Opinion ID: 1795613
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of memorandum.

Text: ¶ 20. Finally, Welsh argues that the trial court erred in excluding a memorandum that he offered into evidence which purported to show that the defendants had expressed plans to offer Tritel stock for sale in the first quarter of 2000. The internal memo was written by a representative of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette (DLJ) following a meeting with Mounger and Martin on August 25, 1999. Welsh notes that this was highly probative of the central issue of whether Mounger and Martin had plans or expectations of going public with Tritel a full month before executing the settlement agreement. ¶ 21. Welsh first attempted to introduce the memorandum during direct examination of Mounger. The defense objected on hearsay grounds. Welsh then attempted to lay the foundation by questioning a senior manager of DLJ, who testified that he did not prepare the memo and did not know who had prepared it; but that it was a regular business practice of DLJ to document such a meeting. The trial court excluded the document, holding that Welsh failed to lay a proper foundation to admit the document over the hearsay objection. ¶ 22. Welsh now argues that the DLJ memo was offered for admission through a qualified authenticating witness under the business record exception to the hearsay rule, M.R.E. 803(6). He contends that M.R.E. 803 requires only that the source of the material be an informant with knowledge about who is acting in the course and scope of regularly conducted activity, and that the document should not be excluded unless the source of the information ... lacks trustworthiness. ¶ 23. This Court reviews a chancery court's decision to exclude evidence for abuse of discretion  that is, this Court defers to the chancery court's decision and will not reverse the decision unless it was unreasonable and unduly prejudicial. Harrison v. McMillan, 828 So.2d 756, 765 (Miss.2002). ¶ 24. The memorandum provides in part: This summer we contacted the Company regarding a potential IPO and we met with the Company in August to discuss such transactions. At that time, Tritel indicated it would likely wait until the first quarter of 2000 to pursue an IPO so that it could instead focus its attention on successfully launching commercial service in certain of its markets. ¶ 25. The Mississippi Rules of Evidence govern whether a document has been authenticated: The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule: Testimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be.... Miss. R. Evid. 901. ¶ 26. Additionally, the business records exception to the hearsay rule provides: A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinion or diagnosis, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness or self-authenticated pursuant to Rule 902(11), unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. Miss. R. Evid. 803(6). ¶ 27. The chancery court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the memorandum from evidence. Welsh never authenticated the document because Welsh's witness never identified the memorandum as one that documented the meeting, i.e. that it was what it is claimed to be or a business record. Although Welsh's witness testified that such a memorandum was used internally with our equity department, he never testified: that it was made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge; that it was kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity; and that it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum. Although Welsh's witness worked for Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, he was not involved in the preparation of the memorandum, and did not testify to the accuracy of the memorandum. Therefore, the chancery court did not err in excluding the memorandum.