Opinion ID: 3012110
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stewart and Caffey

Text: Appellants allege that EMTs Stewart and Caffey violated their son’s constitutional rights in that: (1) Stewart and Caffey failed to exercise the well-established and universally recognized protocols for choking situations; (2) neither Stewart nor Caffey attempted to reach down and directly remove the grape from Shacquiel’s throat; (3) Stewart and Caffey did not arrive at the Morris residence in a more timely manner because they could not locate Weaver Street on the station map; (4) when Stewart and Caffey left the station house to look for the Morris residence, they were lost; and (5) Stewart and Caffey were never provided information on the neighborhood in which they were responsible for providing emergency services, and they failed to familiarize themselves with the neighborhood. Brown, 2000 WL 562743, at . The District Court awarded summary judgment to Stewart and Caffey because it concluded that Appellants’ federal suit was barred by the prior state court action, which Appellants filed and lost. Appellants now argue that the District Court’s application of res judicata was incorrect. We need not decide that issue because, as we explained above, Shacquiel Douglas had no constitutional right to be rescued from choking on a grape, nor did he have a constitutional right to be provided with competent rescue services if rescue was undertaken at all. That is the general rule of DeShaney and its progeny. Additionally, neither of the two exceptions to DeShaney apply. First, the special relationship exception does not apply. That exception only applies when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200. Shacquiel Douglas was not in the state’s custody nor was he held against his will. This is not a case where the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself. Id. at 200. Second, Appellants argue the state-created danger exception applies. In an attempt to state a claim under this 10 theory of liability, they followed the elements of the test we set forth in Kneipp in alleging: (a) [Stewart and Caffey’s] actions created foreseeable and fairly direct harm to the decedent and the plaintiffs; (b) their actions evidenced willful disregard of harm to the decedent and the plaintiffs; (c) a relationship existed between the parties; and (d) their actions created and/or increased a danger to the decedent that otherwise would not have existed. Compl. at P 36. We need to consider only one of the Kneipp elements to understand why Appellants’ state-created danger claim must fail. Appellants allege that Stewart and Caffey’s actions created and/or increased a danger to the decedent that otherwise would not have existed. This is incorrect. The danger facing Shacquiel Douglas was a grape that was stuck in his throat. Neither the Commonwealth nor the city nor Stewart and Caffey had anything to do with that; the danger already existed when Stewart and Caffey arrived on the scene. Although Stewart and Caffey may have failed to rescue Shacquiel successfully from that preexisting danger, we have already said that they had no constitutional obligation to do so. We will, therefore, affirm the District Court’s award of summary judgment to Stewart and Caffey.