Opinion ID: 561210
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Automatic, Statutory Aggravating Circumstance.

Text: 43 Petitioner was charged with premeditated murder and felony murder. The jury was charged on both counts and returned a general verdict. Johnson argues that imposition of the death penalty in his case was predicated upon an automatic finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance--the felony murder that formed the basis of his conviction--and, as such, violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 44 Petitioner raised this claim on direct appeal, 62 but not in his first habeas petition. He now argues that new law, Sumner v. Shuman 63 and Lowenfield v. Phelps, 64 makes this claim appropriate for consideration in a second petition. 45 In Shuman, the Court held that a state statute imposing a mandatory death sentence for a prison inmate convicted of murder while serving a life sentence without possibility of parole violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 65 Proof of a mandatory, aggravating circumstance, the Court held, do[es] not provide an adequate basis on which to determine whether the death sentence is the appropriate sanction in any particular case. 66 The Court noted, further, that [t]he Nevada mandatory capital-sentencing statute under which Shuman was sentenced to death precluded a determination whether any relevant mitigating circumstances justified imposing on him a sentence less than death. 67 46 In the instant case, the death penalty for felony murder as a statutory aggravating factor was not mandatory. The jury, pursuant to the individualized sentencing procedure, was free to consider any mitigating evidence and to recommend a life sentence. Shuman, therefore, does not apply to revive petitioner's claim. 47 Neither does the Court's decision in Lowenfield v. Phelps provide support for petitioner's argument that Florida law, by permitting his conviction and his death sentence to be predicated on a single finding of felony murder, denied him constitutionally adequate sentencing safeguards. The principle animating the Court's decision in Lowenfield was that [t]o pass constitutional muster, a capital sentencing scheme must 'genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.'  68 The Court explained that 48 the narrowing function required for a regime of capital punishment may be provided in either of these two ways: The legislature may itself narrow the definition of capital offenses, as Texas and Louisiana have done, so that the jury finding of guilt responds to this concern, or the legislature may more broadly define capital offenses and provide for narrowing by jury findings of aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase. 69 49 In Florida, the legislature has defined capital offenses broadly, authorizing the imposition of the death penalty on those convicted of first-degree murder. 70 The narrowing under Florida law occurs at the sentencing phase, at which time the jury is required to find at least one aggravating circumstance before recommending a sentence of death. 71 By doing so, the jury narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty according to an objective legislative definition. 72 50 Petitioner's argument that the duplicative nature of the statutory aggravating circumstance renders his sentence constitutionally infirm under Lowenfield is foreclosed by the Court's recent decision in Blystone v. Pennsylvania. 73 In that case, 51 Petitioner was charged and convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy to commit homicide, and criminal conspiracy to commit robbery. The same jury that convicted petitioner found as an aggravating circumstance that petitioner committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony. 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. Sec. 9711(d)(6) (1988). The jury found that no mitigating circumstances existed, and accordingly sentenced petitioner to death pursuant to the Pennsylvania death penalty statute which provides that [t]he verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance ... and no mitigating circumstance or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances. Sec. 9711(c)(1)(iv). 74 52 The Supreme Court rejected petitioner's argument that the mandatory imposition of the death in these circumstances violated the Eighth Amendment requirement of individualized sentencing: 53 The presence of aggravating circumstances serves the purpose of limiting the class of death-eligible defendants, and the Eighth Amendment does not require that these aggravating circumstances be further refined or weighed by a jury. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244, 108 S.Ct. 546, 554, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988) (The use of 'aggravating circumstances' is not an end in itself, but a means of genuinely narrowing the class of death-eligible persons and thereby channeling the jury's discretion.). The requirement of individualized sentencing in capital cases is satisfied by allowing the jury to consider all relevant mitigating evidence. 75 54 The Florida sentencing scheme as applied in Johnson's case genuinely narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. 76 The sentencing court's individualized consideration of mitigating circumstances and ... exercise of discretion 77 were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.