Opinion ID: 4113199
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Plea was unverified.

Text: Not only was Appellants’ Plea in Abatement untimely, but it was unverified. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 93(4) requires a plea in abatement to be verified in order to preserve a party’s objection to a defect of the parties. TEX. R. CIV. P. 93(4). “The failure to verify a pleading required to be verified under Rule 93 generally waives any complaint that the trial court ruled adversely to the plea.” S. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ochoa, 19 S.W.3d 452, 461 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.); see also Pledger v. Schoellkopf, 762 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. 1988) (party waived right to complain regarding lack of capacity by failing to file a verified denial under Rule 93(2)). Here, as discussed above, Appellants filed an original Plea in Abatement eight years after the cause was filed, followed by an Amended Plea in Abatement six months later.89 But neither motion was verified.90 Thus, Appellants failed to preserve the issue for appeal. TEX. R. CIV. P. 93(4); S. County Mut. Ins. Co., 19 S.W.3d at 461. 87 CR127 (First Amended Plea in Abatement, filed April 29, 2014), CR157 (Order, signed on October 9, 2014). 88 CR157 (Order, signed on October 9, 2014), 195 (stating that bench trial began on November 12, 2014). 89 CR85–89 (Plea in Abatement, unverified), 127–37 (First Amended Plea in Abatement, unverified). 90 Id. 37 D. Appellants did not and have not carried their burden to show that there were “indispensable” defendants. Even if Appellants had filed a timely, verified plea in abatement and provided an adequate appellate record for review, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding without the omitted defendants. In 1971, the Texas Supreme Court revised Rule 39 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to “lessen the numbers of categories of indispensable parties.” Cooper v. Tex. Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200, 203–04 (Tex. 1974); Hedley Feedlot, Inc. v. Weatherly Trust, 855 S.W.2d 826, 832 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1993, writ denied). Thus, parties who qualify for joinder under Rule 39(a) are not necessarily indispensable. See, e.g., Longoria v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 04-1500536-CV, 2016 WL 4013793, at  (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 27, 2016, pet. filed) (mem. op.). In fact, “[u]nder the provisions of our present Rule 39 it would be rare indeed if there were a person whose presence was so indispensable in the sense that his absence deprives the court of jurisdiction to adjudicate between the parties already joined.” Pirtle, 629 S.W.2d at 920 (quoting Cooper). The emphasis of Rule 39 is on pragmatism and practicality. McCarthy v. George, 618 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Tex. 1981); Cooper, 513 S.W.2d at 204. Thus, as the movants, Appellants had the burden to prove that the absent defendants were indispensable parties without whom the trial court could not proceed. See Flowers v. Steelcraft Corp., 406 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1966); In re Graybar Elec. Co., Inc., 38 No. 13-08-00073-CV, 2008 WL 3970865, at  (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 26, 2008, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“The movant has the burden of proof to establish the allegations in his motion to abate”). Specifically, Appellants were required to offer evidence on the four factors outlined in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39(b): “first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person’s absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for non-joinder.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 39(b). The trial court must then weigh these factors to determine if it could continue with the present parties “in equity and good conscience.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 39(b). “[T]he trial court has broad discretion under the rules of civil procedure in questions regarding the joinder of parties.” Hedley Feedlot, 855 S.W.2d at 833. Appellants, therefore, must not only conclusively demonstrate the Rule 39(b) factors on appeal, but must show that the trial court abused its discretion to such an extent that the judgment between the parties should be thrown away simply for failing to “settle the whole dispute.” Cooper, 513 S.W.2d at 203–04; see also Pirtle, 629 S.W.2d at 920 (“[P]arties who participate in the trial without complaint will not be heard to complain at the appellate stage when “there is reason not to 39 throw away a judgment just because it did not theoretically settle the whole controversy.”); Campbell v. Jefferson, 453 S.W.2d 336, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.— Tyler 1970, writ dism’d) (“Complete relief between the parties could be and was had in the cause of action.”). Appellants have not even attempted to carry this burden. It is undisputed that not all owners of mineral interests in Share 13 were joined in the suit.91 Moreover, it is undisputed that the absent defendants qualified as “persons to be joined if feasible” under Rule 39(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.92 However, by the time Appellants filed their Plea in Abatement in 2013, joinder of the absent defendants was barred by the statute of limitations and thus infeasible.93 Though Appellants feign ignorance regarding why the potential defendants were not joined, the infeasibility of joining such parties is noted throughout the record— including in the Garzas’ response to Appellants’ Plea in Abatement.94 Appellants further did not establish that the absent mineral interest holders were indispensable to the judgment. In fact, there is no evidence that Appellants ever addressed or offered evidence regarding the Rule 39(b) factors at all in 91 See, e.g., CR127–31, 147–55 (Plea in Abatement and response, both acknowledging that some owners of mineral interests are not party to the suit). 92 CR153. 93 CR153. 94 Appellants’ Brief at 37 (“For whatever reason, the Appellees just did not do it.”); CR153. 40 presenting the issue to the trial court.95 Neither Appellants’ Plea in Abatement nor their Brief on appeal cite or address the factors in Rule 39(b).96 Rather, Appellants claim there is an alleged mandatory rule regarding the joinder of mineral interest owners, citing the word “shall” in Rule 39(a) and the San Antonio Court of Appeals’ opinion in Longoria v. Exxon Mobil Corp.97 255 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 2008, pet. denied). In reality, the Longoria court explicitly rejected Appellants’ proposed mandatory rule, stating: The trial court has broad discretion in deciding matters of joinder of parties. . . . . Although the rule [i.e., Rule 39(a)] provides for joinder in mandatory terms, “there is no arbitrary standard or precise formula for determining whether a particular person falls within its provision. . . . If a person required to be joined under Rule 39(a) cannot be joined, the trial court must decide “whether in equity and in good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed” by considering the factors listed in Rule 39(b). Id. at 179–80 (emphasis added);98 see also, e.g., Ernst v. Banker’s Servs. Group, Inc., No. 05-98-00496-CV, 2001 WL 1256524, at  (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 22, 95 CR127–30 (Appellants’ First Amended Plea in Abatement, discussing only Rule 39(a) and emphasizing the word “shall” without addressing the Rule 39(b) factors). 96 See, generally, Appellants’ Brief at 32–37 (citing and quoting only Rule 39(a), and claiming that the phrase “shall be joined” makes joinder mandatory); see also CR127–30 (same). 97 Id. 98 The facts of Longoria also significantly differ from the case at hand. Here, the trial court did not abate the case or direct the Garzas to add the absent parties. In Longoria, the Longorias were given six months to add the omitted parties but chose not to do so. Longoria, 255 S.W.3d at 184. Additionally, the Garzas demonstrated that joinder of the absent parties was infeasible, triggering the analysis under Rule 39(b). CR121–25, 157–58. Such analysis was never triggered in Longoria. Longoria, 255 S.W.3d at 184. Even more importantly, the trial court in Longoria 41 2001, pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (where plaintiff fraudulently transferred remainder interest in real property to trusts and such trusts were not added as defendants prior to statute of limitations, the trial court properly adjudicated the dispute before it rather than dismissing under Rule 39); Tex. Oil & Gas Corp. v. Ostrom, 638 S.W.2d 231, 235 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (recognizing that joining the lessors and royalty-interest interests owners would be wise, but holding that “we do not conclude that the absence of the lessors and royalty interest holders deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute between the parties before it”). The primary emphasis in Longoria was thus on the trial court’s discretion, not the allegedly per se nature of joinder. Compare Longoria, 255 S.W.3d at 179–80, with Appellants’ Brief at 32–37. The Eastland Court of Appeals reiterated the wide latitude afforded trial courts in matters of joinder in a parallel case: Sabre Oil & Gas Corp. v. Gibson. 72 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2002, pet. denied). In 1957, the Gibsons—along with numerous other landowners—entered into a mineral lease with Sabre covering 38 tracts of land. Id. at 814. In 1997, Sabre drilled a well on the Gibson’s land and filed a Designation of Unit pooling the land with other tracts. Id. The Gibsons sued, claiming that Sabre’s lease had terminated. Id. Sabre filed a plea in abatement, claiming that the other royalty owners pooled with the Gibsons’ tract exercised its discretion to grant rather than deny the plea in abatement. Id. at 183. Here, the trial court exercised its discretion by denying Appellants’ Plea in Abatement. CR157–58. 42 were indispensable. Id. at 815. The trial court denied the motion. Id. On appeal, Sabre challenged the trial court’s denial of its plea in abatement. Id. at 815. The Eastland Court of Appeals however, explicitly rejected the per-se rule that “all royalty owners are necessary parties pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 39.” Id. at 815. The court noted that such rule existed only prior to the enactment of the 1971 changes to Rule 39, and recognized that “Rule 39(a) no longer speaks of ‘necessary’ and ‘indispensable’ parties, and Texas courts have begun to discard these terms.” Id. at 815–16. The Eastland Court then affirmed the trial court’s exercise of discretion in denying the plea in abatement, holding: The trial court was able to provide the requested relief without joining the other royalty owners. Although they had an interest in that their share of the production from the pooled unit would be affected, presence of the other royalty owners was not necessary to determine whether Sabre pooled in bad faith and breached the terms of the lease. Id. at 816. Similarly here, the trial court was able to provide the requested relief without the absent mineral interest owners.99 Appellants provided no evidence to establish that the absent mineral interest holders were indispensable to the suit under the Rule 39(b) factors.100 Thus, even if Appellants had preserved the issue and 99 CR195–97. 100 See, generally, Appellants’ Brief at 32–37 (citing and quoting only Rule 39(a), and claiming that the phrase “shall be joined” makes joinder mandatory); see also CR127–30 (same). 43 provided a sufficient appellate record for review, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Appellants’ Plea in Abatement. III. The judgment against the estates and trust is valid. Appellants next challenge the validity of the judgment against the estates of Vicente Saenz, Hilaria Hernandez and Olivia Salinas Perez and the Eduardo Saenz Children’s Revocable Trust.101 However, the estates waived this issue by participating in the judgment and appeal. Moreover, Appellants have, yet again, failed to provide an adequate record for review. A. The record shows that the estates and trust participated in the judgment and appeal. The Garzas do not dispute that Vicente Saenz, Hilaria Hernandez and Olivia Salinas Perez died prior to trial, that suggestions of death were filed, and that the clerk should have issued a scire facias to join the administrators of the relevant estates. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 152. Nor do the Garzas deny that their petition names the Eduardo Saenz Children’s Revocable Trust, and the Estates of Francisca Vasquez, Eduardo Saenz, and Librada O. Salinas as defendants, rather than the administrators or legal representatives. However, if an estate or trust is represented at or otherwise participates in the trial, the judgment against the estate or trust is nonetheless valid. Werner v. Colwell, 909 S.W.2d 866, 870 (Tex. 1995) (reiterating the rule that when a trust is named as the defendant rather than the relevant trustee, 101 Appellants’ Brief at 37–38. 44 the trust waives the issue by appearing in the case); Bernstein v. Portland Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 850 S.W.2d 694, 699 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied), disapproved of on other grounds by Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. 2000). In Bernstein v. Portland Sav. & Loan Ass’n, Portland Savings and Loan Association sued Sidney and Zayle Bernstein in 1982 for fraud, conversion, and conspiracy. 850 S.W.2d at 697. Defendant Sidney Bernstein died in 1985, while the suit was still pending. Id. at 699. As here, Sidney’s personal representative was never substituted or served with a scire facias. Id. A jury then found Sidney liable, and the trial court entered judgment against Sidney’s estate. Id. The estate appealed, asserting the same argument that Appellants assert: that the judgment was void because an estate is not a legal entity, and scire facias never issued. Compare id. at 699–700, with Appellants’ Brief at 37–38. However, Sidney Bernstein’s personal representative participated in the trial, filing motions and amended answers via counsel. Bernstein, 850 S.W.2d at 700. The estate even appeared and announced ready for trial. Id. The court of appeals thus held that “the judgment against the personal representative is valid, even though it was incorrectly entered against the estate” because the estate “had notice of and participated sufficiently in the case.” Id. at 700. 45 Here, the estates and trust were all represented at trial. From the beginning, Eduardo Saenz Children’s Revocable Trust, and the estates of Francisca Vasquez, Eduardo Saenz, and Librada O. Salinas filed a response to the Garzas’ Bill of Review by and through Richard Schnell.102 The estates and trust did not file a special appearance, and Schnell continued to represent the estates and trust throughout the proceedings.103 In fact, Schnell continues to represent the estates and trust even in this appeal.104 Similarly, regarding the estates of Vicente Saenz, Hilaria Hernandez and Olivia Salinas Perez, Appellants filed a suggestion of death for all three individuals on November 6, 2013.105 No motion to withdraw as counsel for these parties was filed after this date. Appellants’ own Plea in Abatement—filed approximately six months later—explicitly stated that Vicente Saenz’s and Hilaria Hernandez’s interests were still represented by Richard D. Schell.106 Appellants’ Notice of Appeal then confirmed that Schnell not only represented Olivia Salinas Perez 102 CR53 (reflecting Schnell as the attorney for the Estate of Francisca Vasquez, the Estate of Eduardo Saenz, the Estate of Librada O. Salinas, and the Eduardo Saenz Children’s Revocable Trust). 103 See generally CR. 104 CR212 (Notice of Appeal, filed by Richard Schnell on behalf of the Estate of Francisca Vasquez, Estate of Eduardo Saenz, Estate of Librada Salinas, and the Eduardo Saenz Children’s Revocable Trust). 105 CR82. 106 CR132–137 (chart attached to Appellants’ First Amended Plea in Abatement on April 29, 2014, reflecting that Sanez and Hernandez were represented by Schell). 46 throughout the trial, but remains her counsel in this appeal.107 Since all estates and the relevant trust were represented and participated in the trial court proceedings, the judgment is valid. B. Regardless, the record is inadequate to reverse the judgment against Olivia Salinas Perez. Even if the record did not indicate sufficient participation in the trial court proceedings, the inadequate state of the record impedes Appellants’ assertion of error. Olivia Salinas Perez died on May 9, 2003, prior to the dismissal of the original cause number.108 But Appellants have failed to provide a copy of the record from the original cause number.109 As such, the Court must construe the missing record in the Garzas’ favor, and assume that scire facias was issued in the original cause. Imagine Auto. Group v. Boardwalk Motor Cars, Ltd., 430 S.W.3d 620, 632 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (“When confronted with an incomplete record, we presume the omitted portions are relevant to the appeal and the evidence contained within the omitted portions of the record support the trial court's judgment.”); McFarland v. Szakalun, 809 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (“When the record is incomplete, we must 107 See CR198 (Request for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed on Perez’s behalf), 201 (Notice of Past Due Findings filed on Perez’s behalf), 212 (Notice of Appeal taken on Perez’s behalf), 215 (request for Reporter’s Record filed on Perez’s behalf), 218 (Request for Preparation of Clerk’s Record filed on Perez’s behalf). 108 CR29 (original cause dismissed on May 12, 2004), 42 (Perez died May 9, 2003), 82 (same). 109 See supra, Section I(B)(2). 47 assume that the portion omitted supports the correctness of the trial court's judgment.”). Thus, the judgment against Olivia Salinas Perez must be affirmed. IV. The damages award is valid. Appellants next assert numerous challenges regarding the damages awarded by the trial court. Appellants claim that, (a) actual damages are not available for breach of the warranty of title; (b) there is no evidence of each Appellant’s interest in the relevant property; (c) defendants cannot be held jointly and severally liable without specific findings of individual liability greater than fifty percent; and (d) the expert testimony supporting the damages award is unreliable.110 These arguments are erroneous. A. Appellants have not challenged all separate and independent grounds supporting the damages award. Appellants first argue that Texas law “limits the damages available to a plaintiff who prevails on a cause of action for breach of warranty of title.”111 However, the Garzas asserted four separate causes of action against Appellants: breach of warranty of title, breach of covenant against encumbrances, breach of implied covenants, and trespass to try title.112 The trial court found Appellants 110 Appellants’ Brief at 17–24 (regarding damages available for breach of warranty of title), 40–41 (regarding expert testimony), 41–44 (joint and several liability). 111 Appellants’ Brief at 17–24. To clarify, when land is conveyed for consideration other than money, damages for breach of the warranty of title are limited to the value of the land at the time of the conveyance. Compare Ledbetter v. Howard, 395 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Tex. Civ. App.— Waco 1965, no writ), with Appellants’ Brief at 17–19. 112 See CR94–108, 196. 48 liable for all four causes of action; the damages award was not narrowly attributed—by the evidence or the trial court’s findings—to a solitary claim.113 Thus, there are four separate and independent grounds supporting the trial court’s award of damages.114 A trial court’s judgment must be affirmed if it can be upheld on any legal basis supported by the evidence. Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P. v. UBS AG, 451 S.W.3d 508, 519 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (holding “the conclusions of law will be upheld on appeal if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence; incorrect conclusions of law will not require reversal if the controlling findings of fact will support a correct legal theory”); Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. J & J Mobile Homes, Inc., 120 S.W.3d 878, 880–81 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (“[I]t is our duty to uphold the judgment on any theory of law applicable to the case.”). Thus, “[w]hen a separate and independent ground that supports a judgment is not challenged on appeal, the appellate court must affirm.” Bechtel Corp. v. City of San Antonio, No. 04-04-00910-CV, 2006 WL 228689, at  (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 1, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.); Nichols v. Byrne, No. 13-97-456-CV, 1999 WL 58570, at  (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Jan. 28, 1999, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same); see also Nobility Homes, 557 S.W.2d at 83; San Antonio Press, 852 S.W.2d at 65 (“If the 113 CR195–97, 223–26. 114 CR195–97, 223–26. 49 rule were otherwise, an appellant could avoid the adverse effect of a separate and independent basis for the judgment by ignoring it and leaving it unchallenged.”). Here, Appellants attack only a single ground, claiming that the damages awarded in a breach of warranty of title action may be no more than each defendants’ proportional share of the compensation paid by the grantee.115 Appellants do not claim that this purported limit applies to damages awarded for a breach of the covenant against encumbrances, breach of implied covenants, or trespass to try title.116 In fact, Appellants do not even acknowledge these separate and independent bases for the damages award.117 The Court is thus required to affirm the judgment even if Appellants’ challenges to the damages for breach of warranty of title had merit. Gillett v. Achterberg, 325 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Tex. 1959). B. The Garzas are entitled to recover damages for trespass to try title and mineral trespass. Even if Appellants had addressed all the separate and independent bases for the judgment, their challenge would nonetheless lack merit. The Garzas are entitled to recover damages. “The plaintiff in a trespass to try title suit, by pleading facts showing it is entitled, may recover rents and profits or damages incurred from loss of use.” 115 Appellants’ Brief at 17–24. 116 Id. 117 Id. 50 Victory Energy Corp. v. Oz Gas Corp., 461 S.W.3d 159, 177 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, pet. denied); Musquiz v. Marroquin, 124 S.W.3d 906, 912 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied); United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Villanueva, 878 S.W.2d 619, 623 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994, no writ); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 783(f) (a petition for trespass to try title may include, “[i]f rents and profits or damages are claimed, such facts as show the plaintiff to be entitled thereto and the amount thereof”). Furthermore, the Garzas expressly pleaded a mineral trespass, which the trial court found occurred, and this valid legal theory would also support the damages. See Victory Energy Corp., 461 S.W.3d at 177.118 Here, Richard Cortez offered extensive expert testimony regarding “plaintiffs’ share of the royalties for the period of ownership of this mineral interest,” which totaled more than $1.578 million in light of the Litigation Participation Agreement.119 Although Appellants claim there are limitations on the damages for a breach of warranty of title action, they have offered no reason why the Garzas are not entitled to recover actual damages in the form of lost royalty payments for Appellants’ trespass to try title or mineral trespass.120 Thus, even if Appellants had attacked each independent bases supporting the judgment, their challenge would fail. And, a valid legal theory—mineral trespass—would support 118 CR104 (pleading trespass), 225 (Finding of Fact #8). 119 3RR77–79; 5RR Ex. PX-19–22. 120 See, e.g., Appellants’ Brief at 17–24. 51 the judgment anyway. Highland Credit Opportunities CDO, L.P., 451 S.W.3d at 519. C. There is legally sufficient evidence showing Appellants’ interest in Share 13. Amazingly, Appellants next claim there is “not a shred of evidence . . . that showed who the Appellants were, what they owned, what they inherited, where they lived, [or] what their relationship was to Eleuterio Salinas.”121 This statement could not be farther from the truth. Not only was there ample evidence regarding Appellants’ identify, property ownership, and relationship to Eleuterio Salinas, but much of it was proffered by Appellants themselves. Even prior to the trial, Appellants judicially admitted on numerous occasions that they were the predecessors in interest to Eleuterio Salinas; not “names out of [a] phone book,” as they now allege.122 Appellants’ Plea in Abatement—a plea they still champion in this appeal—states: Defendants would show the court that, in addition to the named defendants in this suit, there are many other persons who are record title owners of surface or mineral interests in Share 13.123 121 Appellants’ Brief at 43–44. 122 Compare, e.g., CR129, 3RR41:20–22, 45:12–25; 5RR Ex. DX-8, with Appellants’ Brief at 43–44 (“[N]ot a shred of evidence was introduced that showed who the Appellants were. . . . They could have just as easily picked names out of [the] phone book.”). 123 CR129 (First Amended Plea in Abatement) (emphasis added); see also CR87 (initial Plea in Abatement, stating “Defendants would show the court that, in addition to the named defendants in this suit, the following persons are record title owners of the mineral interests that Plaintiffs claim to own in this suit.”) 52 At trial, Margarito Salinas—a defendant and Appellant, called to the stand by the Appellants—testified on direct examination that “Eleuterio Salinas was my grandfather,” and that Eleuterio died without a will, leaving his portion of Share 13 to his children.124 Appellants then offered and admitted into evidence an affidavit of heirship, signed by Margarito Salinas and tracing the decedents of Eleuterio Salinas in detail.125 Margarito proceeded to testify regarding Eleuterio Salinas’ descendants, their families, and their interests in Share 13, confirming that “[t]he Salinas family has property in Share 13.”126 Later, Appellants agreed to the admission of a map of Share 13, and Appellants’ counsel explained to the trial court that “all of these people on the right side of the courtroom, along with Mr. [Margarito] Salinas, own the remainder of Share 13” and are “descendants of Eleuterio Salinas.”127 When the Garzas offered a second map showing Appellants’ family cemetery and residences, located on Share 13, Appellants did not object.128 Then, in their closing argument, Appellants reiterated that the named defendants were “owners of the property in 124 3RR41:20–22 (stating that Salinas was his grandfather), 45:12–25 (stating that Salinas died without a will as a single man, leaving the property to pass to his children); 5RR Ex. DX-8. 125 5RR Ex. DX-8. 126 3RR53:24–54:24 (testifying that the Salinas family has about 451 acres from Eleuterio, divided among the heirs as family members passed away), 65:7–10, 66:17–20 (testifying that he does not know of any Salinas family members who have conveyed the property outside the family). 127 4RR26:16–20. 128 4RR27:11–28:16; 5RR Ex. PX-27. 53 Share 13 that at one time belonged to Eleuterio Salinas.”129 Appellants’ assertion that there is “no evidence” of their identity, property ownership, or relation to Eleuterio Salinas is thus absurd. Not only is there legally sufficient evidence to show the Appellants’ identity, property ownership, and relationship to Eleuterio Salinas, but much of the evidence was offered by Appellants themselves. D. Appellants were properly held jointly and severally liable for the damages. Next, Appellants challenge the trial court’s imposition of joint and several liability.130 Specifically, Appellants assert that joint and several liability may only be imposed under Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and claim that the Garzas did not establish each Appellant’s liability on an individual basis, nor prove that a singular Appellant was more than fifty percent liable. Appellants fail to recognize however, that joint and several liability may be imposed on joint parties to a trespass. The trial court did not err by holding Appellants jointly and severally liable. Rather, “[t]he imposition of joint and several liability turns upon the actions of the joint-trespassers as parties to the trespass;” not the extent of their individual violation. Victory Energy, 461 S.W.3d at 180–81; see also Walker v. Read, 59 Tex. 187, 191 (Tex. 1883); Plebian Partners, Ltd. v. McCorkle, No. 9-98-320 CV, 1999 129 CR184. 130 Appellants’ Brief at 41–44. 54 WL 199641, at  (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 1, 1999, pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (quoting and applying Parker v. Kangerga to hold parties to trespass jointly and severally liable); Hexamer v. Topographic Land Surveyors, No. 05-97-00108-CV, 1999 WL 114390, at  (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 4, 1999, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Liability for trespass is not dependent upon personal participation and one who causes another to trespass by aiding, assisting, advising or encouraging the trespass is equally liable for the trespass.”); Parker v. Kangerga, 482 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); 70 Tex. Jur. 3d Trespass to Realty § 12 (2016) (“Liability for trespass is not dependent upon personal participation.”); 70 Tex. Jur. 3d Trespass to Realty § 14 (2016) (“The imposition of joint and several liability for a trespass turns upon the actions of the joint-trespassers as parties to the trespass, and personal participation is not required.”). For example, in Victory Energy Corp. v. Oz Gas Corporation, the Oz Gas Corporation filed a trespass to try title suit against Victory Energy Corporation, SmartGas, LLC, and HCP Investments, LLC, among others. 461 S.W.3d at 159– 69. Oz held a leasehold interest in 160 acres of land, and claimed that the defendants trespassed by operating wells on the property. Id. at 168–69. However, a third party had purported to convey an interest to the defendants. Id. The trial court entered summary judgment regarding the defendants’ liability, then held a 55 bench trial on damages. Id. at 169. The defendants were held jointly and severally liable for the actual damages resulting from their trespass. Id. On appeal, the defendants challenged the imposition of joint and several liability, claiming that the trial court erred by failing to impose liability specific to each party or well. Id. at 180. The El Paso Court of Appeals rejected this argument, reiterating the centuryold rule that “all who aid or abet the commission of a trespass are liable jointly or severally.” Id. (citing Cunningham v. Coyle, 1884 WL 8399, at  (Tex. Ct. App. 1884)). The court thus held: The imposition of joint and several liability turns upon the actions of the joint-trespassers as parties to the trespass. Thus, the legal or factual insufficiency of the evidence showing whether appellants actually trespassed as to both wells or benefitted is not directly relevant to the issue of whether the damages may be assessed jointly and severally given that personal participation is not required. Victory Energy, 461 S.W.3d at 180–81. Similarly, here Appellants were parties to the trespass. Margarito Salinas—a defendant and appellant—testified regarding the operation of wells on Share 13, confirming that Eleuterio Salinas’ decedents executed and profited from the oil and gas leases on Share 13.131 The Garzas presented detailed production data from the U.S. Data Library—a resource that aggregates information from the Texas 131 3RR67:7–68:14; 5RR Ex. DX-6. 56 Railroad Commission—regarding the producing wells on the Appellants’ portion of Share 13.132 Richard Cortez provided expert testimony, a report, and calculations regarding the production and royalties collected by the Appellants for oil and gas wells on Share 13.133 The defendants offered no controverting data or expert testimony.134 As in Victory Energy, the trial court held all those who participated in the trespass—i.e., all Appellants—jointly and severally liable.135 Appellants were parties to trespass; specific findings regarding the extent of each trespasser’s individual participation were not necessary. Victory Energy, 461 S.W.3d at 180– 81. Thus, the trial court did not err in holding Appellants jointly and severally liable. E. Appellants did not preserve their challenge to Cortez’s foundational data.136 Finally, Appellants claim that the “expert testimony of Richard Cortez on damages was not reliable,” “would not have survived a Daubert challenge,” and 132 3RR75–76; 5RR Ex. PX-18–22. 133 5RR Ex. PX-18 (expert report, detailing production data, calculations, and profits), P-19– 20 (production data for Salinas wells), P-21–22 (expert calculations regarding royalties, taxes, profit). 134 See, generally, 3RR105:15–106:5 (Cortez testifying that he was unaware of any other experts in the case). 135 CR195–97, 223–226. 136 The admission of expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 800 (Tex. 2006). 57 “is no evidence of damages.”137 Specifically, Appellants criticize Cortez for relying on data provided to him by the Garzas “who got it from a website operated by a private company,” while alleging that Cortez himself “had no prior experience with that website and did no investigation of how such data was obtained or whether it was reliable.”138 This is a challenge to the admissibility of Cortez’s testimony based on his foundational data. See, e.g., Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 409 (Tex. 1998) (“Daubert’s focus is on the trial court’s discretion, when faced with an objection to scientific evidence, to admit or exclude such evidence before or during the trial.”). This type of challenge must be properly objected to and preserved at trial, or it is waived. Coastal Transport, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. 2004); see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1996). The Texas Supreme Court has held that, even in the context of no-evidence attacks on expert testimony, a Daubert/Robinson challenge to the reliability of the underlying data “must be timely made in order to allow the court to exercise its gatekeeper function.” Coastal Transport, 136 S.W.3d at 229 (citing Mar. Overseas, 971 S.W.2d at 411); see also Merrell Dow Pharm. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997). The Court explained: 137 Appellants’ Brief at 40–41. 138 Appellants’ Brief at 40; see also 4RR37:19-39:2 (Appellants’ closing argument, in which counsel stated: “In terms of damages, the only evidence they have on damages is their expert witness, the mayor, Mayor Cortez, who did a great job in math but admitted to the Court that . . . all he did was rely on printouts from a website that were provided to him from the plaintiffs.”). 58 When the expert's underlying methodology is challenged, the court “necessarily looks beyond what the expert said” to evaluate the reliability of the expert's opinion. . . . We therefore conclude that when a reliability challenge requires the court to evaluate the underlying methodology, technique, or foundational data used by the expert, an objection must be timely made so that the trial court has the opportunity to conduct this analysis. However, when the challenge is restricted to the face of the record, for example, when expert testimony is speculative or conclusory on its face, then a party may challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence even in the absence of any objection to its admissibility. Coastal Transport, 136 S.W.3d at 229 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Thus, the only no-evidence challenge to expert testimony that can be asserted for the first time on appeal is an attack on the evidence as conclusory or speculative on its face. Id. Here however, Appellants have not and do not argue that Cortez’s testimony was speculative, conclusory, or otherwise non-probative on its face.139 Rather, Appellants attack Cortez’s testimony only as to the foundational data upon which Cortez relied.140 Yet, Appellants never filed a pretrial Daubert motion to strike Cortez’s testimony, nor did they make an oral objection during trial.141 Appellants cross-examined Cortez regarding the data he relied upon, but did not object to or 139 Appellants’ Brief at 40–41. 140 Id. 141 See, generally, CR; 3RR72–105. 59 secure a ruling on the reliability of such testimony.142 In fact, although Appellants condemn Cortez’s use of information “provided to him by the Plaintiff who got it from a website operated by a private company,” Appellants did not actually object to the admission of the allegedly unreliable website data as trial exhibits, nor did they object to the admission of Cortez’s documented calculations made in reliance on such data.143 Consequently, Appellants’ challenge to Cortez’s foundational data has been waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. This case is similar to Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis. There, Maritime employee Richard Ellis was awarded $12.6 million in damages for overexposure to a roach pesticide that caused him neurological issues. Mar. Overseas, 971 S.W.2d at 404–05. Maritime appealed, complaining that there was no evidence to support Ellis’s actual damages. Id. at 408. The Texas Supreme Court refused to analyze the reliability of Ellis’s expert testimony. Id. at 411. Instead, the Court held that Maritime had waived the issue by not objecting to the reliability of Ellis’s experts before or during trial. Id. at 410–11 (contrasting Maritime with Merrell Dow, 142 3RR76 (“Your Honor, we don’t have any problems in admitting it as a summary of Mayor Cortez’s testimony, but we’re not—we’re not agreeing to the truth of the matters stated in the report.”), 3RR77:12 (Appellants did not object when the U.S. Data Library reports were admitted into evidence), 3RR79:12–80:25 (no objection when charts of Cortez’s calculations of lost royalties based on the reports were admitted), 80–103 (Appellants’ cross examination); 4RR37:19-39:2 (Appellants’ closing argument, in which counsel stated “Mayor Cortez, who did a great job in math but admitted to the Court that . . . all he did was rely on printouts from a website that were provided to him from the plaintiffs.”). 143 Appellants’ Brief at 40–41; 3RR77:12 (no objection when the U.S. Data Library reports were admitted into evidence), 3RR79:12–80:25 (no objection when charts of Cortez’s calculations of lost royalties based on the reports were admitted). 60 where the appellant “objected to the Havners’ scientific evidence at several junctures during the litigation,” including filing numerous pretrial Daubert motions). Maritime could not “complain for the first time after the verdict that the testimony from Ellis’s five experts does not support the judgment.” Maritime, 971 S.W.2d at 411. Appellants never filed a Daubert motion, never made formal objections on the record regarding the reliability of Cortez’s expert opinion, and did not even object to the U.S. Data Library reports when they were admitted into evidence by the trial court.144 Thus, Appellants’ attack on the reliability of Cortez’s foundational data is an attempt to bypass and undermine the “gate-keeper.” Accordingly, this issue has been waived and must be overruled. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER Appellants assert a multiplicity of scattered arguments, none of which provide a legal basis for reversing the trial court’s final judgment. Thus, for the reasons set forth above, Appellees respectfully request that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment, and grant any other relief to which they are entitled. 144 3RR77:12. 61 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Brandy Wingate Voss Brandy Wingate Voss State Bar No. 24037046 Allegra Hill State Bar No. 24075965 LAW OFFICE OF BRANDY WINGATE VOSS 820 E. Hackberry Ave. McAllen, TX 78501 (956) 688-9033 (956) 331-2230 (fax) brandy@brandyvosslaw.com allegra@brandyvosslaw.com Counsel for Appellees 62 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE This document complies with the typeface requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document also complies with the word-count limitations of Rule 9.4(i), if applicable, because it contains 14,670 words, excluding any parts exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1). /s/ Brandy Wingate Voss Brandy Wingate Voss 63 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE On December 29, 2016, in compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.5, I served a copy of this petition for writ of mandamus by e-service, e-mail, facsimile, or mail to: Richard D. Schell LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD D. SCHELL 1801 S. 2nd Street, Suite 460 McAllen, Texas 78503 Fax: (956) 687-3329 Email: rick@rickschell.com /s/ Brandy Wingate Voss Brandy Wingate Voss 64