Opinion ID: 51722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tape Recorded Statements

Text: Alexander argues that the court erred by admitting tape recordings under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. She contends that the government did not meet its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the underlying factual predicates of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) were present. See United States v. Underwood, 446 F.3d 1340, 134546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 225 (2006) (citation omitted). She further argues that, even if the requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) were met, admission of the statements violated her constitutional rights under the Due Process and Confrontation Clauses. Alexander also urges us to hold that the application of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) turns on the existence of an agency relationship between the declarant and the defendant, and that because such a relationship was absent here, the admission of Delellis’s statements was improper. Finally, Alexander contests the admission of the tapes in their entirety on the ground that the tapes included prejudicial statements irrelevant to her case. We address these arguments in turn. 7 1. Requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) In order to introduce the tape recordings of Delellis as co-conspirator statements, the government was first required “to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the conspiracy included the declarant and the defendant against whom the statement [was] offered, and (3) the statement was made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Id. (citation omitted). We review for clear error the district court’s determination that these factual requirements were satisfied. United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296, 1308 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 46 (2006).1 Alexander argues that the government failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the existence of a conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence. We disagree. In assessing whether the government has shown the existence of a conspiracy, the contents of the statement at issue are not alone sufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy, but are to be considered by the district court. Fed R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); see also United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1087 n.22 (11th Cir. 2001). Here, the disputed tape recordings contained statements by Delellis that Alexander was “a friend of [hers]” who would be willing to sign a CMN for a 1 Although the district court did not make explicit findings on this threshold issue, by admitting the controverted statements, the court implicitly found that the statements had been made “in the course of, and in furtherance of, a conspiracy.” See United States v. Miles, 290