Opinion ID: 1024201
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonableness of Hill’s Sentence

Text: In reviewing a post-Booker sentence for reasonableness, this court considers whether the district court adhered to the multi-step process set forth in this court’s post-Booker decisions. First, the district court must properly calculate the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range. United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2054 (2006). The - 4 - court must then “determine whether a sentence within that range . . . serves the factors set forth in § 3553(a) and, if not, select a sentence [within statutory limits] that does serve those factors.” United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 455 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006). The court should first consider whether a traditional Guidelines departure is appropriate. Moreland, 437 F.3d at 432. If the § 3553(a) factors are not satisfied by the departure sentence, the sentencing court may then consider whether to impose a variance sentence. Id. This court affords sentences that fall within the properly calculated Guidelines range a presumption of reasonableness, a presumption permitted by the Supreme Court. Rita v. United States, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2459, 2462 (2007); Green, 436 F.3d at 457 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As the first step in reviewing a post-Booker sentence is to assess whether the district court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, Moreland, 437 F.3d at 432, we first address the two issues raised by counsel as they are both relevant to this assessment.
Hill first questions whether the Government satisfied its burden of proof regarding the drug quantity found attributable to Hill. The district court properly relied upon Hill’s statement to - 5 - Palmer to determine this issue, and no further proof was required. In addition to the statement being constitutionally sound,2 the statement was also admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. “[T]here is no bar to the use of hearsay in sentencing,” United States v. Love, 134 F.3d 595, 607 (4th Cir. 1998), and this type of statement against interest of the uttering party-opponent is considered non-hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). Hill’s statement regarding quantity, as testified to by Palmer, was more than sufficient to satisfy the Government’s burden. B. Denial of Acceptance of Responsibility Adjustment Hill next questions whether the district court properly denied him an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. We agree with counsel that this claim is “without merit.” Under USSG § 3E1.1 (2005), a defendant may receive a two or three-level reduction in his offense level if he clearly demonstrates he has accepted responsibility for his offense. In order to receive such a reduction, “the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he has clearly recognized and affirmatively accepted personal responsibility for his criminal conduct.” United States v. May, 359 F.3d 683, 693 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A]n adjustment 2 Hill gave his statement to Palmer after being read his Miranda rights and there is nothing in the record to indicate any deficiency therein. - 6 - for acceptance of responsibility does not flow automatically from a guilty plea.” Id. In deciding whether an acceptance of responsibility adjustment is warranted, the sentencing court should consider whether the defendant has “truthfully admitt[ed] the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction, and truthfully admitt[ed] or not falsely den[ied] any additional relevant conduct for which the defendant is accountable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).” USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(a) (2005). The false denial of relevant conduct justifies a denial of acceptance of responsibility. United States v. Falesbork, 5 F.3d 715, 721-22 (4th Cir. 1993). This court reviews a district court’s decision to grant or deny an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility for clear error. May, 359 F.3d at 688. The district court properly concluded Hill was not entitled to an reduction in his base offense level for acceptance of responsibility. Although it appears Hill was initially honest in his statement to Palmer, his later attempts to downplay the extent of Smith’s drug trafficking reflect a frivolous and unfounded denial of relevant conduct which supports the denial of the acceptance of responsibility reduction.3 USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. 3 It is beyond dispute that Smith’s drug trafficking was properly considered relevant conduct germane to Hill’s sentencing. See USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1) (2005). - 7 - n.1(a). There was no error, let alone clear error, in the district court’s adjudication of this issue. In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entirety of the record and found no meritorious issues. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. In addition to denying counsel’s motion to withdraw from representation, we require that counsel inform Hill, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Hill requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Hill. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately set forth in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED - 8 -