Opinion ID: 852461
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Double Enhancement Implications of Separate Counts

Text: The line of Indiana cases involving the issue of double enhancement reflects an ongoing examination as to when courts may impose more severe sentences on defendants who have proven to be repeat offenders. Mills v. State, 868 N.E.2d 446 (Ind.2007). See Pedraza v. State, No. 49S04-0711-CR-516, 2008 WL 2133925, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. May 22, 2008); State v. Downey, 770 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. 2002); Devore v. State, 657 N.E.2d 740 (Ind.1995). This case is another in that line. The question here is whether a given felony conviction can be the basis for an SVF count and also serve as grounds for an habitual offender finding. The habitual offender statute itself does not provide an answer. See Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-8 (West 2007). The Court of Appeals confronted the same question in Anderson v. State, 774 N.E.2d 906 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Anderson was convicted of murder, possession of a firearm by an SVF, carrying a handgun without a license, and intimidation. At sentencing, the court attached the habitual offender penalty to the murder count, and it ordered all other sentences to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of 104 years. The SVF count and the habitual offender count were supported by the same 1987 robbery conviction. Anderson appealed, arguing that under Conrad v. State, 747 N.E.2d 575 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), the trial court could not enhance his sentence under the habitual offender statute when that finding is based on the same prior conviction as the SVF count. [1] The Anderson court distinguished Conrad, observing that Anderson's habitual offender penalty attached to the murder count, not the SVF count. [W]here a defendant is convicted of multiple felonies, one of which is possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, and is found to be an habitual offender, Conrad does not preclude the use of one felony both to prove the defendant was a serious violent felon and an habitual offender, where the sentence for a felony conviction other than possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon is the sentence that is enhanced under the general habitual offender statute. Anderson, 774 N.E.2d at 914. We conclude that a court may avoid double enhancement by attaching the habitual to some offense other than the SVF, but, when counts are ordered served consecutively this is a distinction without a difference. Sweatt's conviction for possession of a firearm by an SVF, based on his 1994 rape conviction, and his status as an habitual offender, based on the same 1994 rape but applied to the burglary conviction, do not by themselves create a double enhancement. The use of the same 1994 rape conviction to support both does not implicate Conrad because the enhancements operate on separate counts. Sweatt does not contend that either sentence, taken alone, constitutes an improper double enhancement, and we conclude that they pass muster separately. The aggregate sentence, however, is a different matter. In sentencing an offender who has committed multiple crimes, trial courts face a decision as to whether the sentence on each count should run consecutively or concurrently, or a combination of both. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-1-2 (West 2007). In a case where separate counts are enhanced based on the same prior felony conviction, ordering the sentences to run consecutively has the same effect as if the enhancements both applied to the same count. [2] This result is different only in form from the multiple enhancements the Court of Appeals found improper in Conrad. On the other hand, if the trial court orders the sentences to run concurrently, the enhancements, though duplicative in name, operate just once to increase the defendant's term of imprisonment. [3] The potential penalties flowing from various criminal acts are first and foremost a matter for legislative decision. The statutes applicable here do not conclusively answer the question, and the Rule of Lenity suggests that construction should be against the State. On remand, the trial court may consider whether to alter Sweatt's sentence to remedy this defect.