Opinion ID: 1860995
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Rejection of Residual Doubt as a Mitigator

Text: Darling argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow defense counsel to present penalty-phase evidence to support an argument that residual doubt could be considered as a mitigator. This Court has followed the holding of the United States Supreme Court that there is no constitutional right to present lingering doubt evidence. See Sims v. State, 681 So.2d 1112, 1117 (Fla.1996); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 173-74, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988) (rejecting the argument that the Eighth Amendment requires a capital sentencing jury to be instructed that it can consider lingering doubt evidence in mitigation). We have repeatedly observed that residual doubt is not an appropriate mitigating circumstance. See Preston v. State, 607 So.2d 404, 411 (Fla.1992) (rejecting residual doubt as an appropriate mitigator); King v. State, 514 So.2d 354, 358 (Fla.1987) (same), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241, 108 S.Ct. 2916, 101 L.Ed.2d 947 (1988). Therefore, the trial court properly excluded this testimony.