Opinion ID: 1822646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Assignment of Error E: Nissen's Fifth Amendment Privilege

Text: Lotter next assigns, restated, that the district court erred when it failed to order Nissen to testify when Nissen had no criminal exposure under either the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th and 14th Amendments or the terms of the original sentencing deal in violation of Lotter's right under the 6th and 14th Amendments and the decision in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 16 S.Ct. 644, 40 L.Ed. 819 (1896), and its progeny. Nissen was subpoenaed as a witness in this postconviction action but refused to answer deposition questions relating to his conversations with Haley and his testimony at Lotter's trial, invoking his privilege against self-incrimination. When the transcript of Nissen's deposition was offered at the evidentiary hearing, Lotter made an oral motion requesting that the district court compel Nissen to answer all questions that he had refused to answer. Lotter argued that Nissen could not in good faith claim the Fifth Amendment privilege because the agreement he made with the State prior to testifying at Lotter's trial remained in force and required him to testify at this proceeding. The State argued that Lotter had previously attacked the legality of its agreement with Nissen and that we held on direct appeal that since Lotter was not a party to the agreement, he lacked standing to challenge it. In addition, the State argued that the agreement obligated Nissen to testify truthfully only at any criminal proceeding and thus was not applicable to a civil postconviction proceeding. In its order denying postconviction relief, the district court did not directly address the applicability of Nissen's sentencing agreement with the State. Rather, the court reasoned that the fact that Nissen could be exposed to a separate murder charge pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-303(3) (Reissue 1995) if he willfully lied at Lotter's trial was enough of a real risk to Nissen to honor his claim of Fifth Amendment privilege in this postconviction proceeding. The court thus refused to order Nissen to answer the deposition questions. On appeal, Lotter argues that the agreement Nissen made with the State prior to testifying at Lotter's trial extends him immunity in this proceeding, and thus he has no `reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.' Brief for appellant at 46, quoting Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 121 S.Ct. 1252, 149 L.Ed.2d 158 (2001). Essentially, Lotter argues that Nissen cannot assert a Fifth Amendment privilege because the agreement he made with the State prior to testifying at Lotter's trial is still applicable. Assuming without deciding that Lotter has standing to assert this position, it is without merit. The agreement provides: Nissen will agree to testify against John L. Lotter or any other individual when requested to do so by the State in any criminal proceedings which concern the events which occurred on or about December 24, 1993 through and including December 31, 1993. He will give complete and truthful testimony and answer all prosecution inquiries to the best of his ability and the State agrees that no testimony or other information or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information may be used against ... Nissen in any criminal case except in prosecution for perjury or giving a false statement. (Emphasis supplied.) The agreement expressly requires Nissen to give testimony only in any criminal proceedings. A postconviction proceeding is civil in nature. State v. Reeves, 258 Neb. 511, 604 N.W.2d 151 (2000). The agreement therefore does not apply to this action. The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination extends not only `to answers that would in themselves support a conviction ... but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant.' Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. at 20, 121 S.Ct. 1252, quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). `[I]t need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.' 341 U.S. at 20-21, 71 S.Ct. 534, quoting Hoffman v. United States, supra . The inquiry is for the court; the witness' assertion does not by itself establish the risk of incrimination. Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. at 21, 121 S.Ct. 1252. Here, the district court reasoned: Nissen is exposed to a separate first degree murder charge pursuant to Neb. Rev.Stat. § 28-303(3), if he by willful and corrupt perjury or subordination of the same, purposely procures the conviction and execution of an innocent person. This real risk to Nissen alone is sufficient to honor his claim of privilege. (Emphasis in original.) We find no error in this reasoning and therefore conclude that this assignment of error is without merit.