Opinion ID: 2067285
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Jackson's Statement

Text: Jackson argues that the trial court improperly admitted an incriminating statement he gave to Detective Clarence Sorrell on October 10. He claims the evidence should have been suppressed because his statement was involuntary and because Sorrell continued to question him after he had invoked his right to counsel. This Court reviewed the standards for determining the voluntariness of a confession in Light v. State (1989), Ind., 547 N.E.2d 1073: Recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions focus on two areas of inquiry: 1) whether the alleged coercive police activity violated the U.S. Constitution and 2) whether the defendant's will was overborne by such coercive activity. Coercive police activity is a necessary prerequisite to finding a confession is not voluntary within the meaning of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. A review of the trial court's decision essentially examines the defendant's will to resist, which must not be overborne; nor can his capacity for self determination [be] critically impaired. This analysis ultimately turns on the effect of the totality of the circumstances on the defendant's will. It matters not whether the statement was true or false or even if there is ample evidence aside from the confession to support the verdict. What matters is only whether the statement would not have been given but for coercive government influences. Id. at 1077 (citations and footnote omitted). The circumstances surrounding Jackson's statement demonstrate that his will was not overborne by Sorrell's questioning. The transcript and tape of the statement reveal that although Jackson was upset while he was speaking, he was awake, alert, and free from the influence of drugs and alcohol. Sorrell did not make Jackson any specific promises nor did he threaten Jackson. Particularly telling was Jackson's question early in the interview as to whether he could be guaranteed to go to a Federal pen if he told everything. Record at 5195 (statement at 3). This request indicates that the questioning did not render Jackson incapable of considering whether talking to the police was in his best interest. In addition to general complaints about the coercive atmosphere, Jackson specifically claims that Sorrell coerced his statement by misrepresenting his legal rights. Sorrell read Jackson his legal rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). He then added: You have the right to set here and keep your mouth shut ... say nothing to us ... and we're gonna get up and we're gonna walk outta the room ... but you also have the right... . to tell us ... exactly what happened ... and that may be in your best interest. Do you understand what I'm sayin'? Record at 5195 (statement at 8) (ellipses in original). Jackson claims this confused and coerced him. At the time Jackson made his statement, he had completed fourteen years of formal education. In addition, he had a prior conviction for robbery, suggesting that he had heard his Miranda rights before. Finally, Jackson had a written copy of his Miranda rights in front of him while Sorrell was speaking. Jackson was clearly capable of understanding his rights, and nothing Sorrell said was likely to confuse him. Thus we cannot conclude from the record before us that Jackson was coerced into making an incriminating statement. Jackson also claims that Sorrell continued to question him after he had invoked his right to counsel. Under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, a suspect has the right to the presence and advice of counsel during custodial interrogation by the police. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Once the suspect asserts his right to counsel, the interrogation must cease until counsel has been made available to him or until the suspect initiates further communication with the police and knowingly and intelligently waives the right to counsel which he previously invoked. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983). [A]n accused's post-request responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast doubt on the clarity of his initial request for counsel. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 92, 105 S.Ct. 490, 495, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (per curiam). If a suspect's request for counsel is perceived to be inherently ambiguous, or equivocal in light of the preceding events, any further questioning should be narrowly limited to clarifying whether the suspect actually wished to have counsel present. Sleek v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 751. Jackson claims he invoked his right to counsel during the following portion of the conversation: Det. Sorrell Okay. Do you understand your rights, Don? D. Jackson (No audible response... .) Det. Sorrell Okay. Need you to sign right there.... go ahead and read. D. Jackson Is it possible to have a lawyer here? Det. Sorrell It's possible. Do you ... do you know a lawyer that would come in here? Okay ... you're the one that's gonna ... you know ... you can do that. D. Jackson Well, I... . I . . I'd just like somebody here with me ... (very low mumbling . .. inaudible ...) Det. Sorrell Again, everything is up to you. You know... you're ... you're the man in charge here. The only thing ... the only thing in the world I'm saying ... at this point is ... if somebody else . . if there is somebody else who did something more serious here ... then this is the last time we're gonna have a chance to talk about it. Okay? D. Jackson (No audible response... .) Det. Sorrell Other than that, it looks like ... you're on the line ... and again ... I sa ... as I said before ... it would behoove you to get that all out ... at this point ... so that we can get on with this thing ... get the rest of it done . . and get ... get it cleaned up. We been .. . we been busy since yesterday ... as you could well tell ... so we ... I think ... you know... at ... at this point ... D. Jackson I need help. Record at 5195 (statement at 9-10) (ellipses in original). Jackson's question concerning counsel was equivocal, and Sorrell's response to it was quite appropriate. Jackson was not a stranger to the legal system, and asking him if he knew a lawyer who would come in was within the permissible bounds of clarifying whether he actually wanted a lawyer. Even after Jackson responded that he just wanted somebody, Sorrell continued to give Jackson the opportunity to invoke his right to counsel by telling him that he, Jackson, was the one in charge. Rather than requesting a lawyer, Jackson signed the waiver of rights form and talked to Sorrell. Jackson knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel; both his statement and the evidence derived from his statement were admissible at trial.