Opinion ID: 561243
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Explosive or Incendiary Device.

Text: 31 Under count two of the indictment, Mena was convicted of having boarded the aircraft while in possession of a prohibited article, 49 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1472(l )(2), namely, a bomb, or similar explosive or incendiary device, 49 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1472(l )(1)(C). Under count five, he was convicted of illegally transporting an explosive in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(d). We again take a scriptural approach, cf. 1 Matthew 19:30, and consider the two counts in inverse order. 32 1. Count Five. The Arson Statute defines an explosive to include inter alia explosive or incendiary devices within the meaning of [18 U.S.C. Sec. 232(5) ]. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(j). In enacting 18 U.S.C. Sec. 232(5), Congress cast its definitional net quite widely. There, Congress defined an explosive or incendiary device as 33 any incendiary bomb or grenade, fire bomb, or similar device, including any device which (i) consists of or includes a breakable container including a flammable liquid or compound, and a wick composed of any material which, when ignited, is capable of igniting such flammable liquid or compound, and (ii) can be carried or thrown by one individual alone. 34 18 U.S.C. Sec. 232(5)(C). 35 The appellant acknowledges that the expository parameters of section 232(5) control, and that we have heretofore construed the statutory language expansively. See, e.g., United States v. Stackpole, 811 F.2d 689, 692-93 (1st Cir.1987) (holding that a ziploc bag filled with Coleman lantern fluid was an explosive device under the Arson Statute). He theorizes, withal, that the apparatus he brought on board was not an explosive because (1) it did not include a breakable container and (2) the kerosene-like liquid contained therein was not flammable. The appellant's first theorem can be readily dismissed. At trial, a prosecution expert testified that, upon examining the device at the airport, he was able to break the aluminum sheet covering the top of the container, thereby furnishing persuasive evidence from which a jury could have deduced that the container was breakable. 36 The second theorem is equally unavailing. The appellant presented evidence that the liquid in the container was not flammable in the scientific sense of that word, but merely combustible. The forensic chemist who testified for the government agreed, stating: 37 Flammable ... [means to me] that the vapors will ignite below one hundred degrees Fahrenheit and [the liquid taken from Mena's device] would not fit this definition. 38 Be that as it may, we are not disposed to say that flammability, in the technical sense, is a requisite element of the statute of conviction. To the contrary, any theoretical glow sparked by this scientific testimony is easily extinguished by the weight of existing precedent. Relying on the legislative history of the Arson Statute, the Seventh Circuit concluded that petroleum distillates mixed with air at normal ambient temperatures have an explosive potential within the meaning of the statute. See United States v. Agrillo-Ladlad, 675 F.2d 905, 909 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 829, 103 S.Ct. 66, 74 L.Ed.2d 67 (1982). To like effect is United States v. Morrow, 717 F.2d 800, 803 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1069, 104 S.Ct. 975, 79 L.Ed.2d 213 (1984), where the court specifically held that even a dispersed quantity of kerosene surrounded by combustible materials constituted an incendiary device within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 232(5) and 844(j). These cases plainly indicate that appellant's device, with a kerosene derivative as its active ingredient, fell within the proscription of the same statutes. 39 Any flickers of hope that a different outcome should prevail here are soon doused by a consideration of the statutory structure. Flammable is not one of the myriad defined terms in the Arson Statute, see U.S.C. Sec. 841 (definitions), and we know of no reason why the word should be given an unnaturally restrictive meaning. In the absence of a statutory definition, it seems to us more likely that Congress used the word flammable not in the precise scientific sense, but intending to denote the word's common usage, i.e., capable of being easily ignited and of burning quickly, see Webster's Ninth Collegiate Dictionary 469 (1989). In this instance, the liquid within the container plainly met the lay standard; there was evidence in the record establishing that the kerosene-like liquid in Mena's device would have ignited readily and burned with dispatch had he set fire to the wick. No more was required. 40 In reaching this conclusion, we adhere to the time-honored proposition that, when Congress employs statutory terminology susceptible of one meaning as well as another in the common speech of men, [federal courts] should not stifle a [discernible] policy by a pedantic ... process of construction. Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U.S. 607, 617, 64 S.Ct. 1215, 1221, 88 L.Ed. 1488 (1944). Rather, unless Congress has pointed the other way, courts should endeavor to read familiar words in the manner that ordinary people would most likely understand. See id. at 618, 64 S.Ct. at 1221; Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905, 911 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864, 92 S.Ct. 54, 30 L.Ed.2d 108 (1971). Here, the legislative history belies the suggestion that Congress eschewed the ordinary meaning of flammable. See Agrillo-Ladlad, 675 F.2d at 911 (reviewing legislative history and concluding that it supports the plain meaning of the language contained in the Act [encompassing 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(j) ]). We therefore reject appellant's insistence that an arcane aspect of organic chemistry must predominate over what we discern to be Congress' likely intent. 8 41 2. Count Two. Appellant's challenge to his conviction on this count mirrors his challenge to count five and focuses anew on the technical definition of flammability. Although the correlative of the Air Piracy Statute proscribes boarding an aircraft while in possession of weapons, loaded firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices, 49 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1472(l )(1), nowhere does that statute define the terms explosive or incendiary device. While it is arguable that the terms' meanings as used in section 1472(l ) are broader than under the Arson Statute--a proposition we need not elaborate today--their meanings are certainly no narrower. Since the Arson Statute reached Mena's homemade appliance, see supra, the device would a fortiori come within the parameters of 49 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1472(l ) as well. 42 We add only that we think it particularly appropriate to afford the incendiary device language of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1472(l )(1)(C) its common usage meaning. After all, the Court's pronouncements against perpetuating pedantry at the expense of plainly discernible legislative policies, Addison, 322 U.S. at 617, 64 S.Ct. at 1221, zero in on a particularly inviting target in the air piracy milieu. In dealing with air piracy, Congress unmistakably sought to afford a rational scope for prosecution of suspected hijackers with a minimum of technical barriers. Busic, 549 F.2d at 256 n. 7. Like the Second Circuit, we refuse to permit a litigant to impose a crabbed construction of a term tied to the statutory scheme and thereby to promote the precise overtechnicality that Congress explicitly wished to avoid. Id. at 258. 43 We hold, therefore, that the proof was sufficient to permit the jury to convict on count two. 9 44