Opinion ID: 2226942
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did trial court abuse its discretion in overruling the juvenile's motion for consent decree?

Text: This juvenile relies on several aspects of the proceeding and the court's ruling to support her contention the court abused its discretion in overruling her motion for consent decree. Disposition of this issue requires us to analyze our scope of review in this situation. We review trial court's adjudicatory determination de novo. Meek, 236 N.W.2d at 289; § 232.133(1), The Code. If we apply that standard in the same fashion here, reaching our own determination on the same evidence, a reversal might be avoided if the evidence discloses the juvenile has carried the burden we imposed in division I. See Thompson, 241 N.W.2d at 4 (adjudicatory determination). We conclude, however, that a review in that sense would eliminate the element of trial court's discretion that the legislature built into section 232.46 when it provided the court may suspend the proceedings. . . [and] enter a consent decree. Cf. State v. Speck, 242 N.W.2d 287, 291, 293-94 (Iowa 1976). In these circumstances our role requires a de novo review to the extent of examining all the evidence to determine whether the court abused its discretion. See In Interest of Freund, 216 N.W.2d 366, 368 (Iowa 1974) ([W]e have nothing to review de novo other than whether the juvenile court judge abused the discretion granted under the provisions of Code chapter 232 [to continue the investigation and hearing].). Accordingly, we hold trial court should have the opportunity to exercise its discretion in this case in determining whether, under the proper burden of proof standard described in division I, the juvenile's motion for consent decree should be granted. In remanding, we observe there is no merit in the juvenile's claim the court abused its discretion in hearing this proceeding because it took the guilty-plea hearing of her husband who allegedly was involved in some of the same activities. The record is clear there was no spillover from the Alford -type plea entered in that case. See Manning v. Engelkes, 281 N.W.2d 7, 10 (Iowa 1979); State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320, 324 (Iowa 1976). Finally, we note this proceeding is not mooted because the juvenile, born February 18, 1963, has reached her majority. See Stuart v. State ex rel. Jannings, 253 N.W.2d 910, 913-14 (Iowa 1977); §§ 232.-8(1),.53(2), The Code. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs are taxed to appellant. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.