Opinion ID: 1690567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Stun Gun as a Dangerous Weapon.

Text: Iowa Code section 708.8, which defines the crime of going armed with intent, provides as follows: A person who goes armed with any dangerous weapon with the intent to use without justification such weapon against the person of another commits a class D felony. Iowa Code § 708.8 (1991) (emphasis added). A dangerous weapon is defined in Iowa Code section 702.7 as follows: A dangerous weapon is any instrument or device designed primarily for use in inflicting death or injury upon a human being or animal, and which is capable of inflicting death upon a human being when used in the manner for which it was designed. Additionally, any instrument or device of any sort whatsoever which is actually used in such a manner as to indicate that the defendant intends to inflict death or serious injury upon the other, and which, when so used, is capable of inflicting death upon a human being, is a dangerous weapon. Dangerous weapons include, but are not limited to, any offensive weapon, pistol, revolver, or other firearm, dagger, razor, stiletto, switchblade knife, or knife having a blade exceeding five inches in length. Iowa Code § 702.7 (1991). Geier contends that the district court did not have before it sufficient evidence to support a finding that a stun gun is a dangerous weapon, as defined in Iowa Code section 702.7, and claims to have preserved this asserted error by way of his motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the State's case in chief. However, the motion for acquittal made no reference to any evidentiary insufficiency concerning the stun gun or its characterization as a dangerous weapon. In fact, Geier did not raise the issue presently before us until after the trial had concluded, at which time the argument presented herein was raised in the context of a new-trial motion. We note that as a general matter, [t]he grounds of a motion for new trial must stand or fall on exceptions taken at trial and a party cannot in a post verdict motion amplify or add new grounds as a basis for relief. State v. Droste, 232 N.W.2d 483, 488 (Iowa 1975); Dunahoo and Thomas, Preservation of Error and Making the Record in the Iowa Criminal Trial and Appellate Processes, 36 Drake L.Rev. 45, 84 (1986-87). However, we need not rest our resolution of this issue on the principles of error preservation insofar as we conclude that Geier's argument fails on the merits. A motion for judgment of acquittal is to be granted whenever the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for the charged offense. Iowa R.Crim.P. 18(8)(a). As a reviewing court, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and will draw any reasonable inferences therefrom necessary to support the conviction. State v. Dallen, 452 N.W.2d 398, 399 (Iowa 1990); State v. White, 223 N.W.2d 163, 164 (Iowa 1974). To successfully resist a motion for acquittal, the State must have presented such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.... It is sufficient to raise a fair inference of guilt as to each essential element of the crime although the evidence must do more than raise suspicion, speculation or conjecture. State v. LaPointe, 418 N.W.2d 49, 51 (Iowa 1988); see also State v. Davis, 229 N.W.2d 249, 251 (Iowa 1975). As noted above, Iowa Code section 702.7 includes among its definitions of a dangerous weapon the following: [a] dangerous weapon is any instrument or device designed primarily for use in inflicting death or injury upon a human being or animal and which is capable of inflicting death upon a human being when used in the manner for which it was designed. In State v. McKee, 312 N.W.2d 907 (Iowa 1981), we were called upon to decide what was meant by the phrase bodily injury which is included in the serious injury definition of Iowa Code section 702.18. We said: Bodily injury ordinarily refers only to injury to the body, or to sickness or disease contracted by the injured as a result of injury. Black's Law Dictionary 159. Injury includes an act that damages, harms, or hurts: an unjust or undeserved infliction of suffering or harm ... hurt, damage, or loss sustained.... Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1164 (1976). Thus the ordinary dictionary definition of bodily injury coincides with the Model Penal Code definition of the term. Because the Model Penal Code definition fits the context of section 702.18, we adopt it. The Model Penal Code defines bodily injury as physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition. McKee, 312 N.W.2d at 913 (citing Model Penal Code commentary § 210.0(2)); see also State v. Luppes, 358 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Iowa App.1984) (adopting the McKee definition of bodily injury for purposes of Iowa Code section 708.2(2), the penalty provision for simple assault). We now conclude that the term injury upon a human being in section 702.7 is synonymous with the term bodily injury; accordingly, the McKee definition of bodily injury is to be used in construing the term injury as that term is used in section 702.7. See Iowa Code § 702.1 (1991) (whenever a term, word or phrase is defined in the criminal code, such a meaning shall be given wherever it appears in the Code, unless it is being specially defined for a special purpose.). Deputy Muir testified that the stun gun uses a nine volt battery to create an arc of electricity that ranges from 30,000 volts up to 65,000 volts thereby imparting a shock to the recipient. Clearly, a shock resulting from an electric charge that may range as high as 65,000 volts is a device designed primarily for use in inflicting ... injury, which is described by the Model Penal Code as physical pain ... or an impairment of physical condition. See also State v. Manning, 224 N.W.2d 232, 236 (Iowa 1974) (Jurors are not expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own observation and experience of the affairs of life, but may give effect to such inferences as common knowledge or their personal observation and experience may reasonably draw from the facts directly proved.). Deputy Muir also indicated that the stun gun is capable of causing death if used in the head or neck region. Deputy Muir's testimony exceeds the threshold necessary to sustain the court's finding that a stun gun is a dangerous weapon as that term is defined in section 702.7. Finally, we would note that many courts as well as legislatures have deemed it appropriate to characterize stun guns as dangerous or deadly weapons. See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 800 F.2d 1509, 1513 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1019, 107 S.Ct. 1901, 95 L.Ed.2d 507 (1987) (finding stun gun to be a dangerous weapon for purposes of a federal airline violation, where dangerous weapon was statutorily defined as a weapon likely to produce death or great bodily harm); State v. Evans, 247 Mont. 218, 806 P.2d 512, 516-17 (1991) (concluding that jury properly found a stun gun to be a weapon, where weapon was statutorily defined to be any instrument, article or substance which, regardless of its primary function, is readily capable of being used to produce death or serious bodily injury); People v. MacCary, 570 N.Y.S.2d 322, 323, 173 A.D.2d 646, 647 (App.1991) (concluding that the prosecution adduced sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that a stun gun is a dangerous instrument, where dangerous instrument was statutorily defined as any instrument ... which, under the circumstances in which it is used ... is readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injury); Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 38, ¶ 24-1(a)(2) (1985) (making possession of a stun gun or any other dangerous or deadly weapon with the intent to use it unlawfully against another a criminal offense); Mich.Comp.Laws § 750.224(a) (1991) (making sale or possession of a stun gun a felony); N.C.Gen.Stat. § 14-269(a) (1986) (making it a misdemeanor to carry a concealed stun gun or other dangerous weapon); N.D.Cent.Code § 62.1-01-01(1) (1985) (defining stun gun as a dangerous weapon). We conclude that there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial to convince a rational trier of fact that a stun gun is a dangerous weapon under the aforementioned statutory definition. Accordingly, the district court correctly denied Geier's motion for acquittal.