Opinion ID: 2633743
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Middle of the Road Approach to Competency

Text: Three statesGeorgia, Texas, and Louisianahave adopted the middle of the road approach, maintaining that the mental competency of an alleged fugitive is only relevant to the extent it concerns his or her ability to assist counsel in ascertaining and preparing for the limited issues to be decided in an extradition hearing. See State v. Tyler, 398 So.2d 1108, 1112 (La.1981) (alleged fugitive must not be so incompetent as to be totally unable to assist counsel in extradition proceeding). The Georgia Supreme Court explained its rationale as follows: We are persuaded by, and adopt, the [middle of the road] approach because it best comports with the summary nature of an extradition proceeding, and the principles and goals articulated in Doran. . . . Doran limits the inquiry in an extradition proceeding to four issues. . . . Of these four issues, a petitioner's mental competence realistically impacts only upon the last two-identity and fugitive status. [Citation omitted.] Thus, where, as here, a petitioner in an extradition proceeding claims he is mentally incompetent, the habeas corpus court need only determine whether the petitioner is sufficiently competent to assist counsel in ascertaining his identity and whereabouts at the time of the crime. Oliver v. Barrett, 269 Ga. at 514, 500 S.E.2d 908. See also 31A Am.Jur.2d, Extradition § 127, p. 786 (Mental competency of a fugitive is only relevant insofar as it concerns his or her ability to assist counsel in ascertaining and preparing for the limited issues to be decided in an extradition hearing.). In Ex parte Potter, the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals reiterated the summary nature of the extradition proceeding. The court then observed that the Texas Uniform Extradition Act gives an individual arrested pursuant to an extradition warrant the `right to demand and procure legal counsel.' 21 S.W.3d at 294. The Texas Act also allows such an individual or his or her attorney to `test the legality of [the] arrest.' 21 S.W.3d at 294. The Potter court concluded, therefore, that a petitioner could contest his or her extradition on the basis of any of the four issues identified in Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 99 S.Ct. 530, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978), and would be entitled to discharge the extradition if successful in his or her defense. 21 S.W.3d at 294. With respect to mental competency, the Potter court agreed with the majority of other jurisdictions to the extent they recognize that an alleged fugitive must be sufficiently competent to discuss with counsel facts relating to the limited issues that may be raised. 21 S.W.3d at 296. This is because the alleged fugitive is entitled to counsel, entitled to challenge the legality of his or her arrest, and entitled to assert defenses on the basis of which the extradition warrant may be dismissed: But the Potter court was ultimately persuaded that the middle of the road approach best addressed the alleged fugitive's rights within the limited context of an extradition proceeding. 21 S.W.3d at 296-97. The Potter courts reasoned that the alleged fugitive does not need a broader understanding of die proceedings and a greater ability to consult with his onher attorney because of the summary nature of an extradition and because of the asylum court's narrow role. Further, maintaining a narrow focus in ascertaining competency keeps the proceedings quicker and more efficient. See 21 S.W.3d at 297.