Opinion ID: 2355224
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial instructions.

Text: The jury was instructed on all degrees of homicide and on the defense of self-protection, subject to both the initial aggressor qualification, KRS 503.060(3), and the imperfect self-defense qualification, KRS 503.120(1). As noted above, the jury was not instructed on the elements of fourth-degree assault, the offense of which Hager was ultimately convicted. Instead, the jury was led to its verdict by a series of interrogatories, or mini-verdicts, which required them to find Hager guilty of fourth-degree assault if they believed that he committed either second-degree manslaughter or reckless homicide under a recklessly held belief in the need to act in self-protection. The instructions will be discussed as they were given with the jury's verdict(s) noted as they appear on the instructions.    INSTRUCTION NO. 1 The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of a crime, and the indictment shall not be considered as evidence or as having any weight against him. If upon the whole case you have a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, you shall find him not guilty. Any determination made by you must be unanimous and signed by the foreperson. AUTHORIZED VERDICTS (A) NOT GUILTY. or (B) GUILTY, Murder, OR Manslaughter 1st Degree, OR Manslaughter 2nd Degree OR Reckless Homicide OR Assault 4th Degree.    That portion of Instruction No. 1 describing the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt completely omitted the second sentence of the specimen instruction set forth in RCr 9.56, viz: You shall find the defendant not guilty unless you are satisfied from the evidence alone, and beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is guilty. Although RCr 9.56 provides that the jury shall be instructed substantially as required by the Rule, an instruction which omits a complete sentence of the specimen instruction is not in substantial compliance with the Rule. Instruction No. 1 also failed to instruct the jury on reasonable doubt with respect to the issue of extreme emotional disturbance. Although not mentioned in RCr 9.56, that instruction is required when there is evidence authorizing an instruction on extreme emotional disturbance. Holbrook v. Commonwealth, Ky., 813 S.W.2d 811, 815 (1991), overruled on other grounds, Elliott v. Commonwealth, Ky., 976 S.W.2d 416 (1998); Edmonds v. Commonwealth, Ky., 586 S.W.2d 24, 27 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Wellman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 696 (1985).    INSTRUCTION NO. 1A FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY The Defendant is presumed to be innocent of committing any crime, and the Commonwealth must prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The Defendant has a right to remain silent and is not compelled to testify. The fact that he does not testify is not an inference of guilt and shall not prejudice him in any way. INSTRUCTION NO. 2 DEFINITIONS Serious Physical InjuryMeans physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health, or prolonged loss or impairment of the functions of any bodily organ. IntentionallyA defendant acts intentionally with respect to another's death or to his serious physical injury when it is his conscious objective to cause that death or that injury. WantonlyA defendant acts wantonly with respect to another's injury when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that injury will occur. In order to be substantial and unjustifiable, the risk of injury must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross departure from the level of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. RecklesslyA defendant acts recklessly with respect to another's injury when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the injury will occur. In order to be substantial and unjustifiable that risk of injury must be of such nature and degree that failure to perceive it constitutes a gross departure from the level of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. Extreme Emotional DisturbanceIs a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one's judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from the impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes. It is not a mental disease in itself, and an enraged, inflamed, or disturbed emotional state does not constitute an extreme emotional disturbance unless there is a reasonable explanation or excuse therefor, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.    Instruction No. 2 attempted to paraphrase the statutory definitions of intentionally, KRS 501.020(1), wantonly, KRS 501.020(3), and recklessly, KRS 501.020(4). Although the paraphrased definition of intentionally substantially complied with the definition set forth in KRS 501.020(1), the paraphrased definitions of wantonly and recklessly purported to apply only to a wanton or reckless injury, whereas the result element in this case was death. These definitions could lead a jury to conclude that the definitions of wantonly and recklessly apply only to assaults and not to homicides. That is of particular significance here, where the instructions on second-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide, infra, did not contain language describing wanton or reckless conduct, but left it to the jury to refer back to the definitions of those terms in Instruction No. 2. Further, Instruction No. 2 did not include the definitions of physical force, KRS 503.010(4), and deadly physical force, KRS 503.010(1), which apply to the defense of self-protection. And if the jury had been instructed on the elements of fourth-degree assault, Instruction No. 2 also should have included the definition of physical injury, KRS 500.080(13), which is the result element of that offense.    INSTRUCTION NO. 3 MURDER You will find the Defendant guilty under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: A. That in this county on or about December 24, 1998, the defendant killed John Allen Brown by stabbing him with a knife; AND B. That in so doing: (1) He caused the death of John Allen Brown intentionally and not while acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance; OR (2) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, he wantonly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to John Allen Brown, which did cause his death; AND C. That he was not privileged to act in self-protection. If you find the Defendant GUILTY under this Instruction, proceed to Instruction No. 5. If you find the Defendant NOT GUILTY under this Instruction, please proceed to Instruction No. 4.    Instruction No. 5, to which the jury was directed to proceed upon a finding of guilt under Instruction No. 3, was the initial aggressor qualification of the defense of self-protection set forth in Instruction No. 6. The murder instruction properly included the absence of the privilege to act in self-protection as an element of the offense. [1] However, the instruction erroneously required the jury to find the defendant guilty, thus not to have acted in self-protection, before permitting it to first consider the nature of self-protection as a defense.    INSTRUCTION NO. 4 MANSLAUGHTER 1ST DEGREE If you found the Defendant not guilty under Instruction No. 3, you will find the Defendant guilty under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: A. That in this county on or about December 24, 1998, the Defendant killed John Allen Brown by stabbing him with a knife; AND B. That in so doing: (1) He intended to cause John Allen Brown's death; OR (2) He was acting with the intention of causing serious physical injury to John Allen Brown; AND C. That in so doing the Defendant was not privileged to act in self-protection. If you find the Defendant GUILTY under this Instruction, proceed to Instruction No. 5. If you find the Defendant NOT GUILTY under this Instruction, please proceed to Instruction No. 7.    Like Instruction No. 3 (Murder), Instruction No. 4 required the jury to find the defendant guilty, thus not to have acted in self-protection, before permitting it to first consider the nature of self-protection as a defense.    INSTRUCTION NO. 5 INITIAL AGGRESSOR The defense of self-protection is not available to the Defendant if you believe based on the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the initial aggressor in the use of physical force between him and John Allen Brown. Unless his initial aggression was not intended to and did not create a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to the victim, and the force returned or threatened by the victim was such as to cause the defendant to believe himself to be in imminent danger of death or serious physical injury. INTERROGATORY NO. 1 Do you believe based on the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was the initial aggressor? YES ____ NO ____ __________________ FOREPERSON If you answered NO, proceed to Instruction No. 6. If you answered YES and have found the Defendant guilty of Murder or Manslaughter 1st Degree, enter that verdict on the verdict form and return to the Courtroom.    The second sentence of Instruction No. 5 was an incomplete sentence that, in fact, should have been a clause modifying the first sentence. See KRS 503.060(3)(a); Cooper, supra note 1, at § 11.11. Furthermore, the initial aggressor qualification qualifies the defense of self-protection. The instruction and interrogatory required the jury to decide the qualification before deciding whether Hager was privileged to act in self-protection in the first place. Also, the wording of the directions to the jury upon an answer of YES to Interrogatory No. 1 indicated that the jury must already have found Hager guilty of murder or first-degree manslaughter before considering the defense of self-protection; yet, if Hager acted in self-protection, he could not be guilty of either murder or first-degree manslaughter per Instruction Nos. 3 and 4, each of which included the absence of the privilege to act in self-protection as an element of the offense.    INSTRUCTION NO. 6 SELF PROTECTION Even though the Defendant might otherwise be guilty of Murder under Instruction No. 3, or Manslaughter First Degree under Instruction No. 4, if at the time the Defendant killed John Allen Brown, he believed that Brown was then and there about to use physical force upon him, he was entitled to use such physical force against Brown as he believed necessary in order to protect himself, except that he was entitled to use deadly physical force only if he believed it was necessary in order to protect himself from death or serious physical injury. However, if you further believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was mistaken in his belief that it was necessary to use physical force against John Allen Brown in self-protection, or in his belief in the degree of force necessary to protect himself, AND A. that he knew and disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he was mistaken in that belief, and that this was a gross departure from the level of care that a reasonable person would have observed in the same situation; OR B. that he failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he was mistaken in that belief, and that this was a gross departure from the level of care that a reasonable person would have observed in the same situation, then you shall find him guilty of a lesser offense as instructed after the following interrogatories:    The wording of subparagraph A of Instruction No. 6 with respect to a wantonly held belief and of subparagraph B with respect to a recklessly held belief deviated in several respects from the language contained in the statutory definitions of wantonly and recklessly. KRS 501.020(3) and (4). See also the discussion regarding Instruction No. 2, supra. While such deviations from the statutory language might not warrant reversal in a particular case, we reiterate what we said in McGuire v. Commonwealth, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 931, 936 (1994), that [a]ll substantive law related to criminal responsibility, including general principles of liability, accountability, justification and responsibility ... is now statutory, and instructions should be stated within the context of the statutory framework.    INTERROGATORY NO. 2 Do you believe based on the evidence that the defendant was acting as he believed necessary to protect himself? YES ____ NO ____ ________________ FOREPERSON If you answered NO to Interrogatory No. 2, then you shall find the defendant guilty of Murder under Instruction No. 3 or Manslaughter 1st Degree under Instruction No. 4, so indicate on the verdict form, and return to the Courtroom. If you answered Yes, proceed to Interrogatory No. 3. INTERROGATORY NO. 3 Do you believe based on the evidence that the Defendant was mistaken in his belief that it was necessary to use deadly physical force in order to protect himself from death or serious physical injury or in the degree of force necessary to protect himself from death or serious physical injury? YES ____ NO ____ __________________ FOREPERSON If YES proceed to Interrogatory No. 4. If NO you shall find the Defendant NOT GUILTY and enter your verdict on the verdict form, Instruction No. 11.    While Interrogatory No. 2 tracked the wording of the first paragraph of the self-protection instruction (Instruction No. 6), Interrogatory No. 3 deviated substantially from the wording of the second paragraph of that instruction, viz: that the Defendant was mistaken in his belief that it was necessary to use physical force against John Allen Brown in self-protection, or in his belief in the degree of force necessary to protect himself. If interrogatories are used in criminal instructions, [2] the wording of each interrogatory must track the wording of the instruction to which it pertains. Otherwise, it can only be inferred that the jury's answer to a particular interrogatory represents its unanimous verdict on the issue framed by the instruction to which the interrogatory pertained.    INTERROGATORY NO. 4 Do you believe based on the evidence that the Defendant knew and disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he was mistaken in his need to protect himself in (sic) the degree of force necessary to do so, to such a degree that this was a gross departure from the level of care that a reasonable person would have observed in the same situation? YES ____ NO ____ ____________________ FOREPERSON If YES you shall find the Defendant guilty of 2nd Degree Manslaughter under Instruction No. 7, enter your verdict on the verdict form and return to the Courtroom. If NO, proceed to Interrogatory No. 5.    Interrogatory No. 4 seriously misstated the substantive law of self-protection. By allowing the jury to consider whether the defendant was mistaken in his need for self-protection, instead of mistaken in his belief in the need for self-protection, the interrogatory not only did not track the wording of either KRS 503.120(1) or the instruction on self-protection (Instruction No. 6A), but also directed the jury to evaluate the defendant's need rather than his belief, and thus substituted an objective test for the subjective one embodied in the statutory scheme. KRS 503.050(1), (2); KRS 503.120(1). [T]he initial focus of the penal code is on the defendant's actual subjective belief in the need for self-protection and not on the objective reasonableness of that belief. Elliott v. Commonwealth, supra, at 419.    INTERROGATORY NO. 5 Do you believe based on the evidence that the Defendant failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he was mistaken in his need to protect himself or in the degree of force necessary to do so to such a degree that this was a gross departure from the level of care that a reasonable person would have observed in the same situation? YES ____ NO ____ _________________ FOREPERSON If YES you shall find the Defendant GUILTY of Reckless Homicide under Instruction No. 8, enter your verdict on the Verdict Form and return to the Courtroom. If NO, you shall find the Defendant NOT GUILTY and enter your verdict on the Verdict Form and return to the Courtroom.    Like Interrogatory No. 4, Interrogatory No. 5 allowed the jury to consider whether the defendant was mistaken in his need for self-protection instead of mistaken in his belief in the need for self-protection, thus did not track the wording of Instruction No. 6B to which it pertained, substantially deviated from the language of the statutes, and substituted an objective test for the subjective one embodied in the statutory scheme.    INSTRUCTION NO. 7 MANSLAUGHTER 2ND DEGREE If you found the Defendant not guilty under Instruction No. 3 or 4, you will find the Defendant guilty under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: A. That in this county on or about December 24, 1998, the defendant killed John Allen Brown by stabbing him with a knife; AND B. That in so doing, the Defendant was acting wantonly. If you find the Defendant GUILTY under this Instruction, proceed to Instruction No. 9. If you find the Defendant NOT GUILTY under this Instruction, proceed to Instruction No. 8.    Instruction No. 7 erroneously permitted the jury to find the defendant guilty of second-degree manslaughter if it had  found the Defendant not guilty under Instruction No. 3 or 4 (emphasis added), implying that he would be eligible for conviction of second-degree manslaughter if not guilty of one of the two previously described offenses, but guilty of the other. Obviously, Hager was eligible for conviction of second-degree manslaughter only if the jury had found him not guilty under both Instruction No. 3 and 4. Compare the language of this instruction with that of Instruction No. 5 of the specimen recommended instructions set forth infra in this opinion which provides: If you do not find the Defendant guilty under either Instruction No. 3 or Instruction No. 4.... (Emphasis added.) A more serious error was the failure of Instruction No. 7 to include the absence of the privilege to act in self-protection as an element of the offense. [3] This element was included in the instructions on murder and first-degree manslaughter; and if Hager was entitled to the defense of self-protection with respect to those offenses, he was entitled to the same defense with respect to second-degree manslaughter (and reckless homicide, infra ). Elliott v. Commonwealth , supra. In fact, Instruction No. 10, infra, purported to describe the defense of self-protection as it applies to second-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide. Hager was entitled to an instruction on self-protection with respect to both of those offenses; [4] thus, the substantive instruction on each offense should have included the absence of the privilege to act in self-protection as an element of the offense. Finally, like Instruction Nos. 3 and 4 (murder and first-degree manslaughter), Instruction No. 7 permitted the jury to consider the defense of self-protection only if it had already found Hager guilty of the offense to which the defense pertained.    INSTRUCTION NO. 8 RECKLESS HOMICIDE If you found the Defendant not guilty under Instruction No. 3, 4, or 7, you will find the Defendant guilty under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: A. That in this county on or about December 24, 1998, the defendant killed John Allen Brown by stabbing him with a knife; AND B. That in so doing, he was acting recklessly. If you find the Defendant GUILTY under this Instruction, proceed to Instruction No. 9. If you find the Defendant NOT GUILTY under this Instruction, please proceed to the Verdict Form and indicate your verdict under NOT GUILTY.    Instruction No. 8 contained the same errors as Instruction No. 7, i.e., (1) it permitted the jury to find Hager guilty of reckless homicide if he had been found not guilty of one or more of the previously defined offenses, but guilty of another; (2) it omitted the absence of the privilege to act in self-protection from the elements of the offense; and (3) it permitted the jury to consider the defense of self-protection only if it had already found Hager guilty of the offense.    INSTRUCTION NO. 9 INITIAL AGGRESSOR The defense of self-protection is not available to the Defendant if you believe based on the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he as (sic) the initial aggressor in the use of physical force between him and John Allen Brown. Unless his initial aggression was not intended to and did not create a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to the victim, and the force returned or threatened by the victim was such as to cause the Defendant to believe himself to be in imminent danger of death or serious physical injury. INTERROGATORY NO. 6 Do you believe based on the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was the initial aggressor? YES ____ NO &check; /s/ ________________________ FOREPERSON If you answered NO, proceed to Instruction No. 10. If you answered YES and have found the Defendant guilty of Manslaughter 2nd Degree or Reckless Homicide, enter that verdict on the verdict form and return to the Courtroom.    Instruction No. 9 and the first Interrogatory No. 6 (the instructions included two interrogatories designated as No. 6) were identical to Instruction No. 5 and Interrogatory No. 1. The second sentence of the instruction was an incomplete sentence that, in fact, should have been a clause modifying the first sentence. Furthermore, the initial aggressor qualification qualifies the defense of self-protection. Thus, the instruction and interrogatory required the jury to decide the qualification before considering whether the defendant acted in self-protection in the first place. (The fact that the jury answered this Interrogatory No. 6 indicates that they had already found Hager guilty of either second-degree manslaughter or reckless homicide, though we will never know which.)    INSTRUCTION NO. 10 SELF-PROTECTION Even though the Defendant might otherwise be guilty of Manslaughter 2nd Degree under Instruction No. 7, or Reckless Homicide under Instruction No. 8, if at the time the Defendant killed John Allen Brown, he believed that Brown was then and there about to use physical force upon him, he was entitled to use such physical force against Brown as he believed necessary in order to protect himself, except that he was entitled to use deadly physical force only if he believed it was necessary in order to protect himself from death or serious physical injury. However, if you further believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was mistaken in his belief that it was necessary to use physical force against John Allen Brown in self-protection, or in his belief in the degree of force necessary to protect himself, AND A. That he knew and disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he was mistaken in that belief, and that this was a gross departure from the level of care that a reasonable person would have observed in the same situation; OR B. That he failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he was mistaken in that belief, and that this was a gross departure from the level of care that a reasonable person would have observed in the same situation, then you shall find him guilty of a lesser offense as instructed after the following interrogatories:    Instruction No. 10 was identical to Instruction No. 6, except that it applied the defense of self-protection to second-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide rather than murder and first-degree manslaughter. As in Instruction No. 6, the language used in subparagraph A with respect to a wantonly held belief and in subparagraph B with respect to a recklessly held belief deviated in several respects from the language contained in the statutory definitions of wantonly and recklessly. KRS 501.020(3) and (4). Regardless, as will be discussed more fully infra, subparagraph A should have been omitted in its entirety, because a wantonly held belief in the need to act in self-protection provides no defense to a charge of either second-degree manslaughter or reckless homicide.    INTERROGATORY NO. 6 Do you believe based on the evidence that the Defendant was acting as he believed necessary to protect himself? YES &check; NO ____ /s/ ___________________ FOREPERSON If you answered NO to Interrogatory No. 6, then you shall find the defendant guilty of Manslaughter 2nd Degree under Instruction No. 7 or Reckless Homicide under Instruction No. 8, so indicate on the verdict form, and return to the Courtroom. If you answered Yes, proceed to Interrogatory No. 7. INTERROGATORY NO. 7 Do you believe based on the evidence that the Defendant was mistaken in his belief that it was necessary to use deadly physical force in order to protect himself from death or serious physical injury or in the degree of force necessary to protect himself from death or serious physical injury. YES &check; NO ____ /s/ __________________ If YES proceed to Interrogatory No. 8. If NO you shall find the Defendant NOT GUILTY and enter your verdict on the verdict form.    This second Interrogatory No. 6 and Interrogatory No. 7 were almost identical to Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 3. Thus, while the language of the second Interrogatory No. 6 tracked the wording of the first paragraph of Instruction No. 10, the self-protection instruction to which it pertained, the language of Interrogatory No. 7 deviated substantially from the wording of the second paragraph of that instruction, i.e., that the Defendant was mistaken in his belief that it was necessary to use physical force against John Allen Brown in self-protection, or in his belief in the degree of force necessary to protect himself.    INTERROGATORY NO. 8 Do you believe based on the evidence that the Defendant knew and disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he was mistaken in his need to protect himself in the degree of force necessary to do so, to such a degree that this was a gross departure from the level of care that a reasonable person would have observed in the same situation? YES ____ NO &check; /s/ ________________________ FOREPERSON If YES you shall find the Defendant guilty of Reckless Homicide under Instruction No. 8, enter your verdict on the verdict form and return to the Courtroom. If NO, proceed to Interrogatory No. 9.    Like Interrogatory No. 4, the language of Interrogatory No. 8 did not track the wording of Instruction No. 10A to which it pertained and substantially misstated the law of self-protection by directing the jury to evaluate the defendant's need rather than his belief. Interrogatory No. 8 also erroneously directed the jury that if its answer to the interrogatory was Yes, it shall find the Defendant guilty of Reckless Homicide. Remember, at this point in the instructions, the jury had already found Hager guilty of either second-degree manslaughter or reckless homicide, though we do not know which. The wording of Interrogatory No. 8 tracked the language of the definition of wantonly, KRS 501.020(3), not recklessly, KRS 501.020(4). Thus, under that interrogatory, a wanton belief in the need for self-protection would result in a conviction of reckless homicide, regardless of whether the defendant's mens rea with respect to the result of his conduct was wanton (second-degree manslaughter) or reckless (reckless homicide). As will be discussed more fully infra, a wantonly held belief in the need to act in self-protection provides no defense to a charge of either second-degree manslaughter or reckless homicide. If the jury has found that the defendant otherwise committed reckless homicide, a wanton belief in the need to act in self-protection does not elevate that offense to second-degree manslaughter; and if the jury has found that the defendant otherwise committed second-degree manslaughter, a wanton belief in the need to act in self-protection does not reduce that offense to reckless homicide, which requires a mens rea of recklessness, not wantonness.    INTERROGATORY NO. 9 Do you believe based on the evidence that the Defendant failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he was mistaken in his need to protect himself or in the degree of force necessary to do so to such a degree that this was a gross departure from the level of care that a reasonable person would have observed in the same situation? YES &check; NO ____ /s/ _____________________ If YES, you shall find the Defendant guilty of Assault 4th Degree and fix his punishment at up to twelve (12) months in jail and/or a $500 fine, and enter your verdict on the verdict form. If NO, you shall find the Defendant NOT GUILTY and enter that finding on the verdict form. INSTRUCTION NO. 11 VERDICT FORM The verdict of the jury must be unanimous and be signed by one of you as Foreperson. You may use the form provided below in writing your verdict. (a) We the jury find the Defendant NOT GUILTY. ____________________ FOREPERSON OR (b) We the jury find the Defendant GUILTY under Instruction No. ____. (Use this form if you find the Defendant guilty under Instruction No. 3, 4, 7 or 8.) _______________________ FOREPERSON OR (c) We the jury find the Defendant GUILTY of Assault 4th Degree and fix his punishment at 12 months in jail and a 500.00(sic) fine. /s/ _________________________ FOREPERSON    Even if fourth-degree assault were a lesser included offense of reckless homicide (which it is not), Instruction No. 9 erroneously permitted the jury to find Hager guilty of that offense without having found that the elements of that offense had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellee asserts that evidence of a wantonly or recklessly held belief in the need to act in self-protection always requires an instruction on a lesser offense even if the elements of the lesser offense do not fall within the facts of the case. KRS 503.120(1) does not so provide.