Opinion ID: 1278769
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: equal representation

Text: The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires that a state, in apportioning its legislature, make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts ... as nearly of equal population as is practicable. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1389, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). The legal research before us presented literally dozens of decisions of the United States Supreme Court and other Federal Courts which clearly compel us to declare H.B. 746 unconstitutional because it provides the people of some legislative districts with as much as 32.94% less voting power than the citizens of other districts. In Brown v. Thomson, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 2690, 77 L.Ed.2d 214 (1983), the United States Supreme Court most recently summarized its previous reapportionment holdings with the following statement of the law which we are pledged to follow: Our decisions have established, as a general matter, that an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10% falls within this category of minor deviations. See, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418, 52 L.Ed.2d 465, 97 S.Ct. 1828 [1835] (1977); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764, 37 L.Ed.2d 314, 93 S.Ct. 2332 [2338] (1973). A plan with larger disparities in population, however, creates a prima facie case of discrimination and therefore must be justified by the State. See Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444, 17 L.Ed.2d 501, 87 S.Ct. 569 [572] (1967) (`De minimis deviations are unavoidable, but variations of 30% among senate districts and 40% among house districts can hardly be deemed de minimis and none of our cases suggests that differences of this magnitude will be accepted, without a satisfactory explanation grounded on acceptable state policy. ') The ultimate inquiry, therefore, is whether the legislature's plan `may reasonably be said to advance [a] rational state policy' and, if so, `whether the population disparities among the districts that have resulted from the pursuit of this plan exceed constitutional limits.' Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 328, 35 L.Ed.2d 320, 93 S.Ct. 979 [987] (1973). (Emphasis supplied.) As applied to H.B. 746 the conclusion must be that since the population deviation is 32.94% (not under 10%), the deviation is not in the minor category, but to the contrary, creates a prima facie case of discrimination and must be justified by the state. The defendants herein argue that the grossly disparate population deviation of H.B. 746 can be justified because of Idaho's terrain, its shape, and its relatively sparce population. That argument ignores the rule of law that such justifications will excuse a presumptively discriminatory population deviation (if it is not too large to be excused) only where a good faith effort has been made in constructing districts as nearly of equal population as practicable. Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. at 577, 84 S.Ct. at 1389. The rule is set forth in Brown, supra, in footnote 6 to the majority opinion: 6. In contrast, many of our prior decisions invalidating state apportionment plans were based on the lack of proof that deviations from population equality were the result of a good-faith application of legitimate districting criteria. See, e.g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 25, 42 L.Ed.2d 766, 95 S.Ct. 751 [764] (1975) (`It is far from apparent that North Dakota policy currently requires or favors strict adherence to political lines... . Furthermore, a plan devised by [the special master] demonstrates that ... the policy of maintaining township lines [does not] preven[t] attaining a significantly lower population variance.' ); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 124, 17 L.Ed.2d 771, 87 S.Ct. 820 [823] (1967) (per curiam) (district court did not `demonstrate why or how respect for the integrity of county lines required the particular deviations' or `articulate any satisfactory grounds for rejecting at least two other plans presented to the court, which respected county lines but which produced substantially smaller deviations'); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 445-446, 17 L.Ed.2d 501, 87 S.Ct. 569 [572-573] (1967) (no evidence presented that would justify the population disparities). (Emphasis added.) Similarly, it should be said of H.B. 746 that Idaho's state constitutional mandate of maintaining the integrity of county boundaries, together with other policies articulated in our earlier decision in Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 104 Idaho 858, 664 P.2d 765 (1983) ( Hellar I ), do not prevent attaining a significantly lower population variance than 32.94%. Indeed, the record before us establishes no less than 10 alternative plans with population deviations of less than 10% and which serve the same state policies as those advanced in justification of the 32.94% deviation: Plans Deviation 6A & 6B 8.76% 11A & 11B 9.55% 12A & 12B 9.01% 13A & 13B 9.01% 14A & 14B 9.65% Additionally the record establishes seven other plans (also with B variations) with deviations of less than 19% (making in all 12 A plans and 12 B plans with deviations under 19%). Both Plan 14-B and H.B. 746 advance the state policy of not dividing counties in the formation of legislative districts. Since both meet that requirement it cannot logically be argued that the scheme of H.B. 746 is necessary to preserve that state policy. The four dissenting Justices in Brown v. Thomson, supra , noted: We have warned that although maintenance of county or other political boundaries can justify small deviations, it cannot be allowed to negate the fundamental principle of one person, one vote. E.g., Connor, 431 U.S., at 419, 52 L.Ed.2d 465, 97 S.Ct. 1828 [at 1836]. It is argued that language in our preceding decision in Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 105 Idaho 571, 682 P.2d 524 (1984) ( Hellar II ) suggests a determination of constitutionality for a plan with 32.94% population deviation. While it is true that we stated in dicta in Hellar II that a plan with an assumed population deviation of 41.3%, in light of Brown, supra, would not necessarily be unconstitutional where it was designed to accommodate Idaho's county-boundary constitutional requirement and unique state policies and interest, such a supposition would certainly not apply where alternative plans exist which meet the same objectives and have below 10% deviations. It would be unreasonable to assume we intended to suggest our state legislature could ignore federal constitutional case law. The United States Supreme Court cases speak for themselves. Defense counsel were requested to provide, if such existed, one single federal court decision sanctioning deviations in excess of 20% when plans with less than 10% were before the court. None were cited (our research indicates there are none). Thus, although we are most reluctant to declare H.B. 746 unconstitutional, the requirement that we apply the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause in a manner consistent with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court compels such a result. The equal protection guarantee of the Idaho Constitution, contained in art. 1, § 2, see Langmeyer v. State, 104 Idaho 53, 54, 656 P.2d 114, 115 (1982), and the right of suffrage guarantee of Idaho Const. art. 1, § 19 likewise require that we hold H.B. 746 unconstitutional. The protections of Idaho's constitution are no less compromised by a districting plan with 33% population deviation among districts in the face of equally well suited plans of less than a third that percentage than are the federal constitutional protections. Idaho's Constitution stands on its own, and although we may look to the rulings of the federal courts on the United States constitution for guidance in interpreting our own state constitutional guarantees, we interpret a separate and in many respects independent constitution.