Opinion ID: 773251
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Standard of Review and Burden Shifting Framework.

Text: 39 Summary judgment rulings are reviewed de novo, see Mulero-Rodriguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d 670, 672 (1st Cir. 1996), after considering the record evidence in the light most favorable to, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Feliciano De La Cruz v. El Conquistador Resort & Country Club, 218 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000). The summary judgment ruling is to be upheld provided the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Moreover, [e]ven in employment discrimination cases where elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, this standard compels summary judgment if the non-moving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation. Feliciano, 218 F.3d at 5 (quoting Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 40 Where, as here, no direct evidence of discrimination was proffered by the plaintiff, we apply the McDonnell Douglas - Burdine - Hicks burden-shifting analysis to the Title VII and Section 1981 claims. See Conward v. Cambridge Sch. Comm., 171 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1999). Under that familiar regimen the plaintiff must carry the initial burden . . . of establishing a prima facie case of . . . discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 41 In employment discrimination cases, the plaintiff must make a prima facie 42 . . . showing that: (1) [she] is a member of a protected class; (2) [her] employer took an adverse employment action against [her]; (3) [she] was qualified for the employment [s]he held; and (4) [her] position remained open or was filled by a person whose qualifications were similar to [hers]. 43 Rodriguez-Cuervos v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 181 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Conward, 171 F.3d at 19)). 44 We shall assume, without deciding, that Straughn proffered sufficient competent evidence to establish prima facie claims based on race and gender discrimination. At that point it became necessary for Delta to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action[,] id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Shorette v. Rite Aid of Maine, Inc., 155 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1998)), by identifying enough admissible evidence to support a [rational] finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action. Feliciano, 218 F.3d at 5-6 (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507) (internal quotation marks omitted). 45 Delta proffered competent evidence that Straughn was dismissed due to her dishonesty in repeatedly attempting to mislead a supervisor regarding her wrongful retention of workers' compensation benefits in violation of Delta policy. Richard Ealey, the Delta official ultimately responsible for the dismissal action, attested that though there had been other instances in which Delta employees had not spontaneously surrendered workers' compensation checks in similar circumstances, he was not aware of any situation where the individual denied [having received such checks] when questioned. 46 Where, as here, the employer proffers a nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the reason . . . was 'a coverup' for a 'discriminatory decision.' Id. at 6 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805). At that point, Straughn's burden of producing evidence to rebut the stated reason for [Delta's] employment action merge[d] with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she [was] the victim of intentional discrimination. Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Straughn failed to generate a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether she was discharged due to either her race or gender. 47