Opinion ID: 1103876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Extraordinary Situations

Text: Ordinarily, due process of law requires an opportunity for some kind of hearing prior to the deprivation of a significant property interest. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971). Only in a few limited, extraordinary or truly unusual situations has the Supreme Court allowed outright seizure without opportunity for a prior hearing or other effective substitute safeguards. First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest. Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a government official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute that it was necessary and justified in the particular instance. Fuentes v. Shevin, supra, 407 U.S. at 91, 92 S.Ct. 2000. Falling within the limited, extraordinary category described above are the cases relied on by the city: Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 51 S.Ct. 608, 75 L.Ed. 1289 (1931) (seizure of back taxes owed the federal government); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974) (government seizure of ship used to transport contraband). Other cases involving extraordinary situations are: Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 70 S.Ct. 870, 94 L.Ed. 1088 (1950) (seizure of misbranded drugs); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 67 S.Ct. 1552, 91 L.Ed. 2030 (1947) (seizure of assets of a financially troubled savings bank); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 29 S.Ct. 101, 53 L.Ed. 195 (1908) (seizure of contaminated food shipments). On the other hand, the routine daily booting of automobiles as part of a municipal parking enforcement system does not present a truly unusual situation justifying outright seizure without opportunity for notice and at least an informal hearing prior to final issuance of the order to boot. Seizure before notice of a pending proceeding to boot and an opportunity to object informally is not necessary to secure any governmental or public interest involved in the booting operation. There is no need for action so prompt following the initial proposal to boot as to preclude effective notice and a chance to be heard at least informally. The New Orleans city government does not maintain a strict monopoly of its booting operation, but, in effect, permits an interested party to control and direct its use of force.