Opinion ID: 1673698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reference to Polygraph Test

Text: For his fourth point for reversal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial when a witness made two references to Appellant's having taken a polygraph test. The State argues that this argument is procedurally barred because Appellant failed to object or move for a mistrial at the first opportunity. We agree with the State. The law is well settled that to preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant must object at the first opportunity. Pyle v. State, 340 Ark. 53, 8 S.W.3d 491 (2000); Swanigan v. State, 336 Ark. 285, 984 S.W.2d 799 (1999); Smith v. State, 330 Ark. 50, 953 S.W.2d 870 (1997). Similarly, motions for mistrial must be made at the first opportunity. Id. The policy reason behind this rule is that a trial court should be given an opportunity to correct any error early in the trial, perhaps before any prejudice occurs. Pyle, 340 Ark. 53, 8 S.W.3d 491 (citing Marts v. State, 332 Ark. 628, 968 S.W.2d 41 (1998)). The record here demonstrates that the two references to Appellant's having taken a polygraph test were made during his cross-examination of Ruth Ann Bull. The colloquy between the witness and defense counsel is as follows: Q. Is there any reason that you didn't tell [Officer] Gary McKue that you went in the home and visited the home?
Q. They just did not ask you about it? A. AhI doubt if I was asked. I'm surprised I didn't mention that because I had two or three policemen in my yard the next time Jim Ferguson called. I had my daughter go get the police so they could overhear his conversation. I kept him on the line as long as I could so we could Q. ( Interposing ) you mean later that day? A. Oh, no. This was after he'd taken his lie detector test; he called me, and the first thing he said was Ruth Ann did my wife tell you that she was leaving me. Q. When was that? A. Right after they had taken him to, I believe, Forrest City, and ah tested him, thehowever you say it, he took a lie detector test. Following this exchange, defense counsel continued to cross-examine the witness, without making any objection to the foregoing testimony. Indeed, the record reflects that the motion for mistrial was not made until after the prosecutor had finished redirect of the witness. Thus, Appellant's failure to make a contemporaneous objection to this testimony prevents him from asserting on appeal any error on the part of the trial court for admitting the evidence. See Hill v. State, 337 Ark. 219, 988 S.W.2d 487 (1999). Moreover, despite the procedural bar, Appellant has failed to show that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial. A mistrial is a drastic remedy and should be declared only when there has been an error so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by continuing the trial, or when the fundamental fairness of the trial itself has been manifestly affected. Gaines v. State, 340 Ark. 99, 8 S.W.3d 547 (2000); Ward v. State, 338 Ark. 619, 1 S.W.3d 1 (1999). The trial court has wide discretion in granting or denying a motion for a mistrial, and absent an abuse of that discretion, the decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Id. We defer to the trial court, as it is in a superior position to determine the effect of the allegedly prejudicial remark on the jury. Id. Furthermore, where the possible prejudice could have been cured by an admonition by the trial court, this court has found no abuse of discretion when defense counsel has refused the trial court's offer of such a curative instruction. See Peeler v. State, 326 Ark. 423, 932 S.W.2d 312 (1996); Trull v. State, 322 Ark. 157, 908 S.W.2d 83 (1995). Here, the record shows that defense counsel's motion for mistrial was based on his assertion that the witness's reference to a polygraph test was improper and prejudicial. Defense counsel did not specify what alleged prejudice had occurred. The trial court denied the motion. At that point, the trial was recessed for the day. The next morning, before any further testimony had been taken, defense counsel renewed his motion for mistrial, arguing that the remarks about the polygraph test tainted the jury to the point that Appellant could not receive a fair trial. The trial judge indicated that he had given some thought to the motion overnight, and that he came to the conclusion that the witness's remarks were probably just as prejudicial to the State as they were to the defense, because the jury was not informed as to the results of the test. The trial judge thus denied the motion for mistrial. He offered to instruct the jurors that they should disregard any statement about the polygraph test, but this offer was rejected by defense counsel. Under the circumstances, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the mistrial. The witness's remarks were spontaneous and obviously not solicited by the prosecution. More importantly, there was no prejudicial inference from the witness's remarks, as it was not evident from her testimony how Appellant scored on the test. This court has held that the fact that the jury is apprised that a lie detector test was taken is not necessarily prejudicial if no inference as to the result is raised or if any inferences [that] might be raised as to the result are not prejudicial. Wingfield v. State, 303 Ark. 291, 296, 796 S.W.2d 574, 576 (1990) (citing Johnson v. Florida, 166 So.2d 798 (Fla.App.1964)). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling on this issue.