Opinion ID: 782464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver of Appellate Rights in Plea Agreements

Text: 7 Before analyzing the specifics of Mr. Andis's appeal, we take this opportunity to review and clarify this Circuit's position on the use of appeal waivers in plea agreements. 8 As a general rule, a defendant is allowed to waive appellate rights. Every circuit that has considered this issue has reached the conclusion that at least some forms of appeal waivers are permissible. See generally United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 21-27 (1st Cir.2001); United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110, 113-14 (2d Cir.2001); United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 559-63 (3d Cir.2001); United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 402-06 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir.1992); United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761, 764 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Jemison, 237 F.3d 911, 916-18 (7th Cir.2001); United States v. Nguyen, 235 F.3d 1179, 1182-84 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Rubio, 231 F.3d 709, 711-13 (10th Cir.2000); United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1168-69 (11th Cir.1999). On numerous occasions, we have also acknowledged the general permissibility of including these waivers in plea agreements. See, e.g., DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919, 923-24 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Morrison, 171 F.3d 567, 568 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 868-73 (8th Cir.1998). 9 The policy reasons supporting an appeal waiver were summarized in United States v. Rutan: 10 [t]he chief virtues of plea agreements are speed, economy, and finality. Waivers of appeal in plea agreements preserve the finality of judgments and sentences imposed pursuant to valid pleas of guilty. We also note that plea agreements are of value to the accused in order to gain concessions from the government. 11 956 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir.1992) (internal citations omitted). 12 We further note that the right to appeal is not a constitutional right but rather purely a creature of statute. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977); see 18 U.S.C. § 3742. The Supreme Court has held that a defendant can waive certain constitutional rights by entering a guilty plea. For example, in Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992), the Supreme Court stated that a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of three constitutional rights: the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one's accusers, and the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 29, 113 S.Ct. 517; see also United States v. Gray, 152 F.3d 816, 819-20 (8th Cir.1998) (discussing the constitutional rights a defendant waives by entering a guilty plea and citing to Parke ). Given that the Supreme Court has allowed a defendant to waive constitutional rights, we would be hard-pressed to find a reason to prohibit a defendant from waiving a purely statutory right. Other circuits have adopted a similar rationale for approving the use of these waivers. See, e.g., Teeter, 257 F.3d at 21-22; Khattak, 273 F.3d at 561; United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir.1990). 13 We see no rational basis for challenging the general premise that a defendant can enter into a plea agreement that waives appellate rights. We have, however, imposed limits on the use of these waivers and we reaffirm these limits here. When reviewing a purported waiver, we must confirm that the appeal falls within the scope of the waiver and that both the waiver and plea agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily. Even when these conditions are met, however, we will not enforce a waiver where to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice.
14 Plea agreements are essentially contracts between the defendant and Government. Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345, 351 (8th Cir.1994). However, these agreements are subject to special limitations given their unique nature. Significantly, this Court stated in Margalli-Olvera that [a]pplication of these contract principles is tempered by the constitutional implications of a plea agreement. Id. Also important was our statement that [w]here a plea agreement is ambiguous, the ambiguities are construed against the government. Id. at 353. Interpreting plea agreements in this manner reflects the fact that these agreements are normally drafted by the Government and involve significant rights of a defendant. As such, the burden of proof is on the Government to demonstrate that a plea agreement clearly and unambiguously waives a defendant's right to appeal. Id. 15 In United States v. Hernandez, the Second Circuit stated that while waivers of appellate rights are generally valid, these waivers are to be applied `narrowly' and construed `strictly against the Government.' 242 F.3d 110, 113 (2001) (internal citation and quotations omitted). The court then concluded that the waiver in Hernandez did not prohibit the defendant from challenging the district court's refusal to allow him to withdraw a guilty plea. Id. at 114. We agree with the position taken by the Second Circuit. Plea agreements will be strictly construed and any ambiguities in these agreements will be read against the Government and in favor of a defendant's appellate rights.
16 A defendant must enter into a plea agreement and waiver knowingly and voluntarily for these agreements to be valid. See DeRoo, 223 F.3d at 923; Morrison, 171 F.3d at 568; Michelsen, 141 F.3d at 871. This is the same standard the Supreme Court has required for all guilty pleas. See United States v. Gray, 152 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir.1998) (citing Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. at 28, 113 S.Ct. 517). 17 The requirement that a plea agreement and waiver be entered into knowingly and voluntarily applies to each term of an agreement. For example, a defendant may knowingly and voluntarily enter into a plea agreement waiving the right to a jury trial, but nonetheless fail to have knowingly and voluntarily waived other rights-including appellate rights. There are many ways in which an agreement, or aspects of an agreement, could be entered into without the requisite knowledge or voluntariness. Examples include an agreement entered into upon the ineffective assistance of counsel, DeRoo, 223 F.3d at 924, or undue coercion. 4 18 One important way a district court can help ensure that a plea agreement and corresponding waiver are entered into knowingly and voluntarily is to properly question a defendant about his or her decision to enter that agreement and waive the right to appeal. We have yet to address the impact of an erroneous statement by a district court at the time a plea agreement is accepted and decline to do so here. 5 However, because an erroneous statement, or failure to make a determination as required under Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(1)(N), can create potential error, a district court should endeavor to correctly address any waiver in a plea agreement and ascertain that a defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights addressed by the agreement. 19 Following this process should also help a district judge determine whether to accept a plea agreement. In general, a district judge is under no obligation to accept a plea agreement. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c) (stating that the district court has the authority to reject most plea agreements). The authority to reject a plea agreement, if it is inequitable or otherwise objectionable, operates as a further check on either party's over-reaching.
20 Assuming that a waiver has been entered into knowingly and voluntarily, we will still refuse to enforce an otherwise valid waiver if to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice. Although we have not previously defined this exception, we have described many of its components. See DeRoo, 223 F.3d at 923-24 (stating that a waiver of appellate rights does not prohibit the appeal of an illegal sentence or a sentence in violation of the terms of an agreement, or a claim asserting ineffective assistance of counsel); Michelsen, 141 F.3d at 872 n. 3 (describing the right to appeal an illegal sentence). 21 Other circuits have adopted the miscarriage of justice exception and included within this exception, inter alia, sentences based on constitutionally impermissible factors (e.g., race) and claims asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Teeter, 257 F.3d at 25 n. 9 & 10 (stating that the court would address, inter alia, sentences based on constitutionally impermissible factors, even when a valid waiver existed); Khattak, 273 F.3d at 562 (discussing circumstances where other circuits have found appeal waivers to be invalid). 22 Although we have not provided an exhaustive list of the circumstances that might constitute a miscarriage of justice, we recognize that these waivers are contractual agreements between a defendant and the Government and should not be easily voided by the courts. As such, we caution that this exception is a narrow one and will not be allowed to swallow the general rule that waivers of appellate rights are valid. 23 As the miscarriage of justice exception relates to Mr. Andis's appeal, we reaffirm that in this Circuit a defendant has the right to appeal an illegal sentence, even though there exists an otherwise valid waiver. See DeRoo, 223 F.3d at 923; Michelsen, 141 F.3d at 872. 6 In United States v. Greatwalker, we explained that [a] sentence is illegal when it is not authorized by the judgment of conviction or when it is greater or less than the permissible statutory penalty for the crime. 285 F.3d 727, 729 (8th Cir.2002). In United States v. Peltier, we recently addressed what constitutes an illegal sentence: 24 [a] sentence is illegal when it is not authorized by law; for example, when the sentence is in excess of a statutory provision or otherwise contrary to the applicable statute. A sentence is not illegal if the punishment meted out was not in excess of that prescribed by the relevant statutes ... or the terms of the sentence itself are not legally or constitutionally invalid in any other respect. 25 312 F.3d 938, 942 (8th Cir.2002) (internal citations omitted). 26 We wish to make clear that the illegal sentence exception to the general enforceability of an appeal waiver is an extremely narrow exception. Any sentence imposed within the statutory range is not subject to appeal. Specifically, an allegation that the sentencing judge misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines or abused his or her discretion is not subject to appeal in the face of a valid appeal waiver. Other circuits have explicitly addressed these situations. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir.2000) (an express waiver of [a defendant's] right to appeal, which was knowing and voluntary, [precludes] an appeal based on [a] claim that [a] district court misapplied the Guidelines.); United States v. Atterberry, 144 F.3d 1299, 1300 (10th Cir.1998) (dismissing the defendant's appeal of the base offense level used by the district court in determining his sentence, because he had waived his appellate rights); United States v. Feichtinger, 105 F.3d 1188, 1190 (7th Cir.1997) (an improper application of the guidelines is not a reason to invalidate a knowing and voluntary waiver of appeal rights.).