Opinion ID: 201225
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Section 1252(d)(1) Applies to Habeas Corpus

Text: 17 Sayyah argues that section 1252(d)(1)'s exhaustion requirement does not apply to habeas corpus petitions. He notes that section 1252(d) requires exhaustion as a predicate to court review of a final order of removal but not specifically as a predicate to habeas corpus. He contrasts the statute's lack of mention of habeas corpus with § 1252(c)'s explicit reference to [a] petition for review or habeas corpus of an order (emphasis added). 4 18 We find Sayyah's argument unpersuasive. Six other circuits have read section 1252(d)(1)'s exhaustion requirement, or that of its predecessor, section 1105a(c), as being applicable to habeas corpus petitions. Sun v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 932, 936-44 (9th Cir.2004); Theodoropoulos v. INS, 358 F.3d 162, 169-74 (2d Cir.2004), superseding 313 F.3d 732 (2d Cir.2002); Duvall v. Elwood, 336 F.3d 228, 231-32 (3d Cir.2003); Sundar v. INS, 328 F.3d 1320, 1324-26 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 531, 157 L.Ed.2d 412 (2003); Kurfees v. INS, 275 F.3d 332, 336-37 (4th Cir.2001) (holding that section 1105a(c) applies to habeas corpus petitions); Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 385-90 (5th Cir.2001) (same). 19 Sayyah bases much of his contrary argument on language in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001)—a case in which the Supreme Court held that a different subsection of 8 U.S.C. § 1252, namely subsection (a)(2)(C) ([N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense ....), does not eliminate habeas jurisdiction over petitions by such aliens. See also Mahadeo v. Reno, 226 F.3d 3, 11 (1st Cir.2000). 5 In St. Cyr, the Court stated that [f]or the INS to prevail it must overcome both the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action and the longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction. 533 U.S. at 298, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (citing Ex Parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, 75 U.S. 85, 19 L.Ed. 332 (1868); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996)) (footnotes and parentheticals omitted). In the circumstance of a statute purporting to exclude any and all right of judicial review, the Court found the absence of any specific reference to habeas corpus to be particularly significant. 20 St. Cyr is not analogous to this case, however. Section 1252(d), the statute here at issue, does not purport to eliminate judicial review. Rather, it premises judicial review upon the prior exhaustion of administrative remedies. In so doing, section 1252(d) implements a principle almost universally recognized in our jurisprudence. See, e.g., Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116-17, 64 S.Ct. 448, 88 L.Ed. 572 (1944) (per curiam) (discussing common law exhaustion). 21 In St. Cyr, on the other hand, an interpretation of section 1252(a)(2)(C) eliminating habeas corpus jurisdiction would have invoked the outer limits of Congress' power, 533 U.S. at 299, 121 S.Ct. 2271; see also id. at 314, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (If it were clear that the question of law could be answered in another judicial forum, it might be permissible to accept the INS' reading of § 1252. But the absence of such a forum, coupled with the lack of a clear, unambiguous, and express statement of congressional intent to preclude judicial consideration on habeas of such an important question of law, strongly counsels against adopting a construction that would raise serious constitutional questions.) (citations and footnotes omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has highlighted this important distinction, commenting: 22 The exhaustion requirement of § 1252(d)(1) is not tantamount to a complete preclusion of jurisdiction. Telling a petitioner that he must seek the remedy for an error before an administrative agency or another court prior to seeking it in a habeas proceeding is not the same thing as telling him that he may not pursue the remedy in a federal habeas proceeding in any event. Compelling a petitioner to seek review of an immigration order in the BIA before he can seek to have it set aside in a habeas proceeding is different from barring all habeas review of the order regardless of exhaustion. The difference is that between a reasonable condition precedent and an unconditional preclusion. 23 Sundar, 328 F.3d at 1324. 24 We note, moreover, that subsection (2) of section 1252(d) contains language intimating the likely inclusion of habeas review in section 1252(d). Subsection (2) provides that a court may review a final order of removal only if: 25 another court has not decided the validity of the order, unless the reviewing court finds that the petition presents grounds that could not have been presented in the prior judicial proceeding or that the remedy provided by the prior proceeding was inadequate or ineffective to test the validity of the order. 26 This reference to another court and a prior judicial proceeding suggests that Congress envisaged the term review to encompass habeas corpus review, which commonly follows upon other judicial proceedings. Sun, 370 F.3d at 940; Theodoropoulos, 358 F.3d at 169-72 (stating, [m]oreover, although § 1252(d) fails to expressly mention habeas corpus or § 2241 (as required by [ St. Cyr ] to effect a repeal of habeas jurisdiction), its recitation in subsection (2) of the effect that prior judicial proceedings have on the scope of a subsequent court's review seems plainly to contemplate habeas review.) (footnote omitted). 27 The legislative history of section 1252(d), while not explicit, is also entirely consistent with the inclusion of habeas corpus review. Through the enactment of the IIRIRA, section 1252(d) replaced 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c), which provided that [a]n order of deportation or of exclusion shall not be reviewed by any court if the alien has not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him as a matter of right under the immigration law and regulations . . . . As section 1252(d) merely restates section 1105a(c), cases concerning the latter remain relevant. Sousa, 226 F.3d at 31; see also Sun, 370 F.3d at 937 ([W]e thus have no indication in the statute itself that Congress intended through IIRIRA's enactment of § 1252(d)(1) to remove the exhaustion requirement for habeas petitions that we had previously decided was contained in the very similar language of former § 1105a(c).); Duvall, 336 F.3d at 232 n. 6 (The [scant] legislative history that does exist strongly suggests that the purpose of the two provisions is one and the same.). Nothing in the legislative background nor in cases construing the earlier section 1105a(c) lends support to Sayyah's interpretation. 28 In this circuit's case of Hernandez v. Reno, 238 F.3d 50, 54-55 (1st Cir.2001), the government argued that the exhaustion requirement of section 1105a(c) barred review of Hernandez's habeas corpus petition, which challenged the competency of his counsel. We ultimately concluded from the particular facts in that case that the exhaustion requirement did not bar Hernandez's petition. Id. Hernandez faced immediate deportation notwithstanding the pendency before the BIA of his motion to reopen, and his failure to timely exhaust may have been caused by the very incompetency he complained of. Id. We did not hold that section 1105a(c)'s exhaustion requirement was generally inapplicable to habeas corpus petitions. To the contrary, we stated, [i]n the ordinary case, we agree that the respondent must use the Board's own procedures to resolve his competency of counsel claims. Absent a threat of immediate deportation, a district court should in general decline to entertain a habeas petition challenging competency of counsel. Id. at 55 (citation omitted). 29 We conclude that section 1252(d)'s exhaustion requirement applies generally to habeas corpus petitions. To hold otherwise would drastically limit the utilization of a salutary principle customarily applied in respect to administrative proceedings. Such an interpretation would allow an alien subjected to an adverse decision to reject the very administrative review processes established to correct mistakes and to insist, instead, upon immediate access to a federal court. 30 Accordingly, we hold that section 1252(d)'s exhaustion requirement applies broadly to all forms of court review of final orders of removal, including habeas corpus. 6 We now turn to whether the exhaustion requirement bars review of Sayyah's habeas corpus petition. 31