Opinion ID: 161898
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did Fields voluntarily enter his guilty plea?

Text: 29 Fields raised this issue to the OCCA, alleging that he was misinformed of his chances of receiving the death penalty if he accepted the blind plea and that Burton assumed that the trial judge had assured her that he would not sentence Fields to death. See Fields I, 923 P.2d at 632. The OCCA found the facts were to the contrary. We find nothing in the record to indicate [Fields] and defense counsel were not fully aware that the death penalty was a possibility upon entering a plea. . . . The record reveals no promises of leniency, threats or coercion as the catalyst for [Fields's] entry of a blind plea . . . . Id. Likewise, there is nothing in the record supporting defense counsels' claims that they thought they 'had a wink and a nod' from the judge indicating [Fields] would not receive the death penalty if he entered a plea. Id. Thus, the OCCA concluded that [d]espite his protestations to the contrary, there is . . . nothing to indicate that [Fields] did not knowingly and voluntarily, albeit with some anxiety, enter the guilty plea. Fields I, 923 P.2d at 634. 30 Whether a plea is voluntary is a question of federal law, but this legal conclusion rests on factual findings and inferences from those findings. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35 (1992) (pre-AEDPA case). Fields has not demonstrated a violation of AEDPA because he has failed to show that the OCCA's conclusion that he entered his plea voluntarily was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court . . . or . . . was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts . . . . 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). 31 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a defendant knowingly and voluntarily enter a plea of guilty. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Miles, 61 F.3d at 1465. A plea can be involuntary even if the threats or promises do not come from a person within the criminal justice system. 5 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure 21.4(b), at 157 n.33 (2d ed. 1999). Acts that might constitute coercion if done by the court or a prosecutor may not rise to that level if done by others. Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 867 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing United States ex rel. Brown v. LaVallee, 424 F.2d 457, 461 (2d Cir. 1970) (explaining that statements that might have been coercive when made by a prosecutor or judge are not coercive when made by defendant's mother and his counsel)). 6 [C]oercion by the accused's counsel can render a plea involuntary. United States v. Estrada, 849 F.2d 1304, 1306 (10th Cir. 1988). 32 The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is 'whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.' Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970). A plea may be involuntary when an attorney materially misinforms the defendant of the consequences of the plea, United States v. Rhodes, 913 F.2d 839, 843 (10th Cir. 1990), e.g., by falsely alleging that promises or guarantees exist, see Braun v. Ward, 190 F.3d 1181, 1189 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding a guilty plea voluntary because the defendant was taking his chances by relying on his attorney's good-faith advice and there was no evidence of guarantees or promises). In addition, a plea may be involuntary if counsel informs the defendant that he has no choice, he must plead guilty. See United States v. Carr, 80 F.3d 413, 416 (10th Cir.1996) (stating that, to be valid, a plea must represent a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant) (emphasis added). Fields was neither materially misinformed nor told he had no choice. 33 The two potential sources of coercion in this case are his trial counsel and his family. As for trial counsel, although Burton and Wilson pulled out all the stops and strongly urged Fields to accept the blind guilty plea, they never told him they had a promise or guarantee that by pleading guilty he would not receive a death sentence. They couched their advice in terms of probabilities, e.g., Burton's line-diagram that, based on her assessment of Judge Gullet's statements and actions, he was far more likely to sentence Fields to less than death if he pled guilty. An erroneous sentence estimate by defense counsel does not render a plea involuntary. And a defendant's erroneous expectation, based on his attorney's erroneous estimate, likewise does not render a plea involuntary. Wellnitz v. Page, 420 F.2d 935, 936-37 (10th Cir. 1970) (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court explained, 34 Waiving trial entails the inherent risk that the good-faith evaluations of a reasonably competent attorney will turn out to be mistaken either as to the facts or as to what a court's judgment might be on given facts. 35 That a guilty plea must be intelligently made is not a requirement that all advice offered by the defendant's lawyer withstand retrospective examination in a post-conviction hearing. 36 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970). 37 In a prior case, this court found a guilty plea voluntary despite trial counsel's vigorous[] urg[ing] that his client plead guilty because the attorney believed it was in his client's best interest. See Miles, 61 F.3d at 1470. Indeed, one central component of a lawyer's job is to assimilate and synthesize information from numerous sources and then advise clients about what is perceived to be in their best interests. 'Advice even strong urging' by counsel does not invalidate a guilty plea. Williams v. Chrans, 945 F.2d 926, 933 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting Lunz v. Henderson, 533 F.2d 1322, 1327 (2d Cir. 1976)); accord Carr, 80 F.3d at 416. 38 Furthermore, the trial court advised Fields at the change-of-plea hearing that he could be sentenced to life, life without parole, or death. This colloquy between a judge and a defendant before accepting a guilty plea is not pro forma and without legal significance. Rather, it is an important safeguard that protects defendants from incompetent counsel or misunderstandings. At these colloquies, judges take the time to insure that defendants understand the consequences of a guilty plea. See Hardzog v. State, 293 P. 1107, 1108 (Okla. Crim. App. 1930) (stating that a guilty plea should not be accepted until after the defendant has been fully advised by the court of his rights and the consequences of his plea); cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c) (entitled Advice to Defendant and requiring that a court address the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, inter alia, the nature of the charge and the maximum possible penalty provided by law). Had Fields misunderstood or been misinformed about the possibility of receiving the death penalty, Judge Gullet's discussion would have alerted Fields to that fact. 39 The claim that Fields's family coerced him also fails. While Burton convinced Fields's family to implore him to plead guilty, Fields never alleges that his family members forced or threatened him. By comparison, in Miles, the defendant's family urged him to plead [guilty] so that they would not have to go to prison. Miles, 61 F.3d at 1469. Yet even there this court upheld the district court's determination that although Petitioner's family urged him to enter the plea, they did not force, threaten, or coerce him to do so. Id. 40 For the foregoing reasons, we determine that there was no violation of AEDPA. Fields has not demonstrated that the OCCA's conclusion that he entered his blind guilty plea voluntarily was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court . . . or . . . was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts . . . . 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). 7 41 II. Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in advising Fields to enter a blind guilty plea? 42 Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel involve mixed questions of law and fact for purposes of review under 2254. Gonzales v. McKune, 247 F.3d 1066, 1072 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402-03 (2000) (reviewing question of prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel claim under 2254(d)(1))), reh'g en banc granted on other grounds, No. 00-3003 (10th Cir. June 18, 2001). If a state court did not hear the petitioner's claims on the merits, however, we review the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact, if any, for clear error. Id. 43 The Supreme Court has set forth a two-part test for evaluating the claim of a habeas petitioner who is challenging his guilty plea on the ground that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Miller v. Champion, 161 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1998). First, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). To prove deficient performance, [Fields] must overcome the presumption that counsel's conduct was constitutionally effective. . . . For counsel's performance to be constitutionally ineffective, it must have been completely unreasonable, not merely wrong. Boyd v. Ward, 179 F.3d 904, 914 (10th Cir. 1999). 44 Second, in order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. When assessing prejudice, a court may consider the likelihood that the correction of an alleged error would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the [error] likely would have changed the outcome of a trial. Id. See Miller v. Champion, 262 F.3d 1066, 1073 (10th Cir. 2001). 45 We may address the performance and prejudice components in any order, but need not address both if [Fields] fails to make a sufficient showing of one. Boyd, 179 F.3d at 914. 46 Relevant to this appeal are three ways Fields alleges his trial attorneys' performance was constitutionally ineffective: (1) they coerced Fields into accepting the guilty plea, see Opening Brief at 21, 23; (2) they drew unwarranted conclusions from their conversations with Judge Gullet and the prosecutors, id. at 22-23; and (3) they failed to advise him that he was not guilty of either felony or malice murder, id. at 21, 23-27. 8 47 The OCCA addressed the first two of these claims and found nothing to support [Fields's] claim that counsel's performance was deficient. Fields I, 923 P.2d at 635. It reasoned, The fact that the desired result was not reached in this case does not render defense counsel ineffective. Id. Fields first raised the third claim on federal habeas review, and the federal district court rejected it on two, alternative grounds: (1) it was procedurally barred and no exceptions to the bar apply, and (2) the claim itself lacks merit. Memorandum Opinion at 50.
48 Fields admits that this argument is merely a re-statement of his argument from Issue One. See Opening Brief at 23 (Fields would not have pleaded guilty, except for trial counsel's utilization of certain unacceptable tactics herein above discussed in Proposition I, above.). Since we concluded above that Burton and Wilson did not coerce Fields but merely strongly urged him to do what they thought was in his best interest, we find this argument fails to demonstrate deficient performance. Accordingly, the OCCA's determination that there was nothing [in the record] to support [Fields's] claim that counsel's performance was deficient was not contrary to, or [did not] involve[] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). 49 2. Unwarranted Conclusions from Conversations with the Judge 50 Fields argues that [t]rial counsel's reliance upon these statements [by Judge Gullet and the district attorneys], as gospel, was deficient . . . . Lawyers, like Burton, are supposed to draw conclusions from all the evidence in a case and recommend what they think is in their clients' best interest. That is precisely what Burton did, even if her conclusions were, in hindsight, unwarranted. 51 A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. 52 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (quotations omitted). The Supreme Court has recognized that because representation is an art and not a science, even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way. Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1522 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc) (alterations, quotation marks, and citations omitted). Burton's performance was not completely unreasonable; therefore it was not deficient. See Boyd, 179 F.3d at 914 (For counsel's performance to be constitutionally ineffective, it must have been completely unreasonable, not merely wrong.). 53 The facts in this case are strikingly similar to those in Braun v. Ward, 190 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 1999). In that case, Braun alleged that his blind plea of nolo contendere was involuntary because it was induced by the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id. at 1188. Braun contended that his attorneys misled him into entering his plea when they related to him an alleged conversation with the trial judge indicating that the judge was surprised the prosecutors were seeking the death penalty . . . and when they advised him that he had a better shot in front of the judge than a jury of getting life without parole. Id. In addition, Braun complained about his attorneys' observation that the judge was a veteran and would not feel the pressure to give a death sentence. Id. at 1189. This court rejected his claim, writing, Braun's attorneys made no guarantees regarding his sentence. Based upon their experience and expertise, they properly advised him that he had a better shot in front of the judge. . . . Moreover, it is clear Braun knew when he was entering his plea that he was taking his chances. Id. at 1190. We find no deficient performance in counsel's recommendations that Fields enter into a blind guilty plea based, in part, upon counsel's interpretation of the district judge's sentiments as expressed in ex parte communications. 54 At oral argument, Fields's counsel argued that Burton's representation was deficient because, in advising Fields, she had relied solely on ex parte discussions with Judge Gullet. We reject this argument for two reasons. First, it is counter-factual. Implicit in Burton's recommendation to Fields that he had a better chance of not receiving the death penalty from a judge than a jury was an assessment by Burton of the merits of the case. Second, while it might have been improper for Burton to have ex parte conversations with Judge Gullet, once they occurred she was under no duty to disregard what she had learned. Again, a lawyer is supposed to take all information she learns and use it to advise her client of his best course of action. 55 Consequently, the OCCA's conclusion that Fields's counsels' performance was not deficient was not contrary to, or [did not] involve[] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). 3. Not Guilty of Murder 56 Fields argues that he was not guilty of burglary, so he could not have been guilty of felony murder. He reasons that he was not guilty of burglary because there was not forcible entry [into Schem's home], [Fields] was unarmed and he [believed Schem] was not at home at the time of the break-in of her home. Id. The federal district court concluded (1) that this claim is procedurally barred, and (2) that Fields's own testimony establishes that he is guilty of burglary. See Memorandum Opinion at 30-32, 45-50. We need not review the district court's conclusion that this claim is procedurally barred because we can easily find it fails on the merits. See United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 496 (10th Cir. 1994) (rejecting claim under 2255 on the merits, rather than on the alternative ground of procedural default). 57 Fields's contentions that he did not forcibly enter, that he was unarmed, and that he believed Schem was not home are not dispositive. The essential elements of First Degree Burglary are (1) breaking, (2) entering, (3) a dwelling, (4) of another, (5) in which a human is present, (6) with the intent to commit some crime therein. Calhoun v. State, 820 P.2d 819, 821 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991). The word 'breaking' has been defined as 'any act of physical force, however slight, by which obstructions to entering are removed.' Pack v. State, 819 P.2d 280, 283 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991). In Pack, the OCCA found that pushing a door that was already one to two feet open in order to gain entry qualified as breaking. See id.; see also Dean v. State, 381 P.2d 178, 182 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963) (opening a closed door in order to enter a building constitutes breaking). While here it was ambiguous whether Schem's front door was closed or slightly ajar, Fields's action of opening the screen door, pushing open (or opening) the front door, and crossing the threshold into Schem's home satisfies the first two elements of breaking and entering. 58 Finally, as the district court wrote, There is no requirement that the defendant know someone is at home to commit First Degree Burglary. Rather, someone must be home. Memorandum Opinion at 49 (emphasis in original). It is undisputed that Schem was, in fact, at home when Fields entered with the intent to steal her television. 59 Thus, we find this argument without merit. 60 III. Does using the same evidence to support different death penalty aggravators violate the federal Constitution? 61 It is unclear whether, in this claim, Fields argues that the federal Constitution was violated because (1) the three aggravators in this case were duplicative or (2) the same evidence was used to support more than one aggravator. Either way, this claim fails on the merits. 9 A. Duplicative Factors 62 The constitutional validity of aggravating factors is a question of law subject to de novo review. United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1107 (10th Cir. 1996). In McCullah, this court explained that the presence of duplicative aggravating factors results in weighing a factor twice, see id. at 1111-12, and [s]uch double counting . . . has a tendency to skew the weighing process and creates the risk that the death sentence will be imposed arbitrarily and thus, unconstitutionally. Id. at 1111. Accordingly, we held that the use of duplicative aggravating factors creates an unconstitutional skewing of the weighing process which necessitates a reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. at 1112. To determine whether aggravating factors are duplicative [t]he applicable test 'is not whether certain evidence is relevant to both aggravators, but rather, whether one aggravating circumstance necessarily subsumes the other[s].' Smith v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 454, 464 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Cooks v. Ward, 165 F.3d 1283, 1289 (10th Cir. 1998)). 63 The three aggravating factors in this case prior violent felony, murdered to avoid arrest, and continuing threat to society are not duplicative because none of them necessarily subsumes the others. Prior violent felony requires that the government prove the defendant has committed, in his past, some violent felony which is unrelated to the crime for which he is being convicted. Murdered to avoid arrest requires that the government prove the defendant murdered someone in order to avoid lawful arrest or prosecution for the crime for which he is being convicted. Continuing threat to society requires that the government prove, based upon his prior conduct, the defendant will likely be a continuing threat to society in the future. The three aggravators are distinguishable on the basis of the time-frame and conduct necessary to prove their existence. While some of the same evidence may be relevant to proving the existence of each, none of them necessarily subsumes any of the others. 64 The evidence in this case supports this observation. To prove prior violent felony the government elicited testimony about a purse-snatching Fields committed in 1986. To prove murdered to avoid arrest the government introduced evidence that Fields killed Schem in order to avoid being identified by her. To prove continuing threat to society the government relied on the same evidence for the prior two aggravators plus other evidence, e.g., that [Fields] was unemployed and an admitted crack addict who was prone to panic in stressful situations and that Fields left the scene of the murder, sold the victim's gun to an upstairs neighbor, and purchased additional drugs with that money before returning to his girlfriend's house, all within a short period of time. Fields I, 923 P.2d at 637. This evidence was used to demonstrate a likelihood that Fields would be dangerous in the future. None of the inquiries necessarily subsumed any of the others. 65 This court has explicitly found that prior violent felony and continuing threat to society are not duplicative: [T]he aggravating circumstance of future dangerousness and prior felony conviction are not duplicative. The former is supported by evidence of the petitioner's potentiality for future dangerous acts, the latter by evidence of petitioner's past acts. Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239, 1252 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Berget v. State, 824 P.2d 364 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991)). Berget explains the difference between prior violent felony and continuing threat to society: 66 [T]he two aggravating circumstances are clearly individual, calling for unique determinations on the part of the jury. In one instance, the sentencer is called upon to evaluate evidence, the judgments and sentences, which indicate the defendant's prior history of criminal activity. In the second instance, the court must look at evidence, including the circumstances of the defendant's prior crimes, in order to determine the likelihood of a defendant's future violent criminal activity. 67 Berget, 824 P.2d at 377. 68 We reject Fields's claim of error on this issue. 69