Opinion ID: 2766626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Excusal for cause of Prospective Juror A.J.

Text: Defendant contends that the death sentence must be reversed because the trial court erred in excusing for cause Prospective Juror A.J. The trial court concluded that A.J. would have difficulty following the law on felony murder in a case in which the defendant did not actually kill or intend to kill. As explained in 10 more detail below, Prospective Juror A.J. indicated in his questionnaire that if his conscience conflicted with the law, he would follow his conscience. Although he stated during voir dire that if he were sworn as a juror he would follow the law, he also made clear that the law making a defendant liable for felony murder and a special circumstance would present an extreme conflict for him if the defendant did not intend to kill, and that he would prefer not to be in that situation. We conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the prosecution‘s challenge for cause. On his questionnaire, Prospective Juror A.J. responded to a query about how he would deal with a situation in which the law differed from his beliefs or opinions by stating, ―If it were a moral issue I would opt for my conscience. Otherwise I would do my duty in accordance with the law.‖ In response to another question, he affirmed that he could set aside his personal feelings regarding what the law should be and follow the law as explained by the court. The court began voir dire by noting these responses and explaining that, as a juror, A.J. would have to agree to put aside his views and follow the law. Asked if he could make that agreement, A.J. responded, ―I think so.‖ Asked if he had some particular concern about a moral belief that might conflict with the law, he responded that he did not know what might occur. The court noted that when asked on the questionnaire whether, concerning the issue of penalty, he would limit himself to considering only those factors enumerated by the court, he had written, ―If I must, yes.‖ A.J. explained that when answering that question he had been thinking that there might be a conflict between the law and his moral judgment. The court explained that no one knew exactly what the evidence at trial might be, and that jurors are asked to take an oath that if a conflict arises between their personal views and the law, they would set aside their views and follow the 11 law. The court stated it needed to know whether, if there was a conflict, A.J. would follow his conscience and not follow the law. A.J. responded, ―At this time, I don‘t know whether that situation would arise; therefore I would say, having to answer your question, I would say that I would set aside in order to follow my duty as a juror.‖ A.J. affirmed that he could ―be an impartial juror who will faithfully apply the law in this case.‖ When defense counsel questioned him, counsel commented that A.J. had hesitated every time that he answered a question about his ability to follow the law. Counsel asked what personal feelings he might have that might interfere with his ability to follow the law. A.J. responded that he had never been a juror before. When defense counsel asked whether A.J.‘s hesitation had anything to do with this being a capital case, A.J. responded, ―No doubt that has something to do with it, also.‖ He added, ―I‘m a person who is directed by my conscience. Now, if I promise, through an oath, to set that aside, I will certainly do my duty . . . I don‘t know if the situation — the specific situation will . . . arise where I will be in conflict. But as I said, . . . if I make an oath, say I will set that aside, that will be my primary responsibility.‖ During a break, the court expressed its ―ongoing concern about this juror‘s potential conflict . . . whether or not he can honestly make the commitment to follow the law regardless of a possible conflict.‖ The court encouraged the prosecutor to question the prospective juror on this issue. The prosecutor asked A.J. about his views on the death penalty and A.J. stated that he ―could apply it as a juror‖ and affirmed that he had no concerns about it in relation to his conscience or his moral beliefs. The prosecutor later explained the felony-murder rule and provided a hypothetical in which two former employees of a grocery store burned the store down at night, hoping that no one would be working at that time. One supplied 12 the gasoline and drove the two to the store, and the other lit the fire. The prosecutor asked whether A.J. could follow the law that both would be liable for murder. A.J. responded that he could not, because in the hypothetical there was ―no intention to kill.‖ A.J. promptly clarified, however, that if he had been sworn in as a juror to follow the law, he would do so ―regardless of what my conscience says.‖ He explained that he did not agree with the law in the hypothetical described by the prosecutor, but if sworn in as a juror he would ―follow the law as explained to me by the court.‖ When further pressed by the prosecutor about whether he could follow the law that the man who drove the car in the scenario would be liable for murder ―even though he had no intention to kill and he was not the actual killer,‖ A.J. stated that he would follow the law but ―I prefer not to be in that situation. . . . But if I place myself in that situation and I said to the court, yes, you swear me in, I will follow the law.‖ The prosecutor then explained that the person in the hypothetical who drove the car could be liable for a special circumstance ―if the jury finds that he acted as a major participant and with a reckless indifference to human life.‖ The prosecutor asked whether A.J. could follow the law making that person guilty of the special circumstance. His initial answer was ―no.‖ The trial court interrupted and explained that although the facts of the hypothetical were not those of the present case, he should assume that they might equally put him in a situation in which the law was in conflict with his conscience. The court asked whether he could take the oath. A.J. responded, ―I am telling you that if I was sworn to uphold the law as stated to me, I would do so.‖ In response to another question, he reiterated that if he was a juror and ―I had taken an oath to uphold the law as stated to me, I would do so.‖ He added, however, referring to the discussion about the prosecutor‘s hypothetical, ―I would very much prefer not to be in that situation because of the extreme conflict that would occur.‖ 13 The prosecutor challenged A.J. for cause. Defense counsel disagreed, and opined that the prosecutor‘s hypothetical was misleading. The trial court excused Prospective Juror A.J. for cause. The court stated that it had ―more than a definite impression‖ that the juror would be unable to apply the law if his views conflicted with it. The court noted that although the prosecutor‘s hypothetical did not reflect the circumstances of the present case, ―a key circumstance which could conceivably be before this juror is somebody who is being considered for punishment by the jury who did not preplan and did not intend to murder and who was convicted under the felony-murder rule, and I think this juror has an extreme conflict in that area, and I also have a definite impression that in spite of what he said, this juror would have difficulty and probably be unable in any case of a serious conflict between his personal views and the law to faithfully follow the law.‖ A capital defendant‘s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to an impartial jury prohibits the exclusion of prospective jurors ―simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.‖ (Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522.) A prospective juror may be excused from serving in a capital case, however, if his views on the death penalty would ― ‗prevent or substantially impair‘ ‖ the performance of his duties as a juror. (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 (Witt).) ―A prospective juror who would invariably vote either for or against the death penalty because of one or more circumstances likely to be present in the case being tried, without regard to the strength of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, is . . . subject to challenge for cause, whether or not the circumstance that would be determinative for that juror has been alleged in the charging document.‖ (People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1005; see People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 772 [juror who was unwilling to impose 14 the death penalty on a defendant who was young and had not previously killed was properly excused]; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 916-918 [trial court properly excused prospective jurors who could not consider the death penalty in a case involving an unplanned killing during a burglary but could consider it in other situations, including if the murder were premeditated]; see People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 357-358 [court may exclude jurors who would automatically vote against the death penalty in the case before them, even if they were willing to consider the death penalty in other cases].) ― ‗ ―[O]n appeal, we will uphold the trial court‘s ruling if it is fairly supported by the record, accepting as binding the trial court‘s determination as to the prospective juror‘s true state of mind when the prospective juror has made statements that are conflicting or ambiguous.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 987.)3 We have held that a prospective juror‘s statements that he or she would have a ― ‗hard time‘ ‖ voting for death or would find it ― ‗very difficult‘ ‖ to do so ―indicate a degree of equivocation on the juror‘s part which, taken into account with the juror‘s hesitancy, vocal inflection, and demeanor, can justify a trial court‘s‖ excusal of the juror under the Witt standard. (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 697.) Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court‘s conclusion that A.J. would have difficulty following the law if faced with deciding the punishment for a defendant convicted of felony murder who did not intend to kill. Beginning with the questionnaire, A.J. consistently expressed concern about his ability to follow the law if it conflicted with his moral views. Voir dire revealed 3 We have previously rejected defendant‘s argument, based on Greene v. Georgia (1996) 519 U.S. 145, that we need not give deference to the trial court‘s findings related to juror bias, concluding that California law on this point is settled. (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 132.) 15 that his personal views were in ―extreme conflict‖ with the law making a felony murderer guilty of first degree murder and eligible for the death penalty even if he did not intend to kill. Although A.J. insisted that he would follow his oath as a juror if sworn, he stated that he preferred not being placed in the position of having to do so. The trial court noted that it had the ―definite impression‖ that A.J. would be conflicted despite his promise to follow the law. Under these circumstances, we defer to the trial court‘s conclusion that he would be unable to follow the law if it seriously conflicted with his views.