Opinion ID: 2718250
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Obviousness Determination

Text: The Google Defendants argue that I/P Engine’s claimed invention is obvious as a matter of law because it simply combines content-based and collaborative filtering, two information filtering methods that were well-known in the art. They assert, moreover, that the prior art contained explicit statements describing the advantages of combining these two filtering techniques, and that it would have been obvious to include a user’s query in the filtering process. See Br. of Defendants-Appellants at 3538. We agree and hold that no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. The asserted claims describe a system that combines content and collaborative data in filtering each “informon”—or information item—for relevance to an individual user’s search query. ’420 patent col.28 ll.1-15; I/P ENGINE, INC. v. AOL INC. 9 ’664 patent col.27 ll.27-37. As the asserted patents themselves acknowledge, however, search engines, contentbased filtering, and collaborative filtering were all wellknown in the art at the time of the claimed invention. See ’420 patent col.1 ll.20-45. The record is replete, moreover, with prior art references recognizing that content-based and collaborative filtering are complimentary techniques that can be effectively combined. The WebHound reference explains that “content-based and automated collaborative filtering are complementary techniques, and the combination of [automated collaborative filtering] with some easily extractable features of documents is a powerful information filtering technique for complex information spaces.” J.A. 5427. The Fab reference likewise notes that “[o]nline readers are in need of tools to help them cope with the mass of content available on the World-Wide Web,” and explains that “[b]y combining both collaborative and content-based filtering systems,” many of the weaknesses in each approach can be eliminated. J.A. 5511. Similarly, the Rose patent, which was filed in 1994 by engineers at Apple Computer, Inc., states that “[t]he prediction of relevance [to a user’s interests] is carried out by combining data pertaining to the content of each item of information with other data regarding correlations of interests between users.” J.A. 5414. These references, individually and collectively, teach the clear advantages of combining content-based and collaborative filtering. 5 5 I/P Engine points to recent United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) reexamination proceedings which concluded that Rose and WebHound do not anticipate the asserted claims of the ’420 patent. J.A. 7899902. Here, however, the question is not whether Rose and WebHound anticipate the asserted claims, but instead whether the prior art, viewed as a whole, renders the 10 I/P ENGINE, INC. v. AOL INC. On appeal, I/P Engine does not dispute that the prior art disclosed hybrid content-based and collaborative filtering. It contends, however, that it would not have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to filter items for relevance to a user’s query using combined content and collaborative data. In I/P Engine’s view, the prior art simply took the results of content-based filtering and “threw them over a proverbial wall to a separate profile-based [filtering] system,” but did not also throw the search query “over the wall” for use in the filtering process. Br. of Plaintiff-Cross Appellant at 6-7; see also id. at 40-43; J.A. 3689-90, 3728-31. The fundamental flaw in I/P Engine’s argument is that using an individual user’s search query for filtering was a technique widely applied in the prior art. Indeed, the shared specification of the ’420 and ’664 patents acknowledges that “conventional search engines” filtered search results using the original search query. See ’420 patent col.2 ll.15-18 (explaining that “conventional search engines initiate a search in response to an individual user’s query and use content-based filtering to compare the query to accessed network informons” (emphasis added)). Given that its own patents acknowledge that using the original search query for filtering was a “conventional” technique, I/P Engine cannot now evade invalidity by arguing that integrating the query into the asserted claims obvious. See Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Obviousness can be proven by combining existing prior art references, while anticipation requires all elements of a claim to be disclosed within a single reference.”); Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining that in an obviousness analysis “the prior art must be considered as a whole for what it teaches”). I/P ENGINE, INC. v. AOL INC. 11 filtering process was a non-obvious departure from the prior art. See PharmaStem, 491 F.3d at 1362 (“Admissions in the specification regarding the prior art are binding on the patentee for purposes of a later inquiry into obviousness.”); see also Constant v. Advanced MicroDevices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“A statement in a patent that something is in the prior art is binding on the applicant and patentee for determinations of anticipation and obviousness.”). While I/P Engine acknowledges that the prior art disclosed “conventional ‘content-based filtering’ in response to a query,” it contends that the prior art did “not show or suggest using content and collaborative data together in filtering items for relevance to a query.” Br. of PlaintiffCross Appellant at 43. This argument “tak[es] an overly cramped view of what the prior art teaches.” Allergan, Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 754 F.3d 952, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The Culliss patent renders the asserted claims obvious because it plainly discloses using combined content and collaborative data when analyzing information for relevance to a user’s search query. In the Culliss system, Internet articles are assigned a “key term score” for significant words or phrases. J.A. 5521. Culliss teaches content-based analysis because the key term score can initially be based on the number of times a particular term appears in an article. 6 J.A. 5526. Culliss also 6 Dr. Jaime Carbonell, I/P Engine’s expert, asserted that Culliss does not disclose content-based filtering as required by the asserted claims because Culliss’ repeated feedback-based adjustments to a key term score will dilute or “swamp” the content portion of the score over time. J.A. 3714, 3787. Notably, however, while the asserted claims require content-based filtering, they do not mandate that content-based analysis play a dominant role in the filtering process. See ’420 patent col.28 ll.1-15; 12 I/P ENGINE, INC. v. AOL INC. describes collaborative feedback analysis because the key term score will be increased when search engine users who query particular key terms select an article from the search results list. J.A. 5521. Significantly, moreover, Culliss presents articles to users based upon their key term scores for the terms that were used in a user’s search query. J.A. 5521 (“As users enter search queries and select articles, the scores are altered. The scores are then used in subsequent searches to organize the articles that match a search query.” (emphasis added)). Culliss, therefore, squarely discloses using combined content and collaborative data in analyzing items for relevance to a query. I/P Engine contends that Culliss does not anticipate because it “describes a system for ranking items, not filtering them, as required by the asserted claims.” Br. of Plaintiff-Cross Appellant at 54. As Dr. Lyle Ungar, the Google Defendants’ expert, explained at trial, however, “the standard way of filtering is to rank things and pick all items above a threshold.” J.A. 3366. Notably, moreover, Culliss discloses an embodiment in which articles ’664 patent col.27 ll.27-37. Thus, the fact that in the Culliss system content data may play less and less of a role as more user feedback is obtained does not mean that Culliss does not disclose content-based filtering. To the contrary, Culliss explains that while feedback can raise an article’s key term score (when the article is clicked on by other users), it can also lower that score (when the article is not clicked on by other users). J.A. 5527 (“[I]f the user does not select the matched article, the key term score for that matched article under that key term can be assigned a negative score.”). Thus, the positive and negative feedback adjustments could potentially nearly “cancel each other out,” and content data could play a very significant role in setting an article’s overall score. I/P ENGINE, INC. v. AOL INC. 13 that are given an “X-rated” score for adult content are filtered out and not displayed to persons who enter “G- rated” queries. J.A. 5525. At trial, Carbonell asserted that Culliss was not enabled because it did not provide for a “workable” filtering system. J.A. 3717. In support, he argued that a certain number of G-rated searchers might have to view an article before it would be labeled as X- rated and screened from subsequent G-rated searches. J.A. 3718-19. There is no credible evidence, however, that Culliss would not ultimately succeed in filtering X-rated articles from being viewed by G-rated searchers. See Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (emphasizing that a patent is presumptively enabled and that “the challenger bears the burden, throughout the litigation, of proving lack of enablement by clear and convincing evidence”). Even more importantly, while “a prior art reference cannot anticipate a claimed invention if the allegedly anticipatory disclosures cited as prior art are not enabled,” In re Antor Media Corp., 689 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), a nonenabling reference can potentially qualify as prior art for the purpose of determining obviousness, Symbol Techs. Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see Geo. M. Martin Co. v. Alliance Mach. Sys. Int’l LLC, 618 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Under an obviousness analysis, a reference need not work to qualify as prior art; it qualifies as prior art, regardless, for whatever is disclosed therein.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Even if a reference discloses an inoperative device, it is prior art for all that it teaches.”). Thus, even assuming arguendo that the Culliss filtering system was not fully functional, this does not mean that it does not qualify as prior art for purposes of the obviousness analysis. 14 I/P ENGINE, INC. v. AOL INC. Significantly, moreover, the obviousness inquiry “not only permits, but requires, consideration of common knowledge and common sense.” DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (eschewing “[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense”); Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (explaining that the obviousness analysis “may include recourse to logic, judgment, and common sense available to the person of ordinary skill that do not necessarily require explication in any reference or expert opinion”); Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (emphasizing that “the common sense of those skilled in the art” can be sufficient to “demonstrate[] why some combinations would have been obvious where others would not”). Very basic logic dictates that a user’s search query can provide highly pertinent information in evaluating the overall relevance of search results. See, e.g., 420 patent col.1 ll.21-23 (explaining that a “query” is “a request for information relevant to . . . a field of interest”); id. col.4 ll.5-6 (“The ‘relevance’ of a particular informon broadly describes how well it satisfies the user’s information need.”). As Ungar explained, the query would be just “sitting there” with the results of a search, and it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art “to keep around the query and use that also for filtering.” J.A. 3173. 7 “A person of ordinary skill is . . . a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton,” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421, and the obviousness inquiry must take account of the “routine steps” that a person of ordi- 7 The parties stipulated that, for purposes of both the ’420 and ’664 patents, a person of ordinary skill in the art was “an individual with a bachelor’s degree in computer science with at least [two] years of experience.” J.A. 39. I/P ENGINE, INC. v. AOL INC. 15 nary skill in the art would employ, Ball Aerosol & Specialty Container, Inc. v. Ltd. Brands, Inc., 555 F.3d 984, 993 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg Inc., 705 F.3d 1333, 1344, amended on reh’g, 728 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (concluding that claims directed to an online shopping system were invalid as obvious given that the patentee “did not invent the Internet, or hypertext, or the URL” and using hypertext to communicate transaction information was no more than “a routine incorporation of Internet technology into existing processes”). Because the query was readily available and closely correlated to the overall relevance of search results—and the prior art unequivocally disclosed hybrid content-based/collaborative filtering—retaining the query for use in filtering combined content and collaborative data was “entirely predictable and grounded in common sense.” Ball Aerosol, 555 F.3d at 993; see W. Union Co. v. MoneyGram Payment Sys., Inc., 626 F.3d 1361, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (concluding that the asserted dependent claims, which “add[ed] only trivial improvements that would have been a matter of common sense to one of ordinary skill in the art,” were obvious as a matter of law); Perfect Web, 587 F.3d at 1331 (concluding that a claimed method for sending e-mails was obvious because “simple logic suggests that sending messages to new addresses is more likely to produce successful deliveries than re-sending messages to addresses that have already failed”); Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (concluding that claims which added a web browser to a prior art electronic system were obvious as a matter of law). While our conclusion that the asserted claims are invalid as obvious is grounded on the determination that the prior art, most notably Culliss, disclosed use of the search query when filtering combined content-based and collaborative data, the common sense of a skilled artisan would likewise have suggested retaining the query for use in the filtering process. 16 I/P ENGINE, INC. v. AOL INC.