Opinion ID: 3065109
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to File a Rohan Motion

Text: Last, the State contends that because Nash never sought a competency determination under Rohan in the district court, he has waived the issue and cannot now raise it on appeal. See 13204 NASH v. RYAN Fry v. Melaragno, 939 F.2d 832, 834 (9th Cir. 1991), We disagree. First, although the limited record reveals that Nash’s mental and physical health have been an issue with which habeas counsel are familiar, Dr. Morenz’s recent report notes increasing cognitive decline and recent memory failure. While Dr. Morenz’s report does not fully explain why counsel did not seek an earlier determination of Nash’s mental incompetency, it provides context for counsel’s decision to seek a competency determination in this court: ninety-three-year-old Nash’s competency continues to decline. More importantly, although the State argues that Nash should be barred from raising an issue on appeal that he did not raise in the district court, Nash’s motion for a competency determination does not fit within that circumstance. Nash does not raise the issue of competence to obtain reversal of the district court’s judgment. Rather, his counsel raise the issue because it does not appear that Nash is now capable of communicating rationally with them and they seek a limited remand for a factual determination of his competence. The limited nature of the relief sought further supports our conclusion that Nash’s failure to seek relief in the district court under Rohan should not preclude consideration of Nash’s motion. The ultimate question of how next to proceed must be addressed by this court after the district court makes a competency determination and returns the case to this court for consideration of the merits of Nash’s claim. In sum, Nash’s rapidly deteriorating mental condition leads us to conclude that the precise issue we consider here— whether Nash is competent to pursue the pending appeal of the district court’s denial of his habeas petition—is not subject to the waiver rule invoked by the State. Moreover, because the competency determination will afford the State the opportunity to offer all relevant evidence and fully litigate the issue of Nash’s competence, we are satisfied that our deciNASH v. RYAN 13205 sion in no way contravenes the policies underlying the waiver rule. See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941) (explaining that the importance of the waiver rule lies in our “procedural scheme[‘s] contemplat[ion] that parties shall come to issue in the trial forum vested with authority to determine questions of fact . . . [i]n order that parties may have the opportunity to offer all the evidence they believe relevant . . . [and] that litigants may not be surprised on appeal by final decision there of issues upon which they have had no opportunity to introduce evidence”). We therefore reject the State’s contentions to the contrary. For all of the above reasons, we grant Nash’s motion for a limited remand. We remand this case to the district court to conduct a competency determination. The court may conduct such proceedings as it deems appropriate to reach a fair and prompt determination of Nash’s competence, consistent with the views expressed in this order. The panel shall retain jurisdiction over this appeal. MOTION GRANTED and REMANDED. PRINTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE—U.S. COURTS BY THOMSON REUTERS/WEST—SAN FRANCISCO The summary, which does not constitute a part of the opinion of the court, is copyrighted © 2009 Thomson Reuters/West.