Opinion ID: 1854183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Butler Case

Text: Yet, I find that a majority of the court of appeals has, in fact, agreed on a damage award. In Butler v. Zapata Haynie Corp., 94-1171 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 1186, we noted that the votes by two judges for $294,670 included a vote for $150,000, although those two judges would have awarded more than the majority consensus figure of $150,000. Thus, our rule, as reiterated in Butler, could be summed up as the greater award includes the lesser award. However, the Per Curiam today rejects this rule of law by attempting to distinguish Butler and in the process suggests a solution that violates the Louisiana Constitution. While the Butler decision may not be a perfect solution, it at least follows the Louisiana Constitution in requiring that a majority of the court of appeal concur to render a judgment: The highest award for loss of earning capacity upon which a majority of three judges concurred was $150,000 and that must be the amount of the award in judgment. ( Emphasis supplied ) Butler, supra. Further, the rule recognized by this Court in Butler has been recognized by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal for the last thirty years. In 1977, then Judge Harry Lemmon applied the reasoning of Butler long before the Butler decision. Derbofen v. T.L. James & Co., Inc., 355 So.2d 963 (La.App. 4 Cir.1977) In that case a defendant appealed from a judgment for plaintiffs in the amount of $183,112.30. On appeal, two judges voted for plaintiffs in the amount of $1,494.00, two judges voted for plaintiffs in the amount of $199,637.50, and one judge voted for defendant. The court of appeal's judgment was for plaintiffs in the amount of $1,494.00. They explained: In our view there are two reasonable approaches to the decision that these votes result in the stated decree. One point of view is that since defendant sought relief by appeal, the effect of Judge Schott's vote, combined with our votes, is to grant that relief, at least to the extent of a reduction of. $181,618.30. Under this view the effect of Judge Schott's vote for the ultimate reduction (to zero) resulted in three votes concurring to reduce by $181,618.30 to $1,494.00, since a vote for a greater reduction encompasses a vote for a lesser reduction. The other point of view is that there are four votes to award a judgment to plaintiffs, and the effect of the votes of Judges Samuel and Boutall to award judgment in the amount of $199,637.50, combined with our votes, is to award a judgment of at least $1,494.00, since a vote for a greater award includes by inference a vote for at least the lesser award. Derbofen, supra . See also Lowe v. Gentilly Dodge, Inc., 342 So.2d 1231 (La.App. 4th Cir.1977). Only a year ago, a five-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit was able to overcome a very similar problem by applying the principles of Butler in Vincent v. Vincent, XXXX-XXXX (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/10/07), 949 So.2d 535. There, three judges of the five judge panel agreed that the trial court did not commit manifest error by awarding a spouse permanent spousal support. However, the judges could not agree on how much or how long such support should have been awarded. One judge would have awarded permanent alimony of $7,000 per month, two would have awarded $3,000, and two would have awarded nothing. Further, of the three that affirmed the trial court and would have awarded something, the judge wishing to award $7,000 and one of the judges wishing to award $3,000 would have awarded support for a period of 5 years. The other judge (who would also have awarded $3,000) wished to award support indefinitely. Thus, by final decree of the court, and citing to Butler, spousal support in the amount of $3,000 was awarded because the $7,000 award included the $3,000 award, and it was set for a period of five years since an indefinite period of time necessarily included a period of five years. Vincent, supra. In the present case, two judges of the twelve-judge panel would have awarded $1,312,919.11. Parfait v. Transocean Offshore, Inc., 04-1271, 05-0174, p. 2-3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1/05/07), 950 So.2d 8. Six judges of the twelve-judge panel would have awarded $1,701,029.11. Parfait, supra. Applying our long-standing precedent in Butler, I find the highest award . . . upon which a majority of . . . judges concurred was $1,312,919.11, and that must be the amount of the award in the judgment since the votes by six judges for $1,701,029.11 included a vote for $1,312,919.11. Butler, supra. Nevertheless, the Per Curiam today concludes that Butler does not apply since Butler did not involve a damage award that had been set by a trial court. At p. 638. The Per Curiam places unfounded significance in the idea that an appellate court that sets damages initially (reversing a trial court's judgment for the defendant) is different from a panel that merely modifies those damages. I see no logical basis for distinguishing Butler on this ground. [2] Further, according to the Per Curiam, it seems that we may have two rules, depending on who prevails at the trial court level. If the trial court awards zero damages, Butler will apply and the Court of Appeal can use the greater includes the lesser rule. If the trial court does award damages, the greater includes the lesser rule should not apply. I see no logical basis for having differing rules which depend on who prevails at the trial court level. In my view, Butler should apply across the board.