Opinion ID: 1800913
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During July Selection and the Guilt Phase

Text: In his first issue on appeal, Jones asserts that the trial court erred in denying several of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during jury selection and the guilt phase of his trial. Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), this Court has held that for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be successful, the defendant must establish both deficient performance and prejudice: As to the first prong, deficient performance, a defendant must establish conduct on the part of counsel that is outside the broad range of competent performance under prevailing professional standards. Second, as to the prejudice prong, the deficient performance must be shown to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceedings that confidence in the outcome is undermined. Gore v. State, 846 So.2d 461, 467 (Fla.2003) (citations omitted). However, when a defendant fails to make a showing as to one prong, it is not necessary to delve into whether he has made a showing as to the other prong. Waterhouse v. State, 792 So.2d 1176, 1182 (Fla.2001). [8] Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit court's factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the circuit court's legal conclusions de novo. See Mungin v. State, 932 So.2d 986, 998 (Fla.2006). There is a strong presumption that trial counsel's performance was not ineffective. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1048 (Fla.2000), this Court held that strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct. In his first claim, Jones argued that his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to object, move to strike, or seek a curative instruction when prospective juror Hyers stated that she did not think she could put aside what she had read about the case and render a fair and impartial verdict. The trial court, in an effort to insulate the jury from pretrial publicity, conducted individual voir dire with those potential jurors who indicated that they had heard of the case in the media. At that time, Hyers did not indicate that she had any knowledge of the case. Hyers eventually recalled reading about the case but did not reveal what she read or state any opinion about the case in the presence of the other jurors. She simply expressed doubts about whether she could be fair-minded. Further, Hyers did not serve on the jury and those persons who did serve stated that they had not prejudged Jones and could follow the law. We have previously rejected a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike the venire panel when several potential jurors expressed their feelings about what they had heard about the case. See Johnson v. State, 903 So.2d 888, 896-97 (Fla.2005). We explained that [i]n order for the statement of one venire member to taint the panel, the venire member must mention facts that would not otherwise be presented to the jury. No venire member in Johnson's case mentioned a fact that would not otherwise be presented to the jury. A venire member's expression of an opinion before the entire panel is not normally considered sufficient to taint the remainder of the panel. Id. at 897 (citations omitted). As in Johnson, Jones has failed to demonstrate that counsel's failure to object was deficient performance or that he was prejudiced by Hyers' comments. Thus, the trial court correctly denied this claim for relief. Jones next asserts that the trial court erred in denying his claim that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's statements during jury selection that the victim was the mother of three young children. [9] Specifically, Jones identifies two occasions when the prosecutor asked potential jurors whether this fact would affect their ability to wait until the close of evidence to decide on the appropriate punishment. Our decision in Davis v. State, 698 So.2d 1182 (Fla.1997), is dispositive. In that case, we held that there was no error in allowing the prosecutor to ask a prospective juror in front of the others whether it would hinder her impartiality if the case involved a learning disabled child, because this question would determine if any of the jurors had strong feelings or biases that would prevent them from rendering an impartial verdict in the case. Id. at 1190. Similarly, in this case, the prosecutor's two comments that the victim was the mother of three young children were intended to ensure that the potential jurors understood that they were required to wait until all the evidence was presented before making a decision about the death penalty. Because the prosecutor's comments were not improper, the lack of an objection by trial counsel did not constitute ineffective assistance. See Walls v. State, 926 So.2d 1156, 1169 (Fla.2006) (agreeing with the trial court that the prosecutor's comments during closing argument were not improper and concluding that therefore counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to them). In his third subissue on appeal, Jones contends that the trial court erred in denying his claims that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate the effects of and request a jury instruction on Jones' use of psychotropic medications before and during trial. In its detailed order, the trial court found that these claims were either conclusory or without merit. We agree. Jones did not present any evidence regarding the details of his pretrial medication or that his need for medication impacted issues such as insanity, competency, suppression of statements, and the ability to form premeditation. Therefore, Jones has failed to prove these allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. [10] Moreover, trial counsel requested a jury instruction on the administration of psychotropic medication and the trial court agreed to read it to the jury after opening statements. Although the instruction was actually given after the State had presented several witnesses, the trial court related it back to the beginning of trial. Jones has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by this delay. There is no indication in the record that Jones appeared drugged before the jury or acted out in any way. In fact, attorney Buzzell testified at the evidentiary hearing that Jones was polite and conducted himself very well. We affirm the trial court's denial of relief on these claims. We also affirm the trial court's denial of Jones' claim that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present evidence during the guilt phase of cocaine addiction and lack of premeditation. In Pietri v. State, 885 So.2d 245, 252-53 (Fla.2004), we rejected a similar claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to present a voluntary intoxication defense based on the defendant's persistent use of cocaine on the days prior to the murder. [11] Although Pietri presented several expert witnesses to support his claim, including Dr. Lipman, the same witness who testified in this case, the Court concluded that Pietri failed to present any evidence to demonstrate that he was in fact intoxicated at the time of the offense or any competent evidence proving his inability to form the specific intent to commit the crime. Pietri, 885 So.2d at 252. Jones asserts that Pietri is distinguishable because Jones was clearly impaired at the time of the murder. However, Jones presented no evidence at the hearing that the killing occurred while he was intoxicated or under the influence of cocaine. Nor did Jones demonstrate that his history of drug use impaired him to the extent that he could not form the required intent for premeditated murder. In fact, as to Jones' state of mind at the time of the crime, Dr. Lipman testified only that he thought both of the statutory mental health mitigators applied. Thus, Jones failed to present any evidence to support his claim that trial counsel were ineffective in this regard. Moreover, as the trial court noted, attorney Buzzell testified that he and co-counsel considered presenting evidence of Jones' mental state during the guilt phase but decided against it based on his discussions with Dr. Harry Krop, who was appointed to assist the defense. Attorney Buzzell explained that Dr. Krop indicated that the State would elicit unfavorable information on cross-examination if he were called to testify during the guilt phase. Trial counsel's informed strategic decision not to present this information cannot be considered deficient performance. See Johnson v. State, 769 So.2d 990, 1001 (Fla.2000) (Counsel's strategic decisions will not be second-guessed on collateral attack.). Accordingly, the trial court properly denied relief on this claim. In Jones' fifth ineffective assistance of counsel claim during the guilt phase, he asserted that trial counsel should have objected to the State's presentation of evidence and argument concerning an uncharged sexual battery. The trial court denied this claim, finding that trial counsel made a tactical decision not to object to the State's introduction of the physical condition of the victim's body, and instead chose to highlight the inconclusive nature of the State's evidence. The trial court also found that Jones failed to establish that trial counsel were deficient in failing to object to the State's opening statements and closing arguments on this issue because they were fair comments on the evidence. We find no error in the trial court's findings and conclusions. Jones provides no support for his contention that the State's presentation of evidence of the physical condition of McRae's body was objectionable. Evidence of the condition of the victim's body as found by the police was clearly relevant. Cf. Marquard v. State, 850 So.2d 417, 427 (Fla.2002) (concluding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the introduction of the victim's bones and to a video depicting the victim's bones and personal possessions that were scattered throughout the crime scene because the evidence was relevant to the manner in which the victim was murdered); Looney v. State, 803 So.2d 656, 669-70 & n. 9 (Fla.2001) (explaining that crime scene photographs are relevant when they establish the manner in which the murder was committed, show the position and location of the victim as found by police, or assist crime scene technicians in describing the crime scene). Further, Buzzell testified that defense counsel were aware that the State believed that the evidence supported the inference of a sexual assault and that the defense strategy was to expose the weaknesses in the State's theory. On cross-examination of serologist Diane Hanson, defense counsel elicited testimony that a presumptive test for the presence of semen on an area of Jones' jeans came back negative. Defense counsel also elicited testimony from the medical examiner that the condition of the victim's clothes suggested that she had been dragged to the area where she was found, and testimony from McRae's husband that at times McRae did not wear underwear with her jeans. Counsel's strategic decision to rebut the State's suggestion of a possible sexual assault on cross-examination, rather than object to the evidence, cannot be considered unreasonable under the circumstances of this case. See Occhicone, 768 So.2d at 1048 ([S]trategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.). In addition, Jones does not identify specifically which comments in the prosecutor's opening statements and closing arguments were objectionable. We assume Jones is referring to the prosecutor's opening statements regarding the condition of McRae's body and the closing argument that McRae's shoes may have been off because Jones wanted her pants off. However, these comments were not improper. By referring to the way in which McRae's body was found, the prosecutor was merely outlining what he in good faith expected to be established by the evidence presented at trial, which is the purpose of opening statement. Perez v. State, 919 So.2d 347, 363 (Fla.2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2359, 165 L.Ed.2d 285 (2006). In closing argument, the prosecutor appropriately pointed to an inference that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Griffin v. State, 866 So.2d 1, 16 (Fla.2003) (quoting Bertolotti v. State, 476 So.2d 130, 134 (Fla.1985)). Moreover, the prosecutor did not tell the jury that McRae had been sexually assaulted. Accordingly, trial counsel's failure to object was not deficient performance and the trial court did not err in denying this claim for relief. Jones next contends that the trial court erred in denying his claim that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's remark during opening statements that McRae's murder was heinous, atrocious, and cruel. Jones asserts that counsel's failure to object to the State's reference to this penalty-phase aggravator in the guilt phase undermines the outcome of both the guilt and penalty phases. Specifically, the prosecutor stated: We do not know exactly how long he kept her alive, and we don't know exactly what he did to her but we do know enough to know everything that's important to know for the purpose of proving that he's guilty of first degree murder, and not just first degree murder but horrible, heinous, atrocious and cruel first degree murder. (Emphasis supplied.) We do not decide the issue of deficient performance because Jones has failed to establish prejudice. Given the strong evidence of Jones' guilt, including his confession to the murder and his possession of McRae's vehicle and ATM card, our confidence in the guilty verdict is not undermined by the prosecutor's comment describing the nature of the murder. Cf. Walls, 926 So.2d at 1167 (concluding that the defendant failed to establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to object to one improper prosecutorial comment where the comment was not so prejudicial as to require a new trial). Our confidence in the death sentence is not undermined because as we noted on direct appeal, the HAC aggravator, which was found by the trial court, indisputably appl[ies] in this case. Jones, 748 So.2d at 1027. We also reject Jones' claim that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the State's guilt-phase closing arguments. Jones has failed to provide any support for his contention that the arguments he refers to in his brief were objectionable. Further, after reviewing the comments, we conclude that even if they were improper, Jones was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to object. As with the prosecutor's comment during opening statements that the murder was heinous, atrocious and cruel, none of the alleged improper comments during the prosecutor's closing argument undermine our confidence in the jury's guilty verdict. Next, Jones asserts that the trial court erred in denying his claim that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's reference during opening statements to a racial slur Jones used to describe two African-American males. We previously dealt with this as an evidentiary issue on direct appeal. We determined that any error in allowing Detective Parker to refer to the fact that Jones used a racial slur was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jones, 748 So.2d at 1023. In reaching this conclusion, we found that there was no attempt to inject race as an issue in the trial, or an impermissible appeal to bias and prejudice. Id. We also rejected Jones' argument that the prosecutor elicited improper testimony that Jones had a spider web tattoo, noting that [t]here was no suggestion ever made to the jury by the State that the spider web tattoo was linked to racism. Id. Jones' allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is merely a variant of the issues raised on direct appeal and is therefore procedurally barred. See Torres-Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So.2d 1321, 1323 (Fla.1994) (Proceedings under rule 3.850 are not to be used as a second appeal; nor is it appropriate to use a different argument to relitigate the same issue.). Jones also contends that the trial court erred in denying his claims that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to impeach State witnesses Amy Hudson, a bartender who observed Jones on the night of the murder, and Jackie Doll Jones, Jones' wife. Regarding Hudson, the trial court considered the evidence presented and concluded that the [d]efendant has failed to establish error on the part of counsel for failing to impeach Ms. Hudson with her deposition testimony or challenge her opinion that the man she saw was a crack addict. Further, assuming arguendo, that counsel's performance was deficient, Defendant has failed to establish prejudice to his case from Ms. Hudson's opinion that the man she saw was a crack addict since Mr. Buzzell testified at the evidentiary hearing that he believed the defense had presented an abundance of evidence to establish that Defendant was a crack addict. Accordingly, Defendant [sic] allegations are without merit. (Citations omitted.) We affirm the trial court's denial of relief on this claim. As to Jackie, Jones alleged that trial counsel failed to investigate sufficiently to discover that Jackie had an outstanding warrant in Texas, and failed to present evidence of the full scope of her deal with the State to testify. We agree with the trial court that Jones failed to establish deficient performance. At the evidentiary hearing, Jackie testified that at the time of the trial, neither she nor the State were aware of the charges in Texas. She also stated that she did not have a deal with the State in exchange for her testimony at Jones' trial. Attorney Buzzell testified that he did not recall Jackie saying anything about a crime in Texas. Jones did not present evidence that anyone involved in Jones' trial, including the State or Jackie, knew of the outstanding warrant in Texas or that Jackie had any deals with the State. Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied this claim for relief. In his final claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during jury selection and the guilt phase, Jones asserts that the trial court erred in denying his claim that the cumulative effect of trial counsel's failures requires relief. Because we have concluded that the trial court correctly denied Jones' other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we affirm the denial of Jones' claim of cumulative error. See Holland v. State, 916 So.2d 750, 759 (Fla.2005) (concluding the trial court properly denied defendant's claim that the cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors denied him a fair trial where defendant's individual claims were either legally insufficient, procedurally barred, or meritless), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1790, 164 L.Ed.2d 531 (2006).