Opinion ID: 6108735
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Verdict Directors and Verdict Form

Text: Over BNSF's objections, the circuit court submitted the following verdict directors: Instruction No. 6 relating to Spence's claim BNSF was negligent for failing to maintain the railroad crossing to provide motorists with adequate sight lines to oncoming trains, and Instruction No. 7 relating to Spence's claim BNSF was liable under respondeat superior for the failure of BNSF's train crew to stop or slow the train as Decedent approached given their greater height and enhanced sight lines. 9 The circuit court also submitted Verdict Form A, which states: Note: Complete the following paragraph by filling in the blanks as required by your verdict. If you assess a percentage of fault to any of those listed below, write in a percentage not greater than 100%, otherwise write in zero next to that name. If you assess a percentage of fault to any of those listed below, the total of such percentages must be 100%. On the claim of Plaintiff Sherry Spence for compensatory damages for the wrongful death of her husband, Scott Spence, we the undersigned jurors assess percentages of fault as follows:  Defendant BNSF on sight distance claim ______ % (zero to 100%) Defendant BNSF on failure to stop or slow claim ______ % (zero to 100%) Decedent Scott Spence ______ % (zero to 100%) TOTAL ______ % (zero or 100%) Note: Complete the following paragraph if you assessed a percentage of fault to Defendant BNSF: We, the undersigned jurors, find the total amount of Plaintiff's compensatory damages, disregarding any fault of the Decedent Scott Spence, to be $__________. On appeal, BNSF argues the circuit court erred in overruling its motion for new trial on the ground that, under MAI 20.02, the circuit court should have submitted a single verdict director with two disjunctive acts of negligence, rather than two separate verdict directors setting forth two independent theories of negligence. As a result, BNSF argues Verdict Form A also was improper in that it should have had only one line for its fault and one line for Decedent's fault. The Court rejects these arguments. Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.  Edgerton v. Morrison , 280 S.W.3d 62 , 65 (Mo. banc 2009) (citation omitted). An issue submitted by an instruction must be supported by the evidence .... Oldaker v. Peters , 817 S.W.2d 245 , 251 (Mo. banc 1991) (citation omitted). In making this determination as to a particular instruction, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to its submission. Edgerton , 280 S.W.3d at 65-66 (citation omitted). An instructional error is only grounds for reversal when the instruction misdirected, misled, or confused the jury and resulted in prejudice. Id. at 66 (citation omitted). According to BNSF, Spence's case was based upon two distinct acts of negligence and, therefore, the circuit court should have used MAI 20.02, Multiple Negligence Acts Submitted, to submit those separate acts in the disjunctive. But Comment B to MAI 37.05(1) is directly on point and refutes BNSF's argument. This Comment states: If a plaintiff seeks to recover in a comparative fault case from a master or principal based on both respondeat superior and also based upon the negligent acts of the master (i.e., based on the negligent driving of the employee and also based on the employer's negligence in furnishing a truck with defective brakes), then the jury should be asked to assess one percentage of fault based on the employee's driving, a different percentage of fault based on the employer's conduct in furnishing the truck with defective brakes, and another percentage  of fault based on the conduct of plaintiff. In this instance, the comparative fault verdict form would have a blank for the employee's percentage of fault (which is chargeable to both the employee and the employer); another blank for a percentage of fault for the employer's conduct as submitted in the verdict director submitting the employer's conduct in furnishing the truck with bad brakes (this fault is chargeable only to the master); and a blank for the percentage of fault assessed to plaintiff. However, in McHaffie v. Bunch , 891 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. banc 1995), the Supreme Court held that once an employer has admitted respondeat superior liability, it is improper to allow plaintiff to submit another theory of imputed liability against the employer (as distinguished from another theory of independent negligence). Here, like the example in Comment B, Spence sought to recover on the basis of respondeat superior and on BNSF's own (or direct) negligence, and BNSF sought to have the jury attribute a percentage of comparative fault to Decedent. As explained in the Comment, therefore, each of these requires a separate verdict director and all three determinations should be recorded on separate lines in the verdict form. Because MAI 37.05(1) is only to be used when agency is disputed, BNSF argues Comment B (which follows MAI 37.05(1) ) cannot apply because agency was not disputed in this case. Nothing in the language of Comment B depends upon whether agency is or is not disputed, however, and BNSF makes no compelling argument why the logic of Comment B should not apply equally in both situations. As noted above, the focus of Comment B is on what to do when the plaintiff makes a submissible case on separate claims of direct and imputed liability and the defendant makes a submissible case on comparative fault. Comment B correctly states the law, and the circuit court did not err in submitting Instruction Nos. 7 and 8 and Verdict Form A.