Opinion ID: 656636
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Peremptory Challenge to Juror

Text: 42 The defendant asserts that he was denied equal protection of the law as a result of the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of Dawn Ferguson, the only Native American juror on the venire. This court reviews a challenge to the improper striking of prospective jurors based on their race de novo, giving deference to the trial court's first-hand observation of the circumstances of each case. United States v. Hartsfield, 976 F.2d 1349, 1355-56 (10th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1344, 122 L.Ed.2d 727 (1993). 43 To successfully challenge the government's peremptory strike of Dawn Ferguson, the defendant must first establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination: 44 (1) the defendant must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecution has exercised peremptory challenges to remove members of a particular race from the venire; (2) the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact that peremptory challenges are a jury selection practice which permits discrimination by those who wish to discriminate; and (3) the defendant must show that these facts and other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the venire members from the petit jury on account of their race. 45 United States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461, 1465 (10th Cir.1991) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 882, 116 L.Ed.2d 786 (1992). Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. After receiving the state's explanation, the trial court must then determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. 46 We conclude that the defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination because Joe is a member of a cognizable racial group, Native Americans, and the prosecutor's use of one peremptory challenge to strike Dawn Ferguson, the only Native American juror on the venire, raised an inference that Dawn Ferguson was excluded on account of her race. See United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1313-14 (10th Cir.1987) (holding that the government's peremptory strike of the last potential American Indian juror created a prima facie case of discrimination). The prosecutor, however, offered three legitimate race-neutral reasons for this peremptory challenge: Ms. Ferguson was an artist; she was only twenty-five years of age; and she failed to respond on a questionnaire whether she owned or rented a home. The prosecutor believed that artists tended not to be pro-government, and given the serious nature of a murder charge, the prosecutor was understandably concerned about the jurors' life experiences and maturity level. Based on these proffered reasons, the trial court ruled that the peremptory challenge of Dawn Ferguson was not based on race. Giving deference to the trial court's first-hand observation of these circumstances, we find insufficient evidence of purposeful discrimination and affirm the trial court's allowance of the prosecutor's peremptory challenge.