Opinion ID: 1586390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: rejection of primary-tortfeasor doctrine

Text: 5. Aetna and Milwaukee urge the application of the primary-tortfeasor doctrine which resolves double coverage problems by ascertaining the primary tortfeasor. Usually this is done     by reference to the relationship of the insured parties inasmuch as one is immediately liable to the injured party or by reference to the control of the mechanism through which the loss occurs. The insurer, under whose policy the primary tortfeasor is the named insured, is then the primary insurer, and is liable to the full limits of its coverage, while the secondary insurer under whose policy the primary tortfeasor is but an additional insured, is liable only for the `excess' over the other's limits. 38 Minn. L. Rev. 843. Although some of our decisions in double-coverage situations have spoken of primary and secondary liability, this court has never expressly adopted the primary-tortfeasor doctrine. An examination of the cases shows that this court has looked to the terms of the insurance contracts to fix liability between competing insurers on the basis of contract interpretation, despite language which, taken by itself, might seem to indicate the primary-tortfeasor rule. In Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co. 190 Minn. 528, 530, 252 N.W. 434, 435, 253 N.W. 888, the first Minnesota decision using primary and secondary language, where the question was between two insurers, one covering a general contractor and the other covering a subcontractor's vehicle which injured a third party, with liability resting upon both insured parties, Mr. Justice Stone said: We must determine from the separate contracts whether the insurance was concurrent as to the risk presently involved, or whether one contract furnished primary and the other secondary insurance. The decision held that the insurance of the general contractor provided only excess coverage, but reached that conclusion only after an analysis and construction of the applicable contract provisions. Contractual interpretation, in resolving double coverage, may result in primary and secondary liabilities but that does not mean that the construction of the contracts has been controlled by the so-called primary-tortfeasor doctrine. In Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ind. Co. 242 Minn. 91, 64 N.W. (2d) 380, involving a question of coverage afforded by a general-business-risk policy and two auto-liability policies, there was no application of the primary-tortfeasor doctrine although only the primary tortfeasor was held liable. The decision therein turned upon the unique and controlling adjudicated fact that (although the plaintiff was injured in the course of the assembly of a piece of farm machinery as an essential part of an unloading operation) the sole act of negligence which proximately caused plaintiff's injury occurred upon the dealer's premises several miles away and was therefore separate and apart from the unloading operation. The sole act of negligence consisted of the failure of the defendant dealer to instruct its employee, prior to the truck's departure from its premises, as to the proper manner in which to reassemble the machine. This sole act of negligence was held to be too remote from the unloading operation to be a part of the peril or risk insured against under the Hartford and American policies. [5] Clearly decision in the Gamble-Skogmo case was made without any reference to, or application of, the primary-tortfeasor doctrine. In Eicher v. Universal Underwriters, 250 Minn. 7, 13, 83 N.W. (2d) 895, 899, involving an issue of coverage between the insurer of an employee who was driving and the insurer of the vehicle owned by the employer, the court said: The question of division of responsibility between the two insurers is dependent upon a determination as to which policy should be regarded as affording primary coverage    and which secondary or excess protection. In determining the existence of concurrent or excess coverage, the court based its decision on an analysis and comparison of the terms of the respective policies without applying the primary-tortfeasor doctrine to resolve the question of coverage. 6. The application of rules of construction based upon some relatively arbitrary circumstance  such as holding the insurer of the primary tortfeasor primarily liable; holding the specific insurer liable to the exclusion of the more general insurer; or fixing primary liability upon the insurer first issuing its policy in point of time  brings about a circuity of reasoning and inequitable and confusing results which have little relation to contractual intent or regard for the contractual rights of the parties. [6] In determining the respective liabilities of insurance coverage in cases of overlapping coverage, the decision must rest upon a construction of the language employed by the respective insurers and not upon any so-called primary-tortfeasor doctrine or upon any other arbitrary rule or circumstance. [7] Any language in any of our decisions subject to a contrary interpretation is expressly overruled. In the light of our rejection of the primary-tortfeasor doctrine, we turn to a consideration of the language used in the different policies to determine the issue of coverage or extent of coverage.