Opinion ID: 2494292
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Extent of Credit

Text: The sole issue for discussion is whether the credit the employer receives (either by virtue of written approval or a buyback) extends to future medical benefits. Both lower courts determined that the question had been answered by an earlier court of appeal opinion, Breaux v. Dauterive Hospital Corporation, 02-1072 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/03), 838 So.2d 109. The Breaux opinion cited an opinion by this Court, Brooks v. Chicola, 514 So.2d 7 (La.1987), for the proposition that the workers' compensation insurer is not entitled to a credit for future medical benefits, even when the amount, which the third-party tortfeasor paid in settlement, exceeds that sufficient to reimburse the compensation carrier. Breaux, 02-1072 at 4-5, 838 So.2d at 112. Further, Breaux pointed out that had the Louisiana Legislature wanted to include future medical benefits as part of compensation obligations for which a credit is due, presumably, it would have done so when it amended that statute . . . Breaux, 02-1072 at 5, 838 So.2d at 112. The City argues first that both the Brooks and Breaux opinions involved the interpretation of Section 23:1103 rather than Section 23:1102. According to the City, Section 23:1103 concerns the apportionment of damages (awarded in a suit) between an employer and employee, while Section 23:1102 deals with the proceeds of a settlement or compromise as is the case here. Next, the City argues that, in fact, the legislature did change the law when it amended Section 23:1102 in 1989 by changing the first sentence of paragraph B. Mr. Henry argues in opposition that while the legislature clearly intended to change the law as it was interpreted in Brooks to apply to an employer's reimbursement for past expenses, the legislature could have more clearly changed the law as it applied to future medical benefits, and the fact that it did not do so indicates that no change was intended. We find the City's arguments to be correct. First, our decision in Brooks concerned the division of damages which were awarded in a judgment in a tort suit, pursuant to Section 23:1103, which, we have previously determined, applies to apportionment of damages between the employer and employee in suits against third parties, and not to the division of funds received following the compromise of a claim, which is detailed in Section 23:1102, and which we have, likewise, determined controls this matter. Further, Brooks was authored in 1987. In 1989, as pointed out by the City, the legislature amended both Section 23:1102 and 23:1103. Acts 1989, No. 454, § 4 rewrote the first sentence of paragraph B, which formerly read: If a compromise with such third person is made by the employee or his dependent, the employer or insurer shall be liable for compensation in excess of the amount recovered against such third person only if written approval of such compromise is obtained from the employer or insurer by the employee or his dependent, at the time of or prior to such compromise, to read: If a compromise with such third person is made by the employee or his dependents, the employer or insurer shall be liable to the employee or his dependents for any benefits under this Chapter which are in excess of the full amount paid by such third person, only after the employer or the insurer receives a dollar for dollar credit against the full amount paid in compromise, less attorney fees and costs paid by the employee in prosecution of the third party claim and only if written approval of such compromise is obtained from the employer or insurer by the employee or his dependent, at the time of or prior to such compromise. La.Rev.Stat. § 23:1102, Historical Notes (emphasis added). Equally as important, the amendment added a new fifth sentence to paragraph B, which reads: Such reservation shall only apply after the employer or insurer receives a dollar for dollar credit against the full amount paid in compromise, less attorney fees and costs paid by the employee in prosecution of the third party claim. La.Rev.Stat. § 23:1102, Historical Notes. According to the amended statute, an employer is now liable only for any benefits under this Chapter which are in excess of the full amount paid by such third person, only after the employer or the insurer receives a dollar for dollar credit against the full amount paid in compromise, less attorney fees and costs. The Chapter referred to in the amended language is Chapter 10, Workers' Compensation. The phrase any benefits under this Chapter, then, necessarily includes future medical benefits, which are included in this Chapter, Chapter 10, Workers' Compensation. Further, the statute specifically mandates that employers receive a dollar for dollar credit against the full amount paid in compromise. La.Rev.Stat. § 23:1102 (emphasis added). Again, the full amount paid in compromise would necessarily include any future medical benefits paid in compromise. Likewise, the amendment to Section 23:1103 added a new Paragraph B, which reads: The claim of the employer shall be satisfied in the manner described above from the first dollar of the judgment without regard to how the damages have been itemized or classified by the judge or jury. Such first dollar satisfaction shall be paid from the entire judgment, regardless of whether the judgment includes compensation for losses other than medical expenses and lost wages. Contrary to Mr. Henry's argument, these changes clearly evidence the intent of the legislature to require that employers and their insurers receive a credit for the entire amount of any compromise or settlement, or for the entire amount of a judgment, no matter how the damages have been itemized or classified. Mr. Henry argued that such a determination would discourage employees from filing third-party suits. We disagree that our holding will discourage third-party suits, but we recognize that it will encourage employees to bargain for and settle for not much less than a full recovery. Mr. Henry also argues that employees would have to use their recovery for pain and suffering to pay for future medical costs. Again, if an employee receives in settlement not much less than a full recovery, there will be no need for the employee to expend his or her pain and suffering recovery for medical costs. Regardless, our decision is dictated by the language of the statute and any change must be addressed by the legislature.