Opinion ID: 2084047
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sentence Constitutionality and Reasonableness

Text: Imposing the maximum possible sentence on each count, the trial court enhanced the 30 year presumptive sentence for Class A felonies by 20 years and sentenced the defendant to 50 years imprisonment on each of the three counts of kidnapping. Similarly, the two year presumptive sentence for Class D felonies was enhanced by two years for sentences of four years on each of the three counts of criminal recklessness. In addition the trial court imposed the maximum one year sentence for the Class A misdemeanor handgun violation. The court ordered the three 50-year sentences to be served consecutively with the other sentences to run concurrently, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 150 years. The defendant argues that the enhancement of the presumptive sentence on multiple counts, coupled with imposition of consecutive sentences, constitutes disproportionate sentencing as well as cruel and unusual punishment. He also contends that the sentences are manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the defendant pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 17, formerly Ind. Appellate Review of Sentences Rules 1 and 2. The defendant claims that the enhancements to the maximum on each count, coupled with imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent sentences, particularly when the offenses arise from a single continuous transaction, failed to comply with the requirements of Ind. Code §§ 35-38-1-3, 35-38-1-7, and 35-50-2-5. This assertion is not supported by cogent argument or citation to authority, and we are aware of none. In fact, there is no constitutional or statutory prohibition against using the same factors to both enhance a sentence and impose consecutive sentences. Bish v. State (1981), Ind., 421 N.E.2d 608; Abercrombie v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 407, 417 N.E.2d 316. Moreover, a court may properly rely on prior and distinct offenses to enhance and impose consecutive sentences. Sage v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 699, 419 N.E.2d 1286; Jackson v. State (1982), Ind. App., 441 N.E.2d 29. The defendant further argues that the Court failed to consider evidence of his mental state and motive as mitigating factors. The presumptive sentences were enhanced upon the trial court's finding of aggravating circumstances from prior convictions for crimes of violence including robbery, 1978; rape, 1985; escape, 1974; and sexual battery, 1985. As a separate basis for ordering Counts I, II, and III served consecutively, the trial court identified as further aggravating circumstances that any lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the offense and that the defendant was in need of rehabilitative services as provided in an institution. During the sentencing hearing, the trial court expressly stated that he had listened for mitigating factors and I've not really heard any. Record at 1993. Failure to find mitigating circumstances when clearly supported by the record may imply that they were overlooked and not properly considered. Jones v. State (1984), Ind., 467 N.E.2d 681. However, there is no duty on the trial court to make an affirmative finding expressly negating each potentially mitigating circumstance. Stout v. State (1988), Ind., 528 N.E.2d 476; Stark v. State (1986), Ind., 489 N.E.2d 43. In Hammons v. State (1986), Ind., 493 N.E.2d 1250, 1254-55, we observed: When a defendant argues mitigating circumstances to the trial court, the sentencing judge is not obligated to explain why he has chosen not to make a finding of mitigation. This is particularly true when an examination of the underlying record shows the highly disputable nature of the mitigating factors. Moreover, the trial court is not obligated to credit or weigh the defendant's evidence of mitigating circumstances the same way the defendant does. [Citations omitted.] The evidence of the defendant's mental state was conflicting and disputed. It does not clearly support a claim of impaired mental condition as a mitigating circumstance which necessarily should have been considered by the trial court as a mitigating circumstance. The defendant requests that this Court find the sentence imposed to be disproportionate, manifestly unreasonable, and cruel and unusual. Pursuant to Fointno v. State (1986), Ind., 487 N.E.2d 140, and Hill v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 1103, we recognize that the present aggregate sentence of 150 years is disproportionate at first blush. Further, we are not insensitive to the defendant's suggestion of the possibility that his aggressive assertion of what he perceived to be his rights may have so impinged upon the patience of the trial court as to lead the court into the imposition of a sentence excessive by its language and its terms. The State responds that the sentence imposed was barely adequate, considering the defendant's terrorizing conduct, likelihood of recurrence, prior convictions for violent crimes, refusal to accept responsibility, absence of remorse, and the threatening of his victims with guns and death. We acknowledge the aggravating factors cited by the State, and note in addition that the defendant's conduct in this case consisted of continuous criminal conduct lasting more than sixteen hours and placed at serious risk of death or substantial injury not only the three hostages but also law enforcement officials and other persons. Considering the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, we decline to find the sentence imposed to be manifestly unreasonable, disproportionate, or cruel and unusual. At the same time, however, we consider it significant here that the defendant ultimately chose to refrain from inflicting bodily injury upon his hostages. The relevance of this factor was discussed in Fointno. While the absence of such conduct does not in any way lessen the severity of the crimes as such, and thus does not constitute a mitigating factor justifying a reduction or suspension of the presumptive sentence, the presence of aggravated brutality distinguishes the defendants who commit such acts and justifies a substantially aggravated term where it is present. We do not by this observation debase the seriousness of these crimes themselves. Nor do we suggest that the absence of collateral brutality prevents the imposition of an enhanced sentence. Nevertheless, a rational sentencing scheme should punish more severely those who brutalize the victims of their crimes. 487 N.E.2d at 148 (emphasis in original). A conviction for the offense of kidnapping is punished as a Class A felony, regardless of whether bodily injury is inflicted during the commission of the crime. Ind. Code § 35-42-3-2. The absence of such injury does not diminish the severity of the penalty range to that prescribed for Class B felonies. It is only through the sentencing process that distinctions may be made. While we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in its determination of the sentence, appropriate use of Article 7 Section 4 of the Constitution of Indiana, granting to this Court the power to review and revise sentences in criminal cases, may provide an incentive that might discourage future hostage-takers from injuring innocent people. Considering these factors, we elect to exercise our constitutional authority to review and revise the sentences for counts I, II and III. We now order that the defendant be sentenced to 45 years on each of counts I, II, and III, with the sentences under counts II and III to run concurrently with each other and consecutive to the sentence on count I, for an aggregate sentence of 90 years on these counts.