Opinion ID: 1057964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applicability of Oil Discharge Law

Text: According to the record at the summary judgment stage of this action, Phase II release[d] solid waste constituents [which] impacted the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the facility. The single plume of impacted 24 groundwater contained two prongs, one of which extended onto the Royals' property and impacted the Park's water supply wells. According to the NES, the groundwater contamination was caused by both landfill gas and leachate. Expert testimony established that leachate is formed when rainwater dissolves the soluble components in [the] waste. One of the expert witnesses also explained that landfill gas can contaminate groundwater through landfill gas condensation on the soil being carried downward by rainwater, movement of landfill gas to areas of lower pressure where it then contacts the groundwater, or rainwater's absorbing landfill gas when it comes into contact with it. This natural movement of leachate and landfill gas directly into the groundwater was possible because Phase II was not required to have a bottom liner. Additionally, the migration of the northern prong of the plume was contrary to the expected groundwater flow direction based on the potentiometric surface geometry. These occurrences fall squarely within the ambit of the VWMA and SWMR. That is, the VWMA and SWMR extensively govern the operation of a solid waste disposal facility and impose requirements designed to protect groundwater and to prevent seepage of leachate and landfill gas into the groundwater. Even though Phase II was closed in 1995, the County was required to install and maintain a groundwater monitoring 25 system that [was] capable of determining [Phase II's] impact on the quality of groundwater in the uppermost aquifer at the [Landfill's] boundary during the . . . postclosure care period. 9 VAC § 20-81-250(A)(2)(a). Indeed, the Notice of Violation issued by DEQ to the County asserted that the County's groundwater monitoring system for the closed Phase II did not ensure detection of contaminated groundwater in the uppermost aquifer at the northern boundary between the Landfill and the Royals' property. In addition to maintaining a groundwater monitoring system after closure of a solid waste disposal facility, the SWMR also require the owner or operator of a landfill to maintain both the leachate collection system and the landfill gas monitoring system, as applicable, during the postclosure period. That period is a minimum of 10 years for sanitary landfills that ceased to accept wastes before October 9, 1993 and a minimum of 30 years for those that received wastes on or after October 9, 1993. 9 VAC § 20-81-170(B)(2). Given the specific and all-embracing coverage under the VWMA and SWMR of the occurrences at issue in this case, we conclude that the General Assembly intended such occurrences to be governed exclusively by the VWMA. Cf. City of Lynchburg v. Dominion Theatres, Inc., 175 Va. 35, 43, 7 S.E.2d 157, 160 (1940) (legislation manifesting the intention to occupy the 26 entire field [was] found in the very statutes themselves when considered as a whole). We thus disagree with the trial court's conclusion that the Oil Discharge Law applies to the specific groundwater contamination in this case. Simply put, the Oil Discharge Law does not contemplate the passive, gradual seepage of leachate and landfill gas into groundwater beneath a solid waste disposal facility. The Oil Discharge Law falls under the authority of the Water Control Board, rather than the Waste Management Board, and contains entirely different procedures in the event of a discharge of oil. 19 See Code §§ 62.1-44.34:19, -44.34:20. Upon a discharge of oil, the person or operator responsible must notify immediately the Water Control Board, implement any applicable oil spill contingency plan, and take action to contain and clean up the discharge. Code §§ 62.1-44.34:19, - 44.34:18(B). Unlike many oil discharges, the groundwater contamination in this case, whenever it initially occurred, was not immediately known. It became known years after Phase II was closed as a result of the continued groundwater monitoring required by the SWMR. Only after testing revealed statistically significant increases of constituents in the Monitoring List 19 Both the State Water Control Board, see Code § 62.1.44.7, and the Department of Waste Management, see Code § 10.1-1401, are within the DEQ. Code § 10.1-1183. 27 above the previously established GPS was the County required to notify DEQ and implement a corrective action program. 9 VAC § 20-81-250(B)(2)(b)(1); see also 9 VAC § 20-81-260(A). Most striking, however, is the contrast between the extensive regulations under the VWMA governing a solid waste disposal facility's groundwater monitoring and leachate control and the lack of any regulations under the Oil Discharge Law that are applicable to a such a facility. If the General Assembly had intended the Oil Discharge Law to apply to occurrences such as those in this case, regulations governing the seepage of liquid hydrocarbons regardless of specific gravity via leachate and landfill gas into groundwater would be in place. Code § 62.1-44.34:14. The Royals urge this Court to focus only on Code § 62.1- 44.34:18 and can point to no other provision of the Oil Discharge Law that applies to the County's operation of the Landfill. Because the meaning of person as used in that statute includes a governmental unit, they argue, the County is subject to liability in this case. The Royals are correct that the County comes within the meaning of the term person. See Code § 62.1-44.34:14. But citing the meaning of person does not respond to the question posed by the peculiar facts in this case: whether the contamination of groundwater by the passive, gradual seepage of leachate and landfill gas falls 28 within the purview of the Oil Discharge Law or is governed solely by the VWMA. 20 We must answer that question without stripping the liability provision, Code § 62.1-44.34:18, from the larger legislative context in which the General Assembly placed it. See, e.g., Shivaee v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 112, 124, 613 S.E.2d 570, 577 (2005) (applicability of statute was clear when read in context of other provisions in the same act). Based on the examination of these two statutory schemes, we conclude that the Oil Discharge Law does not apply to the contamination of groundwater as it occurred in this case, i.e., by the passive, gradual seepage of leachate and landfill gas from Phase II into the groundwater beneath it. Thus, we will reverse the judgment of the trial court holding the County liable under the Oil Discharge Law. That conclusion, however, does not end our analysis. As stated above, the trial court granted summary judgment, finding the County liable under both the Oil Discharge Law and inverse condemnation claims asserted by the Royals. Citing this, the Royals contend that based on the County's liability for inverse condemnation alone, which is not challenged on appeal, they are entitled to the jury's award of damages even if the trial court 20 Nor is the question answered by the provision in the County's permit to operate the Landfill, stating that [c]ompliance with the terms of this permit does not constitute a defense to . . . any other law or regulation. See also Code § 10.1-1408.1(F). 29 erred by holding the County liable under the Oil Discharge Law. The County, meanwhile, asserts the Royals failed to proceed on their inverse condemnation claim at the jury trial on the issue of damages. At the commencement of that jury trial, the trial court instructed the jury that it had granted summary judgment in favor of the Royals against the County on the issue of liability under both the inverse condemnation claim and the discharge of oil claim. Following the presentation of evidence, the Royals only offered one instruction on damages (Instruction 1). That instruction read: In determining the damages to which the plaintiff is entitled, if any, you should consider any of the following which you believe by the greater weight of the evidence was caused by the defendant: (1) Any damage to property, real or personal; (2) Any loss of income; (3) Any loss of the means of producing income; or (4) Any loss of the use of the damaged property for recreational, commercial, industrial, agricultural or other reasonable uses. This instruction mirrors almost verbatim the Oil Discharge Law's damages provision. Code § 62.1-44.34:18(C)(4). That statute authorizes damages for injury or damage to person or property, real or personal, loss of income, loss of the means of 30 producing income, or loss of the use of the damaged property for recreational, commercial, industrial, agricultural or other reasonable uses. Id. The similarity of language makes apparent that Instruction 1 pertained to the Royals' claim under the Oil Discharge Law, not their inverse condemnation claim. Furthermore, Instruction 1 does not contain the proper measure of damages for inverse condemnation. The correct measure of damages, in all [cases for damaging or taking without just compensation], is undoubtedly the diminution in value of the property by reason of the change, or the difference in value before and after the change. Town of Galax v. Waugh, 143 Va. 213, 229, 129 S.E. 504, 509 (1925); see Richmeade, L.P. v. City of Richmond, 267 Va. 598, 603, 594 S.E.2d 606, 609 (2004) (measurement of damages for inverse condemnation is based on a decline in the value of the subject property). Instruction 1's phrase [a]ny damage to property, real or personal does not necessarily mean only diminution in value. In this case, the former could encompass the replacement value of the contaminated groundwater, about which one of the Royals' expert witnesses testified. The witness opined that the replacement cost of the contaminated groundwater that was the source of drinking water to the Park residents was $2 million. Diminution in value of real property is not replacement value. Given the difference between Instruction 1 and the proper 31 measure of damages for inverse condemnation, the jury's award of damages was limited to the Royals' claim under the Oil Discharge Law. Therefore, contrary to the Royals' contention, there is no independent basis for the jury's damage award to which the County failed to assign error on appeal. See United Leasing Corp. v. Thrift Ins. Corp., 247 Va. 299, 308, 440 S.E.2d 902, 907 (1994) (no relief on appeal if appellants fail to assign error to an independent ground adopted by the trial court for its ruling). The Royals' failure to offer a jury instruction addressing the measure of damages for their inverse condemnation claim is also evident from a post-trial colloquy between the trial court and the parties. After trial, the County moved to amend the final order to reflect that the Royals' inverse condemnation claim did not go to the jury. The Royals maintained, as they do here, that Instruction 1 covered inverse condemnation damages. The trial court disagreed, stating that if it had been an inverse condemnation case, the court would have instructed the jury that it could award the [Royals] damages for the difference between the value of the property before the taking and the value after the taking. Instruction 1, the trial court stated, was not put in those terms. The trial court concluded: 32 [T]he [c]ourt gave only the damage instruction under the [Oil Discharge Law] because that's what the evidence supported [and] had the instruction been offered . . . there's probably a good chance that the [c]ourt would not have sent that issue to the Jury. I sent the issue to the Jury that the evidence supported. This colloquy confirms what is already apparent: the Royals pursued only their claim under the Oil Discharge Law at the jury trial on the issue of damages. In sum, the Royals abandoned their inverse condemnation claim by offering Instruction 1 as the sole damages instruction. Although the trial court, in its summary judgment ruling, found the County liable under inverse condemnation, Instruction 1 did not encompass the proper measure of damages for that claim. As the law of this case, Instruction 1 binds both this Court and the Royals in this appeal. See Wintergreen Partners, Inc. v. McGuireWoods, LLP, 280 Va. 374, 379, 698 S.E.2d 913, 916 (2010). Therefore, having reversed the trial court's judgment holding the County liable under the Oil Discharge Law, there is no basis on which the Royals can pursue their inverse condemnation claim or retain the jury's award of damages. 33