Opinion ID: 4532137
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Florida Felony Battery

Text: Florida’s felony-battery statute provides that a person commits felony battery if he (a) Actually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other; and (b) Causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement. Fla. Stat. § 784.041(1). In Vail-Bailon, this Court, sitting en banc, held that Florida felony battery under Fla. Stat. § 784.041(1) categorically qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 2L1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d at 1295. That decision is binding here.3 Welch concedes this and acknowledges that he makes the argument only to preserve it for further review. In light of our en banc holding in Vail-Bailon, 3 Although Vail-Bailon involved an analysis of a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines and not a “violent felony” under the ACCA, we have previously recognized—including in Welch’s direct appeal—that “the definitions of ‘crime of violence’ under the Sentencing Guidelines and ‘violent felony’ under the [ACCA] are virtually identical,” and we “have held that considering whether a crime is a violent felony is similar to considering whether a conviction qualifies as a crime of violence.” Welch Direct Appeal, 683 F.3d at 1312 (quoting United States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250, 1253 (11th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 905 (2011)) (cleaned up). Indeed, our decision in Vail-Bailon relied primarily on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Curtis Johnson, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), which was a decision interpreting the ACCA’s elements clause. See Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d at 1302 (“[W]e conclude that the test set out in Curtis Johnson articulates the standard we should follow. . . .”). 12 Case: 14-15733 Date Filed: 05/06/2020 Page: 13 of 19 we hold that the district court did not err in concluding that Welch’s Florida felonybattery conviction was a “violent felony” under the ACCA.