Opinion ID: 1940521
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Monlyn's Claim Regarding His Right to Testify

Text: Monlyn claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that he could testify in his own behalf during the penalty phase. At the evidentiary hearing, Monlyn testified that although he testified in the guilt phase of trial, counsel did not inform him of this right to testify during the penalty phase. He said that he would have testified that he was sorry for what happened and that he was just in the wrong place at the wrong time. Monlyn's trial counsel testified that he had no specific recollection of advising Monlyn. At the time of the trial, however, counsel had practiced law for twenty years and had served as counsel to murder defendants in at least fifty cases, approximately ten of which were death penalty cases. He said that his standard practice was to discuss the right with the client in each and every case and that the decision to testify was the client's. Asked if he probably followed his practice in this case, counsel responded, Not probably. I did it. The lower court found, as a matter of fact, that Monlyn was advised of his right to testify and that the proposed remorse testimony would not have resulted in a life recommendation. To establish this claim, Monlyn must meet both prongs of Strickland. Oisorio v. State, 676 So.2d 1363, 1364-65 (Fla.1996) (holding that to succeed in an ineffectiveness claim that trial counsel interfered with defendant's right to testify, defendant must meet both prongs of Strickland ). He has failed as to both. The trial court's finding, based on trial counsel's unswerving testimony, that counsel always advised clients of this right and that he did so in this case, is supported by competent, substantial evidence. See Roberts v. State, 840 So.2d 962, 973 (Fla.2002) (Findings on the credibility of evidence by a lower court are not overturned if supported by competent, substantial evidence.); accord Zakrzewski v. State, 866 So.2d 688, 696 (Fla.2003) (citing Roberts and, where defendant's and counsel's testimony conflicted, upholding the trial court finding that counsel was credible). Further, Monlyn has shown no prejudice. Monlyn testified during the guilt phase that he did not intend to kill the victim and that he felt bad about it. He testified at the evidentiary hearing that he was just in the wrong place at the wrong time. Such testimony does not reflect remorse and appears to be an attempt to minimize responsibility. Further, Monlyn's testimony stands in direct contravention of the trial testimony presented to the jury that Monlyn planned to rob or kill the victim, or both, and Monlyn's own trial testimony that he chose to hide out in the victim's barn for two nights after he escaped from prison. The evidence showed that he beat the victim with such severity  inflicting over thirty blunt injury wounds  that the victim died after Monlyn tied, gagged, and hid him. Monlyn left the victim to die without seeking any help. The jury unanimously recommended death, and the trial court found five aggravating circumstances, including two of the most serious  that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and that it was cold, calculated, and premeditated. See Larkins v. State, 739 So.2d 90, 95 (Fla.1999) (stating that [HAC and CCP] are two of the most serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme). The trial court found no statutory mitigation and only three nonstatutory mitigating factors. Thus, no reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the penalty phase would have been different had Monlyn testified.