Opinion ID: 528299
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Governmental Suppression of Evidence

Text: 9 Stano alleges that the state improperly withheld evidence that a police detective believed Stano falsely confessed to a prior murder for which he was convicted; that a conspiracy existed to obtain Stano's confessions; that Stano was a pathological liar; and that Stano's prior confessions were coerced. To analyze whether the prosecution improperly suppressed evidence, factors such as the prosecutor's duty to search out and disclose certain evidence, as well as the availability of the evidence to the defense, must be considered. A prosecutor is not constitutionally obligated to obtain information dehors his files for the purpose of discovering information which defense counsel can use.... Morgan v. Salamack, 735 F.2d 354, 358 (2d Cir.1984). Moreover, relief is not warranted whenever a combing of the prosecutor's files after trial reveals evidence possibly useful to the defense but unlikely to have changed the verdict. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). The Supreme Court has held that the prosecution is not constitutionally required to make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2400, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (quoting Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 2568, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972)). In addition, the state has no obligation to communicate preliminary, challenged, or speculative information. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109 n. 16, 96 S.Ct. at 2400 n. 16 (quoting Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98, 87 S.Ct. 793, 809, 17 L.Ed.2d 737 (1967) (Fortas, J. concurring)). 10 Detective Gadberry's difference of opinion with other detectives, his superiors, and the state attorney regarding Stano's responsibility for a prior murder, is not the type of evidence that a prosecuting attorney is constitutionally required to communicate to the defense. Such preliminary police investigatory work, which stands challenged by other members of the department and which is speculative at best, need not be revealed. This evidence was equally available to the defense, as well as to the prosecution, since Detective Gadberry made no secret of his opinion among his peers. See Appendix 16, p. 6. Thus, the prosecution did not suppress this evidence. 11 Stano's other allegations of suppression fail to satisfy this prong of Brady for the same reason. Allegations of a conspiracy to obtain confessions and of coercion in other cases do not constitute the type of evidence the state must investigate and disclose, particularly where the prior confessions and pleas resulted in valid, final convictions. The state owes no duty to the defense to explore and undermine the validity of prior final convictions. The prosecutor may rely on the petitioner's guilty pleas in other cases, which result in convictions subject to independent appellate review, as waiving most non-jurisdictional challenges to the convictions' constitutionality. See McCoy v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1196, 1198 (11th Cir.1986). Although a challenge to the voluntary and knowing nature of a guilty plea may be raised on direct appeal or collateral attack of that conviction id., the validity of a guilty plea in one case may rarely be challenged in the collateral attack of another. Regarding the remaining allegations, the record reflects that the defense was in possession of evidence prior to trial that other jurisdictions considered Stano's confessions unreliable and declined to prosecute based on them, and that Stano was a pathological liar. 4 Consequently, since the defense was either not constitutionally entitled to the evidence or it had equal access to the material, Stano's allegations fail to establish a Brady violation under the first step of inquiry; that the state suppressed evidence.