Opinion ID: 3008926
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Best-Interest Analysis

Text: Brumley further challenges the circuit court’s finding that termination of his parental rights was in G.B.’s best interest. The two factors to consider in determining best interest are the likelihood of adoption and potential harm caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A). Here, Brumley concedes in his brief that the child is adoptable. At the termination hearing, Collins testified that the child’s aunt and uncles wished to adopt him and, as a result, the circuit court properly found that G.B. is adoptable. See Thompson v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 124 (stating that testimony from a caseworker or an adoption specialist that the children were adoptable is sufficient). Thus, we conclude that the adoptability prong is satisfied. Next, Brumley challenges the circuit court’s finding of potential harm. He claims that the record is devoid of any potential harm to his son that would prevent him from seeking custody and placement upon his release from incarceration. The potential-harm analysis must be conducted in broad terms, including the harm the child suffers from the lack of stability in a permanent home. See Lunon v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 647. 10 Cite as 2015 Ark. 356 Brumley argues that this case is similar to Cranford v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2011 Ark. App. 211, 378 S.W.3d 851, in which the custodial grandmother stated her desire that the child have continued contact with his parents. Brumley also notes that the father in Cranford was incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing. However, Brumley’s case is distinguishable from Cranford. In Cranford, the court of appeals found no significant potential harm in allowing the father to visit his son and to pursue reunification efforts. Id. at 10, 378 S.W.3d at 856. The court of appeals noted that the father had “demonstrated stability in housing and employment before his incarceration, and testified that he will be able to regain that stability after his release, which was anticipated to be only six weeks from the termination hearing.” Id., 378 S.W.3d at 856. The court did not agree that termination would necessarily provide greater stability in the child’s life. Id., 378 S.W.3d at 857. Here, Brumley has been incarcerated for most of the child’s life and has no relationship with his son. He expected to be released six months after the termination hearing; however, he did not ask for custody of his son at the hearing, but only for a chance to “work with the custodians” in order to get to know his son. On appeal, Brumley now seeks “custody and/or placement” of his son, unlike the situation in Cranford in which the child stayed in his grandparent’s custody where he was to “remain whether or not his parents’ rights [were] terminated in [the] proceedings.” Id., 378 S.W.3d at 857. Nevertheless, the stability and reasonable hope for reunification that the court of appeals found in Cranford is clearly lacking here. In the instant case, Collins testified that Brumley remained incarcerated and, as a result, 11 Cite as 2015 Ark. 356 lacked essential components of the case plan, including stable housing and employment. We have stated that permanency is the objective of the termination procedure and cannot be lightly discounted. Bearden v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 317, 42 S.W.3d 397 (2001). Thus, we conclude that this evidence of potential harm, combined with the child’s adoptability, supports the circuit court’s ruling that termination of Brumley’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Affirmed; court of appeals opinion vacated. WOOD, J., and Special Justice ROBERT S. SHAFER concur. HART, J., dissents. WYNNE, J., not participating.