Opinion ID: 2101404
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of Douglas Rights

Text: The record shows, we repeat, that Freeman was represented at trial by two experienced Court-appointed attorneys. Within a few days after his conviction, both of them met with him at the jail. Both counsel testified at the post-conviction hearing that at their meeting with Freeman, he was informed of his right to move for a new trial and, if his motion was denied, to appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Arlington Williams, one of appellant's counsel, testified that his co-counsel, James C. Scanlon, explained to him [Freeman] these rights and then told him that whether he wanted us to file this motion for a new trial and a subsequent appeal, [] if a new trial was denied, was a matter for his decision. According to the testimony of Scanlon, Freeman then said that he did not want to appeal. Scanlon further testified that Freeman later reiterated this decision, saying, in addition, that he wanted to go ahead and serve his sentence and get it over with. Freeman asserts that he was never expressly told that he had the right to Court-appointed counsel on appeal if he could not afford private counsel. However, where the facts or circumstances show that a defendant is aware of his rights, a defendant can intelligently and knowingly waive his right to appeal. Commonwealth ex rel. Newsome v. Myers, 428 Pa. 141, 236 A. 2d 763; Commonwealth ex rel. Edowski v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 229, 235, 236, 223 A. 2d 749. In those cases, this Court found, in similar circumstances, that an accused was aware of his Douglas rights and had made a knowing and voluntary waiver of them. In each of those cases, the defendant had Court-appointed counsel at trial who was prepared to continue to represent him in further proceedings if he so wished. In each of those cases, a review of the complete record shows that the defendant was never expressly told that he had the right to free Court-appointed counsel on appeal. Nevertheless, this Court held in both of said cases that the record showed that the defendant was fully aware of his Douglas rights and voluntarily relinquished them. We find that this defendant (Donald Freeman) understood his right to have his free Court-appointed counsel represent him in a motion for a new trial, as well as in an appeal, and that he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived or relinquished these rights. An accused can waive these rights if that waiver constitutes an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938); see also, Commonwealth v. Wilson, 430 Pa. 1, 241 A. 2d 760. However, if the record is silent, the burden of proving such a waiver is upon the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Ezell, 431 Pa. 101, 103, 244 A. 2d 646; Commonwealth v. Wilson , 430 Pa., supra (page 3). Testimony at the Post Conviction Hearing Act hearing shows, we repeat, that defendant had been represented at trial by two experienced, free counsel, and that after his trial and conviction, these attorneys explained to him these rights and then told him that whether he wanted us to file this motion for a new trial and a subsequent appeal, if a new trial was denied, was a matter for his decision. Moreover, defendant testified at the post-conviction hearing that he knew his lawyers' services were provided for nothing and that the Commonwealth paid for it. There is no evidence in this record, or even a reasonable inference, that defendant believed, or had any reason to believe, that his attorneys' services on appeal would not be free. No matter how guilty a defendant is, no matter how often he has voluntarily confessed his guilt, the Minority would require actual awareness or knowledge of his rights to be determined solely by parroted words, when all the facts and circumstances, and defendant's own words show his awareness and knowledge of his right to appeal and to have his free, Court-appointed counsel represent him on appeal. Even a Procrustean stretch of the Constitution or of prior decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States cannot support such a highly technical and far-fetched position. It is clear that defendant knew of his right to free Court-appointed counsel to represent him in post-trial motions and in an appeal, and that he voluntarily, understandingly and intelligently waived this right.