Opinion ID: 757097
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Overall Jurisdiction

Text: 18 Each defendant challenges his convictions on various grounds. First, we address the defendants' overall challenge of the federal court's jurisdiction to prosecute them for the charged offenses. The defendants make two basic challenges: (1) the only federal law applicable to the defendants, as Native Americans, are those encompassed within the Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152, and the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153; (2) alternatively, the defendants urge, even if general federal criminal laws do apply to them, Public Law 280 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162) granted Minnesota state courts exclusive jurisdiction over crimes involving Indians and arising in Indian country. 19 The defendants' first jurisdictional challenge is broad-based and if true, would require this court to dismiss all charges. This particular jurisdictional claim is allegedly derived from historic interpretation of the patchwork of federal statutes and early case law affecting the sovereignty of Indian tribes in America. This area of the law is not easily discerned and has arisen in numerous cases both in this court and other circuit courts of appeal. 10 20 The general laws of the United States were made applicable to Indian Country through the Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152. 11 The second paragraph of the Act contains an exception to this jurisdictional grant for any crime committed by one Indian against another. As early as 1883, the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883), applied this exception and dismissed a federal prosecution for murder of one Indian by another. In 1885, in order to curb a perceived lawlessness resulting from the Crow Dog decision, Congress passed the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, which provides the federal courts with exclusive jurisdiction over certain enumerated crimes. 12 21 The Indian Major Crimes Act allowed for federal prosecution of certain enumerated crimes, and today, the federal government has jurisdiction over fourteen major crimes when they are committed on an Indian reservation. The Indian Major Crimes Act does not contain an Indian-against-Indian exception. Nonetheless, the defendants argue that as a result of the Indian Major Crimes Act, the federal government no longer has jurisdiction under § 1152 to prosecute crimes perpetrated by one Indian against another, unless the crime is one enumerated in § 1153. 13 In support of this argument, the defendants cite United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 36 S.Ct. 699, 60 L.Ed. 1196 (1916), wherein the Supreme Court observed that the inclusion of certain offenses within the Indian Major Crimes Act carries with it some implication of a purpose to exclude others. 241 U.S. at 606, 36 S.Ct. 699. 22 In sum, the defendants argue that the only crimes which may be the basis for federal court jurisdiction are those within the Indian Country Crimes Act and the Indian Major Crimes Act. As the defendants acknowledge, this court has rejected this claim on several occasions. See, e.g., Blue, 722 F.2d at 38486; Stone v. United States, 506 F.2d 561, 563 (8th Cir.1974); United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453, 454-55 (8th Cir.1974). We recognize that when addressing claims like the one made here, our court and other courts of appeal have issued opinions that seem confusing and somewhat inconsistent. 14 However, there are several reasons why we believe our earlier precedent controls. 23 First, many courts of appeal 15 recognize that federal courts may enforce general federal criminal laws against all persons, including Indians within Indian country. 16 Federal statutes of general applicability, those in which situs of the offense is not an element of the crime, are not encompassed within the Indian Country Crimes Act. As a result, the Indian-against-Indian exception contained in the Indian Country Crimes Act does not apply to federal criminal laws of general applicability. 24 The Second Circuit in Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, and the Seventh Circuit in Smith, 562 F.2d 453, emphasized that only federal laws which seek to protect a peculiar federal interest may be prosecuted. 17 For example, in Smith, the offense was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 111 for forcible assault on a federal officer. The Smith court found that the district court had concurrent jurisdiction with the tribal court, because of the peculiarly Federal nature of the assault. 562 F.2d at 458. However, this distinction actually is difficult to apply, given the presumption of jurisdictional authority of Congress to pass federal laws. If Congress passes any federal act, assuming it has constitutional authority to do so, there always exists a federal concern and interest. For this reason, identifying a federal interest in a general federal law in order to override tribal sovereignty seemingly is redundant. 25 At the time that the Indian Country Crimes Act was passed, it may have been assumed, as Felix Cohen points out, that federal laws outside of enclave laws were not applicable to the Indian Country. See Cohen, supra, at 296-97. However, as Indian law evolved, that premise was discarded. General federal criminal laws directed to all persons became recognized as applying equally to Native Americans within Indian Country. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116-17, 80 S.Ct. 543, 4 L.Ed.2d 584 (1960); Cohen, supra, at 284-85. 26 Moreover, the Indian Country Crimes Act speaks only to the general laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. ... 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (emphasis added). Because situs of the offense is not an element of any of the statutory violations committed by the defendants, none of the defendants claim the crimes for which they were convicted were enclave laws. Thus, because the offenses do not fall within the Indian Country Crimes Act, they are not subject to the Act's exception relating to crimes committed in Indian Country by one Indian against another. 18 27 The Indian-against-Indian exception contained in the Indian Country Crimes Act manifested, as Cohen observes, a broad respect for tribal sovereignty, particularly in matters affecting only Indians. Cohen, supra, at 290 (citing Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 36 S.Ct. 699, 60 L.Ed. 1196, and Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030). However, the application of general federal laws to Native Americans in this case does not implicate the tribal concerns of sovereignty addressed by the Indian Country Crimes Act exception. There may be other federal-law prosecutions that would implicate important tribal interests. However, we fail to see how tribal interests are paramount to the federal interests implicated in the various criminal charges involved here. Although the defendants are Native Americans, and their conduct took place within Indian country, tribal interests do not outweigh the federal interest in prohibiting offenses such as mail fraud, money laundering, bribery, and conspiracy. Moreover, Indian tribes are not totally independent of the United States. Federal jurisdiction over the offenses committed here is imperative for the protection of all Native Americans who are U.S. citizens living on Indian reservations. Public Law 280 28 The alternative jurisdictional argument raised by the defendants may be summarily rejected. Defendants assert that even if general federal laws are applicable, under Public Law 280, the federal government has surrendered to the State of Minnesota its criminal jurisdiction over all federal offenses committed on Indian lands. As the defendants acknowledge, this court has rejected this exact argument in two recent cases: Stone, 112 F.3d 971, and United States v. Pemberton, 121 F.3d 1157 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1046, 140 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998). As this court observed in Pemberton: Crimes of general applicability--that is, actions that Congress has declared illegal regardless of where they occur--are not affected by the enactment of Public Law 280 and remain within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. 121 F.3d at 1164. 29