Opinion ID: 3009632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: San Filippo's procedural due process claim

Text: San Filippo also asks us to vacate the district court's grant of summary judgment on his procedural due process claim. San Filippo argues that his due proce rights were violated because the five members of the Senate Panel that conducted th hearings and recommended that he be dismissed were not impartial decision-makers an because the proceeding was tainted by the appearance of impropriety. Specifically, Filippo alleges in his Third Amended Complaint: [The] members of the panel were negotiating with the Rutgers Administrato chiefly responsible for supervising the prosecution of the case for addit compensation, thus giving them a financial incentive in the outcome of th proceedings, in that they reasonably would believe that they would get additional compensation only if their final decision was favorable to the Administrator. Furthermore, all the contacts for such additional compens were held in secret, thus leading to the appearance of impropriety on the of the Panel. Both the magistrate judge and the district court rejected San Filippo's argument th fact-finder could reasonably infer that the panel members believed they were more l to be compensated if they recommended that San Filippo be dismissed. In addition, t magistrate judge and district court rejected San Filippo's argument that the secre negotiations about compensation created an appearance of impropriety. We agree wit conclusions reached by the magistrate judge and district court. The Senate Panel was composed of five faculty members, chosen by lot afte cause and peremptory challenges, whose responsibility was to hold hearings and dete punishing someone for exercising her First Amendment rights makes such ca necessary. Id. at 4402. By holding that the University may be held liable if a fact-finder fi that the Board of Governors was deliberately indifferent to the possibility that di proceedings were initiated against San Filippo in retaliation for the exercise of h first amendment rights, we similarly require his employer to tread with a certain of care to avoid the possibility of inadvertently punishing someone for exercisin First Amendment rights. 42 whether the charges brought against San Filippo were true and constituted grounds f dismissal. The panel had twelve meetings after it convened on December 5, 1986 and the evidentiary hearings began. Between March 24, 1987 and September 22, 1987, the devoted forty-six days to evidentiary hearings. After closing arguments, the panel another twelve meetings before it produced a forty-four page report on December 21, Throughout the hearings, San Filippo was represented by two attorneys, Ira and Pame Goldberg, and a union counsellor provided by the Rutgers AAUP, Dr. Wells Keddie. With the knowledge and consent of San Filippo's attorneys, Dr. Keddie, on 5, 1987, sent a memorandum to the panel chair, Dr. Szatrowski, copied to San Filipp his attorneys. The memorandum suggested various ways to deal with time and schedul problems: I don't have a single original or good idea as to how to resolve the time but there are some things which might mitigate the impact upon the commit members. One of them is the course you are already pursuing, the seeking some relief from normal duties while this demanding activity proceeds. I to me that if the proceedings cannot be concluded by the May 15 date, it be entirely appropriate to request the equivalent of Summer Session pay f of you or released time for those of you (yourself) on summer vacation upcoming trimester. But another possibility might well be worth consider released time after this is all over to enable committee members to make considerable lost time, energy, and opportunity. Dr. Keddie also suggested that panel members be provided meals and accommodations. When it became clear that the hearings would not conclude before commence Szatrowski asked San Filippo's attorney, Ira Goldberg, if he had any objection to Szatrowski asking Dr. Susan Cole, Vice President for University Administration and Personnel, for summer compensation for the panel members. Szatrowski and Goldberg testified in their affidavits that Goldberg voiced no objection and wished Szatrows good luck. When Szatrowski first requested additional compensation and/or released t the spring of 1987, Cole denied the request because she believed that the panel mem 43 were already under an obligation to participate without extra compensation. In late spring, Szatrowski renewed the request in light of the length of the hearings and t that certain panel members were ordinarily not required to be in attendance at Rutg over the summer. By letters dated July 29, 1987, Cole granted the members their re extra compensation and release time. San Filippo was not told of this decision. Shortly after the summer increases were granted, Szatrowski asked Cole fo further additional compensation when it became clear that the hearings would contin the fall. Cole testified that when Szatrowski approached her about the matter of fu payments, she told him when the panel was finished with its business, that we coul discuss the matter again. Szatrowski similarly testified: When I asked if this [the refusal to grant more compensation] meant that regardless of the amount of additional time spent on this matter by the panelists while carrying out their normal duties, there would be no furth consideration for additional compensation in the future, Dr. Cole indicat there would be no consideration possible until after the completion of th hearings. Ultimately, after the panel issued its final report recommending that San Filippo b dismissed, Cole recommended that the panel members receive extra compensation. Based upon this factual scenario, San Filippo alleges that the panel memb would have been tempted to reach an outcome in Rutgers' favor because they would ha believed that they were more likely to get extra compensation if they did so. We ag with the magistrate judge and district court that there is insufficient evidence to support an inference that the faculty members believed that their receipt of compen was tied to the outcome of the proceedings. The cases cited by San Filippo are cas which the adjudicator had a direct financial interest in the outcome. See, e.g., T Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531 (1927) (mayor acting as judge shared in the fees and costs by him); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972) (mayor responsible village finances could not act as judge when fines and forfeitures provided substan 44 portion of village funds). The Supreme Court has held that the impermissible pecun interest must be realistic and more than remote. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 238, 250 (1980). We find no evidence in the record to support a conclusion that the members believed that they were more likely to be compensated if they recommended S Filippo's dismissal. San Filippo alternatively argues that the panel members' participation in hearings while negotiating for additional compensation created an appearance of impropriety. See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 150 (1968) (arbitration panel not only must be unbiased but must also avoid the appearance of bias). Under Commonwealth Coatings, to prevail on an appearance of impropriety due process claim, San Filippo must establish both that the events in question would cause one to reasonably question the panel's impartiality and that t information was concealed from San Filippo. San Filippo makes much of the fact tha was not told about the meetings between Szatrowski and Cole; however, in light of t that Keddie suggested that Szatrowski broach the subject of extra compensation, the meetings do not have the invidious character San Filippo suggests. Finally, San Filippo argues that he should have had the opportunity to de Szatrowski to determine what was said in the conversations between Szatrowski and C San Filippo contends that, although he noticed Szatrowski's deposition in August 19 discovery was stayed after November 1989 when the motions for summary judgment were As the district court noted, San Filippo has failed to explain why Szatrowski was n deposed before August 1989 -- particularly, why he was not deposed during the summe fall of 1989 when San Filippo deposed nine other current and former officials and employees of Rutgers. Moreover, San Filippo does not indicate how he expects the deposition testimony of Szatrowski to differ from the testimony found in Szatrowski affidavit, dated April 2, 1990. For these reasons, we conclude that the district co 45 not abuse its discretion by refusing to delay decision on the summary judgment moti until San Filippo had a chance to depose Szatrowski.