Opinion ID: 186086
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Arguments Raised in Supplemental Pleadings.

Text: 18 BDPCS next contends that even if the Commission dismissed the new arguments raised in the First and Second Supplements as procedurally defective, they are nevertheless preserved for judicial review because the Commission also rejected those arguments on their merits — erroneously, says BDPCS. BDPCS is half right, but unfortunately for BDPCS it is the other half that matters here. 19 Section 405 of the Communications Act precludes judicial review of questions of fact or law upon which the Commission, or designated authority within the Commission, has been afforded no opportunity to pass. 47 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2). We thus generally lack jurisdiction to review arguments that have not first been presented to the Commission. See, e.g., Washington Ass'n for Television & Children v. FCC, 712 F.2d 677, 680-81 (D.C.Cir.1983). Conversely, our jurisdiction is preserved so long as the Commission has been afforded a fair opportunity to pass on the arguments in question. See Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620, 635 (D.C.Cir.1996) (citing Washington Ass'n for Television & Children, 712 F.2d at 680-82). Here, the Commission not only enjoyed a fair opportunity to review the arguments in BDPCS's First and Second Supplements, it actually did review them. So BDPCS is right when it says that we have jurisdiction to review those arguments. 20 But that jurisdiction does not aid BDPCS here. While the Commission did address and reject BDPCS's arguments on their merits, it also dismissed those arguments as procedurally barred. See Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 17,596-97 ¶ 10, 17,611 ¶ 41. When an agency offers multiple grounds for a decision, we will affirm the agency so long as any one of the grounds is valid, unless it is demonstrated that the agency would not have acted on that basis if the alternative grounds were unavailable. See Mail Order Ass'n of Am. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 2 F.3d 408, 434 (D.C.Cir.1993); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88, 63 S.Ct. 454, 459-60, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943). So, although we have jurisdiction to review the merits of BDPCS's substantive arguments, BDPCS — to prevail — must also circumvent each of the two independent procedural grounds upon which the Commission dismissed those same arguments. This BDPCS cannot do. 21 We review an agency's dismissal of pleadings on procedural grounds under the familiar standards of the Administrative Procedure Act, setting aside such dismissals only if they are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(a)(2). Citing this Court's decision in Graceba Total Communications v. FCC, 115 F.3d 1038 (D.C.Cir.1997), BDPCS seems to assert that the Commission's consideration of the merits of its supplemental arguments has the effect of abrogating the dismissal, on procedural grounds, of those same arguments. This mischaracterizes our holding in Graceba. There, the Commission had rejected Graceba's constitutional objection to an FCC order as untimely, but went on to consider (briefly) the merits of the argument. See id. at 1040-41. We found that the Commission's consideration of Graceba's argument was sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirements of Section 405, thus preserving our jurisdiction to review Graceba's substantive claims. Id. at 1041. Rather than opine on the merits, we remanded the case to the Commission for a fuller consideration of Graceba's constitutional claim. Id. at 1041-42. Critically, though, we remanded on the merits only after we had held that the Commission's dismissal of the argument as untimely was improper. Id. at 1040-41. It is only because we had found error in the Commission's procedural ground that we could grant relief on the merits. 22 Missing from BDPCS's citations to authority is any case in which we granted relief on the merits, notwithstanding the fact that the Commission had properly dismissed the pleading on procedural grounds. BDPCS points to our decision in Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 911 F.2d 803, 809 (D.C.Cir.1990), but that case offers no assistance to its cause. There, the FCC had dismissed the petitioner's challenge on procedural grounds, but nevertheless considered the merits of the argument. Just as in Graceba, we concluded that the Commission's consideration of the merits preserved our jurisdiction under Section 405. Id. at 809. We moved immediately to the merits and rejected the petitioner's argument. Id. at 812. That consideration of the merits, however, did not sub silentio undermine the force of the Commission's procedural dismissal. If we had concluded that the petitioner had the better of the argument on the merits, we then would have had to confront the Commission's procedural ground, and, if the petitioner were ultimately to be granted relief, to find it invalid. Our conclusion that the petitioner's claim failed on the merits, however, rendered unnecessary further discussion of the Commission's procedural ground. 23 Here, we can find no error in the Commission's procedural rulings. BDPCS concedes that the arguments in the First and Second Supplements were not timely raised to the Commission and never had been presented to the WTB. On the timeliness issue, this Court has held often enough that the Commission does not abuse its discretion when it decline[s] to entertain a late-filed petition in the absence of extenuating circumstances prohibiting a timely filing. 21st Century Telesis Joint Venture v. FCC, 318 F.3d 192, 200 (D.C.Cir.2003). In fact, we have gone so far as to discourage the Commission from entertaining late-filed pleadings in the absence of extremely unusual circumstances. Id. at 199-200. Here, we need not question whether the circumstances presented by BDPCS are adequately extenuating because BDPCS has never presented any excuse for its failure to raise its arguments in a timely manner. It follows that the Commission did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the untimely arguments. 24 If that were not sufficient, there remains the second procedural basis for the Commission's dismissal — BDPCS's failure to present the supplemental arguments to the WTB. This is an equally open-and-shut case: the Commission's rules do not permit the Commission to grant an application for review if it relies on questions of fact or law upon which the designated authority has been afforded no opportunity to pass. 47 C.F.R. § 1.115(c). The Commission abuses its discretion when it arbitrarily violates its own rules, not when it follows them. 25 Because we uphold the Commission's order on these procedural grounds, we have no occasion to reach the merits of BDPCS's arguments on the invalidity of the WTB's default payment order. 26 The petition for review is denied.