Opinion ID: 1670906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Suit to Have the Election Declared Invalid

Text: With respect to election contests seeking to have an election declared invalid, this Court has stated: Tennessee law empowers a court to void an election on two alternative, but closely related bases. First, upon a sufficient quantum of proof that fraud or illegality so permeated the election as to render it incurably uncertain, even though it can not be shown to a mathematical certainty that the result might have been different. Emery v. Robertson County Election Comm'n, 586 S.W.2d 103, 109 (Tenn. 1979); see also State ex rel Davis v. Kivett, 180 Tenn 598, 177 S.W.2d 551 (1944); Ingram v. Burnette 204 Tenn 149, 316 S.W.2d 31 (1958). Secondly, where some ballots are found to be illegal, [and] the number of illegal votes cast is equal to, or exceeds the margin by which the certified candidate won. Emery v. Robertson County Election Comm'n, supra ; Hilliard v. Park, 212 Tenn 588, 370 S.W.2d 829 (1963). Millar v. Thomas, 657 S.W.2d 750, 751 (Tenn. 1983). First addressing Forbes's claim that the election should be declared void because of election irregularities that resulted in a number of allegedly illegal votes, we hold that she has failed to state a claim for the same reason that she failed to state a claim that she should be declared the winner of the election. The omission of a statement setting out the margin of Bell's victory precludes a grant of relief on this ground. Although requirements for declaring an election void based upon allegations of illegal voting are less stringent than are the requirements for declaring a contestant the victor, Blackwood v. Hollingsworth, supra, 260 S.W.2d at 166, those allegations must still be specific enough to establish that absent the allegedly illegal votes, the result of the election would have been different. In cases in which the contestant seeks to have the election declared void, the prescribed methodology is for the court to consider all of the illegal votes as having been voted one way (against the contestee) and then to ascertain whether the results of the election would thereby have been changed. Ingram v. Burnette, 204 Tenn. 149, 316 S.W.2d 31, 32 (1958); see also Jared v. Fitzgerald, 183 Tenn. 682, 195 S.W.2d 1 (1946). But even if we were to assume in this case that all of the allegedly illegal votes were cast for Bell, there is no basis in Forbes's complaint or amended complaint upon which to say that the deduction of this number of votes from Bell's total would have produced a different result or rendered the outcome in doubt. Hence, we must hold as to this basis for contest that Forbes's pleadings have failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. This ruling leaves Forbes with only one remaining avenue for relief, based on a claim that the election should be invalidated because it was so permeated with fraud and illegality that it cannot be said to fairly reflect the will of the voters. As to this ground, it is not necessarily fatal that the complaint does not specifically set out a sufficient number of illegal votes to change the result of the election or to make the result mathematically uncertain. Southall v. Billings, supra, 375 S.W.2d at 849. To void an election on this basis, however, the alleged wrong must be so gross and palpable a failure of the opportunity for a free and equal expression of the popular will, that the courts cannot permit the election to stand. Barry v. Lauck, 45 Tenn. 588 (1868). Honest mistakes or mere omissions, or irregularity in directory matters  even though gross  if not fraudulent, will not void an election unless they affect the result or at least render it uncertain. Summitt v. Russell, 199 Tenn. 174, 285 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tenn. 1955). Most election contests brought on this theory are based on claims of fraud or conspiracy, but the cases do recognize that statutory violations alone may be sufficient to render an election void. In reviewing a complaint that does no more than allege statutory violations, however, the focus of the court's inquiry must be kept in mind  that is, whether the violations are so serious as to thwart the will of the community upon a particular question. Browning v. Gray, 137 Tenn. 70, 191 S.W. 525, 526 (Tenn. 1916) (citing Barry v. Lauck, supra, 45 Tenn. at 593). Toward that end, the Browning court quoted Barry v. Lauck , as follows: ... Whatever statutory provisions are essential to the attainment of this end, are obviously indispensable; and whatever precautions prescribed by statute against mistake or fraud are of such a nature that their omission in the particular instance has resulted in a fraud upon the electors, or has rendered the result of the election incurably uncertain, or the future omission of which, in the future, if permitted, must necessarily prove avenues of fraud, tend to prevent a fair exercise of the franchise, or to render elections insecure and uncertain, must be held to be a matter of substance, and essential to the validity of the proceeding. Browning 137 Tenn. at 73, 191 S.W. 525. It follows as a corollary that technical non-conformity with election statutes will not necessarily void an election, as such strictness would lead to defeat rather than uphold, popular election, and can not be maintained. McCraw v. Harralson 44 Tenn. 34 (1867). Invalidating an election solely on the basis of technical omissions, much like failing to cross a `t' or dot an `i', would effectively disenfranchise voters. Foust v. May, 660 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tenn. 1983). We conclude that the irregularities alleged in this complaint, while not strictly technical in nature, do not fall far enough along the opposite end of the spectrum to subject the case to trial. We need only compare the nature and extent of the claims in other election contests to those alleged here, in order to demonstrate the basis for our conclusion. In Shoaf v. Bringle, supra , for example, the complaint alleged a conspiracy between election commissioners and contestee Bringle to fail to furnish sufficient ballots at the voting places in the county where [contestant Shoaf] was strong so that his supporters would not have an opportunity to vote for him. 241 S.W.2d at 834. Shoaf's complaint provided a detailed specification of how many voters were prevented from voting at named polling places as a result of the widespread ballot shortage. Id. In addition, the complaint alleged that election officials marked ballots for numerous Negroes and other disqualified voters and voters from without the county for the contestee when there was nothing wrong with the person for whom they marked the ballot and who should under the law have marked his own ballot. Id. at 835. Finally, the complaint alleged instances of [i]ntimidation and duress ... by some of the election officials ... to such an extent that if true these things would amount to a fraud and an illegal election at these places. Id. This Court concluded that the allegations, if proven, would establish that the election was so permeated with fraud and illegality as to render the election void and affirmed the trial court's decision overruling the contestee's demurrer. Id., quoting State ex rel. Davis v. Kivett, supra, 177 S.W.2d at 555. In State ex rel. Davis v. Kivett , the facts alleged in the complaint were equally compelling. The contestant, Davis, sued on the claim that contestee Kivett had conspired with county election commissioners and the local sheriff to form what was called the Tax Payers Ticket for the purpose of steal[ing] the election. Id. at 552. According to the complaint, the commissioners appointed corrupt election officials and the sheriff sent in armed deputies to intimidate the voters and control the election; the contestant's poll watchers were forcibly ejected from various voting places; votes were bought at one precinct and people were procur[ed] from Kentucky to vote at the election; ballots were marked in another precinct for voters who were not disabled from marking their own ballots; absentee ballots were illegally cast in the name of soldiers entering the armed services; a large slush fund was collected and used illegally for the purchase [in bulk] of poll tax receipts and for influencing voters; and, finally, the commissioners failed to file a copy of the election returns with county officials and with the Secretary of State. Id. Allegations as to numbers of ballots, names, dates, precinct locations, and specific amounts of money were included in the complaint. The chancellor found, and the reviewing court agreed, that these allegations were sufficient to withstand demurrer. He concluded further that there were so many violations of law and [so] many of the safeguards surrounding the election were disregarded ... as to render the election incurably uncertain, thus rendering it impossible to purge the returns. Id. at 554. This Court affirmed the invalidation of the election. The complaint in Hollis v. Vaughan, supra, 237 S.W.2d 952, also alleged massive irregularities in the election, resulting from a conspiracy by the election commission to take over the management of the civil affairs of Lawrence County and to steal the election for [contestee] Hollis. Id. at 955. Again, as in State ex rel. Davis v. Kivett , there was payment for blocks of poll taxes by two commissioners; illegal printing of fraudulent ballots that omitted the names of some candidates; gross violation of the law governing the registration of voters; procurement of alleged fictitious absentee ballots; and a failure on the part of election commissioners to certify the election returns. Id. at 955-956. In addition, the election commissioners had arranged for 3,000 absentee ballots to be printed, even though the maximum number of legal absentee voters was no more than 400. Moreover, many of the absentee ballots that were cast in the election carried the forged signature of a notary public who had been dead for over a decade. Id. at 956. It is little wonder that the results of such an election were held invalid. Finally, we take note of the complaint reviewed in Southall v. Billings, supra, 375 S.W.2d 844. It alleged fraud and intimidation in three precincts during a county-wide election for sheriff. Contestant Southall specified, for example, that at the Randolph precinct votes for contestee Billings were purchased by one A.B. Lott; that ballots were illegally marked for Billings by a Mr. Glass; that observers for Southall were threatened and forced to retreat from the polling place; and that when voters protested these actions, they were chased from the premises by a man named Norris Nix, who ran at them with a 4 by 4 timber, cussing and swearing. Id. at 848, 849. Similar occurrences were alleged to have taken place at two other precincts, involving fraud and intimidation on the part of election officials. This Court held that the complaint was sufficient to withstand demurrer. Id. at 849. In this case, by contrast, contestant Forbes alleges the existence of certain election irregularities which, if proven, we would certainly not condone, but which pale by comparison with the egregiousness of the conduct reflected in the cases summarized above. As to Williamson County, these allegations concern only the processing of absentee ballots. Forbes complains that they were not counted first[,] prior to the closing of the polls as required by [T.C.A. § 2-6-117] and that the election registrar improperly delayed certification of the absentee armed services votes beyond the date of the election, in violation of a requirement in T.C.A. § 2-6-106 that they be processed in the same manner as other absentee ballots. The short answer to these allegations is that they fail to indicate any irregularity, let alone a miscarriage of justice sufficient to invalidate all the absentee ballots cast in Williamson County and, by implication, to void the entire election. In the first place, T.C.A. § 2-6-117 does not require that absentee ballots be counted prior to the tally of regular ballots, but only that they be delivered to the polling places by 4:00 p.m. on election day. As for the armed services ballots, certification was held up pursuant to direction by the state election commissioner, as the result of a federal district court order. There is no allegation of tampering or other impropriety in connection with these ballots. With regard to Williamson County, then, we find that the complaint wholly fails to state a cause of action. Indeed, standing alone it borders on the frivolous. Hence, there was no error in the trial court's order that the Williamson County action be dismissed. The contestant's allegations as to Hickman County are concededly more substantial in nature but, in the end, no more availing. Taken verbatim from the complaint, they are, in pertinent part, as follows: 5. Forbes would show to the Court [that] the Hickman County Election Commission (Hickman Commission) violated the requirements of the Tennessee Election Code as follows: a. As to East Elementary precinct: Hickman Commission utilized paper ballots in conjunction with the use of voting machines for other than write-in candidates voting procedures in violation of T.C.A. 2-7-117 and 2-7-119 which permits the use of paper ballots only when voting machines are out of order. Forbes would show all paper ballots at this voting precinct were illegally cast. b. Alternatively, with respect to the paper ballot voting at East Elementary School, 153 paper ballots were cast, under conditions which violate the Election Code of the State of Tennessee rendering the entire paper ballot vote illegal. Specifically: (i.) Hickman Commission permitted the use of unlocked ballot boxes in contravention of T.C.A. 2-7-109 which requires that ballot boxes be empty, and locked before the polling places open and remained locked until the voting has ended. (ii.) Voters utilizing paper ballots were not provided a private voting compartment within which to cast their vote by paper ballot in contravention of T.C.A. 2-3-1087(b)(1)(c)(1). (iii.) That election official(s) were observed opening the unlocked ballots boxes while voting was in progress prior to the closing of the polls and were observed removing an unknown amount of pieces of paper. (iv.) Voters who had voted by paper ballot would turn in paper ballots to an election official(s) rather than deposit the paper ballot in a locked ballot box in the voter's presence. 6. Forbes would further show the Court that numerous violations of the Tennessee Election Code exist with respect to the poll sheets, tally sheets and the manner in which the machine voting was carried out, specifically: (i.) Poll sheets for Cobble and Nunnelly precincts were unsigned at the bottom in violation of T.C.A. 2-7-128. (ii.) Poll sheets for Pinewood precinct (District II) and Nunnelly contained blank signature line spaces in violation of T.C.A. 2-7-112(a)(1). (iii.) Tally sheets unsigned in violation of T.C.A. 2-7-123(b) for all precincts. (iv.) Election officials at East Elementary School Precinct permitted lines of registered voters to accumulate as a result of a violation of T.C.A. 2-7-118 by not strictly enforcing the time limits for voters to use the voting machines thereby causing registered voters to leave the voting place without voting after a wait of at least one and a half to two hours. (v.) Election officials at District VI permitted unauthorized persons to count ballots. Even a broad reading of these allegations fails to show misconduct on the part of election officials sufficient to taint the Hickman County results, let alone the entire four-county election. Significantly, there is no allegation of fraud or conspiracy, and many of the alleged irregularities appear to constitute largely technical violations of the election laws, when viewed in context. The use of an unlocked ballot box, for example, would clearly contravene provisions in T.C.A. § 2-7-109. But Forbes does not charge fraud or tampering in this regard, nor claim that as a result of this irregularity any voter was deprived of voting. Similarly, the complaint alleges that voters using paper ballots were not provided with privacy, in violation of T.C.A. § 2-3-108(b)(1). That statute does set certain standards for the casting of a paper ballot, but again, there is no claim that as a result of the lack of a private voting compartment, anyone casting a paper ballot was harassed, intimidated, or prevented from voting. Other alleged statutory violations appear even less weighty in terms of their effect on the integrity of the election. These include the appearance of blank signature lines on the poll sheets, which may have occurred because of a voter's inadvertence in skipping a line; the fact that voters may have been permitted to stay in the voting machines longer than the two minutes provided in T.C.A. § 2-7-118(a); and the failure to sign each tally sheet, in violation of T.C.A. § 2-7-132(b), which has previously been held not to constitute grounds for invalidating an election, where the ballots have been preserved and delivered to the election commissioner. Summitt v. Russell, supra, 285 S.W.2d at 141. Other allegations, as it turns out, do not even involve statutory violations. One example will suffice. The complaint alleges that voters improperly handed their paper ballots to an election official rather than depositing them in a locked ballot box. No code section is cited as being violated, but we note that T.C.A. § 2-7-114(c) requires a voter using a paper ballot to state his name and present his folded ballot to the judge assigned to receive and deposit the ballots. There is no statutory requirement that the voter must actually place the ballot in the box. In still other instances, the allegations in the complaint are simply too general in nature to withstand a motion to dismiss. The final allegation, for instance, that unnamed [e]lection officials at District IV permitted unauthorized `persons' to count ballots, is not only too vague to assert fraud, abuse of procedure, or taint of the vote; additionally, it fails to assert that the ballots were not also counted by authorized persons. As noted above, our case law recognizes that statutory violations alone may be sufficient to invalidate an election, especially where they thwart those statutory provisions designed to (1) prevent undue influence or intimidation of the free and fair expression of the will of the electors or (2) ensure that only those who meet the statutory requirements for eligibility to vote, cast ballots. Emery v. Robertson County Election Commission, 586 S.W.2d 103, 109 (Tenn. 1979) (gross mishandling of absentee ballots held to have presented opportunity for fraud; election results purged). But not every irregularity, or even a combination of irregularities, will necessitate the invalidation of an election. See, e.g. Lanier v. Revell, 605 S.W.2d 821 (Tenn. 1980) (technical statutory violations not amounting to fraud or the casting of illegal ballots held insufficient to void results); Payne v. Ramsey, 591 S.W.2d 434 (Tenn. 1979) (same), Barham v. Denison, 159 Tenn. 226, 17 S.W.2d 692 (1929) (same). Moreover, courts should be appropriately reluctant to take the step of declaring an election invalid. As we noted in Ingram v. Burnette, 204 Tenn. 149, 316 S.W.2d 31, 33 (1958): It is not an easy task for the courts of our state to set aside and declare elections void. The Courts appreciate the fact that honest mistakes will be made in the conduct of elections. The whole object of our election laws passed by the Legislature over the years has been with the idea of maintaining fair and honest elections. So it is if mistakes have been made and even though fraudulent ballots have been cast, if the Courts can purge the illegal ballots or fraudulent ballots without affecting the result of the election, this will be done. In this case, had the complaint been properly drawn, the purging by the trial court of a specific number of paper ballots in a particular precinct in Hickman County might well have been appropriate. But in her complaint, the contestant has failed to demonstrate that a purge of those ballots would have changed the result of the election or rendered its outcome uncertain. We thus have no choice but to conclude that the chancellor correctly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. We firmly reject any contention that the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to show, district-wide, that the election was so permeated by fraud or illegality as to render the results incurably uncertain or to thwart the will of the electorate. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs will be taxed to the appellant, Jane B. Forbes. REID, C.J., and DROWOTA, O'BRIEN, ANDERSON, JJ., concur.