Opinion ID: 3134725
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Presentencing Issues

Text: We begin by addressing defendant’s claim that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him because it failed to do so within the time period required by the federal courts. The federal district court mandate provided: “Emerson’s petition for habeas corpus is granted with respect to this sentence of death and denied in all other respects. The state is ordered to resentence petitioner pursuant to the dictates of the Sixth Amendment within 120 days of the date of this order.” The order was dated March 30, 1995. On July 30, 1996, the federal appellate court affirmed the federal district court. Emerson V , 91 F.3d at 907. On October 4, 1996, the federal district court issued an order that provided, “The 120-day period for Emerson’s resentencing shall run from the date on which the supreme court disposes of Emerson’s petition for certiorari .” The United States Supreme Court denied defendant’s petition for a writ of certiorari on March 17, 1997. Emerson v. Gilmore , 520 U.S. 1122, 137 L. Ed. 2d 339, 117 S. Ct. 1260 (1997). At a June 26, 1997, status conference, counsel for defendant informed the circuit court of the time limit provided in the federal district court’s order. Defense counsel indicated his agreement to begin the sentencing proceedings on July 14, 1997, the day before the expiration of the 120-day period. The circuit court, therefore, set the case for sentencing on July 14 “[b]y agreement.” On July 14, the jury for the sentencing proceedings was selected. Testimony in the eligibility phase began the next day. On July 16, the jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty. The jury returned its verdict in the aggravation-mitigation phase on July 18, 1997. The circuit court’s judgment and execution order was dated August 19, 1997. According to defendant, the 120-day time limit set by the federal courts expired on July 15, 1997, and the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to sentence him after this date. Defendant concludes that, because he was sentenced on August 19, 1997, his sentence is null and void. He, therefore, asks us to vacate his death sentence and remand the cause for imposition of a sentence other than death. The State responds that defendant’s sentence is valid because the sentencing proceedings commenced within the 120-day period. Alternatively, the State asks us to reject defendant’s argument because, inter alia , (1) defense counsel agreed to a continuance until July 14, and (2) certain delays in the sentencing proceedings were attributable to defendant. We find that defendant’s restrictive interpretation of the federal district court order is unwarranted. Counsel for both sides, as well as the circuit court, were aware of the 120-day time limit contained in the federal district court order. Given the nature of capital sentencing proceedings, their agreement to begin the sentencing proceedings on July 14, 1997, indicates that the court and the attorneys, including defense counsel, believed that the federal district court’s order required commencement, but not completion, of the sentencing proceedings within the 120-day period. We conclude that this is the reasonable interpretation of the federal district court order. See also Cave v. Singletary , 84 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that state-court sentencing proceedings were timely when, during the 90-day period mandated by the federal court order, a status conference was held at which the parties agreed on a later sentencing date). Defendant provides us with no authority to support his claim that the federal district court order required the sentencing proceedings to be completed by the expiration of the 120-day period. He relies on cases in which federal courts have found that a state court failed to comply with the time limit contained in a federal court order disposing of a defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus . In these cases, however, the state courts failed to even commence, much less complete, the necessary proceedings within the time period required by the federal court orders. See Latzer v. Abrams , 615 F. Supp. 1226 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (during the 60-day period within which the federal court required the defendant to be retried pursuant to his petition for a writ of habeas corpus , the state court arraigned the defendant but failed to begin his trial); Homan v. Sigler , 283 F. Supp. 404 (D. Neb. 1968) (the state court never conducted the evidentiary hearing that the federal court required it to hold within 90 days of its order disposing of the defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus ). Thus, these decisions fail to support defendant’s claim that initiation of resentencing proceedings within the time period ordered by a federal court is insufficient to comply with an order such as the one in this case. In any event, even assuming that the circuit court failed to comply with the time limit contained in the federal district court order, we would reject defendant’s challenge to his sentence. Even if a state court fails to conduct new sentencing proceedings within the time period ordered by the federal court pursuant to a defendant’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus , the state court may nevertheless resentence the defendant. See Smith v. Lucas , 16 F.3d 638 (5th Cir. 1994); Moore v. Zant , 972 F.2d 318 (11th Cir. 1992); see also Foster v. Lockhart , 9 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 1993) (if the state fails to retry a defendant within the time ordered by the federal court, the state may usually nevertheless rearrest and retry the defendant). Thus, even if untimely, the circuit court’s sentencing order in this case is valid.
Next, we address defendant’s argument that his sentence must be vacated and his cause remanded for a new sentencing hearing because of certain errors that occurred during voir dire . According to defendant, the circuit court erred in “death-qualifying” prospective jurors and in excusing venireperson Sandra Hersil for cause based on her views about the death penalty.
During voir dire , the circuit court asked prospective jurors whether their feelings about the death penalty were such that “no matter what the facts of the case may be and no matter what the background of the Defendant may be, that under no circumstances would you ever give the death penalty in a murder case.” The court excluded for cause those venirepersons who indicated that their feelings about the death penalty would prevent them from imposing it under any circumstances. According to defendant, the exclusion of these venirepersons violated his federal and state constitutional rights because it resulted in a jury that was more punitive and more likely to impose the death penalty and denied him his right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. See U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 8. In other cases, the United States Supreme Court has already rejected the federal constitutional challenges defendant makes to the death-qualification procedure. The Court has stated that the State has a “legitimate interest in excluding those jurors whose opposition to capital punishment would not allow them to view the proceedings impartially, and who therefore might frustrate administration of a State’s death penalty scheme.” Wainwright v. Witt , 469 U.S. 412, 416, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 846-47, 105 S. Ct. 844, 848 (1985). Thus, a juror may be excluded for cause based on his or her views on the death penalty if “the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ” Wainwright , 469 U.S. at 424, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 851-52, 105 S. Ct. at 852, quoting Adams v. Texas , 448 U.S. 38, 45, 65 L. Ed. 2d 581, 589, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 2526 (1980). Under this standard, the Court has held that a juror who “in no case would vote for capital punishment, regardless of his or her instructions, is not an impartial juror and must be removed for cause.” Morgan v. Illinois , 504 U.S. 719, 728, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 502, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2229 (1992). Defendant argues that this court should nevertheless find that the death qualification of the jury in this case violated his rights to due process and an impartial jury under the Illinois Constitution. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 8. As defendant argues, this court may interpret provisions of the Illinois Constitution more broadly than analogous federal constitutional provisions. See People v. Krueger , 175 Ill. 2d 60, 74 (1996). In determining the extent of state constitutional protections, federal decisions interpreting similar federal constitutional provisions are persuasive but not controlling. People v. McCauley , 163 Ill. 2d 414, 436 (1994). Defendant fails to offer a convincing reason why, in the context of death qualification, this court’s interpretation of state constitutional rights to due process and an impartial jury should differ from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of their federal constitutional counterparts. He provides us with no basis for concluding that the framers of the Illinois Constitution intended it to be interpreted differently than the federal constitution with respect to death qualification of jurors. See People v. DiGuida , 152 Ill. 2d 104, 118 (1992) (“[W]here the language of the State constitution, or where debates and committee reports of the constitutional convention show that the Framers intended a different construction, [this court] will construe similar provisions in a different way from that of the Supreme Court”). Moreover, in the past, this court has indicated agreement with the Supreme Court’s decisions finding that death qualification of a jury does not violate a defendant’s federal constitutional rights to due process and an impartial jury. See, e.g. , People v. Silagy , 101 Ill. 2d 147, 165 (1984); People v. Free , 94 Ill. 2d 378, 401-02 (1983). In addition, in an analogous case involving death qualification of a jury, this court has already rejected the argument that the state due process clause provides greater protections for defendants than the federal due process clause. In People v. Coleman , 168 Ill. 2d 509 (1995), this court held that, where the same jury that determines a defendant’s guilt also decides whether to impose the death penalty, death qualification of the jury does not violate the due process provision of the Illinois Constitution. After noting that the United States Supreme Court had held that death qualification of a jury under these circumstances does not violate federal due process (see Lockhart v. McCree , 476 U.S. 162, 90 L. Ed. 2d 137, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986)), the Coleman court rejected the defendant’s argument that death qualification nevertheless violates Illinois constitutional due process protections. Coleman , 168 Ill. 2d at 549-50, citing People v. Sanchez , 115 Ill. 2d 238, 266 (1986) (“defendant has not presented, nor do we perceive independently, any State constitutional basis for departing from our prior cases and the now-consistent Supreme Court position on the issue”). In arguing that this court should that find the death-qualification process violates the Illinois Constitution, defendant relies entirely on three “empirical studies on the effect of death qualification.” See C. Haney, “Modern” Death Qualification: New Data on its Biasing Effects , 18 Law & Hum. Behav. 619, 629 (1994); R. Fitzgerald & P. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes , 8 Law & Hum. Behav. 31, 46 (1984); E. Bronson, Does the Exclusion of Scrupled Jurors in Capital Cases Make the Jury More Likely to Convict? Some Evidence from California , 3 Woodrow Wilson L.J. 11, 25-31 (1981). He asserts that these studies “conclusively demonstrate that death qualification disproportionately excludes African-Americans, women, Democrats, younger people, low income people, the least and the best educated, unskilled workers, Jews, and agnostics.” Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have rejected such studies as a basis for finding that death qualification of a jury denies a defendant of his right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. See Lockhart , 476 U.S. at 168-79, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 144-51, 106 S. Ct. at 1762-68; People v. Kubat , 114 Ill. 2d 424, 439-40 (1986). In this case, we also decline to base a finding that death qualification violates our state constitution on three social science studies. We hold that it was proper for the circuit court in this case to death qualify the jury.
Defendant contends, however, that, even if we uphold the death-qualification procedure used in this case, his sentence must be vacated and his cause remanded for a new sentencing hearing because the circuit court erred in excluding prospective juror Sandra Hersil for cause based on her opposition to the death penalty. During voir dire , when venireperson Sandra Hersil was asked about her views on the death penalty, she stated: “Well, I believe what the Lord has told us that an eye is for an eye and a tooth is for a tooth, but I don’t think in reality I could judge and put a person to death. And live myself without–I don’t know if I would have psychological, emotional or what kind of trauma. I would have trauma.” The circuit court then asked Hersil whether she would refuse to vote for the death penalty, regardless of the facts of the case. Hersil replied: “I think I could probably say in reality, if my child was involved or my grandchild I would definitely say I would believe I would vote for death. But I don’t know if I could do it for other people. I guess that’s a maternal instinct in me.” The circuit court asked Hersil if she meant that, in this case, she would not be able to vote for the death penalty, no matter what the facts were. Hersil stated: “Probably the only time I could do it [is] if it involved a small child.” At the request of counsel for both sides, the circuit court informed Hersil that, under Illinois law, a person could be eligible for the death penalty in certain circumstances and asked Hersil whether she could follow the law and vote for the death penalty if that were appropriate. Hersil responded: “I think I probably would. I don’t know that I could vote for it.” According to defendant, it was error to exclude Hersil for cause because, although she indicated that imposing the death penalty might cause her psychological or emotional trauma, she indicated a “clear willingness to set aside her personal feelings and follow the law.” A prospective juror may not be removed for cause merely because he or she expresses general objections or conscientious or religious scruples against the imposition of the death penalty. Witherspoon v. Illinois , 391 U.S. 510, 522, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 784-85, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 1776-77 (1968); People v. Shaw , 186 Ill. 2d 301, 316 (1998). For a venireperson’s views on the death penalty to justify excusing that person for cause, they must “ ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ” Wainwright , 469 U.S. at 424, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 851-52, 105 S. Ct. at 852, quoting Adams v. Texas , 448 U.S. 38, 45, 65 L. Ed. 2d 581, 589, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 2526 (1980); People v. Seuffer , 144 Ill. 2d 482, 505 (1991). Removal of a venireperson for cause is appropriate unless it is clear that the venireperson is willing to set aside his or her own beliefs in favor of the rule of law. Lockhart , 476 U.S. at 176, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 149-50, 106 S. Ct. at 1766; People v. Taylor , 166 Ill. 2d 414, 423-24 (1995); People v. Pitsonbarger , 142 Ill. 2d 353, 386 (1990). In determining whether a venireperson should be excused for cause, the venireperson’s remarks must be considered as a whole. People v. Gilliam , 172 Ill. 2d 484, 511 (1996). “A trial judge need not follow a set formula in posing questions on voir dire , and it may be appropriate to exclude a prospective juror even though the person has not expressed his or her views with meticulous precision.” People v. Cole , 172 Ill. 2d 85, 99 (1996). The circuit court’s determination as to whether a prospective juror should be excused for cause will be upheld absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Terrell , 185 Ill. 2d 467, 489 (1998). We find that, viewed in their entirety, Hersil’s voir dire responses support the circuit court’s determination that her views on the death penalty would have “ ‘prevent[ed] or substantially impair[ed] the performance of [her] duties as a juror in accordance with [her] instructions and [her] oath’ ” (see Wainwright , 469 U.S. at 424, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 851-52, 105 S. Ct. at 852, quoting Adams v. Texas , 448 U.S. 38, 45, 65 L. Ed. 2d 581, 589, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 2526 (1980)). While Hersil indicated that she believed she could vote in favor of imposing the death penalty if a relative or small child were the victim, she stated that, in other cases, she did not think she could impose the death penalty or did not know if she could. Her responses do not, as defendant claims, indicate a “clear willingness” to follow the law despite her personal feelings about the imposition of the death penalty. When specifically asked whether she could follow the law by imposing the death penalty in an appropriate case, Hersil initially responded that she “probably” would, but then stated that she did not know whether she could. It was not clear from these responses that Hersil would have been able to set aside her personal beliefs and follow the law. See Lockhart , 476 U.S. at 176, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 149-50, 106 S. Ct. at 1766; Taylor , 166 Ill. 2d at 423 . In other cases involving voir dire responses similar to Hersil’s, this court has held that the circuit court properly excused the prospective jurors for cause. For example, in People v. Cole , 172 Ill. 2d 85, 100 (1996), the prospective juror initially stated that she did not really believe in the death penalty and did not know whether she could vote to impose it. The prospective juror then asserted that she would be able to follow the law and vote to impose the death penalty in an appropriate case but subsequently stated that she did not think she would be able to sign a verdict in favor of the death penalty. This court concluded that, when the prospective juror’s remarks were viewed as a whole, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excusing her for cause. Cole , 172 Ill. 2d at 100; see also Taylor , 166 Ill. 2d at 424. As in Cole , Hersil’s responses to questioning about her ability to follow the law were equivocal and indicated that she would not be able to vote in favor of the death penalty. The circuit court was in a superior position to evaluate the meaning of Hersil’s responses (see People v. Hickey , 178 Ill. 2d 256, 295-96 (1997)), and we cannot conclude based on the record that it abused its discretion in excusing her for cause. We find no error in the voir dire of prospective jurors for defendant’s sentencing hearing.