Opinion ID: 838950
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: substantial relation to achievement of objectives

Text: The documented evidence of economic disparity between men and women  and especially older men and women, who are more likely to suffer the loss of their spouses  bears directly on whether dower is substantially related to our Legislature's goals. Significantly, however, dower by its nature is not aimed broadly at remedying all economic disparity between the sexes. The dower scheme inherently excludes all unmarried men and women; as an element of the laws governing inheritance, dower relates only to surviving spouses' rights to each other's property. Accordingly, dower aims to protect needy spouses and provide a remedy for economic discrimination against women in one distinct arena: spousal property rights upon the death of a spouse. Thus, dower reflects disparities between widows and widowers by discriminating on the basis of gender only within a limited class of men and women: surviving spouses. [11] It is this population of surviving spouses that we must consider when asking whether dower is sufficiently suited to its goals to survive equal protection review. I conclude that, although dower is both overinclusive and underinclusive in relation to the target classes of needy surviving spouses and widows who have suffered economic discrimination, it reflects genuine differences between men and women who have lost a spouse, including that (1) widows receive considerably less income than widowers, (2) women over the age of 65 are more likely to live in poverty than similarly aged men, (3) women have longer life expectancies and, therefore, need economic support for a longer period after the loss of a spouse's contributions to the family, (4) women have less overall earning power in Michigan, and (5) women  particularly those of past generations who may face widowhood in current times  may have relied on their inchoate dower rights during the course of their marriages. Because there are significant documented differences in the economic circumstances of widows and widowers, the use of gender as a proxy for economic disadvantage among surviving spouses is substantially related to the goals of dower. As the dissent observes, United States Census Bureau statistics show that, generally, the median income of married men is nearly double that of married women. [12] As previously noted, Michigan generally falls well behind the national average  and the averages of 44 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico  in wage-equality between the sexes. [13] The dissent also acknowledges that women over 65 are 71 percent more likely than similarly aged men to live in poverty. [14] The United States Social Security Administration confirms that women receive significantly less income than men upon retirement. [15] One reason that women are more likely to face poverty over the age of 65 is longer life expectancy. [16] In 2004, the average life expectancy for American women was 80.4 years, compared to 75.2 years for men. [17] Accordingly, among the aging population most likely to become surviving spouses, gender correlates with economic need. Further, women's longer life expectancies may underlie gender-based distinctions without offending equal protection. Indeed, gender-based distinctions are subject to heightened equal protection review  and not to the strict scrutiny review applicable to distinctions on the basis of race  in part because men and women on the whole have physical differences. Thus, although our inherent differences may not be employed for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's opportunity, sex is not a proscribed classification. VMI, 518 U.S. at 533, 116 S.Ct. 2264 (1996). As the United States Supreme Court observed: The heightened review standard our precedent establishes does not make sex a proscribed classification. Supposed inherent differences are no longer accepted as a ground for race or national origin classifications. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967). Physical differences between men and women, however, are enduring: [T]he two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one [sex] is different from a community composed of both. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193, 67 S.Ct. 261, 91 L.Ed. 181 (1946). [ Id. ][ [18] ] For these reasons, the distinction between widows and widowers does not rest on mere archaic and stereotypic notions or mere presumptions that women suffer from an inherent handicap or [are] innately inferior.... Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982). Rather, the direct evidence of economic disparity between these populations shows that the classification is rooted in accurate data and a reasoned analysis, not the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women, id. at 725-726, 102 S.Ct. 3331 or `overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females,' Nevada Dep't of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 155 L.Ed.2d 953 (2003) (citation omitted). To use the words of the dissent, here a palpable connection clearly exists between gender and the trait for which it serves as a proxy[.] Post at 248.
United States Supreme Court precedent confirms that gender classifications are warranted in marital law and in the retirement context when the classifications remedy women's lower earnings in the past. Indeed, dower directly resembles the portion of the Social Security Act found to be constitutional in Webster, although the law discriminated between men and women. The law in Webster permitted women to exclude three more lower-earning years from the computation of their average wages  resulting in relatively higher benefits upon retirement  because women have been unfairly hindered from earning as much as men.... Webster, 430 U.S. at 315-318, 97 S.Ct. 1192. The resulting gender classification was constitutional because it works directly to remedy some part of the effect of past discrimination. Id. at 318, 97 S.Ct. 1192. Dower has a similar effect, because it assists in addressing women's lower incomes upon retirement, which are one result of lower earnings during women's working lives. Most significantly, like Michigan's dower scheme, the statute in Webster is both underinclusive of less wealthy male workers, who could not benefit from the additional three-year exclusion although they earned lower wages than other men, and overinclusive of more wealthy female workers who could make use of the exclusion although they may not have directly suffered from discrimination.
Next, in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 94 S.Ct. 1734, 40 L.Ed.2d 189(1974), the United States Supreme Court expressly recognized the disparate financial effect on women who lose their spouses. Citing labor statistics similar to those cited above concerning economic and wage disparity between the sexes, the Kahn Court concluded that a Florida tax law granting a $500 property tax exemption to widows but not widowers permissibly cushion[ed] the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden. Id. at 353-355, 94 S.Ct. 1734. Thus, Kahn is directly relevant to the case before us and supports the conclusion that gender-based dower does not offend equal protection. Further, in her brief, Sharon Miltenberger makes the following compelling observation: A woman of 65 now, one most likely to be in the class taking benefit of dower, was 34 when the statistics relied upon in the Kahn decision were recorded. The majority of today's widows were in their prime earning capacity years when women, even college educated women, earned far less than nearly any man. This deprived them not only of earnings at that time, but also the ability to accumulate wealth and property for the future. Finally, like the statute in Webster and Michigan's dower scheme, the law upheld in Kahn is underinclusive of needy spouses because it does not address the needs of less wealthy widowers and overinclusive of widows because it does not exclude high-earning women. The dissent essentially dismisses Kahn, opining that the Court employed rational basis review instead of heightened scrutiny. Post at 255. I do not think that Kahn may be so easily overlooked. Kahn was indeed decided before the United States Supreme Court established the modern test for intermediate scrutiny, which requires a gender classification to be substantially related to important governmental objectives.... Craig, 429 U.S. at 197, 97 S.Ct. 451. Rational basis review merely requires a classification to be rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 100 L.Ed.2d 465 (1988). Kahn upheld the law at issue by concluding that Florida's differing treatment of widows and widowers 'rest[s] upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.' Kahn, 416 U.S. at 355, 94 S.Ct. 1734 quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971) (emphasis added; citation omitted). Thus, the Kahn Court's conclusion appears to have been grounded in something more than a rational connection between the classification and a legitimate governmental purpose. Rather, the Kahn Court concluded that the classification bore a substantial relation to the goal of cushioning the effect of economic discrimination and disparity in income after the loss of a spouse, which the dissent agrees is an important governmental objective. And, as the dissent concedes, Kahn has not been overruled, post at 255, but is still good law. Accordingly, I conclude that Kahn remains persuasive here. [19] The dissent also distinguishes Kahn because it relied heavily on the fact that the provision at issue was a tax provision.... Post at 255. The Kahn Court observed: States have large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation when `taxation is concerned and no specific federal right, apart from equal protection, is imperiled....' Kahn, 416 U.S. at 355, 94 S.Ct. 1734 (citation omitted); post at 255. Because Kahn stated that leeway is afforded when taxation is concerned and no federal right apart from equal protection is involved, I cannot conclude that the Court's decision that the law comported with the Equal Protection Clause arose merely or primarily from special deference to Florida's taxing power.
The dissent prefers to compare dower to the law found unconstitutional in Craig. But, for several significant reasons, I conclude that Craig does not require us to hold that Michigan's dower scheme violates the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, as I discuss further in part III(C), the dissent's application of Craig would effectively render all gender classifications unconstitutional. First, Craig is a problematic decision because although a majority of justices concurred in the result, only a plurality concurred in Justice Brennan's lead opinion. Justices Powell and Stevens each concurred, but explicitly condemned Justice Brennan's endorsement of a middletier analysis. Craig, 429 U.S. at 210, 97 S.Ct. 451 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 212, 97 S.Ct. 451 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stewart similarly concurred in the result because he concluded the classification amount[ed] to total irrationality ... without even a colorably valid justification or explanation, and therefore the law constituted invidious discrimination. Id. at 215, 97 S.Ct. 451 (Stewart, J., concurring in result). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented, rejecting the propriety of a middle-tier analysis, id. at 217, 97 S.Ct. 451 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 217-218, 97 S.Ct. 451 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and harshly criticizing Justice Brennan's attempts to justify his result by subjecting the state to the judicial equivalent of a doctoral examination in statistics, id. at 221-226, 97 S.Ct. 451 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Second, the goals and means of the statute at issue in Craig bore no resemblance to those of Michigan's dower scheme. The Oklahoma law permitting sales of 3.2 percent alcoholic beverages to women aged 18 years or older and men aged 21 years or older was ostensibly aimed at traffic safety. [20] Craig, 429 U.S. at 199, 97 S.Ct. 451. Thus, the law was in no way aimed at remedying past discrimination between the sexes. Indeed, the Craig Court distinguished Kahn and Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 95 S.Ct. 572, 42 L.Ed.2d 610 (1975), for that very reason. Craig noted that Kahn and Schlesinger uph[eld] the use of gender-based classifications ... [based] upon the Court's perception of the laudatory purposes of those laws as remedying disadvantageous conditions suffered by women in economic and military life. Craig, 429 U.S. at 198 n. 6, 97 S.Ct. 451. The Court then concluded: Needless to say, in this case Oklahoma does not suggest that the age-sex differential was enacted to ensure the availability of 3.2% beer for women as compensation for previous deprivations. Id. [21] The law at issue in Craig also did not recognize a historic property right of women. Rather, for reasons unclear to the Court, the law precluded sales of certain alcohol to men under 21, when it could easily have precluded sales to all persons under 21. Third, the statistics in Craig revealed a significantly less direct relationship between drunk driving and men aged 18 to 20 than the statistics here correlating widows and economic disadvantage as compared to widowers. The dissent relies on dicta and generalized statements in Craig regarding the dubious[ness] of proving broad sociological propositions by statistics, and the less tenuous correlations in other cases that were nonetheless rejected as insufficient. Post at 248, quoting Craig, 429 U.S. at 204, 97 S.Ct. 451. Indeed, I agree that the use of statistics inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies the Equal Protection Clause. Post at 248-49, quoting Craig, 429 U.S. at 204, 97 S.Ct. 451. But, as Craig illustrates, unless we are to apply strict scrutiny or strike down all gender-based classifications, empirical data may be necessary to gauge whether there is a substantial relationship between such a classification and an important governmental objective. See part III(C) of this statement. The actual statistics underlying the Court's holding in Craig are not comparable to the data relevant here. The Craig plurality did not find the statistics insufficient merely because 2 percent of men as compared to 0.18 percent of women were arrested for drunk driving. Rather, it concluded that these data represented the most focused and relevant of the statistics offered by the state, yet they did not justify the classification because, overall, the statistics exhibit[ed] a variety of other shortcomings that seriously impugn[ed] their value to equal protection analysis. Craig, 429 U.S. at 201-202, 97 S.Ct. 451. Most significantly, the statistical surveys did not justify the salient features of Oklahoma's gender-based traffic-safety law because [n]one purport[ed] to measure the use and dangerousness of 3.2% beer as opposed to alcohol generally; the Court found this detail to be of particular importance since, in light of its low alcohol level, Oklahoma apparently consider[ed] the 3.2% beverage to be `nonintoxicating.' Id. at 202-203, 97 S.Ct. 451. The plurality added: Moreover, many of the studies, while graphically documenting the unfortunate increase in driving while under the influence of alcohol, ma[de] no effort to relate their findings to age-sex differentials as involved here. Id. at 203, 97 S.Ct. 451. Indeed, Justice Brennan noted that roadside surveys had established that `the under-20 age group generally showed a lower involvement with alcohol in terms of having drunk within the past two hours or having a significant BAC (blood alcohol content).' Id. at 203 n. 16, 97 S.Ct. 451 (citation omitted). Thus, the surveys provide[d] little support for a gender line among teenagers and actually r[an] counter to the imposition of drinking restrictions based upon age. Id. In contrast, as explained above, although gender-based dower is somewhat over-and underinclusive of its goals, there is a clear correlation between widows and economic need, as well as past economic discrimination. The correlation rests on more than the mere loose-fitting generalities concerning the drinking tendencies of aggregate groups presented in Craig. Craig, 429 U.S. at 209, 97 S.Ct. 451. Further, the law at issue in Craig discriminated against men to serve the general goal of traffic safety, which, is unrelated to gender in substance. But here, dower's gender classification is expressly aimed at remedying gender disparities.
Perhaps most significantly, Michigan's dower scheme is distinguishable from the laws compared by the dissent because those laws are amenable to gender-neutral application. The dissent compares cases in which the United States Supreme Court has held that using gender as a proxy for need is unwarranted when nondiscriminatory means of determining need are equally available. Post at 249-50. It relies on Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 99 S.Ct. 1102, 59 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979). But Orr is distinguishable for significant reasons that exemplify the differences between the case before us and the cases on which the dissent relies. The statute in Orr, which allowed for women but not men to receive alimony upon divorce, similarly sought to assist needy spouses and compensate for past discrimination. Id. at 280, 99 S.Ct. 1102. But, crucially, the statute in Orr provided for individualized hearings at which both spouses' financial circumstances were examined. Id. at 281, 99 S.Ct. 1102. Accordingly, the gender-based distinction was gratuitous; the hearings would allow similarly situated individuals to be treated the same with little if any additional burden on the state, and the effort to aid disadvantaged women would not in any way be compromised. Id. at 281-282, 99 S.Ct. 1102. Thus, the state's compensatory and ameliorative purposes [were] as well served by a gender-neutral classification as one that gender classifies.... Id. at 283, 99 S.Ct. 1102. In contrast, probate proceedings under Michigan's EPIC provide no such mechanism to determine financial need. I respectfully suggest that the dissent is too cavalier in suggesting that nondiscriminatory methods such as gender-neutral dower or [d]ower provisions that apply to those spouses who demonstrate an actual need for dower would serve the goals of dower equally well, if not better. Post at 251. While I concur that the Legislature would do well to establish a nondiscriminatory solution, as other states have done, the Legislature alone can determine the feasibility of such a solution in Michigan. At this time, individualized hearings such as those suggested by the dissent do not exist. As I will explain below, I also question the feasibility of creating a gender-neutral dower scheme that is consistent with existing property rights in Michigan. Accordingly, I do not think that Orr is controlling.
Other cases on which the dissent relies involved laws with similarly available means for gender-neutral application. In Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151, 100 S.Ct. 1540, 64 L.Ed.2d 107 (1980), widowers but not widows were required to prove dependence on a spouse's earnings before receiving workers' compensation death benefits. The Court concluded that administrative convenience did not justify discrimination when benefits could be made available either to all applicants regardless of sex or to both men and women who proved dependence. Id. at 151-152, 100 S.Ct. 1540. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 97 S.Ct. 1021, 51 L.Ed.2d 270 (1977), addressed federal old-age, survivors, and disability insurance benefits automatically payable to widows, but payable to widowers only upon proof of dependency. Significantly, not only was a method for proving dependency already in place, but the Court centrally held that the law violated equal protection because it was not aimed at compensating for need or discrimination, but reflect[ed] only a presumption that [women] are ordinarily dependent and denigrated women's wage earnings. Id. at 214, 97 S.Ct. 1021. Finally, the dissent cites Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975), for the proposition that distinctions not entirely without empirical support nonetheless may not meet equal protection standards. Post at 248-49, quoting Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 645, 95 S.Ct. 1225. Weinberger is relevant to the extent that dower may offend equal protection by denigrating women's work and earnings, id. at 645, 95 S.Ct. 1225 as I discuss below. But, as in Wengler, the Court did not hold the Social Security Act benefits scheme at issue in Weinberger unconstitutional because it employed gender as an imperfect proxy for need. To the contrary, the Court concluded that benefits available automatically only to widows with children were not designed to remedy economic discrimination; rather, the classifications were intended to permit women to elect not to work and to devote themselves to the care of children. Id. at 648, 95 S.Ct. 1225. The Court concluded: Since this purpose in no way is premised upon any special disadvantages of women, it cannot serve to justify a gender-based distinction which diminishes the protection afforded to women who do work. Id.
The dissent stresses that dower is underinclusive even with regard to economically disadvantaged widows and overinclusive with regard to widows who do not face financial difficulty. These points are well-taken. But dower is not unconstitutional merely because it is imperfect. First, although dower may apply only in limited circumstances, those circumstances are meaningful. As the dissent notes, `[s]ince a surviving spouse generally takes a dower or curtesy interest free from debts, these interests may offer more protection than other spousal protection provisions.' Post at 245, quoting 15 Powell, Real Property, § 85.20[2][c], p. 379. Significantly, dower also normally attaches to the marital home. [22] Further, dower is not available on a purely random basis. Rather, it is a viable option only if a husband transfers real property without his wife's consent, see MCL 558.13, and also leaves a minimal estate; in other words, it is available in cases such as this one, in which Sharon Miltenberger's husband transferred the marital home and his office without her consent shortly before his death and left an estate with a net worth of only $8,823.06. Finally, dower is only available from transferees who received the property with notice that it was subject to a wife's dower rights; presumably, if the property is purchased, the wife's contingent rights are reflected in a lower purchase price. Thus, although dower may become available in rare circumstances to a widow who is not economically advantaged, the grantee is not unjustly caught unaware of her potential claim. Dower is also underinclusive in the sense that it does not benefit the statistically smaller group of needy widowers. But dower does not denigrate women's earnings, as did the laws at issue in Wengler, Goldfarb, and Weinberger. The dissent asserts that [p]recluding men from asserting a dower right in their wife's lands provides female landowners fewer protections than male landowners. Post at 254. But what prevents a woman from selling her land for a lower price in order to provide her husband a contingent 1/3 remainder during the course of his life? Indeed, because any landowner has such an option, dower appears primarily applicable to cases like this one, in which a spouse explicitly sought to shield his wealth from his mate, who may have relied on her dower right. In contrast, Goldfarb, Wengler, and Weinberger involved disparate treatment of women in public schemes that directly devalued their earnings and for which they had no private remedy. [23] The gender-based distinction in the federal program addressed by Goldfarb, which paid benefits to widows automatically but to widowers only upon proof of dependency, result[ed] in the efforts of female workers required to pay social security taxes producing less protection for their spouses than is produced by the efforts of men.... Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 206-207, 97 S.Ct. 1021. The workers' compensation scheme in Wengler similarly allowed automatic benefits for widows, but not for widowers, without regard to a deceased wife's past work and earnings. Wengler, 446 U.S. at 151, 100 S.Ct. 1540. In Weinberger, the Court explicitly observed that although the notion that men are more likely than women to be the primary supporters of their spouses and children is not entirely without empirical support, the social security taxes at issue were deducted from [the wife's] salary during the years in which she worked. Thus, she not only failed to receive for her family the same protection which a similarly situated male worker would have received [because only widows with children automatically received death benefits], but she also was deprived of a portion of her own earnings in order to contribute to the fund out of which benefits would be paid to others. [ Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 645, 95 S.Ct. 1225.] In sum, dower is not a perfect proxy for need or a complete remedy for past discrimination even within the relevant population of surviving spouses. But dower is not as imperfect  or as easily replaced  as the dissent suggests. Although we may not like the current state of affairs in which women  and widows in particular  are economically disadvantaged as a result of discrimination or of arguably outdated gender-based family roles, the data show that dower is not based on mere `assumptions as to dependency' inconsistent with contemporary reality. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 207, 97 S.Ct. 1021 (citations omitted); post at 246-48. Dower also imposes no particular harm on women landowners who are not economically disadvantaged, because they may contractually protect their husbands. Similarly, landowning men may remove the burden of dower from their transactions simply by soliciting their wives' signatures. Retaining dower also protects the choices of women who have historically relied on its existence while taking time off from work to raise children or maintain their homes. Most significantly, dower serves important, constitutionally sound governmental objectives that are not equally served by hypothetical gender-neutral schemes without additional burdens on the state. Unlike the gender-neutral schemes available in Orr and Goldfarb, gender-based dower cannot be eliminated without compromising the effort to aid disadvantaged women. See Orr, 440 U.S. at 282, 99 S.Ct. 1102. The gender distinction here is not gratuitous. See Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 653, 95 S.Ct. 1225. I would wholeheartedly support laws that provide more direct means of reallocating income or other personal wealth than providing a life estate in a portion of lands owned by a woman's husband[.] Post at 253. But this Court cannot direct the Legislature to create complex social support regimes out of thin air. Indeed, I am not convinced that the Legislature could feasibly adopt a genderneutral dower scheme, as the dissent suggests. Post at 251. First, no mechanism exists to determine whether a spouse is sufficiently dependent to justify a dower right in property owned by a third party. Most significantly, gender-neutral dower for husbands in land already transferred would compromise vested property rights; although a woman's right to dower has always been embedded in Michigan law pertaining to real property, a man's right to dower has never been recognized or taken into account during past transactions involving real property. For these reasons, I conclude that the dissent wrongly equates the shortcomings of dower with its unconstitutionality. There is undeniable evidence that widows are economically disadvantaged as compared to widowers, particularly in Michigan. Because dower does not denigrate women, and because no system of social welfare or remedy for past discrimination can achieve complete success, I conclude that the gender distinction inherent in Michigan's dower statutes is sufficiently related to the goals of dower to withstand equal protection scrutiny.