Opinion ID: 757051
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Right of Allocution

Text: 27 Hall contends that Rule 32(c)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure afforded him the right to make an unsworn statement of remorse before the jury. Rule 32(c)(3)(C) provides that, [b]efore imposing sentence, the court must ... address the defendant personally and determine whether the defendant wishes to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of the sentence. FED.R.CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(C). 28 In support of his contention that Rule 32(c)(3)(C) creates a right to make an unsworn statement before the jury in capital cases, Hall relies upon the following language from 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), which establishes the procedures for sentencing hearings in capital cases: 29 Notwithstanding rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, when a defendant is found guilty or pleads guilty to an offense under section 3591, no presentence report shall be prepared. At the sentencing hearing, information may be presented as to any matter relevant to the sentence.... 30 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). Hall argues that, because the statute expressly states that the portion of Rule 32 requiring the preparation of a presentence report is inapplicable in capital cases and makes no similar reference to any other portion of Rule 32, the doctrine of expressio unius exclusio alterius indicates that Congress did not intend for the FDPA to displace other provisions of Rule 32, including the right to allocute created by subsection (c)(3)(C). 2 31 We need not decide whether § 3593 was intended to displace Rule 32(c)(3)(C) because we conclude that, regardless of whether it was required to do so, the district court complied with the plain language of Rule 32(c)(3)(C) by inquiring of Hall whether he wished to make a statement before it announced his sentence. The text of the rule provides no basis for concluding that the defendant has a right to make a statement to the jury prior to the jury's arriving at its sentencing recommendation. Compliance with the strict language of the rule is achieved when, as was the case here, the district court allows the defendant to make a statement to the court after the jury returns its recommendation but before the district court imposes sentence. 3 32 Hall responds that this interpretation of Rule 32(c)(3)(C) would render allocution an empty gesture because the district court has no discretion to disregard the jury's recommendation. However, other circumstances exist in which allocution is equally devoid of practical impact. This is the case when the statutory mandatory minimum sentence for a particular offense exceeds the maximum sentence under the otherwise applicable U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range. In that circumstance, the court is required to impose the statutory minimum sentence. Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 756 (3d Cir.1996); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1(b) (Where a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutory minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.). 4 33 Furthermore, § 3593(c) counsels against construing Rule 32(c)(3)(C) as establishing an unconditional right for the defendant to make an unsworn statement of remorse to the jury. Section 3593(c) sets forth with great specificity the type of information that may be submitted to the jury during the penalty phase of a capital trial and the circumstances under which it may be presented. 5 In this regard, the statute provides as follows: 34 At the sentencing hearing, information may be presented as to any matter relevant to the sentence, including any mitigating or aggravating factor permitted or required to be considered under section 3592. Information presented may include the trial transcript and exhibits if the hearing is held before a jury or judge not present during the trial, or at the trial judge's discretion. The defendant may present any information relevant to a mitigating factor. The government may present any information relevant to an aggravating factor for which notice has been provided.... Information is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials except that information may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. 35 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (emphasis added). Construing Rule 32(c)(3)(C) as granting a defendant the unconditional right to make an unsworn statement of remorse to the jury would contravene § 3593's mandate that the district court exercise discretion in determining whether to exclude any information offered by the parties on the basis that its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. Id. Section 3593(c) does not contemplate exempting any type of information offered at a sentencing hearing from the district court's gatekeeping function, and we decline to interpret Rule 32(c)(3)(C) to have this effect when the plain language of the rule does not dictate such an interpretation. 36 Furthermore, both Hall and the government concede that § 3593 authorized Hall to make a sworn statement of remorse that would have been subject to cross-examination. 6 Construing Rule 32(c)(3)(C) as creating a per se right to make an unsworn statement of remorse to the jury that is not subject to cross-examination would in no sense increase the accuracy and reliability of the capital-sentencing process. When the district court receives a statement in allocution, it recognizes the legal effect of the fact that the statements are not sworn and the attendant potential effect of this fact upon the credibility of the defendant's statements; the same cannot be said for a jury. Cf. State v. Williams, 688 So.2d 1277, 1284 (La.Ct.App.1997) (The right of allocution has normally been reserved to a defendant addressing the sentencing judge.); Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 555 A.2d 846, 858 (1989) (We find no reason in law or logic why the defendant's presentation of evidence in support of his claim that life imprisonment is the appropriate sentence should be shielded from testing for truthfulness and reliability that is accomplished by cross-examination.). We therefore conclude that the district court did not violate Rule 32(c)(3)(C) by denying Hall's request to make an unsworn statement of remorse before the jury.