Opinion ID: 2326611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of the School Psychologist

Text: The defendant alleges that hearsay statements Mary made to Mary-Ellen Tillotson, a certified school psychologist, were improperly admitted in violation of Rule 803(4) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence because there was no evidence that Mary sought a medical (or mental health) diagnosis from Ms. Tillotson. Ms. Tillotson testified that on September 24, 1996, an employee of the high school asked her to meet with Michelle. Based on her meeting with Michelle, she believed that it was important to talk with Mary about her general well-being. Ms. Tillotson then asked Mary to come to her office with Michelle. As a result of her conversation with Mary, she called the Department of Children, Youth and Families and the Warwick police. A police officer responded to the high school and spoke to both Mary and Michelle. Ms. Tillotson made a written report and, at the request of the officer, drove both girls to the police station. After much discussion with counsel outside the presence of the jury, the trial justice said that he would allow Ms. Tillotson to relate what Mary told her that afternoon. When the jury returned, Ms. Tillotson testified that Mary told her that: She's not supposed to talk about what her dad does to her when her mom is at work. She told me that  an incident that I had related to her, she  she affirmed that something has happened to her. She told me that her father had had sex with her in the basement. Ms. Tillotson also testified that when she asked Mary how often this had happened, Mary seemed to be confused about the times. Hearsay evidence is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. State v. Angell, 122 R.I. 160, 167, 405 A.2d 10, 14 (1979). As a rule, hearsay statements are excluded from the evidence introduced at trial because the usual safeguards of the oath, confrontation, and cross-examination, are not available. Id. However, there are numerous exceptions to this rule. Rule 803(4),  Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment,  allows hearsay statements to be admitted into evidence if the statements were: made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment, but not including statements made to a physician consulted solely for the purposes of preparing for litigation or obtaining testimony for trial. The admissibility of evidence is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the trial justice and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Momplaisir, 815 A.2d 65, 72 (R.I.2003) (citing State v. Andreozzi, 798 A.2d 372, 374-75 (R.I.2002) (per curiam)). The admissibility of Mary's statements hinge on whether the statements were reasonably pertinent to the formulation of a medical diagnosis or treatment. Id. (citing In re Jessica C., 690 A.2d 1357, 1363, 1364 (R.I.1997)). Clearly, Mary's declarations to the school psychologist could be helpful in diagnosing her mental health issues. The statement that her father had sex with her in the basement might be very relevant to the treatment of emotional and psychological injuries. When the perpetrator is a member of the child's immediate household, his or her identity may well be reasonably pertinent not only to the formulation of a treatment plan, but also to ensure that the child is in a safe and secure environment so that treatment can be effectuated. Cf. In re Andrey G., 796 A.2d 452, 456 (R.I.2002) (per curiam) (child's statement to doctor disclosing identity of perpetrator generally not admissible because it merely assigns fault and does not aid in diagnosis). There must, however, be a proper foundation showing that the statements in question were made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Here, Mary did not seek out the psychologist for a diagnosis or treatment of her problems; rather, the psychologist sought out Mary. There was no indication that Ms.Tillotson identified herself to Mary as a psychologist, or that Mary even knew that she was a psychologist. Further, it is not even clear that Mary was alone with Ms. Tillotson when they spoke or whether Michelle was also present during their conversation. A declarant's motive in making the statement must be consistent with seeking diagnosis or treatment. See, e.g., State v. Hildreth, 582 N.W.2d 167, 169-70 (Iowa 1998); State v. Wade, 136 N.H. 750, 622 A.2d 832, 835 (1993). The trial justice considered this dilemma, noting: it's not clear from the hearsay exception as to whose purpose it is, in making the statement to a treating person, whether it's for the purposes of the treating person or for the purposes of the treated person. In other words, did [Mary] make these statements to the school psychologist for the purpose of being treated by the school psychologist or was the school psychologist listening to the statements for the purpose of treating [Mary]?    I had presumed that a student in the Warwick school system visiting the school psychologist on school premises in the school psychologist's office was there to be psychologized by the school psychologist.    I'm going to rule that it is [Mary's] purpose in making the assertion and not the psychologist ['s]   . The underlying rationale for admitting out-of-court statements made in the furtherance of medical diagnosis or treatment is that a person has a strong motivation to be truthful about information that will form the basis of his [or her] diagnosis and treatment. Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 803(4). In this case, there was no showing that Mary's purpose in making the statements was for diagnosis or treatment from Ms. Tillotson, and thus no showing that Mary had a strong motivation to be truthful. After meeting with Michelle, Ms. Tillotson summoned Mary into her office. Whether Ms. Tillotson did this to diagnose and treat Mary or for purely investigatory reasons is of no import here. The dispositive fact is that Mary did not make these statements to Ms. Tillotson because she was seeking treatment, and thus there is no underpinning of reliability. Moreover, there was no showing that Ms. Tillotson ever, in fact, treated Mary. When asked directly if she ever counseled Mary, Ms. Tillotson testified that she met with her on several occasions, but those were not regularly scheduled counseling appointments. She then added, They were generally at the request of someone else for me to meet with her. We conclude, therefore, that there was an insufficient foundation to support a presumption that Mary's statements to Ms. Tillotson were made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. The trial justice seemed to recognize this, but nevertheless drew an inference that Mary was likely to be seeking treatment simply because she was speaking to the school psychologist in her office on the school premises, as she might had she been talking to the school nurse about a cut or a scrape. We conclude, therefore, that Mary's out-of-court statements to the school psychologist were not properly admissible under Rule 803(4). It is well established that the admission of hearsay evidence is not prejudicial when the evidence is merely cumulative and when defendant's guilt is sufficiently established by proper evidence. State v. Micheli, 656 A.2d 980, 982 (R.I.1995) (per curiam) (citing Angell, 122 R.I. at 168, 405 A.2d at 14). While it is true that evidence is accumulated in the course of a trial to determine a defendant's guilt, not all evidence is cumulative. `Cumulative evidence' means `tending to prove the same point to which other evidence has been offered.' State v. Coleman, 239 Neb. 800, 478 N.W.2d 349, 358 (1992) (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 553 (Unabr.1981)). Thus, to qualify as cumulative, the evidence in question need not be introduced only after other evidence tending to prove the same point already has been admitted. Rather, the test is a retrospective one, administered at the close of all the evidence to determine whether the admission of certain evidence was harmless in light of all the evidence admitted on that point. After reviewing the record, we conclude that Ms. Tillotson's testimony was merely cumulative in light of subsequent testimony. [3] The usual reasons for excluding hearsay statements  lack of the oath, confrontation, and cross-examination  are greatly abated here because Ms. Tillotson's testimony did not reveal anything other than that testified to by Mary herself. See Angell, 122 R.I. at 168, 405 A.2d at 14. The strength of the state's case against defendant was directly dependent upon the jury's assessment of Mary's credibility. We therefore conclude that the admission of this testimony was harmless error. The defendant further argues that because Mary's credibility was at issue, Ms. Tillotson's testimony could be conceived by the jury as a conclusive opinion that Mary had testified truthfully. We disagree. The defendant notes that in State v. Haslam, 663 A.2d 902 (R.I.1995), this Court held that the trial court's allowance of the testimony of a counselor vouching for the credibility of the complaining witness was error. The defendant fails to note, however, the different circumstances of the two cases. In Haslam, 663 A.2d at 906, this Court concluded that repeated references to sexual abuse recovery by the counselor would influence the jury by adding credibility to the complaining witness's allegation that she had been sexually abused. The Court said that even though the counselor's testimony was not a literal statement of the counselor's belief in the truthfulness of the complaining witness, the testimony had the same substantive import and would be perceived by the jury as a conclusive opinion that the alleged complaining witness had testified truthfully. Id. Here, however, Ms. Tillotson was identified generally as a school psychologist, and the discussion between Mary and Ms. Tillotson was never characterized as sexual abuse counseling. In her testimony, Ms. Tillotson only repeated Mary's statements. She offered no opinion about their veracity or credibility. Additionally, Mary testified immediately after Ms. Tillotson, and thus the jury had the opportunity to hear the same story directly from Mary. Therefore, we conclude that the jury could not reasonably construe Ms. Tillotson's testimony as vouching for the credibility of Mary.