Opinion ID: 2463565
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: it was error to dismiss mrs. boyle's loss of consortium claim

Text: ¶ 26 Mrs. Boyle argues that the district court erred when it dismissed her loss of consortium claim. The district court did so, and the court of appeals affirmed, based on an erroneous interpretation of the statute at issue. [6] The relevant statute states that [t]he spouse of a person injured by a third party . . . may maintain an action against the third party to recover for loss of consortium. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-11(2) (Supp.2010). [7] The statute defines such injury as a significant permanent injury to a person that substantially changes that person's lifestyle and includes the following: (i) a partial or complete paralysis of one or more of the extremities; (ii) significant disfigurement; or (iii) incapability of the person of performing the types of jobs the person performed before the injury. Id. § 30-2-11(1)(a). ¶ 27 When interpreting a statute, we look first to its plain language and presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and read each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning. . . . [I]f the plain meaning of the statute can be discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools are needed. State v. Harker, 2010 UT 56, ¶ 12, 240 P.3d 780 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the plain language defines an injury as a significant permanent injury to a person that substantially changes that person's lifestyle. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-11(1)(a). The parties interpreted the words and includes (which follow that definition) to introduce an exhaustive list of examples. This was incorrect. When including precedes a list, its common usage is to indicate a partial list. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 777-78 (8th ed. 2004). Had the legislature wished to limit the definition of injury to only the three listed scenarios, it could easily have stated must include rather than includes. The structure of the statute also supports this interpretation because the examples are listed as a subset of the definition. If these were the only consortium claims to be honored, the overlying definition would be superfluous. Furthermore, the parties' definition would, for example, likely exclude a claim where impotence was at issue, thus providing no remedy for loss of sexual relations between spousesone of the more common definitions of loss of consortium. See id. at 328. Had this been the legislature's intent, we believe it would have stated so clearly. Because the statute does not say must include, we interpret the list of examples as just thatexamples that satisfy the definition previously stated, but not an exclusive list. See Mouty v. Sandy City Recorder, 2005 UT 41, ¶ 39, 122 P.3d 521 (The legislature's use of the word `includes' indicates that the [subsequent] examples listed were not necessarily meant to be exhaustive.). ¶ 28 The parties argued at length over whether changes in Mr. Boyle's abilities post-accident could constitute incapacity to do the same types of jobs he could perform before the injury under the statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-11(1)(a)(iii). We do not need to reach this question, [8] because, as explained above, while meeting this standard would be sufficient to constitute an injury, all that is required is that there was a significant permanent injury to a person that substantially changes that person's lifestyle. In this case, opposing counsel conceded in a hearing before the district court that there were facts in dispute regarding whether there was such a significant injury to Mr. Boyle that it substantially changed his lifestyle. [9] That concession precluded dismissal. Both parties were mistaken that there also needed to be issues of fact about at least one of the three examples provided by the statute.