Opinion ID: 2229251
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issue of statutory obligation.

Text: While we do not deem it controlling, we are satisfied trial court was right in determining there was no statutory duty to restrain geese. Plaintiff relies on the following statute: 188.2 Restraint of animals. All animals shall be restrained by the owners thereof from running at large. The term animals as used in this section is not used in its normally broad sense. It is defined in § 188.1(3): `Animal' or `animals' when used in this chapter shall include and embrace horses, cattle, swine, sheep, goats, mules, and asses. This language was adopted in 1924 (40 Ex. G.A., H.F. 71 § 1) supplanting § 2311, The Code, 1897, which included the definition `stock' means cattle, horses, mules and asses   . A historical review of our statutes and case law is found in Wenndt v. Latare, 200 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1972). Plaintiff argues the legislature intended the words include and embrace to be words of enlargement, thereby extending the definition to geese and other domestic fowl. We have examined this contention in light of the statutory construction rule of ejusdem generis, Federated Mutual Imp. & H. Ins. Co. v. Dunkelberger, 172 N.W.2d 137, 140 (Iowa 1969); 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 47.18, at 109 (4th ed. Sands 1973), and the language of § 368.7(5), The Code, 1973 (now repealed, see § 364.1, The Code, 1975) by which the legislature empowered cities to enact ordinances to prohibit animals and fowl from running at large. We have concluded the 1924 legislature in enacting § 188.1(3) coupled with § 188.2 did not intend its prohibition to include fowl.