Opinion ID: 2769479
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Due Process Arguments

Text: We also reject Mr. Brown’s due process arguments. “The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state shall not ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’” Lauck v. Campbell Cnty., 627 F.3d 805, 811 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting U.S. -6- Const. amend. XIV, § 1). Under this amendment, we address two questions. The first is whether a liberty or property interest exists. The second is whether the State provided sufficient procedures. Id. In this case, we will assume Mr. Brown had liberty or property interests implicated by his dismissal from the law school. See Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1978) (assuming without deciding the existence of a liberty or property interest); Trotter v. Regents of Univ. of N.M., 219 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2000) (same). The question then becomes the adequacy of the procedures. The district court properly required greater procedural safeguards because the university was considering an action that was disciplinary rather than academic. See Harris v. Blake, 798 F.2d 419, 423 (10th Cir. 1986). The procedures satisfied the stringent requirements for disciplinary action. When a university considers expulsion, it must use procedures accounting for the conflicting interests. Watson ex rel. Watson v. Beckel, 242 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2001). To consider those interests, we weigh “(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burden, that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.” Id. The objective is to ensure balancing of -7- “[t]he students’ interest in unfair or mistaken exclusion from the educational process” and “the school’s interest in discipline and order.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The risk of unfair expulsion is minimal because Mr. Brown knew what he had done, knew it constituted ground for expulsion, and took various opportunities to urge mitigation. Mr. Brown argues that the procedures should have had greater formality, citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). But Goss simply noted that severe disciplinary action could require “more formal procedures,” not necessarily the equivalent of a trial. Goss, 419 U.S. at 584. For our purposes, the issue is whether greater protections would have proved beneficial. Any benefits would have been minimal in light of the undisputed facts. These facts include Mr. Brown’s acknowledgement that he could be expelled for falsifying his application and his notification to the school that he had given false information. The dean relied on this fact, but gave Mr. Brown an opportunity to respond. Mr. Brown did so, raising procedural objections and requesting a hearing, but failed to address the fact that he had knowingly provided false information. Accordingly, Dean Agrawal ordered expulsion. -8- In light of these undisputed facts, further procedural safeguards would have added little. See Watson, 242 F.3d at 1241 (“All that is necessary to satisfy due process is that the procedures be tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard, to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to present their case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Elsewhere, Mr. Brown contends that Dean Agrawal was biased. But, there is no evidence of a link between the dean’s alleged bias and the decision to expel Mr. Brown. The connection is particularly attenuated because a separate body (the admissions committee) concluded that the school would not have allowed admission into the school if the criminal history had been disclosed. Mr. Brown also relies on the university’s failure to follow its own rules and regulations. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the university’s “failure to follow its own regulations does not, by itself, give rise to a constitutional violation.” Appellees’ App., vol. IV at 579 (citing Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 92 n.8; Trotter, 219 F.3d at 1185; Schuler v. Univ. of Minn., 788 F.2d 510, 515 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)). Mr. Brown argues that the district court erroneously relied on cases involving academic dismissals rather than disciplinary actions. But, even in the disciplinary context, a school’s failure to comply with its own rules -9- “does not, in itself, constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hill v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 537 F.2d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 1976). Indeed, “[t]he Due Process Clause . . . does not require the University to follow any specific set of detailed procedures as long as the procedures the University actually follows are basically fair ones . . . .” Newman v. Burgin, 930 F.2d 955, 960 (1st Cir. 1991). The procedures afforded to Mr. Brown were fair as a matter of law.