Opinion ID: 2623270
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instructions Regarding Specific Unanimity

Text: In his application, Rapoza asserts that, with respect to counts 2, 3, and 4, [t]he fact that [he] raised the defenses of self-defense and lack of intentional or knowing state of mind did not `cure' the Arceo defect in the present case. Indeed, the ICA itself perceived an  Arceo defect in the circuit court's instructions: In [Rapoza's] case, the [prosecution] avoided a part of the impact of the Arceo rule when it separated Count II [(attempted second degree murder of Manuel with a firearm)] from Count V [(attempted second degree murder of Manuel with an automobile)]. In light of the evidence showing that [Rapoza] fired multiple gunshots at or toward each of the three [complainants], the [prosecution] avoided another part of the impact of the Arceo rule when it charged only one offense per alleged [complainant] in Counts II, III, and IV. The part of the Arceo rule not avoided pertained to the fact that each gunshot was a separate attempted Assault in the First Degree or Reckless Endangering in the First Degree. The Arceo rule required the trial court to instruct the jury that if the jury decided beyond a reasonable doubt that [Rapoza] fired one or more shots at or toward a specified [complainant], all twelve of its members must agree on the same shot(s) that were fired. In [Rapoza's] case, the trial court failed to comply with the Arceo rule in this respect. ICA's opinion at 19-20. The ICA clearly erred in holding that Arceo was implicated by the facts of the present matter. As this court has recently parsed Arceo: ... In Arceo, we held that when separate and distinct culpable acts are subsumed within a single count charging sexual assaultany one of which could support a conviction thereunderand the defendant is ultimately convicted by a jury of the charged offense, the defendant's constitutional right to a unanimous verdict is violated unless either the prosecution elects the specific conduct upon which it intends to rely to establish the conduct element of the offense or the trial court gives the jury a specific unanimity instruction. [84 Hawai`i] at 32-33, 928 P.2d at 874-75 (emphasis added). The Arceo decision dealt with a situation in which the prosecution had adduced evidence regarding independent incidents, during each of which the defendant engaged in conduct that could constitute the offense charged, and each of which could have been, but were not, charged as separate offenses. Id. at 21-22, 928 P.2d at 863-64. Inasmuch as these independent instances of culpable conduct were submitted to the jury in a single count that charged but one offense, we held that a specific unanimity instruction was necessary to ensure that each juror convicted the defendant on the basis of the same incident of culpable conduct. State v. Valentine, 93 Hawai`i 199, 208, 998 P.2d 479, 488 (2000) (emphasis in original). In connection with his conduct of discharging the firearm, Rapoza was charged with but one offense in connection with each of the complainants. As to any given complainant, his conduct in discharging the firearm several times did not amount to separate and distinct culpable acts, but rather betokened a continuous, unlawful ... series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force and, thus, constituted but one breach of the criminal law. Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 18, 928 P.2d at 860 (citation omitted). In Valentine, the defendant, while struggling with a police officer, reached around the officer's back and clasped and tugged on the officer's holstered firearm. 93 Hawai`i at 202, 998 P.2d at 482. Valentine was convicted of the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm. Id. We held that a specific unanimity instruction, which would have informed the jurors that they must unanimously agree on whether Valentine's (1) reaching for, (2) clasping of, or (3) tugging on the officer's firearm constituted the requisite conduct element of the offense, was not required. Id. at 208-209, 998 P.2d at 488-89. Unlike Arceo, the facts adduced by the prosecution in Valentine presented no danger that the jury would be confused regarding the conduct of which Valentine was accused and that constituted the charged offense because, inter alia, the evidence concerned only a single episode between Valentine and [the officer], during which the two allegedly engaged in a continuous struggle for possession and control of the firearm. Id. (emphases added). Arceo was, therefore, inapplicable to the facts alleged and adduced in Valentine. Indeed, the facts that animated Arceo further amplify the point that a specific unanimity instruction is not required if the conduct element of an offense is proved by the prosecution to have been a series of acts constituting a continuous course of conduct and the offense is statutorily defined in such a manner as to not preclude it from being a continuous offense. Arceo was charged with and convicted of third and first degree sexual assault in two counts, and the prosecution adduced evidence of multiple acts of penetration in support of each count. Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 2-10, 928 P.2d at 844-852. Inasmuch as sexual assault is not a continuous offense, because, inter alia, the statutes defining sexual assault offenses provided that each act of penetration constitutes a separate offense, see id. at 12-23, 928 P.2d at 854-65, we held that a specific unanimity instruction was required to ensure that the jury had unanimously agreed on the facts constituting the conduct element of each offense, to wit, the particular act of penetrationfrom among the several acts adduced by the prosecution in support of each of the charged offensesthat Arceo committed. Id. at 23-33, 928 P.2d at 865-75. By way of contrast, neither the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm, of which Valentine was convicted, see Valentine, 93 Hawai`i at 201 & nn. 1 & 2, 998 P.2d at 481 & nn. 1 & 2, nor the offenses of attempted second degree murder, attempted first or second degree assault, or first degree reckless endangering, of which Rapoza was tried in connection with counts 2, 3, and 4, see supra notes 1 through 3 and HRS §§ 707-701.5 and 707-711 (1993), are defined in such a manner as to preclude the prosecution from proving that the requisite conduct element was committed by a series of acts constituting a continuous course of conduct. Arceo and Valentine thus teach that, so long as an offense is not statutorily defined in such a manner as to provide that the requisite conduct element cannot be satisfied by a series of acts constituting a continuous course of conduct, the danger present in Arceoi.e., jury confusion regarding the facts constituting the conduct element of an offense-does not arise where the prosecution alleges that the defendant committed but one offense, adduces evidence that the defendant engaged in a series of acts constituting a continuous course of conduct, and argues that the requisite conduct element is satisfied by the defendant's continuous course of conduct, albeit that the defendant's continuous course of conduct may be divisible into conceptually distinct motor activity. As in Valentine, inasmuch as Rapoza's discharge of the firearm constituted but a single continuous offense as to each complainant, Arceo was not implicated, and a specific unanimity instructionpursuant to which the jury would have been required to reach unanimity as to which particular bullet predicated conviction under each of the three countswas not required. The question with respect to Rapoza's conduct was not, as the ICA would have it, identifying the particular shot that Rapoza fired at each complainant, but whether Rapoza separately discharged the firearm in the direction of each. Notwithstanding its misconstruction of Arceo, the ICA's opinion held that the perceived  Arceo defect was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, albeit it under yet another dubious rationale. [8] Nevertheless, inasmuch as the ICA's opinion reached the correct result, to wit, affirmance of Rapoza's conviction of the included offense of attempted first degree assault in connection with count 2, we affirm that result on the alternative ground that Arceo, quite simply, was not implicated by the present matter. Cf. Valentine, 93 Hawai`i at 208-09, 998 P.2d at 488-89.