Opinion ID: 1461844
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Application of the Bribery Provisions to Anderson's Conduct

Text: We begin with the calculation of the base offense level. The district court applied the bribery provisions of § 2C1.1 to Anderson's conduct; Anderson believes that it should have applied the gratuity provisions of § 2C1.2. Convictions under § 666 and § 1343 call for the application of either § 2C1.1 or § 2C1.2, whichever is most appropriate or most specifically covers the offense conduct. See United States v. Agostino, 132 F.3d 1183, 1195 (7th Cir.1997); U.S.S.G. § 2C1.7(c)(4) (2003). The question here is simply whether Anderson's conduct was more akin to a gratuity or to a bribe. See Agostino, 132 F.3d at 1195. Unlike a gratuity, a bribe is a payment made with a corrupt purpose, such as inducing a public official to participate in a fraud or to influence his official action. See U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1 cmt. background. Thus, we have distinguished bribes from gratuities as follows: If the payer's intent is to influence or affect future actions, then the payment is a bribe. If, on the other hand, the payer intends the money as a reward for actions the payee has already taken, or is already committed to take, then the payment is a gratuity. Agostino, 132 F.3d at 1195. In this case, it is clear that Anderson was attempting to influence the future actions of a public official. Anderson concedes that he passed money to Meisch but claims that the payments were simply rewards for past actions and thus gratuities. They were old friends, he argues; Meisch did not do anything he would not have done absent the payment. Anderson's argument, however, suffers from a serious flaw: He focuses exclusively on the payments made to Meisch. Conspicuous by its absence is any reference to the bribe that Anderson and Meisch offered to Rieser. There is no shortage of evidence that the intent of this payment was to influence future action; it formed the basis of his § 666 conviction. Meisch approached Rieser immediately before Rieser was set to appear at an important meeting and asked him to vouch for the sufficiency of the offsite detention pond. It makes no difference that the money was not delivered before the action was taken; the intent was to influence Rieser's action. See United States v. Griffin, 324 F.3d 330, 366 (5th Cir.2003). The § 1343 conviction, which involved a telephone call in which this bribe was discussed, was in furtherance of the bribe and shares its corrupt purpose. In short, both convictions involved an attempt to influence official action. Anderson's argument fails even if we focus on the payments made to Meisch. The sentencing judge found that these payments were also bribes. Meisch took a series of actions, and he received a series of payments. It is unclear whether the payments were rewards for actions he had already taken or bribes for actions he had not yet taken. But the evidence was even more muddled in Agostino, and yet we upheld the district court's factual finding that the conduct at issue involved an attempt to influence future action and was therefore a bribe. See Agostino, 132 F.3d at 1195. Anderson conceded at oral argument that a case could be made either for a bribe or for a gratuity. Contrary to what he suggests, this militates against a finding of clear error. Id. This brings us to the rule of lenity. The rule of lenity applies when there are serious ambiguities in the text of a criminal statute. See, e.g., Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S.Ct. 461, 112 L.Ed.2d 449 (1990). Anderson claims that the rule applies here because an argument could be made for the application of either § 2C1.1 or § 2C1.2. But the rule does not apply when ambiguity is a result of an application of the Guidelines to a particular set of facts; that is, the rule does not apply to factual ambiguities. See United States v. McEntire, 153 F.3d 424, 438 & n. 16 (7th Cir.1998). There is nothing ambiguous about § 2C1.1. See Agostino, 132 F.3d at 1195; United States v. Cruzado-Laureano, 440 F.3d 44, 47 n. 8 (1st Cir.2006). So the rule does not apply here.