Opinion ID: 2757661
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffectiveness Regarding Demetrius Jones

Text: Blake asserts that trial counsel should have questioned State witness Demetrius about his August 20, 2002, statement to law enforcement officers. Blake claims that in that statement, Demetrius indicated that Blake stated on the morning of August 12, 2002, that Blake did not want to be involved in any robbery. Demetrius also indicated that after the shooting, Demetrius saw Green with a 9 mm handgun; Green was looking for Key to instruct Key to tell law enforcement that Key was the driver; and Green tried to help Blake leave town so that Blake would not speak to law enforcement officers about the shooting. Demetrius opined that Green attempted to shift the blame for the Patel shooting to Blake and Key. Because Blake has not demonstrated that his trial counsel failed to ensure that admissible, exculpatory information from Demetrius’ August 20, 2002, - 16 - statement was presented to the jury, this allegation of deficient performance is without merit. Demetrius’ prior statements about Blake’s intent were raised at Blake’s trial. During cross-examination, trial counsel asked Demetrius about his August 20, 2002, statement, in which Demetrius had stated that Blake initially suggested robbing a drug dealer that he knew but then decided he did not feel like doing so. Next, trial counsel did not err by not cross-examining Demetrius about his prior statement regarding Green’s possession of the 9 mm handgun because this information was revealed during direct examination. Demetrius testified that on the morning of August 12, 2002, he saw Green with a revolver and a 9 mm handgun in the car, and that on the evening of August 12, 2002, Green gave him a 9 mm handgun. As for Demetrius’ August 20, 2002, statement about Green’s desire to find Key and instruct him to confess to being the driver, the statement may have been admissible as a statement of Green’s then-existing mental state, see § 90.803(3), Fla. Stat. (2005), and could be interpreted as evidence that Green was, in fact, the driver. Blake does not, however, explain how such evidence would have been helpful to his defense that while he was in the car on the morning of the shooting, he was not the shooter. Blake does not point to any evidence—available at the time of his trial—that would have supported an argument that the driver of the car - 17 - was the shooter. To the contrary, trial witness Donovan Steverson testified that upon hearing a gunshot, he looked over the fence dividing his apartment complex from the convenience store and saw a man “get in the back of the car and they sped away”; and trial witness Trisha Alderman, who also lived near the convenience store, similarly testified that she “remember[ed] seeing a man with a gun getting back in the car on the passenger’s side.” Further, evidence that Green was the driver would have been consistent with Blake’s recorded statement to law enforcement officers, in which Blake stated that Green drove the group to the convenience store and that he, Blake, rode in the backseat. Given this record, Green’s statement about intending to find Key would not have aided the defense’s theory that Green was the shooter and that Blake’s statement was not worthy of belief. Trial counsel is not deficient for failing to present evidence that is neither exculpatory nor impeaching. See Jimenez v. State, 997 So. 2d 1056, 1065 (Fla. 2008). Blake also does not explain why Demetrius’ speculation about why Green wanted Blake to leave town would be admissible. Demetrius would either be repeating Green’s out-of-court statements or offering an inadmissible lay opinion about the purpose of Green’s actions. See § 90.604, Fla. Stat. (2005) (“[A] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced which is sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”). - 18 - Likewise, Blake has not established that Demetrius’ opinion that Green was trying to place the blame for the shooting on Blake and Key would be admissible.
Blake contends that defense counsel erred by failing to determine how many felony convictions Demetrius had at the time of his testimony. This claim is refuted by the record. Prior to calling Demetrius to the stand, the State, the defense, and the trial court had a sidebar discussion about how many felony convictions Demetrius had acquired since the attorneys had last questioned him at a different trial. Defense counsel requested permission from the trial court to “just double-check it with the computer?” A few moments later, defense counsel announced: “Two. That’s what I’m showing.” Thus, the record demonstrates that defense counsel did investigate Demetrius’ felony convictions before crossexamining him. Next, Blake contends the trial counsel should have investigated Demetrius’ criminal history and ensured that the jury was given the true picture of what Demetrius hoped to gain by testifying against Blake. This claim is without merit. Blake has not established that Demetrius received any benefit from the State prior to testifying in Blake’s case that was not revealed to the jury. Trial counsel expressly cross-examined Demetrius on the fact that as of August 19, 2002, when Demetrius was interviewed by law enforcement about the - 19 - Patel shooting, there was an outstanding warrant for Demetrius’ arrest but Demetrius was not arrested. Defense counsel expressly asked Demetrius if the non-arrest “was a concession to curry favor from you in terms of you giving information,” and Demetrius answered, “[y]es.” As for his charges at the time of his testimony, Demetrius testified on direct examination that he had pending charges of possession of cocaine, intent to sell and deliver illegal drugs, and violation of probation. On cross-examination, defense counsel revisited this topic, asking if Demetrius was actually charged with a “crime involving selling cocaine” and “resisting an officer without violence.” Demetrius agreed and admitted that he had been given pretrial release on those charges. In addition, trial counsel crossexamined Demetrius about the fact that in February 2004, he was again arrested and released for another alleged violation of probation. Defense counsel also acted to ensure that the jury knew that Demetrius was facing the possibility of a long prison sentence but was expecting a short one. On direct examination, Demetrius stated that he knew that he was not going to be sentenced until after he testified and that while he had not been given any promises, he was hopeful that his cooperation would result in lenient treatment. On cross-examination, this exchange occurred between defense counsel and Demetrius: - 20 - Q So the reason this delay has taken place in the disposition is to allow you to come testify and then after you testify and after disposition of the Blake matter then you will be sentenced, correct? A Yes. .... Q So you’re looking just on that charge, possession of cocaine with intent to sell and deliver, up to 15 years in prison, aren’t you? A Yes. Q And it doesn’t stop there. I mean you can also get another five years for the violation of probation and the possession of cocaine; isn’t that true? A Yes. Q Actually you can get another year for the resisting an officer, right? A Yes[,] I[] guess. Q So you’re potentially looking at 21 years in prison, isn’t that correct, just adding those three numbers? A Yeah, yeah, yeah. Blake asserts that defense counsel should have cross-examined Demetrius about the exact terms of the plea agreement he received from the State. Blake has not established, however, that those terms could have been known at the time of Blake’s guilt phase trial. Blake was convicted on February 25, 2005, and the plea offer to Demetrius was not signed by the prosecuting attorney until March 3, 2005. Similarly, Blake did not establish that prior to Blake’s conviction, Assistant State Attorney Cass Castillo—the prosecutor in Blake’s case—“was actively assisting [Demetrius].” Initial Brief of Appellant at 50, Blake v. State, No. SC122102 (May 29, 2013). Blake bases this claim on a handwritten note that appears related to a pending violation of probation case against Demetrius. The note - 21 - stated: “You might want to get with Cass—def witness on murder case (?).” When asked at the postconviction evidentiary hearing if he was contacted and gave input regarding Demetrius’ violation of probation case, Castillo answered “I’m confident that I didn’t.” Castillo added: “The only recollection I have of doing anything for [Demetrius] was, I think he got arrested for something or—and I helped get him out of jail, is what I remember doing for [Demetrius].” Blake’s postconviction counsel did not, however, pursue this issue to determine when— before or after Blake’s conviction—Castillo helped Demetrius. Thus, it is not known if this help occurred before Demetrius testified at Blake’s trial. As a result, Blake has not established that trial counsel should have cross-examined Demetrius regarding the help, if any, he received from Castillo.
Blake contends that trial counsel should have used Kelly Govia’s August 16, 2002, statement to law enforcement to impeach Demetrius’ testimony that after the group left early in the morning on August 12, 2002, he did not again see Blake or Green until the afternoon. Govia told law enforcement officers that between 8:30 and 9 a.m. on August 12, 2002, she observed Demetrius speaking with her niece. The niece then reported the substance of the conversation to Govia: that there had been a shooting and Key was in trouble. The niece also told Govia that Demetrius had said that Green had shot someone that morning. Govia also told law - 22 - enforcement officers that she heard Key say that Plump, which is Green’s nickname, pulled the trigger. Blake has not shown that trial counsel overlooked helpful, admissible evidence. Govia’s statements do not contradict Demetrius’ trial testimony. Demetrius could have obtained information about the shooting from a source other than Blake or Green. And any testimony from Govia or her niece that she had heard someone say that Green was the shooter would be inadmissible hearsay, which could not be used to impeach Demetrius because he did not testify about who was the shooter. Blake’s claim that reasonable trial counsel would have investigated Terrell Smith was also unproven. Blake contends that Smith’s August 16, 2002, statement to Detective Ken Raczynski of the Polk County Sheriff’s Office, “undercuts [Demetrius’] testimony that he saw the gun thrown in the lake.” Initial Brief of Appellant at 48, Blake v. State, No. SC12-2102 (May 29, 2013). Detective Raczynski’s report stated: [Smith] was with Green and another pecan skinned, tall male on 08/13/02 in the early evening when they came to this location. Smith stated that he stayed in the car while Green and the other subject got out of the car, ran past the boat on the shore and threw a gun into the lake. At the evidentiary hearing, Smith testified that the third person referenced in his statement to law enforcement was not Demetrius. Blake, however, failed to allege - 23 - why trial counsel should have suspected that the other male noted in Smith’s statement was not Demetrius. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Here, Blake has not established that reasonable trial counsel should have known to further investigate Smith based on his August 16, 2002, statement.