Opinion ID: 615298
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: used in transporting material found by the

Text: Secretary of Transportation to be hazardous under section 5103 of title 49, United States Code, and transported in a quantity requiring placarding under regulations prescribed by the Secretary under section 5103 of title 49, United States Code; and (3) who performs duties on motor vehicles weighing 10,000 pounds or less. Pub. L. No. 110-244, §§ 305-06, 122 Stat. 1572, 1620-21 (effective June 6, 2008). Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on February 11, 2008. Because they allege willful violations of the FLSA, the potential limitations period extends back to February 11, 2005. Throughout this time period, and despite the various amendments to the MCA, Congress did not amend the definition of “commercial 11 Case: 10-20424 Document: 00511631302 Page: 12 Date Filed: 10/13/2011 No. 10-20424 motor vehicle,” and the DOT had in place an existing regulation defining “commercial motor vehicle.” It provides: Commercial motor vehicle means any self-propelled or towed motor vehicle used on a highway in interstate commerce to transport passengers or property when the vehicle– (1) Has a gross vehicle weight rating or gross combination weight rating, or gross vehicle weight or gross combination weight, of 4,536 kg (10,001 pounds) or more, whichever is greater; or (2) Is designed or used to transport more than 8 passengers (including the driver) for compensation; or (3) Is designed or used to transport more than 15 passengers, including the driver, and is not used to transport passengers for compensation; or (4) Is used in transporting [hazardous] material . . . . 49 C.F.R. § 390.5.10 Though this definition generally tracks the statutory definition of commercial motor vehicle, it adds the terms “gross combination weight rating” and “gross combination weight.” “Gross vehicle weight rating” (“GVWR”) is defined in DOT regulations as “the value specified by the manufacturer as the loaded weight of a single motor vehicle.” 49 C.F.R. § 390.5. “Gross combination weight rating (GCWR) means the value specified by the manufacturer as the loaded weight of a combination (articulated) motor vehicle. In the absence of a value specified by the manufacturer, GCWR will be determined by adding the GVWR of the power unit and the total weight of the towed unit and any load thereon.” Id. “Gross vehicle 10 This regulatory definition has been in place since 1999. The Federal Highway Administration (“FHWA”) issued a revised regulatory definition of “commercial motor vehicle,” effective September 3, 1999, in response to the 1998 TEA-21 amendment to the definition of commercial motor vehicle. 64 Fed. Reg. 48510-01, 48515. 12 Case: 10-20424 Document: 00511631302 Page: 13 Date Filed: 10/13/2011 No. 10-20424 weight” (“GVW”) and “gross combination weight” are not defined in the statute or the regulations.11 On appeal, Plaintiffs’ main contention is that the DOT regulation defining “commercial motor vehicle” should not be afforded Chevron deference because the regulation, which allows combinations of vehicles in determining GVWR or GVW, contravenes the plain statutory text, which does not allow combinations of vehicles. However, Plaintiffs did not raise their Chevron argument in the district court either in their summary-judgment briefing or in their Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. Thus, they have waived this argument. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Erskine, 512 F.3d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he CFTC waived any reliance on Chevron deference by failing to raise it to the district court.”); see also Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 322 F.3d 316, 319 n.2 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Defendants also argue that, if the regulation extends to the waiver at issue here, it is invalid under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). This argument was not presented to nor passed on by the district court, and therefore may not be considered on appeal.”). Even if Plaintiffs had not waived this argument, however, it lacks merit. Plaintiffs contend that the statute is unambiguous, that Chevron deference applies only in the case of ambiguous statutes,12 and that the DOT regulation is 11 The FHWA notice of interim final rule stated that “Section 4008 [of TEA-21] also changed the weight threshold in the CMV definition by adding ‘gross vehicle weight’ (GVW) to the previous ‘gross vehicle weight rating’ (GVWR). The agency may now exercise jurisdiction based on the GVW or GVWR, whichever is greater. A vehicle with a GVWR of 9,500 pounds that was loaded to 10,500 pounds GVW would therefore be subject to the FMCSRs if it was operating in interstate commerce.” 64 Fed. Reg. 48510-48511. This indicates that “gross vehicle weight” means the actual loaded weight of a vehicle. 12 Martinez v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 542-43 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Under Chevron, we defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. . . . Deference of this sort however, is not owed automatically to all agency interpretations of statutory provisions; again, there must be ambiguity.”). 13 Case: 10-20424 Document: 00511631302 Page: 14 Date Filed: 10/13/2011 No. 10-20424 therefore not entitled to any deference. Because the statute is unambiguous, Plaintiffs argue, the Court should apply the statute’s plain language and hold that either the truck or the trailer alone must weigh over 10,000 pounds for the vehicle to qualify as a commercial motor vehicle. Because the statute refers to a “self-propelled or towed vehicle” that weighs over 10,000 pounds, Plaintiffs assume that a self-propelled vehicle can mean only the truck excluding any towed vehicle. However, both a truck without a towed vehicle and a truck with a towed vehicle can be a “self-propelled vehicle.” As Plaintiffs themselves emphasize, the statute recognizes that a “motor vehicle” can be “a vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or semitrailer propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used on a highway in transportation, or a combination determined by the Secretary.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(16). Thus, the use of the disjunctive “or” between self-propelled and towed does not necessitate Plaintiffs’ conclusion that a self-propelled vehicle excludes any towed portion of that same vehicle, even though the definition of commercial motor vehicle does not itself include the “or a combination” language. Rather, the statute can be read to mean that a commercial motor vehicle is a self-propelled vehicle (which is a vehicle propelled by its own power, along with any towed vehicle drawn by it, if any) or a towed vehicle with a GVWR or GVW in excess of 10,000 pounds. See Glanville v. Dupar, Inc., Civ. A. No. H-08-2537, 2009 WL 3255292, at  (S.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2009) (concluding that the statutory definition of commercial motor vehicle “does not directly and unambiguously speak to the combination of a truck towing an attached trailer” but that “[t]he statute clearly contemplates a combination of a self-propelled vehicle with a towed attachment that could not travel down the highway by itself”). There is nothing in the statutory language that clearly excludes a combination vehicle from being a “self-propelled vehicle.” Plaintiffs argue that Congress’s choice of GVWR and GVW indicates that only the weight of a single 14 Case: 10-20424 Document: 00511631302 Page: 15 Date Filed: 10/13/2011 No. 10-20424 vehicle – as opposed to a combination vehicle – can be considered because these are measurements of the weight of a single vehicle. All parties agree that GVWR is defined by the regulations as “the value specified by the manufacturer as the loaded weight of a single motor vehicle.” 49 C.F.R. § 390.5. On appeal, Plaintiffs assert that GVW is “the maximum payload that the vehicle was designed to carry,” or “[t]he maximum loaded weight for which a single automobile is designed, as specified by the manufacturer.” Id. However, this is not the same definition of GVW that Plaintiffs urged in the district court. They asserted in the district court that, “although not expressly defined, it is accepted that Gross Vehicle Weight (‘GVW’) means the actual weight of a commercial motor vehicle on a given day” (in their Motion for Summary Judgment) and that it means “the actual weight of a vehicle, plus the actual weight of cargo and passengers, on a given day” (in their Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment).13 Nothing about these definitions indicates that one can consider only the truck without the trailer in determining GVW. Citing a single district court case,14 Plaintiffs assert that “[c]ourts have recognized that the gross vehicle weight rating ‘is only appropriate for determining the weight of a vehicle that is not towing a trailer.’” Therefore, they assert, “the gross vehicle weight rating and gross vehicle weight, by definition, mean the weight of the truck or trailer by itself.” Even if it is true that the GVWR can only apply to a vehicle not towing a trailer, which we do not decide, 13 Plaintiffs do not acknowledge or discuss the difference between their proposed definitions of GVW in the district court and on appeal. Nor do they discuss how their current definition of GVW (“the maximum loaded weight for which a single automobile is designed, as specified by the manufacturer”) differs functionally from the definition of GVWR (“the value specified by the manufacturer as the loaded weight of a single motor vehicle”). As noted, the term “or gross vehicle weight” was added to the definition of commercial motor vehicle in 1998, and thus Congress must have intended for it to have a meaning different from the existing term “gross vehicle weight rating.” 14 Glanville, 2009 WL 3255292, at . 15 Case: 10-20424 Document: 00511631302 Page: 16 Date Filed: 10/13/2011 No. 10-20424 Plaintiffs fail to explain why the same is necessarily true for the GVW, other than to note that, when a truck with a trailer is considered, other measures – gross combination weight rating and gross combination weight – are used. Thus, they assert that the DOT recognized that GVWR and GVW are measures for a single vehicle because it had to include the additional measurements to determine the combined weight of the truck and trailer. By choosing weight measurements that were limited to single vehicles, and omitting measurements that included combined vehicles, Plaintiffs argue, Congress unambiguously intended that either the truck or trailer by itself had to exceed 10,000 pounds. The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that GVW can include only the weight of the truck without the trailer. A separate provision of the United States Code in the title governing highways uses GVW when expressly referring to combination vehicles: 23 U.S.C. §127(d)(4) states that the term “longer combination vehicle” means “any combination of a truck tractor and 2 or more trailers or semitrailers which operates on the Interstate System at a gross vehicle weight greater than 80,000 pounds.” And, as noted, Plaintiffs themselves offer a different definition of GVW on appeal than they did in the district court, and their asserted definition in the district court – actual vehicle weight – does not exclude combination vehicles. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to support their argument that GVW can only apply to a truck without a trailer. If the GVW is the actual weight of a self-propelled vehicle (which can be a single or combination vehicle), then adding the actual weight of the truck and the actual weight of the trailer, as the district court did, is an appropriate method of determining the GVW. The regulation simply includes the term “gross combination weight” for this calculation. Plaintiffs further assert that Defendants offer no explanation of why Congress defined a commercial motor vehicle as a “self-propelled or towed” vehicle that weighs over 10,000 pounds if it wanted the weight of both the self16 Case: 10-20424 Document: 00511631302 Page: 17 Date Filed: 10/13/2011 No. 10-20424 propelled and towed vehicles to be counted, in which case it would have used “and.” But this argument overlooks the rest of the statutory definition of commercial motor vehicle and the role of the Secretary of Transportation in prescribing safety standards. A commercial motor vehicle is a self-propelled or towed vehicle used on a highway in interstate commerce to transport passengers or property when the vehicle meets one of four separate criteria. The first criteria is that it have a GVWR or GVW of at least 10,001 pounds. The other criteria are: (1) that it is designed or used to transport more than 8 passengers (including the driver) for compensation; (2) that it is designed or used to transport more than 15 passengers, including the driver, and is not used to transport passengers for compensation; or (3) that it is used in transporting hazardous material. The disjunctive language “self-propelled or towed vehicle” applies to all four criteria. Congress has mandated that “the Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe regulations on commercial motor vehicle safety” and that “[t]he regulations shall prescribe minimum safety standards for commercial motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. § 31136(a). Among other things, the regulations shall ensure that commercial motor vehicles are maintained, equipped, loaded, and operated safely. Id. Thus, the disjunctive “or towed vehicle” clarifies and ensures that the Secretary maintains jurisdiction over trailers, semitrailers, and other towed vehicles that transport hazardous material or exceed 10,000 pounds, and that these types of towed vehicles are subject to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. Further, the regulation comports with the purpose of the statute as a whole. As the district court in this case recognized, the purpose of defining commercial motor vehicles to include large/heavy vehicles, certain passenger vehicles, and vehicles containing hazardous materials is to bring these vehicles within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Transportation and the applicable safety regulations. Plaintiffs’ construction results in coverage for a pickup truck 17 Case: 10-20424 Document: 00511631302 Page: 18 Date Filed: 10/13/2011 No. 10-20424 weighing 10,001 pounds or a trailer weighing 10,001 pounds, but does not result in coverage for a pickup truck weighing 10,000 pounds and towing a trailer weighing 10,000 pounds, for a combined weight of 20,000 pounds, even though such a vehicle implicates the same, if not greater, safety concerns. The TCA also indicates that Congress was concerned with total vehicle weights and did not intend to exclude combination vehicles from the definition of commercial motor vehicle. As noted, the TCA defines a “covered employee” for purposes of the FLSA as an individual (1) who is employed by a motor carrier or motor private carrier; (2) whose work is defined, in whole or in part, as driver, driver’s helper, loader, or mechanic and “as affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles weighing 10,000 pounds or less in transportation on public highways in interstate or foreign commerce . . . .”; and (3) who performs duties on motor vehicles weighing 10,000 pounds or less. Thus, this language references the overall weight of “motor vehicles,” such that certain employees who work on motor vehicles weighing 10,001 or more pounds (i.e., commercial motor vehicles) are under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Transportation. Last, as noted above, the regulatory construction of commercial motor vehicle was already in place when SAFETEA-LU and the TCA were enacted, but Congress did not change the definition of “commercial motor vehicle” in the SAFETEA-LU or the TCA or indicate that it was rejecting the existing regulatory definition. Thus, the district court correctly inferred that Congress intended the existing regulatory construction to continue to apply. In sum, the statute is ambiguous concerning whether a “self-propelled vehicle” with a GVW in excess of 10,000 pounds can include both a truck and an attached trailer or other combination vehicles. Such a construction is not precluded by the statutory language, however, and is consistent with its purpose. Thus, section 390.5’s definition of commercial motor vehicle comports with the statute and is reasonable. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ argument that the regulation 18 Case: 10-20424 Document: 00511631302 Page: 19 Date Filed: 10/13/2011 No. 10-20424 is not entitled to Chevron deference lacks merit. Further, Plaintiffs fail to show that the district court’s application of the regulation was erroneous. On appeal, Plaintiffs essentially concede that “when combined – the trucks and trailers weighed over 10,000 pounds.” The district court’s grant of summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ overtime claim is therefore affirmed.