Opinion ID: 516267
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Better Administration of Justice

Text: 213 The Supreme Court has reemphasized the special role of the trier of fact as being in the better position to decide questions that have been fully explored by the trial process. The Court discussed the importance of the sound administration of justice, in deciding which tribunal is better positioned to decide mixed questions of law and fact. Pierce v. Underwood, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2547, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988): 214 We recently observed, with regard to the problem of determining whether mixed questions of law and fact are to be treated as questions of law or of fact for purposes of appellate review, that sometimes the decision has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114, 106 S.Ct. 445, 452, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). 215 Even if an appellate court could give adequate attention to a case that occupied weeks or months of trial time, it can not be preferable to require full and independent redetermination by trial and appellate judges of the question that the jury decided. The principle of granting a certain deference on review of a jury's verdict is founded in practicality as well as logic. 216 In all events, however the question of obviousness is classified, there is an inalienable right to jury trial of the issue. The panel majority holds, again generating conflict with our own precedent, that the Federal Rules do not permit asking the jury the question of nonobviousness. While the procedural rules have changed over the years since 1791, the constitution continues to protect the substantive right to a jury trial on protected issues. 217 The right, which is secured by the Seventh Amendment is not a matter of procedure but of substance, and one possessing such right cannot be deprived of it by any means short of an amendment to the Constitution. 218 Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 213, 36 S.Ct. 595, 60 L.Ed. 961 (1916). Rule 49 is not a vehicle for defeating a constitutionally protected right to jury trial. 219 I have not discussed the pertinence to patent litigation of the deep-seated faith that free peoples place in the jury system. See, e.g., Hill, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Litigation, in 1980 Patent Law Annual; The Southwestern Legal Foundation, New York, Matthew Bender, 1980, 261, 275: 220 ... we should be careful that we do not materially trespass on perhaps the most outstanding feature of the jury system--the right of our citizens through the system to inject their common sense of justice into our judicial decisions, which can and often do affect the jurors' daily lives as well as those of the litigants. Every alternative should be fully explored before disenfranchising a litigant's cherished right to a jury trial and our citizens' right to have a part in making the law which governs them. 221 It is this right that was secured by the Seventh Amendment. It is not ours to defeat. IV The Presumption of Validity 222 I must also dissent from the panel majority's rejection of the presumption of validity in obviousness determinations. The majority holds that only the disputed facts underlying the legal conclusion must be established by clear and convincing evidence, not the ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness itself. Panel op. at 767. 223 The requirement of clear and convincing evidence of invalidity is grounded on the statutory presumption of validity, 35 U.S.C. Sec. 282. The presumption arises from the Patent Office's final decision to grant the patent: the examination that not only finds the prior art, but weighs and evaluates the technological and objective evidence, based on scientific experience and legal expertise. American Hoist & Derrick, 725 F.2d at 1358-59, 220 USPQ at 770. Included in the examination is review of all evidentiary factors pertinent to 35 U.S.C. Sec. 103. Thus the presumption is based not only on the identification of prior art and the differences from the claimed invention, but on the administrative decision of unobviousness. It is curious indeed to hold that only the former administrative actions are entitled to its benefit, accepting the expertise of the examiner as searcher but not as evaluator. 224 The question of obviousness is the most frequently litigated argument for patent invalidity. See Note: A Proposal to View Patent Claim Nonobviousness From the Policy Perspective of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), 20 Mich.J.L.Ref. 1157, 1158-59 (1987) (citing 3 Chisum, Patents Sec. 11.06[c] at 11-102). The evidentiary burden of clear and convincing evidence has been imposed in literally hundreds of such decisions, based on Federal Circuit requirement. The panel majority, by undertaking for itself to determine unobviousness in the first instance, simply places the appellate tribunal in the role of patent examiner, bringing the judges' technological and scientific expertise to bear, giving no deference to that of the patent examiner. 225 In the case before us, the jury was instructed that Kenney had the burden of proving invalidity of the Ferguson patent by clear and convincing evidence. By changing the weight of this burden, the panel majority creates another conflict with our precedent. V Validity of the Ferguson '770 Patent 226 The verdict here at issue, wherein the jury held that the Ferguson '770 patent had not been proved invalid, must be reviewed on the established standard, for the court has not in banc changed the law governing appellate review of jury verdicts. 227 On a party's motion for judgment n.o.v. (or for directed verdict, as here), the trial judge may grant the motion 228 only when, without weighing the credibility of the evidence, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment; 229 and in doing so the court 230 must view the evidence in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party who secured the jury verdict. 231 5A Moore's Federal Practice p 50.07 at 50-64, 50-70 (1987) (footnotes omitted). That standard is not followed in the full and independent review undertaken by the panel majority. When the correct standard is used, the jury verdict is sustained. 232 This litigation, reported at Newell Companies, Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 606 F.Supp. 1282, 226 USPQ 157 (D.R.I.1985), is about commercial rights to the do-it-yourself-without-tools window shade: a device of solid practicality. The jury was advised--as may have been common knowledge--that the previous way of obtaining window shades was to take your measurements to a hardware store where a clerk would saw, cut, glue, and staple the components to fit your measurements; the customer often returning to the store for a repeat attempt. The district court stated: Until the time of the claimed invention, store-cut shades were the state of the art. Id. at 1286, 226 USPQ at 158. Newell found a way to avoid all this: a simple way; a new way, as Kenney has acknowledged. 233 The Ferguson invention is not a feat of engineering. It is a simple kit whereby a householder, without tools, can easily fit a shade to his/her own window, of any width and height. It was a smashing success. It bumped from the shelves of K-Mart the entire paraphernalia that householders had previously been condemned to. And the manufacturers of that paraphernalia, having once rejected Ferguson's invitation to make the do-it-yourself-without-tools product, rushed to copy it. Id. at 1286-87, 226 USPQ at 159. 234 The scope of the patent claims is quite narrow. They are not simply to a combination of old shade and old roller, but to a detailed, specific, novel combination of all the elements of a shade that is width adjustable and installable by the consumer without the use of tools or cutting elements. 235 That a claimed invention is simple, easy to understand, or a narrow technological advance, does not foreclose patentability. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 279, 64 S.Ct. 593, 594-95, 88 L.Ed. 721 (1944); Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1572, 1 USPQ2d 1593, 1600 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1052, 107 S.Ct. 2187, 95 L.Ed.2d 843 (1987) (Though technology has burgeoned, the patent system is not limited to sophisticated technologies ... difficult for judges to understand and foreclosed to those who make less mysterious inventions a judge can understand). 236 The question before the jury was whether Kenney had proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the claimed combination would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in that field. The jury answered the question No. 237 The jury may have given substantial weight to the objective indicia of commercial success, copying, long-felt need, and failure of others, for these aspects in this case were of exceptional force. Such indicia, reflecting the contemporaneous reaction of those affected by the invention, give counterweight to judicial hindsight. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 36, 86 S.Ct. 684, 703, 15 L.Ed.2d 545, 148 USPQ 459, 474 (1966) (quoting Monroe Auto Equipment Co. v. Heckethorn Mfg. & Sup. Co., 332 F.2d 406, 412, 141 USPQ 549, 555 (6th Cir.1964)): 238 [Objective indicia] may also serve to guard against slipping into use of hindsight, and to resist the temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of the invention in issue. [Citation omitted] 239 The speed with which this industry, that the district court described as sluggish, moved to copy the Ferguson shade, when its commercial value became apparent, may have been significant to the jury. 240 The district court granted Kenney's motion for directed verdict, and held the claims invalid for obviousness. We as the appellate tribunal do not decide independently whether the window shade was obvious or unobvious: we decide only whether a reasonable jury could have reached the verdict that was reached, in accordance with the established standard of review of jury verdicts. Thus I have reviewed whether a reasonable jury could have reached the verdict that invalidity of the '770 patent had not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, and I have reached a conclusion contrary to that of the panel majority--their conclusion being based on their new standard of independent determination of the issue on the prior art. The Trial 241 The jury trial took nine days. The trial judge correctly instructed the jury as to the law of 35 U.S.C. Sec. 103, with thorough explanation of what factors the law required the jury to consider. 242 The following extracts from the multi-page instructions show the care with which the jury was instructed: Obviousness 243 There are three tests which must be considered in determining whether an invention is obvious: 244 1. What was known in the field of window shade manufacture and design at the time the invention was made; 245 2. How the claim you are considering is different from what was known in the field of window shade manufacture and design at the time the invention was made, and 246 3. The level of ordinary skill in the making of window shades. 247 In addition to the three tests of obviousness you should consider evidence of the following factors in your determination of obviousness: 248
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251 Obviousness is not determined by the use of hindsight, the fact that something seems simple to you now does not mean that it was simple at the time it was invented. You must decide the issue of obviousness solely on the basis of what was known by a person with ordinary skill in the art of making window shades at the time of the invention. You must not decide this issue on the basis of what is known now; that is, on the basis of hindsight. 252 The court instructed the jury concerning the meaning and application of the Graham factors. Illustrative of the instructions concerning the Graham factors are the detailed instructions as to the level of skill: 253 In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, you should first determine whether there was a number of people who regularly worked to solve the type of problem that the invention solved, and, if so, determine the level of ordinary skill of such people at the time the invention was made. You must consider the level of skill as to the time the invention was made. Among the factors that may be considered in your determination are: 254
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259 Neither party has asserted that there was error in the law that the jury was told to apply, including the question presented of whether the defendant 260 has proven by clear and convincing evidence that any of the claims of plaintiff's '770 patent are invalid because they are obvious ... 261 If yes, list claim numbers.... 262 We do not decide whether the trial judge, or an appellate tribunal, could reasonably have reached the independent conclusion that the claims were invalid for obviousness. Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653, 66 S.Ct. 740, 744, 90 L.Ed. 916 (1946) (it is immaterial that the court might draw a contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more reasonable). The only question is whether a reasonable jury could have held, as this jury did, that the challenger Kenney had failed to show obviousness of any claims by clear and convincing evidence. Perkin-Elmer Corp., 732 F.2d at 893, 221 USPQ at 673. 263 The evidence before the jury included the following: Prior Art 264 The jury was told of the close prior art; that the Corcoran scored shade material was prior art and was acknowledged in the specification; and that adjustable-width rollers were part of the prior art. Witnesses explained to the jury that the Rice patent described a telescoping roller for use with standard (i.e. non-tearable) shade material, and that the Gossling '468 and Gossling '944 patents disclosed telescoping rollers to which a standard shade is affixed by various adhesive means. 7 265 There was testimony that Ferguson made a new product; and Kenney's own expert witness Donofrio testified as to the differences between Ferguson's invention and the prior art. Witnesses also testified that none of the attachment means or adhesive means disclosed in the prior art was specifically adapted to adjusting and installing a shade without tools. See the trial testimony of Newell's expert witness Bushnell: 266 Q. ... how would you characterize Tom Ferguson's patent on his do it yourself without tools window shade? 267 A. Well, this product apparently has no real antecedent. There was never a product from the testimony I've heard here today and from the prior patents I've seen, that had a roll up window shade that was able to be sized at home without the aid of tools. 268 Kenney's engineer Paul Comeau agreed that the Ferguson shade was a very different shade than he had seen. In its analysis, the district court agreed that No item of prior art teaches a tear shade mounted on a telescoping roller by adhesive means. 606 F.Supp. at 1293, 226 USPQ at 164. Prosecution History 269 It was explained to the jury that the examiner had twice rejected the claims, citing prior art references and also objecting that the claims as filed were too broad. The examiner would not allow the claims until they were amended to include the critical limitation that the shade assembly is width adjustable and installable by the consumer without the use of tools or cutting elements. Level of Skill 270 The parties agreed that this device did not require complex engineering skills. The district court found that a technical background not necessarily amounting to a college degree in engineering was the only reasonable jury finding on the level of skill, and concluded that: 271 This person [of ordinary skill] would be capable of designing a shade such as the one described in Vincent Sordillo's memo. 272 Newell, 606 F.Supp. at 1294, 226 USPQ at 165. The district court was referring to a private memorandum of a Kenney employee. The court recognized that this memorandum was not part of the prior art, although the court apparently drew inferences adverse to Newell from this abandoned idea, and did not discuss whether the jury could have drawn other inferences, favorable to Newell, such as why a person capable of designing a shade, in the district court's words, did not do so. See Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454, 227 USPQ 293, 298 (Fed.Cir.1985). 273 The jury may have given weight to the undisputed fact that despite the availability of the Corcoran shade material and the other prior art, the accused infringer did not make this innovation, criticized its value, and then rushed to copy it. Objective Indicia 274 The district court recognized the outstanding public acceptance of the claimed shade, but dismissed the considerable evidence of commercial success and copying, saying that such copying does not equal nonobviousness of the claimed invention. Newell, 606 F.Supp. at 1296, 226 USPQ at 167. The record shows extensive, uncontradicted evidence before the jury, in many instances the testimony of Kenney's own witnesses, of commercial success, copying, long-felt need, and failure of others: 1. Commercial Success and Long-Felt Need 275 William Uecker, Senior Vice President for Kenney, testified that the market for window shades had been altered by this new shade, which he foresaw as taking half the window shade market: 276 Q. Did you foresee any impact in the cut-in-store shades, for example, by virtue of this do-it-yourself shade? 277 A. I saw that, and probably still do, that the market for stock window shades will end up about fifty percent of what we call the cut window shades and fifty percent of what we call the adjustable window shades. 278 John Donofrio, Kenney's design expert, agreed with the testimony of Uecker: 279 Q. ... Now do you agree, Mr. Donofrio, with the deposition testimony that was read in of Mr. Uecker, that Tom Ferguson's do it yourself without tools window shade was a significant step forward in the window shade art? 280 A. Yes. 281 Q. And do you agree with Mr. Uecker's testimony that there was really nothing like it before? 282 A. Yes. 283 G. Dickson Kenney, defendant's President, discussed the demand in the marketplace for the Newell shade, and Kenney's loss of customers: 284 Q. Now, how did you first learn that, that there was this demand in the marketplace? 285 A. Several companies had come to Kenney and requested that we develop a product similar on their behalf ... And we were aware that there had been some limited, limited successes on the part of Newell and Clopay in switching certain customers from the so-called conventional shade to the size-at-home, and some of these people that switched early in the process were Kenney customers on other products. 286 Mr. Kenney testified that millions of dollars were involved. Mr. Wright, Operations Manager for Kenney, stated that a reason Kenney entered the do-it-yourself-without-tools window shade market was because K-Mart had switched to that product. 287 Mr. Fallin, the President of Newell's window shade furnishings division, stated that Ferguson's shade was about as new as you could get at that time: 288 Q. Would you describe Tom Ferguson's do it yourself without tools window shade as an improvement on what had gone before? 289 A. Well, it was more than an improvement because it really changed the method of marketing this product line, so it was about as new as you could get at that time. 290 Fallin testified concerning the immediate success of the do-it-yourself shade: 291 Well, from the very beginning, the product started selling. We had a success from the first test store and the sales continued to climb ever since. It's never peaked. It's been a real success story.... 292 Fallin, like Kenney's witnesses, testified to consumer demand and displacement of the prior art product: 293 Q. Well, in light of that [total shade sales staying flat], can you explain why the sales of Mr. Ferguson's shade show an upward trend ... from 1975, about 30,000, to 4 & 1/2 million in 1983? 294 .... 295 A. Well, it has to be taking business from the cut in store shade because if the total units are fairly constant, and the Ferguson shade is increasing in numbers, the only place it could come from would be at the expense of the cut in store type product. 296 The district court gave no weight to the evidence of commercial impact; nor did the panel majority. Precedent requires that all the evidence, including the objective indicia, must be considered in determination of unobviousness. See, e.g., Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573, 1575, 222 USPQ 744, 746 (Fed.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065, 105 S.Ct. 2138, 85 L.Ed.2d 496 (1985) (evidence arising out of the so-called 'secondary considerations' must always when present be considered en route to a determination of obviousness.) 2. Copying 297 Ferguson testified about the interest shown in his invention, by buyers and competitors, at the January, 1976 Housewares Show in Chicago: 298 A. Well, that was the first national introduction of the product, and it was a big booth. That's the largest show in our industry so that's where all the buyers come to see the new products, and we had a demonstration, and a large display, really introducing the product to everybody. The aisles were packed with people. It was the best I've ever seen for the demonstrations. During that time, the Clopay people spent quite a bit of time in our booth, actually even measuring the physical displays, trying to understand as much as they could about our product. 299 Uncontradicted evidence showing copying by six manufacturers (Kenney, Breneman, Graber, Clopay, Joanna-Western, and Stanley) appears throughout the record. The jury could have placed weight, in its determination of unobviousness, on this imitation by the entire window shade industry. 3. Failure by Others The district court stated in its opinion: 300 There was no evidence that others skilled in the art tried and failed to find a solution to the problems preventing in-home fitting of window shades once the Corcoran material was introduced. 301 Newell, 606 F.Supp. at 1294, 226 USPQ at 165. The record does not match this statement. There was testimony that the industry had long recognized the existence of significant problems with the way window shades were fitted, yet previous solutions failed for various reasons. Fallin testified about a device designed to enable cutting a shade at home. Ferguson testified about an adjustable end-plug. 302 The jury heard this testimony that the industry was aware of the problems with the cut-in-store type of shade. They heard of attempted remedies that failed, and the development of other take-home shade systems that failed. There was substantial evidence of failure by others who were presumably of skill in the window shade art. The Jury Verdict 303 The objective indicia can comprise compelling evidence of nonobviousness. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538, 218 USPQ 871, 879 (Fed.Cir.1983) (evidence of secondary considerations may often be the most probative and cogent evidence in the record. It may often establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not.) This considerable evidence was before the jury, along with the prior art, the prosecution history, and extensive argument and explanation and demonstration by counsel and witnesses for both sides. 304 Determining the weight and credibility of the evidence is the special province of the trier of fact. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 856, 102 S.Ct. 2182, 2189, 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982). The trier of fact must not only identify the prior art, its scope and content, but it must also weigh all the evidence, impose the viewpoint of the person of ordinary skill, and determine if the burden of proof has been met. 305 A reasonable jury, on the evidence presented, could have concluded that the claimed invention had not been proved obvious by clear and convincing evidence. I would reinstate the jury verdict, for on the correct standard of review the grounds for reversal of the jury verdict are not met.