Opinion ID: 1880792
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: count 2: behavior toward judge mark ashford

Text: Count 2 states the following allegations: Sometime in 1991, Jones placed an anonymous note in the courthouse mail slot of Judge Mark Ashford ... which threatened Ashford. Ashford believed the letter was a serious threat and turned the matter over to the police, who later determined the letter was a hoax. ... In late 1992 or early 1993, Jones set off firecrackers in Ashford's office in the Douglas County Courthouse, during working hours. Judge Mark Ashford testified that 6 or 7 years prior, a death threat had been left in his mail slot at work. Believing the author to be a person he prosecuted years ago and had recently seen in court, Ashford took the note seriously and gave it to the police. As a result, there was a police investigation and, for a short time, police surveillance of Ashford's home. Several days later, Jones admitted to Ashford that he had written the note and apologized. Ashford accepted Jones' apology and forgave him. Ashford also testified that on one occasion, fireworks were set off in the bathroom area of his office. However, Ashford was not in the office at the time. Jones subsequently admitted that he had set off the firecrackers and apologized. Jones admits that both incidents occurred, but states that the fireworks involved were of a kind meant for indoor use and designed to make confetti. Jones also testified that the note was given to Ashford as part of a series of pranks between the two and that Jones apologized when he discovered that the note had been taken seriously. The special master found by clear and convincing evidence that the incidents occurred and concluded that the conduct violated Canons 1, 1A, 2, 2A, and 3B(4) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and was conduct prohibited by § 24-722(6). Jones admits that these incidents occurred, but states that they were meant as pranks. However, the determination of whether conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice depends not so much on the judge's motives, but more on the conduct itself, the results thereof, and the impact such conduct might reasonably have upon knowledgeable observers. In re Complaint Against Kneifl, 217 Neb. 472, 351 N.W.2d 693 (1984). It is immaterial that a judge's conduct is lawful, albeit unjudicial, or that the judge perceived offensive and harassing conduct as low-humored horseplay. See Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal.3d 270, 515 P.2d 1, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973). Thus, that Jones intended his actions to be seen as pranks does not mitigate the seriousness of his actions. Jones' actions were juvenile, immature, and clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice. Regardless of the motive, such behavior cannot be condoned. Accordingly, we agree with the findings and conclusions of the special master and the commission that the conduct violated Canons 1, 1A, 2, 2A, and 3B(4) of the Code of Judicial Conduct and was conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, as prohibited by § 24-722(6).