Opinion ID: 1761289
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admissibility of Statement Made to Baton Rouge Detectives

Text: Defendant contends that it was error to admit defendant's statement to a Baton Rouge police officer, and that the error was not harmless, especially in the penalty phase of the trial. Defendant made several statements to police regarding his commission of the killings. In addition to his phone call from his trailer to Detective Foster immediately following the shootings wherein he told Detective Foster that he had just killed three people in Baton Rouge and wanted to turn himself in, he talked to Detective Foster by cellular phone while Detective Foster was in route to defendant's trailer and told him there was one other son-of-a-bitch who he would have liked to kill. Defendant told Detective Foster he was drinking a beer and Detective Foster said that when he got there, they could all have a beer together. When the Livingston Parish sheriff deputies arrived at defendant's trailer, defendant emerged from the trailer with three beers and surrendered without incident. Detective Darryl Curtis advised defendant of his rights and defendant signed a consent to search form. The detectives entered the trailer and found the murder weapon. Again, defendant told the detectives that he had killed three people in Baton Rouge. On the way to the Livingston Parish Sheriff's Office, Detective Norris Hull testified that defendant just started talking ... and said something to the effect that she'd had pushed him too far and  uh  he said, I went over there and shot her, knocked her down  shot her. I run up again closer and shot her in the back of the head. I shot the lady  the mother-in-law on the phone and at that time the man started running and I shot him. Defendant also said he thought Mr. Guidry might have been going to get a gun. Detective Haley, who was riding with Detective Hull, testified that defendant said she had bugged him too much and pushed him too far and he said  uh  I shot her in the back. She fell and I shot her in the head and then he said he shot the lady on the phone and he shot the old man because he thought he was going after a gun. He also testified that defendant had tears in his eyes during the drive. When they arrived at the Livingston Parish Sheriff's Office, defendant was read his Miranda rights and was not questioned. He asked Detective Haley if he could use the telephone and Detective Haley explained that he could, but Detective Haley would have to accompany him to the booking room where the telephone was located and could not leave him alone. Defendant then called his mother and Detective Haley heard him tell her Mother, I killed Michelle and her parents and I want you to hear it from me before you hear it from somebody else and No, it wasn't an accident. I went there to do it or words to that effect. All of the above statements made in Livingston Parish were deemed admissible after a motion to suppress and defendant does not contend that the admission of these statements was erroneous. After defendant arrived in Baton Rouge at around 4:00 p.m., Detectives Larkin and Stelly placed him in an interview room, advised him that he was under arrest for three counts of first degree murder and read him his rights. Defendant indicated that he understood his rights, refused to sign a waiver form and indicated that he did not want to talk to the detectives but wanted a lawyer. After defendant refused to sign the waiver form, the detectives presented a second form, consisting of a page of questions followed by blanks for written answers and purporting to assess an arrestee's level of understanding regarding the just-issued Miranda rights. At some point, defendant and Detective Stelly allegedly became angry at each other and Detective Stelly left the room. Detective Larkin testified that defendant's anger toward Stelly resulted from the tone of voice in which Stelly had read defendant his rights and Stelly was angry because he had just come from the crime scene. At the motion to suppress, Detective Larkin testified that he proceeded to talk to him ... attempt to help him regain his composure, and calm him down ... explaining to him [how] the young guys are, they don't understand things and they can't deal with older people sometimes... it seemed to have a calming effect that I could relate to the situation easier than Stelly. Detective Larkin testified that in the process of calming him down, he read defendant the questions from the second form, which the defendant answered. The questions and answers were as follows: When can you have an attorney? Anytime. Can you have an attorney any time you want to, including right now? Yes. Can you use my telephone free of charge to call an attorney any time you want to? Yes. What will happen if you cannot afford an attorney and you want one? Court appoint. Do you have to answer even one of my questions or say anything to me? No. What if you start to answer my questions and then you want to stop? Can you stop any time you want to? Yes. Do you realize that if I am called into court to testify about what both you and I said in here today, I will be placed under oath to tell the complete truth? Yes. Would you want me to tell the truth or would you want me to lie? Truth. I will tell the complete truth regardless if it helps or hurts the prosecutor or helps or hurts your side; do you realize that? Yes. Now that you know all of these rights that you have, do you wish me to continue? No. (Emphasis added.) However, Larkin testified that defendant's anger had subsided and he agreed to talk to me. He said I'll tell you, but I'm not going to tell it to you on tape. Larkin went to get Stelly to tell him defendant was going to make a statement. Defendant then proceeded to tell the detectives how he shot his wife from a distance and then walked up to her and shot her in the head, and then that he shot her parents. Detective Larkin then asked him why he killed them and he said he killed his wife because she wanted  uh  his business  part of the divorce settlement and that was unacceptable and that he killed Mrs. Guidry because she was putting Michele up to trying to take his business away from him and that he killed Mr. Guidry because he knew he was going for a weapon. Larkin then testified that after defendant calmed down his emotions changed completely and he was  uh  cold and  uh  not  maybe not proud that he'd done it, but he was satisfied in that he had done it. Defendant denied making any of these statements to Larkin and Stelly. Defendant argues that the statements made to Detectives Larkin and Stelly were inadmissible under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), and prejudicial in the guilt phase in that the statements seriously undermined defendant's defense that he was undergoing withdrawal from drugs and alcohol at the time of the crime and thus did not appreciate what he was doing. He further claims this was prejudicial in the penalty phase in that it destroyed all defense attempts to mitigate the offense as an impulsive act. Once a suspect in custody expresses a desire, at any stage in the process, to deal with the police only through counsel, all questioning must cease and the accused is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, unless he initiates further communication, exchanges or conversation with the police and validly waives his earlier request for counsel. Edwards v. Arizona, supra, 451 U.S. at 484-485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440-445, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); State v. Abadie, 612 So.2d 1 (La.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 816, 114 S.Ct. 66, 126 L.Ed.2d 35 (1993); State v. Lee, 524 So.2d 1176 (La.1987). Miranda and Edwards are prophylactic rules designed to protect an accused against the inherently compelling pressures of custodial interrogation, whether by police badgering, overreaching or subtle but repeated efforts to wear down an accused's resistance and make him change his mind. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2834, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983); Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 45-46, 103 S.Ct. 394, 395, 74 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982) (per curiam); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298-299, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1688-1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). When a defendant exercises his privilege against self-incrimination, the validity of any subsequent waiver depends upon whether police have scrupulously honored his right to cut off questioning. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). However, police are not obliged to ignore spontaneous and unsolicited statements by someone in custody, as long as those statements do not result from police-initiated custodial interrogation or questioning reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. State v. Ross, 95-1798 (La.3/8/96), 669 So.2d 384, 386 (per curiam). Nor does a previous assertion of the right to counsel bar admission of such statements. Id. Whether the authorities have scrupulously honored an accused's right to silence is determined on a case-by-case basis under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Brooks, 505 So.2d 714, 722 (La.1987); State v. Harper, 430 So.2d 627, 633 (La.1983). When an accused invokes his Miranda right to counsel, the admissibility of a subsequent confession or incriminating statement is determined by a two-step inquiry: (1) did the accused initiate further conversation or communication; and (2) was the purported waiver of counsel knowing and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Abadie, supra at 5-6. The issue in this case is whether, in the process of calming down the defendant and going over the second waiver of rights form, Detective Larkin was continuing his interrogation of defendant such that any further statements made by defendant cannot be deemed an initiation of further conversation or communication, because the interrogation had never ended. As stated in State v. Abadie , [i]n order for there to be a valid waiver, the suspect must have `started,' not simply `continued,' the interrogation; for, just as one cannot start an engine that is already running, a suspect cannot `initiate' an on-going interrogation. Id. (citing Michigan v. Mosley, supra ). There, we defined interrogation as follows: The term interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonable likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. This is an objective test which does not require a determination of the actual perception of the suspect but prohibits police speech or conduct that creates a situation in which the suspect probably will experience the functional equivalent of direct questioning by concluding that the police are trying to get him to make an incriminating response. Id. (cites omitted). In this case, it is clear that Larkin knew that his actions in calming Koon down and reading him the second waiver form was reasonabl[y] likely to elicit an incriminating response. As he testified: Q. When he asked for a lawyer and Stelly left the room, do you know why Stelly didn't go call for a lawyer for him? A. No, I don't know why. Q. Sir? A. I don't know why. Q. But he did request one; didn't he? A. Yes, he did. Q. But you didn't go get him one? A. No, we did not. Q. Why? A. Because at that point in time the procedure was to do the next procedure which is fingerprinting, get him fingerprinted and transported. Q. No, the next procedure was to keep him talking with that piece of paper; wasn't it? A. This was the next procedure, yes. Q. Even after he asked for a lawyer? A. Yes. Because defendant did not reinitiate the conversation but instead the interrogation never ended, the oral statements to Stelly and Larkin should have been suppressed. See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (where defendant said he wanted an attorney in the middle of receiving his Miranda warnings, but the police officers kept reading the Miranda warnings and finally, when they had concluded, defendant agreed to talk to them, the Supreme Court held that this violated the rule of Edwards v. Arizona because the police officers should have cut off questioning, and evidently discontinued the Miranda warnings, when defendant unambiguously stated that he wanted an attorney). The State argues that even if the statement should have been suppressed, any error in admitting the statement was harmless. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 311, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (when reviewing the erroneous admission of an involuntary confession, the appellate court simply reviews the remainder of the evidence against the defendant to determine whether the admission of the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). An error is harmless if it is unimportant in relation to the whole and the verdict rendered was surely unattributable to the error. State v. Seals, 93-0305, p. 12 (La.11/25/96), 684 So.2d 368, 377, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1558, 137 L.Ed.2d 705 (1997) (citing State v. Taylor, 93-2201 (La.2/28/96), 669 So.2d 364, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 162, 136 L.Ed.2d 106 (1996)). This court has determined that harmless error analysis applies to confessions, taken in violation of Edwards v. Arizona , which are introduced at capital trials. State v. Lee, supra . Defendant argues that as to the guilt phase, the statement to Larkin and Stelly concerning his reasons for the killings seriously undermined the intoxication/withdrawal defense that defendant did not know, or at least scarcely appreciated, the acts he was committing. However, the proffered defense of intoxication/withdrawal did not rise to the level of a mental disease or defect rendering defendant incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with reference to the conduct in question. All the psychologists at trial, with the possible exception of Mark Zimmerman (whose testimony is discussed later in this opinion), testified that defendant knew the difference between right and wrong at the time of the commission of the crime. Further, taken together with defendant's other confessions and statements, we conclude that the erroneous admission of the defendant's statement to Detectives Stelly and Larkin was insignificant in relation to the whole of the evidence at the guilt phase and that the jury's rejection of his proffered defenses was surely unattributable to the error. Defendant also argues that the admission of the statement and Larkin's portrayal of defendant as cold and remorseless was not harmless error with regard to the penalty phase as it counteracted defense efforts to mitigate the offense as an impulsive act brought on by jealously. At trial, the defendant testified that on the day of the murders, he was going to the Guidry's home to give Michelle some money he had collected from the sale of a car. On the way, Sarah Robinson told him that Michelle did not deserve the money because Michelle was having an affair with a certain individual. Defendant also testified that when he arrived at the Guidry home and saw Michelle in the backyard, Mr. Guidry yelled at him through the door you no good s.o.b. I will kill you. At that point, he testified that he snapped and all my vision went down to nothing, like I was looking through a porthole or pipe or something and it was just like I was in a dream state. I could see what was going on but I didn't have any control over my actions and I couldn't hear anything. However, when Sarah Robinson testified, she told the jury that she never told defendant anything on the way to the Guidry home about Michelle having an affair and that while she did hear Mr. Guidry call defendant a son-of-a-bitch, it was after defendant had shot Michelle and Mrs. Guidry. In addition, the jury heard the evidence of defendant's statement to police that he shot Michelle because she bugged him and pushed him too far and defendant's statement to his mother that it was not an accident, that he had gone there to kill them. This evidence alone, without the statement made to Detectives Larkin and Stelly, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's act was not an impulsive act committed out of jealousy. Defendant also argues that Larkin's testimony portraying defendant after his statement as cold and remorseless constitutes reversible error. In State v. Lee , where, as here, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, we held that defendant's erroneously admitted statement in which he described his conduct with apparent indifference constituted reversible error in the sentencing phase. We held as follows: There is surely a reasonable possibility that this evidence might have contributed to the jury's decision. Listening to the confession, particularly those portions in which the defendant describes his conduct with apparent indifference, certainly could have led one or more members of the jury to conclude that he felt no remorse for his deeds. A juror listening to the confession also could reasonably be expected to experience strong emotions, ranging from mortification to outrage. Such impressions or emotions could in turn have contributed to the decision of one or more jurors to impose the death penalty. State v. Lee, supra at 1191. This case is distinguishable from Lee. Not only is the erroneously admitted statement far less emotionally stirring than the statement in Lee [2] , defendant's own testimony at trial portrayed a cold and remorseless killer. He testified as follows: Q. You didn't like that, the fact that she went back to her parents every time she would leave you, did you? A. That's the agreement I made with them when I took her away.    Q. But you didn't like that, did you? A. It didn't really bother me one way or the other when we broke up. Q. But after she would be gone for awhile, you didn't like it, did you? A. It didn't bother me at that point either, as long as they were not interfering. This time they interfered. Q. By? A. By telling her if she didn't get a divorce she was not welcome at their house any more.    Q. What exactly was your relationship with Michelle's parents? A. It was rather strained when this happened. Q. Why? A. Because they always tried to get into our business. They would never leave us alone.    Q. She was pretty close with her family, wasn't she? A. Pretty much so. Q. Including her sisters? A. Pretty much so. Q. And you didn't like that did you? A. It didn't bother me one way or the other. The only time I didn't like her coming into contact was when she would come back and tell me different ways that I should be running our business and taking care of things whenever her parents would put her up to that kind of stuff.    Q. Have you ever had any bad words with [Mr. Guidry] before? A. Not real bad words. We had a few arguments. Q. How would you describe him? Was he a volatile type, jump-in-your face kind of guy? A. Yes, sir, he was. Q. He was? A. If I had to describe him, it would be as a bully. Q. Mr. Guidry was a bully? A. Yes, sir. Q. He tried to bully you around? A. He tried to bully all his son-in-laws and his daughters around and his grandchildren. In addition to the above testimony, his other admissible statements to the police regarding his motives are not so different than the erroneously admitted statements. The only statement that differed at all from the admissible testimony was that defendant killed Michelle because she wanted too much property in the divorce settlement. Surely, the jury would not think better of defendant merely because he killed Michelle because she bugged him. The jury also heard defendant's statement to Detective Foster of the Livingston Parish Sheriff's Department by cell phone that he had killed three people in Baton Rouge and that there was one other son-of-a-bitch whom he would have liked to kill. This statement easily could have led the jury to conclude that only did defendant not regret killing his three victims, but only regretted not being able to kill a fourth person. Furthermore, the jury also heard admissible testimony from Donald Hoppe, discussed later in this opinion, that portrayed defendant as cold and manipulative. In light of all the evidence taken as a whole, and especially in light of the fact that the jury heard testimony that defendant shot three people in cold blood and after killing them, regretted that he could not shoot a fourth, we can safely say that there is no reasonable possibility that the statement to Detectives Larkin and Stelly and Larkin's comments about defendant's attitude might have contributed to a juror's decision to impose the death penalty. Assignment of Error No. I is without merit.