Opinion ID: 2978408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Young

Text: Young raises four issues on appeal: sufficiency of the evidence, the denial of his motion for a mistrial, the notice he received regarding the potential for a mandatory life sentence, and the use of a conviction he received while under the age of eighteen as a prior felony drug offense in -8- Nos. 07-6493, 08-5315, 08-5422 United States v. Young, et al. establishing the basis for a mandatory life sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). We address each issue in turn.
When reviewing a defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a court must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime.” United States v. Jones, 102 F.3d 804, 807 (6th Cir. 1996). The credibility, or lack thereof, of the witnesses for the prosecution is not a ground for challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Paige, 470 F.3d 603, 608 (6th Cir. 2006). Young did not make a motion for an acquittal at any point during the trial. Therefore, the court should “reverse his conviction only if the record is ‘devoid of evidence pointing to guilt,’ such that a manifest miscarriage of justice occurred.” United States v. Vasquez, 560 F.3d 461, 469 (6th Cir. 2009). Young was convicted of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. A conspiracy to distribute drugs requires “(1) an agreement to violate the drug laws, and (2) each conspirator's knowledge of, intent to join, and participation in the conspiracy.” United States v. Crozier, 259 F.3d 503, 517 (6th Cir. 2001). A conspiracy can be inferred from evidence of repeat purchases and from the amount of drugs involved. United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 333 (6th Cir. 2005). The record is not devoid of evidence against Young. Story identified Young as his source for cocaine in South Carolina. Story testified that they would get drugs from Young “three or four times a week” and that they would get “9 ounces to 18 ounces.” Further, Young’s voice was -9- Nos. 07-6493, 08-5315, 08-5422 United States v. Young, et al. identified on several phone calls discussing arrangements for drug purchases. To the extent that Young argues there should be more evidence against him or that Story was not a credible witness, he does not raise issues that are cognizable in this sufficiency challenge. So long as there was some evidence supporting the conviction, we cannot find that it was a manifest miscarriage of justice.
Young asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on Chambers’s reference to Young’s criminal history. A denial of a motion for a mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Wimbley, 553 F.3d 455, 460 (6th Cir. 2009). The comment in question occurred during Young’s cross-examination of Chambers. Chambers testified on direct examination that part of the wiretap process was to retrieve the criminal history from phone numbers that called the tapped phone. Chambers testified that he was able to identify Story’s voice on the calls. When the government asked if Chambers could identify any other voices he stated that he could identify “Terry Dawkins, Elisa Grooms. A person I believe to be Connie Young. . . .” On cross-examination, Young’s attorney asked what basis Chambers had to identify Young’s voice. Chambers admitted that he had not spoken with Young but that Story had identified Young’s voice. When Young’s attorney asked “You’re going on what Rickey Story has told you?”, Chambers replied “Well, I mean there’s other factors that corroborated that–what he told me, the phone call I listened to, and Mr. Young’s criminal history.” Young’s attorney asked, “I’m sorry you said what?” Chambers replied “His criminal history.” We use a five factor test for assessing whether a reference to an unrelated arrest requires a mistrial: “(1) whether the remark was unsolicited, (2) whether the government's line of questioning - 10 - Nos. 07-6493, 08-5315, 08-5422 United States v. Young, et al. was reasonable, (3) whether the limiting instruction was immediate, clear, and forceful, (4) whether any bad faith was evidenced by the government, and (5) whether the remark was only a small part of the evidence against the defendant.” Zuern v. Tate, 336 F.3d 478, 485 (6th Cir. 2003). The comment in question came during cross-examination rather than on the government’s direct examination. While the five-factor framework is therefore not directly on point, we find it provides appropriate guidance in assessing Chambers’s comment. Further, based on these factors, Chambers’s isolated comment did not warrant a mistrial. The government did not solicit Chambers’s remark. Instead, Young’s attorney solicited it. The government was not engaged in an unreasonable line of questioning. Indeed, the defense attorney should have been aware that Chambers might reference Young’s criminal history as Chambers indicated earlier that “one of the ways that they identify these people is through reference, among other things, to their criminal history.” Though the district court offered a limiting instruction, Young declined the instruction.1 There was no evidence of bad faith by the government. Finally, the remark was only a small part of the evidence against Young. Taking these factors together, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Young’s motion for a mistrial. Compare United States v. Forrest, 17 F.3d 916,