Opinion ID: 77561
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Investigate and Prepare Mitigating Evidence

Text: 99 We next address Stewart's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on Barbas's failure to investigate and prepare mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of trial. While Stewart's first claim is about inadequate mitigating information being provided to Dr. Afield, the second claim is about inadequate mitigation information being investigated and presented to the jury. Specifically, Stewart argues that his trial counsel failed to present readily available evidence of Mr. Scarpo's alleged abuse and Stewart's longstanding substance abuse problem to the jury at the penalty phase. 100 The state 3.850 court rejected these claims, finding that Stewart had failed to establish prejudice from Barbas's failure to present this evidence to the jury. The state 3.850 court ruled on only the prejudice prong. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court ruled on the performance prong and determined that Barbas conducted a diligent investigation and presented appropriate mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. Id. at 68. The Florida Supreme Court held that the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence in this case was well within the realm of constitutionally adequate assistance of counsel. Id. We fully agree, and, at a minimum, the Florida Supreme Court's determination on the performance prong is not objectively unreasonable. 101 Similar to the claim that Barbas provided Dr. Afield with inadequate information, Stewart's core argument is that Barbas failed to present evidence of Mr. Scarpo's alleged mistreatment of Stewart to the jury in the penalty phase. Stewart asserts that Barbas's lack of knowledge about the abuse does not excuse his failure because obvious mitigation witnesses, like Stewart's stepsisters and aunt, could have provided detailed accounts of the abuse. As a result, Stewart contends that the jury received a romanticized portrayal of his upbringing in the Scarpo household that undercut potentially crucial mitigating evidence. 102 We again reject these arguments for several reasons. First, Barbas's failure to present evidence of Mr. Scarpo's alleged abuse was not deficient because Stewart did not inform Barbas of this abuse. We agree with the Florida Supreme Court's determination that Barbas performed reasonably given his client's failure to mention Mr. Scarpo's abuse. Stewart v. State, 801 So.2d at 67. The fault for any failure to discover Mr. Scarpo's alleged abuse lies with Stewart himself. See Williams v. Head, 185 F.3d at 1237. 103 Second, as the Florida Supreme Court noted, Barbas conducted extensive preparation for the penalty phase. Barbas compiled a list of potential mitigation witnesses after speaking with Stewart and Mr. Scarpo, and Barbas hired an investigation team 32 that was very experienced in researching and investigating mitigation issues for capital cases. Id. at 66. Mr. Fernandez conducted preliminary interviews with Stewart's family members, friends, school counselor, and pastor. Following this initial research, Barbas testified that he personally interviewed witnesses, including Stewart's stepfather, stepmother, stepsisters, aunt, and grand-parents, as well as Engle and LaRue. Barbas also hired Dr. Afield as a mental health expert to conduct a thorough psychological evaluation of Stewart and testify about the emotional disturbance caused by Stewart's childhood abuse by his biological mother. 104 Based on information gleaned from this pretrial work, Barbas presented ample testimony highlighting Stewart's abuse under his biological mother's care and the trauma Stewart suffered at age thirteen upon learning tragic details about his family. Through the testimony of Stewart's family and friends, Barbas portrayed Stewart as a tortured adolescent soul who struggled to conform his conduct to the law. Barbas also presented the testimony of Dr. Afield, who forcefully argued that Stewart suffered extreme emotional disturbance that hampered his ability to control his actions. Based on Barbas's diligent penalty phase preparation and vigorous argument to the jury, we agree with the Florida Supreme Court's determination that Barbas's presentation of mitigating evidence was constitutionally adequate assistance.... Id. at 68. 105 Third, even if Barbas had known about the abuse, Stewart's stepsisters refused to testify at trial. At the state 3.850 hearing, Mr. Fernandez testified, and his interview notes confirm, that both stepsisters did not want to testify at Stewart's penalty phase due to work obligations. Without the testimony of Stewart's stepsisters, Barbas would have struggled to present evidence of Mr. Scarpo's abuse even if he were aware of any mistreatment. Because Stewart's stepsisters were unwilling to testify, Barbas could not be faulted for failing to present their testimony about Mr. Scarpo's abuse even if he had known about it. 33 106 Stewart next asserts that Barbas was unaware of the longstanding nature of Stewart's drug and alcohol abuse and, as a result, failed to present this evidence to the jury. Stewart claims that this failure was not a tactical decision because Barbas did not know about Stewart's longstanding substance abuse problem. According to Stewart, if the jury had evidence of Stewart's substance abuse problem, it would have viewed Stewart in a more sympathetic light. 107 As discussed above, the Florida Supreme Court properly determined that Barbas was well aware of Stewart's alcohol and drug abuse. Stewart v. State, 801 So.2d at 66 n. 7. Dr. Mussenden's competency and psychological evaluations provided ample details about the early roots of Stewart's problem and the extent of his alcohol and drug intake. Stewart's assertion that Barbas was unaware of Stewart's longstanding alcohol and drug use is unsupported by the record. 108 Further, Barbas's decision not to present evidence of Stewart's drug and alcohol abuse is afforded a strong presumption of reasonableness, and Barbas did not perform deficiently for several reasons. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1314; see also Fugate v. Head, 261 F.3d 1206, 1223-24 (11th Cir.2001) (noting that we avoid second-guessing counsel's strategic decisions with the benefit of hindsight). 109 First, reasonably competent counsel may not present such evidence because a detailed account of a defendant's alcohol and drug abuse is invariably a two-edged sword. Housel v. Head, 238 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have repeatedly recognized that evidence of a defendant's alcohol or drug abuse holds little mitigating value and may have the counterproductive effect of alienating the jury. See, e.g., Haliburton v. Sec'y for Dept. of Corr., 342 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir.2003) ([E]vidence [of substance abuse] can often hurt the defense as much or more than it can help.); Crawford, 311 F.3d at 1321 ([S]uch evidence often has little mitigating value and can do as much or more harm than good in the eyes of the jury.); Grayson, 257 F.3d at 1227 ([W]e note that emphasizing [the petitioner's] alcoholic youth and intoxication may also have been damaging to [the petitioner] in the eyes of the jury.). Rarely, if ever, will evidence of a long history of alcohol and drug abuse be so powerful that every objectively reasonable lawyer who had the evidence would have used it. Cf. Van Poyck, 290 F.3d at 1324 (concluding that evidence of childhood abuse is not so powerful that every reasonable lawyer would have presented it to a jury). 110 Second, at the state 3.850 hearing, although Barbas was not asked about his strategy for addressing Stewart's substance abuse at the penalty phase, Stewart's 3.850 counsel questioned Barbas about his decision not to present this evidence to establish a voluntary intoxication defense in the guilt phase. Barbas testified that he deliberately chose not to present such evidence because he believed that it would have opened the door to damaging testimony from Dr. Mussenden, including testimony about Stewart's detailed recollection of Harris's murder. Such testimony from Dr. Mussenden might have undercut the defense strategy of portraying Stewart as incapable of conforming his conduct to the law when he murdered Harris. 111 Similarly, any potential mitigating value of Stewart's substance abuse would have been offset by Dr. Mussenden's testimony at the penalty phase. See Rutherford v. Crosby, 385 F.3d 1300, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 982, 125 S.Ct. 1847, 161 L.Ed.2d 738 (2005) (concluding that counsel's decision not to present evidence of defendant's alcoholism was reasonable because such evidence would have opened the door to evidence about defendant's past violence); Hubbard v. Haley, 317 F.3d 1245, 1260 (11th Cir.2003) (upholding state court finding that counsel performed reasonably in not presenting evidence of alcoholism because such evidence would have been more than offset by mental health records indicating that defendant suffered no mental defect). 112 Third, evidence of Stewart's substance abuse also would have undermined the defense strategy of establishing childhood trauma at age thirteen as the trigger point to violence. At the penalty phase, Mr. Scarpo and Hayward testified that Stewart learned at age thirteen about his biological mother's suicide, his biological father's death in a bar fight, his uncle's murder, and two aunts' deaths in a car accident. Mr. Scarpo testified that Stewart became a bitter child filled with animosity after these revelations. Medlin and Joanne Scarpo testified that Stewart was grief-stricken at age thirteen upon learning that Mr. Scarpo was not his biological father, and Stewart had his first criminal convictions soon after this revelation. Dr. Afield testified that these tragic revelations at age thirteen were the final blow and the trigger for Stewart's future violence. 113 While Barbas built a convincing argument that Stewart's severe emotional disturbance at age thirteen led inexorably to violence, Stewart's early alcohol and drug use preceded this alleged trigger point. Dr. Mussenden's November 1980 psychological evaluation indicated that Stewart began using alcohol and drugs in sixth grade, at least a year before the trigger age of thirteen. As a result, Barbas could not have argued that the drug and alcohol abuse was a product of Stewart's suffering following the tragic revelations about his family. Evidence of Stewart's drug and alcohol abuse before age thirteen thus would have weakened Barbas's forceful argument that tragic family circumstances beyond Stewart's control at age thirteen set in motion Stewart's violent behavior. 114 Accordingly, Barbas performed reasonably in deciding not to present evidence of Stewart's longstanding alcohol and drug abuse to the jury. Therefore, we conclude that the Florida Supreme Court's determination that Barbas presented appropriate mitigation evidence was not objectively unreasonable. 115 Alternatively, Stewart has not demonstrated prejudice arising from the failure to present evidence of Mr. Scarpo's abuse or Stewart's alcohol and drug use. In the penalty phase, Barbas presented detailed accounts of Stewart's childhood abuse and suffering at the hands of his biological mother. Based on Mr. Scarpo's testimony about this mistreatment, Dr. Afield forcefully argued to the jury that Stewart had been programmed for violence by age five and could not conform his conduct to the law. Dr. Afield also mentioned Barbas's drinking at his mother's grave as an indication of severe disturbance. Based on this evidence, the state trial court found Stewart's extreme disturbance and diminished capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct as mitigating factors. 116 In light of the penalty phase evidence of abuse inflicted by Stewart's biological mother, we agree with the state 3.850 court and Florida Supreme Court that similar evidence of Mr. Scarpo's abuse would not have impacted sentencing or produced a different result. See Stewart v. State, 801 So.2d at 67 n. 10; see also Van Poyck, 290 F.3d at 1324 (finding no ineffective assistance of counsel when evidence missing from the penalty phase was merely cumulative). Stewart has also failed to establish how additional evidence of Stewart's substance abuse beyond Dr. Afield's testimony about his drinking would have altered sentencing. Aside from unsupported assertions about potential effects on the jury, Stewart points to nothing in the record that would bring into question the state 3.850 court's finding of no prejudice. 117 Finally, none of this evidence counters the clear aggravating factors in this case: (1) Stewart's commission of the murder during a robbery; and (2) Stewart's prior convictions for violent felonies, including attempted first-degree murder. 34 Weighed against these heavy aggravating circumstances, Stewart has not satisfied his high burden of proving that the sentencing outcome would have been different if the jury had evidence of Mr. Scarpo's abuse or his longstanding substance abuse problem.