Opinion ID: 1096694
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the chancellor erred in failing to give any consideration to the woodells' determination of what was in the best interest of the child.

Text: ¶ 21. The Woodells argue that the chancellor did not give sufficient consideration as to their opinion of what is in the best interest of Shelby. The majority of their argument relies on Troxel and Stacy for the proposition that the custodial parents are in the best position to determine what is in the best interest of their child, therefore, they that contend great deference should be given to their opinion in this regard and some finding with regard to their fitness as a parent must be shown in order for visitation to be granted. ¶ 22. At the onset, it must be noted that Section 93-16-3(2)(b) requires the trial court in determining whether grandparents visitation should be granted to assess whether visitation rights of the grandparent with the child would be in the best interest of the child. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-16-3(2)(b). There is no language in the statute suggesting that the custodial parent's opinion with regard to what is in the best interest of the child is to receive some sort of deference or that findings as to the fitness of a parent are to be made. However, under applicable case law, we find that deference is afforded to the opinion of a natural parent involved in a visitation dispute under this nature. ¶ 23. Returning to the Woodells' arguments with regard to Troxel and Stacy a full reading of the applicable case law leads to the conclusion that neither case stands for the proposition that adoptive parents under the present circumstances receive deference with regards to their opinion that visitation would not be in the best interest of the child or that the custodial parent must be found to be unfit before visitation is proper. These cases and their holdings do not support the arguments made by the Woodells. ¶ 24. In Troxel, the paternal grandparents sought visitation from the natural mother of the child. 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054. The Troxels were the parents of Brad Troxel and the paternal grandparents of Isabelle and Natalie Troxel. Id. at 60, 120 S.Ct. at 2057. After the death of their son, the Troxels continued to have regular visitation with the children. Id. Sometime thereafter, Tommie Troxel, the children's mother, explained to the Troxels that she wanted to limit their visitation. Id. at 61, 120 S.Ct. at 2057. The Troxels then commenced suit seeking grandparents visitation under a Washington Statute. Id. After a lengthy court battle, the case came before the United States Supreme Court on review. Id. at 61-63, 120 S.Ct. at 2057-59. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Washington Supreme Court's holding that the Washington statute allowing for grandparents' visitation was unconstitutional. Id. at 63, 120 S.Ct. at 2058-59. In so finding, the Court placed much emphasis on the fundamental liberty interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children. Id. at 65, 120 S.Ct. at 2060. ¶ 25. In Stacy, the maternal grandparents sought visitation from the natural parents of the child. 798 So.2d 1275. The Rosses were the parents of Sandy Stacy (Stacys) and the maternal grandparents of Kevin Stacy (Kevin). Id. at 1276. We reversed the trial court's grant of unsupervised visitation and overnight visits in favor of the Rosses. Id. at 1284. However, our finding was primarily based on the following: 1. The Stacys were the natural parents of Kevin; 2. The Stacys stipulated from the onset of the lawsuit that the Rosses have a viable relationship with Kevin and they did not intend to permanently deny visitation to them; 3. The Stacys conceded that they were willing to work with the Rosses and afford them some visitation with Kevin; and 4. The Stacys as natural parents enjoy a presumption in their favor as to their judgments with regards to how much time is appropriate for Kevin to spend with his grandparents. Id. at 1279-82. ¶ 26. The most compelling differences between the cases presented above and the present case are the facts and circumstances surrounding the relationships among the parties. Unlike the parent defendants above, the Woodells are not the natural parents of Shelby. They are the adoptive parents of Shelby. Unlike the cases above, at least one of the natural parents of Shelby are still involved in her life and have maintained visitation with her throughout her life. In fact, Shelby calls her biological mother mom; her biological father dad; and her maternal and paternal grandparents grandma and grandpa. Shelby does not refer to Mrs. Woodell as mom, because Shelby knows that her real mother is Laura; just as she knows that her grandparents are the Parkers. Unlike the natural parents in the cases above, the Woodells have completely and totally denied the Parkers visitation. Even in Troxel and Stacy, the natural parents conceded to affording the grandparents visitation and only wished to limit visitation; not like the Woodells who have chosen to deny visitation in its entirety. ¶ 27. Although we have deferred to the opinions and judgments of natural parents when it concerns the amount of visitation to be afforded grandparents, we have not provided that custodial adoptive grandparents, such as the Woodells, should be afforded the same presumptions under the grandparents' visitation rights statutes. Despite the fact that the Woodells are the adoptive parents of Shelby, Shelby is not being misled to believe that they are her natural parents. Shelby is aware that they are her maternal grandparents, that Andy is her father, that Laura is her mother and that the Parkers are her paternal grandparents. Under the circumstances, the Woodells may be custodial parents by way of adoption, but they are not Shelby's natural parents. Any deference that may be afforded the Woodells cannot necessarily be said to supersede the findings of the chancellor that it is in the best interest of Shelby to remain in close contact with her paternal grandparents. ¶ 28. In Martin, this Court stated that the best interest of the child must be the polestar consideration. 693 So.2d at 916. We also found that [t]he visitation should be less than that which would be awarded to a non-custodial parent, unless the circumstances overwhelming dictate that the amount of visitation is in the best interest of the child, and it would be harmful to the child not to grant it. Id. Then, we provided a list of ten factors to be used in determining grandparent visitation: 1. The amount of disruption that extensive visitation will have on the child's life. This includes disruption of school activities, summer activities, as well as any disruption that might take place between the natural parent and the child as a result of the child being away from home for extensive lengths of time. 2. The suitability of the grandparents' home with respect to the amount of supervision received by the child. 3. The age of the child. 4. The age, and physical and mental health of the grandparents. 5. The emotional ties between the grandparents and the grandchild. 6. The moral fitness of the grandparents. 7. The distance of the grandparents' home from the child's home. 8. Any undermining of the parent's general discipline of the child. 9. Employment of the grandparents and the responsibilities associated with that employment. 10. The willingness of the grandparents to accept that the rearing of the child is the responsibility of the parent, and that the parent's manner of child rearing is not to be interfered with by the grandparents. Id. ¶ 29. In assessing and determining the visitation rights of the Parkers the chancellor used the above enumerated factors and made specific findings of fact with regard to each. In fact, the Woodells do not contest these findings but merely assert that visitation is not in the best interest of Shelby and is excessive. The chancellor's findings with regard to each factor were as follows: (1) Visitation will not unduly disrupt Shelby's life. Currently, Shelby has nightly visitation with Laura, her biological mother, but still her legal sister. Periodic visitation by the grandparents would not be near this disruptive. The Woodells offered no other complexities, other than general family life, that would be burdened by visitation. (2) The Parker home is suitable. The Parkers have a home, 70 acres, with other children and some of their nine grandchildren nearby. There are guns in the home (as in probably most Mississippi homes), but they are antiques and locked safely away. Mrs. Parker is primarily a homemaker. (3) Shelby is six. Her age poses no problem for the Parkers. (4) The Parkers are in their 50's and have good physical and mental health. The Court is not concerned with Mrs. Parker's medication for depression based on hormonal changes. (5) The Court did not hear from Shelby, but the grandparents are attached to her. Cards from Shelby, even if written by Laura, indicate a relationship. (6) There was no question presented as to moral fitness. (7) The Parkers live within 15 miles of the Woodells. (8) There is no evidence that the Parkers would undermine or interfere with the general discipline of the child; whereas, the Parkers indicate a willingness to work with the Woodells. (9) Mr. Parker is a self employed plumber. Mrs. Parker is primarily a homemaker. (10) The Parkers' demeanor, as displayed from the stand, indicates that contact with them and Shelby would be in the child's best interest. The Woodells seem intent on limiting contact with the Parkers and Andy, while allowing extensive contact with Laura; further, this appears more of an emotional repose to the deterioration of the relationship of the biological parents than something based on a definitive problem with the Parkers. Thus, the chancellor did in fact properly analyze the facts presented under the Martin factors. His findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and should not be disturbed unless manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous neither of which apply here. See Hollingsworth, 609 So.2d at 424.