Opinion ID: 1060912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Juror Rehabilitation

Text: The appellant next contends that the trial court improperly rehabilitated six jurors after they indicated a propensity to impose a sentence of death without reserving judgment until the presentation of mitigation proof. He further claims that the court improperly denied defense counsel the opportunity to rehabilitate one juror who harbored scruples about the death penalty. Initially, we note that, at the conclusion of voir dire, the court informed the appellant that he had not exercised one of his peremptory challenges. As the State contends, in order to assign as error the trial court's ruling on challenges for cause, an appellant must exercise all of his peremptory challenges. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d at 329. Moreover, the failure to exclude a juror for cause is grounds for reversal only if the [appellant] exhaust[ed] all of his peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him. Id. (emphasis added). See also State v. Kilburn, 782 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989)([o]nly when a defendant exhausts all his peremptory challenges and is forced to later accept an incompetent juror ... can he complain about the jury composition). Of the six prospective jurors about whom the appellant complains, none actually served as a juror on the case. Accordingly, any error in not excusing these potential jurors is harmless because they were not forced upon [the appellant] at the trial. State v. Thompson, 768 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1031, 110 S.Ct. 3288, 111 L.Ed.2d 796 (1990). See also State v. Simon, 635 S.W.2d 498, 510-11 (Tenn.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1055, 103 S.Ct. 473, 74 L.Ed.2d 621 (1982). The appellant's claim is without merit. Additionally, the appellant's contention, that he was improperly prevented from rehabilitating one juror who indicated that she was opposed to the death penalty, is meritless. When asked by the prosecutor if she could impose the death penalty, Juror Carson indicated that she probably could not. The Court then asked Carson on two separate occasions if she could consider the death penalty as a possible punishment. Each time, Carson indicated that, regardless of the evidence, she would feel uncomfortable considering the imposition of the death penalty. Finally, the court inquired, Now, let me make sure I understand. Are you saying that you would automatically vote against the death penalty in any case regardless of what the evidence might show? Is that correct? Carson replied affirmatively. We agree with the State that Ms. Carson's final response left no leeway for rehabilitation. Strouth, 620 S.W.2d at 471. State v. Alley, 776 S.W.2d 506, 517-518 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S.Ct. 758, 107 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990). In any event, assuming that the questioning of Ms. Carson by the prosecutor and the court had not reached the point that left no leeway for rehabilitation, we must consider whether the dismissal of Ms. Carson for cause was appropriate under the dictates of Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). See Alley, 776 S.W.2d at 517-518. In Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852, the United Stated Supreme Court delineated the following standard for determining whether a juror was properly excused for cause: whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror in accordance with his [or her] instructions and his [or her] oath.' The Supreme Court further observed that this standard does not require that a juror's bias be proved with `unmistakable clarity.' Id. Finally, the Court noted that deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the jurors. Id. at 426, 105 S.Ct. at 853. We conclude that Ms. Carson's responses to questioning by the prosecutor and the court adequately demonstrated that her views concerning the death penalty would [have] `prevent[ed] or substantially impair[ed] the performance of [her] duties as a juror in accordance with [her] instructions and [her] oath.' Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852. See also, State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 915-16 (Tenn. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 829, 116 S.Ct. 99, 133 L.Ed.2d 53 (1995). Moreover, as noted earlier, great deference should be given to the trial judge, who is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 426, 105 S.Ct. at 853. The trial court's findings shall be accorded a presumption of correctness and the burden shall rest upon the appellant to establish by convincing evidence that [those findings were] erroneous. Alley, 776 S.W.2d at 518. The appellant has failed to meet this burden.