Opinion ID: 1855318
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: CSC II Instruction

Text: Mr. Lemons' younger daughter testified that she performed oral sex on her stepmother. She also said it happened [n]ot very many other times. Ms. Lemons requested a jury instruction on CSC II on the basis of this testimony, claiming it was insufficient to establish cunnilingus for purposes of CSC I. [28] The trial judge refused the instruction because he had refused a motion for a directed verdict on the same grounds, stating that oral contact is sufficient for cunnilingus. [It][d]oes not require any specific use of a mouth or the tongue as long as there is contact. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, stating, The trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction for the CSC [II]. Upon retrial, the trial court will instruct the jury on [CSC II] if requested.... [Ms. Lemons'] two convictions with respect to the charges involving [her stepdaughter] are reversed, and we remand for entry of judgment of conviction of two counts of [CSC II] and resentencing, with the option to the prosecutor to retry [Ms. Lemons] on the original charges of [CSC I]. Slip op at 3-4. Just last term, we addressed the governing rule regarding when a court is required to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses. In People v. Bailey, 451 Mich. 657, 667-668, 549 N.W.2d 325 (1996), we observed: When reviewing the propriety of a requested lesser included offense instruction, we first determine if the lesser offense is necessarily included in the greater charge, or if it is a cognate lesser included offense. Necessarily included lesser offenses must be such that it is impossible to commit the greater without first having committed the lesser. ... Cognate lesser included offenses are related and hence `cognate' in the sense that they share several elements, and are of the same class or category, but may contain some elements not found in the higher offense. CSC I requires the prosecutor to prove sexual penetration. M.C.L. § 750.520b(1); M.S.A. § 28.788(2)(1). CSC II requires the prosecutor to prove sexual contact. M.C.L. § 750.520c(1); M.S.A. § 28.788(3)(1). Sexual penetration can be for any purpose. M.C.L. § 750.520a(l); M.S.A. § 28.788(1)( l ). The statute defines sexual contact, however, as touching that can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. M.C.L. § 750.520a(k); M.S.A. § 28.788(1)(k). Thus, because CSC II requires proof of an intent not required by CSC Ithat defendant intended to seek sexual arousal or gratificationCSC II is a cognate lesser offense of CSC I. In short, it is possible to commit CSC I without first having committed CSC II. [29] Regardless of the evidence in a given case, the court must instruct the jury on necessarily included lesser offenses. People v. Heflin, 434 Mich. 482, 495, 456 N.W.2d 10 (1990). With regard to cognate offenses, however, the evidence must be reviewed to determine if it would support a conviction of the cognate offense. Bailey at 668, 549 N.W.2d 325. The requested instruction on the cognate offense must be consistent with the evidence and defendant's theory of the case. Heflin at 499, 456 N.W.2d 10. The instruction on a cognate offense will be required if there is a dispute in evidence that would support a conviction of that charge. Bailey, supra at 661, 549 N.W.2d 325. The trial judge did not err in determining that the CSC II conviction would not be consistent with the evidence and the defendant's theory of the case. The evidence offered by the prosecution established that Ms. Lemons engaged in multiple acts of cunnilingus with her son and stepdaughter. Although we have found that penetration for the purpose of establishing fellatio requires actual penetration rather then mere kissing or contact where the defendant is engaging in contact with a child's penis, People v. Johnson, 432 Mich. 931, 442 N.W.2d 625 (1989), the distinction is illogical where the victim testifies without objection that she performed oral sex and placed her face on the defendant's vagina. The only reasonable interpretation of this testimony, which was not brought into question by any cross-examination creating a dispute of fact, is that it was intended to be cunnilingus, which by definition, does not require penetration. The distinction advocated by the defendant would be contrary to the policy of the act and would discourage child victims from testifying by requiring them to describe explicitly the method by which they performed cunnilingus. Testimony that a child victim performed oral sex and placed her fact into the vaginal area of an adult does not raise a dispute on an element distinguishing the cognate offense from the principal charge. We reverse the Court of Appeals determination that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on CSC II.