Opinion ID: 1454631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the religious exemption of rcw 49.60.030

Text: On cross appeal, Farnam assigns error to the trial court's conclusion that because CRISTA is a religious organization, it is exempt from Washington's antidiscrimination laws. [3] Based on this conclusion, the trial court granted CRISTA's motion for a judgment n.o.v. on Farnam's religious discrimination by harassment claim. If the exemption is held to apply, Farnam further argues that CRISTA is estopped from asserting the exemption as a defense and that the exemption violates article 1, section 11 and article 1, section 12 of the Washington Constitution. Our analysis begins with a review of the relevant statutes and the application of the exemption to the present case. Farnam's constitutional claims are then addressed. RCW 49.60, which is known as the law against discrimination, is an exercise of the police power of the state for the protection of the public welfare, health, and peace of the people of this state, and in fulfillment of the provisions of the Constitution of this state concerning civil rights. RCW 49.60.010. The chapter creates a state agency to eliminate and prevent discrimination in a number of areas, including employment. RCW 49.60.010. The provisions of RCW 49.60 shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof. RCW 49.60.020. [4] Under RCW 49.60.040, employer is defined as any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, who employs eight or more persons, and does not include any religious or sectarian organization not organized for private profit. Thus, if CRISTA is a nonprofit, religious organization, it is exempt from the provisions of this chapter. Farnam does not argue directly that CRISTA is not an exempt religious organization. Rather, she contends that the exemption does not apply in the present action because it does not extend to CRISTA's subdivisions, such as the nursing home, unless that subdivision also serves a religious purpose. Under Farnam's reasoning, a separate inquiry must be made to determine if a facility run by a religious organization is itself exempt, regardless of the status of the umbrella organization. Farnam relies on two Washington cases, Yakima First Baptist Homes, Inc. v. Gray, 82 Wn.2d 295, 510 P.2d 243 (1973) and Hazen v. Catholic Credit Union, 37 Wn. App. 502, 681 P.2d 856, review denied, 102 Wn.2d 1003 (1984) to assert that the statute requires facilities run by religious organizations to meet a separate purpose test. Farnam's reliance on these cases is misplaced. The exemption at issue in Gray was a property tax exemption, which was to be construed strictly against the claim of exemption. Gray, at 299. The exemption provides: Property owned by nonsectarian organizations or associations, organized and conducted primarily and chiefly for religious purposes and not for profit, which shall be used, or to the extent solely used, for the religious purposes of such associations, or for the educational, benevolent, protective, or social departments growing out of, or related to, the religious work of such associations[.] (Italics ours.) Gray, at 301. Thus, the use to which a specific piece of property is put determines whether or not the exemption applies to that piece of property, even if the property is owned by a religious organization. RCW 49.60.040 contains no such use or purpose restriction applicable to facilities run by religious organizations. Gray is of limited assistance here. Hazen is the only Washington case to have directly addressed the circumstances under which an organization would be religious for purposes of the exemption of RCW 49.60. There, the court held that a Catholic Credit Union was not a religious or sectarian organization and was subject to RCW 49.60 as a matter of law. In so holding, the court noted that while the credit union was founded in the 1950's in connection with a popular trend in the Roman Catholic Church to financially aid members and all of the incorporators were Catholic laymen, its purpose, as set forth in its bylaws, was to promote thrift and create a source of credit. Hazen, at 503-04. Membership was not limited to Catholics, but was open to all parishioners and all employees of Catholic institutions, employees of the credit union, and family members of members in good standing. Moreover, the credit union had no organizational, structural, financial ties to the Roman Catholic Church and loans made to parishes were made on the same terms as to individuals. The credit union did not report to, or receive input from, the Diocese of Yakima. Members of the board of directors were selected based on their financial, business and management skills, not religious qualifications. Hazen, at 504. No member of the Catholic clergy had ever served as a director and if one were to serve, the selection would be based on that clergy's business and financial skills, not his religious contribution. Hazen, at 504. Similarly, employees were hired on the basis of their ability, not their religious affiliation. The court also noted that the credit union did not provide religious counseling, with the only prayers taking place at the opening and closing of meetings. The court stated that the credit union advertised itself as a financial institution and operated as any other credit union organized under Washington law. Hazen, at 505. Because the statute does not define religious or sectarian organization, the court construed those terms according to their ordinary meaning and stated that it [did] not believe promoting thrift and providing a source of credit are manifestations of devotion to a superior being in a religious sense. Hazen, at 506. The court went on to cite Gray's holding that care of the aged is not a religious purpose within the tax exemption provided to organizations conducted for religious purposes. Hazen, at 506. By making reference to Gray, Hazen appears to have unnecessarily incorporated Gray's discussion of specific purpose under the tax statute into the exemption of RCW 49.60. With the exception of this unnecessary reference to Gray, Hazen does not support Farnam's position. Indeed, Hazen is readily distinguishable in that the court was not called upon to determine if a subdivision of a religious organization comes within the exemption. Hazen's inquiry was limited to the credit union itself. There is nothing in Hazen that requires this court to make a separate determination of the nursing home's status as a religious organization based on an independent religious purpose. [5] In addition to Gray and Hazen, Farnam relies on Equal Empl. Opportunity Comm'n v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989) to argue that, regardless of CRISTA's status, the nursing home must have a religious purpose for the exemption to apply. [5] As Farnam points out, because RCW 49.60 substantially parallels the federal law against discrimination, Title 7 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., [6] Washington courts have looked to the interpretation of the federal law in construing RCW 49.60. Selberg v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 45 Wn. App. 469, 726 P.2d 468, review denied, 107 Wn.2d 1017 (1986); Hollingsworth v. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank, 37 Wn. App. 386, 390, 681 P.2d 845 (citing Davis v. Department of Labor & Indus., 94 Wn.2d 119, 125, 615 P.2d 1279 (1980)), review denied, 103 Wn.2d 1007 (1984). However, federal law does not support Farnam's position. Under federal law, all of CRISTA's activities, including the nursing home, clearly would fall within the religious organization exemption. In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 97 L.Ed.2d 273, 107 S.Ct. 2862 (1987), the Supreme Court held that applying the exemption of section 702 of Title 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to a religious organization's secular activities did not violate the Establishment Clause of the first amendment to the United States Constitution. Amos, at 330. The Supreme Court noted that the District Court had considered and rejected the possibility that § 702 could be construed to exempt a religious organization only with respect to employment involving religious activities. Amos, at 332 n. 8. The Court cited with approval the District Court's conclusion that such a construction was not consistent with the legislative history of the exemption, which prior to 1972 had exempted only the religious activities of religious organizations, but had been amended in 1972 to extend the exemption to all activities of religious organizations. Amos, at 332 n. 9. Because the federal religious exemption, unlike RCW 49.60.030, expressly extends to all activities of a religious organization, reference to federal law in this case is less than helpful. [6] In sum, neither the language of RCW 49.60 nor the case law cited by Farnam requires this court to make a separate determination of the nursing home's status as a religious organization based on an independent religious purposes. Our inquiry is properly limited to CRISTA's status as a religious organization. Hazen's consideration of the entire factual context of the case, including the stated purpose of the credit union, is instructive in this regard. In its articles of incorporation, CRISTA's purpose is, in part: To engage in, foster, encourage, promote, and propagate evangelical churches and missions, and Christian and charitable interests ... [and to] use every method such as radio, telephone, pictures, literature, and the spoken word, et cetera, that the people of the World may hear the Gospel and accept Christ as their own personal saviour. CRISTA's bylaws state, in part: CRISTA MINISTRIES has been created and exists as a Christian organization for the purpose of ministering as Christianity-In-Action. CRISTA shall seek and provide opportunities to demonstrate Christ's love by maintaining and operating a non-profit organization which actively provides appropriate avenues of Christian service to accomplish that mission. CRISTA MINISTRIES shall be enabled by a gathering of Christian people from all walks of life for this purpose, working together to change lives by doing Christ's work in today's world. Both the bylaws and CRISTA's Staff Information Manual contain a Statement of Faith. The Staff Information Manual also provides, in part: CRISTA Ministries ... is a professionally staffed, nonprofit organization engaged in a growing ministry of diverse Christian, humanitarian and community services designed to meet the needs of the whole person ... physical, intellectual and spiritual. The Mission Statement for the nursing staff provides, in part: We, as Christian nurses are accountable to God and responsive to Him for the contribution we make to the development of the nursing profession, to the care of residents and to the support of their families. We offer ourselves to the Lord so that His love may flow through us as we exercise our ministry to His honor and glory. All CRISTA employees must sign a doctrinal statement and adhere to CRISTA's Statement of Faith. CRISTA begins most days with devotions and prayers. CRISTA's schools offer on-campus Bible classes, the Senior Community has vesper services, and there are two chaplains on staff. CRISTA's brochures express Christian values. While CRISTA is interdenominational, and not affiliated with a particular church, Farnam concedes that such affiliation is not required by the statute, but is rather one of the factors to be considered. The facts before us readily support the conclusion that CRISTA is a religious organization within the exemption of RCW 49.60.040. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's granting of CRISTA's motion for judgment n.o.v. on Farnam's religious discrimination by harassment claim. Farnam also argues that, even if CRISTA is a religious organization, it is equitably estopped from asserting the religious organization exemption defense under RCW 49.60. However, the doctrine of estoppel does not apply. [7] Estoppel has three elements: (1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party on the faith of such admission, statement, or act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement, or act. Saunders v. Lloyd's of London, 113 Wn.2d 330, 340, 779 P.2d 249 (1989) (quoting McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wn.2d 299, 308, 738 P.2d 254 (1987)). Estoppel focuses on the justified reliance of the person asserting it. Saunders, at 340. It is undisputed that CRISTA at all times held itself out to Farnam as a religious organization and never represented to her that it would not assert the exemption. Furthermore, it is clear from the personal statement Farman submitted to the ad hoc committee that she believed that CRISTA was a Christian organization. Therefore, the doctrine of estoppel does not apply. Farnam next argues that the exemption for religious organizations contained in RCW 49.60 is unconstitutional under article 1, section 11 (freedom of belief) and article 1, section 12 (privileges and immunities) of the Washington Constitution. She has expressly declined to bring any federal constitutional challenges. For the reasons discussed below, we decline to reach Farnam's state constitutional claims. [8] Farnam argues that the religious exemption violates the absolute freedom of conscience and religious belief guaranteed by article 1, section 11 by allowing employers to discriminate on the basis of religion. However, while she raises her claims under the Washington Constitution, the cases she cites in support of her argument, State v. Meacham, 93 Wn.2d 735, 612 P.2d 795 (1980) and Backlund v. Board of Comm'rs of King Cy. Hosp. Dist. 2, 106 Wn.2d 632, 724 P.2d 981 (1986), were decided under the First Amendment to the federal constitution. Significantly, in Backlund, this court declined to decide the issue under the Washington Constitution because [t]he parties [did not argue] persuasively for a different application of the provisions of the First Amendment and Const. art. 1, § 11 (amend. 34) of the state constitution.... Backlund, at 639 n. 3. While Backlund went on to apply a First Amendment analysis, it would not be appropriate to do so in this case because Farnam has expressly declined to raise a First Amendment challenge. Thus, this court is faced with deciding an issue under our constitution without benefit of citation to appropriate supporting authority. This we decline to do. Accord, Spokane v. Taxpayers of Spokane, 111 Wn.2d 91, 96, 758 P.2d 480 (1988) (constitutional issues not adequately briefed will not be considered by this court). [7] Farnam also asserts that the exemption of RCW 49.60 violates the privileges and immunities clause, article 1, section 12 of the Washington Constitution, because it creates two classes of workers  those who work in secular nursing homes and those who work in religious nursing homes  with protection against discrimination only available to the former. [9] Farnam relies on Duranceau v. Tacoma, 27 Wn. App. 777, 620 P.2d 533 (1980), to argue that strict scrutiny must be applied to the exemption because the right to private employment is a fundamental right. However, in Duranceau, the court stated that [t]he right to hold specific private employment free from unreasonable government interference is a fundamental right. (Italics ours.) Duranceau, at 780. In that case, the City of Tacoma interfered with Duranceau's right to work by denying him access to a city-controlled road. Here, there is no governmental interference. Thus, Duranceau is inapposite. Because Duranceau forms the basis of Farnam's argument, it would be inappropriate to decide this issue on the briefing before us. Therefore, we decline to reach the issue of the constitutionality of the exemption under article 1, section 12. However, it is worth noting that a similar challenge to the federal exemption was specifically rejected under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In American Networks, Inc. v. Utilities & Transp. Comm'n, 113 Wn.2d 59, 77, 776 P.2d 950 (1989), this court stated: The privileges and immunities clause of the Washington State Constitution (article 1, section 12) and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are substantially identical and have been considered by this court as one issue. In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 97 L.Ed.2d 273, 107 S.Ct. 2862 (1987), the Court held that the federal counterpart to Washington's religious exemption does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of alleviating significant governmental interference with the exercise of religion. Amos, at 339. Further, the Court stated that there was no merit to the argument that strict scrutiny was required because the exemption was drawn on religious grounds. While laws discriminating among religions are subject to strict scrutiny, laws affording a uniform benefit to all religions need only satisfy the rational relationship test. Amos, at 339.