Opinion ID: 1828289
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: civil code article 2321 and the 1996 tort reform act

Text: In 1996, the legislature revised Civil Code Article 2321 regarding liability for damage caused by animals, which now reads: The owner of an animal is answerable for the damage caused by the animal. However, he is answerable for the damage only upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that his animal's behavior would cause damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable care. Nonetheless, the owner of a dog is strictly liable for damages for injuries to persons or property caused by the dog and which the owner could have prevented and which did not result from the injured person's provocation of the dog. Nothing in this Article shall preclude the court from the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an appropriate case. Acts 1996, 1st Ex.Sess., No. 1, § 1, eff. April 16, 1996 (Emphasis supplied). Our courts of appeal, as well as various commentators, have noted that the 1996 revision results in an ordinary negligence standard for owners of all animals except dogs, whose owners continue to be governed by a strict liability standard. See Maraist & Galligan, § 14-7; Comment (Joseph F. Piacun), The Abolition of Strict Liability in Louisiana: A Return to a Fairer Standard or an Impossible Burden on Plaintiffs?, 34 Loy. L.Rev. 215 (1997) (hereinafter The Abolition of Strict Liability in Louisiana). However, whether that standard remains the same as was articulated in Loescher v. Parr and explicitly made applicable to animal owners in Boyer v. Seal has, in light of increasing litigation under Article 2321, become a significant unresolved issue of law, in our view. Accordingly, we granted the defendants' writ application in this case to consider the 1996 changes to Article 2321 with respect to dogs and dog owners. Pepper v. Triplet, 03-0619 (La.6/6/03), 845 So.2d 1074. The first court to examine liability for dog owners under the new Article 2321 was Allen v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 36,377 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/18/02), 828 So.2d 190, writ denied, 02-2577 (La.12/19/02), 833 So.2d 343. The Second Circuit in Allen, affirming summary judgment for the plaintiff, asserted that the 1996 revision effectively ended strict liability for all animal owners except dog owners. 828 So.2d at 193 (citing The Abolition of Strict Liability in Louisiana, 34 Loy. L.Rev. at 231-34). With regard to dog owners, the court reasoned, the legislature had retain[ed] strict liability, yet defin[ed] a three-part test to determine liability under Article 2321: First, the dog must have actually caused the damage to the plaintiff's person or property. Second, the owner must have been able to prevent the damages, but failed to do so. Third, the damages must not have been caused by the injured person's provocation of the dog. 828 So.2d at 193 (citing The Abolition of Strict Liability in Louisiana, 34 Loy. L.Rev. at 231-34). The Allen court specifically rejected the defendants' argument that the plaintiff must still prove that the animal posed an unreasonable risk of harm under a balancing test, finding that the amended article does not require such a showing. Id. at 194. In applying the second part of the new test, the Allen court reasoned that the amended article recognizes the obvious and great risk that a dog might bite someone, and therefore imposes on the owner a duty to prevent dog bites. Id. Although the defendants in Allen maintained that their fence adequately prevented the dog from exiting the yard, the court found that the fence, which had a loose board through which the dog placed his head and bit the plaintiff, had failed to prevent the bite. The court reasoned that the defendants could have chained the dog or kept it indoors, and thus failed to prevent the damage to the plaintiff. In the instant case, the First Circuit also addressed liability for dog owners under Article 2321. A majority of the appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff, though one judge dissented as to the fault allocation, believing that the plaintiff should have been assessed with 75% of the fault. The court of appeal stated that strict liability was replaced by a negligence standard for animals generally, but that the legislature retained strict liability for dog owners. The court then found that the amended article sets forth a three-part test for strict liability: A dog owner is liable if (1) the dog actually caused the damage to the plaintiff's person or property, (2) the owner could have prevented the damage, and (3) the dog was not provoked by the person suffering the damage. 02-0022, p. 5, 834 So.2d at 628. After noting that the defendant's dog had caused the damage, the court of appeal in the instant case turned to whether the defendant could have prevented the damage. The court rejected the defendant's argument that nothing the defendant could have done would have prevented damage to the plaintiff because the yard had been completely fenced and the gate secured, and the defendant had never given permission to the plaintiff to enter the yard. The court relied on Allen, supra, for the proposition that erecting a fence does not discharge the dog owner's duty to prevent dog bites and other damage. The court concluded that the district court had not manifestly erred in finding that the defendant could have prevented the injury by placing a Beware of Dog sign on the fence, by securing the gate by a more reliable means, or by chaining the dog. The court also found no error in the trial court's implicit finding that the defendant could have advised the plaintiff of the dog's propensity to bite, a fact of which the defendant had prior knowledge but which the plaintiff did not.