Opinion ID: 2244925
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The February 15 police lineup.

Text: Defendant also filed a pretrial motion to suppress the testimonial identification evidence of Damon Nunn, Jill Barkley, Jackie Barkley, Latonia Young, and Carla Goree on the basis that the previously mentioned lineup that occurred on February 15, 1994 was impermissibly suggestive. The trial judge held a hearing and took evidence on the motion, and also viewed a videotape recording of the lineup proceeding. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. For the same reasons identified in the preceding discussion, it is questionable whether defendant sufficiently preserved for appellate review the issue of whether the police lineup procedure was impermissibly suggestive. In particular, and as noted above, no objection at all was made to the identification testimony of Damon Nunn or to that of Latonia Young. Nevertheless, we again will assume without deciding that the issue was properly preserved and address the merits of defendant's contentions with regard to the lineup procedures. Where a trial court has admitted evidence of pretrial and in-court identification of a person accused of a crime, the reviewing court must determine, under the totality of the circumstances, whether the pretrial confrontation was so suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification as to deny the accused due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Harris v. State, 619 N.E.2d 577, 580 (Ind. 1993), quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). In making this determination, the reviewing court must decide whether law enforcement officials conducted the out-of-court procedures in such a fashion as to lead the witness to make a mistaken identification. Harris, 619 N.E.2d at 580, citing Brooks v. State, 560 N.E.2d 49, 55 (Ind.1990). In sum, defendant argues that the other participants were dissimilar enough in dress, build, and general appearance as to render the lineup impermissibly suggestive under the standard enunciated above. We disagree. In this instance, the police lineup was composed of six persons. All six were young African-American males. All six were wearing black baseball caps turned backwards. One of the six (not defendant) was wearing a white tee-shirt, was of a stocky and muscular build, and was noticeably shorter than the other five. However, the remaining five were all wearing dark shirts or sweatshirts. One (not defendant) was slightly taller than the others and had no mustache. The other four, including defendant, were of roughly the same height and build, and each wore a small mustache. In other words, four of the participants in the lineup, including the accused, appeared to be of roughly the same age, dress, height, weight, and general appearance. The cases cited by defendant in support of his contention that this lineup denied him due process of law are of no avail to him. In none of these cases did the reviewing court find reversible error in the pretrial identification procedures used. See Farrell v. State, 622 N.E.2d 488 (Ind.1993); Vanway v. State, 541 N.E.2d 523 (Ind.1989); Slaton v. State, 510 N.E.2d 1343 (Ind.1987); Dorsey v. State, 490 N.E.2d 260 (Ind.1986), overruled on different issue, Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind.1995); Woodson v. State, 466 N.E.2d 432 (Ind.1984); Johnson v. State, 659 N.E.2d 194 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). These cases simply reiterate the applicable legal standards already articulated above. Our review of the totality of the circumstances associated with the lineup under those standards leads to the conclusion that the trial court committed no error of constitutional dimension in allowing the identification evidence at trial.