Opinion ID: 1813007
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Comment on Hudson's Failure to Testify Against Others

Text: At the conclusion of the guilt phase, the prosecutor argued in closing argument: The Defendant also told detectives that he would accept the charges and that he's willing to spend the rest of his life in prison for what happened. The detectives are saying at the same time, why, why don't you tell us, why should that other guy get out there and be able to roam around free. Give us that guy you were on the phone with, who's calling the shots. Because the guy who pulled the trigger is the guy with the gun, we'd also like the guy who's on the phone, that's why our investigation continues, but we need someone to tell us who's on the phone and to testify. (Emphasis supplied.) Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing this argument was an improper comment on Hudson's right to remain silent. Hudson contends that the comment suggested there was an ongoing investigation in which Hudson did not cooperate and that Hudson needed to testify about matters relating to that ongoing investigation. The trial court found that the comment was proper and denied the motion for mistrial. We agree that the argument of counsel was not an improper comment on Hudson's right to remain silent and not testify because the comment indicating that he refused to further implicate Mejia or be a witness against him was made after Hudson expressly waived his right to remain silent and freely conversed with police. See Hutchinson, 882 So.2d at 955 (The prohibition against commenting on a defendant's silence does not apply when the defendant does not invoke his Fifth Amendment right.); Downs v. Moore, 801 So.2d 906, 911-12 (Fla.2001) (holding that the State is not precluded from admitting evidence of defendant's refusal to answer one question of many where defendant has not invoked his Fifth Amendment rights); Ragland v. State, 358 So.2d 100, 100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (holding that where defendant waived his Fifth Amendment rights and freely and voluntarily conversed with police, comment on the failure to answer one question of many is not a violation of the defendant's right to remain silent). In this case, Hudson did not maintain silence prior to trial, giving several interviews to detectives after waiving his rights, nor did he maintain silence at trial, instead taking the stand to testify. While claiming his own innocence in this case, Hudson fully explained his version of how Mejia directed him to kill Peller and offered him a gun, how Mejia refused to consider any other solution, and how Hudson did not follow through with the murder. While the time of the call was disputed, Hudson admitted calling Mejia to try to cancel the murder. Because Hudson waived his right to remain silent, gave interviews to police, and testified at trial, he has not invoked his right to remain silent, and testimony concerning his reluctance to implicate Mejia further was not improper comment on his right not to testify. Moreover, the testimony and argument of counsel was fair comment on the evidence presented by both Detective Bukata and Hudson, and was made in the context of explaining why there was still an ongoing investigation in the casean issue highlighted by defense counsel several times. The prosecutor said: Because the guy who pulled the trigger is the guy with the gun, we'd also like the guy who's on the phone, that's why our investigation continues, but we need someone to tell us who's on the phone and to testify. The prosecutor further explained: That's why it's an ongoing investigation. There's more than one person involved in this, no question about it, but we need one [sic] someone to give us those other people. We know you, Russell Hudson, pulled the trigger and took Lance Peller's life, no doubt about it, but who sent you there and how do we prove who sent you there. That's the ongoing investigation. The ongoing investigation had been made an issue in the case numerous times by the defense during cross-examination of the detectives and appeared aimed at suggesting to the jury that the detectives were not entirely sure Hudson committed the murder. Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that the argument was not an improper comment on Hudson's failure to testify against Mejia, but was fair comment on the evidence presented. We agree and accordingly deny relief on this claim.