Opinion ID: 2633497
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the district court was within its discretion in ordering immediate occupancy

Text: ¶23 Having determined that Spring Canyon's due process rights were not infringed, we must now decide whether the district court abused its discretion in granting immediate occupancy to Utah County based on the proof of necessity before. it. Utah Code section 78-34-9 provides that a district court shall take proof by affidavit or otherwise of: (i) the value of the premises sought to be condemned; (ii) the damages that will accrue from the condemnation; and (iii) the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation. Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9(2)(a) (Supp. 2005). After receiving that proof, the court may grant or refuse the motion according to the equity of the case and the relative damages that may accrue to the parties. Id. § 78-34-9(2)(b). As stated above, supra ¶ 7, the district court is given broad discretion to determine whether the equities weigh in favor of or against a condemner's motion for order of immediate occupancy. See Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 833 (Utah 1984); Bountiful v. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Utah 1975). And when a local government uses its power of eminent domain for a public road, we have held that the expediency of appropriating any particular property is not a subject of judicial cognizance. Utah Dep't of Transp. v. G. Kay, Inc., 2003 UT 40, ¶ 11, 78 P.3d 612 (internal quotaton marks omitted) (emphasis added); see also Swift, 535 P.2d at 1238 (The expediency . . . in opening a public street is a political question and in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion . . . will not be disturbed by the courts.). We must first determine the burden of production contemplated by section 78-34-9, and then determine whether the district court abused its discretion in finding that Utah County met that burden in this case. ¶24 Spring Canyon argues that this Court's precedent requires a condemner to show considerable or ample evidence of the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation. In support of its position, Spring Canyon cites Swift, 535 P.2d at 1238, and Utah Department of Transportation v. Fuller, 603 P.2d 814, 817 (Utah 1979). Spring Canyon reads these cases too broadly. Instead of setting the threshold burden that the condemner must meet to merit immediate occupancy, these cases merely hold that the considerable supporting evidence in Swift, 535 P.2d at 1238, and the ample supporting evidence in Fuller, 603 P.2d at 817, were enough to satisfy the applicable burden. ¶25 In contrast, Utah County argues that this Court's precedent requires a condemner to show merely some evidence that the prima facie elements exist, and cites Friberg, 687 P.2d at 833, and Cornish Town v. Koller, 817 P.2d 305, 308 (Utah 1991), for its position. But Utah County also reads these cases too broadly. Both Friberg and Cornish Town require a prima facie showing of the right to condemn, but neither case addresses what showing need be made with respect to the elements of section 78-34-9. Friberg, 687 P.2d at 833; accord Cornish Town, 817 P.2d at 308. ¶26 We conclude that the condemner need only present prima facie evidence of the elements of subsection 78-34-9(2)(a)(i) to (iii). This relatively light burden of production stems from appropriate deference to legislative action. See G. Kay, Inc., 2003 UT 40, ¶ 11 (noting the wide discretion usually given government in exercise of its eminent domain power). It is because of this deference that the practice of granting orders of immediate occupancy has been considered routine. State v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 332 P.2d 926, 927 (Utah 1958). [3] In essence, where there is no fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion, Swift, 535 P.2d at 1238, and the condemner has presented prima facie evidence both of its authority to condemn and of the elements found in subsections 78-34-9(2)(a)(i) to (iii), the condemner's decision to seek immediate occupancy should be respected by the courts. ¶27 In light of this deferential standard, local governments are, in large part, left to assess the wisdom of seeking immediate occupancy. Taking immediate occupancy entails some risk because an order of immediate occupancy is interlocutory and is subject to change should the trial court become convinced of the need to do so. Cornish Town, 817 P.2d at 309. Often, as in this case, the government seeks immediate occupancy in order to immediately commence construction. If the district court later determines that condemnation was not appropriate, then there will likely already be substantial damage to the property that a condemner would be required to repair. Spring Canyon argues that this type of damage would be irreparable. Where possession of the property could be returned to the owner, and where the property could be restored, albeit at great expense, to its pre-immediate-occupancy-order state, the damage inflicted is not properly characterized as irreparable. Ultimately, the courts' liberality in granting orders of immediate occupancy merely recognizes that, by filing a motion for immediate occupancy, the condemner assumes the risk that the court may ultimately find against it and require it to incur substantial expense in restoring the property. Although that risk is almost always small, it still serves to deter governmental entities from needlessly seeking immediate occupancy. ¶28 Applying this deferential burden to this case, we conclude that Utah County satisfied its burden of production, and thus, that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering immediate occupancy. Utah County presented evidence that the road would relieve traffic congestion, and the district court specifically stated in its findings that roads are much easier and less costly to construct during the non-winter seasons. Although the evidence is hardly overwhelming, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion by deciding that the equities weigh in favor of Utah County.