Opinion ID: 1801741
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: LeFrere's Testimony

Text: Pamela LeFrere was one of defendant's friends. On February 24, 1996, which was almost a week after Toronczak's disappearance, LeFrere, defendant, defendant's young son Nicholas, and others were in the storage area directly underneath defendant's apartment. Upon seeing some empty pits about five feet long and two feet deep in the dirt floor, LeFrere said to defendant, Who are you going to kill next? Defendant did not say anything, but LeFrere noticed he got real bug-eyed and got real nervous and started pacing. [13] On March 11, 1996, the police found bloodstained cutting tools and Toronczak's partial remains in the storage area. At trial, defendant raised a hearsay objection to the evidence of his conduct in response to LeFrere's question. The trial court overruled the objection, finding the evidence admissible as an adoptive admission. (Evid. Code, ง 1221.) Defendant contends this ruling constituted reversible error. We conclude the evidence did not implicate verbal expression subject to the hearsay rule. (7) `Hearsay evidence' is evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated. (Evid. Code, ง 1200, subd. (a).) Nonverbal conduct constitutes a statement that was made for purposes of the hearsay rule only if it was intended by [the person] as a substitute for oral or written verbal expression. (Evid. Code, ง 225, subd. (b).) Here, nothing suggests that defendant intended his physical reaction to LeFrere's question to be a substitute for oral or written verbal expression. (Evid. Code, ง 225, subd. (b).) Rather, LeFrere's testimony that defendant got real bug-eyed and got real nervous and started pacing merely described nonverbal, nonassertive, emotional behavior. (See People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 129 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 131 P.3d 400] [defendant's emotional displays were nonassertive conduct, and thus not within the hearsay rule]; People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216, 227 [242 Cal.Rptr. 477, 746 P.2d 452] [defendant's silence upon learning of the victim's death was not a statement under the hearsay rule and was admissible to show his prior knowledge of the killing].) The evidence was not subject to the hearsay rule. (8) Even if nonhearsay, [n]o evidence is admissible except relevant evidence. (Evid. Code, ง 350.) That standard was met here. Defendant's conductโconsisting of acute upset to what appeared to be a flippant remarkโgave rise to a reasonable inference that defendant knew killings had occurred, possibly even in the storage area, and therefore was relevant as consciousness of guilt. (See Evid. Code, งง 210, 350; e.g., People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 129-130, 153-154 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988] [evidence of defendant's defiant reaction when ordered to provide hair and blood samples for testing was admissible to show consciousness of guilt].) Although relevant evidence may nonetheless be excluded when it creates a substantial danger of undue prejudice, confusion, or misleading the jury (Evid. Code, ง 352), the evidence here posed no such risk. LeFrere's testimony describing defendant's nonverbal conduct did not implicate the hearsay rule and was relevant to the issue of guilt without being inflammatory or misleading. It was therefore properly admitted. [14] Having concluded that admission of the evidence was not error, we reject defendant's further contentions that the court's ruling violated his state and federal rights to due process of law, a fair trial, confrontation of witnesses, and reliable guilt, special circumstance, and penalty determinations, and that it rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.