Opinion ID: 388113
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conformity of Jury Charge with Indictment.

Text: 17 The indictment in counts 2 and 4 charged that appellant did, directly and indirectly, wilfully and corruptly ask, demand, exact, solicit, accept and receive certain monies from certain sales agents. However, in instructing the jury as to the essential elements required to prove the offenses charged in these counts, the court said that the government had to show (t)hat Defendant, directly or indirectly, asked, demanded, exacted, solicited, accepted, received or agreed to receive a sum of money, or thing of value.... (Emphasis added.) The words agreed to receive and thing of value did not appear in the indictment. Ylda promptly objected to the court's use of these additional words. 18 Each bribery count in the indictment alleged that Ylda acted in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(c)(1) and 201(c)(3). This statute prohibits conduct by a public official who asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value.... (Emphasis added.) The instruction used the very words of the statute. Because the jury charge was proper, we deal with what we consider to be the gist of Ylda's contention: the failure of the indictment sufficiently to charge the essential elements of the bribery offense. 19 The purpose of the indictment is to apprise the accused of the charges against him. It is to be read in the light of its purpose. While an accused may not, of course, be convicted of any offense not spelled out in the indictment however wrongful the conduct proved at trial, minor deficiencies in the language of the indictment do not occasion reversal absent prejudice to the accused. United States v. Contris, 592 F.2d 893, 896 (5th Cir.1979). The indictment is read as a whole to determine its meaning. United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187, 192 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041, 97 S.Ct. 739, 50 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). The test of sufficiency is not whether the indictment could have been more artfully or precisely drawn, but whether it states the elements of the offense intended to be charged and adequately apprises the defendant of that which he must be prepared to meet. United States v. Contris, 592 F.2d at 896. 20 In United States v. Gordon, 638 F.2d 886 (5th Cir.1981), we held that an indictment charging theft of property of the United States constituted full notice of the charge of theft of a thing of value of the government. Similarly, a charge of accepting certain amounts of money sufficiently signalled the accusation that Ylda had accepted a thing of value from the vendors' representatives. The bribes accepted by Ylda were in the form of cash, money orders and cashier's checks, all of which could be considered money in the common sense of that word. Although the term thing of value has a broader meaning than the words sum of ... dollars, the use of the latter term in the language of the indictment resulted in no prejudice to Ylda. The words accept and receive used in the indictment are sufficiently equivalent to the words agrees to receive, the language of the statute, that the failure to include the additional verbiage did not amount to a fatal defect. 21 To pass muster the indictment must allege the essential elements of the offense and state facts sufficient to permit the defendant to plead former jeopardy in a subsequent prosecution. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 1047, 8 L.Ed.2d 240, 250 (1962); United States v. Contris, 592 F.2d at 896. The deficiencies in the bribery counts of the indictment are not material. The indictment adequately informed Ylda of the charges against him and he could not again be subjected to defending against the same accusations. No prejudice having been demonstrated by the failure of the indictment to track the exact language of the statute cited in the bribery counts, Ylda's claim lacks merit. The indictment and the jury charge were both sufficient and neither require reversal in this case. 22