Opinion ID: 2039539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: mistake of fact jury instruction

Text: Defendant was charged with two counts of murder. Both charges stated that he beat and burned and thereby caused the death of Gahan. Count I charged that defendant acted with intent to kill or do great bodily harm, and count II charged defendant acted knowing such acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(a)(1), (a)(2).) Defendant argues that in regard to the beating, the action taken by him, in repeatedly striking Gahan with numchucks, was in self-defense. In regard to the burning, defendant argues that he is not guilty of murder because at the time of the burning, he believed that Gahan was already dead. The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense, but refused to give defendant's mistake of fact instruction. Defendant argues that the appellate court, relying on People v. Ellison (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 985, 81 Ill.Dec. 222, 466 N.E.2d 1024, correctly determined that he was denied a fair trial by the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on mistake of fact. We agree. A defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case if there is some foundation for the instruction in the evidence ( People v. Unger (1977), 66 Ill.2d 333, 338, 5 Ill.Dec. 848, 362 N.E.2d 319), and if there is such evidence, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to so instruct the jury ( People v. Papas (1942), 381 Ill. 90, 95, 44 N.E.2d 896). Defendant's mistake of fact defense was supported by the evidence. Detectives Costello and Schultz both testified that while defendant was giving his statement, he said that he believed Gahan was dead prior to the burning. The State's experts who testified on Gahan's cause of death were unable to conclusively determine that Gahan was alive at the time of burning. While Doctor Powers testified that Gahan was probably alive at the time of the burning, he acknowledged that it was possible that he was already dead. Doctor Blum testified that a lay person seeing an unconscious body with injuries like Gahan's might reasonably conclude that the person was dead. This evidence satisfies the requirement of some foundation to entitle defendant to an instruction on mistake of fact. Mistake of fact is a valid defense if the mistake negates the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 4-8.) In the present case, the trial court, while acknowledging that defendant's tendered mistake of fact instruction was an accurate statement of the law, refused to give it to the jury on the basis that the standard jury instructions adequately covered the mental state requirement. In the instant case, the jury was instructed: To sustain the charge of murder, the State must prove the following propositions: first, that the defendant performed the acts which caused the death of Robert P. Gahan; and second, that when the defendant did so, he intended to kill or do great bodily harm to Robert P. Gahan or he knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Robert P. Gahan; and third, that the defendant was not justified in using the force which he used. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each one of these propositions has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any one of these propositions has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant not guilty. This instruction, while sufficiently informing the jury of the mental state requirements, does not expressly draw to the jury's attention the concept of mistake of fact. Since Illinois recognizes the defense of mistake of fact, when this defense is supported by the evidence it is not sufficient to merely inform the jury of the mental state requirements, but it must also be informed of the validity of the mistake of fact defense. Since (1) defendant's whole case rested upon the concepts of self-defense and mistake of fact, and (2) there exists some evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that defendant burned Gahan under the mistaken belief that he was dead, the failure to give the mistake of fact instruction to the jury cannot be considered harmless.