Opinion ID: 2746353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Statements about the Mitigation Phase

Text: {¶ 143} In proposition of law No. VIII, Thompson argues that the trial court violated his due-process rights by telling jurors conclusively that there would be a second phase of the trial. He claims that the “judge conveyed that Thompson’s guilt was a foregone conclusion” and “infringed upon his presumption of innocence.” See Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; R.C. 2901.05(A). Thompson did not raise this objection at trial, so we review this proposition for plain error.
{¶ 144} The trial judge initially described Ohio’s bifurcated process for capital trials to the jurors during voir dire. The judge explained that if Thompson were convicted of the charges against him, he “could be sentenced to death or to other options of life imprisonment.” In light of the “possibility    that the death penalty could be, under certain circumstances, imposed,” the judge advised that she and counsel would inquire about the prospective jurors’ views on the death penalty. {¶ 145} Before questioning began, the judge emphasized that these voir dire inquiries about capital punishment in no way “impl[ied] that the defendant is guilty of the crime that is charged” or “presuppose[d] that a finding of guilt should be made in this case.” The judge explained, “If there is a conviction by the State proving that the defendant committed these crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, then there is a possibility that there will be a separate hearing, which we will call a sentencing hearing, where the jury will be called upon to make a determination regarding the sentencing.” (Emphasis added.) {¶ 146} With regard to scheduling, the trial judge informed the prospective jurors that the trial phase would begin the following week, and then said, “[I]f there’s a sentencing phase, [it] will begin on June 10th.” (Emphasis added.) Midway through the trial phase, someone apparently inquired about 38 January Term, 2014 whether the same schedule applied to alternate jurors. In response, the trial judge stated: Alternates, at this point, I think the question was raised, you are on the same schedule as these jurors for sequestration. You will remain jurors until they go to deliberate for a verdict. If we get to the second phase, you remain as a juror. And I’m glad that everyone is back, but we have a three-day weekend, and God forbid anything happens, but we will need you. And there will be a break then between this phase and the next phase. And you will remain part of the jury until we finish the second phase of the—get to that second phase. Thompson did not object.
{¶ 147} “Ohio bifurcates capital trials into guilt and penalty phases.” R.C. 2929.03(D); R.C. 2929.04(B) and (C). The jury initially determines a defendant’s guilt. If the jury convicts the defendant of aggravated murder and at least one death specification, then the trial proceeds to the second phase. Otherwise, the second phase never occurs. {¶ 148} In light of this bifurcated system, if a trial judge unequivocally tells a capital jury that there will be a second phase of the trial, the judge violates due process by communicating a belief in the defendant’s guilt and undermining the presumption of innocence. State v. Williams, 73 Ohio St.3d 153, 169, 652 N.E.2d 721 (1995); see R.C. 2901.05(A); The judge does not violate due process by speaking “generally of there being a possibility that the jury would have to return for a second phase depending on the verdict.” (Emphasis deleted.) Id. 39 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 149} Thompson argues that the judge’s language here was conclusive, not equivocal. We disagree. Considered in context, the judge’s statements that “there will be a break then between this phase and the next phase” and “you will remain part of the jury until we finish the second phase of the—get to that second phase” did not imply Thompson’s guilt to the jury. In the sentence immediately preceding these statements, the court stated: “If we get to the second phase, you remain as a juror.” (Emphasis added.) By using the word “if,” the judge clearly indicated that the trial may or may not reach the second phase; she “never spoke in definitive terms” regarding a second phase. Williams at 169. Moreover, as in Williams, the trial judge made the challenged statements about the second phase of trial in the context of explaining the schedule. {¶ 150} Even early on, the judge also repeatedly emphasized that the second phase was only a possibility, not a certainty. She took pains to communicate that all discussions of capital punishment and the possibility of a second phase were not intended to convey anything about Thompson’s guilt. And at the conclusion of the trial phase, the judge admonished the jurors, “If, during the course of the trial, I have said or done anything which you consider to be an indication of my view on these subjects, you are instructed to disregard it.” We presume that the jury followed the judge’s instruction. See Pang v. Minch, 53 Ohio St.3d 186, 195, 559 N.E.2d 1313 (1990). {¶ 151} Accordingly, we conclude that the trial judge did not violate due process by implying Thompson’s guilt, and we reject proposition of law No. VIII.