Opinion ID: 766486
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Bicaksiz's Wife's Testimony

Text: 24 Bicaksiz argues also that the District Court erred at trial in refusing to exclude, pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 403, Bedriye's testimony that Bicaksiz told her if you touch my businesses I will die. Bicaksiz interprets the statement attributed to him as a death threat against Bedriye, and argues that it should have been excluded because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. 25 We review the District Court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion, and [w]e will overturn a trial judge's determination under Rule 403 only if we determine that the judge acted arbitrarily or irrationally. United States v. Tracy, 12 F.3d 1186, 1195 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding no abuse of discretion with respect to admission of evidence of death threats by defendant). 26 Rule 403 provides that [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. We have held that [e]vidence of threats of death is subjected to the same Rule 403 balancing test as other relevant evidence, though the stakes may be heightened. Tracy, 12 F.3d at 1195 (citation omitted). In the instant case, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Bedriye's testimony. The Court held that the evidence of the threat was intrinsic to the crimes of conviction because it was 27 part of the government's basic theory that the murder of the brother was intended to intimidate the wife. Had the alleged murder plot been successful, then under the government's theory the wife would have been made so fearful for her life based upon the threat to her and her brother and fortified by the murder of her brother that she would have relented from her position in the divorce proceedings. 28 We agree that Bedriye's testimony at trial was probative of the government's contention that the projected murder of Esen was part of a scheme to intimidate Bedriye into accepting a disadvantageous divorce settlement, 8 and we find no error, much less arbitrariness or irrationality, in the District Court's decision to admit it. 29