Opinion ID: 2068239
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Withdrawal of Admissions

Text: Under T.R. 36(B) matters admitted are deemed conclusively established unless the trial court permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Like the identical language in the federal rule, the portion of our rule authorizing limited withdrawal or amendment is intended to avoid the binding effect of inadvertent admissions. Although an admission should ordinarily be binding on the party who made it, there must be room in rare cases for a different result, as when an admission no longer is true because of changed circumstances or through honest error a party has made an improvident admission. 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2264 (1970). However, as emphasized by the Advisory Committee Notes to the 1970 amendments to the federal rule: Unless the party securing an admission can depend on its binding effect, he cannot safely avoid the expense of preparing to prove the very matters on which he has secured the admission, and the purpose of the rule is defeated. 48 F.R.D. at 534. Thus the rule itself limits the discretion of a trial court in ruling on a motion to withdraw admissions under T.R. 36(B). The court cannot grant such motion unless it determines both (1) that withdrawal or amendment will subserve the presentation of the merits and (2) that prejudice in maintaining the action or defense will not result to the party obtaining the admission. Even if both of these conditions are satisfied, the rule does not compel the trial court to grant withdrawal or amendment. Rather, the rule states that the court may then grant such request. In the present case, G.M.'s admissions occurred on approximately September 30, 1988, by reason of its failure to answer, object, or seek an enlargement of time pursuant to T.R. 36. At this point, trial was already set for March 7, 1989. G.M. took no action to claim inadvertence and seek prompt amendment or withdrawal of its admissions despite receiving notice of co-defendant Barth's being granted an extension of time, on September 9, 1988, within which to respond to the request for admissions, despite the filing of Aetna's motion for summary judgment on October 4, 1988, which expressly cited and relied upon G.M.'s said admissions, and despite notice that on October 28, 1988, Barth filed its responses to Aetna's request for admissions. It was not until December 29, 1988, the date set for argument on Aetna's motion for summary judgment, that G.M. first sought withdrawal of its admissions. No other pleadings had been filed between August 30, 1988, and December 29, 1988. Trial was then only two months away, and G.M.'s delay in denial of the requested admissions had operated to deprive Aetna of three months time for the development of its proof upon the admitted issues. Neither G.M.'s motion to withdraw admissions nor its supporting memorandum presented the trial court with any claim or indication that its failure to timely respond was inadvertent, that it had nevertheless continued to actively contest the issues involved in the challenged admissions, or that Aetna was aware that G.M. intended to contest the admitted issues at trial. Under these circumstances we cannot find erroneous the trial court's decision denying withdrawal of the admissions. We do not find that both of the criteria in the rule were conclusively demonstrated. In addition, we find no abuse of discretion.