Opinion ID: 410976
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Commission Must Accept Interior's Conditions.

Text: 83 The plain language of a statute controls its interpretation. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 9, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2504, 2506, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980). Because the relevant portion of section 4(e) is plain, our inquiry as to its meaning is at an end unless there is other statutory language in conflict with it. In particular, the Commission's vigorous historical argument cannot move us to ignore the fact that section 4(e) says, quite simply, that the license shall include the conditions which the Secretary deems necessary. 84 The Commission also contends, however, that the apparently plain meaning of section 4(e) is at odds with the duty imposed on the Commission by section 10(a) of the Act. These two sections, however, can easily be harmonized. Section 10(a) generally gives the Commission authority to modify proposed projects before approval, so that they will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for the utilization of waterways and the development of power. Section 10(a) of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. Sec. 803(a) (1976). In the case of a project within a reservation, once the Secretary of the Interior has propounded those conditions deemed necessary for the protection and utilization of the reservation, the Commission is free to modify the proposal in other ways, but not by altering or omitting Interior's conditions, to make it feasible and beneficial to the public. If this cannot be done, the Commission may decline to issue a license at all. The fact that section 4(e) limits the Commission's authority under section 10(a) certainly does not render the two sections inconsistent. To conclude, as does the Commission, that the broad general authorization of section 10(a) is not only inconsistent with, but also overrides, the plain, specific limitation of section 4(e) is to ignore the most elementary canons of statutory construction. See MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 102, 107, 64 S.Ct. 890, 893, 88 L.Ed. 1163 (1944) (However inclusive may be the general language of a statute, it 'will not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the enactment.' ). 85 The Commission urges that giving section 4(e) its literal meaning will place in the hands of Interior an unconditional veto power over the licensing authority of the Commission, unless the Commission itself can review Interior's determination as to what conditions are necessary. We need not decide whether, if this contention were true, it would affect our view as to the meaning of section 4(e). For it is clear that no such unconditional veto power is involved here. First of all, any license issued by the Commission which includes conditions propounded by Interior will be subject to judicial review under section 313(b) of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. Sec. 825l(b). Secondly, any failure by the Secretary of the Interior to conform to the statutory standard in proposing conditions pursuant to section 4(e) will be reviewable as a final agency action under the applicable provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. Secs. 701-706 (1976). The spectre of an unconditional veto power, with which an appointed public official could frustrate the public policies underlying the FPA, is illusory. 86 For these reasons, we conclude that section 4(e) of the FPA requires the Commission to include in any license within a reservation those conditions which the Secretary deems necessary for the protection and utilization of that reservation. 87