Opinion ID: 2381515
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the majority dilutes maxim i

Text: Section 19-320(a) of the District of Columbia Code (1990), quoted in full in note 1 to the majority opinion, is perhaps the paradigmatic statutory expression of the maxim that no man may profit from his own wrong. [2] Paraphrased to fit these facts, the statute provides that Gallimore takes no estate or interest in property of any kind from Ms. Washington by way of inheritance, distribution, devise or bequest, or remainder, reversion, or executory devise dependent upon Ms. Washington's death. The statute goes on to state that any such estate, interest or property to which Gallimore would have succeeded or would have taken in any way from or after Ms. Washington's death goes, instead, as if [Gallimore] had died before [Ms. Washington].  (Emphasis added). This court has held that § 19-320 is to be broadly construed. See Napoleon v. Heard, 455 A.2d 901, 902 (D.C.1983). This means that ambiguities, if any, must be resolved against Gallimore to assure that he does not profit in any way from his murder of Ms. Washington. Notwithstanding the broad phrasing of the statute and the decision in Napoleon, my colleagues have decreed a partition of the jointly held property and have ordered the distribution to Gallimore of an undivided share of it. [3] The trial judge explained effectively why Gallimore should not be rewarded in this way: First and foremost, as mentioned above, awarding the Defendant an unrestricted one-half interest in the property allows the Defendant to take advantage of his own wrong. John Wade, [ supra note 1], 49 HARV.L.REV. at 733.[ [4] ] The right of survivorship in a joint tenancy means that the joint tenant who survives the other cotenants takes the entire estate. 4A RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, ¶ 624[2], at 51-11 (1993). The Decedent's ability, or right, to survive the Defendant has been snuffed out at the hands of the Defendant. Granting the Defendant a one-half interest in the property ... rewards the Defendant for his act of murder by giving him a definite interest in the property. The Defendant attempts to differentiate a joint tenancy from other interests explicitly covered by D.C.Code § 19-320(a) by advancing the statutory purpose as being to prevent the morally repugnant result of awarding a new property interest to a slayer based on his illicit act. Defendant's Motion, p. 6. The Defendant claims that since a joint tenant possesses a one-half interest that is easily severed at any time, recognizing him as a tenant in common with a one-half interest does not award a new property interest. This Court wholly disagrees with the Defendant's conclusion. The Defendant opted to possess property as a joint tenant, running the risk that he could lose his entire interest should he predecease Annie Mae Washington. The Defendant never moved to partition the property. Awarding the Defendant a one-half interest as a tenant in common provides the Defendant with the certainty of some kind of an interest. The Court concludes that this new certainty, in contrast to the prior possibility, is, in fact, a new property interest. Washington, supra, 122 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. at 1133 (emphasis in original). It is true that Gallimore could have sought a partition of the property during Ms. Washington's lifetime. He began living in the house in 1984, however, and made no attempt to secure a partition during the following ten years. Id. at 1133 & n. 8. I agree with the trial judge that the court should not now do for a murderer's benefit that which he could have done, but did not do, for himself. [5] The decedent was seven years younger than Gallimore, but I agree with the trial judge that this is irrelevant. Id. at 1133 & n. 6 (citation omitted). We can never know which of the two would have survived the other if Gallimore had not murdered Ms. Washington. Section 19-320, however, resolves any problem presented by the lack of a crystal ball by effectively creating a conclusive presumption that the decedent would have survived the murderer. It provides that any affected interest in property goes, instead, as if the [murderer] had died before the decedent. If there had been no murder, and if Gallimore had pre-deceased Ms. Washington, Gallimore would have had an interest during his lifetime, but Ms. Washington would have owned the property outright at his death. The majority's disposition awards Gallimore substantially more than he would have had if he had not killed the decedent. This result, in my opinion, is irreconcilable both with the letter of the statute and with the legislative purpose.