Opinion ID: 2145405
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Recommendation as to Sentence

Text: This court has recognized that a defendant who pleads guilty in exchange for an agreed-upon sentence faces different consequences than a defendant who exchanges a guilty plea for the state's recommendation of a certain sentence. See State v. DeZeler, 427 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Minn.1988). DeZeler held that if the sentencing court rejects an agreement as to a defendant's sentence, the defendant is entitled to withdraw the guilty plea. Id.; see also State v. Wolske, 280 Minn. 465, 473-74, 160 N.W.2d 146, 152 (1968) (allowing withdrawal of guilty plea to correct manifest injustice when state failed to abide by its promise and defendant did not receive the benefits contemplated by the agreement). If, conversely, the sentencing court rejects a mere recommendation made pursuant to an agreement, then the defendant may not withdraw the plea unless the defendant can establish either (a) that the defendant mistakenly believed he or she could withdraw the plea if the sentencing court rejected the recommendation, or (b) that there is some other ground for withdrawal. DeZeler, 427 N.W.2d at 234. Perkins does not argue that he mistakenly believed he could withdraw his guilty plea, and he admitted that he was never advised that he could withdraw his plea if the sentencing judge failed to follow the recommended sentence. [7] Rather, Perkins claims that his failure to understand the difference between an agreement as to sentence and a recommendation as to sentence undermined the accuracy, voluntariness, and intelligence of the plea because it led him to believe that the recommendation represented an upward limit on his potential sentence. A valid guilty plea must meet three basic prerequisites: it must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent (i.e., knowingly and understandingly made). State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn.1983). Manifest injustice occurs if a guilty plea is not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent, and thus the plea may be withdrawn. See, e.g., Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 717 (holding that no manifest injustice occurred when defendant's plea had sufficient factual basis). In this case, there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that Perkins did understand the difference between an agreement as to sentence and a recommendation as to sentence and, therefore, that his guilty plea was accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. The plea petition Perkins signed contains clear language explaining that the sentencing component was merely a recommendation that did not bind the court, and that Perkins could not withdraw the guilty plea upon rejection of the recommended sentence. Perkins testified that he did not read through the plea petition line-by-line, but that his attorney told him that the plea agreement was for 110 to 115 months and that if he pleaded guilty he would receive a 110- to 115-month sentence. Perkins' testimony as to whether he understood that the plea petition contained a sentence recommendation only, and not an agreement, was equivocal: Q. Did your attorney ever explain to you the difference between a plea agreement and a plea recommendation? A. I believe he did. Q. Do you know what he told you about that? A. Just that the Judge can depart from it. Q. Did he tell you that the Judge could depart? A. Yes. Q. Did he tell you that the Judge could depart once you pled guilty to this count of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree? A. I was told he didn't have to follow the recommendation of everybody involved. Q What did you think that meant? A. Well when I asked what he could depart to, I was told that I really didn't need to worry about that, that the agreement was already made with the prosecutor. Q. Did you understand that the  as far as the sentence, that that was only going to be a recommendation, that the Judge wasn't bound by that? A. I'm not really sure. Perkins further testified: I understood they were recommendations but the  according to my attorney they already made a deal for 110 to 115 months. That's all I was concerned with. But when the judge told him that 110 months was just a recommendation and that the judge was free to depart from that sentence, Perkins understood [t]hat they had other options they could go with. After the judge informed him of his sentence, Perkins claims he did not object because I believe the man can do anything he wants to, it's his courtroom. Perkins' attorney's testimony supports the claim that Perkins understood that the plea petition contained a recommendation that would not bind the court. Perkins' attorney testified that he advised [Perkins] that these were just recommendations and that they were not binding on the Court. The attorney testified that it was his standard practice to fill out the plea petition together with the defendant, to discuss the agreed-upon terms with the defendant, to explain the defendant's constitutional rights, and to ask the defendant to read the petition. He stated that some defendants have a problem understanding a recommendation as to sentence, but some do not. He stated that he did not have any concern that Perkins misunderstood the distinction between an agreement as to sentence and a recommendation as to sentence. In Schwerm v. State, this court refused to permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea because the defendant knew that the sentencing recommendation would not bind the court. 288 Minn. 488, 491, 181 N.W.2d 867, 868 (1970). The Schwerm court stated: Although a plea of guilty may be set aside where an unqualified promise is made as a part of a plea bargain, thereafter dishonored, a solemn plea of guilty should not be set aside merely because the accused has not achieved an unwarranted hope. Id. Similarly, Perkins merely had an unwarranted hope that the court would follow the recommendation. We cannot set aside his guilty plea merely because his hope was not achieved. See also State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 883 (Minn.1986) (An unachieved, unwarranted hope is not the manifest injustice which mandates plea withdrawal here under rule 15.05   .). The record does not support Perkins' claim that he failed to understand the difference between an agreement as to sentence and a recommendation as to sentence. Accordingly, there is no manifest injustice which requires us to permit a withdrawal of his guilty plea on this ground.