Opinion ID: 365884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: count ii: adequacy, impossibility, sufficiency

Text: 81 Count II charged Lopez, Callahan, Taylor, Patterson and Matassini with conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 (obstruction of justice) and 1510 (obstruction of criminal investigations), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count II charged two aspects of the conspiracy. First, Count II charged that Taylor, then a special investigator for the Florida State Attorney's Office, passed information to Callahan concerning federal investigations, including the fact that Carl Caccamo was a federal informant. Continuing, the count charged that Callahan attempted to arrange the murder of Caccamo. Second, it alleged that the conspirators agreed to give false testimony to the grand jury and withhold information. 4 1. Adequacy 82 Appellant Taylor contends that the district court erred in failing to grant his motion to dismiss Count II of the indictment on the grounds that the indictment failed to adequately describe many of the necessary elements of the offense. We cannot agree. 83 An indictment is sufficient if it contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, sufficiently appraises the defendant of the charges he must be prepared to meet, and safeguards the accused from possible double jeopardy. Russel v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962); United States v. Martinez, 496 F.2d 664, 669 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1051, 95 S.Ct. 627, 42 L.Ed.2d 646 (1974). In that the essence of conspiracy is unlawful agreement rather than accomplishment of the unlawful objective, Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975), 84 it is not necessary to allege with technical precision all the elements essential to the commission of the offense which is the object of the conspiracy, . . . or to state such object with the detail which would be required in an indictment for committing the substantive offense. 85 Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77, 81, 47 S.Ct. 300, 301, 71 L.Ed. 545 (1927) (citations omitted). Accord, United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 483 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Fischetti, 450 F.2d 34, 40 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016, 92 S.Ct. 1290, 31 L.Ed.2d 478 (1971); Brown v. United States, 403 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1968). All that is necessary in charging conspiracy is certainty, to a common intent, sufficient to identify the offense which the defendants conspired to commit . . . . Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 447, 28 S.Ct. 163, 171, 52 L.Ed. 278 (1908); Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77, 81, 47 S.Ct. 300, 71 L.Ed. 545 (1926). 86 Count II meets and exceeds this standard. It alleges a common intent to frustrate the proceedings of the grand jury by arranging for the murder of a government informant, obstructing justice by supplying persons under investigation with inside information, and by agreeing to provide false testimony. Coupled with the eleven overt acts set forth in Count II, naming persons, times and places, appellants were specifically informed of the crimes forming the object of the conspiracy. Accordingly, appellants argument must fail as Count II sufficiently stated an offense. 2. Impossibility 87 As previously mentioned, one part of the conspiracy was the plan to murder Carl Caccamo, who was providing information to the government. Appellant Taylor claims that the government failed to prove that Caccamo was, in fact, an informant and therefore, his motion for a judgment of acquittal should have been granted. Appellant Taylor, however, misreads the statutes involved. 88 Neither 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 nor 1510 requires proof that the witness or source with whom interference is attempted be an informant. Adoption of appellant Taylor's limited interpretation of these statutes would frustrate the clear intent of the statutes that is, to protect individuals assisting in a federal investigation or judicial proceeding. We hold that so long as the evidence showed Caccamo to be a source of information to the government, providing information to a criminal investigator as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 1510, or serving in a capacity as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 1503, a conspiracy to murder him fits squarely within the proscription of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and 1510, as provided in the indictment. 3. Sufficiency 89 Appellants Taylor and Callahan contend that the government's evidence was insufficient to prove an agreement among those charged in Count II. We cannot agree. 90 We note at the outset that the government is not required to prove the existence of an agreement by direct evidence. Ordinarily, the acts and conduct of the conspirators themselves provide relevant and competent circumstantial evidence of an agreement. United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1978). In addition, the government is not compelled to prove that a defendant was familiar with each and every detail of a conspiracy, but rather, that a defendant had knowledge of the agreement and associated with the plan in order to promote its success. Id. At 469. 91 In this case, the testimony of Swartz and the appellants' own taped conversations show with unmistakable clarity that there was a plan and an association for the purpose of hindering the government's investigation. The plan did not take the form of one joint action but rather multiple actions for the purpose of achieving one overall objective. See United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51, 62 (5th Cir. 1973), Cert. denied, 417 U.S. 945, 94 S.Ct. 3067, 41 L.Ed.2d 664 (1975). 92 The record reveals that Lopez, Patterson and Callahan were connected to the distribution conspiracy charged in Count I. Taylor, privy to investigative information through his position in the Florida State Attorney's Office, told Callahan that Caccamo was an informant for the FBI and that indictments would be forthcoming. Taylor also related that because of the information provided by Caccamo, most of the people from the bond office would be called before the grand jury. Taylor told Lopez that the government thought Lopez was dealing in cocaine. In addition, Taylor informed Callahan that his telephones were tapped. 93 Callahan responded to this information by hiring Pat Matassini to kill Caccamo in order to prevent Caccamo from giving further information to federal authorities regarding illegal activities at the bond office. Although the plan failed, it was not due to a lack of diligence in attempting to find Caccamo. Upon hearing of their impending grand jury appearances, appellants took action to ensure that any incriminating information would be withheld. Callahan cautioned both Lopez and Lauro Brannen to forget what they knew about him. Lopez told Swartz to refuse to answer when the grand jury hit a sore spot. Lopez also told Swartz to forget about their dealings with J. T. Bowles, and told Patterson to testify that, to her knowledge, he was not involved in any illegal activity. Finally, Callahan, Taylor, Lopez and Patterson all gave false testimony regarding their knowledge of the conspiracy (marijuana and cocaine) and the attempts to kill Caccamo. In short, the government's evidence of the conspiracy charged in Count II was abundant, clear and convincing. This is a case where the record fairly shrieks the guilt of appellants charged in Count II. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 73 S.Ct. 481, 97 L.Ed. 593 (1953).