Opinion ID: 516909
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: reinstatement and award of back pay by the district court

Text: 35 The question of reinstatement does not pose a problem. Appellants' position on reinstatement is essentially the same as their attack on the jury instructions: since plaintiffs' appointments were not made pursuant to the Puerto Rico personnel laws, they were void ab initio and the district court could not reinstate them. This contention is based on the premise that since the plaintiffs never existed as municipal employees, reinstatement was not possible. We reject this Kafka-like logic. As already indicated, the failure of a municipality to follow the law in hiring employees does not make such employees fair game for political discrimination by a subsequent administration. One of the remedies available for a political discharge in violation of first amendment rights is reappointment. 36 We now turn to the more difficult question of whether it should be the judge or jury who awards back pay in a section 1983 case based upon an alleged unconstitutional political discharge where a jury will determine liability and compensatory damages. This is a question of first impression in this circuit. 7 37 Most of the courts of appeals that have grappled with the problem have focused on the nature of the relief sought: equitable or legal. The Sixth Circuit formulated the classic test in Hildebrand v. Board of Trustees of Michigan State University, 607 F.2d 705, 708 (6th Cir.1979) (citation and footnote omitted): 38 The above-cited authorities mandate that the chief focus to be made when determining whether a jury trial right exists is the nature of the relief sought. If the remedy sought is injunctive relief and/or back pay, no jury trial right attaches. In the ordinary case, if the relief sought includes compensatory and/or punitive damages, then there does exist a right to trial by jury. 39 This reasoning was carried to its logical conclusion in Moore v. Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, 636 F.2d 154 (6th Cir.1980), in which it was held in a 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 action that even though reinstatement was not sought, back pay was equitable relief and the parties were not entitled to a jury trial on that issue. The court then went on to hold that since compensatory and punitive damages were legal relief, plaintiff had a right to a jury trial on those claims. 40 The rule in the Eleventh Circuit also is grounded on the nature of the remedy sought. 41 The district court was correct in holding that appellant's claims were equitable and therefore not the proper subject of a jury trial. Appellant seeks reinstatement, backpay and reimbursement for other lost professional benefits, all of which are equitable whether sought under Title VII or section 1983. Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District, 427 F.2d 319, 323-24 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991, 91 S.Ct. 451, 27 L.Ed.2d 439 (1971); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir.1969). 42 Sullivan v. School Board of Pinellas County, 773 F.2d 1182, 1187 (11th Cir.1985) (footnote omitted). 43 The Ninth Circuit in a combination Title VII and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 case held that section 1981 provides both legal and equitable remedies, and that the legal remedies include compensatory and punitive damages which carry with them the right to a jury trial. Back pay is characterized as either equitable or as a legal remedy incidental to an equitable cause of action, and accordingly not sufficient to create a right to a jury trial. Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 929 (9th Cir.) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971, 103 S.Ct. 302, 74 L.Ed.2d 283 (1982). 44 In Bertot v. School District No. 1, Albany County, 613 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir.1979), the Tenth Circuit held that back pay was an element of equitable relief and was not precluded by a good faith defense. But cf. Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439 (10th Cir.1988) (where trial is both to jury and court due to presence of both equitable and legal issues, seventh amendment requires that essential factual issues central to both must first be tried to the jury. In combination Title VII and Sec. 1981 case, jury determination of back pay award in the Sec. 1981 case must be accepted by court in the Title VII case, if supported by the evidence.). 45 In a political affiliation-discharge case, the Third Circuit held that a party seeking compensation or other legal relief under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 has a right to a jury trial ... although the request for back pay under section 1983 seeks only equitable relief. Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 733 F.2d 260, 263 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 886, 105 S.Ct. 260, 83 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984). 46 The only circuit, as far as we can determine, that has explicitly found back pay to be legal damages is the Eighth. Setser v. Novack Investment Co., 638 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064, 102 S.Ct. 615, 70 L.Ed.2d 601 (1981) 8 was a section 1981 case in which the plaintiff sought back pay, other compensatory damages, and punitive damages. Reinstatement was not sought. The issue was whether plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial on the claim of back pay. After a review of the case law, the court held that back pay determinations are inherently in the nature of legal damages and require a jury trial. Id. at 1142. 47 In contrast to the other circuits, the Seventh Circuit has blithely ignored the problem or decided that none existed. In that circuit, back pay is routinely submitted to the jury in Sec. 1983 cases. And, at least in the cases we have read, there is no discussion of equitable versus legal relief. See Webb v. City of Chester, Ill., 813 F.2d 824, 836 (7th Cir.1987); Crawford v. Garnier, 719 F.2d 1317, 1324 (7th Cir.1983); Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1166 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021, 102 S.Ct. 1719, 72 L.Ed.2d 139 (1982). 48 Although the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the question, we find its opinions in the general area instructive. The Court has always zealously guarded the factfinding function of the jury: Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486, 55 S.Ct. 296, 301, 79 L.Ed. 603 (1935). In Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959), the issue was whether Beacon was improperly deprived of a jury trial on factual issues when the district court ordered that the facts common both to Beacon's anti-trust claims against Fox Theatres and Fox's complaint for declaratory relief be tried first to the court. The Court pointed out that this might, through collateral estoppel, prevent a full jury trial of the counterclaim and crossclaim [of Beacon] which were as effectively stopped as by an equity injunction. Id. at 505, 79 S.Ct. at 954. In discussing the difference between equitable and legal relief, the Court observed: The basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies. Id. at 506-07, 79 S.Ct. at 954. The Court held: 49 If there should be cases where the availability of declaratory judgment or joinder in one suit of legal and equitable causes would not in all respects protect the plaintiff seeking equitable relief from irreparable harm while affording a jury trial in the legal cause, the trial court will necessarily have to use its discretion in deciding whether the legal or equitable cause should be tried first. Since the right to jury trial is a constitutional one, however, while no similar requirement protects trials by the court, that discretion is very narrowly limited and must, wherever possible, be exercised to preserve jury trial. 50 Id. at 510, 79 S.Ct. at 956 (footnote omitted). 51 The next case we find significant is Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 82 S.Ct. 894, 8 L.Ed.2d 44 (1962). This was a trademark case in which the district court had denied petitioner's demand for jury trial on the alternative grounds that either the action was purely equitable or if not completely equitable, any legal issues raised were incidental to the equitable issues. Id. at 470, 82 S.Ct. at 896. The Court commenced its discussion by stating: 52 At the outset, we may dispose of one of the grounds upon which the trial court acted in striking the demand for trial by jury--that based upon the view that the right to trial by jury may be lost as to legal issues where those issues are characterized as incidental to equitable issues--for our previous decisions make it plain that no such rule may be applied in the federal courts. In Scott v. Neely [140 U.S. 106, 11 S.Ct. 712, 35 L.Ed. 358], decided in 1891, this Court held that a court of equity could not even take jurisdiction of a suit in which a claim properly cognizable only at law is united in the same pleadings with the claim for equitable relief. 53 Id. at 470-71, 82 S.Ct. at 896 (footnote omitted). The Court reiterated the point it had made in Beacon Theatres: 54 But the constitutional right to trial by jury cannot be made to depend upon the choice of words used in the pleadings. The necessary prerequisite to the right to maintain a suit for an equitable accounting, like all other equitable remedies, is, as we pointed out in Beacon Theatres, the absence of an adequate remedy at law. 55 Id. at 477-78, 82 S.Ct. at 900 (footnote omitted). 56 In Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 90 S.Ct. 733, 24 L.Ed.2d 729 (1970), the court reversed the holding of the Court of Appeals that the seventh amendment right to a jury trial does not extend to any issues in derivative actions brought by the stockholders of a corporation. The Court held, that the right to jury trial attaches to those issues in derivative actions as to which the corporation, if it had been suing in its own right, would have been entitled to a jury. Id. at 532-33, 90 S.Ct. at 735. The following footnote outlines the nature of the inquiry in determining whether an issue is legal or equitable: 57 As our cases indicate, the legal nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and limitations of juries. Of these factors, the first, requiring extensive and possibly abstruse historical inquiry, is obviously the most difficult to apply. See James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 Yale L.J. 655 (1963). 58 Id. at 538 n. 10, 90 S.Ct. at 738 n. 10. The Court pointed out: 59 Actions are no longer brought as actions at law or suits in equity. Under the Rules there is only one action--a civil action--in which all claims may be joined and all remedies are available. Purely procedural impediments to the presentation of any issue by any party, based on the difference between law and equity, were destroyed.... Under the rules, law and equity are procedurally combined; nothing turns now upon the form of the action or the procedural devices by which the parties happen to come before the court. The expansion of adequate legal remedies provided by ... the Federal Rules necessarily affects the scope of equity. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S., at 509 [79 S.Ct. at 956]. 60 Id. at 539-40, 90 S.Ct. at 739. 61 The most recent case in this area is Tull v. United States, 481 S.Ct. 412, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987). 9 The question was, 62 whether the Seventh Amendment guaranteed petitioner a right to a jury trial on both liability and amount of penalty in an action instituted by the Federal Government seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief under Clean Water Act, 62 Stat. Ch. 758, as amended, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1251, et seq. 63 Id. 107 S.Ct. at 1833. The Court examined both nature of the action and the remedy sought. Id. at 1835. In the course of determining the nature of the action the Court stated: 64 We need not rest our conclusion on what has been called an abstruse historical search for the nearest 18th-century analogue. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S., at 538, n. 10, 90 S.Ct., at 738, n. 10. We reiterate our previously expressed view that characterizing the relief sought is [m]ore important than finding a precisely analogous common law cause of action in determining whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. , at 196, 94 S.Ct. [1005], at 1009 [39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974) ]. 65 Id. at 1837 (footnote omitted). The Court found that the assessment of civil penalties did not involve the 'substance of a common-law right to trial by jury', nor a 'fundamental element of a jury trial.'  Id. at 1840. In holding that the jury determines liability and the trial court assesses the penalty, the Court noted: In this case, highly discretionary calculations that take into account multiple factors are necessary in order to set civil penalties under the Clean Water Act. These are the kinds of calculations traditionally performed by judges. Id. at 1840 (citation omitted). 66 Following the teachings of the Court we look to the nature of the action and the relief sought. There can be no doubt that Sec. 1983 actions create tort liability with damages determined under the common law of torts. 67 We have repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 creates  'a species of tort liability' in favor of persons who are deprived of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured' to them by the Constitution. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 [98 S.Ct. 1042, 1047, 55 L.Ed.2d 252] (1978), quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 [96 S.Ct. 984, 988, 47 L.Ed.2d 128] (1976). See also Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 [103 S.Ct. 1625, 1628, 75 L.Ed.2d 632] (1983); Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258-259 [101 S.Ct. 2748, 2755-2756, 69 L.Ed.2d 616] (1981). Accordingly, when Sec. 1983 plaintiffs seek damages for violations of constitutional rights, the level of damages is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law of torts. See Smith v. Wade, supra [461 U.S.] at 34 [103 S.Ct. at 1628]; Carey v. Phiphus, supra [435 U.S.] at 257-258 [98 S.Ct. at 1049]; cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196, and n. 5 [81 S.Ct. 473, 488, and n. 5, 5 L.Ed.2d 492] (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring). 68 Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305-06, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2542, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (footnote omitted). 69 In tort actions for personal injury tried to a jury, lost wages are invariably treated as being part of compensatory damages. Unlike the calculations required to assess the civil penalty in Tull, the computation of back pay normally requires only the addition (or multiplication) of a fixed sum. To paraphrase Tull, these are the kinds of calculations traditionally performed by juries. See 107 S.Ct. at 1840. Our analysis leads us to conclude that the determination of back pay as a factor of compensatory damages involves the substance of a common-law right to a trial by jury. See Tull, 107 S.Ct. at 1840. 70 In addition to the seventh amendment implication, there is also a sound practical reason for having the jury factor in back pay when determining compensatory damages. Submission of the issue of back pay to the jury as a factor to be considered in its award of compensatory damages eliminates the inevitable overlap between compensatory damages and back pay. In most cases of an alleged unconstitutional firing, there will be evidence of the employee's pay. To expect a jury to ignore this is unrealistic, especially where it may constitute the major item of compensatory damages. This case illustrates this point, see discussion infra at pp. 441-442. 71 Applying the analysis mandated by the Supreme Court, we hold that in a Sec. 1983 case based upon an alleged unconstitutional political firing where the issues of liability and compensatory damages will be determined by a jury, back pay shall be considered by the jury as one of the items of compensatory damages. We are constrained to add that we are not dissolving the traditional legal-equitable dichotomy. Where only reinstatement and back pay are requested or if they are the only issues, in addition to liability, remaining in the case then both reinstatement and back pay shall be for the court. Since this rule is contrary to the procedure followed by some district courts in this circuit, it shall be given prospective effect only. 10 We, therefore, affirm the procedure followed in this case. 72 That, however, does not end the matter. We agree with appellants that the court's instructions on compensatory damages could well have resulted in duplicative damages. The jury was not told until after it returned its verdict that the court would order back pay. The instructions on compensatory damages were as follows: 73 If you find that any plaintiff is entitled to damages, you may consider the following: Plaintiffs' physical condition prior to the personnel action, plaintiffs' emotional condition prior to the personnel action, plaintiffs' ability to work and earn a living prior to the personnel action, plaintiffs' physical and emotional condition and ability to engage in gainful activities after the personnel action. 74 In listing these items, I do not intend to imply that your consideration should be confined to these elements only, nor should you consider any one of them, if you find that there has been no evidence on that point. You should carefully and impartially consider all the matters in evidence, which will assist you in determining the extent of plaintiffs' injuries, if any. You can also consider pain and suffering resulting from the alleged violations of civil rights and the effect or lack, thereof, this may have had, or may have in the future. [Emphasis added.] 75 Although the jury was not told to include back pay as an item of compensatory damages, neither was it told not to do so. The evidence was permeated with references to plaintiffs' lost wages, including documentary evidence of employment records. The sentence beginning You should carefully and impartially consider all the matters in evidence, could well have been construed to pertain to the evidence of lost wages, especially in the absence of any admonition not to do so. As a matter of common sense and logic, the jury could reasonably conclude that back pay was one of the items to be factored into the award of compensatory damages. At the new trial, back pay must, of course, be determined by the jury. 76