Opinion ID: 2916030
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim of Intellectual Disability

Text: Prior to trial, the Defendant filed a “Motion to Dismiss Death Penalty Notice Due to Defendant‟s Mental Retardation.” The Defendant asserted that his I.Q. was 74 and that, taking into account a margin of error of four points, “the possible range of [his] IQ is 70 to 78.” Accordingly, he contended, he was not eligible for the death penalty under either Tennessee law or the federal constitution. Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203 provides that “no defendant with intellectual disability at the time of committing first degree murder shall be sentenced to death.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(b) (2010). The statute defines “intellectual disability” as follows: 10 (1) Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning as evidenced by a functional intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of seventy (70) or below; (2) Deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) The intellectual disability must have been manifested during the developmental period, or by eighteen (18) years of age. Id. § 39-13-203(a) (the “intellectual disability statute”). The intellectual disability statute also provides that “[t]he burden of production and persuasion to demonstrate intellectual disability by a preponderance of the evidence is upon the defendant. The determination of whether the defendant had intellectual disability at the time of the offense of first degree murder shall be made by the court.” Id. § 39-13-203(c). At the pretrial hearing on the Defendant‟s motion, the defense called a single witness, Dr. John Robert Hutson, a clinical psychologist. Dr. Hutson testified that he first encountered the Defendant at Lakeside Hospital in 1993. The Defendant was “an inpatient at the adolescent unit,” and Dr. Hutson was his treating psychologist. The Defendant was fourteen years old at the time. Dr. Hutson described his observations of the Defendant in the hospital: I thought he was very polite, a well behaved young man, but not high functioning intelligently [sic]. He was very depressed, but he was not psychotic as I recall and as the records also reflect. He was in touch with reality, he was able to communicate and converse, but he was limited in his intellectual understanding. The Defendant took the Weschsler Intelligence Scale for Children, third version, I.Q. test while at the hospital, “and he came back with a Full Scale IQ of 77.” Dr. Hutson stated that “the reported margin of error at that administration to [the Defendant] was a plus or minus seven points.” Dr. Hutson met twice more with the Defendant in conjunction with the instant case, once in 2010 and once in 2011. Dr. Hutson did not administer another I.Q. test to the Defendant, but, according to Dr. Hutson, “his verbal abilities and everything did seem consistent with that, his understanding, his comprehension.” In reviewing the Defendant‟s hospitalization records, Dr. Hutson learned that, approximately a month after he left Lakeside, the Defendant was hospitalized at Saint Joseph Hospital in Memphis. The Defendant subsequently was transferred from Juvenile 11 Court custody to another facility in Pennsylvania. Asked about his analysis of the Defendant‟s adaptive functioning, Dr. Hutson testified, “I didn‟t do a formal evaluation of that. One of the problems with [the Defendant] is he‟s really never functioned outside of an institutional environment for a year or more at a time since he‟s been an adolescent.” Asked specifically if the Defendant was “retarded,” Dr. Hutson answered, “He fits in the Borderline Range between normal and retarded.” Dr. Hutson added: I do think it‟s important for the Court to know that I consider [the Defendant] as competent to proceed. His strengths are he does have the ability to converse with you as long as the language isn‟t too abstruse, or if you explain things in simple terms he does get it. He does understand his charges. He understands the potential consequences that may result from a conviction of these charges. If he‟s impaired anywhere it‟s his understanding of the judicial process. But you can explain the roles of the different players, and he does grasp that. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked, “if it‟s a yes or no answer, the answer to the question about is [the Defendant] retarded is no, he is not retarded?” Dr. Hutson replied, “That‟s correct.” Dr. Hutson also reviewed two pages of a Confidential Report of Psychological Evaluation from Saint Joseph Hospital that indicated that the Defendant had retaken the same I.Q. test several weeks after he took the test at Lakeside. The pages Dr. Hutson reviewed indicated a full scale score of 84. Dr. Hutson explained the higher score: “you can probably expect a little bit of learning from having already been exposed to the test a couple of months prior to that.” The State adduced no proof at the pretrial hearing other than its cross-examination of Dr. Hutson.5 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant‟s motion to dismiss the death-penalty notice, noting that Dr. Hutson had opined that the Defendant “is not retarded.” On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the trial court, holding that the Defendant had failed to establish any of the three prongs set forth in the intellectual disability statute. See State v. Bell, No. W2012-02017-CCA-R3DD, 2014 WL 2547721, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. May 30, 2014). The Defendant asserts that the courts below erred. 5 The two pages shown to Dr. Hutson by the prosecutor were admitted for identification purposes only. Our references to the contents of the pages are based on Dr. Hutson‟s testimony about them. 12
A trial court‟s determination that a defendant is or is not intellectually disabled so as to be ineligible for the death penalty presents a mixed question of law and fact. See State v. Strode, 232 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tenn. 2007). While the trial court‟s findings of fact on this issue are binding on this Court unless the evidence preponderates otherwise, we review de novo the trial court‟s application of the law to those facts. See id. B. Significantly Subaverage General Intellectual Functioning As set forth above, the first prong of the intellectual disability statute requires proof that the Defendant suffers from “[s]ignificantly subaverage general intellectual functioning as evidenced by a functional intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of seventy (70) or below.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203(a)(1). This Court has made clear that a trial court‟s determination about a defendant‟s functional I.Q. is not limited to a consideration of his or her raw I.Q. test scores. See State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 202 (Tenn. 2013); Keen v. State, 398 S.W.3d 594, 605 (Tenn. 2012); Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322, 35355 (Tenn. 2011); Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221, 241 (Tenn. 2011). Rather, we have determined that “trial courts may receive and consider any relevant and admissible evidence regarding whether the defendant‟s functional I.Q. at the time of the offense was seventy (70) or below.” Coleman, 341 S.W.3d at 241 (emphasis added). Moreover, we have recognized that, “In formulating an opinion regarding a criminal defendant‟s I.Q. at the time of the offense, experts may bring to bear and utilize reliable practices, methods, standards, and data that are relevant to their particular fields.” Id. at 242; see also Keen, 398 S.W.3d at 604-05. Those “practices, methods, standards, and data” may include a standard error of measurement (“SEM”) applied to an individual‟s raw I.Q. test score. Coleman, 341 S.W.3d at 242 n.55. Therefore, if an expert witness testifying about a defendant‟s functional I.Q. customarily considers a particular test‟s SEM, the expert “should be permitted to base his or her assessment of the defendant‟s „functional intelligence quotient‟ on a consideration of” the SEM. Id.; see also Keen, 398 S.W.3d at 605 n.11 (recognizing that, while “[t]here is an uncomfortable fit between SEM and Tennessee‟s statute, which contains a bright-line cutoff of 70[,] [n]evertheless, consideration of the SEM can aid a trial court as it weighs the various data concerning a particular defendant‟s mental acuity”). However, because of the statute‟s plain requirement that the defendant‟s I.Q. be no higher than 70, we have concluded that “an expert‟s opinion regarding a criminal defendant‟s I.Q. cannot be expressed within a range (i.e., that the defendant‟s I.Q. falls somewhere between 65 to 75) but must be expressed specifically (i.e., that the defendant‟s I.Q. is 75 or is „seventy (70) or below‟ or is above 70).” Coleman, 341 S.W.3d at 242. 13 In this case, Dr. Hutson, the only expert to testify, stated that the Defendant‟s raw I.Q. score on the test administered at Lakeside was 77 with a seven-point SEM. While application of the SEM results in a score range of 70 to 84, Dr. Hutson opined that the Defendant was not “retarded” but that, instead, he “fits in the Borderline Range between normal and retarded.” (Emphasis added). Asked bluntly by the prosecutor whether the Defendant was “retarded,” Dr. Hutson testified that he was not. Significantly, at no point did Dr. Hutson opine that the Defendant‟s functional I.Q. was 70 or below. The proof adduced by the defense in this case simply was not sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant suffers from “[s]ignificantly subaverage general intellectual functioning as evidenced by a functional intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of seventy (70) or below.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13203(a)(1). Moreover, the defense failed to adduce any proof that the Defendant has deficits in adaptive behavior as required by the second prong of the intellectual disability statute. In sum, the defense failed to carry its burden of proving that the Defendant suffers from an intellectual disability that renders him ineligible for the death penalty. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis. C. Constitutionality of the Intellectual Disability Statute In a related issue, the Defendant contends that the intellectual disability statute, as interpreted by this Court, is facially unconstitutional in light of the United States Supreme Court‟s recent decision in Hall v. Florida, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014). In Hall, the Supreme Court considered the Florida Supreme Court‟s interpretation of its state statute prohibiting the execution of intellectually disabled defendants. The Florida statute defined intellectual disability as “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the period from conception to age 18.” Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1994 (quoting Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.137(1) (2013)). The statute defined the term “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning,” as “performance that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test.” Id. Interpreting this statute in a case that preceded Hall, the Florida Supreme Court “held that a person whose test score is above 70, including a score within the margin for measurement error, does not have an intellectual disability and is barred from presenting other evidence that would show his faculties are limited.” Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1994 (citing Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712-13 (Fla. 2007)). Significantly, in Cherry v. State, the Florida Supreme Court refused to recognize the SEM as a consideration in whether the defendant‟s I.Q. score met the statutory cutoff. 959 So. 2d at 712-14. In Hall, the defendant presented proof of an I.Q. score of 71. 134 14 S. Ct. at 1992. “Florida argued that Hall could not be found intellectually disabled because Florida law requires that, as a threshold matter, Hall show an IQ test score of 70 or below before presenting any additional evidence of his intellectual disability.” Id. “The Florida Supreme Court rejected Hall‟s appeal and held that Florida‟s 70-point threshold was constitutional.” Id. Thus, when Hall‟s case came before it, the Florida Supreme Court would have permitted his execution “because he scored a 71 instead of 70 on an IQ test.” Id. at 2001. Had the Florida Supreme Court considered the generally accepted SEM of five points, see id. at 1995, the defendant‟s I.Q. score would have fallen within the range of 66 to 76. Overruling the Florida Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court held as follows: [W]hen a defendant‟s IQ test score falls within the test‟s acknowledged and inherent margin of error, the defendant must be able to present additional evidence of intellectual disability, including testimony regarding adaptive deficits. .... The Florida statute, as interpreted by its courts, misuses IQ score on its own terms; and this, in turn, bars consideration of evidence that must be considered in determining whether a defendant in a capital case has intellectual disability. Florida‟s rule is invalid under the Constitution‟s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Id. at 2001. Significantly, the United States Supreme Court did not hold that Florida‟s statute was unconstitutional on its face, but rather ruled unconstitutional the Florida Supreme Court‟s overly narrow interpretation of the statute. Id. at 1994 (stating that Florida‟s statute could be interpreted “[o]n its face” to pass constitutional muster). Florida‟s high court decided that, unless a defendant could adduce proof that he had a raw score of less than 71 points on an I.Q. test, regardless of the standard error of measurement, the defendant was barred from adducing other proof of his intellectual disability. It was this line of decisions and statutory interpretation that the United States Supreme Court overruled. See also Brumfield v. Cain, __ U.S. __, __, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277-78 (2015) (emphasizing that the determination of a capital defendant‟s functional I.Q. must take into account the standard error of measurement applicable to the defendant‟s raw I.Q. test scores). 15 Like Florida‟s statute, our statute does not require a trial court to take into account the standard error of measurement when evaluating a defendant‟s I.Q. test results. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203. Moreover, we acknowledge that this Court previously has rejected the argument that an I.Q. score of seventy “should be interpreted, under our statute, to include a range of scores between sixty-five and seventy-five” based on an SEM of five points. Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450, 457-58 (Tenn. 2004). However, in subsequent decisions, this Court has held that our statute “does not require a functional intelligence quotient test score of seventy (70) or below.” Coleman, 341 S.W.3d at 241 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, we held in Coleman that the intellectual disability statute “does not require that raw scores on I.Q. tests be accepted at their face value and that the courts may consider competent expert testimony showing that a test score does not accurately reflect a person‟s functional I.Q. or that the raw I.Q. test score is artificially inflated or deflated.” Id. at 224. Thus, we have made clear that, “[i]n formulating an opinion regarding a criminal defendant‟s I.Q. at the time of the offense, experts may bring to bear and utilize reliable practices, methods, standards, and data that are relevant in their particular fields.” Id. at 242. Specifically, unlike the Florida Supreme Court, we held in Coleman that “trial courts may receive and consider any relevant and admissible evidence regarding whether the defendant‟s functional I.Q. at the time of the offense was seventy (70) or below.” Id. at 241 (emphasis added); see also Keen, 398 S.W.3d at 605 (reiterating that, “in determining whether a defendant‟s functional I.Q. is 70 or below, a trial court should consider all the evidence that is admissible under the rules for expert testimony”) (emphasis added). We continued in Coleman: Accordingly, if the trial court determines that professionals who assess a person‟s I.Q. customarily consider a particular test‟s standard error of measurement, the Flynn Effect, the practice effect,6 or other factors affecting the accuracy, reliability, or fairness of the instrument or instruments used to assess or measure the defendant‟s I.Q., an expert should be permitted to base his or her assessment of the defendant‟s „functional intelligence quotient‟ on a consideration of those factors. 341 S.W.3d at 242 n.55 (footnote added); see also Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d at 202 (emphasizing that “raw I.Q. scores are not the final determinant of a criminal defendant‟s intellectual functioning” and that our statute “does not require raw test scores to be 6 “The Flynn Effect refers to the observed phenomenon that I.Q. test scores tend to increase over time. . . . The practice effect refers to increases in I.Q. test scores that result from a person‟s being retested using the same or a similar instrument.” Coleman, 341 S.W.3d at 242 n.55. 16 accepted at face value.” Rather, “[c]ourts may consider competent expert testimony that a particular test score does not accurately reflect a person‟s functional I.Q. or that the raw score is artificially inflated or deflated.”). Thus, unlike the Florida Supreme Court, we have not interpreted our statute to bar the presentation of other proof of a defendant‟s intellectual disability in the event that the defendant cannot produce a raw I.Q. test score of less than 71. Accordingly, we deem our statute, as currently interpreted, to be constitutionally sound under the Eighth Amendment. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.