Opinion ID: 2263096
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Evidence of Post-Miranda Silence Admitted at Trial

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting testimony at trial by a Special Agent of the FBI who informed the court that Appellant was read Miranda warnings and chose to remain silent when arrested in Alabama on 24 December 2002. [14] This testimony also was incorporated by reference into the sentencing proceeding. The testimony consisted of the following: Q: After the Defendant was placed in custody, then what happened to him? A: He was  it was early in the morning of the 24th, he was transported to the Jefferson County jail and the next morning he was transported to the District Court to go before the magistrate on his initial appearance. Q: And who transported him to go before the magistrate for his initial appearance? A: Transporting agents were myself, Special Agent Ralph Phillips and we were joined at the courthouse by supervisory Special Agent Jimmy Brown. Q: All right. And did there come a time that the Defendant was advised of his rights? A: Yes, he was advised of his rights by supervisory Special Agent Jimmy Brown. After explaining the rights to the Defendant, the Defendant did not wish to speak. Q: Where did the advice of rights take place? A: Took place inside of a government vehicle. Q: Okay. Subsequently did the Defendant make any statements without being asked questions by you all? A: Correct. Shortly after being advised of his rights and indicating that he did not wish to waive those rights, a few moments passed, maybe a minute, before the Defendant asked the question of us, what, what this was all about, in his words. Q: Did anyone respond to his question? A: Yes. Supervisory Special Agent Brown indicated to the Defendant that he was under arrest for mailing threatening extortion communications and that there was also wanted posters from the State regarding his alleged involvement in kidnapping and murder. Q: And did he ever have a response to being advised of that? A: His response was that, yes, he'd heard something about a kidnapping but not murder. Mr. Brown, Supervisory Special Agent Brown then again asked the Defendant if he wanted to waive his rights regarding speaking to the agents and again the Defendant said no, he did not wish to waive those rights. Supervisory Special Agent Brown informed him that only questions we would be asking of him from that point on were just personal identifiers, name, date of birth and such. The State argues that this claim is not preserved because no objection was made to any of the Special Agent's testimony. Appellant requests that we review this claim, despite the lack of objection at either trial or sentencing, [15] under the plain error standard. We decline to do so. Our review of this evidentiary issue is a discretionary decision. Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any [issue not presented to the trial court] unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court.... Md. Rule 8-131(a) (2004); see also Conyers v. State, 354 Md. 132, 149-51, 729 A.2d 910, 918-19 (1999); Walker v. State, 338 Md. 253, 262, 658 A.2d 239, 243 (1995); State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178, 187, 638 A.2d 107, 112 (1994); Md. Rule 4-323(a) (2004) (An objection to the admission of evidence shall be made at the time the evidence is offered or as soon thereafter as the grounds for objection become apparent. Otherwise, the objection is waived.); Leuschner v. State, 41 Md.App. 423, 436, 397 A.2d 622, 630 (1979) (holding that [i]t is axiomatic that to preserve an issue for appeal some objection must be made or a party will be deemed to have waived an objection). Although some of our previous death penalty cases may have suggested that we will be less strict about the failure to properly preserve issues for review, we reiterated in Conyers v. State that despite the special character of a capital case, the tried and tested rules of evidence and procedure still apply. 354 Md. at 150, 729 A.2d at 919 (quoting Bruce v. State, 328 Md. 594, 611, 616 A.2d 392, 400 (1992)). In Conyers, we explained the reasons why we ordinarily do not exercise the discretion to address and decide unpreserved issues: The rules for preservation of issues have a salutary purpose of preventing unfairness and requiring that all issues be raised in and decided by the trial court, and these rules must be followed in all cases including capital cases. The few cases where we have exercised our discretion to review unpreserved issues are cases where prejudicial error was found and the failure to preserve the issue was not a matter of trial tactics.    Counsel should not rely on this Court, or any reviewing court, to do their thinking for them after the fact. Furthermore, we have stated that even in a death penalty case, with the potential finality of its outcome, litigation cannot continue ad infinitum through counsel withholding issues or framing the questions differently each time. Conyers, 354 Md. at 150-51, 729 A.2d at 919-20 (Internal citation omitted). We will review the unpreserved claim only where the unobjected to error can be characterized as compelling, extraordinary, exceptional, or fundamental to assure the defendant a fair trial by applying the plain error standard. Richmond v. State, 330 Md. 223, 236, 623 A.2d 630, 636 (1993) (Citations omitted); Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 588-89, 602 A.2d 677, 694 (1992). We decline to apply the plain error standard in the present case because the claim is neither compelling nor extraordinary. The trial judge properly sat as the trier of fact. The testimony of the Special Agent at issue likely did not effect the court's finding of guilt in light of the overwhelming evidence establishing Appellant's guilt, thus the unobjected-to error was not fundamental to assure Appellant a fair trial. Defense counsel may have elected not to object as a tactical decision. It would not be wise for this Court to review the unpreserved claim in the context of the record of the direct appeal where that possibility goes unexplored. Thus, Appellant's failure to object to the agent's testimony precludes our review of this contention. 3.