Opinion ID: 201025
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Chapters 93A and 93B

Text: 19 Boyle appeals to provisions in Chapters 93A and 93B to redress his loss of Navistar business. Chapter 93B, which generally prohibits [u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices between motor vehicle manufacturers, distributors and dealers, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93B, § 3, protect[s] motor vehicle franchisees and dealers from the type of injury to which they had been susceptible by virtue of the inequality of their bargaining power and that of their affiliated manufacturers and distributors. Beard Motors, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Distrib., Inc., 395 Mass. 428, 480 N.E.2d 303, 306 (1985). As such, only dealers, and not prospective dealers, have standing to sue under Chapter 93B. Id. Boyle argues that the contractual relationship — payments for services rendered — that existed between him and Navistar suffices for Chapter 93B standing. 20 Boyle's continued work with Navistar arguably makes him more than a prospective dealer in a way that is relevant to his Chapter 93B standing. 1 Up until the end of 1997, Boyle's dealership work for Navistar was done under the auspices of Walsh's dealership contract. Boyle acknowledged this by waiving the condition to the P & S permitting him to walk away from the deal if he did not have an agreement with Navistar. The Massachusetts Appeals Court has commented that it does not think that the principle established in the Beard case can be circumvented by the tail chasing expedient of assigning the existing dealer's rights to the aspiring dealer. Greater Lowell Auto Mall, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Distrib., Inc., 35 Mass.App.Ct. 247, 618 N.E.2d 1369, 1371 (1993). We agree and conclude that Boyle did not gain Chapter 93B standing by virtue of working for Navistar under Walsh's dealership contract. 21 Boyle, though, continued to perform warranty work for Navistar into the spring of 1998, after Walsh's dealership was terminated on December 31, 1997. We believe that Beard also precludes the standing of a prospective dealer whose dealership application has been formally rejected — as Boyle's was on November 24, 1997 — even where that prospective dealer continues to perform warranty work for the manufacturer. See Beard, 480 N.E.2d at 306-07 (The injuries alleged by Beard — primarily the loss of anticipated profits from the sale of Toyotas and from capital appreciation in the value of the Toyota dealership, due to its inability to obtain the Toyota franchise — are not injuries within the area of legislative concern that resulted in the enactment of [Chapter 93B].). 22 The Chapter 93A claim involves the related allegation that Navistar was unfair and deceptive in how it handled and ultimately denied Boyle's dealership application. Navistar offered as its explanation for the rejection the limited market potential of the dealership, as shown by difficulties experienced by Walsh at the location, combined with Boyle's failure to provide financial projections with his application. Boyle alleges that Navistar representatives told him that the problem with his application was his decision merely to submit a photocopy of his GMC application instead of providing the application materials specifically requested by Navistar. From this he concludes that Navistar's official reasons were a pretext, and thereby surmises the unfair and deceptive conduct, or as put in the brief: Navistar's `tricking' Mr. Boyle into performing services for it while leading him on as to his status as a dealer constitutes an unfair or deceptive act. This leading on, Boyle argues, had as the net effect his thinking he was a dealer so that Navistar could ease the termination of Mr. Walsh's dealership. 23 [A] chapter 93A claimant must show that the defendant's actions fell `within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness,' or were `immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous,' and resulted in `substantial injury ... to competitors or other business[persons].' Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. Garrity Oil Co., 884 F.2d 1510, 1513 (1st Cir.1989) (quoting PMP Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 366 Mass. 593, 321 N.E.2d 915, 917 (1975)). Navistar offered legitimate business reasons for failing to enter into a highly regulated business arrangement. See Greater Lowell Auto Mall, 618 N.E.2d at 1372 (discussing several relevant considerations including the location of the proposed dealer; whether the proposed dealer has a history of profitable operation; and whether the proposed dealer has provided the manufacturer with solid information about its qualifications). Navistar's longstanding — and expressed — concern with the potential market at the site endured after Boyle's application, as Boyle failed to comply with the requirement of submitting a Letter of Intent demonstrating how he planned to be successful selling Navistar trucks at Tuck's, in a way Walsh had not been. The effects of Navistar's actions, e.g., leading Boyle to think he was a dealer, are not actionable under Chapter 93A. Boyle has not stated a claim as to Navistar's unfairness or lack of scruples that triggers the protections of Chapter 93A. 24