Opinion ID: 1057579
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: mr hester's due process claims

Text: Mr. Hester mounts a due process attack on three fronts with regard to the manner in which the trial court conducted his trial. He asserts that the trial court infringed on his right to a fair trial by (1) undermining his ability to make an appropriate record by denying him compulsory process, (2) failing to recuse upon proper motion, and (3) declining to give him a hearing on his final motion for new trial.
Mr. Hester argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that the trial court prevented him from making a meaningful record by denying his right to compulsory process with regard to literally hundreds of subpoenas sought in connection with his many pretrial motions. The Court of Criminal Appeals was not persuaded that the trial court had either undermined Mr. Hester's ability to utilize compulsory process or his ability to make a meaningful record for purposes of appeal. The court also noted that Mr. Hester failed to support these arguments with proper citations to the record or to applicable legal authorities. The briefs Mr. Hester has filed in this Court paint a dramatic picture of a big city lawyer who comes to a small town to represent an unpopular client facing the most serious of criminal sanctions. Despite the lawyer's best efforts to zealously represent his client, he is thwarted at practically every turn by an insular legal community that resists outsiders and by a cabal of local officials, including members of the District Attorney General's office, the Public Defender's office, the clerk's office, and even the court reporters, who are intent on preventing his client from receiving a fair trial. These are serious, disquieting allegations that challenge the foundations of the criminal justice system in McMinn County. Were Mr. Hester's allegations substantiated, they would indelibly taint his trial. We have, however, reviewed the record in search of this substantiation and have not found it. What we have found are indications that the abrasive litigation strategy pursued by Mr. Hester's lead counsel caused great friction that resulted in conduct on all sides that did not meet the highest standards of civility and professionalism expected of legal professionals in capital proceedings. Little would be gained by cataloguing all the lapses of professionalism by the various parties in this case. They did not deprive Mr. Hester of an essentially fair trial. Mr. Hester notes in his brief that [d]efense counsel was appointed to do a job, not to look in the mirror and try to figure out how to be more popular in McMinn County. Attorneys are a sword, and a shield, and not required to make friends. True enough. Lawyers are expected to zealously assert[ ] the[ir] client's position under the rules of the adversary system. Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 8, Preamble (3). However, lawyers also have a special responsibility for the quality of justice, and thus they are expected to demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, even when challenging the rectitude of official action. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, Preamble (2), (5). This record does not substantiate Mr. Hester's allegations regarding a wholesale, arbitrary effort to undermine his lawyer's zealous representation by subverting his lawyer's efforts to obtain the evidence needed to present his defense. For all the reasons well explained by the Court of Criminal Appeals, Mr. Hester has not shown that reversible error was committed. Because we find that the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, State v. Hester, 2009 WL 275760, at -12, adequately states the facts and the law on this issue, we adopt this portion of the opinion as the opinion of this Court and include it as an appendix to this opinion.
Mr. Hester insists that the conduct of both trial judges who presided over this case was so prejudicial that it disqualified them. In his words, he argues that [t]he caliber of improper commentary from the bench indicates a disregard for the institution of justice impaired to its keeper. Judge Wallace and Judge Ross both made inappropriate remarks and rulings necessitating recusal. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that neither trial judge's conduct provided a basis for requiring the judge to step aside. Because Judge Ross recused himself almost two years prior to trial, there is little need to address Mr. Hester's argument that Judge Ross committed reversible error by failing to recuse himself. Accordingly, we are left to address Mr. Hester's argument that Judge Wallace, who replaced Judge Ross, should also have recused himself from the case. Because Mr. Hester never asked Judge Wallace to recuse himself, our review of this issue is limited to determining whether Judge Wallace committed plain error in failing to recuse himself sua sponte. See Bean v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d 798, 803 (Tenn.2009); State v. Byington, No. E2008-01762-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 5173773, at  (Tenn. Crim.App. Dec. 30, 2009) (No Tenn. R.App. P. 11 application filed). As a matter of custom and law, recusal decisions are made by the trial judge himself or herself. See Bailey v. Blount Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 303 S.W.3d 216, 239-40 (Tenn.2010); Bean v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d at 805. Unless the basis for recusal is one of the mandatory grounds in Article 6, Section 11 of the Tennessee Constitution or Tenn.Code Ann. § 17-2-101 (2009), these decisions are discretionary. Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998). Appellate courts review discretionary recusal decisions using the abuse of discretion standard. Bailey v. Blount Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 303 S.W.3d at 240; Bean v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d at 805. Pursuant to Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 10, Canon 3(E)(1): A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: (a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; (b) the judge served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge has been a material witness concerning it; (c) the judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, parent, or child wherever residing, or any other member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding or has any other more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; (d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: (i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director or trustee of a party; (ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (iii) is known by the judge to have a more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; (iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. This Court has held that a trial judge should grant a recusal motion when he or she has any doubt as to his or her ability to preside impartially in the case or when a person of ordinary prudence in the judge's position, knowing all of the facts known to the judge, would find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge's impartiality. Bean v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d at 805 (citations omitted). Thus, even when a trial judge believes that he or she can act impartially, the judge should recuse himself or herself when the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Bean v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d at 805. We have thoroughly reviewed the record of the proceedings after Judge Wallace replaced Judge Ross, and we find no basis for concluding that Judge Wallace committed plain error by failing to sua sponte recuse himself from Mr. Hester's case.
Mr. Hester argues that he is entitled to a new hearing on his motions for new trial with regard to his capital and non-capital convictions because the trial court did not provide him with a hearing on his motion for new trial related to his non-capital convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the manner in which the trial court considered Mr. Hester's motions for new trial was not reversible error. We agree. Mr. Hester was convicted of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and aggravated arson on March 11, 2005. Following a capital sentencing hearing on March 12, 2005, he was sentenced to death for his first degree murder conviction. On August 12, 2005, Mr. Hester filed his first motion for a new trial. He filed an amended motion for new trial on October 17, 2005 and a second amended motion for new trial on November 3, 2005. In response to Mr. Hester's seriatim new trial motions, the State moved to dismiss or to conform Mr. Hester's motions to Tenn. R.Crim. P. 47. Mr. Hester consented to striking his previous new trial motions as long as he was given leave to re-file in a more organized and citable format. In an order filed on November 14, 2005, the trial court stated: [a]fter reviewing the amended motion for new trial, this court could not be clear on the specific nature of the exact claims other than that he was claiming everything was error. Accordingly, by 12/1/05 the defendant shall submit an amended motion which concisely states with clarity the errors alleged in the motion for new trial. On December 1, 2005, Mr. Hester filed an Abridged Motion for New Trial in accordance with the trial court's order. On February 16, 2006, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing and entered judgments on Mr. Hester's non-capital convictions. On that same day, without objection, the trial court also conducted a hearing on Mr. Hester's abridged motion for new trial that focused on his capital conviction and sentence. During this hearing, Mr. Hester's lead counsel stated, [g]iven the number of filings, . . . I don't really have any argument on my motion for new trial. I've put everything I think I want to say in writing. The Court of Criminal Appeals's opinion describes what transpired in relation to the hearing on February 16, 2006: Both the trial court and defense counsel acknowledged that, following the hearing, Mr. Heinsman approached the trial judge in chambers and an off-the-record discussion ensued. Neither the prosecutor nor the defendant himself was present. According to an affidavit submitted by defense counsel, the trial judge and the capital case attorney were present when counsel entered chambers to ask about the timing of the second Motion for New Trial to be filed and the running of time for the Notice of Appeal. Counsel further states: It was discussed that the Motion for New Trial would be filed and decided on the pleadings, but the defendant was not present for this conversation . . . and counsel did not and could not waive oral argument without his knowing consent. [79] On March 17, 2006, Mr. Hester filed a motion for new trial addressing the issues relating to his non-capital convictions. Notwithstanding Mr. Heinsman's earlier statements that an additional hearing would not be necessary, this motion contained a request for a hearing. The trial court did not conduct a hearing, and on May 22, 2006, filed an order addressing the issues relating to Mr. Hester's capital convictions that were the subject of the February 16, 2006 hearing and the issues relating to Mr. Hester's non-capital convictions that were contained in his March 17, 2006 motion. The Court of Criminal Appeals's opinion describes what transpired following the entry of the May 22, 2006 order as follows: On August 28, 2006, the trial court entered an order clarifying the record for appeal. Referencing its off-the-record discussion with defense counsel regarding a hearing of the motion for new trial in the non-capital cases, the trial court stated: Attorney Rich Heinsman then informed the court in chambers that he believed for the record he would need to file an additional motion for new trial related to the non-capital sentencing issues. The court asked if he would need a hearing on those matters and he said he would not. Of course, this matter was not recorded and his client was not present. The court permitted the defendant to file an additional motion for new trial to address the non-capital sentencing issues only and stated that a written order on the other matters would not be entered separately to avoid any confusion on the date for the notice of appeal. The court then informed the state of the defendant's request and that Attorney Heinsman had indicated that a hearing would not be required on the matters. The court further stated that the motion for new trial filed in March 2006 included matters that related to the trial and a request for an additional hearing. The court stated that in early to mid-April, Mr. Heinsman spoke to the capital case attorney regarding his desire to file additional pleadings and was informed that he had until May 1, 2006, to file anything further for the court's consideration. The court states that no written order was entered setting forth this deadline, but the court was aware that it was communicated to Mr. Heinsman, and no other pleadings were filed by the May 1 deadline. The court concluded its order as follows: Although this court had permitted the defendant to file an amendment to the new trial motion to make his record by including his non-capital sentencing issues, such an amendment was not required to preserve the issues. The inclusion of issues other than the non-capital sentencing issues was outside the very lenient and extended deadline the court had set for such filings. The date for raising and arguing other matters had already passed. Accordingly, this court entered an order denying the motion for new trial without additional hearing on May 22, 2006. [80] Mr. Hester does not deny that his lead counsel informed the trial court on February 16, 2006 that no hearing would be necessary with regard to his motion on non-capital offenses. However, he insists that the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing after one was requested in his March 17, 2006 motion and that this error necessitates a remand for a hearing on all his motions for new trial. Assuming for the purpose of argument that the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing on his March 17, 2006 motion for new trial, [81] Mr. Hester has failed to show any prejudice for two reasons. First, Mr. Hester has not pointed to any argument or evidence that he would have presented at a hearing that was not included in his motion. Second, the grounds in Mr. Hester's March 17, 2006 motion are moot or wholly non-meritorious. Mr. Hester's motion addressed three general issues regarding his non-capital sentences: (1) the sentences imposed for attempted first degree murder and aggravated arson, (2) ordering those sentences to be served consecutively, and (3) the sufficiency of the evidence to support Mr. Hester's convictions for attempted first degree murder and aggravated arson. We have already addressed two of these issues on this appeal. [82] A sufficiency of the evidence argument with regard to his non-capital convictions is wholly non-meritorious. Nothing further can be gained by requiring the trial court to conduct a hearing on Mr. Hester's March 17, 2006 motion for new trial.