Opinion ID: 604198
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant Chan

Text: 35 DEA Special Agent James Tse testified at trial about statements that Hoac made after he was arrested. Although the Assistant United States Attorney had instructed Agent Tse not to refer by name to Chan, Tse testified on direct examination as follows: 36 Q: After these rights were given to [Hoac], did you have a further conversation regarding the eight boxes of lychee nuts that contained the heroin? 37 A: Yes. 38 Q: Can you tell us what he told you? 39 A: He told me that another individual was involved. He mentioned that his name was Anom. 40 Anom is an alias of Chan, although that information was never revealed to the jury. 41 Chan's counsel informed the court in a sidebar that Anom was Chan and moved for a mistrial. The court rejected the motion, reasoning that the jury doesn't know that Anom is Chan and they have no way of perceiving that because there's nothing in the case that links Anom to the name Chan. Plus, he didn't say that Anom was a Hong Kong person, which might have a link. The court concluded that any potential error could be cured by having Tse testify that he had previously misspoken when he mentioned the name Anom. Tse so testified on further direct examination. Tse's testimony thereafter referred only to individuals with whom Hoac said he had met. Hoac did not testify at trial, and the court instructed the jury that Hoac's hearsay statements were only admissible against Hoac. Chan argues that the admission of evidence of Hoac's extrajudicial confession at trial was a violation of Chan's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation under Bruton. 42 Redaction of a nontestifying codefendant's confession, when accompanied by a proper limiting instruction, can prevent any Bruton violation. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 209, 211, 107 S.Ct. at 1708, 1709; United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1537 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866, 109 S.Ct. 171, 102 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). Chan contends, however, that the use of a neutral term such as individuals does not avoid a Bruton violation because Richardson requires the elimination of not only the defendant's name, but any reference to his or her existence. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211, 107 S.Ct. at 1709. We reject this argument as an overly strict reading of Richardson. Although the redacted confession in Richardson eliminated any reference to [the defendant's] existence, the Court explicitly left open the question of the admissibility of a confession in which the defendant's name has been replaced with a symbol or neutral pronoun. Id. at 211 n. 5, 107 S.Ct. at 1709 n. 5. 43 In United States v. Long, 900 F.2d 1270, 1280 (8th Cir.1990), the Eighth Circuit reviewed cases from several circuits and drew a distinction between cases in which the redacted statement alerts the jury to the omission of a name and invites them to fill in the blank and cases in which no such speculation is invited. Compare United States v. Bennett, 848 F.2d 1134, 1142 (11th Cir.1988) (Bruton violation where use of pronoun they in redacted confession clearly implicated codefendants) and Clark v. Maggio, 737 F.2d 471, 477 (5th Cir.1984) (Bruton violation where redacted confession referred to the three of us and police witnesses testified that confessor had provided police with specific names of his accomplices), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1055, 105 S.Ct. 1761, 84 L.Ed.2d 823 (1985) with United States v. Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 652-53 (2nd Cir.1989) (no Bruton violation where reference to another person in redacted confession did not indicate that original statement contained actual name), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071, 110 S.Ct. 1114, 107 L.Ed.2d 1021 (1990) and United States v. Garcia, 836 F.2d 385, 390-91 (8th Cir.1987) (no Bruton violation where use of pronoun someone did not draw attention to fact that prosecution had name available and purposely omitted it). See also United States v. Petit, 841 F.2d 1546, 1556 n. 15 (11th Cir.) (distinguishing redacted confession in which reference to a friend could only be understood as referring to specific codefendant from statements that do  'not provide the slightest hint as to [the other defendants'] particular identities'  (quoting United States v. Garrett, 727 F.2d 1003, 1014 (11th Cir.1984), aff'd on other grounds, 471 U.S. 773, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985))), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1237, 108 S.Ct. 2906, 101 L.Ed.2d 938 (1988). 44 In this case, Special Agent Tse used the neutral plural term individuals and did not indicate to the jury that Chan had given actual names or even had stated how many individuals he had met with in Hong Kong. The jury was aware that several people were involved in this conspiracy, including at least one (Leung) who was not being tried with the three defendants. Because Anom was never revealed to the jury to be Chan's nickname and was immediately corrected and replaced with the vague plural individuals, and because the redaction did not invite the jury to fill in the blanks, Hoac's extrajudicial statement did not facially incriminate Chan; rather, it could become incriminating only when linked with other evidence introduced at trial. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208, 107 S.Ct. at 1707; Sherlock, 865 F.2d at 1079-80. We therefore conclude that there was no Bruton error. 45
46 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) provides in relevant part: 47 If the trial judge determines that [a] confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances. 48 Thus, where a defendant raises a genuine issue at trial concerning the voluntariness of a statement, the trial court is obligated by statute to instruct the jury concerning the weight to be accorded that statement. United States v. Fera, 616 F.2d 590, 594-95 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 969, 100 S.Ct. 2951, 64 L.Ed.2d 830 (1980). 49 Chan's counsel devoted the majority of her cross-examination of the Hong Kong police witnesses and her closing argument to the circumstances of Chan's statements, which she argued included overly long periods of questioning, sleep deprivation, and unnecessary use of handcuffs and hoods. That she did not ultimately persuade the jury to disregard the statements does not mean that the weight to be given the statements was not in issue. The district court therefore properly recognized that a § 3501(a) instruction was required, although it rejected Chan's proposed instruction 3 in favor of Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instruction 4.01. 4 Only moments after ruling that it would give the preferred Ninth Circuit instruction, however, the district court failed to give any instruction regarding a defendant's extrajudicial statements. Chan argues that this was error requiring reversal of his conviction. 50 Because Chan did not object to the district court's apparently inadvertent omission when the instructions were given, we review for plain error. United States v. Boone, 951 F.2d 1526, 1541 (9th Cir.1991).  'A plain error is a highly prejudicial error affecting substantial rights.'  United States v. Dischner, 960 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979, 100 S.Ct. 480, 62 L.Ed.2d 405 (1979)), amended, 974 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir.1992). We may reverse Chan's conviction for plain error only if the district court's failure to give the Ninth Circuit instruction so affected the jury's ability to consider the totality of the evidence fairly that it tainted the verdict and deprived [Chan] of a fair trial. United States v. Smith, 962 F.2d 923, 935 (9th Cir.1992). Reversal of a criminal conviction on the basis of plain error is an exceptional remedy, which we invoke only when it appears necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process. United States v. Bustillo, 789 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir.1986). 51 Although we have stated that improper jury instructions will rarely justify a finding of plain error, id. at 1367-68, we are necessarily more cautious when the trial court omits an instruction that is unequivocally mandated by statute. We are also aware that several circuits have held that a failure to issue a § 3501(a) instruction when voluntariness is in issue is plain error per se, focusing their analysis on whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098, 1118 (6th Cir.1984); United States v. Sauls, 520 F.2d 568, 570 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1021, 96 S.Ct. 459, 46 L.Ed.2d 393 (1975); United States v. Barry, 518 F.2d 342, 347 (2nd Cir.1975); United States v. Bernett, 495 F.2d 943, 962 (D.C.Cir.1974). The Supreme Court, however, has clearly stated that a per se approach to plain error under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b) is improper. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16-17 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046-1047 n. 14, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). The reason is that plain error is not merely a question of obviousness. An error that rises to the level of reviewability under Rule 52(b) must not only affect substantial rights, but must also have had an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations. Id. at 17 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. at 1047 n. 14. Any such error must necessarily be harmful. The alternative would be to have appellate courts indulge in the pointless exercise of reviewing 'harmless plain errors'--a practice that is contrary to the draftsmen's intention behind Rule 52(b). Id. 52 Without referring to the Supreme Court's words in Young, some of our cases have indicated that a plain error can also be harmless error. See United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1466 n. 6 (9th Cir.1991) (discussing the split within this circuit), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1598, 118 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992). The Supreme Court's analysis in Young is dispositive and is well supported. The language of Rule 52, which defines harmless error as one which does not affect substantial rights and plain error as one affecting substantial rights, is logically read to suggest that the two are mutually exclusive. See United States v. Jarrad, 754 F.2d 1451, 1457 (9th Cir.) (Where the alleged error is harmless, plain error does not exist and review is unwarranted.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 830, 106 S.Ct. 96, 88 L.Ed.2d 78 (1985); accord United States v. Loya, 807 F.2d 1483, 1492 (9th Cir.1987). Moreover, because plain error requires a high probability that the error materially affected the jury's verdict, United States v. Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 858, 110 S.Ct. 167, 107 L.Ed.2d 124 (1989), it is difficult to see how such an error can be held harmless on the basis of a probability that the error did not materially affect the verdict, see United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 915-16 (9th Cir.1977). 5 We can think of no error prejudicial enough to cause us to overlook a failure to object that would not cause us to reverse. See Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 372 (7th Cir.) ([W]hen a court, on direct appellate review, finds that an error rises to the level of plain error, reversal is automatic.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 206, 107 L.Ed.2d 159 (1989). Our search for a harmless plain error leads us to conclude that there is no such animal. 6 53 Our plain error analysis must therefore turn not on any per se rule, but on whether the district court's failure to give the required instruction, under all of the circumstances presented, was so prejudicial that it tainted the verdict or deprived Chan of a fair trial. We conclude that it was not. Chan's confession was corroborated by the physical evidence, including his ownership of the company that shipped the lychees and his possession of documents relating to the shipment as well as the lease and keys to the packing warehouse. Further evidence indicated that Chan was repeatedly read his rights, signed three separate statements after being permitted to read and correct them, and was given approximately seven hours in a cell to sleep between interviews. All insinuations by Chan's counsel of threats and intimidation were denied on the stand by the Hong Kong Police witnesses, 7 whose trustworthiness the jury was instructed to weigh by the court's general credibility instruction. See United States v. Williams, 484 F.2d 176, 178 (8th Cir.) (per curiam) (omission of § 3501(a) instruction not plain error where jury instructed generally on credibility and weight to be accorded witness testimony), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1070, 94 S.Ct. 581, 38 L.Ed.2d 475 (1973). Because we do not believe that any reasonable juror could have disregarded Chan's confession had the § 3501(a) instruction been given, we are convinced that there is no reasonable possibility that the error had an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations. Young, 470 U.S. at 17 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. at 1047 n. 14. The district court's failure to give the § 3501(a) instruction, although amounting to error, was therefore not such as to undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 16, 105 S.Ct. at 1046.
54 Finally, Chan argues that the district court erred by increasing his base offense level by two for his aggravating role as an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of the heroin conspiracy under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). To justify a two-level increase under § 3B1.1(c), the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had an aggravating role in the offense. See United States v. Mares-Molina, 913 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir.1990). Whether a defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor is a question of fact that is reviewed for clear error. Id. 55 In Mares-Molina, this court adopted a First Circuit holding that for an upward adjustment under § 3B1.1  'the defendant must have exercised some control over others involved in the commission of the offense or he must have been responsible for organizing others for the purpose of carrying out the crime.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Fuller, 897 F.2d 1217, 1220 (1st Cir.1990)). Applying this standard to a defendant who knowingly leased his warehouse to individuals who used it to store cocaine, we held that the district court's finding that the defendant was an organizer or manager was clearly erroneous. Id. 913 F.2d at 774; see also United States v. Koenig, 952 F.2d 267, 274 (9th Cir.1991) (applying Mares-Molina standard, defendant was manager because there was evidence that he played some role in directing coconspirators). Although several cases after Mares-Molina have upheld the two-level upward adjustment without explicitly applying the control over others standard, all such cases arguably met this test. See, e.g., United States v. Schubert, 957 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir.1992) (defendant was organizer because he provided business associate with money to purchase drugs); United States v. Hernandez, 952 F.2d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir.1991) (defendant was manager because he recruited, hired, and instructed workers in counterfeiting scheme), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 334, 121 L.Ed.2d 252 (1992). 56 We do not believe that the district court, properly applying the Mares-Molina standard, could have found by a preponderance of the evidence that Chan was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor under § 3B1.1(c). At sentencing the government argued that the two-level increase was justified because Chan opened the trading company to export the heroin, reserved a shipping date and arranged for a shipping container, assisted Leung in placing the heroin in the cans and loading the shipping container, was promised $50,000-$70,000 by Leung if the shipment was successful, and at the time of his arrest possessed the rental contract and keys for the packing warehouse. While all of these facts suggest that Chan was perhaps one of the more culpable defendants, they do not indicate that he exercised control over others or was responsible for organizing others so as to justify an increase under § 3B1.1(c). Moreover, the court justified the two-level increase by stating: [Chan] didn't organize the whole scenario ... I mean, it seems that Mr. Leung did that.... But [Chan] implemented the importation and in that, utilized organization skills. Organizing the importation, however, is not the same as organizing other conspirators and does not satisfy Mares-Molina. 57 Because no evidence indicated that Chan exercised control over other defendants or was responsible for organizing them, 8 Mares-Molina requires us to hold that the district court's finding that Chan was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor was clearly erroneous. We therefore vacate Chan's sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with this opinion. 58 AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED IN PART.