Opinion ID: 1198942
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Standard of reversal.

Text: Under the so-called Sedeno standard we have traditionally applied to the erroneous omission of instructions on lesser included offenses, the error requires reversal unless the factual question posed by the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other, properly given instructions. ( Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d 703, 721, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913.) Here, the jury did not necessarily reject a heat of passion theory under other instructions, and the People do not suggest otherwise. However, the People urge us to reconsider Sedeno in this respect. The Sedeno standard, the People insist, is too stringent a test whether the error is of federal constitutional magnitude, or is simply a matter of state law. In either case, the People suggest, reversal is not required if an evaluation of the entire record demonstrates that the error was actually harmless. Defendant insists that the failure to instruct sua sponte on all lesser included offenses supported by the evidence is error under both the state and federal Constitutions. In its federal form, he claims, the error is reversible per se. Alternatively, he contends, Sedeno states the minimum level of prejudice scrutiny permitted under either state or federal law. We conclude that the failure to instruct sua sponte on a lesser included offense in a noncapital case is, at most, an error of California law alone, and is thus subject only to state standards of reversibility. We further determine, in line with recent authority, that such misdirection of the jury is not subject to reversal unless an examination of the entire record establishes a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome. (Cal. Const, art. VI, § 13; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.) Accordingly, we overrule the Sedeno standard of reversal in this context. At the outset, we reject any implication that the alleged error at issue in this case the failure to instruct sua sponte on an uncharged lesser included offense, or any aspect thereofis one which arises under the United States Constitution. In Modesto, and again in Sedeno, we concluded that the right at issue was the constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence ( Modesto, supra, 59 Cal.2d 722, 730, 31 Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33; Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d 703, 720, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913), but neither those decisions, nor any other of our authorities before or since, specified that we were relying to any degree on federal constitutional principles. Meanwhile, the United States Supreme Court has expressly refrained from recognizing a federal constitutional right to instructions on lesser included offenses in noncapital cases. In Keeble v. United States (1973) 412 U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 L.Ed.2d 844 ( Keeble ), the court confirmed that under rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (18 U.S.C.) (rule 31(c)), applicable only in federal criminal actions, the defendant is entitled to instructions on a lesser included offense if the jury could rationally find guilt of the lesser offense but acquit of the greater. (412 U.S. at pp. 208-209, 93 S.Ct. 1993.) [13] The court concluded that the rule 31(c) entitlement applied to trials under the Major Crimes Act (MCA), the federal criminal law governing offenses by Native Americans on reservation land, even where the lesser included offense on which instructions were sought was one otherwise not subject to prosecution under the MCA, but only under tribal law. ( Keeble, supra, 412 U.S. at pp. 208-214, 93 S.Ct. 1993.) While constitutional concerns influenced the court's analysis of the relationship between rule 31(c) and the MCA, the decision noted we have never explicitly held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees the right of a defendant to have the jury instructed on a lesser included offense .... In view of our interpretation of the [MCA], those are questions that we need not face. ( Keeble, supra, at p. 213, 93 S.Ct. 1993, fn. omitted.) [14] Subsequently, the high court acknowledged that in particular circumstances, the denial of instructions on lesser included offenses in a capital case would violate the federal Constitution. However, the court emphasized that it was limiting its holding to the capital context. Moreover, the strict limitations the court has since placed even on the rule for capital trials suggest reluctance to formulate any general constitutional right to instructions on lesser offenses. Thus, in Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 ( Beck ), the court concluded that Alabama could not constitutionally impose a death sentence after applying a state statute, limited to capital cases, that prohibited the jury from considering a lesser noncapital offense necessarily included within the capital charge and supported by the evidence. The court made clear at the outset that we have never held that a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction as a matter of due process. ( Id. at p. 637, 100 S.Ct. 2382.) On the other hand, the court noted the value to the defendant of this procedural safeguard, as evidenced by the nearly universal acceptance ... in both state and federal courts that a defendant is entitled to instructions on lesser included offenses warranted by the evidence. ( Ibid. ) Indeed, the court pointed out, Alabama itself granted the right under appropriate circumstances in noncapital cases. ( Id. at pp. 636-637, 100 S.Ct. 2382.) Such protection, the court reasoned, is especially important in a capital case, and the risk that a jury will convict of the charged offense as an alternative to complete acquittal when it believes the evidence shows only some lesser crime cannot be tolerated in a case in which the defendant's life is at stake. ( Id. at p. 637, 100 S.Ct. 2382.) Thus, if the unavailability of a lesser included offense instruction enhances the risk of an unwarranted conviction, [the state] is constitutionally prohibited from withdrawing that option from the jury in a capital case. ( Id. at p. 638, 100 S.Ct. 2382.) The Beck rule has never since been extended beyond the capital context. Moreover, in two more recent cases, the high court has given Beck itself a narrow construction. In Schad, supra, 501 U.S. 624, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555, a five-justice majority rejected a capital defendant's contention that although his jury was instructed on the lesser included offense of second degree murder, he was additionally entitled to instructions on the lesser included offense of robbery. The Schad majority explained that the Eighth Amendment concerns at issue in Beck are focused entirely on the reliability of the capital verdict itself, i.e., whether the jury may have been forced, by an all-or-nothing verdict option, to convict of a capital crime against its view of the evidence in order to avoid complete acquittal. ( Id. at pp. 646-647, 100 S.Ct. 2382.) Hence, the majority reasoned, Beck is satisfied if a capital jury receives only a single noncapital third option between the capital charge and acquittal, since this relieves the all-or-nothing pressure to return an inaccurate capital verdict in order to avoid acquitting the defendant entirely. ( Id. at p. 647, 100 S.Ct. 2382.) [15] Recently, in Hopkins v. Reeves (1998) 524 U.S. 88, 118 S.Ct. 1895, 141 L.Ed.2d 76 ( Reeves ), the high court concluded that the principles of Beck not require Nebraska to provide instructions on lesser nonincluded offenses in capital cases when it did not allow such instructions in noncapital cases. As the central core of its analysis, the Reeves court noted that the Nebraska scheme before it was distinguishable in two critical respects from the invalid Alabama statute at issue in Beck. ( Reeves, supra, 524 U.S. at p. ___, 118 S.Ct. at p. 1900.) First, Nebraska, unlike Alabama, permitted instructions in capital cases, as in noncapital cases, on lesser offenses it deemed to be included in the capital charge. ( Ibid. ) Therefore, Nebraska erected no `artificial barrier' in a capital case to conviction of a noncapital offense as an alternative to acquittal. ( Ibid. ) Second, Nebraska denied instructions on nonincluded offenses to all defendants, capital and noncapital, and thus, unlike Alabama, did [not] treat capital cases differently from noncapital cases. ( Ibid. ) Reeves observed that [b]y ignoring these distinctions to conclude that the Eighth Amendment required Nebraska to allow instructions on nonincluded offenses in capital cases, the court of appeals had unjustifiably limited state sovereignty in a manner more severe than the rule in Beck.  ( Reeves, supra, 524 U.S. ___, ___, 118 S.Ct. 1895, 1901.) Beck, the Reeves court reasoned, stands only for the proposition that a State may not erect a capital-specific, artificial barrier to the provision of instructions that actually are lesser included offenses under state law. ( Reeves, supra, 524 U.S. at p. ___, 118 S.Ct. at p. 1901, italics added.) [16] Thus, the high court's decisions leave substantial doubt that the federal Constitution confers any right to lesser included offense instructions in noncapital cases. They provide no basis whatever for a conclusion that the federal charter would require such instructions, as does California, on the court's own motion. Indeed, this court has explicitly recognized that the California rule requiring sua sponte instructions on lesser included offenses suggested by the evidence is independent of federal law, ( Geiger, supra, 35 Cal.3d 510, 519, 199 Cal.Rptr. 45, 674 P.2d 1303.) Accordingly, we affirm that the rule requiring sua sponte instructions on all lesser necessarily included offenses supported by the evidence derives exclusively from California law. In light of the United States Supreme Court's careful disclaimers, and its tendency to interpret related federal rules, both constitutional and nonconstitutional, in a narrow way, we decline to do what the high court has expressly not done, and to hold that such an instructional rule is required in noncapital cases by the federal Constitution. [17] Defendant asserts, however, that where, as here, instructions on a lesser included offense were given as a matter of state law, the incompleteness of those instructions constitutes federal constitutional error subject to federal standards of appellate review. First, defendant briefly suggests that the failure to instruct on heat of passion manslaughter effectively omitted an element of the offense and removed the issue of provocation negating malice from the jury. (Italics added.) This, defendant urges, is a form of instructional error subject to direct scrutiny under the federal Constitution. [18] We are not persuaded. Defendant was not convicted of manslaughter on the basis of incomplete instructions, but of murder, an offense supported by the evidence as to which defendant claims no misinstruction. His complaint, as we read it, is not that an element of the charged offense of murder was removed from the jury's consideration, but simply that the omission of an element of voluntary manslaughter denied him full jury consideration of that lesser alternative to murder. As explained above, the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the value of lesser included offense instructions as a safeguard against overconviction in lieu of an equally unwarranted acquittal. However, the high court has explicitly refrained from according these interests federal constitutional stature in noncapital cases. It thus appears likely the United States Supreme Court would deem a state conviction for a charged noncapital offense to be untainted by federal constitutional error in the complete absence of unrequested instructions on lesser included offenses. Under these circumstances, defendant's conviction cannot acquire such a taint simply because instructions on a lesser included offense were given but, as provided in the absence of a defense request, were incomplete. [19] Citing Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 65 L.Ed.2d 175 ( Hicks ), defendant urges at somewhat greater length that he had a state-created liberty interest in a jury determination, even absent a request therefor, of all issues bearing on his guilt of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter as an alternative to the charge of murder. The incomplete manslaughter instructions, defendant insists, denied him this right with respect to the issue whether heat of passion rendered him guilty only of the lesser offense. The denial of this state-created right to jury findings, defendant avers, cannot be cured under the federal Constitution by any form of appellate review that speculates on what a properly instructed jury would have done. (See Hicks, supra, 447 U.S. at pp. 346-347, 100 S.Ct. 2227; see also demons v. Mississippi (1990) 494 U.S. 738, 746, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 ( Clemons ).) However, defendant's argument lacks merit for reasons we recently set forth in People v. Wims (1995) 10 Cal.4th 293, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77 ( Wims ). Wims addressed what standard of reversal should apply when the state statutory right (see § 969c) to jury determination of the truth of a noncapital sentencing enhancement (there, use of a dangerous and deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)) is violated by instructional omission of an element of the enhancement. Wims held that such misinstruction is state law error alone, and thus subject, under article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution, to the Watson harmless error test. In reaching this conclusion, Wims rejected the argument that the state-created right to jury determination of noncapital sentencing enhancements implicates federal due process interests under Hicks, and thus precludes harmless error review under state standards. As Wims explained, Hicks focused on a state statutory scheme that generally accorded sentencing power and discretion to the jury. The defendant's jury, however, had been prevented from exercising this discretion by a specific statute that mandated a 40-year term for habitual offenders. The habitual offender provision was ruled unconstitutional after trial but before the appeal was decided. State law would have allowed the appellate court to uphold the 40-year sentence by substituting its sentencing judgment for the jury's, but the appellate court did not do so. Instead, it affirmed on the sole ground that the sentence was within the range the jury could have imposed even absent the invalid mandatory provision. Under these circumstances, Hicks held, the defendant had not received his due process right to the actual exercise of sentencing discretion by either of the entities in which, by state law, such discretion resided. ( Hicks, supra, 447 U.S. 343, 347, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 65 L.Ed.2d 175; Wims, supra, 10 Cal.4th 293, 309, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77.) But in Wims, we found the circumstances before us distinguishable from Hicks in crucial ways. Unlike the laws at issue in Hicks, the California noncapital sentence-enhancement scheme affords a defendant no right to normative jury discretion in sentencing, but only the narrower right to a fact-finding determination as to the truth of an alleged enhancement. Moreover, omission of an element of an enhancement does not entirely deprive the defendant of a jury determination of the enhancement itself; indeed, the jury in Wims  did render verdicts on each weapon-use allegation. ( Wims, supra, 10 Cal.4th 293, 310, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77, original italics.) This form of state law error, Wims concluded, thus does not invoke the rationale of Hicks. (Ibid.; see also People v. Odle (1988) 45 Cal.3d 386, 411-12, 247 Cal.Rptr. 137, 754 P.2d 184 [holding Hicks rationale not applicable to a failure to instruct on the elements of a special circumstance].) In addition, Wims noted, in demons, supra, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725, the high court made clear that Hicks imposes no absolute federal due process bar against application of normal state law standards of appellate review of a defective jury sentencing determination, the right to which also arose under state law. ( Clemons, supra, 494 U.S. 738, 741, 747, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725; Wims, supra, 10 Cal.4th 293, 310, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77.) Clemons thus supports the view, Wims reasoned, that any right to a jury determination arising from state law is  qualified  and limited by the state law standards of appellate review applicable to that determination. ( Wims, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 310, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77, italics added.) The high court's reasoning in demons [thus] applies to California's scheme for section 12022[, subdivision ](b) sentence enhancements. Defendants' state statutory right to jury findings on [such an] enhancement is constitutionally qualified by the duty of California appellate courts to examine `the entire cause' when any `misdirection of the jury' is alleged and to affirm the judgment absent a `miscarriage of justice.' (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) Contrary to defendants' suggestion, therefore, if we examine the record of this trial to determine whether the instructional error resulted in a miscarriage of justice, we do not engage in any impermissible attempt to `substitute' our determination for the jury determination a defendant may claim under section 969c. Indeed, the possibility of such a corrective appellate determination is inherent in the state statutory scheme for jury determination. When rendered, such appellate review complements, and thus affords, defendants their full jury rights and, thus, due process of law under Hicks. [Citation.] ( Wims, supra, 10 Cal.4th 293, 310-311, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77.) Similar principles apply here. The state constitutional requirement of sua sponte instructions allowing a jury determination of lesser uncharged offenses creates only a right to jury fact-finding, not to the exercise of normative jury discretion. Moreover, that right is itself qualified and limited by the standards of appellate review also established by the state Constitution. When we assert and exercise our power to review the error in this way, we usurp no due process interest identified by Hicks. Defendant's claim must therefore be dismissed. When state standards alone have been violated, the State is free ... to apply its own state harmless-error rule to such errors of state law. ( Cooper v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730.) We therefore determine that federal law has no effect on the appropriate standard of California appellate review when, in a noncapital case, the defendant challenges his otherwise valid conviction of a charged offense on grounds the trial court failed in its sua sponte duty under California law to provide instructions, correct and complete, on all lesser included offenses, including all theories thereof, which enjoyed substantial support in the evidence. It remains to consider whether correct principles of California jurisprudence require, or even permit, continued adherence to the strict Sedeno standard of reversal for this form of state law error. We conclude they do not. As we have explained in several recent decisions, the California Constitution, unlike its federal counterpart, contains a provision specifically addressed to the issue of reversible error. It provides that [n]o judgment shall be set aside for various kinds of error in the conduct of the trial, including misdirection of the jury and improper admission or rejection of evidence, unless an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence  indicates that the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13, italics added.) [20] This provision was `added by the electorate of this state for the specific purpose of abrogating the preexisting rule that had treated any substantial error as reversible per se.' ( Wims, supra, 10 Cal.4th 293, 314, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77, quoting People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 501, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037 ( Cahill ), original italics.) The phrase misdirection of the jury, as used in the constitutional provision, extends to the form of error at issue here. ` The word `misdirection' logically includes every kind of instructional error. It seems manifest that incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly omitted instructions may equally `misdirect' the jury's deliberations. Nothing in the language or history of article VI, section 13, suggests that its requirement of actual prejudice, determined by reference to `the entire cause, including the evidence,' applies to some forms of `misdirection,' but not to others. ( Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 579, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 882 P.2d 298.)' ( People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 487, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869 ( Flood ), quoting Wims, supra, 10 Cal.4th 293, 314-315, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77.) In Cahill, a renewed focus on the meaning of article VI, section 13 of the Colorado Constitution caused us to conclude that we must abandon, insofar as based on state law, the decades-old California rule of automatic reversal where an involuntary confession was erroneously admitted in a criminal trial. Cahill reasoned as follows: Article VI, section 13 eliminated the prior appellate presumption that any substantial trial error causes a miscarriage of justice. The Constitution's requirement that the record and evidence be examined for actual unfair harm in the particular case specifically applies to errors in the admission of evidence. This duty is not eliminated simply because the error complained of was itself constitutional. In rare instances involving fundamental `structural defects' ( Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 502, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037) in a criminal proceeding (for example, the complete denial of the right to a jury, or to an impartial judge), it may be impossible, or beside the point, to evaluate the resulting harm by resort to the trial record, and a miscarriage of justice may arise regardless of the evidence. However, the improper admission of a confession, even if state constitutional error, is an evidentiary mistake, a mere trial error ( ibid. ) that occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury. The effect of this form of error can be quantitatively assessed in light of the evidence to determine whether the error was prejudicial or harmless. ( Id. at pp. 487-502, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037; also cf. Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 307-309, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302.) As we have seen, the California reversible-error provision, by its terms, directs that the prejudicial nature of such an evidentiary error be determined `after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence.' (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) ( Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th 478, 502, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037.) Under such circumstances, [t]he prejudicial effect of such error is to be determined, for purposes of California law, under the generally applicable reasonable-probability test embodied in article VI, section 13.... [Citing Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.] ( Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 509-510, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037.) [21] We have since invoked similar principles to conclude that the Watson harmless error test applies to two forms of state law instructional error in criminal trials. In Wims, supra, 10 Cal.4th 293, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77, we held that where the right to a jury trial on a noncapital sentence enhancement arises solely from state law, the erroneous omission to instruct on an element of the enhancement is subject, by virtue of California Constitution article VI, section 13, to the Watson standard of reversal. ( Wims, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 314-316, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77.) In Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th 470, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869, we ruled that any state law error arising from a failure to instruct on an element of a charged criminal offense must, pursuant to article VI, section 13, be evaluated under Watson, despite prior California cases suggesting that with limited exceptions, such error is reversible per se. ( Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 480-491, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869.) As both Wims and Flood make clear, misdirection of the jury, like the improper admission of evidence at issue in Cahill, is a form of error for which the California Constitution expressly requires an individualized prejudice assessment. ( Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th 470, 487-490, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869; Wims, supra, 10 Cal.4th 293, 314, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77.) Moreover, as in Cahill, the missteps at issue in both Wims and Flood were mere errors in the presentation of the case to the jury, not fundamental structural defects that rendered the proceedings unfair regardless of the evidence. ( Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 489-490, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869; Wims, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 312-314, 41 Cal. Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77.) Similar principles govern here, and their application requires abrogation of the Sedeno standard of near-automatic reversal. We explain our reasoning in detail. The stringent Sedeno test of near-automatic reversal for erroneous failure to instruct on lesser included offenses had its origins in Modesto, supra, 59 Cal.2d 722, 31 Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33. Modesto held that, where the evidence supported such instructions, their omission violated the defendant's constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence. ( Id. at p. 730, 31 Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33.) Modesto then expressly rejected application of the Watson standard to determine whether the error was reversible, reasoning that [r]egardless of how overwhelming the evidence of guilt may be, the denial of such a fundamental right cannot be cured by article VI, [former] section 4 1/2 [now section 13] of the California Constitution, for the denial of such a right is itself a miscarriage of justice within the meaning of that provision. ( Modesto, supra, 59 Cal.2d 722, 730, 31 Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33.) Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d 703, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913, later modified Modesto to the extent of acknowledging that Modesto error could be deemed harmless if the issue which would have been presented by the omitted instructions on lesser included offenses was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other, proper instructions. ( Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 721, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913.) With this limited exception, however, the erroneous failure to instruct on a lesser included offense supported by the evidence has remained subject to the Modesto rule of automatic reversal. [22] Neither Modesto nor Sedeno provided significant analysis to support the conclusion that the California Constitution precludes, rather than requires, examination of the entire record, including the evidence, for actual harm. Indeed, as we recently observed, none of the authorities cited by Modesto to support a standard of per se reversal for this form of error compelled any such holding. ( Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th 470, 488, 76 Cal. Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869, and cases cited.) [23] We now conclude that the rigid Modesto standard, even as slightly modified by Sedeno, is a violation of article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution. As we have seen, that provision requires that in cases of misdirection of the jury, an appellate court must examine the entire cause, including the evidence, to determine if a miscarriage of justice occurred. ( Ibid. ) This obligation cannot be avoided by Modesto 's device of asserting, as an ipse dixit, that a particular form of error is itself a miscarriage of justice, regardless of the evidence. The error in failing sua sponte to instruct, or to instruct fully, on a lesser included offense is not a fundamental structural defect in the mechanism of the criminal proceeding ( Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th 478, 502, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037) which cannot or should not be evaluated for prejudice by reference to the entire cause, including the evidence (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13). Instead, like the erroneous introduction of an involuntary confession, or the instructional omission of an element of a charged offense or sentencing enhancement, it is a mere trial error, one committed in the presentation of the case to the jury. By the same token, the probable adverse effect of an erroneous failure to provide a lesser offense option in a particular case can readily be assessed by an individualized, concrete examination of the record in that case. Under such circumstances, as in Cahill, the error must therefore be evaluated under the generally applicable California test for harmless error, that set forth in Watson [24] . A different result cannot be reached by characterizing the error as the denial of the defendant's fundamental right to a jury determination of all the material issues, then reasoning that an appellate court's determination of harmlessness on the evidence cannot cure the deprivation. As Wims indicated, any state law right to a jury determination of particular issues is qualified in turn by the appellate review standards set forth in article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution. ( Wims, supra, 10 Cal.4th 293, 310-311, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77.) And as Cahill, affirmed, the Constitution's bar against appellate reversals where error was harmless applies even when the error itself arose under the same charter. ( Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th 478, 490-491, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037; see also Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th 470, 479-491, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P. 2d 869.) Nor can it be said that an erroneous failure to instruct on a lesser included offense is necessarily prejudicial, on the premise that if the evidence was substantial enough to warrant lesser offense instructions in the first place, it must have been strong enough to affect the outcome had the instructions not been omitted. In fact, the two standards of evidentiary review are distinct. As explained above, under Modesto, Sedeno, and their progeny, the sua sponte duty to instruct on a lesser included offense arises if there is substantial evidence the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense, but not the charged offense. ( Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 684-685, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1.) This standard requires instructions on a lesser included offense whenever `a jury composed of reasonable [persons] could ... conclude[]' that the lesser, but not the greater, offense was committed. ( Id. at p. 684, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1, italics added, quoting People v. Carr, supra, 8 Cal.3d 287, 294, 104 Cal.Rptr. 705, 502 P.2d 513.) In deciding whether evidence is substantial in this context, a court determines only its bare legal sufficiency, not its weight. (See Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1; see also Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d 307, 324, 185 Cal. Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311.) Appellate review under Watson, on the other hand, takes an entirely different view of the evidence. Such post-trial review focuses not on what a reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error under consideration. In making that evaluation, an appellate court may consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result. Accordingly, a determination that a duty arose to give instructions on a lesser included offense, and that the omission of such instructions in whole or in part was error, does not resolve the question whether the error was prejudicial. Application of the Watson standard of appellate review may disclose that, though error occurred, it was harmless. [25] Accordingly, we conclude that in a noncapital case, error in failing sua sponte to instruct, or to instruct fully, on all lesser included offenses and theories thereof which are supported by the evidence must be reviewed for prejudice exclusively under Watson. A conviction of the charged offense may be reversed in consequence of this form of error only if, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13), it appears reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the error not occurred ( Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243). [26] As indicated above, the Court of Appeal in the present case did not attempt to evaluate the erroneous omission of instructions on heat of passion by examining the entire record, including the evidence, to determine whether it was reasonably probable the error affected the outcome. Instead, the court applied prior California decisions requiring that defendant's conviction be reversed unless the jury necessarily resolved the erroneously omitted heat of passion issue in another context. Because we here overrule the authority on which the Court of Appeal relied, we deem it appropriate to remand the matter to the Court of Appeal to permit that court to determine prejudice under the principles established herein. If the Court of Appeal concludes by correct standards that the error was harmless, it should then address the additional issues raised by defendant on appeal. ( Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th 478, 510, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037.)