Opinion ID: 874879
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Willoughby submitted to the officer's show of authority.

Text: Certainly, not every motorist who observes a police vehicle's activated overhead lights has been seized. Rather, the motorist must actually submit to the show of authority. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626-29, 111 S.Ct. at 1550-52, 113 L.Ed.2d at 697-99; Agundis, 127 Idaho at 590-91, 903 P.2d at 755-56. The question presented by this appeal is whether Willoughby's actions of remaining at the scene and stepping from the car as Officer Gillmore approached him constituted submission to the officers' show of authority. We conclude that it did. The Kansas Supreme Court addressed the difficult question presented in cases of passive acquiescence to an ambiguous show of authority in similar circumstances in State v. Morris, 276 Kan. 11, 72 P.3d 570 (2003). After considering a number of decisions from other courts regarding whether the use of emergency lights constituted a show of authority, [1] the court stated: Where there is neither force nor obvious words or actions of submission, some courts have applied the Mendenhall approach without reference to Hodari. E.g., United States v. Buchanon, 72 F.3d 1217 (6th Cir.1995). Other courts have determined that the individual's inaction, albeit passive, is a form of compliance and a submission to authority. E.g., Lawson, 120 Md.App. at 617-18, 707 A.2d 947.... We join this line of cases in terms of outcome, doing so by following the line of cases which hold that Hodari, and in this state our decision in [ State v. Weaver, 259 Kan. 844, 915 P.2d 746 (1996)], requires a finding that the accused submitted to the show of authority. In this case, Morris did not attempt to leave when officers pulled in behind him with their emergency lights flashing. Upon seeing the flashing emergency lights of the officer's patrol car, Morris complied with the officer's show of authority enjoining him to remain. He did not flee; instead, he complied with the assertion of authority. We find that Morris was seized within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.... Id. at 578-79, 72 P.3d 570. We concur with the reasoning and conclusion of the Kansas court. Willoughby's actions of remaining at the scene and stepping out of his car as Officer Gillmore approached constituted submission to the officers' show of authority. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court and district court properly concluded that Willoughby was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. This brings us to the question of whether the seizure violated Willoughby's right to be free from unreasonable seizure.