Opinion ID: 1176061
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Promises of Specific Treatment in Specific Situations

Text: Plaintiff appears to rely in part upon the justifiable reliance theory of enforcement of promises made in employee handbooks recognized in Thompson, 102 Wash.2d at 233, 685 P.2d 1081. However, it appears that the theory is confused to some degree with a contract theory of enforceability. The court in Thompson explained that [g]enerally, an employment contract, indefinite as to duration, is terminable at will by either the employee or employer. Id. at 223, 685 P.2d 1081. The employee and employer can contractually modify the terminable at will doctrine by obligating themselves under provisions in an employee policy manual. Id. at 228-29, 685 P.2d 1081. The court then said:  Independent of this contractual analysis, ... employers may be obligated to act in accordance with policies as announced in handbooks issued to their employees. Id. at 229, 685 P.2d 1081 (emphasis added). The principal reason policy manuals are issued, the court reasoned, is to create an atmosphere of fair treatment and job security for their employees. Id. at 229, 685 P.2d 1081. It would appear that employers expect, if not demand, that their employees abide by the policies expressed in such manuals. This may create an atmosphere where employees justifiably rely on the expressed policies and, thus, justifiably expect that the employers will do the same. Id. at 230, 685 P.2d 1081 (second emphasis added). This court concluded: Therefore, we hold that if an employer, for whatever reason, creates an atmosphere of job security and fair treatment with promises of specific treatment in specific situations and an employee is induced thereby to remain on the job and not actively seek other employment, those promises are enforceable components of the employment relationship. Id. at 230, 685 P.2d 1081. In Swanson, upon reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this court was faced with both a contract claim and a claim based upon promises of specific treatment in specific situations. Swanson, 118 Wash.2d at 519, 826 P.2d 664. The court first [looked] to whether there are material issues of fact as to a possible contract modifying the terminable at will status.... Id. at 523, 826 P.2d 664. [5] The court concluded that factual questions remained on this issue. Id. at 524, 826 P.2d 664. The court then turned to the alternative argument, and held that material issues of fact remain as to whether, in the absence of traditional contract analysis, defendant has made a promise of specific treatment in specific circumstances inducing plaintiff to stay on the job and not seek other employment.... Id. at 525, 826 P.2d 664 (emphasis added). The questions which required resolution were [1] whether statements in employee manuals, handbooks, or other documents amount to promises of specific treatment in specific situations, [2] whether plaintiff justifiably relied upon any such promises, and [3] whether any such promise was breached.... Id. The court also recognized the difference between traditional contract principles and the Thompson promises of specific treatment in specific situations alternative in Gaglidari v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 117 Wash.2d 426, 815 P.2d 1362 (1991). The court observed that [t]he concepts of offer, acceptance and consideration are requisite to a contract analysis of employee handbooks. Id. at 433, 815 P.2d 1362 (citing Thompson, 102 Wash.2d at 228, 685 P.2d 1081). The court then clearly explained: Employer obligations may also arise independent of traditional contract analysis when the employer creates an atmosphere of job security and fair treatment with promises of specific treatment in specific situations and the employee relies thereon. Thompson, 102 Wash.2d at 230, 685 P.2d 1081.... Gaglidari, 117 Wash.2d at 433, 815 P.2d 1362. The Court of Appeals has also recognized the difference. See, e.g., Klontz v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 90 Wash.App. 186, 190 n. 1, 951 P.2d 280 (1998) (declining, in light of authority cited, to treat claim as implied contract claim, and instead treating claim as a Thompson exception to terminable-at-will employment, which requires promises by the employer of specific treatment in specific situations); Bott v. Rockwell Int'l, 80 Wash.App. 326, 331 n. 1, 908 P.2d 909 (1996) (noting that trial court and parties had confused implied contract with the equitable exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine created by Thompson ); Shaw v. Housing Auth., 75 Wash.App. 755, 760-61, 880 P.2d 1006 (1994) (likening the cause of action based upon promises of specific treatment in specific situations to the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel). The difference is clear when the elements of the causes of action are compared. To prevail on a claim based upon promises of specific treatment in specific circumstances, the employee has to establish such a promise contained in an employee manual or handbook or the like, the employee's justifiable reliance, and breach by the employer. Swanson, 118 Wash.2d at 525, 826 P.2d 664; Thompson, 102 Wash.2d at 233, 685 P.2d 1081; Bott, 80 Wash.App. at 332, 908 P.2d 909. These are clearly not the elements which must be shown to establish a contract and a breach thereof. In particular, the justifiable reliance element takes the claim out of the traditional contract realm. Thus, insofar as plaintiff asserts that promises of specific treatment in specific situations were made, bringing him within the cause of action first recognized in Thompson, his action is not upon a contract at all, and the six-year limitations period of RCW 4.16.040(1) applicable to written contracts does not apply. Amicus curiae Washington State Trial Lawyers Association maintains, however, that a written promise within the meaning of the Thompson promises of specific treatment in specific situations alternative brings the action within the six-year statute of limitations as a written agreement giving rise to express or implied liability. See RCW 4.16.040(1). However, unless all the essential elements of a contract are in the written document, an action premised on express or implied liability arising out of the writing are not subject to the six-year limitations period. See Barnes, 128 Wash.2d at 570, 910 P.2d 469; Kloss, 77 Wash.App. at 298, 890 P.2d 480. The court has rejected the idea that liability arising from a written instrument, alone, brings an action within the six-year limitations period. Instead, a contract in writing or written agreement is required. See, e.g., Bicknell v. Garrett, 1 Wash.2d 564, 572-73, 96 P.2d 592, 126 A.L.R. 258 (1939); Evans v. Yakima Valley Grape Growers Ass'n, 52 Wash.2d 634, 637-38, 328 P.2d 671 (1958). An employer's written promise, in and of itself, is insufficient to constitute a contract containing all the essential elements of a contract. Finally, plaintiff's complaint describes his cause of action as wrongful termination contrary to the terms and conditions of his employee handbook. He seeks to recover damages for emotional distress, lost income, impairment of ability to enjoy life and expenses of counseling. While plaintiff seems to allege breach of contract, the complaint also appears to allege a tort cause of action, wrongful discharge, and seeks damages recoverable under a tort (but not a contract) theory. Without passing on the propriety of a tort claim in this case, we note that generally a three-year limitations period applies to a tort claim. RCW 4.16.080(2).