Opinion ID: 1102264
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: grants of immunity

Text: The type of immunity granted to a witness, and the effect of that immunity on the admissibility of the witness' statements in a subsequent prosecution is initially dependent on the source of the immunity itself. There are essentially two sources of immunity: 1) formal, or statutory immunity and 2) informal, or pocket immunity. Statutory immunity is what may be granted by statute when a witness is summoned to testify at a trial or before a grand jury and refuses to do so by invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The State, through the explicit authorization of an immunity statute, may then grant the type of immunity afforded by the statute, and may compel the recalcitrant witness' testimony, under penalty of contempt, and over the witness' invocation of his or her right to remain silent. [5] However, the immunity provided to the witness under the statute in order to compel his or her testimony must be at a minimum co-extensive with the asserted Fifth Amendment privilege which it has displaced. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964). Therefore, the United States Supreme Court has held that where a witness' testimony is compelled through a statutory grant of immunity, prosecutorial authorities are prohibited from using the compelled testimony itself or the fruits derived from the testimony in a subsequent prosecution of the compelled witness. By preventing the use of the compelled statement in any respect, the immunity required by Murphy insures that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on the compelled witness. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); In re Parker, 357 So.2d 508 (La.1978). Unlike formal statutory grants of immunity, however, where the Fifth Amendment is necessarily implicated, informal immunity agreements are bargained for immunity agreements in which the State agrees to limit its rights in prosecuting the defendant in return for the defendant's cooperation or testimony. In an informal immunity agreement, the State is not bound by the procedures and requirements of the immunity statute, and ordinary contract principles apply when interpreting the informal agreements. United States v. Plummer, 941 F.2d 799 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Irvine, 756 F.2d 708 (9th Cir.1985). In contrast to statutory immunity, these informal agreements are contractual in nature and do not as a general proposition, bind prosecutorial authorities who are not a party to the agreement. United States v. Turner, 936 F.2d 221 (6th Cir.1991). Informal immunity agreements are enforced not because of the self-incrimination clause but because the due process clause requires prosecutors to scrupulously adhere to commitments made to suspects in which they induce the suspects to surrender their constitutional rights in exchange for the suspects giving evidence that the government needs against others which simultaneously implicates themselves. United States v. Eliason, 3 F.3d 1149, 1153 (7th Cir.1993). [6] The main distinguishing feature of an informal immunity agreement, as contrasted with a grant of statutory immunity, is that informal immunity cannot be unilaterally imposed by the State on a witness. Informal immunity, by its nature requires an agreement between a witness and prosecutorial officials. In contrast, testimony under a grant of statutory immunity is always compelled. This distinguishing characteristic was noted in United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597 (5th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 861, 110 S.Ct. 175, 107 L.Ed.2d 131 (1989), wherein the Court stated: Patently, Murphy [which involved statutory immunity] is distinguishable from the instant case. In Murphy, the defendant was stuck between the proverbial rock and a hard place: He could testify, and incriminate himself, or he could invoke the fifth amendment and risk contempt charges. As a result, the defendant had no real choice but to testify, a result which would offend fifth amendment principles. Preserving the values underlying that amendment was critical to the Murphy court. To the contrary, in this case Roberson was not compelled to do anything. He bargained with the state, convincing it to forego state property offense charges and the death penalty in exchange for his cooperation. Roberson does not suggest that the state coerced him to accept the agreement or that he did not understand its terms; there is no reason why he could not have demanded federal immunity or refused to cooperate. Neither the state nor the federal prosecutor ever forced Roberson to incriminate himself; hence the interests that were critical to the Murphy court are not involved here. Roberson, supra at 611. Both Murphy and Kastigar concerned the ability of a sovereign to compel testimony under penalty of contempt and over the witness' assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege. Nevertheless, Murphy and Kastigar do not prohibit the use of all testimony given under cooperation agreements; they simply provide a witness with immunity from the use of compelled testimony, as well as evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom. Kastigar at 453, 1661 (emphasis added). In United States v. Camp, 72 F.3d 759 at 761 (9th Cir.1995), the Court noted: The Murphy rule therefore applies only if the witness is compelled to testify. Otherwise there are no Fifth Amendment implications. In United States v. Eliason, 3 F.3d 1149, the Court stated: Eliason makes the allegation that a grant of immunity from the state followed by the witness providing information to the state prosecutor is sufficient to automatically trigger the protections of Kastigar and Murphy in a subsequent federal prosecution. Not surprisingly, the defendant overlooks the essential factor necessary to invoke the right to a Kastigar hearing: compulsion. The record is barren of any allegation much less evidence that the state authorities compelled Eliason to provide information to them, i.e., he neither provided testimony under subpoena nor under a threat of contempt. Eliason, supra at 1153. (Emphasis original). See also, State v. Wallace, 321 So.2d 349 (La.1975), (on rehearing); United States v. McHan, 101 F.3d 1027 (4th Cir.1996); Roberson, supra ; Irvine, supra ; Turner, supra ; Plummer, supra . Simply stated, statutory compulsion is necessary to trigger the protections of Kastigar and Murphy. In the instant case, neither Louisiana nor Mississippi sought to compel Edmondson's testimony. There is no evidence that Edmondson was subpoenaed or otherwise threatened with contempt for her refusal to make a statement. The record clearly establishes that Edmondson pursued and received an informal agreement that she would not be prosecuted in the murder of William Savage in exchange for her cooperation in prosecuting her accomplice for that murder. Such an informal agreement does not automatically trigger the constitutional safeguards required by Murphy and Kastigar. [7] We therefore hold that the court of appeal erred in determining that Edmondson's statement was compelled under Murphy, and that under Kastigar, the State was prohibited from using the statement or any fruits thereof.