Opinion ID: 1103979
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: petitioner was denied access to counsel during a critical stage of his trial.

Text: ¶ 139. In his final claim, Puckett asserts that he was denied access to defense counsel during a critical stage of his trial. As mentioned before, Puckett testified at trial on his own behalf. After cross-examination of Puckett by the State had begun, the trial court took a brief recess and instructed Puckett not to discuss his testimony with anyone including his counsel. ¶ 140. Although this issue was capable of being raised at trial, no objection was taken to the trial court's instruction. This issue is therefore, procedurally barred for the first time in Puckett's application for post-conviction relief. Miss code Ann. § 99-39-21(1). ¶ 141. Without waiving the procedural bar, Puckett's claim is without merit. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Federal Constitution does not compel every trial judge to allow the defendant to consult with his lawyer while his testimony is in progress if the judge decides that there is good reason to interrupt the trial for a few minutes. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 284-85, 109 S.Ct. 594, 102 L.Ed.2d 624 (1989). The United States Supreme Court stated: We are persuaded, however, that the underlying question whether petitioner had a constitutional right to confer with his attorney during the 15-minute break in his testimonya question that we carefully preserved in Geders [ v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed. 2d 592 (1976)]was correctly resolved by the South Carolina Supreme Court. Admittedly, the line between the facts of Geders and the facts of this case is a thin one. It is, however, a line of constitutional dimension. Moreover, contrary to the views expressed by the dissenting member of the South Carolina Supreme Court, see n. 1, supra, it is not one that rests on an assumption that trial counsel will engage in unethical coaching. The distinction rests instead on the fact that when a defendant becomes a witness, he has no constitutional right to consult with his lawyer while he is testifying. He has an absolute right to such consultation before he begins to testify, but neither he nor his lawyer has a right to have the testimony interrupted in order to give him the benefit of counsel's advice. The reason for the rule is one that applies to all witnessesnot just defendants. It is a common practice for a judge to instruct a witness not to discuss his or her testimony with third parties until the trial is completed. Such nondiscussion orders are a corollary of the broader rule that witnesses may be sequestered to lessen the danger that their testimony will be influenced by hearing what other witnesses have to say, and to increase the likelihood that they will confine themselves to truthful statements based on their own recollections. The defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him immunizes him from such physical sequestration. Nevertheless, when he assumes the role of a witness, the rules that generally apply to other witnesses rules that serve the truth-seeking function of the trialare generally applicable to him as well. Accordingly, it is entirely appropriate for a trial judge to decide, after listening to the direct examination of any witness, whether the defendant or a nondefendant, that cross-examination is more likely to elicit truthful responses if it goes forward without allowing the witness an opportunity to consult with third parties, including his or her lawyer. Perry, 488 U.S. at 280-82, 109 S.Ct. 594. ¶ 142. The brief recess that occurred in Perry happened after direct examination and before cross-examination began. Puckett asserts that because the recess in the instant case occurred in the middle of cross-examination, the meaning of Perry is distinguishable. This assertion is without merit. Perhaps the need to prevent discussion between the defendant and his counsel would increase once cross-examination has begun because at that point, the defendant and his counsel would be aware of the direction the cross-examination has taken. ¶ 143. Puckett also relies on this Court's ruling in Pendergraft v. State, 191 So.2d 830 (Miss.1966) to support his claim that he was denied counsel at a crucial stage of the proceedings. In Pendergraft, the trial court recessed for two hours at the conclusion of direct examination of the defendant and instructed the defendant not to converse with counsel. This Court held that instruction to be reversible error stating: Did the trial court's instruction to the defendant and to her attorney not to converse during a two-hour recess of the court, immediately following the defendant's direct testimony in her own behalf, violate the defendant's constitutional right to the assistance of counsel as provided by the above-quoted Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution? 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law section 313 (1965) states the general rule to be: In construing constitutional provisions relating to the right of an accused person to counsel, most courts have expressed the view that the right extends to every stage of the prosecution. And it is said that the right to assistance in preparing for trial is equal to the right to assistance during the trial itself. Accordingly, in addition to the right to representation during the course of his trial, an accused is generally entitled to be assisted by counsel    Am. Jur.2d at 339-340. It may be safely said that at this time in our jurisprudence there is no question of constitutional law more firmly established than the oft-enunciated principle that in the trial of criminal cases in the federal, as well as the state courts, the defendant is entitled to have the guilding hand of counsel at every stage of the proceeding. The trial is, of course, a stage of the proceeding of vital importance to the accused. The right to an attorney extends throughout the trial and to every stage of the proceeding. We need not look to the specific prejudice that resulted to the defendant as the result of the two-hour court-imposed restriction of consultation between the accused and her attorney. This particular phase of the trial is so critical that we do not attempt to envision a particular prejudice such as an overlooked fact, further discussions of strategy, or whether it be merely reassurance to the defendant. We deem it reversible error that the right of consultation granted by the Constitution was denied. Pendergraft, 191 So.2d at 833. ¶ 144. There are two important aspects of the Pendergraft case to be considered. First, Pendergraft was decided in 1966, a little over twenty-two years before the United States Supreme Court's decision in Perry. Second, the recess in Pendergraft was a two-hour delay, where in Perry, the delay was fifteen minutes. ¶ 145. The United States Supreme Court stated that its decision in Perry did not mean that trial judges must forbid consultation between a defendant and his counsel during such brief recesses. Perry, 488 U.S. at 284, 109 S.Ct. 594. Our conclusion does not mean that trial judges must forbid consultation between a defendant and his counsel during such brief recesses. As a matter of discretion in individual cases, or of practice for individual trial judges, or indeed, as a matter of law in some States, it may well be appropriate to permit such consultation. We merely hold that the Federal Constitution does not compel every trial judge to allow the defendant to consult with his lawyer while his testimony is in progress if the judge decides that there is a good reason to interrupt the trial for a few minutes. Id. at 284-85, 109 S.Ct. 594. ¶ 146. Puckett argues that the record does not indicate how long the break was for. He also does not make an assertion that it was anything but a brief recess. The record in this case does give insight to the recess being one relatively brief in nature as apposed to a two hour delay. The record in the instant case contains the following statement by the trial court: THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, while I hesitate to break the continuity of the examination, when we were with counsel in chambers on other matters, it developed that this may be the appropriate time for you to take a recess. In addition to that, we've been informed by the Bailiff that some of you need tothat being the case, we're going to let you retire to theit's not polite, and I apologize. But I'm trying to explain to you why we're stopping in the middle of the testimony. It was your idea, as I understand. But be that as it may, we're going to It you recess. Let me caution you that during this recess you're not to discuss this case among yourselves. Now, technically, Mr. Puckett, you're on the stand as a witness, and during this recess you may not discuss your testimony with anyone. Okay. Let's let the jury exit. ¶ 147. This issue is procedurally barred, and Puckett has not made a showing of cause and actual prejudice requiring relief from the waiver. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1)