Opinion ID: 2508569
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Trial Counsel Were Ineffective In Negotiating And Recommending The Plea Agreement.

Text: The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is `whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.' Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 369, 88 L.Ed.2d 203, 208 (1985). Where ... a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters a plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice `was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.' Id. (citation omitted). Strategic or tactical decisions made by counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Gilpin-Grubb, 138 Idaho at 81, 57 P.3d at 792. Dunlap argues he could not have entered a knowing and voluntary plea because his counsel failed to advise him of the best course of action. Dunlap contends his attorneys did not recommend any course of action for him and he was left completely abandoned to decide whether to accept the State's offer. Furthermore, his attorneys failed to give accurate, informed advice on the consequences of a guilty plea. He asserts trial counsels' testimony supports his position. Finally, Dunlap asserts the American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases requires counsel to ensure that death is not a possible punishment before advising a client to plead guilty. Dunlap contends there is a reasonable probability he would have proceeded to trial had he been properly advised. The United States Supreme Court has stated, [T]he decision to plead guilty before the evidence is in frequently involves the making of difficult judgments. All the pertinent facts normally cannot be known unless witnesses are examined and cross-examined in court. Even then the truth will often be in dispute. In the face of unavoidable uncertainty, the defendant and his counsel must make their best judgment as to the weight of the State's case. Counsel must predict how the facts, as he understands them, would be viewed by a court. If proved would those facts convince a judge or jury of the defendant's guilt? . . . Questions like these cannot be answered with certitude; yet a decision to plead guilty must necessarily rest upon counsel's answers, uncertain as they may be. Waiving trial entails the inherent risk that the good-faith evaluations of a reasonably competent attorney will turn out to be mistaken either as to the facts or as what a court's judgment might be on given facts. That a guilty plea must be intelligently made is not a requirement that all advice offered by the defendant's lawyer withstand retrospective examination in a post-conviction hearing. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769-70, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1448, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 772-73 (1970) (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756-57, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1473-74, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 760-61 (1970)). Dunlap's attorneys evaluated the evidence and determined the State had overwhelming evidence against Dunlap. In their view, the best way to avoid the death penalty was to accept responsibility and attempt to reduce the details the court would be presented with. When attorney Souza was asked if he gave Dunlap the best advice he could, he stated, Well, I hope that we tried to discuss with him and give him the options that he had at that particular time. That certainly was the intent. Attorney Souza explained, [T]here was a decision on his part not to go to trial, and if he didn't go to trial, then what was the best outcome that he could hope for, given the facts and circumstances of this case, and if I remember right, it was discussed in terms of, of course, what the court could do as far as imposing the death penalty or the court giving him fixed life. The Court finds the trial judge did reasonably determine that the defendant was adequately advised by trial counsel on the proposed plea agreement.