Opinion ID: 1731270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: fela causation standard

Text: [6, 7] McNeel argues that in granting the motion for summary judgment, the district court did not appreciate the lower evidentiary standard applicable to a FELA plaintiff's burden of proof. [8] Federal law governs substantive issues in FELA claims litigated in state courts pursuant to concurrent jurisdiction. [9] [8, 9] Under FELA, railroad companies are liable in damages to any employee who suffers injury during the course of employment when such injury results in whole or in part due to the railroad's negligence. [10] This court has stated that to recover under FELA, an employee must prove the employer's negligence and that the alleged negligence is a proximate cause of the employee's injury. [11] We note that FELA causation standards apply where, as here, liability is premised in whole or in part on an alleged violation of the Locomotive Inspection Act, formerly known as the Boiler Inspection Acts. [12] McNeel argues that proximate causation under FELA is subject to a different, more lenient standard than under the common law. Indeed, there are federal cases which would appear to support his argument. [13] Most are based on language in Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., [14] in which the U.S. Supreme Court stated: Under [FELA] the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought. Based upon this language, some courts have stated that there is a relaxed standard for causation in FELA cases. [15] Other courts conclude from Rogers that the plaintiff in a FELA case carries only a slight burden on causation. [16] The existence of a relaxed standard for proving causation in FELA cases was called into question by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Sorrell. [17] In that case, the Court held that in a FELA action, the same causation standard applies to the employer's negligence and the employee's contributory negligence, rejecting a contrary approach employed by Missouri state courts. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the fact that the common law applied the same causation standard to defendant and plaintiff negligence, and FELA did not expressly depart from that approach, is strong evidence against Missouri's disparate standards. [18] A concurring opinion noted that despite its interpretation by some courts, Rogers did not address, much less alter, existing law governing the degree of causation necessary for redressing negligence as the cause of negligently inflicted harm; the case merely instructed courts how to proceed when there are multiple cognizable causes of an injury. [19] Another concurrence, however, noted that the Court's opinion leaves in place precedent solidly establishing that the causation standard in FELA actions is more `relaxed' than in tort litigation generally. [20] Although the Court held that the causation standard for negligence and contributory negligence under FELA is the same, it did not articulate what the proper standard should be inasmuch as it did not grant certiorari on that issue. [10] But even courts which have recognized a relaxed standard of causation have nevertheless held that a FELA plaintiff bears the burden of presenting evidence from which a jury could conclude the existence of a probable or likely causal relationship, as opposed to a merely possible one. [21] In Chapman v. Union Pacific Railroad , we cited the aforementioned language from Rogers but interpreted other U.S. Supreme Court precedent as requiring that in a FELA case, a court cannot allow a jury to speculate concerning the cause of an employee's injuries and must withhold or withdraw the employee's case from the jury unless evidence provides a basis for the reasonable inference that the employee's injury was caused by the employer's negligence. [22] We conclude that this principle governs the causation issue here. In common-law negligence cases where symptoms of an injury are subjective, Nebraska law requires medical testimony. [23] Federal courts apply the same principle in FELA cases where injury is alleged to have occurred as a result of exposure to a toxic substance. [24] In this case, expert testimony was necessary to establish the basis for an inference that McNeel's injuries were caused by the inhalation of fumes attributable to some negligent act or omission on the part of Union Pacific.