Opinion ID: 1247192
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Failure to Require a Prompt Disciplinary Hearing Constitutes a Violation of Due Process

Text: Even assuming, arguendo, that the bar could constitutionally impose a temporary suspension pursuant to section 6007, subdivision (c), the absence of a statutory requirement that the bar also provide, within a reasonably prompt period of time, a full and final determination of the underlying disciplinary matter, renders the statute constitutionally suspect on its face. Indeed, the majority opinion concedes, in light of the reduce[d] time an attorney has to meet the charges against him and the fact that he enjoys fewer rights than attorneys facing adverse action under other statutes, that a final disposition is required at some point to validate the procedures governing the predeprivation hearing. [7] (Maj. opn. at p. 1121, italics added.) In my view, however, such an amorphous time requirement is totally inadequate to protect the interests of a member placed on involuntary inactive enrollment pursuant to the expedited procedures of section 6007, subdivision (c). At some point in time is cold comfort to an attorney whose practice is quietly disintegrating while the bar fiddles. I do not question the bar's good faith in such matters. It is apparent, however, that at some point provides absolutely no time limit and precious little incentive to the bar to proceed expeditiously with the underlying disciplinary matter. Why should they? The attorney has already been placed on indefinite suspension. The instant matter provides a case in point. At the time of the involuntary enrollment proceeding against petitioner, no formal disciplinary charges had been filed, although investigations into eleven matters were underway and client complaints in another seven had been filed. After the order placing petitioner on involuntary inactive enrollment became effective on January 21, 1988, the bar delayed until April 11, 1988, an additional three months, to issue an order to show cause. Moreover, the charges in the order to show cause excluded two of the eight matters which formed the basis of petitioner's involuntary inactive enrollment. To our knowledge, formal charges in these two matters have still not been filed, more than ten months after the effective date of the bar's order of involuntary inactive enrollment. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that due process imposes restraints on the timing as well as the form of a postdeprivation hearing. The due process constraints will depend, in each case, on appropriate accommodation of the competing interests involved. ( Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 579 [42 L.Ed.2d 725, 737, 95 S.Ct. 729]; see also Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985) 470 U.S. 532, 557 [84 L.Ed.2d 494, 513-514, 105 S.Ct. 1487] [conc. and dis. opn. of Brennan, J.].) The relevant interests have been recognized as threefold: the importance of the private interest and the length or finality of the deprivation, the magnitude of the governmental interest, and the nature of the procedure used. ( Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 335 [47 L.Ed.2d 18, 96 S.Ct. 893]; Goss v. Lopez, supra, 419 U.S. at p. 579 [42 L.Ed.2d at pp. 737-738].) Weighing these factors, I cannot agree with the majority that due process is satisfied so long as the bar provides a final disposition at some point. It is undisputed that petitioner has a substantial property interest in his license to practice law. ( In re Ruffalo (1968) 390 U.S. 544, 550 [20 L.Ed.2d 117, 122, 88 S.Ct. 1222].) The disruptions caused by the loss of one's license during the considerable period of time which may pass between the involuntary inactive enrollment and the commencement, much less completion, of final disciplinary proceedings may be truly devastating. Consider the impact on one's personal and professional life of these months in limbo: the loss of wages, indeed of the opportunity to earn a living; the exhaustion of savings or conversion of possessions to replace wages; the possibility that one could not pay for even basic needs, such as food, clothing and rental or mortgage payments. The governmental interest in protecting the public from incompetent or unethical attorneys is substantial. However, that interest is adequately served once the attorney is placed on temporary suspension. Fairness compels that a reasonably prompt commencement of final disciplinary proceedings should immediately follow if it has not preceded the temporary suspension. The Massachusetts Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in the Matter of Kenney (1987) 399 Mass. 431 [504 N.E.2d. 652], a decision which the majority cites with approval. (Maj. opn. at p. 1121.) Following a preliminary hearing, an attorney was placed on temporary suspension pending a full disciplinary proceeding. The Massachusetts court determined, in agreement with the majority in the instant case, that a temporary suspension [after a limited preliminary hearing] without a final adjudication would not be constitutional.... ( Id. at p. 656.) The court observed further that [s]ince the rule does not specify when formal disciplinary proceedings must be instituted ... we interpret the rule to require that disciplinary proceedings, if not already begun, must be instituted within a reasonable time.  ( Ibid., italics added.) The Massachusetts court did not venture to suggest a specific time period within which a disciplinary proceeding, assuming that one has not already commenced, must be initiated. However, given the fact that in this state it is not unusual for a disciplinary hearing to commence six months or more after the issuance of a notice to show cause, I would hold, at a minimum, that a notice to show cause on the underlying disciplinary matter must issue within 30 days after the effective date of an involuntary inactive enrollment under section 6007, subdivision (c). A similar 30-day requirement is contained in the rules governing temporary suspensions of attorneys in the State of Pennsylvania. (Pa. Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement (1986) rule 208(f)(5).) [8] There is no reason that the bar, having already conducted a preliminary investigation and hearing in connection with the involuntary enrollment, cannot issue formal charges and commence final disciplinary proceedings within this time period. The majority's reliance on Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, supra, 470 U.S. 532, for the proposition that a delay of even nine months is not unconstitutional, is misplaced. In that case, the court held merely that Loudermill failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action, and not that nine months can never exceed constitutional limits. ( Id. at p. 554 [84 L.Ed.2d at p. 512] [conc. and dis. opn. of Brennan, J.].) Nor does Loudermill suggest that affording the petitioner a pre deprivation hearing discharges the bar's responsibility to move with dispatch thereafter. On the contrary, the court reaffirmed the need to balance the respective interests at stake in determining the timing and form of the post deprivation hearing necessary to satisfy the requirements of due process. (470 U.S. at pp. 542-543 [84 L.Ed.2d at p. 504].) Absent the requirement of a reasonably prompt postdeprivation notice of formal disciplinary charges, I would hold that section 6007, subdivision (c) violates due process. [9]