Opinion ID: 1386274
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discharge of a Juror

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred by discharging a juror at the juror's request in the midst of the penalty phase. Penal Code section 1089 provides in relevant part that If at any time, whether before or after the final submission of the case to the jury, ... a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears therefor, the court may order him to be discharged and draw the name of an alternate, who shall then take his place in the jury box.... About 8:05 a.m. one day during the penalty phase, one of the jurors, Fred C. Godfrey, telephoned the trial court. He requested discharge from jury service because of the unexpected death of his mother the previous night. The court granted his request and ordered him discharged. (At that time, four of the five alternate jurors originally sworn remained available for service.) Evidently, the communication between the court and Godfrey was effected through the court clerk. Within the hour, the trial court notified the People and defendant of the foregoing events in chambers. Immediately thereafter, in open court outside the presence of the jury, defendant objected to the discharge of Juror Godfrey and moved for reconsideration. In his argument, counsel stated the grounds to the following effect: although the death of Godfrey's mother did indeed provide good cause to continue the trial to accommodate Godfrey, it might not provide good cause to excuse him outright. He suggested that the court speak directly with Godfrey to determine whether a continuance of about a week would enable him to stay on. He made plain that he wanted Godfrey to remain  and that he believed the prosecutor wanted him to go. The trial court impliedly overruled defendant's objection and expressly denied his motion to reconsider. It stated that its ruling with respect to Mr. Godfrey is made without consideration as to anyone's desire for him as a juror, favorable or unfavorable to either side. It matters not to the court. It added: Seems unreasonable to think that we should delay this case any further, considering its rather chopped up time sequence, another four [court] days simply to satisfy someone's desire for a certain juror when we have four alternates. Thereupon, in open court in the presence of the jury, the trial court ordered the court clerk to draw the name of one of the alternate jurors at random. The name drawn was that of Jerome N. Severance. The court directed Severance to take Juror Godfrey's place in the jury box. Defendant did not attempt to challenge Severance and raised no objection whatever. During jury selection, he had made no for cause challenge against Severance. Neither had he made a peremptory challenge, although he had such challenges remaining. (34) As stated, defendant claims that the trial court erred by discharging Juror Godfrey at Godfrey's request. A ruling of this sort is subject to review under the abuse-of-discretion standard. (See In re Mendes (1979) 23 Cal.3d 847, 852 [153 Cal. Rptr. 831, 592 P.2d 318].) Applying that test, we find no error. It was not unreasonable for the court to act as it did. As a general matter at least, the death of a juror's mother constitutes good cause to discharge the juror  and not merely to continue the trial  when, as here, he so requests. As defense counsel observed, a mother's death is obviously ... a tragic and disturbing event. Defendant now challenges the record on which the court acted and the procedures that it followed. But after close consideration, we conclude that his attack fails: the record was sufficient and the procedures adequate. The court conducted itself well within its discretion. (Compare In re Mendes, supra, at p. 852 [rejecting a similar claim based on the court's discharge of a juror at her own request following the death of her brother].) [16]