Opinion ID: 218871
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Similar To

Text: The critical question is whether Landa's offense was similar to a juvenile status offense. In the years after the adoption of the Guidelines, the courts of appeals developed different approaches for determining the meaning of similar to in § 4A1.2(c). See United States v. Grob, 625 F.3d 1209, 1213-14 (9th Cir.2010) (discussing approaches used in different circuits). In 2007, the Sentencing Commission promulgated a test in an Application Note to § 4A1.2 for determining similarity: In determining whether an unlisted offense is similar to an offense listed in subdivision (c)(1) or (c)(2), the court should use a common sense approach that includes consideration of relevant factors such as (i) a comparison of punishments imposed for the listed and unlisted offenses; (ii) the perceived seriousness of the offense as indicated by the level of punishment; (iii) the elements of the offense; (iv) the level of culpability involved; and (v) the degree to which the commission of the offense indicates a likelihood of recurring criminal conduct. U.S.S.G. Supp. to app. C amend. 709 (codified at § 4A1.2 cmt. n.12). We have held that the common sense approach in Application Note 12 is now the governing test for similarity. Grob, 625 F.3d at 1213-14; see also United States v. Lichtenberg, 631 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir.2011). Our common sense evaluation is guided by the factors enumerated in the Application Note. Grob, 625 F.3d at 1215-19. The first factor in determining similarity under the Application Note to § 4A1.2 is a comparison of punishments imposed for the listed and unlisted offenses. For purposes of comparing a listed offense and a potentially similar unlisted offense, we look first to any federal definition of the listed offense. Grob, 625 F.3d at 1215. If there is no federal definition, we look to either the Model Penal Code or state definition. Id. However, none of those sources contains a single definition of juvenile status offense. California law does, however, specify certain prototypical juvenile status offenses, including underage possession of tobacco and truancy by minors. Cf. United States v. Ward, 71 F.3d 262, 263 (7th Cir.1995) (purchase of cigarettes is prototypical juvenile status offense); United States v. Miller, 987 F.2d 1462, 1465-66 (10th Cir.1993) (truancy and loitering are juvenile status offenses). Given that we are asked to determine the similarity of a California offense to juvenile status offenses, we should primarily rest our analysis on a comparison of Landa's offense to these California offenses. Following our recent decision in Grob, we should focus on the punishment actually imposed for the unlisted offense, rather than the maximum possible punishment, because the level of punishment imposed for a particular offense serves as a reasonable proxy for the perceived severity of the crime. 625 F.3d at 1216 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The defendant in Grob had been convicted of an act of criminal mischief, which ordinarily carried potential penalties of $1,500 and six months' imprisonment. The question was whether criminal mischief was similar to the offense of disorderly conduct, which ordinarily carried a possible sentence of $100 and ten days imprisonment under state law. Because Grob himself had actually been fined only $130 for his act of criminal mischief, the court held that the two offenses were similar, despite the large difference in the available maximum sentences. Id. at 1216. The maximum penalty for a violation of California Vehicle Code § 23140(a) is a fine ($100 for a first offense, $200 for a second offense, and $300 thereafter), loss of the offender's driver's license for one year, and the requirement that the offender attend a driving-under-the-influence program. Cal. Veh.Code §§ 13202.5, 23140, 23502, 42001.25. A violation of § 23140(a) is not punishable by imprisonment. Cal.Penal Code § 19.6. The penalty actually imposed on Landa was 18 months' probation, to terminate immediately upon the payment of $665. Because Landa was a first-time offender, his fine should have been $100. The record does not give any indication how the court arrived at $665. I assume that $555 of that amount was attributable to court fees. The record does not reflect whether Landa's license was suspended or whether he was ordered to attend a remedial program, but since those penalties are automatic it is likely that they were imposed. Cal. Veh.Code §§ 13202.5, 23502(a). By comparison, the penalty for underage tobacco possession is a $75 fine or 30 hours of community service. Cal.Penal Code § 308(b). The maximum penalties for truancy, after repeated violations, are a $100 fine, suspension of the student's driver's license, compulsory attendance at a truancy prevention program, 20-40 hours of community service, or adjudication as a ward of the court. Cal. Educ.Code § 48264.5. The penalties imposed on Landa suggest that the California court regarded his offense of violating § 23140(a) as similar to true juvenile status offenses under California law. The fine is in the same range as the fines for those offenses. Driver's license suspension and attendance in a corrective program is a part of the punishment for one of those offenses. The punishment actually imposed on Landa thus falls into the normal range for juvenile status offenses. [1] I note, by comparison, that the penalty for a single violation of California Vehicle Code § 23152, which criminalizes driving by an adult with a blood alcohol content greater than .08%, is jail time of at least 96 hours and up to 6 months, attendance at a corrective program, a 6-month driver's license suspension, a fine of up to $1000 (plus court fees), and probation up to 5 years. Cal. Veh.Code §§ 23536, 23600, 13352(a)(1). Repeated offenses under California Vehicle Code § 23152 are punished by up to three years in prison, a $5,000 fine, and a five-year driver's license suspension. Cal. Veh.Code §§ 23566, 13352(a)(6). Landa's punishment is well below that range. The second factor is the seriousness of the offense. The relatively light sentence imposedprobation that could be terminated upon payment of a small fine made larger by court feesindicates that Landa's violation was not regarded by the California sentencing court as a serious offense. See Grob, 625 F.3d at 1216 (By imposing such a light sentence, moreover, the Montana court deemed Grob's crime fairly minor.). I emphasize that driving under the influence of alcohol is not a trivial matter. But Application Note 12 directs us to consider the seriousness of the particular offense as indicated by the punishment chosen by the court, not by an assessment of the dangerousness or gravity of the behavior divorced from the defendant who was before the sentencing court. The third factor is the elements of the offense. There is no generic juvenile status offense that is defined by a single list of elements. However, all juvenile status offenses share one defining element: they criminalize behavior that would not be criminal if the offender were older. As we have just held, true juvenile status offenses are those that are committed by persons under 18. Driving with blood alcohol content greater than .05% but less than .08% is criminal only for drivers under 21. Driving with blood alcohol content over .08%, on the other hand, is criminal regardless of the offender's age. In criminalizing driving with a blood alcohol content over .05% and choosing a cutoff age of 21, the legislature criminalized a risky activity because it judged that people under that age were less mature, and less able to handle alcohol, than those over the age of 21. So while Landa's offense is not a juvenile status offense because he was over 18, its elements are conceptually similar to those of a juvenile status offense. Its similarity is highlighted by the fact that § 23140(a) is contained in an article entitled Juvenile offenses involving alcohol. The majority assumes that it has been established, for purposes of sentencing, that Landa's blood alcohol content was in excess of .08%. It writes, We think it telling that Landa's conduct would have been illegal regardless of his age. Maj. op. at 841. The police reported that Landa's Breathalyzer measurements were.086% and .087%, but Landa never admitted that those measurements were correct. Landa pled guilty only to driving with a blood alcohol content in excess of .05%. It is established law that for purposes of sentencing, when applying the modified categorical test, we cannot consider information that merely appears in a police report as having been established as true. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 22-26, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005). The fourth factor is the offender's culpability. The fact that § 23140(a) is an infraction, the least serious type of criminal offense, indicates that the legislature viewed the culpability of someone violating this provision as relatively minor. Drinking and driving may nonetheless be properly regarded as a more culpable activity than other juvenile status offenses. In most of those offenses, the offender puts only himself at risk. But a young and inexperienced driver who is intoxicated, even though to a lesser degree than would violate the law for an adult, puts others at risk. See People v. Goslar, 70 Cal.App.4th 270, 278, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 558 (1999) (noting that the California legislature has recognized that younger drivers, less experienced in driving and in the use of alcoholic beverages, were more likely to be involved in accidents at lower blood-alcohol levels than older drivers). The fifth factor is the degree to which the commission of the offense indicates a likelihood of recurring criminal conduct. The Grob court explained that this inquiry is forward-looking. [R]ather than employing hindsight in light of the instant offense, when determining whether a prior offense demonstrated a risk of recurring criminal conduct, courts should look only to the circumstances present at the time of that prior offense. 625 F.3d at 1217. There is no evidence that a violation of § 23140(a) is anything more than weakly predictive of Landa's later offenses. In my view, the five factors slightly favor Landa. The comparison of punishments, the seriousness of the offense, and the elements of the offense favor Landa. The level of culpability disfavors him. The predictiveness of the offense is unclear. As a matter of common sensethe ultimate touchstone of the inquiryI am persuaded that Landa's offense in violation of § 23140(a) is similar to a juvenile status offense. Section 23140(a) criminalizes behavior that would be legal if engaged in by a person above 21, and Landa pled guilty only to a violation of that section. He did not plead guilty to an offense of driving with a blood alcohol level that would be illegal for someone over 21. The only difference between Landa's offense and true juvenile status offense is that the age threshold is 21 rather than 18. In my view, those three years do not make § 23140(a) substantially different from other juvenile status offenses. Indeed, if offenses with an age cutoff of 21 rather than 18 are not similar to juvenile status offenses, the similar to category for juvenile status offenses may turn out to be a null set. My holding would be consistent with, though not compelled by, the limited case-law of our sister circuits. In United States v. Cole, 418 F.3d 592, 598-600 (6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit reasoned that a 19-year-old's conviction for possessing alcohol, when the legal drinking age was 21, was similar to a juvenile status offense and therefore could not be counted as a criminal history point. In United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1309-10 (10th Cir. 2000) the Tenth Circuit hypothesized that a similar conviction could meet the definition of juvenile status offense and concluded that the state of the law was unsettled, although it declined to reverse a district court's contrary conclusion on plain error review. The Eighth Circuit has left open the possibility that offenses committed by those over 18 may be similar to juvenile status offenses. In Webb, 218 F.3d 877, 880 (8th Cir.2000), that court held that the conviction of a 19-year-old for underage possession of alcohol was not a juvenile status offense, but it did not consider whether it was similar to a juvenile status offense, apparently because the defendant had not made that argument. In the later case United States v. Johnston, 533 F.3d 972, 977-78 (8th Cir.2008), the Eighth Circuit noted that Webb had not decided the similar to question and quoted the Sixth Circuit's analysis in Cole, but declined to reach the question because any error would have been harmless.