Opinion ID: 2811919
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Suppressed Evidence

Text: The government contends that even if probable cause was absent, the district court erred in suppressing the fingerprints and immigration record because their discovery was attenuated from the illegal arrest. We reject this contention. The issue is whether “the illegal arrest [was] in part for the purpose of obtaining unauthorized fingerprints so Defendant could be connected to -11- additional illegal activity.” United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1116 (10th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added). In United States v. Olivares-Rangel, we distinguished between fingerprints obtained to aid an investigation after an illegal arrest (which generally are suppressed) and fingerprints that are obtained merely as part of a routine booking procedure (which generally are not suppressed). Id. at 1112–14. Fingerprinting is  investigatory if the “purpose of obtaining Defendant’s fingerprints [is] to link him to criminal activity” and  part of the routine booking procedure if the officer seeks to confirm that the “person who has been arrested is in fact the person law enforcement agents believe they have in custody.” Id. at 1113, 1116. The district court found four facts bearing on application of the exclusionary rule: 1. Mr. Argueta-Mejia was arrested because he was a previously deported felon. 2. Officials of the Immigrations and Customs Enforcement Office conducted the booking process, and the agency’s entire purpose is to enforce immigration laws. 3. The purpose of the booking process was to obtain Mr. ArguetaMejia’s fingerprints to identify him as a previously deported felon. 4. The fingerprints were obtained to further the investigation of the immigration offense, and the unlawful arrest was exploited for the purpose of obtaining the fingerprints. -12- Appellant’s App. at 110. From these facts, the district court concluded the government had failed to show the absence of an investigatory motive. Id. We agree with the district court. The government bore the burden of proving that the evidence was attenuated from the unlawful arrest (see p. 11, above), and the crime hinged on identity and proof that the Attorney General had not granted permission to reenter the country. See United States v. Pena-Montes, 589 F.3d 1048, 1058 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating that the critical evidence necessary to convict the defendant of illegal reentry was “identity itself: [the defendant’s] fingerprints and related records”); see also United States v. Garcia-Beltran, 389 F.3d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n the investigation of immigration offenses, establishing the identity of the suspect is an essential component of such an investigation.”). For these aspects of its burden of proof, the government needed Mr. ArguetaMejia’s immigration record. And there is no evidence of the government’s ability to retrieve the immigration record without Mr. Argueta-Mejia’s fingerprints. In these circumstances, we conclude that the government failed to prove that the evidence had been attenuated from the illegal arrest. The government acknowledges that the district court made three correct factual findings: 1. Mr. Argueta-Mejia was arrested because he was a previously deported felon. -13- 2. The Immigrations and Customs Enforcement Office conducted the booking process. 3. The purpose of the booking process was to obtain Mr. ArguetaMejia’s fingerprints to identify him as a previously deported felon. But the government argues the district court wrongly interpreted the significance of these findings, claiming that  the “purpose of the arrest” was not to obtain fingerprints,  the fingerprints were taken as part of a routine booking procedure, and  the purpose of fingerprinting Mr. Argueta-Mejia was to verify his identity rather than to obtain additional information. We reject these arguments. The district court’s inferences from these factual findings are subject to clear error review (see p. 11, above), and we have no reason to regard these inferences as clearly erroneous. The government also argues that  the district court misapplied an Eighth Circuit case (United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751 (8th Cir. 2001)), and  exclusion of evidence is unwarranted here in light of the policies surrounding the exclusionary rule. These arguments are unpersuasive. First, we cannot reverse based on the district court’s reliance on the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Guevara-Martinez. There the appellate court held that an investigatory motive may be inferred when a defendant is fingerprinted after an interview with immigration officials. GuevaraMartinez, 262 F.3d at 756. That holding arguably applied here because the -14- district court found that the fingerprinting of Mr. Argueta-Mejia was motivated at least in part to aid an investigation. Though the Eighth Circuit decision was not precedential in our circuit, it might have been considered persuasive. Regardless of its persuasive value, however, the district court made a factual finding that the government had taken the fingerprints at least in part to aid the investigation. See pp. 12-13, above. Whatever we think of the Eighth Circuit’s opinion, the district court’s factual finding binds us under the clear-error standard. Finally, we reject the government’s policy argument. The policy ramifications of the exclusionary rule can be debated. See, e.g., Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 5-22 (2001) (discussing the policy arguments for and against the exclusionary rule). But our decision is guided by precedent, not policy considerations. The district court’s finding of an investigatory motive compels exclusion under our precedent in Olivares-Rangel.