Opinion ID: 1690440
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: substantial deviation from employment

Text: To establish a worker's compensation claim, the claimant has the burden of proving all facts essential to compensation.... King v. Johnson Bros. Construction Co., 83 S.D. 69, 155 N.W.2d 183, 185 (1967). Only an employee whose injury arises out of and in the course of the employment is covered by worker's compensation. SDCL 62-1-1(2); see also SDCL 62-3-3; Deuschle v. Bak Const. Co., 443 N.W.2d 5, 6 (S.D.1989). It is clear that the injury arose out of Phillips' employment. Phillips would not have become injured but for the fact he was at work. Therefore, there is a causal connection between the injury and the employment and ... the injury had its origin in the hazard to which the employment exposed [Phillips] while doing his work. Bearshield v. City of Gregory, 278 N.W.2d 166, 168 (S.D.1979) ( citing Krier v. Dick's Linoleum Shop, 78 S.D. 116, 98 N.W.2d 486 (1959)). The injury need not be proximately caused by the employment, but simply that it would not have occurred but for the employment. Krier, 98 N.W.2d at 487. Since the injury arose out of the course of employment, the next issue becomes whether Phillips' injury arose in the course of his employment. In Bearshield, 278 N.W.2d at 168, we stated that this phrase refers to the time, place and circumstances of the injury. Furthermore, [a]n employee is considered to be in the course of his employment if he is doing something that is either naturally or incidentally related to his employment.... Id. We have recognized that this court has allowed recovery in certain cases where a very strict interpretation of the phrase would have prohibited recovery. Id.; see Meyer v. Roettele, 64 S.D. 36, 264 N.W. 191 (1935); Krier, supra; Lang v. Board of Educ. Etc., 70 S.D. 343, 17 N.W.2d 695 (1945); Jacobson v. Strong and Waggoner, 66 S.D. 552, 287 N.W. 41 (1939). Since we have not embraced a strict interpretation of the phrase in the course of employment in matters which do not pertain to horseplay, we now adopt factors to be considered in matters which do pertain to horseplay. Specifically, we adopt the factors enumerated in Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law as to whether horseplay is within the course of employment. Larson states: The current tendency is to treat the question, when an instigator is involved, as a primarily course of employment [question]...; thus minor acts of horseplay do not automatically constitute departures from employment, but may here, as in other fields, be found insubstantial. So, whether initiation of horseplay is a deviation from course of employment depends on: (1) the extent and seriousness of the deviation, (2) the completeness of the deviation (i.e., whether it was commingled with the performance of duty or involved an abandonment of duty), (3) the extent to which the practice of horseplay had become an accepted part of the employment, and (4) the extent to which the nature of the employment may be expected to include some such horseplay. 1A Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law § 23.00 (1990). Since horseplay does not constitute a part of Phillips' duties for Morrell, the question of whether Phillips was operating in the course of his employment becomes a question as to the seriousness of the deviation from his duties. First, when considering the extent and seriousness of the deviation, we must look at the act and not the consequences. Phillips was at his work station where he performed his required duty of cutting sperm cords. Instead of disposing them on a conveyor belt, Phillips threw them at a co-worker. The horseplay involved the throwing of sperm cords which have been described as a straw-like material. Despite the fact that approximately fourteen supervisors and government inspectors were around the kill floor, the line was not shut down, nor was Phillips reprimanded for failure to perform his duties. The extent of the horseplay was not significant enough to affect the work product. Despite the close proximity of the workers, there is no reason to foresee that the throwing of sperm cords or stick wounds would result in a serious injury such as a stabbing wound. The deviation was not serious or substantial. Second, Phillips continued performing his duties as the horseplay took place. Phillips at no time abandoned his duties; rather, his duty to cut the cords was commingled with his act of throwing them at a co-worker. Third, undisputed testimony was given that despite Morrell's rule against horseplay, horseplay such as that engaged in by Phillips did occur. Morrell dealt with or tolerated this horseplay to varying degrees. Finally, it could be expected that some horseplay would be engaged in during the course of assembly line jobs. These monotonous jobs provide such a constant pattern of repetition that some new stimulus becomes necessary to relieve the tedium. For the worker, some moderate amounts of horseplay operate as that stimulus. As stated by the court in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11, 15 (C.A.D.C.1940): [The employment] environment includes associations as well as conditions, and that associations include the faults and derelictions of human beings as well as their virtues and obediences. Men do not discard their personal qualities when they go to work. Into the job they carry their intelligence, skill, habits of care and rectitude. Just as inevitably they take along also their tendencies to carelessness and camaraderie, as well as emotional make-up. In bringing men together, work brings these qualities together, causes frictions between them, creates occasions for lapses into carelessness, and for fun-making and emotional flare-up. Work could not go on if men became automatons repressed in every natural expression.... These expressions of human nature are incidents inseparable from working together. They involve risks of injury and these risks are inherent in the working environment. Having reviewed all four of Larson's factors, as well the causal connection between the injury and employment, we conclude that the horseplay Phillips engaged in was not a substantial deviation from his employment and therefore Phillips' injury is out of and in the course of his employment which is required for an employee to receive compensation under our worker's compensation laws. In addition to the issue regarding deviation from employment, Morrell also has claimed that Phillips' horseplay amounted to willful misconduct under SDCL 62-4-37 and as such disqualifies recovery.