Opinion ID: 4561572
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The compact requirement for class III gaming

Text: IGRA recognizes three different tiers, or “classes” of gaming that may occur on Indian lands if the necessary prerequisites are satisfied. “ ‘ “Class I” consists of social games for minimal prizes and traditional Indian games; “Class II” includes Bingo and similar games of chance such as pull tabs and lotto; “Class III” includes all games not included in Classes I or II.’ ” (Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Ind. v. Wilson (9th Cir. 1994) 64 F.3d 1250, 1255–1256 (Rumsey Indian Rancheria).) Class I gaming on Indian lands is within the exclusive jurisdiction of tribes. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1).) Class II gaming on these lands is generally permitted if “located within a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization or entity (and such gaming is not otherwise specifically prohibited on Indian lands by Federal law),” and “the governing body of the Indian tribe adopts an ordinance or resolution which is approved by the” tribe’s chairperson. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(A), (B).) Class III gaming, which includes slot machines and banked card games, is by far the most lucrative of the three gaming categories and “is subject to a greater degree of federalstate regulation than either class I or class II gaming.” (In re Indian Gaming Related Cases (9th Cir. 2003) 331 F.3d 1094, 4 UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting 1097.) Section 11 of IGRA provides that “Class III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities are” duly authorized by a tribe, “located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity,” and “conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State.” (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(A), (B), (C).) “IGRA’s compact requirement grants States the right to negotiate with tribes located within their borders regarding aspects of class III tribal gaming that might affect legitimate State interests.” (In re Indian Gaming Related Cases, 331 F.3d at p. 1097.) Through this mechanism, “[t]he compacting process gives to states civil regulatory authority that they otherwise would lack under Cabazon, while granting to tribes the ability to offer legal class III gaming.” (Artichoke Joe’s California Grand Casino v. Norton (9th Cir. 2003) 353 F.3d 712, 716.) A compact between a tribe and a state may contain the parties’ agreement on matters such as the kinds of class III gaming that will occur, how this gaming will be regulated, and various other matters relevant to these operations. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C).) Compacts also require federal approval to become effective. (Id., § 2710(d)(3)(B).) A state that allows class III gaming must negotiate in good faith with a tribe that requests a gaming compact. (Id., § 2710(d)(3)(A).)1 If a tribe 1 There is a split of authority regarding whether a state must engage in good faith negotiations concerning class III gaming if it allows any kind of class III game, or if a state must so negotiate only if it allows the specific class III game(s) that a tribe wants to pursue. (Compare Rumsey Indian Rancheria, 5 UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting believes the state has failed to satisfy this responsibility, IGRA provides for a cause of action in federal court, enforceable against a state that has waived its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida (1996) 517 U.S. 44, 76.) Through such an action, a tribe can obtain court intervention and mediation to help secure a compact. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(i)–(vi).) If these efforts fail to yield an agreement, IGRA directs the federal Secretary of the Interior (hereinafter referred to as the Secretary) to impose “procedures” upon a state specifying how class III gaming by the tribe is to occur. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(b)(vii).) 2. The concurrence requirement for gaming on certain after-acquired lands IGRA authorizes tribal gaming on “Indian lands,” defined as “(A) all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; and [¶] (B) any lands title to which is either held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to restriction by the United States against alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power.” (25 U.S.C. § 2703(4)(A)–(B); see also id., § 5108 [authorizing the Secretary to acquire land in trust for a tribe]; 25 C.F.R. §§ 151.10, 151.11 (2020) [articulating criteria to be considered by the Secretary in determining whether to place land into supra, 64 F.3d at p. 1258 with Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. State of Conn. (2d Cir. 1990) 913 F.2d 1024, 1030.) 6 UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting trust for a tribe].)2 But the statute generally prohibits class II and class III gaming on lands acquired by the federal government in trust for the benefit of an Indian tribe after October 17, 1988, the statute’s date of enactment. (25 U.S.C. § 2719(a).) This proscription responds to concerns raised in Congress “about the possibility that tribal governments might acquire land in or near metropolitan areas on which they might open bingo or even casino facilities.” (Boylan, Reflections on IGRA 20 Years After Enactment (2010) 42 Ariz.St. L.J. 1, 9–10.) The statute provides for several exceptions that moderate the general rule prohibiting class II and class III gaming on “after-acquired” trust lands. Among them, the prohibition does 2 A federal regulation promulgated in 2008 (Gaming on Trust Lands Acquired After October 17, 1988, 73 Fed. Reg. 29354 (May 20, 2008)) defines “reservation” as “(1) Land set aside by the United States by final ratified treaty, agreement, Executive Order, Proclamation, Secretarial Order or Federal statute for the tribe, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent; [¶] (2) Land of Indian colonies and rancherias (including rancherias restored by judicial action) set aside by the United States for the permanent settlement of the Indians as its homeland; [¶] (3) Land acquired by the United States to reorganize adult Indians pursuant to statute; or [¶] (4) Land acquired by a tribe through a grant from a sovereign, including pueblo lands, which is subject to a Federal restriction against alienation.” (25 C.F.R. § 292.2 (2020).) Prior to the promulgation of this regulation, the meaning of “reservation,” as used in the relevant provisions of IGRA, was less certain. (Compare Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri v. Norton (10th Cir. 2001) 240 F.3d 1250, 1267 with Exposing Truth about Casinos v. Kempthorne (D.C. Cir. 2007) 492 F.3d 460, 465.) 7 UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting not apply to trust lands that are “located within or contiguous to the boundaries of the reservation of the Indian tribe on October 17, 1988” (25 U.S.C. § 2719(a)(1)), or when “lands are taken into trust as part of — [¶] (i) a settlement of a land claim, [¶] (ii) the initial reservation of an Indian tribe acknowledged by the Secretary under the Federal acknowledgment process, or [¶] (iii) the restoration of lands for an Indian tribe that is restored to Federal recognition” (id., § 2719(b)(1)(B); see also 25 C.F.R. §§ 292.3–292.12 (2020)). These exceptions have been described as either “so obvious that they might be seen as merely technical corrections to the general definition of ‘Indian lands’ ” or “relatively noncontroversial from a conceptual standpoint because they too have history behind them.” (Jensen, Indian Gaming on Newly Acquired Lands (2008) 47 Washburn L.J. 675, 687 (hereinafter Jensen).) “[A]ll require, at least indirectly, demonstrating a strong link between the tribe and the land at issue . . . .” (Id., at p. 688.) Furthermore, “because these provisions deal with circumstances that are exceptional, they are less likely to be of general public interest” than the exception that depends on the existence and exercise of the power to concur. (Ibid.) This additional exception involving the power to concur appears at section 20(b)(1)(A) of IGRA, which provides that tribal gaming may occur on land taken into trust by the federal government for a tribe after IGRA’s date of enactment if “the Secretary, after consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines that a gaming establishment on [the] newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of 8 UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, but only if the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be conducted concurs in the Secretary’s determination.” (25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).) A positive two-part determination by the Secretary does not absolutely require a showing that the property involved is close to a tribe’s existing reservation lands, or that the tribe has a historical connection to the site, although these are among the facts considered by the Secretary in determining whether a gaming establishment would be in the best interest of the tribe and its members and whether it would or would not be detrimental to the surrounding community. (25 C.F.R. §§ 292.16, 292.17, 292.21(a) (2020); see also id., § 151.11(b) (2020) [identifying the location of off-reservation land proposed to be taken into trust for a tribe, relative to a tribe’s reservation, as a factor to be considered by the Secretary in deciding whether to take the land into trust].) Section 20(b)(1)(A) of IGRA, with its requirements of a two-part determination by the Secretary and a concurrence by the appropriate governor, “is Section 20’s only truly discretionary exception.” (All, John McCain and the Indian Gaming “Backlash”: The Unfortunate Irony of S. 2078 (2006) 15 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 295, 302 (hereinafter All).) Because the sequence described by section 20(b)(1)(A) “could apply to any tribe, it is by definition a broader exception than any of the mandatory exceptions” IGRA provides to the law’s general prohibition of gaming on after-acquired lands. (All, at p. 303.) As one scholar has explained, this is the exception for “newly acquired lands most likely to have broad application — and 9 UNITED AUBURN INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE AUBURN RANCHERIA v. NEWSOM Cantil-Sakauye, C. J., dissenting most likely therefore to generate public discussion and, for some, dismay.” (Jensen, supra, 47 Washburn L.J. at p. 688.) Although IGRA is the source of the concurrence procedure, whether an individual state governor has the power to concur is a matter of state law. (Confederated Tribes, supra, 110 F.3d at p. 697.) And in contrast with IGRA’s provision of a cause of action when a state does not engage in good faith compact negotiations, nothing within the statute allows a tribe to seek judicial review of a Governor’s refusal to issue a concurrence. Thus, the concurrence requirement “essentially provides veto power to the Governor of the State in which the land [proposed as a site for gaming operations] is located.” (Sheppard, Taking Indian Land into Trust (1999) 44 S.D. L.Rev. 681, 687.)