Opinion ID: 874771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Prosecutor Engaged in Misconduct by Inflaming the Jury in (1) Eliciting an Unnecessary and Prejudicial Response from a Witness Regarding the Disturbing Nature of the Crime and (2) Repeatedly Using Versions of the Phrase ran over your wife in Questioning Mr. Larsen

Text: Mr. Ellington alleges that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by (1) eliciting a response from a witness that he had only worked at his job for two months because the crime had disturbed him so much and (2) repeatedly stating that Mr. Ellington ran over Mr. Larsen's wife while questioning Mr. Larsen, because this conduct was calculated to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury. While our system of criminal justice is adversarial in nature, and the prosecutor is expected to be diligent and leave no stone unturned, he is nevertheless expected and required to be fair. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007) (quoting State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-28, 725 P.2d 128, 132-33 (1986)). However, in reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct the Court must keep in mind the realities of trial. Id. A fair trial is not necessarily a perfect trial. Id. In questioning Eric Hartmann, the forensic audio analyst who enhanced the 911 audio recording of the incident, the prosecutor asked: Can you tell us, please, why you only worked at RMIN for two months? [9] Mr. Hartmann answered: The simple answer is this case in particular left me with the inability to sleep and I decided that The defense objected to the answer, and the objection was sustained and the response stricken. Mr. Hartmann then stated, without being asked a question: So I had some trouble with this case. The prosecution next asked: After you worked on this particular recording you decided not to work for RMIN anymore? to which Mr. Hartmann answered, That's correct. The defense objected on the ground of relevance, was overruled, and after cross-examining Mr. Hartmann, moved for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct in asking and answering the question regarding why Mr. Hartmann had only worked at RMIN for such a short time. On appeal, Mr. Ellington argues that there was absolutely no proper purpose for [the prosecutor] to have posed the question that he did, and that this smacked of an improper attempt to once again influence the jury with an emotional appeal. The State argues that the question and answer were relevant and thus proper in order to explain that Mr. Hartmann's short time working on the case was not because of poor performance or for a reason related to his ability to do his job well. It also argues that even if the question and answer was prejudicial, it was not so inflammatory as to cause the jury to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence, because the gruesome and tragic nature of what happened was well documented and clearly before the jury in various forms of evidence and testimony. [A]ppeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct.App.2007); see also State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 942, 877 P.2d 905, 913 (1994) (holding that the un-objected to statements made by the prosecutor did not indicate an intent on the part of the prosecuting attorney to inflame the minds of the jurors or to arouse passion or prejudice against [the defendant], nor were they so inflammatory that the jurors might be influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence, and thus there was no misconduct). In Field, this Court found that the prosecutor's question to a witness about a previous investigation was improper because [c]learly the testimony the State was attempting to elicit from [the witness] was highly prejudicial and irrelevant in this case. Field, 144 Idaho at 572, 165 P.3d at 286 We find that the testimony the prosecutor was attempting to elicit from Mr. Hartmann was similarly highly prejudicial and irrelevant. While the prosecution here claims that the question was relevant to rebut anticipated impeachment or attacks on Mr. Hartmann's character by the defense by attempting to establish that Mr. Hartmann was not fired for poor performance, a witness's credibility and character may not be supported before it has been attacked. I.R.E. 608(a), (b); Pierson v. Brooks, 115 Idaho 529, 532-34, 768 P.2d 792, 795-97 (Ct.App.1989) (holding that testimony supporting the witness's character for truthfulness was improperly admitted on re-direct examination because there was no attack on the witness's credibility or character during cross-examination). Even more, the length of Mr. Hartmann's employment was only before the jury because the prosecutor had intentionally elicited that testimony from him. As with its comment on Mr. Ellington's silence, the prosecution never should have gone down the road of questioning Mr. Hartmann about his length of employment knowing full well that it ended with another prejudicial reflection on the disturbing nature of the incident. The testimony regarding why Mr. Hartmann had only worked at RMIN for two months was irrelevant at this point in the testimony. The district court sustained the objection to this answer, implicitly acknowledging the low or non-existent probative value and highly prejudicial nature of the answer. Thus, as the district court noted, the testimony was unnecessarily elicited here from the witness. Thus, we find that there was prosecutorial misconduct. Mr. Ellington's next assignment of misconduct concerns the questioning of Mr. Larsen. During this questioning, the prosecutor asked four questions in a row that included a version of the phrase ran over your wife in order to apparently establish whether Mr. Ellington was in the wrong lane of travel when Mrs. Larsen was hit. These included the colorful phrases After he got done running over your wife, How long afterhe ran over your wife, After he got done running over your wife, and How longafter he got done running over her, all asked one after the other. After defense counsel objected and the prosecutor was told by the court to move on, the prosecutor immediately asked again what Mr. Larsen did after Mr. Ellington ran over your wife. Mr. Ellington argues that the prosecutor's intentional, gratuitous references to Mr. Larsen's wife having been run over were calculated to, and did, appeal to the emotions of the jurors, and as such, constituted misconduct. We agree. The State argues that [t]he fact that Ellington ran over Mr. Larsen's wife was an undisputed fact of this case, and that therefore the focus of the repeated statements was not on the fact that Mr. Ellington ran over Mr. Larsen's wife, but that he ran her over in the wrong laneindicating that he intentionally ran her over. It may be true that the prosecutor was attempting to establish whether Mr. Ellington was in the wrong lane or not. However, the prosecutor could have very easily made the same points and elicited the exact same testimony from Mr. Larsen by phrasing the questions in a less inflammatory way. Repeatedly reiterating the image of Mr. Ellington running over Mr. Larsen's wife was wholly unnecessary. While a prosecutor may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314, 1321 (1935). We are also troubled that the prosecutor seems to have completely ignored the court's admonition to move on, by immediately asking another inflammatory question. The court should not have to lecture the prosecutor in front of the jury in order to get its point across that the current line of questioning is inappropriate and the prosecutor should move to a different one. Thus, we find that the prosecutor's repeated use of the phrase ran over your wife was also misconduct.