Opinion ID: 3011785
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Delegation of Power to the Probation Officer

Text: The government suggests that the termpornography is cabined by the fact that Loy could check with his pr obation officer to gauge its applicability to a particular case. However, although there is no question that [i]n addition to the bare words of the probation condition, the probationer may be guided by further . . . instructions . . . of the . . . 23 probation officer, United States v. Romero, 676 F.2d 406, 407 (9th Cir. 1982), the sentencing court may not wholesaledly abdicate[ ] its judicial r esponsibility for setting the conditions of release, United States v. Mohammad, 53 F.3d 1426, 1438 (7th Cir . 1995) (invalidating an order of restitution wher e the sentencing court allowed the probation officer to dictate the manner of payment). A condition with no core meaning beyond whatever is necessary for Loy's rehabilitation cannot be cured by allowing the probation officer an unfettered power of interpretation, as this would create one of the very problems against which the vagueness doctrine is meant to protect, i.e., the delegation of basic policy matters to policemen . . . for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972); see LoFranco v. United States Par ole Comm'n, 986 F. Supp. 796, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding a par ole condition to be unconstitutionally vague because the pr ohibition on association with outlaw motorcycle gangs delegated policymaking power to the parole officer); cf. United States v. Kent, 209 F.3d 1073, 1079 (8th Cir . 2000) (invalidating a condition requiring probation officer to determine whether the defendant should undergo counseling). 7 Though it is true that [c]ondemned to the use of wor ds, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language, Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110, without a more definitive standard to guide the probation officer's discretion, there is a real danger that the prohibition on por nography may ultimately translate to a prohibition on whatever the officer personally finds titillating. Cf. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (striking down a statute punishing assemblages of persons who conducted themselves in an annoying manner, on the ground that though a city may forbid certain forms of antisocial conduct, [i]t cannot constitutionally do so through . . . an ordinance whose violation may entirely depend upon whether or not a policeman is annoyed). _________________________________________________________________ 7. A similar condition was imposed in this case; however, Loy has not raised any challenges to it, and so we need not addr ess the question whether this court would follow the Eighth Cir cuit reasoning regarding the propriety of conditions that allow the pr obation officer to determine whether a defendant is in need of counseling. 24