Opinion ID: 2584374
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Issue 1 Discussion: Foster's competence at trial

Text: Determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial is governed by K.S.A. 22-3301 et seq. A defendant is incompetent to stand trial when he or she cannot understand the nature or purpose of the proceedings or cannot make or assist in making his or her defense because of mental illness or defect. K.S.A. 22-3301. This is in accord with the United States Supreme Court's standard, which states: `[The t]est must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understandingand whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' State v. Holloway, 219 Kan. 245, 254, 547 P.2d 741 (1976), overruled on other grounds State v. Hood, 242 Kan. 115, 744 P.2d 816 (1987) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 [1960]). Also codified is a judge's duty to further inquire into a defendant's competency should the circumstances warrant. K.S.A. 22-3302(1) states: If ... upon the judge's own knowledge and observation, the judge before whom the case is pending finds that there is reason to believe that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial the proceedings shall be suspended and a hearing conducted to determine the competency of the defendant. The failure to hold a competency hearing, when evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, is a denial of due process. State v. Davis, 281 Kan. 169, 177, 130 P.3d 69 (2006) (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 384-86, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 [1966]); see State v. White, 263 Kan. 283, 316, 950 P.2d 1316 (1997). In Foster's case, competency questions were raised early. The district court ordered him to Larned State Hospital for evaluation. Foster was admitted and stayed approximately 90 days. At the district court's subsequent competency hearing, Dr. J.L.L. Fernando, Foster's evaluating psychiatrist at Larned, expressed his opinion that Foster's history and manner did not suggest any psychiatric symptoms or illness preventing him from assisting his attorney and making known his concerns. The doctor said that while at Larned, Foster demonstrated he understood the charges against him and possible dispositions if he was found guilty. Dr. Fernando testified Foster was aware of a trial's purpose, courtroom proceedings, what various court officers do, and showed some understanding of the plea bargaining process. The doctor concluded Foster was competent to stand trial. Dr. Fernando's report was also skeptical about Foster's claims of pretrial confusion. He wrote: Mr. Foster has indicated he `gets confused' when discussing things, and therefore he may not be able to discuss matters with his attorney. This expressed `confusion' has not been observed by the staff; on the contrary, Mr. Foster has been able to discuss issues on the unit well, make known his needs and to reason well. It is considered Mr. Foster's complaint of being `confused' to be a concerted effort to show staff he is not competent to stand trial. Based on Dr. Fernando's report and testimony, the district court found Foster competent to stand trial. Foster does not challenge this determination. But he argues the district court should have initiated another competency evaluation because of two incidents occurring during trial. The first instance Foster directs our attention to occurred at the close of voir dire. The following exchange involving the court, defense attorney Michael Brown, and Foster occurred: THE COURT: And, Mr. Brown, do you and your client accept the jury? [FOSTER]: I do not, sir. Not yet, sir. MR. BROWN: Sit down. THE COURT: You need to have a seat, please, Mr. Foster. During a short recess, the district court addressed Foster outside the jury's presence with this exchange: THE COURT: All right. We are back on the record outside of the presence of the jury. Mr. Brown, I believe your client had something he wanted to discuss with you and you wished to bring it up outside the presence of the jury. MR. BROWN: Yes.... I didn't understand Mr. Foster's question. I was under the impression he wanted to address the Court or bring up an issue with the Court, something about the jurors being seated, what have you. Is that a fair statement, sir? [FOSTER]: Yes. Basically I don't understand the chart thing and what's going on; and based on the selection and stuff, I just think that some people that I mean shouldn't get included on theon the roster; and I justI don't understand anything that's going on here in the court; and that's why I wanted, to you know, letI just want everybody to, you know give me all the information; but my attorney is busy and stuff. I'm not able to get the right information and stuff. I wasso before the bathroom break I was actually trying to see if we could meet in the small courtroom, like all of us, so we can discuss before got sit [ sic ] on the jury; and that was the situation; but now they're selected, that puts me in situation where I think it's notI did mean comfortable. MR. BROWN: Well, Your Honor, I've given Mr.some time ago Mr. Foster a six-page letter explaining jury trial procedure, also visited with him and explained to him as far as jury selection is concerned it's not an exact science. He quite frankly in my opinion .... [FOSTER]: ... This is my first time in trial in general jury trial and situation. He can send me a lot of paper and stuff, but I'm not going to understand what all the paperwork is saying. If it's a lot of words, going to take a while, you know, not going to draw my attention to what's needed, so better for him to explain it to me than me to actually read about it. So, that's why I was goingtrying to see if he explain to me what he was doing before he go ahead and jump into a situation I'm not prepared for. The district court summarized the proceedings for Foster. The district court told him if he had other questions, he could ask his attorney over the noon hour. The court also told Foster he could not interrupt the proceedings again, but if he had additional questions, they could be raised during recesses. The second alleged incident of confusion occurred before Foster testified in his own defense. Foster claims the record indicates he did not understand the process or the consequences for testifying. More specifically, he argues that despite defense counsel and the district court explaining the process and being advised against testifying, he still did not grasp how his testimony would work including questioning whether he could invoke his right against self-incrimination on certain questions. Further, he argues the district court's effort to educate him is proof his competency required reevaluation. But we read the record differently. It shows there was communication between Foster and his counsel and that the district court interjected itself in the dialogue sufficiently to demonstrate Foster's grasp of the circumstances. The record indicates Foster understood the district court's explanations and signaled his understanding at the district court's and the prosecutor's later behests. We find the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to initiate further competency inquiries. After each instance of alleged confusion at trial, the district court took time to further explain what was happening. Foster acknowledged he understood the proceedings. The record shows there was communication between Foster and his counsel. We believe the trial court sufficiently alleviated any question as to whether Foster had the ability to consult with his attorney and understood the proceedings against him. This issue is without merit.