Opinion ID: 776544
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to investigate and otherwise prepare for the mitigation phase.

Text: 82 Martin argues that his counsel's most egregious failings occurred during the mitigation stage of the trial. He contends that an examination of what occurred (or did not occur) prior to and at the mitigation hearing proves that his counsel failed to investigate or otherwise prepare for sentencing. Counsel made no opening argument at mitigation. They called three witnesses: probation officer Joanna Hairston, who testified to place her presentence report into evidence; Martin's mother; and his grandmother. Martin's reply brief also points to statements that his counsel made to the judge as evidence of prejudice and/or total abandonment. 83 Martin claims that his counsel failed to prepare for the mitigation hearing by failing to conduct an investigation into his background. He points to the failure of counsel to contact his immediate family members, save counsel's talking with his father and requesting a written statement from his mother. He does note the possibility of limited contact [between counsel and] other family members at the courthouse on the day of the hearing. He lists eight family members that have stated, through affidavits, that they were ready and willing to testify at mitigation but were not interviewed by counsel. Martin does not show what they would have testified to, or how such testimony could have aided him at sentencing. 84 Martin also takes issue with his counsel's failure to collect records and documentary evidence pertinent to his medical, mental health, educational, employment, juvenile, and incarceration histories. In his arguments, Martin points to two instances where the trial judge took an exceptionally active role (in his view, taking the place of counsel upon realizing their deficiencies) at the mitigation hearing. As relevant to this argument, he points to the trial judge's independent procurement of his records from the Mansfield Reformatory and the Human Services Agency. A discussion of this information occurred outside of the presence of the jury. The judge called the reformatory's warden, who informed the judge that a psychological profile resulting from interviews and testing revealed nothing extraordinary that would trigger their interests in having further psychiatric examinations of treatment done of [ sic ] the man. The judge later provided defense counsel with a letter from the warden that was consistent with their previous conversation about the records. Defense counsel concluded that the letter was of no value for mitigation, but made it part of the record for appellate purposes. 85 Mrs. Martin's affidavit states that counsel did not prepare her to testify, and that she did not know that she would testify until the day of the hearing. A review of her testimony shows that it described the following: Martin's problems with juvenile court and school; his institutionalization as a juvenile; her being on welfare during his youth; the lack of financial support from Martin's father; Martin's abnormal behavior at school, which led to his referral to the Child Guidance Center; his psychiatric testing at school; his abuse at the hands of her alcoholic husband; his physical and psychological injuries that resulted from a gas explosion; his dropping out of school to work for money to purchase adequate clothing; and other employment history. This testimony and the probation report apparently provided the factual basis for the one mitigating factor that the trial judge found — Martin's background, although the court concluded that it was outweighed by the aggravating circumstance of the crime. 86 After Mrs. Martin's testimony, the defense stated that it had nothing further to offer. The judge then began calling into the audience, inquiring as to whether other family members were present and wished to testify. This constitutes the other action by the judge that Martin contends demonstrates his counsel's ineffectiveness at the hearing. When the judge asked Martin's father, Don't you want to come up here and speak for your son?, he replied, You mean come now? Defense counsel then stated that Martin's father did not want to testify, and the judge asked, You feel that would not be helpful to the defendant?, to which counsel responded, It might not be in the best interest. The judge then inquired whether Martin's counsel wanted to talk to a lady in the courtroom. Counsel responded, I would like the record to show, Judge, that this is not the first time we have talked to Mr. Wilkins about testifying.... Mr. Adrine [co-counsel] has been in constant communication with him. Up to this point, they were fine, but now, there seems to be some interest — Adrine then interrupted, indicating that Martin's grandmother would testify. The judge then stated, Okay. Bring in the jury. Earlier in the proceeding, Adrine stated, Yes, we might further state for the record, that we have been in constant contact with the family outside, inside, during the course of the hearing, and we have discussed the matters fully with both mother and father, the brother, sister, and by telephone we have had several conversations. 87 Martin's grandmother, Hattie Mae Johnson, then testified about the following facts: she took care of Martin when he was a baby and when he was five and six years old; he wanted to go to church with her at that age; she cooked for Martin and his siblings and their frequent hunger as children was due to a lack of financial support from their father; Martin's mother had a hard time raising her children due to her asthma and resulting inability to work steadily; and Martin's limited contact with his father and their relationship was not a typically tight one between father and child. 88 Both parties then indicated they had nothing further and closing statements followed. Defense counsel gave a closing statement in which he attempted to convey a metaphor which analogized Martin to a knotty cord of wood that society had unjustly cast aside at an early age. He concluded by stating: 89 If Ernest Martin is guilty of this, I say, let's improve. If he is going to a [ sic ] institution, let's see if we can't do something to change the outlook or the view or maybe his like that cord of wood, and all he is worth is casting aside, or putting it in a wood burning stove. 90 I don't know, but this will be your choise [typo]. My Bible always says, judge, and says judge thee not — we have to be careful as to whether you want the same judgment. 91 Thank you again. 92 Martin argues that the course of these proceedings shows his counsel's complete failure to investigate mitigating evidence and that this insufficiency was so severe that we should infer prejudice pursuant to United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). 93 In regard to the cooperation of Martin, Carnes stated, We found him to be [a] very difficult, uncooperative client. Co-counsel Adrine, added, And even hostile at times. Id. Martin argues that this statement shows that Defense counsel was [ sic ] sabotaging their own client's case. Martin's lack of cooperation is evident from an exchange between his counsel and the judge in which counsel stated that Martin wanted to give an oral statement, not under oath, at sentencing, but that he was unwilling to tell counsel what the statement would relate, even though they had advised him that he should do so. 94 He also argues that defense counsel impeached his credibility by telling the judge, just after the exchange described immediately above, that he had admitted lying to them about a letter relating to a different matter. They argue that these two statements further provide evidence of counsel's abandonment of Mr. Martin. 95 In support of these propositions, he cites several recent cases from this circuit in which habeas relief has been granted for the failure of counsel to investigate at mitigation. This court's opinion in Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581 (6th Cir.2000), reviewed these cases and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), as follows: 96 In Williams, the Supreme Court found that trial counsel's representation of the petitioner during the sentencing phase fell short of professional standards.... 97