Opinion ID: 2523244
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Marital community liability

Text: ¶ 9 Whether the Wilsons' marital community is liable for Mr. Wilson's intentional torts hinges on whether the sexual abuse occurred in the course of managing community business. In LaFramboise v. Schmidt, 42 Wash.2d 198, 254 P.2d 485 (1953), we held a marital community liable for indecent liberties committed by the husband against a young girl entrusted to the community's care. The parents of six-year-old Beverly LaFramboise left her in the care of Louis and Blanche Schmidt while her parents toured Alaska. The parents paid the Schmidts $35 per week to care for Beverly. At trial, a jury rendered a verdict against the marital community based on a jury instruction that stated the marital community would be liable if the jury found the indecent liberties occurred `during the period while said child was in the care and custody of said defendant and of the said community.' Id. at 199, 254 P.2d 485 (quoting jury instructions). ¶ 10 The Schmidts claimed the community could not be liable because Louis committed the act individually and because Louis acted outside the scope of his employment (i.e., no respondeat superior). Id. We rejected defendants' claims holding, the community is not liable for the torts of the husband, unless the act constituting the wrong either (1) results or is intended to result in a benefit to the community or (2) is committed in the prosecution of the business of the community. Id. at 200, 254 P.2d 485 (emphasis added). We reasoned because Louis committed the intentional tort while conducting community business, the community bore responsibility. Id. ¶ 11 Ms. Wilson claims deElche v. Jacobsen, 95 Wash.2d 237, 622 P.2d 835 (1980), modified our LaFramboise two-pronged approach to community liability. In deElche a married man raped a woman who was sleeping on a sailboat. The victim sued the husband-rapist and won damages, but the husband-rapist had no separate assets with which to satisfy the judgment. We held where a plaintiff wins a judgment against an insolvent tortfeasor spouse for a separate tort (i.e., not committed during community business), the plaintiff may recover from the tortfeasor's one-half interest in the marital community's personal property. Id. at 246, 622 P.2d 835. [2] We embraced the rule in deElche to provide courts a clean, reasonable, and fair means of giving plaintiffs relief against insolvent separate tortfeasors, instead of condoning the preexisting practice among lower courts of stretching community liability to apply to situations where it was questionable. See deElche, 95 Wash.2d at 242, 622 P.2d 835. For torts involving management of community business, however, we left our LaFramboise approach undisturbed. Torts which can properly be said to be done in the management of community business, or for the benefit of the community, will remain community torts with the community and the tortfeasor separately liable. Id. at 245, 622 P.2d 835 (emphasis added). As Professor Cross pointed out in his influential article, the reasoning that there was a community enterprise being conducted [in LaFramboise ] during which the tort occurred probably leaves the community liability intact. Harry M. Cross, The Community Property Law (Revised 1985), 61 WASH. L.REV. 13, 139 (1986). ¶ 12 Unfortunately we generated confusion by criticizing LaFramboise as a case that found community liability upon tenuous contacts with the community and based on `emotional factors or overtones.' deElche, 95 Wash.2d at 242, 245, 622 P.2d 835 (quoting Smith v. Retallick, 48 Wash.2d 360, 365, 293 P.2d 745 (1956)). Ms. Wilson claims these criticisms led to misguided reliance on LaFramboise by the Court of Appeals. Pet. for Review at 10 (emphasis removed). ¶ 13 Even though we decided LaFramboise more than a half-century agonot to mention that we cast stones at it in deElcheLaFramboise 's approach to community liability remains good law. The deElche case altered our approach to liability only for separate torts, not community torts. As Professor Cross stated: It appears probable then, that deElche stands only for the proposition that a separate tort creditor can reach the tortfeasor spouse's half interest in community personal property and perhaps in community real property, in those situations involving purely personal wrongs having no conceivable connection with community property or affairs. Cross, supra, 61 WASH. L.REV. at 140 (emphasis added). Of the cases in our jurisprudence, LaFramboise most closely parallels the facts in the instant matter. It controls here. ¶ 14 The Wilsons' marital community is liable for Mr. Wilson's intentional torts under LaFramboise 's second prong. From the beginning Mr. Wilson linked Clayton's sexual abuse with management of community business. We broadly construe LaFramboise 's second prong. According to Professor Cross: There obviously would be some difficulty in saying that the husband was managing community property at the time or that [child molestation] was intended to benefit the marital community, although the employment to care for the child was so intended. In this area the concept of business is not narrow and the looseness of the test which the cases developed is better identified as requiring that the spouse be engaged in some community errand, affair, or business at the time of the tort to establish community liability. Id. at 137 (emphasis added). ¶ 15 Mr. Wilson used yard work as a means to groom the young boy. The abuse always occurred within the context of yard work, which consisted of community business. Mr. Wilson sexually abused Clayton while overseeing him as an employer, supervisor, landlord, and caretaker. The marital community benefited from Clayton's labor. Mr. Wilson paid Clayton for his work with community funds, [3] and only after he finished abusing Clayton on each occasion. Given the breadth of LaFramboise 's second prong, these facts point confidently toward community liability because Mr. Wilson's torts occurred while he was on some community errand, affair, or business at the time of the tort. Id. The facts here closely parallel those of LaFramboise, in which we assigned liability to the marital community. 42 Wash.2d at 199-200, 254 P.2d 485. ¶ 16 Ms. Wilson cites opinions that apply respondeat superior to determine whether a marital community bears liability for a spouse's individual tort. Her reference to these cases (including LaFramboise ) is confounding because their underlying current counsels when an agent or member of a marital community commits an intentional tort connected to the community, the community bears liability. [4] Ms. Wilson even cites one case that finds community liability for an intentional tort arguably less connected to the marital community than the instant facts. See McHenry v. Short, 29 Wash.2d 263, 186 P.2d 900 (1947) (assault committed by husband due to personal grudge, but while evicting victim from community rental property, deemed community liability). The cases cited by Ms. Wilson merely examine different facts under the same standard. [5] Other factually divergent cases come to the opposite conclusion and, instead, impose community liability. See, e.g., Blais v. Phillips, 7 Wash. App. 815, 502 P.2d 1245 (1972) (community liability for fight that arose in parking lot following a trial concerning management of community property); Benson v. Bush, 3 Wash.App. 777, 477 P.2d 929 (1970) (assault committed during dispute involving community dog deemed community liability). ¶ 17 In the end LaFramboise presents the closest facts to the instant matter. We applied our reasoning in LaFramboise with respondeat superior in mind and found community liability. 42 Wash.2d at 200, 254 P.2d 485. The aforementioned cases, at best, show inconsistent application of our law and, at worst, undermine Ms. Wilson's position. ¶ 18 Ms. Wilson further contends her former husband's intentional sexual tort brought him outside the scope of community business while sexually abusing Clayton, thus excusing liability of the marital community. She cites numerous cases involving the employer-employee (or master-servant) relationship. See, e.g., Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 131 Wash.2d 39, 929 P.2d 420 (1997) (employer not liable for sexual assault committed by employee); C.J.C. v. Corp. of Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wash.2d 699, 985 P.2d 262 (1999) (diocese held not liable for actions of pedophile priest); Bratton v. Calkins, 73 Wash.App. 492, 870 P.2d 981 (1994) (school district not liable for sexual relationship between teacher-employee and student); Thompson v. Everett Clinic, 71 Wash.App. 548, 860 P.2d 1054 (1993) (hospital not liable for molestation committed by doctor-employee); S.H.C. v. Lu, 113 Wash.App. 511, 54 P.3d 174 (2002) (religious organization not liable for molestation committed by nonmanagerial guru). However, all are distinguishable because they do not address liability of a marital community. The cases upon which Ms. Wilson erroneously relies stand for the proposition that an employer is not liable for the intentional torts of its employees an irrelevant issue here. Ms. Wilson also relies heavily on Francom v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 98 Wash.App. 845, 991 P.2d 1182 (2000). Francom held the victim of a nonmanagerial co-worker's sexual harassment could not recover from the harasser's marital community because the tort occurred outside the employee's scope of employment. Id. at 869. Francom, like the cases above, involved a nonmanagerial employee, not an owner or manager. ¶ 19 A husband or wife would be more properly considered an owner, employer, agent, or member of a marital community, not an employee. As the Court of Appeals noted, a more apt analogy is found in Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 103 Wash.2d 401, 693 P.2d 708 (1985). In Glasgow we found employer liability when an owner, manager, partner, or corporate officer personally participates in workplace harassment. Id. at 407, 693 P.2d 708. As a member of his marital community, Mr. Wilson's actions fit Glasgow better than the cases cited by Ms. Wilson. ¶ 20 We hold the Wilsons' marital community is liable for Mr. Wilson's intentional torts because he committed them while conducting community business.