Opinion ID: 4521869
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Quash Search Warrant Dated July

Text: 31, 2008 On July 29, 2008, Detective Spear sought and obtained a warrant to search the premises at the Happy Camp Ranch. In the supporting affidavit, Detective Spear stated that his review of the video surveillance of the parking lot where Pamela was killed showed the alleged suspects fleeing in a red SUV rented by Goldfinger. The affidavit further explained that a suspect had left footprints at the crime scene, which would have been transferred to the vehicle. Detective Spear averred he believed the vehicle was at defendant’s residence. Detectives executed the search warrant on July 29, and found two locked safes that defendant refused to open. On July 30, after locating the red SUV at the Avis Rent A Car location, detectives searched and gathered evidence from the vehicle. Defendant did not seek to suppress evidence seized on either July 29 or July 30. On July 31, Detective Spear sought another warrant to search the premises at the Happy Camp Ranch. The supporting affidavit “incorporated . . . the entirety of” the July 29 search warrant. It also included an “amendment,” adding “personal computers, laptop computers, hard drives, electronic equipment used to store files or written documentation, thumb drives, locked safes, secured lock boxes, authorization of forced entry into locked safes, financial records, soil samples from outside the residence,” among the items to be collected. The amendment also sought “samples of saliva from James Fayed for comparison of evidence collected during the investigation.” To justify the search for these additional items, the amendment explained that during an interview with Pamela’s adult daughter, Desiree, she revealed that “her mother kept records and documentation that incriminates James Fayed on 48 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. her personal computer. Desiree [] advised that the computers that her mother used are in her father’s residence and contain valuable information.” Detectives obtained a search warrant on July 31, which was executed on that day. During the search, authorities seized several laptop computers, over $1 million worth of gold bars, and numerous computer thumb drives. They also found $24,980 in cash wrapped in plastic in defendant’s dresser drawer and another $36,000 in cash in a locked metal briefcase located in defendant’s closet. Defendant moved to quash the warrant, and suppress evidence seized during the search. He alleged that there was no probable cause to issue the warrant and that the warrant was insufficient on its face. For instance, Desiree’s statement that there was incriminating evidence on Pamela’s personal computer was conclusory and “not supported by a single fact in the affidavit.” Also, the warrant was overbroad because while the incriminating evidence was purportedly on Pamela’s laptop computer, the list of search items effectively allowed officers to “search for anything—anywhere, with no specificity.” Further, because detectives had located and searched the red SUV the day before, there was no longer a need to search the premises for the vehicle. Finally, the affidavit on the second warrant contained no facts to support that new evidence had materialized after the first search; thus, the information in the initial affidavit was too “stale” to justify the second search. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to quash. It found probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. The court further found that, even if there was no probable cause, the officers acted in good faith by obtaining a warrant signed by a magistrate before conducting the search. For reasons that 49 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. follow, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to quash. When reviewing issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from governmental searches and seizures, we defer to the court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212.) To determine whether, based on the facts so found, a search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. (Macabeo, at p. 1212.) We conclude that based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court correctly found probable cause for the issuance of the July 31 search warrant. (See Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 230.) First, defendant’s challenge to Desiree’s statement on the ground it was conclusory and lacking factual support to justify probable cause is meritless. As the trial court found, Desiree was presumptively reliable as a “citizen informant.” (See People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 757.) Given her relationship to Pamela and defendant, which was clearly set out in the affidavit, Desiree would naturally be knowledgeable about Pamela’s activities and would be aware that Pamela and defendant were going through a contentious divorce. As the affidavit explained, Desiree told investigators that her mother kept documentation “on her personal computer” and she stated that “computers that her mother used are in her father’s residence.” Whether Pamela used one or several computers in defendant’s residence, it was reasonable to describe the items in “generic terms,” thus subjecting them to a “blanket seizure.” (U.S. v. Lacy (9th Cir. 1997) 119 F.3d 742, 746; see U.S. v. Kimbrough (5th Cir. 1995) 69 F.3d 723, 727 50 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. [“generic language is permissible if it particularizes the types of items to be seized”].) Contrary to defendant’s claim, the search warrant was not overbroad because it listed “personal computers” and “laptop computers” as search items and did not limit it specifically to Pamela’s laptop computer. Authorities had no way of knowing which computer, or how many for that matter, belonged to Pamela, or which ones she may have used. It was acceptable for the search warrant to include such generic terms to describe the items. (U.S. v. Lacy, at p. 746.) Further, defendant’s related claim that the July warrant was “moot” because the red SUV was already located and searched is likewise meritless. After locating the SUV, there was arguably more, not less, reason to search defendant’s residence because evidence began tying defendant to the murder, i.e., the recovered vehicle connected to the murder had been rented by defendant’s company, Goldfinger. The supporting affidavit expressly noted that authorities had collected physical evidence from it. Armed with new physical evidence from the SUV, authorities sought soil samples outside the residence and samples of defendant’s saliva “for a comparison of evidence collected during the investigation.” Though just beginning, the investigation was intensifying as each day passed. Moreover, the July 31 warrant was not based solely on obtaining evidence related to the vehicle used in the murder. The warrant also sought Pamela’s computers that Desiree averred were in defendant’s residence. It further sought to recover evidence from two locked safes that defendant refused to open during the July 29 search. Rather than seizing the safes first and asking for a warrant later, detectives followed proper 51 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. procedure by first obtaining a magistrate’s determination of probable cause. Similarly, defendant’s argument that the information in the initial affidavit became stale because authorities failed to seize items during the first search is without legal or factual support. (See People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 370 [whether warrant establishes “it is substantially probable the evidence sought will still be at the location at the time of the search”].) In this case, Pamela was killed on July 28, 2008. The following day, detectives obtained the first warrant to search the premises on defendant’s Moorpark ranch. The day after that, on July 30, detectives located the red SUV, and recovered physical evidence from the vehicle. In the brief three-day period between the crime and the second search on July 31, it is substantially probable that evidence would still be located at defendant’s premises. (Ibid.) Based on the foregoing, we reject defendant’s claim that the trial court erroneously denied defendant’s motion to quash the July 31 search warrant.