Opinion ID: 1685845
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was the warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate?

Text: McCommon here argues that the issuing magistrate, Justice Court Judge Nevel Mangum, was not a neutral and detached magistrate. Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have held that the individual issuing the warrant must be a neutral and detached magistrate. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948); Birchfield v. State, 412 So.2d 1181 (Miss. 1982). A magistrate who fails to perform his neutral and detached function and who serves merely as a rubber stamp for the police cannot validly issue a search warrant. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979). Judge Mangum was called as a witness for the state during the suppression hearing in this cause. On cross-examination by the defense attorney, Judge Mangum testified that he relied primarily on the fact that the people who requested the warrant were sworn police officers rather than anything in particular in the affidavit of underlying facts and circumstances. Judge Mangum did add however, Well, if I didn't feel like it was warranted, now, then, naturally, I wouldn't issue it. McCommon asserts that the judge's testimony that he primarily relied on the fact that sworn police officers were asking for the warrant is evidence that he was not a neutral and detached magistrate. We disagree. Judge Mangum's testimony that he would not have issued the warrant had he not thought it appropriate is evidence that he was not serving merely as a rubber stamp for the police. We therefore find no merit in McCommon's argument; however, it is appropriate that we add a comment here for the benefit of both the bar and those state officials in whom resides the duty of issuing search warrants. The importance of the neutral and detached magistrate cannot be over emphasized. That magistrate stands as the barrier against unwarranted intrusions into the private lives and personal effects of the people. As the United States Supreme Court said in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2045, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 569 (1971): [T]he warrant requirement has been a valued part of our constitutional law for decades, and it has determined the result in scores and scores of cases in courts all over this country. It is not an inconvenience to be somehow `weighed' against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or should be, an important working part of our machinery of government, operating as a matter of course to check the `well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous executive officers' who are a part of any system of law enforcement. We realize that the task of a magistrate who issues search warrants is not an easy one. Their role requires detachment and study as they consider whether they have been presented with sufficient probable cause to issue a warrant to search or seize a particular person, place or thing. We fully appreciate the gravity of that role and are optimistic that those vested with that responsibility do likewise. The justice court judges, police judges and other judicial officers of the state called upon to issue warrants must remember that they are judges. On their oaths they may not issue warrants just to help law enforcement. They must always remember that a request for a warrant requires a judicial determination. Impartiality and reasoned application of legal principles are the foundation of a judicial determination.