Opinion ID: 821294
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: General Mootness Doctrine

Text: As alluded to earlier, mootness is “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame”; that is, “[t]he requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189; Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 68 n.22; Parvati Corp., 630 F.3d at 516. Thus, mootness doctrine requires re-evaluating the standing requirements throughout litigation. If at any point the plaintiff would not have standing to bring suit at that time, the case has become moot. Yet, after using this “time frame” notion to describe mootness for decades, the Supreme Court has recently recognized that the approach is “not comprehensive.” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190. Specifically, the Court said that the “time frame” conception does not account for some well-established exceptions to mootness—a defendant’s voluntary cessation of conduct and situations “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Id. If the mootness inquiry ended at re-evaluating standing, then cases falling within these exceptions would fail, even though settled mootness doctrine allows them to proceed. Notwithstanding these atypical cases, we have continued to use the “time frame” con16 No. 11-2314 ception as a generally accurate description of the relationship between standing and mootness. See, e.g., Parvati Corp., 630 F.3d at 516; Laskowski v. Spellings, 546 F.3d 822, 824 (7th Cir. 2008). Our sister circuits have done the same. See, e.g., La. Envtl. Action Network v. City of Baton Rouge, 677 F.3d 737, 744 (5th Cir. 2012); Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 561-62 (4th Cir. 2012); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 226 (3d Cir. 2011); Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 556 (9th Cir. 2010); Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505 F.3d 1173, 1189 n.16 (11th Cir. 2007); Ramirez v. Sanchez Ramos, 438 F.3d 92, 97 (1st Cir. 2006). Applying the “time frame” approach to this case, we find that any claims the MPA may have originally had on behalf of its members are now moot. Because the inquiry centers on whether the requirements for standing “continue throughout [the] existence” of the litigation, Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189, we return to the prerequisites of associational standing. Here, the controversy surrounds the first requirement: whether any “members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right.” United Food & Commer. Workers Union, 517 U.S. at 553. Ramskugler no longer fulfills that role for the MPA. If she were to file suit today, she would lack standing because she does not have a redressable claim—her Settlement Agreement waived any sort of relief this court could grant her. Without establishing standing in her own right, Ramskugler cannot be used by the MPA to satisfy the first requirement of associational standing. No. 11-2314 17 Furthermore, the MPA does not have any other members who could fulfill that requirement. Neither in its briefs, nor at oral argument, did the MPA reference any other person in Ramskugler’s very specific liminal state: an individual, who was certified by the LESB, but not yet through the Board’s extended probationary period, and was thus terminated without the protections accorded by Wisconsin statute. Without another member in that particularized position, the MPA cannot assert associational standing. Therefore, if mootness were merely a question of standing in a time frame, then the MPA’s claims would be unquestionably moot.