Opinion ID: 848647
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for promoting child sexually abusive material

Text: It is without dispute that defendant possessed child sexually abusive material that he had obtained over the Internet. The prosecution contends that possessing the material is the legal equivalent of promoting it for purposes of MCL 750.145c(3). MCL 750.145c(3) reads: A person who distributes or promotes, or finances the distribution or promotion of, or receives for the purpose of distributing or promoting, or conspires, attempts, or prepares to distribute, receive, finance, or promote any child sexually abusive material or child sexually abusive activity is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 7 years, or a fine of not more than $50,000.00, or both.... [Emphasis added.] MCL 750.145c(4) reads: A person who knowingly possesses any child sexually abusive material is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 4 years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both, [11] if that person knows, has reason to know, or should reasonably be expected to know the child is a child or that the child sexually abusive material includes a child or that the depiction constituting the child sexually abusive material appears to include a child, or that person has not taken reasonable precautions to determine the age of the child. [Emphasis added.] Possession is not the same as promotion. The prosecutor blurs the two, asserting that by obtaining the material from the Internet, defendant promoted it. To accept that argument, this Court would have to ignore the express language of the Legislature that created a graduated scheme of offenses and punishments regarding child sexually abusive material. The Legislature expressly separated the crimes of production of child sexually abusive material, [12] distribution or promotion of the material, and simple possession. It would not have made the distinction had it intended to equate mere possession with promotion. If the Legislature had wanted end-users of the material to be guilty of promoting such material merely because they possess it, MCL 750.145c(4) would have included promotion. Alternatively, the Legislature would have equated possession with both distribution and promotion in MCL 750.145c(3) instead of creating a separate provision for possession in § 145c(4). The statute on its face makes the mere possession of child sexually abusive material a different and less severe offense than either distribution or promotion of the material.