Opinion ID: 2772259
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the citizen suit provision

Text: A statute gives Washington citizens the right to sue for unfair campaign practices. But there is a prerequisite. The citizen must first give notice of a violation in writing to the AG; the citizen may then sue if the AG failed to commence an action hereunder within forty-five days after the notice. RCW 42.17 A.765( 4)(a)(i). The Court of Appeals held that where the AG refers a complaint to the PDC for investigation after receiving such notice from a citizen, the referral itself counts as 'commenc[ing] an action.' Utter, 176 Wn. App. at 672-73 (quoting RCW 42.17 A.765 (4)(a)(i)). Thus, according to the Court of Appeals, where the AG refers 6 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 for investigation or investigates a complaint, the notice-giving citizen may not sue even if the AG declines to sue. Id. Our review involves statutory interpretation of RCW 42.17A.765. That statute is titled Enforcement. Its first three subsections define various ways the AG may enforce the fair campaign statutes: ( 1) The attorney general and the prosecuting authorities of political subdivisions of this state may bring civil actions in the name of the state for any appropriate civil remedy, including but not limited to the special remedies provided in RCW 42.17A.750. (2) The attorney general and the prosecuting authorities of political subdivisions of this state may investigate or cause to be investigated the activities of any person who there is reason to believe is or has been acting in violation of this chapter, and may require any such person or any other person reasonably believed to have information concerning the activities of such person to appear at a time and place designated . . . to give such information under oath and to produce all ... documents which may be relevant or material to any investigation authorized under this chapter. (3) When the attorney general or the prosecuting authority of any political subdivision of this state requires the attendance of any person to obtain such information ... , he or she shall issue an order setting forth the time when and the place where attendance is required and shall cause the same to be delivered to or sent by registered mail to the person at least fourteen days before the date fixed for attendance. The order shall have the same force and effect as a subpoena .... RCW 42.17A.765 (emphasis added). Finally, subsection (4) provides a mechanism for citizen, as opposed to AG, enforcement: A person who has notified the attorney general and the prosecuting attorney in the county in which the violation occurred in writing that 7 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 there is reason to believe that some provision of this chapter is being or has been violated may himself or herself bring in the name of the state any of the actions (hereinafter referred to as a citizen's action) authorized under this chapter. RCW 42.17A.765(4) (emphasis added). A person may bring such a citizen's action, however, only if [t]he attorney general and the prosecuting attorney have failed to commence an action hereunder within forty-five days after the notice. RCW 42.17A.765(4)(a)(i) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals reasoned that subsections (2) and (3) above, permitting the AG to instigate an investigation and issue orders to facilitate the investigation, constituted actions ... authorized under this chapter. RCW 42.17A.765(4). Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that if the AG refers a complaint for investigation, then it has not failed to commence an action hereunder. RCW 42.17 A.765(4)(a)(i). In sum, therefore, if the AG merely investigates, the citizen cannot sue. Utter, 176 Wn. App. at 672-74. We must therefore decide what it means for the AG to commence an action under RCW 42.17A.765(4)(a)(i). The Court of Appeals equates the word action in RCW 42.17A.765(4) with the investigatory enforcement mechanisms laid out in subsections (2) and (3). But only subsection (1) uses the word actions-it says, The attorney general and the prosecuting authorities of political subdivisions of this state may bring civil actions ....  RCW 42.17A.765(1). The other subsections 8 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 refer to investigatory mechanisms the AG may use to enforce fair campaign laws and make no mention ofactions. 2 Moreover, the word action, as used in failed to commence an action hereunder, RCW 42.17 A.765(4)(a)(i), has a context. The introductory paragraph immediately preceding that phrase clearly grants citizens the right to bring in the name of the state any of the actions (hereinafter referred to as a citizen's action) authorized under this chapter. RCW 42.17A.765(4) (emphasis added). This sequencing suggests that commenc[ing] an action in subsection (4)(a)(i) refers back to the same type of action as the citizen['s] action in subsection (4)(a)-the immediately preceding introductory paragraph using the word action. This sequencing also suggests that commenc[ing] an action in subsection (4)(a)(i) does not include the other nonaction enforcement steps available to the AG per the previous subsections-that is, investigat[ing], RCW 42.17 A. 765(2), requir[ing] a person to appear, id., or issu[ing] an order, RCW 42.17A.765(3). Further, as a matter of plain language, an action and the phrase commence an action are legal terms of art that mean a lawsuit or to sue. See, e.g., BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 35 (lOth ed. 2014). In accordance with that plain meaning, the 2 Subsection (3) does contain the word actions, but it is used in a context irrelevant to this case: In any case where the order is not enforced by the court according to its terms, the reasons for the court's actions shall be clearly stated in writing . . . .  RCW 42.17 A.765(3). 9 Utteretal. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n ofWash., No. 89462-1 statute does not use the term action in isolation but refers to bring[ing], fil[ing], and, in the specific provision at issue, commenc[ing] an action. RCW 42.17A.765(1), (4), (5). Commence an action does not mean to investigate in ordinary legal terminology. See, e.g., Goldmark v. McKenna, 172 Wn.2d 568, 575, 259 P.3d 1095 (2011) (attorney general has power to commence actions); Waples v. Yi, 169 Wn.2d 152, 159, 234 P.3d 187 (2010) (action is commence[d] by filing complaint (citing CR 3(a))); State v. Conte, 159 Wn.2d 797, 810, 154 P.3d 194 (2007) (discussing attorney general's power to bring an action); Whitney v. Buckner, 107 Wn.2d 861, 865, 734 P.2d 485 (1987) (right of access to courts includes right to bring or commence actions); Berge v. Gorton, 88 Wn.2d 756, 761, 567 P.2d 187 (1977) (attorney general has power to commence actions). The Court of Appeals' interpretation is, thus, probably not what the voters intended. 3 In addition, the Court of Appeals' interpretation causes absurd results. If subsections (2) and (3) are authorized actions under chapter 42.17 A RCW, then they are also citizen's actions. RCW 42.17A.765(4) (A person who has notified the [AG] may himself or herself bring in the name of the state any of the actions (hereinafter referred to as a citizen's action) authorized under this chapter.). Thus, 3 The statute at issue was created through the initiative process. We interpret initiatives according to the general rules of statutory construction. City of Spokane v. Taxpayers of City of Spokane, 111 Wn.2d 91, 97, 758 P.2d 480 (1988) (citing Hi-Starr, Inc. v. Liquor Control Bd., 106 Wn.2d 455, 460, 722 P.2d 808 (1986)). 10 Utter eta!. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 under the Court of Appeals' interpretation, if the AG fails to act, a citizen could investigate on his or her own in the name of the state, personally issue orders with the same authority as a subpoena; require the appearance of other citizens to answer questions, and take all the other steps authorized by subsections (2) and (3) above for the AG. That is not a reasonable interpretation of the statute. The plaintiffs also argue that as a practical matter, the AG initially refers all complaints to the PDC for investigation. Thus, if the Court of Appeals' interpretation were correct, the PDC-a government agency-would unilaterally bar all citizen suits for violation of Title 42 RCW just by investigating. The voters cannot possibly have intended to create a citizen's right to sue when the government will not but allow the government to bar every one of those suits with a procedural quirk BIAW argues, however, that there is a difference between a routine referral of a complaint and a case like this one, where the PDC conducts a substantial investigation and makes a recommendation to the AG regarding the merits of a case. BIAW thus asserts that a more formal investigation by the PDC constitutes an action under the statute, while a less formal investigation does not. BIAW offers no citation for this distinction, nor does it explain how to tell the difference between them. We decline BIAW' s invitation to have the courts engage in an after-the-fact 11 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 analysis of whether a particular investigation was thorough enough to qualify as an action, especially without established standards to help the courts make such a determination. Moreover, BIAW's interpretation would defeat the purpose of providing for citizen suits in the first place, because the AG likely declines to sue in exactly those instances where the PDC investigation concludes that no violation occurred. The statute is obviously based on the notion that the government may be wrong, and then it is up to citizens to expose the violation. 4 Finally, BIA W argues that this court has held that the citizen suit provision was constitutional because it applied only in those instances where the state took 'no action,' investigatory or otherwise, at the end of the statutory notice periods. BIAW's Suppl. Br. at 10 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wn.2d 275,314,517 P.2d 911 (1974)). Thus, BIAW argues, interpreting action here to 4 BIAW, in a brief responding to amici arguments, also argues that commence an action must include investigation because otherwise citizens could sue even where the PDC pursues an administrative action based on an investigation of a citizen's complaint, as it is permitted to do under RCW 42.17 A.755. BIAW argues it would be an absurd result to permit both a PDC administrative action and a citizen suit. First, the PDC in this case did not commence any action, administrative or judicial; thus, this question is not presented. Second, BIAW does not explain why that result is absurd. Through administrative enforcement, the PDC may issue orders requiring the respondent to cease and desist from the activity that constitutes a violation and may assess a penalty in an amount not to exceed ten thousand dollars. RCW 42.17A.755(4) (emphasis added). The amounts at issue in a lawsuit are significantly higher. For example, BIA W-MSC settled the AG's suit against it for $584,000. When a citizen wins a suit under the FCPA, the judgment awarded shall escheat to the state,'' less the citizen's costs and attorney fees. RCW 42.17A.765(4)(b). A PDC action thus serves as significantly less of a deterrent to illegal campaign practices. 12 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 exclude investigation renders the citizen suit provision unconstitutional. The cited case does not make the holding BIAW attributes to it. Instead, we said: In our view, the qui tam provision of initiative section 40(4) poses no problem of constitutional dimension. We note respondents' assertion that they fear the threat of frivolous and unwarranted harassment suits. In this connection we can also note that should the suitor fail in his action the trial court, upon finding lack of reasonable cause, may reimburse the defendant for his costs and attorney's fees. In view of the current high costs of legal services, we regard this as no small deterrent against frivolous and harassing suits. Additionally, the plaintiff in such cases is required to give the Attorney General a 40-day notice of an alleged violation. The litigant may then proceed only after the service of a second 10-day notice results in no action on the part of the Attorney General. We feel that these specified safeguards are ample protection against frivolous and abusive lawsuits. Should, however, the courts experience a significant number of palpably frivolous lawsuits, this court may not be without the tools to fashion a remedy within its rulemaking powers. Fritz, 83 Wn.2d at 314 (emphasis omitted). Thus, Fritz does not support BIAW' s argument on this point. We hold that RCW 42.17 A.765 precludes a citizen suit only where the AG or local prosecuting authorities bring a suit themselves, and it does not preclude a citizen suit where the AG declines to sue. 5 5We do not address the question of whether administrative action by the PDC against an entity would preclude a citizen suit, as discussed in note 2, supra. 13 Utter eta!. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1