Opinion ID: 6536852
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: We Modify Our Application of Garcia in Order to Fulfill the Legislature's Intent in Adopting Section 31-20A-4(C)(4)

Text: {40} Fry and Allen urge us to overrule Garcia , asserting that Garcia has deprived them of a meaningful comparative proportionality review and that the mechanism for conducting this review should be modified in various ways. We decline to overrule Garcia . However, we modify Garcia in order to better fulfill the purposes of Section 31-20A-4(C)(4). {41} We first recognize that the Washington Supreme Court, faced with similar concerns regarding proportionality review, recently declared Washington's death penalty scheme unconstitutional as administered in State v. Gregory , 192 Wash.2d 1 , 427 P.3d 621 , 629, 642 (2018). Presented with a study demonstrating that in Washington black defendants were four and a half times more likely to be sentenced to death than similarly situated white defendants, the court concluded that Washington's death penalty is administered in an arbitrary and racially biased manner and therefore violates the state constitution. Id. at 630, 633 , 635-36 ; see Wash. Const. art. I, § 14 (prohibiting the infliction of cruel punishment). The court additionally concluded that, due to this arbitrary and racially biased administration, the death penalty scheme in Washington fails to serve any legitimate penological goals. Gregory , 427 P.3d at 636, 642 . Although the Washington Supreme Court has a statutory duty to review the comparative proportionality of a death sentence very similar to our own, 14 the court concluded that this mandatory review could not address the constitutional infirmities the court had identified. Id. at 637 . While we share the Washington Supreme Court's concern that a death penalty scheme must provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not, id. at 636 (alteration in original) (quoting Furman , 408 U.S. at 313 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 (White, J., concurring)), in order to address this concern we need not determine whether our 1979 capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional as administered because we instead modify our approach to comparative proportionality review. See Pangaea Cinema , 2013-NMSC-044 , ¶ 23, 310 P.3d 604 (prescribing avoidance of a conclusion of, or an allusion to, unconstitutionality in the construction of statutes). {42} While the United States Supreme Court has left states free to define the framework of their comparative proportionality reviews, see Pulley , 465 U.S. at 45 , 104 S.Ct. 871 , there are three steps implicit in any approach. 15 In the first step, the reviewing court defines a universe of cases from which similar cases are to be drawn. Final Report, 15-16. The broadest universe would include all death-eligible cases, whether or not the prosecutor elected to pursue the death penalty. Id. This allows a reviewing court to determine if a death sentence is disproportionate compared to cases prosecuted in districts with different characteristics and sentencing practices. A narrower universe might include  only those cases in which the prosecutor sought the death penalty; all cases that progressed to a capital sentencing hearing; all cases in which the jury unanimously agreed on at least one aggravating factor and imposed either a life or death sentence; or-the narrowest possible option-cases in which the death penalty was imposed. Id. {43} The Garcia Court defined the universe of cases as including cases in which the death penalty was sought and which resulted in a sentence of death or life imprisonment that was affirmed on appeal. Compare Garcia , 1983-NMSC-008 , ¶ 34, 99 N.M. 771 , 664 P.2d 969 (stating that [o]nly those New Mexico cases in which a defendant ... received either the death penalty or life imprisonment and whose conviction and sentence have been upheld ... will be considered appropriate for comparison), with State v. Bland , 958 S.W.2d 651 , 666-67 (Tenn. 1997) (defining the universe from which we choose the pool of 'similar cases' for comparison [as] 'all cases in which the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder' ). {44} In the second step, the reviewing court must define what constitutes a similar case. See Final Report, 15. This produces a pool of cases to be used for comparison purposes. Id. Some states use the approach embraced in Garcia , under which the pool is limited to cases involving the same aggravating circumstance as the death sentence under review. 1983-NMSC-008 , ¶ 34, 99 N.M. 771 , 664 P.2d 969 . Many states include factually similar cases in the pool of comparison cases. See, e.g. , Bland , 958 S.W.2d at 667 (stating that we are not limited to ... cases in which exactly the same aggravating circumstances have been found and considering for additional comparison a non-exhaustive list of salient facts including the manner of death and any justifications for the killing). Under Garcia , we select cases for comparison based on statutorily defined aggravating circumstances and have on occasion considered factual similarities in deciding to affirm a death sentence. See, e.g. , Allen , 2000-NMSC-002 , ¶ 111, 128 N.M. 482 , 994 P.2d 728 (noting that, as in Clark , [the] victim was a child); see also Clark , 1999-NMSC-035 , ¶ 82, 128 N.M. 119 , 990 P.2d 793 (noting that the victim was a child). {45} The third and final step in conducting a comparative proportionality review is to define the test used to establish that a sentence is disproportionate. See Final Report, 15. Three approaches courts have taken in defining disproportionality are: (1) the statistical frequency approach, (2) the precedent-seeking approach, and (3) the reasonableness approach. Id. 16. The statistical frequency approach is a measurement of the relative frequency of death sentences in factually similar cases. Papasavvas , 790 A.2d at 805 . Before the repeal of the death penalty in 2007, 16 the New Jersey Supreme Court applied both statistical frequency and precedent-seeking approaches to assure that the death penalty had been imposed in similar cases. Id. at 804-05. For its statistical frequency analysis, New Jersey utilized the assistance of a special master and their administrative office of the courts. State v. DiFrisco , 142 N.J. 148 , 662 A.2d 442 , 450 (1995). Allen urges that, like New Jersey, we should incorporate a frequency analysis into our comparative proportionality review in addition to a precedent-seeking approach. However, both Fry and Allen implicitly recognize that we lack the records and resources necessary to undertake a statistical review. {46} Garcia is a precedent-seeking approach, which involves comparing the case to the pool of comparison cases in much the same way that a court typically reviews a case. Clark , 1999-NMSC-035 , ¶ 74, 128 N.M. 119 , 990 P.2d 793 ; Final Report, 17. The ultimate test is that a defendant ... should not be put to death if another defendant or other defendants, convicted of murder under the same aggravat[ing] circumstance is given life imprisonment, unless there is some justification. Garcia , 1983-NMSC-008 , ¶ 34, 99 N.M. 771 , 664 P.2d 969 . This is similar to the Tennessee approach, in which a death sentence is disproportionate only [i]f the case, taken as a whole, is plainly lacking in circumstances consistent with those in similar cases in which the death penalty has been imposed,   and [a] death sentence is not disproportionate where the Court can discern some basis for the lesser sentence received in another case with similar circumstances. Bland , 958 S.W.2d at 665 . {47} The reasonableness approach turns on generalized notions of reasonableness, which are in turn based on the particular court's values, experience and general familiarity with prior cases. Final Report, 17. Our application of Garcia has garnered criticism because we ha[ve] held sentences to be proportionate even when there are no other cases in which the defendant was sentenced to death, indicating that we have resorted to a reasonableness approach or ... ha[ve] created an unspoken presumption that a death sentence is always proportionate. Final Report, 19. We will continue to adhere to a precedent-seeking approach but adopt the following modifications to Garcia . 1. We decline to expand the universe of cases beyond cases in which the death penalty was sought, the jury found at least one aggravating circumstance, and which resulted in a sentence of death or life imprisonment that was affirmed on appeal {48} Fry and Allen urge this Court to expand the universe of cases from which similar cases have been drawn to include cases that could have been prosecuted as a death penalty case, regardless of whether the death penalty was actually pursued. Fry and Allen claim that death sentences are overrepresented under Garcia because the universe of cases excludes those in which the prosecutor did not seek the death penalty or offered a plea bargain in favor of life. Expanding the universe would enable us to examine the impact of prosecutorial discretion on the selection of which defendants were selected to receive the death penalty in New Mexico. {49} The State argues that Garcia properly limits the universe of cases to those in which the prosecution sought and the jury had the option to impose a death sentence. See Garcia , 1983-NMSC-008 , ¶ 34, 99 N.M. 771 , 664 P.2d 969 (In our review, we will consider only New Mexico cases in which a defendant has been convicted of capital murder under the same aggravating circumstance(s) .). We agree with the State on this point. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion is not enough to render death sentences constitutionally arbitrary. See Gregg , 428 U.S. at 199, 96 S.Ct. 2909 . We have determined that the Furman Court's concerns about discretionary sentencing did not extend to the areas of charging, plea bargaining, jury verdicts and pardons merely because a possibility of selectivity exists. State ex rel. Serna v. Hodges , 1976-NMSC-033 , ¶¶ 29-36, 89 N.M. 351 , 552 P.2d 787 , overruled on other grounds by Rondeau , 1976-NMSC-044 , ¶ 9, 89 N.M. 408 , 553 P.2d 688 . {50} Whether the New Mexico Legislature intended for comparative proportionality review under Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) to include reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion presents a question of statutory interpretation. We begin by looking at the language of the statute itself, while recognizing that the plain language must yield on occasion to an intention otherwise discerned in terms of equity, legislative history, or other sources. State v. Smith , 2004-NMSC-032 , ¶ 9, 136 N.M. 372 , 98 P.3d 1022 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {51} Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) does not expressly define the universe of cases, much less address whether we should limit our review to those cases in which the prosecutor sought the death penalty. The Legislature did not provide specific guidance as to which cases should be considered substantively or procedurally similar for purposes of comparative proportionality review. However, the term similar cases appears within the phrase the penalty imposed in similar cases in Section 31-20A-4(C)(4). Other courts have construed identical language as communicating an intent for the court to consider cases in which the prosecutor sought the death penalty and which progressed to a death penalty sentencing hearing, whether it resulted in a sentence of death or life imprisonment. See, e.g. , Addison , 7 A.3d at 1247. {52} This interpretation is consistent with the history of Section 31-20A-4(C)(4). Our Legislature adopted Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) in response to Furman and  Gregg which, in turn, provide insight into the appropriate parameters of the comparative proportionality review. See Addison , 7 A.3d at 1230, 1239-40. Like other courts, we conclude that our comparative proportionality review requirement was designed to incorporate the constitutional standards which existed at the time of its adoption. Id. {53} We gather from Furman that Petitioners' death sentences are not per se disproportionate based on how rarely New Mexico prosecutors have pursued the death penalty. Although the Furman Court did not discuss comparative proportionality review, it observed that the rare imposition of the death penalty was not enough to prove that it was being imposed arbitrarily. Furman , 408 U.S. at 293 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 (Brennan, J., concurring) ([T]housands of murders ... are committed annually in States where death is an authorized punishment for those crimes, and death is inflicted in only a minute fraction of these cases.). On the contrary, the rarity of the death penalty could indicate that it was being imposed carefully and selectively. Id. at 294 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 (Informed selectivity ... is a value not to be denigrated.). Based on this reasoning, we agree with the State that it would be illogical to conclude that the Legislature included proportionality review in the [1979 capital sentencing scheme] as a poisoned pill designed to lead to de facto repeal of the death penalty by virtue of the fact that, as it should be, the death penalty is infrequently imposed. {54} Gregg confirms that the Furman Court was not concerned with prosecutorial discretion. Gregg , 428 U.S. at 199, 96 S.Ct. 2909 . In Gregg , the petitioner argued that Georgia's revised capital sentencing scheme remained unconstitutional because it continued to allow unfettered discretion in the opportunities for discretionary action that are inherent in the processing of any murder case. Id. at 198-99 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 . In addition to the prosecutorial discretion to decline pursuit of the death penalty and offer plea bargains in favor of life, these opportunities include the jury's discretion to exercise mercy and the governor's authority to commute a death sentence. Id. at 199 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 . The Gregg Court addressed each of these and determined that a capital sentencing scheme was not constitutionally infirm simply because it gave these actors the legitimate discretion to spare a defendant from the death penalty. Id. This signals that the comparative proportionality review endorsed in Gregg was not intended to include review of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. {55} This is consistent with the approach used by the majority of states. Most states limit their comparative proportionality reviews to cases in which the prosecutor sought the death penalty. See, e.g. , State v. Ross , 225 Conn. 559 , 624 A.2d 886 , 886 (1993) (per curiam) (considering cases in which the conviction of a capital felony after trial was followed by a hearing to consider the imposition of the death penalty); Flamer v. State , 490 A.2d 104 , 138-39 (Del. 1983) ([W]e think it inherently fair, logical and necessary to prevent disproportionate sentencing that this Court compare the sentence below to the facts and circumstances of cases in which a capital sentencing proceeding was actually conducted, whether the murders have been sentenced to life imprisonment or death.); State v. Whitfield , 837 S.W.2d 503 , 515 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) ([T]his Court does not compare death-penalty cases to cases where the death penalty was not sought-such as where the death penalty was waived or the offense of conviction was less than first degree murder.); State v. Kills on Top , 243 Mont. 56 , 793 P.2d 1273 , 1308 (1990) (comparing to cases involving the aggravating circumstance of kidnapping); Petrocelli v. State , 101 Nev. 46 , 692 P.2d 503 , 511 (1985) (considering cases where the jury found some of the same aggravating circumstances), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Thomas v. State , 120 Nev. 37 , 83 P.3d 818 , 823 (2004) ; State v. McHone , 334 N.C. 627 , 435 S.E.2d 296 , 307 (1993) (including all cases arising since the effective date of our capital punishment statute, 1 June 1977, which have been tried as capital cases and reviewed on direct appeal by this Court and in which the jury recommended death or life imprisonment (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Lewis v. Commonwealth , 267 Va. 302 , 593 S.E.2d 220 , 226 (2004) (In conducting this review,  this Court considers the records of all capital murder cases reviewed by this Court, including cases in which the defendant received a life sentence.). {56} By contrast, few states have opted to include in the comparative proportionality review cases in which the prosecutor did not seek the death penalty. See, e.g. , Papasavvas , 790 A.2d at 804 (We will ... consider all death-eligible cases, whether or not they were capitally prosecuted, because the State's decision not to prosecute the defendant capitally does not necessarily reflect on [the] defendant's lack of deathworthiness. (alteration and omission in original) (citation omitted)); Commonwealth v. DeHart , 512 Pa. 235 , 516 A.2d 656 , 671 (1986) (including all cases of murder of the first degree convictions which were prosecuted or could have been prosecuted under the death penalty statute); Bland , 958 S.W.2d at 666 (defining the universe from which we choose the pool of 'similar cases' for comparison [as] 'all cases in which the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder'  (citation omitted)). {57} Because the Gregg Court was not concerned with prosecutorial discretion, we also conclude that the New Mexico Legislature, by modeling its review on the comparative proportionality review endorsed in Gregg , did not intend for Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) to serve as a check on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Under Gregg , prosecutors are free to exercise their discretion in favor of life. See 428 U.S. at 199, 96 S.Ct. 2909 . We decline to adopt a construction of Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) that would encourage prosecutors to seek the death penalty in order to maintain a robust universe of cases. We therefore reject Petitioners' argument that we should expand the universe of cases to all cases in which the death penalty could have been pursued. {58} We also consider whether the comparative proportionality review should be modified to account for the exercise of executive clemency. This power was given to the governor by the people. N.M. Const. art. V, § 6. Like prosecutorial discretion, the governor's power to commute sentences is outside of the effective control of legislatures and an inevitable component[ ] of any capital scheme. Sherod Thaxton, Disciplining Death: Assessing and Ameliorating Arbitrariness in Capital Charging , 49 Ariz. St. L.J. 137 , 195 (2017). Because comparative proportionality review was intended to review caprice in the decision to inflict the death penalty, a governor's isolated decision to afford mercy does not render an otherwise valid death sentence unconstitutional. See Gregg , 428 U.S. at 199, 203, 96 S.Ct. 2909 . {59} Governor Anaya commuted the majority of death sentences imposed under the pre-repeal, 1979 capital sentencing scheme. See Exec. Orders Nos. 86-37, 86-38, 86-39, 86-40, 86-41 (Nov. 26, 1986). Under Gregg , this does not render Petitioners' death sentences disproportionate. See 428 U.S. at 199, 96 S.Ct. 2909 . Because the constitutional jurisprudence gives us no reason to review this exercise of power, we will continue to consider these cases as death penalty cases for purposes of the comparative proportionality review. {60} We also limit our review to cases prosecuted under the pre-repeal, 1979 capital sentencing scheme. To include cases decided before enactment of the present [s]tatute would require consideration of cases decided under the various constitutionally infirm statutes which predate the current one, Flamer , 490 A.2d at 139 , and to include cases prosecuted under the post-repeal scheme would ensure a de facto repeal of the death penalty. This would contradict the Legislature's intent in enacting a savings clause for murders committed before July 1, 2009. {61} The Garcia Court's definition of the universe of cases includes one more restriction: we consider only those cases which were affirmed on appeal. 1983-NMSC-008 , ¶ 34, 99 N.M. 771 , 664 P.2d 969 . This is a reasonable restriction because cases in which the defendant did not appeal cannot be considered a reliable indicator of facts warranting a given sentence. Moreover, because defendants facing either death or life imprisonment almost uniformly appealed, this restriction does not result in the exclusion of a great number of viable comparison cases. But see, e.g. , Adams , CR-86-0064 (10th Dist. Quay County Dec. 5, 1986) (waiving the right to directly  appeal the judgment and sentence of death, anticipating commutation). {62} In sum, we hold that the universe of cases is properly limited under Garcia to those cases in which the prosecutor decided to seek the death penalty, which advanced to a death penalty sentencing hearing in which the jury found at least one aggravating circumstance, and which resulted in a sentence of death or life imprisonment which was affirmed on appeal. 1983-NMSC-008 , ¶ 34, 99 N.M. 771 , 664 P.2d 969 . 2. We expand the pool of cases to include both cases involving the same aggravating circumstance and factually similar cases in which the jury had the option to impose the death penalty {63} The second step of the comparative proportionality review requires us to identify the particular characteristics to be used to identify a  'similar case.'  Final Report, 15. While we adhere to Garcia's definition of the universe of cases, we reconsider the pool of comparison cases and determine that the pool must be expanded from cases involving first-degree murder convictions with the same aggravating circumstances to include factually similar crimes in which the jury considered the death penalty. In reaching this conclusion, we are guided by the Gregg Court's understanding that [ i ] f a time comes when juries generally do not impose the death sentence in a certain kind of murder case , the appellate review procedures assure that no defendant convicted under such circumstances will suffer a sentence of death. 428 U.S. at 206, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (emphasis added). {64} The Garcia Court included within the pool of comparison cases only those cases involving the same aggravating circumstances. 1983-NMSC-008 , ¶ 34, 99 N.M. 771 , 664 P.2d 969 . In cases with the same aggravating circumstance, prosecutors decided to pursue the death penalty and juries found the defendants to be guilty of substantively similar conduct. As such, the Garcia approach ensures that the pool is restricted to cases which are substantively and procedurally similar for purposes of comparative proportionality review. Cf. Addison , 7 A.3d at 1249-1251 (stating that the substantive characteristics of 'similar cases' also include [statutory] aggravating and mitigating factors). In theory, this enables us to determine if the death penalty is generally imposed for a certain kind of murder case, as intended under Gregg , 428 U.S. at 206, 96 S.Ct. 2909 . {65} However, given the rarity of death penalty prosecutions in New Mexico, the Garcia Court's definition of the pool of comparison cases has proven to be unworkable. Final Report, 19 (describing the Garcia approach as logical but noting that it yields only a handful of 'similar' cases for the comparative proportionality review). Only four cases have aggravating circumstances identical to Allen , 17 and the only case with aggravating circumstances identical to Fry is Fry's own conviction for an unrelated murder. 18 Such a small pool of cases distorts our view of the application of the death penalty for similar crimes. {66} We acknowledge, as Petitioners contend, that our comparative proportionality review must be applied to fully answer the central question of ... whether there is a real difference between the many cases in  which the death penalty is not imposed and the few cases in which it is. Final Report, 18; see Furman , 408 U.S. at 313-14 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 (White, J., concurring). Further, the Gregg Court intended for the comparative proportionality review to substantially eliminate[ ] the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury. If a time comes when juries generally do not impose the death sentence in a certain kind of murder case, the appellate review procedures assure that no defendant convicted under such circumstances will suffer a sentence of death. 428 U.S. at 206, 96 S.Ct. 2909 . We are unable to provide that assurance when the pool of comparison cases is restricted to only those with the same aggravating circumstances. {67} Other states include factually similar cases in the comparative proportionality review. See, e.g. , Addison , 7 A.3d at 1253 (reviewing the facts underlying the murder, the aggravating factors, and the mitigating factors because [t]hese characteristics found by the jury establish the unique footprint of the case within which the jury considered ... the crime and the character and background of the particular defendant to decide whether to impose the death penalty); Papasavvas , 790 A.2d at 805 (describing the salient-factors test, under which every death-eligible case is assigned to one of thirteen categories based on the statutory aggravating factors, and further grouped by circumstances that serve either to aggravate or to mitigate the blameworthiness of the defendants in those cases (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Bland , 958 S.W.2d at 667 (Though consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances ... is a crucial element of the process, we are not limited to only those cases in which exactly the same aggravating circumstances have been found.). {68} In Tennessee, for example, the Supreme Court considers a non-exhaustive list including the manner of death (e.g., violent, torturous, etc.), the victim's circumstances including age [and] physical and mental conditions, the absence or presence of provocation ... [or] justification, and the injury to and effects on nondecedent victims. Bland , 958 S.W.2d at 667 . Although the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized that the factual similarities considered when choosing comparison cases are not readily subject to complete enumeration and definition, the court reviewed the relevant facts it had considered in prior cases. Id. In New Mexico, a comprehensive list of factual similarities relevant to the identification of comparison cases is particularly elusive due to the limited nature of our review under Garcia in prior cases. {69} However, examining the universe of death penalty cases in New Mexico, we observe that juries had the option to impose the death penalty in a number of cases with factual similarities to Fry and Allen but which did not result in the same aggravating circumstances. Specifically, regardless of the aggravating circumstances alleged, many cases involved the murder of youthful, typically female victims in the commission of a sexual assault. 19 These cases were excluded from consideration on direct appeal because, although Fry and Allen were both convicted of attempted criminal sexual penetration and therefore guilty of similar conduct, neither was charged with or found guilty of murder in the commission of a criminal sexual penetration as a statutory aggravating circumstance.  {70} Additionally, we note that while New Mexico prosecutors maintained no written criteria for when to pursue the death penalty, they considered additional factors relevant in determining whether to seek the death penalty, including the age of the victim, whether the crime was ethnically motivated, opinions of the victim's family, the number of victims, the suffering of the victim, the generally severe or aggravated nature of the crime, and the impact of the crime on the community. Final Report, 14-15. We consider these factors relevant when determining what makes a case factually similar. {71} In light of the limitations posed by the small universe of death penalty cases, we see no principled reason to exclude factually similar cases in which the jury considered the death penalty from the pool of comparison cases. These cases, like cases involving the same aggravating circumstance, are substantively and procedurally similar to the cases under review because the jury had the option to impose the death penalty based on similar facts. Expanding our review to consider these cases may reveal a pattern where no pattern was readily discernible among cases involving the same aggravating circumstances. This will better serve the purposes of comparative proportionality review by enabling us to determine whether Fry and Allen were sentenced to death by an aberrant jury, in accordance with Gregg , 428 U.S. at 206, 96 S.Ct. 2909 , and thereby ensure that the death penalty is reserved for the most heinous crimes. See Furman , 408 U.S. at 313-4 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 (White, J., concurring); see also id. at 293-95 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 (Brennan, J., concurring). {72} We therefore expand the pool of cases to include factually similar cases in which the jury considered the death penalty. We adhere to Garcia to the extent that the Garcia approach uses the same aggravating circumstance as the starting point for identifying the pool of comparison cases. However, we will also give meaningful consideration to factually similar crimes in which the jury considered the death penalty. 3. A death sentence is disproportionate if juries do not generally impose a death sentence in similar cases and there is no justification for the death sentence to be imposed {73} In the third step of our comparative proportionality review, we turn to the test to be used to establish that a sentence is disproportionate. Garcia states that a death sentence should not be affirmed when similar cases ended in life imprisonment, unless there is some justification. 1983-NMSC-008 , ¶ 34, 99 N.M. 771 , 664 P.2d 969 . We have further recognized that our function in performing comparative review is not to search for proof that a defendant's death sentence is perfectly symmetrical, but to identify and invalidate the aberrant death sentence. Clark , 1999-NMSC-035 , ¶ 80, 128 N.M. 119 , 990 P.2d 793 (quoting Bland , 958 S.W.2d at 665 ). In practice, however, our application of this test has resulted in an unspoken presumption that a death sentence is always proportionate. Final Report, 19. {74} In our initial review of Petitioners' death sentences, we did not explain why Petitioners' death sentences should be affirmed when the majority of defendants received life sentences for similarly shocking crimes. Instead, we concluded that certain facts justified their death sentences without meaningfully considering factually similar cases and whether juries generally imposed death sentences in those cases. See, e.g. , Fry , 2006-NMSC-001 , ¶ 44, 138 N.M. 700 , 126 P.3d 516 (describing the murder as particularly brutal); Allen , 2000-NMSC-002 , ¶ 111, 128 N.M. 482 , 994 P.2d 728 (noting that Allen's victim, like Clark's, was a child); Final Report, 21 ([This] Court has affirmed [a] death sentence by pointing to circumstances that, in its view, distinguish [a death sentence case] from the case in which a life sentence was imposed. However, the distinguishing factors change from case to case.). For this reason, Fry and Allen argue that they were deprived of a meaningful proportionality review and that [i]n practice, proportionality review in New Mexico has not served as a meaningful check on arbitrary and capricious death sentences.  {75} Furman and Gregg require more. Comparative proportionality review must provide a meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not. See Furman , 408 U.S. at 313-14 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 (White, J., concurring). Specifically, the Gregg Court stated that the comparative proportionality requirement would assure that the death penalty would not be imposed unless the death penalty was imposed generally in similar cases. 428 U.S. at 205-06, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although Garcia is not inherently inconsistent with the requirements of Furman and Gregg , in practice our comparative proportionality review has failed to meet the burden of assuring that the death penalty is not imposed in one case where it is not generally imposed in similar cases. {76} At a minimum, comparative proportionality review requires that we thoroughly acknowledge and give meaningful consideration to similar cases that ended in a life sentence. State v. Timmendequas , 168 N.J. 20 , 773 A.2d 18 , 26 (2001) (concluding that [w]ithout knowledge of the life-sentenced cases, [a court] would be unable to determine whether there is a meaningful basis for distinguishing the death sentences it reviews from the many cases in which lesser sentences are imposed (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see Final Report, 18-19 (illustrating the distortion created by a limited universe). [A] significant number of similar cases in which death was not imposed might well provide the most relevant evidence of arbitrariness in the death sentence before the Court. Walker v. Georgia , 555 U.S. 979 , 981 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (respecting the Court's denial on procedural grounds of a petition for writ of certiorari asking whether the Georgia death penalty scheme violated the Eighth Amendment arbitrariness prohibition). {77} In practice, we have not addressed the question of whether a defendant's death sentence is an aberration and have instead conducted a traditional proportionality review. In focusing primarily on facts that could have justified the imposition of the death sentence without meaningfully considering other cases involving similar facts, we have not answered the central question of whether the defendant's death sentence is an aberration from the norm. See, e.g. , Garcia , 1983-NMSC-008 , ¶ 40, 99 N.M. 771 , 664 P.2d 969 (In our duty to review the determination by the jury, we will not retry the case for what may be a better result. (emphasis omitted)). Comparative proportionality is not a question for the jury but rather is intended to serve as a check on the exercise of jury discretion in sentencing. See Wyrostek , 1994-NMSC-042 , ¶ 15, 117 N.M. 514 , 873 P.2d 260 . [T]he primary focus [in assessing the comparative proportionality of a death sentence] is not on the reasonableness of the jury's sentence of death, but rather on how that sentence compares to jury dispositions in comparable cases. Papasavvas , 790 A.2d at 827 (Stein, J., concurring); see also Final Report, 17 ([T]he jury is not asked, and, in our view, should not be asked, to determine whether a death sentence for this particular defendant is warranted given the sentences meted out for similar crimes. This is an entirely different question that is entrusted to the highest court of states that perform this type of review.). This review differs qualitatively from the usual type of appellate review. Wilson, supra , at 265-66. We do not question the proportionality of the death sentences in the traditional sense but instead consider whether there is truly a meaningful basis for distinguishing Fry and Allen from similar cases resulting in a life sentence. {78} Other courts have clarified that the appellate task under [comparative] proportionality review was not to determine whether the capital case before it in some way was, on a scale of moral blameworthiness, roughly equivalent to all other capital cases and, absent such rough equivalence, to reverse the sentence. Nor was that review considered to require that the capital case before the court must affirmatively be shown, on such a scale, to have been quantitatively different from all other cases in which the death penalty was not imposed and, absent such an affirmative  showing, to reverse the sentence. In the Supreme Court's view, rather, the appellate inquiry under proportionality review was whether the death penalty imposed in a particular case was aberrational, within the particular jurisdiction involved, with respect to similar cases. State v. Webb , 238 Conn. 389 , 680 A.2d 147 , 204 (1996) (discussing Gregg ). We must construe Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) in a manner that is consistent with that intent and must do more than determine whether anyone else has ever been sentenced to death under similar circumstances. Final Report, 17. {79} Consistent with the constitutional principles of Furman and Gregg , we conclude that a death sentence is disproportionate if juries do not generally impose a death sentence in similar cases and there is no real justification for the death sentence. 4. Principles of stare decisis do not prevent us from modifying Garcia {80} The State argues that stare decisis prevents us from overruling or modifying Garcia because the Legislature left Garcia undisturbed for nearly thirty years before the repeal. Because we take care to overrule established precedent only when the circumstances require it, State v. Pieri , 2009-NMSC-019 , ¶ 21, 146 N.M. 155 , 207 P.3d 1132 , we modify Garcia only to the extent required to fulfill the purpose of Section 31-20A-4(C)(4). {81} This is not a case where the purpose of the statute must be inferred from silent acquiescence to a well-settled interpretation of law. See, e.g. , Patterson v. McLean Credit Union , 485 U.S. 617 , 619-20, 108 S.Ct. 1419 , 99 L.Ed.2d 879 (1988) (per curiam) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's reconsideration of an issue of statutory interpretation because Congress expressly rejected legislation to override the existing statutory interpretation). To the contrary, the Legislature's intent in adopting Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) is clear from its history, and our application of Garcia has not fulfilled that purpose. This is sufficient justification to modify our approach to comparative proportionality review. See State ex rel. Lee v. Hartman , 1961-NMSC-171 , ¶ 29, 69 N.M. 419 , 367 P.2d 918 (stating that we resort to the interpretative canon of legislative acquiescence when direct methods of interpretation have failed). {82} The State's argument would have greater force if we were overruling a functional approach to comparative proportionality review. Garcia proved to be unworkable in practice because it identified an overly restricted pool of cases. See Pieri , 2009-NMSC-019 , ¶ 21, 146 N.M. 155 , 207 P.3d 1132 ; see also Final Report, 19-21. Legislative acquiescence falls far short of providing a basis to support a [statutory] construction ... so clearly at odds with [the statute's] plain meaning and legislative history. Aaron v. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n , 446 U.S. 680 , 694 n.11, 100 S.Ct. 1945 , 64 L.Ed.2d 611 (1980) ; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction , 87 Mich. L. Rev. 67 , 76 (1988) ([S]ubsequent legislative inactivity cannot ratify a clearly erroneous prior interpretation.). For these reasons, we are unpersuaded by the State's theory of legislative acquiescence.