Opinion ID: 1127405
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: (6a) Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support his convictions for the first degree murders of both Juan and Juanita Bocanegra. In the alternative, he asserts that even if there was sufficient evidence to convict him of the Bocanegra murders on an aider and abettor theory, the evidence supported only a second degree murder conviction because the prosecution failed to prove that Joey intended to kill his parents with premeditation and deliberation, and that defendant aided and abetted in the murders. [1] (7) We need not be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the murders were premeditated. Our inquiry on appeal in light of the whole record [is] whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 511 [41 Cal. Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119] [hereafter Davis ]; see Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573-574, 99 S.Ct. 2781].) The standard of review is the same when the People rely mainly on circumstantial evidence. ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [42 Cal. Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481]; see also People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932 [251 Cal. Rptr. 467, 760 P.2d 996] [conviction based on circumstantial evidence will be affirmed if circumstances reasonably justify trier of fact's findings].) The record does not support either of defendant's contentions. (8a) As we have observed in numerous cases, we apply the tripartite test of People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 [73 Cal. Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942], in deciding whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation based on these three factors: (1) planning activity; (2) motive (established by a prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim); and (3) manner of killing. ( Id., at pp. 26-27; People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 546-547 [280 Cal. Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290] [hereafter Wharton ]; cf. People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 849, fn. 1 [180 Cal. Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776].) [T]his court sustains verdicts of first degree murder typically when there is evidence of all three types and otherwise requires at least extremely strong evidence of (1) or evidence of (2) in conjunction with either (1) or (3). ( Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 27.) We have recently explained that the Anderson factors do not establish normative rules, but instead provide guidelines for our analysis. In People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 517 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 199, 828 P.2d 101] we observed: The Anderson analysis was intended as a framework to assist reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence supports an inference that the killing resulted from preexisting reflection and weighing of considerations. It did not refashion the elements of first degree murder or alter the substantive law in any way. Thereafter, in People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 577, 831 P.2d 1159] (hereafter Perez ) we reiterated the Thomas statement, and added that [t]he Anderson guidelines are descriptive, not normative. [Citation.] The goal of Anderson was to aid reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence is supportive of an inference that the killing was the result of preexisting reflection and weighing of considerations rather than mere unconsidered or rash impulse. [Citation.] [¶] In identifying categories of evidence bearing on premeditation and deliberation, Anderson did not purport to establish an exhaustive list that would exclude all other types and combinations of evidence that could support a finding of premeditation and deliberation.... The Anderson factors, while helpful for purposes of review, are not a sine qua non to finding first degree premeditated murder, nor are they exclusive. (See Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 511.) Finally, we have recognized that it is not necessary that the Anderson factors be present in some special combination or that they be accorded a particular weight. ( People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 247 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643].) Nonetheless, we are guided by the factors in our determination whether the murder occurred as a result of preexisting reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse. ( Ibid. ) (6b) We find substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Joey Bocanegra intended to kill his parents, that he premeditated and deliberated the murders, and that defendant can be found vicariously liable for the murders as an aider and abettor. (9) As we have observed, an aider and abettor must act with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent either of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense. ( People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560 [199 Cal. Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318] [hereafter Beeman ].) We have also recognized that if the aider and abettor undertakes acts with the intent that the actual perpetrator's purpose be facilitated thereby, he is a principal and liable for the commission of the offense. ( People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1, 12, fn. 5 [221 Cal. Rptr. 592, 710 P.2d 392]; see also §§ 31, 190.2, subds. (c) & (d), 971.) Thus, the basis of liability for the perpetrator applies to the aider and abettor and extends to the natural and reasonable consequences of the acts he knowingly and intelligently aids and encourages. ( Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 560.) (6c) As we explain, we conclude that defendant shared Joey's intent to kill, and in assisting Joey in committing the crimes, understood, and facilitated, the full extent of Joey's criminal purpose. Hernandez testified, and defendant admitted to Detective Stratton, that defendant initially waited outside while Joey entered his parents' house. Defendant then entered the house after hearing the sounds of a fight between Joey and Juan. Defendant told Hernandez that he went inside the house to break up the fight between Joey and his father, but the facts belie his stated intent. When defendant entered the house, he saw Joey fighting with his father. Rather than come to Juan's aid, defendant grabbed a curved metal bar and commenced beating Juan. Joey's actions, according to defendant's statements to prosecution witnesses, indicated that Joey deliberated over his father's killing. Joey initially struck Juan in the hallway and then, in the kitchen, obtained a knife that he used to stab Juan. In our view, Joey formed a clear intent to kill, at the latest, during the altercation with his father, and obtained a kitchen knife to carry out that plan. (8b) Our cases hold that planning activity occurring over a short period of time is sufficient to find premeditation. `The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly....' ( Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1127, quoting People v. Thomas (1945) 25 Cal.2d 880, 900 [156 P.2d 7].) (6d) There was also ample evidence of motive. The evidence supports a strong inference that Joey entered his parents' house to rob them. When his father resisted the robbery, Joey was motivated to murder him in order to gain access to both money and tangible goods, including a television set. Substantial evidence supports a finding that Joey believed Juan stood in the way of his plan. Finally, the trial court could infer from the evidence that the manner of killing tended to demonstrate Joey acted with premeditation and deliberation. The attack occurred in a series of rooms, indicating that Juan's repeated attempts to break away from his murderers were consistently thwarted by the attackers' relentless pursuit of him, even after he was gravely wounded. A rational finder of fact could infer that the manner of killing, when combined with Joey's retrieval of the knife in the kitchen, and defendant's retrieval of a metal bar used in clubbing a defenseless Juan, is sufficient to support the trier of fact's implied finding that Joey formed the plan to kill his parents during the altercation, located the murder weapon, and along with defendant, deliberately murdered his father. (See Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 511.) The same evidence supports the trial court's finding that defendant shared Joey's intent and plan to kill Juan, and thus was liable, as an aider and abettor, for Juan's murder. ( Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 560.) The killing of Juan ended after a prolonged knife attack and beating from which Juan attempted to defend himself. Defendant's personal involvement in the murder was substantial. Far from merely acting as a lookout, or beating Juan after he was already dead, defendant was actively involved in assisting Joey in Juan's murder. Defendant's admitted act of arming himself with a curved metal bar before joining the altercation between Joey and Juan indicates he shared Joey's plan. ( Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1126 [evidence of planning activity shown by defendant's act of surreptitiously entering victim's house and obtaining knife from victim's kitchen]; Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 547 [defendant's act of retrieving hammer constituted planning activity].) From this evidence, the trier of fact could reasonably infer defendant knowingly engaged or assisted in Juan's murder as an aider and abettor. ( Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 556.) As to Juanita's murder, defendant asserts the evidence similarly does not support the conviction. He claims that he did not personally kill Juanita [because] she was stabbed to death by Joey. He asserts that there is no evidence in the record that [he] held Juanita down, helped push her back to the sewing room, or had any contact with her while Joey was stabbing her. He contends that there is no evidence to support the People's theory that defendant aided Joey by hitting Juanita with a bar and that [t]here is simply no evidence that [his] initial grabbing of Juanita actually aided, or even was intended to aid, Joey's subsequent stabbing of his mother. Finally, defendant asserts in his reply brief that his efforts to tie and gag Juanita are altogether inconsistent with an intent to kill her. Again, the evidence supports the court's verdicts and refutes defendant's contention. Hernandez testified defendant told him that during the murder of Juan, Juanita screamed. Defendant grabbed Juanita and told Joey to shut her up. Joey then stabbed his mother 26 times. A bloodstained garment was wrapped around Juanita's neck, and her wrists had been tied together with a piece of fabric. The pathologist (Holloway) opined that Juanita died of the stab wounds and that the ligature constriction of her neck was a possible contributing cause. She also had severe scalp injuries that Holloway concluded were consistent with those inflicted by a long bar or pipe less than one-half inch in diameter, similar to the instrument used by defendant to inflict Juan's scalp wounds. The trial court could reasonably infer from the evidence that Juanita was killed in order to keep her from being a percipient witness to the murder of her husband. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have been persuaded that the killing was the result of preexisting reflection and weighing of considerations rather than mere unconsidered or rash impulse. ( Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1125.) Defendant's participation in Juanita's murder, like his aiding and abetting in Juan's killing, clearly supports a finding that defendant aided and abetted her murder. ( Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 560.) Finally, defendant contends that the evidence showing he waded into a fight already in progress and struck the victim several ineffectual blows with an instrument found on the scene, proves no more than an unlawful killing. When nothing further is shown, defendant claims, the presumption is that the evidence supports differing degrees of guilt, based on the same conduct. Thus, defendant asserts, he should have been convicted of murder in the second degree. (See People v. Woods (1992) 8 Cal. App.4th 1570, 1586-1587 [11 Cal. Rptr.2d 231]; see also People v. Wells (1938) 10 Cal.2d 610, 616-617 [76 P.2d 493].) We reject defendant's interpretation of the evidence. Far from wading into a fight and being ineffectual, we have shown how the evidence clearly reflects that defendant aided and abetted Joey in killing both Juan and Juanita. We thus conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict finding defendant guilty of first degree murder.