Opinion ID: 744762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Language in Plea Agreements Contemplating Court-Ordered Restitution

Text: 15 Not to put too fine a point on it (as Snagsby was wont to say in Bleak House ), it would seem self-evident that for a court to order restitution under § 3663(a)(3), the plea agreement might be expected to mention the word restitution. In United States v. Broughton-Jones, the defendant argued that the district court erred in ordering him to pay restitution in an amount greater than the loss attributable to the offense of conviction. 71 F.3d 1143, 1147-48 (4th Cir.1995). The Fourth Circuit, reasoning that under 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3) a sentencing court could order restitution in any amount agreed to in a plea agreement, and that such an agreement may authorize restitution in an amount greater than the loss attributable to the offense of conviction[,] examined the plea agreement to discern if there was any arrangement regarding restitution. Id. at 1147-48. The court held that, because restitution was not mentioned in the plea agreement, the district court could not order restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3). 16 Here, while the plea agreement does not include the word restitution, it is certain that the government anticipated some tax payment by Gottesman. The only question is whether Gottesman understood that these reparations could be ordered by a court. 17 Section 3663(a)(3) is straightforward: court[s] may also order restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed to by the parties in the plea agreement. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3) (emphasis added). Two consequences flow from this language. First, the court can order restitution only in an amount not to exceed that agreed upon by the parties. See, e.g., United States v. Bartsh, 985 F.2d 930, 933 (8th Cir.1993). Second, a court can order restitution only if the parties agreed that a court may do so. Cf., e.g., Silkowski, 32 F.3d at 689; United States v. Stover, 93 F.3d 1379, 1382 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. Osborn, 58 F.3d 387, 388 (8th Cir.1995). 18 In United States v. Stout, the Fifth Circuit faced circumstances analogous to those presented in this appeal. See 32 F.3d 901 (5th Cir.1994). In Stout, the defendant promised in his written plea agreement to resolve his tax liability. The sentencing judge ordered the defendant to make restitution of his tax liability as a condition of his supervised release. On appeal, the defendant argued that he never promised to pay those taxes or to make restitution[, but] that he was obligated only to negotiate a settlement with the IRS. Id. at 904. The Fifth Circuit agreed and held that because the defendant never promised in the plea agreement to pay restitution, agreeing only to resolve his tax liability, the district court was not empowered to order restitution. 19 The need for precise language in § 3663(a)(3) cases is driven by the policy that plea agreements, like contracts, are instruments used to protect the rights and expectations of the parties. See United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir.1986). Hence, plea agreements get a contract law analysis, see United States v. Yemitan, 70 F.3d 746, 747 (2d Cir.1995), tempered with an awareness of due process concerns for fairness and ... adequacy, United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir.1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 20 As with any contract in which the drafting party has an overwhelmingly superior bargaining position, plea agreements are construed strictly against the government. See Ready, 82 F.3d at 559. Here, the district court failed to guard Gottesman's expectations. While the government certainly contemplated that Gottesman would make tax payments, it was also apparent that the terms of payment were yet to be negotiated by Gottesman and the IRS--not imposed by court order. The plea agreement plainly states that Gottesman will pay past taxes due and owing ... on such terms and conditions as will be agreed upon between Milton Gottesman and the IRS. The agreement, in no uncertain terms, reserved for Gottesman the right to negotiate a method of payment with the IRS. Court-ordered restitution, with a court-devised payment plan, was not part of the bargain. 21 We have recognized in the Rule 11 context a similar need for precision of language to protect a defendant's expectations in a plea agreement. In United States v. Showerman, 68 F.3d 1524, 1528 (2d Cir.1995), this Court reviewed a defendant's claim that the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c) when it failed to mention during the plea allocution the possibility that the defendant would be subject to an order of restitution. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1) (the court must address the defendant personally ... and inform [him] ... that the court may ... order the defendant to make restitution to any victim of the offense). The district court in Showerman made no mention of restitution during the plea colloquy, and the plea agreement, while it mentioned the defendant's agreement to make restitution, made no reference to the court's power to order restitution as part of the sentence. Showerman, 68 F.3d at 1528 (emphasis added). The Showerman court therefore vacated the sentence and remanded the case to the district court for a new Rule 11 hearing. 22 Because the agreement between Gottesman and the government did not contemplate court-ordered restitution, the district court did not have the power to order restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3). 23 We vacate only that portion of the district court's sentence that imposed restitution, and otherwise affirm the sentence. We therefore remand to the district court with instructions to withdraw its direction to make restitution. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1).