Opinion ID: 1945963
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instructions Concerning Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance Mitigating Factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(a)

Text: Defendant proffered numerous statutory mitigating factors during the penalty phase. He asserted that he suffered under the 2C:11-3c(5)(a) factor (extreme mental or emotional disturbance) and that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired as the result of metal disease or defect pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(d). Defendant argues that the trial court erred in its charge. Defendant contends that the court's instruction precluded the jury from finding the 2C:11-3c(5)(a) factor applicable if defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect (as opposed to a disturbance). In essence, defendant argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court erroneously precluded the jury from considering any evidence of defendant's mental illness to support the existence of the 2C:11-3c(5)(a) factor. That alleged error, according to defendant, rendered the jury's balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors fatally flawed. In response, the State stresses that defendant failed to raise that objection at trial and further, that the court's charge, when viewed in conjunction with the court's recharge, properly informed the jury. The trial court instructed the jury on the extreme mental or emotional disturbance statutory factor as follows: The first [mitigating factor] is that the defendantsdefendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution. Now, emotional and mental are used in their ordinary sense, and we are not talking, with respect to this mitigating factor, about a defendant who has a mental illness or a mental disease. You have heard testimony that Mr. Koskovich does have a mental illness, and has mental disease. And that's addressed in some other factors. But even if he doesn't have a mental illness, it's possible that he may have been subjected to extreme mental or emotional disturbances, may have been under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbances which clouded his judgment and his control, even though he may have been generally healthy or mentally healthy or even if he was not generally mentally healthy. So the point is this factor might exist in a person who does not havehave any mental disease. It might exist in a person who was free of mental pathology. He might have ... some enormous stress factors taking place in his life at the time of the murder thatthat influenced him, affected his thinking, affected his emotions in a way which was rather extreme. This mitigating factor, it's a statutory factor. It's one listed in the statute. And the statute says thetheto be considered here thethe disturbance, the emotional disturbance, or the mental disturbance, has to be extreme before this mitigating factor exists. So you have to look at the things that were influencing the defendant, and you have to make a judgment as to whether thethethere wasthe defendant was being influenced by an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time he committed this act. Now, again, the mitigating factor, as you'll notice when you read it, is the defendant was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution. This disturbance wasn't enough to excuse him from guilt for the murder. He's been found guilty of the murder, but it's something that might impact on what the sentence should be. And you will notice that we ask you there to give the number of yes votes and the number of no votes. It may be that it's 12 on one side and 12 on the other. It doesn't have to be. Just whatever they are, that you should again, you should discuss the thing, see if you can come up with a consensus on this and all the other mitigating factors. But if you don't have a unanimous vote, just, when you finish your deliberations on that factor, just show what the votes are. After the court completed its charge, defense counsel objected to various portions of it, but not specifically to the court's instruction about the extreme mental or emotional disturbance factor. During deliberations, the jury sent the court a note asking is there a legal definition of extreme or significantly impaired in considering mitigating factors? If not, please provide examples, if possible. The court understood the jury's question to relate to the extreme mental or emotional disturbance factor, as well as the N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(d) mitigating factor. Accordingly, the court re-instructed the jury in the following manner: The answer is that there is a definition of those words that we typically use in the law. It basically parallels standard dictionary references. But I will give it to you. The question with reference to extreme is obviously a reference to Mitigating Factor 1, which is the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution. So the jury is asking what does extreme mean in that factor. And let me give you a somewhat fuller explanation of that factor than I did earlier. And there will be a reference in it to the specific meaning of the word extreme. I wanted to remind you that this mitigating factor may be present even though the defendant was not intoxicated and had neither a mental disease nor a mental defect. It, of course, may be present, in addition, that he had those things. But even if he did not have those things it may be present. This mitigating factor is established by evidence showing that defendant was suffering from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and that such disturbance influenced him to commit the murder. In this regard you are to consider the evidence on the totality of his intellectual and emotional processes at the time he acted. In other words, what was he thinking or feeling at the time; what was the effect of those feelings and thoughts upon him. Then you must consider whether his thoughts or feelings constituted extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and if they did, whether he was under their influence or power. By disturbance we mean agitation, confusion or violent change. But in order to find this factor present you must also be satisfied that the mental or emotional disturbance was extreme. That is that it was great in degree. Extreme simply means great in degree. I want to remind you that in order to find the presence of this factor you must determine that the defendant was suffering from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and that such disturbance influenced him to commit murder. However, if you find that the emotional or mental disturbance was not extreme, you may still consider any emotional or mental disturbance when you're dealing with Mitigating Factor 12 below, which deals with nonextreme mental or emotional disturbance. Because defendant did not specifically object to the court's instruction at trial, we must determine whether the court's... charge was plain error possessing the clear capacity to bring about an unjust result. State v. Feaster, supra, 156 N.J. at 40, 716 A. 2d 395. Under the plain error standard, defendant has the burden of proving that the error was clear and obvious and that it affected his substantial rights. State v. Morton, supra, 155 N.J. at 421, 715 A. 2d 228 (citation omitted). Moreover, in reviewing the charge, we must consider it as a whole. State v. Loftin, supra, 146 N.J. at 374, 680 A. 2d 677 (When the contested instruction concerns a mitigating factor, we similarly examine the instruction in its entirety[.]). We have explained that concepts like extreme mental or emotional disturbance require the jury to make a qualitative judgment. State v. Harris, 141 N.J. 525, 566-67, 662 A. 2d 333 (1995). In State v. Loftin, supra, 146 N.J. at 374, 680 A. 2d 677, we explained that a court's instruction on the extreme mental or emotional disturbance factor should convey to the jury that it could conclude defendant suffered from extreme mental disturbance even if it did not conclude that defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect. In concluding that the trial court's instruction in that case was proper, we noted that [a]lthough the jury charge did not contain the precise language in the model jury charge, the instruction in no way suggested that the c(5)(a) factor could not be found absent mental disease or defect. Ibid. In other words, a court's instruction in respect of the 3c(5)(a) factor must inform the jury that it need not find that a defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect to find that the defendant suffered from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Defendant, however, presents a different argument here. He contends that the court's instruction improperly precluded the jury from finding the extreme mental or emotional disturbance factor because the court suggested to the jury that it not consider evidence of defendant's mental disease or defect in making its determination. In support, defendant points to this portion of the court's charge: [W]e are not talking, with respect to this mitigating factor, about a defendant who has a mental illness or a mental disease. You have heard testimony that Mr. Koskovich does have a mental illness, and has mental disease. And that's addressed in some other factors. In rebuttal, the State contends that even if the 3c(5)(a) charge was erroneous, it was corrected by the court's re-instruction in response to the jury question, in which the court informed the jury that I wanted to remind you that this mitigating factor may be present even though the defendant was not intoxicated and had neither a mental disease nor a mental defect. It, of course, may be present, in addition, that he had those things. But even if he did not have those things it may be present. We agree with the State. Viewed in its entirety, the court's instruction informed the jury that it could consider evidence of defendant's mental disease or defect in evaluating whether defendant suffered from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, but that it was not required to find that defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect to find the 3c(5)(a) statutory factor. We are also satisfied that the court's instruction was not plain error because it did not possess the clear capacity to bring about an unjust result. Any error contained in the court's initial instruction was effectively cured by the re-instruction and, therefore, we find that the instruction was not improper.