Opinion ID: 2679929
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Maximum Period of Incarceration

Text: [¶20] In determining the maximum period of incarceration, a sentencing court should consider all relevant factors not taken into account in the basic sentence, which “include, but are not limited to, the character of the offender and the offender’s criminal history, the effect of the offense on the victim and the protection of the public interest.” 17-A M.R.S. 1252-C(2) (2013). 11 [¶21] In this case, the court found that there were ten aggravating factors: the impact on the victim and the victim’s family, Hayden’s refusal to take responsibility—and as a result forcing his son to testify against him, Hayden’s lack of remorse, his prior criminal history, his volatile unstable character, his history of substance abuse, the likelihood that he will reoffend, and the need to protect the public interest. The court found only one mitigating factor, the nature and existence of the Hayden’s family support, which it determined was of minimal significance. [¶22] Hayden challenges only two of the aggravating factors found by the court. He argues that the court abused its discretion when it found that he would reoffend and when it considered, as an aggravating factor, the fact that he took his case to trial with the knowledge that his eight-year-old son would have to testify against him. Hayden’s first argument is easily dismissed. He has an extensive criminal record that the court could consider as raising the probability that he would reoffend. See State v. Berube, 1997 ME 165, ¶ 13, 698 A.2d 509. His second argument, however, raises a more complex issue. [¶23] Every criminal defendant must be able to exercise his or her constitutional right to a trial by jury without fear of a more severe sentence for doing so unsuccessfully. State v. Grindle, 2008 ME 38, ¶ 15, 942 A.2d 673; State v. Farnham, 479 A.2d 887, 891 (Me. 1984). We have vacated sentences imposed 12 in violation of this principle. See, e.g., State v. Dansinger, 521 A.2d 685, 690 & n.7 (Me. 1987); State v. Sutherberg, 402 A.2d 1294, 1296-97 (Me. 1979). But we have also stated that “[t]here is a clear-cut distinction between enhancing a sentence because the convicted defendant insisted on a trial and considering that fact along with others in assessing . . . [a] defendant’s claim of remorse and reform at the time of sentencing.” Farnham, 479 A.2d at 893. [¶24] In Farnham, we addressed an argument that was nearly identical to Hayden’s—that a sentencing decision that considers a defendant’s election to have a trial—even if it means subjecting a young and vulnerable witness to the trauma of testifying, an event that could be avoided with a guilty plea—violates the defendant’s constitutional right to a trial. Id. at 889-91. In that case, we held that a sentencing court’s reference to the defendant’s decision to go to trial must be evaluated “in the context of all the other factors enumerated by the [court] in drawing an individualistic picture of the person to be sentenced.” Id. at 891. Taking the sentencing transcript as a whole, we concluded that the sentencing court did not punish the defendant for insisting on his right to a trial, but appropriately considered that factor as relevant to the full assessment of the defendant’s contrition and remorse and his prospects for rehabilitation. Id. [¶25] We reach the same conclusion here. Standing alone and taken out of context, the court’s statement that “the evidence in this case was overwhelming, 13 and [Hayden] forced [his son] to testify in a courtroom packed with strangers,” could be perceived as an unconstitutional punishment of Hayden for exercising his right to a trial by jury. The court’s comment, however, was made in the larger context of a reference to a counselor’s review of several factors that contributed to the child’s psychological trauma and the court’s apparent rejection of Hayden’s claim that he loved his son.3 Accordingly, when the court’s statement is reviewed in this larger context of the entire sentencing process, and considering the numerous other aggravating factors listed by the court—many of which, by themselves, could justify the maximum sentence—we find no likelihood that the court impermissibly or unconstitutionally imposed a sentence that was more severe based upon Hayden’s exercise of his right to a trial. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. _____________________________________ On the briefs: Clifford B. Strike, Esq., and Sarah A. Churchill, Esq., Strike, Goodwin & O’Brien, Portland, for appellant Joel Hayden Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine 3 As the child stepped down from the witness stand, Hayden cried out, “Daddy loves you.” The court commented on Hayden’s outburst during sentencing, suggesting to him that “actions speak louder than words.” 14 At oral argument: Clifford B. Strike, Esq., for appellant Joel Hayden Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee State of Maine Cumberland County Unified Criminal docket number CR-2011-4876 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY