Opinion ID: 1405617
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did Unicol Owe Brent a Duty of Care?

Text: The superior court relied on Brock v. Rogers & Babler, Inc., 536 P.2d 778 (Alaska 1975), to conclude that Unicol owed no duty to Brent once it had left the work site because, the Brock court reasoned, former possessors of land are not liable for injuries caused to others while upon the land by any dangerous condition, natural or artificial, which existed when the possession of the land was transferred. [3] Brent attempts to distinguish Brock by arguing that the danger in that case was open and obvious while the danger in this case was latent. Unicol does not address Brent's argument, but argues that Brock controls because a contractor for all intents and purposes is in fact the possessor of the property. Brock and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 352 (1965), [4] on which Brock is based, do not apply here. Unicol was not the owner or lessee of the work site, and Brent's negligence claim is not based on Unicol's status as a former possessor of land, but on its status as the independent contractor which allegedly created a dangerous condition on the land. It was error to conclude that Brock governed. Brent's case is instead governed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 385 (1965), which discusses when an independent contractor can be liable for injuries resulting from dangerous conditions it creates: One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any other condition thereon is subject to liability to others upon or outside of the land for physical harm caused to them by the dangerous character of the structure or condition after his work has been accepted by the possessor, under the same rules as those determining the liability of one who as manufacturer or independent contractor makes a chattel for the use of others. [5] Section 385 reflects the majority rule that a contractor is held to the standard of reasonable care for the protection of third parties who may foreseeably be endangered by his negligence, even after acceptance of the work by the contractee. [6] Unicol recognizes in its brief that § 385 applies to this case but argues that § 385, Comment c supports the conclusion of no liability. Unicol emphasizes the part of Comment c that states: a servant or contractor who turns over the land with knowledge that his work has made it dangerous in a manner unlikely to be discovered by the possessor is subject to liability both to the possessor, and to those who come upon the land with the consent of the possessor or who are likely to be in its vicinity. [7] Unicol argues that this statement dovetails with the reasoning of this court in Brock holding that a former possessor is not liable when it is no longer in possession and control. Unicol argues that it is therefore not liable because the injury occurred after Unicol left the site and after Unicol disclosed to ARCO the conditions and potential hazards at the site.  Although Comment c sets out an exception to § 385, it does not go as far as Unicol contends. Under Comment c, a contractor who turns the site over to the owner may discharge its duty to third persons if the condition which harms the third person is either (1) fully disclosed to the owner, or (2) fully recognized by the owner even if not disclosed. Comment c refers to § 388, Comment n for the discussion of this exception. Comment n states in part: In all such cases the question may arise as to whether the person supplying the chattel is exercising that reasonable care, which he owes to those who are to use it, by informing the third person through whom the chattel is supplied of its actual character. [8] Comment n requires the party creating the danger to act reasonably in ensuring not only that the property owner is informed but that other potential victims will be aware of their peril. Unicol has not discussed, except in the briefest terms, why disclosure of the condition to ARCO must satisfy § 385, and has not discussed § 388 at all. Even assuming that the rule Unicol proposes is correct, however, Unicol has not established that it fully disclosed to ARCO the conditionthe gap between the rig mats and the edgeand it has not established that ARCO fully recognized the nature of the hazard Unicol's work potentially posed. Although some evidence would permit an inference that ARCO was informed of the condition by a walk-around inspection it allegedly conducted with Unicol, a contrary inference could be drawn from evidence that the protective snow berm Unicol claimed it left overlapped the edge and covered part of the rig mat. If the berm did in fact overlap the edge and cover part of the mat, it would have obscured the gap from ARCO's observation, preventing ARCO from recognizing the dangerous condition. Furthermore, it is not enough that ARCO arguably should have discovered the allegedly hazardous condition during its walk-around inspection. Comment c of § 385 refers to § 396 in discussing whether the contractor's liability is affected by the fact that the employer, as the possessor of the land, is under a duty toward the person injured to discover the defect and make the condition safe or warn such person of the existence of the danger. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 396 (1965) provides: A manufacturer of a chattel is subject to liability... although the dangerous character or condition of the chattel is discoverable by an inspection which the seller or any other person is under a duty to the person injured to make. Any duty on ARCO to inspect the site and detect the condition does not automatically relieve Unicol of liability. Under the majority rule expressed in § 385, then, Unicol may be liable to Brent. But some jurisdictions have adopted a minority position. In those jurisdictions, a contractor is immune from liability under the completion and acceptance doctrine: `[W]here the work of an independent contractor is completed, turned over to, and accepted by the owner, the contractor is not liable to third persons for damages or injuries subsequently suffered by reason of the condition of the work, even though he was negligent in carrying out the contract.' [9] This historically was the common law rule, but it has been so riddled with exceptions that most courts have now adopted the modern rule reflected in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 385 (1965). [10] Courts adopting the modern rule of liability have recognized that the justifications for the completion and acceptance doctrine were based on the lack of privity between the contractor and the injured third party. [11] Modern tort law following the watershed case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y.1916), has eschewed the requirement of privity and has found a duty of reasonable care whenever the harm was foreseeable. [12] We adopt the majority rule that allows liability for independent contractors under the terms of § 385 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. We have previously demonstrated a dissatisfaction with strict privity limitations in resolving questions of jobsite liability. [13] We have also allowed liability against chattel manufacturers who are not in strict privity with those injured by a condition of the chattel. [14] The majority rule allowing liability for contractors is consistent with Alaska tort law. Because we adopt the principle set out in § 385, we cannot affirm Unicol's summary judgment on the theory that it owed no duty to Brent.