Opinion ID: 1451124
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Under Circumstances Manifesting Extreme Indifference to the Value of Human Life

Text: Jefferson contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conclusion that his actions were under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. This court has defined extreme indifference as deliberate conduct that culminates in the death of another person. See, e.g., Wyles v. State, 368 Ark. 646, 249 S.W.3d 782 (2007); Branstetter v. State, 346 Ark. 62, 57 S.W.3d 105 (2001); Davis v. State, 325 Ark. 96, 925 S.W.2d 768 (1996). Jefferson argues that his deliberate conduct, even read in the light most favorable to the State, did not culminate in the death of Trooper Carthron. Jefferson states: The word culminate means to reach the highest or a climactic or decisive point. Had the Jefferson vehicle hit Trooper Carthron or someone else, that would have been the culmination of Jefferson's deliberate conduct. But the collision of a trailing car with a person whom Jefferson had passed without injury is too attenuated under the statute and cannot be a basis for a homicide conviction. It appears that Jefferson asserts that the State was required to prove that Jefferson's vehicle hit Trooper Carthron. We disagree. As we recently noted in Perry v. State, 371 Ark. 170, 177-78, 264 S.W.3d 498, 502-03 (2007): This court has a line of cases in which it has said that in felony murder the culpable intent or mens rea relates to the crime of the underlying felony ... and not to the murder itself. Jenkins v. State, 350 Ark. 219, 225, 85 S.W.3d 878, 881 (2002); Cook v. State, 345 Ark. 264, 269, 45 S.W.3d 820, 823 (2001); Jones v. State, 336 Ark. 191, 204, 984 S.W.2d 432, 438 (1999) ([I]n felony murder, a defendant need only have the requisite intent to commit the underlying felony, not the murder). . . . This court has observed recently that [t]he requirement of extreme indifference involves actions that evidence a mental state on the part of the accused to engage in some life-threatening activity against the victim. Williams v. State, 351 Ark. 215, 224, 91 S.W.3d 54, 59 (2002). See Jordan v. State, 356 Ark. 248, 255, 147 S.W.3d 691, 694-95 (2004). Clearly, our reference to against the victim was not made with respect to a specific victim deliberately or purposefully killed, but generally referred to the person who died as a result of the defendant's perpetration of the felony. Thus, the required intent when a person is killed in the course of and in furtherance of or in immediate flight from the felony, here, aggravated robbery, is the intent to commit the felony and not the intent to commit the murder. See Jordan, 356 Ark. at 255, 147 S.W.3d at 694. Jefferson does not dispute that he had the requisite intent to commit aggravated robbery. Jefferson also argues that the Original Commentary to Ark.Code Ann. § 5-10-101 (Repl.1995) makes clear that this situation cannot sustain a conviction for capital murder. The Original Commentary provides, in part: Second, the killing must be done under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. The extreme indifference language makes it clear that proof of an inadvertent killing in the course of a felony will not suffice to establish liability under § 5-10-101(a)(1).... In the absence of this language, a conviction entailing punishment by death could be based on conduct that would otherwise support at most only a conviction of manslaughter or even negligent homicidefor example, where the actor, in making his escape, negligently causes the death of another in an automobile accident occurring several blocks away from the scene of the crime. The Code formulation resulted from an examination of considerations going to the heart of the felony murder rule itself[.] Jefferson states that the accidental killing of one law enforcement officer by another in the course of pursuing a fleeing felon was specifically rejected by the framers of the Criminal Code as a felony murderas evinced by the Original Commentaryand does not fit the strictly construed criteria of the relevant statute. The State contends that, while Jefferson makes much of the Original Commentary regarding the felony-murder statute, which notes that proof of an inadvertent killing and negligently caus[ing] the death of another will not suffice, the facts of this case show that Jefferson did not merely negligently cause the death, but caused the death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. The State avers that a person who robs someone with a gun, flees with his accomplice and the loot in a stolen car on a busy interstate, and initiates a high-speed chase when pursued by several law-enforcement officers with their lights and sirens blaring engages in life-threatening activity. Therefore, the State argues that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, substantial evidence supported a finding that Jefferson acted under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. The State's argument is well taken. We hold that the circuit court did not err in denying Jefferson's directed-verdict motion on the grounds that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Jefferson acted under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life.