Opinion ID: 1385454
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: city of fairbanks' cross-appeal

Text: Finally, the city argues on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in excluding some one hundred photographs depicting forty-five railway crossings in the Portland, Oregon, area. The city sought to introduce the evidence to illustrate its expert witness' testimony that the MUS spur track crossing, although omitting a warning sign written specifically for bicyclists, nonetheless conformed to industry standards. Johnson objected on the ground that there was insufficient similarity between the Portland crossings and the MUS spur track crossing. The dissimilarities emphasized by Johnson were: (a) the inability of the witness to establish the quantity of bicycle traffic at the crossings; (b) the different flangeway construction and crossing materials of some of the depicted crossings; (c) the absence of a showing of any notice to the Portland municipality of any bicycle accidents occurring at any of these crossings; and (d) the absence of any showing of the number of accidents at any of the crossings. The city argues that exclusion emasculated its defense of compliance with an industry standard. It contends that its expert's testimony was intended to revolve around the photographs, and that exclusion deprived [it] of the most forceful and undeniable evidence disproving its alleged negligence: photographs from an exhaustive study which prove that its practices fully complied with applicable standards. It argues that the photographs were admissible under Alaska Rule of Evidence 705 and that the trial court, therefore, abused its discretion in excluding the evidence. After noting the above dissimilarities between the crossings depicted in the photographs and that in the case before it, the trial court held that the pictures would be confusing to the jury and unhelpful in determining the condition of the MUS crossing. In addition, the court noted that it did not see how the photographs established an industry standard. The pictures were accordingly excluded. Although the photographs were excluded, the expert witness was allowed to testify regarding his investigation of railway crossings in the Portland area. He was able to testify that he inspected forty-five crossings in that area and that none of these crossings were signed with specific reference to bicyclists. He further testified that based upon his investigation and research of engineering standards, industry standards did not require warning signs directed specifically at bicyclists. Photographic evidence is admissible, as is other demonstrative evidence, if a proper foundation is laid showing that the photographs accurately depict the subject and if such evidence will be helpful to the jury. Kaps Transport, Inc. v. Henry, 572 P.2d 72, 75 (Alaska 1977). The trial court determined that the offered photographs would not be helpful, and would confuse the jury. A trial court has discretion to exclude relevant evidence if it determines that the evidentiary or probative value is outweighed by, inter alia, the danger of confusing or misleading the jury. Alaska R. Evid. 403; [41] Stevens v. State, 443 P.2d 600, 603 (Alaska 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1039, 89 S.Ct. 662, 21 L.Ed.2d 586 (1969). Thus the issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the offered photographs. Significantly, of the seven Alaska cases cited by the city as addressing the admissibility of photographs, not one has reversed the trial court's decision to either admit [42] or exclude [43] the evidence. A reading of those cases and of the transcript establishes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the offered photographs. The court carefully considered the appropriate factors and made a reasoned decision. The city cites numerous cases in which the exclusion of photographic evidence of railway crossings was held to be error. However, in all but two of these cases the evidence depicted the particular crossing at issue or the immediately surrounding area. [44] The remaining two cases are inapposite. In Cain v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 266 F.2d 942, 945 (5th Cir.1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 886, 80 S.Ct. 158, 4 L.Ed.2d 122 (1959), the court held that the trial judge erred in excluding a photograph of another crossing, where it was offered to show conduct by the same defendant at a similar crossing. In Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 114 Cal. App.2d 224, 300 P.2d 910, 912-13 (1956), the court upheld the trial judge's determination that the photographs were sufficiently similar to be admitted as probative evidence, stating that such a determination is primarily a trial court function. It thus affirmed the trial court's discretionary decision. Neither of these cases support reversal here. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the city's proffered photographic evidence of railway crossings in the Portland area. [45]