Opinion ID: 1247774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's Absence From Penalty-reduction Hearing and Sentence.

Text: (28a) Defendant contends his absence at the sentence-modification hearing and imposition of sentence requires reversal of the judgment. The facts relevant to this claim are as follows. Immediately after the court announced its decision that the penalty in this case should be death, the court allowed defendant to make a statement. In his statement defendant expressed remorse for the death of the two women. [15] The court then set the matter for penalty-reduction hearing and sentencing. Defense counsel informed the court defendant wished to waive his presence at the penalty-reduction hearing. The court declined to take the waiver at that time, but asked counsel to prepare and submit a written waiver, which it would consider at a later time. Six weeks later counsel filed a written waiver executed by defendant and approved by both defense counsel and the prosecutor. The waiver, an adaptation of the form set out in section 977, stated that defendant, having been advised of his right to be present at all stages of the proceedings, hereby waives the right to be present at the hearing of any motion or other proceeding on this cause, ... [including] when a motion to reduce sentence is heard, ... The undersigned defendant hereby requests the court to proceed during every absence of his which the court may permit pursuant to this waiver, and hereby agrees that his interest will be deemed represented at all times by the presence of his attorneys the same as if the defendant himself were personally present in court.... At the commencement of the penalty-reduction hearing the court noted defense counsel were present and defendant was not and a waiver of defendant's appearance had been filed. The court further noted the form specifically waived defendant's presence at the modification hearing and at all stages of the proceedings, but did not expressly refer to the time of imposition of sentence. Defense counsel agreed with the court's conclusion waiver of the latter was inferred from the document. The court then denied the penalty-reduction application and formally imposed the judgment of death. Defendant's constitutional and statutory right to be present at the sentence modification hearing and imposition of sentence is not in dispute. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 819, fn. 15 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525]; Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 105-108 [78 L.Ed. 674, 54 S.Ct. 330, 90 A.L.R. 575]; People v. Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 309-310; §§ 977, 1043.) The question is whether he could waive the right and, if so, did he effectively waive it here. Defendant argues that in a capital case the personal presence of the defendant at every critical phase is mandatory and cannot be waived. In support he cites Hopt v. Utah (1884) 110 U.S. 574, 579 [28 L.Ed. 262, 4 S.Ct. 202] and two federal decisions, Hall v. Wainwright (11th Cir.1984) 733 F.2d 766, 775-776 and Bustamante v. Eyman (9th Cir.1972) 456 F.2d 269, 273-274 (plur. opn.). Although in Hopt, supra, the United States Supreme Court stated a capital defendant could not waive his presence at a critical stage of the proceeding, the holding was based on a statute mandating the defendant's presence. (110 U.S. at p. 578 [28 L.Ed.2d at p. 265]; see Diaz v. United States (1912) 223 U.S. 442, 458 [56 L.Ed. 500, 32 S.Ct. 250]; see also Snyder v. Massachusetts, supra, 291 U.S. at p. 117, fn. [] [What Hopt said about presence was dictum].) Subsequently, in Snyder v. Massachusetts, supra, at page 106 [78 L.Ed. at page 678], the high court stated the federal constitutional right no doubt ... may be lost by consent or at times even by misconduct. Thereafter, in Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 U.S. 337, 343 [25 L.Ed.2d 353, 90 S.Ct. 1057], the court expressly held a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if he conducts himself in a disruptive manner. Most recently, in Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 182 [43 L.Ed.2d 103, 95 S.Ct. 896], the high court indicated the question of waiver was an open one. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the 11th Circuit has taken the view a defendant cannot waive his presence at any critical stage of trial. ( Hall v. Wainwright, supra, 733 F.2d at p. 775; see also Bustamante v. Eyman, supra, 456 F.2d at p. 274 [lead opn. of Ferguson, J.].) In Peede v. State (Fla. 1985) 474 So.2d 808, certiorari denied 477 U.S. 909 [91 L.Ed.2d 575, 106 S.Ct. 3286], the Florida Supreme Court took a different view. Observing that in Drope, supra, 420 U.S. 162, the United States Supreme Court expressly left open the question of whether presence at a capital trial may be waived, the court determined waiver was permissible. Subsequent to Drope, the Florida court noted, rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, relating to the defendant's presence, was changed to eliminate the distinction between capital and noncapital cases, thus permitting a defendant in a capital as well as a noncapital case to waive the right to be present at trial in two circumstances. (474 So.2d at pp. 812-813.) The Florida Supreme Court concluded that just as in noncapital cases, the presence requirement is for the defendant's protection and, just as he can knowingly and voluntarily waive any other constitutional right, a defendant can waive his right to be present at stages of his capital trial if he personally chooses to voluntarily absent himself. [Fn. omitted.] (474 So.2d at p. 814.) To hold otherwise, the court reasoned, would force a defendant into the untenable position of having to disrupt the courtroom to such an extreme as to result in his removal, thereby seriously prejudicing his case. ( Id. at p. 815, citing Illinois v. Allen, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 344 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 359]. See generally 3A Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal 2d (1982) § 723, p. 18.) The issue in this state evidently is of first impression. (Cf. People v. Odle (1988) 45 Cal.3d 386, 407 and fn. 8 [247 Cal. Rptr. 137, 754 P.2d 184] [waiver of presence for rereading of testimony]; People v. Grant (1988) 45 Cal.3d 829, 845-846 [248 Cal. Rptr. 444, 755 P.2d 894] [waiver at proceedings not necessitating defendant's presence].) Having considered the matter closely, we find the reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court persuasive. Permitting waiver, moreover, is consistent with the solicitude shown by modern jurisprudence to the defendant's prerogative to waive the most crucial of rights. (29) A capital defendant may waive counsel and represent himself in propria persona ( Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806; People v. Joseph (1983) 34 Cal.3d 936, 943 [196 Cal. Rptr. 339, 671 P.2d 843]), he may waive jury trial ( People v. Deere, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 359-360), he may decline to put on a defense in the guilt phase ( People v. Teron (1979) 23 Cal.3d 103, 108 [151 Cal. Rptr. 633, 588 P.2d 773]), he may, with the consent of counsel, plead guilty to the underlying charges and the alleged special circumstances ( People v. Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d 739, 746), he may testify to his preference for a sentence of death ( People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 961-962 [248 Cal. Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917]), and he need not participate in the presentation of the defense at the penalty phase (compare People v. Teron, supra, at pp. 108, 115, with People v. Deere, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 363-364). (28b) If a capital defendant may waive counsel to his detriment, and if other felony defendants may waive their right to presence at various stages of trial (e.g., §§ 977, 1043; Taylor v. United States (1973) 414 U.S. 17 [38 L.Ed.2d 174, 94 S.Ct. 194]; People v. Rogers (1957) 150 Cal. App.2d 403, 414-415 [309 P.2d 949]) and at sentence (§ 1193; People v. Brown (1951) 102 Cal. App.2d 60 [226 P.2d 609]), we see no sufficient reason not to permit a capital defendant to waive the right to be present as well. Our statutes governing waiver make no distinction between capital and other felony defendants (see §§ 977, 1193); unless and until the United States Supreme Court should determine the federal Constitution requires it, we decline to impose such a distinction as a matter of state constitutional law. We turn then to a determination of whether defendant validly waived his presence. In compliance with section 977, defendant's written waiver form, filed with leave of court, expressly stated he had been advised of and waived his right to be present when a motion to reduce sentence is heard. Although the form was not executed in open court as the statute requires, counsel earlier and in defendant's presence had orally informed the court of defendant's wish to be absent at the sentence-modification hearing (referred to by counsel as the motion for new trial), and the court had asked counsel to prepare and submit a written waiver. We believe defendant's waiver substantially complied with section 977 so as to constitute a valid waiver of his right to be present at the sentence-modification hearing. (See In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 284-286 [193 Cal. Rptr. 538, 666 P.2d 980].) We reach a contrary conclusion with respect to waiver of defendant's right to be present at the imposition of sentence. Although defendant could waive his right to be present at sentence (§ 1193; People v. Brown, supra, 102 Cal. App.2d 60), defendant's waiver form cannot reasonably be construed to embrace a knowing and intelligent waiver of his presence at the time of sentence. We must therefore determine the prejudicial effect of the error under the Chapman standard of review ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711]). Defendant argues his absence at the imposition of sentence deprived him of the opportunity to address the court and make a statement before pronouncement of final judgment. Defendant, however, made a statement to the court following its sentence verdict and before the sentence modification hearing  at a time, therefore, when the court likely was most open to reassessment of its determination. In his statement defendant acknowledged his responsibility for his crimes and fully expressed his remorse. He stated he understood the court's decision and thanked it for hearing his case. At the time of pronouncement of judgment, therefore, the court had heard defendant's expression of remorse and had twice deliberated carefully and at length over the evidence presented and the arguments made. In the circumstances of this case, where defendant had spoken at the time that mattered most and where the court had already exercised its discretion and reviewed that exercise, we find little likelihood defendant would have chosen to be present at the time of judgment and further find that his absence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.