Opinion ID: 1130105
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Object to Officer Faux's Testimony Elicited to Bolster Thorton's Credibility

Text: Hovater asserts that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to testimony offered by the prosecution to bolster informant Thorton's credibility in violation of rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. At trial, the prosecution's first witness was Officer Faux. During direct examination, the prosecutor asked him about the reliability of Thorton and specifically asked about Thorton's involvement in other cases: Q: Did you make arrests and have charges filed using Mike Thorton? A: Yes. Q: Do you know how many people you bought from, approximately, during that period of time? A: I would say between seven and ten during that period of time. . . . . Q: Of the people who have been charged using him and go through the system ... have they been charged? A: Yes. Q: How many of those people have been convicted, if you know? A: ... Seven, I believe. Q: Were they  ever been through trial with them? A: No, I never had to go to trial on any of them. They all pled guilty after Preliminary Hearing. . . . . Q: ... Have any of the other Defendants who have pleaded guilty ever made any claims that Michael Thorton attempted to plant drugs on them? A: No, never. There has never been a hint or whisper that things didn't go exactly how the cases were presented. During this exchange, Hovater's attorney did not object to either the prosecutor's questions or Officer Faux's responses thereto. Hovater argues that Officer Faux's testimony concerning other convictions secured in part by the use of Thorton was adduced for the purpose of bolstering Thorton's credibility in clear violation of rule 608(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 608(a) provides: The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: . . .; (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. Hovater contends that Thorton's credibility was never impugned prior to Officer Faux's bolstering testimony, this testimony was improperly elicited, and therefore, Hovater's lawyer should have objected to its admission. The State responds that Thorton's credibility was indeed attacked during the opening statement of Hovater's attorney when he stated: Do we really pay  pay very close attention to the informant. Watch the demeanor. You tell me at the end of the trial whether or not you believe that he is telling the truth. According to the State, this statement amounted to an attack on Thorton's credibility and, therefore, the resuscitation of Thorton's credibility was appropriate under rule 608(a). A threshold issue is whether such an attack made during an attorney's opening statement can ever trigger the resuscitation of the attacked witness's credibility. Rule 608(a) provides that bolstering evidence is admissible only after the character of the witness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. (Emphasis added.) A number of jurisdictions with similarly worded rules have held that bolstering evidence is admissible following an attorney's disparagement of a witness's credibility during the attorney's opening statement. See United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464, 1480 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1006 (1987); United States v. Jones, 763 F.2d 518, 522 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 981, 106 S.Ct. 386, 88 L.Ed.2d 339 (1985); State v. Van Der Heyden, 615 A.2d 1246, 1249 (N.H. 1992); People v. Cherry, 161 A.D.2d 185, 554 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 854, 560 N.Y.S.2d 993, 561 N.E.2d 893 (1990). However, it is unnecessary to decide at this time whether Utah's rule should be construed in a similar manner; even if we were to so hold, the opening statement of Hovater's attorney did not attack Thorton's character for truthfulness. The statement merely advised the jury to pay close attention to Thorton, especially his demeanor, during his testimony and decide if he did or did not tell the truth. The remarks were phrased in the alternative and cannot be construed as an attack on Thorton's credibility. It is common to advise juries during opening statements to carefully observe witnesses' demeanor and the manner in which they answer questions to determine if the witnesses are or are not truthful. Indeed, preliminary jury instructions, given by some judges before the presentation of evidence, commonly advise juries to pay close attention to witnesses and their demeanor to determine the weight that should be accorded their testimony. Just as such jury instructions do not constitute an attack on witnesses' credibility, the opening statement of Hovater's attorney did not constitute such an attack. In any case, even if the opening statement had indeed attacked Thorton's credibility and even if such an attack during an opening statement could trigger proper bolstering of Thorton's credibility under rule 608(a), Officer Faux's bolstering testimony was in direct violation of rule 608(b). Rule 608(b) provides in pertinent part: Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of a crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified. Officer Faux, during direct examination, was asked about specific instances where Thorton helped secure convictions of other suspected drug dealers. He was asked how many other persons were arrested, charged, and actually convicted with Thorton's help. In addition, Officer Faux was asked if any of these persons ever claimed that Thorton attempted to plant drugs on them. This was extrinsic evidence offered to support the credibility of another witness in clear violation of rule 608(b). As such, the testimony was improper. And since the evidence had no conceivable beneficial value to Hovater, the failure to object to it cannot be excused as trial strategy. Hovater's counsel was deficient in failing to object to evidence so clearly in violation of rule 608(b). Therefore, Hovater has satisfied the first prong of the Strickland test. However, Hovater must also establish that prejudice resulted from the error, as required by the second prong of the Strickland test. He must show that but for his attorney's failure to object, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different. In determining whether Hovater has satisfied his burden, the testimony of Officer Faux, informant Thorton, Hovater, and his wife must be considered. Officer Faux testified as follows. On the afternoon of January 12, 1994, he met informant Thorton to discuss a possible drug purchase. Thorton suggested that they attempt to purchase drugs from Hovater. Officer Faux agreed. He searched Thorton thoroughly to ensure that he had no contraband. Finding none, the two drove to Hovater's house, intending to purchase methamphetamine from Hovater. After entering Hovater's home, Thorton introduced Faux to Hovater as Jeff and told him that Jeff was interested in buying methamphetamine. At Hovater's request, he and Thorton went to a bedroom alone for approximately two to five minutes while Officer Faux remained in the living room. Shortly thereafter, Thorton exited the bedroom alone. Officer Faux immediately ushered him into a nearby bathroom where Thorton gave him the methamphetamine he had received from Hovater. Officer Faux and Thorton then entered the bedroom where Hovater remained. Officer Faux handed Hovater $50, and before leaving, Thorton asked Hovater if Faux could come back again to purchase more methamphetamine. Hovater replied that he could. Next to testify was informant Thorton. Concerning the events of January 12, 1994, his testimony corresponded to Officer Faux's. Thorton testified as follows. During the afternoon, he, for the first time that day, and Officer Faux visited Hovater's home. He introduced Officer Faux as Jeff and requested that Hovater sell methamphetamine to him. Hovater led Thorton to a bedroom, where he expressed reluctance to deal with a stranger. After his fears were allayed, he removed a small bag of methamphetamine from a box near the bed and handed it to Thorton. Thorton took the drugs and left the bedroom. In a bathroom, Thorton gave Officer Faux the methamphetamine. The two then went to the bedroom, and Officer Faux handed Hovater $50. Just before they left, Thorton asked Hovater if Jeff could return to again purchase methamphetamine. Hovater replied in the affirmative. The defense called Hovater as its first witness. He testified as follows. At about 9 a.m. on January 12, 1994, Thorton came to his house. Thorton owed him $50 for stereo repairs and came to offer drugs as payment. Although Hovater refused the drugs, Thorton left the drugs, stating that they would serve as security for the debt. Later that day, Thorton returned with Officer Faux, who was introduced as Jeff, purportedly to inquire about the possibility of purchasing hotel accommodations Hovater had won in a drawing. He testified that he led Thorton into a bedroom where he kept the information about the hotel accommodations. There, Thorton informed Hovater that Jeff wanted to buy methamphetamine. Hovater testified: I said well that stuff that was left ... is there. He said I will sell him that. And I asked my wife, because I had to have  my wife put it away. She seen it was out there on the dresser or on the headboard. And she wouldn't go for that. So she put it away. And I had to call my wife into the bedroom. And my wife obtained the hotel accommodations and the ... methamphetamine. Hovater testified that Thorton left the bedroom with the methamphetamine and went into the bathroom with Jeff. They both returned together, and Thorton tossed $50 on the bed next to Hovater. After discussing the hotel accommodations, Thorton and Jeff left. According to Hovater's testimony, Thorton never asked if Faux could return to purchase drugs, and Hovater never intimated that he could. Another defense witness, Debra Hovater, Hovater's wife, essentially corroborated Hovater's testimony. Hovater argues that the crux of the case was Thorton's testimony that Hovater sold the methamphetamine to Thorton and Officer Faux against his and his wife's testimony that he did not. It was Thorton's word against his and his wife's. Therefore, he argues, the improper bolstering of Thorton's credibility went to the very heart of the case, making the bolstering prejudicial. However, the record reveals that the case against Hovater was not based solely upon Thorton's testimony, but rather, upon the testimony of both Officer Faux and Thorton. Even without Thorton's testimony, the jury had sufficient evidence to convict Hovater on the sole basis of Officer Faux's testimony, along with expert testimony that the substances received from Hovater were methamphetamine. Officer Faux testified from his own personal knowledge that (1) he and Thorton went to Hovater's house to attempt to purchase methamphetamine from Hovater; (2) when they arrived, Thorton, without methamphetamine, went into a bedroom alone with Hovater to try to purchase drugs; (3) after a brief interval, Thorton emerged from the bedroom with methamphetamine; (4) after receiving the drugs from Thorton, Officer Faux handed Hovater $50 for the drugs; and (5) Hovater said that Faux could return at another time to again purchase methamphetamine. While Hovater testified that he neither owned nor handled the methamphetamine but merely stored it as collateral for a debt, he does not deny that the drugs were at his house, that his wife put the drugs away, that he instructed his wife to retrieve the drugs which his guests took, and that he received $50 from one of his guests. Hovater was charged under section 58-37-8 of the Utah Code. That section, which was outlined in a jury instruction, prohibits any person from distributing or agreeing, consenting, offering, or arranging to distribute a controlled substance, in this case, methamphetamine. [2] Ownership of the illegal substance is not an element of the crime, and nonownership is not a defense. Nor is the actual handling of the drugs an element of the crime. See State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1320-21 (Utah 1986); accord State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 184, 185-86 (Utah Ct.App.1990). Clearly, there was sufficient evidence even without Thorton's testimony that Hovater distributed or agreed, consented, offered, or arranged to distribute methamphetamine. Hence, any bolstering of Thorton's credibility had, at most, an isolated impact on the case which is not enough to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.