Opinion ID: 1476774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jury charge issue

Text: Appellant claims trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the court's charge, which equated specific intent with malice. Appellant claims the following excerpts from the trial court's charge were confusing and incorrect: A killing is with malice if it is done with a specific intent to kill. If the defendant had a specific intent to kill, the killing was malicious.    Again, the difference between first degree murder and third degree murder is a specific intent to kill. If a person has a specific intent to kill, as I have defined it, that constitutes malice, and it is the specific intent to kill with malice that raises third degree murder to first degree murder. If the defendant had a specific intent to kill, it is malicious. If the defendant did not have a specific intent to kill but acted with malice, then a malicious killing without the specific intent to kill is third degree murder. N.T. Trial, 3/13/97, at 287-88, 304-05. Appellant claims these instructions equated malice with specific intent, thus eliminating the Commonwealth's burden of proving every element of murder. When evaluating jury instructions, the charge must be read as a whole to determine whether it was fair or prejudicial. The trial court has broad discretion in phrasing its instructions, and may choose its own wording so long as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its consideration. Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292, 301 (2001). Recently, this Court addressed a similar instruction on malice, in Commonwealth v. Overby, 575 Pa. 227, 836 A.2d 20 (2003). There the trial court instructed the jury on the three mental states of malice and the distinguishing factor between first and third degree murder. Id., at 24 [F]irst degree murder requires the specific intent to kill. Third degree murder does not require the specific intent to kill. Id. (quoting N.T., 7/20/98, at 104). Further, the court instructed the jury, a killing by a person who has the specific intent to kill is a killing with malice. . . . Id. (quoting N.T., 7/20/98, at 102-03). We concluded the trial court did not err in giving this instruction to the jury. Id. Here, after the initial charge, the jury requested clarification on the difference between first and third degree murder. The trial court explained that each element of first degree murder must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt: [element] [t]hree, that the killing was with a specific intent to kill.... [Element] [f]our, that the killing was with malice. N.T. Trial, 3/13/97, at 302-03. Contrary to appellant's assertion, after reviewing the charge in its entirety, the instruction adequately and accurately explained the law to the jury. Here, the trial court gave a comprehensive explanation on all the elements of both first and third degree murder in the initial charge, and fully explained them again after the jury requested clarification. These charges, read as a whole, provided ample guidance for the jury's deliberations. Appellant has failed to prove trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to this charge; as the underlying claim lacks arguable merit, appellate counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. See McGill, supra .