Opinion ID: 552329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: agency responses to appellant's foia requests

Text: 39 Appellant submitted a request to the Army on August 21, 1985; the Army responded by a letter dated March 31, 1986. The Army responded that it had identified records concerning Operation Rusty and Odessa that might be responsive to Oglesby's request, but that a fee commitment was necessary before the Army could proceed with the search. See Letter to Carl Oglesby from Thomas F. Conley (March 31, 1986), reprinted in J.A. at 31-32. The Army refused to waive fees because it was not convinced that there was a sufficient public interest to justify a waiver. 11 See id. Exhaustion does not occur until the required fees are paid or an appeal is taken from the refusal to waive fees. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Griffin, 811 F.2d 644, 648 (D.C.Cir.1987) (where the requester failed to adequately demonstrate a public interest for a fee waiver before the agency it cannot do so before a court without first exhausting its administrative remedies); Irons v. FBI, 571 F.Supp. 1241, 1243 (D.Mass.1983) (upholding regulation requiring payment of fees, or waiver of fees, before FOIA request is deemed to have been received); Crooker v. United States Secret Service, 577 F.Supp. 1218, 1219 (D.D.C.1983) (requester must pay fees or administratively appeal the requirement of fees before seeking judicial review of the denial of his FOIA request). 40 Once appellant made his commitment to pay the Army search and copy fees, by letter dated April 3, 1986, he fulfilled the requirements for a valid FOIA request. See Letter to Thomas F. Conley from Carl Oglesby (April 3, 1986), reprinted in J.A. at 33. Ten days after that date, appellant was free to sue the Army in district court to compel a response. However, he did not do so; instead, he waited to file suit until after the Army responded on May 20, 1986, with its determination to withhold most of the records on exemptions 1 and 7(D) grounds. 12 See Letter to Carl Oglesby from Robert J. Walsh, Jr. (May 20, 1986), reprinted in J.A. at 36-37. 41 Appellant filed suit on December 11, 1987, challenging the Army's denial of his fee waiver request, the partial denial of his request for information, and the inadequacy of the search. Because, however, he did not take an administrative appeal on any of these claims, judicial review of such claims is precluded at this time.
42 Appellant submitted his request to State on August 21, 1985. State responded by letter dated September 9, 1985, agreeing to process his request. See Letter to Carl Oglesby from Peter M. Sheils (Sept. 9, 1985), reprinted in J.A. at 52. State then sent a second letter, before appellant filed suit, informing him that no records responsive to his request had been found. See Letter to Carl Oglesby from Josephine Jelenovic (Feb. 13, 1986), reprinted in J.A. at 53. 43 State's letter constituted an adverse determination under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(6)(A)(i) because appellant did not receive the documents he requested. Under the FOIA, the agency is required to notify the [requester] ... of [the agency's] determination and the reasons therefor, and of the right of such person to appeal to the head of the agency any adverse determination. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(6)(A)(i). A FOIA requester, dissatisfied with the agency's response that no records have been found, may wish to challenge the adequacy of the agency's search. The agency has a duty to notify appellant of the right ... to appeal to the head of the agency, in cases where no records are found in its response as well as those in which specific records are denied. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(6)(A)(i). 44 State's letter to appellant, however, merely informed him that he could call the agency for further information: If you have any questions, please contact the Information and Privacy Staff. This did not qualify as notice to appellant of his right to appeal the negative reference to his inquiry. Because, then, State did not provide notice of appellant's right to appeal, its response was insufficient under the FOIA to trigger the exhaustion requirement and appellant was free to file suit under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(6)(C). We therefore reach the merits of his claim. 45 Appellant challenges the reasonableness of State's search because the agency only searched the record system most likely to contain the requested information, 13 the Central Foreign Policy Records (Central Records), i.e., State's centralized record system which contains all documents that establish, discuss, or define foreign policy; set precedents; or require actions used by more than one office. 14 Declaration of Frank M. Machak, reprinted in J.A. at 136, 137. The district court found that State's search was adequate and granted summary judgment based on the agency's affidavit describing its search. Oglesby, Mem. op. at 6-7; J.A. at 272-73. 46 There is no requirement that an agency search every record system. See Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 952-53 (D.C.Cir.1986) (search is not presumed unreasonable simply because it fails to produce all relevant material); Miller v. United States Department of State, 779 F.2d 1378, 1384-85 (8th Cir.1985) (same); Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 128 (D.C.Cir.1982) (agency need not demonstrate that all responsive documents were found and that no other relevant documents could possibly exist); Marks v. United States Department of Justice, 578 F.2d 261, 263 (9th Cir.1978) (no requirement that an agency search every division or field office on its own initiative in response to a FOIA request when the agency believes responsive documents are likely to be located in one place). However, the agency cannot limit its search to only one record system if there are others that are likely to turn up the information requested. It is not clear from State's affidavit that the Central Records system is the only possible place that responsive records are likely to be located. At the very least, State was required to explain in its affidavit that no other record system was likely to produce responsive documents. 47 In order to obtain summary judgment the agency must show that it made a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested. See Weisberg v. United States Department of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C.Cir.1984); Weisberg v. United States Department of Justice, 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C.Cir.1983); see also Weisberg v. United States Department of Justice, 627 F.2d 365, 371 (D.C.Cir.1980) (agency affidavit must denote which files were searched and reflect a systematic approach to document location in order to enable the appellant to challenge the procedures utilized). State has not satisfied this burden. Its affidavit merely states that [b]ased upon the information contained in Mr. Oglesby's letter, and consistent with customary practice and established procedure, a search was initiated of the Department record system most likely to contain the information which had been requested for the time period 1954-1956, namely, the Central Records. Declaration of Frank M. Machak, reprinted in J.A. at 138. The affidavit does not show, with reasonable detail, that the search method, namely searching the Central Records, was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents. Nor does the affidavit identify the terms searched or explain how the search was conducted. Compare with Affidavit of Robert J. Walsh, Jr., Department of the Army, reprinted in J.A. at 263-65 (affidavit by the Army showing the topics searched and the type of search performed, for example a name only index and master name index, and what those indices contain). A reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type of search performed, and averring that all files likely to contain responsive materials (if such records exist) were searched, is necessary to afford a FOIA requester an opportunity to challenge the adequacy of the search and to allow the district court to determine if the search was adequate in order to grant summary judgment. 48 Because State's affidavit did not adequately describe the agency's search, summary judgment on the adequacy of the search was improper. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's order dismissing appellant's claim against State and remand to the district court. On remand, the district court may order State to submit a reasonably detailed affidavit upon which the reasonableness of its search can be judged.
49 Appellant sent his request to the FBI on August 21, 1985. The agency responded initially by letter dated September 6, 1985. See Letter to Carl Oglesby from James K. Hall (Sept. 6, 1985), reprinted in J.A. at 55. The initial response merely informed appellant that the FBI was processing the request. We need not determine whether this was an adequate and timely response under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(6)(A)(i) for constructive exhaustion purposes, because the FBI sent additional letters before appellant filed suit. These letters, dated October 3, 1985, October 29, 1985, January 15, 1986, and February 26, 1986, apprised appellant of the status of his request. See Letter to Carl Oglesby from James K. Hall (Oct. 3, 1985), reprinted in J.A. at 56; Letter to Carl Oglesby from James K. Hall (Oct. 29, 1985), reprinted in J.A. at 57; Letter to Carl Oglesby from James K. Hall (Jan. 15, 1986), reprinted in J.A. at 58; Letter to Carl Oglesby from Marvin E. Lewis (Feb. 26, 1986), reprinted in J.A. at 59-60. The last letter notified appellant of its final determination to release 15 pages of material and to withhold excerpts of that material under exemptions 1 and 7(C) of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(1), 7(C), and notified appellant of his right to an administrative appeal. Appellant did not file suit until December 11, 1987, almost two years after this final determination was made. Because appellant did not administratively appeal his challenges to the agency, we find that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies. Judicial review of the FBI's determination, therefore, is precluded at this time.
50 Appellant sent his request to the CIA on August 21, 1985. The CIA responded on September 3, 1985. See Letter to Carl Oglesby from John H. Wright (Sept. 3, 1985), reprinted in J.A. at 45. The September 3 letter indicated that the CIA would go forward with the search absent any problems or any need for additional information. Again, we need not determine if this response was adequate for constructive exhaustion purposes, because the CIA made its final determination on the merits of appellant's request before appellant filed suit. On September 10, 1985, the CIA released 20 pages of declassified material to appellant without charge and indicated that other records were being transferred to NARA and that appellant should contact NARA directly. See Letter to Carl Oglesby from John H. Wright (Sept. 10, 1985), reprinted in J.A. at 46-47. On October 3, 1985, the CIA informed appellant of its determination to withhold documents responsive to appellant's request, pursuant to exemption 3, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(3), 15 and to deny appellant's request for a fee waiver for future searches. 16 See Letter to Carl Oglesby from John H. Wright (Oct. 3, 1985), reprinted in J.A. at 50. Appellant did not file suit until December 11, 1987, more than two years after the CIA had made its final determination. We find that the exhaustion of administrative remedies became mandatory when the CIA made its determination regarding appellant's request and appellant was thereafter required to appeal any challenges he had to the head of the agency before seeking judicial review. Since he did not administratively appeal his challenges, judicial review is precluded at this time. 51
52 Appellant sent his request to NARA on September 19, 1985. NARA's military headquarters and military field office responded separately to the request: the military headquarters responded on October 1, 1985, and the military field office responded on November 14, 1985. See Letter to Carl Oglesby from Wilbert Mahoney (Oct. 1, 1985), reprinted in J.A. at 73; Letter to Carl Oglesby from Edwin A. Thompson (Nov. 14, 1985), reprinted in J.A. at 74-75. 53 The response from the military headquarters indicated that no records were found relating to meetings between General Gehlen and U.S. officials, or to Operation Rusty, and that records relating to Werewolf activities and the Odessa Movement would be furnished subject to fees for copying the documents. In addition, the headquarters indicated that records relating to Operation Sunrise were too numerous to search, but that these records would be made available in their entirety in the NARA research room for appellant to review for himself. Appellant contends that NARA did not fulfill its FOIA obligation when it merely provided records for appellant's review in its public reading room. We find that NARA's response was adequate under the FOIA. 54 NARA did not deny appellant any records; all relevant records were made available to him. In Tax Analysts v. United States Department of Justice, 845 F.2d 1060 (D.C.Cir.1988), affirmed, 492 U.S. 136, 109 S.Ct. 2841, 106 L.Ed.2d 112 (1989), we held that an agency need not respond to a FOIA request for copies of documents where the agency itself has provided an alternative form of access, for example, making records available in a reading room. Tax Analysts, 845 F.2d at 1065, 1066-67; 109 S.Ct. at 2852; see also Grunfeld & Herrick v. United States Customs Service, 709 F.2d 41, 42 (11th Cir.1983) (holding that the Customs Service complied with FOIA by posting the requested information at the customshouse); Lead Industries Association, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Administration, 610 F.2d 70, 86 (2d Cir.1979) (agency not required under FOIA to send requester copies of records that had appeared previously in a report published by the agency); Eason v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1 G.D.S. p 80,092 (D.D.C.1980) (a daily compilation of current newspaper and magazine articles on nuclear energy made available to the public in the Commission's Public Document Room was sufficient), cited with approval in Tax Analysts, 845 F.2d at 1065 n. 10. An agency is not required by the FOIA to mail copies of records, nor even to provide a requester-convenient location for access. Tax Analysts, 845 F.2d at 1067; see also Nolen v. Rumsfeld, 535 F.2d 890, 892 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104, 97 S.Ct. 1133, 51 L.Ed.2d 555 (1977) (agency not required to mail copies of requested records or pay travel expenses to obtain the requested records). While the agency may not send the FOIA requester on a scavenger hunt, Tax Analysts, 109 S.Ct. at 2852, in this case NARA has not done so; it has made all responsive records available in one central location for appellant's perusal. This satisfied the requirement under the FOIA to make records available to the public. 55 Appellant also challenges the adequacy of NARA's search and the denial of his fee waiver request; however, he did not pursue any of these challenges administratively. Until appellant exhausts his administrative remedies by appealing his challenges to the head of the agency, judicial review of any challenge is precluded. 17 56 NARA's military field office responded on November 14, 1985, releasing one index card of information, but withholding three other index cards pursuant to exemption 1, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(1). The November 14 letter properly informed appellant of his right to appeal and the process and deadline for doing so. Appellant did not appeal NARA's decision administratively, however. Therefore, appellant did not exhaust his administrative remedies as required before seeking judicial review.
57 Appellant sent his request to the NSA on August 21, 1985. The NSA responded on October 15, 1985, informing appellant that it would not conduct the search unless he paid one-half of the estimated search costs in advance and also agreed to pay the balance. See Letter to Carl Oglesby from Julia B. Wetzel (Oct. 15, 1985), reprinted in J.A. at 70-71. Appellant did not challenge the NSA's denial of his fee waiver request administratively, therefore he did not constructively exhaust his remedies and was not entitled initially to bring any challenge in district court. The district court nevertheless found that the issue of the fee waiver was the only issue before the court at that time, and that the issue was moot because the NSA subsequently agreed to waive the fees. See Oglesby, Mem. op. at 9; reprinted in J.A. at 275. However, because the appellant had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to each of his claims, none of his claims were properly before the court, including the challenge of the NSA's denial of appellant's fee waiver request. 58 Appellant's FOIA request became complete when the NSA granted his fee waiver request. If, as suggested by the briefs in this case, the NSA has already responded to appellant's FOIA request, then appellant must pursue his administrative remedies with respect to any adverse rulings before bringing suit.