Opinion ID: 1085611
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Amato’s Testimony

Text: In their pro se supplemental briefs, defendants challenge the admission of testimony by Shapiro’s probation officer, Jennifer Amato, under Rules 403 and 404(b). Because 5 We likewise conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Shapiro’s motion to strike from the indictment the allegations that defendants had previously been convicted of fraud. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d); United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Motions to strike surplusage from an indictment will be granted only where the challenged allegations are not relevant to the crime charges and are inflammatory and prejudicial.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 12 defendants did not object to this testimony below, we review only for plain error, see United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. at 2164, which we do not identify here. Amato testified that, under the terms of Shapiro’s supervised release, he was not permitted to associate with other convicted felons without prior approval of his probation officer. She further testified that Shapiro (1) did not inform her of his contact with Stitsky, (2) failed to tell her about his employment at Cobalt prior to October 2004, and (3) misrepresented certain other facts about his employment and financial holdings. Amato’s testimony was evidence of Shapiro’s intent to defraud investors because it supported an inference that Shapiro knew he was engaged in impermissible activities with Cobalt and, therefore, deliberately failed to disclose his position and criminal history to investors. Under these circumstances, Amato’s testimony was admissible under Rule 403. Further, because her testimony was direct evidence of the charged conduct, see United States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d at 44, and offered for a purpose other than propensity, see United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d at 156, it presents no Rule 404(b) concern.