Opinion ID: 2847459
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Mullins begins by arguing that the government produced insufficient evidence to convict him of wire fraud and bribery. Sufficiency challenges are very difficult to win because we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and reverse only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. McClellan, No. 14-2449, 2015 WL 4451052, at  (7th Cir. July 21, 2015); United States v. Hosseini, 679 F.3d 544, 557 (7th Cir. 2012). The government alleges that Mullins waived arguments about the sufficiency of the evidence, but we need not decide whether the government is correct because, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verNo. 14-1701 7 dict, we conclude that the record contains abundant evidence to support the convictions. To prove wire fraud, the government must establish that there was (1) a scheme to defraud in which the defendant participated, (2) intent to defraud, and (3) use of interstate wires. 18 U.S.C. § 1343; United States v. Sheneman, 682 F.3d 623, 628 (7th Cir. 2012). Mullins submits that he did not scheme to defraud Cook County. He maintains that he simply expedited time-sensitive contracts and broke no county rules. And he adds that even if there was a scheme, he did not participate in it because he did not personally draft proposals or approve the contracts. The jury had more than sufficient reason to disbelieve these assertions. A fraud scheme exists when there is a willful act to receive, deceive, or cheat to cause financial loss to another. See United States v. Howard, 619 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2010). Here ample evidence establishes that Mullins intended to cheat Cook County out of money. According to the witnesses, Mullins altered proposals and wrote invoices to fit below the $25,000 approval threshold and thereby avoided detection by the Board of Commissioners. He then helped the vendors receive payments before they completed any work and despite never delivering services commensurate with the county’s payments to them. By helping to arrange for these proposals, invoices, and payments for incomplete work, the scheme and Mullins’s participation in it is adequately supported. See Sheneman, 682 F.3d at 629 (finding sufficient evidence where defendant took active role in misleading victim bank). Accordingly, the government adequately proved wire fraud. 8 No. 14-1701 To prove bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) the government must show that a public agent solicited “corruptly anything of value” in connection with a transaction of $5,000 or more. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B); see United States v. Blagojevich, No. 11-3853, 2015 WL 4433687, at  (7th Cir. July 21, 2015); United States v. Robinson, 663 F.3d 265, 271 (7th Cir. 2011). An agent acts corruptly when he understands that the payment given is a bribe, reward, or gratuity. See United States v. Hawkins, 777 F.3d 880, 882 (7th Cir. 2015). To attack the sufficiency of the bribery conviction, Mullins raises two arguments, but they are both meritless. Mullins first contends that he did not act corruptly because, he says, other departments requested the work and approved the contracts from the vendors. But Mullins himself testified that his input and recommendation were important in choosing vendors. And he used his influence corruptly. As already observed, Mullins altered the invoices to remain under $25,000 and kept himself in the approval process. Later, when the vendors received their fees, Mullins required and received cash kickbacks under the ruse, as Peery explained, that the kickback payments were for “subcontractors.” In reality the payments were given to Mullins to secure future awards from Cook County, as Render testified. Thus, jurors could infer that the cash that Mullins received from vendors was a reward—a bribe—for buying his influence in obtaining their contracts. Mullins also contends that he cannot be convicted of bribery because the government produced no evidence of quid pro quo, such as the vendors receiving something in return for the bribe. But they did receive something—their contracts. In any case, evidence of quid pro quo is not necesNo. 14-1701 9 sary to establish a violation of § 666(a)(1)(B). See United States v. Boender, 649 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Gee, 432 F.3d 713, 714–15 (7th Cir. 2005). Thus, the bribery counts are intact.