Opinion ID: 2076252
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: shackling of hunt

Text: Hunt next contends that the trial judge erred by requiring him to wear leg irons during the sentencing hearing. The issue of shackling a defendant in a death penalty sentencing hearing has been addressed rarely. This Court considered the issue in Bowers v. State, 306 Md. 120, 507 A.2d 1072, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890, 107 S.Ct. 292, 93 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In Bowers, we held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in ordering that Bowers wear leg irons during his death penalty sentencing hearing. The issue was discussed extensively in two other death penalty cases. In Duckett v. State, 752 P.2d 752 (Nev. 1988), the trial court had ordered the defendant to wear manacles and prison garb during the penalty phase of the trial after he had been convicted of a double murder. The Nevada Supreme Court sustained the trial judge's action. The court's opinion focused on the fact that the defendant was no longer entitled to the presumption of innocence, as well as the need to protect society from a convicted defendant who might have concluded that he had nothing to lose from further acts of violence. Id. at 755. In Elledge v. State, 408 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 981, 103 S.Ct. 316, 74 L.Ed.2d 293 (1982), the trial judge ordered that the defendant wear leg irons during a death penalty hearing after learning that the defendant had stated his intention to attack the bailiff and had also become proficient in karate. The defendant was sentenced to death. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the death penalty. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in a habeas corpus proceeding, however, reversed the death penalty. That court held that the shackling was inherently prejudicial and that the trial judge failed to provide the defendant with an opportunity to rebut the evidence offered as a justification for the shackling. [2] Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1451-52, modified, 833 F.2d 250 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014, 108 S.Ct. 1487, 99 L.Ed.2d 715 (1988). We begin our analysis by noting that the trial judge has broad discretion in maintaining courtroom security. The courts uniformly rely upon an abuse of discretion standard for reviewing the action of trial judges in the matter of restraint.... Bowers 306 Md. at 132, 507 A.2d at 1078. The reviewing court should not determine whether less stringent security measures were available to the trial court, but rather whether the measures applied were reasonable and whether they posed an unacceptable risk of prejudice to the defendant. Bruce v. State, 318 Md. 706, 721, 569 A.2d 1254, 1262 (1990). The risk of prejudice varies with the security measure. Some measures are inherently prejudicial and may be used only when there is a compelling state interest specific to the trial. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 1346, 89 L.Ed.2d 525, 534 (1986). Placing a defendant under physical restraints such as leg irons at a guilt/innocence trial is an inherently prejudicial measure and requires a compelling state interest. Bruce at 721, 569 A.2d at 1262. This is true because one accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced at trial. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 1934, 56 L.Ed.2d 468, 475 (1978). When the presumption of innocence is lost as the result of a conviction, there is less risk of prejudice at the sentencing hearing. Bowers at 136-38, 507 A.2d at 1080-81. See generally Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d at 1451 & 1453; Elledge v. State, 408 So.2d at 1022-23; Duckett, 752 P.2d at 754-55. Shackling a defendant during the guilt/innocence phase of trial is inherently prejudicial because it highlights the need to separate a defendant from the community at large.... Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. at 569, 106 S.Ct. at 1346, 89 L.Ed.2d at 534. This concern is not as great during the sentencing hearing. It is clear that the defendant will be separated from the community. The only issue is whether the defendant will receive the death penalty or life imprisonment. The defendant's guilt of first degree murder is established and the jury is less likely to be prejudiced by the defendant's appearance in leg irons. The defendant stands in the position of a convicted felon brought before a trial court for sentencing. He thus is unlike the ordinary defendant who at trial stands clothed with a presumption of innocence. Bowers at 132, 507 A.2d at 1078. Because of this, other state interests may outweigh any prejudice to the defendant. The most obvious is the State's interest in maintaining custody of a convicted murderer. Perhaps no other defendant appearing before the court has a greater incentive to attempt escape than a convicted murderer facing the possibility of being executed. His best hope is a life sentence. We must determine whether there was an essential state interest in ordering this appellant to wear leg irons during his sentencing hearing and whether, weighed against the state interest, the order posed an unacceptable risk of prejudice. The prejudice posed by security measures, and whether a compelling state interest outweighs that prejudice, must be measured on a case by case basis. Bruce, 318 Md. at 721, 569 A.2d at 1262. There are three essential state interests which may justify physically restraining a defendant: Preventing the defendant's escape, protecting those in the courtroom, and maintaining order in the courtroom. Unless one or more of these factors outweigh any prejudice to the defendant, physical restraint is inappropriate. The record shows that Hunt was a significant escape risk. He fled the scene and left the State after murdering Officer Adolfo. While in prison, he feigned an illness so that he would be sent to the hospital to see what my chances were for freedom. Also, the appellant showed an inability to adjust to prison life, reflected by several prison rules violations and his resultant continuous confinement to segregated quarters. He was twice cited for possession of weapons. [3] Finally, the sentencing proceeding was held in a windowed, street level courtroom which might have provided temptation for an escape attempt. See Billups v. Garrison, 718 F.2d 665 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 820, 105 S.Ct. 91, 83 L.Ed.2d 37 (1984), where the court found that the combination of a relatively insecure area and the more than average risk of escape satisfied the use of shackles on a defendant in an armed robbery and felonious assault trial. Given the factors taken as a whole, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that appellant was an escape risk and that the need for some physical restraints outweighed any potential prejudice to Hunt. Hunt contends that the trial judge did not explain his reasons for requiring leg irons. Also, he contends that the trial judge's decision was based solely on the unsupported opinion of Judge Angeletti. He raises two important issues. First, the trial judge should insure that the record reflects the reasons for extraordinary security measures such as physical restraints. Bowers, 306 Md. at 138, 507 A.2d at 1081. Second, while the trial judge has broad discretion for courtroom security, he or she may not delegate that discretion to a third party. United States v. Samuel, 431 F.2d 610, 615 (4th Cir.1970).
The record does not contain a summary list of reasons, but nonetheless is replete with support for the judge's decision. From the outset of the resentencing hearing, he was concerned with courtroom security. The same judge had presided over the original trial and was aware of Hunt's background. He knew that Hunt had a record of violent crime [4] and that a psychiatric report indicated that Hunt had an anti-social personality. Hunt, 312 Md. at 505-06, 540 A.2d at 1130. At the original trial, the judge ordered enhanced security in the form of additional officers in the courtroom. Id. at 506, 540 A.2d at 1130. He ordered similar security at the resentencing hearing. The judge ordered Hunt to wear leg irons during the sentencing hearing after receiving a presentencing investigation report and after hearing the testimony of Judge Angeletti, chair of the court's security committee. The report and Judge Angeletti's testimony appear in the record. When the judge issued his order, he stated: With respect to what just transpired ... I'm ordering that Mr. Hunt wear leg irons in the courtroom. Clearly, the judge based his decision on the immediately preceding record, which included Judge Angeletti's testimony recommending restraints for Hunt, as well as the presentence investigation report. The judge also referred to the presentencing report as a key factor in reassessing the need for leg irons. He stated that the presentencing report changes things considerably. We hold that the judge adequately indicated his reasons for ordering Hunt to wear leg irons in court.
Hunt also contends that the judge relied solely on Judge Angeletti's opinion, and thus improperly delegated his discretion. The record indicates otherwise. The trial judge did not fail to exercise his discretion and did not delegate that discretion to Judge Angeletti. That the trial judge was concerned with security before consulting with Judge Angeletti is clear from the record. He had previously ordered enhanced security. In fact, he consulted with Judge Angeletti only after receiving the presentencing report. He carefully considered the security requirements throughout the proceedings, and ordered the appellant to wear leg irons only after receiving the presentencing report which added significant information on the issue, as well as hearing Judge Angeletti explain, on the record in open court, his reasons for recommending physical restraints. The trial judge did not rely solely on, nor delegate his discretion to, Judge Angeletti. The trial judge's decision to change the level of courtroom security was not mere acquiescence to a recommendation, but rather a mature reflection based upon somewhat different conditions. Bowers, 306 Md. at 138, 507 A.2d at 1081. We also note that by ordering leg irons, the judge employed a restraint obviously designed to prevent escape, but not designed to prevent acts of violence by the defendant. This is a lesser restraint than handcuffs, and accordingly, less prejudicial. The American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice (2d Ed. 1982) § 15-3.1(c), as cited in Bowers, 306 Md. at 129, 507 A.2d at 1076, notes in commentary that [t]here is some authority that shackles are not to be used if the danger can be overcome by armed guards and that handcuffs are not to be used if less visible leg irons will suffice. That the judge's decision to change the level of security occurred after the trial started, and after the jury had first seen Hunt without shackles, causes some concern. But because the decision was made promptly after receiving relevant new information contained in the presentence report, the judge properly exercised his discretion. Although it would be preferable that the defendant be restrained from the beginning of the trial, if at all, the judge cannot be precluded from taking appropriate security measures when new information or circumstances arise. See State v. Weikle, 223 Neb. 81, 388 N.W.2d 110 (1986) (no error where trial judge ordered a previously unrestrained defendant to wear leg irons during the appearance in court of inmate witnesses after the judge had heard testimony that the defendant contemplated another escape attempt).
When considering extraordinary security measures, the trial judge should employ procedural protections to minimize the possibility of prejudice to the defendant. Such procedures should include hearing any argument on the issue out of the presence of the jury, affording the defendant an opportunity to rebut, and upon request, issuing cautionary instructions to the jury or polling the jurors to determine if they would be disposed against the defendant because of the security measures. See Bowers, 306 Md. at 129-34, 507 A.2d at 1076-79. The trial judge provided adequate procedural protections. The argument was held outside the jury's presence. Hunt's counsel had the opportunity to argue against the use of physical restraints, and had the opportunity to cross-examine Judge Angeletti. Hunt did not offer any evidence to rebut the reports of prison violations. Hunt did, however, attempt to rebut the escape risk status by arguing that he had been taken to his psychiatrist's office and to court without previous incident. Hunt may have been entitled to, and the trial judge offered to give, cautionary instructions to the jury about the leg irons. The judge also offered to poll the jurors on whether they would be prejudiced by seeing Hunt in leg irons. Hunt's counsel, making a strategic decision, specifically asked that the judge do neither. Having rejected the judge's offer, Hunt cannot now complain about the failure to poll the jury or the failure to give a cautionary instruction.