Opinion ID: 165793
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consent Judgment

Text: It is a well-accepted rule that a party to a consent judgment waives any objection to matters within the scope of the judgment. Mock v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522, 526 (10th Cir. 1992) (collecting cases). “[A] decree, which appears by the record to have been rendered by consent is always affirmed, without considering the merits of the cause.” Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 324 (1928) (quoting Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. United States, 113 U.S. 261, 266 (1885)). In the absence of a reservation of the right to appeal a consent decree, there are only three exceptions to this general rule. Mock, 971 F.2d at 527. A party may appeal a consent judgment where he can establish he did not actually consent, where he can show fraud in the procurement, or where the court entering the judgment lacked subject matter -6- jurisdiction over the case. Swift, 276 U.S. at 324. None of these exceptions apply. DWG’s initial contention is that the stipulation was not voluntary. It argues that due to the confusing nature of the court’s order vacating the proceedings, Little was required to participate at the preliminary injunction hearing on a cell phone from the back of a taxicab where Little could only intermittently hear the proceedings until he reached his hotel and a land-line telephone. 4 Further, DWG contends Little was required to participate without the assistance of documents and agreed to stipulate only under the threat of sanctions by the district court. These arguments are singularly without merit. It was Little himself who first suggested a stipulation. Moreover, he never indicated to the district court that he could not hear the proceedings and, in fact, informed the district court prior to the stipulation that he had switched to a land line telephone. Although he The reason Little was not present in person was based on his belief that the 4 hearing had been vacated by court order. That order stated: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that proceedings in this case have been vacated from hearing before Honorable Tena Campbell: TYPE OF PROCEEDING: Court vacates all dates set in scheduling order pending resolution of dispositive motions. -7- bemoans his presence in another state, necessarily proceeding by memory alone, he never requested a continuance. We must stretch to find sympathy for his predicament since his location was based on his own failure to carefully read the district court’s order vacating all dates set forth in the scheduling order, not the actual hearing. Nevertheless, the mere fact Little appeared telephonically does not seem to have affected his ability to voluntarily enter into the stipulation. The argument that the district court coerced agreement through the threat of sanctions borders on offensive. The district court willingly provided DWG with the option of an additional thirty days to submit and present argument on what it believed to be new evidence. Although the district court warned DWG that it would seriously consider awarding attorneys’ fees to RUFI if DWG repeated previously made arguments, there is nothing improper in a district court’s admonishment to a party that it will not tolerate certain behavior and advising of possible consequences for disregard of the warning. DWG next asserts that, if the stipulation is considered voluntary, the stipulation is limited solely to an agreement that it would not use the term “U.S Prime” in the future, reserving the disposition of the unclean hands or secondary meaning issues. It also maintains its request at the hearing for several days to review the permanent injunction order coupled with its immediate notice of appeal indicates it had changed its position. DWG further complains the district -8- court did not instruct DWG that it was waiving its right to appeal by stipulating to the permanent injunction. “[T]he scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it.” United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971). Our review of the transcript of the hearing and the subsequent order granting a permanent injunction reveals DWG voluntarily consented to the permanent injunction and all issues were clearly included in the stipulated judgment. A review of the transcript is revealing. Following its specific offer of an additional thirty days to identify new evidence, the district court stated, “If you believe that, you agree that my order of preliminary injunction may simply become final, that is another option you have.” (Preliminary Injunction Hearing Tr. at 13-14.) In response, DWG’s counsel stated he intended to permanently forego using the term “U.S. Prime,” and made the following offer, “[I]f we can fashion some kind of stipulated judgment between the two parties, we can call this a closed deal and waste no more resources.” (Id. at 14 (emphasis added). The district court then asked counsel, “What if I just say based on the stipulation of the parties, the injunction is permanent; each party to bear its own costs, would that achieve the offer you just made?” (Id.) Mr. Little responded with a request for two or three days to review the draft. In reply, the district court stated: -9- [L]et me tell you exactly what it would be. It would be my order granting [the preliminary] injunction of September 28th . . . . It would have one paragraph that would say based on the stipulation and the discussion at this hearing, the following order becomes permanent. There would be a final paragraph that would say I find this is not an exceptional case justifying an award of attorney’s fees, therefore, the case is dismissed. Each party to bear its own attorney’s fees. (Id. at 15.) DWG’s counsel responded, “Your Honor, I have no problem with that at this point, and that way I would not have to bring up more issues, and I would be – I am acceptable to that.” (Id.) Thus, DWG’s argument that its stipulation did not cover the issues of unclean hands and secondary meaning is unsupported in the record. Indeed, DWG’s counsel twice indicated his wish to call this a closed case to avoid raising new issues and to avoid wasting resources. He settled without expressing any reservations, knowing the scope of the preliminary injunction—having appealed those issues already—and knowing that an identical permanent injunction order would conclude the entire case. DWG points to no case law requiring the district court to instruct counsel on the legal consequences of his actions when consenting to judgment. In addition, if DWG was dissatisfied with any part of the permanent injunction order, it should have raised these objections with the district court first, rather than immediately filing an appeal. Because the entire scope of the preliminary injunction was included within the stipulation and no other exception to the rule prohibiting the appeal of consent -10- judgments is applicable, DWG has waived its right to appeal and affirmance is necessary. See Mock, 971 F.2d at 526 n.5 (“[T]he appropriate disposition, if the appeal represents no more than a retroactive attempt to undo consent properly given, is affirmance rather than dismissal.”). 5