Opinion ID: 801039
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 25(b)

Text: Harris next argues that his sentencing by a visiting judge was conducted in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(b). When a sentencing judge has not presided over trial, this court reviews the decision to proceed with sentencing for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jones, 982 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir.1992). [1] After a verdict or finding of guilty, any judge regularly sitting in or assigned to a court may complete the court's duties if the judge who presided at trial cannot perform those duties because of absence, death, sickness, or other disability. Fed. R.Crim.P. 25(b)(1). The Advisory Committee Notes indicate that the rule is intended to cover situations in which a judge who has been assigned ... to try the case is, at the time for sentence, [] back at his regular place of holding court which may be several hundred miles from the place of trial. It is not intended, of course, that substitutions shall be made where the judge who tried the case is available within a reasonable distance from the place of trial. Fed.R.Crim.P. 25 advisory committee's note (1966 Amendments). The judge who presided at trial was neither dead nor sick. There has been no showing that she was absent from the district nor otherwise disabled so that she could not perform the sentencing. Asked at oral argument in this court why he thought she did not do the sentencing, government counsel stated that he believed that the court was in turmoil following the fatal shooting of Chief Judge John Roll. Such turmoil would not constitute a reason under Rule 25(b), whose violation appears to be undisputed. Furthermore, the visiting judge was not sufficiently familiar with the record. See, e.g., Jones, 982 F.2d at 385. Judge Reade was familiar with the PSR and had Harris's objections to it. She was not, however, familiar with the trial transcript. If familiarity with the PSR qualified a judge to sentence, it would become routine for visitors to replace trial judges at sentencing. Judge Reade's comment on the practice in Arizona, quoted here, suggests that it had already become so in Arizona. Rule 25(b) articulates a standard that assumes it to be important that sentencing be done by the judge who presided at trial. Why is it important? Because only that judge has had the opportunity to observe every aspect of the trial and to take into account in sentencing what has been observed. Sentencing is an art, not to be performed as a mechanical process but as a sensitive response to a particular person who has a particular personal history and has committed a particular crime. Lack of sufficient familiarity with the details of that person's trial is prejudicial to him. We conclude that because the absence of the original trial judge was not in accordance with Rule 25(b), and the visiting judge was not sufficiently familiar with the record, the visiting judge abused her discretion by conducting Harris's sentencing. Because Harris's sentence must be vacated, we do not address his final argument that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. For the reasons stated, the sentence is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for sentencing by the trial judge.