Opinion ID: 2257779
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendant's Pretrial Absence

Text: Defendant argues that his absence from a pretrial hearing, in which the court addressed six of his motions, constitutes reversible error. On December 1, 1994, the court held a hearing on six motions, the purpose of which was to close pretrial proceedings to the press; to declare the death penalty in violation of international law; to dismiss the capital counts of the indictment due to the alleged inadequacy of facts and instructions presented to the grand jury; to exclude the victims' relatives from the courtroom; to exclude Chrostowski from the courtroom; and to sever the counts pertaining to the incident with Chrostowski. Due to an administrative error, the authorities did not transport defendant from the Monmouth County Jail to the courthouse. Defendant was temporarily incarcerated in the Monmouth County Jail rather than the Burlington County Jail. His name was omitted from a computer printout of defendants scheduled to appear in court. Defense counsel objected to holding the hearing in defendant's absence and requested an adjournment. At the hearing, eight attorneys, including two representing Bryant, two representing defendant, two representing the State, and two representing several newspapers were present. The court denied the motion for adjournment because of difficulty in rescheduling a hearing and because the motions dealt with questions of law. Defendant appeals from only one of the rulings, the decision not to sever the counts relating to the Chrostowski stabbing. Generally speaking, criminal defendants, particularly those charged with a capital offense, should be present during court proceedings. Indeed, after the hearing on the subject motion, this Court amended Rule 3:16 to provide: The defendant must be present for every scheduled event unless excused by the court for good cause shown. R. 3:16(a). Here, however, we hold that the trial court did not commit reversible error in proceeding with the pretrial motions in defendant's absence. Because the motions centered on questions of law, defendant's presence was not constitutionally required. State v. Auld, 2 N.J. 426, 433, 67 A. 2d 175 (1949). The traditional justifications underlying defendant's right to be present, specifically the right to assist counsel in his defense, to assist in the cross-examination of witnesses, and to influence the jury psychologically by his presence, see Hudson, supra, 119 N.J. at 172, 574 A. 2d 434, were absent. See Kentucky v. Stincer, supra, 482 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. at 2667, 96 L.Ed. 2d at 647 (holding Confrontation Clause not violated when defendant's absence does not deprive him of opportunity to cross-examine witnesses effectively); Snyder, supra, 291 U.S. at 106-07, 54 S.Ct. at 332, 78 L.Ed. at 678 (holding defendant's presence not required when useless or of no tangible benefit); State v. Hammond, 231 N.J. Super. 535, 541, 555 A. 2d 1169 (App.Div. 1989) (finding no error in defendant's involuntary absence during jury charge).