Opinion ID: 221663
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lack of Instruction on Substance Involved

Text: While the verdict slip asked whether the substance involved in Washington and Frost's conspiracy was 500 grams of cocaine and/or whether the substance involved was 50 grams of crack, the court did not provide any explanation for the meaning of involved. 3 The instructions neglected to say that Washington was liable for the crack Frost distributed only to the extent that 1) Washington supplied Frost with the crack; or 2) Washington supplied Frost with the cocaine used to 3 Washington was entitled to findings by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to the quantity and types of drugs involved in the conspiracy. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. Under Apprendi, [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Indeed, the amount of drugs for which a defendant is sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) is such a fact. United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Buckland, 289 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2002). A person convicted in 2009 of a crime involving at least 50 grams of crack was subject to a statutory maximum sentence of life, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2009), and a person convicted of a crime involving at least 500 grams of cocaine was subject to a statutory maximum sentence of 40 years (unless the drugs resulted in a death, and then the statutory maximum sentence was life), id. § 841(b)(1)(B). -8- manufacture the crack and the manufacture of crack was either (a) within the scope of his conspiracy with Frost or (b) a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy he had joined. See United States v. Lococo, 514 F.3d 860, 865 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Banuelos, 322 F.3d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 2003). This omission, Washington claims, was plain error. The verdict slip's substance involved language comes from 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1), which prescribes mandatory minimum and maximum sentences for various drug-related crimes depending on the quantity of drugs involv[ed]. But, in the case of a conspiracy, as this Court said in Banuelos, the full extent of the drugs linked to a conspiracy may not automatically be attributed to the defendant. 322 F.3d at 704. A conspirator is liable for only the quantity of drugs that either (1) fell within the scope of the defendant's agreement with his coconspirators or (2) was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. Id. In Lococo, this Court made clear that the rule announced in Banuelos has special resonance when one conspirator provides his coconspirator with cocaine, but the second transforms it into crack. 514 F.3d at 864-66. This Court held it was error to sentence the defendant, who had pled guilty to conspiring to distribute cocaine while denying he knew that the conspiracy involved crack, based on the amount of crack involved in the conspiracy, without a jury having found that Lococo knew or reasonably could have foreseen that the conspiracy involved the -9- crack. Id. at 865 (Lococo didn't admit that he knew or could reasonably foresee that the conspiracy involved crack cocaine. Quite the contrary, he repeatedly denied it. So even if the district court had made the findings required by Banuelos, those findings would have violated Apprendi . . . by exposing Lococo to a higher statutory maximum based on facts he never admitted.). Under Lococo, Banuelos, and their progeny, the district court's failure to instruct about the meaning of substance involved was error. Indeed, because Lococo is directly controlling authority, the district court committed plain error. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (explaining that plain error is an error that is obvious). Finally, it was an error of constitutional proportion, relieving the government of its burden to prove all elements of the crime. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Since Washington failed to object to the instruction at trial, he bears the burden of persuasion with respect to demonstrating that the error affected his substantial rights. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. To satisfy this burden, Washington must show that the erroneous instruction affected the outcome of his trial. Id. He has failed to do so. The government offered both direct and circumstantial evidence that Washington knew Frost was converting Washington's cocaine into crack for sale to Nehring—Frost's testimony, the items found during the search of Washington's home, the longstanding Frost-Washington relationship. Washington cannot prove -10- with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that a properly instructed jury would have found that Washington was not liable for 50 grams of crack.4 See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946).