Opinion ID: 2632366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress

Text: ¶ 7 Oklahoma first adopted the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, also known as the tort of outrage, in Breeden v. League Services Corp., 1978 OK 27, 575 P.2d 1374. The tort is governed by the narrow standards of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46. [2] Id. The tort requires evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct coupled with severe emotional distress. Gaylord Entertainment Co. v. Thompson, 1998 OK 30, ¶ 45, 958 P.2d 128, 149. To recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) the resulting emotional distress was severe. ¶ 8 The trial court acts as a gatekeeper regarding the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct and the severity of the plaintiff's distress. Miller v. Miller, 1998 OK 24, ¶ 34, 956 P.2d 887, 901. The roles of the trial court and the jury are well established: The court, in the first instance, must determine whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery or whether it is necessarily so. Where, under the facts before the court, reasonable persons may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether the conduct in any given case has been significantly extreme and outrageous to result in liability. Likewise, it is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether based upon the evidence presented, severe emotional distress can be found. It is for the jury to determine whether, on the evidence, severe emotional distress in fact existed. Breeden, 1978 OK 27, 575 P.2d at 1377-78 (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted). The trial court's gatekeeper role with regard to the second and fourth elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress ensures that only valid claims reach the jury under the appropriate legal standards. ¶ 9 The second element of this tort requires proof that the defendant's conduct was so outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and that such conduct is regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Kraszewski v. Baptist Medical Center of Oklahoma, Inc., 1996 OK 141, 916 P.2d 241, 248. In general, a plaintiff must prove that the recitation of defendant's conduct to an average member of the community would arouse the listener's resentment against the defendant and would lead the listener to exclaim Outrageous! Id. ¶ 10 In this case, regarding as true all evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to Welton and disregarding all evidence favorable to Craig, the record shows that Craig harassed Welton virtually non-stop after she quit her job with CPI on October 31, 1997. Craig wanted Welton to come back to work for him and wanted her to resume their intimate relationship. He harassed her for two years, through at least November of 1999. He did not stop harassing her after CPI sued her in February of 1998, after the trial court ruled against CPI on its motion for temporary restraining order in March of 1998, after Welton became engaged to Keith Dixon in June of 1998, after Welton married Keith Dixon in September of 1998, after the trial court ruled against CPI and Craig on all of their claims in April of 1999, or after the attorney for CPI and Craig took Welton's deposition in May of 1999. In those two years Craig repeatedly attempted to contact Welton. He called her land-line phones, called her cell-phones, left voice mail on her phones, sent e-mails, mailed letters and cards and sent flowers and gifts. In two of his letters he asked her to contact his psychologist. He found out where she worked and twice dropped letters through the sun-roof of her car while she was at work. He called her friends and asked them to intervene on his behalf. He drove slowly past her house. He drove through her neighborhood. He showed up at restaurants where she went with friends. Welton not only did not respond to Craig's attempts to contact her, she took steps to avoid him. She changed her phone numbers. She moved out of her apartment before her lease ended and lived for two months with a friend. None of this worked, as Craig was able to learn her new phone numbers, learn her friend's address, learn her new e-mail addresses and learn where she worked. ¶ 12 We do not find an entire absence of proof as to whether Craig's conduct was sufficiently extreme and outrageousness to warrant submission of that issue to the jury. We conclude the trial court properly denied Craig's motion for directed verdict on this element of the tort. ¶ 13 The fourth element of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires proof that the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it. Breeden, at 1377-78, n. 6. While emotional distress includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea, it is only where the emotional distress is extreme that liability arises. Miller v. Miller, 1998 OK 24, 956 P.2d 887, 900 n. 44. The intensity and duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity. Severe distress must be proved; but in many cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed . . . . The distress must be reasonable and justified under the circumstances, and there is no liability where the plaintiff has suffered exaggerated and unreasonable emotional distress, unless it results from a peculiar susceptibility to such distress of which the actor has knowledge. Breeden, 1978 OK 27, 575 P.2d at 1377-78, n. 6. ¶ 14 In this case, regarding as true all evidence and inferences favorable to Welton and disregarding all evidence favorable to Craig, the record shows that Welton, who is by nature stoic, was very afraid of Craig. One of her friends testified: [Alysia] was scared. I mean she would shake when she read [the letters]. She wasand she's not like that. I mean if you know Alysia, she's not scared of anything, and it was really weird to see her that way. The friend further testified that Alysia had never reacted that way to anything before, and that Alysia cried [and] lost weight, had a rash all over her arms and legs and [was] just a nervous wreck. Welton described those two years of her life as having been the worst thing I've ever gone through. Every day is a scary day. Every day I'm afraid he's going to do something, send another letter, send another card, show up in my parking lot, show up at my house. It's just the most painful thing I've ever been through. Welton testified that when she eventually called Craig's therapist, as Craig had asked, the therapist knew immediately who she was. The therapist asked if Craig was still stalking her and when Welton answered yes, the therapist suggested that Welton get a protective order against Craig. Welton became even more fearful after her conversation with Craig's therapist. She testified: I was already stressed out about what he was doing with the letters and stuff, but [the therapist] took it to another level. Now, I was like, I didn't know what he was going to do. Welton also testified that although Craig had never threatened her physically, I just didn't know what level he was going to take it to. Like I said, I saw him outside of Keith's house, you know. He was finding out where I lived, he was finding out phone numbers that I had disconnected. He wouldn't stop. ¶ 15 Again, we do not find an entire absence of proof of severe emotional distress on the part of Welton. We conclude the trial court properly denied Craig's motion for directed verdict on this element of the tort.