Opinion ID: 1278599
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Propriety of the Orders Regarding Defense Services

Text: Both Corenevsky and the People observe that Evidence Code section 730 explicitly provides for court-appointed expert witnesses, [6] and that Evidence Code section 731, subdivision (a), [7] and Government Code section 29603 [8] clearly state that the county must pay those court-ordered expenses. Of course, these statutes do not directly provide for court-ordered investigators, law clerks, or enumerated experts other than expert witnesses generally. (3) However, as we observed in Sand, the right to such services is to be inferred from at least two statutes respecting an indigent defendant's statutory right to legal assistance; [9] and more fundamentally, such court-ordered defense services may be required in order to assure a defendant his constitutional right not only to counsel, but to the effective assistance of counsel. (4) It cannot be doubted that the right to counsel guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions [10] includes, and indeed presumes, the right to effective counsel ( United States v. Cronic (1984) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [80 L.Ed.2d 657, 669, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2044]; Strickland v. Washington (1984) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064]; McMann v. Richardson (1970) 397 U.S. 759, 771, fn. 14 [25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773, 90 S.Ct. 1441]; People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581-583 [189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144]; Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) supra, 31 Cal.3d 424, 428; People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 423-425 [152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 1]), [11] and thus also includes the right to reasonably necessary ancillary defense services. ( Keenan, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 428 [The right to effective counsel also includes the right to ancillary services necessary in the preparation of a defense]; In re Ketchel (1968) 68 Cal.2d 397, 399-400 [438 P.2d 625] [`A fundamental part of the constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel is that his attorney ... is obviously entitled to the aid of such expert assistance as he may need ... in preparing the defense']; Puett v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal. App.3d 936, 938-939 [158 Cal. Rptr. 266] [the right to counsel encompasses the right to effective counsel which in turn encompasses the right of an indigent and his appointed counsel to have the services of an investigator]; People v. Faxel (1979) 91 Cal. App.3d 327, 330 [154 Cal. Rptr. 132] [The due process right of effective counsel includes the right to ancillary services necessary in the preparation of a defense]; cf. Mason v. State of Arizona (9th Cir.1974) 504 F.2d 1345, 1351 [the effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Process Clause requires, when necessary, the allowance of investigative expenses or appointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants].) A right to ancillary defense services will thus arise if Corenevsky has demonstrated the need for such services by reference to `the general lines of inquiry he wishes to pursue, being as specific as possible.' ( Faxel, supra, 91 Cal. App.3d at p. 330; People v. Worthy (1980) 109 Cal. App.3d 514, 520-521 [167 Cal. Rptr. 402].) [12] Although such motions can be granted only if supported by a showing that the investigative services are reasonably necessary ( Puett, supra, 96 Cal. App.3d at p. 939), it has been recognized that because of the early stage at which the request typically arises, it will often be difficult for counsel to demonstrate a clear need for such funds. ( Mason v. State of Arizona, supra, 504 F.2d at p. 1352.) Therefore the trial court should, in appropriate circumstances, view with considerable liberality a motion for such pre-trial assistance. ( Ibid. ) [13] (5a) In the present case the trial court granted Corenevsky's requests for expert witnesses and a jury selection expert, and denied his request for law clerks. Although the record is ambiguous, it reveals that the court also initially denied, but subsequently granted, some funds for investigative services. Neither party has directly questioned the propriety, amount, or enforcement of the latter order; moreover, the current state of the record would not permit us to resolve any issues arising from that order. We therefore do not address any issues relating to Corenevsky's requests for investigator services. The People claim that the trial court erred in granting Corenevsky's request for a jury selection expert. Corenevsky, on the other hand, claims the court erred in denying his request for law clerks. [14] (6) Of course, a trial court's order may be set aside only if it constitutes an abuse of discretion. An order is presumed correct; all intendments are indulged in to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. ( Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [86 Cal. Rptr. 65, 468 P.2d 193].) (5b) Although Corenevsky's motion was entitled to have been heard in camera, and would therefore not normally be subject to disclosure, we note that former defense counsel consented to a hearing in open court. Moreover, the record indicates that former counsel also supplied the People with copies of the written motion for defense services, apparently as an appendix to one of the myriad other motions filed in this case. We therefore refer to and quote from those transcripts and written motions in determining whether the trial court erred in granting and denying the requested defense services. Corenevsky's request for $8,740 for a jury selection expert was based on his former counsel's belief that the difficulty of selecting a jury in a murder case with special circumstances alleged demands the assistance of an expert. The record also contains other confidential information, not disclosed to the People, but which was known to the trial court, and which indicates the necessity for special attention to jury selection in this case. Although we should not be interpreted as generally approving of public funds being paid for a so-called jury selection expert, in this instance the trial court had ample basis on which to grant Corenevsky's request; we conclude that it was well within its discretion in doing so. (7) Defendant also set out in great detail the basis for his request for continuing funding of two law clerks. His written motion for funds declared: The need for two law clerks: Ms. Judith A. Descalso has clerked for the Public Defender on this matter for several months and is very familiar with the legal aspects of the pretrial matters and has assisted in preparing several of the trial motions. She has also been researching and preparing voir dire and jury instructions. Her assignment will be to assist in court during the trial of the matter and this assistance has two aspects. First, she will ready and make available to counsel pleadings and transcripts tabbed to specific pages from the voluminous materials required at trial. This includes five trial index binders, an index to those binders, the trial motions and notes for factual argument, and the case boxes of discovered reports and memoranda. Second, she will conduct legal research as needed during the trial and prepare copies of cases and memoranda as needed. As this is a very complex case in re the expected testimony, the lack of this performance would [impair counsel's adequacy]. Mr. Steven Joffe has clerked on this matter for about four months. He has continually worked on the research and preparation of memoranda and written objections to the multitude of tangible and intangible evidence that is expected to be offered by both the People and the defendant. His detailed knowledge of this is an invaluable asset at trial. His primary assignment will be to provide further memoranda as needed regarding specific research needing elaboration for argument on which he completed work. The remainder of his primary assignment will be to study the daily transcripts with counsel during evening sessions so that needed research may be completed. It is expected that various motions will be made during trial that will arise only as trial is ongoing. These matters will need research and preparation and this will be Mr. Joffe's secondary assignment to be worked with Ms. Descalso. It is expected these motions will include motions to strike the testimony of witnesses, dismissal and mistrial. The motions may also be as to exclusion or suppression of tangible or intangible evidence as facts unfurl. Both law clerks will be expected to apportion the task of arranging the travel and accommodations of witnesses and expert witnesses. The clerks will be expected to brief the witnesses on the proceedings and conduct an initial interview with the witnesses. A report will then be made to counsel who will cover the important aspects with each witness and individually prepare the experts as well. Counsel also argued that the volume of documents generated by both parties required the assistance of the law clerks in order to sort and organize the materials. He concluded that without their assistance this defendant could not receive adequate or effective assistance of counsel. This showing would be sufficient to support a trial court's conclusion that the requested services would be not merely convenient but reasonably necessary. ( Puett, supra, 96 Cal. App.3d 936, 939; Mason v. State of Arizona, supra, 504 F.2d 1345, 1352.) The question posed by Corenevsky, however, is whether the trial court erred in denying such funds. If the court had explicitly found the requested services were not reasonably necessary, we would not now second-guess that determination; as the People observe, an appellate court will reverse such an order only when the circumstances shown compelled the [trial] court to exercise its discretion only in one way, namely, to grant the motion. ( Puett, supra, 96 Cal. App.3d at p. 941.) The record, however, demonstrates on its face that the trial court denied Corenevsky's motion, not on the basis of lack of need, but because the court felt the request related to staffing problems[,] and that is something that you should be taking up with your public defender and his budget instead of the court simply saying that in addition to whatever budget you already have the court is going to expand that budget. Whether you like it or not ... there are budgetary constraints. The record clearly demonstrates that such an attempt through the public defender's office would have been futile. Moreover, the court's order is suspect because it fails to address the key issue posed by defendant: whether such ancillary services are reasonably necessary. Furthermore, the record reveals that the court made its order under the assumption  perhaps reasonable at the time, but as we shall explain, mistaken  that the court could order funds for expert witnesses under Evidence Code section 731, [15] but had no authority to order other needed ancillary services. Because the trial court erroneously failed to base its order on a finding of the reasonableness of Corenevsky's request for law clerks, [16] and because it apparently held a mistakenly limited view of its authority to authorize services, its order in this respect was error.