Opinion ID: 2968022
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Witness C

Text: [ ] 38 UNITED STATES v. MOUSSAOUI The district court determined that Witness C could provide material evidence because he could support Moussaoui’s contention that he was not involved in the September 11 attacks. We agree with the district court that a jury might reasonably infer, from Witness C [ ] that Moussaoui was not involved in September 11. We therefore conclude that Moussaoui has made a plausible showing that Witness C would, if available, be a favorable witness. 3. Balancing Having considered the burden alleged by the Government and the right claimed by Moussaoui, we now turn to the question of whether the district court should have refrained from acting in light of the national security interests asserted by the Government. The question is not unique; the Supreme Court has addressed similar matters on numerous occasions. In all cases of this type—cases falling into “what might loosely be called the area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence, Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 55 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)—the Supreme Court has held that the defendant’s right to a trial that comports with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments prevails over the governmental privilege. Ultimately, as these cases make clear, the appropriate procedure is for the district court to order production of the evidence or witness and leave to the Government the choice of whether to comply with that order. If the government refuses to produce the information at issue—as it may properly do—the result is ordinarily dismissal.24 For example, in Roviaro, the Supreme Court considered the conflict between the governmental interest in protecting the identity of a confidential informant and a defendant’s right to present his case. The Court acknowledged the importance of the so-called informer’s privilege but held that this privilege is limited by the fundamental requirement of fairness. Where the disclosure of an informer’s iden24 Some of the cases in this area involve a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, while others concern a defendant’s rights under the Due Process Clause. The fact that different constitutional provisions are involved is immaterial to our analysis. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritahis, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987) (adopting due process framework for analyzing compulsory process claim). UNITED STATES v. MOUSSAOUI 39 tity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61. The Court emphasized that the choice to comply with an order to disclose the identity of a confidential informant belongs to the Government. See id. at 59 (What is usually referred to as the informer’s privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law, (emphasis added)); id. at 61 (stating that when the identity of a confidential informant is necessary to the defense, the trial court may require disclosure and, if the Government withholds the information dismiss the action (emphasis added)). That it is the responsibility of the Government to decide whether it will comply with a discovery order is even more apparent from Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), in which the Court held that the government’s privilege in confidential reports generated by prosecution witnesses must give way to the defendant’s right to effectively cross-examine the witnesses, see id. at 668-69. The Court acknowledged that the protection of vital national interests may militate against public disclosure of documents in the Government’s possession but concluded that the Government can invoke its evidentiary privileges only at the price of letting the defendant go free. . . . [S]ince the Government which prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see that justice is done, it is unconscionable to allow it to undertake prosecution and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive the accused of anything which might be material to his defense. Id. at 670-71 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court emphatically stated that [t]he burden is the Government’s, not to be shifted to the trial judge, to decide whether the public prejudice of allowing the crime to go unpunished is greater than that attendant upon the possible disclosure of state secrets and other confidential information in the Government’s possession. Id. at 672 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has also applied this rule—-that a governmental refusal to produce evidence material to the defense is made upon 40 UNITED STATES v. MOUSSAOUI pain of sanction—to the good faith deportation of potential defense witnesses. In Valenzuela-Bernal, the defendant claimed that the Government violated his compulsory process rights by deporting two illegal immigrants who were potential defense witnesses. In assessing this claim, the Court observed that the case involved a conflict between the vitally important Executive duty of prosecuting criminal offenders and the congressional mandate (to be carried out by the Executive) of promptly deporting illegal aliens. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 863-64. The Court admonished that: it simply will not do . . . to minimize the Government’s dilemma in cases like this. Congress’ immigration policy and the practical considerations discussed above [regarding overcrowding in detention facilities] demonstrate that the Government had good reason to deport [the potential witnesses] once it concluded that they possessed no evidence relevant to the prosecution or the defense of [the] criminal charge. No onus, in the sense of hiding out or concealing witnesses, attached to the Government by reason of its discharge of the obligations imposed upon it by Congress; its exercise of these manifold responsibilities is not to be judged by standards which might be appropriate if the Gov- ernment’s only responsibility were to prosecute criminal offenses. Id. at 865-66. The Court nevertheless held that the Government’s good faith deportation of the potential witnesses would be sanctionable if the witnesses were material to the defense. See id. at 873-74. In addition to the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in this area, we are also mindful of Congress’ judgment, expressed in CIPA, that the Executive’s interest in protecting classified information does not overcome a defendant’s right to present his case. Under CIPA, once the district court determines that an item of classified information is relevant and material, that item must be admitted unless the government provides an adequate substitution. See 18 U.S.C.A. App. 3 § 6(c)(1); Fernandez, 913 F.2d at 154. If no adequate substitution can be found, the government must decide whether it will prohibit the disclosure of the classified information; if it does so, the district court UNITED STATES v. MOUSSAOUI 41 must impose a sanction, which is presumptively dismissal of the indictment. See 18 U.S.C.A. App. 3 § 6(e). In view of these authorities, it is clear that when an evidentiary privilege—even one that involves national security—is asserted by the Government in the context of its prosecution of a criminal offense, the balancing we must conduct is primarily, if not solely, an examination of whether the district court correctly determined that the information the Government seeks to withhold is material to the defense. We have determined that the enemy combatant witnesses can offer material testimony that is essential to Moussaoui’s defense, and we therefore affirm the January 30 and August 29 orders. Thus, the choice is the Government’s whether to comply with those orders or suffer a sanction. UNITED STATES v. MOUSSAOUI 43 Volume 2 of 2 44 UNITED STATES v. MOUSSAOUI