Opinion ID: 566091
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Efficacy of Alternative Remedies

Text: 58 To determine whether a minority preference program, like the one struck down in Croson, is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, one must inquire whether the local legislature considered the use of race-neutral means to increase minority participation. Id. at 507, 109 S.Ct. at 728, 102 L.Ed.2d at 890 (majority opinion). In Croson, the Supreme Court observed that there was absolutely no evidence in the record that the Richmond City Council considered any alternatives to the racial quota adopted. Id. The Court compared this absence of evidence to the situation in Fullilove, in which Congress carefully examined and rejected race-neutral alternatives before enacting the MBE set-aside, id. at 507, 109 S.Ct. at 728, 102 L.Ed.2d at 891, and the program therein was found constitutional. 59 There is evidence in the record that Metro Dade pursued without success other means to increase the representation of minorities in the Department. Chief Edward Donaldson testified at trial that the Fire Department had a recruitment program aimed at minorities. He stated that recruiters were sent to high schools and college campuses to inform and encourage minority students to sign up for the Fire Department's test. Because it was difficult for the Department to find women capable of passing the physical capability test, they apparently had a very targeted program to identify females and get them interested in the position of firefighter. (Testimony of Jacquelyn Rowe-Dottin, Human Resources Coordinator.) 60 Moreover, the Department's Affirmative Action Program for 1983-83 included a Summary Agreement (Agreement) that detailed the planned recruitment efforts of the Fire Department. The Agreement provided for a recruitment specialist to organize and implement a special recruitment program. The duties of the recruitment specialist included presentations at local colleges, high schools, job fairs and career day presentations. In addition, the recruitment specialist was to coordinate with minority and female organizations in order to inform the entire Dade County community of fire service career opportunities. The Agreement also provided for special programs directed towards minority youth, such as a Summer Youth Employment Program, which employed minority youths while educating them about fire prevention. Additionally, a group of black firefighters from the Department, the Progressive Firefighters, was to continue an outreach program to the black community, according to the terms of the Agreement. 61 The Fire Department's programs to increase the number of minorities in the Department through special outreach and recruitment programs are impressive. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the Department has sufficiently considered and implemented additional remedial alternatives.(ii) The Flexibility and Duration of the Plan 62 In determining whether the Metro Dade Plan meets the narrow tailoring requirement, consideration of the flexibility and duration of the program must be given. Courts considering whether a minority preference plan meets the precision requirement emphasize that the government entity should adopt the program for a limited duration to facilitate a periodic re-evaluation of the program. See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 513, 100 S.Ct. at 2792, 65 L.Ed.2d at 947 (Powell, J., concurring) (The temporary nature of this remedy ensures that a race-conscious program will not last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate); accord L.D. Mattson, Inc. v. Multnomah County, 703 F.Supp. 66, 68 (D.Or.1988). In addition, because rigid quotas are by their very nature antithetical to the flexibility mandated by the narrow tailoring requirement, unyielding preferential quotas will normally doom an affirmative action plan. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 508, 109 S.Ct. at 729, 102 L.Ed.2d at 891 (highly critical of rigid quotas); Paradise, 480 U.S. at 197, 107 S.Ct. at 1080, 94 L.Ed.2d at 240 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (rigid quota for affirmative action plan is impermissible). 35 The Supreme Court has specifically approved the use of hiring goals, on the other hand, which do not rigidly dictate a required number of minorities to be hired. See, e.g., Johnson, Wygant, Weber. 63 The Metro Dade Plan does not continue indefinitely, but terminates upon the satisfaction of its affirmative action goals. Ms. Rowe-Dottin testified that [t]he plan is reviewed annually ... [T]he plan is remedial in nature, and it addresses problems of under-utilization. If they don't exist, then there is no need to set a goal. 36 Moreover, the Plan's hiring provisions are appropriately sensitive to the Supreme Court's distinction between goals and quotas. The Dade County Affirmative Action Policy and Statement: Goals and Timetables, (AAPS), states: 64 Under a system of goals, therefore, the County is never required to hire a person who does not have qualifications needed to perform the job successfully; and the department is never required to hire an unqualified person in preference of another applicant who is qualified. 65 The Fire Department followed the guidelines outlined in the AAPS, because although it sought to hire 37 Hispanics, it was only able to hire 28. The Department was unwilling to hire unqualified minorities just to meet its goals. Had a strict quota been in place, on the other hand, the Department would have been required to fill these 37 positions with Hispanics. Because the Plan does not endure in perpetuity, and because it does not impose rigid quotas, I find that Metro Dade has satisfied this second criterion of the narrowly tailored prong. 66 (iii) Over-and-Under-Inclusiveness of the Plan 67 The crux of Peightal's argument on appeal is that the Plan is both over-and-under-inclusive in its preferential treatment of Hispanics. Peightal maintains that the Dade County minority preference program is over-inclusive because it favors white European Spaniards with no significant cultural or linguistic discernability from non-Hispanic white persons. 37 In addition, Peightal argues that the Plan is under-inclusive because the class of persons qualifying for preferential treatment as Hispanics fails to include other national and ethnic groups that are susceptible to similar discrimination. 68 The EEOC definition of Hispanic, as applied by Metro Dade, includes: All persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race. Peightal asserts that this definition is over-inclusive because it includes persons who can trace their ancestry to Spain, irrespective of language or culture, but would preclude favorable treatment to persons with Portuguese heritage, for example. According to Peightal, since white European Spaniards with no visibly discernable Hispanic characteristics have not been subjected to past or present discrimination, it violates the narrowly tailored prong of the strict scrutiny prong to include them in the favored group called Hispanics. 69 While it may seem anomalous to grant employment preferences to a light-skinned descendant of Spanish grandparents who speaks no Spanish and has no individual cultural ties to an American Spanish community or to Spain, (while denying such preferences to the Portuguese-speaking offspring of Portuguese parents), such a situation would not arise under the Metro Dade Plan, because the Plan adopts the EEOC requirement that a person's claim of identification with a certain racial or ethnic group should accompany strong visible indication that the person culturally and linguistically identifies with the group he or she claims. (emphasis in original). 38 70 As for the Plan's alleged under-inclusiveness, Peightal argues that it excludes, and therefore discriminates against, members of European national origin, Middle Eastern national origin, and Slavic/Russian national origin, while benefitting those of Spanish origin. Peightal claims that Greeks, Italians, Portuguese, Jews, Israelis, Iranians, and others, are all culturally and linguistically discernable and subject to discrimination in the work place as a result of their ethnic characteristics. However, since these groups are not benefited by the Department's minority preference program, Peightal argues that the Plan is therefore unconstitutionally under-inclusive. 71 However, it is well established that the Equal Protection Clause does not require public employers to institute affirmative action goals for each and every ethnic group that may exist in a community. 39 In adopting an affirmative action plan an employer may rationally limit its application to those minority groups in the local work force that are most in need of remedial efforts. Cf. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 n. 35, 98 S.Ct. at 2751 n. 35, 57 L.Ed.2d at 774. The Equal Protection Clause does not require a state actor to grant preference to all ethnic groups solely because it grants preference to one or more groups. A state actor does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment so long as it [is] rational ... to conclude that the groups [the state actor] preferred had a greater claim to compensation than the groups it excluded. Id. In Dade County, the two most prevalent minority groups are blacks and Hispanics. We hold that an affirmative action plan addressing past discrimination against these two groups is rational, and therefore not under-inclusive. 72 (iv) The Effect of the Remedy Upon Innocent Third Parties 73 Unquestionably, Peightal was harmed by the hiring preferences dictated in the Metro Dade Plan. However, a state or local government may constitutionally require innocent nonminorities to share the burden of remedying the effects of past identified discrimination. See Fullilove 448 U.S. at 484, 100 S.Ct. at 2777, 65 L.Ed.2d at 928. As the plurality explained in Wygant: 74 In cases involving valid hiring goals, the burden to be borne by innocent individuals is diffused to a considerable extent among society generally. Though hiring goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply do not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose. Denial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of an existing job. 75 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282, 106 S.Ct. at 1851, 90 L.Ed.2d at 274 (Burger, C.J., and Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor, J.J.) (emphasis in original). 76 The Plan calls for no layoffs, as in Wygant, and it does not impose an absolute bar to the hiring of non-minorities. See Paradise, 480 U.S. at 184, 107 S.Ct. at 1073, 94 L.Ed.2d at 231. Accordingly, I would hold that the Plan did not have an unconstitutional effect on non-minorities. To Sum It Up 77 The County has complied with the requirements of the first prong of the strict scrutiny standard by showing a compelling government purpose for the Plan. In particular, I conclude that (i) the firefighter position at issue was unskilled; (ii) the general population was the proper labor pool to use for comparative purposes; (iii) Dade County was the appropriate geographic area; and (iv) the disparity between the percentages of minorities in the Fire Department and the general population was great enough to justify the trial court's finding of previous discrimination by Metro Dade, and the need for the kind of remedial efforts sought by the Plan. 78 The second prong of the strict scrutiny standard was also satisfied by Metro Dade, because the Plan was narrowly tailored to meet its remedial objectives. More specifically, the Plan (i) adequately considered and implemented alternative remedies to a minority-preference program; (ii) was flexible and of limited duration; (iii) was not unconstitutionally over-or-under-inclusive; and (iv) did not unnecessarily trammel on the rights of nonminorities.