Opinion ID: 1119431
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Approaches of Different Jurisdictions

Text: 11. The various jurisdictions have developed differing standards for determining whether the predicate felony is collateral or independent. See generally 1 Robinson, supra, § 103(b) (noting different approaches). Some jurisdictions, such as Kansas, have focused solely on whether the act that caused the homicide was the same as the underlying felonious conduct. See, e.g., State v. Prouse, 244 Kan. 292, 767 P.2d 1308, 1313 (1989). The Kansas Supreme Court explained: Time, distance, and the causal relationship between the underlying felony and the killing are factors to be considered in determining whether the killing is a part of the felony and, therefore, subject to the felony-murder rule. The collateral felony must, therefore, be felonious conduct other than the lethal act itself. Thus, a homicide occurring during the commission of an independent felony, such as aggravated robbery, rape, or kidnapping, comes under the felony-murder statute. However, the lethal act itself cannot serve as the independent collateral felony necessary to support a felony-murder conviction. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Lucas, 759 P.2d at 90 (syllabus language)); see also Garrett v. State, 573 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. Crim.App.1978) (noting that, for felony-murder doctrine to apply, there must be felonious conduct other than the act causing death). 12. Other jurisdictions focus on the defendant's underlying purpose in committing the predicate felony. See, e.g., People v. Mattison, 4 Cal.3d 177, 93 Cal.Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d 193, 198 (1971) (in bank); People v. Moran, 246 N.Y. 100, 158 N.E. 35, 36 (1927). In Mattison, the California Supreme Court held that the same act could serve as the basis for both the homicide and the predicate felony so long as the predicate felony was committed with a collateral or independent felonious design. Mattison, 93 Cal.Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d at 198 (quoting People v. Taylor, 11 Cal.App.3d 57, 89 Cal.Rptr. 697, 699, hearing denied, (Oct. 28, 1970)). Under this approach, if a defendant committed burglary with the intent of assaulting the occupant of the home and actually killed the occupant, the felony of burglary could not serve as a predicate felony for felony murder because it was not committed with a felonious design that was collateral to the homicide. However, the opposite conclusion would be true if the burglary were committed with the intent of robbing the occupant but resulted in a homicide. Cf. Taylor, 89 Cal.Rptr. at 701-02 (discussing felony murder and burglary). 13. However, in People v. Hansen , the California Supreme Court recently departed from this collateral felonious-design test, focusing instead on whether allowing the particular felony to serve as a predicate felony for applying the felony-murder doctrine would subvert legislative intent regarding the mens-rea requirements of the murder statutes. People v. Hansen, 9 Cal.4th 300, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 885 P.2d 1022, 1030-31 (1994) (in bank) (concluding that felony of willful discharge of a firearm at inhabited house could serve as predicate felony for felony murder when the shooting killed an occupant). 14. Arizona has followed yet another approach. Arizona's felony-murder statute specifically enumerates certain felonies for which a resulting homicide will be deemed first-degree murder. See State v. Miniefield, 110 Ariz. 599, 522 P.2d 25, 28 (1974) (en banc). Accordingly, in applying the felony-murder doctrine, the Arizona courts only look to see if the predicate felony is enumerated in the statute, regardless of whether the underlying act was unitary or if there was only a single purpose. Id. (holding that arson resulting in death constituted felony murder even though the same act was the basis for both the predicate felony and the homicide, and even though the defendant's design was to use the act of arson to commit a homicide). The New Mexico felony-murder statute, however, does not enumerate possible predicate felonies. NMSA 1978, § 30-2-1(A)(2) (Repl.Pamp.1994).