Opinion ID: 612140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Government's Use of Grand Jury and Administrative Subpoenas

Text: 141 Rojas contends that the district court erred in allowing the government to employ administrative subpoenas to uncover evidence without a finding of probable cause that a crime had taken place. He also claims that the government abused the grand jury subpoena power by using it to gather additional evidence in support of the previously-returned indictment. 142 After Rojas was arrested on January 9, 1991, he was informed that a sealed indictment had been returned against him on May 2, 1990. His counsel filed motions for discovery and inspection, and received materials including Rojas' telephone records, and those of defendants Kenneth Lawson and Mary Lawson. These records had been subpoenaed after the May 1990 indictment. In addition, his attorney was provided with Rojas' credit card statements, subpoenaed on January 17, 1991, defendant William Baird's telephone records, ordered subpoenaed on June 19, 1990, as well as other items. 143 Rojas subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment based upon the government's alleged abuse of the grand jury subpoena power. He argued that the government improperly utilized this power to obtain materials to supplement the indictment already handed down. The district court denied Rojas' motion after a hearing at which the government represented that the materials in question were secured by way of DEA administrative subpoenas, not grand jury subpoenas. 7 At trial, Rojas, joined by his co-defendants, objected to such subpoenas having been being employed without a demonstration of probable cause before a neutral magistrate. 144 Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 876(a) (Subpoenas--Authorization of use by Attorney General): 145 In any investigation relating to his functions under this subchapter with respect to controlled substances ... the Attorney General may subpena witnesses, compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, and require the production of any records (including books, papers, documents, and other tangible things which constitute or contain evidence) which the Attorney General finds relevant or material to the investigation. 146 The Attorney General may delegate this power to special agents in charge of those criminal investigations covered by the statute. United States v. Hossbach, 518 F.Supp. 759, 765-66 (E.D.Pa.1980) (citing 28 C.F.R. Subpart R, Appendix § 7(a)). The sorts of items that are capable of being procured as a result plainly include the records presently in controversy. Id. at 767 (telephone records); United States v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 516 F.Supp. 225 (D.Wyo.1981) (telephone records). 147 Once a targeted individual has been indicted, the government must cease its use of the grand jury in preparing its case for trial. United States v. Breitkreutz, 977 F.2d 214, 217 (6th Cir.1992). It may, however, continue to employ the grand jury process as part of an ongoing investigation, possibly leading to further charges against the subject of the former indictment. Id. Section 876 of title 21 simply furnishes the Attorney General and his delegates with an alternative mechanism for carrying on the investigation. However, unlike the grand jury system, it may also be used to discover evidence related to the charges in the original indictment. 8 148 Recipients of administrative subpoenas, such as those issued in accordance with 21 U.S.C. § 876, are afforded certain protections under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The subpoena has to be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance [would] not be unreasonable. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 1740, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967). 149 If it is a subpoena duces tecum, the government does not have to secure a judicial warrant before service is effectuated. Nonetheless, the subpoenaed party [must be able to] obtain judicial review of the reasonableness of the demand prior to suffering penalties for refusing to comply. Id. at 545, 87 S.Ct. at 1740. See also Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 415, 104 S.Ct. 769, 773, 78 L.Ed.2d 567 (1984). 150 Should an on-premises search and inspection be required to execute the subpoena, a valid search warrant is needed as a condition precedent if consent is not forthcoming. If, as in the instant case, the subpoena is to be based upon 21 U.S.C. § 876, and the purpose behind the search [is] ... a quest for evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution, a full probable cause showing is mandatory. 9 United States v. Lawson, 502 F.Supp. 158, 165 (D.Md.1980). See also Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 508, 512, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949, 1951, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978). A showing which only comports with reasonable legislative or administrative standards, as when regulatory noncompliance is suspected, will not suffice. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1735, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). See also Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1824, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978) (Probable cause in the criminal sense is not required to undertake administrative search aimed at uncovering civil violations of the Occupational Health and Safety Act). 151 Here, the administrative subpoenas were not directed at Rojas, but rather at third party businesses. As a consequence, he did not have standing to dispute their issuance on Fourth Amendment grounds, unless he could demonstrate that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy attaching to the records obtained. See, e.g., United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). It is evident, however, that Rojas did not have both an actual and a justifiable privacy interest in any of these materials, including his credit card statements and telephone records. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2581, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979) (in case involving pen register, the Court doubt[ed] that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-41, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 1623, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976) (records of bank transactions were not private papers, over which a person could claim ownership or possession, but were business records). The information contained within them was readily accessible to employees during the normal course of business. Rojas therefore lacked standing to challenge the government's use of the subpoenas. 10 152 The situation would not have been different if the government had infringed upon the constitutional rights of those entities subpoenaed. One generally does not have standing to complain about the breach of another's rights. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). As it happened, none of the parties subpoenaed was opposed to turning over the requested items. 153 B. Motion In Limine Related to Rojas' Colombian Origins; Motion For Mistrial Based Upon References to Rojas' Colombian Ties 154 Rojas further asserts that the district court should have granted his motion in limine to prohibit the government from mentioning his having been born in Colombia, or from introducing his passport records, which revealed that he had journeyed to Colombia several times, ostensibly to visit relatives, in the three to five years prior to his arrest. 11 155 Rojas also argues that a mistrial was warranted because of inflammatory references that were made concerning his connections to Colombia. In his view, they were gratuitous and were designed both to arouse ethnic bias and to tap into the jury's presumed eagerness to combat the national drug crisis, including by way of a misguided verdict. See United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1153-54 (6th Cir.1991) (urging jury to strike a blow to the drug problem was harmful to the constitutional right to a fair trial); United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 25 (D.C.Cir.1990) (appeals to racial passion affected jury impartiality). He cites three such references aside from those adverted to regarding his motion in limine. 156 First, the government was allowed to call a federal prisoner, Andres Tealdo, as a witness and to ask him leading questions. This led Tealdo to testify that he knew Rojas in 1989, and that Rojas told him that he sold cocaine from Colombia. Second, the government stated during its closing argument that Robert Dale Murr could pick up a telephone and arrange for his cocaine broker, the Defendant Kenneth Lawson, to have a Columbian drug dealer, Victor Rojas, bring him kilogram quantities of cocaine by Kentucky by a phone call. Lastly, on cross-examination, Jerry Parks referred to Rojas on one occasion as Victor Manuel Noriega Rojas. While not a direct reference to his background, Rojas claims that, by implication, it drew attention to his ties to Colombia, a country commonly understood to be a hub in the international drug trade. 157 Motions in limine to exclude evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. We detect no such abuse in the instant case. That Rojas had ties to Colombia and travelled there frequently was relevant to the government's contention that he was the cocaine supplier in the charged conspiracy. We believe that, as proffered for such a legitimate purpose, the complained-about evidence was not unduly prejudicial. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. 158 The denial of a mistrial motion is also assessed under the abuse of discretion standard. Moore, 917 F.2d at 220. Before Tealdo took the stand, the district court and counsel held a lengthy bench conference, during which they discussed the implications of his anticipated evidence. The government expected that Tealdo's testimony would be that Rojas admitted to him that he was a drug dealer whose cocaine source was in Colombia. Significantly, defense counsel objected only on the grounds that this would constitute irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of other bad acts, relying upon Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. We are of the opinion that it was properly allowed in and was not, in fact, inflammatory. As a consequence, the portion of the government's closing argument about which Rojas complains had a basis in evidence. 159 As for Parks' calling him Victor Manuel Noriega Rojas, Rojas suggests that this was harmful because General Noriega's highly-publicized drug trial was underway in Florida at the same time as the instant proceedings. While such a reference was inappropriate, it was an isolated remark and we are satisfied that it did not deprive him of a fair trial. See Bowers, 739 F.2d at 1055. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Rojas' motion for a mistrial. 160 C. The Rojas Photospread 161 Rojas also alleges that only after the government's examination of witness Vivian Cummins did he first become aware that she had been shown a photospread containing his picture as part of her pretrial identification of him. He contends that this violated his right under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and its progeny to any exculpatory or impeachment evidence held by the government. 162 The record indicates that Rojas did request such so-called Brady evidence in the proper fashion. At side bar, the government averred that defense counsel had been provided with a copy of the photospread before Ms. Cummins even hit the stand. Whether this was so, we are persuaded that Cummins had a sufficient basis for her pretrial identification of Rojas, independent from any refreshment provided by the photospread. As a result, Rojas' timely mistrial motion need not have been granted. D. The Confidential Presentence Information 163 Rojas, on behalf of his co-defendants, next asserts that the district court erred in allowing confidential presentence information to be submitted by the United States Probation Office without affording him an inspection of the materials, and an opportunity to comment as to their import. 164 At a hearing where sentencing matters were discussed, defense counsel asked whether the district judge had any confidential presentence information in his possession. The judge indicated that he did, but maintained that it was not the sort of material he was obligated to divulge: 165 [A]ny information that I may get, directly or indirectly, from the probation officer independent of the presentence report of a confidential nature ... is solely--if any information that I receive from the probation office, directly or indirectly, is for my illumination and my consideration, and it would not be of any--any use or benefit to you or the defendant at all. And that information is exempt. 166 The district judge then overruled counsel's motion, made in accordance with Rule 32(c)(3)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for a summary of the confidential information. 167 The information in question was placed under seal, and we examined it. It consisted of nothing more than the probation officer's sentencing recommendations concerning defendants. Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(A), such recommendations are not required to be disclosed to the accused. Consequently, the district court did not withhold any sentencing information that defendants were entitled to examine. E. Acceptance of Responsibility 168 Finally, Rojas argues that he should have been given a two-point reduction in offense level under the federal sentencing guidelines for acceptance of responsibility. Rojas asserts that he offered to plead guilty and to acknowledge that he conspired to distribute, and did distribute, the amount of cocaine charged in the indictment. However, according to his attorney, there was a dispute with the government over Mr. Rojas' remembrance or memory of what quantities came down here on a certain date, and Mr. Parks and Mr. McKeehan's memory. As a result, the government would not enter into a plea agreement with Rojas, and he subsequently went to trial. 169 Rojas claims that, in spite of his desire to admit his wrongdoing, his offense level was not lowered because he did not, in fact, plead guilty. Consequently, he contends that he was penalized for exercising his right to a trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 170 Section 3E1.1 of the sentencing guidelines (Acceptance of Responsibility) does not inflict an across-the-board penalty upon those defendants who go to court to contest their prosecution. Application Note 2 to the section plainly provides that: 171 Conviction by trial ... does not automatically preclude a defendant from consideration for such a reduction. In rare situations a defendant may clearly demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility for his criminal conduct even though he exercises his constitutional right to a trial. This may occur, for example, where a defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt (e.g., to make a constitutional challenge to a statute or a challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct). In each such instance, however, a determination that a defendant has accepted responsibility will be based primarily upon pre-trial statements and conduct. 172 It is well established that a penal scheme which extends a benefit to defendants who own up to their conduct does not unconstitutionally burden those who exhibit no remorse. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1471, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). A plea of guilty is an indication of contrition, so it is not surprising that leniency is more often granted to defendants who accept responsibility by pleading guilty. United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1362 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1026, 122 L.Ed.2d 171 (1993). 173 The record reveals that Rojas' acceptance of responsibility was not unconditional; he was keenly interested in securing a plea agreement. Rojas' counsel stated explicitly that because of my understanding that the United States cannot give him any assurance that he will not be prosecuted in any other district, then he is not pleading guilty ... I want to state on the record that he is willing to plea, except for the Government said they would not promise to prosecute him in any other districts. He also complained that the government [was] not willing to cut [Rojas] one iota as part of a bargain because, in his view, Rojas' testimony might not resonate with that of Parks and McKeehan. Notwithstanding Rojas' equivocation, the district judge told him that he would take ... into account his alleged readiness to concede his culpability. The court need not have done so; that it did demonstrates that its failure to give Rojas an offense level reduction under section 3E1.1 was not punishment for his having stood trial. 174 However, the court ultimately felt that Rojas' refusal to testify against his co-defendants, which may have resulted in the acquittal of one of them, and to adequately divulge information about his superiors in his cocaine supply network was significant. The district court's findings concerning a defendant's acceptance of responsibility for his offense are not to be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Perry, 908 F.2d at 58. The sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility. For this reason, the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review. Application Note 5 to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Applying such a standard here, we do not believe the district court's particular conclusion as to Rojas was improper. 12