Opinion ID: 2800048
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Newly Discovered Evidence—Murder Plot

Text: Several months before the start of trial, Pettengill met with Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents and told them Durand suggested to Pettengill they should arrange for Beckman to be murdered in order to collect on a key man life insurance policy on Beckman. Pettengill’s comments were noted on an FBI “Form 302,” dated November 3, 2011 (Form 302). -30- Over a year later, on December 21, 2012, the government alluded to the murder plot in its sentencing memorandum for Durand. On December 26, 2012, the government moved for an evidentiary hearing “at which the United States will prove by the preponderance of the evidence that, in December of 2009, Mr. Durand proposed to Mr. Pettengill that they arrange for the murder of Jason Bo-Alan Beckman in order to collect and split the proceeds of a life insurance policy on Beckman’s life.” The government did not disclose the Form 302 to Beckman and Durand until December 28, 2012, more than six months after trial. In an email to the defendants’ attorneys, the government stated it looked in its files for this Form 302 in preparation for sentencing. Not finding the Form 302, the government asked the FBI to review its files. The FBI delivered the Form 302 on December 27, 2012. The government explains the lack of disclosure “was a mistake” and “it intended to turn over all of its interview memoranda in this enormous case.” On December 28, 2012, and December 30, 2012, Durand and Beckman, respectively, moved for a new trial based on the newly discovered Form 302 evidence. A few days later, on January 3, 2013, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the morning of the sentencing hearings. The district court denied Beckman’s and Durand’s motions for a new trial and later issued a memorandum opinion to that effect.
This court “review[s] the district court’s denial of [a defendant’s] motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Haskell, 468 F.3d 1064, 1076 (8th Cir. 2006); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1). A successful Rule 33(b) movant must show that: -31- (1) the evidence [was] unknown or unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) the defendant [was] duly diligent in attempting to uncover it; (3) the newly discovered evidence [is] material; and (4) the newly discovered evidence . . . probably will result in an acquittal upon retrial. United States v. Rubashkin, 655 F.3d 849, 857 (8th Cir. 2011) (alterations and emphasis in original). “[T]he standard in our circuit for a Rule 33 motion is clear and binding. The rule requires that the newly discovered evidence ‘probably will result in an acquittal.’” Id. at 858 (internal citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Baker, 479 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 2007)). The district court found Beckman failed to satisfy the last two elements for a Rule 33(b) motion because (1) the alleged murder plot occurred after the fraud ended, and so was immaterial, and (2) the Form 302 contained inculpatory, rather than exculpatory, statements as to Beckman, i.e., Pettengill and Beckman “knew the money was gone, and the plan was to blame Cook.” The district court did not clearly err in its findings and did not abuse its discretion. Beckman also states the district court erred because if Beckman had access to the Form 302 before trial, he may have reconsidered “his decision not to seek a severance from Durand” and might not have engaged in “‘hands off’ treatment of Durand” at trial. The district court did not explicitly address this argument in its order. “Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(a) vests the district court with authority to order severance if consolidation for trial appears to prejudice the government or a defendant. Nevertheless, there is a strong presumption against -32- severing trials.” United States v. Kramer, 768 F.3d 766, 770 (8th Cir. 2014). Beckman does not allude to any prejudice he suffered by being joined as a codefendant with Durand, nor does he delineate just what evidence he would have produced about Durand relevant to the time frame of the fraud had Beckman known about the alleged murder plot before trial. Thus, his argument is unsupported and without merit.
Beckman and Durand argue the government’s failure to produce the Form 302 violated the requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). “‘To show a Brady violation, the defendant must establish that (1) the evidence was favorable to the defendant, (2) the evidence was material to guilt, and (3) the government suppressed evidence. . . . Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” United States v. Jeanpierre, 636 F.3d 416, 422 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Ladoucer, 573 F.3d 628, 636 (8th Cir. 2009)). “‘We review de novo allegations of Brady violations.’” Mandacina v. United States, 328 F.3d 995, 1001 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. McElhiney, 275 F.3d 928, 932 (10th Cir. 2001)). Beckman also argues the government violated the requirements of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972). “‘Under [Giglio], the government must disclose matters that affect the credibility of prosecution witnesses. [F]or example, a defendant is entitled to know of a promise to drop charges against a key witness if that witness testifies for the government.’ However, the nondisclosure of Giglio evidence only justifies a retrial if the withheld information is deemed material.” United States v. Garcia, 562 F.3d 947, 952 n.7 (8th Cir. 2009) (second alteration in original) (internal citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Morton, 412 F.3d 901, 906 (8th Cir. 2005)). -33-
Beckman claims the Form 302 was exculpatory because the evidence of a murder plot would “buttress[] his arguments about his lack of knowledge of any overall conspiracy.” But the Form 302 actually is inculpatory on that issue, so this evidence was not favorable to Beckman, as Brady requires. Second, Beckman states the “fact that Pettengill never disclosed the murder plot to Mr. Beckman . . . seriously undermines credibility and character.” But Pettengill’s admitted role in the scheme seriously affected his credibility from the beginning, and it is unclear how the revelation of another purported act of deception would have materially affected the jury’s interpretation of Pettengill’s testimony. Beckman has not established the withheld information is material, as both Brady and Giglio require.
Durand first contends Pettengill’s statement in the Form 302 that the “fund was doing great and had $40 million” supports his argument that the enterprise did not begin as a scam and that Durand reasonably believed the program was legitimate. Pettengill substantially testified to the $40 million balance at trial, and the Form 302 would have only amounted to cumulative evidence. Second, in the Form 302, Pettengill stated, “Swiss FX [a firm run by Pettengill and Durand] was pitched more correctly than the Oxford currency program. It was not pitched with a guaranteed rate.” This information, too, came out at trial when Pettengill testified as to Swiss FX that he “wanted to have an organization that was actually compliant with the law.” Neither assertion reasonably would have produced a different outcome, as Brady requires. Third, and “[m]ost importantly,” Durand conclusively states, “[s]howing the jury what the government knew and when they would have known it, was crucial. That missing piece of paper would more likely than not have caused a different -34- outcome with respect to the [c]onspiracy [c]ount [] against Mr. Durand.” Finally, in his reply brief, Durand cites for the first time several more of Pettengill’s statements in the Form 302 that Durand surmises might have led to exculpatory statements by Pettengill on cross-examination. Such conjecture does not meet the Brady materiality requirement.
Beckman and Durand argue the government’s failure to produce the Form 302 also violated the Jencks Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500. “After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified.” Id. § 3500(b). This court “review[s] a district court’s ruling under the Jencks Act for clear error.” United States v. New, 491 F.3d 369, 376 (8th Cir. 2007). Assuming the Form 302 is a “statement” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e), “[w]e will not overturn a conviction for noncompliance with the Jencks Act where there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the government, nor an indication of prejudice to the defendant.” United States v. Douglas, 964 F.2d 738, 741 (8th Cir. 1992). Even if Beckman or Durand could establish prejudice, neither has established bad faith on the part of the government. Beckman provides no argument whatsoever as to bad faith. Durand assumes bad faith simply from the non-disclosure itself, arguing the government did not produce the Form 302 because it was exculpatory as to him. On the contrary, it is hard to imagine Durand would not have objected and filed a motion in limine to exclude the Form 302 if it had been timely produced, considering the revelation of a possible murder-for-hire. Because the Form 302 is inculpatory as to both Beckman and Durand, the government had no obvious motive to exclude it. The district court did not clearly err by denying Beckman’s and Durand’s motion for a new trial based on a Jencks Act violation. -35-
Finally, both Beckman and Durand argue the Form 302 would have provided impeachment material during cross-examination of Pettengill. Yet, generally, “new evidence which is merely cumulative or impeaching is not, according to the oftenrepeated statement of the courts, an adequate basis for the grant of a new trial.” Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 9 (1956) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Burns, 495 F.3d 873, 875 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining “impeachment evidence is rarely sufficient to entitle a defendant to a new trial”). The district court properly denied the motions for a new trial on this basis.