Opinion ID: 72653
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Add 2 points for each prior sentence of

Text: imprisonment of at least sixty days not counted in (a) (c) Add 1 point for each prior sentence not counted in (a) or (b), up to a total of 4 points for this item. Pielago contends that a six-month sentence to a community treatment center falls within subsection (c) instead of (b), because it is not a “sentence of imprisonment.” For a definition of “sentence of imprisonment” within the meaning of § 4A1.1(b) we look to the Sentencing Guidelines’ commentary. Note 1 of the commentary to § 4A1.1 refers us to § 4A1.2 for a definition of the term. Section 4A1.2(b) states that “sentence of imprisonment means a sentence of incarceration . . .,” a definition that is not particularly helpful to our analysis. 20 Fortunately, the background commentary to § 4A1.1 sheds some light on what the Sentencing Commission meant by a “sentence of imprisonment”: Subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of § 4A1.1 distinguish confinement sentences longer than one year and one month, shorter confinement sentences of at least sixty days, and all other sentences, such as confinement sentences of less than sixty days, probation, fines, and residency in a halfway house. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 comment. (backg’d). That commentary makes it clear that a sentence to a halfway house is not a “sentence of imprisonment.” But the commentary uses residency in a halfway house as an example, not an exhaustive list of the types of confinement that are not “sentences of imprisonment.” The question we must decide, then, is whether for the purposes of § 4A1.1 confinement in a community treatment center equates to residency in a halfway house or instead to a sentence of confinement. Our circuit has no decision close to point. We begin by looking at how other circuits have answered related questions. In United States v. Rasco, 963 F.2d 132, 135-36 (6th Cir. 1992), the Sixth Circuit concluded that confinement in a community treatment center as a result of a parole revocation was “imprisonment” under § 4A1.2(k). The Rasco Court reasoned that the Sentencing Commission was focusing on the reason for the defendant’s confinement, not his place of confinement. See id. at 135. The court explained that because § 4A1.2(k) deals with confinement as a result of parole revocation, the Commission was 21 obviously concerned with the reason why the defendant had been confined, the defendant’s failure to stay out of trouble while on parole. See id. at 135-36. Therefore, it was irrelevant where the defendant spent his sentence; only the fact that the his parole had been revoked was determinative. See id. However the Rasco Court did “recognize that this interpretation arguably conflicts with the background commentary to section 4A1.1” Id. at 136. Whether it conflicts with the commentary or not, Rasco is distinguishable from this case. Section 4A1.2(k), which is concerned with calculating the criminal histories of prior parole violators, implicates a different set of policy concerns than does § 4A1.1. The Sentencing Commission had a reason to more harshly sanction those who have violated parole in the past, even though the resulting incarceration was only in a halfway house or community treatment center. However, Pielago’s stay in a community treatment center was not the consequence of a parole violation. He was sentenced directly to that confinement. Therefore, the Rasco Court’s reasoning is not applicable to this case. See also United States v. Jones , 107 F.3d 1147, 1161-65 (6 th Cir. 1997) (limiting the Rasco decision, and holding that a sentence of home detention is not a “sentence of imprisonment” for § 4A1.1 purposes). A year later, the Ninth Circuit, addressing exactly the same issue as the Rasco Court, concluded that a term of confinement in a community treatment center is not a “sentence of imprisonment,” 22 even when it resulted from revocation of parole. In United States v. Latimer, 991 F.2d 1509, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit declined to follow Rasco, and rejected the idea that the term “sentence of imprisonment” meant anything other than precisely what it says. See id. The Latimer Court based its holding on what the Sixth Circuit acknowledged but failed to be guided by: the background commentary to § 4A1.1. See id. at 1515. Because that commentary distinguishes a term of confinement in a halfway house from a sentence of imprisonment, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the question was whether a term confinement in a community treatment center should be included along with residency in a halfway house as a sentence that is not a “sentence of imprisonment.” See id. at 1516. It answered affirmatively, noting that community treatment centers and halfway houses are treated as equivalent forms of punishment throughout the Sentencing Guidelines. See id. at 1512-13. We agree with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Latimer. Several Sentencing Guidelines provisions indicate that the Commission considers confinement in a community treatment center, like confinement in a halfway house, not to be “imprisonment.” Section 5C1.1(d) provides that district courts may sentence defendants whose sentencing range is six to ten months to “community confinement” in lieu of part of their sentence of imprisonment. Section 5F1.1 defines “community confinement” as 23 “residence in a community treatment center, halfway house . . . or other community facility.” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.1 comment. (n.1). These two provisions indicate that the Sentencing Commission considered a sentence to confinement in a community treatment center to be different from a “sentence of imprisonment.” The Sentencing Guidelines also indicate that community treatment centers and halfway houses are functionally equivalent. Section 2P1.1(b)(3) states that “if the defendant escaped from the non-secure custody of a community corrections center, community treatment center, ‘halfway house,’ or similar facility, . . . . decrease the offense level by 4 levels.” Similarly, § 5B1.4(b)(19) states that “residence in a community treatment center, halfway house or similar facility may be imposed as a condition of probation or supervised release.” These two provisions show that the Sentencing Commission considered time served in community treatment centers and halfway houses to be equivalent to each other and distinct from a sentence of imprisonment. As a matter of fact, in five of the six sections of the Sentencing Guidelines in which the term “halfway house” appears, the term “community treatment center” appears right alongside it. Compare U.S.S.G. §§ 2J1.6(b)(1)(B); 2P1.1(b)(3); 5B1.4(b)(19); 5C1.1(e)(2); 5F1.1 comment. (n.1) with U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1 comment. (backg’d). The only time “halfway house” does not appear with “community treatment center” is in the background commentary to § 24 4A1.1. We do not read any significance into that omission. The Sentencing Commission simply did not make an all-inclusive list there. Instead, “halfway house” is used only as an illustrative example of the types of confinements that are not to be considered “imprisonment” under § 4A1.1. For these reasons, we join the Ninth Circuit in concluding that a term of confinement in a community treatment center, like residency in a halfway house, is not a “sentence of imprisonment” for the purposes of § 4A1.1. As a result, § 4A1.1(c) applies in this case, and Pielago should have been given only one criminal history point for his 1986 conviction and sentence. Accordingly, his criminal history category should have been III and his sentencing range 121 to 151 months.