Opinion ID: 1254168
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pro-Death-Penalty Bias.

Text: Appellant next claims that the voir dire of prospective jurors Ratliff, Blanco, Wolfe, Hamilton, Housewright, Jackson, and Lederle reflected such strong pro-death-penalty bias that they could not be fair. He argues that his failure to challenge some of these jurors for cause should be excused because the trial occurred before Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, clarified the standard for excusing prospective jurors in capital cases. Under the then-governing Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, standard, a juror could be excused only if the juror's attitude about the death penalty made it unmistakably clear that the juror would automatically vote for or against the death penalty regardless of the nature of the aggravating and mitigating evidence. Appellant did not challenge Ratliff, Wolfe, and Jackson for cause. He used peremptory challenges to excuse Ratliff, Blanco, Jackson, Housewright, Wolfe, and Lederle, and did not exhaust his peremptory challenges, using only 20 of the 26 peremptory challenges allotted to him. Hamilton's name was not called and thus she was never seated, and the need to exercise a peremptory challenge never arose. Assuming that appellant did not waive any claim with respect to possible pro-death-penalty bias as to those prospective jurors not challenged ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 121, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887), he cannot demonstrate prejudice as to them or the jurors actually challenged. He had a sufficient number of peremptory challenges remaining to have excused them. ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 401, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610.) The claim lacks merit in any event. Our review of the voir dire of these prospective jurors about whom appellant now complains satisfies us that the court did not err in denying the challenges that were made and would not have erred had it denied challenges to the others. [32] None displayed such bias that he or she could not have been fair. Finally, appellant cannot demonstrate prejudice because none of these prospective jurors actually served as a juror or alternate juror.