Opinion ID: 2810983
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Specificity of the Supreme Court’s Language

Text: The Supreme Court stressed that it was dealing with recall of the mandate when explaining the test to determine whether the Ninth Circuit was acting sua sponte: As a textual matter, § 2244(b) applies only where the court acts pursuant to a prisoner’s “application.” This carries implications for cases where a motion to recall the mandate is pending, but the court instead recalls the mandate on its own initiative. Whether these cases are subject to § 2244(b) depends on the underlying basis of the court’s action. If, in recalling the mandate, the court considers new claims or evidence presented in a successive application for habeas relief, it is proper to regard the court’s action as based on that application. In these cases, § 2244(b)(2) applies irrespective of whether the court characterizes the action as sua sponte. Id. at 554 (emphasis added). Through this language, the Supreme Court took great pains to make clear that the sua sponte action it was testing was recall of a mandate, as opposed to something else. The specificity of this 7 language in the first section, combined with the disclaimer in the second section, suggest that the Supreme Court was limiting its interpretive rule to the recall of a mandate. 2. Distinctions Between the Issue in Calderon and this Case This limitation is imperative here, for the Supreme Court had powerful reasons to distinguish between (1) all courts’ ability to sua sponte invoke fraud on the court (which is at issue here) and (2) an appellate court’s desire to recall its mandate (which was at issue in Calderon). The majority points out that when a court is defrauded, the judgment never becomes final. See Maj. Op. at 16 (stating that courts have historically enjoyed the power to invoke fraud on the court because judgments procured through fraud had never become final); see also Kenner v. Comm’r, 387 F.2d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 1968) (“We think . . . that it can be reasoned that a decision produced by fraud on the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final.”). Because the judgment never became final, the court can act through its jurisdiction over the original proceeding. Otherwise, the case would continue in perpetuity. In contrast, an appellate court transfers jurisdiction to the district court by issuing a mandate. See In re Sunset Sales, Inc., 195 F.3d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, when a court recalls its mandate sua 8 sponte, it impinges on the finality of the judgment and its relationship to another court in a way that is absent when a court merely invokes its fraud-on-the-court power sua sponte to continue proceedings that had never terminated. This difference accounts for the Supreme Court’s effort to determine whether the Ninth Circuit was acting on the first habeas petition or the second habeas petition. The determination took on importance under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act because the first round of habeas proceedings had already terminated. Here, we are attempting to determine whether the district court was acting in the original criminal case or the sixth round of federal postconviction proceedings. As the majority acknowledges, if the original criminal proceedings had been tainted by a fraud on the court, those proceedings were never terminated. See Maj. Op. at 16 (stating that when there is a fraud on the court, the judgment never became final). Surely the district court had the power to determine whether the original criminal case had ever ended. Because a fraud on the court prevents termination of the tainted proceedings, no court has ever applied the statutory provisions governing second-or-successive petitions to a judge’s power to remedy a fraud on the court. See Gonzales v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corrs., 366 F.3d 1253, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that in Calderon, the Supreme Court recognized 9 that a mandate in a habeas case can be recalled when there was a fraud on the court, creating a question about the legitimacy of the judgment); see also Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1193-94 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act is designed to protect against judicial abuse by the petitioner, not the State’s perpetration of a fraud on the court). In my view, Congress has given little indication of an intent to restrict the established power of a court to act sua sponte to address fraud on the court. In the absence of congressional repeal of this power, a district court continues to enjoy the necessary power to address fraud on itself―regardless of whether the petitioner files a second-or-successive motion to vacate the judgment. II. The District Court’s Characterization of its Action Having concluded that a court may invoke fraud on the court sua sponte even after the filing of a motion, the resulting issue is whether the district court exercised that power. The majority acknowledges that the district court said it was acting sua sponte. Maj. Op. at 24 (“Here, the district court claimed it acted sua sponte to correct a fraud on the court.”). I would abide by the district court’s characterization of its action. Mr. Williams pleaded guilty to federal criminal charges and filed multiple post-conviction motions. His sixth motion, styled as a motion to withdraw and nullify his guilty plea, led to the district court’s concern 10 about a fraud on the court. Ultimately, however, the court invoked its fraud-on-the-court power sua sponte rather than in response to Mr. Williams’ motion. Initially, the district court did not believe Mr. Williams’ motion would be considered second-or-successive based on his allegations of a fraud on the court. See Appellant’s App., vol. II, at 359 (“[B]ecause Defendant seeks relief based on a fraud upon the court claim, it is distinct from a habeas petition and is not governed by [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act].”). As a result, the court allowed the case to proceed. But during the proceedings, the court changed its approach based on a newly issued opinion in our court: United States v. Baker, 718 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2013). There we held that “a motion alleging fraud on the court in a defendant’s criminal proceeding must be considered a secondor-successive collateral attack because it asserts or reasserts a challenge to the defendant’s underlying conviction.” Baker, 718 F.3d at 1207. The district court correctly interpreted Baker to foreclose consideration of Mr. Williams’ motion unless we were to authorize a second-or-successive motion under § 2255. Appellant’s App., vol. II, at 383 n.5. Instead of continuing with the approach now forbidden by Baker, the district court initiated consideration of the issue under its authority to invoke fraud on the court sua sponte. In doing so, the district court distinguished its order from the one in Baker, stating in footnote five: 11 “The instant case is distinguishable due to the fact it is the Court, not the defendant, that has invoked its inherent authority and has construed Williams’ Motion to Withdraw and Nullify Guilty Plea as a fraud on the court motion.” Id. 1 Nothing in the district court’s analysis is inconsistent with a sua sponte invocation of fraud on the court. Thus, I would conclude that the court invoked fraud on the court sua sponte, as it had the authority to do.