Opinion ID: 2604616
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Law in Washington

Text: The majority recognizes that State v. Rousseau, 40 Wash.2d 92, 241 P.2d 447 (1952) holds one faced with illegal arrest may resist with reasonable force. But to apply the rule we must carefully distinguish between arrests which are lawful and those which are not, and distinguish between resistance through force which is reasonable and force which is unreasonable. In our state, and elsewhere, one has no right to use any force to resist a lawful arrest, and one has no right to use unreasonable force to resist even an unlawful one. Washington incorporated this common law into territorial law in 1881 by statute, and upon statehood territorial law became law of the state. Code of 1881, § 1; Const. art. XXVII, § 2. See also RCW 4.04.010 (The common law ... shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this state.) (emphasis added). Shall is imperative. State v. Krall, 125 Wash.2d 146, 148, 881 P.2d 1040 (1994). The incorporated common law on the right to resist illegal arrest is clear: The law is well settled that reasonable means including physical force may be used to resist an illegal arrest.... This rule of law is based on the principle that an illegal arrest is an assault and battery, and one so arrested may either turn and walk away or match force with force.... Curtis v. United States, 222 A.2d 840, 842 (D.C.App.1966) (citations omitted). Since the beginning our state has subscribed to this rule. See State v. Symes, 20 Wash. 484, 490, 55 P. 626 (1899) (`If one, even an officer, undertakes to arrest another unlawfully, the latter may resist him.') (citing 1 Bishop, Criminal Law § 868). I can find no case (aside from the majority opinion here) which overrules this line of authority. Compare WPIC 120.06, Resisting ArrestsElements (a prima facie case requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the arrest or attempt to arrest was lawful.). I accept the majority's claim that our leading modern authority on this issue is State v. Rousseau, 40 Wash.2d 92, 241 P.2d 447 (1952). Rousseau has been cited and relied upon in numerous cases preceding this. I submit it summarizes a rule of law upon which Mr. Valentine is entitled to rely in the present and which should not be lightly cast aside for the future. The facts of Rousseau are these: Mr. Rousseau was unlawfully arrested without probable cause for a second degree burglary on a Seattle street corner. Although the arrest was effected in a completely nonviolent way, and he was not even handcuffed, Rousseau pushed the arresting officer into the path of an approaching automobile which, according to this court, could have seriously injured or killed the officer as effectively as though the appellant had used a gun, a knife, or other deadly weapon.... Id. at 95, 241 P.2d 447. Fortunately, however, the officer was not injured but instead pursued Rousseau in earnest, arresting him on the second occasion for assaulting an officer in the context of the earlier arrest. The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the second arrest was also illegal since it arose from Rousseau's use of force to resist the first arrest. Considering the question on appeal, the Supreme Court announced the governing rule of law: It is the law that a person illegally arrested by an officer may resist that arrest, even to the extent of the taking of life if his own life or any great bodily harm is threatened. Rousseau, 40 Wash.2d at 94, 241 P.2d 447 (citing John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 535, 20 S.Ct. 729, 731, 44 L.Ed. 874 (1900) and State v. Gum, 68 W.Va. 105, 69 S.E. 463, 33 L.R.A.N.S. 150 (1910)). In so holding, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the claim that even in the case of an unlawful arrest, the person arrested would be warranted in using force and inflicting personal injury upon the officer only in selfdefense, the necessity or apparent necessity for which must appear. 40 Wash.2d at 95, 241 P.2d 447. Rather, the Rousseau majority adhered to John Bad Elk, Gum, and State v. Robinson, 145 Me. 77, 72 A.2d 260, 262 (1950), which laid down the rule that the force used in resisting an unlawful arrest must be reasonable and proportioned to the injury attempted upon the party sought to be arrested, and he cannot use or offer to use a deadly weapon if he has no reason to apprehend a greater injury than a mere unlawful arrest. Rousseau, 40 Wash.2d at 95, 241 P.2d 447. Although the Supreme Court concluded that Rousseau's first arrest was unlawful, it also concluded that the degree of force used by Rousseau to resist that unlawful arrest may have been unlawfully excessive, which is usually a question for the jury under all the circumstances. Id. at 96, 241 P.2d 447 (emphasis added). Had the trial court in Mr. Valentine's case followed the dictates of Rousseau, it would have given the jury instruction proposed by Valentine, thereby allowing the jury to determine whether or not Valentine used unreasonable force in resisting arrest. Id. Our courts followed the common law rule as expressed in Rousseau in 1952 for at least another 30 years. For example, in City of Kennewick v. Keller, 11 Wash.App. 777, 787, 525 P.2d 267 (1974) the illegally arrested defendant, faced with loss of liberty alone, resisted the unlawful arrest by jerking free of the officer's grasp and then hitting the officer. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's conviction for resisting arrest, reasoning that one has the lawful right to use reasonable force to resist an unlawful arrest. The court cited Rousseau for the proposition that [a] citizen has the right to resist an unlawful arrest so long as that resistance is reasonable in light of all the circumstances. Id. at 787, 525 P.2d 267. Also following the common law rule was State v. Counts, 99 Wash.2d 54, 659 P.2d 1087 (1983), in which a man illegally arrested and facing nothing more than loss of liberty threatened the arresting officers with a butcher's knife. In reversing defendant's conviction for assaulting the officers, this court cited Rousseau and remanded for new trial which should include an instruction to the jury on a defendant's right to use reasonable resistance against an unlawful arrest. Counts, 99 Wash.2d at 61, 659 P.2d 1087. The same rule was applied again in State v. Hoffman, 35 Wash.App. 13, 664 P.2d 1259 (1983), in which the police perpetrated an unlawful arrest. During the unlawful arrest the defendant pulled away from the officer, swung at him and a scuffle ensued. The defendant faced only a loss of liberty, yet the court acknowledged his right to resist. We recognize that the defendant had a right to defend himself against an unlawful arrest. Hoffman, 35 Wash.App. at 17, 664 P.2d 1259 (citing Counts, 99 Wash.2d 54, 659 P.2d 1087, and City of Kennewick, 11 Wash.App. 777, 525 P.2d 267). Whether he used reasonable force under the circumstances is, however, a question for the jury. Hoffman, 35 Wash. App. at 17, 664 P.2d 1259 (citing Rousseau, 40 Wash.2d 92, 241 P.2d 447). State v. Johnson, 29 Wash.App. 307, 309, 628 P.2d 479 (1981) is in accord: [A] citizen [has] the right to resist an unlawful arrest so long as that resistance is reasonable in light of all the circumstances .... (citing City of Kennewick, 11 Wash.App. at 787, 525 P.2d 267). In State v. Humphries, 21 Wash.App. 405, 586 P.2d 130 (1978) the police unlawfully entered a dwelling and the defendant struck the officer. On appeal the court noted that [a] person illegally arrested by an officer may resist that arrest; the force used in resisting an unlawful arrest must be reasonable and proportioned to the injury attempted on the party sought to be arrested. Id. at 407-08, 586 P.2d 130 (citing Rousseau, 40 Wash.2d 92, 241 P.2d 447 and City of Kennewick, 11 Wash.App. at 787, 525 P.2d 267). Despite all of this precedent, none of which has ever been overruled, and despite the clarity of the rule, the great principle of a person's right to resist unlawful arrest has become tarnished, if not obscured, by dicta thoughtlessly conceived by courts demonstrating little or no recognition of the importance of the issue. For example, State v. Hornaday, 105 Wash.2d 120, 131, 713 P.2d 71 (1986), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Preston, 66 Wash.App. 494, 832 P.2d 513 (1992), allowed dictum to the effect that `[t]he use of force to prevent even an unlawful arrest which threatens only a loss of freedom is not reasonable.' (quoting State v. Goree, 36 Wash.App. 205, 209, 673, P.2d 194 (1983), review denied, 101 Wash.2d 1003 (1984)). This was dictum because the arrestee used no force and was convicted only of being uncooperative in resisting arrest, not of assaulting an officer. Further, the court found the defendant's response reasonable and reversed his conviction. Such ill-considered dictum from Hornaday was essentially repeated in State v. Mierz, 127 Wash.2d 460, 901 P.2d 286 (1995), which rejected the defendant's claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not argue that he was entitled to use self-defense in the form of siccing his dogs on law enforcement officers. Id. at 477, 901 P.2d 286. In the context of rejecting the self-defense claim the court stated [a]n arrestee charged with assault upon a law enforcement officer must show that there was an imminent threat of serious physical harm in connection with an unlawful arrest in order to establish legitimate use of force in self-defense. RCW 9A.16.020(3).... Mierz, 127 Wash.2d at 476, 901 P.2d 286. But to the contrary, the cited statute recognizes the right to defend against unlawful arrest: The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases: . . . . (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary.... RCW 9A.16.020 (emphasis added). Thus any claim that Mierz overruled Rousseau sub silentio (Majority at 1297) credits this court with an act of thoughtlessness justified by neither the facts nor holding of that decision. In fact, this statute is perfectly consistent with the jury instruction offered by Valentine because it recognizes his right to prevent an offense against his person in case the force is not more than is necessary. In any event, the language in Mierz was mere dicta because it was not necessary to the decision in that case. Pedersen v. Klinkert, 56 Wash.2d 313, 317, 320, 352 P.2d 1025 (1960). Ill-considered dictum should not be transformed into a rule of law. State ex rel. Hoppe v. Meyers, 58 Wash.2d 320, 329, 363 P.2d 121, 100 A.L.R.2d 304 (1961). Apparently the majority also relies upon ill-considered dictum from the Court of Appeals, although such opinions are not binding upon this court. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Cadigan, 55 Wash.App. 30, 37, 776 P.2d 727, review denied, 113 Wash.2d 1025, 782 P.2d 1069 (1989) (lawful arrest where the defendant made no assertion that the arrest was unlawful).