Opinion ID: 2636537
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: First Ortiz Exception

Text: A criminal defendant may qualify to take a late appeal under the first Ortiz exception if he or she has been denied basic procedural due process, i.e., timely and reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. See State v. Willingham, 266 Kan. 98, 100-01, 967 P.2d 1079 (1998); State v. Reeves, No. 97,344, ___ Kan.App. ___, 2008 WL 1868629, unpublished opinion filed April 25, 2008; State v. Barron, No. 97,378, ___ Kan.App. ___, 2008 WL 1722206, unpublished opinion filed April 11, 2008; Casner v. State, 37 Kan.App.2d 667, 674, 155 P.3d 1202 (2007). Three Kansas statutes provide specific procedural safeguards of the right to appeal by certain criminal defendants. First, K.S.A. 22-3210(a)(2) requires a judge who accepts a felony guilty or nolo contendere plea to inform the defendant of the consequences of the plea. These consequences include waiver of the right to appeal any resulting conviction. K.S.A. 22-3424(f) instructs that a sentencing judge must inform a defendant who has gone to trial of defendant's right to appeal and of the right of a person who is unable to pay the costs of an appeal to appeal in forma pauperis. We note that Phinney, 280 Kan. at 402, 122 P.3d 356, and State v. Pickerill, No. 93,595, ___ Kan.App. ___, 2006 WL 2129122, unpublished opinion filed July 28, 2006, rev. denied 282 Kan. 795 (2006), have interpreted this provision broadly to apply to all defendants. In keeping with these precedents, we hold explicitly that the requirements of K.S.A. 22-3424(f) apply regardless of whether a defendant went to trial and regardless of whether he or she is indigent. K.S.A. 22-4505 requires the district judge to inform an indigent felony defendant of the right to appeal... [a] conviction and the right to have an attorney appointed and a transcript of the trial record produced for that purpose. Due process is deniedand an out-of-time appeal may be permissible under the first Ortiz exceptionif a district judge fails to abide by one of these statutes, as they have been interpreted by our earlier case law. Thus a district judge must inform a criminal defendant at sentencing, regardless of whether the defendant has entered a plea or gone to trial, that: (1) a right to appeal the severity level of the sentence exists; (2) any such appeal must be taken within 10 days, (see Phinney, 280 Kan. at 400, 122 P.3d 356; Willingham, 266 Kan. at 100-01, 967 P.2d 1079 [citing Mitchell, 231 Kan. at 146, 642 P.2d 981]); and (3) if the defendant is indigent, an attorney will be appointed for the purpose of taking any desired appeal. Compare Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(j) (allocating to court responsibility to inform criminal defendant of right to appeal). The evidentiary burden of showing that the district judge failed to communicate one or more of these three pieces of information at sentencing is on the defendant, who must demonstrate deficiency from the transcript of the sentencing hearing. Based on analogous United States Supreme Court decisions, we are confident that this allocation of the evidentiary burden does not offend due process. In Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992), the United States Supreme Court held that, while the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant would violate due process, there was no due process violation in a statutory presumption of competence, which placed the burden on defendant to prove his or her incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence. In so holding, the Medina Court recognized that the traditional balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), that applied to procedural due process claims in civil cases, did not provide an appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural rules in criminal cases. Medina, 505 U.S. at 442-43, 112 S.Ct. 2572. Rather, the appropriate analytical approach set forth in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977), governs. The issue in Patterson was whether defendant's conviction of second-degree murder under a New York statute deprived him of due process by placing on him the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the affirmative defense of acting under the influence of extreme emotional distress, in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter in the first degree. The Court held it did not. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 209-10, 97 S.Ct. 2319. In particular, the Patterson decision held that the power of a State to regulate procedures for carrying out criminal laws, including the burden of producing evidence, is not subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless it `offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people so as to be ranked as fundamental.' Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201-02, 97 S.Ct. 2319; see Medina, 505 U.S. at 445, 112 S.Ct. 2572. The high Court's rationale underlying this less intrusive inquiry into due process concerns in criminal cases is that many aspects of criminal procedure are already defined by specific guarantees of the United States Constitution Bill of Rights, and that, beyond those, the Due Process Clause has limited operation. See Medina, 505 U.S. at 443, 112 S.Ct. 2572 (citing, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 [1990]). Although we have not previously adopted the less intrusive due process analysis set out in Medina for criminal cases, we have acknowledged or relied upon other aspects of that decision. See State v. Davis, 281 Kan. 169, 176, 130 P.3d 69 (2006) (citing Medina for proposition that criminal trial of incompetent violates due process); State v. McKinney, 265 Kan. 104, 107, 961 P.2d 1 (1998) (citing Medina in holding Kansas' competency statutes, presuming competence and implicitly requiring defendant to prove incompetence by preponderance of the evidence, do not violate due process); State v. Cellier, 263 Kan. 54, 948 P.2d 616 (1997) (same). When the applicability of the first Ortiz exception is in issue, if the defendant discharges the burden of demonstrating from the sentencing hearing transcript that the district judge failed to communicate one or more of the three required pieces of information, the State still may prevent a late appeal by proving that the defendant possessed actual knowledge of all of the required information by some means other than the district judge's oral statements at sentencing. The source of such actual knowledge may be counsel's advice, the wording of an agreement signed by the defendant, or some other person or document; but the State bears the evidentiary burden on this point. If the sentencing hearing transcript demonstrates that the district judge did not adequately inform the defendant orally, and the State is unable to demonstrate that the defendant had actual knowledge of the required information from some other source, the defendant must then prove that, had he or she been properly informed, a timely appeal would have been sought. This evidentiary burden rests on the defendant. This requirement for application of the first Ortiz exception is consistent with this court's original admonition that a defendant may not let the matter rest and with our previous decisions. See Phinney, 280 Kan. at 405-06, 122 P.3d 356; Mitchell, 231 Kan. at 147, 642 P.2d 981. In addition, we believe it is true to United States Supreme Court precedent. See Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 24, 119 S.Ct. 961, 143 L.Ed.2d 18 (1999) (relief from sentencing court's error in failing to inform defendant of appeal right requires showing of prejudice); Cody v. United States, 249 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir.2001); Soto v. United States, 185 F.3d 48, 55 (2d Cir.1999).