Opinion ID: 477834
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Definitely true.

Text: 46 Not only do Bosley's and Edwards' testimony indicate that the appropriate requirements for the SLA II position are nonpartisan in nature, the majority fails to point to any testimony or documentary evidence, other than Bosley's modification of his statement, suggesting directly that partisan allegiance constitutes an appropriate requirement for the job of SLA II. 47 Thus, from the testimony of mostly partial witnesses, without any support from Missouri statutory law or administrative rules, the majority constructs an Elrod-Branti confidential relationship between the SLA II and the Clerk of Court. In doing so, however, the majority ignores the central distinction in Elrod and Branti between mere loyalty and political loyalty. The evidence in this case only shows that the SLA II position legitimately requires a loyal person; it falls far short of showing that the position requires a politically loyal person. 48 The outcome which I believe is correct under Elrod and Branti may seem unfair to Bosley in that he would be the first Circuit Clerk affected by Elrod and Branti, particularly because Bauer himself certainly exercised powers not inherent in the office of SLA II when he actively campaigned for the reelection of Circuit Clerk Roddy. The Supreme Court, however, did not exempt employees previously hired for patronage reasons from its general rule. The Supreme Court's ruling in Elrod protected from the time it was decided all employees in positions for which political affiliation is not an appropriate job requirement. Bauer held such a position after Elrod and Branti had been decided and thus cannot be excepted from its rule. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 49 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the Supreme Court held that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Id. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738 (citations omitted). This defense of qualified immunity is an affirmative one which therefore must be pleaded. 3 Id. at 815, 102 S.Ct. at 2736. Creamer v. Porter, 754 F.2d 1311, 1317 (5th Cir.1985) (citations omitted). 50 Elrod and Branti had been decided before Bosley dismissed Bauer in January of 1984. These decisions certainly established the constitutional right that government employees could not be terminated for patronage reasons from positions for which political affiliation was not an appropriate requirement. Bosley contends that the general establishment of the right is not sufficient but that it must be clearly established to be a right the plaintiff Bauer held. Bosley submits that it was not clearly established that Bauer did not fit within the Elrod-Branti exception. 51 There will always be some uncertainty whether it is clearly established that a particular individual possesses a given constitutional right. As the Supreme Court recently stated in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1986), regarding the prohibition of wiretaps without a warrant and whether such law was clearly established: 52 We do not intend to suggest that an official is always immune from liability or suit for a warrantless search merely because the warrant requirement has never explicitly been held to apply to a search conducted in identical circumstances. But in cases where there is a legitimate question whether an exception to the warrant requirement exists, it cannot be said that a warrantless search violates clearly established law. 53 Id. 105 S.Ct. at 2820 n. 12. 54 In Mitchell, 472 U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 2816-20, the general constitutional prohibition against wiretaps without probable cause had not been clearly established by the Supreme Court before the action in question took place. Here, Elrod and Branti had both been decided before Bosley dismissed Bauer. 55 Clearly some question still remained after Elrod and Branti as to who was to be excepted from the general rule. But as the Mitchell case clarifies, some question is not sufficient. In every valid suit for violation of constitutional rights there will remain some question as to the legitimacy of the claim. Harlow certainly was not intended to discourage such valid suits, which it would effectively do if interpreted this way, by immunizing public officials from liability in them. 56 Harlow especially should not be interpreted to free public officials who deliberately fire employees before serious questions of the constitutionality of such actions can be resolved. In this case, Bosley fired Bauer in the face of a proposed order of the St. Louis Circuit Court sitting en banc prohibiting such action. Such behavior by a public official should not be protected. 57 I therefore believe that the jury's award of $58,000 in actual damages and $6,000 in punitive damages to Bauer should be reinstated. The award of $6,000 in punitive damages was based on the jury's finding that Bosley believed he was violating Bauer's constitutional rights when he terminated him. Evidence was submitted that Bauer knew of the Elrod and Branti cases at the time he fired Bosley and also that Bosley knew he could not constitutionally fire Bauer for political reasons but did so in spite of such law. The jury's verdict therefore is supported by the evidence and should not be overturned.