Opinion ID: 184033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: doe failed to consult

Text: The record shows that DOE sought the affected States' input in three ways but also excluded them from participating in several significant respects. First, on February 2, 2006, DOE invited the public, including the affected States, to provide comments for its ongoing Congestion Study. Second, DOE informed the affected States of a technical conference that would be held in Chicago in March 2006. Third, when it issued the Congestion Study in August 2006, it invited comments on the designation of NIETCs. 71 Fed. Reg. at 45,047. On the other hand, the record shows that DOE did not extend an invitation to potentially affected States to attend an invitation-only workshop on the Congestion Study that was held in May 2006. Also, DOE did not disclose to the affected States the congestion modeling data it used to conduct the Congestion Study. Furthermore, DOE never extended any invitation to the affected States or their Governors to consult on the preparation of the Congestion Study. [7] DOE also cites its meetings with NARUC and meetings and conferences with other State entities as evidence that it met its obligation to consult. There is little, however, to suggest that these events provided meaningful opportunities for dialogues between the States and DOE. NARUC, of course, is not a state or even a state entity. Rather, it is a quasi-governmental organization that includes representatives of all fifty states. ... NARUC v. FCC, 746 F.2d 1492, 1497 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1984). Moreover, NARUC itself advised DOE that meeting with it was not the same as consulting with the affected States. [8] The record also fails to support DOE's assertion that those meetings that were held with certain State entities allowed for a meaningful exchange of information. [9] In sum, DOE's claim that it met its obligation to consult with the affected States is based on the argument that it had the discretion to determine what consultation required, that it met its obligation by inviting comments from the public (including the affected States) while it was preparing the Congestion Study, that it subsequently considered all objections to the Congestion Study raised by the affected States, and that any failures in this process of consultation were harmless.
DOE claims that § 216 does not require more than notice-and-comment proceedings. DOE asserts that because Congress did not define what it meant by consultation, we must defer to DOE's interpretation of the term. However, we do not read the statute as encompassing DOE's proffered definition, and such a definition is contrary to the applicable rules of statutory interpretation as it would render Congress's choice of language meaningless. Moreover, we find no support for DOE's position in the relevant case law.
An ordinary meaning of the word consult is to seek information or advice from (someone with expertise in a particular area) or to have discussions or confer with (someone), typically before undertaking a course of action. The New Oxford Dictionary 369 (2001) (emphasis added). We conclude that this is the definition that Congress intended when it directed DOE to prepare the Congestion Study in consultation with the affected States. Thus, DOE was to confer with the affected States before it completed the study. This conclusion is supported by all the applicable rules of statutory construction. It is required by the statutory context as the juxtaposition of the two sections indicates that Congress intended consultation to be more than responding to comments. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (noting that the plain meaning of statutory language is determined by reference to the specific context in which the language is used and the broader context of the statute as a whole). The definition gives meaning to every word in the statute. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (noting that it is a court's duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.). Moreover, DOE's interpretation of consult to mean no more than notice-and-comment would render part of the statute superfluous. If consultation means no more than an opportunity for comment, there was no reason for Congress to use distinct language in § 824(a)(1) and § 824(a)(2). We have been directed to avoid such an interpretation. See Knight v. Comm'r, 552 U.S. 181, 190, 128 S.Ct. 782, 169 L.Ed.2d 652 (2008) (commenting that accepting [a particular] approach would render part of the statute entirely superfluous, something that we are loath to do) (quoting Cooper Indus. v. Aviall Servs., 543 U.S. 157, 166, 125 S.Ct. 577, 160 L.Ed.2d 548 (2004)). Moreover, requiring DOE to actually confer with the affected States is consistent with the purpose of the EPAct. In reaction to black-outs and brown-outs, Congress sought to give the federal government a greater role in the development of transmission lines and to circumscribe somewhat the States' traditional authority over the placement and construction of power lines. In recognition of this impact on the States' traditional authority, Congress intended that affected States would participate in a study that might ultimately result in some limitation of their traditional powers. Indeed, the Supreme Court has been sensitive to these concerns. See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173, 121 S.Ct. 675, 148 L.Ed.2d 576 (2001). A recognition of the sensitivity of these issues supports our determination that where, as here, Congress has directed an agency to consult with States before taking action that may curtail traditional State powers, we must require that the agency heed Congress's direction.
In addition, our conclusion that the ordinary meaning of consult involves conferring with an entity before taking action is amply supported, if not compelled, by our relevant precedent. In Environmental Defense Center v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir.2003), we considered a provision that required the EPA to conduct certain studies in consultation with the States, and to issue regulations based on these studies in consultation with State and local officials. Id. at 863. EPA asserted that it had met its obligation by consulting extensively with States and localities before issuing its regulations. Id. at 864. We agreed, noting: [T]he overall record indicates EPA met its statutory duty of consultation. A draft of the first report was circulated to States, EPA regional offices, the Association of State and Interstate Water Pollution Control Administrators (ASIWPCA), and other stakeholders in November, 1993, and was revised based on comments received. EPA established the Urban Wet Weather Flows Federal Advisory Committee (FACA Committee), balancing membership between EPA's various outside stakeholder interests, including representatives from States, municipalities, Tribes, commercial and industrial sectors, agriculture, and environmental and public interest groups. 64 Fed.Reg. 68,724. The 32 members of the Phase II FACA Subcommittee, reflecting the same balance of interests, met fourteen times over three years and state and municipal representatives provided substantial input regarding the draft reports, the ultimate Phase II Rule, and the supporting data. Id. None of the efforts noted in Environmental Defense Center are present here. No draft was circulated to the States, no committee was created that included representatives from the States, and the affected States were not given access to the supporting data. Thus, DOE's efforts here fall far short of the efforts that were determined to meet the requirement for consultation in Environmental Defense Center. In Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation v. FERC, 746 F.2d 466 (9th Cir.1984), we held that the FERC violated its duty of consultation. We noted that it was not enough to give notice to the agencies and Indian tribes, as the consultation obligation is an affirmative duty. Id. at 475. We noted that the respective fishery agencies believed the consultation process would take place in the preparation of [a fish and wildlife report], but that the agency issued the [report] before the exhibit was submitted. Id. Here too, the agency had an affirmative duty to consult and the affected States reasonably believed the consultation process would take place, but DOE issued the Congestion Study without engaging in any meaningful consultation with the States. Our perspective is also consistent with the opinion of the United States Court of International Trade in U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 29 C.I.T. 33, 362 F.Supp.2d 1336 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2005). Addressing notice, comment, and consultation requirements, the court held that it is not enough to prove that the agency solicited and received comments from the Domestic Producers before executing the Suspension Agreement. ... The agency must also give those comments meaningful consideration and must engage the Domestic Producers in good faith consultations, in a timely fashion. Id. at 40. The court found that: Throughout this action, the Government has persisted in conflating Commerce's notice-and-comment obligations with its consultation obligations. And, to some extent, the Government has also conflated its consultation obligations under one part of the statute with its consultation obligations under another part. However, the statute is clear: Commerce's consultation obligations are separate and distinct from (albeit related to) its notice-and-comment obligations. Id. at 40 n. 14. We think that DOE pursued a similarly erroneous course here, attempting to conflate its obligation to consult with the affected States while preparing the Congestion Study with its obligation to provide the States an opportunity to comment on its NIETC report.