Opinion ID: 2542678
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Motion for mistrial (for improper comment on silence)

Text: [¶12] Ms. Cazier claims that the district court should have granted her motion for a mistrial after the State's first witness, Officer Malik, testified I tried to interview [Ms. Cazier] and she didn't want to talk to me. She contends this constituted an improper comment on her exercise of her constitutional right to remain silent. [¶13] We have described the right to remain silent as one of the most fundamental rights accorded a defendant in our criminal justice system. Williams v. State, 2004 WY 117, ¶ 18, 99 P.3d 432, 444 (Wyo. 2004). The right to silence provided by Article 1, Section 11 of the Wyoming Constitution is self-executing, existing pre-arrest when an individual is questioned by the state's agents for purposes of a criminal investigation. [4] Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387, 390 (Wyo. 1995). Accordingly, the prosecutorial use of the citizen's silence to infer the guilt of the citizen is constitutionally prohibited. Id. In right-to-silence cases, we evaluate `the entire context in which the statements were made' and we will `not take sentences and phrases out of context.' Spinner v. State, 2003 WY 106, ¶ 19, 75 P.3d 1016, 1024 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 373 (Wyo. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980, 121 S.Ct. 1620, 149 L.Ed.2d 483 (2001)). We also consider `whether the prosecutor asked improper questions, whether he emphasized or followed up on the silence issue, and whether he attempted to exploit the issue in any way.' Spinner, 2003 WY 106, ¶ 19, 75 P.3d at 1024 (quoting Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 39, 43 P.3d 80, 96 (Wyo. 2002)). Abeyta v. State, 2003 WY 136, ¶ 12, 78 P.3d 664, 667-668 (Wyo. 2003). [¶14] The statement at issue arose during cross examination when defense counsel inquired as to the nature and extent of the investigation. Officer Malik testified as follows: [Defense Counsel] Now, and you never interviewed [the children] to see [Malik] I never interviewed them. Q.  to see what they had to say, if this incident even took place on the 11th? Is that what you mean by an objective interview? You just took [Mr. Cazier's] word for it, didn't you? A. Say that again? Q. You just took [Mr. Cazier's] word for it that it had happened as he said? A. Well, I tried to interview Danyel and she didn't want to talk to me. (Emphasis added.) [¶15] Defense counsel objected. The district court sustained the objection and then held discussions with counsel in chambers. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which the district court took under advisement. The district court offered to provide a curative instruction to the jury when the trial resumed, but defense counsel preferred not to draw undue attention to the testimony at that time. After dismissing the jury at the end of the first day of trial, the district court announced its ruling on the motion for a mistrial. The district court provisionally denied the motion, indicating that if the State tried to refer to the statement or include it in argument, that it would reexamine the motion. The prosecution made no reference to Officer Malik's statement during the remainder of the trial. [¶16] Granting a mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy that should be resorted to only in the face of an error so prejudicial that justice could not be served by proceeding with trial. Allen v. State, 2002 WY 48, ¶ 75, 43 P.3d 551, 575 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Warner v. State, 897 P.2d 472, 474 (Wyo. 1995)). In reviewing the district court's decision for an abuse of discretion, we inquire as to the reasonableness of the choice made by the trial court. Lucero, 14 P.3d at 924. We have recognized that the district court is in the best position to assess any prejudicial impact of this type of claimed error. Allen, ¶ 75, 43 P.3d at 575. [¶17] Ms. Cazier characterizes Officer Malik's response to the question as a gratuitous, unsolicited comment to the jury concerning the exercise of her right to remain silent. A comment upon an accused's silence occurs when used to the state's advantage either as substantive evidence of guilt or to suggest to the jury that the silence was an admission of guilt. Tortolito, 901 P.2d at 391. The statement was not elicited by the prosecution. The record, read in context, does not reflect Officer Malik's intent to cast guilt upon Ms. Cazier. He was responding to vigorous cross-examination, and in his efforts to defend his impartiality and investigatory techniques, he mentioned Ms. Cazier's refusal to speak to him. [¶18] The district court responded reasonably to the motion. The district court offered to draft a curative instruction, advising the jury of Ms. Cazier's constitutional right and prohibiting any inference from her pretrial silence. Defense counsel's rejection of this offer was a tactical decision that this court will not second guess. Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, ¶ 22, 18 P.3d 1164, 1174 (Wyo. 2001). The district court gave thoughtful consideration to Ms. Cazier's request for a mistrial and even upon denying it, left the matter open for further consideration if the State attempted to use that portion of Officer Malik's testimony to its advantage. In concluding that a mistrial was not warranted, the district court relied on Hughes v. State, 658 P.2d 1294 (Wyo. 1983). In Hughes, we held that a fleeting reference to appellant's silence, not resulting from inquiry by the prosecution nor exploited by the prosecution, is not error. Id., 658 P.2d at 1296. We agree with the district court's assessment. The record does not reveal that the State attempted to use Officer Malik's statement to its advantage. The State did not ask the jury to consider Ms. Cazier's pretrial silence as evidence of her guilt. Accordingly, we can find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Ms. Cazier's motion for a mistrial.