Opinion ID: 2206314
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: constitutional driver's license

Text: I, being a sovereign citizen of the United States of America, do hereby, by this document, license myself to operate a motor vehicle or any other mechanical device on or off the public highways, roads or right-of-ways anywhere in these United States and continue to exercise the privilege of this right as long as in so doing, I do not infringe upon the life, liberty, or property of another person or endanger the health, morals and safety of society. Kouba later produced his North Dakota driver's license and Anderson determined that it was under suspension. Kouba was then given a ticket for driving a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension. He was subsequently tried and convicted of this offense. Kouba has made a plethora of arguments. We, however, need only address the issues which are controlling and decisive of this appeal. Nodland v. Nokota Co., 314 N.W.2d 89, 93 (N.D.1981). First, we address Kouba's argument that he was not accorded a hearing as provided for by the North Dakota Century Code. He contends that his driver's license was improperly suspended because he was not accorded a hearing in his home county as he had requested. It is his contention that Section 39-06-33, N.D.C.C., which provides that a driver's license may not be suspended under the provisions of Section 39-06-32, N.D.C.C., without a hearing in the county of the licensee's residence, is controlling in this action. However, Section 39-06-33, N.D.C.C., is applicable only for matters of driver's license suspension arising under the provisions of section 39-06-32. Section 39-06-32, N.D.C.C., provides for six specific instances in which the Highway Commissioner may suspend the license of an operator. Those instances include commission of an offense for which mandatory revocation of license is required, incompetence to drive a motor vehicle, unlawful or fraudulent use of a driver's license, refusal to submit to an implied consent chemical blood test, failure to pay a fine or serve any other sentence, or failure to appear in court or post and forfeit bond. Kouba's license was not suspended for any of those reasons. Instead, his license was suspended because he accumulated a total of 12 or more points assigned, in his case, for speeding. His license was therefore suspended under the provisions of Section 39-06.1-10, N.D.C.C. That section provides: If the licensee makes a written request for a hearing within ten days after mailing of the notice, the hearing shall be held in accordance with the applicable provisions of chapter 28-32. § 39-06.1-10, N.D.C.C. Chapter 28-32 of the North Dakota Century Code is the Administrative Agencies Practice Act. That Act provides comprehensive procedures for hearings held by administrative agencies. At Section 28-32-05, N.D.C.C., the Administrative Agencies Practice Act provides that the administrative agency shall issue a notice for hearing, which shall fix the time and place for trial.... That section, however, also provides that the parties may agree upon a definite time and place for a hearing. Id. In this action, the parties did not agree upon a definite time and place for the hearing. Therefore, the Highway Commissioner, through his hearing officer, acted properly in setting the time and place for the hearing. In this instance, the place for that hearing was set at the State Highway Department in Bismarck. Kouba was therefore accorded a fair opportunity to be heard under the requirements of the North Dakota Century Code and, though he chose not to appear at the hearing, his driver's license was properly suspended. The next issue which we will address is whether or not Mr. Kouba has an inalienable right to drive on the highways of North Dakota. We have consistently held that no such right exists. We have recognized the importance of the driving privilege in our society today, but we have said that the privilege cannot be granted without limitations as to its continuance. Asbridge v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner, 291 N.W.2d 739, 750 (N.D. 1980). The use of the public highways is not an absolute right which everyone has, and of which a person cannot be deprived; it is instead a privilege which a person enjoys subject to the control of the State in its valid exercise of its police power. Timm v. State, 110 N.W.2d 359, 362 (N.D.1961). In State v. Harm, 200 N.W.2d 387, 391 (N.D.1972), we said: Permission to operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways is not a civil right nor is the license to do so a contract or property right in a constitutional sense but, rather, it is a mere license or privilege. Thompson v. Thompson, 78 N.W.2d 395 (N.D.1956). Although the privilege might be a valuable one ( Helland v. Jones, 76 N.D. 511, 37 N.W.2d 513, 514 (1949)), nevertheless the license to drive may be revoked pursuant to the procedure and for violations of the conditions prescribed by the statute under which it was issued. Thompson v. Thompson, supra .  We therefore conclude that Kouba does not have an inalienable right to use the highways of our state in violation of the laws of our state. Just as others must, he must abide by the laws of our state which are intended to make travel on our highways reasonably safe for all. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm, with costs on appeal to neither party. VANDE WALLE, PAULSON, SAND and PEDERSON, JJ., concur.