Opinion ID: 1366476
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Valuation of Retirement Benefits

Text: Patricia first contends that the trial court erred in selecting April 1988 as the functional termination date of the marriage for the purpose of calculating the portion of Joseph's retirement benefits available for inclusion in the marital estate. Patricia argues that the date should properly have been July 1992, the date of trial, or at the very least, July 1990, when she and Joseph first expressly agreed to dissolve the marriage. Although the date for valuation of marital property in a divorce ordinarily should be as close as practicable to the date of trial, Ogard v. Ogard, 808 P.2d 815, 819 (Alaska 1991), the date for segregating marital from post-marital property is ordinarily the date of the functional termination of the marriage, that is, the date when the marriage has terminated as a joint enterprise or when a married couple cease functioning economically as a single unit. Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1, 3 & n. 7 (Alaska 1986), see also Bays v. Bays, 807 P.2d 482, 486 (Alaska 1991). Determining the cutoff date for distinguishing marital from non-marital property is a matter for resolution by the trial court on a case-by-case basis; we have declined to treat the matter as an issue of law. Schanck, 717 P.2d at 3, see also Bays, 807 P.2d at 486; Dixon v. Dixon, 747 P.2d 1169, 1174-75 (Alaska 1987). We review the trial court's selection of the cutoff date for segregating marital and non-marital property under the abuse of discretion standard. Bays, 807 P.2d at 486. In the present case, we find ample evidence in the record to support the trial court's conclusion that the Hanlons' marriage had terminated as a joint enterprise by April 1988. [3] The evidence indicates that, by that date, Joseph had done virtually everything in his power to separate himself physically from the marriage and to establish himself on an independent economic footing. The evidence further indicates that, although Joseph may have been discouraged from discussing termination of the marriage while Patricia underwent surgery and treatment for cancer in 1987 and early 1988, any uncertainty concerning the future of the marriage ended by the spring of 1988. By then, Patricia was working as a substitute teacher. According to Joseph, it was at this point that he began actively and unequivocally pursuing efforts to end the marriage. Patricia points to her own testimony and testimony of her sister disputing Joseph's claim that he unequivocally communicated his desire to end the marriage in the spring of 1988. However, assessing witness credibility is a trial-court function, and the court in this case clearly acted within its discretion by crediting one version of events over another. Parker v. Northern Mixing Co., 756 P.2d 881, 892 (Alaska 1988) (it is the function of the trial court, not of this court, to judge witnesses' credibility and to weigh conflicting evidence). Patricia also insists that Joseph's continued provision of money for his family's living expenses and his payments of the mortgage on the family home demonstrate that the marriage continued to function as a joint economic enterprise after the spring of 1988. These actions, however, standing alone, seem indicative of little more than Joseph's recognition of his obligation to provide ongoing support for his family's separate financial needs and to pay the note on the house in accordance with his legal obligation to do so. Considering the totality of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining April 1988 was an appropriate date for distinguishing marital property from post-marital property. Accordingly, in establishing the value of the Hanlons' marital property at the time of trial, the superior court properly relied on April 1988 as the cutoff date separating the marital and post-marital portions of Joseph's retirement benefits.