Opinion ID: 1386274
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Limitation of Examination on Voir Dire

Text: (4a) Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it limited his examination of prospective jurors on individual sequestered voir dire, assertedly in violation of California law as construed in People v. Williams (1981) 29 Cal.3d 392 [174 Cal. Rptr. 317, 628 P.2d 869]. From the very beginning of individual sequestered voir dire, as they extensively questioned the prospective jurors on their understanding of the two possible sentences at the penalty phase, defense counsel declared that life imprisonment without possibility of parole meant life imprisonment without possibility of parole. In so doing, they stated or implied that the penalty would inexorably be carried out. They contrasted life imprisonment without possibility of parole, which might be imposed on defendant, with life imprisonment simpliciter, which had been imposed on such notorious criminals as Charles Manson and Sirhan Sirhan. After 16 prospective jurors had been examined, the prosecutor objected to defense counsel's examination on the ground that the questioning unduly emphasize[d] life imprisonment without possibility of parole and was in the form of argument and comment on the law. He said, One or two questions on the subject I think would be sufficient. The trial court expressed a concern to avoid the topic of possible postverdict governmental actions bearing on execution of penalty, specifically, commutation by the Governor of the sentence of death. Defense counsel responded that the prospective jurors did not understand life imprisonment without possibility of parole, and needed instruction thereon. The trial court stated that both the prosecutor and defense counsel were entitled to ask the prospective jurors how they feel about the two subject matters. Namely, death or life without the possibility of parole. But it also said: We are not here to instruct them on the law at this point. What we are here to talk about is their qualifications. Later, it reiterated: This is not the time to preinstruct the jury or precondition them. The trial court proceeded to rule as follows: I will allow the question, `Do you understand that life without possibility of parole really means that in California; no eligibility for parole?' If they say yes to that, that's it. If they want to know more, you can ask them. I don't want any references to Manson or Sirhan or that stuff. It has nothing to do with their qualifications to sit on this case. (Paragraphing omitted.) Thereafter, eight more prospective jurors were examined. Defense counsel continued to declare that life imprisonment without possibility of parole meant life imprisonment without possibility of parole. And they continued to state or imply that the penalty would inexorably be carried out. When the last of these eight prospective jurors, Kenneth N. Judnick, was passed for cause by both sides, defense counsel stated that defendant had wished to examine Judnick more extensively as to life imprisonment without possibility of parole because of what he believed to be Judnick's possible lack of understanding. Counsel added that in his view, the meaning of the penalty was generally a very crucial point and called for more extensive questioning. The trial court responded that Judnick understood the matter very clearly. [4] Following this interchange, the trial court undertook to instruct each of the remaining 103 prospective jurors  and actually instructed almost all of them  that life imprisonment without possibility of parole meant life imprisonment without possibility of parole. In doing so, it sometimes suggested that the penalty would inexorably be carried out. Defense counsel continued as previously in this regard. Even the prosecutor occasionally made comments to similar effect. In People v. Williams, supra, 29 Cal.3d 392, we construed relevant statutory provisions, including former Penal Code section 1078, and reconsidered pertinent cases, among them People v. Edwards (1912) 163 Cal. 752 [127 P. 58]. (29 Cal.3d at pp. 398-407.) (5) We le[ft] intact the considerable discretion of the trial court to contain voir dire within reasonable limits. ( Id. at p. 408.) But we held that counsel should be allowed to ask questions reasonably designed to assist in the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges whether or not such questions are also likely to uncover grounds sufficient to sustain a challenge for cause. ( Id. at p. 407.) We proceeded to reaffirm that it is not `a function of the examination of prospective jurors to educate the jury panel to the particular facts of the case, to compel the jurors to commit themselves to vote a particular way, to prejudice the jury for or against a particular party, to argue the case, to indoctrinate the jury, or to instruct the jury in matters of law.' [Citation.] Therefore, a question may be excluded if it appears to be intended solely to accomplish such improper purpose. ( Id. at p. 408, fn. omitted.) (6) On appeal, as Williams itself makes plain (see 29 Cal.3d at pp. 409-412), a ruling by a trial court limiting examination of prospective jurors on voir dire is subject to review under the abuse-of-discretion standard. (4b) Applying that test here, we find no error. As noted, the trial court ruled as follows: I will allow the question, `Do you understand that life without possibility of parole really means that in California; no eligibility for parole?' If they say yes to that, that's it. If they want to know more, you can ask them. (Paragraphing omitted.) In making its determination, the court evidently recognized, and sought to follow, such relevant decisions as People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631 [36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810], and People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136 [207 Cal. Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430]. In Morse we held to the effect that in deciding on penalty in a capital case, the jury is to consider only the criminal and his crime  and not possible postverdict governmental actions bearing on execution of sentence. (60 Cal.2d at pp. 636-653.) In Ramos we concluded that an instruction that the Governor could commute both a sentence of death and life imprisonment without possibility of parole would violate the state constitutional due process guarantee because its reference to the commutation power invites the jury to consider matters that are both totally speculative and that should not, in any event, influence the jury's determination. (37 Cal.3d at p. 155.) In pertinent part, defense counsel's examination of the prospective jurors was apparently not designed  and was certainly not conducted  to assist in the intelligent exercise of challenges. Indeed, as counsel themselves effectively admitted, their questioning was intended to instruct the prospective jurors that life imprisonment without possibility of parole meant life imprisonment without possibility of parole  and also, it seems, to suggest to them that the penalty would inexorably be carried out. The trial court might properly have prohibited such examination altogether. Instead, it merely imposed a limitation. Its evident purpose was to prevent undue emphasis by defense counsel on life imprisonment without possibility of parole. It did so in order not to trigger speculation by the prospective jurors as to possible postverdict governmental actions bearing on execution of penalty. In proceeding as it did, the court acted reasonably. Defendant argues against our conclusion. His point appears to be as follows: he was entitled to assure himself that the prospective jurors fully understood, and actually believed, that life imprisonment without possibility of parole meant life imprisonment without possibility of parole; but the trial court's ruling frustrated his attempts to do so. We doubt the entitlement. The assurance defendant apparently sought seems unattainable. We also doubt the effect. The ruling did indeed limit examination in this area, but not unduly so. Indeed, it appears to have drawn a reasonable line between productive and counterproductive questioning. To the extent that defendant's argument assumes that a party has a right to instruct the prospective jurors on the meaning of life imprisonment without possibility of parole, it is unsupported. In Williams we declared all but expressly that no such right exists. (29 Cal.3d at p. 408.) It is manifest that the trial court's ruling could not have had any appreciable effect on the process or outcome of the jury's deliberations. On its face, as we have concluded, the ruling did not unduly limit defendant's examination of prospective jurors on voir dire. Neither did it impose any such limitation as applied. Defendant asserts that defense counsel's questioning was obviously chilled. The record is otherwise. More important, the trial court and/or defense counsel and/or the prosecutor generally instructed the prospective jurors  including, specifically, all who were subsequently sworn to serve as jurors or alternates  that life imprisonment without possibility of parole meant life imprisonment without possibility of parole. In so doing, they sometimes suggested  favorably to defendant, but inaccurately  that the penalty would inexorably be carried out. [5] Defendant challenges the effectiveness of the instruction. His attack relies ultimately on speculation. Speculation, however, is insufficient. To be sure, as a group the prospective jurors did not enter or leave voir dire with a technical knowledge of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. But the record shows that they obtained an understanding adequate for their purposes. We recognize that in the absence of the trial court's ruling, defendant would probably have examined the prospective jurors more extensively and, as a result, might possibly have discovered further useful information. But on this record, such probabilities and possibilities are without consequence. [6]