Opinion ID: 1801680
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The prior crimes and expert testimony as evidence of motive

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting his prior 1976 crimes as evidence of his motive to sexually assault Polly. We disagree. (28) Although motive is not an element of any of defendant's crimes, the absence of apparent motive may make proof of the essential elements less persuasive.... ( People v. Phillips (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 69, 84 [175 Cal.Rptr. 703].) Evidence of a defendant's prior criminal acts is admissible when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive . . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) Here, defendant's kidnapping of Polly, his failure to take items of significant value, the evidence of planning, and his use of the silky bindings and the intricately knotted hood device raised but did not fully answer questions about defendant's motive. Defendant's prior 1976 crimes were relevant and admissible to prove his motive to sexually assault Polly, as defendant admitted to having sexual fantasies about assaulting and binding his prior female victims. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to introduce expert testimony concerning paraphilia as an explanation of his motive in both this case and his prior crimes. He relies on People v. McFarland (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 489 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 884] ( McFarland ). At issue in McFarland was whether the defendant, who twice previously had been convicted of lewd conduct with a child under 14 years of age, had an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest in children, for purposes of section 647.6 (annoying or molesting a minor), when he stroked a four-year-old girl's arm and face. A psychiatrist called by the prosecution who had not examined the defendant testified, based on court documents and psychiatric reports from the defendant's prior convictions, that the defendant had such an interest. ( McFarland, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 492.) The Court of Appeal in McFarland concluded that the psychiatrist's testimony was inadmissible and reversed. A prosecutor, it held, may not present an expert's opinion about a defendant's predisposition to commit sexual offenses unless the defendant places his character regarding such matters at issue, as such evidence constitutes inadmissible character evidence. (See Evid. Code, §§ 1100, 1101, 1102.) The court noted that Evidence Code section sections 1101, which allows the introduction of prior criminal acts in certain circumstances, and 1108, which allows propensity evidence to be used in certain sexual offense cases, only permit the prosecution to present evidence of specific acts, not expert testimony. ( McFarland, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 495.) The court also held that the admission of the expert's opinion of the defendant's propensity to commit sexual offenses also violated Penal Code section 29, which prohibits an expert from offering an opinion on the ultimate question of whether the defendant had or did not have a particular mental state at the time he committed the offense. ( Id. at p. 496.) Here, the prosecution's expert, Dr. Park Elliott Dietz, defined the sexual disorder known as paraphilia, and he described the characteristics typical of persons who have those disorders. (See p. 562, ante. ) Although he did not give a medical opinion or diagnosis that defendant was a paraphiliac, he testified that certain of defendant's prior crimes, in which he used weapons and prepared bindings for use on lone female victims, were consistent with the stages of a sexual assault by a paraphiliac, and that defendant's statement that he fantasized about tied-up crime victims while masturbating indicated that he was a paraphiliac. He also testified that defendant's behavior in the kidnapping and murder of Polly was consistent with paraphilia. Defendant argues that under the reasoning of McFarland, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th 489, the trial court should have excluded this testimony. (29) The trial court properly allowed Dr. Dietz to give a general description of paraphilia and the behavior typical of persons who have this disorder. Expert testimony of this nature is admissible on any subject `sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.' ( People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 905 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 447, 94 P.3d 574] [prosecution may present expert testimony regarding battered women's syndrome]; see also Evid. Code, § 805.) It is a closer question whether the trial court erred when it permitted Dr. Dietz to testify that when defendant committed his prior assaults and when he kidnapped and murdered Polly, his behavior was consistent with paraphilia. But even if the court should have excluded this testimony, the error was harmless under any standard. As we have explained, the court properly admitted the evidence that defendant had repeatedly stalked, bound, and assaulted other women, as well as defendant's admission that he found his attacks sexually stimulating. Dr. Dietz's brief testimony that defendant's conduct was consistent with paraphilia drew a conclusion that the jury could easily have drawn by itself, without Dr. Dietz's help. Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury not to consider Dr. Dietz's testimony as evidence that the defendant is a person of bad character or that he had the requisite intent or mental state at the time of the commission of the crimes or that he has a disposition to commit crimes, and that his testimony could be used only for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show motive. Under these circumstances, any error could not have prejudiced defendant.