Opinion ID: 555138
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Vagueness Issue

Text: 43 Tabacca argues that 49 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1472(j) is unconstitutionally vague. This is more so the case, he argues, if this court finds that a conviction may be obtained under the statute without proof that the safety of the aircraft was endangered.
44 Tabacca did not raise this issue before the District Court. He may, however, attack the constitutionality of the law under which he is charged for the first time on appeal. United States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523, 1528-29 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 860, 108 S.Ct. 173, 98 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987).
45 When determining an issue of vagueness, this court must consider the common understanding of the terms of the statute in question. United States v. Fitzgerald, 882 F.2d 397, 398 (9th Cir.1989). Further, because this action does not involve first amendment rights, this court need only examine the vagueness challenge under the facts of the particular case and decide whether, under a reasonable construction of the statute, the conduct in question is prohibited. Id.; United States v. Doremus, 888 F.2d 630, 634 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. Hogue, 752 F.2d 1503 (9th Cir.1985). It is not necessary to address whether the statute is vague as to its other potential applications. Hogue, 752 F.2d at 1504. 46 A statute is void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence of what conduct is prohibited, or if it invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Doremus, 888 F.2d at 634. 47 Tabacca argues that both of these evils are present under Sec. 1472(j). First, Tabacca argues that terms such as intimidate, threaten, interfere, and lessen the ability are so vague that they do not provide any standard by which to determine the kind of conduct prohibited. 48 We conclude that 49 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1472(j) does not criminalize general acts of threats or intimidation. Rather, the provision clearly includes modifying language which provides parameters of conduct. The proscribed acts must occur while aboard an aircraft and must interfere with the performance by ... [an] attendant of his duties or lessen the ability of such ... [an] attendant to perform his duties. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1472(j).  'Words inevitably contain germs of uncertainty.' Imprecision in penal legislation should be tolerated if the language can be said nevertheless to give fair notice to those who might violate it. Gilbert, 813 F.2d at 1530 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2913, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). 49 Looking to the particular circumstances of this case, Tabacca's actions come within a reasonable construction of Sec. 1472(j). A person of ordinary intelligence could foresee that grabbing and shoving a flight attendant, coupled with a diatribe of profrane remarks, are actions which could inhibit the performance of an attendant's duties. 50 Tabacca argues secondly that Sec. 1472(j) invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by the flight crew members. He points out that when his flight landed in Los Angeles the flight attendants singled out passengers for arrest by the waiting police. His assertion, however, that they randomly selected those they did not like is unfounded. Rather, the flight attendants pointed out those whom they believed had been smoking on the flight in violation of the no-smoking regulation. Nor does the fact that Tabacca was the only one prosecuted necessarily support Tabacca's theory that Sec. 1472(j) is arbitrarily enforced. It is possible that no other passenger battered and swore at a flight attendant as Martinez testified that Tabacca did. 51 Tabacca's challenge to Sec. 1472(j) on grounds of vagueness is rejected. 52