Opinion ID: 3010151
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Proof of Voluntariness

Text: The district court instructed the jury that the defendant's burden of proof in establishing the voluntariness of the releasedismissal agreement was one of preponderance of the evidence. The Livingstones challenge that instruction, arguing that the standard should have been one of clear and convincing evidence. We agree. In Rumery, the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the appropriate standard of proof; the language used by the Court in finding the release-dismissal agreement at issue in that case enforceable was consistent with either a preponderance standard or a standard of clear and convincing evidence. Although we did not explicitly address the question of the appropriate standard of proof in Livingstone I, we did observe that oral release-dismissal agreements should be subjected to particularly exacting judicial scrutiny: Ordinarily, the existence and terms of [a release-dismissal] agreement can be resolved by reference to a written document. While we do not hold that as a matter of law an oral agreement to waive the right to sue in exchange for the dismissal of criminal charges can never be valid, the absence of a written release-dismissal agreement requires even more scrupulous review by the courts than otherwise. No published opinion of any of the courts of appeals after Rumery has even considered, much less sustained, an oral release-dismissal agreement. Indeed, the Rumery Court never mentioned the possibility of an oral release-dismissal agreement. Justice Stevens, at least, assumed that such agreements were written. See Rumery, 480 U.S. at 417 n.22, 107 S.Ct. at 1205 n.22 (A court may enforce such an agreement only after a careful inquiry into the circumstances under which the plaintiff signed the agreementand into the legitimacy of the prosecutor's objective in entering into [it]. (emphasis added)) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 12 F.3d at 1212. We then noted a number of advantages of written agreements. These included the fact that they allow the parties more opportunity for deliberate reflection, id., and that a written document facilitates negotiation as to the agreement's terms, see id. at 1213. We also observed that a written releasedismissal agreement may provide a subsequent court with evidence as to the parties' respective bargaining power. Id. For example, if the attorney for the party forgoing civil claims prepared the agreement, this may support the conclusion that the agreement was voluntary; if the prosecutor did so, and if he presented it in a manner that discouraged negotiation, this may support the conclusion that it was not. See id. In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), the Supreme Court set forth its methodology in assigning standards of proof: The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to 'instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.' In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1070, 25 L.Ed.2d. 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision. Id. at 423. The Court then placed the three standards of proof within this broad framework. The least demanding standard, that of a preponderance of the evidence, is appropriate to a typical civil case involving a monetary dispute between private parties. Id. Society's concern with the outcome of such a case is minimal; thus, it is appropriate to adopt a standard that allocates the risk of error between the litigants in roughly equal fashion. Id. The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, by contrast, is reserved for criminal cases, in which society wishes to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment. Id. Intermediate between these two standards is the one applicable in cases in which the interests at stake . . . are deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money. Id. at 424. The standard has been known by a variety of names, but usually employs some combination of the words 'clear,' 'cogent,' 'unequivocal,' and 'convincing.' Id. at 424. Examples of proceedings in which the Court has found a heightened standard of proof to be appropriate are proceedings to terminate parental rights, see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); involuntary commitment proceedings, see Addington, 441 U.S. at 432; and deportation proceedings, seeWoodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1966). The Court has stated that, in civil actions between private litigants, a standard of proof greater than one of a preponderance of the evidence will only apply in cases in which 'particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake.' Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389-90 (1983)). Thus, a preponderance standard suffices even in cases in which severe civil sanctions may ultimately be imposed, if those sanctions do not implicate particularly important interests or rights. See Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 389. We find that the enforcement of the oral release-dismissal agreement at issue in this case would indeed implicate important individual interests or rights. Although the Livingstones' section 1983 claims are in form claims for money damages, underlying them is the Livingstones' interest in redressing a possible violation of their constitutional rights. Moreover, section 1983 actions, when successful, do more than compensate injured plaintiffs: they serve the important public purpose of exposing and deterring official misconduct, and thereby protecting the rights of the public at large. In Rumery, all nine Justices recognized the importance of ensuring that release-dismissal agreements do not encroach upon this purpose. See Rumery, 400 U.S. at 395; id. at 400 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 419 (Stevens, J., dissenting). A clear-and-convincing standard appropriately allocates more of the risk of error associated with oral release-dismissal agreements to those who seek to enforce them. As we noted in Livingstone I, oral release-dismissal agreements raise particularly significant questions of voluntariness, as the lack of a written document may inhibit negotiation as to an agreement's terms and render it difficult for prospective parties to reflect on those terms. We also observed in Livingstone I that an oral agreement ordinarily contains less evidence as to the course of the parties' negotiations than does a written agreement. As a result, there is a greater risk of error in a jury's evaluation of whether an oral release-dismissal agreement was concluded voluntarily. We think that those seeking to enforce a release-dismissal agreement should bear this greater risk. Indeed, a clear and convincing standard will encourage prosecutors Ä who are likely to have comparatively frequent contact with release-dismissal agreements, and who have an interest in ensuring that those agreements are later found to be enforceable Ä to ensure that release-dismissal agreements are, whenever possible, written down. The standard will therefore have the salutary effect of reducing the overall risk of misunderstandings in the conclusion of releasedismissal agreements, and increasing the accuracy of juries' decisions as to whether a release-dismissal agreement was concluded voluntarily. Since, when this case was first remanded, the parties challenging the enforceability of the Livingstones' oral releasedismissal agreement were only required to establish the voluntariness of the agreement under a preponderance-of-theevidence standard, the jury's finding of voluntariness will be vacated. If, on this remand, it again becomes necessary to address the issue of voluntariness, the more demanding clear-and-convincing standard will be utilized. B. Instruction on Existence of a Legitimate Criminal Justice Objective. The Livingstones sought to have the district court instruct the jury that one of the factors for it to consider in determining whether they voluntarily entered into the release-dismissal agreement was whether there is a l[e]gitimate criminal justice objective to support [the agreement's] validity. Livingstones' Proposed Jury Instruction 10, App. at 394. The district court declined to so instruct; the Livingstones contend that this was error. Evidently the rationale for the proposed instruction was that the Livingstones sought to argue to the jury that elements of the public-interest analysis should enter into the jury's evaluation of whether the agreement was voluntary. We see no reason why the public-interest issue is pertinent to the jury's consideration of the voluntariness issue, and we therefore think the district court was correct in concluding that such an instruction would have been inappropriate. C. Admission of Ceraso's Testimony. The district court found that, by challenging the releasedismissal agreement, the Livingstones had waived any claim of attorney-client privilege as to the testimony of Ceraso, Mrs. Livingstone's lawyer at her criminal proceeding. Accordingly, the district court permitted Ceraso to be deposed, and then allowed him to be called as a witness at the voluntariness proceeding. App. at 101. On appeal, the Livingstones argue that this decision was erroneous. We disagree. The attorney-client privilege is waived for any relevant communication if the client asserts as a material issue in a proceeding that: (a) the client acted upon the advice of a lawyer or that the advice was otherwise relevant to the legal significance of the client's conduct. Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers 130(1) (Final Draft No. 1, 1996); see also Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994) ([A] party can waive the attorney client privilege by asserting claims that put his or her attorney's advice in issue in the litigation.). The Livingstones' complaint states that Washington Township may seek to assert as a possible defense a purported agreement not to sue and/or release, but that the Township will not be able to sustain its burden that the same was entered into in a knowing and voluntary fashion. App. at 21. The complaint goes on to state that the agreement was not knowing because [p]laintiffs, at the time, were unaware that the same could be interpreted as foregoing a damage claim. They specifically were unaware of the precise extent of any claimed waiver. App. at 22. The Livingstones made similar claims before the district court and on appeal. Mrs. Livingstone was represented by counsel at her criminal trial; her attorney played a central role in the negotiation of the release-dismissal agreement. Under Rumery, the advice of counsel is an explicit, and important, element of the voluntariness analysis. See Rumery, 480 U.S. at 394; id. at 401 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing, as one of the factors bearing on the enforceability of a release-dismissal agreement, importantly, whether the defendant was counseled). Mrs. Livingstone's assertion that she did not appreciate the release-dismissal agreement's legal implications is tantamount to a claim that her attorney did not give her accurate legal advice. It would be unfair to allow her to make this claim without permitting the opposing parties to investigate her attorney's version of the relevant events. See United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 813 (1991) (holding that a party who asserts a claim that in fairness requires examination of protected communications thereby waives the attorney-client privilege as to those communications). In the terms of the draft Restatement, Mrs. Livingstone has effectively asserted that the advice provided to her by her attorney is relevant to the legal significance of [her] conduct. Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's ruling that the attorney-client privilege had been waived. D. Exclusion of Expert Testimony. The Livingstones challenge the district court's decision, at the voluntariness proceeding, to exclude the testimony of their expert, John Peters, who had prepared a report addressing the underlying liability of the police officers and of Washington Township. Mrs. Livingstone's attorney, Ceraso, had testified that he had advised Mrs. Livingstone to conclude a release-dismissal agreement because any damages that she would recover in a subsequent civil suit would have been largely, or completely, offset by the damages that the police officers would recover, assuming that they filed counterclaims. App. at 767. The plaintiffs sought to introduce Peters' testimony in order to demonstrate that Ceraso's advice had been inaccurate. The district court found that Peters' testimony was inadmissible under Rule 702, because it would not assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence, and under Rule 403, because of prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, and waste of time. App. at 777. We will address only the district court's application of Rule 403, which we find was entirely appropriate. Peters' report was quite likely to be prejudicial; it asserted, in considerable detail, that Washington Township and the police-officer defendants had violated Mrs. Livingstone's civil rights. A jury presented with a substantial amount of information on the merits of an underlying civil rights action might well look to those merits in making its decision on the distinct Ä and distinctly different Ä issue of voluntariness, thus creating a significant risk of prejudice. Rule 403 requires that a court balance the prejudicial effect of proposed evidence against its probative value. If evidence that a party to a release-dismissal agreement had received improper legal advice is of sufficient probative value, this analysis may well weigh in favor of admissibility. The probative value of Peters' testimony was not, however, high, as it did not engage Ceraso's testimony directly. Ceraso's advice to Mrs. Livingstone had addressed the net award of damages that she could expect from her potential civil suit against the police and their potential civil suit against her. Peters' report only barely touched on the merits of a possible civil suit by the police against Mrs. Livingstone, and did not discuss the likely award of damages in either suit. Thus, his testimony would not have greatly helped the jury to understand the correctness of Ceraso's advice. E. Exclusion of Trial Transcript. At the trial of the voluntariness issue, counsel for the Livingstones sought to introduce into evidence an exchange between Heneks and Judge Cicchetti that occurred the day before the release-dismissal agreement purportedly was concluded. The district court found that this exchange was not relevant, and excluded it. The Livingstones appeal this ruling, asserting that Judge Cicchetti's comments in the exchange that they sought to introduce resembled his later remarks at the release-dismissal colloquy, and that the Livingstones might have been misled into believing that he was simply repeating his earlier comments. We agree with the district court's finding that this exchange is not relevant. Judge Cicchetti's comments in the portion of the exchange presented to the district court, App. at 790, bore little resemblance to his later comments at the release-dismissal proceeding, Appellees' App. at 32. VI. Application of Pennsylvania Law to the Livingstones' State-Law Claims. As we noted in our discussion of the procedural history of this case, the district court dismissed a number of the Livingstones' state-law claims on grounds, such as the statute of limitations, unrelated to the release-dismissal agreement. The dismissal of those claims is not before us on appeal. The remaining state-law claims included claims of assault and battery against defendants Monack and Snyder; a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against defendants Monack, Snyder, and Moody; and a claim of conversion against all defendants. Neither the parties nor the district court have discussed what standard applies to determine the enforceability of the releasedismissal agreement as to the state-law claims. Instead, they have apparently assumed that the standard applicable to these claims is no different from that applicable to section 1983 claims. This is not necessarily true; the question whether the Livingstones have waived their claims under state law is itself one of state law, see Livingstone I, 12 F.3d at 1210 n.6, and state law cannot be assumed to parallel federal law on this question. In Livingstone I, we observed that the courts of Pennsylvania frequently follow the principles set forth in the Restatement [of Contracts], id., and suggested that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court might be likely to do as the United States Supreme Court did in Rumery, and look to the public-interest analysis in the Restatement of Contracts to determine when it is appropriate to enforce a release-dismissal agreement. See id. However, we did not then have occasion to decide precisely what standard Pennsylvania would apply to the enforcement of a release-dismissal agreement. That question is now before us. Indeed, that question subsumes two distinct questions: (1) What standard would Pennsylvania courts be likely to apply to determine whether the enforcement of a release-dismissal agreement is in the public interest? (2) What standard would Pennsylvania courts be likely to apply to determine the voluntariness of a release-dismissal agreement? A. Public Interest We have discovered no reported Pennsylvania cases addressing the question of when, if ever, it is in the public interest to enforce a release-dismissal agreement. Our analysis of the caselaw and policies of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has persuaded us, however, that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would apply a public-interest standard resembling that applied under federal law. The courts of Pennsylvania have long declined to enforce contracts that are contrary to public policy. See, e.g., Kuhn v. Buhl, 96 A. 977 (Pa. 1916) (finding unenforceable as against public policy an agreement between bidders for public lands under which one of them would, in exchange for a fee, withdraw its bid). After Kuhn, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania accepted the standard set forth in section 320(1) of Tentative Draft No. 12 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (March 1, 1977) as its standard for the nonenforcement of contracts as against public policy. SeeCentral Dauphin School District v. American Casualty Co., 426 A.2d 94, 96 (Pa. 1981). Section 320(1) of the Tentative Draft was to emerge (with one minor stylistic alteration not relevant here) as Section 178(1) of the Restatement (Second) as finally adopted. It provides that [a] promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of such terms. Restatement (Second) of Contracts 178(1) (1981). We may reasonably conclude Ä as the Pennsylvania Superior Court has already concluded, see Donegal Mutual Insurance Co. v. Long, 564 A.2d 937, 942 (Pa. Super. 1989) Ä that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, having accepted tentative section 320(1) in Central Dauphin, would now accept permanent section 178(1). In Rumery, the Supreme Court drew upon section 178(1) to fashion its federal common-law rule that a release-dismissal agreement will be unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy harmed by enforcement of the agreement. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 392 & n.2. We think that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not only draw on section 178(1) in considering the enforceability of a releasedismissal agreement but, in construing that section's open language, would look to Rumery and its progeny in the courts of appeals as persuasive authority. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court would, of course, also consider the policies of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, as expressed in the Commonwealth's statutes and common law. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has treated Pennsylvania's common law as an important instrument for curbing official misconduct, paralleling at the level of state law the United States Supreme Court's view of the policies underlying section 1983. See, e.g. Supervisors of Lewis Township v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., 523 A.2d 719, 722 (Pa. 1987) (finding that permitting insurance coverage of willful or fraudulent conduct on the part of a public official is contrary to Pennsylvania law and public policy, as personal financial liability is intended to deter official misconduct). We therefore conclude that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would subject agreements that purport to waive tort liability to at least as careful scrutiny as the United States Supreme Court has applied to agreements purporting to waive liability under section 1983. The Livingstones argue that the law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania strictly limits the private resolution of criminal charges. In support of this claim, they cite Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 314, a rule permitting a form of courtsupervised settlement in certain types of criminal cases. That rule provides: When a defendant is charged with an offense which is not alleged to have been committed by force or violence or threat thereof, the court may order the case to be dismissed upon motion and a showing that: (a) the public interest will not be adversely affected; (b) the attorney for the Commonwealth consents to the dismissal; (c) satisfaction has been made to the aggrieved person or there is an agreement that satisfaction will be made to the aggrieved person; (d) there is an agreement as to who shall pay the costs. Pa. R. Crim. P. 314. The Livingstones assert that the fact that this rule does not permit settlements in the case of offenses alleged to have been committed by force or violence or threat thereof implies that such settlements are disfavored, or perhaps prohibited, under Pennsylvania law. We are not persuaded that Rule 314 demonstrates that Pennsylvania would not permit release-dismissal agreements in other situations. A prosecutor who has sound public-interest reasons for declining to go forward with a prosecution, or for terminating a prosecution after it has begun, must have the authority to do so. As a corollary of this authority, a prosecutor presumably also has the authority to condition a dismissal on some undertaking by the defendant. We find, however, that Rule 314 demonstrates that the courts of Pennsylvania would be likely to subject release-dismissal agreements to close scrutiny. Further, the fact that Rule 314(a) requires that a judge determine that the public interest will not be adversely affected by a dismissal demonstrates the Commonwealth's commitment to reviewing release-dismissal agreements for their impact on the public interest. The Pennsylvania courts have also read Rule 314's limitations on the circumstances in which criminal prosecutions may be dismissed to indicate that the law does not favor out-of-court compromise over prosecution. Commonwealth v. Pettinato, 520 A.2d 437, 439 (Pa. Super. 1987) (concluding that an offer from a criminal defendant to pay a complainant a fee in exchange for her agreement not to testify was admissible into evidence in the defendant's criminal trial; because Rule 314 strictly limits consensual dismissals in criminal cases, the civil rule of evidence barring the admission of offers of settlement into evidence did not apply). In summary, then, we find that Pennsylvania would be likely to permit release-dismissal agreements to be enforced in some cases, but would monitor them closely to ensure that their enforcement is in the public interest. The federal rule, which places the burden of proving that a release-dismissal agreement is in the public interest on those seeking to enforce the agreement, has the same goals. Pennsylvania would therefore be likely to apply a very similar rule.