Opinion ID: 2828520
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: consent, or the lack thereof

Text: As the Majority opinion sets out in full, George Varriale’s consent to have biological samples taken from his person occurred during the late morning of 10 July 2012 in a wooded area in Glen Burnie, Maryland. Maj. Slip Op. at 2–4. Detective David Wood (“Detective Wood”), who was investigating a report of a rape occurring nearby, approached Varriale, a homeless person who was living in a makeshift campground in a wooded area near the scene of the alleged crime, and introduced himself. Detective Wood explained that “he was conducting an investigation,”2 Maj. Slip Op. at 3, and asked 2 The record is unclear regarding whether, before Varriale gave his biological samples, Detective Wood specified verbally that he was conducting an investigation of a rape. Detective Wood’s Investigative Report, detailing his actions of 10 July 2012, was included in the materials provided to the Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County in advance of the Motion to Suppress hearing. In pertinent part, Detective Wood’s Investigative Report states as follows: I met with Officer Pederson in the wooded area . . . . [The subject] identified himself as George Varriale. . . . I informed Mr. Varriale I was conducting an investigation and I wanted an opportunity to talk to him. I told him he was not (Continued…) 2 (…continued) under arrest and was not under any obligation to talk to me. He agreed to talk to me and he gave me consent to use a digital voice recorder for the interview. . . . I advised Mr. Varriale we would like to collect saliva swabs and penile swabs from him. I placed a completed Consent to Search Person form in front of him and read the form to him. He agreed to give the Anne Arundel County Police Department consent to a search of his person for the purpose of furnishing evidence relating to saliva and penile swabs. The Investigative Report then recounts in detail the conversation Detective Wood had with Varriale, wherein they discussed Varriale’s activities the night before, his knowledge of the alleged victim, and Detective Wood’s further investigation of the matter. As noted above in the Investigative Report, Detective Wood used a digital voice recorder to make an audio recording of his interview with Varriale. The recording begins, however, after the point in time when Varriale consented to have the conversation recorded, and begins with Detective Wood reiterating their earlier conversation and confirming that Varriale understood that he was not under arrest and was not obligated to talk to him. The audio recording sheds no light on how Detective Wood characterized the nature of the investigation to Varriale originally. Regrettably, the Circuit Court judge presiding over Varriale’s suppression hearing prevented Detective Wood from developing the circumstances more fully through his testimony. During Detective Wood’s direct examination, the following transpired: [Detective Wood]: They had a subject found in a tent in that wooded area who identified himself as George, so I wanted to talk to the subject and, you know, still it’s very earlier [sic] in the investigation. I’m trying to figure out what’s going on, you know, he’s located as a possible subject. So when I arrived, I had all officers but one be there. I did have one officer with me just for officer’s safety, I guess routine, and I identified myself to the George subject and basically formed on what little I had, and (indiscernible) for him to talk to me. THE COURT: Let me ask you a question. [Detective Wood]: Yes. (Continued…) 3 Varriale if he would consent to a search of his person. Detective Wood read then to Varriale a document entitled “Anne Arundel County Police Consent to Search Person Form” (“Consent Form”) and placed a completed Consent Form in front of him for his signature. In pertinent part,3 the Consent Form stated: Case #: 12-725920[4] Date: 7-10-12 (…continued) THE COURT: His case, the relevance, Counsel, of the [2012] incident is just how they came in possession of the DNA sample, correct? [Prosecution]: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. We’re in no need of going to any great detail on this event, are we? [Prosecution]: No. Well, I intended to—the issue is, I believe, is consent. ... THE COURT: Can we stipulate to anything here so that we can get the detective back to bigger and better things? Discussion between the attorneys and the hearing judge ensued. Much later in the hearing, when the hearing judge turned his attention back to Detective Wood, he asked the witness two direct questions regarding a different factual issue and then dismissed the witness. 3 See Maj. Slip Op. at 3 (reproducing the Consent Form in full). 4 The underlined text reflects blanks on the document that were completed by hand. The remainder of the document appears to be a pre-printed form. Clearly, the investigation was of a specific alleged crime (indicated by a case number) that is highly unlikely to have been the cold case burglary occurring four years earlier. 4 I, George Varriale, do hereby consent to a search of my person for the purpose of furnishing evidence relating to one or more of the following: [. . . Saliva . . . Penile Swabs . . .] ... I realize that if I do consent to a body search, that any evidence found to be involved in this investigation, being conducted by the Anne Arundel County Police Department can be used in any future criminal prosecution. (emphasis added). Varriale signed the form, cooperated in the obtention of the samples by an evidence technician, and had an extended conversation with Detective Wood about the events of the proceeding evening. In short order, Varriale was excluded as a source of DNA from the alleged rape, see Maj. Slip Op. at 4–7, and Detective Wood did not contact Varriale again after 10 July 2012.5 At the suppression hearing, Varriale argued that the State’s DNA match evidence as to the much older burglary case should have been excluded on the grounds that subsequent use of his DNA profile to conduct a cold case comparison search of the DNA databank exceeded the scope of his consent and constituted therefore an unreasonable search in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. See Maj. Slip Op. at 4–7. The Circuit Court judge denied Varriale’s motion to suppress, sans explanation, findings of fact, or conclusions of law (not that such are required, but it is helpful often to understand what a trial judge is thinking, particularly in the context of a suppression ruling). 5 As of the date when Varriale was excluded as a possible suspect in the rape investigation, his expectation of privacy as a citizen was restored to its full vigor. I will speak more to this status later. See infra Part II of this dissent. 5 On appeal of Varriale’s conviction after entering a conditional guilty plea, the Court of Special Appeals conceded that Varriale “may not have unambiguously consented to the use of his DNA outside of the rape investigation,” Varriale v. State, 218 Md. App. 47, 52–53, 96 A.3d 793, 796 (2014), and that “the consent form is not a model of clarity.” Varriale, 218 Md. App. at 54, 96 A.3d at 797. The intermediate appellate court opined as follows: While the form states that Varriale’s DNA “can be used in any future prosecution,” the form does not clearly specify whether the State may use the DNA only in a “criminal prosecution” for the alleged rape that the police were actually investigating, as opposed to some other “criminal prosecution” that is entirely unrelated to the alleged rape. Because we must construe this ambiguity against the State as the drafter, we conclude that the consent form does not contain Varriale’s consent to the use of his DNA in criminal prosecutions that are unrelated to the alleged rape. Id. The intermediate appellate court concluded nonetheless that the ambiguity was “ultimately immaterial” because the State did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment as it “had no obligation to obtain a warrant before reexamining the DNA sample that it had lawfully obtained.” Varriale, 218 Md. App. at 53, 96 A.3d at 796; see id. at 55, 96 A.3d at 797. The thrust of the Majority’s reasoning here hangs on its threshold determination that Varriale did not place an “express limitation” on his consent. See Maj. Slip Op. at 2 (“[W]e shall hold that, where Varriale’s consent to search was not expressly limited by him, by the State, or by law, the Fourth Amendment does not preclude the State from storing and using his voluntarily provided DNA sample and resultant DNA profile for 6 additional, unrelated criminal investigations.”), 9, 15, 18, 18 n.9, 19 (“Therefore, absent an express limitation placed on the use or storage of the DNA evidence by Varriale, the State, or by law, we cannot conclude that it was unreasonable for the State to maintain and utilize Varriale’s DNA for subsequent unrelated investigations.”), 19, 24, 25. In interpreting the Consent Form signed by Varriale, the Court majority reasons that it demonstrates neither an express limitation on the permitted use of the DNA evidence nor an express consent to any future use. Indeed, the form does not specify what the State would do with the DNA evidence once it was collected (namely, that it would retain the DNA profile and upload it to the LDIS). Unlike the Court of Special Appeals, however, we do not conclude that the form should be construed against the State to mean that there was no consent to the subsequent use and analysis of Varriale’s DNA. Maj. Slip Op. at 15. The Majority proceeds then to apply the United States Supreme Court’s “‘objective’ reasonableness” test, as set out in Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991), to measure the scope of Varriale’s consent: “[W]hat would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” See Maj. Slip Op. at 15. The Majority concludes, applying the Jimeno test, that [l]ooking at the totality of the circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude that the lawful use of Varriale’s DNA was limited only to the rape investigation. It is undisputed that Varriale made no express limitation indicating that his consent was limited to or conditioned upon the DNA evidence being used exclusively in the rape investigation. Maj. Slip Op. at 18. The Majority’s assessment of the scope of Varriale’s consent, in my view, is so far removed from the reality of what a typical reasonable person would have believed, based 7 on the totality of the circumstances in this case, as to boggle the mind of virtually any person-on-the-street in our State. A typical reasonable person, presented with the Consent Form at issue in this case, with a specific case number written on the top of the form identifying the aim and scope of the investigation as being a part of an ongoing, open rape investigation,6 would assume that, indeed, the biological samples provided (and the DNA profile developed from the samples) would be used only in connection with the ongoing, open rape investigation. Furthermore, a reasonable person would understand the Consent Form to mean: “any evidence found to be involved in this investigation, being conducted by the Anne Arundel County Police Department can be used in any future criminal prosecution [of the alleged crime under investigation].” (emphasis added). By its own terms and the circumstances of the encounter between Detective Wood and Varriale, Varriale’s Consent Form limits the scope of the search (and its fruit) to use only in the rape investigation case (“this investigation”) and any future criminal prosecution related thereto. When Varriale’s DNA profile was compared to the DNA profile of the biological samples taken from under the alleged victim’s fingernails, his sample was found to exclude him as a suspect in the rape investigation and the scope of consent reached its limit. After that failed comparison, however, Varriale’s sample (during the automatic database search, see Maj. Slip Op. at 5–7) was compared to 6 Most burglary investigations probably do not call for the collection of a penile swab, unless it is suspected that a penis was used as a burglary tool. In any event, this fact reinforces the notion that Varriale had every reason to believe it was only a rape allegation that was under active investigation. 8 evidence samples not “found to be involved in this [rape] investigation,” to wit, every other sample from every unsolved crime for which there was a DNA sample entered into the LDIS suspect index; i.e., evidence from untold other investigations. A typical reasonable person would not understand Varriale’s Consent Form to encompass such a continuation of the use of the fruit of his sample. The Majority is wrong to conclude, therefore, that Varriale did not limit expressly the scope of his consent. Varriale limited the scope of his consent—the standard Consent Form provided to him by the Anne Arundel County Police Department limited expressly the scope of his consent by its own terms. Because the Majority misunderstands the appropriate scope of Varriale’s consent, its Fourth Amendment analysis is flawed as well. Even if the consent may be deemed not to be limited expressly to use of Varriale’s biological samples (and resultant DNA profile) only in the rape investigation, I cannot endorse that the Court of Special Appeals and the Majority here appear to expect a homeless person living in the woods to be able to appreciate that he needs to re-negotiate the terms of the pre-printed Consent Form to specify that his biological samples may not be used to investigate any imaginable crime other than the one being investigated. This is beyond the ken of a typical lay person, even one who is not a homeless person living in the woods. Unless and until the Public Defender or private criminal defense attorneys open offices in the woods,7 the Majority’s standard, as applied in this case, represents an 7 Or raccoons are accepted for matriculation in law schools. 9 unreasonable expectation of what a typical reasonable person in Varriale’s shoes would know to do.