Opinion ID: 2621822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Time Bar Under RCW 10.73.090(1)

Text: Motions for collateral attack, including PRPs, must normally be filed within one year of final judgment: No petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. RCW 10.73.090(1). This petition was filed over five years after the final judgment, and is barred unless it falls under a statutory exception or the conviction is facially invalid. Stoudmire first claims that his petition falls under the exception provided in RCW 10.73.100(6), which allows a claim to be raised at a later date when it is based on a significant change in the law. He supports this with dicta from the previous Stoudmire opinion, wherein this court opined that the community placement issue  appears to fall within RCW 10.73.100(6). Stoudmire, 141 Wash.2d at 346, 5 P.3d 1240 (emphasis added). Stoudmire does not claim that any other statutory exception to the time bar applies. Stoudmire's purported change in the law results from a 1996 case in which this court held that mandatory community placement is a direct consequence of a plea; i.e., a consequence that arises from the guilty plea itself rather than from other proceedings. State v. Ross, 129 Wash.2d 279, 284, 916 P.2d 405 (1996). This court had previously held that a defendant must be informed of all direct consequences of a plea. Id. (citing State v. Barton, 93 Wash.2d 301, 305, 609 P.2d 1353 (1980)). The Ross court therefore applied Barton in holding that a defendant who is not informed of mandatory placement may withdraw his plea. Id. at 280, 916 P.2d 405. One test to determine whether an appellate decision represents a significant change in the law is whether the defendant could have argued this issue before publication of the decision. In re Pers. Restraint of Holmes, 121 Wash.2d 327, 332, 849 P.2d 1221 (1993). One year after Ross was decided, Division Three of the Court of Appeals held that Ross did not constitute a significant change in the law because the opinion merely applied settled case law to new facts. State v. Olivera Avila, 89 Wash.App. 313, 321, 949 P.2d 824 (1997). Stoudmire claims that Olivera-Avila, was poorly reasoned and should be overruled by this court. However, this court has recently had an opportunity to overrule Olivera-Avila but declined to do so. In re Pers. Restraint of Greening, 141 Wash.2d 687, 697, 9 P.3d 206 (2000). The Greening court clarified the meaning of significant change: While litigants have a duty to raise available arguments in a timely fashion and may later be procedurally penalized for failing to do so ... they should not be faulted for having omitted arguments that were essentially unavailable at the time, as occurred here. We hold that where an intervening opinion has effectively overturned a prior appellate decision that was originally determinative of a material issue, the intervening opinion constitutes a significant change in the law for purposes of exemption from procedural bars. Id. at 697, 9 P.3d 206 (footnote omitted). Ross did not effectively overturn a previous appellate decision, and the arguments used in the case were previously available to litigants. We therefore adhere to the holding of Olivera-Avila and hold that Ross does not represent a significant change in the law. Thus, this petition does not fall under the exception in RCW 10.73.100(6).