Opinion ID: 3194599
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: KRPC 1.16(d)

Text: Hawkins argues that the panel erred in concluding that her conduct in winding up her representation of M.S. in DA11637 constituted a violation of KRPC 1.16(d) (2015 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 573). The rule states: Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. The panel concluded that Hawkins violated KRPC 1.16(d) by (1) failing to provide the psychological evaluation and police report to Amy Durkin, M.S.'s subsequent attorney; (2) taking 8 days to provide M.S. with the file when she only had 10 days to file objections to the case manager's recommendations; and (3) failing to timely refund unearned legal fees to M.S. 1. The Case File, the Psychological Evaluation, and the Police Report Hawkins claims that her delay in providing the case file to M.S. and her failure to provide Durkin with the psychological evaluation and the police report (contained within the case file) can be explained by the fact that M.S. only made one request for her file— on May 2, 2012—and that prior to picking up her file on May 10, 2012, she informed Hawkins that she would not be filing an objection to the case manager's recommendations, apparently indicating to Hawkins that a quick transfer of the case file, including the evaluation and police report, was not essential to protecting M.S.'s interests. Hawkins further claims that she called Durkin on May 9, 2012, regarding the evaluation 34 and report but that Durkin never returned her call. Hawkins also points out that Durkin testified before the panel that the evaluation and report were no longer needed because she never filed objections to the case manager's recommendations and that M.S.'s former husband was no longer having contact with their children. The record shows that on April 30, 2012, the case manager in M.S.'s case mailed and emailed her written recommendations to the parties and to the judge presiding over the case. It appears that the recommendations were entered into the district court's filing system on May 3, 2012. And the recommendations were not approved by the judge until May 21, 2012. On Wednesday, May 2, 2012, M.S. left a hand-written note at Hawkins' office, requesting her case file as soon as possible. The note did not mention anything about M.S. wishing to terminate Hawkins as her attorney. That same day at 3:08 p.m., Hawkins wrote M.S. an email, acknowledging that she had received M.S.'s request and informing her that the file would be ready for her to pick up on May 10, 2012. In the email, Hawkins also stated: In the meantime do you want me to follow through on any of the matters we discussed? 1. Communicating to Trina [the case manager] a mea culpa 2. Speaking with the Guardian ad Litem to see if she will agree with the objection re continuing case management 3. Preparing the objection 4. Any other matters Please advise. (Emphasis added.) 35 Hawkins sent the same email later that day at 9:54 p.m. Though Durkin testified that she entered her appearance as M.S.'s attorney on May 2 or 3, records from the Douglas County District Court indicate that she entered her appearance on May 4. At 11:46 a.m. on Monday, May 7, Hawkins sent another email to M.S., stating: I did not receive a response so I assume you do not wish for me to take any further action and will assume my representation has been terminated, unless I hear otherwise from you. Later that day at 2 p.m., Hawkins forwarded to M.S. the email she had sent her twice on May 2. At the top of the email, Hawkins noted that the message had been previously sent three times, that at least one of them was returned, and that she was looking forward to M.S.'s response. At 6:58 p.m. on May 7, M.S. finally responded to Hawkins' emails, informing her that she would be at Hawkins' office on May 10 to pick up the case file. In the email, M.S. specifically told Hawkins that there was [n]o need to prepare an objection. M.S. apologized for the slow reply, noting that she had been in KC today, and not home. At 2:12 p.m. on May 8, Hawkins sent an email to Durkin, noting that she had received Durkin's entry of appearance. Hawkins also wrote: Do you want to pick up the file so I can answer your questions or do you prefer I give it to [M.S.]? Five minutes later, Durkin replied to the email, stating: It is fine if you give it to [M.S.]. I don't think that I have any questions right now. Phone records indicate that Hawkins placed a 2- minute call to Durkin's office in Eudora on May 9. On May 10, 2012, M.S. picked up the file from Hawkins' office. Hawkins required M.S. to sign a receipt when she picked up the file. The receipt stated: 36 This is to certify that on this date I have received the original documents and exhibits I submitted along with pleadings, exhibits, and correspondence from the law office of J. Hawk Law Ltd. I understand there are certain items to which I cannot directly receive, and those items to-wit: psychological evaluation, police reports, will be forwarded directly to my attorney, Amy Durkin. I have had the opportunity to review the items returned and it does contain those items listed above, less those items that I cannot directly receive. Ultimately, Hawkins admitted in her testimony before the panel that she never forwarded the psychological evaluation or the police report to Durkin and that both documents were still in her possession. Durkin testified that though M.S. was not completely satisfied with the case manager's recommendations, objections were never filed due to the short timeframe for doing so. Durkin also testified that she did not become aware of the existence of the psychological evaluation or the police report until she spoke with the Disciplinary Administrator's office regarding M.S.'s complaint. Durkin stated that had she timely received the psychological evaluation (presumably a document she has never reviewed), she may have filed objections to the case manager's recommendations. At the time of her testimony before the hearing panel (October 9, 2014), Durkin noted that having the documents now within her file was unimportant to her current representation of M.S., considering that M.S. had sole legal custody of the children and that her ex-husband was no longer having contact with the children. Though the parties agree that M.S. had 10 days to file objections to the recommendations, neither party explains when the time period began to run or whether only business days or all days were counted for purposes of determining the 10-day 37 period. Thus, it is unclear when the exact deadline was for M.S. to file her objections. Consequently, this makes it difficult to judge whether Hawkins' transfer of the case file to M.S. on May 10, 2012, was reasonable under the circumstances. Regardless, the evidence above indicates that when Hawkins received M.S.'s written request for her case file on May 2, Hawkins responded via email that same day, informing M.S. that she could pick up her case file on May 10 and asking her whether she wanted Hawkins, among other things, to prepare the objections to the case manager's recommendations. If Hawkins, as her May 2 email indicates, was acting under the assumption that she would be preparing the objections for M.S., then it certainly cannot be said that she acted unreasonably by setting May 10 as the date for M.S. to pick up her case file. Furthermore, when M.S. finally responded to Hawkins' numerous emails on May 7, M.S. expressed no concern with picking up her case file on May 10 and told Hawkins that there was no need to prepare objections. Under these facts, it cannot be said that Hawkins failed to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect M.S.'s interests. See KRPC 1.16(d). Though Hawkins' transfer of the case file to M.S. on May 10 does not appear to constitute a violation of KRPC 1.16(d), the same cannot be said of Hawkins' failure to forward the psychological evaluation or the police report to Durkin. Though hindsight shows that M.S. was not harmed by Hawkins' failure to forward the documents to Durkin, it does not change the fact that under KRPC 1.16(d), Hawkins had a duty to timely forward the documents to Durkin. Hawkins could not provide the hearing panel with a valid reason for why she still retained the documents. Accordingly, we find sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the hearing panel's conclusion that Hawkins violated KRPC 1.16(d) by failing to forward the documents to Durkin. 38 2. Returning Unearned Legal Fees to M.S. In Hawkins' answer to the complaint, she admitted that M.S., at the time she terminated Hawkins as her attorney, requested a refund of the unearned fees she had advanced to Hawkins. The record shows that between June 11 and July 9, 2012, M.S. called Hawkins' office numerous times requesting an accounting and a refund of any unearned fees. In her answer to the complaint, Hawkins admitted that on July 9, 2012, she sent M.S. a check in the amount of $691.17. On August 13, 2012, Hawkins sent M.S. a billing statement, a letter, and a check for $215. This amount included 1 hour of time ($185) that was withheld from the first refund plus a credit of $30. In an apparent attempt to explain the delay in refunding the unearned fees to M.S., Hawkins states that when M.S. requested her refund, Hawkins informed M.S. she was providing a full accounting and that [a]fter the full accounting, Ms. Hawkins did return all of her unearned fees to M.S. Regardless of whether this is true, it does not change the fact that it took Hawkins 3 months after her representation of M.S. had ended to refund M.S. all of her money. Hawkins does not explain in her brief why a full accounting would take so long. Accordingly, we find sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the hearing panel's conclusion that Hawkins violated KRPC 1.16(d) by failing to timely refund unearned legal fees to M.S.