Opinion ID: 2640468
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Commission must appoint a new commissioner if the appointing authority fails to do so within 45 days of a vacancy.

Text: Having established that the statute requires fixed terms of four years, we now examine the manner in which Commission vacancies must be filled when a commissioner leaves office before the end of a full, four-year term and when a commissioner continues in office beyond the end of a full, four-year term. And we also analyze the limits on the duration of the appointment power of the Commission under subsection (1)(b). As discussed, subsection 13-5.5-102(1)(b) requires vacancies to be filled by the appointing authority within forty-five days after the vacancy occurs. If the appointing authority does not do so, then the Commission must make the appointment. Subsection (1)(b) also mandates that no member may serve more than two full terms, plus the remainder of a vacated term if that member was initially appointed to finish an unexpired term of office. The plain language of subsection (1)(b) indicates that when a commissioner is appointed to fill an unexpired term, he or she serves the remainder of that term. This language, combined with the intent of the legislature to create fixed, four-year terms, brings us to the heart of the issue before us. Prior Speakers and Presidents made appointments for periods both longer and shorter than four-year terms. The appointing authorities then made subsequent appointments in odd-numbered years for four years starting when those irregular terms ended. In situations where the irregular term was shorter than four years, the statute mandates that the subsequent appointee's term could only have been as long as the amount of time remaining in the prior appointee's unfinished four-year term. Cases where the irregular term was longer than four years create a different problem. To analyze that type of situation, we return to Banta. In that decision, we interpreted the holdover provision of Colorado Constitution article IV, section 6. Under that provision, a person holding any civil office under the state ... shall, unless removed according to law, exercise the duties of such office until his successor is duly qualified. Colo. Const. art. XII, § 1. We noted that the language of this holdover provision defines an officer who continues to occupy his office after its term has expired as a de facto officer. Banta, 542 P.2d at 381. Based on this definition, we held that a vacancy occurs when the term of office expires, even if the de facto officer is still occupying the office. Id. The de facto officer, in effect, occupies a technically vacant office until the next officer is appointed, but nonetheless, the de facto officer possesses the authority to discharge the duties of the office. Id. at 380. Thus, under Colorado Constitution article XII, section 1, a commissioner appointed to a term longer than four years, in violation of the statute, becomes a de facto officer at the end of four years when the term expires pursuant to statute. Consequently, the next appointee, whether the same commissioner or another individual, could only be appointed to a term equal to the remainder of the four-term that began running at the end of the first four-year term. Turning to address the duration of the Commission's appointment power under subsection (1)(b), we conclude that this statute creates a finite window of time within each fixed, four-year term of office during which the Commission may exercise its appointment power. Under Banta, a vacancy occurs when the term of office expires. Id. at 381. Because the Commission Statute mandates that, when a vacancy occurs, the Commission shall appoint a new commissioner if the appropriate appointing authority fails to do so within forty-five days of that vacancy, the Commission's appointment power begins forty-five days after an appointing authority fails to make an appointment to a vacant office and ends when that term of office expires. [7] When a term of office ends or expires, the appointment power returns to the appropriate appointing authority, who must act within the next forty-five days. This interpretation of subsection (1)(b) furthers the purpose and the framework of the Commission Statute. In this manner, the intended appointing officers, rather than the Commission, will retain the primary appointment powers. The Commission will exercise its appointing powers in limited circumstances to ensure that the Commission enjoys its full statutory body of ten working members. In addition, the system of fixed statutory terms is preserved. To construe subsection (1)(b) otherwise could cause a specific office to lose its appointment power indefinitely, because if the office holder failed to act within forty-five days, then the Commission could also fail to act, causing an indeterminate vacancy and reducing the number of Commissioners. Thus, we hold that an appointing authority's power of appointment is renewed at the start of each four-year term of office. We now apply the applicable law to both lines of appointments in question.