Opinion ID: 2092803
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Board's Supplemental Report and Recommendation.

Text: On November 19, 1999, the Board, which was once again unanimous, issued a scholarly, thoughtful, and balanced supplemental report in response to this court's order. [9] The Board summarized its views by stating that the principles of Kersey should not be applied to cases of cocaine addiction in general and to this case in particular. This is about the least appropriate case we can think of for the extension of Kersey involving as it does intentional misappropriation of client funds and dishonesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation by a scheme to deceive the Office of Bar Counsel in its investigation through fabricated documents and false statements.[ [10] ] After surveying the authorities from other jurisdictions, [11] and the arguments for [12] and against [13] the extension of Kersey principles to disciplinary proceedings against attorneys addicted to cocaine, the Board stated that, in its view, the courts rejecting cocaine addiction as a mitigating factor have the better of the argument, as a general proposition, for the reasons stated above. We find the reasons relating to the protection of clients especially compelling. From the standpoint of the victimized client, it makes no difference whether the culpable attorney is addicted to cocaine or not. The Board took special note of decisions of the Supreme Courts of New Jersey [14] and California [15] rejecting cocaine addiction as a mitigating factor. The Board took pains to emphasize the gravity of Marshall's misconduct. In the Board's view, Marshall's misappropriation and his fabrication of evidence would each ordinarily be sufficient, without more, to require disbarment under our case law. See, e.g., In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190, 193 (D.C.1990) (en banc) (misappropriation); In re Goffe, 641 A.2d 458, 464-68 (D.C.1994) (per curiam) (fabrication). [16] According to the Board, adoption of Marshall's position would mean that a lawyer who commits a criminal act by possessing an illegal drug and steals from his client, even if only to feed his habit, would be better off in the disciplinary system than a lawyer who misappropriates client funds but does not commit the additional illegal act of possessing cocaine. We do not think that our disciplinary system should countenance such a paradox. Notwithstanding its view that Kersey should not be applied to cocaine addiction, the Board recommended that the court avoid an absolutist position: That does not mean that cocaine addiction is necessarily irrelevant in any and all cases. We can conceive of a situation involving a relatively minor disciplinary offensenot misappropriation of client funds or fabrication of evidence in which cocaine addiction, its consequences, and a respondent's efforts to deal with it could be relevant. It is not necessary or desirable for this [c]ourt to close the door in every case to consideration of the subject. For example, we note that even courts rejecting cocaine addiction as a mitigating factor have indicated that recovery from substance abuse, rehabilitation of a respondent, and his or her efforts to help other addicts recover may be proper factors to consider in the mix that goes into fashioning a disciplinary sanction. [Citations omitted.] We do not think that the [c]ourt should erect a disincentive to recovery or rehabilitation of addicts by adopting too rigid a rule. Finally, the Board rejected Marshall's contention that refusal by the court, in his case, to mitigate the sanction of disbarment would violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The Board concluded that Marshall was not a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA and that he had not been subjected to discrimination on account of his disability. The Board stated: On the basis of the misconduct shown on this record, [Marshall] is not qualified to practice law in the District of Columbia. We cannot and do not believe that Congress intended the ADA to be a shield, much less a sword, to be wielded against appropriate discipline of lawyers who break the disciplinary rules. We cannot and do not believe that Congress intended that a lawyer who misappropriates client funds and fabricates evidence to coverup his wrongdoing should be insulated by the ADA from the efforts of the public authorities of the District of Columbia to protect the public from him. Nor is it plausible in any sense we can comprehend to say that Respondent is being subjected to discrimination if disciplined, up to and including disbarment. With respect to the discrimination argument, respondent is not being disciplined because he is or was a cocaine addict. He is not being discriminated against by reason of such disability. He is being disciplined because he misappropriated client funds and fabricated evidence. This is not discrimination against a cocaine addict. Any lawyer not addicted to cocaine, who did the same thing, would be disciplined in the same way, for the same reasons. Disciplining a lawyer for dishonesty is not discriminating against someone for a disability. No one has yet made the absurd suggestion that dishonesty is itself a disability protected by the ADA or any other provision of law.[ [17] ]