Opinion ID: 4543021
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Partial Sequestration of Jury

Text: Finally, the appellants argue that the district court deprived them of their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to a fair and impartial jury by granting the government's motion for a partially anonymous and semi-sequestered jury. If a district court has taken reasonable precautions to protect a defendant's fundamental rights, we review its decision to empanel an anonymous jury for abuse of discretion. United States v. Kadir, 718 F.3d 115, 120 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 801 (2d Cir. 1994)). A district court minimizes the prejudicial effects of an anonymous jury on the defendant by giving the jurors 'a plausible and nonprejudicial reason for not disclosing their identities' and by conducting a voir dire designed to uncover bias. Id. (quoting Thai, 29 F.3d at 801). [W]hen genuinely called for and when properly used, anonymous juries do not infringe a defendant's constitutional rights. United States v. Pica, 692 F.3d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Thai, 29 F.3d at 800). After taking reasonable precautions 56 to minimize any prejudicial effects on the defendant and to ensure that his fundamental rights are protected, [a] district court may order the empaneling of an anonymous jury 'upon . . . concluding that there is strong reason to believe the jury needs protection.' Kadir, 718 F.3d at 120 (quoting Pica, 692 F.3d at 88). Most importantly, the district court protected the appellants’ fundamental rights by ensuring that the jury was not anonymous with respect to any of the parties. While the jurors' identities were kept from the public, the appellants and their counsel (and the government, too) were provided with the names of the prospective jurors during jury selection and were free to investigate any of them for potential bias. Moreover, the court employed a jury questionnaire and permitted all parties to review the prospective jurors' answers and move to strike jurors for cause. Similarly, the court allowed the parties to conduct extensive voir dire before submitting their peremptory challenges. And the court instructed the empaneled jurors that the measures of partial sequestration (being transported to and from the courthouse by U.S. Marshals and being required to remain in the jury room or behind the courtroom during breaks) were not unusual and were being taken to ensure [their] privacy and impartiality in light of the media and public attention this trial is likely to receive. App. at 378–79. 57 The district court's conclusion that there was strong reason for the jury to be kept anonymous and sequestered from the public fell well within its discretion. For one thing, as the appellants acknowledge, this case prompted a significant amount of media attention across the world, including reporting that revealed personal information about potential witnesses. In a sealed filing, the government also proffered evidence suggesting a possibility that jurors might face safety concerns if their names were revealed to the public, including evidence that potential witnesses in the case had already been subjected to severely intimidating behavior. The appellants do not challenge any of the evidence cited by the district court in this regard. Instead, they rely on two opinions from the Southern District of New York to argue that the district court's conclusion was incorrect as a matter of law. First, the appellants assert that a court's concern about media attention, without more, is insufficient to justify the impact on a defendant's trial that empaneling an anonymous jury may have. United States v. Mostafa, 7 F. Supp. 3d 334, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing United States v. Vario, 943 F.2d 236, 241 (2d Cir. 1991)). Even were Mostafa precedential for these purposes, however, it is 58 inapposite. The district court's decision here relied on legitimate considerations of juror safety in addition to its concerns about media attention that did not exist in that case. Second, the appellants argue that the government could not make a satisfactory showing of a reasonable likelihood of juror intimidation, because [t]here [was] no evidence that [the appellants] either participated in or directed efforts to . . . intimidate witnesses. United States v. Gambino, 818 F. Supp. 536, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Our caselaw does not, however, require a court to find that a defendant personally intimidated or attempted to intimidate witnesses or others associated with the trial in order to empanel an anonymous jury. In United States v. Aulicino, 44 F.3d 1102 (2d. Cir. 1995), for example, we concluded that the district court did not err in empaneling an anonymous jury based on evidence of potential jury tampering by [the defendant's] coconspirators . . . even in the absence of evidence that [the defendant] in particular had sought to obstruct justice. Id. at 1117. In a more recent summary order, we affirmed the empaneling of an anonymous jury based on threats made to cooperating witnesses by other participants in the defendant's conspiracy. United States v. Vendetta, 83 F. App'x 394, 400 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order), vacated on other grounds by Vondette v. 59 United States, 543 U.S. 1108 (2005)). The court's finding, therefore, that the threats and violence faced by the potential witnesses ha[d] a clear connection and [were] directed to preventing the investigation and/or prosecution of one of the crimes for which the defendants [were] on trial adequately justified its decision to partially anonymize and sequester the jury. Sealed App. at 20.