Opinion ID: 2638406
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The federal CWA incorporates state law standards.

Text: Even if federal law allowed states to impose minimum instream flow conditions on water quality certifications prejudicing existing rights, Ecology must still possess the requisite state law authority to do so here. State procedures in chapters 90.22 and 90.54 RCW govern the establishment of minimum water flowsprocedures which also expressly prohibit Ecology from affecting existing water rights. Moreover, these procedures mandate minimum flows be established, if at all, by rule. [6] Chapter 90.22 RCW authorizes Ecology to establish, by rule, minimum instream flows or levels to protect fish, game, birds, other wildlife resources, and recreational and aesthetic values. Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wash.2d 68, 81, 11 P.3d 726 (2000). Establishing minimum instream flows requires public notice and hearing. RCW 90.22.020. However the establishment of minimum instream flows: shall in no way affect existing water and storage rights and the use thereof, including but not limited to rights relating to the operation of any hydroelectric or water storage reservoir or related facility. RCW 90.22.030 (emphasis added). Ecology also can establish a water resources policy and program pursuant to chapter 90.54 RCW. However, if Ecology adopts a program or withdraws water under such a program, it must follow administrative procedures such as providing public notice and opportunity for comment. Additionally RCW 90.54.900 states: [n]othing in this chapter shall affect any existing water rights ... nor shall it affect existing rights relating to the operation of any hydroelectric or water storage reservoir or related facility[.] (Emphasis added.) Similarly RCW 90.54.920(1) mandates [n]othing in this act shall affect or operate to impair any existing water rights.  (Emphasis added.) Chapters 90.22 and 90.54 RCW are the only lawful ways Ecology can set minimum instream flows that could affect the District's water rights, yet under these two schemes Ecology cannot impair existing water rights. RCW 90.22.030, 90.54.900, .920(1). The majority opines the procedural requirements in chapters 90.22 and 90.54 RCW do not apply to Ecology's determination because the agency was setting the instream flow requirements for the District onlynot all water right holders or applicants in the basin where Sullivan Creek is located. Because Ecology was not setting instream flows universally applicable, the majority maintains chapters 90.22 and 90.54 RCW are inapplicable. Majority at 764-65. The majority's position makes little sense. Chapters 90.22 and 90.54 RCW are the express statutory schemes for setting minimum instream flows. Both schemes require Ecology to follow the proper rule making process, affecting all users of the same water equally. Minimum instream flows constitute an appropriation affecting competing claims to the same water. Postema, 142 Wash.2d at 80-82, 11 P.3d 726. To accept the majority's argument, one must believe that Ecology for the same water could discriminate amongst water right holders by setting minimum instream flows for one, while allowing others to take as much water as they need, even to the point that flows would be diminished below the minimum set as a precondition for power company usage. Where lies the logic (not to mention due process or equal protection)? How is the public interest served by establishing a minimum flow requirement for a user on one side of the creek which is inapplicable to a user of the same water on the opposite side? The majority also contends Ecology's authority to impose minimum instream flows against the District's existing rights stems from the WWPCA. Majority at 764-65. It argues the state water resources laws (chapters 90.22 and 90.54 RCW) and the WWPCA (chapter 90.48 RCW) are separate spheres of regulation, and the water quality certification differs from establishing minimum instream flows pursuant to the state water resources laws. Id. at 764-65. The majority contends the § 401 certification only affects the District's rights and has no effect on other water rights. Id. at 764. It maintains Ecology's authority to set instream flows on a § 401 certification stems from the CWA and the WWPCA. Id. at 764-65. At the outset, I note neither Ecology nor the PCHB expressly justified its decision to impose instream flow conditions on the WWPCA. In any event, given the majority's reliance on the WWPCA, I discuss its applicability below. The WWPCA provides Ecology is the state water pollution control agency for federal CWA purposes and generally can take all actions necessary to secure to the state the benefits and to meet the requirements of the CWA. RCW 90.48.260. Pursuant to this grant of statutory authority, Ecology has adopted water quality standards to regulate our state navigable waters. Ch. 173-201A WAC. Ecology divides waters into five classes. WAC 173-201A-030. Sullivan Creek is classified AA, as extraordinary. WAC 173-201A-120(1). This classification identifies specific designated uses as well as criteria applicable to such waters. WAC 173-201A-030. Here Ecology included instream flow conditions in the § 401 certification to ensure designated uses relating to fish, recreation, and navigation (all listed in WAC 173-201A-030) would not be threatened by the Sullivan Creek Project. Ecology convinces our majority that because no provision in the WWPCA prevents Ecology from affecting existing rights, Ecology's authority is not so limited. Majority at 44. Ecology points to other statutes that include savings provisions to protect existing water rights, citing RCW 90.03.030 and 90.44.440. It argues because the Legislature did not include a savings provision in the WWPCA, its authority over parties with existing water rights is unlimited. This position is untenable. The WWPCA authorizes Ecology to prevent and control water pollution in Washington. RCW 90.48.010. Ecology asserts the definition of water pollution is at least as broad as the definition in the federal CWA as interpreted by Elkhorn II, thereby implying authority to set instream flow conditions as pollution regulation. The majority is persuaded but provides virtually no analysis. Majority at 765. However a change in water quantity alone cannot constitute pollution under our state law. The WWPCA defines pollution as: such contamination, or other alteration of the physical, chemical or biological properties, of any waters of the state, including change in temperature, taste, color, turbidity, or odor of the waters, or such discharge of any liquid, gaseous, solid, radioactive, or other substance into any waters of the state as will or is likely to create a nuisance or render such waters harmful, detrimental or injurious to the public health, safety or welfare, or to domestic, commercial, industrial, agricultural, recreational, or other legitimate beneficial uses, or to livestock, wild animals, birds, fish or other aquatic life. RCW 90.48.020 (emphasis added). In the list of alterations that constitute pollution the Legislature did not include changes in volume or reductions in quantity of water. Rather the reference is to the physical, chemical or biological properties of the water. One need not be a rocket scientist (or a marine biologist) to understand a little water does not necessarily have different properties than a lot of water. It may be true a constant discharge of an effluent into a smaller body of water may cause it to have a greater concentration of effluent than a larger body; however, here no effluent is added, rather a portion of the otherwise existing water is merely diverted. Hence, the properties of the water are unchanged. Moreover, two years after it added the pollution definition, the Legislature enacted chapter 90.22 RCW which authorized Ecology to establish minimum water flows [to] protect[] fish, game, birds or other wildlife resources, or recreational or aesthetic values, RCW 90.22.010, indicating its recognition that volume is distinct from quality. And, significantly, this legislation expressly prohibited Ecology from affecting existing rights when establishing minimum flows. RCW 90.22.030. The majority also attempts to find authority for Ecology to impair existing water rights by imposing instream flow conditions in a water quality certification under the state watershed planning statutes, chapter 90.82 RCW, enacted in 1997 and 1998. Majority at 765-66. Specifically, it points to RCW 90.82.080(4), which states: Nothing in this chapter either: (a) Affects the department's authority to establish flow requirements or other conditions under RCW 90.48.260 or the federal clean water act for the licensing or relicensing of a hydroelectric power project under the federal power act; or (b) affects or impairs existing instream flow requirements and other conditions in a current license for a hydroelectric power project licensed under the federal power act. The majority's reliance on this statute is misplaced. RCW 90.82.080(4) provides only that Ecology's authority in the circumstances enumerated is not reduced; it does not create additional authority to establish instream flow conditions. Further the watershed planning statutes define minimum instream flow by reference to chapters 90.03, 90.22, and 90.54 RCWall of which expressly prohibit impairing existing rights. RCW 90.82.020; see also RCW 90.03.010, 90.22.030, 90.54.900, .920(1). We must also note Ecology does not dispute that no watershed planning has ever occurred in connection with the Sullivan Creek project. In C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop, 138 Wash.2d 699, 708, 985 P.2d 262 (1999), we described the basic principles of statutory construction: We construe an act as a whole, giving effect to all the language used. Related statutory provisions are interpreted in relation to each other and all provisions harmonized. (Citation omitted.) The majority's strained statutory interpretation ignores these principles. Under the majority's view, chapters 90.22, 90.48, and 90.54 RCW cannot be harmonized. If the asserted definition of pollution in RCW 90.48.020 permits Ecology to establish minimum instream flows individually for each owner of an existing water right, this statute clearly conflicts with RCW 90.22.030, 90.54.900, and .920(1), which expressly prohibit Ecology from so acting. Unlike the majority, I would reverse the PCHB ruling that affirmed Ecology's conditional water quality certification. Ecology can act only by legislative authorization. Rettkowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 122 Wash.2d 219, 226, 858 P.2d 232 (1993). Unless Ecology is considering an application for a new water permit under RCW 90.03.290, it must establish minimum instream flows pursuant to chapter 90.22 or 90.54 by the rule-making procedures therein. There is no statute state or federalauthorizing Ecology to impose instream flow conditions on a water quality certification pursuant to § 401 of the CWA, when such imposition interferes with established existing water rights. To hold otherwise necessarily implicates takings.