Opinion ID: 1179846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Judgment of Murder

Text: Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of murder. Specifically, he challenges, in various particulars, the constitutionality of ORS 163.095(2)(f), which defines the crime of aggravated murder after escaping, and ORS 163.105, which dictates the penalty for a person found guilty of aggravated murder. [11] He argues that, because he was indicted for a single count of aggravated murder under ORS 163.095(2)(f) and sentenced for a violation of that statute under ORS 163.105, and because those statutes are unconstitutional, this case should be remanded to the trial court to vacate his judgment and sentence and to impose a judgment and sentence for the lesser included crime of intentional murder. Defendant argues, among other things, that ORS 163.095(2)(f) and ORS 163.105 violate Article I, section 16, [12] of the Oregon Constitution, because they impermissibly impose a penalty so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper; that those statutes violate Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution, because persons who murder while escaping are impermissibly treated differently than those who murder after they have completed their escape; and that those statutes are unconstitutionally vague in violation of Article I, sections 10 and 21, of the Oregon constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. All of those contentions have been addressed and rejected in State v. Isom, 313 Or. 391, 394-402, 837 P.2d 491 (1992). Defendant also argues that ORS 163.095(2)(f) and ORS 163.105 violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, because there is no genuine narrowing of the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and no scheme reasonably justifying the imposition of a more severe sentence on one person compared to those found guilty of murder. That argument was expressly left open in State v. Isom, supra, 313 Or. at 398 n. 10, 837 P.2d 491. In State v. Farrar, supra , this court stated: An aggravating factor or a category of aggravated murder is vague in violation of the Eighth Amendment if it does not genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 US 356, 108 SCt 1853, 100 LEd2d 372 (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 US 420, 100 SCt 1759, 64 LEd2d 398 (1980), cert den 456 US 919 [102 S.Ct. 1778, 72 L.Ed.2d 180] (1982) (plurality). Godfrey v. Georgia illustrates the Eighth Amendment concern. In that case, the jury had found, as an aggravating factor, that the murder was `outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.' The plurality in Godfrey reasoned, however, that because almost all murders could be characterized in this way, this aggravating factor did not provide any `principled way to distinguish in this case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not.' Id., 446 US at 433 [100 S.Ct. at 1767]. Accordingly, it held that the factor was vague in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 309 Or. at 184, 786 P.2d 161. Farrar held that ORS 163.095(2)(d) and (2)(e), which define, respectively, aggravated murder in the course of and in furtherance of a felony and aggravated murder by concealment, did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 309 Or. at 184-85, 786 P.2d 161. In evaluating their validity, the question to be asked, the court held, is whether the category at issue impermissibly could be applied to almost all murders. Id. at 185, 786 P.2d 161. Those statutes specified a discrete class of criminal conduct and thereby genuinely narrowed the class of persons eligible for the death penalty in compliance with the Eighth Amendment. Ibid. The principles articulated in Farrar are dispositive in this case. The question is not whether aggravated murder after escaping is broader than aggravated felony murder for escape in the first degree, or whether there is overlap among subsections, or whether the particular subsection at issue in this case is broader than defendant would like it to be. Rather, the question is whether the category at issue impermissibly could be applied to almost all murders. Id. at 185, 786 P.2d 161. Clearly, the answer to that question is no. ORS 163.095(2)(f), the provision defining aggravated murder after escaping, describes a discrete class of criminal conduct. That category could not, by any means, be applicable to almost all murders. We hold, therefore, that ORS 163.150(1)(f) genuinely and clearly narrows the class of persons who are eligible for the death penalty and does not violate the Eighth Amendment. State v. Farrar, supra . Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for entry of a judgment of murder.