Opinion ID: 618220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Air Sunshine's Claims

Text: Only two of Air Sunshine's claims remain on appeal: (1) a Bivens claim alleging that the C402 inspection process amounted to a deprivation of Air Sunshine's property without due process, in contravention of the procedural Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; and (2) a Bivens claim that the delays and other actions of Carl with respect to all three sets of facts were carried out in retaliation for Air Sunshine's complaints regarding Hau-Lepera during the October 8 meeting, in contravention of the First Amendment. Air Sunshine, 2010 WL 4861457, at .
Carl argues the complaint fails even to state a procedural due process claim, much less a claim which would overcome qualified immunity. We agree. We bypass the question of whether Air Sunshine can even bring a procedural due process claim under Bivens. Bivens claims are implied from the Constitution, and such implied causes of action are disfavored. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947-48. While the Supreme Court has extended Bivens to the Due Process Clause, it has only done so in the context of [t]he equal protection component of that clause. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 235, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979). Even assuming a properly stated procedural due process claim is cognizable under Bivens, the complaint does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a valid procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must (1) identify a protected liberty or property interest, and (2) allege that the defendants ... deprived [him] of that interest without constitutionally adequate process. González-Droz v. González-Colón, 660 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir.2011) (second alteration in original) (quoting Aponte-Torres v. Univ. of P.R., 445 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir.2006)) (internal quotation mark omitted). Because Air Sunshine fails to allege a deprivation by Carl, we do not reach the assertion that there is a protected property interest in the outcome of the inspection process. The complaint alleges that the deadline for Air Sunshine to complete the C402 inspection process was December 8, 2008. [6] On that date, Air Sunshine lost its authority to schedule operations. The only specific actions the complaint alleges Carl took with respect to the inspection process all occurred after this date, so there was no plausible causal connection alleged. Beyond that, the specific allegations regarding Carl do not state a valid claim for other reasons. The only specific allegations contained in the complaint are that (1) Carl stated that an extension of the inspection deadline was not possible, (2) Carl indicated that his assistant could conduct the inspection of the fleet alone, but five days later stated that a team would be required, and (3) Carl refused to accept the inspection results of the former FAA inspector hired by Air Sunshine pending an approval of a revision to certain manuals. The complaint does not allege that Carl made the decision, or even had the authority to make the decision, regarding whether to grant the extension. This failure to make personal allegations is alone fatal. Importantly, and independently, the relevant regulation provides that an extension may be made [i]n the event of an unforeseen scheduling conflict for a specific airplane. 14 C.F.R. § 135.422(c). The complaint does not plead any unforeseen scheduling conflict, so there is no plausible basis to infer that the regulation even granted discretion to anyone to allow an extension. [7] Further, the regulation's use of the word may means the decision to grant an extension is discretionary, and thus not subject to a Due Process Clause challenge. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756, 125 S.Ct. 2796, 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005) ([A] benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion.). For these reasons as well, the allegations against Carl fail. [8] This result does not change with the remaining allegations about Carl's assistant or his failure to accept Air Sunshine's proffered inspection results. Carl's determination that a team would be needed to conduct an inspection, rather than his assistant alone, was within his authority and cannot support a procedural due process claim. [9] The bald allegation that Carl refused to accept the inspection Air Sunshine had conducted, pending revision of certain manuals, which Air Sunshine had been waiting for Carl to approve, also does not state a procedural due process claim. The complaint does not state when the private inspection took place, when the results were submitted to Carl, when Carl refused to accept the inspection, why his refusal was improper, and provides no other information that would provide necessary context for a claim of constitutional violation. These and the other naked assertion[s] of procedural due process violations are devoid of `further factual enhancement' and do not survive the motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (internal quotation marks omitted). Carl's actions were also entirely consistent with lawful conduct, which is another reason the complaint fails to meet the Iqbal standard. See, e.g., Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 75 (3d Cir.2011) (complaint fails to state a Bivens claim where the allegations described conduct consistent with otherwise lawful behavior by immigration officials); Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir.2009) (complaint fails to state a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where actions of law enforcement officials in conducting investigation were consistent with lawful conduct).
As with the procedural due process claim, no claim of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment is stated, even without looking to the additional requirements needed to overcome qualified immunity. It is questionable whether Bivens extends to cases asserting a violation of First Amendment rights or retaliation for the exercise of those rights. The Supreme Court has declined to extend Bivens to an instance of a federal employee allegedly suffering retaliation for protected speech in violation of the First Amendment. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 369, 373, 390, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983). Further, Iqbal itself stated that the Court has declined to extend Bivens to a claim sounding in the First Amendment, while assuming, without deciding, that a Bivens claim based on the Free Exercise Clause would be actionable. 129 S.Ct. at 1948. Once again, we need not decide the question, as even assuming such a claim is cognizable under Bivens, Air Sunshine's complaint is deficient. In order to succeed on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a party must show that her conduct `was constitutionally protected, and that this conduct was a substantial factor [or] ... a motivating factor driving the allegedly retaliatory decision.' Gorelik v. Costin, 605 F.3d 118, 123 (1st Cir.2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.2005)). The complaint does not meet even this basic standard. The only even arguably protected activity the complaint alleges is that Air Sunshine stated, at an October 8, 2008 meeting with Carl, that an FAA employee, Hau-Lepera, had done Air Sunshine no justice. The complaint provides no factual basis plausibly to infer that Carl's later actions were motivated by this comment with respect to any of the three sets of facts. It is true the period for the C402 inspection process expired, but not on the basis of any actions by Carl, and so the retaliation claim fails with respect to that set of occurrences. As to the ferry permit, all of the specifically alleged events occurred before the October 8 meeting and so could not have been retaliatory on Carl's part. The complaint alleges that Carl initially refused the permit on August 28, 2008, and continued that refusal until some unspecified time in October 2008, when Carl conducted the inspection. While the complaint does not state when the inspection took place, no facts are alleged to provide a plausible basis to conclude that the period of delay (if any such period existed) between the October 8 meeting and the inspection was in retaliation for the comment about Hau-Lepera. Air Sunshine's SAAB 340 proving test allegations also fail to provide a plausible basis to infer retaliation for the comment. The complaint essentially describes a series of delays regarding the proving test process that began around August 2007 and continued into 2009. These delays are entirely consistent with permissible and lawful actions, particularly after Carl's 2008 involvement. First, there are specific procedures which govern the proving test, and Air Sunshine does not plead that it complied with these procedures. The process is detailed and places the burden on the operator to provide the appropriate material for the proving test to take place. See FAA Order 8900.1 ¶¶ 3-2286 to 3-2316 (2011). In phase one, the applicant must request authorization from the FAA to conduct the proving runs; after such a request, an initial contact meeting occurs and an FAA test team is assigned. Id. ¶ 3-2312. In phase two, the applicant must prepare a formal test plan, providing a variety of information, and this plan must be complete before the evaluation may continue. Id. ¶ 3-2313. In phase three, [10] the FAA test team engages in an in-depth review and analysis of the applicant's test plan. Id. ¶ 3-2314. If the inspector determines that the material is deficient or unacceptable, the [inspector] must return the entire submission to the operator. Id. ¶ 3-4(C) (2011). The Handbook also makes clear that while FAA employees may provide advice and guidance to applicants, the development of the final product submitted to the FAA is solely the responsibility of the operator, not the FAA employee. Id. ¶ 3-2(C). Air Sunshine's complaint makes no attempt either to plead that it complied with any of these requirements, or to state in non-conclusory terms how the relevant procedures were not followed by Carl. [11] In fact, the complaint itself states some of the reasons Carl offered for why the proving tests could not take place, including Air Sunshine's failure to comply with FAA regulations and submitting information in an improper procedural format. These reasons, on their face, are entirely consistent with the procedural requirements outlined in the FAA handbook. There is simply no basis to infer that Carl's actions were motivated by retaliation for a remark critical of a co-worker and friend. As between [these] `obvious alternative explanation[s]' for the delays, and the purposeful, invidious discrimination [Air Sunshine] asks us to infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951-52 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Second, at the time of the October 8 meeting, Air Sunshine had already been waiting for proving runs for over a year. This delay occurred before Carl was even assigned to Air Sunshine's certification. See Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 308 (1st Cir.2008) (allegations of retaliation did not suffice where the complained-of action long predated the speech and continued afterward); McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 259 (7th Cir.1996) (dismissing complaint where [t]he allegedly retaliatory conduct was merely the continuation of the conduct giving rise to the complaints). Third, the complaint does not provide any facts concerning certification of aircraft owned by similarly situated companies, general information about how long the certification process usually takes, allegations explaining why the proffered reasons for delay were false or unjustified, or any other facts that would support an inference of differential treatment, much less that the treatment was motivated by retaliation. Air Sunshine's [m]ere broad conclusory allegations of wrongdoing in the complaint are not a substitute for a meaningful factual context. Nestor Colon Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 42 (1st Cir.1992). As a result, the complaint fails to state a claim of retaliation. Because no constitutional claims were stated, Carl was entitled to qualified immunity and the magistrate judge erred in ruling otherwise.