Opinion ID: 4528343
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Equal Protection Framework

Text: “When a state distributes benefits unequally, the distinctions it makes are subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 (1982). At its core, the Clause says that “all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Thus, plaintiffs alleging an equal protection claim have to make two showings: first, that the defendants treated them differently from other similarly situated persons, and second, that this difference in treatment is not supported by a sufficiently strong governmental interest. E.g., id. at 439–40; Jolivette v. Husted, 694 F.3d 760, 771 (6th Cir. 2012); Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011); Scarbrough v. Morgan Cty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006). Much of the Supreme Court’s equal protection case law concerns the second part of this test, and specifically how strong the governmental interest must be. For example, if a government policy discriminates based on race or another immutable, protected characteristic, the Court applies “strict scrutiny” and will uphold the policy only if it furthers a “compelling state interest” and is narrowly tailored in doing so. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; accord, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); see also, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (also applying strict scrutiny “[w]hen a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right”).9 9 Classifications based on gender are reviewed under “intermediate scrutiny,” in which the challenged policy “must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those Nos. 18-1855/1871 Gary B., et al. v. Whitmer, et al. Page 22 On the other hand, if the policy does not concern a protected class, “rational basis” review is used, and the policy will be sustained if it “is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. This rational basis standard is extremely forgiving. The challenged action is presumed to be constitutional, and the burden is on Plaintiffs to negate “every conceivable basis” that might support it. Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)). Further, “[w]hen social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude.” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. Plyler v. Doe throws a wrench in this. In Plyler—discussed more extensively later, see infra Part II.E.2—the Supreme Court faced a Texas policy that required undocumented children to pay tuition before they could attend public school, 457 U.S. at 205–06, 206 n.2. In assessing the plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge, the court noted that “[u]ndocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class,” and that education as a general matter is not a fundamental right. Id. at 223. And so, rational basis must apply. But the Court went on: [M]ore is involved in these cases than the abstract question whether [the challenged policy] discriminates against a suspect class, or whether education is a fundamental right. [The policy] imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status. The stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their lives. By denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation. In determining the rationality of [the policy], we may appropriately take into account its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children who are its victims. In light of these countervailing costs, the discrimination contained in [Texas’s policy] can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of the State. objectives.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217–18, 218 n.16 (discussing the application of intermediate scrutiny to classifications that, “while not facially invidious, nonetheless give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties”). Nos. 18-1855/1871 Gary B., et al. v. Whitmer, et al. Page 23 Id. at 223–24 (emphasis added). Thus, while still couched in rational basis review, the Plyler court held that when a discrete group of children is denied a basic public education, such a policy can survive only if “if furthers some substantial state interest.” Id. at 223–24, 230.10