Opinion ID: 2231471
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Section 11-501.1(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(a) (West 2006)) provides, in pertinent part, that [a]ny person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this State shall be deemed to have given consent    to a chemical test or tests of blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the content of alcohol    in the person's blood if arrested    for [DUI]. If a motorist submits to testing that reveals a blood-alcohol level in excess of the legal limit, or if he or she refuses to submit to testing, his or her driving privileges will be summarily suspended by the Secretary of State upon the submission of a sworn report of the arresting officer. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.1(d), (e) (West 2006). A motorist whose driving privileges have been summarily suspended may request a judicial hearing to seek rescission of the suspension. 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1 (West 2006). A hearing on a petition to rescind a summary suspension is a civil proceeding in which the driver bears the burden of proof. People v. Smith, 172 Ill.2d 289, 294-95, 216 Ill.Dec. 658, 665 N.E.2d 1215 (1996). If the driver establishes a prima facie case for rescission, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with evidence justifying the suspension. Smith, 172 Ill.2d at 295, 216 Ill.Dec. 658, 665 N.E.2d 1215. There are four issues that may be raised: (1) whether the person was placed under arrest for an offense under section 11-501 (625 ILCS 5/11-501 (West 2006)); (2) whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, another drug, or both; (3) whether the person received the statutory motorist's warning and refused to complete the test or tests; and (4) whether the test or tests disclosed an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more. 625 ILCS 5/2-118.1(b)(1) through (b)(4) (West 2006). Here, the court entered an order pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of the statute, rescinding the summary suspension due to no reasonable grounds. In determining whether there has been reasonable grounds under subsection (b)(2) of the statute, this court has utilized the probable cause analysis deriving from the fourth amendment. Smith, 172 Ill.2d at 297, 216 Ill.Dec. 658, 665 N.E.2d 1215, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968). Similarly, courts often use the phrase reasonable grounds coterminously with probable cause in summary suspension proceedings. Smith, 172 Ill.2d at 297, 216 Ill.Dec. 658, 665 N.E.2d 1215 (referring to probable cause in a summary suspension proceeding); People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill.2d 530, 532, 306 Ill.Dec. 94, 857 N.E.2d 187 (2006) (noting that the basis for both a defendant's motion to suppress and a petition to rescind was the lack of probable cause); People v. Rush, 319 Ill.App.3d 34, 253 Ill.Dec. 383, 745 N.E.2d 157 (2001); People v. Fortney, 297 Ill.App.3d 79, 87, 231 Ill.Dec. 720, 697 N.E.2d 1 (1998). This is because the issues raised in a petition to rescind and a motion to suppress are overlapping. Rush, 319 Ill.App.3d at 38, 253 Ill.Dec. 383, 745 N.E.2d 157. Indeed, in People v. Luedemann , we reviewed the appeal of a petition to rescind and a motion to suppress without making a distinction between the analysis applied to either motion, although an argument was not made to this court that such a distinction should be made. Luedemann, 222 Ill.2d 530, 306 Ill.Dec. 94, 857 N.E.2d 187. [1] Hence, in this review of an appeal of a petition to rescind, we use the standard of review applicable to the review of suppression hearings. Luedemann, 222 Ill.2d at 542, 306 Ill.Dec. 94, 857 N.E.2d 187. We apply the two-part standard of review that the United States Supreme Court adopted in Ornelas v. United States. Luedemann, 222 Ill.2d at 542, 306 Ill.Dec. 94, 857 N.E.2d 187, citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 920 (1996). A reviewing court will uphold findings of historical fact made by the circuit court unless such findings demonstrate clear error, and a reviewing court must give due weight to any inferences drawn from those facts by the fact finder. Luedemann, 222 Ill.2d at 542, 306 Ill.Dec. 94, 857 N.E.2d 187, citing Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699, 116 S.Ct. at 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d at 920. In other words, we give great deference to the trial court's factual findings, and we will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Luedemann, 222 Ill.2d at 542, 306 Ill.Dec. 94, 857 N.E.2d 187, citing People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill.2d 425, 431, 256 Ill.Dec. 836, 752 N.E.2d 1078 (2001). A reviewing court, however, remains free to undertake its own assessment of the facts in relation to the issues and may draw its own conclusions when deciding what relief may be granted. Luedemann, 222 Ill.2d at 542, 306 Ill.Dec. 94, 857 N.E.2d 187, citing People v. Pitman, 211 Ill.2d 502, 512, 286 Ill.Dec. 36, 813 N.E.2d 93 (2004). Accordingly, we review de novo the trial court's ultimate legal ruling as to whether the petition to rescind should be granted. Luedemann, 222 Ill.2d at 542-43, 306 Ill. Dec. 94, 857 N.E.2d 187, citing Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699, 116 S.Ct. at 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d at 920, Pitman, 211 Ill.2d at 512, 286 Ill.Dec. 36, 813 N.E.2d 93; Sorenson, 196 Ill.2d at 431, 256 Ill.Dec. 836, 752 N.E.2d 1078. We therefore turn to the relevant fourth amendment principles applicable to Officer Dawdy's warrantless arrest of Wear inside Foiles' home. The physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the fourth amendment is directed. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2097, 80 L.Ed.2d 732, 742 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1379, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 650 (1980). The fourth amendment guarantees: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. U.S. Const., amend. IV; accord Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 6. It is a basic principle of the fourth amendment that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Payton, 445 U.S. at 586-87, 100 S.Ct. at 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d at 651. This is because, `[t]o be arrested in the home involves not only the invasion attendant to all arrests but also an invasion of the sanctity of the home. This is simply too substantial an invasion to allow without a warrant, at least in the absence of exigent circumstances, even when it is accomplished under statutory authority and when probable cause is clearly present.' Payton, 445 U.S. at 588-89, 100 S.Ct. at 1381, 63 L.Ed.2d at 652, quoting United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (2d Cir. 1978); see also People v. Foskey, 136 Ill.2d 66, 75, 143 Ill.Dec. 257, 554 N.E.2d 192 (1990) (requiring probable cause and exigent circumstances before an officer may make a warrantless arrest inside a home). The constitutionally prescribed sanctity of the home, however, is not limitless. As the United States Supreme Court in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006), recently stated, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is `reasonableness,' the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions. Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403, 126 S.Ct. at 1947, 164 L.Ed.2d at 657, citing Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13, 120 S.Ct. 7, 8, 145 L.Ed.2d 16, 19 (1999) ( per curiam) ; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967). [L]aw enforcement officers may make a warrantless entry onto private property to fight a fire and investigate its cause [citation], to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence [citation], or to engage in `hot pursuit' of a fleeing suspect, United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42, 43[, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300] (1976). Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403, 126 S.Ct. at 1947, 164 L.Ed.2d at 657. Relevant to the matter at hand is only one of those enumerated exceptions, namely, hot pursuit as set forth by United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43, 96 S.Ct. at 2409-10, 49 L.Ed.2d at 305. Accordingly, we must first determine if Officer Dawdy had probable cause to arrest Wear outside of the residence. If so, we consider if Officer Dawdy's warrantless and nonconsensual entry into Foiles' home was excused under the doctrine of hot pursuit.