Opinion ID: 2041803
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does PERA Provide a Discharge Procedure in Conflict with TTA?

Text: TTA, as the statutory excerpts set out in Part II above indicate, provides a very specific discharge procedure including furnishing written charges along with a statement of the teacher's rights, a hearing not less than 30 nor more than 45 days after filing charges, and a decision in writing within 15 days of the conclusion of the hearing, which must be furnished the teacher within 5 days after it is rendered. TTA is in effect the teachers' Magna Charta. [8] The heart of it is this guarantee of due process in any discharge proceeding, especially prior notice and hearing. It must be presumed therefore that if the Legislature should decide to repeal what it had so specifically granted it would not do so in an off-hand manner but by specific repeal or repeal by implication clear beyond peradventure. As we said in Rathbun v State of Michigan, 284 Mich 521, 544; 280 NW 35 (1938), quoting 59 CJ, p 1051: it will not be presumed that the legislature, in the enactment of a subsequent statute, intended to repeal an earlier one, unless it has done so in express terms   . (Emphasis added.) Without question, PERA provides no specific repeal of TTA discharge procedure. Does PERA repeal TTA's discharge procedure by implication by setting up a discharge procedure in direct, unavoidable conflict? The answer is that it does not. Nowhere in PERA is any discharge procedure set up. PERA does not specify that there must be notice and hearing before discharge. PERA does not specify that notice and hearing are not necessary before discharge. PERA § 6 does not provide in any way, shape, or fashion the mechanism or authority for a discharge or disciplinary proceeding. What PERA does set up is a procedure in its own words to be a determination as to whether he [the alleged striker] did violate the provisions of this act. The pertinent language is: [the alleged striker] shall be entitled to a determination as to whether he did violate the provisions of this act. The request shall be filed in writing within 10 days after regular compensation of such employee has ceased or other discipline has been imposed. This hearing obviously is not a discharge or discipline hearing because it is only requested after discharge or discipline. In establishing the rules of conduct for such a determination, there is specific reference to a body of rules outside of PERA, which, in this case, Justice LEVIN'S opinion agrees is TTA. The text here referred to is as follows: In the event of such request [for a determination whether or not there was a violation of the PERA anti-strike provision] the officer or body shall within 10 days commence a proceeding for the determination of whether the provisions of this act have been violated by the public employee, in accordance with the law and regulations appropriate to a proceeding to remove the public employee. (Emphasis added.) In short, since PERA does not set up a discharge procedure itself and specifically refers outside of PERA for such a procedure, it cannot be said, following the rules of statutory construction set out in Part III of this opinion, that PERA by implication has repealed the discharge procedure in TTA. As a matter of fact, not only is there no statutory repugnancy here, it is perfectly possible and reasonable to read these statutes together, i.e., a PERA hearing shall occur only after there has been discipline imposed following the procedural dictates of TTA. [9] We recognize that some might feel that the TTA time limits and requirements, though not by any means unduly long, might better be shortened to meet the exigencies of strike situations. This approach was in fact taken by the Court of Appeals in this case. However, we do not write legislation; the time periods involved are properly matters for legislative consideration and action. Accordingly, as outlined above, we hold that the Crestwood Board of Education erred in discharging the subject teachers summarily, without prior notice and hearing, and without reference to the applicable provisions of TTA. V  Contrary Contention The opinion of our learned Brother LEVIN, however, states: Section 6 of the PERA empowers the officer or body generally having disciplinary authority over an employee to terminate the employment of or impose other discipline on an employee who strikes in violation of the PERA. In providing that an employee's request for a hearing to determine whether he did violate the PERA be filed within ten days after regular compensation has ceased or other discipline has been imposed, the Legislature manifested an intention that the officer or body may impose discipline without a prior hearing. The conclusion reached in the first sentence is inferred in the second sentence from the following language in PERA § 6: Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, any person holding such a position who, by concerted action with others    absents himself    shall be deemed to be on strike but the person, upon request, shall be entitled to a determination as to whether he did violate the provisions of this act. The request shall be filed in writing, with the officer or body having power to remove or discipline such employee, within 10 days after regular compensation of such employee has ceased or other discipline has been imposed.    Nowhere in this PERA language is there any description of a removal procedure. All there is is a description of a procedure for a determination as to violation of the PERA anti-strike provision after there has been a removal proceeding in no way described in PERA. Consequently, the best that can be said for the conclusion in our Brother LEVIN'S opinion that PERA provides a procedure for discharge is that it is based on an inference. It certainly is not set out in so many words in PERA. So the first question is  can there be a repeal by implication where the conflicting provision proposed to substitute for a well-established and precise provision is no more than a possible inference? Let us recall the direct Rathbun reference to this: [I]t will not be presumed that the legislature, in the enactment of a subsequent statute, intended to repeal an earlier one, unless it has done so in express terms   . (Emphasis added.) 284 Mich 521, 544. But the second question is even more damaging  can there be an inference from the above quoted PERA language that not only is there a removal procedure specified but that what is specified is discharge without prior notice and hearing? Surely this is too much  a true non sequitur. Certainly the fact that an alleged striker has the right to contest the alleged violation of PERA within ten days after he has been disciplined, discharged or his pay stopped says nothing as to how his discipline or discharge was accomplished, i.e., with or without prior notice or with or without prior hearing. This is the pertinent language of the act: [The alleged striker] shall be entitled to a determination as to whether he did violate the provisions of this act. The request shall be filed in writing    within 10 days after regular compensation of such employee has ceased or other discipline has been imposed.] All it says is that after the alleged striker has been disciplined, he may request a hearing, nothing more  not a single word as to how the discipline was imposed. Consequently, it is submitted this kind of an inference supplies no basis whatsoever to conflict with and repeal by implication a specific provision for the traditional prior notice and hearing provided in TTA. In passing, it may be noted as well that the force of the phrase [n]otwithstanding the provisions of any other law, which Justice LEVIN heavily relies upon in his analysis, focuses on establishing that the described concerted action shall be deemed to be [a] strike and, possibly, to the right of the person to request a determination as to whether he was or was not in violation. We also take note that the opinion of Justice LEVIN expresses a commendable concern that there be in Michigan under aegis of PERA/MERC, similar to the Federal pattern of NLRA/NLRB, a unitary procedure for the discipline of public employees who strike. This is a concern, as Justice LEVIN'S opinion points out, that this Court as a whole shares, and this specific opinion agrees with. However, in his opinion, Justice LEVIN has pushed this concern further than the Legislature has given any warrant, and at too great a cost in established human rights. It must be recognized that there is at least one significant difference between the NLRA/NLRB and PERA/MERC patterns, that is that the Congress in establishing the self-contained NLRA/NLRB system specifically recognized and bottomed the system on the right to strike to balance employer power and labor power. [10] As the United States Supreme Court noted in Division 1287, Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees v Missouri, 374 US 74, 82; 83 S Ct 1657; 10 L Ed 2d 763 (1963), reh den, 375 US 870; 84 S Ct 29; 11 L Ed 2d 100 (1963): Collective bargaining, with the right to strike at its core, is the essence of the federal scheme. On the other hand, the Michigan Legislature in PERA § 6 went back to the Hutchinson Act which was specifically [a]n act to prohibit strikes by certain public employees. [11] To compensate for the lack of strike power, the Legislature over the years had guaranteed to public employees specific rights and procedures, among them those outlined in TTA. These rights and procedures, to a greater or lesser extent, carried over with PERA. Historically and legally, therefore, while PERA was a big step forward by the Legislature in responding to the constitutional mandate to establish a system of collective bargaining for public employees, [12] it is common knowledge that PERA did not in and of itself establish a clear, unified system but rather staked out a new system co-existing with an old system, with a murky gray area of operation and applicability in between them. [13] The all too vivid judicial history in recent years of conflicting and ineffectual reactions to ever-worsening school labor relations has highlighted and increased public awareness and understanding of the legislative hiatus in the interlock between PERA and TTA. Justice LEVIN has courageously applied his very considerable legal and forensic talents to terminate this legislative mish-mash. His opinion has produced a new order under the aegis of PERA/MERC, but at the cost of eliminating the important and traditional rights of notice and hearing before discharge and at the further cost of blinking at the recognized rules of statutory construction. We concede that the result of our opinion is not as tidy as that of Justice LEVIN'S opinion and leaves much for the Legislature to do. [14] We reach this result not out of any overwhelming reluctance to utilize the full potential of judicial power but through the recognition that the proper balance of administrative order and efficiency on the one hand, and personal rights on the other, necessary to meet the complex demands of teacher  school board relations at this time of extreme tension is not a matter that lends itself to the limited options of judicial construction of the material before us but requires the most comprehensive, as well as the wisest, employment of the Legislature's political and drafting skills. As a matter of fact, the Legislature is this very moment vigorously and exhaustively examining the subject, and the media have expressed the hope that a new solution carefully balancing all the equities is in the making. Under these circumstances and at this time, we feel the Legislature is best equipped to tackle the larger policy decisions and this Court can better serve the public by solving this case on the fundamentals of legislative construction, pointing out such anomalies in the PERA/TTA interlock as this case has brought to our attention.