Opinion ID: 1123578
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction of the Prosecution's Appeal as to Stagner

Text: The right of appeal in a criminal case is purely statutory and exists only when given by some constitutional or statutory provision. State v. Dannenberg, 74 Haw. 75, 78, 837 P.2d 776, 778, reconsideration denied, ___ Haw. ___, 843 P.2d 144 (1992) (citation omitted). The Prosecution's right of appeal in criminal cases is limited to those instances set forth in HRS § 641-13 (Supp. 1992), which provides in relevant part that: [an] appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the State from the district or circuit courts to the supreme court, subject to chapter 602, in all criminal cases, in the following instances: (1) From an order or judgment quashing, setting aside, or sustaining a motion to dismiss, any indictment or complaint or any count thereof; (2) From an order or judgment, sustaining a special plea in bar, or dismissing the entire case where the defendant has not been put in jeopardy [.] (Emphases added.) Stagner contends that we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal because the Prosecution erred in bringing its appeal under HRS § 614-13(1). [1] The standard of review for statutory construction is well-established. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law which this court reviews de novo. Pacific Int'l Servs. Corp. v. Hurip, 76 Hawai`i 209, 216, 873 P.2d 88, 95 (1994); Franks v. City and County of Honolulu, 74 Haw. 328, 334, 843 P.2d 668, 671 (1993). In addition, our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature[,] which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. Hurip, 76 Hawai`i at 216, 873 P.2d at 95 (citations omitted). And where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, our only duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning. Ing v. Acceptance Ins. Co., 76 Hawai`i 266, 270, 874 P.2d 1091, 1095 (1994) (citations omitted). Finally, in determining the purpose of the statute, we are not limited to the words of the statute to discern the underlying policy which the legislature seeks to promulgate ... [but may] look to relevant legislative history[.] Sol v. AIG Hawaii Ins. Co., 76 Hawai`i 304, 307, 875 P.2d 921, 924 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), reconsideration denied, 76 Hawai`i 353, 877 P.2d 890 (1994). We now address Stagner's contention that the Prosecution erred in bringing its appeal under HRS § 641-13(1). The trial court's dismissal of Counts 1 through 4 of the indictment resulted in the dismissal of all charges, i.e., the entire case, against him. Therefore, Stagner argues that this appeal can only be brought pursuant to [HRS § ] 641-13(2), if it [sic] all. Stagner's answering brief at 2. We disagree. It appears that Stagner interprets subsections (1) and (2) of HRS § 641-13 as being mutually exclusive. It also appears that he interprets subsection (1) as applying only to orders dismissing less than the entire case and subsection (2) as applying only to orders dismissing the entire case. While we agree that it is necessary for the entire case to be dismissed for subsection (2) to apply, there is absolutely nothing in the language of HRS § 641-13 to indicate that this would prevent subsection (1) from applying. Stagner also argues that because jeopardy attached when evidence was taken in this jury trial, the Prosecution cannot bring its appeal under either subsection (1) or (2) of HRS § 641-13. We disagree. Although jeopardy attaches in jury trials when the jury is empaneled and sworn, State v. Moriwake, 65 Haw. 47, 51, 647 P.2d 705, 709 (1982) (citation omitted), dismissal of a charge after jeopardy attaches does not always bar further prosecution on the same charge. State v. Decenso, 5 Haw.App. 127, 136, 681 P.2d 573, 580 (1984) (citing United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883, 99 S.Ct. 226, 58 L.Ed.2d 197 (1978)). In United States v. Scott , the defendant moved to dismiss two counts of his indictment for preindictment delay. 437 U.S. at 84, 98 S.Ct. at 2190. The trial court granted the motion at the close of all the evidence, after jeopardy had attached. Id. The government appealed the dismissal and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that any further prosecution of the defendant was barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, and therefore dismissed the appeal. Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and stated: [w]e think that in a case such as this the defendant, by deliberately choosing to seek termination of the proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offense of which he is accused, suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause if the Government is permitted to appeal from such a ruling of the trial court in favor of the defendant. Scott, 437 U.S. at 98-99, 98 S.Ct. at 2198. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that where the defendant himself seeks to have the trial terminated without any submission to either judge or jury as to his guilt or innocence, an appeal by the government from his successful effort to do so is not barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. 100-01, 98 S.Ct. at 2199. See Decenso, 5 Haw.App. at 136, 681 P.2d at 580. The holding in Scott consistent with the underlying purpose of HRS § 641-13 as indicated by the relevant legislative history. HRS § 641-13 was originally enacted into law by Act 40 of the 1911 Territorial Legislature. 1911 Haw.Sess.L. Act 40, § 1 at 37. [2] According to the Senate Judiciary Committee's report on Senate Bill No. 35, which was ultimately signed into law as Act 40: At the present time, in criminal cases, although the defendants may appeal from decisions of trial courts to the Supreme Court, the Territory, representing the people, cannot do so. There are many good reasons why a decision in favor of a defendant in a criminal case upon a question of fact, or on the guilt or innocence of the defendant should not be reviewed, but there is no good reason why a person charged with crime should be permitted to escape simply because a trial judge has erred on a pure question of law. Not only should the Supreme Court be the final judge of questions of law in a particular case for the protection of the public and to prevent guilty persons from escaping through erroneous decisions of law, but it is highly important that questions of criminal law should be determined by a single highest court, so as to settle the law for other courts and thus avoid decisions both ways by different trial judges. The bill in question is taken substantially from a similar bill passed by Congress for Federal cases on March 2, 1907, (34 U.S. Statutes at large 1246) and is in line with the best thought on questions of improved judicial procedure. The bill is directed to a judgment rendered before the moment of jeopardy is reached, and therefore is not repugnant to the 5th amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Taylor vs. United States, 207 U.S. 120 [28 S.Ct. 53, 52 L.Ed. 130 (1907)]. Referring to the Federal act mentioned above, the Supreme Court of the United States stated in the case of the United States vs. Bitty, 1908, 208 U.S. 393 [28 S.Ct. 396, 52 L.Ed. 543]: `The object of the act is to prevent unnecessary delay in the administration of the criminal law, and to provide a method by which courts of original jurisdiction may be instructed as to the validity and meaning of a particular criminal statute sought to be enforced.' 1911 Senate Journal at 309-10 (emphases added). Similarly, the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, in recommending passage of Senate Bill No. 35, explained: This Bill provides that in [c]riminal [c]ases, the Territory may have the right to appeal in certain points of law. The defendant now has his right and there is no reason why the Territory, representing the people, should not. It does not change the rule that there can be no appeal on behalf of the Government, where a question of fact is involved, or that the guilt or innocence of the defendant cannot be reviewed. The passage of this Bill will permit the Government and the people to obtain from the Supreme Court decisions on questions of [c]riminal [l]aw, bearing on pleadings and the validity of certain statutes. It will prevent to a large extent decisions by Circuit Judges absolutely at variance on the same statute. 1911 House Journal at 389 (emphases added). In the present case, Stagner was successful in having Counts 1 through 4 of the indictment dismissed on a question of law unrelated to [the] factual guilt or innocence of the offense of which he is accused, and without any submission to the jury as to his guilt or innocence. Consequently, based on the Scott decision and the clear language and purpose of HRS § 641-13, we hold that the Prosecution is not barred from bringing this appeal. This court previously discussed the applicability of HRS § 641-13 in State v. Marzo, 64 Haw. 395, 641 P.2d 1338 (1982), and State v. Swafford, 68 Haw. 653, 729 P.2d 385 (1986). Because the analyses in Marzo and Swafford are potentially misleading, we overrule them to the extent they conflict with this opinion. In Marzo, the defendant cited the State's discovery violations and orally moved for dismissal after the jury was sworn but before evidence was taken. Marzo, 64 Haw. at 396, 641 P.2d at 1339. The circuit court dismissed three charges of criminal assault against the defendant. The State appealed the dismissal under HRS § 641-13(1). Id. at 398, 641 P.2d at 1340. However, this court stated: [j]urisdiction of this court is invoked by HRS § 641-13(2) and not [HRS] § 641-13(1) as the government urges. Hence, this court is without jurisdiction if the dismissal has put defendant in jeopardy. We hold that, under the circumstances of the case, where defendant moved for and obtained a dismissal immediately after the jury was sworn, preventing a trial to determine his guilt or innocence, no jeopardy attaches. Id. at 398, 641 P.2d at 1340-41 (citations omitted). It appears that the Marzo court concluded that subsections (1) and (2) are mutually exclusive and that subsection (1) applies only to pretrial orders and subsection (2) applies only to after-commencement-of-trial orders. If so, we believe it erred. Indeed, if the legislature intended such a result, it could have made this clear in the language of the statute. For example, HRS § 641-13(7) allows the prosecution to appeal: [f]rom a pretrial order granting a motion for the suppression of evidence, including a confession or admission, or the return of property in which case the intermediate appellate court or the supreme court, as the case may be, shall give priority to such an appeal and the order shall be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal[.] (Emphasis added.) Thus, we find that subsection (1) of HRS § 641-13 is not necessarily limited to pretrial situations. In Swafford, the State appealed the dismissal with prejudice of the indictment against Swafford after the trial commenced and some of the witnesses testified. The basis of the dismissal was the State's refusal to disclose the identity of a confidential police informant. Swafford, 68 Haw. at 654, 729 P.2d at 386. After reciting the circuit court's ruling dismissing the case with prejudice, this court stated: [i]t is clear, then, that the entire case was dismissed based on all the evidence adduced at trial. HRS § 641-13(2), and not HRS § 641-13(1), thus controls. In State v. Marzo, 64 Haw. 395, 641 P.2d 1338 (1982), the defendant obtained dismissal of the charges after the jury was sworn but before evidence was taken. Here, the charges were dismissed after all the evidence was taken. Therefore, State could only take an appeal from the order dismissing the case with prejudice under the authority of HRS § 641-13(2). Id. at 657, 729 P.2d at 387 (emphases in original). It appears that Swafford followed Marzo 's rule that HRS § 641-13(1) applies exclusively to pretrial orders. If so, we believe it erred. In addition, the court's unwarranted emphasis that the entire case was dismissed, misleadingly implies that HRS § 641-13(1) applies only to orders that do not dismiss the entire case. As discussed supra, while it is necessary for the entire case to be dismissed for subsection (2) to apply, there is nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that this would prevent subsection (1) from applying. Because of this, we believe the analysis of HRS § 641-13 in Swafford is erroneous. Accordingly, we overrule State v. Swafford, 68 Haw. 653, 729 P.2d 385 (1986) and State v. Marzo, 64 Haw. 395, 641 P.2d 1338 (1982), to the extent that they conflict with our interpretation of HRS § 641-13 in this opinion. We now address the merits of the Prosecution's appeal.