Opinion ID: 2320334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Jencks Act and Brady Issues

Text: After trial, appellants learned that, before trial was underway, the MPD had been conducting an administrative investigation and disciplinary proceeding into Officer Gibson and her partner, Officer Anderson, focusing on the manner in which they had processed the crash scene on 20th Street. Specifically, the MPD had inquired as to whether Gibson carelessly had overlooked the rusted gun later found in the station wagon, and whether she had mislabeled other evidence. Appellants accordingly filed motions under D.C.Code § 23-110 (2001) to vacate sentence based on newly discovered evidence. Appellants claimed that the government intentionally had suppressed sworn exculpatory statementsJencks statements by Gibson, made during the disciplinary proceeding which the government could have disclosed before the verdict but withheld. [19] Attached to the motion were several documents that appellants claimed the prosecutor should have disclosed at trial pursuant either to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994) (requiring production at trial of any statement by a witness, called by the prosecution, that relates to the subject matter of the witness's direct testimony) or to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (Fifth Amendment due process requires government, upon defendant's request, to disclose in time for trial any evidence in its possession both favorable to defendant and material to guilt or punishment). Among the sworn statements previously undisclosed was one by Gibson on March 22, 1994, in which she revealed to an MPD investigator that, from the time the police had arrived at the 20th Street location until the crime scene investigation began, an hour had passed as a result of a jurisdictional dispute between the Mobile Crime Lab Unit and the 5th District Crime Scene Search Unit. In addition, Gibson attempted to explain why the MPD had found shells and a handgun in the brown station wagon ten months later on the second search: Almost anything could have contributed to the evidence surfacing. . . . I am human and sometimes humans do err. I would take full responsibility for the allegations brought forth in the complaint if there weren't any discrepancies. However, there are many. Was a gun overlooked in the auto at the crime scene? Did at least two Crime Scene Search Officers and possibly others overlook a gun in the auto? Certainly a gun was found in the auto almost a year later but was it always in the auto? The vehicle was not sealed at any time in my presence or anytime thereafter. Therefore the auto was accessible to anyone even though it may have been stored on a police facility. . . . Did someone store the gun in [the] auto after it was towed for storage and simply forgot it was there? Did someone put the gun in the auto after it was towed and maybe others prevented him/her from retrieving it such as sickness, incarceration or even death? One thing is clear. Thirteen pieces of evidence were recovered from the scene. Clearly, there were concerted efforts made to retrieve all evidence connected with the case. [Emphasis added.] Gibson further acknowledged that her initial item descriptions from her investigation had been erroneous, and that she had not completed new forms correcting them, which would explain the discrepancies between the evidence reports she prepared and Hickman's evidence reports from the 20th Street crime scene. Gibson explained that she thought Hickman had rectified the discrepancies by initialing Hickman's correct descriptions on the evidence bags. The discrepancies in Gibson's and Hickman's reports related only to the shell casings, not at all to the other evidence. Under questioning by the investigating officer, Sergeant Yvette Tate, about the newspaper in the station wagon where the rusted gun later had been found, Gibson answered: Tate: Did you observe [on May 10, 1993] any newspaper in the car? If so where was it located? Gibson: I recall seeing newspaper but I don't remember where. Tate: When did you observe the newspaper? Was it after your photos were printed? Gibson: Yes. Tate: Did you look underneath the newspaper? Gibson: I don't remember seeing the newspaper until after I saw the photos. Tate: Was there evidence underneath the newspaper? Gibson: I can't recall. [handwritten: No I did not see any newspaper.] [initialed TG]. The transcript also indicates that a union representative, Marcello Muzzati, noted on behalf of Gibson: [W]e object to this statement due to the fact that we were willing to waive the 45 day rule in order not to create additional [J]en[c]ks material. The motions judge found no Jencks Act or Brady violations, although he did find that Gibson's failure to make known her disciplinary statements was intentional and that this act of bad faith must be imputed to the government. Because all evidence from Gibson's disciplinary proceeding will be available at a retrial, Jones v. United States, 719 A.2d 92 (D.C.1998), any possible Brady or Jencks Act violation is relevant only to Bell's ADW (Douglas) and related weapons convictions derived from the crash scene, and thus we review this issue only as it relates to these charges. The record makes clear that none of these Bell convictions was dependent to any meaningful extent on Gibson's trial testimony, and that none would have been undermined appreciably by impeachment derived from her disciplinary proceeding. The only evidence of the assault on Officer Douglas (and related weapons offenses) was the testimony of Officers Douglas and Brown. Specifically, Brown and Douglas pursued a station wagon until it crashed; Brown identified Bell as the blue-shirted suspect from that vehicle, at the crash site, who fired what appeared to be a gun at Douglas; like Brown, Douglas saw the muzzle flashes; Bell himself admitted that he'd been in the vehicle at the crash site; Brown saw Bell fleeing from the station wagon; crime scene officers, including but not limited to Gibson, retrieved a 9mm Smith & Wesson pistol from Bell's flight paththe gun that Brown described; Brown also identified photographs of the crash scene and the 9mm Smith & Wesson pistol found there; a ballistic expert testified that this pistol was operable; and the record reflects that Bell had no license to carry a pistol. Accordingly, Gibson's statements at trialeven if strickenor at her disciplinary proceedingeven if producedwould not have affected the outcome in a way that triggers Brady or Jencks Act sanctions. Specifically, as to the convictions that arise from the assault on Douglas, the failure to disclose Gibson's disciplinary proceeding in full was not so serious that there would have been a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (applying Brady ); accord Johnson v. United States, 537 A.2d 555, 559-60 (D.C.1988). Nor is there a reasonable likelihood that disclosure would have had a significant effect on the outcome of the trial or produced a different result. Moore v. United States, 657 A.2d 1148, 1152 (D.C.1995) (applying The Jencks Act). It is important to note, finally, that even though the motions judge found that the government had acted in bad faith by intentionally withholding the very fact of Gibson's disciplinary proceeding from the jury, that evidentiary omission at most had legal relevance to the planted gun theory of the defense. That theorybecause it concerned only a rusted .32 caliber pistol found inside the station wagonwas entirely unrelated to the crash site convictions based on the 9mm Smith & Wesson. And, in any event, Brady is not used to punish the government for conduct that would not, with reasonable probability, affect the outcome. See Johnson, 537 A.2d at 559-60. Nor did the withheld fact of the disciplinary proceeding, combined with the government's bad faith, comprise, without more, a statement subject to Jencks Act sanctions. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e); see also Hilliard v. United States, 638 A.2d 698, 704-05 (D.C.1994) (foundational requirement[] for production under Jencks Act is that material constitute a `statement'). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Bell's ADW conviction (Officer Douglas) and the related counts for PFCV, PPW, and CPWL at the crash site. However, we reverse Webb's and McClain's convictions on all charges, and reverse Bell's convictions for first-degree murder while armed, Bell's two AWIK convictions, the ADW conviction, and Bell's conviction for PFCV as to Tillman and the related assaults. We remand this case for a new trial of all defendants on all charges on which we reverse. So ordered.