Opinion ID: 3023754
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury determination regarding withdrawal

Text: Mr. Oppong challenges the jury’s verdict by arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. “Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence after a conviction is ‘highly deferential.’” United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 2001). We have plenary power to determine, after drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the Government, whether the evidence would allow a rational jury to convict. See id. The jury’s verdict must be upheld if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 188 (3d Cir. 1998). Mr. Oppong contends that he made a prima facie case of withdrawal by communicating his withdrawal to a co-conspirator and argues that the Government did not offer an adequate rebuttal. In United States v. Steele, we set out the requirements for a prima facie case of withdrawal: “defendant must present evidence of some affirmative act of withdrawal on his part, typically either a full confession to the authorities or communication to his co-conspirators that he has abandoned the enterprise and its goals.” 685 F.2d 793, 803-04 (3d Cir. 1982). Mr. Oppong testified that he had a falling out with a co-conspirator, Mr. Kittoe, in April 1997 and made a statement to Mr. Kittoe that he wanted to cease his involvement in Mr. Kittoe’s drug activities. See Trial Tr., App. at 11 4246-50. The Government argues, notwithstanding the District Court’s finding to the contrary, that Mr. Oppong did not establish a prima facie case of withdrawal because his evidence was limited to his own testimony and was not sufficiently clear and unambiguous. Assuming, as the District Court found, that Mr. Oppong succeeded in establishing a prima facie case, we nonetheless conclude that the Government offered a sufficient rebuttal. Therefore, after drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the Government, we must conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Mr. Oppong did not withdraw. Rebuttal may be achieved either by “impeaching the defendant’s proof or by going forward with evidence of some conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy subsequent to the act of withdrawal.” United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 582 (3d Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the case at bar, the Government challenged Mr. Oppong’s credibility, and offered testimony by Mr. Ramos as to Mr. Oppong’s continuing involvement in the conspiracy. The cross-examination of Mr. Oppong and examination of one of the Customs Agents revealed a number of significant inconsistencies in Mr. Oppong’s testimony, which could have indicated to a jury that his testimony was not credible. Combined with Mr. Oppong’s prior conviction for lying, a reasonable jury could conclude that his withdrawal testimony had been impeached. There was also documentary evidence of phone calls on Mr. Oppong’s cell phone that could reasonably imply support for the Government’s position. Finally, the phone records could reasonably be understood to support Mr. Ramos’s testimony regarding drug sales 12 involving Mr. Oppong, which occurred after his alleged withdrawal. For these reasons, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Mr. Oppong’s conviction.