Opinion ID: 1574967
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to Communicate Plea Agreement.

Text: [10] Lopez first argues that she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel with respect to plea negotiations. In particular, Lopez contends that a plea agreement for second degree murder was not communicated to her. At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, the parties stipulated that an offer of second degree murder and use of a weapon had been communicated to defense counsel prior to trial. In overruling Lopez' motion with respect to this allegation, the district court, in keeping with this stipulation, found that Lopez' trial counsel failed to convey that agreement to Lopez. However, the district court concluded that Lopez was not prejudiced by this failure, as Lopez had not demonstrated that she would have accepted the offer. At the evidentiary hearing, lead counsel testified that he recalled the State's making one plea offer for first degree murder in which the State would decline to pursue the death penalty. Lead counsel indicated he did not believe this offer was a good offer, as he found it unlikely that Lopez would be sentenced to death, but he brought the offer to Lopez. He recalled that Lopez thought about the offer for a few days, but indicated that Lopez was adamant about rejecting the offer. Second chair counsel, in his deposition, echoed this, testifying that Lopez wanted to go to trial because she did not remember what happened at the time of the shooting. According to lead counsel, he and second chair counsel suggested later that Lopez offer to plead guilty to manslaughter and use of a weapon, but Lopez refused to let counsel make this offer to the State and insisted upon going to trial. Both counsel also testified that Lopez seemed to generally understand what was going on in connection with the charges filed against her. Lead counsel testified that he attempted to discuss with Lopez the events surrounding the murder, but that Lopez always indicated she did not remember what had happened. Lead counsel indicated that he met with Lopez once or twice a week for about an hour each time. It is not clear from the record, but it appears these meetings occurred over a somewhat lengthy period of time prior to trial. Lead counsel also testified that he went over police reports with Lopez; provided to Lopez copies of depositions taken in the case; and, as a matter of course, would have discussed the State's evidence and witnesses against Lopez in general terms, including forensic evidence. Lead counsel also indicated it was his recollection that Lopez was present at the formal hearings held in the case, which included a suppression motion. Lopez testified that only one offer, which involved serving between 20 and 40 years in prison, was communicated to her. Lopez specifically testified that no offer to plead guilty to second degree murder was ever communicated to her and that if such had been offered, she would have accepted. Lopez generally testified that she had expressed a desire to know what had happened at the time of Gandarilla's death, but that if she could have found out without going to trial, that would have been acceptable. Lopez testified that she received no copies of police reports or depositions and did not recall attending any hearings in the case. Lopez also indicated that even at the time of the postconviction evidentiary hearing, she was uncertain as to the difference between no contest and guilty pleas, and that had she understood the difference before trial, she would have pled no contest or guilty. [11] As an initial matter, we conclude that the district court's finding that Lopez' counsel failed to communicate the plea agreement in question to Lopez was not clearly erroneous. We further conclude that such failure was deficient as a matter of law. However, we also agree with the district court that Lopez has not demonstrated that she would have accepted the plea agreement for second degree murder. As such, Lopez cannot show she was prejudiced by counsel's failure to communicate the plea agreement. The prejudice inquiry in cases involving plea agreements focuses upon whether counsel's ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. [16] Various standards exist for determining whether a defendant has made a showing of prejudice. For example, in the Eighth Circuit, [t]o establish prejudice . . . the movant must show that, but for his counsel's advice, he would have accepted the plea. To command an evidentiary hearing, the movant must present some credible, non-conclusory evidence that he would have pled guilty had he been properly advised. [17] However, the Seventh Circuit, citing Strickland, requires a defendant to establish through objective evidence that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's advice, he would have accepted the plea. [18] The Sixth Circuit largely concurs with the Seventh Circuit's standard, except it notes that  Strickland . . . only requires that a defendant demonstrate that there is a `reasonable probability' that the result of the proceeding would have been different. The Supreme Court has imposed no requirement that the defendant meet his burden of proof through objective evidence. [19] [12] We concur with the Sixth Circuit's reading of Strickland and hold that the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficiency, he or she would have accepted the plea. We conclude, however, that Lopez cannot meet this standard. A review of the record reveals that Lopez testified she did not understand the difference between guilty and no contest pleas. Lopez contends that had she understood that difference, she would have pled guilty or no contest to the plea agreement for second degree murder offered by the State. Lopez stated during her testimony that she did not remember the shooting and thought trial was the only way to find out what happened. Lopez claimed that trial counsel did not share any of the State's case with her and that had they done so, she would have accepted that version of events and not gone to trial. However, evidence was introduced by the State that contradicts Lopez' assertion that she would have pled guilty to second degree murder. Both counsel testified that Lopez rejected one plea agreement and refused to let them approach the State with another suggested agreement  this one for manslaughter. They both testified that Lopez wanted to go to trial, with lead counsel testifying that she was adamant about it. Moreover, Lopez' contention that she was not informed as to the State's case against her is contradicted by lead counsel's testimony. He testified that he met with Lopez, provided to her copies of the depositions taken in the case, and outlined the State's case and evidence against her. He further testified that Lopez was present at the formal hearings in her case, a fact confirmed by a review of the various bills of exceptions from those hearings. The district court found Lopez' contention that she would have pled guilty to be not credible. We conclude that this finding of fact was not clearly erroneous. Lopez did not meet her burdenshe has not shown there was a reasonable probability that she would have accepted the second degree murder plea agreement offered by the State. As such, Lopez' first assignment of error is without merit.