Opinion ID: 1536009
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Empaneling a Jury from Hunterdon County

Text: After having decided to empanel a jury from Camden County, the trial court agreed to hear subsequent argument from the State in favor of empaneling a jury from Hunterdon County. On January 29, 1996, the court granted the State's motion to empanel a jury from Hunterdon. Defendant argues that Camden County was the proper jury pool. Rule 3:14-2 authorizes a change of venue or trial by a foreign jury if the court finds that a fair and impartial jury cannot otherwise be had. However, that Rule does not offer any guidelines in selecting the county for venue or the source of a foreign jury. The Appellate Division, in State v. Harris, 282 N.J.Super. 409, 421, 660 A. 2d 539 (App.Div.1995), appeal after remand, 156 N.J. 122, 716 A. 2d 458 (1997), relying on the American Bar Association guidelines for venue and jury selection in choosing Hunterdon County, applied the following factors:

(5) Any other factor which may be required by the interests of justice. [ Id. at 421, 660 A. 2d 539, (quoting Criminal Justice Standards: Trial by Jury, ABA Crim. Just. Sec. Standard 15-1.4 ( 3d. ed. 1993)).] We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in empaneling a jury from Hunterdon County. The trial court applied the Harris factors in determining that Hunterdon County was the appropriate source for the foreign jury. The court first considered the nature and extent of pretrial publicity in the proposed counties. The Trentonian and, to a lesser extent, the Trenton Times, were the main sources of objectionable publicity about defendant. The circulation of the Trentonian and the Trenton Times in Mercer, Hunterdon, and Camden Counties was as follows: Trentonian Circulation 1991 Mercer Hunterdon Camden Circulation 51,810 1,342 110 Times Circulation 1992 Mercer Hunterdon Camden Circulation 60,215 1,796 under 25 In other cases we have upheld the empanelment of a jury from a county with a far greater circulation disparity than that present here. In Harris, the combined newspaper circulation figures were as follows: approximately 20,000 in Burlington County; 3,000 in Hunterdon County; and 250 in Camden County. We approved the empanelment of a Burlington County jury because the net effect was not significantly different than if the jury had been from Camden County. Id. at 150, 716 A. 2d 458. Similarly, in Feaster, supra, 156 N.J. at 51, 716 A. 2d 395, we allowed the empanelment of a Salem County jury even though it had a higher level of publicity than the proposed county. (Observing Salem County was by no means inundated with publicity about the murders.) In this case, the combined circulation rates of the two papers for Mercer County were 34.3 percent; for Hunterdon County, 2.8 percent; and for Camden County, .03 percent. [7] Given the assumptions implicit in determining the extent of pretrial publicity, we disagree with the dissent's assertion that this factor weighs heavily in defendant's favor. Post at 661-62, 737 A. 2d at 135-36 (Handler, J., dissenting). The circulation rates for Hunterdon County were significantly lower than those of Mercer County. Although Camden County had the lowest circulation rates, the net effect of a two percent disparity indicates that Hunterdon County also was clearly outside the circulation range of the Trenton newspapers. Harris, supra, 156 N.J. at 148-50, 716 A. 2d 458 (noting defendant's argument that most effective method of minimizing potential prejudice is to pick jury from county where Trenton newspapers are not ubiquitous). With regard to Factor 2, the court properly determined that empaneling a Hunterdon County jury would disrupt the judicial system in Hunterdon County far less than it would disrupt the Camden County judicial system. The trial court contacted Hunterdon County court officials and was assured that jury selection would not disrupt their caseload. Hunterdon County had no capital murder cases pending. By contrast, Camden County had five pending capital murder cases. Moreover, Camden County had 2,057 criminal cases pending indictment as of September 1995, while Hunterdon County had 147. Camden had 4,551 post-indictment cases pending, and Hunterdon County had 180. Clearly, the relative hardships imposed on the prospective courts favored Hunterdon County. Factor 3, the relative burdens on the parties and other interested parties, also favored Hunterdon County. Traveling between Camden and Trenton takes about one hour. By contrast, a trip between Flemington, in Hunterdon County, and Trenton takes about 35 minutes. Obviously, those travel times would affect how long the trial could last each day. Moreover, the area in Camden where the jurors would be dropped off was relatively desolate. A local law enforcement officer described it as a dangerous area after hours. Given those circumstances, the court properly determined that the hardship would be less onerous for Hunterdon County jurors. Concerning factor 4, defendant argues that the demographic characteristics of Camden County are more similar to those of Mercer County. As of 1990, Mercer County had a population of 325,824. Hunterdon's population was 107,776 and Camden's was 502,824. 1994-1995 New Jersey Municipal Data Book (hereinafter,  Data Book ). Females comprised 52.6 percent of Mercer County, 50.1 percent of Hunterdon, and 51.9 percent of Camden counties. In 1989, the per capita income in Mercer was $18,936, $23,236 in Hunterdon and $15,733 in Camden. Data Book at 584-85, 578. The percentage of college graduates was 19.4 percent in Mercer, 23.4 percent in Hunterdon, and 13.4 percent in Camden. Ibid. Thus, in many demographic respects, Hunterdon County was more comparable to Mercer than Camden. With regard to racial demographics, however, there was a disparity between the countiesMercer had an 18.89 percent african-american population, Hunterdon had a 2.06 percent african-american population, and Camden had a 16.2 percent african-american population. Defendant's jury pool in Hunterdon County contained only fifteen minority jurors in a pool of 715, substantially less than the african-american representation of 18.8 percent in Mercer County. Defendant argues that the court should have empaneled jurors from Camden County since it more closely reflected the racial composition of Mercer County. Failure to do so, he contends, violated his constitutional rights. This Court has emphasized that a defendant has the right to trial by an impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 523, 511 A. 2d 1150 (1986). Under Rule 3:14-2, a court must consider racial demographics in deciding whether to change the venue of a criminal trial or to empanel a foreign jury. Harris, supra, 282 N.J.Super. at 417, 660 A. 2d 539. However, racial demographics should not be the sole factor in that decision. In selecting the county from which to draw a foreign jury, the court should ... consider racial demographics together with all other pertinent factors[,] especially the ABA factors. Id. at 419, 660 A. 2d 539. Racial demographics should be a particularly weighing factor in selecting the source of a foreign jury when the victim and the defendant belong to different races. Id. at 419-20, 660 A. 2d 539. In this case, defendant and the victim were of the same race. The Constitution does not guarantee a defendant a jury of any specific racial composition. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538, 95 S.Ct. 692, 702, 42 L.Ed. 2d 690, 703 (1975). What the Constitution guarantees is that every defendant will be tried by an impartial jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1717, 90 L.Ed. 2d 69, 80 (1986) (challenging prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes in discriminatory manner); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480-81, 110 S.Ct. 803, 807, 107 L.Ed. 2d 905, 916-17, reh'g den. 494 U.S. 1050, 110 S.Ct. 1514, 108 L.Ed. 2d 650 (1990). To establish an Equal Protection violation, defendant must show purposeful discrimination in the decisionmaking process, Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550, 87 S.Ct. 643, 646, 17 L.Ed. 2d 599, 603-04 (1967), that had a discriminatory effect on the outcome. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1531, 84 L.Ed. 2d 547, 556 (1985). Purposeful discrimination implies that the decisionmaker selected a particular course of action at least in part `because of,' not merely `in spite of' its adverse effects ... Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2296, 60 L.Ed. 2d 870, 887-88 (1979). Thus, to prevail on this claim, defendant would have to show that the trial court's decision to empanel a jury from Hunterdon was motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose or because the court anticipated a racially discriminatory effect. Defendant has not proven such intent or effect. The record is devoid of evidence remotely hinting that the trial court's decision to empanel a jury from Hunterdon County was animated by a discriminatory purpose. The court changed venue to ensure that the victim's family could exercise their State Constitutional right to be present at the trial. It also considered the fact that Hunterdon County is closer in proximity to Mercer County. That would mean more time for trial each day and less time that the jurors would have to travel. The court also took into account the juror's personal security. Jurors drawn from Camden would be dropped off in a dangerous area. Given the trial court's focus on relevant considerations, we find that the empanelment of a Hunterdon jury did not deprive defendant of equal protection. Defendant also has failed to show he was deprived of rights under the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment, in pertinent part, provides that the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.... U.S. Const. amend. VI. The fair cross-section venire requirement is obviously not explicit in this text, but is derived from the traditional understanding of how an `impartial jury' is assembled. Holland, supra, 493 U.S. at 480, 110 S.Ct. at 807, 107 L.Ed. 2d at 916. The Constitution does not require that petit juries actually mirror the community or reflect the various groups in the population. Holland, 493 U.S. at 483, 110 S.Ct. at 808, 107 L.Ed. 2d at 918; Taylor, supra, 419 U.S. at 538, 95 S.Ct. at 702, 42 L.Ed. 2d at 703. It does not guarantee that every discrete group will be represented proportionally in the jury venire or on the petit jury. Gilmore, supra, 103 N.J. at 525, 511 A. 2d 1150. The purpose of the cross-section requirement is to assure that defendant is tried before an impartial jury, which the Constitution demands. Holland, supra, 493 U.S. at 480, 110 S.Ct. at 807, 107 L.Ed. 2d at 916. There is no evidence that the racial composition of the jury venire affected the jury's ability to be impartial. This case does not involve any racial issue but rather involves human concerns that touch the hearts and minds of all people, regardless of their race, religion or gender. Given the overwhelming evidence against defendant, it is highly doubtful that a jury from Camden would have reached a different verdict or sentence. Moreover, there is no assurance that the composition of the jury pool would have been radically different in Camden County. Because the case received basically the same amounts of press coverage in both Camden and Hunterdon Counties, and the victim and the defendant were of the same race, the trial court properly decided that the disparate racial composition of the counties was an important, but not the critical factor. Absent a showing of illegal discrimination, defendant had no constitutional right to a jury from Camden County simply because it might have increased his chances of having more minorities on his jury. We find little merit in the dissent's assertion that racial demographics outweigh the other demographic characteristics enumerated in Harris factor four. Post at 663-64, 737 A. 2d at 137 (Handler, J., dissenting); see Harris, supra, 282 N.J.Super. at 421, 660 A. 2d 539. [W]here... race is the demographic characteristic at issue, the change of venue must be to a county having the same racial demographics.... Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment on R. 3:14-2 (1998) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Unlike Harris, race is not the demographic characteristic at issue. In Harris, the defendant, a black man, was charged with the capital murder and rape of a young white girl. Id. at 411, 660 A. 2d 539. In this case, defendant and the victim were of the same race. The dissent also asserts that the failure to empanel a jury from Camden constitutes a Sixth Amendment violation of such magnitude that it cannot be considered under the harmless error analysis. Post at 666-67, 737 A. 2d at 138-39 (Handler, J., dissenting). In State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 94, 95, 548 A. 2d 846 (1988) ( Bey I ), we held that in capital cases we shall continue to determine the reversibility on the basis of a qualitative determination that considers, in the context of the entire case, whether the error was clearly capable of affecting either the verdict or the sentence. We noted, however, that the only exception where harmless error analysis would not apply involves constitutional violations ... [that] by their very nature cast so much doubt on the fairness of the trial process that, as a matter of law, they can never be considered harmless. (quoting Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 1792, 100 L.Ed. 2d 284 (1988)). [8] We find that the alleged error of not having jurors empaneled from Camden was not clearly capable by its nature of affecting either [defendant's] verdict or the sentence. As we stated in Harris, The principal risk of jury contamination in this case arose in Mercer county and not in the home counties of the jurors. It made little difference whether the jurors were from Burlington or Camden Counties. Ibid. Once the initial taint is dispelled by the empanelling of a foreign jury, the source of that jury does not by its very nature render the trial process so fundamentally unfair as to require automatic reversal. Effect on Jury Moreover, defendant offers no evidence showing that any jury member actually was prejudiced by the trial being held in Mercer County. To the contrary, the evidence indicates that jury members remained untouched by press coverage throughout the trial. Central to the court's decision to empanel a foreign jury was the fact that the Mercer County court administrators had substantial experience in the procedures necessary to protect jurors from trial-related publicity, gained while host[ing] the Harris trial. Jurors were picked up each morning and transported to Mercer County. Prior to trial, a special area on the fifth floor of the Mercer County Courthouse was designated for the jurors' use. The court repeatedly admonished jurors that it was vital for them to avoid any publicity about the case and to avoid discussing the matter with anyone. When trial began on May 5, 1997, the trial court told the jurors to eat lunch inside the courthouse and to avoid any contact with outsiders. The court then asked if anyone had been subjected to accounts of the case. All jurors answered in the negative. The court told jurors to inform the court if any information about the case came to their attention during the trial. The court also told jury members to have somebody screen [all media sources] for them. Every single day of the trial the court asked the jurors whether they had seen, heard, or read anything about the case. Every day, the answer was no. Although defendant brought inflammatory news stories about the trial to the court's attention on an ongoing basis, there is no evidence that any of the jury members ever saw any inflammatory publicity. The court took great precautions to ensure that jurors remained isolated. For example, immediately before the penalty phase, the defense moved to terminate the trial and sentence defendant as a non-capital offender because of the Trentonian 's unprecedented coverage of the verdict. To see whether any juror was adversely affected by publicity and whether the jurors could remain impartial during the penalty phase, the court individually questioned each juror. At the conclusion of the individual voir dire, the court determined that all jurors remained fair and impartial. The court continued to question jurors about their exposure to publicity throughout the penalty phase. The jurors each time indicated they had not viewed or read any information about the case. It would have been preferable if the trial court had not reversed its decision to change venue. Nevertheless, because of the precautions taken by the trial court, the fact that empanelment of a foreign jury was a valid management technique at the time of the trial to avoid the effect of prejudicial pretrial publicity, and the lack of evidence indicating actual jury taint resulted from the trial being held in Mercer County, defendant's constitutional rights were not infringed upon. The court's decision to reverse its prior determination to change venue and to empanel a foreign jury was not reversible error. The record reveals that the trial court took more than adequate measures to minimize the danger that prejudice would infiltrate the adjudicatory process. Harris, supra, 156 N.J. at 149, 716 A. 2d 458. The trial court carefully weighed the Harris factors in selecting a jury from Hunterdon. There is no evidence of purposeful discrimination or actual bias. Empaneling a jury from Hunterdon County did not infringe on or deny defendant's constitutional rights. Accordingly, the trial court's decision to change its original venue order is not an abuse of the trial court's discretion and is not reversible error.