Opinion ID: 1167401
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The slander action against Fossum

Text: March, 1956, defendant Fossum was elected mayor of the town of Pacific, but pursuant to the existing law, did not take office until June. In the interim, he attended several council meetings. At least two matters of town business disturbed him and two members of the town council: the alleged use of the town truck by plaintiff after the council had cancelled his right to use it in his personal business (whether he used it is a disputed fact); and the council's sale to plaintiff of 2900 pounds of copper for $1. Plaintiff later resold the copper for approximately $1150. [1] This was an alleged attempt to compensate plaintiff for engineering services performed in addition to his regular duties. After a meeting with some of the town council, defendant Fossum interviewed a deputy prosecuting attorney of King County. He had several subsequent meetings at the request of the deputy. These conversations are the basis of plaintiff's slander action against defendant Fossum. We mentioned previously that criminal charges were commenced by the deputy prosecuting attorney against plaintiff, but later dismissed. [2] The principal defenses to an action for defamation are truth, consent, absolute privilege, qualified or conditional privilege, and fair comment or privileged criticism. See Gaffney v. Scott Pub. Co., 41 Wn. (2d) 191, 193, 248 P. (2d) 390 (1952); 3 Restatement, Torts § 583 et seq.; Brennan, An Outline of the Law of Libel in Washington, 30 Wash. L. Rev. 36, 41 (1955). The instant case concerns the defense of qualified or conditional privilege of statements made to a prosecuting attorney. In Owens v. Scott Pub. Co., 46 Wn. (2d) 666, 674, 284 P. (2d) 296 (1955), this court defined qualified or conditional privilege. On certain occasions one is qualifiedly or conditionally privileged to publish false and defamatory matter of another and is not liable therefor, provided such privilege is not abused. Facts contained in such communication need not be true, if published without malice, in good faith, and in an honest belief of their truth arrived at after a fair and impartial investigation or upon reasonable grounds for such belief. 3 Restatement of the Law of Torts 241 to 260, §§ 593 to 598. These occasions arise when the publication is for the protection of the interest of the publisher, Fahey v. Shafer, 98 Wash. 517, 167 Pac. 1118; the recipient or a third person, Ecuyer v. New York Life Ins. Co., 101 Wash. 247, 172 Pac. 359; persons sharing a common interest, Chambers v. Leiser, 43 Wash. 285, 86 Pac. 627; Ward v. Painters' Local Union, 41 Wn. (2d) 859, 252 P. (2d) 253; family relationships, Kimble v. Kimble, 14 Wash. 369, 44 Pac. 866; public interest, Stevens v. Haering's Grocetorium, 125 Wash. 404, 216 Pac. 870. In connection with the last mentioned type of privilege the publication is privileged only when made to a public officer or a private citizen who is authorized to act. The privilege does not extend to a publication to the entire public.... [3] While there is authority indicating that public policy requires that statements made to a prosecuting attorney are absolutely privileged, [2] the majority of the cases hold that the privilege is qualified or conditional, not absolute. [3] The statements must be made without malice, in good faith, and in an honest belief of their truth arrived at after a fair and impartial investigation or upon reasonable grounds for such belief. But the privilege cannot be abused. For example, in Stevens v. Haering's Grocetorium, 125 Wash. 404, 216 Pac. 870 (1923), the court said: ... we find evidence in the record from which the jury might find that the statement to the police officers was made in a loud and unduly harsh manner, over a telephone located in a public market, and within the hearing of many. The rule is succinctly stated in 3 Restatement, Torts § 598. An occasion is conditionally privileged when the circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief that (a) facts exist which affect a sufficiently important public interest, and (b) the public interest requires the communication of the defamatory matter to a public officer or private citizen and that such person is authorized or privileged to act if the defamatory matter is true. [4] Decisions in this jurisdiction recognizing the defense of qualified privilege are cited in the quotation from Owens, supra . It is the universal rule that defamatory statements lose their conditional privileged character upon proof of actual malice. The rule dispositive of the instant case is found in Fahey v. Shafer, 98 Wash. 517, 522, 167 Pac. 1118 (1917), wherein this court said: ... where a communication is prompted by a duty to the public or ... to another having a corresponding interest, it is privileged if made in good faith and without malice. [authorities cited] In this state malice is not ordinarily an essential element in the civil action for damages for libel or slander. [authority cited] But this is not true in cases involving the qualified privilege. In such cases, actual malice must be proved before there can be a recovery. This follows from the very nature of the privilege, which in itself is a complete defense in the absence of malice. The burden in such cases is upon the plaintiff to prove the existence of malice. [authorities cited] Whether a statement, if made in good faith and without malice, is privileged is a question for the court. But if there is any evidence reasonably tending to show actual malice, the plaintiff has the right, notwithstanding the privileged character of the communication, to have the question of malicious excess of privilege submitted to the jury upon such evidence. [authorities cited] Where the qualified privilege exists and the court can see that the language used will warrant no inference of malice, and there is no other proof of malice, it is the duty of the court to grant a nonsuit. [authorities cited] (Italics ours.) Plaintiff argues: (1) defendant Fossum's oral statements to the deputy prosecuting attorney were untrue, were slanderous per se, and malice is presumed; (2) this malice defeats the defense of qualified privilege; (3) therefore, defendant Fossum is not entitled to a dismissal of the action for slander. We do not accept the accuracy of plaintiff's syllogism. He is attempting to defeat the defense of qualified privilege by using the fictitious `legal malice' which is `implied' as a disguise for strict liability in any case of unprivileged defamation. Proof of falsity alone is not conclusive of malice that automatically destroys the defense of qualified privilege of statements made to a prosecuting attorney. The authorities require that malice be proved in order to defeat the defense. Fahey v. Shafer, supra . If plaintiff's argument that the statements must be true before the defense of qualified privilege is available, then the defense of truth would apply and there would be no defense of qualified privilege. We have studied the testimony of defendant Fossum and the deputy prosecuting attorney. We cannot say that the language used by Mr. Fossum in his conversations with the deputy warrants the inference of malice. Was there any other evidence of malice sufficient to take the case to the jury on the question of malice? It is easier to illustrate and prove the affirmative than the negative. The main thrust, however, of plaintiff's argument is that Fossum failed to disclose to the deputy prosecuting attorney certain of his business relations with the town. This argument is not persuasive for two reasons: first, the deputy did not testify that Fossum did not tell him of these matters; he testified: ... I cannot say that he didn't tell me; but if so, it didn't appear important to me because I have no present recollection of it. second, Fossum's business relations with the city are irrelevant for there is no evidence that plaintiff had anything to do with the matters involved. We have examined the record carefully. Defendant Fossum has established the defense of qualified privilege. There is no evidence of malice to defeat the defense. The judgment against defendant Fossum is reversed with instruction to dismiss the action for slander. He will recover one half of the costs on appeal.