Opinion ID: 2151113
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does the newly created sec. 161.30, Stats., prohibit the possession with intent to sell and sale of cocaine?

Text: The construction of ch. 384 as requiring the substitution of a right number for a wrong one means that there is a sec. 161.30, Stats., dealing with the possession of dangerous drugs. However, even with this the fact, appellant argues that such sec. 161.30 fails to create the crime of illegal possession [of cocaine] with intent to sell. This argument begins, but does not end, with the contention that sec. 161.30 (12) only prescribes penalties; it does not enact the offense or create the crime. That a penalty statute may make an act unlawful is well recognized. [9] Where, as here, the statute imposes a punishment for the commission of an act i.e., illegal possession of cocaine with intent to sell, such provision is sufficient to make such possession with such intent a crime. [10] The second phase of the argument on this point is that, if sec. 161.30, Stats., creates a crime, such crime is left fatally undefined. Sec. 161.30 (12) (d), authorizes the imposition of a sentence of not more than five years and a fine of $5,000 or both, upon one who is convicted of the illegal possession with intent to sell, sale . . . of any dangerous drug. . . . There is no failure of definition here. Illegal possession is described in sec. 161.30 (7). The phrase with intent to is defined in sec. 939.23 (4). Sale is defined in sec. 161.30 (1) (L). Finally, appellant argues that, if a crime is created and sufficiently defined, sub. (12) of 161.30, Stats., is not within the exemption provisions of sub. (8) of 161.30, so it would subject all purveyors and prescribers of the drugs involved to criminal prosecution. There is no claim that this issue as to lack of exemption relates in any possible way to the criminal charge brought against the defendant. The issue raised does not apply to and could not prejudice the appellant. We need not here examine substantive provisions of sec. 161.30 which do not apply to the case before us. These are bridges that do not have to be crossed now. It may well be that the legislature will act to clarify the situation, before other subsections of this law are presented to this court by individuals directly affected by their meaning and application. However, it should be noted, even in advance of such legislative clarification, that the crime spelled out in sec. 161.30 is that of illegal possession. It would appear a reasonable interpretation that, as long as purveyors and prescribers of drugs comply with the provisions of sec. 161.30, they do not illegally possess and hence need no specific exemption. Under the crime as now defined, it would appear that it is only when they fail to comply with the provisions of sec. 161.30, that they could be deemed to unlawfully possess the dangerous drugs described. Arguments as to a greater or lesser immunity than that should be addressed to the legislature, not to the courts.