Opinion ID: 1459522
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the State Court Action Was Decided on the Merits

Text: O'Connor argues that because the state-court action was ultimately decided on appeal in part on statutory immunity grounds, it was not decided on the merits. We find this argument unhelpful. [3] The invasion of privacy claim was the only claim on which the jury ruled in O'Connor's favor. The Appellate Court reversed, however, concluding that the trial court improperly failed to set aside the verdict because the plaintiff's claim against the defendant for invasion of privacy was barred by governmental immunity [under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-557n(a)(2)]. O'Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 90 Conn.App. at 63, 877 A.2d 860. There is divided authority as to whether a judgment based on an immunity defense is a judgment on the merits for the purposes of res judicata. Compare Lommen v. City of East Grand Forks, 97 F.3d 272, 275 (8th Cir.1996) (finding that, under Minnesota law, a decision based on governmental immunity is considered on the merits for the purposes of res judicata ) and Flores v. Edinburg Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d 773, 775 n. 3 (5th Cir.1984) (summary judgment on grounds of sovereign immunity is a judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata) with Wade v. City of Pittsburgh, 765 F.2d 405, 410 (3rd Cir. 1985) (stating, with regards to a state-court judgment based on statutory immunity, that we predict that under Pennsylvania law, if a judgment is entered before development of the merits and is based on a collateral defense applicable only to the first action, claim preclusion would not apply.). In light of the disposition of the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress on the merits, however, we do not think it matters whether the claim for invasion of privacy was decided on the merits or not. The district court's conclusion that the substantive due process claims could not be pursued under principles of res judicata would have been valid even if it had been based on the state court's decision on the merits of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim alone. To paraphrase the district court's opinion, for the plaintiff to succeed on his remaining claim in federal courtwhether defendants violated his right to substantive due processhe would have had to prove that the defendants' insistence on obtaining his past medical records was arbitrary and oppressive. See O'Connor, 482 F.Supp.2d at 232. The Board's insistence on obtaining these records, and its intent in doing so, were central to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims that were tried in state court. Under the transactional test that the Connecticut Supreme Court has adopted to determine whether an action is barred by res judicata, the decision on the merits in the state court against O'Connor on his intentional infliction claim therefore bars his pursuit of the substantive due process claims in federal district court. [4] See Comm'r of Envtl. Prot., 227 Conn. at 189-90, 629 A.2d at 1124 (judgment in first action extinguishes all other claims with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.).