Opinion ID: 75545
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel pertaining to the conviction

Text: 26 Giving the state court findings of fact the presumption of correctness, we find no error in the district court's conclusion that Thompson has not established that counsel's performance at the guilt/innocence phase of trial was so unreasonable and prejudicial as to undermine our confidence in the outcome of his conviction. Thompson claims first that it was ineffective and prejudicial for counsel to concede in opening statement that Thompson had robbed and kidnaped Gray and pushed her down the well, even though Counsel also asserted that it was Franklin and not Thompson who had shot her. We find that Counsel's concession of Thompson's participation in the crime was not unreasonable in light of the overwhelming evidence that Counsel knew was going to be presented against Thompson during the trial. First, in every statement Thompson gave to the police and to his lawyers, Thompson had confessed to the robbery and kidnaping. Even when he changed his story and placed the blame for the shooting on Shirley Franklin, he still admitted that he had robbed and kidnaped Gray. His original two confessions indicated that he had already placed Gray in the well and emptied his gun into it before he returned home to obtain more bullets and, accompanied by Shirley, returned and fired additional shots into the well. Later, he told his lawyers and testified at trial that, after he had robbed and abducted Gray, he was panicked and drunk and, not knowing what to do, told Gray to get in the trunk of the car and drove to Franklin's home. After telling Franklin what had happened, they then drove to the well. In fact, Thompson testified at trial that he had told Franklin that they should put Gray in the well and then flee the country and call to tell someone where Gray was. When Thompson refused to shoot Gray after Franklin's insistence that he do so, Thompson said Franklin called him chicken, took the gun and shot into the well. 27 Counsel knew that the foregoing would be Thompson's testimony at trial. They also knew that Shirley Franklin would testify that it was Thompson who shot Gray in the well, and that she had arrived at the well with Thompson after the fact. They further understood that Thompson's confession after his arrest, corroborating Franklin's version of events, would also be introduced at trial. The record from the state habeas hearing supports the fact that counsel made a strategic decision to present the case as Thompson presented it to them: Thompson was culpable for the robbery and abduction, but he had no intent to murder Ms. Gray and did not participate in the murder. Counsel also testified at the hearing that they conceded Thompson's limited participation to gain credibility for Thompson's testimony that it was Franklin that suggested and carried out the killing. Under these circumstances, we do not find that Thompson has borne his burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard. 28 Thompson next argues that it was ineffective and prejudicial to elicit testimony which implicated Thompson in Franklin's lifestyle, her past criminal acts and conduct reflecting her remorselessness after the murder. Defense counsel testified at the state post-conviction hearing that their strategy at trial was one of diminished capacity, limited participation, addiction to drugs and alcohol, and remorse. Faced with Franklin's testimony and Thompson's own confession as well as his later story that it was Franklin who had ordered and then carried out the murder, Counsel's course of action was to present a picture of Franklin as an older woman who controlled and manipulated Thompson with drugs and alcohol and was successful in getting him to do her bidding, not only at the well, but in the past as well. Trial counsel sought to discredit Franklin's conflicting testimony by introducing her prior conviction for armed robbery, her record of escapes, the testimony of Connie Pope that Franklin admitted to robbing older men by taking them to motels and knocking them unconscious, as well as an armed robbery of a pizza restaurant in Boaz, Alabama, and the testimony of Thompson that several months prior to the murder he had robbed a store with Franklin and that Franklin had held a gun on the storekeeper. 29 Thompson argues that it would have been sufficient to impeach Franklin with only the evidence of her prior convictions and escapes and other conduct in which Thompson did not participate. However, counsel was attempting to explain Franklin's domination of Thompson to support his story that it was Franklin who had committed the murder and so elicited testimony regarding Franklin's influence on him and evidence of his actions at her direction on prior occasions. Counsel's strategy to paint Franklin as manipulating Thompson and as the more evil of the two is not beyond the scope of professional representation required by the Constitution when considered in light of what was available as a defense under the circumstances here. 30 Thompson next argues that Counsel fell below the standard for constitutionally effective counsel by abandoning a viable intoxication defense which would have permitted the jury to convict of a lesser included offense. He argues that Counsel should have presented their own psychiatric expert's report which concluded that Thompson drank as much as a case of beer or a fifth of whiskey a day, had suffered from blackouts since the age of 17, smoked up to a quarter of an ounce of marijuana a day, used Dialaudid, and took approximately 10 milligrams of Valium each day. Thompson also argues that Counsel should have argued that Thompson's alcohol and drug use on the night of the murder left him with diminished capacity. 31 Prior to trial, trial counsel had filed motions for a psychiatric examination and an independent psychiatric examination. As a result, Thompson was evaluated at Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility by a lunacy commission which concluded that although at the time of the alleged offense, it is possible Mr. Thompson was under the influence of self-administered intoxicants, Thompson was criminally responsible for his actions at the time of the crime. Trial counsel felt that the evidence from the Lunacy Commission that Thompson was competent and that his self-administered intoxicants did not diminish his criminal responsibility could have been harmful to Thompson, and thus, did not present it at trial. 32 Thompson was also evaluated by Dr. R.A. Sleszynski, a private psychiatrist hired by trial counsel. Counsel testified that they did not present the testimony of Dr. Slezynski because, after discussing the report with Sleszynski, trial counsel felt that Sleszynski was not sympathetic to their client and that his attitude on the witness stand would be detrimental to Thompson. They also believed that Dr. Slezynski's diagnosis that Thompson had an anti-social personality disorder would harm Thompson. Evidence regarding Thompson's dependence on alcohol since he was in his teens and drug use had been otherwise presented to the jury. Counsel testified that they considered and weighed the competing factors regarding Slesznski's impact on the jury and made a strategic decision not to use him because the possible harm to their client outweighed the possible benefit. We do not find error in the state and district court's finding that trial counsel's performance in this regard did not fall below the standard of professional performance enunciated in Strickland. 33