Opinion ID: 1196295
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Present Guilt Phase Defense or Argument as to Lesser Degree of Culpability

Text: (22) The defense offered no evidence at the guilt phase. At the conclusion of the prosecutor's argument, counsel also declined to present any response, specifically affirming that the decision was for strategic or tactical purposes and that defendant was not at odds with the choice. (See People v. Frierson (1985) 39 Cal.3d 803, 815-816 [218 Cal. Rptr. 73, 705 P.2d 396].) Defendant now contends counsel rendered ineffective assistance because the evidence supported a finding that he was guilty of only second degree murder or merely aiding and abetting an assault. He also suggests his attorneys should have cross-examined prosecution witnesses more rigorously and could have presented evidence that he did not share the killer's intent. (See People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560 [199 Cal. Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].) We do not find counsel's tactical choices constitutionally lacking under the circumstances. In resolving claims of ineffective assistance, we must assess counsel's overall performance throughout the case ( Kimmelman v. Morrison (1986) 477 U.S. 365, 386 [91 L.Ed.2d 305, 326, 106 S.Ct. 2574]), evaluating it from counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances. [Citation.] ( Id., at p. 384 [91 L.Ed.2d at p. 325].) As experienced criminal attorneys, defense counsel pragmatically recognized that the evidence established the callously calculated murders of four innocent and unsuspecting victims for which defendant was directly responsible. In formulating a guilt phase strategy, they could reasonably have anticipated eventually having to conduct a penalty phase as well. Apparently, counsel determined the strongest defense against a death sentence was to portray Williams as the mastermind, who orchestrated the killings and was in control of events, while defendant, younger and more susceptible to peer pressure, simply accompanied him in a subservient role without prior knowledge of his precise purpose. Although counsel could have made this argument at the guilt phase, the likelihood of reducing defendant's culpability for special circumstance murder was minimal given the compelling evidence of his involvement at least as an aider and abettor. Asking the jurors to pass upon this theory at an early stage may well have diluted its credibility and hardened their attitudes even before the penalty phase began. (See, e.g., People v. Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 290, 295.) Indeed, had the jury rejected this theory as to guilt, they implicitly would have already concluded defendant was the actual killer, leaving the defense in a greatly weakened position in appealing for life over death. Thus, counsel may have reasonably determined that their efforts would be best applied to mitigating the penalty. (See, e.g., People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1097-1998 [248 Cal. Rptr. 510, 755 P.2d 960]; People v. Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 292-293; but see People v. Frierson, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 814-815 [counsel cannot refuse to honor defendant's clearly expressed desire to present a defense at guilt/special circumstances phase of trial].) Through a selective reading of the record with considerable hindsight, defendant speculates a more favorable determination would have resulted from other possible courses; yet he has failed to establish as a demonstrable reality any professional lapse in the defense actually employed. ( People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 426.) Lack of success does not reflect incompetence of counsel. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 694]; see also People v. Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 288-289.) Indeed, as the court observed at the close of trial, I believe on the evidence presented in this case the same outcome would result no matter what the trial strategy or tactics that might be employed by the defense. (See People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 582.) As to whether certain witnesses should have been more rigorously cross-examined, such matters are normally left to counsel's discretion and rarely implicate inadequacy of representation. (See, e.g., People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 41 [255 Cal. Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109]; People v. Murphy (1972) 8 Cal.3d 349, 366-367 [105 Cal. Rptr. 138, 503 P.2d 594]; People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 458 [99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1].) [8] Defendant identifies no exculpatory or impeachment evidence that counsel could have revealed by further questioning of prosecution witnesses and that would have produced a more favorable result at trial. (23) The record also does not sustain the purported failure to present extenuating evidence of intent. Such claims must be supported by declarations or other proffered testimony establishing both the substance of the omitted evidence and its likelihood for exonerating the accused. (See, e.g., In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408 [179 Cal. Rptr. 223, 637 P.2d 690]; see also People v. Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 294-296.) We cannot evaluate alleged deficiencies in counsel's representation solely on defendant's unsubstantiated speculation.