Opinion ID: 696224
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Carlos Meyers

Text: 91 The only issue raised in Meyers' appeal is that the district court erred by enhancing his base offense level two points for obstruction of justice under section 3C1.1. That section authorizes an enhancement [i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1. Application Note 3 lists, among other things, committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury and providing materially false information to a judge or magistrate as examples of the types of conduct that will support an enhancement under this guideline. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1, App.Note 3(b) & (f). The guideline thus applies to a defendant who provides false testimony at his own trial concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake or faulty memory. United States v. Dunnigan, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993); see also United States v. Dillard, 43 F.3d 299, 309 (7th Cir.1994). Under the Supreme Court's Dunnigan decision, if a defendant objects to a sentence enhancement resulting from [his] trial testimony, [the] district court must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice, or an attempt to do the same. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1117. We review the district court's obstruction finding for clear error. Mounts, 35 F.3d at 1219. 92 Meyers was the last of the defendants to testify at trial, and he essentially corroborated Walton's story 9 that the group had been discussing a legitimate entertainment venture rather than a cocaine deal. In applying the obstruction enhancement, the district court made detailed findings to support its conclusion that Meyers' testimony had been willfully false: 93 The pure fact of the matter is that [Meyers'] version contrasted substantially, if not almost in toto, with all of the other evidence in the case, including the objective evidence. And even as I listened to it, my own sense was that it was full of untruths.... 94 [Meyers] not only exculpated himself, but he laid it all at the feet of [Johnson-Dix], took out every other defendant in the case. She pleaded guilty in this case. Even she admitted this was a drug deal gone sour. And the evidence was overwhelmingly so, that this is a drug deal gone sour. Nobody did business like this.... 95 And I think in all objectivity, Mr. Meyers' story was a concocted, calculated set of falsehoods.... I don't think it was true and it's repeated in substantial measure in his version of the offense to the probation officer. That is a very fanciful account of what happened in this case. It can't possibly bear the weight of truth, and it doesn't. So I am going to apply the obstruction enhancement. 96 (Sept. 29, 1994 Tr. at 7-8.) In light of the court's statements, Meyers' contentions that the district court's findings were too vague and that the court never addressed the specific acts of perjury ring hollow. The district court's findings were both sufficient to satisfy Dunnigan and were not clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Dillard, 43 F.3d at 309; United States v. Sanchez, 32 F.3d 1002, 1006 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 346, 130 L.Ed.2d 302 (1994).