Opinion ID: 739302
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: minutes of the 1982 meeting; attorney-client privilege

Text: 36 After an in camera review of the relevant documents, we conclude that the final minutes of the 1982 meeting are protected by the attorney-client privilege. Primarily at issue is whether the communications memorialized by the minutes were made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states: 37 [I]n civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law. 38 Fed.R.Evid. 501. In this civil, diversity case in which state law governs, Rule 501 provides that state law will govern the issue of privilege. See Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 861-62. 39 It is not clear whether the law of Pennsylvania, the forum state, or the law of Michigan, the state in which the communications occurred, will supply the rule as to privilege. We need not reach this potentially thorny issue, however, because the law as to attorney-client privilege in Pennsylvania does not differ in any significant way from that in Michigan. The elements of the attorney-client privilege are well-known and are not, in any material respect, disputed here. We need not, therefore, dwell on them, except to note their basic contours in Pennsylvania and Michigan. 40 In Pennsylvania, the attorney-client privilege in civil matters has been codified. The relevant statutory provision reads: 41 In a civil matter counsel shall not be competent or permitted to testify to confidential communications made to him by his client, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose the same, unless in either case this privilege is waived upon the trial of the client. 42 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 5928 (West 1982). The communications must be for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. See Leonard Packel & Anne Bowen Poulin, Pennsylvania Evidence § 501.1(c), at 306 & n. 22 (1987 & Supp.1995). A corporation may claim the privilege for communications between its counsel and its employees who have authority to act on its behalf. See Maleski v. Corporate Life Ins. Co., 163 Pa.Cmwlth. 36, 641 A.2d 1, 3 (1994); Packel & Poulin, supra, § 501.1(b). 43 In Michigan, the standard is stated in similar terms. The attorney-client privilege attaches to the confidential communications made by a client to his attorney acting as a legal adviser and made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice on some right or obligation. Kubiak v. Hurr, 143 Mich.App. 465, 372 N.W.2d 341, 345 (1985). Case law in Michigan also recognizes the right of a corporation to claim the privilege to protect communications between certain of its employees and its counsel. See Hubka v. Pennfield Township, 197 Mich.App. 117, 494 N.W.2d 800, 802 (1992) (citing Mead Data Central, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 253 n. 24 (D.C.Cir.1977) (interpreting the federal Freedom of Information Act)), rev'd on other grounds, 443 Mich. 864, 504 N.W.2d 183 (1993). 44 Our brief review of Pennsylvania and Michigan law as to the attorney-client privilege reveals that the two states agree in the respect most relevant to our case: for a communication to be privileged, it must have been made for the purpose of securing legal advice. See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 862 (setting out the traditional elements of the attorney-client privilege and including the requirement that the communication be made for the purpose of securing legal advice); Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers §§ 118, 122 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 1996) (same). 9 We now turn to determining whether the communications contained in the relevant document satisfy this standard. 10 45 Our review of the final minutes, the draft minutes, the report Nolte summarized at the meeting, and relevant affidavits, leads us to conclude that the communications in the meeting were made for the purpose of securing legal advice. Ford clearly had concerns about the Bronco II; this is not surprising given that the product was in the early stages of its development. Nolte examined the legal implications of some of those concerns and proposed a particular course of action, contained in his report to the Policy and Strategy Committee, to address them. The Policy and Strategy Committee meeting itself was called in part to discuss Nolte's proposal. The discussion at the meeting, then, was intended to secure Nolte's legal advice. 46 The district court initially ruled that the minutes disclose only factual material, contain no legal discussion, were not created in anticipation of litigation ..., and contain no communication to counsel which was intended to be kept confidential. The court later stated that the minutes were business records that memorialized essentially business and safety decisions. We disagree with the district court's conclusions as to the nature of the documents. The documents do not contain merely factual material nor do they detail mere business decisions; in that respect, the district court clearly erred in describing these documents. Certainly, the ultimate decision reached by the Policy and Strategy Committee could be characterized as a business decision, but the Committee reached that decision only after examining the legal implications of doing so. Even if the decision was driven, as the district court seemed to assume, principally by profit and loss, economics, marketing, public relations, or the like, it was also infused with legal concerns, and was reached only after securing legal advice. At all events, disclosure of the documents would reveal that legal advice. We thus hold that the minutes of the 1982 meeting are protected from discovery by the attorney-client privilege. 11