Opinion ID: 198980
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Disposition of the State Law Claims

Text: 57 The district court held that it could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Grimmel's state law claims because of the absence of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Because we conclude that subject matter jurisdiction exists, the premise for the dismissal has vanished. 58 Guilford argues that Counts I and II do not satisfy the requisites for supplemental jurisdiction and must be dismissed, while Counts IV, V, and VI are preempted by the ICCTA and must be dismissed. Grimmel, on the other hand, contends that the district court should stay only those claims relating to defendants' refusal to provide service, pending referral to the STB, and proceed on the merits of the remaining claims. 59 The decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is left to the sound discretion of the district court. See Vera-Lozano v. International Broad., 50 F.3d 67, 70 (1st Cir. 1995). A federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim whenever it is joined with a federal claim and the two claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact and the plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them both in one judicial proceeding. Id. (quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The supplemental jurisdiction statute states that a district court may refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the state claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction or the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(1), (c)(2). The district court should consider on remand whether to stay, act on, or dismiss Grimmel's state law claims.