Opinion ID: 1461962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Robinson's Case

Text: The Robinson matter involves preparation of a draft separation agreement. Chasnoff's engagement did not include negotiating the actual agreement; rather, it appears that he was to prepare the basis from which Robinson, or someone on her behalf, would undertake to bargain an actual agreement. Judge Chapin's findings of violations were based on the facts set forth below. Robinson[ ] met with [Chasnoff] for one-and-a-half hours on October 7, 1997 and retained him to draft a separation agreement. The retainer agreement provided for a $3,500 retainer fee and an hourly rate of $250 per hour for time expended beyond fourteen hours. [Chasnoff] received the $3,500 retainer fee by the latter part of October 1997. Rather than depositing the funds into a trust or escrow account, [Chasnoff] deposited the money into his own account. Because she was planning to move to New York, Robinson requested that [Chasnoff] prepare a draft of the separation agreement by the beginning of November. Robinson had been married for two-and-a-half years, there were no children of the marriage, and the couple did not jointly hold any real property. The complainant's chief concern regarding the separation agreement pertained to a loan made by her parents to her husband. Robinson met with [Chasnoff] again on October 14, 1997 for one hour, at which time she provided [Chasnoff] with the documents he had requested at their initial meeting. [Chasnoff] met with Robinson once again on November 6, 1997 for one-and-a-half hours at [Chasnoff's] request. At this meeting, Robinson instructed [Chasnoff] that she wanted the agreement prepared by no later than the end of the year. At no time had [Chasnoff] indicated to Robinson that he would be unable to meet this deadline. In addition to [Chasnoff's] delay in providing his client with the settlement agreement, [Chasnoff] failed to respond to Robinson's repeated requests for a billing statement. Robinson requested a billing statement from [Chasnoff] in November and December, but she was not provided with one. Nor was she provided with the draft agreement, as promised by [Chasnoff]. [Chasnoff] and Robinson met yet again on January 15, 1998 for 1.33 hours, at which time they went over the same matters discussed previously. [Chasnoff] promised Robinson that the agreement would be completed by January 17, 1998. Again, [Chasnoff] failed to meet this deadline. On February 11, 1998, Robinson delivered a letter at [Chasnoff's] office advising him that she was terminating his representation. The letter also stated that Robinson would return to his office on February 13, 1998 to obtain a billing statement and her file and that she would pay for the draft of the agreement if it were ready by that date. Robinson went to [Chasnoff's] office three additional times in February to obtain a billing statement and her file. Finally, on February 27, 1998, [Chasnoff's] secretary provided Robinson with a statement, which indicated that [Chasnoff] earned the entire retainer except for $897.50, and Robinson was provided a check for that amount. [Chasnoff] did not provide Robinson with the draft settlement until March 3, 1998. The draft settlement agreement, which was prepared using a template, was incomplete and replete with inaccuracies. For example, the agreement contained boilerplate language erroneously reflecting that the couple had children. Judge Chapin found that Chasnoff failed to act with diligence, in violation of MRPC 1.3, because [Chasnoff] was aware that time was of great importance to his client when he undertook this representation, but he fell far short of delivering to his client's expectations, even though the settlement agreement did not contain any particularly complex or novel issues. Finding a violation of MRPC 1.4 (duty to communicate), Judge Chapin explained as follows: Robinson repeatedly communicated her requests to [Chasnoff's] office for a billing statement and for information regarding the status of her separation agreement. Robinson was entirely reasonable in making these requests, particularly given the deadlines she had communicated to [Chasnoff] and the lack of compliance thereof. In addition, Judge Chapin concluded that MRPC 1.5(a), requiring reasonable fees, had been violated because of the factors set forth below. The value of [Chasnoff's] services to his client dropped dramatically due to the unexplained passage of time between the first deadline and the date on which [Chasnoff] eventually delivered the agreement. Although [Chasnoff's] time records showed that he spent ten hours consulting with his client and preparing the agreement, Robinson did not receive the full value of this time spent, since the end result was incomplete and riddled with inaccuracies. Furthermore, [Chasnoff] spent a considerable amount of time covering the same material with his client during their several meetings that much of this time was, in effect, wasted. These findings and conclusions are supported by the evidence. Chasnoff's exceptions are denied.