Opinion ID: 2169441
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adjudicatory Power

Text: We are also satisfied that courts have ample authority under their adjudicatory powers to review prosecutorial decisions where there is a showing of patent and gross abuse. Even if a diversion decision did not entail the exercise of a quasi-judicial power, review in this instance would be consistent with the traditional role which courts have exercised in safeguarding individuals from abusive governmental action. The judiciary is commonly called upon to review the rationality of decisions by other branches of government or agencies with special expertise. For instance, in State v. Wingler, 25 N.J. 161 (1975), this Court upheld its power to review action by the Commissioner of Institutions and Agencies, even though it noted that the authority vested in him was highly discretionary and that courts will not ordinarily interfere with its exercise, 25 N.J. at 180-81. In re Senior Appeals Examiners, 60 N.J. 356 (1972) furnishes another example where the Court asserted its power to review decisions which, in the first instance, were not judicial in nature. We concluded that the authority delegated to the Civil Service Commission carried with it the administrative responsibility of acting reasonably both procedurally and substantively and that judicial review was appropriate to determine if the Commission had abused its discretion. 60 N.J. at 370. In discussing our power to review decisions of the Parole Board, we held in Monks v. N.J. State Parole Board, 58 N.J. 238 (1971) that the Board has broad but not unlimited discretionary powers    and under our special constitutional structure ( N.J. Const., Art. VI, sec. 5, para. 4 (1947)) the Board's actions are always judicially reviewable for arbitrariness. [7] 58 N.J. at 242. We implicitly recognized this aspect of the Judiciary's review power in Leonardis when we voiced our desire to limit a decisional process which might yield ad hoc or arbitrary determinations. 71 N.J. at 121. Certainly, the prosecutor is not immune from the ban against arbitrariness in governmental decision-making. In In re Investigation Regarding Ringwood Fact Finding Comm., supra , the Court held that it had authority to review the prosecutor's decision to dismiss a complaint concerning an election law violation. It rejected all assertions that such review would violate the separation of power doctrine, 65 N.J. at 518, stating: It would indeed disserve our democratic processes if misconceptions with respect to the proper meaning and scope of the doctrine of separation of powers were to result in retrogressive restrictions on this and comparable judicial controls which are so well-designed towards curbing governmental improprieties and excesses. [65 N.J. at 520] [8] Even assuming arguendo that the prosecutor is entitled to the full protection which the Executive enjoys under the separation of powers doctrine, this fact alone would not render him beyond the reach of judicial review. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed. 2d 1039 (1974); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed. 2d 752 (1972). Nor can we conclude that by overruling a decision by a prosecutor, a judge would be exercising a prosecutorial function. As we stated in Leonardis, the decision to admit or reject an applicant into a PTI program is an exercise of quasi-judicial power. See ante 71 N.J. at 115. Certainly PTI involves alternatives for a prosecutor which he would not have had absent R. 3:28. As the ABA Commission on Correctional Facilities and Services concludes, PTI involves far more than merely an exercise of the charging function. The report states: It is one thing not to charge and let the accused go totally free, but it may be quite another to withhold a charge, and hence not to invoke the jurisdiction of the court system, on condition that an uncharged, untried, unconvicted person submit to a correctional program. [ Pretrial Intervention Legal Issues : A Guide to Policy Development 12, n. 4 (1974)] See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed. 2d 54 (1975) (suggesting in dicta that where pretrial release is attended by burdensome conditions a judicial hearing may be necessary). Not only would this result give prosecutors more control than they had prior to the adoption of PTI, but it would pose the threat of expanding governmental control over individuals suspected, yet not convicted, of committing crimes. See Note, Diversion: The Threat of Expanding Social Control, 10 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 180, 182, 197 (1975); [9] Note, Pretrial Intervention Programs-An Innovative Reform of the Criminal Justice System, 28 Rutgers L. Rev. 1203, 1223 (1975); Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process, 83 Yale L.J. 827 (1974). Other courts have also concluded that diversion entails more than merely the charging function, and hence, cannot be said to fall solely within the discretion of the prosecutor. The California Supreme Court, for instance, held that diversion under California's statutory pretrial program was essentially a judicial function. People v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 11 Cal. 3d 59, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21, 520 P. 2d 405 (1974); Sledge v. Superior Court of San Diego, 11 Cal. 3d 70, 113 Cal. Rptr. 28, 520 P. 2d 412 (1974). In the former case the court expressly rejected the notion that diversion was an aspect of the prosecutor's charging function, and instead, held that [a]t whatever stage such intervention occurs ... it is an integral step in the process leading to the disposition of the case before the court, and therefore constitutes an exercise of judicial authority within the meaning of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. 11 Cal.3d at 68, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 27, 510 P. 2d at 409. It reasoned that once the question of diversion arises the prosecutorial die has long since been cast. The case is before the court for disposition, and disposition is a function of the judicial power no matter what the outcome. [11 Cal. 3d at 65, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 26, 520 P.2d at 410] [10] See also, United States v. Gillespie, 345 F. Supp. 1236 (W.D. Mo. 1972). But see, Thompson v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 325, 212 N.W. 2d 109 (1973).