Opinion ID: 1804086
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutorial Comments during Guilt Phase

Text: Poole first asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial when the prosecutor repeatedly commented in closing argument during the guilt phase on Poole's failure to testify at trial and his silence after his arrest. In making this argument, Poole cites several statements made by the prosecutor before defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial. We find that the first two comments were not contemporaneously objected to and, as a result, are not properly preserved for appellate review. We also find that although the last comment was an erroneous prosecutorial comment on silence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. The prosecutor began by stating that the defense's argument came from Fantasy Land. A few sentences later, the prosecutor stated, Well, there is no evidence in this case that at any time, either in this trial or anywhere else, Mr. Poole ever acknowledged that he did anything. A few paragraphs later, the prosecutor continued: Mr. Poole talked to the police. And Mr. Pooleso that there's this other guy that was involved. Well, there's no evidence. Keep in mind what's evidence and what's argument. Mr. Dimmig is arguing all these things, but there is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Poole ever said, hey, somebody else was there before me and these people's heads were bashed in. There is no evidence of that. And there's no evidence that Mr. Poole ever said, well, I went in there and raped her and left her and then somebody else came in and beat their heads in. There's no evidence of that either. That's argument. But when you look at what the testimony is and what the physical evidence is and what the photographs are, there is no evidence to support that theory. .... And if Mr. Poole wants to tell the state and Detective Grice that somebody helped him commit this crime, then let him come forward because At this point, defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing that the prosecutor's comments violated Poole's right to remain silent. The prosecutor argued that defense counsel's argument that Poole admitted to three of the crimes opened the door. After the prosecutor stated that he would not take the argument any further, the trial judge denied the motion for mistrial. The first two comments that Poole alleges were improper were not followed by an objection. [2] We have consistently held that the failure to raise a contemporaneous objection when improper closing argument comments are made waives any claim concerning such comments for appellate review. Card v. State, 803 So.2d 613, 622 (Fla.2001). However, we have carved out an exception to the contemporaneous objection rule when the unobjected-to comments rise to the level of fundamental error, that is, an error that reaches down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty or jury recommendation of death could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error. Id. at 622. Neither of the two comments rises to the level of fundamental error because both comments were invited responses to the defense's closing argument. During his closing argument, defense counsel stated that Poole acknowledged that he committed the crimes of sexual battery, robbery, and burglary but denied that he was the person who inflicted the injuries on White and Scott. In response, the prosecutor was arguing that there was no evidence in the case to support the argument that Poole acknowledged that he committed those crimes or to support the argument that someone else inflicted the injuries on the victims. Because the prosecutor's comments were invited responses, the comments cannot be deemed improper. See Walls v. State, 926 So.2d 1156, 1166 (Fla.2006); see also Dufour v. State, 495 So.2d 154, 160-61 (Fla. 1986). Therefore, these comments do not warrant reversal. The final commentAnd if Mr. Poole wants to tell the state and Detective Grice that somebody helped him commit this crime, then let him come forward because....was objected to. Moreover, we find that this comment was an improper comment on Poole's failure to testify. Under article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution, a defendant has the constitutional right to decline to testify against himself in a criminal proceeding. Therefore, any comment on, or which is fairly susceptible of being interpreted as referring to, a defendant's failure to testify is error and is strongly discouraged. Rodriguez v. State, 753 So.2d 29, 37 (Fla. 2000) (quoting State v. Marshall, 476 So.2d 150, 153 (Fla.1985)). In the instant case, the prosecutor's comment impermissibly suggested a burden on Poole to prove his innocence by stating that he had to come forward and testify. Although this was an erroneous comment on Poole's silence, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial because in light of the evidence linking Poole to the crimes, the error was not so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial. Dessaure v. State, 891 So.2d 455, 464-65 (Fla.2004). [3] The evidence presented demonstrates that Poole was seen heading towards the victims' trailer on the night of the crime; Poole sold video games like those taken from the victims' residence immediately after the attack; the semen found in White matched Poole; Poole's shoeprint matched a shoeprint left inside the victims' trailer; and a stain found on Poole's shirt matched White's DNA profile. Accordingly, relief is not warranted on this claim.