Opinion ID: 1805327
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the trial court err in quashing the subpoena duces tecum which sought production of nelson's financial records and profits, to be used for calculation of consequential damages?

Text: Prior to trial, Phipps brought a subpoena duces tecum requesting Nelson's previous four years' income tax returns. Our statute allows the court, upon motion, to quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable and oppressive. SDCL § 15-6-45(b)(1). Nelson so moved, and via a telephonic hearing, the court granted the motion to quash. The order granting the motion fails to state the court's rationale, and no transcript of the telephonic hearing is included in the record; therefore, we cannot review the basis of the ruling. We have held that a party seeking to modify or quash such a subpoena has the burden of proving the necessity of doing so. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Grudnik, 90 S.D. 571, 243 N.W.2d 796, 798 (1976). We generally recognize that the trial court should be allowed considerable discretion on its evidentiary rulings. See State v. Hanson, 456 N.W.2d 135, 138 (S.D. 1990); State v. Olesen, 443 N.W.2d 8, 9 (S.D. 1989); State v. Bawdon, 386 N.W.2d 484, 486 (S.D.1986). However, in the present matter, if the issue of consequential damages issue is re-tried, the court is free to reconsider its ruling on the subpoena. See SDCL 37-6-24 (allowing damages in addition to injunction in trademark infringement action). Further, we note that the briefs of the parties addressed our statutes on punitive damages. In our opinion, this has no application to consequential damages incidental to the issuance of an injunction. MILLER, C.J., and SABERS, J., concur. HENDERSON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. AMUNDSON, J., dissents.