Opinion ID: 436310
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant Kupperman

Text: 8 Dr. Demery alleges that defendant Kupperman deprived him of his civil rights by (a) wilfully inducing certain investigative agents to commit perjury, and (b) failing to notify Dr. Demery that he was revoking the BMQA's waiver of certain requirements contained in the BMQA's order of August 31, 1977. He seeks both damages and equitable relief. 9 With regard to the prayer for equitable relief, the complaint against Kupperman was properly dismissed. Dr. Demery does not contend, and it does not appear, that Deputy Attorneys General have any role whatever in the issuance or vacation of BMQA orders or in the revocation or restoration of medical licenses. See Cal. Const. art. V, Sec. 13 (describing powers of Attorney General); Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code Secs. 2000-22 (West 1984) (describing powers, duties, and structure of BMQA). The Attorney General simply acts as legal counsel to the board in judicial and administrative proceedings against it. See Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code Sec. 2020 (West 1984). 10 With regard to the prayer for damages, Dr. Demery argues that, because the conduct that allegedly gave rise to the civil rights violations was administrative or investigative, not quasi-judicial, in nature, the district court erred in finding Kupperman absolutely immune. We agree with the district court that Kupperman was absolutely immune from this type of suit. 11 In enacting section 1983, Congress did not abrogate the common-law immunity that state officials traditionally enjoyed. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951). The contours of prosecutors' immunity from section 1983 suits were outlined by the Supreme Court in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) and Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). In Imbler, the Court held that prosecutors, both state and federal, are absolutely immune from section 1983 damage suits challenging conduct intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct. at 995. It expressly declined to consider whether like or similar reasons require immunity for those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate. Id. at 430-31, 96 S.Ct. at 994-95. The Court thus left standing the Ninth Circuit rule, enunciated in Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir.1965), that a prosecutor is absolutely immune when he acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, but that he enjoys only a qualified immunity [i]f he acts in the role of a policeman. Id. at 536. 12 In Imbler, the Court recognized that the line between administrative or investigative acts and quasi-judicial acts is not always a clear one. It noted that some of the duties of a prosecutor in his role as an advocate for the state involve actions that may also be denominated administrative or investigative. 424 U.S. at 430-31 & n. 33, 96 S.Ct. at 995 & n. 33. It declined, however, to lay down rules for determining which such duties would give rise to absolute prosecutorial immunity. We recently undertook that task in Freeman ex rel. the Sanctuary v. Hittle, 708 F.2d 442 (9th Cir.1983) (per curiam) and Ybarra v. Rose, 723 F.2d 675 (9th Cir.1984). In those cases, we held that that absolute prosecutorial immunity attaches to the actions of a prosecutor if those actions were performed as part of the prosecutor's preparation of his case, even if they can be characterized as investigative or administrative. Freeman, 708 F.2d at 443 (investigative acts); Ybarra, 723 F.2d at 679 (administrative acts). 13 In Butz v. Economou, the Supreme Court held that officials performing the functions of a prosecutor in administrative proceedings are entitled to the absolute prosecutorial immunity described in Imbler. Butz, 438 U.S. at 511-12, 98 S.Ct. at 2913-14. Although Butz involved federal administrative officials, we have held that the Imbler immunity also applies to state administrative officials who perform functions analogous to those of a prosecutor. Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102, 102 S.Ct. 678, 70 L.Ed.2d 644 (1981). 14 The first of Dr. Demery's claims against Kupperman is squarely controlled by the Supreme Court's holdings in Imbler and Butz, as refined by our holdings in Freemanand Ybarra. Appellant contends that Kupperman induced witnesses to testify falsely. The alleged inducement occurred while Kupperman was conferring with the witnesses for the purpose of determining whether to bring charges against Dr. Demery. We think that conferring with potential witnesses for the purpose of determining whether to initiate proceedings is plainly a function intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct. at 995, and is therefore a quasi-judicial function to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force. Id. We doubt that such a function can be characterized as administrative or investigative. See Heidelberg v. Hammer, 577 F.2d 429 (7th Cir.1978) (prosecutor absolutely immune from suit alleging that he falsified line-up reports); Lee v. Willins, 474 F.Supp. 970 (E.D.N.Y.) (prosecutor absolutely immune from suit alleging that he coerced false testimony), aff'd, 617 F.2d 320 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861, 101 S.Ct. 165, 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980). But even if it could be so characterized, Kupperman is immune under our holdings in Freeman and Ybarra, for conferring with potential witnesses regarding their knowledge of underlying events is plainly part of a prosecutor's preparation of his case. The fact that inducing false testimony is wrongful and indefensible is not relevant to the question whether immunity attaches. Underlying the doctrine of absolute immunity is a recognition that the advancement of broader public policies sometimes requires that concededly tortious conduct, no matter how reprehensible, go unremedied, at least by means of a civil action for damages. 15 Dr. Demery next complains of Kupperman's failure to notify him of the revocation of the waiver of the medical course requirement. Because that failure did not occur in connection with the preparation of the case, our holdings in Freeman and Ybarra do not in terms control. We believe, however, that the principles that underlie the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity require a holding that prosecutors are absolutely immune from civil suits alleging wrongdoing with regard to post-litigation as well as pre-litigation handling of a case. 16 The necessity for absolute prosecutorial immunity was summarized by the Supreme Court in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-13, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2913-14, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). First, prosecutors are, like judges and witnesses, particularly susceptible to harassment suits because [t]he loser in one forum will frequently seek another, charging the participants in the first with unconstitutional animus. Butz, 438 U.S. at 512, 98 S.Ct. at 2913. As the Court stated in Imbler, a defendant will often transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions to the state's advocate. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425, 96 S.Ct. at 992. Second, the safeguards built into the judicial process tend to reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct. Butz, 438 U.S. at 512, 98 S.Ct. at 2914. Most important among these safeguards is the correctability of error on appeal and through collateral attack. 17 The first factor focuses on the prosecutor's status, not on the nature of the claim against him. This factor thus weighs just as heavily in favor of immunity for a prosecutor's handling of a case after trial as before and during trial. Because by hypothesis resentful defendants initiate suits irrationally or for purposes of harassment, they are just as likely to ascribe unconstitutional purposes to the prosecutor's post-trial acts as to his acts before and during trial. 18 The second factor also favors absolute prosecutorial immunity for a prosecutor's post-trial acts, for the safeguards built into the judicial process apply to those acts as well. For instance, if Dr. Demery had a right to be notified of a revocation of the waiver of the medical-course requirement, his failure to receive that notice would render the revocation ineffective. In addition, if he had a right to be notified of the revocation before his time for appeal had run, it is likely that the time for appeal would be considered tolled under state law. Like allegations of misconduct during the trial preparation stage, allegations of misconduct in a prosecutor's post-trial handling of a case can generally be corrected without resort to a civil trial for damages. This claim, like the claim in Ybarra, is the type that the Supreme Court, in its wisdom, wanted to prevent and recognized would be better handled by various post-trial remedies .... Ybarra, 723 F.2d at 679-80 (quoting Ybarra v. Rose, No. 81-4922, slip op. at 9 (C.D.Cal. Dec. 30, 1981)). 19 We thus do not believe that a meaningful distinction can be drawn, for purposes of applying the immunity described in Imbler, between a prosecutor's post-trial handling of a case and his handling of a case before or during trial. In accordance with the Court's holding in Butz that this immunity applies equally in the context of administrative proceedings, we hold that defendant Kupperman is absolutely immune from the claim for damages based on the allegation that he wrongfully failed to notify Dr. Demery of the revocation of the waiver of the medical-course requirement.