Opinion ID: 4523916
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Perceived Whistleblower Claim

Text: We also reject Ms. Demery’s contention that CPAC perceived her to be a whistleblower. The Board found that Ms. Demery did not exhaust an allegation for perceived whistleblowing before OSC. Appx8 n.7. The Board further found that, even if she had, there was no evidence that the Agency perceived Ms. Demery as a whistleblower. Id. We again agree with the Board. The perceived whistleblower doctrine prevents a supervisor from taking retaliatory action against an employee, even if the employee’s disclosure is later found unprotected, so long as the retaliation was taken in response to the disclosure. Montgomery v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 382 F. App’x 942, 947 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Thus, even if Ms. Demery did not Case: 19-2282 Document: 35 Page: 9 Filed: 04/09/2020 DEMERY v. ARMY 9 actually engage in a protected activity, she could still have a claim if the agency officials nevertheless perceived her as having engaged in protected activity. For an employee to establish that the Board has jurisdiction over an individual right of action appeal from OSC regarding a perceived whistleblower claim, he must, in addition to showing that he exhausted remedies before OSC, make a nonfrivolous allegation that the agency perceived him as a whistleblower and that his perception as a whistleblower was a contributing factor to his non-selection. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3); King v. Dep’t of Army, 116 M.S.P.R. 689, 696 (2011). Below, the Board found that Ms. Demery failed to raise this claim to OSC. We review the Board’s legal conclusion that Ms. Demery failed to exhaust her administrative remedies de novo. Ms. Demery did not allege to OSC any perceived whistleblower theory separate from her whistleblower theory. Rather, her contention on appeal essentially is that raising a whistleblower theory also includes a perceived whistleblower theory. We disagree and see no error in the Board’s ruling that Ms. Demery failed to exhaust her perceived whistleblower claim before OSC. Ward v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 981 F.2d 521, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[T]he employee must inform [OSC] of the precise ground of his charge of whistleblowing.”). In any event, the Board also found no evidence that Ms. Demery was perceived as a whistleblower. Ms. Langley at CPAC was unaware of Ms. Demery’s disclosures and Mr. Denham did not forward those disclosures to anyone else at CPAC and therefore it is impossible that CPAC perceived Ms. Demery as a whistleblower and retaliated against her. Thus, the Board’s conclusion that Ms. Demery was not perceived as a whistleblower is supported by substantial evidence. Case: 19-2282 Document: 35 Page: 10 Filed: 04/09/2020 10 DEMERY v. ARMY F. Additional Allegations To the extent Ms. Demery is requesting review of her other allegations, such as her Equal Employment Opportunity complaint containing an age discrimination allegation, we lack jurisdiction over these allegations because they are outside the scope of the Board’s final decision. “Section 1295(a)(9) of Title 28 circumscribes our jurisdiction to review the Board’s decisions, limiting it to jurisdiction over an appeal from a final order or final decision of the Board.” Haines v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 44 F.3d 998, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). For example, we do not have jurisdiction over Ms. Demery’s claim regarding Ms. Stoucker because Ms. Demery failed to exhaust this claim in front of OSC. For all of Ms. Demery’s additional complaints and allegations we do not have jurisdiction because Ms. Demery failed to exhaust these allegations in front of OSC, she did not appeal or failed to timely appeal decisions from OSC to the Board, or she failed to timely appeal from the Board. We have considered Ms. Demery’s remaining argu- ments and find them unpersuasive.