Opinion ID: 2975873
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: analysis

Text: Petitioner asserts that “[t]he District Court erred by requiring Petitioner to meet an “unequivocal evidence” standard, rather than a “preponderance of the evidence” standard, to prove that the children’s habitual residence was in France. (Petitioner’s Br. at 50.) We agree. By federal statute, the Hague Convention is implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, which establishes that a petitioner seeking return of a child under the Hague Convention “shall establish by a preponderance of this evidence . . . that the child has been wrongfully removed or retained . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(1). This preponderance of the evidence standard has been recognized by this Court. See Friedrich II, 78 F.3d at 1064 (“[T]he plaintiff in an action for return of the child has the burden of proving the exercise of custody rights by a preponderance of the evidence.”). Rather than apply this preponderance of the evidence standard, however, the magistrate judge applied the heightened standard of evidence adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Mozes. According to the decision below, “the Court examines the evidence to determine whether ‘the objective facts point unequivocally’ to the conclusion of a new habitual residence in France.” (J.A. 109 (quoting Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1081.)) This unequivocal evidence standard was first articulated by a Scottish Court in Zenel v. Haddow, 1993 S.L.T. 975, 979 (Scot. 1st Div.), and was imported into the United States by the Ninth Circuit in Mozes. 239 F.3d at 1081. While the Supreme Court has held that, in interpreting treaties, a court should “find the opinions of our sister signatories to be entitled to considerable weight,” Air France, 470 U.S. at 404, the weight of a foreign court decision cannot overcome a superceding Act of the United States Congress. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 193-94 (1888) (“[I]f there be any conflict between the stipulations of the treaty and the requirements of the law, the latter must control.”). The International Child Abduction Remedies Act expressly states that courts should apply a preponderance of the evidence standard, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(1), not the unequivocal evidence standard adopted by Scotland and the Ninth Circuit. As a United States Court of Appeals, this Court is bound by Congress’ decision. Respondent argues that Petitioner failed to object to the magistrate judge’s use of the incorrect evidentiary standard, and thus claims this issue is waived on appeal. We disagree. While it is true that a general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal, see Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508-09 (6th Cir. 1991), this Court has held that an objection preserves an issue when it “explain[s] and cite[s] specific portions of the report which [counsel] deem[s] problematic.” Smith v. Chater, No. 96-3325, 1997 WL 415309 (6th Cir. July 18, 1997) (unpublished opinion). In this case, Petitioner filed 65 individual objections to the magistrate judge’s report. According to one of those objections, “Petitioner objects to the manner in which the Magistrate [Judge] failed to apply the dictates of Friedrich I, as set forth at the top of page 26, i.e., to ‘focus on the child, not the parents, and examine past experience, not future intentions.’” (J.A. 139.) This objection is not a general objection to the magistrate judge’s entire report. Rather, it cites and specifically quotes the language of the report which Petitioner found problematic, and gives the specific page number where that language may be found. Furthermore, it expressly states Petitioner’s belief that the magistrate judge should have applied Friedrich I, rather than the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Mozes. As has already been discussed, the magistrate judge’s decision to No. 06-3889 Robert v. Tesson Page 12 erroneously apply an unequivocal evidence standard stems from its error in applying Mozes. Therefore, the district judge would have no difficulty determining from this objection that Petitioner objected to the application of the Mozes standard in lieu of the Friedrich I standard, and by extension, that the magistrate judge should not have applied those parts of Mozes which are inconsistent with Friedrich I. We therefore hold that the magistrate judge applied the wrong standard of evidence in deciding this case. Accordingly, the evidence in this case should have been considered under a preponderance of the evidence standard. III. Thomas and Alexis Were Habitual Residents of the United States at the Time of Their Removal