Opinion ID: 2608831
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Heading: The Litigation Privilege Section 47(2)

Text: The central issue we address is whether the litigation privilege of section 47(2) applies to plaintiffs' conduct. (3) Our analysis starts from the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. ( People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1007 [239 Cal. Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154]; People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 895 [231 Cal. Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288].) In determining intent, we look first to the language of the statute, giving effect to its plain meaning. ( Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 218-219 [188 Cal. Rptr. 115, 655 P.2d 317].) (4) On its face, section 47(2) applies to all publication[s] or broadcast[s] made in the course of a judicial proceeding. Although the litigation privilege was originally limited to shielding litigants, attorneys and witnesses from liability for defamation (see Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1163 [232 Cal. Rptr. 567, 728 P.2d 1202]), it has been interpreted to apply to virtually all torts except malicious prosecution. ( Albertson v. Raboff (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375, 382 [295 P.2d 405]; Kilgore v. Younger (1982) 30 Cal.3d 770, 778 [180 Cal. Rptr. 657, 640 P.2d 793]; Block v. Sacramento Clinical Labs, Inc. (1982) 131 Cal. App.3d 386, 390 [182 Cal. Rptr. 438]; Pettitt v. Levy (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 484, 489 [104 Cal. Rptr. 650].) (5) This includes the tort of invasion of privacy. ( Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38 Cal.3d 355, 364 [212 Cal. Rptr. 143, 696 P.2d 637, 49 A.L.R.4th 417]; see Kilgore v. Younger, supra, 30 Cal.3d 770, 782.) (6) We recently held in Silberg v. Anderson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at page 212, that the privilege of section 47(2) extends to any communication: (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action. (See, e.g., Green v. Uccelli (1989) 207 Cal. App.3d 1112, 1124 [255 Cal. Rptr. 315]; Carney v. Rotkin, Schmerin & McIntyre (1988) 206 Cal. App.3d 1513, 1521 [254 Cal. Rptr. 478]; Walsh v. Bronson (1988) 200 Cal. App.3d 259, 269 [245 Cal. Rptr. 888]; Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal. App.3d 764, 772-773 [234 Cal. Rptr. 653]; Chen v. Fleming (1983) 147 Cal. App.3d 36, 41 [194 Cal. Rptr. 913]; Hagendorf v. Brown (9th Cir.1983) 699 F.2d 478, 480.) (1b) Here, park management alleges that it suffered injury from the taping of confidential telephone conversations, not from any publication or broadcast of the information contained in these conversations. Thus, the litigation privilege is plainly not applicable. Unless [plaintiffs] can demonstrate that the natural and customary import of the statute's language is either `repugnant to the general purview of the act,' or for some other compelling reason, should be disregarded, this court must give effect to the statute's `plain meaning.' ( Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 218-219, citing 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1973) § 46.01, p. 49.) Plaintiffs rely on Ribas v. Clark, supra, 38 Cal.3d 355, for the proposition that section 47(2) immunizes them from liability. In Ribas, the plaintiff and his wife, who was not represented by counsel, began divorce proceedings that ultimately resulted in a court-approved property settlement agreement. Subsequently, the wife learned from an attorney about the adverse tax consequences of the settlement. She then asked her attorney to listen on an extension telephone while she spoke to her husband. On the basis of information obtained during the telephone conversation, the wife filed an action to set aside the dissolution decree, alleging that her husband had procured the settlement agreement by fraud. At the arbitration hearing, the wife's attorney testified that, while listening to the telephone call without the husband's knowledge or consent, she heard the husband state that he had prevented his wife from obtaining counsel during the dissolution proceedings. Following the hearing, the husband brought an action against the attorney for violation of Penal Code sections 631, subdivision (a) [8] and 637.2 (see fn. 5, ante ), as well as common law invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress and outrage. The trial court sustained the attorney's demurrer, without leave to amend, as to all causes of action on the ground that the attorney was immune from liability pursuant to section 47(2). On review, we drew a distinction between eavesdropping, in violation of the privacy act, and testifying during an arbitration hearing. As to the act of eavesdropping, we concluded that Penal Code section 637.2 authorizes civil awards of $3,000 for each violation of the Privacy Act ... [and b]ecause the right to such an award accrues at the moment of the violation, it is not barred by the judicial privilege [of section 47(2)]. ( Ribas v. Clark, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 365.) We also determined that the purpose of section 47(2), to afford[] free access to the courts and facilitat[e] the crucial functions of the finder of fact (38 Cal.3d at pp. 364-365), necessitated that to the extent plaintiff allege[d] in his complaint that he suffered actual injury solely as a result of [the attorney's] testimony ... his cause of action under Penal Code section 637.2 must fail. ( Id. at p. 365.) Accordingly, we held that the husband could sue the attorney for the statutory civil award authorized by Penal Code section 637.2, but that his action was barred insofar as it was based on his common law right to privacy, because his alleged injury stems solely from defendant's testimony at the arbitration proceeding. [Citations.] (38 Cal.3d at p. 364, italics added.) (1c) This case and Ribas v. Clark, supra, 38 Cal.3d 355, share several common features. Both cases involve alleged violations of the privacy act in which the offending party claimed immunity under the litigation privilege. In both cases, moreover, the acts upon which liability was premised were committed in anticipation of litigation but prior to the commencement of any actual judicial proceeding. These factual congruities, and the sound reasoning of Ribas, compel the conclusion that park management's claim for damages under Penal Code section 637.2 is not barred by the litigation privilege of section 47(2). Implicit in the Ribas decision was the distinction between injury allegedly arising from communicative acts, i.e., the attorney's testimony, and injury resulting from noncommunicative conduct, i.e., the invasion of privacy resulting from the attorney's eavesdropping. This distinction has traditionally served as a threshold issue in determining the applicability of section 47(2). For example, in Westlake Community Hospital v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465 [131 Cal. Rptr. 90, 551 P.2d 410], we were required to determine whether a hospital was immune under section 47(2) from liability for the termination of a physician's staff privileges. We noted that the doctor's claim [was] not that her injury ha[d] been occasioned simply by [the hospital's] malicious statements at the proceedings, but rather that she ha[d] been injured by the malicious actions of the hospital ... in revoking her staff privileges.... Although ... [section 47(2)] has on occasion been applied in contexts other than a defamation action [citation], its absolute privilege has always attached only to statements or publications made in connection with the applicable proceeding. (17 Cal.3d at p. 482, original italics; see Cuenca v. Safeway San Francisco Employees Fed. Credit Union (1986) 180 Cal. App.3d 985, 994 [225 Cal. Rptr. 852]; Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen (1983) 146 Cal. App.3d 200, 234 [194 Cal. Rptr. 180]; cf. White v. Western Title Ins. Co. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 870, 888 [221 Cal. Rptr. 509, 710 P.2d 309].) We note that plaintiffs have not cited a single case in which section 47(2) has been held to bar suit for personal injuries arising from noncommunicative conduct that occurred during a judicial proceeding. On the contrary, a review of the myriad cases that have applied section 47(2) to shield defendants from liability demonstrates that, without exception, the privilege has applied only to torts arising from statements or publications. (See, e.g., Ribas v. Clark, supra, 38 Cal.3d 355; Carden v. Getzoff (1987) 190 Cal. App.3d 907 [235 Cal. Rptr. 698]; Steiner v. Eikerling (1986) 181 Cal. App.3d 639 [226 Cal. Rptr. 694]; Rosenthal v. Irell & Manella (1982) 135 Cal. App.3d 121 [185 Cal. Rptr. 92]; Asia Investment v. Borowski (1982) 133 Cal. App.3d 832 [184 Cal. Rptr. 317, 30 A.L.R.4th 561]; Portman v. George McDonald Law Corp. (1979) 99 Cal. App.3d 988 [160 Cal. Rptr. 505]; Umansky v. Urquhart (1978) 84 Cal. App.3d 368 [148 Cal. Rptr. 547]; Lerette v. Dean Witter Organization, Inc. (1976) 60 Cal. App.3d 573 [131 Cal. Rptr. 592]; Pettitt v. Levy, supra, 28 Cal. App.3d 484; Kachig v. Boothe (1972) 22 Cal. App.3d 626 [99 Cal. Rptr. 393]; Agostini v. Strycula (1965) 231 Cal. App.2d 804 [42 Cal. Rptr. 314].) Here, park management seeks statutory damages under Penal Code section 637.2 not for injuries arising from the broadcast and publication of private conversations, but from the recording of them. Moreover, since park management's right to a statutory remedy accrued at the moment of the violation, plaintiffs' contention that the telephone conversations were made in anticipation of litigation is simply irrelevant. Penal Code section 637.2 was intended to provide those who suffer an infringement of this aspect of their personal liberty a means of vindicating their right. ( Ribas v. Clark, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 365.) Finally, we note that the result urged by plaintiffs, an extension of section 47(2) to unlawful conduct undertaken to obtain evidence in anticipation of litigation, would lead to unacceptable consequences. Suppose, a prospective defendant kept important documents at home. If a prospective plaintiff, in anticipation of litigation, burglarized defendant's premises in order to obtain evidence, plaintiffs here would apparently apply the privilege to protect the criminal conduct. Such an extension of section 47(2) is untenable. The instant case and the example are comparable in that both involve violation of a penal statute, and in both cases the offending party seeks immunity from civil liability. In both, the claim must fail. In sum, we hold that park management's cross-complaint for damages for violation of Penal Code section 632 is not barred by the litigation privilege of section 47(2).