Opinion ID: 1689961
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Order Extending Time for Appeal.

Text: The respondent widow by her motion for review attacks the validity of the county court's order which extended the time within which the appellant Eva Bauman might appeal from the court's order construing the will. In the first place the validity of the extension order cannot be raised by a motion for review. This is readily apparent upon reading sec. 274.12 (1), Stats. The reason is because the motion for review must seek a reversal or modification of the judgment or order or portion thereof appealed from. Respondent here does not seek any reversal or modification of the order construing the will which appellant has appealed from but a reversal of a subsequent order. In order to attack this subsequent order it was incumbent upon respondent under sec. 274.12 (4), [1] to separately appeal therefrom which she did not do. However, the motion for review is dated December 3, 1964, which was well within the thirty-day period from appellant's perfection of her appeal on November 19, 1964, but the record does not disclose when it was served on other interested parties or their counsel or upon the register in probate. Sec. 274.11 (4), Stats., provides that this court shall have jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action from the time an appealable order is entered. The county court's order of November 4, 1964, extending time to appeal is an appealable order. Therefore, under sec. 269.51 (1), [2] appellant by participating in the appeal and not moving to dismiss the motion for review has waived the right to object to this court passing on the merits of the motion for review which we treat as if it were a properly perfected appeal from the extension order. See Asen v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. (1960), 11 Wis. (2d) 594, 106 N. W. (2d) 269. Passing now to the merits of the extension order, we hold the petitioner's failure to request an extension of time in which to appeal did not render this order invalid. Sec. 324.05, Stats., [3] provides for two types of relief. We do not deem that the failure of the petitioner to ask for the particular type of relief granted is fatal so long as the verified petition or affidavit upon which the order is entered is sufficient to support the order. Thus the crucial question is whether appellant Bauman's verified petition set forth facts which would warrant the trial court in concluding her failure to appeal from the order construing the will within the sixty-day period allotted by sec. 324.04 (1), Stats., was without fault on her part. Paragraph 10 of her petition alleged: That your petitioner resides in the State of New Jersey and is unfamiliar with the laws of the State of Wisconsin, and your petitioner personally and through an attorney in the State of New Jersey, has requested her Co-Executors in this matter, to-wit: Bass & Goldstein, (Gerald L. Bass and Bernard Goldstein) to appeal the Order of this Court dated May 22, 1964, and they have failed and refused so to do. While not any model in preciseness, this paragraph is open to the reasonable interpretation that appellant by reason of her New Jersey residence and the nonco-operation of her co-executors was unaware during the sixty-day period following the order of May 22, 1964, of the statutory requirement that any appeal had to be taken within such sixty-day period. A further reasonable inference to be drawn is that her request to her coexecutors to appeal from the order occurred during the sixty-day period and their failure to do so absolved her from fault. We conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the county court to so interpret the allegations of paragraph 10 of the petition. Cf. Estate of Baumgarten (1961), 12 Wis. (2d) 212, 224, 107 N. W. (2d) 169, holding that the statutory words without fault are to be liberally construed. The order extending time to appeal fails to contain any recital or finding that appellant was without fault in failing to appeal within the allotted sixty days. It merely recites that appellant's petition made pursuant to sec. 324.05, Stats., came on for hearing on October 30, 1964; the appearance of the parties at this hearing; and that the court was duly advised in the premises. Inasmuch as the legislature has not seen fit to require that an order granting relief under sec. 324.05 contain a recital or finding of no fault on the part of the applicant, this court is not inclined to make such recital or finding an absolute requirement by court decision. Sec. 324.05 is a remedial statute and should be liberally construed to accomplish its objective.