Opinion ID: 765770
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Shipment of Merchandise

Text: 34 The plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in ruling that Blastoff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning the shipment of LogoAthletic merchandise bearing the Rams' St. Louis Rams mark on April 12, 1995. Blastoff seems to contend that because the defendants were unable to produce an actual specimen of apparel bearing the St. Louis Rams mark which was shipped to the St. Louis area on April 12, 1995, the trial court should have ruled that the defendants produced no evidence of their use of the mark in commerce by that date. The plaintiff argues that the failure to produce the actual shirt gives rise to an inference adverse to the party failing to produce the original. The trial judge rejected the plaintiff's argument, determining that Blastoff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the propriety of the shipment date because the defendants had submitted evidence of such use including affidavits, testimony, and a photograph of the shirt. 35 The defendants submitted a federal application for the St. Louis Rams mark on April 26, 1995. The application stated that the defendants' first use of the mark in commerce was on April 12, 1995, the date on which LogoAthletic, an official NFL licensee, shipped apparel bearing the St. Louis Rams mark to the St. Louis area. Accompanying the application was a photograph of a shirt bearing the word mark St. Louis Rams. The defendants have provided additional support for the claims made on the applications by way of the affidavit testimony of James P. Connely, who served as Senior Vice President of Consumer Products for National Football League Properties in 1995. Connely stated that he had personal knowledge of the shipment, and his testimony corroborates the defendants' contention that the merchandise was shipped on April 12, 1995. The plaintiff's only support for its conclusion that the defendants' evidence is insufficient to establish the defendants' use in commerce is a citation to the PTO's Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure sec. 905.03, which outlines procedures for the PTO's disposal of bulky specimens received with trademark applications. The plaintiff's support for its contention is irrelevant to the issue under consideration, and contrary to the plaintiff's claim, the defendants have proffered several exhibits establishing their use of the mark in commerce. Thus, we are in agreement with the district court's ruling that the plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to this question.