Opinion ID: 2069077
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: We now will consider the matters which are controverted at the evidentiary hearing. The 30 witnesses called were nearly unanimous in saying that Iverson was generally cooperative and compliant, followed directions of his employers and others in authority, and understood instructions given to him. It appears that both sides of the case offered such evidence, but for differing purposes. The State offered it to show that Iverson was legally competent and that his testimony was given understandingly and voluntarily, while the defense offered similar evidence to show that Iverson's will was easily overborne and psychological pressures upon him could readily overcome any resistance he might have to incriminate himself. There was also some testimony that Iverson, while ordinarily agreeable, became violent at times, particularly when he had been drinking. One description of his conduct was that he was complacent unless the aggressive component of his personality was triggered. Both sides offered psychiatric testimony. The defense offered the testimony of Dr. Wallace, a psychologist who had examined Iverson about 13 days after his arrest and determined at that time that he was unable to assist in his defense because of mental incompetency. He testified at the evidentiary hearing that in his opinion Iverson was mentally impaired, that there was a high probability of mental impairment which affected the voluntary nature of his statement. To what degree it affected the voluntary nature of his statement was not described by Dr. Wallace. The State offered the testimony of several medical experts including Dr. Hubert Carbone, the superintendent of the North Dakota State Hospital, who gave his opinion that Iverson was competent on the day in question, as well as being competent when he later was examined by Dr. Carbone and the staff of the State Hospital; that he was competent to stand trial, knew the nature of the act of which he was accused and the potential consequences, and was capable of contributing to his defense. Dr. Carbone gave as his diagnostic impression: episodic excessive drinking in a basically inadequate, passive-aggressive personality structure. There was other medical testimony, including that of a doctor who had treated Iverson several times and considered him competent; and a great deal of lay evidence, most of it indicating competence to an average degree. The trial court concluded that . . . the testimony of all witnesses, with the exception of Dr. Wallace, discloses that the defendant was fully competent to understand the nature of the proceedings and fully competent to communicate with others when he gave his statements to the State's Attorney at approximately 4:50 p. m., and to police officers at approximately 11:20 p. m., November 27, 1968. We agree. The contrary testimony of Dr. Wallace was based upon an examination of approximately two hours, which Dr. Wallace admitted was not long enough. However, at the trial he had the benefit of reports of other psychiatric and psychological examinations, which he said confirmed his earlier opinion. His earlier opinion was given at the request of the county court of Grand Forks County, but was disregarded by that court, which proceeded to hold the preliminary hearing regardless of Dr. Wallace's opinion that Iverson could not at that time assist in his defense. As pointed out above, the court's proceeding with the preliminary hearing has been held not prejudicial, partly because Iverson did not testify at the preliminary hearing. The county judge, basing his opinion in part upon his own experience in conducting more than 300 mental-health hearings under State law, concluded that Iverson was competent to assist in his defense. We have examined the transcript of the questioning of Iverson by Dr. Wallace and his associates and we, based upon some experience in such matters also but without medical expertise, find nothing in Iverson's answers to indicate anything other than normal responses. We note further that Dr. Wallace's opinion was based in large part upon an analysis of Rorschach tests, and that Dr. Ismir of the State Hospital staff also gave Rorschach tests and concluded: The projective tests, and in particular the Rorschach, failed to provide any peculiar, loose or bizarre concepts. None of the formulations expressed by him were extreme or suggestive of either schizophrenic or neurotic disturbance. Instead the emerging picture is that of a passive-aggressive orientation and make-up. The Court of Appeals noted that Judge Bakken did not evaluate or discuss the fact that Drs. Wallace and Bohrod had reported to his court that Iverson was not competent to understand the nature of legal proceedings. Judge Bakken, in his memorandum opinion, makes clear that he did evaluate the opinions of Dr. Wallace and Dr. Bohrod, although he did not discuss them in his prior decision. He states: However, I did order that the defendant be given a mental evaluation at the state hospital prior to trial and such examination was conducted during the period from February 14 to March 21, 1969. With knowledge of the very limited and incomplete basis for the findings of Dr. Bohrod and Dr. Wallace, I accepted the findings of Dr. Carbone and his staff as correct as did the defendant and his counsel at that time. We believe the evidence overwhelmingly indicates that Iverson was competent on November 27, 1968. We have not detailed the testimony of the other 29 witnesses, but we agree with Judge Bakken's characterization of it. It was suggested by the Court of Appeals that the trial attorney for Iverson might cast some light upon the circumstances of November 27, 1968. The State was prevented from exploring the attorney's communications with his client by the positive refusal of Iverson to waive the attorney-client privilege. As a result, the State could only inquire as to the attorney's observations, which were generally favorable to the State's contention that Iverson was competent and cooperated with his attorney. At the time of the trial and for some time prior to it, the trial attorney for Iverson had the assistance of two or more law students at the University of North Dakota. Two of these former law students, Kent Higgins and Richard Baer, testified. No privilege was asserted as to their testimony. It was their opinion that Iverson, while cooperative, was somewhat passive and did not volunteer information to them. They thought he was excessively unemotional. However, Mr. Higgins testified that he had no feeling that Iverson was incompetent at the time of the trial. A possible explanation for lack of cooperation between Iverson and the two law students appeared when the trial attorney, Mr. Rubin, testified that he had instructed Iverson not to talk with anyone without Rubin's knowledge and that this may have caused Iverson to hold back when conversing with the law students. Rubin testified that he had no difficulty in communicating with Iverson, who in turn had no difficulty in expressing himself to Rubin. He said that Iverson was cooperative, responded logically, and had a good rapport with the attorney. In fact, Mr. Rubin testified that Iverson acted no differently toward him than did any other client. The evidentiary hearing provided a full exploration of all the circumstances of the two statements given by Iverson on November 27, 1968. The first statement, which is the more strongly challenged, was not a confession, but included statements which were used for impeachment at the trial. The impeachment related mainly to a discrepancy between the earlier statement [see State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1, 20] when Iverson admitted that on the day before the bodies were found he had climbed the stairs to the girls' apartment and knocked on the door, and his testimony at the trial that he had stayed in the car and honked the horn. As was pointed out in the earlier decisions, the first statement was taken a few hours after the discovery of the bodies, at a time when the investigation was just beginning and had not jelled to the point of proceeding in any certain direction. Iverson was subpoenaed to appear at the State's Attorney's office for interrogation, but so were two residents of the apartment building where the bodies were found. The same warning was given by the State's Attorney to all three. The warning is severely challenged, and properly so, because it included the sentence I must advise you that you cannot refuse to answer the questions without also advising him that he had the right to remain silent and exercise his privilege against self-incrimination. However, it has already been determined by this court and the Court of Appeals that the Miranda warnings were not required at this stage of the proceedings where Iverson was not the focus of investigation and was not in custody. Although the interrogation took place at the police station, it lasted only about 20 minutes and Iverson left at the conclusion of the questioning and, according to at least one witness, was free to go at any time during the interrogation. The questioning at the police station took place in an office, not a cell. The room was about 10 by 14 feet, furnished with a desk and three chairs, lighted by four fluorescent lights in the ceiling, and was carpeted and had drapes at the windows. The defendant was seated in an upholstered leather chair when he gave the statement. Other persons present, the State's Attorney and two police officers, gave testimony which was indicative of a lack of coercive influences. The court reporter, also present, testified that in his opinion the defendant understood his right to counsel and understood the proceedings and knowingly consented to the taking of the statement, but also testified that he got the impression that the answer I don't understand it applied to the entire statement of the State's Attorney which preceded it. However, it is equally plausible that the answer could have referred only to the portion of the statement referring to a double murder. The defense puts much weight upon excerpts from the testimony of the court reporter, and also upon statements by one of the police officers that he considered Iverson a suspect at the time he was subpoenaed to make a statement in the afternoon of November 27. Weight is also placed upon the statement of the same officer that he would have detained Iverson if Iverson had attempted to leave during the afternoon interrogation. However, this testimony is based upon recollection many years later and is contradicted by equally credible testimony of other officers, Lieutenant Bye and former Detective Siverson. Similarly, defense counsel points to a discrepancy between the testimony of the chief of police to the effect that he had not ordered a bloodhound brought to the police station and the testimony of the handler of the bloodhound that she was contacted by the chief of police to do so. We believe that all of these matters represent the kinds of conflicts between the recollection of different witnesses which are often encountered in litigation and are normally resolved by the finder of fact in favor of one contention or the other. We believe that the trial court here was well within its discretion in resolving the conflicts in the evidence, and that they are not crucial to the ultimate conclusion in this case. The defense also contends that allowing the bloodhound to enter the office where the afternoon interrogation took place was inherently coercive and that a suggestion that Iverson take a lie detector test likewise was coercive. We note that the presence of the bloodhound came either at the end or near the end of the afternoon interrogation, and that there is no evidence to the effect that the presence of the bloodhound or the suggestion as to the use of the lie detector had a coercive effect in fact. Nor do we believe that we can find a coercive effect as a matter of law.