Opinion ID: 477929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Garcia to Sec. 1981 Claims

Text: 23 Although the Supreme Court has not considered whether the same statute of limitations should apply in Sec. 1981 suits as in Sec. 1983 suits, see Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 48 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 2924, 2929 n. 11, 82 L.Ed.2d 36 (1984), we find the reasoning of Garcia to be persuasive in this context as well. As an initial matter, it is clear that the same statutory directive applies to both types of claims. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 (1982). Similarly, the Court's emphasis in Garcia on avoiding collateral litigation over the applicable statute of limitations is equally compelling here. Both Sec. 1983 and Sec. 1981 provide remedies for a broad range of actions that could be characterized as various state torts. Allowing the characterization to turn on the particular facts of a case presents the same threat of excessive collateral litigation. Thus the Court's conclusion that Sec. 1988 is fairly construed as a directive to select, in each State, the one most appropriate statute of limitations, Garcia, 471 U.S. at 275, 105 S.Ct. at 1947, is equally applicable here. 24 More importantly, we see no difference between the central objectives of Sec. 1981 and Sec. 1983--each a product of the Reconstruction Era 11 --for the purposes of applying Garcia to Sec. 1981 claims. Both statutes were enacted to ensure that individuals whose federal Constitutional or statutory rights are abridged [could] recover damages or secure injunctive relief. Burnett, 468 U.S. at 55, 104 S.Ct. at 2932. Section 1981, like Sec. 1983, broadly protects the right of all persons to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 (1982). A violation of that command is a personal injury in very much the same sense as is a violation of Sec. 1983. As the Court explained in Garcia, 25 The unifying theme of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is reflected in the language of the Fourteenth Amendment that unequivocally recognizes the equal status of every person  subject to the jurisdiction of any of the several States. The Constitution's command is that all persons  shall be accorded the full privileges of citizenship; no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or to be denied the equal protection of the laws. A violation of that command is an injury to the individual rights of the person. 26 471 U.S. at 277, 105 S.Ct. at 1948 (last emphasis added; footnote omitted). See also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n. 10, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 1009 n. 10, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974) (suggesting that racial discrimination be treated as a dignitary tort); Developments--Section 1981, 15 HARV. C.R./C.L. L.REV. 29, 224 (1980) (noting that some courts have characterized claims under Sec. 1981 as dignitary torts). Indeed, it is significant to note that in reaching the conclusion that Sec. 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury claims, the Court cited two cases that held that Sec. 1981 claims are also appropriately characterized as personal injury claims. See Garcia, 471 U.S. at 278 n. 38, 105 S.Ct. at 1948 n. 38 (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179-82, 96 S.Ct. 2586, 2598-2600, 49 L.Ed.2d 415 (1966) ); McCausland v. Mason County Bd. of Educ., 649 F.2d 278, 279 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098, 102 S.Ct. 671, 70 L.Ed.2d 639 (1981) ). 27 Moreover, characterization of Sec. 1981 claims as personal injury actions is far from unique. Indeed, before Garcia, courts frequently characterized claims brought under both statutes as personal injury claims. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 182, 96 S.Ct. at 2600 (affirming reliance on personal injury statute of limitations in Sec. 1981 claim and noting that petitioners have not cited any Virginia court decision to the effect that the term 'personal injuries' in Sec. 8-24 means only 'physical injuries' ); Garcia v. University of Kansas, 702 F.2d 849, 851 (10th Cir.1983) (applying statute for injury to the rights of another to both Sec. 1981 and Sec. 1983 claims); Jones v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 679 F.2d 32, 36 (5th Cir.) (applying tort statute to Secs. 1981 and 1983 claims for racial discrimination), modified on other grounds, 688 F.2d 342 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 951, 103 S.Ct. 2420, 77 L.Ed.2d 1310 (1983); McCausland (personal injury statute applied to Sec. 1981 and Sec. 1983 claims); Movement for Opportunity & Equality v. General Motors Corp., 622 F.2d 1235, 1242-43 (7th Cir.1980) (Indiana personal injury statute applied to Sec. 1981 claim; court noted that the choice of a statute of limitations under section 1981 (for discriminatory actions by private individuals) is essentially the choice to be made under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1976) (for discriminatory actions under color of state law).); Ingram v. Steven Robert Corp., 547 F.2d 1260, 1263 (5th Cir.1977) (applying injury to the rights of another statute of limitations to a Sec. 1981 claim). Indeed, this very court has applied the District's personal injury statute to Sec. 1981 claims. See Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d at 994. Thus we conclude that characterization of Sec. 1981 claims as personal injury actions is both appropriate and accurate. 28 Our conclusion is consistent with the result reached by other courts that have considered the issue. In Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113 (3d Cir.1985), which similarly involved allegations of employment discrimination, the Third Circuit concluded that the Garcia analysis appl[ies] equally to actions under Sec. 1981. Id. at 119. Thus the court held that the personal injury statute of limitations of the forum state supplies the most analogous statute of limitations for actions brought under Sec. 1981. Id. at 120. 12 See also Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784 F.2d 505, 511 (3d Cir.1986) (Garcia made the Goodman decision inevitable) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has indicated in dicta that the personal injury statute of limitations should apply to Sec. 1981 claims. See Friedlander v. Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore, 788 F.2d 1500, 1503 n. 2 (11th Cir.1986). See also Anderson v. University Health Center, 623 F.Supp. 795, 796 (W.D.Pa.1985) ([T]here is no reason why the same rule [applicable to Sec. 1983 claims] should not apply to Section 1981 actions.); Saldivar v. Cadena, 622 F.Supp. 949, 958 (W.D.Wis.1985) (applying statute applicable to actions for injuries to the character or rights of another to Sec. 1981 claims). Indeed, the concurrence has cited not a single decision by a court outside this circuit that, in the wake of Garcia, has applied a statute other than that applicable to personal injury claims to a Sec. 1981 action. 13 29