Opinion ID: 164875
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Foundation

Text: 39 We begin with the requirement that the executive order be based on a specific statutory foundation. Executive Order 12,072 was issued under the authority vested in [the] President of the United States of America by Section 205(a) of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended (40 U.S.C. 486(a)). This Act gave the President power to prescribe such policies and directives, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, as he shall deem necessary to effectuate the provisions of said Act, which policies and directive shall govern the Administrator and executive agencies in carrying out their respective functions. 40 U.S.C. § 486(a) (2000). 6 As a House of Representatives Report explains, [b]y reason of the impact of this legislation upon all agencies in the executive establishment, this subsection authorizes the President, if he deems it advisable, to prescribe over-all policies and directives which shall govern the Administrator of General Services and executive agencies in operations under this act. H.R.Rep. No. 81-670 (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1475, 1491. 40 Interior suggests the Executive Order lacks sufficient statutory foundation because there is nothing in the language of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 that indicates a congressional intention to create enforceable rights in non-bidders. Further, Interior suggests the statutory foundation is insufficient because the Act does not contain any directive addressing location of federal office space within the [central business area]. 41 Our review of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 convinces us the Act provides a sufficient statutory foundation for Executive Order 12,072. It is well established that Congress may delegate responsibility to the executive branch so long as Congress provides an intelligible principle to guide the exercise of the power. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409, 48 S.Ct. 348, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928). Congress chose to utilize a relatively broad delegation of authority in the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949. However, Congress did instruct the President's exercise of authority should establish an economical and efficient system for ... the procurement and supply of property. See 40 U.S.C. § 471 (2000). 7 We think Executive Order 12,072's directions concerning the consideration of locations within the central business area are sufficiently related to the Act to be a valid exercise of the Act's delegated authority. 8 Thus, Executive Order 12,072 must be accorded the force and effect given to a statute enacted by Congress. See Farkas, 375 F.2d at 632. Since we give the Executive Order the force and effect of a statute, it can provide the basis for standing under the Administrative Procedure Act. It simply does not matter that the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 does not specifically mention either central business areas or each party that has standing under the Act. 42 Interior suggests standing under the Administrative Procedure Act can only be provided through a statute itself rather than an executive order. In support of its position, Interior cites several cases holding federal employees did not have standing to sue under Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76. See, e.g., Courtney v. Smith, 297 F.3d 455 (6th Cir.2002), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 64, 157 L.Ed.2d 28 (2003); United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 844 F.2d 1087, 1096 (4th Cir.1988). We think Interior's reading of the Administrative Procedure Act is too restrictive. The Administrative Procedure Act allows standing for [a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Interior's position seems to ignore the portion of the Act granting standing to [a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action. Id. When this portion is read in conjunction with the rest of the Administrative Procedure Act, we think it clearly allows standing for those plaintiffs within the `zone of interests' protected by the statute, executive order, or regulation which the agency is alleged to have violated provided, of course, that the executive order or regulation is within in the scope of authority delegated by Congress. Buffalo Cent. Terminal v. United States, 886 F.Supp. 1031, 1044 (W.D.N.Y.1995). See also H & F Enters., Ltd. v. United States, 973 F.Supp. 170, 174 (D.D.C.1996). Similarly, Interior's reliance on the cases involving Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 is misplaced. The Circular explicitly instructed it should not be construed to create any substantive or procedural basis for anyone to challenge any agency action or inaction. See Courtney, 297 F.3d at 462; Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 844 F.2d at 1095. 9 If anything, these cases support our conclusion because they looked beyond the foundational statute in determining whether the plaintiffs had standing. Cf. Lee v. United States Air Force, 354 F.3d 1229, 1245-46 (10th Cir.2004) (consulting an administrative regulation in determining whether plaintiff met the prudential zone of interests test). Consequently, we conclude the executive order has sufficient statutory authority and must be accorded the force of a congressional statute. 43