Opinion ID: 1967844
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Restriction on Certain Witness Testimony

Text: The limitation a trial judge puts on the examination of a witness is an evidentiary ruling which we generally review for abuse of discretion. [60] Jones raises two claims of abuse of discretion with the trial judge's rulings with regard to the testimony of two prosecution witnesses, Officer Anthony DiNardo of the New Castle County Police Department and Yolanda hum. Officer DiNardo testified for the State that he collected over 800 vials of marijuana in plain view of the basement in which Muhammad Reinford (the murder victim's brother) lived. On cross-examination, defense counsel for Jones asked Officer DiNardo if Reinford had ever been prosecuted for any offense related to the marijuana. The State objected on relevance grounds, [61] and Jones's counsel responded that it was relevant to show whether Reinford had any bias against the State. After a brief discussion, the trial judge ruled that the inquiry was irrelevant. According to Jones's counsel, he drafted an unopposed motion in limine seeking the opportunity to explore Reinford's bias. After reviewing the motion, the trial judge stated, I wanted to clarify that my [DiNardo] ruling had nothing to do with relevance when it dealt with the police officer, or the detective. It was the fact that there was no foundation for whether he could or could not make charges in the decision. Jones argues that the trial judge abused her discretion in preventing his line of questioning related to Reinford's bias during DiNardo's testimony. The State counters that Jones had the opportunity to impeach during Reinford's cross-examination, and further, the fact that Reinford had not been charged with drug offenses was placed before the jury through the testimony of another officer. It is well-settled that the bias of a witness is subject to exploration at trial and is always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of the testimony. [62] While the trial judge may exercise her discretion to limit the extent of such evidence of bias, she cannot foreclose a legitimate inquiry into a witness' credibility. [63] The objective with this form of impeachment is to uncover any incentive a witness might have to testify falsely. [64] Here, the record shows that Jones's counsel was attempting to impeach the credibility of Reinford's testimony before Reinford testified. Counsel did not lay a foundation for this question, nor was it relevant for the purposes for which he was offering it. The testimony Jones sought to introduce during Officer DiNardo's cross-examination was not probative of a motive for Officer DiNardo to testify falsely. A trial judge has discretion to exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of the interrogation of witnesses. [65] This includes limiting the scope of cross-examination to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness.  [66] The witness was Officer DiNardo, not Reinford. We find no abuse of discretion. Additionally, it is apparent from the record that the jury ultimately knew that Reinford was not charged. Officer Gary Taylor, another prosecution witness, testified that a large quantity of marijuana was found at the Reinford residence and that he never considered charging Reinford with any drug crimes because he was there to conduct a homicide investigation. Further, in anticipation of a defense argument that Reinford may have had bias, Officer Taylor testified that he was not a party to any discussion regarding prosecuting Reinford for a drug crime. Officer Taylor also testified that he never discussed with Reinford the possibility of being charged. Reinford testified that he had smoked marijuana that night, but that it did not impair his faculties. The jury heard testimony from which they could infer that Reinford was not charged with any marijuana offense. Even if the limitation on Jones's cross-examination of Officer DiNardo was errorand it was not the error was clearly harmless. [67] Jones next argues that the trial judge erred in restricting the cross-examination of Yolanda Lum, a drug dealer who worked for Page. At the time of her testimony, Lum had charges pending against her. The trial judge denied Jones the ability to impeach Lum under D.R.E. 609 because her pending charges were not convictions. This Court has previously explained that D.R.E. 609(a) prevents the admissibility of evidence of charges that are pending. [68] Rule 608(b), however, permits the trial judge discretion to allow a party to use specific instances of misconduct if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness to attack a witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness on cross-examination. [69] In her ruling, the trial judge permitted Jones to question Lum's bias toward the State in ways other than mentioning that she had a charge pending. This limitation was short-lived. The following day, the State reassessed its earlier position and sought to recall Lum as a witness to introduce the evidence of her arrests and pending charges for purposes of credibility. [70] The trial judge allowed the State to recall Lum. Jones's counsel requested to cross-examine her about the charges first. The trial judge properly denied that request, since she had discretion to allow the State to question its witness first. [71] After the State questioned Lum about her arrests and pending charges, Jones chose not to cross-examine her at all. Because Jones ultimately had the opportunity to cross-examine Lum on the same subject matter without limitation, his argument on appeal lacks merit.