Opinion ID: 777482
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Potential for Two Marks Holdings

Text: 198 Even if one gets past the conceptual hurdle of treating as a continuum (or a set and subset) two rationales that are not clearly related in scope, it is not clear that a Marks analysis of the rationales in Bakke would produce the holding that the majority claims it does. 199 As mentioned, the majority defines the relevant judgment in Bakke abstractly, as holding that race can sometimes be used by educational institutions. Until now, we have assumed that the judgment in Bakke is as the majority defines it. Rather than adopting a broad statement providing no real guidance on when race can be used and for what purposes, we might look at what the two opinions that concur on the possibility of a constitutional use of race have to say about each of the two potential rationales, namely remedying past discrimination and diversity. If we do this, we are essentially left with two holdings in Bakke on the permissible rationales for the use of race: one holding permitting the use of race for diversity purposes sometimes and one permitting it for remedial purposes sometimes. 8 See generally Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Hopwood, Bakke and the Future of the Diversity Justification, 29 Tex. Tech. L.Rev. 1, 30-32 (1998). 200 Justice Powell's decision would be the narrowest grounds to support the holding that race can sometimes be used to remedy the effects of past discrimination. This is because the Brennan group would have allowed the use of race whenever there is a sound basis for believing that the problem of underrepresentation of minorities ... [is] attributable to handicaps imposed on minority applicants by past and present racial discrimination. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 369, 98 S.Ct. 2733. On the other hand, Justice Powell expressed a more limited view of the permissible use of race in this regard in Section IV-B of his opinion. He agreed that [t]he State certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimination. Id. at 306, 98 S.Ct. 2733. However, Justice Powell would not have permitted simple reliance on general past discrimination, but instead would have required specific findings by a competent government body that the use of race is responsive to identified discrimination before race could be used remedially in admissions decisions. Id. at 310, 98 S.Ct. 2733. 201 However, with respect to the redefined holding discussing diversity, the one relevant in this case, Justice Brennan's opinion facially is the narrower. Justice Powell wrote broadly in his Section IV-D that [t]he attainment of a diverse student body clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education. Id. at 312, 98 S.Ct. 2733. Later, Powell wrote again that the interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a university's admissions program. Id. at 314, 98 S.Ct. 2733. Justice Brennan, on the other hand, specifically added a restriction to his expressed agreement. As discussed above, Justice Brennan would be willing to support the diversity rationale embodied in the Harvard diversity program set out by Justice Powell as a model, at least so long as the use of race to achieve an integrated student body is necessitated by the lingering effects of past discrimination. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326 n. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2733. Since it put a limit on the utility of diversity as a rationale supporting the constitutionally permissible use of race in admissions programs where Justice Powell's opinion expressed no limit, Justice Brennan's opinion is narrower than Justice Powell's on the use of race to encourage diversity. So by merely redefining the relevant holding more accurately, I have reached a result opposite that of the majority — Justice Brennan's rationale becomes the narrower and therefore becomes the Marks holding to be gleaned from Bakke on the diversity issue. This further shows the error in relying on Marks to answer the question before this court. 202 The above discussion is intended simply to illustrate that reasonable minds can and do differ on the holding, if any, to be found in Bakke with respect to the diversity rationale. Those holding different views on the subject could go back and forth endlessly, with no clear resolution. The reason for this — as almost all, wherever they stand on the argument, would agree — is that we are trying to divine a clear holding from a decidedly unclear decision. 203 In this circumstance, the better view is that Marks simply fails to extract from Bakke a holding on the constitutionality of the diversity rationale. Indeed, the very fact that one must struggle to find a way to fit the Court's Bakke writings into the Marks mold counsels against finding such a holding in Bakke. 204