Opinion ID: 799074
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Delegation of counsel's responsibilities to co-defendant's counsel

Text: Stephens argues that he his counsel was ineffective for delegating substantive duties to counsel for his co-defendant. Stephens makes a similar, separate argument, albeit on the same grounds, that counsel was per se ineffective because he was operating under a conflict of interest: because [Stephens] was actually represented by the attorney for codefendant Cummings and because Cummings' and Stephens' defenses were antagonistic, his right to conflict-free counsel was violated. Stephens II, 975 So.2d at 422. Although Stephens frames this argument as two separate claims, we address them together here. After a careful review of the record in this case, we conclude that the Florida Supreme Court was not unreasonable in concluding that Stephens' attorney was acting as his separate counsel, with only Stephens' interests in mind. Likewise, although Stephens' attorney failed to attend some key depositions, as noted above, and failed to object in certain instances, it is apparent from the record that Stephens' counsel was concerned only with Stephens' interests, and was not operating under a conflict of interest. The Florida Supreme Court's denial of these claims was therefore not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.