Opinion ID: 2762645
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: In seeking to set aside a verdict under the federal Constitution for lack of sufficient proof, Winfield needed to convince the Massachusetts courts that, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, [no] rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond -12- a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Magraw v. Roden, 743 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2014). This standard exhibits great respect for the jury's verdict, Magraw, 743 F.3d at 4, but nevertheless does not insulate such a verdict from reversal if based on evidentiary interpretations and illations that are unreasonable, insupportable, or overly speculative. Id. (quoting United States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1995)). With the Massachusetts courts having rejected Winfield's direct appeal by concluding that the jury verdict was based on sufficient evidence, this collateral attack seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court provides Winfield with a second, more limited opportunity to set aside the jury's verdict. As constrained by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)4, our collateral federal review is limited to determining whether the state courts' decision finding the evidence constitutionally sufficient was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[.] 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In other words, we do not ask, as we might on direct review of a conviction in federal court, whether the evidence was constitutionally sufficient. We ask, instead, whether the state 4 See Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218-1219, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254. -13- courts' ruling that the evidence is constitutionally sufficient was itself unreasonable. Id.5 Unreasonable in this context means that the decision evinces some increment of incorrectness beyond mere error. Leftwich v. Maloney, 532 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 2008); see generally Hurtado v. Tucker, 245 F.3d 7, 16 (1st Cir. 2001) (Habeas review involves the layering of two standards. The habeas question of whether the state court decision is objectively unreasonable is layered on top of the underlying standard governing the constitutional right asserted.). The resulting test raises a high bar, but it is nevertheless a bar that can be met. See O'Laughlin v. O'Brien, 568 F.3d 287, 304 (1st Cir. 2009) (acknowledging the extremely high bar that must be overcome on habeas review to overturn a state court decision, but finding the bar met). Demonstrating a refined understanding of the limited scope of our review--a scope reflective not only of statutory requirements, but of our respect for the jury's role and our deference to the state courts' consideration of Winfield's challenge--Winfield joins issue only on the narrow question of whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to permit a reasonable jurist to conclude that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that it was Winfield, rather than his 5 We answer this question de novo, without deference to the decision of the district court. Pena v. Dickhaut, 736 F.3d 600, 603 (1st Cir. 2013). -14- wife Patricia, who committed the crime. And even without Winfield's well-advised implicit concession, the assumption we must make that the jury believed the testimony of the mother and grandmother, together with the expert evidence, does indeed mean that we need presume that either Winfield, his wife or both must have committed the charged crime. We therefore train our review on Winfield's key argument that [w]hatever reason the prosecution had for blaming [the defendant] rather than his wife, assuming there was one, never made it into evidence before the jury. Notionally, Winfield is correct that evidence sufficient only to establish with nearly equal likelihood that A or B committed a crime cannot support a verdict against either. [I]f the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence of the crime charged, this court must reverse the conviction. O'Laughlin, 568 F.3d at 301 (quoting United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 323 (1st Cir. 1995)). The rationale for this rule is simple: A criminal trial ought not be an arbitrary exercise, and where an equal or nearly equal theory of guilt and a theory of innocence is supported by the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt. Id. (emphasis omitted). -15- There is some question whether this rule we have recognized applies as a law determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In other words, is it a simple rewording of the Jackson standard, or is it a circuit level added refinement? See Glebe v. Frost, 135 S.Ct. 429, 430 (2014); White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014). Jackson after all included the statement that a federal habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume--even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record--that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. Ultimately, we need not decide whether evidentiary equipoise precludes collateral reversal of a guilty verdict because, viewed reasonably as a rational jury may have viewed it, the evidence did not point with nearly equal force at both Winfield and his wife. Most notably, only Winfield was left alone in the apartment with the two-year-old victim and the infant on October 13, 2005. He therefore had a materially greater opportunity to commit the offense without detection. Winfield does offer a two-part rejoinder to the observation that he had a materially greater opportunity to commit the crime. He points first to his statement that he was asleep until 10:30 or 11:00 that morning. He points second to the possibility that the perpetrator muffled the victim's cries while -16- assaulting the child, thus perhaps explaining some of the bruises. The Massachusetts courts were unconvinced that the countervailing force of this rejoinder was sufficient to restore equilibrium in the directional thrust of the circumstantial evidence. Reason is not to the contrary. The home was a single floor unit with two bedrooms, a living room, a kitchen, and a single bathroom. Any opportunity to commit the crime without notice by Winfield, even if thought to be still sleeping, or by the four-year-old, could reasonably be viewed as markedly less than the opportunity to commit the crime undetected after both the other adult and the four-year-old left the apartment. And the fact that the doctor's estimated range of the time of injury commenced at noon, after he awoke, tilted the evidence in the same direction.6 In a different but also probative manner, the conflicting testimony by the mother and Winfield regarding whether the child was responsive on the phone created further cause to call into question Winfield's version of events that day. There is also the evidence that, after the state intervened, Winfield reported that he had noticed a bad diaper rash on the day in question, and that the victim fell out of bed. Yet there is no evidence that he reported such facts on the day in 6 The mother's phone call did, we note, interrupt by 20 minutes Winfield's 45-60 minute window alone with the victim. It still left a window of opportunity that was greater for him than for his wife. -17- question, even when the victim was crying and limp when the grandmother picked her up. We do observe that, if Winfield's statement to police-- that he was out for four hours and did not watch the victim on Wednesday, October 12--were believed, it would follow that he had no time alone with the victim on Wednesday, while his wife did, and new bruises were detected at the end of that day. It is not unreasonable to think, though, that a rational jury could have discounted Winfield's version of events. And even if not, a jury was not compelled to find that the source of the bruises (a fall perhaps?) was identical to the source of the vaginal and anal injuries. More generally, the logical choices here were not limited to either Winfield alone, or his wife alone. A third choice was both. So the contention that logic pointed unerringly to Winfield's guilt or innocence in equipoise is not correct. Winfield notes that his wife never testified, and therefore never denied the crime, while the jury heard Winfield's recorded statement in which he denied the crime. The absence of the wife's appearance as a witness is puzzling. Apparently both sides concluded that there was more to lose in calling her. In any event, given the foregoing evidence pointing more towards Winfield, we cannot say that the absence of testimony by the wife rendered the evidence so clearly insufficient that a finding of guilt would represent an increment of incorrectness beyond mere error. -18- Leftwich, 532 F.3d at 23. The prosecution may prove its case by circumstantial evidence, and it need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence so long as the total evidence permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Brown, 603 F.2d 1022, 1025 (1st Cir. 1979)(citations omitted); see also Stewart v. Coalter, 48 F.3d 610, 615-16 (1st Cir. 1995) (Guilt beyond a reasonable doubt cannot be premised on pure conjecture. But a conjecture consistent with the evidence becomes less and less a conjecture, and moves gradually toward proof, as alternative innocent explanations are discarded or made less likely.). We need not consider whether the additional evidence on which the state courts relied--for example, Winfield's access to a curling iron (which would seem to have been equally available to his wife), or his rather innocuous statement that he did not want to have the victim at his home--were sufficiently illuminating to lend further legitimacy to the verdict. [D]etermining whether a state court's decision resulted from an unreasonable legal or factual conclusion does not require . . . an opinion from the state court explaining [its] reasoning. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011). Nor need we ignore the difficulty of assuming that rational reasoning played any role in the decision to commit the crime (or in much of the behavior leading up to October 13). Certainly a rational jury could have acquitted Winfield. The -19- question at this stage of review, though, is whether the state courts could reasonably conclude that, where Winfield's opportunity to commit the offense was materially, albeit marginally, greater than that of the only other possible perpetrator7, and where the expert evidence and the phone call cast heightened relevant focus on the time when he was alone with the child, a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the perpetrator. For the foregoing reasons, we must answer yes.