Opinion ID: 2333373
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trends and Price Indices:

Text: Erie contends that the Division erroneously considered an upward trend in value of Hudson River waterfront realty between 1940 and the assessment dates. The arguments advanced by Erie stress the weight of evidence, but also include the assertion that evidence of trends is per se inadmissible. In City of Newark v. West Milford Tp., Passaic County, 9 N.J. 295, 307 (1952), this court held that neither a temporary general inflation nor a temporary general depression condition was in itself a sufficient reason for increase or decrease in assessed valuation of property. And we have held that resort to price indices by the means of application of a translator of dollar value to original cost is an improper method of valuation. In re New Jersey Power & Light Co., 9 N.J. 498, 514-515 (1952). However, in the New Jersey Power & Light Co. case, ubi supra, we adopted language of the United States Supreme Court, expressed in West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 295 U.S. 662, 671, 672, 55 S.Ct. 894, 898, 79 L.Ed. 1640, 1647 (1935), which included the following:    This is not to suggest that price trends are to be disregarded; quite the contrary is true. And evidence of such trends is to be considered with all other relevant factors.    (Emphasis supplied) Further, in New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. v. Communications Workers, etc., supra (5 N.J., at page 373), it was held: The Company criticises the Board's consideration of `trends' as a basis for the wage award. We agree that `trends' do not constitute proper items to be considered in arriving at `a just and reasonable determination' of a labor dispute. The objective of the proceedings provided for in the statute is to consider, by an application of the standards delineated therein to the evidence, the justness and reasonableness of the wages, in the particular labor dispute, existing at the time of the dispute and to make a determination accordingly. The employment of `trends' in the attainment of the objective is considered improper because `trends' are illusory. A `trend' is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary (2 d ed. 1947), as the `general direction taken by something changing or subject to change.' A `trend' may change its direction at any time. If it progresses in one direction for a sufficient length of time it becomes more than a `trend'; it becomes an established thing which would be reflected in the existing conditions disclosed by the application of the standards specified in the statute, particularly standards Nos. 2 and 3. To predicate a determination of what is just and reasonable, at the time a labor dispute is being resolved, upon something which has not as yet become established but which, if established at some future time might possibly change existing conditions, either one way or the other, would be manifestly unfair to both parties involved in the dispute. No translator factor was resorted to in Commissioner Hull's report. The evidence of trends in property values, including the Consumers' Price Indices, under the circumstances of this case was admissible and consideration thereof by the Division in reaching its determination was proper. Cf. Hackensack Water Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 2 N.J. 157, 163 (1949); L. Bamberger & Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 1 N.J. 151, 156-157 (1948). Price trends may not be used exclusively as an indication of present value, as by translation of a previous valuation by use of dollar equivalents or as the sole basis for an opinion. Cf. 43 Am. Jur., Public Utilities and Services, sec. 115, p. 653. The use of trends is collateral and corroborative only, since the principal inquiry as to value is local, that is, similarity of other lands and sales prices thereof under the conditions surrounding the sales, and the element of remoteness of such evidential sales in respect to locale, are vital elements of tax assessment. Cf. 3 Wigmore on Evidence (3 rd ed. 1940), secs. 718, 719, pp. 51-54; 51 Am. Jur., Taxation, sec. 727, p. 669. It has been said that assessors    should recognize that the true value of a fixed asset, such as real estate, is fairly constant and must be gauged by conditions, not temporary and extraordinary, but by those which over a period of time will be regarded as measurably stable. Alfred J. Sweet v. City of Auburn, 134 Me. 28, 180 A. 803, 804, 104 A.L.R. 784, 787, 789 ( Sup. Jud. Ct. 1935). Cf. Jones on Evidence (1938), sec. 168, pp. 292-296. Relevant price-current lists and market reports which are recognized for trustworthiness by commercial trade experience are admissible, but must be closely scrutinized to determine the weight to be accorded them. 6 Wigmore on Evidence (3 rd ed. 1940), secs. 1702, 1704, pp. 22-23, 26-29. See also Nat'l. Conf. of Com'rs. on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953), Rule 63(30), p. 210; American Law Institute, Model Code of Evidence (1942), Rule 528, pp. 293-294.