Opinion ID: 2386212
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Reevaluation of the Relevant Factors

Text: It is impossible to read the trial court and majority decisions in Spaulding v. Butler without concluding that these decisions simply give different weight to the various factors bearing on custody and, as a result, reach different conclusions. This would be entirely understandable and healthy if the decisions came from two different trial judges. It is not appropriate if one of the decisions comes from an appellate court purportedly issued under a limited standard of review. In two respects, the circumstances of Spaulding, and the family court decision, make it more likely that this Court will abandon its limited role and decide the case de novo. First, the family court faced a choice between two flawed parents. For either, it is easy to state why that parent should not be a primary custodian; it is far harder to find and weigh positive skills and conduct which warrant confidence that a child in that parent's custody will have positive and nurturing parenting in a safe and secure environment. Unfortunately, there is no third option; the trial judge was forced to make a disquieting and unpleasant choice, almost on the basis of the least damage to the child. Second, the trial judge, to her credit, did not sugarcoat the negative history, skills, characteristics or motives of either parent. I say to her credit because the decision reinforces that the court had no illusions that it could assure the child a good home and that the court struggled to find the best result. But that result has become harder to affirm because the flaws of the custodial parent, as explicitly contained in the findings, are so difficult to accept. Indeed, on the surface, it appears much easier to accept the majority analysis because it details the father's flaws and largely ignores, or explains, the mother's flaws. In a truncated fashion, the majority quotes the family court's analysis of the mother's flaws in its decision on whether there were changed circumstances and then largely ignores that analysis in looking at the best interest of the child. Let me repeat, in full version, what the family court found about the negative factors bearing on the mother as a custodian: Specifically, during [the] time [between September 1994 and April 1997] there was a pattern of poor care of a severe and painful diaper rash, the severity of which was unnecessary as shown by the improvement in the rash during the weekend visitations with Mr. Spaulding; a pattern of Nathan appearing for visits with Mr. Spaulding with a number of bruises and marks on his body; a lead test indicating lead poisoning of Nathan with no information that the problem had been taken care of; a pattern of biting behavior between Michael and Nathan that had not improved despite the work of Ms. Butler with Meredith McCartney in therapy; delays in Nathan's developmental milestones as indicated by testing through Triple E and Stepping Stones; and severe bite marks on Nathan from Michael on April 11, 1997. . . . [The evidence] shows a child living in an environment with a pattern of neglect sufficient to result in measurable developmental delays and physical injuries. The change is substantial in that it resulted in Nathan lagging behind in his development and suffering painful personal injury despite remedial efforts. It is unanticipated in that one would never expect parental care to result in such an impact on a child. Thus, the family court was forced to chose between a parent who exhibited a pattern of neglect sufficient to result in measurable developmental delays and physical injuries and a parent who had a history of abuse and attempts to alienate the child from the other parent, at best an unenviable choice. Where the trial court decision is candid and balanced about the nature and difficulty of this choice, I cannot say the same about the majority decision here. It builds to its ultimate conclusion that the family court could not find within its discretion that it was in the child's best interest to award custody to a father who was a batterer, a liar, and . . . [who] consciously and deliberately alienated Nathan from mother. ___ Vt. at ___, 782 A.2d at 1178. The equivalent criticism of the majority is that it cannot find as a matter of law that custody must be awarded to a mother who, when she had custody, engaged in a pattern of neglect sufficient to result in measurable development delays and physical injuries. I think we trivialize the difficulty and complexity of child custody adjudication with this kind of analysis. The essence of this dissent is that the kind of difficult choice presented by Spaulding must be made by the judge who heard the evidence and viewed the parents as they testified and otherwise participated in the merits hearing. To the extent we have an appellate role, we should exercise it sparingly, and not as we are doing here, to second-guess the considered choice of the family court judge and substitute our own judgment. Because that is the fundamental point of the dissent and captures what I believe is wrong in the majority decision in Spaulding, I will not belabor my specific disagreements with that decision beyond three additional points. I do not understand the remand in this case, other than for the evaluation of changed circumstances. The Court has said that the family court could not reach the decision it did based on its findings and that the findings are supported by the evidence. Under that analysis, the family court has no choice but to award custody to the mother. To the extent the majority is trying to suggest that it did anything other than substituting its judgment for the trial judge, that suggestion is illusory. Indeed, the worst outcome we could have for the child is further extensive litigation to reopen the findings and conclusions of the family court. A good deal of the majority's analysis is based on its conclusion that any risk that the child would be unsafe if placed with the mother is speculative at best. Id. at ___, 782 A.2d at 1178. I can describe that conclusion only as incredible. The family court detailed the past harm to the child while in mother's custody and concluded that there had been a pattern of neglect sufficient to result in ... physical injuries. How is it speculative that the identical pattern will reoccur when custody is again transferred to the mother? Third, we need to be careful in how we define parental alienation and in administering a rule that a parent cannot benefit from alienating a child from the other parent. No parent who believes that the other parent is the cause of physical, sexual or extreme emotional abuse of the child is promoting contact between the child and that parent. The family court justifiably criticized the father for being too quick to go to the police, SRS or the courts, but some of father's allegations of abuse were confirmed in earlier court proceedings and formed the basis of the abuse prevention order transferring custody to father and limiting mother to supervised visitation. Unless the majority is prepared to say that father somehow defrauded the family court, a conclusion with no support in the findings, it is inappropriate to call a courtordered custody situation a successful attempt[] at alienation. Id. at ___, 782 A.2d at 1177. In conclusion, I believe that in both Spaulding and Cloutier the majority has embarked on the pursuit of a more just and correct custody determination that will injure the exact children it is attempting to protect. If we actually accorded the family court broad discretion in determining the best interests of the child, as both decisions state we do, the only consistent conclusion would be to affirm the custody decisions in both cases. Reluctantly, I must dissent from the reversals in both cases.