Opinion ID: 2791152
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tidelands

Text: ¶15. The court then granted partial summary judgment in favor of Gunn and Harris, reasoning that, under the Tidelands Act, the mean high water line as of July 1973 determined the boundary between the public trust tidelands and the Gunn and Harris properties. The mean high water line closest to that date showed the boundary of the tidelands seaward of the current water line. The chancellor ruled that, in order for the line to be the toe of the seawall as the State contends, the State was required to show, and failed to do so, that the sand beach was not constructed pursuant to a legislative enactment and for a higher public purpose.5 In the alternative, the chancellor stated that, under Gilich, the State failed to produce admissible evidence that the sand beach was created by filling in tidelands up to the seawall and that the State intended to retain full title to the filled land.6 ¶16. In order to fully analyze the issue, a look into the history of the tidelands is necessary. When admitted into the Union, the State of Mississippi was granted title to lands subject to the ebb and flow of the tide and up to the mean high water level, without regard to navigability. The Mississippi Constitution states, “[l]ands belonging to, or under the control 5 “[A]nd with this in mind the State was then required to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that the artificial accretions above this mean high water line were not done pursuant to a constitutional legislative enactment and for a higher public purpose.” Bayview Land, Ltd. v. State ex rel. Clark, 950 So. 2d 966, 984 (Miss. 2006). 6 Miss. State Hwy. Comm’n. v. Gilich, 609 So. 2d 367 (Miss. 1992). 8 of the State, shall never be donated directly or indirectly, to private corporations or individuals . . . .” Miss. Const. art. 4, § 95. ¶17. After hurricanes repeatedly washed away roads parallel to the Mississippi Sound, the Legislature passed an Act in 1924 that authorized certain counties to erect sea walls or other structures for the protection of public roads.7 Section three of the Act authorized the boards of supervisors in these counties to exercise eminent domain to procure the right of way for these seawalls and beaches, among other things, to protect the highways. In 1938, this Court held that the State was absolute owner of the beds of its shores of the sea, wherever the tide ebbs and flows, as trustee for the people, and that the State had no authority to convey title of the land below the high-water mark. State ex rel. Rice v. Stewart, 184 So. 44, 50 (Miss. 1938). ¶18. This Court then considered the Guice case, where a landowner with beachfront property and Harrison County each claimed title to a sand beach located to the south of the seawall. Harrison Cnty v. Guice, 140 So. 2d 838 (1962). Harrison County acquired an easement to construct and maintain a seawall over the Guice property. Id. at 839. South of the seawall was around 200 feet of uplands until the mean high water line and then a fortyfoot beach. Id. Over time, wave action, partly due to the construction of the seawall, eroded some of the property south of the seawall. Id. Harrison County then dredged sand from the bottoms of the Sound and pumped in the sand over the area south of the seawall to create another sand beach for road and seawall protection. Id. This Court found title to the sand 7 1924 Miss. Laws ch. 319. 9 beach in Guice, holding that Harrison County had no title in lands that always remained above the mean high tide line. Id. at 842. As to the artificially created lands, this Court ruled that an owner acquires fee simple title to additional lands when the owner has no part in creating the artificial additions or accretions. Id. ¶19. Following the Guice decision, the United States brought suit against Harrison County for enforcement of the federal contract entered into for the construction of the Harrison County sand beaches. United States v. Harrison Cnty., Miss., 399 F. 2d 485 (5th Cir. 1968). As stated in Guice, in 1947, a hurricane destroyed a considerable portion of Highway 90 and caused more than $18,000,000 worth of damage, mostly to Harrison County. Id. at 488. Harrison County entered into a contract with the United States to procure federal funds for construction of a sand beach. Id. at 490. In turn, Harrison County agreed to dedicate the beach for the perpetual use of the general public. Id. at 488-89. The sand beach was constructed on bottoms that were then underwater. Id. at 489. After the Guice decision, several people were forcibly denied access to the beach, and the United States brought suit. Id. at 490. The Fifth Circuit chose not to follow Guice, reasoning that stare decisis was not appropriate because the County denied that it had agreed to or was attempting to operate a public beach. Id. at 491. The Fifth Circuit next opined that the Guice decision granted private landowners title to land, free of charge, which “unquestionably belonged to the State when the improvements began.” Id. The Court held that the Mississippi Constitution overruled the common law and required the filled tidelands forming the sand beach to belong to the State in trust for the general public. Id. 10 ¶20. In July 1973, the Legislature enacted the Coastal Wetlands Protection Act to preserve the natural state of coastal wetlands, except where alteration would serve a higher public interest in compliance with the public purposes of the public trust.8 ¶21. A suit was brought afterward to determine the inland boundary of the tidelands. Cinque Bambini P’ship. v. State, 491 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1986). Cinque Bambini held record title to 140 acres of land. Id. at 511. The State claimed the property as tidelands. Id. Ninetyeight of the 140 acres consisted of two lakes created by dredging fill material for construction of Highway I-10. Id. at 510. The remaining forty acres consisted of the north branch of Bayou LaCroix and eleven small drainage streams. Id. Cinque Bambini argued that the State held title to tidelands only under navigable waters. Id. This Court determined fee simple title to lands naturally subject to the tide were held by the State in trust, while lands brought within the ebb and flow of the tide by avulsion or artificial or nonnatural means remained with the private titleholders. Id. at 510-11. This Court granted title to the ninety-eight acres of lakes created by dredging in Cinque Bambini and held that the remaining forty acres consisted of tidelands. Id. The United States Supreme Court then affirmed this Court’s 8 Mississippi Code Section 49-27-3 states: It is declared to be the public policy of this state to favor the preservation of the natural state of the coastal wetlands and their ecosystems and to prevent the despoliation and destruction of them, except where a specific alteration of specific coastal wetlands would serve a higher public interest in compliance with the public purposes of the public trust in which coastal wetlands are held. Miss. Code Ann. § 49-27-3 (Rev. 2012). 11 decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 108 S. Ct. 791, 98 L. Ed. 2d 877 (1988) (reasoning that, regardless of petitioners having long been record title holders and paying taxes on the forty acres, these facts did not change the outcome that the lands at issue became the property of the State upon its admission to the Union in 1817). ¶22. Vast uncertainty continued to surround the boundary between public tidelands and private ownership, and the Public Trust Tidelands Act of 1989 was codified to help resolve the dispute.9 Miss. Code Ann. § 29-15-3(2) (Rev. 2010). The Tidelands Act reaffirmed that tidelands are held in trust by the State of Mississippi for the use of all the people. Miss. Code Ann. § 29-15-5(1) (Rev. 2010). The Act directed the Secretary of State to prepare a Preliminary Map of the tidelands held in trust. Miss. Code Ann. § 29-15-7(1). Where the shoreline is undeveloped, the tidelands boundary was to depict the current mean high water line. Id. In developed areas or areas with encroachments, the boundary was to be the mean high water line nearest the date of the Coastal Wetlands Protection Act.10 Id. Once the Secretary of State created the preliminary map, the map was transmitted to each chancery clerk of the coastal counties. Miss. Code Ann. § 29-15-7(3). The chancery clerks were to post the map in a public place. Id. ¶23. After posting the preliminary map, there was a sixty-day period for submission of comments. Miss. Code Ann. § 29-15-7(4) (Rev. 2010). The Act directed the Secretary of State to revise the map accordingly within twenty days. Id. The final map was published after 9 The Act is codified in Sections 29-15-1 through 29-15-23 of the Mississippi Code. 10 The Coastal Wetlands Protection Act was effective July 1, 1973. 12 the twenty-day period and recorded in the land records of each county. Id. The Secretary of State was required to find landowners who violated the trust within 120 days and issue notice by certified mail. Id. The notice informed the landowner of a three-year period to dispute the boundary on the final map. Id. After three years, the Secretary of State’s map would be final unless the landowner submitted a contrary claim. Id. ¶24. After the Tidelands legislation, this Court revisited and reversed Guice, finding that the sand beach below the seawall in Harrison County was held in trust by the State as tidelands. Miss. State Hwy. Comm’n. v. Gilich, 609 So. 2d 367, 374 (Miss. 1992).11 The Giliches’ deed stated that the southern boundary of the property was the Gulf of Mexico. Id. at 369-70. It was uncontested that Harrison County constructed the sand beach at issue. Id. at 370. This Court overruled Guice as to artificially created lands, holding that, under the Mississippi Constitution, “once the state possesses public trust lands it is deemed to possess such property forever.” Id. at 375. Lands not in tidelands in 1817 could become tidelands via the natural process of accretion or the general rising or expansion of the tide. Id. Remanding the case, this Court stated that the Giliches owned no part of the disputed property unless it was established that a sand beach continually existed above the mean high tide line prior to the construction of the beach by Harrison County. Id. at 374. ¶25. In the next major tidelands case, the Secretary of State challenged the constitutionality of the Tidelands Act. Sec’y of State v. Wiesenberg, 633 So. 2d 983, 986 (Miss. 1994).12 The 11 The Tidelands Act was not mentioned in this case. 12 The Secretary of State was concerned with protecting the public trust and conceded that the legislation easily could be declared constitutional, but for the use of the 1973 mean 13 chancery court found the Tidelands Legislation constitutional and the State appealed. Id. This Court expressed the need for resolving boundary disputes along the coastline, stating the tidelands uncertainty impeded property development and financial transactions. Id. We concede that basing the mean high water line as of 1973 will not produce a perfect line, but after the Secretary of State incorporates all comments concerning any artificial changes and applies his discretion, the plan will produce a tidelands map that protects the public’s interest as well as private ownership and hopefully put to rest the chaos that has plagued this subject matter and this geographical area for many years. The Secretary of State, after mapping, hearing comments and applying discretion, must hold to a minimum, any incidental or accidental public trust land losses. In upholding this legislation, we interpret the use of the July 1, 1973, date as a starting point in ascertaining the mean high water line in developed areas. Contrary to the Secretary of State’s interpretation, this date is not a mandatory bench mark. Rather, the preliminary map shall be drawn as it existed on July 1, 1973, and all interested parties, including adjacent landowners, the public, and the Secretary of State, will have sixty days in which to submit comments which may be used to adjust the final map. Any comments indicating the presence of any unauthorized artificial filling on developed properties prior to July 1, 1973, should be reflected on the final map. This means that the Secretary of State may also incorporate his own comments into the final map. This vast discretion gives the Secretary of State a superior voice in finalizing the map. Id. at 991-92. This Court acknowledged the Secretary of State’s vast discretion in finalizing the tidelands map, and that this discretion was integral to the constitutionality of the Tidelands Act. Id. at 991. In the Secretary of State’s discretion, the final map could include or exclude lands artificially filled prior to 1973, “[h]owever, if a landowner can show that this artificial filling was done pursuant to a legislative act, or for a higher public purpose, the 1973 mean high water line should remain in tact.” Id. high water line in developed areas. The Secretary of State argued that the use of the 1973 line would result in a “donation” of public trust property, making the Tidelands Act unconstitutional. 14 ¶26. The last major tidelands case was in 2006, in which the Imperial Palace casino obtained various governmental permits that allowed the casino to build a hotel and garage on land bordering Biloxi Back Bay. Bayview Land, Ltd. v. State ex rel. Clark, 950 So. 2d 966 (Miss. 2006). Artificial accretions, due in great part to an accumulation of oyster shells from canning companies, extended the land seaward over many years, adding more than three acres to the shoreline. Id. The State, along with the oyster canneries, maintained a program to replant the oyster shells on reefs in the trust waters. Id. at 982. After the Secretary of State released the preliminary map showing these artificial accretions as trust land, Imperial Palace submitted objections to the boundary line. Id. at 977. In the Secretary of State’s final map, the boundary line did not change. Id. at 978. The Secretary of State sent certified notice to Bayview and Imperial Palace informing the parties of a violation of the Tidelands Act, and both parties filed a complaint claiming ownership of the land. Id. This Court held that the State failed to prove by a preponderance of credible evidence that the artificial accretions above the mean high water line were not done pursuant to a constitutional legislative enactment and for a higher public purpose. Id. at 984. Therefore, the boundary of the tidelands was the mean high water line closest to July 1, 1973, and the case was remanded to determine the boundary via that line. Id. at 985. ¶27. In the instant case, the State argues summary judgment was inappropriate because the trial court imposed a higher burden than appropriate on a summary judgment motion. The State argues that the Secretary of State had discretion in determining the boundary of public trust tidelands, and the toe of the seawall was the correct boundary line on East Beach. The 15 State also argues that material issues of fact existed as to whether the sand beach was manmade and whether the sand beach was constructed by filling in tidelands. In contrast, Gunn and Harris argue that there are no issues of material fact because the Secretary of State was limited in his discretion, and that the correct tidelands boundary on East Beach is the mean high water line closest to July 1973. This line shows the boundary of the tidelands as seaward of the sand beach. In addition, Gunn and Harris argue that the sand beach is natural, not manmade, and has always been in that location. ¶28. The State produced into evidence a letter dated January 21, 1954, from the Jackson County Board of Supervisors to the District Engineer from the Mobile District of the Corps of Engineers, which stated, “The attached map indicates the location of proposed sand beaches to be constructed at Ocean Springs, Miss., with material dredged from the borrow areas designated on the map.” The map refers to both East Beach and Front Beach. ¶29. Another letter entered into evidence dated January 25, 1954, from the Mobile Corps of Engineers to the Jackson County Board of Supervisors, stated, “You are hereby authorized by the Secretary of the Army to construct a sand beach 200 to 300 feet wide by 11,700 feet long, in the Mississippi Sound, fronting Ocean Springs, Mississippi.” (Emphasis added.) Gerald McWhorter, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Lands, stated in his Rule 30(b)(6) deposition that following the passage of legislation, seawalls were built and sand beaches were pumped in on the tidelands in front of the seawalls. (Emphasis added.) ¶30. Aerial photographs of East Beach from 1942 and 1958 also were entered into evidence. The chancellor found that both photographs showed a sand beach and an existing 16 road. The State argues that the photographs were on different scales and that comparison of the two to scale would reveal the construction of a sand beach in 1954. ¶31. Also in evidence was a Public Trust Tidelands Lease that Gunn entered into on June 22, 2009, authorizing Gunn to build a pier in front of his property. The lease stated: LESSEE agrees to maintain free public access to the open water portion of LEASE PREMISES subject to reasonable actions necessary to ensure the safety and convenience of all users. LESSEE may prohibit unauthorized boats from anchoring to his structures. LESSEE agrees that the adjacent sand beach from the seawall to the mean high water mark is Public Trust Lands and shall be open to public use and public access. (Emphasis added.) ¶32. Additionally, the legend on both the preliminary and the final map the Secretary of State prepared clearly states, “Denotes approximate location of mean high water line in areas where the current location of said line (or the toe of the seawall in areas where beach renourishment has occurred) is the boundary of public trust lands.” This Court has repeatedly held that the use of the 1973 starting point is subject to state common law regarding tidelands, submerged lands, and riparian and littoral lands. Secretary of State v. Wiesenberg, 633 So. 2d 983, 986 (Miss. 1994); see also Stewart v. Hoover, 815 So. 2d 1157, 1162 (Miss. 2002). ¶33. In the chancellor’s addendum, after further analyzing Guice, he opined that it would not be reasonable to find that the Legislature intended to transfer what previously had been public beaches to abutting landowners. The chancellor found that the difference between the Harrison County beaches and the Jackson County beaches is that the State failed to produce admissible evidence that East Beach was created by filling tidelands. “Where doubt exists 17 as to whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the trial judge should err on the side of denying the motion and permitting a full trial on the merits.” Prescott v. Leaf River Forest Products, Inc., 740 So. 2d 301, 309 (Miss. 1999). This is a title suit that greatly affects both private and public interests. Summary judgment should be granted with great caution. Simpson v. Boyd, 880 So. 2d 1047 (Miss. 2004) (citation omitted). ¶34. It is undisputed that the mean high water mark closest to July 1, 1973, is seaward of the sand beach. However, this Court’s holding in Gilich and the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Harrison County show that the 1973 water line is not controlling with regard to sand beaches created by filling in tidelands. The State created genuine factual issues by producing evidence supporting the conclusion that East Beach was constructed by filling in tidelands. The State produced expert affidavits and testimony and official letters authorizing the creation of a sand beach in Ocean Springs by filling in tidelands. The State additionally produced a tidelands lease, which Gunn himself signed, stating that Gunn agreed that the beach was considered tidelands held in trust by the State and open to public use. “Motions for summary judgment may not be used to determine or decide issues of fact, only to decide whether there are any material fact issues to be tried.” American Legion Ladnier Post [Number] 42, Inc. v. City of Ocean Springs, 562 So. 2d 103, 106 (Miss. 1990). The burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists is on the movant. Gunn and Harris failed in their burden to show that there were no material issues of fact to be determined. ¶35. Therefore, partial summary judgment was inappropriate and is reversed. Of necessity, 18 we reverse the remaining aspects of the chancellor’s judgment as well. This case is remanded for a full trial on the merits. ¶36. REVERSED AND REMANDED. WALLER, C.J., DICKINSON, P.J., LAMAR, KITCHENS AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR. RANDOLPH, P.J., PIERCE AND COLEMAN, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING. 19