Opinion ID: 794243
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Reasonableness of Florez's Incarceratory Sentence

Text: 37 Florez contends that his 210-month prison sentence, 52 months less than the low end of his Sentencing Guidelines range, is unreasonable when compared to the 120-month sentence imposed by a different judge on Chepe. See United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 24 (2d Cir.2006) (discussing authority of appellate courts pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1) to review sentences for reasonableness). We disagree. 38 Reasonableness review involves consideration not only of the sentence itself, but also of the procedure employed in arriving at the sentence. Id. at 26 (collecting cases). The procedural inquiry focuses primarily on the sentencing court's compliance with its statutory obligation to consider the factors detailed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Canova, 412 F.3d 331, 350 (2d Cir.2005); see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261-62, 125 S.Ct. 738. Among these factors is the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(6). While this court has recognized that Congress's primary concern in enacting § 3553(a)(6) was to minimize sentencing disparities nationwide, United States v. Joyner, 924 F.2d 454, 460 (2d Cir.1991); accord United States v. Tejeda, 146 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir.1998), we have not ruled, post- Booker, as to whether that statutory section also permits district courts to consider sentencing disparities between co-defendants in the same case, see United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d at 31-32 n. 9 (leaving resolution of that issue for another day). 39 In this case, the district court compared Florez's potential sentence to that received by his brother Chepe, as well as to sentences received by similarly situated defendants nationwide. 4 Because the government does not challenge this application of § 3553(a)(6), we need not address the propriety of considering co-defendant disparity on this appeal. Plainly, Florez cannot complain that the district court committed procedural error in failing fully to consider § 3553(a)(6). His reasonableness challenge reduces, at best, to a complaint about the weight the district court afforded the disparity between his Guidelines range and his brother's sentence. This is not a point on which we are inclined to second-guess a sentencing judge. 40 As this court recently explained, the requirement that a sentencing judge consider an 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factor is not synonymous with a requirement [that] the factor be given determinative or dispositive weight in the particular case. Id. at 32 (emphasis in original). Precisely because § 3553(a)(6) is only one of several factors that must be weighted and balanced by the sentencing judge, id. at 32, a district court's identification of disparity does not necessarily require it to adjust a sentence downward from the advisory guidelines range in order for that sentence to be reasonable, United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 442 F.3d 539, 543 (7th Cir.2006), much less compel any particular reduction. Thus, if sentencing disparities between co-defendants are properly considered, the weight to be given such disparities, like the weight to be given any § 3553(a) factor, is a matter firmly committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge and is beyond our [appellate] review, as long as the sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable in light of all the circumstances presented. United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d at 32. Reasonableness review does not, after all, entail the substitution of our judgment for that of the sentencing judge. Id. at 27. Rather, the standard of our review is more akin to abuse of discretion. Id. at 27. 41 In this case, the record indicates that the district court would have acted well within its discretion in concluding that Florez and his brother were not sufficiently similarly situated to warrant any reduction in the identified sentencing disparity between them. Although the men may have borne comparable culpability in the charged conspiracies, they were dissimilarly situated in other respects important to sentencing. Whereas Chepe had pleaded guilty and accepted responsibility for his role in the charged conspiracies, Florez had successfully fled from justice for almost five years. After apprehension, Florez never accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct, insisting on his innocence even after verdict and at sentencing. See id. at 32 (noting that defendants were not similarly situated where one pleaded guilty and accepted responsibility for criminal conduct and other did not). Further, the brothers' situations were dissimilar in that Chepe specifically requested and obtained a sentencing departure based on extraordinary family circumstances, whereas Florez made no such application. 42 In fact, Judge Sifton did not completely deny Florez sentencing consideration based on disparity. Despite reservations about the leniency shown to Chepe, the judge concluded that justice was best served in Florez's case by imposing a non-Guidelines sentence that reduced some-what the disparity in the brothers' sentences. Because the government does not challenge this rationale, we have no reason to review its consideration under § 3553(a)(6). We conclude only that Florez fails to show that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence when it narrowed but did not eliminate the sentencing disparity between the two brothers. Florez's sentence was well within the broad range of reasonable sentences that the District Court could have imposed in the circumstances presented. Id. at 34.