Opinion ID: 1129643
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: is the certification statute mandatory or directory?

Text: Going directly then to the constitutionality of Laws of 1965, ch. 99, p. 1302, the Federal Court Local Law Certificate Procedure Act, RCW 2.60, we should first ascertain whether the statute is directory or mandatory. RCW 2.60.020, the operative section under which the question has been certified, states: When in the opinion of any federal court before whom a proceeding is pending, it is necessary to ascertain the local law of this state in order to dispose of such proceeding and the local law has not been clearly determined, such federal court may certify to the supreme court for answer the question of local law involved and the supreme court shall render its opinion in answer thereto. (Italics mine.) If this statute is, as the majority claim, discretionary or directory and not mandatory, then we have no constitutional problem because the court can answer or not answer as it chooses, depending upon the whims of the moment. That is, if it is directory only, this court, under such a construction, is free to answer some, all, or none of the questions certified to it, depending upon its inclinations and the state of its docket. What is now a question of constitutionality could conceivably, under a statute merely directory in nature, be simply regarded as a matter of good neighborliness. We can be good neighbors one time and indifferent ones another, and no one can charge us with a duty in any event. But if the statute is merely directory, it is a nullity anyway because it then purports to allow us to do that which the court has the option of now doing without it  make public pronouncements having no force of law on divers legal subjects. Does the statute purport to compel this court to answer the certified question, or is compliance left to the court's discretion? The statute, I note, employs the language of compulsion or command in several places. In the foregoing section (RCW 2.60.020) it declares that this court shall render its opinion in answer to the question put to it. Elsewhere it uses similarly mandatory language alongside of words denoting permission. RCW 2.60.030 (Laws of 1965, ch. 99, § 3, p. 1304), provides: Certificate procedure shall be governed by the following provisions: (1) Certificate procedure may be invoked by a federal court upon its own motion or upon the motion of any interested party in the litigation involved if the federal court grants such motion. .... (6) The supreme court shall forward to the federal court utilizing certificate procedure its opinion answering the local law question submitted. (Italics mine.) as contrasted with the following permissive phraseology: (7) The supreme court may adopt rules of practice and procedure to implement or otherwise facilitate utilization of certificate procedure. (RCW 2.60.030 (7)) (Italics mine.) Thus, I am confident that the legislature has commanded the Supreme Court (1) to answer by written opinion the question submitted to it by any federal court concerning Washington law if (a) the law of this state on the point in issue before the federal court has not, in that court's opinion, been clearly determined, and (b) a clear answer as to the Washington law is, in the opinion of the federal court, necessary to a determination of the cause on hearing; (2) to take jurisdiction either (a) upon the certification of the federal court sua sponte, or (b) on the motion of any party to the federal proceedings on the federal court's approval of such application; and (3) to forward its answer to the federal court by written opinion. The statute, as I read it, leaves to the discretion of the Supreme Court of this state only the adoption of rules of practice implementing the certificate procedure. The majority finds comfort in the idea that, if we regard the words shall and may as synonymous, it will make the statute directory. On other occasions, this court has, I realize, in ascertaining the legislature's intentions, been required to construe the mandatory word shall as the lexical equivalent of the permissive expression may, but that interpretive expedient is neither available nor advisable here for the certification statute uses both terms and in such context that they cannot possibly be synonymous. To hold that the word shall as used repeatedly in the statute means may, to me savors of pure judicial invention and bodes ill for problems of statutory construction in the future. I would be loathe to see such an interpretative expedient applied to the Decalogue. It is apparent to me that the legislature intentionally used the word in its ordinary sense. The dictionary says that shall ordinarily denotes a command, a mandate, a duty, an obligation, or a categorical undertaking or promise: owe, owes, ought to, must ... will have to: ... will be able to: can ... used to express a command or exhortation ... used in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is mandatory ... used to express what is inevitable or what seems to be fated or decreed or likely to happen in the future ... used to express determination.... Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1964). Contrastingly, the same dictionary shows that may in its ordinary and usual meaning denotes permission, or authority or a right enabling one to do something. Conveying the idea of choice, option or discretion, the statute thus logically employs the permissive or directory may in authorizing the federal court to invoke the statute and in saying the Supreme Court may adopt rules of practice or procedure (Italics mine.), to implement or otherwise facilitate the procedure. But the same statute in denoting mandatory requirements or compulsion contrastingly uses shall. Thus, the employment of both terms in the same statute sensibly requires that they be given their ordinary meaning and unmistakably establishes that shall, as used in RCW 2.60, means must. In construing the words as the legislature obviously intended, the meaning of the statute is left clear and the legislative intention manifest, and we need not resort to the rules of construction stated in Faunce v. Carter, 26 Wn.2d 211, 173 P.2d 526 (1946); and Seattle v. Reed, 6 Wn.2d 186, 107 P.2d 239 (1940). Rules of construction ought not be employed to becloud but rather to clarify a statute. The words shall and may are too valuable to the law to be deprived of their meaning by interchangeable usage. If the law loses them as separate word entities, it will be hard put to find a brief, cogent substitute for either. They should, therefore, be given their ordinary meaning for it is apparent that that is the sense in which the legislature used them. Accordingly, the words of the statute that the Supreme Court shall render its opinion, and shall forward its opinion to the federal court, and that such opinion shall be a written opinion which shall include a certificate that it is in answer to the certified question, bespeak a mandatory intent, and an explicit purpose in the legislature to direct that this court not only has but must take jurisdiction of the controversy and must answer the certified question. Couched as it is in the language of mandate and command, the statute is not permissive or directory, but mandatory, and no amount of legalese can make the words mean differently. There are, of course, areas in the law where it is mandatory that this court take jurisdiction, such as certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition, and in some instances habeas corpus and review on appeal in which we may constitutionally decide to go no further than the initial examination of the premises and terminate the cause short of a decision on the merits. In such cases, however, the decision-making process of the court has actually operated to decide the question of jurisdiction. The court, in granting or denying an extraordinary writ or remedy without going to the merits in cases claimed to arise under its original  or perhaps inherent  jurisdiction is actually an employment of the judicial power, for deciding the question of whether the extraordinary writ should issue or the remedy is available at all in a given case constitutes an exercise of the court's jurisdiction. That the legislature has long recognized this concept is seen in its early enactment of RCW 2.04.020 and 2.28.150 which provide that, once the court has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter, it shall possess all power necessary to the full exercise of that jurisdiction. In the matter now before us, however, the statute purports to assume this judicial function by commanding this court to assume jurisdiction and to function judicially whenever a federal trial or appellate court submits a question to it in accordance with the statute. The statute thus purports to foist upon the court a jurisdiction  and a duty  not encompassed by nor included in those powers granted it in the constitution nor encompassed within its inherent or statutory powers. Being mandatory, in my opinion, it purports to compel the court unconstitutionally to perform a nonjudicial function.