Opinion ID: 2308051
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Government's AppealThe OLC Memoranda

Text: The Government contends that the information redacted from the OLC memoranda may be withheld from disclosure under either FOIA Exemption 1 or 3. In our view, Exemption 1 resolves the matter easily. [4] Exemption 1 permits the Government to withhold information specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy if that information has been properly classified pursuant to such Executive order. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). The Government contends that the redacted information was properly classified under Executive Order No. 12,958, as amended, which authorized the classification of information concerning intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology. Exec. Order No. 12,958 § 1.5(c), 60 Fed.Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995), as amended by Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed.Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003) (hereinafter Exec. Order No. 12,958). [5] Executive Order No. 12,958 also required as a condition to classification that an original classification authority determine[ ] that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security and is able to identify or describe the damage. Id. § 1.1(a)(4), 68 Fed.Reg. at 15,315. [6] The district court held that the exemption was inapplicable because, in its view, the information pertains to a source of authority rather than a method of interrogation. J.A. 1174-75. [7] On appeal, as it did in the district court, the Government contends that the information pertains to an intelligence method and an intelligence activity, and that each category provides a basis for classification under Executive Order No. 12,958. In support of this contention, the Government has submitted declarations from General James L. Jones, then-Assistant to the President for National Security and National Security Advisor; General Michael V. Hayden, then-Director of the CIA; Leon Panetta, then-Director of the CIA; and Wendy M. Hilton, Information Review Officer for Detainee-Related Matters for the CIA. Based on our ex parte and in camera review of the unredacted OLC memoranda and the Government's classified declarations, we agree with the Government that the redacted information was properly classified because it pertains to an intelligence activity. Plaintiffs concede that, even if we were to characterize the information as a source of authority, withholding [a] source of authority itself is . . . proper if disclosing it would reveal . . . intelligence sources, methods, or activities. Pls.' Br. 40-41. We give substantial weight to the Government's declarations, which establish that disclosing the redacted portions of the OLC memoranda would reveal the existence and scope of a highly classified, active intelligence activity. See Doherty v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 775 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir.1985). We reject any notion that to sustain the Government's assertion that the withheld information concerns a protected intelligence activity under Executive Order No. 12,958 is effectively to exempt the CIA from FOIA's mandate. In response to Plaintiffs' FOIA requests and related court orders, the Government has already produced substantial information about its use of EITs, including almost all of the contents of the OLC memoranda. With regard to the limited material it has withheld from disclosure, the Government has sustained its burden by giving reasonably detailed explanations of how the information pertains to a classified intelligence activity. Carney, 19 F.3d at 812. On appeal, Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Government has established that public disclosure of the redacted information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security. Exec. Order No. 12,958 § 1.1(a)(4), 68 Fed.Reg. at 15,315. Nor do we. [W]e have consistently deferred to executive affidavits predicting harm to the national security, and have found it unwise to undertake searching judicial review. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927 (D.C.Cir.2003). Recognizing the relative competencies of the executive and judiciary, we believe that it is bad law and bad policy to second-guess the predictive judgments made by the government's intelligence agencies regarding whether disclosure of the information redacted from the OLC memoranda would pose a threat to national security. Wilner, 592 F.3d at 76 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Government's declarations describe in persuasive detail how revealing the redacted information would cause exceptionally grave harm to national security by (1) damaging on-going activities and relationships with foreign intelligence liaison partners, which are of utmost importance to the CIA's overseas intelligence operations, Hilton Decl. ¶ 9(a), May 7, 2010; (2) alerting our adversaries of the existence of [the] intelligence method, which would give them the opportunity to alter their conduct to adapt to this new information and make future intelligence operations more dangerous and less effective, id. ¶ 9(b); and (3) increasing the risks for all individuals involved in those operations, including CIA officers and assets, id. ¶ 9(c). According substantial weight and deference to the CIA's declarations, see Doherty, 775 F.2d at 52, we conclude that it is both logical and plausible that the disclosure of the information pertaining to a CIA intelligence activity would harm national security. Furthermore, we reject the district court's suggestion that certain portions of the redacted information are so general in relation to previously disclosed activities of the CIA that their disclosure would not compromise national security. It is true that the Government has disclosed significant aspects of the CIA's discontinued detention and interrogation program, but its declarations explain in great detail how the withheld information pertains to intelligence activities unrelated to the discontinued program. Hilton Decl. ¶ 6. And even if the redacted information seems innocuous in the context of what is already known by the public, [m]inor details of intelligence information may reveal more information than their apparent insignificance suggests because, much like a piece of jigsaw puzzle, each detail may aid in piecing together other bits of information even when the individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself. Wilner, 592 F.3d at 73 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sims, 471 U.S. at 178, 105 S.Ct. 1881; ACLU v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 628 F.3d 612, 625 (D.C.Cir.2011). Again, it is both logical and plausible that disclosure of the redacted information would jeopardize the CIA's ability to conduct its intelligence operations and work with foreign intelligence liaison partners. Both parties contend that the district court's compromise, whereby the Government could avoid public disclosure of the redacted information by substituting a purportedly neutral phrase composed by the court, exceeded the court's authority under FOIA. We agree. FOIA does not permit courts to compel an agency to produce anything other than responsive, non-exempt records. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). If the Government altered or modified the OLC memoranda in accordance with the compromise, the Government would effectively be creating documentssomething FOIA does not obligate agencies to do. See, e.g., Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 152, 100 S.Ct. 960, 63 L.Ed.2d 267 (1980); Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp. v. U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 585 F.2d 1382, 1388 (2d Cir. 1978). Moreover, given the relative competencies of the executive and judiciary, the district court erred in second-guess[ing] the executive's judgment of the harm to national security that would likely result from disclosure, by crafting substitute text thatin its own viewwould avoid the harms that could result from disclosure of the information in full. See Wilner, 592 F.3d at 76. The district court's apparent reliance on the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. app. 3, §§ 1-16, as a basis for the compromise was erroneous. [8] Contrary to the district court's assertion, CIPA applies exclusively to criminal cases. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3, §§ 2-3, 5. Indeed, CIPA is codified as the third appendix to Title 18 of the U.S.Code, which concerns crimes and criminal procedure, and we have found no case law supporting the district court's adoption of CIPA in a FOIA context such as this. [9] The Government sufficiently explained that the withheld information pertains to an intelligence activity and that disclosure of the information would likely result in harm to national security. The Government's declarations are not contradicted by the record, and there is no evidence of bad faith by the Government in this regard. Accordingly, the Government has sustained its burden of proving that the information redacted from the OLC memoranda is exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 1. See Wilner, 592 F.3d at 73. We therefore reverse the district court's judgment insofar as it required disclosure of the informationeither in full or in accordance with the district court's compromisein the OLC memoranda and the transcript of the district court's ex parte, in camera proceeding.