Opinion ID: 2630185
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony about defendant's statements

Text: As recounted, Dalton ran the automobile chop shop at the compound. He testified that sometime during the week following the murder, while defendant was at the compound, he started to brag to Dalton about leaving some dude floating. Dalton told defendant to shut up because he did not want to know anything about it. When Dalton learned defendant had told Dalton's sister Barbara Triplett and his niece Charlene about the floating man, Dalton became angry and wanted defendant to leave the compound. Asked by the prosecutor to explain what bad thing Dalton thought defendant was referring to, Dalton testified: Sounds like he took somebody out and blew them away and left them floating in a lake, to tell you the truth. But that ain't what he told me. That's what I put together on my own. That's when I told him I didn't want to hear nothing and I didn't want him up at our house. Defense counsel did not object. Barbara Triplett testified that around the same time defendant said something to her about a person floating in Canyon Lake who was not able to make decisions for himself. Defendant's statement made Barbara feel very uncomfortable and uneasy. The day after Dalton's direct examination, and outside the jury's presence, defense counsel moved to strike, as inadmissible and objectionable speculation, Dalton's testimony as to what he had figured out about defendant's reference to the floating man. Counsel made no motion to strike Barbara Triplett's testimony. In the alternative, counsel agreed to the court's suggestion that the jury be admonished about lay opinion testimony. The trial court then instructed the jury: I'm going to give you a cautionary instruction with respect to the opinions expressed by lay witnesses, and this is particularly, although it goes to all witnesses, particularly with respect to the direct testimony of Danny Dalton that you heard yesterday. [ถ] You are to give no weight to the opinion of lay witnesses nor to draw inferences from the expressions of those opinions unless you find that the opinions are clearly based on facts to which the witness has testified. Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike Dalton's testimony and that the court's admonition was inadequate and legally erroneous. Defendant also contends the trial court should have stricken Barbara Triplett's testimony, even though defense counsel did not object to it. At the outset, defendant's claim as to Barbara Triplett's testimony is forfeited for want of a timely objection below. Defendant contends that, under People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th 800, he was excused from objecting to Triplett's testimony because by the time she testified the court had denied defendant's motion to strike Dalton's similar testimony, thereby signaling it would also deny an objection to Triplett's testimony. Hill is inapplicable to the instant case. In Hill, we explained that a party may raise a claim on appeal despite the lack of an objection at trial where the circumstances show an objection would have been futile. ( Id. at pp. 820-822.) No such futility is shown on the facts of this case. Defendant objected to Dalton's testimony and moved to strike it, but ultimately agreed instead to a cautionary instruction, which the court gave. Given these facts, defendant could not reasonably assume that, had he similarly objected to Triplett's testimony, the trial court would not offer some similar remedy. Accordingly, we cannot conclude an objection would have been futile, and if defendant had an objection to Triplett's testimony he was required to make it below. Because he did not, the claim is forfeited. As to Dalton's testimony, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to strike. The trial court's admonishment to the jury (to which defense counsel agreed as an alternative) adequately addressed defendant's concerns about Dalton's speculative comments. Defendant contends the instruction was erroneous because it did not use the language of the Law Revision Commission's comment to Evidence Code section 800: A witness who is not testifying as an expert may testify in the form of an opinion only if the opinion is based on his own perception. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 3A West's Ann. Evid. Code (2009 ed.) foll. ง 800, p. 3.) But the trial court's reference to facts to which the witness has testified expressed the same legal concept. In the context of Dalton's testimony, the facts about defendant's statements to which Dalton testified were the words Dalton had personally heard.