Opinion ID: 2633505
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: federal title vii claims

Text: {17} Examination of the sexual discrimination standards applicable to Plaintiff's Title VII claims reveals that her present claim for intentional interference with a contract could not have been actually and necessarily decided in federal court for two reasons: (1) a substantial portion of Plaintiff's evidence was excluded in federal court but would not be excluded in state court, and (2) the threshold showing for Title VII claims is different from what is needed to establish intentional interference with a contract. As to the first reason, the Tenth Circuit found that the federal district court had properly excluded much of Plaintiff's evidence as falling outside of the Title VII period of limitations. Deflon, 1 Fed.Appx. at 812-15. [2] There are exceptions to this limitations period, but the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff had not satisfied them here. Id. at 813-15. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit did not consider any evidence outside of the 300-day range, including Plaintiff's allegations that Defendant Sawyers called Plaintiff into his office almost every morning for roughly one year belittling her work performance and threatening to fire her, while pacing in front of Plaintiff and waiving his finger in her face; that Defendant Lasky demeaned Plaintiff; and that Defendant Hartley made inappropriate comments directed at Plaintiff, shunned Plaintiff by refusing to speak to her or acknowledge her for a period of time, and ignored company policy by denying Plaintiff compensation for commissions that coworkers stole from her. This evidence would not be excluded in Plaintiff's state court action because no similar limitations period applies in intentional interference with contract cases. {18} The second reason supporting our conclusion that Plaintiff's claim for intentional interference with a contract was not actually and necessarily decided in federal court is the fact that the threshold showing for Title VII claims is different from what is needed to establish intentional interference with an employment contract. The Tenth Circuit approached Plaintiff's allegations of sexual discrimination under Title VII as four separate causes of action: (1) sexual discrimination based on a hostile work environment; (2) sexual discrimination resulting in constructive discharge; (3) sexual discrimination based on disparate compensation; and (4) sexual discrimination based on a failure to promote. Deflon, 1 Fed.Appx. at 810. These sexual discrimination claims required Plaintiff to demonstrate either sexually discriminatory conduct or retaliation following a complaint of sexual discrimination, not that Defendants unjustifiably played an active and substantial part in causing Plaintiff to lose the benefits of her employment. Ettenson, 2001-NMCA-003, ¶ 14, 130 N.M. 67, 17 P.3d 440. We examine each of Plaintiff's federal sexual discrimination claims in greater detail below.
{19} In order to prove sexual discrimination based on a hostile work environment theory, Plaintiff needed to establish that the alleged conduct stemmed from a sexual animus and was severe or pervasive enough to create a work environment that was objectively and subjectively abusive and hostile. Deflon, 1 Fed.Appx. at 816. Considering only conduct tied to gender, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court had properly dismissed this claim; Plaintiff failed to `show that a rational jury could find that the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.' Id. (quoting Penry v. Fed. Home Loan Bank, 155 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir.1998)). While proving sexual discrimination under this standard might suffice to prove interference with an employment contract, we decline to hold that a plaintiff must show sexual discrimination in order to establish intentional interference with a contract. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit did not actually and necessarily decide Plaintiff's current claims by dismissing her federal hostile work environment claim.
{20} To succeed on her constructive discharge claim, Plaintiff needed to show that the employer by its discriminatory acts has made working conditions so difficult that a reasonable person in the employee's position would feel compelled to resign. Deflon, 1 Fed.Appx. at 819 (quoting Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 344 (10th Cir.1986)). The Tenth Circuit explained that Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of constructive discharge in two ways: (1) Plaintiff was forced to resign from her job due to sex discrimination or (2) Plaintiff was the object of retaliatory discrimination following a complaint of sexual discrimination. Id. at 819. {21} The Tenth Circuit found that the first of these constructive discharge theories failed because Plaintiff had not demonstrated a sexually hostile work environment, id., which it had previously defined as sexual harassment severe or pervasive enough to create a work environment that was objectively and subjectively abusive and hostile. Id. at 816. We have already indicated that Plaintiff did not have to prove sexual harassment creating an abusive and hostile work environment in order to succeed on her intentional interference with a contract claim. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit's holding on this issue does not preclude Plaintiff's present claims. {22} Regarding Plaintiff's second theory for constructive discharge, based on retaliatory discrimination, to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discrimination in federal court, Plaintiff needed to show: (1) protected opposition to discrimination or participation in a proceeding arising out of discrimination; (2) adverse action by the employer; and (3) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. Id. at 819 (citing Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir.1993)). Plaintiff was unable to establish the requisite causal connection because the retaliatory conduct she alleged occurred before she filed an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaint, not after. Id. There would be no similar time limitation in the state case, and Plaintiff would not have to show any retaliation. Plaintiff simply needs to show that Defendants unjustifiably interfered with her employment obligations and played an active and substantial part in causing Plaintiff to lose the benefits of her employment. Ettenson, 2001-NMCA-003, ¶ 14, 130 N.M. 67, 17 P.3d 440. We conclude that the Tenth Circuit's analysis on constructive discharge did not actually and necessarily decide Plaintiff's intentional interference with a contract claim.
{23} To prove her claims for disparate pay and failure to promote, Plaintiff needed to demonstrate that Danka paid her less than similarly situated male employees and passed her over for promotions in favor of male employees. Deflon, 1 Fed.Appx. at 817-18. The Tenth Circuit concluded that Plaintiff failed to show that Danka actually paid her less than similarly situated male co-workers, id. at 817, or that Danka denied Plaintiff a promotion. Id. at 818. Both of these causes of action focus on the conduct of Plaintiff's corporate employer, not on the issue of whether Defendants unjustifiably caused Plaintiff to lose the benefits of her employment at Danka. See Ettenson, 2001-NMCA-003, ¶ 14, 130 N.M. 67, 17 P.3d 440. Thus, the Tenth Circuit's rulings on the disparate pay and failure to promote claims did not actually and necessarily decide Plaintiff's present claims.