Opinion ID: 2828010
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of a Further Continuance

Text: The governing regulations permit an immigration judge to “grant a motion for continuance for good cause shown.” GARCIA V. LYNCH 11 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. The decision to grant or deny the continuance is within “the sound discretion of the judge and will not be overturned except on a showing of clear abuse.” Sandoval-Luna, 526 F.3d at 1247 (quoting De la Cruz v. INS, 951 F.2d 226, 229 (9th Cir. 1991)). When reviewing an IJ’s denial of a continuance, we consider several factors, including: (1) the nature of the evidence not obtained or admitted as a result of the denial of the continuance, (2) the reasonableness of the alien’s conduct, (3) the inconvenience to the court, and (4) the number of continuances previously granted. Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009). On the facts here, we conclude there was no abuse of discretion. Although it would have been reasonable for the IJ to grant Garcia an additional continuance, it was not unreasonable for him not to do so. Garcia claimed that he would have used the additional time to seek postconviction relief, but he had previously sought such relief to no avail. Indeed, he had failed to complete the program that could have resulted in the expungement of his state conviction. Further, the IJ had previously continued Garcia’s proceedings three times for various procedural reasons. Although “[t]he IJ’s discretion . . . is not without limits,” id., the IJ here acted within those limits in declining to continue Garcia’s proceedings for a fourth time. There was no abuse of discretion.