Opinion ID: 1960572
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in applying daubert and mitchell to determine the admissibility of dr. hahn's testimony

Text: Subsequent to the rendition of the Court of Appeals' opinion in this case, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case to address the issue of whether Daubert was limited to testimony based on scientific knowledge. We abated oral argument in this case until the Supreme Court rendered its opinion, which it did on March 23, 1999. See Kumho Tire Company v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). After careful review of the additional briefing on the issue, review of the Kumho decision itself, and consideration of the oral arguments presented, we adopt the reasoning of Kumho and hold that Daubert and Mitchell apply not only to testimony based on scientific knowledge, but also to testimony based on technical and other specialized knowledge. [See KRE 702]. We also conclude that a trial court may consider one or more of the more specific factors that Daubert [and Mitchell mention[ ] when doing so will help determine that testimony's reliability. But ... the test of reliability is flexible, and Daubert 's [and Mitchell 's] list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case. Rather, the law grants [the trial] court the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997) ([a trial court's reliability determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion]). Kumho, 526 U.S. at 140-41, 119 S.Ct. at 1171, 143 L.Ed.2d at 246-47. Therefore, the Court of Appeals' central holding that Daubert and Mitchell only apply to testimony based on scientific knowledge is in error. Next, we note that abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review of a trial court's evidentiary rulings. See Tumey v. Richardson, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 201, 205 (1969); Transit Authority of River City (TARC) v. Vinson, Ky.App., 703 S.W.2d 482, 484 (1985). The same standard applies under the Kentucky Rules of Evidence, including KRE 702. Mitchell, 908 S.W.2d at 102; accord United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54, 105 S.Ct. 465, 470, 83 L.Ed.2d 450, 459 (1984). While the Kentucky Rules of Evidence allow a trial court to admit a somewhat broader range of scientific testimony than would have been admissible under Frye, [1] they leave in place the `gatekeeper' role of the trial judge in screening such evidence. General Electric Company v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-142, 118 S.Ct. 512, 517, 139 L.Ed.2d 508, 516 (1997). A trial court's ruling on the admission of expert testimony is reviewed under the same standard as a trial court's ruling on any other evidentiary matter. Compare Fugate, 993 S.W.2d at 935 (the decision as to the qualifications of an expert rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not disturb such ruling absent an abuse of discretion) with Justice v. Commonwealth, Ky., 987 S.W.2d 306, 314-15 (1998) (a trial court's ruling on relevancy under KRE 403 is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard). Thus, we are left with the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Hahn's testimony.