Opinion ID: 1723327
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: sentencing instruction ps-2

Text: Johnson's first complaint on this instruction is that it did not provide a principled basis for distinguishing this case from the many other murder cases in which the death penalty was not imposed under the statute. His supporting argument is somewhat amorphous, nebulous, which we would be inclined to ignore in a less somber case. As we construe it, he argues that including as an aggravating circumstance his 1963 conviction of assault to commit rape did not channel the sentencing jury's discretion by clear and objective standards. We note that Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5)(b) authorizes the sentencing jury to consider as an aggravating circumstance, the defendant was previously convicted ... of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. Contrary to Johnson's assertion, this is a clear and objective standard, fulfilling the guidelines of the United States Supreme Court in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983), and as further stated by California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983); and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). It is not the purpose of Federal appellate review to deny to the states the authority to and responsibility for determining the aggravating circumstances which justify a death penalty. Gregg v. Georgia, supra; Zant v. Stephens, supra; California v. Ramos, supra; and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). Nor is it the function of this Court to curtail this authority vested in our legislature. We cannot say the legislature had no constitutional authority to include this as an aggravating circumstance in a death penalty case. Johnson further claims, without citing authority, that the conviction was too remote in time to be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Again, we are not prepared to deny the legislature had the power and lawful authority to include this aggravating circumstance in the instruction on the facts in this case. We note the circuit judge wisely and humanely permitted Johnson to include in the instruction as a mitigating circumstance the remoteness in time of this conviction. Johnson was thus permitted to argue to the jury the point he asserts here, and in this argument he had the approval of the court's own instruction. Cf. Zant v. Stephens, supra; Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980). Nor do we find merit in Johnson's next contention that the record does not support a consideration by the jury as an aggravating circumstance that Johnson committed the murder for the purpose of avoiding arrest. Finally, he argues the record does not support a jury consideration whether the murder was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. But, see: Booker v. State, 449 So.2d 209 at 220-221 (Miss. 1984); Caldwell v. State, 443 So.2d 806 (Miss. 1983) at 814-815; and Irving v. State, 441 So.2d 846 (Miss. 1983) at 849-850.