Opinion ID: 1061020
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Age Discrimination in Employment Challenge

Text: We turn now to the question of whether the statutory scheme violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. That Act makes it unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise (1) discriminate against any individual with respect to ... compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify ... employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual or employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect [employee's] status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or (3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter. 29 U.S.C. Section 623(a). The Act specifically excludes bona fide seniority system[s] from coverage. Thus, we must determine whether the application of the statute at issue concerns the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment and, if so, whether it violates the terms of the Act or is excluded from its coverage. Some courts have held that state workers' compensation statutes do not concern the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment and thus are not affected by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. See Peck v. General Motors Corp., 164 Mich. App. 580, 417 N.W.2d 547 (1987); O'Neil v. Department of Transportation, 442 So.2d 961 (Fla.App. 1983). The Michigan Court of Appeals rationalized that while [t]he ADEA addresses discrimination by employers against employees, [t]he Workers' Disability Compensation Act is a uniform system of compensation mandated by the state and not the employer. Peck v. General Motors Corp., 417 N.W.2d at 555. Likewise, the Florida Court of Appeals noted that ADEA provisions are limited to employment practices within the control of the employer. O'Neil v. Department of Transportation, 442 So.2d at 962. While we find these justifications less than probing, we are mindful of the fact that even if our statute concerns compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment such as to fall under the Act, classifications based on age are not, by definition a violation of the Act. If the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age, the classification is authorized, even if it involves age discrimination. Brown v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 599 P.2d at 1031. Against this backdrop, we have plaintiff's hollow claims that the statute violates the Act. Plaintiff argues that Congress has mandated a policy that promotes the employment of older persons and consequently, decries the cut-off set by our statute. Yet, plaintiff cites no cases in which a provision of a workers' compensation statute terminating benefits at age sixty-five has been deemed to violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Furthermore, plaintiff does not describe how the statute differentiates between protected individuals and non-protected individuals to the detriment of older individuals. The disparity in our statute is not based on age, but on degree of disability. Such disparity does not violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.