Opinion ID: 1412175
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Continuing Crimes

Text: As we observed earlier in this opinion, under the general premise of the common law a crime is committed in just one place so only the government of that single place would have jurisdiction to prosecute and punish the crime. Exceptions were made at common law to this single situs rule for offenses characterized as continuing such as kidnapping and larceny. 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel & Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure § 16.1(d) (2d ed., West 1999). A continuing offense is a crime considered as transitory, on-going, or capable of repetition or continuation and as such is considered committed, and subject to prosecution, at any place where the crime was initiated, continued or completed. Id. Several states [29] have found sexual assault in the second degree, commonly referred to as forcible rape, to be a continuing offense in circumstances such as the case before us. On a whole these courts have concluded that when the elements of an offense occur sequentially, are repeated or continue over a limited span of time or constitute a single chain of events, then the offense is a continuing crime by which venue lies both in the place where the defendant caused the victim to be fearful through use of force or threats of force and the place where the defendant engaged in the prohibited sexual act. See Spoonmore v. State, 411 N.E.2d 146 (Ind.App.1980) (single chain of events establishing a basis for jurisdiction where any act occurred); State v. Redford, 242 Kan. 658, 750 P.2d 1013 (1988) (series of events which are material elements forming single crime); Moore v. Commonwealth, 523 S.W.2d 635 (Ky.1975) (initial abduction a sequential part of carrying out the purpose of having carnal knowledge of victim); People v. Slifco, 162 Mich.App. 758, 413 N.W.2d 102 (1987) (crime began where force or coercion employed even though sexual penetration occurred in another location); McKorkle v. State, 305 So.2d 361 (Miss.1974) (threat of physical violence is an element of the offense which continued until the rape was committed; State v. Gallup, 520 S.W.2d 619 (Mo.App.1975) (rape continues until all elements of the crime are completed); People v. Burgess, 107 A.D.2d 703, 484 N.Y.S.2d 58 (1985) (force as an element of the crime continued uninterrupted through the rapes and until the victims were released). Additionally, at least one state has applied similar reasoning in finding robbery to be a continuing offense when elements of the crime are committed in more than one jurisdiction. People v. Kalwa, 306 Ill.App.3d 601, 239 Ill.Dec. 726, 714 N.E.2d 1023 (1999) (robbery takes on the nature of a continuing offense when the elements of the crime occur sequentially). West Virginia Code § 61-11-12 (1969) (Repl.Vol.2000), which addresses where a crime committed in more than one county within the state may be tried, impliedly establishes a much broader category of continuing offenses than those identified as such at common law. This statute provides: When an offense is committed partly in one county and partly in one or more other counties within this State, it may be alleged that the offense was committed and the accused may be tried in any one county in which any substantial element of the offense occurred. Although this multi-venue statute is limited by its terms to actions occurring within the state, we find its underlying theory compatible with resolving jurisdictional questions arising from situations where substantial elements of an offense are committed partly within West Virginia and partly within another state or states. A significant reason for reaching this conclusion is perhaps the most obvious: to provide no incentive for criminals to elude prosecution and punishment for violating the penal laws of this state. As United States Supreme Court Justice Holmes stated in Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 31 S.Ct. 558, 55 L.Ed. 735 (1911), a case involving extradition: Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting ... [the accused] within its power.... [T]he criminal need not do within the State every act necessary to complete the crime. If he does there an overt act which is and is intended to be a material step toward accomplishing the crime, and then absents himself from the State and does the rest elsewhere, he becomes a fugitive from justice.... Id. at 285, 31 S.Ct. 558. Accordingly we hold that the offenses of sexual assault in the second degree and robbery may constitute continuing offenses for purposes of criminal prosecution within the territorial jurisdiction of the state of West Virginia. In order to be considered a continuing offense, the facts must demonstrate that at least one substantial or material element of the alleged sexual assault or robbery occurred within this state as part of a sequential chain of events. Therefore, on this basis we uphold the lower court's denial of the motion to acquit because at that stage in the proceedings the lower court was required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Fischer, 158 W.Va. 72, 211 S.E.2d 666 (1974) (`Upon motion to direct a verdict for the defendant, the evidence is to be viewed in light most favorable to prosecution. It is not necessary in appraising its sufficiency that the trial court or reviewing court be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant; the question is whether there is substantial evidence upon which a jury might justifiably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' State v. West, 153 W.Va. 325 [168 S.E.2d 716] (1969).).