Opinion ID: 2199758
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The court's refusal to exclude accepted jurors from the courtroom during the voir dire.

Text: After the first juror had been accepted and sworn, a motion was addressed to the trial court asking for the removal of such juror and all jurors subsequently sworn from the courtroom during the interrogation of the remaining veniremen. The basis of the motion was: (1) selected jurors would hear statements made by other prospective jurors which would tend to implant in their minds notions concerning the case to be tried which would not be properly evidential, and (2) the audition of such remarks or statements might establish in the minds of the accepted jurors some prejudice or prejudices against the defendants. The application was denied and each juror sworn was permitted to occupy a seat in the jury box during the remainder of the voir dire. A large number of jurors were examined and there appears as part of the record an analytical chart prepared by counsel which purports to show the extent to which such jurors already selected were permitted to hear expressions by other members of the panel who were being interrogated as to their qualifications. Admitting there is no precedent for their position in this jurisdiction, defendants turn to Texas, where, in Gunn v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. R. 209, 234 S.W. 399, 400 ( Sup. Ct. 1921), apparently such relief was granted. No other adjudications supporting this disposition have been submitted. Counsel, however, asserts that although we have no decisions dealing with this problem here, there are pronouncements which inferentially support his position. He points to State v. O'Leary, 110 N.J.L. 36 ( E. & A. 1933), also a case in which the life of the accused was at stake. There the court stated (at page 39):    the sequestering of the jury during the continuance of the trial is a `requisition of absolute law, and is not, in any measure, a matter resting in the discretion of the court.' A rule of procedure rooted in tradition and precedent, devised for the protection alike of society and the accused, should not be set aside unless the reasons which gave it vitality no longer obtain. This is not the case here. The considerations which gave it existence are as cogent and compelling to-day as when it first took form. The opinion quotes from State v. Hornsby, 8 Rob. 554, 41 Am. Dec. 305 ( La. 1844), wherein the rationale of the practice of sequestration of jurors is stated as follows (110 N.J.L., at page 39):    `This precaution is necessary to protect the accused from any undue influence which may be exercised upon the members of the jury, even without their knowledge, and cannot be tortured into a disparagement of their integrity. Improper impressions may and will be made upon their minds by artful and designing men, of which they may be perfectly unconscious; neither can they shut their ears to the expression of popular opinion.' To which should be added that society is entitled to protection from improper influences that may be exerted upon jurors in cases of such great moment. From this it is argued that if in a capital case jurors must be shielded from hearing expressions of popular ill will toward the accused during the trial emanating from outside the courtroom, it is inconsistent to constitute them a captive audience to listen to similar expressions during the voir dire. It is said that the admonitions by the court to disregard such remarks are ineffective to extirpate from their memories the objurgations uttered in their presence. Contrasted to this theory is the admitted fact that no rule of court, no statute, no judicial decision requires, directs or even suggests directly or otherwise the removal of accepted jurors. The procedure followed in the instant case was in accord with the custom followed here from the time when memory of man runneth not to the contrary. The distinction between a jury's hearing expressions made in a courtroom during part of a trial and being subjected to expressions from certain of the public who might well be prejudiced because of the perpetration of a crime of extreme violence is quite marked. As to any incident which may occur within the courtroom, the court has an opportunity to assess the possible prejudice resulting and is in a position to provide protection for the accused by declaring a mistrial, if necessary, or through its admonitions to the jury. Obviously, such protection cannot be provided with respect to incidents which occur outside of the courtroom. History is replete with capital cases where the public feeling was at extreme heights. On these occasions a proper endeavor should be made in the application of our judicial procedure during the trial to neutralize the prejudicial effects. Moreover, while the jurors who have been selected may be subjected to statements of disqualified veniremen during the voir dire, it is also during this very process of selecting a jury that an active attempt is made to impress upon the jurors our fundamental notion of trial by a fair and impartial jury, an endeavor which is participated in by counsel for each side and the court itself. In other words, the educational process works both ways, and on balance, we cannot say that the time-honored practice which was followed here worked to the prejudice of the defendants. Even if the contrary view were accepted, still we are satisfied that any possible harm to the defendants was averted by the court's instructions to the jury at the completion of the voir dire as follows: Now, having completed the selection of the jurors, I hereby instruct you jurors that you should completely disregard and eliminate from your minds any and all questions, answers and expressions of opinion that may have been heard by you during the examination of the prospective jurors. I further instruct you that from this point on you are to determine the case and reach your verdicts or verdict solely upon the evidence presented to you by the State and by the defendants and upon the law as it will be given to you by the court at the completion of the case. And again in its final charge to the jury the court said: Let me say to you that no article which may have appeared in any newspaper or anything that you may have read or heard about this case before your selection as a juror cannot and should not be considered by you in the determination of this case; that you also are to completely disregard and eliminate from your minds any and all questions, and answers and expression of opinions that you may have heard during the examination of the prospective jurors. There can be no question but that this jury was thus adequately admonished to consider the case upon the evidence alone, a duty which they were sworn to do and which they had stated under oath they were capable of performing. Accordingly, we find no merit in the suggestion of error in the trial court's refusal to exclude the sworn jurors during the voir dire.