Opinion ID: 1656256
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Gay Rights is a political/public issue.

Text: ¶ 23. It is hardly debatable that the extension of certain rights to gays and lesbians has become an important political public issue. Numerous states, including Mississippi, have passed laws prohibiting the marriage of gay partners. See Miss.Code Ann. § 93-1-1(2). Some state officials have openly defied the laws of their respective states and allowed gay couples to marry. There is even a movement to amend the United States Constitution to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman. Lambda Legal, the organization which filed the complaint in the case sub judice, is a political organization which works to establish and increase the rights for gays and lesbians. Thus, the case before us unquestionably involves political/public interest speech. In applying the requirements of the Constitution to the facts of this case, we will first look to other jurisdictions for guidance. ¶ 24. In a case with similar facts, justice of the peace James Scott was disturbed about what he considered to be injustice in the administration of the judicial system in his county. Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.1990). Judge Scott wrote an open letter to county officials in which he accused the county court at law court and the district attorney's office of adversely affect[ing] justice in [his] county. Id. at 203. The judge's letter was circulated to the local press and attracted a great deal of attention from citizens, judges and eventually the Texas Commission on Judicial Performance, which issued Judge Scott a public reprimand. Id. at 204. The Texas Commission justified the reprimand by holding that Judge Scott's conduct served only to cast public discredit upon the judiciary. The Texas Commission ordered Judge Scott to show more restraint in future oral and written communications. Id. ¶ 25. Judge Scott filed suit, challenging the Commission's reprimand as an unconstitutional restraint of his freedom of speech, guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The United States District Court granted summary judgment to the Texas Commission. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the reprimand violated Judge Scott's First Amendment rights. The following excerpt from Scott is particularly applicable and instructive: [W]e have recognized that the state may restrict the speech of elected judges in ways that it may not restrict the speech of other elected officials. In Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n of La., 565 F.2d 295, 301 (5th Cir.1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013, 98 S.Ct. 1887, 56 L.Ed.2d 395 (1978)), we upheld a state statute requiring judges to resign from the bench before declaring their candidacy for an elective non-judicial office and explained that the state may regulate the speech of judges in order to preserve the impartiality of the judicial branch.... We were careful to note, however, that our holding in Morial was a narrow one, turning on the fact that the resign-to-run statute, and restrictions on judicial campaign promises, were fairly limited intrusions into the political speech of elected judges. That is, Louisiana's resign-to-run requirement does not burden the plaintiff's right to vote for the candidate of his choice or to make statements regarding his private opinions on public issues outside a campaign context; nor does it penalize his belief in any particular idea. These are core first amendment values. Id. at 301 (emphasis added). Unlike the statute upheld in Morial, the reprimand of Scott does infringe upon the right to make statements... on public issues outside a campaign context and thus touches upon core first amendment values. Accordingly, the Commission must carry a very difficult burden in order to demonstrate that its concededly legitimate interest in protecting the efficiency and impartiality of the state judicial system outweighs Scott's first amendment rights. We conclude that the Commission has failed to carry that burden. Neither in its brief nor at oral argument was the Commission able to explain precisely how Scott's public criticisms would impede the goals of promoting an efficient and impartial judiciary, and we are unpersuaded that they would have such a detrimental effect. Instead, we believe that those interests are ill served by casting a cloak of secrecy around the operations of the courts, and that by bringing to light an alleged unfairness in the judicial system, Scott in fact furthered the very goals that the Commission wishes to promote. Scott, 910 F.2d at 212-13 (emphasis added). ¶ 26. The Scott court pointed out that, although the courts at one time [3] condoned the right of the state as an employer to restrict free speech, the Court has [since] rejected that approach in favor of one recognizing that public employees do not shed constitutional protection when they enter the workplace but nevertheless balances those employees' rights against the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Id. at 210, citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). ¶ 27. In another case involving a judge who made a speech at a pro-life rally, the Supreme Court of Washington stated that [a] judge does not surrender First Amendment rights upon becoming a member of the judiciary, and [i]f a person does not completely surrender his or her right to freedom of speech upon becoming a candidate, then we cannot expect the candidate to do so once elected to judicial office. In re Sanders, 135 Wash.2d 175, 188-89, 955 P.2d 369, 375 (1998). ¶ 28. Here, Judge Wilkerson expressed his views on a political/public interest issue  the rights of gays and lesbians. We therefore may not impose sanctions unless we conclude, under the specific facts of this case, that the restraint the Commission seeks to enforce is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. It seems to us difficult to conclude that discussion of the rights of gays poses more of a threat to judicial integrity than Judge Scott's direct criticism of the judicial system itself. Stated another way, we find the integrity of the judiciary less threatened by Judge Wilkerson's statements about gays than by Judge Scott's constitutionally-protected statements which directly criticized the integrity of the judiciary.