Opinion ID: 172852
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: The District Court Should Only Have Attributed One Criminal History Point to Mr. Caldwell Based on his 2002 Conviction for Driving While a Habitual Offender

Text: Mr. Caldwell admits that he was convicted of driving while a habitual offender in Kansas state court in 2002 after being caught driving with a suspended license three times in five years. For that offense, he was initially sentenced to twelve months' probation and thirty days in jail. However, he was given the option of paying a $1500 fine in lieu of serving those thirty days. He apparently paid a portion of that fine at some point but, after failing to pay the balance of the fine, he served five of his thirty-day sentence in March 2006. The district court appropriately attributed one criminal history point to Mr. Caldwell for this conviction. Under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1), an offense like driving with a suspended license qualifies for a criminal history point only if the sentence was a term of probation of more than one year or a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days. To constitute a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days, the defendant must actually serve some portion of that sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n. 2. In this case, Mr. Caldwell was initially allowed to pay a fine instead of actually serving any of that time. Therefore, his sentence of twelve months' probation and thirty days' imprisonment did not initially qualify to earn him a criminal history point. However, after he failed to pay the balance of the fine, he was placed in jail for five days. Because he actually served a portion of his thirty-day sentence, Mr. Caldwell was assessed a criminal history point for that offense. However, the district court erred by adding two additional points to Mr. Caldwell's criminal history based on this offense. The district court determined that Mr. Caldwell qualified for a two-point increase pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d), which provides that the court should [a]dd 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation. . . (emphasis added). A criminal justice sentence is defined as any sentence that would qualify for a criminal history point under § 4A1.2(c), see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1, cmt. n. 4, which, as described above, includes within its purview any sentence of more than twelve months' probation or thirty days' imprisonment, provided that at least a portion of that term of imprisonment is actually served. The application of the relevant Guidelines provisions in this case presents a question of first impression before this court. Mr. Caldwell acknowledges that he was under probation for driving while a habitual offender when he committed his 2005 offense. [5] However, at the time of that offense, he had not yet served any portion of his thirty-day sentence. Thus, when he committed the 2005 offense, the probationary term he was then serving did not yet qualify as part of a criminal justice sentence under § 4A1.1(d). The question of first impression before this court is, therefore, whether a defendant's criminal history category can be increased for committing an offense while serving under a criminal justice sentence where the probationary term he was serving at the time of the offense only later qualified as a criminal justice sentence due to events that took place after the defendant committed the offense of conviction. We hold that, in these circumstances, it was error to add these two points to Mr. Caldwell's criminal history. The plain language of § 4A1.1(d) is limited to offenses committed  while under any criminal justice sentence . . . (emphasis added). In this case, Mr. Caldwell was not under a criminal justice sentence at the time he committed any of the conduct of conviction. We cannot ignore the plain language of that provision. See United States v. Dell, 359 F.3d 1347, 1349 (10th Cir.2004) (We find the plain language of the sentencing guidelines and the accompanying commentary to be dispositive.). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision to grant Mr. Caldwell a one-point increase for his prior conviction, but reverse the district court's decision to add two additional points to his criminal history for committing his offense while under a criminal justice sentence. Because a two-point reduction would move Mr. Caldwell from criminal history category IV to category III, we must remand this case for resentencing in light of this error.