Opinion ID: 2625903
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Carvalho was improperly passed for cause

Text: This court has previously stated that, [w]hen a juror is challenged on grounds that he has formed an opinion and cannot be impartial, the test is `whether the nature and strength of the opinion ... are such as in law necessarily ... raise the presumption of partiality.' State v. Graham, 70 Haw. 627, 633, 780 P.2d 1103, 1107 (1989) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878)). The prevailing rule[, however,] allows a person with preconceived notions about a case to serve as a juror if he `can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.' Graham, 70 Haw. at 633, 780 P.2d at 1107 (citations omitted). In the present case, Carvalho admitted that his association with law enforcement would cause him to be biased. In response to the court's inquiry as to whether he would try to be fair and impartial, Carvalho replied that it may be very difficult to be fair and impartial. Tr. 4/9/01 at 15-16. In our view, Carvalho's agreement with the prosecutor that he could treat police officers like any other witness, in itself, did not adequately rehabilitate him as a prospective juror. Carvalho's responses to defense counsel's inquiries demonstrated that he had preconceived notions and partiality toward victims and police officers due to his association with law enforcement. For example, as noted above, he stated, All of my background says that the arrest wasn't made in vain. In response to defense counsel's question, So as you sit here and you look at Mr. Iuli, you go, well, he must have done something right, he wouldn't be sitting in the chair there, Carvalho nodded his head in the affirmative. Moreover, Carvalho explicitly stated that it would be a tough call as to whether he could be fair. His statement, I'll try to be honest, was ambiguous at best and certainly does not expressly signify, as the prosecution implies, that he would attempt to be fair and impartial. Furthermore, Carvalho did not assure the trial court that he would base his decision solely upon the evidence. See State v. Ibanez, 201 Ariz. 56, 31 P.3d 830, 832 (Ariz.Ct.App.2001) (stating that, if a prospective juror expresses serious doubts about her ability to be fair and impartial, she must be excused for cause, unless she ultimately assures the trial court that she will base her decision solely upon the evidence); cf. Graham, 70 Haw. at 635-36, 780 P.2d at 1108 (holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to excuse the prospective juror for cause because she expressly stated that she would try to be fair to the defendant and her responses during colloquy with the court dispelled the suggestion that she could not render a verdict based on the evidence). Carvalho's statements during voir dire were express declarations of bias. Carvalho did not affirmatively state that he could render a fair and impartial verdict. We need not decide, however, whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to excuse Carvalho for cause because, as we discuss infra, Iuli has failed to meet his burden of establishing that his right to exercise a peremptory challenge was denied or impaired.