Opinion ID: 4562342
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: Four members of the Somali diaspora appeal from their convictions for sending, or conspiring to send, $10,900 to Somalia to support a foreign terrorist organization. Their appeal raises complex questions regarding the U.S. government’s authority to collect bulk data about its UNITED STATES V. MOALIN 7 citizens’ activities under the auspices of a foreign intelligence investigation, as well as the rights of criminal defendants when the prosecution uses information derived from foreign intelligence surveillance. We conclude that the government may have violated the Fourth Amendment and did violate the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) when it collected the telephony metadata of millions of Americans, including at least one of the defendants, but suppression is not warranted on the facts of this case. Additionally, we confirm that the Fourth Amendment requires notice to a criminal defendant when the prosecution intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose information obtained or derived from surveillance of that defendant conducted pursuant to the government’s foreign intelligence authorities. We do not decide whether the government failed to provide any required notice in this case because the lack of such notice did not prejudice the defendants. After considering these issues and several others raised by the defendants, we affirm the convictions in all respects. BACKGROUND 1
Somalia’s turbulent recent history forms the backdrop for this case. After military dictator Siad Barre was ousted in 1991, the country spiraled into civil war. Fighting between rival warlords led to a humanitarian crisis in Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, and other parts of the country. An estimated 30,000 people died in Mogadishu alone, and hundreds of thousands more were displaced. As the war 1 All the factual information presented in this opinion comes from unclassified or declassified sources. 8 UNITED STATES V. MOALIN continued, its impact on the populace was exacerbated by recurring periods of severe drought and famine. In 2004, an interim government for Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government (“TFG”), was established in Kenya. Although the TFG received significant international support, it faced widespread distrust and opposition in Somalia. The TFG installed itself in Somalia with the protection of Ethiopian military forces, which occupied Somalia beginning in 2006. Somali opposition to the TFG and the Ethiopian occupation developed into a broad-based, violent insurgency undertaken by a variety of groups with disparate agendas. One element of the insurgency was a group called “alShabaab,” which means “the youth” in Arabic. Al-Shabaab used distinctive types of violence, such as improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings. In March 2008, the United States designated al-Shabaab a foreign terrorist organization. A key figure in al-Shabaab, Aden Hashi Ayrow, was killed in a U.S. missile strike on May 1, 2008. Many Somalis have fled the country. An estimated three million live abroad, creating a global Somali diaspora. Somalis abroad often remain actively engaged in developments in Somalia, and contributions from the diaspora are a critical source of financial support within the troubled country. As Somalia has no formal banking system, members of the diaspora who wish to send money back frequently rely on informal money transfer businesses called “hawalas.”
Defendants Basaaly Saeed Moalin (“Moalin”), Mohamed Mohamed Mohamud (“M. Mohamud”), Issa UNITED STATES V. MOALIN 9 Doreh (“Doreh”), and Ahmed Nasir Taalil Mohamud (“Nasir Mohamud”) immigrated to the United States from Somalia years ago and lived in Southern California. 2 Moalin and Nasir Mohamud were taxicab drivers; M. Mohamud was an imam at a mosque; and Doreh worked at Shidaal Express, a hawala. Between October 2010 and June 2012, the United States (“the government”) charged defendants in a five-count indictment with conspiring to send and sending $15,900 to Somalia between January and August of 2008 to support alShabaab. 3 The charges against all four defendants were: conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a); conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1); and conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) and (h). Moalin, M. Mohamud, and Doreh were charged with an additional count of providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) and (2), and Moalin was charged with a further count of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a), based on his alleged provision of a house in Somalia to members of al-Shabaab. Shortly after filing the initial indictment, the government filed notice that it intended to use or disclose in the proceedings “information obtained or derived from 2 Moalin and Doreh are U.S. citizens, M. Mohamud has refugee status, and Nasir Mohamud has a visa. 3 At trial, the government sought only to prove that defendants had sent $10,900 to support al-Shabaab. 10 UNITED STATES V. MOALIN electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to the authority of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.” At trial, the government’s principal evidence against defendants consisted of a series of recorded calls between Moalin, his codefendants, and individuals in Somalia, obtained through a wiretap of Moalin’s phone. The government obtained access to Moalin’s calls after receiving a court order under FISA Subchapter I, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1812. Several of the recorded calls involved a man who went by “Shikhalow” (sometimes spelled “Sheikalow”) or “Majadhub,” whom the government contends was Ayrow, the important al-Shabaab figure. In addition to the intercepted phone calls, the government introduced records of money transfers completed by Shidaal Express, the hawala where Doreh worked. In a recorded call from December 2007, Shikhalow requested money from Moalin for “rations.” The two men also discussed other fundraising efforts relating to a school. Moalin then spoke with Doreh, reporting that “[o]ne dollar a day per man” was needed for forces stationed “where the fighting [is] going on.” Moalin also spoke with Nasir Mohamud, telling him that money was needed for “the young men who are firing the bullets” and that, within the last month, “these men cut the throats of 60” Ethiopians and destroyed up to five vehicles. Ten days later, Moalin called Shikhalow to tell him that he had sent $3,300 using the recipient name “Yusuf Mohamed Ali.” Transaction records from the Shidaal Express reveal two transfers of $1,950 each to “yusuf mohamed ali” from “Duunkaal warsame warfaa” and “safiya Hersi.” Two days later, Moalin called Shikhalow again, and Shikhalow told him he had “received the three.” Moalin also offered Shikhalow the use of one of his houses in Somalia, UNITED STATES V. MOALIN 11 which, Moalin noted, had an attic suitable for hiding documents and weapons. A half-hour after making the call to Shikhalow, Moalin told another acquaintance he “was talking to the man who is in charge of the youth.” Later, in January 2008, Moalin called Shikhalow again, urging him to allow another group to handle “overall politics” while Shikhalow dealt with “military matters.” Shikhalow disagreed, stating, “we, the Shabaab, have a political section, a military section and a missionary section.” Shikhalow recounted recent incidents in which his group had planted a landmine and launched mortar shells at the presidential palace, and requested more money “to support the insurgent.” Communications between Moalin and Shikhalow continued through April 2008, during which time several money transfers were made to “yusuf mohamed ali,” “YUSUF MOHAMED ALI,” “DUNKAAL MOHAMED YUSUF,” and “mohamed yusuf dunkaal.” Ayrow was killed on May 1, 2008. A week later, Moalin told an acquaintance that he did not want “the assistance and the work that we were performing” to stop, even though “the man that we used to deal with is gone.” In July 2008, a senior operational figure in al-Shabaab gave Moalin contact information for Omar Mataan. Later that day, Moalin got in touch with Mataan and promised to send money. The following week, Moalin spoke with Nasir Mohamud, reporting that they were being “closely watched,” but that they could still support “the orphans” and “people in need” and would “go under that pretense now.” Shidaal Express records show a series of transfers over the 12 UNITED STATES V. MOALIN next few weeks, including one to “Omer Mataan” and another to “Omer matan.” 4 Defendants did not dispute that they sent money to Somalia through Shidaal Express, but they did dispute that the money was intended to support al-Shabaab. They maintained that Shikhalow was not Ayrow but a local police commissioner, and that their money went to support the work of regional administrations governing in the absence of an effective central government. Moalin also presented evidence that he supported humanitarian causes in Somalia during the time period of the indictment. In February 2013, the jury convicted defendants on all counts.
Before trial, Moalin moved to suppress, among other things, “all interceptions made and electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to [FISA], 50 U.S.C. § 1801, et seq., and any fruits thereof, and/or for disclosure of the underlying applications for FISA warrants.” Moalin contended that information in the government’s applications for the FISA wiretap may have been “generated by illegal means”—that is, that the government may have violated the Fourth Amendment or its statutory authority under FISA in collecting information supporting the FISA warrants. The district court denied Moalin’s suppression motion and did not grant security-cleared defense counsel access to the documents supporting the FISA orders. 4 We review the call transcripts in greater deal in Part V of the Discussion section of the opinion, infra pp. 53–57. UNITED STATES V. MOALIN 13 Two days before trial, the prosecution disclosed an email from a redacted FBI email address to the government’s Somali linguist, who was monitoring Moalin’s phone calls during the wiretap. The email said: “We just heard from another agency that Ayrow tried to make a call to Basaaly [Moalin] today, but the call didn’t go through. If you see anything today, can you give us a shout? We’re extremely interested in getting real-time info (location/new #’s) on Ayrow.” Months after the trial, in June 2013, former National Security Agency (“NSA”) contractor Edward Snowden made public the existence of NSA data collection programs. One such program, conducted under FISA Subchapter IV, involved the bulk collection of phone records, known as telephony metadata, from telecommunications providers. Other programs, conducted under the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, involved the collection of electronic communications, such as email messages and video chats, including those of people in the United States. Subsequent statements of public officials defending the telephony metadata collection program averred that the program had played a role in the government’s investigation of Moalin. These statements reported that the FBI had previously closed an investigation focused on Moalin without bringing charges, then reopened that investigation based on information obtained from the metadata program. For instance, in a hearing before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence held shortly after the Snowden disclosures, then-FBI Deputy Director Sean Joyce described a post-9/11 investigation conducted by the FBI that initially “did not find any connection to terrorist activity. Several years later, under [FISA Subchapter IV], the NSA provided us a telephone number only in San Diego that had 14 UNITED STATES V. MOALIN indirect contact with an extremist outside the United States.” Joyce explained that the FBI “served legal process to identify who was the subscriber to this telephone number,” then, after “further investigation and electronic surveillance that we applied specifically for this U.S. person with the FISA Court, we were able to identify co-conspirators, and we were able to disrupt” their financial support to a Somali designated terrorist group. According to Joyce, “if [the FBI] did not have the tip from NSA, [it] would not have been able to reopen that investigation.” In another congressional hearing, Joyce specifically named Moalin as the target of the investigation. On September 30, 2013, defendants filed a motion for a new trial. Defendants argued that the government’s collection and use of Moalin’s telephony metadata violated the Fourth Amendment, and that the government had failed to provide notice of the metadata collection or of any surveillance of Moalin it had conducted under the FISA Amendments Act, including, potentially, the surveillance referred to in the email to the linguist. The district court denied the motion, concluding that “public disclosure of the NSA program adds no new facts to alter the court’s FISA . . . rulings,” and that the telephony metadata program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Moalin, No. 10-CR-4246 JM, 2013 WL 6079518, at ,  (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013). This appeal followed. On appeal, defendants continue to challenge the metadata collection and the lack of notice of both the metadata collection and of any additional surveillance not disclosed by the government. They also make arguments regarding the government’s obligation to produce exculpatory evidence; the district court’s evidentiary rulings; and the sufficiency of the evidence to UNITED STATES V. MOALIN 15 convict Doreh. We present the facts relating to each argument as we analyze it.