission constituting an offense `through misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was no evil design, intention, or culpable negligence.' ... [¶] ... have historical significance, [but] are now unnecessary restatements, in a defense format, of the requirements of the definitional elements of an offense. To say that it is a defense that the criminal conduct or omission was committed by a non-negligent accident, is simply to say that all result element offenses [i.e., offenses that require an intent to produce a particular result] require at least proof of negligence as to causing the prohibited result. This is already made clear by the culpability requirements of specific offense definitions. ... (1 Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses (1984) Accident or Misfortune, § 63, p. 269, fns. omitted.) A trial court's responsibility to instruct on accident therefore generally extends no further than the obligation to provide, upon request, a pinpoint instruction relating the evidence to the mental element required for the charged crime. The California cases that have discussed the defense of accident, including those cited by defendant, generally support the commentator's view. In People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 674 [114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474], we explained, [g]enerally, the claim that a homicide was committed through misfortune or accident `amounts to a claim that the defendant acted without forming the mental state necessary to make his or her actions a crime.' In People v. Acosta (1955) 45 Cal.2d 538 [290 P.2d 1], this court reversed a conviction of willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously driving and taking a vehicle without the consent of the owner and with the intent to deprive the owner of title to and possession of the vehicle. The defendant had been in the backseat of a taxi when the taxi driver, believing himself to be under attack by the defendant, rolled out of the moving vehicle. The defendant then either climbed into the front seat and got behind the wheel of the taxi or attempted to steer the taxi from the backseat. This court found it would be accident if the defendant did not intend the criminal actdriving the taxior if the act had not been motivated by an intent to deprive the owner of title and possession of the vehicle. ( Id. at pp. 543-544.) We thus recognized the defense would rebut the prosecution's proof of a mental element of the crime. In People v. Gonzales (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 382 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 111], the defendant was convicted of the willful infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant. Under the defense version of the events, the complaining witness's injuries were caused when the defendant opened a door to gain entry into a room the victim was leaving and, without intending to do so, struck the victim in the face with the door. ( Id. at p. 390.) The accident defense was raised to negate the mental element of the crime: the intent to inflict corporal injury. In People v. Lara (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 102 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 402], the court found the defense of accident was available in a prosecution for battery (any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another (Pen. Code, § 242)), when there was evidence the defendant accidentally injured the victim while turning around in an attempt to free himself from her grasp. The court explained: The accident defense amounts to a claim that the defendant acted without forming the mental state necessary to make his or her actions a crime. ( Lara, at p. 110.) In People v. Jones (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1303 [286 Cal.Rptr. 163], a prosecution for attempted murder, there was evidence the defendant pointed a shotgun at an investigating police officer but did not intend to fire it; the shotgun discharged as the officer attempted to knock it aside. The court found the defense of accident was available because there was evidence from which a reasonable juror could have concluded the defendant did not intend to discharge the firearm. ( Id. at p. 1314.) Similarly, in People v. Garnett (1908) 9 Cal.App. 194 [98 P. 247], the court reasoned it would not have been murder if the shot that killed the victim resulted from the accidental discharge of the defendant's gun. ( Id. at pp. 203-204.) (6) In each case, the defense of accident was raised to rebut the mental element of the crime or crimes with which the defendant was charged. Consequently, assuming the jury received complete and accurate instructions on the requisite mental element of the offense, the obligation of the trial court in each case to instruct on accident extended no further than to provide an appropriate pinpoint instruction upon request by the defense. [3]