Opinion ID: 1497450
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Limits on Required Findings

Text: Although this court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the Commission, [14] petitioner asserts that the conflict in the testimony was sufficiently sharp that we should hold the Commission to a higher standard of elaboration than it achieved here. According to the petitioner's brief, the rationale of the Commission's finding [on traffic] was not set forth in the Decision. Petitioner argues that the challenged findings are too conclusional that the Commission is obliged to explain more precisely than it did how it arrived at its basic findings on each contested issue of fact. DCAPA § 1-1509(e). In effect, petitioner argues that there is a fourth requirement under the substantial evidence test: the agency must express the reasons why it found the basic facts as it did, explaining, for example, why it favored particular testimony. While this argument has obvious appeal, calling for the ultimate in rational, elaborated decision-making, it cannot prevail in this case  as the history of the DCAPA makes clear. Because this petition necessitates our consideration, for the first time, of the limits on required elaboration of findings of fact in agency decision-making, it is important that this question receive thorough examination. After a substantial effort for over a dozen years by the Bar Association of the District of Columbia and others interested in administrative reform, Congress adopted the DCAPA on October 21, 1968 (effective one year later), to assure a fair and more uniform administrative process for ninety-three or more local government agencies. Pub.L.No. 90-614, 82 Stat. 1203 (current version, codified at D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 1-1501 et seq. ); S.Rep.No. 1581, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1968); Woodridge Nursery School v. Jessup, D.C.App., 269 A.2d 199, 200 (1970); see generally Griffin, The District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act: Its History, Provisions, and Interpretation, 61 Geo.L.J. 575 (1973). The drafters intended to provide procedures comparable to the federal Administrative Procedure Act, but in the provisions of significance to this case they relied primarily on the original (1946) and revised (1961) Model State Administrative Procedure Acts adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. S.Rep.No. 1581, supra at 2; H.R.Rep.No. 202, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 4-5 (1967); Griffin, supra at 576-77. Especially relevant here is § 11 of the 1946 Model Act from which the following language of DCAPA § 1-1509(e) is taken: The findings of fact shall consist of a concise statement of the conclusions upon each contested issue of fact. In the 1961 revision of the Model Act, the foregoing language was rewritten, in § 12, to read as follows: Findings of fact, if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings. Several aspects of this Model Act development are noteworthy. First, both the 1946 and 1961 provisions were designed to achieve the same end and are not materially different in the fact-finding burdens imposed on the agency. 2 F. Cooper, State Administrative Law 470 (1965). Thus, the 1961 Act can be read to provide an interpretive gloss on the 1946 provision incorporated into § 1-1509(e). Second, the Model Acts  and then DCAPA § 1-1509(e)  were drafted to achieve the degree of explicitness in agency findings required by Saginaw Broadcasting Co., supra, in which our federal circuit court emphasized the importance of basic or underlying facts. Id. 68 App.D.C. at 287-89, 96 F.2d at 559-61; see Woodridge Nursery School, supra at 202; Model State Administrative Procedure Act (U.L.A) § 12, Comment (1961). [15] Finally, although the required findings under § 1-1509(e) (conclusions upon each contested issue of fact) have been construed to be findings of basic or underlying facts, it is important to note that neither of the Model Acts nor their principal authority, Saginaw Broadcasting Co., supra, requires an additional statement of reasons to justify the basic findings. As the drafters have perceived it, the findings themselves, taken together, provide a sufficient articulation of the reasons for decision. [16] With this said, we also should note that in some respects the 1961 Model Act provides for a more detailed statement of agency reasoning than the 1946 version and the DCAPA require. For example, § 12 of the 1961 Act also provides that [i]f, in accordance with agency rules, a party submitted proposed findings of fact, the decision shall include a ruling upon each proposed finding a powerful way of forcing an agency to come to grips with the parties' assertions. See 2 F. Cooper, supra at 478-81. [17] In addition, for contested cases in which a majority of the agency officials who are to make the final decision have not personally heard the case ( e. g., cases using a hearing examiner), the DCAPA and the 1946 Model Act require that a proposed decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, be served on the parties, with an opportunity for them to file exceptions and present argument to a majority of the officials who are to render the order or decision. DCAPA § 1-1509(d); Model State Administrative Procedure Act (U.L.A) § 10 (1946). In lieu of proposed findings and conclusions, however, the 1961 Model Act provides that [t]he proposal for decision shall contain a statement of the reasons therefor and of each issue of fact or law necessary to the proposed decision. . .. Model State Administrative Procedure Act (U.L.A.) § 11 (1961). The drafters concluded that this would require a sharper focus by the decision-makers on the critical issues, resulting in a more meaningful hearing and final decision, than that provided by the 1946 Model Act. See 2 F. Cooper, supra at 462. It is clear, therefore, that in some respects the 1961 Model Act has gone beyond the 1946 version  and the DCAPA  in requiring an articulation of reasons for findings. The point is, however, that the DCAPA, apropos of the original and revised Model Acts, imposes a basic or underlying facts requirement in § 1-1509(e) without more. [18] Congress deemed the basic findings of fact themselves to provide enough reference points for a reviewing court to determine whether those facts each have sufficient evidentiary support and, when taken together, rationally lead to the agency's decision. It follows that the Commission's Findings 5 and 6 as to the adequacy of city services available to an enlarged Safeway and the anticipated impact on the existing street system, respectively, are the type of basic findings, i. e, conclusions upon each contested issue of fact, called for by the DCAPA. As indicated earlier, each of these findings is supported by sufficient evidence to sustain the Commission's decision.