Opinion ID: 1156159
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: transfers of property for less than full market value

Text: The Act empowers the Authority: ... [T]o acquire, purchase, hold, use, improve, lease, mortgage, sell, transfer, and dispose of any property, real, personal, or mixed, or any interest therein. S.C. Code Ann. § 13-17-70(5) (Supp. 1985). S.C. Const. art. III, § 31, provides: Lands belonging to or under the control of the State shall never be donated, directly or indirectly, to private corporations or private individuals, or to railroad companies. Nor shall any land be sold to corporations, or associations, for a less price than that for which it can be sold to individuals. The Circuit Court held § 13-17-70(5) must be read as prohibiting the donation of property within the meaning of S.C. Const. art III, § 31. The Authority contends this holding will prevent it from transferring property to private firms for less than full market value. We disagree. This Court consistently has construed S.C. Const. art III, § 31, to allow the State to consider indirect benefits accruing to it in determining whether a grant of State property amounts to a proscribed donation. See, e.g., State v. Broad River Power Co. , 177 S.C. 240, 181 S.E. 41 (1935); Antonakas v. Anderson Chamber of Commerce , 130 S.C. 215, 126 S.E. 35 (1924). In McKinney v. City of Greenville , 262 S.C. 227, 203 S.E. (2d) 680 (1974), we stated: It is established beyond question by the decisions of the Supreme Court of South Carolina that a public body may properly consider indirect benefits resulting to the public in determining what is a fair and reasonable return for disposition of properties without running afoul of the constitutional prohibition against donations. [Emphasis supplied]. 262 S.C. at 242-243, 203 S.E. (2d) at 688. See also Elliott v. McNair , 250 S.C. 75, 156 S.E. (2d) 421 (1967) (no requirement that maximum price be obtained). The Circuit Court, by clear implication, held that § 13-17-70(5) must be read consistently with S.C. Const. art. III, § 31, as construed by this Court. Accordingly, we hold the Authority's exception is without merit.