Opinion ID: 2026801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Any Assigned Duty

Text: When the Board issued its decision denying Kouzoukas disability benefits, it held that Kouzoukas was not disabled and could be returned to a full duty position as an active police officer. The Board now contends that we should uphold its decision to deny Kouzoukas disability benefitseven if we find that she cannot be returned to full, active dutybecause the evidence supports the finding that Kouzoukas is not disabled within the meaning of the Code. Section 5-115 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/5-115 (West 2006)) defines the term disability as: A condition of physical or mental incapacity to perform any assigned duty or duties in the police service. (Emphasis added.) The Board argues that Kouzoukas is not disabled within the meaning of the Pension Code because she is not incapable of performing any assigned duty. To support this contention, the Board points to Officer Schaedel's testimony that there are positions within the Chicago police department which would be able to accommodate Kouzoukas' restrictions. Like the appellate court below, we recognize that a person, such as Kouzoukas, who cannot return to full police duties, still may not be disabled within the meaning of the Code if a position is made available to her which can be performed by a person with her physical disability. 383 Ill.App.3d at 952, 322 Ill.Dec. 216, 890 N.E.2d 1135. See also Peterson v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Pension Fund, 54 Ill.2d 260, 263-65, 296 N.E.2d 721 (1973); Terrano v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 315 Ill.App.3d 270, 274-75, 248 Ill. Dec. 230, 733 N.E.2d 905 (2000). The flaw in the Board's reasoning, however, is that the position within the Chicago police department which Officer Schaedel testified might accommodate Kouzoukas' restrictions, wasas Officer Schaedel admitted never actually offered to Kouzoukas. Thus, for Kouzoukas, the position proposed by Officer Schaedel was never an assigned duty and, therefore, there is no way to know whether Kouzoukas is qualified for and capable of performing this duty, whether the position is open and available to her, or whether the position would, in fact, accommodate Kouzoukas' restrictions. At the hearings on Kouzoukas' application for duty disability benefits, she presented evidence that she was unable to perform any assigned duty. In other words, Kouzoukas proved that, since her injury on July 25, 2004, whenever she returned to work and was given an assignmentwhether it be full, active duty or restricted dutyher back pain prevented her from performing the duties assigned to her. Thus, the manifest weight of the evidence shows that Kouzoukas carried her burden of proving that she was disabled, that is, that she had a physical condition which made her incapable of performing any assigned duty and that no position within her limitations was offered to her. See Terrano v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 315 Ill.App.3d at 274-76, 248 Ill. Dec. 230, 733 N.E.2d 905 (it is a firm offer of a limited duty position that could be performed by an individual with the applicant's physical limitations that renders the applicant not disabled within the meaning of the Code despite his inability to perform the duties of an active police officer). The Board argues that its decision to grant or reject a claimant's application for duty disability benefits should not be dependent on the availability of an assignment in the Chicago police department within the claimant's restrictions. According to the Board, such a holding encroaches on the exclusive original jurisdiction bestowed upon it by the Pension Code. See 40 ILCS 5/5-189 (West 2006). We disagree. The Board has the duty under the Code to determine whether a claimant is disabled. In the case at bar, Kouzoukas presented evidence which established that she had chronic back pain which severely limited her ability to sit, stand, walk, drive, and wear a gunbelt. Moreover, because of these limitations, Kouzoukas' doctors did not provide her with a release to return to work. As a result, the Chicago police department would not reassign Kouzoukas to any position. Under these circumstances, Kouzoukas met her burden of proving that she was disabled. To hold otherwise would be to place Kouzoukas in an untenable catch 22 situationunable to work because the Chicago police department will not assign her to a position in the police service which she can perform, yet unable to obtain disability benefits. We recognize that during the course of the hearings Kouzoukas' physical limitations were delineated and Drs. Yapor and Demorest agreed that Kouzoukas could return to work under a strictly prescribed set of restrictions. In addition, Officer Schaedel testified that there existed within the Chicago police department a position that might accommodate Kouzoukas' sitting and standing restrictions, as well as the limitations on her wearing a gunbelt. However, because the Chicago police department never actually offered Kouzoukas a position within her restrictions, the Board could not say that Kouzoukas was no longer disabled within the meaning of the Code. In the case at bar, the Board should have granted Kouzoukas a duty disability benefit and instructed her to present herself to the Chicago police department with a doctor's release listing her restrictions as determined at the hearing. Then, if the Chicago police department offered Kouzoukas a position which accommodated the restrictions set forth in her doctor's release, she would no longer be entitled to duty disability benefits. If, however, the Chicago police department was unable to reassign Kouzoukas to a restricted duty position within her limitations, she would remain eligible for duty disability benefits, unless she was found to be ineligible for some other reason or, as a result of a future examination, it was determined that she was no longer disabled. See Terrano, 315 Ill.App.3d at 276-77, 248 Ill.Dec. 230, 733 N.E.2d 905 (Under the Code, there are a number of future events that could impact the plaintiff's right to receive duty disability benefits, including attaining the age of 63 (40 ILCS 5/5-154 (West 2006)), felony conviction (40 ILCS 5/5-227 (West 2006)), refusal to be examined by a board physician (40 ILCS 5/5-157 (West 2006)), or a change in disability status is revealed after a required annual physical examination (40 ILCS 5/5-156 (West 2006))).