Opinion ID: 1286415
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Additional Mental Health Evidence Conceivably Available

Text: Above, we have analyzed the prejudice portion of Lance's ineffective assistance of counsel claim in light of our conclusion that there is no reasonable probability that trial counsel, if he had adequately investigated Lance's background, ultimately would have obtained an extensive neuropsychological examination like the one Lance has relied upon in the habeas court. We now turn to our alternative analysis of prejudice, which begins with the assumption that trial counsel would have obtained such a specialized examination. Lance presented testimony in the habeas court from three experts in neuropsychology. Thomas Hyde, M.D., Ph.D., testified that he administered over 100 neurological tests to Lance. Yet, as his testimony establishes, only one of those tests indicated brain dysfunction. Dr. Hyde concluded that Lance had significant damage to the frontal and temporal lobes resulting from multiple blows to the head and from alcohol abuse. He testified that persons with frontal lobe dysfunction often decompensate under periods of extreme emotional distress. He also testified that such persons are unlikely to be able to plan and commit murder without leaving evidence but, instead, are more often involved in crimes of impulse. Dr. Hyde concluded that Lance's mental state might have had an impact on Lance's ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, but he also acknowledged that other reasonable neurologists might disagree with his conclusions in Lance's case. The second of Lance's three experts in neuropsychology, Ricardo Weinstein, Ph.D., commented generally on Lance's psychosocial history as follows: [I]t's a relatively unusual case in terms of his upbringing, fairly normal upbringing from an intact family, no major history of dysfunction, no history of child abuse, neglect, things of that nature, no history of significant mental illness in the family. However, Dr. Weinstein concluded that Lance, as a result of multiple head injuries, the exposure to toxic fumes, the ingestion of gasoline, and a history of heavy alcohol use starting at the age of 19, suffered from generalized and diffuse brain dysfunction and clear compromises in the frontal lobe functions. Dr. Weinstein concluded that Lance was not insane or mentally retarded, that he understood that certain behaviors are unacceptable, but that his brain dysfunction... negatively impact[ed] his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. In particular, Dr. Weinstein concluded that Lance would have difficulty in planning and in impulse control and that the combined effects of Lance's brain dysfunction and his alcohol intoxication on the night of the murders would have rendered his capacity to think in a logical, well-directed manner ... equivalent or similar to an individual that suffers from mental retardation. Finally, Lance presented testimony from a third expert, David Pickar, M.D., who concluded that Lance, as a result of multiple head traumas and alcohol abuse, suffered from impaired intellectual and frontal lobe function that resulted in impairments of his ability to plan and to control his impulses. The Warden presented expert testimony from one [1] neuropsychologist, Daniel A. Martell, Ph.D. Dr. Martell's findings regarding Lance's IQ were consistent with those of Lance's experts, and he concluded that Lance functioned within a range that's higher than mild mental retardation but lower than average. Dr. Martell added, however, that he had administered an additional test to determine what Lance's IQ had been before any possible brain injuries and that the test showed Lance's earlier IQ to fall within the exact same ranges as found by the various experts who testified in the habeas court. Dr. Martell testified that some of Lance's test results indicated frontal lobe dysfunction, but Dr. Martell further testified as follows: His weaknesses with regard to frontal lobe have to do with a tendency to perseverate or repeat himself and mild to moderate impairment in problem-solving abilities in certain contexts like adapting to changing problems but not others like planning an effective strategy for solving a problem. However, his ability to inhibit unwanted or impulsive behaviors appears to be relatively intact. And I think that's important in my analysis with regard to the issue of the crime itself because these data do not suggest to me that he is, in fact, impulsive or unable to control his impulses. Dr. Martell concluded that Lance's frontal lobe dysfunction would not have prevented him from planning the murders and would not have made him so impulsive that he could not prevent himself from committing the murders. As we noted above, Dr. Martell also stated that Lance's symptoms were so subtle that a typical court-ordered evaluation might not have given any indication of problems. Dr. Martell summarized his opinion by stating, In my opinion, [Lance's diagnosis is] not significant to the crime. The habeas court considered the mental health evidence summarized above and concluded that presentation of that evidence at trial in reasonable probability would have changed the outcome of the sentencing phase. We conclude as a matter of law that the habeas court erred by reaching this conclusion regarding prejudice. We agree with Lance's argument that trial counsel could have presented mental health evidence without abandoning his sentencing phase strategy of showing residual doubt because the mental health evidence was not directly inconsistent with that theory and might have enhanced it slightly, e.g., by indicating that, due to Lance's mental condition, it might have been more difficult for him to have carried out the murders without leaving more evidence than was actually discovered during the investigation of the crimes. However, assuming trial counsel would have chosen to present the mental health evidence, even the most favorable aspects of that evidence showed merely that Lance functioned, when sober, in the lower range of normal intelligence; that he had some memory problems; that he suffered some depression related to his inability to accept his divorce; that he had some difficulty in planning and problem solving; that he might have been somewhat impulsive; and that his functional intelligence, unsurprisingly, became more impaired when he was drunk. Against this somewhat mitigating evidence, the jury would have weighed Lance's long history of horrific abuse against Joy Lance, including multiple threats to kill her and at least one previous attempt to murder Butch Wood in a manner that was very similar to the manner in which he eventually succeeded in murdering him and Joy Lance. The jury also would have weighed the new evidence against the evidence about the night of the murders, which showed that Lance armed himself with a shotgun, traveled to the home where the victims were staying, kicked in the door, and systematically murdered them. Finally, the jury would have weighed the new evidence against the evidence about Lance's demeanor and conduct after the murder, including the derogatory manner in which he referred to Joy Lance, his statement that Butch Wood was in Hell, his lament to an inmate that he had acted foolishly by calling Joy Lance's father shortly before committing the murders, and his boast to an inmate that he hit Joy so hard that one of her eyeballs stuck to the wall. Given Lance's long history of contemplating the murder of Joy Lance and Butch Wood, the manner in which he finally carried out their murders, and his utter disregard for their suffering and deaths afterward, we conclude that the new evidence of Lance's subtle neurological impairments, even when considered together with the other mitigating evidence that was or should have been presented at trial, would not in reasonable probability have changed the outcome of the sentencing phase if it had been presented at Lance's trial. Compare Porter v. McCollum, supra, ___ U.S. at ___(III), 130 S.Ct. at 453-456. We also conclude, contrary to Lance's arguments in his cross-appeal, that the new evidence of subtle neurological impairments would not have significantly affected the jury's deliberations during the guilt/innocence phase. Given the weakness of the new mental health evidence and the overwhelming evidence of the intentional and deliberate nature of Lance's crimes, we conclude that it is essentially beyond possibility that the jury would have failed to convict Lance of the murders. We further conclude that it would have been highly unlikely that the new mental health evidence would have led the jury to render a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, which would not foreclose a death sentence in any event. See OCGA § 17-7-131(a)(2) (defining [m]entally ill). See also Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 756, 764(12), 620 S.E.2d 778 (2005) (holding that the statute that provides for a verdict of guilty but mentally ill does not preclude a death sentence as the result of such a verdict).