Opinion ID: 2156855
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sixth Amendment and Joint Representation

Text: The Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel provides for representation that is free from conflicts of interest or divided loyalties. [18] Nevertheless, a defendant may waive his right to the assistance of an attorney unhindered by a conflict of interests. [19] The standard for measuring an effective waiver of a constitutional right was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Zerbst [20] : A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. [21] This standard was subsequently refined when the Supreme Court held that [w]aivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. [22] Accordingly, the waiver of the right to have effective assistance by a conflict-free trial attorney must be: knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. [23] The United States Supreme Court has recognized that multiple representation of criminal defendants engenders special dangers of which a trial judges must be aware. [24] Permitting a single attorney to represent codefendants ... is not per se violative of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel. [25] A trial judge confronted with the prospect of joint representation is immediately alerted to possible conflicts of interest and must take adequate steps to ascertain whether the conflicts warrant separate counsel. [26] The right to have the effective assistance of a conflict-free attorney applies irrespective of whether the attorney is appointed or privately retained. In this case, both Lewis and Black were represented by the same assistant public defender. Twenty years ago, in Cuyler, the United States Supreme Court noted that the vast majority of public defender offices have a strong policy against multiple representation and that approximately half of the public defender officers never undertake such a representation. [27] When an indigent person like Lewis appears for trial represented by the same appointed attorney as his co-defendant, it is imperative that the trial judge make certain that he understand his right to have a conflict-free attorney appointed to represent him and that he has made an intelligent voluntary waiver of that right. The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of a conflict-free attorney is so fundamental to our adversarial system of criminal justice that the Delaware General Assembly has enacted a statute which provides: [f]or cause, the court may, on its own motion or upon the application of the Public Defender or the indigent person, appoint an attorney other than the Public Defender to represent the indigent person at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. [28] That statute also mandates the award of reasonable compensation to be fixed by the court and paid by the State of Delaware. [29]