Opinion ID: 2611437
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: implied waivers

Text: The State argues that a rule requiring law enforcement officers to clarify a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal response to Miranda warnings will eliminate the possibility of ever finding an implied waiver and therefore will conflict with prior Utah Supreme Court decisions. The State directs our attention to State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39 (Utah 1987), and State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385 (Utah 1986), cases with facts the State claims are analytically indistinguishable from the case before us, as two examples of instances where we found implied waivers of Miranda rights. We disagree. Initially, we note that if a rule requiring clarification of a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal statement is in conflict in any way with either Calamity or Kelly, such conflict arose out of our decision in Wood, a case decided six years after Calamity, not out of the court of appeals' decision below, as the State argues. Thus, to the extent that either Calamity or Kelly is inconsistent with Wood, they were superseded by Wood. More important, we do not think that Wood 's clarification requirement precludes the finding of an implied waiver under appropriate circumstances. We reaffirm today that a waiver of a suspect's rights may be inferred from his acknowledgment of his understanding of his rights and his subsequent course of conduct. State v. Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Utah 1986) (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979)); see also Pena, 869 P.2d at 940 (holding same only few months after Wood was decided). We look at the totality of the circumstances to determine if a suspect has made a valid waiver. 717 P.2d at 1349. Although the mere silence of a suspect may not be enough to support the finding of a valid implied waiver, [t]hat does not mean that the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may never support a conclusion that defendant has waived his rights. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373, 99 S.Ct. at 1757. After an officer has informed a suspect of his Miranda rights and has determined that the suspect understands those rights, the officer must then determine if the suspect is willing to waive those rights and answer questions. If the suspect responds ambiguously or equivocally, the officer must then focus on clarifying the suspect's intent. According to Wood, A simple, straightforward effort to clarify the request is appropriate. 868 P.2d at 84. If the officer has properly attempted to clarify the suspect's response and the suspect continues to respond ambiguously or equivocally, a valid implied waiver may still be found after a review of the totality of the circumstances. In the case before us, Leyva acknowledged that he understood his rights as read to him by Wassmer. Wassmer then asked Leyva, Having these rights in mind do you wish to talk to us now? Leyva's response, however, was ambiguous: I don't know. Wassmer then stated: You don't have to answer questions if you don't want to. It is up to you. Leyva nodded in response to this statement and then answered the questions Wassmer put to him. The court of appeals held that Wassmer's statement You don't have to answer questions if you don't want to. It's up to you was not a sufficient attempt at clarifying Leyva's response, and, therefore, Leyva could not have waived his Miranda rights. However, we think that the totality of the circumstances leads to a different conclusion. After Wassmer made the above statement, Leyva nodded. While it is arguable whether Leyva's nod was an indication that he nevertheless wished to speak to Wassmer, Leyva's nod at least reflected his understanding that he did not have to respond to questioning. Yet, Leyva's incriminating response to Wassmer's next question was made unhesitatingly. Further, while Wassmer was transporting Leyva to jail, Leyva initiated the conversation which led to his admission that he had seen Wassmer's lights and had tried to run. Wassmer made a sufficient attempt to clarify Leyva's intent following Leyva's ambiguous response, and Leyva voluntarily and willingly responded after clearly indicating an understanding that he did not have to do so. We think that in light of the totality of the circumstances, therefore, Leyva knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, and his statement was properly admitted by the trial court.