Opinion ID: 2630573
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutorial Standing and Entitlement to Disclosed Information

Text: Real party in interest the District Attorney for the County of San Diego argues he has a right, on behalf of the People, to be heard in Pitchess proceedings and to concurrently receive material ordered disclosed after a successful defense motion. In support, the district attorney cites several statutory provisions, none of which explicitly confers the rights he seeks. Code of Civil Procedure section 1005, subdivisions (a)(6) and (b), on which the district attorney relies, set forth the formal requirements for notice and hearing on Pitchess motions, but are silent with regard to whether notice shall be given to the district attorney, as well as to the governmental agency that holds the records sought. Penal Code section 684, unamended since its enactment in 1872, provides that the People of the State of California are a party to any criminal prosecution, but does not speak to the question of notice. Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (a) requires service of notice of a Pitchess motion on the governmental agency having custody of the records sought, but provides no insight into whether other parties are to be given notice in this context. The district attorney also relies on the state constitutional guarantee of due process found in article I, section 29 of the California Constitution. The provision, adopted in 1990 as part of Proposition 115, enshrines the People's right to due process of law. Observing that the central meaning of procedural due process is that parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard ( People v. Sutton (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 795, 803, 23 Cal. Rptr.2d 632, citing, inter alia, Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 80, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556), the district attorney argues he has a strong and specific interest in every Pitchess discovery motion filed in a criminal prosecution, entitling him to notice, presence and a right to be heard, in that the result of a Pitchess hearing may affect the outcome of the underlying criminal action. The Court of Appeal agreed, reasoning that, because the ruling on a Pitchess motion may affect the outcome of the whole criminal proceeding, state constitutional due process principles afford the district attorney a right both to notice and hearing, and to receipt of disclosed records. We have no doubt that, as a party to the underlying criminal proceeding, the district attorney under general due process principles is entitled to notice of the date and place of the hearing on a defense Pitchess motion. In this manner, if the court requires clarification or explanation of any matters set forth in the supporting affidavits, it will be able to ask questions of both the defense and the prosecution and thus obtain any information the court deems `essential' to a fair and proper decision. (Cf. People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 262, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193.) [5] However, the district attorney, in asserting entitlement to argue the prosecutorial point of view and to receive any information the court orders disclosed, overstates the extent of his legitimate interest in what is essentially a third party discovery proceeding. In a Pitchess hearing, the district attorney prosecuting the underlying criminal case represents neither the custodian of records nor their subject, and thus has no direct stake in the outcome. Instructive in this regard is Bullen v. Superior Court (1988) 204 Cal. App.3d 22, 251 Cal.Rptr. 32. In that case, the district attorney purported to appear on behalf of a third party to an underlying criminal prosecution, in mandate proceedings seeking to compel the superior court to vacate its order allowing the defense access to the third party's home for discovery purposes. Finding no statute authorizing the district attorney to represent a third party in discovery proceedings in a criminal action, the Bullen court ordered the district attorney's recusal. ( Id. at p. 25, 251 Cal.Rptr. 32.) Arguably, for a prosecutor to actively challenge the sufficiency of a Pitchess movant's good cause showing is to advance the interests of the third party custodian and police officer. The circumstance, moreover, that a successful Pitchess motion may yield information leading to evidence admissible in the underlying criminal proceeding does not necessarily give the district attorney an interest in the motion meriting the full panoply of due process rights in Pitchess proceedings. Notably, the reciprocal discovery statutes enable the prosecution to prepare to meet the defense case whenever defense receipt of Pitchess disclosure ripens into the intent to call a witness. (See Pen.Code, § 1054.3.) The Pitchess procedure is, as noted, in essence a special instance of third party discovery. Another such procedure is reflected in Penal Code sections 1326 and 1327, which empower either party in a criminal case to serve a subpoena duces tecum requiring the person or entity in possession of the materials sought to produce the information in court for the party's inspection. ( People v. Blair (1979) 25 Cal.3d 640, 651, 159 Cal.Rptr. 818, 602 P.2d 738; People v. Superior Court ( Barrett ), supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 1315, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 264; Pacific Lighting Leasing Co. v. Superior Court (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 552, 560, 131 Cal.Rptr. 559.) In such case, if the custodian of records objects to disclosure of the information sought, the party seeking the information must make a plausible justification or a good cause showing of need therefor. Significantly in this context, the defense is not required, on pain of revealing its possible strategies and work product, to provide the prosecution with notice of its theories of relevancy of the materials sought, but instead may make an offer of proof at an in camera hearing. ( People v. Superior Court ( Barrett ), supra, at pp. 1320-1321.) A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel in the preparation of a case for trial likewise encompasses the assistance of, and confidential communication with, experts in preparing a defense. ( Prince v. Superior Court (1992) 8 Cal. App.4th 1176, 1180, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 855 [where sufficient semen sample existed to permit independent DNA testing by both prosecution and defense, prosecution expert was not entitled to observe and obtain results of defense testing].) The right logically extends to the opportunity to investigate and develop evidence generally, such as impeachment evidence of the kind at issue here. Nor do we find statutory authority to compel the defense or the trial court to share with the prosecution the fruits of a successful Pitchess motion. The prosecution is entitled to discovery from the defense only in accordance with Penal Code sections 1054.3 and 1054.7. (Pen.Code, § 1054, subd. (e); see People v. Tillis (1998) 18 Cal.4th 284, 294, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 447, 956 P.2d 409.) Of course, the prosecution itself remains free to seek Pitchess disclosure by complying with the procedure set forth in Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045. [6] Absent such compliance, contrary to the premise underlying Justice Baxter's concurring and dissenting opinion, peace officer personnel records retain their confidentiality vis-à-vis the prosecution. (Pen.Code, § 832.7; see People v. Superior Court ( Gremminger ) (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 397, 407, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 910.) [7]