Opinion ID: 175541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Richardson failed to exhaust state remedies with respect to the second identification.

Text: Preliminarily, the Superintendent claims that Richardson is procedurally barred from challenging Pierre-Louis's second station-house viewing because Richardson did not exhaust that challenge before the state courts. [3] This claim has merit. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), [a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that... the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Exhaustion requires that the prisoner fairly present the federal claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review). Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347, 158 L.Ed.2d 64 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A prisoner has not fairly presented a federal claim before a state court if the federal claim is not mentioned in the prisoner's state court brief. See id. at 32, 124 S.Ct. 1347. Here, Richardson challenges both the first and second pre-trial identifications, but did not directly challenge the second, official station-house identification before the state appellate court. Richardson's Appellate Division brief argued that the first station-house viewing was impermissibly suggestive. Although his brief stated that [g]iven the total lack of effort on the part of the police to reduce the suggestiveness herein it is apparent that this identification was not reliable and that [e]ach of Louis' subsequent identifications of [Richardson] was premised upon th[e] initial highly suggestive procedure, Richardson's App. Div. Br. 35, it did not describe the second identification or argue that the official showup was impermissibly suggestive. As the Appellate Division was not expected to look beyond Richardson's brief to locate the claim that the second station-house viewing was suggestive, Richardson did not fairly present that claim before the Appellate Division. [4] See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 29, 124 S.Ct. 1347. Richardson therefore failed to exhaust his claim that the second identification was improper. Were we to dismiss Richardson's petition without prejudice to allow him to exhaust his claim in state court, New York procedural rules would bar him from raising the claim at this point. See N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 440.10(2)(c); Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir.2000). When a petitioner can no longer present his unexhausted claim of trial error to the state courts, we deem the claim procedurally barred. Acosta v. Artuz, 575 F.3d 177, 188 (2d Cir.2009); see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Because Richardson shows no cause for or prejudice from the failure to raise the claim, and failing to consider it will not result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, his claim cannot proceed. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546.