Opinion ID: 1666801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: apportionment of the award

Text: Based on testimony that Halcott Conn was impecunious at the time of trial, [4] the trial judge invoked the inability to pay doctrine and limited Halcott Conn's in solido liability with the State to $6,000. In addition, the judge held the State solely liable for an additional $29,000. The court of appeal reversed, concluding that where one of several joint tortfeasors is solvent, the rule requiring the court to consider a defendant's inability to pay is inapplicable. The thrust of Conn's argument is that the court of appeal erred in refusing to consider his inability to pay and in holding him liable in solido with the State for the entire $35,000 award. The inability to pay rule was recognized as early as 1886 in the case of Williams v. McManus, 38 La.Ann. 161. In that case, in an action for damages for slander, the court pointed out, in passing, that the defendant was a laborer and of limited means and that the jury had not made a proper and commensurate allowance and went beyond the limits to be observed in such cases. The court then reduced the judgment from $2,000 to $500. See also, Loyacano v. Jurgens, 50 La.Ann. 441, 23 So. 717 (1898), in which the court stated that a person's circumstances may be considered in estimating damages to be awarded in a personal injury case. The obvious purpose of the rule is based on the equitable principle that courts will not grant vain and useless relief or render a judgment incapable of execution. Williams v. Garner, 268 So.2d 56 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1972). [5] Recognition of the inability to pay doctrine is not the problem in the instant case. Rather, the question is whether the doctrine is applicable where there are joint tortfeasors liable in solido, one solvent and the other insolvent. Relying on LSA-C.C. arts. 2098, 2103, 2104 and 2324, [6] and Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933), the State argues that a debtor's insolvency is a personal defense which may be asserted only when the solvent co-debtor seeks contribution from the insolvent co-debtor after payment of the judgment or obligation. Accordingly, the State contends that any evidence of the defendant's inability to pay is premature, and inadmissible, in determining the amount to be awarded to a plaintiff on the trial on the merits in a tort suit. We agree. In Howell v. Knight, 193 So.2d 282 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1966), the court stated that where codefendants are cast jointly and in solido, the evidence must show the inability of all defendants to respond before a judgment is rendered in a lesser amount than would ordinarily be assessed against solvent defendants. In the instant case, defendant Conn acknowledges that where there exist solvent and insolvent co-debtors in solido, evidence of insolvency may not be considered for the purpose of reducing the amount to be awarded plaintiff. He contends, nevertheless, that such evidence is admissible at trial on the merits, as between the co-obligors, to limit the liability of the insolvent defendant. We do not agree. LSA-C.C. art. 2324 provides: He who causes another person to do an unlawful act, or assists or encourages in the commission of it, is answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage caused by such act. [7] As this article states, each joint tortfeasor is liable to the fullest extent for the damages caused plaintiff. See also, LSA-C.C. art. 2315 and 2091. [8] Because either of the two solidary obligors may be responsible for payment of the amount of the judgment, the inability of one solidary co-obligor to pay does not become relevant until the solvent co-obligor seeks contribution from the insolvent one. In Brown v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company, 243 La. 271, 142 So.2d 796 (1962), this Court stated that although the injured party's cause of action against either or both of two joint tortfeasors comes into being and the obligation of each tortfeasor to the injured party commences at the time a tort is committed, the rights and obligations as between the joint tortfeasors do not then arise, because the obligations between the joint tortfeasors are not created by the commission of the tort, but rather spring from the principle of contribution. In accordance with Brown, we conclude that where there are solvent and insolvent joint tortfeasors liable in solido, evidence of the insolvent defendant's inability to pay may not be considered by the trial judge in determining damages to be awarded to the plaintiff, or in apportioning damages as between those joint tortfeasor defendants at the trial on the merits of plaintiff's claim. Having so concluded, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeal, with the exception that costs are to be paid by the State. As amended, affirmed. AMENDED AND AFFIRMED. DIXON, C. J., concurs with reasons. EDWARD A. de la HOUSSAYE, J. ad hoc, concurs and assigns reasons. MARCUS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.