Opinion ID: 220600
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Invalidity of Claim 25 of the '077 Patent

Text: Finally, BD argues that the district court erred when it denied BD's motion for JMOL that claim 25 of the '077 patent was anticipated by McGary or Pressly or rendered obvious in light of these references in view of UK Patent Application GB 2197792A (Power). As an initial matter, RTI argues that BD waived these invalidity arguments by failing to advance the arguments in a pre-verdict motion for JMOL. See FED.R.CIV.P. 50(a). We disagree. Rule 50(a)(2) requires the moving party, before the case is submitted to the jury, to specify the judgment sought and the law and the facts that entitle the movant to the judgment. The Fifth Circuit has construed this rule liberally, concluding that oral motions that succinctly state the basis for the motion are sufficient under Rule 50 to preserve the issue. Tharling v. City of Port Lavaca, 329 F.3d 422, 426 n. 4 (5th Cir.2003); see also Blackboard v. Desire2Learn, Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1379-80 (Fed.Cir.2009) (collecting cases from the Fifth Circuit). BD's pre-verdict motion is sufficient under Rule 50. At the close of the evidence, BD presented an oral motion to the district court that sought JMOL that claim 25 of the '077 patent was anticipated by McGary and/or Pressly and/or obvious in light of the combination of McGary, Pressly, and Power. JMOL Order, at 6 n. 1. The motion identified both the legal grounds for the motion as well as the underlying references for each ground, thus alerting the district court to and putting RTI on notice of BD's specific anticipation and obviousness positions. See id. No more was necessary to satisfy the requirements of Rule 50(a). See Blackboard, 574 F.3d at 1380. Because BD did not waive its invalidity arguments, we address each of BD's arguments below.
BD argues that it is entitled to JMOL that McGary and/or Pressly anticipate claim 25 of the '077 patent. The parties agree that McGary and Pressly each disclose every limitation of claim 25 with one exception. Claim 25 requires a plunger having a retraction position obtained by pressing the thumb cap to move the plunger forward beyond the tactile first position and thereby operating the retraction mechanism and simultaneously lodging the thumb cap in the open back of the barrel thereby rendering the thumb cap inaccessible for grasping. In particular, the parties dispute whether McGary and Pressly disclose lodging the thumb cap in the open back of the barrel thereby rendering the thumb cap inaccessible from grasping. BD argues that both McGary and Pressly disclose the lodging limitation and points to Figure 13 of McGary and Figure 2 of Pressly. Reproduced below are the portions of these figures that BD claims depict the open back of the syringe barrel and the thumb cap lodged into the open back of the barrel: In response, RTI points to testimony by its technical expert that both McGary and Pressly, which the PTO considered during prosecution, do not meet the lodging limitation because those references require the end of the syringe body to be spread apart in order for the thumb cap to fit in the body and lock the thumb cap in place. We agree with RTI. For a prior art reference to anticipate a patent claim, the reference, as read by one of ordinary skill in the art, must disclose each claim limitation. Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir.2003). Whether a prior art reference anticipates a claim is a question of fact that we review for substantial evidence when the issue is tried to a jury. Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor Am., 605 F.3d 967, 974 (Fed.Cir.2010). In this case, RTI presented expert testimony that the McGary and Pressly references disclose locking the thumb cap and that one of ordinary skill in the art would conclude that this disclosure does not meet the lodging the thumb cap limitation. J.A. 2608. While BD presented contrary expert testimony, the jury was free to credit or discredit that testimony in rendering a verdict. In addition, during prosecution of the application that issued as the '077 patent, inventor Shaw argued that Pressly, instead of disclosing a thumb cap that lodges into the back end of the open barrel, requires locking of the plunger in accordance with the conventional wisdom of the syringe art. September 28, 1998 Response and Amendment in Application Serial Number 09/843,050, at 9-11. Thus, substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict that Pressly and McGary do not anticipate claim 25 of the '077 patent.
We reach a similar conclusion on BD's appeal of the district court's denial of its motion for JMOL that claim 25 would have been obvious as a matter of law in light of Pressly and/or McGary in view of Power. BD primarily relies on Figures 3 and 4 from Power, and reproduced below are portions of those figures that show the open end of the barrel and the thumb cap: BD argues that Figure 3 discloses the lodging limitation and that Power, by also disclosing a locking embodiment in Figure 4, shows that it would have been obvious to replace the locking embodiment in McGary or Pressly with the lodging embodiment in Power. We disagree. Under the Patent Act, [a] patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Although the ultimate determination of obviousness under § 103 is a question of law, it is based on several underlying factual findings, including (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; (3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art; and (4) evidence of secondary factors, such as commercial success, long-felt need, and the failure of others. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966). When a party appeals a jury verdict of nonobviousness, we first review the jury's underlying factual findings for substantial evidence. See Duro-Last, Inc. v. Custom Seal, Inc., 321 F.3d 1098, 1108 (Fed.Cir.2003). After conducting this review, we independently review the district court's legal conclusion on obviousness. See id. In this case, substantial evidence supports the jury's presumed findings on the factual issues that underlie the conclusion of nonobviousness. RTI presented expert testimony that, at the time Shaw filed his parent patent application in 1995, artisans of ordinary skill would not have been motivated to replace the locking mechanism disclosed in McGary and Pressly with the lodging mechanism for a conventional syringe disclosed in Power. J.A. 2608-10. RTI also presented expert testimony, including testimony regarding BD's internal studies from the 1990s on the impracticability of retractable syringes, that supports the jury's presumed factual findings related to secondary considerations of nonobviousness. Id. at 2604-10. Having concluded that substantial evidence supported the jury's factual findings, there only remains the ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness. Although the figures from these references, on their face, tend to show that Power's lodging mechanism is interchangeable with the locking mechanism disclosed in McGary or Pressly, we cannot, in light of the jury's underlying factual determinations, conclude that claim 25 of the '077 patent would have been obvious in 1995 to one of ordinary skill in the art. Thus, we affirm the district court's denial of BD's motion for JMOL that claim 25 of the '077 patent was obvious.