Opinion ID: 558096
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sentencing: Relevant Conduct

Text: 24 Lastly, Townley objects to the inclusion of additional, uncharged drug amounts in computing his sentence under the Guidelines' relevant conduct provisions, see U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3. Townley argues that the sentence violated his due process right to make the Government prove these offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Our previous precedents have consistently rejected such claims. See, e.g., United States v. Sleet, 893 F.2d 947, 949 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Gooden, 892 F.2d 725, 727-28 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 2594, 110 L.Ed.2d 274 (1990). Relying on McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.), we concluded that a preponderance of the evidence suffices for determinations at sentencing. Gooden, 892 F.2d at 727-28. 25 We nonetheless observe the unusual nature of the sentencing determination in this case. Here, the Government charged and proved only a single drug infraction involving 27 grams of cocaine. Yet, the Government urged the court to sentence Townley for his alleged participation in a multi-person cocaine conspiracy entailing nearly 6,000 grams. These 6,000 grams produced an 18-level increase in Townley's base offense level and a seven-fold increase in the permissible sentencing range. Under such circumstances, due process conceivably could require more than a mere preponderance. At the very least, McMillan allows for the possibility that the preponderance standard the Court approved for garden variety sentencing determinations may fail to comport with due process where, as here, a sentence enhancement factor becomes a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense. 477 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. at 2417. 4 26 The Third Circuit recently deemed the preponderance standard of McMillan inadequate under seemingly analogous circumstances. United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1101 (3d Cir.1990). In Kikumura, the Guidelines dictated a range of twenty-seven to thirty-three months imprisonment (level 18) for passport offenses and possession of explosives. However, upon finding that the defendant acquired the explosives as an international terrorist and planned to kill large numbers of people, the district court departed upward and imposed a sentence of thirty years (equivalent to level 40). The Third Circuit concluded:This is perhaps the most dramatic example imaginable of a sentencing hearing that functions as a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. at 2417. In this extreme context, we believe, a court cannot reflexively apply the truncated procedures that are perfectly adequate for all of the more mundane, familiar sentencing determinations. 27 Id. at 1100-01. The court went on to hold that, under these circumstances, due process requires clear and convincing evidentiary support for the facts relied upon to enhance the sentence. Id. at 1102. 28 We do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case, such as this one, the clear and convincing standard adopted by our sister circuit might apply. Nevertheless, we do not adopt the clear and convincing standard here. Rather, we leave that question for another day, because in our view, the Government's evidence cannot withstand scrutiny even under the preponderance standard applicable to the usual case. See United States v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458, 464 (8th Cir.1990). 29 The Government urges us to uphold the district court's determination with respect to (1) the 1,857 grams of cocaine from Blunt's apartment, and (2) the four kilograms of cocaine from the bus station incident. However, for the reasons discussed below, we possess a definite and firm conviction that consideration of these quantities constituted error. Accordingly, we reverse. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 541, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948).
30 The Government argues that the cocaine from Blunt's apartment constitutes relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a)(2). Under that section, which applies to drug distribution offenses, relevant conduct encompasses all such acts and omissions that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a)(2) & comment. (backg'd.). From the Government's viewpoint, the Blunt cocaine comprised part of a common scheme or plan, because: (1) the confidential informant asserted that both Blunt's and Townley's apartments housed drugs or drug proceeds, (2) both apartments actually contained cocaine and Blunt's apartment contained cash, (3) both apartments housed identical lock boxes containing either cocaine or cocaine traces, and (4) Townley and Blunt corresponded about Jaguar Productions. We remain unconvinced. 31 At a minimum, the Government must prove the factual prerequisites to a sentence enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458, 464 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Streeter, 907 F.2d 781, 792 (8th Cir.1990). In this case, the Government must show that Townley possessed a personal interest in or responsibility for the Blunt cocaine. Under the Guidelines, this requirement could be satisfied by proof that Townley aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured or willfully caused the presence or processing of the cocaine in Blunt's apartment. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3, comment. (nn. 1-2). Alternatively, the Government could show that the Blunt cocaine fell within the scope of criminal activity jointly undertaken by Townley and reasonably foreseeable to him. Id. 32 The Government does not contend that its evidence satisfies the first alternative. As to the second alternative, we note that the Government elected not to charge this case as a conspiracy. Although not dispositive, we pause to question whether the Government itself believed that it possessed probable cause to charge joint criminal activity, much less a preponderance of proof. Cf. United States v. Byrd, 898 F.2d 450, 453 (5th Cir.1990) (An indictment is a conclusive finding that there is probable cause to believe that the allegations in the indictment took place). 33 We further observe that the Government, in attempting to associate Townley with the Blunt cocaine, relies heavily on the hearsay allegations of a still-undisclosed informant. Our prior cases indicate our concern about the reliability of hearsay statements in the sentencing context. See, e.g., United States v. Cammisano, 917 F.2d 1057, 1062 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100, 103-04 (8th Cir.1990). Such misgivings are especially fitting here. 34 We have previously noted the inconclusive nature of the informant's statements in this case. See supra note 3. Additionally, the fact that the police investigation failed to corroborate critical aspects of the informant's story amplifies our concerns. Most significantly, the police search of Townley's apartment failed to produce the alleged drug proceeds. These drug proceeds formed the sole objective means of verifying the informant's accusations with respect to Townley. They also formed the only direct link between Townley and the purported drug dealings between Blunt and Townley's half-brother. Moreover, the Government never called the informant, or any other knowledgeable person, to explain the absence of the proceeds or to delineate the connections now alleged between these three individuals. Cf. United States v. Winfrey, 900 F.2d 1225, 1228 (8th Cir.1990) (co-conspirator testifies at trial about defendant's participation); United States v. Mann, 877 F.2d 688, 690 (8th Cir.1989) (DEA agent observes working relationship between defendant and cocaine supplier). 35 The remainder of the Government's evidence renders us no more certain. The Government produced no chemical evidence to establish that the cocaine found in Townley's and Blunt's apartments came from the same source. 5 Moreover, the lock box from Townley's apartment creates negligible grounds for suspicion--particularly in the absence of testimony from the informant identifying the lock box as one of the aluminum containers earlier observed in Blunt's apartment. Lastly, we point out that the Government failed to present one iota of evidence connecting Jaguar Productions to drug activity. Cf. United States v. Koonce, 884 F.2d 349, 352 (8th Cir.1989) (defendant's correspondence contained explicit reference to continuing criminal enterprise). The Government nowhere contradicted Townley's testimony that Jaguar Productions constituted a legitimate business enterprise and sought no details about its records or operations. 36 Under the circumstances, we conclude that the Government failed to prove that Townley joined his half-brother and Blunt in a cocaine distribution scheme. We therefore hold that the district court erred in sentencing Townley for the cocaine from Blunt's apartment. See United States v. North, 900 F.2d 131, 133 (8th Cir.1990).
37 The Government likewise urges us to include the four kilograms of cocaine from the bus station incident. According to the Government, the fact that Townley arrived at the bus station, wearing a pager and a medallion, to pick up passengers bearing similar medallions, a picture of Townley and cocaine destined for Townley's half-brother renders the cocaine from this incident attributable to Townley. 38 In our view, however, the Government's evidence lacks one crucial element: knowledge. Nowhere does the Government establish that Townley knowingly assisted his half-brother's purported drug operation. Although Townley could have been a culpable participant, he also could have embarked on an innocent favor. Cf. United States v. Lawrence, 918 F.2d 68, 70-71 (8th Cir.1990) (defendant accompanied co-conspirator on a drug buy and knowingly carried a pouch of cocaine). None of the Government's evidence, including the medallions, the group picture and the hearsay statements of Dominica Ashford, prove inconsistent with a favor analysis. Furthermore, the Government has yet to present evidence that Townley carried the pager other than in connection with his legitimate insurance saleswork. 39 The Government makes much of the fact that Townley, during the heat of a drug interrogation, attempted to disassociate himself from his half-brother. While this factor may suggest that Townley ultimately came to know the purpose of his errand, it reveals little about Townley's intent at the time he set out for the bus station. 40 The implicit assertion in the Government's case is that Townley must have known about drugs allegedly destined for his half-brother. Yet, the Government presented no proof that Townley even maintained regular contact with his half-brother, much less knew the workings of his half-brother's alleged illicit activities. Cf. United States v. Frondle, 918 F.2d 62, 65 (8th Cir.1990) (defendant admits knowledge of alleged co-conspirator's operation). We cannot tolerate this kind of guilt by association. Stripped of its improper inferences, the Government's allegations against Townley stand as bare conjecture. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in sentencing Townley for the cocaine from the bus station incident. See United States v. Rivera, 898 F.2d 442, 445-46 (5th Cir.1990).