Opinion ID: 66148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claims Relating to Quinn’s Arrest

Text: The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court mandated a two-step sequence for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims: first, a court must 6 No. 08-40633 decide whether the facts alleged or shown are sufficient to make out a violation of a constitutional right; second, the court must decide whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct. Id. at 201. If the official’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right, then qualified immunity is not applicable. Prior to Saucier, the Court had merely suggested that “the better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998). Saucier made clear that these two steps were sequential and that a court may not skip the first step and proceed directly to the second step. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. In a very recent decision, the Court rejected the rigid sequential approach set out in Saucier. In Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009), the Court held that “while the sequence set forth [in Saucier] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory,” and that judges “should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Id. at 818. Quinn contends that the district court did not apply the correct legal standard for qualified immunity in this case because the district court inquired into the objective reasonableness of Quiles’s actions. This argument is wholly without merit, as “[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established [under the second step of the qualified immunity inquiry] is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”2 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. 2 This circuit has at times characterized its approach in qualified immunity cases as a three-pronged inquiry in which the traditional second prong is divided into two separate and distinct inquiries: whether the right was clearly established and whether an officer’s conduct 7 No. 08-40633 The district court held that Quinn had adequately alleged a violation of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, but that Quiles’s belief that his conduct in procuring the warrant was lawful was objectively reasonable. The issue is whether the district court was correct that Quinn failed to raise a fact issue as to the objective reasonableness of Quiles’s belief that his conduct was lawful. In the qualified immunity context, the objective reasonableness of an officer’s belief that his conduct was lawful is a question of law, not fact. See Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp., 430 F.3d 245, 256 (5th Cir. 2005). Quinn argues that Quiles’s procurement of the arrest warrant violated clearly established law that making an arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and that engaging in judicial deception when applying for a warrant violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In other words, Quinn contends that it would be clear to a reasonable officer that swearing out a probable cause affidavit based on the evidence available in this case on September 8, 2004, and providing the supporting evidence to the magistrate that was in fact provided by Quiles, violated Quinn’s right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from arrest in the absence of probable cause and his right under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from the use of judicial deception in the procurement of warrants. was objectively reasonable. See, e.g., Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 135 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The second prong of the qualified immunity test is better understood as two separate inquiries: whether the allegedly violated constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the incident; and, if so, whether the conduct of the defendants was objectively unreasonable in the light of that then clearly established law.”); Brown v. Bryan County, Okl., 67 F.3d 1174, 1181 (5th Cir. 1995) (“A proper analysis of a qualified immunity defense requires us to conduct a two (sometimes three) prong inquiry.”), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 397 (1997). The Supreme Court’s recent case law makes it clear that these inquiries are more appropriately viewed not as separate and distinct, but as two sides of the same analytical coin. See Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202; see also Conroe Creosoting Co. v. Montgomery County, Tex., 249 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Second, we determine whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time the defendant acted. A constitutional right is ‘clearly established’ if ‘the unlawfulness of the conduct would be apparent to a reasonably competent official.’”). 8 No. 08-40633 The Fourth Amendment requires that an officer have probable cause for an arrest. Probable cause exists “when the totality of the facts and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A police officer is entitled to qualified immunity for an arrest if a reasonable person in the officer’s position could have believed he had probable cause to arrest. Id. The district court held that a reasonable officer could have concluded that there was probable cause at the time that Quiles executed the probable cause affidavit based on the videotaped interview of Katie, Turner’s affidavit, Houston’s written and oral statements, and the CPS intake report. Quinn argues that a reasonable officer could not have concluded that there was probable cause based on the available evidence because the evidence cited by Quiles and the district court consisted solely of Katie’s uncorroborated allegations of abuse; the allegations differed in detail when they were made to different individuals; the allegations were made by a teenager of unknown reliability during a time of great stress; Quiles did not attempt to get Quinn’s side of the story; and Quiles never talked directly to Katie about the allegations.3 3 Quinn heavily relies on an affidavit from a purported police procedures expert stating that the available evidence was insufficient to give an objectively reasonable officer the level of proof necessary to conclude that Quinn had committed a crime. Quinn asserts that this affidavit is sufficient to raise a fact issue as to objective reasonableness. However, as noted by the district court, “this court has repeatedly held that objective reasonableness in a qualified immunity context is a question of law for the court to decide, not an issue of fact.” Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp., 430 F.3d 245, 256 (5th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Quinn also asserts that Quiles himself conceded in his deposition that Quiles only had reasonable suspicion that Quinn had sexually assaulted his daughter, not probable cause, and that this is sufficient to raise a fact issue as to objective reasonableness. However, Quiles’s statement in his deposition that he had reasonable suspicion referred to the period immediately after he first reviewed the CPS intake report, before he had reviewed the videotaped interview of Katie and received Turner’s affidavit and Laurie Houston’s written and oral statements. Quiles has consistently stated that he believed that he had probable cause at the time he executed the 9 No. 08-40633 Although the facts known to Quiles at the time of the arrest did raise some questions about the Katie’s reliability, which Quiles did not pursue, these questions were not so significant as to have made it objectively unreasonable for Quiles to have believed that probable cause existed in light of the detailed nature of Katie’s allegations and the fact that Quiles did not possess evidence at the time that Katie may have had a motive to fabricate the allegations. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983) (“[E]ven if we entertain some doubt as to an informant’s motives, his explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed first-hand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case.”); United States v. Phillips, 727 F.2d 392, 399 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that detailed nature of informant’s statement could compensate for uncertainty regarding the informant’s veracity). The inconsistencies in Katie’s descriptions of the timing of the abuse are relatively minor; her attempted suicide is not necessarily indicative of a lack of reliability, and may in fact be viewed as supporting her allegations of abuse; and shoplifting is a relatively minor crime that does not provide particularly strong evidence that a person is generally untrustworthy. Katie’s vested interest in the child support dispute between Quinn and Laurie Houston raises a more serious question about her reliability, but there is no evidence that Quiles was aware of the dispute at the time of the arrest. There is no evidence that Quinn disregarded any exculpatory evidence at the time of the arrest. See Wadkins v. Arnold, 214 F.3d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Although an officer may not disregard readily available exculpatory evidence of which he is aware, the failure to pursue a potentially exculpatory lead is not sufficient to negate probable cause.”); see also Evett v. DETNTFF, 330 F.3d 681, 688 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1988)) (“[W]hile probable cause affidavit. 10 No. 08-40633 law enforcement personnel ‘may rely on the totality of facts available to them in establishing probable cause, they also may not disregard facts tending to dissipate probable cause.’”). Further investigation into Katie’s reliability may have been advisable as a matter of good police practices, but it was not objectively unreasonable to believe that probable cause existed even in the presence of some questions about Katie’s reliability.4 Quinn argues that this case is similar to Ripson v. Alles, 21 F.3d 805 (8th Cir. 1994), in which the court held that a police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity for his arrest of a parent who had allegedly sexually abused his two-year-old daughter. In Ripson, the officer arrested the child’s father based on statements by the child’s mother that the child had signs of redness in her genital area after visiting her father and claimed that her father had touched her inappropriately, as well as a statement by the mother’s live-in boyfriend corroborating the mother’s statement that the child claimed that her father had touched her inappropriately. Id. at 808. It was undisputed that, at the time of the arrest, the officer knew that there was no medical evidence of abuse and that the child’s parents were involved in a custody dispute over the child. Id. The county attorney had also advised the officer to “keep investigating.” Id. The court held that “[b]ased on all of the facts and circumstances within [the officer’s] knowledge and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information at the time of the arrest, a reasonable officer could not 4 Quiles asserts that he did not interview Quinn because Laurie Houston had informed him that Quinn was an alcoholic and a flight or suicide risk, and that he did not interview Katie because he was concerned about causing her additional trauma. We do not find these explanations to be particularly satisfying, as they appear to be based on largely unsupported speculation, and there were presumably ways of interviewing Quinn and Katie while being sensitive to these concerns. However, we do not believe that it was objectively unreasonable to believe that probable cause existed without interviewing Quiles and Houston, regardless of the reason that Quiles did not interview them. 11 No. 08-40633 have believed probable cause existed for the arrest of [the father] for sexually abusing his daughter.” Id. Quinn contends that this case is similar to Ripson in that there was no physical evidence of abuse or other evidence to corroborate the allegation of abuse, and asserts that the case for probable cause was actually stronger in Ripson because the allegations in that case were made contemporaneously with the abuse. There are clearly some factual similarities between this case and Ripson, but Ripson is distinguishable on a number of different grounds. First, the lack of corroborating physical evidence in this case is not as suspicious because the alleged abuse occurred a number of years prior to the investigation and Katie had been sexually active since the alleged abuse. Second, the allegations of abuse in this case were made by the alleged victim herself, not simply by her mother. Third, there is no evidence that Quiles was aware of the legal dispute between Quinn and Laurie Houston over child support, whereas in Ripson the officer was aware of the custody dispute. Considered as a whole, the facts in Ripson that tended to cast doubt on the veracity of the allegations of abuse and that were known to the officer at the time of the arrest appear more significant than those known to Quiles. Quinn also argues that Quiles’s belief that he fully disclosed all relevant facts and did not withhold exculpatory evidence from the magistrate judge that issued the warrant was not objectively reasonable. Quiles testified that he submitted all of the evidence that he had collected in this case to the magistrate judge. Quinn has failed to present any competent summary judgment evidence that Quiles withheld relevant evidence from the magistrate judge; Quinn simply speculates that Quiles was aware of various facts bearing on Katie’s credibility, including that she was seeing a psychiatrist and had attempted suicide on numerous occasions, because Laurie Houston was aware of them and she had been interviewed by Quiles. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir. 12 No. 08-40633 1994) (stating that unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence). Based on the record evidence, Quiles’s belief that he fully disclosed all relevant facts and did not withhold exculpatory evidence from the magistrate judge was objectively reasonable.5 We agree with the district court that Quinn failed to raise a fact issue as to the objective reasonableness of Quiles’s belief that his conduct was lawful.
Under Texas law, official immunity protects individual public officials from suit arising from performance of (1) discretionary duties (2) in good faith (3) within the scope of their authority. Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 422 (Tex. 2004) (citing City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex. 1994)). Quinn concedes that Quiles was acting within the scope of his authority as a McKinney police officer when he applied for the arrest warrant, but argues that Quiles was not engaged in a discretionary function and that Quinn has raised a fact issue as to whether Quiles acted in good faith. “If an action involves personal deliberation, decision and judgment, it is discretionary; actions which require obedience to orders or the performance of a duty to which the actor has no choice, are ministerial.” Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 654. “Ministerial acts are those for which the law prescribes and defines the duty to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment.” Ballantyne, 144 S.W.3d at 425 (citation and internal quotations omitted). The Texas Supreme Court has held that the actions of a police officer during a high-speed chase are discretionary because “[t]he decision to pursue a particular suspect will fundamentally involve the 5 For the same reasons discussed above, Quiles did not violate Quinn’s clearly established substantive due process rights. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775 (2003) (stating that conduct must be “conscience shocking” to violate substantive due process). 13 No. 08-40633 officer’s discretion, because the officer must, in the first instance, elect whether to undertake pursuit,” and that “[b]eyond the initial decision to engage in the chase, a high speed pursuit involves the officer’s discretion on a number of levels, including, which route should be followed, at what speed, should back-up be called for, and how closely should the fleeing vehicle be pursued.” Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 655. A number of Texas appellate courts have held that a police officer’s investigation of a crime, determination of probable cause, and decision concerning if and when to make an arrest, are discretionary functions. See, e.g., Kersey v. Wilson, 69 S.W.3d 794, 799 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2002, no pet.); Davis v. Klevenhagen, 971 S.W.2d 111, 117–18 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.); Zess v. Funke, 956 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1997, no writ); Antu v. Eddy, 914 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1995, no writ); City of Hempstead v. Kmiec, 902 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); Chapman v. Gonzalez, 824 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied); Dent v. City of Dallas, 729 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1986, writ refused n.r.e.). Quiles was clearly performing a discretionary function for the purposes of official immunity under Texas law when he investigated the alleged abuse and executed the probable cause affidavit.6 To determine whether a public official acted in good faith, a court should consider whether a reasonably prudent official, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed that his conduct was justified based on the 6 Quinn cites Welch v. Milton, 185 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2006, pet. denied) for the proposition that, the immunity context, “[d]iscretionary acts are those related to determining what the policy of the governmental unit will be, but do not extend to the carrying out of the specifics of particular policies or exercise of ‘professional’ or ‘occupational’ discretion.” Id. at 597 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). That proposition is plainly at odds with the rule announced by the Texas Supreme Court that, in the official immunity context, discretionary actions are those that involve personal deliberation, decision and judgment. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 654. 14 No. 08-40633 information he possessed when the conduct occurred. See Ballantyne, 144 S.W.3d at 426. This test is derived substantially from the federal qualified immunity test. For the same reasons that we hold that Quiles held an objectively reasonable belief that his conduct was lawful, we hold that Quiles acted in good faith for the purposes of the official immunity inquiry. We agree with the district court that Quiles was protected by official immunity.
Quinn asserts that the district court erred in holding that there is no freestanding federal cause of action for malicious prosecution. The district court’s holding is clearly supported by this court’s decision in Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 945 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that “no such freestanding constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution exists”).
Quinn asserts that the district court erred in holding that Quinn had failed to state a claim against the City for negligence because such a claim was barred by sovereign immunity. Under Texas law, the City of McKinney, as a unit of state government, is immune from suit and liability except to the extent that there is a waiver of immunity. See Dallas Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003). As the district court held, Quinn’s negligence allegations do not fall within the waiver of sovereign immunity for certain tort claims outlined in the Texas Tort Claims Act. See Perez v. City of Dallas, 180 S.W.3d 906, 910 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2005, no pet.) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 101.021, 101.022).