Opinion ID: 2386870
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Heading: Are the policy provisions involved ambiguous?

Text: We have said the rules for construing insurance policies are well settled. The policy is a contract. Plain and unambiguous language must be given its plain meaning. The contract should be construed as a whole; but, in so far as open to different constructions, that most favorable to the insured must be adopted.    However,    the rule `does not authorize a perversion of language, or the exercise of inventive powers for the purpose of creating an ambiguity where none exists.' Wendorff v. Missouri State Life Insurance Co., 318 Mo. 363, 1 S.W.2d 99, 101 [4, 5], 57 A.L.R. 615 (omitting citations). Central Surety & Ins. Corp. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 359 Mo. 430, 222 S.W.2d 76, after quoting (78 [1]) the foregoing from the Wendorff case, states (80 [6]): Where possible, it is our duty to give every clause of the policy some meaning. These cases involved policy provisions excepting liability. See Davis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 234 Mo.App. 748, 119 S.W.2d 488, 493 [4], quoting Williams v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 170, 180, 54 S.Ct. 348, 78 L.Ed. 711, 92 A.L.R. 693, 700. Aler v. Travelers Indemnity Co., D.C. Md.1950, 92 F.Supp. 620, 622, was an early declaratory judgment action involving provisions of a policy extending and limiting, by exclusionary provisions, the insured's coverage on his Mercury automobile in his use of any other automobile, subject to the following provisions    (b) This insuring agreement does not apply: (1) to any automobile owned by, hired as a part of a frequent use of hired automobiles by, or furnished for regular use to the named insured or a member of his household other than a private chauffeur or domestic servant of the named insured or spouse. The insured was driving his mother-in-law's Plymouth automobile at the time of the accident. The mother-in-law had been a member of the insured's household for a year or more, paying no rent or board, and at the time of the accident was ill and confined to her bed. The insured, his wife and his son had been using both cars when needed. The court, after analyzing the issues involved in an opinion that has become a leading case, held that the exclusionary clause was not ambiguous and excepted from coverage the use of any other automobile (1) owned by the insured or a member of his household or (2) furnished for regular use to the insured or a member of his household. 623 [2, 3]. Garnisher stresses Pray v. Leibfarth, D. C.E.D.Mich.1952, 106 F.Supp. 613 [3], and the majority opinion therein upon appeal, Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Pray, 6 Cir., 1953, 204 F.2d 821. The Pray case and the Aler case involved identical policy provisions. The garnishee, insurer, had issued a policy on Leibfarth, Jr.'s Pontiac automobile. Plaintiff was injured while Leibfarth, Jr., accompanied by Leibfarth, Sr., was driving the father's Cadillac automobile. The father, mother and son each had his or her own car. The opinion of the district court (106 F.Supp. 615 [2, 3]) and the majority opinion of the circuit court (204 F.2d 824 [4, 5]) refused to follow the Aler case, supra. Each held the exclusionary provisions ambiguous, and emphasized the lack of a comma before the words the named insured in the phrase or furnished for regular use to the named insured    for the holding. The court stated (204 F.2d loc. cit. 824): In order to make a complete sentence of the questioned provision, grammatical construction would seem to require that the three phrases (1) `to any automobile owned by,' (2) `hired as a part of a frequent use of hired automobiles by,' and (3) `or furnished for regular use to', have as their object the words `the named insured or a member of his household' etc. Without inserting a comma ( which is not to be found in the policy ) before the words `the named insured', the provision cannot be so construed; for unless the comma be inserted as specified, the first two of the three aforementioned phrases are left dangling without an object. A strong dissenting opinion in the Pray case (204 F.2d 825) approved the construction given the exclusionary clause in the Aler case, supra, quoting Ewing v. Burnet, 11 Pet. 41, 54, 9 L.Ed. 624, to the effect that instruments are construed from their four corners, and if the true meaning is apparent, `the punctuation will not be suffered to change it.' Garnisher's case of Continental Cas. Co. v. Suttenfield, 5 Cir., 1956, 236 F.2d 433, 437, states: The language we are to construe has been found ambiguous. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Pray, 6 Cir., 1953, 204 F.2d 821. However, the court did construe the provision involved and held the use of the hired automobile was not a frequent use within the meaning of the exception. In Leteff v. Maryland Casualty Co., La. App.1957, 91 So.2d 123, 126, plaintiff was injured while riding in a Plymouth station wagon operated by Leslie W. Ventress, Jr., but owned by his father, and involved an insurance policy issued by the Maryland Casualty Company to Leslie W. Ventress, Jr. on a 1950 Chevrolet truck. The Use of Other Automobiles insuring agreement contained the following exceptions: (b) This insuring agreement does not apply: (1) to any automobile owned by, hired as part of a frequent use of hired automobiles by, or furnished for regular use to the named insured or a member of his household   . The court, after an exhaustive review of cases involving like clauses (91 So.2d loc. cit. 128 et seq.), held the exclusionary provision not ambiguous, stating (loc. cit. 142): `The language of the exclusion is not ambiguous. It is somewhat cumbersomely written and must be read with close scrutiny in order to grasp its full meaning, but there is nothing wrong with its grammatical construction. There is a well known rule of grammar which says that if it can be avoided verbs and prepositions are not separated from their object or objects by punctuation. The exception to that rule is where a parenthetical or explanatory phrase is thrown in after the preposition and before its object, then such phrase for clarity must be set apart by commas. There is another rule that a series of words or phrases are separated by commas, except there should be no comma before the first nor after the last of the series. In the provision here under consideration the qualifying phrase the named insured or a member of his household   . is the object to the first preposition by. It is the object of the second preposition by and it is the object of the preposition to. It would be wholly improper to separate with the comma the preposition to from its object the named insured or a member of his household   .' Like reasoning resulted in a like conclusion on similar policy provisions in American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 3 Cir., 1940, 115 F.2d 807. In the Leteff case, the court, bearing in mind the established rules of interpretation and the reason for the exclusion clauses, considered the Pray case to stand alone, to be against the great weight of authority, and in error (91 So.2d loc. cit. 139, 140). Garnishee's policy No. 368 139-B29-16 was issued fundamentally to cover Michael E. Kincaid, the insured, while operating the automobile specifically designated therein, his 1948 Plymouth. Clause IV of the policy's insuring agreements extended certain specified coverages therein mentioned (including coverage A, bodily injury) to insured's Use of Other Automobiles, subject, however, to certain limitations and exclusions with respect to this enlarged coverage. The purpose of the exclusionary clause so far as involved is to protect the insurer against the loss of premiums and against the increased and uncompensated hazard resulting from an insured's use of other automobiles by excluding coverage in the use of other automobiles where the insured or members of the same household own two or more automobiles which are used interchangeably with only one particular automobile insured. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Pulsifer, D.C.Me., 41 F.Supp. 249, 251 [1]; Rodenkirk v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 325 Ill.App. 421, 60 N.E.2d 269, 274 [3]; Aler v. Travelers Indemnity Co., supra. The exclusionary provision under consideration, involving prepositional phrases and objects, may be parsed readily. We conclude it is not ambiguous and excludes from coverage the insured's use of any other automobile (1) owned by the insured or a member of the same household, or (2) furnished for regular use to the insured or a member of the same household. See, in addition to the cases mentioned supra, Ransom v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 250 N.C. 60, 108 S.E.2d 22, 25 [4]; Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 4 Cir., 259 F.2d 389, 392 [3]; Northwest Cas. Co. v. Legg, 91 Cal. App.2d 19, 204 P.2d 106, 108; Vern v. Merchants Mut. Cas. Co., Sup.App.T., 118 N.Y.S.2d 672, 674; Campbell v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 4 Cir., 211 F.2d 732, 735 [2, 3]; Rodenkirk v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 325 Ill.App. 421, 60 N.E.2d 269, 274 [3, 4]; Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marr, D.C.N.J., 128 F.Supp. 67, 71 [4]. With the exception of the first two, these cited cases and others are reviewed in the Leteff case, supra, 91 So.2d 128 et seq. See 5A Am.Jur., Automobile Insurance, 86, § 88; Annotation, 173 A.L.R. 901.