Opinion ID: 2221918
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Failure to Exercise Due Diligence

Text: Appellants first argue that the district court erred when it granted equitable relief because the Hornigs failed to exercise due diligence in having the case reinstated after the April 1, 1997, dismissal. Appellants argue that because the Hornigs did not exercise due diligence in reinstating their case, they are not entitled to equitable relief. It is a well-established maxim that equity aids the vigilant and the diligent, not those who sleep on their rights. See, 27A Am.Jur.2d Equity § 120 (1996); 30A C.J.S. Equity § 115 (1992). This maxim is qualified, however, by another principle of equity which states that a party seeking to take advantage of the maxim must be free from fault, and the party must have done nothing to lull his or her adversary into repose, thereby obstructing and preventing vigilance on the part of the latter. See 30A C.J.S., supra. The Hornigs argue that due to appellants' past conduct in stipulating to reinstatement and in continuing with discovery after the April 1, 1997, dismissal, it was reasonable for them to believe that appellants would stipulate to reinstatement after the term of court ended. In other words, the Hornigs argue that appellants lulled them into inactivity. Appellants, therefore, should be prevented from taking advantage of the maxim that equity aids the vigilant and the diligent, not those who sleep on their rights. We agree with the Hornigs that appellants' conduct prevents them from benefiting under the maxim that equity aids the diligent, not those who sleep on their rights. From our de novo review of the record, we conclude that appellants lulled the Hornigs into repose, thereby obstructing and preventing them from acting with vigilance. In this case, the dismissal occurred on April 1, 1997. After this date, appellants participated in the deposition of Dan Hartung on May 29. Appellants also participated in the Hornigs' efforts to depose appellants' expert, Paul Packman. The deposition of Packman was originally scheduled for June 18, but was continued to August 4 because of a conflict with appellants' schedule, and then was rescheduled to January 1998 because of conflicts with appellants' counsel's schedule. In addition, appellants' counsel served the Hornigs with new materials on September 5, 1997, including videotapes which were prepared by appellant Crown Equipment after appellants' initial response to the Hornigs' production requests. Obviously, appellants' counsel received a generous amount of leeway from the Hornigs in scheduling the deposition of appellants' expert witness, Packman. Then, in January 1998, appellants' counsel took advantage of the situation which he helped create by refusing to stipulate to reinstatement. Although one could argue that the Hornigs' counsel should have been more zealous, we cannot condone appellants' apparent strategy of I gottcha. We conclude that appellants' conduct prevents their use of the maxim that equity aids the vigilant, not the negligent. In light of the numerous dismissals and reinstatements in this case, coupled with appellants' continued participation in discovery after April 1, 1997, it was reasonable for the Hornigs to believe that appellants would stipulate to reinstatement. Appellants are not without fault and shall not be permitted to take advantage of a situation which they helped create.