Opinion ID: 1781968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: the death sentence is disproportionate in this case.

Text: In accordance with Miss. Code Ann. Section 99-19-105(3)(c), this Court must review the record in this case and compare it with other capital murder cases in which this Court has entered judgment since Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242 (Miss. 1976). Foster contends the imposition of the death penalty is disproportionately severe in his case. Foster cites his mental capacity and his age as primary mitigating factors which he contends lead to the conclusion that the death sentence is too great a punishment when the aggravating and mitigating circumstances are weighed against each other. Nixon v. State, 533 So.2d 1078, 1102 (Miss. 1987). First, Foster cites Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329 (Miss. 1988) for the proposition that significant mental impairment is a valid ground for holding the death sentence disproportionate in a particular case. In Pinkney, this Court, in affirming the death penalty, noted the appellant suffered from no mental incapacity. Foster points out that in the sentencing phase of his trial, his father testified that Foster dropped out of school in the eighth grade and that Foster twice suffered head injuries at the age of twelve. Despite such testimony, we fail to see where Foster has effectively distinguished his situation from that presented in Pinkney. Other than the testimony of his father, Foster presented no documented evidence indicating mental impairment. Indeed, a report from Whitfield detailed that, although Foster had a low I.Q., he had the ability to understand right from wrong and was not considered retarded. Foster argues that in addition to being mentally disabled, his youth prevents him from being morally culpable for his crime. He states: The more a defendant is mentally impaired, or the younger he or she is, the less mentally and morally culpable he is. As previously outlined in Assignments I and II, there is no constitutional barrier to imposing the death penalty on persons of Foster's age or even younger. In reviewing our previous death penalty cases we find the sentence not to be disproportionate to the sentence imposed in the present case. Foster has cited no cases which would lead us to a conclusion to the contrary. This assignment of error is rejected as being without merit. This court finds no reversible error in the sentencing phase of Foster's trial.