Opinion ID: 4023381
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicial Estoppel Applies

Text: In an apparent attempt to circumvent the single‐recovery rule, Janusz emphasizes that the settlement in Keystone was for less than the full amount of the judgment, thereby sug‐ gesting that the judgment was not fully satisfied. But Janusz unambiguously informed the Keystone court that the judg‐ ment had been fully satisfied—information the court relied on in vacating the judgment and dismissing the case. As a result, Janusz is judicially estopped from suggesting that the Keystone judgment was not fully satisfied due to the settle‐ ment amount. When the doctrine of judicial estoppel is invoked against a party, we examine three factors: “(i) whether the party’s positions in the two litigations are clearly inconsistent; (ii) whether the party successfully persuaded a court to accept its earlier position; and (iii) whether the party would derive an unfair advantage if not judicially estopped.” Wells v. Coker, 707 F.3d 756, 760 (7th Cir. 2013). On at least one occa‐ sion, we have suggested that state law, not federal common law, should apply when the judgment at issue was rendered by a state court. See Saecker v. Thorie, 234 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 2000). But we need not resolve that issue here, since Illi‐ nois law does not differ significantly from federal law on the No. 15‐1330 11 issue. See People v. Caballero, 794 N.E.2d 251, 262 (Ill. 2002) (“[T]he party to be estopped must have (1) taken two posi‐ tions, (2) that are factually inconsistent, (3) in separate judi‐ cial or quasi‐judicial administrative proceedings, (4) intend‐ ing for the trier of fact to accept the truth of the facts alleged, and (5) have succeeded in the first proceeding and received some benefit from it.”). The district court correctly concluded that judicial estop‐ pel applies here. First, Janusz has taken inconsistent posi‐ tions as to whether the Keystone judgment was satisfied by a payment of the entire judgment amount. Janusz and Key‐ stone jointly executed a “Release (Satisfaction) of Judgment” in which they declared that Janusz “ha[d] received full satis‐ faction and payment” for the $3,177,500 judgment. Separate‐ ly, the parties executed a stipulation stating that “Keystone had paid Plaintiff all monies due and owing to him as the result of the Judgment previously entered against Key‐ stone.” Both documents were attached to Keystone’s motion to vacate the judgment and dismiss the case with prejudice, which the state court granted. These statements conflict with Janusz’s repeated claim in this case that he received only $3 million from Keystone. Unwilling to acknowledge this clear inconsistency, Ja‐ nusz contends that he and Keystone merely conveyed to the Keystone court that the settlement, not the judgment, had been fully satisfied. But this ignores the unambiguous language of the Release, the Stipulation, and Keystone’s Motion. Janusz argues that focusing on these documents without regard to the existence of a settlement somehow elevates “form over substance.” However, Janusz has failed to cite a single fact demonstrating that the court in Keystone could have reason‐ 12 No. 15‐1330 ably believed that the parties’ settlement involved an amount different from the judgment. Notably, there is no evidence that Janusz or Keystone ever provided a copy of their settlement agreement to the court. And at oral argu‐ ment, Janusz was unable to explain why he could not have modified the Release and the Stipulation to note the precise amount of the settlement. Second, the court in Keystone clearly accepted Janusz’s earlier position. In its order granting Keystone’s motion to vacate and dismiss, the court found that “the Judgment pre‐ viously entered against Keystone in the amount of Three‐ Million One‐Hundred and Seventy‐Seven Thousand Five‐ Hundred and 00/100s United States Dollars ($3,177,500.00) ha[d] been remitted and satisfied in full.” At oral argument, Janusz conceded that he never informed the Keystone court that this statement was incorrect and should be modified ac‐ cordingly. Third, we find that Janusz would be unfairly enriched if he were not judicially estopped. We disagree with Janusz’s claim that he did not derive any benefit from his statements to the Keystone court. As the City defendants correctly ob‐ serve, the settlement agreement obligated Janusz to help ob‐ tain vacatur, dismissal, and discharge of Keystone’s appeal bond by co‐signing the stipulation and release and by “ex‐ ecut[ing] any and all supplementary documents … which may be necessary or appropriate to give full force and effect to the terms and intent of this Agreement.” A plain reading of the agreement indicates that Janusz was to undertake these actions in exchange for receiving $3 million. We also find that it would be unfair for Janusz to seek compensation in addition to the $3 million he has already received. As dis‐ No. 15‐1330 13 cussed above, Saichek instructs that Janusz is not entitled to a second bite at the apple simply because he believes he should have been awarded more money on the first go‐ round. While the City defendants may not be immune from a contribution action by the Keystone defendants, it would be unfair to require them to continue defending claims “based on the very same theory of recovery for the very same inju‐ ries in the very same [event]” that gave rise to the Keystone judgment. Saichek, 787 N.E.2d at 834–35. Because we find that the single‐recovery rule and the doctrine of judicial estoppel apply here, we need not address the City defendants’ alternative argument that the Keystone settlement agreement released the City defendants from lia‐ bility for injuries jointly caused by the Keystone and City de‐ fendants.