Opinion ID: 2600609
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Prior Acts of Child Abuse

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of his prior acts of physical abuse against children, in violation of Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision (b), and 352. As we explain, we conclude that the evidence was properly admitted.
Through an in limine motion, the prosecutor sought the admission of testimony from defendant's ex-girlfriend, D. Robertson, that defendant had kicked and hit his two children from that relationship, S. and J., when they were young. Defense counsel objected that the evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352. The trial court tentatively ruled the evidence involving S. and J. admissible to show intent, motive, and absence of accident, and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect. Later, at trial, in a sidebar conference during Robertson's testimony, the prosecutor stated he was seeking admission of the evidence in order to show intent and absence of accident, but not motive. The trial court so instructed the jury immediately before Robertson's testimony. As summarized above, Robertson testified defendant hit and kicked S. and J. when they were one and three years old, respectively.
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), permits the admission of other-crimes evidence against a defendant when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident ...) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act. (See People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 145 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357].) Section 1101 prohibits the admission of other-crimes evidence for the purpose of showing the defendant's bad character or criminal propensity. ( Ibid. ) Like other circumstantial evidence, its admissibility depends on the materiality of the fact sought to be proved, the tendency of the prior crime to prove the material fact, and the existence or absence of some other rule requiring exclusion. ( People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 705 [27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289].) On appeal, the trial court's determination of this issue, being essentially a determination of relevance, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169].) As noted, the trial court admitted defendant's prior acts of child abuse to show intent and absence of accident. Treating intent and absence of accident as distinct and separate bases for admissibility, defendant first contends that evidence of his intent in his prior acts of child abuse was irrelevant to any element of intent required for the charged crimes of first degree premeditated murder and first degree murder by torture. Defendant contends that the evidence he kicked and hit his two children showed neither premeditation, intent to kill, nor intent to torture. But the trial court's use of intent and absence of accident merely reflects two ways of describing the same relevant issue, namely, that defendant performed the acts that killed Kesha intentionally rather than accidentally. The prosecution's burden of proving all the elements of the charged offenses included the threshold showing that the acts that caused Kesha's death were performed intentionally rather than accidentally, and defendant's prior acts of violence against other children were relevant to proving this. As to absence of accident, defendant acknowledges that Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), permits the admission of other-crimes evidence to show absence of accident, but he contends such evidence can only be admitted when a defendant has introduced accident as a defense. Defendant argues that he never offered an accident defense. Rather, he contends his defense was that Hill caused the fatal wounds, and that, even if his defense was that she might have done so accidentally, this did not amount to an accident defense for himself. Defendant construes the purpose of absence of accident evidence too narrowly. Certainly, when a defendant admits committing an act but denies the necessary intent for the charged crime because of mistake or accident, other-crimes evidence is admissible to show absence of accident. ( People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d 867, 879 [248 Cal.Rptr. 172, 755 P.2d 355].) But we have never limited evidence of absence of accident to such instances. Rather, a defendant's plea of not guilty puts in issue all the elements of the charged offense. ( People v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 705-706; People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 422-423 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 666, 867 P.2d 777].) Furthermore, defendant declined to stipulate that Kesha's wounds were caused intentionally. (See People v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 706, fn. 24.) Indeed, defendant offered expert testimony to support the theory that Kesha's burns were caused accidentally. We also note that the defense opening statement raised the possibility that defendant accidentally caused Kesha's fatal internal injuries when he slipped and fell while carrying Kesha to the shower following the burns allegedly caused by Hill. This expressly placed the question of accident in issue for the prosecution's case-in-chief, notwithstanding that, when defendant ultimately testified, he denied falling with Kesha. Finally, defendant contends that, even if the other-crimes evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), the evidence should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the probability that it would cause undue prejudice. Defendant essentially contends that evidence of child abuse is intrinsically highly inflammatory. But, as discussed above, the evidence was probative of the issue of intent and absence of accident. The prior child abuse evidence was far less inflammatory than the evidence of Kesha's injuries, and this decreased the possibility that the jury's passions were inflamed by the evidence of defendant's uncharged child abuse. (See People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 405 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757].) Defendant also contends the prior child abuse evidence should have been excluded because the events took place between seven and 10 years before the date of the charged murder. But, on this record, we cannot conclude that the passage of time significantly lessened the probative value of the evidence. (See, e.g., ibid.; People v. Ing (1967) 65 Cal.2d 603, 612 [55 Cal.Rptr. 902, 422 P.2d 590].) Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision (b), and 352.