Opinion ID: 50595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Award of Mediation Costs

Text: Cook argues that the district court should not have taxed mediation costs against it because mediation expenses do not fall within the limited category of costs that may be taxed under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. In support of its position, Cook points to Mota v. University of Texas Houston Health Science Center, 261 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2001). In Mota, this court addressed whether the district court had abused its discretion in taxing mediation fees under § 1920 in a Title VII action. 261 F.3d at 529-30. The Mota court began its analysis by examining 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See id. at 529. Under § 1920, a court may tax the following costs: (1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title; (6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title. 7 Accordingly, we need not address Defendants’ alternative arguments in favor of affirming the district court. -15- The court noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has indicated that federal courts may only award those costs articulated in section 1920 absent explicit statutory or contractual authorization to the contrary.” Id. (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 444-45 (1987)). Turning to the text of § 1920, the Mota court concluded that the district court “erred in taxing [the losing party] with the costs of mediation [because the expense did not fall] within section 1920.” Id. at 530. The court further determined that nothing in Title VII supported the award of mediation fees because “mediation costs do not fall within the limited category of expenses taxable under Title VII.” Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (providing that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person”). The reasoning in Mota cuts against the district court’s decision to award mediation fees in this ERISA case. First, the language in § 1920 has not changed since the Mota court concluded that mediation fees do not fall within any of the categories of expenses listed in the statute. Second, like Title VII’s provision on costs, the applicable ERISA subsection on costs does not explicitly authorize the award of mediation expenses. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (“[T]he court in its discretion may allow a -16- reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to either party.”). Defendants assert, however, that Mota is limited to Title VII cases and should not be applied in this ERISA action. Defendants instead point to this circuit’s en banc decision in Gaddis v. United States, 381 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2004), as support for the district court’s award of mediation fees in this case. According to Defendants, mediation fees are recoverable expenses because mediators essentially act as court appointed experts, a cost recoverable under § 1920(6). We disagree. In Gaddis, the court held that district courts may tax guardian ad litem fees as court costs against nonprevailing parties, including the government in Federal Tort Claims Act cases. 381 F.3d at 447. In analyzing the issue, the court identified three alternative grounds for permitting the taxation of guardian ad litem fees. First, the court reasoned that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) constituted the alternative express statutory authorization required by the Supreme Court in Crawford Fitting to provide district courts with the inherent authority and discretion to tax guardian ad litem fees as costs against nonprevailing parties.8 Id. at 452-55. Second, the court determined that guardians ad litem reasonably 8 Rule 17(c) provides in relevant part: “The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such other order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent person.” -17- fit within the meaning of the phrase “court appointed experts” in § 1920(6), thereby allowing district courts to tax their compensation as costs per § 1920. Id. at 455-57. And third, the court reasoned that precedent subsequent to Crawford Fitting allowed for the taxation of guardian ad litem fees as costs. Id. at 457-59. None of the three alternate grounds for permitting the taxation of guardian ad litem fees in Gaddis is applicable to the taxation of mediation expenses here. First, there is no statutory or contractual provision that permits the taxation of the cost in question. As explained above, the ERISA statute on costs, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), does not constitute an explicit authorization to tax mediation costs, nor does it seem reasonable to construe the provision as a blanket power to tax costs. See Agredano v. Mut. of Omaha Cos., 75 F.3d 541, 544 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that § 1132(g)(1)’s “allowance for ‘costs of action’ empowers courts to award only the types of ‘costs’ allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1920”); cf. Holland v. Valhi Inc., 22 F.3d 968, 979-80 (10th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the argument that 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) expressly authorized taxation of expert witness fees). Likewise, the source of the district court’s authority to authorize the use of mediation in a civil action does not support the taxation of mediation fees. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-652. There is absolutely nothing in these statutory provisions that would -18- expressly or implicitly provide district courts with the inherent authority or discretion to award mediation fees as costs. Second, unlike the guardian ad litem fees in Gaddis, mediation expenses do not reasonably fit within the statutory language of § 1920(6), which allows for “[c]ompensation of court appointed experts.” Nowhere does the statute define “court appointed experts.”9 That term is defined elsewhere as an “impartial expert” or as “[a]n expert who is appointed by the court to present an unbiased opinion.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 619 (8th ed. 2004). Although the court in Gaddis did not define court appointed expert, it identified two characteristics that indicate when one “reasonably serve[s] as [an] expert[].” 381 F.3d at 456. The court explained that guardians ad litem appointed by the court reasonably serve as experts in the sense that they liaise with the court and are charged with the important duty of providing their insight as to how the judicial process is or is not comporting with the best interests of the minor or incompetent person involved. 9 In Gaddis, this court concluded that we are not constrained to define “court appointed experts” as that term is used in Federal Rule of Evidence 706. 381 F.3d at 456-57 (“While there is some indication in the legislative history that court appointed expert as used in § 1920(6) refers to a court appointed expert as appointed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 706, the plain statutory language of § 1920(6) does not so narrowly limit the interpretation of court appointed expert. This en banc Court is thus not constrained to so narrowly interpret the category of court appointed expert.”) (internal citation omitted). Contra In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 481 F.3d 355, 363-64 (6th Cir. 2007). -19- Id. Under the Gaddis interpretation, experts “liaise with the court” on the matter in which the court requires assistance and “are charged with the important duty of providing their insight” to the court regarding that aspect of the case. See id. The Gaddis court reasoned that guardians ad litem reasonably fit within the definition of “court appointed experts” under § 1920(6) because a “guardian ad litem’s special duty is to submit to the court for its consideration and decision every question involving the statutory and constitutional rights of the minor that may be affected by the action.” Id. Turning to the issue of whether a mediator reasonably fits within the scope of a court appointed expert, we examine the definition and role of a mediator. The prevailing definition of a mediator is “[a] neutral person who tries to help disputing parties reach an agreement.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (8th ed. 2004); see also 1 JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 4.1 (3d ed. 2005) (stating that “[m]ediation involves a neutral third party–-the mediator–-whose function is to assist the parties in their negotiations”). Similarly, the Uniform Mediation Act defines mediation as “a process in which a mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute.” UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 2(1) (2001). From these descriptions it is apparent that, in contrast to -20- guardians ad litem, mediators lack the essential characteristics of court appointed experts, under both the general definition and the interpretation of the Gaddis court. First, the role of mediators is to facilitate negotiations between the parties in an unbiased manner, not to liaise with the court. As a result, mediators “usually deal[] directly with the parties” during mediation and need not communicate with the court at all. SEE GRENIG, supra, § 4.41 (describing the role of mediators in terms of interaction with the parties). In addition, because the discussions in mediation are frequently confidential, it is questionable whether a mediator could ethically communicate an opinion to a court at all. See id. § 4:10 (explaining that “[s]tatements made during mediation may be accorded protection by federal or state laws”); see also N.D. TEX. CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE & DELAY REDUCTION PLAN, at 6 (rev. May 2002) (providing that “[a]ll communications made during ADR procedures [including mediation] are confidential and protected from disclosure”). Indeed, aside from acting as neutral parties, mediators appear to share no other significant common qualities with court appointed experts. Therefore, mediators fall outside a reasonable interpretation of court appointed experts. Third and finally, contrary to the precedent that supported the en banc court’s decision in Gaddis, case law from this circuit and other circuits does not support the taxation of mediation fees as costs under § 1920. As discussed earlier, this -21- court in Mota held that mediation fees are not taxable costs under § 1920. See 261 F.3d at 530. In addition to Mota, decisions from two other circuits have considered whether mediation expenses fall within § 1920, and both courts have concluded that they do not. In Brisco-Wade v. Carnahan, the Eighth Circuit held that “the district court abused its discretion in taxing the mediator’s fee against defendants” in part because “section 1920 does not list mediation fees as taxable costs, and we have found no statutory authority . . . permitting the taxation of mediation fees . . . .” 297 F.3d 781, 782 (8th Cir. 2002). Similarly, in Sea Coast Foods, Inc. v. LuMar Lobster & Shrimp, Inc., the Ninth Circuit rejected the appellants’ attempt to recover mediation fees, concluding that “[n]othing in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 provides for the costs of a mediator.” 260 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2001).10 Accordingly, because mediation fees are not explicitly authorized by § 1920, and because this circuit’s en banc decision 10 Several district courts have also agreed that mediation fees should not be taxed as costs under § 1920. See, e.g., Hodak v. City of St. Peters, No. 4:04-CV-01099, 2007 WL 674249,  (E.D. Mo. Feb. 28, 2007); Condon v. Hunting Energy Servs. L.P., No. H-04-3411, 2006 WL 2882857,  (S.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2006); JES Props., Inc. v. USA Equestrian, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1296 (M.D. Fla. 2006); Zeuner v. Rare Hospitality Int’l, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 2d 635, 640 (M.D.N.C. 2005); Bernard v. Int’l Portfolio Mgmt., Inc., No. 04-CV-60671, 2005 WL 1840157,  (S.D. Fla. July 25, 2005); Firestine v. Parkview Health Sys., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 658, 672 (N.D. Ind. 2005); Bickers v. U.S. Home Mortgage Corp., No. 3:96-CV-0959, 1997 WL 340947, at  (N.D. Tex. June 18, 1997). -22- in Gaddis does not support the district court’s award of mediation fees as taxable costs, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in awarding mediation expenses as taxable costs to Defendants under § 1920 in this ERISA action. Cf. Mota, 261 F.3d at 530. We therefore vacate the district court’s award of mediation fees.