Opinion ID: 2585368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: need for pretrial competency hearing

Text: Alicea maintains that the district court abused its discretion in denying a pretrial competency hearing to address Alicea's contention that neither DC nor WC were competent to testify because their memories of the events at issue and, hence, their proposed trial testimony, were too deficient and had been tainted in the process of interviews with the church pastor and school teacher, as well as law enforcement personnel. We have held that when a child is called into the courtroom to testify, and the child's competency is called into question by either party, it is the duty of the trial court to make an independent examination of the child to determine competency, and that determination will not be disturbed unless shown to be clearly erroneous. English v. State, 982 P.2d 139, 145 (Wyo.1999). In English, we also held that an assertion that a child's testimony was tainted could best be comprehended as a part of the competency hearing and that a separate taint hearing is not required. 982 P.2d at 146. In English, we established that the requirement that a competency hearing on the issue of taint, based on an assertion that the child's statements were the product of suggestive or coercive interview techniques, or some other potentially improper influence, is triggered whenever a party presents the court with some evidence that a child witness is incompetent [1] . 982 P.2d at 146-47; Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 58 (Wyo. 1999). Alicea contends that he presented the trial court with some evidence that the children's memories were both faulty and tainted and, therefore, it abused its discretion in not conducting a full-fledged taint hearing that included questioning of the children. It is clear from the record that the trial court comprehensively reviewed all materials of record that had a bearing on this issue, and that he patiently considered all arguments and testimony offered by Alicea with an open mind. His conclusion was tacitly that the required showing of some evidence was not achieved. The standard, some evidence has been defined in a similar context as follows: `Some evidence means a quantity more than none or a scintilla, that rationally may lead to a conclusion of incompetency.' Hatten v. State, 978 S.W.2d 608, 611 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1998). In a dissimilar context (threshold for discovery in allegation of selective prosecution), some evidence was said to mean that the showing must be more than frivolous and based on more than conclusory allegations. United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508, 1512 (9th Cir.1995). In English, we did not define what the standard some evidence was intended to mean, other than by example. In that case, we held that the following facts were more than necessary to meet the some evidence standard: The victim was five years of age (weighed heavily in the assessment); the circumstances surrounding the questioning of the child suggested taint (Mother, who did questioning, assumed the sexual touching and asked leading questions that conformed to that assumption); the Mother was a trusted authority figure; Mother used rewards to pressure child (trading secrets game); and the child's initial statements were not spontaneous but the product of interrogation (of great importance). 982 P.2d at 147. We have comprehensively reviewed the record with respect to this issue. We conclude that Alicea's argument boils down to this: The children's testimony was tainted because the various interviewers asked leading and suggestive questions and lacked expertise and experience in interviewing children in circumstances such as those peculiar to this case. Use of leading questions to facilitate an examination of child witnesses who are hesitant, evasive, or reluctant is not improper. State v. Smith, 158 N.J. 376, 730 A.2d 311, 319 (N.J.1999). Moreover, Alicea's contentions in this regard were based solely upon the opinion of an expert witness, the psychologist, Dr. Esplin. An examination of his testimony reveals that his opinions were uncertain because of a lack of information and, for the most part, were conclusory and speculative. DC was about 15 years of age when her initial revelations were made, and DC made similar statements between the ages of 10 and 11. Although leading questions were asked by all interviewers, there was no evidence that those interviewers assumed the existence of the criminal conduct, and, as we set out above, the use of leading questions is not improper in this context. While all interviewers were authority figures of various sorts, the record does not suggest that their status as such was used to coerce information from the children. Finally, the record fully supports a conclusion that the children's initial statements to peers were spontaneous and voluntary. Based on the totality of this record, we conclude that Alicea did not meet the threshold requirement of some evidence of taint to trigger the requirement that the trial court conduct a hearing to enquire of the children as to quality of their memories of the experiences they intended to relate to the jury at trial. We hold that the trial court's resolution of this issue was within its sound discretion and not clearly erroneous.