Opinion ID: 654186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Documents Pertaining to Asset Transfers

Text: 23 After the district court's order, Linde Thomson complied in full with the requests for documents pertaining to asset transfers. On appeal, Linde Thomson seeks the return of these documents. An appellant may challenge a subpoena following compliance without raising mootness problems when it seeks return of the tendered documents. Office of Thrift Supervision v. Dobbs, 931 F.2d 956, 958 (D.C.Cir.1991). If the records were wrongfully subpoenaed, Linde Thomson is entitled to their return. See Id. at 958; FTC v. Browning, 435 F.2d 96, 97-98 (D.C.Cir.1970). We look therefore to the propriety of the district court's order enforcing the subpoena.
24 Linde Thomson first argues that much of the requested information pertaining to asset transfers was irrelevant to the stated purposes of the RTC's investigation. An administrative subpoena is valid if the requested information is reasonably relevant. See FTC v. Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1086, 1089 (D.C.Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1255, 122 L.Ed.2d 654 (1993); FTC v. Anderson, 631 F.2d 741, 745 (D.C.Cir.1979). 7 We measure this relevancy against the general purposes of [the agency's] investigation, FTC v. Texaco, 555 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C.Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974, 97 S.Ct. 2939, 53 L.Ed.2d 1072 (1977), which necessarily presupposes an inquiry into the permissible range of investigation under the statute. The investigation's boundary may be defined quite generally. See Invention Submission, 965 F.2d at 1090. We have held that the agency's own appraisal of relevancy must be accepted so long as it is not 'obviously wrong.'  Id. at 1089; FTC v. Carter, 636 F.2d 781, 787-88 (D.C.Cir.1980). Moreover, absent legal error, [a] finding by the district court that documents are relevant and necessary to an inquiry ... is essentially factual in nature and cannot be overturned unless the district court's finding is clearly erroneous. FTC v. Lonning, 539 F.2d 202, 210 n. 14 (D.C.Cir.1976). 25 The relevancy inquiry turns on an examination of the RTC's order of investigation. In launching its argument, Linde Thomson relies on its perception that the RTC investigation had only two purposes: ascertaining the potential liability of Linde Thomson for the failure of FSB & T and determining whether it would be cost-effective to bring suit, if such liability existed. Because Linde Thomson believes it has provided ample information for resolution of these two inquiries, it perceives the additional requests as irrelevant. We believe that Linde Thomson's relevancy argument is predicated on an unduly restrictive interpretation [303 U.S.App.D.C. 325] of the order of investigation that fails to account for its plainly broader scope. In addition to the two goals acknowledged by Linde Thomson, the RTC order also states the purposes of determining whether ... the RTC should seek to avoid a transfer of any interests or an incurrence of any obligations ... [and whether] the RTC should seek an attachment of assets. App. 2. Like the gas producers in Texaco, Linde Thomson has posited an erroneous interpretation of the scope of the administrative inquiry and then sought to limit the investigation to the confines of this distorted interpretation. See Texaco, 555 F.2d at 874. 26 When the scope of the RTC investigation is determined by reference to the clear terms of the order, the relevancy of the requested asset transfer documents is plain. Under 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1821(d)(17)(A) (1993), the RTC is authorized to avoid asset transfers motivated by an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the insured thrift or the RTC. Section 1821(d)(18) allows the RTC to attach the assets of any person. Items two and three of the investigation order, therefore, mirror express statutory grants of power to the RTC. Pursuant to its statutory authority and the investigation order, the RTC sought production of asset transfer information from January 1991 to the present. Although this request may encompass transfers unrelated to FSB & T, the statute limits the RTC's inquiry only temporally, authorizing the RTC to freeze, and therefore, we conclude, to investigate, any transfer within a five-year period made with intent to defraud. At this stage of its investigation, the RTC need not tie the material it seeks to a particular theory of violation or to concrete facts suggesting fraud. See Invention Submission, 965 F.2d at 1090. We believe that a wide range of investigation is necessary and appropriate where, as here, multifaceted activities are involved, and the precise character of possible violations cannot be known in advance. Texaco, 555 F.2d at 877. Accordingly, we reject Linde Thomson's relevancy challenge.
27 Linde Thomson next claims that the request for these documents imposed undue burdens on the firm. This argument is again premised on Linde Thomson's erroneous interpretation of the scope of the RTC's investigation. See generally Texaco, 555 F.2d at 881-83. Because Linde Thomson sees little more to the investigative order than the determination of whether to pursue litigation and whether such litigation would be cost-effective, it perceives the requests for documents pertaining to asset transfers as unnecessary and, consequently, unreasonably oppressive. As stated above, we reject Linde Thomson's constrained interpretation of the range of permissible inquiry. 28 The burden of proving undue hardship is not easily met where ... the agency inquiry is pursuant to a lawful purpose and the requested documents are relevant to that purpose. Texaco, 555 F.2d at 882. Every subpoena imposes a burden on its recipient. Because of the RTC's broad mandate, we are loath to accord the agency anything less than extreme breadth in conducting its investigation. See Texaco, 555 F.2d at 882 n. 51; Genuine Parts Co. v. FTC, 445 F.2d 1382, 1391 (5th Cir.1971). We see nothing in the RTC's request, limited as it is to a reasonable time-frame, to suggest undue disruption or serious hindrance of the normal operations of Linde Thomson's business. See Texaco, 555 F.2d at 882; SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188, 189 (7th Cir.1975). As Linde Thomson freely admits, it had ceased operations as a law firm approximately one year and one-half before the RTC issued the order of investigation and subpoena. Because we perceive no further profound hardship, we affirm the district court's order enforcing the subpoena.