Opinion ID: 2351632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Party Wall Window Issue

Text: In their main brief appellants contend that Mr. Stiglitz unilaterally built a `party wall' as a `divisional wall' on the West side of the Hefazi Property without the prior written consent of the Plaintiffs. They claim that Mr. Stiglitz trespassed and encroached on their property to build a party wall and that party wall constituted a taking of private property for private use because: It is clear that the party wall was built by Defendant Stiglitz to squeeze every possible square inch out of the remodeling and expansion of his home to his absolute boundary line. This could be accomplished only with a party wall as there would not have been sufficient space between the adjoining properties for the construction workers to build a dividing wall to the outer limits of the Stiglitz Property boundary line. Furthermore, the appellants argue that they acquired a prescriptive easement which ripened no later than 1991 .... In their reply brief they state: Appellants' brief makes no equitable claim for an easement for air and light. The facts here are simply these: the Plaintiffs own the West wall of their building, which has a bedroom window on it; the Defendant, in order to build a new two-story addition at the rear of his property, built a party wall on the Plaintiffs' West wall, forever sealing Plaintiffs' bedroom window.... Of course, the fact that the Plaintiffs' and the Defendant's properties historically shared a partial party wall did not give the Defendant the right to extend at will the length of the party wall several more yards north on the West wall of the Plaintiffs' Property, which had a bedroom window on it.... They also maintain that they acquired an easement running with the land or an implied easement that vested on or before February 20, 1991 and which precluded the sealing of the window or windows by Mr. Stiglitz. [9] As the Hefazis contend in their main brief: The parties are adjoining neighbors in Georgetown who shared a party wall through the front portion of their common property line. A rear portion of Plaintiffs' house extended beyond Defendant's house, on the property line. That rear portion of Plaintiffs' house contained three windows and a doorway which provided the only access to the lower basement level of Plaintiffs' property. An access easement to the lower basement level of Plaintiffs' property was acquired by prescription running with the land on or before February 21, 1991, access which has been open, notorious and uninterrupted since at least February 20, 1976. In paragraphs 8 and 9 of their complaint the Hefazis stated: 8. Prior to Beach's purchase of the Hefazi and Stiglitz Properties [in] 1976, there existed a window in the West wall of the Hefazi Property, which window has been in continuous and uninterrupted use for more than 26 years. 9. The window has provided air, light and ambiance to a first floor/sub-basement tenant apartment continuously since on or before February 20, 1976. As he did in his summary judgment motion, appellee argues that American law does not recognize ... an irrevocable easement by implication or prescription for the air and light that once passed, before the addition was built, through the open portion of Stiglitz' property into the windows. Moreover, appellee asserts that DCRA found no violation in the sealing of the window located on the property line; that Mr. Stiglitz did not erect[ ] a party wall encroaching on the Hefazi property; nor did he construct any new common wall or new party wall; and that [b]y extending the new addition on his property up to the preexisting party wall, in which he himself enjoyed an ownership interest, [Mr.] Stiglitz cannot have trespassed on the Hefazis' parcel. Furthermore, Mr. Stiglitz contends that his conduct was not outrageous and extreme as required to be shown to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress. And, Mr. Stiglitz also argues that the chimney flue issue was resolved and that the Hefazis continue to enjoy ... the full benefit of the [chimney flue] easement. The law governing the creation of prescriptive easements is clear. Chaconas v. Meyers, 465 A.2d 379, 381 (D.C.1983). To establish the existence of a prescriptive easement, the appellants must show that their use of the appellee's land was open, notorious, exclusive, continuous and adverse, and that it was for the statutory period of fifteen years. Id. at 381 (citing D.C.Code § 12-301(1) (1981)) (other citations omitted). Moreover, the burden of establishing [this] use[ ] by a preponderance of the evidence ... rests upon the claimant. Id. at 381-82 (citing Baltic Investment Co. v. Perkins, 475 F.2d 964, 154 U.S.App. D.C. 380 (D.C.Cir.1973)). A use is considered to be adverse if [it is] not accompanied by any recognition, in express terms or by implication, of a right in the landowner to stop such use now or at some time in the future. Chaconas, 465 A.2d at 382 (citations omitted). Accord RESTATEMENT OF PROP.: ADVERSE USE § 458 (1944) (A use of land is adverse to the owner of an interest in land which is or may become possessory when it is (a) not made in subordination to him, and (b) wrongful, or may be made by him wrongful, as to him, and (c) open and notorious.). Furthermore, [t]he concept of adverse use includes ... the ingredient that the conduct is either inherently wrongful or wrongful at the election of such potential servient owner in this case, Stiglitz. 4-34 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.10[2][d] (2004). As such, American courts have refused to allow the acquisition by prescription of easements of light and air.... Id. Here, the appellants cannot demonstrate that they have acquired an easement by prescription. In essence, they assert that they have acquired a negative easement  the right to prevent appellee from using his property in such a manner as to affect their use and enjoyment of their own property. [10] However, it is well settled that a negative easement cannot be created by prescription. Id. To the contrary, a negative easement can only be created by an express grant. See LEONARD A. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EASEMENTS § 573 (2003) (An easement in the unobstructed passage of light and air cannot be acquired by prescription.). Accord RICHARD POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY (ABRIDGED) § 413 (1980) (American courts have wisely refused to allow the acquisition by prescription of easements of light and air ...). In fact, this is the rule now established in all the American States, with a single exception, [Delaware] ... JONES, supra at § 573. This rule flows from the basic principle that the actual enjoyment of the air and light by the owner of the house is upon his own land only, and that the owner of the adjoining lands has submitted to nothing which actually encroached upon his rights ... Id. Thus, [o]ne may obstruct his neighbor's windows at any time and [n]o action can be maintained for obstructing a view ... Id. at § 579, 583. Accord TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY § 763 (3d ed.) In addition, the appellants cannot demonstrate that their use of the party wall windows was for the statutory period of fifteen years, as required by D.C.Code § 12-301(1) (1981). [11] As a general principle, a property owner cannot hold an adverse interest against him or herself. See Jones, supra at § 166 (No easement by prescription can commence or exist while the dominant and servient estates are held by one and the same person.); 4-34 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34.02 (2000) (While an easement is clearly an `interest in land' for the creation of which compliance with the Statute of Frauds is requisite, it is equally clearly never an `estate in land[,]' [thus] [t]he requirement that the servient tenement be in the possession of some person other than the easement owner...). In order to establish the existence of a prescriptive easement, the claimant must demonstrate his or her use of the property is adverse. However, a use cannot be adverse where the user has full legal title to the underlying property, and consequently, the ability to use the land in whatever legal fashion he or she sees fit. JONES, supra (If the dominant and servient tenements are the property of the same owner, the exercise of the right, which in other cases would be subject to an easement, is, during the continuance of his ownership, one of the ordinary rights of property only, which he may vary or determine at his pleasure without in any way increasing or diminishing those rights.). To fall within the province of prescriptive easement law, the dominant and servient tenements must, therefore, belong to different persons. Id. Recognizing this fact, it becomes clear that the time for acquiring by prescription does not run while the dominant and servient estates are in the occupation of the same person. In this case, the Hefazi and Stiglitz properties were owned by the Wiggins until February 20, 1976, and even though the property subsequently was subdivided and sold, it was owned by a single person, Mr. Beach, until 1989. Therefore, the fifteen-year statutory period could not begin to run until the property was sold as subdivided property to separate owners by Mr. Beach on September 25, 1989. At the earliest, then, the statutory period would expire on September 25, 2004  exactly two days after oral arguments in this case. Accordingly, the appellants cannot show that they acquired an easement by prescription. [12] We turn now to the question as to whether the appellants can establish their acquisition of an easement by implication with respect to the West wall window that was sealed as a result of Mr. Stiglitz' addition. This court has recognized implied easements in some circumstances. See e.g., Carrollsburg v. Anderson, 791 A.2d 54,61 (D.C.2002). Generally, there are two types of implied easements, an implied grant, and an implied reservation. See JONES, supra, § 127 at 101-02. In essence the Hefazis contend that when they sold what ultimately became the Stiglitz property, they acquired an easement by implied reservation with respect to air and light flowing through the window in the west wall. The general rule is that if the grantor intends to reserve any right over the tenement granted, it is his duty to reserve it expressly in the grant. JONES, supra, § 127 at 102. If there is no express reservation, and there is none in the case before us since the September 29, 2000 basement easement is absolutely silent about the west wall window, the general rule is that: There is no implied reservation of an easement in case one sells a part of his land over which he has previously exercised a privilege in favor of the land he retains, unless the burden is apparent, continuous and strictly necessary for the enjoyment of the land retained. Id. § 136 at 111. But the general rule contains an exception which arguably is applicable here: if the easement is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the estate ... retained by the grantor, and the easement is in fact annexed to it and in use at the time of the grant, and is, as well, open, apparent and continuous, an easement by implication may be recognized. Id. § 154 at 127. However, the term `necessary' is to be understood as meaning that there could be no other reasonable mode of enjoying the dominant tenement without this easement. Id. § 156 at 130. Here, as a matter of law, there is no showing on this record that the burdening of the 2803 Que Street property with an implied reservation of light and air with respect to the west wall window was reasonably necessary to the Hefazis' enjoyment of their 28th Street property. The record contains virtually no information about the value of the window in the west wall in relation to the value and use of the 28th Street premises. Paragraph 9 of the Hefazis complaint alleges that the window in the west wall has provided air, light and ambiance to the first floor/sub-basement tenant apartment continuously since on or before February 20, 1976. The letter which the Hefazis' attorney wrote to DCRA on December 19, 2001 states, there is one first floor window in [the west] wall of my clients' property.... And, the attorney's letter of February 26, 2002 to DCRA advises that there are three registered apartments at the 28th Street property, but there are no details about any of these apartments, including the first floor/sub basement apartment. Without such details as the amount of rent the apartments generate, any reduction of rent that would result from the sealing of the west wall window, the lighting conditions in the first floor/sub basement apartment, or the futility of trying to reconfigure the apartments to take into consideration the sealing of the west wall window, the trial court could not have concluded that the Hefazis acquired an implied reservation of air and light in the west wall window at the time they conveyed the 2803 Que Street property. Thus, we are satisfied that the record in this case, which the trial court undoubtedly reviewed prior to deciding Mr. Stiglitz' motion for summary judgment, did not support the Hefazis' assertion that they had either an easement by prescription or an implied easement. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. So ordered.