Opinion ID: 1159477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Claims of Error Relating to Denial of Motion for Severance

Text: (7) Baker also moved for a separate trial on the ground that the prosecution would introduce a post-arrest statement by Brawley that implicated Baker. That statement was not introduced at the trial, and any error in denying the motion was not prejudicial. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) (8) Baker further argues that a severance should have been granted because of alleged misconduct by the prosecutor and Brawley's attorney that occurred during the guilt trial. However, the propriety of the denial of a motion for separate trials must, of course, be tested as of the time of the submission of the motion ( People v. Clark, 62 Cal.2d 870, 883 [44 Cal. Rptr. 784, 402 P.2d 856]), and the question of error cannot be determined in the context of subsequent developments at the trial ( People v. Massie, 66 Cal.2d 899, 919 [59 Cal. Rptr. 733, 428 P.2d 698]). Thus the asserted misconduct affords no basis for concluding that the court erred in denying the motion for severance. The claimed misconduct involved statements made at the guilt trial by Brawley's attorney and the prosecutor relating to whether the decedent was ever convicted of a felony. [4] The court instructed the jury that the matter is not material to any of the purposes of this trial here, as they have so far been revealed to us and should not be even discussed by the jury. It must be assumed that the jury followed this instruction. ( People v. Gould, 54 Cal.2d 621, 629 [7 Cal. Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865]; People v. David, 12 Cal.2d 639, 650 [86 P.2d 811].)