Opinion ID: 1304167
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Ordinary Meaning and Agency Interpretation of the Code Term Lot Area

Text: The gist of Mall's argument is that because condemned street easements are not expressly excluded from the code's definition of lot area, they must be included. This argument overlooks the plain meaning and purpose of the code and distorts the well established common law and everyday understanding of the word lot. Mall would have us redefine lot to include certain public streets, despite the code's clear expression and intent that lot and street should be distinct. For the downtown Metropolitan Business Zone, the FAR formula is defined in relevant part as follows: The gross floor area of any structure ... shall not exceed ten (10) times the lot area ... (Italics ours.) SMC 24.46.110(A). Resolution of this dispute turns upon the meaning of lot area, which is defined as the total horizontal area within the lot lines of a lot. (Italics ours.) SMC 24.08.130(4). Lot lines are defined in turn as the property lines bounding a lot. (Italics ours.) SMC 24.08.130(12). [1, 2] Thus, the code leads us to rely on the term property lines to determine what is included within lot area. Since property lines are not expressly defined by the code, one must look to their common and ordinary meaning. See Dominick v. Christensen, 87 Wn.2d 25, 27, 548 P.2d 541 (1976); Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. 10, 88 Wn.2d 286, 291, 559 P.2d 1340, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977). Property lines are commonly understood as those lines which separate one's lot from adjoining lots or the street. Linneman Constr., Inc. v. Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 504 F.2d 1365, 1369 (8th Cir.1974); Loveladies Property Owners Ass'n v. Barnegat City Serv. Co., 60 N.J. Super. 491, 502-03, 159 A.2d 417 (1960); Ujka v. Sturdevant, 65 N.W.2d 292, 294 (N.D. 1954); Gage v. Chicago, 223 Ill. 602, 605, 79 N.E. 294 (1906); 34A Words and Phrases, Property Line, at 323 (1957). This understanding of property lines is consistent with the code's definition of lot as a parcel of land ... abutting by not less than twenty feet (20') upon a street, SMC 24.08.130(3), and of front lot line as the lot line separating the lot from the street, SMC 24.08.130(10). See also SMC 24.08.130(5), (10), and (15) (defining corner lots in relation to street boundaries). Since property lines bound a lot, and a lot extends only so far as the adjoining lot(s) and street(s) upon which it abuts, the code's definition of lot sets the outer limits for code purposes at which property lines or lot lines may lie. This interpretation also comports with the position of the DCLU: [W]hen the street comes into being, the property line becomes that line that separates the street from the lot. Hearing Examiner Transcript, at 77 (Feb. 7, 1984). Mall does not directly quarrel with the proposition that property lines run between a lot and abutting street. Yet, Mall would have us limit the above rule to dedicated streets based on its erroneous position that property lines, for zoning code purposes, constitute the boundaries defining fee ownership. Although intuitively appealing, this broader definition of property lines nullifies the very distinction Mall offers between condemned and dedicated streets. Mall seems to forget that a landowner whose property adjoins a dedicated street easement also owns a portion of the street property in fee. Puget Sound Alumni of Kappa Sigma, Inc. v. Seattle, 70 Wn.2d 222, 226, 422 P.2d 799 (1967) (citing Burmeister v. Howard, 1 Wash. Terr. 207, 211 (1867)). Landowners with property abutting dedicated streets hold a reversionary fee interest to the center line of the street. Roeder Co. v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 105 Wn.2d 567, 716 P.2d 855 (1986); RCW 35.79.040. If one were to apply Mall's definition of property lines so as to include condemned street easements in lot area, dedicated street easements would logically have to be included as well. Since the vast majority of Seattle streets, regardless of how acquired, are easements in which the abutter owns an underlying fee, nearly every landowner in the city could increase his FAR (and circumvent numerous other code requirements) by simply asserting his reversionary interest in the adjacent street. In short, allowing property lines to include all fee ownership in the technical sense renders the zoning code meaningless as a bulk and density control. See, e.g., Beatrice v. Williams, 172 Neb. 889, 112 N.W.2d 16 (1961). The DCLU's guidelines for drawing plot plans, upon which Mall relies, are not determinative on the question before us. See exhibit 14 (DCLU Information Bulletin 103). The DCLU guidelines are not law. They cannot supersede the zoning code. The guidelines simply inform the homeowner of the requisite information  including the demarcation of all easements and abutting streets  to include on a plat. The guidelines advise that property lines are the legal dimensions of [one's] property, a conception which may vary according to the purpose at hand. Exhibit 14, at 7. It has been stipulated that Mall owns a reversionary interest to a portion of Westlake Avenue and it is undisputed that Mall owns a portion up to the center lines of Fourth Avenue and Pine Street. See Roeder Co. v. Burlington Northern, Inc., supra ; Puget Sound Alumni of Kappa Sigma, Inc., at 226; Gillis v. King Cy., 42 Wn.2d 373, 377-78, 255 P.2d 546 (1953). However, such interests are mere future expectancies, bereft of enjoyment and incapable of pecuniary advantage. In re New York, 278 N.Y. 163, 173, 15 N.E.2d 563 (1938). As such, they cannot be considered part of Mall's developable lot area under the code. Indeed, Mall's deed overlooks these limited interests and describes the property in question as lying to the west of Westlake Avenue and bounded by Westlake, Fourth Avenue and Pine. Exhibit 1. When Mall purchased the property, Westlake Avenue had been a street for 60 years. Thus, Mall never had a realistic expectation of using the street property for pecuniary gain. Moreover, it is questionable whether Mall's claim to fee ownership of the full width of Westlake Avenue, although stipulated as fact by the parties, is sustainable as a matter of law. When Westlake Avenue was formed by condemnation in 1903, Mall's predecessors in interest received full compensation for the property. Nowhere does Mall's deed show a transfer of any rights in such land to Mall. If the street were now to be vacated, landowners on the east side of Westlake Avenue would have a cognizable claim to one-half of the street property. See RCW 35.79.040 (if any street or alley is vacated by the city, the affected property shall belong to the abutting property owners, one-half to each); see also Seattle v. Hinckley, 67 Wash. 273, 278-79, 121 P. 444 (1912); Burmeister, at 211-12. In short, nothing in the facts demonstrates that Mall's interest in Westlake Avenue is any greater than that of any landowner in any adjacent street. [3] More instructive than the DCLU guidelines are the decisions rendered by both the DCLU Director and Hearing Examiner that Mall's lot area does not include Westlake Avenue. It is a well established rule of statutory construction that considerable judicial deference should be given to the construction of an ordinance by those officials charged with its enforcement. Keller v. Bellingham, 92 Wn.2d 726, 731, 600 P.2d 1276 (1979); Morin v. Johnson, 49 Wn.2d 275, 279, 300 P.2d 569 (1956). In the context of a zoning case, this court has explained the reasons for this rule of deference as follows: The primary foundation and rationale for this rule is that considerable judicial deference should be accorded to the special expertise of administrative agencies. Such expertise is often a valuable aid in interpreting and applying an ambiguous statute in harmony with the policies and goals the legislature sought to achieve by its enactment. At times, administrative interpretation of a statute may approach lawmaking, but we have heretofore recognized that it is an appropriate function for administrative agencies to fill in the gaps where necessary to the effectuation of a general statutory scheme. It is likewise valid for an administrative agency to fill in the gaps via statutory construction  as long as the agency does not purport to amend the statute. (Citation omitted.) Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 85 Wn.2d 441, 448, 536 P.2d 157 (1975). In Hama Hama, as in the present case, the administrative agency's interpretation of a zoning code disfavored the involved property owners. Nevertheless, it was upheld on the principle of judicial deference. Mall argues that this rule of deference must give way to the rule that ambiguous zoning ordinances are to be strictly construed in favor of property owners. See, e.g., Morin, at 279. Yet such preference to property owners is only warranted to the extent ambiguity exists. Here, there is no ambiguity. The code's definition of lot area clearly excludes streets. Furthermore, zoning ordinances are to be liberally construed so as to effectuate their intent. Dando v. King Cy., 75 Wn.2d 598, 603, 452 P.2d 955 (1969). In light of the DCLU's long-standing expertise in calculating lot areas under the code, we uphold its interpretation. The approach taken by the Court of Appeals in East v. King Cy., 22 Wn. App. 247, 255, 589 P.2d 805 (1978) is applicable here. In resolving a dispute over the meaning of a zoning code's undefined use of the term campus, the court held first, that undefined, unambiguous terms in a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning, and second, that to the extent ambiguity exists, deference must be paid to the enforcing agency's interpretation. East, at 253-55. In the present case, the ordinary meaning and agency interpretation of property lines both yield the same result: the property lines bound Mall's lot area at the street.