Opinion ID: 1531775
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Denial of the Motion for a Directed Verdict

Text: It is elementary that in passing on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial justice is required to view the evidence and any reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was made, and, when so viewed, there is a question of fact for the jury the motion must be denied. The defendant acknowledges such to be the rule, but argues that however viewed, the evidence in the instant case could not support a verdict for plaintiff. This is so, it contends, because it is as reasonable to assume that defendant had neither actual nor constructive notice of the dangerous condition for a period of time long enough to enable it to correct the condition as it is to assume that defendant was aware of this danger to its patrons and neglected to correct it. In support of this contention, it relies on several cases in this jurisdiction, all of which, however, are readily distinguishable on their facts. However, defendant also relies on Oelschlaeger v. Hahne & Co., 2 N.J. 490, 66 A.2d 861, where plaintiff also stumbled over a fitting stool but was denied recovery on defendant's motion to dismiss. In Oelschlaeger, there was no evidence as to where the fitting stool was placed when not in use, nor of defendant's knowledge that such stools were moved about by patrons. Rather, the evidence is that there were shoe clerks and patrons alike moving about in the few minutes Mrs. Oelschlaeger stood at the counter, and turning fell over a stool. She asked the court to presume that it had been negligently left there by a servant of defendant, or, in the alternative, defendant was negligent in failing to remove it. The New Jersey court pointed out that while negligence can be inferred from established facts, it will not be presumed from facts which are susceptible to two equally reasonable but contradictory inferences. Thus the court concluded that on the facts established by plaintiff, it was as reasonable to presume that patrons moving about the shoe department had left the stool where Mrs. Oelschlaeger fell over it as it was to presume that an employee of defendant had placed it there. Continuing, the court pointed out that if the dangerous condition resulted from the conduct of a patron, Mrs. Oelschlaeger had the burden of establishing that such patron's conduct had come to defendant's attention in time to be remedied. Here, it was the practice of defendant to keep its fitting stools under the chairs when not in use and the stool in question was so positioned, except that it had been pushed so far under the chair as to constitute a dangerous condition in the aisle traveled by plaintiff. Consequently, the evidence is open to the inferences that either the fitting stool had been placed where encountered by plaintiff by one of defendant's employees, or had been further pushed under the chair by a patron. In either event, it made for a dangerous condition of which defendant had long-standing knowledge and, from the evidence adduced, had never taken measures to prevent such conditions. Neither is there evidence that, in lieu of preventive measures, defendant warned its patrons. See Dawson v. Rhode Island Auditorium, Inc., 104 R.I. 116, 242 A.2d 407. On this state of the evidence the trial justice correctly denied defendant's motion. Neither did he err in denying the motion on the grounds that the evidence established that plaintiff's invitation did not extend to the area in which the injury occurred. In Millken v. Weybosset Pure Food Market, 71 R.I. 312, 44 A.2d 723, this court recognized that there may be areas of a storekeeper's premises from which the public is excluded and, ordinarily, the storekeeper's duty to keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition does not extend to such areas. However, we also held that to escape liability for an injury incurred by a patron in such an area, the storekeeper must take such steps as will make it obvious to patrons that the area is not for their use and whether such steps were taken is a question of fact for the jury. In the instant case, all the evidence is that although the aisle or space in which the plaintiff was injured was primarily intended for use by defendant's employees, patrons were not forbidden to use it and, in fact, customarily did so.