Opinion ID: 715055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: motion to modify confidentiality order

Text: 133 Plaintiffs have moved that the Court modify the Consent Protective Order entered November 30, 1993, to permit information and documents designated as confidential under that order to be used by plaintiffs' lawyers and their clients in Grayson et al. v. K Mart Corporation, 1:92-cv-141-JEC, and in Sands et al. v. K Mart Corporation, 1:93-cv-20330-JEC, consistent with the confidentiality orders in place in those cases. Because discovery has closed in the Grayson and Sands cases and granting plaintiffs' motion would have the effect of extending discovery in those cases, the Court denies the motion. Any further extension or supplementation of discovery in Grayson or Sands should be determined by Judge Carnes and not by modification of the protective order in this action. 1 II. MOTIONS TO PERMIT JOINDER, FOR LEAVE TO AMEND, AND TO AUTHORIZE NOTICE 134 Plaintiffs have filed a motion to permit joinder of similarly situated additional plaintiffs under 29 U.S.C. 216(b), for leave to amend the complaint, and to authorize notice to potential additional plaintiffs. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants these motions. 135 Plaintiffs in this action are five former store managers of Kmart retail stores who claim that they were discriminated against on the basis of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). They allege that between 1990 and 1992, following a company-wide reorganization, plaintiffs were victims of an age-motivated purge of store managers in Kmart's southern region. They seek to allow persons to join in this action who were demoted or resigned from the position of store manager during the 1990-1992 period and were at least 40 years old. They request leave to amend their complaint to add that the action is brought on behalf of other similarly situated persons and ask the Court to approve issuance of a notice to the potential additional plaintiffs informing them of their right to join in the action. A. Joinder 136 The ADEA incorporates the procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for combining claims of similarly situated plaintiffs. The procedure under the FLSA provides for an opt-in class action. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 137 Defendant argues that an opt-in class action is not appropriate here because plaintiffs have not made substantial allegations that the additional plaintiffs are similarly-situated. Defendant claims that the record does not support plaintiffs' claim that the additional class members are similarly situated. Defendant points to the February 22, 1994 Order by Judge Carnes in a similar case, ruling that the plaintiffs' claims in that case should be severed because plaintiffs had not directed the court's attention to any discrete program or procedure employed by Kmart that affected each of the plaintiffs. This Court, however, does not interpret the similarly situated language of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a discrete program or procedure affecting each of the potential plaintiffs. 138 Congress has stated its policy that ADEA plaintiffs should have the opportunity to proceed collectively. A collective action allows age discrimination plaintiffs the advantage of lower individual costs to vindicate rights by the poolings of resources. The judicial system benefits by efficient resolution in one proceeding of common issues of law and fact arising from the same alleged discriminatory activity. Hoffman [Hoffmann]-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 [110 S.Ct. 482, 486, 107 L.Ed.2d 480] (1989). In this action, plaintiffs are alleging an upper management policy of age discrimination that affected plaintiffs and the opt-in class of plaintiffs. These allegations describe the circumstances giving rise to the alleged upper management policy and the manner in which that policy allegedly resulted in age discrimination against a class of plaintiffs. Furthermore, these allegations are supported by deposition and affidavit evidence. The Court concludes that plaintiffs have made substantial allegations of common issues of law and fact arising from the same alleged discriminatory activity that is sufficient to warrant granting plaintiffs the opportunity to proceed collectively. 139 Defendant further argues that the charges filed by plaintiffs did not provide the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) with notice that plaintiffs were seeking to represent a class. Defendant claims that individuals may opt-in under the provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) only if one or more of the plaintiffs filed EEOC charges giving the EEOC notice of the class nature of the claims so that the EEOC could attempt to fulfill the conciliatory purpose of the notice requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). See Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir.1986); Church v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 137 F.R.D. 294, 300-01 (N.D.Cal.1991). Defendant claims that plaintiffs' EEOC charges did not allege either class-wide discrimination or that they were filed on behalf of a class. 140 All of the circuits that have addressed this issue have held that the timely filing of an administrative claim by a named plaintiff in a § 216(b) class action satisfies the filing obligation of all members of the class as long as the administrative claim gave notice to the administrative agency of alleged class discrimination. 2 Tolliver v. Xerox Corp., 918 F.2d 1052, 1058 (2nd Cir.1990) (even where an ADEA class action has been decertified, individuals may piggyback onto an administrative claim filed by another individual as long as the claim indicated that the grievance affects a group of individuals, alerting the administrative agency that more is alleged than an isolated act of discrimination and giving sufficient notice to the employer for it to explore conciliation with the affected group); Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 852 F.2d 1008, 1016 (7th Cir.1988) (similarly situated individuals can opt-in to a suit if the plaintiff's administrative claim gave notice to the administrative agency and the defendant that the discrimination is class-wide); Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 1062, 1078-79 (3rd Cir.1988) (so long as class issues are alleged, a timely charge may serve as the basis for a class action); Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986) (to serve as a basis for a class action, claim must allege class-wide discrimination or that it represents class); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (claimant must purport in the administrative claim to represent a class or others similarly situated); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir.1980). 141 In this action, plaintiff Kempton's administrative claim states that [w]ithin the last year, at least fifteen (15) other store managers, all over age 40, have been demoted. Plaintiff Taylor's administrative claim states that [o]ther older store managers have been demoted. Plaintiff Bob Williams' administrative claim states that [a]t least six other store managers, over age 40 years, were also demoted and cut in pay. The Court concludes that these timely filed administrative claims filed by three of the five named plaintiffs in this action gave notice of class discrimination to the EEOC and to Kmart, alerting the agency and employer that more is alleged than an isolated act of discrimination and that these claims therefore satisfy the filing obligation of all members of the class. Accordingly, the Court grants plaintiffs' motion to permit joinder of similarly situated additional plaintiffs under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). B. Leave to Amend 142 Defendant argues that the Court should deny plaintiffs' motions as untimely. [A] party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); Nolin v. Douglas County, 903 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11th Cir.1990). District courts have only limited discretion to deny a party leave to amend the pleadings. Espey v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 748 (11th Cir.1984); Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Investment Corp., 660 F.2d 594 (5th Cir.1981). Thus, the Court is constrained to allow a plaintiff leave to amend unless there is substantial countervailing reason. Id. In determining whether to grant leave to amend, a court may consider undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and the futility of the amendment. Nolin, 903 F.2d at 1550 (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 [83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222] (1962)). 143 After reviewing the motion and responses in this action, the Court concludes that defendant has not demonstrated any substantial countervailing reasons to deny plaintiffs leave to amend and grants plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint to add that the action is brought on behalf of other similarly situated individuals. C. Notice 144 Plaintiffs have requested that the Court approve issuance of a notice to the potential additional plaintiffs informing them of their right to join in this action. In Hoffman [Hoffmann]-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 [110 S.Ct. 482, 107 L.Ed.2d 480] (1989), the Supreme Court approved district court involvement in the notification process to potential opt-in members in an ADEA § 216(b) class action. The Supreme Court held that district courts have discretion, in appropriate cases, to implement 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), as incorporated by 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), in ADEA actions by facilitating notice to potential plaintiffs. Id. at 169 [110 S.Ct. at 485]. 145 Defendant argues, however, that it should not be ordered to provide names and addresses of all store managers demoted in the southern Region during 1990-92 and those who resigned after notice of demotion, because only those former store managers who timely filed EEOC claims would be eligible to opt-in, under what defendant claims is binding precedent. Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.1977). The Court notes that the Price decision was rendered before the 1978 amendment to the ADEA concerning the notice requirement which has been interpreted by the courts as not requiring each plaintiff to have filed a timely administrative claim. See Lusardi, 855 F.2d at 1077; see also, McCorstin, 621 F.2d at 755. In addition, in cases filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et. seq., the Eleventh Circuit has adopted the single filing rule allowing a plaintiff who has not filed an EEOC claim to rely on another plaintiff's EEOC claim if the claim was timely and arose out of similar discriminatory treatment in the same time frame. Calloway v. Partners Nat'l Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446, 449-50 (11th Cir.1993). The purpose of the notification requirement in Title VII is analogous to that of the ADEA. Accordingly, the Court does not agree with defendant that only those individuals that timely filed an administrative claim are eligible under § 216(b) and grants plaintiffs' motion that the Court approve issuance of a notice to the potential additional plaintiffs informing them of their right to join the action.