Opinion ID: 544250
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Administrative Delay.

Text: 29 Although the reasons explained above provide a more-than-adequate basis for our decision, we believe that the board's inexcusable delay in deciding this case--or, more precisely, the effects of that delay on the efficacy and reasonableness of the board's remedy--provide an independent ground for denying enforcement. 30 Remedies in unfair labor practice cases must be designed to restore the status quo as nearly as possible, had the wrong not been committed. NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 872 (2d Cir.) (Hand, J.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576, 58 S.Ct. 1046, 82 L.Ed. 1540 (1938). For this reason, prompt resolution of these claims is critical. Without a final determination of the charge, the rights and duties of the parties remain unresolved, injuries not only remain unrecompensed but also continue to be incurred, and neither side can enter into negotiations with any confidence about where it stands as to past wrongs and future liabilities. As then-Chief Judge Lumbard succinctly put it, remedies for unfair labor practices must be speedy in order to be effective. NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 181 (2d Cir.1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972, 86 S.Ct. 1862, 16 L.Ed.2d 682 (1966). 31 The importance of promptly resolving unfair labor charges is reflected in a number of NLRB procedures and practices, particularly at the early stages of the administrative process. For example, the limitations period for filing an unfair labor practice charge is a relatively brief six months. NLRA Sec. 10(b). Pre-trial discovery, perhaps the primary source of delay in civil actions, is almost never allowed by the board. 2 C. Morris, supra, at 1625 (citing NLRB Case Handling Manual, Pt. 1, Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings, r10292.4). Moreover, board procedures are designed to encourage voluntary settlement before issuance of the complaint, see 29 C.F.R. Sec. 101.7, and at every subsequent stage of the proceedings. Id. Sec. 101.9 (settlement after formal proceedings have begun). 32 Sadly, however, once a case is presented to the board, it appears to enter a new dimension--one where time has little meaning. House Committee on Government Operations, Delay, Slowness in Decisionmaking, and the Case Backlog at the National Labor Relations Board, H.R.Rep. No. 1141, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1984). The long delays that we have come to expect from the board often force workers to wait years for a decision, a process that can be so frustrating that many have said they would prefer to have the case decided immediately by the flip of a coin. Id. at 11. Employers are similarly harmed by excessive delay, since a company's liability for any violation ultimately found continuously escalates while the case is pending. And delay is ultimately corrosive to the collective bargaining process itself, as the parties are forced to bargain with one another without knowing what the board might ultimately decide; and, when a decision is finally issued, the remedy often will bear little relation to the human situation which gave rise to the need for Government intervention. Advisory Panel on Labor-Management Relations Law, Report to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Organization and Procedure of the National Labor Relations Board, S. Doc. No. 81, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960). 33 Although administrative delay before the board is deplorable, a court's responsibility in reviewing long-delayed orders is far from certain. Of course, if the board has not yet issued its decision, an aggrieved party may bring an action seeking to compel the board to act, because the NLRB, like other federal agencies, has a statutory duty to conclude its proceedings within a reasonable time, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 555(b), and a court may compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706(1); see Silverman v. NLRB, 543 F.2d 428 (2d Cir.1976) (per curiam) (mandamus granted to compel NLRB to determine amount of back pay award); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856, 863-64 (4th Cir.1961) (courts have the right and the duty to enforce the [Administrative Procedure] Act's requirement that the Board proceed with reasonable expedition). 34 But where the case reaches us after the board has issued a decision, the situation is different, and courts have been reluctant to deny enforcement on the basis of administrative delay alone. Although at least one judge of this circuit would hold that where the lapse of time is chargeable to the snail-like pace of the Board there must be some point at which the courts have the power and the duty to withhold a grant of enforcement, NLRB v. Staub Cleaners, Inc., 418 F.2d 1086, 1091 (2d Cir.1969) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1038, 90 S.Ct. 1357, 25 L.Ed.2d 649 (1970), the majority view seems to have been that denying enforcement on the ground of delay alone unfairly punishes employees for the Board's nonfeasance. NLRB v. International Assoc. of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Ironworkers, Local 480, 466 U.S. 720, 725, 104 S.Ct. 2081, 2084, 80 L.Ed.2d 715 (1984) (per curiam); see also NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 396 U.S. 258, 266, 90 S.Ct. 417, 421, 24 L.Ed.2d 405 (1969); NLRB v. Star Color Plate Serv., 843 F.2d 1507, 1510 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 828, 109 S.Ct. 81, 102 L.Ed.2d 58 (1988). 35 Nonetheless, the courts of appeals have been charged by congress with responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness of Labor Board decisions, Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 490, 71 S.Ct. at 466, and if we were simply to ignore the effects of administrative delay, we would abandon this important supervisory responsibility. Therefore, while NLRB orders are normally subject to limited judicial review, Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216, 85 S.Ct. 398, 405, 13 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964), we must withhold enforcement of orders that will not effectuate any reasonable policy of the act, even where the problems with the order are caused primarily by the lapse of time between the practices complained of and the remedy granted. Cf. NLRB v. Koenig Iron Works, Inc., 856 F.2d 1, 3-4 (2d Cir.1988) (denying enforcement of bargaining order where twelve years expired between expiration of collective bargaining agreement and order); NLRB v. J. Coty Messenger Serv., 763 F.2d 92, 99-101 (2d Cir.1985) (denying enforcement of bargaining order where board failed to analyze effect of passage of time and employee turnover). 36 In this case, we believe that the passage of time between the company's action and the board's remedy has so changed the underlying situation at Emhart that enforcement of the order now not only would undermine more labor policies that it would advance, but also would mock reality. In the years that passed between the ALJ's decision and the board's order, the parties signed two collective bargaining agreements, both of which featured reinstatement by plant-wide seniority, the very procedure the board found to be objectionable when implemented unilaterally by Emhart nearly six years earlier. During that six-year period all reinstatements were made on the plant-wide basis, and during most of that period it was done with the union's agreement. Moreover, the board's cease and desist order applies by its own terms only to the Bloomfield plant, see Board's Order at 11, which closed in 1985. The order also directs Emhart to post the standard notices in conspicuous places in the now vacant facility. Thus, if we were to accept the board's order for what it actually says, it would be impossible to enforce, because cease and desist orders are generally confined to the particular geographic location involved. 2 C. Morris, supra, at 1655. In these circumstances, therefore, we would deny enforcement of the board's order even if Emhart had committed an unfair labor practice.