Opinion ID: 1059808
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Province of the Judiciary.

Text: Because these two subjects are related, we will discuss them together. The plaintiff argues that the medical malpractice cap violates the separation of powers doctrine and also invades the province of the judiciary. In rejecting a separation of powers challenge in Etheridge, we pointed out that under art. VI, § 1 of the Virginia Constitution, the General Assembly, subject to provisions relating to the power and jurisdiction of this Court, has the power to determine the original and appellate jurisdiction of the courts of the Commonwealth. 237 Va. at 100, 376 S.E.2d at 532. We also noted that under art. IV, § 14 of the Constitution, the General Assembly's authority extends to all subjects of legislation not herein forbidden or restricted, and that the common law is one area in which the General Assembly's authority has not been forbidden or restricted. Id. Accordingly, we said that the legislature has the power to provide, modify, or repeal a remedy. 237 Va. at 101, 376 S.E.2d at 532. And we concluded that whether the remedy prescribed in Code § 8.01-581.15 is viewed as a modification of the common law or as establishing the jurisdiction of the courts in specific cases, clearly it was a proper exercise of legislative power. 237 Va. at 101, 376 S.E.2d. at 532. This rationale applies with equal force here, and it should be sufficient to dispose of the plaintiff's arguments concerning separation of powers and the province of the judiciary, but the plaintiff disagrees. He says that art. VI, § 5 of the Constitution of Virginia establishes that the judiciary, not the legislature, makes the rules applicable to jury verdicts. On brief, the plaintiff quotes art. VI, § 5 as providing that this Court has the authority to make rules governing . . . the practice and procedures to be used in the courts of the Commonwealth.... However, what the plaintiff has omitted at the end of this quotation is of crucial importance. The full text of art. VI, § 5 reads as follows: The Supreme Court shall have the authority to make rules governing the course of appeals and the practice and procedures to be used in the courts of the Commonwealth, but such rules shall not be in conflict with the general law as the same shall, from time to time, be established by the General Assembly. (Emphasis added.) In addition, Code § 8.01-3, which is listed in the cross-reference following art. VI, § 5, provides that, while this Court may prepare a system of rules of practice and a system of pleading and the forms of process, . . . [t]he General Assembly may, from time to time, by the enactment of a general law, modify, or annul any rules adopted or amended pursuant to this section [and in] the case of any variance between a rule and an enactment of the General Assembly such variance shall be construed so as to give effect to such enactment. (Emphasis added.) Thus, we find no merit in the plaintiff's arguments concerning separation of powers and the province of the judiciary. Accordingly, we reject the arguments.