Opinion ID: 3175253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Board’s Findings Regarding the Conduct of

Text: Raymond and the Carpenters on October 2, 2006 The ALJ found and the Board agreed that Raymond and the Carpenters committed multiple unfair labor practices on October 2, 2006. Raymond and the Carpenters challenge a 16 number of the Board’s findings and the legal conclusions emanating therefrom. Raymond first challenges the Board’s finding that, on October 2, Raymond told the drywall-finishing employees that they had to join the Carpenters “that day.” Raymond claims that the evidence simply does not support this finding. We disagree. The Board accepted the ALJ’s credibility determinations in assessing the veracity of witnesses who testified at the unfair labor practice hearing. Raymond, 354 N.L.R.B. at 757 n.2. We “will not reverse the Board’s adoption of the ALJ’s credibility determination unless it is ‘hopelessly incredible, self-contradictory, or patently unsupportable.’” SFO GoodNite Inn, LLC v. NLRB, 700 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). The existence of potential inconsistencies in credited testimony, without more, is not sufficient for the court to overturn an ALJ’s credibility finding. See id. at 1011. Furthermore, the “mere fact that conflicting evidence exists is insufficient to render a credibility determination ‘patently [u]nsupportable.’” Parsippany Hotel Mgmt. Co. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 413, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Rather, only in the “most extraordinary circumstances” will it be appropriate for the court to overturn such a determination. SFO, 700 F.3d at 10-11. In this case, the ALJ afforded significant weight to the testimony of one drywall-finishing employee, Jose Ramos, whose “demeanor, while testifying, was that of a veracious witness.” Raymond, 354 N.L.R.B. at 778. Not only did Ramos “recount[] [Raymond’s] alleged threat to the listening drywall finishers,” but he also testified that, “without the immediate prospect of another job, [he did] not . . . report for work the next day.” Id. at 778-79. To the ALJ, it was “unmistakably 17 clear” that Ramos believed that the company was “utterly serious” in telling the employees that they had to join the union on October 2. Id. at 778. Raymond offers no plausible basis for this court to reject the ALJ’s credibility determinations accepting the testimony of Ramos and other witnesses who generally confirmed Ramos’s testimony. Raymond also challenges the Board’s finding that the company’s statement to the employees gave unlawful assistance to the Carpenters because the statement was intimidating and thus caused the employees to designate the Carpenters as their bargaining agent lest they lose their jobs. Raymond argues that, while its statement telling the employees to join the union “that day” may well have induced employees to sign the “Application for Membership” form, it would not have coerced them to sign the “Authorization for Representation” form. Raymond argues that the employees could differentiate between the two forms, so there is no actual evidence to support the Board’s finding. We are not persuaded. It is not necessary for the Board to point to “evidence of actual intimidation” in support of its finding. Teamsters Local Union No. 171 v. NLRB, 863 F.2d 946, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Rather, whether employees have been coerced is assessed by reference to the “totality of the circumstances.” Fountainview Care Ctr., 317 N.L.R.B. 1286, 1289 (1995), enforced 88 F.3d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The court is obliged to “recognize the Board’s competence in the first instance to judge the impact of utterances made in the context of the employer-employee relationship.” Progressive Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 453 F.3d 538, 544 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). And, as the Board has held, “[w]here, as here, an employer imposes certain requirements on its employees, it must bear the burden of any ambiguity in its message.” Acme Tile & Terrazzo Co., 318 18 N.L.R.B. 425, 427-428 & n.8 (1995) (considering whether employer statements conditioned employment on union membership), enforced 87 F.3d 558 (1st Cir. 1996). Here, the ALJ noted that the Application for Membership form and the Authorization for Representation form were printed together on a single document and were distributed to the employees as soon as the meeting ended. Raymond, 354 N.L.R.B. at 780. In these circumstances, the Board found that the employees, having just been told to join the Carpenters “that day” if they wanted to keep their jobs, “undoubtedly completed and executed every form on the large document without regard to the differences between them.” Id. Such a finding is reasonable, and we will not disturb it here. See Fountainview, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1289 (authorization forms presented alongside job applications in a single document gave “the impression that there was a link between [union authorization] and the hiring process”). Finally, as noted above, a union must provide employees with a Beck notice at or before the time when the employees become obligated to make payments pursuant to a unionsecurity clause. Cal. Saw & Knife, 320 N.L.R.B. at 233. Here, there is no dispute that the drywall-finishing employees first received a Beck notice when they were given copies of the Carpenters’ magazine, which was after they had already completed and returned the Carpenters’ forms. The Board concluded that the forms “obligat[ed] [the employees] to pay monthly dues.” Raymond, 354 N.L.R.B. at 781. The question here, then, is whether the Carpenters effectively committed the employees to pay dues without first explaining the legal limits of the union-security provision. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding. The Application for Membership form provides for “Monthly dues 19 in the amount of $____, per month, commencing immediately,” which are “due and payable each month while on application.” And the Supplemental Dues and CLIC Authorization form states, “I hereby authorize the Southwest Carpenters Vacation (‘Trust’) to deduct from my vacation benefits supplemental dues . . . .” From these facts, the Board reasonably concluded that, by filling out and signing the forms, the employees became obligated to pay dues prior to the time that they received a Beck notice.