Opinion ID: 711135
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Violation of a Good Samaritan Duty

Text: 20 Appellees contend that, even if the federal regulation did not create a special duty to protect them from the harm that they suffered, the Government is nevertheless liable for negligence under South Carolina law. As the Government points out, South Carolina courts have adopted the Good Samaritan provision of the Second Restatement of Torts, which states: 21 One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking if ... the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking. 22 Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 323 (1993); see Sherer v. James, 290 S.C. 404, 351 S.E.2d 148, 150 n. 3 (1986). Appellees contend that the Government undertook to render services to them by enacting a regulation requiring presentation of certificates of title; that Customs agents failed to enforce that regulation with reasonable care; and that Appellees were harmed due to their reliance upon Customs agents to use such care. 23 We find Appellees' argument unpersuasive. First, the Customs regulations do not represent an effort specifically to render services to Appellees; instead, the regulations and authorizing legislation 5 were intended to deter the removal of stolen autos from the United States. See S.Rep. No. 98-308, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4910, 4912-13 (stating that the legislation was intended to prevent the exportation of certain stolen vehicles by imposing civil penalties on exporters and importers that violate the applicable statutes and regulations). Second, while there is evidence in the record suggesting that Appellees' employees believed that the cars could not be exported so long as they held the certificates of title, there is no evidence that demonstrates that they genuinely relied upon Customs officials to enforce the regulation: nothing in the record makes clear that Appellees would not have agreed to follow the industry practice of using sight drafts--particularly with Preowned, a company that had been a customer for more than three years--had the Customs regulations not required presentation of certificates of title. We reject Appellees' argument accordingly. 24 B. BREACH OF A FEDERAL DUTY THAT IS ANALOGOUS TO A DUTY RECOGNIZED BY STATE LAW 25 Regardless of whether South Carolina law would impose tort liability for violation of 19 C.F.R. Sec. 192.2(b), Goldstar describes a second means by which the FTCA might permit Appellees' negligence action: the action would be permitted if the Government has breached a duty under federal law that is analogous to a duty of care recognized by state law. Goldstar, 967 F.2d at 969; see also Rayonier, 352 U.S. at 319, 77 S.Ct. at 376-77 (stating that a court must determine whether a private person would be responsible for similar negligence under the laws of the State where the acts occurred) (emphasis added). 26 The Government contended that there is no authority holding a private party liable under South Carolina law for anything remotely resembling the alleged conduct at issue: permitting exportation on the basis of improper documents. Appellant's Brief at 12. Conceding that perhaps such a close analogy need not be found, the Government further argued that there is no duty under South Carolina [law] to protect persons from the criminal actions of third parties, such as absconding with stolen goods. Appellant's Brief at 12. 27 Neither the district court nor Appellees attempted to identify appropriate analogies. Having reviewed the matter, we conclude that South Carolina law would not impose liability for breach of a duty that is sufficiently analogous to the duty purportedly imposed on Customs officials by 19 C.F.R. Sec. 192.2(b) to render the Government liable to Appellees for the Customs agents' actions. 28 We therefore hold that the district court erred when it denied the Government's motion for summary judgment on the issue of negligence, and vacate the judgment entered against the Government accordingly.