Opinion ID: 2495846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: P-44A (commercial driver's licenses)

Text: ¶ 40. Leah and Dewey contend that the trial court improperly denied P-44A, which would have held the defendants negligent as a matter of law because Byrd lacked a commercial driver's license. ¶ 41. P-44A stated: The Court instructs the jury that the Defendants were negligent as a matter of law in failing to have the required license. If you find that this failure was the proximate cause or a proximate contributing cause of the accident, then it shall be your sworn duty to enter a verdict in favor of the Plaintiffs, and you shall assess damages in accordance with the remaining instructions. ¶ 42. Leah and Dewey argue that Byrd acted negligently by failing to execute a proper turn into the driveway or by using the wrong driveway to access the property. They further argue that undisputed trial evidence proved that Byrd needed a Class D license to operate the truck and trailer, and that with the proper license and training, he would not have attempted an unsafe turn. ¶ 43. Leah and Dewey refer to different commercial driver's license statutes to support their positions. Leah points to Section 63-1-211 as authority. See Miss.Code Ann. § 63-1-211 (Supp.2010) (commercial driver's licenses, generally). Dewey cites Sections 63-1-74, 63-1-77, and 63-1-82. See Miss.Code Ann. §§ 63-1-74 (purpose of commercial driver's license statutes), 63-1-77 (requirement to have commercial driver's license, generally), 63-1-82 (commercial driver's licenses, generally) (Rev. 2004) (all three statutes repealed 2009). ¶ 44. At trial, McLain testified that his boss had instructed him to have Byrd pick up the equipment from Smith's house on the day of the accident. Out of concern, McLain had verified the request with Independent Roofing safety director Russell Ramsey. McLain knew the trip to Smith's home would have been difficult for an experienced driver, and he also thought that Byrd had been unfamiliar with loading equipment. ¶ 45. Ramsey testified that he did not recall authorizing Byrd to pick up the equipment. Ramsey had known that Byrd did not have a commercial driver's license, and that he had not been trained to drive trucks. Ramsey testified that he thought that Byrd would have needed a Class D license to drive the truck and trailer. He explained that the Class D license would have required a written test, rather than a skills tests. ¶ 46. Byrd acknowledged that he lacked a commercial driver's license. And while he was experienced in driving eighteen-wheelers, Independent Roofing had not trained him to drive the truck and trailer he had used to haul Independent Roofing's materials. ¶ 47. Smith held a Class A commercial driver's license at the time of the accident, which he testified would have covered the truck and trailer that Byrd had driven. Smith had taken the piece of equipment to his home using the same truck and trailer driven by Byrd, but he had used an alternate gravel road nearby to access his property. ¶ 48. Here, the cited commercial driver's license statutes do not apply. The accident occurred on September 29, 2003, and the effective date of Section 63-1-211 was July 1, 2009. Miss.Code Ann. § 63-1-211 (Supp.2010). See City of Starkville v. 4-County Elec. Power Ass'n, 909 So.2d 1094, 1109 (Miss.2005) (noting that statutes do not apply retroactively absent a clear statement from the Legislature). Further, Leah and Dewey failed to show that the Legislature had enacted Sections 63-1-74, 63-1-77, or 63-1-82 to address the type of harm that occurred in this case. Most importantly, the plaintiffs failed to prove a connection between the injury and Byrd's lack of a particular license. Therefore, the trial judge properly refused instruction P-44A. Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc., 887 So.2d at 787; Burr, 909 So.2d at 726. See also Utz, 32 So.3d at 477.