Opinion ID: 675724
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: good policy, bad policy, and this court's role

Text: 58 The Secretary strenuously argues that an at least equal to standard protects American consumers from unhealthful, unwholesome, or adulterated products while allowing foreign poultry products to be imported at reasonable costs. In contrast, the Secretary asserts that imposition of the same standards with accompanying jot for jot identicality would raise these costs to a prohibitive, protectionist level without any concomitant increase in the safety and quality of the imported product. According to the Secretary, holding foreign poultry producers to the same standards even contains the seed of an absurdity: That such a practice would prohibit the importation of poultry products produced under superior foreign standards! 59 Even though there is superficial appeal to some of the Secretary's policy arguments, they are overdrawn. 84 As a preliminary matter, we observe that although the Secretary places much weight on his prohibiting-superior-standards-is-absurd argument, he has failed to cite even one instance in which a foreign country actually uses a superior standard. All we have been offered is hypotheticals. As the Secretary must certify the production and inspection practices in foreign countries--and hence is presumably familiar with such practices--we find this omission strange. 60 In addition, we note that the Secretary's jot for jot concern misapprehends our holding. All we hold today is that the plain language of the the same in the PPIA unambiguously forecloses the Secretary from adopting an at least equal to standard for imported poultry. Thus what is statutorily proscribed is the Secretary's current practice of certifying foreign programs in globo as at least equal to the federal one, with the accompanying allowance of wholesale, unjustified or unexplained variation from federal standards. 61 Concluding that such wholesale variation is proscribed does not mean, however, that the phrase the same precludes any and all variation from the federal standards. Applications requiring us to ascertain the precise congruity required by the phrase the same in context are not before us; thus, the degree of variation allowed--and whether such variation rises to the level of effectively adopting the proscribed at least equal to scheme--cannot be defined here. 85 We do note, though, that certain technical variations do not, for example, prevent foreign standards from being considered the same as federal standards. 86 The Secretary also has the authority to approve discrete, authorized variations of the type commonly approved under the federal standards. 87 But what we have here goes well beyond that: It is effectively the introduction of a wholly different scheme of regulation that--while it may arguably be a better scheme--is not the one authorized or established by Congress. Beyond disallowing this scheme we need not--and thus do not--go. 62 As a parting comment, we also observe that the Secretary's arguments fail to account for the various legitimate reasons why Congress might want to hold imported poultry to the federal standards. For example, requiring such congruity between foreign and federal standards means that all poultry--domestic and foreign--sold inter state must be produced and inspected according to one set of rules. Accordingly, such an approach maintains uniformity in the national market, thereby presumably engendering the lowered information costs and enhanced consumer confidence commonly associated with such uniformity. 88 63 In addition, adopting such an approach offers the traditional advantage associated with bright line rules--agency personnel would no longer be required to make subjective, fact-specific judgments as to whether one country's standards are somehow in globo at least equal to federal standards. If we operate from the uncontested assumption that the Secretary has devised a federal program that ensures safety, then lessening of subjectivity here also reduces the risk that unsafe products might be imported--i.e., that agency personnel might err, even once, in concluding that a foreign program which differs substantially from our own nevertheless offers safety standards at least equal to the federal program. 89 64 Finally, we note that--as a matter of policy--there would be little reason for the Secretary to single out domestic state program poultry producers, who must likewise meet an at least equal to standard to sell intrastate, and prevent them from entering the interstate market. Of course, there is a simple rebuttal to this argument: The statute prevents such producers from selling their products interstate. And that rebuttal applies equally to the Secretary's impassioned plea for the at least equal to standard for foreign poultry producers: The statute flatly forbids it! These points place the foregoing policy discussion in proper perspective. Although such a discussion is helpful to our understanding of the PPIA and Sec. 17(d)--and is necessary as a check for any absurdities--these policy concerns cannot control the disposition of this case. Policy choices are for Congress--not the courts. And here Congress has chosen--twice. IV