Opinion ID: 767491
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The 12(b)(6) dismissals

Text: 5 We review de novo a 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim for relief. See Chance v. Armstrong, I/O, 143 F.3d 698, 701 (2d Cir. 1998). On appeal, we must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and may affirm the district court's dismissal only where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief. Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6 Cruz's failure to promote claim rests on her allegation that, because of her race, Coach reneged on its promise to promote her to Coordinator of Systems Operations. The district court dismissed this claim on the ground that Cruz had not alleged the elements of a prima facie case, because she had not claimed that she applied and was qualified for any position that was subsequently filled by a non-minority. We agree. 7 In order to establish a prima facie case for failure to promote, the plaintiff must allege that: 1) she is a member of a protected class; 2) her job performance was satisfactory; 3) she applied for and was denied promotion to a position for which she was qualified; and 4) the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants. Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 709 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973)). 1 To meet this prima facie burden, Cruz alleged in her complaint that her supervisor promised her, in June 1994, that she would be promoted to the new coordinator position when Coach created that job in January 1995. The company did not create the coordinator position, however, in January 1995 or at any later time. Rather, Cruz alleges, in October 1995, Coach hired two non-minority individuals as financial analysts and gave these two employees many of the analytical responsibilities it had previously entrusted to Cruz. 8 Significantly, Cruz did not allege in her complaint that she ever applied for the financial analyst position or that she was qualified for that position. Nonetheless, Cruz argues that her complaint makes out a prima facie case for failure to promote because the financial analyst and coordinator positions were in fact the same job, and therefore an application for the coordinator position -- which she presumably completed, either formally or informally -- was in effect an application to be a financial analyst. Cruz's complaint, however, is devoid of any language from which the court might draw this conclusion. Although the complaint alleges that [Cruz's] promised position [as coordinator] was given to the financial analysts, it does not describe the responsibilities of either position, the respective qualifications of Cruz and the financial analysts, or otherwise indicate that the two jobs were equivalent in any way. The complaint thus cannot be read to claim either that the two jobs were identical or that an application for coordinator was an adequate substitute for an analyst application. 2 9 Moreover, nothing in the complaint supports the inference that Cruz was qualified to be a financial analyst. Even taking as true Cruz's allegation that Coach gave some of her responsibilities to the financial analysts, this fact alone does not establish that Cruz was competent to perform all the duties of the analyst job, and nothing else in the complaint helps to demonstrate that point. The complaint contains no information about either the responsibilities of a financial analyst or Cruz's employment skills, information that might have supported the inference that Cruz was fit for the position. Without such information, the complaint cannot be understood to allege, either directly or indirectly, that Cruz was qualified for the job. Absent this allegation, and absent any claim that she applied for the financial analyst position, Cruz's complaint fails to state a prima facie case for failure to promote.
10 Along with the failure to promote claim, Cruz's complaint alleged that Coach terminated her in retaliation for defend[ing] herself against Heriveaux's sexual harassment and physical assault in the altercation that ultimately led to her dismissal. Here as well, Cruz's complaint fails to state the elements of a prima facie retaliation claim. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of this claim. 11 To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate participation in protected activity known to the defendant, an employment action disadvantaging the person engaged in the protected activity, and a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Johnson v. Palma, 931 F.2d 203, 207 (2d Cir. 1991). The term protected activity refers to action taken to protest or oppose statutorily prohibited discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3; see also, e.g., Wimmer v. Suffolk County Police Dep't, 176 F.3d 125, 134-35 (2d Cir.) (discussing scope of statute's protected activity provision), cert. denied, 145 L. Ed. 2d 310, 120 S. Ct. 398 (1999). In this case, Cruz did not make out a prima facie case of retaliation because she did not claim to have engaged in any protected activity within the meaning of the statute. Slapping one's harasser, even assuming arguendo that Cruz did so in response to Title VII-barred harassment, is not a protected activity. While the law is clear that opposition to a Title VII violation need not rise to the level of a formal complaint in order to receive statutory protection, this notion of opposition includes activities such as making complaints to management, writing critical letters to customers, protesting against discrimination by industry or by society in general, and expressing support of co-workers who have filed formal charges. Sumner v. United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990). It does not constitute a license for employees to engage in physical violence in order to protest discrimination. 12 We need not decide here whether violence in opposition to Title VII-prohibited behavior might, in some circumstances, be protected under Title VII's retaliation provision. In the situation at bar, Cruz had many options for resisting Heriveaux's offensive behavior, including leaving the room and reporting the incident to Human Resources. She selected none of these options, however, but chose instead to respond by slapping Heriveaux. Under these circumstances, Cruz's decision -- even if, as she claims, she believed herself to be acting in self-defense -- does not enjoy the protection of Title VII. Because Cruz engaged in no protected activity, therefore, she has not established a prima facie case for retaliatory discharge.