Opinion ID: 2076775
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Division of Personal Property

Text: After determining that Bansda did not have a legal or equitable interest in the real property, the court divided the rest of the marital and non-marital property. Bansda maintains that she was entitled to the value of the household appliances and to the value of rental income paid to Bansda and Wheeler during the marriage. She further contends that her contributions to the house helped attract renters. Bansda's counsel made similar points during closing argument, stating that the parties had bought household appliances together, which should be divided between the two as marital property, and that the money they earned from renting the property should be divided as well. Wheeler testified that he and Bansda had rented out the house to a group of men for $2,050 per month. He further testified that he had received some rental payments from January 2002 through December 2005, and that he had put those payments toward the mortgage. Pursuant to D.C.Code § 16-910(b), the rental income, which originally was paid into a joint account and had accumulated during the marriage, was marital property subject to equitable distribution. Bansda alleges that Wheeler had closed the joint account and moved all of the rental income into a personal account. The court subsequently ruled, however, that Wheeler was entitled to all of the marital assets in his personal possession. Bansda may have had a claim to the rental income as marital property received between 2002 and 2005, had substantial funds remained in Wheeler's personal account at time of trial. We conclude, however, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to consider this argument, made on the final day of trial. The record reveals that any rental money had been exhausted to pay the mortgage on the house and that this rental income covered less than half of the total amount that he paid on the mortgage, [4] that Wheeler had received very little rent during the time that Bansda refused to vacate Rittenhouse, and that Wheeler was forced to pay the majority of the mortgage from his personal income, without help from Bansda. The division of marital property in the form of arts and gifts, as well as household furniture, also arose during closing argument. The trial judge informed the parties that he would need a list of all arts and gifts and household furniture in order to divide and distribute the property pursuant to D.C.Code § 16-910(b). Bansda indicates in her brief that she was not refunded any of the money that she spent on household appliances. The trial court, however, awarded her all the personal property located at Rittenhouse except for the dining room table, chairs and matching bench, and the gardening tools. There is no basis for a refund to Bansda for the household appliances, as they were clearly awarded to her. Finally, Bansda argues, in broad and conclusory terms, that the trial court miscalculated the parties' marital and non-marital funds and property, including pensions. She indicates that she corrected the court's figures in a sworn affidavit presented to this court. This affidavit, however, is not a part of the record evidence submitted to the trial court, and we cannot consider it for the first time on appeal. The trial court relied largely on Wheeler's testimony and the plaintiff's exhibits to calculate the parties' marital and pre-marital funds. The court noted that it was difficult to assess the current or recent value of Bansda's assets because she had repeatedly failed to comply with discovery requests. Therefore, the court calculated values to the best of its ability, making the appropriate credibility determinations when necessary. See Joiner-Die v. United States, 899 A.2d 762, 764 (D.C.2006) (In a bench trial, the judge, as fact finder, has the right to make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences of fact.). In this non-jury trial, we will not set aside the court's factual findings where there is evidentiary support for these findings and where they are not clearly erroneous. See Malik Corp. v. Tenacity Group, LLC, 961 A.2d 1057, 1060 (D.C.2008). This is especially true where, as here, [t]he evidence presented to the trial court [must] be viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. [5]