Opinion ID: 795700
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Cross-Appeal Analyzed

Text: 48 Field Day, in its cross-appeal, argues that the District Court erred in three respects in determining that the remainder of the Mass Gathering Law was constitutional.
49 First, Field Day argues that the Mass Gathering Law is unconstitutional because it `authorizes' but does not require the issuance of a mass gathering permit to an applicant who has satisfied all of the permit requirements. Field Day also draws on the 1970 press release announcing the passage of the Mass Gathering Law, which stated that permits may be issued `when it appears that ... such gathering [can be] held without hazard to public health or safety.' (emphasis added). 50 The District Court determined that, although the Mass Gathering Law nowhere explicitly states that once an acceptable permit application is submitted, it must be approved, New York law generally provides that `mandatory words may be interpreted in a merely permissive sense or vice versa,' (quoting McKinney's Statutes § 171 cmt.) (footnotes omitted), and further determined that, to the extent the Mass Gathering Law was permissive and may be applied to favor certain speakers over others, a more reasonable approach than striking the entire law from the outset is to deal with such a pattern of abuse when it happens (citing Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. at 324-25, 122 S.Ct. 775). 51 As with the parties' disagreement about the meaning of appears, the resolution of this issue is rendered more difficult than it should be by the shortcomings of the Sanitary Code. The word authorize appears in the first clause of the Mass Gathering Law and merely qualifies what the Sanitary Code may do — in this case, authorize officers to issue a permit. See N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 225(5)(o). If the Sanitary Code explicitly addressed a public official's duty to issue a mass gathering permit this would be a non-issue. The Sanitary Code, however, says nothing about a public official's duty, mandatory or discretionary, to issue (or deny) a permit. The Sanitary Code makes clear that no mass gathering may be held without a permit, provides the form and schedule for applying for a permit, dictates what additional information must be submitted with the application, and sets forth the conditions under which a mass gathering permit may be revoked — but nowhere does the Sanitary Code provide that a permit shall (or may) or shall not (or may not) be issued or under what circumstances. See N.Y. Comp. R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 7-1.40(a), (b), and (d). 52 As previously noted, this Court must construe statutes, where necessary and possible, to avoid serious constitutional issues. See, e.g., Empire HealthChoice Assur., 396 F.3d at 144-45. Were the Mass Gathering Law and Sanitary Code read to authorize an official to deny a mass gathering permit even where all statutory and regulatory requirements had been met and no unreasonable danger to life or health was present, the statutory/regulatory scheme would be of more than doubtful constitutional validity. See, e.g., City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 770, 108 S.Ct. 2138 (A presumption that an official will act in good faith and adhere to standards absent from the regulation's face is undermined when the official is granted unbridled discretion); Dillon v. Municipal Court, 4 Cal.3d 860, 94 Cal.Rptr. 777, 484 P.2d 945, 952 (1971) (The Seaside ordinance is not only devoid of all standards but, to make matters worse, contains no guarantee that a permit will issue even if the application meets all of the five conditions of the section.). Although the Supreme Court has stated that it  will not write nonbinding limits into a silent state statute, City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 770, 108 S.Ct. 2138, the Court has also stated that limits may be explicitly provided by textual incorporation, binding judicial or administrative construction, or well-established practice. Id. 53 Here, although there is no specific language requiring the issuance of permits in the Mass Gathering Law and Sanitary Code, New York law does generally require that licenses be issued if an applicant satisfies all statutory and regulatory requirements. See Bologno v. O'Connell, 7 N.Y.2d 155, 158 (N.Y. 1959), 196 N.Y.S.2d 90, 164 N.E.2d 389 (Refusal to issue a license would, of course, be arbitrary and in excess of reasonable discretion if based solely upon a ground which the Commissioner may not consider.); Picone v. Comm'r of Licenses of New York City, 241 N.Y. 157, 161 (N.Y. 1925), 149 N.E. 336 (If an applicant for a license can show that he is a fit and proper person to engage in a licensed business under the provisions of the licensing statute, the licensing officer may not arbitrarily impose limitations not contained in the statute upon his right to do business.). We read the Mass Gathering Law and Sanitary Code as bound by this construction and interpret the permissive word authorize as mandatory. Accordingly, neither the Mass Gathering Law nor the Sanitary Code allows an official to deny a permit to an applicant who has otherwise satisfied the strictures of the statutory and regulatory requirements.
54 Second, Field Day argues that the last clause of the Mass Gathering Law, providing that in his review of such applications, as well as in carrying out his other duties and functions in connection with such a gathering, a permit issuing official may request and shall receive from all public officers, departments and agencies of the state and its political subdivisions such cooperation and assistance as may be necessary and proper, N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 225(5)(o), unconstitutionally permits such an official to refuse to request assistance, even where such assistance is both necessary and proper. As an example, Field Day posits that an official may capriciously demand[ ] that uniformed police officers provide security for the festival but then refuse[ ] to provide those officers. The State counters that Field Day badly misunderstand[s] the provision because the Mass Gathering Law does not provide for assistance to the speaker but, instead, to the permit-issuing official. According to the State, such assistance is limited to those duties of the permitting official — reviewing applications, granting permits, and revoking permits — established by the Sanitary Code. See N.Y. Comp. R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 7-1.40. The State argues that the provision of security staff is expressly the duty of the mass gathering applicant. See N.Y. Comp. R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 7-1.40(e) (setting forth the [a]dditional duties of a permittee for a mass gathering, and requiring that [a] maintenance and internal security staff acceptable to the permit-issuing official shall be provided). The State also argues that New York law permits this Court to read permissive words as mandatory if such construction furthers legislative intent. See N.Y. STAT. § 171 cmt. 4 55 The answer to Field Day's challenge comes in two parts. First, in accordance with the comments to N.Y. STAT. § 171 and this Court's duty to read the statute as constitutional if possible, the most reasonable reading of the assistance provision is that a request for assistance must be made if the official determines that such assistance is necessary and proper. Second, because neither the Mass Gathering Law nor the Sanitary Code require a permitting official to provide assistance to an applicant by, for example, providing police officers as security personnel, it is not true that the Mass Gathering Law and Sanitary Code permits an official to choose the events of favored speakers or favored speech that will receive public assistance or veto events by withholding assistance from disfavored speech or speakers. 56 In relation to this last point, we note once again that a finding of facial constitutionality does not foreclose as-applied challenges. In Chicago Park District the Supreme Court was presented with an ordinance which provided grounds on which the Park District may deny a permit rather than must deny a permit. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. at 324, 122 S.Ct. 775. The plaintiffs argued that this provision allow[ed] the Park District to waive the permit requirements for some favored speakers, while insisting upon them for others. Id. The Supreme Court observed that such construction was certainly not the intent of the ordinance, which the Park District has reasonably interpreted to permit overlooking only those inadequacies that, under the circumstances, do no harm to the policies furthered by the application requirements. Id. at 324-25, 122 S.Ct. 775. The Supreme Court went on to explain that [g]ranting waivers to favored speakers (or, more precisely, denying them to disfavored speakers) would of course be unconstitutional, but we think that this abuse must be dealt with if and when a pattern of unlawful favoritism appears, rather than by insisting upon a degree of rigidity that is found in few legal arrangements. Id. at 325, 122 S.Ct. 775. Similarly, granting public assistance to favored speakers or favored speech in the manner that Field Day complains of would be unconstitutional. Such situations must be dealt with in as-applied challenges if and when they arise.
57 Finally, Field Day argues that the Mass Gathering Law is unconstitutional in its entirety because it denies an applicant effective review of the permitting decision. Field Day's argument is premised on the assertion that the statute lacks objective criteria on which to base an as-applied challenge. However, as explained in the foregoing, the Mass Gathering Law does provide such criteria. Under Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. at 321-23, 122 S.Ct. 775, because this is a content-neutral, time-place-manner restriction, that is all that is required. 58 Given the foregoing, this Court affirms the District Court's determination that these provisions of the Mass Gathering Law and Sanitary Code are constitutional. 59