Opinion ID: 3158883
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Johnson’s 1997 media interviews

Text: {¶ 69} Finally, Johnson claims that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of media interviews that he gave shortly after Shanon’s murder. {¶ 70} On November 13 and 14, 1997, Johnson spoke to three local television reporters. He stated that around 7:30 a.m. on November 12, 1997, he heard his dog barking and went to get her. Johnson said that he did not see anyone outside. He told them that later that night, he saw cameras flashing in the Markses’ bathroom and a coroner’s vehicle outside their house. Johnson told the reporters that he was shocked that this crime had occurred in the neighborhood and indicated concern about staying there with his family. {¶ 71} Over defense objection, the prosecutor introduced a video recording depicting the three media interviews both at Johnson’s 1998 trial and his 2011 mitigation hearing. 17 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 72} A defendant’s statements to reporters, like other conduct following the completion of a crime, may be relevant evidence of consciousness of guilt. See People v. Cain, 10 Cal.4th 1, 32, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224 (1995). And “[e]vidence of consciousness of guilt    [is evidence] of guilt itself.” State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 11, 679 N.E.2d 646 (1997); State v. Moore, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 12 MA 8, 2013-Ohio-1435, 990 N.E.2d 625, ¶ 132. But Johnson asserts that the interviews were relevant only to his guilt, and not to his sentence. {¶ 73} The state argues that media interviews are admissible during the mitigation phase because, under State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d 404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, they provide evidence of the nature and circumstances of an offense. Davis held that “a prosecutor may legitimately refer to the nature and circumstances of the offense” for certain purposes, id. at ¶ 326, but it did not specifically address whether a defendant’s media interviews after the completion of a crime fall under the rubric of “nature and circumstances.” {¶ 74} Here, Johnson’s statements to the press revealed very little about the nature and circumstances of the crime. However, the statements did indicate that the crime likely occurred around 7:30 a.m., and they established that Johnson could see into the Markses’ bathroom from a window in his own home. Thus, at least to some minimal degree, the media interviews were relevant evidence of nature and circumstances. {¶ 75} Johnson also argues that the interviews should have been excluded as unfairly prejudicial. He reasons that the interviews had little, if any, probative value. By contrast, he asserts that there was a high likelihood of unfair prejudice because the interviews, which were played twice for the jury, were very likely to appeal to the jurors’ emotions and their instincts to punish him. On the video, Johnson (who later confessed) said that he had been shocked to learn of this crime in his neighborhood, and he said that he had heard dogs barking on the morning of the murder and wished he had seen the perpetrator. These brazen 18 January Term, 2015 misrepresentations could impassion a jury. However, even if the trial court arguably should have excluded the evidence, at most Johnson can establish “a mere error of law or judgment,” which is insufficient to prevail on abuse-of-discretion review. Thompson, 141 Ohio St.3d 254, 2014-Ohio-4751, 23 N.E.3d 1096, at ¶ 91. Moreover, the alleged error was harmless in light of the remaining evidence adduced during the mitigation phase. See, e.g., DePew, 38 Ohio St.3d at 287, 528 N.E.2d 542. {¶ 76} For all these reasons, we reject proposition of law No. 3.