Opinion ID: 2611883
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is Section 208(d) a Separate Offense or an Enhancement?

Text: (1) At the outset, we consider whether section 208(d) [2] is a crime separate from, or an enhancement to, the crime of section 207, subdivision (a) (hereafter section 207(a)), [3] kidnapping. If section 208(d) is an enhancement to section 207(a), it necessarily incorporates the asportation test articulated for section 207(a) simple kidnapping. If section 208(d) is a separate crime, however, we must then determine whether the asportation standard is derived from section 207 simple kidnapping or section 209 aggravated kidnapping. Both parties assert that section 208(d) is a separate offense. We agree. First, we observe that the Legislature, in the recently enacted section 667.61 (part of what is commonly known as the One Strike law), which creates a new enhancement, characterized section 208(d) as a separate crime. In particular, one of the operative circumstances that gives rise to the application of the enhancement is that the defendant kidnapped the victim of the present [sexual] offense in violation of Section 207, 208 , 209, or 209.5 (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(1), italics added.) In addition, the One Strike law also amends section 1203.066, subdivision (a)(6) to limit the trial court's sentencing options for A person who violated Section 288 or 288.5 while kidnapping the child victim in violation of Section 207, 208 , or 209. (Italics added.) Significantly, section 1203.066, subdivision (a)(6), formerly read, A person convicted of kidnapping the child victim in violation of either Section 207 or 209 and who kidnapped the victim for the purpose of committing a violation of Section 288 or 288.5. Second, we have previously outlined a general approach to ascertaining whether a statute is an enhancement or a substantive offense. In People v. Hernandez (1988) 46 Cal.3d 194 [249 Cal. Rptr. 850, 757 P.2d 1013], we held that section 667.8, which at the time provided for an additional term of three years for any person convicted of a felony violation of various sexual offenses, who, for the purpose of committing [that] sexual offense, kidnapped the victim in violation of Section 207, was an enhancement, not a substantive offense. (46 Cal.3d at pp. 200, 207-208.) We observed that an enhancement `means an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term.' ( Id. at p. 207, quoting Cal. Rules of Court, rule 405(c).) In contrast, a separate offense base term involve[s] ... a choice among three possible terms prescribed by statute. (§ 1170, subd. (a)(2); [Cal. Rules of Court,] rule 405(b)....) (46 Cal.3d at p. 207.) Section 667.8 provided for a single three-year term, and this of itself suggest[ed] the section is not a separate offense. (46 Cal.3d at p. 207.) Moreover, [i]ts language referring to `an additional term' of three years is likewise consistent with other enhancement statutes. ( Ibid. ) We noted that The fact that section 667.8 includes an element in addition to those necessary to prove a violation of section 207 or the sex crimes specified, certainly d[id] not imply it has defined a new crime. Enhancements typically focus on an element of the commission of the crime or the criminal history of the defendant which is not present for all such crimes and perpetrators and which justifies a higher penalty than that prescribed for the offenses themselves. That is one of the very purposes of an enhancement's existence. ( People v. Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 207-208.) However, reference to the wording of the statute and its specification of one term leaves no doubt that an enhancement rather than a substantive crime is involved. ( Id. at p. 208.) Since People v. Hernandez, supra, 46 Cal.3d 194, the Legislature has modified the way in which it drafts enhancements. As we recently observed in People v. Hall (1994) 8 Cal.4th 950, 958-959 [35 Cal. Rptr.2d 432, 883 P.2d 974], Although the [Determinate Sentencing Act] from its inception included sentence enhancements, originally the statutes imposing such enhancements provided only a single term, rather than a range of possible terms. ( Id. at pp. 958-959.) [I]n 1989, the Legislature amended several existing enhancement provisions by replacing the single term of imprisonment, specified for the enhancement, with a range of three possible terms of imprisonment. ( Id. at p. 959.) Thus, contrary to what we suggested in Hernandez, supra, it is no longer dispositive that a statute is a separate crime if it prescribes confinement for one of three terms. We note, however, that the enhancement in Hall used the language, an additional term and enhancement. ( Id. at p. 954; § 12022.5, subds. (a), (f).) When, as in this case, the statute neither uses the language an additional term nor enhancement, and does prescribe confinement for one of three terms, i.e., five, eight, or eleven years, we have no basis on which to characterize it as an enhancement. Third, a finding that section 208(d) is a separate crime, and not an enhancement, is supported by its legislative history. Section 208(d) was originally introduced as an amendment to section 209, subdivision (a) (hereafter section 209(a)), [4] which proscribes kidnapping for ransom, extortion, or reward. [5] (Sen. Bill No. 2079 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 20, 1990, p. 1.) As such, it was expressly characterized as a felony or separate crime. ( Ibid. ) The purpose of th[e original] bill [was] to make the punishment for kidnaping for sex crime purposes equal to the punishment for kidnaping for financial gain. (Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2079 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) June 7, 1990, p. 1.) Sponsors argue[d] that the penalty for kidnaping for the purpose of committing sexual offenses should be as severe as the penalty for kidnaping for ransom or robbery. ( Id. at p. 2.) Apparently in response to certain opposition to both the proposed lack of an asportation requirement and the severity of the penalty, a compromise was reached and Senate Bill No. 2079 was moved from section 209(a) to section 208(d), and amended to provide that the penalty would be five, eight, or eleven years. (Assembly Com. on Public Safety, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2079 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) p. 2; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2079 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) pp. 2-3; letter dated Sept. 7, 1990, from Sen. Roberti to Governor Deukmejian, p. 2.) However, nowhere in the subsequent legislative history is section 208(d) characterized as an enhancement. Rather, this history refers to persons found  guilty of kidnapping another for the purpose of committing rape, or  convicted of kidnapping for the purposes of rape, and compares section 208(d) with the crimes of kidnapping for purposes of robbery and ransom, which are clearly separate crimes from, not enhancements to, simple kidnapping. (Cal. Youth and Adult Correctional Agency, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2079 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 31, 1990, p. 1; Assembly Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2079, supra, p. 1; Sen. 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2079 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 27, 1990, p. 1.) Finally, we note that at the time of section 208(d)'s enactment, section 667.8, subdivision (a), already provided a three-year enhancement for any person convicted of a felony violation of various sexual offenses who, for the purpose of committing that sexual offense, kidnapped the victim in violation of Section 207.... The legislative history of section 208(d) expressly notes the existence of this enhancement. (Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2079, supra, p. 2.) Accordingly, if the Legislature had intended that section 208(d) be merely an enhancement to section 207, it would have most likely added it as an amendment to section 667.8, not section 208. In sum, we conclude that section 208(d) is a separate offense from, not an enhancement to, section 207(a). [6]