Opinion ID: 1955198
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Authority of the Judge

Text: Maryland Rule 4-325(c) provides, in pertinent part: The court may, and at the request of any party shall, instruct the jury as to the applicable law and the extent to which the instructions are binding.... The court need not grant a requested instruction if the matter is fairly covered by instructions actually given. See Smith v. State, 302 Md. 175, 179, 486 A.2d 196 (1985), quoting with approval Bruce v. State, 218 Md. 87, 97, 145 A.2d 428 (1958) (it is incumbent upon the court, ... when requested in a criminal case, to give an ... instruction on every essential question or point of law supported by evidence); Blackwell v. State, 278 Md. 466, 477, 365 A.2d 545 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 918, 97 S.Ct. 2183, 53 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977) (where there is no evidence supporting an instruction, it need not be given). It is clear from the record that requests were made to instruct the jury on the doctrine of self-defense, both perfect and imperfect. [5] And defense counsel made timely objection to the refusal of the judge to grant his requests. Md.Rule 4-325(e). The threshold determination whether the evidence was sufficient to generate the doctrine of self-defense was a question of law for the judge. We believe that the judge erred as a matter of law in refusing to grant Dykes's requests for the instructions. He recognized that the burden was on Dykes to generate the issue of perfect and imperfect self-defense. But we think that he mistook the nature of that burden. He did not find that the law of self-defense was inapplicable because the evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Dykes, did not mount up to some evidence, which would tend to show that the homicide was within the ambit of self-defense. Rather, he justified his refusal on findings of fact. He recounted the evidence in detail and found: 1) The evidence was not sufficient to show that Landon was the aggressor. 2) Dykes had the opportunity to retreat and did not do so. 3) Dykes raised a fist fight to a deadly level; he took the fight beyond a mere skirmish between two individuals to the deadly weapon stage. 4) Dykes was in no danger at all of serious bodily harm after Landon had dropped his knife. The judge concluded: I don't think the question of self-defense or an imperfect self-defense has been generated by the evidence. About all the evidence has got to say about that is [Dykes] was lured to [Landon's] home and he was lied to. He went willingly to engage in an illegal activity, and he found out after he got there he had been lied to and he wasn't going to be able to engage in that illegal activity. Certainly that is not sufficient provocation to kill a man, to stab a man. He had a chance to leave, and he didn't. Instead of leaving he did the opposite. He advanced towards the man. He had armed himself before he did it. So I don't believe that the question of self-defense or partial self-defense has been generated by the evidence, and I am not going to give an instruction on it. In short, the judge resolved conflicts in the evidence, choosing which parts of Dykes's statement and testimony to believe, weighed the evidence and made findings of fact. On this culling of the evidence, he found that the elements necessary to establish perfect self-defense had not been established and that the incidents of imperfect self-defense had not been met. This went far beyond his authority. It is now firmly established, as we have seen, that there is a legal basis in the administration of criminal justice in this State for an instruction on imperfect self-defense as well as on perfect self-defense. And we think that Dykes met the burden we have imposed on a defendant to establish a factual basis for the instructions. When the evidence before the jury here is winnowed so as to leave that which is most favorable to Dykes, it takes no more than a casual scanning to disclose that it is not bereft of some evidence which, if believed by the jury, would be sufficient for it to find that the elements of perfect self-defense or the incidents of imperfect self-defense were fulfilled. For example, there was some evidence, even though it may be difficult to accept, which was sufficient to create a jury issue whether, in fact: 1) Landon was the initial aggressor; 2) Dykes was in imminent fear of being sexually assaulted; 3) if Landon was not the initial aggressor, he became the aggressor by escalating a non-deadly affray to a deadly level; 4) a safe retreat was not reasonably possible; 5) the force used by Dykes was not excessive in the circumstances, especially in light of evidence tending to show that Landon was persistently choking Dykes; 6) Dykes had a subjectively honest and objectively reasonable belief that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. If the jury so found, it could have concluded, guided by proper instruction and looking to the totality of the circumstances, that the doctrine of perfect self-defense applied. If the jury found the first five of those factors but determined that Dykes had a subjectively honest but objectively unreasonable belief that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, it could have concluded that the doctrine of imperfect self-defense applied. See Perry v. State, 234 Md. 48, 52, 197 A.2d 833 (1964); Crawford v. State, 231 Md. 354, 361, 190 A.2d 538 (1963); Bennett v. State, 230 Md. 562, 567, 188 A.2d 142 (1963); Gunther v. State, 228 Md. 404, 409, 179 A.2d 880 (1962) (all to the effect that a person not seeking a fight but fearing an attack may arm himself in anticipation of the attack); Watkins v. State, 79 Md. App. 136, 139, 555 A.2d 1087 (1989) (defendant may claim self-defense, even as initial aggressor, if victim escalated altercation to deadly level); Lambert v. State, 70 Md. App. 83, 93, 519 A.2d 1340, cert. denied, 309 Md. 605, 525 A.2d 1075 (1987) (while general self-defense rule precludes use of deadly weapon against unarmed assailant, account must be taken, among other things, of respective size of defendant and assailant and violent nature of unarmed attack); [6] Tipton v. State, 1 Md. App. 556, 562, 232 A.2d 289 (1967) (where defender uses deadly force against nondeadly attacker, original attacker becomes defender). Of course, what evidence to believe, what weight to be given it, and what facts flow from that evidence are for the jury, not the judge, to determine. Gore v. State, 309 Md. 203, 210, 214, 522 A.2d 1338 (1987); Wilson v. State, 261 Md. 551, 566, 276 A.2d 214 (1971); Jacobs v. State, 238 Md. 648, 650, 210 A.2d 722 (1965). [7] When the trial judge resolves conflicts in the evidence, in the face of the some evidence requirement, and refuses to instruct because he believes that the evidence supporting the request is incredible or too weak or overwhelmed by other evidence, he improperly assumes the jury's role as fact-finder.