Opinion ID: 1861097
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: warrantless search issue.

Text: It is settled law that a warrantless entry and search, with certain specific exceptions, is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article VI, Section 11 of the South Dakota Constitution. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); and Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970). Equally settled law is the proposition that warrantless searches are permissible in emergency situations. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963); Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and Mincy v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). In Terry v. Ohio, supra, the Court held: [I]t is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure and the search `warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate? (Emphasis supplied) 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906 It is our holding that the initial entry of the Martin home was not unreasonable, illegal or unconstitutional. The officers were acting in an emergency situation which fully justified them in entering the house and making a search not only for the decedent but also to investigate to ascertain whether other dead bodies or dangers were apparent. The question then arises whether they were justified in continuing the search over a longer period of time without the benefit of a search warrant. Under the facts here it is our holding that the fruits of the search, and specifically the articles that caused the death, were legally seized. The evidence is clear that at the initial entry the pickax and rolling pin were in plain view and observed by Officer Whittecar, and Deputy Peters, as well as by the officers and pathologist who later arrived. The Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, said: Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such an article is supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate. 403 U.S. at 465, 91 S.Ct. at 2037, 29 L.Ed.2d at 582 In a case not greatly dissimilar in its facts the Missouri Supreme Court in the case of State v. Epperson, 571 S.W.2d 260 (Mo.1978), said that the property could be seized: ... if such evidence was readily observable and was discovered inadvertently rather than by anticipation or by a concerted search, and was immediately recognized as evidence of a crime. 571 S.W.2d at 265 It is our holding that the items which were in plain view upon the initial entry of the officers, and specifically the death weapons (rolling pin and pickax), are admissible. As to items seized later in the morning by the officers we similarly find them admissible. This would include fingerprints, blood samples, articles removed from the washing machine, etc. These items were no more than an actual continuation of the first [search], and lack of a [search] warrant did not invalidate the resulting seizure of the evidence. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1951, 56 L.Ed.2d 486, 499 (1978). We have considered other issues raised by appellant and find them to be without merit. Judgment affirmed. WOLLMAN, C. J., and DUNN, J., concur. MORGAN, J., concurs specially. MILLER, Circuit Judge, sitting for ZASTROW, J., who was a member of the Court at the time this case was orally argued. HENDERSON and FOSHEIM, JJ., not having been members of the Court at the time this case was orally argued, did not participate.