Opinion ID: 848701
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the court's gatekeeper role under mre 702

Text: MRE 702, as it existed at the time of trial, [44] provided: If the trial court determines that recognized scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. In both its former and current incarnations, [45] MRE 702 has imposed an obligation on the trial court to ensure that any expert testimony admitted at trial is reliable. [46] While the exercise of this gatekeeper role is within a court's discretion, a trial judge may neither abandon this obligation nor perform the function inadequately. [47] Indeed, the obligation imposed by MRE 702 is reinforced by MRE 104(a), which provides that [p]reliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness ... shall be determined by the court.... [48] The requirements of MRE 104(a) extended to the application of MRE 702 because the admission of expert testimony under this rule hinges on preliminary questions concerning qualification. For example, reference in MRE 702 to scientific evidence implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science, and the rule's reference to knowledge connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. [49] As such, MRE 104 requires the trial court to address these preconditions before admitting expert testimony. It is well-established that the proponent of evidence bears the burden of establishing relevance and admissibility. [50] At the time this case was tried, the proponent of expert opinion evidence bore the burden of establishing admissibility according to the Davis-Frye general acceptance standard. [51] MRE 702 has since been amended explicitly to incorporate Daubert's standards of reliability. But this modification of MRE 702 changes only the factors that a court may consider in determining whether expert opinion evidence is admissible. It has not altered the court's fundamental duty of ensuring that all expert opinion testimony  regardless of whether the testimony is based on novel [52] science  is reliable. Thus, properly understood, the court's gatekeeper role is the same under Davis-Frye and Daubert. [53] Regardless of which test the court applies, the court may admit evidence only once it ensures, pursuant to MRE 702, that expert testimony meets that rule's standard of reliability. In other words, both tests require courts to exclude junk science; Daubert simply allows courts to consider more than just general acceptance in determining whether expert testimony must be excluded. This gatekeeper role applies to all stages of expert analysis. MRE 702 mandates a searching inquiry, not just of the data underlying expert testimony, but also of the manner in which the expert interprets and extrapolates from those data. Thus, it is insufficient for the proponent of expert opinion merely to show that the opinion rests on data viewed as legitimate in the context of a particular area of expertise (such as medicine). The proponent must also show that any opinion based on those data expresses conclusions reached through reliable principles and methodology. [54] Careful vetting of all aspects of expert testimony is especially important when an expert provides testimony about causation. [55] The United States Supreme Court's caveat in Joiner is persuasive: [N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.[ [56] ] When a court focuses its MRE 702 inquiry on the data underlying expert opinion and neglects to evaluate the extent to which an expert extrapolates from those data in a manner consistent with Davis-Frye (or now Daubert ), it runs the risk of overlooking a yawning analytical gap between that data and the opinion expressed by an expert. [57] As a result, ostensibly legitimate data may serve as a Trojan horse that facilitates the surreptitious advance of junk science and spurious, unreliable opinions.