Opinion ID: 2637269
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Heading: Necessity of Proof of Causation

Text: We first address whether involuntary manslaughter, as defined in Kansas, requires the State to prove that a defendant's conduct caused the victim's death. Our standard of review on this question of statutory interpretation is de novo. State v. Bryan, 281 Kan. 157, 159, 130 P.3d 85 (2006); see also State v. Robinson, 281 Kan. 538, 539-40, 132 P.3d 934 (2006) (in interpreting statute, court must give effect to plain, unambiguous language, expressed intent of legislature). Although criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused, our interpretation must be reasonable and sensible in light of the legislature's word choice. See State v. Vega-Fuentes, 264 Kan. 10, 14, 955 P.2d 1235 (1998). As mentioned, Scott ultimately was charged and convicted under K.S.A.2004 Supp. 21-3404(c), which defines involuntary manslaughter as the unintentional killing of a human being committed . . . during the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner. Nothing in this statute explicitly exempts bar owners or bartenders from criminal liability for the death of a patron if the elements of the criminal offense are proved. That being said, it does not appear that our involuntary manslaughter statute has ever been employed on similar facts, i.e., to prosecute a bar owner or bartender on the theory that violation of a statute regulating the dispensing of liquor resulted in fatal alcohol poisoning of a patron. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 273 Kan. 49, 51-52, 41 P.3d 783 (2002) (demonstrating typical invocation of K.S.A. 21-3404(c) as lesser included offense in murder case in which defendant claims lawful self-defense but may have exerted unlawful excess force, leading to unintentional death of victim); see also State v. Bell, 266 Kan. 896, 916, 975 P.2d 239, cert. denied 528 U.S. 905, 120 S.Ct. 247, 145 L.Ed.2d 207 (1999) (instruction on involuntary manslaughter not warranted where no evidence other than defendant's own statement that he fired first shot in self-defense); State v. Meyers, 245 Kan. 471, 474, 781 P.2d 700 (1989) (involuntary manslaughter instruction not available despite assertion of self-defense where evidence established that, after altercation, defendant went to his home, got a gun, went looking for the victims, fired warning shots, then closed his eyes and fired two shots, one of which struck and killed the victim); State v. Seelke, 221 Kan. 672, 673, 681, 561 P.2d 869 (1977) (wife's voluntary manslaughter conviction for shotgun slaying of her drunken husband who had just savagely beaten her and threatened both her and her twin babies reversed where evidence supported instruction on lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter based on lawful act, unlawful manner self-defense); State v. Gregory, 218 Kan. 180, 185-86, 542 P.2d 1051 (1975) (evaluating district court's instruction on manslaughter, holding jury could conclude self-defense with excessive force, justifying lawful act, unlawful manner involuntary manslaughter instruction). Several Kansas cases arising under distinct factual circumstances demonstrate that convictions of involuntary manslaughter require proof that the defendant's conduct caused the victim's death. State v. Chastain, 265 Kan. 16, 25, 960 P.2d 756 (1998); State v. Collins, 36 Kan.App.2d 367, 371, 138 P.3d 793 (2006). Moreover, the victim's contributory negligence, while not a defense, is a circumstance to be considered by the jury along with all other evidence to determine whether the defendant's conduct was or was not the proximate cause of the decedent's death. In some instances, a decedent's contributory negligence may have been a substantial factor in his or her death and a superseding cause thereof; it may have intervened between a defendant's conduct and the fatal result so as to be itself the proximate cause. Chastain, 265 Kan. 16, Syl. ¶ 7, 960 P.2d 756. See Collins, 36 Kan.App.2d at 371, 138 P.3d 793. In Chastain, 265 Kan. 16, 960 P.2d 756, the defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter after a fatality resulted from a collision at an intersection. The State contended the defendant was under the influence of alcohol and driving at a high speed; the defendant contended the victim's negligence in running a stop sign caused the accident. When, during deliberations, the jury asked if the fault of both parties could be considered, the district judge responded in the affirmative. On appeal, this court upheld the defendant's conviction of the lesser included offense of driving under the influence, holding that the district judge's response to the jury was correct and that causation was an essential element of the crime. 265 Kan. at 24-25, 960 P.2d 756. In Collins, 36 Kan.App.2d 367, 138 P.3d 793, our Court of Appeals examined another involuntary manslaughter case involving an allegation that the defendant driver was under the influence of alcohol and his ultimate conviction on the lesser included offense of driving under the influence. At trial, the defense had relied on the victim's negligence in sitting on a stationary motorcycle in the middle of the road at night, arguing that the fatality accident would have occurred even if the defendant had been sober and reasonably prudent. On appeal, the State argued that the district judge had erred in instructing the jury on proximate cause. The appellate panel affirmed the conviction, holding that proof of involuntary manslaughter while driving under the influence required evidence that defendant's conduct proximately caused the victim's death. 36 Kan.App.2d at 371, 138 P.3d 793. Other Kansas cases have consistently held likewise. See State v. Anderson, 270 Kan. 68, 72, 12 P.3d 883 (2000) (proof of proximate cause required); State v. Yowell, 184 Kan. 352, 336 P.2d 841 (1959) (more required for proof of involuntary manslaughter than mere unlawful act as attendant circumstance in series ultimately resulting in fatality; unlawful act must be proximate cause of victim's death); see also State v. Scott, 201 Kan. 134, Syl. ¶ 3, 439 P.2d 78 (1968) (evidence sufficient to sustain manslaughter conviction where death would not have resulted except for unlawful conduct); State v. McNichols, 188 Kan. 582, 586-87, 363 P.2d 467 (1961) (same; unlawful conduct must be proximate cause of death to support manslaughter); State v. Maxfield, 30 Kan.App.2d 873, 878-79, 54 P.3d 500 (2001), rev. denied 273 Kan. 1038 (2002) (holding evidence sufficient to support finding that defendant's conduct caused victim's death, thus supporting involuntary manslaughter conviction); State v. Woodman, 12 Kan.App.2d 110, 113-17, 735 P.2d 1102 (1987) (defendant charged with aggravated vehicular homicide, driving under the influence; victim ran red light; jury instruction too vague on necessity of proximate-cause proof; conviction reversed). These results are not surprising, given the statute's plain language. The legislature chose to use the word killing to describe the death of the victim for each of the potential means of involuntary manslaughter it defined. Killing connotes specific, proximate causationnot merely a peaceful, natural death. We note that Black's Law Dictionary recognizes the word's necessary implication; kill means to end life; to cause physical death. (Emphasis added.) Black's Law Dictionary 886 (8th Ed.2004). Application of the Kansas rule requiring proof of causation also is supported by our review of precedent from other jurisdictions that have arisen in factual circumstances somewhat more similar to those before us here. See Votre v. State, 192 Ind. 684, 138 N.E. 257 (1923) (at party involving drinking, dancing, defendant offered drink of whisky to minor girl; girl died that night of heart attack caused by alcohol poisoning; defendant's conviction reversed for insufficient evidence of causation; death not natural result, probable consequence of defendant's unlawful act; victim had long suffered from heart disease); Jabron v. State, 172 Miss. 135, 159 So. 406 (1935) (manslaughter conviction in death of child to whom defendant gave whisky reversed; defendant had no reason to anticipate act would result in death; evidence showed child's mother also gave child whisky on same day; child liked, had access to whisky); People v. Haber, 221 App.Div. 150, 223 N.Y.S. 133 (1927) (victim died of alcohol poisoning shortly after drinking wood alcohol served illegally at defendant's hotel; notwithstanding victim's dying declaration that defendant's whisky killed him, court held evidence insufficient to establish defendant's unlawful sale caused death; evidence showed victim hard drinker, drank at other places on day of death; others had drunk defendant's whisky, had not been poisoned); State v. Reitze, 86 N.J.L. 407, 92 A. 576 (1914) (innkeeper unlawfully sold liquor to visibly intoxicated man who, upon leaving premises, died after fall; court reversed manslaughter conviction; although sale of liquor unlawful, sudden death not usual, probable result of that unlawful act). In light of all of the above, we have no hesitation in holding the State must prove that a defendant's behavior was the proximate cause of the victim's death under K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 21-3404(c). We now turn to the question of whether that proof existed in this case.