Opinion ID: 2127821
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consecutive Sentence of Probation

Text: The question before us is whether the imposition of a sentence of probation to be served consecutively to a simultaneously imposed term of imprisonment is authorized under the Code. Relying primarily on People v. Mack (1985), 133 Ill.App.3d 788, 88 Ill.Dec. 832, 479 N.E.2d 445, and People v. Dailey (1989), 188 Ill.App.3d 683, 135 Ill.Dec. 953, 544 N.E.2d 449, defendant argues that a court is not authorized to impose a sentence of probation to be served consecutively to a period of incarceration. In Mack, the appellate court found that a sentence of probation consecutive to a term of imprisonment had the effect of increasing the penalty. Citing Fitzsimmons v. Norgle (1984), 104 Ill.2d 369, 84 Ill.Dec. 665, 472 N.E.2d 802, the court found that the law does not permit the enhancement of a penalty without a clear indication of a legislative intent to accomplish that result. The Mack court further held that any ambiguity in a statute calling for the enhancement of a penalty required the application of a rule of lenity and strict construction in favor of the defendant. ( Mack, 133 Ill. App.3d at 794, 88 Ill.Dec. 832, 479 N.E.2d 445.) Because the Mack court found that the Code provisions on sentencing did not expressly authorize a consecutive sentence of probation (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 1005-1-1 et seq.), it held that the rules of lenity and strict construction precluded a sentence of probation from running consecutively to a term of imprisonment. Mack, 133 Ill.App.3d at 795, 88 Ill.Dec. 832, 479 N.E.2d 445. The court in Dailey summarily followed the rationale in Mack. ( Dailey, 188 Ill. App.3d at 688, 135 Ill.Dec. 953, 544 N.E.2d 449; see also People v. Lowery (1988), 177 Ill.App.3d 639, 126 Ill.Dec. 729, 532 N.E.2d 414 (reaffirming the decision in Mack); People v. Jocelyn (1989), 181 Ill.App.3d 774, 130 Ill.Dec. 757, 537 N.E.2d 1086 (holding that a sentence of probation running consecutively to a term of imprisonment was an available sentencing option following a conviction of escape because the legislature specifically provided for an increased penalty); People v. Gerdes (1990), 196 Ill.App.3d 133, 142 Ill.Dec. 758, 553 N.E.2d 108 (finding it impermissible to require periodic imprisonment be served consecutive to the sentence of imprisonment); People v. Sweeney (1990), 200 Ill.App.3d 218, 146 Ill.Dec. 659, 558 N.E.2d 622 (finding a defendant charged with committing a separate felony while on pretrial release could receive a probationary sentence consecutive to incarceration because the legislature provided for an increased penalty).) The appellate court in the present case, however, disagreed with the Mack court and found that a consecutive sentence of probation was an allowable sentencing disposition. (See also People v. Gischer (1977), 51 Ill.App.3d 847, 9 Ill.Dec. 264, 366 N.E.2d 521 (holding that terms of probation not imposed at the same time and not for the same offense may run consecutively to each other).) We agree with the appellate court in the case at bar and find that the Code authorizes such a sentence. The Illinois Constitution of 1970, article I, section 11, requires that [a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11.) A sentencing court must not only consider rehabilitative factors in imposing a sentence, it must also make rehabilitation an objective of the sentence. (See People v. Bigham (1992), 226 Ill.App.3d 1041, 1049, 168 Ill.Dec. 793, 590 N.E.2d 115; People v. Gibbs (1977), 49 Ill.App.3d 644, 648, 7 Ill.Dec. 330, 364 N.E.2d 491.) Rehabilitation has been emphasized in the Code in section 5-6-1(a). (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005-6-1(a).) This section provides: Except where specifically prohibited by other provisions of this Code, the court shall impose a sentence of probation or conditional discharge upon an offender unless, having regard to the nature and circumstance of the offense, and to the history, character and condition of the offender, the court is of the opinion that: (1) his imprisonment or periodic imprisonment is necessary for the protection of the public; or (2) probation or conditional discharge would deprecate the seriousness of the offender's conduct and would be inconsistent with the ends of justice. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005-6-1(a).) In section 5-5-3(c)(2), the Code specifically sets forth numerous instances in which a period of probation is prohibited. (Ill.Rev. Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3(c)(2).) None of these instances are applicable to the case before us, nor does section 5-5-3(c)(2) prohibit the imposition of a sentence of probation consecutive to a sentence of imprisonment. Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3(c)(2). In section 5-6-2(b), the Code directs that multiple terms of probation imposed at the same time run concurrently. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 1005-6-2(b); see also People v. Motta (1991), 223 Ill.App.3d 182, 185, 165 Ill.Dec. 324, 584 N.E.2d 503.) This section, however, only applies to multiple terms of probation imposed at the same time, not to a term of probation imposed consecutively to a sentence of imprisonment. Had the legislature wanted to prohibit consecutive sentences of probation in all other cases, it could have easily done so in this section. However, the legislature expressly prohibited consecutive sentences of probation only in a limited situation as set forth in section 5-6-2(b). In further support of our finding, the legislature, in section 5-5-3 of the Code, set forth allowable dispositions: Disposition. (a) Every person convicted of an offense shall be sentenced as provided in this Section. (b) The following options shall be appropriate dispositions, alone or in combination, for all felonies and misdemeanors other than those identified in subsection (c) of this Section: (1) A period of probation;       (4) A term of imprisonment. (Ill.Rev. Stat.1989, ch. 38, pars. 1005-5-3(a), (b).) Rather than prohibiting a combination of a sentence of imprisonment and probation, this section specifically authorizes the imposition of a sentence of probation in combination with a term of imprisonment. Thus, we conclude that section 5-6-2(b), together with section 5-5-3(b), authorizes the imposition of a sentence of probation to be served consecutively to a sentence of imprisonment. Moreover, we find no provision in the Code which disallows or specifically prohibits the imposition a sentence of probation to be served consecutively to a simultaneously imposed sentence of imprisonment. In section 5-8-4 of the Code, entitled Concurrent and consecutive terms of imprisonment, the legislature specified under what circumstances concurrent and consecutive sentences of imprisonment may be imposed. This section provides: The court shall not impose a consecutive sentence except as provided for in subsection (a) unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the defendant, it is of the opinion that such a term is required to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant, the basis for which the court shall set forth in the record. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-4(b).) While not expressly authorizing a sentence of probation to be served consecutively to a sentence of imprisonment, we find nothing in the language of this section that would prohibit such a sentence. Although section 5-8-4 applies to consecutive terms of imprisonment and is therefore not controlling on the issue presented here, the imposition in this case of a consecutive sentence of probation is consistent with the criteria set forth in that section. Additionally, the argument was made in Mack that a consecutive sentence of probation is an increase in the penalty. We fail to see how a consecutive sentence of probation imposed for a particular offense has the effect of increasing the penalty. In the instant case, defendant was convicted of four drug offenses and was sentenced to three concurrent five-year terms of imprisonment for three of the offenses and to a consecutive sentence of probation for the remaining offense. The sentence of probation was for a separate offense and did not increase the penalty for any of the charges. In fact, the court could have sentenced defendant to a consecutive sentence of imprisonment, consistent with the provisions of section 5-8-4, but did not do so here. Because no increase in penalty occurred, the admonitions in Fitzsimmons are inapplicable.