Opinion ID: 156357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Kansas Has a Higher Educational Standard

Text: 34 At the time Molly's IEPs were developed, Kansas provided as follows: 35 Exceptional children means persons who ... differ in physical, mental, social, emotional or educational characteristics to the extent that special education services are necessary to enable them to progress toward the maximum of their abilities or capacities. 36 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-962(f)(2) (emphasis added). In 1994, the section was amended to read as follows: 37 Exceptional children means persons who ... differ in physical, mental, social, emotional or educational characteristics to the extent that special education services are necessary to enable them to receive educational benefits in accordance with their abilities or capacities. 38 Id. (emphasis added). The O'Tooles argue that either version of the statute imposes a higher standard for the provision of special education services than Rowley's some benefit standard under the IDEA. While they do not articulate a precise standard, the O'Tooles appear to argue that Kansas obligates school districts to provide special education services which will maximize each child's potential. We disagree. 39 First, as another Kansas federal district court judge has stated in rejecting the identical argument, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-962(f)(2) does not--by its terms--bind the State of Kansas to anything at all. Logue v. Shawnee Mission Pub. Sch. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512, 959 F.Supp. 1338, 1350 (D.Kan.1997). Rather, it simply defines exceptional children. It is Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-966(a) which obligates school districts to provide special education services for all exceptional children who are residents of the school district. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-966(a). 40 Moreover, even were we to assume that § 72-962(f)(2) obligated school districts to educate exceptional children as defined therein, the language itself does not compel the conclusion that Kansas has adopted a higher standard than that of Rowley. The pre-1994 amendment language defined exceptional children as those who need services to enable them to progress toward the maximum of their abilities. Requiring progress toward their maximum abilities is not obviously different, and more demanding, than requiring some educational benefit. Additionally, § 72-961 states the legislative intent behind Kansas' special education statutes: It is the purpose and intention of this act to provide for educational opportunities which will contribute to the development of each exceptional child in this state in accord with his or her abilities and capacities. (emphasis added). That language is comparable to Rowley's standard, and certainly indicates the Kansas legislature did not intend to obligate school districts to maximize the educational opportunities provided to exceptional children. 41 Furthermore, while the O'Tooles urge us to make much of the fact that the amended language defining exceptional children as those requiring services to enable them to receive educational benefits in accordance with their abilities, seems more similar to Rowley 's standard, we cannot conclude from the fact of the amendment alone that the earlier standard was higher. 6 Indeed, the parties direct us to no language either in the statutes themselves or in any legislative history which explains the standard under either version of the statute, or explains the reason for the amendment. 7 42 The O'Tooles further argue that, even if their construction of § 72-962 is not compelled by the language and timing of amendments to the statute, a Kansas administrative regulation, when read in conjunction with § 72-962, supports their argument. We disagree. According to the O'Tooles, the particular regulation provided as follows at the time relevant to this case: 43 Least restrictive environment means educational placement in which, to the maximum extent appropriate, exceptional children are placed in educational programs provided the most benefit at the least distance away from regular educational placement. 44 Kan. Admin. Regs. § 91-12.22(aa) (emphasis added). 8 The O'Tooles argue that the emphasized phrase indicates that Kansas has expressly elected to go beyond the standards enunciated in Rowley. Appellant's Br. at 27. We fail to see how an administrative regulation, defining least restrictive environment as the placement where an exceptional child receives the most benefit at the least distance away from a regular placement, evidences an intent to obligate school districts to provide any particular level of special educational services. Rather, it appears to be a restatement of the need to balance the obligation to provide a FAPE with the obligation to place the child in an environment closest to a regular educational setting. 45 In sum, absent any other clear indication by the Kansas legislature that it so intended, neither the language of the relevant statutes, nor the timing and content of any amendments to those statutes, convinces us that the legislature purposely adopted a standard requiring Kansas schools to provide educational services to exceptional children at a higher level than the IDEA requires. 9