Opinion ID: 2508099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Purcell's Statements During Videotaped Reenactment

Text: During trial, defendant moved to excise Purcell's statements from the videotape on the ground that they were self-serving attempts to diminish her responsibility and to shift the blame to defendant, and thus, were inadmissible under People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265, and Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476. The prosecutor opposed the motion, arguing that Purcell's statements were admissible hearsay qualifying as declarations against penal interest or adoptive admissions. The trial court denied the motion, finding that  unlike the situation in Aranda and Bruton  Purcell's statements were not untrustworthy or self-serving. She incriminated herself and did not attempt to place more blame on defendant. To the extent she incriminated defendant, she simply confirmed what he had already confessed to. The court admitted the videotape and its transcription, which included Purcell's statements. Defendant argues that admission of Purcell's statements violated the Aranda/Bruton rule. We have rejected a similar argument. ( People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 537, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137.) The Aranda/Bruton rule addresses the situation in which `an out-of-court confession of one defendant ... incriminates not only that defendant but another defendant jointly charged. ' ( People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 455, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 917 P.2d 187, italics added, fn. omitted.) `The United States Supreme Court has held that, because jurors cannot be expected to ignore one defendant's confession that is powerfully incriminating as to a second defendant when determining the latter's guilt, admission of such a confession at a joint trial generally violates the confrontation rights of the nondeclarant. ( Ibid., italics added.) In this case, [declarant] was not jointly charged or tried with defendant, but was separately tried and convicted of murder. Accordingly, the Aranda/Bruton rule does not preclude admission of [declarant's] extrajudicial statements against defendant. ( Ibid. ) Defendant further argues that, because the majority of Purcell's statements shifted the principal blame for the homicide onto defendant while minimizing her own role, the statements were unreliable and thus violated his United States Constitution Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. In Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, the high court held that the confrontation clause does not bar admission of an unavailable witness's hearsay statement against a defendant if the statement bears adequate `indicia of reliability.' ( Id. at p. 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531.) To meet the requirement of reliability under the Roberts test, the evidence must fall either within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or contain particularized guarantees of trustworthiness such that adversarial testing would be expected to add little, if anything, to the statement's reliability. ( Ibid. ) [T]he `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' required for admission under the Confrontation Clause must ... be drawn from the totality of circumstances that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief. ( Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805, 820, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638.) In finding Purcell's statements to be reliable and trustworthy, the trial court noted that: (1) the statements were against her penal interests, and/or (2) Purcell confirmed defendant's description of the crime throughout the videotape  including her own culpability  and never blamed defendant any more than he had already blamed himself. Thus, the court found her statements admissible as statements against her penal interest or as adoptive admissions. However, since then, the high court has overruled the test in Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597. ( Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1369-1374, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 ( Crawford ).) Instead, Crawford held that [w]here testimonial [hearsay] evidence is at issue ... the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. ( Id. at 541 U.S. at p. 68, 124 S.Ct. at p. 1374.) Although the high court did not comprehensively define the term testimonial, it noted, [w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.  ( Id. at 541 U.S. at p. 68, 124 S.Ct. at p. 1374, italics added.) It further noted that The [Confrontation] Clause ... does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted. ( Id. at p. 59, fn. 9, 124 S.Ct. at p. 1369, fn. 9.) Although we question whether Crawford can be applied retroactively to cases with final judgments (see Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 68-69, 124 S.Ct. at pp. 1374, 1378 (conc. opn. of Rehnquist, J.) [describing majority decision as a mantle of uncertainty over future criminal trials in both federal and state courts; the new rule; and a change of course]), we need not decide that issue because defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was not implicated. As in Crawford, here, Purcell's statements made during the police interrogation are testimonial, and it does not appear from the record that defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. ( Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 61-62, 53, fn. 4, 124 S.Ct. at pp. 1370 & 1365, fn. 4.) Defendant did not dispute Purcell's unavailability at trial, nor does he do so on appeal. However, Purcell's statements incriminating defendant were not admitted for purposes of establishing the truth of the matter asserted, but were admitted to supply meaning to defendant's conduct or silence in the face of Purcell's accusatory statements. ( People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 624, 247 Cal.Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070; CALJIC No. 2.71.5.) [B]y reason of the adoptive admissions rule, once the defendant has expressly or impliedly adopted the statements of another, the statements become his own admissions .... [Citation.] Being deemed the defendant's own admissions, we are no longer concerned with the veracity or credibility of the original declarant. ( Silva, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 624, 247 Cal. Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070.) Evidence of a statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is one of which the party, with knowledge of the content thereof, has by words or other conduct manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth. (Evid. Code, § 1221.) The statute contemplates either explicit acceptance of another's statement or acquiescence in its truth by silence or equivocal or evasive conduct. There are only two requirements for the introduction of adoptive admissions: `(1) the party must have knowledge of the content of another's hearsay statement, and (2) having such knowledge, the party must have used words or conduct indicating his adoption of, or his belief in, the truth of such hearsay statement.' [Citation.] ( People v. Silva, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 623, 247 Cal.Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070.) Admissibility of an adoptive admission is appropriate when `a person is accused of having committed a crime, under circumstances which fairly afford him an opportunity to hear, understand, and to reply, and which do not lend themselves to an inference that he was relying on the right of silence guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution....' ( People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1189, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) In defendant's presence, Purcell stated that: (1) defendant directed her to strike Janine with the flashlight and rocks, to determine if she was dead, and to tie her hands, and (2) defendant came up with the idea of robbing and killing Janine. Defendant's own prior direct admissions confirmed the truth of Purcell's statements. Purcell said nothing incriminating that defendant himself had not already admitted. After Purcell corroborated defendant's prior admissions, he never retracted them; thus, he continued to acknowledge the truth of Purcell's statements. Under these circumstances, her statements inculpating defendant during the joint interview qualify as adoptive admissions. Purcell further stated  out of defendant's presence  that they disposed of Janine's property and attempted to cash her checks after the killing and robbery. When the police later related Purcell's statements to defendant, he confirmed their accuracy. Thus, he expressly adopted them. Having concluded that Purcell's statements were admissible under the adoptive admissions rule, the trial court submitted to the jury the question whether defendant's conduct actually constituted an adoptive admission. The jury was instructed how to consider the evidence, including that [e]vidence of such an accusatory statement is not received for the purpose of proving its truth, but only as it supplies meaning to the silence and conduct of the accused in the face of it. Unless you should find that the defendant's silence and conduct at the time indicated an admission that the accusatory statement was true, you should entirely disregard the statement. (CALJIC No. 2.71.5.) Thus, because Purcell's statements were admitted for a nonhearsay purpose, defendant's Sixth Amendment right was not implicated. ( United States v. Kehoe (8th Cir.2002) 310 F.3d 579, 590-591; Globe v. Florida (Fla.2004) 877 So.2d 663, 672-673.)