Opinion ID: 1801741
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sentencing for Second Degree Murder

Text: The jury convicted defendant of three homicidesโthe first degree murders of Albano and Toronczak, and the second degree murder of Stadtโand also found true the single multiple-murder special-circumstance allegation. At the penalty phase, the jury was given two alternative verdict forms reflecting the choice of imposing either a single sentence of death or a single sentence of life without the possibility of parole. [22] The verdict forms did not reflect that the identified sentence would apply only to the two first degree murders of Albano and Toronczak, and not to the second degree murder of Stadt. Defendant does not contend it was error to allow the jury to render a single death verdict, rather than individual verdicts for each of the two capital crimes. Rather, he asserts that the forms provided, combined with the court's failure to specify in its instructions the counts on which the penalty decision was to be based and with the prosecution's argument describing the case as being about three murders, misled the jury into returning a death sentence for all three murders, including the second degree murder of Stadt. According to defendant, the jurors were obligated to determine whether or not to impose the death penalty for two first-degree murders made worse by the fact that there were three homicides altogether. In claiming the jurors were instead allowed to sentence him to death for three homicides, including one second-degree murder, defendant asserts the error violated his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, due process, a reliable penalty determination, and meaningful appellate review. We are not persuaded. In accordance with the mandate of section 190.3, the trial court instructed the jury that, in reaching its penalty decision, it must consider the various factors in aggravation and in mitigation, including the circumstances of the crime of which defendant was convicted and the special circumstances found true. (ง 190.3, factor (a); CALJIC No. 8.85.) Consistent with section 190.3 and the court's instructions, the prosecution properly reminded the jury, without any defense objection, that it had proved three murders, three of them. After reviewing the circumstances of the Stadt and Albano murders, the prosecution argued, also without objection, that defendant deserved the death penalty for those two murders and the multiple-murder special-circumstance finding. The prosecution then argued that if that was not enough for the jury to vote for death, then there was another murder to consider, that of Toronczak, and that together the three murders certainly warranted a death verdict. [23] The instructions were correct, the prosecution's arguments were appropriate, and the jury was not misled. On this point, no state law or constitutional error occurred. Defendant is correct, however, that the trial court entered a judgment that erroneously imposed only a single sentenceโdeathโas to all three murder counts. Respondent agrees and acknowledges that a death sentence is not authorized for second degree murder. Accordingly, pursuant to our statutory power to modify an unauthorized sentence (ง 1260), we vacate the death sentence imposed on the second degree murder count (count two) and order the judgment modified to reflect the appropriate sentence for that count, which is a state prison term of 15 years to life. ( People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1048 & fn. 7 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 82, 162 P.3d 596].) Contrary to defendant's suggestion, we find it entirely unnecessary, given the circumstances of this case, to remand the matter to the trial court to allow consideration whether the authorized sentence on the second degree murder count should be stayed.