Opinion ID: 47306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Probable Cause Affidavit and Warrant

Text: “A district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” United States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237, 1240 (11th Cir. 1999). We accept the district court’s findings of fact to be true, unless shown to be clearly erroneous, and review the district court’s application of the law to those facts 14 de novo. Id. “[A]ll facts are construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below.” United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000). “The individual challenging the search has the burdens of proof and persuasion.” United States v. Cooper, 133 F.3d 1394, 1398 (11th Cir. 1998). The Fourth Amendment provides for the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, and mandates that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Probable cause to support a search warrant exists when the totality of the circumstances allow a conclusion that there is a fair probability of finding contraband or evidence at a particular location.” United States v. Brundidge, 170 F.3d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Furthermore, probable cause “is a fluid concept--turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts[.]” Id. citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2329, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). This Court affords “great deference” to a lower court’s determination of probable cause. Brundidge, 170 F.3d at 1352. As we have noted: Under the Gates totality of the circumstances test, the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ prongs . . . for assessing the usefulness of an informant’s tips, are not independent. ‘[T]hey are better understood as relevant considerations in the totality of the circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable cause determinations: a deficiency in one may be compensated for . . . by a strong showing as 15 to the other[.]’ Id. at 1352-53. At the outer limits of probable cause determinations involving a close call, we have held that, in addition to independently corroborating an informant’s facts, creating circumstances where the informant is unlikely to lie can also corroborate the informant’s tip. See United States v. Foree, 43 F.3d 1572, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding search warrant where a substantial basis supported the magistrate’s finding of probable cause, especially in light of the fact that “the CI was unlikely to be untruthful, for, if the warrant issued, lies would likely be discovered in short order and favors falsely curried would dissipate rapidly.”). As for Harris’s Franks challenge to the veracity of Daniels’s statements regarding a “controlled buy” set forth in the affidavit underlying the search warrant, we have held that if, after an evidentiary hearing has concluded: the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard [of the truth] is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit. United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 986 (11th Cir. 2001), citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2676, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). 16 Turning first to the issue of whether a material and deliberate misrepresentation was made to the issuing magistrate in violation of Franks, Harris’s focus is on the statement in the affidavit that there was a “controlled purchase” made by a CI, something he argues never happened based on the officers’ testimony presented at the hearing. Specifically, Harris points to the fact that there was little, if any, control exerted over the buy. It is true that the testimony established that there was no video or audio surveillance, and, in fact, the police were not physically present on the premises, but rather were positioned in vehicles nearby and none of the officers actually saw or heard the purchase take place. Furthermore, while the officers in this case provided the CI money to make the purchase, it was not marked or recovered from Harris’s person or residence. Moreover, the small bag of drugs purchased by the CI was not dated or marked to indicate when and where they were retrieved, nor was any analysis done to verify the substances. However, there was also testimony that the CI’s car, person, and girlfriend were all searched before and after the purchase, and the CI turned over the drugs very soon after making the purchase. Whatever the shortcomings of the Crenshaw County Sheriff Department’s “controls” for making controlled purchases, taking the facts in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, the testimony of Officers 17 White and Daniels demonstrated that they honestly believed that the CI had made a controlled purchase of drugs from Harris’s residence. White’s testimony was that, while the preferred method for a controlled buy was to physically watch the CI make the purchase, it was not possible to do so in this case. Despite the lack of audio or video surveillance equipment, White still explained that the CI was monitored (although he did not explain how), which is why the affidavit for the search warrant mentioned the “controlled purchase.” Daniels’s testimony echoed a belief that, by searching the informant and his car prior to making the purchase and providing him the money to buy drugs, the purchase was controlled. Taking the facts in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, the government, it cannot be said that Daniels’s statement in the affidavit that a “controlled purchase” had taken place constituted a deliberately false statement or a statement made in reckless disregard of the truth, such as is required for the affidavit to be set aside under Franks. The fact that the officers’ definition of a “controlled purchase” is perhaps not as stringent as the one Harris might hope for does not mean that the officers were deliberately lying when they testified that they believed the purchase to be a “controlled” one. As such, we conclude that Harris’s Franks challenge does not warrant a reversal. Turning next to the issue of whether the affidavit was sufficient to establish 18 probable cause, it is a close call. The face of the affidavit itself states only that (1) information was received from an informant within the past 24 hours that drugs were located and sold in the Harris residence; (2) a controlled purchase had been made from within the residence; (3) the source had in the past provided information leading to the recovery of stolen property; and (4) the buy was made within the past 24 hours in the kitchen of the house. However, the last line of the affidavit was not even written by Officer Daniels, but rather by the magistrate judge who issued the warrant. The warrant does not describe in much detail why the informant was considered reliable, nor does it describe when and what the informant provided in the way of information that led to the recovery of stolen property. Furthermore, the details of the “controlled purchase” are left out entirely until the magistrate himself wrote in the final line, and Daniels does not indicate that the informant’s information was in any way corroborated. However, we decline to address whether the warrant in this case lacked probable cause because assuming, arguendo, that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause on its face, the testimony at the hearing regarding the discussions between Officer Daniels and the issuing magistrate are sufficient to establish a good faith reliance on the warrant, as discussed below.