Opinion ID: 2806519
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The evidence of guilt was weak, and the state

Text: court’s contrary conclusion rested on multiple unreasonable determinations of the facts. Although the state court acknowledged that “the prosecution case was hampered by weaknesses in the identification evidence,” it nevertheless concluded it was “highly unlikely that the jury was influenced by the prosecutor’s improper argument as opposed to the other strong evidence of [Zapata’s] guilt.” The “strong evidence” the court cited included these “facts”: (1) “the universe of likely perpetrators was effectively confined to OSP members by the absence of any explanation for the crime other than gang-related hatred”; (2) the similarities between Zapata’s likeness and the police sketch meant “the gunman was either [Zapata] or another OSP member who also happened to resemble the sketch”; and (3) “[t]he involvement of [Zapata]’s pickup in the shooting, which the defense did not seriously contest, made ZAPATA V. VASQUEZ 23 it extremely likely that he was either the gunman or the driver.” The court concluded that “[t]hese facts, which do not depend on the credibility of any witness who had an arguable motive to lie, pointed strongly to [Zapata] as the actual killer.” The record does not support the court’s characterization of this evidence, and its ultimate prejudice determination regarding the facts was unreasonable on the actual record. The state court’s first observation is demonstrably an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Because OSP was just one of many active Norteño gangs in the Gilroy area, the universe of perpetrators was not “confined to OSP members” – it was significantly broader than the state court assumed. The prosecution’s gang expert, Officer Guerin, testified that there were “several cliques of Norteño gangs” active in the area, including OSP, East Side Gilas, Firme Mafia, Family Unity and the Brown Pride Kings, and “some other smaller ones.” He further testified that “any person from a Norteño gang” would have viewed a member of Calle Ocho (“Eighth Street”) as the enemy and thus would have harbored animosity towards someone wearing a number 8 jersey like the one Juan Trigueros had on. Guerin noted the “biggest . . . two” gangs were the East Side Gilas and OSP, both of which had been particularly active the summer of Trigueros’ shooting. When asked why a man wearing a number 8 jersey would be targeted, Guerin said: 8 is common – is an identifying number for all our Sureño gangs in Gilroy . . . . So it’s significant in that in my opinion . . . if any 24 ZAPATA V. VASQUEZ Norteño gang member including someone from OSP sees someone . . . who[m] they perceived to be a possible gang member or a Sureño gang member wearing a jersey with the number 8 it could help better their perception as to that person being from and a member of the Eighth Street Sureño gang. The prosecutor questioned Guerin about the significance of the area where Trigueros was stranded: Q: That particular area down Leavesley past the 7-Eleven where our shooting took place . . . is that an area that is more Norteño controlled or Sureño controlled? A: It would be more – we see more activity of Norteño gang members in that area. Q: Is that an area where if an Eighth Street gang member would appear or try to loiter or hang out he would be someone possibly challenged by a Norteño gang member? A: Correct. . . . [That area is] highly traversed by everyone in town and most importantly Norteño gang members. Guerin further explained: 7-Eleven on Leavesley – Leavesley is a main road in Gilroy – is predominantly a Norteño- controlled area. Many Norteño gang ZAPATA V. VASQUEZ 25 members live in the immediate area . . . so I consider that area a Norteño gang area. And a Sureño gang member going into that area, whether it’s the 7-Eleven store, the Rotten Robbie’s gas station or the gas station across the street . . . those are all areas where Norteños frequent. And if a Sureño comes into that area they’re going to – if they come across Norteño gang members they’re going to be looked upon as not being in the proper area for that – for a Sureño gang member. Given this uncontradicted evidence, the state court unreasonably assumed that the shooter had to be an OSP member.9 Guerin’s testimony establishes that all Norteño gangs frequented the area near the 7-Eleven and that any one of them would have viewed a man wearing the number 8 with animosity. Even factoring in Guerin’s testimony that OSP and another large Norteño gang, East Side Gilas, were particularly active in the summer of 2001, the universe of potential gunmen was still significantly broader than a single Norteño “clique.” If the potential shooter could just as likely have been a member of the East Side Gilas, another major Norteño subgroup, let alone any one of the many other 9 The state court’s misunderstanding regarding the universe of potential shooters is reflected elsewhere in its opinion. The court wrote: “An expert testified that the neighborhood in which he had stranded himself was claimed as turf by Outside Posse (OSP), a local clique of the Norteños street gang.” The gang expert’s testimony establishes the area was generally claimed as Norteño turf, not specifically OSP turf. The gang expert testified that “[w]e have several cliques of Norteño gangs,” including OSP, and that the area surrounding the 7-Eleven was “predominantly a Norteño-controlled area.” 26 ZAPATA V. VASQUEZ Norteño subgroups in Gilroy, then the mere fact of Zapata’s OSP membership was less probative of his guilt. Second, and for the same reason, the court’s second assumption – that the similarities between Zapata’s face and the police sketch meant that the shooter had to be an OSP member who resembled Zapata – also constitutes an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Again, according to the prosecution’s own expert witness, OSP was just one of many Norteño subgroups whose members frequented the area near the 7-Eleven, so the state court’s belief that the shooter could only have been an OSP member resembling the sketch was unreasonable.10 Third, the court’s statement that the involvement of Zapata’s white Toyota pickup truck in the shooting was never seriously contested is also directly contradicted by the record. Defense counsel not only cross-examined the prosecution’s witnesses on their vehicle identification testimony, but also explicitly highlighted the conflicts and inconsistencies in that testimony during his closing argument. As Zapata’s attorney emphasized at trial, the state’s witnesses disagreed on the make and the type of vehicle involved in the shooting. Morton, who testified that he had “be[en] in automotive all [his] life,” said the vehicle was a 10 Moreover, there was disagreement at trial about the degree to which Zapata actually resembled the sketch. When asked to compare his sketch against a contemporaneous photo of Zapata, the police sketch artist could say only that there was “some likeness.” Puphal, whose description formed the basis of the sketch, was never able to identify Zapata in a photo lineup. And Echeverria, who initially said the sketch looked “just like” Zapata, testified at trial that she had purposely overstated the degree to which the sketch resembled Zapata. ZAPATA V. VASQUEZ 27 Ford truck or an SUV with a topper. Puphal testified the truck was a single cab white pickup; at trial, when shown a photograph of Zapata’s truck, he said only that it “could be” the one involved in the shooting. Although Davila testified that the truck was a Toyota, it was only a month before trial, and over three years after the murder, that he identified Zapata’s truck as the one involved in the shooting. In sum, the defense vigorously argued this point and created enough uncertainty to give at least some jurors reason to doubt whether the getaway car was Zapata’s white pickup.11 The 11 Defense counsel attacked the vehicle identification testimony in closing summation, arguing: Sergeant Davila gave us testimony that’s inconsistent and irreconcilable with the testimony of Brian Puphal and inconsistent and irreconcilable with the testimony [of] Joe Morton. Sergeant Davila is the only witness who comes into this courtroom and tells us he saw a Toyota pickup truck. Is that because he recalls seeing a Toyota pickup truck because he might have seen a photo of it when he met with Detective Zen? Or did it come up – or is it a recollection? Who knows where it came from. And why is – you know, that’s just one piece of the problem. You know, you’ve got Joe Morton who tells you he’s been in automotive all his life, he thinks it was a Ford, thinks it has a camper shell. We’ve got Brian who just knows it was a white truck, a four-by-four. And then here is the timing problem. . . . [Davila] says he sees somebody driving like a wild man and driving like a wild man I have in quotes. That was a wild man that no one else saw driving that night, that nobody else reports. He heard a screeching noise. A noise that nobody else heard. No one else reported. . . . Two people see a truck slowly moving progressing down Leavesley and then down Murray. Nobody heard the pealing [sic] of rubber, that screeching noise [Davila] talked about. And you’ll 28 ZAPATA V. VASQUEZ evidence about the truck was not only hotly disputed, but it fell short of establishing the vehicle at the shooting was Zapata’s. The state court’s contrary determination that the involvement of Zapata’s truck was “not seriously contested” misstated the record and was unreasonable as well. Taken together, the foregoing three critical, but unfounded, factual assumptions were unreasonable and seriously undermine the state court’s prejudice assessment. In addition, the state court emphasized that a “guilty verdict was also strongly favored by the testimony and statements of the three witnesses attacked as ‘the informants’12 by the defense,” particularly the “directly incriminat[ing]” testimony of Sarah Sanchez, who testified that Zapata told her he “shot up” the 7-Eleven. In assessing the strength of this testimony, however, the court entirely recall [Davila] was in the gas station when he hears that noise. He’s in the gas station when he hears the two shots and shortly thereafter hears the screeching sound. You know, sounds that nobody heard. Joe Morton goes out and he told us on the Murray Street side of the Shell station in time to see what he thought was a white Ford pickup truck with a camper driving away. No screeching, no laying of rubber on the pavement, no colliding with the median. You know, it’s – do I think [Davila] came into this courtroom and lied to you? Absolutely not. . . . What you know of this case, the evidence that we have all seen and heard, was he wrong? Absolutely. But the prosecution embraces his testimony with the exception of the timing problem because he’s the one person without a dog in this fight that recalls having seen a Toyota pickup truck. You know, if it doesn’t make sense you have to reject it. 12 Zapata’s counsel referred to Sarah Sanchez, Nancy Echeverria and Victoria Lopez as “the informants” in his closing argument. ZAPATA V. VASQUEZ 29 overlooked a serious inconsistency in Sanchez’s testimony and her resulting questionable credibility. Cf. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (“A federal court can disagree with a state court’s credibility determination and, when guided by AEDPA, conclude the decision was unreasonable or that the factual premise was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence.”). Sanchez testified that in May or early June 2001, very shortly after the shooting, Zapata approached her while she was dropping off an OSP associate named Donald Reyes at the Ramirez ranch. She testified that Zapata asked if she could “do him a favor,” and drive his truck to Stockton or Manteca because “he had shot up somebody at 7-Eleven.” Donald Reyes, who testified for the defense, said he had never asked Sanchez for a ride and was incarcerated from April to the middle of June 2001, a fact to which the parties stipulated. Furthermore, as the state court did note, Sanchez also admitted at trial that she harbored ill will towards Zapata because, in November 2002, he and a group of OSP associates attacked her new boyfriend, presumably to send a message from her previous boyfriend, an OSP member. She did not contact the police about what Zapata purportedly told her until after that attack. The testimony of Nancy Echeverria, Zapata’s ex- girlfriend, was also subject to attack for bias. Echeverria, who was dating Zapata at the time of the Trigueros murder, testified at trial that she first suspected Zapata may have committed the murder after seeing the police sketch shortly afterward, but she called the police tip line only in December 2002, after Zapata had broken up with her and 18 months after the shooting. She testified at trial that she exaggerated the degree of resemblance between the police sketch and Zapata and lied about when she last saw the truck because she wanted to “burn” Zapata and his new girlfriend “in a big 30 ZAPATA V. VASQUEZ way.” Furthermore, she admitted she had not been entirely truthful in her pretrial conversations with Detective Zen about Zapata’s involvement in the murder: “[N]ot everything I said was true, so it’s kind of like, you know, I lied and I had to face reality.” Similarly, Victoria Lopez retreated at trial from her pretrial statement that she “kind of th[ought] it was stupid [Zapata]” who committed the murder because he began driving a black Taurus after May 2001. She testified that she continued to see Zapata drive the white pickup after May 2001 and that she could not remember the rest of her pretrial statement. The prosecution attempted to explain the inconsistencies by arguing Echeverria and Lopez had received threats from OSP members prior to trial, but the fact remained there were serious inconsistencies between their pretrial statements and in-court testimony.13 Considering these factors together, we conclude the California Court of Appeal’s prejudice determination was based on multiple misapprehensions of the record, and its assessment of the strength of the evidence against Zapata was therefore unreasonable. First, its conclusion that the universe of perpetrators was limited to OSP members is contradicted by the testimony of the prosecution’s own gang expert, who testified that OSP was just one of several active Norteño gangs in the area, and that members of any one of them would have viewed a perceived Sureño with animosity. 13 Specifically, the prosecution presented evidence that Echeverria was afraid to testify because she had been intimidated by OSP members. Detective Zen testified Echeverria told him that she would lie if she was forced to testify in court. Echeverria, however, said she was afraid to testify because she had lied in her pretrial statements. ZAPATA V. VASQUEZ 31 Second, its observation that the involvement of Zapata’s truck in the shooting was never seriously contested is belied by the record; the state’s witnesses could not agree on the type of vehicle involved in the shooting. Finally, the “directly incriminating” testimony of Sarah Sanchez was subject to attack for both credibility and bias, and the statements made by Echeverria and Lopez were also subject to viable credibility challenges. In addition to the considerations explicitly mentioned by the state court, two additional foundations of the prosecution’s case were weak at best. First, the prosecution argued Zapata’s truck disappeared immediately following the Trigueros murder. There was, however, contradictory evidence about when the truck disappeared. In pretrial statements, Echeverria said the truck was “gone the next day, in the morning,” and Lopez observed that Zapata began driving a black Taurus “right after” the murder and had stashed his truck at the Stockton home of Rico Clarke. At trial, however, Echeverria testified she saw Zapata driving the truck in Gilroy the day after the murder, in the afternoon, and Lopez testified she saw Zapata drive the truck “sometime after” the Trigueros shooting.14 Clarke denied having kept 14 Specifically, when questioned about when she last saw the truck, Lopez had the following exchange with the prosecutor: Q: Now did you ever see that white pickup truck after the shooting at the 7-Eleven on Leavesley in May 2001? A: Yeah, I think he used to drive it afterwards. Q: When? 32 ZAPATA V. VASQUEZ the truck for Zapata, and Detective Zen testified that he did not see the truck at Clarke’s house when he went to investigate in late 2002. In December 2002, Zen found the truck at an apartment complex in nearby Morgan Hill where Priscilla Pena, Zapata’s new girlfriend, was living. In March 2003, Zen seized the truck from Pena’s sister’s house, also located in Morgan Hill. There was also conflicting evidence about why the truck disappeared from Gilroy. Witnesses on both sides testified that Zapata’s truck was a “piece of junk,” in bad condition, and may have broken down. Multiple witnesses also testified A: I – well, sometime after May I guess until he got a black car. Q: Okay. Do you recall telling Dan Zen that as soon as it happened he didn’t drive his truck no more. Do you remember telling Dan Zen that? A: I remember it had broken down on the side of the freeway. . . . Q: You never saw the truck the day after, the month after, six months after, a year after the 7-Eleven shooting, did you? A: What do you mean? Q: You never saw the truck after the shooting? A: After that had happened? Q: After you read it in the paper, correct. A: No, because he had driven it afterwards but it had broken down. And after that – after that the car wasn’t fixable . . . . ZAPATA V. VASQUEZ 33 Zapata moved to Hollister sometime after the shooting and that the truck had been relocated there. Second, the prosecution emphasized the similarity between Zapata’s likeness and the eyewitness descriptions of the shooter. Puphal described the shooter to a police sketch artist shortly after the shooting as a “stocky” Hispanic man with a scraggly but “complete goatee” and beads around his neck, and Zapata had a tattoo on his neck. At trial, however, Puphal failed to positively identify Zapata in a photograph shown at trial, nor was he able to identify Zapata in a pretrial photographic lineup. Shortly after the shooting, in a police statement, Puphal described the shooter as being 5'5,15 whereas Joe Morton, who heard the shots and saw a man fleeing the scene of the crime, testified he was sure the man had been between 5'10 and 6' tall. When asked if there was “[a]ny chance he was five seven,” Morton responded, “No.” Furthermore, Echeverria told Detective Zen during a pretrial interview that the sketch looked “just like” Zapata when he was trying to grow a goatee. During cross- examination, however, she testified Zapata never had a goatee like the one pictured in the sketch and was incapable of growing one: Q: And you told the Court at that time that you told that lie because you didn’t like [Zapata]. Is that the truth? 15 At trial, Puphal initially testified during direct examination that the shooter was between 5'5 and 5'8, but when questioned on crossexamination, Puphal stated that the shooter was “approximately” 5'5. 34 ZAPATA V. VASQUEZ A: That’s the truth. And when I had seen the sketch I figured, you know, if I say that he had a goatee or tried to grow one it was going to make it seem more like, you know, give – well, basically, that he was – it was just going to land on him that he did do it. Q: Well, it would make him look like the guy in the sketch. A: Correct. Similarly, witnesses for both the prosecution and defense testified Zapata could not grow a goatee. Given Puphal’s statement that the gunman “definitely” sported a goatee, this testimony further undercuts the degree to which Zapata matched the eyewitness description of the shooting. In short, as the state court acknowledged, the prosecution’s case was “hampered by weaknesses in the identification evidence.” A careful reading of the record reveals that the case was even weaker than the state court believed it to be, sufficiently so that the court’s conclusion that the jury was not influenced by the prosecutor’s “serious,” unchallenged misconduct was manifestly unreasonable. By contrast, in Darden, the Supreme Court concluded an improper prosecutorial argument was not prejudicial because “[t]he weight of the evidence against petitioner was heavy; the overwhelming eyewitness and circumstantial evidence to support a finding of guilt on all charges reduced the likelihood that the jury’s decision was influenced by argument.” 477 U.S. at 182 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Unlike in that case, here, the likelihood the jury’s decision was influenced by the prosecutor’s egregious ZAPATA V. VASQUEZ 35 and inflammatory closing argument is heightened because the evidence against Zapata was weak, and the eyewitness and circumstantial evidence was far from overwhelming.