Opinion ID: 616881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We have limited jurisdiction in an interlocutory appeal. [6] In this case we have jurisdiction over the qualified immunity and absolute legislative immunity issues, but we lack jurisdiction over the statutory immunity issue. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of this Circuitthe final judgment rule. The Supreme Court has clarified, however, that a decision `final' within the meaning of § 1291 does not necessarily mean the last order possible to be made in a case. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (quotation omitted). Instead, a district court's ruling may be appealed if it fall[s] in that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). We must determine which of the issues raised by Officer Montoya and Secretary Williams fit into the small class of claims that we may review in an interlocutory appeal under Cohen 's collateral order doctrine. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 524-25, 105 S.Ct. 2806.
Both Officer Montoya and Secretary Williams appeal the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss on qualified immunity. The Supreme Court has explained that qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability . . . it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Id. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806. Therefore, a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable `final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id. at 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806; see also Peterson v. Jensen, 371 F.3d 1199, 1201-02 (10th Cir.2004) (reviewing on interlocutory appeal a denial of a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds). Whether Mr. Brown has alleged a violation of his clearly established constitutional rights to overcome Officer Montoya's and Secretary Williams's defense of qualified immunity is an issue of law reviewable on interlocutory appeal.
Secretary Williams also appeals the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss for absolute legislative immunity. In Sable v. Myers, 563 F.3d 1120, 1121 (10th Cir.2009) (citing to Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525, 105 S.Ct. 2806), we stated that absolute legislative immunity is reviewable on an interlocutory appeal. Although we have jurisdiction over this issue, we do not reach it because we reverse, on qualified immunity grounds, the district court's denial of Secretary Williams's motion to dismiss Mr. Brown's individual capacity claim against him.
Officer Montoya and Secretary Williams argue that they have statutory immunity under the Wetterling Act. We lack jurisdiction to review this issue. The Wetterling Act states: Law enforcement agencies, employees of law enforcement agencies and independent contractors acting at the direction of such agencies, and State officials shall be immune from liability for good faith conduct under this section. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(f). [7] In Decker v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 982 F.2d 433 (10th Cir.1992), we held that we lacked interlocutory jurisdiction over statutory immunity from liability. Id. at 437 (holding that, because the statutes on which defendants relied provide[d] `an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,' . . . [the defendants'] asserted right to be free from liability can be effectively vindicated in a future appeal of a final order. (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806)).