Opinion ID: 2654917
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of the Chapin Street Shooting

Text: Israel claims that the trial court abused its discretion53 in admitting the evidence of his involvement in the uncharged Chapin Street murder; he argues that this was impermissible propensity evidence and that it was significantly more prejudicial than probative. We conclude that this evidence was properly admitted and used for the limited purposes of proving the identity of the perpetrator of the Columbia Road shootings and establishing that Israel was in possession of the weapon used in those shootings. 52 See also People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433, 445 (Cal. 2007) (“The presumption of innocence and right to jury trial will not be infringed [by a determination that the forfeiture doctrine applies] because the jury „will never learn of the judge‟s preliminary finding‟ and „will use different information and a different standard of proof to decide the defendant‟s guilt.‟”), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008). 53 See Jones v. United States, 27 A.3d 1130, 1143 (D.C. 2011). 39 While evidence of an uncharged crime is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the defendant‟s criminal disposition, it may be admissible when offered for some “substantial, legitimate purpose.”54 Proof of identity, where the identity of the perpetrator of the charged offense is in dispute, is one such non-propensity purpose.55 Other crimes evidence may be probative of identity where there exists “a reasonable probability that the same person committed both crimes due to the concurrence of unusual and distinctive facts relating to the manner in which the crimes were committed.”56 We have held that this may be shown by evidence that the same weapon or other instrumentality was used in both crimes. 57 In addition, as pointed out in Jones, proof that the defendant possessed the weapon (or instrumentality) in question may be admissible on the related, but distinct, ground that it is “direct evidence” of the defendant‟s complicity in the offense for which 54 Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 89-90 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 55 Jones, 27 A.3d at 1143. 56 Drew, 331 F.2d at 90 & n.11. 57 See Jones, 27 A.3d at 1145-47 (D.C. 2011) (upholding admission in prosecution for murder of evidence that the defendant committed an uncharged armed robbery in which the murder weapon was employed). 40 he is on trial.58 The special procedural requirements that ordinarily must be met for the admission of other crimes evidence under Drew, such as the requirement that the uncharged offense be proved by clear and convincing evidence, do not apply to such direct evidence of the defendant‟s guilt.59 The court still may exclude the evidence, though, if it finds that its probative value is outweighed substantially by the risk of unfair prejudice.60 In this case, ballistics evidence established that the gun used in the shootings on Columbia Road was used just eight days earlier in the shooting on Chapin Street. There was a single attacker in each incident. From the fact that the same weapon was used in two such events so close in time, a reasonable trier of fact could infer that the same person was the shooter in both of them. The government‟s evidence—the strength of which is not challenged in this appeal— that Israel was the shooter on Chapin Street therefore was admissible under the 58 Id. at 1146 (citing Busey v. United States, 747 A.2d 1153, 1165 (D.C. 2000)); see also Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1096-97 (D.C. 1996) (en banc). 59 Jones, 27 A.3d at 1146-47; see Johnson, 683 A.2d at 1098 (stating that “Drew does not apply” to other crimes evidence that is, inter alia, “direct and substantial proof of the charged crime”). 60 Jones, 27 A.3d at 1147; see generally Johnson, 683 A.2d at 1098-1100. 41 twin rationales that it was probative of Israel‟s identity as the perpetrator of the Columbia Road shootings and direct evidence that Israel possessed the murder weapon and was guilty of the crimes for which he was on trial. Whether the danger of unfair prejudice to Israel from introducing the uncharged Chapin Street murder substantially outweighed its probative value was a question committed to the discretion of the trial court, “and we owe a great degree of deference to its decision.”61 We cannot conclude that the court abused that discretion. Evidence of an uncharged murder undeniably has a prejudicial impact, but unfair prejudice is minimized where the evidence is admitted for a valid purpose and has substantial probative value, the prosecution does not present or argue it improperly, and the court correctly instructs the jury on the permissible use it may make of the evidence. Those conditions were satisfied here. Israel‟s claim that the government exploited the evidence to prejudice the jury against him is not supported by the record. The prosecutor took care not to invite improper propensity implications, but rather highlighted the legitimate identity inferences, arguing that the same murder weapon was used only a week before the second shooting in the same manner, and that “those similarities . . . prove[] to you that 61 Johnson, 683 A.2d at 1095. 42 it‟s the same shooter.” The trial court instructed the jury that it could use the Chapin Street evidence only for its value as proof of identity, and not for any other purpose, such as “to conclude that Mr. Israel has a bad character or criminal propensity.” On the record before us, we do not find undue prejudice.