Opinion ID: 1905072
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unlawful delegation of legislative power

Text: The Constitution of 1921, under which this case falls, declares that The legislative power of the State shall be vested in a Legislature, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. La.Const. Art. III ¶ 1. These powers which the constitution invests in the legislature cannot be delegated to any body or authority. Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets, 231 La. 51, 90 So.2d 343 (1956). Thus, The general rule is that any statute or ordinance that purports to vest arbitrary discretion in a public officer, without prescribing a definite rule for his guidance, is unconstitutional. City of Shreveport v. Herndon, 159 La. 113, 105 So. 244 (1925), and the seven cases cited to support this rule. Exceptions to this general doctrine exist in the law. Accordingly, the legislature may confer upon an executive or administrative officer or board discretion in the administration of the law with the right to determine facts or a state of things upon which the law makes or intends to make its own action depend, provided that the statute establish a sufficient basic standard and rule of action for the guidance of the instrumentality or officer that is to administer the law. (emphasis added.) City of Alexandria v. Alexandria Fire Fighters Assn., 220 La. 754, 57 So.2d 673 (1952). Considering this proposition, in the Tichenor Case, supra, this Court said that courts will not hesitate to strike down legislation vesting in private persons the right to determine the state of things upon which the effect of the law depends as this is a legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form. See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S.Ct. 855, 80 L.Ed. 1160 (1935). Considered under these elementary and fundamental principles, Section 2223 grants the Board the authority to promulgate quarantine regulations to prevent the reinfection of livestock, without a single basic standard or rule of action for the guidance of the Board which is to administer the rules it promulgates. That is to say, the board may promulgate and enact rules and regulations for invoking quarantine as it deems fit in its sole and unhampered discretion. In fact, in this case, no rules or procedure have been established for invoking quarantine. Quarantine was imposed over plaintiff's herd by the heavy hand of the Board without establishing in any proceeding at any time that plaintiff's herd was infected. This is made clear by the record in three litigated cases where the Board failed in that respect. To further illustrate the evil resulting from the unlawful delegation of legislative power, quarantine was invoked in this instance without a hearing, and plaintiff has had no opportunity to contest the validity of that quarantine, either before the board or otherwise. There is no contention here that the State may not regulate and control brucellosis or establish a program to prevent infection of livestock with brucellosis. It is a contention, however, that in its effort to do so the legislature has made an unrestricted delegation of legislative power and authority to an administrative agency. In doing so the legislature has unconstitutionally failed to outline to the administrative agency basic standards and guidelines to accomplish that purpose. As a result, the administrative agency has acted in its sole and unregulated discretion, invoking the powers of the State as it saw fit without any legislative guidelines whatsoever insofar as quarantine is concerned. This, according to all established authority, makes the statute under which the Board acted unconstitutional. The objectionable features of this legislation do not arise from the fact that details of regulation are left to the administrative agency. What is objectionable about this legislation is that no primary standard is recited whereby the administrative agency is guided in invoking quarantine. As a result no regulations are prescribed and quarantine is imposed at the discretion of the Board. Specifically, the attack on the constitutionality of Section 2223 is based upon this Court's adjudication in State of Louisiana v. Morrow, 231 La. 572, 92 So.2d 70 (1956), in which a watch-making statute was struck down as unconstitutional. There the Court said: The delegation of unlimited discretionary powers to the Board herein without fixing any standards or guideposts for the Board to carry out the legislative will is in effect a surrender of legislative power. Such a surrender is unconstitutional. More pertinent to the instant case is Ezell v. City-Parish Plumbing Board of Baton Rouge, 234 La. 441, 100 So.2d 464 (1958), in which this Court found that a statute or ordinance vesting arbitrary discretion in a public official without prescribing fixed and definite rules or specific conditions for the official's guidance is unconstitutional. There a master plumber was deprived of his certificate as a master plumber without an opportunity to present any defense, for no guideline requiring such an important protection was contained in the statute under which the administrative authority acted. Clearly no guideline is contained in Section 2223. Only the brute authority is delegated to prescribe necessary quarantine regulations without setting out what is necessary. The statute is for that reason unconstitutional.