Opinion ID: 2363126
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review Regarding Dismissal

Text: Maryland Rule 2-506, as relevant to voluntary dismissal by order of court, provides:    (b) By order of court. Except as provided in section (a) of this Rule, a party who has filed a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim may dismiss the claim only by order of court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been filed before the filing of a plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal, the action shall not be dismissed over the objection of the party who filed the counterclaim unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. (c) Effect. Unless otherwise specified in the notice of dismissal, stipulation, or order of court, a dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a party who has previously dismissed in any court of any state or in any court of the United States an action based on or including the same claim. Rule 2-506(b) is patterned after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 41(a)(2). Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Fibreboard Corp., 95 Md.App. 345, 349, 620 A.2d 979, 982 (1993). Under [FRCP] Rule 41(a)(2) and [Maryland] Rule 2-506(b), the granting of a motion for voluntary dismissal is within the [trial] court's discretion, after weighing the equities and giving due regard to all pertinent factors. Owens-Corning, 95 Md.App. at 349-50, 620 A.2d at 982; 8 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 41.40[2] (3d ed. 1999) (The decision to grant or deny a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) is addressed to the sound discretion of the [trial] court.); see also, e.g., Conafay v. Wyeth Laboratories, 793 F.2d 350, 353-54 (D.C.Cir.1986); Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 603 (3d. Cir.1991); Gap, Inc. v. Stone Int'l Trading, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 584, 588 (S.D.N.Y.1997). Thus, the trial judge's decision under Maryland Rule 2-506(b) will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the judge abused that discretion. Owens-Corning, 95 Md. App. at 350, 620 A.2d at 982; 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 41.40[11][a]; see also, e.g., Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Leith, 668 F.2d 46, 49 (1st Cir.1981) (holding that the trial court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss under [FRCP] 41(a)(2) is reviewable only for abuse of discretion); Conafay, 793 F.2d at 354. The analytical paradigm by which we assess whether a trial court's actions constitute an abuse of discretion has been stated frequently. In Wilson v. John Crane, Inc., 385 Md. 185, 867 A.2d 1077 (2005), for example, we iterated [t]here is an abuse of discretion where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court[ ] . . . or when the court acts without reference to any guiding principles. An abuse of discretion may also be found where the ruling under consideration is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the court[ ] . . . or when the ruling is violative of fact and logic. Questions within the discretion of the trial court are much better decided by the trial judges than by appellate courts, and the decisions of such judges should be disturbed where it is apparent that some serious error or abuse of discretion or autocratic action has occurred. In sum, to be reversed [t]he decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what that courts deems minimally acceptable. 385 Md. at 198-99, 867 A.2d at 1084 (quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. 295, 312-13, 701 A.2d 110, 118-19 (1997)). An abuse of discretion, therefore, should only be found in the extraordinary, exceptional, or most egregious case. Wilson, 385 Md. at 199, 867 A.2d at 1084.