Opinion ID: 2257808
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Why The Victims' Rights Amendment Is Self-Executing

Text: Applying the approach outlined above to the case at bar, I first consider whether there was a constitutional violation. Here the Bandonis allege that defendants deprived them of their constitutional and statutory rights as crime victims by, among other things, failing to provide them with a presentencing opportunity to address the court. In particular they were not, as required by article 1, section 23, given notice by defendants before sentencing of their right to address the court concerning the impact of the criminal defendant's conduct upon them. In addition they were not, as required by the Victim's Bill of Rights Act, informed of their rights to address the court prior to the criminal defendant's nolo contendere plea, to be apprised of the disposition of criminal defendant's case, to request restitution as an element of the case's final disposition, or to provide a written victim's-impact statement in connection with the criminal defendant's plea bargaining. I thus conclude that the Bandonis' complaint sufficiently pleads a constitutional violation. I next consider four criteria in determining whether article 1, section 23, is self-executing: (1) whether the constitutional provision describes a right in sufficient detail to be enjoyed, protected, and enforced as opposed to merely expressing general principles; (2) whether the provision contains a specific directive to the General Assembly requiring further legislative action for implementation; (3) whether the constitutional history of the provision indicates the framers' intended effect; and (4) whether self-execution harmonizes with the scheme of rights laid out in the Rhode Island Constitution as a whole. See Shields, 658 A.2d at 928-29 (ultimately concluding that no cause of action under state due-process clause because clause was not self-executing). First, article 1, section 23, certainly is not limited to general principles or philosophical truisms. Although it provides that agents of the state shall treat crime victims with dignity, respect and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice process, Rd. Const. art. 1, ง 23, it also establishes a specific individual right to be able [b]efore sentencing    to address the court regarding the impact which the perpetrator's conduct has had upon the victim. Id. And the preamble to article 1 declares this rightโlike the others enumerated in our Declaration of Certain Constitutional Rights and Principlesโto be essential and unquestionable and of paramount obligation. R.I. Const., art. 1 preamble. [57] The majority's rationale for concluding that the constitutional right of crime victims to address the court before sentencing fails the first prong of the self-execution test is worthy of particular scrutiny because it is riddled with contradictions, nonsequitors, and objectively erroneous statements about the effect of the victims' rights amendment on pre-existing statutory law. First, we are told that crime victims' right to address the court before sentencing is not self-executing because the framers chose to model the Mctims' rights amendment from the broad contours of ง 12-28-2's Legislative Purpose provision knowing full well that other sections within chapter 28 contained more specific rights as well as the means by which these rights may be enjoyed and protected . (Emphasis added.) We are then told that this supposed fact is highly persuasive to [the majority's] conclusion that article 1, section 23, espouses only general principles and is therefore not self-executing. The problem with this contention, as the majority well knows, is that the portion of the victims' rights amendment giving crime victims the specific right to address the court before sentencing is not included in the broad contours of ง 12-28-2's Legislative Purpose provision but is instead based upon one of those other sections within [the Victim's Bill of Rights statute that] contained more specific rights, as well as the means by which these rights may be enjoyed and protected. The majority itself then points to ง 12-28-3(a)(11), as enacted by P.L.1983, ch. 265, ง 1, and ง 12-28-4, as providing the precise procedures by which crime victims can exercise their right to address the court before sentencing. Accordingly, far from embodying the unenforceably broad contours of a legislative purpose provision, the majority concedes that the constitutional language allowing for crime victims to address the court before sentencing contains all the requisite specificity needed for such a clause to be self-executing because it is modeled on the specific statutory provisions providing the precise procedures by which crime victims can exercise their right to address the court before sentencing. Nonetheless, we are still told by the majority that on the one hand article 1, section 23, is not self-executing because it was modeled on the broad contours of the legislative purpose provisions of the pre-existing Victim's Bill of Rights Act, and yet we are also told on the other hand that because this specific right to address the court was already included elsewhere in the Victim's Bill of Rights Act, this proves that article 1, section 23, was not intended to be self-executing. The majority attempts to have it both ways, but its legal analysis simply cannot withstand scrutiny. [58] The majority next claims that a closer inspection of the statute's General rights provision shows that crime victims had already been given the right to address the court prior to sentencing three years before article 1, section 23, was ever ratified. Indeed, the majority erroneously contends that article 1, section 23, provides crime victims with no additional rights beyond those promulgated by the General Assembly in 1983. But in 1983 crime victims were only given the right to address the court before sentencing in those cases where the defendant has been adjudicated guilty following a trial by jury. See P.L.1983, ch. 265, ง 1. Article 1, section 23, provided crime victims with additional rights (beyond those given in 1983) to address the court after guilty verdicts in nonjury trials and even in those cases when there is no trial at all because the defendant has pled guilty, pled nolo contendere, or is being sentenced after a plea bargain of some sort. [59] Accordingly, contrary to the majority's erroneous statements, article 1, section 23, did indeed provide crime victims with additional rights beyond those that had been promulgated by the General Assembly in 1983, and it did so with more than the specificity required for this clause to be self-executing, especially when its particular provisions are compared to the relatively general due-process, just-compensation, cruel-and-unusual-punishment, and equal-protection provisions in the United States Constitution that have already been declared to be self-executing. Second, article 1, section 23, contains no directive to the General Assembly for further enabling legislation pertaining to the right of crime victims to address `the court before sentencing. This lack of an express legislative directive weighs heavily in favor of a conclusion that this portion of article 1, section 23, is self-executing, given the specificity of the enumerated right and the constitutional history of the provision. The third criterion of the self-execution analysis calls for a review of the constitutional history of article 1, section 23. In construing constitutional amendments, we have as our primary purpose to give effect to the intent of the framers. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Ethics Commission), 612 A.2d 1, 7 (R.I.1992). In doing so, we properly consult extrinsic sources and the history of the times. Id. at 7-8. A close review of the Constitutional Convention's contemporaneous documentary record reveals that the critical motivating force behind the victims' rights amendment was the need for greater protection for victims of crime. See Report of the, Judiciary Committee Relating to Victims of Crime Resolution (86-140) 10 (Judiciary Committee Report), reprinted in Journal of the 1986 Constitutional Convention, Vol. 1, No. 8, at 10 (May 29, 1986) (Journal). Indeed, noting that victims' rights should be made constitutional    to make then [ sic ] more enduring, the Judiciary Committee for the 1986 Constitutional Convention expressly bemoaned the fact that the existing legislative enforcement scheme for victims' rights was presently inadequate and that its lack of enforcement provisions was a major defect. Id. at 11. A historical review of the 1986 Convention's handling of the victim's rights amendment shows that the framers in fact intended for victims to have enforceable rights in the courts after the amendment was adopted. Indeed the majority's declaration that it is the undeniable conclusion that the framers intended to condition a victim's right to legal recourse upon future legislative action is contrary to what is revealed in the primary sources I have examined. The initial draft of the victims' rights amendment (Resolution 86-140) [60] expressly included an enforcement provision in addition to the specific rights identified therein: These rights shall be enforceable by the victims of crime and they shall have recourse in the law for any denial thereof. This initial draftโincluding this recourse languageโnot only received approval from the Judiciary Committee [61] but was read in full and passed resoundingly on the full floor of the Constitutional Convention. [62] After passage on the convention floor Resolution 86-140 was referred to the Committee on Style and Drafting, where its text was altered and the recourse language noted above was dropped. An annotated draft of the 1986 State Constitution contained in the original papers of the 1986 Constitutional Convention (and dated contemporaneously with the Committee on Style and Drafting's alteration of Resolution 86-140) reflects the various alterations of the committee and further indicates that the Committee on Style and Drafting merely  clarified language  in Resolution 86-140. [63] When Resolution 86-140 was returned in the following days to the full convention floor as amended by the Committee on Style and Drafting, it immediately thereafter obtained final passage by a vote of the delegates but only after the delegates were assured that the style committee's changes were made only for the economy of language. See Proceedings at Constitutional Convention 62 (June 26, 1986) (Proceedings). [64] Thus the minutes of the Constitutional Convention themselves reveal that the removal of the enforcement and recourse-in-the-law language from the initial draft was not intended to alter the substantive meaning of Resolution 86-140 as approved by the delegates and by the Judiciary Committee before it was referred to the Committee on Style and Drafting. Rather when the amended Resolution 86-140 was presented to the full constitutional delegation minus the enforcement and recourse language, its introduction was prefaced with this very telling remark: This resolution on victim rights was redrafted for the economy of language and it now reads as follows. Proceedings at 62 (June 26, 1986). (Emphasis added.) The amendment was then read and it passed without any objection. Thus, it is clear that Resolution 86-140 was not amended with the intent to preclude victims from obtaining recourse in the law for any denial of their rights. Rather, it is evident that the framers voting for final passage did so under the assurance they received that the substantive meaning underlying the initial draft they had approved so overwhelmingly prior to the Committee on Style and Drafting's alterations was still intactโthat is, that victims' rights still shall be enforceable by the victims of crime and they shall have recourse in the law for any denial thereof. [65] To support its position, the majority relies upon language it excerpts from a Judiciary Committee report (published prior to final passage of the victims' rights amendment) to the effect that specific provisions for enforcement [should be left] to the General Assembly. However, this commentary was directed to the draft Resolution 86-140 that included the explicit enforcement and recourse-in-the-law language previously discussed. Thus the committee's comments do not indicate an intention to preclude judicial relief but only that more specific enforcement provisions would be left to the Legislature. [66] The majority also contends that when the Committee on Style and Drafting deleted the recourse-in-the-law language from Resolution 86-140, it did so by substituting the clause and shall receive such other compensation as the state may provide. I disagree that there was any substitution of one clause for the other. Rather, the other-compensation clause was inserted in that part of the victims' rights amendment concerning the financial compensation that crime victims shall be entitled to receive for any injury or loss caused by the perpetrator of the crime. Thus the placement of this clause in that portion of the amendment's text (pertaining to crime victims' remedies for losses inflicted by the criminal) shows that that clause had nothing to do with that portion of the amendment concerning what compensation or other relief may be afforded to crime victims whose presentencing rights to address the court have been violated by the government. [67] Next, even if the majority was correct in its conclusion that this other-compensation clause was intended by the framers to be substituted for the recourse-in-the-law clause in Resolution 86-140, there is even more reason to conclude that this substitution was not intended to effect a substantive change in the enforceability of the amendment. First, the fact that the language change occurred in the Committee on Style and Drafting rather than in the Judiciary Committee or in some other substantive committee of the Convention strongly suggests that it should be construed as a style change and not as a change in the substance of the amendment. Second, the delegates of the Convention were told before they voted on the amendment that the changes were for the economy of language and not for purposes of revising any substantive provision that they had already approved in passing Resolution 86-140. Third, and most significant of all, the text of the other-compensation clause is consistent with providing crime victims with a judicial remedy to compensate them for the violation of their constitutional right to address the court before sentencing of the criminal who injured them. As much as the majority might be loath to admit it, the Judiciary is part of the state that is expressly referenced in this amendment. Thus the majority erroneously assumes that the words other compensation as the state may provide refers solely to what the General Assembly may enact as, legislation. But when I last looked, both the Executive and the Judiciary were still branches of the state. Accordingly, especially when this matter is considered in light of what the amendment was intended to accomplish for crime victims and of the professed economy-of-language purpose for the Style and Drafting Committee's changes to Resolution 86-140, it appears to me that the insertion of the other-compensation clause and the deletion of the recourse-in-the-law language were not intended to preclude the Judiciary from enforcing the victims' rights amendment without prior legislative approval to do so. Moreover, a further review of the Judiciary Committee report reveals that the committee members did not intend to preclude victims from obtaining judicial relief for violation of their constitutional rights. In the report the committee noted that it was considering three different proposals for a victims' rights constitutional amendment. It ultimately decided to accept Resolution 86-140 (with its recourse-in-the-law language discussed above) because it steers a middle course between one proposal merely outlining a simple right to be present and to be heard at all stages of judicial proceedings and another more detailed proposal that (among other things) encouraged the establishment of community-based programs to rehabilitate offenders and provided for a victim's right to compensation within two months after his or her expenses or losses were incurred. See Judiciary Committee Report at 1, reprinted in Journal at 10 (May 29, 1986). Indeed, Resolution 86-140 staked a middle ground between these two other proposals because not only did it contain an explication of victim rights butโat that timeโit also included a general enforcement provision without the more specific details of the third proposal. Because Resolution 86-140 already provided for victims' recourse in the law for any violation of their rights, the Judiciary Committee was merely providing that the General Assembly could refine and provide further enforcement mechanisms by which victims could seek recourse in the courtsโa proposition that it had already accepted in approving Resolution 86-140. [68] Thus this constitutional history strongly indicates that the framers' primary reason for enacting this amendment was to assuage concerns about the lack of enforcement for victims' rights under the existing statutory scheme and it shows that the amendment was adopted so that victims' rights shall be enforceable by the victims of crime and they shall have recourse in the law for any denial thereof. Accordingly I believe that by denying a private right of action to crime victims, this Court is imposing remedial roadblocks to enforcement that were not contemplated by the framers and which have the effect of totally frustrating their avowed purpose in drafting this amendmentโnamely, to mandate enforcement of victims' rights. Finally, with regard to the fourth and last criterion for determining whether article 1, section 23, is self-executing, I note that there are no other more specific provisions in the Rhode Island Constitution that provide the requisite protections for crime victims. Cf. Shields, 658 A.2d at 929 (finding state constitutional due-process clause was not self-executing because other constitutional provisions provided recourse for state interference with property rights). In fact, the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Convention reveal that the victims' rights amendment was enacted precisely because such rights could not be linked with any other existing constitutional provision. See Proceedings at 62 (June 26, 1986); Journal at 11 (May 29, 1986). Having shown that article 1, section 23, is self-executing-that it was not intended to require any further action of the General Assembly before it would become enforceableโI next address the appropriate remedy here. Mindful that our duty is to review the Bandonis' complaint only to determine whether they have stated a cause of action for some form of relief, I observe that the Bandonis' ultimate entitlement to any remedy or remedies will depend on the facts of the case as they are developed at trial. If plaintiffs are successful, [i]t will be a matter for the trial judge to craft the necessary relief. Corum v. University of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761, 413 S.E.2d 276, 290 (1992). Moreover, some rights may require greater or lesser relief to rectify a constitutional transgression. Id. 413 S.E.2d at 291. Nevertheless, I conclude that fashioning a remedy for a constitutional violation is consistent with the Judiciary's general power to remedy violations of specific legal duties. When a legislative [or constitutional] provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing tort action. Restatement (Second) of Torts ง 874A, at 301 (1979). Indeed, State Bills of Rights Provisions are exceptionally amenable to enforcement by a section 874A type action because they tend to be phrased as declarations either of positive rights or of limitations on government, but without simultaneously specifying a `civil remedy' for their breach. J. Friesen, State Constitutional Law: Litigating Individual Rights, Claims, and Defenses ง 7-5(c), at 420 (2d ed.1996) (footnotes omitted). Accordingly I would not foreclose the possibility of a monetary-damages award to the Bandonis provided that they are able to establish that their damages were proximately caused by the alleged victims' rights violations. [69] However, as our sister state courts have done in Shields and Rockhouse, I think we should proceed cautiously in making such a determination, and I would not necessarily permit such relief if (unlike the situation here) the General Assembly had enacted an alternative remedial scheme or if there were any other factors counseling hesitation. I also note in passing that other forms of relief may be appropriate, based upon the facts alleged in the Bandonis' complaint. [70] However, these are decisions that should be made in the first instance by the Superior Court. In short I believe that the Bandonis' complaint states a claim under our Constitution for which relief in the form of damages as well as other possible equitable remedies may be available, and I would remand this claim for further proceedings.