Opinion ID: 385703
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Types of Agency and Federal Court Jurisdiction Distinguished

Text: 47 When a state's jurisdiction to adjudicate, 97 as opposed to its enforcement or prescriptive jurisdiction, is at issue, questions of service of process, subject matter jurisdiction, and personal jurisdiction are invariably intertwined and hence, frequently confused. Before a federal court may adjudicate a controversy, it must possess jurisdiction over both the subject matter of the action and over the persons whose rights are to be affected by its determination. 98 Both types of jurisdiction are constitutionally limited. The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts depends totally upon congressional implementation of a constitutional grant of subject matter jurisdiction. 99 Furthermore, federal courts are subject to limits of personal jurisdiction a court may not exercise its adjudicatory authority over an individual unless it has power to reach him, as circumscribed by the due process clause of the Constitution. 100 Under modern doctrine, 101 due process is not satisfied unless the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of a lawsuit against him in that forum does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 102 Procedural due process further requires that a court not exercise its adjudicatory authority over a person, even when it has the power to do so, unless that person has been given adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. 103 Thus a court may lack personal jurisdiction over an individual either because it is powerless to affect his rights or because it has failed to give him proper notice that his rights are at issue. 48 If properly accomplished, service of process confers personal jurisdiction upon a court to adjudicate the rights of a party. 104 When as here, the issue is the propriety of a particular technique of serving a particular type of process, however, neither subject matter jurisdiction nor personal jurisdiction in either the power or the notice sense is directly at issue. 105 The basic inquiry here is thus whether the district court's enforcement order should be vacated because the manner used by the agency to serve its subpoena was unauthorized by, or in in some other way obnoxious to, domestic or international law. 49 The district court, however, apparently viewed the central issue in the case as whether or not the power of the FTC to serve process abroad could validly be inferred from its broad investigatory and regulatory jurisdiction. 106 The court read Blackmer v. United States 107 as unequivocally conclud(ing) that the lawful exercise of jurisdiction confers the authority to effect service. 108 It then postulated that since the Blackmer Court had upheld Congress' power expressly to authorize issuance of subpoenas abroad, it must have also approved Congress' power to secure service of those subpoenas. By delegating its subpoena power to the FTC, the district court concluded, Congress by implication must have delegated to the agency authority to effect subpoena service in any permissible manner. 109 50 Such an analysis fundamentally misreads the Supreme Court's jurisdictional findings in Blackmer, as a review of the history of that case will demonstrate. Upon discovery of the Teapot Dome scandal in 1923, a number of the prominent Americans involved, among them Harry Blackmer, fled to France. To compel their testimony in the subsequent criminal proceedings, Congress passed the Walsh Act 110 authorizing the federal district courts to compel the attendance of American witnesses abroad in connection with domestic criminal proceedings. The statute expressly authorized service of judicial subpoenas outside the United States and specified the means of service to be employed. 111 Pursuant to the Act, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia issued a subpoena which was served upon Blackmer in the statutorily authorized fashion, requiring Blackmer to appear as a witness at a criminal trial. When Blackmer failed to respond, he was found in contempt of court. The U. S. Supreme Court affirmed the contempt conviction and upheld the statute against a due process attack solely on the grounds that Blackmer was, and continued to be, a citizen of the United States. 112 51 The Blackmer Court found the statute consistent with both the Constitution and international law for two reasons. With respect to the exercise of the United States' prescriptive authority over Blackmer, the Court found there is no question of international law, but solely of the purport of the municipal law which establishes the duties of the citizen in relation to his own government, namely, the duty which the citizen owes to his government ... to support the administration of justice by attending its courts and giving his testimony whenever he is properly summoned. 113 With respect to the exercise of the United States' adjudicative authority over Blackmer, the Court held that the trial court's authority to give Blackmer constitutionally required notice was a necessary adjunct of its judicial power over him, which in turn was independently based upon the contact provided by his American citizenship. 114 52 Upon examination, this case bears little resemblance to Blackmer. In Blackmer, the primary question was one of personal jurisdiction: whether Blackmer's American citizenship provided a sufficient basis for the court's assertion of its adjudicatory power over him. 115 The witness did not challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the court; Congress had by statute explicitly delegated to the court the authority to issue its subpoenas abroad as part of its general jurisdiction to adjudicate. Nor did Blackmer question whether Congress had authorized the particular technique of service employed. In the Walsh Act, Congress had clearly stated its intent to equip courts with a means by which to serve American witnesses abroad to procure their attendance in criminal proceedings. 116 Thus the only question of international law discussed in Blackmer was whether Congress, by enacting the Walsh Act, had exceeded its prescriptive jurisdiction. 117 53 Here, by contrast, the primary questions are those of subject matter jurisdiction and technique of service. At the time of service, Congress had explicitly conferred subject matter jurisdiction on the agency to investigate conditions which may affect America's foreign trade, but it had not explicitly delegated to the agency any authority to serve its subpoenas on foreign citizens abroad. 118 In Blackmer, the congressional intent regarding the proper method of service was unmistakable; here, it is precisely the congressional intent with respect to technique of service which is in dispute. 54 In direct contradistinction to Blackmer, in this case the personal jurisdiction of both the district court and the agency over the respondent is not at issue: the court has secured personal jurisdiction over the respondent by proper service of process and, misguidedly or not, the respondent has conceded that the documents being sought are subject to the personal jurisdiction of the agency. 119 The relevant issues under international law, therefore, are whether the FTC has properly served its subpoena and whether the court exceeded its enforcement jurisdiction by enforcing that subpoena. 55 The district court chose to answer the question of the propriety of the FTC's method of service by reference to the agency's subject matter jurisdiction. 120 Thus, the district court derived the agency's specific authority to serve its subpoena abroad in the manner chosen not from any federal statute, but solely by implication from the agency's general investigatory and regulatory jurisdiction. In view of the prevailing principles of international law opposing that mode of service, 121 we will examine whether such an implication was warranted. 56