Opinion ID: 853161
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Absence of a De Facto Custodian

Text: The legislature amended the statutes governing child custody proceedings in 1999 to provide for de facto custodians. [4] Chad argues that Hembree was required to be joined as a de facto custodian by the trial court pursuant to section 31-17-2-8.5. [5] That section provides, If a court determines that a child is in the custody of a de facto custodian, the court shall make the de facto custodian a party to the proceeding. Ind.Code § 31-17-2-8.5 (Supp.1999). Chad requests that child support be assessed against each parent retroactive to August 11, 1998 and made payable to Hembree, as custodian. The Court of Appeals held that Chad waived this argument by failing to raise it in the trial court. Dunson, 744 N.E.2d at 970. Chad did submit a Final Argument Memorandum of Law in support of his proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the trial court. In that memorandum, he mentioned the absence of the de facto custodian, but at no point did he move to join Hembree as an indispensable party or to dismiss the action for lack of an indispensable party. In the first place, it is not clear that the de facto custodian statute applies in this case. The de facto custodian provisions Chad cites are included in the statutes governing paternity and child custody and visitation, not child support proceedings. [6] Regardless of the resolution of that issue, we think that in order to preserve the issue for appeal, Chad was required to move, pursuant to Trial Rule 19, to join Hembree or dismiss for lack of an indispensable party. See e.g., K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) ([F]ailure to add a necessary party [pursuant to Trial Rule 19] can result in waiver of that right in some cases.); Coak v. Rebber, 425 N.E.2d 197, 199-200 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) (If [the defendant] had felt that the presence of [additional parties] was necessary to a just adjudication, he could have made a motion before or during the hearing to have joined them as parties.); Ligon Specialized Hauler, Inc. v. Hott, 179 Ind.App. 134, 140-41, 384 N.E.2d 1071, 1076 (1979) (Since [the defendant] could have made a motion before or during trial to join [another party] as a party, the question arises whether [the defendant's] failure to do so constitutes a waiver under T.R. 19(C).... We will not allow a party to sit idly by until appellate review before presenting appropriate motions for the joinder of additional parties.).