Opinion ID: 4562740
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admissibility of Other-Acts Evidence

Text: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting other-acts evidence in this case. The evidence of Cordero’s attempt to kill King and of defendants’ scheme to distribute K2 was relevant for purposes other than to show character and was probative of material issues in the case. Furthermore, the probative value of this evidence did not outweigh its prejudicial effect. Cordero’s offering Rosario payment for King’s murder upon suspecting King’s cooperation with the government was admissible under Rule 404(b). We have consistently held that other-acts evidence involving threats or attempted acts of violence by defendants against trial witnesses is admissible to show consciousness of guilt. See United States v. Fortson, 194 F.3d 730, 737 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Maddox, 944 F.2d 1223, 1230 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 36 (6th Cir. 1975); see also United States v. Hanson, 208 F.3d 215, 2000 WL 125863, at  (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision) (per curiam). “Because spoliation evidence tends to establish consciousness of guilt without any inference as to the character of the spoliator, its admission does not violate Rule 404(b).” Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d at 79. As we explained in Mendez-Ortiz, “[t]he fact that [a] defendant attempted to bribe and threaten an adverse witness indicates ‘his consciousness that his case is a weak or unfounded one; and from that consciousness may be inferred the fact itself of the cause’s lack of truth and merit.’” Id. (quoting II Wigmore, Evidence § 278). While King had not yet formally become a trial witness by the time Cordero solicited his murder, it was certainly a likelihood given that Velasquez had already been arrested. Regardless, the Seventh Circuit has observed that threats to suspected informants “fit[] comfortably within the widely recognized principle that a defendant’s attempts to intimidate potential witnesses are probative of his consciousness of guilt.” United States v. Mokol, 646 F.3d 479, 483 (7th Cir. 2011). The consciousness-of-guilt evidence was furthermore probative of Cordero’s intent, knowledge, and lack of mistake, all of which are permissible purposes of other-acts evidence under Rule 404(b). If, as Cordero says, he had no knowledge that the package being rerouted contained cocaine or that Velasquez had been paid to murder Goines, Cordero would not have Nos. 19-3540/3543 United States v. Cordero, et al. Page 19 felt as compelled to silence King.3 Moreover, Cordero’s efforts to prevent King from divulging what he knew suggested that Cordero did not act unwittingly or with honest intent. Indeed, courts have observed that evidence tending to show consciousness of guilt frequently bears upon a defendant’s intent and knowledge. See United States v. Perez, 387 F.3d 201, 209 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461, 1476 n.16 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Gonsalves, 668 F.2d 73, 75 (1st Cir. 1982). The issues of intent, knowledge, and absence of mistake were material in this case. In particular, the crime of murder for hire necessitates a showing of “intent that a murder be committed.” 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). The government must similarly demonstrate that a defendant’s distribution of cocaine was done “knowingly or intentionally.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). In addition, to convict a defendant of conspiracy, the government must establish that the defendant knowingly and intentionally joined the conspiracy. United States v. Hughes, 505 F.3d 578, 593 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 371). While absence of mistake is not an essential element of the crimes charged, Cordero arguably raised the defense at trial by arguing that any attempt to reroute the package was done without the knowledge that it contained cocaine. Cordero also made a similar argument with respect to the murder-for-hire charge, claiming that he assisted Velasquez in obtaining Goines’ address while under the impression that Velasquez would merely sell the information. “[A]bsence of mistake is in issue where a defendant admits involvement in a specific event but asserts that he acted unwittingly or with honest intent.” United States v. Sandoval, 460 F. App’x 552, 564-65 (6th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). The government may present other-acts evidence when, as here, it helps prove a defendant’s “specific criminal intent,” where such intent is imposed “either by virtue of the defense raised by the defendant or by virtue of the elements of the crime charged.” United States v. Johnson, 27 F.3d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir. 1994). 3Inhis brief, Velasquez points out that King would have witnessed Cordero commit other, uncharged crimes, thus providing Cordero a reason to silence King that was unrelated to King’s knowledge of the charged crimes. Although this is true, it serves only to diminish, rather than extinguish, the relevance of this evidence for demonstrating Cordero’s guilty conscience regarding the charged offenses. Velasquez also asserts that Cordero may have sought to kill King out of rage rather than to silence him. Perhaps, but this argument again relates to the degree the evidence is relevant, an issue which is more appropriately considered as part of a Rule 403 balancing analysis. See United States v. Manns, 277 F. App’x 551, 559 (6th Cir. 2008). Nos. 19-3540/3543 United States v. Cordero, et al. Page 20 The district court accurately and succinctly conveyed the permissible purposes of the Rule 404(b) evidence when the court instructed the jury that it could consider evidence of defendants’ other crimes “only as it relates to the Government’s claim on Defendants’ intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake.” This instruction accordingly passes muster under our caselaw, which holds that a court’s instruction on the proper use of Rule 404(b) evidence should be “clear, simple, and correct.” United States v. Davis, 547 F.3d 520, 527-28 (6th Cir. 2008) (alteration omitted) (quoting Johnson, 27 F.3d at 1193). Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the other-act evidence was not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. We have repeatedly ruled that spoliation evidence is highly probative and not sufficiently inflammatory to warrant exclusion under Rule 403. See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 769 F. App’x 289, 296 (6th Cir. 2019); Hanson, 2000 WL 125863, at ; Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d at 79. Defendants do not point to a case holding otherwise. In his brief, Velasquez asserts that the probative value of the spoliation evidence in this case is minimal because King would have witnessed Cordero commit other, uncharged crimes, thus providing Cordero a reason to silence King that was unrelated to King’s knowledge of the charged crimes. True enough, but this argument has little force given that the charged crimes in this case (murder for hire and distribution of a kilogram of cocaine) were far more serious than the uncharged crimes (sale of K2 in prison and illegal possession of a cell phone). Velasquez also points out that Cordero may have sought to kill King out of rage rather than in an attempt to silence him. We rejected a similar argument in United States v. Manns, 277 F. App’x 551, 559 (6th Cir. 2008), where we noted that “[a] rational factfinder could conclude that the threats [against a witness] constituted evidence of consciousness of guilt rather than revenge for untruthful testimony.” Moreover, any prejudice resulting from Rosario’s testimony was diminished by the court’s legally correct cautionary instructions, which were delivered both at the time the testimony was given and again at the conclusion of trial. The trial court’s delivery of consistent, frequent, and accurate limiting instructions weighs against a finding of unfair prejudice. United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 350, 363-64 (6th Cir. 1997). Also without merit is defendants’ challenge to the admission of testimony showing a scheme by Velasquez and Cordero to sell K2 at Fort Dix. The K2 scheme was sufficiently Nos. 19-3540/3543 United States v. Cordero, et al. Page 21 related and close in time to the cocaine distribution scheme as to be probative of Cordero’s knowledge of and intent to join the conspiracy with Velasquez. The K2 evidence also served to rebut Cordero’s defense at trial that he was innocently assisting Velasquez in rerouting a package without knowledge that the package contained cocaine. “This court has repeatedly recognized that prior drug-distribution evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) to show intent to distribute.” United States v. Hardy, 643 F.3d 143, 151 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) (collecting cases). Such evidence is also admissible to show knowledge. See United States v. Rodriguez, 882 F.2d 1059, 1064-65 (6th Cir. 1989). That evidence, however, must be sufficiently probative. In Hardy, we explained that to be probative of a defendant’s present intent to possess and distribute, the evidence of other drug distribution must be “[1] substantially similar and [2] reasonably near in time to the specific intent offense at issue.” 643 F.3d at 151 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 721 (6th Cir. 2002)). As to the second of these requirements, the evidence demonstrated that the K2 scheme was in effect while Cordero assisted Velasquez in rerouting the package. The contemporaneous nature of defendants’ two drug schemes strongly enhanced the probative value of the K2 evidence. We have stated that “relative temporal proximity increases a prior act’s probative value.” United States v. Asher, 910 F.3d 854, 861 (6th Cir. 2018). That Cordero was already running a drug distribution operation might well lead a juror to believe that Cordero was a knowing and voluntary participant in a second drug scheme. With respect to the first requirement, while the uncharged K2 scheme differed in several obvious ways from the charged cocaine scheme, the schemes were related in at least three relevant respects. First, the K2 scheme involved narcotics distribution, as opposed to the purchase and use of narcotics for personal use. Compare Haywood, 280 F.3d at 721-22. Second, the schemes involved the same two co-conspirators, a relevant indicator of relatedness. The evidence that Velasquez merely solicited Cordero’s assistance in rerouting a package appears much less innocent when considering that Cordero was already conspiring with Velasquez to distribute narcotics. This reasoning finds substantial support in the caselaw. We have on several occasions rejected Rule 404(b) challenges to the admission of other drug dealing Nos. 19-3540/3543 United States v. Cordero, et al. Page 22 activity where that activity involved individuals identified as co-conspirators or accomplices in the case on trial. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 16 F.3d 1429, 1442-43 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Robison, 904 F.2d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 1990); Rodriguez, 882 F.2d at 1064-65. In Robison, for instance, we held that evidence of the defendant’s cocaine deals with a coconspirator five months before the start of the indicted conspiracy was probative of the defendant’s intent to distribute cocaine. 904 F.2d at 368. Furthermore, we have noted the absence of a common accomplice in cases where the prior drug trafficking conduct was deemed unrelated to the charged offense. In United States v. Bell, 516 F.3d 432 (6th Cir. 2008), we reversed the defendant’s conviction based on the improper admission of uncharged drug trafficking evidence. Id. at 444. In doing so, we required that prior drug distributions be “part of the same scheme or involve[] a similar modus operandi as the present offense.” Id. at 443. We identified Robison and Rodriguez as meeting that requirement because, in those cases, evidence of the defendant’s earlier drug trafficking conduct with a coconspirator demonstrated present intent to distribute drugs with the same co-conspirator. Id. (citing Robison, 904 F.2d at 368; Rodriguez, 882 F.2d at 1064-65). Although Bell’s earlier convictions involved the same type of narcotics charges, the convictions were for offenses that occurred years earlier and were otherwise unconnected to the charges Bell was on trial for. Id. at 444. United States v. Zelinka, 862 F.2d 92, 99 (6th Cir. 1988), likewise recognized the probative value of other-act evidence involving the same accomplice. In Zelinka, we reversed the defendant’s drug trafficking conviction, reasoning that evidence of the defendant’s involvement in drug distribution sixteen months after the date of the charged offense “was remote from the period of the conspiracy and involved none of the other conspirators.” Id. Other circuits have also permitted the admission of prior drug dealing evidence when it involved the same co-conspirator. In United States v. Zackson, 12 F.3d 1178, 1182 (2d Cir. 1993), the Second Circuit concluded that “evidence that [the defendant] had previously engaged in narcotics trafficking with [his co-conspirator] is highly probative of [the defendant’s] intent to enter another drug conspiracy with the same co-conspirator, and to rebut [the defendant’s] defense of innocent association.” The First Circuit took a similar stance in United States v. Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 2000). There, the defendants were convicted of conspiring Nos. 19-3540/3543 United States v. Cordero, et al. Page 23 with a man named Vega to import marijuana by ship. Id. at 114. The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s admission of testimony from Vega that he and the defendants, including one Santana, had previously sailed large quantities of marijuana and cocaine to the U.S. Id. at 115-16, 119. The court reasoned that “[b]y offering evidence of a second incident in which Santana was involved in a completed drug venture with some of the same participants, the government gave the jury a reason to view skeptically Santana’s claim that he was just an innocent bystander who was ‘merely present,’ but rather to conclude that he was a knowing and intentional participant in the crimes charged in the indictment.” Id. at 119. Aside from involving distribution of narcotics by the same co-conspirators, the K2 and cocaine schemes were related in that each was conducted from inside prison. Indeed, Cordero faced many of the same hurdles rerouting the drug package as he did coordinating the delivery and sale of K2. Each scheme required communication with Velasquez, who was outside of prison, which had to be done without detection by prison authorities. The evidence showed that Cordero used a hidden cell phone to accomplish this task. Cordero also had significant knowledge of the prison economy, which he relied upon to advance each of the drug schemes at issue. For example, Cordero was able to sell K2 to others in the prison and rented contraband smartphones for King to use in rerouting the cocaine package. Finally, the payment system Cordero and Velasquez had established for the K2 scheme would be equally useful for divvying up the proceeds from the cocaine distribution scheme. In short, Cordero’s successful operation of a drug distribution scheme from within prison demonstrated his knowledge and skill to do so again. In the analogous case of United States v. Gessa, 971 F.2d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc), we held that testimony describing the defendant’s previous use of a boat to import cocaine to Florida from the Bahamas “was probative of ‘intent, preparation, or plan,’ because the prior excursions were probative of defendant’s ability and opportunity to participate in an importation scheme.” To be sure, the cocaine and K2 plots were dissimilar in certain ways. But to be admissible under Rule 404(b), “the prior act need not ‘be identical in every detail’ to the charged offense.” United States v. Alkufi, 636 F. App’x 323, 332 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Perry, 438 F.3d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 2006)). For instance, we have upheld the admission of Nos. 19-3540/3543 United States v. Cordero, et al. Page 24 prior acts evidence involving cocaine and hashish despite the fact that the charged offense involved only heroin. See United States v. Ismail, 756 F.2d 1253, 1259 (6th Cir. 1985). In the present case, the conspiracies occurred at the same time, included the same co-conspirators, and involved, at least in several important aspects, a similar modus operandi. The district court accordingly did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the K2 evidence was probative of Cordero’s knowledge of and intent to join the cocaine distribution conspiracy with Velasquez. The probative value of the K2 evidence was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact. As discussed, the K2 scheme was ongoing while Cordero worked with Velasquez to reroute the cocaine passage. Accordingly, the concern we have expressed that a defendant is “prejudice[d] . . . for something that happened in the distant past,” Myers, 123 F.3d at 363, is not present in this case. In addition, under Rule 403, the court may consider whether other means of proof are available aside from the prejudicial other-act evidence. Id. While the jury heard evidence of Velasquez’s involvement in drug dealing, there was comparatively little evidence linking Cordero to drug trafficking. The K2 evidence was therefore important for the Government’s case. Another relevant factor in the Rule 403 balancing analysis is the severity of the uncharged act in comparison to other evidence presented at trial. In United States v. Maddox, for instance, we observed that a witness’s “mere mention” of one defendant’s involvement in an uncharged drug conspiracy was “pretty tame stuff” in comparison to other testimony detailing the defendants’ operation of over a dozen crack houses and commission of robbery and other violent gun crimes. 944 F.2d at 1226-28, 1232. Here, the evidence of Cordero’s involvement in the sale of synthetic marijuana is far less inflammatory than the evidence presented concerning the murder-for-hire schemes and the distribution of a kilogram of cocaine. Finally, the prejudicial effect of this testimony was lessened by the trial court’s cautionary instructions. The court gave a cautionary instruction as soon as the K2 evidence was introduced and gave a substantially similar instruction at the end of trial.