Opinion ID: 889184
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Breach of Warranty Claims

Text: ¶ 41 Fleetwood also argued in its post-trial motion that the Vaders' claims for breach of implied and express warranties were not supported by sufficient evidence and should not have been submitted to the jury. Fleetwood argued that the evidence showed that David Vader reviewed the express warranties associated with the motor home, and knew that Fleetwood's limited warranty did not cover the chassis and its component parts, as these were covered separately by the Ford Motor Company's warranty. The District Court rejected this argument by noting that in one of Fleetwood's sales brochures, [it] promised a `flawless ride.' They jury could have easily found, and probably did, that this sort of statement, although made in a sales brochure, arose to the level of an express warranty. ¶ 42 We agree with the District Court, and conclude that Fleetwood's appeal of the denial of its post-trial motion with regard to this claim is without merit. Once again, a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law is not an invitation to reweigh the evidence, but only to determine whether there was any evidence which would support submitting a particular claim to the jury. The District Court correctly reasoned that the jury could have concluded that one of Fleetwood's sales brochures, which was admitted into evidence and promised a flawless ride, created an express warranty which was subsequently breached. Thus, we affirm the District Court with respect to the breach of warranty claims as well. ¶ 43 Issue Two: Did the District Court abuse its discretion in doubling the jury's award under the CPA? ¶ 44 As noted above, ( see ¶ 13), the District Court doubled the award of damages for violations of the CPA. Fleetwood asserts the District Court abused its discretion in so doing. Although § 30-14-133, MCA, of the CPA does allow the District Court to treble damages, Fleetwood maintains that under Plath the increase of damages is not intended to punish but instead to be compensatory and remedial rather than punitive. See Plath, ¶ 27. Fleetwood maintains the District Court's rationale was based, in part, on a deterrence rationale which Fleetwood claims makes the doubling of the award for all practical purposes a judicially-imposed punitive damage award. Fleetwood asserts that this doubling of punitive damages is both contrary to the CPA and raises serious constitutional concerns in light of such cases as BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996) and State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003), which address the impropriety of excessive punitive damage awards. Accordingly, Fleetwood argues the doubling of damages by the District Court should be reversed. ¶ 45 The Vaders and the State, appearing as Amicus, both argue that the doubling of the damage award under the CPA was within the discretion of the District Court. Ironically, the Vaders also claim on cross-appeal that the District Court abused its discretion when it failed to treble the damages because treble damages are allowed under the CPA and do not lead to an excessive award. ¶ 46 In Plath, we discussed the practical application of the treble damages provision of the CPA. In that case, a district court refused to increase an award of damages under the CPA because the plaintiffs failed to show that a defendant had engaged in any culpable behavior. Plath, ¶ 16. We explicitly rejected the notion that such a showing was required and remanded the matter to the district court. As we stated in our holding, The District Court erred when it ruled treble damages would not be awarded because the evidence did not support a finding generally associated with punitive damages. The purpose of the trebling provision of the Montana Consumer Protection Act is to promote or encourage private individuals to pursue violations of Montana's Consumer Protection Act by making it more economically feasible to pursue those claims where actual damages are minimal. Montana's treble damages provision is purely a discretionary function of the district court and such awards should be determined on a case-by-case basis. A district court decision whether or not to award treble damages under the Act should be guided by the overall purpose of the Act itself, which is to protect the public from unfair or deceptive practices engaged in by trade or commerce. The specific purpose of the treble damage provision is to encourage consumers to bring these civil actions by making it more economically feasible. Plath, ¶ 28. ¶ 47 Based on a portion of the above-quoted language, Fleetwood suggests that an increase of damages cannot be made unless the actual damages are minimal. But as the State correctly notes, nothing in the statute itself suggests any such requirement. Instead, Montana's CPA gives district courts discretion, without imposing any particular criteria, to grant an award of treble damages if it finds that such an increase will further the purpose of the CPA. See Plath, ¶ 22 (noting that, among jurisdictions which have consumer protection acts, Montana's CPA falls in the class of the distinct minorit[y] of consumer protection acts [which] allow for a purely discretionary award of treble damages.). In Plath, we noted that the CPA's treble damage provision does not require any specific conduct that would trigger imposition of the treble damage award and further observed that this treble damage award is not punitive in nature and ... does not require specific intentional conduct on the part of the defendant. Plath, ¶ 27. In other words, the treble damages provision does not require a plaintiff to prove malice, oppression, or fraud, which under Montana law is prerequisite conduct necessary to allowing punitive damages. Plath, ¶ 26 (citing T & W Chevrolet v. Darvial, 196 Mont. 287, 293, 641 P.2d 1368, 1371 (1982)). Although, in practical terms, the trebling function has a deterrent effect, it is used primarily as a compensatory measure, and thus is not intended to be punitive. Plath, ¶ 25. ¶ 48 Fleetwood has not argued that Plath was wrongly decided or should be overruled. Instead, Fleetwood maintains that the District Court's reasoning shows that it was basing its decision on a deterrence rationale which went beyond the compensatory rationale adopted in Plath. However, in Plath we highlighted the fact that punitive damages are awarded in response to a plaintiff's showing of malice, oppression, or fraud by the defendant. If the District Court stated that it was trebling damages in order to punish such conduct, then Fleetwood's case would arguably have some merit. Here, the District Court's rationale shows that the doubling of the damage award was designed to level the playing field and deter inappropriate action by manufactures in the future. This satisfies the remedial purpose inherent in the trebling damages provision, and was within the District Court's discretion. ¶ 49 Moreover, it was equally within the District Court's discretion to award only a doubling of damages, instead of a trebling of damages as requested by the Vaders. The language of the treble damages provision is discretionary, and the District Court certainly did not commit an abuse of discretion by awarding a doubling of damages, as opposed to a tripling of damages, or no increase at all. Thus, we affirm the District Court's award. ¶ 50 Issue Three: Are the Vaders entitled to an award of attorney's fees under the CPA for fees incurred on appeal? ¶ 51 The Vaders assert that attorney's fees are available for consumers who successfully secure a CPA award, and that fees incurred on appeal should be awarded as well. The Vaders argue that this Court seemingly recognized the validity of such an award of attorney's fees in Baird v. Norwest Bank, 255 Mont. 317, 843 P.2d 327 (1992). They also argue that other jurisdictions allow an award of attorney's fees incurred on appeal in successfully defending an award under consumer protection laws. See e.g., Cange v. Stotler & Co., 913 F.2d 1204, 1211 (7th Cir.1990); Jordan v. Transnational Motors, Inc., 212 Mich.App. 94, 537 N.W.2d 471, 474 (1995); Wash. State Phys. Ins. Exch. & Assn. v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash.2d 299, 858 P.2d 1054, 1074 (1993). The Vaders request that we remand this matter to the District Court to determine the amount of attorney's fees which should be awarded for defending their verdict on appeal. ¶ 52 Given that Fleetwood has not objected to an award of attorney's fees for work performed on appeal, we grant the Vaders' request to remand this matter to the District Court. Although no Montana cases explicitly hold that attorney's fees may be awarded for work performed in defending a CPA award on appeal, we did appear to implicitly recognize their availability in Baird. See Baird, 255 Mont. at 329, 843 P.2d at 334-35. Section 30-14-133(3), MCA, of the CPA states that [i]n any action brought under this section, the court may award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees incurred in prosecuting or defending the action. Clearly, the Vaders' appeal was necessary to defend their award under the CPA. Moreover, as the Vaders note, other jurisdictions with consumer protection acts do allow attorney's fees incurred on appeal. Thus, we remand this matter to the District Court for a determination and assessment of reasonable attorney's fees incurred on appeal.