Opinion ID: 173489
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Commonality and Predominance

Text: Gable and Wolin assert that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that the proposed class could not show that common issues predominate. We agree. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) provides that questions of law or fact common to the class are a prerequisite to class certification. Commonality exists where class members' situations share a common issue of law or fact, and are sufficiently parallel to insure a vigorous and full presentation of all claims for relief. Cal. Rural Legal Assistance, Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 917 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.1998). Appellants easily satisfy the commonality requirement. The claims of all prospective class members involve the same alleged defect, covered by the same warranty, and found in vehicles of the same make and model. Appellants' complaints set forth more than one issue that is common to the class, including: 1) whether the LR3's alignment geometry was defective; 2) whether Land Rover was aware of this defect; 3) whether Land Rover concealed the nature of the defect; 4) whether Land Rover's conduct violated the Michigan Consumer Protection Act or the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act; and 5) whether Land Rover was obligated to pay for or repair the alleged defect pursuant to the express or implied terms of its warranties. These common core questions are sufficient to satisfy the commonality test. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019-20. We next consider whether these common questions predominate. While Rule 23(a)(2) asks whether there are issues common to the class, Rule 23(b)(3) asks whether these common questions predominate. Though there is substantial overlap between the two tests, the 23(b)(3) test is far more demanding, see Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623-24, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997), and asks whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation, id. at 623, 117 S.Ct. 2231.
The district court erred when it concluded, without discussion, that certification is inappropriate because Gable and Wolin did not prove that the defect manifested in a majority of the class's vehicles. The appellants allege a violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act and the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, because, for example, Land Rover represented that the vehicles had particular characteristics or were of a particular standard when they were of another, and Land Rover failed to reveal material facts about the vehicles. Gable alleges breach of implied warranty because the vehicles were defective and not of merchantable quality at the time they left Land Rover's possession. Common issues predominate such as whether Land Rover was aware of the existence of the alleged defect, whether Land Rover had a duty to disclose its knowledge and whether it violated consumer protection laws when it failed to do so. See Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir.2005) (per curiam). Land Rover argues that the evidence will demonstrate that the prospective class members' vehicles do not suffer from a common defect, but rather, from tire wear due to individual factors such as driving habits and weather. Thus, according to Land Rover, the district court correctly decided not to certify a class because appellants failed to prove that their tires wore prematurely due to a defect. However, we have held that proof of the manifestation of a defect is not a prerequisite to class certification. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901 (9th Cir.1975) ([N]either the possibility that a plaintiff will be unable to prove his allegations, nor the possibility that the later course of the suit might unforeseeably prove the original decision to certify the class wrong, is a basis for declining to certify a class which apparently satisfies the Rule.). What Land Rover argues is whether class members can win on the merits. For appellants' claims regarding the existence of the defect and the defendant's alleged violation of consumer protection laws, this inquiry does not overlap with the predominance test. Although early tire wear cases may be particularly problematic for plaintiffs seeking class certification, we reject Land Rover's suggestion that automobile defect cases can categorically never be certified as a class. Gable and Wolin assert that the defect exists in the alignment geometry, not in the tires, that Land Rover failed to reveal material facts in violation of consumer protection laws, and that Land Rover was unjustly enriched when it sold a defective vehicle. All of these allegations are susceptible to proof by generalized evidence. Although individual factors may affect premature tire wear, they do not affect whether the vehicles were sold with an alignment defect.
Appellants also allege breach of express warranty because Land Rover refused to repair the tires and the geometry defect pursuant to the terms of the Limited Warranty and the Tire Warranty. Although we have not considered whether common issues related to such a warranty might predominate, we note that the Sixth Circuit reached a similar issue in Daffin v. Ford Motor Co., 458 F.3d 549 (6th Cir.2006). In Daffin, an owner of a van sued for a defective throttle body assembly that caused the accelerator to stick. 458 F.3d at 550. All proposed class members were covered by a standard warranty providing for the repair or replacement of defective products. The court concluded that the following common issues predominated: (1) whether the throttle body assembly is defective, (2) whether the defect reduces the value of the car, and (3) whether Ford's express `repair or replace' warranty covers the latent defect at issue in this case. Id. at 554. The court distinguished the case from instances where different class members were exposed to different products such that the uncommon issue of causation predominated over the lesser shared issues. Id. All plaintiffs received the same allegedly defective product, and all had the same express warranty claim that the car did not conform to the written warranty. As in Daffin, all of the proposed class members here are covered by a Limited Warranty that provides for the repair or replacement of defects, and all of the proposed class members allege that their vehicles suffer from the same defect. These claims require common proof of the existence of the defect and a determination whether Land Rover violated the terms of its Limited Warranty. Accordingly, we conclude that common issues predominate regarding Land Rover's obligations under its Limited Warranty. Land Rover's other warranty, the Tire Warranty, provides that when tire wear is caused by a defect in the vehicles, Land Rover will replace the tires and/or pay for realignment. Claims for breach of the Tire Warranty do not easily satisfy the predominance test. A determination whether the defective alignment caused a given class member's tires to wear prematurely requires proof specific to that individual litigant. See Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1189 (although there may be common liability issues regarding a pacemaker defect, to determine causation and damages for each of the three claims asserted here, it is inescapable that many triable individualized issues may be presented). Tires deteriorate at different rates depending on where and how they are driven. Whether each proposed class member's tires wore out, and whether they wore out prematurely and as a result of the alleged alignment defect, are individual causation and injury issues that could make classwide adjudication inappropriate. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018-21 (7th Cir.2002) (reversing certification where plaintiffs alleged defective tire design because a class action would not be manageable: tires were recalled at different times, they may have differed in their propensity to fail, some vehicles were re-sold, some owners alleged they were advised to underinflate their tires, and there were six tire models representing sixty-seven different designs). As to the existence of a defect in the vehicles, failure to disclose the defect, recovery pursuant to state consumer protection laws, and breach of the Limited Warranty, we hold that the district court erred when it required Gable and Wolin to show that a majority of proposed class members' vehicles manifested the results of the defect. We reverse on this basis, and remand for the district court to address the remaining class issues. For example, appellants have set forth a proposed plan for a trial bifurcated with a liability phase and a damages phase, which the district court has not addressed. As to the breach of the Tire Warranty claim, while we observe that this claim may not be amenable to class treatment, the district court still must address this issue on remand because it did not previously address it in light of the threshold manifestation requirement it imposed.