Opinion ID: 576706
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: IRS's Motion to Amend

Text: 9 BBCA argues that the IRS's motion to amend was a Rule 59(e) motion because it expressly stated that it was made pursuant to Rules 59(e) and 60(a), and because the new judgment resulted in a substantive change. The IRS argues that its motion to amend was a Rule 60(a) motion to correct a clerical mistake, not a Rule 59(e) motion. Rule 60(a) motions do not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. We find that the IRS's motion was a Rule 60(a) motion. 10 Although the IRS's motion did state that it was pursuant to Rule 59(e), the substance of a motion rather than the form of a motion is controlling. E.g., Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir.1983) (though styled as a Rule 59(e) motion nomenclature is not controlling). To be a Rule 59(e) motion, the IRS must have sought a substantive change in the judgment. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Continental Casualty Co., 684 F.2d 691, 693 (10th Cir.1982). We find that it did not. 11 The IRS's motion clearly sought only the correction of a clerical error. The motion itself focused on the clerk's inadvertent error when entering judgment, and the district court expressly noted that the new judgment was entered because of clerical error. Additionally, adding the language with prejudice did not change the effect of the November 26 judgment. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides: 12 Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 13 Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Under this rule, the original dismissal was with prejudice even though it did not expressly so state. 4 Cf. LeBeau v. Taco Bell, Inc., 892 F.2d 605, 607 (7th Cir.1989) (under 41(b), court's order that cause dismissed for want of prosecution was with prejudice). Because the December 18 judgment merely made explicit what was implicit in the November 26 judgment, the IRS's motion did not seek a substantive change. Id. at 609. Accordingly, it was not a Rule 59(e) motion, but a Rule 60(a) motion that did not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. See United States v. Mansion House Center North Redevelopment, 855 F.2d 524, 527 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 993, 109 S.Ct. 557, 102 L.Ed.2d 583 (1988).