Opinion ID: 1578000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of Iowa Code Section 598.35(3).

Text: This case presents our third opportunity to consider the constitutionality of Iowa's grandparent visitation statute. However, only the facts of this case distinguish it from our considerations of the statute in Santi and Howard. Importantly, no alterations have been made to the statute itselfit remains in the same form as it was in both of our prior cases. Perhaps not surprisingly, we conclude that the same fundamental flaws found fatal to subsections (1) and (7) of the statute also doom subsection (3). The overarching principle in our analyses of the grandparent visitation statute is that a parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of [his] children is `perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by' the United States Supreme Court. Santi, 633 N.W.2d at 317 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060, 147 L.Ed.2d 49, 56 (2000)). We were guided by this principle in resolving Santi and we reconfirmed it in Howard, where we clarified that the parental interest is not lessened by the marital status of [an] otherwise fit [parent]. Howard, 661 N.W.2d at 188. This means the state has no lesser standard for intervention in a case such as this one, in which one spouse has outlived the other spouse. [1] Id. For this reason, we apply strict scrutiny constitutional analysis to Iowa Code section 598.35(3) just as we applied it in our examinations of subsections (1) and (7). See id. at 188-89; Santi, 633 N.W.2d at 318. This analysis requires that any infringement by the state ... be `narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.' Howard, 661 N.W.2d at 188 (citations omitted). The grandparent visitation statute has three elemental requirements that must be satisfied before visitation is granted: (1) the petition for visitation must be based on one of seven situations related to the family structure, (2) the decision to award visitation must be in the best interests of the child(ren), and (3) a substantial relationship must exist between the grandparent(s) and grandchild(ren) before the filing of the petition. See Iowa Code § 598.35(3). In Howard, we examined each of these three requirements to determine whether any of them supported a compelling state interest. 661 N.W.2d at 191. We determined that both the situational and best interests elements failed to provide the necessary compelling state interest. See id. Yet, we also noted that the last elementa substantial relationshiprevealed some legislative concern with protecting children from substantial emotional harm, a type of standard other jurisdictions have imposed in considering grandparent visitation. Id. It is unnecessary to analyze this case under the compelling state interest prong of the strict scrutiny test because the visitation statute clearly is not narrowly drawn. Nevertheless, a compelling state interest analysis in this case would very likely reach the same conclusions reached in Howard, even though this petition for grandparent visitation arises under a different subsection of the statute. As previously noted, the parental interest is not lessened by the marital status of [an] otherwise fit [parent]. Id. at 188. There have been no allegations that John is unfit, and there is no indication in the record that such an allegation, if made, could be established. This core fact alone undermines any potential finding of a compelling state interest in this case. In Howard, we ultimately concluded that Iowa Code section 598.35(1) was unconstitutional because the three requirements utilized by the statute to permit grandparent visitation to take place over the objection of a parent fail to impose the essential limitations demanded by Troxel to narrowly serve the compelling interest to intervene and to safeguard against unwarranted intrusions into the decisions of fit parents. Id. at 191. We determined that that statute was deficient in three particulars: on its face [it] not only fails to recognize the degree of harm or potential harm to the child needed to support state intervention, but it fails `to require a threshold finding of parental unfitness' and fails to require the court to consider a parent's objections to allowing visitation. Id. at 192 (citation omitted). Thus, for the same reasons identified in Santi, the statute fail[ed] to comport with the Due Process Clause on its face because these provisions must be a part of any grandparent visitation statute under our Due Process Clause. Id. at 191-92. Iowa Code section 598.35(3) is similarly deficient. For this reason, it too fails to comport with the Due Process Clause on its face, making it unconstitutional. Id. at 191. The district court correctly determined that the statute was unconstitutional and rightly denied Arnie and Lucy's visitation petition.