Opinion ID: 1246974
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: witherspoon exclusion of jurors for cause

Text: (29) Defendants challenge the exclusion under section 1074, subdivision 8, of the Penal Code of certain jurors, based on those jurors' opposition to the death penalty. Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 784, 88 S.Ct. 1770], holds that a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding venirmen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. The court excepted from this ruling prospective jurors who made unmistakably clear ... that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them.... ( Id., at p. 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 785].) We must then determine whether all of the excused jurors made it unmistakably clear that he or she would automatically vote against the death penalty regardless of the evidence in the case. Of course, as we explain infra, our determination in the instant case must be made on the basis of the voir dire examination of the entire panel of veniremen conducted during the time the particular veniremen were present in the courtroom and until the time they were excused for cause, including all questions posed and answers given, and additionally all of the circumstances in which each colloquy took place. ( People v. Varnum, supra, 70 Cal.2d 480, 492-493].) Defendants specifically challenge the exclusion of jurors Rogers, Willis, Bishop and Polizzi. We have independently reviewed the voir dire of the other six jurors excluded under section 1074, subdivision 8, of the Penal Code, and find that they were properly excluded under the applicable Witherspoon rules. [12] (1) Juror Rogers. We have set forth in an appendix that portion of the transcript pertaining to the voir dire of jurors Rogers and Willis. As to Miss Rogers, the court had inquired whether there is any juror that entertains such a conscientious opinion that he would under no circumstances vote for the death penalty, and Miss Rogers replied I wouldn't vote for the death penalty. On voir dire, Miss Rogers further stated that in her opinion she could not vote for the death penalty no matter how heinous the crime. However, defense counsel then posed the extreme hypothetical example of a defendant who had killed 10 women and children, had stated that he would kill again if released, and had offered to disclose the location of the bodies of his other victims for $100 each. Miss Rogers replied that she did not know about that type of person; I never heard of that type of person. Upon further questioning along these lines, Miss Rogers agreed that as to such a hypothetical case, the death penalty was a question of degree, and that she would have to get all the facts, before deciding whether or not to impose it. Subsequently, Miss Rogers was asked by the prosecutor whether she would be willing to vote for a verdict of death under any particular circumstances, and she replied I can't think of any circumstances now. However, once again she was presented with the hypothetical example described above, and was asked whether she would vote for death in that case. Miss Rogers replied I don't know if I would or not. I really can't say. Finally, the prosecutor addressed the jurors as a group, explained that the jury had absolute discretion to determine whether or not a proper case existed to justify the death penalty, and then asked the jury whether they would have the courage to vote for a verdict of death if they determined that this was a proper case. Miss Rogers replied No, I wouldn't, and was excused by the court. Although the instant trial preceded the decision in Witherspoon, the standards which the trial court imposed comported fully with those announced in Witherspoon. Therefore, we could base our decision as to Miss Rogers upon the rule that Where a prospective juror gives conflicting answers to questions relevant to his impartiality, the trial court's determination as to his state of mind is binding upon an appellate court. [Citations.] ( People v. Linden, 52 Cal.2d 1, 22 [338 P.2d 397].) Moreover, we have concluded Miss Rogers made it unmistakably clear that under no circumstances would she impose the death penalty, and, therefore, was properly excused. (2) Juror Willis. In response to the question whether there was any juror that entertains such a conscientious opinion that he would under no circumstances vote for the death penalty, Juror Willis replied I am.... I don't believe I could send a man to death. I don't believe I could vote to go to the gas chamber. Subsequently, defense counsel examined Miss Rogers on voir dire and, as we noted above, elicited her testimony that she could not vote for the death penalty in any situation, although as to the extreme hypothetical example posed to her, she really didn't know, since it depends upon the degree, and I would have to get all the facts. Thereupon Juror Willis agreed that his answers to the questions posed to Miss Rogers would be substantially the same as hers. Finally, Juror Willis was told that the state sought the death penalty for a killing which occurred during an alleged robbery. Willis stated that he was opposed to sitting on the case for the reason that the death penalty was sought, stating further that I don't think I would be fair to the State. I don't think it would be fair to the State for me to sit on it. When asked if he had a bias or prejudice in the proceeding, Willis replied, I am against capital punishment, yes. Thereupon, Juror Willis was excused. We have previously held in People v. Hill, 70 Cal.2d 678, 701, footnote 3 [76 Cal. Rptr. 225, 452 P.2d 329], that a juror was properly excluded who answered I believe so, in response to the question whether the venireman would be unable to return a verdict imposing the death penalty regardless of the evidence. Moreover, by his initial testimony and by adopting the answers previously given by Miss Rogers, Juror Willis made it unmistakably clear that under no circumstances would he impose the death penalty and, therefore, we conclude that Juror Willis was properly excused. (3) Juror Bishop. Juror Bishop was asked: Can you imagine a case in which you would be willing to vote for the death penalty, or is your state of mind that you would be unlikely in any situation to vote for death? He answered: I would be unlikely in any situation to vote for death. He was then asked, Well, Mr. Bishop, in a proper case, would you impose the death penalty? He then answered, No, I would not. We have heretofore discussed the ambiguity inherent in the phrase, proper case. ( People v. Teale, supra, 70 Cal.2d 497, 514-515; People v. Varnum, supra, 70 Cal.2d 480, 494-495.) However, in Teale and Varnum, we held that a juror could be properly excluded, based on a response to a question using the phrase, proper case, where the court has, during the voir dire proceedings, made clear to the assembled panel that the jury would in its sole discretion decide whether the case before it was a `proper case' for the infliction of the death penalty. (70 Cal.2d at p. 516.) In the instant case, the court explained to the assembled veniremen: The law imposes neither death nor life imprisonment, but presents the two alternatives in the absolute discretion of the jury. The Legislature has formulated no rules to control the exercise of the jury's decision. In these circumstances, juror Bishop was properly excluded. (4) Juror Polizzi. Juror Polizzi stated: ... I don't believe in the death penalty. She was questioned further by the court: Q ... In a proper case are you telling the Court that you would not impose the death penalty? A Yes. Q Under any circumstances? A (Nods in the affirmative.) Juror Polizzi was properly excused.