Opinion ID: 597808
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Sentencing of Frias

Text: 56 During the phase of the investigation that followed the March 1989 arrests of Concepcion and Aponte, the authorities learned that the Organization ran a heroin cutting operation in Frias's apartment at 608 West 189th Street in Manhattan. They obtained a warrant for Frias's arrest and a search warrant for the apartment. As officers sought to execute the search warrant on August 22, 1989, a semi-automatic sawed-off rifle and a semi-automatic pistol were thrown from one of the apartment's windows and were recovered by officers posted outside. Inside the apartment, Frias and a co-defendant were arrested; trace amounts of heroin were found; and numerous items, including paraphernalia used to manufacture and package narcotics, were seized. Three other men, including two Organization members who were tried below with these appellants and whose appeals have been disposed of by summary order, were apprehended as they tried to escape. 57 The indictment charged Frias with conspiring with other Organization members to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute narcotics, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 846; using a firearm in relation to a narcotics trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); possessing an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d); and possessing firearms as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The jury acquitted Frias on the two narcotics-related counts and convicted him on the two firearms counts. 58 The Presentence Report (PSR) prepared on Frias, using the 1988 version of the Guidelines because that version was in effect at the time of his offenses and the version in effect at the time of his sentencing could have created an ex post facto problem, see United States v. Adeniyi, 912 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir.1990), calculated that Frias's base offense level was 36. Though the Guidelines provided a lower base offense level for weapons offenses not committed in connection with any other crime, the basis for the PSR calculation was that Frias had possessed his weapons in connection with the Organization's narcotics operations and that his participation in that conspiracy required use of the higher base offense level pursuant to Guidelines §§ 2K2.1(c)(1), 2K2.2(c)(1), § 2X1.1, and § 2D1.1. In addition, the PSR concluded that the offense level should be adjusted upward by two steps pursuant to Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(1) on the ground that Frias had possessed his firearms during the commission of the drug offense, yielding an adjusted offense level of 38. Given that offense level and Frias's criminal history category of II, the range of imprisonment prescribed by the Guidelines was 262 to 327 months. The PSR noted, however, that because the statutory maximum prison term for each count on which Frias was convicted was 10 years, the maximum to which he could be sentenced was 120 months on each count, to be served consecutively, for a total of 240 months. 59 Frias objected to the PSR calculation, arguing principally that his sentence could not properly be calculated on the basis of conduct of which the jury had acquitted him. The district court rejected his contentions and accepted the recommendations of the PSR. The court stated that the government had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Frias had 60 used the firearms in connection with--the firearms at issue for which he was convicted in connection with the commission of conspiracy to distribute narcotics in the unknown organization conspiracy and the firearms were possessed during the commission of the conspiracy and used in connection with the conspiracy and directly related to the conspiracy. 61 (June 28, 1991 Transcript of Hearing on Sentencing of Frias at 14-15.) The court went on to find that Frias's involvement in the Organization's major massive drug conspiracy had been established by clear and convincing proof, above preponderance (id. at 17), and it decided to sentence Frias to the statutory maximum, two consecutive 10-year prison terms. 62 On appeal, Frias contends (a) that the increases in offense level were not authorized by the Guidelines and violated his right to due process; (b) that increasing his offense level on the basis of conduct for which he had been acquitted violated his right to be free from double jeopardy; and (c) that making his sentences consecutive rather than concurrent violated his right to be free from double jeopardy. 63
64 Frias contends that the base offense level for the offenses of which he was convicted should have been at most 16, which carried an imprisonment range of 24-30 months. He argues that the federal Sentencing Commission (Commission) could not have intended to require the much higher base offense level of 36, and ensuing adjustment to 38 for which the imprisonment range was 262-327 months, on the basis of conduct of which he had been acquitted. We conclude that the district court properly interpreted the Guidelines as directing the calculation of the base offense level with reference to Frias's acquitted conduct, but we also conclude that the court should consider whether the outcome of that calculation in the present case warrants a downward departure. 65 Under the 1988 Guidelines, a conviction under § 922(g)(1) for possession of firearms by a person previously convicted of a felony was governed by § 2K2.1; a conviction under § 5861(d) for possession of unregistered firearms was governed by § 2K2.2. Compare 1988 Guidelines §§ 2K2.1, 2K2.2 with 1989 Guidelines §§ 2K2.1, 2K2.2 (eff. Nov. 1, 1989) (placing most weapons possession offenses under § 2K2.1) and 1990 Guidelines §§ 2K2.1, 2K2.2 (eff. Nov. 1, 1990) (same) and 1991 Guidelines § 2K2.1 (eff. Nov. 1, 1991) (adding most weapons trafficking offenses to § 2K2.1). For Frias's § 922(g)(1) conviction, § 2K2.1(a) of the 1988 Guidelines set a base offense level of 9; for his § 5861 conviction, § 2K2.2(a) set a base offense level of 12. These offense levels were only conditional, however, for each section contained a cross-reference requiring the court to apply a different guideline if the firearm had been used in connection with another offense that carried a higher offense level: 66 [i]f the defendant used the firearm in committing or attempting another offense, apply the guideline in respect to such other offense, or § 2X1.1 (Attempt or Conspiracy) if the resulting offense level is higher than that determined above. 67 1988 Guidelines § 2K2.1(c)(1); see id. § 2K2.2(c)(1) (substituting for for in respect to, and moving second comma to follow parenthetical). Here, the court was persuaded by at least a preponderance of the evidence that Frias had used his firearms in connection with the Organization's narcotics conspiracy. It was required, therefore, to turn to § 2X1.1. 68 Section 2X1.1 set as the base offense level for conspiracy [t]he base offense level from the guideline for the object offense, plus any adjustments from such guideline for any intended offense conduct that can be established with reasonable certainty. 1988 Guidelines § 2X1.1(a) (emphasis added). Since the object of the Organization's conspiracy was distribution of narcotics, the court was required to look to Guidelines § 2D1.1. That section required that narcotics traffickers be sentenced in relation to the quantity of narcotics involved in the offense, see 1988 Guidelines § 2D1.1(a)(3), as set forth in the Drug Quantity Table following § 2D1.1. Since the evidence showed that the Organization had distributed more than 10 kilograms of heroin, that Table required a base offense level of 36. 69 In United States v. Patterson, 947 F.2d 635 (2d Cir.1991), this Court held that under the comparable cross-reference provision found in § 2K2.1(c)(2) of the 1990 Guidelines, the base offense level for a defendant convicted of both firearms and narcotics offenses was properly calculated as if the weapons offense were a drug offense because the latter carried the higher penalty. See id. at 636 (when evidence show[s] that the gun was possessed in connection with an attempted drug transaction and the object offense carries a higher offense level than that provided for the gun offense, the Guidelines explicitly refer the sentencing court to the guideline for the offense committed or attempted). Patterson, however, did not deal with the question of whether such an increase was intended when the defendant was not convicted of both weapons and narcotics offenses. 70 The cross-references in the weapons sections of the 1988 Guidelines, quoted above, referred simply to committing another offense, without specifying whether that offense was to be an offense of which the defendant was convicted. We think it plain, however, that there was no intent to require a conviction, for the commentary accompanying § 2K2.1 indicates that the Commission did not mean its reference to be limited to offenses with which the defendant was charged. It stated that 71 [t]he firearm statutes often are used as a device to enable the federal court to exercise jurisdiction over offenses that otherwise could be prosecuted only under state law. For example, a convicted felon may be prosecuted for possessing a firearm if he used the firearm to rob a gasoline station. Such prosecutions result in high sentences because of the true nature of the underlying conduct. The cross reference at § 2K2.1(c)(1) deals with such cases. 72 1988 Guidelines § 2K2.1 Background (emphasis added). Since the Commission intended another offense to include an offense that could not be prosecuted in federal court, it obviously meant that term to include conduct with which the defendant was not charged. Accord United States v. Humphries, 961 F.2d 1421, 1422 (9th Cir.1992) (per curiam) (Commission intended to allow the continuation of the practice of extending federal jurisdiction over otherwise unreachable underlying conduct); United States v. Harris, 932 F.2d 1529, 1537 (5th Cir.) (no error in sentencing defendant under the guideline for murder when calculating defendant's sentence for firearms offense even though defendant was not charged with murder), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 324, 116 L.Ed.2d 265 (1991); United States v. Willis, 925 F.2d 359, 361 (10th Cir.1991) (the cross reference ... requires that when a defendant uses an illegal firearm to commit other offense conduct [aggravated assault] that he be sentenced according to such other offense conduct even though his conviction is only for the unlawful possession of firearms); United States v. Madewell, 917 F.2d 301, 306 (7th Cir.1990) (same). Thus, in United States v. Bronaugh, 895 F.2d 247 (6th Cir.1990), the Sixth Circuit ruled that a defendant charged with and convicted of only a firearms offense was properly sentenced to the statutory maximum prison term of five years, rather than the 6-12-month range conditionally prescribed by 1988 Guidelines § 2K2.1(a) for his offense of conviction, because the district court found it established by a preponderance of the evidence that he had used the weapon in drug trafficking. The court of appeals noted that the cross-reference in that section led to a higher offense level, resulting in a prescribed imprisonment range of 262-327 months though the defendant had not been charged with drug trafficking. It ruled that the five-fold increase in his sentence because a preponderance of the evidence indicates he is guilty of an uncharged crime was intended by the Commission and was within the authority granted by Congress. Id. at 251. 73 Given the Commission's evident intent that the term another offense include uncharged offenses, we are left with the question of whether it also meant that term to include an offense with which the defendant was charged but of which he was acquitted. We conclude that it did. It had been established long before the advent of the Guidelines that the sentencing court could properly take into account any information known to it, see, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1082, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949), so long as the defendant had an opportunity to respond in order that the court not rely on misinformation, Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 1255, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948). Since an [a]cquittal d[id] not have the effect of conclusively establishing the untruth of all the evidence introduced against [a] defendant, United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181, 184 (2d Cir.1972), and since disputed facts for purposes of sentencing needed only to be established by a preponderance of the evidence, see, e.g., United States v. Lee, 818 F.2d 1052, 1057 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956, 108 S.Ct. 350, 98 L.Ed.2d 376 (1987), the sentencing court was entitled to consider information that the defendant had engaged in conduct that was the subject of an acquittal, United States v. Roland, 748 F.2d 1321, 1327 (2d Cir.1984); United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d at 183. 74 We have ruled that the adoption of the Guidelines has not changed these basic principles. Thus, disputed facts relevant to sentencing, even under the Guidelines, need be established only by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177, 182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 844, 111 S.Ct. 127, 112 L.Ed.2d 95 (1990); United States v. Cousineau, 929 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Shoulberg, 895 F.2d 882, 886-87 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Guerra, 888 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir.1989) (preponderance standard applicable to calculation of offense level based on defendant's possession of uncharged narcotics), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090, 110 S.Ct. 1833, 108 L.Ed.2d 961 (1990); see also United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 655-56 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (collecting cases), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1564, 118 L.Ed.2d 211 (1992). And the sentencing court remains entitled to rely on any type of information known to it. See, e.g., United States v. Carmona, 873 F.2d 569, 574 (2d Cir.1989) (use of testimony from trial in which defendant was not a defendant or represented by counsel); United States v. Alexander, 860 F.2d 508, 512-13 (2d Cir.1988) (use of grand jury testimony); see also 1988 Guidelines § 1B1.3 Background (Relying on the entire range of conduct, regardless of the number of counts that are alleged or on which a conviction is obtained, appears to be the most reasonable approach to writing workable guidelines for [such] offenses.). 75 Accordingly, in United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, in which a defendant had been convicted of narcotics trafficking but acquitted of possessing a firearm in connection with that trafficking, we upheld the district court's upward adjustment of his base offense level by two steps based on the offense characteristic of possessing a firearm during the commission of narcotics offense. 899 F.2d at 182; cf. United States v. Moreno, 933 F.2d 362, 374 (6th Cir.) (upholding sentencing court's consideration of quantities of drugs dealt in by conspiracy, where defendant was convicted of attempting to possess 500 or more grams of cocaine but acquitted of conspiracy), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 265, 116 L.Ed.2d 218 (1991). 76 Frias seeks to distinguish Rodriguez-Gonzalez on the basis that there the sentencing court used the acquitted conduct merely to adjust a base offense level upward by a relatively small increment, not to set a high base offense level initially. We think any suggestion that the Commission did not intend to prescribe a high base offense level in circumstances such as those here, or that the Guidelines are ambiguous in this regard, is belied by the commentary to § 2K2.1, quoted above, which explained that the cross-reference to the higher base offense levels for other crimes was a recognition that prosecutions under the federal firearm statutes often result in high sentences because of the true nature of the underlying conduct. 1988 Guidelines § 2K2.1 Background. All later versions of the Guidelines have included the same cross-reference, see 1992 Guidelines § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A); id. Application Note 14; 1991 Guidelines § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A); id. Application Note 14; 1990 Guidelines § 2K2.1(c)(2), and the 1990 Guidelines made the same observation, see id. Background. 77 We conclude that, in light of the court's findings that Frias possessed his guns in connection with the Organization's conspiracy to distribute more than 10 kilograms of narcotics, the applicable guideline established a base offense level of 36. 78 Nonetheless, both the Guidelines and the Sentencing Reform Act provide that the sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the range established by the applicable guideline, if the court finds 'that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.'  Guidelines § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988) (emphasis added)). Although the above discussion reveals that the Commission envisioned some increase in offense level based on conduct of which the defendant had been acquitted, it is questionable whether it envisioned an increase to the degree that occurred here. The example given in the Background commentary to 1988 Guidelines § 2K2.1 does not indicate that the Commission intended the cross-reference, to a guideline for conduct of which the defendant was not convicted, to result in so large an increase. 79 In stating that the cross-reference provided by § 2K2.1(c)(1) could result in high sentences because of the true nature of the underlying conduct, the commentary provided as an illustration a convicted felon ... prosecuted for possessing a firearm if he used the firearm to rob a gasoline station. 1988 Guidelines § 2K2.1 Background. The base offense level for possession of that firearm under the 1988 Guidelines would have been 9; application of the cross-reference to the 1988 guideline for robbery would have resulted in a base offense level of 18, see 1988 Guidelines § 2B3.1(a), an increase of nine levels. Assuming a defendant, such as Frias, with a Criminal History Category of II, the sentence would have been increased from 6-12 months to 30-37 months; instead of a possible prison term of just six months, the hypothetical defendant could have been sentenced to more than three years. Such an increased sentence would aptly be termed high. 80 On the other hand, an increase from one year to 22 years would more aptly be termed astronomical. In the present case, application of the cross-reference provision raised Frias's base offense level from 12 to 36, increasing the prescribed imprisonment range from 12-18 months to 210-262 months. Thus, instead of being imprisoned for perhaps as little as one year, he could, in theory, have been sentenced to imprisonment for nearly 22 years. If the Commission had intended that conduct of which the defendant was acquitted could lead to a sentence of nearly 22 years instead of one-to-three years, we doubt that it would have chosen the relatively mild term high. 81 In sum, though we agree with the district court that application of the cross-reference provisions of the Guidelines resulted in a base offense level of 36, we doubt that, with respect to conduct of which the defendant was acquitted, the Commission intended so extreme an increase. We therefore conclude that the district court had the power to depart downward pursuant to Guidelines § 5K2.0. Since the court apparently did not consider whether such a departure was permissible, we vacate Frias's sentence and remand the matter to permit the court to consider whether or not to depart from the offense level arrived at through strict application of the Guidelines.
82 In addition, we have difficulty with the PSR's final upward adjustment of offense level from 36 to 38 pursuant to Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(1) on the ground that, in connection with the narcotics conspiracy, Frias possessed weapons. Though United States v. Patterson, 947 F.2d 635, might appear at first blush to sanction this increase, we conclude that it does not. In Patterson, the defendant had been convicted of three narcotics offenses and a firearms offense, the latter arising out of the narcotics activity. Pursuant to 1990 Guidelines § 3D1.2 the sentencing court grouped the gun conviction with the three narcotics convictions in order to determine the base offense level; it then made a two-level upward adjustment for possession of the gun. We approved the sentence, stating that although [s]uperficially, this is arguably double-counting, not all double-counting is prohibited. Id. at 637. We can see the validity of adding a weapons-use increase where, as in Patterson, the weapons conviction carried a lower offense level than the narcotics convictions, and the former was subsumed in the latter for purposes of grouping at the higher level. But in the present case, the final increase brings the calculation full circle. Frias was convicted only of weapons offenses; they were not grouped with narcotics offenses, because there were no narcotics convictions. The narcotics base offense level entered the picture here only through the cross-references designed to ensure that the offense level for the weapons offenses adequately reflected the seriousness of the weapons offenses. To add to the narcotics offense level, chosen only to reflect the circumstances of the weapons offenses, an increment for possessing weapons is tantamount to adding an increase on the basis that the defendant possessed weapons in the course of possessing weapons. This constitutes impermissible double-counting, and we cannot conclude that the Guidelines authorized it. 83 Accordingly, we conclude that Frias's total offense level under the Guidelines should not have been more than 36. Thus, even if the district court decides not to depart downward from level 36 as discussed in the previous section, it should reconsider the sentence to be imposed on Frias, using a base offense level of 36 rather than 38.
84 Frias argues that even if the Guidelines authorized calculation of his base offense level with respect to acquitted conduct, punishment for conduct not proven beyond a reasonable doubt violated his right to due process, and punishment for conduct of which he was acquitted violated his right to be free from double jeopardy. He also contends that his right to be free from double jeopardy was violated by the imposition of consecutive sentences for offenses involving the same firearms. We disagree. 85
86 As indicated above, we have held that disputed facts relating solely to sentencing need be proven only by a preponderance of the evidence, and that a defendant's right to due process is not violated by the calculation of his sentence with reference to facts proven only under that standard and not proven under the higher reasonable-doubt standard that is applicable at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d at 182; United States v. Weinberg, 852 F.2d 681, 685 (2d Cir.1988); United States v. Lee, 818 F.2d at 1057; see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-93, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 2418-20, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (due process does not require application of a standard of proof greater than preponderance in state sentencing proceedings); United States v. Isom, 886 F.2d 736, 738 (4th Cir.1989) (enhancement of sentence based on acquitted conduct does not violate due process because [a] verdict of acquittal demonstrates only a lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; it does not necessarily establish the defendant's innocence). 87 Frias argues that use of the preponderance standard here violates due process because application of the cross-reference provision resulted in a 22-step increase in his offense level. See United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1100-01 (3d Cir.1990) (at least clear and convincing evidence required to support findings resulting in 22-level upward departure); cf. United States v. Townley, 929 F.2d 365, 370 (8th Cir.1991). Whatever the merits of this contention, compare, e.g., United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1100-01, and United States v. Townley, 929 F.2d at 370, and Note, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Adopting Clear and Convincing Evidence as the Burden of Proof, 57 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1387 (1990), with, e.g., United States v. Salmon, 948 F.2d 776, 778-79 (D.C.Cir.1991) (government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any facts that would enhance a defendant's sentence), and United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d at 661 (due process does not require a higher standard of proof than preponderance of the evidence to protect a convicted defendant's liberty interest in the accurate application of the Guidelines), and United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d at 182 (adoption of the Guidelines has not changed the principle that disputed sentencing factors need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence to satisfy due process), we need not address it here. The district court found that the government had established Frias's use of the guns in connection with the conspiracy by clear and convincing proof. Thus, even if we were to agree with Frias that due process required that that standard be employed in such situations, that standard would not afford Frias a basis for relief. 88
89 We have also recognized that though in imposing sentence the district court may take into account conduct that was not the basis for conviction, the punishment imposed is for the offense of conviction, not for the other conduct: 90 In considering the acquitted conduct as a basis for enhancing [the defendant's] sentence, the district court was not relying on facts disclosed at trial to punish the defendant for the extraneous offense, but to justify the heavier penalties for the offenses for which he was convicted. 91 United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d at 181 (quoting United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747, 749 (5th Cir.1989) (per curiam)). The penalty imposed cannot exceed the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction, if, as here, the statutory maximum for the other relevant conduct is higher. Thus, the reference to acquitted conduct as a basis for enhancing the punishment to be meted out for the offense of conviction does not violate the defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy. United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d at 184; cf. United States v. Funt, 896 F.2d 1288, 1300 (11th Cir.1990) (court may consider injury to victims of conduct shown in connection with counts on which defendant was acquitted); United States v. Atkins, 480 F.2d 1223, 1224 (9th Cir.1973) (per curiam) (court may consider information relating to count reversed on appeal); United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652, 655 (2d Cir.1973) (court may consider information relating to dismissed counts); United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843, 86 S.Ct. 89, 15 L.Ed.2d 84 (1965); Billiteri v. United States Board of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944-45 (2d Cir.1976) (parole board entitled to consider information relating to dismissed counts). 92 Finally, a single transaction may give rise to liability for distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause if the legislature so intended. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1145, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981) (Where Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.). There is no question that the offenses of possession of unregistered weapon, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and possession of a weapon as a previously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), are distinct offenses, each including at least one element that the other does not, see Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932); cf. United States v. Lawrence, 928 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir.1991) (no double jeopardy violation in cumulative punishment for violations of § 922(g)(1) (possession of gun by felon) and § 924(c) (use of gun in relation to narcotics trafficking)), and there is no indication here that Congress intended that a defendant convicted of both a § 922(g)(1) offense and a § 5861(d) offense not be punished cumulatively for both.