Opinion ID: 2614001
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged instructional error as to burden of proof of torture special circumstance

Text: (23) Defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the elements of the torture-murder special circumstance. Specifically, defendant contends the trial court did not instruct the jury it must find that defendant did in fact inflict extreme, cruel, physical pain and suffering upon a living human being, because, in orally instructing the jury according to a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.81.18 offered by defendant, the court stated that  If Mr. Crittenden did in fact inflict extreme, cruel, physical pain and suffering upon a living human being no matter how long its duration, awareness of pain by the deceased is not a necessary element of torture. (Italics added.) The written version of the instruction provided by the trial court informed the jury as follows: To find that the special circumstance, referred to in these instructions as murder involving infliction of torture, is true, each of the following facts must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: [¶] 1. Mr. Crittenden intended to, and did kill a human being. [¶] 2. The killing did constitute murder in the first degree. [¶] 3. Separate and independent from the intent to kill, Mr. Crittenden also had the specific intent to torture the victim. [¶] 4. In this regard the intent to torture means a specific intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain upon a living human being for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion or for any sadistic purpose. [¶] 5. Further, the specific intent to torture must be established beyond a reasonable doubt to have been a willful, deliberate and premeditated intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain. In this regard, the word willful means intentional. The word deliberate means formed or arrived at as a result of careful thought and weighing the considerations for and against the proposed course of action. The word premeditated means considered beforehand. [¶] 6. Mr. Crittenden did in fact inflict extreme, cruel, physical pain and suffering upon a living human being no matter how long its duration. Awareness of pain by the deceased is not a necessary element of torture.  (Italics added.) As noted, in reading the instruction to the jury, the trial court added the word if before the italicized passage. The trial court's inadvertent misreading of the instruction does not appear to be error, because no reasonable juror would have understood the instruction to relieve the jury of the necessity of making a determination that defendant did in fact inflict extreme, cruel, physical pain and suffering upon William. First, the oral instruction did not, as suggested by defendant, omit the element that defendant did in fact inflict extreme, cruel, physical pain and suffering upon a living human being, but indicated, rather, that if the jury found that fact, awareness of pain was not an element of torture. Second, the jury received the correct (as modified by defendant) version of CALJIC No. 8.81.18 in its written form. (See People v. Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th 140, 189-190 [trial court's omission of portion of CALJIC No. 3.19 held harmless because jurors received correct instruction in written form]; People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 215-216 [260 Cal. Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285]; People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 163-165 [246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629]; see also People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97, 111, fn. 2 [249 Cal. Rptr. 630, 757 P.2d 569] [presumption jurors were guided by written version of instructions].) The oral and written rendering of the instruction also specifically advised the jury that specific intent to inflict extreme pain was an element of the special circumstance. In addition, we may consider whether, in light of the argument of counsel, the trial court's slight misreading of the instruction could have been prejudicial. (See People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 451-452 [285 Cal. Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273] [whether prosecutor's argument exploited possible ambiguities in instructions]; People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 435-436 [243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279]; cf. People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1254-1255 [278 Cal. Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899] [neither counsel discussed issue that was inadequately addressed in instruction].) In the present case, during closing argument, the prosecutor stated: Finally, the jury has to find that Mr. Crittenden did, in fact, inflict extreme cruel physical pain and suffering upon a living human being no matter how long its duration and that awareness of the pain by the victim is not a necessary element of the torture. (Italics added.) The prosecutor also emphasized the evidence tending to demonstrate that William did suffer extreme pain from the neck and back injuries. Rather than exacerbating the trial court's misreading, this argument served to reinforce the correct written version of the instruction. We conclude any error was nonprejudicial. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)