Opinion ID: 2173751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The burden was upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Karen committed the delinquent act of theft of lost or mislaid property. § 27-20-29(2), N.D.C.C. (proof beyond a reasonable doubt). Section 12.1-23-04, N.D.C.C., provides: 12.1-23-04. Theft of property lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake. A person is guilty of theft if he: 1. Retains or disposes of property of another when he knows it has been lost or mislaid; ...       and with intent to deprive the owner of it, he fails to take readily available and reasonable measures to restore the property to a person entitled to have it. § 12.1-23-04, N.D.C.C. This definition requires a specific intent to deprive the owner. This intent is the very gist of the crime. As such it must be proved by the State. We agree with what the Supreme Court of Minnesota said in State v. Higgin, 257 Minn. 46, 99 N.W.2d 902 (1959), when it held that intent could not be presumed from the defendant's actions thus placing a burden upon the defendant to rebut the presumption. The court said: where specific intent is an essential element of the offense charged, it can never be presumed, at least in the sense that it must be found from a given state of facts in the absence of countervailing or rebutting evidence. Like every other essential element of the crime, specific intent must be established beyond reasonable doubt or be reasonably deducible from the evidence. It may not rest on a presumption. As previously mentioned, intent to defraud may be, and normally is, inferred from the established circumstances. But no matter how uncontrovertible the evidence of the intent to defraud may be, the court may not declare that the evidence establishes such intent. 99 N.W.2d at 907. Thus, the State was required to prove that Karen's intent was to deprive the owner of the vest. Section 12.1-23-10(2)(c), N.D.C.C., defines deprive to mean: (c) To dispose of property or use it or transfer any interest in it under circumstances that make its restoration, in fact, unlikely. This intent to deprive is crucial. A person is not bound to take charge of an item he finds which he believes to be lost. If he does, however, he has the rights and obligations of a depository for hire. § 60-01-34, N.D.C.C. There is no requirement that the finder must take steps to find the rightful owner unless he knows or suspects who the owner is. § 60-01-35, N.D.C.C. Thus, the specific intent to deprive is what transforms the innocent act of taking charge of lost property, and not searching out the owner, into a criminal act. Karen asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove she committed the delinquent act of theft of mislaid property. Hearings held to determine delinquency under the Uniform Juvenile Court Act are to be conducted informally (§ 27-20-24, N.D. C.C.), but there must be sufficient, competent evidence to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the delinquent act was committed by the juvenile. A review of the transcript reveals that three persons testified. They were Ramona Huff, the petitioner, and the two police officers. None of the witnesses had any actual knowledge concerning the finding and disposal of the vest. All three witnesses testified that Karen had told them she had found the vest, worn it, and then left it at the high school gymnasium. The testimony also indicates that after Karen found the vest she hid it before going to the home of the woman for whom she babysat. The witnesses also testified that several of Karen's acquaintances had seen her wearing the vest. The only evidence concerning the disposal of the vest was that the witnesses all said Karen told them she left the vest at the gymnasium. When all of this evidence is considered, a finding that Karen intended to deprive the owner of the vest by leaving the vest in the gymnasium becomes a very close and difficult determination. We would normally allow the juvenile court's decision to stand when, as required, we give its finding appreciable weight. On our review of the transcript, however, we cannot find sufficient, competent evidence to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Karen committed theft of mislaid property as defined by Section 12.1-23-04, when the hearsay evidence and Karen's statements given to the officers without being informed of her rights are excluded from consideration. The relevant testimony of both police officers consisted solely of hearsay evidence or of the statements given to them by Karen. [4] This hearsay evidence was clearly a concern of the juvenile court judge as the judge questioned the officer as follows: Q I missed the name of the person whom you talked to and you identified the person. It probably was another lady or girl. But I made a note that the witness says, or the person talking to you, told you that she saw [Karen] wearing the vest. What is the name of the person that told you that? A Yes, that was [Linda]. Q [Linda]? A Yes. Q How old is [Linda]? A Approximately 12-11, 12 years old. Q Roughly when was it that [Linda] told you this? A This was the night of the interview. Q Oh, the night when all of these people A Yes, we had all subjects that were involved. Q Maybe a couple of weeks after the 29th? A Yes, approximately, yes. As the testimony given by the officers was either hearsay evidence obtained by talking to Ramona and Karen's friends, or statements elicited by the officers when they questioned Karen without informing her of her rights, their testimony should not have been considered by the court in making its determination. A review of Ramona's testimony reveals that a substantial amount of her testimony regarding control of the vest was hearsay evidence. [5] When the testimony of the police officers is excluded, as is the hearsay evidence given by Ramona, we do not believe that sufficient evidence remains to determine that Karen intended to deprive the then unknown owner of the vest. To deprive means to dispose of the property under circumstances that make its restoration, in fact, unlikely. Our review of the evidence does not convince us that the use of Karen's statements were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-11 (1967). In light of the fact that we cannot conclude that the juvenile court judge would have arrived at the conclusion that Karen committed the alleged delinquent act had the court not considered the inadmissible testimony, the decision of juvenile court must be and is hereby reversed. The case is remanded for a rehearing before a juvenile court judge other than the one who heard this case initially. The designation of that judge shall be made by the presiding judge of the Northwest Judicial District. SAND, PAULSON, PEDERSON and VANDE WALLE, JJ., concur.