Opinion ID: 2216530
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Instruction on Extra Hazardous Crossing.

Text: In the instruction on what constitutes an extra hazardous crossingthe vital issue in the casethe court included a statement that the jury could consider whether or not the railroad cars were reflectorized. We set out part of the instruction: The Defendant railroad was under no duty to place reflectors, reflectorized paint, or other reflectorized or bright material on the side of its boxcars, and failure to do so, in and of itself, does not constitute negligence on its part, but such an absence may be taken into consideration together with all the facts as shown by the evidence in determining whether the crossing was more than ordinarily dangerous. (Emphasis added). We believe this was error. Whether or not a crossing is extra hazardous depends upon its physical characteristics and conditions relating to the crossing itself. This includes anything which would obstruct visibility, heavy traffic which would pose an unusual problem, or similar circumstances. We find no authority, and none has been pointed out, which suggests the condition of a particular train renders an otherwise safe crossing unusually hazardous. As used in this context extra hazardous does not depend on the type of railroad equipment using the tracks at a given moment. While that would bear on the railroad's general negligence, it would not change a safe crossing into a dangerous one. The following from Glanville v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company, 190 Iowa at 181, 180 N.W. at 155, bears somewhat on this matter: There must be something in the configuration of the land, or in the construction of the railroad, or in the structures in the vicinity, or in the nature or amount of the travel on the highway, or in other conditions, which renders the ringing the bell and the sounding the whistle inadequate properly to warn the public of danger. See also Berk v. Arendts, 254 Iowa 363, 369, 117 N.W.2d 905, 907 (1962). The instruction as given reversed the principles which should govern. If the jury first finds the crossing is extra hazardous, then the absence of reflectorized material or other safeguards might constitute negligence but this is only because the crossing is extra hazardous. The absence of such warnings does not make it so. In other words, whether a crossing is extra hazardous must be determined on factors relating to the crossing, not to the equipment which uses it. Support for this is found in Gant v. Chicago & North Western Railway Company, 434 F.2d at 1260-61 where the court said this: While not specifically raised, there is an inference in appellant's argument that the crossing here involved was extraordinarily hazardous because of the length of the train. . . . [I]t is . . . clear that a crossing is not to be considered hazardous one day and not hazardous the next, based solely upon the length of the train using the crossing.. . . The length of the train was not claimed as a ground of negligence. Its presence on the crossing was in no manner illegal. Again, neither the Iowa Legislature nor the Iowa court has ever considered the length of a train in listing conditions which would make a crossing extraordinarily hazardous. We will not do so here. This same rationale applies to the condition of the cars in the present case. The erroneous instruction permitted the jury to find this crossing extra hazardous based upon a factor which should not have been considered, and this requires reversal for a new trial.