Opinion ID: 1712255
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Selection of Grand Jury Foreperson

Text: In assignment of error Number 14, defendant maintains the trial court impermissibly discriminated on the basis of race and sex in selecting the foreperson of the grand jury that indicted him. To demonstrate an equal protection violation based on discrimination in the selection of the grand jury foreperson, a defendant is required to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. A prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination is established by proving: (1) those alleged to be discriminated against belong to an identifiable group in the general population; (2) the selection process is subject to abuse according to subjective criteria; and (3) the degree of under-representation, as shown by comparing the proportion of the group at issue found in the general population to the proportion called to serve, over a significant period of time. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1280, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977). If the defendant establishes a prima facie case of discrimination using this approach, the burden shifts to the State to rebut that prima facie case. Id. In this case, the first two prongs of the tripartite showing were never seriously at issue. African-Americans and women are both identifiable groups capable of being singled out for disparate treatment. Moreover, the procedure for selecting grand jury forepersons in effect at the time of defendant's indictment was unquestionably subject to abuse according to subjective criteria which may include race and sex. [14] Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 118 S.Ct. 1419, 140 L.Ed.2d 551 (1998); Johnson v. Puckett, 929 F.2d 1067, 1072 (5th Cir.1991). Thus, the dispute in this case centers on whether defendant established the third prong of the three-part test, which requires a statistical showing of substantial under-representation over a substantial period of time, and, if he did, on whether the State successfully rebutted that prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination. Defendant argues resort to a statistical showing of under-representation to indirectly establish purposeful discrimination is unnecessary in this case because there is direct evidence of such discrimination in the selection of the grand jury foreperson through the testimony of the Clerk of Court for St. James Parish, Edmond Kinler, Jr. Called by the State, Mr. Kinler testified that since a 1972 Louisiana Supreme Court decision invalidating the St. James Parish venire system selection process (which up to that point had excluded women from the general venire), the concerned parish officials have adopted a system that trie[s] to alternate east west, male female, and white and black, when choosing a grand jury foreperson. Defendant argues that this testimony supports a finding of discrimination through a system of exclusion by limited inclusion and establishes that a type of quota system was employed in selecting the grand jury foreperson, in violation of the equal protection guarantee of the United States Constitution. Defendant's reliance on Kinler's testimony to establish an equal protection violation in this instance is misplaced. Although the Clerk of Court candidly acknowledged concern about race, gender, and geographics in the effort to pick a fair cross section of the community to serve as grand jury forepersons, that type of concern is not itself discriminatory. State v. Fleming, 02-1700, p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/16/03), 846 So.2d 114, 121, writ denied, 03-1391, 1393 (La.11/26/03), 860 So.2d 1132. In Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215 (3rd Cir.1992), for example, the selecting trial judge mentioned that he employed race as a factor in an effort to pick a fair cross section of the community and to achieve an even mix of people from backgrounds and races, and things like that. Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1228. While finding this type of subjective sorting according to race objectionable and ill-conceived, the federal court could not conclude that such activity violated the equal protection clause because it apparently was not motivated by a desire to discriminate purposefully against African-Americans, nor was it apparently an attempt expressly to limit the number of African-Americans who could serve. Ramseur, 983 F.2d at 1228. A similar conclusion was reached by the court in State v. Fleming, supra . In that case, the selecting trial judge acknowledged that in choosing the members of defendant's grand jury, he was concerned about race and gender and attempted to achieve a balance that was consistent with the Orleans Parish demographics. Fleming, 02-1700, p. 7, 846 So.2d at 121. Citing Ramseur, the court held that such concern could not be construed as evidence of discriminatory intent sufficient to establish an equal protection violation as the judge's statement did not demonstrate a desire to limit proportionately the number of African-American jurors to a fixed percentage; rather, his concern was more a matter of logical necessity. Fleming, 02-1700 at 7-9, 846 So.2d at 120-22. A similar conclusion can be reached here. The strategy adopted in this case, of alternating east/west, male/female and white/black, while ill-advised, did not lead to a violation of the Equal Protection clause because it apparently was not motivated by a desire to discriminate purposefully against African-Americans or females, nor was it apparently an attempt expressly to limit the number of African-Americans or females who could serve as grand jury forepersons. Quite the contrary, an attempt was made to be inclusive. The selection process did not involve the invidious discrimination of exclusion. Further, it is clear from the record that the trial court did not err in concluding that defendant failed to carry his burden of establishing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by a statistical showing of under-representation over a substantial period of time. Defendant introduced evidence obtained from the Clerk of Court and Department of Elections and Registration from 1960 through September 1998 to argue that based on the population spread in St. James Parish, you would expect to see 25 percent white males, 25 percent white females, 25 percent black males, and 25 percent black females. The actual numbers showed that 70.5 percent of the grand jury forepersons were white males, 7.7 percent were white female, 8.9 percent were black male, and 12.9 were black female. The Clerk of Court testified, however, that women only became eligible venire members in 1972. Therefore, the pre-1972 statistics the defendant relied on would have skewed the numbers to make them appear more discriminatory than more recent reality would suggest. [15] Given this flaw in defendant's statistical data, the trial court's finding that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in the selection of grand jury forepersons does not constitute an abuse of discretion. Defendant's assignment of error Number 14 lacks merit.