Opinion ID: 2966946
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Initiation of a Qui Tam Action

Text: The primary area of contention is whether Eberhardt met the first element of a prima facie case by engaging in protected activity. The statute protects lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the employee or others in furtherance of an action under this section, including investigation for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in an action filed or to be filed under this section. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(h). IDC contends that because the investigation was done on behalf of the employer, Eberhardt never engaged in protected activity. IDC neglects the fact that protected activity includes initiation of . . . an action filed or to be filed under this section. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(h) (emphasis added). Thus, wholly apart from whether his _________________________________________________________________ With respect to the jury instruction, Rule 51 requires a party's objection to stat[e] distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. Eberhardt argues that the objection to the instruction regarding the protected activity element of a prima facie case was not specific enough. At trial, however, there was an extended discussion as to this issue, and IDC offered an alternative instruction that the court rejected. See (J.A. at 461-64.) The issue is preserved for review. 7 internal investigation rose to the level of protected activity, Eberhardt made it clear to IDC prior to his termination that he intended to bring a qui tam action under the False Claims Act and that the Act protected him from retaliation. Eberhardt made his intentions known on several occasions prior to his termination. First, he wrote a February 9, 1995, memo to McCoubrey stating that he was being singled out for leading the investigation, that he was pretextually being put in an impossible predicament, and that IDC's actions were a violation of the Federal Whistleblower Protection Act. In a February 13, 1995, memo to Kellogg (IDC's corporate counsel), Eberhardt explicitly alleged that IDC had violated the False Claims Act and that Eberhardt was protected by section 3730(h). See (id. at 718.) That same day he told Kellogg of his intention to bring a qui tam action. On February 16, 1995, Eberhardt met with the Board of Directors and informed them of his intention to file suit against IDC under the False Claims Act. Because these acts constituted the initiation of . . . an action . . . to be filed [under section 3730], Eberhardt engaged in protected activity. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(h). In addition, IDC received express notice of Eberhardt's protected activity, and it was permissible for the jury to find that Eberhardt's termination was a result of this protected activity. Thus, sufficient evidence existed which could establish a prima facie case under section 3730(h). Accordingly, it was not error for the trial court to deny IDC's motions for judgment as a matter of law.