Opinion ID: 2654647
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Burglarious Tools

Text: The government points us last to Fish's prior conviction under the Massachusetts statute prohibiting the making, possession, and use of burglarious instruments. That statute reads as follows: Whoever makes or mends, or begins to make or mend, or knowingly has in his possession, an engine, machine, tool or implement adapted and designed for cutting through, forcing or breaking open a building, room, vault, safe or other depository, in order to steal therefrom money or other property, or to commit any other crime, knowing the same to be adapted and designed for the purpose aforesaid, with intent to use or employ or allow the same to be used or employed for such purpose, or whoever knowingly has in his possession a master key designed to fit more than one motor vehicle, with intent to use or employ the same to steal a motor vehicle or other property therefrom, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than ten years or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars and imprisonment in jail for not more than two and one half years. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 49. Fish argues that because the government never raised the burglarious instruments conviction until this appeal, we should not consider the offense. While we -35- note the peculiarity of placing an appellate court in the position of finding facts to satisfy an element of an offense, we need not address Fish's contention: We ultimately conclude, as perhaps the government did when it determined not to argue the issue in the district court, that the burglarious tools statute is overbroad, as well. The problem for the government is that Massachusetts courts have made clear that a “tool or implement . . . designed for . . . breaking open a building, room, vault, safe or other depository” as described in the first clause of section 49 can be a master key, so long as the master key is not one for an automobile. Commonwealth v. Tilley, 306 Mass. 412, 417 (1940) (“Keys expressly made to fit a particular lock for the purpose of wrongfully gaining access to a depository in which goods were kept, in order to steal them, are tools and implements of the kind and character described in the statute.”).11 Given the possibility that a defendant might be convicted of making or possessing a master key without any attempt to use it--a crime that strikes us as posing a relatively low risk of the ultimate use of physical force against persons or property–-we cannot conclude that the burglarious tools 11 Though the offense of possession of an automobile master key may no longer be charged under the first clause, see Commonwealth v. Collardo, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1013, 1013-14 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982), the government provides us no reason to conclude that the possession of a non-automobile master or duplicate key could not be charged under the first clause. -36- offense, even as limited under the modified approach, categorically constitutes a crime of violence.