Opinion ID: 2120964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the 1987 batson hearing

Text: As noted, the proceedings just described took place in 1982. After our 1987 remand on the basis of the 1986 Batson decision, defendant moved for a ruling that a prima facie case under Batson existed. In support of the motion, defendant offered the 1982 voir dire transcript and copies of relevant juror information forms completed by venire members. On submission of the 1987 motion for a Batson ruling, the trial judge called on the State to supplement the record, remarking: When the [1982] motion was made I did go into it. I gave reasons why I did not think at that time they were excluded because of race. I basically said for the record what I thought. However I can't read the State's mind. The State can tell me for the record what they had in mind, if they remember. A trial prosecutor, declaring that the State was not conceding that defendant had made out a prima facie case, then proceeded to set out reasons for the State's peremptory challenges.
Gay. In regard to Gayle Gay, the prosecutor said that the first thing that came to our mind was that she was a victim of an unsolved felony and that she had been peremptorily challenged because among other reasons, primarily because of that fact. The prosecutor argued that five other venire members who were not black had been excused for similar reasons. At that point, defense counsel said that he had understood that the court would first rule on whether a prima facie case had been established. The trial judge replied: I ruled at the time I did not find it. That's the reason I ruled the way I did at the time. Now I want him to supplement the record. Afterwards you can supplement the record, anything you have contrary to what the State said, and we will send the record out. The prosecutor then observed that initially Gay had also said that the unsolved crime might affect her ability to be impartial. He asserted that, though she had corrected herself, the State had obviously felt concern. Buckley. In regard to Roger Buckley, the prosecutor said that Buckley's brother had left law enforcement to become a drug abuse counselor, that one of defendant's attempted defenses was that he was under the influence of drugs at the time of the crimes, and that the defense had listed prospective expert witnesses regarding drug abuse. This is something that stood out like a stoplight, the prosecutor said. Bartlett. In regard to Louise Bartlett, the prosecutor cited cumulative reasons. He first referred to her demeanor and said that she had had a tough time looking at the Court and a tough time responding to the Court's questions. If you look at the record on four different occasions the Court had to go back and repeat questions in order for the Court to even hear her answers, he added. The prosecutor continued by saying that, like Gayle Gay and several white jurors who were excused for the same reason, one of Bartlett's sons had been the victim of an unsolved burglary or robbery. Last but not least, the prosecutor concluded, Bartlett had said that she belonged to group or organization, quote, Defenders, which simply did not have a strong law enforcement ring to it. The prosecutor said that the reasons for excusing Bartlett had almost amounted to cause but that the State had exercised a peremptory challenge rather than asking that she be excused for cause. Wadley. In regard to Denise Wadley, the prosecutor said that she was a younger person and that she was living at an address where one of the original State's witnesses was residing[a] state witness that    had apparently given a statement to the defense. In any event, it was making it rather difficult in cooperating with the State, added the prosecutor. There was no supportive evidence in the record (and there was some contradictory evidence) as to the accuracy of the prosecutor's statement about the witness' place of residence. Franklin. Finally, in regard to Kenneth Franklin, the prosecutor said that he was a young man, about the defendant's age, that he lacked roots in the community and work experience because he was single and unemployed and his only employment had been some type of work at a pancake house, and that he had had difficulty speaking to the Court, understanding what was going on, apparently looking at the Court. The State cited People v. Talley (1987), 152 Ill.App.3d 971, 986-87, 105 Ill. Dec. 800, 504 N.E.2d 1318 (finding no error in trial court's denial of defendant's mistrial motion after prosecutor merely explained that he had been not too happy with challenged venire member's demeanor and how he answered the questions).
Defense counsel and the trial judge then had a spirited exchange over counsel's inquiry as to whether the State would offer more evidence prior to the defense's rebuttal. During this colloquy, defense counsel said: The motion I filed was a motion for you to declare a prima facie case. To this, the judge replied: The motions you filed I am putting in the file. I was told to conduct a hearing as I read what the Supreme Court told me to do, not you. You can supplement the record any way you wish to. After a continuance to review the voir dire transcripts to which the prosecution had referred, defense counsel argued at length in rebuttal of each prosecution explanation. As defense counsel neared the end of his argument, the following exchange occurred: THE COURT: Let me ask you a question. The Supreme Court is going to have to answer for all of us. Merely because the victim is white and the defendant is black, can you excuse him for that reason? Is that a valid peremptory challenge? MR. ISAACSON [assistant public defender]: Because the defendant is black and the victim white? THE COURT: Yes. MR. ISAACSON: I think, it is absolutely clear you cannot. THE COURT: I am not too sure. I ask it because I wish they would answer that question for me because I think that is the whole problem which is wrong with peremptory challenges. Proceed.
At the beginning of what may be called the State's surrebuttal argument, the prosecutor said that at the Batson hearing it was the defense's obligation to prove a prima facie case of discrimination, but that the absence of black jurors alone was insufficient proof. The State argued that its peremptory challenges were exercised against a racially mixed group of five black and six white venire members, that the defense could have used more of its peremptory challenges so that seven to eight black venire members remaining might have been reached for voir dire, and that the defense had not established a prima facie case. In addition, the State argued that it had not been obliged to follow Batson precepts when it offered its 1982 explanations for peremptory challenges; it did not then have the assistance of a voir dire transcript or even the juror information forms; and it should not be held strictly to its 1982 explanations. Finally, the State argued that, while it had articulated nonracial reasons for the peremptory challenges, the reasons were not required by Batson to rise to the level of cause for challenge, and the State had not claimed that the reasons articulated were the only reasons for the challenges. Thus, according to the prosecutor, the record should be very clear that even if someone stretching the imagination could assume that the defense in this case has presented a prima facie case, which I submit no one can, that the State in this case has not violated the mandates of Batson. At this point, the transcript reveals the following exchange: THE COURT:    I ruled of course at the trial I did not see any racial excluding here. Based upon the hearing I have here, I have not changed my mind   .       Since I ruled before, I have not changed my ruling after hearing the reasons given to me today. MR. ISAACSON: Your Honor, could your Honor make a finding of whether or not we have established a prime [ sic ] facie case? THE COURT: No, you did not. MR. ISAACSON: And one further THE COURT: Which I ruled at the time of the trial.