Opinion ID: 2639221
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bench Trial After Hearing on Settlement Efforts

Text: [¶ 16] The husband contends the trial court abused its discretion in presiding over the divorce trial after hearing evidence concerning the parties' settlement mediation. He claims the trial court was no longer impartial after hearing evidence concerning the failed mediation and should have ordered a change of judge for the divorce trial. The husband cites TZ Land & Cattle Co. v. Condict, 795 P.2d 1204, 1211 (Wyo. 1990), in support of his claim of judicial prejudice warranting a change of judge. [¶ 17] The change or disqualification of a judge under the circumstances presented here is governed by W.R.C.P. 40.1(b)(2), which provides in pertinent part as follows: (2) Disqualification for Cause. Whenever the grounds for such motion become known, any party may move for a change of district judge on the ground that the presiding judge: ... (E) is biased or prejudiced against the party or the party's counsel. The motion shall be supported by an affidavit or affidavits of any person or persons, stating sufficient facts to show the existence of such grounds. Nothing in the record suggests, nor does the husband argue, that he moved for a change of judge or filed an affidavit showing the presiding judge was biased or prejudiced as required by W.R.C.P. 40.1(b)(2). The husband asserts his failure to file a motion with a supporting affidavit was not fatal because filing a motion is discretionary and not mandatory, the issue really fell under W.R.C.P. 40.1(b)(4) which provides for a change of judge on the presiding judge's own motion, and the first opportunity he had to raise the issue was on appeal. We find no merit in the husband's claims. [¶ 18] It is clearly the intent of W.R.C.P. 40.1(b)(2) that disqualification of a judge be initiated by the filing of a motion with a supporting affidavit. It is discretionary only in the sense that the filing of a motion is not mandated in all cases where a party believes a judge is biased; rather, the party may choose to proceed with the presiding judge despite the suspected bias or file a motion for a change of judge. It is not discretionary, however, in the sense asserted by the husband that a party may elect to not seek disqualification by filing a motion; proceed with the presiding judge; and then, after an unfavorable outcome at trial, claim bias or prejudice for the first time on appeal. Particularly where, as here, the basis for the husband's allegation did not arise during trial but rather arose during the hearing on the wife's motion to enforce settlement a full week before trial, we can see no justifiable reason for the delay in raising the issue. [¶ 19] As for the husband's claim that the presiding judge should have ordered a change of judge on his own motion pursuant to W.R.C.P. 40.1(b)(4), we find nothing in the record before us to support the claim that a change of judge was warranted. The husband points to the trial judge's comments which he made at the close of the evidence on the wife's motion to enforce the settlement and after closing arguments in the same proceeding: I want [closing arguments] to be brief because I know exactly what your positions are. I've made up my mind, and you're not going to persuade me otherwise, but you're welcome to be brief. .... ... These parties have used the system to quite an extent and they have been unable to resolve their differences. I'm going to resolve those differences and neither one of you may like how it gets resolved, and the waffling and all that stuff is over with now. And there will be no mediation. And it isn't called mediation when a case goes to trial. I'll sit and listen to this some more and then I'm going to decide. And you're not going to have any input in how I decide, and that's the way it's going to be and it may be a lot more painful than where this was when you left Denver. And so the motion to enforce the settlement agreement is denied, and this case will go to trial as scheduled. Neither of these comments is sufficient to form a basis for disqualification. [¶ 20] We have defined bias and prejudice as follows: Prejudice involves a prejudgment or forming of an opinion without sufficient knowledge or examination. Bias is a leaning of the mind or an inclination toward one person over another. Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725, 729 (Wyo.1979). The fair meaning of any remark made by the trial judge must be interpreted in light of the context in which it was made. Brown v. State, 816 P.2d 818, 824 (Wyo.1991). From the trial judge's comments, there is no evidence of either bias or prejudice. The first comment asserted by the husband, taken in context, simply reflected the trial court heard the evidence presented by the parties; understood their positions; and, based upon the evidence, reached a decision. The comment further reflected that, while the trial court was willing to allow counsel to make closing arguments, it was firmly convinced from the evidence there was no mutual assent and the comments of counsel in closing argument would unlikely persuade it differently. There simply is nothing about the comment to suggest judicial prejudice. [¶ 21] The second comment likewise fails to suggest prejudice on the trial court's part. Rather, it reflects the reality of the situationthe parties were unsuccessful in their efforts to settle their differences, resolution of the dispute was now in the trial court's hands, and the court would decide the matter based upon the evidence presented without the parties' consensus. Again, we find nothing prejudicial in the trial court's comment. [¶ 22] Finally, the manner in which the hearing on the wife's motion to enforce settlement was conducted convinces us no prejudice occurred. Early in the hearing, the husband's counsel objected to testimony concerning the settlement terms, pointing out the issue was whether the parties had entered into an enforceable contract and whether there was a mutual assent, not the details of the failed settlement. The trial court responded as follows: I don't have any problem with it being appropriate that [the mediator] testifies. I'm not certain that I need to know that they put a value of X dollars on this asset and half went to one and half went to the other or anything like that. I need to know if it was fully explained to them, and what evidence there was that there was an acceptance or a meeting of the minds by each of them and that sort of thing, and I think I can do that independently of the nuts and bolts terms of the agreement. Thereafter, both the trial court and the parties' counsel were sensitive to the necessity of not getting into the details of the settlement discussions. Under these circumstances, we find no prejudice. [¶ 23] Affirmed.