Opinion ID: 4543350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cash-Transfer Evidence

Text: Defendant next contends that the government’s presentation of the bank-document evidence showing cash transfers violated Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). He concedes that he did not make this objection at trial, so our review is only for plain error. We see no plain error. The bank documents revealed that in the months before Defendant’s arrest, large cash deposits totaling $29,600 had been deposited into his account in Nashville, and on two occasions cash withdrawals matching the deposit amounts were made by Defendant in Phoenix on the same day as the deposits. Agent Epps testified that this pattern was consistent with pipeline or funnel accounts used by drug traffickers. The prosecutor relied on this evidence during closing arguments, asserting that the bank statements supported the government’s theory that Defendant was on his way to Nashville to deliver the drugs and deposit proceeds into his account for withdrawal in Phoenix, consistent with the scheme suggested by the previous cash transfers. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) provides: “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). The rule has deep historical roots based on concerns that a jury will convict the defendant for being a bad person, rather than because the defendant’s guilt of the charged offense has been established beyond a reasonable doubt: [It] codifies the common law doctrine forbidding the prosecution from asking the jury to infer from the fact that the defendant has committed a bad act in the past, that he has a bad character and therefore is more likely to 20 have committed the bad act now charged. Although this “propensity evidence” is relevant, the risk that a jury will convict for crimes other than those charged—or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad person deserves punishment—creates a prejudicial effect that outweighs ordinary relevance. United States v. Shomo, 786 F.2d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 1986) (further internal quotation marks omitted). But evidence of prior bad acts “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). “This rule is one of inclusion, rather than exclusion, unless the evidence is introduced for the impermissible purpose or is unduly prejudicial.” United States v. Smalls, 752 F.3d 1227, 1237 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). As a threshold matter, we question whether the cash-transfer evidence is “character” evidence within the meaning of Rule 404(a). Rather, it is akin to evidence of a modus operandi, a distinctive course of conduct that is probative of a similar course of conduct at a later time, not the sort of general propensity that we think of as character. See generally Paul F. Rothstein, Evidence in a Nutshell: State and Federal Rules 105–14 (6th ed. 2011). In any case, Rule 404(b) permits the government’s use of the cash-transfer evidence against Defendant. As we summarized in Smalls: We consider a four-part test when determining whether evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b): (1) the evidence must be offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be relevant; (3) the trial court must make a Rule 403 determination of whether the probative value of the similar acts is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; 21 and (4) pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 105, the trial court shall, upon request, instruct the jury that evidence of similar acts is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted. 752 F.3d at 1237 (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant addresses only the first two parts of the test—whether the evidence was used for a relevant proper purpose. In our view, the bank-records evidence was properly admitted. It supported an inference of a course of conduct, a pattern of repeated behavior from which knowledge could be inferred. Evidence obtained at the time of the arrest established that the Durango was transporting substantial quantities of unlawful drugs to Nashville. Obviously, the drugs would be sold for a large amount of cash. The bank records showed that Defendant had repeatedly received large sums of cash from Nashville in the prior three months. One can infer that those sums were payments for previous drug deliveries to Nashville. And one can infer from Defendant’s receipt of those payments that he must have known of the purpose of the trip in the Durango. The chain of reasoning is not that Defendant committed the bad acts of receiving large sums of cash and therefore must be a drug dealer. Rather, the evidence establishing a drug delivery to Nashville explains why Defendant was receiving large sums of cash from Nashville; and Defendant’s prior repeated involvement implies his knowledge of the drugs in the Durango for this trip. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) (permitting admission of prior-acts evidence to prove plan and knowledge); United States v. Collins, 764 F.2d 647, 653 (9th Cir. 1985) (admission of defendant’s checkbook and bank records showing large cash deposits during time defendant was said to have been importing drugs did not violate Rule 404(b) as evidence “was relevant to her claims that she was ignorant of the 22 eight pounds of cocaine which she received”). The district court did not err in allowing the government’s use of the cash-transfer evidence, let alone plainly err.