Opinion ID: 2548729
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Correct View of This Case

Text: [¶ 18] Before trial, the district court denied WERCS' motion for summary judgment on Capshaw's breach of employment contract claim. At the conclusion of the hearing on that motion, the district court stated that the statute of frauds, asserted as an affirmative defense by WERCS, and the doctrine of substantial performance, asserted as an exception to the statute of frauds by Capshaw, were at play in the case. Further, the district court concluded that all of these matters involving substantial performance presented questions of fact or mixed questions of law or fact for a jury to resolve. [¶ 19] In the presentation of the case at trial, the parties presented evidence from which the jury had to decide what kind of employment contract this was and what were its terms. The only feature of the contract on which the parties agreed was that it was oral, not written. Capshaw maintains that evidence was received from which a jury could find a contract of indefinite duration, with specified, guaranteed income during the first five years, and at least $100,000 each year thereafter as long as he satisfactorily performed his job duties; he maintains these assurances gave rise to an implied covenant that WERCS would not fire him without good cause. On the other hand, WERCS maintains that evidence was received from which a jury could find an at-will contract for an indefinite term with no covenant that WERCS could fire Capshaw only for cause; and WERCS also maintains that Capshaw presented evidence and argument from which a jury could find a contract of definite duration, namely, a duration of five years. In defense of that type of contract, WERCS pressed the affirmative defense of the statute of frauds. And, in response to that affirmative defense, Capshaw pressed the substantial performance exception to the statute of frauds. [¶ 20] It was in this posture that the parties submitted the case to the jury. That this is so is unquestionably confirmed by the pertinent instructions of law given by the district court to the jury after the evidence was closed and the parties had rested their case. As we know, a party is entitled to have the jury instructed upon its theory of the case if that theory is supported by competent evidence. Thunder Hawk v. Union Pacific R. Co., 891 P.2d 773, 783 (Wyo.1995). The jury instructions most pertinent to Capshaw's breach of employment contract claim and WERCS' defenses to that claim included Jury Instructions Nos. 11 through 24. Jury Instruction No. 11 stated the parties' contentions. Jury Instruction No. 12 stated the at-will presumption under Wyoming law and Capshaw's burden to prove the existence of a for cause employment contract. Jury Instruction No. 13 described the nature of an at-will employment. Jury Instruction No. 14 instructed that the parties may alter an at-will employment, an express contract may be either written or oral, and an implied for-cause contract may arise from the parties' conduct and an employer's course of dealing. Jury Instruction No. 15 instructed that offer, acceptance, and consideration were the elements of a binding contract; and that the parties' mutual assent, by words or actions, was necessary for contract formation. Jury Instruction No. 15A defined consideration. Jury Instruction No. 16 identified the four elements of the breach of employment contract claim which Capshaw must prove. Jury Instruction No. 17 instructed that evidence of the terms of the employment contract may be found in the parties' actions after entering into the contract and the parties' performance under the contract. Jury Instruction No. 18 instructed on the statute of frauds and the substantial performance exception to it. Jury Instruction No. 19 explained the concept of substantial performance. Jury Instruction No. 20 explained WERCS' contention about written at-will disclaimers signed by Capshaw in 1996 and 1997. Jury Instruction No. 21 instructed that if the jury decided that the parties' employment contract was for a specified time, then WERCS could terminate Capshaw only for cause; and the instruction generally, and briefly, explained for cause. Jury Instruction No. 22 explained removal of a corporate officer by the corporation's board of directors. Jury Instruction No. 23 explained an employer's use of information about a terminated employee obtained after the employee's termination. Jury Instruction No. 24 instructed on recoverable damages if the jury found breach of contract. In these jury instructions, then, the trial court presented the law applicable to the breach-of-employment-contract issues actually raised by the evidence. Thunder Hawk, 891 P.2d at 783; Baier v. State, 891 P.2d 754, 756 (Wyo.1995). To reiterate, Capshaw maintained that evidence was received from which the jury could find an implied contract of indefinite duration, with specified guaranteed income during the first five years, and at least $100,000 each year thereafter so long as he satisfactorily performed his job duties, and assurances that WERCS would not fire him without good cause. On the other hand, WERCS maintained that evidence was received from which the jury could find either (1) an at-will contract for an indefinite term with no covenant that WERCS could fire Capshaw only for cause; or (2) a contract of definite, specified duration, namely, five years. If the jury had found this latter type of contract, then WERCS relied on the statute of frauds jury instruction and Capshaw relied on the substantial performance exception jury instruction. [¶ 21] As we inspect the special verdict form submitted without objection to the jury along with the jury instructions set forth above, we see that the special verdict form did not ask the jury to find whether the employment contract was either (1) a contract of indefinite duration with an implied for cause requirement, as Capshaw maintained; (2) an at-will contract of indefinite duration without a for cause requirement, as WERCS maintained; (3) a contract of definite, specified five years' duration, as WERCS alternatively maintained; or (4) if it was a contract of definite duration, then whether Capshaw substantially performed. Instead, the special verdict form asked only whether there existed an employment contract requiring good cause for discharge. And, as we have noted earlier, the jury answered in the affirmative. It is, then, at this point that we must apply W.R.C.P. 49(a)' s provisions and the understanding of those provisions which the federal cases give us. WERCS' sole issue on appeal is that the trial court's summary judgment ruling  which allowed Capshaw to raise at trial the substantial performance exception to WERCS' affirmative defense of the statute of frauds  resulted in the special verdict and judgment entered against WERCS at trial. But we do not know that and we will never know that because WERCS did not seek the jury's special written finding upon whether the contract was of definite duration and whether Capshaw substantially performed. By not submitting those issues of fact to the jury on the special verdict form and by not demanding their submission to the jury before it retired, WERCS waived its right to have those issues tried by the jury. W.R.C.P. 49(a); Hyde v. Land-of-Sky Regional Council, 572 F.2d at 991. The trial court is deemed to have made a finding on those issues in accord with the judgment on the special verdict. Id. As further explained in Ansin v. River Oaks Furniture, Inc ., addressing the defendant's failure to submit affirmative defense issues on the special verdict form: Under Rule 49(a), if the district court does not make a finding on an issue not submitted to the jury, it will be presumed on appeal that the lower court made whatever finding was necessary in order to support the judgment that was entered. 9A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2507, at 185-86 (1995); see also Kavanaugh v. Greenlee Tool Co., 944 F.2d 7, 11-12 (1st Cir.1991). As the district court entered a judgment for the plaintiffs, we presume that it found that defendants had not proven the claimed equitable defenses. 105 F.3d at 756. [¶ 22] Applying this understanding of Rule 49(a)'s provisions to WERCS' appeal, because the trial court did not make a finding on the issues of fact not submitted by WERCS to the jury  whether the employment contract was one of definite duration of more than one year and thus within the statute of frauds and whether Capshaw substantially performed  we presume on appeal that the trial court made whatever finding was necessary in order to support the judgment that was entered. As the trial court entered a judgment for Capshaw, we presume that the trial court found that WERCS had not proven the claimed defenses and affirmative defenses. Accord, AG Systems, Inc. v. United Decorative Plastics Corp., 55 F.3d at 974. The proper standard of review requires this Court to adopt a view of the case that makes the jury's answers in the special verdict form consistent. Hiltgen v. Sumrall, 47 F.3d at 701. Based upon the evidence and the jury instructions, the jury could have found that a for cause employment contract existed, without ever finding that it was for a definite term of more than one year which would be within the statute of frauds, and without ever having to find whether Capshaw substantially performed. Thus, the trial court's pre-trial summary judgment rulings of which WERCS' complains actually played no part in the jury's special verdict. We affirm the judgment entered on the jury's special verdict in all respects.