Opinion ID: 2548438
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nature of City Council's Decision

Text: We first address PH's point on appeal that the circuit judge erred in determining the city council's vote not to rezone was legislative and in dismissing its claim for de novo review and a jury trial under section 14-56-425. According to PH, the city council's decision to deny its rezoning request was administrative in nature, and section 14-56-425, accordingly, applies. We turn to the applicable statutory law. Arkansas Code Annotated sections 14-56-401 through XX-XX-XXX provide the Code for Municipal Planning. Section 14-56-425 of that Code specifically states: In addition to any remedy provided by law, appeals from final action taken by the administrative and quasi-judicial agencies concerned in the administration of this subchapter may be taken to the circuit court of the appropriate county where they shall be tried de novo according to the same procedure which applies to the appeal in civil actions from decisions of inferior courts, including the right of trial by jury. Ark.Code Ann. § 14-56-425 (Repl.1998). The plain language of that statute makes clear that it applies only to final decisions from administrative or quasi-judicial agencies. It is well settled that when a municipality acts in a legislative capacity, it exercises a power conferred upon it by the General Assembly. See, e.g., City of Lowell v. M & N Mobile Home Park, Inc., 323 Ark. 332, 336, 916 S.W.2d 95, 97 (1996). This court has also clearly held that when city councils exercise their legislative power, courts will review their decisions only to determine if they are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. See, e.g., id. at 336-37, 916 S.W.2d at 97. If the city council's action is purely administrative, then section 14-56-425 applies. The question in the instant appeal turns on whether the city council's action in denying PH's rezoning request was administrative or legislative in nature. To answer the question, we must examine our case law. In Wenderoth v. City of Fort Smith, plaintiffs brought suit in circuit court to challenge a Fort Smith Board of Directors' ordinance, which rezoned properties that were adjacent to their land. 251 Ark. 342, 472 S.W.2d 74 (1971). This court ruled that the predecessor to section 14-56-425, under which the plaintiffs had filed suit in circuit court, was unconstitutional because it permitted a de novo review of final action taken by the administrative, quasi judicial, and legislative agencies. Id. at 344, 472 S.W.2d at 75 (citing Ark. Stat. Ann. § 19-2830.1) (emphasis added). This court held that the statute could not, according to the Separation of Powers Clause in the Arkansas Constitution, empower the judiciary to take away the discretionary powers vested by our legislature in the city's legislative body to enact zoning and rezoning ordinances. Id. at 345, 472 S.W.2d at 75. The statute was thereafter amended to provide for de novo review of only administrative and quasi-judicial agency decisions. Eight years after Wenderoth, this court again addressed the proper standard of review in zoning cases. See City of Conway v. Hous. Auth. of Conway, 266 Ark. 404, 584 S.W.2d 10 (1979). In City of Conway, the Conway Housing Authority applied to the Conway Planning Committee to rezone a parcel of land from R-3 (Residential) to B-3 (Business). The committee denied the request, and the Conway City Council affirmed that decision. The housing authority filed a complaint in circuit court, contesting the failure to rezone, and the judge rezoned the property to B-3. The city appealed, and, on review, this court affirmed the circuit judge's finding that the city acted arbitrarily. We specifically said, The General Assembly saw fit to give cities the right to exercise zoning authority. . . [and] granted the cities the right to legislate upon zoning matters. This right is, of course, not unlimited. Therefore, when a municipality, pursuant to authority granted by the General Assembly, takes action in zoning classifications, it is exercising a legislative function and is not subject to review by the courts of its wisdom. Neither do the courts have power to review such legislative action by the cities in a de novo manner. In fact, when the General Assembly attempted to grant the courts power to review such actions de novo, we held such actions unconstitutional. Therefore, it follows that the power of the court to review the action of the municipalities is limited to determining whether or not such action was arbitrary, capricious, or wholly inequitable. Id. at 409, 584 S.W.2d at 13 (internal citations omitted). While the City of Conway court did not explicitly address whether the city council's decision to deny the rezoning request was legislative in nature, it did say that [i]n zoning matters the General Assembly has delegated legislative power to the cities in matters relating to zoning of property. Id. (emphasis added). Two years after City of Conway was decided, this court again held that the decision of a city council not to rezone a piece of property was subject to review based on whether the city council acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably. See City of Little Rock v. Breeding, 273 Ark. 437, 442, 619 S.W.2d 664, 667 (1981). The Breeding court said that [i]t has been well-established that such zoning decisions of the city are legislative in nature. . . . Id. In City of Lowell v. M & N Mobile Home Park , some fifteen years later, this court relied on City of Conway for the proposition that the judicial branch does not have the authority to review zoning legislation de novo, as that would constitute an unconstitutional taking of the power of the legislative branch. 323 Ark. at 337, 916 S.W.2d at 98 (emphasis added). In City of Lowell, a landowner owned 7.19 acres of land, of which two acres were zoned MHP for a mobile home park, and the remaining land was zoned R-1, for single-family dwellings. The landowner applied to the planning commission to have the R-1 land rezoned as MHP. The commission denied the request, and the city council likewise rejected the application. The landowner then filed a complaint in circuit court, contesting the zoning decision, and the judge rezoned the land as MHP. This court reversed the circuit judge's decision. We did not expressly determine that the city council's action was legislative in nature but said: In summary, the party alleging that legislation is arbitrary has the burden of proving that there is no rational basis for the legislative act, and regardless of the evidence introduced by the moving party, the legislation is presumed to be valid and is to be upheld if the judicial branch finds a rational basis for it. It is not for the judicial branch to decide from evidence introduced by the moving party whether the legislative branch acted wisely. Id. at 340, 916 S.W.2d at 99. Following our City of Lowell decision, this court appeared to change the law regarding whether some zoning decisions, and specifically a city council's denial of a zoning request, were legislative in nature. See Camden Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. Sutton, 339 Ark. 368, 5 S.W.3d 439 (1999). In Camden, an organization owned land and petitioned to have it rezoned from RS-2 (Residential) to M-2 (Manufacturing). The City of Camden Planning Commission recommended that the application be granted, but the city board refused to rezone the property. After failing to have the property rezoned by the board, the landowners circulated an initiative petition seeking to have the issue put on the ballot for popular vote. The petition was certified. The Fairview Community Defense Committee, which opposed the rezoning, then filed an action in circuit court, seeking to remove the initiative from the ballot. The circuit judge found that issues concerning whether to rezone are administrative decisions, not legislative, and thus are not subject to the initiative process. This court affirmed the circuit judge's decision. We began our analysis in Camden by framing the issue as whether the actions taken by the Commission and the City Board were legislative or administrative. Camden, 339 Ark. at 372, 5 S.W.3d at 442. This court then summarized the test for determining the difference between legislative and administrative acts: Both legislative and executive powers are possessed by municipal corporations. . . . The crucial test for determining what is legislative and what is administrative is whether the ordinance is one making a new law, or one executing a law already in existence. . . . Executive powers are often vested in the council or legislative body and exercised by motion, resolution or ordinance. Executive action evidenced by ordinance or resolution is not subject to the power of the referendum, which is restricted to legislative action as distinguished from mere administrative action. The form or name does not change the essential nature of the real step taken. 339 Ark. at 373, 5 S.W.3d at 442 (quoting Scroggins v. Kerr, 217 Ark. 137, 228 S.W.2d 995 (1950)). We then found that the city board had not taken legislative action because its decision to not accept the Commission's administrative proposal was only a rejection of proposed administrative action and did not constitute any legislative action or administrative action by the City Board. Id. In its opinion, the Camden court distinguished the Wenderoth decision and specifically found that there, the city had adopted a proposed change in the comprehensive ordinance and the court did not, in that case, analyze the action of the city on the issue of whether it was administrative or legislative in nature. Id. at 374, 5 S.W.3d at 443. The Camden court expressly held that [i]f the observations in obiter dicta in Wenderoth are inconsistent with this holding we clarify, modify, or overrule such statements to the extent that they may be in conflict with our holding in this opinion. Id. at 375, 5 S.W.3d at 443. Four years after our decision in Camden was handed down, this court had occasion to revisit its holding. See Summit Mall Co. v. Lemond, 355 Ark. 190, 132 S.W.3d 725 (2003). In Summit Mall, landowners brought suit in circuit court, seeking to enjoin the City of Little Rock from issuing a building permit to Summit Mall or taking any other action pursuant to an enacted ordinance, which granted Summit Mall permission to develop a tract of land in West Little Rock. There were many issues on appeal in Summit Mall, but one is relevant to the instant case. Summit Mall and the city each argued that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because the City Board's action was administrative and any challenge to the ordinance should have been brought under section 14-56-425. This court disagreed that, under our holding in Camden, the city's rezoning decision was administrative in nature and should have been brought under section 14-56-425. We first noted that in Camden, the appellant had sought rezoning of its property from the Camden Planning Commission when a comprehensive zoning plan was already in effect. Id. at 200, 132 S.W.3d at 731. We further attempted to distinguish the facts in Camden and said in that case no action was taken by the City Board. Because the City Board failed to pass any ordinance, it obviously did not act legislatively. Id. In the Summit Mall case, however, the city board not only approved the recommended action of the Planning Commission and amended [the ordinance], but it rezoned the subject property and added new, specialized conditions to accommodate the rezoning. Id. at 201, 132 S.W.3d at 732. We held that this action clearly constituted rezoning and was a legislative act by the City Board. In the instant case, the circuit judge made the following, specific, findings regarding whether the city council's action was legislative or administrative in nature: [L]owell and the body of case law it represents hold that de novo review is inappropriate in a case involving an appeal to circuit court of a city council's denial of a requested rezoning. Camden does not purport to overrule that body of law, as the question of administrative versus legislative action in that case was analyzed in the specific context of whether an initiative could be held pursuant to Amendment 7. . . . . The court finds that analyzing the question of administrative versus legislative action by a city council in the denial of a proposed rezoning depends upon the context, and that an initiative question is a different context than the question of standard of review on an appeal of a denial of requested rezoning: But the sense in which the word legislation is used in this connection is not always the same as that in which it is used in other contexts. Conduct allowed as legislative in character for one purpose may be deemed not legislative for some other and different purpose. Scroggins v. Kerr, 217 Ark. 137, 228 S.W.2d 995 (1950). The Court recognizes that the denial of Plaintiff's request for rezoning in this case was administrative in nature under Camden for purposes of applying Amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitution, but the Court holds that the denial of Plaintiff's request for rezoning was legislative in nature for purposes of applying Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-425. This court now takes this opportunity to clarify whether decisions by a city council to approve or deny a requested rezoning of land are legislative or administrative in nature. We hold, in line with our precedent excepting the Camden decision, that zoning decisions by city boards are legislative in nature. We specifically hold that zoning decisions, whether grants or denials, are legislative in nature. Accordingly, the procedure set forth in section 14-56-425 does not apply. Moreover, because our holding in Camden Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. Sutton, 339 Ark. 368, 5 S.W.3d 439 (1999), involved a denial of a zoning request and has lent confusion to this issue, we overrule it. We affirm the circuit judge on the point that the city council's action was legislative in nature, but we dissociate ourselves from the judge's attempt to distinguish Camden because we are overruling that case in this opinion.