Opinion ID: 1930358
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did the admission of the statements by the codefendants violate each defendant's right to confrontation of witnesses?

Text: Appellants contend the admission of their statements denied them their constitutional right to confrontation, since both statements incriminated each appellant and since neither appellant took the stand. For this contention they rely on Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (Because of the substantial risks that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extra judicial statements in determining petitioner's guilt, admission of a non-testifying codefendant in a joint trial violated the petitioner's right of cross-examination secured by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment). See also, Langston v. State, 373 So.2d 613 (Miss. 1979); Brown v. State, 340 So.2d 718 (Miss. 1976). This Court notes the directives set forth in Brown, 340 So.2d 718 at 721: [T]he prosecution should not offer, and the trial judge should not admit, in evidence, incriminating statements of a codefendant (implicating the defendant) during the State's case in chief, since it could not be known whether the codefendant would testify after the State rested. The statement, if admissible, should be admitted only after the codefendant took the stand and was subject to cross-examination by the defendant, and, when admitted, the trial judge should immediately, and at such other times as the statement might be referred to, tell (orally instruct) the jury that the statement must not be considered against the defendant. Likewise, if so requested by the defendant, the trial judge must instruct the jury in writing. Applying the Brown decision, these defendants seek reversal because the codefendant's statements were introduced during the state's case in chief. However, prior to admission of the confession the trial court had a hearing outside the jury's presence to determine the admissibility of the codefendants' confessions. If, in such a case, the trial judge determines that particularized guarantees of trustworthiness are present, that is, that the statements corroborate one another on the core details of the crime, then, the Brown procedure need not be followed. Authority for this exception to the Brown rule is found in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (1980), the United States Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause of the federal constitution was not violated in introduction of testimony of a witness at a preliminary hearing not produced at the defendant's trial. The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. First, in conformance with the Framers' preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case (including cases where prior cross-examination has occurred), the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant... . The second aspect operates once a witness is shown to be unavailable. Reflecting its underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence, the Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. [97] at 107, 78 L.Ed. 674, 54 S.Ct. 330 [at 333], 90 A.L.R. 575. The principle recently was formulated in Mancusi v. Stubbs: The focus of the Court's concern has been to insure that there `are indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant,' Dutton v. Evans, supra, [400 U.S. 74] at 89, [27 L.Ed.2d 213, 91 S.Ct. 210 [at 220]], and to `afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement,' California v. Green, supra, [399 U.S. 149] at 161, [26 L.Ed.2d 489, 90 S.Ct. 1930 [at 1936]]. It is clear from these statements, and from numerous prior decisions of this Court, that even though the witness be unavailable his prior testimony must bear some of these `indicia of reliability.' 408 U.S. [204] at 213, 33 L.Ed.2d 293, 92 S.Ct. 2308 [at 2313]. The Court has applied this indicia of reliability requirement principally by concluding that certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the substance of the constitutional protection. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. [237] at 244, 39 L.Ed. 409, 15 S.Ct. 337 [at 340]. This reflects the truism that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 155, 26 L.Ed.2d 489, 90 S.Ct. 1930 [at 1933], and stem from the same roots. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86, 27 L.Ed.2d 213, 91 S.Ct. 210 [218] (1970). It also responds to the need for certainty in the workaday world of conducting criminal trials. In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate indicia of reliability. Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. The instant case is one of those other cases in which the evidence must be excluded absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. This Court now addresses the facts to determine if that guarantee of trustworthiness is present. In the case sub judice during the state's case in chief, both defendants took the stand outside the presence of the jury to challenge the admissibility of the interlocking confessions. Both defendants were subject to direct and cross-examination at this point. Upon admission of the confessions, the jury was duly instructed that each confession could not be considered as evidence against the other defendant. Under this set of facts, this Court concludes that the defendants' right to confrontation was not violated. But see Mitchell v. State (Miss. No. 55,746, decided September 24, 1986) (not yet reported). (No particularized guarantees of trustworthiness were found present, failure to follow Brown required reversal in this case.) The State submits that the case at bar is most similar to Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 99 S.Ct. 2132, 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979). In Parker the three defendants were jointly tried and each of their interlocking confessions was admitted into evidence. None of the defendants took the stand. And although each of the confessions was subjected to a process of redaction in which references by the confessing defendant to the other defendants were replaced with the words blank or another person, the United States Supreme Court noted that the confessions were nevertheless such as to leave no possible doubt in the jurors' minds concerning the person[s] referred to. 442 U.S. at 65, 99 S.Ct. at 2135, 60 L.Ed.2d at 719. In affirming the convictions, the United States Supreme Court discerned: [T]he incriminating statements of a codefendant will seldom, if ever, be of the `devastating' character referred to in Bruton when the incriminated defendant has admitted his own guilt. The right protected by Bruton  the Constitutional right of cross-examination, id., at 137, 20 L.Ed.2d 476, 88 S.Ct. 1620 [at 1628]  has far less practical value to a defendant who has confessed to the crime that to one who has consistently maintained his innocence. Successfully impeaching a codefendant's confession on cross-examination would likely yield small advantage to the defendant whose own admission of guilt stands before the jury unchallenged. Nor does the natural motivation to shift the blame onto others, recognized by the Bruton Court to render the incriminating statements of codefendants inevitably suspect. id., at 136, 20 L.Ed.2d at 476, 88 S.Ct. at 1620, require application of the Bruton rule when the incriminated defendant has corroborated his defendant's statements by heaping blame onto himself. 442 U.S. 72, 99 S.Ct. 2132, 60 L.Ed.2d 723, but see Lee v. Illinois, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986) [subjects upon which the two confessions did not interlock could not be characterized as irrelevant or trivial.] The confessions in the case at bar are almost identical in every detail. Furthermore, each defendant admitted his own guilt. This Court concludes that there is a showing of particularized guarantee of trustworthiness to permit introduction during the state's case in chief. Finding no reversible error in this record, this Court affirms the convictions of Billy Gene Seales and Ricky Brown. AFFIRMED. WALKER, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE and HAWKINS, P. JJ., and DAN M. LEE, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.