Opinion ID: 1435953
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the disputed jury instruction

Text: Appellant complains that his convictions must be reversed because the trial court erroneously declined to give a particular theory of the case instruction. The specific instruction that was requested read as follows: Defendant, Alfred Durham, has presented testimony that he received cocaine from Walter Thomas as possible payment for a debt Mr. Thomas owed to Mr. Durham, and that after examining the cocaine Mr. Durham returned it to Mr. Thomas and received $50 in cash as payment for Mr. Thomas's debt. If you believe the defendant's theory of the case you must find him not guilty of Count I, distribution of cocaine. Long v. United States, 623 A.2d 1144 ( [D.C.] 1993); United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.1977). Not surprisingly, the prosecutor opposed the request for this instruction, arguing that it misstated the law. The trial court fundamentally agreed with government counsel that even if appellant physically received the drugs from Thomas and later returned them to Thomas, the act of returning the cocaine was sufficient to constitute distribution. Defense counsel argued that Durham's act of handing back the cocaine to Thomas was not a transfer within the meaning of the statute. Counsel contended that it was no more than an incomplete distribution. The trial judge ruled that this theory, as set forth in the requested instruction, was not a recognized defense under the Code's definition of distribution. We agree. The trial judge eventually gave the jury one part of the requested instruction, even though this decision was insufficient to satisfy defense counsel. The judge read to the jury only the first paragraph, as quoted herein above. [5] The instant litigation focuses on the practical application of the bedrock rule that a criminal defendant is entitled to have the judge instruct the jury on his or her legal theory of the case. The right to such an instruction flows from a threshold finding by the trial court that the proffered defense is a recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor. Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988); Minor v. United States, 623 A.2d 1182, 1185 (D.C.1993). The precise dispute in this litigation is whether this appellant's defense theory is indeed a valid defense to the charge of distribution of cocaine under our statutory definition. Based upon the following analysis, we hold that it is not. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellant, there was no error in the trial court's decision to decline to give the second portion of the requested instruction. The Code defines distribution as the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another other than by administering or dispensing of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship. D.C.Code § 33-501(9). In turn, the term transfer has been found by this Court to bear the same meaning as the dictionary meaning, `to carry or take from one person or place to another.' Long, supra, 623 A.2d at 1147, quoting Philip B. Gove, Webster's New International Dictionary 2426-27 (1986). Appellant's actions fit neatly into the statutory definition of a transfer. Appellant's return of the cocaine to Thomas constituted the express, physical act of distributing the cocaine. During the time that he was examining the drugs, appellant had practical control of this cocaine. When he returned it to Thomas, the transfer of actual control occurred anew. See Long, supra, 623 A.2d at 1148. Durham's admission of the hand-off corroborated the key police testimony that described appellant as reaching into a pocket and handing an object to Thomas. The appellant, in making his transfer of the drugs to Thomas, was effectively putting the drugs back into circulation for potential use by others or for further distribution, and this is certainly what our Code seeks to punish as distribution. Durham, in his trial testimony, did not purport to know what Thomas would do with the drugs that he handed back to him. The fact that Thomas was actively using drugs interchangeably as cash is more than enough to establish that appellant's hand-off reinserted the rocks of cocaine into the stream of commerce. In any event, we held years ago that any act of giving narcotics to another person constitutes an act of unlawful distribution. Wright v. United States, 588 A.2d 260, 262 (D.C.1991). The prosecutor need not prove that a sale took place, for example. This is elementary. Moreover, this Court construes the term distribute literally, because the Code itself does not distinguish among types of transfers between parties. Long, supra, 623 A.2d at 1147. The Code simply makes no provision for motive-driven defenses to criminal liability for any drug offense. The Council did not intend to enact or permit any such loophole. Casting appellant's testimony in its best light, his ultimate dissatisfaction with the quality of the cocaine is an assertion that only elucidates the debtor-creditor issue. Durham's post hoc rationalization for handing back the drugs is totally irrelevant to the fact that he transferred the cocaine from himself back to Thomas. We hold that his assertion of a personal reason for making the transfer of the drugs to Thomas is not a legally cognizable basis for a defense, and he was therefore not entitled to the jury instruction that he demanded. We have scrutinized the points and authorities cited and argued by appellant, and we do not find them to be persuasive. As a threshold matter, it is important to note that appellant does not provide any legal authority to establish that a recognized defense exists as he has formulated it. Rather, he appears to rely principally upon inapposite conclusions from an opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The case he cites is United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.1977). The facts of that case are distinguishable from the underlying facts herein, and Swiderski is therefore not instructive. While we do not seek to inflate the importance of Swiderski by dwelling upon it, we pause to discuss it in detail only because of appellant's heavy reliance on that opinion. The defendant in Swiderski, was convicted by a jury of the offense of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. There was no conviction for the crime of distribution. The appellant therein testified that he and his fiancee had jointly purchased drugs from another person while inside of an apartment and that they did so in order to get high. [6] The Government's own evidence showed that defendant and his fiancee had acted as a pair in purchasing a quantity of cocaine for $1,250.00. Appellant was the person who made the actual purchase. He and his fiancee immediately sampled the drugs while still inside the apartment. A physical transfer had occurred from one person to another in the course of their sampling. Id. Soon after the episode inside the apartment, the two drove a van away from the apartment building. They both alighted from the van and were arrested while together on the street. Thereupon, the law enforcement officers seized a quantity of drugs from the fiancee. There was no proof at trial that they actually had passed any drugs to any third persons, despite testimony from the government informant that they had articulated a plan to sell the drugs to other people. The conviction was reversed because of what the Second Circuit determined to be an erroneous jury instruction, combined with the effect of the prosecutor's theme in closing argument. The trial court in Swiderski had instructed the jury that giving or passing cocaine to a friend or fiancee constitutes distribution. Id. at 448-49. [7] The Circuit Court panel focused on the uniquely close relationship between Swiderski and his cohort. The Circuit concluded that the mere existence of joint possession by two closely related persons  here an engaged couple who later married one another  is alone not enough to provide the basis for such an inference [of intent to distribute]. Id. at 449. The Second Circuit also focused upon the couple's ingestion of some of the drugs while still inside the apartment. Overall, the appellate court assumed arguendo the truth of their claim that they arrived at the apartment for the exclusive purpose of immediately using the same drugs that they purchased. Appellant herein seizes upon a certain passage in Swiderski as supportive of his own position. He cites the Circuit's observation that Congress, in enacting the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, sought to distinguish between one who acts as a link in the chain of distribution and one who has already acquired possession for his own use. Id. at 451. The Circuit Court warned, however, Our holding here is limited to the passing of a drug between joint possessors who simultaneously acquired possession at the outset for their own use. Id. In the instant case, it was appropriate to refuse to give the full proffered jury instruction because the facts that were admitted by appellant squarely placed him as a proverbial link in the chain of distribution. Appellant implies that he was entitled to the jury instruction that was demanded because, like the scenario proffered by the defense in Swiderski, any transfer of the drugs was only related to his personal possession of such drugs. He further implies that he did not intend for those drugs to travel any further than its original owner, Thomas, if appellant had decided not to keep them. We cannot build this kind of bridge between Swiderski and the instant case, because proprietary relationships have never had a place in the analysis of distribution cases in our jurisdiction. Furthermore, the concept of ownership or the permanency of ownership has never been determinative of criminal responsibility for the illegal possession or distribution of drugs. Even if appellant was only a bailee of some kind, his conduct still falls within the definition of distribution if he transferred the drug to any other person after he physically received it. Appellant's reliance upon Swiderski misses the mark. In the instant case, in contrast to the facts in Swiderski, appellant certainly did not transfer the cocaine back and forth with Thomas as part of a scheme to obtain drugs for their mutual, immediate enjoyment. [8] For all of the reasons explicated above, Swiderski is readily distinguishable and should have no impact upon our decision. Irrespective of opinions like Swiderski from the federal courts or elsewhere, we are required to follow the holdings of preexisting case law in our own jurisdiction. The decision in Swiderski is at variance from the law in the District of Columbia, because in post- Swiderski opinions, rulings of this Court fully support the Government's interpretation of the definitions of transfer and distribution. Several exemplary cases from our own Court provide controlling precedents. They emphasize the strict definition of distribution in the context of PWID prosecutions. That definition, of course, remains identical when the charge is distribution. In Wright v. United States, supra , a panel of this Court affirmed convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and phencyclidine (PCP) in a case in which appellant was arrested in possession of a pouch containing 13 tinfoil packets of marijuana laced with PCP and a container bearing three ziplock bags of cocaine. He had been displaying a tinfoil to two other individuals on the street just prior to his arrest. The Government's evidence included testimony that defendant had admitted that he had intended to share the drugs with a friend. As we noted earlier herein, a prior panel of our Court restated the principle that giving or sharing drugs with another constitutes distribution under the law, and an intention to share is evidence of an intent to distribute. Wright, supra, 588 A.2d at 262, citing Chambers v. United States, 564 A.2d 26, 31 (D.C.1989). In Chambers, a panel of this Court affirmed convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and distribution of cocaine. The distribution count related to an incident in which the police directly observed the defendant selling a quantity of drugs to an undercover policeman. Ernest Chambers had been working as a team with his co-defendant Martha Hubbard. Id. at 27. The PWID count against Chambers related to three tinfoil packets of cocaine that were found in his pockets after arrest. The appellant in Chambers testified at trial that he had planned to share the cocaine with Hubbard (who had been arrested with him). Id. at 28. The panel observed, Since such sharing would have been a distribution, Chambers' own testimony proved an intent to distribute. Id. at 31. Further, we noted, Chambers' testimony that he planned to share the cocaine with Hubbard was a judicial admission of an intent to distribute. Id. at 31 n. 10. [9] Today, we are also constrained to say that the rejected portion of the instruction that was requested by Durham did not even capture the real theory of the defense as it should have been articulated, i.e., that appellant was not a link in the chain of distribution because he never intended to be more than a mere possessor. Based upon the actual wording of the requested instruction, combined with appellant's corresponding testimony, the first half of the instruction was effectively a judicial admission of guilt. This is because, like the testimony in Chambers, the defense testimony and proffered instruction herein did no more than recite the facts constituting a distribution  and the reasons for which the distribution was committed. It did not set forth a theory that would negate criminal liability itself. [10] More recently, in Malloy v. United States, 605 A.2d 59 (D.C.1992), we reiterated that the statute does not distinguish among types of transfers between parties, i.e., sales to third persons or . . . deliveries between a dealer and a courier. Id. at 61. Today, as then, no distinction means no distinction. We cannot overrule or disavow the conclusions already embraced in Chambers, Wright, and Malloy on the subject of whether transfers for the purpose of personal sharing of drugs constitutes an illegal act of distribution. The pronouncements in all three cases clearly preclude a reversal herein today. Finally, appellant urges us to rule in his favor by following the suggestions in the dissenting opinion in Lowman v. United States, 632 A.2d 88 (D.C.1993) (Schwelb, J. dissenting). In the dissent, there was an invitation to judicially devise a way to lessen the harsh effects of the Code on people like Alfred Durham. We reject this invitation, for good reasons. In Lowman, a panel of this Court affirmed the appellant's conviction for distribution of cocaine. The jury convicted Lowman as an aider and abettor to a principal distributor of drugs. She aided and abetted the sales by steering customers to another person who was selling cocaine. More precisely, the appellant therein brought the buyer to the seller, asked the seller if he had drugs in the quantity sought by the buyer, remained during the actual sale, and left almost immediately after the sale. Id. at 91. The dissent stated that if everyone who assisted a buyer of drugs were thereby rendered a distributor, then, a fortiori, every purchaser would also logically have to be deemed an aider and abettor to a felony, and would therefore be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence. Id. at 96. The dissenter was concerned that the result in Lowman meant that the punishment would be disproportionate to the crime, and that such was not intended by the legislature. Id. at 101. In Lowman, we considered the legislative history of the District of Columbia Code and found that it disclosed that the Council did indeed draw distinctions among various categories of offenders. However, the Council most certainly did not do so in such a way that could provide relief for the appellant in Lowman or for Alfred Durham. The majority in Lowman stated: Unlike our dissenting colleague, infra at 98, we do not read the legislative history of the District of Columbia's statute to suggest more than that the Council of the District of Columbia was distinguishing between possession and distribution, between first and repeat offenders, and between dealers who sell to adults and those who sell to minors. . . . The concern our dissenting colleague addresses, namely the distinction between a person who aids a buyer and a person who aids the seller of illegal drugs, is not found in that history. The humanitarian and policy considerations favoring the dissent's approach are, in our view, more properly for the legislature, rather than the court, to weigh in deciding whether to amend existing law. We are unpersuaded at this point that the court's interpretation of aiding and abetting might result in a buyer of illegal drugs being guilty of the crime of distribution. Id. at 92 (citation omitted). We know that the Council of the District of Columbia consciously did include the concept of leniency in its statutory scheme to punish and combat drug distribution. However, it chose to do so only in the sentencing phase of the legal process, not through its definitions of the offenses. The Council incorporated leniency through the establishment of the so-called addict exception to the mandatory-minimum sentences for the crime of distribution. [11] This was a valid legislative choice, but we have no authority to broaden it into areas not chosen by the Council. On the whole, appellant asks this Court to recognize a defense that is precluded by the words of the statute and by pre-existing case law in our own jurisdiction. Like the majority in Lowman, we will not plunge into re-writing the Code because we do not sit as a legislature. We cannot waver from the principle of separation of powers. This principle would require us to deny Durham any relief, even if we were sympathetic to his arguments. His remedy on this issue lies solely in the Legislative Branch.