Opinion ID: 2315015
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The policies governing the discovery of information held by expert witnesses.

Text: The traditional instincts of the adversary system slowed early efforts to discover the opinion of an adverse party's expert. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F. 2d 784 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 918, 101 S.Ct. 1363, 67 L.Ed. 2d 344 (1981), succinctly states the development of the doctrine, and we merely summarize it here. Early resistance to relaxing the discovery process was premised on the theory that no party should build its case by foraging for opinions from the experts of the other party. Id. at 792. Closely related to that was the so-called work product rule of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947), which insulates the efforts of an attorney to develop a client's case from discovery. In addition, the attorney-client privilege prevents both the discovery and the use of such evidence on the basis that the expert was the client's messenger conveying privileged information to the attorney. Smith, supra, 626 F. 2d at 792. Those conceptual concerns gradually yielded to the more pragmatic realization that it was simply not fair or productive to try cases in the dark. The simplest and most concise statement of that proposition is found in Moore's Federal Practice: By 1967, when the preliminary draft of what was to become the amended discovery rules of 1970 were circulated, there was a marked trend toward recognition of the fact that when an expert witness is to be put on at the trial effective cross-examination requires advance information as to his identity and the substance of his testimony. [4 James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 26.66 (2d ed. 1991).] The drafters of the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sought to resolve this inharmonious state of affairs by providing a uniform, orderly scheme of discovery. Smith, supra, 626 F. 2d at 792. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 now embodies that scheme of discovery. The 1969 revisions of the New Jersey Rules of Civil Procedure proceeded along a parallel path. In that year, Rule 4:10 made what is clearly one of the most significant practice changes in the entire 1969 revision, and that is its authorization of discovery of opinions of expert witnesses. Sylvia B. Pressler, Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, R. 4:10-2 comment (1971). After the 1970 revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we again amended our Rules to conform to the federal Rules. Report of Supreme Court's Committee on Rules, 1, 28-29 (1972). Both the federal Rule and the state Rule had contemplated the discovery of the opinions only of experts who were to be called as witnesses. See R. 4:10-2(d)(1). In her commentary to the revision of the 1969 interrogatory rules Judge Pressler stated, [t]he second change in this rule [4:17] implemented the expert discovery practice of R. 4:10-2 [covering deposition of experts] by instituting what is in effect a mandatory exchange of the reports of experts  but, only those experts who are intended to be called as witnesses at trial. Pressler, supra, Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, R. 4:17 comment (1971) (emphasis added). In short, the dominant theme of those rule changes was that advance knowledge through pretrial discovery of an expert witness's basis for his opinion is essential for effective cross-examination. Michael H. Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Part One: An Analytical Study, 1976 U.Ill.L.F. 895, 897. Because there would be no occasion to cross-examine the expert who would not be produced at trial, there was no need to provide for discovery of the expert's opinion. Significantly, however, those Rules allowed, as do the current Rules, the discovery of the opinion of a non-testifying expert whom another party had retained or employed in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial only on a showing of exceptional circumstances. R. 4:10-2(d)(3). See Koutsouflakis v. Schirmer, 247 N.J. Super. 139, 588 A. 2d 893 (Law Div. 1991).