Opinion ID: 787192
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Remaining Convictions

Text: A. Federal Bribery Conspiracy (Autiello) 102 Autiello argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for federal bribery conspiracy in connection with the Maggiacomo Job scheme. Autiello contends that, because there was no direct evidence about either the identity of his co-conspirator or the fate of the $5,000 Mary Maggiacomo paid him, the evidence gave nearly equal circumstantial support to an inference that he pocketed the money as a payment for his efforts with the police department (with which he had influence) on behalf of Joseph Maggiacomo as it did to an inference that he passed the bribe along to some public official, or at least conspired to do so. See United States v. Andujar, 49 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir.1995) (If the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilty and a theory of innocence of the crime charged, this court must reverse the conviction.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The argument is unconvincing. 103 There was evidence that, during a face-to-face meeting in which his favorable intercessions were sought, Autiello told Mary Maggiacomo and her husband that Providence police officer positions were prized and that Joseph Maggiacomo's chances were not good because the Maggiacomos were not Providence taxpayers and had not made any contributions. In nearly the same breath, Autiello told them that, if they wanted Joseph to be accepted into the police academy, they would have to come up with $5,000 in cash. The juxtaposition of these two comments, combined with the evidence that Autiello himself held no authority to make police academy admission decisions, permitted a reasonable inference that the $5,000 was to be a political contribution that would serve as Joseph's ticket of admission when passed along to someone with authority over academy admission decisions. 104 B. Hobbs Act Attempted Extortion and Extortion Conspiracy (Corrente) 105 Corrente makes three arguments in favor of reversing or vacating his convictions for Hobbs Act attempted extortion and Hobbs Act extortion conspiracy in connection with the Freitas Lease and Freitas Invoices schemes: (1) there was insufficient evidence that these schemes had the constitutionally required impact on interstate commerce; (2) there was insufficient evidence that he affirmatively acted in such a way as to be fairly accused of having attempted or conspired to engage in extortion; and (3) the district court's jury instructions erroneously described what was required to establish an attempt or conspiracy to engage in extortion. There is some question whether each of these arguments was made below as to each of the three convictions, but we bypass issues of forfeiture because none of the arguments is persuasive on its merits. 106 Corrente's first argument is largely based on an assertion that his convictions are unconstitutional because his offense conduct had to, but did not, have more than a de minimis effect on interstate commerce in order to jibe with the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000). After briefs were filed in this case, another panel of the court rejected this argument, United States v. Capozzi, 347 F.3d 327, 334-336 (1st Cir.2003), so we must reject it too, see, e.g., United States v. Downs-Moses, 329 F.3d 253, 263 (1st Cir.2003). 107 Corrente alternatively argues that no reasonable factfinder could have found that his offense conduct had such a de minimis effect. He is wrong. 108 With respect to Corrente's attempted extortion in connection with the Freitas Lease scheme, the jury could have found that, but for Freitas' agreement to pay Corrente for favorable intervention on his behalf with the school department, there was a realistic probability that the City contractor (an entity engaged in interstate commerce and whose lease agreement would be a transaction affecting interstate commerce 12 ) would have leased space in Cranston, Rhode Island. This evidence alone satisfies constitutional concerns, even if the space for which Corrente advocated actually proved to be a better fit for the contractor. See Capozzi, 347 F.3d at 335 (extortionate conduct need only create a realistic probability of an effect on interstate commerce) (citations omitted); id. at 337 (conviction for attempted extortion requires only a showing that the identified effect would have occurred had the defendant succeeded in the extortion); United States v. Tormos-Vega, 959 F.2d 1103, 1113 (1st Cir.1992) (extortionate conduct meets constitutional requirements even where it has a beneficial effect on interstate commerce) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); id. (where the victim's acquiescence in an extortion results in a transaction with effects on interstate commerce, constitutional concerns are satisfied). 109 With respect to the Freitas Invoices scheme, the jury could have found that a city contractor that was indisputably engaged in interstate commerce was deprived of $1,100 in order to facilitate payments to which it was entitled. This was enough. See Capozzi, 347 F.3d at 337 (One common method for the government to establish the required ` de minimis effect' on interstate commerce is to show that the defendant's activity minimally depletes the assets of an entity doing business in interstate commerce. ) (quoting United States v. Nguyen, 246 F.3d 52, 54 (1st Cir.2001)). 110 Corrente's other two arguments are very difficult to follow. In the main, they appear to be interrelated attacks on the correctness of Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 112 S.Ct. 1881, 119 L.Ed.2d 57 (1992). Evans interpreted the provision of the Hobbs Act under which Corrente was convicted — one which prohibits extortion by means of the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, ... [2] under color of official right, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) — not to require that the government prove that the defendant initiated the extortionate transaction or otherwise induced the payments. Rather, the Government need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts. Id. at 268, 112 S.Ct. 1881. Corrente appears to believe that the Evans Court erred in concluding that the defendant need not induce the payment or otherwise initiate the event. See Corrente Br. at 49. To the extent that he is so arguing, Corrente acknowledges that we are powerless to grant him relief and that he must go to the Supreme Court. Id. 111 There are hints of other arguments in Corrente's brief, but none is sufficiently developed to warrant consideration on the merits. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990). In any event, our review of the record convinces us that there is no basis for reversing or vacating Corrente's attempted extortion and extortion conspiracy convictions. 112 Any sufficiency challenge is doomed because there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions even under the more demanding interpretation of the Hobbs Act for which Corrente advocates. With respect to the Freitas Lease scheme, the jury could have found that Corrente induced payments from Freitas when, at one point prior to receiving any money related to this scheme, he suggested to Freitas that City Hall could either hurt or help his chances of securing the lease (depending, presumably, on whether Freitas anted up). With respect to the Freitas Invoices scheme, the jury could have found that Pannone, Corrente's co-conspirator, induced payments on Corrente's behalf by encouraging Freitas to throw something at Corrente — i.e., to pay to get paid. 113 So too with the jury instructions. As clarified in a supplemental charge just prior to the return of the verdicts, the instructions on the attempted extortion and extortion conspiracy charges were, if anything, overly generous to Corrente. And because the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions even under the arguably too lenient instructions, any error was harmless. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a); United States v. Royal, 100 F.3d 1019, 1027 (1st Cir.1996).