Opinion ID: 1181051
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Defendant's Request to Address the Jury

Text: (12) The court twice (once at the time of defense counsel's penalty phase opening statement, and again immediately before defense counsel's penalty phase closing argument) denied counsel's request that his client be allowed to address the jury personally without having to take the stand and subject himself to cross-examination. At the time of the second request the court expressed concern that defendant would not be able to confine himself to proper argument, and that his statements might mislead and confuse the jury. Defense counsel made no offer of proof as to what defendant's statement would have disclosed. Defendant claims the court's ruling was prejudicial error. Although there is no United States Supreme Court case on point, defendant claims a federal circuit court case sheds light on the issue. In Ashe v. State of N.C. (4th Cir.1978) 586 F.2d 334, 336 (cert. den. 441 U.S. 966 [60 L.Ed.2d 1071, 99 S.Ct. 2416])  a noncapital sentencing case  the defendants were convicted and sentenced in state court. They sought a federal writ of habeas corpus on the basis the sentencing court had denied their request to personally address the court before being sentenced. The federal circuit court held: [W]hen a defendant effectively communicates his desire to the trial judge to speak to the imposition of sentence, it is a denial of due process not to grant the defendant's request. ( Id., at p. 336.) The court offered little analytical support for its conclusion except for a brief footnote in which it suggested that three United States Supreme Court cases seem to recognize that right. (586 F.2d at p. 336, fn. 3.) [9] Ashe suggested that a defendant's statement may be limited as to both duration and content: He need be given no more than a reasonable time; he need not be heard on irrelevancies or repetitions. ( Id., at p. 337.) The court did not grant the requested writ, but instead remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on what the defendants would have told the sentencer; it stated that if the defendants' information proved to be irrelevant or cumulative in view of their counsel's statements, denial of the right to speak would be deemed harmless error. ( Id., at p. 337.) Assuming Ashe is correct in its federal due process analysis, that case is distinguishable. In the noncapital sentencing context, a defendant does not generally have an opportunity to testify as to what penalty he feels is appropriate. Accordingly, Ashe might be correct in saying a defendant may not be denied that opportunity when he requests it. The sentencing phase of a capital trial, on the other hand, specifically provides for such testimony. The defendant is allowed to present evidence as well as take the stand and address the sentencer. Given this, we fail to see the need, much less a constitutional requirement, for a corresponding right to address the sentencer without being subject to cross-examination in capital cases. One state court opinion cited by defendant seems to support his position, but that case too is distinguishable. In Harris v. State (1986) 306 Md. 344 [509 A.2d 120], Maryland's high court held a capital defendant has a right to address the sentencing jury without subjecting himself to cross-examination. Significantly, however, the court expressly stated that this right is not a fundamental right secured by either the federal or the state constitution ( id., at p. 126), but is grounded instead on that state's common law ( id., at pp. 124-127). Further, the court observed that its own rules of court guaranteed the right in cases tried after 1984 ( Harris had been tried at a time when the rules were silent on the issue). ( Id., at p. 127.) Finally, the court noted that defense counsel had made an offer of proof containing the substance of what defendant would have said if he had been allowed to address the jury. ( Id., at p. 123.) This offer was crucial to the court's analysis. It held that when a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute and provides an acceptable proffer ... [, and when] the right so asserted is denied ... the sentence must be vacated. ( Id., at p. 127, italics added.) In contrast to Harris, defendant does not show that his understanding of the right of allocution is recognized by the common law of this state. Most significantly, unlike Harris, defense counsel here made no offer of proof. In this situation, we assume even the Harris court would find the issue not properly preserved. For the reasons set out above, we discern no error. [10]