Opinion ID: 217244
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Our Review of Credibility

Text: The majority's decision hinges on upholding the IJ and BIA's adverse credibility determination. It is true that we review credibility determinations under the deferential substantial evidence standard. See Kartasheva v. Holder, 582 F.3d 96, 105 (1st Cir.2009). The majority spells out our general policy of deference but implies that deference is the alpha and omega of our review. This is not so. Instead, we have recognized that the fact that an IJ considers a petitioner not to be credible constitutes the beginning not the end of our inquiry. Wiratama v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting Aguilera-Cota v. I.N.S., 914 F.2d 1375, 1381 (9th Cir.1990)). [O]ur deference is not unlimited, Kartasheva, 582 F.3d at 105, and thus we must determine whether the IJ's determination has sturdy roots in the administrative record, looking to the IJ's decision for specific and cogent reasons why an inconsistency, or a series of inconsistencies, render the alien's testimony not credible. Wiratama, 538 F.3d at 4 (internal quotation marks removed). [W]e may not affirm the agency's decision when we cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the agency's view. Sok v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Mukamusoni v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 110, 119 (1st Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks and brackets removed)). Finally, because Dehonzai's petition pre-dates the REAL ID Act, the IJ's adverse credibility determination must be founded on inconsistencies that go to the heart of the claim and pertain to material facts, not merely to peripheral or trivial matters. Kartasheva, 582 F.3d at 105 (internal quotation marks removed). These principles are well-recognized. Indeed, applying our standard of review to past cases, we have held that remand on the issue of credibility is required where the IJ and [BIA] misstate [an immigrant's] testimony, apply labels (like inconsistent and evasive) that are at odds with what the transcript shows, and draw inferences that appear wholly speculative and without record support. Castaneda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 17, 24 (1st Cir. 2007) (en banc). We have also held that remand is required where the IJ's decision rests on specifically enumerated but ultimately inadequate reasons, and where numerous translation difficulties undercut an IJ's finding of inconsistent testimony or evasive demeanor. Kartasheva, 582 F.3d at 105-06, 107. To anchor these holdings firmly to their statutory basis at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B), where determinations of the immigration courts reflect these sorts of deficiencies, any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary. Immigration courts may not simply say not credible and free their faulty decisions from the fetters of robust judicial review. I am convinced that those authorities applied to these facts compel remand. My reasoning follows.