Opinion ID: 6342797
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Negligence Claim against Mr. Ayersman

Text: We begin our analysis with Mr. Ayersman’s argument that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment as to the Wratchfords’ claim that he 12 was negligent in investigating the Wratchford fire. Mr. Ayersman contends that the law of this state unequivocally provides that negligence claims against public officials in the performance of discretionary functions are barred. He draws this from the following holdings: If a public officer is either authorized or required, in the exercise of his judgment and discretion, to make a decision and to perform acts in the making of that decision, and the decision and acts are within the scope of his duty, authority, and jurisdiction, he is not liable for negligence or other error in the making of that decision, at the suit of a private individual claiming to have been damaged thereby. .... In the absence of an insurance contract waiving the defense, the doctrine of qualified or official immunity bars a claim of mere negligence against a State agency not within the purview of the West Virginia Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act, W.Va. Code § 29-12A-1, et seq., and against an officer of that department acting within the scope of his or her employment, with respect to the discretionary judgments, decisions, and actions of the officer. Syl. Pts. 4 and 6, Clark v. Dunn, 195 W. Va. 272, 465 S.E.2d 374 (1995). While we agree that this Court has generally recognized that claims sounding in “mere negligence” against public officials cannot stand, the claim asserted in this case belies that characterization. Syllabus point ten of A.B. directs a reviewing court to “first identify the nature of the governmental acts or omissions which give rise to the suit for purposes of determining” whether qualified immunity applies. A.B., 234 W. Va. at 497, 766 S.E.2d at 756. While respondents assert generally that Mr. Ayersman acted 13 “negligently” in his investigation of the fire, their specific allegations and the evidence adduced reveal far more than the type of “mere negligence” rendered immune pursuant to Clark. In fact, the Amended Complaint illustrates that this “negligence” claim is predicated on intentional conduct and is essentially a watered-down version of the Wratchfords’ civil conspiracy claim, as they allege that “[e]ach of the [d]efendants were negligent in their reliance upon the work product of the other investigators. . .in determining the causation of the fire[.]” Taken in conjunction with the rest of the Amended Complaint, which alleges that the named defendants worked in concert to deprive the Wratchfords of the insurance proceeds — namely the civil conspiracy claim pled in the same Amended Complaint — it is clear this is not a claim of “mere negligence,” but one predicated on intentional conduct allegedly undertaken to prevent the Wratchfords from recovering under their insurance policy. For this reason, we conclude that the Wratchfords’ negligence claim is mischaracterized and, thus, is not explicitly barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity under syllabus point six of Clark. See 195 W. Va. at 274, 465 S.E.2d at 376, syl. pt. 6. That said, Mr. Ayersman is still a state employee, so he may still be entitled to qualified immunity for causes of actions arising from the acts or omissions that underlie the Wratchfords claims. In this regard, we have explained that [t]o the extent that governmental acts or omissions which give rise to a cause of action fall within the category of discretionary functions, a reviewing court must determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that such acts or omissions are in violation of clearly established statutory or 14 constitutional rights or laws of which a reasonable person would have known or are otherwise fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive in accordance with State v. Chase Securities, Inc., 188 W.Va. 356, 424 S.E.2d 591 (1992). In absence of such a showing, both the State and its officials or employees charged with such acts or omissions are immune from liability. A.B., 234 W. Va. at 497, 766 S.E.2d at 756, syl. pt. 11. The Wratchfords argued below, as they do on appeal, that Mr. Ayersman violated the Ethics Act, specifically West Virginia Code § 6B-2-5(e) 14, insofar as he communicated information about the investigation of the fire at their home to third parties. However, the Wratchfords’ argument on this point is flawed; the Review Board explicitly found that no such violation had been committed. More specifically, any information Mr. Ayersman shared with third parties (Erie and FSI) was not confidential; moreover, the WVSFMO has no policy prohibiting fire marshals from sharing information regarding such information with third parties like fire insurers and private companies investigating suspicious fires. 15 14 West Virginia Code § 6B-2-5(e) provides, in relevant part that “[n]o present or former public official or employee may knowingly and improperly disclose any confidential information acquired by him or her in the course of his or her official duties nor use such information to further his or her personal interests or the interests of another person.” 15 In fact, the existence of such a policy would seem counterintuitive insofar as the very function of the WVSFMO is to investigate potential arsons and the results of such investigations would necessarily be of use to an insurance company in determining how to handle an insurance claim resulting from a fire. 15 On appeal, the Wratchfords contend that the Review Board was misled by the WVSFMO, arguing that the WVSFMO falsely represented to the Review Board that there was “no policy against sharing information about fire investigations with other agencies, law enforcement, or insurance companies.” However, the Wratchfords have cited nothing purporting to show the existence of such a policy; rather, their only citation is to an email from Mr. Ayersman which includes language stating that he will not share information with third parties. The unrefuted testimony below established that Mr. Ayersman added that language to the emails himself, not at the request of the WVSFMO. In the absence of any citation — to the record or otherwise — purporting to show that such a policy against sharing information with insurance companies exists, we cannot conclude that there has been a violation of the Ethics Act, or that the circuit court erred in finding that no such violation had been shown. To reiterate, the Wratchfords’ entire argument that Mr. Ayersman violated some clearly established statutory or constitutional right or law hinges upon an alleged violation of the Ethics Act. The Probable Cause Review Board (“Review Board”) of the West Virginia Ethics Commission — which is specifically tasked with determining whether an ethics violation has occurred — definitively concluded that a violation did not occur. Other than a bare allegation that the Review Board was misled, the Wratchfords 16 have presented this Court with nothing to indicate that conclusion was flawed. Accordingly, the Wratchfords’ argument on this point must fail. 16 Given that the Wratchfords cannot establish a violation of clearly established constitutional or statutory laws or rights, the only way they can overcome the presumption of qualified immunity for Mr. Ayersman is to demonstrate that his conduct in investigating the fire was fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive. We have held: The ultimate determination of whether qualified or statutory immunity bars a civil action is one of law for the court to determine. Therefore, unless there is a bona fide dispute as to the foundational or historical facts that underlie the immunity determination, the ultimate questions of statutory or qualified immunity are ripe for summary disposition. Syl. Pt. 1, Hutchison v. City of Huntington, 198 W. Va. 139, 479 S.E.2d 649 (1996). We have also stated in Maston v. Wagner, 236 W. Va. 488, 508 n.15, 781 S.E.2d 936, 956 n.15 (2015), that questions regarding malice “are questions for the fact-finder.” In examining the record before this Court, we have little trouble determining that there are enough disputed “foundational or historical facts” regarding Mr. Ayersman’s conduct during the investigation of the fire to preclude summary judgment on qualified 16 The circuit court went a step further and held that the Ethics Act generally does not afford individual rights that may be enforced via civil suits, so it cannot be a “clearly established statutory or constitutional right or law,” the violation of which can overcome qualified immunity. In their cross-assignment of error, the Wratchfords contend the circuit court erred in reaching this conclusion. However, because there is no violation of the Ethics Act in the case at bar, we need not address this argument. 17 immunity grounds. Specifically, we are most concerned with Mr. Ayersman’s dual employment with the WVSFMO and FSI. To be clear, we are not stating that Mr. Ayersman’s dual employment in and of itself constitutes fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive conduct. Rather, the facts of this case indicate that there are serious questions as to for whom Mr. Ayersman was working during the investigation. Despite Mr. Ayersman’s contention that he was working in his official fire marshal capacity during the investigation of the fire, several documents contained in the record call that into question, including Mr. Ayersman’s time sheets listing the hours he worked for the WVSFMO and FSI — time sheets indicating that on more than one occasion he worked more than twenty-four hours a day. That necessarily implies that there was an overlap in the hours he was working for the WVSFMO and FSI. Beyond this, we cannot ignore that there are questions surrounding Mr. Ayersman’s contact with Mr. Harris prior to the investigation. While we acknowledge that Mr. Harris is Mr. Ayersman’s supervisor in his private employment, the juxtaposition of that contact with the start of this investigation is troubling — particularly given other outstanding questions regarding how Mr. Ayersman came to be assigned to this investigation by the WVSFMO. Similarly, it is not unreasonable to think a jury might find that Mr. Ayersman’s conduct during Ms. Wratchford’s polygraph examination and interview could rise to the level of malice. An examination of the basic facts surrounding 18 that specific portion of the investigation reveals not only that it lasted four-and-a-half hours, but that Ms. Wratchford became physically ill during the interview, and that there are disputes about the admission she allegedly made therein. Moreover, those circumstances, when coupled with Ms. Wratchford’s suicide attempt that evening, leave far more questions than answers regarding the tactics employed during the interview. Finally, we note that the Wratchfords have alleged that Mr. Ayersman included false or misleading information in the criminal complaints he filed with the magistrate court at the close of his investigation. In particular, the Wratchfords contend Mr. Ayersman did not accurately represent their finances, insofar as he did not provide the magistrate court with a complete list of the Wratchfords’ bank accounts in an effort to imply that Ms. Wratchford had a motive to commit arson. In a similar vein, the Wratchfords contend that Mr. Ayersman falsely alleged Ms. Wratchford admitted to a prior arson attempt when she left a lit candle burning under a tabletop Christmas tree. As noted above, the record calls into question whether Ms. Wratchford made such an admission, as she denies having done so and the polygraph examiner, when deposed, also stated he did not recall her making that admission. However, in her own deposition, Ms. Wratchford recounts the incident, so it is not outside of the realm of possibility that she did make such an admission during or after the polygraph examination. Ultimately, whether the inclusion of that admission in the criminal complaints is evidence of fraud, malice, or oppression sufficient to overcome qualified immunity is not our charge, but that of the jury on remand. 19 Based on the foregoing, we agree with the circuit court that there are disputes of historical or foundational fact that warrant review by a factfinder before a determination can be made as to whether Mr. Ayersman is entitled to qualified immunity on the negligence claims. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s order on this point.