Opinion ID: 4577668
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arave Well

Text: ¶37 The district court correctly found that the Araves and Southwick12 satisfied the first, second, and fifth elements of an interference claim: specifically, that the Plaintiffs possess enforceable water rights, those rights are senior to Pineview’s water rights, and Pineview’s pumping of Well 4 hindered the Plaintiffs’ ability to get their water because it dropped the water table below the level of the Arave Well’s pump. However, the court made insufficient findings to establish that the Plaintiffs’ method and means of diversion were reasonable (the third element). Consequently, the court could not properly conclude that despite reasonable efforts, the Plaintiffs were unable to obtain some quantity of their water rights (the fourth element). For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s interference determination. ¶38 With regard to the first element of an interference claim, Pineview does not dispute that the Araves and Southwick possess lawfully appropriated water rights. However, Pineview contends that the district court essentially granted the Plaintiffs a right to a certain level of the water table, to which they have no enforceable right. Pineview correctly characterizes the district court’s conclusions. The court ruled that: [Pineview’s] interference consists of dewatering the aquifers that are the source of supply for the Arave and [Snowberry] wells, thus obstructing and hindering the quantity of water available to the Arave and [Snowberry] wells, first by depriving the Arave well of virtually all water, and by obstructing the [Snowberry] well’s ability to produce water. __________________________________________________________ 12 In this section of the opinion addressing only the Arave Well, when we refer to the “Plaintiffs,” we mean Arave and Southwick. 11 ARAVE V. PINEVIEW Opinion of the Court ¶39 Pineview relies on our decision in Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corporation, for its contention that the Plaintiffs have no enforceable right to the level of the water table. See 2010 UT 37, ¶ 12. In Bingham, the plaintiffs sued the city, alleging that its manner of diverting water had reduced the level of soil saturation beneath the plaintiffs’ properties, thereby impairing their ability to raise crops and livestock. Id. ¶¶ 1, 5–6. Significantly, the plaintiffs had not appropriated the water in the soil. Id. ¶¶ 29, 36. Nevertheless, they argued that the level of soil saturation was a component of the water rights that they had appropriated because it allowed them to use the appropriated water more beneficially. Id. ¶¶ 20, 25. In other words, the plaintiffs required less water to irrigate their land before the city’s diversion had lowered the water table. Id. ¶ 20. We affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the city, reasoning that beneficial use of water does not substitute for appropriation. Id. ¶¶ 29–30. Thus, because the plaintiffs had not appropriated the water in their soil, they did not have an enforceable right to its continued presence. Id. We also explained that the plaintiffs had sustained no compensable injury because they were still able to access all of the water to which they were entitled under their water rights. Id. ¶¶ 49–50. ¶40 The circumstances here are different than those in Bingham. Here, the Plaintiffs each have lawfully appropriated water rights, allowing them to divert water from their respective wells. They are not claiming an enforceable right to use additional unappropriated water simply because it is present in their soil. Cf. id. ¶ 24. Instead, they seek to enforce their existing senior water rights. And although we held in Bingham that the plaintiffs had no enforceable right to the water in their soil, we recognized that “a claim of interference can be sustained where a junior appropriator lowers the water table in a manner that hinders the diversion of water by a senior appropriator.” Id. ¶ 51. ¶41 We conclude that the Plaintiffs have satisfied this element of an interference claim because they have lawfully appropriated water rights. But we clarify that the Plaintiffs have an enforceable right only in these lawfully appropriated water rights—not in a particular level of the water table. The Plaintiffs’ claim that Pineview’s dewatering of the aquifer constitutes actionable interference cannot be divorced from the requirement that the Plaintiffs make reasonable efforts to obtain their water. Fundamentally, the Plaintiffs must show that because of the actions of Pineview, they can no longer access the water to which 12 Cite as: 2020 UT 67 Opinion of the Court they are entitled even though they have made reasonable efforts to do so. If they cannot make such a showing, they have demonstrated only that Pineview has lowered the water table, not that it has prevented them from obtaining some quantifiable portion of their water right. ¶42 With regard to the second element, it is undisputed that the Araves’ and Southwick’s water rights are senior to Pineview’s. ¶43 However, with regard to the third element, we conclude that the district court did not find sufficient facts to establish that the Plaintiffs’ method and means of diversion were reasonable. This element is based upon the rule of reasonableness, which requires that each appropriator’s “means of diversion must be reasonable and consistent with the state of development of water in the area.” Wayman, 458 P.2d at 866. The rule of reasonableness permits the factfinder a measure of flexibility in considering the totality of relevant facts—such as the quantity of water available, the average annual recharge, the existing rights that are in conflict, and their relative priorities—with the objective of putting the greatest amount of water to beneficial use. Id. at 865. As we explained in Wayman, all water users are required to “employ reasonable and efficient means in taking their own waters in relation to others to the end that wastage of water is avoided and that the greatest amount of available water is put to beneficial use.” Id. ¶44 Here, the district court concluded, the “Plaintiffs‘ means and method of diverting their water are reasonable. Their wells are the only possible method for diverting the water under their rights. Those wells functioned without problem until [Well 4] was drilled.” ¶45 These findings are not sufficient to establish that the operation of the Arave Well was reasonable during the relevant time period. The district court appears to have based its conclusion on two findings: first that the Araves can divert their water only through the use of the well based on the terms of their water right, and second that the well functioned without issue until Well 4 began to operate. Those facts are certainly relevant to the reasonableness question, but they do not complete the analysis. It is also necessary to consider whether the Araves were operating the well efficiently and consistent with the current state of development in the area, and to identify and consider any other factors relevant to maximizing the beneficial use of water. 13 ARAVE V. PINEVIEW Opinion of the Court ¶46 Here, the record evidence established that although the water table dropped when Well 4 pumped, “there ha[d] not been a general decline in groundwater levels in the regional basin in which [the] aquifers are located,” although it fluctuated seasonally. Under these circumstances, it was necessary to determine whether the Plaintiffs made reasonable efforts to obtain the available water but were unable to do so. However, the court did not make findings related to whether the Plaintiffs could have lowered their pump or otherwise modified the well to reach the available water, or conversely, explain why this would have been futile or otherwise not possible.13 Without this, there are not adequate findings to establish that the Plaintiffs made reasonable efforts to obtain their water. ¶47 While the Plaintiffs’ failure to meet the requirements of the third element is dispositive, we note that the third and fourth elements are closely related. If the Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that their means and method of diversion are reasonable, it is impossible to satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie case— that despite reasonable efforts, the Plaintiffs could not obtain the quantity of water to which they were entitled. ¶48 We note an additional problem with the Plaintiffs’ proof on the fourth element. The district court did not make findings about the specific amount of their respective water rights that the Araves and Southwick were unable to obtain. Rather, the court found that Pineview’s operation of Well 4 interfered with the Plaintiffs’ well. But this does not necessarily establish that the Plaintiffs were unable to obtain some quantity of their water right. ¶49 The Plaintiffs did not offer evidence of how much water they used or how much of their appropriated water they were not able to obtain. This is because the Araves did not have a metering device in their well. We do not mean to suggest that it was __________________________________________________________ 13 Rather, the court found that the Araves removed the pump and used the well as a monitoring well to document the impact of pumping Well 4. The court accepted the Plaintiffs’ explanation that if they had pumped the well at the same time, it would have been more difficult to interpret the data. While this may be the case, it does not excuse the Araves from showing that at some point after the alleged interference, they made reasonable efforts to reach available water but were unable to do so. 14 Cite as: 2020 UT 67 Opinion of the Court impossible for Plaintiffs to show interference by proving that Pineview interfered with the year-round nature of their water rights. But it is difficult for them to establish that Pineview prevented them from obtaining some quantifiable amount of the water to which they were entitled with no measurements of the amount of water they could obtain at the time of the alleged interference. ¶50 In sum, we conclude there are insufficient findings to establish that the Plaintiffs’ means of diversion was reasonable and that despite their reasonable efforts the Plaintiffs were unable to obtain some quantity of their water rights. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s ruling that Pineview interfered with the Arave Well.