Opinion ID: 785417
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The BIA's May 7, 2002 CAT Decision

Text: 28 The Senate voted to ratify the CAT in 1990, subject to a number of conditions, see 136 Cong. Rec. 36,198 (1990), and in 1998 Congress directed the Attorney General to implement Article 3 of the CAT subject to any reservations, understandings, declarations, and provisos contained in the ... Senate resolution of ratification. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub.L. 105-277, Div. G, Title XXII, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681-822, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note (2000). 29 Article 3 of the CAT expressly prohibits the United States from returning any person to a country in which it is more likely than not that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. (While the CAT uses the phrase substantial grounds for believing rather than more likely than not, the Senate voted to ratify the CAT with the understanding that the more likely than not standard would be used, see 136 Cong. Rec. 36,198 (1990), and that standard is not disputed here.) As is pertinent to this case, the CAT defines torture as 30 any act by which severe pain or suffering... is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him ... information or a confession... when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 31 Art. 1. It is this definition that lies at the heart of Khouzam's second petition for review. 32 On January 14, 2000, after three days of hearings, an immigration judge determined that it is more likely than not that Khouzam will be tortured if he returns to Egypt. The judge discounted large portions of Khouzam's testimony as not credible, but relied heavily on portions of the testimony by one of Khouzam's witnesses, whom the parties agreed was an expert on the judicial and penal system of Egypt. This witness testified with certainty that if petitioner were to return to Egypt, he would immediately be taken to a police station and tortured or otherwise abused before being allowed to secure an attorney. The judge also relied on the State Department Country Reports on Egypt that corroborated this testimony. The judge found 33 Taken together, the evidence is overwhelming that [Khouzam] will more likely than not be subjected to torture by a responsible Egyptian government official who will breach his duty and engage in the torture of [Khouzam], or at the least, will abdicate such duty by acquiescing in such torture as defined under the regulations implementing the Torture Convention. 34 On July 24, 2000 the BIA affirmed this decision. The BIA found that even in actions unrelated to terrorist investigations, the local Egyptian police have routinely tortured, abused, and killed suspected criminals to extract confessions. It concluded 35 In light of the evidence that the Egyptian authorities routinely torture and abuse suspected criminals and the medical evidence indicating that [Khouzam] has scars and injuries which are consistent with past torture, ... we agree with the Immigration Judge that [Khouzam] has established that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured if returned to Egypt. 36 Almost two years later, on May 7, 2002, the BIA changed its mind based on what it perceived as a change in the law. Without making any new findings of fact, the BIA decided that the acts to which Khouzam will more likely than not be subjected in Egypt do not constitute torture. Although the BIA's reasoning is not entirely clear, we understand it to be saying two things. 37 First, citing Matter of J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291 (BIA 2002), the BIA reasons that because Khouzam is essentially fleeing from prosecution for a crime, [h]is detention and any acts perpetrated against him would ... arise from a lawful sanction and therefore not constitute torture. If the BIA actually means this literally, it is patently erroneous. It would totally eviscerate the CAT to hold that once someone is accused of a crime it is a legal impossibility for any abuse inflicted on that person to constitute torture. Although the CAT excludes from its definition pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions, it also lists pain or suffering inflicted for the purpose of obtaining a confession as an example of torture. When the Senate considered the CAT, its concern over the CAT's reference to lawful sanctions led it to qualify its ratification with the understanding that a state could not through its domestic sanctions defeat the object and purpose of the Convention to prohibit torture. 136 Cong. Rec. 36,198 (1990). In directing the Attorney General to implement the CAT subject to the Senate's understandings, it was Congress' aim for the CAT's protections to extend to situations where the victim has been accused of a crime. 38 To the extent that the BIA's decision relies therefore on J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, its reliance is misplaced. If J-E actually stood for this proposition, we would have to disapprove of it in light of Congress' clearly expressed contrary purpose. Moreover, in J-E-, the BIA itself acknowledged that acts inflicted against accused criminals can constitute torture. 23 I. & N. Dec. at 302-04. It found that there are isolated instances of mistreatment in Haitian prisons that rise to the level of torture, id. at 302, but that the respondent in that case had simply failed to produce sufficient evidence to show that he would more likely than not be subjected to such mistreatment. Id. at 304. The BIA stated, for example, that the respondent had failed to show that the torture was pervasive and widespread. Id. Since, in Khouzam's case, the BIA has already found that Egyptian police routinely torture and abuse suspected criminals, we fail to see how J-E- would lead the BIA to change its mind regarding Khouzam's eligibility for CAT relief. 39 The BIA's second line of reasoning is based on Matter of Y-L-, A-G-, R-S-R-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 285, 2002 WL 358818 (A.G.2002). In that case, as the BIA stresses, the Attorney General emphasized that acts ... must occur with the consent or approval of authoritative government officials acting in an official capacity in order to constitute torture. The BIA implies that this requirement is not met with respect to the acts likely to be inflicted on Khouzam. Since the BIA had previously found in 2000 that the evidence pointed toward acts inflicted by local police or, more generally, the Egyptian authorities, the BIA must have concluded in 2002 that these authorities would not necessarily be acting in their official capacities when carrying out the acts. Although it is hard to square this conclusion with the BIA's finding that the purpose of those acts was to extract confessions, the more fundamental problem with the government's reasoning is the notion that torture requires the consent or approval of government officials acting in official capacities. 40 The Ninth Circuit recently addressed this issue in Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir.2003). In holding that torture does not require that acts be willfully accept[ed] by government officials, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress had spoken clearly on this subject. See id. at 1194. We are similarly persuaded. We start with the language of the CAT itself, and the Senate understandings subject to which Congress directed that the CAT be implemented. The CAT itself requires that torture be inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. President Reagan signed the Convention in 1988, and then transmitted it to the Senate for advice and consent, along with 17 proposed conditions. See S. Exec. Rep. 101-30, at 7 (1990). One of these conditions was an understanding that acquiescence meant that the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have knowledge of such activity and thereafter breach his legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity. Id. at 15. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, however, found that these conditions created the impression that the United States was not serious in its commitment to end torture worldwide. Id. at 4. 41 This problem was addressed two years later, when the first Bush administration submitted a revised and reduced list of proposed conditions. See id. In the revised list, the understanding on the definition of acquiescence now merely required the official to have awareness of the activity constituting torture. See id. at 9. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported that this change was intended to make it clear that both actual knowledge and `willful blindness' fall within the definition of the term `acquiescence.' Id. The Committee recommended ratification subject to the revised understandings, and the Senate voted in favor of this on October 27, 1990. See 136 Cong. Rec. 36,198 (1990). 42 From all of this we discern a clear expression of Congressional purpose. In terms of state action, torture requires only that government officials know of or remain willfully blind to an act and thereafter breach their legal responsibility to prevent it. Although the determinative sources here are the language of the CAT itself and the Senate's understandings, we note that the CAT's drafting history also supports our conclusion. In fact, the consent or approval requirement would have been more consistent with the text first proposed by Sweden in 1979, and it was the United States that proposed broadening this text to include acquiescence. See J. Herman Burgers & Hans Danelius, The United Nations Convention Against Torture 41-42 (1988). The BIA and the Attorney General have erred in adding a requirement of official consent or approval. We therefore expressly disapprove of Matter of Y-L-, A-G-, R-S-R-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 2002 WL 358818 (A.G.2002), insofar as it takes a contrary position. 43 Under a correct interpretation of the law, there would have been no basis for the BIA to vacate its July 24, 2000 decision. The fact that Khouzam has been accused of a crime does not in itself render any acts inflicted against him incapable of constituting torture. Further, the BIA's July 24, 2000 finding that the Egyptian police have routinely tortured, abused, and killed suspected criminals to extract confessions is completely at odds with the BIA's conclusion that the state action requirement has not been met. 44 Applying the correct legal standard to the BIA's findings de novo, we conclude, as the BIA itself previously did, that Khouzam will more likely than not be tortured if he is deported to Egypt. To the extent that the Egyptian police are acting in their official capacities — as is strongly suggested by the fact that their goal is to extract confessions — then the acts are carried out by ... a public official ... acting in an official capacity. CAT, Art. 3. To the extent that these police are acting in their purely private capacities, then the routine nature of the torture and its connection to the criminal justice system supply ample evidence that higher-level officials either know of the torture or remain willfully blind to the torture and breach their legal responsibility to prevent it. As two of the CAT's drafters have noted, when it is a public official who inflicts severe pain or suffering, it is only in exceptional cases that we can expect to be able to conclude that the acts do not constitute torture by reason of the official acting for purely private reasons. Burgers & Danelius, supra, at 119. 45 Because we hold that the BIA erred in deciding to vacate its July 24, 2000 decision, we need not reach or rule upon the question of whether the BIA abused its discretion in deciding to reconsider that decision.