Opinion ID: 2520110
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Deference to the Board's Interpretation of Section 11521(a)

Text: The Attorney General argues that the Board has consistently interpreted section 11521(a) to allow a maximum 30-day stay for evaluating already filed petitions and contends that the Board's interpretation is entitled to deference. He cites to a declaration by David T. Thornton, chief of enforcement for the Board, [4] and directs our attention to a page from the Board's Discipline Coordination Unit Procedure Manual entitled Request for MBC Stay. [5] Even were we to assume these two items from the record are conclusive proof that the Board has consistently interpreted section 11521(a) as the Attorney General argues, the purported Board interpretation is not entitled to judicial deference. We addressed the issue of judicial deference to administrative agency statutory interpretation in Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031 ( Yamaha ). In Yamaha, the Court of Appeal had determined a State Board of Equalization publication represented the dispositive interpretation of Revenue and Taxation Code section 6008 et seq. ( Yamaha, supra, at pp. 5-6, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031.) In reversing and remanding, we acknowledged that while agency interpretation of the meaning and legal effect of a statute is entitled to consideration and respect by the courts ( id. at p. 7, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031), agency interpretations are not binding or ... authoritative ( id. at p. 8, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031). Courts must, in short, independently judge the text of [a] statute.... ( Id. at p. 7, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031.) We determined that the weight accorded to an agency's interpretation is fundamentally situational ( id. at p. 12, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031, italics omitted) and turns on a legally informed, commonsense assessment of [its] contextual merit ( id. at p. 14, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031). Yamaha set down a basic framework of factors as guidance and concluded that the degree of deference accorded should be dependent in large part upon whether the agency has a `comparative interpretative advantage over the courts' and on whether it has arrived at the correct interpretation. ( Id. at p. 12, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031.) Applying these basic principles of judicial review, our deference is unwarranted here. The Board's interpretation is incorrect in light of the unambiguous language of the statute. We do not accord deference to an interpretation that is `clearly erroneous.' ( People ex rel. Lungren v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 294, 309, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 855, 926 P.2d 1042; Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 14, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031.) Furthermore, section 11521(a) is not a regulation promulgated by the Board, but a legislative enactment applicable to a wide range of administrative agencies. We are less inclined to defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute than to its interpretation of a self-promulgated regulation. ( Yamaha, supra, at p. 12, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031.) Nor does the Board have any particular expertise in interpreting widely applicable administrative adjudication statutes. ( Ibid.; see California Advocates for Nursing Home Reform v. Bonta (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 498, 505-506, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 823 [declining to accord deference to regulations promulgated by the Dept. of Health Services pursuant to the APA].) While the Board is generally required to adhere to the provisions of the APA (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 2230), this responsibility is incidental to its primary duty to carry out disciplinary actions against members of the medical profession ( id., § 2004). In sum, we agree with Bonnell that section 11521(a) is unambiguous and allows a maximum 10-day stay for agency review of an already filed petition for reconsideration. As a result, the Board's decision to order a reconsideration is void for lack of jurisdiction. ( American Federation of Labor v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1017, 1042, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 109, 920 P.2d 1314 [An administrative agency must act within the powers conferred upon it by law and may not act in excess of those powers.... Actions exceeding those powers are void]; Ginns v. Savage (1964) 61 Cal.2d 520, 525, 39 Cal.Rptr. 377, 393 P.2d 689 [agency's power to order reconsideration expires on the date set as the effective date of the decision].)