Opinion ID: 725322
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: James Dillon Smith

Text: 6 Before pleading guilty to aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine, Smith moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. Smith contended an earlier administrative forfeiture of his property under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(6) was punishment and barred his prosecution. The district court denied the motion. Smith's double jeopardy argument is foreclosed by the contrary holdings of the United States Supreme Court and this court. See United States v. Ursery, No. 95-345, 64 U.S.L.W. 4565, 4572 (U.S. June 24, 1996) (a civil forfeiture under § 881(a)(6) is not punishment for double jeopardy purposes); United States v. One 1970 36.9' Columbia Sailing Boat, No. 95-3158, 1996 WL 403038, at  3 (8th Cir. July 19, 1996) (same under § 881(a)(4)). 7 Smith raises two other issues. First, Smith--who received a two-level aggravating-role enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c)--contends the district court improperly failed to grant his request for disclosure of any relevant portions of his codefendants' presentence reports. Smith contends the information would support his theory that the government had inconsistently applied the same evidence to assign differing role levels among the codefendants. Smith contends this inconsistent application created an illegal sentencing disparity. The sentencing court rather than the government, however, was responsible for the sentencing adjustments made in each case, and Smith cannot rely on his codefendants' sentences as a yardstick for his own. See United States v. Granados, 962 F.2d 767, 774 (8th Cir.1992). To the extent Smith is challenging the aggravating-role enhancement, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in assessing the enhancement, because the evidence showed Smith supervised at least one other person. See United States v. Hazelett, 80 F.3d 280, 284 (8th Cir.1996). 8 Finally, Smith challenges the district court's refusal to depart downward under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. Smith contends he was entitled to a departure because his guilty plea influenced other defendants to plead guilty, and because of the alleged disparity between his and his codefendants' sentences. Because we conclude the district court was clearly aware of its authority to depart and chose not to do so, we may not review this claim. See United States v. Jenkins, 78 F.3d 1283, 1290-91 (8th Cir.1996). 9 We thus affirm the sentences imposed by the district court.