Opinion ID: 1150251
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Public Access to Civil Court Proceedings

Text: At the outset, we hold that both civil and criminal court proceedings in Florida are public events and adhere to the well established common law right of access to court proceedings and records. In Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 1254, 91 L.Ed. 1546 (1947), the United States Supreme Court held: A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public property... . There is no special perquisite of the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished from other institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in proceedings before it. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n. 17, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2829 n. 17, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980), Chief Justice Burger stated: Whether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a question not raised by this case, but we note that historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart expressed that the first and fourteenth amendments clearly give the press and public a right of access to trials themselves, civil as well as criminal. Id. at 599, 100 S.Ct. at 2839. See also Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir.1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100, 104 S.Ct. 1595, 80 L.Ed.2d 127 (1984); In re Astri Investment, Management & Securities Corp., 88 B.R. 730 (D.Md. 1988). While this Court has recognized the common law right of access to criminal proceedings in Bundy v. State, 455 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1109, 106 S.Ct. 1958, 90 L.Ed.2d 366 (1986), and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Lewis, 426 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1982), we have not expressly done so in civil proceedings. The reason for openness is basic to our form of government. Public trials are essential to the judicial system's credibility in a free society. The Supreme Court of California, in In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526, 530-31, 34 P. 227, 228-29 (1893), justified the public's right to know what transpires in both civil and criminal courtrooms and stated: In this country it is a first principle that the people have the right to know what is done in their courts. The old theory of government which invested royalty with an assumed perfection, precluding the possibility of wrong, and denying the right to discuss its conduct of public affairs, is opposed to the genius of our institutions, in which the sovereign will of the people is the paramount idea; and the greatest publicity to the acts of those holding positions of public trust, and the greatest freedom in the discussion of the proceedings of public tribunals that is consistent with truth and decency, are regarded as essential to the public welfare. Therefore, when it is claimed that this right has in any manner been abridged, such claim must find its support, if any there be, in some limitation expressly imposed by the lawmaking power, or the right to exercise the authority claimed must be necessarily implied as essential to the execution of the powers expressly conferred. Wigmore also articulated reasons for public access to all court proceedings, explaining: The publicity of a judicial proceeding is a requirement of much broader bearing than its mere effect upon the quality of testimony... . Nevertheless, it plays an important part as a security for testimonial trustworthiness... . (1) Its operation in tending to improve the quality of testimony is twofold. Subjectively, it produces in the witness' mind a disinclination to falsify; first, by stimulating the instinctive responsibility to public opinion, symbolized in the audience, and ready to scorn a demonstrated liar; and next, by inducing the fear of exposure of subsequent falsities through disclosure by informed persons who may chance to be present or to hear of the testimony from others present. Objectively, it secures the presence of those who by possibility may be able to furnish testimony in chief or to contradict falsifiers and yet may not have been known beforehand to the parties to possess any information. ... . (2) The other reasons ... for requiring publicity are of three distinct sorts: (a) Subjectively, a wholesome effect is produced, analogous to that secured for witnesses, upon all the officers of the court, in particular, upon judge, jury, and counsel. In acting under the public gaze, they are more strongly moved to a strict conscientiousness in the performance of duty. In all experience, secret tribunals have exhibited abuses which have been wanting in courts whose procedure was public. (b) Persons not called as parties to the suits before the court may nevertheless be affected, or think themselves likely to be affected, by pending litigation. They should have the opportunity of learning whether they are thus affected, and of protecting themselves accordingly; they have a right to be present for the purpose of hearing what is going on. (c) The educative effect of public attendance is a material advantage. Not only is respect for the law increased and intelligent acquaintance acquired with the methods of government, but a strong confidence in judicial remedies is secured which could never be inspired by a system of secrecy... . 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1834 (Chadbourn rev. 1976) (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted). We fully approve the reasoning of Shortridge and Wigmore. While a strong presumption of openness in judicial proceedings exists, the law has established numerous exceptions to protect competing interests. These exceptions fall into two categories: the first includes those necessary to ensure order and dignity in the courtroom and the second deals with the content of the information. We address only the second category in this case. Because of the strong openness presumption, a closure order must be drawn with particularity and narrowly applied. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Lewis , we modified the Fourth District's test regarding closure of criminal proceedings. We directed that trial judges apply the following three-pronged test when considering closure of criminal court proceedings: 1. Closure is necessary to prevent a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice; 2. No alternatives are available, other than a change of venue, which would protect the defendant's right to a fair trial; and 3. Closure would be effective in protecting the rights of the accused, without being broader than necessary to accomplish this purpose. 426 So.2d at 6. This test, derived primarily because of first amendment contentions, was designed to address the problems of prejudicial pretrial publicity and the competing constitutional rights to a fair trial by an impartial jury for criminal defendants. The test was not conceived or drawn to address closure in civil proceedings. In State ex rel. Gore Newspaper Co. v. Tyson , the Fourth District addressed the closure of a dissolution proceeding. The court reversed a closure order and stated that it could not permit closure solely upon the wishes of the parties to the litigation, absent cogent reasons. 313 So.2d at 788. The court recognized the trial court's authority to close civil proceedings, stating: The court, under its inherent power, may for cogent reasons exclude the public and press from any judicial proceeding to protect the rights of the litigants and to otherwise further the administration of justice; In determining the restrictions to be placed upon access to judicial proceedings, the court must balance the rights and interests of the parties to the litigation with those of the public and press; The type of civil proceeding, the nature of the subject matter and the status of the participants are factors to be considered when evaluating the cogent reasons for excluding the public and press from access to the courts. Id. at 787. We are in general agreement with this holding, recognizing that trial courts may exercise their power to close all or part of a proceeding in limited circumstances. In this regard, we feel that a definitive statement by this Court is necessary to assist judicial officers in this sensitive area. We conclude that the following factors must be considered to determine a request for closure of a civil proceeding. First, a strong presumption of openness exists for all court proceedings. A trial is a public event, and the filed records of court proceedings are public records available for public examination. Second, both the public and news media shall have standing to challenge any closure order. The burden of proof in these proceedings shall always be on the party seeking closure. Third, closure of court proceedings or records should occur only when necessary (a) to comply with established public policy set forth in the constitution, statutes, rules, or case law; (b) to protect trade secrets; (c) to protect a compelling governmental interest [e.g., national security; confidential informants]; (d) to obtain evidence to properly determine legal issues in a case; (e) to avoid substantial injury to innocent third parties [e.g., to protect young witnesses from offensive testimony; to protect children in a divorce]; or (f) to avoid substantial injury to a party by disclosure of matters protected by a common law or privacy right not generally inherent in the specific type of civil proceeding sought to be closed. We find that, under appropriate circumstances, the constitutional right of privacy established in Florida by the adoption of article I, section 23, could form a constitutional basis for closure under (e) or (f). In this regard, we disagree with the district court in the instant case. Further, we note that it is generally the content of the subject matter rather than the status of the party that determines whether a privacy interest exists and closure should be permitted. However, a privacy claim may be negated if the content of the subject matter directly concerns a position of public trust held by the individual seeking closure. Fourth, before entering a closure order, the trial court shall determine that no reasonable alternative is available to accomplish the desired result, and, if none exists, the trial court must use the least restrictive closure necessary to accomplish its purpose. Fifth, the presumption of openness continues through the appellate review process, and the party seeking closure continues to have the burden to justify closure. This heavy burden is placed on the party seeking closure not only because of the strong presumption of openness but also because those challenging the order will generally have little or no knowledge of the specific grounds requiring closure. We find no justification to give dissolution proceedings special consideration, as advocated by Dempsey Barron. The parties seeking a dissolution of their marriage are not entitled to a private court proceeding just because they are required to utilize the judicial system. Dissolution proceedings are regulated by statute and are unique because the state is considered an interested third party to protect the public welfare. See, e.g., Perez v. Perez, 164 So.2d 561 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964); Harman v. Harman, 128 So.2d 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961). While Florida, as a matter of public policy, has expressly made certain civil proceedings confidential (adoptions, § 63.162, Fla. Stat. (1987); paternity, § 742.031, Fla. Stat. (1987); juvenile proceedings, § 39.09 and 39.408, Fla. Stat. (1987)) and some states have enacted legislation limiting public access to divorce proceedings (Cal. [Civ.] Code § 4360 (Deering 1984); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1516 (1981)), the Florida Legislature has chosen not to do so. We conclude that dissolution proceedings must be treated similar to other civil proceedings, and thus the presumption of openness applies. In Sentinel Communciations, the Fifth District held that parents and children in a dissolution proceeding had privacy rights that justified closure of the court file. We disapprove that decision to the extent it implies that parties to all dissolution proceedings involving minor children have an absolute privacy right to seal the file. We also disapprove that portion placing the burden of proof on the challenging party rather than the party seeking closure. We agree with the closure in Sentinel Communciations because of the express finding of injury to an innocent third party. In that proceeding, the trial judge determined that a minor child had been adversely affected by the litigation and that continued publicity would in all likelihood be highly detrimental to that child. That factual finding makes it distinguishable from the instant case.