Opinion ID: 1439558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: public policy based wrongful discharge tort

Text: The next issue is whether plaintiffs' claims fall within the wrongful discharge tort recognized by this court in Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn.2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). Prior to Thompson Washington adhered to the common law rule that employment contracts are terminable at will by either party. Thompson, at 225. In Thompson we announced several exceptions to this general rule including a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge if the discharge of the employee contravenes a clear mandate of public policy. Thompson, at 232. See also Dicomes v. State, 113 Wn.2d 612, 782 P.2d 1002 (1989). Plaintiffs allege that defendant terminated them based on their ages and in retaliation for plaintiff Bennett's opposition to defendant's discriminatory practices. Because Washington State has public policies against age discrimination and retaliatory conduct in employment, plaintiffs argue, defendant's termination of them in violation of these policies provides the basis for a wrongful discharge cause of action. With respect to plaintiffs' claims that their terminations were age motivated, we decline to address whether defendant's conduct provides the basis for a wrongful discharge tort because we conclude that the implied cause of action under RCW 49.44.090 recognized above encompasses these claims. In reaching this conclusion, we have examined the language of RCW 49.44.090. That statute prohibits certain types of employer conduct; that conduct, then, will provide the basis for a cause of action for violation of the statute. Specifically, the statute prohibits terminat[ions] from employment based on age. Therefore, if plaintiffs can prove that defendant terminated them on the basis of their age, they will have established a clear violation of the statute's prohibition against age-motivated terminations. We next consider plaintiff Bennett's claim that, in addition to being unlawfully based on age, her discharge was also in retaliation for her opposition to her employer's discriminatory practices. She alleges that following defendants' creation of an age-hostile work environment and plaintiff Bowden's discharge in July 1985, she hired an attorney who warned defendant that any subsequent action against plaintiff Bennett would be considered retaliatory. In March 1986 defendant terminated plaintiff Bennett's employment. She claims that this discharge was in response to her resistance to his discriminatory practices and as such violates public policy and provides a basis for a separate tort of wrongful discharge. [8] Unlike the age-motivated discharges, the retaliatory conduct of defendant is not encompassed within the express prohibitions of RCW 49.44.090. As to this claim, then, we consider whether it falls within the wrongful discharge tort recognized in Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., supra . [9] In Thompson we indicated that to state a cause of action, the employee must plead and prove that a stated public policy, either legislatively or judicially recognized, may have been contravened. Thompson, at 232. Recently we discussed at length the public policy tort, indicating that [t]he key in these cases is the proper definition of public policy. Dicomes, at 617. We may look to the letter or purpose of a statute to find a contravention of public policy. Dicomes, at 620. In Dicomes we recognize[d] the public policy found in protecting employees who are discharged in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e., employee `whistleblowing' activity. Dicomes, at 618. In the context of public employment, we noted that the Legislature had announced a similar policy. Dicomes, at 618. Plaintiff Bennett sought legal assistance in response to allegedly unlawful employer conduct. This is not the same employee activity that was at issue in Dicomes, but because plaintiff's conduct is similar to employee whistleblowing, we apply by analogy the Dicomes analysis. In that case, we indicated that In determining whether retaliatory discharge for employee whistleblowing activity states a tort claim for wrongful discharge under the public policy exception, courts generally examine the degree of alleged employer wrongdoing, together with the reasonableness of the manner in which the employee reported, or attempted to remedy, the alleged misconduct. Dicomes, at 618-19. Applying the Dicomes employee whistleblowing analysis here, if Ms. Bennett can prove that defendant's discharge of her sister was age motivated, or that any of the terms or conditions of her employment were age related, then the employer wrongdoing which she resisted is a clear violation of RCW 49.44.090. Ms. Bennett responded by hiring an attorney to protect herself from similar discriminatory practices. Certainly an employee's seeking the assistance of legal counsel when confronted with discrimination in her workplace is not an unreasonable manner of attempting to remedy employer misconduct. We conclude therefore that the alleged employer wrongdoing, unlawful discrimination, together with the reasonableness of the employee's response, the hiring of legal counsel, are sufficient to state a tort claim for wrongful discharge under the public policy exception. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the same employer misconduct and method of resisting that misconduct have been embraced by the Legislature. RCW 49.60.210 makes it an unfair practice for an employer to discriminate against a person because she has opposed practices forbidden by that chapter. When a person deems herself the subject of such an unfair practice, she can avail herself of the legal system by way of a civil action. RCW 49.60.030(2). Although RCW 49.60 is not applicable here because the defendants do not fit within that chapter's employer definition, the statute does indicate the Legislature's recognition that retaliatory discharge is an unfair employment practice and that seeking legal recourse is a reasonable employee response. We hold that plaintiff Bennett has met her burden in pleading and proving a stated public policy which may have been contravened by her discharge. She has therefore stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge under the public policy exception. At this point we emphasize that we again do not reach the question reserved in Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 367, 753 P.2d 517 (1988), as to whether a cause of action exists for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy when the declaration of public policy is declared in a statute already providing a remedy. But see Jones v. Industrial Electric-Seattle, Inc., 53 Wn. App. 536, 768 P.2d 520 (1989) (the Court of Appeals refused to recognize a wrongful discharge tort when a statutory remedy under RCW 49.17.160 was available to, but was not fully pursued by, the aggrieved employee). We do not reach this question because the source of plaintiffs' rights to relief is RCW 49.44.090, a statute not providing an express remedy.