Opinion ID: 2776907
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Third Lee Factor

Text: The third Lee factor calls for consideration of “the impact of [the] particular sanction on the proper administration of justice in general[.]” Lee, 385 A.2d at 163. The judge gave this factor explicit consideration when he weighed the sanction of striking the testimony against the alternative of granting a mistrial. In brief, the judge rejected a mistrial for sound reasons relating to administration of justice concerns — while mistrials are sometimes necessary, they are disfavored precisely because of their adverse consequences for the administration of justice — and he selected a meaningful sanction calculated not only to remedy the prejudice 31 to appellant but also to dissuade the government from surprising the defense at trial with evidence it wrongfully failed to disclose in discovery. Appellant argues that the judge improperly considered the government’s ability to “prove its case” when the government had created the problem by its deliberate failure to disclose Freese’s expected testimony. In addition, appellant agrees that the judge failed to consider the “bad incentives” that failing to grant a mistrial would create for prosecutors in future cases. We do not agree. The judge recognized that the “witnesses to this case are reluctant at best to be here,” a comment in part reflective of the fact that it was necessary for the court to issue a bench warrant to secure Rowe’s presence at trial and that Stover was such a reluctant witness that her initial testimony on direct had to be contradicted by the prosecutor’s reading of her testimony before the grand jury.17 Thus, if, as appellant asserts, the judge was required to make a “particularized finding that granting a mistrial would pose some undue detriment to this proceeding,” he had the basis for, and his comment conveyed, such a finding. In explaining why a 17 The judge also had heard the government’s pretrial proffer that Stover had been approached by individuals (appellant’s mother and another individual who was listed as a possible defense witness) who told her that “the only reason why she [was] still alive” was because of appellant’s mother. 32 mistrial is “a step to be avoided whenever possible,” this court has emphasized the “substantial social costs” a mistrial entails, including, inter alia, that the “dispersion of witnesses may render retrial difficult, even impossible,” such that “while reversal may, in theory, entitle the defendant only to retrial, in practice it may reward the accused with complete freedom from prosecution[.]” Salmon v. United States, 719 A.2d 949, 956 (D.C. 1997) (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72 (1986)) (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). While “[t]he price of a retrial is one that society must be prepared to pay if the defendant’s initial trial was unfair[,]” id., it was not inappropriate for the trial judge to consider those potential costs in determining which sanction to choose, so long as the judge was satisfied that appellant had been afforded “a fair opportunity to meet” the government’s evidence. Whether the defense’s requested sanction would “hinder[] the administration of justice” was an appropriate consideration. Wiggins 521 A.2d at 1149. Finally, appellant’s argument about “bad incentives” overlooks that exclusion of Freese’s testimony was itself an “extreme sanction.” United States v. Rodriguez, 765 F.2d 1546, 1557 (11th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[H]aving the testimony stricken from the record . . . is the most severe remedy a court can impose short of declaring a mistrial.” United States v. Thai, 29 33 F.3d 785, 806 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sowell v. Walker, 755 A.2d 438, 447 (D.C. 2000) (agreeing that “striking testimony can be a severe remedy”).