Opinion ID: 1877549
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: McLain's Claims Against the Contractors and Subcontractor.

Text: We must next determine whether the immunity extends to the State's contractors and subcontractor. McLain argues that Pelling and Selco are not immune because they failed to fully perform their contracts by not monitoring the traffic control devices. He claims these duties are clearly part of the specifications included in the contract. The defendants claim that the immunity extended to the State under Iowa Code section 668.10(1) must be extended to the State's contractors who comply with all State plans and specifications. We agree with the defendants. The rule is well established that a contractor for the State is not liable to a third party for damages if the contractor complies with the State's plans and specifications and is not negligent in performing its work. Monroe v. Razor Constr. Co., 252 Iowa 1249, 1252, 110 N.W.2d 250, 252 (1961); Pumphrey v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 250 Iowa 559, 568-69, 94 N.W.2d 737, 742 (1959). In other words, in those situations the contractor shares the same immunity as the State. However, if a contractor acts negligently, it cannot enjoy any immunity. Monroe, 252 Iowa at 1252, 110 N.W.2d at 252. Here, the evidence in the record reflects that Pelling and Selco complied with all State plans and specifications and did not perform their work in a negligent manner. Throughout the project, the State controlled all decisions regarding the placement and installation of the traffic control devices. Selco installed the warning signs as it contracted to, and on the day of the accident, the signs were in their proper locations and in complete working order. McLain also argues that the duties of Pelling and Selco, as contractors, extend beyond their contractual duty to implement the State's plan. He cites Kowalski v. State, 447 N.W.2d 146, 148 (Iowa App.1989), for the proposition that contractors have a continuing duty to the traveling public to provide reasonable traffic control devices. In other words, McLain argues that Pelling and Selco had a duty to monitor the effectiveness of the traffic control devices after they were installed. We first note that the lawsuit in Kowalski was filed before the July 1, 1984 effective date of section 668.10(1). See 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1293, § 10. Therefore, our court of appeals decided the case without reference to the statute or the effect of state immunity on contractors involved in construction projects with the State. McLain's argument fails because, as noted earlier, monitoring is part of the decision-making process of whether to install additional signs. This decision is clearly retained by the State and immunized by section 668.10(1). Because Pelling and Selco complied with the State's contract specifications, we conclude as a matter of law that they may share immunity with the State, pursuant to Iowa Code section 668.10(1).