Opinion ID: 2222251
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: loss of earning capacityopinion of vocational rehabilitation counselor

Text: Dawes next assigns that the review panel erred in remanding the issue of loss of earning capacity to the single judge. The single judge's order in this case discussed the opinion of a court-appointed vocational rehabilitation counselor, who concluded that Dawes suffered a 40-percent loss of earning capacity. The single judge, citing Variano v. Dial Corp., 256 Neb. 318, 589 N.W.2d 845 (1999), stated that the opinion of the court-appointed counselor was entitled to a presumption of correctness. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-162.01(3) (Supp.1999). The single judge noted rebuttal evidence offered by Wittrock, but found that it did not rebut the presumption of correctness to which the opinion of the court-appointed counselor was entitled. The review panel concluded that the single judge erred. The review panel stated that a rebuttable presumption `disappears' upon the receipt of contrary evidence and that [a]fter the receipt of contrary evidence in the present case, the trial court continued to accord the opinion of the court appointed counselor the statutory presumption of correctness, which was error as a matter of law. Consequently, the review panel remanded the issue of loss of earning capacity to the single judge for reconsideration. The review panel's analysis, however, is contrary to our opinion in Variano, 256 Neb. at 326, 589 N.W.2d at 851, in which we stated: A rebuttable presumption is generally defined as [a] presumption that can be overturned upon the showing of sufficient proof. Black's Law Dictionary 1186 (6th ed.1990). In all cases not otherwise provided for by statute or by these rules a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence. Neb. Evid. R. 301, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-301 (Reissue 1995). We hold that this rule applies to the rebuttable presumption that an opinion regarding loss of earning capacity expressed by a vocational rehabilitation counselor appointed or selected pursuant to § 48-162.01(3) is correct. Accord, Frauendorfer v. Lindsay Mfg. Co., 263 Neb. 237, 639 N.W.2d 125 (2002); Rodriguez v. Monfort, Inc., 262 Neb. 800, 635 N.W.2d 439 (2001); Noordam v. Vickers, Inc., 11 Neb.App. 739, 659 N.W.2d 856 (2003); Romero v. IBP, Inc., 9 Neb.App. 927, 623 N.W.2d 332 (2001). By holding that the rebuttable presumption of correctness established by § 48-162.01(3) was governed by Neb. Evid. R. 301, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-301 (Reissue 1995), we rejected the bursting bubble theory upon which the review panel's analysis was based. See, McGowan v. McGowan, 197 Neb. 596, 250 N.W.2d 234 (1977) (explaining effect of Neb. Evid. R. 301); Fed.R.Evid. 301 advisory committee note (explaining that proposed Fed.R.Evid. 301, upon which Neb. Evid. R. 301 is based, rejected bursting bubble theory under which presumption vanishes upon introduction of contrary evidence); G. Michael Fenner, Presumptions: 350 Years of Confusion and It Has Come to This, 25 Creighton L.Rev. 383 (1992). Thus, pursuant to § 48-162.02(3) and § 27-301, the burden was placed on Wittrock to prove the incorrectness of the court-appointed counselor's opinion. See Spaghetti Ltd. Partnership v. Wolfe, 264 Neb. 365, 647 N.W.2d 615 (2002) (applying Neb. Evid. R. 301). The single judge's opinion correctly applies the law as explained by our decision in Variano v. Dial Corp., 256 Neb. 318, 589 N.W.2d 845 (1999). Dawes is correct in arguing that the review panel erred in concluding otherwise. This purported legal error was the sole basis for the review panel's conclusion that the issue of loss of earning capacity should be remanded. Therefore, the decision of the review panel is reversed to the extent that it requires the single judge to reconsider Dawes' loss of earning capacity. Instead, the decision of the single judge on that issue should be affirmed.