Opinion ID: 158602
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendant's Motion to Fire His Attorney

Text: 15 At the close of defendant's case and directly before closing arguments, Beers' counsel informed the court that defendant wished to fire him, stating that defendant's dissatisfaction stemmed from the strategic decision not to introduce evidence of Doe's happiness while with Beers. As noted above in Part II.A., defendant did not proffer this evidence to ensure that the government could not introduce its evidence that defendant had abused Doe. The district court informed Beers that it was too late to dismiss his attorney. It elaborated, [W]e've come through the trial. We are ready to instruct and argue so his request that you be terminated will be denied. Supp. App., Vol. IV, at 487. The court further stated that defendant's attorneys represented him very well. This exchange occurred between the district court and defendant's attorney. The court refused to hear from Beers directly. Defendant contends on appeal that the failure of the district court to hear from Beers personally constitutes reversible error. We disagree. 16 As defendant correctly argues, it is unclear from the colloquy between defense counsel and the court whether Beers desired to substitute counsel or to proceed pro se. However, we affirm under either scenario. We review a district court's refusal to substitute counsel for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Johnson, 961 F.2d 1488, 1490 (10th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Blaze, 143 F.3d 585, 593 (10th Cir. 1998). `To warrant a substitution of counsel, the defendant must show good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict.' Blaze, 143 F.3d at 593 (quoting United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 1987)). We also must strongly consider the timeliness of defendant's motion. See Johnson, 961 F.2d at 1490. 17 While we may perhaps prefer the district court to allow defendant to fully explain his reasons for dissatisfaction with counsel, formal inquiry is not essential where the defendant otherwise stated his reasons for dissatisfaction on the record. United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384, 1391 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Padilla, 819 F.2d at 956 n.1 (While the court did not conduct a formal inquiry into defendant's reasons for terminating appointed and retained counsel, the omission is harmless where the defendant otherwise stated his reasons for dissatisfaction.). In Willie, we upheld the trial court's denial of defendant's request for replacement of counsel because defendant had stated on the record that he was dissatisfied with his counsel's interpretation of the law. See 941 F.2d at 1391. Here, the defense counsel informed the court of the reasons for Beers' dissatisfaction. It involved a strategic decision, given the in limine evidentiary ruling discussed above, not to put forth evidence that Doe was happy while Beers held him. This reason is not one that warrants substitution of counsel, especially considering that defense counsel consulted with Beers in making its decision not to introduce the evidence. 18 Moreover, the untimeliness of defendant's request - directly before closing arguments and jury instructions - further bolsters the district court's determination. Beers had already received an earlier substitution of counsel prior to trial, and substitution at this point would have seriously delayed proceedings, confused the jury, and prejudiced the prosecution. Courts have to balance the need for efficient administration of the criminal Justice system against the defendant's right to counsel, Padilla, 819 F.2d at 956, but `there must be some limit to the defendant's ability to manipulate the judicial system,' Willie, 941 F.2d at 1391 (quoting United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 110 (4th Cir. 1988). The court specifically noted that it felt defense counsel had competently represented defendant. Thus, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Beers to substitute counsel. 19 Next, we address the district court decision assuming defendant wished to fire his counsel in order to represent himself. Although [u]nder the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to waive counsel and represent [himself], United States v. Callwood, 66 F.3d 1110, 1113 (10th Cir. 1995), the right to self-representation is unqualified only if demanded before trial, United States v. Mayes, 917 F.2d 457, 462 (10th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When defendant does not assert this right before trial, we review the district court's decision whether to allow defendant to proceed pro se for an abuse of discretion. See Callwood, 66 F.3d at 1113; Mayes, 917 F.2d at 462. 20 To invoke the right of self-representation, defendant must clearly and unequivocally assert his intention in a timely manner. See, e.g., Callwood, 66 F.3d at 1113. In this case, even giving defendant every benefit and assuming that he would have clearly and unequivocally requested to proceed pro se had he personally addressed the court, the request would have been extremely untimely. The district court was clearly concerned with the timeliness of the request, twice stating that it was simply too late. The trial had gone on for several days, and both sides had rested their arguments. Beers' reason for seeking to dismiss his attorney - a disagreement regarding strategy - could not outweigh the prejudice and confusion that would result from firing his attorney at this late juncture in the trial, especially given that the trial court specifically stated that defense counsel represented defendant very well throughout the trial. See Mayes, 917 F.2d at 462. In short, we affirm the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss his attorney.