Opinion ID: 867362
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: ¶ 22 Cox next objects that the State presented insufficient evidence to support the verdict. We review the sufficiency of evidence presented at trial only to determine whether substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict. State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 218, ¶ 93, 141 P.3d 368, 393 (2006). Substantial evidence is evidence that reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Stroud, 209 Ariz. 410, 412-13, ¶ 6, 103 P.3d 912, 914-15 (2005) (quoting State v. Hughes, 189 Ariz. 62, 73, 938 P.2d 457, 468 (1997)). [T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). ¶ 23 To convict a defendant of violating A.R.S § 13-3102(A)(4), the state must prove that the defendant knowingly posssess[ed] a deadly weapon . . . if such person is a prohibited possessor. The parties stipulated that Cox, a previously convicted felon, was a prohibited possessor. Cox contested only whether he knowingly possessed the firearms. ¶ 24 The term possess is defined by statute as knowingly to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over property. A.R.S. § 13-105(30). In this case, the State did not claim that Cox physically possessed the weapons. The State argued that Cox constructively possessed the weapons; that is, Cox was aware of the guns in his trunk and had control over them. ¶ 25 At the close of the evidence, Cox moved for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 20 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, asserting that the State had not presented substantial evidence that he exercised control over the weapons. Instead, he argued, the evidence merely showed his presence in the vicinity of the guns. The court denied the motion. ¶ 26 Cox correctly notes on appeal that the State bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he (1) knew that the guns were in the trunk and (2) exercised control over them. Focusing only on evidence presented by the defense, Cox contends that the State failed to present substantial evidence from which a jury could find that he actually possessed the weapons or that he exercised control over them. He maintains that his mere presence in a car in which guns are found is insufficient to support a criminal conviction. See State v. Miramon, 27 Ariz.App. 451, 452, 555 P.2d 1139, 1140 (1976) (noting that the defendant's mere presence where contraband is found is insufficient to establish knowing possession of the contraband). ¶ 27 Here, however, the State presented evidence of more than mere presence. Cox owned and was driving the car containing the guns. [4] After being stopped, he acknowledged to Deputy Bonds that there was a shotgun in the trunk, indicating knowledge of its presence. Moreover, several shell casings and a live round were found in the vehicle, further suggesting that the car might contain weapons. Although the parties presented differing theories as to when Cox became aware of the guns, the verdict indicates that the jury found the deputies' testimony regarding the events more credible than Perko's. No rule is better established than that the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and value to be given to their testimony are questions exclusively for the jury. State v. Clemons, 110 Ariz. 555, 556-57, 521 P.2d 987, 988-89 (1974); see also State v. Lehr, 201 Ariz. 509, 517, ¶ 24, 38 P.3d 1172, 1180 (2002). ¶ 28 Because sufficient evidence was presented from which reasonable jurors could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cox knowingly controlled the guns, we conclude that the Rule 20 motion was properly denied.