Opinion ID: 3173488
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: First and Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Text: Defendants claim that the district court erred by failing to fully discuss the denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity with regard to these claims. It is 'certain, and the case law is clear, that [the officials] are entitled to a thorough determination of their claim[s] of qualified immunity if that immunity is to mean anything at all.' Payne, 749 F.3d at 701 (first and third alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting O'Neil v. City of Iowa City, Iowa, 496 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2007)). A thorough determination discusses all of the claims litigated. Here, the court denied qualified immunity by generally denying Defendants' motion for summary judgment but only analyzed the Eighth Amendment claim. Nonetheless, a review of the facts determined by the district court, as well as those likely assumed, reveals no violation of either the First or Fourteenth Amendment, and thus, we reverse and dismiss these claims as well. -10- Saylor claims that in retaliation against him for filing the state tort case and in violation of the First Amendment, Defendants (1) terminated Dr. Christensen so that Saylor no longer received adequate psychiatric care, (2) discontinued his medicines, (3) refused to provide him with psychotherapy, (4) transferred him to a new facility, and (5) kept him isolated in Administrative Segregation without review. Similarly, Saylor's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim arises due to his transfer to TSCI and his subsequent confinement in SMU. In order to succeed on a First Amendment retaliation claim Saylor must show that (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) the government official took adverse action against him that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity, and (3) the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity. Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th Cir. 2004). The reason for the government official's action must have been to prevent the plaintiff from engaging in the protected activity. Id. First, inmates have no constitutional right to receive a particular or requested course of treatment, and prison doctors remain free to exercise their independent medical judgment. Meuir v. Greene Cty. Jail Emps., 487 F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997)). As such, Defendants violated no constitutional right by assigning Saylor to another psychiatrist when Dr. Christensen's contract with NDCS ended or by changing Saylor's medication at the direction of a doctor. Second, a prisoner enjoys no constitutional right to remain in a particular institution. Goff v. Burton, 7 F.3d 734, 737 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Murphy v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 769 F.2d 502, 503 (8th Cir. 1985)). In fact, prison officials 'may transfer a prisoner for whatever reason or for no reason at all.' Id. (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983)). However, retaliation against a prisoner cannot be the motivation behind the transfer. Id. Here, the clearly stated, nonretaliatory reason for the transfer was to provide Saylor with -11- necessary psychiatric care. He refused to see Dr. Kamal at NSP, and Dr. Baker was available to work with Saylor at TSCI. Finally, Saylor was kept in Administrative Segregation, specifically SMU, because he requested his own cell due to his PTSD. This is the only area with single prisoner cells. Although he was cleared to be released into Protective Custody, he would have had to share a cell with a roommate, which he refused to do. It is blatantly contradictory to request a private cell with no roommates and then complain about isolation. Because none of Saylor's activities were protected and none of Defendants' actions were retaliatory, Saylor has no First Amendment claim. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). To state a claim under the Due Process Clause, some interest must first be violated. See Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419, 424 (8th Cir. 1999). A liberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself, by reason of guarantees implicit in the word 'liberty,' or it may arise from an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221. In most cases, substantive due process violations involve marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity. Singleton, 176 F.3d at 425 (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994)). More generally, the Supreme Court has held that substantive due process protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). In regards to Saylor's transfer from NSP to TSCI: the Due Process Clause in and of itself [does not] protect a duly convicted prisoner against transfer from one institution to another within the state prison system. Confinement in any of the State's institutions is -12- within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). Here, Saylor was transferred to a comparable prison for the sole purpose of obtaining psychiatric care. This does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and neither does Saylor's confinement in SMU once he arrived at TSCI. Saylor only has a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment if the action by the government officials impose[d] atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Segregation due to a prisoner's request to be kept in a single prisoner cell because of PTSD is not an atypical or a significant hardship. Rather, TSCI made special accommodations for Saylor. Accordingly, there has been no constitutional violation, and thus, Saylor has no cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on these two issues.