Opinion ID: 1433938
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Retroactivity of Senate Bill 96-74

Text: Adopted prior to the trial of this case, Senate Bill 96-74 amended the definition of nontributary ground water to state, as a matter of law, that not nontributary ground water ... in the Denver Basin shall not become nontributary ground water as a result of the aquifer's hydrostatic pressure level dropping below the alluvium of an adjacent stream due to Denver Basin well pumping activity. § 37-90-103(10.5). The Well Company relied on precisely this type of evidence to rebut the state engineer's finding that the Arapahoe aquifer water sought to be adjudicated is not nontributary. Adhering to the plain language of this statute, the water court upheld the state engineer's determination that the aquifer underlying the subdivision was not nontributary. Like the other standards and requirements applicable to use rights for Denver Basin water, this legislative prescription functions to maintain surface supply to prior appropriators as depletions occur. Thus, has the General Assembly acted to prevent later users of this ground water resource from claiming changed conditions, due to well pumping, as a reason to classify the water as nontributary and avoid the augmentation plan decree requirements applicable to not nontributary water. This decision is within the legislature's plenary power. The Well Company asserts that the legislature intended to give the provisions of Senate Bill 96-74 prospective effect only. We disagree. The provisions of Senate Bill 96-74 addressed an issue that had arisen in prior augmentation cases involving not nontributary Denver Basin water in the context of considering an alleged break in the aquifer's connection with the natural stream system. See Simpson v. Yale Invs., Inc., 886 P.2d 689, 698 (Colo.1994). The legislature was undoubtedly aware of this issue and chose to resolve it, because the statutory language of Senate Bill 96-74 is specifically tailored to address the theory raised in Yale Investments. [13] Under these circumstances, we view Senate Bill 96-74 as demonstrating clear legislative intent that its terms should apply to pending decree and permit applications. The Well Company argues that Senate Bill 96-74, if applied retroactively in this fashion, violates Colo. Const. art. II, § 11, which states that [n]o ex post facto law, nor law ... retrospective in its operation... shall be passed by the general assembly. But, this prohibition applies solely to statutes which take away or impair a vested right acquired under existing laws or create a new obligation or impose a new duty or attach a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past. Vail v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 108 Colo. 206, 214, 115 P.2d 389, 393 (1941). The Well Company had no vested right to use the Arapahoe aquifer water underlying the homeowner's lots at the time Senate Bill 96-74 was enacted. Inchoate rights may be validly affected by legislation which alters the litigation posture of the parties to pending litigation, at times dramatically. See Taxpayers for the Animas-La Plata Referendum v. Animas-La Plata Water Conservancy Dist., 739 F.2d 1472, 1477 (10th Cir. 1984). We also reject the Well Company's contention that the legislature cannot disturb the intent and expectations of the parties to these deeds, who believed the waters of the Arapahoe aquifer to be nontributary at the time of their execution. Since the General Assembly has plenary power over the allocation and use of nontributary water, see Bayou Land, 924 P.2d at 147; American Water Dev., Inc. v. City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352, 369 (Colo.1994), it may subject the vesting of use rights in such water to whatever requirements it may design. The General Assembly recognized in Senate Bill 5 that the regulatory framework and provisions it there adopted for nontributary water were based upon the best available evidence at this time. § 37-90-102(2). The legislature thereby anticipated that additional knowledge and future legislative policy could alter the standards for management of ground water in particular basins or throughout the state. A deed may not negate the application of legislative choices to an inchoate right. Even if the General Assembly, the state engineer, and the water court at some time in the past had considered water in the Arapahoe formation to be nontributary, as the Well Company contends, this would not prevent the legislature from reclassifying the water based on additional information or imposing different or additional management criteria prior to the vesting of a use right in the water. The water court applied Senate Bill 96-74 to this case as the General Assembly intended, and this legislation is not unconstitutional as applied.