Opinion ID: 78358
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The National Firearms Act Is Constitutional.

Text: Spoerke argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss his indictment because the National Firearms Act is unconstitutional. Spoerke argues that the Act is both facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to him. The district court rejected both arguments, and so do we. The National Firearms Act is facially constitutional. The Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801 et seq., regulates firearms, including destructive device[s], id. § 5845(a)(8), and requires the taxation and registration of firearms by manufacturers, possessors, transferors, dealers, importers, and sellers. See United States v. Aiken, 974 F.2d 446, 447 (4th Cir.1992). The Supreme Court has upheld the Act based on the taxation power of Congress, Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514, 57 S.Ct. 554, 556, 81 L.Ed. 772 (1937), and we have upheld the Act in a decision involving a destructive device. United States v. Ross, 458 F.2d 1144, 1145 (5th Cir.1972). Congress under the taxing power may reasonably impose a penalty on possession of unregistered weapons. Id. ; see also United States v. Gresham, 118 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir.1997) ([I]t is well-settled that [the Firearms Act] is constitutional because it is `part of the web of regulation aiding enforcement of the transfer tax provision in [the Act].' (quoting Ross, 458 F.2d at 1145)). Spoerke's argument that the Act is unconstitutional as applied to him because pipe bombs are unlawful and cannot be taxed fails. [T]he unlawfulness of an activity does not prevent its taxation. Dep't of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 778, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1945, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994). A statute does not cease to be a valid tax measure because it deters the activity taxed, because the revenue obtained is negligible, or because the activity is otherwise illegal. Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 98 n. 13, 90 S.Ct. 284, 289 n. 13, 24 L.Ed.2d 283 (1969). The constitutionality of the Act as applied to Spoerke does not depend on whether he is legally permitted to possess the pipe bombs. Gresham, 118 F.3d at 263. Spoerke's argument is also based on a false premise: No federal statute completely outlaws the possession of pipe bombs ...; therefore, their registration is not legally impossible. Id. ; United States v. Eaton, 260 F.3d 1232, 1236 (10th Cir.2001) (Prosecution for possession of unregistered pipe bombs under the Act was not unconstitutional because registration of a pipe bomb is not a legal impossibility.). Because Spoerke conceivably could have registered and paid taxes on his pipe bombs, the registration requirement governing pipe bombs ... is part of the web of regulation aiding enforcement of the transfer tax provision in [the Act] and is plainly constitutional. Gresham, 118 F.3d at 263 (internal quotation marks omitted). We also have rejected an argument by a defendant that his firearms conviction violate[d] due process because it punishes him for possessing an unregistered firearm when registration to [the defendant], a convicted felon, is precluded by law. United States v. Rivera, 58 F.3d 600, 601 (11th Cir.1995). We explained that, because the defendant could comply with the Act by declining to possess firearms[,]... his conviction under [the Act] does not violate due process. Id. at 602. The same is true for Spoerke and his pipe bombs. Because Spoerke could have declined to manufacture and possess the pipe bombs, his indictment and conviction do not violate his right to due process.