Opinion ID: 200732
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Causation Instructions and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: 18 Appellant makes a multi-pronged attack on the court's charge to the jury on the causal relationship between his alleged distribution of cocaine and Fortin's death. The court instructed the jury as follows: 19 And I instruct you that for you to find that Loretta Fortin's death resulted from the use of cocaine that the defendant distributed, you must find that the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Loretta Fortin died as a consequence of her use of the cocaine that the defendant distributed on or about the dates alleged in the indictment. 20 I instruct you that you must find the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the use of that cocaine played a significant causal role in bringing about the death of Loretta Fortin. 21 And I instruct you that the government does not have to prove that Loretta Fortin's death from the use of the cocaine was foreseeable for the defendant or for the others. 22 Appellant contends that this charge suffered from three specific flaws: first, although he specifically requested the significant causal role language, he now claims that this instruction understated the government's burden of proof; second, he contends that the court should have instructed the jurors that, to convict him, they needed to find that there was no intervening or superseding cause of death; and, finally, he asserts that the wording of the instruction in effect required the jury to find causation. Appellant additionally argues that his trial counsel's acquiescence to the causation instructions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and thus was a Sixth Amendment violation. 23 We briefly address the asserted flaws below, but note at the outset that neither the claims of instructional error nor the ineffective assistance claim are properly before us. The causation charge as given by the trial judge was requested and specifically approved by defense counsel. Indeed, at a sidebar conference held after the jury charge, counsel twice confirmed upon inquiry from the judge that he had [n]o objection and no additional requests. Having directly bypassed an offered opportunity to challenge and perhaps modify the instructions, appellant waived any right to object to them on appeal. See United States v. Mitchell, 85 F.3d 800, 807 (1st Cir.1996) (discussing difference between waiver and forfeiture and noting that only the latter is subject to plain error review). 24 The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, meanwhile, runs up against our longstanding rule that fact-specific claims of ineffective assistance cannot make their debut on direct review of criminal convictions, but, rather, must originally be presented to, and acted upon by, the trial court, United States v. Mala, 7 F.3d 1058, 1063 (1st Cir.1993); see also United States v. Martinez-Vargas, 321 F.3d 245, 251 (1st Cir.2003). Appellant argues that this case is unusual and worthy of consideration at this juncture because there was no possible tactical reason for trial counsel to request the significant causal role language, and the record is thus sufficiently developed to permit effective review. See Mala, 7 F.3d at 1063. We disagree, believing, as our discussion below indicates, that a tactical reason exists, and that this case, like most, would thus benefit from the trial court's perspective on the attorney's performance and its impact. See id. In any event, our discussion infra of appellant's specific instructional complaints strongly suggests that, were we to reach the issue of counsel's competence, we inevitably would find no constitutional error. 25 Turning to appellant's specific complaints, we first address his claim that the court diluted the government's burden of proof by asking the jury to determine whether cocaine that he distributed played a significant causal role in bringing about the death of Loretta Fortin. Under the statute, an enhanced sentence must be imposed on a defendant who commits a drug offense if death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). We have described the necessary proof to be that a defendant deals drugs and a user of those drugs dies as a result, United States v. Soler, 275 F.3d 146, 153 (1st Cir.2002). Both the statute and our precedent thus link the jury's finding simply to whether death was a result of the offense; an instruction requiring jurors to find a significant causal relationship suggests a higher, rather than lower, burden of proof. Even if we were to review for plain error, therefore, appellant's contention would be unavailing. 26 We easily can dispose of appellant's second complaint about this portion of the instruction, which is that the opening words, I instruct you that you must find directed the jurors to reach the conclusion contained in the second part of the sentence, i.e., that the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the use of that cocaine played a significant causal role in bringing about the death of Loretta Fortin. In context, it is clear that the court was advising the jurors that, in order to convict, they needed to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence supported the specified causal relationship. 27 Appellant's remaining point, that the court improperly omitted an intervening cause instruction, also merits little response. Although he points to the other drugs and alcohol ingested by Fortin, appellant identifies no evidence in the record that would permit a conclusion that another substance, rather than cocaine, was responsible for her death. The medical examiner testified that, in his opinion, the level of cocaine in Fortin's system was enough by itself to kill her. He further stated that none of the other substances she had consumed was at a level sufficient to cause her death, and it was very unlikely that death would have resulted from only the combination of alcohol, codeine and valium. On this record, the failure to give an intervening cause instruction was not plain error.