Opinion ID: 165930
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defining murder mens rea

Text: 49 Serawop's basic argument is that § 1112 incorporates the common law understanding of voluntary manslaughter as a homicide that would constitute murder but for the fact that the killing was committed in the heat of passion. Therefore, we start with an overview of the mens rea element of murder. 50 Second degree murder is the catch-all murder offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (defining second degree murder as [a]ny other murder not enhanced to first degree). Our case law defines second degree murder as an unlawful killing with malice. Pearson, 203 F.3d at 1270 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a)). In Pearson, we defined the mental element of second degree murder as requiring either (1) general intent to kill, 3 (2) intent to do serious bodily injury, (3) depraved heart recklessness; 4 or (4) a killing in the commission of a felony that is not among those specifically listed in the first degree murder statute. Id. at 1271. These mental states make up the core murder intent. 51 First degree murder, on the other hand, is a more serious offense that requires proof of something in addition to this basic murder intent. See Wood, 207 F.3d at 1228. While second degree murder requires only a general intent, meaning that the defendant is aware that the result is practically certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result, Welch, 327 F.3d at 1095 n. 13; accord Soundingsides, 820 F.2d at 1242, first degree murder requires additional proof of a specific intent—including premeditation, deliberation, or a killing in the commission of certain enumerated felonies. Wood, 207 F.3d at 1228; see also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980). 52 Despite these distinct mental state requirements for these different degrees of murder, we have always said that malice is an element of both first and second degree murder. Lofton, 776 F.2d at 920. Although we have sometimes been less than precise in our language—suggesting in Pearson, for example, that second degree murder's malice element is satisfied simply by establishing one of the enumerated mental states—malice is actually a legal term of art. See Browner, 889 F.2d at 551. 53 Malice is not satisfied simply by killing with an intentional or reckless mental state; instead, malice specifically requires committing the wrongful act without justification, excuse, or mitigation. See 50 Am.Jur.2d Homicide § 37 (1999) ([Malice] is said to include all those states and conditions of mind which accompany a homicide committed without legal excuse or extenuation. ) (emphasis added); Black's Law Dictionary 976 (8th ed.2004) (defining malice as intent, without justification or excuse, to commit a wrongful act) (emphasis added); 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 33 (1991) (Malice has been defined as consisting of the intentional doing of a wrongful act toward another without legal justification, excuse, or mitigation. ) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has also described malice as lack of provocation. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 216, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). 54 Thus, when we say that a murder must be committed with malice, we mean not just that it requires a particular murderous intent but, more to the point, that it must also be without legal justification, excuse, or mitigation. This is why, in Lofton, we held that to establish malice the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of heat of passion when it is an issue in the case. Lofton, 776 F.2d at 920. Heat of passion is one legal excuse pursuant to which what would otherwise constitute murder is mitigated to a less culpable offense of manslaughter —because with heat of passion, malice in the sense of lack of provocation no longer exists. 5 See id.