Opinion ID: 787266
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Rand as a Vessel

Text: 19 Congress enacted the Act to restore and maintain the biological, chemical, and physical integrity of our country's waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1251. The Act prohibits, with certain exceptions, the discharge of any pollutant by any person. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Although sewage is considered a pollutant under the Act, sewage from vessels is excluded from the definition of a pollutant. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). Thus, if the Rand qualifies as a vessel, the appellants did not violate the criminal provisions of the Act, and we must reverse their convictions. West Indies, 127 F.3d at 309. 20 The Act's definitions of both new and existing vessels includes every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on the navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1)-(2). This definition is identical, in all relevant respects, to the definition contained in the General Provisions of the United States Code. 1 U.S.C. § 3 (defining a vessel as a watercraft ... used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water). 5 The General Provision's definition has been used in the context of numerous other federal statutes, including the Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. § 2101(45) (stating vessel has the same meaning as under 1 U.S.C. § 3), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(28) (using same definition as 1 U.S.C. § 3, with minor grammatical changes), and the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C § 13102(21) (using same definition as 1 U.S.C. § 3, and adding watercraft intended to be used, as a means of transportation by water). 21 Only one circuit has addressed the statutory definition of vessel in the specific context of the Act. West Indies, 127 F.3d at 309. Despite the scarcity of caselaw regarding the meaning of vessel under the Act, an abundance of caselaw analyzing the vessel definition under similarly worded statutes exists. Arguably, Congress intended the definition in the Act to be interpreted in the same way as the definition contained in 1 U.S.C. § 3. Cf. McCarthy v. The Bark Peking, 716 F.2d 130, 134 (2d Cir.1983) (noting Congress's use of the term vessel in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), without providing a definition different from that found in 1 U.S.C. § 3, evidences Congress intended to adopt this commonly-used term). We will interpret the term vessel under the Act consistently with previous interpretations of 1 U.S.C. § 3, because both identically define the term vessel. Cf. United States ex rel. Zissler v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 154 F.3d 870, 875 (8th Cir.1998) (citation omitted) (Where Congress uses the same form of statutory language in different statutes having the same general purpose, courts presume that Congress intended the same interpretation to apply in both instances.); West Indies, 127 F.3d at 309 (reviewing vessel according to long-standing interpretation of the term `vessel' in other contexts). 22 Reviewing the caselaw regarding the definition of vessel convinces us the Rand fits within that definition. In McCarthy, 716 F.2d at 134, the Second Circuit stated, Pursuant to the axiom that `vessels' must be at least capable of use as a means of transportation on water, courts uncertain of a particular craft's place in nautical taxonomy have drawn distinctions based on the presence or absence of [ ] residual capacity. At the same time, however, virtually any capacity for use as seagoing transportation-perhaps even the hypothetically plausible possibility-has sufficed to lend the dignity of `vessel' status to a host of seemingly unlikely craft. Id. (citations omitted). A craft need not be actually engaged in navigation or commerce in order to come within the definition of `vessel.' The question is one of residual capacity. Id. at 135; see also Farrell Ocean Servs., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.2d 91, 93 (1st Cir.1982) ([A] qualifying `vessel' is one that is capable of use as a vessel even if not functioning as such at the moment in question.). As the Fifth Circuit observed over twenty years ago, [n]o doubt the three men in a tub would also fit within our definition [of a `vessel' under 1 U.S.C. § 3], and one probably could make a convincing case for Jonah inside the whale. Burks v. Am. River Transp. Co., 679 F.2d 69, 75 (5th Cir.1982). 23 The government argues the Rand was not a vessel because its engines did not work, requiring it to be towed. Inoperable engines and towing are not sufficient to disqualify the Rand as a vessel. In Pleason v. Gulfport Shipbuilding Corp., 221 F.2d 621, 623 (5th Cir.1955), the Fifth Circuit applied 1 U.S.C. § 3 in a maritime lien case and concluded the Carol Ann was a vessel. The Carol Ann's propellers and propeller shafts had been removed; she did not have her own light, heat, or power in operation; her primary engines had been removed; her steering apparatus, aside from the rudder, had been removed; and none of her remaining machinery worked; but her superstructure was intact; and her navigation lights remained in place, though inoperable. Id. at 622-23. The Carol Ann had been towed across the Gulf of Mexico without a crew, motive power, or operative steering. Id. at 623. At her final destination, the Carol Ann was moored to a dock with steel cables and ropes and used for receiving shrimp for storing, freezing, processing, and resale, similar to a plant that would operate on land. Id. Electric and telephone lines were connected to the Carol Ann, although she had a power system of her own. Id. Regardless of these land-bound attributes, the court concluded the Carol Ann was plainly a vessel. Id. 24 In discussing 1 U.S.C. § 3, the Fifth Circuit places emphasis on the phrase capable of being used. Campbell v. Loznicka, 181 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir.1950). The court in Campbell stated the question of whether a yacht called the Scorpio had ever sailed the seas or transported any commerce did not control whether it was a vessel. Id. at 359. Concluding the Scorpio was indeed a vessel, the court observed, Undoubtedly, it was a type of water craft, long afloat, readily towable, and entirely capable of being used, even if inefficiently, in transportation, ... and was a `vessel' within the wording of the statute, and within the intent and purpose of the law. Id. 25 The government argues we should follow the analysis from West Indies, wherein the Third Circuit concluded a permanently moored barge was not a vessel under the Act. At first glance, West Indies appears to support the government's position. However, closer inspection indicates otherwise. In West Indies, 127 F.3d at 309, the defendants were convicted for discharging sewage into a bay from a barge. The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions, ruling the barge, used to house workers, was not a vessel because it was moored permanently to the shore, could not have been used for transport because it was halfway submerged with part of [its] hull resting on the bottom of the bay, had water visible below deck, and could not be moved from its mooring. Id. In contrast, the Rand was not permanently moored, was floating and had no part of its hull resting on the river bed, and could be moved easily. 26 The government also cites Kathriner v. UNISEA, Inc., 975 F.2d 657, 660 (9th Cir.1992), for support. In Kathriner, the Ninth Circuit ruled the UNISEA, a former liberty ship converted into a floating fish processing plant, was not a vessel in navigation under the Jones Act because it was permanently moored and had no movement capabilities, and had no means of navigation, no independent source of propulsion, and no transportation function at all. Id. Just as with West Indies, Kathriner is distinguishable. First, the definition of vessel in navigation under the Jones Act is not as expansive as the general definition of vessel. Compare Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit. J/V, 97 F.3d 603, 607 (1st Cir.1996) (noting the general definition of vessel, under 1 U.S.C. § 3 is significantly more inclusive than that used for evaluating seaman status under the Jones Act), with Kathriner, 975 F.2d at 659, 662 (stating seaman status under the Jones Act requires a plaintiff prove he was aboard a vessel in navigation, and observing the definition from 1 U.S.C. § 3 is the one most courts use for purposes of the LHWCA). The present case does not present us with the question of whether the Rand was a vessel in navigation under the Jones Act. Furthermore, the UNISEA had permanent utility connections and was designed as a floating factory-merely extending land over water for the purpose of increasing the usable space of a dock-side fish processing operation, and when the UNISEA was converted to a shrimp processing plant, a large opening was cut into her hull to allow for dock traffic, and if put to sea, she would surely sink. Id. at 660. The Rand, in contrast, was attached to two spud poles by eighteen bolts, which could easily be removed, permitting the Rand to be towed because she floated on her own, which is sufficient to bestow vessel status on her. 27 The government also claims the Rand is not a vessel because VHI advertised the Rand as a permanently moored facility. We reject this argument as the Second Circuit rejected a similar argument in McCarthy, where it concluded the Peking remained a vessel despite her age and current use. McCarthy, 716 F.2d at 135-36 & n. 6. The court observed the Peking was capable of being towed, welded rudder notwithstanding, was not subject to United States Coast Guard inspections, and its owners did not intend to return the Peking to active navigation. Id. Regardless, noting the expansive scope given the section 3 definition of vessel, the Second Circuit held the Peking was a vessel under the LHWCA. Id. at 136. 28 While we are aware [t]he fact that it floats on the water does not make it a ship or vessel, Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625, 627, 7 S.Ct. 336, 30 L.Ed. 501 (1887), the facts in this case lead to the conclusion the Rand was a vessel under the Act. We fully appreciate the government's arguments, but if we were to adopt the government's definition of the term, capable of use, we would have to equate the term to mean current use, an interpretation the statutory language and the caselaw do not support. The Rand was capable of use as a vessel, albeit under tow. While it may have been inefficient or expensive to use the Rand as a vessel, those factors do not serve to strip the Rand of its vessel status. See Campbell, 181 F.2d at 359. The Rand fits into the category of many other vessels with similarly limited capacities. McCarthy, 716 F.2d at 135. Although the Rand probably will never slip her moorings and set off toward open waters, she is nonetheless a towable vessel capable of use as a means of transportation on water. Id. at 136. 29 If the Act's exception for sewage from vessels were meant to apply only to vessels currently in navigation, as the government urges the statute's plain meaning does, Congress could have defined the exception accordingly. It did not, and we refuse to deviate from years of precedent interpreting the term vessel to include craft like the Rand. See Springer v. Gov't of Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201-02, 48 S.Ct. 480, 72 L.Ed. 845 (1928) ([A]s a general rule inherent in the American constitutional system, ... the judiciary cannot exercise ... legislative power). The expansive scope given to the definition of vessel under 1 U.S.C. § 3, McCarthy, 716 F.2d at 136, leads to the inescapable conclusion the Rand was a vessel under the Act.