Opinion ID: 170884
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the adequacy of the warning

Text: We turn now to the merits. Because jurisdiction is based on diversity, we apply the law of the forum state, in this case the Oklahoma law of products liability. A plaintiff may recover under a theory of strict products liability in Oklahoma if she can prove that: 1) the product was the cause of the injury; 2) a defect existed in the product at the time it left the manufacturer's possession and control; and 3) the defect made the product unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff or his property. McMurray v. Deere & Co., Inc., 858 F.2d 1436, 1439 (10th Cir.1988) (applying Oklahoma law). Under Oklahoma law, the test for whether a product is unreasonably dangerous is whether the product is `dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.' Id. (quoting Kirkland v. Gen. Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1362-63 (Okla.1974) (further internal quotation marks omitted). However, even where a product's design defect makes the product unreasonably dangerous, Oklahoma law does not impose liability if the product contains a warning that adequately addresses the known risks of use. See Smith v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 612 P.2d 251, 253-54 (Okla. 1980). The Oklahoma Supreme Court has enunciated the relevant standard: If a product is potentially dangerous to consumers, a manufacturer is required to give directions or warnings ... as to its use. If these warnings cover all foreseeable use and if the product is not unreasonably dangerous if the warnings and directions are followed, the product is not defective in this respect. If the warnings are unclear or inadequate to apprise the consumer of the inherent or latent danger, the product may be defective; particularly where a manufacturer has reason to anticipate danger may result from the use of his product and the product fails to contain adequate warning of such danger, the product is sold in a defective condition. Id. Further, Oklahoma law does not require a manufacturer to foresee that [professionals who use its product will] fail to read its warnings, and then use [the product] in a manner that manufacturer's instructions expressly warned against. Hutchins v. Silicone Specialties, Inc., 881 P.2d 64, 67 (Okla.1993). Finally, there is no duty to warn a knowledgeable user of the product of the dangers associated therewith. Duane v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 833 P.2d 284, 286 (Okla.1992). The district court concluded that, had there been no warning on the tractor, a triable issue would exist regarding whether the tractor was unreasonably dangerous. Citing common failures in the starting circuitry, the need that this created for farmers to bypass start their tractors, the fact that the tractor was designed in such a way that bypass starting was easy to accomplish, and the potential for unexpected movement associated with bypass starting, the district court found that there was sufficient evidence in the record for reasonable jurors to find that the tractor was unreasonably dangerous. Deere does not challenge this conclusion. We confronted a similar question in McMurray v. Deere & Co., 858 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir.1988). In McMurray, the plaintiff's decedent had died when he attempted to bypass start his tractor while it was in gear. Id. at 1437-38. In that case, the district court had issued a jury instruction that required the jury to find in favor of the defendant if it found that bypass starting the tractor was an abnormal use of the product. Id. at 1438-39. Oklahoma law only allows such a defense where the method of using a product is not that which the manufacturer intended or is a use that could not reasonably be anticipated by a manufacturer. Id. at 1442 (quoting Fields v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 56 (Okla.1976)). We found that Deere intended ... that the tractor would be used for agricultural purposes and that Mr. McMurray, when he bypass started it, was attempting to use [his tractor] for a proper purpose. Id. at 1442-43. Accordingly, we held that Mr. McMurray did not use his in an abnormal manner or in an unforeseeable way. Id. at 1443. Since McMurray, Deere implemented its bypass start campaign, which resulted in the warning being placed on Mr. McPhail's tractor. Because this sticker was present, Oklahoma law also requires Mrs. McPhail to prove that the warning is unclear or inadequate to apprise the consumer of the inherent or latent danger. Smith, 612 P.2d at 254. The district court held that Deere's warning was adequate or, in the alternative, that Mr. McPhail's awareness of the dangers of bypass starting rendered the warning unnecessary. Mrs. McPhail appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment regarding the adequacy of the warning. [4] We agree with Mrs. McPhail that there are genuine issues of material fact that should have precluded the grant of summary judgment on this issue. The sticker on Mr. McPhail's tractor contains two sentences. First, it tells the operator of the tractor to [s]tart only from seat in park or neutral. Aplt.App., Vol. II, at 163. Second, it warns that [s]tarting in gear kills. Id. The warning also contains the word DANGER and an illustration of a person standing on the ground being run over by the tractor as it moves forward. Id. We find that these cautionary phrases, taken in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, give rise to an issue of fact regarding the clarity and adequacy of this warning. Specifically, the sticker does not warn a user that the tractor's transmission can engage even though the tractor appears to be in neutral. Instead, the warning expressly connects the danger of death to starting in gear. Although the first sentence instructs the operator to [s]tart only from seat, it also highlights the need to start in park or neutral. This implies that the dangers of bypass starting might be averted by making sure that the tractor is in park or neutral, not in gear, when it is started. Yet, Mrs. McPhail's evidence makes it apparent that this is not the case. Deere argues that if farmers simply complied with the first four words of the warningstart only from seatthey would not be able to bypass start and would not be at risk. True. But they might also not be able to use the tractor. The record shows that Deere is aware that normal use of the tractor sometimes makes it necessary to bypass start the tractor, which cannot be accomplished from the seat. Mr. Kirk Ney, a Division Engineer for Deere, acknowledged the need that farmers have to bring in their crops during harvest time, because it is tied to their livelihoods. Aplt.App., Vol. III, at 64. He testified that some failures in the starting system are easily fixable and may be fixed by the tractor's operator, instead of a technician, depending on ... what's wrong. Id. at 63. He went on to state that of course it would be necessary to diagnose the problem. Id. Finally, he acknowledged that Deere's service technicians are trained to diagnose starting circuitry problems by bypass starting tractors, and that even Deere service technicians had been injured while bypass starting tractors they were diagnosing. Id. at 78-81. This testimony, taken in the light most favorable to Mrs. McPhail, could lead a reasonable juror to conclude that Deere has anticipated that farmers will need to bypass start their tractors, and the warning fails to account for this need. The district court decision does not take into account this key shortcoming in the warning: the inference that the danger arises from starting the tractor when it is not in neutral or park. Mrs. McPhail provided evidence that the behavior of the Quad-Range Transmission masks whether the tractor is in gear. The affidavit from Mrs. McPhail's expert witness states that the gear selector for this model tractor could appear to be in neutral when the tractor was actually in gear. These characteristics of the tractor give rise to the inference that even an operator who takes care to ensure that the tractor is in neutral cannot be sure that unexpected movement will not occur. Mr. Coffelt testified that, after the accident, the tractor was traveling in reverse at a pretty good rate of speed and that he couldn't believe it, it was going backwards instead of forwards. Aplt.App., Vol II., at 102. These facts support an inference that the tractor was in a gear that Mr. McPhail had not deliberately selected. The sticker affixed to Mr. McPhail's tractor warned: Danger. Start only from seat in park or neutral. Starting in gear kills. This informs a tractor's operator of the potentially lethal consequences of bypass starting a tractor in gear. However, reading the warning in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it may also suggest that starting the tractor in neutral or park eliminates that danger. While the warning contains cautionary depictions regarding bypass starting generally and tractor motion caused by bypass starting, the warning does not caution against the possibility that even a tractor that appears to be in neutral or park may move under engine power. Indeed, by stating that starting in gear kills, it tends to suggest that if the user is sufficiently careful in ensuring that the tractor is in park or neutral, all will be well. Absent some warning about false or apparent neutral settings on this transmission, we are unable to find, as a matter of law, that this warning overcomes the dangerous conditions of the tractor. The district court found, alternatively, that Mr. McPhail's own knowledge of the dangerous condition of the tractor would make it impossible for Mrs. McPhail to prove the causation element necessary for recovery on a theory of products liability. However, the evidence in the record regarding Mr. McPhail's knowledge relates to the dangers of bypass starting generally, and not to the specific dangerousness at issue here. That is, Mr. McPhail may have been aware that a tractor will move if it is bypass started while it is in gear. Nothing in the record shows that Mr. McPhail also knew that a tractor that appeared to be in neutral could, in fact, be capable of unexpected movement. Similarly, the evidence Deere presented regarding the knowledge of farmers in the community also addressed only the dangers of starting in gear, not the danger that a tractor could appear to be in neutral when in fact it was not. Mrs. McPhail has presented evidence that this model of tractor was capable of potentially lethal behavior that is not addressed by the tractor's warning. This evidence creates a genuine factual dispute with regard to the adequacy of the warning, and makes summary judgment in favor of Deere inappropriate.