Opinion ID: 1991834
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Kidnaping Charge

Text: In a related argument, appellant contends that his separate conviction and sentence for kidnaping [6] must be vacated, because under the facts of this case the seizure and transport of the victim from the point of abduction to the Chillum Place parking lot was merely incidental to the commission of the two assaults and, therefore, the kidnaping charge merged with the assault charges. [7] This contention is without merit. Numerous decisions by this court, beginning with Sinclair v. United States, 388 A.2d 1201 (D.C.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1118, 99 S.Ct. 1026, 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979), and Robinson v. United States, 388 A.2d 1210 (D.C.1978), have addressed the question of when the movement and detention of a victim is merely incidental to the commission of another crime. Where the detention or confinement of the victim is deemed an integral element of the crime itself it may be viewed as merging with the principal offense in contradistinction to constituting a separate crime. Sinclair v. United States, supra, 388 A.2d at 1204. In Robinson, a case which also involved a sexual assault, we stated that [i]n making this determination, we inquire whether the asportation (or seizure) in a given case was of the type incidental to every rape or whether the confinement and restraint were significant enough of themselves to warrant an independent prosecution for kidnaping. 388 A.2d at 1211. A separate conviction for kidnaping can be sustained when the movement places the victim in greater danger or makes it more likely that the perpetrator will proceed in the underlying crime and will not be apprehended. Beck v. United States, 402 A.2d 418, 422-23 (D.C.1979). In the instant case, appellant forced the victim into his car, drove her nearly three miles, for more than fifteen minutes, from Hyattsville, Maryland, into an abandoned lot in the District, and then sexually attacked her. The attack took place at 5:30 a.m., in the middle of winter when it was still dark outside so that the victim could not read the street signs and did not know where appellant was taking her. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that appellant's seizure and movement of the victim were merely incidental to the assault offenses. Evidence that appellant grabbed the victim and forced her into his car and then drove her three miles from the point of abduction to the empty lot was sufficient in and of itself to support the kidnaping charge; appellant completed the act of kidnaping before his attempted sexual assaults. Moreover, the transportation of the victim in the dark to unfamiliar and deserted surroundings, substantially increased the likelihood of bodily harm beyond that inherent in assaults of this nature. It is also clear that by taking his victim to a strange and deserted location, appellant facilitated his ability to commit his attack. In sum, the evidence presented is sufficient to support a separate conviction for kidnaping. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 473 A.2d 828, 834 n. 7 (D.C.1984) (evidence that appellant took victim 200 years from spot where the first accosted her, then raped her, supported kidnaping charge); Beck v. United States, supra, 402 A.2d at 423 (evidence that appellant forced victim into house and upstairs to bedroom where he repeatedly sexually assaulted her, supported kidnaping conviction); United States v. Wolford, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 2-3, 444 F.2d 876, 877-78 (1971) (evidence that during truck hijacking victim was driven 3.8 miles from point of abduction, went beyond momentary detention incident to any robbery, and supported kidnaping conviction). Compare Robinson v. United States, supra, 388 A.2d at 1211 (evidence that within a few moments appellant dragged victim approximately 63 paces, and then attempted to rape her, insufficient to support kidnaping charge)., In sum, none of appellant's contentions reach the level of reversible error. [8] Accordingly, his convictions on appeal are Affirmed.