Opinion ID: 2809817
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Facts and Procedural History in This Case

Text: Over the course of more than 30 years, [Petitioner] was convicted nine times for crimes involving deviant sexual acts with children. Based on his convictions, [Petitioner] was first determined to be a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) in 1997 in SEEBOTH V. ALLENBY 7 a civil jury trial proceeding. He was held for consecutive two-year terms from 1997 until 2005 . . . . While [Petitioner] was still in custody for the 2003–05 term, the California District Attorney filed a petition in May 2005 to extend [Petitioner]’s commitment from the end of that 2003–05 term. Seeboth, 659 F.3d at 946 (citations and footnotes omitted). Petitioner’s trial for the 2005 recommitment petition did not take place until September 2010. He currently is in custody because that proceeding resulted in an order committing him for an indefinite term. Id. at 947. In this appeal, Petitioner argues that the SVPA is facially unconstitutional because it fails to establish a time period within which a recommitment trial must occur.2 Petitioner claims that the lack of a timing provision violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because there is a timing provision in the civil commitment laws that apply to MDOs and NGIs. See Cal. Penal Code § 1026.5(b)(4) (providing that an NGI has a right to a trial that commences “no later than 30 calendar days prior to the time the person would otherwise have been released, unless that time is waived by the person or unless good cause is shown”); id. § 2972(a) (same for MDOs). Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the Sacramento County Superior Court (“Superior Court”) asserting, among other claims, that the absence of a timing provision in the SVPA violated his equal protection rights under the federal and state constitutions. The Superior Court denied his equal 2 For simplicity, we refer to such a provision as a “timing provision.” 8 SEEBOTH V. ALLENBY protection claim on the merits, holding in part: “Petitioner has not shown that he is similarly situated to the other types of long-term civil commitments.” Petitioner next filed a state habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal, which denied the petition without an opinion. Finally, after filing further petitions in Superior Court and the Court of Appeal, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court denied the petition, citing People v. Duvall (In re Duvall), 886 P.2d 1252, 1258 (Cal. 1995), without a narrative explanation. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied the petition, holding that the state courts’ rejection of the equal protection claim “cannot be said to have been an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.” Petitioner timely appeals.