Opinion ID: 169172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: M onetary Sanctions and Filing Restrictions

Text: Defendants have filed motions for sanctions in appeal No. 05-6387 (from Springer I) and appeal No. 06-5123 (from Springer III), each of w hich requests a flat fee of $8,000 to compensate them for attorney’s fees and costs in defending what they argue are frivolous appeals. Springer thus has had notice and an opportunity to respond, as required by Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1514 (10th Cir. 1987). This court has the power to award just damages and single or double costs if the court “determine[s] that an appeal is frivolous” or brought for purposes of delay. Fed. R. App. P. 38; 28 U.S.C. § 1912. “An appeal is frivolous when the result is obvious, or the appellant’s arguments of error are wholly without merit.” Braley, 832 F.2d at 1510 (quotation omitted). W e determine that appeal No. 05-6387 and appeal No. 06-5123 are frivolous and brought for purposes of delay. W hen the IRS issued its notices of deficiency in 1996, Springer had two options, to pay the tax and sue for a refund under 26 U.S.C. § 7422 or to petition the Tax Court for a redetermination under 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a). See Taylor v. Allan, 204 F.2d 485, 486 n.4 (10th Cir. 1953). He chose the latter option, and the Tax Court ruled against him, a judgment that is now incontestable. W hen the IRS issued its notice of intent to levy, Springer properly requested a CD P hearing, but he challenged that hearing in a jurisdictionally defective action, Springer I, then took a frivolous appeal from the -14- dismissal of that action. Springer III was dismissed as a procedurally improper means of challenging the government’s power to impose penalties arising from the failure to file federal income tax returns for 1982-2006, and his appeal from that dismissal also was frivolous. M oreover, many of his arguments take issue with the fact of his underlying liability for 1990-1995, a fact that is no longer open to challenge. Accordingly, we conclude that the results in appeal No. 05-6387 and appeal No. 06-5123 are obvious, that Springer’s arguments are wholly without merit, and that these appeals were brought to delay further the collection of his federal income tax liability for 1990-1995. Defendants’ motions, therefore, have a sound basis. 6 In support of their requests for a flat fee of $8,000 in both Springer I and Springer III, defendants state that “[a]ccording to the records of the Tax Division of the Department of Justice, the average expense in attorney salaries and other costs incurred by this office in the defense of frivolous taxpayer appeals in which sanctions were awarded during 2004 and 2005 is approximately $11,042.” No. 05-6387, Appellees’ M ot. for Sanctions at 7; see also No. 06-5123, Appellees’ M ot. for Sanctions at 5-6 (substantially the same). W e granted a similar request for $8,000 in Kyler v. Everson, 442 F.3d 1251, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 6 Like Springer I, Springer II was a jurisdictionally defective challenge to the CDP hearing, and the appeal from Springer II also is frivolous. Because the government has not asked for sanctions in that appeal, we base our award of monetary sanctions on the other two appeals. -15- 2006). But under the unique circumstances of Springer I and Springer III, we conclude that just damages are $4,000 for each of the two appeals, for a total of $8,000. 7 See Stafford v. United States, 208 F.3d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 2000) (granting request for $4,000 sanction in frivolous tax appeal). W e expressly note that this award is not meant to establish a presumptive or flat-fee sanction to be used in all frivolous tax appeals.
Federal courts have the inherent power under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) to regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions under appropriate circumstances. See W inslow v. Hunter (In re Winslow), 17 F.3d 314, 315 (10th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 352 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). Injunctions restricting further filings are appropriate where (1) the litigant’s lengthy and abusive history is set forth; (2) the court provides guidelines as to what the litigant may do to obtain its permission to file an action; and (3) the litigant receives notice and an opportunity to oppose the court’s order before it is implemented. See Tripati, 878 F.2d at 353-54. 7 Although we have remanded cases to the district court to make findings of fact related to an award of just damages, see, e.g., Beilue v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local No. 492, 13 F. App’x 810, 815 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished), Springer has not opposed the amount that defendants request, and remand therefore is unnecessary. (W e cite Beilue for informational purposes only, not as precedent. See 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A ).) -16- As discussed above, these combined appeals are frivolous. Additionally, Springer has a long history of filing meritless federal actions and appeals pro se. W e found his first tax appeal frivolous and imposed a $2,000 sanction. See Springer v. IRS, Nos. 95-5072 & 95-5142, 1996 W L 164459 (10th Cir. Apr. 8, 1996) (unpublished). W e dismissed four other tax-related appeals because Springer had not paid that sanction. See Springer v. United States, No. 98-5056 (10th Cir. June 15, 1998) (unpublished order of dismissal); Springer v. United States, No. 97-5095 (10th Cir. Oct. 16, 1997) (unpublished order of dismissal); Springer v. United States, No. 97-5093 (10th Cir. Oct. 16, 1997) (unpublished order of dismissal); Springer v. Comm’r, No. 97-9008 (10th Cir. Oct. 15, 1997) (unpublished order of dismissal). In yet another tax case w here Springer was a plaintiff but not an appellant, we noted the district court had properly granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs on their claim that federal taxation amounted to involuntary servitude and imposed monetary sanctions for the frivolous appeal. See Buckner v. United States, No. 98-5057, 1999 W L 61071, at  (10th Cir. Feb. 4, 1999) (unpublished). And as noted above, the Tax Court imposed a $4,000 sanction for Springer’s frivolous appeal from the notices of deficiency concerning his 1990-1995 income tax liability. Springer has not found any more litigation success outside of the tax arena. In Springer v. Alabam a, we imposed a $1,000 sanction on Springer for filing a frivolous appeal of the district court’s dismissal, on sovereign immunity grounds, -17- of his claim that the respective ballot law s of all fifty states violated his constitutional right to run for president. See No. 99-5227, 2000 W L 305492, at  (10th Cir. M ar. 24, 2000) (unpublished). He also brought a similar suit against the election officials of all fifty states. In that case, we affirmed the district court’s dismissal because Springer had failed to identify a legal theory entitling him to relief, see Springer v. Balough, No. 00-5071, 2000 W L 1616246, at  (10th Cir. Oct. 30, 2000) (unpublished), and we later affirmed the district court’s assessment of costs against him, see Springer v. Rancourt, 17 F. App’x 824, 826 (10th Cir. 2001). W e summarily affirmed the district courts’ dismissal of Springer’s libel and slander claims in Springer v. The Infinity Group Co., No. 98-5182, 1999 W L 651391, at (10th Cir. Aug. 26, 1999). And we affirmed the dismissal of another case in which Springer asserted that the defendants had breached a contract to pay a $1,000,000 reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of anyone involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy on the ground that Springer had sued the wrong defendant. See Springer v. Hustler M agazine, No. 99-5117, 1999 W L 979242, at  (10th Cir. Oct. 28, 1999) (unpublished). In view of his abusive pattern of filing frivolous or malicious actions and appeals pro se, we must restrict Springer’s access to the courts. “The right of access to the courts is neither absolute nor unconditional, and there is no constitutional right of access to the courts to prosecute an action that is frivolous -18- or malicious.” Winslow, 17 F.3d at 315 (quotation and alteration omitted). “[W ]here, as here, a party has engaged in a pattern of litigation activity which is manifestly abusive, restrictions are appropriate.” Id. (quotation omitted). Our filing restrictions must be narrowly tailored. See Tripati, 878 F.2d at 352. But as our review indicates, Springer has not limited the scope of his baseless attacks to the tax arena or a particular set of defendants. Thus, Springer’s litigation history does not present circumstances similar to those we recently considered in Sieverding v. Colorado Bar Association, 469 F.3d 1340, 1345 (10th Cir. 2006), where we modified a district court’s filing restrictions by limiting them to filings against only those persons and entities against whom the plaintiff had a history of proceeding, without regard to subject matter. Therefore, subject to Springer’s opportunity to object, as described below, we propose the following reasonable filing restrictions on future filings by Springer “commensurate with our inherent power to enter orders ‘necessary or appropriate’ in aid of our jurisdiction.” Winslow, 17 F.3d at 315 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)). Springer is ENJOINED from proceeding in this court as a petitioner in an original proceeding or as an appellant in a civil matter (except in these combined appeals) unless he is represented by a licensed attorney admitted to practice in this court or unless he first obtains permission to proceed pro se. To obtain permission to proceed pro se, Springer must take the follow ing steps: -19- 1. File a petition with the clerk of this court requesting leave to file an original proceeding or to proceed pro se on appeal. If Springer seeks to proceed pro se on appeal, he must file the petition with the clerk of this court not more than ten days after filing his notice of appeal in the district court; 2. Include in the petition the following information: A. A list of all lawsuits currently pending or filed previously with this court, including the name, number, and citation, if applicable, of each case, and the current status or disposition of the appeal or original proceeding; and B. A list apprising this court of all outstanding injunctions or orders limiting Springer’s access to federal court, including orders and injunctions requiring him to seek leave to file matters pro se or requiring him to be represented by an attorney, including the name, number, and citation, if applicable, of all such orders or injunctions; and 3. File with the clerk of this court a notarized affidavit, in proper legal form, which recites the issues Springer seeks to present, including a short discussion of the legal basis asserted therefor, and describing with particularity the order being challenged. The affidavit also must certify, to the best of Springer’s knowledge, that the legal arguments being raised are not frivolous or made in bad faith, that they are warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, that the appeal or other matter is not interposed for any improper purpose such as delay or -20- to needlessly increase the cost of litigation, and that he will comply with all appellate and local rules of this court. The affidavit must be filed with the petition and is therefore subject to the same ten-day filing deadline as the petition in the case of a pro se appeal. These documents shall be submitted to the clerk of this court. The matter will be dismissed for failure to prosecute if the required documents are not submitted, are submitted in an improper form, or are untimely submitted. If the matter is not dismissed for failure to prosecute, the clerk shall forward the documents to the Chief Judge or the Chief Judge’s designee for review to determine whether to permit Springer to file an original proceeding or to pursue an appeal. This review will take into account the preclusive effect of the Tax Court’s determination in Springer v. Comm’r, No. 26045-96 (T.C. Feb. 10, 1997) (unpublished), as to the fact of Springer’s liability for federal income taxes, penalties, and interest for 1990-1995 and the government’s right to collect that liability, matters that are not subject to further litigation. W ithout the approval of the C hief Judge or the Chief Judge’s designee, the matter w ill be dismissed. If the Chief Judge or the Chief Judge’s designee approves the petition, an order shall be entered indicating that the matter shall proceed in accordance with the Federal Rules of A ppellate Procedure and the Tenth Circuit Rules. Springer shall have ten days from the date of this order and judgment to file written objections to these proposed filing restrictions. See Winslow, 17 F.3d at -21- 316. The response shall be limited to fifteen pages. See id. If Springer does not timely file objections, the filing restrictions shall take effect twenty days from the date of this order and judgment, and the filing restrictions shall apply to any matter filed after that time, except for further filings in these combined appeals. Id. at 316-17. If Springer does file timely objections, the filing restrictions shall not take effect until after this court has ruled on those objections.