Opinion ID: 592262
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Harris' Appeal

Text: 23 Harris contends he should be resentenced because the district court failed to make written findings and attach them to the presentence investigation report (PSI) as required by Fed.R.Crim.Pro. 32(c)(3)(D). This rule provides as follows: 24 If the comments of the defendant and the defendant's counsel or testimony or other information introduced by them allege any factual inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report or the summary of the report or part thereof, the court shall, as to each matter controverted, make (i) a finding as to the allegation, or (ii) a determination that no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into account in sentencing. A written record of such findings and determinations shall be appended to and accompany any copy of the presentence investigation report thereafter made available to the Bureau of Prisons. 25 The government concedes this rule was violated in that the district court relied on factual matters contained in the PSI but failed to attach written findings; however, it contends resentencing is not necessary. 26 The requirement of written findings is designed to serve two purposes: it protects a defendant's due process rights by insuring his sentence is based on accurate information and it provide[s] a clear record of the disposition and resolution of controverted facts in the presentence report. United States v. Eschweiler, 782 F.2d 1385, 1387 (7th Cir.1986). This latter purpose is intended to assist both appellate courts in their review of sentencing hearings and administrative agencies that use the report in their own decisionmaking procedures. Id. (footnote omitted). 27 An examination of our cases discussing Rule 32(c)(3)(D) reveals that we have remanded for resentencing only if the first purpose of the rule has been infringed in some way. In Eschweiler, we declined to remand for resentencing because the transcript of the sentencing hearing clearly demonstrated that the judge did not consider the disputed facts in deciding the defendant's sentence. Id. at 1389-90. We further supported our holding by referencing Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a), which directs that [a]ny error ... which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. In United States v. Moran, 845 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.1988), we did not remand for resentencing because the record clearly revealed that the district judge had made factual findings, even though those findings were delivered orally and were not reduced to writing. Id. at 139. Similarly, in United States v. Rodriguez-Luna, 937 F.2d 1208 (7th Cir.1991), we declined to remand for resentencing, holding that the defendant's due process rights [we]re not implicated because the district judge clearly made a finding as to the disposition of the dispute about the relevant quantity of cocaine. Id. at 1213. Our review of the transcript in this case reveals the district court allowed Harris an opportunity to present witnesses and arguments addressing the disputed factual matters, and that the judge made findings of fact as to the amount of drugs involved. We discern no denial of any of Harris' due process rights; consequently, we will not remand for resentencing. 5 28 However, the second purpose has not been fully served. Although we have been able to conduct a review based on the transcript, 6 we are not the only body that is likely to examine the district court's actions in this case. Consequently, consistent with our prior cases addressing this issue, we remand for the limited purpose of affording the district court an opportunity to make and attach written findings to the PSI. E.g., Eschweiler, 782 F.2d at 1391, 1393. Once again, we emphasize that strict compliance with Rule 32(c)(3)(D) is not discretionary but mandatory, and ask the district courts to make a more diligent effort to comply with the rule. Rodriguez-Luna, 937 F.2d at 1214.