Opinion ID: 529707
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Doe's Further Arguments

Text: 37 Doe presents several additional arguments to demonstrate that NSA wrongfully applied the chapter 370 regulations when it should have applied chapter 371 instead. He draws support from the language of chapter 370, the Supreme Court's assumptions in Carlucci, and the convening of a board of appraisal to deal with his situation. 38 Doe argues that the for cause procedures of chapter 370 are by their own terms inapplicable to national security-based dismissals. 6 Doe Br. at 18-20; Doe Reply Br. at 11. The interpretation advanced in Carlucci that such removals require an immediate threat of harm suggests that chapter 370 procedures are unavailable only if they could cause serious damage to national security. 109 S.Ct. at 412. As we have seen, the record supports NSA's assertion that Doe was dismissed because of long-term unsuitability for access to SCI and not because he posed an immediate security threat. Thus, the national security exception to chapter 370 is no more applicable to Doe than are the provisions of 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7532. Doe's submission that the exception to chapter 370 totally defeats NSA's case, Doe Reply Br. at 11, is, therefore, without merit. 39 Doe further contends that the Supreme Court opinion in Carlucci can be read only as assuming that Doe's termination was one in the interest of national security. Doe Reply Br. at 9. Although Doe may be correct about the Court's assumptions, Doe admits that Certiorari [w]as [g]ranted on [o]nly the [n]arrow [i]ssue of [w]hether the [p]rocedures of 5 U.S.C. 7532 [w]ere [m]andated in [t]his [c]ase. Id. at 5. The Court's determination that Sec. 7532 procedures were not mandated for Doe is not at all inconsistent with our separate finding now--on an issue that was not before the Supreme Court--that Doe's dismissal was for cause and therefore did not implicate Sec. 7532. 40 Finally, Doe argues that by its actions NSA in fact utilized the national security criteria of chapter 371 rather than the for cause criteria of chapter 370. Id. at 11. He claims first that NSA never applied the efficiency of the service standard of chapter 370. Our discussion above indicates that this claim is too weak to provide a basis for relief. Although none of the communications by NSA to or about Doe employed the language of efficiency, the thrust of the board of appraisal's findings concerns Doe's judgment and his suitability for access to SCI. Clearly, Doe could not promote NSA's efficiency if he did not have access to the confidential information necessary for his job. 41 As an additional support for his argument that NSA actually was applying chapter 371, as it incorporates Sec. 7532, Doe points to NSA's use of a board of appraisal, provided for under chapter 371 but not under chapter 370. Doe Br. at 20. NSA responded that the board provided an additional protection voluntarily accorded [Doe] and did not require final determination by the Secretary of Defense as provided by chapter 371. Govt.Br. at 30. Unlike security clearance revocations, employment dismissals do not require the NSA Director to call upon boards of appraisal. 50 U.S.C. Sec. 832(b). It is incongruous for Doe to maintain that NSA's use of the board entitled him to procedural protection that as a matter of law is less substantial than the safeguards he received under chapter 370. See Carlucci, 109 S.Ct. at 413.