Opinion ID: 864681
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: J.N.O.V. and new trial.

Text: ¶6. Following the verdict, Dupree moved for JNOV or in the alternative a new trial. Because the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court based on its decision to deny a new trial, this opinion focuses on the motion for a new trial as opposed to the denial of JNOV. ¶7. Motions for a new trial are made pursuant to Rule 59. Trial courts have authority to grant a new trial, where, in the exercise of their sound discretion, they regard such a verdict as being contrary to the substantial weight of the evidence. C & C Trucking Co. v. Smith, 612 So. 2d 1092, 1099 (Miss. 1992). A denial of a request for new trial will be reversed only when such denial amounts to a abuse of that judge's discretion. Maxwell v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 513 So. 2d 901, 908 (Miss. 1987). This Court “should give substantial weight, deference and respect to the decision of the trial judge in matters such as this.” C & C Trucking Co., 612 So.2d at 1099. ¶8. In finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial, the Court of Appeals stated: ¶20 It is apparent that the trial judge abused his discretion when he failed to grant a new trial. The testimony is uncontradicted. Sanders was a resident at the Windsor place. She was unable to care for or protect herself. ¶21 Duff was also a resident at the Windsor Place. He was known to wander into other resident's rooms. He was known to be abusive, both with physical 5 violence and crude sexual displays and comments. Uncontradicted testimony from current and former employees of the Windsor Place substantiate this. ¶22 Duff sexually assaulted Sanders in her room at the Windsor Place. The nursing home was to provide a safe residence for Sanders. The overwhelming weight of the evidence shows they were aware of the potential danger Duff posed and did not take action to prevent it. Davis admitted that if Windsor Place had taken some action in regard to the notice, the sexual assault on Sanders would not have occurred. It is for this reason we reverse and remand for a new trial on Sanders' claim. Dupree, 881 So. 2d at 836. ¶9. The majority opinion by the Court of Appeals is flawed in its analysis and overlooks substantial evidence supporting the verdict. Specifically, it failed to consider the Department of Human Services’ investigation into the incident. Further, it failed to note that Duff was a dementia patient. There was no mention of Windsor Place’s limited authority in transferring problematic patients. Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals majority, much of the evidence was contradicted. Though reasonable people may disagree as to whether Windsor Place was negligent, in this instance a jury by a vote of ten to two found that it was not. As will be discussed, there was substantial evidence supporting the verdict. ¶10. We agree with Judge Griffis’s separate opinion that there is nothing in the record that would indicate the jury did anything other than fulfill its sworn duty to resolve the disputes of fact. This duty includes determining whether Sanders carried her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that Windsor Place was negligent or that damages were proximately caused by any negligent act. Id. at 837-38. Like Judge Griffis, this Court considers facts and discusses how the verdict was supported by the testimony. See id. at 83840. 6 ¶11. On December 2, 1999, an employee of Windsor Place found Duff in Sanders’s room. Duff had his pants down and his penis out, and he was in the bed on top of Sanders moving his hips in an up and down motion. Ensuing medical examinations did not reveal that any penetration had occurred. There was no evidence that any sexual touching or rape occurred nor was there evidence of blood or discharge. ¶12. Sherry Davis, administrator of Windsor Place, testified that all residents of Windsor Place were protected to the best of the nursing home’s ability and that it was not negligent in this instance. She testified that the incident was reported to the Attorney General’s office pursuant to the Mississippi Vulnerable Adults Act. After an investigation, the Department of Health found that Windsor Place was not negligent in its treatment and protection of Sanders. The Court of Appeals majority opinion fails to discuss the fact that the investigation by the DHS supported the verdict. ¶13. Davis further testified regarding the duties owed to Duff and that it was not uncommon for Alzheimer’s patients, like Duff, to talk and act in a sexually suggestive manner. She testified regarding the decision to allow Duff to remain at Windsor Place despite his behavior and that only a resident’s family or treating physician could transfer a resident to another facility. See 42 C.F.R. § 483.40 (2004) (only a physician may admit an individual to another facility). She testified that Windsor Place sought to have Duff relocated and informed Duff’s family regarding his behavior. However, Duff’s family was waiting for a spot to open at the Veteran’s hospital and thus took no action. Thus, at this point Windsor Place’s options for transferring Duff elsewhere were limited. 7 ¶14. Dee DaCosta, a registered nurse, was on duty on the night of the incident. DaCosta initially reported the incident to the Attorney General’s office. She testified that on the night of the incident, the nursing home was properly staffed and that no member of the nursing home staff did anything improper in the treatment of Sanders. She stated measures were taken to protect the residents from Duff. Further, she testified that only a doctor had the power to restrain or transfer Duff and that the doctors did not do so. ¶15. Crystal Harris, a certified nurse's aide at Windsor Place, testified that Windsor Place did not ignore Duff in his care and supervision. Another CNA, Kimberly Thompson, testified that she provided more of her attention to Duff when he was combative and paid close attention to Sanders. ¶16. Thompson and Sheila Glover, in-service coordinator for Windsor Place, testified that the nursing home did not deviate from the standard of care owed to Sanders. Glover testified that Windsor Place made several unsuccessful attempts to have Duff transferred. Like Davis, Glover testified regarding Windsor Place’s limited authority to transfer Duff. Further, she testified regarding conversations between nursing staff and treating physicians regarding Duff’s behavior. ¶17. Sandra Stewart, a geriatric nurse for over twenty-two years, testified that Windsor Place provided appropriate care for both Sanders and Duff. She also recalled communicating with Duff's treating physicians regarding his behavior throughout his residency. She did not believe that anyone at Windsor Place was negligent in the care of Sanders, even in light of this incident. 8 ¶18. Kathleen Meyer testified as an expert witness for Sanders. On cross-examination, she admitted that ordering the transfer of a resident is within the exclusive purview of the treating physician, not Windsor Place. Meyers offered no testimony of proposed treatment that she believed would have prevented the incident. She agreed that wandering in and out of other residents' rooms was a common characteristic of Alzheimer's and dementia patients, such as Duff. Meyer stated that nursing homes were only allowed to restrain residents after those residents had met requirements outlined in state and federal regulations, which were not present here. See 42 C.F.R. § 483.13(a) (2004) (resident has a right to be free from any physical or chemical restraints). She testified that the Windsor Place employees properly documented and reported Duff's behavior to the doctors. ¶19. Dr. David Marion testified that he only observed Sanders on one occasion and that he did not review all of her medical records. On cross-examination, Dr. Marion also stated: “I don’t think anyone can say to a certainty how she was affected or unaffected by that particular event.” ¶20. Thompson and Debbie Porter testified that when they went into Sanders’s room after the incident, Sanders appeared to be calm and not agitated, as if nothing unusual had occurred. ¶21. No other evidence as to damages allegedly suffered by Sanders was presented. Dupree presented no evidence to establish that Sanders incurred a physical injury or that she even knew that the incident even occurred. There was no evidence of any physical injury, such as bleeding, discharge, bruising, cuts, scratches or scraping to the skin of Sanders. There was no evidence of any sexual touching or penetration. Indeed, nothing was presented to establish that she was harmed or injured either mentally or physically by Duff’s aberrant conduct. 9 ¶22. Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and the jury verdict was supported by the evidence. As to the elements of duty and breach, the testimony of Davis, DaCosta, Harris, Thompson and Stewart all supported the jury’s verdict. Each testified regarding the standard of care and the fact that Windsor Place had a duty to ensure a safe environment for its residents. However, much of their testimony supported a finding that Windsor Place did not breach its duty. Several testified regarding Windsor Place’s lack of authority to transfer or discharge Duff. ¶23. Duty and breach aside, there was no testimony supporting injury to Sanders. As already stated, there was no physical evidence. Thompson and Porter testified that Sanders was not conscious of the incident. Only Dr. Marion testified further about the alleged injuries. However, he admitted that based on Sanders’s limited capacity, he could not testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as to the effect of the incident on Sanders. ¶24. Though there was evidence and testimony in favor of Dupree/Sanders, there was sufficient contradictory evidence and testimony to support the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. A new trial may be granted where the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, or when the jury has been confused by faulty instructions, or when the jury has departed from its oath and its verdict is a result of bias, passion, and prejudice. Griffin v. Fletcher, 362 So. 2d 594, 596 (Miss. 1978). As there is no evidence in this record to support that any of the aforementioned occurred, the decision from the Court of Appeals must be reversed on this issue, as there was conflicting evidence presented by both sides and the great deference that this Court affords juries.