Opinion ID: 1448152
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claimed Sentencing Error

Text: Although Dison presents an issue of first impression in this circuit, three other circuits  two in published decisions and one in an unpublished, non-precedential opinion  have held that the plain language of the relevant statutes mandates application of the § 3147 enhancement to the offense of failure to appear in violation of § 3146. [10] Like each of the other circuits that has confronted this issue, we too are persuaded by Congress's unambiguous language to conclude that a defendant who commits the offense of failure to appear is subject to the § 3147 enhancement for committing that offense while on release. Here is why. When the plain language of a statute is unambiguous and does not lead[ ] to an absurd result, [11] our inquiry begins and ends with the plain meaning of that language. [12] The plain language of § 3147 is unambiguous in mandating a sentence enhancement to [a] person convicted of an offense committed while released under [ ] chapter [207]. [13] In the instant case, Dison was convicted of an offense  failure to appear in violation of § 3146  that she committed while she was on release under chapter 207 of Title 18. The § 3147 enhancement thus unambiguously applies to Dison. [14] The rule of lenity has no traction in such cases. [15] Dison contends that even if the § 3147 enhancement could be read as extending to the § 3146 offense of failure to appear, the enhancement as applied to her violates the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause because it exposes Ms. Dison to multiple punishments for the same offense. It is true that Dison is subject to the § 3147 enhancement for having failed to appear while on release even though she committed that offense in the only manner possible, viz., while on release. [16] Yet, assuming arguendo that the enhancement subjects Dison to double counting, such an application would not necessarily violate the double jeopardy clause. [17] The [Supreme] Court has ... defined the nature of double jeopardy protection by stating: `[w]ith respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.' [18] Here, there was a single prosecution for Dison's offense of failure to appear. And, we know that cumulative punishment, to the extent any exists, is within the intent of Congress because the Guidelines are explicit when double counting is forbidden. [19] Under the doctrine of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, only if the guideline in question expressly forbids double counting, would such double counting be impermissible. [20] Section 3147 contains no prohibition against cumulative punishment. We presume, therefore, that Congress intended to impose it; there is thus no double jeopardy violation. [21] We continue briefly to emphasize that the instant case is not one in which we must determine whether Congress intended to permit a defendant to be convicted of, and sentenced for, two offenses that penalize the same underlying conduct. [22] If that were the case, we would require a clear and definite legislative directive indicating that Congress intended both punishments. [23] Instead, our precedent establishes that § 3147 provides only a sentence enhancement and does not constitute an independent offense or an element thereof. [24] This analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi, which held that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [25] Apprendi is inapplicable to a fact used in sentencing that does not increase a penalty beyond the statutory maximum. [26] And, regardless of the fact that § 3147 calls for punishment in addition to the sentence prescribed for the underlying offense, the § 3147 enhancement can never result in a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum prescribed for the offense committed while on release, here failure to appear. [27] Our foregoing analysis of the subject sentencing scheme therefore stands without the need for any additional scrutiny. Given the unambiguous statutory language  which does not lead to an absurd result [28]  we presume Congress intended the § 3146 offense and the § 3147 enhancement to interact in the manner that the plain text mandates. If, hereafter, Congress finds this result unpalatable, it is within its power to rewrite the existing statute. [29]