Opinion ID: 1974288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: haworth's recovery for defamation

Text: Common law defamation consists of: (a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication. Lester v. Powers, 596 A.2d 65, 69 (Me.1991) (adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977)).
The Feigons first contend that the jury should not have been allowed to consider any of the statements because as a matter of law they were in the form of opinion and not false statements of fact. The court, in accordance with Caron v. Bangor Publishing Co., 470 A.2d 782, 784 (Me.1984), determined that the statements were not pure opinion but were capable of being interpreted as having factual content. Although the United States Supreme Court has cast doubt on the constitutional distinction between fact and opinion, at least in the case of a media defendant, statements of fact and statements of opinion that can reasonably be interpreted as implying factual assertions are properly submitted to the jury. [3] See Yetman v. English, 168 Ariz. 71, 811 P.2d 323, 331 (1991). Thus, it was not error for the court to refuse to rule that Lee Feigon's statement, I hear you hired the drunk, as a matter of law had no factual content and was entitled to absolute protection. Accordingly, it was proper for the court to have the jury determine whether the Feigon's statement was an opinion or false assertion of fact. Accord True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257, 262 (Me.1986); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566, comment c, illustration 3 (1977).
The Feigons also contend that their statements are not inherently defamatory, that the appellation drunk is susceptible of varying interpretations, and that the comments regarding the workers leaving early do not necessarily convey a derogatory meaning. We disagree. Whether the statements are capable of a defamatory meaning is a question for the court, and involves not just the words themselves, but the totality of the circumstances surrounding the communication. Bakal v. Weare, 583 A.2d 1028, 1030 (Me. 1990); see also Fortier v. IBEW, Local 2327, 605 A.2d 79, 80 (Me.1992). Whether or not the language set out will bear the interpretation given to it by the plaintiff, whether or not it is capable of conveying the meaning which he ascribes to it, is in such a case a question of law for the court. What meaning the words did convey to one hearing him is in such a case a question for the jury. Bradburg v. Segal, 121 Me. 146, 148, 116 A. 65, 66 (1922); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 comment c. Because the Feigons were specifically commenting on their experience with Haworth in his professional capacity as the builder of their house, and given the derogatory connotation capable of attaching to the statements, it was not error for the court to conclude that the words spoken were capable of defamatory meaning, nor for the jury to determine that Lenz, on hearing the words, attributed a defamatory meaning to them. [4] Cf. True, 513 A.2d at 262. In addition, Leanne Feigon contends for the first time on appeal that the judgment against her should be set aside because her statements standing alone are not capable of defamatory import and, therefore, there is no evidence that would support the jury's verdict against her. At trial, both Feigons denied that they made any of the statements denigrating Haworth. There was evidence, however, that Lee and Leanne Feigon together served as the general contractor on the construction project. Lenz testified that the first statement made to her denigrating Haworth, implying that because Haworth was their contractor the Lenzes would have to rent property for a longer period of time, was made by Leanne. The statements made by Lee that Lenz hired the drunk and that there was drinking on the job resulting in the work crew leaving the job site earlier and earlier, eventually not showing up at all, were made in the presence of, and were never repudiated or contradicted by Leanne. Indeed, shortly after these statements were made by Lee, Leanne told Lenz that she was glad that the Lenzes had hired Haworth because Haworth would then have money enabling the Feigons to collect on their anticipated judgment against him. Although the Feigons made a general motion for a directed verdict, Leanne did not request that the court distinguish her statement from that of her husband for purposes of liability, nor did she ask for a separate jury verdict form, or that the jury be instructed to assess her liability for defamation separately. In these circumstances, we cannot say that the jury erred in returning a general verdict against the Feigons. See Stubbs v. Bartlett, 478 A.2d 690, 693 (Me.1984) (failure to object to special verdict form that did not make separate liability inquiry as to husband and wife plaintiffs precluded subsequent complaint of failure to award wife separate damages).
The Feigons further contend that because they shared a common interest with the Lenzes in determining the amount of time the Lenzes would need the rental property, their communications to Lenz were protected by the conditional privilege accorded to statements made between parties sharing a common interest, and the court's failure to so instruct the jury was error. Because the court's instruction to the jury gave the Feigons the same protection they would have been entitled to if their statements were privileged, any error in the court's conclusion that there was no conditional privilege was harmless. A conditional privilege against liability for defamation arises in settings where society has an interest in promoting free, but not absolutely unfettered speech. Lester, 596 A.2d at 69 (citations omitted). Even if a conditional privilege exists, however, it may be lost through abuse. The privilege does not protect against liability for false statements made with knowledge of their falsity or in reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. [5] Id.; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 600. In this case, the court instructed the jury that in order for Haworth to recover for defamation, the conduct of the Feigons had to be intentional, knowing, or in reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement made. The jury found the Feigons to have violated that higher fault standard. Thus, the court, even though it did not instruct the jury that the Feigons were protected by a conditional privilege, nevertheless gave the Feigons the benefit of the fault standard applicable to a conditionally privileged statement. That being so, we need not decide whether the statements by the Feigons were conditionally privileged. Stanley v. Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc., 462 A.2d 1144, 1148-49 (Me.1983).
The Feigons also contend that they are protected by a constitutional privilege because Haworth is a public figure. Fair comment about public figures, even if false, is protected by a privilege that can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence of the speaker's knowledge and disregard of the comment's falsity. Lester, 596 A.2d at 69. Whether a person is a public figure is a question of law. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580A, comment c. The construction of the Feigons' solar home did receive a fair amount of coverage in newspapers and magazines, but Haworth received little publicity from his work on it and certainly not the kind of fame that would allow him easy access to the media to rebut defamatory statements. As a small businessman dependent on reputation, Haworth is especially vulnerable to disparaging comments on his conduct and the conduct of his business. The solar home construction was not a public controversy in the ordinary sense. It was not error for the court to conclude that Haworth was not a public figure.
The Feigons finally argue that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that the statements were made with knowledge of their falsity or a reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. A jury verdict will not be disturbed if it is supported by credible evidence that allows the jury to rationally reach its verdict. True, 513 A.2d at 265. The statements made to Lenz disparaged Haworth's on-the-job conduct and labelled him a drunk. The statement that Haworth was a drunk was supported by no other evidence and the Feigons presented little to corroborate the statement about Haworth's drinking on the job and leaving early. On the other hand, Haworth presented substantial evidence to show that whatever drinking occurred at the job site, occurred after and not during working hours. Consequently, the jury was justified in finding that the statements were false [6] and were made with knowledge of their falsity or a reckless disregard for their truth. [7]