Opinion ID: 758055
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Internal Versus Extraneous Influence

Text: 25 Having considered the proper standard of review, we must now determine whether the influence on juror # 1 was internal or extraneous. Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits a juror from 26 testify[ing] as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. 27 FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (emphasis added). 28 In Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987), the Supreme Court provided examples of both internal and extraneous jury influences. Examples of internal influences include the behavior of jurors during deliberations, the jurors' ability to hear or comprehend trial testimony, and physical or mental incompetence of a juror. Id. at 118, 107 S.Ct. 2739 (citing United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70 (2d Cir.1974)). The Court noted that the internal processes of the jury generally constitute internal influences. Id. at 120, 107 S.Ct. 2739. In contrast, Tanner gave the following as examples of extraneous influences: a juror in a criminal trial who had previously applied for a job in the district attorney's office (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982)), a bribe attempt on a juror (citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954)), and newspaper articles and media attention (citing United States v. Thomas, 463 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir.1972)). Id. at 117-18, 107 S.Ct. 2739. 29 In the instant case, the government argues that juror # 1's recollection that he might have had previous business dealings with Herndon constitutes an internal influence. In support of its argument, the government analogizes the present case to United States v. Rigsby, 45 F.3d 120 (6th Cir.1995). The juror in Rigsby believed that she might know some of the witnesses in a criminal trial. Id. at 122. Defense counsel had not questioned the jurors during voir dire about their knowledge of the witnesses. When the juror brought her knowledge to the attention of the judge and parties, defense counsel never unequivocally requested the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and did not make a motion for a mistrial, but counsel did suggest that the district court inquire about which witnesses the juror knew. Id. at 125 (emphasis added). The district court did not conduct such an investigation, and the defendant was convicted. On appeal, the defendant challenged the district court's failure to investigate. This court affirmed the decision of the district court, holding that no further inquiry into the juror's knowledge of any of the witnesses was necessary because the juror's statement was tentative, defense counsel failed to clearly object, and the trial was in an intimate rural community. Id. at 125. The Rigsby court failed to state whether the potential influence on the juror was deemed internal or extraneous. 30 While the government contends that the Rigsby court must have implicitly found that the influence on the jury was internal because it did not require a hearing, we find it unnecessary to resolve that question because of the many distinctions between Rigsby and the present case. While the main similarity is the tentative knowledge of the juror in question, the allegation in the instant case is that the juror was familiar with a party rather than a witness. The testimony of both Herndon and Stone, moreover, indicates that the juror may have had a negative experience during his interaction with Herndon. The Rigsby court also relied on the likelihood that in small communities a juror may know someone testifying at the trial. In the instant case, however, there was apparently no problem in selecting jurors who were not familiar with Herndon. In addition, defense counsel in Rigsby did not unequivocally request a hearing, whereas Herndon specifically requested a hearing and an opportunity to interview the juror. Finally, counsel in Rigsby failed to ask the jurors during voir dire whether they were familiar with any of the witnesses, while in the instant case the jurors had been asked whether they knew Herndon. 31 In contrast, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982), held that a juror in a criminal trial who had submitted a job application to the local district attorney's office was influenced by extraneous information. The Court held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias. Id. at 215, 102 S.Ct. 940. A new trial will not be necessary every time a question of juror partiality is raised. Id. at 217, 102 S.Ct. 940. Where a colorable claim of extraneous influence has been raised, however, a Remmer hearing is necessary to provide the defendant with the opportunity to prove actual bias. Id. In Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954), a juror was offered money in exchange for a favorable verdict. The Court held that a hearing was required to determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not [they were] prejudicial. Id. at 230, 74 S.Ct. 450. 32 In United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir.1984), a case factually similar to the case at bar, a juror failed to reveal during voir dire that he had served on a committee with the defendant and thus personally knew him. After the trial was completed, several jurors expressed doubts to defense counsel about the guilty verdict. Other jurors commented that the juror in question was especially committed to return a 'guilty' verdict. Id. at 1529-30. The district court in Perkins conducted a hearing and interviewed the jurors. After the hearing, the district court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit stated that [e]xtrinsic evidence, evidence that has not been subject to the procedural safeguards of a fair trial, threatens such constitutional safeguards as the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel. Id. at 1533. Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit, after considering all of the evidence introduced concerning the juror's statements, determined that the extraneous information might have influenced the verdict. It therefore remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 1534. 33 From Tanner, Smith, and Perkins, we distill the principle that an extraneous influence on a juror is one derived from specific knowledge about or a relationship with either the parties or their witnesses. This knowledge or relationship is such that it taints the deliberations with information not subject to a trial's procedural safeguards. These types of influences, moreover, may well deny the litigants their constitutional right to have the case heard by a fair and impartial jury. We thus conclude that juror # 1's recollection that he may have had prior business dealings with Herndon raises such concerns and constitutes an extraneous influence. Such an extraneous influence in the instant case has all the more potential for harm because the juror's putative knowledge relates to a party rather than to a witness.