Opinion ID: 848945
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the applicability of mccready ii

Text: In McCready II, defendants, who owned residential rental property, refused to rent their property to unmarried couples. In doing so, defendants stated that the units were available only to married couples and that they usually did not rent to unmarried couples. 459 Mich. at 134, 586 N.W.2d 723. Plaintiffs, two unmarried couples who intended to cohabit, brought suit after being denied the opportunity to rent the property. Defendants maintained that any discrimination was premised upon their perception of plaintiffs' conduct rather than the plaintiffs' marital status. Id. at 138, 586 N.W.2d 723. The issue to be resolved in McCready II was whether a claim for marital status discrimination could be stated where the claim was premised on defendant's rejection of plaintiffs because of their unmarried cohabitation. The statutory provision at issue in McCready II, M.C.L. § 37.2502(1), states in pertinent part: A person engaging in a real estate transaction, or a real estate broker or salesman, shall not on the basis of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, familial status, or marital status of a person or a person residing with that person: (a) Refuse to engage in a real estate transaction with a person. [Emphasis added.] In determining that the plaintiff had stated a claim for marital status discrimination, this Court attempted to distinguish status from conduct, concluding that [p]laintiffs' marital status, and not their conduct in living together, is the root of the defendants' objection to renting the apartment to the plaintiffs. Id. at 140, 586 N.W.2d 723. We further noted that the case was complicated by a statute forbidding lewd and lascivious cohabitation by unmarried couples, M.C.L. § 750.335. Id., at 136, 586 N.W.2d 723. However, the opinion held that there was insufficient evidence that the plaintiffs intended to engage in lewd and lascivious behavior. Id., at 141, 586 N.W.2d 723. In reversing the trial court's grant of summary disposition for defendant in this case, the Court of Appeals applied McCready II and concluded that plaintiff had a valid claim for marital discrimination to the extent that plaintiff establishes discrimination on the basis of his unmarried cohabitation .... Op. at 159, 645 N.W.2d at 646. However, McCready should not be read so expansively as to create a right to cohabit under our Civil Rights Act. Properly read, the plaintiffs in McCready II submitted sufficient direct evidence of marital status discrimination to survive defendant's motion for summary disposition. While stated above, we take this opportunity to unequivocally reiterate that the unambiguous language of the Civil Rights Act protects only the consideration of a person's marital status. Adverse action against an individual for conduct, without regard to marital status, provides no basis for recourse under the act. It is irrelevant that the conduct at issue does or does not have criminal consequences. [4] In McCready, direct evidence was presented that the defendants considered the marital status of the plaintiffs in refusing to engage in the desired real estate transaction. Our Civil Rights Act requires no more. [5]