Opinion ID: 891704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Improper Joinder and Denial of Motion to Sever

Text: {11} Rule 5-203 addresses joinder of offenses, joinder of defendants, and motion for severance. In Gallegos, this Court acknowledged the confusion surrounding improper joinder claims and denial of motion to sever claims. 2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 17, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828. In this opinion, in conjunction with Gallegos and State v. Garcia, 2011-NMSC-003, 149 N.M. 185, 246 P.3d 1057 (2011), we clarify Rule 5-203 claims. Rule 5-203 states: A. Joinder of offenses. Two or more offenses shall be joined in one complaint, indictment or information with each offense stated in a separate count, if the offenses, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both: (1) are of the same or similar character, even if not part of a single scheme or plan; or (2) are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts either connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan. B. Joinder of defendants. A separate complaint, indictment or information shall be filed for each defendant. Two or more defendants may be joined on motion of a party, or will be joined by the filing of a statement of joinder by the state contemporaneously with the filing of the complaints, indictments or informations charging such defendants: (1) when each of the defendants is charged with accountability for each offense included; (2) when all of the defendants are charged with conspiracy and some of the defendants are also charged with one or more offenses alleged to be in furtherance of the conspiracy; or (3) when, even if conspiracy is not charged and not all of the defendants are charged in each count, the several offenses charged: (a) were part of a common scheme or plan; or (b) were so closely connected in respect to time, place and occasion that it would be difficult to separate proof of one charge from proof of others. C. Motion for severance. If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants by the filing of a statement of joinder for trial, the court may order separate trials of offenses, grant a severance of defendants, or provide whatever other relief justice requires. In ruling on a motion by a defendant for severance, the court may order the prosecutor to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements or confessions made by the defendants which the prosecution intends to introduce in evidence at the trial. {12} As we stated in Gallegos, Rule 5-203(A) is not a discretionary or permissive rule; it demands that the State join certain charges. 2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 10, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828. Rule 5-203(A) requires multiple offenses be joined whenever they are of the same or similar character, even if not part of a single scheme or plan or are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts either connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan. {13} In State v. Gammill, a Court of Appeals opinion, Judge (later Justice) Minzner analyzed improper joinder as a defect in an indictment that must be preserved before a trial on the merits begins. 102 N.M. 652, 654, 699 P.2d 125, 127 (Ct.App.1985). Rule 5-601(C) NMRA requires that defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment be raised prior to trial. Accordingly, to preserve an improper joinder claim a defendant must raise the claim prior to trial pursuant to Rule 5-601(C) and ground his claim in the criteria enumerated in Rule 5-203(A). {14} We next address prejudice in the joinder context at the trial level. The inherent prejudice in joining unrelated offenses is what causes our joinder rule to specifically limit when joinder of offenses is permissible. See United States v. Lotsch, 102 F.2d 35, 36 (2d Cir.1939) (the venerable Judge Learned Hand noted [t]here is indeed always a danger when several crimes are tried together, that the jury may use the evidence cumulatively). Therefore, the defendant does not have to show prejudice at the trial court level because of the inherent prejudice in joining offenses that are not of the same or similar character or based on the same conduct or on a series of acts either connected together or . . . [part] of a single scheme or plan. Rule 5-203(A). Joining unrelated charges can increase the risk to the defendant by making it more difficult for him or her to testify for one charge but not for another. Similarly, by permitting the jury to hear evidence that is not cross-admissible in separate trials invites a jury to use the evidence of separate crimes cumulatively. See U.S. v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733, 736 (4th Cir.1976). At trial, the defendant should only have to show that the offenses joined in the indictment, information, or complaint do not meet the criteria for joinder under Rule 5-203(A). If the trial court finds that the defendant has made this showing, the trial court should sever the improperly joined offenses. Quashing the indictment or dismissing the complaint are not the trial court's exclusive remedies. Rule 5-601(C)(2) requires dismissal only if the objection is not otherwise remediable. Severance of the improperly joined offenses eliminates the inherent risks of prejudice we outline above when offenses are improperly joined. {15} Defendant's motion to sever the drug trafficking charge specifically outlined the grounds in Rule 5-203(A). The State argues it was proper to join the drug trafficking count because evidence supporting the drug trafficking count was discovered during the course of the shooting investigation. Thus, the State asserts that the offenses were properly joined because they were based on a series of acts . . . connected together in time and space. {16} Under certain circumstances, federal courts have held joinder under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which is similar to Rule 5-203(A), to be proper when evidence of two separate crimes was found during the same search. See United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282, 289 (10th Cir.1983) (holding that joinder was proper where guns, a large quantity of cocaine, and drug paraphernalia were found in the defendant's kitchen, because such evidence indicated that the defendant possessed the drugs and guns as part of a common plan to sell cocaine); see also United States v. Park, 531 F.2d 754, 761 (5th Cir.1976) (holding that joinder of gun and drug charges was proper because they were based on the same transaction, illicit drug activities). However, in each of these cases there was more than a [m]ere factual similarity of events, there was a logical relationship between the offenses. United States v. Ford, 632 F.2d 1354, 1372 (9th Cir.1980) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by United States v. De Bright, 730 F.2d 1255, 1259-60 (9th Cir.1984). Particularly, other courts have been willing to join offenses when drugs and guns are found during a search because possession of such tends to show an intent of drug trafficking. See Valentine, 706 F.2d at 289; Park, 531 F.2d at 761. {17} Here, there is no logical relationship between the shooting and the drug trafficking. In fact, neither party argued that the shooting had any relationship to the trafficking of drugs. The detectives searched Defendant's house for evidence related to the shooting and found the red striped shirt Defendant allegedly wore at the shooting. The sneakers were found in close proximity to the red striped shirt, and it was inside the sneakers that the two bags of cocaine were found. The other evidence relating to drug trafficking, including scales and some plastic bags, were subsequently found inside the residence. It was not Defendant's offenses that could be construed as a series of acts either connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan, Rule 5-203(A), but rather, it was Defendant's shooting offense combined with the detectives' actions following the shooting that led to the joinder of the drug trafficking offense with the shooting offenses. See United States v. Gray, 78 F.Supp.2d 524, 532 (E.D.Va.1999) (holding it improper for the government to join child pornography charges, which were discovered when searching for evidence of unauthorized access to a government computer, because under Rule 8(a), it is a defendant's `offenses,' not any governmental act, that must be part of the `same act or transaction' to permit joinder). It is clear from the indictment that it was error to join the drug trafficking count with the shooting counts.