Opinion ID: 2164200
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: communications with jury

Text: The trial in this case began with the selection of the jury on July 19, 1976. After hearing one witness, the court took an early recess for the day; court did not resume until 9:30 a. m., the following day to allow the jurors sufficient travel time. The matter was submitted to the jury at 6 p. m., on July 20, 1976, following the giving of the court's instructions and closing arguments. After taking a break for dinner, the jury resumed its deliberations. At 10:30 p. m., the trial judge sent the following communication to the jury: Please advise whether you believe that you will be able to arrive at a verdict in this case, or whether you believe that you are hopelessly deadlocked. Do not reveal how you stand numerically or otherwise in responding to this communication. and received the reply from the jury foreman: We have taken considerable time reviewing your instructions and have taken two votes but have not reached a decision. We do not feel we are hopelessly deadlocked. Just before midnight, the trial judge again sent the same message to the jury and received the reply: We are making progress and have taken four votes. At that time, the trial judge advised counsel that if a verdict was not reached by 1 a. m., he would declare a mistrial. At 12:51 a. m., the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the lesser charge of assault and battery. Defendant asserts that the trial judge's messages to the jury coerced and pressured the verdict. This court has previously held that the  Allen charge [2] or get-together instruction is not to be used in criminal trials in this state's courts. State v. Ferguson, 1970, 84 S.D. 605, 175 N.W.2d 57. Defendant admits that the communications with the jury were not in the form of an Allen charge or get-together instruction, but asserts that the message contained an innuendo that the verdict should be reached as soon as possible. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Function of the Trial Judge, § 5.2(b) express the prevalent rule that [t]he trial judge should require a record to be kept of all communications received by him from a juror or the jury after the jury has been sworn, and he should not communicate with a juror or the jury on any aspect of the case itself (as distinguished from matters relating to physical comforts and the like), except after notice to all parties and reasonable opportunity for them to be present. See also 75 Am.Jur.2d, Trial, § 1001. Defendant here makes no complaint that the trial judge's communications to the jury were without notice to him or in his absence. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Trial by Jury, § 5.4(b), (c) suggest: (b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to agree, the court may require the jury to continue their deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction as provided in subsection (a). The court shall not require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals. (c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable probability of agreement. The problem presented by these standards and case authority is how the trial court is to determine whether the jury has reached an impasse after several hours of deliberation. The North Dakota, Michigan, Minnesota and Tennessee courts have established guidelines in State v. Klein, 1972, N.D., 200 N.W.2d 288; People v. Luther, 1974, 53 Mich.App. 648, 219 N.W.2d 812; State v. Mims, 1975, 306 Minn. 159, 235 N.W.2d 381; Kersey v. State, 1975, Tenn., 525 S.W.2d 139, that such determination be made by communicating in open court. This, of course, would be required only in the absence of agreement by the defendant and his counsel to a written communication. If orderly supervision of the docket or convenience of the jury, the parties, the lawyers, or court personnel requires that the judge be informed as to the prospect of the jury's reaching a verdict by a certain time, the proper procedure is to recall the jury to the courtroom. Thereupon, in the presence of defendant and counsel, the judge should direct the jury foreman to poll the jury in private in the jury room and then to return and inform the judge whether a majority does or does not believe a verdict can be reached by a certain time. State v. Mims, 235 N.W.2d at 387. (However), [t]he trial court should admonish the jury at the very outset not to indicate how they stand as to conviction or acquittal or whether they entertain a predominant view. State v. Hutchins, 1964, 43 N.J. 85, 202 A.2d 678. See also People v. Luther, supra, 219 N.W.2d at 814. In each of those cases, communications with the jury in open court was approved. The content of the communications was not held to be coercive even though a definite time was mentioned in the message. Here the communication did not contain any reference to a time and is not in any manner coercive. Since defendant does not object to the form of the communication, but only its substance, we find no error.