Opinion ID: 6497289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Internet-Access Condition

Text: ¶ 15. Defendant first claims that the State failed to prove that he was subject to a probation condition prohibiting internet use. This argument is without merit. To prevail in a probation-revocation proceeding, “[t]he State must present evidence to prove . . . the terms and conditions of [defendant’s] probation.” Millard, 149 Vt. at 385, 543 A.2d at 701. Here, the State established that defendant was subject to a condition that prohibited any internet access without prior approval. That provision states in its entirety: You may not own, possess, or have access to a computer or other devices [] that have access to the internet, unless approved, in advance, by your Probation Officer or therapist. You may not have or maintain a social media account, such as Facebook, Instagram, Kik, Snapchat, etc. of any kind unless approved, in advance, by your Probation Officer or designee in writing. Such approval shall be based upon your progress in the aforementioned sex offender counseling, as well as how well you are progressing in your rehabilitation, to be determined by your Probation Officer or 1 Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s determination that he violated the condition prohibiting him from possessing a device with photographic or videographic capabilities. 6 therapist. Lack of approval must be based upon reasonably objective criteri[a] relating to your lack of progress in sex offender counseling and/or lack of progress in your overall rehabilitation such that access to such contraband would risk violation of your conditions of probation. Your Probation Officer or therapist should approve use of this technology when therapeutically supported based upon progress in your sex offender counseling, either within or without a correctional facility. You will allow your Probation Officer or designee to monitor your computer and internet usage, to include through the use of specific software for monitoring sex offenders, for the sole purpose of determining whether you have engaged in activities that would constitute a violation of these conditions of probation. You will pay for any expenses associated with this. You may use computers within the correctional facility when you are serving any portion of your sentences. The above condition expressly prohibited defendant from accessing the internet unless he received prior approval from his probation officer or therapist. It likewise prohibited him from having or maintaining a social-media account of any kind without prior approval. The plain language of the condition made it clear that defendant was not to access the internet at all without first obtaining his probation officer’s permission. We therefore reject defendant’s claim that the condition did not prohibit him from using the internet. ¶ 16. Defendant next argues that, even if a complete prohibition on internet use was contemplated, the condition required such a ban to be preceded by a finding that he had not made adequate progress in counseling or rehabilitation. He argues that the probation officer impermissibly modified the condition by imposing an internet ban from the outset of his probation without first considering his compliance with treatment and conditions. ¶ 17. Probation officers have some discretion in implementing conditions, but the power to impose or modify the language of the conditions “rests exclusively with the courts.” State v. Rivers, 2005 VT 65, ¶ 15, 178 Vt. 180, 878 A.2d 1070; see 28 V.S.A. §§ 252(a), 253(a). Thus, we have reversed VOP convictions that were premised on violations of probation-officer-imposed requirements where those requirements were not implied or justified by the language of the underlying probation conditions. For example, in State v. Galloway, the defendant was found to 7 have violated a condition requiring him to “successfully enroll, participate in, and complete a program for sex offenders approved by [the Department of Corrections]” by failing to complete the VTPSA while he was serving the incarcerative portion of his sentence. 2020 VT 29, ¶ 17, 212 Vt. 91, 231 A.3d 1157. This Court reversed the conviction, concluding that the Department’s interpretation of the condition constituted an impermissible modification because it added a requirement not expressly or impliedly present in the condition, namely, requiring defendant to complete the program offered in prison, as opposed to a community-based program. Id. ¶ 18. ¶ 18. Similarly, in Rivers, the defendant was convicted of violating a condition prohibiting him from having contact with children under the age of sixteen by attending a fair. 2005 VT 65, ¶ 16. We reversed, concluding that the probation officer had interpreted the condition to prohibit the defendant from going to places where children could be expected to congregate, but that this interpretation was not expressed in or implied by the condition’s plain language. Id. We held that “[b]y prohibiting defendant from attending the fair, defendant’s probation officer converted the probation condition from a contact-based condition to a location-based condition. In so doing, the probation officer crossed the line between condition interpretation and modification.” Id. ¶ 19. ¶ 19. Defendant’s attempt to analogize this case to Galloway and Rivers fails because his probation officer did not impose an interpretation of the internet-access condition that was inconsistent with its plain language. The condition clearly contemplates that defendant was to begin probation without any internet access, a restriction that could be loosened over time if he demonstrated progress in sex-offender counseling and rehabilitation. The condition did not require the probation officer to first make a finding that defendant was failing to progress in treatment before prohibiting him from using the internet. It did not state, for example, that defendant was to have access to the internet unless his probation officer forbade it due to lack of progress. Rather, the “lack of approval” language, viewed in context, provided guidelines for the probation officer 8 to exercise his discretion when and if defendant demonstrated the necessary progress.2 The probation officer applied the language as written and did not impose any impermissible modifications. ¶ 20. For the same reason, we reject defendant’s claim that the condition failed to put him on notice that he was not permitted to use the internet. “A probationer has fair notice of those conditions expressly stated in the probation certificate.” State v. Stern, 2018 VT 36, ¶ 7, 207 Vt. 479, 186 A.3d 1099; see 28 V.S.A. § 252(c) (requiring probationer be given certificate explicitly setting forth probation conditions). “Fair notice can also be provided by the instructions and directions given to defendant by his or her probation officer.” State v. Peck, 149 Vt. 617, 619-20, 547 A.2d 1329, 1331 (1988). As discussed above, the condition plainly stated that defendant could not use any device to access the internet without prior approval from his probation officer. Even if defendant did not understand the internet-access condition when he signed it upon his release from prison in March 2020, the probation officer explained it to him after his first violation in April 2020. We therefore conclude that defendant had fair notice that he was prohibited from accessing the internet. ¶ 21. Defendant further contends that the internet-access condition is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague, lacks a reasonable nexus to his offenses, and violates his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. Defendant argues that in Packingham v. North Carolina, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a North Carolina law prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing social-media websites violated the First Amendment rights of offenders because it was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest in protecting children from abuse. 582 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017). Defendant also points to decisions from other jurisdictions striking down conditions prohibiting any computer or internet use for convicted sex offenders as unconstitutionally overbroad. See, e.g., United States v. Holena, 906 F.3d 288, 290 (3d Cir. 2018) 2 No evidence of defendant’s progress in treatment was presented below. 9 (reversing imposition of condition of supervised release that prohibited sex offender from using computers or internet); People v. Morger, 2019 IL 123643, ¶ 58, 160 N.E.3d 53, 69 (holding that Illinois statutory probation condition banning sex offenders from using social-media websites was unconstitutionally overbroad). ¶ 22. These decisions might be relevant if defendant were appealing directly from the imposition of the internet-access condition. However, it is well-settled law in Vermont that “a probationer is barred from raising a collateral challenge to a probation condition that he was charged with violating, where the challenge could have been raised on direct appeal from the sentencing order.” Austin, 165 Vt. at 401, 685 A.2d at 1084. This rule applies to constitutional challenges that were apparent at the time of sentencing. See id. at 401 n.3, 685 A.2d at 1084 n.3. The record shows that the conditions in this case were carefully negotiated between defense counsel and the State and were agreed to by defendant. The internet-access condition clearly contemplated that defendant would not be allowed to use the internet or have a social-media account without first obtaining approval from his probation officer. He had the opportunity to appeal the condition or to move for sentence reconsideration, but he did not do so. Nor did he move to modify the condition at any point. Accordingly, he is barred from arguing now that the conditions are facially invalid. ¶ 23. Defendant asserts that the Austin rule does not apply because he is challenging the application of the internet-access condition rather than the condition itself. See id. (noting that this Court “ha[s] allowed constitutional challenges to be made during revocation proceedings when the alleged constitutional infirmity became apparent only as applied to the facts of the alleged violation”). He argues that the condition as applied by the probation officer impermissibly infringes on his right to freedom of speech. Defendant failed to preserve this argument for our review by raising it before the trial court. See State v. Hinchliffe, 2009 VT 111, ¶ 31, 186 Vt. 487, 987 A.2d 988 (“Even when the defendant asserts a violation of constitutional rights, failure to 10 promptly raise the issue before the trial court results in a waiver.” (quotation omitted)). Moreover, defendant’s argument depends on a flawed premise: namely, that the prohibition on internet or social-media use arose from the probation officer’s interpretation of the condition and was not apparent at the time of sentencing. The meaning of the condition was clear at the time of its imposition, and defendant cannot circumvent the Austin rule by claiming that he is merely challenging how it was applied to him. See State v. Amidon, 2010 VT 46A, ¶ 10, 188 Vt. 617, 8 A.3d 1050 (mem.) (declining to address claims on appeal from VOP finding that probation condition violated First Amendment right of association and lacked nexus to underlying crime because “given defendant’s agreement to these conditions as part of his original plea bargain, these challenges should have been raised on direct appeal from his sentencing order”). ¶ 24. The evidence presented at the VOP hearing was sufficient to support the trial court’s determination that defendant violated the internet-access condition. Defendant admitted at the hearing and to his probation officer that he had used a smartphone and a gaming console to access the internet. Defendant’s mother testified that defendant had used the internet to send nude pictures of himself to others. His probation officer observed that defendant possessed smartphones, computers, and the gaming console in his home. The officer testified that defendant did not have approval to use these devices, and defendant admitted that he had possessed a smartphone and a PlayStation without receiving prior approval. There was also sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant had a social-media account, specifically, his admission to the probation officer and the Facebook posts presented by the State. Although defendant suggested that his ex-girlfriend had used his password to create the posts, the trial court was within its discretion to find his testimony not credible in light of the other evidence. See Austin, 165 Vt. at 398, 685 A.2d at 1082 (“Findings of fact fairly and reasonably supported by any credible evidence must stand.”). We therefore decline to disturb the court’s conclusion that defendant violated the internet-access condition. 11