Opinion ID: 1275934
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Compensability of the Upper Back Condition

Text: Following Hodges IV, and upon stipulation of the parties, Hodges was given additional time to submit evidence to demonstrate a link between his 1977 accident and his upper back problems for which he sought compensation. In Hodges V, the Board found that [t]he employee has failed to submit any evidence to indicate the employee did not have upper back problems prior to the 1977 accident or that the 1977 accident aggravated or accelerated the preexisting conditions.[] Furthermore, much of the evidence the employee submitted in response to our request in Hodges IV, was not presented at the hearing prior to Hodges III. Since the evidence is new, the employee is required to state the reason why, with due diligence, the new evidence could not have been produced at the time of the hearing.... The employee has failed to do so. Hodges proposes a variety of arguments to explain why the Board's decision is flawed. Hodges claims that the Board placed insufficient weight on the opinions of his treating physicians and ignored exceptionally voluminous evidence that supports these doctors' conclusions. Hodges points to a number of depositions and medical reports, some of which link his lower back injury to his upper back problems, and he argues that the Board erred by finding to the contrary. Alaska Constructors claims that Hodges did not satisfy the prerequisite of 8 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 45.150(d)(2) (1996) that a party moving for modification explain why newly submitted evidence was not available at the prior hearing. [5] Alternatively, Alaska Constructors contends that none of the evidence submitted with the petition for modification tends to show a causal link between Hodges's upper back problems and his June 6, 1977 accident. We conclude that the Board properly denied Hodges's request for modification because Hodges failed to explain why newly discovered evidence supporting the allegation could not have been discovered and produced at the time of the hearing. 8 AAC 45.150(d)(2). We have consistently held that an allegation of mistake should not serve as `a back-door route to retrying a case because one party thinks he can make a better showing on the second attempt.' Interior Paint Co., 522 P.2d at 169 (quoting 3 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 81.52, at 354.8 (1971)); cf. Burrell v. Burrell, 696 P.2d 157, 163 (Alaska 1984) (holding that motion for relief from judgment under Civil Rule 60(b) does not allow for relitigation of issues previously adjudged). It is apparent from the record that Hodges sought to relitigate the issues with evidence that could have been submitted prior to the Board's decision in Hodges III. The bulk of Hodges's new evidence consists of depositions taken in 1993 relating to medical diagnosis and treatment that had occurred years earlier. Hodges failed to explain adequately why the evidence could not have been produced at the time of the hearing that preceded the Board's decision in Hodges III. The only explanation Hodges offered the Board for failing to introduce this evidence sooner is contained in two sentences of an affidavit that Hodges's attorney submitted: That your affiant could not produce or introduce evidence at the July 1991 hearing, which evidence was developed by following procedure adopted by affiant. The wisest and best way was to file the application with the Board (which was in fact filed) in June of 1992. [6] Therefore, we hold that the Board acted within its province in denying modification of its previous decision concerning the compensability of Hodges's upper back condition. [7] Our holding here resolves Hodges's claim for reimbursement for travel related to medical treatment. Under 8 AAC 45.084, the employer is responsible for paying transportation expenses for an employee's travel to receive medical treatment for work-related injuries. Because we affirm the Board's determination that Hodges's upper back condition is non-compensable, reimbursement for travel costs associated with treatment of that condition is inappropriate.