Opinion ID: 2575790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issue 2: Did the district court err in allowing Demetria Rucker to testify?

Text: Kirtdoll argues that the district court violated his right to a fair trial when it allowed Demetria Rucker to testify at trial. He specifically asserts that Rucker violated a witness sequestration order issued pursuant to K.S.A. 22-2903 by sitting in the courtroom during the preliminary hearing, although she did not testify at the hearing. He further alleges that because the statutory order was violated, no prejudice need be shown but, if so, prejudice was demonstrated. The State responds with a multitude of reasons why Kirtdoll's position has no merit. We need only address a few of them. K.S.A. 22-2903 discusses the sequestration of witnesses: During the examination of any witnesses or when the defendant is making a statement or testifying the magistrate may, and on the request of the defendant or state shall, exclude all other witnesses. He may also cause the witness to be kept separate and to be prevented from communicating with each other until all are examined. Under the statute, on the defendant's request, sequestration of witnesses is mandatory at a preliminary hearing. However, we have stated that at trial, sequestration is not a right; rather, it is committed to the discretion of the trial court. State v. Heath, 264 Kan. 557, 588-89, 957 P.2d 449 (1998). In either scenario, a violation of a court order sequestering witnesses does not automatically disqualify a witness from testifying in the absence of any showing of prejudice to the defendant, and the trial court may in its discretion permit the witness to testify despite the violation. [Citations omitted.] State v. Johnson, 258 Kan. 475, 491-92, 905 P.2d 94 (1995). As the State notes, it endorsed approximately 300 witnesses at the time of the preliminary hearing, and defense counsel did not object at any time to the State calling Rucker as a trial witness or to her testimony. As a general rule, a party cannot raise an issue on appeal where no contemporaneous objection was made and where the trial court did not have an opportunity to rule. State v. Flynn, 274 Kan. 473, 502, 55 P.3d 324 (2002). Absent an objection, Kirtdoll did not properly preserve this issue for appeal. Moreover, the following colloquy demonstrates that Kirtdoll availed himself of the opportunity to explore the possible problem during Rucker's cross-examination: Q. [Defense counsel] Now at the preliminary hearing, did the witnesses all stay out in the hallway so they didn't hear each other's testimony? A. [Rucker] Correct. Q. You didn't stay out in the hallway, did you, you stayed and listened, right? A. Yeah. But they said being that they had not handed me a subpoena yet, that therefore I can come in and testify. MR. HUETER [Defense counsel]: No other questions. We acknowledge that there are several exceptions to the general rule that a new legal theory may not be asserted for the first time on appeal, including: (1) the newly asserted theory involves only a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and is finally determinative of the case; (2) consideration of the theory is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent denial of fundamental rights; and (3) the judgment of the trial court may be upheld on appeal despite its reliance on the wrong ground or having assigned a wrong reason for its decision. State v. Schroeder, 279 Kan. 104, 116, 105 P.3d 1237 (2005). Kirtdoll does not assert that any of the above exceptions are applicable to his case, however. Nor do we find any under these facts because Rucker's testimony was basically corroborated by several other witnesses.