Opinion ID: 2163453
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Pre-Arbitral Collyer Deferral Doctrine

Text: Between the benchmarks of Spielberg in 1955 and Carey in 1964, it is apparent that the Federal authorities had increasingly indicated a disposition to reconcile the competing claims of Federal labor policy in favor of the arbitral process. Especially was this clear in the case of post -award deferral. In the seminal decision of Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837; 77 LRRM 1931 (1971), however, the NLRB explicitly extended the ambit of discretionary NLRB deferral authority and ushered in the era of  pre -arbitral deferral, [25] representing an accommodation between, on the one hand, the statutory policy favoring the fullest use of collective bargaining and the arbitral process and, on the other, the statutory policy reflected by Congress' grant to the Board of exclusive jurisdiction to prevent unfair labor practices. Id., 841. In Collyer, the union charged that the employer had violated NLRA, § 8(a), subds (1) and (5) by allegedly undertaking unilateral changes in certain wages and working conditions. The employer maintained that it was so authorized pursuant to the parties' collective bargaining agreement as well as their prior course of contractual dealing. Accordingly, the employer averred that the dispute should be resolved through the parties' contractually binding grievance arbitration machinery as the appropriate forum for grievance adjustment despite the union's characterization of the dispute in statutory terms. After reviewing the parties' factual allegations and contractual agreement, the NLRB majority opined that this was essentially a dispute over the terms and meaning of the contract, id., 837, which in its entirety arises from the contract, id., 839. The breadth of the arbitration provision satisfied the majority that the parties intended to make the grievance and arbitration machinery the exclusive forum for resolving contract disputes. Id., 839. Noting that the dispute between these parties is the very stuff of labor contract arbitration, id., 842, the board emphasized that [t]he competence of a mutually selected arbitrator to decide the issue and fashion an appropriate remedy, if needed, can no longer be gainsaid. Id., 842. Sensitive to the dissent's objection that deferral to private arbitral consideration would strip the parties of statutory rights and henceforward mandate private compulsory arbitration of otherwise statutory disputes, the NLRB majority responded: We are not compelling any party to agree to arbitrate disputes arising during a contract term, but are merely giving full effect to their own voluntary agreements to submit all such disputes to arbitration, rather than permitting such agreements to be sidestepped and permitting the substitution of our processes, a forum not contemplated by their own agreement. Id., 842. (Emphasis supplied.) The NLRB concluded that the threshold issue of whether to defer arises only when a set of facts may present not only an alleged violation of the Act but also an alleged breach of the collective-bargaining agreement subject to arbitration. Id., 841. Elaborating on those factors favoring pre-arbitral deferral, [26] the majority observed that [t]he contract and its meaning    lie at the center of [the] dispute, such that,    the Act and its policies become involved only if it is determined that the agreement between the parties, examined in the light of its negotiating history and the practices of the parties thereunder, did not sanction Respondent's right to make the disputed changes    under the contractually prescribed procedure. Id., 842. We conclude that the Board is vested with authority to withhold its processes in this case, and that the contract here made available a quick and fair means for the resolution of this dispute including, if appropriate, a fully effective remedy for any breach of contract which occurred. Id., 839. The NLRB announced that, per Spielberg, it would reserve jurisdiction pending arbitration to guarantee that there will be no sacrifice of statutory rights if the parties' own processes fail to function in a manner consistent with the dictates of our law. Id., 843. As justification for their announcement of the discretionary pre-arbitral doctrine subject to Spielberg review, the majority surveyed the Federal statutory labor scheme as well as the Federal sphere's interpretation thereof [27] and, in the words of concurring member Brown, found that the raison d'etre of the [NLRA] is to encourage collective bargaining. Id., 844. The Collyer doctrine was cast as comporting with the [dynamic] policy of this Nation to avoid industrial strife through voluntary resolution of industrial disputes. Id., 843. Since the Collyer decision, at least three Federal circuits have directly upheld that doctrine [28] and at least three others have offered implicit approval in considering whether the NLRB properly exercised its authority not to defer. [29] While the NLRB's decisions in Roy Robinson [Chevrolet], Inc, 228 NLRB 828; 94 LRRM 1474 (1977), General American Transportation Corp, 228 NLRB 808; 94 LRRM 1483 (1977), and the Supreme Court's ruling in Alexander v Gardner-Denver Co, 415 US 36; 94 S Ct 1011; 39 L Ed 2d 147 (1974), [30] appear to have somewhat restricted the expansion of Collyer's scope, the Federal sphere has consistently upheld and applied Collyer's four-factor test in determining whether pre-arbitral deferral is appropriate. The Collyer doctrine has been discussed favorably in dicta by the United States Supreme Court, William E Arnold Co v Carpenters Dist Council, 417 US 12, 16-17; 94 S Ct 2069; 40 L Ed 2d 620 (1974), and has prompted the Second Circuit to state: The validity of the Collyer doctrine is no longer seriously in doubt. Lodges 700, 743, 1746, International Ass'n of Machinists v NLRB, 525 F2d 237, 239 (CA 2, 1975).