Opinion ID: 726685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: 14 CERCLA is a broad and complex statute aimed at the dangers posed by hazardous waste sites. Among other things, CERCLA provides a cause of action to recover response costs incurred in remedying an environmental hazard, 42 U.S.C. § 9607, and allows those liable for response costs to seek contribution from other liable parties, id. § 9613(f). A plaintiff must meet four elements to establish CERCLA liability: (1) that hazardous substances were disposed of at a facility; (2) that there has been a release or threatened release of hazardous substances from the facility into the environment; (3) that the release or threatened release has required or will require the expenditure of response costs; and (4) that the defendant falls within one of four categories of responsible parties. Id. § 9607(a); see United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258-59 (3d Cir.1992). If these requirements are met, responsible parties are liable for response costs regardless of their intent. See id. at 259 (CERCLA imposes strict liability on responsible parties.). 15 The parties agree that the first three requirements are met. Their dispute concerns whether Dowel is a responsible party. CERCLA makes four classes of people liable for response costs or contribution: the current owner or operator of a facility, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1); any person who owned or operated the facility at the time of disposal of a hazardous substance, id. § 9607(a)(2); any person who arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged for transport for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances at the facility, id. § 9607(a)(3); and any person who accepts or accepted hazardous substances for transport to sites selected by such person, id. § 9607(a)(4). HMAT contends that Dowel is liable as a person who owned or operated the facility at the time of disposal of a hazardous substance. 16 CERCLA defines disposal by incorporating the definition used by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). See id. § 9601(29) (The terms 'disposal', 'hazardous waste', and 'treatment' shall have the meaning provided in section 1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act.). Under RCRA, 17 The term disposal means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any waters, including ground waters. 18 Id. § 6903(3). Focusing on the breadth of this definition, HMAT reads disposal to encompass the passive migration of contaminants. HMAT offers no evidence that any passive migration has occurred here but asks us to take judicial notice that waste tends to spread once it is put in the ground, See Office of Remedial Response, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Superfund Exposure Assessment Manual 8 (1988) [hereinafter Superfund Manual ] (waste in landfills tends to migrate due to, inter alia, rain, groundwater movement, and wind) and waste therefore must have spread during the six years Dowel owned the property. Several courts have been sympathetic to this argument. See United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 164-65 (4th Cir.1984) (migration of hazardous substances can constitute disposal under RCRA); CPC International, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 759 F.Supp. 1269, 1278 (W.D.Mich.1991) (the unchecked spread of contaminated groundwater qualifies as disposal under CERCLA); Stanley Works v. Snydergeneral Corp., 781 F.Supp. 659, 662-64 (E.D.Cal.1990) (ongoing migration of hazardous substances constitutes disposal under CERCLA); United States v. Price, 523 F.Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.N.J.1981) (spreading of hazardous substances constitutes disposal under RCRA), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir.1982); cf. Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845-46 (4th Cir.) (leaking from tanks that were deposited prior to the defendants' ownership constitutes disposal subjecting the defendant to CERCLA liability), cert. denied sub nom. Mumaw v. Nurad, Inc., 506 U.S. 940, 113 S.Ct. 377, 121 L.Ed.2d 288 (1992); State of New York v. Almy Bros., Inc., 866 F.Supp. 668, 676-77 (N.D.N.Y.1994) (gradual leaking from drums deposited prior to the defendants' ownership constitutes disposal under CERCLA); In re Hemingway Transport, Inc., 108 B.R. 378, 382 (Bankr.D.Mass.1989) (leaking drums constitute CERCLA disposal), aff'd, 126 B.R. 650 (D.Mass.1991), aff'd, 954 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1992). 19 We are unpersuaded. A thorough examination of the text and structure of CERCLA convinces us that the passive migration of contaminants alleged here does not constitute disposal. Our conclusion is based on the plain meaning of the words used in the disposal definition and is supported by the structure of CERCLA's liability scheme. We also believe that our interpretation is consistent with CERCLA's purposes. 2 B. The Language 20
21 The definition of disposal begins with the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3). Courts holding that passive migration can constitute disposal have focused on the words leaking and spilling, terms that generally do not denote active conduct. See CPC International, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (W.D.Mich.1991); United States v. Price, 523 F.Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.N.J.1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir.1982). 22 We think there is a strong argument, however, that in the context of this definition, leaking and spilling should be read to require affirmative human action. Both leaking and spilling also have meanings that require some active human conduct. Leak can be defined as to permit to enter or escape through a leak. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged 1285 (Philip Babcock Gove & the Mirriam-Webster Editorial Staff eds., 1986) [hereinafter Webster's ]. Similarly, spill can mean to cause or allow to pour, splash, or fall out. Id. at 2195. Meaning derives from context, hence the constructional canon noscitur a sociis, which states that one may infer meaning by examining the surrounding words. The words surrounding leaking and spilling--discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, and placing--all envision a human actor. In the context of these other words, then, Congress may have intended active meanings of leaking and spilling. See Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F.Supp. 1454, 1457 (N.D.Cal.1989); Robert L. Bronston, Note, The Case Against Intermediate Owner Liability for Passive Migration of Hazardous Waste, 93 Mich. L.Rev. 609, 616 (1994). 23 But we need not address this question in the broad terms of whether disposal always requires active human conduct. Even if it does not, we conclude that the passive migration at issue in this case cannot constitute disposal. While leaking and spilling may not require affirmative human conduct, neither word denotes the gradual spreading of contamination alleged here. A common definition of leak--and the one most favorable to HMAT--is to enter or escape through a hole, crevice, or other opening. Webster's, supra at 1285. This definition requires that a substance leak from some opening. For example, the definition would encompass the escape of waste through a hole in a drum. 3 But HMAT has offered no evidence of leaking drums. Compare, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 846 (4th Cir.) (the plaintiff presented evidence showing that tanks had leaked), cert. denied sub nom. Mumaw v. Nurad, Inc., 506 U.S. 940, 113 S.Ct. 377, 121 L.Ed.2d 288 (1992). And there is no other evidence that waste escaped from any opening during Dowel's ownership. 24 The definition of spilling is also unavailing. Although spilling too sometimes denotes the movement of liquid in the absence of human action, such a definition does not cover the spreading of waste at issue here. Passive definitions of spill suggest a rapid torrent, not gradual passive migration over the course of several years. See Webster's, supra at 2195 (defining spill as, inter alia, to flow, run, or fall out, over, or off with waste, loss, or scattering as the result and as to come, go, or pass with a turbulent rush[; to] pour in an unrestrained, profuse, or disorderly manner). Consider, for example, an oil spill. 25
26 It is especially unjustified to stretch the meanings of leaking and spilling to encompass the passive migration that generally occurs in landfills in view of the fact that another word used in CERCLA, release, shows that Congress knew precisely how to refer to this spreading of waste. A prior owner who owned a waste site at the time of disposal is only liable in the event of a release or threatened release. 42 U.S.C. § 9607. CERCLA defines release in relevant part as follows: 27 The term release means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant).... 28 Id. § 9601(22). The definition of release is thus broader than that of disposal: release encompasses disposing and some elements of the disposal definition and also includes some additional terms. 29 Most importantly, the definition of release includes the term leaching, which is not mentioned in the definition of disposal. Leaching is the process or an instance of separating the soluble components from some material by percolation. Webster's, supra at 1282. Leaching of contaminants from rain and groundwater movement is a principal cause of contaminant movement in landfills, see Superfund Manual, supra at 8, and is the predominant cause of groundwater contamination from landfills, Edward Repa & Charles Kufs, Leachate Plume Management 2 (1985). The word leaching is commonly used in the environmental context to describe this migration of contaminants. See, e.g., Steven Ferrey, The Toxic Time Bomb: Municipal Liability for the Cleanup of Hazardous Waste, 57 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 197, 207 n. 34 (1988) (Leachate is liquid or water soluble contaminated substances that migrate away from the point source of contamination in groundwater or surface water, often influenced by rain and normal water table activities. Such a phenomenon is described as 'leaching' of contaminants.). 4 Congress's use of the term leaching in the definition of release demonstrates that it was aware of the concept of passive migration in landfills and that it knew how to explicitly refer to that concept. 30 Yet Congress made prior owners liable only if they owned land at the time of disposal, not at the time of release. 31
32 Our conclusion that the meaning of the words in the disposal definition cannot cover the passive migration alleged in this case is buttressed by the language of CERCLA's liability provision. If the spreading of contaminants is constant, as HMAT would have us assume, characterizing liable parties as any person who at the time of disposal ... owned or operated any facility, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2), would be a rather complicated way of making liable all people who owned or operated a facility after the introduction of waste into the facility. See Snediker Developers Ltd. Partnership v. Evans, 773 F.Supp. 984, 989 (E.D.Mich.1991); Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, 718 F.Supp. 1454, 1457 (N.D.Cal.1989); In re Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc., 115 B.R. 559, 565 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1990). Furthermore, there would be no need for the separate responsible party category of current owner or operator, id. § 9607(a)(1). See Ecodyne Corp., 718 F.Supp. at 1457. Although CERCLA is not written with great clarity, 5 we will not impute to Congress an intent to set up a simple liability scheme through a convoluted methodology. C. Structure: The Innocent Owner Defense 33 Our conclusion that the language of CERCLA's definition of disposal does not include the passive migration alleged here is also supported by a significant aspect of CERCLA's liability scheme, the innocent owner defense. Since the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), Pub.L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675), CERCLA has exempted certain innocent owners from liability. 34 CERCLA provides a defense to liability if the defendant can prove that the release or threatened release was caused solely by an act or omission of a third party. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3). The defense is generally not available if the third party causing the release is in the chain of title with the defendant. See id. § 9601(35)(A). However, the defense is available in such circumstances if the person claiming the defense is an innocent owner. To establish the innocent owner defense, the defendant must show that the real property on which the facility is located was acquired by the defendant after the disposal or placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility and that [a]t the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility. 6 35 Because CERCLA conditions the innocent owner defense on the defendant's having purchased the property after the disposal of hazardous waste at the property, disposal cannot constitute the allegedly constant spreading of contaminants. Otherwise, the defense would almost never apply, as there would generally be no point after disposal. See United States v. Petersen Sand and Gravel, Inc., 806 F.Supp. 1346, 1351-52 (N.D.Ill.1992); In re Diamond Reo Trucks, Inc. v. City of Lansing, 115 B.R. 559, 566 n. 3 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.1990); Bronston, supra at 627-28. We think it unlikely that Congress would create a basically useless defense. 7 36 The innocent owner defense's apparent limitation to current owners also supports the conclusion that disposal does not encompass the passive spreading alleged here. The provision establishing the innocent owner defense states: Nothing in this paragraph or in section 9607(b)(3) of this title [, which provides the causation defenses including the third party defense,] shall diminish the liability of any previous owner or operator who would be otherwise liable under this chapter. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C). This language certainly suggests that the innocent owner defense is unavailable to prior owners or operators. 8 37 While the question whether the innocent owner defense is available only to present owners is not before us--and we do not decide the issue--we note that such a limitation makes sense only if passive spreading of waste in a landfill is not included in disposal. If passive migration is excluded from disposal, past owners will generally only be liable as owners at the time of disposal when they have committed or allowed affirmative acts of disposal on their property. They would thus have little need for the innocent owner defense, which requires, inter alia, that a defendant did not cause[ ] or contribute[ ] to the release or threatened release, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(D); exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, id. § 9607(b)(3)(a); and took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party [causing the release] and the consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions, id. § 9607(b)(3)(b). On the other hand, if prior owners were liable because waste spread during their tenure and the innocent owner defense is available only to current owners, prior owners would be in a significantly worse position than current owners: they would be liable for passive migration of waste even if they had no reason to know of the waste's presence. We do not believe that this was Congress's intent. D. CERCLA's Purposes 38 We have explained our confidence that the meaning of the words defining disposal does not encompass the gradual spreading of waste in a landfill and that this conclusion is supported by the structure of the innocent owner defense. We also conclude that this reading of disposal is consistent with CERCLA's purposes. 39 Congress enacted CERCLA with two principal goals in mind--to facilitate the cleanup of potentially dangerous hazardous waste sites, Tippins Inc. v. USX Corp., 37 F.3d 87, 92 (3d Cir.1994), and to force polluters to pay the costs associated with their pollution, United States v. Alcan Aluminum, 964 F.2d 252, 257-58 (3d Cir.1992). See United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 814 (3d Cir.1995). Our holding is clearly consistent with the latter purpose. Those who owned previously contaminated property where waste spread without their aid cannot reasonably be characterized as polluters; excluding them from liability will not let those who cause the pollution off the hook. And, many of these owners will pay for the pollution: if they disclose the fact that the land contains waste, their selling price will reflect the cost of CERCLA liability. If they have knowledge of contamination and do not disclose it to a transferee, they are liable for response costs even after the transfer. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C). 9 The only prior owners who will not pay any cleanup costs are those who bought and sold the land with no knowledge that the land is contaminated. 40 And our holding will not undermine the goal of facilitating the cleanup of potentially dangerous hazardous waste sites. Even if owners of previously contaminated land can evade liability by transferring the land, ample incentives remain to promote cleanup. See United States v. Petersen Sand and Gravel, Inc., 806 F.Supp. 1346, 1353 (N.D.Ill.1992); Bronston, supra at 637-40. 10 Present owners and operators remain strictly liable for the costs of cleanup, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1), as do some prior owners, id. § 9607(a)(2), people who arranged for disposal, id. § 9607(a)(3), and transporters of hazardous substances, id. § 9607(a)(4). Moreover, a number of provisions ensure that contamination will be discovered and the fact of contamination disclosed if the land is transferred. CERCLA imposes criminal liability (including prison sentences) for failure to report a release of hazardous substances above a certain threshold. See id. § 9603. As mentioned, if an owner transfers land that it knows to be contaminated without disclosing the contamination, it remains liable even after the transfer. Id. § 9601(35)(C). In addition, the innocent owner defense encourages potential buyers to investigate the possibility of contamination before a purchase. See id. § 9601(35)(B) (in order to claim the innocent owner defense, a defendant must have undertaken all appropriate inquiry). 41 Thus, for the reasons we have stated, we agree with the district court that HMAT cannot proceed on its passive theory of disposal: the movement of contaminants alleged here does not constitute disposal. However, because we conclude that HMAT may proceed on its active theory of disposal, the issue to which we now turn, we will vacate the court's order granting summary judgment to Dowel on HMAT's CERCLA claim.