Opinion ID: 2575468
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issue 2: Did the district court err in admitting into evidence Pham's statements to law enforcement made without being provided an interpreter?

Text: Pham objects to the admission of statements he made to the police, i.e., agent Falletti, because they were taken without an interpreter in violation of K.S.A. 75-4351(e). The State responds that although English is not Pham's primary language, the statements were voluntarily and understandingly made. In reviewing a trial court's decision regarding the suppression of a confession, an appellate court reviews the factual underpinnings of the decision by a substantial competent evidence standard and the ultimate legal conclusion by a de novo standard. State v. Swanigan, 279 Kan. 18, Syl. ¶ 1, 106 P.3d 39 (2005). Furthermore, in determining whether a confession is voluntary, a court looks at the totality of the circumstances, including the duration and manner of the interrogation; the ability of the accused on request to communicate with the outside world; the accused's age, intellect, and background; and the fairness of the officers in conducting the interrogation. Swanigan, 279 Kan. 18, Syl. ¶ 2. An additional circumstance for consideration is the accused's fluency in the English language. State v. Garcia, 243 Kan. 662, Syl. ¶ 8, 763 P.2d 585 (1988). The essential inquiry in determining the voluntariness of a statement is whether the statement was the product of the free and independent will of the accused. Swanigan, 279 Kan. 18, Syl. ¶ 2. As Pham points out, K.S.A. 75-4351(e) states that a qualified interpreter shall be appointed for persons whose primary language is one other than English prior to any attempt to interrogate or take a statement from a person who is arrested for an alleged violation of a criminal law of the state or any city ordinance. We designated this statute's place in the confession analysis in State v. Zuniga, 237 Kan. 788, 791-92, 703 P.2d 805 (1985), stating: K.S.A. 75-4351 and the sections that follow it provide the machinery for the selection, appointment and compensation of interpreters under various circumstances. They authorize the expenditure of public funds for that purpose. The statutes do not contain any sanctions for violations thereof. Suppression is a severe sanction, much criticized. While the purpose is to encourage peace officers to follow statutes or constitutional guidelines, it may prevent otherwise proper evidence from being introduced in the case at hand. . . . . The purpose behind K.S.A. 75-4351(e) is to ensure that there is clear communication between one who is in custody and the officers who are questioning him. The statute does not state a rule of evidence. Whether or not an interpreter is appointed and is present at the taking of the statement, the trial court must still determine whether an in-custody statement was freely, voluntarily and knowingly given, with knowledge of the Miranda rights. That determination must be based upon the totality of the circumstances. (Emphasis added.) We affirmed in State v. Nguyen, 251 Kan. 69, 74-75, 833 P.2d 937 (1992), that the absence of an interpreter is not dispositive of the confession's admissibility: When an in-custody statement is taken in English from an accused whose primary language is not English, but who also speaks English, failure of the officers to have an interpreter in attendance pursuant to K.S.A. 75-4351(e) does not vitiate the statement if it was freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly made with full knowledge of the Miranda rights. (Citing State v. Garcia, 243 Kan. 662, Syl. ¶ 9, 763 P.2d 585 [1988].) In the instant case, the district court held a hearing on the voluntariness of Pham's statement. After hearing testimony from Detective Jason Ott, Agent David Falletti, and the defendant; hearing arguments; and watching the videotape of the interrogation, the district court ruled that the statement was freely and voluntarily given. As a basis for this legal conclusion, the court made the following findings: 1. The defendant filed a motion seeking to quash the taped interview of the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for a Jackson v. Denno hearing regarding the same taped interview. Testimony was received and arguments were heard. The court took the matter under advisement so as to view the tape. 2. The interview took place in an interview room at the police department in Liberal, Kansas. The defendant was supplied with water and was helped in notifying his employer of his whereabouts. There was no evident physical discomfort during the interview. The defendant had been in the United States approximately 25 years and had previously served time in the Kansas Prison system for approximately 19 years. At the time of the interview the defendant had full time employment in the meat packing industry in Liberal, Kansas. The interview was in English and lasted approximately 2 hours. English was not his native language. There is no contention on the part of either party that this is not a custodial interrogation. 3. Before the interview, the defendant read the Miranda warning and indicated that he understood the warning. When he read the warning, the defendant occasionally paused to correct his pronunciation of the words on the form. The wording on the form was in common language of ordinary meaning. 4. During the entire session the responses were fairly quick and were appropriate to the questions asked. Although the defendant spoke with a heavy accent with some difficulty in pronunciation, minor syntax problems, and other minor word usage problems, the tape reveals no substantial presence of evident misunderstanding in the conversation, questions and answers. 5. The defendant contended that although he reads and speaks English that he understands only about 30% of the words. The taped interview, taken in toto, does not support this contention. Again, there is no evidence of any substantial misunderstanding during the interview or during the reading of the Miranda warning. The defendant's answers and statements were relatively quick and appropriate to the question asked or the situation at hand. 6. It was evident during the interview that the defendant knew of his rights. This was shown when the defendant, at the end of the interview, after giving consent to search his vehicle and place of abode and being told he was being arrested for aggravated burglary and robbery, said that he did not have any money and needed a lawyer. 7. The defendant contends that the explanation of relatively complicated right-to-search-form by the interviewer was proof that the Miranda warning needed more explanation. While it is true that the interviewer explained the consent to search form, it is not clear to the court how this proves that the Miranda warning should have been explained in detail. Much of the conversation around the consent to search appeared to be about just exactly what was to be searched and how. The Miranda warning need no such explanations. 8. During the interview, upon several occasions, the interviewing KBI agent exhorted the defendant to tell the truth. There were, however, no promises made by the agent as to any leniency or deals. 9. It is evident from the totality of the conversation and interview that the defendant had an English language capacity to understand the plain words of the Miranda warning. There is no per se rule requiring an interpreter for a person whose native language is not English. The test is whether or not English is sufficiently understood by the defendant to understand the plain language of the Miranda warning. As such, the state has satisfied the burden. Additionally, it is evident from the totality of the conversation and all of the factors surrounding the interview that the waiver of rights and his subsequent statements were the product of the free and voluntary will of the defendant. The district court's findings are supported by substantial competent evidence contained in the videotaped statement and the testimony of Ott and Falletti at the suppression hearing. See State v. Swanigan, 279 Kan. 18, Syl. ¶ 1, 106 P.3d 39 (2005). Falletti testified he went over the Miranda rights with Pham by having him read out loud each of the five lines from the Miranda card. After each line was read by Pham, Falletti asked Pham if he understood, to which Pham applied in the affirmative. The videotape shows throughout that Pham was able to understand and converse with Falletti in English. Among other things, Pham demonstrated that he understood by providing numerous specific details during the 2-hour interview about the events of the morning of the crime. Falletti also testified that before taping began he asked Pham if he wanted an interpreter, but Pham stated he did not need one. Ott confirmed that Falletti asked if Pham needed an interpreter. Ott testified that Pham told Falletti he had been in America for over 20 years, he understood English, and he did not need an interpreter. While Pham denies these and other comments attributed to him, this court does not reweigh evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the evidence. State v. Swanigan, 279 Kan. at 23. Under the totality of the circumstances, including the absence of an interpreter, we can independently conclude as a matter of law that Pham's statements were made freely, voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly with full knowledge of his Miranda rights. See State v. Garcia, 243 Kan. 662, Syl. ¶ 9, 763 P.2d 585 (1988). See also Swanigan, 279 Kan. 18, Syl. ¶ 1 (whether confession is voluntary is conclusion of law).