Opinion ID: 2510443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: at both probation revocation and probation extension proceedings, a defendant should be afforded the minimum requirements of due process.

Text: ¶11 The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution forbids a state from depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This amendment guarantees both substantive and procedural due process rights. What constitutes due process, however, depends upon the type of proceeding and, more specifically, the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between legislative means and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose. Beardon v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1983) (alteration in the original) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶12 Based on these considerations, the United States Supreme Court has determined that probation revocation proceedings, which are not criminal in nature [4] and involve only a conditional liberty interest, are entitled only to the minimum requirements of due process. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶13 Neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether a defendant in a probation extension proceeding is entitled to the same rights as a defendant in a probation revocation proceeding. Clearly, a defendant in an extension proceeding is not entitled to greater due process rights, because at such a proceeding we are not dealing with the immediate, grievous loss of liberty implicated in a revocation of probation, but instead with a mere continuation of probationary restrictions and the possibility of future revocation. United States v. Ortiz, 733 F.2d 1416, 1417-18 (10th Cir. 1984). ¶14 What is less clear, however, is whether a defendant is entitled to any due process rights at an extension proceeding. Many jurisdictions have held that due process protections do not attach to probation extension proceedings. [5] Skipworth v. United States, 508 F.2d 598, 601-02 (3d Cir. 1975) (holding that due process does not require notice and hearing for a probation extension because the loss of liberty is merely potential); United States v. Carey, 565 F.2d 545, 547 (8th Cir. 1977) ([A] mere noncustodial period of supervision to a term within the statutory limits [does not] implicate[] a liberty interest sufficient to require a pre-extension hearing as a constitutionally commanded right.); United States v. Cornwell, 625 F.2d 686, 688 (5th Cir. 1980) ([E]xtension of a non-custodial period of supervision to a term within the statutory limits (does not) implicate a liberty interest sufficient to require a preextension hearing as a constitutionally commanded right. (internal quotation marks omitted)); Forgues v. United States, 636 F.2d 1125, 1127 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding ex parte extension did not offend due process because [p]robation . . . is a non-custodial supervisory period far less onerous to the probationer than the incarceration which results from the revocation of probation); United States v. Silver, 83 F.3d 289, 291-92 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding probation extension does not result in a liberty interest [being] so infringed as to require this court to call for additional protections as per the Due Process Clause). But many of these same courts have invoked their supervisory power to require that the probationer receive notice of the extension hearing and be advised of a right to a hearing and to counsel. Skipworth, 508 F.2d at 602-03 (requiring notice of proposed extension and right to hearing and counsel); Cornwell, 625 F.2d at 689 (invoking supervisory powers to require courts to notify probationers of proposed extensions and right to a hearing); Forgues, 636 F.2d at 1127 (same). Contra Carey, 565 F.2d at 547 (declining to use supervisory power to require a probation extension hearing). ¶15 One of the justifications offered by these jurisdictions for not extending due process rights to extension proceedings is that the factual inquiry in extension proceedings is quite different than that in revocation proceedings. Skipworth, 508 F.2d at 602; accord Silver, 83 F.3d at 292; Carey, 565 F.2d at 547. Specifically, in revocation proceedings a court must resolve a contested factual determination . . . [and] decide whether there was, in fact, a violation of probation. State v. Smith, 769 A.2d 698, 705 (Conn. 2001). In contrast, in most extension proceedings, a court may extend probation without finding that any probation violation occurred. Id. ¶16 In Utah, however, Utah Code section 77-18-1 (the Probation Statute) requires a court to hold a hearing in order to extend, modify, or revoke probation, unless that right is waived, and to find that the probationer has violated the terms of probation. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(a) (Supp. 2005). Because our Probation Statute requires a hearing (and a probation violation) to extend probation, we require that the hearing be conducted in accordance with the minimum requirements of due process, commensurate with those applicable to revocation proceedings. Having determined that a probationer must be afforded the minimum requirements of due process at a probation extension proceeding, we now turn to Orr's arguments that his extension proceeding did not meet those requirements.