Opinion ID: 1348989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Were Taylor's due process rights violated by the State's release of the victim's car?

Text: K.S.A. 22-2512(2) states: When property seized is no longer required as evidence, it shall be disposed of ... in such manner as the court in its sound discretion shall direct. Taylor claims that, because the victim's car was released without notifying him or obtaining a court order as required by K.S.A. 22-2512, his right to due process was violated because potentially exculpatory evidence was lost. After Taylor's wife's car was processed, dusted for fingerprints, and the contents inventoried by the police, at the secured party's request, the car was turned over to the finance company holding it as security for a loan. Taylor was aware of this, and his trial counsel wrote the county attorney objecting to the release of the vehicle. Taylor did not raise this as an issue in his direct appeal. The district court held that because Taylor failed to raise the issue in his direct appeal this issue was not proper for a K.S.A. 60-1507 action. Kansas Supreme Court Rule 183(c)(3) allows trial errors affecting constitutional rights to be raised even though the errors could have been raised on appeal, provided there were exceptional circumstances excusing the failure to raise the issue by appeal. The Court of Appeals commented that, although it believed the existence of exceptional circumstances was doubtful, it would consider the issue because a due process violation was alleged. We also will review the allegation. In State v. Antwine & McHenry, 6 Kan. App.2d 900, 636 P.2d 208 (1981), rev. denied 230 Kan. 819 (1982), the defendants claimed their convictions must be reversed and the charges dismissed because of the State's release of seized evidence to the victim of the defendant's crimes. The appellate court observed that the State's discretion in determining whether evidence should be released or retained for trial is not unlimited. In the absence of a showing that the returned items were clearly exculpatory or that defendants were clearly prejudiced by the failure to have access to the property, the good faith release by the prosecution of property seized in a criminal investigation to the owners thereof does not warrant a reversal of the convictions or a dismissal of the charges against the defendants. 6 Kan. App.2d at 904-05. The United States Supreme Court recently ruled that, in cases where the State fails to preserve potentially useful evidence, there is no due process violation unless the petitioner shows bad faith on the part of the State. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 102 L.Ed.2d 281, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988). The Court recognized that, when evidence is lost, the courts face the almost impossible task of trying to determine the materiality of unknown and undiscernible evidence. 488 U.S. at 57-58. The Court expressed an unwillingness to read the fundamental fairness requirement of the Due Process Clause as imposing on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution. It thought that requiring a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the police both limits the extent of the police's obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable bounds and confines it to that class of cases where the interests of justice most clearly require it, i.e., those cases in which the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant. 488 U.S. at 58. Unless a defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to process potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. Here, the inside of the car was dusted and the information collected. Apparently the fingerprints were not developed or sent to the KBI lab for comparison, but were available to the defendant. Taylor was aware the car would be released; in fact, a member of his family later obtained possession of the vehicle. The State clearly did not make the disposition based on a court order as is required by the statute. Taylor has failed to show a bad faith due process violation or that he was prejudiced by the release of the car; therefore, the error was harmless.