Opinion ID: 1657126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Barlett's Verdict Director

Text: The verdict director offered by Barlett on the Railroad's liability submitted four alternative claims of negligence in the disjunctive: 1) the Railroad operated the train at an excessive speed; 2) the Railroad failed to sound an adequate and timely warning; 3) the Railroad failed to maintain the right-of-way clear of vegetation; and 4) the flashing lights were not operating, and the Railroad failed to stop or slow down. The Railroad claims there was insufficient evidence on all these submissions except the second, failure to sound a warning. The Railroad also asserts federal preemption.
The Railroad claims that the common law claim of excessive speed is preempted by federal law, citing 45 U.S.C. § 434, and 49 C.F.R. § 213.9. The United States Supreme Court recently ruled that, while some state claims based on dangerous conditions at crossings are allowed, federal law preempts state common law claims based on excessive speed. CSX Transportation, Inc., v. Easterwood, ___ U.S. ___, ___ _ ___, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 1738-44, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). Thus, while a railroad may be liable for failure to remedy unsafe conditions, it may not be liable for traveling at an unsafe speed in areas with such conditions. To the extent that Barlett's allegation is that the Railroad had a common law duty not to speed, he fails to state a claim. While the parties dispute whether this point was preserved at trial, this dispute is irrelevant because failure to state a claim can be raised for the first time on appeal. Rule 55.27(g)(2).
The Railroad argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the submissibility of the claims based on: 1) vegetation; 2) the failure of the flashing lights; and 3) the excessive speed. In reviewing submissibility, this Court takes the evidence in the light most favorable to the party submitting the instruction, and makes all reasonable inferences in support of that party. Oldaker v. Peters, 817 S.W.2d 245, 251-52 (Mo. banc 1991); Delisi v. St. Luke's EpiscopalPresbyterian Hospital, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 170, 173 (Mo. App.1985).
The Railroad argues that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that the vegetationa line of trees parallel to the trackobstructed the view of plaintiff Barlett. The evidence is clearly sufficient. Photographs demonstrated that a driver will not see a train approaching the crossing until the driver passes the line of trees. The driver of the car behind Barlett testified that her view was obstructed. The Railroad engineer testified that he could not see Barlett's car until it passed the trees. From these facts, a jury could reasonably infer that the vegetation obstructed Barlett's vision. The Railroad also argues that the instruction was contrary to Barlett's trial theory. While at times Barlett focused on the engineer's point-of-view, this focus was not exclusive. The verdict director on vegetation was not inconsistent with Barlett's trial theory. In addition, the Railroad did not raise this objection in its motion for new trial or at trial. Therefore, it is not preserved for review. Rule 70.03.
The Railroad contends that the evidence was insufficient to show its knowledge that the lights were not working, or to prove causation. Several witnesses testified that they neither saw the lights flashing nor heard the bells ringing. Extensive testimony demonstrated that the train crew had a duty to be on the lookout for the lights, or that the crew actually did look at the lights. From this testimony, the jury could have believed that the lights were not flashing, and that the crew knew or should have known this fact. In arguing causation, the Railroad misinterprets the theory behind this submission. The flashing lights are intended to warn drivers that a train is coming. If the lights are not working, then the train has a duty to provide that warning by alternate means, such as lowering its speed so drivers see the train for a longer period of time before the train blocks the entire crossing. As such, the failure to slacken the speed contributed to cause the collision. The decision in Easterwood does not clearly prohibit this submission. Where a specific, individual hazard exists, a train has a duty to slow down or stop. See Easterwood, ___ U.S. at ___ n. 15, 113 S.Ct. at 1743 n. 15. Easterwood does not directly address whether this duty is preempted. Id. The evidence was sufficient to support submission of the failure of the flashing lights.
The Easterwood decision holds that federal law and regulations preempt a common law claim of excessive train speed, which is defined as traveling too quickly given the `time and place.' Easterwood, ___ U.S. at ___ n. 15, 113 S.Ct. at 1743 n. 15. Easterwood did not address whether federal law preempts local speed limits. At trial, the evidence indicated that the train was violating the speed limit of 25 m.p.h. established by a Joplin ordinance. While the Railroad contests the validity of this ordinance, this Court does not need to decide its validity because the evidence does not support causation under any theory. The first potential theory of causation put forth by Barlett in this trial was the mere location rule. The mere location rule would permit finding causation from evidence that the train's speed at a remote point in time caused the train to be at the scene of the accident. See Mullis v. Thompson, 358 Mo. 230, 213 S.W.2d 941, 947 (1948). The mere location rule does not apply to other types of accidents (car and boat), where evidence of speed is only relevant to show the speed immediately before the collision. Hewitt v. City of Kansas City, 761 S.W.2d 679, 680 (Mo.App.1988). This case demonstrates why traditional causation is the better rule. The collision occurred at a relatively busy intersection. In fact, another car was immediately behind Barlett. Thus, if the train had been going slower at a remote point in time, it might well have missed Barlett, but hit the next car. The mere location rule also violates common sense, leaving causation open-ended. The mere location rule theoretically allows evidence of train speed over an infinite number of prior runs. While speed at a remote point in time may be a philosophical cause of a collision, it cannot be a legal cause. The mere location rule cannot be the basis for submitting a claim of violating the speed limit in this, or any future, case. Alternatively, Barlett contends that causation could be proved under the traditional theory of causation. At the ordinance speed limit of 25 m.p.h., a train would block the entire intersection in less than a second after the time it passed the end of the tree line. Thus, if the train were going the speed limit, a driver would have inadequate warning time to avoid an accident. Likewise, no evidence showed that a train could have stopped at that speed in time to avoid this collision. Thus, under the facts of this case, even though a violation of the Joplin speed limit could be shown, it would be impossible to prove causation.