Opinion ID: 1226361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constructive Amendment or Variance of the Indictment

Text: Generally, this Court evaluates claims of constructive amendments to or variances from an indictment de novo. United States v. Hynes, 467 F.3d 951, 961 (6th Cir.2006); United States v. Flowal, 163 F.3d 956, 962 (6th Cir.1998). However, where no specific objection is raised regarding a constructive amendment or a variance before the district court, we are limited to plain error review on appeal. United States v. Mann, 195 Fed.Appx. 430, 437 (6th Cir.2006) (plain error applied to constructive amendment claim where no objection was lodged with the trial court); United States v. Caver, 470 F.3d 220, 236 (6th Cir.2006) (plain error review applied to variance appeal). To establish plain error, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights. If all of these requirements are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir.2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The defendant bears the burden of proving whether a constructive amendment or variance has occurred. United States v. Chilingirian, 280 F.3d 704, 712 (6th Cir.2002).
Kuehne alleges that the government constructively amended count 6 of the indictment inasmuch as the jury instructions broadened the basis of conviction under § 924(c). Moreover, Kuehne argues that the discrepancy between the jury instructions, the evidence regarding the number of guns offered at trial and the number of guns alleged in the indictment constitutes either a constructive amendment or a prejudicial variance from the indictment. We find Kuehne's allegations to be without merit. An indictment may be the subject of an actual amendment, a constructive amendment, or a variance. United States v. Budd, 496 F.3d 517, 521 (6th Cir.2007). Thus, constructive amendments and variances are two types of modifications to indictments that have been recognized by this Court. Hynes, 467 F.3d at 961. Constructive amendments and variances, however, differ with respect to the burden placed upon the defendant and the remedy mandated upon a showing that a constructive amendment or variance has occurred. A constructive amendment results when the terms of an indictment are in effect altered by the presentation of evidence and jury instructions which modify essential elements of the offense charged such that there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant may have been convicted of an offense other than the one charged in the indictment. United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 338 (6th Cir.2005). Constructive amendments are per se prejudicial because they infringe on the Fifth Amendment's grand jury guarantee. Hynes, 467 F.3d at 962 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Because of the constitutional injury that results from a constructive amendment, when proven, a defendant is entitled to a reversal of his conviction. Id. A variance, however, is not per se prejudicial. Budd, 496 F.3d at 521. Rather, reversal is warranted only where a defendant proves that (1) a variance occurred and (2) that the variance affected a substantial right of the defendant. United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 757 (6th Cir.2000). A variance occurs when the charging terms [of the indictment] are unchanged, but the evidence at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment. Id. at 756-57. The substantial rights of the defendant are affected only when the defendant shows prejudice to his ability to defend himself at trial, to the general fairness of the trial, or to the indictment's sufficiency to bar subsequent prosecutions. Hynes, 467 F.3d at 962 (quoting United States v. Barrow, 118 F.3d 482, 488-89 (6th Cir.1997)).
Kuehne contends that count 6 of the indictment was constructively amended by the district court when the court instructed the jury regarding the use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). As noted above, a constructive amendment occurs where the indictment is effectively altered by the presentation of evidence and jury instructions which change the material elements of an offense. To determine whether a constructive amendment has occurred, therefore, we review the language of the indictment, the evidence presented at trial, the jury instructions and the verdict forms utilized by the jury. See United States v. Brown, 332 F.3d 363, 371 (6th Cir.2003). Count 6 of the indictment alleged that Kuehne aided and abetted the use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). However, when instructing the jury regarding the offense, the district court erroneously asserted that Kuehne was charged with using and carrying a firearm. In particular, the district court stated: Count 11 [5] charges on or about December 13th, 2002 in the Southern District of Ohio and elsewhere John David Kuehne, Jr. aided and abetted a person known to the grand jury carrying and/or using two firearms, to wit: A Taures Model PT 92[.]9 millimeter pistol, serial number TUE4914 and a Colt model 19110-A1 [.]45 caliber pistol, serial number CV 19208 during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime for which he may be prosecuted in the United States. . . . (J.A. at 1681-82) (emphasis added) Although the district court properly instructed the jury regarding the elements that must be proven in order to convict Kuehne of the use offense and specifically defined use within the meaning of the statute, its initial error in stating that Kuehne was charged with both using and carrying a firearm was repeated on the verdict forms given to the jury. The verdict form for count 6 stated [w]e, the Jury, find Defendant John David Kuehne, Jr. `Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt' of Aiding and Abetting Using or Carrying [a] Firearm in Relation to a Drug Trafficking Crime, on or about December 13, 2002, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 324(c) and 2. (J.A. at 42) Indeed, when reading the verdict on count 6, the jury foreperson stated that the jury found Kuehne guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aiding and abetting using and carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime[.] (J.A. at 1710) The difference between the words use and carry is not merely semantic inasmuch as each has distinct meanings within § 924(c)(1). In Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 143, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), the Supreme Court held that the term use is to be construed narrowly and its application limited to the active employment of a firearm. Active employment includes brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and, most obviously, firing or attempting to fire a firearm. Id. at 148, 116 S.Ct. 501. The term carry, however, as used by the statute is construed broadly and retains its ordinary meaning. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 131, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998). A defendant carries a firearm when he conveys or moves the firearm, including via a vehicle, and when there is personal agency and some degree of possession over the firearm. Id. at 137, 118 S.Ct. 1911; see id. (holding that the term carry includes driving a car with guns locked in the glove compartment or the trunk). As the Supreme Court has noted, a firearm can be used without being carried, e.g., when an offender has a gun on display during a transaction, or barters with a firearm without handling it; and a firearm can be carried without being used, e.g., when an offender keeps a gun hidden under his clothing throughout a drug transaction. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 146, 116 S.Ct. 501. Based on the disparate meanings of the terms use and carry, the introduction of the term carry broadened the basis for conviction on count 6. Although the jury instructions broadened the basis upon which Kuehne could have been convicted, this fact alone does not resolve the question of whether a constructive amendment or a variance occurred in this case. This court has held that a constructive amendment occurs where both the jury instructions and the evidence at trial vary from the indictment to broaden the basis for conviction. See United States v. Cusmano, 659 F.2d 714, 718 (6th Cir.1981); see also Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 213, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960). We have also found constructive amendments where jury instructions differ from an indictment, even in the absence of varied evidence, to charge the jury on a separate offense that was not listed in an indictment. See United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 936 (6th Cir.2004). However, where the jury instructions alone differ from the indictment to charge the same crime, but on an alternative theory, a mere variance occurs and a defendant must demonstrate prejudice. See Budd, 496 F.3d at 522, 525; Martin v. Kassulke, 970 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir.1992). As an initial matter, Kuehne has not alleged that the evidence offered at trial varied from his indictment. Consequently, Kuehne may demonstrate a constructive amendment only upon a showing that the district court charged the jury on an alternative crime rather than an alternative method[ ] by which one crime . . . could have been committed. Budd, 496 F.3d at 522. We find that Kuehne has not made this showing. As we noted in Combs, § 924 criminalizes two distinct offenses. The first offense criminalizes the use or carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, while the second criminalizes the possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. Combs, 369 F.3d at 931. Thus, following the logic of Combs, the term use and carry provides two alternative methods of conviction for the during and relation to offense. See also United States v. Washington, 127 F.3d 510, 514 (6th Cir.1997) ([A] defendant can be convicted under § 924(c)(1) if he either uses or carries a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense.). Inasmuch as the jury was charged regarding two different methods of committing the same offense rather than a wholly distinct offense, a variance occurred and Kuehne must demonstrate that his substantial rights were affected by the district court's erroneous jury instruction. [I]n this context, substantial rights are affected only when a defendant shows prejudice to his ability to defend himself at trial, to the general fairness of the trial, or to the indictment's sufficiency to bar subsequent prosecutions. Hynes, 467 F.3d at 962. In the instant case, we find that Kuehne has not established that his substantial rights were impacted by the erroneous jury instruction. Kuehne's ability to defend himself at trial was not undermined by the instruction because his defense was premised on an assertion that he did not participate in any of the alleged crimes. Moreover, Kuehne has not suggested that the general fairness at trial was compromised or that the indictment will subject him to future prosecutions. Inasmuch as Kuehne has failed to establish that his substantial rights were affected by the jury instruction, he has not shown a prejudicial variance and is therefore not entitled to relief. See United States v. Blankenship, 923 F.2d 1110, 1116 (5th Cir.1991) (finding that an indictment charging the use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense was not constructively amended by the district court's addition of the term carry when instructing the jury).
Kuehne further alleges that the government constructively amended the remaining counts of the indictment which charged that Kuehne aided and abetted the theft of, possessed or bartered one or two weapons. Kuehne asserts that because the government offered evidence demonstrating that over 200 weapons were involved in the offenses listed in the indictment, a constructive amendment to the indictment occurred. In the alternative, Kuehne asserts that the increased evidence regarding the number of weapons constituted a material variance. Similar to the above, this argument is without merit.
First, Kuehne has not demonstrated that a constructive amendment occurred with respect to any of the counts enumerated in the indictment. Although the government offered evidence of more firearms than were listed in the indictment, the jury was instructed regarding the specific weapons charged in the indictment and that it had to find those weapons were involved in the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. [6] Moreover, nowhere does Kuehne identify a discrepancy between the counts as listed in the indictment and the instructions regarding the necessary elements for conviction on those counts. Thus, Kuehne's constructive amendment contention fails inasmuch as there was no difference between the charges as enumerated in the indictment and the instructions issued to the jury regarding those charges. Hynes, 467 F.3d at 965.
Second, Kuehne also fails to show that a material variance occurred. In the instant case, the government presented evidence regarding the firearms charged in the indictment. Kuehne's major point of contention is based on the fact that the government produced evidence of additional weapons beyond those alleged to have been stolen in the indictment. The presentation of additional evidence to substantiate charged offenses, however, does not constitute facts materially different from those charged in the indictment. Even assuming that the government's proof of more weapons than were alleged in the indictment constituted a variance, Kuehne has not demonstrated that such a variance affected his substantial rights. The substantial rights of the defendant are affected only when the defendant shows prejudice to his ability to defend himself at trial, to the general fairness of the trial, or to the indictment's sufficiency to bar subsequent prosecutions. Hynes, 467 F.3d at 962 (quoting United States v. Barrow, 118 F.3d 482, 488-89 (6th Cir.1997)). In the case at bar, Kuehne does not allege that the variance affected his ability to defend himself at trial. [7] Indeed, Kuehne's ability to defend himself was not impacted inasmuch as Kuehne's defense essentially came down to an assertion that the government did not meet its burden of proof with respect to the offenses charged and therefore did not rest on the number of weapons attached to any particular count of the indictment. Nor does Kuehne allege a lack of fair notice regarding the criminal charges he would face. See United States v. Robison, 904 F.2d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that discrepancy between the type of gun alleged in the indictment and the type of gun described in jury instruction did not constitute a variance because the defense offered at trial was not substantially affected by the particular type of firearm with which he was convicted of having involvement).