Opinion ID: 1095355
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: did the trial court improperly admit evidence of separate and distinct crimes other than the one charged?

Text: Griffin's first assignment of error concerns the introduction of certain photographs which depicted the scene of the crime. The photographs showed two bodies laying at the rest area. Although Griffin fails to cite any authority for the proposition that such photographs constitute evidence of other crimes, we will address this issue any way. Photographs of bodies may be admitted into evidence in criminal cases where they have probative value and where they are not so gruesome or used in such a way as to be overly prejudicial or inflammatory. Johnson v. State, 476 So.2d 1195, 1206 (Miss. 1985); Cabello v. State, 471 So.2d 332 (Miss. 1985). Additionally, we have also recognized that evidence of a separate and distinct crime other than the crime for which the accused has been charged is inadmissible in those proceedings against the accused. Blair v. State, 445 So.2d 1373 (Miss. 1984). However, there are some recognized exceptions to this general rule, including an exception which allows introduction of evidence of a separate and distinct crime where the two crimes are so intertwined as to constitute a single transaction. See Johnson v. State, 416 So.2d 383, 386 (Miss. 1982). Turning to the instant case, it is clear that the two crimes were so connected so as to constitute a single transaction. The bodies were found together and the victims were killed by the same weapon. The remaining forensic evidence indicates that the time of death for each victim was within minutes of the other. Further, the photographs were not extremely gruesome nor used in an inflammatory or prejudicial manner. They were used simply to identify the scene of the crime and the victim and were highly probative in this regard. We cannot say that the introduction of these photographs was reversible error. Griffin complains that evidence of a separate crime was elicited by the State during the testimony of Officer Kenny Williams. During direct examination, Officer Williams was asked who arrested Griffin and testified that Griffin was arrested on other charges. Defense counsel objected and the trial judge immediately instructed the jury to disregard the statement. Thereafter, on cross-examination, defense counsel again asked Williams who arrested Griffin and he responded in like manner. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial which was overruled. An attorney who invites error cannot complain of it. Edwards v. State, 441 So.2d 84, 90 (Miss. 1983). Clearly, defense counsel invited the error in this case, particularly in light of the fact that a similar exchange had occurred only moments before during direct examination. Further, defense counsel should have requested that the trial judge admonish the jury again. See Simpson v. State, 497 So.2d 424, 431 (Miss. 1986). We find no merit in this argument. Additionally, Griffin argues that evidence of a separate and distinct crime was introduced during the re-direct examination of Debra Butler by the State. On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to impeach Butler by introducing letters she had written to Griffin while she was incarcerated. Reference was made to certain violent acts done to her by Griffin in the past. On re-direct, the State inquired about the nature of these acts and Butler testified that Griffin had beaten her and burned her with cigarettes in the past. Griffin contends that such testimony was highly prejudicial and simply used to inflame the passion of the jury, thus constituting reversible error. We disagree. In Gill v. State, 485 So.2d 1047 (Miss. 1986), we recognize that where one side opens the door, the other may come in and develop that point in greater detail. 485 So.2d at 1051; see also, Winters v. State, 449 So.2d 766 (Miss. 1984). Once the letters were introduced, the prosecution was free to delve into and develop the statements contained therein in greater detail. We find no error here. Finally, Griffin cites other similar incidents during the testimony of other witnesses which he failed to object to at trial. It is incumbent on counsel to object contemperaneously when objectional statements are given during a witness' testimony so that the trial judge can correct any error with proper instructions to the jury. Shelton v. State, 445 So.2d 844, 846 (Miss. 1984). Griffin's failure to object or ask the court to admonish the jury effectively prevents him from assigning this as error on appeal. Accordingly, we find no merit in Griffin's claim that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of separate and distinct crimes other than the one for which he was charged. B.