Opinion ID: 1176285
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is the prohibition against discrimination limited only to situations where the defendant and excluded or rejected jurors were of the same race?

Text: The state contends that this defendant, a Caucasian, has no standing to complain of the exclusion of Black veniremen. We disagree with this argument for several reasons. Defendant argues that under the sixth amendment to the federal constitution his right to an impartial jury includes the opportunity to obtain a jury comprising a fair cross-section of the public. This principle is well established. See Ballew, Peters, McCray, Wheeler, Gilmore. Obviously, this right is implicated not only when those rejected for discriminatory motives are members of the defendant's own racial or ethnic group. The discriminatory exclusion of jurors from any cognizable group necessarily violates the right to a chance for a fair cross-section, no matter what the racial or ethnic characteristics of the defendant, his lawyer, the judge or any party to the action. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987); Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145 (Colo. 1987); Gilmore, 103 N.J. at 536 n. 9, 511 A.2d at 1164 n. 9. The state argues that the explicit language of Batson applies only to those cases in which the excluded jurors and the defendant himself are of the same racial group. This is true. [2] We believe, however, that the language of Batson 's holding was aimed at the specific facts and legal issues presented to the Court. Lacking specific guidance from the Supreme Court, we must determine in this case whether the Batson principle applies to situations going beyond Batson 's specific facts and to those involving the jury trial guarantee of the sixth amendment. Arizona provides an illuminating frame of reference. This state has a rich and diverse racial and ethnic composition of Native American, Hispanic, Caucasian, Black, Oriental and other citizens. Throughout Arizona's history, members of a wide variety of racial, ethnic and religious groups have settled in the territory and state, contributing their unique cultures, traditions and views to those of Arizona's indigenous peoples. Both the newcomers and the native peoples of this region have contributed immeasurably to the growth and development of our state. If we apply the Batson principle exclusively to those cases in which the defendant and the excluded jurors are of the identical racial or ethnic group, our trial judges and lawyers will frequently be forced to inquire into the racial and ethnic makeup of particular jurors. If possible we should adopt the rule that would obviate or reduce the necessity for such an unseemly and intrusive procedure. [3]