Opinion ID: 71468
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether meadowcraft was entitled to judgment

Text: AS A MATTER OF LAW
Established, Does Evidence Sufficient to Disprove All of the Employer's Proffered Reasons Preclude Judgment as a Matter of Law for the Employer? Meadowcraft and Combs disagree both as to the applicable law and the weight of the evidence. Meadowcraft contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because (1) Combs failed to produce evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable factfinder to disbelieve its proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for promoting Walker instead of Combs, and (2) even if Combs had produced such evidence, he still failed to present evidence that discrimination was the true reason for the decision. According to Meadowcraft, it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law even if a reasonable factfinder could have rejected each of its proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for promoting Walker instead of Combs, because Combs had the additional burden of demonstrating that Meadowcraft's decision was motivated by racial animus. For that proposition, Meadowcraft relies primarily on Walker v. NationsBank of Florida, 53 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1995), and dicta contained in this circuit's recent decision in Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436 (11th Cir. 1996). Combs takes issue with Meadowcraft's view of the law and the evidence. First, Combs contends that he put forward sufficient 9 evidence to permit a reasonable factfinder to disbelieve Meadowcraft's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision, and he argues that no further evidence of discrimination is required for the jury's verdict to be sustained. Combs relies primarily on this Court's decision in Howard v. BP Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520 (11th Cir. 1994), as well as the Supreme Court's landmark decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). Alternatively, Combs contends that he put forward sufficient additional evidence of discriminatory intent to support the jury's verdict -- even if rejection of Meadowcraft's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons were not enough, when coupled with his prima facie case, to support a finding of discrimination.3 We turn first to the parties' legal arguments. In light of the parties' differing views of the law governing Title VII discrimination claims that rely on circumstantial evidence, and the arguments that the parties make in support of those views, we think it appropriate to examine the applicable law in some detail. Such a review is especially appropriate in light of the Isenbergh panel's recent observation in dicta that, some confusion exists in the law of this circuit about whether Hicks always precludes judgments as a matter of law for employers whenever there is a 3 According to Combs' alternative theory, the jury's verdict is supported by evidence that Meadowcraft had no established criteria for promotion to supervisor and only two out of twelve plant supervisors were black. We reject that theory without detailed discussion, because the evidence offered to support it was undeveloped and without analytic foundation. See, e.g., Brown v. American Honda Motor Co., 939 F.2d 946, 952-53 (11th Cir.) (noting that statistics without analytic foundation are virtually meaningless), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1058, 112 S. Ct. 935 (1992). 10 plausible basis on which to disbelieve the employer's proffered reason for the employment decision in question, 97 F.3d at 442. We believe that any confusion about this question in our circuit's law -- defined by holdings, not dicta -- is limited, and we hope that our discussion will limit that confusion even more. As we will discuss, there is a substantial line of cases in this circuit that adequately and accurately sets forth the legal principles governing the nature and quantum of evidence necessary to permit a jury to infer discrimination. Before turning to those cases, however, we will review briefly the basic legal framework governing discrimination cases that are based on circumstantial evidence. B. The Basic Framework Governing Discrimination Cases Based on Circumstantial Evidence Despite a Title VII plaintiff's failure to present direct evidence of discrimination, he may nevertheless present sufficient circumstantial evidence of discrimination to create a jury question. In evaluating Title VII claims supported by circumstantial evidence, we use the now-familiar framework established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981). Under that framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 11 1824; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54 & n.6, 101 S. Ct. at 1093-94 & n.6. Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S. Ct. at 1094 (footnote omitted). The effect of the presumption of discrimination created by establishment of the prima facie case is to shift to the employer the burden of producing legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S. Ct. at 1094. To satisfy that burden of production, [t]he defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55, 101 S. Ct at 1094 (citation and footnote omitted). [T]o satisfy this intermediate burden, the employer need only produce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus. Id. at 257, 101 S. Ct. at 1096 (emphasis added). If a defendant carries its burden of producing legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision, the presumption of discrimination created by the McDonnell Douglas framework drops 12 from the case, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 & n.10, 101 S. Ct. at 109495 & n.10. However, elimination of the presumption does not imply that the trier of fact no longer may consider evidence previously introduced to establish a prima facie case. Id. at 255 n.10, 101 S. Ct. at 1095 n.10. As the Supreme Court has explained: A satisfactory explanation by the defendant destroys the legally mandatory inference of discrimination arising from the plaintiff's initial evidence. Nonetheless, this evidence and inferences properly drawn therefrom may be considered by the trier of fact on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual. Indeed, there may be some cases where the plaintiff's initial evidence, combined with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to discredit the defendant's explanation. Id. Once a defendant satisfies its intermediate burden of production, and the initial presumption of discrimination accompanying the prima facie case has been eliminated, the plaintiff has the opportunity to discredit the defendant's proffered explanations for its decision. According to the Supreme Court: [The plaintiff] now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. ... [The plaintiff] may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Id. at 256, 101 S. Ct. at 1095 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). In other words, the plaintiff has the opportunity to come forward with evidence, including the previously produced evidence establishing the prima facie case, sufficient to permit a 13 reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment decision. Id.; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S. Ct. at 1825. C. The Effect of Evidence Sufficient to Permit Rejection of the Employer's Proffered Nondiscriminatory Reasons
The framework for evaluating discrimination cases based on circumstantial evidence, which we have just discussed, had been established for some time when the Supreme Court decided St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). Before the Hicks decision, however, the circuits had split over the effect of a decision by the factfinder that the proffered nondiscriminatory reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons for its employment decision. Some of the circuits had held that a finding of pretext mandated a finding of illegal discrimination, while others had held that a finding of pretext did not. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 512-13, 113 S. Ct. at 2750 (listing cases). The divergent views of the circuits on the effect of a finding of pretext prompted the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Hicks to resolve the question. Id. at 512, 113 S. Ct. at 2750. In Hicks, the plaintiff had brought a Title VII lawsuit, alleging he had been demoted and discharged because of his race. Id. at 505, 113 S. Ct. at 2746. After a full bench trial, the district court found for the defendant, despite its finding that the reasons the defendant gave for its actions were not the real 14 reasons for the plaintiff's demotion and discharge. Id. at 508, 113 S. Ct. at 2748. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that once the plaintiff had discredited all of the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision, the plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and held that judgment for the plaintiff was not compelled by rejection of all of the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons. Id. at 511, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. Although the Supreme Court in Hicks rejected the position that disbelief of the employer's proffered reasons requires judgment for the plaintiff, the Court was careful to explain that such disbelief, in tandem with the plaintiff's prima facie case, is sufficient to permit the factfinder to infer discrimination. The Court said: The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and the Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such rejection, [n]o additional proof of discrimination is required. Id. at 511, 113 S. Ct. at 2749 (quoting Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 493 (8th Cir. 1992)) (footnote omitted) (second emphasis added). That is a pretty clear statement. Four justices dissented in Hicks, but none of them did so because they thought that rejection of an employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons, together with the prima facie case, is 15 insufficient to permit the factfinder to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination. To the contrary, the dissenting justices would have gone even further than the majority did. They would have affirmed the Eighth Circuit's holding that once the factfinder rejects the employer's explanations for its decision, a finding of discrimination is required, and the plaintiff is entitled to judgment. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 532-33, 113 S. Ct. at 2760-61 (dissenting opinion of Souter, J., joined by White, Blackmun, and Stevens, J.J.). Based on the Supreme Court's clear statement in the majority opinion in Hicks, read together with the rationale of the dissenting justices, we understand the Hicks Court to have been unanimous that disbelief of the defendant's proffered reasons, together with the prima facie case, is sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a finding of discrimination. Therefore, it follows from Hicks that a plaintiff is entitled to survive summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of law, if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact as to the truth of each of the employer's proffered reasons for its challenged action. With one exception, which we will discuss later, up until the Isenbergh opinion, not only the holdings but also the statements of this Court have been entirely consistent with that understanding of the Hicks decision. 2. The Post-Hicks Case Law in this Circuit Before Isenbergh Just a few months after the Supreme Court decided Hicks, we were called upon to apply it in Hairston v. Gainesville Sun 16 Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 913 (11th Cir. 1993). In Hairston, a terminated employee sued his former employer, alleging age discrimination and retaliatory termination.4 The district court granted summary judgment for the employer. We reversed. In doing so, we explained that, under Hicks, if the employer carries its burden of production (by articulating legitimate reasons for the action), the plaintiff must demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. Id. at 919 (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508, 113 S. Ct. at 2747) (internal quotation marks omitted). Following the Hicks rule, we did not hold that additional proof of discrimination would be required at trial. Instead, we explained: The plaintiff may succeed by directly persuading the court at trial that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. In order to establish pretext, the plaintiff is not required to introduce evidence beyond that already offered to establish the prima facie case. .... [P]laintiff's burden at summary judgment is met by introducing evidence that could form the basis for a finding of facts, which when taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, could allow a jury to 4 Although Hairston was an age discrimination case brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and not under Title VII, [t]he Eleventh Circuit has adapted to issues of age discrimination the principles of law applicable to cases arising under the very similar provisions of Title VII. Hairston, 9 F.3d at 919 (citing Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1989)). Indeed, the Isenbergh panel opinion, which we discuss infra in some detail, acknowledges that the Title VII burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas and Burdine also applies to age discrimination cases. See Isenbergh, 97 F.3d at 440. 17 find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff has established pretext .... Id. at 920-21 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Because the plaintiff in Hairston had submitted sufficient evidence to permit the factfinder to find that the employer's proffered reasons were pretextual, we held it was error for the district court to grant summary judgment. Id. at 921. Thus Hairston, our first decision on this issue following Hicks, clearly held that one way a plaintiff may succeed in establishing discrimination is by showing that the employer's proffered explanations are not credible. When that happens, the plaintiff may or may not ultimately prevail in the litigation, because the factfinder may or may not choose to make the permissible inference of discrimination. However, as we explained in Hairston, once the plaintiff introduces evidence sufficient to permit the factfinder to disbelieve the employer's proffered explanations, summary judgment is not appropriate, because [i]ssues of fact and sufficiency of evidence are properly reserved for the jury. Id. at 921. We said nothing in Hairston about the plaintiff being required to establish anything more than a prima facie case plus the falsity of the tendered explanations; we said nothing about anything else being required for the plaintiff to avoid summary judgment, because nothing else is required. In Batey v. Stone, 24 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 1994), we were again called upon to apply the Hicks rule, this time in the context of sex discrimination. In Batey, we recognized that under Hicks, evidence demonstrating the incredibility of the employer's 18 proffered explanations is not, standing alone, enough to compel judgment for the plaintiff. Id. at 1334 n.12 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, we held that such evidence is sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's burden in responding to a summary judgment motion, because Hicks permits the trier of fact to base a finding of discrimination on rejection of the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons, taken together with the plaintiff's prima facie case. Id. at 1334. Because the plaintiff in Batey had produced sufficient evidence for the factfinder to disbelieve the reasons that the employer proffered for the employment decision, we reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer. Id. at 133536. Consistent with our Hairston precedent, and with Hicks, we held that evidence of pretext, when added to a prima facie case, is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment. Id. Batey was followed closely by our decision in Howard v. BP Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520 (11th Cir. 1994). In Howard, we reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant where there was sufficient evidence to permit the factfinder to reject the defendant's proffered reasons for awarding gas station dealerships to white and Asian dealers instead of to the plaintiff, who was black. We explained the effect of that evidence as follows: [Hicks] holds that proof that a defendant's articulated reasons are false is not proof of intentional discrimination; it is merely evidence of intentional discrimination. However, evidence of intentional 19 discrimination is all a plaintiff needs to defeat a motion for summary judgment. That evidence must be sufficient to create a genuine factual issue with respect to the truthfulness of the defendant's proffered explanation. Id. at 525 (emphasis in original). In Howard, as in Hairston and Batey, we held that summary judgment was inappropriate because, taken together with the plaintiff's prima facie case, the fact finder's rejection of [the] defendant's proffered reasons is sufficient circumstantial evidence upon which to base a judgment for the plaintiff. Id. at 527. We again addressed application of the Hicks rule in CooperHouston v. Southern Railway Co., 37 F.3d 603 (11th Cir. 1994). In that case, we reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of an employer where the evidence was sufficient to permit the factfinder to reject the employer's proffered explanation for its employment decision. We explained that in order to avoid summary judgment, [the plaintiff] was ... obligated to present evidence that [the employer's] legitimate reasons were not what actually motivated its conduct, and we held that the plaintiff had met that obligation. Id. at 605 (citations omitted). The plaintiff's pretext evidence in Cooper-Houston included evidence that the employer had made racially derogatory remarks in the workplace, so it was unnecessary to discuss whether summary judgment would have been inappropriate even if the plaintiff's pretext evidence itself had not been racially charged. Significantly, however, we did not say that evidence of racially prejudiced attitudes was required for proof of pretext, even though 20 such evidence was present in that case. Therefore, Cooper-Houston represents our fourth post-Hicks decision on this issue, all consistently establishing the law of this circuit that a prima facie case plus evidence permitting disbelief of the employer's proffered reasons equals the plaintiff's entitlement to have the factfinder decide the ultimate issue of discrimination. So far, so good. But then came the incongruent Walker decision. In Walker v. NationsBank of Florida, 53 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1995), a panel of this Court affirmed the grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the employer in an age and sex discrimination case, even though the plaintiff had established a prima facie case and had put on evidence sufficient to permit the factfinder to disbelieve all of the employer's proffered reasons for the adverse employment action. Id. at 1556-58. Despite that evidence, the Walker panel said that Walker did not produce evidence that raised a suspicion of mendacity sufficient to permit us to find on this record that the bank intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of age and/or sex. Id. at 1558. For that reason, the panel concluded that [r]easonable and fair-minded persons, in the exercise of impartial judgment, would not conclude that the bank had discriminated against [the plaintiff] on the basis of her age or sex. Id.