Opinion ID: 1355928
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Juror Inquiry During Penalty Phase Deliberations

Text: (15) Defendant asserts that the trial court committed prejudicial error by allegedly giving an unresponsive answer, outside of his counsel's presence, to a written inquiry sent in from the jury room which read: What are the ramifications should the jury be unable to reach a unanimous decision on this stage of the trial? The record is unclear on this point. The jury commenced its penalty phase deliberations on the morning of January 31, 1984, and the written inquiry described above, contained in the clerk's transcript on appeal, is so dated. Defendant's claim assumes that this written inquiry was the subject matter of the proceedings which took place at 3:35 p.m. on that same date, which were transcribed as follows: THE COURT: Matter of People against Allison. The record will indicate the defendant is present. Counsel are not. And we have 12 jurors and 3 alternates.  The question the court received is that at the present time the jury is tired. There is no comment the court can make on the question. At this time, the court will excuse you tonight and order you back at 9:30 in the morning at which time you may continue deliberations. .... .... .... .... . . (Italics added.) Read in the context suggested by the Attorney General, the record could support an inference that [t]he question the court received was in fact a request by the jury that deliberations be adjourned for that day because the jurors were tired. On the other hand, the court's statement, [t]here is no comment the court can make on the question, would seem out of place in that context. In any event, the fact remains that nowhere in the record is it indicated that the jury's written inquiry concerning possible deadlock was ever addressed by the court. Even assuming on this record the inference urged by defendant, namely, that the court gave an unresponsive answer to the question concerning possible deadlock, no grounds for reversal are shown. Although it has long been the rule that the trial court should not entertain communications from the jury except in open court, with prior notification to counsel..., so that `the trial judge [can] afford the parties an opportunity to be apprised of any such communication and to have the opportunity to make timely objection to any action by the court or jury which might be deemed irregular' (Citations) ( People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 848-849 [183 Cal. Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93], quoting People v. Alcalde (1944) 24 Cal.2d 177, 189 [148 P.2d 627]), here neither counsel's absence, nor the court's failure to directly respond to the inquiry, affected a substantial right of defendant such as would support a presumption of prejudice. ( People v. Hogan, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 849.) In People v. Belmontes, supra, 45 Cal.3d 744, we considered the matter of what, if any, would be the proper response to juror inquiries about possible deadlock during penalty phase deliberations. We conclude[d] that such an instruction under the 1978 death penalty law would have the potential for unduly confusing and misguiding the jury in their proper role and function in the penalty determination process. Penalty phase juries are presently instructed that their proper task is to decide between a sentence of death and life without the possibility of parole. Any further suggestion along the lines suggested herein [i.e., instruction in the full-blown language of the alternatives set forth in section 190.4, subd. (b)] could well serve to lessen or diminish that obligation in the jurors' eyes. (See People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 511-516 [244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803] [1977 death penalty law]; cf. People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 852 [139 Cal. Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997, 97 A.L.R.3d 73] [wherein we held erroneous any instruction which states or implies that a jury's failure to reach a verdict will necessarily require retrial].) ( Belmontes, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 814, fn. omitted.) Defendant had no right to have his jury instructed in a more responsive manner concerning the subject of penalty phase deadlock. No prejudice from the court's handling of the jurors' inquiry is shown.