Opinion ID: 1436149
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: truck measure

Text: The conflict in this case is essentially one of price. The disputed conversion factor and the meaning of the term truck measure are subsidiary points having a direct bearing on the ultimate question of the price to be paid for the sand sold by Blue Rock to Raymond. The thrust of Raymond's argument is not that Blue Rock in fact delivered less sand than Blue Rock claims to have delivered. The sand was delivered by the ton and there is no dispute as to the amount of tons actually delivered. The essence of Raymond's argument is that the price charged per ton greatly exceeds the price which should have been charged, notwithstanding Raymond's ostensible acquiescence in the allegedly incorrect charges. As already noted, it is agreed that the total price to be paid by Raymond for all the sand delivered was to be the same, whether the sand was measured in tons or in cubic yards truck measure. From this premise, Raymond argues, initially, that the Justice below erred as a matter of law in failing to give the words truck measure what Raymond contends to be their plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning. It is Raymond's position that the words should be construed to call for nothing less than a standard cubic yard of precisely 27 cubic feet, measured in the truck. Blue Rock's position is that a cubic yard truck measure may or may not be the same as a standard cubic yard, because the phrase truck measure indicates that the quantity of sand is to be measured by the truck itself. According to Blue Rock's evidence, the term depends upon the hypothetical or assigned capacity of a given truck and the extent to which that truck appears to be fully loaded. Thus, a truck having a capacity of ten cubic yards and seemingly loaded to the hilt would be considered to be carrying ten cubic yards, truck measure. Whether it actually contained exactly ten cubic yards was never ascertained and, as Blue Rock in effect argues, the parties by using the phrase truck measure agreed to sacrifice such precision for what they deemed to be a more expedient approximation. The significance of ascertaining the meaning of the phrase lies in the fact that the price per ton was to be equated with the price per cubic yard truck measure. If the words truck measure signify something other than a standard cubic yard, then it would be inappropriate to attempt to ascertain the number of pounds in a standard cubic yard. The only proper way to equate the price per ton with the already established price per cubic yard truck measure would be to attempt to ascertain the number of pounds in a truck measured cubic yard. In the case at bar there was considerable evidence from which the trier of fact could conclude that the proper meaning of the phrase was that suggested by Blue Rock. The phrase itself is reasonably and fairly capable of different constructions, and it is, therefore, ambiguous. See Major v. Bishop, 1972, 10 Cir., 462 F.2d 1277. In addition to an examination of the express terms of an agreement, the Code also encourages resort to course of performance (11 M.R.S.A. § 2-208), course of dealing (11 M.R.S.A. § 1-205), and usage of trade (11 M.R.S.A. § 1-205). See, Major v. Bishop, supra; Jaeco Pump Co. v. Inject-O-Meter Mfg. Co., 1972, 10 Cir., 467 F.2d 317; Oskey Gasoline and Oil Co., Inc. v. OKC Refining Inc., 1973, D.Minn., 364 F. Supp. 1137; Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distrib. Co., 1965, W.D. Pa., 236 F.Supp. 879, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 355 F.2d 114. Here, the writings of the parties fail to supply any definition of the term truck measure. However, one of Blue Rock's witnesses testified that he and a representative of Raymond had orally agreed to establish a conversion factor by dividing the weight of the sand in the trucks by the assigned capacity of the trucks. The Raymond representative denies having any agreement, but the trial Justice was free to disregard the denial. An agreement to this effect could be viewed as strong evidence in favor of Blue Rock's interpretation. If Raymond was willing to divide by the assigned capacity of the truck, without regard to the exact volume of material in the truck, it would be inconsistent for Raymond now to argue that it had always interpreted truck measure to mean actual, and not average, volume. Although this would suffice to sustain the finding assumed to have been made by the Justice below, we need not rest our decision with respect to the present argument on this evidence alone. The same Raymond witness further explained his understanding of truck measure on direct examination by counsel for Raymond. The pertinent excerpt from the transcript contains the following questions and answers: A. My interpretation of that would be measured when delivered, that is the way I believed it to be. Q. Measured how? A. By volume. By checking the height of the load to see that it is pretty much in conformance with the designated volume capacity of the truck body. Q. In other words, by actual measurement? A. Well, you couldn't actually measure each and every one of them, but you could tell whether a load was short or not. (Emphasis added). Elsewhere in the record, where the witness insisted that a cubic yard truck measure meant simply 27 cubic feet, he elaborated on he phrase in terms which conform precisely with Blue Rock's interpretation: Truck measured cubic yard would be pre-determined as to how many cubic yards of volume are contained on the truck and if that truck is loaded to the hilt, to full capacity, whether it be five cubic yards or ten cubic yards, then if the truck were full, we would know that we have five cubic yards or ten cubic yards. You have designations on the chart of the truck with various numbers, six yards or ten yards or twelve yards, etc. and I can't see any difference in 2700-cubic feet on a truck or 27 cubic feet in the yard. A yard is a yard, to me. It is not disputed that Raymond accepted and paid for a large quantity of sand the price of which had been computed in accordance with Blue Rock's understanding of the disputed phrase. The contract provided for repeated opportunities for performance by both parties, yet Raymond, with knowledge of Blue Rock's formula for dividing by the assigned capacity of the truck, never objected to this formula and never insisted that the weight of the sand should be divided only by the actual amount of sand in the truck. Even when Raymond mentioned an independent laboratory to determine the weight per cubic yard, it did not object to Blue Rock's formula, but only to the identity of the party who was to apply the formula. Subsequently, when Raymond issued its followup order, it expressly affirmed Blue Rock's prices computed in accordance with Blue Rock's formula, and implicitly abandoned even the suggestion of an independent laboratory. Under these circumstances, Raymond's course of performance could well be viewed as complete acquiescence in Blue Rock's interpretation of the phrase truck measure. Oskey Gasoline and Oil Co., Inc. v. OKC Refining Inc., supra; Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distrib. Co., supra. There was additional evidence, which could be viewed as showing a usage of trade (11 M.R.S.A. § 1-205(2)), to the effect that the average rather than exact quantity resulting from this definition of truck measure was a commonly accepted measurement in the trade. Such evidence may properly be considered in interpreting the meaning of the words used by the parties. Major v. Bishop, supra; Edward E. Morgan Co. v. United States, supra (usage admitted to define truck measure). Raymond has placed considerable emphasis on the fact that this interpretation of the phrase necessarily injects an element of uncertainty into the dealings between the parties. It is suggested that a more exact measurement could have been employed. We fully agree with this observation and the subsequent conversion to tons supports the argument that a more precise measurement might have been employed. This, however, does not relieve Raymond from liability. Section 2-204 of the Code expressly sanctions agreements in which one or more terms are left open as long as there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy, and the parties have intended to make a contract. The parties, if they wish, may deal on the basis of average measurements without rendering the agreement unenforceable. See, Major v. Bishop, supra. Under the Code, they may fail to agree on the price and still have a valid contract. 11 M.R.S. A. § 2-305; see, e. g., Morris Co. v. Athas, 1972, 221 Pa.Super. 239, 289 A.2d 758. The fact that the parties might have adopted a better standard is immaterial. [T]he law gives effect to the contract recognized by the parties in their course of dealing [and course of performance], regardless of other provisions which the parties might have adopted during their negotiations if they had seen fit to do so. Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distrib. Co., supra, 236 F.Supp. at 882.