Opinion ID: 556752
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence of Separate Possession

Text: 16 At oral argument, Bonavia contended that, even if such a separate possession can support a separate conviction, the evidence on the possession of the Wesco rifle is insufficient to support a separate conviction in this case. Bonavia specifically argues that Speese did not identify the weapon charged in count four as definitely the same weapon as was involved in the shooting incident. In addition, Bonavia argues that Speese's testimony shows great uncertainty about when this incident supposedly took place. 10 17 The standard of review we employ in judging the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the evidence--when considered in the light most favorable to the government, and accepting all reasonable inferences from the evidence and the credibility choices made by the jury--proves the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A jury's verdict cannot be overturned if any reasonable construction of the evidence would have allowed the jury to find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Montes-Cardenas, 746 F.2d 771, 778 (11th Cir.1984). 18 At trial, Speese had an opportunity to examine the weapon charged in count four to determine if it was the same weapon that Bonavia and he had shot at Bonavia's home. Although it had been several years since the incident took place, Speese stated I would, with a fair degree of certainty, say that would probably be the same weapon. I am not that familiar with these types of weapons so I could say it was the same one. (sic). He later said, during cross-examination, As I said 10 minutes ago, it appears to be similar to what I recollect firing. 19 A reasonable construction of this testimony is that the incident at Bonavia's home involved the Wesco rifle charged in count four of the indictment. A jury, hearing Speese's testimony and realizing that the events he described occurred at least two years before, could reasonably have believed that the incident took place and that it involved the same weapon. That the jury might actually have found Bonavia guilty of count four based on the presence of the Wesco rifle in Bonavia's office is not critically important; what is more important is that there is sufficient evidence, apart from the fact that the Wesco was found in Bonavia's office, to support a conviction for a separate possession. 11 We, thus, find the evidence sufficient to support a separate conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1202(a) and affirm Bonavia's conviction on count four. 20 Implicit in this issue of sufficiency of the evidence is the issue of whether the district court erred in not charging the jury that it needed to find that Bonavia separately possessed each weapon in order to convict him on all three counts--an issue we consider sua sponte. Because Bonavia never objected to the court's failure to give an instruction on separate possession, never requested such an instruction, and never requested a special verdict form on which the jury could indicate whether it found that Bonavia had held the Wesco rifle at his home, we review the failure to give such an instruction for plain error, in the context of the charge as a whole and of the entire trial. See United States v. Meester, 762 F.2d 867, 880 (11th Cir.1985). We note that the plain error doctrine should be applied sparingly lest the contemporaneous objection rule, requiring timely objections to preserve issues for appeal, be swallowed by the plain error exception. United States v. Reyes-Vasquez, 905 F.2d 1497, 1501 (11th Cir.1990). We employ the plain error doctrine only on appeal from a trial infected with error so 'plain' that the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant's timely assistance in detecting it. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1592, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982). As our predecessor court said in United States v. Gerald, 21 [p]lain error is error which is both obvious and substantial.... The plain error rule is not a run-of-the-mill remedy. The intention of the rule is to serve the ends of justice; therefore, it is invoked only in exceptional circumstances [where necessary] to avoid a miscarriage of justice.624 F.2d 1291, 1299 (5th Cir.1980) (quoting Sykes v. United States, 373 F.2d 607, 612 (5th Cir.1966), and Eaton v. United States, 398 F.2d 485, 486 (5th Cir.1968)). Failure to instruct the jury on an essential element of a crime has been held to be plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663 (6th Cir.1977) (failure to instruct that intent to distribute was element of crime of possession of controlled substance with intent to distribute was plain error). The error of the district court here, if any, does not rise to that level: in his charge to the jury, the district judge did not omit any element of the crime of possession of firearms. We cannot say, when examined in the context of the entire trial--especially the evidence on the Wesco rifle and the government's arguing the case to the jury as if it had to prove separate possession--that the district court's failure to instruct the jury on separate possession resulted in the likelihood of a grave miscarriage of justice. See Reyes-Vasquez, 905 F.2d at 1500-01. 22