Opinion ID: 203028
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: González-Valero's Claims

Text: Throughout the trial, the defendants were seated in the first two rows of the courtroom rather than at the defense table with their attorneys. On the second day of trial, González-Valero submitted an emergency motion stating that he could not communicate effectively with his attorney and requesting that he be seated beside counsel so that he could interact and communicate regarding the evidence presented to fully exercise his rights to effectively confront and cross-examine testimony presented against him. The next day, González-Valero's counsel asked the court if another table could be obtained because [i]t is difficult to communicate. The judge responded that he already had spoken with the marshals and that another table would not fit. The court then said: Counsel, you can communicate. González-Valero contends that his distance from his attorney deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, and he argues that the district court abused its discretion in failing to either probe his claim of inadequate communication or make alternative arrangements. See United States v. Balsam, 203 F.3d 72, 82 (1st Cir.2000) (noting that courtroom seating arrangements for defendants and counsel are reviewed for abuse of discretion). We previously have concluded that seating five co-defendants in the first row of a courtroom's spectator section because of limited space in the courtroom did not significantly impede the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to consult with counsel. Id. ; see also United States v. Larson, 460 F.3d 1200, 1216 (9th Cir.2006) [39] ; United States v. Sorrentino, 726 F.2d 876, 887 (1st Cir.1984) (Where special circumstances, such as the number of defendants, make it impractical for defendants to sit at the counsel table, `as is ordinarily the case,' the seating arrangement is necessarily `a matter best left to the discretion of the trial court.' (quoting United States v. Turkette, 656 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir.1981))). Although we noted in Balsam that the court had assured the defendants that they could consult freely with their attorneys as they wished, either by walking the short distance to the defense table, or passing written notes, 203 F.3d at 82, defendant does not complain that he was prevented from using such techniques here. He identifies no particular instance in which he was unable to communicate effectively with counsel. With nine defendants and nine separate counsel, and in the absence of any indication of actual prejudice, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in seating the defendants immediately behind, rather than beside, their attorneys.
González-Valero also claims that he was compelled to wear prison clothing for the first three days of the five-day trial, [40] in violation of his constitutional right not to be forced to wear identifiable prison garb in court, United States v. Pina, 844 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1988). See also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976) (holding that an accused may not be compelled to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes); Moore v. Ponte, 186 F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir.1999) (explaining that compelling a defendant to attend trial in prison or jail clothing . . . could impair the presumption of innocence) (citing Williams, 425 U.S. at 504-05, 96 S.Ct. 1691). Defendant asserts that he first filed a motion asking that he be allowed to wear civilian clothing on October 23, 2005-the day before the trial started. Receiving no response, he filed a second motion on October 25, after trial had started. That motion was granted the same day. A due process violation occurs not from an accused's appearance in prison clothes but from the compulsion that he so appear. Williams, 425 U.S. at 512-13, 96 S.Ct. 1691. Neither in his motions nor on appeal has González-Valero established or argued that he was forced to wear prison clothing; his second motion simply request[ed] that he be provided the opportunity to appear . . . in civilian dress. He equates the court's failure to respond to his initial motion with a compulsion that he wear prison attire, but there is no basis for a conclusion that he was prevented from wearing the clothing of his choice. Moreover, his second motion noted that the defendants wore khaki pants and shirts provided by the marshals, clothing that is neither stereotypical prison attire nor-so far as the record indicates-indicative of his prisoner status. Cf. Felts v. Estelle, 875 F.2d 785, 785-86 (9th Cir.1989) (finding due process violation where defendant compelled, during the first six days of trial, to wear a jumpsuit labeled in two places L.A. County Jail). Thus, defendant has failed to establish constitutional harm from the clothing he wore at trial.