Opinion ID: 2584655
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 27

Heading: Discrimination against insured plaintiffs

Text: Our colleagues note their sensitivity to the prospects of discriminating between low income, public assistance plaintiffs, and private insureds under the so-called benefit-of-the-bargain approach, which has been used to justify the collateral source rule in other jurisdictions. But they do not address the obvious evidentiary schism generated by their approach between plaintiffs with private insurance benefits and uninsured plaintiffs. As an example, assume we have two civil trials against the same defendant occurring across the hall from each other in any Kansas courthouse. Liability is admitted. Plaintiffs each suffered a broken leg. The issues in both cases are the reasonable value of the medical services provided to each plaintiff to heal the broken leg and plaintiff's noneconomic damages for pain and suffering. Each hospital billed $10,000 for those medical services. In the first courtroom, the plaintiff personally purchased for herself medical insurance. The insurance company settled the $10,000 billing for an actual cash payment of $1,000 and a negotiated write-off of $9,000. In the second courtroom, the plaintiff had no medical insurance, so there was no write-off. Under our colleague's approach, in the first courtroom, the jury would hear evidence of the $10,000 billing to the insured plaintiff, be told the hospital will accept $1,000 to satisfy its bill of $10,000, and some limiting instruction will be given that introduction of the $1,000 figure is not given to necessarily diminish plaintiff's noneconomic loss. Any attempt by the insured plaintiff to explain the compromised payment evidence will necessarily lead to disclosure of a collateral source. The jury will be asked to determine the reasonable value of the medical services necessary for plaintiff's recovery. The jury also will be asked to consider plaintiff's noneconomic damages for pain and suffering but will not be able to consider the $1,000 figure in its determination of noneconomic damages. The jury also will not be allowed to consider the existence of the plaintiff's insurance, even though that fact is obvious. A limiting jury instruction also will be added in an effort to address the potential for prejudice. In the second courtroom, the uninsured plaintiff will have the jury consider the same legal questions, but without the additional evidence about the $1,000 that would satisfy the hospital bill. The uninsured plaintiff's lawsuit also will have none of the complications or limitations outlined above for the insured plaintiff. Common sense tells us the defendant is better off in the first courtroom against the insured plaintiff because there is a greater likelihood the uninsured plaintiff will obtain a higher jury verdict based on the original amount billed and a higher pain and suffering award. This result makes no sense. See Wentling v. Medical Anesthesia Services, 237 Kan. 503, 517, 701 P.2d 939 (1985). In the first courtroom, the tortfeasor benefits from the collateral source evidence, while in the second courtroom the same tortfeasor does not. As the Helfend court observed: If we were to permit a tortfeasor to mitigate damages with payments from plaintiff's insurance, plaintiff would be in a position inferior to that of having bought no insurance, because his payment of premiums would have earned no benefit. Defendant should not be able to avoid payment of full compensation for the injury inflicted merely because the victim has had the foresight to provide himself with insurance. 2 Cal.3d at 10, 84 Cal.Rptr. 173, 465 P.2d 61. In Farley v. Engelken, 241 Kan. 663, 678, 740 P.2d 1058 (1987), this court decried a statute that altered the collateral source rule's impact for some, but not all, tortfeasors and some, but not all, of their victims, as being devoid of a legitimate legislative purpose. Our colleagues fail to tell us what legitimate judicial purpose their preferred result serves, or why it should be imposed at this time when it has such an obviously disparate impact between those tort victims with insurance and those without.