Opinion ID: 1183195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Scope of Voir Dire

Text: During the voir dire Milligan's attorney asked a prospective juror whether she believed in the biblical expression of an eye for an eye. The trial court sustained an objection to the question on grounds of relevancy. Milligan now asserts that ruling was error. When attempting to empanel a jury in a capital murder trial a number of issues arise which are not relevant to any other form of litigation. Because a verdict of guilty leads to the ultimate question of whether the accused should be executed, a decision of paramount importance to the defendant, the personal beliefs and convictions of the members of the jury are highly relevant. A defendant is entitled to explore the prospective juror's values and personal convictions, including those reflected in or reflective of religious beliefs. We hold that the trial court erred when it ruled that the prospective juror's belief in the adage of an eye for an eye was irrelevant. Nevertheless, we further hold that under the guidelines of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), reh'g denied, 386 U.S. 987, 87 S.Ct. 1283, 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967), such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as the prospective juror involved stated unequivocally that she could put aside any personal beliefs and follow the law as instructed by the judge. D.