Opinion ID: 1901355
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether wells and oliver are entitled to an award of compensatory damages for emotional distress or punitive damages.

Text: ¶ 40. Fidelity and American Bankers next argue that Wells and Oliver failed to establish a right to recover damages for emotional distress, given the lack of any physical injury on their part. We have usually followed the majority view that, in order to recover for mental anguish unaccompanied by demonstrable physical or mental injury, the defendant's conduct must be malicious, intentional, willful, wanton, grossly careless, indifferent or reckless. Mississippi Valley Gas Co. v. Estate of Walker, 725 So.2d 139, 148 (Miss.1998); Morrison v. Means, 680 So.2d 803, 806 (Miss.1996). In these cases, where the defendant's conduct rises only to the level of ordinary negligence, the plaintiff must prove some sort of injury or demonstrable harm, whether it be physical or mental, and that harm must have been reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. Walker, 725 So.2d at 148; Morrison, 680 So.2d at 805 n. 1. ¶ 41. In another line of cases, we have demonstrated an intent to relax the standard of proof in emotional distress cases and follow the minority view that a plaintiff may recover for emotional distress and mental anguish proximately resulting from ordinary negligence, provided only that the injury was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. Southwest Miss. Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Lawrence, 684 So.2d 1257, 1269 (Miss.1996); Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Veasley, 610 So.2d 290, 295 (Miss.1992); Strickland v. Rossini, 589 So.2d 1268, 1275 (Miss.1991). Even in this more permissive line of cases we have required a heavy burden of proof in order to establish a right to recover emotional distress damages. ¶ 42. In Adams v. U.S. Homecrafters, Inc., 744 So.2d 736 (Miss.1999), for example, we endorsed the more permissive minority view, but nevertheless held that the plaintiffs had failed to have met their burden of proof in this regard through her testimony as to her mental distress. A plaintiff testified as follows: A. It's been a total nightmare. I mean, I've stayed up for days and I've stayed up for nights just hoping water wouldn't get in my porch. I have been out there the middle of the nighttime making sure, and I have dug it out in the middle of the nighttime just to keep water out of the house because I just couldn't get no help. Q. What do you do when you're at work and it rains? A. Worry real bad. Sometimes I leave work and go check real quick because I don't work because I don't work butI guess it's about a half a mile from my house. Id., at 743-44. We held this testimony to be insufficient even under the more permissive line of cases, stating: The evidence presented here is similar to that in both Morrison v. Means and Strickland v. Rossini , wherein the plaintiffs complained of worry or emotional upset and loss of sleep. Morrison, 680 So.2d at 807; Strickland, 589 So.2d at 1275-76. We found that this was insufficient evidence to support an award for emotional distress.... We find that Mr. Adams's vague testimony about loss of sleep and worry caused by the drainage problem was insufficient to support an instruction or award of damages for emotional distress in this case. Id. ¶ 43. We have applied the line of cases adopting the more restrictive majority view in the most recent holdings on this issue, although the cases applying the minority view have not been overruled. See Summers ex rel. Dawson v. St. Andrew's Episcopal Sch., Inc., 759 So.2d 1203, 1211-12 (Miss.2000) (In this case sub judice there was absolutely no evidence to support emotional or mental anguish. The parents, suffering no bodily injury or trauma, have the burden to prove that the supervision of St. Andrew's was done maliciously, intentionally, or with such gross negligence to show an utter indifference to the consequence.); see also Whitten v. Cox, 799 So.2d 1 (Miss.2000). A plaintiff therefore may not recover emotional distress damages resulting from ordinary negligence, without proving some sort of physical manifestation of injury or demonstrable physical harm. ¶ 44. Wells and Oliver have failed to make such a showing of demonstrable physical harm, and their testimony is similar to that which we have held to be insufficient even in the more permissive line of cases. For example, Wells testified as follows: Q: Now, these increased payments and the calls that you received, what effect did they have on you personally, Ms. Wells? A. Caused a lot of stress. Q: Did you ever have any trouble sleeping at night? A: Yes, it was very stressful. I had a lot of restless nights.... Oliver similarly testified, Well, it was stressing. It was totally embarrassing when they called my job. It cost me a lot of sleepless night because we were having some financial difficulties, and we were trying our best to meet our obligations. ¶ 45. Wells and Oliver thus presented no evidence of demonstrative physical symptoms or harm as required under the majority line of cases, and their testimony is also similar to that which we have rejected as insufficient in the cases adopting the more liberal standard of recovery. See, e.g. Adams, 744 So.2d at 743-44.
¶ 46. Wells and Oliver may recover punitive damages only if they established that Fidelity's and American Bankers' actions were malicious, intentional, willful, wanton, grossly careless, indifferent or reckless. Walker, 725 So.2d at 148. Wells and Oliver have failed to establish a cause of action against American Bankers because privity of contract did not exist between Wells, Oliver and American Bankers. The punitive damages award against this defendant should therefore be reversed. ¶ 47. With regard to Fidelity, however, a different result is appropriate. As discussed earlier, this case is remanded for consideration of claims that Fidelity engaged in bad faith in the performance of the contract and not on matters excluded for review under the filed rate doctrine. Assuming that the trial court concludes that certain allegations in Wells's and Oliver's complaints are not barred by this doctrine, the court should find that the jury may consider these allegations as they relate to Fidelity's (but not American Bankers') alleged breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Given that these important issues are yet to be resolved, we are not issuing a ruling as to the availability of punitive damages against Fidelity.