Opinion ID: 2745484
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Counsel’s Conflict of Interest

Text: Mr. Adams alleges the following facts in support of this claim. As part of the investigation that resulted in the drug charges against him, his girlfriend and co-defendant Cheridan Horrocks was charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. She entered into a plea agreement with the government that required her to cooperate by testifying in future proceedings. The government promised to recommend a downward departure at sentencing if her cooperation amounted to substantial assistance. Prior to Mr. Adams’ trial, his trial attorney David Leavitt allegedly interviewed Ms. Horrocks in prison and obtained information from her that was favorable to Mr. Adams. Although Mr. Leavitt had been advised to consult with counsel before interviewing cooperating witnesses, he failed to do so in Ms. Horrocks’ case. During the interview, Ms. Horrocks informed Mr. Leavitt that she and Mr. Adams were common-law spouses. Mr. Leavitt allegedly prepared an -6- affidavit based on spousal privilege to keep her from testifying against Mr. Adams, which arguably would have violated her plea agreement with the government. When the government brought this interview to the attention of Ms. Horrocks’ attorney, Michael Jaenish, Mr. Jaenish was angered and threatened to file a bar complaint against Mr. Leavitt. At trial, Ms. Horrocks provided testimony against Mr. Adams as anticipated. But Mr. Adams alleges that Mr. Leavitt failed to cross-examine Ms. Horrocks in any meaningful way, even though her testimony was highly damaging to his defense and Mr. Adams claims she could easily have been impeached as a witness. According to Mr. Adams, Mr. Leavitt explained his failure to cross-examine by stating that Ms. Horrocks was “too well prepared” and “antagonistic.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 8. He promised to call her as an adverse witness in Mr. Adams’ own case, when her step-mother’s testimony would be available to counter her statements. But according to Mr. Adams, Mr. Leavitt never recalled Ms. Horrocks, never discredited her testimony, and never presented any of the positive information that she allegedly revealed to him during the prison interview. Mr. Adams also alleges that on the day when Mr. Horrocks was scheduled to testify as part of his case, Mr. Leavitt and Mr. Jaenish engaged in a “shouting-match” about her testimony during a recess. Id. at 9. Mr. Jaenish called Mr. Leavitt unethical and threatened to go to the bar if he called Ms. Horrocks as a witness. Immediately after this recess, Mr. Leavitt informed the court he would not be calling -7- Ms. Horrocks. When Mr. Adams asked him why not, Mr. Leavitt stated angrily that if she testified the prosecution would revoke her plea bargain and they would be responsible for her serving 40 years in prison. Mr. Adams asserts that these facts reveal that Mr. Leavitt had two separate conflicts of interest that adversely affected his representation of Mr. Adams. First, he was concerned for his own interests rather than Mr. Adams’: by calling Ms. Horrocks and presenting the information he obtained from the unauthorized interview, Mr. Leavitt would have risked damage to his personal reputation and a bar complaint from Mr. Jaenish. Second, Mr. Leavitt was looking out for Ms. Horrocks more than Mr. Adams: he “became more worried about preserving [Ms.] Horrocks’ plea agreement than his own client.” Id. at 12. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the “right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest.” Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981). Generally, to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim the defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that prejudice resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984). But where counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest, prejudice is presumed, id. at 692, and “no further showing of prejudice is necessary.” United States v. Flood, 713 F.3d 1281, 1286 (10th Cir.) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 341 (2013). This presumption of prejudice arises, however, “only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel ‘actively represented conflicting interests’ and that ‘an -8- actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 350 (1980)).1 “An actual conflict of interest exists only if counsel was forced to make choices advancing interests to the detriment of his client.” Workman v. Mullin, 342 F.3d 1100, 1107 (10th Cir. 2003) (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, there must be more than a potential conflict of interest or “a mere theoretical division of loyalties.” Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002). Moreover, to prevail, the defendant “has the burden of showing specific instances to support [his] claim of actual conflict of interest.” Flood, 713 F.3d at 1287 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Having carefully considered Mr. Adams’ petition, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion when, without holding an evidentiary hearing, it denied his claim that his counsel was laboring under an actual conflict of interest at trial. Mr. Adams’ claim, if believed, would entitle him to relief under § 2255. But evidentiary questions remain, for example, concerning whether the alleged instances of ineffective representation were the result of the conflict of interest or strategic choices by his attorney. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing is needed concerning this claim. 1 “[T]he Supreme Court has never applied Cuyler’s presumption of prejudice outside the context of a multiple representation claim.” Flood, 713 F.3d at 1286 n.1. But this court has applied the presumption in other contexts, most notably to “a conflict-of-interest claim based on a third-party fee arrangement.” Id. Accordingly, we will assume that the standard applies under the circumstances of this case. -9-