Opinion ID: 2218958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: tribal legislative jurisdiction

Text: We again begin our inquiry with an examination of federal law. Tribal authority is inherent in the tribe's retained sovereignty; it does not arise by delegation from the federal government. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 328, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 1088-89, 55 L.Ed.2d 303, 315-16 (1978). Nevertheless, Indian tribes are no longer `possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty[.]' Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 1675, 56 L.Ed.2d 106, 113 (1978); Montana, 450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. at 1258, 67 L.Ed.2d at 510; Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322-23, 98 S.Ct. at 1086, 55 L.Ed.2d at 312 (1978). Tribal sovereignty is subject to limitation by specific Constitutional and treaty provisions, Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323, 98 S.Ct. at 1086, 55 L.Ed.2d at 312, acts of Congress, Id.; Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56, 72, 98 S.Ct. at 1675, 1684, 56 L.Ed.2d at 114, 124; Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195, 98 S.Ct. at 1014, 55 L.Ed.2d at 213; Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 556, 23 S.Ct. 216, 217, 47 L.Ed. 299, 301 (1903); Fredericks v. Mandel, 650 F.2d 144 (8th Cir.1981); Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. v. 100.95 Acres of Land, 540 F.Supp. 592, 598 (Neb.1982); Swift Transp., 546 F.Supp. at 1193; State v. Vandermay, 478 N.W.2d 289, 290 (S.D.1991); or by implication due to the tribe's dependent status. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. at 1258, 67 L.Ed.2d at 510; Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323, 98 S.Ct. at 1079, 1086, 55 L.Ed.2d at 303, 312; Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363, 366 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967, 103 S.Ct. 293, 74 L.Ed.2d 277 (1982). As a general rule, the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. at 1258, 67 L.Ed.2d at 510. Montana, discussing the extent of tribal civil regulatory authority over non-Indians, established that the dependent status of Indian tribes has implicitly divested them of the power to regulate, in general, `the conduct of non-members on land no longer owned by, or held in trust for the Tribe.' De La Cruz, 671 F.2d at 366 (citing Montana and Colville Confederated Tribe v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52 (9th Cir.1981)). Montana acknowledged that tribes retain some civil authority over non-Indians: But exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation.... [Thus,] the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to activities of nonmembers of the tribe. To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564-65, 101 S.Ct. at 1258, 67 L.Ed.2d at 509-10 (citations omitted). Montana went on to note, without deciding, that a tribe may have other authority as well: A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566, 101 S.Ct. at 1258, 67 L.Ed.2d at 511 (citations omitted). In contrast to the determination of the judicial jurisdiction of a tribal court, [t]he primary effect of Montana is to create a threshold presumption that tribes do not have legislative and regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee lands within the reservation. Pommersheim, supra at 345. We look first to determine whether Hettich was engaged in consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. at 1258, 67 L.Ed.2d at 510. It is clear that neither Hettich's consensual relationship with the tribe, through his utilization of its courts, nor his relationship with its members, through the operation of his grocery store, gave rise to the tort involved in this case. We conclude, therefore, that it is not within the inherent sovereign powers of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe to regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, Hettich's claimed tortious conduct on State Highway 63. We next look to determine whether Red Fox has clearly and convincingly established that Hettich's claimed conduct, allowing his horse to wander onto State Highway 63, within the reservation, threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. Id. (Emphasis added.) While Montana dealt with a tribe's authority to regulate non-Indian fishing on reservation land owned in fee by nonmembers of the tribe, it can be used to determine the extent that a tribe may regulate the tortious conduct of non-Indians on non-Indian lands within the reservation boundaries. It is apparent that Hettich's conduct had a direct effect on the economic security, or the health or welfare of Red Fox. However, the second test under Montana is concerned with the effect upon the tribe, not on the individual tribal member. [9] Red Fox argues that the health and welfare of the tribe was affected because a tribal member's property was damaged and a tribal officer was required to investigate. While it may be argued that the tribe may be indirectly affected by Hettich's conduct, only by stretching the test set forth in Montana to extremes can it be said that Hettich's conduct directly affected the tribe. [10] The distinction between tribal interests and tribal member interests is reflected in the cases cited in Montana, as well as subsequent cases applying the test. See Babbitt, 710 F.2d 587 (tribe's interest in enforcing repossession statute); De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363 (tribe's interest in enforcing building, health, and safety regulations); Knight v. Shoshone & Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir.1982) (tribe's interest in enforcing zoning ordinance). Red Fox has not referred this court to any law of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe which determines that conduct such as Hettich's claimed conduct has a direct effect on tribal interests. Red Fox has not clearly and convincingly established that the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe is directly affected by Hettich's claimed conduct. We conclude, therefore, that the state court acted properly when it did not recognize the tribal court judgment under the principles of comity because Red Fox has failed to establish clearly and convincingly that the tribal court had jurisdiction to consider Hettich's claimed conduct. [11] Our decision today does not determine that the tribal court was without jurisdiction. Nor do we determine that the state of South Dakota has jurisdiction. Rather, we hold only that Red Fox has not met her burden of proof. This holding is consistent with Montana's general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. at 1258, 67 L.Ed.2d at 510. [12] Affirmed. AMUNDSON, J., concurs. SABERS, J., concurs specially. WUEST and HENDERSON, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.