Opinion ID: 1776672
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: arbitration of disputes and waiver of jury trial:

Text: a. Dispute Resolution. Any controversy or claim between or among you and me or our assignees arising out of or relating to this contract or any agreements or instruments relating to or delivered in connection with this contract, including any claim based on or arising from an alleged tort, shall, if requested by either you or me, be determined by arbitration, reference, or trial by a judge as provided below. A controversy involving only a single claimant, or claimants who are related or asserting claims arising from a single transaction, shall be determined by arbitration as described below. Any other controversies shall be determined by judicial reference of the controversy to a referee appointed by the Judge or, if the Court where the controversy is venued lacks the power to appoint a referee, by trial by a Judge without a jury, as described below. YOU AND I AGREE AND UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE GIVING UP THE RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY, AND THERE SHALL BE NO JURY WHETHER THE CONTROVERSY IS DECIDED BY ARBITRATION, BY JUDICIAL REFEREE, OR BY TRIAL BY A JUDGE. b. Arbitration. Since this contract touches and concerns Interstate Commerce, an arbitration under this contract shall be conducted with the United States Arbitration Act (Title 9, United States Code), notwithstanding any choice of law provision in this contract. The Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association (`AAA') also shall apply. The arbitrator(s) shall follow the law and shall give effect to statutes of limitation in determining any claim. Any controversy concerning whether an issue is arbitrable shall be determined by the arbitrator(s). The award of the arbitrator(s) shall be in writing and include a statement of reasons for the award. The award shall be final. Judgment upon the award may be entered in any court having jurisdiction, and no challenge to entry of judgment upon the award shall be entertained except as provided by Section 10 of the United States Arbitration Act or upon a finding of manifest injustice.... (Capitalization and bold in original.) The following terms are defined at the beginning of the contract: `I,' `me,' `myself,' or `my' mean[s] all persons who sign this Contract as buyer or co-buyer, jointly and severally, and `you' or `your' mean[s] the Seller and any assignee. The arbitration provision in the contract and the stand-alone arbitration agreement are hereinafter sometimes referred to together as the arbitration agreement. On or about February 26, 2001, Stevens sent Phillips a letter regarding the condition of the manufactured home she had purchased. In the letter, she demanded that certain repairs be made to the home and she also demanded money damages for various problems relating to the condition of her home. On or about March 15, 2001, before Stevens filed this action, Southern Homes filed a Demand for Arbitration with the American Arbitration Association seeking to arbitrate the claims Stevens made in her letter. On or about March 23, 2001, Stevens filed this action against Phillips individually. Stevens's complaint contained three counts: Count I alleged that Phillips was guilty of misrepresentation, in that Phillips represented to her that the sale of the home would include furniture and a deck and that the home would be delivered, installed, and ready for occupancy by December 19, 2000, that [t]he defendant further promised and represented to her that any problems in the home would be promptly repaired, within twenty-four hours in the case of leaks, and that [t]he defendant consciously and deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff; count II alleged promissory fraud, averring that Phillips, when she made the promise that the home would include furniture and a deck, had no intent to provide the furniture and a deck as a part of the bargain they had made; and count III claimed that the arbitration agreement, which Stevens admitted she signed, permitted the purchaser and the salesperson to also agree to arbitrate disputes between themselves, but that [t]he defendant Uta Phillips, who was the salesperson, never executed the agreement to arbitrate disputes with plaintiff, and that [b]y filing this complaint, the plaintiff does hereby [revoke her offer] to arbitrate disputes with the defendant, Uta Phillips. With respect to counts I and II, Stevens, although not naming Phillips's employer, Southern Homes, as a party, nevertheless included allegations relating to Southern Homes, as follows: With respect to any conduct herein for which a principal or employer is to be held liable for the wrongful conduct of an agent, servant, or employee, the plaintiff alleges that the principal knew or should have known of the unfitness of the agent, servant, or employee, and employed [her] or continued to employ [her] or continued to use [her] services without proper instruction or with a disregard of the rights or safety of others; or authorized the wrongful conduct; or ratified the wrongful conduct; or the act of the agent, servant, or employee was calculated to or did benefit the principal or employer. This paragraph appeared in both counts I and II of Stevens's complaint. On or about April 25, 2001, Phillips filed a motion to compel arbitration. In an affidavit submitted in support of her motion, she stated that Stevens's purchase of the manufactured home was financed through Green Point Credit Company, which is headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio, and that [t]he actual sales documents and credit approval came from Green Point Credit in Pensacola, Florida. Phillips also attached to her affidavit documents that she averred were maintained in the files of Southern Homes in the normal course of business; one of those documents was the contract signed by Stevens and Phillips, who signed in her representative capacity for Southern Homes, the pertinent provisions of which have already been quoted. Phillips also filed an affidavit made by Tony Capasso, the controller for Indies House Manufactured Homes, who stated that, based upon the records of the company, the home purchased by Ms. Stevens would be constructed with materials purchased and paid for through Interstate Commerce in excess of $14,000. Although the trial judge initially denied Phillips's motion to compel arbitration on December 18, 2001, Phillips filed a motion to reconsider the denial and a second motion to compel arbitration on January 11, 2002; she attached as an exhibit the stand-alone arbitration agreement, attached to this opinion as an appendix. After considering Phillips's submission and Stevens's response, the trial court rescinded its December 18, 2001, order denying Phillips's motion to compel arbitration and entered the following order, compelling Stevens to arbitrate her claims against Phillips: On January 11, 2002, the Defendants filed a Motion entitled `Motion to Reconsider Denial of the Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and Defendants' Second Motion to Compel Arbitration.' The Court has reviewed two cases directly on point: Ex parte Gray, 686 So.2d 250 (Ala.1996), and Monsanto Company v. Benton Farm, 813 So.2d 867 (Ala.2001). The Monsanto case involved the sale of cottonseed and the lawsuit was filed in Lowndes County, Alabama, against various entities including Dixie Agricultural Supply `DAS.' The Plaintiffs had executed an Arbitration Agreement with DAS. They also sued an employee of DAS, named Smith. The Circuit Court granted DAS's Motion to Compel Arbitration but denied Smith's Motion to Compel Arbitration. Smith appealed. Smith argued that under the authority of Ex parte Gray, 686 So.2d 250, 251 (Ala.1996), `he should be able to compel arbitration of the plaintiffs' claims against him, as a nonsignatory, because he was an agent of DAS, the only defendant whose motion to compel arbitration was granted.' [813 So.2d at 873.] Justice Harwood, writing for the majority, agreed, stating: `The plaintiffs' claim against DAS and Smith arise out of the same circumstances, i.e., Smith's representations, made while he was acting as an agent of DAS and within the scope of his employment with DAS, concerning the sale of Technology Cottonseed to the plaintiffs....' [813 So.2d at 874.] The Alabama Supreme Court went on to hold that Smith stood in the shoes of his principal, not only as to the question of liability, but also to the question of coverage of the Arbitration Agreement used by DAS in the sale to the plaintiffs. In Ex parte Gray, the Plaintiff's suit arose out of the sale of an automobile. The Plaintiff had executed an Arbitration Agreement with the dealership. In order to avoid arbitration the Plaintiff only sued the salesman, Gray, and not the dealership. The Supreme Court held that a party should not be able to avoid arbitration by merely suing an employee of the principal. It is the Court's opinion that the Court's Order dated December 18, 2001, should be rescinded and that the Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration is due to be GRANTED.