Opinion ID: 2227435
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Instructions and Comments to the Jury

Text: Defendant raises several issues which relate to instructions and comments the court made to the jury. Defendant claims that reversal is required because (1) the trial court stated before the jury during the death penalty hearing that the jury does not impose the sentence; (2) the trial court refused to modify sentencing verdict forms and to instruct the jury at the eligibility phase of the death penalty hearing that the only alternative to death was life in prison without parole; (3) the court refused to instruct the sentencing jury that drug use and lack of a significant criminal history were mitigating, and that the jury could recommend mercy whether or not it found mitigation; and (4) defendant was erroneously found eligible for the death penalty based upon murder in the course of residential burglary. Citing Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985), 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231, defendant argues that an isolated statement of the trial court, indicating that the jury would not impose the sentence, misled the jury to believe that it did not have the final responsibility for the penalty. Defendant's argument is meritless. In Caldwell, the prosecution told the sentencing jury that its decision would be subject to automatic review, implying that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the death sentence rested elsewhere. ( Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 325-26, 105 S.Ct. at 2637-38, 86 L.Ed.2d at 237.) In this case, the jurors were repeatedly told the life-and-death decision was theirs. The prosecutor and defense counsel, in their opening statements, made this clear to the jurors: What you will decide at the end of this aggravation and mitigation proceeding is whether there is aany mitigating factor sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence.       You, as jurors, have the power to determine whether or not Lawrence Jackson lives or dies.       And remember, the decision that you make at the close of this hearing, you must make and live with that decision for the rest of your lives. This theme was revisited during closing arguments: You must decide    there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence.       Only this jury, only you twelve people can decide whether he lives or dies. The People of the State of Illinois through Richard Daley, Paula Daleo, Joe McNerney, Joe Barbaro, they cannot decide. Only you can decide. Judge Joseph Urso can't decide. Only you can decide.       If you sign the death penalty verdict today that verdict is for keeps. The jury was also apprised by defense counsel of the procedure whereby the jury returns a verdict for death and the judge imposes the sentence: If you unanimously decide there are [no mitigating factors] then you will be instructed the Court shall sentence the defendant to death.       If you sign a verdict for the death penalty you set a chain of events in motion. Judge Urso signs an order that Lawrence Jackson shall be put to death. The jury was instructed by the court: At this hearing you will determine whether the defendant will be sentenced to death.       You are to apply the law to the facts and in this way decide whether the defendant will be sentenced to death. We believe the jurors were aware of their responsibility and knew that they alone would decide whether defendant lived or died. Moreover, we find adequate steps were taken to inform the jury that natural life without parole was the only alternative disposition. At the sentencing phase of the death penalty hearing, the trial court instructed the jury: Under the law the defendant shall be sentenced to death if you unanimously find that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence. If you are unable to unanimously find that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence, the defendant will be sentenced to natural life imprisonment. And no person serving a term of natural life imprisonment can be paroled or released except through executive clemency. The instruction given was essentially IPI Criminal 2d No. 7C.05 (Supp.1989). The instruction embodies the views expressed by this court in People v. Gacho (1988), 122 Ill.2d 221, 119 Ill.Dec. 287, 522 N.E.2d 1146. This instruction alone, given at the sentencing phase of a death penalty hearing, is sufficient, under the circumstances of this case, to inform the jury that life in prison without parole is the only alternative to death. We reject defendant's contentions that this instruction should have been given at the eligibility phase and that the sentencing verdict forms should have been modified. Defendant cites no authority which would mandate these measures, nor are we aware of any. With respect to defendant's former contention, we note that the ultimate sentence to be imposed would be irrelevant at the first stage of a death penalty hearing where the jury determines only whether defendant is eligible for the death sentence, not whether it is actually to be imposed. We find no error here. We reject, too, defendant's contention that the court erred when it refused to instruct the sentencing jury that lack of significant criminal history and drug use were mitigating, and that the jury could recommend mercy whether or not it found mitigation. First, it appears to us that defendant had a significant criminal history; therefore, an instruction such as he suggests would not have been proper. Defendant was 23 years old when he committed these murders. Defendant, a chronic drug user, said he began selling heroin and cocaine at age 15. He was convicted of robbery in 1981 and was sentenced to three years in the Department of Corrections. Defendant's second felony conviction, for failure to return from furlough, followed 14 months later. Defendant's sister testified that defendant sometimes broke into residences to get money to buy drugs. She admitted she knew defendant had burgled Vincent Rowe's residence. Under the circumstances, instructing the jury regarding lack of significant criminal history would have been inappropriate. As for defendant's remaining contentions regarding instructions concerning drug use and recommendations of mercy, we note, as defendant has, that this court has previously held nonstatutory mitigating factors need not be specified in an instruction when the jury is instructed that it may consider any relevant mitigation ( People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill.2d 378, 420, 69 Ill.Dec. 1, 447 N.E.2d 218), and a mercy instruction need not be given for the same reason ( People v. Sanchez (1986), 115 Ill.2d 238, 269-70, 104 Ill.Dec. 720, 503 N.E.2d 277). We decline the defendant's invitation to reconsider these holdings.