Opinion ID: 889688
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Furlough and Parole

Text: ¶ 24 Roundstone next argues that he was actually on parole and thus excluded from official detention by § 45-7-306(1)(b), MCA, which provides that [o]fficial detention does not include supervision of a person on probation or parole. . . . Roundstone argues that furlough should be considered parole under the statutes, given the essential characteristics of parole. Noting that parole is defined as the release to the community of a prisoner by the decision of a hearing panel prior to the expiration of the prisoner's term, subject to conditions imposed by the hearing panel and subject to supervision of the department, § 46-23-103(5), MCA (emphases added), Roundstone compares a definition of furlough from Black's Law Dictionary as [a] brief release from prison. Black's Law Dictionary 745 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 9th ed., West 2009) (emphasis added). He cites § 46-23-215(3), MCA, which provides that [w]hile on furlough, the prisoner remains in the legal custody of the department and is subject to all other conditions recited by the hearing panel. Roundstone's argument is that this parallel language necessarily means that furlough should be considered parole because it satisfies the statutory definition of parole. [9] ¶ 25 Section 46-23-218, MCA, authorizes the Board of Pardons and Parole to adopt rules pertaining to parole. See also Admin. R.M. 20.1.101(3)(a) (2007) (the Board is responsible for the oversight of Montana's inmate parole and furlough programs); Admin. R.M. 20.1.101(1)(d)(i) (2010). The Standard Operating Procedures of the Probation and Parole Bureau provide that [f]urlough offenders are not eligible for Gate Money until such time as they are on parole status, and if the offender secures acceptable living arrangements and/or employment, then the offender  may be eligible to be placed on parole status without returning to the correctional facility. (Emphases added.) The Procedures state that [i]f the offender fails to report as ordered to the supervising parole officer or fails to return to the facility as ordered in the furlough permit, the offender may be charged with escape. . . . Before release, Roundstone signed next to a provision in the Furlough Program Rules that stated, [a]bsconding from furlough or failure to return on time will be considered felony escape. This same document noted that furlough provided an opportunity to seek employment or living arrangements in order to develop a parole plan and that if such employment or living arrangements were obtained and approved, then the offender  may be eligible to be placed on parole. (Emphasis in original.) Roundstone's probation officer was authorized to initiate the final steps for the Board's issuance of a parole certificate upon completion of the conditions. These Procedures and Program Rules indicate that furlough must be satisfactorily completed before attaining parole. Consistent herewith, we held in Romannose that the evidence did not support defendant's claim to be a parolee when he was on `live-out' status from a prerelease center. Romannose, 281 Mont. at 89, 931 P.2d at 1308. In making that determination, we noted that the defendant was on inmate status while a resident of the prerelease, and he signed forms acknowledging that any unauthorized absence would constitute felony escape and that he was in official detention until the Board formally approved him for parole. Romannose, 281 Mont. at 89, 931 P.2d at 1308. ¶ 26 This position was supported by evidence at the hearing. Carter testified that Roundstone was on inmate status when he was transferred from prison to the prerelease center and on inmate status when he left the prerelease center on furlough. Carter explained that everybody on furlough is an inmate. Additionally, the court asked Carter whether a person can be an inmate and be on parole at the same time, to which Carter responded, No. . . . During that furlough status . . . he's still considered an inmate. They do not start that parole status until the completion of the furlough. Carter testified that Roundstone was eligible for parole but not actually placed on parole until the Parole Board completes a parole certificate. ¶ 27 While Roundstone urges us to conclude that furlough is pre-certificate parole. . . and after furlough is completed the prisoner is granted post-furlough parole, we decline to do so, as it would essentially require rewriting the statutes. While, admittedly, both furlough and parole are forms of release and are subject to the Board's conditions, the Legislature has not provided in statute that furlough is, in fact, parole. [10] There are regulatory distinctions between the two based on statute which this Court recognized in Romannose. Neither is there ambiguity requiring application of the rule of lenity, as Roundstone urges. We affirm the District Court's denial of the motion to dismiss. [11] ¶ 28 II. Is § 45-7-306, MCA, void for vagueness as applied to Roundstone? ¶ 29 Alternatively, Roundstone raises an as-applied constitutional challenge to § 45-7-306, MCA, on vagueness grounds. Roundstone concedes he did not raise the issue in the District Court and thus requests plain error review or review for ineffective assistance of his counsel in failing to raise the issue. ¶ 30 A law that is so vague that it leaves ordinary people uncertain as to what conduct it prohibits or that it may authorize or encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is repugnant to the Due Process Clauses of the Constitutions of Montana and the United States. G'Stohl, ¶ 9. A statute can violate due process on vagueness grounds if: (1) the statute fails to give actual notice to citizens, that is, whether the statute fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that the contemplated conduct is forbidden, or (2) it fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. State v. Dixon, 2000 MT 82, ¶¶ 27-28, 299 Mont. 165, 998 P.2d 544; G'Stohl, ¶ 10. [12] ¶ 31 Generally, a constitutional issue is waived if not raised at the earliest opportunity. State v. Mainwaring, 2007 MT 14, ¶ 20, 335 Mont. 322, 151 P.3d 53. However, this Court may discretionarily review claimed errors that implicate the fundamental rights of a defendant pursuant to plain error review. State v. Norman, 2010 MT 253, ¶ 17, 358 Mont. 252, 244 P.3d 737. The decision to invoke plain error review is a discretionary one that is to be used sparingly on a case-by-case basis. State v. Hayden, 2008 MT 274, ¶ 17, 345 Mont. 252, 190 P.3d 1091. A party must (1) show that the claimed error implicates a fundamental right and (2) `firmly convince' this Court that failure to review the claimed error would result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings, or compromise the integrity of the judicial process. Norman, ¶ 17. We require that the alleged error be `plain.' State v. Taylor, 2010 MT 94, ¶ 15, 356 Mont. 167, 231 P.3d 79. ¶ 32 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution guarantee the right of effective assistance of counsel. Sartain, ¶ 29. We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) under the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Whitlow v. State, 2008 MT 140, ¶ 10, 343 Mont. 90, 183 P.3d 861. A defendant must prove that (1) counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel's performance prejudiced the defense. Whitlow, ¶¶ 10, 12, 20. We first consider whether IAC claims are more suitable for postconviction relief. State v. Main, 2011 MT 123, ¶ 48, 360 Mont. 470, 255 P.3d 1240; Sartain, ¶ 30. [W]e ask `why' counsel did or did not perform as alleged and then seek to answer the question by reference to the record. State v. Kougl, 2004 MT 243, ¶ 14, 323 Mont. 6, 97 P.3d 1095 (citing State v. White, 2001 MT 149, ¶ 20, 306 Mont. 58, 30 P.3d 340). If the record on appeal explains why, we will address the issue on appeal. Kougl, ¶ 14, 97 P.3d 1095. If, as is often the case, the claim is based on matters outside the record, we decline to address the issue and allow the defendant to pursue a claim in postconviction proceedings where a record can be developed. Kougl, ¶ 14. It is unnecessary to ask why counsel performed as alleged where there is no plausible justification for counsel's actions or inaction. Kougl, ¶ 15. ¶ 33 We decline to take up Roundstone's vagueness challenge under either of his arguments. Roundstone did not raise a vagueness challenge below, despite significant pre-trial motion practice, but instead pled guilty. The above discussion in Issue One describes the clear notices Roundstone received about furlough and the expectations of him, including reporting to his probation officer and returning to the prerelease center. He was advised that failure to do so could lead to an escape charge. We conclude that his assertions of vagueness do not compel our review under plain error. ¶ 34 Regarding the IAC claim, the record does not disclose the reasons counsel did not raise a vagueness challenge or that there is no plausible justification for trial counsel's failure to do so. It is plausible that counsel did not think the vagueness challenge was meritorious or that the decision was strategic, given that a plea agreement had been negotiated. See State v. Frasure, 2004 MT 305, ¶ 12, 323 Mont. 479, 100 P.3d 1013 (counsel are not expected to make motions that theoretically might help their clients if the motions lack merit); State v. Maine, 2011 MT 90, ¶ 39, 360 Mont. 182, 255 P.3d 64 ([t]he only evidence is that counsel failed to raise it, and it is certainly possible that counsel did conduct an investigation and decided that the facts did not support such a defense). We dismiss the IAC claim without prejudice to pursuing postconviction relief. ¶ 35 III. Did the prosecution violate Roundstone's due process rights by seeking an unusually severe sentence? ¶ 36 Roundstone claims the prosecutor sought an unusually harsh sentence in response to Roundstone's challenge of the escape charge, which violated his due process rights. ¶ 37 The principle of prosecutorial vindictiveness originates from the idea that it is unconstitutional for the State or its agent to penalize a person for exercising his or her legal rights. See U.S. v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 2488, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982); see also Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27-28, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 2101-02, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974). `To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort.' Knowles, ¶ 28 (quoting Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 372, 102 S.Ct. at 2488 (internal quotation omitted)). Citing Blackledge, this Court has stated that [r]etaliatory action on the part of the prosecutor for the exercise of procedural rights by an accused has been held to violate constitutional due process requirements. State v. Sather, 172 Mont. 428, 434-35, 564 P.2d 1306, 1310 (1977). ¶ 38 To establish that a prosecution was vindictive, a defendant must establish either (1) actual vindictiveness, or (2) a rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness in those cases in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists. Wasman v. U.S., 468 U.S. 559, 566, 568-69, 104 S.Ct. 3217, 3222-23, 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984); Goodwin, 457 U.S at 373, 380-81, 102 S.Ct. at 2488, 2492; see also U.S. v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031, 1040 (10th Cir.1991). In sum, where the presumption applies, the sentencing authority or the prosecutor must rebut the presumption that an increased sentence or charge resulted from vindictiveness; where the presumption does not apply, the defendant must affirmatively prove actual vindictiveness. Wasman, 468 U.S. at 569, 104 S.Ct. at 3223. ¶ 39 Roundstone concedes the presumption of vindictiveness is not at issue, and he argues on the basis of actual vindictiveness. Roundstone's argument is based upon comments made by the prosecutor during the change of plea and sentencing hearing: The practice of the [DOC] of giving concurrent sentences for somebody who is a violent offender, or anybody else, and decides to walk away from either prison or from a pre-release center, there has got to be a consequence. All of the others, at least the ones that I've prosecuted, were not treated as persistent felony offenders because they came in prior to getting to this stage of the proceedings and accepted responsibility. And they accepted responsibility. And I think that there ought to be a message, at least from this county attorney and hopefully from the judges of this district, that if you come to the Helena Pre-Release Center and you walk away from it, there is going to be a consequence, and it's not going to be concurrent time. And if you make that mistake, then you ought to accept responsibility and come into court and do so, because if you don't, there is going to be a consequence. The evidence required to prove actual vindictiveness has been described as objective proof that the prosecutor's charging decision was motivated by a desire to punish [the defendant] for doing something that the law plainly allowed him to do, see Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384, 102 S.Ct. at 2494, or evidence of the prosecutor's bad faith or malicious actions. Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 28, 94 S.Ct. at 2102. ¶ 40 The plea agreement provided that each side was free to make sentencing recommendations, which were understood by Roundstone to be nonbinding upon the court. Probation and Parole Officer Carter testified at the sentencing hearing and, when asked about sentences pursued by the DOC in escape cases, stated: They generally look at two-year sentences. . . . The bulk of the time they are concurrent to somebody's sentence. I actually have an issue with that. I don't think there is any accountability for people when they escape because itreally there is no consequence for that. When asked by the court for her recommendation on Roundstone, Carter stated that, after detention, I would want to see some suspended time or significant amount of time to make sure that he's able to stay clean and sober because he was only out on furlough for a matter of weeks when he escaped and then was consuming alcohol again. ¶ 41 After Carter's testimony, the State gave its recommendation of ten years with five years suspended and then the prosecutor made the comments to which Roundstone objects. While the comments could be viewed as careless, they came, notably, following the concerns expressed by Carter about sentences which imposed no accountability or consequence[s] on escape offenders, with the prosecutor adding that this sentence was not going to be concurrent timeCarter's specific criticism. The sentencing judge wisely put the issue in proper perspective: I'm not going to punish you for what you did as far as filing all of these motions; I think that is fine. But the law requires me to give you five years. So I'm going to and I think it's important that you have some suspended time, as [the prosecutor] suggested, for follow-up. And that doesn't require your incarceration, it just requires that you comply with their directives. ¶ 42 The prosecutor's comments were brief and handled well by the sentencing court. We conclude that Roundstone was not deprived of due process. ¶ 43 Affirmed. We concur: BETH BAKER, MICHAEL E. WHEAT, JAMES C. NELSON and BRIAN MORRIS, JJ.