Opinion ID: 4529971
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admitting Murder Evidence

Text: Setiawan argues that the district court constructively amended the indictment by admitting evidence that he killed Teton. Essentially, Setiawan argues that he was charged with a conspiracy to distribute drugs -- not the separate offense of killing someone during the course of a drug crime -- so evidence of Teton's murder could not be presented as an overt act of the drug-distribution conspiracy. Setiawan did not preserve this claim at trial, so as both parties agree, we review for plain error. See United States v. Brandao, 539 F.3d 44, 60 (1st Cir. 2008). Although Setiawan makes a constructive-amendment argument, it is unclear whether his complaint would be described more appropriately as a variance from the indictment. See United States v. Rodríguez-Rodríguez, 663 F.3d 53, 58 n.6 (1st Cir. 2008) (The line [between the two doctrines] is inherently fuzzy.) (citation omitted). A constructive amendment occurs when the difference between the indictment and the proof at trial is so great that the defendant was essentially convicted of a charge for which he was not indicted; a variance occurs when the charge is unchanged, but the facts proved at trial are different from those - 11 - alleged in the indictment. See United States v. Fisher, 3 F.3d 456, 462 (1st Cir. 1993). Ultimately, it does not matter whether we construe Setiawan's argument as one of constructive amendment or variance -- neither occurred here. The introduction of evidence at trial that Setiawan murdered Teton did not constructively amend the indictment, which charged Setiawan with, among other things, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances under 21 U.S.C. § 846. The government is not required to allege or prove any overt act as an element of a § 846 conspiracy. See United States v. Vega-Figueroa, 234 F.3d 744, 754 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13 (1994)). Therefore, the government's gratuitous proof of an overt act relevant to the conspiracy -- Teton's murder -- does not involve an alleged constructive amendment of [the indictment] to include an 'offense not charged by the grand jury.' United States v. Fornia-Castillo, 408 F.3d 52, 66 (1st Cir. 2005). (quoting United States v. Dunn, 758 F.2d 30, 35 (1st Cir. 1985)). Setiawan is mistaken in his argument that this is the first time that murder evidence has been introduced as an overt act in a drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. We have recognized, but found unavailing, the contention that admitting this sort of evidence arguably carrie[s] the risk of turning a drug conspiracy case into a murder case. United States - 12 - v. Rivera Calderón, 578 F.3d 78, 99 (1st Cir. 2009). Here, the murder evidence does not appear to have been calculated to arouse the passions of the jury, so its admission is not reversible error. Id. at 98. Setiawan merely asserts without development that the murder evidence was unfairly prejudicial. Even if his argument were not waived, see United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990), after careful review, we note that the relevant testimony was presented in a manner similar to that approved of in Rivera Calderón -- the witnesses described the murder[] matter-of-factly, stating that [Teton was] shot but leaving out graphic details. 578 F.3d at 98. Further, [t]here is no variance when, as here, a defendant does not contend that the government failed to prove [the indictment's] allegations at trial but argues that he was charged only with [those] acts, and that the government 'varied' from the indictment by offering additional evidence. United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 477–78 (1st Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original). In Vega-Figueroa, we rejected a variance claim like Setiawan's. There, the defendant claimed that the trial evidence of his involvement in a drug-trafficking conspiracy -- including his involvement in an uncharged murder -- impermissibly varied from the indictment, which did not mention the murder. 234 F.3d at 753. We determined that there was no basis for a variance - 13 - claim because the government was not limited at trial only to those overt acts alleged in the indictment. Id. at 754. Differently stated, [t]he fact that the government proved aspects of the conspiracy beyond those recited in the indictment . . . simply does not constitute a variance. Fisher, 3 F.3d at 463. Finally, even if there had been a constructive amendment or variance, Setiawan could not demonstrate prejudice under the plain-error standard because he does not dispute that he had advance notice of the murder evidence. See Brandao, 539 F.3d at 62–63 (finding that the constructive amendment did not seriously jeopardize the defendant's rights when, among other things, he was provided adequate notice of the charges against him); ForniaCastillo, 408 F.3d at 67 (concluding that the variance was not prejudicial when the defendant had ample notice of and ample opportunity to prepare to meet the government's evidence before trial). In Rivera-Donate, for instance, we declined to find a prejudicial variance when the defendant could not 'credibly claim surprise' about the government's proof at trial. Id. At 130 (quoting United States v. Marrrero-Ortiz, 160 F.3d 768, 773 (1st Cir. 1998)). Setiawan knew that he was under indictment for participating in a drug-distribution conspiracy, and he knew that his central defense needed to be that he was not part of that [conspiracy]. United States v. Alicea-Cardoza, 132 F.3d 1, 6 - 14 - (1st Cir. 1997). Therefore, he cannot demonstrate prejudice under the plain-error standard.