Opinion ID: 498378
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: fourth amendment claims raised at the suppression hearing

Text: 9 Prior to the trial on the criminal charge, Zabalaga moved to suppress as evidence all items that had been seized from the locked safe, on the ground that the warrantless search was not supported by probable cause and that the items seized were the fruits of an illegal search. Only two witnesses testified at the suppression hearing, John McClellan and Carlton Hughes; the defendant was not called to testify in his behalf. Following the hearing, the trial judge ruled that Zabalaga had no legitimate expectation of privacy in either the car searched or the items seized. Zabalaga, op. at 6. Consequently, the items seized from the safe were admitted during the trial of Zabalaga on the criminal charge. 10 The appellant claims that the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence taken from the car, because the automobile and its contents were seized and searched in violation of the Fourth Amendment. On this point, there are several potentially troublesome issues in this case, including: the legality of the impoundment and inventory search of the rental car; the legality of the warrantless search of the safe if the impoundment and inventory search were legally infirm; and the materiality of the consent given by Hughes after police officers already had surveyed the contents of the automobile. But we need not reach these questions because the appellant cannot survive the required threshold inquiry regarding his claimed expectation of privacy. 11 The question here is whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140, 99 S.Ct. 421, 429, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). In Rakas, after receiving a robbery report, the police stopped the suspected getaway car, which the owner was driving and in which the defendants were passengers. In their search of the car, the police found a box of rifle shells in the glove compartment and a sawed-off rifle under a passenger seat. Following their arrest, the defendants moved to suppress the rifle and shells on Fourth Amendment grounds, but the state court ruled that the defendants lacked standing to object to the lawfulness of the search of the car. The Supreme Court affirmed, first observing that petitioners ... were passengers occupying a car which they neither owned nor leased, 439 U.S. at 140, 99 S.Ct. at 429, then holding that petitioners' claims must fail because [t]hey asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile, nor an interest in the property seized. Id. at 148, 99 S.Ct. at 433. Absent such interests in the automobile or its contents, the petitioners had failed to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 150, 99 S.Ct. at 434 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 12 We can discern no meaningful distinction between Rakas and the instant case. Under Rakas, the appellant bears the burden on a motion to suppress of establishing not only that the search was unlawful, but also that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2561, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980). In the instant case, the District Court found that: 13 Zabalaga was not the owner or lessee of the car, nor was he given permission to drive it by Carlton Hughes. At no time has he asserted a possessory interest in the vehicle or the items seized. He could have done so during his initial arrest or the subsequent questioning about the vehicle. 14 Zabalaga, op. at 6. Apart from his failure to establish any interest in the car, there also is no evidence that the appellant drove the car or that he had permission to do so. And, while disclaiming ownership of the vehicle at the time of his arrest, the appellant never asserted any claim to the personal goods that were stored in the car. Indeed, Zabalaga never claimed that he had permission to put his belongings in the car. Finally, there were no identifying markings on either the personal goods in the car or on the safe, that would suggest that Zabalaga had a legitimate expectation of privacy in either the car or the safe therein. Given these circumstances, it cannot be found that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress. 15