Opinion ID: 788656
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Decision in United States v. Cruz

Text: 15 Before addressing the merits of this case, we pause to note that we have already considered Cruz's appeal. In resolving that appeal we held that the government offered insufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have found Cruz guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Cruz, 363 F.3d 187, 199-200 (2d Cir.2004). We so held because the record, which largely tracks the evidence offered against Rodriguez, was devoid of evidence that Cruz knew that Medina possessed drugs or that he intended to sell drugs to Ramos. Id. at 198. We noted that the DEA agents' testimony that Cruz engaged in countersurveillance activity when he initially arrived at the Boston Market, that Cruz was present at the Boston Market during the meeting, and that Cruz drove the Lincoln Town Car in which Ramos first saw the heroin all indicated that Cruz was present at the scene of the crime and likely knew that some type of crime was being committed. Id. at 198-99. We held, however, that the evidence fell short of establishing that Cruz knew of the specific crime Medina proposed to commit or that Cruz intended to facilitate such a crime. Id. at 199. We thus held that the government offered insufficient evidence to show that, although Cruz may have served as a lookout, he possessed the requisite knowledge and specific intent to sustain his conviction. Id. 16 In addition, we also addressed Cruz's argument that Agent Tully was erroneously permitted to offer expert testimony regarding the meaning of Cruz's statement that he was present at the scene of Medina's meeting with Ramos because he had been asked to watch someone's back. We held that the district court improperly permitted Agent Tully to offer expert testimony regarding the meaning of this phrase because the government had offered no evidence that it had a fixed meaning in drug parlance. Id. at 197. Nonetheless, even taking into consideration this improperly admitted testimony, we held that there existed insufficient proof to permit a reasonable jury to have found Cruz guilty. Id. at 200. Accordingly, we reversed Cruz's conviction and directed the district court to enter a judgment of acquittal. Id. at 189, 200. 17