Opinion ID: 195567
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sentencing of Romero

Text: 58 Defendant Romero argues that the district court erred in finding that, as a matter of law, it was precluded from granting a downward departure in sentencing for extraordinary family circumstances under Sec. 5K2.0 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Romero testified at his sentencing hearing that the mother of his children was murdered in Colombia in 1988. His three children presently live with his sister in Santa Marta, Colombia. The sister has four children of her own to take care of. They all live together in a small two-bedroom house. The sister's husband works only periodically. Romero's eldest daughter was suspended from school because Romero's sister and her husband could not make the monthly payments that the school required. Romero's son, Ronald Romero, suffers from a rare blood disease. Ronald's doctor recommended treatment with special pills and food as well as a blood transfusion. Romero did not know if his son Ronald had ever received the recommended treatments. 59 Following Romero's testimony, the court rejected any downward departure based on Sec. 5K2.0 for unique family circumstances. The court stated: 60 You are going to 5K2.0, basically, and asking me to read within the context of this case a departure for unique family circumstances of the kind not normally or not taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission when they drafted the guidelines. 61 But I do not think that that's the case. As a matter of fact, your request falls within the category that discourages departures that pertain to such things as family ties and family responsibilities, etcetera. I do not think that this case is so different from what I see in 90 percent of the cases. Take a look at what happened here today this afternoon. We have visions that are as terrible and as depressing and as sad as the ones that he has now. 62 I cannot, on the basis of what I know of this record, and on the basis of what I heard here, make a substantial departure under that particular section.... 63 I do not think--I do not think that this stands as a situation that is so different from that that we see on a daily basis, which are very sensitive situations. Assuming no diseases, assuming no circumstances of that kind--the mere fact that a father, that of itself is extraordinary, but that is not what the law allows me to consider. Romero's Attorney then stated: 64 Well, your Honor, precisely your Honor stated assuming no diseases, and that is precisely why we raised the matter. It is what the probation officer called a rare blood disease, and that is why we had, at the outset of our allocution, explained to your Honor the problems that we have encountered. The court responded: 65 That's okay. But I am not assuming that that is true. I am assuming that what the child has is sickle-cell anemia. It could be sickle-cell anemia, it could be leukemia, but those two factors are not enough for me to depart. 66 Romero argues that the court's statement (that is extraordinary, but that is not what the law allows me to consider) evinced the court's perception that it was legally unable to depart in the absence of diseases or circumstances of that kind. According to Romero, the court's position was that on a record which did not include particular medical conditions, the court was legally precluded from departing. Yet the court then assumed Romero's son had a blood disease--either sickle-cell anemia or leukemia--and thus that an unusual circumstance was present. The court, however, still did not depart because, Romero claims, it thought that it could not legally do so under the circumstances of this case. Romero's interpretation of the court's decision is mistaken. We therefore uphold his sentence. 67 United States Sentencing Guidelines Sec. 5K2.0 recognizes that under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(b) the sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the range established by the applicable guideline, if the court finds 'that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.'  U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(b)). Family ties and responsibilities are normally discouraged grounds for departure, U.S.S.G. Sec. 5H1.6, because they are not outside the normal heartland case which the Sentencing Commission has already taken into consideration. Nonetheless, such factors could remove a case from the heartland, but only if they are present in a manner that is unusual or special, rather than 'ordinary.'  United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 948 (1st Cir.1993) (emphasis in original). Thus, a sentencing court may depart downward for purposes of a defendant's family ties and responsibilities, if, and only if, it finds those factors to be unusual or special. Id. at 948, 951. 68 Ordinarily, a district court's refusal to exercise its discretion to depart downward from the sentencing guidelines is not reviewable on appeal. United States v. LeBlanc, 24 F.3d 340, 348 (1st Cir.1994); United States v. Smith, 14 F.3d 662, 665 (1st Cir.1994); United States v. McAndrews, 12 F.3d 273, 276 (1st Cir.1993). Appellate jurisdiction does attach, however, where the sentencing court's decision not to depart is based on the court's mistaken view that it lacks the legal authority to consider a departure. LeBlanc, 24 F.3d at 348; Smith, 14 F.3d at 665-66; United States v. DiIorio, 948 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1991). In other words, where the court errs in determining whether the allegedly special circumstances are of the kind that the Guidelines, in principle, permit the sentencing court to consider, we may proceed to review the courts sentencing decision not to depart. Rivera, 994 F.2d at 950-51. On the other hand, if we find that the court properly understood its power to depart, but refused to exercise that power, we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal. LeBlanc, 24 F.3d at 348; United States v. Lombardi, 5 F.3d 568, 571-72 (1st Cir.1993). 69 Thus, the issue on this appeal is whether the district court exercised its discretion by finding that Romero's family circumstances, including his son's disease, was not sufficiently unusual or different from the heartland case to warrant a departure or whether the court found that the Guidelines did not allow him to depart for circumstances like the ones present in this case. Because we find the court did not misunderstand its authority to depart, its departure decision is not reviewable on appeal. 70 It is fairly clear that the court understood its ability to depart under the guidelines, but found that the facts of the case prevented the court from doing so. The court explicitly and correctly noted that it was considering a discouraged type of departure for unique family circumstances. The court then found that the facts of this case were not so different from what I see in 90 percent of the cases. This demonstrates that the court knew that it could depart if it found the facts placed the present case outside of the heartland of cases that it normally faced. 71 The court did say: Assuming no diseases, assuming no circumstances of that kind--that mere fact that a father, that of itself is extraordinary, but that is not what the law allows me to consider. (emphasis added). In the context of the entire decision and the court's previous statements, we interpret this statement simply as a correct expression of the applicable law. The court was saying that it could not depart unless it found the facts of the case were unusual or different than the heartland case and that the mere fact that Romero was a father and had children that someone else was caring for did not constitute an unusual or special situation for which the Guidelines would allow a departure. After Romero's counsel pointed out that there was evidence of a special circumstance--namely Romero's son's blood disease--the court stated that it had assumed the son had either sickle-cell anemia or leukemia, but that those two factors are not enough for me to depart. The court was not saying that the Guidelines prohibited him from considering Romero's son's disease as the type of factor upon which a departure decision can be based, he was merely saying that he considered the disease and that it was not enough for [him] to depart. Although the court's language is not a model of clarity, we are certain that the judge was making a factual and discretionary determination here; he did not hold that diseases can never merit a departure under the Guidelines. The court was thus not mistaken about its power to depart but rather made a judgment call that we may not review on appeal. 72 Affirmed.