Opinion ID: 1941338
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instruction on Entrapment

Text: The defendant first argues that he sold cocaine to the undercover officer because of police entrapment. He asserts, therefore, that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a jury instruction on entrapment.
A trial court must grant a defendant's requested jury instruction on a specific defense if there is some evidence to support a rational finding in favor of that defense. State v. Lavoie, 152 N.H. 542, 547, 880 A.2d 432 (2005). Some evidence means more than a minutia or a scintilla of evidence. Id. To be more than a scintilla, evidence cannot be vague, conjectural, or the mere suspicion about the existence of a fact, but must be real and of such quality as to induce conviction. State v. Graham, 259 Neb. 966, 614 N.W.2d 266, 272 (2000). A court need not give weight to allegations which are intrinsically improbable or flatly contradicted by irrefutable evidence. United States v. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d 809, 815 (1st Cir. 1988). Moreover, while conclusory and self-serving statements, standing alone, will not suffice, United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1165-66 (10th Cir.1986), a defendant's account, though self-serving, may have weight if it is interlaced with considerable detail and has some circumstantial corroboration in the record. United States v. Joost, 92 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir.1996) (quotation omitted); see State v. Haycock, 146 N.H. 5, 9-11, 766 A.2d 720 (2001) (court erred by not giving requested instruction on self-defense even though defendant testified inconsistently on numerous occasions). Without the necessary quantum of evidence to support the defense, jury instructions are not grounds for reversal if read as a whole they fairly cover the issues of law in the case. State v. Letourneau, 133 N.H. 565, 568, 578 A.2d 865 (1990). We review the trial court's failure to give an instruction for an unsustainable exercise of discretion. Lavoie, 152 N.H. at 547, 880 A.2d 432. Pursuant to RSA 626:5 (2007): It is an affirmative defense that the actor committed the offense because he was induced or encouraged to do so by a law enforcement official or by a person acting in cooperation with a law enforcement official, for the purpose of obtaining evidence against him and when the methods used to obtain such evidence were such as to create a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to commit it. However, conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment. The general purpose of the affirmative defense of entrapment is to prevent a defendant from being convicted of a crime manufactured by law enforcement officers. State v. Bacon, 114 N.H. 306, 308, 319 A.2d 636 (1974). While ordinarily entrapment raises an issue of fact to be determined by the jury, if the defendant fails to meet his burden of producing some evidence in support of the defense, the trial court should not submit the issue to the jury. See id. at 309, 319 A.2d 636; see also Lavoie, 152 N.H. at 547, 880 A.2d 432. Generally, the determination of whether a defendant has been entrapped is made by reference to one of two criteria, one a subjective test and the other an objective test. State v. Little, 121 N.H. 765, 769, 435 A.2d 517 (1981). The subjective test focuses upon the intent or predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime. Id. Under the subjective test, if the defendant is found to have been predisposed to commit the crime, the defense will fail. Id. Under the subjective test, the actions of government officials are not critical factors unless their conduct is so outrageous as to offend due process. Id. By contrast, the objective test focuses exclusively upon the conduct of law enforcement officials and their agents in providing the defendant with an opportunity to commit the crime. Id. at 770, 435 A.2d 517. Under the objective test, evidence of the defendant's predisposition to commit the alleged crime is irrelevant. Id. In New Hampshire, the determination of whether a legitimate entrapment defense exists . . . involve[s] elements of both the subjective and objective test. Id. at 771, 435 A.2d 517. Thus, we look at the conduct of law enforcement officials and their agents to determine whether they engaged in the kind of conduct . . . [that] may . . . have induced the accused to commit the crime charged. State v. Groulx, 106 N.H. 44, 47, 203 A.2d 641 (1964) (quotation omitted). We also examine the defendant's own conduct and predisposition, Little, 121 N.H. at 772, 435 A.2d 517 (quotation omitted), to determine whether he was ready to commit the crime and the police only furnished him an opportunity to do so, State v. Campbell, 110 N.H. 238, 241, 265 A.2d 11 (1970). Under New Hampshire law, therefore, the entrapment defense consists of two elements: (1) government inducement; and (2) the lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in the alleged criminal conduct. See Little, 121 N.H. at 771-72, 435 A.2d 517. In this respect, New Hampshire law comports with the law in the majority of jurisdictions. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62-63, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988); United States v. Daniel, 3 F.3d 775, 778 (4th Cir.1993); United States v. Jackson, 345 F.3d 59, 66 (2d Cir.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1157, 124 S.Ct. 1165, 157 L.Ed.2d 1055 (2004), and cert. denied, 541 U.S. 956, 124 S.Ct. 1705, 158 L.Ed.2d 391 (2004); United States v. Ryan, 289 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 927, 123 S.Ct. 324, 154 L.Ed.2d 221 (2002); United States v. Tejeda, 974 F.2d 210, 217 (1st Cir.1992); State v. Verrecchia, 766 A.2d 377, 387 (R.I.2001). See generally 2 W. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 5.2(a), at 562-64 (3d ed.2007). Because it is an affirmative defense, see RSA 626:5, the defendant bears the burden of proving entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence, see RSA 626:7 (2007). Little, 121 N.H. at 772, 435 A.2d 517. Thus, to be entitled to an instruction on entrapment, a defendant must produce some evidence on both prongs of the defense. See Lavoie, 152 N.H. at 547, 880 A.2d 432; see also Tejeda, 974 F.2d at 217; Sparks v. State, 91 Md.App. 35, 603 A.2d 1258, 1283, cert. denied, 327 Md. 524, 610 A.2d 797 (1992). He must produce some evidence to support a rational finding that: (1) the charged offense was induced by government officials; and (2) he was not predisposed to engage in it. See Lavoie, 152 N.H. at 547, 880 A.2d 432; Little, 121 N.H. at 771-72, 435 A.2d 517. With these general principles in mind, we now analyze whether the trial court erred when it ruled that the defendant failed to meet this burden.
[I]nducement . . . goes beyond providing an ordinary opportunity to commit a crime. United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 961 (1st Cir.) (quotations omitted), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1051, 115 S.Ct. 654, 130 L.Ed.2d 558 (1994); see Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 550, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 118 L.Ed.2d 174 (1992); RSA 626:5 (merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment). An inducement, by its very nature, contemplates more than a request and an affirmative response. Sparks, 603 A.2d at 1283. It is more than a solicitation. It is more even than a successful solicitation. Id. (citation omitted). Thus, an agent deployed to stop the traffic in illegal drugs may offer the opportunity to buy or sell drugs and, if the offer is accepted, make an arrest on the spot or later. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 549, 112 S.Ct. 1535. An `inducement' consists of an `opportunity' plus something else  typically, excessive pressure by the government upon the defendant or the government's taking advantage of an alternative, non-criminal type of motive. Gendron, 18 F.3d at 961. Courts have found a basis for sending the entrapment issue to the jury (or finding entrapment established as a matter of law) where government officials: (1) used intimidation and threats against a defendant's family; (2) called every day, began threatening the defendant, and were belligerent; (3) engaged in forceful solicitation and dogged insistence until defendant capitulated; (4) played upon defendant's sympathy for informant's common narcotics experience and withdrawal symptoms; (5) played upon sentiment of one former war buddy for another to get liquor (during prohibition); (6) used repeated suggestions which succeeded only when defendant had lost his job and needed money for his family's food and rent; [and] (7) told defendant that she (the agent) was suicidal and in desperate need of money. The background and context of each example illustrate possible government overreaching  of its having acted unfairly by employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it. Id. at 961-62 (quotations, citations, brackets and ellipsis omitted). Here, even if we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, it did not constitute some evidence to support a rational finding that the defendant was induced to commit the charged offenses. With respect to the charged offenses, there is no evidence at all that the undercover officer engaged in any improper inducement. Rather, even taking the defendant's testimony as true, the officer merely asked him for drugs. Mere solicitation is not inducement as a matter of law. See Sparks, 603 A.2d at 1283; see also RSA 626:5. While the defendant implies that he would never have sold cocaine to the officer had the police informant not induced him to return to his drug addiction by repeatedly doing drugs with him, his own testimony establishes that even before the informant contacted him, he had been partying. This case is, thus, distinguishable from Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958), where the Court found inducement as a matter of law. First, in Sherman, the informant targeted the accused after meeting him at a doctor's office where they were being treated for narcotics addiction. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 371, 78 S.Ct. 819. By contrast, the informant here knew the defendant because she had used drugs with him in the past and had observed him selling drugs to a mutual friend. Moreover, while the accused in Sherman was being treated for drug addiction and was trying to avoid drugs before being induced to sell them to the informant, the defendant had been using drugs within several days of the informant's first contact. Id. at 371, 376, 78 S.Ct. 819. Further, in Sherman, before ever asking the accused to sell him drugs, the informant cultivated a relationship with the accused by running into him accidentally and allowing their conversation gradually to progress to their mutual attempts to overcome narcotics addiction. Id. at 373, 78 S.Ct. 819. Conversely, the informant here, knowing that the defendant had sold drugs in the past, called him out of the blue and asked him to sell drugs to her. Also, in Sherman, the accused agreed to sell the informant drugs only after a number of repeated requests and after the informant solicited the accused's sympathy by feigning physical suffering due to withdrawal symptoms. Id. at 371, 78 S.Ct. 819. Here, the informant merely asked the defendant twice if he would sell drugs to her. The first time he was asked, the defendant said that he was not sure that he wanted to do it and that he had to think about it. The second time he was asked, within moments of the first time, he said okay. He never said no. Additionally, in Sherman, the informant notified the police about the accused only after repeatedly buying drugs from him, while here, the informant notified the police before any sales took place. Id. Finally, in Sherman, the Court found inducement as a matter of law based upon the uncontroverted testimony of the government's witnesses, while here, the sole evidence supporting the defendant's entrapment defense is his own self-serving account. Id. at 373, 78 S.Ct. 819. The only other inducement to which the defendant points concerns the sale to the informant for which he was never charged. The alleged inducement, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, is that the police informant asked him twice if he would sell cocaine to her, telling him that she had a really good customer, Nick, who got a ball [of cocaine] every week, for whom she could not procure cocaine as usual because of time constraints. He testified that he assented because he believed that if he helped her out by selling her cocaine (to give to Nick), the amount of cocaine involved would enable him to keep a package for himself. As he testified: In the way of doing things at the time, generally speaking, you buy something for somebody and you take a piece for yourself. And, you know, when the amount is a ball, two hundred dollars, well that's enough to be able to give someone, another wholesaler, a good deal and still keep some for yourself. . . . So, the anticipation was that I could help her out. I could keep a package. She could keep a package. And that would be the case. Not to say that once you start using drugs, you know, any purchase, any chance to get a hit is enough. But for someone out of the blue to call you, two hundred dollars would be like a minimum amount, you know. It's just, you know, that you could do it. None of this constitutes improper inducement. That the informant asked the defendant twice is not inducement. See Sparks, 603 A.2d at 1283; see also State v. Trujillo, 75 Wash.App. 913, 883 P.2d 329, 332 (1994), rev. denied, 126 Wash.2d 1008, 892 P.2d 1088 (1995). Nor is it inducement that the defendant was lured by the promise of a good cocaine customer and the ability to keep some of the cocaine for himself. The defendant's failure to produce some evidence that he was induced to commit the charged offenses is fatal to his claim that he was entitled to a jury instruction on entrapment. Accordingly, we need not address the sufficiency of the defendant's proof that he was not predisposed to commit the charged offenses.