Opinion ID: 1286505
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Figueroa's Confrontation Clause Claim

Text: The district court prohibited Figueroa's counsel from pursuing two lines of cross-examination of government witness Jonathan Wright: (1) Wright's possible gang affiliation, and (2) his swastika tattoos. Figueroa argues that the district court thereby violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to cross-examine government witnesses at trial. See U.S. Const. amend. VI (In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him....). Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). One way of discrediting a witness is cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. Id. The motivation of a witness in testifying, including her possible self-interest and any bias or prejudice against the defendant, is one of the principal subjects for cross-examination. Henry v. Speckard, 22 F.3d 1209, 1214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1029, 115 S.Ct. 606, 130 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994). [A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). It does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. Id. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431. District courts may impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Id. Only when this broad discretion is abused will we reverse a trial court's decision to restrict cross-examination. Crowley, 318 F.3d at 417.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in restricting Figueroa's cross-examination of Wright regarding his possible gang affiliation. Although counsel may explore certain areas of inquiry in a criminal trial without full knowledge of the answer to anticipated questions, he must, when confronted with a demand for an offer of proof, provide some good faith basis for questioning that alleges adverse facts. United States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769, 779 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040, 104 S.Ct. 704, 79 L.Ed.2d 169 (1984). Here, defense counsel acknowledged that he had no information as to whether Wright was affiliated with a gang. The district court therefore properly ruled that Figueroa had not laid a proper foundation to question Wright on this subject. [4]
We think that the district court abused its discretion, however, when it ruled that Figueroa could not cross-examine Wright about his tattoos. The record reflects that the defendant is a member of a racial or ethnic minority group. Wright, who testified against Figueroa, bore two tattoos depicting swastikas. Inasmuch as the tattoos suggested that Wright harbored animus against racial or ethnic minority groups and their members, they were relevant to and probative of Wright's credibility, bias, and motive to lie when testifying against Figueroa. The Confrontation Clause protects the right to engag[e] in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431. As we recently stated, It is hard to conceive of a more `prototypical form of bias' than racial bias. Brinson v. Walker, No. 06-0618, draft slip op. 10, 547 F.3d 387, 393, 2008 WL 4890153, 2008 U.S.App. LEXIS, at  (2d Cir. Nov. 13, 2008). And racial bias, at least when held in extreme form, can lead people to lie or distort their testimony, and therefore might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness' testimony, even though the bias is directed generally against a class of persons and not specifically against the accused. Id. at 11, 547 F.3d at 394, 2008 WL, at , 2008 U.S.App. LEXIS, at  (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). It was apparently, and understandably, assumed by the district court and the parties that the swastika is commonly associated with white supremacism and neo-Nazi groups harboring extreme forms of racial, religious and ethnic hatred and prejudice against minority groups, including that to which Figueroa assertedly belongs. [5] The fact that a witness customarily carries or displays a swastika, as a tattoo or otherwise, therefore would tend to suggest that he or she holds racial, religious or ethnic prejudices. That in turn suggests a basis on which the jury could find the witness's testimony not credible. [T]he jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness' testimony. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984). In a criminal trial, a witness wearing or bearing a swastika should ordinarily be subject to cross-examination on credibility grounds where a jury might reasonably infer that the symbol indicated likely bias against the defendant. [6] [T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on ... cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431. The government argues that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in this instance. We disagree. In federal courts, limits on the admission of relevant testimony are largely governed by Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 403. In this case, however, the district court did not purport to exclude the proffered cross-examination under Rule 403. It did not conclude that the cross-examination would be unduly prejudicial, confusing or misleading to the jury, or cumulative. The court based its decision solely on the ground that the proposed cross-examination was designed to elicit character evidence inadmissible under Rule 608 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. [7] We think the district court thereby erred as a matter of law. The Supreme Court has held that impeachment for bias is admissible under Rule 402 [8] even when the impeachment material is not independently admissible under Rule 608 as concerning [the witness's] character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, Fed.R.Evid. 608. See Abel, 469 U.S. at 51, 55-56 & n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 465. [9] Here, as in Abel, the purpose of the proposed line of cross-examination was not to show the witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, Fed.R.Evid. 608; it was to impeach the witness for bias. Bias is a term used in the common law of evidence to describe the relationship between a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party. Bias may be induced by a witness' like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness' self-interest. Proof of bias is almost always relevant.... Abel, 469 U.S. at 52, 105 S.Ct. 465. Because the jury could have found that Wright's tattoos were indicative of bias, examination of him on that subject matter was relevant irrespective of its admissibility vel non under Rule 608. See id. at 55-56, 105 S.Ct. 465. [10] A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996); see also Zervos, 252 F.3d at 169 (A district court [abuses its discretion] when ... its decision rests on an error of law (such as application of the wrong legal principle)....). The district court therefore abused its discretion in restricting Figueroa's cross-examination because its decision rested on a legally erroneous application of Rule 608. As noted, the district court did not purport to exclude the proposed line of questioning under Rule 403. Because we review a Rule 403 decision for abuse of discretion, and since the district court did not exercise its discretion on this basis or engage in a balancing process that we can review, we have no occasion to decide whether the [evidence was] properly excluded under the Rule. United States v. Colomb, 419 F.3d 292, 302 (5th Cir.2005) (citation omitted); accord United States v. Peak, 856 F.2d 825, 834 n. 6 (7th Cir.) ([T]he district judge did not invoke Rule 403 to justify his evidentiary ruling. This court, therefore, cannot review the ruling on Rule 403 grounds.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 969, 109 S.Ct. 499, 102 L.Ed.2d 535 (1988). Based on the proverbial cold record before us, the reasons the court excluded the relevant tattoo evidence seem relatively modest compared to the Rule 403 factors favoring admissibility. But the written record is cold indeed. We therefore express no opinion as to whether, had the district court prohibited the proposed line of questioning under Rule 403, it would have been acting in the exercise of its sound discretion. We conclude that the district court's prohibition on cross-examination for bias on the grounds upon which it relied violated Figueroa's confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment.