Opinion ID: 2076516
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Breach of Contract

Text: Taylor first challenges the trial court's determination that Taylor breached Paragraph 16 of the contract of sale. In reviewing a trial court's determination as to the meaning of a contractual provision, we must ask first whether the meaning of the provision is plain on its face or whether it is ambiguous. Sacks v. Rothberg, 569 A.2d 150, 154 (D.C.1990). If the contract provision is ambiguous, i.e., reasonably susceptible of different constructions or interpretations, 1901 Wyoming Avenue Coop. Ass'n v. Lee, 345 A.2d 456, 461 n. 7 (D.C.1975), our review is limited. In such a case, the trial court will essentially have been acting as a finder of fact, Dodek v. CF 16 Corp., 537 A.2d 1086, 1092 (D.C. 1988), and we will reverse only if the trial court's determination is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (1989). Where a contract is ambiguous, the trial court may, explicitly or implicitly, consider extrinsic evidence such as the circumstances before and contemporaneous with the making of the contract, all usageshabitual and customary practiceswhich either party knows or has reason to know, the circumstances surrounding the transaction and the course of conduct of the parties under the contract. 1901 Wyoming Avenue Coop. Ass'n, supra, 345 A.2d at 461-62. Here, contrary to Taylor's first contention, the meaning of Paragraph 16 is not plain. [3] The obtain-consent requirement could, as Taylor argues, be seen as applicable only when the purchaser could rightly withhold consent. On the other hand, it could be read, as Polinger urged and as the trial court read it, to require the seller to seek consent, even where the purchaser could not rightly withhold consent. The trial court heard evidence on three consecutive days, much of which it solicited, concerning the entire background and series of events involved in the dealings between the parties, including evidence about the formation of the contract. Included was the testimony of Arnold Polinger. On questioning by the court, Polinger testified that we [Purchasers] felt that we had the right to approve what they were going to do there within its reasonableness, so that it would be something that wouldn't hurt us. There would be some cooperation between the two of us and it wouldn't take the whole view where there would be some element of give and take on that. Asked the basis for this view, Polinger explained: Well, we thought before they would go in for a rehearing [before the BZA] that they would bring us the plan, based upon Paragraph 16. Here's our plan for what we're doing below. Do you have any comment? Do you approve it? Do you not approve it? Do you want to turn the lots this way or that way?; and we mutually worked out some sort of plan we could support and they could submit. Finally, asked what he thought Paragraph 16 meant at the time it was added, Polinger stated: As I interpreted this, originally we had the right to approve what plan they may make representation to the BZA with and we were to be arbitrary [ sic ]. It might be that they couldn't have sold that lot at all and by putting this in, I read this to mean essentially we had to be reasonable in what we required so that they could still sell the lots and wouldn't be stuck with something which would essentially be made unusable. In addition, Bernard Segerman, also one of the plaintiffs, testified that he never anticipated major development of the lower lots without at least our being aware of what was going on and the chance to oppose it. These portions of testimony are consistent with the trial court's perfectly reasonable interpretation of Paragraph 16 as requiring Taylor to seek Polinger's consent to proposed representations to governmental authorities that might affect Polinger's lots, even where Polinger might not withhold its consent in circumstances covered by the proviso clause. As the trial court indicated, Taylor's position would mean that he could anticipate Polinger's likely response, determine whether that response would be required under the provision, and then decide whether to seek Polinger's consent at all. Thus, Taylor would unilaterally make a determination as to what might be a contested issue; namely, whether consent could be withheld under the proviso. And in any event, an effort to secure Polinger's consent would have alerted Polinger to a pending event affecting his property. In substance, the trial court interpreted the provision as one akin to a typical lease clause in which assignment of the leasehold by a tenant is prohibited without the consent of the landlord, not to be unreasonably withheld. It would seem strange to think that a tenant could unilaterally assign his leasehold without seeking the landlord's consent on the basis that that consent could not be withheld. See Brefries East End Inc. v. Platt, 116 Misc.2d 574, 575, 457 N.Y.S.2d 677, 678 (N.Y.App.Term 1982) (per curiam) (under lease and statutory provisions requiring tenant to provide landlord with notice and obtain consent before subletting apartment, where tenant failed to take such steps it is no answer to say, after the fact, that had the required notice been given, consent could not have been reasonably withheld). If nothing else, the request would alert the landlord to the impending presence of a new tenant. [4] Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling that Taylor breached Paragraph 16 of the contract of sale.