Opinion ID: 1264924
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Heading: A Plaintiff May Assert A Claim For Relief For NIED In Hawai`i, By Virtue Of Negligent Exposure To HIV, Without Demonstrating A Predicate Harm.

Text: This court first recognized the independent tort of negligent infliction of mental distress in Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). In Rodrigues, the plaintiffs alleged emotional distress caused by the state having negligently caused extensive flood damage to their home. We acknowledged that, theretofore, the traditional rule had been that that there [was] no recovery for the negligent infliction of mental distress alone. 52 Haw. at 169, 472 P.2d at 518 (citations omitted). We then rejected the traditional rule, announcing that the preferable approach is to adopt general standards to test the genuineness and seriousness of mental distress in any particular case and holding that serious mental distress may be found where a reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case. Id. at 171, 173, 472 P.2d at 519-20. Thus, Hawai`i became the first jurisdiction to allow recovery [for NIED] without a showing of physically manifested harm to the plaintiff. Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 63 Haw. 557, 560, 632 P.2d 1066, 1068 (1981). In Rodrigues, we further recognized that, inasmuch as the interest in freedom from negligent infliction of serious mental distress is entitled to independent legal protection[,]... there is a duty to refrain from the negligent infliction of serious mental distress. Id. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520. We also noted that a limitation on the right of recovery in such cases, as in all negligence cases, is that the defendant's obligation to refrain from particular conduct is owed only to those who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous. Id. at 174, 472 P.2d at 521. Our first opportunity to apply the principles articulated in Rodrigues arose in Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Haw. 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974). In Leong, we declared that recovery was potentially available for NIED where a ten-year-old boy witnessed the death of his stepgrandmother. We noted that this court has not hesitated to grant negligently-inflicted mental distress [] unaccompanied by resulting physical injuries [] independent legal protection. Id. at 403, 520 P.2d at 762. We therefore held that, when it is reasonably foreseeable that a reasonable plaintiff-witness to an accident would not be able to cope with the mental stress engendered by such circumstances, the trial court should conclude that defendant's conduct is the [legal] cause of plaintiff's injury and impose liability on the defendant for any damages arising from the consequences of his negligent act. Id. at 410, 520 P.2d at 765. This court has noted that physical injury rules have been criticized as inadequate methods of distinguishing between worthy and unworthy claims. [5] Larsen v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc., 74 Haw. 1, 40, 837 P.2d 1273, 1293 (1992). Accordingly, we have held several times that recovery for NIED is permitted without a showing of physically manifested harm to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 18, 780 P.2d 566, 576 (1989); Campbell, 63 Haw. at 560, 632 P.2d at 1068; Leong, 55 Haw. at 407, 520 P.2d at 764; Rodrigues, 52 Haw. at 173, 472 P.2d at 520. On the other hand, we have also subscribed to the principle that recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress by one not physically injured is generally permitted only when there is `some physical injury to property or [another] person' resulting from the defendant's conduct. [6] Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawai`i) Ltd., 76 Hawai`i 454, 465-66, 879 P.2d 1037, 1048-49 (1994) (quoting Chedester v. Stecker, 64 Haw. 464, 468, 643 P.2d 532, 535 (1982)) (emphasis added); see also Tabieros v. Clark Equip. Co., 85 Hawai`i 336, 361, 944 P.2d 1279, 1304 (1997). Accordingly, we have denied recovery for NIED where the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any predicate physical or property injury. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Liberty Newspapers Ltd. Partnership, 89 Hawai`i 254, 269, 971 P.2d 1089, 1104 (1999) (defamation action); Tseu ex rel. Hobbes v. Jeyte, 88 Hawai`i 85, 92-93, 962 P.2d 344, 351-52, reconsideration denied, 91 Hawai`i 124, 980 P.2d 998 (1998) (housing discrimination action); Ross, 76 Hawai`i at 466, 879 P.2d at 1049 (discriminatory discharge action). We have declared, however, that recovery for particularly foreseeable emotional distress may be had in the context of a breach of contract where there is no predicate injury to the person. See Francis, 89 Hawai`i at 241, 971 P.2d at 714 (citing Brown v. Bannister, 14 Haw. 34, 36-37 (1902) (discussing recovery for humiliation suffered as a result of a breach of a promise to marry), and Wilson v. Houston Funeral Home, 42 Cal.App.4th 1124, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 169, 173 (Cal.Ct.App. 1996) (discussing recovery for mental anguish caused by a mortician's errors in preparing a body for burial)). A plaintiff asserting a claim of NIED based on a fear of developing AIDS will not necessarily experience a predicate physical injury. In the present case, for example, it appears that the plaintiffs have not contracted HIV, nor were they physically injured during their handling of the allegedly tainted blood sample. Thus, in order for an NIED claim to be available to the plaintiffs based solely upon their fear of AIDS, and in the absence of physical injury sustained by anyone as a result of the defendants' conduct, we would, of necessity, be obliged to carve out an exception to our general rule that recovery is permitted only when there is a predicate physical injury to someone. See Ross, 76 Hawai`i at 465-66, 879 P.2d at 1048-49. Other jurisdictions have held that recovery for NIED may be allowable where a defendant's negligence places the plaintiff in actual physical peril. See, e.g., Vallery v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 630 So.2d 861, 866 (La.Ct. App.1993) (observing that NIED recovery may be had in cases allowing damages for fright or nervous shock, where the plaintiff was actually in great fear for his personal safety (quoting Moresi v. Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, 567 So.2d 1081, 1096 (La.1990)); K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 558 (Minn.1995) (noting that recovery for NIED is granted in cases where plaintiffs are in some actual personal physical danger caused by defendant's negligence) (emphasis added)); Brown v. New York City Health And Hosps. Corp., 225 A.D.2d 36, 648 N.Y.S.2d 880, 885 (1996) (noting that a cause of action seeking [NIED] recovery must generally be premised upon a breach of a duty owed directly to the plaintiff which either [actually] endangered the plaintiff's physical safety or caused the plaintiff fear for his or her own physical safety (quoting Creed v. United Hosp., 190 A.D.2d 489, 600 N.Y.S.2d 151 (N.Y.App.Div.1993) (quoting Lancellotti v. Howard, 155 A.D.2d 588, 547 N.Y.S.2d 654 (N.Y.App.Div.1989)))); Heiner v. Moretuzzo, 73 Ohio St.3d 80, 652 N.E.2d 664, 669-70 (1995) (observing that Ohio courts have recognized that a plaintiff may recover for NIED where he or she has been subjected to actual physical peril); cf. Carroll v. Sisters of Saint Francis Health Servs., Inc., 868 S.W.2d 585, 594 (Tenn.1993) (observing that in some situations, whether the plaintiff has incurred a literal physical injury has little to do with whether the emotional damages complained of are reasonable). This principle comports with the reasonable person standard originally articulated in Rodrigues. In our view, a reasonable person would foreseeably be unable to cope with the mental stress engendered by an actual, direct, imminent, and potentially life-endangering threat to his or her physical safety. Cf. Bramer v. Dotson, 190 W.Va. 200, 437 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1993) (observing that conventional wisdom mandates that fear of AIDS triggers genuinenot spuriousclaims of emotional distress). This concept is not, as Continental suggests, a departure from longstanding precedent in the areas of negligence theory and the independent cause of action for [NIED], but merely entails a recognition that the reasonableness standard established in Rodrigues has broader application than has previously been employed. Accordingly, we hereby recognize an exception to the general rule that recovery for NIED is permitted only when there is some predicate injury to a person, see Ross and Tabieros, supra, and hold that a claim of NIED for which relief may be granted is stated, inter alia, where the negligent behavior of a defendant subjects an individual to an actual, direct, imminent, and potentially life-endangering threat to his or her physical safety by virtue of exposure to HIV. [7]