Opinion ID: 608834
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jorge's Appeal.

Text: 29 Jorge Sostre claims that his convictions under Count 1 (conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 846) and Count 2 (possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, id. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 2) were based solely on his mere presence in the vicinity of the drug transaction. Jorge contends that he was simply visiting brother Rodrigo's apartment, and that the casual statements he made to Vegas and Agent Roberto, though arguably indicating his general awareness of the drug transaction, were far too vague to establish his active participation. Jorge says the government's characterization of him as a lookout is unsupported by the evidence, which shows that the front door of the apartment building was left open during the drug transaction, and that he never made any attempt to signal or warn the others when the DEA raid began. As to his constructive possession of the cocaine, Jorge argues that there is no evidence he ever had access to it or power over it. 30 We again view all evidence in the light most favorable to the government, Wight, 968 F.2d at 1395, while at the same time recognizing that  'the line that separates mere presence [at the site of a drug offense] from culpable presence is a thin one, difficult to plot,'  United States v. O'Campo, 973 F.2d 1015, 1020 (1st Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707 (1st Cir.1992)). In this case, however, we believe that the evidence, as a whole, adequately supported the conclusion that Jorge knowingly remained on the front porch to facilitate the prearranged drug transaction. 31 First, Jorge's presence during Rodrigo's incriminating conversations with Vegas and Agent Roberto, his apparent agreement with his brother's assessments concerning the quality of the cocaine and the low level of police activity in the neighborhood, and his later statements about the money and merchandise, provided firm support for an inference that Jorge knew that an illegal drug transaction was about to occur. 32 Second, jurors are neither required to divorce themselves from their common sense nor to abandon the dictates of mature experience, which reasonably may include their recognition that criminals rarely welcome innocent persons as witnesses to serious crimes. Cf. Ortiz, 966 F.2d at 712; United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 18 (1st Cir.1991). Jorge did not reside at the apartment where the drug transaction occurred, nor was he a captive of the circumstances. Although appellate counsel suggested the possibility that Jorge's visit to his brother's apartment may have been occasioned by the innocent impulse to promote their filial bond, the jury reasonably could conclude that an innocent person, with knowledge of an impending drug transaction, would not linger outside for over an hour on a winter day in a location which afforded him an obvious vantage point from which to observe the surrounding neighborhood as well as the ingress to the site of the drug deal. Cf. United States v. Padilla, 961 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir.) (while mere negative acquiescence, even coupled with guilty knowledge, is generally insufficient to establish participation, the otherwise innocent behavior of scanning the area may support a reasonable inference that defendant acted as lookout), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 138, 121 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992); see also United States v. Martinez, 479 F.2d 824, 829 (1st Cir.1973). ([P]resence itself implies participation [where] ... a companion stands by during a [crime], ready to sound a warning or give other aid if required.). 33 Finally, the record indicates that Jorge, at the onset of the DEA raid, moved off the front porch and away from the residence in a rapid manner, then casually slow[ed] down and walk[ed] up the sidewalk. We have recognized that [e]vidence of flight ... is a particularly eloquent reflection of a guilty mind, United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 923 (1st Cir.1991), which  'may be admitted at trial ... so long as there is an adequate factual predicate creating an inference of guilt of the crime charged.'  United States v. Montoya, 917 F.2d 680, 683 (1st Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Hernandez-Bermudez, 857 F.2d 50, 52 (1st Cir.1983)) (emphasis added). While the evidence of flight would not have been enough in and of itself to support Jorge Sostre's convictions, the jury fairly could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that in so acting he was attempting to flee the crime scene, thereby recasting his earlier admissions and conduct as the factual predicate for the ultimate common-sense inference of guilt. Id. (significance of evidence of flight is exclusively for the jury). 34 The judgments of conviction are affirmed.