Opinion ID: 6499669
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Third-Party Retaliation

Text: We now address Lesiv’s third-party retaliation claim. On this issue, he asserts that Illinois Central retaliated against his brother Lyubomir by subjecting Lesiv to materially adverse actions, and that he can sue for that retaliation under Thompson, 562 U.S. 170. As an initial matter, the district court declined to address Lesiv’s third-party claim because Lesiv was “not a third party” and had an individual retaliation claim related to his own protected activity. Thus, in the court’s view, Lesiv could not advance a third-party claim here. The court did not cite any support for treating individual and third-party claims as mutually exclusive. Neither does Illinois Central in repeating this position on appeal. We ﬁnd no support for this position and decline to adopt it. We instead view the two claims as distinct but not mutually exclusive theories of retaliation. Cf. Fogleman v. Mercy Hospital, Inc., 283 F.3d 561 (3d Cir. 2002) (addressing diﬀerent theories of individual and third-party retaliation under Americans with Disabilities Act, among others, as distinct theories of retaliation); see also George v. Republic Airways Inc., No. 1:20-cv-01702-SEBDLP, 2021 WL 1022428, at –6 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 17, 2021) (considering plaintiﬀ’s individual and third-party claims under Title VII as diﬀerent theories of retaliation). There is no legal barrier to Lesiv bringing both individual and third-party retaliation claims. No. 21-2496 19 We next consider whether Lesiv falls within Title VII’s zone of interests to bring a third-party retaliation claim related to Lyubomir’s protected activities. In its brief, Illinois Central makes an additional threshold argument that Lesiv does not meet those standards because he has not shown that Illinois Central harmed a third party to retaliate against Lesiv. But that argument inverts the standard for these types of claims.
We draw our understanding of third-party retaliation claims from Thompson, 562 U.S. 170. In that case, plaintiﬀ Thompson and his ﬁancée both worked at the defendant company. His ﬁancée ﬁled a charge of sex discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Three weeks later, the company ﬁred not her but Thompson. He then sued the company, alleging that it ﬁred him to retaliate against his ﬁancée. To determine whether Thompson could bring a thirdparty retaliation claim despite not having engaged in protected activity himself, the Court ﬁrst asked whether the ﬁancée could have sued for that retaliation. That question required determining whether the employer’s ﬁring of Thompson constituted unlawful retaliation. The Court concluded with little diﬃculty that if Thompson’s version of the facts was true, then the ﬁring violated Title VII. The Court thought it was “obvious” that, under the Burlington Northern standard, “a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from engaging in protected activity if she knew that her [ﬁancé] would be ﬁred.” 562 U.S. at 174. Thus, the ﬁancée could have sued for the company’s action against Thompson as an unlawful act of retaliation against her. 20 No. 21-2496 The Court then turned to the “more diﬃcult question” whether Thompson himself could also sue for that retaliation even though, again, he did not engage in any protected activity. 562 U.S. at 175. The Court said yes. Thompson qualiﬁed as a “person aggrieved” under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). He fell within the Act’s “zone of interests,” so he had a claim for retaliation. 562 U.S. at 175–78. As the Court explained, “the purpose of Title VII is to protect employees from their employers’ unlawful actions,” and the statute enables “suit by any plaintiﬀ with an interest ‘arguably [sought] to be protected by the statute.’” Id. at 178 (alteration in original), quoting National Credit Union Admin. v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 495 (1998). Thompson was an employee, thereby falling under Title VII’s general scope. Equally important, Thompson was “not an accidental victim of the retaliation;” rather, “injuring him was the employer’s intended means of harming [his ﬁancée].” Id. Accordingly, the Court held that Thompson fell within the Act’s zone of interests and was therefore “a person aggrieved with standing to sue” under the statute. Id.
The next question is whether Lesiv falls within Title VII’s zone of interests. Lesiv does if Lyubomir, Lesiv’s brother, could have sued for the alleged retaliation here. If so, we ask whether Lesiv could also sue because harming Lesiv, an employee, was the employer’s intended means of retaliating against Lyubomir. Since we conclude that Lesiv has no evidence to support this second element, we decline to address whether Lyubomir could have brought a retaliation suit himself. No. 21-2496 21
On this record, a reasonable jury could not conclude that Illinois Central acted to retaliate against Lyubomir by harming Lesiv. 8 Like other circuits, we read this inquiry as a causation requirement. See, e.g., Threat v. City of Cleveland, 6 F.4th 672, 680–81 (6th Cir. 2021); Tolar v. Bradley Arant Boult Commings, LLP, 997 F.3d 1280, 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2021). We thus draw on our case law regarding causation for individual claims under Title VII. Here, Lesiv must oﬀer evidence that his brother’s charge or lawsuit was “a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” Carlson v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 828 n.1 (7th Cir. 2014), quoting Nassar, 570 U.S. at 362. “The requirement of but-for causation in retaliation claims 8 This issue, like many related to “statutory standing,” is a merits question. See, e.g., Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 140 (2014) (explaining that to fall under Lanham Act’s zone of interests, “a plaintiff must plead (and ultimately prove) an injury to a commercial interest in sales or business reputation proximately caused by the defendant’s misrepresentations”); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 97 & n.2 (1998) (in zone-of-interests tests, “the merits inquiry and the statutory standing inquiry often ‘overlap,’” and in some cases, “it would be exceedingly artificial to draw a distinction between the two” (internal citation omitted)). If a reasonable jury could conclude that Illinois Central took action against Lesiv to harm his brother, Lesiv would fall within Title VII’s zone of interests and would therefore have a valid claim for that retaliation. Since a reasonable jury could not come to that conclusion, Lesiv’s claim fails on the merits, not for lack of jurisdiction. See Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 128 n.4 (clarifying that “statutory standing” is “misleading, since the absence of a valid (as opposed to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 22 No. 21-2496 does not mean that the protected activity must have been the only cause of the adverse action. Rather, it means that the adverse action would not have happened without the activity.” Id. This showing can be made with circumstantial evidence. See Abrego v. Wilkie, 907 F.3d 1004, 1015 (7th Cir. 2018). Regardless of the types of evidence Lesiv puts forward, we follow the Ortiz directive to analyze all the evidence and ask whether the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to ﬁnd that Lyubomir’s charge or lawsuit caused Lesiv to suﬀer the adverse employment actions. See 834 F.3d at 765. 9 As discussed above, Lesiv oﬀered evidence of two materially adverse actions: the dangerous work assignment and the suspension. To meet his burden on causation and survive summary judgment, he must oﬀer evidence of a retaliatory motive on the part of Grayer, who imposed the work assignment, and/or Duggan, who imposed the suspension. Lesiv relies on two pieces of circumstantial evidence to support those inferences of causation: the diﬀerent treatment he received compared to a similarly situated employee and the timing of the incidents. We address each in turn, beginning with Duggan and the suspension. 9Unlike the evidence on Lesiv’s individual retaliation claim based on his own protected activity, there is evidence that some of the relevant supervisors knew of the brother’s protected activity. Duggan, for instance, was named as a witness in the brother’s lawsuit and was in the process of scheduling his deposition around the time of Lesiv’s dangerous assignment and suspension. Lesiv also argues that Grayer was aware of the lawsuit because his name was in his brother’s complaint and he was a potential witness. As we explain in the text, however, Lesiv’s evidence cannot meet the causation standard even if everyone involved was aware of his brother’s protected activity. No. 21-2496 23
Turning to the comparator ﬁrst, recall that another employee, Barwan, refused to work the “A yard” the day before Lesiv refused to work the RIP track. (Both of those assignments entail heavy repairs on railcars.) Barwan, however, was not suspended for his insubordination. Lesiv contends this disparity in treatment supports a reasonable inference of a retaliatory motive on the part of Duggan. We disagree. Evidence that a “similarly situated employee[]” whose close contact did not engage in protected conduct was “treated diﬀerently may furnish circumstantial evidence of retaliation or other unlawful motive.” Donley v. Stryker Sales Corp., 906 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir. 2018). Whether a comparator is similarly situated is often a question for the jury. Johnson v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 895 (7th Cir. 2018). We ask whether the two employees are situated similarly enough for a reasonable comparison. Id., citing Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846–47 (7th Cir. 2012). In a case challenging disciplinary action, the plaintiﬀ and comparator ordinarily must have “dealt with the same supervisor, [been] subject to the same standards, and ha[ve] engaged in similar conduct without such diﬀerentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them.” Donley, 906 F.3d at 639 (alterations in original). The congruence need not be perfect. Id. Some similarities between Lesiv and Barwan are easy to see. The two engaged in similar conduct: Both refused a work assignment and both dealt with the same supervisor: Duggan. And the supervisor, as the decision-maker, treated the two diﬀerently: Duggan suspended Lesiv but not Barwan. Lesiv thus asserts that the divergent treatment between the two 24 No. 21-2496 would support a reasonable inference of a retaliatory motive on the part of Duggan. 10 To justify the diﬀerent treatment of Lesiv and Barwan, Illinois Central argues ﬁrst that the two engaged in diﬀerent conduct. One of its arguments is persuasive while the other is not. To start, Illinois Central eﬀectively contends that “this was Barwan being Barwan,” whereas Lesiv’s reaction was out of the ordinary for him and hostile, so that the relief supervisor and presumably Duggan correctly viewed their behaviors diﬀerently. That argument might be oﬀered at trial, but “it is not a winner on summary judgment.” Coleman, 667 F.3d at 851. Courts are not in the business of distinguishing comparators in discipline cases by deciding on summary judgment whether one person was joking around and the other was not. “[A]t the summary judgment stage, the employer cannot defeat a plaintiﬀ’s prima facie case of discrimination on the theory that it applied its ‘no tolerance’ policy on threats to some workers while dismissing dangerous acts of others as mere ‘horseplay.’” Id. We reiterate: “Such fact issues are the province of the jury.” Id. 10At oral argument, Illinois Central disputed whether Lesiv and Barwan had the same decision-maker. It argued that the relief supervisor interacted with Barwan in the moment, whereas Duggan communicated with Lesiv, so the two were subject to different supervisors. The distinction is not persuasive, at least as a matter of law on summary judgment. Both employees told the relief supervisor they were refusing to work their assignments. Duggan was made aware of Lesiv’s refusal immediately and learned of Barwan’s later. Duggan decided to suspend Lesiv but not Barwan. The different treatment occurred when Duggan learned of Barwan’s actions and did not impose a similar penalty. For purposes of summary judgment, we treat Lesiv and Barwan as subject to the same decisionmaker. No. 21-2496 25 Illinois Central’s second argument is a winner, however, and defeats the comparator here. It is true that Barwan and Lesiv both refused a work assignment, but Lesiv’s actions went further. The stated reasons for Lesiv’s suspension were because of his attitude toward the relief supervisor in refusing the RIP track assignment and his tone with Duggan during their phone conversation. Barwan was not insubordinate toward Duggan. Even viewing the facts most reasonably favorable to Lesiv, the altercation is a diﬀerentiating circumstance that distinguishes Barwan and Lesiv and Duggan’s treatment of them. Donley, 906 F.3d at 639. Thus, Lesiv’s comparator evidence could not support a ﬁnding that Duggan acted with a retaliatory motive. If we had any doubts on that score, they are assuaged by the other undisputed evidence in the record, which weighs decisively against Lesiv here. Take, for instance, the timing of the suspension. Duggan suspended Lesiv two and a half years after Lyubomir ﬁled a charge of discrimination and retaliation and nearly a year after Lyubomir ﬁled his lawsuit in state court. While suspicious timing can support an inference of a retaliatory motive, such a long gap between the protected activity and adverse action “can weaken and eventually break an inference of causation.” Baines v. Walgreen Co., 863 F.3d 656, 665 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Lalvani v. Cook County, 269 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 2001) (“As the time separating the protected conduct and the adverse employment action grows, the causal inference weakens and eventually time becomes the plaintiﬀ’s enemy.”). A two-and-a-half-year gap and near oneyear gap between the respective protected activities and materially adverse actions strongly suggest that the timing was not suspicious and cast serious doubts on whether a jury could ﬁnd a retaliatory motive here. See id. (one-and-a-half26 No. 21-2496 year gap was “well beyond the time that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that [the materially adverse action] was causally related to [the protected activity]”). Lesiv points out correctly that a plaintiﬀ can sometimes establish causation despite a substantial delay between the protected activity and the adverse action. See Baines, 863 F.3d at 665 (“[A] long gap will [not] undermine a causal connection that is otherwise supported by suﬃcient circumstantial evidence.”). In such cases, we typically see evidence of prolonged antagonism against the plaintiﬀ, evidence that, despite a long gap, the alleged retaliation was the ﬁrst opportunity for retaliation, or something similar. See Carlson, 758 F.3d at 829 (reversing dismissal; despite long gap between adverse actions and protected activity, evidence of constant antagonism supported inference of retaliatory motive); Malin v. Hospira, Inc., 762 F.3d 552, 559–60 (7th Cir. 2014) (reversing summary judgment; long gap was not fatal to retaliation claim when evidence indicated defendant “had a long memory,” repeatedly retaliated against plaintiﬀ by denying her promotions, and then eﬀectively demoted her when ﬁrst given the opportunity). Lesiv has not produced comparable evidence to support a jury verdict here. 11 11 Lesiv points to affidavits from co-workers saying that management monitored him more closely and targeted him after the brother filed his lawsuit. Plaintiffs are, of course, entitled to submit affidavits that contain information based on witnesses’ personal knowledge and experiences. See Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 967–68 (7th Cir. 2013). These affidavits, however, are conclusory and do not offer evidence to support their conclusions, and some are not related to Lesiv’s or his brother’s protected activities: “I believe Illinois Central placed a target upon the entire Lesiv family due to the disciplinary issues related to Lyubomir,” and “I believe Illinois Central placed a ‘bullseye’ on [Lesiv’s] … back as retaliation for No. 21-2496 27 Nonetheless, Lesiv asserts that the timing is suspicious and supports an inference of retaliation because Lyubomir’s state lawsuit was still pending. In addition, Duggan had been contacted about scheduling a deposition in that lawsuit roughly two weeks before the adverse action against Lesiv. Lesiv contends that Lyubomir’s lawsuit might have been on Duggan’s mind when he suspended Lesiv, supporting an inference of retaliatory motive. In the absence of other evidence supporting the inference, this is too speculative. See, e.g., Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 960 (aﬃrming summary judgment on retaliation claim and rejecting arguments based on layers of “impermissible speculation”). Even viewing the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to Lesiv, the adverse actions here came immediately after heated confrontations between Lesiv and his supervisors, providing a ready explanation that had nothing to do with his brother’s lawsuit. At bottom, there simply is no evidence that Duggan was responding to his brother’s protected activity by suspending Lesiv. The record does not contain suﬃcient evidence to permit a reasonable fact ﬁnder to conclude that a retaliatory motive caused the materially adverse action here, even on summary judgment. Lesiv’s refusal to work the RIP track alone.” They do not include factual details of Duggan’s motivations or actions toward Lesiv leading up to the suspension to support those beliefs and that would lend support to an inference of retaliation. These affidavits thus do not present a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Accord, Visser v. Packer Engineering Associates, Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (“Discrimination law would be unmanageable if disgruntled employees—the friends of the plaintiff and often people in the same legal position as the plaintiff—could defeat summary judgment by affidavits speculating about the defendant’s motives.”). 28 No. 21-2496
Finally, we turn to Grayer and the solo RIP track assignment. Lesiv’s evidence would not support a reasonable inference that a desire to retaliate against Lyubomir drove Grayer to assign Lesiv to work the RIP track alone. All a jury would have to support a ﬁnding of causation is the two-and-a-halfyear gap between Lyubomir’s charge of discrimination and Lesiv’s solo RIP track assignment, and the nearly one-year gap between the lawsuit and the assignment. That evidence is not enough to pose a genuine dispute of fact and defeat summary judgment on causation. Accord, Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 959 (without more, evidence of two-month gap between protected activities and adverse action did not defeat summary judgment on retaliation claim). To sum up, Lesiv has not met his burden on causation to support the reasonable inference that he faced materially adverse actions because of his or his brother’s activities protected by Title VII. Illinois Central was entitled to summary judgment on both claims. AFFIRMED.