Opinion ID: 373006
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: united states intervention

Text: 9 The Commonwealth defendants, relying on United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1977), contend that the court erred in permitting the United States to intervene as a plaintiff. In Solomon the United States filed a complaint charging the State of Maryland with violating the rights of mentally retarded residents of the Rosewood State Hospital. The district court dismissed the action, holding that the United States lacked authority to bring it. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. In the instant case, equating intervention under Rule 24 with the original action in Solomon, the Commonwealth defendants urge that Solomon be followed and intervention by the United States disapproved. Of course, since the Halderman and PARC appeals defend the order appealed from on all the same grounds that the United States does, the resolution of the federal government's right to participate has no effect on the merits of the appeal. But its standing as an intervenor would determine the standing of the United States to seek or oppose Supreme Court review. Thus it is appropriate that we address that question. 10 In Solomon the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the numerous federal statutes evidencing a federal interest in, concern for, and activity with respect to the mentally retarded. 6 It pointed out that no statute expressly authorized the United States to bring suit to challenge the alleged deprivation of the rights of the retarded. Reviewing and purporting to distinguish numerous cases sustaining the authority of the United States to sue in the absence of such express statutory authorization, 7 the court said: 11 (W)e decline to hold that in the absence of specific authority the United States may sue in the instant case. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153) (1952) the so-called Steel Seizure Case is one of the reasons for our decision. It raised the question of whether the President had the authority to seize the nation's steel industry in an effort to prevent a crippling steel strike during the Korean War. Because the President had no statutory or constitutional authority to seize the mills, the Court held that the seizure was illegal and improper. 12 The case is important here because of the light that it sheds on the doctrine of separation of powers. 13 563 F.2d at 1128. 14 We do not find persuasive the Solomon court's analogy between President Truman's nonjudicial seizure of the steel mills by military force and a judicial proceeding to obtain injunctive relief enforcing legislative policies in aid of the mentally retarded. There is all the difference in the world for separation of powers purposes between a naked exercise of executive power and executive branch resort to the judicial branch for relief which Congress has not expressly prohibited. The President is, after all, charged with the responsibility to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . U.S.Const. art. II, § 3. When, in an effort to do so, he resorts to an Article III court under a recognized grant of federal jurisdiction such as 28 U.S.C. § 1345, and that court finds no legislative prohibition against that resort, the lawsuit cannot reasonably be seen as an invasion of the powers of Congress. Before relief can be given in such a suit, one branch, the executive, must seek it, while a second branch, the judiciary, must agree that it is authorized by the law promulgated by a third branch. If the judiciary has, in an individual case, misconstrued the law, Congress can, constitutional pronouncements aside, change the rule for the future. If Congress wishes to withhold from the executive branch the civil remedies available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it can by specific legislation say so. Thus, we find unconvincing the separation of powers argument invoked by the Solomon court to reject executive branch enforcement of federal law. 8 15 In this case, however, we need not decide whether absent the Halderman action the United States could independently have sued. The suit was already pending. Moreover, in its constitutional dimensions the suit was expressly authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We hold that the initial plaintiffs have standing to enforce federal statutory claims as well. See p. 95 Infra. Thus Congress has made the decision that someone could seek the injunctive relief in question. Intervention presented no danger that the federal executive would be initiating a lawsuit that Congress somehow never intended. Intervention was sought pursuant to Rule 24, Fed.R.Civ.P. 24, and there was ample justification for permitting it. Under Rule 24(b)(2), a district court may allow intervention when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have common questions of law or fact. Rule 24(b) makes specific provision for intervention by governmental agencies interested in statutes, regulations, or agreements relied upon by the parties in the action. Here, as noted below, there is extensive federal legislation directed toward the well-being of the mentally retarded. Several executive branch agencies, especially the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), have important responsibilities under that legislation. Large amounts of federal funds flow to Pennsylvania from the federal government, and the United States is vitally interested in the enforcement of the conditions on which those grants are made. One such condition is compliance with governing federal law. Had the United States sought to do so, it could have brought suit to enforce the conditions attached to its grants. 9 Clearly, then, the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting intervention under Rule 24.