Opinion ID: 1469269
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disability Discrimination Under the Human Rights Act

Text: In order to establish a prima facie case under the DCHRA, Grant must show that she has a disability and that a reasonable accommodation could have been made by Hecht's for that disability. See American Univ. v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Human Rights, 598 A.2d 416, 422 (D.C. 1991). The DCHRA defines a disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual having a record of such an impairment or being regarded as having such an impairment. D.C.Code § 2-1401.02(5A) (2001), formerly D.C.Code § 1-2502(5A). The definition of disability is substantially similar to the definition found in the ADA and EEOC regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(a). We have considered decisions construing the ADA as persuasive in our decisions construing comparable sections of DCHRA. See, e.g., Howard Univ. v. Green, 652 A.2d 41, 45 (D.C.1994); Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, 631 A.2d 354, 367-68 (D.C.1993); Lyles v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 572 A.2d 81, 82-3 (D.C.1990). A major life activity is defined as functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. Croley v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 759 A.2d 682, 700 n. 18 (D.C.2000) (citing EEOC regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)). The substantial limits language requires an individual that has a disability to be significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity ... Id. at 700 n. 17 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). Grant contends that she was denied reasonable accommodations by her employer Hecht's. However, she does not address directly how her insulin dependent diabetic condition is a disability under the DCHRA. Grant asserts that absent taking the proper amount of insulin, [she] could lose her sight, suffer kidney damage, and die. Hecht's argues that Grant's diabetic condition is controlled fully by medication; therefore, her condition does not substantially limit any of her major life activities, which is a requirement to have a qualifying disability. In granting summary judgment on Grant's DCHRA claim, the trial court held that Grant failed to demonstrate that any genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether she had a disability within the meaning of the DCHRA. In view of that holding, the trial court was not required to, and did not, consider whether Grant had established that a reasonable accommodation could have been made by Hecht's for her disability. Like the trial court, we turn our attention to the issue: did Grant have a disability within the meaning of the DCHRA. The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of whether mitigating factors are considered in determining disability. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). In Sutton, the Supreme Court found that [a] person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by mitigating measures still has an impairment, but if the impairment is corrected it does not `substantially limit' a major life activity. Id. at 483, 119 S.Ct. 2139. [1] See also Croley, supra, 759 A.2d at 701 (where we discussed the rationale of Sutton ). The Supreme Court in Sutton noted that if mitigation was not considered it would... force [courts and employers] to make a disability determination based on general information about how an uncorrected impairment usually affects individuals, rather than on the individual's actual condition. Sutton, supra, 527 U.S. at 483, 119 S.Ct. 2139. As an example the Supreme Court described the case of a diabetic taking insulin. If the mitigating measures were ignored all diabetics [would be found] to be disabled, because if they failed to monitor their blood sugar levels and administer insulin, they would almost certainly be substantially limited in one or more major life activities. Id. See also Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 520, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999) (applying the rationale of Sutton to conclude that petitioner is not `disabled,' as the mediating factormedicationis taken into consideration when assessing whether petitioner is substantially limited in any major life activity). In her deposition, Grant stated that while on insulin for diabetes she felt pretty good, could take care of herself, and did not have problems with her vision or walking. While Grant has a physical impairmentdiabetesher impairment is mitigated by insulin use. When taking insulin Grant is not substantially limited in any major life activities. Mitigating measures, specifically insulin use, are taken into account when considering whether an individual has a disability under the DCHRA. The trial court did not err in concluding no disability and thus granting summary judgment on the disability/accommodation claim.