Opinion ID: 3055301
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Intercepted Phone Calls

Text: 8 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 9 of 53 The task force used a variety of techniques to investigate the suspected drug activity at 1239 McDonald Street, including controlled buys. However, the controlled buys were only marginally successful, as law enforcement was limited in the amount it could purchase due to the high price of the Oxycontin pills. Search warrants executed at 1239 McDonald Street were mostly unfruitful because the location was not a stash house and no drugs or cash were ever found inside. And due to the nature of the drugs, customers would often ingest the Oxycontin pills before leaving the street after purchasing them, making immediate stops of suspected customers unproductive. Ultimately, law enforcement sought and obtained authorization to conduct three wiretaps. When Carlos Riggs went to jail, law enforcement used the wiretaps on the telephones of Cameron White (who made several calls to Carlos Riggs while in jail), Brandon Moody (the alleged supplier of Oxycontin), and Marlon Riggs (who law enforcement thought might take over the operation after Carlos Riggs’s arrest). Carson participated or was mentioned in the following intercepted calls. In an intercepted phone call on July 26, 2010, Carson called Marlon Riggs and asked to speak with another dealer, Gavin Walker. In the course of the conversation, Carson told Walker: “Dude in the . . . little heating van, the little AC dude. He[’s] fixing to pull up. Give him a[n] old car.” An “old car” or “car” 9 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 10 of 53 refers to an Oxycontin pill. In an August 9, 2010 phone call, Carson called Marlon Riggs and warned him: “The folks on Watts now,” referring to the drug investigation task force. On August 11, 2010, Carson called Marlon Riggs and asked, “You got some cars?” 3 Marlon Riggs responded that he did not. In a phone call on September 9, 2010, Carson called Cameron White and said, “You still got some hero?” White replied, “Yeah, I’m [a]bout [to] pull up at the spot now.” 4 “Hero” refers to heroin, and “the spot” refers to 1239 McDonald Street. In another call on September 9, 2010, White called an unidentified male. The unidentified male asked if White had “some of that boy.” “Boy” is another term for heroin. White responded, “Yeah, but . . . I ain’t in Brighton right now.” The unidentified male asked if White had left some with someone. White stated, “Yeah, they got some down there. Little Ike got it down there at the spot. Wayne got some too.” “Wayne” is Carson’s nickname. In a September 10, 2010 call, Gavin Walker asked Cameron White, “Where that skillet at?” White answered, “Damn Wayne had that bitch last.” A “skillet” refers to a digital scale. 3 This phone call serves as the basis for Count 20, charging Carson with use of a communication facility in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of § 843(b). 4 This phone call serves as the basis for Count 33, charging Carson with use of a communication facility in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of § 843(b). 10 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 11 of 53 On September 12, 2010, Walker called White and asked if anyone had any “boy.” White responded that he had “been trying to get . . . some.” In the course of the conversation, White asked “who all down there,” to which Walker replied, “Me, Wayne, Fatboy . . .” In a September 14, 2010 call, Carson called White and told him, “Tell [Ike] white boy [is fixing] to pull up . . . in about 30 seconds.” White is then heard telling someone, “White boy is about to pull up in [a]bout 30 seconds wanting them OPs. Want them OPs. . . . [He] need them three.”5 “OPs” are a nickname for the reformulated Oxycontin pills. On September 18, 2010, Carlos Riggs called White from jail. In that call, White complained to Riggs that Carson was not helping out at “the spot” and when the “[b]ill man come around, he take off runnin’.” In a September 19, 2010 intercepted phone call, Carson called White and asked if he “got some Ps?” “Ps” refer to Oxycontin pills. In a phone call later that same day, Carson called White again and asked if he “got some dog food?” White answered, “Yea there is some dog food at the house.” Later in the conversation Carson asked, “You know what I’m talking about man?” In response, White said, “Oh, you talking about that dog food. No there ain’t no more of that. No I need to get some of that.” “Dog food” is a nickname for heroin. But Carson and White 5 This phone call serves as the basis for Count 40, charging Carson with use of a communication facility in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in violation of § 843(b). 11 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 12 of 53 also had dogs, so the phone call may have referred to actual dog food. On September 20, 2010, Carson called White. White said, “I was fixing to see if you had some of them OPs up there.” Carson responded, “All right, I’ll try to get you some down there in a minute.” In a September 24, 2010 phone call, Carson again called White asking “how many cars you got?” White said he only had one. Carson responded, “Bring me that one.” C. The Superseding Indictment On March 30, 2011, the government filed a superseding indictment charging Defendant Carson and 17 other defendants 6 with a number of offenses related to the alleged Oxycontin and heroin drug sale operation at 1239 McDonald Street. Specifically, the superseding indictment charged Carson with a conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute or distribute controlled substances lasting from May 2008 to December 12, 2010 in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1), three counts of using a telephone to facilitate a drug trafficking offense in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (Counts 20, 33, and 40), and one count of possessing a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 59). With regard to Count 1, all defendants were charged with conspiring to 6 These codefendants included Carlos Riggs, Marlon Riggs, Gavin Walker, and Cameron White, among others. 12 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 13 of 53 possess with the intent to distribute or distribute: 100 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectible amount of heroin . . . , a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine hydrochloride, . . . and an amount of oxycodone (Oxycontin), . . . and a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of marijuana. Carson was the only defendant to proceed to a trial. All other defendants pled guilty and entered into plea agreements with the government. D. Pretrial Motions Prior to trial, Carson filed three motions to suppress: (1) a motion to suppress evidence found in the January 5, 2011 search of his home; (2) a motion to suppress the cash and guns found in Carson’s vehicle in the November 2009 traffic stop; and (3) a motion to suppress the cash found on Carson’s person and the statements Carson made during the September 23, 2010 police encounter. 1. First Motion to Suppress In his first motion to suppress, Carson argued that his home was searched pursuant to an unconstitutional general warrant. Specifically, the warrant permitted officers to seize “Drug proceeds, records, Controlled Substance marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and items as outlined in Attachment 1 (items common to the drug trade) and other evidence of illegal activity.” Attachment 1 included a list of 11 rather broad categories, including paragraph 11: “Any and all other material evidence of violations of Criminal Code of Alabama, together with 13 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 14 of 53 fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crimes at this time unknown.” Carson alleged that the warrant impermissibly allowed law enforcement to seize almost anything, and that the “unlawfulness of the warrant was so plain that it was unreasonable for any competent officer to rely upon it in good faith.” The matter proceeded to a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge first set the motion for an evidentiary hearing, but the parties agreed that the issue could be resolved without a hearing based on the pleadings. The magistrate judge then issued Findings and Recommendations, ultimately recommending that the motion to suppress should be denied because “[t]he good faith exception of Leon is applicable to the acquisition and execution of a warrant in this case.” The magistrate judge rejected the government’s alternative arguments that it was not a general warrant or that the unconstitutional parts of the warrant could be severed. First, the magistrate judge noted that in Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 96 S. Ct. 2737 (1969), the Supreme Court had held that a warrant was not unconstitutionally overbroad when it included, at the end of a list of items to be seized, a general clause authorizing seizure of “other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown.” Id. at 479, 96 S. Ct. at 2748. But the magistrate judge also observed that “[t]he lynchpin in Andresen was the fact that the overly broad phrase appeared after a colon preceding the description of items to be seized.” Viewing the Andresen warrant in context: (1) the general clause in 14 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 15 of 53 Andresen was not in its own sentence and was part of a series following a list of “items pertaining to . . . lot 13, block T” (the property to be searched) and a colon; and (2) the word “crime” in the general clause was limited to the crime of false pretenses charged in relation to “lot 13, block T.” Id. at 480–82, 96 S. Ct. at 2748– 49. Here, however, the warrant’s Attachment 1 “stands alone,” and “by its own terms is not limited in scope because no limiting clause precedes the more general clauses.” The magistrate judge also rejected the government’s alternative argument that any unconstitutional portion of the warrant could be severed from those portions supporting probable cause. The magistrate judge concluded that this could not be done here where it was impossible “to determine whether the seizures were made pursuant to the unlawful general provision of the warrant or the more limited one.” However, the magistrate judge determined that the good faith exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), should be applied to the search conducted pursuant to the warrant. The magistrate judge first observed that the following question had been put to the parties: whether an officer obtaining a search warrant from a Jefferson County [state] judge containing language which had previously been determined by a judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s specificity requirements could be said to have acted in objective good faith in relying on a warrant with similar defects. 15 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 16 of 53 The magistrate judge agreed with the government that a U.S. district court judge’s determination was not binding, and further observed that the Eleventh Circuit had later held Leon’s good faith exception was applicable to the warrant in that case in an unpublished affirmance. The magistrate judge found the warrant in this case “far more limited in scope” than that in the Northern District of Alabama case. Specifically, “the broad definition of paragraph 11 [in Attachment 1] is expressly cabined by the limitation describing Attachment 1 on the face of the warrant”: “(items common to the drug trade).” Thus, the warrant was “limited to evidence and, therefore, presumably violations of law common to the drug trade as opposed to a more broad definition of items to be seized and unspecific offenses.” Accordingly, the magistrate judge concluded that law enforcement could in good faith rely upon the warrant and recommended Carson’s motion to suppress be denied. 2. Second and Third Motions to Suppress Carson’s second motion to suppress sought to exclude the admission of the firearms and money seized in the November 2009 search of his vehicle. In a third motion to suppress, Carson sought to suppress evidence obtained in the September 2010 encounter. Specifically, Carson sought to exclude admission as evidence: (1) the $1,440 in cash found on Carson’s person; and (2) the statements he made to law enforcement during the encounter. Carson argued that the statements should 16 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 17 of 53 be suppressed because he was in custody when the statements were made and he was at no time advised of his Miranda rights. The magistrate judge conducted a suppression hearing regarding Carson’s second and third motions to suppress. At the suppression hearing, the government presented the testimony of Detective Jacob Bradley concerning the November 4, 2009 traffic stop and search, and the testimony of Sergeant Victor Sims, Sergeant Cameron Beedle, and Sergeant Dannielle Jackson concerning the September 2010 stop. The officers testified to the events described above in relation to the September 2010 stop. Notably, on cross-examination of Sgt. Sims, defense counsel questioned Sgt. Sims about conducting the pat-down of Carson: [Defense Counsel:] Well—now, when you patted [Carson] down, you put him on the—pat him down? [Sgt. Sims:] Yes, sir. [Defense Counsel:] You’re looking for weapons? [Sgt. Sims:] Yes, sir. [Defense Counsel:] Did you find any weapons? [Sgt. Sims:] No, sir. [Defense Counsel:] Did you find anything that was hard? [Sgt. Sims:] Not that I can recall, no, sir. [Defense Counsel:] But then you saw something soft? [Sgt. Sims:] Yes, sir. [Defense Counsel:] Did you think that was a weapon? [Sgt. Sims:] No, sir. I recognized it as money, as a roll of money. [Defense Counsel:] But when you patted him down, did you think it was a weapon? [Sgt. Sims:] No, sir. [Defense Counsel:] But you asked him what it was? [Sgt. Sims:] Yes, sir. 17 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 18 of 53 [Defense Counsel:] At that time, [Carson] had—not spreading but had his hands on the car? [Sgt. Sims:] Yes, sir. [Defense Counsel:] Was he free to go? [Sgt. Sims:] He was not free to go, per se. [Defense Counsel:] All right. Well, when you asked him those questions, did you—before you asked him those questions, did you give him his rights? [Sgt. Sims:] I didn’t read him his rights, no, sir. [Defense Counsel:] Did anybody read him his rights at that time? [Sgt. Sims:] No, sir. [Defense Counsel:] All right. And then you got the money? [Sgt. Sims:] I asked him, and he gave me permission. After the suppression hearing, the magistrate judge issued Findings and Recommendations. The magistrate judge first recommended denying Carson’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the November 2009 search of his car because Detective Bradley had probable cause to stop Carson’s car, Detective Bradley’s questions during the stop were constitutionally permissible, and Carson’s consent to the search of the car and seizure of the cash and guns was voluntary. The magistrate judge also recommended denying Carson’s motion to suppress the evidence of the cash and Carson’s statements made during the September 2010 stop. Most relevant here, the magistrate judge made this recommendation because: (1) the Terry7 stop of Carson was based on reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity; (2) Carson consented to 7 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884–85 (1968). 18 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 19 of 53 removal of the cash from his pocket; (3) Carson was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he was walked from where he was initially stopped to the agents at 1239 McDonald Street; and (4) Carson was not in custody when he spoke with the onsite agents at 1239 McDonald Street. The magistrate judge stated that “Carson was simply not in custody at the time he made” the statements to the officers, and even after being moved to 1239 McDonald Street, “he was not under arrest. . . . [n]or was Mr. Carson in custody” for purposes of Miranda. Over Carson’s objections to the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations as to all three motions to suppress, the district court concluded that “the magistrate judge’s report on all three of these issues is due to be and is hereby adopted, and the recommendations of the magistrate judge are accepted by this Court.” 3. Motion in Limine Carson also filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude items seized from his home in the January 5, 2011 search, specifically the two guns found. Carson argued that these items were: (1) irrelevant to the conspiracy charged in the superseding indictment; and (2) unfairly prejudicial, as he would admit to being a drug user at trial. After hearing argument on the motion in limine, the district court denied it. E. Carson’s Trial 19 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 20 of 53 Carson’s jury trial began on August 29, 2011. During the first day of trial, Carson’s defense counsel objected that it had only received redacted copies of the wiretap applications and orders, and the statute governing these wiretaps required unredacted copies be provided to the defense at least 10 days prior to trial. The government explained that the redactions were related to individuals who were involved in ongoing investigations. Based on the district court’s “cursory review,” the district court stated that the redactions appeared to be consistent with the government’s explanation. The district court overruled defense counsel’s objection but ordered the government to provide the defense with unredacted copies of the wiretap applications and orders by the end of the day. The government furnished these copies the next morning. Despite receiving unredacted copies, defense counsel maintained its argument that “the statute says what it says,” and the government’s failure to produce unredacted copies of the wiretap applications 10 days prior to trial precluded admission at trial of the intercepted phone calls and other evidence resulting from the wiretaps. The district court rejected the defense’s argument. The district court observed that having reviewed the redacted copies, “the Court believes that they were complete enough for you to have all of the basic elements that you need to cross-examine or to be ready for trial.” Further, any prejudice caused by delay in 20 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 21 of 53 receiving the unredacted copies had been rectified by defense counsel receiving them that day. The district court also told the defense it could have additional time to review the unredacted copies and even offered to delay trial if necessary for defense counsel to complete that review. In its case-in-chief, the government presented the testimony of numerous law enforcement officers that participated in the investigation, including Special Agent Gerhardt, Sgt. French, Detective Bradley, Sgt. Sims, and Sgt. Beedle; the wiretapped phone conversations involving Carson; and the testimony of several of Carson’s codefendants: Carlos Riggs, Marlon Riggs, Cameron White, Gavin Walker, and Demarcus Witt. The defense case proceeded on a theory that Carson was a small-time drug dealer and drug user, but he was not part of the Riggs organization and thus not a member of the charged conspiracy. The defense called witnesses who testified that Carson visited those he knew at 1239 McDonald Street for social reasons and that he had little discretionary money. Carson also testified in his defense. First, Carson admitted that he sold drugs beginning in 2009. But Carson denied that his drug dealing was part of the Riggs organization. Carson said his involvement with the Riggs brothers and others in the organization was strictly for “[e]ntertainment purposes.” Carson said he did deal drugs at times on McDonald Street, but claimed that 21 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 22 of 53 he was kicked off the street three times by Carlos Riggs. And Carson said he purchased from Riggs’s dealers only three times when his own supplier ran out. Carson said he otherwise did not deal with the Riggs organization because their prices were higher and he was afraid of Carlos Riggs. On each occasion he dealt with the Riggs organization, Carson had no intention of making it a continuous arrangement. Notably, Carson did not contest that he participated in the wiretapped phone conversations and that these phone conversations concerned drug transactions— including the three calls that anchored the three counts of using a telephone in furtherance of the drug conspiracy. For the most part, Carson’s defense was that the various phone calls referenced individual transactions in line with his own small-time drug dealing and personal drug use. For instance, Carson said that the July 26, 2010 phone call in which he asked Gavin Walker to give a man in a van a pill was to pay for the man’s work on Carson’s air conditioning unit. In the September 9, 2010 phone call in which Carson asked Cameron White for some heroin, Carson said he was interested in obtaining it only as a customer and planned to use it with a girl. In the phone call referencing dog food, Carson said he meant actual dog food and not heroin. Carson also testified that the September 18, 2010 phone call between Cameron White and Carlos Riggs referenced a falling out he had with White, and 22 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 23 of 53 supported his argument that Carlos Riggs often kept him from selling on McDonald Street. On September 2, 2011, the jury returned its verdict. The jury found Carson guilty on Count 1 of conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute or distribute oxycodone (Oxycontin) and heroin. The jury found the conspiracy involved an amount of heroin weighing less than 100 grams. The jury found Carson guilty as to Counts 20, 33, and 40, charging use of a communication facility in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. Lastly, the jury found Carson not guilty on Count 59 charging possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. F. Carson’s Sentence On February 1, 2012, the district court entered a judgment sentencing Carson to 210 months’ imprisonment as to the drug conspiracy conviction, and 48 months’ imprisonment as to each of the three convictions for use of a communication facility to facilitate a drug trafficking offense, all sentences to run concurrently with one another. Carson filed this timely appeal. II. CARSON’S STATEMENTS IN THE SEPTEMBER 2010 ENCOUNTER
“We apply a mixed standard of review to the denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress, reviewing the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its 23 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 24 of 53 application of law to those facts de novo.” United States v. Tamari, 454 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
On appeal, Carson first argues that the statements he made to law enforcement in the September 2010 encounter should have been suppressed as they were made without Carson first being advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966). Specifically, Carson challenges the admission of: (1) his statements to Sergeant Sims and Sergeant Beedle when he was first stopped, including his statement concerning where he obtained the $1,440 in cash; and (2) his statements to Special Agent Gerhardt and Sergeant Jackson after being escorted to 1239 McDonald Street. Carson maintains he was in custody for the duration of the encounter and was therefore entitled to Miranda warnings prior to any questioning by law enforcement. The Fifth Amendment provides individuals with a right against selfincrimination. U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that the government may not use a defendant’s statements elicited during a custodial interrogation against that defendant unless officials provide specific warnings concerning the defendant’s rights against self-incrimination beforehand. United States v. Woods, 684 F.3d 1045, 1055 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). But the trigger for Miranda protections is custody. A person is in custody 24 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 25 of 53 for purposes of Miranda if, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe the restraint on his freedom of movement has been curtailed to the degree associated with a formal arrest. United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277, 1284 (11th Cir. 2010). In assessing whether a reasonable person in Carson’s position would have understood his freedom of movement to have been curtailed in this way, “we consider the totality of the circumstances, including whether the officers brandished weapons, touched the suspect, or used language or a tone that indicated that compliance with the officers could be compelled, as well as the location and length of the detention.” United States v. Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d 876, 881 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). For instance, a person temporarily detained pursuant to an ordinary traffic stop is not “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150 (1984). This Court has further held that a defendant stopped pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), is not “in custody” for Miranda purposes where the restraint used is “the minimal amount necessary for such a stop” and the circumstances of the stop do not involve “the type of ‘highly intrusive’ coercive atmosphere that may require Miranda warnings even before a formal arrest is made.” United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1150 (11th Cir. 2004). Carson alleges that the stop and questioning he was subjected to by law 25 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 26 of 53 enforcement amounted to custodial interrogation because: (1) he was ordered to place his hands on the patrol car; (2) the officers searched him and took away his money and identification; 8 and (3) the officers then took him to another area for further questioning. In response, the government argues that Carson was not in custody for Miranda purposes because: (1) he was standing on a public street in public view; (2) he was questioned only briefly; (3) Carson was never placed in handcuffs or arrested; and (4) the officers never brandished their weapons. Alternatively, the government argues that even if Carson was in custody, any error in the admission of his two statements was harmless. We need not resolve the custody issue because even assuming that Carson was subjected to custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings, “[t]he admission of statements obtained in violation of Miranda is subject to harmless error scrutiny.” United States v. Arbolaez, 450 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Under harmless error scrutiny, “[t]he question is whether there is a reasonable probability that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we must decide whether “after we subtract the statements that should not have been admitted at [Carson’s] trial, the remaining evidence is so overwhelming that we are 8 Carson’s assertion here is premised on the fact that at trial, Sgt. Beedle testified that upon taking Carson to Special Agent Gerhardt and Sgt. Jackson, Sgt. Beedle “handed his identification [to the officers and] said, ‘Here’s him. Here’s his money.’” According to Carson, this “prov[es] that they had taken the identification.” 26 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 27 of 53 convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the improperly admitted evidence did not affect the verdict.” United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2010); see United States v. Gari, 572 F.3d 1352, 1362 (11th Cir. 2009). The government bears the burden to demonstrate that an error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 892 (11th Cir. 2005). The non-Mirandized statements introduced from the September 2010 encounter were essentially that: (1) Carson first said he had obtained the $1,440 in cash found on his person from working at a steel plant but then said it was payment for breaking down boxes at a Shell gas station; and (2) Carson said he did not live on McDonald Street and was in the area because he had been visiting a girl. 9 Subtracting these two statements Carson made to law enforcement in the September 2010 encounter concerning where he obtained the cash and why he was in the area, the remaining evidence of Carson’s guilt is overwhelming. Carson’s testimony alone could support the verdict. First, Carson admitted that he was a drug dealer, and at times he sold drugs, including Oxycontin, on McDonald Street. Carson also acknowledged that he associated with many members of the Riggs organization, particularly Marlon Riggs. On three occasions, Carson conceded he purchased drugs from Riggs organization members when his own supplier ran out, and on one of those occasions he purchased heroin. 9 Carson’s other statements during the encounter, including that Carson had been paid “under the table” and had not paid taxes on those earnings, were not admitted at trial. 27 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 28 of 53 As for the wiretapped phone conversations, Carson admitted it was his voice on the calls, including the three phone calls that served as the bases of the three counts for use of a telephone in furtherance of the drug conspiracy. While Carson testified fervently that these isolated incidents did not mean he was part of the charged drug conspiracy, the jury was free to not only disbelieve Carson’s testimony but also to conclude the exact opposite of what he said was true and to use it as substantive evidence against him. See United States v. Williams, 390 F.3d 1319, 1325 (11th Cir. 2004). Additionally, Carson’s codefendants testified that Carson sold pills at 1239 McDonald Street, both providing Oxycontin pills to Riggs organization members for resale and purchasing pills to sell himself. When the Riggs organization switched from selling Oxycontin to selling heroin, one of Carson’s codefendants testified that Carson became a major source of heroin. And despite Carson’s assertions that he often purchased the drugs for his own use, a number of Carson’s codefendants testified that they had never seen Carson use Oxycontin or heroin. We must also consider the impact the admission of these two statements had on the other evidence and on Carson’s defense. See Arbolaez, 450 F.3d at 1293 (“[T]he court must inquire into (1) the effect of the erroneously admitted statement upon the other evidence introduced at trial, and (2) upon the conduct of the defense.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The admission of these statements 28 Case: 12-10682 Date Filed: 05/31/2013 Page: 29 of 53 showed Carson was inconsistent concerning where he had obtained the cash and about where he lived. But in the absence of these statements, other evidence showed Carson had $2,000 in cash during the November 2009 traffic stop and $5,877 in cash at his home in the January 2011 search. More importantly, the testimony of Carson’s codefendants significantly undermined his credibility on every key point, even without the statements. Furthermore, Carson has never indicated that the admission of these two non-Mirandized statements affected his defense in any way. For example, he has never claimed that he would not have testified had these statements been excluded. Finally, these statements played little if any role in the government’s case against Carson. The two non-Mirandized statements from the September 2010 encounter, while introduced, were not emphasized by the government during trial, during cross-examination of Carson, or in closing argument. Accordingly, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of the statements Carson made without the benefit of Miranda warnings in the September 2010 encounter did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. Thus, we affirm the district court’s denial of Carson’s motion to suppress the statements.