Opinion ID: 2451499
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Does each claim avoid the jurisdictional bar?

Text: Admittedly, in some instances, deciphering the nature of the relief sought under each of the property owners' claims is difficult, but it is a necessary exercise. We categorize the claims generally as follows: (1) The property owners contend the County exceeded its statutory authority in violation of the County Home Rule Act, K.S.A. 19-101 et seq. when the Board enacted the self-help and abatement remedy provisions in Section 6 of Resolution 2005-01. This attacks the Board's ability to levy the tax at issue. It is properly characterized as a challenge to a tax assessment and falls under K.S.A. 60-907(a). This claim is not jurisdictionally barred by K.S.A. 19-223. (2) The property owners also claim Resolution 2005-01 is void because it prohibits a broader class of conduct than the criminal nuisance statutes, K.S.A. 21-4106 and K.S.A. 21-4107. This argument is two-pronged: (a) The County is only entitled to declare a nuisance for conditions that injure or endanger the public health, and the property owners contend it goes beyond those limitations; and (b) the County exceeded its authority by creating its own procedures to determine whether a nuisance exists. We find the Court of Appeals was correct in its analysis that the nature of relief sought under these arguments is best characterized as a challenge to the Board's January 2006 cleanup order and only tangentially related to the special tax assessment. While a finding that the order was improperly entered would ultimately negate the tax assessment, we agree the property owners were required to bring this claim earlier under K.S.A. 19-223. We find both prongs of this argument barred. The property owners further claim Resolution 2005-01 is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the United States Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements because: (a) Sections 5(a) and 5(b) are vague and overbroad when defining what constitutes a nuisance and an unsightly appearance, in violation of their right to due process; and (b) Section 5 is overly vague and gives the County's agent unbridled authority to determine whether a property constitutes a nuisance. Related to this, the property owners also argue Resolution 2005-01 is overbroad because it prohibits the constitutionally protected right to peaceful ownership, use, and enjoyment of property by prohibiting conditions that are neither injurious nor a danger to public health. We find these contentions are also only tangentially related to the special tax assessment and more properly viewed as a challenge to the Board's January 17, 2006, order finding that the property does not comply with Resolution 2005-01. The property owners were required to bring these issues under K.S.A. 19-223 and may not now proceed under K.S.A. 60-907(a). (4) The property owners further argue Resolution 2005-01 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it exempts farmers and those engaged in agricultural pursuits from its provisions. The argument made is that there is no rational basis for treating general landowners differently than farmers. Again, this is not directly related to the special tax assessment. It is better characterized as a challenge to the Board's order finding the land is not in compliance with Resolution 2005-01. As such, it cannot now be raised under K.S.A. 60-907(a). (5) Finally, the property owners make various arguments that Resolution 2005-01 was unconstitutional as applied to them and that the County's conduct toward them was arbitrary and capricious. They assert the following: (a) They were not given sufficient notice or opportunity to attend the January 17, 2006, hearing; (b) the County's actions conflicted because the county environmental technician assured them by phone the County would not act as long as the cleanup was progressing, but then the county counselor sent a letter shortly thereafter requiring compliance within 21 days; (c) the county employees entered the property and began work despite the progress the property owners made complying with the order; and (d) the County engaged in arbitrary and capricious conduct because the work performed exceeded any legitimate goals of abating dangerous conditions and amounted to beautifying the property. We find the first claim in this series (sufficient notice of the January 2006 hearing) is essentially just another attack on the Board's order and needed to be raised under K.S.A. 19-223. It is subject to the jurisdictional bar. But the remaining claims are sufficiently tailored to challenge the special tax assessment and survive a jurisdictional attack. These latter claims go to the County's decision to initiate its own cleanup efforts and the degree of work performed, which was ultimately determinative of the amount the County billed. Those may properly be seen as claims under K.S.A. 60-907(a). In summary, this analysis leads us to the conclusion that only some of the property owners' claims appropriately targeted the special tax assessment under K.S.A. 60-907(a). The Court of Appeals correctly found K.S.A. 19-223 bars review of the claims noted above but erred by finding all claims were barred. Our remaining question is whether the property owners were required to exhaust administrative remedies before filing their surviving claims in the district court.