Opinion ID: 177263
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985)

Text: Sherman argues that the language of Section 1 (i.e., that the period of silence shall be an opportunity for silent prayer or for silent reflection on the anticipated activities of the day), 105 ILCS 20/1, coupled with Section 1's legislative history and historical context, demonstrates that the asserted secular purpose is a sham. In support of her position, Sherman relies heavily on the Supreme Court's opinion in Wallace, 472 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 2479, in which the Court considered the constitutionality of Alabama's moment of silence law, which provided: At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public schools the teacher in charge of the room in which each class is held may announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such period no other activities shall be engaged in. Id. at 40 n. 2, 105 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Alabama Code § 16-1-20.1). The Court held that Alabama's moment of silence law lacked any secular purpose. Id. at 59-60, 105 S.Ct. 2479. However, while striking the Alabama statute in Wallace, the Supreme Court recognized that [t]he legislative intent to return prayer to the public schools is, of course, quite different from merely protecting every student's right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during the school day. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 59, 105 S.Ct. 2479. This case is significantly different than Wallace. In Wallace there was no evidence of a secular purpose; rather, the asserted legislative purpose was to return prayer to public schools. The sponsor of the moment of silence law in that case inserted into the legislative recordapparently without dissenta statement indicating that the legislation was an `effort to return voluntary prayer' to the public schools. Id. at 56-57, 105 S.Ct. 2479. The bill's sponsor later confirmed this purpose in court proceedings, testifying that he was the prime sponsor of the bill and that the bill was an effort to return voluntary prayer to our public schools ... it is a beginning and a step in the right direction. Id. at 43, 105 S.Ct. 2479. The bill's sponsor also testified that apart from the purpose to return voluntary prayer to public school, he had no other purpose in mind. Id. Wallace also involved a suspect historical context. The statute challenged in Wallace was passed in 1981, even though the state legislature had just recently (1978) authorized a one-minute period of silence in all public schools for meditation. Id. at 40, 105 S.Ct. 2479. Then in 1982, the state legislature enacted another provision authorizing teachers to lead willing students in a prescribed prayer to Almighty God ... the Creator and Supreme Judge of the world. Id. That historical context confirmed the sponsor's testimony that the moment of silence law was just a beginning and a step in the right direction to the effort to return voluntary prayer to our public schools. Id. at 43, 105 S.Ct. 2479. Conversely in this case, the State has offered a secular purpose for Section 1 establishing a period of silence for all school children in Illinois to calm the students and prepare them for a day of learning. The plain language of the statute supports this secular purpose by establishing a mandatory moment of silence: In each public school classroom the teacher in charge shall observe a brief period of silence with the participation of all the pupils therein assembled at the opening of every school day. 105 ILCS 20/1. And emphatically Section 1 declares: This period shall not be conducted as a religious exercise.... Id. Thus, the plain language disavows any religious purpose in Section 1. Rather than exposing a sham, the legislative history confirms the secular purpose of Section 1. Specifically, the Senate sponsor, Senator Lightford, explained that, under the 1969 version of the law some teachers were observing a period of silence, but othersoften in the same schoolwere not. S. Proceedings, 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., March 21, 2007, at 88. Lightford explained that her intent in amending the law was to create uniformity across the State in all of our schools, so that all public school students would be given the same opportunity for meditation, moment of silence, reflection. Id. She further emphasized that the moment should not be conducted as a religious exercise, but rather was a neutral act which affords students the opportunity to reflect on whatever they wish, whether religious or not. Id. at 86. During debate on the bill, other members of the House and Senate expressed support for a mandatory moment of silence to quiet students and to instill a little meditative exercise at the beginning of the day. Id. at 87, 88 (statements of Sens. Cronin & Sieben); see also id. at 89 (statements of Sen. Meeks); H.R. Proceedings, 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., May 31, 2007, at 63-64. And throughout the debates no one in either the House or Senate spoke of using the period of silence as a mechanism to return prayer to the schools. After the Governor vetoed the bill, the Senate and House debated the propriety of overriding the veto. During these debates, those supporting the bill again spoke of the need for a mandatory moment of silence to calm students at the beginning of the school day. S. Proceedings, 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., Oct. 3, 2007, at 11; H.R. Proceedings, 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., Oct. 11, 2007, at 95, 99. The Senate sponsor also reiterated that the period of silence was not to be conducted as a religious exercise. S. Proceedings, 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., Oct. 3, 2007, at 11. And as with the debate on the original passage of the bill, there were no statements indicating a legislative intent to return prayer to school. Our dissenting colleague claims any secular purpose is secondary to religious motives, citing statements made during the House debate by opponents to the bill, including comments made by one representative who, speaking in support of sustaining Governor Blagojevich's veto, focused on the religious motivation of the constituents who called his office in support of Section 1. (Dissent at 521). The dissent also asserts there are troubling statements in the record indicating religious motivations on the part of some of the Act's supporters, pointing to a press report and the singing of a parody. (Dissent at 521-22). However, what is relevant is the legislative purpose of the statute, not the possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law. Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249, 110 S.Ct. 2356, 110 L.Ed.2d 191 (1990) (plurality opinion). Even less relevant are the motives of opponents to a bill and the varied motives of constituent. Moreover, even assuming motivation was relevant and that a press report could be considered legislative history, Senator Lightford's statement to a newspaper reporter (that the General Assembly opens every day with a prayer and the Pledge of Allegiance, and that I don't get a choice and I don't see why students should have a choice) has no bearing on Section 1. The Illinois legislature may open its sessions with a prayer by the assigned clergy for that day. Some legislators may prefer silence. But Section 1 does not likewise require schools to start the day with a prayer. In fact, Section 1 expressly states that the period of silence shall not be conducted as a religious exercise. 105 ILCS 20/1. Therefore, it is not reasonable to read the press quote as an expression by Senator Lightford of a desire to institute school prayer or as undermining the stated secular purpose of Section 1. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95, 103 S.Ct. 3062, 77 L.Ed.2d 721 (1983) (stating that the Court is reluctant to attribute unconstitutional motives to the states, particularly when a plausible secular purpose for the state's program may be discerned from the face of the statute). Rather, the proposed amendment sought solely to change the may to a shall in Section 1. Thus the only mandate is for silence. Regarding the Simon and Garfunkel take-off, neither Sherman nor the ACLU relied on the singing of this parody as evidence that the legislature's stated secular purpose was a sham, and we think rightly so; a few legislators singing a parody does not evidence legislative intent, much less overcome the clear statements of secular purpose made by the legislature during debate. In short, then, the debate of the initial bill and the veto override overwhelmingly supports Illinois's stated secular purpose and provides a stark contrast to the Wallace case. In Wallace, the bill's sponsor inserted into the legislative history a statement that the legislation was an effort to return voluntary prayer to the public schools. And the bill's sponsor, during testimony at the preliminary injunction stage, confirmed that was the sole purpose of the statute. In contrast, here, the floor debates confirm the asserted secular purpose. [3] Sherman also claims that the historical context demonstrates that Section 1's secular purpose is a sham, again relying on Wallace. The historical context underlying Section 1, however, differs significantly from that facing the Court in Wallace. In Wallace, the historical context made clear that Alabama was attempting to reintroduce school prayer in a stepped approach: first by establishing a moment of silence in 1978, then in 1981 by adding prayer to the statute, and finally, the following year, by authorizing teachers to lead a prayer at the beginning of the school day. Conversely, in this case, the Illinois legislature adopted a period of silence in 1969 and the only change to that law came with the 2007 amendment making the period of silence mandatory. [4] This timing contrasts sharply with Wallace's tightly choreographed historical context which moved Alabama in four short years from a moment of silence to a moment of teacher-led prayer.