Opinion ID: 750120
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The probable sentence or other consequences if the person is convicted.

Text: 87 Id. § 9-27.230. In a passage relevant to a juvenile's challenge to the Attorney General's certification under § 5032, the Manual advises against commencing a federal prosecution based on the same acts involved in a prior state proceeding unless the matter involves a substantial federal interest. Id. § 9-2.142. 88 The Attorney General's certification, thus, is essentially a perfunctory corollary to the decision to prosecute itself. The Supreme Court has spoken on the reasons why these type of decisions should be insulated from judicial review: 89 [T]he decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plans are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. 90 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1530, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985). This decision is administrative in nature, made after a studied assessment of the Government's policy visions and priorities, as well as practical considerations like budgetary constraints, the effectiveness of prior enforcement efforts in a particular area, and the strategic advantages and disadvantages of proceeding in federal court. In short, it is precisely the type of task assigned to a political branch rather than to our government's neutral arbiters. Courts are inherently reactive bodies and an attempt to second-guess the executive branch's prosecutorial discretion in this regard would expand the bounds of our delegated authority and commit us to an inappropriate role in the criminal justice system. 91 As a final matter, we note that our conclusion takes into account the Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 115 S.Ct. 2227, 132 L.Ed.2d 375 (1995). In that case, the Court considered a provision of the Westfall Act that empowers the Attorney General to certify that a federal employee sued for negligence was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). Once the Attorney General makes this certification, the United States Government takes the place of the employee as the defendant and the governing law becomes the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2671. The plaintiffs in Lamagno urged the district court to review the Attorney General's certification in their case because the FTCA would have required dismissal of their claims. The Court held that judges could review the substantive accuracy of the Attorney General's certification for two main reasons: (1) the Attorney General had an overwhelming incentive to make this certification in order to avoid liability, Lamagno, 515 U.S. at 427, 115 S.Ct. at 2233, and (2) courts traditionally have reviewed a government official's determination of factual matters that are dispositive of court controversies, id. at 429-30, 115 S.Ct. at 2233-34. 92 Those two concerns are not implicated in § 5032. The statute does not deprive any injured parties of a remedy at tort--one of the factors fueling the Court's decision in Lamagno. Furthermore, there is no hint that the Attorney General would (or could) have a conflict of interest in deciding whether a prosecution was justified by a substantial federal interest. The decision to prosecute results in expenditures and diversion of resources from other tasks rather than an immunity that safeguards governmental funds. Finally, a certification of the existence of a substantial federal interest is not outcome-determinative in the same way that the certification can be in the FTCA context. Under § 5032, the district court still makes the ultimate determination of whether a transfer to adult status is appropriate and does not merely rubber-stamp the Attorney General's decision on the matter. 93 We join the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that courts cannot review the substantive basis of the Attorney General's certification of a substantial Federal interest under 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Defendants can challenge technical aspects of the Government's compliance with the certification requirement (e.g., whether the certifying party was a proper agent of the Attorney General, whether the certifying party actually made the unreviewable statement that a substantial federal interest existed, whether the certification was filed in a timely manner, etc.). Defendants also remain free to raise constitutional challenges to certifications that are made in bad faith and/or that constitute selective prosecution. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608, 105 S.Ct. at 1531. Appellant Key, however, does not raise a challenge that is cognizable in the federal courts.