Opinion ID: 474629
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: co-conspirator's testimony

Text: 16 At trial the government informant William Ayala was permitted to testify to certain matters that co-conspirator Roberto Ramirez told him about Reyes' involvement in the conspiracy. Reyes argues that the co-conspirator's testimony was improperly admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and that the trial court failed to follow the order of proof required for admission of co-conspirator's testimony by United States v. Peterson, 611 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905, 100 S.Ct. 2985, 64 L.Ed.2d 854 (1980). 17 Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy is not hearsay. Reyes' contention is that the statements admitted were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy. According to Reyes, a statement can be in furtherance of a conspiracy only if it is both intended to promote the conspiracy and did in fact have the effect of promoting the conspiracy. 18 This Circuit has no talismanic formula for ascertaining when a conspirator's statements are in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Davis, 766 F.2d 1452, 1458 (10th Cir.1985); United States v. Shepherd, 739 F.2d 510, 514 (10th Cir.1984). Reyes suggests that other circuits appear to require that the statements actually assist the conspirators in achieving their objectives. See also, United States v. Layton, 720 F.2d 548, 556 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1069, 104 S.Ct. 1423, 79 L.Ed.2d 748 (1984); United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 909 (8th Cir.1985). The contexts in which this language is used, however, indicate the courts' attempts to distinguish admissions or narratives from statements intended in furtherance of the charged conspiracies. This Court rejects the defendant's proposition that the statements must actually further the conspiracy to be admissible. Rule 801(d)(2)(E) explicitly says statements need be 'in furtherance of the conspiracy,' not that they 'further the conspiracy.' It is enough that they be intended to promote the conspiratorial objectives. United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1270 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117, 103 S.Ct. 753, 74 L.Ed.2d 971 (1983). See also United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 632 (2nd Cir.1979). 19 Ayala testified that Ramirez had told him that Reyes was sponsoring the purchase and distribution of cocaine. Further, Ramirez had explained to Ayala that Reyes' role in the organization was that of an investor or financial backer. Since Ramirez' statements explained events important to the conspiracy to one of its members in order to facilitate the conspiracy, the Court finds that the statements were in furtherance of the conspiracy. 20 Finally, Reyes contends that the order of proof recommended in United States v. Peterson for the admission of hearsay statements of co-conspirators was not followed in this case. Reyes complains that his confrontation rights were violated since hearsay and nonhearsay testimony were intermingled and because the government had not established Reyes' participation in the conspiracy until after some of the hearsay had been admitted. In United States v. Rivera, 778 F.2d 591, 595 (10th Cir.1985), this Court recently commented on the order of proof in the admission of co-conspirator's hearsay testimony: 21 In United States v. Peterson, 611 F.2d at 1330, we stated that although we determined it was preferable, whenever possible, to require the Government to first introduce independent proof of the conspiracy and subsequently to establish the connection of the defendant with it before admitting hearsay declarations, there was an exception recognized where it was not reasonably practicable to require the showing to be made before admitting the evidence; in such a case the trial judge could admit the hearsay statements, subject to their being connected up later. 22 In this case, the trial judge was aware of the Peterson decision and the preferred method of proof. (Tr. Vol. VI, p. 628). The record indicates that the court admitted the statements conditionally, subject to their being connected up. (Tr. Vol. IV, p. 161). At the close of the government's case, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that the United States had established with independent evidence the existence of the conspiracy and Reyes' participation in it. (Tr. Vol. VI, p. 627.) Under these circumstances, this Court finds that no reversible error was committed. See United States v. Harenberg, 732 F.2d 1507 (10th Cir.1984); United States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018, 101 S.Ct. 3008, 69 L.Ed.2d 390 (1981). 23 No reversible error has been demonstrated. Accordingly, the conviction of the defendant is AFFIRMED.