Opinion ID: 703939
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is quantum meruit available during the pre-Bloom period?

Text: 9 Minnesota law determines the rights of the parties in this diversity action, and we review the district court's interpretation of Minnesota law de novo. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1221, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991). The basic contours of the law of quantum meruit, or unjust enrichment, are well settled under Minnesota law: 10 An action for unjust enrichment may be based on failure of consideration, fraud, mistake, and situations where it would be morally wrong for one party to enrich himself at the expense of another. However, a claim of unjust enrichment does not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of others, but instead lies where one party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term 'unjustly' could mean illegally or unlawfully. 11 Hesselgrave v. Harrison, 435 N.W.2d 861, 863-64 (Minn.App.1989) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Although the applicable law is well settled, the facts of this case are rather unique and therefore require us to address some preliminary issues. 12 The first unique aspect of this appeal involves defining the benefit received (allegedly unjustly) by Titan. Titan makes much of the fact that Ventura provided no services for Titan other than pursuant to the Ventura-Titan contracts. While it is true that the Ventura-Titan contracts governed all the services provided by Ventura (i.e., his acts of appearing at the wrestling match and commentating), the agreements do not necessarily address all the benefits created by Ventura's services. Ventura's services created several varieties of intellectual property rights. In defining the benefit conferred upon Titan, the proper focus is not merely Ventura's labor as he performed, but must also include the intellectual property rights created by Ventura's performance. Thus, we find that the intellectual property rights to Ventura's commentary are benefits upon which an action for unjust enrichment may be based. 13 We next must determine whether Titan, in taking this benefit, was unjustly enriched. Ventura's quantum meruit claim may succeed only if Titan's rights to use Ventura's performance are limited so that Titan is not entitled to use the performance without Ventura's consent. We believe that Titan's rights are limited by Ventura's right to publicity. In determining the law of the State of Minnesota concerning publicity rights, we are bound by the decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court. If the Minnesota Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, we must determine what that court would probably hold were it to decide the issue. The parties have identified, and we have discovered, no case in which the Minnesota Supreme Court has either accepted or rejected the tort of misappropriation of publicity rights. We must therefore attempt to predict the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court. 5 In making our prediction, we may consider relevant state precedent, analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly works and any other reliable data. B.B. v. Continental Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 1288, 1291 (8th Cir.1993). 14 We believe that the Minnesota Supreme Court would recognize the tort of violation of publicity rights. We are aware that Minnesota does not recognize the fourfold tort of invasion of privacy. See Hendry v. Conner, 303 Minn. 317, 226 N.W.2d 921, 923 (1975); Stubbs v. North Memorial Medical Center, 448 N.W.2d 78, 80-81 (Minn.App.1989). However, the right of publicity differs substantially from the right to privacy. Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F.Supp. 1277, 1280-81 (D.Minn.1970); 2 Fowler V. Harper et al, The Law of Torts Sec. 9.7, at 657 (1986). The policy underlying the tort of invasion of privacy is the protection of the privacy and solicitude of private personae from the mental distress that accompanies undesired publicity. Uhlaender, 316 F.Supp. at 1280. Minnesota courts have refused to adopt this policy on their own initiative. Stubbs, 448 N.W.2d at 81. However, the policy underlying the right to publicity is different in several important respects. The right to publicity protects the ability of public personae to control the types of publicity that they receive. The right to publicity protects pecuniary, not emotional, interests. Uhlaender, 316 F.Supp. at 1280-81. As such, the policy underlying the right to publicity is more akin to the policy underlying the protection of trade names, which Minnesota recognizes. See Minn.Stat. Sec. 325D.165 (Supp.1995) (1994 Amendment to Minnesota Unlawful Trade Practices Act); Sec. 325D.44 (Supp.1995) (Minnesota version of Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act). Indeed, the district court for the District of Minnesota has twice relied upon this distinction to recognize the right to publicity. Uhlaender, 316 F.Supp. at 1280-81 (distinguishing misappropriation from right of privacy); McFarland v. E & K Corp., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1246, 1247, 1991 WL 13728 (D.Minn.1991) (quoting Uhlaender, 316 F.Supp. at 1281-82). Thus, we believe that the Minnesota courts would recognize the right to publicity, and Titan's violation of this right makes Titan's use of Ventura's commentary without his consent unjust. 6 15 However, quantum meruit is not available simply because Titan may have been unjustly enriched. Minnesota law is clear that [w]here an express contract exists, there can be no implied [in law] contract with respect to the same subject matter. Reese Design v. I-94 Highway 61 Eastview Center Partnership, 428 N.W.2d 441, 446 (Minn.App.1988); accord Sharp v. Laubersheimer, 347 N.W.2d 268, 271 (Minn.1984). On the other hand, if an existing contract does not address the benefit for which recovery is sought, quantum meruit is available regarding those items about which the contract is silent. Holman v. CPT Corp., 457 N.W.2d 740, 745 (Minn.App.1990); Frankson v. Design Space Int'l, 394 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Minn.1986); Sagl v. Hirt, 236 Minn. 281, 52 N.W.2d 721, 725 (1952). 7 16 Between 1985 and 1987, Ventura performed services for Titan under two different agreements. Ventura's services as a wrestler are governed by the WBA; his services as a commentator are governed by his oral agreements with McMahon. Thus, two contracts existed between Ventura and Titan between 1985 and March 1986, when the WBA was terminated. Whether quantum meruit recovery was proper depends upon whether or not the two agreements between Ventura and Titan were of limited scope, addressing only televised live performances, or also included subsequent videotape releases of the performances. The district court found that the WBA precluded royalties for the videotape exploitation of Ventura's performance as a wrestler. The district court also found that Ventura and Titan had no agreement concerning the payment of royalties for videotape exploitation of Ventura's performance as a commentator. This finding concerns the intent of the parties, Cepeda v. Swift & Co., 415 F.2d 1205, 1207-08 (8th Cir.1969), and as such, is a factual finding which we review only for clear error. 1 Steven A. Childress & Martha S. Davis, Federal Standards of Review Sec. 2.23 (2d ed. 1991) (The clearly erroneous rule generally applies to a finding regarding the intent of the contracting parties, at least where the contract is ambiguous.). 17 We have reviewed the record, and are left with no definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. From 1985 to 1987, there was no discussion of Titan's right to use Ventura's color commentary. At least initially, 8 Ventura was not aware of the impending videotape sales, as merchandising was not part of the industry practice. These facts support the conclusion that Ventura's contract for commentating services did not contemplate a license for videotape distribution. Accordingly, we hold that the district court's finding that the pre-Bloom Ventura-Titan contracts did not address videotape licenses or royalties is not clearly erroneous. See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). We believe that the judgment of the district court was correct insofar as it awarded damages for the exploitation of Ventura's pre-Bloom commentating performances. 18