Opinion ID: 853338
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellate Ineffectiveness as to Guilt Phase Claims

Text: Timberlake also argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness for not pursuing an intoxication defense. The postconviction court addressed this as an issue of trial counsel ineffective assistance of counsel and found that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to pursue an intoxication defense because it was inconsistent with Timberlake's principal claim that he was not the shooter. Moreover, there was evidence that Timberlake drank both before and after the shooting, making any conclusions about his intoxication level at the time of the murder highly speculative. Appellate counsel did not raise this issue on appeal. Therefore, this claim is reviewed as a Bieghler type two issue, that is, failure to present an issue. This Court has noted several times the need for a reviewing court to be deferential to appellate counsel on this issue: [T]he reviewing court should be particularly sensitive to the need for separating the wheat from the chaff in appellate advocacy, and should not find deficient performance when counsel's choice of some issues over others was reasonable in light of the facts of the case and the precedent available to counsel when that choice was made. Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d at 194. This Court has approved of the two-part test used by the Seventh Circuit to evaluate these claims: (1) whether the unraised issues are significant and obvious from the face of the record and (2) whether the unraised issues are clearly stronger than the raised issues. Id. (quoting Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir.1986)). Otherwise stated, to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a defendant must show from the information available in the trial record or otherwise known to appellate counsel that appellate counsel failed to present a significant and obvious issue and that this failure cannot be explained by any reasonable strategy. Ben-Yisrayl, 738 N.E.2d at 260-61. Menadue filed a 154-page brief and raised twenty-eight issues. She thoroughly reviewed the record and interviewed trial counsel and other members of Timberlake's legal team before choosing what issues to raise on appeal. She was not deficient for failing to raise this issue because it was neither significant nor carried a reasonable probability of success. Although there was evidence that Timberlake was intoxicated at the time of the murder, he has not established that this defense would have had a reasonable probability of success at trial. Under the law at the time, in order to succeed on a defense of voluntary intoxication, the intoxication had to be so severe as to preclude the defendant's ability to form the requisite mens rea. Ferguson v. State, 594 N.E.2d 790, 792 (Ind.1992). Evidence that the defendant could plan, operate equipment, instruct the behavior of others, carry out acts requiring physical skill, disengage and leave the scene, and find his way to a friend's home seeking aid show that his intoxication was not so great as to relieve him from responsibility for his acts. Id. (citing Hughett v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1015, 1017-18 (Ind.1990)). Here, Timberlake was able to shoot Greene, flee the scene of the crime, and then phone for assistance. There was no reasonable probability that the defense would have succeeded at trial. [6] Timberlake's argument fails for a second reason as well. We think it is clear that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to raise Timberlake's intoxication at the guilt phase. Timberlake's defense was that McElroy did the shooting. Trial counsel's decision not to pursue a voluntary intoxication defense was a reasonable professional decision to avoid seemingly inconsistent defenses. Because trial counsel was not deficient, appellate counsel cannot be deficient for failing to raise this issue.
Timberlake also challenges the handling of State witness Roy Hood. Hood was a passing motorist who claimed to have seen a man fitting Timberlake's description shoot Greene. Before trial, Hood made several inconsistent statements about the incident. At the postconviction relief proceeding, Hood testified that when he saw Greene, he had already been shot. Also, at the postconviction relief hearing, a coworker of Hood's testified that Hood had told specific lies to him and was a liar with a bad reputation in the community. The postconviction court again addressed this issue only in terms of ineffective assistance of trial counsel: [T]rial counsel was intimately familiar with the State's case and witnesses and manyif not allsignificant witnesses were deposed by trial counsel. Petitioner cannot show that trial counsel performed deficiently in this regard. Because appellate counsel did not raise this issue on appeal, it again presents a Bieghler type two issue. Therefore, Timberlake must show from the information available in the trial record or otherwise known to appellate counsel that appellate counsel failed to present a significant and obvious issue and that this failure cannot be explained by any reasonable strategy. Ben-Yisrayl, 738 N.E.2d at 260-61. This issue does not appear to be a significant and obvious one. In any event, it would not have established trial counsel ineffectiveness. Although Hood was not questioned at trial about all the inconsistencies discovered by postconviction investigation, trial counsel did cross-examine Hood on several discrepancies in his statements. As we noted in the direct appeal: As defendant made clear during his cross-examination of Hood, there were inconsistencies. However, the basic points of his testimony remained the same and were corroborated by others. Timberlake, 690 N.E.2d at 253 n. 1. We cannot say that the postconviction evidence unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the postconviction court's on the issue of trial counsel's performance in this respect. Furthermore, Timberlake has not established that appellate counsel was deficient based on the information available to her which did not include information on Hood's reputation for dishonestyat the time of the direct appeal. Because Timberlake has established neither deficient performance nor prejudice on this point at the trial level, this issue was not an obvious one which appellate counsel was deficient for failing to raise.
Timberlake claims that appellate counsel ineffectively raised trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to cross-examine McElroy. Menadue challenged trial counsel's handling of McElroy, Timberlake, 690 N.E.2d at 260, but Timberlake now claims that she was ineffective in her handling of this claim because the postconviction record established that McElroy was under the influence of anti-psychotic drugs, was undergoing counseling, and had been threatened with the death penalty, all of which may have affected his perceptions on the day of the shooting and were not presented in her claim of trial counsel ineffective assistance of counsel. The postconviction court found this claim to be res judicata as to trial counsel ineffective assistance of counsel and did not address it as to appellate ineffective assistance of counsel. This claim asserts a type three Bieghler error. This Court observed that [c]laims of inadequate presentation of certain issues, when such were not deemed waived in the direct appeal, are the most difficult for convicts to advance and reviewing tribunals to support. Bieghler, 690 N.E.2d at 195 (emphasis in original). These claims are reviewed under the highest standards of deference to counsel's performance and relief will be awarded only where the appellate court is confident it would have ruled differently. Id. at 196. We do not believe that Timberlake has established either prong of the Strickland test with respect to this claim. Menadue's failure to include evidence of McElroy's medications in her challenge to trial counsel's handling of his cross-examination does not rise to the level of deficient performance given the role and function of appellate counsel on direct appeal. First, Menadue cannot be measured by information unknown to appellate counsel but later developed after the appeal by post-conviction counsel. Ben-Yisrayl, 738 N.E.2d at 261. Second, McElroy was questioned extensively at trial and at postconviction and his version of events never changed with respect to his identification of Timberlake. Timberlake, 690 N.E.2d at 252 (McElroy did not waver in his identification of defendant as the shooter, nor was his testimony unsupported by other witnesses or circumstantial evidence. The jury was aware of the inconsistencies and was faced with the responsibility of judging the credibility of the witnesses and determining what occurred.). Finally, the record challenging this omission does not establish a reasonable probability that McElroy's perception was clouded. [7] The postconviction evidence therefore does not establish a reasonable probability of a different result. Because Timberlake did not establish trial counsel ineffectiveness on this point, he cannot establish that appellate counsel was ineffective for inadequate presentation of this issue.