Opinion ID: 895122
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction: Is This a Civil or Criminal Matter?

Text: We cannot address Harrell's due-process claim if we lack jurisdiction. Courts always have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction. [5] The Texas Constitution gives us jurisdiction in all cases except in criminal law matters. [6] We therefore consider whether an inmate trust fund withdrawal order is a civil or criminal matter. If the former, we have jurisdiction to reach the due-process issue; if the latter, jurisdiction rests, if anywhere, with our sister high court, the Court of Criminal Appeals. [7] Four Texas courts of appeals have divided 2-2 over whether a section 501.014(e) order is civil or criminal. The Waco and Amarillo courts of appeals have declared them criminal in nature as they arise from and are closely related to a criminal matter. [8] The San Antonio and Texarkana courts of appeals have reached the opposite conclusion, reasoning that withdrawal orders are a post-judgment collection process distinct from the underlying criminal case. [9] This split of authority has led inmates to file appeals both in this Court and in the Court of Criminal Appeals, which recently addressed the jurisdictional issue in In re Johnson. [10] In that case, the Court of Criminal Appeals examined its own jurisprudence and the risk of a potential conflict between our bifurcated highest appellate courts in deciding that withdrawal orders were not criminal-law matters. [11] We agree that withdrawal orders are more civil in nature than criminal. We start with the proposition that [d]isputes which arise over the enforcement of statutes governed by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and which arise as a result of or incident to a criminal prosecution, are criminal law matters. [12] Further, we observe that in criminal-law matters, criminal law is the subject of the litigation. [13] The withdrawal orders hereissued nine years after Harrell's first conviction and three years after his secondmay be incidental to criminal prosecutions and a mechanism to enforce criminal judgments, but they do not arise over enforcement of a statute governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. Nor is criminal law the focus of this action. True, a withdrawal order does seize payment for costs previously taxed in a criminal case, but the criminal case is over. Harrell is not contesting the convicting court's authority to assess costs but its authority to collect costs. And those costs are collected, as the two orders in this case make clear, pursuant to Government Code, Sec. 501.014, not any provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure nor any other criminal statute. Section 501.014 includes costs assessed during criminal matters, but it also authorizes inmate-account withdrawals for costs arising in civil proceedings, including payment of child support, restitution, health care costs, and fines. [14] Even as to court fees and costs, the statute applies not just to criminal cases but to all orders for court fees and costs. [15] Moreover, the subject matter of this appeal does not concern Harrell's guilt, innocence, or punishment, the chief features of a criminal proceeding. [16] The procedure at issue is substantively akin to a garnishment action or an action to obtain a turnover order. Properly viewed, it is a civil post-judgment collection action that is (1) distinct from the underlying criminal judgments assessing Harrell's conviction, sentence, and court costs, and (2) aimed at seizing funds to satisfy the monetary portion of those judgments. The court is enforcing a money judgment that, while tangentially related to the underlying criminal judgments, is nonetheless removed from them. At bottom, Harrell is alleging the alleged wrongful taking of property. Given that this case presents no construction of a criminal statute, and instead presents the issue of a trial court's ability to seize funds post-judgment pursuant to a civil statute, we hold that withdrawal orders are more substantively civil than criminal. We now turn to the merits of Harrell's due-process claim.