Opinion ID: 2556735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Equitable Relief Appropriate

Text: As a second basis for appealing the hearing justice's grant of plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction, defendants urge that the city was not entitled to injunctive relief because it had an adequate remedy at law. To support its position, defendants cite to Reback v. Rhode Island Board of Regents for Elementary and Secondary Education, 560 A.2d 357, 359 (R.I. 1989), where we said, [i]n order to prove entitlement to a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs had the burden of proving that there was no adequate remedy at law and that they would be irreparably harmed if the injunction was not granted. In Reback, we held that loss of teacher certification could reflect adversely on professional reputations in such a way that there was no adequate remedy at law. Id. The standard for preliminary injunctive relief when the underlying harm derives from an incident of continuing trespass is well established and provides that [a] continuing trespass wrongfully interferes with the legal rights of the owner, and in the usual case those rights cannot be adequately protected except by an injunction which will eliminate the trespass. Santilli v. Morelli, 102 R.I. 333, 338, 230 A.2d 860, 863 (1967) (quoting Ferrone v. Rossi, 311 Mass. 591, 42 N.E.2d 564, 566 (1942)); see also Renaissance Development Corp. v. Universal Properties Group, Inc., 821 A.2d 233, 238 (R.I.2003) (noting the general rule that when there is a continuing trespass on an owner's land, he or she is entitled to a mandatory injunction); Wolfe v. City of Providence, 77 R.I. 192, 201, 74 A.2d 843, 848 (1950) (holding [i]njunctive relief is especially applicable where the injury is continuous or is being constantly repeated, and the legal remedy would necessarily involve the bringing of successive actions) (citing Lonsdale Co. v. City of Woonsocket, 21 R.I. 498, 500, 44 A. 929, 930 (1899)). In the matter under review, defendants were living at the public park and treating the encampment as a personal residence. [9] In Brindamour v. City of Warwick, 697 A.2d 1075, 1077 (R.I.1997), we held that a person or people in a city park after hours are trespassers. Furthermore, in Mesolella v. City of Providence, 508 A.2d 661, 668 n. 8 (R.I.1986), we relied on the definition of continuing trespass advanced by the Restatement (Second) Torts, § 158, cmt. m. at 280 (1965) as [a]n unprivileged remaining on land in another's possession   . Therefore, it is clear from the record that the encampment, established without a grant of authorization or permission from the City of Providence, was nothing more than a continuing trespass. Thus, we hold that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he determined that injunctive relief was appropriate.