Opinion ID: 1644833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Newly Discovered Evidence Kimberly Quillin Affidavit

Text: Tompkins argues that the trial court erred in summarily denying his newly discovered evidence claim based on the affidavit of one Kimberly Quillin. By way of background, Kathy Stevens testified at trial that she went to Lisa DeCarr's house alone at approximately 9 a.m. on the morning of March 24, 1983. After hearing a loud crash, Stevens opened the front door and saw Lisa on the couch struggling and hitting Tompkins, who was on top of her attempting to remove her clothing. Lisa asked Stevens to call the police. At that point, Stevens left the house, but did not call the police. Stevens testified that she later returned to the house with her friend Kim. [13] On October 10, 2008, Tompkins obtained a sworn affidavit from Kimberly Quillin, formerly known as Kim Lisenby. In this affidavit, Quillin stated: 1. My name is Kimberly Quillin and I reside in Tampa, FL. 2. In 1983 I went by the name of Kim Lisenby and attended Middleton Junior High. 3. In March 1983 I do not remember anyone by the name of Kathy Stevens aka Mamroe aka Sample. 4. In March 1983 I do not remember anyone by the name of Lisa DeCarr. 5. I remember that while attending Middleton Junior High, a rumor that a body was found under a house. 6. In 1983 school started at 8:00 AM and I would have been on the bus from 7:15 AM to about 7:40 AM. 7. I do not remember any police officer, investigator or anyone else speaking to me about this matter. 8. In 1989, I was married and using the name Kimberly Kuhnie and moved to Washington. In his fifth successive postconviction motion, Tompkins alleged that neither he nor counsel were able to locate and speak with Quillin previously, despite repeated attempts to find her, because Kathy Stevens testified that Kim Lisenby  accompanied her to Lisa DeCarr's house. Tompkins asserted that his counsel exercised due diligence in trying to locate Kim Lisenby, who is now Kim Quillin. Tompkins contended that Quillin's affidavit contradicted Stevens's testimony. We disagree with Tompkins's contention that the trial court erred in summarily denying this newly discovered evidence claim, but do so on the basis of the second prong of a newly discovered evidence claim rather than due diligence. To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must meet two requirements: First, the evidence must not have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of diligence. Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. See Jones v. State, 709 So.2d 512, 521 (Fla.1998) ( Jones III ). Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones III test if it weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability. Jones III, 709 So.2d at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So.2d 309, 315 (Fla.1996) ( Jones II )). If the defendant is seeking to vacate a sentence, the second prong requires that the newly discovered evidence would probably yield a less severe sentence. See Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla.1991) ( Jones I ). In determining whether the evidence compels a new trial, the trial court must consider all newly discovered evidence which would be admissible, and must evaluate the weight of both the newly discovered evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the trial. Id. at 916. This determination includes whether the evidence goes to the merits of the case or whether it constitutes impeachment evidence. The trial court should also determine whether this evidence is cumulative to other evidence in the case. The trial court should further consider the materiality and relevance of the evidence and any inconsistencies in the newly discovered evidence. Jones III, 709 So.2d at 521 (citations omitted). The summary denial of a newly discovered evidence claim will be upheld if the motion is legally insufficient or its allegations are conclusively refuted by the record. McLin v. State, 827 So.2d 948, 954 (Fla.2002). Although the trial court found that Tompkins's claim was untimely because Tompkins and counsel were aware of Quillin's existence, albeit under a different surname, as early as 1985, this Court need not address the timeliness of Tompkins's claim because the trial court properly summarily denied relief based on the second prong of Jones. This evidence is not of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. Jones III, 709 So.2d at 521. The State presented the testimony of three key witnesses at trial  Barbara DeCarr, Kathy Stevens, and Kenneth Turco. Although Tompkins attempts to characterize Quillin's affidavit as significant new evidence, the affidavit has at best minimal impeachment value. Moreover, Stevens's affidavit does not constitute the type of evidence this Court has held requires an evidentiary hearing to determine whether it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. This is not a case where an important witness has recanted his or her testimony, see Lightbourne v. State, 742 So.2d 238 (Fla.1999) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether newly recanted testimony, when considered cumulatively with all of the post-trial evidence that indicated other witnesses testified falsely, required a new penalty phase hearing), or where the defense has credible new evidence that another person may have committed the murder. As this Court explained in Tompkins VI when evaluating Tompkins's claim that James Davis's affidavit was newly discovered evidence: [N]one of the State's three `key witnesses'  Mrs. DeCarr, Stevens, or Turco  has recanted. 980 So.2d at 459. This Court also concluded in Tompkins VI in affirming the summary denial: Tompkins' case is more akin to Sims v. State, 754 So.2d 657, 662-63 (Fla. 2000), in which the Court affirmed the denial of a newly discovered evidence claim based on hearsay statements that a person other than the defendant committed the crime. The Court noted that the evidence was admissible solely for impeachment purposes, did not place the alternative suspect at the scene of the crime, and did not affect the testimony of the three eyewitnesses who identified the defendant as the perpetrator. See id. at 662. The Court also observed that the defendant had not presented any evidence that directly refuted the State's case. See id. at 662-63. Tompkins VI, 980 So.2d at 459. Tompkins also asserts that when Quillin's affidavit is evaluated cumulatively with all of the exculpatory evidence learned during collateral proceedings, it is clear that a reasonable juror would have had more than reasonable doubt about [Tompkins's] guilt and he would have been acquitted. However, we conclude that the motion, files, and records conclusively show that Tompkins is not entitled to relief. See McLin, 827 So.2d at 954. As explained in Tompkins VI, this Court in Tompkins IV affirmed the summary denial of Tompkins's Brady claims, concluding that [e]ither the undisclosed documents are not Brady material because they are neither favorable to Tompkins nor suppressed, or Tompkins has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the lack of disclosure. Tompkins IV, 872 So.2d at 241; see also Tompkins VI, 980 So.2d at 459. The Court further concluded in Tompkins IV: [E]ven if we were to engage in a cumulative analysis and consider the undisclosed, favorable documents in conjunction with Tompkins' claims raised in his first motion for postconviction relief, our conclusion as to prejudice would not change. 872 So.2d at 24-42. In Tompkins VI, this Court reached the same conclusion as to Davis's affidavit. 980 So.2d at 459. Even assuming the truth of each allegation, at the most Quillin asserts only that she does not remember anyone by the name of Kathy Stevens. On its face, it would appear that a possible explanation for Quillin's lack of memory is that twenty-five years have passed. However, we need not reach the credibility of the witnesses. Notably, none of the three main witnesses have ever recanted or changed their testimony. Because Quillin's affidavit is of marginal weight, it does not alter our prior conclusions that a cumulative analysis of the evidence favorable to Tompkins does not entitle him to a new trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in summarily denying Tompkins's claim of newly discovered evidence in the form of Quillin's affidavit.