Opinion ID: 2304290
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Valid Judgment

Text: [¶ 17] Thompson's final argument is that the default assessments are void because the Assessor acted beyond its authority by assessing taxes against Thompson, who claims that he was not a resident individual of Maine during the years at issue. [7]
[¶ 18] Based on the current state of the record in this summary judgment proceeding, a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to Thompson's residency for years 1997-1999. Although Thompson's swearing that he was a Maine resident in 1996 when registering to vote, and the lack of any record of his payment of Pennsylvania income taxes during the years in question may make his claim of Pennsylvania residency difficult to prove, those difficulties of proof of contested facts do not justify summary judgment. Even when one parry's version of the facts appears more credible and persuasive to the summary judgment court, a summary judgment is inappropriate if a genuine factual dispute exists that is material to the outcome. Arrow Fastener Co., Inc. v. Wrabacon, Inc., 2007 ME 34, ¶ 17, 917 A.2d 123, 126. Summary judgment is not a substitute for trial. Id. ¶ 18, 917 A.2d at 127. [¶ 19] Although, based on the record, Thompson has sufficient minimum contacts with the State to establish personal jurisdiction, it does not necessarily follow that the Assessor had authority to tax Thompson's income. [8] Taxation of the income of a non-resident, earned outside of Maine, is constitutionally beyond this State's reach. See Barney v. State Tax Assessor, 490 A.2d 223, 225 (Me.1985); see also Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 49-52, 40 S.Ct. 221, 64 L.Ed. 445 (1920). [9] If the Assessor acts outside of its taxing authority, its actions are void and subject to collateral attack. See Sold, Inc. v. Town of Gorham, 2005 ME 24, ¶ 12, 868 A.2d 172, 176 (Subject to equitable defenses . . . a governmental action may be challenged at any time, as ultra vires, when the action itself is beyond the jurisdiction or authority of the administrative body to act.). [¶ 20] Thompson did not waive his argument that the Assessor acted outside of its authority by failing to assert it earlier, as the Assessor cannot, by virtue of a person's failure to assert non-residency, enter final default assessments against a person who was beyond its constitutional and statutory reach. Although personal jurisdiction is not an issue in this case, we liken our holding that Thompson did not waive his lack of residency argument to our previous determinations that a failure to assert lack of personal jurisdiction does not waive the issue, and that even a default judgment entered without personal jurisdiction may be collaterally attacked. See Architectural Woodcraft Co. v. Read, 464 A.2d 210, 212 (Me.1983); Lewien v. Cohen, 432 A.2d 800, 805 (Me.1981) (Without personal jurisdiction, any judgment entered by such a court is void and . . . should not be given res judicata effect.). [¶ 21] The parties' statements of material facts indicate a factual dispute about Thompson's residency for years 1997-1999. Thompson asserts that he paid Pennsylvania income taxes, voted in Pennsylvania, and spent fewer than 183 days in Maine during those years. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Thompson, as we are required to do, he may not have been a resident individual during the years in question. If Thompson was not a resident individual, the Assessor acted beyond its authority in entering final assessments against him, and the default assessments would be void and could not have res judicata effect. Because there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to residency for 1997-1999, the court erred in entering summary judgment and Thompson must be allowed a fact-finding hearing regarding residency for those years.
[¶ 22] The record shows that Thompson registered to vote in Maine in 1996 and swore an oath that he was, at that time, a resident of Maine. [10] He cannot now claim that he was not a resident in 1996, because a party to a summary judgment proceeding cannot create a dispute as to a material fact by making an assertion contrary to a fact stated in that party's prior sworn statement. See Schindler v. Nilsen, 2001 ME 58, ¶ 9, 770 A.2d 638, 641-42; Zip Lube, Inc. v. Coastal Sav. Bank, 1998 ME 81, ¶ 10, 709 A.2d 733, 735. Therefore, the final assessment for 1996 does have res judicata effect, and Thompson may not now collaterally attack that assessment by asserting that he was not a Maine resident in 1996.