Opinion ID: 2831586
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: The appellant, Murphy & Landon, P.A. (the “Firm”), disputes the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (the “Board”) finding that Chelsey Pernic, a paralegal at the Firm, had not been fired for just cause and was thus entitled to unemployment benefits. A Claims Deputy for the Department of Labor initially ruled for Pernic, and the Appeals Referee for the Department of Labor affirmed after preventing the Firm from submitting evidence about the full scope of Pernic‟s alleged misconduct. The Board then affirmed the Appeals Referee‟s decision, which the Superior Court affirmed once more in an effort to abide by the deferential standard of review that is required when reviewing decisions by the Board. The Firm now appeals to this Court, arguing that the Board‟s conclusions—that Pernic was discharged for a single violation of the Firm‟s financial policy and that she was not given an adequate warning—were not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Relatedly, the Firm contends that this error resulted in large measure because the Firm was unfairly restricted from presenting evidence of the broader scope of Pernic‟s poor job performance, including her lateness, disrespectful and uncooperative attitude, and shirking, in its hearing before the Appeals Referee. It argues that the Board did not remedy this error because, although the Firm was allowed to present evidence of Pernic‟s cumulative misconduct in the Board hearing, the Board nonetheless concluded, without explanation, that Pernic was fired for a single incident of misconduct, a conclusion that was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. 1 Although our standard of review of a decision by the Board is deferential, it is not altogether without teeth. In this case, the Board‟s conclusions were not rationally grounded in the record, and thus, we need not defer to them. For one, the Board erred by deferring to the Appeals Referee‟s conclusion that the cause of Pernic‟s termination was her decision to pay an invoice without permission when that conclusion was inconsistent with substantial, unrebutted evidence, including testimony that Pernic had been warned about her substandard performance in several areas, and her termination letter, which stated that Penic was terminated for six different types of misconduct. Unlike the Appeals Referee, the Board at least heard the evidence that Pernic was fired for cumulative misconduct, but it then failed to explain why it gave that evidence no weight at all, despite Pernic‟s failure to contradict it. In other words, although the Board tried to cure the Appeals Referee‟s improper limitation of the record, it then failed to give any rational consideration to the evidence before it and deferred to the original decision made on what it knew to be an improperly limited record. The Board‟s decision that Pernic did not receive a clear warning that she could be terminated for another instance of misconduct is also unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. The uncontradicted record evidence shows that Pernic received a warning that her insubordination and poor performance could lead to her termination, but she continued to act disrespectfully and was therefore terminated. The Firm should not be penalized because it did not anticipate the precise form that Pernic‟s last act of misconduct would take. Nor should it be penalized for allowing Pernic time to improve her deficient performance. To do so would create a perverse incentive for an employer to 2 discharge an employee at the first instance of poor performance in order to avoid the outcome that the Firm suffered here. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the judgment of the Superior Court affirming the Board‟s decision.