Opinion ID: 2617828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Trial Court's Denial of Lankford's Second Motion for New Trial.

Text: Lankford next argues that the trial court erred when it denied his second motion for new trial which was based upon newly discovered evidence and the recanted testimony of the State's key witness, Bryan Lankford. The newly discovered evidence was a letter written by Bryan Lankford, which disclosed that he had lied when he testified that Mark had committed the murders, and that it had actually been he who committed the murders. The recantation of testimony occurred at the evidentiary hearing on Mark's second motion for new trial; Bryan testified that he had lied at Mark's trial and that his brother was not involved in the actual killings. Mark Lankford now argues that whether this Court applies the test for granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence or the test for granting a new trial based on recanted testimony, a new trial should be granted because the only direct evidence that linked Mark Lankford with the Bravences' murders was Bryan Lankford's original trial testimony. We note from the outset that while the decision of whether to grant a new trial is a discretionary matter for the trial judge. Idaho Code § 19-2406(7) (1987), limits the instances in which that discretion may be exercised. [3] Idaho Criminal Rule 34, New Trial, states in part: The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to him if required in the interest of justice. This Court, in State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 384, 716 P.2d 1152 (1986) stated: The question of whether the interest of justice requires a new trial under the circumstances of a particular case is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court; and the trial court's decision thereon will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. (Citation omitted.) Although I.C. § 19-2406 does not specifically address new trials on the basis of recanted testimony as opposed to the discovery of new evidence, the apparent intent of the legislature and opinions rendered by this Court exemplify the fact that recanted testimony is a form of new evidence and is thus covered by subsection (7). The trial judge does not abuse his or her discretion unless a new trial is granted for a reason that is not delineated in the code or unless the decision to grant or deny a new trial is manifestly contrary to the interests of justice. As the Idaho Court of Appeals noted in State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 730 P.2d 1069 (Ct.App. 1986), there are two different judicial approaches to determining whether the interests of justice require that a new trial be granted on the basis of recanted testimony. One approach has been to treat the recantation as a form of newly discovered evidence. When a new trial is sought upon such evidence, the moving party must satisfy what has become known as the Berry test. This multi-part test, named after the case of Berry v. State, 10 Georgia 511 (1851), includes the requirement that the new evidence probably would produce a different result. Berry has been adopted in substance by most state and federal courts. 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 557 (2d Ed. 1982) (hereinafter WRIGHT). It was approved by our Supreme Court in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976). A second approach has been to treat recanted testimony as a problem distinct from newly discovered evidence. Perjured testimony affects the integrity of the judicial process in a way that overlooked evidence does not. WRIGHT, § 557.1. Moreover, while a rigorous standard for obtaining a second trial upon new evidence may be justified as an incentive for the parties to marshal evidence and to present it at the first trial, the parties need no such incentive to combat perjury. The seminal decision establishing a distinct test for recanted testimony is Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.1928). There, as in the present case, a government witness announced after trial that he had given false testimony. The Larrison court held that a new trial should be granted when (a) [t]he court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a material witness is false, (b) [t]hat without it the jury might have reached a different conclusion, and (c) [t]hat the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity until after the trial. (Emphasis original.) (Footnote omitted.) Those courts which fail to discern any functional difference between the recantation of trial testimony and the discovery of new evidence after trial applied the Berry test in both situations. E.g., United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840 (9th Cir.1979) cert. den., 445 U.S. 942, 100 S.Ct. 1337, 63 L.Ed.2d 775 (1980). However, most courts now apply the Larrison test to recanted testimony. E.g., United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. den. 429 U.S. 819, 97 S.Ct. 65, 66, 50 L.Ed.2d 80 (1976); see generally WRIGHT, § 557.1. In Idaho, the relationship between Berry and Larrison has not been explored thoroughly. However, our Supreme court, without mentioning Berry or its adoption in Drapeau, has cited Larrison with approval. In State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 716 P.2d 1152 (1986), the Supreme Court explicitly noted Larrison's three elements. The court then reformulated Larrison as follows: [U]nder the holding of Larrison, it would seem that in appropriate circumstances, where a defendant submits an affidavit by a government witness in which the witness recants his testimony and specifies in what ways he dishonestly testified and in what ways he would, if given the opportunity to testify again, change that testimony and where a defendant makes a showing that such changed testimony may be material to a finding of his guilt or innocence, a new trial should be held. 110 Idaho at 385, 716 P.2d at 1157 (emphasis added). Lawrence, 112 Idaho at 151-152, 730 P.2d 1071-1072. In the instant case, the trial court, upon consideration of substantial competent evidence, determined that the original testimony was correct and that the recantation was not believable. The trial court, as part of exhaustive findings and opinion on this issue, noted in part: It is very crucial to note that Bryan Lankford's recantation of his trial testimony was made under circumstances which raise a grave doubt as to its reliability. ... . Based upon a review of the files and records herein as well as a consideration of the testimony given by Bryan Lankford at Defendant's second motion for a new trial, this Court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by Bryan Lankford at the second motion for a new trial was false and furthermore that the testimony given by Bryan Lankford at the Defendant's trial concerning the participation of the Defendant in the killing of the Bravences was true. It is the opinion of this Court that it cannot be said that the recantation reasonably could affect the outcome of the trial. Furthermore, this Court does not conclude that evidence of the recantation would probably produce a different verdict. Finally, and based upon the foregoing, the recantation evidence does not, in the interests of justice, require that a new trial be granted. Thus, our inquiry need go no further since the record demonstrates no manifest abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of a new trial.