Opinion ID: 1664552
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Video-deposition testimony

Text: For his third point on appeal, Mr. Hale relies upon three distinct arguments. First, he argues that the use of Mr. Rutherford's video-deposition testimony at trial violated his constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him as guaranteed by the 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 2, section 10, of the Arkansas Constitution. Second, he argues that the use of video-deposition testimony was erroneous because Mr. Rutherford was not unavailable pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 804(b)(1). Finally, he contends that the State failed to follow the procedure established by Ark. Code Ann. § 16-44-201. This court has consistently interpreted the Confrontation Clauses of the United States and Arkansas Constitutions to provide identical rights. Smith v. State, 340 Ark. 116, 8 S.W.3d 534 (2000). Here, Mr. Hale asserts that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated by the use of a video deposition because he was not able to meet the witness face-to-face. We recently summarized the seminal United States Supreme Court cases on this issue as follows: The United States Supreme Court held in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988), that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact. Two years later, the Court held that the Confrontation Clause does not guarantee criminal defendants an absolute right to a face-to-face meeting with witnesses against them at trial. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990). The Court further held that the right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where the trial court makes a case-specific finding that the denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy... and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured. Id. Smith v. State, supra . Mr. Hale contends that because the denial of face-to-face confrontation is not necessary in this case, the trial court erred in allowing the use of a video deposition. We disagree. The trial court specifically found that the use of Mr. Rutherford's video deposition at Mr. Hale's trial was necessary because the witness was unavailable to testify in person. In doing so, the trial court noted the history of the case: They've had to fly this [witness] back from Africa twice for this trial. The State introduced into evidence an affidavit signed by Mr. Rutherford, which stated that although he was a resident of Texas, his business dealings take him out of the country most of the year, he would be in Africa or Great Britain on specific scheduled trial dates, and he had no foreseeable plans to return to Arkansas in the near or distant future. Mr. Rutherford also testified on direct examination by the State that 80% of his life is spent abroad. Courts have consistently allowed the use of video depositions in similar circumstances where the witness was shown to be unavailable. United States v. Mueller, 74 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 1996) (where the witness was unavailable because he lived in London, England); United States v. Gifford, 892 F.2d 263 (3d Cir. 1989) (where the witnesses were located in Belgium and the government was unable to procure their attendance at trial); United States v. Kelly, 892 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1989) (where the witnesses were foreign nationals unwilling to travel to the United States for trial); United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.1988) (where the witness was being held in custody by French police). [I]t has been held that when a witness is actually unavailable at trial his prior testimony may be admitted if sufficient indicia of reliability are present. United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir.1979) (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972) and Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968)). Likewise, this court has upheld the use of a witness's video deposition at trial when the record revealed that the witness was in London, England at the time of the trial. Verdict v. State, 315 Ark. 436, 868 S.W.2d 443 (1993). In this case, when the trial court found that the witness was unavailable to testify at trial, it thereby made the case-specific finding of necessity mandated by Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990). Mr. Hale also argues that the deposition should not be allowed because Mr. Rutherford was not unavailable so as to fall within the hearsay exception found at Ark. R. Evid. 804(b)(1) for former testimony. We disagree. Ark. R. Evid. 804(a)(5) states that a witness is unavailable if he [i]s absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure his attendance ... by process or other reasonable means. Mr. Hale does not dispute that Mr. Rutherford was absent from the hearing. Rather, he contends that the State did not make a sufficient showing that they were unable to procure Mr. Rutherford's attendance by process or other reasonable means. However, the State clearly submitted evidence that Mr. Rutherford was located outside of the United States, where he was not subject to subpoena or other process. In United States v. Kelly , the appellant raised an identical argument after the trial court admitted the deposition of witnesses located in Europe. The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals stated: [w]e conclude that since the government had no power to compel the witnesses to attend, it adopted a reasonable solution when it deposed them in Europe. United States v. Kelly, supra . Accordingly, the State submitted sufficient proof that they were unable to procure Mr. Rutherford's attendance. Finally, Mr. Hale argues that the State failed to follow the procedure set forth in Ark.Code Ann. § 16-44-201. However, that argument is not preserved for appeal because it was not raised below. We do not address arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Dodson v. State, 341 Ark. 41, 14 S.W.3d 489 (2000). In his arguments below, Mr. Hale asserted a violation of section 16-44-202. [7]