Opinion ID: 1439532
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Venireperson W.S.

Text: The state's race-neutral reasons for striking W.S. were that: (1) he appeared agitated, confused and unwilling to be present; (2) he slept during portions of voir dire; (3) he appeared confused over how to handle conflicting witnesses; (4) he lived near Pine Lawn, but failed to express his familiarity with Pine Lawn; and (5) he refused to talk about his nephews, who were law enforcement officers. The state's second reason  that W.S. was asleep  is alone sufficient to justify the strike. In fact, the majority acknowledges as much, but then concludes that W.S.'s sleeping must be discounted when examining the facts of the case in a larger context. No case is found, however, that holds, even in the larger context, that a sleeping juror is not always subject to a peremptory strike, and in fact, the sleeping juror is most often the proper subject of a strike for cause. Even without the sleeping juror problem, each of the state's other reasons for the strike were independently sufficient to justify the strike. The majority first addresses the state's concern over W.S.'s agitation and confusion by simply stating that there is no indication that W.S.'s confusion would have impaired his ability as a juror. But given the trial court's superior vantage point on matters relating to the venireperson's demeanor, this Court must defer to the trial court's determination. And even if W.S.'s demeanor was not agitated, the fact that he appeared confused concerning the role of the jury is certainly a valid race-neutral reason for striking him. Then, as with M.B., the majority suggests that familiarity with the Pine Lawn area was a pretextual reason for striking W.S. However, just as with M.B., the majority again fails to explain exactly how W.S. was similarly situated with the venirepersons who were familiar with Pine Lawn and who were not stricken. Finally, regarding the state's fifth reason  W.S.'s refusal to discuss his nephews' law enforcement experience  the majority concludes that, if anything, his attitude toward law enforcement appears to be generally positive and that such an attitude is usually favorable to the state's position. This conclusion, of course, is speculation, and it may well be that W.S.'s refusal to discuss the matter may be caused by some dissatisfaction with his nephews' experience. In any event, the state's concern that a venireperson may be biased in one way or another toward law enforcement is a valid race-neutral reason for striking a venireperson.