Opinion ID: 168154
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Johnson next argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for JM OL because there was insufficient evidence to support the mixed-motive defense. W e review the district court’s refusal to grant JM OL de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. M ason v. Okla. Tpk. Auth., 115 F.3d 1442, 1450 (10th Cir. 1997). Under that standard, “we view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” Webco Indus., Inc., 278 F.3d at 1123. “[J]udgment as a matter of law is warranted only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting the party opposing the motion.” M ason, 115 F.3d at 1450. It is well established that “[t]he jury . . . has the exclusive function of appraising credibility, determining the weight to be given to the testimony, drawing inferences from the facts established, resolving conflicts in the evidence, and reaching ultimate conclusions of fact.” Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Sw. Pub. Serv. Co., 104 F.3d 1205, 1212 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotations omitted). To prevail in a mixed-motive case, an employer does not need to provide direct evidence that it would have made the same decision even in the absence of an improper motive. See Foster v. Univ. of Ark., 938 F.2d 111, 114 (8th Cir. 1991). Rather, an employer may satisfy its burden on the mixed-motive defense by presenting sufficient objective evidence from which the jury could reasonably -14- conclude that the employee’s job performance was so unsatisfactory that he would have been discharged even in the absence of an improper motive. See id. The City presented evidence that it found Johnson’s performance in connection with the M aples arrest to be unsatisfactory and cited what is saw as Johnson’s incompetence as a reason for terminating his employment. Although Johnson presented some evidence that the M aples arrest was supported by probable cause, he admits that there was contrary evidence on this point, Aplt. Opening Br. at 24. W e do not weigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. M ason, 115 F.3d at 1450. After careful review of the record, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Johnson’s performance in the M aples arrest, view ed in context of the specific counseling and training the City had provided to Johnson, was sufficiently unsatisfactory that the City would have terminated his employment even in the absence of a retaliatory motive. Johnson’s specific arguments to the contrary lack merit. First, he asserts that it is undisputed that no TPD officer had ever been terminated for incompetence or for a bad DUI arrest. Even if true, this bald fact does not necessitate a finding that the City’s reasons in this case were not mixed. Johnson’s entire chain of command emphasized that Johnson had received additional SFST training shortly before the M aples arrest and failed to perform -15- appropriate SFSTs on M aples. Thus, this case involved more than simple incompetence or a single bad DUI arrest. Second, Johnson argues that the percentage of suspects he arrested for DU I that tested below the legal limit was less than the department-wide average. 6 The implication we ostensibly are to draw is that this statistic means the City should not have terminated his employment. However, it was not Johnson’s percentage of low breath tests that motivated his discharge, but rather his performance in the M aples arrest viewed in the context of the specific counseling and training he had received. Thus, the jury was free to reach its conclusion despite any statistical comparison favorable to Johnson that the evidence may have supported. Third, Johnson points to testimony concerning a comparison case in which other officers beat and falsely arrested a suspect outside of their jurisdiction and lied to IA investigators to conceal their conduct. Johnson contends that this conduct was w orse than his arrest of M aples yet those officers w ere only disciplined, not discharged, suggesting that his own discharge was fabricated. However, there was no evidence that those officers had a history of poor performance in an area in which they had just received specific counseling and training, which was the basis for Chief Palmer’s opinion that the other case was less serious than Johnson’s. Although M erchant testified that the comparison 6 Apparently, this argument concerns Johnson’s DUI arrests in 2001, as Pierce’s N ovember 2000 report showed his percentage of low breath test results was higher than the department average. -16- case was worse and warranted discharge, that opinion does not undermine the fact that M erchant also recommended termination based on Johnson’s arrest of M aples. That the City did not discharge the other officers, therefore, is an insufficient basis for JM OL in Johnson’s favor. Johnson offers no argument concerning the other non-retaliatory basis for discharge proffered by the City, namely, his false or incorrect testimony. Accordingly, we need not address it. 7 To the extent Johnson’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence implicates Instruction No. 4, the mixed-motive instruction, our review is limited to plain error review because he did not object to that instruction in the district court, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(2). As sufficient evidence supported the defense, we see no plain error. In sum, we conclude that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that the C ity would have discharged Johnson even in the absence of a retaliatory motive. As discussed below, the fact that there was no evidence of or instruction regarding the CBA did not impermissibly affect that finding. 7 Johnson argues for the first time in his reply brief, and without citation to any legal authority, that the mixed-motive defense fails because the City did not avail itself of any of a number of established methods of carrying its burden of proof. W e decline to consider non-jurisdictional arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief, Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 1994), or arguments not supported by any legal authority, see Phillips v. Calhoun, 956 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Cir. 1992). -17-