Opinion ID: 1144465
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court erred by informing the venire of on-going settlement negotiations.

Text: ¶ 6. Weatherly asserts on appeal that the trial court erred by informing the venire of on-going settlement negotiations. Weatherly argues that Rule 408 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence disallows the mentioning of settlement negotiations at any time during trial, with one exception pointed out in Smith v. Payne, where the fact of settlement was used for the purpose of explaining the absence of a settling defendant at trial. 839 So.2d 482, 487 (Miss.2002). With regard to disclosing the amount of settlement, the Court stated that the probative value, if any, of the settlement amount is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; however, this case does not offer any guidance with regard to the factual situation in the present case. Id. Weatherly cites cases from other jurisdictions, which found that Rule 408 prohibits the trial judge from discussing settlement negotiations with the jury. See infra Kennon v. Slipstreamer, Inc., 794 F.2d 1067, 1071 (5th Cir.1986); Fahrbach v. Diamond Shamrock, Inc., 122 N.M. 543, 928 P.2d 269, 274 (+ 1996). Relying on Green v. State, 97 Miss. 834, 53 So. 415, 416 (1910), Weatherly submits that the proscription against discussing settlement negotiations found in Rule 408 applies with even greater force to the trial court because of the importance that jurors place on the judge. ¶ 7. Rule 408 provides that: Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. Miss. R. Evid. 408. Although evidence of settlement is not admissible to prove liability or the invalidity of a claim under Rule 408, this rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. Id. ¶ 8. There are no Mississippi cases directly on point with regard to whether a trial court's disclosure of on-going settlement negotiations between parties actively involved in a trial to the venire violates Rule 408; however other jurisdictions provide guidance. In Fahrbach, the Supreme Court of New Mexico stated that an analogous version of Rule 408 applies equally to comments of the court or of counsel made in argument to jury or in voir dire. 928 P.2d at 274. The Fifth Circuit has held that Federal Rule 408 bars the admission of evidence of settlement unless it is admissible for a purpose other than to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount Kennon, 794 F.2d at 1069. Similar to this Court's reasoning in Smith, the Fifth Circuit held that while it is reversible error for a trial court to reveal the amount of settlement, revealing the fact of settlement is permissible when it explains the absence of settling defendants who were previously in court because it serves the purpose of reducing jury confusion. Id. at 1070. However, unlike Smith and Kennon, mentioning the settlement in this case was not for the purpose of explaining the absence of a settling co-defendant; in fact, there was no purpose in disclosing the parties' settlement negotiations and in our view to do so was prejudicial error. We find that the disclosure of settlement negotiations in this case clearly falls outside of the permissible purposes set out in Rule 408. The trial court reasonably could have and should have found a more appropriate way of dealing with the delay without disclosing to the venire that the parties were trying to settle the case, which implies responsibility for the injury. ¶ 9. One authority provides: As a general rule, if a trial judge refers at all to the subject of a compromise, he must do so in such a fashion that no party may complain of bias, hostility, or duress, or a predetermined result. Nor may any of the above be made apparent to a jury. Thus, broadly, it has been regarded as prejudicial error for a trial judge to demonstrate hostility in his remarks to a party, or to the jury, or to suggest that the party might be visited with an adverse result should he fail to settle, especially if the jury is aware of such attitude. D.L. Spillman, Jr., Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Suggestion or Comments by a Judge as to Compromise or Settlement of Civil Case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457, 1460 (1966)(footnote omitted). Welker emphasizes that merely to refer to compromise as a generally desirable resolution or to point out that compromise is a technique available to litigants, however has not been regarded as erroneous. Id. However, Welker fails to recognize that the judge in this case did not merely refer to compromise as a desirable resolution, but actually informed the venire that the parties, in the case that they were about to consider, were engaged in settlement negotiations at the very moment that they sat in the courtroom awaiting jury selection. When the jurors returned for voir dire following the trial court's statement, it was obvious that the case did not settle. Shortly after, counsel for Welker told the venire that the evidence would show that Ms. Welker's actual damages were $4,000,000. The jury reasonably could have concluded that Weatherly had seriously considered a multi-million dollar demand in the morning negotiations, which could have inadvertently resulted in prejudice. Therefore, the trial court's reference to the settlement was not done in such a fashion that no party may complain of bias, hostility, or duress, or a predetermined result. Id. ¶ 10. Even more critical, considering what occurred in the case at bar, in Green, this Court stated that jurors are very susceptible to the influence of the judge, and thus a judge cannot be too careful and guarded in language and conduct in the presence of the jury to avoid prejudice to either party. 53 So. at 416. The Court further stated that a reviewing court will not stop to inquire whether the jury was actually influenced by the conduct of the judge. All the authorities hold that if they were exposed to improper influences, which might have produced the verdict, the presumption of law is against its purity; and testimony will not be heard to rebut this presumption. Id. Therefore, whether the jury was actually prejudiced or influenced by the statement is not for the Court to decide; rather, the mere fact that the statement was made to the jury creates a conclusive presumption of such prejudice. We continue to adhere to Green. We note that the trial judge egregiously advised the jury that 90 percent of the cases that are ever filed [settle]. This statement only further highlighted the prejudice. Taking into consideration the importance placed on trial judges and their role in safeguarding impartiality, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by informing the venire of last minute, on-going settlement negotiations taking place on the first day of trial.