Opinion ID: 1684595
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Move to Suppress Evidence

Text: Zakrzewski also contends that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence taken from his home. Specifically, Zakrzewski contends that the motion to suppress would have been meritorious because the initial entry into the home was done without a search warrant and that the fruits of the initial entry were used in obtaining the search warrant. Although warrantless searches and seizures are generally prohibited by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution, police may enter private premises and conduct a search without a warrant if exigent circumstances exist. See Rolling v. State, 695 So.2d 278, 293 (Fla.1997). After an evidentiary hearing the trial court denied relief on this issue, finding that the search of the home was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, the Defendant has failed to establish that counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress was an error so serious that he was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and the Defendant failed to establish that counsel's errors were so serious as to result in prejudice to the Defendant. Trial counsel made a reasoned informed strategic decision not to file a motion to suppress the evidence seized from the Defendant's home; and, the Defendant has failed to establish either prong of the Strickland test pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668[, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674] (1984). The United States Supreme Court explained in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), that the two-part test of Strickland applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel arising out of the plea process. See also Stano v. State, 520 So.2d 278, 280 n. 2 (Fla.1988) (recognizing the Hill decision); Williams v. State, 717 So.2d 1066, 1066 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (A trial attorney's failure to investigate ... a defense relying on the suppression of evidence, which results in the entry of an ill-advised plea of guilty ... constitute[s] a facially sufficient attack upon the conviction.). However, in order to establish the prejudice prong of Strickland the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366. [6] In addition, [w]here defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). In this case, Koran stated during the evidentiary hearing that he did not file a motion to suppress because he felt it would have been a futile exercise. Koran explained that he believed that any motion to suppress would have been denied based on the exception to the warrant requirement for exigent circumstances. Similarly, Killam testified that he did not consider filing a motion to suppress the evidence taken from Zakrzewski's home. Although Killam's primary responsibility was to present mitigation during the penalty phase, he did discuss the idea of a motion to suppress with Koran and both were convinced that such a motion would have been unsuccessful. Harold Mason, Zakrzewski's Air Force Sergeant at the time of the murders, described the events that led up to the police entry into Zakrzewski's residence. Mason testified that he became concerned when Zakrzewski failed to report for class on June 13, 1994. After attempting to locate Zakrzewski by calling Zakrzewski's home, the hospitals, the Sheriff's Office and the local police, Mason went to Zakrzewski's home, where he noticed a broken window and accumulated mail. After speaking with neighbors, who gave differing accounts of when they had last seen Zakrzewski, Mason called the Okaloosa County Sheriff's Office and requested that a deputy meet him at Zakrzewski's home. When Deputy Robert Baczek arrived, Mason related his attempt to locate Zakrzewski and indicated that he was concerned by Zakrzewski's absence. Deputy Baczek testified that after talking with Mason and making his own assessment of the situation, he feared for the welfare of whomever may have been in the house at that time, thinking that there may have been a burglary, the family may have been on vacation, or something like that. Deputy Baczek told dispatch that he was going to enter the house through the broken window to check on the welfare and see if there had been any kind of burglary inside. Thus, Deputy Baczek did not enter Zakrzewski's home with the intent to seize evidence or make an arrest. Based on the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, the record in this case and the trial court's factual findings, we conclude that Zakrzewski has failed to establish deficient performance as a result of his defense counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress. However, even if counsel's performance were deficient, we conclude that Zakrzewski has failed to establish that but for counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty. Although Zakrzewski alleged prejudice in his motion; i.e., that he would not have pled guilty, there was no evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing to establish this allegation and no reason to assume that had the motion been denied, Zakrzewski would not have still pled guilty, reserving the right to appeal. See generally Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(b)(2)(A)(i) (A defendant who pleads guilty ... may expressly reserve the right to appeal a prior dispositive order of the lower tribunal....). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of relief on this claim.