Opinion ID: 1855522
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the defendant was denied a fundamentally fair trial where the state was allowed to elicit inadmissible hearsay testimony which bolstered testimony regarding an admission by the defendant.

Text: ¶ 5. Misty Dawn Carpenter was called by the State as a witness in its case-in-chief. Carpenter testified about a conversation she had with Alexander on August 13, 1993, as they drove to Memphis with her boyfriend, Jay Weaver. The pertinent testimony is as follows: We was on our way to Memphis and Bugger [Alexander] looked over at Jay and was talking about a knife that had been thrown into some water. I don't know what water, but it was just some water. Jay told Bugger to shut up, to shut up, shut up. Bugger said, What are you talking about? And Jay told him just to shut his mouth. And I asked him what was going on. Bugger said, I stabbed my mother-in-law. You didn't know that? And I said, Do what? And Jay said, Shut up, shut up, shut up, shut your mouth. Stop running your mouth, stop telling. And I said, Why did you do that? I think this is what, this is what was said: It was late at night, toward the morning hours. He went into his mother-in-law's house, and it was some pills or something there that he had wanted, and as he approached in the house she woke up. He put a pillow over her face, and he said he stabbed the bitch. And Jay was just steady telling him to shut up, shut up, shut up. Immediately before the preceding testimony, Alexander objected to any potential hearsay, but that objection was overruled. Alexander complains that Carpenter's statements as set forth above were inadmissible and prejudicial hearsay. Alexander is wrong. ¶ 6. Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. M.R.E. 801(c). We have held that, [w]here the fact that a particular statement was made is of itself a relevant fact, regardless of the truth or falsity of such statement, the statement is admissible in evidence as an independently relevant fact. Jackson v. State, 527 So.2d 654, 656 (Miss.1988) (quoting Tolbert v. State, 407 So.2d 815, 821 (Miss.1981)). Generally, words which accompany and give character to a transaction are not considered hearsay. Gayten v. State, 595 So.2d 409, 414 (Miss.1992). A statement is not considered hearsay if it is offered merely to show its effect on someone. Knight v. State, 601 So.2d 403, 406 (Miss.1992). In Knight, the trial court excluded as hearsay the statement of a witness that another person had warned the defendant that he had better leave the scene. We held that [t]his statement, when offered for its effect on Knight, is not offered `to prove the truth of the matter asserted.' Rather it is offered for the fact that it was said. It does not fit the definition of hearsay. Id. at 406. ¶ 7. The testimony regarding Jay Weaver's repeated admonitions to shut up does not fit the definition of hearsay because there were no assertions of fact. For the same reason, Weaver's testimony regarding her own part of the conversation is also not hearsay. Carpenter testified that after Alexander began his revelations, she asked him 1) what was going on; 2) Do what?; and 3) Why did you do that? These three statements are questions which were not offered to prove the truth of any matter asserted and are therefore not hearsay. ¶ 8. Carpenter's testimony regarding Alexander's statements was not hearsay because they were admissions by a party-opponent under M.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A). Such admissions, by definition, are not hearsay. We need not determine whether the statements are exceptions to the hearsay rule since the statements at issue are not hearsay. ¶ 9. We have consistently held that [t]he relevancy and admissibility of evidence are largely within the discretion of the trial court and reversal may be had only where that discretion has been abused. Johnston v. State, 567 So.2d 237, 238 (Miss.1990). In the instant case, no abuse of discretion has been shown. Rather, Alexander argues that [t]he rules of evidence make no provision for testimony of this nature. The pertinent question is whether the rules of evidence provide for the exclusion of such relevant evidence. Alexander has not shown that they do. This issue fails.