Opinion ID: 1128377
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the trial court erred in refusing to suppress charles crawford's confession.

Text: ¶ 31. Crawford argues that his statements made to F.B.I. agents and police on Saturday, January 30, 1993, should have been suppressed because: 1) his constitutional rights were violated when he was interrogated outside the presence of his attorney; 2) his statements were involuntary in that he was in great pain and law enforcement refused to obtain medical treatment for him until they had obtained a confession; and 3) his statements were obtained with the assistance of illegally obtained and privileged information (mental health reports obtained from Crawford's attorney without his consent). Usually for this Court, determining whether a confession is admissible is a finding of fact which is not disturbed unless the trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard, committed manifest error, or made a decision contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731, 742 (Miss. 1992). Crawford notes, however, and the State concedes, that the trial court did not make specific factual findings regarding the admissibility of Crawford's confession. Therefore, this Court must conduct an independent review of the totality of the circumstances discoverable in the entire record in order to resolve the questioned validity of Crawford's confession. See Coverson v. State, 617 So.2d 642, 647 (Miss. 1993); Holland v. State, 587 So.2d 848, 860 (Miss. 1991).
¶ 32. Crawford contends that law enforcement knew that he was represented by counsel and chose to interrogate him outside the presence of his attorney anyway. In his statement of issues, Crawford contends that admission of these confessional statements violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel. However, Crawford only addresses the Sixth Amendment claim in his brief. Assignments of error unsupported by any meaningful argument or relevant authority need not be addressed on appeal. Brown v. State, 690 So.2d 276, 297 (Miss. 1996). Therefore, as to the Fifth Amendment claim, Crawford is procedurally barred. ¶ 33. Crawford claims that the admission of his confession violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Determining whether a confession is admissible is a finding of fact which is usually not disturbed by this Court unless the trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard, committed manifest error, or made a decision contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Balfour, 598 So.2d at 742. However, as stated previously, the trial judge here did not make a specific finding of fact as to the admissibility of Crawford's confession. Therefore, while this Court may rely on necessarily implied findings, we are under no obligation to review under the manifest error standard. ¶ 34. Under the Mississippi Constitution, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel `attaches once the proceedings reach the accusatory stage.' Johnson v. State, 631 So.2d 185, 187-88 (Miss. 1994) (citation omitted). The right to counsel, both federal and state varieties, attaches at the point in time when the initial appearance under Rule 1.04 of the Uniform Rules ought to have been held. Morgan v. State, 681 So.2d 82, 90 (Miss. 1996). As is the case with the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are not violated by questioning in the absence of his attorney unless the defendant has asserted his right to an attorney. Wilcher v. State, 697 So.2d 1087, 1096 (Miss. 1997). ¶ 35. Though it is not particularly clear from the appellant's brief, Crawford could be making one of two arguments under the Sixth Amendment. First, Crawford may be arguing that because he was represented by Fortier in another proceeding, he was not to be questioned outside the presence of Fortier. At the time of the interrogation, Randy Fortier represented Crawford for a pending rape and assault trial, which was not connected with the disappearance of Kristy Ray. Fortier's representation did not yet extend to the offense of kidnaping. The Sixth Amendment right is offense-specific; it cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions. Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1316 (Miss. 1994); Balfour, 598 So.2d at 746. Therefore, Crawford cannot rely on the invocation of his right to counsel pursuant to previous charges of rape and assault. ¶ 36. It is more likely that Crawford is arguing that because he was arrested without a warrant, his proceedings had reached an accusatory stage and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached. Once the right to counsel has attached and been asserted, the State must of course honor it. Morgan, 681 So.2d at 90 (emphasis added). Although there is debate between the parties as to when the accusatory stage began so as to jumpstart Crawford's right to counsel, we feel that this determination is not germane to the disposition of the issue. As was addressed previously, there is a conflict of testimony as to whether Crawford invoked his right to counsel. Because the trial court made a general determination of admissibility rather than a specific finding of fact, we find that the trial court did not err in admitting the confessional statement. Accordingly, Crawford's argument regarding violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel is without merit.
¶ 37. The next sub-issue raised by Crawford is whether his confession was coerced, based on a law enforcement refusal to give him medical treatment for his back. The standard of review in such cases is the same as that applied above. [O]nce the trial judge has determined, at a preliminary hearing, that a confession is admissible, the defendant/appellant has a heavy burden in attempting to reverse that decision on appeal. Sills v. State, 634 So.2d 124, 126 (Miss. 1994) (citation omitted). Such findings are treated as findings of fact made by a trial judge sitting without a jury as in any other context. As long as the trial judge applied the correct legal standards, his decision will not be reversed on appeal unless it is manifestly in error, or is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1281 (Miss. 1994) (citations omitted). Where, on conflicting evidence, the court makes such findings, this Court generally must affirm. Lesley v. State, 606 So.2d 1084, 1091 (Miss. 1992) (citations omitted). ¶ 38. The general rule is that for a confession to be admissible it must have been given voluntarily, and not as the result of any promises, threats or other inducements. The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary. The burden is met and a prima facie case made out by testimony of an officer, or other persons having knowledge of the facts, that the confession was voluntarily made without any threats, coercion, or offer of reward. Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 838 (Miss. 1994) (citation omitted). ¶ 39. The instant case is distinguishable from Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), cited by Crawford. In Mincey, there was clear, undisputed indication that the defendant wanted a lawyer. Id. at 399, 98 S.Ct. at 2417. Further, the defendant was depressed almost to the point of coma. Id. at 398, 98 S.Ct. at 2416. Mincey had partial paralysis of one hip, wore breathing tubs, a catheter, and an IV, and was under the influence of medication. Id. at 396, 98 S.Ct. at 2415. As Crawford correctly states, evidence that the defendant was in pain during the interrogation does not, by itself, render the defendant's confession involuntary. See Wheeler v. State, 536 So.2d 1347, 1349 (Miss. 1988); Gavin v. State, 473 So.2d 952, 955 (Miss. 1985); Bullock v. State, 391 So.2d 601, 605-06 (Miss. 1980). ¶ 40. Crawford testified at the suppression hearing that at the time of his arrest, he was walking with a shotgun as a crutch, because he had hurt himself. He said that he had stepped through a dry well and fell through some tin. Crawford testified that there was some debate as to whether he should be taken to the hospital before he was taken to the Chalybeate School. He gave his interview while lying on the floor because he could not sit up in the chair, and told the authorities of the fact that he was in pain. Crawford testified that the authorities told him that the quicker we got this over with the quicker we could get out of there and go on, you know, whatever attention I needed, you know, could be taken care of. ¶ 41. Agent Jackson testified that Crawford mentioned that he had hurt his back when he first entered the interrogation room at the Chalybeate School. Jackson asked Crawford if he would be more comfortable lying on the floor, and Crawford responded that he would. He also denied that law enforcement threatened or inferred that they would withhold medical treatment from Crawford unless he talked and answered questions. Jackson's testimony was echoed by Agents Summerlin, Williams, and Bush. Agent Maddock testified that he did not recall Crawford ever asking for medical assistance. ¶ 42. In the case at hand, all officers who witnessed Crawford's statement testified that it was voluntarily given. They specifically denied refusing Crawford medical treatment until he gave his statement. Therefore, the State made a prima facie showing that Crawford's statement was voluntary. Again, although the judge made no specific finding of facts regarding the admissibility of Crawford's confession, in light of the conflicting evidence, this Court will rely on the findings implied by the trial court's ruling. Saucier v. State, 562 So.2d 1238, 1244 (Miss. 1990). Since it cannot be said that the trial court erred, Crawford's arguments on this point are without merit. Hunter v. State, 684 So.2d 625, 633 (Miss. 1996).