Opinion ID: 885879
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did the District Court abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest?

Text: ¶ 31 The District Court awarded the Stroms the sum of $42,700 together with interest from July 1, 1997, until the date of judgment. The Logans assume that the District Court's award of prejudgment interest was pursuant to § 27-1-210(1), MCA, which creates an entitlement to interest for damages awarded that are capable of being made certain by calculation.... The Logans then argue that the award of interest in a negligence case such as this does not meet the standard of being a sum capable of being made certain prior to the issuance of judgment. ¶ 32 The Stroms contend that the controlling statute is not § 27-1-210(1), MCA, but rather § 27-1-212, MCA, which authorizes a discretionary award of interest in cases not grounded in contract. That statute provides as follows: In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract and in every case of oppression, fraud, or malice, interest may be given, in the discretion of the jury. This section does not apply in actions for recovery of damages arising from injury to a person or property brought against a governmental entity under Title 2, chapter 9, parts 1 through 3, as amended. ¶ 33 We have held that the statutory discretion granted to the jury to award interest applies as well to a judge sitting as the trier of fact in a negligence case. Semenza v. Bowman (1994), 268 Mont. 118, 127, 885 P.2d 451, 457. Furthermore, in Semenza we held that § 27-1-212, MCA, unlike § 27-1-210, MCA, does not have a certainty requirement; it does not require liquidated damages. We hold that the award of prejudgment interest was within the court's discretion under § 27-1-212, MCA.