Opinion ID: 1541345
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the plaintiffs' appeals

Text: In reviewing the trial courts' orders dismissing these complaints, our standard of review is deferential. We have repeatedly held that trial court rulings on forum non conveniens motions are entitled to receive considerable deference from this court. We will not reverse such a ruling unless presented with clear evidence that the trial court abused its broad discretion. Jenkins v. Smith, 535 A.2d 1367, 1369 (D.C. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam) (citations omitted); Smith v. Alder Branch Realty Ltd., 684 A.2d 1284, 1285-86 (D.C.1996). [W]here the [trial] court has considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257, 102 S.Ct. 252, 266, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981) (citations omitted). An appellate court must not los[e] sight of this rule, and substitute its own judgment for that of the [trial] court. Id. We have characterized the reversal of a discretionary decision based on forum non conveniens as an unusual step, Dunkwu v. Neville, 575 A.2d 293, 294 (D.C. 1990), and we have only rarely set aside rulings either way. Jenkins, supra, 535 A.2d at 1370. [8] Where, as here, it is shown that neither party resides in the District and the plaintiff's claim has arisen in another jurisdiction which has more substantial contacts with the cause of action, the burden normally allocated to the defendant to demonstrate why dismissal is warranted for forum non conveniens rests instead upon the plaintiff to show why it is not. Mills, supra, 511 A.2d at 11 (citation omitted). In such cases, this court has emphasized the decisiveness of the public interest in reducing the volume of cases on our overcrowded court calendars. Id. (citations omitted). The deferential standard of review does not mean that this court will simply rubber-stamp the trial court's ruling. [O]ur review of rulings on forum non conveniens motions includes an independent evaluation of . . . [both] private and public factors. Jenkins, supra, 535 A.2d at 1369 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But this independent evaluation is not to be confused with de novo review. Rather, we apply close scrutiny to the specific factors identified and evaluated by the trial court; once we are satisfied that the trial court took the proper factors into account, we adopt a deferential approach in determining whether the trial court's decision fell within the broad discretion committed to it. Smith, supra, 684 A.2d at 1287 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Before addressing the private and public factors which govern forum non conveniens motions, we think it important to focus, as Judge Keary did, on two considerations which are central to these cases and which affect all or most of the specific issues which the parties have raised. First, as Judge Keary recognized, the burden will be on the plaintiffs to show that medical malpractice occurred, and there can be no recovery absent such a showing. [9] According to the plaintiffs, [a]t its heart, this case is about a conspiracy to defraud patients at NME's psychiatric hospitals. This case, however, is not a single class action; 145 complaints have been dismissed by the Superior Court on forum non conveniens grounds. In order to prevail, each plaintiff must establish that in light of his or her medical records, family background, personal history, behavior, and symptoms he or she received inadequate psychiatric care. Each trial will therefore entail a detailed review of the plaintiff's background and treatment, with experts on both sides offering opinions as to whether the treatment of that individual plaintiff conformed to the applicable standard of care. In four of the five cases before us, all of the alleged malpractice occurred in Maryland or Virginia; in the fifth, Eric T., only one of the plaintiff's five hospitalizations was in a facility in the District. These cases thus have the potential of bringing to the Superior Court 145 medical malpractice, fraud and conspiracy cases in which the events giving rise to potential liability occurred outside the District. Second, none of the plaintiffs resides in the District. In such cases, we have accorded very little weight to the plaintiff's choice of forum. Dunkwu, supra, 575 A.2d at 294-95; Mills, supra, 511 A.2d at 10-11. Indeed, a non-resident plaintiff's choice of forum is a comparatively minor factor. Rose, supra, 583 A.2d at 159 (citation omitted). In Dunkwu, a Virginia resident brought suit in the Superior Court for medical malpractice allegedly committed in Virginia against her infant daughter by a physician licensed both in Virginia and in the District. The trial judge denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, but this court reversed, holding that the complaint should have been dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. We stated that if the plaintiffs were permitted to litigate in the Superior Court on the basis of such attenuated contact with the District, then a motion of this kind [could] be defeated by a showing of very little more than that the [non-resident] plaintiff chose the courts of the District of Columbia as her forum. Dunkwu, supra, 575 A.2d at 294; Rose, supra, 583 A.2d at 158 (quoting Dunkwu ). In the present case, the defendants do not reside or practice in the District and, at least insofar as medical malpractice is concerned, the nexus between the litigation and the District is even less substantial than in Dunkwu.
Because all of the plaintiffs and defendants in Eric T. are non-residents of the District, Judge Keary did not abuse her discretion in drawing the obvious conclusion that Maryland was a superior forum to the District in terms of the conventional private interest factors, i.e. the convenience of the parties, the relative ease of access to evidence, and related considerations. To be sure, Gaithersburg is not a great distance from the District, and we are dealing with a relatively compact and closely interrelated metropolitan area. Rose, supra, 583 A.2d at 159 n. 7 (citation omitted); see also Auerbach v. Frank, 685 A.2d 404, 411 (D.C.1996); Neale v. Arshad, 683 A.2d 160, 163 (D.C.1996). Nevertheless, Judge Keary correctly identified the convenience factors and evaluated them in a rational manner. Under our standard of review, that was sufficient. Smith, supra, 684 A.2d at 1287. Judge Keary also addressed, with commendable restraint and moderation, the question whether the plaintiffs had selected the District as a forum in order to avoid Maryland's tort reform restrictions. One of the purposes of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is to avoid forum-shopping. Id. at 160. [D]ismissal may be warranted where a plaintiff chooses a particular forum, not because it is convenient, but solely in order to harass the defendant or take advantage of favorable law. Piper Aircraft Co., supra, 454 U.S. at 249 n. 15. Judge Keary's assessment of this factor  noting the realistic possibility that it is the prospect of a significantly larger recovery that brings plaintiffs here, Rose, supra, 583 A.2d at 159-60 n. 5 (quoting trial judge's opinion)  was reasonable, and we will not second-guess her. With respect to the issue of forum non conveniens, Eric T. obviously presents a somewhat stronger case for the plaintiff than the other cases before us do. On one occasion, Eric T. was hospitalized in the District. One of the defendants in his case  PIW  is located in this jurisdiction. In contrast, there was neither a District of Columbia hospitalization nor a defendant currently practicing in the District in Hood, Hitchens, Schoeny, or Kirk. Moreover, several of the plaintiffs in the other appeals live much further from Washington, D.C. than Eric T. does, [10] and the treatment facilities involved in some of those appeals are located at some distance from the District. [11] Accordingly, our assessment of the private interest factors in Eric T. applies a fortiori to the other four cases. [12]
Judge Keary was of the opinion that the public interest factors tilted overwhelming[ly] in favor of trying the Eric T. litigation in Maryland. Her conclusion is a reasonable one, and it applies with equal or greater force to the other four cases. This court has emphasized the public interest considerations in applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens to situations in which the plaintiff's choice of forum was between a District of Columbia court and a court of equivalent jurisdiction in one of the counties in the Metropolitan Area. Carr v. Bio-Medical Applications of Washington, 366 A.2d 1089, 1092 (D.C.1976) (citations omitted). [T]here is a local interest in having localized controversies decided at home. Piper, supra, 454 U.S. at 260, 102 S.Ct. at 268 (quoting Gulf Oil, supra, 330 U.S. at 509, 67 S.Ct. at 843). The appeals before us all involve Maryland or Virginia plaintiffs who (with the partial exception of Eric T.) were allegedly the victims of medical malpractice while hospitalized in Maryland or Virginia. Accordingly, if there was malpractice or other misconduct as alleged, it occurred in Maryland and Virginia hospitals at the hands of psychiatrists currently licensed only by those jurisdictions. Moreover, the physician-defendants maintain their offices exclusively in Maryland or Virginia and are affiliated with professional associations in their home states. Maryland and Virginia have an obvious interest in protecting their health care providers from invalid claims. Further, each of these states has enacted tort reform legislation and has a significant interest in applying that legislation to malpractice claims that arise within its borders. See Bledsoe v. Crowley, 270 U.S.App. D.C. 308, 310-12, 849 F.2d 639, 641-43 (1988); cf. Dunkwu, supra, 575 A.2d at 296 (according substantial weight to Virginia's governmental interest in capping liability for malpractice). A state in which malpractice allegedly occurred also has an interest in deciding the validity of serious allegations against hospitals which do business in that jurisdiction and against physicians who are licensed to practice medicine there. See Ussery v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 647 A.2d 778, 780-81 (D.C.1994). [13] The plaintiffs point out that PIA and NME had their principal offices in the District at the time of the wrongs alleged. They argue that [t]he District of Columbia cannot turn a blind eye to fraudulent and tortious activities occurring within its borders because the District of Columbia has a public interest in protecting its citizens and its neighbors against such abuses. In our view, however, the action taken by the United States Attorney against PIA already has substantially vindicated the District's interest in punishing and deterring any relevant wrongdoing. The District can further protect its own citizens in the fifty-eight cases brought by residents of this jurisdiction; its interest in compensating non-residents as well is surely minimal. Finally, these five cases do not stand alone. They are lead cases which are expected to determine where more than one hundred and forty similar suits will be tried or settled. The addition to the Superior Court's docket of such a large number of malpractice, conspiracy and fraud cases brought by nonresident plaintiffs against non-resident defendants would have a dramatic impact on that court's already formidable litigation burden. [I]n actions involving non-resident plaintiffs bringing claims arising outside the District of Columbia, this court has emphasized the decisiveness of the public interest in reducing the volume of cases on [the District's] overcrowded court calendars. Mills, 511 A.2d at 11 (citations omitted). This court has made it clear that plaintiffs from other jurisdictions should normally resort to their own courts: The courts of the District of Columbia, burdened as they are, should not without good reason be asked to make inquiry concerning events happening outside their jurisdiction. Frost v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc., 327 A.2d 810, 813 (D.C.1974). [W]e are well aware that our courts are congested with litigation, and that to the extent we can alleviate the case load of our courts by dismissing foreign litigation, the courts can reach other cases more promptly. Jimmerson v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of the Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 663 A.2d 540, 546-547 (D.C.1995); see also Rose, supra, 583 A.2d at 159-60; Dunkwu, supra, 575 A.2d at 297. [A]dministrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origins. Frost, supra, 327 A.2d at 814 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp., supra, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. at 843). If all of these actions were allowed to remain on the Superior Court's docket, then, as the corporate appellees point out in their brief, the Superior Court would be hit with a veritable avalanche of idiosyncratic litigation. Judge Keary estimated, as we have seen, that each of these trials would take two to four weeks. Accord, Ted D. v. Psychiatric Inst. of Montgomery County, No. C.A. 3581-95 (Super.Ct.D.C. Aug. 4, 1995) (Kennedy, J.) (trial would last at least three weeks); see also Michele K. v. Psychiatric Inst. of Montgomery County, et al, No. CA 3321-95 (Super Ct. D.C. June 14, 1995) (von Kann, J.) (same). If only twenty of the 145 cases  fewer than one in seven  were to go to trial, and if each lasted three weeks, then, considering trial time alone, these cases, all of them focusing on the details of the treatment in Maryland and Virginia of residents of those states by physicians licensed in those states would require the investment of sixty weeks of Superior Court judges' time  well over a year! Obviously, too, there is more involved here for each trial judge than three or four weeks spent on the bench in trial. We must also consider the time that the judge would have to devote to motions and matters other than the trial proper. Our appellate bench is likewise busy, and these cases would assuredly reach this court in some numbers. Finally, we are dealing here with potential jury trials, and in the words of Judge von Kann, [i]t is very difficult to pick a jury in the District for a trial that lasts [three or four weeks]. We  you have to go through a lot of jurors to get folks who are available and able to devote that amount of time. . . . We have a shrinking population in the District of Columbia, and although we have abolished exemptions from jury duty, it is still difficult to get people who are willing to come in and serve for protracted periods of time. And when we do, it imposes a significant burden upon them. . . . And to dragoon D.C. residents into coming and sitting in this court for two or three or four weeks to hear how some Maryland providers improperly confined a Maryland resident, I think would be quite an improper imposition on our D.C. jurors. Michele K., supra (oral ruling July 14, 1995). [14]