Opinion ID: 1183644
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limiting Defendant's Testimony Concerning Communist Conspiracy

Text: Defendant took the stand and at some length testified in response to his counsel's questioning about communist conspiracies which he believed to be linked with the decedent and which brought about the death for which he was charged. After considerable attention had been devoted to his state of mind and fears, the testimony filling many pages (the State asserting it to have required one and one-half hours of time), the following ensued: Q What specifically happened aboard ship which tied into the incident of Ronald Jones's death? A That refers back to the federal officer, what I told him. Q You wanted him to  A Investigate this incident. Q Investigate what? A This incident that took place in Port Hueneme, California, on this naval base, which has been confirmed. Q Okay, what was that incident? MR. BRORBY [Deputy County Attorney]: I'm going to object to that question as being incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. The objection was sustained and defendant's counsel made an unsuccessful offer of proof concerning various events relating to communist plots and purporting to show the state of defendant's mind at the time of the trial and perhaps at the time of decedent's death. Defendant now argues that it was prejudicial error for the court to so limit his testimony, asserting on the basis of State v. Martin, 102 Ariz. 142, 426 P.2d 639, 645, that the jury in determining criminal responsibility when insanity is pleaded as a defense is entitled to have the entire picture of the defendant. We are inclined to think that counsel misinterprets the Martin case, as well as the general citations on the subject, which are applied too literally. Essentially the purport of the Martin case is that evidence which may have a bearing on the questions of whether the defendant understood the nature or quality of his act and whether he knew right from wrong will not be deemed too remote for the jury's consideration. We do not consider it as authority for according a defendant a right to state without limitation his philosophy and events which led up to it. In the instant case, previous to the court's limitation, defendant had expressed quite fully his communistic-plot fear and in so doing had been very repetitious. The description of his testimony by his own counsel as rambling indicates little question in that regard. The jury, if it believed what he said, could scarcely avoid having been impressed that his life had long been under the shadow of fear that sooner or later communistic planning would overrun and outdo him. Thus, anything that defendant could have added to this impression by discussion of matters which had happened long since at sea while he was in the merchant marine would at best have been merely an exercise in tautology. That the trial court has wide discretion respecting examination of witnesses is too well established to justify discussion. Gajewski v. United States, 8 Cir., 321 F.2d 261, 268, certiorari denied, 375 U.S. 968, 84 S.Ct. 486, 11 L.Ed.2d 416; 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence § 408 (13 Ed.); 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 317. We find no abuse of discretion in the court's ruling concerning this aspect.