Opinion ID: 1844767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: GPC complains about the court's instruction number twenty-five, which stated:

Text: [A] joint venture may arise if the parties, in the conduct of their affairs, actually place themselves in such a position as permits the relationship to be inferred, and if, from the facts and circumstances of the particular case, it appears that there was at least an implied intention to create a joint venture relationship, the relationship may be found to exist, notwithstanding a denial by an alleged joint venturer, and whether or not the parties expressly understood it to be a joint venture. GPC's objection is that this instruction inject[ed] the unprecedented notion, neither pled nor requested by the plaintiff, that a party could be found vicariously liable [for acts] of another based solely on what outside observers interpret the relationship to be. When instruction twenty-five is read as a whole, we believe it merely states the general rule that a joint venture may be established by implication. See, e.g., Pay-N-Taket, Inc., 259 Iowa at 724, 145 N.W.2d at 625; Goss v. Lanin, 170 Iowa 57, 64-65, 152 N.W. 43, 46 (1915); 46 Am.Jur.2d Joint Venture §§ 8, 9, at 30-31 (1969); 48A C.J. S. Joint Venture § 10, at 408 (1981). This instruction correctly informed the jury that, to find a joint venture based on implication, more than an inference was required; it must also be shown that there was at least an implied intention to create a joint venture. B. GPC has another objection to instruction twenty-five: it informed the jury that one of the requirements for a joint venture is an agreement that the profits or losses from the project would be shared. (Emphasis added.) GPC argues that there must be an agreement to share profits and losses and that there was no evidence of an agreement to share losses. Therefore, there could be no joint venture. Farm-Fuel responds that GPC failed to object to this instruction at trial, and it appears that this is so. We reject this argument in any event. While an agreement to share losses would strengthen a finding of joint venture, we do not believe it is necessarily required if there are other sufficient indicia of a joint venture to support a finding that it existed. Moreover, as we have already noted, an agreement to share losses may be inferred. See Smith, Landeryou & Co. v. Hollingsworth, 218 Iowa at 234-35, 251 N.W. at 752. Failure to instruct that an express agreement to share losses is a requirement for a joint venture would not be fatal, in our view, when it is obvious from the instructions as a whole that an agreement to share in the fortunes, whether good or bad, of an enterprise may be an indication of a joint venture. We believe that is the case here. C. In a special verdict form, the question was asked of the jury whether ACR and GPC had a joint venture on August 21, 1980, without limiting it to the Farm-Fuel project. GPC argues that a finding by the jury that a joint venture existed on that date is not the equivalent of a finding that there was a joint venture with regard to Farm-Fuel on that date. It argues that this instruction allowed the jury to find GPC vicariously liable based on a general joint venture between GPC and ACR. Farm-Fuel counters that GPC made no objection to this verdict form at trial and therefore waived it. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 196. We believe the objection was waived, but, in any event, the instructions when taken as a whole make it clear that the joint venture was required to be with regard to the Farm-Fuel plant. First, the special verdict question itself refers specifically to the date of the Farm-Fuel/ACR contract, August 21, 1980. Also, the instruction provided in part that the joint venture required to be established concern[ed] the sale of technology and rendering of engineering services for Farm-Fuel alcohol plant in Storm Lake, Iowa. D. GPC argues that the jury was given no guidance on the concept of proximate cause in instruction twenty-three, which stated: You are instructed that the measure of damages in this case is such amount as may reasonably be considered as arising naturally from the breach of warranty itself or the representations made, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties, at the time the warranty was expressed or the representations made, as the probable result of such actions. You are further instructed that damages, to be recoverable, must be direct and certain. Contingent, remote or speculative damages will not be allowed. GPC asserts that Uniform Jury Instruction 2.6, defining proximate cause should have been given in connection with instruction twenty-three. Farm-Fuel responds that instruction forty-seven did explain the concept of proximate cause. While instruction twenty-three does not mention proximate cause, as such, it does require that damages must be shown to be direct and certain. Also, instruction thirty sets forth the requirements necessary for recovery, including a finding that [t]he breach of express warranty was a proximate cause of damage to Plaintiff. Instruction forty-seven then defined proximate cause in substantially the same language as Uniform Instruction 2.6. We believe the instructions, when taken as a whole, made it clear that proximate cause as defined in Uniform Instruction 2.6 was required. E. The court instructed the jury that it could allow recovery for Farm-Fuel's lost equity in the plant and fixtures and for its net operating losses for the years involved. The jury returned verdicts on both elements. GPC complains that there was insufficient evidence on both the lost equity and net operating loss elements. As to the lost equity element, GPC contends that the court erred in failing to advise the jury that credit must be given for salvage value of the plant. We summarily reject the sufficiency of the evidence issue; there was abundant evidence from which the jury could have concluded these elements of damage were caused by ACR. On the matter of the court's failure to instruct on salvage value on the element of lost equity, GPC did not object to the failure of the instructions or special verdict form to provide for salvage credit. It therefore waived its right to object on appeal. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 196.