Opinion ID: 1641388
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the trial court err when threatening defense counsel with contempt for making a timely valid objection in the presence of the jury?

Text: When the young child took the stand, she testified that she knew who Freddie Young was and identified him. The prosecutor asked the child where she was hurt, and she pointed between her legs (via a series of leading questions). The State began asking the child who hurt her there. The child did not answer. The child appeared, from the record, to be frightened and/or emotionally upset. The prosecutor continued to ask this question in various forms, leading and nonleading. The following exchange occurred: Q: I bet everybody always want [sic] to play with a microphone, don't they? So now you have a chance to say whatever you want to say into that microphone. So you just need to go ahead and tell us who came in your room and woke you up that night. Just tell that ole microphone who it was? BY MR. GUY ROGERS, JR: Your honor, I'm sorry, but I object to this. I don't mean to be mean, but I've got my client to protect. BY THE COURT: You can sit down. Sit down. BY MR. GUY ROGERS, JR: I object  BY THE COURT: I'm going to hold you in contempt, Mr. Rogers. Sit down. The only other prior objection during the young child's testimony was to the prosecutor's demonstrative use of anatomically correct dolls. After the exchange noted above, the questioning continued. The young girl, some time later, testified that she had told Smith that Fred had done this to her. Defense counsel made no other objections. On appeal, Young asserts that since the admonition took place in front of the jury, it bolstered the witness's testimony in the eyes of the jury and created unfair prejudice to the defendant, because the jury would infer that defense counsel had acted improperly. We find no cases in this jurisdiction where this Court has reviewed a trial court's admonition to cease objecting upon pain of contempt. In commenting upon the influence a trial judge has on the jury during trial, this Court has previously said: It is a matter of common knowledge that jurors, as well as officers in attendance upon court, are very susceptible to the influence of the judge. The sheriff and his deputies, as a rule, are anxious to do his bidding; and jurors watch closely his conduct, and give attention to his language, that they may, if possible, ascertain his leaning to one side or the other, which, if known, often largely influences their verdict. He cannot be too careful and guarded in language and conduct in the presence of the jury, to avoid prejudice to either party. Green v. State, 97 Miss. 834, 838 53 So. 415, 416 (1910). Green involved a judge who ran short of venire members and ordered a deputy sheriff to summon five talesmen, i.e., people summoned to serve as jurors from among bystanders at court. The stated purpose was, as the trial judge put it, We want to break this nigger's neck. Id. at 835, 53 So. 415. The judge stated he made this statement in jest. Id. We reversed and remanded the conviction. Id. at 838, 53 So. 415. We have also stated, Should a case arise in which it is obvious that a judge had been partial, biased or prejudiced, and that his attitude and conduct had brought about an unfair trial, the Court would reverse the case and grant a new trial. Garrett v. State, 187 Miss. 441, 455, 193 So. 452, 455 (1940). Garrett dealt with a defendant's motion for recusal of a judge who was a friend of a prosecution witness. Garrett, 187 Miss. at 452-53, 193 So. 452. In Parker v. State , this Court held that, Ordinarily counsel may not complain of slight or not seriously prejudicial impropriety in remarks or comments by the court where they are provoked by himself. Parker v. State, 401 So.2d 1282, 1285 (Miss. 1981). In the present case, defense counsel did not appear to be bringing the opprobrium on themselves by questioning the trial court's ruling on any subject. Defense counsel was making an objection, the basis of which is unknown. It is apparent from the record that the trial court overreacted when he told defense counsel to sit down upon pain of contempt. However, these comments did not deny the defendant a fundamentally fair trial. Garrett v. State, 187 Miss. 441, 455, 193 So. 452, 455 (1940). Therefore, the error was harmless.