Opinion ID: 1705049
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did Leake Allege Facts Showing Appellate Counsel's Representation to be Ineffective?

Text: Leake's postconviction petition does not allege any facts, but only alleges conclusions. The petition does not specifically claim ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and only makes the following vague allegation: Sentencing court erred when it sentenced petitioner in lieu of attorney-client conflicts and denied effective assistance of counsel. In a memorandum submitted with the postconviction petition, Leake argued several instances of alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel concerning the conduct of the trial and, as relevant to the issue here, argued: Trial counsel's failure to inform the petitioner of all ramifications that attached to rejecting states plea offer, thus taking away petitioners right to choice and make an informed decision. (T.p.209-11). The state offered the petitioner a sentence of life (30 years) with the possibility of parole in exchange for a guilty plea of first-degree murder. The state also offered to run the petitioners probation violation concurrent with the sentence, as opposed to consecutive. The trial court stated that if petitioner were found guilty of first-degree murder, he would have no choice but to sentence petitioner to life in prison, plus the probation violation sentence (which only added up to thirty months). Petitioner then was erroneously informed by trial counsel that he had two choices: 1) plead guilty to first-degree murder and be sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole, or 2) risk going to trial, being found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison plus the probation violation sentence (thirty months). Trial counsel did not inform petitioner that due to his prior convictions, a sentence of life with out the possibility of parole was available nor ask the state would they even consider this option. If this option would have been available to the petitioner during plea negotiations, there is a reasonable probability that the petitioner would not have proceeded with trial and accepted offer. Leake did not allege any facts to identify what the objective standard of reasonableness would be for trial counsel under these facts. He did not present any expert opinion about what that standard would be or that trial counsel's representation fell below it. He did not allege that, if properly advised, he would have accepted the plea offer and entered a plea of guilty. Further, Leake did not allege that appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing on direct appeal this aspect of trial counsel's representation. Instead, Leake's only arguments about appellate counsel concerned such counsel's failure to argue a violation of Leake's right to be present at every stage of trial; failure to inform Leake of all procedural options regarding the due date for his pro se brief; failure to argue ineffective assistance of trial counsel in connection with the trial judge's alleged ex parte communication with jurors; failure to raise a Brady violation and denial of due process claim based on the state's failure to disclose deals made with trial witnesses; and failure to raise arguments regarding Leake's spousal privilege. Leake did not allege any facts to show what the objective standard of reasonableness would be to judge the effectiveness of appellate counsel's selection of the issues to argue on direct appeal, or that appellate counsel's representation fell below that standard. Likewise, Leake did not present any expert opinion about what that standard would be or that appellate counsel violated the standard. On this postconviction record, I would conclude that Leake has not alleged sufficient facts to warrant an evidentiary hearing on this claim of the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.