Opinion ID: 169762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of the Right to Appeal the Sentence

Text: A defendant may not appeal her sentence if she has waived her appellate rights in an enforceable plea agreement. [1] This Court employs a three-pronged analysis to determine whether to enforce a waiver of appellate rights. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. We examine (1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice. Id.
The plea agreement provides: [T]he defendant waives the right to appeal the sentence imposed in this case except to the extent, if any, the court departs upwards from the applicable sentencing guideline range determined by the court. This waiver encompasses all appellate challenges to the sentence other than those falling within the explicit exception for challenges to upward departures. The District Court sentenced Ms. Smith within the advisory Guidelines range it calculated; it did not depart upward. Thus, Ms. Smith's challenges to the District Court's application of the offense-level adjustments clearly fall within the scope of the waiver. Ms. Smith insists, however, that her appeal falls outside the scope of the waiver because the District Court relied on facts derived from the sentencing hearing to determine the applicability of the offense-level adjustments. According to Ms. Smith, the court should have relied solely on the stipulated facts in the plea agreement  those facts within the scope of the agreement. There is no basis in the law for this argument. A sentencing court may find facts for sentencing purposes by a preponderance of the evidence, see United States v. Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 684-85 (10th Cir.2005), and the plea agreement explicitly provides that [t]he defendant . . . agrees that facts that determine the offense level will be found by the Court at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence and agrees that the Court may consider any reliable evidence, including hearsay.
The defendant bears the burden to demonstrate that her waiver was not knowing and voluntary. United States v. Edgar, 348 F.3d 867, 872-73 (10th Cir. 2003). Under Hahn, this Court looks primarily to two factors to assess the voluntariness of a defendant's waiver. We examine whether the language of the plea agreement states that the defendant entered the plea agreement knowingly and voluntarily. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1324. There is no dispute that this condition is satisfied here. We also look for an adequate Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 colloquy. Id. at 1325. The District Court questioned Ms. Smith extensively at the plea hearing, establishing that she was competent to enter the plea and understood all of the terms of the agreement. The court specifically discussed the waiver of her appellate rights, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(1)(N), and Ms. Smith affirmatively acknowledged that she understood that waiver. Yet Ms. Smith argues that her waiver was not knowing and voluntary because, at the end of the plea hearing, the District Court indicated that she retained her appellate rights. Indeed, after completing the Rule 11 colloquy and accepting Ms. Smith's guilty plea, the court stated: [P]ursuant to Rule 32(j) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant has the right to appeal the sentence. But a district court's statement that a defendant has the right to appeal does not necessarily negate a waiver-of-appeal provision contained in a plea agreement when the defendant enters into that agreement prior to the court's statement. See United States v. Atterberry, 144 F.3d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir.1998) (explaining that a district court's oral advisement of appellate rights following a defendant's written waiver do[es] not affect a defendant's prior decision to plead guilty and waive appellate rights (emphasis added)). This is especially true when, after informing the defendant that he has appellate rights, the court does not ask defendant whether he understands the description of those rights. See id. (explaining that sentencing court's statement that the parties could appeal the sentence did not invalidate defendant's waiver of appellate rights because, in part, the court did not query the defendant as to whether he understood its description of his appeal rights). Here, the District Court conducted a complete Rule 11 colloquy, specifically explaining to Ms. Smith that she would be waiving her right to appeal and to collaterally attack her conviction and sentence if she accepted the plea agreement. Ms. Smith said that she understood these terms. The prosecutor also outlined the provisions of the plea agreement in court, stating: [Ms. Smith] also waives any appeal rights or collateral attack rights except those as specified in the plea agreement. Ms. Smith, her attorney, and the prosecutor then signed the agreement. It was not until the next day, at the very end of the sentencing hearing  following the Rule 11 colloquy, her acceptance of the plea agreement, and a full evidentiary hearing regarding application of the safety valve provision  that the District Court judge informed Ms. Smith, apparently as a matter of routine, that she had a right to appeal the sentence. The court did not ask Ms. Smith whether she understood this statement, as it had done previously for the waiver of her appellate rights. For these reasons, the court's statement did not negate Ms. Smith's prior written waiver of her appellate rights. [2] In addition, the court's statement may even have been consistent with the plea agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, Ms. Smith retained the right to appeal her sentence if the District Court sentenced her outside the advisory Guidelines range or if the United States exercised its right to appeal the sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b). Thus, the District Court's comment may only have been intended to inform Ms. Smith of her right to appeal as limited by the waiver. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(j) (requiring sentencing court to inform defendant of  any right to appeal the sentence (emphasis added)); Atterberry, 144 F.3d at 1301 (noting that a court's general advisement of a right to appeal may be consistent with a plea agreement's conditional waiver of direct appeal). Although, in this case, the District Court's routine recitation of appellate rights does not render Ms. Smith's waiver invalid, we acknowledge that such instructions may have the potential to render appellate waivers invalid under different circumstances, such as when the instructions are inconsistent with the defendant's rights or when the district court's statement has the serious potential to confuse the defendant. We therefore provide the following guidance regarding a district court's obligation to inform the defendant of his appellate rights after accepting a plea agreement containing a waiver of appellate rights. Rule 32(j) provides that [a]fter sentencing  regardless of the defendant's plea  the court must advise the defendant of any right to appeal the sentence. Fed. R.Crim.P. 32(j)(1)(B) (emphasis added). The clear import of this rule is that advice as to a right to appeal a sentence need be given only when such a right exists. See also United States v. Tang, 214 F.3d 365, 368-71 (2d Cir.2000) (interpreting prior version of Rule 32). When a defendant waives certain appellate rights in a plea agreement, the district court need not, and should not, inform him that he retains such rights by, for example, making a blanket statement that the defendant has a right to appeal. Instead, the district court should inform the defendant that he has a right to appeal the sentence only to the extent that the defendant has not waived that right in the plea agreement. Such a statement, in conjunction, of course, with the court's confirmation that the defendant entered into the plea agreement knowingly and voluntarily through a complete Rule 11 colloquy, should ensure both that the defendant understands his rights and that the waiver is enforceable.
The third prong of the enforcement analysis requires the court to determine whether enforcing the waiver will result in a miscarriage of justice. A miscarriage of justice occurs [1] where the district court relied on an impermissible factor such as race, [2] where ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid, [3] where the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, or [4] where the waiver is otherwise unlawful. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Elliott, 264 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir.2001)). Ms. Smith argues only that the waiver is otherwise unlawful. To be otherwise unlawful, an error must `seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). Ms. Smith argues that the District Court unjustifiably concluded that she obstructed justice, and that this erroneous ruling resulted in an upward adjustment to her sentence and the court's improper refusal to apply the acceptance of responsibility adjustment. These errors, she claims, affect the fairness of the proceedings, as well as the integrity and public reputation of the judicial system. Ms. Smith misunderstands the miscarriage of justice exception to enforcement of a waiver of appellate rights. This exception looks to whether the waiver is otherwise unlawful, id. (emphasis added), not to whether another aspect of the proceeding may have involved legal error. Ms. Smith's argument that alleged errors in the court's determination of her sentence should invalidate her appellate waiver illustrates what Hahn called the logical failing[ ] of focusing on the result of the proceeding, rather than on the right relinquished, in analyzing whether an appeal waiver is [valid]. Id. at 1326 n. 12 (discussing whether an appeal waiver was knowing and voluntary); see also, e.g., United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1169 (11th Cir.1999) (A waiver of the right to appeal . . . includes a waiver of the right to appeal blatant error.). To allow alleged errors in computing a defendant's sentence to render a waiver unlawful would nullify the waiver based on the very sort of claim it was intended to waive. In sum, because Ms. Smith knowingly and voluntarily entered into the plea agreement containing a waiver of appellate rights, because the alleged errors are within the scope of the waiver, and because enforcement of the waiver would not result in a miscarriage of justice, we conclude that Ms. Smith's plea agreement, and the appellate waiver contained therein, is enforceable.