Opinion ID: 415511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the mere colombian seaman.

Text: 94 The majority maintains that the inference of Michelena-Orovio's involvement in the distribution scheme is at war with the facts in this case. at 506 (quoting Fenner v. General Motors Corp., 657 F.2d 647, 651 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 942, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982)). This war is based on facts that are not even in the record. The majority paints a picture of Mr. Michelena-Orovio as a poor family man who is simply trying to earn a living by serving as a member of a crew. There is no evidence in the record that Michelena-Orovio had a family waiting for him to return to Colombia, but there is ample evidence, as the majority recognizes in part IV.A of its opinion, that his means of earning a livelihood was smuggling a substantial quantity of marijuana. 95 The majority accepts Michelena-Orovio's argument that the absence of actual contact with the United States and his status as a lowly non-English speaking seaman further weakens the case against him. Michelena-Orovio's first argument concerns the fact that he, a Colombian national, was discovered on a foreign vessel on the high seas. He maintains that the evidence proved only that he was on a vessel loaded with marijuana headed for the United States, but that plans never actually called for his entry into this country. While the evidence might be sufficient to demonstrate that he knew that the vessel contained contraband and that he had joined in the conspiracy to bring it close enough to the United States for someone else to import it, he maintains that there is no evidence that he knew of or cared about the contraband's fate once it reached American shores. 9 96 Cadena itself does not support this high seas/foreign vessel distinction. The defendants in Cadena were charged in the same indictment as the defendants in the companion case, Rodriguez, supra. In Cadena, we stated that the fact that none of the appellants who were tried in this case is charged with an overt act on land merely results from the fortuity of a bifurcated trial and is not decisive. 585 F.2d at 1258 n. 7. In fact, in Rodriguez we reversed the convictions of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute of two of the American defendants who had helped to arrange the importation of Cadena's cargo from within the United States because we found, as in Cadena, that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the defendants were involved in anything more than the conspiracy to import. 97 Further, this distinction makes no sense in terms of the issues in this case: knowledge of and participation in the conspiracy to distribute the marijuana. Since Michelena-Orovio was properly convicted of conspiracy to import marijuana into the United States, he presumably knew the destination of the cargo. 10 We have already rejected the idea that a conspirator could escape liability on the importation count on the ground that he never actually entered United States territory. See United States v. Ricardo, 619 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063, 101 S.Ct. 789, 66 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980); see also United States v. Schmucker-Bula, 609 F.2d 399, 402 (7th Cir.1980). 11 While a foreign national may not have the same detailed knowledge of our laws as a United States citizen might have, it would hardly be irrational for a jury to infer that Michelena-Orovio knew that the possession and distribution of marijuana in the United States is illegal. After all, both are also illegal in Colombia, and indeed, in most parts of the world. Therefore, to the extent that participation in the conspiracy to distribute may normally be inferred from participation in the conspiracy to import a large quantity of contraband, in light of the absence of a legal market for the imported goods, Michelena-Orovio's knowledge of and dependence on the existence of the distribution scheme are the same as those of his American counterpart. 98 The fact that some other conspirator was assigned the task of actually bringing the contraband into this country and distributing it does not mean that the defendant could not be convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, since the government need not demonstrate any overt act on the part of the defendant to connect him to a conspiracy to violate the narcotics laws. Rodriguez, supra; see also United States v. Davis, 666 F.2d 195, 201 n. 9 (5th Cir.1982). Further, each conspirator is responsible for all of the acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that he has joined. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946); United States v. Diaz, 655 F.2d 580 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910, 102 S.Ct. 1257, 71 L.Ed.2d 448 (1982); United States v. Hodges, 606 F.2d 520 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035, 100 S.Ct. 708, 62 L.Ed.2d 671 (1980). 99 I must add that to accept the defendant's proposed distinction would undercut the purposes of the narcotics laws. Both 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846 and 21 U.S.C. Sec. 963 were part of a congressional revision and recodification of the nation's narcotics laws designed to deal in a comprehensive fashion with the growing menace of drug abuse in the United States. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, H.R.Rep. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4566, 4567. In his message accompanying the proposed bill, the President stated that he wanted successful prosecution of an increased national effort against illegal drug trafficking. Legislation to Regulate Controlled Dangerous Substances and Amend Narcotics and Drug Laws, 1970: Hearings on H.R. 1444 Before the Subcomm. on House Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 196 (1970) (statement of Richard Nixon, President of the United States). See also Rodriguez, 612 F.2d at 915-17. 100 No one can deny that the conspiracies in this case, like many before them, had roots in a field in Colombia. In fact, a number of drug smugglers carefully avoid entering the United States in the hopes that they will avoid criminal prosecution altogether. See, e.g., Schmucker-Bula, supra. To hold that Michelena-Orovio cannot be implicated in the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute would be to limit the government's ability to combat the drug trade at its source. I cannot conclude that Congress intended, or that the facts of this case warrant, such a result. 101 Michelena-Orovio's final argument is that the inference of participation in the distribution scheme should not be applied to him because, unlike the defendants in Mazyak, Mann and even Cadena, he was simply a lowly member of the crew. We recently rejected a similar argument in United States v. Sockwell, 699 F.2d 213 (5th Cir.1983). 12 Sockwell was a member of the crew of a vessel that had been carrying 150,000 pounds of marijuana; after the marijuana was transferred to another boat, the crew burned and sank their ship. Sockwell was convicted of conspiracies to import and to possess with intent to distribute, as well as the substantive offenses of importation and possession. 102 On appeal, Sockwell contended that his convictions should be overturned because he was merely a cook for the vessel's crew and did not participate in any of the activities of the vessel. Id. at 215. We rejected this contention and found that testimony of the other crew members, as well as circumstantial evidence, demonstrated that he was a participating and functioning member of the conspiracy throughout. Id. As in Michelena-Orovio's case, Sockwell had been a member of a small crew (five men) on board a marijuana-laden boat on a lengthy voyage. See United States v. Alfrey, 620 F.2d 551, 556 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 938, 101 S.Ct. 337, 66 L.Ed.2d 160 (1980). Further, in each case all of the crew members presented a single fabricated story. 103 Michelena-Orovio's lowly employee argument is in essence no more than a variation on the mere presence argument rejected in the majority's discussion of the importation count. As the majority explains, we have held that a crew member may not be convicted of a violation of the narcotics laws solely on the basis of his presence on board a boat loaded with contraband. United States v. Bland, 653 F.2d 989 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055, 102 S.Ct. 602, 70 L.Ed.2d 592 (1981); United States v. Willis, 639 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir.1981). In contrast, the captain may be presumed to know the nature of his cargo. Bland, 653 F.2d at 996. 104 As was discussed in detail, however, in our disposition of the defendant's argument with regard to the importation count, more than mere presence was established in this case. 13 The jury determined that the evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that Michelena-Orovio was aware of and participated in the conspiracy to import a large quantity of marijuana. He was not a mere employee, but an employee aware of the nature of his business. It is well settled in this circuit that a conviction will not be reversed for lack of evidence merely because the defendant played only a minor role in the overall scheme. United States v. Alvarez, 625 F.2d 1196, 1198 (5th Cir.1980) (en banc) (affirming conviction of conspiracy to import marijuana of Colombian supplier's friend who intended to be present at the remote off-loading site for the marijuana). 105