Opinion ID: 1803521
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Heading: Citizen's Arrest Defense.

Text: The right of a private person to arrest another, commonly referred to as the right of citizen's arrest, originated at common law. 5 Am.Jur.2d Arrest § 56, at 708 (1995). However, our legislature expressly conferred this right on our citizens in 1851. See Iowa Code § 2846 (1851). Today, Iowa Code section 804.9 governs the arrest of persons by private individuals. It creates two categories of citizen's arrest: public offenses and felonies. See id. § 804.9 (1997). A citizen may make an arrest for any public offense if the offense is committed or attempted in the [citizen's] presence. Id. § 804.9(1). However, if the public offense is a felony, a less stringent standard is imposed. If the offense constitutes a felony, the citizen must only possess reasonable grounds to believe the person to be arrested committed the felony. Id. § 804.9(2). There is an additional requirement to perfect a citizen's arrest. The citizen making the arrest must inform the person to be arrested of the intent to arrest and the reasons for the arrest. Id. § 804.14 (manner of making an arrest). No formal announcement is required, as long as the citizen sufficiently conveys, either through words or conduct, the intent to perform a citizen's arrest. See State v. Rains, 574 N.W.2d 904, 910 (Iowa 1998); State v. Dennison, 571 N.W.2d 492, 495 (Iowa 1997); State v. Lawler, 571 N.W.2d 486, 490 (Iowa 1997); 6A C.J.S. Arrest § 43, at 100 (1975); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 128 cmt. a.; Rollin M. Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 Iowa L.Rev. 201, 249 (1940) [hereinafter Perkins]. However, noncompliance with the notification requirements is excused if the person to be arrested is actually committing the offense or is escaping so that the citizen does not have the time or opportunity to announce the arrest. Iowa Code § 804.14. Thus, no announcement is required if it would not be feasible under the circumstances. Perkins, 25 Iowa L.Rev. at 250. An arrest is defined as taking a person into custody. Iowa Code § 804.5. It includes restraint of [a] person or [a] person's submission to custody. Id. Rife claims Wharff perfected the arrest and was required to have witnessed a predicate public offense committed by Rife. He further claims Wharff was required to notify Rife of his intent to make an arrest and the reasons for the arrest. Rife asserts there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find the necessary elements of lawful arrest, and he was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Historically, the requirement that a public offense be committed in the person's presence has been liberally construed. People v. Lee, 204 Cal.Rptr. 667, 669 (Cal.App. Dep't Super.Ct. 1984); State v. Bergeron, 326 N.W.2d 684, 686 (N.D. 1982). Yet, as with police officers making warrantless arrests, mere knowledge of the commission of a misdemeanor offense is insufficient to support a citizen's arrest. State v. Duren, 266 Minn. 335, 123 N.W.2d 624, 631 (1963). Instead, the citizen must have observed conduct by the alleged offender that is sufficiently indicative of a crime in the course of its commission. 5 Am.Jur.2d Arrest § 57, at 708. It is sufficient if the citizen detected the commission of the offense through one of his or her senses, such as hearing, sight, or smell. State v. Moore, 129 Idaho 776, 932 P.2d 899, 902-03 (Ct.App.1996); Gray v. Earls, 298 Mo. 116, 250 S.W. 567, 572 (1923); Bergeron, 326 N.W.2d at 686; 6A C.J.S. Arrest § 15, at 25-26 & n. 15. We agree the record fails to reveal whether Wharff witnessed any public offense, although it does reveal evidence to support a finding that Rife committed one or more public offenses. The record further reveals Wharff was working as an employee of Papa's Planet on August 13, 1998, and worked in the area where the incident occurred. The record also shows Wharff joined in the chase of Rife along with several other employees and security personnel employed by Papa's Planet immediately after Rife began to run from the nightclub. More importantly, the employees and security officers were acting together. Rife acknowledged the employees and security officers acted in concert. The circumstances that permit peace officers to make an arrest without a warrant include the commission of a public offense in the presence of the peace officer. Iowa Code § 804.7(1). Thus, one of the grounds authorizing a peace officer to make a warrantless arrest mirrors one of the grounds authorizing a private person to make an arrest. Compare id., with id. § 804.9(1). We additionally recognize that the knowledge of one peace officer, acting in concert with other peace officers, is presumed to be shared by all. State v. Satern, 516 N.W.2d 839, 841 (Iowa 1994); State v. Owens, 418 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Iowa 1988); State v. Thornton, 300 N.W.2d 94, 97 (Iowa 1981); accord People v. Thompson, 793 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Colo.1990); Voorhees v. State, 699 So.2d 602, 609 (Fla. 1997). This shared-knowledge doctrine permits one officer to make an arrest without knowledge of all of the predicate elements to support an arrest as long as other officers involved have the predicate knowledge. See Torrey v. City of Tukwila, 76 Wash.App. 32, 882 P.2d 799, 803-04 (1994) (officers acting together, misdemeanor in the presence of one, arrest by the other, no tort); accord Jackson v. State, 274 Ark. 317, 624 S.W.2d 437, 439 (1981); Thompson, 793 P.2d at 1175; People v. Baca, 198 Colo. 399, 600 P.2d 770, 771-72 (1979); Voorhees, 699 So.2d at 609-10; Thornton, 300 N.W.2d at 97. Considering the identical authority of citizens and peace officers to make warrantless arrests, we believe the rule of shared knowledge applicable to police officers acting together should also apply to citizens acting together. Applying the rule of shared knowledge to the citizen's arrest in this case, we find the record demonstrates sufficient evidence was introduced to satisfy the presence requirement. The employees were acting within the scope of their employment and, consequently, were acting in concert in detaining Rife. Several of Wharff's co-employees testified at trial to public offenses committed by Rife in their presence. Under the circumstances, it was not necessary for Wharff to also testify to the same evidence. Rife also claims there was insufficient evidence that the defendants complied with the disclosure requirement of the arrest statute. He claims this too rendered the arrest unlawful. Although none of the employees or security officers involved in the citizen's arrest informed Rife of their intent to arrest, we find there was sufficient evidence to justify noncompliance with the disclosure requirement under section 804.14 based on the circumstances surrounding the arrest. The disclosure requirement under section 804.14 appears to be designed to minimize the amount of force required to accomplish the arrest. See 1 Dobbs, § 83, at 194. Without the disclosure, the plaintiff might perceive the arrest as an attack or some other misuse of power. Id. at 195. On the other hand, section 804.14 recognizes the futility of disclosure when the person to be arrested is actually engaged in the commission of or attempt to commit an offense, or escapes, so that there is no time or opportunity to do so.... Iowa Code § 804.14. There was substantial evidence to show the employees were excused from the notification requirement when they attempted to restrain Rife on Papa's Planet's premises because Rife was actually engaged in the commission of ... an offense at the time. Id. Furthermore, there was substantial evidence to excuse the disclosure after Rife broke loose and ran from the premises. See id. In both instances, the situations escalated within short time periods. There was no time or opportunity for the employees to announce their intentions. See id. Additionally, the rationale for requiring the disclosure no longer existed after Rife ran from the scene. As explained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts: If the person arrested knows of the cause of [the] arrest, the manifestation would be a mere superfluous and idle ceremony, and is therefore not required. If an officer attempts to arrest or arrests another engaged in the commission of an offense or on fresh pursuit, the officer is not required to manifest the cause of the arrest. In such case it is extremely unlikely that the person arrested is unaware of the fact that he is committing the offense, but his ignorance is immaterial unless the actor realizes or should realize that the other is not aware that his conduct constitutes an offense. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 128 cmt. f. The circumstances support a finding that Rife was aware his conduct constituted a public offense and the defendants sought to detain him for that purpose. See 1 Dobbs, § 83, at 195 (disclosure not required where person to be arrested already aware of the reason for the arrest). Finally, when Wharff caught up with Rife, Wharff requested Rife's cooperation before ultimately restraining him. After handcuffing Rife, Habick informed Rife the police department had been summoned. Upon the officers' arrival, Rife was promptly released to their control. Thus, the procedural requirements of section 804.24, requiring a private citizen to deliver an arrested person to a police officer or magistrate without unnecessary delay, were also satisfied.