Opinion ID: 653698
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Proper Disposition

Text: 14 This being the case, the three-judge panel should have remanded this matter to the district court to determine David Mason's competency by applying the burden of proof enunciated by the three-judge panel--viz. whether Mason, by a preponderance of the evidence, was mentally competent to withdraw his petition and to waive his appeals. 15 In cases where an appellate court determines that an improper burden of proof was applied, the normal course is to remand so that the evidence can be reexamined in light of the appropriate standard. See Santowsky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367-68, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1074, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); Ng Yip Yee v. Barber, 267 F.2d 206 (9th Cir.1959); Brewer v. Lewis, 989 F.2d 1021, 1031 (Norris, J., dissenting). See also Carvalho v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 794 F.2d 454, 455 (9th Cir.1986) (recognizing that burden of proof affects all aspects of the jury's verdict and that it is impossible to determine whether the erroneous burden of proof was outcome determinative); Matter of Battaglia, 653 F.2d 419, 423-24 (9th Cir.1981) (after concluding that the district court misplaced the burden of proof, the court held that [b]y placing the burden of persuasion on [the defendant], the district court made the gaps in [the defendant's] proof more damaging than the gaps in the government's proof. This was error.); United States v. Lake, 482 F.2d 146, 149-50 (9th Cir.1973) (erroneous burden-shifting instruction required new trial where there is at least some doubt that the jury misinterpreted the proper allocation of the burden of proof). 16 Here, the district court applied an improper allocation of the burden of proof to determine David Mason's competency. In so doing, the court placed more weight on the deficiencies in Attorney Marson's proof establishing incompetency than on the government's proof establishing competency. In short, the district court improperly placed the risk of nonpersuasion on Attorney Marson. 17 Nonetheless, the three-judge panel concludes, that even though the district court said it was placing the burden of proof on Attorney Marson, that in fact the court did not do so when it determined David Mason's competency. The panel does not provide any record cites to support its conclusion. In fact, the district court's application of the incorrect burden of proof pervades its analysis in determining David Mason's competency. See Order, at 8-9, 15, 16, 17, 18. The district court never found that David Mason had the capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation. Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 1506, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966). The district court merely found that David Mason was not incompetent. The district court did not affirmatively find that he was competent to waive his appeals. 18 The district court's error could have easily changed the outcome of this case. This is because [i]n all kinds of litigation it is plain that where the burden of proof lies may be decisive of the outcome. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1342, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958). Given the substantial evidence that David Mason had suffered severe trauma beyond the range of usual human experience (e.g., setting himself on fire, intentional collapsing of his own windpipe, slashing his own wrists, attempting to hang himself, and slashing of his own throat), I find it impossible to say that the district court's erroneous placement of the burden of proving incompetency on Attorney Marson could not have affected the outcome in any way. 19 Indeed, the district court acknowledged as much in its Order Denying Motion to Strike, Denying Motion to Amend or Alter the Judgment and Granting Application For a Certificate of Probable Cause and a Stay of Execution, at 2-3. The court there said that [i]f the orders of June 7 and 14, 1993, are based on an error of law or fact, this court may have erred in allowing Mr. Marson to be discharged by petitioner. Id. (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the district court entered a stay of David Mason's execution pending review by our court of the issue regarding the placement of the burden of proof. Id. at 4-5. In so doing, the district court noted that [o]ne district court has placed the burden of proof on the state at an analogous hearing ... and, although this court disagrees with that holding, the issue is debatable among jurists of reason. Id. at 5. Hence, the district court implicitly acknowledged that the placement of the burden of proof in this case could be outcome determinative. 20 Accordingly, we should have remanded this matter to the district court so that it could have applied--in light of the three-judge panel's decision--the proper burden of proof to determine David Mason's mental competency to withdraw his petition and to waive his appeals. 2 21