Opinion ID: 1755468
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusive-Remedy Provision

Text: A primary purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to relieve employees injured on the job of the burden of proving their employer's negligence and to provide them prompt remuneration for their on-the-job injuries. See Paradissis v. Royal Indem. Co., 507 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. 1974). Because of this purpose, we have liberally construed the Act in the employee's favor. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Sinclair, 984 S.W.2d 958, 961 (Tex.1999); Lujan v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 756 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex.1988). Under the Act, only injuries occurring in the course and scope of employment are compensable. Tex. Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 8308-1.03(10) (repealed) (current version at Tex. Lab.Code § 401.011(10)). [1] The Act defines course and scope of employment as an activity of any kind or character that has to do with and originates in the work, business, trade, or profession of the employer and that is performed by the employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of the employer. Tex. Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 8308-1.03(12) (repealed) (current version at Tex. Lab.Code § 401.011(12)). To fully effectuate the Act's purpose to provide prompt and certain remuneration to injured employees, course and scope has been interpreted expansively to include additional injuries that result from treating on-the-job injuries. See Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Gonzales, 518 S.W.2d 524, 526 (Tex.1975); see also Duke v. Wilson, 900 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, writ denied). When considering the extent of a compensable injury, [t]he full consequences of the original injury, together with the effects of its treatment, upon the general health and body of the workman are to be considered. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 518 S.W.2d at 526. Thus, if an additional injury occurs in the probable sequence of events and aris[es] from the actual compensable injury, it is deemed to have occurred in the course and scope of employment for compensation purposes. Duke, 900 S.W.2d at 886. For example, in Western Casualty, the employee injured his finger at work. He became permanently disabled because of pain medication administered to treat his injury. See 518 S.W.2d at 525. We held that he was entitled to compensation for total disability. See id. at 528. Similarly, in Duke, the employee injured her right knee at work. See 900 S.W.2d at 883. Her doctor operated on the wrong knee, and complications resulted in the loss of her left knee cap. See id. The court concluded that the loss of her left knee cap was a compensable injury. See id. at 886. Drugs prescribed for on-the-job injuries are considered part of an employee's treatment under the Act. [2] See Tex. Rev.Civ. Stat. arts. 8308-1.03(20)(E), 8308-4.69 (repealed) (current versions at Tex. Lab.Code §§ 401.011(19)(E), 408.028). In her deposition, Payne testified that when she returned to work after her injury her back was easily irritated, and this interfered with her ability to do her job. Dr. Green prescribed Toradol to treat her back pain, and she filled this prescription at the hospital pharmacy. Payne suffered a severe reaction to the Toradol after taking it for four and one-half months. Clearly, Payne's Toradol reaction resulted from treating her on-the-job back injury; therefore, her injury arose in the course and scope of her employment for compensation purposes. Payne concedes that her reaction to Toradol is a compensable injury under the Act, and that she has been receiving workers' compensation benefits for her Toradol reaction since February 1993. Necessarily, then, Payne agrees that, at least for compensation purposes, her Toradol reaction arose in the course and scope of her employment. But Payne argues that her Toradol reaction was an independent injury that did not occur in the course and scope of her employment for purposes of the exclusive-remedy provision, which applies only to work-related injur[ies]. The hospital, on the other hand, contends, and the court of appeals agreed, that compensability and exclusivity are coextensive, and that the recovery of benefits under the Act is the exclusive remedy against a covered employer for a compensable injury. We have never decided whether an injury arising in the course and scope of employment for compensation purposes is necessarily work-related for exclusivity purposes. See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 8308-4.01(a) (repealed) (current version at Tex. Lab.Code § 408.001(a)). The Act does not define work-related injury, and this Court has not construed the term. Courts seem to use the terms course and scope of employment and work-related interchangeably. This Court has used the term work-related when discussing compensable injuries, even though the Act defines a compensable injury as one that arises in the course and scope of employment. See Albertson's, 984 S.W.2d at 959 (Sinclair filed a compensation claim ... for an alleged work-related injury.); Lewis v. Lewis, 944 S.W.2d 630, 630 (Tex.1997) (Lewis suffered a work-related injury ... for which he claimed compensation.). And other courts have referred to injuries arising in the course and scope of employment when discussing the exclusive-remedy provision, even though that provision refers to work-related injuries. See Hoffman v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 979 S.W.2d 88, 89 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1998, pet. dism'd by agr.) (The Texas Workers' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for an employee injured in the course and scope of his employment.); Dickson v. Silva, 880 S.W.2d 785, 788 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (The [A]ct provides the exclusive remedy for injuries employees sustain in the course of their employment.). Whether or not compensability and exclusivity are always and for all purposes coextensive, which we do not decide, we hold that they are coextensive here. If Payne's Toradol reaction, which arose out of the treatment of her on-the-job injury, is deemed to have occurred during the course and scope of her employment for compensation purposes, we see no reason why it should not also be deemed work-related for exclusivity purposes. After all, in exchange for affording employees prompt and certain recovery for on-the-job injuries, the Workers' Compensation Act shields employers from common-law liability for those injuries. See Paradissis, 507 S.W.2d at 529. Payne argues that we should not consider her Toradol reaction work-related for exclusivity purposes because (1) she was not in the course and scope of her employment when she obtained Toradol from the hospital pharmacy, and (2) she stood in a consumer-retailer, rather than an employer-employee, relationship with the hospital when she obtained the Toradol. We consider these arguments in turn. Payne claims that she was not in the course and scope of her employment when she obtained Toradol from the hospital pharmacy because she filled her prescription after work and on her days off, she never took Toradol while working, and she could have chosen to fill her prescription at any pharmacy. Payne relies upon Ruiz v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 158 Misc.2d 948, 607 N.Y.S.2d 207, 208 (N.Y.App. Term 1993), aff'd, 211 A.D.2d 539, 621 N.Y.S.2d 345 (N.Y.App.Div.1995), to support her argument. In Ruiz, an employee was injured when a pharmacy operated by Chase improperly filled her prescription. See Ruiz, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 208. The court held that the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation law did not bar the employee's claim because there was no nexus between the injury and the employment. See id. In so holding, the court pointed out that the prescription was for a non-work-related injury. See id. The court also emphasized that the pharmacy was open to both Chase employees and non-Chase employees who worked in the same office building, without special discounts or privileges for Chase employees. See id. Here, Payne filled a prescription, without charge, for an on-the-job injury at a hospital pharmacy open only to hospital patients and employees filling prescriptions for on-the-job injuries. Thus, Ruiz is distinguishable and does not support Payne's position. Texas courts have held that the aggravation of an employee's on-the-job injury is work-related for purposes of the exclusive-remedy provision. See Darensburg v. Tobey, 887 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied); cf. Godinet v. Thomas, 824 S.W.2d 632, 633 (Tex.App.-Houston [14 th Dist.] 1991, writ denied). In Darensburg, an employee's on-the-job injury was aggravated after being misdiagnosed by the medical director of his employer's on-site health facility. See 887 S.W.2d at 85-86. The court of appeals held that the exclusive-remedy provision barred his suit for the aggravation injury. See id. at 90. Payne attempts to distinguish Darensburg, claiming that the employee there was treated at a company facility not open to the general public by a doctor authorized to treat only company employees, while the hospital pharmacy was available to any patient or employee. See id. at 85, 87. Moreover, Payne claims she was not required to use the hospital pharmacy and was free to fill her prescription at any pharmacy she wished. But by providing free prescriptions to employees for on-the-job injuries, the hospital was providing an employment benefit that Payne utilized in filling her Toradol prescription at the hospital pharmacy. Thus, we cannot say that Payne was not in the course and scope of her employment when she filled her Toradol prescription. Payne next argues that the exclusivity provision should not apply because she stood in a consumer-retailer, rather than an employer-employee, relationship with the hospital when she filled her prescription. Despite Payne's protestations to the contrary, her argument raises the dual-capacity doctrine. [3] Under that doctrine, an employer normally shielded from liability by the workers' compensation exclusive-remedy principle may become liable in tort to an employee if it occupies, in addition to its capacity as an employer, a second capacity that confers on it obligations independent of those imposed on it as an employer. See 2A A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 72.80. We have never decided whether an employee may use the dual-capacity doctrine to avoid the Act's exclusive-remedy provision. But even if we were inclined to recognize the doctrine, [4] which we do not decide, it does not apply here. The test for determining dual capacity is not concerned with how separate or different the second function of the employer is from the first but whether the second function generates obligations unrelated to those from the first, that of employer. Larson, supra, § 72.80. An employee, therefore, may sue her employer in tort only if her employer's second capacity is independent and unrelated to its status as an employer. Here, the summary-judgment evidence establishes that the hospital only filled Payne's prescription because it was her employer. The hospital pharmacy does not dispense drugs to the general public, and except for employees who have been injured on the job, it does not dispense medications to hospital employees. The hospital pharmacy fills prescriptions for employees only if a doctor has ordered the medication to treat a work-related injury. Before filling these prescriptions, the pharmacy verifies that the employee is a workers' compensation claimant and that a doctor has ordered the prescription to treat a work-related injury. When an employee who has been injured on the job obtains medication for that injury at the hospital pharmacy, the pharmacy collects no money from the employee. Because the hospital only filled Payne's prescription because she sustained an on-the-job injury, the hospital was acting in its capacity as an employer when it filled Payne's prescription and the dual-capacity doctrine does not apply.