Opinion ID: 853394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sentencing Revision

Text: The judicial amendments to the Indiana Constitution drafted in the 1960s confer a distinct responsibility on the appellate courts: the power to review all questions of law and to review and revise the sentence imposed. Ind. Const. art. VII, § 4. As Judge Najam of the Court of Appeals correctly observed, This authority is found in the text of the Constitution and is independent from our general appellate jurisdiction. Bluck v. State, 716 N.E.2d 507, 516 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). Those who framed these provisions had in mind the sort of sentencing revision conducted by the Court of Criminal Appeals in England. Cooper v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1216, 1218 (Ind.1989). The English statute establishing the Court of Criminal Appeals gave the power to review and revise sentences: On appeal against sentence the Court of Criminal Appeal shall, if they think that a different sentence should have been passed, quash the sentence passed at the trial, and pass such other sentence warranted in law by the verdict (whether more or less severe) in substitution therefor as they think ought to have been passed, and in any other case shall dismiss the appeal. Id. (quoting Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edward 7, ch. 23, § 4(3)). Indiana appellate courts have exercised this responsibility over the last three decades with great restraint, recognizing the special expertise of the trial bench in making sentencing decisions. We have indicated by rule that a sentence will be modified only when it is manifestly unreasonable, Ind. Appellate Rule 17(B), a very tough standard to meet. Still, persons have an appellate right to full consideration of claims. In 1997, we amended Rule 17(B) to remove even tougher language to the effect that a sentence was not manifestly unreasonable unless no reasonable person could think so. Judge Najam correctly concluded that this change invites more meaningful appellate review. Bluck v. State, 716 N.E.2d at 515-16. Rule 17(B) currently reads, The reviewing court will not revise a sentence authorized by statute except where such sentence is manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. This formulation still means that trial court decisions are to be affirmed on the great majority of occasions. When this standard is met, however, the reviewing court should revise the sentence, as the Court of Appeals did in the recent cases of Biehl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 337 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied, and Mann v. State, 742 N.E.2d 1025 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied. Walker was convicted on two counts of child molestation for performing oral sex on a six-year-old boy. Crimes against children are particularly contemptible. See Singer v. State, 674 N.E.2d 11 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). The trial court found a number of aggravating circumstances, including committing the crime while on probation and fleeing the jurisdiction. Still, the trial court did not find a history of criminal behavior. Moreover, the two separate counts of child molestation were identical and involved the same child. Additionally, there was no physical injury. Although the absence of physical injury does not bar an enhanced sentence, this is some distance from being the worst offense or the most culpable offender. While the aggravating circumstances warranted an enhanced sentence, Walker's aggregate sentence of eighty years is manifestly unreasonable.