Opinion ID: 198473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper Sanction Instruction

Text: 37 Kmart's second argument is that the district court abused its discretion in giving the sanction instruction that it gave to punish Kmart for failing to produce Guffy for deposition. Kmart recognizes that the choice of sanctions for failing to comply with a discovery order lies within the sound discretion of the court. See Marx v. Kelly, Hart & Hallman, P.C., 929 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir.1991). Kmart also concedes that it is proper for a trial judge to sanction a party for its failure to appear for deposition pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A) & (B) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(d) by instructing the jury to assume that the party's testimony would have been unfavorable. What Kmart objects to here is the language of the sanction instruction given. 38 Kmart acknowledges that it would not have been an abuse of the district court's discretion to have instructed the jury to accept as true that Kmart was on notice that merchandise in the Humacao store was stacked in a dangerous manner. Kmart argues that the district court crossed the line when it instead instructed: 39 From K-Mart's refusal to produce its loss control manager, the Court instructs you that the loss control manager's statements would have been harmful to K-Mart's case. Therefore, you are instructed to accept as true that K-Mart knew that merchandise in its store was often stacked in an unsafe manner, frequently causing that merchandise to fall from shelves and injuring K-Mart customers. 40 Kmart argues that this instruction improperly communicated to the jury that Kmart knew of a serious, nationwide safety problem that frequently caused injuries to Kmart customers. Kmart argues that this message caused the jury to award damages designed to punish Kmart for this nationwide problem. 41 Again, Kmart complains after failing to raise an objection before the trial court, 2 as is required by Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 Therefore, we review the challenged jury instruction for plain error. See Chute, 143 F.3d at 631; Transamerica Premier Ins. Co. v. Ober, 107 F.3d 925, 933 (1st Cir.1997); Poulin v. Greer, 18 F.3d 979, 982 (1st Cir.1994). 42 While the language of the instruction was not perfect, there was no plain error. We do not read the instruction, as Kmart does, to establish that Kmart had a nationwide safety problem. The sanction instruction referred only to the store and did not attempt to establish any facts regarding other Kmart stores. With regard to the statements that merchandise in the store was often stacked in an unsafe manner and that merchandise frequently fell and injured customers, we do not find this language, in the absence of a focused objection, to fall outside the scope of the district court's discretion. Rule 37(b)(2)(A) authorizes the district court to enter an order stating that the matters that were the subject of the discovery order that was violated shall be taken to be established. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A). Guffy was Kmart's loss control manager, and the purpose of taking his deposition was to determine facts regarding: (1) merchandise display and storage, and (2) the extent of similar accidents and injuries occurring in Kmart stores. When Kmart violated the court's order by failing to produce Guffy for deposition, it was proper for the district court to sanction Kmart by instructing the jury to accept the unfavorable proposition that plaintiffs hoped to prove during Guffy's testimony: that unsafe merchandise display practices had caused similar accidents and injuries in the relevant Kmart store. Therefore, the giving of this particular sanction instruction does not warrant a new trial. 4