Opinion ID: 2326776
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admitting the Grand Jury Testimony

Text: [¶ 26] The audiotape of Gorman's mother's grand jury testimony was admitted pursuant to M.R. Evid. 803(5), the exception to the hearsay rule for past-recorded recollection. Rule 803(5) provides: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: .... (5) Recorded Recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness's memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admissible, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but shall not be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party. [¶ 27] Pursuant to M.R. Evid. 803(5), a document or a recorded statement may be admitted as substantive evidence if the proponent of the statement demonstrates that: (1) the contents of the document or recording are a record of matters previously known to, and remembered by, the witness; (2) the record had been previously made, or adopted, by the witness, at a time when memory of the matters was then fresh; (3) at that past time, the record was remembered by the witness to be an accurate record of the matters described; and (4) the witness presently has no memory or insufficient memory of the subject matter of the statement. State v. Discher, 597 A.2d 1336, 1341 (Me.1991); Cope v. Sevigny, 289 A.2d 682, 687-88 (Me.1972). [¶ 28] In Cope, we suggested that these criteria would be established by statements from the witness as his present memory. Cope, 289 A.2d at 687. In Discher, we qualified this suggestion from Cope, and we held that the criteria could be established by direct or circumstantial evidence, independent of the forgetful declarant appearing and testifying as to present memory. Discher, 597 A.2d at 1342. We stated that while we had anticipated one scenario in Cope: Sometimes, however, a witness may be unable or unwilling to testify from present memory. Further inquiry into the ability of the witness to recall the event in question could be time-consuming and unproductive. At such times, it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether the foundational requirements of Rule 803(5) have been satisfied on a case-by-case basis, whether by direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. (citations omitted). [¶ 29] Accordingly, the criteria for admission of past recollection recorded may be established independent of the declarant's testimony as to present memory. The trial court has considerable discretion as to the method used to comply with the rule, and its determination as to whether the foundational requirements have been sufficiently met will be deferentially reviewed. Boehmer v. LeBoeuf, 650 A.2d 1336, 1340 (Me.1994). See also State v. Robinson, 656 A.2d 744, 746-47 (Me.1995). [¶ 30] Rule 803(5) was modeled on the federal rule. See Discher, 597 A.2d at 1341. The advisory committee note to Fed. R. Evid. 803(5), states that [n]o attempt is made in the exception to spell out the method of establishing the initial knowledge or the contemporaneity and accuracy of the record, leaving them to be dealt with as the circumstances of the particular case might indicate. Fed. R. Evid. 803 advisory committee's note. [¶ 31] Grand jury testimony has been admitted under the federal recorded recollection exception to the hearsay rule. See United States v. Patterson, 678 F.2d 774, 777-80 (9th Cir.1982) (admitting grand jury transcript after foundation established by declarant with present memory of having given grand jury testimony and that he believed he had not lied to the grand jury); United States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62, 67 (3rd Cir.1966) (explaining, generally, that admission of grand jury testimony as recorded recollection is a proper use of such testimony). [¶ 32] In this case, there is no dispute that the State established that Gorman's mother had insufficient recollection to enable [her] to testify fully and accurately. M.R. Evid. 803(5). Gorman contends that the State did not establish the remaining criteria for admission of the grand jury testimony. We address those criteria in turn. [¶ 33] Was the grand jury testimony made or adopted at a time when the witness's memory of the matters was fresh? Gorman's mother testified before the grand jury that her son confessed to her on December 9, 2001. The grand jury testimony was presented February 8, 2002. Gorman contends the two-month lapse in time was too long to conclude that the statements were made while fresh in the witness's mind. The two-month period of time is significantly shorter than that found acceptable in other cases. United States v. Smith, 197 F.3d 225, 231 (6th Cir.1999) (15 months); Patterson, 678 F.2d at 778-80 (10 months). The trial court could reasonably conclude that in those two months a mother would not forget or confuse her son's confession to her that he had killed another human being. [¶ 34] Gorman also argues that the quality of the memory should be considered because his mother's illness and the medication she was taking may have substantially impaired her ability to perceive reality and convey her perceptions in a reliable manner. However, the trial court did not exceed the bounds of its discretion in determining that the testimony was given while Gorman's mother's memory of the events was sufficiently fresh, and that the issue of impairment at the time of the grand jury testimony was a question of credibility for the jury. [¶ 35] Was the tape of the grand jury testimony a record of matters previously known to and remembered by the witness? [¶ 36] Was the grand jury testimony remembered by the witness to be accurate at the time it was presented? The State could not establish either of these elements directly, from the witness's present memory. Therefore, it had to establish them with circumstantial evidence. See Robinson, 656 A.2d at 746-47; Discher, 597 A.2d at 1342. The State did establish that the grand jury testimony was given under oath. Through the court reporter, it identified Gorman's mother as the person who gave the testimony, and established that the transcript and the audiotape accurately recorded her testimony. [¶ 37] At trial, when asked by the State if you testified before the Grand Jury under oath on February 8, 2002, and you took an oath did you testify to the truth? Gorman's mother responded Absolutely. During her grand jury testimony she stated that I've always wanted to tell the truth. I just never wanted to talk. She further stated that her testimony about the telephone conversation with her son was almost word for word. She stated twice that she would never forget it. She also testified to the grand jury, I just wanted the justice system to do their job and let justice be served and leave me out of it. Because I certainly don't want to testify at any trial[,]and that you may think I'm a terrible person by not coming forward with this sooner. But I knew good and well my son would pay for what he did. I just didn't want to be the one. [¶ 38] The trial court concluded that this evidence established the witness's prior knowledge of the contents of her testimony, and that the tape of the grand jury testimony was an accurate record of that knowledge. The trial court also found the following: [T]here is a very limited likelihood, based not only on what [the witness] said today, but also the fact that she testified under the pains and penalties, as they say, of perjury to the Grand Jury, I find it very unlikely that she would have lied and I'll take notice of her current motive she may have to forget statements that she made earlier that would be incriminating to her son. [¶ 39] The trial court, in its ruling, relied in part on the content of the grand jury testimony, and it relied on the fact that the testimony was given under oath and was independently established to be accurate by the court reporter. In addition, the trial court relied on other factors authorized by our case law to establish sufficient reliability through circumstantial evidence: (1) the fact that the witness was unable or unwilling to testify from present memory; (2) the witness's close relationship with the defendant, which, the trial court found, may have been the reason for her memory loss or reluctance to testify; and (3) the witness's trial testimony that if she testified before the grand jury, she testified truthfully. [¶ 40] The trial court did not exceed the bounds of its discretion in concluding that the grand jury testimony had sufficient indicia of accuracy when presented and that the declarant had then-present knowledge of the facts about which she testified for the grand jury testimony to be admitted under M.R. Evid. 803(5).
[¶ 41] The rule of evidence regarding admission of prior inconsistent, under oath statements, M.R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A), was not addressed at trial in relation to the grand jury testimony. The Rule 801(d)(1)(A) issue was not generated until Gorman's mother testified before the jury. We address Rule 801(d)(1)(A) here because, even if the Rule 803(5) ruling was in error, which it was not, admission of the grand jury testimony was appropriate under a different rule than the one addressed at trial. Thus, any error would be harmless. See State v. White, 2002 ME 122, ¶ 16, 804 A.2d 1146, 1150. A trial court action, proper under the law, may be affirmed, even if for a reason different than that given by the trial court. State v. Gwinn, 390 A.2d 479, 481-83 (Me.1978), 2 Cluchey & Seitzinger, Maine Criminal Practice § 52.3 at IX-131 (1995 ed.). [¶ 42] Rule 801(d)(1)(A) provides, in pertinent part that: (d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: (1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the witness's testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing or other proceeding, or in a deposition. [¶ 43] We have interpreted M.R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) to allow admission, as substantive evidence, of a prior inconsistent statement, given under oath, of a witness who testifies at trial. State v. Creamer, 379 A.2d 733, 734 (Me.1977). Such a statement is not hearsay. Id. See also Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 801.4 at 401 (2000 ed.). [¶ 44] During the trial, Gorman's mother testified before the jury in response to the State's questions, as follows: Q. I am asking you prior to the discovery of Ms. St. Laurent's body, did your son tell you what he had done that Saturday night that Ms. St. Laurent had disappeared? A. He told me that he dropped her off at the [Portland night club], I believe is how you say it. He told me that they  that there was a party and it never really developed and that he had dropped her off. Q. Now  A. I am sorry, I'm a little nervous and after yesterday's media, I couldn't sleep last night so I am sorry. Q. Did what he tell you change at all? A. No, sir. Q. It never changed? A. No, sir. Q. Had you ever testified that his story to you kept changing? A. No, sir. Q. You're sure of that? A. I don't know. I don't remember. [¶ 45] Gorman's mother's trial testimony as to what Gorman had said about his encounter with St. Laurent, that he never changed this statement, and that she had not testified that Gorman's statement to her kept changing were statements that were inconsistent with her under oath grand jury testimony. Those inconsistencies made the grand jury testimony admissible as substantive evidence pursuant to M.R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A). United States v. Young, 316 F.3d 649, 659-60 (7th Cir.2002) (affirming admission of grand jury testimony as prior inconsistent statements under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A); United States v. Russell, 712 F.2d 1256, 1258 (8th Cir.1983)) (holding grand jury testimony admissible as substantive evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) when a witness could not recall substance of grand jury testimony).
[¶ 46] Gorman contends that the admission of his mother's grand jury testimony, even if proper pursuant to M.R. Evid. 803(5), or M.R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A), violated his right to confront the witness against him under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 6 of the Maine Constitution. We have recognized that statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule may be inadmissible when tested against the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution because Confrontation Clause analysis differs from hearsay rule analysis. See State v. Small, 2003 ME 107, ¶ 22, 830 A.2d 423, 428. [¶ 47] Applying this difference in analysis, the United States Supreme Court recently held that the Confrontation Clause barred admission of a statement that qualified for admission as a statement against penal interest under a Washington State Court rule similar to M.R. Evid. 804(b)(3). Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1374, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The Crawford opinion extensively reviews the history of the Confrontation Clause and its relationship to the hearsay rule. Most significantly, it explicitly overrules Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), and the analytical framework which Roberts had supplied to address questions of admissibility of hearsay under the Confrontation Clause over the past two decades. Thus, the Court observed: Although the results of our decisions have generally been faithful to the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the same cannot be said of our rationales. Roberts conditions the admissibility of all hearsay evidence on whether it falls under a firmly rooted hearsay exception or bears particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 448 U.S., at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531. This test departs from the historical principles identified above in two respects. First, it is too broad: It applies the same mode of analysis whether or not the hearsay consists of ex parte testimony. This often results in close constitutional scrutiny in cases that are far removed from the core concerns of the Clause. At the same time, however, the test is too narrow: It admits statements that do consist of ex parte testimony upon a mere finding of reliability. This malleable standard often fails to protect against paradigmatic confrontation violations. Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1369. [¶ 48] After discussing some judicial and academic criticism of Roberts, the Court continued: Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of reliability. Certainly none of the authorities discussed above acknowledges any general reliability exception to the common-law rule. Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined. Cf. 3 Blackstone, Commentaries, at 373 (This open examination of witnesses ... is much more conducive to the clearing up of truth); M. Hale, History and Analysis of the Common Law of England 258 (1713) (adversarial testing beats and bolts out the Truth much better). The Roberts test allows a jury to hear evidence, untested by the adversary process, based on a mere judicial determination of reliability. It thus replaces the constitutionally prescribed method of assessing reliability with a wholly foreign one. Id. at 1370. [¶ 49] Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, looked to the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause in common law practice at the time of adoption of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 1365. As the English authorities above reveal, the common law in 1791 conditioned admissibility of an absent witness's examination on unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine. The Sixth Amendment therefore incorporates those limitations. Id. at 1365-66. [¶ 50] With this history, and conceding some exceptions, [5] Justice Scalia's opinion indicates that the United States Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has adhered to the following principle: Testimonial [6] statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had prior opportunity to cross-examine. Id. at 1369. [¶ 51] For unavailable witnesses, this rule, focusing on prior opportunity for examination, replaces the firmly rooted or particularized guarantees of trustworthiness tests of Roberts when Confrontation Clause questions arise. While the focus of the opinion was the unavailable witness, the Court also addressed the circumstances when a declarant appears for cross-examination. The Court indicated that such an appearance removes any Confrontation Clause constraint on use of prior statements: Finally, we reiterate that, when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970). It is therefore irrelevant that the reliability of some out-of-court statements `cannot be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to the same matters in court.' Post, at [1377], (quoting United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 395, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986)). The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it. (The Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted. See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414, 105 S.Ct. 2078, 85 L.Ed.2d 425 (1985).) Id. at 1369 n. 9. [¶ 52] Gorman contends that his mother was effectively unavailable for cross-examination because, in addition to her lack of memory, she was, during her grand jury testimony, under the influence of psychiatric medications and had a history of delusional thought that demonstrated an inability to separate fact from fantasy to the extent that, according to Gorman, she was not even minimally competent to be a witness. Essentially, Gorman seeks to reargue the competence question, addressed earlier, as a Confrontation Clause issue. However, a witness is not constitutionally unavailable for purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis when a witness who appears and testifies is impaired, see State v. McKenna, 1998 ME 49, ¶¶ 1-4, 707 A.2d 1309, 1310, or forgetful, see United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 560, 108 S.Ct. 838, 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988). [¶ 53] Gorman's mother's forgetfulness was particularly selective. She remembered and testified about events on December 8 and a conversation with Gorman on December 10 or 11, but she claimed no memory of a conversation with Gorman on December 9. She remembered and testified about the condition of her health at the time of her grand jury testimony and she testified that if she had testified at the grand jury she absolutely would have testified truthfully, but she claimed no memory of the grand jury proceedings. She remembered and testified about some statements Gorman made to her about his encounter with St. Laurent, and she claimed that he had not changed those statements. [¶ 54] In Owens, the United States Supreme Court held that even when a witness has no present memory of a prior out-of-court statement, the right of confrontation is satisfied if the accused has the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at trial: This Court has recognized a partial (and somewhat indeterminate) overlap between the requirements of the traditional hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause. The dangers associated with hearsay inspired the Court of Appeals in the present case to believe that the Constitution required the testimony to be examined for indicia of reliability, or particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. We do not think such an inquiry is called for when a hearsay declarant is present at trial and subject to unrestricted cross-examination. In that situation... the traditional protections of the oath, cross-examination, and opportunity for the jury to observe the witness' demeanor satisfy the constitutional requirements. We do not think that a constitutional line drawn by the Confrontation Clause falls between a forgetful witness' live testimony that he once believed this defendant to be the perpetrator of the crime, and the introduction of the witness' earlier statement to that effect. Id. (internal citations omitted). [¶ 55] Thus, the Crawford Court observed: when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements. Crawford , 124 S.Ct. at 1369 n. 9. [I]t is this literal right to `confront' the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause [.] California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970). [7] Here, the Confrontation Clause was satisfied when Gorman was given the opportunity to examine and cross-examine his mother before the jury regarding what she did and did not recall and the reasons for her failure of recollection. There was no Confrontation Clause violation in admission of the mother's grand jury testimony.