Opinion ID: 1924787
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Imposition of Four Consecutive Sentences of Life Imprisonment Without Parole

Text: The defendant also argues on appeal that the trial justice exceeded his authority in imposing four consecutive sentences of life without parole. The defendant received two of those sentences for his two convictions on carjacking resulting in death (counts 6 and 7), and he received the other two for his two first-degree murder convictions (counts 8 and 9). He contends that the statute governing penalties for carjacking does not allow a defendant to be punished with more than one sentence of life without parole with respect to any one death, and he also argues that the trial justice followed an erroneous procedure in imposing these sentences. We do not reach these issues today because they are not properly before us. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that a challenge to a criminal sentence must begin with the filing of a motion in the Superior Court pursuant to the provisions of Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. [33] State v. Collins, 679 A.2d 862, 867 (R.I.1996); see also State v. Hesford, 900 A.2d 1194, 1198 (R.I.2006); Bettencourt, 723 A.2d at 1114. If a defendant opts to file a Rule 35 motion and then is aggrieved by the Superior Court's decision regarding the motion, he or she may appeal to this Court. Collins, 679 A.2d at 867; see also Hesford, 900 A.2d at 1198; Bettencourt, 723 A.2d at 1114. However, we will not consider the validity or legality of a sentence on direct appeal unless extraordinary circumstances exist. Collins, 679 A.2d at 867; see also Hesford, 900 A.2d at 1198; Bettencourt, 723 A.2d at 1114. The record in the instant case is devoid of any Rule 35 motion filed by defendant in an attempt to correct or reduce his sentence. The defendant contends that the fact that G.L.1956 § 12-19.2-5 confers on this Court the right and duty to conduct a de novo review of sentences of life without parole [34] somehow exempts him from the requirement that he first file a Rule 35 motion. We disagree. We see no good reason for departing from the age-old practice whereby issues are first litigated at the nisi prius level and then reviewed by us on appeal. [35] And we perceive absolutely no indication in § 12-19.2-5 that the General Assembly has mandated that we make such a departure from long-established practice. While we have indicated that extraordinary circumstances could justify the bypassing of the Rule 35 requirement, Collins, 679 A.2d at 867, we can perceive no extraordinary circumstances in the instant situation. Given our affirmance (see supra ) of most of defendant's convictions on several very grave felonies, he will be serving a very long prison sentence while the Rule 35 proceedings take place (if he opts to initiate such proceedings). We fail to see how he would be prejudiced by our requiring that his case follow the usual Rule 35 track rather than considering his arguments on this direct appeal. In short, there is no reason to characterize the present circumstances as extraordinary. [36] For these reasons, this Court will not consider at this time defendant's argument that the trial justice exceeded his authority in imposing four consecutive sentences of life without parole on defendant. See Collins, 679 A.2d at 867.