Opinion ID: 173269
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lopez-Ahumado's Factual Allocution

Text: Lopez-Medina also contends his right to confrontation was violated when the court admitted Lopez-Ahumado's factual allocution. As previously discussed, [w]here testimonial [hearsay] evidence is at issue ... the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Lopez-Ahumado's statements at his change of plea hearing fall within the core class of testimonial statements. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2531, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009) (quotations omitted); see also United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 78 (2d Cir.2004) (holding there is no question that a plea allocution is testimonial under Crawford ). Because Lopez-Ahumado's statements at his change of plea hearing were testimonial, they could not be admitted in Lopez-Medina's trial for the truth of the matter asserted unless Lopez-Ahumado was unavailable and Lopez-Medina had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. [11] We need not consider whether Lopez-Ahumado was unavailable because it is clear the second requirement was not met  Lopez-Medina did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine Lopez-Ahumado. The government contends Lopez-Medina waived his right to challenge the admission of the plea allocution by questioning Officer Johnson about Lopez-Ahumado's conviction and sentence. The government also argues Lopez-Ahumado's statements were properly admitted pursuant to the rule of completeness in order to correct a likely misimpression that [Lopez-Ahumado] had already claimed full responsibility for the crime. (Appellee's Br. at 39.) Lopez-Medina argues, for the first time on appeal, that he did not waive his rights under the Confrontation Clause because his questioning of Johnson did not exceed the scope of the district court's ruling at the motion in limine. In the alternative, he argues if the evidence was properly admitted pursuant to the rule of completeness, the court erred in refusing to allow him to introduce the portion of Lopez-Ahumado's plea agreement in which the government offered the possibility of a reduced sentence in exchange for Lopez-Ahumado's substantial assistance. Because we conclude the evidence was properly admitted under the rule of completeness, we need not decide the waiver issue. [12] The rule of completeness is a common law doctrine partially codified in Rule 106 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Echo Acceptance Corp. v. Household Retail Servs., Inc., 267 F.3d 1068, 1089 (10th Cir.2001). Rule 106 provides: When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it. While Rule 106 applies only to writings and recorded statements, we have held the rule of completeness embodied in Rule 106 is `substantially applicable to oral testimony, as well by virtue of Fed.R.Evid. 611(a), which obligates the court to make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth.' United States v. Zamudio, 141 F.3d 1186, No. 96-2181, 1998 WL 166600, at  (10th Cir. Apr.6, 1998) (unpublished) (quoting United States v. Mussaleen, 35 F.3d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1994)). [13] The government contends the court correctly admitted the fact allocution pursuant to the rule of completeness because it clarified that Lopez-Ahumado had admitted to jointly possessing the drugs found in the truck and did not take sole responsibility for the crime. Lopez-Medina does not contend the rule of completeness is not applicable or cannot overcome the right to confrontation. Instead, he argues the court violated the rule of completeness by failing to allow him to introduce the portion of Lopez-Ahumado's plea agreement which reflected the government's offer of a reduced sentence in return for Lopez-Ahumado's substantial assistance. He claims this information was necessary to explain to the jury Lopez-Ahumado's motive for pleading guilty. The purpose of Rule 106 is to prevent a party from misleading the jury by allowing into the record relevant portions of a writing or recorded statement which clarify or explain the part already received. United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 481 (4th Cir.2004) (quotations omitted); see also Echo Acceptance Corp., 267 F.3d at 1089 (The rule of completeness... functions as a defensive shield against potentially misleading evidence proffered by an opposing party.). The rule of completeness, however, does not necessarily require admission of [an entire statement, writing or recording.] Rather, only those portions which are `relevant to an issue in the case' and necessary `to clarify or explain the portion already received' need to be admitted. Zamudio, 1998 WL 166600, at  (quoting United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1259 (7th Cir.1993)). In determining whether a disputed portion of a statement must be admitted [under the rule of completeness], the trial court should consider whether `(1) it explains the admitted evidence, (2) places the admitted evidence in context, (3) avoids misleading the jury, and (4) insures fair and impartial understanding of the evidence.' Id. (quoting United States v. Li, 55 F.3d 325, 330 (7th Cir.1995)). The fact allocution satisfies this four-part test. It is clear from the record that, as the government predicted, Lopez-Medina tried to pin the crime entirely on Lopez-Ahumado. The government objected to any reference to Lopez-Ahumado's conviction as irrelevant and inadmissible hearsay. Defense counsel stated he wanted the jury to know Lopez-Ahumado was convicted because he wanted the jury to hear the full story. The fact allocution explains the basis for Lopez-Ahumado's guilty plea and places that evidence in context. It avoids misleading the jury into believing Lopez-Ahumado accepted sole responsibility for possessing the drugs found in the truck and ensures that the jury understood Lopez-Ahumado's guilty plea did not relieve Lopez-Medina of potential liability. Even if the fact allocution would be subject to a hearsay objection, that does not block its use when it is needed to provide context for a statement already admitted. See Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 1:43 (3d ed. 2007); see also, e.g., United States v. Bucci, 525 F.3d 116, 133 (1st Cir.2008) (the rule of completeness may be invoked to facilitate the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence); United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C.Cir.1986) (noting every major rule of exclusion, with the exception of Rule 106, includes the proviso except as otherwise provided by these rules and stating Rule 106 can adequately fulfill its function only by permitting the admission of some otherwise inadmissible evidence when the court finds in fairness that the proffered evidence should be considered contemporaneously); but see United States v. Guevara, 277 F.3d 111, 127 (2d Cir.2001) (Rule 106 does not make admissible what is otherwise inadmissible), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 298 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.2002). Thus, the court did not err in admitting the fact allocution pursuant to the rule of completeness. [14] Lopez-Medina argues if the fact allocution was properly admitted under the rule of completeness, that same rule should have allowed him to introduce the government's promise it would seek a downward variance if Lopez-Ahumado provided substantial assistance in the prosecution of others. The rule of completeness connects with Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence. See Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 1:42. Rule 403 authorizes the court to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.... The district court acted within its discretion in excluding the government's promise under Rule 403 because it does not satisfy the four-part test outlined above. The fact the government promised to seek a lower sentence in exchange for Lopez-Ahumado's substantial assistance does not explain either the fact of Lopez-Ahumado's plea or the factual basis for his plea. In the statement he submitted to the court in advance of his guilty plea, Lopez-Ahumado admitted to possessing with intent to distribute the methamphetamine found in the pickup truck and the methamphetamine found in the Clearfield apartment. Presumably he pled guilty to one count to avoid proceeding to trial and facing a possible (even likely) conviction on two counts. The fact Lopez-Ahumado did not assist the government suggests the government's promise to seek a downward variance in exchange for such assistance was not the reason he pled guilty. And there is no reason to believe the government's promise altered the facts to which Lopez-Ahumado admitted. Admitting the government's promise would not have ensured a fair and impartial understanding of the evidence which is the purpose of the rule of completeness. Actually, it would have had quite the opposite effect  misleading the jury by suggesting the government's offer motivated Lopez-Ahumado's guilty plea, when, in fact, it did not. See United States v. Wright, 826 F.2d 938, 946 (10th Cir.1987) (rejecting defendant's claim he should have been allowed to introduce parts of diary that were not demonstrably relevant to the issues since Rule 106 does not require admission of parts of written statement that are neither explanatory of the previously introduced portions nor relevant [to those portions]; [i]t would be puerile to suggest that if any part of a statement is to be admitted the entire statement must be admitted).