Opinion ID: 168528
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of victim impact evidence during the sentencing stage

Text: 99 Mr. Short contends that the admission of certain victim impact evidence violated his constitutional right to a fundamentally fair sentencing hearing. He challenges the prepared statement of Kiyoka Yamamoto, Mr. Yamamoto's mother, asserting it contained certain statements that exceeded the bounds of admissible evidence. 100 The State filed the victim impact statement in October 1996, six months prior to trial. Defense counsel had ample time to review and object to the statement before trial. Rather than objecting, defense counsel agreed that it substantially complied with the law. Short, 980 P.2d at 1100. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial only at the end of the presentation of the testimony. Here, the OCCA decided: 101 The victim impact evidence in this case comes very close to weighting the scales too far on the side of the prosecution by so intensely focusing on the emotional impact of the victim's loss. . . . 102 Mrs. Yamamoto's statements concerning her feelings and actions upon learning of her son's injury and subsequent death were emotional, but fell within the guidelines set forth in Cargle and § 984. These statements were probative of the emotional, psychological, and physical effects she experienced as a result of the death of her only child. Mrs. Yamamoto's statements concerning her son's desire to study in America, his eventual achievement of that goal and his concern for his mother provided a brief glimpse of the unique characteristics of the individual known as Ken Yamamoto. While her statements concerning her fifteen year illness, her son's wish to be buried in Oklahoma City, and her son's death bed thoughts upon seeing his mother were not relevant victim impact evidence, their admission did not prevent the jury from fulfilling its function in the second stage of trial. While a portion of the victim impact testimony was very emotional, taken as a whole, the testimony is within the bounds of admissible evidence, and its focus on emotion did not have such a prejudicial effect or so skew the presentation as to divert the jury from its duty to reach a reasoned moral decision on whether to impose the death penalty. 103 Id. at 1101 (emphasis added). 104 In Payne v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of admissible victim impact evidence during sentencing. 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). As we have noted, in Payne the Court held 105 that the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar to victim impact evidence. The Court acknowledged that [a] State may legitimately conclude, as Oklahoma has, that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. In most cases, such evidence serves entirely legitimate purposes. But in some cases, victim impact evidence is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 106 Turrentine v. Mullin, 390 F.3d 1181, 1200 (10th Cir.2004) (internal citations omitted). 107 Section 984(a) of Title 22 of the Oklahoma Statutes restricts victim impact evidence to financial, emotional, psychological, and physical effects of the impact of the crime itself on the victim's family and some personal characteristics about the victim. Id. Here, 108 the trial court noted it had read Mrs. Yamamoto's statement and found it to be in conformity with [Oklahoma law]. The court was informed that Mrs. Yamamoto, a Japanese citizen, would read her statement in Japanese then it would be translated into English by an interpreter. Defense counsel agreed to the procedure and noted that the defense had had a copy of Mrs. Yamamoto's statement for awhile and agreed that it substantially complied with the law. 109 Short, 980 P.2d at 1100. Mr. Short contends that the victim impact testimony exceeded the statute's bounds and was unduly prejudicial. Our review, however, is limited to federal law. 110 Mrs. Yamamoto conveyed the following: Mr. Yamamoto was her only son, she raised him herself, he was twenty-two years old at the time of his death, he came to America to study art, he was an excellent student at Oklahoma City University, he called her every two or three days and visited in the summer, he had cared for her during a fifteen-year illness, and he wanted to stay in America and study but he was worried about her. She stated that she received a telephone call at her home in Kyoto, Japan, about her son's injuries and the hospital's belief that he had only fifteen hours to live. Under a great amount of stress, she flew to Oklahoma City to see her son for the last time. She believed that he waited for her to come, recognized her voice, tried to move his head, and then passed away. Also, she presented her interpretation of what he must have been thinking when she arrived at the hospital. In addition, she stated that seeing fires, bombs, and emergencies on television was very stressful for her, and that she buried her son in Oklahoma at his request. Finally, she said that her son's death had greatly affected her life. 111 At the close of this testimony, as noted, defense counsel objected to the victim impact evidence and requested a mistrial, arguing that counsel did not recognize until this point how emotional the evidence would be. Id. at 1101. 112 The trial court admitted the evidence was emotional, noting that the witness cried and that she was permitted a few minutes to regain her composure. The court noted however that the witness got through her testimony, and that it was still of the opinion the evidence was proper under Cargle [v. State, 909 P.2d 806, 824-25 (Okla.Crim.App.1995)]. The request for a mistrial was overruled. 113 Id. 114 The OCCA's inquiry focused on its decision in Cargle, 909 P.2d at 824-25, which applied the Supreme Court's decision in Payne. In Cargle, the OCCA reviewed victim impact evidence of a victim's sisters, and testimony from another victim's mother and determined that it exceeded the statutory framework of admissible evidence. Id. at 829. For example, one statement portrayed one victim as a cute child at age four, which in no way provides insights into the contemporaneous and prospective circumstances surrounding his death nor concerns the impact of the crime upon the victim's immediate family. Id. The OCCA concluded that the entire statement . . . goes to the emotional impact of [the victim's] death. There is no explicit testimony as to the financial, psychological or physical effects of the crime on his family. Id. at 829-30. However, after acknowledging these errors, the OCCA concluded they were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 835. Although it granted relief on other grounds, the Tenth Circuit held that the OCCA's decision in denying relief on this ground was not an unreasonable application of federal law. Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1224 (10th Cir.2003). 115 Here, as in Cargle, we must assess the alleged prejudicial effect of the victim-impact testimony by examining the aggravating and mitigating factors and the overall strength of the State's case. In doing so, we note that Mr. Short's assertions of prejudice are undermined by his counsel's delay in challenging Mrs. Yamamoto's statement. Counsel had the English version of the victim impact statement six months before trial began. Nevertheless, he did not challenge its admission until after the entire statement was read to the jury. The absence of a contemporaneous objection deprived the trial court of the ability to curtail any troubling portions of the statement. Counsel's argument that he could not foresee the extreme emotional impact of the victim impact statement is particularly unconvincing when there is but one impact statement to be read by a family member. Mindful of that unjustified delay, we proceed to examine the evidence presented at sentencing. 116 In addition to the emotional statement given by Mrs. Yamamoto, the prosecution presented the following testimony in support of the statutory aggravators: 117 (1) Susan Short, Mr. Short's wife of seven years, who had filed for divorce, testified that Mr. Short physically and emotionally abused her and her children. Ms. Short stated that she had obtained a protective order in 1991 against Mr. Short. She also testified that she had asked him during the summer of 1986 if he knew how to make a firebomb and that he explained to her how to make one. 118 (2) Troi Lyn Billy, testified that in July 1991 she had offered her home to the Short family. Ms. Billy and her husband asked Mr. Short to leave after a week. According to Ms. Billy, Mr. Short threatened to sexually assault her and to kill her and her children. Ms. Billy filed two police reports and obtained a protective order against Mr. Short. 119 (3) Debra Duncan, who had lived with and had a child with Mr. Short, testified that she sought two protective orders against Mr. Short, and then had each dismissed. 120 In closing, the prosecution reminded the jury that Mr. Short had knowingly endangered more than one person in the apartment complex. Next, the prosecution defined the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator, and argued that Mr. Yamamoto unquestionably suffered serious physical injury. The prosecutor also argued that Mr. Short undoubtedly posed a continuing threat to society based on his past actions, and his horrific upbringing that instilled this learned behavior. During final rebuttal, the prosecution referred to the victim impact testimony and Mrs. Yamamoto's suffering several times. 121 The defense presented the following witnesses in its effort to present mitigating circumstances, which the jury may have considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability or blame. 122 (1) Trina Louise Hartshorn, Mr. Short's sister, testified about their upbringing. According to her testimony, their mother was often in prison, was a rage-a-holic and frequently used intravenous drugs in front of the children. She stated that her stepfather sexually abused her and physically abused her mother and Mr. Short. She suspected that her father and her stepfather sexually abused Mr. Short. 123 (2) Nelda Rawson, Mr. Short's first cousin, also testified to Mr. Short's violent childhood surroundings. She stated that his father physically abused his mother and threatened her with a knife. She asked the jury to spare Mr. Short's life. 124 (3) Sharon Kay Davis, Mr. Short's first cousin, testified that she witnessed Mr. Short's father abuse his mother. Ms. Davis testified regarding Mr. Short's mother's drug use, and how she took care of Mr. Short and his sister for two years when they were children. She also asked the jury to spare Mr. Short's life. 125 (4) and (5) Thomas Ackerman, Jr. and Anthony Mark Benjamin, both correctional officers at the Oklahoma County jail, each testified that they were frequently on duty watching Mr. Short. Both testified that Mr. Short was cooperative, obeyed orders, and had not been a problem in the jail. 126 (6) S. Daryl Larson, a volunteer jail chaplain at the Oklahoma County jail, testified that he met weekly with Mr. Short, and that Mr. Short had a genuine interest in religion and Jesus Christ. 127 (7) Dr. Wanda Draper, a clinical professor in the psychiatric department at the University of Oklahoma's College of Medicine, reviewed Mr. Short's records, and interviewed Ms. Hartshorn and Ms. Rawson. Dr. Draper testified about the impact of Mr. Short's unstable and traumatic family dynamics. She stated that his mother was a prostitute and often brought men into the home when Mr. Short was a preschooler. She stated that his mother did not take him to school. His father gave him wine when he was two years old, and potty trained him by rubbing his feces in his face. According to Dr. Draper, Mr. Short was abandoned by nearly every adult in his life, most significantly by his mother who was arrested twenty-two times during his childhood. She noted that on the few occasions that he was surrounded by people who set boundaries, he was able to work and save money. Dr. Draper testified that the Oklahoma County jail was a structured environment and his time there served as a good predictor of how he might do in prison. She also testified he would not be a danger to others in prison. 128 Defense counsel beseeched the jury for mercy, and emphasized Mr. Short's horrific childhood, and the relentless physical, emotional, and sexual abuse he endured. Defense counsel suggested that his upbringing introduced him to criminal behavior and familiarity with drug use. Noting that Mr. Short was not to be excused for his behavior, counsel implored the jury to consider life imprisonment as an alternative to the death penalty. 129 Based on our deferential standard of review—despite the presence of considerable and compelling mitigation evidence— there is no indication that the jury was prevented from fully considering these mitigating factors. Moreover, examining the relative strength of the State's case under Cargle, there was little if any testimony presented during the sentencing phase that supported a residual doubt theory or that impacted the strength of the State's evidence as to Mr. Short's involvement in setting the blaze. Furthermore, the jury found three aggravating circumstances and insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh them when it imposed the death penalty. 130 We agree that Mrs. Yamamoto's statement contained irrelevant information, and that much of the statement was highly emotional. However, like the OCCA, we conclude that the admission of irrelevant and overly emotive testimony, though troubling and com[ing] very close to weighting the scales too far on the side of the prosecution, did not tip the scales far enough. Short, 980 P.2d at 1101. Thus, the OCCA did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law as to its assessment. 131