Opinion ID: 460188
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Accrual of the Right of Action

Text: 18 Geyen contends that his first cause of action accrued in 1982 when he exhausted his administrative remedies. He notes that this Court requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before military action may be reviewed in federal court, Hodges v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 417, 419-20 (5th Cir.1974), and cites cases in which other courts requiring exhaustion have held that a serviceman's action challenging his discharge accrues when the ABCMR takes its final action. Lichtenfels v. Orr, 604 F.Supp. 271, 276 (S.D.Ohio 1984); Kaiser v. Secretary of the Navy, 525 F.Supp. 1226, 1229-30 (D.Colo.1981). 19 Appellees urge that Geyen's action accrued, at the latest, in 1972 when he was discharged. They acknowledge the exhaustion requirement, but contend that the proper approach is to toll the statute of limitations while agency proceedings are pending. They point to several cases that have adopted this approach. Nichols, 721 F.2d at 660; Mosley v. Secretary of the Navy, 522 F.Supp. 1165, 1167 n. 5 (E.D.Pa.1981), aff'd mem., 688 F.2d 823 (3d Cir.1982). 20 Section 2401(a) must be read with due regard to those practical ends which are to be served by any limitation of the time within which an action must be brought. Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503, 517, 87 S.Ct. 1177, 1185, 18 L.Ed.2d 256 (1967) (quoting Reading Co. v. Koons, 271 U.S. 58, 62, 46 S.Ct. 405, 406, 70 L.Ed. 835 (1926)). The principal purpose of statutes of limitations is to protect defendants and courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117, 100 S.Ct. 352, 357, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979). 21 Were we to find that Geyen's challenge to his activation and the denial of his hardship applications accrued in 1982 when the ABCMR decided not to upgrade his discharge, we would defeat the purpose of Sec. 2401(a)'s six-year limitation. The district court found that records concerning Geyen's case are missing and noted the difficulty in reconstructing events surrounding his activation and the denial of his hardship applications. Moreover, the ABCMR may in the interest of justice review and correct any military record, no matter how long ago the alleged error or injustice occurred. 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1552(b) (1982); see, e.g., Ballenger v. Marsh, 708 F.2d 349 (8th Cir.1983) (ABCMR considers petition in 1959 to remedy alleged injustice that occurred in 1923). Under Geyen's theory, a serviceman dishonorably discharged in 1985 could petition the ADRB for an upgrade within fifteen years, 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1553(a) (1982), seek review from the ABCMR twenty years later in the interest of justice, and then, having exhausted his administrative remedies, seek review of the 1985 discharge in federal court within six years of the ABCMR's decision. Thus, in the year 2026 a federal court could find itself entertaining an action involving events that occurred in 1985. 22 We reject the rule that Geyen proposes. We hold that Geyen's first cause of action accrued, at the latest, upon his discharge in 1972. Although we agree with the Ninth Circuit that the statute of limitations should be tolled when a serviceman is exhausting his remedies before military review boards, Nichols, 721 F.2d at 660, the tolling does not help Geyen. Between his discharge in 1972 and his complaint in the district court in 1983, more than seven years elapsed during which he was not before any military review board and was not under any disability that would toll the running of the statute. We hold, therefore, that Geyen's first cause of action is barred by Sec. 2401(a)'s six-year limitation. 23