Opinion ID: 1741618
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Payment of Counsel Fees

Text: The determination of the respective responsibilities of the legal profession and the government in providing constitutionally required representation for indigents is a new and evolving problem. The common law did not ensure the poor a right to counsel; rather, it was the professional obligation of the American lawyer and his English counterpart to accept an assignment to represent an indigent party when so directed by the court, which occurred in selected and limited cases. Further, there was no right to compensation from the government or any other source for such representation. The principal question that arises from the advent of a fundamental constitutional right to counsel in various classes of cases, which effectively began in 1963 with Gideon v. Wainwright , is whether the members of the bar should now be relieved of their historical responsibility to represent the poor whenever the constitution mandates the right to counsel in a legal proceeding. In establishing a constitutional right to counsel in certain cases, the United States Supreme Court placed the obligation to provide counsel on the government rather than the individual members of the legal profession. There was no intention to place the entire fiscal burden on the legal profession to perform a function which is the constitutional responsibility of the government. The common law obligation of the profession to represent the poor without compensation has been carried forward in contemporary practice by cases such as United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978, 86 S.Ct. 550, 15 L.Ed.2d 469 (1966), which endorse the historical concept that one who is allowed the privilege to practice law accepts a professional obligation to defend the poor. [3] Some courts and commentators have expressed the contrary view that requiring court-appointed counsel to serve without compensation constitutes an unfair imposition upon the bar and an unfair taking of private property in violation of the due process clause. [4] It is our view that the government has an obligation to provide legal representation when such appointment is required by the constitution, but lawyers should not be totally relieved of their professional obligation to provide legal services to the poor. In the absence of a statutory payment formula, we find that when the appointment of counsel is constitutionally required under Potvin, payment should be made under the formula expressed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441, 448 (1966): We are satisfied the burden is more than the profession alone should shoulder, and hence we are compelled to relieve the profession of it. ... But for the time being at least, we think the members of the bar should contribute something more, despite still other calls upon them for gratuitous service. To that end, the compensation should be less than that expected of a client who can pay. The rate should reimburse assigned counsel for his overhead and yield something toward his own support. In approximate terms the overhead of the average law office probably runs about 40% of gross income. To meet that expense and yield something to assigned counsel, we suggest compensation at 60% of the fee a client of ordinary means would pay an attorney of modest financial success. When appointment of counsel is desirable but not constitutionally required, the judge should use all available legal aid services, and when these services are unavailable, he should request private counsel to provide the necessary services. Under these circumstances, no compensation is available, and the services are part of the lawyer's historical professional responsibility to represent the poor. To the extent the government must provide fees for appointed counsel, such payment must be made by the county under section 43.28, Florida Statutes (1979). This statutory provision was not considered by the trial court or the parties in this action. Section 43.28 provides: The counties shall provide appropriate courtrooms, facilities, equipment, and, unless provided by the state, personnel necessary to operate the circuit and county courts. [Emphasis added.] This section was enacted to aid in the implementation of a new judicial article and was adopted immediately following the amendment of article V in 1972. In our opinion, when appointment of counsel is constitutionally required to represent an indigent, the case cannot proceed without such an appointment; consequently, such counsel is personnel necessary to operate the court. In such an instance, the trial court may require the county to pay appropriate attorney's fees for such representation absent any other statutory provision. We note that the counties are required by statute to pay such fees in criminal matters. §§ 27.53(2), 925.035(6), Fla. Stat. (1979).