Opinion ID: 2772452
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merits of Ward’s IAC-at-Sentencing Claim

Text: Ward asserts a COA should issue because the district court’s resolution of his IAC claim presents a question debatable among reasoned jurists. 11 Case: 14-70015 Document: 00512912236 Page: 12 Date Filed: 01/22/2015 No. 14-70015 Specifically, Ward contends his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel relied on inaccurate and incomplete medical diagnoses of Ward’s mental illness, which prejudiced the penalty phase of his trial. As discussed above, we evaluate the COA application “through the lens of the deferential scheme laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).” Barrientes, 221 F.3d at 772. This deferential standard of review has particular bite in evaluating the appealability of ineffective assistance claims—the Supreme Court requires that federal courts “use a ‘doubly deferential’ standard of review that gives both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013).
Ward’s history of mental illness was a central issue throughout his criminal trial and appeal. On state habeas review, Ward challenged his trial counsel’s mitigation investigation. Ultimately, the CCA rejected this claim and held that Ward’s counsel was not unconstitutionally deficient. Because we review the reasonableness of the state court’s decision denying Ward habeas relief to determine its appealability, we summarize the factual record on which the CCA made its decision below.
Initially, defense counsel challenged Ward’s competency to stand trial. The testimony and expert reports from the competency proceedings pertain to the state habeas court’s assessment of trial counsel’s mental-health investigation. Defense psychiatrist Dr. Heidi Vermette and psychologist Dr. Kristi Compton reviewed Ward’s medical, school, and prison records; evaluated Ward; and interviewed his parents. They testified that Ward first exhibited behavioral problems, specifically uncontrollable rage, beginning at age three. He was admitted to the Children’s Medical Center in Dallas, where doctors diagnosed him with bipolar disorder at age four. Dr. Vermette and Dr. 12 Case: 14-70015 Document: 00512912236 Page: 13 Date Filed: 01/22/2015 No. 14-70015 Compton described the myriad medications prescribed (including Depakote, lithium, Haldol, Ritalin, Elavil, Thorazine, Respiradol, and Dicertarin) and the numerous diagnoses (including bipolar disorder, personality disorder, schizoaffective disorder, depression, and oppositional-defiant disorder). They also noted that Ward’s intelligence was above average and that he had dyslexia. The court found Ward competent to stand trial. Counsel’s strategy at the guilt phase was to argue that Ward’s childhood and family caused a delusional mental state toward the City of Commerce that precluded the required intent for capital murder—retaliation. Dr. Vermette testified to this effect and stated that, in her opinion, Ward’s symptoms are consistent with a “psychotic disorder” and that he has “paranoid delusions.” This conclusion was supported by Ward’s father’s testimony about, and records of, the city-code violations at the Ward home dating back to 1993—including photographs of the Ward home and references to illegal rubbish and to the demolition of the home. The jury considered this evidence and found Ward guilty of capital murder. At the penalty phase, defense counsel emphasized that Ward was mentally ill from an extremely young age and that his parents exacerbated his illness and did not follow up on needed therapy. The defense introduced school and medical records and testimony indicating that Ward was aggressive in elementary school toward his fellow students, had difficulty forming friendships, and was unable to feel empathy. By sixth grade, Ward was diagnosed with depressive disorder and a personality disorder “with narcissistic features.” Although doctors repeatedly recommended that Ward’s parents seek individual and family therapy, they did not do so. Ward’s parents believed Ward was not getting appropriate school services because of school officials’ vendetta against the family. For their part, health examiners believed that his parents’ derogatory statements toward the 13 Case: 14-70015 Document: 00512912236 Page: 14 Date Filed: 01/22/2015 No. 14-70015 school contributed to Ward’s disrespect for school authorities. By eighth grade, Ward used vulgar language with teachers and peers, arrived to class late and left early, and, when his behavior was out of control, it took three male staff members to restrain him. At this time, Dr. Douglas Keene observed Ward to be “frankly psychotic.” In ninth grade, Ward’s aggression escalated when he fought one of his teachers. In eleventh grade, he was accused of stabbing another student in the leg. After this incident, he was homeschooled until graduation. At age eighteen, he was charged with assault on a public servant and resisting arrest. By this time, experts testified that Ward had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, depression, learning disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and he was taking Depakote and lithium. Ward briefly attended college but dropped out, citing disagreements with instructors whom he described as deceitful and political. When he was twentyone, Ward’s father hit him in the head with the butt of a revolver to keep him from going next door and killing his neighbors, giving Ward a mild concussion. In his federal habeas petition, Ward primarily challenges counsel’s effectiveness by attacking the diagnoses of Dr. Compton, Dr. Vermette, and Dr. Randall Price. Ward contends these diagnoses were inaccurate and based on counsel’s insufficient investigation, which prejudiced his defense. Dr. Compton testified at trial that her primary diagnosis was that Ward had shared psychotic disorder. As discussed above, Ward had an unusually close relationship with his father. Dr. Compton believed that Ward and his father suffered from similar delusions that there was a conspiracy in the town against the family that included the school district, government, and court system. Dr. Compton testified that Ward’s father possessed delusional, odd beliefs that he imposed on his son. She also diagnosed Ward with delusional disorder (persecutory type), bipolar disorder by history, learning disorder, and 14 Case: 14-70015 Document: 00512912236 Page: 15 Date Filed: 01/22/2015 No. 14-70015 personality disorder with “strong signs of narcissistic, obsessive compulsive, and antisocial features.” Dr. Vermette relied on a competency evaluation by Dr. Michael Pittman (the trial court’s expert), who diagnosed Ward with bipolar disorder and a personality disorder with “paranoid, antisocial, and narcissistic traits.” Dr. Vermette also relied on a 2007 neuropsychological evaluation by Dr. Price, another defense expert, that found Ward’s clinical picture consistent with “delusional disorder, bipolar mood disorder, obsessive-compulsive and narcissistic personality traits, severe learning disabilities, and antisocial behaviors.” Dr. Price also believed that Ward and his father suffered from similar delusions that constituted “a shared delusional type psychosis.” The jury also heard testimony from Ward’s special-education teachers and service providers detailing the Ward family’s opposition to various mentalhealth interventions. The director of the agency that delivered specialeducation services to Ward’s school district testified that Ward was labeled seriously emotionally disturbed. The agency brought in behavioral consultants from a university and developed a behavioral-management program for Ward that his parents rejected. Ward’s special-education teacher for kindergarten through first grade brought a box of records to court that she had kept for fifteen years out of fear that Ward’s parents would sue her—Ward’s father had apparently threatened her more than once. She testified that Ward would attack her, and he choked, bit, hit, and kicked other children every week. Her records contained a 1992 report by a psychologist that said Ward’s parents noticed a problem in their son when he was between eighteen and twenty-four months of age. A diagnostician with the special-education-service agency testified that Ward’s father was confrontational and difficult to work with. She testified about an incident when, after Ward had hurt a teacher, Ward’s father showed up at her office and threatened her because he did not want his son 15 Case: 14-70015 Document: 00512912236 Page: 16 Date Filed: 01/22/2015 No. 14-70015 punished. She explained that the Wards regularly declined extended-year services from the school district, and that Ward’s father often threatened her job and threatened to sue the school district. The school district feared litigation so much so that it instructed her to take a lawyer with her to every meeting with the Wards. She summarized that the Wards opposed their son’s special education, and that Ward used this to manipulate school personnel by threatening to call his parents. Ward’s defense counsel also presented testimony further illustrating the background, behavior, and personality of Adam Ward’s father, Ralph. Ralph Ward testified about his education, which included a master’s degree in manufacturing engineering technology and a doctor of education degree. At the time of Adam Ward’s trial, Ralph Ward was unemployed and had been “for some time.” He believed he had sacrificed his professional aspirations, education, and degrees to stay at home to protect his son from society and society from his son. He confirmed his interest in the “Illuminati” and his belief that the city singled out and picked on his home Specifically, he believed that the head of code enforcement was connected with the city council, which was connected with the school district, and the school district was “scared to death” of a lawsuit he had threatened to file. The mother of one of Ward’s former youth-baseball teammates also testified about a memorable incident involving Ralph and Adam Ward. She recalled an occasion when, after a young Adam Ward was upset about losing a baseball game, Ralph Ward abruptly brought his son to the ground and held him down for about five minutes. Two Commerce police officers testified about another incident in 2006 (after the murder but before the trial), when they were dispatched to the Wards’ street to stand by while a city worker read meters. They testified that Ralph Ward backed his car out of his driveway, and, when he drove past the 16 Case: 14-70015 Document: 00512912236 Page: 17 Date Filed: 01/22/2015 No. 14-70015 city crew working on a sewer line across the street, he extended his hand out of the window in a gun-shaped gesture and simulated firing it at the city workers. Adam Ward also testified against his attorney’s advice during the penalty phase. Ward said he believed the school board wanted retribution against his parents and summarized: “[t]he superintendent runs the school board. The school board runs city council. The city council runs everybody else.” He claimed other families had been conspired against, but most had the sense to get out of town and “scatter to the wind,” though he could not think of specific examples. The defense’s expert forensic psychologist, Dr. Price, testified at the penalty phase about his neuropsychological evaluation of Ward. Dr. Price explained that Ward exhibited paranoia during his evaluation interview: “He was very paranoid, thought the system and everybody was against him and he was not responsible for any of his problems.” Dr. Price testified that Ward “thought everybody in the system, that the Commerce Schools . . . , all of the police in Commerce, all authorities were somehow conspiring against him and his family to get them, to catch them, to persecute them.” Dr. Price characterized Ward as delusional, but noted that his delusions were “moderate” and “very fixed,” explaining: “I’ve seen worse. I’ve seen a lot more – more – more – more severe and pervasive delusional thinking but he’s – he’s quite delusional and . . . narcissistic.” Dr. Price also observed that Ward’s “elevated sense of mood” during his interview “were all consistent with a bipolar kind of disorder in a manic phase.” On cross-examination, Dr. Price acknowledged that there is no treatment effective in reversing the trends of an antisocial personality disorder, though he noted on redirect that people can age out of antisocial personality tendencies in a structured environment (such as prison), particularly after they reach age forty. 17 Case: 14-70015 Document: 00512912236 Page: 18 Date Filed: 01/22/2015 No. 14-70015 After considering extensive mitigation evidence during the penalty phase, the jury sentenced Ward to death. In total, the trial court allocated more than $136,000 for Ward’s counsel to retain various experts to testify during the competency, guilt, and penalty phases of the trial including: a psychologist, a psychiatrist, a neuro-psychologist, a fact investigator, and a mitigation specialist. During closing argument in the penalty phase, defense counsel focused his argument on Ward’s mental illness. Defense counsel noted that Ward has been mentally ill since the age of two and that multiple evaluations over the years correctly predicted he would end up in a courtroom. Counsel discussed Ward’s childhood and family life, and observed that Ward has not received proper mental-health treatment. Counsel noted that the Wards had been continually told by medical professionals to “get him some help” and to get “family counseling,” but they did not do so. Counsel stressed that, if given a life sentence, Ward would have proper “continuing mental health treatment which he’s never had before.” Counsel also underscored Dr. Price’s testimony that antisocial personality disorders “burn out after about 20 years.”
As noted above, Ward’s state habeas application challenged trial counsel’s mitigation investigation and argued that these deficiencies led to the inaccurate diagnosis of “Shared Delusional Disorder.” The habeas mitigation specialist interviewed Ward, his parents, and nineteen other people, and reviewed relevant records including the notes and reports of a mitigation investigator and consulting psychologists. The state habeas IAC claim also relied on the following new evidence from witnesses who ostensibly could have testified as mitigation witnesses during the penalty phase of Ward’s trial: 18 Case: 14-70015 Document: 00512912236 Page: 19 Date Filed: 01/22/2015 No. 14-70015 • An affidavit from university psychologist Steven Ball regarding his desire to testify at the trial about his “long-standing professional understanding” of Ward. • Affidavits from Commerce residents Judy and Michael Fane who said that Code Officer Walker had been hostile and inappropriate about city-code issues several days before his death. • An affidavit from a secretary at Ward’s middle school who felt sorry for Ward as a boy, felt that the school’s disciplinary methods were somewhat barbaric, and was upset by Ward’s trial and sentence. • An affidavit from Charles Sleeman, a fellow Boy Scout who considered Ward to be his best friend and said Ward was bullied by students and picked on by teachers his whole life, but had a strong spirit and stood up for others. • An interview with Leon and Loretta Harrison, neighbors of the Wards, who treated Ward as their adopted son. Leon acted as Ward’s spiritual advisor and had been approached to testify on Ward’s behalf but did not do so and later regretted it. The state habeas court found that Ward’s trial counsel conducted a thorough and constitutionally adequate mitigation investigation. The state habeas court also concluded that there was no reasonable probability that, but for the alleged deficiencies, the outcome of the penalty phase would have been different. We must now decide whether the district court’s decision—that the state court’s resolution of Ward’s IAC claim was not unreasonable under § 2254(d)— presents a question debatable among reasoned jurists sufficient to warrant a COA.
In evaluating Ward’s petition for a COA to appeal his IAC claim under § 2254, we look to “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” § 2254(d)(1). For IAC claims, “the ‘clearly established federal law’ against which we measure the state court’s 19 Case: 14-70015 Document: 00512912236 Page: 20 Date Filed: 01/22/2015 No. 14-70015 denial of relief is the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington,” 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Clark v. Thaler, 673 F.3d 410, 417 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 179 (2012). To prevail under Strickland, Ward must show that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Hoffman, 752 F.3d at 439. “In judging the defense’s investigation, as in applying Strickland generally, hindsight is discounted by pegging adequacy to counsel’s perspective at the time investigative decisions are made and by giving a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 381 (2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Review of a petition for a COA to appeal an IAC claim “under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). In the habeas context, “[e]stablishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult. The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (citations omitted). Moreover, because the “Strickland standard is a general one,” “the range of reasonable applications is substantial.” Id. In short, IAC habeas claims are subject to two layers of deference, and state courts are granted substantial leeway. See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009).
Ward argues that his trial attorneys failed to conduct a complete investigation into Ward’s past and that this failure led to an incomplete psychosocial history on which Dr. Price rendered his inaccurate medical diagnosis. Specifically, Ward contends Dr. Price misdiagnosed him with antisocial personality disorder and that trial counsel unreasonably relied on a 20 Case: 14-70015 Document: 00512912236 Page: 21 Date Filed: 01/22/2015 No. 14-70015 fact investigator—rather than a mitigation specialist—to conduct the mitigation investigation. Texas counters that Ward has not presented evidence that the defense experts’ antisocial-personality-disorder diagnoses were wrong, and the mitigation evidence that Ward claims his trial counsel failed to present was, in fact, presented to the jury. We agree with Texas that Ward’s application for a COA does not demonstrate that the state court’s rejection of his IAC claim—viewed through the lens of § 2254’s deferential standard of review—is debatable among reasoned jurists. Several defense experts diagnosed Ward with antisocial personality disorder. Ward does not direct this Court to evidence in the record indicating this diagnosis was wrong, and we are aware of none. Ward instead finds fault with the extent of defense counsel’s mitigation investigation on which these diagnoses were rendered. But the “Supreme Court has emphasized that ‘counsel has wide latitude in deciding how best to represent a client . . . .’” Clark, 673 F.3d at 427 (quoting Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2003)). Further this general challenge fails to demonstrate that the state court unreasonably found, as a factual matter, that Ward’s trial counsel was effective. After all, as the district court observed, the trial court allocated more than $136,000 for Ward’s counsel to retain expert assistance. That trial counsel decided to use its time and resources on mental-health experts, rather than on a professional mitigation specialist or further investigation into Ward’s past, may very well reflect counsel’s reasonable strategic decision “to balance limited resources” and to focus on expensive clinical psychologists and forensic experts rather than on investigators. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 789 (“Counsel was entitled to formulate a strategy that was reasonable at the time and to balance limited resources in accord with effective trial tactics and strategies.”). Moreover, as the district court correctly observed, Ward’s argument that his trial team was “not aware of the 21 Case: 14-70015 Document: 00512912236 Page: 22 Date Filed: 01/22/2015 No. 14-70015 characteristics displayed by Mr. Ward prior to his fifteenth birthday” is flatly contradicted by the record. The medical and school records, experts’ reports, and trial testimony all discuss Ward’s significant behavioral problems throughout childhood and adolescence. The state habeas court could therefore reasonably conclude on this record that Ward’s trial counsel’s metal-health investigation was not constitutionally ineffective. Cf. Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089 (2014) (“The selection of an expert witness is a paradigmatic example of the type of ‘strategic choic[e]’ that, when made ‘after thorough investigation of [the] law and facts,’ is ‘virtually unchallengeable.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690)). This is not a case in which defense counsel was aware of a mental illness that counsel had completely failed to present to the jury—and even if it were, we have denied a COA application in such circumstances. For instance, in Feldman v. Thaler, the petitioner sought a COA to appeal the denial of his IAC habeas claim in a death-penalty case. 695 F.3d 372, 376 (5th Cir. 2012). Feldman shot and killed three people following an incident of road rage. Id. at 375. In the state-court habeas proceedings, Feldman submitted evidence to the CCA that he had been diagnosed with bipolar II disorder one year before the murders. Id. at 379. Trial defense counsel was apparently aware of this, but did not present expert witnesses on this point, instead relying on “vague appeals to circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 378–79. The prosecution seized on this, arguing at trial that “if Feldman truly suffered from a mental disorder, [the defense attorney] would have presented expert testimony.” Id. at 378. Additionally, Feldman’s habeas counsel later obtained a postconviction diagnosis of bipolar I. Id. at 379. We denied Feldman’s application for a COA on his ineffective assistance claim. Id. at 381. Giving defense counsel “the benefit of the doubt,” we explained that the CCA “was plainly justified in concluding that Feldman failed to overcome Strickland’s ‘strong presumption’ 22 Case: 14-70015 Document: 00512912236 Page: 23 Date Filed: 01/22/2015 No. 14-70015 that [defense counsel’s] omission ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. at 380, 382 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). In contrast, here, the jury heard extensive testimony from expert and lay witnesses about Ward’s mental illnesses, making this an even stronger case for denial of a COA. In sum, perhaps Ward’s trial counsel could have investigated more, hired different experts, or presented more mitigating witnesses. But as we have said previously, courts “must be particularly wary of arguments that essentially come down to a matter of degrees. Did counsel investigate enough? Did counsel present enough mitigating evidence? Those questions are even less susceptible to judicial second-guessing.” Skinner v. Quarterman, 576 F.3d 214, 220 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, we cannot say the state court’s decision rejecting this claim was unreasonable, or that our conclusion is debatable among reasoned jurists, particularly in light of the “‘doubly deferential’ standard of review that gives both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.” Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 13. Because jurists of reason could not debate the district court’s decision, we deny Ward’s application for a COA on his IAC claim.