Opinion ID: 1893288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Three-Year Moratorium

Text: The three-year prohibition on Interstate's offering high-speed ferry service began on May 1, 2000. That prohibition ended on May 1, 2003. Therefore, the issue of the propriety of the moratorium, which was before this Court on May 8, 2003, now is moot. Nevertheless, the moratorium did not stand alone. As a regulatory measure it was linked to the requirement that Interstate would have to apply for a CPCN at the end of the moratorium if it wished to provide high-speed ferry service. Thus, although the moratorium has ended, the other part of the Division's mandate remains applicable to Interstate. Therefore, considering the moratorium and the requirement of CPCN approval as part of the same regulating order, the propriety of the order viewed as a whole is not moot. We therefore address the merits of this issue below. Section 39-4-10 provides that the Division may, upon hearing and investigation, regulate any practice, act or service that is unjust, unreasonable, insufficient, preferential, unjustly discriminatory, or otherwise in violation of any of the provisions of chapters 1-5 of [title 39]. In this case, after conduOting an investigation and hearing, the Division determined that Interstate had engaged in planning for providing high-speed ferry services. It based this determination on evidence that Interstate's assistant operations manager Joshua Linda (Mr. Linda) went on test rides on a high-speed ferry and inquired about the prices of such a vessel that was advertised for sale, as well as negative inferences garnered from Mrs. Linda's invocation of the Fifth Amendment when questioned about Interstate's interest in achieving high-speed ferry capabilities. Therefore, the Division entered its order that prohibited Interstate from entering the highspeed ferry market for three years pursuant to its authority under § 39-4-10. The trial justice, however, concluded that the Division had no authority to prohibit Interstate from engaging in highspeed ferry services for three years. Specifically, the trial justice determined that the Division was not regulating Interstate based upon a current practice, act or service, as the statute unambiguously provided, but rather was issuing the moratorium because of the possibility that Interstate may enter the market in the future. We certainly agree with the trial justice that § 39-4-10 is unambiguous. It permits the Division to issue orders regulating carriers if it finds that any    practice, act or service    is unjust, unreasonable, insufficient, preferential, unjustly discriminatory, or otherwise in violation of    chapters 1-5 of [Title 39]   . (Emphasis added.) The word is is defined as [t]he third person singular present indicative of the verb be.    In its present state; as it stands. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 693 (10th ed.1981). Given this definition, the plain meaning of § 34-4-10 clearly demonstrates that there must be an actual, currently existing practice, act or service for the Division to regulate a carrier after an investigation and hearing. [5] We depart from the reasoning of the trial justice, not in his interpretation of § 39-4-10, but rather in his application of that section to the facts in this case. The three-year prohibition was based upon evidence that Interstate had begun planning to enter the high-speed ferry market. The Division properly adduced that evidence from the proceedings before it. Because Mrs. Linda invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a civil proceeding, the Division was permitted to draw the adverse inference against Interstate that it was planning to enter the high-speed market. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 1558, 47 L.Ed.2d 810, 821 (1976). At the very least the Division was entitled to conclude that Interstate was engaged in acts and practices to determine whether it should do so. The Division also inferred from Mr. Linda's actions elicited during Hi-Speed's CPCN hearing, which included taking test rides on high-speed vessels and inquiring about the prices of such vessels, that Interstate had engaged in active planning to enter the high-speed ferry market. Therefore, it is clear that the Division based the three-year prohibition on Interstate's current activity of planning to enter the high-speed ferry market. All that remains to decide is whether § 39-4-10 includes planning within its definition of practice, act or service. We conclude that it does. This Court never has interpreted the definition of the practice, act or service language as written in § 39-4-10. Therefore, we must look to other bodies of law for guidance. Specifically, we turn to the principles of the criminal law of attempt for aid in determining when planning rises to the level of an act. For the purposes of criminal attempt, a person's preparation or plan for a crime qualifies as an act only when that person has made a substantial step toward completing the ultimate goal. See State v. Ferreira, 463 A.2d 129, 132 (R.I.1983). We now conclude that this standard also is appropriate when determining whether engaging in planning is sufficient to amount to a practice, act or service under § 39-4-10. Thus, only if Interstate's preparation was a substantial step toward deciding whether it should pursue high-speed ferry capabilities will it come within the purview of the Division's regulatory authority under § 39-4-10. It is clear to us that Interstate had taken substantial steps toward acquiring highspeed capacity. Mr. Linda's efforts to test ride a high-speed vessel, combined with his multiple inquiries into the price and specifications of such vessels undoubtedly is a substantial step toward deciding whether to ultimately acquire or otherwise offer high-speed service. Those actions are sufficient to constitute an act under the substantial step standard. Therefore, the Division had the authority under § 39-4-10 to impose the three-year moratorium on Interstate.