Opinion ID: 4513522
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Existence of a Conspiracy (Count 1)

Text: First, Hamm and Shields argue that there is insufficient evidence of a conspiracy. In their view, the evidence shows only a buyer–seller relationship between the two of them, and not an agreement between them, Jennifer, and Tracey Myers. We disagree. To establish a 21 U.S.C. § 846 drug conspiracy, “the government must prove (1) an agreement to violate drug laws; (2) knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy; and (3) participation in the conspiracy.” United States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556, 567 (6th Cir. 1999). The agreement can be tacit, not formal, and the “government may meet its burden of proof through circumstantial evidence.” Ibid. However, “[g]enerally, a buyer-seller relationship alone is insufficient to tie a buyer to a conspiracy.” United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672, 680 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Cole, 59 F. App’x 696, 699 (6th Cir. 2003)). “The buy–sell transaction is simply not probative of an agreement to join together to accomplish a criminal objective beyond that already being accomplished by the transaction.” United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th Cir. 1991). Nos. 17-6383/18-5121 United States v. Hamm, et al. Page 7 Still, “this court has often upheld conspiracy convictions where there was additional evidence, beyond the mere purchase or sale,” of a wider agreement. Cole, 59 F. App’x at 699– 700. For instance, we have considered circumstantial evidence on the following factors to establish that “a drug sale is part of a larger drug conspiracy” including: “evidence of advanced planning”; multiple “transactions involving large quantities of drugs”; “repeat purchases . . . or other enduring arrangements”; “the length of the relationship”; “the established method of payment”; “the extent to which transactions are standardized”; and “the level of mutual trust between the buyer and the seller.” Deitz, 577 F.3d at 680–81 (citations omitted). Here, the evidence cuts both ways. There were only two transactions between Shields and Hamm, and the relationship was only a few days old when they were both arrested. On the other hand, the quantities involved were large. Jennifer testified that each transaction involved two to three grams of fentanyl. This estimate (the most conservative in the record) suggests that each sale yielded twenty to thirty doses. Also, the trips to Cincinnati required extensive planning carried out by phone calls and text messages. And Shields’s involvement did not stop with the sales; he also offered to teach Hamm how to mix the drugs for resale. Most importantly, there was evidence that the Mt. Sterling trio’s relationship with Shields, while new, was meant to be exclusive and ongoing. Hamm told Shields he did not want to “make other arrangements,” the Hamms declined an offer from a previous supplier once they started dealing with Shields, and Shields told Hamm, “I like to build relationships with my people . . . .” A reasonable juror could have inferred from all of this that Shields had a tacit agreement with Hamm. The evidence that Jennifer and Myers joined this agreement is even stronger. Myers sometimes joined Hamm on his resupply trips, and Jennifer almost always did. Moreover, there was evidence that Hamm tried to control Myers’s sales. In an August 23 text message to one of her customers, Myers explained, “I want ya to try the new shit but don’t let [Hamm] know . . . Cause [Hamm] is trying to get rid of his” old supply first. And a message from the Hamms to their former supplier confirms that they worked as a unit with Myers: “This is [Jennifer] & [Hamm] . . . we got the straight fent . . . If U don’t believe me or my husband and Tracey then ask someone that we deal with.” Nos. 17-6383/18-5121 United States v. Hamm, et al. Page 8 Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable juror could have found that Shields, Hamm, Jennifer, and Myers had an agreement to distribute opioids in Mt. Sterling. While it “is not totally implausible” that Hamm and Shields had only a buyer–seller relationship, “this was not the version of the events that the jury chose to accept,” and the evidence is sufficient to support its verdict on Count 1. United States v. Price, 258 F.3d 539, 546 (6th Cir. 2001). Hamm alone makes two additional arguments on the conspiracy count. Both are meritless. First, he contends that since his transactions with Shields occurred in Cincinnati, venue was improper in the Eastern District of Kentucky. Objections to improper venue generally “must be raised by pretrial motion,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(A)(i). Hamm made no such motion. In any event, an offense that spans multiple districts may be “prosecuted in any district in which [it] was begun, continued, or completed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). Second, Hamm points out that while the indictment charged him with conspiring to distribute carfentanil, fentanyl, and heroin, the government did not introduce any evidence that fentanyl and carfentanil are Schedule I or II controlled substances. But they unquestionably are, see 21 C.F.R. §§ 1308.11(b), 1308.12(c)(6), (9), and this was a question of law, not a factual issue for the jury to decide. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales-Palma, 645 F.2d 844, 846 (10th Cir. 1981).