Opinion ID: 1697763
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: carjacking charge

Text: Deparvine also contests several aspects of the carjacking charge, including the indictment, the jury instructions, the jury's unanimity in reaching a guilty verdict, and the sufficiency of the evidence. The crux of Deparvine's argument is that the 1971 Chevrolet truck was never specified as the subject motor vehicle of the carjacking charge in the indictment, and the State's arguments as well as the trial court's instructions may have confused the jury as to whether it was the truck or the Jeep that was claimed to have been carjacked. Initially, we reject any claim that the indictment insufficiently described the motor vehicle that was the subject of the carjacking. Deparvine did not attack the indictment on this ground in the trial court. We also reject Deparvine's contention that the State contended that the Jeep, not the truck, was the subject of the carjacking charge in count five. The State did not argue to the jury that the Jeep was the subject of the carjacking. The most that can be said of the State's arguments during discussions on the motion for judgment of acquittal and outside the presence of the jury is that the State asserted that Deparvine may also have seized the Jeep to get back to the truck after the murders, but, nevertheless, the State asserted his ultimate goal is the unlawful taking . . . of the truck. The State focused on its theory that Deparvine coveted the truck and murdered the Van Dusens to get it. The State argued that Deparvine intended to obtain, acquire that truck by whatever means necessary and that [i]t was a robbery for that title [(referring to the ownership title of the truck)]. Indeed, after reviewing the record on the court's instructions and the State's closing argument, we do not agree with Deparvine that there was a genuine risk that the jury was confused or that unanimity was compromised in considering the carjacking charge. In closing argument, the State never made any arguments that the Jeep was carjacked or stolen. Rather, the State began its closing argument stating, Why kill for a truck, a truck, a motor vehicle, something as common and accessible as a truck? Because that truck was coveted by this defendant. Similarly, in defense counsel's closing argument, counsel focused on rebutting the State's theory that the truck (and not the Jeep) was stolen. For example, defense counsel stated, Common sense tells you that any devious plan to steal a truck, much less kill people, much less with a person with legal knowledge would not have left a trail a mile wide and big flashing arrows pointing directly to the guilty person. On this record, we reject the claim that there is a genuine risk that some members of the jury may have convicted Deparvine of carjacking the truck while others may have convicted him of carjacking the Jeep. We also reject Deparvine's claim of error on the carjacking instructions. We agree with the State that defense counsel never objected to the instructions on the basis argued here. [23] Where a defendant does not object to the jury instructions at trial, the defendant waives the issue for appellate review unless the error, if any, is fundamental. State v. Weaver, 957 So.2d 586, 588 (Fla.2007) (citing Reed v. State, 837 So.2d 366, 370 (Fla.2002)). In State v. Delva, 575 So.2d 643 (Fla.1991), we explained: To justify not imposing the contemporaneous objection rule, the error must reach down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error. In other words, fundamental error occurs only when the omission is pertinent or material to what the jury must consider in order to convict. Failing to instruct on an element of the crime over which the record reflects there was no dispute is not fundamental error and there must be an objection to preserve the issue for appeal. Id. at 644-45 (citations omitted) (quoting Brown v. State, 124 So.2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1960), and Stewart v. State, 420 So.2d 862, 863 (Fla.1982)). In Deparvine's case, the instructions properly tracked the language of the indictment and the statute. See  812.133, Fla. Stat. (2003). Furthermore, we reject Deparvine's argument that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of carjacking. Although Deparvine argues that the carjacking charge could not be based on the taking of the truck because there is no evidence regarding what may have occurred before the Van Dusens were killed, Florida Statutes provide: An act shall be deemed `in the course of the taking' if it occurs either prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the taking of the property and if it and the act of taking constitute a continuous series of acts or events.  812.133(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003). Whether the Van Dusens were murdered after Deparvine took possession is irrelevant since a reasonable jury could infer from the evidence that the taking was the consequence of a continuous series of acts or events all focused on the taking of the truck.