Opinion ID: 1727310
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the arrest warrant was based on probable cause

Text: ¶ 5. The State asserts this Court erred in our original opinion when we addressed the legality of the arrest warrant for the first time upon appeal. In its motion for rehearing, the State contends that there was no issue at trial or on appeal, in any manner or form, relating to the sufficiency of probable cause or the legality of the arrest. In his reply brief, however, Conerly did address the legality of his arrest warrant by asserting that the only basis for the warrant was the uncorroborated affidavit given by Lenoir. Ordinarily, we will not consider issues raised for the first time in an appellant's reply brief. Sanders v. State, 678 So.2d 663, 669 (Miss.1996). However, plain errors of sufficient constitutional importance are likely to affect the outcome of a case and may be addressed for the first time by this Court upon appeal. This Court has recognized an exception to procedural bars where a fundamental constitutional right is involved. Maston v. State, 750 So.2d 1234, 1237 (Miss.1999); see Smith v. State, 477 So.2d 191, 195 (Miss.1985). Consequently, we will once again visit this issue. ¶ 6. Conerly asserts that the arrest warrant was issued based on nothing but raw hearsay. This Court has previously held that an arrest warrant may be based on hearsay. Walker v. State, 192 So.2d 270, 273 (Miss.1966). There must be underlying facts and circumstances, however, which support the hearsay so as to allow a neutral and detached magistrate to find the existence of probable cause. Id. at 273. Uncorroborated and unsubstantiated hearsay will simply not suffice. In the present case, the arrest warrant was based exclusively on an affidavit, which reads in relevant part as follows: On September 23, 1997, Dornis Lenoir, came home and discovered that 1 diamond ring and a car radio amplifier [were] missing from her residence at 18 Conerly Lane. The house was locked and the house was entered into from a window. Dornis Lenoir was advised by some neighbors down the road that the person who was responsible for the missing items was Ricky Conerly. (emphasis added). Lenoir's neighbors, however, did not witness the incident nor did they provide any factual data to support their suspicions. From the record before us, it appears that the affidavit was based on nothing more than uncorroborated rumors. ¶ 7. To obtain an arrest warrant for a felony, either with or without a warrant, a police officer must have (1) reasonable cause to believe that a felony has been committed; and (2) reasonable cause to believe that the person proposed to be arrested is the one who committed it. Henry v. State, 486 So.2d 1209, 1212 (Miss. 1986). Arrest warrants or search warrants shall be issued only by the judge after a judicial determination that probable cause exists based upon the affidavit or other evidence before the court. Miss. Unif. R.P.J.C. 3.03. Furthermore, in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the United States Supreme Court established a totality of the circumstances standard for determining the existence of probable cause: The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision based on all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information. We adopted the Gates totality of the circumstances test in Lee v. State, 435 So.2d 674, 676 (Miss.1983). ¶ 8. Moreover, this Court has defined probable cause as follows: Probable cause is a practical, non-technical concept, based upon the conventional considerations of every day life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. It arises when the facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge, or of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to justify a man of average caution in the belief that a crime has been committed and that a particular individual committed it. Strode v. State, 231 So.2d 779, 782 (Miss. 1970). Perhaps more simply put, probable cause means more than a bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify condemnation. Wagner v. State, 624 So.2d 60, 66 (Miss.1993). Taking into consideration these definitions of probable cause, along with the totality of the circumstances standard adopted in Lee, we find that the information contained within the record before us is insufficient to establish probable cause. If the sole reason for the issuance of the arrest warrant was Lenoir's testimony of what her neighbors' thought, then no probable cause existed to support the issuance of the warrant. Suspicion alone does not meet the constitutional standard of probable cause. Henry v. State, 486 So.2d at 1212. Lenoir's neighbors told her that they thought Conerly was responsible for the break-in. From the record, it appears that the neighbors' testimony was nothing more than rumor and was not supported by any other evidence. Moreover, the record does not indicate that Conerly was even seen in the area on the day of the break-in. ¶ 9. It is important to note, however, that Conerly did not raise this issue at trial, nor did he raise the issue in his initial brief upon appeal. Therefore, the trial judge was never given the opportunity to rule on the legality of the arrest warrant. Consequently, facts and information, supportive of a finding of probable cause may be absent from the record before this Court. As a result, we remand this case to the Marion County Circuit Court for a determination of whether sufficient probable cause existed to render the Conerly's arrest warrant valid.