Opinion ID: 2041497
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legislation may be divided into two general classifications:

Text: 1. Laws which imperatively command or prohibit the performance of acts. 2. Laws which only authorize or permit the performance of acts. II. As to the latter classification of laws, no delegation of legislative power is involved merely because broad discretion is conferred on a party, who is given authority, to determine whether or how that authority shall be exercised. The General Assembly may grant to one of its agencies, or even a private corporation, power to take or authorize others to take whatever action it deems necessary to accomplish a purpose which the state itself would have authority to accomplish. In such an instance, it is not necessary, in order to avoid a delegation of legislative power, for the General Assembly to specify or define the particular action which may be taken or authorized or to limit such power in any way, other than by relating it to such a purpose. See, also, City of Akron v. Dobson, 81 Ohio St. 66, 90 N.E. 123. As pointed out in the opinion by Ranney, J., in Giesy v. Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville Rd. Co., supra, 4 Ohio St. at page 328, even though the limits of such authority are indefinite, the courts have the power to prevent abuses, which may arise in the use of such authority for purposes other than attainment of the lawful purposes for which it was granted. In particular, the auditor contends that Sections 1205 and 1217, General Code, involve a delegation of legislative power. These portions of the turnpike act purport to grant the commission power to police the turnpike and to make rules and regulations for use and protection of the turnpike and provide that violations of those rules and regulations shall be misdemeanors punishable by fine. It is argued that a delegation of legislative power is involved in these provisions because no standards are established to guide the commission. These portions of the turnpike act present a different problem from that presented by those portions which merely authorize or permit the performance of acts. We do not express any opinion as to whether they involve a delegation of legislative power. Cf. Strain, Dir., Trustee v. Southerton, 148 Ohio St. 153, 74 N.E.2d 69; Matz. Adm'r v. J. L. Curtis Cartage Co., 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N.E.2d 220; Coady v. Leonard et al., Board of Liquor Control, 132 Ohio St. 329, 7 N.E.2d 649. We do not believe that that question is before the court at this time. Even if such provisions are invalid, the General Assembly could readily enact statutory provisions covering the use and protection of turnpike projects. Even if these provisions are invalid, their invalidity should not be any substantial obstacle to the construction of turnpikes under the turnpike act. It does not appear to be either improbable or unreasonable that the General Assembly would have enacted other portions of the turnpike act, including Section 1220, General Code, even if it knew that these portions of the act were invalid. If these portions of the act are stricken out, those which remain are complete in themselves and capable of being executed in accordance with the apparent legislative intent wholly independent of the portions of the act so stricken. It follows that, even if these portions of the act are unconstitutional, the remaining portions must be sustained. Treasurer of Fayette County v. People's & Drover's Bank, 47 Ohio St. 503, 25 N.E. 697, 10 L.R.A. 196; State ex rel. Greenward Realty Co., v. Zangerle, Aud., 135 Ohio St. 533, 21 N.E.2d 662; Gager, Treas., v. Prout, 48 Ohio St. 89, 26 N.E. 1013; Geiger v. Geiger, 117 Ohio St. 451, 160 N.E. 28; Bowles v. State, 37 Ohio St. 35, 44. Demurrer to amended answer sustained and writ allowed. ZIMMERMAN, MIDDLETON and HART, JJ., concur. WEYGANDT, C. J., concurs in the judgment and in the first three paragraphs of the syllabus which are decisive of the issues here involved. STEWART, J., concurs in the judgment and in the syllabus except paragraph four. MATTHIAS, J., concurs only in paragraphs two, three and four of the syllabus, and dissents from the judgment for the reasons stated in State ex rel. Kauer, Dir., v. Defenbacher, Dir., 153 Ohio St. 268, 285, 91 N.E.2d 512.