Opinion ID: 206148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Consolidation and the Right to a Jury Trial

Text: Although Luera did not make a Rule 9(h) election to proceed under the admiralty rules for her claims against the in personam defendants, the question remains whether her assertion of in rem admiralty claims in the same complaint nevertheless precludes a jury trial on her in personam claims. We conclude that the mere presence of admiralty claims in the same complaint as claims premised on diversity jurisdiction does not preclude a jury trial. Appellants argue that we are foreclosed by our prior decisions in T.N.T. Marine and Durden from allowing a jury trial in this case. Other courts and commentators have construed these decisions as creating a rule in this circuit that the presence of an in rem admiralty claim in a complaint will preclude a jury trial. See Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping, Inc., 113 F.3d 1050, 1057 (9th Cir.1997) ([I]n T.N.T. Marine ... the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff had no right to a jury where he alleged both in personam and in rem claims.); Webb v. Ensco Marine Co., 121 F.Supp.2d 1049, 1052 (E.D.Tex.2000) (The crux of Durden is that, after the court dismissed the plaintiff's Jones Act claim, the plaintiff's claim against the vessel in rem `invoked the unique power of the admiralty court.' (quoting Durden, 803 F.2d at 849)); Hamilton v. Unicoolship, Ltd., No. 99 CIV 8791, 2002 WL 44139, at  (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2002) (The Fifth Circuit has not allowed jury trials on claims brought under diversity jurisdiction combined with in rem admiralty claims.); Steven F. Friedell, When Worlds Collide: The In Rem Jury and Other Marvels of Modern Admiralty, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 143, 164 (2004) ([The Fifth Circuit] has held that a plaintiff who sues a vessel in rem and its owner in personam is not entitled to a jury even if he alleges diversity jurisdiction in addition to admiralty jurisdiction.). We agree with the district court in this case that such a reading of our prior cases is too broad. Although the court in Durden and T.N.T. Marine did rely on the existence of an in rem claim in the complaint as a reason for holding that a jury trial was unwarranted, the plaintiff's inclusion of an in rem claim was important only in the factual scenario presented in those cases. Because the plaintiffs in those cases had pleaded alternative bases of jurisdiction for their in personam claims, it was somewhat ambiguous whether the plaintiffs had made a Rule 9(h) election to pursue their in personam claims in admiralty, and we used the in rem claim as an indicator that the plaintiffs wanted to pursue all of their claims in admiralty. If the inclusion of the in rem claims was automatically fatal to a plaintiff's jury trial demand, there would have been no need for the court to consider the asserted bases for jurisdiction or the language used by the plaintiffs in their complaints. These cases are therefore best read as creating a rule regarding a plaintiff's Rule 9(h) election and not a complete prohibition on a jury trial where an in rem admiralty claim is asserted in the same complaint as a claim that would otherwise carry a right to a jury trial. This case is instead controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 83 S.Ct. 1646, 10 L.Ed.2d 720 (1963). In Fitzgerald, a seaman was injured while working aboard a ship. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged three separate claims against his employer: a negligence claim based on the Jones Act, an unseaworthiness claim, and a maintenance and cure claim. Id. at 17, 83 S.Ct. 1646. The Jones Act claim carried a statutory right to a jury trial, but the unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure claims, brought under the court's admiralty jurisdiction, did not carry such a right. Id. The district court impaneled a jury to hear the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims, and the jury found in favor of the employer on both claims. Id. The court then dismissed the jury and decided the maintenance and cure claim itself. Id. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that all of his claims should have been decided by the jury. Id. The Supreme Court held that it was error for the district court to dismiss the jury because all of the claims ought to have been tried together to the same fact finder. Id. at 21, 83 S.Ct. 1646. The Court noted that the procedure used by the district court, trying a portion of the case to the jury and a portion to the bench, was commonly employed in Jones Act cases, but the Court concluded that separating the claims was an outdated and wasteful practice. Id. at 18-20, 83 S.Ct. 1646. Splitting the claims unduly complicates and confuses a trial, creates difficulties in applying doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and can easily result in too much or too little recovery. Id. at 19, 83 S.Ct. 1646. The Court held that, because the claims arose out of one set of facts, [o]nly one trier of fact should be used for the trial of what is essentially one lawsuit to settle one claim split conceptually into separate parts because of historical developments. Id. at 21, 83 S.Ct. 1646. The Court's decision did not rest on any right of the plaintiff to have his admiralty claims tried by a jury: While this Court has held that the Seventh Amendment does not require jury trials in admiralty cases, neither that Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution forbids them. Nor does any statute of Congress or Rule of Procedure, Civil or Admiralty, forbid jury trials in maritime cases. Id. at 20, 83 S.Ct. 1646. Because there was no statutory or constitutional obstacle to trying admiralty claims to a jury, the Court held that concerns of judicial efficiency and the fair administration of justice override the historic tradition of trying admiralty claims to the bench. Id. at 20-21, 83 S.Ct. 1646. These same concerns of inefficiency and potential problems applying res judicata and collateral estoppel are present whenever a claim carrying the right to a jury trial is joined with an admiralty claim that carries no right to a jury trial. All of the circuits that have addressed the issue have concluded that, under Fitzgerald, admiralty claims may be tried to a jury when the parties are entitled to a jury trial on the non-admiralty claims. Most recently, in Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping, Inc ., the Ninth Circuit faced precisely the same issue we consider today. 113 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir.1997). In Ghotra, the plaintiff, a marine surveyor, was killed while inspecting a vessel. Id. at 1053. His surviving family members brought three negligence claims premised on diversity jurisdiction against both the owner and charterer of the ship, and an in rem claim against the ship itself for negligence under admiralty jurisdiction. Id. The court held that the presence of the in rem claim in the complaint did not preclude a jury trial on the in personam negligence claims. Id. at 1057. Because the claims arose out of the same factual circumstances, the court found nothing inherently incongruous about bringing an in rem and an in personam claim together before the jury when the claims arise out of a single occurrence. Id. [6] The Third and Fourth Circuits have also concluded that the presence of an admiralty claim does not defeat a plaintiff's properly preserved right to a jury trial. In Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148 (4th Cir.1995), the Fourth Circuit held that when the accident and injuries underlying the plaintiff's law and admiralty damage claims are the same, the considerations underlying the pragmatic rule of Fitzgerald dictate its application, even when the plaintiff has named different defendants in those claims. Id. at 154. [7] In Blake v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 417 F.2d 264 (3d Cir.1969), the plaintiff, an injured longshoreman, filed a complaint alleging negligence against the shipowner under diversity jurisdiction and demanded a jury trial. Id. at 265. The shipowner then filed a separate suit in admiralty against the stevedoring company alleging indemnity. Id. The district court consolidated the two suits, trying the entire case to a jury. On appeal, the shipowners contended that the court should not have tried the issues in the admiralty suit to the jury. Id. Relying on Fitzgerald, the Third Circuit concluded that if the circumstances justify such action, a district court exercising section 1333 jurisdiction over a maritime claim may require that the issues of fact be tried to a jury in closely related actions or claims involving common issues of fact. Id. at 266. Despite this compelling authority, Appellants contend Fitzgerald does not apply to this case for several reasons. First, Appellants claim that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unified with the admiralty rules in 1966, prohibit jury trials for all admiralty claims, and that Fitzgerald did not survive the unification of the rules. We find dubious any contention that Fitzgerald is no longer good law because we, like many other courts, have continued to apply Fitzgerald after the unification of the rules. Daniel v. Ergon, Inc., 892 F.2d 403, 409 (5th Cir.1990); see also Haskins v. Point Towing Co., 395 F.2d 737, 742-43 (3d Cir.1968) (dismissing argument that Fitzgerald did not survive unification). Appellants nonetheless argue that the unified federal rules essentially provide them a right to a bench trial for admiralty claims. Rule 38(e) explains that the unified rules do not create a right to a jury trial on issues in a claim that is an admiralty or maritime claim under Rule 9(h). The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 amendment of Rule 9 similarly state, It is no part of the purpose of unification to inject a right to jury trial into those admiralty cases in which that right is not provided by statute. Appellants are correct that the unification of the civil and admiralty rules was intended to work no change in the general rule that admiralty claims are to be tried without a jury. Romero v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 515 F.2d 1249, 1252 (5th Cir.1975). But nothing in Rule 38(e) or the other rules prohibits a trial by jury on joined civil and admiralty claims. 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2315 (3d ed.2008). In this sense, the Court's observation in Fitzgerald that no statute of Congress or Rule of Procedure, Civil or Admiralty, forbid[s] jury trials in maritime casesremains accurate. 374 U.S. at 20, 83 S.Ct. 1646. Without an express prohibition on jury trials in admiralty cases, we agree with the Court in Fitzgerald that concerns of judicial economy and the fair administration of justice override the historic tradition of trying admiralty claims to the bench when the claims are closely related. Indeed, the unified rules specifically contemplate hybrid proceedings such as the one in this case by providing that admiralty and non-admiralty claims can be brought together in the same action. Rule 20(a)(2) provides, Personsas well as a vessel, cargo, or other property subject to admiralty process in remmay be joined in one action as defendants. Appellants' argument would require us to construe a plaintiff's joinder of admiralty and non-admiralty claims under Rule 20 as an implied waiver of her right to a jury trial. To be sure, Luera could have waived her Seventh Amendment right to a jury by pleading her in personam claims under the district court's admiralty jurisdiction, see T.N.T. Marine, 702 F.2d at 588, but she did not do so in this case. We do not construe her joinder of claims, which is allowed by the rules, as an implicit waiver of her constitutional right to a jury trial. See FED.R.CIV.P. 38(a) (The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment ... is preserved to the parties inviolate.); see also Ghotra, 113 F.3d at 1057 (noting that the liberal joinder rules permit claims to be brought in a single action while preserv[ing] any statutory or constitutional right to a jury trial) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, where such claims are not joined under Rule 20 but brought in separate suits, Rule 42(a) provides district courts with broad authority to consolidate actions that involve a common question of law or fact. We find it persuasive that Luera could, and at the outset she did, bring her in rem and in personam claims in separate actions. With the claims pending in separate actions, there is no question that Luera was entitled to a jury trial on her in personam claims. We see no reason why consolidation of those claims with the in rem admiralty claims into a single action should change the result. See Ghotra, 113 F.3d at 1057 ([W]e find no reason to penalize the [plaintiffs] by ruling that the decision to combine the two [claims] into one single action constituted an election to proceed in admiralty alone without the right to jury trial.). Second, Appellants attempt to distinguish Fitzgerald from this case on the basis that the Court permitted a jury trial for the unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure claims in Fitzgerald because those claims, though brought in admiralty, could have been brought at law. Unlike the admiralty claims in Fitzgerald, the in rem admiralty claims in this case are within the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. See T.N.T. Marine, 702 F.2d at 588. Appellants claim that because in rem admiralty claims cannot be brought at law, they can never be tried before a jury. We disagree with Appellants' characterization of the claims in Fitzgerald. The in rem claims here and the in personam claims in Fitzgerald were all based on the court's admiralty jurisdiction. Although the plaintiff's unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure claims in Fitzgerald could have been brought at law, the plaintiff pleaded them as admiralty claims. Once the claims were within the admiralty jurisdiction of the court, the admiralty rules applied. The Court in Fitzgerald faced the same issue we face today: A plaintiff pleaded a claim for which she is entitled to a jury trial and an admiralty claim that does not confer that right. Fitzgerald is therefore not distinguishable on this basis, and we follow the Court's lead in permitting all of the claims to be tried to a jury where the claims arise out of one set of facts. Fitzgerald, 374 U.S. at 21, 83 S.Ct. 1646. Finally, Appellants assert that the rule in Fitzgerald applies only in the context of Jones Act claims and should not be extended to cover the claims at issue in this case. This argument is premised on a supposed distinction between a statutory right to a jury trial and a constitutional right to a jury trial. Any distinction between a right to a jury in a Jones Act case and a right to a jury in a common law case is without a difference. See Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, 369 U.S. at 360, 82 S.Ct. 780 (This suit being in the federal courts by reason of diversity of citizenship carried with it, of course, the right to trial by jury. As in cases under the Jones Act ... trial by jury is part of the remedy. (internal citations omitted)). Though Luera's in personam claims do not come with a statutorily mandated jury trial right, they are endowed with a constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial. [8] Appellants fail to demonstrate why Luera's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial should be given less weight than a Jones Act plaintiff's statutory right to a jury trial. Furthermore, claims against a vessel in rem fall exclusively under the federal court's admiralty jurisdiction. Plaintiffs asserting in rem claims against vessels have no choice but to elect to proceed under the admiralty rules for those claims. Under Appellants' theory, a plaintiff in Luera's position would be left with a Hobson's choice: she could either plead her in personam claims together with her in rem claims but waive her right to a jury trial, or she could preserve her right to a jury trial by pleading her in personam claims only and forgo a legally cognizable in rem claim. Plaintiffs should not be required to make such a choice when a third option remainsupholding the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial for the in personam claims. The district court concluded that Luera's in personam claims, premised on diversity jurisdiction and subject to a timely jury demand, must be tried to a jury. The court was left with two options: try the case partially to the jury and partially to the bench, or try the entire case to the jury. As the district court recognized, Fitzgerald counsels that when one of a plaintiff's claims carries with it the right to a jury trial, the remaining claims, though premised on admiralty jurisdiction, may also be tried to a jury when both arise out of one set of facts. 374 U.S. at 21, 83 S.Ct. 1646; see also Blake, 417 F.2d at 266 ([O]nly by the decision of common issues of fact by a single trier of fact can the potential benefits of ... consolidation be realized fully.). The district court, finding that all of the claims were based on one event, causing one set of injuries, to one victim, held that the claims should be tried together to the jury. We hold that, consistent with Fitzgerald, the district court did not err by ordering that the claims should be tried together to a jury. To be clear, we do not hold today that a plaintiff bringing an in rem admiralty claim, or any other claim brought under admiralty jurisdiction, has a right to a jury trial. No statute, rule, or constitutional provision confers such a right. But neither does any statute, rule, or constitutional provision provide Appellants with a right to a bench trial. The practice of trying admiralty claims to the bench is simply one of custom and tradition. That tradition cannot trump Luera's constitutional right to a jury trial for her non-admiralty claims, and the non-jury component of admiralty jurisdiction must give way to the [S]eventh [A]mendment. Ghotra, 113 F.3d at 1057 (internal quotation omitted).