Opinion ID: 2826633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Flowage Easement

Text: Columbia Venture argues the County's adoption of the revised FEMA flood maps (which designate most of Columbia Venture's property as lying within the regulatory floodway and trigger development restrictions that prevent Columbia Venture from expanding the levees) is tantamount to the County taking a flowage easement upon Columbia Venture's property for which it is entitled to just compensation under the Takings Clause. We disagree, for the Special Referee properly found Richland County's floodway development restrictions are simply limitations on land use and do not constitute a flowage easement upon Columbia Venture's property. We acknowledge the well-established principle that government-induced flooding may, in some circumstances, constitute a taking that would justify compensation under the Takings Clause. See Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 511, 518 (2012) ('[W]here real estate is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material . . . so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of the Constitution.') (quoting Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 181 (1871)). However, for flooding to amount to a taking, there must be a causal connection between the challenged government act and the increased flooding—a connection which is lacking in this case. See Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 149– 50 (1924) (finding no taking occurred where there was no causal connection between the construction of a nearby government canal and the increased amount or severity of periodic flooding). In addition to the requirement of a causal connection, a compensable taking occurs only where a claimant shows an actual increase in the frequency or severity of flooding. See Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939) (rejecting the argument that the passage of legislation in and of itself constitutes a taking and noting that although [a] reduction or increase in the value of property may occur by reason of legislation . . . [s]uch changes in value are incidents of ownership and cannot be considered as a 'taking' in the constitutional sense); see also Stueve Bros. Farms, LLC v. United States, 737 F.3d 750, 753 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ([U]nder well-settled law, the apprehension of flooding does not constitute a taking of a flowage easement.). Indeed, to successfully show the government has taken a flowage easement, a claimant must demonstrate that the occurrence of flooding is the natural consequence of government action and that such flooding, though it may be intermittent, is nevertheless of a type which will be inevitably recurring. Barnes v. United States, 538 F.2d 865, 870–73 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (finding claimant had shown a government taking of a flowage easement by demonstrating significant damages resulting from frequent and inevitably recurring flooding which was the natural consequence of the government's control of the flow of a river through a nearby dam). In evaluating this claim, we find the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256 (1939), instructive. Following the most disastrous of all recorded floods which occurred along the Mississippi River in the spring of 1927, Congress enacted the Mississippi Flood Control Act of 1928 (the 1928 Act) which provided for extensive improvements to a 950-mile system of levees along both banks of the Mississippi River stretching from Missouri to the Gulf of Mexico. Id. at 261. The improved levee system was designed to include several designated spillway points, at which the height of the existing levees would not be raised and behind which diversion channels would be constructed. These lower spillway points were created to divert floodwaters from the main river channel in an effort to prevent floods from cresting over the higher riverside levees during major flood events. Thereafter, Julia Sponenbarger, an owner of land lying in a contemplated diversion channel along the waterway, filed suit against the United States alleging the 1928 Act would result in her property being inundated with water during major floods, for which she was entitled compensation under the Takings Clause. Although the existing levees protecting her land would not be altered or reduced under the 1928 Act, Sponenbarger nevertheless claimed a taking had occurred because the government planned to improve other nearby levees but not those protecting her land. The Supreme Court held the 1928 Act did not constitute a taking of Sponenbarger's property or a servitude from excessive floodwaters because the United States had neither caused her property to flood nor in any wise nor to any extent increased the flood hazard thereto. Id. at 263 (internal marks omitted). Since the existing levees were to remain in place, the Supreme Court found: [T]he 1928 Act had not increased the immemorial danger of unpredictable major floods to which [Sponenbarger]'s land had always been subject. Therefore, to hold the Government responsible for such floods would be to say that the Fifth Amendment requires the Government to pay a landowner for damages which may result from conjectural major floods, even though the same floods and the same damages would occur had the Government undertaken no [action] of any kind. So to hold would far exceed even the extremest conception of a taking by flooding within the meaning of that Amendment. For the Government would thereby be required to compensate a private party owner for flood damages which it in no way caused. Id. at 265. The Supreme Court readily acknowledged that a taking may occur where the government directly subjects private land to intermittent floods; however, as to Sponenbarger's property, the Court held [t]he Government has not subjected [her] land to any additional flooding, above what would occur if the Government had not acted; and the [Takings Clause of the] Fifth Amendment does not make the Government an insurer that the evil of floods be stamped out universally. Id. at 266. Here, as in Sponenbarger, the existing levees have remained in place, and unlike other cases in which the natural consequence of government action caused an increase in flooding, here, the County's actions in adopting FEMA's revised flood maps do not, in any way, increase the flood hazard to which Columbia Venture's property has historically been exposed. Compare Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 (1933) (finding a compensable flowage easement was created by reason of the government's construction of a dam along a tributary of the Tennessee River, which caused an increase in the frequency of intermittent overflows upon claimant's farmland, destroyed claimant's crops, and impaired his use of the land for agricultural purposes), and Cotton Land Co. v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 232, 233–35 (Ct. Cl. 1948) (finding compensable taking occurred where the construction of a dam and the impounding of water in its reservoir caused over 7,000 acres of claimant's land to be flooded), and Barnes, 538 F.2d at 870–73 (finding claimant demonstrated the government had taken a flowage easement where claimant proved significant damages resulting from frequent and inevitably recurring flooding that was the natural consequence of the government's control of the flow of a river through a nearby dam), with Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 286 (1939) (finding no taking occurred where riverbank levee was not lowered from its previous height and the land at issue was as well protected from destructive floods as [it was] formerly and stating [t]he Government could become liable for a taking, in whole or in part, even without direct appropriation, [only] by such [action] as would put upon this land a burden, actually experienced, of caring for floods greater than it bore prior), and Sanguinetti 264 U.S. at 149–50 (finding no taking occurred despite periodic flooding of claimant's property because the land was subject to the same periodic overflows prior to the government's construction of a nearby canal and levee system and claimant produced no evidence that the amount or severity of flooding was increased by construction of the canal). Indeed, the County's ordinances, which allow for maintenance and repair but prohibit expansion of the existing levees, merely maintain the status quo in terms of the flood risk. Thus, in the absence of any increase in flooding attributable to an act of the County, we affirm the Special Referee's finding that the County did not take a flowage easement.19 19 To the extent Appellant argues an exaction has occurred, we would likewise find this theory unavailing. This case in no manner falls within the exactions line of cases, as Richland County has not required Columbia Venture to grant an easement or dedicate a portion of its property for public use. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (finding conditions on development of property constitute a taking if there is not a nexus between the legitimate state interest and the condition created or if the burden created by the condition is not roughly proportionate to the government's justification for regulating) (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)). Further, to the extent Columbia Venture argues the County's development restrictions amount to a categorical taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (finding a taking occurs where a regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land), we likewise find this theory provides no relief because approximately thirty percent of Columbia Venture's property is not designated as lying within the regulatory floodway and therefore is not subject to the same stringent development restrictions. Moreover, the entire tract retained substantial value for agricultural and other purposes, even under the existing designations. Indeed, since February 2002, Columbia Venture