Opinion ID: 1735196
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Naughton's and the Reillys' Cross-Appeal.

Text: Because of our holding regarding the application of joint and several liability, as well as the necessity for a remand in this case, the only remaining arguments that could require our disposition are those that might impact the new trial on remand. We find the only arguments that may have such an impact are Naughton's argument that jury instruction No. 20 inaccurately stated the law, and the Reillys' argument that substantial evidence does not support the jury's finding that Reilly was twenty percent at fault. Preliminarily, we observe that Naughton may not have preserved this issue for appeal. Naughton did object to instruction No. 20, but did not argue it misstated the law. See Collister v. City of Council Bluffs, 534 N.W.2d 453, 454 (Iowa 1995) (We consider only the objections to the instructions that were properly raised in the district court proceedings.). Nevertheless, even assuming this issue was preserved for appeal, instruction No. 20 accurately stated the law. Aiding and abetting, as a theory of recovery and as embodied in instruction No. 20, does not require Naughton to consciously desire Anderson to lose control of the vehicle or that Naughton consciously wanted Anderson to fail in his duty to look out. IMT correctly points out that Naughton has confused the concepts of aiding and abetting in tort and aiding and abetting the violation of criminal statute. In Heick, we said aiding and abetting under Iowa Code section 703.1a criminal statuterequired that there be evidence the defendant `participate[d] in it as something that he wishes to bring about.' 561 N.W.2d at 54 (quoting State v. Lott, 255 N.W.2d 105, 108 (Iowa 1977), overruled by State v. Allen, 633 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Iowa 2001) (overruling the holding in Lott that one who aids only the transferee of drugs cannot be found guilty of delivery)). This is not the case when the theory is advanced in tort. To aid and abet a violation of a rule of the road, all that is required is that there be substantial evidence that [the defendant] encouraged or assisted [another] in committing these violations. Id. at 53; accord Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 cmt. d, at 317. This does not require that Naughton consciously desire or want Anderson to lose control of the vehicle or fail to keep a proper lookout. It simply requires Naughton to know Anderson's actions were tortious and that Naughton gave substantial assistance. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 cmt. d, at 317 (imposing liability on the person who aids and abets regardless of whether the principal knows his act is tortious, but only when the person who aids and abets gives substantial assistance and knows the act, or intended act, is tortious). This is exactly what instruction No. 20 required, and it therefore correctly stated the law. We do not address the Reillys' claim on cross-appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding by the jury of his fault. The Reillys did not preserve error on this claim at trial, and they are not entitled to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the finding of Reilly's fault for the first time on appeal from a jury verdict. See Meier v. Senecaut III, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.); cf. In re A.R., 316 N.W.2d 887, 888, 889 n. 2 (Iowa 1982) (In ordinary civil cases tried to the court, the sufficiency of the evidence may be challenged on appeal even though not raised below. (Emphasis added.)); Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.904(2). Reilly's allocation of fault, however, must be determined anew on remand. The new trial on remand shall be limited to issues of fault. The damages upon retrial shall be the damages established by the jury at the initial trial. See Schwennen, 430 N.W.2d at 104.