Opinion ID: 1887522
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Board's Findings on Remand

Text: Respondent argues that the record does not support the Board's conclusion that she submitted a patently fraudulent voucher. She contends that the Board's original finding that the voucher was prepared without much deliberation and that it was reckless, careless, and not cunning, negates any conclusion that respondent acted with a fraudulent intent. She argues that eleven of the twelve entries on the voucher are supported by the evidence and that one uncorroborated entry, i.e., a jail visit, would not render the entire voucher patently fraudulent. However, in Cleaver-Bascombe I, this court rejected respondent's argument that the Hearing Committee's findings lacked adequate support in the record. Cleaver-Bascombe I, supra, 892 A.2d at 402. The Board found that all of the Committee's factual determinations are supported by substantial evidence and adopted them  in toto,  and this court did the same. Id. To the extent that respondent seeks to revisit the challenges previously raised and disposed of, we are foreclosed from doing so by the law-of-the-case doctrine. Lenkin Co. Mgmt. v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 677 A.2d 46, 48 (D.C.1996) (citing Kritsidimas v. Sheskin, 411 A.2d 370, 371 (D.C.1980)); see also M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971) ([N]o division of this court will overrule a prior decision of this court . . . and . . . such [a] result can only be accomplished by this court en banc.). Thus, we consider here only those new or additional findings made in response to this court's remand order. In the prior decision, the court affirmed the Board's findings and conclusions that respondent knowingly submitted a voucher for payment for services that she knew that she had not performed. Consistent with the Board's report, the court concluded that respondent's conduct violated four disciplinary rules: (1) Rule 1.5(a) (charging an unreasonable fee); (2) Rule 3.3(a)(1) (making a false statement of material fact to a tribunal, i.e., Superior Court); (3) Rule 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation); and (4) 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct that seriously interferes with the administration of justice). [6] Cleaver-Bascombe I, supra, 892 A.2d at 403-04. The question that the court wanted clarified on remand before determining the appropriate sanction was the inconsistency between the Board's conclusion that Respondent submitted a `patently fraudulent voucher' with its position that the Hearing Committee's findings `do not support the conclusion that she presented false evidence or testimony. . . .' [7] Id. at 410-11. In response to the court's remand order, the Board found that there was clear and convincing evidence that respondent knowingly submitted a false voucher and exacerbated the misconduct with false testimony at the hearing. Citing as an example testimony concerning the jail visit, the Board went on to find that Bar Counsel proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent knew when she testified to it that her story about the D.C. Jail visit was false. The Board pointed out that respondent defended her voucher, insisting that it fairly reflected the services she had provided. Although the Hearing Committee did not find her testimony credible, it did not find it to be deliberately false. The Board made that finding on remand. The Board then concluded, that respondent perjured herself. Respondent argues that the record does not support the Board's supplemental finding that she testified falsely at the disciplinary hearing or perjured herself. She contends that although the Hearing Committee did not credit her testimony, it did not find that her testimony was deliberately false, but rather based its finding on other credible evidence. She contends further that she qualified her testimony, basing it upon her recollection and even identifying some mistakes in the bill. Bar Counsel argues that there is substantial record evidence to support the Board's finding that Bar Counsel proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent knowingly submitted a false voucher to the Superior Court and that respondent deliberately gave false testimony before the Hearing Committee concerning it. The Board acknowledges correctly, as respondent points out, that [t]he Hearing Committee heard [Respondent] testify and found her testimony not to be credible, but it did not make a finding that her testimony was deliberately false. However, the Board reached that conclusion based on the facts that were established by the evidence. Specifically, the Board found that: While it is hard to imagine why Respondent would have made up the D.C. Jail visit out of whole cloth when she originally prepared her voucheras we have noted she did have encounters with her client to which she could have properly attributed timewe find that when she stuck with her story during the disciplinary proceedings, she did so knowing it was false. . . . And even though the Hearing Committee listened to her testimony and did not find it to be knowingly false, we find that the Committee erred in this respect. We find that Bar Counsel proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent knew when she testified to it that her story about the D.C. Jail visit was false. In reaching the foregoing conclusions, the Board accepted the Hearing Committee's factual findings that were supported by substantial evidence. See Elgin, supra, 918 A.2d at 373 (citations omitted) (setting forth the standard that the Board must accept the Hearing Committee's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence). Those findings included that there was clear and convincing evidence that respondent did not meet with her client at the D.C. Jail on the date that she indicated on her voucher. While the Hearing Committee reached its determination by crediting certain evidence and discrediting other evidence, as respondent contends, [8] this factor does not undermine the Board's conclusion based on that evidence that Respondent knew when she testified in detail about the meeting that it had not occurred. As to the claimed meeting at the jail, the Board could properly conclude that it is hard to imagine that Respondent forgot that she did not go [to the jail] and that she could not be reasonably mistaken in testifying otherwise. [9] The Board's factual finding in this regard is supported by substantial evidence of record; therefore, we adopt it. See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h); Elgin, supra, 918 A.2d at 373. The Board went further to conclude that respondent perjured herself, citing as an example her testimony concerning the jail visit. Respondent argues that the record does not support the conclusion that she perjured herself. She contends that such a finding should not be made absent a finding of the requisite specific intention, which the Hearing Committee did not make. Whether the Board could properly find all elements of perjury in the legal sense based on the Hearing Committee's factual findings or on the record has no significant impact on the sanction here, given the facts that have been established. [10] It is sufficient for purposes of the disposition of this case that the Board found that respondent's testimony concerning her jail visit was knowingly false, a finding fully supported by clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, as we said in Cleaver-Bascombe I: [I]f Respondent did not in fact come to the jail on that occasion, and if the claim in her voucher that she did visit was a deliberate falsehood, then she necessarily also lied under oath at the hearing; it is hard to imagine that Respondent forgot that she did not go. Cleaver-Bascombe I, supra, 892 A.2d at 410. We need not, and do not decide, whether the Board's further legal conclusion that respondent is guilty of perjury in any legal sense of the term is supported.