Opinion ID: 203621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: QLT's Objections to the Conduct of the Trial

Text: We turn now to the next group of QLT's objections, all of which claim prejudicial error in the conduct of the trial. We evaluate each in turn. First, QLT asserts procedural defects in the misuse of confidential information theory of unjust enrichment. QLT argues that it was under the impression that the trial court disposed of this theory at the close of MEEI's evidence when it granted judgment as a matter of law to QLT, pursuant to Rule 50(a), with respect to MEEI's misappropriation of trade secrets claim, only to find the theory revived in the trial court's post-trial opinion. Consequently, QLT argues that it was precluded from presenting evidence relating to this theory, warranting a new trial. In its ruling on QLT's post-trial Rule 50(b) motion, the trial court, relying on our previous ruling, noted that Massachusetts law treats unjust enrichment through the misuse of confidential information differently from claims of misappropriation of trade secrets. MEEI-III, 495 F.Supp.2d at 210-11. Therefore, the trial court explained that it always understood that its grant of judgment as a matter of law on the trade secrets claim left the confidential information claim undisturbed. We agree with the trial court's assessment of events, and conclude that the court's Rule 50(a) ruling was clear enough to put QLT on notice that the confidential information claim was not dismissed. We begin with the basic principle that the purpose of a Rule 50 motion to dispose of claims or issues, not legal theories. See Hammond v. T.J. Litle & Co., 82 F.3d 1166, 1172 (1st Cir.1996). This basic norm should have put QLT on notice that in conformity with the general principle, the trial court's Rule 50(a) decision on one legal claim did nothing to disturb separate legal claims that relied on similar evidence. In the present case, the trial court made clear that it was granting judgment with respect to the trade secrets claim. And after explaining its four separate and independent rationales for doing so, the trial court immediately noted that the Chapter 93A claim insofar as it depends upon an alleged misappropriation of trade secret[s] fails. This statement is instructive because it demonstrates that, in addition to excising the trade secret claim from the case, the trial court was willing and able to limit the manner in which the parties could pursue other claims. The trial court's failure similarly to limit the unjust enrichment claim should have put QLT on notice that this claim survived. In addition, the fact that MEEI requested a jury instruction regarding confidential information enhanced QLT's notice. Finally, the fact that QLT requested instructions limiting MEEI's theory of unjust enrichment to the patent benefit theory suggests that QLT was aware that the confidential information theory remained alive and well. In these circumstances, we cannot credit QLT's ipse dixit that it was precluded from offering evidence regarding confidential information. QLT next argues that the trial court erroneously failed to admit a document that purportedly corroborates MGH researchers conceived of using photodynamic therapy to treat before MEEI researchers did. We review a trial court's decision to exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Livick v. Gillette Co., 524 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir.2008); Hoffman v. Applicators Sales & Serv., Inc., 439 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir.2006). The document at issue was one about which an MGH witness testified and which did not rely on BPD, the photodynamic agent found in Visudyne. This document was only marginally relevant, if relevant at all, especially since we already have determined that establishing the precise inventorship of each claim of the '591 application was not necessary to MEEI's patent benefit theory of unjust enrichment. QLT was not prejudiced by the exclusion of the document, and there was no abuse of discretion in its exclusion. Finally, QLT raises a number of challenges relating to the jury instructions. An error in jury instructions warrants reversal only if the error is determined to have been prejudicial based on a review of the record as a whole. Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir.1992); Connors v. McNulty, 697 F.2d 18, 21 (1st Cir.1983). First, QLT asseverates that the instructions allowed the jury impermissibly to rely on the theory that QLT had to pay more for use of MEEI's confidential research than contract-specified amounts. The record in the case belies QLT's characterization. At QLT's request, the trial court specifically instructed the jury that any unjust enrichment had to be found outside of whatever contracts MEEI had or Dr. Miller or Dr. Gragoudas personally had. The trial court further noted that all such contracts have been performed. [MEEI, Miller and Gragoudas] did what they were supposed to do; QLT did what it was supposed to do. This is not a contract case. We believe that the trial court explained the law as well as can be expected. Davet, 973 F.2d at 22 ( citing Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 353 (1st Cir.1989)). Therefore, we find no error in this instruction, which was directly responsive to QLT's concerns. Next, QLT challenges the trial court's unjust enrichment instruction. [30] Specifically, QLT maintains that the trial court's general unjust enrichment instruction was overly broad and therefore created a risk that the jury would find unjust enrichment based on theories other than the two theories actually submitted. It appears in large part that QLT's concerns were that the jury would reward MEEI for its general contribution to Visudyne. Even if we assume arguendo that QLT properly preserved these objections and that they might have some merit, they are unavailing. It is true that in civil cases, a new trial is usually warranted if evidence is insufficient with respect to any one of multiple claims covered by a general verdict. Gillespie v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 386 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir.2004) ( quoting Kerkhof v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., 282 F.3d 44, 52 (1st Cir.2002)). Moreover, this rule applies not only to general verdicts encompassing multiple causes of action, but also to special verdicts where a verdict question encompasses multiple theories, one of which is defective. Id. at 29-30 ( citing Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 468 (1st Cir.1996)). Nevertheless, this approach is by no means rigid. On the contrary, we have consistently recognized that a jury is likely to prefer a better supported theory to one less supported, and consequently, we apply a generous harmless error analysis in order to determine whether it is reasonably likely that the jury in fact relied on a theory with adequate evidentiary support. Gillespie, 386 F.3d at 30 ( citing Davis v. Rennie, 264 F.3d 86, 106 (1st Cir.2001)). The litmus test of such a harmless error review is whether the appellant was unjustly prejudiced. Davis, 264 F.3d at 106 ( quoting Asbill v. Hous. Auth. of Choctaw Nation, 726 F.2d 1499, 1504 (10th Cir.1984)). In this case the jury was presented with substantial evidence regarding both of the theories of unjust enrichment that we specifically approved in our prior decision. Moreover, QLT does not (and cannot) contend that the trial court's charge regarding unjust enrichment was legally incorrect. See MEEI-II, 412 F.3d at 234 n. 7. Where, as here, the jury heard a legally adequate instruction, which was supported by competent evidence, we will not assume jury confusion or verdict taint. See Davis, 264 F.3d at 109 (discussing analogous situation in which general verdict was based on two different claims rather than similar theories supporting the grounded its unjust enrichment award on either or both of the two submitted theories, we conclude that QLT was not unfairly prejudiced.) We need go no further. We have considered the parties' remaining arguments and find them unavailing. After a careful review, we find no error in the conduct of the trial that was sufficiently prejudicial  if it was error at all  to warrant either reversal or a new trial.