Opinion ID: 781207
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Actions for which the appellees may be held liable

Text: 72 Before turning to the issue of whether the evidence presented by the workers is sufficient to meet the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress, we first examine what evidence may be considered with respect to each appellee. This analysis includes whether each appellee may be liable for the acts of others, as well as whether certain types of conduct may be preempted by federal law. 73 The workers have not alleged or argued conspiracy or any other theory that would make the appellees generally liable for all of the allegedly outrageous acts. They have argued no theories that would allow appellees Orea and Guevara to be held liable for anyone's actions but their own. Viewing the workers' pleadings charitably, they have argued that Orea and Guevara are agents of UNITE-SW, and that UNITE is liable for the actions of UNITE-SW. They also argue that the actions of former union steward Leovigilda Romero are attributable to the union. 7 74 The union's liability for its purported agents is governed by Norris-LaGuardia Act § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 106. This section requires clear proof of participation, authorization, or ratification before a union can be held liable for the acts of its officers or members. Id. The workers' protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, the clear proof standard is applicable to this case. The Supreme Court held in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), that [p]lainly, § 6 applies to federal court adjudications of state tort claims arising out of labor disputes. Id. at 737, 86 S.Ct. 1130. There can be no doubt that the conduct at issue here arose out of a labor dispute. 75 The union does not challenge the workers have raised triable issues of fact as to UNITE's liability for the conduct of UNITE-SW, and as to Orea's and Guevara's agency, but vigorously disputes the union's liability for Romero's actions. We find that the workers have not presented evidence that a reasonable jury could conclude amounts to clear proof that the union authorized or ratified Romero's actions. At most, the evidence demonstrates only that Romero was a former shop steward who still maintained contact with union officials, including Guevara and Orea. 8 Thus, we will not consider Romero's acts in our analysis of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 76 The union also argues that it cannot be held liable for an incident in which unknown persons placed flowers and black ribbons at the entrances to the Sorrento factory, which some of the workers interpreted as a death threat or as evidence of witchcraft. The workers have presented no evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that Orea or Guevara was responsible for the placing of the flowers. Furthermore, even if circumstantial evidence might lead a jury to conclude that union supporters placed the flowers, there is no clear proof that the union authorized or ratified this act, and therefore it cannot be considered against the union either. See 29 U.S.C. § 106. 77 Finally, the union argues that consideration of the evidence of allegedly harassing home visits by union officials is pre-empted by federal labor law. Under San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959), actions regulated directly by the NLRA generally may not be regulated by state tort law. Id. at 243-45, 79 S.Ct. 773. When it is clear ... that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield. Id. at 244, 79 S.Ct. 773. The union cites cases that suggest that home visits are permitted by the NLRA and prohibited as an unfair labor practice if they are threatening or coercive. See Randell Warehouse of Ariz., Inc., 328 N.L.R.B. 1034, 1037 (1999) (visits by union representatives are unobjectionable so long as they are unaccompanied by threats or other coercive conduct); see also Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 540, 112 S.Ct. 841, 117 L.Ed.2d 79 (1992) (implying that home visits are a perfectly acceptable means for the union to contact workers). 78 Although coercive home visits might constitute an unfair labor practice, [t]he fact that a state tort may also constitute an unfair labor practice ... does not inevitably cause preemption of the state claim. Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 785 (9th Cir.2001). The Supreme Court has limited Garmon -preemption in the context of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 430 U.S. 290, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 51 L.Ed.2d 338 (1977), the Court considered an employee's claims that his union harassed and intimidated him when he complained about the discriminatory operation of a hiring hall. Although noting that discrimination in the operation of a hiring hall is regulated by federal labor law, id. at 303 & n. 12, 97 S.Ct. 1056, the Court nonetheless allowed the employee's IIED claims to proceed under California law: 79 [R]igid application of the Garmon doctrine might support the conclusion ... [that the employee's] entire action was pre-empted by federal law. Our cases indicate, however, that inflexible application of the doctrine is to be avoided, especially where the State has a substantial interest in regulation of the conduct at issue and the State's interest is one that does not threaten undue interference with the federal regulatory scheme. With respect to [the employee's] claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, we cannot conclude that Congress intended exclusive jurisdiction to lie in the Board. 80 No provision of the National Labor Relations Act protects the outrageous conduct complained of by [the employee].... Regardless of whether the operation of the hiring hall was lawful or unlawful under federal statutes, there is no federal protection for conduct on the part of union officers which is so outrageous that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it. 81 Id. at 302, 97 S.Ct. 1056; see also Radcliffe, 254 F.3d at 785. We find the resolution of this issue squarely controlled by Farmer, and thus hold that the allegedly threatening and intimidating home visits may be considered against the union. 82