Opinion ID: 411138
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Prosecutor's Motivation

Text: 15 In applying this standard of review to the facts of the instant case, this Court begins with the presumption that the prosecutor acted in good faith in moving to dismiss the first indictment. That presumption is rebutted upon a showing of a lack of good faith. We turn to the record for evidence of the prosecutor's motivation. In the first place, the prosecutor in this case surely gave the district court nothing more than a mere conclusory interest--a superseding indictment would be sought--as a basis for dismissal of the indictment. With full recognition that the burden is not on the prosecutor to prove that dismissal is in the public interest, this Court determines that such an unsupported conclusory reason as the seeking of a superseding indictment is insufficient in and of itself to support a dismissal under Rule 48(a). The prosecutor abused the confidence of the district court by offering the seeking of a superseding indictment as a reason for dismissal. Crediting the Government with a good faith motive, the district court granted the motion to dismiss. 18 16 It was not until the arraignment on the second indictment that the lack of good faith on the part of the Government first became evident. At that time the prosecutor stated: We were fixing to go to trial, and we did not go to trial because there were some people on the jury that knew him, ... I wasn't about to go to trial under the circumstances. This statement by the prosecutor raised a clear inference of absence of good faith on the part of the Government--an inference the Government never attempted to rebut either in its brief or in oral argument to this Court. In fact, when asked during oral argument before this Court if it was the Government's position that the reasons for dismissal of the first indictment were as given in the record, the Government attorney responded, I would assume so, your honor, ... I would certainly assume that it was the case. 17 The reflection of the record is specific and dramatic. The Government was simply displeased with the selected jury because there were people on it that the Government believed knew the defendant. This was the only reason ever proffered by the Government for its dismissal of the first indictment. This reason, we believe, was inadequate and improper under Rule 48(a). One week later the Government obtained a second indictment of Salinas in order to get a better jury, a jury more to its liking. It is apparent, therefore, that the Government used Rule 48(a) to gain a position of advantage or to escape from a position of less advantage in which the Government found itself as the result of its own election. 19 The Government decided to repudiate the whole proceeding it had initiated 20 rather than to utilize other avenues that were available: (1) hold a hearing on the Government's allegations that some of the jurors knew the defendant, (2) conduct additional voir dire, (3) utilize one or both of the alternate jurors who had been selected, or (4) challenge the jurors for cause. In short, the Government was not content with the prospect of trying the case to the chosen jury and trifled with the Rules of Criminal Procedure to harass defendant Salinas. 21 For this Court to condone such conduct would invite future misconduct by the Government 22 and open the door to the possibility of grave abuses. 23