Opinion ID: 258346
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: reinstatement and back pay

Text: 30 The trial examiner recommended and the Board ordered Company to offer certain drivers immediate and full reinstatement and to make said drivers whole for any loss of pay suffered by reason of Company's unfair labor practices. Back pay was to be based upon earnings which would have been made from the date of the discriminatory discharges to the date of the offers of reinstatement, less any net earnings during that period. 31 The Board has power under the Act to order reinstatement with or without back pay, 10 and the Board exercising its discretion may fashion such orders in a manner which will effectuate the policies of the Act under the circumstances of each particular case. 11 The existence of unfair labor practices without more will justify orders of reinstatement with back pay. However, over the years an extensive array of cases have articulated principles which are used to determine if and to what extent reinstatement and/or back pay will be ordered. 12 Defenses do exist. 32 It is well settled that an illegally discharged employee will lose his right to reinstatement if he has been unconditionally offered reemployment by the discharging employer and has refused such employment. 13 Much evidence was produced at the hearing before the trial examiner which was aimed at establishing that unconditional offers had been made. Some of the evidence is persuasive of the fact and much is uncontradicted. While the record clearly establishes that offers were made, the record does not so clearly establish that the offers were unconditional so as to raise a defense to reinstatement. No doubt the evidence adduced is sufficient to support a finding of unconditional offers, but the record contains no findings by the Board or the trial examiner as to the unconditional nature of the offers. Under the trial examiner's view of the case, which view was shared by the Board, such findings were not considered necessary. The trial examiner put it this way: 33 Considerable testimony was adduced relative to job offers made to some complainants by Respondent Knowles. I deem it unnecessary to pass on whether they were unqualified offers, because it is clear and I find that they were predicated upon the spurious lease to Knowles. Stated otherwise, I have found that Respondent Hennings Logging discriminatorily discharged complainants and Board policy requires that they receive an offer from that concern which is and was their employer. Entertainment or recognition of the offers from Knowles would be tantamount to a finding that the Hennings Logging lease to Knowles was bona fide and that is what is precisely contrary to the findings heretofore made. 34 The Board said substantially the same thing a little differently: 35 The alleged offers by Knowles, although made at a time when Knowles was actually an agent of Respondent Employer, were not offers of reemployment with the Respondent Employer in connection with which any of their former rights would have been restored. These offers were therefore not offers of reinstatement and they did not affect the employees' rights to be reinstated by the Respondent Employer. 36 We agree with Company that the Board's position with regard to Knowles' offers of employment is logically untenable in light of the prior decision in connection with the charges of unfair labor practices that the lease between Company and Knowles was a sham and that Knowles was at all times the agent of Company. According to elementary principles of logic something which is black cannot at the same time be something that is not black. Mutual exclusives cannot co-exist. If the lease was sham and as a consequence Knowles was an agent of and under the control of Company he could not, insofar as offers of employment were concerned, be acting for himself and not for Company. The reasoning of the trial examiner that recognition of Knowles' offers as those of the Company would be tantamount to a recognition of the bona fides of the lease is incomprehensible. Quite the reverse would seem to be true. Thus, if the lease was a sham intended to disguise the unlawful nature of the discharges and Knowles was really the agent of Company a later determination that Knowles did not act for the Company would appear to be a recognition that the lease had substance and that Knowles was not an agent. Furthermore, we find nothing to support the Board's statement that the offers were not offers in connection with which any of their former rights would have been restored. 37 We think that consistency requires that Knowles be considered to have been the agent of Company throughout. The Board under an erroneous view of Knowles' role in making offers failed to find whether the offers of employment were sufficiently unqualified so as to support a defense to reinstatement. If we thought the record permitted it we might determine whether the offers were unqualified, but we don't think the record is adequate and we will not do for the Board what should have been done in the first instance. It is the function of the Board to assess the weight and credibility of the evidence and to determine whether Knowles in his capacity as Company's agent made unconditional offers of employment, and on remand perhaps more evidence will be required to make such a determination. 38 Back pay is often closely related to reinstatement but the remedies are not inextricably intertwined. One can exist without the other. 14 The Board in this case ordered back pay for the period between the unlawful discharges and the reinstatement offers as ordered made by the Board. Back pay is a remedy which has for one of its purposes the making of employees whole for losses in pay occasioned by unfair labor practices. Employees cannot be made more than whole. 15 39 The Board's decision respecting back pay is confused and the confusion is not remedied by its brief in this court. After stating that a clearly unjustifiable refusal to accept new employment would provide ground for tolling or abatement of back pay the Board stated: 40 Here, the offers were not offers made by a neutral employer. The offers were made by an agent of the culpable employer posing as a new employer. As noted, the offers were not offers of reinstatement. It would not effectuate the policies of the Act to require these employees to cooperate with their culpable employer by accepting from it, either directly or through its agent, less than the full reinstatement which is their due. The Board then concluded that the failure to accept Knowles' offers did not affect Company's responsibility for back pay. On brief the Board stated in support of its position: 41 Courts have recognized that employees are not required to accept discriminatory jobs (N. L. R. B. v. Armour & Co., 154 F.2d 570, 571, 169 A.L.R. 421 (C.A.10) certiorari denied 329 U.S. 732, 67 S.Ct. 92, 91 L.Ed. 633) or offers which are a negation of their rights under the Act (N. L. R. B. v. Poultrymen's Service Corp., 138 F.2d 204, 211 (C. A.3)). 16 42 The board while refusing to recognize Knowles as the agent of Company in connection with offers of employment did recognize Knowles as the agent of Company for purposes of back pay. However, the Board concluded that to require acceptance of Knowles' offers would force the drivers to cooperate with their culpable employer. Cited in defense of this position are cases which have no proper application to the facts of this case, for in those cases the offers were for non-equivalent employment the acceptance of which would have deprived the employees of the very rights they alleged were violated by the employer. 17 We find no evidence to support the Board's statement that Knowles' offers were for less than    full reinstatement. But we do not now decide that the offers were for full reinstatement to equivalent or better employment since the nature of the offers is a matter we leave to the Board upon further proceedings. We do, however, dispense with the Board's contention that the offers were necessarily for discriminatory jobs or that acceptance would have required the drivers to cooperate with their culpable employer, simply because the offers were made by Knowles and not expressly in the name of the Company. Thus, the nature of the offers is an unresolved question, but, if it is determined that they were unqualified offers of full reinstatement, and were not subject to any condition which restricted the right of the drivers under Section 7 of the Act, the failure of the drivers to accept such offers would affect Company's back pay obligations. The offers would toll the running of the back pay obligation from the time they were made, though it is possible that the obligation would survive for the interim period between the unlawful discharges and the offers. 43 The evidence discloses that the discharged truck drivers almost from the beginning took part in a strike against the Company. Company contends that striking employees are not entitled to back pay whether the strike be an economic strike or an unfair labor practice strike. While it is clear that there is no back pay obligation in connection with an economic strike, 18 we do not believe that participation in an unfair labor practice strike necessarily defeats a right to back pay. N. L. R. B. v. Cowell Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 237, 245 (9th Cir.1945). Company has not cited us to any authority to the contrary. The remedies of the Board to cure violations of public policy cannot be removed by the exercise by employees of their right to protest unlawful employer action. This strike could not be an economic strike (although the line may often be hard to draw) for no increased benefits of any kind had ever been discussed or subjected to negotiation. The strike was not motivated directly by economic considerations. Of course, participation in an unfair labor practice strike can affect the amount of back pay recoverable insofar as the strike hampered the efforts of discharged employees to mitigate their damages by seeking new employment. The Board recognized the effect of the strike in this last mentioned regard and stated in its decision that Company during the compliance period will be afforded an opportunity to adduce evidence concerning efforts, or lack of efforts, of the discriminates to seek suitable new employment. We assume the Board will adhere to its statement. 44 On remand we contemplate that the Board will determine the exact nature of the offers that were made (whether unconditional, equivalent, etc.) at all times considering Knowles to be Company's agent. The effect of the offers on reinstatement and back pay is to be decided free of any notions that Knowles was acting for himself or that the offers (if for substantially equivalent employment (duties, conditions, pay etc.)) would be for discriminatory jobs. We also contemplate that all issues will be determined regarding the remedy, if any, which is proposed including a consideration of the employees' duty to mitigate damages and the actual amounts, if any, which are assessed. In this manner further petitions for review or enforcement, if any, will more than likely be dispositive of the case. 45 The Board's findings of unfair labor practices are affirmed; and therefore the petitions of the Board for enforcement of its cease and desist orders are granted. The order insofar as reinstatement and back pay are concerned is vacated and the cause is remanded to the Board for further proceedings, including the taking of further evidence if necessary, not inconsistent with the foregoing opinion.