Opinion ID: 1703304
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Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Powell and the Certified Question

Text: When addressing the issue of whether the Crockers' right to possess their son's body for burial should be afforded constitutional protection, the Fourth District relied upon Powell to conclude that the right of the next of kin to possess the body for burial was not a `protectable liberty or property interest in the remains' of the decedent. Crocker, 727 So.2d at 1088 (quoting Powell, 497 So.2d at 1193). Accordingly, the issue presented by the certified question is whether that statement in Powell was limited to the issue of the constitutionality of the corneal removal statute or whether our reasoning in Powell precludes finding that the Crockers possessed a protectable property interest in the remains of their son so as to bar any section 1983 action arising from an alleged deprivation of procedural due process. In Powell, the parents brought an action against various state officials alleging the wrongful removal of their deceased sons' corneas without the parents' notice or consent. 497 So.2d at 1189-90. Notably, the parents did not challenge the State's right to conduct the autopsy without their consent; instead, they challenged the constitutionality of section 732.9185, Florida Statutes (1983), which authorized medical examiners to remove corneal tissue from decedents during statutorily required autopsies when a patient is in need of corneal tissue for a transplant. § 732.9185(1), Fla. Stat. (1983). In our opinion in Powell, this Court began by explaining the legitimate state interest in obtaining suitable corneal tissue that can restore sight to the functionally blind, which is especially important for the elderly and newborns. 497 So.2d at 1190-91. The Court also noted that the record reflected that the key to successful corneal transplantation is the availability of high-quality corneal tissue that must be obtained shortly after death. See id. at 1191. Significantly, the Court observed that although an autopsy necessarily results in a massive intrusion into the decedent[,] ... cornea removal, by comparison, requires an infinitesimally small intrusion which does not affect the decedent's appearance. With or without cornea removal, the decedent's eyes must be capped to maintain a normal appearance. Id. Thus, this Court held that the statute authorizing the removal of the corneal tissue achieves the permissible legislative objective of providing sight to many of Florida's blind citizens. Id. In reaching this conclusion in Powell, the Court analyzed the question of protected constitutional rights and stated that a person's constitutional rights terminate at death. If any rights exist, they belong to the decedent's next of kin. Id. at 1190 (citations omitted). The Court then rejected the parents' claim that the right to control the disposition of their decedents' remains is a fundamental right of personal liberty protected against unreasonable governmental intrusion by the Due Process Clause, concluding that [n]either federal nor state privacy provisions protect an individual from every governmental intrusion into one's private life, especially when a statute addresses public health issues. Id. at 1193 (citation omitted). Despite broad language used in the Powell opinion, our holding in that case was limited to an analysis of the constitutionality of the cornea removal statute that addressed a public health issue. In fact, in that case we balanced the State's interest in obtaining suitable corneal tissue against the infinitesimally small intrusion incident to the corneal tissue removal. Id. at 1191. As Justice Shaw pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Powell, the only issue before the Court in that case was the constitutionality of the statute authorizing medical examiners to remove corneal tissue from decedents. Id. at 1194 (Shaw, J. dissenting). Although the Powell petitioners included a section 1983 claim in their complaint, the issue of the viability of that claim was not before the Court. More importantly, the Court could have upheld the constitutionality of the statute without any consideration of the section 1983 action because the Court found that in light of the massive intrusion that necessarily followed from the autopsy, the infinitesimally small intrusion which does not affect the decedent's appearance did not amount to a violation of the right of the next of kin to possess the decedent's remains for purposes of burial. Id. at 1191. Any potential right of the next of kin was based upon their need to celebrate the life of the deceased through appropriate commemoration, and that potential right was qualified by the overriding police power of the state to regulate the care and disposition of dead bodies. Id. at 1196 (Shaw, J. dissenting). Our rejection in Powell of a constitutional attack on a narrowly drawn statute regulating the disposition of the corneas of a deceased person does not necessarily translate into the broader conclusion that the right to possess a loved one's remains for the purposes of burial should never be accorded protected status under the Fourteenth Amendment, whether labeled a quasi-property right or a legitimate claim of entitlement. Although we rejected the petitioners' constitutional claims in Powell, we explained that Florida recognizes a limited right to possession of the body for burial, sepulture or other lawful disposition. Id. at 1191. This conclusion is consistent with the approach of other courts that have found that this right constitutes a legitimate claim of entitlement or a quasi-property interest. In Lawyer v. Kernodle, 721 F.2d 632 (8th Cir.1983), one of the cases cited in Powell, for example, the Eighth Circuit rejected a claim based on section 1983 that arose from allegations of a negligent diagnosis of the cause of death. [8] Although finding that the allegations of the complaint did not give rise to a duty, the Eighth Circuit nevertheless recognized the parameters of the underlying right: In the sense in which the word property ordinarily is used, one whose duty it becomes to bury a deceased person has no right of ownership over the corpse; but, in the broader meaning of the term, he has what has been called a quasi property right which entitles him to the possession and control of the body for the single purpose of decent burial. If the deceased person leave [sic] a widow, such right belongs to her .... 721 F.2d at 634 (emphasis added). Two months later, the Eighth Circuit in Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1984), considered a section 1983 claim based on allegations that the coroner failed to return to the plaintiff all of the body organs of the plaintiff's dead husband following an autopsy. In explaining the dimensions of the right, the Eighth Circuit relied on the applicable Arkansas state law: Under Arkansas law, the next of kin does have a quasi-property right in a dead body. See Teasley v. Thompson, 204 Ark. 959, 165 S.W.2d 940, 942 (1942). Mrs. Fuller received the body in what appeared to be acceptable condition. We know of no Arkansas cases which extend this quasi-property right to all of the body's organs, and in any event we note that under Arkansas law Mrs. Fuller could have taken possession of her husband's organs if she had made a written request. 724 F.2d at 719 (emphasis added). [9] Likewise, in Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304 (5th Cir.1989), the Fifth Circuit examined a section 1983 claim arising from allegations that before performing the mandatory autopsy, the medical examiner had performed unauthorized experiments on two infants who had died from Sudden Infant Death Syndrome. The threshold issue in the case was whether the parents of the infants had been deprived of a constitutional property or liberty interest in the bodies of their children within the context of section 1983. See id. at 307. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit considered the relevant Louisiana statutory and case law regarding the rights of next of kin in the body of a deceased relative and concluded that Louisiana statutory and case law created a quasi-property right for survivors in the remains of their dead relative. Id. at 308. In particular, the Fifth Circuit relied on a Louisiana statute providing the order of priority of those who had the right to control the disposition of the remains of a deceased person and Louisiana case law recognizing the right of relatives to possess the body of the deceased for burial. See id. Similarly, Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir.1991), involved a section 1983 action regarding the potential property interest in a deceased's remains. The court in Brotherton noted that a majority of the courts confronted with the issue of whether a property interest can exist in a dead body have found that a property right of some kind does exist and often refer to it as a `quasi-property right.' Id. at 480. In finding that the next of kin had a constitutionally protected interest in her relative's corneas that rose to the level of a legitimate claim of entitlement, the Sixth Circuit relied on Ohio statutes, including Ohio's version of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, that granted the next of kin the right to control the disposal of the body. Id. at 482. The Sixth Circuit also relied on Ohio case law that: (1) acknowledged that the next of kin have the right to possess the body for burial; and (2) allowed a claim by the next of kin against those who disturb a buried dead body. See id. at 480-82. Four years after Brotherton, the Sixth Circuit reached the same conclusion in a case arising under Michigan law. See Whaley v. County of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111 (6th Cir.1995). As in Brotherton, in finding a legitimate claim of entitlement, the Sixth Circuit relied upon Michigan case law that the next of kin have a right to possess the body for burial and prevent its mutilation, and the court also relied upon Michigan's Anatomical Gift Act. See Whaley, 58 F.3d at 1115-16. Similar to the statutes and case law in the cases that have found a constitutionally protected right (either referred to as a legitimate claim of entitlement or a quasi-property right), Florida law also contains a number of indicia, both in its statutes and case law, that recognize the rights of the next of kin in their dead relatives' remains. For example, pursuant to section 245.07, Florida Statutes (2000), a county may not bury or cremate any body received by the anatomical board without making a reasonable effort to contact any relatives of the deceased person [and i]f a relative of the deceased person is contacted and expresses a preference for either burial or cremation, the county shall make a reasonable effort to accommodate the request of the relative. § 245.07. Likewise, section 732.912(3), Florida Statutes (2000), authorizes the donation of a decedent's body or organs by the next of kin in a prescribed order of priority, and section 732.912(4), recognizes the right of the next of kin to object to the removal or donation of organs. Further, section 732.9185(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2000), provides for the right of the next of kin to object to the donation of corneal tissue. [10] In addition to these statutory provisions, Florida case law has long recognized the right to possess a loved one's remains for purposes of burial or other appropriate disposition: It is well settled that, in the absence of testamentary disposition to the contrary, a surviving spouse or next of kin has the right to the possession of the body of a deceased person for the purpose of burial, sepulture or other lawful disposition which they may see fit. And the invasion of such right by unlawfully withholding the body from the relative entitled thereto is an actionable wrong, for which substantial damages may be recovered. Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So.2d 188, 189 (Fla.1950) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In recognizing the exception to the impact rule, this Court observed that this rule would not be extended to cases: where the wrongful act is such as to reasonably imply malice, or where, from the entire want of care of attention to duty, or great indifference to the persons, property, rights of others, such malice will be imputed as would justify the assessment of exemplary or punitive damages. The right to recover, in such cases, is especially appropriate to tortious interference with rights involving dead human bodies, where mental anguish to the surviving relative is not only the natural and probable consequence of the character of wrong committed, but indeed is frequently the only injurious consequence to follow from it. Id. at 189. (emphasis supplied). Thus, Florida cases have recognized causes of action based upon interference with a dead relative's body in a variety of circumstances where the underlying conduct alleged rises to the level of intentional misconduct or malice. See, e.g., Kirker v. Orange County, 519 So.2d 682, 684 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (right of action for mutilation of dead body based on right of next of kin to bury body in an unmutilated condition); Smith v. Telophase Nat'l Cremation Soc'y, Inc., 471 So.2d 163, 165 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (intentional infliction of mental distress for failure to properly dispose of decedent's ashes); Sherer v. Rubin Mem'l Chapel, Ltd., 452 So.2d 574, 575 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (holding that relatives of deceased alleged facts sufficient to impute malice in mishandling of corpse); Scheuer v. Wille, 385 So.2d 1076, 1078 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (claim of intentional infliction of emotion distress for unauthorized embalming precluded entry of summary judgment for funeral home). Based upon these statutory rights of the next of kin in their dead relatives' bodies, along with the case law on this issue, we conclude that in Florida there is a legitimate claim of entitlement by the next of kin to possession of the remains of a decedent for burial or other lawful disposition. We also find that referring to the interest as a legitimate claim of entitlement most accurately describes the nature of the interest. Accordingly, Powell does not preclude all section 1983 claims grounded on interference with an interest in a dead body, Crocker, 727 So.2d at 1089, and therefore we answer the certified question in the negative.