Opinion ID: 2071445
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: lps has failed to show right to intervene as defendants

Text: In its chameleon-like pleading, LPS alleges that it has a direct legal interest in defending the constitutionality of the school funding statutes and that if the funding statutes are unconstitutional, it seeks the same relief that OPS might receive. In seeking to intervene as defendants, it argues that the OPS action could enjoin school funding and harm LPS. OPS, however, argues that the State is adequately representing any LPS interest regarding the statutes' constitutionality. We have long held that `[w]hen public officers are engaged in litigation to protect public rights, and their pleadings and procedure maintain the public interest, no private person is entitled to intervene.' Best & Co., Inc. v. City of Omaha, 149 Neb. 868, 877, 33 N.W.2d 150, 156 (1948). Accord Smithberger v. Banning, 130 Neb. 354, 265 N.W. 10 (1936). We have applied the same principle as other jurisdictions which routinely hold that under the parens patriae doctrine, when a state is a party to a suit involving a matter of sovereign interest, it is presumed to represent the interests of all its citizens. See, e.g., Maine v. Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 262 F.3d 13 (1st Cir.2001); United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics, 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir.1984); Commonwealth of Pa. v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501 (3d Cir.1976); New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 126 N.M. 788, 975 P.2d 841 (1998). See, also, Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182 (7th Cir.1982) (discussing presumption in dicta). The concept of parens patriae refers to when a governmental entity presents itself as a trustee, guardian, or representative of all citizens. 6 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 24.03[4][a] at 24-49 (3d ed. 2004). Discussing the parens patriae doctrine, the U.S. Supreme Court has explained: The  parens patriae  doctrine ... is a recognition of the principle that the state, when a party to a suit involving a matter of sovereign interest, must be deemed to represent all its citizens. ... The principle is a necessary recognition of sovereign dignity, as well as a working rule for good judicial administration. Otherwise, a state might be judicially impeached on matters of policy by its own subjects, and there would be no practical limitation on the number of citizens, as such, who would be entitled to be made parties. New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 372-73, 73 S.Ct. 689, 97 L.Ed. 1081 (1953), quoting Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163, 50 S.Ct. 275, 74 L.Ed. 784 (1930). To overcome the presumption that the government is adequately representing all of its citizens, the applicant must show that its interest is different from the state's interest and that the state will fail to represent the applicant's interest. See, e.g., Hooker Chemicals & Plastics, supra . In addition, a difference in tactics does not create inadequate representation. Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, supra ; Chiglo v. City of Preston, 104 F.3d 185 (8th Cir.1997); New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL, supra . Courts generally hold that state representation is adequate if (1) no collusion is shown between the representative and an opposing party, (2) the represented interest is not adverse to the proposed intervenor, and (3) the representative has been diligently prosecuting the litigation. See, e.g., Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Com. of Pa., 674 F.2d 970 (3d Cir.1982); Wade, supra . The presumption applies equally to individual citizens and political subdivisions. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics, supra . In applying the parens patriae doctrine, courts have held that in cases where a party sought to intervene as defendants to defend the constitutionality of a statute, the state adequately represented the applicant's interests and denied intervention as a matter of right. Horton v. Meskill, 187 Conn. 187, 445 A.2d 579 (1982). See, New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL, supra ; Pennsylvania Ass'n of Rural and Small Schools v. Casey, 531 Pa. 439, 613 A.2d 1198 (1992). LPS argues that we overruled the parens patriae doctrine in Ruzicka v. Ruzicka, 262 Neb. 824, 635 N.W.2d 528 (2001). We disagree. In Ruzicka, we stated in dicta that under § 25-328, a party who is adequately represented by another party may intervene. But Ruzicka did not involve a governmental party and thus did not involve the parens patriae doctrine. Ruzicka did not overrule our previous cases applying the doctrine. Here, LPS seeks first to intervene as defendants to defend the constitutionality of the school funding system. So, LPS' position is identical to that of the State, and we presume under the parens patriae doctrine that the State adequately represents that interest. LPS has not alleged that the State has failed to perform its duties in defending the litigation, nor has it alleged any malfeasance or collusion. Therefore, LPS has failed to allege facts showing that it may intervene as defendants. The district court correctly denied intervention.