Opinion ID: 1251685
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Martha F. Matter

Text: In August 1978, Martha F. retained petitioner to take possession of and distribute an inheritance which had been left in a savings account by her deceased mother, Rosa H. [4] Petitioner spoke with an officer of the bank, who then sent him a cashier's check for the full amount of the inheritance, along with a letter containing the names and addresses of the six surviving children. Petitioner deposited the money in his trust account, except for $100 which he retained by agreement as his fee for the distribution. Ms. F. heard nothing further from petitioner after August of 1978. Neither she nor any of the other heirs received checks from him. She repeatedly left messages with his answering service, and on one occasion she went to his office and left a note under his door. Petitioner did not respond to any of her messages. In April 1979, Ms. F. filed a claim for the undistributed estate in small claims court. Petitioner did not appear, and Ms. F. was awarded a default judgment on May 21st. On June 26th, petitioner appeared at judgment debtor examination proceedings. He stated to the judge that he had the money and that he would write Ms. F. a check for the full amount as soon as he returned to his office. As a result, the court ordered the case dropped from the calendar. A week later, Ms. F. had not received the check so she commenced proceedings to attach petitioner's bank account to satisfy the judgment. She eventually received $449.56 from his commercial account. At the State Bar hearing, petitioner gave Ms. F. a money order for the balance. Petitioner's defense was that Ms. F. wanted him to turn over the entire fund to her, and he was concerned about his liability to the other heirs if he did so. He testified that he wrote several letters trying to locate heirs for whom he did not have current addresses and to ascertain the wishes of the other heirs about turning over the entire fund to Ms. F. [5] However, at the State Bar hearing he was unable to ascertain from reviewing his own file whether he had received responses from the other heirs. He explained that his secretary quit in November of 1978, and thereafter he had only part-time or temporary secretarial help. He did not regularly open or file his mail after the beginning of 1979. At the time petitioner told the court that he would send Ms. F. the check he had sufficient funds to do so. However, at the State Bar hearing, he could not remember whether those funds had been in his trust account or elsewhere. Bank records in evidence before the hearing panel revealed that in September and December of 1978, the balance in his trust account fell below the amount which he was holding for the Rosa H. heirs. No 1979 records were offered into evidence. The hearing panel found that petitioner violated his oath to discharge faithfully his duties as an attorney (§ 6067) and his duty to maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (§ 6103), and that he failed to use reasonable diligence to accomplish the purpose for which he was employed. (Rule 6-101(2).) It also found that he committed acts of moral turpitude and dishonesty in three respects: by commingling and misappropriating his client's funds (rule 8-101(A)); by failing promptly to pay out these funds to Ms. F. when she requested them (rule 8-101(B)(4)); and by making a false statement of fact to the court to seek to mislead it (rule 7-105(1)). (See § 6106.) (4) Petitioner challenges the three findings of moral turpitude. He argues that no moral turpitude was involved in commingling or misappropriating the funds which he received from the bank, since he maintained the funds in a trust account and was not aware that the account balance dropped below the amount of the Rosa H. estate. He notes that he was frequently out of town during the relevant time period and did not consistently examine his trust account records. The record supports petitioner's claim that initially the money was properly deposited in a client trust account. However, the hearing panel's finding that it was subsequently misappropriated is also supported by legally sufficient evidence. The fact that the balance in [that] trust account [fell] below the amount due his client will support a finding of wilful misappropriation. ( Jackson v. State Bar (1979) 25 Cal.3d 398, 403 [158 Cal. Rptr. 869, 600 P.2d 1326]; Black v. State Bar (1972) 7 Cal.3d 676, 691 [103 Cal. Rptr. 288, 499 P.2d 968]; Vaughn v. State Bar, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 851.) And [e]ven if petitioner's conduct were not wilful and dishonest, gross carelessness and negligence constitute a violation of an attorney's oath faithfully to discharge his duties and involve moral turpitude. ( Jackson v. State Bar (1979) 23 Cal.3d 509, 513 [153 Cal. Rptr. 24, 591 P.2d 47].) Furthermore, petitioner's repeated refusal to communicate with Ms. F., or to respond to her demands that he account to her for the estate, will justify a finding that the misappropriation was wilful. ( Jackson v. State Bar, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 403.) Petitioner next challenges the finding that he failed promptly to pay out the funds on request. He argues that Ms. F. did not provide him with the names and addresses of the other heirs, and that she demanded the entire sum for herself. Yet the record is clear that petitioner did not take any reasonable measures to disburse the funds promptly. At most, he wrote only once to the heirs whose names and addresses had been provided by the bank. He could not recall if he had received any responses to these letters. Moreover, he did not give Ms. F. even the one-seventh of the estate to which he conceded she was entitled, nor did he send checks for the remaining shares to any of the other heirs. He failed to respond to frequent inquiries from Ms. F. as to what he was doing with the money. (5) Finally, petitioner argues that there is no substantial evidence that he made false statements to the judgment debtor court. As this is a finding on which the hearing panel heard testimonial evidence, it is entitled to great weight and will not be set aside based on petitioner's simple reassertion here of his testimony before the hearing panel. ( Vaughn v. State Bar, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 852.) (6) Misappropriation is a serious offense. ( Gordon v. State Bar (1982) 31 Cal.3d 748, 757 [183 Cal. Rptr. 861, 647 P.2d 137]; Himmel v. State Bar (1971) 4 Cal.3d 786, 798 [94 Cal. Rptr. 825, 484 P.2d 993].) Clearly it involves moral turpitude. ( Resner v. State Bar (1960) 53 Cal.2d 605, 612 [2 Cal. Rptr. 461, 349 P.2d 67].) (7) Additionally, petitioner's false statement to the court that he was prepared to pay Ms. F.'s judgment at once and his concealment of any reservations or conditions to immediate payment (see ante, p. 122, fn. 5) plainly violated rule 7-105(1) and involved moral turpitude. ( Garlow v. State Bar (1982) 30 Cal.3d 912, 917-918 [180 Cal. Rptr. 831, 640 P.2d 1106]; Davidson v. State Bar (1976) 17 Cal.3d 570, 574 [131 Cal. Rptr. 379, 551 P.2d 1211].) Petitioner has not met his burden of showing that the findings of moral turpitude are unsupported by the record.