Opinion ID: 2363126
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Circuit Court's Exercise of Discretion Here.

Text: The trial judge considered, in his articulated thought processes, the four factors in reaching his determination to deny Respondents a voluntary dismissal without prejudice: This Court notes in the context of this case that the initial complaint was filed in this case on April 14, 2003. There have been several, indeed, three amended scheduling orders, extending the time for certain deadlines. Including discovery, the filing of dispositive motions. And, critically, in the context of this case, to come forward with expert evidence demonstrating causation. The Court notes that scheduling orders are not guidelines. They're not suggestions. They are orders. And the Court endeavored to work with counsel to arrive at scheduling orders that were acceptable to all sides. In the context of this motion, in considering the various factors that the Court has stated, there has been significant effort and expense on all sides in preparing for trial. The vaccine defendants themselves, according to the information that has been provided, have deposed several witnesses. Indeed thirteen witnesses. And there have been many corporate designees produced, which I understand to be nineteen for their various depositions. In addition, defendants have consulted and retained experts, and had an independent medical examination done pursuant to the Maryland rule. So, clearly, notwithstanding plaintiffs' argument, that some of those efforts and expenses were cross designated in this and other cases throughout the country, there has been, in this Court's eyes, significant effort and expense in preparing for trial. In terms of the second factor, excessive delay or lack of diligence on the part of the movant. I will say, as all counsel have stated here, there has been no lack of diligence whatsoever on behalf of [local counsel] in the context of the plaintiffs' efforts in this case. There has been some discussion as to other counsel. But, I believe it's necessary to address that in the context of this motion. The third motion, insufficient explanation of a need for dismissal. There has been the explanation for this dismissal. Whether or not it's sufficient or not, really is dependent on the facts of this case. And, the facts of this case demonstrate that the plaintiffs have conceded that Dr. Bradstreet is, indeed, the sole expert on specific causation. And, without that opinion, they are unable to prosecute their claims. In ordering a third amended scheduling order, last month this Court accepted the affidavit presented to it that Dr. Bradstreet would be able to render an expert opinion by the end of December, based on the affidavit that was presented to me. And, several days after that, Dr. Bradstreet was withdrawn as an expert in this case. Many could note, implicitly or explicitly, the effect of that. But that's the factual circumstances that this case is presented to this Court. There is no other expert noted by the plaintiffs who will replace Dr. Bradstreet's previously anticipated testimony, or that there would be any evidence available by any other expert at this point to go forward in connection with these proceedings. In addition, the Court notes that there are two pending motions for summary judgment. Indeed, a motion for summary judgment filed by the vaccine defendants on the same day that the motion for dismissal of all claims without prejudice was filed by the plaintiffs. There has, as well, been a previous motion for summary motion [sic] filed by Eli Lilly and Company, that the Court denied, at that time, for the sole purpose of allowing additional discovery to go forward before reconsidering that issue. The Court does have to take into consideration in the facts of this case that there are minor plaintiffs involved. And the Court is most empathetic with that issue. Nevertheless, the Court distinguishes this case from a case such as Berrain v. Katzen[,] [331 Md. 693, 629 A.2d 707 (1993)], or Fulton v. K & M Associates[,] [331 Md. 712, 629 A.2d 716(1993)], relied upon by the plaintiffs, where there was either parental, or guardian neglect, or even perhaps the neglect of attorneys. That is not an issue in this case. In that context, the Court does not believe that a minor's motion for voluntary dismissal is, or should be analyzed any differently than any other voluntary dismissal motion. I have considered the cases relied upon by the vaccine defendants. Although admittedly, not all fours with this case, but a guidance to the Court in the context of determining whether good cause exist for the granting of a motion for voluntary dismissal with prejudice. And, under a review of all those factors, including the efforts that the Court has undertaken to allow sufficient time to present these issues to the Court, the Court finds, based on those factors that is would be inappropriate for this Court to grant a motion to dismiss a claim voluntarily without prejudice given the facts of this case. Critical to the Court is the extensive discovery that has been undertaken. The thirteen depositions. The corporate designees that have been noted. The time, effort and expense in briefing the preliminary motions, and gathering discovery, and presenting dispositive motions to the Court, that are relevant to the Court's consideration. As a result, under the fact specific circumstances of this case, this Court denies the plaintiffs' renewed motion for voluntary dismissal of all claims without prejudice for the reasons so stated. Although finding it clear from the transcript of the [21 December 2004] hearing that the circuit court carefully considered each of the [four] factors . . ., and in spite of the deferential standard of review to be accorded the trial court's decision, the Court of Special Appeals nonetheless held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the complaint, without prejudice. Skevofilax, 167 Md.App. at 22, 891 A.2d at 429. Specifically, the Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court made the first factor, [Petitioners'] effort and expense, determinative of its decision when that factor (a) is not compelling under the facts of the instant case, and (b) was the only one that the court found weighed in [Petitioners'] favor. Id. We hold that, in addition to misinterpreting the Circuit Court's consideration of the four factors, the Court of Special Appeals failed to give the trial court's decision the deference it deserved.
The trial court specifically found that significant time and money had been expended by both sides in this litigation. As indicated by Judge Berger, thirty-two total depositions had been taken as of the date of the grant of summary judgment. Of these, thirteen were specific to the Skevofilaxes' claims. [16] Other forms of discovery, including interrogatories, document production, and independent medical evaluations also were conducted in connection with the pending litigation. The Court of Special Appeals observed that some of the depositions were cross-referenced with other thimerosal cases pending elsewhere, and hypothecated that selected depositions pertaining solely to the Skevofilaxes' suit might be reused if their suit were re-filed, with little or no need to update them. Skevofilax, 167 Md.App. at 16, 891 A.2d at 426. It is equally likely, however, that many of the depositions would need to be updated significantly if Respondents filed anew. If Respondents were to re-file the lawsuit significantly later, following a dismissal without prejudice, but within applicable limitations periods, as Petitioners argued, some experts currently identified by the parties no longer may be available to testify. Of additional possible consequence, Michael's condition may change significantly such that entirely new independent medical evaluations would be necessary. The fact remains that the Skevofilaxes' litigation had been pending for nearly twenty months at the time the dispositive motions were filed. Even if some of the depositions could have been recycled in renewed litigation, significant effort and funds already had been expended in defending the causes of action. As Judge Berger noted, there had been significant discovery over and above the depositions, the parties had briefed significant preliminary motions, and had presented numerous dispositive motions before the trial court. That the intermediate appellate court reached a different conclusion on this factor based on the facts before the trial court does not render the Circuit Court's decision an abuse of discretion, as long as a reasonable person could have adopted the view of the trial court. North v. North, 102 Md.App. 1, 14, 648 A.2d 1025, 1031-32 (1994) ([A] ruling reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard will not be reversed simply because the appellate court would not have made the same ruling. The decision under consideration has to be well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing court and beyond the fringe of what the court deems minimally acceptable.). Based on the record before the Circuit Court at the time of its decision, we are unwilling to hold that the trial judge abused his discretion in finding that the expense and effort exerted in preparing for litigation weighed in favor of denying Respondents' request for voluntary dismissal without prejudice.
Contrary to what the Court of Special Appeals suggests, the time and money expended by Petitioners in preparing their defense was not the only factor the trial court considered that weighed against dismissal without prejudice. As to the second factor, excessive delay or lack of diligence on the part of the movant, the intermediate appellate court held that [t]he trial court specifically found that there was no lack of diligence on the part of appellants. This interpretation of the Circuit Court's reasoning is not accurate entirely. It is a well-established principle that `[t]rial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it properly.' State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 179, 825 A.2d 452, 458 (2003) (quoting Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 206, 699 A.2d 1170, 1194 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1082, 118 S.Ct. 866, 139 L.Ed.2d 763 (1998)); see also Medical Mut. Liability Ins. Soc. of Md. v. Evans, 330 Md. 1, 34, 622 A.2d 103, 119 (1993); Wagner v. Wagner, 109 Md.App. 1, 50, 674 A.2d 1, 25 (1996) ([W]e presume judges to know the law and apply it, even in the absence of a verbal indication of having considered it.). It is equally well-settled that there is a strong presumption that judges properly perform their duties, and that trial judges are not obliged to spell out in words every thought and step of logic. Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 273, 619 A.2d 105, 110 (1993); see also Kirsner v. Edelmann, 65 Md.App. 185, 196 n. 9, 499 A.2d 1313, 1319 n. 9 (1985) ([A] judge is presumed to know the law, and thus is not required to set out in intimate detail each and every step of his or her thought process.); Zorich v. Zorich, 63 Md.App. 710, 717, 493 A.2d 1096, 1099 (1985) (Because trial judges are presumed to know the law, not every step in their thought process needs to be explicitly spelled out.); Bangs v. Bangs, 59 Md.App. 350, 370, 475 A.2d 1214, 1224 (1984) (A chancellor is not required to articulate every step in his thought processes.). Thus, [t]he trial judge need not articulate each item or piece of evidence she or he has considered in reaching a decision. . . . The fact that the court did not catalog each factor and all the evidence which related to each factor does not require reversal. John O. v. Jane O., 90 Md.App. 406, 429, 601 A.2d 149, 160 (1992); see also Cobrand v. Adventist Healthcare, Inc., 149 Md.App. 431, 445, 816 A.2d 117, 125 (2003) (holding that when a matter is reserved to the sound discretion of the trial court, a trial judge's failure to state each and every consideration or factor in a particular applicable standard does not, absent more, constitute an abuse of discretion, so long as the record supports a reasonable conclusion that appropriate factors were taken into account in the exercise of discretion.) (internal citations omitted). The trial judge here found that there had been no lack of diligence on the part of Respondents' local Maryland counsel, in representing the Skevofilaxes. The Circuit Court continued, however, that [t]here has been some discussion as to other counsel. While the trial court did not elaborate further as to other counsel, it would be reasonable to infer from discussion and documents in this record that the court was referring to Respondents' national counsel in the thimerosal litigation. It is clear from the transcript that the trial court at least considered the possible delay or lack of diligence attributable to the movant and commented tactfully upon it. We hold, therefore, that the Court of Special Appeals misinterpreted the trial court's consideration of this second factor.
The Court of Special Appeals additionally misinterpreted the Circuit Court's consideration of the third factor, the explanation of the need for dismissal. Judge Berger stated that [t]here has been the explanation for this dismissal. Whether or not it's sufficient . . . really is dependent on the facts of this case. The trial court then reiterated Respondents' explanation that Dr. Bradstreet was their sole expert on specific causation and that they would be unable to pursue the causes of action in the absence of his expert opinion. According to the Court of Special Appeals, however, had the trial court found Dr. Bradstreet's withdrawal pretextual, it should have said so expressly. It therefore interpreted the trial court's articulation to mean that the Respondents' explanation was sufficient, and that it mitigated in favor of the requested dismissal without prejudice. Skevofilax, 167 Md. App. at 18, 891 A.2d at 426. The Circuit Court indeed considered the factual background surrounding Dr. Bradstreet's withdrawal from the case. A careful review of the trial court's decision, however, reveals that the court neither expressly nor impliedly rendered an opinion as to whether this explanation was sufficient to merit dismissal without prejudice. We simply cannot determine from the 21 December 2004 transcript, as the Court of Special Appeals purported to do, whether the trial court weighed this factor in favor of Petitioners or Respondents. Even if the trial court's comments were construed as a determination that Respondents' explanation was sufficient, we hold that it was not an abuse of discretion nevertheless to deny Respondents' motion. Each of the factors need not endorse a particular disposition in order to rule in a certain way. Ohlander, 114 F.3d at 1537 (Each factor need not be resolved in favor of the moving party for dismissal to be appropriate, nor need each factor be resolved in favor of the opposing party for denial of the motion to be proper.) (quoting Phillips U.S.A., Inc., 77 F.3d at 358); see also Kovalic, 855 F.2d at 474 (The enumeration of the factors to be considered . . . is not equivalent to a mandate that each and every factor be resolved in favor of the moving party before dismissal is appropriate. It is rather simply a guide for the trial judge, in whom discretion ultimately rests.) (quoting Tyco Laboratories, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 627 F.2d 54, 56 (7th Cir.1980)). That a party provides an adequate explanation for the need to dismiss without prejudice does not compel the trial judge to grant the motion.
The fourth factor counsels a trial judge to consider the current pleading status of the litigation, i.e., whether there were any motions for summary judgment pending at the time the motion for dismissal without prejudice is filed. This factor is premised, at least in part, on the principle that a plaintiff confronting the potential for an adverse disposition of his, her, or its case may not dismiss unilaterally the case in order to file again in the future at a time when the conditions may be more favorable. See, e.g., Phillips U.S.A., Inc., 77 F.3d at 358 ([A] party should not be permitted to avoid an adverse decision on a dispositive motion by dismissing a claim without prejudice.); Grover, 33 F.3d at 719 (At the point when the law clearly dictates a result for the defendant, it is unfair to subject him to continued exposure to potential liability by dismissing the case without prejudice.); Pace, 409 F.2d at 334 (affirming the denial of a motion to dismiss without prejudice on the ground that the plaintiffs were using the motion as a tactic to prevent summary judgment in favor of the defendants); see also MARYLAND RULES COMMENTARY 351 (explaining that the purpose of the present Maryland Rule 2-506 was to avoid a plaintiff's abuse of the right to unilateral voluntary dismissal at any time before the trial itself commenced). [17] Judge Berger noted that [i]ndeed, a motion for summary judgment filed by [Petitioners] on the same day that the motion for dismissal of all claims without prejudice was filed by the [Respondents]. There has, as well, been a previous motion for summary motion [sic] filed by Eli Lilly and Company, that the Court denied, at that time, for the sole purpose of allowing additional discovery to go forward before reconsidering that issue. The Court of Special Appeals, however, held that the Respondents' motion for dismissal without prejudice was motivated solely by the withdrawal of Dr. Bradstreet, rather than an attempt to prevent an adverse disposition of the litigation by way of Petitioners' motions for summary judgment. Skevofilax, 167 Md.App. at 20, 891 A.2d at 427-28. The Court of Special Appeals reasoned that [a]lthough the trial court did not make any determination as to whether this factor favored [Respondents] or [Petitioners], the only conclusion supported by the record in this case is that this factor favors the granting of [Respondents'] motion to dismiss without prejudice. Skevofilax, 167 Md.App. at 20, 891 A.2d at 428. The intermediate appellate court misstates the Circuit Court's reasoning. Petitioners' 1 December 2004 motion for summary judgment was filed the same day as Respondents' renewed motion for voluntary dismissal. It is not clear from the record, based on the time each motion was filed, whether a reasonable inference could be drawn either that Respondents' Rule 2-506(b) motion was in response to the Vaccine Defendants' motion for summary judgment, or simply the result of Dr. Bradstreet's withdrawal. We are inclined to agree with Petitioners, however, that it was not a race to file at that point. It is clear that Respondents legally were unable to maintain successfully their claims against Petitioners in the absence of an expert opinion on specific causation, nor did they have any basis to oppose summary judgment without such an expert. Counsel for Respondents quite properly conceded as much at the 21 December 2004 hearing before the trial court. Even if the motion to dismiss without prejudice was not in direct response to the prospect of an adverse disposition of the case in favor of Petitioners, Respondents should have foreseen that, without an expert as to specific causation, Vaccine Defendants would seek summary judgment. According to Petitioners, they were ready to file their dispositive motions at the completion of Dr. Bradstreet's deposition regardless of the outcome of the awaited genomic susceptibility tests. [18] If motions for summary judgment were not pending formally at the time of Respondents' Rule 2-506(b) motion, Respondents hardly could have been uncognizant of the likelihood that renewed motions for summary judgment would be forthcoming, following Dr. Bradstreet's withdrawal, considering especially that Petitioners had filed dispositive motions at virtually each earlier critical juncture of the litigation. Of greatest significant to the Circuit Court, apparently, was Eli Lilly and Company's initial motion for summary judgment as to the fraud counts, although that motion was not renewed formally until 3 December 2004, 2 days after Respondents' renewed motion for voluntary dismissal was filed. The initial motion was denied in May 2004 expressly in order to allow the parties to conduct discovery. Considering that the time for designating experts had passed, and that the bulk of fact discovery had been conducted, it likely was apparent to Respondents that Eli Lilly's motion for summary judgment would be renewed subsequent to Dr. Bradstreet's withdrawal. A reasonable trial judge, given the status of the pending litigation at the time of the relevant hearing, could conclude that the fourth factor weighed in favor of Petitioners.
A primary thrust of the Court of Special Appeals's opinion was that [t]he particular circumstances of the case sub judice present an additional factor that the trial court must consider in deciding a motion to dismiss without prejudice under Maryland Rule 2-506(b)  Michael's status as a minor. Skevofilax, 167 Md.App. at 20, 891 A.2d at 428. Federal courts interpreting FRCP 41(a)(2) have held that a trial court should consider the equities not only facing the non-moving party, but also those equities in favor of the movant. Ohlander, 114 F.3d at 1537; see also WRIGHT AND MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2364. Additionally, the four factors previously addressed are not exclusive, and any other relevant factors should be considered. Ohlander, 114 F.3d at 1537 (citing Phillips U.S.A., Inc., 77 F.3d at 358 (10th Cir.1996)). The intermediate appellate court observed that Maryland courts traditionally have been solicitous of the legal rights of minors when a next friend or guardian sues on their behalf for personal injuries or other similar causes of action. In affixing this special duty to protect the interests of minors in litigation, the two lower courts here looked primarily to two cases where this Court reversed trial court decisions denying plaintiffs' motions for voluntary dismissal without prejudice where the minor plaintiffs' next friends failed to pursue diligently the claims: Fulton v. K & M Associates, 331 Md. 712, 629 A.2d 716 (1993) and Berrain v. Katzen, 331 Md. 693, 629 A.2d 707 (1993). [19] According to the Court of Special Appeals, the trial court failed to give any consideration to the additional factor `unique to the context of the [the] case.' Skevofilax, 167 Md.App. at 23, 891 A.2d at 429 (quoting Ohlander, 114 F.3d at 1537). This failure, furthermore, was found to constitute an abuse of discretion because the trial court failed to exercise its discretion in accordance with correct legal standards. Skevofilax, 167 Md.App. at 23, 891 A.2d at 429. We concede that, where the record so reveals, a failure to consider the proper legal standard in reaching a decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. Ehrlich v. Perez, 394 Md. 691, 908 A.2d 1220 (2006) (No. 137, Sept. Term 2005) (filed 12 October 2006), slip op. at 14 (`[E]ven with respect to a discretionary matter, a trial court must exercise its discretion in accordance with correct legal standards.') (quoting LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 381 Md. 288, 301, 849 A.2d 451, 459 (2004)); Alston v. Alston, 331 Md. 496, 504, 629 A.2d 70, 74 (1993); see also Ohlander, 114 F.3d at 1537 (A clear example of an abuse of discretion exists where the trial court fails to consider the applicable legal standard or the facts upon which the exercise of is discretionary judgment is based.); McNickle v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 888 F.2d 678, 680 (10th Cir.1989). Because this Court concludes that the cases relied on by Respondents and the Court of Special Appeals do not compel here the grant of dismissal without prejudice, we determine that the Circuit Court properly considered the legal standards regarding protection of the legal rights of minors. The issue in Fulton v. K & M Associates was whether a circuit court abused its discretion in denying a minor plaintiff's motion to dismiss without prejudice when the plaintiff lacked necessary medical evidence due to a lack of cooperation on the part of the next friend in taking the minor plaintiff to be tested. 331 Md. at 713, 714, 629 A.2d at 717. In a complaint, filed through his next friend and mother, against several property owners, the minor plaintiff alleged that he suffered chronic lead poisoning during infancy after ingesting deteriorated lead paint in various rental dwellings in Baltimore City. Fulton, 331 Md. at 714, 629 A.2d at 717. According to plaintiff's counsel, testing was necessary for medical experts to conclude whether exposure to lead was the cause of plaintiff's permanent brain injury. Id. Because the plaintiff's next friend did not cooperate with efforts to conduct medical tests on the minor, medical evidence to support their claims could not be developed. Id. His counsel, therefore, pursued voluntary dismissal without prejudice, under Maryland Rule 2-506(b), in order to preserve the minor's cause of action. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff filed a timely appeal with the Court of Special Appeals. Before the intermediate appellate court considered the case, we issued a writ of certiorari on our initiative. 329 Md. 479, 620 A.2d 349 (1993). In reversing the trial court's decision, we held that the trial court owes a duty to infants represented by a next friend, to insure that the next friend does not prejudice the rights and interests of the minor though conflict of interest, fraud, or neglect. Fulton, 331 Md. at 715, 629 A.2d at 719. We concluded that [i]n light of the apparent neglect of the next friend in prosecuting the claim of the infant plaintiff the trial court should have intervened on behalf of the minor and permitted dismissal of the claim without prejudice. Id. In Berrain v. Katzen , [20] the issue was whether it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to enter default judgment against a minor plaintiff when the next friend and mother failed to comply with the defendants' reasonable requests for discovery. In Berrain, three siblings suffered permanent brain damage after allegedly ingesting lead paint flakes or chips while living with their mother in dwellings owned by the defendants. 331 Md. at 695, 629 A.2d at 707. Defense counsel propounded interrogatories to the plaintiffs on 2 December 1991. Berrain, 331 Md. at 696, 629 A.2d at 708. After waiting seven months for a response, the defendants moved for sanctions pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-432(a), which caused the circuit court to grant a default order. Berrain, 331 Md. at 696-97, 629 A.2d at 708. The plaintiffs noted an appeal to the intermediate appellate court, and we again issued a writ of certiorari on our initiative. 329 Md. 337, 619 A.2d 547 (1993). After exploring the roots of the next friend's functions in ancient English statutory and common law, we reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that it was an abuse of discretion to enter default judgment in favor of the defendants. We held that the trial court has a special duty to protect the rights and interests of the minor plaintiff who is represented by [a] next friend to insure that the next friend does not prejudice those rights and interests through conflict of interest, fraud, or, in this case, neglect. Berrain, 331 Md. at 706, 629 A.2d at 715-16. We find nothing in Fulton or Berrain to support reversal of the Circuit Court's decision here. There was no conflict of interest, fraud, or neglect on the part of minor's next friend. Judge Berger, in rendering his opinion from the bench, clearly took into consideration Michael Skevofilax's minority status. [21] Also clear from the trial judge's oral opinion is that, outside of some delaying tactics employed by national counsel alluded to briefly by the trial court, there was no neglect on the part of either Michael's next friend or his attorneys. Judge Berger specifically held that I will say, as all counsel have stated here, there has been no lack of diligence whatsoever on behalf of [plaintiffs' counsel] in the context of plaintiffs' efforts in this case. Nor is there any evidence that either counsel or the next friends engaged in the conflicts of interest or fraud against which we cautioned in Fulton and Berrain. We find that, absent conflict of interest, fraud, or neglect by a parent, guardian, next friend, or the minor's attorney, a motion for voluntary dismissal made on behalf of a minor should not be analyzed differently than a motion for dismissal without prejudice filed by any plaintiff. In the circumstances of the present case, it was not an abuse of discretion for the Circuit Court to treat the Rule 2-506(b) motion as it would any other motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice.