Opinion ID: 1057786
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mandamus and Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Text: Stamos argues that convicting a defendant of a crime he was not charged with, and which is not a lesser-included offense, exceeded the authority of the court, is void ab initio, and therefore a judicial nullity. She contends that since a valid 6 sentencing event has yet to occur in this matter, the general district court retains subject-matter jurisdiction over this ongoing criminal proceeding, and mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel a prospective sentencing event. The general powers of the judiciary in Virginia are conferred by Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution of Virginia. This section by itself confers jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court of Virginia in certain matters and further states: Subject to the foregoing limitations, the General Assembly shall have the power to determine the original and appellate jurisdiction of the courts of the Commonwealth. The concept of jurisdiction defines power. With regard to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, the Circuit Courts and the General District and Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Courts, the powers of such courts are entirely prescribed by statute. An order of a court of the Commonwealth can be void by operation of two concepts. An order may be void ab initio, meaning it was without effect from the moment it came into existence. In that respect it is void. Such a void order is a nullity without force or effect and may be collaterally challenged. An order of a court may also be voidable if it contains reversible error. Singh v. Mooney, 261 Va. 48, 52, 541 S.E.2d 549, 551 (2001). However, the order is not void until 7 it is directly and successfully challenged. Id. at 51, 541 S.E.2d at 551. Of critical distinction is the difference between a court lacking jurisdiction to act upon a matter and the court, while properly having jurisdiction, nonetheless erring in its judgment. In Singh, we held that: [a]n order is void ab initio if entered by a court in the absence of jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the parties, if the character of the order is such that the court had no power to render it, or if the mode of procedure used by the court was one that the court could not lawfully adopt. Id. at 51-52, 541 S.E.2d at 551 (internal citations omitted)(holding that an order entered in violation of Rule 1:13 was voidable, not void ab initio). There is no dispute that in this case the general district court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. The remaining possibilities pursuant to Singh, depend upon whether the court had the power to render the judgment being collaterally attacked. In Rawls v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 213, 683 S.E.2d 544 (2009), a case involving collateral attack after conviction, we declared a sentence in excess of statutory limitations to be void ab initio. We stated that the character of the judgment was not such as the [C]ourt had the power to render. Id. at 221, 683 S.E.2d at 549 (internal quotation marks omitted). Of 8 course, the reason the court did not have power to render was because the General Assembly authorized a punishment for the offense and the punishment imposed was in excess of the authority granted by the General Assembly. To restate the obvious: the Constitution of Virginia authorized the General Assembly to confer power upon the circuit courts. The General Assembly prescribed the applicable punishments for criminal offenses. The punishment imposed in Rawls exceeded the power granted to the circuit court. Rawls quoted from a 19th century case involving liability of a surety. See Anthony v. Kasey, 83 Va. 338, 5 S.E. 176 (1887). In that case the court repeatedly stated that Kasey, the surety, had not been a party to the suit in question. Nonetheless, the trial court proceeded upon a rule to show cause against the surety after a deficiency had been determined upon sale of property. The manner in which the court proceeded was such a departure from the established mode of procedure as to render the decree not only erroneous, but void. Id. at 342, 5 S.E. at 178. We stated with regard to sureties, [t]heir liability, if any, grows out of their undertaking as sureties on the bond, and can be ascertained and enforced only by suit on the bond in a common law court, where full opportunity for making defense and the constitutional right of trial by jury can be had. Id. (quoting Thurman v. Morgan, 79 Va. 367, 372 9 (1884)). Clearly, the trial court had proceeded against Kasey when he was not a party to the action, depriving him of his constitutional and statutory right to a trial by jury. The trial court was without power to proceed in such a manner. In Evans v. Smith-Wythe Airport Commission, 255 Va. 69, 495 S.E.2d 825 (1998), we held that the circuit court's order restricting the exercise of the power of eminent domain of an airport authority was void ab initio because the circuit court did not have the power to render a judgment which permitted a governmental entity to relinquish the power or right of eminent domain. Id. at 74, 492 S.E.2d at 828. In 1981, the Airport Commission initiated condemnation proceedings against the Evanses which subsequently resulted in an order reflecting a settlement which purported to limit the Airport Commission's right to initiate a condemnation action against the Evanses' property as long as they or their children owned the property. Id. at 71, 495 S.E.2d at 826. In 1996, the Airport Commission initiated a declaratory judgment action alleging that the order entered in the condemnation proceeding was void ab initio. Id. at 71, 495 S.E.2d at 827. In this respect, the second action was a collateral challenge to the order in the first action. The character of the first judgment was not such that the court had the power to render, because the power of eminent domain is an inalienable attribute of sovereignty, and the court acted 10 outside the scope of Code § 25-46.34(e) when it divested the Airport Commission of the power or right of eminent domain given to it by the General Assembly. Id. at 73, 495 S.E.2d at 827. Burrell v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 474, 722 S.E.2d 272 (2012), is the most recent case in which we have found that a court rendered a judgment it did not have the power to render, and that the judgment was therefore void ab initio. In Burrell, the circuit court order contained a provision stating that the court would reduce the defendant's conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor following the defendant's incarceration and successful completion of probation. Id. at 476, 722 S.E.2d at 272. The circuit court ruled that Code § 19.2-303 gave it jurisdiction to change the offense of conviction in the sentencing order after the court had lost jurisdiction to modify the sentencing order pursuant to Rule 1:1. Id. at 479, 722 S.E.2d at 274. That statute, however, did not authorize the circuit court to reduce a conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor after a defendant had served the active portion of a sentence. Rather, it authorized the circuit court to suspend or otherwise modify the unserved portion of such a sentence. Id. We held that the circuit court did not have the power to render a judgment reducing Burrell's conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor more than five years after the entry of the 11 sentencing order, and the order was therefore void ab initio. 2 Id. at 480, 722 S.E.2d at 275. In the cases analyzed above, the court orders were void ab initio because the courts did not have the power to render the judgments at issue. In this case, however, Judge Kelley did have such power as a general district court judge to render the judgment at issue. The case was begun in a normal manner not unlike thousands of cases brought in the Commonwealth every year. We are aware that warrants are routinely amended, particularly in the general district courts. The power to do this is plainly evident in Code § 16.1-129.2, which provides in pertinent part: Upon the trial of a warrant, the court may, upon its own motion or upon the request either of the attorney for the prosecution or for the accused, amend the form of the warrant in any respect in which it appears to be defective. But when the warrant is so defective in form that it does not substantially appear from the same what is the offense with which the accused is charged, or even when it is not so seriously defective, the judge of the court having examined on oath the original complainant, if there be one, or if he sees good reason to believe that an offense has been committed, then without examination of witnesses, may issue under his own hand his warrant reciting the offense and requiring the defendant in the original warrant to be arrested and brought before him. Upon the arrest of the defendant on the new warrant and his production or appearance in court the trial shall proceed 2 Burrell, long after the 21-day period prescribed in Rule 1:1 had made the conviction order final, sought to collaterally attack the order in this proceeding. 12 upon the new warrant. When there is an amendment of the original warrant the trial shall proceed on the amended warrant. But whether the warrant is amended or a new warrant is issued, the court before proceeding to trial on the same may grant a continuance to the prosecution or to the defendant upon such terms as to costs as may be proper under the circumstances of the case; provided, however, that if the warrant be amended or if a new warrant be issued after any evidence has been heard, the accused shall be entitled to a continuance as a matter of right. Code § 16.1-129.2 (emphasis added). Stamos argues that the doctrine of separation of powers does not permit the court to do exactly what is permitted by Code § 16.1-129.2. The record in this case does not specifically reference the basis for Judge Kelley's ruling. However, this statute clearly demonstrates that the power to amend warrants and even issue a new warrant is vested in the general district court judge. The issue is not whether the court had the power to do so. It did. The issue is whether the court erred when it did so. The dissent maintains that once a plea of guilty is accepted by the court, it is the equivalent of a conviction for that offense, and imposition of punishment is then authorized. As we stated earlier, however, the record does not support Stamos' contention that Nobles' guilty plea was ever accepted by Judge Kelley. If Judge Kelley never found Nobles guilty of DWI, 13 Judge Kelley retained the authority to amend the warrant as provided in Code § 16.1-129.2. The general district court has jurisdiction over the offense of reckless driving (Code § 16.1-123.1(1)(b)); the defendant was before the court; Judge Kelley did not sentence Nobles beyond the statutory range. While Judge Kelley had the jurisdiction to amend the warrant, he may have erred in the manner in which he did so. We have previously stated: A challenge to an order based on a trial court's misapplication of statute generally raises a question of court error, not a question of the court's jurisdiction. Hicks v. Mellis, 275 Va. 213, 219, 657 S.E.2d 142, 145 (2008). Accordingly, the August 2, 2011 order was not void ab initio. The August 2, 2011 order became final after 21 days in accordance with Rule 1:1. Judge Kelley has lost subject matter jurisdiction to modify the August 2, 2011 order. Additionally, mandamus is not the appropriate remedy here, as [m]andamus is applied prospectively only; it will not be granted to undo an act already done. In re Commonwealth, 278 Va. 1, 9, 677 S.E.2d 236, 239 (2009). Because the August 2, 2011 order is final and can no longer be undone, the circuit court erred when it issued a writ of mandamus against Judge Kelley. In light of our holding that mandamus does not lie, we need not address the issues raised in assignments of error 1 and 5 14 regarding whether Kelley's procedural due process rights were violated in the circuit court or whether the circuit court erred in imposing a temporal requirement of twenty-one days in the writ of mandamus.