Opinion ID: 1277449
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: injury to victim

Text: The third factor which has been considered by courts in establishing the proof necessary to maintain a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress is whether the victim is critically injured or killed. Courts have required that the victim suffer a critical injury or death before a plaintiff can bring a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d at 116; Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983); Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d at 527-28. The importance of the requirement that the victim suffer critical injury or death was articulately explained by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Portee v. Jaffee, supra . In adopting the requirement that the victim suffer a critical injury or death, the Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized the trauma which accompanies the plaintiff's observation of the death or serious injury of a person closely related to the plaintiff: While any harm to a spouse or a family member causes sorrow, we are here concerned with a more narrowly confined interest in mental and emotional stability. When confronted with accidental death, `the reaction to be expected of normal persons,' ... is shock and fright.... [T]he observation of either death or this type of serious injury is necessary to permit recovery. Since the sense of loss attendant to death or serious injury is typically not present following lesser accidental harm, perception of less serious harm would not ordinarily result in severe emotional distress. Thus, the risk of an extraordinary reaction to less serious injury is not sufficient to result in liability. To impose liability for any emotional consequence of negligent conduct would be unreasonable; it would also be unnecessary to protect a plaintiff's basic emotional stability. Therefore, a cause of action for emotional distress would require the perception of death or serious physical injury. 417 A.2d at 528 (citation omitted). We believe that the Supreme Court of New Jersey's reasons for this requirement are sound. Although minor injuries to a closely related person may evoke feelings of concern, such emotions do not rise to the level of the anguish and disbelief that a plaintiff may experience after witnessing the critical injury to or death of one to whom the plaintiff is closely related. Therefore, in addition to the other factors stated above, we hold that the emotional trauma alleged by a plaintiff must be the direct result of either the critical injury to or death of a person closely related to the plaintiff.