Opinion ID: 2516548
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: objection to questions

Text: The State put Everitt's brother David on the stand. Jacques argues that the trial court erred when it sustained the State's objections to questions asked by Jacques' counsel on recross-examination for the purposes of showing bias. On recross-examination the following took place: Q. Mr. Everitt, how close were you to your brother, Ronnie? A. Fairly close. Q. In age how close? A. Within five years. Q. Pretty upset that he wasthat he died? A. Yeah. [PROSECUTOR]: These questions are going beyond the scope of redirect. THE COURT: Sustained. Q. Your Honor, it goes to possible bias of the witness. THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. Q. Mr. Everitt, you would like very much to see someone convicted of his murder, wouldn't you? [PROSECUTOR]: Objection, Your Honor, beyond the scope of direct. [COUNSEL]: Bias. THE COURT: Sustained. It is beyond the scope. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment affords the accused of the right to cross-examination. State v. Humphrey, 252 Kan. 6, 17, 845 P.2d 592 (1992). The exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17, 39 L. Ed.2d 347, 94 S. Ct. 1105 (1974); State v. Davis, 256 Kan. 1, 15-16, 883 P.2d 735 (1994); State v. Bowen, 254 Kan. 618, Syl. ¶ 6, 867 P.2d 1024 (1994). A witness can be questioned about possible bias and motivation for testifying regardless of the scope of the direct examination. Failure to allow a party to cross-examine a witness about possible bias or motivation for testifying is error. Davis, 415 U.S. at 308. However, the error may be harmless and does not automatically require reversal. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 89 L. Ed.2d 674, 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986); State v. Rinck, 256 Kan. 848, 854, 888 P.2d 845 (1995); State v. Gadelkarim, 256 Kan. 671, 683, 887 P.2d 88 (1994). Several factors are considered by an appellate court when determining whether a trial court's refusal to allow cross-examination about possible bias or motivation for testifying was harmless, including: (1) the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case; (2) whether the testimony was cumulative; (3) the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points; (4) the extent of the cross-examination otherwise permitted; and (5) the overall strength of the prosecution's case. Delaware, 475 U.S. at 684; Davis, 256 Kan. at 16. The trial court should have allowed Jacques to continue to question David Everitt about his possible bias and motivation for testifying. David's testimony, which may have revealed bias and motivation for testifying for the State, was not proffered to the court. As the brother of the victim in this case, however, his bias is obvious. David was allowed to testify that he and Everitt were close and that he was pretty upset when Everitt died. David further testified that he would like to see someone convicted for the death of Everitt. David testified that a knife was found in Everitt's truck. David testified that Everitt and Jacques had been buying cocaine when Everitt was stabbed. David further testified that Jacques possessed cocaine on March 1. What more he would have testified to regarding his bias and motivation to testify is unknown. The jury was well aware that David was Everitt's brother and would be biased against Jacques. Given that (1) David's testimony was not central to the State's case, (2) David's testimony was cumulative with other testimony in the case, and (3) the overall strength of the prosecution's case, we hold that the error was harmless and had little, if any, likelihood of changing the result at trial.