Opinion ID: 2332913
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Claim 9Testing of Physical Evidence

Text: Chambers avers that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to arrange for testing of physical evidence obtained from the crime scene, specifically, blood found on a stone, in two samples of snow, on a pair of pantyhose, on a sock, and on a sapling stick. He also contends that the PCRA court erred in refusing to permit him to arrange for forensic testing of those items. Before the PCRA court, Chambers requested discovery of this evidence pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 902(e)(2), which provides that [o]n the first counseled [PCRA] petition in a death penalty case, no discovery shall be permitted at any stage of the proceedings, except upon leave of court after a showing of good cause. [13] We have indicated that a showing of good cause requires more than just a generic demand for potentially exculpatory evidence, especially in circumstances where the evidence was available previously. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 553 Pa. 485, 720 A.2d 79, 90-91 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 810, 120 S.Ct. 41, 145 L.Ed.2d 38 (1999) ( habeas corpus relief granted on other grounds). We review the denial of a discovery request in post-conviction proceedings for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Lark, 560 Pa. 487, 746 A.2d 585, 591 (2000). The PCRA court rejected Chambers' request because Chambers failed to show good cause why the discovery should be permitted. Chambers failed to explain why trial counsel had not previously undertaken to request this discovery. Likewise, Chambers' allegation that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request this discovery cannot succeed. Chambers failed to question his trial counsel at the PCRA hearing to determine why counsel did not seek blood testing of both Chambers and Morris at the time of the original trial and trial counsel did not explain his inaction in the Affidavit that Chambers submitted to the PCRA court. Exhibit 1 to Brief of Chambers. Chambers has failed to prove that his trial counsel did not have a reasonable strategic basis for not seeking blood testing. Accordingly, Chambers has failed to meet the second prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Kimball, 724 A.2d at 333.