Opinion ID: 1379313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: instructions on principals, including aiders and abettors

Text: The jury was instructed that persons who are legally regarded as principals in the crime ... and equally guilty thereof, include [1] those who directly and actively commit the act constituting the crime or [2] those who with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the person who directly and actively commits the crime intentionally aid and abet in its commission, or [3] those who, whether present or not at the commission of the crime, advise and encourage its commission. (See CALJIC No. 3.00.) Defendant contends that this instruction permitted the jury to return a verdict of first degree murder without finding that he acted with the requisite malice, premeditation, and deliberation. (3) Because the instruction was requested by defendant's trial counsel, as well as by the prosecution, the Attorney General contends that any claimed defects in it were waived. There appears no conceivable tactical purpose, however, for defense counsel's requesting an instruction that would erroneously lessen the prosecutorial burden of proving malice, premeditation, or deliberation. Claims of instructional error are reviewable when such error could only have resulted from counsel's neglect or mistake in requesting the instruction (§ 1259; People v. Barraza (1979) 23 Cal.3d 675, 683 [153 Cal. Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947]) even though defendant would be barred from challenging an instruction that his counsel requested for a deliberate tactical purpose ( People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, 228-229 [207 Cal. Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121]). (See People v. Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 353 [253 Cal. Rptr. 199, 763 P.2d 1289]; People v. Graham (1969) 71 Cal.2d 303, 319 [78 Cal. Rptr. 217, 455 P.2d 153]; cf. People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 932 [269 Cal. Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676] [the requirement of a deliberate tactical choice is limited to situations in which the court is under an obligation to instruct sua sponte in a manner other than it did].) Accordingly, we examine defendant's present claim on its merits. (4) Defendant contends that under the instruction, if the jury determined that one or more persons other than himself, such as Rutherford, Forrester, or Soria, planned either of the killings, but that defendant was the one who inflicted the fatal wound, i.e., directly and actively commit[ted] the act constituting the crime (CALJIC No. 3.00), the jury could find defendant guilty of first degree murder whatever his mental state when he acted. Any such misleading effect of CALJIC No. 3.00 was precluded, however, by the instruction not to single out any certain sentence or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others, but instead to consider all the instructions as a whole and ... to regard each in the light of all the others. (See CALJIC No. 1.01; People v. Chavez (1985) 39 Cal.3d 823, 830 [218 Cal. Rptr. 49, 705 P.2d 372].). The jury was instructed that murder perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing with express malice aforethought is murder of the first degree. (See CALJIC No. 8.20.) Moreover, [t]o constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing and the reasons for and against such a choice and, having in mind the consequences, he decides to and does kill. ( Ibid., italics added.) From these and other instructions, a reasonable juror would understand that one who becomes a principal to the crime of deliberate and premeditated first degree murder by directly and actively commit[ting] the act constituting the crime (CALJIC No. 3.00) must have personally premeditated and deliberated with malice aforethought. We need not consider a tortuous analysis of the instructions that no reasonable juror would undertake. ( People v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d 471, 488 [247 Cal. Rptr. 172, 754 P.2d 218].) (5a) Defendant further claims prejudice from CALJIC No. 3.00's descriptions of two other kinds of principals  those who, with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the [active perpetrator] intentionally aid and abet in the crime's commission, and those who advise and encourage its commission. Those descriptions also, he contends, erroneously exposed him to conviction of first degree murder without a finding of premeditation and deliberation on his part. Each of defendant's two convictions of first degree murder could have been based on either of two findings: that he was the actual perpetrator or that he was an aider and abettor. Defendant claimed that he did not actually kill either victim because Patty was already dead when he fired the shotgun at her, and Stacy was already dead when he slit her throat. The prosecutor vigorously disputed these claims, but argued that even if the jury were to accept them, it should nonetheless convict defendant of first degree murder as an aider and abettor. In accordance with this argument, the jury was given other instructions, in addition to CALJIC No. 3.00, on aiding and abetting. Defendant contends that these aiding and abetting instructions, even in combination, were deficient in that they authorized his conviction of first degree murder without a finding by the jury that his acts of aiding and abetting were done with premeditation, deliberation, and express malice. No such finding was required. (6) In People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547 [199 Cal. Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318], we explained that the aider and abettor must share the specific intent of the perpetrator. By `share' we mean neither that the aider and abettor must be prepared to commit the offense by his or her own act should the perpetrator fail to do so, nor that the aider and abettor must seek to share the fruits of the crime. [Citation.] Rather, an aider and abettor will `share' the perpetrator's specific intent when he or she knows the full extent of the perpetrator's criminal purpose and gives aid or encouragement with the intent or purpose of facilitating the perpetrator's commission of the crime. [Citations.] ( Id. at p. 560.) We further explained in People v. Croy, supra, 41 Cal.3d 1, that the aider and abettor need not have intended to encourage or facilitate the particular offense ultimately committed by the perpetrator. His knowledge that an act which is criminal was intended, and his action taken with the intent that the act be encouraged or facilitated, are sufficient to impose liability on him for any reasonably foreseeable offense committed as a consequence by the perpetrator. It is the intent to encourage and bring about conduct that is criminal, not the specific intent that is an element of the target offense, which Beeman holds must be found by the jury. ( People v. Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d 547, 556.) ( Id. at p. 12, fn. 5.) The jury was given the following instruction based on People v. Yarber (1979) 90 Cal. App.3d 895, 916 [153 Cal. Rptr. 875]: A person aids and abets the commission of a crime if, with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator of the crime, he intentionally aids, promotes, encourages or instigates by act or advice the commission of such crime. In Beeman, supra, we criticized that instruction as sufficiently ambiguous to conceivably permit conviction upon a finding of an intentional act which aids, without necessarily requiring a finding of an intent to encourage or facilitate the criminal offense. (35 Cal.3d at p. 561.) (5b) But any such ambiguity was rendered harmless as to defendant by the instructions underlying the verdicts of guilt of both murders with special circumstances. The jury was told: If the defendant was not the actual killer, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested or assisted the actual killer in the commission of the murder in the first degree before you are permitted to find the alleged special circumstances of that first degree murder to be true as to the defendant. (See § 190.2, subd. (b).) The latter instruction apprised the jury that if defendant did not actually kill either victim, its verdict of guilt for the murder of that victim with special circumstances must be based on a conclusion that defendant intended to encourage or facilitate the actual killer's first degree murder of the victim. ( People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 310-311 [261 Cal. Rptr. 348, 777 P.2d 121]; People v. Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d 471, 487-488.) Defendant contends the instructions should have explicitly connected the mental state requisite to aiding and abetting with his defense that he participated in the killings out of fear for his life. Defendant did not request any such instruction but claims that the court should have instructed to that effect on its own motion. The instructions the court actually gave, however, fully covered any valid defense along these lines. As stated earlier, the jury was told that if it should find from the evidence that at the time the alleged crime was committed the defendant honestly held a belief that his own life was in danger, it should consider what effect, if any, this belief had on the defendant and whether he formed any of the specific mental states that are essential elements of murder. The jury also was instructed that the specific intent with which an act is done may be proved by the surrounding circumstances, which must be not only consistent with the requisite specific intent but irreconcilable with any other rational conclusion. (See CALJIC No. 2.02.) The substance of that instruction was repeated with explicit reference to the mental state required for proof of a special circumstance. (See CALJIC No. 8.83.1.) (7) [I]n the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on the general principles of law governing the case, i.e., those principles relevant to the issues raised by the evidence, but need not instruct on specific points developed at trial. ( People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 681 [fn. omitted].) (5c) The instructions given the jury provided an ample basis for defendant to argue that his claimed fears for his life were inconsistent with an intent to encourage or facilitate either murder. None of the instructions was inconsistent with that argument, and no additional instructions on the subject were required to be given sua sponte.