Opinion ID: 3164793
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Promptly Take Substantial Parental Responsibility for the Children

Text: Â¶36Â Â Â Â Â Â Â One basis for termination of parental rights under section 19-5-105(3.1) is â[t]hat the parent has not promptly taken substantial parental responsibility for the child.â Â§ 19-5-105(3.1)(c). Here, we are concerned with only one of the three factors listed for consideration: â[w]hether the parent has failed to pay regular and reasonable support for the care of the child . . . .â Â§ 19-5-105(3.1)(c)(II). As to this factor, the trial courtÂ found that M.C. made only one payment of $250 for child support after it restored his parental rights in June 2013. Additionally, he made that one payment only two weeks prior to the October 2013 termination hearing. The court also stated that M.C.âs other expenses in facilitating his visitsâtravel, food, clothing, toys, car seats, and a strollerâ âdid not go directly to the daily care of the childrenâ and thus do not count as support. After reviewing the trial courtâs findings, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that M.C. had failed to pay regular and reasonable support for the twinsâ care according to his means. Â§ 19-5-105(3.1)(c)(II). Â¶37Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Section 19-5-105(3.1)(c)(II) can be broken into three parts: (1) âpay regular and reasonable support,â (2) âfor the care of the child,â and (3) âaccording to that parentâs means.â While the statute does not define its terms, we assume that the legislature intended to give each term its plain and ordinary meaning. Roup v. Commercial Research, LLC, 2015 CO 38, Â¶ 8, 349 P.3d 273, 276. We read the statuteâs language in context to give effect to all parts. Reno v. Marks, 2015 CO 33, Â¶ 20, 349 P.3d 248, 253. With this in mind, we interpret the provisionâs terms. Â¶38Â Â Â Â Â Â Â First, section 19-5-105(3.1)(c)(II) begins with the phrase âpay regular and reasonable support.â âSupport,â while not defined in the statute, refers to expenditures that are used for the necessary, everyday care of the children. See Websterâs New Intâl Dictionary 2297 (3d ed. 2002) (defining âsupportâ as âto pay the costs ofâ and âto provide a basis for the existence or subsistence ofâ). These expenditures include basics such as clothing, shelter, food, and medical care. Furthermore, young children, such asÂ the twins in this case, require additional expenditures, including age-appropriate furniture, food, and diapers. Â¶39Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In addition, the adjectives âregularâ and âreasonableâ in section 19-5-105(3.1)(c)(II) provide parameters for assessing support. âRegularâ support for the care of the children means consistent support over a period of time. This definition recognizes that children have ongoing expenses related to their care. âReasonableâ support for the care of the children, likewise, is what ordinary parents would need to spend for the care of their children under their individual circumstances. See Blackâs Law Dictionary 1379 (9th ed. 2010) (defining âreasonableâ as âproper[] or moderate under the circumstancesâ). Â¶40Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Second, the support must be âfor the care of the child.â Child support is a right that belongs exclusively to the child. McQuade v. McQuade, 358 P.2d 470, 472 (Colo. 1960). Therefore, the support must go to the childrenâs daily care and cannot be used for expenditures made for the parent. Third, the use of the phrase âaccording to that parentâs meansâ evinces the legislatureâs understanding that parents have different resources available and that courts should consider a parentâs means when scrutinizing the reasonableness of the payments. Â¶41Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Here, the parties disagree on which expenditures fall under the statute. At issue are M.C.âs one child support payment of $250, his litigation expenses in this case, his travel expenses to and from visits, and his purchases of food, clothing, toys, car seats, and a stroller, all of which he used during those visits. We examine these expenditures under section 19-5-105(3.1)(c)(II). Â¶42Â Â Â Â Â Â Â M.C.âs one child support payment was a payment in support of the twins that went to their care, as required by the statute. Nevertheless, one payment of $250 is not âregular.â In the approximately three months between the date his parental rights were restored and the termination hearing, M.C. provided a single payment. Hence, he did not meet the ongoing needs of his two children. Additionally, the payment was not âreasonable.â Reasonable support is based on what it costs to provide care for a child coupled with what a parent can afford to pay. A reasonable parent, under M.C.âs individual circumstances, would not conclude that one payment of $250 in three months would cover the cost of caring for two young children. Significantly, the trial court found that M.C. had the financial means to provide additional support and noted that M.C.âs parental rights were reestablished for nearly three months before he made the one support payment. Thus, the trial court did not err when it found that M.C.âs single payment of $250 was neither regular nor reasonable. Moreover, the trial court correctly determined that no impediment prevented M.C. from providing more support. The trial court reasoned that because the adoptive parents had no legal obligation to provide their financial information, their refusal to provide the information was not an impediment. Additionally, the court correctly noted that a formal child support determination was not required for M.C. to provide support. See In re I.R.D., 971 P.2d 702, 705 (Colo. App. 1998) (rejecting the argument of non-abandonment in a termination of parental rights case where the father argued that he did not fail to provide reasonable support because the mother was wealthy and hadÂ neither sought, nor been awarded, child support) (citing In re Petition of Martensen, 267 P.2d 658 (Colo. 1954)). Â¶43Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Because the statute states that the support should be provided âaccording to the parentâs means,â the facts that the adoptive parents did not provide their financial information and that there was no court order for child support do not excuse M.C. from providing more support. What T.W. and A.W. earn is irrelevant. Unlike the child support guidelines statute, Â§ 14-10-115, section 19-5-105(3.1)(c) requires neither consideration of the custodial parentsâ financial resources nor a comparison of the partiesâ incomes. Section 14-10-115 is inapplicable because the guidelines are meant to â[c]alculate child support based upon the parentsâ combined adjusted gross income estimated to have been allocated to the child if the parents and children were living in an intact householdâ and apply specifically to âproceeding[s] for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, maintenance, or child support.â Â§ 14-10-115(1)(b)(I), (2)(a). Hence, M.C.âs argument that he should be excused from paying fails because T.W. and A.W.âs refusal to provide their financial information did not create an impediment. See Â§ 19-5-105(3.3). Â¶44Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In contrast to child support payments, M.C.âs litigation expenses and travel expenses, while substantial, did not go to âthe care of the child[ren].â Moreover, if courts considered litigation costs as going to the care of the children, it would give inappropriate weight to the cost of legal services while shifting focus away from direct, parent-child support. Likewise, M.C.âs travel expenses did not go to the care of theÂ children. M.C. provided for the twinsâ care during his visits, not by traveling to see them. Â¶45Â Â Â Â Â Â Â As to the other expenses, such as food, clothing, toys, car seats, and a stroller, the trial court found that these expenses were âitems to facilitate [M.C.âs] visitsâ with the twins that âdid not go directly to the daily care of the children.â The evidence presented at trial supports that finding. The expenditures related to visiting the twins, in combination with the single child support payment, did not rise to the level of âregular and reasonable support.â Â§ 19-5-105(3.1)(c)(II). Additionally, the trial courtâs finding that M.C. failed to provide regular and reasonable support was not âmanifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfairâ and was âwithin a range of reasonable options.â Churchill v. Univ. of Colo., 2012 CO 54, Â¶ 74, 285 P.3d 986, 1008 (âIn assessing whether a trial courtâs decision is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair, we ask not whether we would have reached a different result but, rather, whether the trial courtâs decision fell within a range of reasonable options.â) (quoting Eâ470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Revenig, 140 P.3d 227, 230â31 (Colo. App. 2006)). Â¶46Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Finally, the trial courtâs finding that M.C. did not provide regular and reasonable support for the twinsâ care supports the conclusion that he failed to âpromptly take[] substantial parental responsibilityâ for the twins. Thus, we agree with the trial courtâs conclusion that based on its findings under the clear and convincing evidence standard, M.C. failed to promptly take substantial parental responsibility. Â¶47Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Having established that at least one of the prongs of section 19-5-105(3.1) has been met, the statute now requires that we review whether the twinsâ best interests areÂ served by terminating M.C.âs parental rights and allowing them to remain with the adoptive parents.