Opinion ID: 2188660
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Did the charge to the jury impermissibly dilute the State's burden to prove defendant's guilt on all counts beyond a reasonable doubt?

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court's charge regarding the prosecution's obligation to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was improper and constitutes reversible error. The point is raised as plain error before us since defense counsel did not object to the charge at trial. He focuses on the court's definition of reasonable doubt, which cautioned the jurors against viewing the State's evidence with skeptical minds or ignoring an interpretation of the evidence that might favor the State or searching for doubt instead of the truth. Defendant argues that the charge inflated the degree of doubt that would qualify as reasonable, suggesting that the jurors must be more than skeptical about the State's case. In the defense view, the charge narrowed the circumstances that would have entitled defendant to have the benefit of a reasonable doubt and placed inferences consistent with guilt on an equal footing with inferences consistent with innocence. Taken in the abstract, the challenged portions of the charge may have that tendency. However, we have repeatedly stated that `portions of a charge alleged to be erroneous cannot be dealt with in isolation but the charge should be examined as a whole to determine its overall effect.' State v. Marshall, supra, 123 N.J. at 135, 586 A. 2d 85 (quoting State v. Wilbely, 63 N.J. 420, 422, 307 A. 2d 608 (1973)). Our review of the court's charge to the jury convinces us that its overwhelming tenor was to convey to the jury that the State bore the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on each and every element of the case. While telling jurors to search for the truth, the court, in the same sentence, told them to give the defendant the benefit of a reasonable doubt, if it arises in your mind, after you have considered all of the evidence in the case. In addition, the court correctly charged the jury on the presumption of innocence and on the State's burden of proof. Furthermore, the State's burden of proving each element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt was restated without qualification in the context of the separate instructions concerning the various charges in the indictment, so that [t]he concept of the State's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt permeates the trial court's jury charge. State v. Marshall, supra, 123 N.J. at 136, 586 A. 2d 85. Nonetheless, we repeat the admonition that we expressed in State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 524 A. 2d 130 (1987), in which we cautioned our trial courts against using any charge that has a tendency to `understate' or `trivialize the awesome duty of the jury to determine whether the defendant's guilt was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' Id. at 41, 524 A. 2d 130 (quoting Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 373 Mass. 116, 364 N.E. 2d 1264, 1272 (1977)). Any instruction that suggests that the concept of reasonable doubt is a simple search for truth may run the risk of detracting from both the seriousness of the decision and the State's burden of proof. Because the degree of certainty required to convict is unique to the criminal law, we discourage the resort to any language that tends to minimize the indispensable nature of the reasonable doubt standard. We are satisfied that the trial court's clear statement of the presumption of innocence and its repeated emphasis on the continuing burden of proof on the State with respect to each of the individual charges fully and accurately apprised the jury of the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Read in their entirety, the challenged portions of the charge do not constitute grounds for reversal of the convictions.