Opinion ID: 877561
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: enforceable promise, waiver and estoppel

Text: The record indicates that at a meeting with the commissioners on September 18, 1979, Reiter was repeatedly promised a hearing. The commissioner refused to discuss the reasons for his discharge, stating that a hearing would be scheduled. Subsequently, on October 23, 1978, Reiter received a letter from the deputy county attorney, which stated in part: ... our studies have indicated that you are not entitled to a grievance hearing, and therefore none will be scheduled. The effect of the letter was to deny Reiter the opportunity to refute the charges made against him in the list of reasons for his discharge. The issue is whether Reiter was entitled to a hearing by virtue of the commissioners' promise to hold a hearing. The promise to hold a hearing was not supported by any independent consideration. Therefore, it was not an enforceable promise under contract law, independent of the employment contract. Nor could the promise be enforceable as an implied term of Reiter's implied contract of employment, assuming he had such a contract. When Reiter was employed, the predecessor to section 39-2-503, MCA, was in effect. That statute provides that an employment without a specified length may be terminated at the will of the employer, i.e. that no reason or good cause need be shown. This statute was in effect a part of the employment contract between the county and Reiter. A promise to hold a hearing, given at a later date, could not modify that part of the contract without independent consideration unless consented to by both parties in writing. Section 28-1-1601, MCA. Did the promise operate as a waiver of the county's right to fire Reiter without a hearing? A waiver is defined as the intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a known right, claim or privilege. Farmer's Elevator Co. of Reserve v. Anderson (1976), 170 Mont. 175, 552 P.2d 63. The record indicates that the commissioners were not even aware that Reiter was not entitled to a hearing at the time they promised the hearing. If they did not know of their right to fire Reiter without a hearing, they could not have voluntarily and intentionally waived that right. A waiver can also arise by conduct, in which case it is called an implied waiver. This doctrine requires a detrimental reliance by the party who is led by the conduct to believe a waiver has occurred. See Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Guertzgen (9th Cir.1939), 100 F.2d 299; Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1752. Thus the doctrine of implied waiver is akin to estoppel. The elements of estoppel are set forth in section 26-1-601, MCA. Essential to the doctrine is the detrimental reliance by the innocent party upon the representations of the other party. In this case, the record shows no evidence of reliance by Reiter. Reiter was promised a hearing and also offered a reinstatement as a janitor rather than a supervisor. From Reiter's deposition it is apparent that he did not refuse the demotion as a result of the promise of a hearing. Rather he refused the demotion because the proposed contracts required him to acknowledge that his behavior was unsatisfactory and he felt these contracts were demeaning. Therefore, since there is no evidence of a detrimental change in position due to the promise, the doctrines of equitable estoppel and implied waiver do not apply. Since Reiter has no due process right to a hearing and the commissioners' promise was unenforceable, the respondent's motion for summary judgment was properly granted. The order of the District Court entering summary judgment in favor of the respondents is hereby affirmed. DALY and SHEEHY, JJ., concur. SHEA, J. will file a written dissent later.