Opinion ID: 2630926
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cross-examination of Tobin Regarding Stolen Property (Letner, Tobin)

Text: Prior to trial, the prosecution informed the trial court it intended to present evidence indicating that Letner had stolen from a local beauty parlor the bags of beauty products found in Pontbriant's car after the murder. The prosecutor argued that the theft of the items was relevant to establish that defendants had brought the items with them in the car in order to attempt to sell them to raise money for their escape. Defendants objected to the admission of this evidence on the ground it constituted irrelevant other-crimes evidence that improperly would imply defendants were the type of individuals who committed burglaries, such as the offense charged in the present case. The trial court ruled that the evidence would be admissible to demonstrate, as the prosecutor argued, consciousness of guilt reflected in a plan to facilitate defendants' escape. The court found that the possible prejudicial effect of admitting this evidence was slight in view of the nature of the charges, and advised that it would instruct the jury that the evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. [16] During the prosecution's case-in-chief, Jeanette Mayberry testified that the bags of beauty products belonged to Letner, and that he told her he stole the items from a store in Visalia. Upon a defense objection, the trial court refused to strike the testimony but admonished the jury that as to whether he stole these, or didn't steal them is not an issue before you, and you shouldn't consider that as to whether [defendants] are guilty or not guilty of the crimes with which they are charged. The prosecution presented no other evidence concerning the stolen beauty products during its case-in-chief. During his direct examination, Tobin testified that he knew the bags of beauty products had been placed in Pontbriant's car. He also testified on direct examination that after defendants spent the night in the house on South Crenshaw, Letner wanted to return to the car but Tobin didn't want to go near the car. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Tobin a number of questions concerning the beauty products. In response to an initial question regarding whether Letner had said he had stolen the items, Tobin answered, He may have, but after several more questions he stated Letner had told him only that the items were hot, meaning they had been stolen. Neither defendant objected to the prosecutor's questions. Later, on cross-examination by Letner's attorney, Tobin testified that when Letner drove onto the highway, Letner was hopingbecause of his concern regarding the stolen items inside the vehiclethat the police car would stop following them. [17] Tobin also testified that the major reason he did not wish to return to Pontbriant's car was because the stolen beauty products were still inside, and thus he and Letner decided to abandon the vehicle. (16) On appeal, defendants contend that the trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor to question Tobin concerning the beauty products having been stolen, and that the admission of this testimony violated defendants' constitutional rights. Initially, defendants incorrectly assert that defense counsel objected to the questions seeking to elicit Tobin's knowledge that the beauty products had been stolen. To the contrary, both defense attorneys objected only whenafter moving on from the issue of Tobin's knowledge that the items were stolen, and questioning Tobin regarding the toolbox that also was found in Pontbriant's carthe prosecutor asked, Would Richard Letner take stolen items to the swap meet and sell them regularly? The trial court sustained this objection. Defense counsel again objected when the prosecutor later inquired where the tools sold by defendants at the swap meets came from, and those objections again were sustained. Defendants therefore forfeited their appellate challenges regarding the stolen beauty products by failing to object during the prosecutor's examination. ( People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 714 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 326, 140 P.3d 657].) Moreover, even assuming that defendants' pretrial objections to the prosecutor's offer of proof concerning the stolen beauty products constituted an in limine motion to exclude evidence of this nature, defendants were required to renew their objection at trial, when the trial court would have the opportunity to evaluate their objections in light of the actual evidence presented. ( People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 547 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137] [[t]he general rule is that `when an in limine ruling that evidence is admissible has been made, the party seeking exclusion must object at such time as the evidence is actually offered to preserve the issue for appeal . . .'].) The requirement of a contemporaneous objection is especially applicable in the present case, because prior to trial defendants objected to the prosecution's presentation of the evidence in its case-in-chief, and the testimony challenged on appeal was elicited in the course of cross-examining Tobin during his own defense case, following (1) his testimony on direct examination establishing that he knew the beauty products had been placed in the car, (2) Jeanette Mayberry's testimony indicating that the items were stolen, and (3) the trial court's admonition to the jury not to consider Mayberry's testimony with regard to the identity of the thief. ( People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 190 [279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949] [an in limine motion, without a contemporaneous objection at trial, is sufficient to preserve an objection for appeal only when (1) a specific legal ground for exclusion is advanced and subsequently raised on appeal; (2) the motion is directed to a particular, identifiable body of evidence; and (3) the motion is made at a time before or during trial when the trial judge can determine the evidentiary question in its appropriate context].) Indeed, one reasonably might conclude Letner and Tobin purposefully chose not to object to the prosecutor's cross-examination, in the hope of using evidence of the stolen character of the items to explain why defendants drove onto the highway (rather than to Pontbriant's house, where they purportedly were to store their belongings) when the officer followed them, and why they abandoned the car (and their belongings) on the side of the road after the traffic stop. Because on appeal defendants challenge the admissibility of Tobin's testimony based primarily upon their pretrial arguments and the trial court's ruling, and because their failure to object to the testimony during the cross-examination denied the prosecutor an opportunity to justify its admission in light of the state of the evidence at that point in the trial, and denied the trial court an opportunity to decide this issue in the first instance, their claims are forfeited. In any event, based upon the record before us, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to question Tobin concerning a subject that Tobin brought up in his own testimony. ( People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 754 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485] ( Mayfield ) [cross-examination can explore a defendant's testimony in greater detail than the direct testimony, and, in general, the permissible scope of cross-examination is very wide].)