Opinion ID: 2490169
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the county court had jurisdiction to set aside the order of dismissal and remand.

Text: ¶ 9. Nelson argues that she had a right to dismiss her appeal voluntarily. She argues that the dismissal and remand on writ of procedendo deprived the county court of jurisdiction. According to Nelson, once her appeal was dismissed and the case remanded on writ of procedendo, the county court was unable to retake jurisdiction even for the limited purpose of considering whether to set aside the order of dismissal and remand on writ of procedendo. The jurisdictional question presented is governed by Mississippi's procedural law. ¶ 10. The county court found that it has authority to dismiss an appeal on the appellant's motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeal, and that it was within its authority to dismiss Nelson's appeal at her request. However, on reconsideration, the county court determined that it had erred by dismissing Nelson's appeal without timely notice to the city, and without the benefit of the city's arguments in opposition to dismissal. We must determine whether the county court erred by reconsidering the dismissal of Nelson's appeal under these circumstances. ¶ 11. The Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court allow appeals to county court from justice court or municipal court. URCCC 12.02. Rule 12.02 states that an individual who has been adjudged guilty of a criminal offense by a justice or municipal court may appeal to county court or, if there is no county court having jurisdiction, then to circuit court . . . . for a trial de novo. URCCC 12.02(A)(1), (C). Perfecting the appeal requires the simultaneous filing of a notice of appeal, a cost bond, and an appearance bond or cash deposit within thirty days of the judgment. URCCC 12.02(A)(1). When the appeal is perfected, the prior judgment of conviction is stayed. URCCC 12.02(C). Rule 12.02 expressly sets out three situations in which the trial court may dismiss the appeal with prejudice: (1) if the defendant fails to post the required appearance bond or cash deposit; (2) if the notice of appeal does not contain the information required by Rule 12.02(A)(2), and the court does not allow amendment; or (3) if the defendant fails to appear at the time and place set by the court. URCCC 12.02(A)(1), (A)(2), (B)(1). ¶ 12. On several occasions, this Court has discussed a defendant's ability to obtain a dismissal of an appeal from justice court or municipal court for a trial de novo. In Bang v. State, 106 Miss. 824, 64 So. 734, 735 (1914), Pier Bang was convicted in justice court of the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors and fined $150. Bang appealed to the circuit court, and a trial took place. Id. After the State had rested its case, Bang moved to dismiss the appeal. Id. The circuit court overruled the motion, and Bang appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court. Id. In holding that Bang had no right to have the appeal dismissed, the Court stated: It will be seen that the case is brought into the circuit court by appeal from the judgment of the justice of the peace court. When it reaches the circuit court, it is there for trial anew, and disposition just as other cases therein pending. The circuit court is a trial court. The case, although brought to that court by appeal, is there for trial. In this prosecution for a criminal offense, appellant, while his case was being tried, occupied the same position as any other defendant being tried on a criminal charge. Id. The Court also appeared to rely on the fact that the State had presented its evidence against Bang before he had moved for dismissal, stating: The trial judge did not err when he overruled the motion of appellant in this case for permission to dismiss his appeal. Appellant was being tried anew in the circuit court. He was on trial for the crime charged against him. His case was being disposed of as other and like cases in that court. All of the evidence to prove his guilt had been introduced on behalf of the state. The proof was sufficient to support a verdict convicting him. He had no right then to have his case dismissed. Id. ¶ 13. The Court addressed the issue again in Thigpen v. State, 206 Miss. 87, 39 So.2d 768 (1949). Henry Clay Thigpen was convicted in justice court of the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors and sentenced to pay a fine of $250 and costs. Thigpen appealed to the circuit court, but on the morning of trial, he moved for a continuance. Id. at 769. When the trial court denied the motion, Thigpen moved to dismiss the appeal on a writ of procedendo. Id. Thigpen was found guilty and appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. Citing Bang, the Court stated that one appealing a conviction from the Justice of the Peace court to the Circuit Court stands there for trial de novo as defendant and he occupies in that court the same attitude of a defendant as he did in the court of the Justice of the Peace and as such is impotent to dismiss the case. Id. The Court held that Thigpen had no more right to dismiss the appeal in the Circuit Court than he had to enter a nolle prosequi in the court of the Justice of the Peace because a defendant charged with a crime has no right to dismiss the case against him from the docket. Id. ¶ 14. In Peeples v. State, 216 Miss. 790, 63 So.2d 236 (1953), and Parham v. State, 229 So.2d 582 (Miss.1969), this Court relied upon Bang and Thigpen to find a defendant was not entitled to dismiss an appeal from justice court. In each case, the trial court had overruled the defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal, made on the day of trial. In Peeples, the Court, citing Bang and Thigpen, found without discussion that the issue was without merit. In Parham, the Court, citing Thigpen and Peeples, found that the argument that the circuit court is required to dismiss an appeal from the Justice of the Peace Court upon the request of the defendant has been refuted in at least two cases from this Court. The Court supported its holding with a quote from Thigpen's discussion of Bang. Parham, 229 So.2d at 584. ¶ 15. The Court revisited the issue in Lee v. State, 357 So.2d 111 (Miss.1978). Wilbert Lee was convicted in justice court of driving while intoxicated and sentenced to ninety days in jail and fined $320. Id. at 112. He appealed to circuit court for a trial de novo. Subsequently, his counsel moved to dismiss the appeal. The circuit court granted the motion and remanded the case to justice court on writ of procedendo. Id. With new counsel, Lee moved to set aside the dismissal and writ of procedendo and reinstate the appeal; the trial court overruled the motion. Id. Lee appealed to this Court, arguing that he was improperly denied a hearing on the motion to set aside. Id. Lee argued that he would have shown at a hearing that he never had authorized his prior counsel to move for dismissal. Id. ¶ 16. The Court found that, in order to dismiss an appeal and remand on a writ of procedendo, the defendant must be called in open court and given an opportunity to prosecute the appeal. Id. (citing McCoy v. State, 302 So.2d 509 (Miss.1974)). Because the appellate record was inconclusive as to whether the defendant had been present at the dismissal of the appeal, a hearing on the issue was necessary. Id. at 113. The Court reversed and remanded for a hearing on whether dismissal of the appeal was proper, or whether the motion to set aside the dismissal should be granted. Id. ¶ 17. Nelson cites Lee in support of her argument that the county court lacks jurisdiction to reinstate an appeal that has been dismissed and the case remanded on writ of procedendo. She specifically relies on the language in Lee that where the justice court had already found the appellant guilty and had passed sentence in the cause, an order dismissing an appeal on a writ of procedendo is tantamount to a guilty plea and acceptance of the justice court sentence. Lee, 357 So.2d at 113. From this statement, Nelson concludes that, with the order dismissing the appeal and remanding on writ of procedendo, the county court deprived itself of any further jurisdiction, and that the county court was without jurisdiction to set aside the order of dismissal. ¶ 18. However, Lee actually stands for the opposite of Nelson's proposition. In Lee, the Court reversed the circuit court's denial of a motion to set aside an order that had dismissed an appeal and remanded on writ of procedendo. Id. The Court remanded for a hearing and a determination of whether the order of dismissal and remand on writ of procedendo should be upheld or set aside. Id. This Court determined that dismissal may have been improper because Lee had not been present in open court and was not given the opportunity to prosecute the appeal. Therefore, Lee explicitly recognized that a court to which an appeal has been taken for a trial de novo is empowered to: (1) grant the defendant's appropriately timed motion to dismiss the appeal and remand on writ of procedendo ; and (2) set aside the order of dismissal and remand on writ of procedendo, upon a determination that the order of dismissal and remand was improper. Id.; see also Ferrell v. State, 785 So.2d 317, 320-21 (Miss.Ct.App.2001). ¶ 19. Under Lee, the county court had jurisdiction to consider the motion to set aside the order of dismissal and remand. The county court determined that the order of dismissal and remand was improper because the city had lacked notice and an opportunity to respond to Nelson's motion to dismiss. Therefore, the court reinstated the appeal, giving the State an opportunity to respond to Nelson's motion to dismiss. Nelson argues that this ruling infringed upon her right to dismiss the appeal voluntarily without the city's consent. She cites precedent from Oklahoma and Wyoming that a party may dismiss an appeal from justice court to county court at any time before the commencement of the trial without the consent of the other party. O'Rourke v. O'Rourke, 142 Okla. 238, 286 P. 341, 343 (1930); Mayott v. Knott, 16 Wyo. 108, 92 P. 240, 241 (1907). However, this precedent is inapposite to this case. The reason the county court set aside the order of dismissal and remand was not because the city had not consented to the order. Rather, the court set aside the order of dismissal and remand because the city had not been afforded an opportunity to respond to the motion to dismiss. On reconsideration, the county court determined that it had erred by entering the order of dismissal and remand without allowing a response from the city. Therefore, the county court set aside the order of dismissal and remand. We find that the decision to hear the city's arguments on the motion to dismiss in this case was within the county court's sound discretion.