Opinion ID: 1959151
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Inappropriateness of Suppression

Text: The majority also concludes that the effective dismissal of the charges against Redmond was an appropriate discovery sanction which was within the Court's discretion to impose. Majority Opinion, supra, at 304-309. I cannot agree. The provisions of Pa.R.Crim.P. 305(E) are as follows: Remedy If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit discovery or inspection, may grant a continuance, or may prohibit such party from introducing evidence not disclosed, other than testimony of the defendant, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. (Emphasis added). The sanction order did not merely prohibit [the police officer] from introducing evidence not disclosed,  it suppressed any evidence of any kind from the officer, including evidence of Redmond's alleged recent confession to the officer. If this sanction was authorized at all, then, it must come then under the residual authorization to enter such order as it deems just under the circumstances.  As broad as the residual authorization may appear, our prior case law demonstrates that it does not include the authority exercised in this case. It is true that when a party has failed to comply with a Pa.R.Crim.P. 305 discovery order, the trial court has broad discretion in choosing an appropriate remedy. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 364 Pa.Super. 521, 540-41, 528 A.2d 631, 641 (1987) (citing cases). However, we have found termination of the prosecution to be `a penalty far too drastic' for a prosecutor's violation of discovery rules. Commonwealth v. Gordon, supra, 528 A.2d at 641; Commonwealth v. Woodell, 344 Pa.Super. 487, 492, 496 A.2d 1210, 1213 (1985); Commonwealth v. Parente, 294 Pa.Super. 446, 452, 440 A.2d 549, 552 (1982) (appeal denied); Commonwealth v. Yost, 348 Pa.Super. 297, 502 A.2d 216 (1985). The Commonwealth asserts, the majority readily conceeds, and I agree, that the sanction order imposed here leads inexorably to just that result by suppressing evidence of Redmond's alleged recent confession along with all other evidence from Officer Murphy. In Commonwealth v. Bonasorte, supra , this Court did affirm a suppression order arising from a police officer's refusal to produce a confidential informant for an in camera interview. However, Bonasorte is materially distinguishable in two critical respects. First, the defendant's disclosure burden was clearly met in Bonasorte by the fact that the informant was a primary source for information included in a search warrant probable cause affidavit, and the trial court found that the Commonwealth's own evidence in the suppression hearing challenging the warrant raised serious doubts as to the existence of the alleged informant. Second, suppression was required in that case based upon the trial court's determination that the probable cause affidavit was wilfully false, the search unconstitutional, and the fruits of the search tainted, and not as a discovery sanction for failure to disclose the identity of the informant. 486 A.2d at 1371-74; see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); Commonwealth v. Miller, 513 Pa. 118, 518 A.2d 1187 (1986); Commonwealth v. Hall, 451 Pa. 201, 302 A.2d 342 (1973). Here, no search warrant was involved. Moreover, the informant's tips in no way led to the crucial evidence suppressed by the sanction order. Rather, it was a mere fortuitous coincidence that the officer who knew the identity of the confidential informant was also the officer to whom Redmond allegedly confessed, and who developed other evidence unrelated to and, in fact, contrary to the informant's tips. The informant's identity and his/her tip were wholly unrelated to any of the inculpatory evidence suppressed by the sanction order.