Opinion ID: 529730
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: elements of the act

Text: 22 The Anti-Injunction Act applies when (1) a court of the United States (2) grants an injunction (3) to stay proceedings (4) in a state court. See 17 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 4222 (1988). Elements 1, 2, and 4 are self-evident in this case. An argument may be made, however, that the third element is absent because the district judge did not order a stay of the state court proceedings that suspended or terminated the state case. But such a literal construction of the third element mistakes title for effect. The practical result of the district judge's order here was to cast doubt on the effectiveness of the Pennsylvania Superior Court's ruling and on any judgment that might result from it. The district court's order could effectively prevent the state trial judge from proceeding in accordance with the Superior Court's direction. The injunction, by obstructing and interfering with the state courts' process, thus has the effect of a stay within the meaning of the statute. 23 The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970). There, a state court had enjoined a union from picketing a railroad. The union repaired to federal court, and persuaded the district judge to enjoin the railroad from giving effect to or availing [itself] of the benefits of the state court order. The Supreme Court agreed that, for section 2283 purposes, the federal injunction constituted a stay of state court proceedings. [T]he prohibition of Sec. 2283 cannot be evaded by addressing the order to the parties or prohibiting utilization of the results of a completed state proceeding. Id. at 287, 90 S.Ct. at 1743. 24 Here, in addition to and as an alternative to its injunction, the district court issued a declaratory judgment that application of state law to the state court action is pre-empted by ERISA. This declaratory relief is not insulated from the Anti-Injunction Act's review. The prohibition of section 2283 is not an anachronistic, minor technicality, easily avoided by mere nomenclature or procedural sleight of hand. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 491, 505 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1932, 104 L.Ed.2d 404 (1989). Where, as here, declaratory relief would produce the same effect as an injunction, a declaratory judgment is barred if section 2283 would have prohibited an injunction. Thiokol Chemical Corp. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 448 F.2d 1328, 1332 (3d Cir.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019, 92 S.Ct. 684, 30 L.Ed.2d 668 (1972). See 17 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, supra, Sec. 4222, at 503-04.