Opinion ID: 4514238
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jeopardy Orders

Text: [¶20] The father contends that the court erred in finding that each child is in circumstances of jeopardy, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding and that the court “likened symptoms of parental discord 13 . . . to conditions of jeopardy.” The father contends that the allegations against him “cannot meet the threshold required of ‘serious harm or threat of serious harm’” pursuant to 22 M.R.S. §§ 4002(6)(A) and 4035 (2018). [¶21] We review the court’s factual findings for clear error and will affirm its jeopardy determination “unless there is no competent record evidence that can rationally be understood to establish as more likely than not that the child was in circumstances of jeopardy to his [or her] health and welfare.” In re Nicholas S., 2016 ME 82, ¶ 9, 140 A.3d 1226 (quotation marks omitted); see 22 M.R.S. § 4035(2) (requiring that a determination of jeopardy be supported by a preponderance of the evidence). [¶22] “Jeopardy” is defined as “serious abuse or neglect, as evidenced by . . . [s]erious harm or threat of serious harm.” Id. § 4002(6). “Serious harm” is further defined, in part, as “[s]erious mental or emotional injury or impairment which now or in the future is likely to be evidenced by serious mental, behavioral or personality disorder, including severe anxiety, depression or withdrawal, untoward aggressive behavior, seriously delayed development or similar serious dysfunctional behavior.” 22 M.R.S. § 4002(10)(B) (2018). 14 [¶23] For a court to find jeopardy, it “need[] only . . . find, as a matter of fact, that it was more likely than not that [the child] would incur serious harm, or be subject to a threat of serious harm, if she was returned to the custody” of the parent. In re Nicholas S., 2016 ME 82, ¶ 11, 140 A.3d 1226. We have previously held that “the existence of the emotional harm or threat of emotional harm [is required to] be of sufficient severity that, now or in the future, it is likely to be evidenced by serious mental, behavioral or personality disorder. That disorder may manifest itself through severe anxiety, depression or withdrawal, or other dysfunctional behavior, but there must be evidence of the likelihood of the disorder or threat of that disorder.” In re Jazmine L., 2004 ME 125, ¶ 15, 861 A.2d 1277 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted); see In re Irene W., 561 A.2d 1009, 1012-13 (Me. 1989) (finding jeopardy as a result of “emotional harm” and anxiety). We have, in another context, determined that “emotional harm can create jeopardy in the same way as physical harm.” In re J.H., 2015 ME 10, ¶ 7, 108 A.3d 1271. [¶24] Here, the court did not clearly err in determining that each child currently experiences anxiety relating to visitations with the father, and that the emotional well-being of each child will likely worsen in the future absent 15 any change in the visitation schedule or the father’s conduct. Although the record gives support to the father’s contention that “parental conflict and a vast contrast in parenting styles” has contributed to the children’s anxiety, there is, nonetheless, competent evidence in the record, including testimony from the children and their social workers, demonstrating that the father’s conduct toward both children regarding the foods they eat, their appearances, and the comments made about their mothers has contributed to and increased each child’s anxiety, and that this anxiety would continue into the future. [¶25] Therefore, because there was “competent record evidence that can rationally be understood to establish as more likely than not that the [children were] in circumstances of jeopardy to [their] health and welfare,” In re Nicholas S., 2016 ME 82, ¶ 9, 140 A.3d 1226 (quotation marks omitted), the court did not clearly err in determining that each child is in circumstances of jeopardy. See 22 M.R.S. § 4035(2)
[¶26] The father next contends that the court abused its discretion when it entered jeopardy orders as to each child simultaneously with 16 corresponding parental rights orders, arguing that the court was required to dismiss the Department’s petitions for child protection orders. [¶27] During a child protection proceeding, and “upon request of a parent,” a court “may enter an order awarding parental rights and responsibilities pursuant to [19-A M.R.S. § 1653 (2018)] if the court determines that the order will protect the child from jeopardy and is in the child’s best interest as defined in [19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3)].” 22 M.R.S. § 4036(1-A) (2018). The court must then require that a family matters case be opened and “require the case to be appropriately docketed without a separate initial filing by the parties.” Id. § 4036(1-A)(A). In such instances, “when a court determines that entering a parental rights order pursuant to [section 4036(1-A)] will alleviate jeopardy, the court must do so.” In re Nicholas S., 2016 ME 82, ¶ 6, 140 A.3d 1226. [¶28] Here, there were existing family matters cases already pending for each child. The effective orders were the 2007 parental rights and responsibilities order regarding the older child, and the 2016 amended divorce judgment regarding the younger child. As such, the parents could not “request” a parental rights and responsibilities order to take the place of the pending orders, nor could a new family matters case be “open[ed],” and the 17 court did not err in not dismissing the Department’s petition. 22 M.R.S. § 4036(1-A); see In re Paige L., 2017 ME 97, ¶¶ 35-39, 162 A.3d 217 (affirming a jeopardy order and an amended parental rights and responsibilities order). B. Delegation of Court’s Authority in the Parental Rights Orders [¶29] The father also argues that the court erred in its judgments modifying the 2016 order amending divorce judgment regarding the younger child, and the 2007 parental rights judgment regarding the older child, when it deferred to the recommendations of the children’s therapists when determining contact between the father and each of the children. The father contends that instead of making its determinations based on the standards set forth in 19-A M.R.S. § 1653, the court, in effect, delegated to the children’s therapists its authority to determine the future contact between the father and the children. [¶30] “We review a ruling on a motion to modify a parental rights and responsibilities order for findings unsupported by the record, an abuse of discretion, or an error of law.” Kelley v. McKee, 2019 ME 155, ¶ 7, 218 A.3d 753. “We review a trial court’s decision on a motion to modify a divorce judgment for an abuse of discretion or errors of law.” Papadopoulos v. Phillips, 2018 ME 74, ¶ 8, 186 A.3d 852 (quotation marks omitted). In each instance, 18 when modifying a judgment, the trial court must analyze the child’s best interests as required by 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3). Kelley, 2019 ME 155, ¶ 7, 218 A.3d 753; Papadopoulos, 2018 ME 74, ¶ 8, 186 A.3d 852. Generally, “it is error for a court to delegate responsibility to a third party to decide when a parent can have contact with his children.” Pearson v. Wendell, 2015 ME 136, ¶ 33, 125 A.3d 1149. Thus, “the requirement of third-party approval for contact . . . improperly ‘transfer[s] the court’s responsibility for determining the best interest of the child to the therapist.’” Id. (quoting Knight v. Knight, 680 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Me. 1996)). [¶31] Here, the court required that contact between the father and the older child shall resume “as therapeutically recommended.” Similarly, the court required that contact between the father and the younger child take place in the presence of a professional supervisor for a period of six weeks, but after that time, contact could be extended “upon recommendation of the child’s therapist.” The court erred by requiring that future contact, and any extension of such contact, between the father and each child be dependent upon the recommendation of the child’s therapist, because this “transfer[red] the court’s responsibility for determining the best interest[s] of the child[ren].” Pearson, 2015 ME 136, ¶ 33, 125 A.3d 1149 (quotation marks 19 omitted). As we made clear in Knight, although the court can consider a therapist’s opinion in its determination of a parent’s right to have contact with a child, “the court cannot make the visitation outcome dependent upon that opinion.” Knight, 680 A.2d at 1038. [¶32] Therefore, we vacate the parental rights orders in part and remand for the court to clarify that decisions regarding contact between the father and each child, as set forth in paragraph 1 of the court’s judgment modifying the 2016 order amending divorce judgment regarding the younger child, and paragraph 2 of the court’s judgment modifying the 2007 parental rights judgment regarding the older child, must be made by the court after considering the best interests of each child, and that these decisions may be guided by, but not dependent on, the recommendations of each child’s therapist.7 C. Father’s Motion for Contempt [¶33] The father contends that the court erred and abused its discretion when it denied his motion for contempt against the mother of the younger child, arguing that the mother unilaterally ceased contact between 7 Although the father has not raised the “delegation of authority” issue as to the court’s jeopardy orders, we note that both jeopardy orders identically condition future contact between the father and each child upon the recommendations of the children’s therapists, mirroring the language contained in the court’s orders modifying the 2016 order amending divorce judgment and 2007 parental rights judgment. 20 the father and the child even when the mother was able to comply with the existing order that governed visitation. [¶34] “We review the factual findings that form the basis for the trial court’s decision regarding motions for contempt for clear error, and the ultimate denial of a motion for civil contempt for abuse of discretion.” MacMahon v. Tinkham, 2015 ME 9, ¶ 10, 109 A.3d 1141 (alterations omitted) (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted). Where a party has not filed a motion for further findings of fact, see M.R. Civ. P. 52, “we assume that the court made any necessary subsidiary findings that are supported by competent evidence in the record.” Efstathiou v. Efstathiou, 2009 ME 107, ¶ 10, 982 A.2d 339. [¶35] The father, as the moving party, had the burden of proof at the hearings to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the mother of the younger child was “presently able to comply with the court’s . . . order and that she ha[d] failed or refused to do so.” MacMahon, 2015 ME 9, ¶ 11, 109 A.3d 1141; see M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(2)(D). After the moving party establishes a failure to comply, “the alleged contemnor has the burden of production, of going forward with evidence of his inability to comply. The burden of persuasion, however, remains with the moving party.” Ames v. Ames, 2003 ME 21 60, ¶ 22, 822 A.2d 1201 (alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, when challenging the denial of a motion for contempt on appeal, the father must demonstrate that “a contrary finding is compelled by the evidence.” MacMahon, 2015 ME 9, ¶ 11, 109 A.3d 1141 (quotation marks omitted). [¶36] Here, the court found that the father “failed to carry . . . his burden[],” because, in light of the history of the father’s parenting style and the anxiety issues of the child that had “resurfaced” in 2017 and 2018, it was not unreasonable for the mother to “cease contact.” The court also found that the mother was “trying to protect the child from the risk posed by [the father’s] conduct towards the child.” Because, as noted above, the court’s findings as to jeopardy were supported by competent evidence in the record, the father has not met his burden “that a contrary finding is compelled by the evidence.” Id. (quotation marks omitted); see Ames, 2003 ME 60, ¶¶ 23-24, 822 A.2d 1201. As such, the court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion in denying the father’s motion for contempt. The entry is: Jeopardy orders affirmed. Parental rights orders vacated, in part. Denial of motion for contempt affirmed. Parental rights matters 22 remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Amy McNally, Esq., Woodman Edmands Danylik Austin Smith & Jacques, P.A., Biddeford, for appellant father Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human Services Molly Owens, Esq., Owens & Hodgkins Law, PLLC, Machias, for appellee mother of the older child Dennis L. Mahar, Esq., Mahar & Clark, Calais, for appellee mother of the younger child Machias District Court docket numbers FM-2006-66, FM-2010-70, PC-2019-2, and PC-2019-3 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY