Opinion ID: 1832878
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Best Interests of Children in this Case.

Text: In light of the above principles, and after our de novo review of the entire record, we agree with the court of appeals that joint physical care is not in the best interest of the children under the unique facts presented in this case. For most of the marriage, Delores has been the primary caregiver. The concepts of continuity, stability, and approximation thus cut strongly against joint physical care as a quality alternative least disruptive to the children and most likely to promote their long-term physical and emotional health. Decker, 666 N.W.2d at 178; Walton, 577 N.W.2d at 870; Bevers, 326 N.W.2d at 898. The record also shows that the parties have significant difficulties in communication. Lyle has strong beliefs, and Delores tends to attempt to avoid conflicts with him by simply acquiescing. Further, the divorce proceedings demonstrated considerable mutual distrust and a high level of conflict between the parties, complete with allegations of sexual improprieties and domestic abuse. It is noteworthy that while Lyle disputed most of the alleged incidents of physical abuse, he admitted that he and Delores engaged in pushing matches. Furthermore, there was substantial evidence in the record that Lyle has a controlling personality that could extend into the post-divorce world. In light of this record, there is a distinct danger that flare-ups in the relationship could disrupt the children's lives in a joint physical care context. Hynick, 727 N.W.2d at 580. The record also demonstrates differences in parenting styles. Lyle admits to being overly protective. Their discipline styles are also different, with Lyle recognizing that there are some things that he would allow, but Delores would not, and vice versa. Additionally, Lyle and Delores have different views on the potential role of counseling in helping the children through the difficulties created by divorce. While the parties were able to handle the logistics of joint physical care pursuant to the district court's temporary order, this factor is not dispositive. Over the long haul, we believe there is a high potential for conflict if joint physical care were to continue. The district court recognized the problems in the relationship and attempted to address them in its order. For example, the court found it necessary to decide who would determine the children's religious affiliation and to include pointed language ensuring that extracurricular choices of each spouse would be honored. These are the kind of decisions that inhere in joint custody, not joint physical care. See Iowa Code § 598.41(5)( b ). The fact that the district court found it necessary to include such provisions, and thereby raise the possibility of contempt in the event of violation, does not reflect a high degree of confidence in the ability of the parties to have a smooth, working relationship which is a prerequisite to a successful joint physical care arrangement. The district court's order alternating physical custody on six-month intervals may have also been designed to lessen potential friction between the parties. There was no evidence in the record to suggest that the alternate six-month arrangement was designed to accommodate work schedules of the parties or was based on some other logistical factor. Like the court of appeals in this case, a number of appellate courts have invalidated similar arrangements. Ireland v. Ireland, 914 S.W.2d 426, 429 (Mo.Ct.App.1996) (invalidating change of custody every two months); In re Custody of D.M.G., 287 Mont. 120, 951 P.2d 1377, 1387 (1998) (reversing two-year alternating custody order); Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 432-33 (Wyo.1998) (reversing two-month alternate custody). As noted by the Washington Supreme Court, orders which provide for alternating residence of the child for substantially equal intervals can result when the parties and the courts are searching to avoid underlying disputes. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wash.2d 39, 940 P.2d 1362, 1369 (1997), superseded by statute, Wash. Rev.Code. § 26.09.405-560 (2000); but see Kaloupek v. Burfening, 440 N.W.2d 496, 498-99 (N.D.1989) (affirming trial court order alternating custody on six-month basis); Drewry v. Drewry, 3 Ark.App. 97, 622 S.W.2d 206, 209 (1981) (same). It is not necessary, however, for us to consider the validity of such an alternating physical care arrangement. Having examined the entire record, we hold that this is not a case where joint physical care is in the best interest of the children in light of the primary caregiving responsibilities of Delores, the communication and respect issues, the contentiousness of the marriage, and the lack of agreement on daily matters. We conclude that the best interest of the children will be advanced by awarding physical care to Delores rather than to award joint physical care. [1] At the same time, Lyle has an important role to play in his children's lives. No one questions his devotion to them and their need for his guidance and support. A responsible, committed, nonresident parent, with good parenting skills, has the potential to engage in a high-quality relationship with his or her child and to positively impact the child's adjustment. Gilmore, 20 Int'l J.L. & Pol'y & Fam. at 352. Because the district court ordered the parties to share joint legal custody, Lyle will continue to be involved in major decision-making for his children. In order to promote the desirable level of physical contact, on remand, the district court should establish liberal visitation for Lyle, which includes visitation every other weekend, commencing at 6:00 p.m. on Friday night and concluding at 6:00 p.m. Sunday evening and every Wednesday night commencing at 6:00 p.m. and ending at 8:00 a.m. Thursday morning. Lyle shall have visitation on his birthday and Father's Day every year. Delores, conversely, shall have physical custody of the children on her birthday and Mother's Day each year. In addition, Lyle shall have visitation on every other holiday including New Year's Day, Easter, Memorial Day, Fourth of July, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Eve, Christmas, New Year's Eve. Holiday visitation shall be from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. Lyle shall have visitation on the children's birthdays on odd numbered years, while Delores shall have even numbered years. In addition, Lyle shall have visitation of the children in the summer for a total of four weeks at two twoweek intervals. These two-week intervals shall be separated by at least one week. Lyle shall give Delores written notice no later than April 15 of each year of the times at which he wishes to exercise these vacation periods. During one of those two-week intervals, Lyle shall have uninterrupted visitation. Delores is also entitled to exercise one two-week period of visitation exclusive of Lyle's rights each summer. Delores shall provide Lyle written notice no later then April 30 of each year of the weeks she has selected. Each party is further entitled to uninterrupted visitation during alternating spring breaks. Delores shall have visitation in even numbered years and Lyle shall have visitation in odd numbered years. Finally, the parties shall alternate visitation during Christmas break. In odd numbered years, Delores shall have visitation the first half and Lyle the second. The reverse is true in even numbered years. Lyle is further entitled to any additional visitation that can be agreed upon by the parties. We expect Delores to support Lyle's relationship with the children as required by Iowa Code section 598.41(5)( b ). Through liberal visitation and the exercise of joint legal custody, the children can realize the benefits of Lyle's continued involvement in their lives.