Opinion ID: 1989584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reasonable Expectations of Insureds

Text: Before concluding this dissent, I think it important to point out one other respect in which the majority opinion deviates from governing precedent. Animating the majority opinion, I think it fair to say, is the view that [a]n injury caused by a faulty furnace is the very kind of risk for which a CGL [commercial general liability] policy would be expected to provide protection. Ante at 333. Underscoring that point, the majority exaggerates the impact of a straightforward reading of the absolute pollution exclusionfor instance, by mistakenly claiming that [a]lmost any mishap at an apartment complex could be denied coverage, and by quoting one court's alarmist view that the insurance policy would be rendered virtually meaningless to the insured. Id. The majority seems to be suggesting that even if the exclusion unambiguously does cover indoor air pollution claims, it should be interpreted not to do so in order to satisfy the reasonable coverage expectations of persons who purchase general liability insurance without reading the exclusion. Indeed, this reasonable expectations doctrine is the explicit premise of many of the cases on which the majority relies. See, e.g., Regional Bank of Colo. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 35 F.3d 494, 497-98 (10th Cir.1994) (invoking reasonable expectations doctrine of Colorado law to find insurance coverage for injuries caused by exposure to carbon monoxide from a faulty heater, regardless of whether or not the pollution exclusion in the policy was ambiguous). Past cases of this court have squarely rejected this interpretation of the doctrine of reasonable expectations. See Chase, 780 A.2d at 1131-32; Smalls v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 678 A.2d 32, 35 (D.C.1996). As we held in those cases, while ambiguous policy provisions may be construed in a manner consistent with the reasonable expectations of the purchaser of the policy, unambiguous provisions will be enforced . . . as written, so long as they do not violate a statute or public policy. Chase, 780 A.2d at 1131-32 (quoting Smalls, 678 A.2d at 35; citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Where the . . . exclusion . . . is clear and unambiguous .... there is no legal basis for considering whether it was consistent with [the policyholder's] reasonable expectations. Smalls, 678 A.2d at 35. [T]he reasonable expectations doctrine is not a mandate for courts to rewrite insurance policies and reallocate their assignment of risks between insurer and insured. Chase, 780 A.2d at 1132.