Opinion ID: 706911
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Meaning of the Disputed Terms of the Contract

Text: 14 Although appellants generally do not doubt the applicability of Connecticut law, they argue that they did not agree to apply Connecticut law to determine the timeliness of petitions to vacate arbitration awards. Appellants claim that, in selecting the AAA to administer arbitration proceedings, the parties evinced an intention to select a neutral forum. However, it does not follow from this that the parties also intended to avoid Connecticut law. AAA rules provide for many details of procedure not covered in Connecticut's arbitration law. See generally AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES (1993); CONN.GEN.STAT.ANN. Secs. 52-408--52-424 (West 1991). Moreover, the AAA rules do not purport to establish the time period within which a party may petition a court for judicial review of an arbitration award. In short, the parties' selection of the AAA to administer arbitration proceedings arising under the Merger Agreement in no way alters the provisions setting forth their understanding on the choice of law to govern and construe the agreement. 15 In a vain attempt to bolster their argument, appellants also note that neither the choice of law provisions nor the arbitration clause contains an express agreement to apply the 30-day Connecticut time limit. On this point, appellants contend that the [c]hoice of law provisions in contracts are generally understood to incorporate only substantive law, not procedural law such as statutes of limitation.... Absent an express statement of intent, a standard choice of law provision such as this one will not be interpreted as covering a statute of limitation. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Petersen, 770 F.2d 141, 142-43 (10th Cir.1985). Value Health responds that, while this may be true in some cases, the Connecticut limitation period is substantive and, therefore, does not require express incorporation. We agree. 16 Under Connecticut law, time limits may be either substantive or procedural, and jurisdictional time limits are not subject to waiver and are thus considered substantive. Lo Sacco v. Young, 210 Conn. 503, 555 A.2d 986, 988 (1989). Under Connecticut law, a statute of limitation is substantive when it applies to a right created by statute, as opposed to a right recognized at common law, and substantive limitation periods apply in any forum in which the right is sought to be enforced. Baxter v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 230 Conn. 335, 644 A.2d 1297, 1299, 1302 (1994). The 30-day Connecticut limitations period is considered to be part of the statute granting the right to challenge an arbitration award, and, therefore, it  'was directed to the newly created liability so specifically as to warrant saying that it qualified the right.'  Thomas Iron Co. v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 131 Conn. 665, 42 A.2d 145, 147 (1945) (quoting Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454, 24 S.Ct. 692, 694, 48 L.Ed. 1067 (1904)). 17 Thus, the Connecticut statute of limitations for petitions to vacate arbitration awards is jurisdictional, not subject to waiver, and, accordingly, substantive. See Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Castellano, 225 Conn. 339, 623 A.2d 55, 58 (1993) (If [a motion to vacate an arbitration award] is not filed within the thirty day time limit [of section 52-420(b) of the Connecticut Code], the trial court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the motion.). Accordingly, appellants' petition to vacate the arbitration award was untimely under Connecticut law, and thus untimely under the Merger Agreement as well.