Opinion ID: 2031928
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Comments Relating to Forensic Evidence

Text: Defendant contends that the prosecution erred in arguing to the jury that certain forensic evidence conclusively linked him to the crimes charged. Specifically, defendant objects to the prosecutorial comments that a burnt hair came from the defendant's head, that an ABO blood type match existed, that DNA testing revealed a match between defendant and the rapist, and that the killer's semen in the victim's body matched the defendant. Defendant also argues that the prosecutor erred in arguing facts not in evidence when he said that the burnt hair was in the victim's car. We first point out that the defendant failed to object to these challenged remarks at trial, and he has thus waived the issues for review. ( People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill.2d 176, 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124.) Plain errors affecting substantial rights, however, may be considered by a reviewing court even if a defendant fails to properly preserve the issue. (134 Ill.2d R. 615(a).) The plain error rule applies when the evidence is closely balanced or when the error is of such magnitude that it deprives the defendant of a fair trial. ( People v. Fields (1990), 135 Ill.2d 18, 60, 142 Ill.Dec. 200, 552 N.E.2d 791; People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill.2d 564, 576-77, 38 Ill.Dec. 809, 404 N.E.2d 233.) As stated, we do not find the evidence in this case closely balanced, and thus examine the remarks only to determine whether any error deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Defendant first argues that the prosecutor in rebuttal overstated the evidence when he said, Judy Zeman didn't know that that burnt hair was in her car that came off his [defendant's] head. Defendant points out that a forensic scientist testified only that the burnt hair was consistent with his hair, not that the burnt hair was conclusively defendant's. Defendant concludes that the burnt hair comment amounted to plain error. People v. Linscott (1991), 142 Ill.2d 22, 153 Ill. Dec. 249, 566 N.E.2d 1355. The Linscott court reversed a murder conviction based on improper prosecutorial comments that misrepresented two of three elements of the State's evidence against the defendant. In Linscott, the prosecutor in closing argument commented that the defendant's hair had been found at the crime scene. The Linscott court found that the prosecutor's comment was improper because the evidence merely showed that the defendant was in a class of possible donors of the hair and not that the hair conclusively belonged to the defendant. ( Linscott, 142 Ill.2d at 28-34, 153 Ill.Dec. 249, 566 N.E.2d 1355.) Because the evidence in Linscott was so closely balanced, this court concluded that the improper comment amounted to plain error. Linscott, 142 Ill.2d at 33-34, 153 Ill. Dec. 249, 566 N.E.2d 1355. As in Linscott, we find that the prosecutor's comment that the burnt hair in the car came from the defendant's head overstated the evidence. Unlike the evidence in Linscott, however, the evidence against the defendant in this case was not closely balanced. We further do not believe that the burnt hair comment deprived the defendant of a fair trial. (See People v. Robinson (1993), 157 Ill.2d 68, 83-84, 191 Ill.Dec. 107, 623 N.E.2d 352 (prosecutor's overstatement of blood-comparison and boot-impression evidence did not amount to plain error); Sutherland, 155 Ill.2d at 22-25, 182 Ill.Dec. 577, 610 N.E.2d 1 (prosecutor's overstatement of fiber-comparison evidence did not amount to plain error).) The prosecution only remarked once that the burnt hair was from the defendant's head. The other reference made by the prosecution was that [a] single burnt hair [was] in his [defendant's] car, which was a statement supported by testimony. We also note that the jury was instructed to disregard statements made in closing argument not based on the evidence. Defendant also asserts that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence when he stated that the burnt hair was found in the victim's car, for the testimony showed that it was found in defendant's car. We agree with the State that this misstatement was merely a slip of the tongue. The trial judge instructed the jury to disregard any statements made in closing argument that were not based on the evidence. We find that the misstatement did not constitute plain error. We next consider the ABO blood type comment. At trial, Arlene Hall, a forensic scientist, testified that the defendant has type A blood and is considered a secretor. She explained that a secretor is a person whose ABO blood type can be detected in his or her bodily fluid secretions. Hall concluded that the blood type of the person whose seminal material was obtained from the victim's vaginal swab is consistent with the defendant's. Defense counsel elicited from Hall that 40% of the Caucasian population in the United States has type A blood and that between 70% and 75% of that 40% are secretors. Defendant takes exception with the prosecutor's comment in closing argument that the forensic scientist declared an ABO blood type match. He again cites Linscott in support of his argument that the comment amounted to plain error. In Linscott, the prosecutor told the jury that hairs found at the victim's apartment matched the defendant's. The Linscott court found that the prosecutor's match comment misrepresented the inherent nature of hair comparison and overstated the evidence because testimony established only that the hairs were consistent with the defendant's. ( Linscott, 142 Ill.2d at 34-35, 153 Ill.Dec. 249, 566 N.E.2d 1355.) We note that the Linscott court concluded that the improper comment did not amount to plain error. Linscott, 142 Ill.2d at 35, 153 Ill.Dec. 249, 566 N.E.2d 1355. As in Linscott, testimony here established only that defendant's blood type was consistent with the blood type found in the seminal material, not that it matched. We believe, however, that the Linscott discussion as to match comments is distinguishable from the claim here because hair comparison is different from ABO blood type grouping. While hairs may vary from hair to hair on an individual's head, each individual has an identifiable ABO blood type. The ABO system is widely recognized because accurate typing is crucial to the administration of safe blood transfusions. ( Harbold, 124 Ill.App.3d at 379, 79 Ill.Dec. 830, 464 N.E.2d 734.) We conclude that the prosecutor's comment as to an ABO blood type match was not improper. Defendant next contends that the prosecutor erred in arguing to the jury that the DNA testing revealed a match between the defendant and the rapist. Specifically, the defendant objects to the following prosecutorial comments: He confessed. He left his semen in the body of his victim.    You heard Agent Coffin of the FBI. DNA, match. Even the defendant's own expert witness could not exclude this man. Now, these experts can play with the numbers all they want. One in 466 or one in 48, they can say whatever they want but one fact stands out. This man cannot be excluded. The semen of the rapist matches the defendant. Uncontradicted. Uncontroverted. The semen matches. Again, defendant relies on the Linscott discussion of match comments to support his argument that the remarks constituted plain error. We believe that the DNA match comments were supported by the evidence at trial. The State's expert testified to a match between defendant's blood and the seminal fluid from the victim's vaginal swab. Both experts explained at trial that DNA testing is a comparison science and that a match is expressed in probabilities, not absolutes. Furthermore, the prosecutor's comments, considered in context, simply stressed that a match means that the defendant could not be excluded as the donor of the semen, not that the defendant was the only possible donor of the semen. Even if the admission of DNA evidence in this case was erroneous, thus making the match comments improper, however, we do not believe that the comments were so egregious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. In addition, the evidence of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming. Finally, defendant argues that the prosecutor erred in remarking in opening that the killer's semen in the victim's body matched defendant's. Whether the prosecutor was referring to a DNA match or an ABO blood type match, we believe that the comment was not improper or did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial for the reasons stated above, and, thus, do not invoke the plain error rule.