Opinion ID: 1330549
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: testimony of decedent's father

Text: Prior to trial, Wade filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Roy Rankin, the decedent's father. In the motion, defense counsel argued that a check written by the decedent on the day he was shot was a self-authenticating document. Therefore, it was not necessary that Roy Rankin testify regarding the document. In addition, defense counsel offered to stipulate to certain other facts about which Roy Rankin was expected to testify, [13] and finally contended that other stated reasons [14] for Roy Rankin's testimony would serve only to arouse the sympathy of the jury and unfairly prejudice the defendant. Wade's motion was denied, and the State declined his offer to stipulate to certain facts. Just prior to Roy Rankin's testimony, defense counsel asked the court to note Wade's objection to testimony regarding the decedent's family or children. Thereafter, Roy Rankin testified that he identified his son's body at the funeral home, that his son had been employed as a truck driver, and that his son had a twelve-year-old son. He also testified to the authenticity of a check written and cashed by his son on the day he was shot. He identified his son's wallet and stated that there was no money in it after the shooting. In addition, Roy Rankin testified that he owned the red truck his son was driving at the time of the shooting. Roy Rankin explained that his son had permission to drive the truck. Finally, he identified the shirt his son was wearing when he was shot (which contained a bullet hole with blood around it). [15] Wade argues that the court erred in allowing this testimony, which he contends was irrelevant, prejudicial, and intended only to arouse the sympathy of the jury. The State responds that the testimony of the decedent's father was relevant and not unduly prejudicial. In reviewing the court's ruling on this issue, we are mindful that [a]lthough most rulings of a trial court regarding the admission of evidence are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, ... an appellate court reviews de novo the legal analysis underlying a trial court's decision. State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 680, 461 S.E.2d 163, 186 (1995) (citations omitted). Accord Syl. pt. 1, McDougal v. McCammon, 193 W.Va. 229, 455 S.E.2d 788 (1995). To be admissible, evidence must first be relevant. W. Va. R. Evid. 402. Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. W. Va. R. Evid.401. We have said that: Under Rule 401, evidence having any probative value whatsoever can satisfy the relevancy definition. Obviously, this is a liberal standard favoring a broad policy of admissibility. For example, the offered evidence does not have to make the existence of a fact to be proved more probable than not or provide a sufficient basis for sending the issue to the jury. McDougal at 236, 455 S.E.2d at 795. Applying this liberal standard, we find that most of the evidence Wade complains of was relevant, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting that evidence. However, even though the relevancy standard is a liberal one, we are disturbed by the admission of Roy Rankin's testimony that the victim had a twelve-year-old son, a fact which bore absolutely no relation to the issues involved in this case. We have held that [e]vidence that a homicide victim was survived by a spouse or children is generally considered inadmissible in a homicide prosecution where it is irrelevant to any issue in the case and is presented for the sole purpose of gaining sympathy from the jury. Syl. pt. 5, in part, State v. Wheeler, 187 W.Va. 379, 419 S.E.2d 447 (1992). We find that this evidence was not relevant to any fact of consequence to this case, and was admitted in error. However, our analysis does not end with the determination that improper evidence was admitted. `A judgment will not be reversed because of the admission of improper or irrelevant evidence when it is clear that the verdict of the jury could not have been affected thereby.' Syllabus Point 7, Starcher v. South Penn Oil Co., 81 W.Va. 587, 95 S.E. 28 (1918). Syllabus Point 7, Torrence v. Kusminsky, 185 W.Va. 734, 408 S.E.2d 684 (1991). Syl. pt. 3, McDougal. Accord, W. Va. R. Evid. 103(a) (Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected.). Moreover, [u]nder Rule 103(a), to warrant reversal, two elements must be shown: error and injury to the party appealing. Error is harmless when it is trivial, formal, or merely academic, and not prejudicial to the substantial rights of the party assigning it, and where it in no way affects the outcome of the trial. Stated conversely, error is prejudicial and ground for reversal only when it affects the final outcome and works adversely to a substantial right of the party assigning it. Reed v. Wimmer, 195 W.Va. 199, 209, 465 S.E.2d 199, 209 (1995). However, the determination of whether a particular error was prejudicial or harmless to a criminal case is significantly more stringent than in civil cases. State v. Marple, 197 W.Va. 47, 53, 475 S.E.2d 47, 53 (1996). With regard to criminal cases, we have recognized: Harmless error analysis in the appeal of a criminal case asks not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered... was surely unattributable to the error. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081, 124 L.Ed.2d 182, 189 (1993). Marple at 53, 475 S.E.2d at 53. In the context of testimony regarding the family of the victim in a criminal trial, we have previously noted that when confronted with this issue, other courts strongly consider the weight of all the evidence presented at trial, as well as the manner in which the objectionable and perhaps improper references to the victim's family were made. State v. Wheeler, 187 W.Va. 379, 388, 419 S.E.2d 447, 456 (1992). While the prosecutor in this case elicited improper testimony from Roy Rankin, he did not dwell on that testimony. Roy Rankin stated that the victim had a twelve-year-old son, but gave no further testimony in that regard. In light of the substantial eye witness testimony presented at trial, we believe that the jury would have reached the same verdict in the absence of Roy Rankin's testimony. Consequently, we find this error was harmless. However, we feel that we should once again caution prosecutors that, while `[g]reat latitude is allowed counsel in argument of cases, ... counsel must keep within the evidence, not make statements calculated to inflame, prejudice or mislead the jury, nor permit or encourage witnesses to make remarks which would have a tendency to inflame, prejudice or mislead the jury.' Wheeler, 187 W.Va. at 389, 419 S.E.2d at 457.