Opinion ID: 783131
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Supportability of the compensatory damages award

Text: 78 The jury awarded Zhang $360,000 in compensatory damages on his discrimination claim, which the appellants claim is excessive compensation for emotional distress and not supported by substantial evidence. They concede that at least $136,845 of this amount could be attributed to economic damages, 12 but maintain that the evidence is insufficient to support awarding the remaining $223,155 for emotional distress. This argument was first raised after the verdict in a motion for a new trial, and we will not overturn a district court's denial of a motion for a new trial absent a clear abuse of discretion. Desrosiers v. Flight Int'l of Fla., Inc., 156 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir.1998). 79 As an initial matter, we disagree with the appellants' calculation of economic damages. Although the appellants concede that the jury could have awarded Zhang back pay and front pay totaling $136,845 for the years 1999-2002, they argue that the jury could not have awarded bonuses for these years, even though Zhang's contract allowed a $25,000 annual performance bonus. We hold that the jury reasonably could have awarded bonuses for these years; the evidence in the record demonstrates that in 1998, the year before he was terminated, Zhang exceeded his performance goal and had the highest sales of any American Gem employee. The jury reasonably could have concluded that Zhang would have continued his outstanding work performance, entitling him to bonuses in each of the following four years and an additional $100,000 in economic damages. Thus the jury could have awarded up to $236,845 in economic damages, leaving only $123,155 in compensation for emotional distress. 80 Regardless of whether the figure for emotional distress damages should be $223,155 or $123,155, however, we will not disturb the award. We may reverse a jury's finding of the amount of damages if the amount is grossly excessive or monstrous. Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1011 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1116, 120 S.Ct. 936, 145 L.Ed.2d 814 (2000). Although the appellants argue that emotional distress damages must be supported by substantial evidence, they cite no Ninth Circuit caselaw to support this proposition, instead relying on the Fourth Circuit case Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1251 (4th Cir.1996). The holding of Price that the evidence of the emotional distress must be demonstrable, genuine, and adequately explained, id. at 1251, is not the law of this Circuit: 81 While objective evidence requirements may exist in other circuits, such a requirement is not imposed by case law in... the Ninth Circuit, or the Supreme Court. See Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 762 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir.1985) (upholding emotional damages based solely on testimony); Johnson v. Hale, 13 F.3d 1351, 1352 (9th Cir.1994) (noting that emotional damages may be awarded based on testimony alone or appropriate inference from circumstances); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 n. 20, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (noting that emotional distress damages are essentially subjective and may be proven by reference to injured party's conduct and observations by others). 82 Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 513 (9th Cir.2000) (citation and parallel citations omitted). In Passantino, we upheld a $1,000,000 compensatory emotional distress damage award — in addition to $2,200,000 in economic damages — for a retaliatory discharge of an employee who complained of sex discrimination. Id. at 510-14. 83 Zhang's testimony alone is enough to substantiate the jury's award of emotional distress damages. Zhang testified that the job at American Gem was my dream, working in this country, and that when he was terminated, he was troubled, and couldn't believe it. He testified that when American Gem sent letters to his suppliers stating that he had been terminated, the Chinese version of the letters made it seem like I was either criminal or something very bad. He stated that the termination very, very hurt my dignity and reputation, because the letters went to suppliers in Dalian, China, his hometown, and people think there must be something wrong, because Wei is doing something wrong in the States. He testified that people from China called him, concerned about the letters, and that American Gem ruined my future business.... Because doing business in China, your reputation and your credibility is the key. Despite the fact that his testimony was hampered by language and translation problems, the jury obviously could have gleaned that he was greatly hurt and humiliated by his termination and the manner in which it was carried out. Under Passantino, this testimony is more than sufficient to support a substantial compensatory damage award for emotional distress. The award of compensatory damages was not grossly excessive or monstrous. Lambert, 180 F.3d at 1011. The district court committed no error, let alone a clear abuse of discretion, in denying the motion for a new trial on this basis. 84