Opinion ID: 2641219
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Subordinate Bias (or “Cat’s Paw”) Liability

Text: Lobato advances a second theory for Title VII liability: that Lundstrom’s bias was the proximate cause of Lobato’s termination. In support of this theory, Lobato relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011). See generally EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 484–88 (10th Cir. 2006) (background on subordinate bias liability). In Staub, an army reservist brought a claim that he was fired because of his employer’s hostility toward his military -21- obligations, a violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), which mirrors Title VII. 4 Staub’s theory of unlawful discrimination was not that the HR manager who fired him was biased, but that the HR manager uncritically relied on reports from two of Staub’s supervisors who were biased against him. Given the HR manager’s undisputed lack of antimilitary animus, the question presented was what to do when the decisionmaker “has no discriminatory animus but is influenced by previous company action that is the product of a like animus in someone else.” Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1191. The Supreme Court concluded, “[I]f a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA.” Id. at 1194 (footnotes and emphasis omitted). Lobato reads Staub as announcing a categorical rule. He contends if a biased supervisor’s animus in any way leads to an adverse employment decision, 4 USERRA prohibits an employer from discharging an employee if the discharge was motivated by hostility to his obligations as a military reservist. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a), (c). The Staub Court noted the similarities between USERRA and Title VII. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1191 (“[USERRA] is very similar to Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination ‘because of . . . race, color, religion, sex, or national origin’ and states that such discrimination is established when one of those factors ‘was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.’”). -22- it is the proximate cause of that decision and thus the employer incurs liability— even if the employer conducts an independent investigation. But Staub does not go this far. The Staub Court explained that a “necessary” element to a subordinate bias claim is the decisionmaker’s uncritical “reli[ance]” on facts provided by a biased supervisor. Id. at 1193. If there is no such reliance—that is to say, if the employer independently verifies the facts and does not rely on the biased source—then there is no subordinate bias liability. The Court did not specify which element is missing absent reliance on facts from the biased supervisor, but it is plain that the element is proximate cause. As the Court explained in another recent case: The term “proximate cause” is shorthand for a concept: Injuries have countless causes, and not all should give rise to legal liability. “What we . . . mean by the word ‘proximate,’” one noted jurist has explained, is simply this: “[B]ecause of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2637 (2011) (quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)). Further, the Court has acknowledged that it is necessary to limit cause given that, “[i]n a philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond.” Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 266 n.10 (1992). Embracing such a broad approach to cause “would result in infinite liability for all wrongful -23- acts, and would set society on edge and fill the courts with endless litigation.” Id. 5 And here, there is a strong incentive not to stretch the limits of causation. Otherwise, any time a biased employee . . . sets in motion the process that leads to an adverse employment action, the employer would be liable, even if the employer then conducted an entirely independent inquiry and decisionmaking process insulated from the animus of the biased employee, and no matter how compelling the nondiscriminatory grounds for taking the adverse employment action. Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1181 (9th Cir. 2007). Staub recognizes this problem and solves it. The Court explained that “the supervisor’s biased report may remain a causal factor if the independent investigation takes it into account without determining that the adverse action was, apart from the supervisor’s recommendation, entirely justified.” Staub, 131 5 Lobato’s evidence may suggest cause-in-fact—i.e., whether, but for Lundstrom’s initial report, Bentley and Romero would have known that Lobato submitted a false expense request or that Lobato engaged in other misconduct. But cause-in-fact, or “but-for” causation, is not the same as proximate cause. See David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 Hofstra L. Rev. 1671, 1680–85 (2007). Proximate cause is “little more than a swirling maelstrom of policy, practicality, and case-specific fairness considerations.” Id. at 1682. “The only purpose of adding a proximate cause requirement is to limit liability short of the full reach of but-for causation . . . .” Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1431, 1432 (2012) (reviewing the effects of Staub). And in employment discrimination law, the Court has “adopted a more rigorous view of what proximate cause requires.” Id. Thus, as we explained above, the Supreme Court requires reliance as a “necessary” element of a subordinate bias theory. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1193. -24- S. Ct. at 1193 (emphasis added). In short, an employer is not liable under a subordinate bias theory if the employer did not rely on any facts from the biased subordinate in ultimately deciding to take an adverse employment action—even if the biased subordinate first alerted the employer to the plaintiff’s misconduct. 6 With this understanding, we look to see if there is a genuine dispute about whether NMED relied on any facts from Lundstrom in deciding to terminate Lobato. 7 Again, Staub provides the answer. There, the HR manager received two reports from two biased supervisors of Staub’s alleged misconduct. Staub disputed the allegations to management, attributing them to his supervisors’ impermissible bias. But the HR manager “did not follow up” on the dispute. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1190. When the second report 6 Lobato suggests that the above analysis conflicts with McKenna v. City of Phila., 649 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1918 (2012), or Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am., Inc., 686 F.3d 339 (6th Cir. 2012), which also address post-Staub Title VII subordinate bias theories. We disagree. Unlike here, in both McKenna and Chattman, the decisionmakers uncritically relied on information provided by a biased subordinate. See McKenna, 649 F.3d at 178–79 (the record suggested that the decisionmakers heard evidence only from the biased subordinate); Chattman, 686 F.3d at 353 (the biased subordinate “misinformed and selectively informed” the ultimate decisionmakers about the incident that triggered the adverse employment action). Further, in Chattman, the plaintiff alleged that the biased subordinate selectively reported conduct violating company policy, and there, such violations were otherwise widespread. But Lobato has not alleged that Lundstrom selectively reported Lobato’s misconduct. 7 The Staub Court “express[ed] no view as to whether the employer would be liable if a co-worker, rather than a supervisor, committed a discriminatory act that influenced the ultimate employment decision.” Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1194 n.4. -25- came, she simply “relied” on the biased supervisor’s “accusation” and terminated Staub. Id. at 1189. By contrast, here, there is no indication that Carlos Romero or Bentley ultimately relied upon Lundstrom’s version of the facts. To the contrary, well before Lobato’s termination, Romero detailed in a letter to Lundstrom that he did not credit any of Lundstrom’s particular criticisms of Lobato. For example, Lundstrom accused Lobato of lying on his résumé. Instead of relying on Lundstrom’s accusation, NMED conducted its own investigation into Lobato’s conduct. As is detailed in Bentley’s affidavit, NMED reviewed records available through a database for state employers and independently determined whether Lobato misrepresented when he had ended his time at the public defender’s office. And Lobato does not dispute any of NMED’s factual findings related to the résumé falsification issue; he disputes only that these factual findings actually demonstrate NMED’s good faith belief that he lied on his résumé. 8 The same holds true for the expense report issue. Again, Bentley did not rely on Lundstrom’s accusation that Lobato was fraudulently claiming per diem expenses. Rather, she investigated the matter herself and even attempted to solicit (unsuccessfully) Lobato’s point of view. She independently concluded that 8 Lobato does dispute that NMED conducted an independent investigation into the résumé falsification issue, but he fails to account for Bentley’s database investigation. -26- Lobato did not stay at a hotel in Albuquerque, and—unlike Staub—Lobato does not dispute this underlying factual basis for his termination either. Because there is no genuine dispute that NMED decided to dismiss Lobato after conducting an independent investigation without relying on facts from Lundstrom, we conclude this theory of Title VII liability fails.