Opinion ID: 814134
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Multiplicity of Counts 12-17

Text: Grimes further argues that the subsection E offenses charged in Counts 12-17 are multiplicitous because the repeated messages left on the six days charged—January 4, 10, 11, 23, 24, and 25—were part of a single ongoing course of conduct. If a defendant is charged with a single crime in multiple counts, those counts are multiplicitous, and subjecting the defendant to multiple punishments violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Chipps, 410 F.3d at 447. Where the same statutory violation is charged in multiple counts, “the question is whether Congress intended the facts underlying each count to make up a separate unit of prosecution.” Id. (citing Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84 (1955)). Thus, “we must decide whether Congress intended to punish . . . a course of conduct . . . or whether Congress sought to punish separately individual acts.” Id. at 448. “To determine how many courses of conduct [Grimes] undertook, we apply the so-called ‘impulse test.’” Id. at 449 (citing United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 224 (1952)). “Under the impulse test, we ‘treat[] as one offense all violations that arise from that singleness of thought, purpose or action, which may be deemed a single ‘impulse.’” Id. (quoting Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. at 224) (alteration in original). In making this determination, we may “look to the statutory language, legislative history, and statutory scheme to ascertain what Congress intended the unit -9- of prosecution to be.” Id. at 448. We resolve any doubt as to congressional intent in favor of the defendant. Id. Grimes argues that, although he left a series of voicemail messages for Dan and Marcie Kari on each of six different days, each represented by a separate count, all of these messages were part of a single course of conduct, and, therefore, charging each day’s messages separately violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. In opposition, the Government contends that in preparing the indictment it needed to select some unit of prosecution, which would represent a separate unit of repeated calls. It chose to separate the different days into different counts because, for each day, Grimes called from multiple numbers and did not always identify himself in the voicemail message, requiring the Government to prove that he was the caller who left each series of voicemail messages. The Government also argues that each day of messages involved different thoughts or purposes of Grimes, with some days involving direct threats to the Karis and other days involving messages that could be construed as Grimes simply attempting to locate his wife. Although we appreciate the difficulty in ascertaining the proper unit of prosecution in light of the “repeated calls” requirement of subsection E, the definition of the term “repeated” undercuts the argument that twenty-six voicemail messages left over three weeks can be separated into six different courses of conduct or impulses. According to its definition, the term “repeated” means “renewed or recurring again and again; constant, frequent.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1924 (1961). Although no court has defined the term as it is used in subsection E, under subsection D, the term repeated has been construed to mean “repeated in close enough proximity to one another to rightly be called a single episode, and not separated by periods of months or years.” Bruce I. McDaniel, Annotation, Prohibition of Obscene or Harassing Telephone Calls in Interstate or Foreign Communications under U.S.C.A. § 223, 50 A.L.R. Fed. 541 (1980) (discussing United States v. Darsey, 342 F. Supp. 311 (E.D. Pa. 1972)). This definition also is consistent -10- with the jury instruction given in this case, which explained that “‘[r]epeated’ or ‘repeatedly’ means to recur again and again, or to do over and over again in close proximity to one another so as to be called a single episode and not separated by periods of months or years.” Final Jury Instr. No. 12 (emphasis added). Thus, resolving any doubt as to Congress’s intent in favor of the defendant, we conclude that the term “repeatedly” in subsection E is most properly read as encompassing the entire three-week period and all twenty-six messages. Therefore, the subsection E offenses charged in Counts 12-17 are multiplicitous. Nonetheless, a question remains as to the proper remedy. Grimes argues that the double jeopardy violation requires us to remand the case to the district court for resentencing. We disagree, however, because the sentences for Counts 12-17 run concurrently. See Chipps, 410 F.3d at 449 (holding that when “the sentences for the [multiplicitous] counts are concurrent there is no need for resentencing”); see also United States v. Easom, 569 F.2d 457, 459 (8th Cir. 1978) (“[W]e do not perceive any need for resentencing due to the similarity of the . . . offenses involved.”). The imposition of concurrent sentences does not allow us to avoid the double jeopardy issue entirely because the special assessments imposed for each count subject Grimes to multiple punishments. See United States v. Christner, 66 F.3d 922, 927 (8th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we instruct the district court to vacate Counts 13-17, including the five associated $100 special assessments.