Opinion ID: 1632797
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Co-employees' Liability

Text: Burkett charges the co-employee defendants with liability under Code 1975, § 25-5-11(c)(2), based on their alleged willful removal of a portion of the blade guard cover supplied by Loma, and under § 25-5-11(c)(1) and (2) for their alleged willful failure to place a splash guard on the billet saw prior to Burkett's injury. Section 25-5-14 limits co-employee civil liability to causes of action based on willful conduct, if the injured employee receives workmen's compensation. Reed v. Brunson, 527 So.2d 102 (Ala.1988). Under § 25-5-11(c)(2), willful conduct specifically includes: The willful and intentional removal from a machine of a safety guard or safety device provided by the manufacturer of the machine with knowledge that injury or death would likely or probably result from such removal; provided, however, removal of such a guard or device shall not be willful conduct unless such removal did, in fact, increase the danger of use of the machine and was not done for the purpose of repair of the machine or was not part of an improvement or modification of the machine which rendered the safety device unnecessary or ineffective. As explained in the discussion of Burkett's claim against Loma, sometime after the sale of the saw to Wolverine and before Burkett's injury, the original saw blade guard was modified so that the portion of the blade exposed was increased from 15 to 30 inches. Adolph Nussbaum testified in his deposition that the change was made by Wolverine. David Styers, engineering manager of Wolverine, testified that, to the best of his knowledge, Wolverine had made all of the modifications to the saw. However, Burkett produced no evidence that any of the co-employee defendants had modified the guard. All co-employee defendants testified that the modifications to the blade cover and feed mechanism had been made before they began working at the Wolverine plant. The longest-serving co-employee had worked at the Wolverine plant for 24 years before Burkett's injury. Burkett offered no evidence contradicting the affidavits of the co-employees. Therefore, we must consider the evidence offered by the co-employees to be uncontroverted, so that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to their freedom from liability under § 25-5-11(c)(2) for the alteration of the original blade guard. Isbell v. Alabama Power Co., 477 So.2d 281 (Ala.1985). Next, Burkett claims that the co-employees' failure to add a splash guard prior to his injury was equivalent to the removal of a safety guard under § 25-5-11(c)(2). After Burkett's accident, a splash guard was added to the billet saw he had been operating when he was injured. Such a splash guard was not included on Loma billet saws at the time Loma sold the billet saw to Wolverine. After the adoption of the 1974 ANSI standards, Loma added to its billet saws a base guard giving protection equivalent to that given by a splash guard. Burkett alleges that co-employee David Styers had a duty to keep the saw in working order; that Neil LeMay and Jerry Powell had the duty to provide workers with safe equipment; and that Harold Martin, David Styers, and Clint Williams had a responsibility to insure that the saw complied with OSHA standards. Because of the safety responsibilities of the co-employees, their knowledge that a splash guard had been added to the other billet saw at the plant, their knowledge that a splash guard would enhance safety, and the fact that the saw was allowed to be operated without a splash guard, Burkett argues that the failure to add a splash guard was legally equivalent to the willful and intentional removal of a safety guard under § 25-5-11(c)(2). This Court has addressed § 25-5-11(c)(2) in Reed v. Brunson, 527 So.2d 102 (Ala. 1988). In Reed, the plaintiff was injured when his hand was caught in a concrete mixer. He alleged that the defendant coemployees had willfully and intentionally removed a guard from the front of the mixer. Id. at 121. There was evidence that such a guard had been removed, but the Court entered summary judgment for the co-employees, holding that the removal of the front guard did not proximately cause the injury. Id. The guard removed did not shield the point at which the plaintiff caught his hand. Side guards would have shielded this point, but when the mixer was installed at the plant it did not include such guards. Thus, the Court ruled that the plaintiff's injury was not proximately caused by the defendants' removal of a safety guard or device that had been provided by the manufacturer of the mixer. Id. (Emphasis added.) Likewise, the co-employee defendants in this case did not remove a safety guard provided by the manufacturer and, thus, are not liable under § 25-5-11(c)(2). There is no duty under § 25-5-11(c)(2) et seq. on co-employees to add safety guards that the manufacturer fails to provide. Such a claimed duty is the essence of Burkett's second claim against his co-employees. Section 25-5-11(c)(2) does not require coemployees to add a safety device to compensate for the willful removal of one by previous co-employees. In § 25-5-14 the Legislature expressly provided co-employees immunity from civil liability for all causes of action except those based on willful conduct, due to the disruptive effect of such suits on employee relations and the adverse effect [of such suits on] efforts to retain existing, and to attract new industry to this state. In § 25-5-11(c), the Legislature set forth four very specific acts that may constitute willful conduct. Section 25-5-11(c)(2) provides only that the willful and intentional removal ... of a safety device provided by the manufacturer falls within the Legislature's definition of willful conduct. (Emphasis added.) The failure to add a safety device does not fit the definition of willful conduct under § 25-5-11(c)(2). Last, Burkett claims that the co-employee defendants were guilty of willful conduct under § 25-5-11(c)(1) for failing to add a splash guard prior to his injury. Section 25-5-11(c)(1) provides that the plaintiff must show that the defendant possessed [a] purpose or intent or design to injure another, and provides that willful conduct is shown by one who with knowledge of the danger or peril to another consciously pursues a course of conduct with a design, intent and purpose of inflicting injury. Under Reed, the intent required for § 25-5-11(c)(1) is shown by evidence tending to show either (1) the reason why the co-employee defendant would want to intentionally injure the plaintiff, or someone else, or (2) that a reasonable man in the position of the defendant would have known that a particular result (i.e., injury or death) was substantially certain to follow from his actions. Reed, 527 So.2d at 120. (Emphasis in original.) This Court evaluated a claim similar to Burkett's in Turnbow v. Kustom Kreation Vans, 535 So.2d 132 (Ala.1988). In that case, the plaintiff was injured when he fell out of the delivery van he was driving. The driver's door of the van had been damaged in an earlier accident. Because of this earlier damage, the door came open on the second occasion. Id. at 133. Following the earlier accident, the plaintiff's employer was paid for estimated repairs to the van, but, in the year that had passed between the two accidents, the supervisor never had the van repaired. The plaintiff sued his supervisor, who was responsible for the van's maintenance, under § 25-5-11(c)(1), claiming that he had willfully allowed the van to be maintained in [a] manner ... likely to cause ... serious harm. Id. at 134. (Emphasis added.) This Court held that the supervisor's failure to repair the van's damaged door did not amount to willful conduct under § 25-5-11(c)(1). The Court affirmed a summary judgment for the supervisor, because the plaintiff had produced no evidence that the supervisor had a reason to intentionally injure [anyone] and had produced no evidence that a reasonable person in [the supervisor's] position would have known that injury or death ... was substantially certain to occur because of [his] failure to have the van repaired. 535 So.2d at 134. The Court stated that perception of a risk of injury does not amount to a purpose to injure or knowledge that injury is substantially certain to follow. Id. The Court noted that the van had been driven in its damaged condition for one year without any resulting injury and that the supervisor had driven the van himself knowing of the damage to the door's latch. Burkett has produced no evidence that any of the co-employee defendants intended or had a purpose to injure anyone by their failure to add a splash guard. As in Turnbow, even though the defendant co-employees may have perceived a risk of injury, this perception is insufficient for a jury to infer that [they] acted with a purpose to injure another. 535 So.2d at 134. Because the saw was operated for at least 24 years without an injury, it cannot be said that any co-employee defendant had knowledge that injury was substantially certain to follow from the failure to add a splash guard. Thus, Burkett fails on his claim under § 25-5-11(c)(1), as well as on his claims under § 25-5-11(c)(2). Accordingly, the summary judgment for the co-employee defendants is affirmed. AFFIRMED. HORNSBY, C.J., and JONES, HOUSTON and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.