Opinion ID: 1965145
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retroactive Application of Section 5-1038(a)(2)(i)2

Text: Prior to October 1, 1995, section 5-1038 read: § 5-1038. Finality; modification. (a) Declaration of paternity final. Except in the manner and to the extent that any order or decree of an equity court is subject to the revisory power of the court under any law, rule, or established principle of practice and procedure in equity, a declaration of paternity in an order is final. (b) Other orders subject to modification. Except for a declaration of paternity, the court may modify or set aside any order or part of an order under this subtitle as the court considers just and proper in light of the circumstances and in the best interests of the child. See Md.Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol.), § 5-1038 of the Family Law Article. In Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 336 Md. 303, 315, 648 A.2d 439, 445 (1994), this Court held that [r]eading §§ 5-1038(a) and (b) together, it is clear that the more liberal revisory rule, § 5-1038(b), governs orders relating to paternity, but does not control the declaration of paternity itself. Rather, § 5-1038 read in its entirety makes it plain that paternity judgments are governed by the strict revisory rules set forth in [Maryland] Rule 2-535. The revisory power of Maryland Rule 2-535, which authorizes trial judges to alter or amend a final judgment, only applies within thirty days of entry of the judgment and thereafter only in the rare instances of fraud, mistake, or irregularity. See Maryland Rule 2-535; see also Md.Code (1974, 1998 Repl.Vol.), § 6-408 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article; Tandra S., 336 Md. at 315-18, 648 A.2d at 445-46. Tandra S., like this case, involved multiple appeals by putative fathers seeking to overturn previous paternity declarations entered against them. One of the putative fathers in that case had taken a post-declaration blood test, which excluded him from being the biological father of the child at issue. [2] In the second case, the mother confessed to the putative father, after a paternity declaration had been entered against him, that she had committed perjury at the paternity hearing by naming him as the father. In fact, she had already legally changed the child's last name to reflect his true lineage and parentage. Id. at 308, 648 A.2d at 441. Both parties in the second case subsequently sought to end the putative father's child support obligation, but the Baltimore City Bureau of Support Enforcement challenged that attempt. Despite the strong, if not conclusive evidence, that neither man was the biological father in his case, the holding in Tandra S. precluded both men from vacating the earlier paternity declarations against them because they had not produced evidence of fraud, mistake, or irregularity under the narrow, common-law definitions given to those terms. See id. at 323, 648 A.2d at 448. The General Assembly, in its next Regular Session, enacted 1995 Maryland Laws, Chapter 248 (hereinafter Chapter 248), specifically to overturn the effect of Tandra S. Chapter 248 altered section 5-1038 to allow adjudicated fathers to reopen and challenge the paternity declaration against them when they are excluded from being the biological father by a post-declaration blood or genetic test. Section 5-1038 of the Family Law Article now states: § 5-1038. Finality; modification. (a) Declaration of paternity final; modifications. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, a declaration of paternity in an order is final. (2) (i) A declaration of paternity may be modified or set aside: 1. in the manner and to the extent that any order or decree of an equity court is subject to the revisory power of the court under any law, rule, or established principle of practice and procedure in equity; or 2. if a blood or genetic test done in accordance with § 5-1029 of this subtitle establishes the exclusion of the individual named as the father in the order. (ii) Notwithstanding subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, a declaration of paternity may not be modified or set aside if the individual named in the order acknowledged paternity knowing he was not the father. (b) Other orders subject to modification. Except for a declaration of paternity, the court may modify or set aside any order or part of an order under this subtitle as the court considers just and proper in light of the circumstances and in the best interests of the child. [Emphasis added.] Clearly, Chapter 248 was designed to remedy the effect Tandra S. had on paternity declarations. In this appeal, it is for this Court to decide whether the changes implemented by Chapter 248 extend to paternity declarations entered prior to the effective date of the statute. We hold that the changes rendered by Chapter 248 apply to paternity declarations entered before October 1, 1995. The retroactive or retrospective application of a legislative enactment has been defined in 2 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland's Statutory Construction, § 41.01, at 337 (5th ed. 1993): The terms `retroactive' and `retrospective' are synonymous in judicial usage and may be employed interchangeably. They describe acts which operate on transactions which have occurred or rights and obligations which existed before passage of the act. (Footnote omitted.) Concerning the retroactive application of a statute, we noted in Spielman v. State, 298 Md. 602, 607, 471 A.2d 730, 733 (1984): There is no absolute prohibition against retroactive application of a statute. [ State Comm'n on Human Relations v. Amecom Div., 278 Md. 120, 123, 360 A.2d 1, 4 (1976).] The question whether a statute operates retrospectively, or prospectively only, ordinarily is one of legislative intent. In determining such intent this Court has repeatedly stated, [t]here is a general presumption in the law that an enactment is intended to have purely prospective effect. In the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, a statute is not given retrospective effect. Traore v. State, 290 Md. 585, 593, 431 A.2d 96, 100 (1981). See also Dashiell v. Holland Maide Candy Shops, 171 Md. 72, 74, 188 A. 29, 30 (1936) (It is, of course, a general principle that statutes are not to be given a retrospective effect unless their words require it....). There are exceptions to the general presumption that legislative enactments may not be applied retroactively. One such category of exceptions concerns legislative enactments that apply to procedural changes. See Roth v. Dimensions Health Corp., 332 Md. 627, 636, 632 A.2d 1170, 1174 (1993) (Notwithstanding this presumption [against retroactivity], if the statute `contains a clear expression of intent that it operate retrospectively, or the statute affects only procedures or remedies, it will be given retroactive application.' (quoting Amecom Div., 278 Md. at 124, 360 A.2d at 4 (citations omitted))); Mason v. State, 309 Md. 215, 219-20, 522 A.2d 1344, 1346 (1987) (Despite the presumption of prospectivity, a statute effecting a change in procedure only, and not in substantive rights, ordinarily applies to all actions whether accrued, pending or future, unless a contrary intention is expressed....); Janda v. General Motors Corp., 237 Md. 161, 168, 205 A.2d 228, 232 (1964) (Ordinarily a change affecting procedure only, and not substantive rights, made by statute (and an amendment of the Maryland Rules has essentially the same effect) applies to all actions [and matters] whether accrued, pending or future, unless a contrary intention is expressed. ) (alteration in original) (quoting Richardson v. Richardson, 217 Md. 316, 320, 142 A.2d 550, 553 (1958)), disapproved in part on other grounds by Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Riverdale Heights Vol. Fire Co., 308 Md. 556, 520 A.2d 1319 (1987); Kelch v. Keehn, 183 Md. 140, 144, 36 A.2d 544, 545 (1944) (Where the effect of the statute is not to obliterate existing substantial rights but affects only the procedure and remedies for the enforcement of those rights, it applies to all actions whether accrued, pending or future, unless a contrary intention is expressed.). The Court of Special Appeals reasoned below that Chapter 248 was not a procedural enactment. That court pointed out that the procedure for a putative father to attempt to set aside a prior paternity adjudication is the same as it was prior to Chapter 248 being enacted. The intermediate appellate court believed that Chapter 248 merely provided an additional ground on which to challenge a prior paternity declaration. See Tyrone W., 129 Md.App. at 280, 741 A.2d at 564. We note, however, that the caption to Chapter 248, as enacted, states that it is AN ACT concerning Paternity ProceedingsProcedure. [3] In addition, the title clause states that the enactment is [for] the purpose of ... generally relating to paternity proceedings. The caption and title clause indicate that the Legislature believed it was placing into section 5-1038, not an additional ground, but an additional procedure or type of proceeding by which a putative father could seek a revision of a prior paternity declaration. This intention is further evidenced by the Legislature's placement of the equitable relief in subparagraph (a)(2)(i)1, while the blood or genetic test procedure was placed in subparagraph (a)(2)(i)2. Although the original procedure for revisiting paternity remains the same after Chapter 248's enactment, the methods by which revisiting the issue of paternity may be done have been expanded by the statute. The procedure contained in section 5-1038(a)(2)(i)1 empowers the trial court to re-examine a paternity declaration under its equitable revisory powers, contained in Maryland Rule 2-535. Subparagraph 2, however, empowers the court to set aside a paternity declaration based solely on a paternity test administered under section 5-1029 of the Family Law Article. In other words, the methods envisioned by the different subparagraphs each involve a procedural step not contained in the other. [4] A second exception to the general presumption against retroactive application of laws is when legislation is intended to have a remedial effect, and it does not impair vested rights. Generally, remedial statutes are those which provide a remedy, or improve or facilitate remedies already existing for the enforcement of rights and the redress of injuries. They also include statutes intended for the correction of defects, mistakes and omissions in the civil institutions and the administration of the state. The definition of a remedial statute has also been stated as a statute that relates to practice, procedure, or remedies and does not affect substantive or vested rights. Every statute that makes any change in the existing body of law, excluding only those enactments which merely restate or codify prior law, can be said to remedy some flaw in the prior law or some social evil. [Footnotes omitted.] 3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland's Statutory Construction, supra, § 60.02, at 152; see also 2 id. § 41.09, at 399 (The statutes which fall into this category [of remedial statutes] are ones that describe methods for enforcing, processing, administering, or determining rights, liabilities or status.). The appellate courts of this state have also defined remedial legislation. For instance, in Amecom Div., 278 Md. at 125, 360 A.2d at 5, we said that [a]n act is remedial in nature when it provides only for a new method of enforcement of a preexisting right. (Citing Kelch, 183 Md. at 145, 36 A.2d at 544; Ireland v. Shipley, 165 Md. 90, 98, 166 A. 593 (1933)). Under Maryland law, statutes are remedial in nature if they are designed to correct existing law, to redress existing grievances and to introduce regulations conducive to the public good. Weathersby v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat'l Management Co., 86 Md.App. 533, 550, 587 A.2d 569, 577 (1991) (citing State v. Barnes, 273 Md. 195, 208, 328 A.2d 737, 745 (1974)), rev'd on other grounds, 326 Md. 663, 607 A.2d 8 (1992). This raises the question of whether Chapter 248 was intended to be remedial. [5] We note first that 3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland's Statutory Construction, supra, § 60.01, at 147, states: Many statutory issues relating to family law are considered remedial. For example, one of the purposes of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, which has been adopted by all fifty states, is to provide enforcement of the claims of nonresidential parents and children entitled to support. Singer also notes that [t]he Uniform Parentage Act has been held to be remedial and that [m]odern social legislation is generally regarded as being remedial in nature. 3 id. § 60.02, at 154. In determining whether Chapter 248 is remedial in nature, we look to the general tenets of statutory construction. As this Court has said time and time again, [t]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. See, e.g., Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). Although the interpretation of statutes begins with the plain language of the statute in question, see, e.g., Jones v. State, 357 Md. 141, 159, 742 A.2d 493, 502 (1999), we noted in Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992), that the plain meaning rule of construction is not absolute; rather, the statute must be construed reasonably with reference to the purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body. The Court will look at the larger context, including the legislative purpose, within which statutory language appears. (Citations omitted.) Review of the type mentioned in Tracey often consists of reviewing the materials saved in the bill files of the legislative bill ultimately adopted and enrolled as the Act in question. Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15, 525 A.2d 628, 632-33 (1987). These rules of statutory construction presumably apply to the legislative history surrounding the intent that an Act have retroactive effect. The legislative history of Chapter 248 clearly shows that its effects were meant to be remedial, i.e., it was intended to be applied to all paternity claims and declarations, whether prior, current, or prospective, that are rendered false by present or future blood or genetic testing. Put more simply, Chapter 248 was intended to remedy the effect of Tandra S. both prospectively and retrospectively. Chapter 248 began as House Bill 337, which had a companion bill, Senate Bill 114. Materials compiled by the Department of Legislative Reference in the bill files for both indicate the intended remedial nature of this enactment. For instance, in her testimony before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Senator Paula Hollinger, a sponsor of S.B. 114, stated: I am not here today to testify for a bill dealing with women's rights but rather, to take a stand for men's rights. A case was brought to my attention in the early part of October 1994 when the Court of Appeals handed down a 5-2 decision on a paternity case. The highest court in Maryland ruled that a man who agreed to pay child support but later found he was not the biological father must continue paying child support. The reason for the decision according to Chief Judge Robert C. Murphy's majority opinion was that if paternity cases were not final then children would be left fatherless and without support. Certainly no one would advocate for that situation; however, I believe there is a fairness issue at stake here and, if passed, SB 114 would amend the code to deal fairly with this issue by authorizing the court to modify or set aside a declaration of paternity under certain circumstances. .... ... In light of the inequality exhibited in the recent publicized cases of 2 men who accepted paternity and child support only to discover they were not the biological father, yet had to continue support payments, I urge a favorable report on SB 114. In addition, the bill files contain copies of three articles published shortly after the filing of the Tandra S. decision, which criticize the opinion or express the Maryland legal community's distaste with its result. See Adam Ambrose, Paternity: A Missed Opportunity, Daily Rec., Nov. 12, 1994; Jane Bowling, Forcing Paternity in the Name of Finality and Expediency, Daily Rec., Nov. 12, 1994; William Thompson, Md. High Court's Paternity Ruling Fathers Bizarre Justice, Balt. Sun, Oct. 24, 1994. The bill files also contain a copy of the Tandra S. decision. The following paragraph of Judge Eldridge's and Judge Raker's dissenting opinion appears in the bill file as shown below: {In light of the basic differences between paternity judgments and the judgments in other types of lawsuits, the majority's holding today, in the words of the Court of Special Appeals, defies common sense. Undoubtedly society has a strong interest in ending disputes at some point in time, and normally other interests must yield to the limitations on a court's revisory powers. Nevertheless, a completely rigid adherence to the shibboleth that in today's highly litigious society, there must be some point in time when a judgment becomes final, in the face of irrefutable scientific evidence that a particular individual did not father a given child, with all of the attendant ramifications of such decree, is absurd. Under the majority's view, presumably if the Provincial Court of Maryland in the 1600's had issued a decree that the earth was flat, the absence of fraud, mistake or irregularity, as narrowly defined by this Court, would make that Provincial Court decree sacrosanct. Or, if Rule 2-535(b) were to be given extra-territorial effect, presumably the March 5, 1616, decree by a tribunal in Rome, aimed at Galileo Galilei, and declaring that Copernicanism is erroneous and that the planet earth is the center of the universe, would be given conclusive effect. Like the courts below, I do not believe that all common sense must be abandoned in the name of Rule 2-535(b).} Tandra S., 336 Md. at 330-31, 648 A.2d at 452 (Eldridge and Raker, JJ., dissenting). Clearly, the perceived injustices to putative fathers in situations similar to the putative fathers in the Tandra S. case could not be remedied by legislation with a strictly prospective effect. [6] Apparently, the Legislature agreed with the various criticisms of Tandra S. in the media and with Judge Eldridge's and Judge Raker's claim that the decision defied common sense. Turning to this case, it would equally abandon common sense to deny, once again, a putative father the ability to challenge a paternity declaration simply because he has the misfortune of having the declaration entered against him prior to October 1, 1995. The bill files also contain more generic evidence of the Legislature's intent that Chapter 248 be applied retroactively. Originally, at their first reading, both H.B. 337 and S.B. 114 would have allowed the courts to reopen any previous paternity declaration, and any corollary judgment resulting from such litigation, if the court considered it just and proper in light of the circumstances and in the best interests of the child to do so. As proposed at their first reading, either bill would have completely deleted former section 5-1038(a), thus eliminating any reference to the revisory power of the trial court or the finality of the paternity declaration. Under the original S.B. 114 (Jan. 23, 1995), subsection (b) would have become the entirety of section 5-1038 and would have been amended to read: Notwithstanding any other law or rule, the court may modify or set aside any order or part of an order under this subtitle as the court considers just and proper in light of the circumstances and in the best interests of the child. House Bill 337 (Feb. 2, 1995) would have amended the provision to read: The court may modify or set aside any order or part of an order under this subtitle as the court considers just and proper in light of the circumstances and in the best interests of the child. Thus, in its original form, House Bill 337 authorize[d] a court to modify or set aside any order or part of an order in a paternity proceeding that the court considers just and proper in light of the circumstances and in the best interests of the child. Department of Legislative Reference, Bill Analysis, House Bill 337 (1st ed.) (emphasis added). The best interests of the child provision, however, did not survive as to decisions on paternity declarations. Senate Bill 114 remained unchanged after its passage through the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee and its second reading. House Bill 337 had changed substantially by its second reading, however. It would have recodified section 5-1038 to read in relevant part: (2) A declaration of paternity may be modified or set aside: .... (ii) 1. If a blood or genetic test done in accordance with § 5-1029 of this subtitle establishes the definite exclusion of the individual named as the father in the order; and 2. On a showing of fraud. H.B. 337 (Mar. 14, 1995). As the revised Bill Analysis prepared by the Department of Legislative Reference pointed out, this version of H.B. 337 was more narrowly drawn [than S.B. 114]. Senate Bill 114 would allow a court to modify or set aside any order or part of an order in a paternity proceeding, including a declaration of paternity, as the court considers just and proper in light of the circumstances and in the best interests of the child. (Emphasis added.) After passage in their respective chambers, both bills were substantially altered again by the joint conference committee into the form ultimately adopted as Chapter 248: AN ACT concerning Paternity ProceedingsProcedure FOR the purpose of ... authorizing a court to modify or set aside a declaration of paternity under certain circumstances; and generally relating to paternity proceedings. .... SECTION 1. BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND, That the Laws of Maryland read as follows: