Opinion ID: 461012
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: lukens other contentions

Text: 120 In addition to the matters which have been discussed above, Lukens has raised other claims of error. It contends that the trial judge erred by impermissibly shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. We find no merit to this argument. In the introduction to his opinion, the trial judge reviewed the leading cases of Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). He stated clearly that the burden of proof was on plaintiffs. We are not persuaded that the casual references in the opinion to which Lukens points should be interpreted as contradicting the earlier unambiguous allocation of the burden of proof. 121 The court's opinion similarly displayed a thorough understanding of the difference between disparate impact and disparate treatment cases and of the relevant evidence under each theory. The defendant takes exception to the district judge's comment that 122 One must be careful not to over-categorize in this context. The analytical distinctions ... are of only limited utility. The ultimate questions to be answered are essentially the same in all employment discrimination cases: Has the defendant caused a given employee or group of employees to be discriminated against? ... Is the action or conduct complained of justifiable ...? 123 580 F.Supp. at 1121. 124 We find no fault with these observations. In Dillon v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998 (3d Cir.1984), we similarly commented on excessive preoccupation with the various formulae used in an employment discrimination case and observed that they are simply tools designed to aid in the analysis of evidence. The ultimate question remains whether the defendant has discriminated. The presumptions and shifting burdens are merely an aid--not ends in themselves. When direct evidence is available, problems of proof are no different than in other civil cases. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 613, 622, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978). If judges lose sight of the ultimate question, the analysis intended to aid in the process will instead have become a hinderance. 125 Lukens also argues that the district court misapplied evidence by failing to recognize that a statistical variation in itself does not establish discrimination unless the record also shows the requisite availability of positions and the qualification of the claimants. We do not so read the district court's opinion. In considering the statistical data presented as part of the plaintiffs' case, the court demonstrated its recognition of the limits of such evidence and the caution with which it must be viewed. The court noted that to prevail the class was required to prove that disparate treatment exists and is the defendant's regular and standard operating procedure. 580 F.Supp. at 1120. In another part of the opinion, the court made clear that it had considered Lukens' attempts to show that [the plaintiffs'] comparisons are faulty because of factual dissimilarities. Id. 126 We repeat once again that the clearly erroneous rule applies to our review of factual findings, including those based in part on statistical data. Statistical proof in Title VII cases must be evaluated in light of the surrounding facts and circumstances. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1857, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 338, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 2731, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977), Justice Rehnquist in his concurring opinion wrote, [i]t is for the District Court, in the first instance, to determine whether these statistics appear sufficiently probative of the ultimate fact in issue.... In making this determination, such statistics are to be considered in light of all other relevant facts and circumstances. See also Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 215 (4th Cir.1984). 127 We have reviewed Lukens' remaining contentions using this standard. We cannot say that the findings made by the district court are clearly erroneous, nor do we find error in the legal guidelines used by the court in reaching these remaining findings. Therefore, the judgment of the district court with respect to the instances of discrimination not previously discussed will be affirmed.