Opinion ID: 1988708
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Admissibility of the Evidence Seized During the Search

Text: The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when it considered the drug evidence during Fuller's violation of probation hearing because the search that produced the evidence was reasonable under the United States and Delaware Constitutions. To the extent that the officers departed from departmental guidelines, the departure did not render the search unconstitutional because of the curtailed rights of a probationer as compared with an ordinary citizen. In addition, the totality of the circumstances reveals that the Superior Court correctly determined that by the time the officers ordered Fuller to stop his car they had probable cause to believe that the vehicle was carrying contraband. In Griffin v. Wisconsin, [3] the United States Supreme Court held that a warrantless search of a probationer's home was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Court indicated that the special nature of probationary supervision justified a departure from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements for searches. [4] The Court held that the state's regulatory requirement that there be reasonable grounds for a search was sufficient to render the search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the search complied with the regulation. The majority deemed it irrelevant that the search may not have comported with other state regulations governing searches of probationers  that the search satisfied the state's reasonable grounds regulation was constitutionally sufficient. [5] Under Griffin, the special nature of the probationary relationship and the conditions imposed on Fuller under that relationship justified the search at issue, [6] despite the fact that the officers may not have complied with every provision of the Department of Corrections' procedures governing searches of probationers. Officer DuPont twice received supervisor approval to conduct the search  first, after discussing the information contained in the tip before the subject vehicle was located and second, after a vehicle matching the description had been found and officers had confirmed that it was registered to a probationer. In obtaining that approval, the officers and the supervisor considered the information that the Department had and whether it provided sufficient grounds to search. The purpose of the regulations is to ensure that the Department has sufficient grounds before undertaking a search. The individual procedures advance that goal but are not independently necessary, as demonstrated by the fact that the regulations explicitly state exceptions for when the search checklist need not be used. Even if the officers did not follow each technical requirement of the search regulations before searching Fuller, they did satisfy those that affect the reasonableness inquiry under the United States and Delaware Constitutions. In Griffin, it was sufficient that the search comported with the state regulation requiring that probationers be searched only on reasonable grounds. Similarly in the present case, Officer DuPont obtained a supervisor's approval after considering the substantive factors on which the regulations require that search decisions be made. Officer DuPont had received information from a past proven reliable informant that a probationer of a certain description was selling drugs in a particular area and driving a vehicle of a certain description. The tip contained enough information to provide Officer DuPont with sufficient reason to believe the seller was in violation of probation. When he located a vehicle and its driver matching the description in the general area described in the tip, and then confirmed that the car was registered to a probationer, the informant's tip was corroborated. Finally, Officer DuPont twice obtained supervisor approval for the search, both before a subject was located and after the information was corroborated. Thus, the search comported with the substantive requirements of the regulation, which is sufficient to render a search of a probationer constitutionally reasonable. We also conclude that the officers had constitutional grounds on which to conduct the search independent of the reduced level of cause that is required in order for a search of a probationer to be reasonable. A review of the totality of the circumstances [7] reveals that the officers possessed sufficient information to provide them with probable cause to search Fuller's vehicle. The officers acted only after receiving a tip from a past proven reliable informant, after corroborating certain aspects of the tip, and after Fuller failed to stop when the officers initially signaled for him to stop. Because we hold that the search at issue was supported by probable cause and otherwise constituted a constitutionally reasonable search, we do not reach the State's argument that the exclusionary rule does not apply to probation revocation hearings.