Opinion ID: 400065
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the applicable statutory standard for an award of

Text: ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER TSCA 32 Section 19(d), of TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d), authorizes awards of attorneys' fees in cases involving petitions for review of regulations brought, as was the instant case, pursuant to section 19(a): 33 The decision of the court in an action commenced under subsection (a), or of the Supreme Court of the United States on review of such decision, may include an award of costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees for attorneys and expert witnesses if the court determines such an award is appropriate. 34 As was noted in Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33 (D.C.Cir.1982), a case involving a comparable attorneys' fee provision under the Clean Air Act: 35 On its face, the statutory provision clearly permits the court to award attorneys' fees to prevailing, substantially prevailing, or non-prevailing parties in appropriate cases. 36 Id. at 34. The same may be said of the relevant statutory provision in section 19(d) of TSCA. 37 The significance of the attorneys' fee provision of TSCA may be highlighted by comparison to other statutory fee provisions. For example, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (4)(E) provides that attorneys' fees under the Freedom of Information Act are available only to a complainant who has substantially prevailed. Likewise, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), covering awards of fees against the United States, provides that: 38 Unless expressly prohibited by statute, a court may award reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys ... to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States or any agency and any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity.... 39 (emphasis added). 3 In enacting a provision allowing for an award of attorneys' fees whenever a court finds that such an award is appropriate, it seems plain that Congress intended to give the courts greater latitude than is allowed under statutes such as FOIA (substantially prevailing) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (prevailing party). 40 Albeit sparse, the legislative history surrounding the attorneys' fee provision of TSCA confirms this reading and offers some guidance in identifying appropriate cases. Section 19 in the original Senate and House bills, i.e., the bills that preceded the passage of TSCA in its final form, each contained provisions allowing the courts to award reasonable fees for attorneys and expert witnesses if the court determines that such an award is appropriate. See S. 3149, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 19(c)(3) (1976); H.R. 14032, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 19(c)(3) (1976), reprinted in Legislative History of the Toxic Substances Control Act, at 136, 384 (1976) (hereinafter Legislative History). Although minor modifications were made to section 19 in the conference between the Senate and House Managers of the TSCA bills, the Conference Committee ultimately retained intact the provision allowing for awards of reasonable fees for attorneys and expert witnesses if the court determines that such an award is appropriate. Id. at 709. 41 The only significant discussion of the attorneys' fee provision apparently occurred on September 28, 1976, during the Senate's consideration of the Conference Report. Id. at 721, 727-30. During this discussion, Senator Magnuson, who was the ranking Senate Manager on the Conference Committee, made it clear that the attorneys' fee provision is not restricted to plaintiffs or to successful parties. Legislative History at 729 (emphasis added). However, Senator Magnuson made a point of indicating that the attorneys' fee provision was not without limits: 42 It is not the intention of these provisions to provide an award for an individual or a group if that individual or group may stand to gain significant economic benefits through participation in the proceeding. Id. at 729. 4 43 In addition to his own remarks, Senator Magnuson sought and received consent to print the remarks of Senator Tunney (which had appeared in the Congressional Record of March 26, 1976), as part of the legislative history of section 19. Id. at 727. In his printed comments, Senator Tunney first stated that 44 (the attorneys' fee) provision (of TSCA) would allow an award of fees and costs to any party when appropriate, a word which should (be) liberally construed to effectuate the purposes of this act. 45 Id. (emphasis added). Following this initial comment, Senator Tunney added that: 46 (I)n typical circumstances, the court should follow prevailing case law which holds that a successful plaintiff should ordinarily recover in (sic) attorneys' fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. ... Plaintiff in the (sic) sense is used to mean the parties seeking to enforce the rights granted by this section and can include an intervenor, or a defendant in some cases.... 47 Where plaintiff's proceeding is brought in good faith or on the advice of component (sic) counsel, fees and costs would ordinarily be denied to a prevailing defendant.... The standard for awarding fees and costs to a prevailing defendant is not the same as for a plaintiff because, if it were, the risk to the average citizen of bringing suit under this section would be so great it would discourage such suits. 48 Fees and costs would be awarded to a successful plaintiff under this provision where there was a final court order granting the relief requested by plaintiffs, or as a matter of interim relief pending the outcome of the case. The provision does not require the entry of a final order before fees or costs may be recovered.... Such awards are especially important where a party has prevailed on an important matter in the course of the litigation even where he does not ultimately prevail on all the issues. For purposes of the award of fees and costs, it is appropriate to make awards when the parties have (1) vindicated rights through consent judgment or (2) without formally obtaining relief, or (3) where such award is in the public interest without regard to the outcome of the litigation. 49 Id. at 727-28 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Although Senator Tunney occasionally referred to prevailing or successful plaintiffs, these references-when read in context-cannot be seen to be inconsistent with his initial view that the attorneys' fee provision should be liberally construed. Id. at 727. Nor do his remarks appear to be inconsistent with Senator Magnuson's view that the attorneys' fee provision is not restricted to ... successful parties. Id. at 729. This latter point is confirmed by Senator Tunney's observation that attorneys' fees may be appropriate where the award is in the public interest without regard to the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 728. 50 The remaining remarks offered by Senator Tunney pertained to the appropriate measure of attorneys' fees. On this final point, he commented as follows:By specifying a general rule for the amount of fees to be awarded, this provision requires the method of calculating fees be no different than that now being utilized in other fields of law as, for example antitrust and securities regulation litigation. The actual time spent is that reasonably calculated to advance the client's interest. The Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D.Cal.1974), and the amount can be adjusted for factors including inter alia, the centingent (sic) nature of the success or the quality of the work performed. Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973), on remand, 382 F.Supp. 999 (E.D.Pa.1974), or benefits to the public from the suit. Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 8 E.P.D. 9444 (C.D.Cal.1974). Fees should not be reduced merely because the attorneys are salaried employees of public interest and or foundations-funded law firms. 51 Legislative History at 728. 52 With these general legislative standards in mind, we may now turn to the specific claims being advanced by EDF for attorneys' fees in this case.