Opinion ID: 69198
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Error in the Criminal History Category Assessment

Text: This case requires us to address the question of whether term of imprisonment, as it appears in § 4A1.2(k), refers only to the portion of the term of imprisonment that was not suspendedor, whether it refers to the entirety of the term of imprisonment issued upon revocation, regardless of any subsequent suspension of that term. We conclude that term of imprisonment, as it appears in § 4A1.2 as a whole, is synonymous with sentence of imprisonment and therefore refers only to the portion that was not suspended. § 4A1.2(b)(2). [6] We recognize that the Commission's supplanting of § 4A1.2(e)'s sentence of imprisonment with a different, un-defined term (term of imprisonment) in § 4A1.2(k) could reasonably lead to the conclusion that the two terms share different meanings. Our review of § 4A1.2, however, leads us to conclude that attaching disparate meanings to these two terms results in irreconcilable inconsistencies in § 4A1.2 as a whole. As a result, we write to clarify this error. Section 4A1.2(e) governs whether Jasso's prior conviction in Texas state court counts for current criminal history purposes. Under § 4A1.2(e)(1), [a]ny prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month that was imposed within fifteen years of the defendant's commencement of the instant offense is counted. Under § 4A1.2(e)(2), [a]ny other prior sentence that was imposed within ten years of the defendant's commencement of the instant offense is counted. Under § 4A1.2(e)(3), however, [a]ny prior sentence not within the time periods specified above is not counted. Thus, for a district court to properly assess criminal history points for a prior conviction pursuant to § 4A1.1, the prior conviction must fit into either of § 4A1.2(e)'s first two categories. United States v. Arviso-Mata, 442 F.3d 382, 385 (5th Cir.2006) (holding that where a defendant's conviction does not fall within the time periods specified in § 4A1.2(e)(1) or (2), it should not [b]e counted.). Jasso's 1995 state court sentence to felony probation, alone, cannot contribute any criminal history points since it was well-over the ten year limitation found in (e)(2) and because as a term of probation, it fails to meet the thirteen month minimum established in (e)(1). [7] Thus, the only possible way his 1995 conviction could count for criminal history purposes would be if the term of imprisonment issued upon his revocation of probation affected the quantification of his original term of imprisonment in § 4A1.2(e), pursuant to § 4A1.2(k). Section 4A1.2(k) governs the implications of a probation violationas it relates to the calculation of criminal history points. Arviso-Mata, 442 F.3d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 2006) (Section 4A1.2(k)(2)(B) explains how the new term of imprisonment affects the counting of criminal history points under § 4A1.2(e).); accord United States v. Arnold, 213 F.3d 894, 896 (5th Cir.2000) (That provision explicitly addresses the problem of revocation of parole.). Specifically, § 4A1.2(k) states that: [i]n the case of a prior revocation of probation, parole, or mandatory release, add the original term of imprisonment to any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation. The resulting total is used to compute the criminal history points for § 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c), as applicable. (emphasis added). This seemingly simplistic phraseology instructs district courts to add the term issued upon revocation to the original term of imprisonment. The government's position is that the original term (zero years) should be added to the term imposed upon revocation (ten years) for a resulting total of tenplacing Jasso's 1995 conviction well-within § 4A1.2(e)(1)'s thirteen month minimum. Such an interpretation of term of imprisonment as it appears in § 4A1.2(k), however, offers only a cramped reading that does not comport with the term's appearance in § 4A1.2 as a whole. The error in the district court's addition of the two contested criminal history points in the present case, however, is made evident when two terms, sentence of imprisonment and term of imprisonment, found in sections (b), (e), (k) and the notes accompanying § 4A1.2, are read in accordance with the canon of statutory construction noscitur a sociis. Under the familiar canon of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, `a word is known by the company it keeps.' In re Hickman, 260 F.3d 400, 403 (5th Cir.2001). Our review of § 4A1.2 contained herein reveals that sentence of imprisonment and term of imprisonment keep quite close company. Given their undeniable close quarters, coupled with their interchangeable use, we conclude that sentence of imprisonment and term of imprisonment should be read synonymously. It then follows that the district court's assessment of the two additional criminal history points was in error, albeit it far from obvious. A review of the Application Notes in the Sentencing Guidelines provides ample support for our interpretation. In Application Note No. 11, the Commission evinced its intent that pursuant to § 4A1.2(k), [r]ather than count the original sentence and the resentence after revocation as separate sentences, the sentence given upon revocation should be added to the original sentence of imprisonment, if any, and the total should be counted as if it were one sentence. (emphasis added). Thus, the Commission refers to the original sentence as the original term of imprisonment in § 4A1.2(k)(1), yet in Application Note No. 11 exchanges original term of imprisonment for original sentence of imprisonment. Given that Application Note No. 11 is the note designed to provide district courts with better insight to the true meaning of § 4A1.2(k), the note's replacement of term of imprisonment with sentence of imprisonment leads us to conclude the two terms cannot have disparate meanings. [8] Application Note No. 11 also explains that § 4A1.2(k) is designed to benefit the defendant by limiting the number of criminal history points that may be assigned to a single conviction (three), even if the defendant served multiple prison sentences on that conviction due to violations of his probation. That is, it does not seem that a disproportionately harsher punishment for having violated probation was the true intent of the Commission, for in Comment No. 11 following § 4A1.2(k), the Commission states that the purpose of § 4A1.2(k) is to ensure that no more than three points will be assessed for a single conviction, even if probation or conditional release was subsequently revoked. If this Court were to conclude that § 4A1.2(k)(1)'s original term of imprisonment does not refer to the calculated sentence of imprisonment as found in § 4A1.2(e) and defined in § 4A1.2(b)this Court would be interpreting § 4A1.2(k)(1) as requiring the sentencing court to add the original term of a sentence (without the benefit of subtracting any suspended portion of the original sentence pursuant to in § 4A1.2(b)(2)), to the new sentence issued upon revocation. That is, under such an interpretation, anytime a defendant violated probation on a prior conviction, the sentencing court would be required to consider portions of the defendant's original sentence that the sentencing court would not have otherwise considered. Such a conclusion would violate the Supreme Court's rule of lenity, a policy the Supreme Court has adopted in statutory construction. Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980) (This policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.). [9] For the aforementioned reasons, we hold that for purposes of calculating criminal history points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, term of imprisonment shares the same meaning as sentence of imprisonment. Because until now the error in assigning any other meaning to term of imprisonment has been anything but obvious, and because we review the district court's error under the plain error standard of review, we affirm the district court's sentencing of the defendant-appellant. Sentencing courts are now instructed that in calculating the term issued upon revocation pursuant to § 4A1.2(k), they are to include in their calculations only ... the portion [of any sentence issued upon revocation] that was not suspended. § 4A1.2(b)(2).