Opinion ID: 1861248
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the motion for summary affirmance

Text: After remand, the second amended complaint was again amended on March 24, 1977. The first cause of action of the third amended complaint contained allegations that on April 1, 1974, Mrs. Toni Stamborski, one of the teachers who received notice of disciplinary hearings, appeared before the Hortonville School Board. At that time she rejected representation by the Hortonville Education Association. Notwithstanding the fact that she had been absent from her teaching duties during the same period of time as the other teachers, the board did not discharge her but gave her a disciplinary letter and she lost five days pay. It was alleged that she was treated differently from the other teachers because she appeared before the board without representation by the Hortonville Education Association, and this constituted a denial of equal protection to the members of the association who were discharged. The second cause of action in the third amended complaint alleged that the board violated secs. 118.21 and 118.25, Stats. in hiring replacement teachers, as a consequence of which the actions of the board were null and void. It was also alleged that the members of the Hortonville Education Association offered to return to work on April 25, 1974, but the board refused to rehire them on the ground that they had already hired replacements. The plaintiffs claim they were unlawfully precluded from returning to their positions and engaging in their professions and consequently suffered loss of their livelihood. The trial court decided the equal protection issue pursuant to summary judgment procedure. The record shows that Mrs. Stamborski attended the hearing scheduled for her and responded to thirty-two questions dealing with her individual situation, which the other teachers refused to do. The board's explanation for allowing Mrs. Stamborski to return to work is that she was willing to do so without the prerequisite condition of a master contract for all teachers. She resumed her teaching duties on April 8, 1974 when the schools reopened. The other teachers were discharged and invited to apply for re-employment. One teacher, Mr. Bellaire, accepted the offer to reapply prior to April 8th. He was re-employed and resumed his teaching duties when school opened. The undisputed facts did not make out a case of denial of equal protection. Mrs. Stamborski was treated differently because she did not insist upon a new master contract as a condition of returning to her duties. Mr. Bellaire, who abandoned his militancy prior to the reopening of school, received treatment essentially equal to that accorded Mrs. Stamborski. Plaintiffs argue that school could have been reopened with temporary replacements without firing the plaintiffs. Even if this were true, it would not raise an inference of denial of equal protection. At most it would show that plaintiffs were fired, not for their union sympathies, but for their continued participation in the strike. As the United States Supreme Court held, the Hortonville School Board was not required to adopt the least punitive method of breaking the strike. [5] The trial court sustained a demurrer to the cause of action which alleged the illegal hiring of replacements on the ground that the replacement teachers were indispensable parties and had not been joined in the lawsuit. The court also ruled that there was no private right of action for violation of the statutes governing the hiring of teachers. Plaintiffs argue that they did not rely upon the statutory qualification provisions for their cause of action. They claim that these provisions were not the grounds of the cause of action, because they did not impose a duty on the school board to hire or reinstate the plaintiffs when they offered to return to work on April 25th, but that the statutes invalidate the claim of the school board that plaintiffs could not be rehired or reinstated because their positions had been filled by replacements. By this argument plaintiffs are admitting that the claim based on lack of statutory qualifications is not a separate cause of action. Rather, it is intended to show that there is no defense by the school board to a claim for reinstatement and back wages because of the alleged unlawful discharge of the teachers. Because the plaintiffs were not unlawfully discharged, they have no right to re-employment. Therefore, they have no standing to challenge the school board's reasons for refusing to reemploy them. The judgments and orders in this case, construed to be a single declaratory judgment adjudicating the rights and duties of the parties, are affirmed.