Opinion ID: 6435
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did roche owe willis a legal duty in negligence?

Text: 9 Willis first challenges the district court's determination that Roche owed no legal duty to Willis under Texas law to use reasonable care in its administration of a drug test of Willis's urine sample. We agree with Willis that the district court erred in ruling no such duty existed. The district court's holding was predicated on the conclusion that Texas law was insufficiently developed on the specific issue of a laboratory's liability for negligent drug testing for a federal Erie court to predict, and thus that the court was forced to rely on the law of negligence as it applies to physicians employed as independent contractors. However, the law of Texas is indeed sufficiently clear for Erie court prediction purposes on the specific issue of a drug testing laboratory's duty to testees to use reasonable care in conducting its tests. See, e.g., Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, Inc., 855 S.W.2d 248 (Tex.App.—Austin 1993) (Carroll, C.J.) (writ of error granted Feb. 2, 1994). In the recent Texas Court of Appeals case we deem determinative on the question of duty presented in this case—SmithKline, supra: an employer rescinded a job offer it had made to Plaintiff Doe, because of a false positive generated by the defendant outside laboratory relative to Doe's urine sample. The drug laboratory in SmithKline used the same testing technology as was used by Roche in Willis's case—a combination of the initial screening EMIT test and the confirming, more sophisticated (and more reliable) GC/MS test), which mispurported that Doe used 10 opiates.1 Doe's only recourse was to reapply for employment with the company in six months; but the company declined Doe's reapplication. The SmithKline Texas intermediate appellate court opinion reverses a trial court summary judgment ruling in favor of the laboratory. As the Texas Court of Appeals explains in SmithKline: The Texas Supreme Court has described the existence of a duty [in negligence cases] as follows: [I]f a party negligently creates a situation, then it becomes his duty to do something about it to prevent injury to others if it 1 It is common for most drug testing programs to differentiate between screening and confirming tests. The most accurate tests are expensive, slow and require highly trained personnel. This makes them unsuitable for large scale drug screening. The practice has developed of using an inexpensive test designed for maximum sensitivity as a screening test, followed by a sophisticated confirming test. Screening tests are designed to yield fewer false-negative results, since a negative result will end the testing process. By far the most frequently used screening test is the EnzymeMultiplied Immunoassay Technique (EMIT).       The principal disadvantages of the EMIT test are that adulterated urine samples can produce universally false-negative results and other prescription and nonprescription drugs may cross react, causing false-positives.       [Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry (GC/MS) is a commonly-used confirming test]. This is probably the most accurate drug testing tool.    GC/MS instrumentation is usually automated and under computer control, with the instrument's operational parameters available for storage, printout, and evaluation. Data generated from GC/MS instruments can easily be reviewed by independent third parties. Within the scientific community, it is generally accepted that if positive screening test results are confirmed by a GC/MS test, no false positives should occur. Douglas L. Stanley, Employee Drug Testing, 61 JOURNAL OF THE KANSAS BAR ASSOCIATION 19 (Jan. 1992) (citing Reliability of Urine Drug Testing, 258 JAMA 2587-2588 (1987)). 11 reasonably appears or should appear to him that others in the exercise of their lawful rights may be injured thereby. More recent cases have described duty as a function of several interrelated factors—the risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the actor's conduct—of which the foremost and dominant consideration is the foreseeability of the risk. If a risk is foreseeable, it gives rise to a duty of reasonable care. SmithKline, id. at 255 (quoting Buchanan v. Rose, 159 S.W.2d 109, 110 (Tex.1942); and citing Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex.1990); El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex.1987); Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 312 (Tex.1983); Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex.1983)). Pursuant to these interrelated factors of consideration, SmithKline holds that a drug tester owes a duty of reasonable care to the person whose bodily fluids are assayed for traces of illegal drugs (the drug testee): As stated in [the Texas Supreme Court's case,] Otis, changing social conditions lead constantly to the recognition of new duties. Otis, 668 S.W.2d at 310. If any individual has at least partially created the danger in issue, he is under an affirmative duty to act. El Chico, 732 S.W.2d at 306. We conclude that SmithKline is not merely an innocent bystander, but rather, it partially created a dangerous situation. As information services become more prevalent in our society, the information providers should be held accountable for the information they provide. Such information should be complete and not misleading. Credit-reporting agencies have long been held to the exercise of due care in securing and distributing information concerning the financial standing of individuals, firms, and corporations. See e.g., Bradstreet Co. v. Gill, 72 Tex. 115, 9 S.W. 753, 757 (1888).       It is foreseeable that employers would interpret a raw result showing a positive opiate test result as exclusively indicating illegal or illicit drug use and would not consider the possibility of ... anomalies. SmithKline, id. at 255-256. The evidence before the district court indicates that Willis's employer (Du Pont) may well have 12 interpreted the Roche-administered test results in such an exclusively indicative manner. One of the items of evidence the district court deemed determinative for purposes of granting Defendant-Appellee Roche's motion for summary judgment was a submitted attachment to a Du Pont employee handout, dated December 18, 1989, which assures potential testees-employees that Du Pont was confident that all positive results will be as accurate as science permits. (Record, Vol. 1., p. 274). Opinions of the Texas Courts of Appeal are indicia of state law, which should be followed by the federal courts sitting as Erie courts absent a strong showing that the state supreme court would rule differently. Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 920 F.2d 259, 260 (5th Cir.1990) (emphasis added; citations omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 171, 126 L.Ed.2d 131 (1993). And the fact that the Texas Supreme Court has granted a writ of error in SmithKline, and thus will review this case, does not represent such a strong showing that the state supreme court w[ill] rule differently [from the SmithKline Texas Court of Appeals]. Indeed, we deem the SmithKline court's basic reasoning as to the existence of the drug testing laboratory's duty to be quite soundly based on established Texas law, regardless of the fact that SmithKline represents the first reported Texas case to directly address the particular question of the duties of drug testing laboratories to testees. SmithKline is certainly a better representative of relevant Texas law than is the line of physician liability cases on which the district court relied. 13 We deem it relevant as well that several other courts addressing the particular issue of whether a negligence duty runs from the drug testing laboratory to testees have deployed the same analysis exhibited in SmithKline. In Elliott v. Laboratory Specialists, Inc., 588 So.2d 175 (La.App. [5th Cir.] 1991), writ denied, 592 So.2d 415 (La.1992), for example, the Louisiana Court of Appeals affirms an award of $25,000 in damages to a testee against the drug testing company administering the test, as the testing company was found to have failed to conform with appropriate and proper testing methodology. Like the Texas Court of Appeals in SmithKline, the Elliott court explains that to hold a testing laboratory does not owe the testee a duty to analyze his or her bodily fluid in a scientifically reasonable manner would work an abuse of fundamental fairness and justice. The Elliott court explains that such a laboratory should be held responsible for its conduct, as the risk of harm in our society to an individual because of a false-positive drug test is so significant that any individual wrongfully accused of drug usage by his or her employer is properly within the scope of protection under the law. Elliott, id.; see also Lewis v. Aluminum Co. of America, 588 So.2d 167 (La.App. [4th Cir.] 1991), writ denied, 592 So.2d 411 (La.1992); Nehrenz v. Dunn, 593 So.2d 915 (La.App. [4th Cir.] 1992). See generally Douglas L. Stanley, Employee Drug Testing, 61 JOURNAL OF THE KANSAS BAR ASSOCIATION 19 (Jan. 1992) (noting that [t]he most accurate [drug] tests ... require highly trained personnel; and within the scientific community, it is generally accepted that 14 if positive screening test results are confirmed by a GC/MS test [i.e., the type of test used by Roche in this case], no false positives should occur ; and reporting that, in light of these facts, a state court jury in Kansas has held Roche liable to a testee plaintiff for its improperly administered GC/MS testing of the plaintiff's urine—which faulty administration resulted in the generation and reporting of a false positive for plaintiff's illegal drug use) (emphasis added) (citing a relevant Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) article on the proposition about the generally reliable GC/MS drug testing technology: Reliability of Urine Drug Testing, 258 JAMA 2587-2588 (1987)). See generally also Canipe v. National Loss Control Service Corp., 736 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.1984) (reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant in a negligence action brought (under Tennessee law) by an injured machine operator against the corporation which had contracted with the machine operator's employer to provide safety inspections and related accident-prevention services at the plant where the machine operator worked, because, inter alia, of the existence of genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendant corporation performed its undertaking negligently, and as to whether such negligence proximately caused the machine operator's injury), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1191, 105 S.Ct. 965, 83 L.Ed.2d 969 (1985). In sum, we hold that under current Texas law, Roche owed Willis a duty of reasonable care in conducting tests on Willis's urine sample for illicit drug use by Willis, for use by Willis's 15 employer in decisionmaking relative to Willis's employment conditions. B. DID ROCHE FULFILL ITS DUTY TO EXERCISE REASONABLE CARE IN TESTING WITH RESPECT TO WILLIS? The district court held too that, even assuming Roche owed a duty of care to Willis, Roche fulfilled that duty and thus could not have been negligent. We conclude that the summary judgment evidence discloses otherwise. As the party moving for summary judgment, Roche has the initial burden of submitting evidentiary documents comprising a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment. Lavespere, supra, 910 F.2d at 178. Roche met this initial burden by producing summary judgment evidence in the form of an expert affidavit—from Dr. Paula Childs, a laboratory director at Roche—that responds to and negates the allegations set out in Willis's complaint, including Willis's allegations concerning Roche's use of the most advanced (GC/MS) testing technology available, and its administration of that technology (the use of a particular chemical in the application of the GC/MS technology). Hence, the burden was shifted to Willis to go beyond his pleadings, and set out specific facts—supported by evidence—to show summary judgment was not appropriate, because genuine fact issues exist. Lavespere, supra. To this end, Willis attached to his affidavit a Du Pont memorandum, which states: (1) Roche had discovered a potential problem with methodology used to confirm positive tests for methamphetamines; (2) that it appeared that this problem was isolated to Roche and to the confirmation of 16 methamphetamines; and (3) that it appeared the problem began in June 1990. This evidence and the inferences from it, viewed in the light most favorable to Willis, indicate that something unique to Roche's application of the GC/MS testing technology resulted in a Roche problem with confirming positive test results. Although the memorandum gives no indication of exactly when Roche discovered a problem existed, read in the light most favorable to Willis, it suggests that Roche knew or should have known of a problem with its methodology as early as June 1990—two months before Roche tested Willis's urine specimen. Summary judgment evidence further discloses that Roche lost its National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) certification because of the disproportionately high level of false positives generated by its particular administration of the GC/MS methamphetamine tests. Willis has therefore called into (genuine, material) question whether Roche used due, reasonable care in testing Willis's urine sample. See, e.g., Humphreys v. PIE Nationwide, Inc., 723 F.Supp. 780 (N.D.Ga.1989) (holding that material issues of fact, precluding summary judgment, existed as to whether the defendant employer had followed the proper chain of custody procedures in connection with the handling of the plaintiff's urine sample for drug testing purposes). Roche's summary judgment argument that it was using the most advanced testing technology available when it tested Willis's sample—and therefore could not, as a matter of law, be held to have used anything but reasonable care in its testing of Willis's urine sample—provides it with no summary judgment shield 17 against the obvious genuine issue of material fact in this case as to how it actually administered or deployed this technology relative to Willis's urine sample. Roche's argument is akin to the obviously untenable position that there could not be a genuine issue of material fact about whether a driver of an automobile in a car crash was negligent in her operation of the vehicle, simply because the vehicle is generally recognized in the automobile industry as the safest of all cars currently sold. See generally Canipe v. National Loss Control Service Corp., 736 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.1984) (reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant in a negligence action brought by an injured machine operator against the corporation which had contracted with the machine operator's employer to provide safety inspections and related accident-prevention services at the plant where the machine operator worked, because, inter alia, genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the defendant corporation performed its undertaking negligently and whether such negligence proximately caused the machine operator's injury), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1191, 105 S.Ct. 965, 83 L.Ed.2d 969 (1985). In sum: longstanding, bedrock summary judgment principles—from the days when summary judgment was a relatively disfavored judicial device, and continuing through the Supreme Court's 1986 trilogy of summary judgment cases liberalizing the utilization of the device2—are to the effect that fact questions 2 See Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 18 are considered with deference to the nonmovant, inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and, in general, genuine issues of material fact are to be left for reasonable resolution by the fact-finder. Under any principled summary judgment analysis, the record in this case demonstrates the existence of genuine issues of material fact as to Roche's negligence in conducting a urinalysis for drug use on Willis's urine sample which resulted in a false positive. The issue is not whether we (or the district court) think(s) Plaintiff will or will not prevail at trial. The issue is whether there exist genuine, material fact issues for resolution by the trier of fact. And whether Roche fulfilled its duty of reasonable care when it tested Willis's urine for methamphetamine use is a genuine, material, disputed fact issue on the record before us. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Summary Judgment Nonmovant Willis, as we must, we conclude that the record in this case contains evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Roche was negligent in the manner in which it administered the generally reliable GC/MS drug testing technology relative to Willis's urine sample, and that such negligent application of this test technology proximately caused injury to Willis. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact for fact-finder resolution as to (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). 19 whether Roche fulfilled its duty to Willis. C. REGARDING WILLIS'S NEGLIGENCE DAMAGES; OR, DID WILLIS FAIL TO PLEAD A VIABLE THEORY OF RECOVERY? Appellee Roche has also argued on appeal that affirmance of the district court's entry of summary judgment is necessary because Willis failed to even plead a viable cause of action under Texas law. Roche relies on the Texas Supreme Court's recent opinion in Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex.1993), for the proposition that Texas does not recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.3 While it is true that the Texas Supreme Court holds in Boyles that there is no general duty not to negligently inflict emotional distress[,] the Boyles court also carefully explains that its decision does not affect a claimant's right to recover mental anguish damages caused by defendant's breach of some other legal duty. Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 597. Simply put: Boyles does not overrule Texas law generally developing negligence duties, breaches, and damages—which law constitutes the type of case Willis pleaded and controls the question of whether there exist or do not exist genuine issues of material fact in this case. Indeed, the Boyles court even emphasizes that it does not disturb the negligent infliction of emotional damage caselaw concerning 3 In Boyles, the plaintiff, a college student, brought an action against her sexual partner for negligent infliction of emotional distress she suffered due to various people seeing a videotape of her and Boyles engaged in sexual intercourse, filmed by Boyles. Allegedly, ten of Boyles's friends were shown the tape, and gossip about it spread to Kerr's friends as well as other students at the university she attended. 20 duties derived from special business relationships. Boyles, id., 855 S.W.2d at 597. See Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 66 Tex. 580, 18 S.W. 351 (1885) (failure of telegraph company to timely deliver death message); Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex.1973) (telephone company employee's invasion of a service subscriber's privacy); Pat H. Foley & Co. v. Wyatt, 442 S.W.2d 904 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (funeral home's negligent handling of a corpse). Roche's attempts to make a legal mountain out of the Boyles molehill notwithstanding, all Boyles holds is that Texas law does not impose legal duties based solely on a personal relationship, even an intimate one. Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 600 (emphasis added). Roche's legal obligation to use due, reasonable care in testing Willis's urine sample for drug use arises out of the assumption for consideration by the testing laboratory of the task of drug-testing, and the fact that it is clearly foreseeable that if this testing task is misconducted (no matter how advanced the general test technology so administered might be) the testee will sustain cognizable injury. This narrow duty is fundamentally dissimilar from the amorphous duty not to negligently inflict emotional distress at issue in and rejected by the Texas Supreme Court in Boyles. D. DOES WILLIS HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ROCHE FOR DEFAMATION? Finally, Willis has sought damages from Roche for the latter's publication of the false positive test results to Willis's employer. Roche has responded that Willis signed a consent form, 21 granting permission to release the results of such tests to Du Pont. The form reads: I furthermore give (outside laboratory) my permission to release the results of such tests to the company. (Record Vol. 1., p. 252). However, in Texas, a purported consent and waiver that does not expressly release liability for negligence does not constitute an effective release from liability for negligence. Texas has adopted the express-negligence doctrine, which requires any purported indemnity agreement to expressly state that it applies to negligence in order to be deemed effective as a release for negligence liability. See, e.g., Doe v. SmithKline Beecham, 855 S.W.2d 248 (Tex.App.—Austin 1993).4 We thus hold that the form at issue in this case is insufficient to release Roche from liability for publication of negligently obtained false positive results. Still, the district court (citing Boze v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d 801, 806 (5th Cir.1990)) also decided that, even without a valid consent and in light of a defamatory report, Roche's defamatory publication was nonetheless qualifiedly privileged. The district court's analysis in this respect follows: Th[is] privilege advances the need for free communication of information to protect business and personal 4 The waiver at issue in SmithKline contained the following exculpatory language, which the SmithKline court holds inadequate to shield SmithKline from liability for its negligence—in light of the express-negligence doctrine: I consent to the release of the drug screen results to authorized Quaker representatives for appropriate review. I release and agree to hold harmless Quaker, its employees and its agents, from any liability to me based on the results of the drug screening. Doe v. SmithKline Beecham, 855 S.W.2d 248, 253 (Tex.App.—Austin 1993) (Carroll, C.J.) (writ of error granted Feb. 2, 1994). 22 interests. Gaines v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 681 F.2d 982, 986 (5th Cir.1982). In order for the moving party to prevail on a summary judgment asserting this privilege, however, an absence of malice must be shown. Houston v. Grocers Supply Co., Inc., 625 S.W.2d [798] at 801 [Tex.App.1981]. The only manifestation of malice established by plaintiff stems from the very fact that the test results were false. The law is clear,  [m]alice is not implied or presumed from the mere fact of the publication, nor may it be inferred alone from the character or vehemence of the language used, nor found from the falsity of the statement alone.'  Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d [743] at 754 [Tex.Civ.App.1976] (citations omitted). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate express malice or implied malice. Record Vol. 1., p. 424. We agree with this reasoning and conclusion by the district court; and hold therefore that the trial court was correct in granting Roche's motion for summary judgment on Willis's defamation claim.