Opinion ID: 2260822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Inquiry related to the mortuary

Text: Boorman argues that close family members who are aware that mortuary services are being performed should have standing to assert an emotional distress claim for the alleged negligent handling of a deceased person's remains. Boorman further argues that those persons need not observe the offending acts or demonstrate any physical manifestation to succeed on such a claim. We agree. This court has never had the opportunity to address the specific factual scenario raised in appellants' federal complaint. While we have recognized that an individual may have a cause of action for emotional distress in other contexts, see, e.g., Barmettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 114 Nev. 441, 447-48, 956 P.2d 1382, 1386-87 (1998) (concluding that direct victims of negligent conduct may bring a claim for emotional distress); Grotts v. Zahner, 115 Nev. 339, 340, 989 P.2d 415, 416 (1999) (recognizing witness-bystander claims for emotional distress), we have never been presented with the opportunity to discuss the scope of an emotional distress claim resulting from the alleged negligent handling of a deceased person's remains. Although we have not addressed this issue in Nevada, the negligent handling of a deceased person's remains is a commonly recognized tort. For example, the California Supreme Court addressed this issue in Christensen v. Superior Court, which is helpful to our discussion. 54 Cal.3d 868, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 79, 820 P.2d 181 (1991). In Christensen, friends and relatives of the decedent brought an emotional distress cause of action against a mortuary and crematory for negligently and intentionally mishandling the deceased's remains. See id. at 184-85 (alleging that mortuary and crematory defendants harvested decedent's body parts and organs). In determining the class of persons who may assert such a claim, the California Supreme Court rejected the limitation that only those persons who have the statutory right to control the disposition of the body and who contract for its disposition may assert an emotional distress claim. Id. at 183. That class of persons is not a reliable indicator of the family members who may suffer the greatest emotional distress if the decedent's remains are mishandled. Id. at 191. Instead, the Court reasoned that [o]ne of several children of the decedent may arrange for the services on behalf of all siblings, as well as a surviving spouse or parent of the decedent [and, i]f so, the crematory or mortuary assumes a duty to all of these family members. [4] Id. at 191. By undertaking such a duty, mortuary and crematory operators create[ ] a special relationship obligating them to perform [funeral] services in the dignified and respectful manner the bereaved expect.... Id. at 193. Therefore, the Court concluded that such a defendant owes a duty to close family members who were aware that funeral and/or crematory services were being performed, and on whose behalf or for whose benefit the services were rendered. Id. at 183. We are persuaded by the California Supreme Court's reasoning in Christensen as it relates to what class of person may assert an emotional distress claim against a mortuary. Unlike the duty of a county coroner, which we discuss in the next section, a mortuary voluntarily undertakes a duty to competently prepare the decedent's body for the benefit of the bereaved. See Christensen, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 79, 820 P.2d at 193. While we must limit liability at some point, and thus conclude that a mortuary's duty does not run to all persons potentially affected by the decedent's passing, such as close friends and distant relatives, we cannot conclude that a mortuary only owes a duty to the person with the right to dispose of the body. Limiting recovery for emotional distress damages to the person with the right to dispose of the body would be an arbitrary delineation. See id. at 191. Certainly, in some instances the person with the right to dispose of the body would arguably suffer emotional distress upon learning about the negligent treatment of a loved one's body. However, in many other instances, a close family member who is not the person with the right to dispose of the body may be more affected by such negligent conduct. Therefore, we conclude that close family members who are aware of both the death of a loved one and that mortuary services were being performed may bring an action for emotional distress resulting from the negligent handling of the deceased's remains. We further conclude that persons who may assert such a claim do not need to observe or perceive the negligent conduct, or demonstrate any physical manifestation of emotional distress. Requiring a potential plaintiff to observe or perceive the negligent conduct would essentially grant immunity to persons who negligently handle a deceased's remains in many instances because the activities of a mortuary mostly occur behind closed doors. See Contreraz v. Michelotti-Sawyers, 271 Mont. 300, 896 P.2d 1118, 1122 (1995) (requiring a potential plaintiff to be present or observe the offending act is an unreasonable and arbitrary limitation and [u]pholding such a rule would create an immunity that could protect mortuaries from their egregious conduct while barring recovery to those persons possibly suffering the greatest harm). Also, our historical concern that emotional distress must be demonstrated by some physical manifestation of emotional distress is not implicated in this context. We need not question the trustworthiness of an individual's emotional anguish in cases involving desecration of a loved one's remains. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 54, at 362 (5th ed. 1984) ([A group of cases eliminating the physical manifestation requirement] has involved the negligent mishandling of corpses ... [because there is] ... an especial likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress, ... which serves as a guarantee that the claim is not spurious.); Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App.3d 207, 163 Cal.Rptr. 445, 450 (1980) (concluding that damages are recoverable... without physical injury for negligent mishandling of a corpse); Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 118 Idaho 830, 801 P.2d 37, 44 (1990) (exempting the physical manifestation of emotional distress requirement in cases involving the negligent handling of a deceased person's remains). Therefore, while a plaintiff must allege some emotional disturbance resulting from the defendant's negligent conduct, there is no need to demonstrate any physical manifestation of that emotional distress. Ultimately, the determination of whether a close family member should be able to recover any damages in such an action is a question for the trier of fact. [5]