Opinion ID: 2833272
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: when struck by;

Text: a motor vehicle designed for use mainly on public roads or a trailer of any type. 2. Any other person while occupying your covered auto with your permission. The trial court concluded that Sturrock = s injuries were covered. A divided court of appeals affirmed. [1] There is no dispute that Sturrock is a A covered person. @ The parties so stipulated. There is no dispute that Sturrock was occupying a motor vehicle at the time of his injury. But coverage under the PIP provisions does not attach simply because an insured was injured A [w] hile occupying @ a covered motor vehicle. A [B] odily injury @ must A result[] from a motor vehicle accident. @ This Court had occasion in Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Griffin [2] to construe the term A auto accident. @ Royal, the insured, was driving a vehicle when his two passengers fired gun shots and wounded Griffin in the leg as he walked down a street. Griffin alleged negligence and gross negligence. The issue was whether Royal = s insurer was required to defend or indemnify him. [3] Royal = s policy said that the insurer A > will pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for which any covered person becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident. = @ [4] Coverage extended to A > you or any family member for the ownership, maintenance, or use of any auto or trailer. = @ [5] We held that the term A auto accident @ is not ambiguous. [6] Quoting State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Peck , [7] we said, A > The term A auto accident @ refers to situations where one or more vehicles are involved with another vehicle, object, or person. = @ [8] We held, A To read Griffin = s petition as alleging an > auto accident = would strain that term beyond any reasonable meaning. @ [9] Griffin = s injuries were not from an auto accident, but from a drive-by shooting, even though the shooter was using a covered vehicle for transportation at the time of the shooting. The Peck decision, cited in Griffin , is instructive. Salazar was a passenger in Peck = s vehicle while Peck, the insured, was taking her dog from a groomer to a veterinarian. Salazar was sitting in the back seat with the dog when the dog bit him, inflicting severe lacerations to his face. [10] The insurer sought a declaratory judgment that it had no obligation to defend Peck in Salazar = s suit against her. [11] The policy provided that the insured A > will pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for which any covered person becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident . = @ [12] The court of appeals held that the term A auto accident @ was unambiguous, and that it must apply that term = s A ordinary and generally accepted meaning. @ [13] The court of appeals concluded A that the ordinary and generally accepted meaning of the term > auto accident = refers to situations where one or more vehicles are involved in some type of collision or near collision with another vehicle, object, or person. @ [14] It then said, A [f] urthermore , we are persuaded that the automobile must, in some manner, be involved in the accident, @ and A [t]he mere fact that an accident takes place in or near an automobile does not mean the accident was an > auto accident. = @ [15] The ordinary, generally accepted meaning of A motor vehicle accident @ does not call to mind tripping over the threshold of a vehicle while exiting, notwithstanding a decision from a court of appeals more than thirty years ago, which held that injury had occurred in a motor vehicle accident when an insured with phlebitis in his leg A was favoring it as he twisted in order to get out of the car and as he did so his right knee caught and the cartilage snapped. @ [16] This Court = s decision in Mid-Century Insurance Co. of Texas v. Lindsey [17] does not hold otherwise. The Lindsey case construed another section of the Texas standard auto policy, the uninsured/underinsured motorist provision. [18] Lindsey was the insured. He was sitting in a car parked next to Metzer = s truck when Metzer = s nine-year-old son attempted to climb into the cab of the truck through its sliding rear window and caused a gun on a gun rack mounted over the rear window to discharge. Lindsey was struck by the gunshot. After the $20,000 limits of Metzer = s policy were paid, Lindsey sued his insurer under the uninsured/underinsured motorist provisions. The policy provided: A We will pay damages which a covered person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured [or underinsured] motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by a covered person, or property damage, caused by an accident. The owner = s or operator = s liability for these damages must arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured [or underinsured] motor vehicle. @ [19] The Court = s decision in Lindsey primarily focused on the A > arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the . . . motor vehicle = @ language. [20] We examined decisions from this [21] and other [22] jurisdictions that had considered the meaning of A arose out of the use of a motor vehicle. @ We then looked, in particular, at situations in which a gun was involved and whether and under what circumstances the discharge of a firearm A arose out of the use @ of a vehicle. [23] We concluded that A Lindsey = s injury arose out of the use of the Metzer truck @ because A Metzer = s son = s sole purpose was to gain entry into the truck to retrieve his clothing. @ [24] He was not playing with the gun, trying to shoot it, or load or unload it. [25] He was using the vehicle A qua vehicle, rather than simply as an article of property, @ [26] and his use of the underinsured vehicle injured the insured. In the instant case, the policy provision at issue does not contain the broad A arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the . . . motor vehicle @ language. The policy instead says that coverage applies only if there is A bodily injury: resulting from a motor vehicle accident @ while a covered person is A occupying @ or A struck by @ a motor vehicle. Sturrock = s injury occurred when he was alighting from his vehicle. But that does not answer the question of whether his injury was one A resulting from a motor vehicle accident, @ as the PIP provisions of his policy require. In Lindsey we only briefly discussed what constitutes an A auto accident. @ [27] The policy provision required that the injury result from A an accident. @ There was no question that the shooting in Lindsey was A an accident. @ We explained that the boy A did not intend to cause the shotgun to discharge or Lindsey to be injured, nor was it reasonably foreseeable that either consequence would result from the boy = s trying to enter the pickup through the rear window. @ [28] But the insurer argued that A accident @ should be read to mean A auto accident. @ In addressing that argument, we assumed, without deciding, that the term A accident @ as used in the uninsured/underinsured motorist policy provision could be limited to an A auto accident. @ We then cited our decision in Griffin , quoting its holding that A > [t]he term > auto accident = refers to situations where one or more vehicles are involved with another vehicle, object, or person. = @ [29] We then concluded that A [n] othing in the language or holding of either case suggests that an > auto accident = requires a collision or excludes occurrences like the one in this case. @ [30] Nothing in Lindsey suggests that the mere fact that an accident took place in an automobile means that it was an A auto accident. @ To the contrary, we cited Peck with approval for the proposition that when a vehicle is merely the situs of the injury, there is no A auto accident. @ [31] We approved the rationale in Peck , affirming A that a dog bite inflicted while the victim was in a car was not an auto accident. @ [32] The vehicle in Peck was being used for transportation when the dog bite occurred, and it was certainly an accident from the insured = s point of view. But the vehicle was merely the location of an accident that could have occurred anywhere, just as Sturrock in the case presently before us could have tripped and injured himself in many locales other than his parked truck. By contrast, the accidental shooting in Lindsey could only have occurred from use of the A vehicle qua vehicle. @ [33] The shotgun was on a gun rack mounted to the vehicle, and the boy came into contact with it when he was attempting to retrieve his clothing stored in the vehicle. We said that A > [ i ]f the discharge or incident could have occurred regardless of the vehicle, the courts seem to be consistent in holding there is no coverage. = @ [34] Accordingly, we said that if the boy had been handling the gun while in the vehicle and it had accidentally discharged, there would have been no coverage. [35] We recognized in Lindsey that the question of whether there was even a use of a motor vehicle was A a close case, @ [36] as evidenced by the numerous, sometimes conflicting decisions from other jurisdictions. [37] The Court today cites five cases from other jurisdictions that find coverage when an insured is injured entering or exiting a vehicle or is injured near a vehicle. [38] But the policy language in each of these cases is different from Texas = s standard PIP provision. Each of the policy provisions afforded broader coverage than Texas = s PIP provision, and most importantly, none of the policy provisions in those cases required an auto or motor vehicle accident as a prerequisite to coverage. [39] The Court cannot convincingly distinguish the decisions that do deal with policies that require an auto or motor vehicle accident in order for coverage to apply. In Farmers Insurance Co. of Washington v. Grelis , [40] which was cited and relied on in Peck , [41] the policy provided coverage A > for injury to each insured person caused by an automobile accident. = @ [42] The policy defined A accident @ as A > a sudden event . . . resulting in bodily injury neither expected nor intended by the insured person. = @ [43] The policy defined A > injured person = @ as A > an insured person who is injured by accident while occupying or being struck by an automobile. = @ [44] The insured was in his van, parked on the side of a boulevard when he allowed a stranger to enter and was then robbed. The robber tripped on a part of the front seat of the van, which caused him to lunge forward and stab the insured. The robber then ordered the insured to drive away. The Washington court held this was not an A automobile accident. @ [45] That court reasoned that A [t]he fact that the van seats were incidentally involved does not convert this incident into an > automobile accident. = @ [46] The court concluded that A cases construing the words > arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the owned automobile, = a phrase which is common in many insurance policies . . . [are] of no value because that language does not appear in the endorsement in question. @ [47] Subsequently, the Washington Supreme Court had occasion to construe the term A motor vehicle accident @ when used in a policy. The policy provided coverage for A > bodily injury to each insured person caused by a motor vehicle accident . = @ [48] The insured owned a camper affixed to his pickup. When he purchased the camper, it included an unattached wooden object intended as a step to facilitate entering and exiting. The insured was injured when he was in a park for overnight camping and exited the camper. He A stepped down from the truck = s tailgate onto the unattached wooden step that had been placed on the ground. The step somehow gave way, causing [the insured] to fall. In falling, his arm caught on the edge of the tailgate, cutting it. @ [49] The Washington court held this was not a motor vehicle accident. [50] The court gave several examples of injuries that might occur while entering or exiting a vehicle that would not A comport with the plain, ordinary, and popular meaning of that term, @ including entering and exiting pickups and sport utility vehicles. [51] The court said: An image that easily comes to mind is an insured tripping while making the oft-difficult step down from the high doorway of a pickup truck or sports utility vehicle. Another is tripping C over, say, the threshold or a seatbelt C while entering a vehicle. Making all such accidents A motor vehicle accidents @ for insurance purposes is a logical extension of the Court of Appeals = holding that A the use of a vehicle depends on an insured = s ability to safely enter and exit it. @ However, this definition does not fit with A a fair, reasonable, and sensible construction as would be given to the contract by the average person purchasing insurance. @ Nor would this construction of the term A motor vehicle accident @ comport with the plain, ordinary, and popular meaning of that term. [52] The Washington Supreme Court correctly discerned that there are quite a number of insurance policies that use language much broader than A bodily injury resulting from a motor vehicle accident, @ which is the language in the Texas personal injury protection provisions. Cases construing policies with broader language, including those relied upon by the Court in this case, are inapposite when faced with a policy that requires a A motor vehicle accident @ or A auto accident. @ Even when the language is broader and does not require an auto or motor vehicle accident, courts are divided on what is and is not covered. Courts have found no coverage under policy provisions covering (or directed by statute to cover) injuries incurred when A occupying, entering into, alighting from or using an automobile, @ [53] or from the A use of the automobile . . . while in or upon, entering or alighting from the automobile, @ [54] or A arising out of operation, maintenance or use @ of a vehicle, [55] or A arising out of the maintenance or use @ of a vehicle, [56] or simply A arising out of the use @ of a vehicle. [57] Conversely, coverage has been found when a policy covers (or is required by statute to cover) injury A arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use @ of a vehicle, [58] or A arising out of maintenance or use @ of a vehicle, [59] or A while occupying @ a vehicle, [60] or A while alighting @ a vehicle, [61] or simply A arising out of use @ of a vehicle. [62] To bolster its conclusion that Sturrock = s injuries come within the PIP provision, the Court cites a number of decisions that hold there is coverage when a vehicle collides with someone entering or exiting a covered vehicle. [63] But no one questions that there has been an auto or motor vehicle accident when a vehicle strikes a pedestrian. The Court cites two Texas cases to support its holding. One is Southern Surety Co. v. Davidson , [64] in which the policy did not require an auto or motor vehicle accident. The policy was not even an automobile liability policy. It covered A > [t]he effects resulting exclusively of all other causes from bodily injury sustained by the insured during the life of this policy solely through external, violent and accidental means. = @ [65] The other case cited by the Court is Berry v. Dairyland County Mutual Insurance Co. of Texas in which the court of appeals concluded A the phrase > motor vehicle accident = can be construed as having more than one meaning @ and that it was therefore the court = s A duty . . . to give the phrase the construction that is most favorable to the insured. @ [66] As discussed above, this Court has since held that the term A auto accident @ is unambiguous, [67] and Berry = s holding is therefore unsound.