Opinion ID: 2978537
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: M. came out of the bathroom.

Text: Jensen’s testimony differed from A.M.’s on several crucial points. He testified at trial that on July 29th he went to the residence where A.M. and her family lived, but that he did not enter their house. He also denied having been alone with A.M. that day and denied touching her inappropriately. Jensen also alleged that, prior to the incident, he had given A.M.’s family at least three warnings of eviction because the family had failed to pay rent. He claimed that, at the time of the alleged incident, he had already completed eviction documents and, on July 27th, had shown these documents to A.M.’s stepfather—an allegation contested by A.M.’s stepfather. Following the July 29th incident, A.M.’s family suspected that Jensen had entered their apartment when the Jensens were not home. Consequently, Detective Randall prepared an envelope of “tell-tale” purple powder and planted it in A.M.’s No. 08-1758 Jensen v. Romanowski Page 4 kitchen. Shortly thereafter, the family found the envelope open and purple powder scattered about their kitchen. Detective Randall interviewed Jensen and noticed that Jensen had traces of purple powder beneath his nails. Notably, during the interview, Jensen testified differently than he testified at trial—admitting that he had been alone with A.M. on several occasions and once gave her a hug when she appeared to be upset. Jensen made several admissions in the current trial regarding his 1989 conviction: that the conviction existed and that he had pled “no contest” to the charge; that he had engaged in the activity for which he had been prosecuted; that in 1989 he confessed to having “deep feelings” for young women and that he had trouble controlling those feelings; and that at the time of the 1989 conviction, he was seeking psychological help to control his feelings. However, it was the testimony of Lieutenant Wolter, who interrogated the 1989 complainant, that provided details of the 1989 conviction that would not otherwise have been known to the jury in the present case. Lieutenant Wolter testified that: when he was previously employed as a road trooper at the Newaygo post of the state police, he received a complaint from a female who was thirteen years old or younger alleging that [Jensen] engaged in nonconsensual sexual contact with her involving above-the-clothes fondling of her chest and buttocks area. Lieutenant Wolter testified that the victim in that case was a neighbor of [Jensen], that it was reported there was no other adult present in the apartment at the time of the assault, and that the victim reported that [Jensen] told her that she had “a nice butt.” People v. Jensen, No. 235372, slip op. at 2 (Mich. App. Nov. 9, 2004). No. 08-1758 Jensen v. Romanowski Page 5 The prosecution introduced Lieutenant Wolter’s testimony over Jensen’s objections under Michigan’s residual hearsay exception.2 The prosecution appears to have made no effort to produce the 1989 victim or any witness to the 1989 event. On January 19, 2001, the state trial court jury found Jensen guilty of first-degree home invasion, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.110a(2), and second-degree criminal sexual conduct, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520c(1)(a) (sexual conduct with a person under thirteen years of age). On February 20, the trial court sentenced Jensen to concurrent terms of 60 months to 240 months for the home invasion and 38 months to 180 months for the criminal sexual conduct. Jensen appealed from his convictions, alleging that the admission of Lieutenant Wolter’s testimony regarding what the 1989 complainant had said violated Jensen’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. He further contended that the prosecution materially relied upon Lieutenant Wolter’s testimony in building its case and that the alleged constitutional error was not harmless because it may have had a substantial or injurious impact or influence on the jury’s verdict. The Michigan Court of Appeals initially reversed Jensen’s convictions and remanded his case for a new trial, holding that Lieutenant Wolter’s testimonial evidence violated Jensen’s rights under the Confrontation Clause and that the error was not harmless. People v. Jensen, No. 235372 (Mich. App. Sept. 9, 2003), vacated, No. 235372 (Mich. App. Nov. 9, 2004).3 Subsequently, the prosecutor argued in a motion for rehearing that Jensen’s own admissions and other properly admitted evidence of the prior conviction were sufficient to overcome the taint of Wolter’s improper testimony. 2 This exception allows the court to admit hearsay evidence if the relevant hearsay testimony is: A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact, (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts, and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. Mich. R. Evid. 803(24). 3 The original opinion is no longer available online. No. 08-1758 Jensen v. Romanowski Page 6 The Michigan Court of Appeals granted the prosecutor’s motion and vacated its prior opinion. Id. In a subsequent opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that admitting the testimony violated Jensen’s Confrontation Clause rights but found that the error was harmless. People v. Jensen, No. 235372 (Mich. App. Nov. 9, 2004). Jensen appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, which denied him leave to appeal. People v. Jensen, 693 N.W.2d 823 (Mich. 2005). Jensen then filed a habeas corpus petition on April 4, 2006, alleging that the Michigan trial court’s rulings deprived him of due process, a fair trial, and his right to present a defense. The district court held that the state court did not violate Jensen’s due process rights nor his right to present a defense. However, the court found that, because the prosecution had presented testimonial evidence regarding a prior offense without attempting to produce either the victim of the prior offense or any witness to that offense, the 1989 testimonial evidence violated Jensen’s right to confront and examine the witness against him. The court further held that, under the “substantial and injurious effect” test described in Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, the error was not harmless and granted Jensen habeas relief. The State timely appealed.