Opinion ID: 3026425
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Can Sarbanes-Oxley’s longer limitations

Text: periods apply to any of the claims raised in plaintiffs’ complaint? To repeat, in Lieberman we held that the lengthier limitations periods provided by Sarbanes-Oxley did not apply to claims that had expired under the limitation periods in place prior to the passage of that legislation, even if the claims were filed after its enactment and would be timely under its 16 provisions. 432 F.3d at 488–92. We explicitly reserved the question, however, whether that Act lengthened the limitations periods for claims on which the periods were already running but had not yet expired. Id. at 488. Though there is a “presumption against retroactive legislation [that] is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence,” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994), it is also the case that if Congress has expressly provided for retroactive effect, a court must “enforce[] the statute as written,” Lieberman, 432 F.3d at 488. As noted above, in § 804(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley Congress explicitly stated that “[t]he limitations period[s] provided by section 1658(b) of title 28, United States Code, as added by this section, shall apply to all proceedings addressed by this section that are commenced on or after the date of enactment of this Act.” 116 Stat. 801. Congress used the terms “proceedings . . . that are commenced” instead of “claims that accrue” or similar such language. The plain meaning of these words directs that claims filed after July 30, 2002, receive the benefit of the extended limitations periods, even if the shorter periods had already begun (but had not expired) on the underlying causes of action. Hence, the types of claims listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) and raised in suits with timing like this one—filed in 2004 but complaining of events in 1999—get the benefit of Sarbanes-Oxley’s two-year statute of limitations and five-year statute of repose. The lingering question, though, is whether each of plaintiffs’ claims here is in fact within the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b). 17