Opinion ID: 2975530
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: PIP Benefits

Text: The interaction between the relevant statutes here is clear. Because it is undisputed that Alger received at least some PIP benefits from State Farm, the No-Fault Act’s one-year limitations period -5- No. 06-1694 Jimkoski v. State Farm Auto Ins. required the Estate to bring suit by August 14, 2001—within one year after Alger incurred the last expense, which would have been August 14, 2000, the day Alger died. Because the Estate did not bring suit until March 15, 2002 (over a year and a half after Alger’s death), the Estate’s claim was ostensibly time barred under Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3145(1) (“If . . . payment has been made, the action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent . . . survivor’s loss has been incurred.”). Michigan’s death savings statute, however, revived the Estate’s claim. This statute extended the limitations period to bring the PIP benefits claim from one year after Alger’s death to two years after Alger’s personal representative was appointed, which occurred on March 19, 2001. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5852 (“[A]n action which survives by law may be commenced by the personal representative of the deceased person at any time within 2 years after letters of authority are issued although the period of limitations has run.”). Therefore, because the death savings statute extended the limitations period to March 19, 2003, the Estate’s March 15, 2002 action was not time barred. Although the Estate’s action was not time barred, recovery was limited. Under the No-Fault Act’s one-year-back rule, the Estate was not entitled to recover for the entire 24-year period that it alleged Patricia was underpaid PIP benefits. Because no suit was filed within one year of Alger’s accident, the one-year-back rule applies, which limits recovery to only those expenses incurred during the year before Alger’s death. Mich. Comp. Laws § 500.3145(1); accord, e.g., Cameron v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 718 N.W.2d 784, 788 (Mich. 2006). Therefore, the district court correctly allowed the Estate’s action to proceed to trial, but only for recovery of expenses incurred between August 14, 1999, and August 14, 2000—the year before Alger’s death. -6- No. 06-1694 Jimkoski v. State Farm Auto Ins. Notwithstanding the application of these statutes, the Estate contends that, because of its well-pleaded allegations of fraud, it was entitled to equitable tolling of the one-year-back rule. That is, says the Estate, the district court erred by not permitting the Estate to pursue PIP benefits dating back to October 1976, because State Farm fraudulently induced the Jimkoskis into believing they were receiving the proper amount of PIP benefits. The Estate’s argument is meritless because, as the district court correctly concluded, the Estate improperly pleaded fraud. The Estate did not plead fraud with particularity. The Sixth Circuit has interpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) as requiring plaintiffs to allege the time, place, and content of the alleged misrepresentation on which they relied; the fraudulent scheme; the fraudulent intent of the defendants; and the injury resulting from the fraud. See, e.g., Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, the Estate’s complaint fell short of this requirement. The Estate’s complaint contained three counts only, none of which listed a fraud claim. Further, a review of the Estate’s 43-paragraph complaint finds no allegations of the time, place, and content of any alleged misrepresentations. As the district court noted, although the Estate’s “allegations may satisfy the general pleading requirements, they do not state a claim of fraud with particularity.” (JA 612.)