Opinion ID: 1495209
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Especially Aggravated Kidnapping By Parent

Text: The indictment in this case charged that the defendant did . . . unlawfully and knowingly remove and confine ATHENE BAUGHMAN, a person under thirteen (13) years of age, so as to interfere substantially with ATHENE BAUGHMAN's liberty, in violation of TCA 39-13-305. Therefore, the indictment charged especially aggravated kidnapping in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-305(a)(2)false imprisonment, as defined in § 39-13-302 . . . [w]here the victim was under the age of thirteen (13) at the time of the removal or confinement. False imprisonment is committed when a person knowingly removes or confines another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with the other's liberty. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-302(a). Finally, the word [u]nlawful means, with respect to removal or confinement, one which is accomplished by force, threat or fraud, or in the case of a person who is under the age of thirteen (13) or incompetent, accomplished without the consent of a parent, guardian or other person responsible for the general supervision of the minor's or incompetent's welfare.  Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-301(2) (emphasis added). The dispute in this case revolves around the emphasized portion of the statutory definition of the word unlawful. The defendant maintains that under the plain language of this statutory definition a parent can never be prosecuted for removing or confining his or her minor child unless the removal or confinement is accomplished by force, threat, or fraud. Since the indictment in this case did not charge force, threat, or fraud, the defendant contends that the trial court properly dismissed the indictment. The defendant says that because the statute specifies a parent and did not use the term custodial parent, his status as a parent is sufficient to preclude this prosecution. Had the General Assembly intended to require the consent of the custodial parent, the defendant avers that term would have been included in the statute. While the defendant contends that the meaning of the statute is clear on its face, he finds further support for his position in the fact that the General Assembly classified custodial interference as a Class E felony, punishable by one to six years imprisonment and a maximum fine of $3,000, whereas especially aggravated kidnapping is a Class A felony, punishable by fifteen to sixty years imprisonment and a maximum fine of $50,000. The defendant claims that it is illogical to assume the Legislature would intend to punish a parent who commits custodial interference by kidnapping a child in violation of a court order so much less severely than a parent who commits the same act when no court order is in place. Therefore, the defendant maintains that both the plain language of the statute and a logical reading of this statute with related statutory provisions support the trial court's holding that parents are not subject to prosecution for especially aggravated kidnapping under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-305(a)(2) when there is no allegation that the minor child was removed or confined by force, threat, or fraud. Although the State's briefs filed in this Court did not address this issue, the State argued in the Court of Criminal Appeals that the plain language of the statute does not support the trial court's decision. According to the State, the phrase responsible for the general supervision of the minor's . . . welfare in the definition of unlawful, modifies the words parent, guardian, or other person. Under the circumstances of this case, the State argues that Athene's mother was the parent responsible for the general supervision of her welfare. In support of this argument, the State points out that the defendant was not married to Athene's mother and that there was no court order relating to legitimation or custody. Under these circumstances, the State contends that Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-2-304 controls. This statute declares: [a]bsent an order of custody to the contrary, custody of a child born out of wedlock is with the mother. The State maintains that notwithstanding the defendant's status as Athene's natural father, he was not the parent responsible for the general supervision of the minor's welfare because he did not have custody under section 36-2-304. Therefore, the State claims that the defendant is subject to prosecution for especially aggravated kidnapping because he removed or confined Athene without the consent of her mother, who the State claims is the parent responsible for the general supervision of the minor's welfare because she had custody pursuant to Section 36-2-304. As previously indicated, the construction of a statute is a question of law which appellate courts review de novo, with no presumption of correctness. Walls, 62 S.W.3d at 121. In construing statutes, our duty is to effectuate legislative intent. State v. Alford, 970 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tenn.1998); Carter v. State, 952 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tenn.1997); Wilson v. Johnson County, 879 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tenn.1994). Legislative intent is to be ascertained primarily from the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used, without a forced or subtle construction that would limit or extend the meaning of the language. Alford, 970 S.W.2d at 946; Carter, 952 S.W.2d at 419. Courts are restricted to the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used by the legislature in the statute, unless an ambiguity exists which requires further inquiry to ascertain legislative intent. Browder v. Morris, 975 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tenn.1998). The language employed must be considered in the context of the entire statute, and the component parts of a statute should be construed, if possible, consistently and reasonably. Alford, 970 S.W.2d at 946; Wilson, 879 S.W.2d at 809. Furthermore, we are to assume that the legislature used each word in the statute purposely, and that the use of these words is intended to convey a meaning and serve a purpose. Browder, 975 S.W.2d at 311. Where the language of the statute is clear and plain and fully expresses the legislature's intent, resort to auxiliary rules of construction is unnecessary, and we need only enforce the statute. Id. The statute at issue in this case is clearly and plainly written. Removal or confinement is not unlawful if it is accomplished with the consent of a parent. The statute does not use the term custodial parent. The consent of a parent is sufficient. The State's argument that the phrase responsible for the general supervision of the minor's or incompetent's welfare modifies the words a parent, guardian or other person is unpersuasive. Considering the language in context and assuming that the General Assembly used each word in the statute purposely with the intent of conveying a meaning and serving a purpose, we are of the opinion that the phrase upon which the State relies modifies only the words other person. This phrase serves to describe persons, in addition to parents and guardians, who may consent to the removal or confinement of a minor or incompetent. Applying the phrase in the manner suggested by the State would render the terms parent and guardian superfluous and unnecessary. As the defendant points out, the State's interpretation of the statute also would subject a parent to a Class A felony prosecution under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-305(a)(2) for conduct that is ordinarily prosecuted as custodial interference, a Class E felony or a Class A misdemeanor, if the child is returned voluntarily by the defendant. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-306(d). As the defendant points out, the conduct at issue is the sameremoving or detaining a minor child. The difference is that custodial interference requires that the removal or detention be in violation of a court order regarding the child's custody. Even though our decision is based primarily upon the plain language of the statute, we agree with the defendant that it is against logic to conclude that the General Assembly intended to impose a less severe punishment when this type of conduct violates a court order than the punishment imposed when no court order is violated. [4] Therefore, we conclude that the defendant is not subject to prosecution for especially aggravated kidnapping under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-305(a)(2). The indictment in this case fails to allege that the defendant removed or confined the minor child by force, threat, or fraud, and the removal or confinement was not accomplished without the consent of a parent because the defendant is the minor child's father. We note that our holding in this regard is consistent with prior Tennessee law. For example, in Hicks v. State, 158 Tenn. 204, 12 S.W.2d 385 (1928), this Court held that a father was not subject to prosecution for kidnapping when he took his children from his ex-wife without knowledge that she had obtained a divorce while he was in prison and had been awarded custody of the children in the divorce proceeding. In so holding, this Court stated that the father's claim to their custody, in the absence of a decree excluding it could be asserted without resort to legal process, and such assertion would not render him guilty of a crime. Hicks, 12 S.W.2d at 386. [5] Our holding on this issue also is consistent with the majority view from other jurisdictions. See Armendariz v. People, 711 P.2d 1268 (Colo.1986); Johnson v. State, 637 So.2d 3 (Fla.Ct.App.1994); People v. Algarin, 200 Ill.App.3d 740, 146 Ill. Dec. 494, 558 N.E.2d 457 (1990); see generally William B. Johnson, Annotation, Kidnapping or Related Offense by Taking or Removing of Child by or under Authority of Parent or One in Loco Parentis, 20 A.L.R.4th 823, 827 (1983). Therefore, while we certainly do not condone the defendant's conduct, the trial court correctly held that, as the minor child's father, the defendant is not subject to prosecution for especially aggravated kidnapping under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-305(a)(2) in the absence of an allegation that the minor child was removed or confined by force, threat, or fraud. Nor is the defendant subject to custodial interference since he violated no court order when he removed or confined the minor child. This Court does not substitute its own policy judgments for those of the legislature. Gleaves v. Checker Cab Transit Corp., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 799, 803 (Tenn.2000). Instead, this Court must presume that the legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says. Id. It is not for the courts to alter or amend a statute. Id. The General Assembly, not this Court, is empowered to amend the criminal statutes at issue in this case.