Opinion ID: 1159607
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prejudice requirement

Text: Petitioner first contends the trial court erred in granting defendant relief under section 1016.5 without requiring him to demonstrate he was prejudiced by the incomplete advisement he received at the time of his 1992 plea. Petitioner contends that, in order to prevail on his section 1016.5 motion, defendant must show not only that the trial court failed, at the time of that plea, to advise him as provided by the statute and that there exists, at the time of the motion, more than a remote possibility that his conviction will have one or more of the specified adverse immigration consequences (§ 1016.5, subd. (b)), but also that, properly advised, he would not have pleaded no contest in the first place. For the following reasons, we agree.
Initially, [a]s in any case of statutory interpretation, our task is to determine afresh the intent of the Legislature by construing in context the language of the statute. ( Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 1159, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) In determining such intent, we begin with the language of the statute itself. ( Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 73, 276 Cal. Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373.) That is, we look first to the words the Legislature used, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. ( City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 90, 260 Cal.Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222.) If there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, 'then the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.' ( Lennane v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 263, 268, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 563, 885 P.2d 976.) But when the statutory language is ambiguous, `the court may examine the context in which the language appears, adopting the construction that best harmonizes the statute internally and with related statutes.' ( Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery (1998) 19 Cal.4th 714, 724, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 506, 968 P.2d 65.) In construing a statute, we must also consider `the object to be achieved and the evil to be prevented by the legislation.'  ( Harwich v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 276, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 222, 980 P.2d 927.) And, wherever possible, we will interpret a statute as consistent with applicable constitutional provisions, seeking to harmonize Constitution and statute. ( California Housing Finance Agency v. Elliott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 575, 594, 131 Cal.Rptr. 361, 551 P.2d 1193, citing numerous authorities.) By its terms, section 1016.5 applies whenever, after January 1, 1978, the court fails to advise the defendant as required and the defendant shows that conviction of the offense ... may have the consequences specified therein. (§ 1016.5, subd. (b).) In such circumstances, section 1016.5 provides that, on defendant's motion, the court shall vacate the judgment and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and enter a plea of not guilty. ( Id., subd. (b).) Section 1016.5 contains an express statement of the legislative intent underlying the statute. (§ 1016.5, subd. (d).) The Legislature was concerned about the many instances involving an individual who is not a citizen of the United States charged with an offense punishable as a crime in which a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is entered without the defendant knowing that a conviction of such offense is grounds for deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States. ( Ibid. ) Therefore, the Legislature declared, section 1016.5 was enacted to promote fairness to such accused individuals by requiring in such cases that acceptance of a guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere be preceded by an appropriate warning of the special consequences for such a defendant which may result from the plea. ( Id., subd. (d).) [7] Partly on the basis of section 1016.5, subdivision (d), some Courts of Appeal have expressly or impliedly engrafted onto section 1016.5 prejudice or diligence requirementsmost commonly that the defendant was, in fact, ignorant of potential adverse immigration consequences, or that he would not have pleaded guilty had proper advisements been given. (See, e.g., People v. Castaneda (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1612, 1617-1622, 44 Cal. Rptr.2d 666; People v. Murillo (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1298,1305, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 403; People v. Aguilera (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 128,130-132, 208 Cal.Rptr. 418.) Defendant suggests that the Legislature's use of shall vacate the judgment in section 1016.5, subdivision (b) renders the statute a per se rule of reversal, incompatible with a construction that requires defendants to demonstrate prejudice. We disagree. While the word `shall' in a statute is ordinarily deemed mandatory, and `may' permissive ( California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1143, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 693, 899 P.2d 79), a court may consider the consequences that would follow from a particular construction and will not readily imply an unreasonable legislative purpose ( id. at p. 1147, 43 Cal. Rptr.2d 693, 899 P.2d 79). We conclude that defendant's proffered construction does not accord with the legislative purpose underlying section 1016.5. Defendant correctly observes that section 1016.5, subdivision (b) expressly details only one proof requirement relating to the consequences of a court's failure to give the advisements required by section 1016.5, subdivision (a), i.e., that the defendant show that conviction of the offense to which he pleaded guilty or nolo contendere actually may have one or more of the specified adverse immigration consequences. On the other hand, section 1016.5 contains no express reference to prejudice and thus is silent on the question whether such a requirement may be inferred. Fortunately, `we do not construe statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.' ( Harwich v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 276, 87 Cal. Rptr.2d 222, 980 P.2d 927.) Accordingly, in construing section 1016.5 with respect to prejudice, we may be guided by other provisions in the criminal law relating to that topic. (See, e.g., Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 (hereafter article VI, section 13); Pen. Code, § 1404.)
Article VI, section 13 provides, in its entirety: No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. In seeking review, petitioner suggested that the trial court, in granting defendant's section 1016.5 motion, had permitted the vacating of a judgment where there was no injustice, implicating article VI, section 13. Petitioner points out that failure to advise a defendant in compliance with section 1016.5 is not one of the few errors that have been found so fundamental as to be reversible per se despite article VI, section 13. Petitioner argues we must prefer a construction requiring section 1016.5 movants to demonstrate prejudice because a contrary construction would call into question the statute's constitutionality. (See Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 53, 65, 195 P.2d 1 [court will not reach out and unnecessarily pronounce upon the constitutionality of any duly enacted statute].) Defendant contends petitioner is precluded from relying on article VI, section 13 for the first time on appeal, not having invoked that constitutional provision in the trial court. Petitioner acknowledges having explicitly invoked article VI, section 13 for the first time in the Court of Appeal, but argues the invocation was not a change in legal theory, but rather, mere elucidation of one aspect of its trial court theory that section 1016.5 is subject to equitable defenses. We need not determine whether petitioner's first express references to article VI, section 13 in fact echo earlier themes. Defendant's own authority on the theory of trial doctrine notes its application is discretionary with the reviewing court and, in any event, subject to an exception for appellate reliance on a new theory where the issue is one of law alone. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 406, p. 457; see also id., § 407, p. 459.) The exception applies here, as petitioner's theory indeed raises a purely legal issue, i.e., whether our construing section 1016.5 not to require a demonstration of prejudice might implicate article VI, section 13. Substantively, defendant argues article VI, section 13 does not apply to a vacation of judgment under section 1016.5. As defendant points out, we long have recognized that [t]he amendment by which [former article VI, section 4½ predecessor to article VI, section 13] was added to the constitution was not `designed to repeal or abrogate the guarantees accorded persons accused of crime by other parts of the same constitution, or to overthrow all statutory rales of procedure and evidence in criminal cases.' ( People v. Hall (1926) 199 Cal. 451, 458, 249 P. 859, quoting People v. O'Bryan (1913) 165 Cal. 55, 65, 66, 130 P. 1042 [holding final test of miscarriage of justice is the opinion of the appellate court upon the result of the error, not whether error is constitutional].) From the first, defendant notes, in considering article VI, section 13 (and former art. VI, § 4½) we have recognized [i]t is an essential part of justice that the question of guilt or innocence shall be determined by an orderly legal procedure, in which the substantial rights belonging to defendants shall be respected. ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, at p. 65, 130 P. 1042.) The court's error in misadvising him, defendant argues, so compromised his substantial right to make an informed plea that it cannot be considered merely error as to any matter of procedure within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Petitioner concedes that article VI, section 13 does not encompass misadvisement under section 1016.5 as a misdirection of the jury, an improper admission or rejection of evidence or an error as to any matter of pleading. Petitioner insists, however, that article VI, section 13 does encompass a trial court's failure to deliver full section 1016.5 advisements as an error as to any matter of procedure because the law regards as procedural all `those legal rules which direct the course of proceedings'  ( People v. Williamson (1933) 134 Cal.App. 775, 781, 26 P.2d 681) without conferring substantive rights. No court previously has considered whether a criminal defendant's right under section 1016.5 to receive from the court specified immigration advisements on the record is a matter of procedure, error in the implementation of which is subject to article VI, section 13. Our previous pronouncements in an analogous situation, however, provide useful guidance. We repeatedly have referred to the judicially declared rule compelling advisement of the direct consequences of a guilty plea as one of criminal procedure. ( People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1022, 1 Cal. Rptr.2d 902, 819 P.2d 861; accord, People v. Barella (1999) 20 Cal.4th 261, 266, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 975 P.2d 37; People v. Wright (1987) 43 Cal.3d 487, 495, 233 Cal. Rptr. 69, 729 P.2d 260.) Moreover, we have relied on article VI, section 13 in holding that [a] trial court's failure to comply with this judicial rule of criminal procedure requires reversal only if it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached if he had been properly advised. ( People v. Wright, supra, at p. 495, 233 Cal.Rptr. 69, 729 P.2d 260, fn. omitted.) As noted, People v. Williamson , cited by both parties, calls procedural `those legal rules which direct the course of proceedings to bring parties into court, and the course of the court after they are brought in.' ( People v. Williamson, supra, 134 Cal.App. at pp. 781-782, 26 P.2d 681, quoting Kring v. Missouri (1882) 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506.) On its face, section 1016.5's requirement that courts administer [specified immigration advisements] on the record to the defendant (§ 1016.5, subd. (a)) before accepting a guilty or nolo contendere plea would seem to be such a rule. Of course, the precise legal rule at issuethat criminal defendants preparing to plead guilty or no contest be given specified immigration advisementsis not primarily of judicial origin. Section 1016.5 confers important rights our Legislature accorded in fairness to ... accused individuals (§ 1016.5, subd. (d)). But section 1016.5 rights are not substantive in the sense of flowing from `the prerogative of the legislature to declare what ... acts shall be unlawful' ( Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1093, fn. 6, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680, overruled on another point in Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 80, fn. 6, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 960 P.2d 1046). With all appropriate deference, we cannot derive, merely from the Legislature's reference to fairness in section 1016.5, subdivision (d), an intent that the procedural safeguards mandated thereby be regarded as essential element[s] of a fair trial or due process ( People v. Sarazzawski (1945) 27 Cal.2d 7, 11, 161 P.2d 934) so as to insulate any error in providing them from analysis, under article VI, section 13, as error as to any matter of procedure. Furthermore, we are not persuaded that defendant's rights under section 1016.5 are, by their nature, so important as to constitute an essential part of justice ( People v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. at p. 65, 130 P. 1042), any deprivation of which must be regarded as a miscarriage. Nor do we believe a trial court's failure to deliver complete section 1016.5 advisements ranks among the kinds of errors that, regardless of the evidence, may result in a `miscarriage of justice' because they operate to deny a criminal defendant ... a fair trial ( People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 501, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037) as does, for example, the denial of the defendant's right to a jury trial or to an impartial trial judge ( ibid. ). (See also People v. Succop (1967) 67 Cal.2d 785, 789-790, 63 Cal.Rptr. 569, 433 P.2d 473 [denial of hearing on temporary commitment constituted deprivation of substantial right]; People v. Sarazzawski supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 18, 161 P.2d 934 [same re denial of reasonable opportunity to present new trial motion]; see generally 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Reversible Error, §§ 3303-3311, pp. XXXX-XXXX [discussing types of errors held per se reversible notwithstanding art. VI, § 13].) Defendant relies heavily on People v. Gontiz, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th 1309, 68 Cal. Rptr.2d 786 ( Gontiz ), which held that section 1016.5 does not require a defendant moving for relief thereunder to show prejudice, beyond that his conviction actually may have adverse immigration consequences. ( Gontiz, supra, at p. 1317, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 786.) The Gontiz court, noting that section 1016.5, subdivision (b) contains no express reference to prejudice, opined the statute provides for mandatory vacation of judgment where a trial court fails to give the specified advisements, limited only by the requirement that the movant be in danger of suffering those consequences. ( Gontiz, supra, at p. 1311, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 786.) As far as it goes, we do not find the reasoning of Gontiz entirely unpersuasive. But Gontiz did not consider whether section 1016.5 should be construed in order to avoid state constitutional infirmities, and cases are not authority for propositions not considered. ( People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 482, fn. 7, 82 Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 P.2d 580.) Obviously, the principle of construction invoked by the Gontiz court that a criminal statute's ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the defendant ( Gontiz, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1318, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 786)cannot take precedence over paramount constitutional considerations. Ultimately, we need not decide whether defendant's state statutory right to receive specified immigration advisements is constitutionally qualified by the duty of California appellate courts to examine 'the entire cause' when any [`error as to any matter of procedure'] is alleged and to affirm the judgment absent a `miscarriage of justice' ( People v. Wims (1995) 10 Cal.4th 293, 310, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77 [bracketed text quoting art. VI, § 13 added]), as defendant fails to adduce any authority suggesting the Legislature, when enacting section 1016.5, intended to depart from the normal rules, consonant with that constitutional provision, governing withdrawal of a plea for misadvisement regarding collateral consequences. Defendant does not dispute that immigration consequences, generally, are considered collateral consequences of a criminal conviction. ( Gontiz, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1311, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 786; see also People v. Limones (1991) 233 Cal. App.3d 338, 344, 284 Cal.Rptr. 418.) As defendant's own authority acknowledges, [n]ormally a motion to vacate a plea based on misadvisement or omission of a collateral consequence requires the defendant to demonstrate that he would not have entered into the plea had he known of the consequence. ( Gontiz, supra, at p. 1311, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 786, citing People v. Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1022-1023, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 902, 819 P.2d 861.) We see no indication that the Legislature intended section 1016.5 to operate as an exception.
On the other hand, for the entire period of section 1016.5's existence (and before), the Legislature has provided that no mistake or error in a proceeding mandated by the Penal Code renders the proceeding invalid, absent prejudice to the defendant's substantial rights. (§ 1404.) Thus, section 1404 provides that: Neither a departure from the form or mode prescribed by this Code in respect to any pleading or proceeding, nor an error or mistake therein, renders it invalid, unless it has actually prejudiced the defendant, or tended to his prejudice, in respect to a substantial right. Enacted in its present form by the Legislature in 1872, section 1404 is derived from a provision that entered the code in 1851. (Stats.1851, ch. 29, § 601, p. 279.) We long have held that section 1404 constitutes a legislative command that courts disregard technical errors in procedure unless they impact the substantial rights of defendants. (See, e.g., People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1164-1165, 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315 [omissions in stenographic record]; In re Etie (1946) 27 Cal.2d 753, 757, 167 P.2d 203 [failure of parole revocation order to specify ground]; People v. Durrani (1897) 116 Cal. 179, 198, 48 P. 75 [peremptory challenge of juror].) Most recently, we cited section 1404 in concluding that a trial court's use of an inaccurately worded form for the jury to record its finding on a prior felony conviction allegation created no prejudicial defect in the finding. ( People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 330-331, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374.) We do not presume that the Legislature intends, when it enacts a statute, to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such intention is clearly expressed or necessarily implied. ( Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77, 92, 104 Cal.Rptr. 226, 501 P.2d 234.) Rather, we must assume that, when enacting section 1016.5, the Legislature was aware of existing related laws and intended to maintain a consistent body of rules. ( Fuentes v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 1, 7, 128 Cal.Rptr. 673, 547 P.2d 449.) There is no indication the Legislature enacted section 1016.5 in denigration of, or as an exception to, section 1404's general proviso that only those procedural errors that prejudice the defendant's substantial rights render the criminal proceeding invalid. Moreover, to afford relief for incomplete advisement under section 1016.5 only to defendants who demonstrate they were prejudiced thereby accords with the Legislature's expressly stated purpose of addressing instances in which pleas are entered without the defendant knowing the immigration consequences. (§ 1016.5, subd. (d).) For the foregoing reasons, and in order to avoid whatever constitutional infirmity a contrary construction might engender, we have no difficulty construing section 1016.5 to require that defendants, in order to obtain relief under subdivision (b) of the statute, demonstrate they were prejudiced by any failure of the court to provide complete advisements under subdivision (a). Accordingly, when ruling on defendant's section 1016.5 motion, the trial court in this case erred in failing to consider, not only whether it formerly had failed to advise defendant as section 1016.5 requires and whether, as a consequence of his conviction on the offense to which he pleaded nolo contendere, defendant actually faces one or more of the statutorily specified immigration consequences, but also whether defendant was prejudiced by the court's having provided incomplete advisements. [8] Although the order of the trial court must therefore be reversed, for the guidance of the trial court on remand we turn now to discussion of petitioner's other claims of error.