Opinion ID: 1439705
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: In Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 108 S.Ct. 818, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988), a non-Title VII case, the Supreme Court held that there is no judicial review of the merits of a security clearance determination. That decision is exclusively for the executive. The Court also stated that the denial of a security clearance is not an adverse action. Id. at 530, 108 S.Ct. 818. Thereafter, in Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925 (3d Cir.1996), another non-Title VII case, we considered the claim of a mathematician for the NSA who was fired for refusing to take a polygraph test. She sued, alleging equal protection and due process violations, among other claims. The district court had dismissed all claims under Egan. We upheld the dismissal but for different reasons. We stated: If Stehney had asked for review of the merits of an executive branch decision to grant or revoke a security clearance, we would agree. But not all claims arising from security clearance revocations violate separation of powers or involve political questions. Id. at 932. We held that we could review the merits of Stehney's claims because Stehney had standing, and her claims were not barred by the political question doctrine or the doctrine of sovereign immunity. We concluded, however, that a writ of mandamus, which Stehney sought, was not appropriate because Stehney had not sought relief under the Administrative Procedure Act in the first instance. Moreover, deciding the merits, we held that the NSA had followed its own regulations in denying the security clearance and Stehney received all the process she was due regarding the denial of the clearance (if she was due any process at all since no one has a right to a security clearance). Importantly, we noted that there was a distinction between challenging the merits of a clearance revocation and challenging the revocation process, and we had jurisdiction to rule on the latter. Id. Here, Makky asserts: As alleged in the Complaint, TSA supervisor Robin Burke suspended Dr. Makky without pay on account of Dr. Makky's national origin and religion, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Although proceedings surrounding his security clearance had been commenced at the time of Burke's actions, Dr. Makky's allegations nevertheless clearly state a Title VII claim that does not in any way depend on an analysis of whether the ultimate suspension or revocation of his security clearance was proper. Appellant's Br. at 15. Makky acknowledges that he would be foreclosed under Egan from challenging the decision to deny the security clearance, even if it were denied due to discrimination. He emphasizes that is not what he is arguing. Instead, he argues that the decision to suspend him without pay was motivated in substantial part by discriminatory animus, and that claim is not foreclosed under Egan. He compares his situation to that of Stehney, who, we held, could challenge the process by which her clearance was denied. Based on our precedent in Stehney, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to review Makky's claim of discrimination because a discrimination claim under a mixed-motive theory does not necessarily require consideration of the merits of a security clearance decision. The basis of a mixed-motive theory is that both a legitimate and discriminatory reason for an employment decision can co-exist. See Watson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 216 (3d Cir.2000) (recognizing that the point of a mixed-motive theory is that a plaintiff may suffer discrimination even though there may also be a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action). We reiterate that in analyzing Makky's mixed-motive Title VII claim, we cannot question the motivation behind the decision to deny Makky's security clearance.