Opinion ID: 532639
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Practical Finality Doctrine

Text: 38 The type of issue triggering review of interim orders under Forgay are immediately executable judicial decrees deciding property rights. Thus, as delimited by that case, the practical finality doctrine does not apply to the publication sanction. The payment of the cash bond might seem to fit into the Forgay exception were it not for the further explication of the doctrine by the Court: 39 This rule, of course, does not extend to cases where money is directed to be paid into court.... Orders of that kind are frequently and necessarily made in the progress of a cause. But they are interlocutory only, and intended to preserve the subject-matter in dispute from waste or dilapidation, and to keep it within the control of the court until the rights of the parties concerned can be adjudicated by a final decree. 40 Forgay, 47 U.S. (6 How.) at 204-05. 41 We believe that not only will Ruden Barnett not suffer irreparable injury by not securing review of the bond sanction until the final resolution of the monetary sanctions, but that the practical finality doctrine explicitly excluded cases such as this. Ruden Barnett was ordered to pay a bond to the court, not to pay a certain sum of money to BankAtlantic. See Id. at 204. The bond did not decide[ ] the right to ... property; it ensured that there would be funds with which to pay the fees and costs assessed at the end of trial by keeping the $250,000 within the control of the court until the rights of the parties concerned [could] be adjudicated by a final decree. Id. at 204-05. We do not have jurisdiction over this case under the practical finality doctrine. C. Conclusion 42 Both PaineWebber and Ruden Barnett may file new appeals with this court once the district court has entered truly dispositive orders on the sanctions from which they appeal. We DISMISS this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.