Opinion ID: 1255705
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Dawson Claim

Text: Recently, in Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992), the United States Supreme Court held that evidence of a defendant's abstract beliefs, if irrelevant to the proceedings, could not be introduced at the sentencing proceeding. Id. at 165-67, 112 S.Ct. at 1097-99. In Dawson, a stipulated statement was admitted during the sentencing phase indicating that Dawson was a member of a prison gang known as the Aryan Brotherhood. Id. The short statement did not discuss why his gang membership was relevant to his crime or sentence. Id. The Supreme Court held that although relevant evidence as to a defendant's beliefs could be admitted, the statement at issue was irrelevant and was erroneously admitted by the trial court at the sentencing hearing. Id. Prefatorily, Ford contends that without an adequate record, the district court could not have properly compared Dawson 's analysis to the circumstances which occurred at her trial. As to the merits of the district court's decision, Ford argues that the stage of trial at which the evidence was admitted is not an important distinction. Ford alleges that the jury was instructed during the penalty phase that it could consider all evidence presented at the guilt phase. Ford argues that her controversial opinions were irrelevant to her sentencing and that the jury, under Dawson, could not constitutionally consider such opinions in determining her sentence. In addition, Ford argues that an issue remains as to whether her trial counsel was ineffective in eliciting abstract views from her and in failing to object to their consideration in the penalty phase. Finally, Ford claims that the trial court's refusal to exclude her beliefs from the trial phase, despite her counsel's objections, was error, considering the irrelevancy of the beliefs and the highly inflammatory nature of the subjects. Initially, we note that in this petition for writ of habeas corpus, Ford never presented to the district court the issue of whether the jury improperly considered Ford's beliefs in determining her sentence. Ford mentioned Dawson in a supplemental statement to support her petition's claim that her trial counsel unreasonably failed to seek a pretrial suppression of materials and writings containing Ford's beliefs. Dawson has little relevance to this claim, and the district court did not err in determining without the record that Dawson was distinguishable from the instant case. Only on appeal to this court does Ford present the theory that the jury may have erroneously considered these materials in the penalty phase of her trial. Ford cannot change her theory underlying an assignment of error on appeal. McCall v. State, 97 Nev. 514, 516, 634 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1981). Even if we were to consider the merits of Ford's position on the unwarranted assumption that she demonstrated good cause for not raising this issue previously, we would conclude that the admitted material to which Ford objects was not totally irrelevant to the proceedings, and that consequently, Dawson is distinguishable from the instant case. Ford's petition notes: A small portion of this material [Ford's books and writings] was relevant to the defense of insanity as demonstrating loose association of thought which is a symptom of schizophrenia. By far the bulk of Petitioner's writings had no relevance to the charges or the defense and were private musings, never intended for publication, expressing unpopular attitudes on highly controversial topics. It also states: Trial counsel unreasonably examined Petitioner and elicited from her a virtual autobiography of her travels and travail from the time of her first employment to the date of the Thanksgiving Day event. This prejudiced Petitioner by opening the door to extensive cross-examination by Prosecutor Dunlap in which he: (i) examined Petitioner on virtually all her major writings, her collection of books and her attitudes to Jews, Mormons, Hitler, American Indians, use of marijuana, sadomasochism, witchcraft and the occult, and established religion... . The foregoing material from Ford's petition indicates that Ford's beliefs and attitudes were properly admitted during the guilt phase as a result of defense counsel opening the door. The effort by defense counsel to delve into Ford's past was an apparent tactical decision to prove Ford's only valid defense, that of insanity. See Ford, 102 Nev. at 130, 134-35, 138 n. 8, 717 P.2d at 30, 32-33, 34-35 (discussing Ford's defense, her testimony and her turbulent life). Tactical decisions are virtually unchallengeable absent extraordinary circumstances. Ford, 105 Nev. at 853, 784 P.2d at 953 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691, 104 s.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). These extraordinary circumstances have not been shown. The excerpts above also indicate that at least certain of Ford's beliefs were relevant in providing insight as to why Ford sought to kill so many people who were unknown to her. The issue presented on appeal is whether the alleged jury instruction given during the penalty phase permitting the jury to consider evidence presented during the guilt phase so tainted the sentencing as to require reversal based on Dawson. We perceive no reasonable grounds to support such a conclusion. The Dawson Court stated: We think that it [the First Amendment] similarly prevents Delaware here from employing evidence of a defendant's abstract beliefs at a sentencing hearing when those beliefs have no bearing on the issue being tried. Dawson, 503 U.S. at 168, 112 S.Ct. at 1099 (emphasis added). The Dawson Court precluded evidence of Dawson's membership in the Aryan Brotherhood only because the evidence was  totally without relevance to Dawson's sentencing proceeding.  Id. at 165, 112 S.Ct. at 1097 (emphasis added). The Dawson Court noted: We have previously upheld the consideration, in a capital sentencing proceeding, of evidence of racial intolerance and subversive advocacy where such evidence was relevant to the issues involved. In Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983), for example, we held that a sentencing judge in a capital case might properly take into consideration the elements of racial hatred in Barclay's crime as well as Barclay's desire to start a race war. See id. at 949, 103 S.Ct., at 3424 (plurality opinion); id., at 970, and n. 18, 103 S.Ct. at 3435, and n. 18 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). Id. at 164, 112 s.Ct. at 1097. Similarly, in the instant case, declarations and admissions by Ford at the time of the Thanksgiving Day tragedy indicate elements of racial hatred. See Ford, 102 Nev. at 130-31 n. 4, 717 P.2d at 30. Unlike the facts in Dawson, evidence of Ford's intolerances were not totally irrelevant to the sentencing proceedings. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in distinguishing Dawson based solely on the evidence in the record before it.