Opinion ID: 201905
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Apprendi/Booker — All Defendants

Text: 77 All three defendants challenge their sentences on the basis of a misunderstanding of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). Each argues that it was error for the district court to impose a sentence on the basis of facts found by the court by a preponderance of the evidence, but not found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In Yeje-Cabrera's case, the alleged flaw was a sentence enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 3B1.1 based on the court's finding that he was the organizer, manager and leader of a large-scale drug organization including more than five individuals. In Pérez's case, the jury stated in its special verdict form that Pérez was responsible for five kilograms of cocaine, but the district court found that Pérez was responsible for a drug quantity between 15 and 50 kilograms. It also imposed a sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, based on its finding that Pérez was a career offender. 7 In Olivero's case, the claimed error arises from the district court's finding that Olivero was responsible for at least 499 grams of cocaine, when the jury verdict had attributed no particular drug quantity to Olivero. 78 These objections — that the judge, not the jury, found certain facts — misapprehend the law as it was eventually articulated in United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). As we explained in United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68 (1st Cir.2005), the Booker error is not that a judge (by a preponderance of the evidence) determined facts under the Guidelines which increased a sentence beyond that authorized by the jury verdict or an admission by the defendant; the error is only that the judge did so in a mandatory Guidelines system. Id. at 75. 79 For this reason, we reject Olivero's argument that because the jury did not attribute a specific drug quantity to him, his sentence must be vacated. 80 Olivero argues in particular that, because there was no specific drug quantity found by the jury, the statutory maximum for him was that based on a Guidelines offense level of 12, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(14) (providing for a base offense level of 12 where the drug quantity is less than 25 grams of cocaine). With a base offense level of 12 and a criminal history category of I, the high end of the Guidelines range would have been 16 months. See United States v. Green, 346 F.Supp.2d 259, 327 (D.Mass.2004). But the actual statutory maximum here was 20 years. The district court's attribution to Olivero of a specific quantity of cocaine (at least 499 grams) no more invalidates his sentence than it does his conviction. There was a period between Blakely and Booker when the district courts were forced to predict and improvise. Some courts, as the court did here, predicted wrongly that Sixth Amendment concerns required as a remedy that certain issues (for instance, drug quantity) be decided by a jury, not a judge. It is now well settled that this was wrong; the remedy was to make the Guidelines non-mandatory. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 756-57; Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 75. 81 Since Booker we have made it clear that the district courts may make drug quantity determinations for sentencing purposes: 82 Under the 5-4 constitutional ruling in Booker, judge-made enhancements under the guidelines that result in a sentence greater than the sentence that could be imposed based solely on the facts found by the jury do amount to Sixth Amendment violations if the guidelines are treated as mandatory; but under the companion 5-4 remedial ruling in Booker, this problem is washed out by treating the guidelines as advisory. A defendant sentenced under the mandatory regime may be entitled to resentencing under the advisory one ... but Booker both created and cured the constitutional error at the same time. 83 United States v. Pérez-Ruiz, 421 F.3d 11, 14-15 (1st Cir.2005) ( Pérez-Ruiz II ). We rejected the defendant's claim that the district judge violated the Sixth Amendment by himself making the determinations as to drug quantity and other enhancements. Id. at 14; see also United States v. Sanchez-Berrios, 424 F.3d 65, 80 (1st Cir.2005) ([A]n unadorned claim that the judge — and not the jury — found sentencing facts, even if true, does not warrant resentencing. (citing United States v. Martins, 413 F.3d 139, 152 (1st Cir.2005))). There was no reversible error in the district court's attribution to Olivero of at least 25 grams of cocaine. 8 That is a separate matter than the government's appeal from the sentence, which we address below. 84 No defendant makes a plausible claim for a remand under Booker and Antonakopoulos. Yeje-Cabrera and Olivero never filed briefs raising a Booker/Antonakopoulos argument, so they have waived any claim they might have had under those decisions. See United States v. Vega Molina, 407 F.3d 511, 534 n. 7 (1st Cir.2005). 85 Pérez did file a supplemental brief seeking resentencing under Booker, but he has not shown why resentencing is justified in his case. He concedes that plain error review applies. We thus apply the standard that we articulated in Antonakopoulos. See Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 77. 86 Pérez has not met his burden of showing a reasonable probability that the district court would impose a different sentence more favorable to the defendant under the new `advisory Guidelines' Booker regime. Id. at 75. Pérez points to nothing in the record that would suggest that the district court would have sentenced him more leniently had it been free to do so. Instead, he asks this court to look outside the record — for instance, he claims that the trial judge made public statements condemning the Guidelines in general as too harsh — and he ultimately disclaims any attempt to make the requisite showing under Antonakopoulos, admitting that he is not claiming, per se, that the sentencing court might have given him a more favorable sentence had [it] not been for the guidelines. In fact, the court stated: 87 There's no reason to depart downward in your case. You are a career offender. You've had all the chances the law allows. I have given you the bottom of the guidelines. Not that that amounts to much when it comes out to being a 30 year sentence. 88 This is the sentence for dealing drugs in our society. It is the sentence decreed by the people's representatives sitting in congress. It is a fair and just sentence. 89 On these facts, a remand for resentencing is not warranted. See Sanchez-Berrios, 424 F.3d at 80 (It is not enough for a defendant merely to argue that his sentence might have been different had the guidelines been advisory at the time of sentencing.); id. (stating that the fact that defendant was sentenced at the bottom of the Guidelines range, standing alone, is manifestly insufficient to satisfy the third element of the plain error test). 90