Opinion ID: 658168
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unreasonable Delay In Execution Of The Warrant

Text: 17 Williams next argues that, following the report from the confidential informant on October 22, 1992, cocaine was no longer present in the residence, probable cause for the warrant had evaporated, and therefore, the warrant was no longer valid when it was executed on October 30, 1992. Williams contends that the eight-day delay in execution of the search warrant was unreasonable. 18 We agree with Williams that, after learning from the informant that the cocaine was no longer in the apartment but that a new shipment would be arriving within a week, the better practice would have been for the officers to return to the court to update the information supporting the October 22, 1992 warrant and obtain a new warrant. However, the failure to return to court and seek a new warrant did not invalidate the search warrant in the present case because probable cause continued to exist at the time the warrant was executed. 19 Whether the period of delay between issuance and execution of a warrant is reasonable necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The present case comes within the ambit of United States v. Shegog, 787 F.2d 420 (8th Cir.1986) (Shegog ). In Shegog, Gregory Shegog argued that an eight-day delay between the issuance and execution of a search warrant was unreasonable and invalidated the search. A reliable, confidential informant informed detectives that Shegog was selling phencyclidine (PCP) from a particular residence. The informant told the detectives that he had been inside the residence in question and had seen a large quantity of PCP. Consequently, the detectives applied for and obtained a state search warrant on March 4, 1985. Later that same day, the confidential informant notified the detectives that the drugs at Shegog's residence had been shipped out but that more was expected to come in. On March 12, 1985, eight days after the search warrant had been issued, the informant told the detectives that the new shipment of drugs had arrived at Shegog's house. The detectives immediately executed the warrant and seized large quantities of drugs and packaging materials. 20 Like the present case, the record in Shegog indicated that probable cause existed on March 4, 1985, at the time the search warrant was issued, to believe that drugs and currency would be found at Shegog's residence. The Shegog court held that the search warrant was not unreasonably executed eight days later because probable cause continued to exist to believe that drugs would be found at the residence in question. Shegog, 787 F.2d at 422. Shegog concluded that probable cause continued to exist when the warrant was executed due to the continuing and ongoing nature of the suspected criminal activity and similarity of facts existing at the time the warrant was issued and the time the warrant was executed. Id. at 423. 21 In determining whether probable cause dissipated over time, a court must 'evaluate the nature of the criminal activity and the kind of property for which authorization to search is sought.'  United States v. Simpkins, 914 F.2d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir.1990) (Simpkins) (quoting United States v. Foster, 711 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103, 104 S.Ct. 1602, 80 L.Ed.2d 132 (1984)). The present case parallels Shegog. The facts supporting the issuance of the warrant on October 22, 1992, to search the Chalmette apartment for quantities of cocaine substantially correspond to those facts existing on October 30, 1992, when the warrant was executed. Further, the continuing and ongoing nature of cocaine trafficking supports the continued existence of probable cause. It is reasonable for law enforcement officers to conclude that large-scale drug operations continued at the same location for a period of time. 3 Simpkins, 914 F.2d at 1059. 22 As in Shegog, we note that the issue of whether the delay in execution of the search warrant was unreasonable is a question that could have easily been avoided had the officers applied for and obtained a second search warrant on the basis of the informant's additional information regarding Williams' drug trafficking activities. Rather than speculate whether probable cause continued to exist, the better practice is to return to court and update the information and obtain a new warrant. 23