Opinion ID: 1347716
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: issues eleven and twelve.

Text: CONCLUSION. We conclude that there is no federal or state per se constitutional bar to the introduction of victim impact evidence in the penalty phase of a capital case and that such evidence is admissible under Washington law. Specifically, in the case before us the testimony by the victim's father was properly admitted and did not violate the Defendant's due process rights. Generally, the term victim impact evidence refers to evidence given by the victim of the crime, or the representative of the victim, which describes the victim or the effect of the crime on the victim and his or her family. Often such evidence is referred to as a victim impact statement. Shortly before the Defendant's special sentencing proceeding in this case commenced, the United States Supreme Court decided Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (1991). Payne overruled prior federal law which had imposed a constitutional bar on the presentation of victim impact evidence at capital sentencing proceedings. Based on the Payne decision, and a 1989 victim's rights amendment to the Washington State Constitution, the trial court ruled that victim impact evidence could be admitted at the Defendant's special sentencing proceeding. During that proceeding, the father of the victim was called to testify. He testified about the victim's interests, and her plans for the future. He discussed the effects of his young daughter's murder on his work, his emotions and his family. In closing arguments, the prosecuting attorney recalled much of this testimony in noting the lost opportunities of the victim and her family and how the crime had affected them. No evidence was admitted regarding the victim's family's opinions of the crime, of the Defendant or as to what they felt was the appropriate punishment. The Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing such testimony and argument during his sentencing proceeding. Two related issues arise with regard to this victim impact evidence: 1. Whether the Constitution of the United States bars the introduction of the testimony by the father of the victim at the capital sentencing proceeding; and 2. Whether such testimony is barred by the Washington State Constitution. We conclude that there is no federal or state per se constitutional bar to the introduction of victim impact evidence in the penalty phase of a capital case and that such evidence is admissible under Washington law. Specifically, in the case before us the testimony by the victim's father was properly admitted and did not violate the Defendant's due process rights. [25] In Payne, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment does not bar the admission of victim impact evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital trial. [67] Payne imposes no per se constitutional bar, but leaves the individual states to decide whether to allow victim impact evidence in death penalty sentencing proceedings. In Payne, the Supreme Court overruled two of its earlier cases, Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 96 L.Ed.2d 440, 107 S.Ct. 2529 (1987) and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 104 L.Ed.2d 876, 109 S.Ct. 2207 (1989), which had prohibited the use of such evidence in death penalty cases. In Booth, the Court considered the use of victim impact evidence in capital sentencing proceedings and had imposed an irrebuttable presumption of undue prejudice and irrelevance on such evidence, determining that the Eighth Amendment prohibits its introduction in all cases. [68] Two years later, in Gathers, the Court extended this prohibition to prosecutorial argument in death sentencing hearings. [69] Then, more recently, in Payne, the Court overruled Gathers and most of Booth. [70] The Court held in Payne that if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar. [26] While the Defendant herein does not argue that the victim impact statement made at his sentencing proceeding violates the Eighth Amendment, he does appear to argue that its admission violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Under Payne, when the introduction of such evidence is so unduly prejudicial that it leads to a fundamentally unfair trial, a defendant may still seek relief under the Fourteenth Amendment. [71] In this case, however, the evidence which the victim's father presented, and which the prosecuting attorney reiterated in argument to the jury, was no more unfairly prejudicial or inflammatory than the evidence and argument which was introduced in the Payne case โ and which the Court did not find to be fundamentally unfair. [72] In Payne, the defendant had brutally stabbed a young mother and her two children, aged 2 and 3. The mother and daughter died from the stab wounds, but Nicholas, the 3-year-old boy, survived. Nicholas' grandmother was permitted to testify to the jury that He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why she doesn't come home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to me many times during the week and asks me, Grandmama, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I'm worried about my Lacie. Payne, at 814-15. In argument, the prosecuting attorney in Payne referred to the continuing effects on Nicholas and the effects of the murders on other family members and the tragedy for the defendant's family. The Supreme Court did not find this victim impact statement, or the prosecuting attorney's argument based on it, to be unfairly prejudicial or inflammatory. In the present case, as well, we cannot say that the jury's hearing about the victim's interests and expectations or about her father's natural feelings of grief deprived the defendant of due process. In fact, as the Court in Payne explained, it accepted review in order to determine if victim impact evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact of the crimes on the victim's family was admissible at a capital sentencing proceeding. [73] This was exactly the kind of evidence which was admitted herein, and in a relatively abbreviated way. [27] The Defendant herein also argues that he was denied due process because he was not notified earlier in the trial that the prosecution intended to use victim impact evidence at his sentencing. The record reflects, however, that defense counsel was aware during trial that the United States Supreme Court was reconsidering the victim impact issue in the Payne case. The prosecution informed the defense the same day Payne was decided that it intended to offer victim impact testimony at the sentencing proceeding. Defense counsel was allowed to interview the victim's father prior to his testimony. The trial court's denial of a continuance based on alleged surprise does not merit exclusion of the evidence, especially since any possibility of prejudice from the failure to delay sentencing is remote in this case. [74] In light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Payne, we conclude that the Defendant's federal constitutional rights were not violated by the introduction of victim impact evidence. The Defendant herein also argues that the Washington State Constitution article 1, section 3 (due process) and section 14 (cruel punishment) bar the use of victim impact evidence in capital cases in this state. The Defendant relies on prior case law from this court which limits what is constitutionally admissible at death penalty sentencing proceedings, specifically, State v. Bartholomew, 98 Wn.2d 173, 654 P.2d 1170 (1982) ( Bartholomew I), State's cert. granted and remanded, 463 U.S. 1203, defendant's cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1212 (1983), adhered to on remand, 101 Wn.2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984) ( Bartholomew II). Capital punishment proceedings are regulated in the State of Washington by statute, RCW 10.95. In Bartholomew II, this court found portions of that statute to be unconstitutional under our state constitution. We therefore must examine that statute, along with the case law limiting it, in light of the issue of admissibility of victim impact evidence at special sentencing proceedings. Specifically, the evidence admissible in a special sentencing proceeding is determined by RCW 10.95.060(3) and .070. RCW 10.95.060(3) states in pertinent part: The court shall admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence, including hearsay evidence and evidence of the defendant's previous criminal activity regardless of whether the defendant has been charged or convicted as a result of such activity. RCW 10.95.070 provides: In deciding the question posed by RCW 10.95.060(4) [Having in mind the crime of which the defendant has been found guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency?], the jury, ... may consider any relevant factors, including but not limited to the following: [list of factors.] Thus, on the face of Washington's death penalty statute, evidence received at death sentencing hearings is limited only by the requirement of relevance. However, in 1984, this court in Bartholomew II held some of the language quoted above to be unconstitutional and limited the kinds of evidence the prosecution may present at a special sentencing proceeding. Noting that evidence presented at a capital sentencing proceeding must be accurate, reliable, and not unduly prejudicial to the defendant, this court found that RCW 10.95.060(3) and 10.95.070 violated the Eighth Amendment as well as article 1, sections 3 and 14 of the Washington State Constitution. [75] The court also found that the due process clause of our state constitution requires that evidence introduced in capital cases conform to the Rules of Evidence. The Bartholomew II court further found that consideration of evidence of other crimes of which the Defendant was not convicted violated the cruel punishment and due process sections of the Washington State Constitution. [76] In State v. Lord, 117 Wn.2d 829, 889-90, 822 P.2d 177 (1991), cert. denied, 121 L.Ed.2d 112 (1992), we clarified this ruling by holding that this rule is limited to the State's case in chief, and that evidence of uncharged criminal behavior can be offered to rebut mitigation evidence presented by the defendant. In addition, the court in Bartholomew II held that the statutory directives to consider any relevant evidence and any relevant factors must be limited to mitigating evidence and factors. Finally, the Bartholomew II court found that evidence of nonstatutory aggravating factors must be limited to defendant's criminal record, evidence that would have been admissible at the guilt phase, and evidence to rebut matters raised in mitigation by the defendant, the latter of which may only be admitted if the rebuttal value of the evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect. [77] We have consistently and recently adhered to these holdings of Bartholomew II. [78] The State argues that Bartholomew II should be overruled in its entirety. It asks that both victim impact statements and evidence of prior uncharged crimes be held admissible and that the Rules of Evidence be held to not be applicable in special sentencing proceedings. Such fundamental changes in the jurisprudence of capital sentencing law in this state are unnecessary to the resolution of this case and we therefore decline the invitation to overrule Bartholomew II in its entirety. In this case, there is no issue regarding prior uncharged crimes or application of the Rules of Evidence. The only issue properly before us is the constitutionality of the admission of victim impact evidence in capital cases. The critical question with regard to victim impact evidence is relevance, which would be a statutorily required prerequisite even without the holdings of Bartholomew II. [79] In limiting the categories of evidence admissible at a death sentencing proceeding, the court specifically stated in Bartholomew II that it was relying on independent state constitutional grounds. [80] Under Bartholomew II, victim impact evidence does not fit within any of the categories of evidence held to be admissible during the special sentencing phase of a capital case. However, when Bartholomew II was decided, the victims' rights amendment (Const. art. 1, ง 35 (amend. 84)), was not yet part of our state constitution. Rather, in 1984, the court was construing a constitution which is a different constitution than the one we examine today. The question here then becomes, what effect does the new victims' rights amendment have on our constitutional analysis of the death penalty statute as it relates to victim impact evidence? We turn, therefore, to this new state constitutional amendment. In 1989, at the request of then Attorney General Eikenberry, the Legislature, in an effort to give certain rights to crime victims and to encourage victims to cooperate in the prosecution of crimes, unanimously passed Senate Joint Resolution 8200, offering Washington's electorate the opportunity to add a victims' rights provision to the state constitution. [81] The voters of the State of Washington overwhelmingly accepted the amendment; 78 percent of those voting cast ballots in favor of the amendment. [82] The amendment is codified as Const. art. 1, ง 35 (amend. 84), and provides in pertinent part: Upon notifying the prosecuting attorney, a victim of a crime charged as a felony shall have the right to be informed of and, subject to the discretion of the individual presiding over the trial or court proceedings, attend trial and all other court proceedings the defendant has the right to attend, and to make a statement at sentencing and at any proceeding where the defendant's release is considered, subject to the same rules of procedure which govern the defendant's rights. In the event the victim is deceased, incompetent, a minor, or otherwise unavailable, the prosecuting attorney may identify a representative to appear to exercise the victim's rights. (Italics ours.) The addition of the victims' rights amendment creates a potential tension between the due process rights of the capital case defendant (as interpreted by Bartholomew II) and the victims' constitutional rights added by Const. art. 1, ง 35 (amend. 84). The prosecuting attorney and amicus (the Attorney General) argue that the later amendment overrules the prior state constitutional construction. We conclude, however, that these two parts of the constitution can be harmonized. [28] A new constitutional provision prevails over prior provisions of the constitution if (1) it specifically repeals them, or (2) it cannot be harmonized with them. Nevertheless, it is settled that implied repeal of one constitutional provision by another is not favored, and every reasonable effort will be made to give effect to both provisions; [83] that can be done in this case. The victims' rights amendment does not specifically repeal any provision of the state constitution or this court's construction of the state due process clause. In fact, this court in Bartholomew II did not even consider, discuss or rule on the admissibility of victim impact evidence. The question then is how Const. art. 1, งง 3, 14 (due process and cruel punishment) should be harmonized with Const. art. 1, ง 35 (amend. 84) (victims' rights). Harmony can be achieved in one of two ways: (1) we could hold that the victims' rights amendment does not (and cannot) apply to victim impact evidence in death penalty cases, (but such evidence would be admissible in other felony cases); or (2) we can hold that the categories of evidence which are admissible at a death sentencing proceeding can be expanded to include victim impact evidence. [29] Should we adopt the former conclusion, the irony would be that in cases involving the most heinous crimes of all, the victim's representative would be prohibited from making a victim impact statement while in other murder cases, the victim's representative would be allowed to make such a statement. Furthermore, the victims' rights amendment expressly contemplates the right to use victim impact evidence [i]n the event the victim is deceased. We conclude that the second construction more clearly gives meaning to all parts of the Washington State Constitution. Although defendants in capital cases have always had substantial due process rights during the sentencing phase of the trial, the victim also now has constitutional rights [84] and these must be harmonized with the defendant's rights. Bartholomew II held that the state due process clause requires that the Rules of Evidence be applied to capital sentencing proceedings. [85] In order to be admissible, victim impact evidence has to be relevant. [86] ER 401 provides: Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. The pivotal question is the relevance of victim impact evidence to the question which a jury must answer in the death sentencing proceeding. The jury must answer this question: Having in mind the crime of which the defendant has been found guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency? (Italics ours.) RCW 10.95.060(4). The majority of the United States Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (1991) disagreed with that court's prior majority opinion in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 96 L.Ed.2d 440, 107 S.Ct. 2529 (1987) that only the characteristics of the defendant and the circumstances of the crime were relevant to the capital sentencing determination. The Court in Payne noted that the specific harm caused by the murder may play a role in a meaningful assessment of the defendant's moral culpability and blameworthiness, and that the harm caused by a defendant as a result of a crime has historically been an important concern of the criminal law. [87] Certainly, the harm caused in this case includes the loss of a child's life, hopes, and dreams and the grief experienced by the child's family. The Payne majority noted that states cannot preclude the sentencer from considering any relevant mitigating evidence that the defendant proffers, thus requiring that the defendant be treated as a uniquely individual human being. Just as defendants should be treated as unique individuals, evidence should now be allowed to show each victim's uniqueness as an individual human being. In this case, the expected loss to the family of the defendant if he is sentenced to death has been allowed to be considered by the jury in sentencing; surely the loss to the innocent victim's family must be at least as relevant. The majority in Payne said that the Booth Court's ban on victim impact evidence had unfairly weighted the scales in a capital trial โ that while virtually no limits were placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a defendant could introduce concerning his own circumstances, the State was barred from either offering a glimpse of the life which the defendant chose to take or demonstrating the loss to the victim's family and to society. Hence, the Supreme Court in Payne concluded that a state may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed; we do hereby so conclude. We also agree with Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Payne. It addresses the relevancy issue. He explains as follows. Murder has foreseeable consequences and every defendant, if endowed with the mental capacity for criminal responsibility, knows that the life he or she will take by homicidal behavior is that of a unique person and that the person to be killed probably has close associates, survivors, who will suffer harms and deprivations as a result of the victim's death. When a defendant chooses to kill, this necessarily relates to a whole human being and threatens an association of others who may be distinctly hurt. The fact the defendant may not know the details of the victim's life or the needs of the victim's survivors should not obscure the facts that death is always to a unique individual and harm to some group of survivors is a consequence so foreseeable as to be virtually inevitable. The foreseeability of the killing's consequences imbues them with direct moral relevance. [88] In this case, where the murderer was found to have intended to take the life of a child, we cannot simply conclude, as we are asked to do by the Defendant, that the harm caused to that child's family is irrelevant. As Justice O'Connor points out: Murder is the ultimate act of depersonalization. It transforms a living person with hopes, dreams, and fears into a corpse, thereby taking away all that is special and unique about the person. The Constitution does not preclude a State from deciding to give some of that back. (Citation omitted.) Payne, at 832 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Again, we agree. The Washington State Constitution speaks powerfully to these fundamental principles. Const. art. 1, ง 35 (amend. 84) provides in relevant part: To ensure victims a meaningful role in the criminal justice system and to accord them due dignity and respect, victims of crime are hereby granted the following basic and fundamental rights.... a victim of a crime charged as a felony shall have the right ... to make a statement at sentencing ... In the event the victim is deceased,... the prosecuting attorney may identify a representative to appear to exercise the victim's rights. (Italics ours.) The language of Const. art. 1, ง 35 (amend. 84) is without exception. There is nothing in either the language or the history of this amendment to suggest that capital cases should be excepted from the clear wording of the constitutional amendment giving to murder victims' representatives the right to make statements. We conclude that the Legislature and the voters of the State of Washington intended that a crime victim, or a victim's representative, should be allowed to make a statement unless there is a direct constitutional impediment. Once the Supreme Court allowed victim impact evidence in Payne, any per se federal constitutional bar to the admission of such evidence was removed. The mandate of the people of the State of Washington, as expressed through the constitutional amendment processes culminating in adoption of the victims' rights amendment to our state constitution, is to give to victims of crime the right to participate in the judicial process by making a statement at the defendant's sentencing. We are bound to enforce this law absent a constitutional prohibition, [89] and hereby do so. The Defendant in this case also argues that allowing victim impact evidence will really result in allowing victim worth evidence and that the murder of more reputable victims may result in the death penalty for a defendant whereas the murder of those with less stature may not. While we recognize this potential danger, it is not of such consequence that we should disallow all evidence by which the jury learns of the harm caused by the Defendant's crime. The Defendant's argument in this regard essentially involves a policy issue and not a legal issue and we defer to the judgment of the Legislature and the voters on the wisdom of allowing victim impact evidence. Furthermore, we adopt the response of the Supreme Court of Nevada to this same argument: We find the argument unpersuasive. The key to criminal sentencing in capital cases is the ability of the sentencer to focus upon and consider both the individual characteristics of the defendant and the nature and impact of the crime he committed. Only then can the sentencer truly weigh the evidence before it and determine a defendant's just deserts. Apropos to the point is the statement by the venerable Justice Cardozo in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122[, 78 L.Ed. 674, 54 S.Ct. 330, 338] (1934), that justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true. ... [The Defendant] created the evidence portraying the immutably tragic consequences to his victims and their loved ones. He is hardly in a position to complain that a jury of his peers was given a fair exposure to his handiwork. Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 137, 825 P.2d 600, 606-07 (1992). [30] Having decided that there is no federal or state constitutional ban on the admission of victim impact evidence in capital cases, we must decide whether the Legislature must first statutorily authorize such evidence. As explained above, the Legislature has already authorized the admission of all relevant evidence at the special sentencing procedure in a capital case. [90] In Bartholomew II, we narrowed that class of admissible evidence based on this court's construction of the Washington State Constitution. In light of the addition of the victims' rights amendment to our constitution, we now expand the classes of relevant evidence which may constitutionally be admitted to also include victim impact evidence. The special sentencing proceedings statute, RCW 10.95.060, evinces a legislative intent to allow as broad a class of evidence as is constitutionally permissible at the penalty phase of a capital trial. Therefore, we conclude that it would be an unnecessary act to now require the Legislature to again reiterate its intent that a victim impact statement may be made by a murder victim's family member at the sentencing phase of a capital case. The constitutional impediment to the introduction of such evidence having been removed, [91] such evidence was properly admissible under the existing statute. [92] By ruling as we have, we join the majority of states that have considered the issue of victim impact evidence in capital cases and have concluded that it is admissible. [93] We concur with those states that have concluded that some victim impact evidence is relevant, and we conclude that such evidence does not constitute a per se violation of the due process clause of the Washington State Constitution. [31-33] We also conclude that such evidence does not violate our state constitution's prohibition against cruel punishment. [94] In State v. Dodd, 120 Wn.2d 1, 21-22, 838 P.2d 86 (1992), we held that in the context of our death penalty review procedures, we need not interpret Const. art. 1, ง 14, the cruel punishment clause of the state constitution, more broadly than the Eighth Amendment to the federal constitution. In questions regarding the interpretation of Const. art. 1, ง 14, we look to current community standards, objective indicia of which include the statutes and cases of other jurisdictions as well as our own. [95] As noted above, case law from across the country indicates that the introduction of victim impact statements at capital sentencing hearings is increasingly gaining wide acceptance. Many states have enacted statutes which allow for victim impact statements. [96] Because of the general acceptance of victim impact evidence across the country, as well as our own State's acceptance of victim impact evidence, as demonstrated by the adoption of RCW 7.69.030 and Const. art. 1, ง 35 (amend. 84), we conclude that the Washington State Constitution does not provide a per se prohibition against the introduction of such evidence based on the bar to cruel punishment. [34] Because we conclude that victim impact statements do not per se violate the Washington State Constitution, this does not mean that any and all such evidence is admissible. Under Bartholomew II, ER 403 applies to capital sentencing proceedings. This allows a trial court to place certain reasonable limits on the amount and scope of victim impact evidence. The Supreme Court of California, which allows victim impact evidence in a capital case, warns that such evidence is not without limits. We agree. The jury must face its obligations soberly and rationally, and should not be given the impression that it may allow emotion to reign over reason. Therefore, in each case it is the trial court's function to strike a careful balance between the probative and the prejudicial. We agree with the decision in People v. Raley, 2 Cal. 4th 870, 830 P.2d 712, 8 Cal. Rptr.2d 678 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1352 (1993) wherein the California Supreme Court explained a trial court's function in that regard as follows: On the one hand, it should allow evidence and argument on emotional though relevant subjects that could provide legitimate reasons to sway the jury to show mercy or to impose the ultimate sanction. On the other hand, irrelevant information or inflammatory rhetoric that diverts the jury's attention from its proper role or invites an irrational, purely subjective response should be curtailed. Raley, 2 Cal. 4th at 916 (citing People v. Edwards, 54 Cal.3d 787, 836, 819 P.2d 436, 1 Cal. Rptr.2d 631 (1991)). We therefore conclude that victim impact evidence is admissible in the sentencing phase of capital cases and that trial courts, which are experienced in balancing the probative against the prejudicial, should exercise their informed discretion in deciding the scope of permissible victim impact evidence in a given case. In the case before us, there was no error in the admission of the victim's father's statements about his young murdered daughter or about the profound effect of the murder upon her family. As the Payne Court recognized, victim impact evidence may properly include a description of the emotional trauma suffered by the victim's family. The Defendant also argues that the introduction of any victim impact evidence will make the proportionality review engaged in by this court pursuant to RCW 10.95.130(2) impossible because emotional and irrelevant evidence will be introduced. We have already explained above that victim impact evidence is not irrelevant to the jury's decision in the penalty phase of a capital case and such evidence is subject to an ER 403 balancing test by the trial court. The fact that some of the evidence in a murder trial is emotional does not render a proportionality review impossible. A proportionality review is an independent review conducted by this court which focuses on the defendant and on the crime committed and which seeks to avoid the systemic problems of random arbitrariness and the imposition of the death sentence based on race. [97] There is nothing whatsoever about the introduction of constitutionally permissible victim impact evidence which renders that proportionality review impossible.