Opinion ID: 2174363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Contempt Charge

Text: After the jury returned the verdict of guilty, Appellant Sprowls began yelling obscenities at the trial judge and threw a chair in the direction of the bench. As a result, the trial court held Appellant in contempt and issued an order stating, in part: 1. That the defendant, Dennis Sprowls, be and is hereby deemed in contempt of this Court. 2. That for said contempt, the defendant, Dennis Sprowls, is hereby sentenced to 179 days in jail, with commencement of said sentence being reserved until the Defendant has satisfied his sentence of the primary charges herein. 3. That upon satisfaction of the primary sentence herein, the defendant is to be brought before this Court for a determination of when his aforesaid contempt sentence is to be served. Appellant argues that the trial court erroneously retained jurisdiction of his case until completion of his underlying sentence in order to run the misdemeanor contempt sentence consecutively to the twenty-five year felony sentence. Appellant concedes that this issue is unpreserved. Recently, in Norton v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 750 (2001), we held: If we were to permit the KRS 532.110(1)(a) requirement of concurrent sentencing for definite and indeterminate terms to apply to sentences imposed for contempt of court, we have no doubt the requirement would materially limit the court's power of contempt. This we will not do. If the courts are to have the power to control participants in the judicial process and effectively administer justice, the power of contempt must be more than a hollow threat. As we stated in [ Woods v. Commonwealth, Ky., 712 S.W.2d 363, 365 (1986)], [w]itnesses cannot be allowed to freely refuse requests of the court with the certainty that their penalty will be of limited duration. . . . Similarly, if a defendant knows with certainty that any contempt conviction will simply be ordered to run concurrently with his felony sentence, the court's power of contempt is made meaningless. (Footnote omitted). If the courts are to have any real power to control the behavior of the defendants in their courtrooms, the power of contempt must carry with it a real punishmentthe possibility of serving additional time imprisoned for contemptible behavior. Therefore, we hold the KRS 532.110(1)(a) requirement of concurrent sentencing does not apply to terms imposed as punishment for contempt of court. Accordingly, while we conclude, and the Commonwealth concedes, that the trial court erred in attempting to reserve consideration of the contempt sentence until the completion of Appellant's underlying sentence, the trial court did not err in ordering the contempt sentence to run consecutive to Appellant's sentence for murder.