Opinion ID: 171217
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mr. Weber's Lawsuit

Text: Mr. Weber filed suit in Oklahoma state court in March 2005 against GE and the insurance brokers with whom he had dealt. [4] GE promptly removed the case to federal court, asserting that Mr. Weber's state causes of action  for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, bad faith breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty  sought recovery under an employee welfare benefit plan and, therefore, were preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. [5] Simultaneously, GE moved the federal court to dismiss the complaint based on ERISA preemption. Mr. Weber countered that GE had failed to show that ERISA governs the Voluntary Life Insurance plan and contended that the plan fell within the 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j) safe harbor. [6] Because GE premised its removal on federal question jurisdiction, Mr. Weber asked the court to remand the case to the state court. In August 2005, the district court held that ERISA governed Mr. Weber's claims and directed Mr. Weber to file an Amended Complaint. Mr. Weber complied, amending his complaint to include two ERISA claims alongside two state claims; GE answered. Mr. Weber then filed a motion to remand the case on May 9, 2006, arguing that ERISA did not govern the dispute because the Voluntary Life Insurance policy fell within the 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j) safe harbor exemption from ERISA's umbrella. In support, Mr. Weber offered fourteen exhibits, including (1) portions of the depositions of a Winner human resources employee and the insurance brokers, (2) Winner's Benefit Plan Description packet, and (3) various documents eventually produced by GE in the administrative record. Just a few days after he moved for a remand, Mr. Weber settled with the non-diverse insurance brokers. The district court refused to remand the case in a minute order dated June 30, 2006. Therein, the district court noted that the only issue remaining is ERISA, and set a new schedule for the case. GE filed the administrative record with the district court on July 31, 2006. Mr. Weber thereafter moved for summary judgment. Subsequently, based on the administrative record, the court granted Mr. Weber's motion for summary judgment. In its order granting Mr. Weber's motion for summary judgment, the court concluded that GE had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying Mr. Weber death benefits. The court found that Ms. Weber met the `Actively at Work' definition, at the latest, on May 12, 2003. The court rejected GE's interpretation of the Policy, explaining that the plain language of the Actively At Work definition did not require an employee also to have worked 30 hours per week after the effective date. Nor could GE argue, the court concluded, that the Actively at Work definition mandated that Mrs. Weber work full time for a single day. Furthermore, the court also noted that clearer language was available to GE if it intended to inform an employee that 30 hours per week was required, but that GE had not used such language. In sum, the court concluded that GE's interpretation of the Policy was arbitrary and its determination unreasonable. [7] In response to Mr. Weber's motion to alter or amend its judgment, the district court finalized its judgment on June 28, 2007, awarding $169,274.00 to Mr. Weber. This figure included the $100,000 in Voluntary Life Insurance benefits, augmented by prejudgment interest at the rate of 15%. This appeal by GE followed.