Opinion ID: 2234065
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 28

Heading: Presumption of Mental Retardation

Text: Section 28-105.01(3) provides in part: An intelligence quotient of seventy or below on a reliably administered intelligence quotient test shall be presumptive evidence of mental retardation. Vela contends that the district court erred in determining that because the Stanford-Binet was not reliably administered by Piersel, the full-scale IQ score of 66 did not meet the statutory presumption. The district court found that the Stanford-Binet score of 66 was not obtained on a reliably administered test for three reasons. First, it concluded that the statistical probability of Vela's validly obtaining the score after the scores he obtained on the prior IQ tests was remote. The testimony of multiple experts supports this finding. Second, the court concluded that Piersel did not address the issue of malingering in a meaningful manner. Again, substantial evidence supports this, as at least two experts testified to the evidence of malingering and Piersel's ineffective evaluation of this issue. Third, the court concluded that Piersel failed to follow the published Stanford-Binet protocol, because he reported the full-scale score even though there was significant variation between the verbal and nonverbal scores. Again, several experts testified that this was not proper protocol. Overall, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the district court's finding that the Stanford-Binet score of 66 was not obtained on a reliably administered test, and there is no clear error in the court's finding on this issue.