Opinion ID: 1059329
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: appointment of expert to testify regarding conditions of confinement

Text: Bell assigns error to the circuit court's denial of his motion for appointment of a correctional specialist as an expert to provide testimony regarding the conditions of confinement under which Bell would be housed if he were sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life. Bell claims that he needed this expert to review information about Bell, to assess his likelihood of being a future danger in prison, and to testify concerning the correctional systems used in a maximum security prison to manage inmates and prevent acts of violence. Recognizing that this Court has rejected the relevancy of this type of evidence, see Burns, 261 Va. at 340, 541 S.E.2d at 893; Cherrix, 257 Va. at 310, 513 S.E.2d at 653, Bell, nevertheless, urges this Court to reexamine this issue because, in his view, our rulings are inconsistent with decisions of the United States Supreme Court and because trial courts in Virginia are not consistently following the decisions in Cherrix and Burns. Bell asserts that evidence concerning the prison conditions in which he would serve a life sentence is relevant not only in mitigation and in rebuttal to the Commonwealth's evidence of future dangerousness, but also to his future adaptability to prison life. A jury, argues Bell, cannot assess a defendant's likelihood of adjusting to life in prison if evidence describing the conditions of confinement is excluded from the jury's consideration. According to Bell, the common thread running through the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994); and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), is the Court's recognition that many inmates who would be dangerous if released are not dangerous when confined to the `structured environment' of prison. In Skipper, the defendant sought to introduce testimony from two jailers and a regular visitor to the jail regarding the defendant's good adjustment during the time he had spent in confinement. 476 U.S. at 3, 106 S.Ct. 1669. The only question before the Supreme Court was whether the exclusion from the sentencing hearing of the testimony [the defendant] proffered regarding his good behavior during the over seven months he spent in jail awaiting trial deprived [the defendant] of his right to place before the sentencer relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment. Id. at 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669. In holding that the trial court's exclusion of this evidence impeded the sentencing jury's ability to fulfill its task of considering all relevant evidence concerning the character and record of the defendant, the Court specifically stated that it was not hold[ing] that all facets of the defendant's ability to adjust to prison life must be treated as relevant and potentially mitigating. Id. at 7 n. 2, 106 S.Ct. 1669. The Supreme Court, in Williams, found that the defendant's counsel rendered ineffective assistance, in part, because counsel failed to introduce evidence at sentencing from two prison officials who described the defendant as among the inmates `least likely to act in a violent, dangerous or provocative way.' 529 U.S. at 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Counsel also failed to introduce evidence at sentencing from two experts who had testified at trial for the prosecution. In their trial testimony, they had opined that there was a high probability that the defendant would pose a continuing threat to society. Id. at 368-69, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Those experts, however, also surmised that the defendant would not pose a danger to society if kept in a structured environment, but the defendant's counsel failed to elicit that opinion at sentencing. Id. at 371, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Finally, in Simmons, the issue was whether the Due Process Clause requires a sentencing jury to be informed that a defendant is parole ineligible when that defendant's future dangerousness is at issue. 512 U.S. at 163-64, 114 S.Ct. 2187. Reiterating that a defendant's character, prior criminal history, mental capacity, background, and age are just a few of the many factors ... that a jury may consider in fixing appropriate punishment[,] the Court concluded that there may be no greater assurance of a defendant's future nondangerousness to the public than the fact that [the defendant] never will be released on parole. Id. Contrary to Bell's assertion, our decisions in Cherrix and Burns are not inconsistent with these three cases. To use Bell's term, the common thread in these cases is that evidence peculiar to a defendant's character, history and background is relevant to the future dangerousness inquiry and should not be excluded from a jury's consideration. This includes evidence relating to a defendant's current adjustment to the conditions of confinement. As the Court stated in Skipper, a defendant's disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life in prison is itself an aspect of ... character that is by its nature relevant to the sentencing determination. 476 U.S. at 7, 106 S.Ct. 1669. But, as we had already stated, [e]vidence regarding the general nature of prison life in a maximum security facility is not relevant to that inquiry, even when offered in rebuttal to evidence of future dangerousness. Burns, 261 Va. at 340, 541 S.E.2d at 893. While we do not dispute that Bell's future adaptability in terms of his disposition to adjust to prison life is relevant to the future dangerousness inquiry, Bell acknowledged on brief that the individual that he sought to have appointed has been qualified previously as an expert in prison operations and classification, The testimony that Bell sought to introduce through the expert concerned the conditions of prison life and the kind of security features utilized in a maximum security facility. That is the same kind of evidence that we have previously rejected as not relevant to the future dangerousness inquiry. See Burns, 261 Va. at 340, 541 S.E.2d at 893; Cherrix, 257 Va. at 310, 513 S.E.2d at 653. Nor is such general evidence, not specific to Bell, relevant to his future adaptability or as a foundation for an expert opinion on that issue. Thus, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying Bell's motion. Bell failed to show a particularized need for this expert. Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 462, 544 S.E.2d 299, 305, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 481, 151 L.Ed.2d 395 (2001). In light of the inadmissibility of the evidence that Bell sought to introduce through the expert, he also failed to establish how he would be prejudiced by the lack of the expert's assistance. See id.