Opinion ID: 6317046
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Moya Matter

Text: The Board rejected the Hearing Committee’s determination that Mr. Haar was reckless in the Moya matter and determined that Mr. Haar did not engage in misconduct of any sort. Citing this court’s decision in In re Kanu, 5 A.3d 1, 5 n.1, 17 n.4 (D.C. 2010), the Board reasoned that “[w]hen he received the fee from Mr. Moya [pre-Mance], [Mr. Haar]—as did others—treated it as his own and was free to spend it as he saw fit.” Further, the Board explained that “[n]othing in Mance . . . supports . . . [the] notion that the Court intended to require [Mr. Haar] (and presumably, myriad other practitioners) immediately to audit all their pending flat fee cases, ascertain the amounts of any unearned fees, disgorge those funds, and place them in trust until ‘earned.’” The Board concluded that if this “[c]ourt [had] intended members of the Bar to place in trust funds that had been received preMance [but not yet fully earned at the time Mance was issued]” the court “would have . . . said so.” 15 We agree with the Board that Mr. Haar’s handling of the Moya fees is not sanctionable misconduct. Mr. Haar should not be sanctioned for failing to take affirmative steps to place previously received flat fees in trust, when it was quite unclear from In re Mance that he was required to take such steps. To begin with, Mance itself was an acknowledgement that Rule 1.15(e) did not provide clear guidance as to flat fees. And when we used our decision in Mance to clarify that rule, holding that flat fees were a type of advance fees, we expressly stated that that holding was only “prospective,” 980 A.2d at 1206, at least suggesting that already received flat fees (like the Moya fees) were grandparented. 6 We therefore sustain the Board’s dismissal of the Moya matter.