Opinion ID: 2218880
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Informer's privilege and police perjury.

Text: Despite the trial court's ruling that the court believed the officers and questioned the reliability of the informant, on appeal the defendants strenuously argue that this is a case to check the truthfulness of the officer and affiant in an application for a search warrant in which the information given is supplied primarily by a confidential informant. Defendants contend that to determine whether the informant actually exists or whether the information given was untruthfully reported can only be meaningfully shown with the informant's actual testimony at the suppression hearing. While we agree that the informant's identity may be disclosed when information from the informant is necessary to confirm police perjury, some quantum of evidence of possible police perjury must be shown before disclosure can be required. In this case, we find the defendants have failed to present any evidence of police perjury. The United States Supreme Court articulated the standard by which an affidavit supporting probable cause and issuance of a search warrant may be challenged for veracity. The Court stated: [W]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2676, 57 L.Ed.2d 667, 672 (1978). Mere allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth are insufficient to mandate an evidentiary hearing; they must be accompanied by an offer of proof. Id. at 171, 98 S.Ct. at 2684, 57 L.Ed.2d at 682. Claims of negligent or innocent mistakes are insufficient. Id. The defendants believe they are entitled to pursue a Franks hearing to determine the veracity of the information supplied by Officer Callas in his affidavit. Their argument is that the only meaningful way to establish a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit is to question the confidential informant. The Supreme Court's decision in McCray has been criticized for its failure to provide a standard that protects against police perjury. Under McCray, it has been argued that to obtain a search warrant a police officer need only say that an unnamed reliable informant told him that the defendant was committing a crime. See 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3(g), at 702-07 (2d ed. 1987). When the affiant's information comes largely from a confidential informant, testimony from that informant would be a sure way to determine whether the affiant intentionally, knowingly or recklessly misstated the truth in the affidavit. But if the court grants a defendant's request for disclosure of an informant's identity any time a defendant wished to challenge the veracity of the affiant, the informer's privilege would be rendered illusory, and would be nothing more than mandatory disclosure. If a defendant may insist upon disclosure of the informant in order to test the truth of the officer's statement that there is an informant or as to what the informant related or as to the informant's reliability, we can be sure that every defendant will demand disclosure.... And since there is no way to test the good faith of a defendant who presses the demand, we must assume the routine demand would have to be routinely granted. McCray, 386 U.S. at 306, 87 S.Ct. at 1060, 18 L.Ed.2d at 68. We recognize that it is hard for the defendants to discover evidence tending to prove that police perjury has occurred. Proving the nonexistence of an individual whose identity is unknown to the defendant is a difficult task. Establishing that the unknown informant inaccurately described the defendant's activities could be equally difficult. Courts that have considered this question generally require some preliminary showing of falsity of the officer's statements in the affidavit before disclosure will be required to establish the elements necessary to obtain a Franks hearing. United States v. Schauble, 647 F.2d 113, 117 (10th Cir.1981); State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 106 (Minn.1989); State v. Butler, 207 Neb. 760, 765, 301 N.W.2d 332, 335 (1981). We have previously noted that we have considerable hesitancy to accept this perjury argument. Luter, 346 N.W.2d at 811. In this case, the defendants have failed to show any misstatements in the affidavit that would indicate a perjured affidavit. First, we note that the errors alleged by the defendants were only posed by the defendants' counsel during cross-examination at the suppression hearing; no direct evidence of the allegedly incorrect information was given. But even if we accept as true the defendants' claim that false statements were made, these appear to be honest mistakes, or errors negligently made at most. We cannot expect complete accuracy in preliminary police investigations, and honest mistakes that do not provide the basis for probable cause will not defeat an otherwise valid search warrant. The allegedly false statements show neither a reckless disregard for the truth by the affiant nor that they were made knowingly and intentionally. Whether Rachael Walters was defendant Richard Robertson's girlfriend, as alleged, or babysitter, as defendants state, or both, is of small consequence. The statement that Michelle Robertson was a convicted drug dealer rather than a deferred judgment recipient on the charge makes no change in the message conveyed that she had participated in illegal drug activity. The affiant's statement that Rachael Walters rather than Marjorie Withers accompanied Robertson on May 14, 1991, on a trip through Missouri and Kansas added no information that better supported the basis for the warrant than if the right woman companion had been named. The only alleged error of any significance is the assumption in the affidavit that Doug James and Victor Worley were the same person. The officers cited in support of the warrant application that Worley was a convicted drug dealer. Applying this conviction to Doug James, defendants argue, was an untruth of large consequence and requires testing by disclosure and examination of the informant. We do not view this error, if in fact so, to be of material proportion. The assumption by the officers that Doug James was an alias is understandable, given that both names carried the same social security number. Even when combined with the other alleged errors of fact made by the affiant, we believe the showing required of defendants to support disclosure of the informant's identity falls far short of what is legally necessary. Nor does the fact that the affiant obtained some information from an officer who did not testify at the suppression hearing provide enough support to alter our result. Having found the purported errors in the affidavit inconsequential, we are not convinced that this case warrants the in camera examination of the informant that the defendants suggest. While an in camera examination by the trial judge may be ordered in those rare cases in which the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that police misconduct or perjury has probably occurred, no such showing has been made by the defendants here. We conclude that the defendants have failed to establish need for disclosure of the informant's identity, either to challenge the reliability of the informant or the veracity of the swearing officer. REVERSED.