Opinion ID: 2791770
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Agents’ Standing

Text: The Agents claim a number of different injuries. First, they allege that they are being compelled to violate their oath to uphold the laws of the United States if they follow the Directive. Second, the burden of complying with DACA is causing injury to the Agents. Finally, the Agents argue that they are threatened with employment sanctions if they do not follow the Directive. In considering the motion to dismiss for lack of standing, we consider Plaintiffs’ amended complaint and its attachments, 35 Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and Plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion to dismiss and its attachments. 36 Neither party objects to the court’s consideration of these documents, nor do the parties contest the relevant facts.
The Agents assert that they have suffered an injury in fact because enforcing DACA would require them to violate their oaths to uphold the laws of the United States, specifically § 1225(b)(2)(A). In opposition, DHS argues that the violation of one’s oath alone is insufficient to establish standing. 34 In a letter brief filed after oral argument, Mississippi put forward three new arguments in support of its standing, based on (1) the cost of issuing driver’s licenses to DACA’s beneficiaries; (2) standing requirements specific to the Administrative Procedure Act; and (3) the federal government’s abdication of its duties to enforce the immigration laws. Because Mississippi failed to provide evidentiary support on these arguments and failed to make these arguments in their opening brief on appeal and below, they have been waived. See Tex. Democratic Party v. Benkiser, 459 F.3d 582, 594 (5th Cir. 2006); XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Kiewit Offshore Servs., Ltd., 513 F.3d 146, 153 (5th Cir. 2008). 35Plaintiffs attached the Napolitano Directive and the 2006 study conducted by the State of Mississippi. 36Plaintiffs attached affidavits from Plaintiff Christopher L. Crane, Plaintiff David A. Engle, Plaintiff James D. Doebler, and Plaintiff Samuel Martin. 12 Case: 14-10049 Document: 00512995490 Page: 13 Date Filed: 04/07/2015 No. 14-10049 Instead, the plaintiffs must allege a separate adverse consequence that will flow if they comply with DACA. The district court agreed with DHS and held that the violation of one’s oath alone is not a sufficient injury in fact to support standing. Citing to Finch v. Mississippi State Medical Ass’n., 585 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1978), and Donelon v. Louisiana Division Of Administrative Law, 522 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2008), the district court found that the Agents are “suing to ensure that the Directive . . . compl[ies] with their opinion of what federal law requires.” In other words, the agent’s subjective belief that complying with the Directive will require him to violate his oath is not a cognizable injury. We agree. Under the Fifth Circuit precedent, the violation of one’s oath alone is an insufficient injury to support standing.
Next, the Agents assert that the burden of compliance with DACA qualifies as a sufficient injury to satisfy the requirements of constitutional standing. Specifically, the Agents allege that they must inevitably alter their current processes to ensure that they defer action with respect to DACAeligible aliens. DHS argues that “a government employee responsible for carrying out an agency policy does not have standing to challenge that policy merely because of work responsibilities related to that policy.” The district court again agreed with DHS and held that the burden of compliance with DACA is insufficient to satisfy the injury requirement of standing. We agree. First, the Agents do not point to, and we have not found, any case where a plaintiff has had standing to challenge a department policy merely because it required the employees to change their practices. Second, the Agents have not alleged with any specificity how their practices will change in a substantial way. There are no factual allegations in the amended complaint describing the practices of the Agents before DACA or how those practices have changed or 13 Case: 14-10049 Document: 00512995490 Page: 14 Date Filed: 04/07/2015 No. 14-10049 will change. More importantly, there are no allegations that any change which may occur will make their employment duties significantly more difficult. The Agents have not alleged a sufficient injury in fact with respect to compliance with DACA to satisfy the requirements of constitutional standing.
Finally, the Agents allege that they have suffered an injury in fact by virtue of being threatened with employment sanctions if they do not comply with the terms of the Directive. Specifically, the Agents argue that they are threatened with employment sanctions if they detain a DACA-eligible alien for a removal proceeding. The district court found that the facts alleged in the Agents’ complaint were sufficient to demonstrate that they are threatened with employment sanctions; and these allegations were sufficient to support the Agents’ claims of injury in fact to establish standing in this suit. For the following reasons, we disagree. As we stated above, Plaintiffs must allege an injury that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” 37 The threat of a future injury can suffice as a sufficient injury in fact, but only if it is “certainly impending.” 38 “[W]e have repeatedly reiterated that . . . ‘[a]llegations of possible future injury’ [is] not sufficient.” 39 We begin with the observation that Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that any agent has been sanctioned or is threatened with employment sanctions for detaining an alien and refusing to grant deferred action under 37 Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. Ct. at 2341 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). 38Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted)). 39 Id. (quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158 (internal quotation marks omitted)) (emphasis in original); See also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n. 2. 14 Case: 14-10049 Document: 00512995490 Page: 15 Date Filed: 04/07/2015 No. 14-10049 DACA. 40 The complaint alleges that on one occasion an agent’s supervisor instructed the agent to defer action under the Directive to an alien, and the agent refused to follow the supervisor’s instruction. The agent received a nondisciplinary letter admonishing him for refusing to follow his supervisor’s instruction. This admonishment for refusing to follow a supervisor’s instruction does not support Plaintiffs’ claim that they are threatened with employment sanctions for failing to exercise their discretion to grant deferred action to an alien who appears to satisfy DACA’s criteria. This brings us to a fundamental flaw in the Agents’ argument. The Agents’ reading of the Directive — that they are always required to grant deferred action and cannot detain an alien who may meet the Directive’s criteria — is erroneous. The Napolitano Directive makes it clear that the Agents shall exercise their discretion in deciding to grant deferred action, and this judgment should be exercised on a case-by-case basis: [Our Nation’s immigration laws] are not designed to be blindly enforced without consideration given to the individual circumstances of each case.