Opinion ID: 1515950
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionality of Stalking Statute

Text: RSA 633:3-a provides, in pertinent part, that a person commits the offense of stalking if he or she [p]urposely, knowingly, or recklessly engages in a course of conduct targeted at a specific person which would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her personal safety or the safety of a member of that person's immediate family, and the person is actually placed in such fear. RSA 633:3-a, I(a). RSA 633:3-a, II(a) defines course of conduct as 2 or more acts over a period of time, however short, which evidences a continuity of purpose. Pursuant to RSA 633:3-a, II(a), [a] course of conduct shall not include constitutionally protected activity, nor shall it include conduct that was necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose independent of making contact with the targeted person. A course of conduct may include following, approaching or confronting the targeted person or a member of that person's immediate family. RSA 633:3-a, II(a)(2). The defendant argues that the term legitimate purpose is unconstitutionally vague under the State and Federal Constitutions because it is undefined and does not sufficiently limit the trial court's discretion. We first analyze the defendant's claim under the State Constitution, State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231, 471 A.2d 347 (1983), citing federal authority for guidance only, id. at 233, 471 A.2d 347. The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Burke, 153 N.H. 361, 364, 897 A.2d 996 (2006). A statute may be impermissibly vague because it fails to establish standards for the police and public that are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty interests. Id. (quotation omitted); Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999). Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law for either of two independent reasons. Burke, 153 N.H. at 364, 897 A.2d 996. First, if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits, and [s]econd, if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Burke, 153 N.H. at 364, 897 A.2d 996 (quotations omitted); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000). We addressed a similar challenge in State v. Porelle, 149 N.H. 420, 822 A.2d 562 (2003), where we construed an earlier version of the stalking statute, RSA 633:3-a (1996 & Supp.1999). The earlier version of the statute defined stalking, in part, as appearing on more than one occasion for no legitimate purpose in proximity to the residence, place of employment, or other place where another person is found under circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to fear for his personal safety. RSA 633:3-a, I(d)(4) (Supp.1999); Porelle, 149 N.H. at 422, 822 A.2d 562. The defendant argued, among other things, that the phrase for no legitimate purpose was unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied. Porelle, 149 N.H. at 422, 425, 822 A.2d 562. In rejecting this contention, we defined a legitimate purpose as one that is genuine or accordant with law. Id. at 425, 822 A.2d 562 (quotations omitted). We ruled that the phrase no legitimate purpose, read in the context of the entire statute, which measures the offending conduct by an objective standard, did not give too much discretion to police officers. Id. As the presence or absence of a genuine or lawful purpose for appearing in proximity to another can readily be determined, we concluded that the phrase no legitimate purpose did not render the statute unconstitutionally vague, either on its face or as applied to the defendant. Id. For similar reasons, we hold that the phrase legitimate purpose as used in RSA 633:3-a, II(a), does not render the current version of the statute unconstitutionally vague, either on its face or as applied to the defendant. Like the defendant in Porelle, the defendant here takes the phrase out of context. As we explained in Porelle, By taking this phrase out of context, the defendant ignores the fact that the statute measures a defendant's actions by an objective standard, in that the offending conduct is only prohibited under circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety. Id. The phrase legitimate purpose read in the context of the entire statute, coupled with an objective standard, does not give too much discretion to the trial court. See id. This phrase, read in conjunction with the rest of the statute, does not require a person of common intelligence to guess at its meaning. See id. at 425-26, 822 A.2d 562. Like the defendant in Porelle, the defendant in this case argues that RSA 633:3-a is similar to loitering statutes that the United States Supreme Court has found unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 425, 822 A.2d 562; see Morales, 527 U.S. at 47, 64, 119 S.Ct. 1849. We disagree for the same reasons that we set forth in Porelle. See Porelle, 149 N.H. at 425-26, 822 A.2d 562. As the Federal Constitution offers the defendant no greater protection than does the State Constitution under these circumstances, see id. at 423, 822 A.2d 562, we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution as we do under the State Constitution.