Opinion ID: 2609747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ex parte communications by the trial judge with the jury during its deliberations

Text: On three occasions during the jury's deliberations the trial judge sent written communications to the jury without first reconvening the court and affording the appellants and their counsel an opportunity to be present. One was in response to a written request from juror Baugh to be excused from jury duty [10] as well as to a report from the bailiff that there was an open dictionary in the jury room. [11] The other two were in response to written questions from the jury seeking definitions of the concepts accessory before the fact, scene of the crime, and aggravated assault upon a person. [12] A majority of this court  consisting of Justice Menor, Justice Ogata, and myself  agree that the trial judge's ex parte communications with the jury during their deliberations were reversible error. See State v. Irebaria, 55 Haw. 353, 358, 519 P.2d 1246, 1250 (1974) (dicta). A defendant in a criminal case has a procedural and constitutional [13] right to be present whenever the court communicates with the jury. Bustamante v. Eyman, 456 F.2d 269, 272 (9th Cir.1972); see Hawaii R. Crim.P. 30(d). Because this right is of constitutional dimensions, moreover, at the very least it is enforceable on appeal by a rule requiring reversal unless the prosecution shows that a violation of the right was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [14] See United States v. Dellinger, supra, 472 F.2d at 377-380; United States v. Schor, 418 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir.1969). Apart from the question whether the ex parte judge-jury communications were harmless error, we note at the outset a Hawaii statute and a decision of this court which mandate reversal of the appellants' convictions. HRS § 635-43, effective during the trial of these cases, [15] provides as follows: Unless the parties to the cause on trial either in person or through their attorneys, shall file therein their written consent that the court may charge the jury orally, it shall be the duty of the court, except as provided in section 231-25, to reduce in writing and read its charge to the jury; and the manuscript of such charge, signed by the court, shall be filed in the cause, and shall constitute a part of the record thereof. Whenever, and as often as the court shall depart from such duty, either party to such suit shall be entitled as a matter of right, to demand and have granted a new trial of such cause. [16] (Emphasis added). The italicized portion of this statute suggests that the degree of prejudice resulting from an improper judge-jury communication is irrelevant to the right to a new trial. This interpretation is firmly supported by The Great Wilno v. Fernandez, 34 Haw. 603 (1938), a civil case construing the precisely equivalent predecessor to HRS § 635-43, RLH 1935, § 3745. In that case, the court concluded that the submission of an additional written instruction to a deliberating jury, without first convening the court, is reversible per se under the statute unless both parties consent in writing to such a procedure. The opinion, applicable a fortiori to a criminal case, speaks directly to the harmless error argument. It reasons as follows: The procedure followed by the court in this case is in direct violation of the terms of the statute. The statute makes it the duty of the court, in the absence of the written consent of the parties or their attorneys, to reduce to writing and read its charge to the jury. The charge in question was reduced to writing but was not read to the jury, and the record shows that neither the parties nor their attorneys gave their written consent to the procedure followed. The statute provides that the parties shall be entitled, as a matter of right, to a new trial whenever the court shall depart from the duty imposed upon it by the statute. Some courts hold that the procedure here followed, though error, is harmless where the instruction given correctly states the law but none of the opinions examined by us disclose statutory provisions similar to the provisions of our statute on the subject. We are not concerned with the wisdom of the statute. That is a matter for the legislature. The statute, by prescribing what the consequence of a departure by the court from its duty shall be, makes it mandatory that we sustain the exception to the giving of the instruction in question in the manner herein set forth and makes it unnecessary for us to consider the substance of the instruction in question. 34 Haw. at 606. The Great Wilno does not concern itself with the demands of a bothersome legal technicality devoid of substance. The decision is solidly based in considerations of policy. It recognizes what other courts have recognized without the aid of a legislative declaration such as HRS § 635-43  the right of a litigant and his attorney to be present at that crucial state of a case in which the judge communicates with a deliberating jury on matters of substance is far too important to leave to the vagaries of the harmless error rule. See, e.g., Shields v. United States, 273 U.S. 583, 47 S.Ct. 478, 71 L.Ed. 787 (1927); People v. Harris, 43 Mich. App. 746, 204 N.W.2d 734 (1972). Harmless error analysis of an ex parte judge-jury communication neglects a significant reason underpinning the requirement that a judge afford the parties an opportunity to be present prior to the communication  the importance of allowing the parties an input into the trial judge's thinking so that the resulting communication with the jury will be the best one possible and not just one that an appellate court can subsequently declare harmless. See Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U.S. 76, 82, 39 S.Ct. 435, 63 L.Ed. 853 (1919); [17] United States v. Dellinger, supra, 472 F.2d at 380 (ostensibly applies harmless error test, but concludes that ex parte judge-jury communication was error because the suggestions of counsel might well have been helpful and led to a different exercise of discretion). Because HRS § 635-43 has been repealed since the appellants' trial, see note 15 supra, it necessarily has no applicability to future trials. In appeals from future trials, our analysis of ex parte judge-jury communications will look to whether they were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See note 14 supra. Indeed, even if we apply only that standard to the present cases, reversal is required. We do not find harmless beyond a reasonable doubt the trial judge's submission to the jury, during deliberations, of written copies of three instructions, previously given orally, dealing with the concepts accessory before the fact, scene of the crime, and aggravated assault upon a person. While there is authority in this state to support the provision of an entire set of unmarked instructions to a deliberating jury in a criminal case, State v. Peters, 44 Haw. 1, 6, 352 P.2d 329, 332 (1959), the trial judge's procedure of transmitting piecemeal some instructions to the exclusion of others was unprecedented and highly prejudicial. There were dozens of instructions in these cases, dealing with such important matters to the defense as the presumption of innocence, the right of an accused not to testify, and the authority of the jury to view with special skepticism the testimony of alleged accomplices granted immunity from prosecution. As to these instructions, the jury was forced to rely on its memory of the previous oral charge. But instructions on the liability of an accessory and the elements of aggravated assault were afforded the jury by the trial judge in written form. Inherent in this procedure was the insidious danger that the jury would place undue focus and emphasis on the written instructions [18]  a danger heightened by the unusually long three and one-half day period of jury deliberations.