Opinion ID: 586639
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Meyers

Text: 9 Meyers was a supplier to the operation. While law enforcement officials were executing arrest and search warrants at the Spears' residence they intercepted a telephone call from Meyers. A number of telephone conversations ensued between one of the drug enforcement agents and Meyers. These calls were recorded. Meyers negotiated with the agent for the purchase of six kilograms of cocaine. Meyers was subsequently arrested. Meyers pleaded guilty to using a communication facility to facilitate the distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). The district court found that Meyers' base offense level was 12, which together with his criminal history category of VI, resulted in a sentencing range of 30 to 37 months. The district court departed from the guidelines and imposed a sentence of 72 months' imprisonment to be followed by three years' supervised release. In support of its upward departure, the district court found that the applicable criminal history category did not adequately reflect the extent of Meyers' past criminal conduct and that the six kilograms of cocaine discussed in the telephone conversations was a substantial amount and aggravating circumstance. 10 Meyers raises a number of issues on appeal. First, Meyers contends that it was improper for the district court to consider the quantity of cocaine under negotiation as an aggravating factor in deciding whether to depart upward. Meyers points out that the Sentencing Commission expressly included the quantity of drugs as a relevant sentencing factor for many other drug related offenses and argues that the omission of drug quantity as a sentencing factor in § 843(b) offenses evidences the Commission's implicit, but purposeful, rejection of quantity as a factor in such cases. Meyers also contends that the quantity of drugs is not the type of unusual circumstance that would justify a departure since it is always a factor underlying a § 843(b) offense. 11 This court has rejected the argument that a court may not consider the quantity of drugs involved in a § 843(b) offense in United States v. Feekes, 929 F.2d 334 (7th Cir.1991). Accord United States v. Crawford, 883 F.2d 963 (11th Cir.1989) (argument rejected in context of 21 U.S.C. § 846 possession offense); United States v. Correa-Vargas, 860 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.1988) (argument rejected in context of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) telephone offense). The court in Feekes concluded that a district court may depart upward where a large quantity of drugs is involved. See Feekes, 929 F.2d at 337. The court cited cases in which 622 grams or more of cocaine were involved as examples of cases in which an upward departure would be appropriate. See id. An upward departure was warranted in this case given that Meyers was negotiating to supply six kilograms of cocaine. See id. 12 Furthermore, the extent of the departure was reasonable. Although it was not a quantity-based offense at the time of Meyers' offense, 2 the district court made reference to the drug quantity tables and noted that they would result in a sentencing range of 210 to 262 months' imprisonment. It was appropriate for the district court to look to the table as a point of reference. See id. at 337-38. The district court sentenced Meyers to 72 months' imprisonment. This is well below the 210 to 260 month range Meyers would face under the amended version of § 2D1.6. It was proper for the district court to depart upward from the base offense level and the amount of the departure was reasonable because the district court tied the departure to the drug quantity table. See Feekes, 929 F.2d at 337-38; United States v. Asseff, 917 F.2d 502, 506 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir.1990). 13 Second, Meyers contends that the district court erred when it compared the sentencing range for the offense of conspiracy with the sentencing range for using a communication facility to facilitate the distribution of cocaine. As part of the presentence report, the probation department assesses the impact of the plea agreement on the guidelines sentence by comparing the guidelines applicable under the plea agreement to the guidelines that would apply if the defendant were to plead to all counts. This assessment is based on the assumption that the allegation of the counts to be dismissed could be proved and that additional relevant facts in the investigative files are correct. This is standard procedure, and such comparison information is regularly before a sentencing court. 14 We perceive no error in a district court reviewing this comparative information. A district court may consider any relevant information in sentencing including conduct for which a defendant has not been convicted. 18 U.S.C. § 3661 provides that [n]o limitation shall be placed on the information ... which a court ... may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence. Sentencing under the guidelines has not changed this. See United States v. Agyemang, 876 F.2d 1264, 1271 (7th Cir.1989). We also point out that while the district court did note the significant difference between the respective ranges, it provided other, sufficient reasons that supported its decision to depart. Thus, it is not clear that this comparison affected the district court's decision to depart upward. The district court did not err by comparing the sentencing range Meyers would have faced had he been convicted of the conspiracy count with the range for the § 843(b) offense. 15 Third, Meyers contends that the district court erred when it relied on the information contained in police reports to find that he had engaged in prior similar adult criminal conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction which provides a basis for departing from the guideline range. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(e). These reports indicate that on January 25, 1985, police in Polk County, Florida, executed a search warrant for a residence allegedly belonging to a William N. Myers. They found firearms, exploding ammunition, drug paraphernalia and suspected cocaine and marijuana residues. Meyers argues that the reports are unreliable in that they do not contain sufficient information from which criminal conduct can be imputed to him. Meyers disputes that the residence was his. 16 The information in the police reports contained sufficient indicia of reliability for the district court to rely on them. The reports indicate that the residence belonged to Meyers. 3 Although the criminal charges that were filed based on the search were eventually dismissed, Meyers' parole was revoked and he was returned to prison. The Parole Commission found that a preponderance of the evidence showed that Meyers possessed the items seized and was a trafficker in drugs and/or narcotics. We cannot conclude that the district court's finding that defendant was involved in criminal activity in January of 1985 was clearly erroneous. 17 Even if it were improper for the district court to rely on this information, there was sufficient other information to support the upward departure. As the district court noted, Meyers also had a foreign conviction that was not factored into his criminal history category. Section 4A1.3(a) provides that a prior sentence not used in computing the criminal history category such as a foreign offense may justify an upward departure. Meyers also received various concurrent sentences for his offenses which were factored into his criminal history score as single offenses. This may also properly be considered in determining whether the criminal history category adequately reflects the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 commentary, app. note 3. This additional information provided a sufficient basis for the district court's decision to depart upward. 18 Finally, Meyers contends that the district court erred when it used his prior conviction of conspiracy to import methaqualone in (1) applying the imprisonment enhancement provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b); (2) establishing his criminal history category; and (3) departing upward from the guidelines range. Meyers contends that in such a situation, a defendant's prior conviction is double counted in violation of due process. 19 We disagree. The guidelines direct a court to consider a defendant's prior sentences in placing the defendant in a criminal history category. Where the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the extensiveness of the defendant's criminal record, a court has discretion to depart upward. See Guideline § 4A1.3. In making this determination, a district court may only consider information of the type specified in § 4A1.3(a)-(e). Although this list is not exhaustive, it is apparent from the nature of the information listed that the district court is not to reconsider a prior sentence already factored into the criminal history category. Because the court may only depart where the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct, § 4A1.3 ensures that a conviction is not being double counted. 20 The district court in this case specifically considered the type of information listed in § 4A1.3. The district court made a determination that the other criminal conduct, other than the methaqualone conviction, was not sufficiently accounted for in the first place. There is no double counting in this. Consequently, we reject defendant's argument. 21 Nor does § 843(b), when applied in this situation, subject a defendant to double counting. Section 843(b) provides that the court may sentence a defendant up to a maximum of eight years' imprisonment where the defendant has a prior conviction. This section does not further increase the defendant's sentence, but merely raises the maximum sentence that a court may give. This does not result in double counting.