Opinion ID: 2208286
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Expenditure of Town Funds

Text: [¶ 35] In Counts VI, VII, and VIII, Smith challenged the Town's appropriation and expenditure of funds to reimburse citizens for expenditures related to the first septage ordinance, claiming that this appropriation was illegal because it was not for a public purpose. [9] [¶ 36] Smith's Rule 56(h) statement of material facts was defective, as the trial court found, because he did not properly controvert defendant's statements [of material facts] by either admitting, denying or qualifying ... [and] fail[ed] ... to give proper record references. According to the Town's statement of material facts, the money at issue was appropriated for the purpose of hiring experts to defend the first septage spreading ordinance and to pay legal fees and mailing expenses which were incurred in bringing the ordinance to a vote at the December 22, 1999, special Town meeting, and monies were disbursed from the appropriation in order to pay all costs incurred by citizens relating to the first septage spreading ordinance. On those facts, which Smith did not properly dispute, the expenditure was for a public purpose and was not illegal. Cf. Delogu v. State, 1998 ME 246, ¶ 10, 720 A.2d 1153, 1155 (stating that we interpret article IV, part 3, section 1 of the Maine Constitution to require that taxation and spending at either the state or local level be for a public purpose to be constitutionally valid). The Town was thus entitled to a summary judgment on Counts VI, VII, and VIII.