Opinion ID: 2980405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Personal Opinion about Guilt

Text: Davidson points to twenty-five statements by the government that he claims improperly express the prosecutor’s personal opinions regarding his guilt. “[A] prosecutor may not express a personal opinion concerning the guilt of the defendant . . . because such personal assurances of guilt . . . exceed[] the legitimate advocate’s role by improperly inviting jurors to convict the defendant on a basis other than a neutral independent assessment of the record proof.” Caldwell v. Russell, 181 F.3d 731, 737 (6th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Mackey v. Dutton, 217 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2000). However, a prosecutor is “free to argue that the jury should arrive at a particular conclusion based upon the record evidence, including the conclusion that the evidence proves the defendant’s guilt.” Id. The majority of the statements cited by Davidson fall in the latter category and were not improper. In context, these statements are merely summaries of the evidence against the defendant -8- No. 10-5902 United States v. Davidson or suggestions that the evidence shows that Davidson was a drug dealer. See Cristini v. McKee, 526 F.3d 888, 901 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Prosecutors can argue the record, highlight any inconsistencies or inadequacies of the defense, and forcefully assert reasonable inferences from the evidence.”). Two statements made by the prosecutor, however, are arguably improper in that they may be understood as personal intimations about Davidson’s guilt. At the beginning of her final rebuttal argument, the prosecutor criticized Davidson’s characterization of the case before stating, “Is he innocent? No.” Near the end, the prosecutor again claimed that “the Defendant is guilty.” These statements can be less easily understood as a summary of the evidence presented in the case, and it is possible that a jury could perceive them as the prosecutor’s personal opinion. However, even though these two statements are arguably improper, Davidson’s claim fails because they do not rise to the level of flagrancy. The district court gave repeated, though general, instructions that the jury should disregard the lawyers’ statements and arguments if they conflicted with the evidence or the court’s instructions about the law. Furthermore, the overwhelming strength of the evidence against Davidson weighs against a finding of flagrancy. Because the statements were not flagrant, we only reverse if “‘(1) the proof against the defendant was not overwhelming, (2) opposing counsel objected to the conduct, and (3) the district court failed to give a curative instruction.’” Cobleigh, 75 F.3d at 247 (quoting United States v. Brown, 66 F.3d 124, 127 (6th Cir. 1995)). Davidson cannot meet this test. He did not object to the prosecutor’s statements, the court gave general instructions regarding the attorneys’ statements during the proceeding, and, as explained above, the proof against Davidson was overwhelming. B. Vouching for the Credibility of Government Witnesses -9- No. 10-5902 United States v. Davidson As with statements about the defendant’s guilt, “[a] prosecutor should not give his own opinion as to the credibility of [a] witness.” West v. Bell, 550 F.3d 542, 565 (6th Cir. 2008). Davidson points out several improper statements in which the prosecutor vouches for the credibility of government witnesses. Near the beginning of her rebuttal, the prosecutor stated, “I’d submit to you, the testimony of Kim Goins is incredibly credible.” Referring to Goins and Josh Taylor, the prosecutor said, “They’re telling the truth here today, I’d submit to you, because they got the drugs from Richard Davidson.” Later, the prosecutor again referred to Goins as “credible” and the rest of the witnesses as “telling the truth, especially Kim Goins.” Although ultimately concluding that a new trial was not necessary, in United States v. Krebs, 788 F.2d 1166, 1176-77 (6th Cir. 1986), we found prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor stated: “I want to suggest to you that [the government witness] was telling the truth. . . . Basically she had no reason to lie,” and “she is basically telling the truth in this case because she had no reason to lie.” Krebs, 788 F.2d at 1176. The prosecutor’s comments in this case are similar. Because these statements may have been improper, the second inquiry is to determine whether the comments were flagrant. The court gave potentially curative instructions explaining that the prosecutor’s statements were not evidence, as discussed above. Also weighing against Davidson is the fourth flagrancy factor, “the strength of the evidence against the accused.” See Cobleigh, 75 F.3d at 247. Ultimately, the prosecutor’s statements do not meet the test for flagrancy simply because of the overwhelming strength of the evidence against Davidson. C. Inflammatory Comments - 10 - No. 10-5902 United States v. Davidson Davidson next argues that the prosecutor made a number of inflammatory statements. The only statement meriting discussion is the prosecutor’s comment that “[t]his is a cancer to our society, shooting guns around kids and slinging dope, taking advantage of weak people.” The prosecutor, albeit sensationally, was referring in part to Officer Hritz’s testimony that Davidson had fired a shotgun near an area where children were playing. In United States v. Morrow, the prosecutor stated during his closing that carrying a weapon during a drug offense (as the defendant had allegedly done) “exposes the lives of agents and other people, this is national forest land, you and I, our children have rights to walk on forest land, and that’s reason [sic] we have laws we do, to protect citizens, individuals.” United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir. 1992). We held that “the prosecutor’s ill-chosen words did not violate Morrow’s right to a fair trial.” Id. As in Morrow, the statement in this case was isolated, and the evidence was more than sufficient for a conviction. Even if the comment was inflammatory and improper, it was not flagrant and does not warrant a new trial. D. Comments Regarding Davidson’s Failure to Testify Davidson claims that the prosecutor impermissibly commented on his failure to testify at trial during her closing argument. The prosecution stated: “Can he rebut any of the proof in this case by the witnesses that you all heard from his friends? Can he rebut that? No he can’t.” These comments, while inartfully expressed, were not improper when understood in context. The prosecutor is directly responding to Davidson’s closing statements, suggesting that he has refused to address or engage with the evidence against him, and instead simply argued that the investigation - 11 - No. 10-5902 United States v. Davidson was racially motivated. In any event, it was not flagrant in that it was isolated, it would not tend to mislead the jury, and the strength of the evidence was overwhelming. E. Other Allegations of Misconduct Davidson’s other arguments concerning prosecutorial misconduct are without merit. He argues that the prosecution misquoted Tera Love’s testimony, falsely suggested that he had called witnesses, improperly referred to him as a self-described rapper, improperly referred to other bad acts, testified during opening and closing arguments, and knowingly presented false testimony. The prosecution’s paraphrasing of Love’s testimony was accurate, as were the prosecutor’s comments that Davidson “had enablers taking the stand on his behalf.” The prosecutor was not implying that Davidson called any witnesses, but was instead pointing out that the government’s witnesses were still reluctant to testify against him. It was also not improper for the prosecution to portray Davidson as a self-described rapper; witnesses discussed his music career, and Davidson himself elicited testimony about his music on cross-examination. The prosecutor’s reference to Davidson’s “other bad acts,” such as Officer Hritz’s testimony regarding the shooting in Rockwood, was not improper in that the prosecutor was simply referring to evidence that was properly admitted during trial. Davidson’s conclusory claim that the prosecutor “testified” on a number of occasions is also without merit. Finally, Davidson argues that the government knowingly presented false testimony when it allowed Haga to testify that he observed a pistol tucked into the waistband of Davidson’s pants. Davidson’s argument that this testimony was false seems to be based on the fact that the pistol was not mentioned in Agent Herndon’s warrant affidavit (the affidavit only mentioned that Haga had seen an assault-type rifle on a coffee table). - 12 - No. 10-5902 United States v. Davidson Simply because the warrant affidavit does not include every detail, however, does not mean that Haga’s testimony is false, or especially that the government knew the testimony to be false.