Opinion ID: 2973671
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Leon & The Good-Faith Exception

Text: In Leon, the Supreme Court addressed the “question whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution’s case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 900. The case arose when police, using a confidential informant, began investigating two individuals suspected of drug trafficking. Id. at 901. During the investigation the police conducted surveillance of three residences and discovered that cars parked at the residences and cars visiting the residences belonged to individuals previously arrested for possession of marijuana. Id. A check of one of the individual’s probation records led the police to Alberto Leon, who likewise had a previous arrest for drug charges, and at the time of the prior arrest, the police had information that Leon was heavily involved in drug importation into the United States. Id. Police then witnessed several persons arriving at the residences and leaving with small packages, as well as two individuals leaving Los Angeles on flights to Miami, a known drug source city. Id. at 902. The pair, upon returning, were discovered with small amounts of marijuana. Id. On the basis of these facts, the officers prepared an affidavit requesting a search warrant, had it reviewed by several Deputy District Attorneys, and submitted it to a magistrate. Id. The magistrate then issued a facially valid search warrant, the searches were conducted, and the officers discovered large quantities of drugs and other evidence sufficient to charge the defendants with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and various other counts. Id. The defendants filed a motion to suppress which was granted in part by the district court. Id. at 903. The court concluded that the affidavits were insufficient to establish probable cause and that the magistrate had erred by issuing the warrants. Id. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the affidavit lacked probable cause and that the magistrate erred by issuing the warrant. Id. at 904. The Ninth Circuit also declined the government’s request to recognize a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 905. The government filed a petition for certiorari, expressly declining to seek review over the probable cause determination and presenting only the question of “[w]hether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant No. 04-5887 United States v. McClain, et al. Page 3 that is subsequently held to be defective.” Id. It was in this posture that the Supreme Court reviewed the case. To determine whether the good-faith exception ought to exist, the Court determined that it must “weigh[] the costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution’s case in chief of inherently trustworthy tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that ultimately is found to be defective.” Id. at 907. In weighing the costs and benefits, the Court recognized the “substantial social costs” of the exclusionary rule because of its interference with the truth-seeking functions of judge and jury. Id. (citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980)). Further, when officers act in good faith, granting defendants an exclusionary privilege that results in a windfall undermines and “offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system.” Id. (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976)). Because of the high societal cost of exclusion, the Court determined that “[c]lose attention” must be paid to the “remedial objectives” and purposes behind the exclusionary rule. Id. at 908. The remedial objective of the exclusionary rule, pure and simple, is deterring police misconduct. Id. at 916. The rule is not designed to punish the errors of judges and magistrates. Id. (noting that “there exists no evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires application of the extreme sanction of exclusion”). Thus, to have any purpose, the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence “must alter the behavior of individual law enforcement officers or the policies of their departments.” Id. at 918. With these factors balanced, the Court determined that “suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in1 those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.” Id. Thus, when the remedial objective of the Fourth Amendment will be served, exclusion is the appropriate remedy. When no deterrence can be expected to result from suppression, then society ought not be forced to bear the cost of exclusion. The Court found that when officers act in objective good-faith reliance on the determinations of a magistrate, suppression “cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.” Id. at 919. Leon acknowledges that suppression of evidence based on the errors of a magistrate serves no deterrent purpose upon police officers’ conduct, and therefore, suppression is not justified in those circumstances. This approach recognizes that “[r]easonable minds frequently may differ on the question of whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause,” and therefore, when police officers rely, in objective good-faith, on a detached and neutral magistrate’s determination of probable cause, but a court later finds the magistrate’s conclusions to be in error, a punishment inflicted upon the police officers and society serves no purpose. Id. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule to guard against abuse.2 1 It is highly relevant to point out the posture of Leon. Officers investigated and accumulated facts which they believed amounted to probable cause. They prepared an affidavit and presented it to a magistrate who agreed. The warrant was later found to be invalid after the officers relied in good faith upon the magistrate’s conclusions and executed the search. Leon was not a case, like McClain, where the officers first violated the Fourth Amendment and then sought to play nice afterwards. Leon controls our decision when magistrates err and officers rely in objective good-faith. It does not purport to address the issue of police error. To the extent that it does, Leon’s clear command that suppression is the remedy if it will deter police misconduct, controls here to deter the police error that occurred. 2 First, deference to a magistrate “does not preclude inquiry into the knowing or reckless falsity of the affidavit upon which that determination was based.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 914 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)). Second, a magistrate must remain neutral and detached and cannot serve as a rubber-stamp for the police. Id. (citing Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964)). Third, reviewing courts will not defer to a magistrate’s finding of probable cause where the affidavit does not “provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause.” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983)). No. 04-5887 United States v. McClain, et al. Page 4 Furthermore, as the Court very clearly noted in United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975): The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defendant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official action was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force. The purposes of the exclusionary rule are served where “it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 542. Thus, the good-faith exception is particularly appropriate “when an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope. . . . In most such cases, there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-21. Stated another way, “[p]enalizing the officer for the magistrate’s error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.” Id. at 921 (emphasis added). And, finally, applying these principles in Leon itself, the Court found that suppressing the evidence, based on the magistrate’s erroneous determination that the facts in the affidavit established probable cause, would serve no deterrent purpose on the police. The police had done nothing wrong and nothing illegal. They had conducted lawful surveillance and submitted this information to a magistrate who determined that probable cause existed for a search warrant. Id. at 925-26. They then properly executed the warrant and discovered incriminating evidence. Id. Leon, therefore, presents the quintessential good-faith exception case — proper police conduct, a magistrate’s error, and objective good-faith police reliance on the magistrate’s determination. In these circumstances, where the magistrate’s determination is later found to be erroneous, suppressing the evidence will do nothing to deter police conduct, because the police did not do anything unlawful.