Opinion ID: 2634741
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: common authority where a cohabitant is present

Text: ¶ 17 The State argues that Dangle had common authority to consent to a search of the premises and that when they came upon Morse, the police officers had no duty to obtain his consent. The State argues that it was Morse's affirmative duty to explicitly object to the search. It is essentially the State's position that Morse was not present in his own apartment until police found him. While such a suggestion may make sense from the perspective of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement, simply inquiring into whether a police officer's subjective beliefs are reasonable is not sufficient under article I, section 7. ¶ 18 We have been quite explicit that under our constitution, the burden is on the police to obtain consent from a person whose property they seek to search. In obtaining that consent, police are required to tell the person from whom they are seeking consent that they may refuse to consent, revoke consent, or limit the scope of consent. State v. Ferrier, 136 Wash.2d 103, 116, 960 P.2d 927 (1998). We have never held that a cohabitant with common authority can give consent that is binding upon another cohabitant with equal or greater control over the premises when the nonconsenting cohabitant is actually present on the premises. We have never held that a person is not present in her home unless and until the police come upon her. We decline to do so now. ¶ 19 In Leach, we held that where the police have obtained consent to search from an individual possessing, at best, equal control over the premises, that consent remains valid against a cohabitant, who also possesses equal control, only while the cohabitant is absent. Leach 113 Wash.2d at 744, 782 P.2d 1035. In Walker, Mrs. Ellen Walker consented to a search of her home. Before the search began, however, Mr. Gus Walker, Mrs. Walker's husband, arrived. The police failed to obtain Mr. Walker's consent to search and he did not affirmatively object to the search. Contraband was found in the couple's bedroom. Only Mrs. Walker was convicted and she argued, relying on Leach, that without her husband's consent, the search was invalid as against her. While we rejected her argument, we concluded the following about Leach: It follows from [ Leach ] that because Ellen and Gus were cohabitants and both present during the search, Ellen's consent to the search was invalid as to Gus. Walker, 136 Wash.2d at 684, 965 P.2d 1079. ¶ 20 In the case before us, Morse was the sole signatory on the lease and the sole tenant in the apartment searched. As guests in Morse's apartment for five days, Dangel and her husband had limited control and, therefore, limited authority over that portion of the apartment they shared with Morse. The record, however, is unclear as to the precise scope of their authority. There is certainly insufficient evidence in the record to support a conclusion that the Dangels shared control over Morse's bedroom. Moreover, since Morse was at all times present in his apartment, [4] the State must prove that Dangel had greater authority over the areas of the premises searched in order to consent to a search that would bind Morse. We hold that the State has failed to meet its burden and that Dangel's consent to search was ineffective as to Morse. Since there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction without the fruits of the unlawful search we reverse Morse's conviction.