Opinion ID: 1178057
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: proceeds of the automobile

Text: Appellant claims the proceeds of the sale of a Lincoln Continental automobile. The executor resists this claim on the grounds that appellant made no objection to the sale and the court confirmed it. The circumstances are set forth in the undisputed affidavit of appellant's counsel: In an attempt to locate the title certificate, the executor's trust officer telephoned appellant's counsel, who informed him that appellant claimed ownership of this automobile. The officer responded that he had a sale, but would not proceed in the face of any adverse claim. The two then agreed that appellant would not object to the sale, but would make claim to the proceeds rather than to the automobile itself. Apparently neither communicated this agreement to the executor's attorney. The court later granted the executor's petition for confirmation of sale of personal property, and the automobile was sold. Appellant contends that the executor should be estopped from raising the order of the court as a defense to her claim. The executor counters that appellant's counsel acted improperly by communicating directly with an adverse party, rather than its counsel, and therefore cannot invoke the doctrine of estoppel in this circumstance. The executor's attorney claims prejudice in his being deprived of the opportunity to determine whether to conduct the sale forthwith or only after litigating the question of ownership to the automobile. The circumstances of this case fit all the elements of equitable estoppel, as specified in Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., Utah, 652 P.2d 1298 (1982); Rice v. Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969); and J.P. Koch, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Co., Utah, 534 P.2d 903, 905 (1975). Thus, in Rice v. Granite School District, supra , the defendant was estopped to rely on the statute of limitations because its insurance carrier had induced the plaintiff to delay filing her action. Quoting approvingly from an earlier authority, we stated: Where the delay in commencing an action is induced by the conduct of the defendant, ... it cannot be availed of ... as a defense. One cannot justly or equitably lull an adversary into a false sense of security thereby subjecting his claim to the bar of limitations, and then be heard to plead that very delay as a defense to the action when brought. 23 Utah 2d at 28, 456 P.2d at 163. Similarly, in reasonable reliance upon an agreement with the executor, appellant refrained from challenging its petition for confirmation of the sale of the automobile. The executor is equitably estopped from later changing its position and asserting that appellant is barred by the court's order. Appellant is not precluded from invoking equitable estoppel by her attorney's direct contact with the executor's trust officer. As appellant points out, the executor-bank is a sophisticated organization and its trust officer an experienced professional. The contact, which was initiated by the bank, was made in the course of the officer's routine duties. In addition, we perceive no prejudice resulting to the bank or its counsel from the sale of the automobile before, rather than after, the contest over its ownership. The dismissal of appellant's claim to the proceeds of the automobile is therefore reversed, and this claim is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In other respects, the dismissal of appellant's petition is affirmed. No costs awarded. HALL, C.J., STEWART and HOWE, JJ., and J. DUFFY PALMER, District Judge, concur. DURHAM, J., does not participate herein; PALMER, District Judge, sat.