Opinion ID: 2095527
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defense of Abandonment

Text: Appellant argues that the evidence indicates that he abandoned the attempted robbery prior to the shooting which took the life of the decedent. Therefore, he should be absolved of criminal liability for the attempted robbery. Abandonment relieves an accused of criminal responsibility when a criminal enterprise is cut short by a change of heart, desertion of criminal purpose, change of behavior, and rising revulsion for the harm intended. Pyle v. State (1985), Ind., 476 N.E.2d 124, 126; see also, Land v. State (1984), Ind., 470 N.E.2d 697. One who asserts this defense must establish that he voluntarily abandoned his effort to commit the crime and voluntarily prevented commission of the crime. Ind. Code § 35-41-3-10 (Burns 1979 Repl.). He must have renunciated the criminal plan prior to the completion of the crime or before it became inevitable. Harrison v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 677, 382 N.E.2d 920, cert. denied, 441 U.S. 912, 99 S.Ct. 2010, 60 L.Ed2d 384 (1979). The accused must have actually engaged in the prohibited conduct, that is, taken a substantial step toward the attempted crime. [4] The conduct constituting abandonment must occur after commencement of the substantial step, Woodford v. State (1986), Ind., 488 N.E.2d 1121, but prior to completion of the attempted crime. Deterrence and absence of dangerous conduct are the rationales underlying the defense of abandonment. Deterrence is achieved because perpetrators have an opportunity to avoid criminal liability by abandoning an inchoate offense. Abandonment would thus increase the likelihood of avoiding the substantive harm of the attempted crime. 1 P. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 81(a) (1984); Model Penal Code § 5.01, comment 8 (1985). Renunciation of criminal purpose also tends to negate dangerousness. Society seeks to punish persons with culpable state of minds who have demonstrated their dangerousness. 1 P. Robinson, § 81(a) supra. When the actor demonstrates renunciation of criminal purpose, criminal liability should not be imposed. Consideration of these policies, in combination with the elements of the offense, indicates that abandonment does not constitute a defense to a felony-murder charge when death occurs during the attempted commission of a felony. The elements of felony-murder are the killing of another human being while committing or attempting to commit the underlying felony. Miller v. State (1983), Ind., 448 N.E.2d 293. In the case at bar, the State had the burden to prove that Sheckles: (1) killed another human being (2) while taking a substantial step toward (3) the knowing or intentional (4) taking of property from another person (5) by using or threatening the use of force, or by putting any person in fear. Ind. Code §§ 35-41-5-1; XX-XX-X-X(2); XX-XX-X-X. Felony-murder is designed to protect society from the substantive harm of death and the harm attributed to the underlying felony charged, here attempted robbery. Indiana requires that the abandonment occur after conduct evidencing a substantial step but before the substantive harm occurs or becomes inevitable. Interpretation of the statutory phrase, while committing or attempting to commit indicates that a legal abandonment cannot occur when a person has been killed during the commission of the underlying felony in felony-murder. We have recently indicated that the phrase in the felony-murder statute, while committing, connotes that the homicide and felony must be committed during one continuous transaction. A transaction is continuous when the commission of both the homicide and felony are closely connected in time, place, and continuity of action. Eddy v. State (1986), Ind., 496 N.E.2d 24. A homicide occurs while committing the accompanying felony when the perpetrator shoots the homicide victim while leaving the felony scene. Averhart v. State (1984), Ind., 470 N.E.2d 666. The application of abandonment to felony-murder would produce results antithetical to the reasons underlying the defense and would be contrary to the purpose of the felony-murder rule. In the case at bar, the substantive harm sought to be protected by the proscription of robbery was avoided because appellant did not complete the robbery. Obviously, the primary substantive harm attributed to felony-murder was not similarly avoided. As this Court said in Moynihan v. State (1880), 70 Ind. 126: The perpetration of, or the attempt to perpetrate ... [the underlying felony] ... involves great moral depravity and an utter disregard of the rights of person and property; and the Legislature, for the protection of society and for wise ends, have thought it necessary to make the taking of life in the perpetration of, or the attempt to perpetrate, ... murder in the first degree, without any reference to any intent to commit the homicide. The party who perpetrates, or attempts to perpetrate, either of those offences, intends a great wrong in the commission of the offence, and if death ensue he must take the consequences which result. Moynihan, 70 Ind. at 130. While Sheckles did not complete the robbery, he did commit the offense of felony-murder: he killed someone while attempting a robbery. The attempted robbery was but an element of the proof for felony-murder and the State proved that element. To absolve an accused of criminal liability for felony-murder where he abandoned an element of the offense while committing the substantive harm sought to be prevented by statute would be an egregious affront to society. Accordingly, we hold that abandonment does not constitute a defense to a charge of felony-murder predicated upon an attempted robbery.