Opinion ID: 2417907
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Missouri Automobile Dealers Association

Text: We fail to appreciate the significance of the posted sign as an aid to plaintiff's case. In the first place, the sign is an incorrect statement of the law of which it purports to give notice. The section mentioned, § 301.250, prohibits lending to others a vehicle displaying dealer's license plates, and has no reference to regularly licensed vehicles, such as the two 1953 Chevrolets mentioned above; and, insofar as charging all of the defendants, including Wooderson, with actual knowledge of the foregoing section, as urged by plaintiff, they are chargeable with such knowledge as a matter of law, wholly apart from having seen the inaccurate conclusion displayed on the sign. The plaintiff concedes there was no direct evidence of any agreement on Wooderson's part to violate said section. Indeed, there is nothing in the record to show that Wooderson knew or had reason to believe that the car he drove into the fatal collision was displaying a dealer's license plate. His only declaration concerning that element of the alleged conspiracy appears in the portion of his deposition which was offered by plaintiff and received in evidence as an admission against interest, as follows: Q. To your knowledge, the 1960 Chevrolet was owned by the Fleetwood Chevrolet Company and had their license plates on it? A. I believe so. We agree with respondents that, contrary to appellant's contention, this statement does not show Wooderson had knowledge that a dealer's license plate was on the automobile. The quoted language is as susceptible to being interpreted as meaning regular license plates as it is to meaning dealer's license plates. There is no contention that the alleged violation of the statute was a proximate cause of decedent's death. It was relied on exclusively for the purpose of showing an illegal concert of action on the part of all the defendants, and thus to invoke the doctrine of imputed negligence. The most important single fact to which plaintiff can point is that Wooderson, at the time of the casualty, was operating a motor vehicle which, during the time of his possession of it on loan, was illegally licensed; but when this fact is taken collectively with all of the other facts and circumstances hereinabove set forth on this branch of the case, the proof remains insufficient to support an inference that Wooderson had agreed, combined or conspired with the defendant-partners to do an act made unlawful by statute. Therefore, at the time of the casualty, Wooderson could not have been carrying out any conspiracy to which he was a party to commit the unlawful act charged, and therefore the defendant-partners could not be held liable for damages resulting from his negligence. See in this connection (although the relative positions of the parties are reversed), Hanson v. Dalton Coal & Materials Co., (Mo. App.) 264 S.W.2d 897, an action for personal injuries and property damage bottomed on the principle of the Wooldridge case. It was there charged, and the proof showed, that the defendant-trucker at the time of the accident was engaged in hauling the company's property in violation of certain statutes and regulations of the Public Service Commission. The evidence was examined and held insufficient to establish that the corporate defendant conspired with the trucker to so unlawfully operate his truck, and hence no liability on its part for the trucker's negligence. Because of the inevitability of the foregoing conclusion, it was deemed unnecessary to discuss the facts in relation to the alleged conspiracy having been entered into for the purpose of causing pecuniary benefits to flow to defendant-partners. The plaintiff's evidence having made out a submissible case of actionable negligence against defendant Wooderson, the judgment on directed verdict in his favor is reversed, and the cause remanded for new trial as to him; and, for the reasons stated, the judgment in favor of the defendant-partners should be, and it is, affirmed. All of the Judges concur.