Opinion ID: 2557061
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Second Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Modify Sentence

Text: 1. The Contentions of the Parties In support of her motion to modify sentence, defense counsel acknowledged the precedential significance of State v. Pari, 553 A.2d 135 (R.I.1989), but she suggested that the fact that that case was two decades old somehow lessened its value as precedent. More tellingly, she also contended that there is ambiguity as to when sentencing actually occurs and that that ambiguity militated in favor of the court's granting her motion; in counsel's view, sentencing is not a discrete, one-time event. The following language from defense counsel's argument sufficiently summarizes her contentions:  State v. [ Pari ] is a 1989 case, Judge, and all it says is that you can do it at the time of sentencing. When is sentencing? There is not a whole lot of case law out there on whether or not you can do it on a motion to reduce, a motion to modify, a post-conviction relief. It's all in the realm of sentencing. And this [c]ourt, as you know, has the power [to] sentence a defendant to anything.    And I would ask you to consider that in standing by your decision and perhaps if I may make some new law, State v. [ Pari ] is 1989, Judge, there is no other case set talking about whether a [c]ourt can order a defendant into work release. [Section] 12-19-2 says at sentencing, but you know that this [c]ourt has the authority to change sentences, to modify sentences, to vacate sentences. [8] At the hearing on July 10, 2009, the prosecutor responded with directness to defendant's contention that there is a question as to just when sentencing occurs. He argued as follows: [F]or the record I can't imagine how there is any confusion about what sentencing means. Sentencing is sentencing, and that happened a long time ago in this case. At the same July 10 hearing, counsel for the DOC argued in opposition to defendant's motion to modify sentence; she relied on procedural grounds, and she also responded to defendant's contentions regarding the meaning of the term sentencing. The following passage is illustrative of the DOC's position with respect to the latter issue: I'm a bit perplexed I think by what I perceive to be the argument  that we don't really know what sentencing is. I think we do know what sentencing is. It's on the docket. Sentencing was June 18, 2007. To suggest that sentencing is something that continues indefinitely into the future, I don't think is supported by case law or frankly even common sense. [Section] 12-19-2 does give your Honor the ability to order work release to a first time offender if he qualifies at sentencing. Any change to a defendant's sentence, whether it be a reduction or    modification is pursuant to Rule 35 which states that you have 120 days in which to make such a motion. The DOC also alluded to policy concerns with respect to creating yet another potential route to work release: I would submit [that] by ordering an inmate into [the] work release program who does not qualify under the rules of the Department of Corrections; it creates an issue because it is now opening the floodgates, if you would, to every other inmate at the ACI who doesn't currently qualify for work release to treat one inmate differently than all of the other inmates who has to follow the rules. Finally, addressing defendant's contention about the relatively old nature of the Pari case, counsel for the DOC argued that the age of a judicial opinion should not have a bearing on whether or not the holding set forth in the opinion is to be followed; she added that the Pari case has never been overruled and remains bedrock law.