Opinion ID: 395139
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Destruction of the Whimsical Doubt

Text: 17 While we reject Smith's argument that conviction by a death-qualified jury violates his right to an impartial jury, we are fully cognizant that, with regard to the guarantee of impartiality, there are strong competing interests on both sides. As the Supreme Court indicated in dicta in Witherspoon, the question is one of accommodation. The Court stated that, even if a defendant proved that the jury which convicted him was less than neutral, 17 the issue would then become whether the State's interest in submitting the penalty issue to a jury capable of imposing capital punishment may be vindicated at the expense of the defendant's interest in a completely fair determination of guilt or innocence. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. at 520 n.18, 88 S.Ct. at 1776. Thus the Court characterizes the dilemma as a problem of remedy and invites consideration of a remedy which, while accommodating the state's interest in submitting the penalty issue to a jury capable of voting for death may be less restrictive of the defendant's interests than is the current scheme. 18 With this less restrictive alternative approach in mind, the Supreme Court suggested, 18 and petitioner Smith urged at oral argument, the use of a bifurcated trial, with one jury to determine guilt and another to fix punishment. 19 This court is not persuaded, however, that this procedure would in fact be less restrictive of the capital defendant's interests. 20 Indeed our fear is that, were we to sanction such a remedy as an appropriate balance of constitutional rights, we would deprive the capital defendant of important benefits which the current system affords him. 21 19 As capital trials are currently conducted in Georgia, the same jury sits at both the guilt and penalty phase. 22 There is a potential benefit to a defendant inherent in such a procedure which would be lost were the jury which found guilt discharged and a new jury empanelled to decide punishment. We cannot point to any empirical data in this record demonstrating such a benefit, but we ought not ignore reality. 20 The fact that jurors have determined guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not necessarily mean that no juror entertained any doubt whatsoever. There may be no reasonable doubt doubt based upon reason and yet some genuine doubt exists. It may reflect a mere possibility; it may be but the whimsy of one juror or several. Yet this whimsical doubt this absence of absolute certainty can be real. 21 The capital defendant whose guilt seems abundantly demonstrated may be neither obstructing justice nor engaged in an exercise in futility when his counsel mounts a vigorous defense on the merits. It may be proffered in the slight hope of unanticipated success; it might seek to persuade one or more to prevent unanimity for conviction; it is more likely to produce only whimsical doubt. Even the latter serves the defendant, for the juror entertaining doubt which does not rise to reasonable doubt can be expected to resist those who would impose the irremedial penalty of death. 22 Under Georgia's present procedure, such a juror would sit to decide punishment. The right to have that juror or those jurors , entertaining whimsical doubt, on the penalty jury is of undoubted value to the defendant. 23 The scheme appellant here urges upon us would effectively destroy the whimsical doubt. The guilt-determining jurors including those not absolutely certain would be thanked for their service and discharged. A new jury, including only those willing to impose the death penalty, would be selected. They would entertain no doubt that the defendant before them was, indeed, the guilty party. Presumably they would be instructed that the defendant was the guilty party. They would hear only evidence of aggravating circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime and mitigation if there be evidence of such. Not even a flimsy alibi would disturb their deliberations; no suggestion of misidentification would be material. Certainty of guilt would replace any whimsical doubt entertained by the discharged jurors. Some may conclude that the destruction of the whimsical doubt, sought here by appellant, would involve a more serious deprivation of the benefits of the constitutionally guaranteed jury trial than envisioned by Smith's advocates in this appeal. 23 In short, Smith has not persuaded us that the remedy he has suggested is a better accommodation of the state's and the defendant's interests than is the present system. 24 24 That there is no record in this case evaluating the impact of the two-jury system upon important interests of the defendant further illustrates the shortcomings of appellant's case. A compilation of data from experience or experiment might show the relative likelihood of the imposition of the death penalty by jurors directed to accept the guilt of defendant and by jurors who have heard and considered defendants' attacks upon prosecutors' fact cases. Absent such data, mere proof of the coincidence of exclusions for cause and elimination of tendencies of excused veniremen is but a fragment of the whole picture. 25 What we have written here is not based upon a review of the record in this case. We merely presume to some understanding of the place of a jury in our system for the administration of justice. That role is, in the end, the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen spoken of in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1905, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970). 26