Opinion ID: 71120
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reopening of Prior Decisions

Text: Wolfe argues that the third ALJ effectively reopened the prior decisions by reexamining the merits of those decisions. We have jurisdiction to review the Secretary's refusal to reopen a prior decision if (1) the claimant raises a colorable constitutional claim, or (2) the record demonstrates that there has been an actual reexamination of the merits of a prior administrative decision. Jones v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 941 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir.1991) (per curiam).6 Wolfe claims that the prior ALJ decisions in fact were reopened by the third ALJ when he revised Wolfe's educational level and past relevant work description. The Secretary contends that the ALJ merely examined the prior decisions and specifically declined to reopen them. Federal courts generally lack jurisdiction to review a decision by the Secretary to refrain from reopening a prior claim for benefits. Califano v. Sanders, 430 6 The C.F.R. also allows a court to reopen a prior proceeding to correct an error that appears on the face of the evidence that was considered when the decision was made. 20 C.F.R. § 404.988(c)(8). U.S. 99, 107-09, 97 S.Ct. 980, 985-86, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). In Passopulos, we outlined the circumstances that would permit our review of a final decision of the Secretary: Generally, a final decision by the Secretary will be deemed reopened if it is reconsidered on the merits to any extent and at any administrative level, Cherry v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1186, 1189 (11th Cir.1985); Hall v. Bowen, 840 F.2d 777, 778 (11th Cir.1987). The ALJ, however, must be allowed some leeway to evaluate how newly presented evidence relates back to the prior application in order to determine whether to reopen the case pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.988, 404.989. Hall, 840 F.2d at 778; Cherry, 760 F.2d at 1189. Specifically, this court has held that an ALJ does not reopen a prior final decision when the ALJ evaluates evidence presented in support of the original application solely to make a reasoned determination of its res judicata effect on the second application. Cherry, 760 F.2d at 1189. Alternatively, this court has suggested that the Secretary's final decision will be deemed reopened if the ALJ does not apply res judicata and bases an ultimate determination on a review of the record in the prior application. Cherry, 760 F.2d at 1189 (citing with approval Brown v. Heckler, 565 F.Supp. 72, 74 (E.D.Wis.1983)). Passopulos, 976 F.2d at 645-46 (11th Cir.1992). In the 1986 hearing, vocational expert Tremblay testified that Wolfe's past relevant work as a metal finish repairer was semi-skilled, heavy work with no transferable skills because his skills were specific to the automotive industry. R2-16-86. In 1992, the third ALJ concluded that Tremblay's testimony was less credible and less appropriate than VanValin's testimony at the 1984 hearing. R2-16-35-37. The third ALJ relied on VanValin's testimony in finding that Wolfe's past job had transferable skills. R2-16-44. The ALJ's task is to examine the evidence and resolve conflicting reports. Powers v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 1151, 1152 (11th Cir.1984) (per curiam). We find that the third ALJ's examination of the conflicting vocational expert testimony from the two prior hearings was appropriate and did not constitute a reopening of the prior decisions. See Rohrich v. Bowen, 796 F.2d 1030, 1031 (8th Cir.1986) (holding that an ALJ's review of claimant's prior medical examination from a prior application did not amount to a reconsideration of the prior application on its merits). The third ALJ's determination that the other two ALJs had mischaracterized Wolfe's educational level as limited, when it was actually marginal, constituted a reopening. By determining that the first two ALJs had erred, the third ALJ went beyond evaluating evidence for the purpose of making a reasoned determination of its res judicata effect. The ALJ reconsidered the merits of the prior decisions with regard to Wolfe's educational level. When we determine that an ALJ has reopened a prior decision, we have jurisdiction to review the prior decision to the extent that it has been reopened. See Robertson v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 623, 625 (8th Cir.1992) (per curiam). On review, our task is to determine if the Secretary's denial of disability is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp.1995). We have the power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. Id. If we determine that the errors in a prior decision would entitle the claimant to benefits that he has been denied, then we should remand the case for a reexamination of the prior closed application. See Jelinek v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 507, 509-11 (8th Cir.1985). In this case, we are limited in our review of the prior applications to the mischaracterization of Wolfe's educational level as limited when the evidence indicates that the appropriate description, at the most, should have been marginal. As discussed above, however, there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the third ALJ's finding that Wolfe possessed a marginal education. Therefore, the fact that the third ALJ's reconsideration of the merits of the prior applications constituted a de facto reopening of those decisions requires that on remand the Secretary must determine whether Wolfe's correct educational level, once established by sufficient evidence, would entitle him to benefits during the periods covered by the 1982 and 1986 decisions.7 Because we find that the third ALJ in fact reopened the prior decisions, we do not address Wolfe's alternative arguments that his due process rights were violated or that there were errors on the faces of the prior decisions that require a reopening.