Opinion ID: 2638434
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of incomplete recording of defendant's first interview

Text: As noted, the June 17, 1988, interview was only partially tape-recorded. The prosecution offered the entire tape recording as evidence, but an issue arose as to the admissibility of extraneous statements contained in the recording: the prosecutor was concerned about defendant's self-serving statements, and defense counsel was concerned about the officers' hearsay and accusatory insinuations. It was agreed the parties would edit out offending statements. In addition, defendant argued the recording of the second police interview with him, conducted a few days after the June 17th interview, should (with the exception of the discussion of defendant's prior murder) be admitted without any redactions because the entire interview had been recorded. The prosecution disagreed, arguing the intervening days between the first and second police interrogations allowed defendant to think about how to slant his story to portray his involvement in the crime in the best light. The prosecution ultimately did not introduce the second recording into evidence. Defendant argues that the trial court committed a number of errors by admitting the redacted recording of the June 17th interview. He first claims the redacted recording was so distorted and misleading that it should certainly have been excluded as more prejudicial than probative. We assume defendant is referring to Evidence Code section 352, but he nowhere asserts he made such an objection at trial. Moreover, even if such a claim was preserved, the gist of defendant's argument is that the full recording included much information favorable to him that had been redacted. For example, in the interview defendant claimed he had at first been less than forthcoming with police because he had gotten married while in prison, vowed to change his life, and just wanted to serve his present term and join his wife; he had discouraged Garrison from harming Dolinka; he was not personally responsible for the stabbing; and that when he saw Dolinka emerge from the service station, he did not appear to be badly hurt. Even had defendant moved to exclude the redacted June 17th recording pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, the trial court should properly have denied the motion. The fuller picture defendant argues should have been presented to the jury consisted of self-serving hearsay not otherwise admissible at trial. (See Evid. Code, § 1220 [to qualify as a party admission, a hearsay statement must be introduced against the declarant].) Defendant was free to present this information by taking the stand himself. To allow him to present this evidence through admission of the unredacted recording would have allowed him to present favorable evidence without subjecting himself to cross-examination. `A defendant in a criminal case may not introduce hearsay evidence for the purpose of testifying while avoiding cross-examination.' ( People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 820, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436, quoting People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36, 69, 201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433 (plur. opn. of Broussard, J.).) Defendant further argues that [providing the jury with this type of truncated, distorted, and misleading `confession' deprived [him] of state and federal due process, and of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. It again appears that defendant did not preserve this issue for appeal by raising the constitutional claim below. Assuming, however, for argument the issue is properly before us, we find it lacks merit: defendant's trial was not rendered fundamentally unfair nor was he deprived of his Sixth Amendment rights merely because the trial court did not allow him to spread before the jury his own hearsay statements insulated from cross-examination. Defendant also contends that, by playing for the jury the edited version of the recording of his June 17th statements, and also ruling the prosecution was not obligated to introduce the recording of his June 21st interview with police, the trial court subjected him to unfair pressure to testify, thereby burdening his constitutional right to refrain from testifying. ( Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106.) Defendant exaggerates his dilemma. First, defense counsel willingly participated in the redaction of the June 17th recording because the recording contained information damaging to his client, such as the fact defendant was already in prison when the interview occurred. Second, the trial court was correct in ruling that it could not force the People to introduce the second recording into evidence. Finally, even assuming undue pressure was placed on defendant to testify, he apparently was able to withstand the pressure, for he did not take the stand. Accordingly, there was no violation of defendant's Fifth Amendment rights.