Opinion ID: 2682794
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Attorney General's Jurisdiction to File a New Ballot Title

Text: Proponents claim that the Attorney General lost jurisdiction to file a new ballot title because the Attorney General's objection to Proponents' ballot title was untimely filed with the Secretary of State. ¶3 On Wednesday, September 18, 2013, Initiative Petition No. 397, State Question 767, was filed with Secretary of State by Proponents. On Thursday, September 19, 2013, the Secretary of State sent a notice by Interagency Mail to the Attorney General that an initiative petition had been filed and submitted a copy of the ballot title to the Attorney General. The Attorney General states that the notice from the Secretary of State was received on Friday, September 20, 2013. On Friday September 27, 2013, the Attorney General filed with the Secretary of State a notice that the ballot title did not comply with applicable laws, and that pursuant to 34 O.S.2011 § 9(D) he would prepare and supply to the Secretary of State a ballot title within ten days. On October 11, 2013, the Attorney General filed a ballot title with the Secretary of State. ¶4 Proponents argue that the Attorney General has five business days from the date the ballot title is filed with the Secretary of State to file an objection to a ballot title. They submit that they filed the ballot title on Wednesday September, 18, 2013, and that the Attorney General's objection filed on Friday, September 27, 2013, was beyond the five-day limit. They contend that the Attorney General lost jurisdiction to file an objection when the five-day period expired. ¶5 The Attorney General argues that the five-day period for him to file an objection to a ballot title commences when a ballot title is filed with the Attorney General by a proponent . The Attorney General submits that the Proponent failed to file the ballot title with the Attorney General and that this five-day period never commenced. Proponents argue that they are not required to file copies of a proposed initiative and ballot title with the Attorney General. The Attorney General also argues that his objection to the ballot title was filed with the Secretary of State within five business days from the date he received copies of the initiative petition and ballot title from the Secretary of State via interagency mail. ¶ 6 The parties have different views on the meaning of language in 34 O.S.2011 § 9 (A), (B), & (D). The relevant language states that: A. When a referendum is ordered by petition of the people against any measure passed by the Legislature or when any measure is proposed by initiative petition , whether as an amendment to the Constitution or as a statute, it shall be the duty of the parties submitting the measure to prepare and file one copy of the measure with the Secretary of State and one copy with the Attorney General. 34 O.S.2011 § 9(A) (emphasis added). B. The parties submitting the measure shall also submit a suggested ballot title which shall be filed on a separate sheet of paper and shall not be deemed part of the petition . . . . 34 O.S.2011 § 9(B) (emphasis added). D. The following procedures shall apply to ballot titles of referendums ordered by a petition of the people or any measure proposed by an initiative petition: 1. After the filing of the petition and prior to the gathering of signatures thereon, the Secretary of State shall submit the proposed ballot title to the Attorney General for review as to legal correctness. Within five (5) business days after the filing of the measure and ballot title, the Attorney General shall, in writing, notify the Secretary of State whether or not the proposed ballot title complies with applicable laws . . . . 34 O.S.2001 § 9 (D) (1) (emphasis added). ¶7 Section 9(A) states that the parties submitting the measure must prepare and file one copy of the measure with the Secretary of State and one copy with the Attorney General. In § 9(A) submitting the measure identifies who is required to file a copy of the measure with both the Attorney General and the Secretary of State . ¶8 Section 9(B) states that the parties submitting the measure shall also submit a suggested ballot title . . . . Section 9(B) does not expressly identify the Secretary of State, Attorney General or both are to receive the submitted ballot title. However, a party's duty to submit the ballot title is expressly stated to be performed with the act of submitting the proposed measure to the Attorney General and Secretary of State . Section 9(B) plainly states that the parties submitting the measure shall also submit a suggested ballot title. ¶9 The primary goal in reviewing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent, if possible, from a reading of the statutory language in its plain and ordinary meaning. 1 This is so because the plain words of a statute are deemed to express legislative authorial intent in the absence of any ambiguity or conflict in language. 2 The test for ambiguity in a statute is whether the statutory language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation. 3 Generally, and consistent with a court's construction of alleged ambiguity in a contract, 4 a judicial determination of the presence of more than one reasonable construction of the statutory language, i.e. , ambiguity, presents a question of law 5 because the determination that a statutory construction is reasonable is based initially on a plain meaning of the words in the statute where no fact is disputed. 6 The plain language of § 9 (A) & (B) states that the ballot title is submitted with the measure, and the measure is submitted to both the Attorney General and the Secretary of State . We hold that Proponents were required to file or submit a copy of initiative petition and a copy of the ballot title to the Attorney General when they filed the initiative petition and ballot title with the Secretary of State. ¶10 The next argument made by the parties is whether the five business days for the Attorney General to object to a ballot title commence on (1) the day a proponent files the initiative petition and ballot title with the Secretary of State, or (2) the date the initiative petition and ballot title are filed with the Attorney General, or (3) the date the Attorney General receives notice from the Secretary of State that an initiative petition and ballot title have been filed. ¶11 The Attorney General's argument is that 34 O.S. § 9 should be construed to mean that the filed copy of the ballot title which it reviews for legal correctness is the one filed with the Attorney General, and that the filing of this copy with the Attorney General is also the event which commences the Attorney's General's five-day period to file an objection to the ballot title. We reject that construction of 34 O.S. § 9, as contrary to the plain language of that statute. ¶12 The statutory language providing the Attorney General five business days to object to a ballot title does not occur in isolation from the rest of the statute in which it appears. The five-day period occurs not in paragraphs A or B but in paragraph C and immediately following a sentence stating that: After the filing of the petition and prior to the gathering of signatures thereon, the Secretary of State shall submit the proposed ballot title to the Attorney General for review as to legal correctness . This sentence refers to the Secretary of State performing the act of submitting a copy of the ballot title to the Attorney General for review as to legal correctness. The plain language of the statute states that the reason the Secretary of State submits a copy of the ballot title to the Attorney General is for the Attorney General to determine the legal correctness of the ballot title. Because of this duty on the Secretary of State to submit a copy of the ballot title to the Attorney General for review as to legal correctness, we conclude that the copy that the Secretary of State submits to the Attorney General is a copy of the ballot title filed of record with the Secretary of State. ¶13 Further, the language [w]ithin five (5) business days after the filing of the measure and ballot title the Attorney General shall, in writing, notify the Secretary of State whether or not the proposed ballot title complies with applicable laws occurs immediately after language stating that the Secretary of State has a duty to provide a copy of the ballot title to the Attorney General for the purpose of this determination. The statutory language does not state that the five-day period commences upon the date the Attorney General receives notice of the filing from the Secretary of State. ¶14 During oral argument before the Court en banc , counsel for the Attorney General argued that the Attorney General's construction of 34 O.S. § 9 was a long-standing construction of a statute by a state agency, and that a long-standing construction should be given deference by the Court. We agree that deference may be afforded to the long-standing construction of a statute by a state agency. 7 We also recognize that continual construction of a statute by the agency charged to enforce it must be given great weight; and that when the Legislature has convened many times during a period in which an administrative agency has construed a statute and it has not expressed its disapproval with that construction, the Legislature's silence may be regarded as acquiescence in or approval of the agency's construction. 8 However, upon a closer examination of the Attorney General's argument, we conclude that these principles do not apply. ¶15 Generally, a published Attorney General Opinion may be persuasive authority for a court, but a court is not bound by the Opinion of the Attorney General. 9 It is also correct that legislative silence after promulgation of a published Attorney General Opinion may be judicially construed as a legislative approval of an Attorney General's construction of an ambiguous and uncertain statute. 10 But in the matter before us, no published Attorney General Opinion has been cited in support of the Attorney General's construction of 34 O.S. § 9. We have no Attorney General Opinion before us that would allow us to examine its ratio decidendi for a quality of persuasiveness in legal argument. No published agency rule has been cited by the Attorney General. 11 The record of facts before us contains no reference to a previous public construction of 34 O.S. § 9 by the Attorney General on the issues before the Court. 12 ¶16 Deference given to a state agency's construction of a statute is based upon the statute's language being ambiguous or uncertain, 13 and the fact that the agency's construction must be legally reasonable when applied to the circumstance, 14 and the agency's construction must be consistent and continual in a public manner so that the Legislature has notice of the construction by the agency. 15 Is 34 O.S. § 9 ambiguous and uncertain? We think not, and rules of construction for determining legislative intent for an ambiguous statute are not needed in this case. ¶17 Prior to 1994, paragraph § 9(D) expressly provided for the five-day period to commence on the date the ballot title was filed with the Attorney General. 16 In 1994 this language expressly stating that the five-day period commenced upon filing with the Attorney General was removed from the statute by legislative amendment. 17 The 1994 amendment also added language that the Secretary of State shall submit the proposed ballot title to the Attorney General for review as to legal correctness . 18 In one legislative act the Secretary of State was given the duty of providing a copy of the ballot title to the Attorney General for a review of the ballot title's legal correctness and the date to commence the five-day period for the Attorney General to file an objection was changed. 19 ¶18 During oral argument before the Court en banc , counsel for the Attorney General argued that a five full days were needed by the Attorney General to examine a proposed initiative and ballot title to make a correctly reasoned and informed approval of, or objection to, a ballot title, and that the Attorney's General's five-day limit should not be shortened by whatever means the Secretary of State may, in his or her discretion, use to provide a copy of the ballot title to the Attorney General. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a court will generally presume that a public official will act in good faith to perform the official's duties and will faithfully discharge the duties the law imposes on the official. 20 We decline to assume that a Secretary of State will select a method of notice that is inconsistent with 34 O.S. § 9(D), or that a Secretary of State is either unwilling or unable to convey a copy of the ballot title to the Attorney General immediately upon its filing when the Secretary of State performs this duty imposed by 34 O.S. § 9(D). ¶19 Because of the arguments of the parties, we must note that the day an initiative petition is filed with the Secretary of State is not counted as the first day of the five-day period because fractions of a day are disregarded in statutory computations which include more than one day and when there is no question of priority involved. 21 We must note that § 9(D) does not use the language suggested by the Attorney General that it is necessary that he be provided five full days to file a response to the ballot title. The statute requires the Attorney General's response within five days from the filing with the Secretary of State. We also note that the five days is further defined by the statute as five business days. We construe the phrase business to be consistent with 25 O.S. Supp. 2012 § 82.1, and therefore exclude statutory holidays defined in § 82.1, so that a business day would be Monday through Friday, inclusive, and does not include Saturday, Sunday, or any statutorily listed holiday in § 82.1 which may fall on any day within the five-day period after the initiative petition and ballot title are filed with the Secretary of State. 22 ¶20 After a proponent submits a copy of both the proposed measure and ballot title to both the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, and before signatures are collected, the Secretary of State submits the proposed ballot title to the Attorney General for review as to legal correctness, and the Attorney General must respond within five business days, and the response must state whether a proposed ballot title complies with applicable laws. 23 If the Attorney General objects to the ballot title, then the Attorney General must file with the Secretary of State a corrected ballot title within ten (10) business days of determining that the proposed ballot title is defective. 24 ¶21 The ballot title was filed with the Secretary of State on Wednesday, September 18, 2013. The first day of the five-day period was Thursday, September 19, 2013, and the fifth day was Wednesday, September 25, 2013. The response was filed by the Attorney General with the Secretary of State on Friday, September 27, 2013. The response was filed two days late. Proponents argue that the Attorney General had ten business days from September 25, 2013, to file a new ballot title and the new ballot title had to be filed by Wednesday, October 9, 2013. They argue that the ballot title filed by the Attorney General on Friday, October 11, 2013, was untimely and of no legal effect. However, if the filing of the Attorney General on September 27, 2013, although untimely, still retained legal efficacy, then the ballot title filed by the Attorney General on October 11, 2013, was on the tenth business day after he filed his initial response to ballot title. ¶22 Proponents argue that the 34 O.S. § 9 (D) duty imposed on the Attorney General is a mandatory duty to file a response within five business days; and then if an objection to the ballot title is timely made, the duty to file a new ballot title within ten business days is also a mandatory duty. Proponents conclude that because the time limit is mandatory it is also jurisdictional. They state that the Attorney General lost jurisdiction to respond to the ballot title and to file a new ballot title when he did not file within five days from the date the ballot title was filed with the Secretary of State. ¶23 Generally, the legal principle which has been followed in this jurisdiction for many years is that a public official performing a statutorily required duty will not be divested of jurisdiction to perform that duty by the mere passage of time unless the statute also states that the duty shall not be performed by that official after the expiration of a certain time or date. For example, in School District No. 61, Payne County v. Consolidated District No. 2, Coyle, Logan County , 1925 OK 518, 237 P. 1110, we stated the following: The case of People v. Cook , 14 Barb. (N. Y.) 259 [1852], seems to be one among the early cases passing upon this question, and is frequently referred to in later decisions, wherein the following rule is announced in the syllabus of the opinion: Statutes directing the mode of proceeding by public officers are directory, and a strict compliance with their provisions is not essential to the validity of the proceedings, unless it be so declared in the statute. Within this principle, where a statute directs a public officer to do a thing within a certain time, without any negative words restraining him from doing it afterwards, the naming the time will be regarded as directory merely, and not as a limitation of his authority. This rule has been very steadfastly adhered to, by the courts, in all cases where certain acts are directed to be done, by public officers, within a stated time, and in a particular manner, when those acts are of a public character, and concern the public interests, or when the rights of third persons are concerned. A discussion of the rules announced in the syllabus above quoted will be found on page 290 and the following pages of the opinion, citing numerous authorities illustrating the application of the rules announced. In 25 R. C. L. p. 769, § 16, the following language is found: In general, statutory provisions directing the mode of proceeding by public officers and intended to secure order, system, and dispatch in proceedings, and by a disregard of which the rights of parties cannot be injuriously affected, are not regarded as mandatory, unless accompanied by negative words importing that the acts required shall not be done in any other manner or time than that designated .    School District No. 61, Payne County , 237 P. at 1111 (emphasis added). Application of School District No. 61, Payne County , supra , requires an examination of 34 O.S. § 9, and a determination if any words state that the acts required by the Attorney General shall not be done in any other manner or time than that designated. There is no express language in 34 O.S. § 9 which removes jurisdiction from the Attorney General to file an objection to a ballot title two days late, and there is nothing in the plain language of § 9 indicating a legislative intent to remove the Attorney General from the ballot title procedure by an untimely response to the filing of an initiative or ballot title. 25 ¶24 Our opinion in School District No. 61, Payne County , supra , was released in 1925 and applied a principle used by several courts since at least 1852. 26 Proponents have not made any argument that the holding in School District No. 61, Payne County , supra , has been superseded. The rationale used in School District No. 61, Payne County , supra , is found in other contexts such as the general rule that jurisdiction of a court, once correctly invoked, will not usually be divested by a subsequent event such as the passage of time unless a statute expressly states the contrary or if a legislative intent is shown that would make a time limit mandatory. 27 Proponents have not made any argument that a recognized public policy calls for modifying or overruling School District No. 61, Payne County , supra . The Legislature is certainly aware that in the context of the initiative process it may restrict a filing after a certain date, and appears to have used such language in 34 O.S. 2011 §4, where with reference to filing signature sheets with the Secretary of State it has enacted language stating that additional signature sheets shall not be accepted after 5:00 p.m. on the ninetieth day. 28 ¶25 We recognize the possibility that a statute may express a mandatory requirement in the absence of express language stating that the requirement is mandatory. Several rules of construction may be used to make a determination whether express language is necessary to create mandatory law or alter certain legal interests in a particular circumstance. 29 Specifically, when examining whether statutory language is mandatory in the context of statutorily specified time limits, the Court may examine whether statutory time limits attach directly to the right created. 30 Before us today we have no authority cited in either briefs or in oral argument concerning whether express language is necessary to show a mandatory statutory requirement in this context or whether the five-day limit attaches to a right itself. However, the issue presented is publici juris because it concerns the proper procedure used by the People when enacting legislation. 31 Because the issue is publici juris and no additional evidence is necessary to adjudicate an issue of law, we may nevertheless adjudicate the issue whether the five-day period is mandatory in nature. 32 ¶26 The purpose of the statutory initiative process is to provide a procedure where the People, the citizens of Oklahoma, exercise their right of initiative whereby they propose bills and laws and enact them or reject them at the polls independent of legislative assembly. 33 This right of the People to enact laws through an initiative petition process is reserved in Article V § 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution, 34 and we have explained that the People's right is a fundamental and precious right zealously protected by this Court. 35 Proponents view the Attorney General's participation in the initiative petition process in this case as an obstruction to the People's right of initiative. We disagree. As we explain herein, the Attorney General's participation is not as a typical counsel in an adversarial litigation dispute. An Attorney General does not use the People's initiative process as a vehicle to champion his or her political positions. An Attorney General's participation in an initiative process is as a neutral legal advisor for the People. The Attorney General is required by statute to give an opinion on a ballot title proposed with an initiative petition and is required by statute to defend ballot titles, either those filed by proponents which he approves, or those authored and filed by the Attorney General. Participation by the Attorney General in every initiative petition proceeding is required by statute. ¶27 The Constitution grants to the People a right to an initiative and states that the Legislature shall make suitable provisions for carrying into effect this right, 36 and the statutorily required participation by the Attorney General in the ballot title process is part of the initiative process for carrying into effect the right of the People . As we note herein, a properly worded ballot title is one means used to combat fraud and deceit in the initiative process. The ballot title functions as a safeguard to protect the initiative right of the People, and we will not cripple, avoid or deny by technical construction the initiative right. 37 This portion of Proponents' argument ultimately rests upon a technical construction that the five-day filing period for the Attorney General in 34 O.S. § 9(D) must be attached to a right possessed by, and litigated by, an Attorney General. We reject this view as contrary to the plain language of 34 O.S. § 9(D) and conclude that the five-day period § 9(D) does not attach directly to a statutorily created right possessed by the Attorney General. The plain language of the statute places a duty upon the Attorney General that is the nature of the exercise of a governmental function that is part of a legislative process used by the People. ¶28 Proponent's jurisdiction argument requires a determination whether the Legislature had uppermost in mind the effect of the procedural step at issue upon the process, and whether the Legislature intended it not as a mere procedural step but a requirement that was essential to the result of the process or the Legislature's intended goal. 38 In Proponents' argument, the procedural step which they urge as jurisdictional is the timeliness of the response filed by the Attorney General. However, we find no legislative intent in the plain language of the statute to make the timeliness of the response an essential or critical step in the result of the initiative process. ¶29 Our conclusion will not impose any additional burden upon the People to propose initiatives. This is so because (1) the Attorney General concedes that timeliness of his actions may be controlled by mandamus, and (2) as explained herein, we recognize that a proponent's ninety-day period to collect signatures may commence after a ballot title appeal in accordance with the plain language and meaning of the ballot title statutes and prior opinions of this Court. ¶30 We have stated the general rule that Those who challenge the validity of actions of public officials apparently within their statutory powers must carry the burden of demonstrating such invalidity. 39 Proponents have not met their burden to show that the Attorney General's filing two days late deprived the filing of legal effect. We reject the argument made by Proponents that the time limits for the Attorney General in 34 O.S. §9(D) are jurisdictional. We hold that the Attorney General's § 9(D) response to a ballot title required by law to be filed within five days from the date the ballot title is filed with the Secretary of State is statutorily effective although the Attorney General's filing is two days late . School District No. 61, Payne County , supra . ¶31 Although we reject Proponents' argument that the five-day time limit for the Attorney General in 34 O.S. § 9(D) is jurisdictional, we must note that an Attorney General may not thwart an initiative by failing to file a response to the filings with the Secretary of State. Counsel for the Attorney General observed in his brief and during oral argument that the proper judicial remedy for a violation of this five-day deadline would be a writ of mandamus to compel a response. 40 We also note that although the Attorney General states that mandamus may be used, he also invokes the substantial compliance standard of 34 O.S. § 24. 41 ¶32 In some circumstances, judicial application of a substantial compliance standard to a duty to take an action within a defined period of time may result in an excused performance within that time period. 42 Although not expressly argued as a syllogism, when his § 24 substantial-compliance-standard argument is combined with his argument that after receipt of the ballot title by the Attorney General a full five days of legal research is needed by the attorney(s) assigned to review a proposed ballot title and file a response with the Secretary of State, he is essentially creating a syllogism with the conclusion that he should be excused from the five-day period for filing a response to a ballot title because factual circumstances prevent him from meeting this deadline. With this conclusion, the Attorney General's hypothetical mandamus action would not turn on whether the Attorney General had missed the five-day deadline, but whether the Attorney General had sufficient factual reasons for delay past the five-day deadline and only when such reasons were legally insufficient would the writ issue. 43 We decline to adopt this view. ¶33 There is no suggestion or evidence before us from the Attorney General that fulfilling the duty to file an initial response to a ballot title takes more than five days. We assume that a Secretary of State will act in good faith and perform his or her duty and provide a copy of ballot title to an Attorney General immediately upon its filing. Berryman v. Bonaparte , supra . We also assume that an Attorney General will act in good faith and perform his or her duty and file a timely response to any ballot title filing with the Secretary of State. Id . ¶34 We agree with that part of the Attorney General's statement that the statutory role of the Attorney General in drafting a ballot title does not place him in the usual and ordinary adversarial posture that occurs in a litigation context, or provide him with a public platform to express political views. He represents all of the People in the context of either approving a ballot title written by others or providing one which he authors. The purpose of a ballot title along with the gist appearing on a signature page is to prevent deceit and fraud in the initiative process. 44 We agree with the Attorney General that he is required by statute to be made a defendant if anyone timely objects to a proposed ballot title, 45 and he must defend a ballot title, either one prepared by a proponent which he approved and did not alter, or one he authored and substituted for the initial title. His filing a response to the ballot title is an important step in the process of the initiative to help prevent deceit and fraud, and that filing should not be made ineffective in the absence of legislative intent requiring that result. ¶35 Ideally, in this limited role as a legal advisor to the People, the Attorney General is not merely reactive to a particular proponent of an initiative who fails to provide him with statutorily required notice, or merely reactive to a particular Secretary of State who selects a means of notice to the Attorney General that is less than immediate. But rather, that he takes positive action for a quick review of the ballot title once it is filed with the Secretary of State and he has notice of its filing. Ideally, a proponent of an initiative and a Secretary of State would provide the Attorney General with the types of notice which the statutes require and the Attorney General needs. We are confident that proponents of initiatives, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General will work together in the future to avoid the procedural issues which are a large part of this controversy.