Opinion ID: 2611058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 35

Heading: Privileges and immunities and equal protection challenges

Text: Defendant argues that ORS 163.095(2)(e) is unconstitutional because its terms can be selectively applied by prosecutors based upon arbitrary, haphazard and ad hoc decisions concerning whether to charge a person with aggravated murder by concealment or regular murder based upon the same conduct. He reasons that, under the standards articulated in State v. Freeland, 295 Or. 367, 667 P.2d 509 (1983), and State v. Pirkey, 203 Or. 697, 704-05, 281 P.2d 698 (1955), the challenged section of the aggravated murder statute violates the state privileges and immunities clause (Art. I, § 20) and the federal equal protection clause (Am. XIV). In State v. Freeland , Justice Linde, writing for a majority of the court, identified two categories of unequal treatment that may offend Article I, section 20: `Haphazard' or standardless administration, in which the procedure is chosen ad hoc without striving for consistency among similar cases, differs from impermissible classification, because a systematic practice of following one or the other procedure in identifiable types of cases or circumstances itself reflects some articulable policy toward classes of cases. The quoted reference in [ State v. ] Edmonson, [291 Or. 251, 254, 630 P.2d 822 (1981)], above, to `social, geographic, or other classes of defendants' only relates to the validity of such a policy. An individual challenging purely ad hoc, unsystematic use or denial of one or the other procedure need not show that he has been discriminated against on grounds that would be invalid if they were the basis of a systematic policy. 295 Or. at 374, 667 P.2d 509 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). Freeland analyzed whether a prosecutor's use of two charging procedures ( i.e., grand jury or preliminary hearing) adhered to sufficiently consistent standards to represent a coherent, systematic policy, even when not promulgated in the form of rules of guidelines. On the factual record (which included prosecutorial reliance upon administrative convenience, minimization of cross-examination and an individual deputy's personal preference), Justice Linde wrote: We agree with the circuit court that even without such ad hominem discrimination, the present case falls within the principle that equal treatment may not be denied `haphazardly' by ad hoc decisions that, as the court quoted from [ State v. Edmonson, supra , ] 291 Or. at 254 [630 P.2d 822], do not `uniformly rest on meaningful criteria that indeed make the privileges of a preliminary hearing equally available to all persons similarly situated, or, in the constitutional phrase, upon the same terms.' In State v. Pirkey , a former statute (Or. Laws 1949, ch. 129, § 1) made it a crime to draw a check with insufficient funds, but it gave unfettered discretion to the grand jury or magistrate (to whom the complaint is made or the action tried) to proceed against the defendant by a felony or a misdemeanor. In declaring the statute unconstitutional, this court stated: So far as the statute is concerned, the same identical act, under the same circumstances, may constitute a felonious crime when committed by one person, and a misdemeanor when committed by another.       [S]ince the statute itself furnishes no criterion by which to determine when an accused is to be charge with felony, and when with a misdemeanor, the statute, at least insofar as it provides for alternative charges, must be void by reason of constitutional mandate   . Defendant acknowledges that in State v. Reynolds, supra, 289 Or. at 538-40, 614 P.2d 1158, this court found no constitutional violation of the aggravated felony murder statute, ORS 163.095(2)(d), wherein the court reasoned that a prosecutor's discretion is not unfettered because a criterion existed for the charging decision. The aggravated felony murder statute is distinguishable from its unaggravated counterpart, ORS 163.115(1)(b), based upon the additional element of personal commission of the homicide. Nevertheless, defendant argues that the section defining aggravated murder by concealment, ORS 163.095(2)(e), is indistinguishable from the unaggravated felony murder section, ORS 163.115(1)(b), and, thus, prosecutorial discretion is not adequately limited concerning which offense to charge. Defendant asserts that regular felony murder involves the commission of a killing in the course of and in furtherance of or during immediate flight from a committed or attempted commission of certain specified felonies, ORS 163.115(1)(b). Flight necessarily constitute an effort to conceal. Likewise, an effort to conceal necessarily occurs in furtherance of the underlying crime. Thus, defendant claims that ORS 163.095(2)(e) violates the principles of Freeland, Pirkey, Article I, section 20, and the Fourteenth Amendment. ORS 163.095(2)(e) is separate from simple felony-murder. The statute requires proof that the murder was committed intentionally and for a specific purpose  to conceal the commission of a separate crime or the identity of the crime's perpetrators. The simple felony-murder statute requires neither intent nor purpose to conceal the commission of a separate crime or to conceal the identity of the perpetrators. It applies whenever a person is killed during the course of certain felonies. The statutes are not indistinguishable as claimed by defendant. Because they are distinguishable, prosecutorial discretion is adequately limited.