Opinion ID: 2391757
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bill Williams' Testimony

Text: Ford argues that the trial court erred in qualifying Bill Williams as an expert on cruise control diagnosis. We agree. A person may be qualified as an expert in a particular area based upon knowledge, skill, experience, training or education. Rule 702, SCRE. In determining a witness's qualifications as an expert, the trial court should not have a solitary focus, but rather, should make an inquiry broad in scope. Fields v. J. Haynes Waters Builders, Inc., 376 S.C. 545, 555, 658 S.E.2d 80, 85 (2008). The test for qualification of an expert is a relative one that is dependent on the particular witness's reference to the subject. Wilson v. Rivers, 357 S.C. 447, 452, 593 S.E.2d 603, 605 (2004). The qualification of a witness as an expert is within the trial court's discretion, and this Court will not reverse that decision absent an abuse of discretion. Fields, 376 at 555, 658 S.E.2d at 85. During the motion in limine to determine whether Williams qualified as a cruise control expert, Williams testified that he had worked in the automotive industry as a trainer, consultant, software developer, and writer since the early 1980s and was currently conducting seminars to train automobile technicians who focus on the brake systems in vehicles. On cross-examination, Williams admitted that he had no professional experience working on cruise control systems prior to this litigation. He also admitted that he had not conducted any comparison of the Explorer's cruise control system to any other system and acknowledged that he had never taught or published papers on cruise control systems. The trial court ruled that Williams qualified as an expert in the training and operation of the cruise control and brakes and allowed him to testify as to cruise control diagnosis. In our view, there is no evidence to support the trial court's qualification of Williams as an expert in cruise control systems. Williams had no knowledge, skill, experience, training or education specifically related to cruise control systems. Rather, it appears he merely studied the Explorer's system just before trial, which he indicated in his testimony to the jury: This is how I taught myself the [Explorer's] cruise control, or speed control system. While Williams may have been qualified as an expert in other aspects of automobile components, such as the brake system, the trial court failed to properly evaluate Williams' qualifications specific to cruise control systems. Compare Wilson, 357 S.C. at 452, 593 S.E.2d at 605 (holding that the trial court erred in refusing to qualify a medical doctor as an expert in biomechanics where the doctor had training in biomechanics, had been qualified as a biomechanics expert in other states, and had some educational background in biomechanics); Lee v. Suess, 318 S.C. 283, 457 S.E.2d 344 (1995) (holding that the trial court erred in failing to qualify a plastic surgeon as an expert in the field of family practice where the plastic surgeon served as a professor who provided instruction to family practitioner residents and where family practitioners referred their patients to him for diagnosis). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in qualifying Williams as a cruise control expert. Notwithstanding this error, to warrant reversal, Ford must show that it was prejudiced by the admission of this evidence. See Fields, 376 S.C. at 557, 658 S.E.2d at 86. Prejudice is a reasonable probability that the jury's verdict was influenced by the challenged evidence. Id. (finding that the trial court's error in failing to qualify an expert was harmless error since the testimony would have been cumulative). In this case, we do not believe that this error alone prejudiced Ford's defense. Williams' testimony essentially consisted of a description of the system accompanied by models and diagrams of the components. Moreover, the jury heard Ford extensively question Williams' qualifications on cross-examination regarding his knowledge of cruise control systems in an attempt to impeach his credibility on the subject. Furthermore, the trial court prohibited Williams from testifying to matters outside of his scope, specifically noting he could not testify as to electrical engineering matters. Trial courts should be cautious in conferring an expert label upon a witness because juries may accord excessive or undue weight to expert testimony. In this case, however, we hold that the trial court's error in qualifying Williams as an expert in cruise control diagnosis did not prejudice Ford.