Opinion ID: 499806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dating and the Freedom of Association

Text: 20 The conduct for which the escort services claim constitutional protection is dating. The county submitted much evidence that escorts were nothing more than call girls and that the escort bureaus operated as panderers. 599 F.Supp. at 1406-08 & n. 7. Although given ample opportunity by the district court to describe the activities that their employees and clients pursue, the escort services chose to rest their facial challenge on a broad claim of a constitutional right to date, which they also refer to as a right of interpersonal association, silent association, and social association. 21 The Constitution protects associations because of their intrinsic value as well as their value as instrumentalities for achieving certain ends: 22 Our decisions have referred to constitutionally protected freedom of association in two distinct senses. In one line of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty. In another set of decisions, the Court has recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment--speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion. The Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties. 23 The intrinsic and instrumental features of constitutionally protected association may, of course, coincide. 24 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3249-50, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984); see Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1940, 95 L.Ed.2d 474 (1987). In protecting certain kinds of highly personal relationships, Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618, 104 S.Ct. at 3250, the Supreme Court has most often identified the source of the protection as the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, not the first amendment's freedom to assemble. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86, 98 S.Ct. 673, 679-81, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1937-38, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (plurality opinion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1680-82, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619, 104 S.Ct. at 3250 (citing to other cases). The first amendment's freedom of association protects groups whose activities are explicitly stated in the amendment: speaking, worshiping, and petitioning the government. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622-23, 104 S.Ct. at 3252. The first amendment also gives us the freedom not to assemble with those whose goals we do not share. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 301, 106 S.Ct. 1066, 1073, 89 L.Ed.2d 232 (1986); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 1792, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). 25 In Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that made it a criminal offense for three or more persons to gather on a sidewalk and  'conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by.'  402 U.S. 611, 611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1686-87, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971). The ordinance was invalid on its face because it infringed on the right of people to gather in public places for social or political purposes. Id. at 615, 91 S.Ct. at 1689 (emphasis added). Several lower courts have held that the first amendment protects private and social associations regardless of whether they have an overtly expressive purpose. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311 (5th Cir.1980) (court declared an ordinance prohibiting loitering with persons known to be using or in possession of narcotics unconstitutional on its face); McKenna v. Peekskill Housing Auth., 497 F.Supp. 1217, 1221-22 (S.D.N.Y.1980) (first amendment protects private and social associations, even those without a hortatory purpose), modified, 647 F.2d 332 (2d Cir.1981). The escort services rely heavily on Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir.1984), in which the Eleventh Circuit found that the first amendment protected a policeman's right to date the daughter of a convicted felon and reputed mobster. Sawyer, McKenna, and Wilson were decided before Roberts, and one court has suggested that the right asserted by officer Wilson was the freedom of intimate association under the fourteenth amendment. Trujillo v. Board of County Comm'rs, 768 F.2d 1186, 1188-89 (10th Cir.1985). We agree. Although Wilson and his companion alleged that they discussed philosophical and social issues, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the constitutional issue on the assumption that they were simply dating. 733 F.2d at 1543 & n. 2. 3 26 Of course, a single association may have intimate and expressive features and therefore be entitled to claim the protection of both the first and fourteenth amendments. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618, 104 S.Ct. at 3249. If the activities of escorts and their clients qualify as intimate associations, the escort services may attack the regulation as intruding on the right of privacy. To the extent that the escort services or their employees are involved in expressive association, they may challenge the county's regulation as an impermissible burden on their first amendment rights, as overly broad, and as excessively vague. 4
27 The relationships protected by the fourteenth amendment are those that attend the creation and sustenance of a family and similar highly personal relationships. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19, 104 S.Ct. at 3250. The individuals are deeply attached and committed to each other as a result of their having shared each other's thoughts, beliefs, and experiences. By the very nature of such relationships, one is involved in a relatively few intimate associations during his or her lifetime. Id. at 620, 104 S.Ct. at 3250. The factors relevant in determining whether a particular association can claim the protection of the due process clause are the group's size, its congeniality, its duration, the purposes for which it was formed, and the selectivity in choosing participants. 28 As a couple, an escort and client are the smallest possible association. In other regards, however, the relationship between escort and client possesses few, if any, of the aspects of an intimate association. It lasts for a short period and only as long as the client is willing to pay the fee. Although a client may have some choice as to the person he or she wishes as a companion, the escort must accompany whomever the employer selects. Escorts and their clients do not claim to be involved in procreation, raising and educating children, cohabitation with relatives, or the other activities of family life. An escort may be involved with a large number of clients. While we may assume that the relationship between them is cordial and that they share conversation, companionship, and the other activities of leisure, we do not believe that a day, an evening, or even a weekend is sufficient time to develop deep attachments or commitments. In fact, the relationship between a client and his or her paid companion may well be the antithesis of the highly personal bonds protected by the fourteenth amendment. These are not the ties that have played a critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs. 468 U.S. at 618-19, 104 S.Ct. at 3250. 29 We conclude that the county's regulation does not reach such a substantial amount of conduct protected by the freedom of intimate association to permit a facial challenge, and to that extent the escort services' reliance on Wilson is misplaced. 5
30 The freedom of expressive association permits groups to engage in the same activities that individuals may engage in under the first amendment. 31 An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed. According protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression by the majority. Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends. 32 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622, 104 S.Ct. at 3252 (citations omitted). Dating and other social activities are worthy of some protection under the first amendment even though these activities may lack an overt political, religious, or educational purpose. We do not limit protection to words that are strident, contentious, or divisive, but extend it to quiet persuasion, inculcation of traditional values, instruction of the young, and community service. Id. at 636, 104 SCt. at 3259 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Our Constitution is designed to maximize individual freedoms within a framework of ordered liberty. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). We conclude that dating and other social associations to the extent that they are expressive are not excluded from the safeguards of the first amendment. 33 Our analysis cannot stop here, for we must decide the extent to which the activities of the escort services are entitled to these protections. While the first amendment fully protects expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, ethical, and other topics, Abood, 431 U.S. at 231, 97 S.Ct. at 1797, it does not protect every communication or every association that touches these topics. The escort services contend that their escorts and clientele associate for social, economic, and cultural ends, but have never disclosed the type of expression that they fear may be chilled. Legislatures, in regulating commercial activity, have severely limited the freedoms of speech and association: 34 Moreover, it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 [69 S.Ct. 684, 691, 93 L.Ed. 834] (1949). Numerous examples could be cited of communications that are regulated without offending the First Amendment, such as the exchange of information about securities, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 [89 S.Ct. 1454, 22 L.Ed.2d 756] (1969), corporate proxy statements, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, [90 S.Ct. 616, 24 L.Ed.2d 593] (1970), the exchange of price and production information among competitors, American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, [42 S.Ct. 114, 66 L.Ed. 284] (1921), and employers' threats of retaliation for the labor activities of employees, NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618, [89 S.Ct. 1918, 1942, 23 L.Ed.2d 547] (1969). See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61-62 [93 S.Ct. 2628, 2637, 37 L.Ed.2d 446] (1973). Each of these examples illustrates that the State does not lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a component of that activity. 35 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456-57, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 1918-19, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978). The county argues that the escort services are not involved in protected expression and may be regulated to the same extent as any purely commercial activity. The escort services vigorously contest the assertion that their first amendment rights are less worthy of protection because their activities are commercial. They compare themselves with publishers and purveyors of books and newspapers, concert promoters, cable television franchisers, and owners of topless bars. Those organizations' claim on the first amendment is not diminished by their sale of expression. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 787, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1421, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 386, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 2559, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64 & n. 6, 83 S.Ct. 631, 636 & n. 6, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963); Kev, Inc. v. Kitsap County, 793 F.2d 1053, 1058-60 (9th Cir.1986); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1410 n. 10 (9th Cir.1985); Gannett Satellite Information Network, Inc. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 745 F.2d 767, 772 (2d Cir.1984); Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 567 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054, 105 S.Ct. 2115, 85 L.Ed.2d 480 (1985). The escort services urge that they are entitled to the same protection in the sale of companionship. 36 We readily concede that distinguishing between associations that are primarily expressive and those that are primarily commercial will not always be easy. Justice O'Connor, writing separately in Roberts, suggested that the courts can make this distinction by examining an association's activities and purposes: 37 Many associations cannot readily be described as purely expressive or purely commercial. No association is likely ever to be exclusively engaged in expressive activities, if only because it will collect dues from its members or purchase printing materials or rent lecture halls or serve coffee and cakes at its meetings. And innumerable commercial associations also engage in some incidental protected speech or advocacy. The standard for deciding just how much of an association's involvement in commercial activity is enough to suspend the association's First Amendment right to control its membership cannot, therefore, be articulated with simple precision.... 38 In my view, an association should be characterized as commercial, and therefore subject to rationally related state regulation of its membership and other associational activities, when, and only when, the association's activities are not predominantly of the type protected by the First Amendment. 39 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 635, 104 S.Ct. at 3259 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 40 Under any test it is clear that the escort services are primarily commercial enterprises, and their activities are not predominantly of the type protected by the first amendment. Despite its superficial appeal, the escort services' attempt to analogize themselves to newspaper publishers does not withstand scrutiny. First, both speech and the press are explicitly mentioned in the first amendment; escort services and dating are not. Second, books and newspapers are, without doubt, expression; dating is conduct that is protected to the extent that it involves expressive activities. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622, 104 S.Ct. at 3252; see also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms). A couple out on the town is not an overtly expressive association when compared to political parties, civil rights organizations, publishers, churches, lobbyists, labor unions, and other special interest groups. 41 Third, and most important, the escort services make no claim that expression is a significant or necessary component of their activities. The services' advertisements included in the record do not tout their employees' skills in conversation, advocacy, teaching, or community service, and thus we assume that clients select their companions on the basis of other criteria. 6 Unlike publishers, concert promoters, and cable television franchisers, the escort services do not control the content of expression or ensure that any expression occurs. They exercise no editorial judgment over the messages their employees convey and do not insist that they convey any. See Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1410 n. 10 (selection of which views to present is a component of expression protected by the first amendment). If a client does not care to engage in expressive activities while dating, we must assume that neither the escort services nor the escort compel the client to do so. The escort services simply do not care what the couples talk about or whether they talk at all. The escort services cannot claim that expression constitutes anything but an incidental aspect of their commercial activity.