Opinion ID: 194512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the court's authority to depart

Text: We begin our discussion of the court's authority to depart by pondering a jurisdictional quandary. That quandary resolved, we then address the merits of appellants' claim.
Ordinarily, an appeal will not lie from a district court's refusal to depart from a properly calculated sentencing enforceability vel non of such waivers or the safeguards which must be employed in respect thereto. 4 range. See United States v. Tardiff, 969 F.2d 1283, 1290 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Romolo, 937 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1991) (collecting cases). However, appellate jurisdiction may attach when it appears that the failure to depart stemmed from the sentencing court's mistaken impression that it lacked the legal authority to depart or, relatedly, from the court's misapprehension of the rules governing departure. See United States v. Amparo, 961 F.2d 288, 292 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 224 (1992); United States v. Lauzon, 938 F.2d 326, 330 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 450 (1991); Romolo, 937 F.2d at 22. Although this paradigm is dictated by the Sentencing Reform Act, see Romolo, 937 F.2d at 23 (discussing operation of 18 U.S.C. 3742(a)), it also works well from a practical standpoint: in respect to declinations to depart, the limited appellate review that is available serves to correct errors which are essentially legal in nature, but does not brook interference with a sentencing court's exercise of factfinding functions or discretion. See Amparo, 961 F.2d at 292; see also Romolo, 937 F.2d at 23. These appeals fit snugly within the contours of the exception permitting appellate review. The gravamen of appellants' complaint is their colorable claim3 that the 3In what it terms the rarest of all cases, the government, which has a duty to see that justice is done, Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), argues that the defendants' assignment of legal error is on the mark. While such unanimity of purpose might raise jurisdictional concerns in a civil case, see Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) (explaining adversity requirement); see also Moore v. Charlotte- 5 district court confused the legal standard governing departures under U.S.S.G. 5K1.1 with the legal standard governing departures under a markedly different guideline, U.S.S.G. 5K2.0. This claim presents a question of law, not of fact, comfortably within our assigned purview. We hold, therefore, that we have jurisdiction over these appeals. B. The Distinction Between Departure Modalities. We turn next to the merits of the claim. Because the assignment of error involves the parameters of a district judge's departure authority, we afford plenary review. See Lauzon, 938 F.2d at 330; cf. United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir.) (holding that de novo review is warranted when the court of appeals is called upon to determine whether or not circumstances are of a kind or degree that may appropriately be relied upon to justify departure under section 5K2.0), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 862 (1989). The district judge explicitly interpreted our decision in United States v. Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d 347 (1st Cir. 1989), as restricting his ability to depart downward in these cases. Aguilar-Pena, however, involved a district court's decision to Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47, 48 (1971) (per curiam) (finding no case or controversy where both litigants desire precisely the same result), criminal cases are a breed apart. When the government confesses error in a criminal proceeding, appellate courts routinely continue to exercise previously acquired jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 405 (1981) (per curiam); Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258-59 (1942); see also United States v. Udo, 963 F.2d 1318, 1319 (9th Cir. 1992) (reviewing a failure to depart pursuant to 5K1.1 in circumstances analogous to those presented in this case). 6 depart under section 5K2.0.4 See id. at 349-53. Under section 5K2.0, a district court is empowered to depart from the GSR if there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission. U.S.S.G. 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 3553(b)). Noting that the birth of the Sentencing Commission was to some extent reflective of Congress's ardent desire to dispense with inequalities based on localized sentencing responses, Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d at 352, we held that the district court's authority to depart under section 5K2.0 was restricted to those few instances where there is something 'special' about a given offender, or the accouterments of the crime committed, which distinguishes the case from the mine-run for that offense. Id. at 350. In other words, Aguilar-Pena reflected this court's staunch belief that section 5K2.0 operates as a safety valve to be employed at the discretion of the district judge on those infrequent occasions when some important, atypical factor, not duly considered by the Sentencing Commission, removes a particular case from the heartland for a given offense. Id. at 351. U.S.S.G. 5K1.1 is a different provision with a different raison d'etre. Congress specifically directed the Sentencing Commission to 4Aguilar-Pena flowed naturally from, and relied upon, our opinion in United States v. Diaz-Villafane. See, e.g., Aguilar- Pena, 887 F.2d at 349-50 (citing and quoting Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 49-52). Like Aguilar-Pena, Diaz-Villafane involved a departure under U.S.S.G. 5K2.0. 7 assure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed . . . to take into account a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. 28 U.S.C. 994(n) (1988). Section 5K1.1 sprouted from this statutory seed. It provides, inter alia, that: Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines. U.S.S.G. 5K1.1. This guideline serves a dual purpose. In addition to permitting ex post tailoring of defendants' sentences to reflect meaningful assistance rendered between the dates of apprehension and sentencing, it provides defendants, ex ante, with an incentive to cooperate in the administration of justice. See, e.g., United States v. Damer, 910 F.2d 1239, 1241 (5th Cir.)