Opinion ID: 70335
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jackson's sentence enhancement as an armed career

Text: CRIMINAL PURSUANT TO Sec. 924(e) 29 Having determined that Jackson was properly convicted under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1) as a felon in possession of a firearm, we now review his contentions that the district court erroneously enhanced his sentence. Jackson first challenges the district court's decision to treat him as an armed career criminal for sentencing purposes. An armed career criminal is [a] defendant who is subject to an enhanced sentence under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(e). U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.4. Section 924(e)(1) provides: 30 In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another, such person shall be fined not more than $25,000 and imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such person with respect to the conviction under section 922(g). 31 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 924(e)(1) (West Supp.1995) (emphasis added); see also U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.4, comment. (n. 1) (Under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(e)(1), a defendant is subject to an enhanced sentence if the instant offense of conviction is a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g) and the defendant has at least three prior convictions for a 'violent felony' or 'serious drug offense,' or both, committed on occasions different from one another. (emphasis added)). 32 In finding that Jackson was an armed career criminal, the district court relied on his prior guilty plea on one date in Texas to five counts of robbery by assault. Those counts were based on five separate robberies that occurred within a two-month period and for which Jackson received concurrent sentences. Jackson contests the characterization of these five incidents as separate convictions because, he argues, these five separate robbery convictions were consolidated for sentencing purposes and constitute a single conviction. According to Jackson, a defendant is not subject to armed career criminal enhancement under Sec. 924(e) unless his prior convictions--not the crimes themselves--occurred on three or more separate occasions. We reject Jackson's argument, because it flies in the face of the plain language of Sec. 924(e), the application note to U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.4, and binding precedent in this circuit. 33 The language of the statute requires only that the prior felonies or offenses be committed on occasions different from one another, not that the convictions be obtained on separate occasions. 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 924(e)(1) (West Supp.1995). The application note to the Sentencing Guidelines says the same thing. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.4 comment. (n. 1). In United States v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 943, 111 S.Ct. 2240, 114 L.Ed.2d 482 (1991), we rejected a contention identical to Jackson's position and held that Sec. 924(e) does not require separate indictments; the final conviction under section 922(g) must merely be preceded by three convictions for crimes that are temporally distinct. Id. at 1538; see also Owens, 15 F.3d at 996 n. 2, 998; United States v. Greene, 810 F.2d 999, 1000 (11th Cir.1986) (per curiam) (rejecting defendant's argument that burglaries charged as four counts in one indictment were not separate under the predecessor to Sec. 924(e), because [t]he indictment alleged burglaries of four separate buildings at four separate locations on four different days in 1962.). 34 Jackson concedes that the five robberies for which he was convicted were committed on five separate occasions: November 17, 1970; December 9, 1970; January 5, 1971; January 11, 1971; and January 19, 1971. It matters not for Sec. 924(e) purposes that the legal consequences of Jackson's separate criminal acts were imposed upon him on the same day. Nor does it matter that the legal consequences were sentences to be served concurrently instead of consecutively. See United States v. Herbert, 860 F.2d 620 (5th Cir.1988) (treating two burglary convictions rendered in same proceeding and yielding concurrent sentences as separate), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1070, 109 S.Ct. 2074, 104 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989). 35