Opinion ID: 198097
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Patrick Cunan

Text: 33 Patrick's first argument concerns what he contends was misconduct on the part of the trial judge. Specifically, he takes issue with Judge Young's practice of holding up exhibits for the government, so that the jury could view the enlargements while the witness testified. The record indicates that Judge Young did this regularly, but that he also held up exhibits for the defense during cross-examination. 34 Patrick asserts he was denied his right to a fair trial because the practice gave the jury the impression that Judge Young was acting as the prosecutor's assistant. Judge Young instructed the jury that when we have big things and we have a witness on the stand, we found that it makes sense--and I don't mind doing it, and I'll do it for everybody--if I hold them up, because then people don't have to get down. It saves time. No objection to the practice was lodged at the time, and we therefore review for plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). To obtain relief based on plain error, an appellant must show that the trial judge committed an error that constituted a '[d]eviation from a legal rule'; that the error was obvious and 'clear under current law'; and, that the error affected 'substantial rights.'  United States v. Bartelho, 129 F.3d 663, 673 (1st Cir.1997), pet. for cert. filed (U.S. June 5, 1998)(No. 98-5442) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). 35 It is well-established that a judge is not a mere umpire; he is 'the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct,' and has a perfect right--albeit a right that should be exercised with care--to participate actively in the trial proper. Logue v. Dore, 103 F.3d 1040, 1045 (1st Cir.1997) (quoting Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1933)). Our inquiry into whether a trial judge has crossed the line in claims of this kind focuses on whether the complaining party can show serious prejudice. Id. Thus, where the judge participates actively, the judge's participation must be balanced; he cannot become an advocate or otherwise use his judicial powers to advantage or disadvantage a party unfairly. Id. In the final analysis, we examine claims of prejudice according to a standard of fairness and impartiality, recognizing that each case tends to be fact-specific. United States v. Polito, 856 F.2d 414, 418 (1st Cir.1988) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 36 Under these facts, we detect no prejudice, and therefore no error. First, we find it difficult to understand the argument that the judge displayed partiality in the course of this conduct when he also held up exhibits for the defense. Although he was called upon to do this far more frequently for the government, this imbalance is not attributable to bias. Instead, it is the result of the fact that the government's case was document-intensive, and the appellants' defense was not. Nor do we think the record supports the argument that this practice conveyed bias to the jury. Judge Young was careful to clearly state that this practice was a courtesy to the witnesses, and was done in the interest of saving time. Moreover, the jury was instructed about the purpose of the judge's practice contemporaneously with the first instance of actual assistance. Thus, if there was the threat of unintended taint, we think it was effectively muted from the outset. We therefore do not think the district court's practice deprived Patrick of a fair trial. 7
37 Patrick next asserts that his constitutional right to effective cross-examination was infringed by the district court's decision to restrict a certain line of cross-examination on hearsay grounds. At numerous times during the trial, Patrick's counsel questioned witnesses on cross-examination as to whether DeCato had ever told them that he had made $1 million as a result of his investment in the recovery of silver bars from the shipwreck Atocha. The district court consistently sustained the government's objections, finding that the questions called for hearsay. Patrick asserts on appeal, as he did in the district court, that he was not attempting to establish the truth of the matter asserted--that DeCato's funds came from salvaging efforts--but instead that DeCato had a pattern of misrepresenting to others that his money came from legitimate sources. It would follow, then, that DeCato would have used a similar line on the Cunans. Thus, Patrick urges, restriction of this line of cross-examination so infringed Cunan's rights to present a defense that a new trial is warranted. 38 Patrick's argument is based on United States v. Mulinelli-Navas, 111 F.3d 983 (1st Cir.1997), where we reversed a conviction and remanded for a new trial on the basis of the district court's refusal to permit certain cross-examination, id. at 993. We reiterated that [t]he Sixth Amendment, and thus the constitutional minimum that must be allowed a criminal defendant before a trial court's discretion to limit cross-examination adheres, includes the ability to develop and present a defense. Id. at 992. Crucial to our decision was the fact that in Mulinelli-Navas, the district court's limitation foreclos[ed] the introduction of any testimony to support Mulinelli's theory of defense. Id. (emphasis in original). 39 Patrick's argument turns initially on whether the district court's restriction of cross-examination foreclosed his ability to present this particular defense. We think it did not. The record reveals that there was ample evidence generated by the government's case to support Patrick's theory of defense. Numerous witnesses testified throughout the trial that DeCato represented to them that he was either in the construction business, or an investor in property, or a condominium manager, or a collector of precious metals. We do not think it particularly relevant that this evidence came in during the government's direct examination as opposed to the Cunans' cross-examination. It was testimonial evidence which directly supported the defense theory. It provided an evidentiary basis for Patrick to urge the jury to infer that DeCato had similarly misrepresented the source of his income to the Cunans. Mulinelli-Navas is therefore largely inapposite to this case. 40 Because there was sufficient evidence before the jury from which to present this defense, the trial court's discretion to limit cross-examination adhere[d]. Mulinelli-Navas, 111 F.3d at 992. The district court ruled that if Patrick wanted to introduce evidence suggesting that DeCato had made a considerable amount of money due to his involvement with the Atocha, he had to do so with competent evidence, not hearsay. Similarly, the trial court ruled that if the Cunans wanted to introduce evidence as to what DeCato had told others about the Atocha in order to prove that the Cunans thought they were dealing with treasure ship money rather than drug money, they would first have to show some communication about the Atocha treasure from DeCato to the Cunans. The court was clear that it would be receptive to such evidence. We detect no abuse of discretion in the restriction of cross-examination. 41 In a related vein, Patrick asks us to note that the district court somehow failed to assist Patrick in compelling the appearance of Mel Fisher, the head of the Atocha salvage operation. At the end of the fifteenth day of trial, the Cunans' attorney asked the district court what the procedure would be for compelling the appearance of Fisher. The district court responded that it would first have to determine whether it had the power to order Fisher to appear, before holding a hearing on whether to exercise that power. Patrick takes issue with the district court's comment, I rather doubt that I have the power to order someone who is a resident in Florida [to] present themselves in Massachusetts. The next day, however, the Cunans' counsel stated that we will not be getting into the Atocha. Accordingly, no hearing was ever held, and there was no request that Fisher be compelled to appear.
42 Patrick's final assertion of error concerns the giving of a willful blindness instruction to the jury. Two claims are made. First, Patrick alleges that it was error for the court to instruct on willful blindness at all because there was insufficient evidence to support the instruction. Because a timely objection was lodged to the giving of the instruction, we review its propriety for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Mitchell, 85 F.3d 800, 809 (1st Cir.1996). Second, Patrick contends that the language of the instruction was incorrect because it failed to specifically instruct that mere recklessness or negligence is not enough to support a finding of willful blindness. Because this specific assertion of error was not raised below, we review for plain error. See United States v. O'Connor, 28 F.3d 218, 221 (1st Cir.1994). 43 With regard to Patrick's first contention, we detect no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to instruct on willful blindness. We stated in United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 452 (1st Cir.1994), that [t]he trial court may instruct the jury concerning willful blindness when a defendant claims a lack of knowledge, the facts support an inference of defendant's conscious course of deliberate ignorance, and the instruction, taken as a whole, cannot be misunderstood by a juror as mandating the inference of knowledge. Patrick argues that when there is an absence of evidence showing deliberate acts, on Defendant's part, aimed at avoidance of actual knowledge, then the willful blindness instruction should not be given. Patrick's Br. at 27. But this is not the law. All that is required is that the facts support an inference of defendant's conscious course of deliberate ignorance. Brandon, 17 F.3d at 452 (emphasis added). 44 We think the facts of this case sufficiently supported the inferences necessary to permit the district court to instruct on willful blindness. There was evidence which tended to show that the Cunans were closely involved with DeCato's extensive purchases, and were aware that he was purchasing goods and property under false names. There was also evidence that they knew that he was a fugitive from a drug trafficking charge, yet accepted large amounts of cash from DeCato, turning that cash into checks for his purchases. In the face of this, they adamantly maintain that they did not know DeCato's funds came from drug trafficking. This evidence supports an inference of conscious avoidance. See United States v. Gabriele, 63 F.3d 61, 66-67 (1st Cir.1995) (finding similar red flags of criminal activity sufficient to support instruction). 45 Turning to Patrick's second assertion, we detect no plain error. The district court's instruction was as follows: 8 46 [Y]ou may infer that a person had knowledge from circumstantial evidence or evidence showing willful blindness by that person. Willful blindness exists when a person, whose suspicion has been aroused deliberately fails to make further inquiries. If you find that a person had a strong suspicion and someone withheld important facts, yet shut his or her eyes for fear of what he or she would learn, you may conclude that the person acted knowingly. 47 Patrick asserts that this instruction should have included a statement that mere recklessness or negligence is not enough to support a finding of willful blindness. He is correct that our recent decisions on the issue have approved instructions that included such language. See, e.g., Brandon, 17 F.3d at 452 n. 72; United States v. Richardson, 14 F.3d 666, 671 (1st Cir.1994). We stated in Brandon that [t]he danger of an improper willful blindness instruction is the possibility that the jury will be led to employ a negligence standard and convict a defendant on the impermissible ground that he should have known an illegal act was taking place. 17 F.3d at 453 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also First Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions--Criminal § 2.14 (West 1998). But we think the instruction at issue was adequately worded to avoid such a danger. The instruction speaks of conscious acts of avoidance--deliberately fails to make further inquiries, shut his or her eyes. This language conveys the proper standard to apply in assessing the Cunans' conduct, and fairly read, does not suggest that anything less will suffice. We therefore find no plain error. 48 As a final note, we do not understand Patrick's contention that the district court failed to instruct the jury that it must find willful blindness beyond a reasonable doubt. The record demonstrates that the court instructed the jury that the government must prove the knowledge element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, before outlining the ways in which the knowledge element could be satisfied, including willful blindness.