Opinion ID: 1520697
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Blotting Out of a Substantial Defense

Text: The second part of the Bruce test requires the defendant to prove that trial counsel's incompetence caused him actual prejudice by blotting out the essence of a substantial defense. The burden of proving actual prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is considerable. See Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 435 (D.C.App.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024, 97 S.Ct. 644, 50 L.Ed.2d 626 (1976). A substantial defense lost due to incompetence must be shown to be a defense as a matter of law, and one that is available from the facts and circumstances of the particular case. See Angarano v. United States, 312 A.2d 295, 300 (D.C.App.1973). In determining whether the essence of a substantial defense has been blotted out, this Court must examine trial counsel's conduct and the nature of the defense in light of the totality of the circumstances. Oesby v. United States, supra, 398 A.2d at 8 n.15. The defendant contends that several of his substantial defenses were blotted out by trial counsel's incompetence. First, defendant suggests that trial counsel's failure to file pretrial motions to suppress the in-court identification of the complaining witness and to suppress an inculpatory statement made by defendant to the police after his arrest blotted out his defenses of misidentification and alibi. The defendant also contends trial counsel should have filed motions to dismiss based on pre-indictment delay and failure to provide a speedy trial. Finally, defendant claims that trial counsel's failure to investigate and prepare an alibi defense resulted in that defense being blotted out by witness memory loss. 1. Failure to File Motion to Suppress Defendant's Statement Defendant claims that a motion to suppress an alleged involuntarily procured statement by defendant should have been made by trial counsel. This statement, which was made to the police at the time of defendant's original arrest, placed the defendant at the scene of the robbery. Although no pretrial motion had been filed, the trial Court entertained defendant's oral motion to suppress the statement. The basis of defendant's oral motion was that the defendant's signature did not appear on the waiver [of] rights form. After a bench conference, this motion was held in abeyance until a detective appeared and testified that he had read the defendant his rights prior to the defendant's statement. Trial counsel did not renew his motion to suppress after this testimony. The Court has examined the record and finds as a fact that defendant was informed of his Miranda rights, that he understood his rights and that he thereafter made the statement voluntarily. An attorney is not required to undertake what appears to be fruitless tasks, including the filing of meritless motions. See Oesby v. United States, supra, 398 A.2d at 8. Thus, trial counsel's failure to file a pretrial motion or renew his motion to suppress after the detective testified did not prejudice, much less blot out, defendant's defense of misidentification or alibi. 2. Failure to File Motion to Suppress Identification Defendant contends that trial counsel should have moved to suppress the identification testimony of the complaining witness because of a suggestive pretrial identification. The complaining witness, Mr. Appenzeller, testified at trial that he first identified the defendant seven months after the incident as one of the individuals who robbed and assaulted him. This identification took place during the defendant's juvenile trial. The police officers allegedly pointed to the defendant and asked Mr. Appenzeller whether the defendant was one of his assailants. The Supreme Court, in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), said that an in-court identification of a defendant might constitute a denial of due process if the pretrial identification procedures were unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification. Id. 388 U.S. at 302, 87 S.Ct. at 1972. More recently, in reaffirming the Stovall principle, the Court has held that the taint of improper pretrial identification procedures could be obviated by showing that the witness' original observation of the defendant was reliable. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977). Holding that reliability, not deterrence of improper police procedures, was the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony, id., the Court stated that the indicia of reliability included the opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself. Id. The trial testimony concerning Mr. Appenzeller's first identification of the defendant does not indicate whether it was made under impermissibly suggestive circumstances. Defendant has not provided the Court with any additional evidence of suggestiveness. Nevertheless, the Court finds that even if such evidence were produced, Mr. Appenzeller's original observation of the defendant was sufficiently reliable to remove any taint caused by suggestiveness in the original identification procedures. Mr. Appenzeller testified at trial that two black males, one tall and thin, the other shorter and pudgy, first came into the well-lit construction trailer at midday on September 17, 1975, and asked him whether he was interested in buying radios. Appenzeller was not interested. Approximately four hours later, Appenzeller saw these same two individuals come back inside the trailer while he was talking on the telephone. After Appenzeller put the receiver down, he had a gun placed to his head, and was tied up, beaten and robbed. Mr. Appenzeller testified that the defendant was the short pudgy man who participated in the robbery and assault. While Appenzeller's first positive identification of the defendant took place seven months after the robbery, the record indicates that he was certain at this later date that the defendant was one of his assailants. Under these circumstances, the Court finds that Mr. Appenzeller's in-court identification of the defendant was proper. Trial counsel's failure to make the meritless motion to suppress identification caused the defendant no actual prejudice. 3. Failure to File Motion to Dismiss for Pre-indictment Delay Defendant contends that trial counsel should have moved to dismiss the indictment because of excessive pre-indictment delay. There was a sixteen month period of time between the robbery and the filing of the indictment charging the defendant with armed robbery and lesser crimes. A Fifth Amendment Due Process claim based on pre-indictment delay is made concrete and ripe for adjudication not by a mere lapse of time, but by proof of actual prejudice. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2048, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977);1 Jefferson v. United States, 382 A.2d 1030, 1033 (D.C.App.1978). Defendant claims actual prejudice because the potential alibi witness, his mother, can no longer remember whether she was with the defendant on the day the offense was committed. Standing alone, such speculative allegations of faded witness memory do not constitute actual prejudice. See United States v. Blevins, 593 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1979). In addition, the defendant's mother testified at the evidentiary hearing that she did not remember in May of 1976 whether the defendant was with her during the time of the robbery on September 17, 1975. This testimony suggests that even if the indictment had been filed promptly after Mr. Appenzeller's identification in April 1976, the defendant's alibi defense would not have been prejudiced. Trial counsel's failure to file such a motion to dismiss caused the defendant no actual prejudice.