Opinion ID: 2639442
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: attempted aggravated murder, aggravated assault, killing a police service dog

Text: ¶ 39 At the conclusion of the State's case in chief, Hamilton moved to dismiss the charges of attempted aggravated murder, aggravated assault, and killing a police service dog, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to warrant submitting these charges to the jury. The trial court denied his motion. We affirm. ¶ 40 A defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the conclusion of the State's case in chief requires the trial court to determine whether the defendant must proceed with the introduction of evidence in his defense. State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 570 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524 (Utah 1983)). If the State fails to produce believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged, State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ¶ 13, 20 P.3d 300 (quotations and citations omitted), the trial court must dismiss the charges. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (1999); Utah R.Crim. P. 17(o). ¶ 41 When evaluating whether the State produced sufficient believable evidence to withstand a challenge at the close of the State's case in chief, we apply the same standard used when reviewing a jury verdict. Hence, believable evidence in this context means the evidence must be capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Clark, 2001 UT 9 at ¶ 15, 20 P.3d 300. Stated more fully, if upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, the court concludes that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, id. at ¶ 13 (quotations and citations omitted), we will uphold the denial of a motion to dismiss. We therefore turn now to a discussion of the charges of attempted aggravated murder, aggravated assault, and killing a police service dog.
¶ 42 Hamilton challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the attempted aggravated murder charge. Specifically, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because there was insufficient evidence to submit the two statutory aggravators to the jury. The two statutory aggravators at issue require that the victim be a peace officer who was either acting under color of legal authority or on duty. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(e), (k) (1999). To support this contention, Hamilton asserts that Deputy Chambers's conduct fell wholly outside the scope of his authority because he used excessive force by firing shots at Hamilton. Hamilton claims this action divested Chambers of his police status as a matter of law. We disagree. ¶ 43 Attempted aggravated murder occurs when a person takes a substantial step toward intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] the death of another under any of the seventeen aggravating circumstances listed in the statute. Id. §§ 76-4-101, 76-5-202(1). At trial, the prosecution asserted two alternative statutory aggravators: (e) the homicide was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest of the defendant or another by a peace officer acting under the color of legal authority or for the purpose of effecting the defendant's or another's escape from lawful custody; .... (k) the victim is or has been a peace officer [or] law enforcement officer ... and the victim is either on duty or the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is related to that official position, and the actor knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim holds or has held that official position. Id. § 76-5-202(1)(e), (k) (emphasis added). ¶ 44 In this instance, we need not delineate the nuances of any difference in the acting under the color of legal authority or on duty standards because, under any reasonable articulation of those standards, it is beyond question that Chambers was both acting under the color of legal authority and on duty. Chambers was conducting official police business and in uniform at the time Hamilton shot him. Chambers went to Vance Springs with three other uniformed officers and a police dog in his official capacity to remove trespassers and to arrest any person that resisted. Moreover, there was ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Hamilton shot Chambers while Chambers was trying to arrest him, and that Hamilton did so to avoid arrest. Hence, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Hamilton's motion to dismiss because there was sufficient evidence to warrant submitting the attempted aggravated murder charge to the jury.
¶ 45 We now examine Hamilton's claim that there was insufficient evidence to submit the aggravated assault charge to the jury. The State charged Hamilton with aggravated assault because he allegedly aimed his rifle at Sheriff Yardley in a threatening manner. A person commits aggravated assault if he or she (1) commits assault, and (2) uses a dangerous weapon ... or other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b) (1999). Section 76-5-102(b) defines an assault as a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another. Id. § 76-5-102(1)(b). Hamilton advances that the State did not produce sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that his conduct constituted a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, id., and therefore, the trial judge should not have submitted the charge to the jury. Again, we disagree. ¶ 46 Although Hamilton denies that his rifle was aimed at Yardley, all evidentiary inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the [jury] verdict. State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, ¶ 2, 6 P.3d 1116. In this case, Yardley testified that Hamilton's rifle was aimed directly at him when Hamilton warned him not to come any closer. Yardley further testified that even after Hamilton swung his rifle away from him, he still kept it in firing position, with both hands near the trigger. Additionally, Deputy White witnessed the encounter between Yardley and Hamilton and corroborated Yardley's testimony. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could find that Hamilton's actions constituted a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another. Id. We conclude therefore that the aggravated assault charge was properly submitted to the jury.
¶ 47 Hamilton contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of killing a police service dog because Max had lost his status as a police service animal at the time he was killed. In his view, Max lost his status as a police service animal because his handler, Deputy Chambers, was not acting within his authority as a peace officer when Max was shot. ¶ 48 Section 76-9-306 of the Utah Code makes it a class A misdemeanor for a person to intentionally cause bodily injury or death to a police service animal. Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-306(2) (1999). [13] A police service animal is defined as any dog or horse used by a law enforcement agency, which is specially trained for law enforcement work, or any animal contracted to assist a law enforcement agency in the performance of law enforcement duties. Id. § 76-9-306(1)(b). ¶ 49 Hamilton urges this court to read into the service animal statute a specific limitation on police dog status: that a dog's police service status is contingent upon its handler's continuing status as a police officer. In other words, if a police handler acts outside the scope of his authority, his police dog also loses its status as a police service animal. We find Hamilton's reasoning problematic in light of the plain language of the statute. [14] However, we decline to decide whether a police service animal loses its status when its handler acts outside the scope of his authority because, as we have already held, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Chambers was both acting under the color of legal authority and on duty during the events at Vance Springs. ¶ 50 Moreover, defense counsel conceded in oral argument that Chambers acted within the scope of his police authority at least until Chambers fired shots at Hamilton. Since the evidence shows that Chambers did not fire shots at Hamilton until after Hamilton shot Max, by the defense's own admission, Chambers was acting within the scope of his police authority at the time Max was shot. Therefore, Max could not have lost his police service status at the time he was shot. We thus conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Hamilton's motion to dismiss the charge of killing a police service dog and that it was proper to submit this charge to the jury.