Opinion ID: 2552147
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Allowing empty chair defendants would contravene Benner v. Wichman and the purpose of AS 09.17.080.

Text: In Benner we heldafter noting that a defendant's right to contribution from other at-fault parties did not survive the Tort Reform Initiativethat equity requires that defendants have an avenue for bringing in others who may be liable to the plaintiff. [18] To describe this remedy, we chose the term equitable apportionment as opposed to equitable indemnity to convey that we were vindicating not just the right of defendants to have damages apportioned in accordance with their fault, but the commensurate duty of responsible third parties to pay plaintiffs. [19] The purpose of limiting fault allocation to joined partiesmore specifically, to parties potentially liable to the plaintiff, rather than empty chair defendantswas to ensure that fault was accurately litigated. [20] As explained in the commentary to the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, which we relied on in Benner, a fair apportionment of fault requires adversarial fact-finding: The limitation to parties to the action means ignoring other persons who may have been at fault with regard to the particular injury but who have not been joined as parties. This is a deliberate decision. It cannot be told with certainty whether that person was actually at fault or what amount of fault should be attributed to him, or whether he will ever be sued, or whether the statute of limitations will run on him, etc. An attempt to settle these matters in a suit to which he is not a party would not be binding on him. Both plaintiff and defendants will have significant incentive for joining available defendants who may be liable. The more parties joined whose fault contributed to the injury, the smaller the percentage of fault allocated to each of the other parties, whether plaintiff or defendant. [21] The risk entailed in shifting blame to an empty chair is well-illustrated by the circumstances of this case: if the statute of limitations were a bar to Alaska General Alarm's liability and it were impleaded for purposes of fault allocation alone, Grinnell would have every motivation to blame Alaska General Alarm for McIntire's injuries. But Alaska General Alarm, facing no liability, would have little incentive to defend itself. The burden thus would fall on McIntire to demonstrate that Grinnell was at fault and that Alaska General Alarm was not. This burden shifting would encourage defense counsel to wait until the statute of limitations expired to join third parties, and would frustrate recovery by plaintiffs. [22] This result could be avoided by holding that additional defendants cannot be joined for allocation of either fault or liability once the limitations period for the underlying cause of action has expired. But this solution would create its own unfairness. If a complaint is filed on the last day allowed by the statute of limitations, a defendant would as a practical matter have no opportunity to apportion fault to responsible third parties [23] a result that we rejected as inequitable in Benner. [24] Other jurisdictions for the same reason have held that a defendant's right to contribution under joint and several liability should not be limited by the two-year statute of limitations for tort claims. [25] Amicus curiae State of Alaska suggests that allowing late joinder of third-party defendants for purposes of allocating liability, rather than merely fault, is barred by language in AS 09.17.080 requiring the court to consider the nature of the conduct of each party at fault, but to award damages and enter judgment only against each party liable. [26] On this point we agree with the Supreme Court of Utah, which looked at similar language in its comparative fault statute and concluded that the statutory scheme, taken as a whole, allows the court to consider the fault of any person, but to allocate fault only to plaintiffs, defendants, and [under the Utah statute] persons immune from suit. [27] Moreover, the language distinguishing between findings of fault and judgments based on liability was originally drafted by the legislature as part of a comparative fault statute that retained joint and several liability; consequently, it is unpersuasive evidence of the intent of the Tort Reform Initiative's drafters to allocate fault without liability. [28] We thus conclude, as did the superior court, that under the comparative fault scheme at issue here third parties must be joined for purposes of allocating fault and liability, or not at all. Moreover, the limitations period governing the underlying claim should not bar the liability of third-party defendants to the plaintiff for their share of fault. [29] To hold otherwise would abandon the statute's stated purposeapportioning liability equitably among at-fault parties [30] in favor of a defense to liability that finds no support in the language or history of the statute and is generally disfavored by courts. [31]