Opinion ID: 2422374
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Superior Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Issue The Restitution Order.

Text: The State does not dispute that the Superior Court officially released Moore from probation on July 30, 2002 and did not attempt to quantify the amount of restitution, identify to whom it was owed, or issue an order requiring him to pay it until over two months later, on October 1, 2002. But, the State contends, the Superior Court's opinion in Linton v. State [7] directly addresses this issue. The State urges this Court to adopt that case's analysis. In Linton v. State, Linton signed a plea agreement with the State and agreed to a sentence that included one year of probation, a substance abuse evaluation and required substance abuse program, and payment of restitution in an amount to be determined at a later date. [8] The Court of Common Pleas discharged Linton from probation when she completed a substance abuse program, and nearly six months later, this court ordered her to pay $10,585 in restitution. [9] After the court denied Linton's Motion to Vacate the restitution order, Linton appealed to the Superior Court for relief. [10] The Superior Court affirmed the denial of Linton's motion, and its affirming order relied on two factors. First, the Superior Court judge determined that, by statute, the imposition of restitution and probation constitute two separate judgments that are not dependent on each other. [11] Second, the Superior Court judge determined that 11 Del. C. § 4104(d), which grants a court jurisdiction over a convicted person until fines and restitution have been paid in full, does not require that a court make any particular pronouncement in order to retain jurisdiction or define its length. . . . [12] Consequently, the judge determined that despite discharging Linton from probation before quantifying the restitution Linton owed, the statute permitted the Court of Common Pleas to implicitly retain[] jurisdiction so that the court could assess the value of the restitution at a later date. [13] The immediate case does not require us to either adopt or reject the Linton analysis, and we decline to do either. Instead, we hold that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to issue Moore's restitution order based on the unique facts of this case. As in Linton, the court in this case released Moore from probation before quantifying the restitution he owed. This case, however, features several distinctions that we believe to be critical. First, Moore and the State agreed to specific contractual terms in his plea agreement. In return for Moore's guilty plea, the State agreed to recommend a sentence of probation, payment of fines, and payment of restitution to the three named individuals riding in the car that Moore struckspecifically, Seibert and the Bensons. While the plea agreement left the amount of restitution an open term to be filled at some indefinite later date by the PSIO, it explicitly listed the parties indeed, the only partiesto whom the court would make Moore pay restitution as a condition of his agreement with the State to plead guilty. Upon accepting Moore's plea agreement, the Superior Court had jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. The Superior Court did not, however, have the power unilaterally to amend the agreement, without notice and an opportunity to be heard, to force Moore to pay restitution to four new claimantsAAA, The Hartford, DBA Collections, or Dynamic Physical Therapy. [14] Second, when the Superior Court judge discharged Moore from probation, he manually marked a diagonal line through the entirety of subsections 1.A and 1.B of the sentence modification form. [15] In their place, he handwrote Effective July 30, 2002 defendant is discharged successfully from Probation. [emphasis added]. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person could only conclude that any restitution issue had been finally resolved. In Linton, the judge merely held that the statutory scheme, in the absence of judicial conduct to the contrary, implicitly retain[s the court's] jurisdiction so that the court could assess the value of the restitution at a later date. [16] Even assuming that the statutory scheme empowers a court implicitly to retain jurisdiction without requiring any particular pronouncement by the court Linton's critical statement of law that we assume arguendo without deciding herethe judge in this case affirmatively struck the section of the sentence modification form addressing restitution. In fact, the judge properly did so, because Moore's auto insurance carrier, AAA, had paid Seibert, and the Bensons filed no loss claim form. That indirect act reasonably demonstrates an intent to discharge Moore from further restitution orders. It also had the effect of precluding the later assertion of jurisdiction to impose restitution without prior notice and a chance to be heard in the ongoing case. If, indeed, as Linton suggests, the imposition of restitution and probation constitute two separate judgments, then before restitution can be ordered, the person subject to any order must be given notice and a hearing before a final order of restitution can effectively be entered. The factual differences between this case and Linton are critical to the divergent results. In any event, the Superior Court lacked authority unilaterally to impose restitution to be paid to any parties other than Seibert and the Bensons. Moreover, by crossing through the restitution section of the sentence modification order and discharging Moore from probation seemingly without condition or any discussion of ongoing restitution, the Superior Court disclaimed, or (to paraphrase Linton ), particularly pronounced no further interest in any continuing statutory jurisdiction it may have had to modify or resurrect phoenix-like a moribund restitution order.