Opinion ID: 707605
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nichols' Cross-Appeal

Text: 51
52 Nichols complains that the district court erred in affording the section 2254(d) presumption of correctness to the state habeas court fact findings, contending that the following three circumstances precluded application of the presumption, namely: (1) the failure of the state habeas trial judge--Judge Harmon (who did not preside at either of Nichols' trials)--to sua sponte recuse himself on account of having been the prosecuting attorney in Nichols' May 1980 guilty plea conviction for robbery, which conviction had been put in evidence by the state at the punishment stage of Nichols' trial; (2) an inappropriate remark made by Judge Harmon at the state habeas evidentiary hearing; (3) Judge Harmon's having adopted verbatim the state's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on the state habeas proceeding. While the district court found that these matters had occurred (see note 36, supra ), it concluded that they did not justify denying the presumption of correctness to the state court findings, and further concluded that it would evaluate each state finding individually in the light of the entire record, including that of the federal habeas proceedings. Nichols, 802 F.Supp. at 70. 38 The only state habeas fact finding which the district court ultimately determined not to be entitled to the presumption of correctness was the finding that [t]he jury was presented with overwhelming evidence that both the applicant and Williams shot Shaffer, 39 the district court instead determining that the only conclusion which the record supports is that both Williams and Nichols shot at Shaffer but that either Williams or Nichols actually shot Shaffer. Id. at 75 (original emphasis). 40 53 Nichols has not demonstrated error in the district court's failing to reject the other state court habeas factfindings. We conclude that the above-mentioned three circumstances relied on by Nichols do not, singly or collectively, mandate a contrary determination. We consider these seriatim. 54 With respect to Judge Harmon's having been prosecutor in Nichols' May 1980 guilty plea to robbery, which prior conviction had been put in evidence at the punishment stage of Nichols' trial, we observe that neither the validity of that conviction (and the related sentence) nor its use at Nichols' sentencing was in any way at issue in either Nichols' trial (or direct appeal) or in his state habeas proceeding (which commenced in 1989), or in this federal habeas. As a matter of Texas law, Judge Harmon clearly was not disqualified from serving as the habeas trial judge. See, e.g., Hathorne v. State, 459 S.W.2d 826, 829, 833 (Tex.Crim.App.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 914, 91 S.Ct. 1398, 28 L.Ed.2d 657 (1971). 41 We have previously indicated that in a comparable position, a federal judge would not be disqualified under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 455. United States v. Outler, 659 F.2d 1306, 1312-13 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950, 102 S.Ct. 1453, 71 L.Ed.2d 665 (1982). See also Adams v. United States, 302 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.1962). And, it is settled that section 455 establishes a statutory disqualification standard more demanding than that required by the Due Process Clause. United States v. Couch, 896 F.2d 78, 81 (5th Cir.1990). 55 The complained of remark of Judge Harmon came at a portion of the state habeas evidentiary hearing dealing with Nichols' effort to mount a statistical challenge to the Texas capital sentencing scheme, when in response to a witness' suggestion that Nichols' counsel could obtain statistical data regarding habeas corpus cases by issuing a bench warrant to bring each Harris County inmate in for a hearing, Judge Harmon responded 'Could we arrange for a van to blow up the bus on the way down here?'  Nichols, 802 F.Supp. at 79. We are unable to conclude that this clearly inappropriate remark was anything more than an ill-considered, off-the-cuff attempt to inject humor into the proceeding. Though the remark was plainly tasteless and out of place, it does not establish bias and prejudice. Certainly, there is no indication that Nichols or either of his counsel so understood the remark at the time. Cf. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241, 108 S.Ct. 546, 552, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). Moreover, these remarks were made near the conclusion of a full evidentiary hearing fairly and impartially conducted with due regard for Nichols' rights. Cf. United States v. Wade, 931 F.2d 300, 302-305 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 888, 112 S.Ct. 247, 116 L.Ed.2d 202 (1991); Pomeroy v. Merritt Plaza Nursing Home, 760 F.2d 654, 657-659 (5th Cir.1985). [J]udicial remarks during the course of a trial that are ... disapproving of, or even hostile to, ... the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge unless they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible. Liteky v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). No such showing is even approached here. 56 As for the complaint that Judge Harmon adopted the state's proposed findings and conclusions, that is fully answered by Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 571, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (even when the trial judge adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings ... may be reversed only if clearly erroneous). 57 Section 2254(d) requires that state court findings be afforded a presumption of correctness unless it is shown that one or more of eight specified exceptions are applicable. The three circumstances relied on by Nichols are potentially relevant only to the sixth and seventh exceptions: (6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court proceeding; or (7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court proceedings; .... The state habeas court afforded Nichols--represented by two competent lawyers--every opportunity to present his contentions, allowing the filing of an original and three amended habeas petitions over a period of more than a year, and conducting an evidentiary hearing with full opportunity to present evidence, even continuing the hearing in order for Nichols' counsel to locate an additional witness. Nichols clearly had a fair hearing, 42 and was not denied due process in connection with the state court habeas proceedings. 43 58 We reject Nichols' contention that the district court erred by according the section 2254(d) presumption of correctness to the state habeas factfindings. 59
60 Nichols argues that the district court erred by failing to find that the punishment phase special issues (see note 6, supra ) did not allow the jury to give effect to Nichols' mitigating character evidence. We reject this contention. At the least, the second special issue concerning future dangerousness provided an adequate vehicle for the jury to give effect to this mitigating evidence, placing it within the effective reach of the sentencer, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have found itself foreclosed from thus considering it. The Supreme Court and this Court have many times so held. See Johnson, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2669; Crank v. Collins, 19 F.3d 172, 175 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2699, 129 L.Ed.2d 825 (1994); James v. Collins, 987 F.2d 1116, 1122 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 30, 125 L.Ed.2d 780 (1993); Barnard v. Collins, 958 F.2d 634, 640 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 990, 122 L.Ed.2d 142 (1993); Graham v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1009, 1030-1033 (5th Cir.1992) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 461, 113 S.Ct. 892, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993). Cf. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 267, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 2954, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). No Penry-type evidence was presented. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). 61
62 Nichols complains of various instances of allegedly improper argument by the prosecution, mostly at sentencing, asserting that he was thereby denied a fair trial and deprived of due process of law. We reject this contention, and find no error in the district court's denial of relief in this connection. 63 Where improper prosecutorial argument is asserted as a basis for habeas relief,  'it is not enough that the prosecutors' remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned,'  rather [t]he relevant question is whether the prosecutors' comments 'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.'  Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). In order to constitute a denial of due process  'the acts complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevent a fair trial,'  Derden, 978 F.2d at 1457. Moreover, the burden is on the habeas petitioner to also show a reasonable probability that but for these remarks the result would have been different. See Felde v. Blackburn, 795 F.2d 400, 403 (5th Cir.1986). Further, failure to object to an argument--wholly apart from questions of procedural bar--is an indication that it was not perceived as having a substantial adverse effect, Derden at 1458, or would not naturally and necessarily be understood as advancing improper considerations. Milton v. Procunier, 744 F.2d 1091, 1095 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1030, 105 S.Ct. 2050, 85 L.Ed.2d 323 (1985). See also Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 241, 108 S.Ct. at 552. 64 We now turn to the specific instances complained of by Nichols. 65 (i) Nichols initially complains that in argument at the punishment stage the prosecutor improperly injected religion. No objection was made to this argument, and on direct appeal the Court of Criminal Appeals held that complaint in this respect was accordingly waived. Nichols, 754 S.W.2d at 199-200. The same holding was made on the state habeas (together with the alternative holding that on the merits relief was not warranted). No cause being shown for the failure to object, the claim is procedurally barred under the principles of Wainwright v. Sykes and Engle v. Isaac and their progeny. See Andrews v. Collins, 21 F.3d 612, 628 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 908, 130 L.Ed.2d 790 (1995). 44 66 Moreover, the claim is lacking in merit even if it were not barred. At the punishment stage the defense introduced testimony of a priest who, at Nichols' request, visited him several times while he was in jail awaiting trial. The priest testified on direct that he had first met Nichols ten years earlier, but had never visited in his home or seen him at church, that while in jail Nichols' attitude changed from one of depression to remorse and contrition, and that if given a chance Nichols could become a constructive citizen. On cross, he admitted that he did not know what Nichols was doing in the some ten years after he first met him and when he saw him in jail. The defense, near the end of its punishment argument, called attention to the priest's testimony. The now complained of prosecution argument 45 was in response. The natural understanding of the thrust of this argument is that the jury could reasonably infer that the priest did not really know Nichols and that Nichols' supposed change to remorse and contrition was not genuine. Such a contention is essentially proper. There is absolutely no reasonable likelihood that these brief passages of argument (or anything else in the trial) created a meaningful risk that the jury verdict was to any extent based on Nichols' religious beliefs (or lack thereof, or on any inference in that regard from the priest's failure to testify in regard thereto). 67 (ii) Complaint is also made of prosecution arguments at sentencing concerning the victim's character, which are also asserted to have been outside the record. Again, there was no objection to these arguments, and the state habeas court held them for that reason barred (and, alternatively, not to justify relief on the merits). This claim is hence foreclosed by the procedural bar. 68 It also fails on the merits. The prosecutor's reference to the grief and loss of the victim's family and his asking the jury to consider the victim were essentially within the range of argument held not to offend the Eighth Amendment in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). This is also the case with respect to the brief reference to Shaffer's employment and being killed while at work. There was no argument (or evidence) as to opinions of the victim's family about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence. Id. 501 U.S. at 833, 111 S.Ct. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring). There was nothing so inflammatory about the argument as to render the entire sentencing proceeding unfair. Id. at 831-33, 111 S.Ct. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring), at 835-36, 111 S.Ct. at 2614 (Souter, J., concurring). Moreover--and also dispositive of the contention that the argument went beyond the evidence 46 --defense counsel in his argument had already raised these matters, arguing that my heart goes out to his [Shaffer's] family and [t]hey [Shaffer's family] have had a terrible tragedy in their family. 47 Defense counsel further argued I doubt very seriously if the Shaffer family would get any satisfaction from imposition of the death sentence on Nichols, and stated I feel for them but taking Joe's life is not going to help them a bit but could hurt a lot of other folks. Defense counsel also referred in this connection to the testimony of a defense sentencing witness who stated he was willing to do whatever it takes (or whatever needs to be done) for Shaffer. Suffering by the Shaffer family was a premise the defense had already explicitly raised and accepted in its sentencing phase argument. The prosecutor reminded the jury to look solely at the evidence and not cry for either side. There was no deprivation of due process or fundamental unfairness in the prosecution's response. 48 69 (iii) Nichols next complains of two prosecutorial arguments at the guilt/innocence stage of the trial which he contends were incorrect statements of the legal principles applicable. No objection was made to either argument at trial, on direct appeal, or in the state habeas proceedings. It is clear that the Texas contemporaneous objection rule would bar relief in state court, and the claims are accordingly procedurally barred on federal habeas. Teague, 489 U.S. at 297-300, 109 S.Ct. at 1068-69. See also Weaver v. McKaskle, 733 F.2d 1103, 1104-5 (5th Cir.1984); Marks v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 730, 734-35 (5th Cir.1982). Cf. Bates v. Blackburn, 805 F.2d 569, 574-75 (5th Cir.1986); Webb v. Blackburn, 773 F.2d 646, 650-651 (5th Cir.1986). We also note that these claims were not raised in the federal habeas petition below, and, although the arguments were quoted in Nichols' post-evidentiary hearing brief below, Nichols never sought to amend his petition and these particular claims were not addressed by the district court. See United States v. Smith, 915 F.2d 959, 964 (5th Cir.1990). 70 In any event, these claims have no merit. The first complained of argument 49 was a proper plea to the jury to use its common sense in evaluating the defense's contentions as to what had actually happened. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1905, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970) (jury trial calls for the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen). Nichols' appellant's brief does not explain why he thinks this argument was improper nor cite any supporting authority. We note that the prosecutor had explained at length to the jury that they were obligated to follow the court's charge, as did the charge itself. This contention is frivolous. The second challenged argument 50 was in substance a correct statement of the law that, under the charge, Nichols could only be found guilty of capital murder or of murder, or found not guilty. Moreover, defense counsel did not request a charge on any form of robbery as a lesser included offense, and no such charge was given. Yet defense counsel had argued that Nichols was guilty of aggravated robbery. 51 The state's argument was a proper response and a correct statement of the law. Nichols cites no authority in support of his contention. We reject it as frivolous. 71 (iv) The next complained of argument is the state's reference at sentencing to Nichols' having been indicted for the unadjudicated offenses, evidence of which had been put before the jury. 52 On direct appeal this argument was challenged as being outside the record (here it is challenged only as an improper inference of guilt from an indictment), and the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the contention was barred because no trial objection to the argument had been made. Nichols, 754 S.W.2d at 199-200. Hence this claim is procedurally barred. Moreover, although this argument of the prosecutor was presented in Nichols' post-evidentiary hearing brief below, 53 it was never included in his federal habeas petition or addressed by the district court. 72 In any event, the claim is without merit. The argument was in response to defense counsel's argument criticizing the state for not having taken action on the unadjudicated offenses, arguing there has been no action taken by any other group of individuals or by the state. 54 The state responded that another group of individuals had acted, by indictment. Moreover, defense counsel had previously expressly acknowledged in argument that Nichols had been charged with attempted escape. The evidence as to the other unadjudicated offenses--the August 13 and October 11, 1980, armed robberies--was undisputed, and substantial evidence was presented as to the planned escape. There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury was improperly influenced by this passing rebuttal remark of the prosecution. 55 73 (v) Three other prosecutorial arguments, two at the guilt/innocence stage and one at sentencing, are attacked as having improperly struck at Nichols over the shoulders of his trial counsel. 56 Apart from this general and uninformative characterization, Nichols' appellant's brief does not explain the basis for the challenge and contains no supporting argument. The complaint is not adequately presented for review. Fed.R.App.P. 28(a)(6); United States v. Beaumont, 972 F.2d 553, 563 (5th Cir.1992). Nor was it in the district court. 57 In any event, the complaints present no basis for relief. To begin with, no objection was made at trial (or on appeal) to these arguments (and they were not a grounds of complaint in the state habeas). They are hence procedurally barred. Even if they were not, the present no basis for relief. The brief references at the guilt/innocence stage to the door game and physical evidence caught them are nothing more than argument that the inferences as to what happened urged by defense counsel were not consistent with the physical evidence. The sentencing argument referred to the fact that at the guilt/innocence stage defense counsel argued that Williams fired the fatal shot from the door as he went back in, while at sentencing defense counsel appeared to argue that Williams fired the fatal shot from in front of the counter. And, the prosecution's argument was in response to defense counsel's criticism of the prosecution for its asserted inconsistency in the Williams and Nichols cases. 58 These unobjected to prosecution arguments did not deprive Nichols of due process or deny him a fair trial or sentencing, and there is no reasonable likelihood that they caused the verdict to be to any extent improperly based. 74 (vi) Quoting a single sentence from the state's argument at each phase of his trial, Nichols asserts that each improperly injected the personal beliefs of the prosecutor into its argument. 75 Nichols' appellant's brief makes no argument in support of this assertion, and the complained of sentences are not mentioned in his federal habeas petition or in the district court's opinion. Assuming the matter is properly before us, it is procedurally barred as no objection was made at trial (or on appeal) to either argument (and neither was raised as a ground for relief in the state habeas proceeding). 76 In any event, neither argument presents a basis for relief on the merits. The first statement Nichols challenged was made by the prosecutor during the punishment phase of the trial. Referring to James Paul Martin, an inmate at the Harris County Jail who testified that he and Nichols had been involved in an escape plot while in jail, the prosecutor stated: I wouldn't come to court to you and say convict a man on the word of a criminal without corroboration. Although a prosecutor may not express his personal opinion as to the credibility of witnesses, or his own belief regarding a defendant's guilt, United States v. Walker, 613 F.2d 1349, 1355 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 944, 100 S.Ct. 2172, 64 L.Ed.2d 800 (1980), he may properly comment on the weight of the evidence. See Casel, 995 F.2d at 1309. Here, it is clear from the context in which the statement was made that the prosecutor was not expressing his personal opinion about the credibility of Martin. Rather, he was directing the jury to look to other evidence that supported Martin's testimony, which, because it was the testimony of a convicted felon, would be suspect standing alone. 59 This type of argument is permissible to the extent that it draws a conclusion based solely on the evidence presented. Id. (citing United States v. Enstam, 622 F.2d 857, 869 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 1351, 67 L.Ed.2d 336 (1981); United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 824 (5th Cir.1980), and United States v. Binker, 795 F.2d 1218, 1223 (5th Cir.1986)). Such is the case here. 77 The second statement which Nichols objects to was made during the state's argument at the close of the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. In arguing that Nichols fired the shot that killed Shaffer, the prosecutor stated: And I'll tell you it was his hand that did the killing. Once again, however, Nichols gives an incomplete picture. Immediately after the prosecutor made the above-quoted statement, he asked How do you know that? and then proceeded to summarize the evidence presented at trial which would tend to support the theory that Nichols fired the fatal shot. In United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396 (5th Cir.1978), this Court explained that a prosecutor may state his own opinion or knowledge of the case as long as he makes it clear that the conclusions he is urging are conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. Id. at 401. Here, the prosecutor argued the admitted evidence in support of the challenged statement. Hence, in the context of the prosecution's argument the statement was not improper. 78 (vii) Lastly, Nichols asserts that at sentencing the prosecution improperly commented on Nichols' failure to call witnesses or present evidence. Again, without citation to authority or meaningful argument, Nichols quotes four sentences which he contends are thus improper. First, during the state's argument at the end of the punishment phase of the trial, the prosecutor stated: 79 Why is it that not one, not one employer except a family friend, Mr. Creal, came and sat here and told you what a nice worker he was. Not one. Not even a co-worker came here to verify to you that he actually worked or that he was a good worker, not one. 80 Later, the prosecutor commented that Not one employer, not one co-worker, not one school mate, not one neighbor has come here. 81 Again, these portions of the argument were not complained of in Nichols' federal habeas petition. Moreover, they are procedurally barred. No objection was made at trial (or on appeal) to the first argument (and it was not raised as a ground for relief in the state habeas proceedings). The second argument was objected to at trial on the ground it was not a correct statement of the evidence. 60 On direct appeal, Nichols complained that the statement was improper as comment on his failure to call punishment witnesses, and the Court of Criminal Appeals held that [b]ecause the challenge on appeal does not comport with the objection at trial, nothing is presented for review. Nichols, 754 S.W.2d at 200. 61 82 At all events, the claims lack merit. As a matter of Texas law, the prosecutor may comment on the defendant's failure to call a material witness, and he may draw an inference from that failure that the testimony would have been unfavorable. O'Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F.2d 365, 388 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1013, 104 S.Ct. 1015, 79 L.Ed.2d 245 (1984); see also O'Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464, 479 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 988, 100 S.Ct. 2975, 64 L.Ed.2d 846 (1980). Moreover, in federal trials, although a party's failure to call a witness equally available to both sides may not be properly commented on, if the defendant fails to call a witness peculiarly within his control, the prosecutor may properly comment on that failure. United States v. MMR Corp., 907 F.2d 489, 501-02 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936, 111 S.Ct. 1388, 113 L.Ed.2d 445 (1991). That the potential witness is ... accessible to service of subpoena by the court does not make the witness equally available to both parties. Id. at 502. The relationship of the witness to a party may make him or her more available to that party. Id. Such is the case sub judice. Here, the prosecutor was commenting on Nichols' failure to call certain types of witnesses during the punishment phase to establish mitigating circumstances. These types of witnesses are generally more available to the defense. And, because the option of producing and coming forward with mitigating circumstances is upon the capital defendant, O'Bryan, 591 S.W.2d at 479, they are more likely to be called by the defense. The prosecutor's brief comment on Nichols' failure to call certain types of good character witnesses was not clearly improper; certainly it did not render the sentencing fundamentally unfair or deprive Nichols of due process. 83 Nichols asks that we view all the complained of prosecution arguments together. However, even when all are viewed cumulatively--and even without considering that counsel did not think the vast majority of them worth complaining of at trial, or on appeal, or in any of the lengthy and frequently amended state habeas petitions, or, for the most part, in the federal petition--it is entirely clear to us that they did not operate to deprive Nichols of a fundamentally fair trial at any stage of the proceedings or to deny him due process, and that there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury's verdict at either stage was improperly affected thereby.
84 Nichols complains of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, listing in three pages of his brief nine different claims in this respect. After evidentiary hearings in both the state habeas court and the district court below, all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were rejected by the state habeas trial court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, and the district court below. 85 Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), a habeas petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden to demonstrate both deficient performance and prejudice. Id. at 686-87, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. As to the former, judicial scrutiny of counsel's conduct must be highly deferential, id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, the distorting effect of hindsight is to be avoided, id. at 689-90, 104 S.Ct. at 2065-66, and courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. It is not enough to show that some, or even most, defense lawyers would have handled the case differently. Green v. Lynaugh, 868 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 831, 110 S.Ct. 102, 107 L.Ed.2d 66 (1989). To establish prejudice, [i]t is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding, Strickland 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2067; rather, he must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. 86 Our examination of the record, including that of the habeas proceedings, reflects that Nichols was represented vigorously and effectively at trial by his two counsel Lane and Scott, each of whom had likewise so represented him throughout his first trial. These attorneys were familiar with the facts of the case, made and procured hearings and rulings on appropriate pretrial motions and motions to suppress, investigated and presented testimony, made objections, presented appropriate jury arguments, and subjected the state's case to rigorous adversarial testing and opposition at trial. Many of the instances of alleged ineffectiveness which Nichols raises on appeal were not adequately raised below, and hence are not properly before us. United States v. Smith, 915 F.2d 959, 964 (5th Cir.1990). But even considering all the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised on appeal, we are convinced that Nichols has neither overcome the strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance nor demonstrated any reasonable probability that but for the claimed deficiencies the result of the proceedings would have been different. No such probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome has been shown. We now briefly address the particular assertions of ineffectiveness raised by Nichols on this appeal. 87 (i) Complaint is made that Nichols' attorneys failed to attempt to delay entry of the July 31, 1981, mistrial order in Nichols' first trial until August 31, 1981, when the 1981 amendment to Tex.Code Crim.Proc. art. 37.071(e) came into effect providing that if the jury is unable to answer any punishment special issue the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment. This contention materially differs from the only claim made below respecting this subject, which was that counsel was ineffective for failing to ask the trial court to set aside the interlocutory order of mistrial and to sentence Nichols to life imprisonment in accordance with amended article 37.071(e). In any event, the present contention, as well as that made below, is without merit, and under neither theory has either deficient performance or prejudice been demonstrated. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals specifically rejected Nichols' attempt to invoke amended article 37.071(e), stating [b]ecause appellant's first trial was held prior to the effective date of the amendment to subsection (e), the amendment has no application. Nichols, 754 S.W.2d at 204. Nichols cites no authority and makes no meaningful argument, in support of his contention on appeal. 62 Nor are we aware of any such authority. So far as we are able to ascertain, nothing in Texas law would authorize the trial court to discharge the jury without declaring a mistrial. And, it would be patently unreasonable for defense counsel to have urged, or for the trial court to have ordered, that the jury continue bound to the case for another month. 63 Moreover, continued deliberations would risk a yes answer to the single special issue which the jury had not then unanimously answered in the affirmative. 88 (ii) Nichols next complains that his counsel failed to present Williams' testimony as given at his own trial--instead of that given at Nichols' first trial--and failed to utilize the transcript of Williams' trial on cross-examination of Williams' prosecutor to force the latter to admit that Williams was convicted as the lone triggerman. These contentions were not raised below and are not properly before us. In any event, they are wholly without merit. Williams' testimony at his own trial was not more favorable to Nichols then his testimony at Nichols' first trial. Indeed, Williams' testimony at his own trial indicated that when he shot (or shot at) Shaffer from the door, he did so in response to Nichols telling him shoot-shoot (see note 2, supra ). Williams did not mention this in his testimony at Nichols' first trial. Had this testimony been before the jury, it would have wholly undercut Nichols' defensive theory that he was not guilty even under the law of parties because when Williams fired what the defense contended was the fatal shot, Nichols had already completely left and Williams' shot was the separate act of Willie Ray Williams, acting independently for which, under the wording of the court's jury charge, Nichols would not be responsible. As to the cross-examination of Williams' prosecutor, what Williams was convicted of was determinable from, and only from, the record in that case. We have held that that does not reflect a determination that Williams was the lone triggerman. Nor is there any showing that Williams' prosecutor could possibly shed any other light on the matter. The jury had before it the undisputed fact of Williams' conviction for Shaffer's murder, as well as his testimony that he shot Shaffer from the door, causing him to fall back. Nichols makes no showing of deficient performance or prejudice in regard to these matters. 89 (iii) On the basis of April 1992 affidavits submitted after the evidentiary hearing below to the district court with Nichols' motion to expand the record, which the district court denied, Nichols contends that defense counsel failed to interview witness Teresa Ishman, a deli employee, and failed to examine deli employee Johnson on the 'triggerman' issue. This issue is not properly before us. The affidavits are not a part of the record (and no complaint has been made of the ruling denying the motion to expand the record); and they were tendered to the district court in respect to a Brady claim. Further, the issue was not adequately raised below. The habeas petition only alleged in the most conclusional form that Counsel's overall performance, including the general lack of any investigation, denied petitioner effective assistance of counsel at both stages of the trial. Counsel's trial strategy was unreasonable and it was not based on an adequate investigation. There was no allegation concerning Johnson or Ishman or the subject matter to which their affidavits are now alleged to be relevant. These allegations in the petition are plainly inadequate to raise a constitutional issue in the respect now asserted on appeal. See Ross v. Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008, 1011-1012 (5th Cir.1983); Alexander v. McCotter, 775 F.2d 595, 602-603 (5th Cir.1985). The allegations may not be supplemented on appeal. Alexander at 603. 90 Moreover, there is no adequate showing or allegation that counsel was deficient in this respect. Present counsel, who had been representing Nichols since sometime before May 1989, took the position below that they did not find out the information in the affidavits until early 1992. Nichols suggests no basis on which trial counsel can be faulted for not producing this information while excusing habeas counsel for not producing it in the state habeas or earlier in the federal habeas. Cf. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992). Further, the Ishman affidavit states that she initially told the police that she saw nothing. 64 This was consistent with Johnson's testimony that when Nichols and Williams shot at Shaffer, the other deli employee there--Ishman (then known as McGee, which was not her true name)--was back in the kitchen or bathroom and did not come out. As to Johnson, defense counsel had already reviewed--and at trial succeeded in getting before the jury--her written, sworn statement to the police, and there was nothing to indicate that she had ever said anything else, much less anything favorable to the defense. Nor do the April 1992 affidavits show a probability of a different result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Johnson's affidavit reflects that just after Nichols shot, and before either Nichols or Williams left, she saw Williams leaning across the counter and firing the shot that killed Mr. Shaeffer (sic). This entirely contradicts the defense theory that the fatal shot was fired by Williams from the door after Nichols left and was thus the separate act of Williams acting independently for which under the charge Nichols would not be responsible. Ishman's affidavit mentions only an initial set of shots fired from the counter area (after which she ran into the restroom, where Johnson was already locked in). Ishman does state Shaffer went down and reached under the counter for his gun, but this is just what Johnson's October 13, 1980, statement--which was before the jury without limitation--said. In Johnson's trial testimony, she admitted making the October 13, 1980, statement, but said that although Shaffer went down in a squat position she didn't see him reach for anything. 65 Nichols' statement and Williams' testimony, both before the jury, were that Shaffer came up with a gun in his hand. 91 (iv) Nichols next complains of counsel's failure to object to the trial court's grant to juror Pearson of an exemption from jury service for child care under Tex.Govt.Code Ann. Sec. 62.106(2). Nichols does not explain why the exclusion was erroneous, but it may possibly have been in that although Pearson had custody of her two-year-old child, the statute speaks to exclusion for those having custody of children under ten where the jury service requires leaving the child or children without adequate supervision, and Pearson had said she had a sitter. It is questionable that constitutionally deficient performance is shown. Whether a juror is desirable is inherently a matter of judgment, particularly when, as in Pearson's case, a strong antipathy to service is expressed. 66 In any event, prejudice is not demonstrated. Although the state did not request or suggest Pearson's exclusion, and Pearson clearly said she wanted the exemption, Nichols asserts prejudice because Pearson had indicated reluctance to impose the death penalty and the state eventually used all its peremptory challenges. However, at the time Pearson was excused, the state had used only two of its peremptory challenges. It cannot be shown that but for her exclusion Pearson would have served. And, nothing in the record tends to establish that, in the absence of defense counsel's errors, a different factfinder ... would have been reasonably likely to arrive at a different outcome. Green v. Lynaugh, 868 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir.) (original emphasis), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 831, 110 S.Ct. 102, 107 L.Ed.2d 66 (1989). Moreover, in United States v. Prati, 861 F.2d 82 (5th Cir.1988), we concluded that the Supreme Court, in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988), rejected 'the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of a constitutional right to an impartial jury.'  Id. at 87 (quoting Ross, 487 U.S. at 88, 108 S.Ct. at 2278). Instead, the pertinent inquiry is whether the jurors that actually sat were impartial as required by the sixth amendment. Id. Because Nichols does not assert that his jury was not impartial, he has failed to demonstrate that his counsel's failure to object to the exclusion of Pearson was prejudicial. 67 92 (v) Complaint is next made of defense counsel's failure to object to an allegedly improper shuffle of three venire members. Nichols does not explain why or in what respect the shuffle was improper and cites no authority indicating that it was. Hence, nothing is presented for review. Fed.R.App.P. 28(a)(6); Beaumont at 563. In any event, neither deficient performance nor prejudice has been shown. Nichols claims that absent the shuffle alternate juror Walker, who would have been reluctant to impose capital punishment, would have been the twelfth juror. 68 However, when the three jurors were shuffled, none of them, including Walker, had been voir-dired, so the record reflects no basis on which to conclude that defense counsel should have known or believed that Walker would be favorable to the defense (or more so than any other of the three). Additionally, Nichols' assertion that, absent the shuffle, Walker would serve as the twelfth juror rather than as an alternate is purely speculative and is insufficient to establish prejudice. 93 (vi) Nichols next contends that trial counsel was inadequate for failing to request an anti-parties instruction at the punishment stage of trial. We reject this contention. At the time of trial, it was not clearly established Texas or federal law that such an instruction, if requested, was required. 69 While the law was not so clear that a request for such a charge could be said to be plainly futile, this does not mean that counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing to request such a charge. See Smith v. Collins, 977 F.2d 951, 960 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 97, 126 L.Ed.2d 64 (1993); Selvage v. Collins, 975 F.2d 131 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 663 (1993); Buxton. Moreover, a law of parties instruction was not given at sentencing, and it appears clear that all concerned operated on the assumption that the law of parties did not apply at sentencing. We conclude that under the circumstances counsel was not constitutionally deficient for failing to request an affirmative anti-parties instruction at sentencing. Further, for the reasons and authorities previously recited in connection with the state's appeal (see Part IA, supra ), we also conclude that Nichols has failed to demonstrate prejudice from the failure to give an anti-parties instruction. There is no reasonable probability that the giving of such an instruction would have altered the outcome. See also, e.g., Belyeu v. Scott, 67 F.3d 535 (5th Cir.1995). Finally, this asserted ground of ineffective assistance of counsel was not raised below. 94 (vii) Nichols next complains that counsel was deficient for failing to request a Penry-type instruction concerning mitigating evidence. This contention was not raised below. Moreover, it is wholly without merit. The case was tried seven years before Penry. In any event, the state habeas court did not apply the procedural bar to this claim, but rather rejected it on the merits. And, we have held that federal law did not entitle Nichols to such an instruction (see part IIB, supra ). Consequently, neither a deficiency on the part of counsel nor prejudice is shown. 95 (viii) Complaint is made in general terms that counsel failed to object to repeated improper jury argument by the state, but the arguments in question are not identified other than by a general reference to the section of Nichols' brief complaining of improper argument, and which particular arguments were not objected to is not identified. No authorities are cited and no explanation or meaningful argument is made in the three brief sentences dealing with this complaint. It is not properly presented to us. Moreover, it was not raised below except as to those few instances of prosecutorial argument as to which complaint was made below (see Part IIC, supra ). The other instances are not properly before us. In any event, for the reasons stated in Part IIC above, the arguments in question, singly and collectively, were not so improper and prejudicial that the failure to object to any or all of them can properly be characterized as constitutionally deficient performance by counsel, or as rendering Nichols' trial as a whole fundamentally unfair, or as giving rise to any reasonable probability that had objections been made the result would have been different. Nothing in connection with these complaints serves to undermine confidence in the trial's outcome. 96 (ix) Lastly, Nichols makes the conclusory assertion that trial counsel were ineffective in failing to move for a new trial on the grounds of their own ineffectiveness at trial. This contention is frivolous. No procedural bar has prevented Nichols from raising ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Moreover, we have held, as did the district court and the state habeas court, that Nichols was not denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. 97 In sum, we reject all Nichols' claims on appeal that the district court erred in denying him relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
98 Nichols' sole remaining claim on appeal is a three-sentence argument that the matters of which he complains on appeal (Part IIA-D), plus those on which the district court granted him relief and which are the subject of the state's appeal (Part IA-C), amount to cumulative error under our decisions in Derden and Kirkpatrick v. Whitley, 992 F.2d 491 (5th Cir.1993), 70 and denied Nichols a fair trial. For the reasons previously noted in addressing these contentions severally, we find no merit in Nichols' argument. Reviewing the entire record, we conclude that Nichols has not made out a case of cumulative error under Derden, and that the matters complained of did not, singly or in combination, operate to deny him a fundamentally fair trial, deprive him of due process, or undermine confidence in the outcome. We accordingly reject Nichols' contention in this respect. 99 Having specifically addressed and rejected all of Nichols' points in his cross-appeal, we reject Nichols' cross-appeal and affirm so much of the district court's judgment as denies Nichols habeas relief.