Opinion ID: 213922
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mental State Testimony

Text: Diaz contends that the district court abused its discretion by permitting Agent De La Cruz to testify that Diaz was at the scene of the drug transaction as a lookout. According to Diaz, this testimony functioned as an expert opinion of Diaz's mental state in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b). Where the party challenging the trial court's evidentiary ruling makes a timely objection, we review the ruling under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Sumlin, 489 F.3d 683, 688 (5th Cir.2007). If this court finds error, we review for whether there was harm. Id. `Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.' Id. (quoting Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a)). An error affects substantial rights if there is a reasonable probability that the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the conviction. Id. (citations omitted). Without a reasonable probability, this court is not required to reverse a conviction. Id. Lay witnesses also may give opinion testimony about a defendant's mental state. See Fed.R.Evid. 701; United States v. McMillan, 600 F.3d 434, 456 (5th Cir. 2010). The opinions are not expert ones but are based on the witness's perception and that are helpful in understanding the testimony or in determining a fact in issue.. . . McMillan, 600 F.3d at 456 (citations omitted). After testifying that Diaz was a lookout, Agent De La Cruz testified that he saw Diaz standing in between the trailer and the van, seeing side to side, making sure no vehicles were coming. This testimony did not rest upon scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge. Instead, it was an observation that result[ed] from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life. . . . United States v. Yanez Sosa, 513 F.3d 194, 200 (5th Cir.2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Other circuits in unpublished opinions have upheld testimony from law enforcement officers that a defendant acted as a lookout. See United States v. Valdez-Reyes, 165 Fed.Appx. 387, 391-93 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished); United States v. Hernandez, 45 Fed.Appx. 686, 690-91 (9th Cir. 2002) (unpublished). Where the testimony is based on [an officer's] personal perceptions of defendant's conduct . . . [t]he district court could legitimately conclude in exercising its discretion that the opinion testimony would clarify for the jury that the officer[] believed defendant was more than a disinterested observer. . . . Valdez-Reyes, 165 Fed.Appx. at 392. This reasoning is convincing. Agent De La Cruz's testimony was based upon his personal perception of Diaz's conduct and would clarify for the jury how Diaz appeared to be acting. Diaz contends that caselaw supports the principle that when government agents testify that presence at a drug transaction indicates an awareness of drugs, they are offering improper expert testimony of a defendant's mental state, or the functional equivalent of such testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza-Medina, 346 F.3d 121, 127-29 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Ramirez-Velasquez, 322 F.3d 868, 879 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Gutierrez-Farias, 294 F.3d 657, 662-63 (5th Cir.2002). In these cases, however, the officers were offered as expert witnesses, and the impermissible portion of their testimony concerned drug courier profiles, whereby their testimony clearly suggested that because most drivers know there are drugs in their vehicles, [the defendant] must have known too. Mendoza-Medina, 346 F.3d at 128-29; Gutierrez-Farias, 294 F.3d at 663. Such testimony amounted to the functional equivalent of a forbidden opinion on the ultimate legal issue in the case. Gutierrez-Farias, 294 F.3d at 663 (quotation marks and citations omitted). There was no indication that Agent De La Cruz's testimony extrapolated Diaz's behavior from the witness's supposed expert knowledge of the behavior of others. Rather, Agent De La Cruz testified that Diaz was acting as a lookout because of Diaz's behaviorstanding near a drug transaction, looking side to side, and observing potential street traffic. Agent De La Cruz's testimony was admissible opinion testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701. Even if the district court did err in some way, though, it was a harmless error in light of the remaining overwhelming evidence, which we discuss below. See United States v. Setser, 568 F.3d 482, 494-95 (5th Cir.2009). The district court did not abuse its discretion.