Opinion ID: 2169345
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plaintiff's takings claim.

Text: The district court characterized the damage caused to Kelley's property by the officers as tortious conduct, rather than a taking of private property under the county's powers of eminent domain, and concluded that the county and sheriff were therefore immune from liability under Iowa Code sections 670.4(3) and 670.12 of the Municipal Tort Claims Act. Before addressing the county and sheriff's statutory immunity under Iowa Code sections 670.4(3) and 670.12, we must first address whether the damage caused to Kelley's property amounts to a taking of private property under article I, section 18 of the Iowa Constitution for which compensation must be paid, or whether the damage to plaintiff's property is more in the nature of tortious conduct, subject to the immunity provisions of Iowa Code chapter 670. We begin our analysis with this issue because a claim for compensation under the takings clause of article I, section 18 of the Iowa Constitution would seem to exist independent of any statutory tort immunity provisions. See Connolly v. Dallas County, 465 N.W.2d 875, 878 n. 4 (Iowa 1991) (stating that the municipal immunity provisions at issue in that case, see Iowa Code section 613A.4(7) and (8), now codified at section 670.4(7) and (8), when read with the definition of tort, now codified at section 670.1(4), would violate article I, section 18 of the Iowa Constitution as they would appear to exempt the county from liability for constitutional torts, i.e., a takings claim). [2]
Article I, section 18 of the Iowa Constitution provides in pertinent part: Eminent domain. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation first being made, or secured to be made to the owner thereof, as soon as the damages shall be assessed by a jury, who shall not take into consideration any advantages that may result to said owner on account of the improvement for which it is taken. (Emphasis added.) In Bormann v. Kossuth County Board of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 315 (Iowa 1998), cert. denied, Girres v. Bormann, 525 U.S. 1172, 119 S.Ct. 1096, 143 L.Ed.2d 96 (1999), we set forth the following analysis concerning takings claims: (1) Is there a constitutionally protected private property interest at stake? (2) Has this private property interest been taken by the government for public use? and (3) If the protected property interest has been taken, has just compensation been paid to the owner? The alleged taking of private property in this case is the physical damage caused to Kelley's property by the officers when they entered the property to execute the arrest warrant. Thus, the facts of this case do not fit neatly within the other categories of takings cases such as the physical invasion or occupation of private property, or the regulation of the use of property by statute or ordinance. See Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 316-17 (noting difference between physical invasion and regulation of use of property).
In our cases, we have explained the distinction between the government's exercise of authority under the eminent domain and police power doctrines as follows: Eminent Domain is the taking of private property for a public use for which compensation must be given. On the other hand Police Power controls and regulates the use of property for the public good for which no compensation need be made. Kent v. Polk County Bd. of Supervisors, 391 N.W.2d 220, 226 (Iowa 1986) (quoting Hinrichs v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 260 Iowa 1115, 1126, 152 N.W.2d 248, 255 (1967)); see also Woodbury County Soil Conservation Dist. v. Ortner, 279 N.W.2d 276, 278 (Iowa 1979). With respect to the exercise of police power for the public health and welfare, we have stated: While the police power is very broad, and not capable of exact definition, it is not boundless, and, as a rule, is subject to constitutional limitations. Property may be destroyed under this power, without notice or opportunity to be heard, and, without compensation to the owner, to prevent the spread of contagious diseases, to stay the progress of a devastating fire, and in other exigencies, where the public needs protection or defense. Under this power, public nuisances may sometimes be abated; but, in all such cases, the necessity for summary action must exist, and one who would justify on the ground of necessity must be able to convince a jury that the occasion was present which authorized his act.... Waud v. Crawford, 160 Iowa 432, 434, 141 N.W. 1041, 1041 (1913) (emphasis added). As one commentator has explained: [t]he term regulatory taking refers to situations in which the government exercises its police powers to restrict the use of land or other forms of property. This is often accomplished through implementation of land use planning, zoning and building codes. In contrast, a governmental entity exercises its eminent domain power or acts in an enterprise capacity, where it takes unto itself private resources and uses them for the common good. Where the private landowner will not sell the land, the government entity seeks condemnation of the property and pays a fair purchase price to be determined in court. On the other hand, an inverse condemnation claim is sought by a landowner when the government fails to seek a condemnation action in court. [3] Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 317 (quoting John W. Shonkwiler & Terry Morgan, Land Use Litigation § 1.02, at 6 (1986)). The exercise of police power may, in some situations, amount to a taking of private property if it deprives a property owner of the substantial use and enjoyment of one's property. See Iowa Coal Min. Co. v. Monroe County, 555 N.W.2d 418, 431 (Iowa 1996) ( Iowa Coal II ); Ortner, 279 N.W.2d at 278. The point at which police power becomes so oppressive that it results in a taking is determined on a case-by-case basis. Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 316; Iowa Coal Min. Co. v. Monroe County, 494 N.W.2d 664, 670 (Iowa 1993) ( Iowa Coal I ); Ortner, 279 N.W.2d at 278. This ad hoc approach applies a balancing test that is essentially one of reasonableness, see Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 317, which asks whether the collective benefits of the regulatory action outweigh the restraint imposed upon the property owner, see Easter Lake Estates, Inc. v. Polk County, 444 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 1989); Ortner, 279 N.W.2d at 278. Factors to be considered in applying the test include: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant's property; (2) the regulation's interference with investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action. Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 316-17 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d 631, 648 (1978)). Our case law provides some examples of the distinction between the legitimate exercise of police power and the exercise of power under eminent domain. For example, we have said that the forced removal of billboards, at the owner's cost, which are maintained in violation of Iowa Code chapter 306C (Junkyard Beautification and Billboard Control Act) is a valid exercise of police power of the state, not an exercise of the power of eminent domain for which compensation must be paid. Iowa Dep't of Transp. v. Nebraska-Iowa Supply, 272 N.W.2d 6, 14 (Iowa 1978), overruled on other grounds by Estate of Grossman v. McCreary, 373 N.W.2d 113, 114 (Iowa 1985); see also Goodenow v. City Council, 574 N.W.2d 18, 25 (Iowa 1998) (holding that city ordinance forcing landowner to mow grass and weeds growing on city-owned property at landowner's expense is proper exercise of police power and does not constitute a taking of private property); Kent, 391 N.W.2d at 226-27 (holding that county ordinance prohibiting persons from owning dangerous and vicious animals is valid exercise of police power and does not amount to a taking of private property); Ortner, 279 N.W.2d at 279 (holding that provisions of soil conservation statutes, which require landowners to terrace property at landowners' expense is a proper exercise of police power and does not constitute a taking of private property); Walker v. Johnson County, 209 N.W.2d 137, 139 (Iowa 1973) ([w]here police power is properly exercised in limited situations it is well settled affected property owners are not entitled to prior notice and hearing, even where total destruction of the property is required to protect public health and public property, stating rule in context of claim based on the due process clauses of the Iowa and United States Constitutions); Loftus v. Department of Agric., 211 Iowa 566, 581, 232 N.W. 412, 420 (1930) (concluding that statute authorizing the destruction of diseased cattle without compensation was a proper exercise of police power and did not deprive property owner of due process under Iowa and United States Constitutions).
The district court judge found that the damage caused to Kelley's property was more in the nature of a tort and did not constitute a taking of private property within the meaning of article I, section 18 of the Iowa Constitution. Upon our review, we agree with the district court's decision. A. Through enactment of section 804.15, [4] the legislature has articulated the public policy that law enforcement officers may use force to enter private premises for the purpose of executing an arrest warrant. The use of force authorized by section 804.15, however, is not without limitation. According to restrictions imposed by the legislature, such force as is reasonably necessary may only be used when a law enforcement officer has reasonable cause to believe that a person whom the officer is authorized to arrest is present on [the] private premises. See Iowa Code § 804.15. In this case, plaintiff's property was damaged by law enforcement officers, who were exercising their authority under section 804.15, in the course of performing their public duties of enforcing the criminal laws. Enforcement of the criminal laws is clearly within the county's power to provide for the health, safety and welfare of its citizens. Plaintiff's property was therefore damaged as a consequence of the county's exercise of police power and not as a consequence of the county's exercise of its power under eminent domain. Thus, the more narrow question we must decide is whether the county's exercise of police power in this case was unreasonable. The district court judge impliedly found that the officers did not use unreasonable force to enter the premises. Based upon our review of the record, we agree with the district court's finding. We first point out that Kelley does not allege that the amount of force used by the officers to enter the residence was unreasonable. Additionally, the record shows that the officers chose to execute the warrant in the late evening hours because of the subject's reputation for assaultive and combative behavior. The officers also identified themselves and demanded entry before using force to enter the home. The record thus shows that the officers properly exercised their authority granted to them by Iowa Code section 804.15 when they forcibly entered the home. We also believe that the county's right to provide for the safety and welfare of its citizens in enforcing the state's criminal laws and procedures outweighs any interference or economic impact of the officers' action on plaintiff's property as presented in this case. The damage caused to plaintiff's property in this case would seem to be more in line with those cases where property owners have been forced to bear some burden for the public good, but where no taking of private property was found. See Goodenow, 574 N.W.2d at 25 (landowner forced to mow weeds and grass growing on city-owned property at landowner's expense); Kent, 391 N.W.2d at 221 (owner forced to give up pet lion); Ortner, 279 N.W.2d at 276 (landowners forced to terrace property at landowners' expense); Iowa Dep't of Transp., 272 N.W.2d at 14 (owner of billboards forced to remove billboards at owner's expense). B. Additionally, the damage to plaintiff's property seems to be more in the nature of a tort rather than a permanent deprivation of property, or creation of a permanent property interest, as contemplated by article I, section 18. For instance, if someone other than a non-governmental employee had broken into the residence and caused the same damage to Kelley's property as was done here, Kelley would have a private cause of action in tort for trespass and damages against that person. We will address this point further in the next division. We simply point out at this juncture that the present case can be distinguished from the inverse condemnation or permanent taking situation we found in Bormann. 584 N.W.2d at 321. This is because the property rights infringement in Bormann was more in the nature of an involuntary permanent easement on the neighbors' land, which situation does not exist in the present case. Id. In Bormann, a county board of supervisors had approved the application of certain landowners to place their land in an agricultural area. Nearby landowners challenged the board's action. We concluded that Iowa Code section 352.11(1)(a), which grants immunity from nuisance suits for farm operations located in an agricultural area, gave the applicant landowners the right to maintain a nuisance on their property that would affect the property of the nearby landowners. Id. This right to maintain a nuisance, we found, resulted in the granting of an involuntary easement by the county board of supervisors for the benefit of the applicant property owners, who were protected by the nuisance immunity. Id. We further concluded that the granting of such an easement by the county amounted to a taking of the neighbors' private property for public use in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and in violation of article I, section 18 of the Iowa Constitution. Id. We noted that government action need not amount to a physical invasion of the surface of the land in order for a taking to be found. Id. at 317. C. In summary, we conclude that the damage caused to the doors on plaintiff's property by the officers was a reasonable exercise of police power and therefore does not amount to a taking of plaintiff's property within the meaning of article I, section 18 of the Iowa Constitution. Plaintiff therefore has not satisfied the second step in the takings analysis and is not entitled to compensation under that theory for damage caused to his property by the officers. See id. at 315. Other authorities support our conclusion. See Patel v. United States, 823 F.Supp. 696, 699 (N.D.Cal. 1993) (concluding that property damage caused to plaintiff's property by officers serving search and arrest warrants on occupants of property did not give rise to claim for inverse condemnation under California Constitution); Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 10 Cal.4th 368, 41 Cal. Rptr.2d 658, 895 P.2d 900, 913 (1995) (stating that efforts of law enforcement officers to apprehend a felony suspect cannot be likened to an exercise of the power of eminent domain and holding that property damage to plaintiff's liquor store and its contents caused by law enforcement officers while trying to apprehend a suspect did not amount to taking of private property under California Constitution); McCoy v. Sanders, 113 Ga.App. 565, 148 S.E.2d 902, 905 (1966) (concluding that landowner is not entitled to damages under Georgia Constitution for fish kill and damage to pond when police drained pond on plaintiff's property in search of murder victim); Indiana State Police v. May, 469 N.E.2d 1183, 1184 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) (concluding that damage caused to homeowner's property by police officers trying to apprehend murder suspect who took refuge in plaintiff's home was in the nature of a tort, for which state was immune under state tort claims act; damage did not amount to a taking of private property under eminent domain power and thus homeowner was not entitled to compensation); Blackman v. City of Cincinnati, 140 Ohio St. 25, 42 N.E.2d 158, 160 (1942) (holding that state statute which makes it a crime to refuse to assist law enforcement officer in apprehending a suspect did not delegate eminent domain power to police officer so as to subject city for liability for damage to plaintiff's vehicle sustained when police officer ordered plaintiff to pursue another vehicle containing a fleeing suspect; owner of vehicle not entitled to compensation under Ohio Constitution); Sullivant v. City of Oklahoma, 940 P.2d 220, 226 (Okla.1997) (concluding that damage to plaintiff-landlord's property caused by police officers while executing search warrant of apartment in apartment complex owned by plaintiff did not amount to a taking of private property under the Oklahoma Constitution). [5] We therefore affirm the decision of the district court on this issue.