Opinion ID: 1213767
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discharge of Pollutants Into Navigable Waters From a Point Source

Text: Having concluded that there is insufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the berm and entire shooting range lawn are jurisdictional wetlands, and assuming arguendo that (1) the area bordering the range to the north and east and (2) unspecified parts of the shooting range lawn constitute jurisdictional wetlands, and hence navigable waters for purposes of the CWA, the question is whether SAPS has provided sufficient evidence to create a material issue of fact as to whether Metacon is discharging lead munitions into these jurisdictional wetlands from a point source. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (The term `discharge of a pollutant'... means ... any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.). SAPS contends that there are two point sources on the Metacon site: the shooting range and the berm. Metacon responds that there is insufficient evidence that either the shooting range or the berm is a point source under the CWA. Our construction of the CWA begins with [the] statutory text and its plain meaning. Bonime v. Avaya, Inc., 547 F.3d 497, 503 (2d. Cir.2008). When considering the text, we must also keep in mind context and the structure of the statute as a whole. Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir.2000), rev'd on other grounds, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002); see also Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995) ([T]he meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988) (assessment of plain meaning must also look to language and design of the statute as a whole). The CWA defines point source as any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). We have said that the definition of a point source is to be broadly interpreted, and further: The touchstone of the regulatory scheme is that those needing to use the waters for waste distribution must seek and obtain a permit to discharge that waste, with the quantity and quality of the discharge regulated. The concept of a point source was designed to further this scheme by embracing the broadest possible definition of any identifiable conveyance from which pollutants might enter waters of the United States. Dague, 935 F.2d at 1354-55 (quoting United States v. Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir.1979)); see also Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir.1994) ([T]he definition of a point source is to be broadly interpreted.). We have also made clear, however, that the phrase discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance cannot be interpreted so broadly as to read the point source requirement out of the statute. For example, we have held that whether a human being who discards vials of blood into the Hudson River constitutes a point source for purposes of § 1362(14) is at best ambiguous, so that a criminal conviction obtained on such a theory is inconsistent with the rule of lenity. See United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 646 (2d Cir.1993). In Plaza Health Labs., we explained: [I]f every discharge involving humans were to be considered a discharge from a point source[,] the statute's lengthy definition of point source would have been unnecessary. It is elemental that congress does not add unnecessary words to statutes. Had congress intended to punish any human being who polluted navigational waters, it could readily have said: any person who places pollutants in navigable waters without a permit is guilty of a crime. Id. at 646; see also id. at 647 (We find no suggestion either in the act itself or in the history of its passage that congress intended the CWA to impose criminal liability on an individual for the myriad, random acts of human waste disposal, for example, a passerby who flings a candy wrapper into the Hudson River, or a urinating swimmer. Discussions during the passage of the 1972 amendments indicate that congress had bigger fish to fry.). The CWA's structure confirms this point. Although the term nonpoint source is not defined in the CWA, the statute clearly indicates that there is a category of nonpoint source pollution, and leaves the regulation of nonpoint source pollution to the states. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(7) ([I]t is the national policy that programs for the control of nonpoint sources of pollution be developed and implemented in an expeditious manner so as to enable the goals of this chapter to be met through the control of both point and nonpoint sources of pollution.); id. § 1329 (entitled Nonpoint source management programs); see also Frank P. Grad, Treatise on Environmental Law § 3.03 (updated 2009) (The regulatory structure under the Clean Water Act emphasizes the distinction between `point sources' and `nonpoint sources.' Unlike point sources, nonpoint sources are not subject to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), under which the discharge of pollutants into the waters of the United States without permit is illegal. Control of nonpoint sources continues to be primarily a state function, with indirect federal participation.); Plaza Health Labs., 3 F.3d at 647 (stating that authority over control of pollutants from runoff ... resides in the State or ... local agency) (quoting S.Rep. No. 92-414, at 3744 (1971)); id. at 653 (Oakes, J., dissenting) (The structure of the statute  which regulates point source pollution closely, while leaving nonpoint source regulation to the states under the Section 208 program  indicates that the term `point source' was included in the definition of discharge so as to ensure that nonpoint source pollution would not be covered.); Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1373 (4th Cir.1976) (Congress consciously distinguished between point source and nonpoint source discharges, giving EPA authority under the Act to regulate only the former.). In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir.2001), this Court cited Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1984), for its definition of a nonpoint source: Congress had classified nonpoint source pollution as runoff caused primarily by rainfall around activities that employ or create pollutants. Such runoff could not be traced to any identifiable point of discharge. Trustees for Alaska, 749 F.2d at 558; see also Plaza Health Labs., 3 F.3d at 652 (Oakes, J., dissenting) (Nonpoint source pollution is, generally, runoff: salt from roads, agricultural chemicals from farmlands, oil from parking lots, and other substances washed by rain, in diffuse patterns, over the land and into navigable waters.); Frank P. Grad, Treatise on Environmental Law § 3.03 (updated 2009) (Nonpoint sources include pollution from diffuse land use activities such as agriculture, construction and mining that enter the waters primarily through indiscrete and less identifiable natural processes such as runoffs, precipitation and percolation.). We also stated that nonpoint sources ... can consist of, for example, runoff due to the agricultural use of land adjoining a river. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 268 F.3d at 94; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (stating that the term point source does not include agricultural stormwater discharges.). This is consistent with the EPA's guidance on nonpoint source pollution: [Nonpoint source pollution] is caused by diffuse sources that are not regulated as point sources and normally is associated with agricultural, silvicultural and urban runoff, runoff from construction activities, etc. Such pollution results in the human-made or human-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water. In practical terms, nonpoint source pollution does not result from a discharge at a specific, single location (such as a single pipe) but generally results from land runoff, precipitation, atmospheric deposition, or percolation. EPA Office of Water, Nonpoint Source Guidance 3 (1987); see also Nonpoint Source Program and Grants Guidelines for States and Territories, 68 Fed.Reg. 60653, 60655 (2003) (Nonpoint source pollution is caused by rainfall or snowmelt moving over and through the ground and carrying natural and human-made pollutants into lakes, rivers, streams, wetlands, estuaries, other coastal waters, and ground water.); EPA Office of Water, Polluted 5 (1994) (EPA Doc. No. 841-F-94-005) (Nonpoint Source pollution is caused by rainfall or snowmelt moving over and through the ground. As the runoff moves, it picks up and carries away natural and human-made pollutants, finally depositing them into lakes, rivers, wetlands, coastal waters, and even our underground sources of drinking water.). The EPA's NPDES regulations define the extent to which surface runoff can in certain circumstances constitute point source pollution. The definition of Discharge of a pollutant includes additions of pollutants into waters of the United States from: surface runoff which is collected or channelled by man.  40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (emphasis added). By implication, surface water runoff which is neither collected nor channeled constitutes nonpoint source pollution and consequentially is not subject to the CWA permit requirement. See Hardy v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 164 F.3d 789, 794 (2d Cir.1999) (relying on the familiar principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of the other). We accord the EPA's regulation Chevron deference. See Estate of Landers v. Leavitt, 545 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir.2008) (Most agency interpretations that have qualified for Chevron deference are rules that have been promulgated in regulations issued through notice and comment or adjudication, or in another format authorized by Congress for use in issuing `legislative' rules. (internal quotation marks omitted)). At Chevron step one, we consider whether Congress has clearly spoken to the issue of when surface runoff can constitute a point source discharge. See Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir.2007). Given that nonpoint source pollution is not defined in the statute and a point source is merely defined as any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, we find that it has not. If we cannot conclude that Congress has `directly addressed the precise question at issue,' we will proceed to Chevron step two, which instructs us to defer to an agency's interpretation of the statute, so long as it is `reasonable.' Cohen, 498 F.3d at 116. Limiting the scope of the term point source to surface runoff that is collected or channeled by human beings is consistent with the CWA's definition of point sources as discernible, confined and discrete conveyances, such as any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, [or] container, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14), and hence is reasonable. Moreover, our case law is in accord with the EPA's regulations. We have indicated that [t]o be sure, the [CWA] does generally contemplate that discharges be `channelized' in order to fall within the EPA's regulatory jurisdiction; that is why the term `point source' is defined as `discrete, discernable, conveyances.' Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 510. Other Circuits have specifically held that [b]road though [the] definition [of point source] may be, we are of [the] opinion that it does not include unchanneled and uncollected surface waters. Appalachian Power Co., 545 F.2d at 1373; see also Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 842 n. 8 (9th Cir.2003) (Diffuse runoff, such as rainwater that is not channeled through a point source, is considered nonpoint source pollution and is not subject to federal regulation.); Shanty Town Assocs. LP v. EPA, 843 F.2d 782, 785 n. 2 (4th Cir.1988) (stating that the definition of a point source excludes unchanneled and uncollected surface runoff, which is referred to as `nonpoint source' pollution); Sierra Club v. Abston Constr. Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir.1980) (Although the point source definition excludes unchanneled and uncollected surface waters, surface runoff from rainfall, when collected or channeled by coal miners in connection with mining activities, constitutes point source pollution. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Robin Kundis Craig, Local or National? The Increasing Federalization of Nonpoint Source Pollution Regulation, 15 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 179, 191 (2000) (Although storm water runoff is generally a nonpoint source of water pollution, Congress recognized in 1987 that much storm water is actually collected and channeled before reaching waterways, such as in city drain systems. The 1987 [storm water permitting] amendments explicitly extended the federal NPDES permit program for point sources to cover municipal and industrial discharges of storm water.).
With the distinction between point source and nonpoint source pollution in mind, we turn to SAPS's evidence of point source discharges on Metacon's site. We conclude that SAPS has not provided sufficient evidence to raise a material issue of fact as to whether (1) the berm is a point source, and (2) assuming arguendo that the firing line of the shooting range is a point source, lead is discharged into jurisdictional wetlands from the firing line.
SAPS first argues that the berm leaches lead into jurisdictional waters, and is therefore a point source which discharges pollutants into navigable waters. However, there is insufficient evidence in the record to support this claim. The LBG report, as noted previously, concludes that ground water beneath the shooting range has not been impacted by lead from the... range and, regarding wetland surface water, that lead is not leaching out of the soil or surface water to contaminate surrounding waters. J.A. at 266. The AEI report does not disagree. It indicates that tests were performed on certain soil samples taken from the berm and that these samples exceeded the CTDEP's Pollutant Mobility Criteria (PMC)  its RSR for assessing, among other things, the capacity of pollutants potentially to leach. The report concludes based on this testing that the lead is leachable and may over time pose a threat to ground water quality, id. at 643, but it does not provide evidence that any actual leaching has occurred. For the reasons already articulated, the bare fact that soil samples from the Metacon berm may exceed Connecticut's RSR threshold for pollutant mobility is not enough, without more, to raise a material issue as to whether a serious risk of endangerment to ground water may be present, for the purpose of the RCRA. The AEI report suggests the lead is leachable but provides no information as to the likelihood of leaching or the seriousness of any risk it presents. Notably, the CTDEP itself informed Connecticut's Attorney General on the basis of the LBG report, which analyzed ground and surface water, that [a]ll the results indicated that lead was not detected or was present at concentrations in groundwater and surface water below action levels. Id. at 262. For the purpose of a CWA permit violation, however, all that is necessary is an unauthorized discharge into jurisdictional waters. As we have already said, there is no evidence that lead has leached from the berm into ground water. [6] And SAPS has similarly provided no evidence that lead has migrated from the berm to Metacon wetlands through leaching. Lead was detected in wetland soils and surface waters near the berm. The AEI report suggests that if the lead migrated from the berm, however, it was by means other than leaching  that wetland sediments and surface water behind and adjacent to the backstop/berm may be receptors for lead contamination due to surface water runoff and airborne dust. J.A. at 637. This method of contamination, however, even assuming that it takes place, does not fall within the statute. Id. For even assuming the Metacon berm may be described as a container, or conduit, the record contains no evidence that it serves as a confined and discrete conveyance of lead to jurisdictional wetlands by these routes. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). The EPA's NPDES regulations, which SAPS does not challenge and to which we defer, make clear that surface water runoff that is neither collected nor channeled does not constitute point source pollution. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2; see also Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 268 F.3d at 94; Trustees for Alaska, 749 F.2d at 558; EPA Office of Water, Nonpoint Source Guidance 3 (1987). Even assuming rain and flooding at the Metacon site may cause lead in the berm to migrate to jurisdictional wetlands via surface water runoff, SAPS has provided no evidence that such runoff is in any way collected or channeled by man. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. [7] Thus, there is insufficient evidence that surface water runoff from the berm constitutes a discharge from a point source, and such runoff is outside the ambit of the CWA permit requirement. This Court's precedent supports this conclusion. In Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114 (2d Cir.1994), we found that liquid manure that flowed from the field of a farm to a jurisdictional water constituted a discharge from two point sources: (1) a swale coupled with a pipe that channeled the manure and (2) manure-spreading vehicles that discharged manure onto the field. With respect to the swale, we noted that the liquid manure was collected and channelized through the ditch or depression in the swale of field 104 and thence into the ditch leading to the stream. Id. at 119. SAPS points to no evidence of a similar conveyance in the case at bar. With respect to the manure spreading machines, this Court held as follows: [W]e agree with the appellants that, alternatively, the manure spreading vehicles themselves were point sources. The collection of liquid manure into tankers and their discharge on fields from which the manure directly flows into navigable waters are point source discharges under the case law. Id. (emphasis added). Here, by contrast, there is no evidence that lead deposited into the berm directly flows into Metacon wetlands. The AEI report indicates that it does so only as part of surface water runoff, which results from rain or flooding. Moreover, unlike in Concerned Area Residents, there is no evidence that the surface water runoff from the berm containing lead is in anyway channeled or collected. We also find that lead in the berm that migrates to jurisdictional wetlands as airborne dust does not constitute a discharge from a point source. Based on the record before us, there is no evidence that airborne lead moves by any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14), to Metacon wetlands. The berm simply cannot be described as a discernible, confined and discrete conveyance with respect to lead that is carried by the wind, some portion of which may happen to land on nearby wetlands. See Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 510 ([T]he [CWA] does generally contemplate that discharges be `channelized' in order to fall within the EPA's regulatory jurisdiction.). To be clear, our holding is not that a berm can never constitute a point source, but only that there is insufficient evidence that the migration of lead from Metacon's berm by virtue of runoff and airborne dust is a point source discharge. Cf. Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 550 F.3d 778, 784 n. 4 ([W]hile a dam might not always be considered a point source, the dam turbines that were the focus of the decision in S.D. Warren clearly were a point source.). Even assuming the berm is an identifiable source from which lead pollution reaches jurisdictional wetlands  a generous assumption on the record here  this is not enough to satisfy the CWA requirement of a point source discharge. Otherwise, a passerby who flings a candy wrapper into the Hudson River, or a urinating swimmer would constitute point sources. Plaza Health Labs., 3 F.3d at 647. So too would runoff due to the agricultural use of land adjoining a river, Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc., 268 F.3d at 94, or runoff of salt from roads, oil from parking lots, Plaza Health Labs., 3 F.3d at 652 (Oakes, J., dissenting), or pollutants from construction activities. EPA Office of Water, Nonpoint Source Guidance 3 (1987). But these are paradigmatic examples of nonpoint source pollution. Both the CWA's definition of a point source and the CWA's structure, which leaves the regulation of nonpoint source pollution to the states, make clear that Congress chose to exempt a class of pollution from the CWA's permit requirement. To find that SAPS has presented sufficient evidence that the berm constitutes a point source on the undeveloped record before us would imply that runoff or windblown pollutants from any identifiable source, whether channeled or not, are subject to the CWA permit requirement. Such a construction would eviscerate the point source requirement and undo Congress's choice. The CWA's broad remedial purpose, i.e., to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a), cannot override the plain text and structure of the statute. See Plaza Health Labs., 3 F.3d at 647. In sum, a point source discharge requires that pollutants reach navigable waters by a discernible, confined and discrete conveyance and the AEI report's vague references to potential surface water runoff and windblown dust from the berm are insufficient to raise a material issue of fact that these are point source discharges.
SAPS also argues that the firing line from which Metacon members shoot constitutes a point source. We need not reach the issue, however. Assuming arguendo that the firing line of the shooting range constitutes a point source, SAPS has failed to adduce sufficient evidence that lead shot is discharged from the firing line into jurisdictional wetlands. SAPS does not contend that bullets from the firing line are discharged into the wetlands located on the northern and eastern borders of the range  the area that Metacon itself admits to be wetlands. Appellants' Br. 19-20; Appellants' Reply Br. 14-16. In any event, there is insufficient evidence in the record that this occurs. While bullets are discharged into the berm, as explained above, the berm does not constitute a jurisdictional wetland. This leaves the possibility that bullets are discharged from the firing line into unspecified jurisdictional wetlands on the shooting range itself. Metacon indicates that, in addition to the berm, lead bullets are also discharged into [t]arget lines ... downrange at 10, 25, 50, 75 and 100 yards. J.A. at 211. SAPS has introduced evidence that certain samples drawn from locations between the firing line and the berm had intermediate concentrations of lead as compared to samples drawn from the berm, where the lead concentrations were highest, and the firing line, which had the lowest levels of concentration. Id. at 642. Not surprisingly, the highest concentrations of lead in locations between the firing line and the berm were detected adjacent to the target holders. Id. Although this evidence suggests lead is discharged into the shooting range lawn from the firing line, with higher concentrations of lead accumulating near the targets, SAPS has provided no evidence that the targets are positioned on or near jurisdictional wetlands. Moreover, SAPS has provided no evidence that soil samples drawn from the shooting range lawn, and indicating elevated levels of lead, were drawn from or near jurisdictional wetlands. Even assuming the presence of jurisdictional wetlands somewhere on the shooting range, there is no evidence that lead is discharged into those areas, and hence there is an insufficient basis for a reasonable jury to draw an inference that lead is discharged from the firing line into jurisdictional wetlands on the range. To summarize, SAPS has failed to provide sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether (1) any lead that may reach jurisdictional wetlands from the berm results from a point source discharge; and (2) lead that is discharged from the firing line constitutes a discharge into jurisdictional wetlands. Accordingly, SAPS has not marshaled sufficient evidence to warrant a jury trial on an essential element of its CWA claim, i.e., that Metacon discharges lead munitions into navigable waters from any point source. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). The district court's grant of summary judgment to Metacon on that claim is affirmed.