Opinion ID: 3066183
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Review of Amado’s Brady Claim

Text: Since the Court of Appeal’s decision does not survive AEDPA review, we now review the constitutionality of Amado’s conviction and, specifically, his claim of a violation of Brady, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). See Frantz, 533 F.3d at 737. Recall that a Brady prosecutorial misconduct claim must meet three essential elements: “The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or § 1181(8) requires a party seeking a new trial to submit an attorney’s declaration describing when the evidence was discovered, in lieu of an attorney representation corroborating a witness’s declaration. See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002) (holding that the independent state ground must be “firmly established and regularly followed”). The statute itself does not require such a declaration, nor does the case the California Court of Appeal relied on, People v. Martinez, 685 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Cal. 1984) (in bank), which states only that facts supporting a new trial must “be shown by the best evidence of which the case admits.” Lapan had reason to believe that his statement to the Superior Court was sufficient without an accompanying declaration because California courts have held that “[s]tatements of a responsible officer of the court are tantamount to sworn testimony.” People v. Wolozon, 188 Cal. Rptr. 35, 37 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (citing People v. Laudermilk, 431 P.2d 228, 238 (Cal. 1967)). In any event, Lapan did file a declaration, and the Court of Appeal, although allowing Amado to augment the record with the declaration, simply ignored it. As to the requirement that Amado show that he could not have obtained the evidence with due diligence, that rule was not simply an independent state procedural rule, but is interwoven with, and changes the substance of, the Brady requirement. See Morales v. Calderon, 85 F.3d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Federal habeas review is not barred if the state decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law” (internal quotation marks omitted).). AMADO V. GONZALEZ 33 because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Banks, 540 U.S. at 691. Here, there is no dispute that the impeachment material meets the favorable-to-the-accused standard. We therefore turn to the other two elements. Under Wiggins we consider those issues de novo, since they were not addressed by the Court of Appeal. 539 U.S. at 534; see also Frantz, 533 F.3d at 737.
Impeachment Material Under Kyles, the fact that the individual prosecutors who brought the case against Amado may not themselves have had the Hardy impeachment material in their possession is not a bar to Amado’s Brady claim. At oral argument before this Court, the State conceded that the prosecution had access to Hardy’s conviction and probation records, for Hardy was prosecuted by the same office that prosecuted Amado, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office.11 Pursuant to Kyles, the prosecution had a Brady obligation to produce these records. 514 U.S. at 437. Cf. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (“To the extent [a Brady obligation] places a burden on the large prosecution offices, procedures and regulations can be established to carry that burden and to insure communication of all relevant information on each case to every lawyer who deals with it.”). 11 Hardy stated in his declaration that he was prosecuted in Long Beach. Long Beach falls under the auspices of the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office. 34 AMADO V. GONZALEZ At oral argument, the State questioned whether prosecutors had access to records on Hardy’s gang affiliation. However, that information was discussed in the very same probation report that discussed Hardy’s prior felony conviction. Had the State obtained that report, as the State concedes it was required to do, it also would have discovered Hardy’s gang affiliation.
We next consider whether Amado was prejudiced as a result of the State’s failure to produce the Brady information. A defendant is prejudiced if the evidence that was not produced is material. As we noted above, the Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence was material. For the following reasons, we agree with the Court of Appeal. “The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. The test for materiality “is not a sufficiency of evidence test.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. Evidence can be sufficient to sustain a verdict, and still Brady can be violated. Id. at 434–45. If “the favorable evidence [not produced] could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict,” Brady has been violated. Id. at 435. AMADO V. GONZALEZ 35
The State withheld not one but three pieces of evidence that had the potential of undermining Hardy’s testimony. First, Hardy had a robbery felony conviction. Defense counsel could have argued that this conviction rendered him an untrustworthy witness. Second, Hardy was on probation for that conviction at the time he testified. Defense counsel could have argued that Hardy was seeking favor with his probation officers by helping the police solve a wellpublicized murder case. Third, Hardy was a former member of a Bloods gang, and the defense could have argued that Hardy was biased against a member or friend of the rival Crips. Lapan’s cross-examination of Hardy did not address any of these points, for Lapan, without the suppressed impeachment evidence, lacked a good-faith basis to ask the appropriate questions. Lapan’s cross-examination was short, focusing on Hardy’s weak vision and his arguable inability to identify people running across his field of vision. The suppressed information would have added to the force of the cross-examination and defense counsel’s closing argument. There is a reasonable probability that the suppressed information would have made a difference, causing the jury to view Hardy’s implication of Amado with a great deal more suspicion. The State makes two arguments why the jurors’ view of Hardy would not have changed. First, the State argues that Hardy was already impeached by the cross-examination on his weak vision. The suppressed information, however, could have been used to show that Hardy had a motive to embellish 36 AMADO V. GONZALEZ the truth, and even to lie. This is an entirely different reason to cast doubt on Hardy’s words than the one presented at trial. The State’s second argument is that Hardy’s reluctance to testify and limited memory show that he was not biased against Amado. If Hardy was testifying against Amado in order to win favor with the prosecution, he would have been much more helpful and supplied detailed answers while on the stand, the State reasons. This argument, however, ignores Hardy’s cooperation with the police the night after the shooting. Hardy provided substantial assistance to the police on that day, voluntarily calling the authorities and identifying Amado as the teenager he saw with the gun. The details of Hardy’s initial implication of Amado were admitted into evidence through the testimony of Detective Esquivel, who helped fill in the gaps of Hardy’s sometimes spotty testimony. Thus, Hardy’s initial identification of Amado—possibly tainted by Hardy’s motives for bending the truth—made it into the mix of evidence considered by the jury.
Different Result Hardy’s statements against Amado, in his testimony and as introduced through Detective Esquivel, were critical to Amado’s conviction. Hardy was the only person to testify that Amado brought a weapon to the scene. Without such testimony, it is doubtful that the jury would have found that Amado had the requisite criminal intent to aid and abet Johnson’s attack on the passengers on the bus. Indeed, without such evidence, Amado was just one member of a crowd. Mere presence in a crowd is not sufficient to render AMADO V. GONZALEZ 37 a person an accomplice. See People v. Salgado, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 373, 381–82 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). At trial, the prosecution emphasized the critical nature of Hardy’s testimony. The prosecutor argued during summation that Hardy’s testimony on Amado’s carrying of a gun showed he was involved in the “significant amount of planning and talking” about the attack prior to the shooting. The prosecution emphasized that Hardy “specifically describes somebody that looks like Randall Amado, and then later picks that person out the next day.” Hardy was the one who “hear[d] people discussing the shooting” and called the police to set the case in motion. The prosecution told the jury that “the only reason” Hardy had to identify Amado was that he truly believed that Amado was “the guy who he saw on January the 16th, 1997, with a gun.” Would the prosecutor have argued with such conviction if Hardy had been impeached by his recent robbery conviction, his felony probation status with a motive to curry favor with the authorities, and his past membership in the Bloods, in frequent rivalry and conflict with members of the Crips? The prosecutor’s failure to discharge his Brady obligations enabled him to bolster Hardy’s credibility well beyond the credibility Hardy would have had if all the impeaching information had been made available to defense counsel and, by defense counsel, to the jury. Relying on California cases that broadly apply accomplice liability to gang members, the State contends that even if Hardy had not testified at all, Amado still could have been convicted. See, e.g., People v. Medina, 209 P.3d 105, 112 (Cal. 2009) (gang member involved in a fistfight responsible for shooting committed by another member of his gang); 38 AMADO V. GONZALEZ People v. Ayala, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575, 585 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (gang member participates in murder when he rides with a fellow gang member to assist him in a beating of a rival gang); People v. Montes, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 482, 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (gang member who wielded a chain in a gang fight responsible for shooting committed by a fellow gang member). But without Hardy, the only evidence against Amado was Barner’s and Grisson’s testimony, which showed that, at best, Amado ran to the bus with many others who were not indicted. On such evidence, it is questionable if a jury could have convicted Amado of intending to facilitate murder. See Salgado, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381–82. We do not need to decide more than the question before us—whether the prosecutor’s violation of Brady was prejudicial. The standard is not whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction, but whether there is a “reasonable probability” that the outcome would have been different, meaning that “the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435. Here, that standard is met. The impeaching evidence was strong enough to cast a cloud of doubt over Hardy’s testimony. With that cloud of doubt, the remaining evidence against Amado was weak. While Barner and Grisson both put Amado at the scene of the crime, neither of them testified that they saw him with a weapon or heard him make any statements, or heard others make statements, that suggested that Amado intended to participate in an assault. There was no proof that Amado had any discussions with Johnson and Pugh, or had a strong relationship with them that would have suggested that Johnson and Pugh had shared their plan with Amado. Hardy’s testimony that Amado carried a gun was AMADO V. GONZALEZ 39 influential to the jury in delivering a verdict against Amado, and it is reasonably probable that a jury, if made aware of the impeaching information against Hardy, would have given little, if any, credence to his testimony and would have returned a different verdict.