Opinion ID: 895199
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reduction of Indefinite Suspension

Text: We first consider the parts of the hearing examiner's order reducing Kelley's suspension from indefinite to 180 days. By reducing the suspension, the hearing examiner effectively reinstated Kelley to the police force. The City argues that because Kelley was an assistant chief, Section 143.014(h) did not provide authority for the examiner to temporarily suspend or demote him after finding the charges against him were true; rather, the examiner was required to uphold the indefinite suspension. Kelley responds that the City is precluded from arguing that Section 143.014 prohibits a hearing examiner from reducing an assistant chief's suspension because Chief Melis failed to cite Section 143.014 in his written statement as a basis for the discipline. See id. § 143.052(c), (e) (requiring a department head who suspends an officer to file a written statement with the commission giving the reasons for the suspension, identifying each civil service rule allegedly violated, and describing the acts alleged to have violated each rule identified). He further asserts that the Legislature could not have reasonably intended to provide a hearing examiner with no authority to alter a suspension if the charges are determined to be true.
After suspending an officer, a department head must provide a written statement to the commission and the officer giving the reasons for the suspension. Id. § 143.052(c). The statement must point out each civil service rule allegedly violated and describe each infraction. Id. § 143.052(e) The statement must also inform the officer of the right to appeal and that the right to appeal a hearing examiner's decision to a district court is limited. Id. §§ 143.052(d), 143.057(a). If the officer appeals, the department head is restricted to the department head's original written statement and charges, which may not be amended. Id. § 143.053(c). Nothing in the Act requires the department head's statement to specify what authority a hearing examiner has or what sections of the Act provide the hearing examiner with authority. Further, if Section 143.014(h) limits a hearing examiner's jurisdiction, that jurisdiction cannot be expanded by a City's failure or refusal to cite the section. See City of Pasadena, 292 S.W.3d at 21 ([T]he City's failure to object to an incorrect citation cannot expand the jurisdiction of a hearing examiner, any more than it could expand the jurisdiction of a trial court.). Accordingly, when Section 143.014(h) applies, a hearing examiner cannot refuse to comply with it because it was not cited in the department head's written statement. Chief Melis's failure to cite Section 143.014(h) did not preclude the City's argument that because Kelley was an assistant chief, Section 143.014(h) did not provide authority for the examiner to temporarily suspend or demote him after finding the charges against him were true.
Had the hearing examiner found the charges against Kelley to be untrue, Section 143.014(h) required that Kelley be restored to his previous classification of commander. The logical corollary to that provision, according to the City, is that if the charges are found to be true, then the only permissible remedy must be to uphold whatever suspension was imposed. Kelley counters that the trial court and court of appeals correctly determined Section 143.014 is applicable only if the hearing examiner finds the charges to be untrue, while Section 143.053, providing for appeal of a disciplinary suspension, specifies a hearing examiner's authority if the charges are found to be true. We agree with Kelley. Section 143.014(h) does not address what a hearing examiner may do if the charges are found to be true. While the Act provides that persons such as Kelley do not have civil service protection, it provides that if such a person is indefinitely suspended, the person has the same rights and privileges of a hearing before the commission in the same manner and under the same conditions as a classified employee.  TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 143.014(h) (emphasis added). When a classified employee appeals an indefinite suspension and the charges are found to be true, the Act affords a hearing examiner options as far as the discipline to be imposed. Id. § 143.053(e), (g). Nothing in the plain language of Section 143.014(h) or its context in the Act indicates that these options are not available when an assistant chief appeals. Further, the fact that the Legislature specifically restricted a hearing examiner's authority in the case of an assistant chief if the charges are found to be untrue, but not when the charges are found to be true, indicates that the exclusion of such a restriction was intentional. See Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 253 S.W.3d 184, 193 n. 20 (Tex.2007). We conclude that Section 143.014(h) did not limit the hearing examiner's options with respect to disciplinary actions when he found the charges against Kelley to be true. The City further argues that if Section 143.053 applies in this case, it limits a hearing examiner's options to permanently dismissing an indefinitely suspended officer if the charges are found to be true because a hearing examiner has no authority to reduce an indefinite suspension to a temporary suspension. The City relies on language in Section 143.053 that a hearing examiner shall state which specific provision applies in rendering the decision. TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 143.053(e). It urges that because the context does not necessarily require a different construction and a different construction is not expressly provided for in the statute, the Legislature's use of the word shall imposes a duty on the examiner. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.016(2). The City also argues that because Section 143.053(e) uses or in regard to a hearing examiner's disciplinary options, a hearing examiner has no authority to combine disciplinary actions so the officer is both temporarily suspended and restored. TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 143.053(e). Under the City's proposed construction, a hearing examiner has no authority to reduce an indefinite suspension to a temporary suspension because such action necessarily involves restoring an officer and imposing a temporary suspension. For reasons explained below, we disagree with the City's logic, although we ultimately agree that the Act does not authorize an officer to be both suspended and restored. Subchapter D of the Act authorizes two types of discipline: (1) voluntary discipline which an officer may agree to and accept and (2) involuntary discipline which may be imposed by the department head without regard to whether the officer agrees that discipline is warranted or that the discipline imposed is appropriate. Voluntary discipline includes demotion, see Section 143.054(e), suspension for a period of sixteen to ninety days, see Section 143.052(g), and uncompensated duty. See id. § 143.055(c). However, the Act provides for only one type of involuntary discipline that may be imposed by the department head: suspension for a reasonable period not to exceed 15 calendar days or for an indefinite period. Id. § 143.052(b); see also id. § 143.054(a), (c) (providing that a department head can recommend to the commission that an officer be involuntarily demoted, but it is the commission that decides whether to demote the officer). A suspended officer does not receive pay and does not accrue other benefits during a suspension. Id. § 143.055(e). The Act tightly structures disciplinary procedures, outcomes, and appeal processes. Involuntary discipline of an officer by the department head may be only for violation of a civil service rule. Id. § 143.052(b). If the department head does not consider an offense serious enough to warrant imposing indefinite suspension dismissal from the departmentthe only other option for involuntary discipline that the department head may impose is temporary suspension without pay for fifteen days or less. If an officer appeals from an involuntary disciplinary suspension, then the examiner hearing the appeal may suspend the officer only if the officer is found to have violated a civil service rule and only if the specific charges against the officer are found to be true. Id. § 143.053(g). The Act clearly defines the limits of two of the three decisions a hearing examiner is authorized to make: permanent dismissal or restoration to the officer's former classified position or status with back pay and benefits. Id. § 143.053(e). The boundaries of the third decision authorizedtemporary suspension without payare not so easily discerned. Id. § 143.053(e)(2). If Section 143.053(e)(2), which authorizes an examiner to impose a temporary suspension, is read in isolation, it does not impose any limit on the length of a temporary suspension an examiner is authorized to impose: In its decision, the [hearing examiner] shall state whether the suspended fire fighter or police officer is ... temporarily suspended from the department. Id. § 143.053(e). But Section 143.053(e)(2) must be construed in context with the remainder of Subchapter D, and particularly with Section 143.052. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex.2004) (We must read the statute as a whole and not just isolated portions.). Section 143.052(b) allows the department head to impose an involuntary suspension of fifteen days or less. TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 143.052(b). We see no language indicating the Legislature intended to allow an independent third party hearing examiner to impose a longer temporary disciplinary suspension than the department head could impose, other than the language of Section 143.053(e)(2) itself. And we do not believe construing the statute to grant such authority would yield the reasonable result the Legislature is presumed to intend. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.021(3). For example, in this case the hearing examiner imposed a temporary suspension of 180 days. That is twelve times the length of the fifteen-day maximum involuntary suspension Chief Melis could have imposed on Kelley, and twice the ninety-day length of the maximum suspension on which the Act would have allowed Chief Melis and Kelley to agree. It takes little imagination to envision how suspending officers for lengthy and unpredictable time periods [5] could disrupt operations and schedules of police departments; not to mention the difficulties that allowing unfettered leeway to third party hearing examiners pose to department discipline and morale. Moreover, interpreting Section 143.053(e)(2) to allow suspensions without any time limits invites challenge of the Act as an improper delegation of legislative authority. See City of Pasadena, 292 S.W.3d at 18-19 (explaining that if a statute does not bind hearing examiners to definite standards for reaching decisions and instead gives them broad latitude in determining not only factual disputes but the applicable law, they become not merely independent arbiters but policy makers, which is a legislative function). We conclude that the Legislature intended Section 143.053(e)(2) to authorize a hearing examiner to temporarily suspend an officer for a period of fifteen days or less. Thus, when the charges against officers are found to be true, Section 143.053(e) limits a hearing examiner's jurisdiction to imposing dismissal from the department, imposing a temporary suspension of fifteen days or less, or restoring the officer's former position or status in the department's classified service together with wages and benefits lost as a result of the suspension. We next address the City's contention that the Act does not authorize a hearing examiner to reduce an indefinite suspension because this would allow a hearing examiner to both temporarily suspend and restore an officer. As indicated above, we disagree. First, in the section entitled Disciplinary Suspensions, the Act provides that a department head may suspend an officer for up to fifteen days or for an indefinite period. TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 143.052(b). Although an indefinite suspension is equivalent to a dismissal from the department, under the Act it is nevertheless a suspension, and the Act does not differentiate between an indefinite suspension and a suspension of fifteen days or less. See id. §§ 143.052, 143.053 (setting out the procedures related to a disciplinary suspension). The Act requires the hearing examiner to state whether a suspended officer is dismissed, temporarily suspended, or restored. Id. § 143.053(e). A dismissal has the same result as an indefinite suspension, yet the department head's authority for maximum discipline is labeled an indefinite suspension, not a dismissal. We presume the Legislature intended the different descriptions for the same substantive result to indicate a difference between the two situations. See Kappus v. Kappus, 284 S.W.3d 831, 835 (Tex.2009) (We presume the Legislature chose its words carefully and intentionally.). That is accomplished by interpreting the phrase indefinite suspension to mean what it says it is: a suspension. The hearing examiner is specifically authorized to reduce a period of suspension, and the statute does not limit that authority to particular types or lengths of suspension. Further, this Court has previously held that a civil service commission [6] could reduce an indefinite suspension to a temporary one. Patton v. City of Grand Prairie, 686 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.1985); see also Firemen's & Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d 953, 956-57 (Tex.1984) (The Commission is charged by law with discretion to set the penalty where it finds that the charges made by the Department Head are true.). The City asserts that the holding in Patton is no longer valid because after Patton was decided the civil service laws were amended, and such an option is no longer available. We do not agree. The Act applicable in Patton was Texas Revised Civil Statutes Article 1269m. Act of May 15, 1947, 50th Leg., R.S., ch. 325, 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws 550, amended by Act of May 3, 1951, 52d Leg., R.S., ch. 298, § 1, sec. 16, 1951 Tex. Gen. Laws 470, repealed by Act of May 1, 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 149, § 49(1), 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 707, 1307. Section 16 pertained only to indefinite suspensions while Section 20 pertained to disciplinary suspensions of up to fifteen days. Section 16 allowed for an appeal from an indefinite suspension. Like the current statutory language, its language required the commission's decision to state whether an officer shall be permanently or temporarily dismissed or restored. The section allowed for the commission to reduce an indefinite suspension to a temporary suspension. Patton, 686 S.W.2d at 109. In 1983 when the Legislature amended the Act, it combined indefinite suspensions and temporary suspensions into one section and, in similar fashion to the current statute, did not differentiate between appeals from indefinite and temporary suspensions. Act of May 30, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 420, §§ 7-9, sec. 16, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2246, 2260-68 (repealed 1987). The statute again specified that in its decision the commission shall state whether the officer was permanently dismissed, temporarily suspended, or restored. Act of May 30, 1983, 68th Leg., R.S., ch. 420, § 7, sec. 16, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2246, 2261 (repealed 1987). The Act was later nonsubstantively recodified to the current version at issue here. Act of May 1, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 149, sec. 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 707, 910-917 (current version at TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 143.053). Nothing in the current language of the statute or the legislative history indicates legislative intent to change the disciplinary options that were originally available to the commission in cases of indefinite suspensions. On the other hand, we agree with the City that the Act differentiates between a suspension and a restoration. A suspended officer cannot be paid or accrue benefits: A police officer may not earn or accrue any wage, salary, or benefit arising from length of service while the person is suspended or performing uncompensated duty. TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 143.055(e). When Section 143.053(f) is read in context with Section 143.055(e) and both are given meaning, the Legislature's intent when using the term restored in Section 143.053 becomes clearer. It references situations in which an officer is returned to duty without any suspension, and the return to duty is without any loss of pay or benefits: If the commission finds that the period of disciplinary suspension should be reduced, the commission may order a reduction in the period of suspension. If the suspended fire fighter or police officer is restored to the position or class of service from which the person was suspended, the fire fighter or police officer is entitled to: (1) full compensation for the actual time lost as a result of the suspension at the rate of pay provided for the position or class of service from which the person was suspended; and (2) restoration of or credit for any other benefits lost as a result of the suspension, including sick leave, vacation leave, and service credit in a retirement system. Id. § 143.053(f). Thus, the Act does not authorize a hearing examiner to both restore an officer while at the same time suspending the officer, even if the officer's suspension is reduced from that imposed by the department head. In sum, the examiner did not exceed his jurisdiction by reducing Kelley's indefinite suspension. However, the temporary suspension imposed on Kelley was for 180 days. The Act does not authorize a hearing examiner to impose a temporary suspension of more than fifteen days, and the hearing examiner exceeded his jurisdiction by ordering a 180-day suspension.