Opinion ID: 2372009
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Release of Prospective Jurors 36, 48, 49, and 53

Text: ¶ 57 The trial court also suggested by e-mail on January 2, 2007, that four other potential jurors, numbers 36, 48, 49, and 53, each of whom had a parent who was murdered, be released. The State objected to release of all of these prospective jurors except number 53. Potential juror 36 was released the next day, when Irby was present, for cause. ¶ 58 The reason that the trial court suggested that these potential jurors be released was related to Irby's particular trial. Irby was charged with murder. But as pointed out, the right to be present requires more than this relationship. The right to be present rests on the principle that the defendant's presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure, Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2658 (emphasis added), and the defendant's presence is required only to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, Snyder, 291 U.S. at 107-08, 54 S.Ct. 330. It is debatable whether a defendant's presence while potential jurors merely fill out questionnaires would make any difference in the fairness of the procedure. ¶ 59 Nevertheless, the process here went further than jurors filling out forms. The court determined that these jurors should be released on the basis of their answers to the questionnaire and engaged in communications with counsel, which led to the release of potential juror 53. Irby's constitutional right to be present was implicated. ¶ 60 However, any error was harmless. A violation of the right to be present is subject to harmless error analysis. See Benn, 134 Wash.2d at 921, 952 P.2d 116; Lord, 123 Wash.2d at 306-07, 868 P.2d 835; Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117-18, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983); see also United States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 535 (6th Cir.2001) (right to be present at voir dire is not a structural right the violation of which constitutes per se error; reversal is required only when there is prejudice to the defendant); see, e.g., United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408, 437 (6th Cir.1999). Accordingly, error is harmless if beyond a reasonable doubt the violation did not contribute to the verdict. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 26, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). ¶ 61 The only one of these potential jurors who was in a position to be on Irby's jury was potential juror 36, because the jury was filled before the other potential jurors' numbers were reached. Thus, any error as to any of the rest of these jurors was harmless. There is no possibility that the verdict could have been affected by release of jurors who were not in a position to sit on the jury. ¶ 62 Nor was there any error in the release of potential juror 36. On January 3, 2007, when Irby was present, he agreed with the State that juror 36 should be released for cause. Therefore, this juror did not sit on Irby's jury, either. ¶ 63 Indeed, of all of the jurors that the trial court suggested be released in Irby's absence on January 2, 2007, only four, potential jurors 7, 17, and 23, and 36, had a chance of being on Irby's jury because of their low number. The first three of these were, as discussed above, released within the trial court's broad discretion for hardship reasons having nothing to do with the facts or legal issues in Irby's case. The last, as noted, was dismissed for cause the next day by agreement when Irby was present. ¶ 64 Irby claims, though, that he might have wanted potential jurors 7, 17, and 23 on his jury and they may have decided to remain upon questioning in his presence. Irby's speculation that he might have wanted a particular juror on his jury makes no difference in the analysis. First, as this court has long held, a defendant has no right to be tried by a particular juror or jury. State v. Gentry, 125 Wash.2d 570, 615, 888 P.2d 1105 (1995); Phillips, 65 Wash. at 327, 118 P. 43. Second, the release of a potential juror on grounds identified in RCW 2.36.100 is a matter within the trial court's discretion and not a matter for the defendant to decide. ¶ 65 Finally, if an impartial jury is obtained, no reversible error occurs in any event. See Phillips, 65 Wash. 324, 118 P. 43; Howard, 200 U.S. at 174, 26 S.Ct. 189 (quoting Brown, 175 U.S. at 172, 20 S.Ct. 77) (`[i]f from those who remain an impartial jury is obtained, the constitutional right of the accused is maintained'); Nguyen v. Archuleta, No. CIVA07CV00702WYDBNB, 2008 WL 4079300, at  (D.Colo. Aug. 25, 2008) (unpublished) (applicant for a writ of habeas corpus argued that his right to be present was violated because he was absent from a portion of voir dire of two prospective jurors held in chambers; district court agreed any error was harmless because the prospective jurors did not serve on the jury at the defendant's trial; court observed that the defendant's speculation that he may not have wanted those jurors excused does not demonstrate that his presence during voir dire would have contributed to the fairness of the proceedings), aff'd, 369 Fed.Appx. 889 (10th Cir.2010) (unpublished).