Opinion ID: 793728
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the conviction invalidated?

Text: 25 The next step under the federal statute is to determine whether the conviction was expunged, set aside, the defendant was pardoned, or the defendant's civil rights were restored. This determination depends on the order of dismissal that certifies that the defendant is relieved of any obligations imposed on him by the previous order and satisfied his criminal liability, so this cause is hereby dismissed and the Probation Officer is relieved from any further supervision of the Defendant. 26 Under New Mexico law, such a termination of a criminal proceeding does not amount to any of the kinds of invalidation of a conviction specified by the federal felon in possession statute. The New Mexico statute says that a defendant who successfully obtains a dismissal of a suspended imposition of sentence is relieved of any obligations. 7 This could arguably be read to amount to expungement, but that is not how the New Mexico courts have construed it. New Mexico has another procedure called conditional discharge, which, like an expungement, does eliminate the conviction, under State v. Herbstman 8 and State v. Lopez. 9 But because deferred imposition of sentence, Valerio's procedure, is preceded by an adjudication of guilt while conditional discharge is not, State v. Brothers 10 and Padilla v. State 11 hold that a conviction still exists when the imposition of sentence is deferred. 12 27 This conclusion compels us to affirm the felon in possession conviction. This is counterintuitive for two reasons. First, Valerio is not a convicted felon for purposes of the state felon in possession statute. 13 As far as the State of New Mexico is concerned, he is entitled to possess firearms. The reason why is that the state statute requires a sentence as well as a conviction, 14 and Valerio's burglary sentence was deferred and never imposed. The Eleventh Circuit recently decided a case where, despite the felony conviction, the defendant was entitled under state law to possess firearms, and likewise ruled that it made no difference to the defendant's rights under the federal statute. 15 The federal government criminalizes quite a few things that the laws of various states do not, such as possession of eagle feathers. 16 28 Second, and more troubling, an opinion of the New Mexico Attorney General said that persons in Valerio's situation were entitled to possess firearms under the federal statute. The 1988 opinion of the New Mexico Attorney General's Office says that the federal right to possess firearms is restored under New Mexico law when a person successfully completes the period of deferred imposition of sentence, because the dismissed case would not be considered a `conviction' for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922. 17 The opinion cannot be reconciled with the New Mexico cases discussed earlier. The Attorney General's opinion says that because the right to vote is automatically restored upon successful completion of the period of deferment [of imposition of sentence] ... successful completion of a deferred sentence under New Mexico law would not be considered a `conviction' for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922. 18 29 Those civil rights that were restored to Valerio, were restored by operation of law, not by a certificate. Had they been restored by a certificate that told him he was no longer convicted and that his civil rights were restored, then the anti-mousetrapping rule would require that state to tell the felon point blank that guns are not kosher in his certificate for the federal prohibition on possession to apply. 19 Valerio's problem, though, is that he cannot get to the third step of the federal analysis, where the anti-mousetrapping rule operates. The reason is that his civil rights were not restored for purposes of the federal statute. 30 The problem with the New Mexico Attorney General's analysis is that it treats restoration of the right to vote as sufficient for the federal statutory phrase, has had civil rights restored, but the federal cases do not. Though the federal statutory phrase does not require that all of a person's civil rights have been restored, neither is it satisfied where any of his civil rights have been restored. Circuit law establishes that the restoration of civil rights must be more than de minimis and must be substantial but need not be complete. 20 31 Under New Mexico law, Valerio's civil right to vote has been restored. 21 However, we have not found a case that says restoration of the right to vote is sufficient. A legislature might choose to allow convicted felons to vote for reasons unrelated to their dangerousness, so it is not sufficient to amount to restoration of civil rights for purposes of the federal statute. 32 By contrast to the right to vote, no civil right could be more relevant to a felon's future dangerousness than the right to possess firearms. And New Mexico has restored Valerio's right to possess firearms. 22 But that is not enough. 33 In Congress' view, existing state laws `provide less than positive assurance that the person in question no longer poses an unreasonable risk of dangerousness.' Congress meant to keep guns away from all offenders who, the Federal Government feared, might cause harm, even if those persons were not deemed dangerous by the state. 23 34 We held in United States v. Andaverde, 24 that a state right to possess a shotgun did not suffice, in the absence of the right to vote, to serve on a jury, and to hold public office. We held in United States v. Meeks 25 that only if a felon's civil rights are substantially restored do we proceed to the next step, determining whether the state has restricted his right to possess firearms. 26 Likewise the Fifth Circuit held in United States v. Thomas 27 that it simply does not matter what the state law provides concerning possession of firearms, in the absence of a more complete restoration of civil rights. 28 35 In United States v. Dahms, 29 we held that a convicted felon who regains the rights to vote, to sit on a jury and to hold public office in the state in which he was originally convicted has had his rights substantially restored under § 921(a)(20). 30 All the cases we have found from other circuits use the same three civil rights as the test of whether civil rights have been restored for the federal felon in possession crime. 31 Distinguishing Dahms, we held in United States v. Meeks 32 that even where the felon had regained his right to vote and to hold most public offices, where the felon could not serve on a jury or hold the public offices of sheriff or highway patrol officer the state's restoration of civil rights was not substantial enough to entitle him to possess firearms under the federal statute. 33 The Fourth Circuit likewise held that there is insufficient restoration of civil rights where the state did not restore the right to serve on a jury. 34 36 This case is controlled by Meeks. Valerio's right to serve on a jury and his right to hold public office have not been restored. 35 That means he does not get past the second step of the analysis, restoration of civil rights, so we do not reach the third step, whether the state has restricted his right to possess firearms. The district court correctly denied his motion to dismiss.