Opinion ID: 836322
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: suchodolski analysis

Text: This Court asked the parties to address whether the non-retaliation provision in the CIAR, § 1011, is consistent with Suchodolski. McNeil v. Charlevoix Co., 482 Mich. 1014, 1014-1015, 759 N.W.2d 644 (2008). [1] I think that § 1011 of the CIAR falls squarely within Suchodolski's first example of a public policy creating an exception to the general rule of at-will employment. Under the common law, there is a general rule of at-will employment, meaning that [i]n general, in the absence of a contractual basis for holding otherwise, either party to an employment contract for an indefinite term may terminate it at any time for any, or no, reason. Suchodolski, 412 Mich. at 694-695, 316 N.W.2d 710. As discussed in the majority opinion, Suchodolski recognized that, under the common law, there is an exception to the general at-will rule when the basis for termination is contrary to public policy. Id. at 695, 316 N.W.2d 710. Suchodolski stated that an exception has been recognized to [the common-law at-will employment] rule, based on the principle that some grounds for discharging an employee are so contrary to public policy as to be actionable. Id. In addition to explaining the general public-policy exception, Suchodolski provided three examples of public policies that fall within the exception. Id. at 695-696, 316 N.W.2d 710. [2] I would hold that § 1011 of the CIAR falls within the first example provided in Suchodolski of a public policy that creates an exception to the general rule of at-will employment. The first Suchodolski example is an explicit legislative statement that prohibits the discharge of an employee in retaliation for that employee's acting in accordance with a legally recognized right or duty. Suchodolski, 412 Mich. at 695, 316 N.W.2d 710. This is precisely what § 1011 is. Section § 1011 provides that [n]o person or employer shall discharge, refuse to hire or in any manner retaliate against any employee, applicant for employment or customer because such employee, applicant or customer exercises any right to a smoke-free environment afforded by this regulation. The county boards of commissioners that organized the NMCHA adopted the CIAR by a majority vote. They are local legislative bodies and were exercising the legislative power granted to them by the constitution and statutes of our state. [3] Thus, the CIAR qualifies as a legislative statement. Further, an employee's right to a smoke-free environment is a legally recognized right under the CIAR. [4] Finally, the CIAR explicitly prohibits discharging an employee in retaliation for that employee's exercise of a legally recognized right. Therefore, I would hold that § 1011 of the CIAR falls within Suchodolski's first example of a public policy that constitutes an exception to the common-law at-will employment doctrine. [5]