Opinion ID: 201690
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discharge of Elsa Romero

Text: 6 We begin by considering the Board's finding that the Hospital violated section 8(a)(3) of the Act by firing Elsa Romero, a respiratory therapist, because of her union activities. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). The Hospital claims that the Board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence because the proof was overwhelming that the Hospital terminated Romero because of her failure to follow Hospital rules. 7 An employer violates section 8(a)(3) by punishing an employee for engaging in pro-union or other protected activities. E.C. Waste, Inc. v. NLRB, 359 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir.2004). But an employer is free to terminate a union enthusiast so long as it applies its usual disciplinary standards and procedures. See NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899, 901 (1st Cir.1981). Whether or not a particular dismissal crosses the line typically depends on the employer's motive. E.C. Waste, 359 F.3d at 41. 8 The Board and courts have applied a burden-shifting approach in evaluating whether a particular termination violates section 8(a)(3). Under this approach, the General Counsel must first establish a prima facie case by demonstrating (i) the employee's engagement in protected activity, (ii) the employer's knowledge of that activity, (iii) that the employer harbored animus toward unions, and (iv) a causal link between the anti-union animus and the termination. See Hosp. San Pablo, 207 F.3d at 71. 9 If the General Counsel meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the employer to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have followed the same course of action in the absence of the employee's union activities. See E.C. Waste, 359 F.3d at 42. Importantly, even if the employer proffers a seemingly plausible explanation, ... the Board does not have to accept it at face value. If the Board supportably finds that the reasons advanced by the employer are either inadequate or pretextual the violation is deemed proven. Id. 10 The Hospital has not challenged the Board's finding that the General Counsel established the prima facie case so we will focus primarily on the evidence concerning the Hospital's claim that it fired Romero for cause. Romero was hired by the Hospital as a respiratory therapist in 1995. She was an active Union member. She served as shop steward and was a member of the Union's collective bargaining committee. During the course of her employment, her supervisor, Carmen Martinez (Supervisor Martinez), told Romero that she should be less visible in demonstrating her support for the Union by limiting her press exposure as a Union supporter. The ALJ characterized this statement as a veiled threat that Romero should curtail her union activities or possibly suffer adverse employment consequences. Nevertheless, in December 1997, Romero was rated as an excellent employee and received a 3.9 out of a possible 4.0 on her year-end evaluation. 11 Ten months later, Romero was fired. The termination letter, dated October 26, 1998, charged Romero with falsely claiming that she performed respiratory therapies on two patients during the night of October 18, 1998. It also cited two reports of Romero's insubordinate behavior subsequent to the October 18th incident and referenced a previous disciplinary charge against Romero dating to mid-1997. 12 On October 18th, Romero had reported to work for the 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. shift. There was a shortage of respiratory therapists that evening so the supervisor on duty, Minerva Ruiz, asked Romero to arrange for the coverage of additional patients. Romero coordinated with fellow therapist Janice Martinez (Therapist Martinez) to cover the additional workload. Romero agreed that she would treat the patients in rooms 275-335. 13 Romero testified that she followed the established practices in performing her duties that evening. For each patient, she read the medical orders, performed the prescribed therapy, and then returned to the nurse's station, where she recorded the therapy in a log called the Respiratory Therapy Care Notes. Romero testified that among her patients on the night of October 18th were the two patients occupying room 292. Romero stated that she recorded the therapy for one of the patients on the patient's notes from the prior day and, for the other patient, she recorded the therapy on a blank page in the patient's notes instead of on the page reserved for the October 18th treatments. Both Romero and Supervisor Martinez agreed that, ideally, a therapist recorded the therapies chronologically, but that the alternative recording procedures described by Romero were commonplace. 14 On October 21, 1998, Supervisor Martinez noticed that both Romero and Therapist Martinez claimed to have performed identical services for the patients in room 292. Doubting that both employees had performed the same services on a single shift, Supervisor Martinez questioned Romero and Therapist Martinez about the duplicate entries. Both employees claimed that they had performed the services. 15 To investigate the issue, Supervisor Martinez went to the notes for the patients in room 292 and observed that Therapist Martinez had recorded that she had performed the services in the spaces reserved for October 18th. Supervisor Martinez did not, however, review the remaining portions of the notes for these patients to see if Romero had recorded the therapy in another spot. 16 After reviewing the October 18th entries, Supervisor Martinez again confronted Romero, who reiterated that she had performed the services on the patients in room 292. At this encounter, Supervisor Martinez did not ask Romero where she had recorded the therapies. Nor did she interview any of the other employees on duty on October 18th to ascertain who had performed the therapies on the patients in room 292. 17 As mentioned above, in addition to the October 18th incident, Romero's termination letter referenced Romero's insubordinate behavior subsequent to October 18th — reports by a nurse and shift coordinator claiming that Romero had acted disrespectfully toward coworkers and superiors. Supervisor Martinez admitted that she did not investigate either claim. The termination letter also cited a suspension that Romero received in mid-1997 for having another employee punch her time card. 18 On these facts, the Board determined that Romero's termination was unlawful. The Board found that Supervisor Martinez's investigations were inadequate. It concluded that Supervisor Martinez's failure to investigate thoroughly the charges against Romero evidenced a rush to judgment motivated by anti-union animus. It also concluded that the Hospital's reliance on a stale disciplinary charge to justify the termination evidenced pretext. The Hospital takes issue with the Board's conclusion that Supervisor Martinez's conduct was improper and that it was wrong for the Hospital to rely on the mid-1997 suspension as a basis for firing Romero. 19 The conducting of an inadequate investigation of (or a complete failure to investigate) the incident upon which the employer relied as grounds for discharge can support a finding of discriminatory motive. See, e.g., Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. NLRB, 984 F.2d 556, 560 (1st Cir.1993). Whether a particular investigation was sufficiently slipshod to support an inference of discrimination is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. See Valmont Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 244 F.3d 454, 466 (5th Cir.2001). 20 Supervisor Martinez did not entirely ignore her obligation to investigate the October 18th incident. She did talk to the individuals directly involved in the incident and looked at the most pertinent records. The Board concluded, however, that an adequate investigation would have included a more detailed interview with Romero, a more thorough investigation of the paper record, and conversations with employees who may have had knowledge about the incident. Were we the initial factfinders, we might view the adequacy of this investigation differently. But we are only reviewing for substantial evidence, and on this record, we cannot say that the Board's conclusion was beyond reason. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1957) (stating that Board determination is entitled to affirmance even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo ). 21 In any event, the Board's conclusion is substantially reinforced by the other reasons offered by the Hospital for Romero's discharge. Supervisor Martinez conducted no investigation into the charges of insubordination leveled against Romero and did not even ask Romero for her position on the allegations. The Hospital's reliance on completely uninvestigated charges to support a termination suggests that the reasons given were pretextual. See W.W. Grainger, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 1118, 1121 (7th Cir.1978). 22 Moreover, the Board was reasonable in concluding that the Hospital's reliance on Romero's year-old suspension was probative of pretext. See NLRB v. Q-1 Motor Express, Inc., 25 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir.1994) (finding substantial evidence of discrimination based in part on the employer's reliance on stale charges). Not only was the violation over a year old, but it predated Romero's outstanding 1997 performance evaluation. Cf. NLRB v. Hale Container Line, Inc., 943 F.2d 394, 400 (4th Cir.1991) (affirming Board finding that an employee's termination was pretextual where the rationale offered by the employer was inconsistent with its recent exemplary evaluation of the employee's performance). The Hospital claims that it relied on this conduct because it favored progressive discipline (i.e., increasing the severity of discipline for each rules infraction). But, as the ALJ observed, the Hospital produced no evidence to show that it maintains and follows a system of progressive discipline for its employees. 23 In sum, there was proof that Romero was a union activist and that Supervisor Martinez harbored animus against her because of her union activities. There also was proof that Supervisor Martinez discharged Romero based on superficially investigated and uninvestigated charges, and on a stale infraction that predated Romero's recent outstanding performance evaluation. On these facts, the Board's conclusion that Romero's termination violated section 8(a)(3) is supported by substantial evidence.