Opinion ID: 1704807
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: During The Guilt PhaseThe District Attorney Attempted Impeachment of Witnesses.

Text: ¶ 56. Flowers claims that the State improperly cross-examined witnesses on prior inconsistent statements, but then never presented any evidence to prove that any of the alleged prior statements had ever actually been made. The State argues that Flowers failed to allege that the questions were not asked in good faith and that had he done so the State would have produced the statements in a proffer to be included in the record. ¶ 57. Rule 613 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence which pertains to prior statements of witnesses provides: (a) Examining Witness Concerning Prior Statement. In examining a witness concerning a prior statement made by him, whether written or not, the statement need not be shown nor its contents disclosed to him at that time, but on request the same shall be shown or disclosed to opposing counsel. (b) Extrinsic Evidence of Prior Inconsistent Statement of Witness. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This provision does not apply to admissions of a party-opponent as defined in Rule 801(d)(2). (emphasis added) There is no longer the requirement that the witness be directed to the statement on cross-examination as to a particular time or sequence. See M.R.E. 613 and comments. The witness should just be given an opportunity to explain the statement, and the opposite party must be given an opportunity to examine the statement. Under this procedure, several collusive witnesses can be examined before disclosure of a joint prior inconsistent statement. M.R.E. 613 and comments. However, this Court has also held that the stricter standard should be followed, and we have required the questions to include, whether or not on a specific date, at a specific place, and in the presence of specific persons, the witness made a particular statement. Carlisle v. State, 348 So.2d 765, 766 (Miss.1977) (citations omitted). Then with the predicate properly laid, the witness may be impeached by showing prior statements inconsistent with the in-court testimony, so long as the statement made in court is one relevant to the issue in the case and therefore not collateral. Id. (citing Williams v. State, 73 Miss. 820, 19 So. 826 (1896), aff'd, 170 U.S. 213, 18 S.Ct. 583, 42 L.Ed. 1012 (1898)). ¶ 58. More importantly here, counsel must have a good faith basis for any question asked on cross-examination; therefore, counsel may not use prior inconsistent statements as a guise of impeachment for the primary purpose of placing before the jury substantive evidence which is not otherwise admissible. Harrison v. State, 534 So.2d 175, 178 (Miss.1988) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original); Foster v. State, 508 So.2d 1111, 1115 (Miss. 1987). ¶ 59. In Harrison, where the prior statements were offered as circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer that the trial testimony of the witness was unreliable, this Court stated that the statements were not hearsay. 534 So.2d at 179. The trial judge could have sua sponte instructed the jury to consider the prior statements as impeachment evidence only, but the failure to do so was harmless error when there was ample evidence from which the jury could find the defendant guilty of murder; the statements were disclosed in open court to the witness and opposing counsel; the witness was on the witness stand and available for interrogation by counsel opposite concerning the inconsistencies; and the jury's ability to obey such an instruction is questionable. Id. As in Harrison, [t]he point of this inquiry is to expose to the jury the witness' special motive to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony. Id. See also Cantrell v. State, 507 So.2d 325, 330 (Miss. 1987) (bias is always material). As a note, attempting to distinguish the cases cited to by Flowers, the State points out that in Harrison the State was trying to impeach its own witness. Harrison, 534 So.2d at 180. In Hosford v. State, 525 So.2d 789 (Miss.1988), the only evidence the State had against Hosford was the prior unsworn statement of the State's own eyewitness. This Court stated the record showed no evidentiary basis to ask the questions that were asked of the defendant. Hosford at 792. The numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct here (including but not limited to the introduction of matters totally unsupported by any evidence) resulted in a denial of Flowers's right to a fair trial. When this occurs, this Court must reverse. See, e.g., Wilkins v. State, 603 So.2d 309, 317-22 (Miss.1992)(reversing murder conviction due to prosecution's tactics of introducing inadmissible evidence); Griffin v. State, 557 So.2d 542, 552-54 (Miss.1990) (reversing capital murder conviction due to cumulative effect of improper prosecutorial acts which denied defendant fundamentally fair capital murder trial); Hosford, 525 So.2d at 791-94 (reversing conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct in improper cross-examination including matters unsupported by evidence resulting in a denial of fair trial); Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868, 872-75 (Miss.1987) (reversing capital murder conviction due to prosecution's improper admission of evidence); Foster v. State, 508 So.2d 1111, 1114-15 (Miss.1987) (reversing capital murder conviction and stating that counsel must have a good faith basis for any question asked on cross-examination); Hickson v. State, 472 So.2d 379, 384-85 (Miss.1985) (reversing murder conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct resulting in denial of right to fair trial, citing cases prohibiting prosecutor from insinuation of matters unsupported by evidence); Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45, 49-50 (Miss.1985) (reversing capital murder conviction due to improper actions of prosecutor denying defendant his right to a fair trial); Smith v. State, 457 So.2d 327, 333-35 (Miss.1984) (reversing conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct in manner of questioning witnesses and resulting denial of a fair trial, citing numerous cases); Collins v. State, 408 So.2d 1376, 1380-81 (Miss.1982)(reversing conviction due to cumulative effect of prosecutorial misconduct, including improper statements regarding evidence not in record, which denied defendant right to fair trial); Clemons v. State, 320 So.2d 368, 371-73 (Miss.1975)(reversing conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct in arguing facts not in evidence denying defendant of his right to a fair trial); Sumrall v. State, 272 So.2d 917, 919 (Miss.1973)(reversing conviction since defendant denied right to a fair trial due to cumulative effect of prosecutor's actions). ¶ 60. Here, the State tried to impeach the defense non-party witnesses. Flowers argues that prosecutorial misconduct occurred during the guilt phase in numerous situations. We first consider Connie Moore's testimony that she had bought a pair of Fila Grant Hill tennis shoes for her son, after which the State tried to show that she had bought them for Flowers. On cross-examination of Moore the State questioned her about the shoes: Q. Did you tell your son Lemarcus Moore that you wanted him to go to Curtis' lawyer, Mr. Gilmore, and lie for Curtis, tell him that Curtis was at home all morning that day? Did you also tell him that Curtis was already in enough trouble; he was going to have to lie for him, and did you further tell your own son that you wanted him to lie and say that Curtis didn't have any Fila shoes, that the only one in the household that owned Fila shoes was his brother Marcus? A. No, sir. Q. Do you deny telling your son those things? A. I didn't. Q. Do you know of any reason that your son would have to say that you asked him to lie if you didn't? A. No, sir. Q. Do you remember buying these shoes? A. Yes, sir. Q. You bought them in Greenwood, didn't you? A. Yes, sir. Q. Patricia Hollman was with you when you bought them, wasn't she? A. No, sir. She wasn't. Q. Let me ask you this. Do you remember the day you bought those shoes telling Patricia Hollman that you were buying those for Curtis' birthday present? A. No, sir. Q. Do you deny that? A. Yes, sir. Q. And if she said that, that wouldn't be true? A. It wouldn't. Q. So you deny that she was with you when you bought the shoes, and you further deny that you told her you were buying them for Curtis? A. Yes, sir. The proper predicate for impeachment was laid. Carlisle, 348 So.2d at 766. The witness was given an opportunity to explain or deny, which she did. Defense counsel did not object. However, we find the prosecutor's actions to be plain error. Brown, 690 So.2d at 297 (defendant who fails to make a contemporaneous objection must rely on plain error to raise the assignment on appeal). See also Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1289 (Miss.1994) (citing Gray v. State, 487 So.2d 1304, 1312 (Miss.1986)). Here, Moore flatly stated that she did not make the statement to Hollman that she had bought the shoes for Curtis's birthday. The State was required to continue with the impeachment and show a basis in fact for the question, or to offer a subsequent witness in rebuttal to prove Moore's prior statement was true and that Moore lied. The State's tactic here was in bad faith because the State had no basis in fact to make such a claim. On rebuttal, the State never refuted Moore's denial. Hollman testified as a State's witness and was never asked this same question by the State. Nor was she produced in rebuttal after the prosecutor posed this insinuation to Moore who flatly denied it. We find that this was clearly error by the State. ¶ 61. Flowers also asserts that the State erred during additional questions posed to Connie Moore. The State asked Moore whether she had asked her son to lie for Flowers and state that he did not own any Fila tennis shoes. This too was clearly improper questioning. While the State did not deny Flowers the opportunity to question these witnesses about a prior inconsistent statement that they were not first asked about in open court and given the opportunity to deny, that is not the issue at hand. The potential impeaching witness was apparently present. The State never offered proof that in fact would have impeached witness Moore's outright denial that she had ever asked her son to lie for Flowers or state that he did not own any Fila tennis shoes. ¶ 62. This Court has recently addressed this issue in Walker v. State, 740 So.2d 873 (Miss.1999), wherein the Court stated: The asking of questions without a factual basis leaves an impression in the mind of jurors that the prosecutor actually had such facts in hand and that the insinuations through questioning contained some truth. This leaves false and inadmissible ideas in the minds of jurors that cannot be adequately rebutted by the testimony of witnesses or instructions from the court. Id. at 884. Walker further cited to a prior case concerning this same issue of prosecutors questioning witnesses with no evidentiary basis for the questioning when making direct accusations to witnesses who deny same, and then the State makes no attempt to prove them. This Court has clearly held that it is prejudicial error for questions on cross-examination to contain insinuations and intimations of such conduct when there is no basis in fact. Id. (citing Hosford, 525 So.2d at 793). Here, the prosecutor clearly made no attempt to prove that Moore had lied when she denied these questions posed to her on cross-examination. We find error in the State's failure to offer proof that Moore lied. Such questioning without evidentiary basis has been found by this Court to be inflammatory and extremely prejudicial. Id. It certainly was prejudicial in the case at bar.