Opinion ID: 353340
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Issue of Liability

Text: 14 Appellant first argues that the District Court erred in denying her motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. These were made on the alleged ground that the evidence conclusively demonstrated that the house in question had been rented as a matter of law prior to plaintiffs' first contact with Mrs. Carter. 15 While we accept arguendo appellant's premise that a person cannot discriminate with respect to the rental of property that has already been irrevocably committed to another, we cannot agree that reasonable minds could reach no other conclusion on the facts of this case. 16 The standards for granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a directed verdict are the same. Cockrum v. Whitney, 479 F.2d 84, 85 (9th Cir. 1973); 5A Moore's Federal Practice P 50.07(2). Neither should be granted unless the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. Kay v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 548 F.2d 1370, 1372 (9th Cir. 1977). In ruling on these motions 17 the trial judge cannot reweigh the evidence or consider the credibility of the witnesses. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment would be granted and all inferences must be drawn in that party's favor. Id. 18 The United States Supreme Court stated these guiding principles well in Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35, 64 S.Ct. 409, 412, 88 L.Ed. 520 (1944): 19 The focal point of judicial review is the reasonableness of the particular inference or conclusion drawn by the jury. It is the jury, not the court, which is the fact-finding body. It weighs the contradictory evidence and inferences, judges the credibility of witnesses, receives expert instructions, and draws the ultimate conclusion as to the facts. The very essence of its function is to select from among conflicting inferences and conclusions that which it considers most reasonable. . . . Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable. (citations omitted) 20 Appellant states that as a matter of simple agency law Ms. Woodsford had a specifically enforceable contract to rent the subject premises on April 11, 1974, one day prior to the plaintiffs' first contact with Mrs. Carter, which occurred on April 12. Even though Mrs. Carter continued to show the property and tell people that it remained available after April 11, and, indeed, appears to have been under the impression herself until April 13 that the property had not yet been rented, it is argued that certain transactions between her agent, Mr. McGinnis, and the new tenant, Ms. Woodsford, contractually bound Mrs. Carter on April 11. Several witnesses for the defendant testified as to the following events: 21 1. Ms. Woodsford, having been informed of the availability of the property by an acquaintance at Rent-A-Home, initially communicated with Mrs. Carter on April 8, 1974, and was told to get in touch with Mrs. Carter's real estate agent, Mr. McGinnis. 22 2. On April 10 Mrs. Carter met Ms. Woodsford briefly. Ms. Woodsford later that day paid a deposit to Mr. McGinnis. 23 3. On the afternoon of April 11 Mr. McGinnis came into the restaurant where Ms. Woodsford worked, bringing with him a document entitled LEASE RENTAL AGREEMENT AND DEPOSIT RECEIPT. The front of the lease, which was an exhibit at trial and part of the record on this appeal, contains a recital that in the event this agreement is not accepted by the owner or his authorized agent within four (4) days, the total deposit shall be refunded. Mrs. Carter had initialled the front page of the lease at the top and signed at the bottom. Above her signature, she had written in the words, subject to meeting the new tenant. The back of the lease contains the words, The undersigned owner accepts the foregoing offer and agrees to rent the herein described premises on the terms and conditions herein specified, followed by signature lines for the owner's authorized agent and the owner. Mrs. Carter had not yet signed the back of the lease at the time of this meeting. 24 4. In the restaurant, Ms. Woodsford signed the lease, both on the front and on the back. Mr. McGinnis also signed on the front and on the back under the acceptance section. 25 5. Mrs. Carter later signed the back of the lease, the date and time of which are uncertain. 26 Appellant urges that, while Mr. McGinnis may not have been expressly authorized to enter into a binding contract with Ms. Woodsford on Mrs. Carter's behalf, nonetheless he had been invested with the power so to act, and that the contract he signed was binding as within the scope of his apparent authority. Since the document required only a single signature for acceptance, it is argued, Mrs. Carter's signature was superfluous. Appellant notes that no jury could be expected to appreciate (these) subtleties of agency law. Finally, she submits that the words, subject to meeting the new tenant, should be construed as a condition subsequent, rather than precedent to the formation of a contract. 27 It is clear that the jury, even on the evidence described above, could have drawn reasonable inferences which would have defeated appellant's apparent agency theory. Among the controverted issues of fact which the jury was entitled to resolve unfavorably to the appellant was the effect of the phrase subject to meeting the new tenant upon the appearance of Mr. McGinnis' agency. The jury could reasonably have concluded that Mrs. Carter retained the right of refusal after April 11, and that her acceptance was not finally given until sometime on or after April 13, which was subsequent to her discriminatory refusal to accept the Fountilas as tenants. Moreover, as the sole judge of credibility, the jury could reasonably have chosen to disregard certain testimony essential to appellant's case. 28 Our conclusion, then, is that reasonable minds could in fact differ as to the date at which Mrs. Carter's house was rented, and, therefore, that the motions for a directed verdict and a judgment notwithstanding the verdict were properly denied by the district court. It should be noted in this context that to the extent appellant bases her dissatisfaction with the verdict upon the failure of the district court to instruct the jury on the law of agency, her assignment of error is precluded by her counsel's failure to request such instructions or object to their omission. Fed.R.Civ.P. 51.