Opinion ID: 879106
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Dvorak's strict liability claim

Text: In addition to the negligence claims mentioned above, Dvorak's complaint also included a claim against Matador based upon strict liability for engaging in an abnormally dangerous activity. Dvorak points out this Court in Matkovic v. Shell Oil Co. (Mont.1985), 707 P.2d 2, 42 St.Rep. 1482, recently addressed the theory of strict liability in cases involving an abnormally dangerous activity. In Matkovic this Court adopted § 519 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which basically holds that [o]ne who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person ... of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm. Matkovic, 707 P.2d at 3-4. In addition, this Court listed numerous factors adopted from § 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to determine whether a particular activity is abnormally dangerous. Dvorak now argues, consistent with the law embodied in Matkovic, that the transport and storage of hydrogen sulfide contaminated materials by Matador is an abnormally dangerous activity, thereby making Matador strictly liable for his injuries. Dvorak further asserts this issue of whether the handling and storage of hydrogen sulfide contaminated matter is an abnormally dangerous activity is a question of fact for the jury. We acknowledge that Dvorak's allegations under this issue create a superficial factual issue as to whether the handling of hydrogen sulfide contaminated materials is an abnormally dangerous activity. However, we find, as did the District Court, that even if a jury could have found that Matador's activities were abnormally dangerous, Matador can not be liable in any event because it was not the proximate cause of Dvorak's injuries. This Court has previously established that a showing of proximate cause is a necessary element for any plaintiff's recovery in strict liability. Brown v. North American Manufacturing Co. (1978), 176 Mont. 98, 576 P.2d 711. Therefore, in order for Dvorak to establish a prima facie case for strict liability, it must be proven that Matador's conduct was the proximate cause of his injuries. Further, contrary to Dvorak's belief, the showing of proximate cause under strict liability is identical to that required for a prima facie showing of negligence. In other words, a defendant's liability can be cut off by a superseding intervening force. As we have already explained under issue I, we find that Beall's conduct, and not Matador's conduct, was the proximate cause of Dvorak's injuries. Therefore, Matador can not be strictly liable for Dvorak's injuries. Finally, we agree with Matador that the ultimate reason strict liability does not apply in this case is that Dvorak's injury did not occur while Matador was conducting any activity at all. Rather, the injury occurred during the conduct of an activity by Beall. Matador was not carrying on an abnormally dangerous activity which resulted in harm to Dvorak. Matador had delivered the tank to Beall and it was Beall, not Matador, who was carrying on the activity involved in Dvorak's injury. In other words, Matador was carrying on no activity, abnormally dangerous or otherwise, which resulted in Dvorak's injuries. In conclusion, we hold the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Matador. This Court has repeatedly stated that a plaintiff is subject to summary judgment if he fails in establishing certain material elements in a negligence action (or any cause of action for that matter). Scott v. Robson (1979), 182 Mont. 528, 535, 597 P.2d 1150, 1154; see also Pickett v. Kyger (1968), 151 Mont. 87, 439 P.2d 57. This general rule applies to the instant case. With regard to his negligence claims under issue I, Dvorak failed to establish the basic principles of agency law necessary to hold Matador vicariously liable for Beall's wrongful conduct. Further, even under a general negligence theory Matador can not be held liable to Dvorak because Dvorak failed to establish that Matador was the proximate cause of his injuries. (This is even assuming Matador owed a duty to Beall and Dvorak in the first place.) Finally, with regard to his strict liability claim under issue II, Dvorak failed to establish a prima facie case for this cause of action. As explained in the opinion above, Dvorak failed, once again, to show that there was a proximate causal connection between Matador's conduct and his injuries. We hold because Dvorak failed to establish the necessary elements of his stated causes of action, summary judgment was appropriately granted in favor of Matador. The order of the District Court granting summary judgment is affirmed. TURNAGE, C.J., and WEBER, SHEEHY and GULBRANDSON, JJ., concur.