Opinion ID: 2590549
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appointment of Counsel Issues

Text: The prosecution originally charged the murders of Stumpf and Adkins in one information and alleged a multiple-murder special circumstance. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).) After determining defendant qualified for the appointment of counsel, the trial court appointed Morris Jones. In light of the special circumstances allegation and the prosecution's announced intention to seek the death penalty, the court also appointed Ronald Skyers as second counsel pursuant to section 987, subdivision (d). After defendant successfully moved to sever the murder charges, however, the court relieved Skyers for the initial trial of the Stumpf killing. Defendant now contends this action deprived him of his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution because Skyers, who became lead counsel at the beginning of the second trial, was deprived of the opportunity to evaluate the demeanor of witnesses and to adequately prepare himself for the ultimate penalty phase. We find no error. Section 987, subdivision (d) provides for additional counsel only [i]n a capital case, i.e., one in which a special circumstance has been alleged and the prosecution seeks the death penalty. Defendant's trial for the killing of Ronald Stumpf involved no special circumstance allegations. Thus, once the court granted defendant's severance motion, the trial for the killing of Stumpf was no longer a capital case but simply a first degree murder prosecution. Indeed, following severance, defendant faced the specter of the death penalty only if he were convicted of the first or second degree murder of Stumpf. (See § 190.2, subd. (a)(2); cf. Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 454, 204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699.) As such, the court had no authority to maintain Skyers as second counsel until that time. (See Sand v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 567, 575, 194 Cal.Rptr. 480, 668 P.2d 787 [holding that the defendant was not entitled to ancillary defense services under section 987.9 because he no longer faced the death penalty].) The fact that defendant may not have had the benefit of Skyers's participation in the Stumpf trial during the Adkins-Shy trial resulted from defendant's successful motion to sever the murder charges, not from any error on the part of the trial court in relieving Skyers until the matter became a capital case. Moreover, as the court noted when this point was raised at trial: [I]t would be no different than having a prior conviction [for first or second degree murder] and having to do it again.
On the morning the Adkins-Shy trial was about to commence, Morris Jones told the court that he would not be able to participate as defendant's counsel because the day before he had been appointed to the bench and was therefore no longer a practitioner of law. He also indicated that he had explained this to defendant. The court relieved Jones as counsel, designated Skyers as lead counsel, and appointed Ronald Higgins as second counsel. Defendant now contends the court erred in permitting Jones to withdraw under the circumstances in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. We find no error. Under the California Constitution, [a] judge of a court of record may not practice law.... (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 17; see In re Craig (1938) 12 Cal.2d 93, 96, 82 P.2d 442.) Since the trial court had no viable alternative, it had no obligation to conduct a hearing prior to relieving Jones. The contrary authorities cited by defendant all involved attorneys who were authorized to practice law but sought to withdraw for some collateral reason. Defendant speculates from the record that the court and counsel had some off-the-record discussion in his absence regarding Jones's judicial appointment and need to withdraw, and that his exclusion from this discussion violated his rights. Even assuming that such a discussion occurred, we find no prejudice because, as noted, the trial court was constitutionally foreclosed from requiring Jones to continue his participation.