Opinion ID: 6317039
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: WEC's claimed prescriptive right

Text: ¶23 We assume without deciding that Wis. Stat. § 893.28(2) still requires a public utility's use be visible, open, and notorious. Therefore, at issue here is whether WEC's use after the 1980 grant of permission was: (1) continuous for a period of ten years; and (2) visible, open and notorious. We conclude that WEC's use met both conditions prior to Bauer's purchase of the property. 12 No. 2019AP2090 ¶24 A continuous use is one that is neither voluntarily abandoned by the party claiming a prescriptive right nor interrupted by an act of the landowner or a third party. See Red Star Yeast & Prods. Co. v. Merch. Corp., 4 Wis. 2d 327, 335, 90 N.W.2d 777 (1958); see also 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 51. Whether a use is abandoned or interrupted will depend[] on the nature and the character of the right claimed. Shellow v. Hagen, 9 Wis. 2d 506, 512, 101 N.W.2d 694 (1960). A use remains continuous even when the user takes measures reasonably necessary to maintain or improve the use, so long as those measures are not inconsistent with the use's original nature and character nor more burdensome on the landowner. See Garza v. Am. Transm. Co. LLC, 2017 WI 35, ¶29, 374 Wis. 2d 555, 893 N.W.2d 1; Bino v. City of Hurley, 14 Wis. 2d 101, 106, 109 N.W.2d 544 (1961). ¶25 Here, the nature and character of WEC's claimed right is to provide gas service to a neighboring home via an underground plastic pipe. That use began in July 1980 and WEC contends it continued uninterrupted through July 1990, at which point it ripened into a prescriptive right. Bauer counters that a genuine dispute exists as to whether WEC's periodic repairs to the line disrupted its continuous use. According to Bauer, those repairs restarted the ten-year vesting period, so WEC's prescriptive right could not vest until after she purchased the property in 1996. ¶26 Bauer's argument misses the mark. The evidence reveals that WEC's replacement and relocat[ion] of the line 13 No. 2019AP2090 meant it repaired the line by splicing in a new piece of pipe to the original one. No evidence suggests that the character of the use——supplying gas along a single conduit——ever changed. Nor did these repairs increase the burden on the landowner; any land rendered unbuildable by the original line merely remained so. Accordingly, nothing in the record creates a genuine dispute that WEC's actions constituted anything other than reasonable maintenance on the line to continue its initial purpose. To the contrary, these activities manifest an ongoing desire to continue the use rather than interruption or voluntary abandonment.10 As such, this record supports only one conclusion: WEC's use was continuous for ten years by July 1990. ¶27 That leaves the visible, open, and notorious requirement. A visible, open, and notorious use is one that would put a reasonably diligent landowner on notice of the use. See Kurz v. Miller, 89 Wis. 426, 433-34, 62 N.W. 182 (1895). The requirement's role is to give the landowner knowledge and [an] opportunity to assert his or her rights. 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 42. Consistent with that objective, actual knowledge of the use satisfies this requirement. See Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 2.17 (2000); 28A Moreover, if repairs disrupted a continuous use, then 10 public utilities would face an unreasonable dilemma whereby honoring their legal obligations to repair and maintain a line could mean they risk altogether losing the right to continue servicing customers via that line. See Wis. Stat. §§ 182.0175(2m)(c) & 196.745(1)(a); Wis. Admin. Code § PSC 135.012 (December 2018). 14 No. 2019AP2090 C.J.S. Easements § 33; Bruce & Ely, Jr., supra § 5:13. Bauer does not dispute her predecessor's actual knowledge of WEC's use, evidenced by the written permission Garside granted WEC. So, here too, the record permits one conclusion: WEC's use was visible, open, and notorious to Garside. ¶28 Absent a genuine dispute over WEC's continuous use from July 1980 through July 1990 or Garside's actual knowledge of that use, we conclude that summary judgment is appropriate. We therefore affirm the circuit court's declaration that WEC acquired a prescriptive right across the Garside property to deliver natural gas to the neighboring home before Bauer owned the property. And because Bauer purchased the property subject to WEC's vested right, we further affirm the dismissal of her trespass and ejectment claims against WEC.