Opinion ID: 2585950
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standards of Review Apportion Power Between the Trial and Appellate Courts Based on the Courts' Institutional Competencies

Text: ¶19 We have previously explained that [t]he primary function of a standard of review is to apportion power and, consequently, responsibility between trial and appellate courts for determining an issue. [14] Standards of review should allocate discretion between the trial and appellate courts in a way that takes account of the relative capabilities of each level of the court system to take evidence and make findings of fact in the face of conflicting evidence, on one hand, and to set binding jurisdiction-wide policy, on the other. [15] These considerations are critical in selecting a standard of review from along a spectrum of deference that runs from highly deferential review under a clearly erroneous standard on one end to completely nondeferential review under a correctness standard on the other end. [16] ¶20 Because a trial court is in a better position to judg[e] credibility and resolv[e] evidentiary conflicts, an appellate court reviews the trial court's findings of fact for clear error. [17] Conversely, an appellate court reviews a trial court's conclusions of law for correctness because a single trial judge is in an inferior position to determine what the legal content of [a legal concept] should be [whereas] a panel of appellate judges, with their collective experience and their broader perspective, is better suited to that task. [18] Additionally, the published decisions of appellate courts provid[e] state-wide standards that guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials. [19] ¶21 The analytical complexity of our standard of review is at its height when we review a trial court's application of a legal concept to a given set of facts. When we review so-called mixed questions of fact and law, the considerations that favor a more-deferential standard of review and those that favor a less-deferential standard of review compete for dominance, and the amount of deference that results will vary according to the nature of the legal concept at issue. Mixed questions of fact and law involving different legal issues will often require different standards of review. [20] ¶22 While we have said that, ultimately, the legal effect of [the] facts is the province of the appellate courts, [21] our prior decisions recognize that, with regard to many mixed questions of fact and law, it is either not possible or not wise for an appellate court to define strictly how a legal concept is to be applied to each new set of facts. [22] Where the correct application of a legal concept is difficult to explain using a generally applicable standard, overinvolvement by an appellate court can lead to confusing and inconsistent pronouncements of the law. [23] We have recognized that the application of such a legal concept incorporates a de facto grant of discretion to the trial court, and, accordingly, we review the trial court's decision on the mixed question of fact and law with deference commensurate to that discretion. [24] ¶23 But with regard to certain mixed questions where uniform application is of high importance, as in the context of Fourth Amendment protections, we have held that policy considerations dictate that the application of the legal concept should be strictly controlled by the appellate courts. [25] Thus, if we determine that society's interest in establishing consistent statewide standards outweighs other considerations, we grant no discretion to the trial court, and we review the mixed question for correctness. [26] ¶24 We have described the varying levels of discretion afforded trial courts in Pena and Brake using Professor Maurice Rosenberg's pasture metaphor, which describes the discretion given to a trial court on a particular mixed question as a pasture bounded by fences that represent the boundaries of the legal concept. [27] Because the established boundaries of each legal concept are unique, different mixed questions are associated with pastures of different sizes. [28] When a trial court stays within the pasture associated with a specific legal concept, it is free to reach one of several possible conclusions about the legal effect of a particular set of facts without risking reversal. [29] Discretion is broadestand the standard of review is most deferentialwhen the application of a legal concept is highly fact dependant and variable. [30] Discretion is most confinedand the standard of review is nondeferentialwhen the legal concept is easily defined by appellate courts or when appellate courts erect strict fences for policy reasons. [31]