Opinion ID: 2059329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Release of Information to Third Parties

Text: In plaintiff's third and final argument concerning waiver, plaintiff contends that the confidentiality privilege should be considered waived because Steven voluntarily shared information with school officials and court personnel, such as Steven's probation officer, and because there was a public disclosure concerning Steven's mental health treatment in an article in a local publication, Chicago Magazine. Plaintiff does not provide any authority, either statutory or case law, for a finding of waiver under these circumstances. Furthermore, one need only look to the Mental Health Act to find that plaintiff's position is untenable. The Mental Health Act provides for the consensual disclosure of information by a recipient. 740 ILCS 110/5 (West 2000). Section 5 of the Act makes it clear that a recipient may consent to disclosure of information for a limited purpose and that any agency or person who obtains confidential and privileged information may not redisclose the information without the recipient's specific consent. Assuming that, as plaintiff contends, defendants have shared Steven's mental health treatment records with school officials and a probation officer, we draw from this fact no conclusion that Steven intended to waive his confidentiality privilege. Any confidential information which may have been shared was released for a limited purpose and did not constitute a general waiver of the confidentiality privilege. Nor do we find that there has been a public disclosure of Steven's mental health record merely because an issue of Chicago Magazine contained an article in which a single, brief reference was made to Steven having been treated for a chemical imbalance. By all indications, this article was not authorized by either Steven or the Pfiels. Consequently, any information which has come into the public domain through this article was without Steven's consent and cannot be considered as evidence that he waived the confidentiality privilege. Furthermore, even if we ignored the unauthorized nature of the article, we would be constrained to find that, to the extent the article constitutes a public disclosure, waiver of the confidentiality privilege would be limited to the information contained in the public disclosure. The magazine article cannot provide the basis for allowing the type of full-scale disclosure of Steven's mental health records which plaintiff seeks. In sum, the Mental Health Act places strict limits on the circumstances under which disclosure of confidential information may be allowed, as well as the amount of confidential information that may be released. In most instances, when a party seeks the admission of mental health records and communications in legal or administrative proceedings, section 10(a)(1) of the Act will provide the framework for determining when confidential information may be disclosed. Accordingly, an initial hurdle will be showing that the recipient's mental condition was introduced by the recipient. If this hurdle cannot be met, the information may not be admitted, regardless of whether the opposing party's claim or position would be advanced or facilitated by the disclosure of the information. Waiver of the privilege is recognized in very limited circumstances. In the present case, the circumstances do not support a finding that the mental health confidentiality privilege has been waived. The Fundamental Fairness Exception The final issue, and the crux of this appeal, is whether Steven's mental health records and communications, which are decidedly confidential and privileged under the Mental Health Act, should, nevertheless, be disclosed in the pending civil proceedings based on considerations of fundamental fairness. Authority for claiming the existence of a fundamental fairness exception to the Mental Health Act confidentiality privilege is grounded on this court's decision in D.C. v. S.A., 178 Ill.2d 551, 227 Ill.Dec. 550, 687 N.E.2d 1032 (1997). Consequently, we look to our opinion in D.C. and its foundational principles. We begin with a review of the facts and procedural history of the case. The plaintiff in D.C. filed a negligence action against defendants seeking recovery for injuries he allegedly suffered when he attempted to walk across a highway and was struck by a car driven by S.A. Defendants answered the complaint, raised the affirmative defense of plaintiff's contributory negligence, and filed a counterclaim alleging plaintiff's negligence was the proximate cause of damages to S.A.'s vehicle. In the course of discovery, defendants issued subpoenas for deposition to the Edwards Hospital, where plaintiff was treated after the accident, and to Dr. Georgeson, plaintiff's treating physician, directing them to produce plaintiff's medical, psychiatric and/or psychological records for copying. Plaintiff sought a protective order and the trial court ordered that production be limited to plaintiff's medical records, which were discoverable on the issue of damages. The medical records which were produced showed that upon plaintiff's release from Edwards Hospital, he was referred to Linden Oaks Hospital, the psychiatric unit of Edwards Hospital. Additionally, plaintiff's treating physician prepared a medical treatment summary in which it was noted that the referral for psychiatric treatment was made based on indications by plaintiff that he might have been attempting suicide at the time of the accident. Defendants then moved to compel production of plaintiff's psychiatric and psychological records. Plaintiff invoked the privilege afforded by the Mental Health Act, but the trial court ruled that plaintiff had introduced his mental condition into the proceedings. The trial court ordered that all of plaintiff's medical and psychiatric records be produced for in camera inspection. After reviewing the records, the trial court ruled that three pages of records from Edwards Hospital and three specific items of information contained in the records from Linden Oaks were relevant and admissible pursuant to the factors set forth in section 10(a)(1) of the Mental Health Act. Before releasing this information to defendants, however, the trial court certified for interlocutory appeal the question of whether plaintiff had introduced his mental condition into the case, thereby making the specified records discoverable. The appellate court reframed the certified question and held that a plaintiff who files a negligence suit does not introduce his mental condition as an element of his claim. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's finding that plaintiff had introduced his mental condition into the case. This court reversed the appellate court. Although we agreed that the specified records were privileged communications within the meaning of the Act and that, in the strictest sense, plaintiff had not introduced his mental condition into the proceedings, we held that fundamental fairness commands that the privilege yield. Underpinning this ruling was our refusal to place our imprimatur on plaintiff's wielding the privilege as a sword to manipulate the legal system, coupled with the recognition that, after in camera inspection, the trial court restricted discovery to information which met all other requirements of section 10(a)(1) of the Act and had little to do with plaintiff's mental health treatment and more to do with plaintiff's conduct at the time of the accident. Furthermore, the information was obtainable from no other source and could, potentially, absolve defendants of any liability and bar plaintiff's recovery. We concluded that, on balance, the interests of substantial justice and fundamental fairness outweighed plaintiff's right to assert the confidentiality privilege under the unique facts of the case. The facts in D.C. do not resemble the situation in the present case. First, there is nothing in this case to indicate that defendants are invoking the confidentiality privilege as a means to exploit or subvert the legal process. In fact, it may be that by protecting Steven's right to assert his privilege, the Pfiels are actually hampering their own defense to the extent that they will be unable to respond fully to allegations that they failed to take action to control Steven's behavior. Thus, contrary to plaintiff's assertions that defendants are trying to hide behind or playing a game with the privilege, there is nothing devious or underhanded about defendants' invocation of the privilege. Indeed, the confidentiality privilege is being employed precisely as intendedto shield information which our legislature has seen fit to protect. While plaintiff may be prevented from gaining complete access to information which could be beneficial to her cause, any unfairness is that [which is] present any time a    defendant seeks to bar potentially damaging evidence on the basis of a discovery privilege or other exclusionary rule. People v. Gemeny, 313 Ill.App.3d 902, 911, 247 Ill.Dec. 71, 731 N.E.2d 844 (2000). As we acknowledged in D.C., Privileges which protect certain matters from disclosure are not designed to promote the truth-seeking process, but rather to protect some outside interest other than the ascertainment of truth at trial. 1 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 72, at 269 (4th ed.1992). Thus, privileges are an exception to the general rule that the public has a right to every person's evidence. D.C., 178 Ill.2d at 561-62, 227 Ill.Dec. 550, 687 N.E.2d 1032. Another major distinction between D.C. and the present case is the nature of the evidence held discoverable in D.C. and the impact that evidence had on the outcome of the case. In D.C., legitimate discovery revealed information about plaintiff's mental state at the time of the accident which, if true, had the potential of completely barring plaintiff's recovery and absolve defendant of liability. In other words, the privileged information had the inherent capacity to determine the outcome of the case. In the case at bar, the trial court has ordered discovery when there is nothing to suggest that anything that might be revealed through the disclosure of Steven's mental health records and communications could be outcome determinative to any matter pending in the civil case brought by plaintiff. As we noted earlier, the trial court has already ruled that Steven may not deny liability on the wrongful-death and survival claims against him. The only other claim pending against him is that he recklessly caused emotional distress to plaintiff. This claim relates to events which took place in 1995, when Steven, while free on bail, killed his brother and assaulted his sister. Plaintiff was alerted by police and she allegedly suffered worry and strain due to fear that Steven would retaliate against her. Clearly, records pertaining to Steven's mental health treatment prior to July 1993 are not pertinent to this claim. We realize that plaintiff also seeks to hold the Pfiels liable for Steven's intentional acts against her daughter on theories of negligent supervision and negligent entrustment. To succeed on her claim of negligent supervision, plaintiff must show that: (1) the Pfiels were aware of specific instances of prior conduct sufficient to put them on notice that the act complained of (in this case, Hillary's murder) was likely to occur; and (2) that the Pfiels had the opportunity to control their minor child Steven. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 316 (1965); Lott v. Strang, 312 Ill.App.3d 521, 524, 245 Ill.Dec. 154, 727 N.E.2d 407 (2000). To prove negligent entrustment, plaintiff must show that the Pfiels gave Steven express or implied permission to use a dangerous instrument which they knew, or should have known, would likely be used in a manner involving an unreasonable risk of harm to others. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 308 (1965); Zedella v. Gibson, 165 Ill.2d 181, 209 Ill.Dec. 27, 650 N.E.2d 1000 (1995). Thus, it does not appear likely, nor does plaintiff allege, that Steven's mental health records will reveal evidence which, by itself, has the potential to establish plaintiff's claims against the Pfiels. Consequently, unlike the situation in D.C., recognition of the confidentiality privilege would not have the effect of determining the outcome on any claim raised by plaintiff in this case. Furthermore, in the present case, confidential records and communications are not the only source of information concerning the Pfiels' knowledge. Plaintiff's complaint contains factual allegations which, if proven, would support her claim that the Pfiels knew or should have known that Steven was a danger to others. Plaintiff's arguments before this court belie the need for disclosure of privileged information. For the same reason, we reject plaintiff's claim that by upholding the confidentiality privilege in this case her constitutional due process rights will be violated. Plaintiff has no vested right in an unfettered claim, any more than the defendant in D.C. had a vested right in an unfettered defense. See D.C., 178 Ill.2d at 567-68, 227 Ill.Dec. 550, 687 N.E.2d 1032. In sum, the fundamental fairness considerations which drove our opinion in D.C. are not present in this case. Absent truly extraordinary circumstances, not present here, the statutory privilege must prevail. To recognize a fundamental fairness exception in this case would eviscerate the statutory privilege. As a final observation, we note that an important consideration in our resolution of D.C. was the scope of disclosure that was allowed. In D.C. the trial court inspected the plaintiff's medical and mental health records in camera and ruled that an extremely limited amount of information, which was related to plaintiff's conduct at the time of the accident and met the requirements of section 10(a)(1), should be disclosed. In the present case, however, the trial court has ordered broad discovery. Although Steven's mental health records were to be produced for in camera inspection, but before ruling on the relevance and admissibility of any information contained in these records, plaintiff would have been allowed to depose defendants and question them on matters that go to the heart of the therapist-recipient relationship. Plaintiff would be able to inquire about diagnoses and treatment plans and learn about private conversations with therapists regarding mental health treatment Steven may have received at any time prior to July 1993. Even if we believed that fundamental fairness demanded the abrogation of the confidentiality privilege in this case, which we do not, such broad discovery would be unwarranted.