Opinion ID: 466309
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: evidence of jenkins' prior bad acts

Text: 38 Jenkins argues that his conviction should be reversed because the trial court improperly permitted government witness Judith Rouse to testify to some irregularities in a conventional loan Jenkins arranged on a mobile home she purchased from Young American. The acts in question occurred more than a year before the alleged conspiracy, and Jenkins argued at trial that the evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial. The trial court admitted the evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and agreed to give a limiting instruction. Jenkins now argues that admissibility under Rule 404(b) was improper, that no jury instruction was given, and that the evidence was also inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. 39 The evidence was properly admitted under Rule 404(b). The fact that Jenkins used fraudulent means to secure conventional loans is probative on issues of intent, knowledge, good faith and absence of mistake in dealing with the FHA transactions. See, e.g., United States v. Walls, 577 F.2d 690, 696 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 893, 99 S.Ct. 251, 58 L.Ed.2d 239 (1978); United States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1356 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978). 40 Having concluded that the evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b), we review the Rule 403 determination for an abuse of discretion. United States v. O'Connor, 737 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1198, 84 L.Ed.2d 343 (1985). The district court admitted the evidence only after both sides presented their arguments on probative value and undue prejudice. The district court's determination that the probative value was not outweighed by the prejudice is supportable on this record. There was no abuse of discretion. 41 After the court held the evidence admissible, counsel for Jenkins and White both requested a curative instruction, and the judge agreed to give one. Following the testimony, however, the admonition covered only the testimony's application to other defendants. There was no further limiting instruction, as appears required by United States v. Bailleaux, 685 F.2d 1105, 1109-10 (9th Cir.1982). The problem with Jenkins' argument at this stage is that he did not object to the curative instruction given following the testimony or to the absence of an instruction as part of the jury charge. It is not at all clear from the record that such a further objection would have been unavailing. Jenkins therefore waived the request for a curative instruction.