Opinion ID: 170344
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issue any other just order.

Text: (continued...) -14- Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. “A party seeking to defer a ruling on summary judgment under Rule 56(f) must file an affidavit that explains why facts precluding summary judgment cannot be presented. This includes identifying the probable facts not available and what steps have been taken to obtain these facts.” Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1042 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation and alteration omitted). The nonmovant must also state with specificity how the additional time will enable him to rebut the movant’s allegations of no genuine issue of material fact. Id.; see also Libertarian Party of New Mexico, 506 F.3d at 1309. Ruleford failed to supply an affidavit to support its motion to extend discovery as required by Rule 56(f). The purpose of the affidavit is to ensure the nonmoving party invokes the protections of Rule 56(f) in good faith. Comm. for First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1522 (10th Cir. 1992). This requirement also allows the district court to assess the merit of the request. Id. 7 (...continued) The language was amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules and the changes were intended to be stylistic only. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s note. These changes, therefore, have no bearing on this case. -15- Without the required affidavit specifically stating the evidence sought, Rule 56(f) relief is not available. The district court, therefore, did not err in denying Ruleford’s Rule 56(f) motion for extended discovery. 8 Ruleford also argues the district court committed reversible error by failing to rule in a timely fashion on the joint motion to extend discovery, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). Under Rule 6(b)(1), the court may, for good cause, extend a deadline with or without a motion or notice so long as the request is made before the expiration of the deadline originally prescribed by the previous court order. Under the original scheduling order, the district court instructed the parties to complete discovery prior to May 31, 2005. The district court did not rule on the joint motion until July 21, 2005 when it denied the Rule 56(f) motion on the merits and denied the Rule 6(b)(1) motion as moot. Although the district court did not rule on the joint motion until the deadline had passed, Ruleford wholly failed to demonstrate good cause. As the district court found, Ruleford was dilatory in engaging in discovery. He never sent written discovery requests and waited until the end of the discovery period to notice eighteen depositions in sixteen work days. Although Tulsa World initially 8 The district court denied Ruleford’s Rule 56(f) motion based on several grounds. In addition to Ruleford’s failure to attach a supporting affidavit, the district court concluded Ruleford was dilatory by failing to engage in even rudimentary discovery. As this court has explained, although courts are to treat Rule 56(f) motions liberally, they may be denied when dilatory or lacking in merit. Bolden v. Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006). -16- agreed to extend discovery, the court is not bound by the agreement of the parties. In short, Ruleford has “offered no colorable reason why the discovery deadline should have been extended.” Bolden v. Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006). The district court did not, therefore, abuse its discretion in denying the extension.