Opinion ID: 1160486
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Jury's understanding of mitigating circumstances

Text: During the jury's deliberations concerning the appropriate sentence to impose, the jury foreman sent a note to the trial judge requesting a Black's Law or proper definition of mitigating circumstances. Before the judge could respond, however, the jury returned with a verdict imposing four death sentences. The trial judge nevertheless granted a request by the defense, over the State's objections, that the jury be given an instruction answering the jury's question, [31] and be ordered to deliberate again. Five to ten minutes later, the jury again returned a verdict imposing four death sentences. Evans maintains that even though the jury received a definition of mitigating circumstances, it is apparent that they gave that definition no consideration because they returned with the first verdict before receiving their requested definition, and after receiving the requested definition, they returned a verdict after deliberating only long enough to sign the new verdict forms. Evans concludes that the jury could not possibly have given proper consideration to the mitigating evidence he presented because the jury did not understand the meaning of mitigating circumstances. Evans correctly notes that a sentencing body may not nullify or neutralize the weight of mitigating evidence by excluding such evidence from its consideration, Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 490, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 1261, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990), and that the death penalty must not be imposed in an arbitrary or irrational manner, Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321, 111 S.Ct. 731, 739, 112 L.Ed.2d 812 (1991). However, we are persuaded that the jury was properly instructed and that there is no evidence to indicate that the jury ignored the evidence adduced in mitigation. The jury was instructed concerning the mitigating circumstances presented by Evans. Additionally, Penalty Phase Instruction No. 16 provided, in relevant part: The mitigating circumstances which I have read for your consideration are given only as examples of some of the factors you may take into account as reasons for deciding not to impose a sentence of death on the defendant. Any aspect of the defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense, including any desire you may have to extend mercy to the defendant, which a jury believes is a basis for imposing sentence less than death may be considered a mitigating factor. Any one of them may be sufficient, standing alone, to support a decision that death is not the appropriate punishment in this case. (Emphasis added.) Evans never objected to the adequacy of these instructions and we conclude that they were sufficient and proper instructions to the jury on the subject of mitigating circumstances. Moreover, the additional instruction defining mitigating circumstances clarified any possible confusion. This court has always presumed that the jury abided by its duty to read and consider all instructions provided by the trial court. See Lambert v. State, 94 Nev. 68, 70, 574 P.2d 586, 587 (1978). We further reject the argument that the jury failed to consider the mitigating evidence presented by Evans based solely upon the length of the jury's deliberations.