Opinion ID: 1826905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Failure to Challenge a Prospective Juror

Text: Green argues that defense counsel Parker was ineffective for failing to seek to have juror Guiles excused for cause or to peremptorily strike him because of a statement that he made during voir dire that his niece had been murdered three years earlier and for failing to ask follow-up questions. During voir dire, the following exchange took place: The Court: Have any of you been the victim of a crime or has any member of your immediate family been the victim of a crime? . . . . Mr. Guiles: My niece was murdered, but that's not immediate family. The Court: How long ago was that? Mr. Guiles: Three years ago. The Court: Three years ago? Mr. Guiles: (Nods head.) The Court: Where was it? Mr. Guiles: In Naples. The Court: Would you be able to set aside that? Mr. Guiles: Well, it doesn't seem like it's the same kind of thing. The Court: Would you be able to set it aside and not let it affect the case? Mr. Guiles: Yes. We affirm the trial court's denial of this claim because Green fails to meet both prongs of the Strickland standard. First, Green was not prejudiced by Parker's failure to remove Guiles for cause because the trial court inquired whether the murder of Guiles' niece would affect his decision in the case. Guiles said that it would not. Thus, Guiles met the test for juror competency enunciated in Davis v. State, 461 So.2d 67, 70 (Fla.1984) (The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given . . . by the court.). Second, Parker did not render ineffective assistance in failing to ask Guiles more questions, because an allegation that there would have been a basis for a for cause challenge if counsel had followed up during voir dire with more specific questions is speculative. Johnson v. State, 903 So.2d 888, 896 (Fla.2005); Reaves v. State, 826 So.2d 932, 939 (Fla. 2002). Third, Parker's performance was not deficient for failing to exercise a peremptory strike to remove Guiles. At the evidentiary hearing, Parker testified that he was satisfied that juror Guiles would be able to follow the law regarding the weighing of the evidence and separate himself from the fact that his niece had been killed. This decision does not fall outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. See Davis, 461 So.2d at 70.
Next, Green asserts that the trial court erred in denying relief with regard to dog tracking evidence. Specifically, Green argues: (1) that the State withheld impeaching dog track evidence in violation of Brady; (2) that the State affirmatively misled the jury to believe that no such evidence existed in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); (3) that counsel was ineffective for failing to discover and use dog tracking evidence for impeachment purposes; and (4) that counsel was ineffective for failing to retain an expert witness on dog tracking evidence. These claims are both procedurally barred and meritless.