Opinion ID: 1287078
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: motion to suppress based on alleged violation of crr 3.1 right to counsel

Text: Copeland argues that when the officers took him to the Kent City jail on July 26, 1990, and took blood and hair samples from him pursuant to the search warrant authorizing the seizure of such samples, he was denied his right to counsel under CrR 3.1 [11] and the evidence should be suppressed. The trial court, assuming that the right to counsel was violated, held that the evidence was not tainted by the violation. Under CrR 3.1(a), [t]he right to [counsel] shall extend to all criminal proceedings for offenses punishable by loss of liberty.... CrR 3.1(b)(1) provides that [t]he right to [counsel] shall accrue as soon as feasible after the defendant is taken into custody, appears before a committing magistrate, or is formally charged, whichever occurs earliest. The parties dispute whether there were any criminal proceedings giving rise to a right to counsel within the meaning of CrR 3.1(a), whether Copeland was taken into custody within the meaning of CrR 3.1(b)(1), and whether suppression of the evidence is the appropriate remedy for any violation of the CrR 3.1 right to counsel in this case. The State argues that criminal proceedings have begun only if the defendant has been arrested, and it intends to charge him with a crime. The State argues in this case that Copeland was temporarily detained solely to permit execution of the warrant. The State agrees, though, that Copeland was taken into custody. Br. of Resp't at 11. CrR 3.1(b)(1) says the right to counsel shall accrue as soon as feasible after the defendant is taken into custody.... CrR 3.1(c)(1) states that [w]hen a person is taken into custody that person shall immediately be advised of the right to [counsel].... CrR 3.1(c)(2) states that [a]t the earliest opportunity a person in custody who desires [counsel] shall be provided access to a telephone.... CrR 3.1(b) and (c) clearly contemplate that if Copeland was in custody, the right to counsel arose. CrR 3.1(a) is not contrary. Its aim is not so much to define when the right accrues but to explain that all criminal proceedings are encompassed by the rule: The right to [counsel] shall extend to all criminal proceedings for offenses punishable by loss of liberty regardless of their denomination as felonies, misdemeanors, or otherwise. CrR 3.1(a). CrR 3.1 does not support the State's argument that criminal proceedings begin only when a defendant is arrested with the intent to charge him for a crime. See Heinemann v. Whitman County, 105 Wash.2d 796, 718 P.2d 789 (1986) (custody under former JCrR 2.11(b)(1) which provided that the  right to counsel shall accrue as soon as feasible after the defendant is taken into custody  same as for Miranda purposes). When Copeland was handcuffed and taken to the Kent City jail where the samples were taken, his freedom of movement was restricted. State v. Sargent, 111 Wash.2d 641, 648-49, 762 P.2d 1127 (1988) (freedom of movement is determinative of custody for Miranda purposes). Where there is a violation of the court rule right to counsel, the remedy is suppression of evidence tainted by the violation. State v. Schulze, 116 Wash.2d 154, 804 P.2d 566 (1991). The trial court ruled that the blood and hair samples were not tainted by any violation of the right to counsel. Copeland maintains, however, that the evidence was tainted in two ways. First, he argues that if counsel had been afforded to him, counsel could have challenged the search warrant before the samples were taken. In Schulze, the defendant was suspected of committing vehicular homicide while under the influence of intoxicants. He argued that he had a right to counsel under CrR 3.1 before submitting to a mandatory blood test. This court said that assuming that the court rule right to counsel had been violated, the blood test results were not tainted by the violation. The court reasoned that even if defendant had contacted his attorney, the attorney could have done nothing except advise defendant to submit to the mandatory testing. Schulze, 116 Wash.2d at 163-64, 804 P.2d 566. Similarly, in this case counsel could not have advised Copeland to refuse to give samples because the warrant was valid. Moreover, even if the warrant was invalid because not supported by probable cause, as Copeland argues, the evidence would be suppressed based upon lack of probable cause to issue the warrant. State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wash.2d 525, 536, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993). The right to counsel argument would be immaterial. Copeland also claims that counsel could have attempted to obtain an order preventing the FBI from destroying the remainder of the DNA sample. The State aptly points out that the destroyed remainder was not from the blood drawn pursuant to the warrant. Thus, whether or not counsel could have obtained an order requiring preservation of the remaining DNA sample is a matter unrelated to evidence obtained from Copeland pursuant to the warrant. The evidence obtained through execution of the search warrant was not tainted by the violation of the CrR 3.1 right to counsel, and thus the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress based upon an alleged violation of that right.