Opinion ID: 6335851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Detective Cramer’s testimony

Text: Hall next argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from Det. Cramer regarding whether Hall exhibited indicators of mental illness. During the Commonwealth’s direct examination of Det. Cramer, the following exchange occurred: Commonwealth’s Attorney (CW): Did you observe anything in your interactions with him to lead you to believe that he was mentally ill in any way or a danger at that point? Det. Cramer (W): No, sir. We have particular protocols for instances like that. It’s not a real common occurrence but it does occur and if in our assessment of someone we feel like that is the attention that they need then they are taken to an evaluation place, generally in Hazard for this area, I believe. CW: To the psych ward? W: Yes. CW: Have you arrested or been involved in cases in the past where someone was arrested and in such a mental state that they were taken to the psych ward instead of the jail? W: Yes, sir. It’s been a long time, but yes. CW: But you didn’t do that here? W: No, sir. I didn’t. I didn’t see any indicators. CW: If the defendant had exhibited symptoms that would justify that, would you have taken him? W: Yes, sir. 19 Hall then objected on the basis that Det. Cramer was beginning to testify to expert knowledge regarding mental health without having been established as an expert in that field. The trial court overruled the objection, stating that if the detective was trained to look for indicators of mental illness, then his testimony was admissible. To this Court, Hall seems to concede that Det. Cramer’s testimony was not expert testimony but was, instead, lay opinion testimony. Hall argues that because Det. Cramer did not speak to Hall until after Hall had been transported to the jail, Det. Cramer did not have the requisite personal knowledge of how Hall acted immediately after the shooting to render an opinion on whether Hall exhibited symptoms of mental illness. Because this issue involves the admissibility of evidence, we review the ruling by the trial court for abuse of discretion. Little, 272 S.W.3d at 187 (citations omitted). A trial court abuses its discretion only where its decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” English, 993 S.W.2d at 945 (citations omitted). Under Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 701(a), opinion testimony from a lay witness must be “[r]ationally based on the perception of the witness.” In order to satisfy this requirement, “[a] witness must have personal knowledge” of that to which he testifies. Davidson v. Commonwealth, 548 S.W.3d 255, 258 (Ky. 2018) (quoting ROBERT G. LAWSON, KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK § 6.05[2][c], 417 (5th ed. 2013)). Hall argues that Det. Cramer did not have personal knowledge of Hall’s actions or demeanor close enough in time to the 20 shootings to allow Det. Cramer to provide an opinion on whether Hall should have been arrested or been taken to a psychiatric hospital. This argument mischaracterizes Det. Cramer’s testimony. Det. Cramer was not asked about and did not testify to Hall’s mental status close in time to the shooting. He also was not asked and did not testify to his opinion regarding whether Hall should have been taken from the scene of the shooting to a psychiatric hospital rather than to the jail. Instead, Det. Cramer testified to his personal observations of Hall when he did interact with him, which was later in the evening and after Hall had already been transported to the jail. Det. Cramer testified that specifically at that time Hall was not displaying any indicators that would have caused Det. Cramer to transport him to a psychiatric hospital. This information was certainly within Det. Cramer’s personal knowledge. The amount of time that passed between the shooting and Det. Cramer’s observations of Hall would affect the weight of the evidence as opposed to its admissibility. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.