Opinion ID: 1390303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Construction by the Parties.

Text: The State contends that the theory of acquiescence cannot be applied against the State, citing Garcia v. State, 274 S.W. 319 (Tex. Civ. App.), which merely holds that the State is not bound by acts of private landowners in locating a common boundary. The State also cites Bidwell v. McCuen, 183 Iowa 633, 166 N.W. 369, 372, and Langle v. Brauch, 193 Iowa 140, 185 N.W. 28, 30, but the foundation of these cases is that no one representing the public was authorized to enter into an agreement upon, or acquiesce in, any particular location [of the highway involved]. (166 N.W. at 372.) As will appear, such reasoning is inapplicable here. Defendants cite, in answer to the State's contention that the theory of acquiescence cannot be applied against the State, the cases of In re Title of Kioloku, 25 Haw. 357 (1920), aff'd sub nom, Territory v. Hutchinson Sugar Plantation Co., 272 Fed. 856 (9th Cir.1921); and United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256 (1947). These were lost grant cases. Particularly in point is the following excerpt from In re Title of Kioloku, supra :    In the Chaves case [159 U.S. 452] the court said:    Nothing, it is true, can be claimed by prescription which owes its origin to, and can only be had by, matter of record; but lapse of time, accompanied by acts done or other circumstances, may warrant the jury in presuming a grant or title by record. Thus also, though lapse of time does not of itself furnish a conclusive bar to the title of the sovereign, agreeably to the maxim nullum tempus occurrit regi, yet if the adverse claim could have had a legal commencement, juries are advised or instructed to presume such commencement after many years of uninterrupted possession or enjoyment.    (25 Haw. at 370.) The State has attempted to distinguish these cases on the facts, but the distinctions sought to be made are inconsequential. [20] More important, the State has not met the proposition that the defendants' claim could have had a legal commencement. We already have referred to the authority of the Minister of Interior with respect to maheled lands under the Act of August 24, 1860 (S.L. 1860, p. 27). A similar statute was enacted on December 16, 1892 (S.L. 1892, c. 68). Though a patent for Kumuulu by name was issued to Victoria Kamamalu in 1861, that did not mitigate against the possibility that another patent for the same property by metes and bounds could have issued, as would have been authorized. Cf., Greenwell v. Paris, 6 Haw. 315 (opinion of a single justice, 1882). And where, as here, the question was whether the title had remained in the government, there was no requirement that a Boundary Commissioner's certificate [21] precede the issuance of a patent by metes and bounds. The 1892 statute (S.L. 1892, c. 68) specifically provided that approval of the survey by the Surveyor General was sufficient. The aforesaid Acts of August 24, 1860 and December 16, 1892, contained expiration dates. However, since the question here is one of the extent of the award, not the complete absence of an award, it is significant that, as early as 1876, the laws recognized that the government might by quit claim, or otherwise, dispose of its rights in any land by way of compromise or equitable settlements of the rights of claimants   . (S.L. 1876, c. 44, § 2.) This represents another avenue by which defendants' claim might have been perfected. In the Land Act of 1895 (Sp. S.L. 1895, c. 26, § 17), it was provided that the President of the Republic, upon the recommendation of the Commissioners of Public Lands and with the approval of the Executive Council, might execute quitclaim deeds for perfecting the titles of private lands where such titles are purely equitable or where such lands are suffering under defective titles, or in cases of claims to use of lands upon legal or equitable grounds. With the Governor of the Territory (subsequently the Governor of the State) substituted for the President of the Republic, the Commissioner of Public Lands substituted for the Commissioners of Public Lands, and the Executive Council omitted, these provisions became successively sections 254 and 276, R.L. 1905; sections 344 and 379, R.L. 1915; sections 442 and 479, R.L. 1925; sections 1554 and 1568, R.L. 1935; sections 4534 and 4535, R.L. 1945; and sections 99-43 and 99-44, R.L.H. 1955. [22] By S.L. 1962, c. 32, these sections were repealed, together with other provisions, and a new chapter was enacted; see R.L.H. 1955 (Supp. 1965), chapter 103A, especially section 103A-48. This was after the commencement of the present suit in 1960. The lost grant doctrine, while adopted in the Kioloku case, supra, represents a fiction which this court is reluctant to apply here. It is a doctrine that perhaps requires re-examination. In this case, it is more realistic to recognize that an award was made, which was tantamount to a grant, [23] that the question is one of construction by the parties, and that the doctrine of construction by the parties is applicable. It cannot be said that no one representing the public was authorized to acquiesce [24] in the construction of the award. Inapplicable here is the statement in United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40, that: [O]fficers who have no authority at all to dispose of Government property cannot by their conduct cause the Government to lose its valuable rights by their acquiescence, laches, or failure to act. We conclude that this is a case in which we may look to evidence which shows the conduct of the parties with reference to the lands in dispute in so far as it legitimately reflects their intent with respect to the grant. People v. Tahawus Purchase, Inc., 26 N.Y.S.2d 795, 814, aff'd, 268 App. Div. 100, 48 N.Y.S.2d 896. In that case, as in this, the action was in ejectment and was brought by the State for the purpose of establishing that a certain patent did not include a piece, there 187 1/2 acres, in the possession of defendant. And in State v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., supra, 48 Haw. 152, 176, 397 P.2d 593, 607, where the dispute was between the State and private persons as to the extent of a Land Commission Award, the court ruled that: If considered ambiguous, the construction given a deed by the parties to it will be given effect unless it contravenes some rule of law. The record shows more than mere possession [25] and payment of taxes on the part of defendants and their predecessors. If that were all the doctrine of construction by the parties would not apply, since the construction must be participated in by all. Nahaolelua v. Heen, 20 Haw. 613, 615 (1911). Nor do we hold that the mere failure of the State to dispute defendants' possession would call for invoking the doctrine of construction by the parties, even though there were several instances when lists of government lands in general, or unassigned lands in particular, were compiled without Waiau being included. Here the record shows that in 1881, on a Hawaiian Government Survey map of Oahu, the upland of Waiau was designated L.C.A. 7713 V.K., i.e., Victoria Kamamalu's Land Commission Award 7713. In 1890, following the opinion of this court in Thurston v. Bishop, supra, 7 Haw. 421 (1888), an act was passed To Settle the Title to certain Unawarded Lands, and to Authorize a Compromise with the Trustees under the Will of the late Bernice Pauahi Bishop, (S.L. 1890, c. 78). This act recited that Bernice Pauahi Bishop came into possession of certain lands which had been continuously held and claimed by her ancestors, now called unassigned lands, of which the following are at present in the possession of the Trustees of her estate, naming fifteen lands. It provided for the patenting to the trustees of certain of the named lands upon the quitclaim of the remainder of the named lands. The land here in dispute was not mentioned, although in possession of the trustees at that time as successors in interest to Victoria Kamamalu. It also is noteworthy that an 1892 report of the Minister of the Interior summarized the compromise thus effected and stated that the whole question of the unassigned lands is practically settled. In 1902, on a Hawaii Territory Survey map, the upland of Waiau again was designated L.C.A. 7713. However, on July 24, 1912 the Government Surveyor reported to the Commissioner of Public Lands that the Estate of B.P. Bishop has, through some mistaken idea of the boundaries of the ili of Kumuulu, made use of what seems to be, beyond any doubt, a valuable public property, basing this statement on Bishop's map and the Land Commission records. On November 19, 1918, an action of ejectment was brought by the then Territory of Hawaii to recover the land now in dispute and the forested area as well. Summons was served, but the case was never brought to trial. It was voluntarily discontinued by the Attorney General in May, 1929. In the Index of Land Commission Awards published by the government that same year, Kumuulu, L.C.A. 7713, Apana 35, was listed as containing 2522 acres. It is to be noted that the government had maintained on various occasions prior to 1929 that Kumuulu was unsurveyed. This was the purport of the listing of Kumuulu in the first Index of Land Commission Awards published in 1861. A predecessor of defendants agreed with the view that the boundaries had not been determined when, in 1873, he filed an application for the settlement of the boundaries of various lands, including Kumuulu, which however was not pursued as to the latter. Defendants suggest this was because of the Boundary Commissioner's statement in connection with the Austin application for settlement of the boundaries of Waimalu, which adjoins Waiau, that Waiau is now settled by Bishop's survey   . However, a report to the Minister of the Interior by W.D. Alexander, Surveyor General, made in 1886, listed Kumuulu, cross-referenced to Royal Patent 4475, said to be by name, as one of the lands the boundaries of which had not been settled; and an official publication made in June and July, 1924, pursuant to Act 208, S.L. 1919, as amended by Act 155, S.L. 1923, now R.L.H. 1955, sections 100-7-10, listed Kumuulu, L.C.A. 7713 Ap. 35, among the unsurveyed lands the boundaries of which were required to be legally determined before July 1, 1925, otherwise the Territory would have the same surveyed, and have the boundaries adjudicated, at the owner's expense. At the time of this publication the Territory's ejectment suit was pending, and in view of this there could have been no intention of stimulating action by the Bishop Estate to seek a determination of the extent of the Kumuulu award. The list, like other such lists, was simply a list of unsurveyed lands. Such lists, in and of themselves, did not signify a government claim, though they were indicative of uncertainty. The Minister of the Interior noted in a report in 1882 that as the surveys were completed more Government lands will be found. Subsequently, as seen, the government made the claim which resulted in the 1918 ejectment action. After the discontinuance of the 1918 ejectment action in 1929, there was a period of more than thirty years before any further dispute was raised, the present action being brought in 1960. During this thirty-year period, action was taken which we deem decisive in view of the fact that prior thereto the title dispute had been brought to light, aired, and dropped, and this at a time when In re Title of Kioloku, supra , had already been decided; and in view also of participation in the below reviewed action by the Governor and Commissioner of Public Lands in whom was vested the statutory authority which continued during this period as above set out. In 1937, the Territory entered into an exchange deed, executed on behalf of the Territory by the Governor and Commissioner of Public Lands, reciting that Parcels F and G therein described, were portion[s] of R.P. 4475, L.C. Award 7713, Apana 35, to Victoria Kamamalu, at Waiau, Ewa, Oahu. Parcel F had its point of beginning at the boundary of Waimalu, to the east of the ten acre parcel which the State now says comprised the award. This portion of Parcel F was separated from the ten acre piece by the Ili of Kauhihau, and according to the State's present contention that the Ili of Kumuulu lay below the paaina, all of Parcel F was outside of Victoria's award. Parcel G lay to the west of the ten acre piece, being separated from it by Piikoi's award, the Ili of Kaluaoopu. In 1938 there was another exchange deed executed on behalf of the Territory by the Governor and Commissioner of Public Lands, making similar recitals as to certain parcels outside the area now contended to have comprised the award. In 1945, the Territory commenced a condemnation suit, Law No. 17749, Parcels 80, 84, and 87 of which, described as portion[s] of R.P. 4475, L.C. Aw. 7713, Apana 35 to V. Kamamalu, were outside the ten acre parcel, two of the pieces being west of Piikoi's award, while one was to the north of that award. On March 19, 1953, a stipulation was entered into for the acquisition of these and other parcels, the stipulation including the point that the Bishop Estate is the owner in fee simple of said lands, free from encumbrances. This again is significant as showing acquiescence in defendants' claim. [26] Our decision does not countenance acquiescence by public officials in an unfounded claim. As shown by Part I of this opinion, such is not the situation. At least in respect of the land involved in this suit, the public officials could well have concluded that further litigation would be fruitless. From what occurred following the 1912-1929 period we must take it that they did so conclude, and that they intended to abandon the issue now presented. There has emerged a pattern of construction by the parties which tips the scale against the present suit. Plaintiff cannot sustain the burden of proof resting upon it in ejectment. Cf., Deponte v. Ulupalakua Ranch, 48 Haw. 17, 395 P.2d 273, rehearing denied, 48 Haw. 149, 396 P.2d 826.