Opinion ID: 1181055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Juror Inquiries During Penalty Phase Deliberations

Text: After less than three hours of deliberation, the jury foreman presented the court with a note inquiring (1) what happens if we can't agree? (2) can the majority rule on life imprisonment? and (3) how long do we deliberate today and what happens if we don't reach a decision by then? The court responded by rereading CALJIC No. 8.84.2  as modified at defense counsel's request  which in essence told the jury they had to choose between life imprisonment without parole and death, and that any verdict had to be unanimous. The concluding sentence of the modified instruction read: In order to make a determination as to penalty, all twelve jurors must agree, if you can.  At this point a juror asked: If we can't, Judge, what happens? The trial judge replied that he knew what would happen but could not elaborate upon it. Defense counsel requested the court to inquire of the jury whether it would be able to reach a verdict, and the inquiry was posited. One juror responded: Not the way it is going. The foreman replied: That is tough, yes. The court then asked the foreman: Do you think if I allow you to continue to discuss the matter and for you to go over the instructions again with one another, that the possibility of making a decision is there? The foreman replied: I believe there is a possibility. Another juror added: We did need more time. Finally, a different juror asked: [W]ould this be an either/or situation? ...  to which the court replied: It is not that.... If you can make that either/or decision. If you cannot, then I will discharge you. Under the 1977 death penalty legislation (former § 190.4, subd. (b)), if a jury was unable to agree on penalty the court would impose a sentence of life without parole. Under the current death penalty law applicable here, if the jury is unable to agree on penalty the court must impanel a new jury; if the second jury becomes deadlocked, the court in its discretion may impanel a third jury or impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. (§ 190.4, subd. (b).) [23] (47) Defendant argues that the trial court's failure to forthrightly answer the juror's inquiry was error. He contends that the only forthright reply would have been an instruction in the full-blown language of section 190.4, subdivision (b); i.e., informing the jury of the statutorily mandated procedures and possibility of subsequent retrials in the event of a deadlock. We conclude that such an instruction under the 1978 death penalty law would have the potential for unduly confusing and misguiding the jury in their proper role and function in the penalty determination process. Penalty phase juries are presently instructed that their proper task is to decide between a sentence of death and life without the possibility of parole. Any further instruction along the lines suggested herein could well serve to lessen or diminish that obligation in the jurors' eyes. (See People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 511-516 [244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803] [1977 death penalty law]; cf. People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 852 [139 Cal. Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997, 97 A.L.R.3d 73] [wherein we held erroneous any instruction which states or implies that a jury's failure to reach a verdict will necessarily require retrial].) [24] In any case, the trial judge here responded to the jurors' questions in a commendably forthright fashion. When initially faced with the inquiries, he sought to avoid any confusion or unseen prejudice by rereading the pertinent CALJIC instruction. But thereafter, when one juror asked the very pointed question: Is it either/or? [i.e., automatic imposition of one or the other penalty in the event of a deadlock]  the court prudently avoided misinforming and misleading the jury by stating: If you can make that either/or decision. If you cannot, then I will discharge you. Defendant can claim no prejudice from such a limited disclosure. It bore no resemblance to the often criticized  Allen -type instruction designed to extract a verdict from a deadlocked jury by admonishing the minority jurors to rethink their positions in light of the majority's views. ( Allen v. United States (1896) 164 U.S. 492, 501 [41 L.Ed. 528, 530-531, 17 S.Ct. 154].) The jurors deliberated an additional one and a half days after receiving reinstruction and the court's responses to their inquiries before reaching their penalty verdict. There was no objection to the rereading of CALJ1C No. 8.84.2, nor did trial counsel propose or request any further instructions. No further instructions were required; no prejudice from the court's replies to the jurors' inquiries is shown.