Opinion ID: 2551147
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Affidavit limitations

Text: Gehner contends that only information specifically listed in NRS 50.315(4) may be admitted by affidavit. This court's primary objective in construing a statute is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. [8] In so doing, this court must first look to the plain language of the statute. [9] But, if the statutory language is ambiguous or otherwise does not speak to the issue before this court, this court must construe the statute `in line with what reason and public policy would indicate the legislature intended.' [10] NRS 50.315(4) provides that the affidavit of a person who withdraws a sample of blood from another for analysis by an expert is admissible to prove certain facts: (a) The occupation of the affiant or declarant; (b) The identity of the person from whom the affiant or declarant withdrew the sample; (c) The fact that the affiant or declarant kept the sample in his sole custody or control and in substantially the same condition as when he first obtained it until delivering it to another; and (d) The identity of the person to whom the affiant or declarant delivered it. On its face, subsection 4 does not discuss much of the information contained in the affidavit at issue. However, subsection 4 is part of a larger statute. NRS 50.315(8) delegates the power to adopt regulations prescribing the form of an affidavit under the statute to the Committee on Testing for Intoxication. The affidavit in this case is a form and encompasses standard procedures used to withdraw blood for testing. The record indicates that the form was developed and approved by the committee. [11] The language of subsection 8, when read in conjunction with subsection 4, creates an ambiguity in the statute. Did the Legislature intend that affidavits cover only the subject matter enumerated in subsection 4, or did it intend to give the committee authority to broaden the scope of the affidavits? Given this ambiguity, we turn to the legislative history to ascertain the Legislature's intent. The minutes from the Senate Committee on the Judiciary reveal that NRS 50.315(4) was added to avoid the unnecessary appearance of health care professionals at trials or hearings when defense counsel had no cross-examination questions. [12] The judiciary committee was presented with a sample affidavit to illustrate what would be admitted in place of a health care professional's testimony at trial. [13] The sample affidavit is identical in format to the nurse's in this case, including the language about not using alcohol solutions or alcohol-based swabs. Accordingly, the Legislature was aware of the type of statements that might be contained in an affidavit and, thus, arguably did not intend for such statements to be inadmissible under NRS 50.315(4). Rather, the Legislature set forth the minimum information that must be contained in an affidavit and left the remaining information to the discretion of the committee delegated to regulate testing procedures. Interpreting the statute literally, without regard to subsection 8 or the legislative history, would lead to an absurd result. Health care professionals would be required to testify even when the defendant had no issues for cross-examination. This would undermine the whole purpose of the statute. We conclude that the affidavit was admissible and that the municipal court and district court erred in excluding it on the basis of statutory noncompliance. We now turn to the constitutionality of the statute under Crawford and the Confrontation Clause.