Opinion ID: 2374905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶ 31] Appellant next contends that there was insufficient evidence to establish his guilt. The elements of aggravated vehicular homicide are identified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-106(b)(i), which reads, in part, as follows: (b) A person is guilty of aggravated homicide by vehicle and shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years, if: (i) While operating or driving a vehicle in violation of W.S. 10-6-103, 31-5-233 or XX-XX-XXX, he causes the death of another person and the violation is the proximate cause of the death. [¶ 32] The vehicular homicide charge in this case was based on a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b) (LexisNexis 2007), which provides: (b) No person shall drive or have actual physical control of any vehicle within this state if the person: (i) Has an alcohol concentration of eight one-hundredths of one percent (0.08%) or more; or (ii) To a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving: (A) Is under the influence of alcohol. Pursuant to these statutes, the State was required to prove that Appellant was intoxicated, that he was driving the vehicle, and that his intoxication was the proximate cause of the victims' deaths. Appellant does not dispute that there was sufficient evidence to establish that he was intoxicated at the time of the crash. Rather, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was driving the truck when it crashed or to establish that his intoxication was the proximate cause of the crash and resulting deaths. [¶ 33] The standard of review for determining whether evidence is sufficient to support a conviction is well-established: In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence..., we examine and accept as true the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences which can be drawn from it. We do not consider conflicting evidence presented by the defendant. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a jury could have reasonably concluded each of the elements of the crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard applies whether the supporting evidence is direct or circumstantial. Martin v. State, 2007 WY 2, ¶ 32, 149 P.3d 707, 715 (Wyo.2007), citing Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 16, 123 P.3d 543, 549 (Wyo.2005). See also, Garay v. State, 2007 WY 130, ¶ 2, 165 P.3d 99, 100 (Wyo.2007). Anderson v. State, 2009 WY 119, ¶ 6, 216 P.3d 1143, 1145 (Wyo.2009). [¶ 34] Because there were no witnesses to the crash, the jury was required to rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that Appellant was driving. Circumstantial evidence is proof of facts or circumstances from which the existence or non-existence of other facts may reasonably be inferred. John Q. Hammons, Inc. v. Poletis, 954 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Wyo.1998). Circumstantial evidence is not evidence of a lower order; the law makes no distinction between the weight to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. at 1357-58. [¶ 35] In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence we do not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence. Smith v. State, 2009 WY 2, ¶ 15, 199 P.3d 1052, 1057 (Wyo.2009). A jury is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence in reaching a conclusion. We have given the following description of a permissible inference: An inference is a process of reasoning by which a fact or proposition is deduced fairly and logically from other facts proven or admitted. An inference is truly evidence. The weight to which it is entitled depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.... Id. (citing Seeley v. State, 959 P.2d 170, 176 (Wyo.1998)). [¶ 36] Accepting all reasonable inferences from the State's evidence, we find that the jury could have reasonably concluded that Appellant was driving at the time of the crash. Excluding the investigating officer's opinion as to the positions of the occupants of the vehicle, there was ample evidence to support the conclusion that Appellant was driving. Witnesses placed the victims in the passenger and back seats of the vehicle and saw Appellant drive away from the bar. The accident occurred precisely within the time frame established by the State, which allowed little or no time for the occupants to adjust their positions. In addition, the fact that there was very little damage to the driver's side of the vehicle, whereas the rest of the truck was destroyed, matches the relatively minor physical harm that Appellant experienced as compared to the victims. We find that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to make the reasonable inference that Appellant was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. [¶ 37] We also find that there was sufficient evidence to establish that Appellant's conduct was the proximate cause of the victims' deaths. In order to establish proximate cause, there must be sufficient evidence that the crash and resulting deaths were the natural and probable consequence of Appellant's wrongful act of driving under the influence to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely operating a vehicle. See Edwards v. State, 2007 WY 146, ¶ 10, 167 P.3d 636, 639 (Wyo.2007); Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1204 (Wyo.1992); Hodgins v. State, 706 P.2d 655, 657 (Wyo.1985). [¶ 38] Appellant argues that the State did not establish proximate cause because it failed to show what caused the truck to leave the road. Appellant suggests many possible events that could have caused the accident, such as an attempt to avoid wildlife in the road, an attempt to avoid an oncoming car, or a vehicle malfunction. However, there was no evidence that any of these events occurred. On the other hand, there was overwhelming evidence that Appellant was driving while intoxicated. [¶ 39] We have previously addressed proximate cause in this context. For example, in Glazier, the appellant and his girlfriend were riding on the appellant's motorcycle while the appellant was intoxicated. The motorcycle skidded as it went around a turn and the crash resulted in the death of the appellant's girlfriend. We found the evidence sufficient to establish proximate cause and explained: In this case, the motorcycle left the highway in broad daylight at a high rate of speed. Appellant was under the influence of alcohol and drugs. This accident resulted. This evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that appellant was incapable of safely driving and that this was the proximate cause of the accident. A reasonable person would foresee that driving a motorcycle while under the influence of impairing substances to such a degree that they are unable to drive safely might cause severe injury or death to themselves or another person. Glazier, 843 P.2d at 1204; see also Allen v. State, 2002 WY 48, ¶ 43, 43 P.3d 551, 566 (Wyo.2002) (One who drinks and drives should reasonably foresee that some among the potential victims of drunken driving will not wear seat belts and that such victims, among others, might be seriously injured in an alcohol-induced collision.); Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 819 (Wyo.1996) (The jury could have reasonably concluded that Appellant was intoxicated, that he drove his vehicle in a reckless manner, and that either or both circumstances were the proximate cause of the victim's death.). [¶ 40] In this case, the prosecution introduced evidence that showed Appellant had a blood-alcohol content of .26% after the crash. The State proved that Appellant was driving the truck when it went off the road and crashed into a tree, and further, that the roads were dry that night and that weather conditions were good. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Appellant's driving under the influence was the proximate cause of the victims' deaths.