Opinion ID: 1160989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jury instruction on joint venture

Text: The trial court provided the jury with an instruction on joint venture, which stated in pertinent part: You are instructed that a joint venture arises out of, and must have its origin in, a contract, expressed or implied, in which the parties agree to enter into an undertaking for profits in the performance of which they have a common purpose the objects or purpose of which they have a community of interest. The intent to form such a relationship must exist; a joint venture cannot arise by operation of law. However, as to third persons, the legal, and not the actual, intent of the parties controls, and the parties may be estopped in favor of third persons from denying that they are joint venturers, even though they never intended to become such. However, the defendants claim that the instruction on joint venture was improper because it did not properly state the law in Kansas and, therefore, misled the jury as to what actually constitutes a joint venture. The defendants contend that the trial court's instruction on joint venture was so vague and meaningless as to provide no guidance to the jury. Thus, the defendants claim that the jury found a joint venture existed based on an improper instruction. According to the defendants, the proper definition of a joint venture under Kansas law can be found in Modern Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Cinderella Homes, Inc., 226 Kan. at 75-76. See also Flight Concepts Ltd. Partnership v. Boeing Co., 38 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 1994); Southwest Nat'l Bank of Wichita v. ATG Constr. Mgt., Inc., 241 Kan. 257, 260, 736 P.2d 894 (1987). These cases define joint venture and list specific acts or conduct which is indicative of a joint venture. However, the trial court's joint venture jury instruction did not include the acts or conduct which were indicative of a joint venture, as the case law definitions do. The defendants claim that if the instruction had included a list of certain acts or conduct which indicate a joint venture, then the jury would have concluded that these acts did not exist herein and, thus, a joint venture did not exist herein. As such, the defendants assert that if the jury had been properly instructed as to the full definition of a joint venture, then the jury would not have concluded that Capital and Castanuela participated in a joint venture with Creative to defraud the plaintiffs. The trial court took its instruction on joint venture from 15 Am. Jur. Pl. and Pr. Forms (rev.), Joint Venture § 7, and this is a correct statement of law. See 46 Am. Jur.2d, Joint Ventures § 1, cited in Neighbors Construction Co., Inc. v. Seal-Wells Construction Co., Inc., 219 Kan. 382, 385, 548 P.2d 491 (1976). Error cannot be predicated on the refusal to give an instruction when its substance is adequately covered in other instructions. Here, the substance of the factors specified in Modern Air Conditioning were given and they did not need to be specifically listed in the joint venture instruction for the instruction to be proper. See Potts v. Lux, 161 Kan. 217, 222, 166 P.2d 694 (1946). In Potts, this court enumerated various factors which may be considered in determining whether a partnership exists. However, when the PIK committee defined partnership in PIK Civ.2d 7.07, it did not set forth all the various factors which this court had previously approved in Potts for the purpose of determining whether a partnership existed. See Turon State Bank v. Estate of Frampton, 253 Kan. 621, 625, 861 P.2d 117 (1993) (While we do not endorse or recommend the giving of an instruction on the badges or indicia of fraud, we think the determination of whether one should be given should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court based upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. We anticipate that ordinarily a trial court will not need to give such an instruction, but if the court is of the opinion, based upon the evidence and circumstances of the case, that such an instruction is necessary for the guidance of the jury in arriving at a proper verdict, the trial court should not be precluded from giving an instruction on the badges or indicia of fraud.). (Emphasis added.) If the jury instructions, read as a whole, fairly instruct the jury on the law governing the case, are substantially correct, and the jury could not reasonably be misled by them, the instructions will be approved on appeal. In re Application of City of Great Bend for Appointment of Appraisers, 254 Kan. 699, 713, 869 P.2d 587 (1994). The trial court's jury instruction on joint venture was substantially correct and fairly instructed the jury on joint venture law. The trial court herein used its discretion, based upon the facts and circumstances of this particular case, and decided not to include the specific facts indicating a joint venture within its joint venture jury instruction. The trial court decided that based on the evidence and circumstances, such an instruction, including all the specific facts of a joint venture, was not necessary for the guidance of the jury in arriving at a proper verdict. The trial court's decision was not so arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable that no reasonable person would agree with the court. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling. See Smith v. Printup, 262 Kan. 587, 592, 938 P.2d 1261 (1997). This issue fails.