Opinion ID: 1919018
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Limiting instruction concerning Tate's arrests

Text: ¶ 25. Tate claims the trial court committed reversible error by not giving a limiting instruction concerning his arrests on June 20, 2003, and September 12, 2001. Tate argues that trial judges are required to give a limiting instruction sua sponte whenever Rule 404(b) evidence is offered, unless the party objecting to the evidence objects to the limiting instruction under Smith v. State 656 So.2d 95 (Miss.1995). ¶ 26. The State points our that Smith was recently overruled in Brown v. State, 890 So.2d 901, 913 (Miss.2004). In his reply brief, Tate concedes that Brown overruled Smith, but submits that the trial court still should have given a sua sponte instruction. ¶ 27. The record shows no request by Tate for the instruction he now argues he should have received. Issues not brought before the trial court are deemed waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Wilcher v. State, 479 So.2d 710, 712 (Miss.1985). Thus, Tate is procedurally barred from raising this issue. ¶ 28. As for Tate's argument that the trial court should have granted this instruction sua sponte, this Court held in Brown that a trial court is not required to issue a sua sponte instruction, and that the burden should be upon counsel to request a limiting instruction if the defense desires one. The Court reasoned: Yet Smith and its progeny place a great burden upon the trial court. In many instances a limiting instruction from the bench can actually focus a jury's attention on the sensitive testimony. Because a defendant might be prejudiced by such an instruction, we allowed trial counsel to actually object to the sua sponte instruction. See Robinson v. State, 735 So.2d 208, 210 (Miss.1999). However, it is not per se prejudicial to a defendant if a jury simply hears an isolated instance of a crime or bad act in the course of a trial. The burden should properly be upon the trial counsel to request a limiting instruction. This was our rule before Smith, in accord with Rule 105 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. The rule provides in pertinent part that [w]hen evidence which is admissible ... for one purpose but not admissible ... for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly. Miss. R. Evid. 105 (emphasis added). We struggled in Smith to require judges to issue the sua sponte ruling, since that would contradict a rule so clear as M.R.E. 105. 656 So.2d at 100. Today we abandon Smith's requirement that a judge issue a sua sponte limiting instruction and return to the clear language of Rule 105. The rule clearly places the burden of requesting a Rule 404(b) limiting instruction upon counsel. 890 So.2d at 913. Jury instructions that reference prior arrests and convictions may be counterproductive to the defendant. While serving to limit the jury's consideration of the prior wrongs, such instructions also remind and emphasize to the jury that the defendant committed prior bad acts. Whether to request such an instruction is a matter of trial strategy in the exclusive province of the defendant, in consultation with his or her attorney. Without a request by defense counsel, the trial court properly did not sua sponte give a limiting jury instruction.