Opinion ID: 1160457
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: In Limine Motion to Bar Evidence of Statements by Allen Birkman

Text: (3a) Prior to trial, defendant moved the superior court, in limine, to preclude the People from introducing certain evidence on the ground that it was inadmissible hearsay. Ross joined therein. The evidence in question comprised statements by Allen Birkman. Hearsay, of course, is evidence of an out-of-court statement offered by its proponent to prove what it states. (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) Unless it comes within an exception, it is inadmissible. ( Id., § 1200, subd. (b).) One such exception is for spontaneous declarations, which: (1) [p]urport[] to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant ( id., § 1240, subd. (a)); and (2) were made spontaneously ( id., § 1240, subd. (b)), even if in response to questioning ( People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 319 [246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082]), while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception (Evid. Code, § 1240, subd. (b)). At an evidentiary hearing, Charles Kosobud testified, in pertinent part, to the following effect: On May 17, 1987, late in the morning, he was near the Golden 1 Credit Union; a man later identified as Birkman called for help; within seconds, Kosobud went to his aid; Birkman  who was stipulated to have suffered a stab wound to the heart  was holding his right hand to his chest, and had blood flowing through his fingers; he had a wallet in his left hand; he was swaying; steadying him, Kosobud asked if they had robbed him; Birkman responded, No, but they tried; Kosobud asked who; Birkman responded, Two blacks; he soon collapsed onto the ground. Officer Calvin Lim of the Sacramento Police Department testified, in pertinent part, to the following effect: When he arrived at the Golden 1 Credit Union, Birkman was already receiving emergency medical aid; within several minutes, he was placed in an ambulance for transport to a hospital; Lim rode along; Birkman was semiconscious, had difficulty breathing, was very tense, and appeared to be in extreme pain; he said he felt numbness or tingling all over his body; Lim asked if he knew who had attacked him; he responded, a male black, approximately six foot tall, who had gotten into a Camaro; within several more minutes, they arrived at the hospital  where it was stipulated he died the next day. The superior court denied the motion. It impliedly determined that evidence of Birkman's statements was indeed hearsay. But it expressly determined that it came within, among other exceptions, that for spontaneous declarations. In this connection, it stated that it recognized that Kosobud and Officer Lim asked questions of Birkman, and it wasn't something that [he] just blurted out. However, the law is very clear that that doesn't negate the spontaneity required for spontaneous declarations. At the guilt phase, Kosobud and Officer Lim testified as to Birkman's statements in substantially the same terms as they had testified at the evidentiary hearing. Defendant contends that the superior court erred by denying his motion to preclude evidence of Birkman's statements. Unlike below, here defendant does not argue that the evidence in question was inadmissible hearsay. Indeed, he all but concedes that it came within the exception for spontaneous declarations. Unsurprisingly so. Instead, defendant argues that the evidence in question was barred by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant has not preserved his claim for review. (4) It is, of course, `the general rule'  to which we find no exception here  `that questions relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the ground sought to be urged on appeal.' ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 786, fn. 7 [276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330], quoting People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 548 [146 Cal. Rptr. 732, 579 P.2d 1048].) (3b) There was neither a specific nor timely objection below predicated on the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause. True, there was a bare reference to the confrontation rule (capitalization deleted) in moving papers submitted by defendant. But that was all. And that was not enough. In any event, defendant's claim is lacking in support in the law. His argument is, in substance, that, even if evidence of Birkman's statements came within the exception for spontaneous declarations, it still violated the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause. But where ... hearsay... come[s] within a firmly rooted exception ..., the Confrontation Clause is satisfied. ( White v. Illinois (1992) 502 U.S. 346, 356 [116 L.Ed.2d 848, 859, 112 S.Ct. 736].) Among such firmly rooted exceptions is that for spontaneous declarations. ( Id. at p. 355, fn. 8 [116 L.Ed.2d at p. 859].) [4]