Opinion ID: 3054361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Delegation and Inpatient Treatment

Text: [4] With respect to the inpatient treatment aspect of Condition 5, Defendant argues that the district court impermissibly delegated judicial authority to the probation officer. [W]here the [district] court makes the determination of whether a defendant must abide by a condition, and how (or, when the condition involves a specific act such as drug testing, how many times) a defen- dant will be subjected to the condition, it is permissible to delegate to the probation officer the details of where and when the condition will be satisfied. United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 2005). But “a probation officer may not decide the nature or extent of the punishment imposed upon a probationer.” Id. at 881 (internal quotation marks omitted). [5] Here, Condition 5 requires Defendant to participate in a counseling or sex offender treatment program, “which may include inpatient treatment, as approved and directed by the Probation Officer.” (Emphasis added.)4 Thus, although the 4 We have held that a similar condition is not overbroad, Cope, 527 F.3d at 956, but we have not addressed whether such a condition is an improper UNITED STATES v. ESPARZA 775 court clearly mandated participation in a treatment program of some sort, the decision whether Defendant would receive inpatient or outpatient treatment is left to the discretion of the probation officer. Defendant argues that inpatient treatment is a condition different in kind from an outpatient program, such that the probation officer would be deciding “the nature or extent of the punishment” to be imposed. Stephens, 424 F.3d at 881. The government counters that the district court required psychological treatment and that the inpatient/ outpatient format is simply a decision about “where and when the condition will be satisfied.” Id. at 880. [6] We are persuaded by Defendant’s argument. In terms of the liberty interest at stake, confinement to a mental health facility is far more restrictive than having to attend therapy sessions, even daily. Our conclusion in this regard is bolstered by Congress’ recognition of procedural and substantive protections that apply to civil commitment to inpatient facilities. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4248. Accordingly, we hold that, on remand, the district court must strike from Condition 5 the phrase “which may include inpatient treatment.”5 CONDITION 5 AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED. delegation of authority, see United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1003 n.7 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting the issue, but declining to reach it), cert. denied, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. Jan. 12, 2009) (No. 08-7566). 5 We hold only that a district court may not delegate to the probation officer the decision whether a defendant must be committed to inpatient treatment. We express no view on the question whether a district court could order mandatory inpatient treatment as a condition of lifetime supervised release.