Opinion ID: 174766
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether Appellants granted consent to use the ASR marks after July 12, 2006

Text: Appellees contend that the judgment may be affirmed based upon the district court's separate conclusion that their use of the ASR marks was with Appellants' consent and permission. The district court concluded that [Appellees'] use of the intellectual property, including use past the commencement of this litigation, was with [Appellants'] consent and acquiescence. However, a fair reading of the district court's discussion as a whole reflects a determination that Appellants consented to the use of the ASR marks before July 12, 2006 and acquiesced to that use after July 12, 2006. The district court observed that [Appellants'] conduct after they sent the July 12, 2006 demand letter led [Appellees'] to believe that they continued to have `permission' to use the trademarks. The district court's phrasing  i.e., that Appellees only believed that they had permission  demonstrates that the district court was focused on acquiescence rather than actual consent. To be sure, Kennedy made active representations that Appellees could use the ASR marks, at least for the purposes of specific tasks. The district court found that Kennedy request[ed] that [SAC] process certificates and certify members in the ASR program for classes, and that he continued to forward student information to SAC to be included in SAC's `website system' [between July 12, 2006 and November 2007]. Nonetheless, as the district court determined, Appellees did not have a contractual right to use the ASR marks. Any consent that may have been granted after July 12, 2006 arguably amounted to nothing more than a revocable license to use the ASR marks for the particular tasks. Because the parties were litigating actively with respect to the ASR marks at the time Kennedy made his requests, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine if and when Appellants revoked any post-July 12, 2006 consent to Appellees' use of the marks. Because of these difficulties, the district court was correct to apply the acquiescence doctrine to the instant case. Rather than attempting to determine exactly when Appellants granted or revoked consent, the proper inquiry is whether and to what extent Appellees relied reasonably on Appellants' active representations that Appellees had a right to use the marks.