Opinion ID: 3014402
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: WPCL claim

Text: The WPCL holds “employers” liable for an employee’s unpaid wages, but defines an “employer” as “every person, firm, partnership, association, corporation, receiver or other officer of a court of this Commonwealth, any agent or officer of any of the abovementioned classes employing any person in this Commonwealth.” 43 P.S. §§ 260.1, 260.2a (1999) (emphasis added). We have held that this language imposes personal liability on high-ranking corporate officers for employees’ unpaid wages. Carpenters Health and Welfare v. Ambrose Inc., 727 F.2d 279, 283 (3d Cir. 1983). Although there may remain some question as to the exact levels of management that can be reached individually under Ambrose, “there is no question that the legislature intended to include 7 at least the highest ranking corporate officers” in the group that is liable. Id. Gaucher and Young, as the president/CEO and the chief operating officer of ASG, clearly appear to be two of ASG’s highest ranking corporate officers and so meet Ambrose’s standard for personal liability as “employers” under WPCL. At the very least, the level of their corporate responsibility and management raises an issue of fact. However, Gaucher and Young were still entitled to summary judgment for back pay under the W PCL because Walsh has no “wages” to recover. The law only extends to wages earned by employees but not paid by employers. Here, it is undisputed that Walsh never drew any salary. Walsh argues that he did earn “guaranteed pay,” however, and that is defined as a “fringe benefit” included within the broader definition of “wages” under the WPCL. Although the WPCL definition of “wages” and “fringe benefits” does include guaranteed pay, see 43 P.S. § 260.2a (1999), the WPCL only allows recovery for wages that “have actually vested by expenditure of time and effort.” Hirsch v. B&B, 90-CV1076, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5993, at  (E.D. Pa. May 1, 1991). Walsh accepted a salary of $100,000, but that was to be an annual salary and was not payable to him merely because he showed up for the job. Moreover, unlike the employee who was awarded guaranteed wages in Hirsch, Walsh never actually became an “employee.” Indeed, that is precisely why he is suing. Thus, it can not now seriously be argued that he earned a full year’s salary by expending time and effort for ASG for one full year. Accordingly, we 8 will affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment against Walsh on his claim for wages under the WPCL.6 This does not, however, suggest that Walsh can not recover a full year’s salary – as well as other appropriate damages – against Gaucher and Young individually on his fraud claims. Gaucher and Young can prevail on Walsh’s WPCL claims only because of the statutory definition of “wages” set forth in that act. Walsh’s claim for actual damages under his fraud theory is not limited by that definition. The evidence establishes that Walsh resigned his job in California and relocated to Philadelphia pursuant to a contract of employment for $100,000 per year. This evidence supports an award of damages in the amount of that one year’s salary, minus any mitigation even though the contract was to extend for a full five years, together with Walsh’s moving expenses.