Opinion ID: 1771560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: TRAYLOR v. STATE

Text: This Court nearly a century and a half ago defined the abiding standard for determining the admissibility of a confession. Officers are not allowed to delude the suspect as to his or her rights or to exert a coercive influence: To render a confession voluntary and admissible as evidence, the mind of the accused should at the time be free to act, uninfluenced by fear or hope. To exclude it as testimony, it is not necessary that any direct promises or threats be made to the accused. It is sufficient, if the attending circumstances, or declarations of those present, be calculated to delude the prisoner as to this true position, and exert an improper and undue influence over his mind. Simon v. State, 5 Fla. 285, 296 (1853) (emphasis omitted and added). The Court subsequently in Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957 (Fla.1992), set forth a series of guidelines for use in Florida similar to those announced in Miranda  that were designed to ensure the voluntariness of confessions. The Court expressly addressed the right to counsel: Under [article I, section 9, Florida Constitution], if the suspect indicates in any manner that he or she does not want to be interrogated, interrogation must not begin, or, if it has already begun, must immediately stop. If the suspect indicates in any manner that he or she wants the help of a lawyer, interrogation must not begin until a lawyer has been appointed and is present, or, if it has already begun, must immediately stop until a lawyer is present. Once a suspect has requested the help of a lawyer, no state agent can reinitiated interrogation on any offense throughout the period of custody unless the lawyer is present.... Traylor, 596 So.2d 966 (emphasis added). A statement obtained in violation of this proscription cannot be used by the State. Id. The Court in Traylor thus held that if a suspect indicates in any manner that he or she wants the help of a lawyer the interrogation must cease. This proscription necessarily embraces a scenario such as the present, for the defendant here was seeking basic information on which to make an informed decision concerning his right to counsel. No valid societal interest is served by withholding such information. Indeed, both sides can only benefit from disclosure: Disclosure ensures that any subsequent waiver will be knowing and intelligent, and it reaffirms those qualities in a prior waiver. [10] Nondisclosure, on the other hand, is doubly harmful: It exacerbates the inherently coercive atmosphere of the interrogation session, and it places in doubt the knowing and intelligent nature of any waiverwhether prior or subsequent. Accordingly, we hold that if, at any point during custodial interrogation, a suspect asks a clear question concerning his or her rights, the officer must stop the interview and make a good-faith effort to give a simple and straightforward answer. To do otherwisei.e., to give an evasive answer, or to skip over the question, or to override or steamroll the suspectis to actively promote the very coercion that Traylor was intended to dispel. A suspect who has been ignored or overridden concerning a right will be reluctant to exercise that right freely. Once the officer properly answers the question, the officer may then resume the interview (provided of course that the defendant in the meantime has not invoked his or her rights). Any statement obtained in violation of this proscription violates the Florida Constitution and cannot be used by the State. See Traylor, 596 So.2d at 966. In the present case, we conclude that Detective Mink should have made an honest effort to answer Almeida's question concerning his right to counsel. Both Almeida and the State would have benefitted from the dissemination of basic, common sense information concerning this right. Instead, by ignoring the question and continuing the interrogationi.e., by steamrolling the defendantthe officers did two things. First, they exacerbated the inherently coercive atmosphere of the interrogation session. (How could Almeida feel free to exercise his rights when police had just overridden his question concerning those rights?) And second, they placed in doubt the validity of the prior waiver. (How could Almeida have knowingly and intelligently waived his rights earlier if he did not know what good ... an attorney [is] going to do?)