Opinion ID: 1316068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: fair housing acts

Text: ¶ 21 We now examine whether the trial court properly found that Malibu did not violate the Federal Fair Housing Act (the FFHA or Title VIII), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3631 (1994), [7] and the Utah Fair Housing Act (the UFHA), Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-2-1 to -14 (1994 & Supp.1999). Sparks contends that summary judgment in favor of Malibu on its eviction claim was error because Malibu violated the fair housing acts. She also alleges that the trial court erred in denying her own motion for summary judgment on her counterclaim for relief under the fair housing acts. Whether Malibu violated the fair housing acts is dispositive of both Sparks' defense and counterclaim. ¶ 22 In her defense and counterclaim, Sparks contends that Malibu discriminated on the basis of familial status under the fair housing acts. Familial status discrimination, under both the FFHA and the UFHA, generally refers to discrimination in regard to housing against a child being domiciled with a parent or legal guardian. [8] See 42 U.S.C.A. § 3602(k) (1994); Utah Code Ann. § 57-21-2(14) (Supp.1999). Sparks argues that Malibu discriminated against her grandchild on the basis of familial status by requiring her (in the seven-day notice) to remove everyone except for Sparks and her two daughters, [9] and by establishing a rule restricting mobile home occupancy to one family per mobile home (the one-family rule), [10] which allegedly discriminates against multi-generation families, such as that of Sparks. Specifically, Sparks contends that the seven-day notice is a discriminatory action in violation of section 3604(b) of the FFHA and section 57-21-5(1)(b) of the UFHA, and that the notice and the one-family rule are discriminatory statements in violation of section 3604(c) of the FFHA and section 57-21-5(2) of the UFHA. Before addressing either of these allegations and the corresponding statutes in detail, we must determine whether Sparks has standing to raise her defense or counterclaim under the FFHA and the UFHA.
¶ 23 The trial court determined that Sparks lacks standing to sue under the FFHA or the UFHA. Malibu contends that we should uphold the trial court on this issue because the definition of familial status under the acts does not include Sparks. According to Malibu's argument, familial status refers to a child domiciled with a parent or guardian, and Sparks is not the parent or guardian of her adult daughter's child. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 3602(k) (1994); Utah Code Ann. § 57-21-2(14) (1994). To determine standing, we look to those provisions in the acts describing those who may bring suit. ¶ 24 Both the FFHA and the UFHA grant standing to aggrieved person[s]. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (1994); Utah Code Ann. § 57-21-12(1) (Supp.1999). The FFHA defines aggrieved person to include any person who  (1) claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (2) believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3602(i) (1994). Similarly, the UFHA defines the term to include any person who: (a) claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (b) believes that he will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur. Utah Code Ann. § 57-21-2(1) (Supp.1999). ¶ 25 In the instant case, Sparks asserts that she has been, or will be, injured by Malibu's discriminatory practices based on familial status because, as she alleges, Malibu's seven-day notice mandated either the removal of her grandson or the eviction of Sparks, her two daughters, and her grandson. This alleged injury is sufficient to make Sparks an aggrieved person under the FFHA. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982); Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979); Mountain Side Mobile Estates v. Secretary of HUD, 56 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir.1995). We hold that such alleged injury is also sufficient to qualify Sparks as an aggrieved person under the UFHA. Thus, Sparks has standing to raise a defense or counterclaim under the FFHA and the UFHA. We next consider whether Sparks' contentions under those acts withstand summary judgment.
¶ 26 Sparks first asserts that Malibu took a discriminatory action on the basis of familial status, in violation of section 3604(b) of the FFHA and section 57-21-5(1)(b) of the UFHA, when Malibu issued the seven-day notice. Section 3604(b) states that it shall be unlawful (b) [t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(b) (1994) (emphasis added). The analogous Utah provision, section 57-21-5(1)(b), states in pertinent part: (1) It is a discriminatory housing practice to do any of the following because of a person's race, color, religion, sex, national origin, familial status, source of income, or disability: . . . . (b) discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of the sale or rental of any dwelling or in providing facilities or services in connection with the dwelling.... Utah Code Ann. § 57-21-5(1)(b) (1994) (emphasis added). ¶ 27 Federal courts have explained that a plaintiff may recover under section 3604(b) by successfully alleging either of two theories. [11] The appropriate theory depends upon the manner in which the alleged discrimination occurred. The first theory is disparate treatment, which requires a plaintiff to show that the landlord has intentionally treated the plaintiff differently from other persons or groups. See Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir.1999); Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1501 (10th Cir.1995). The second theory is disparate impact, which instead involves a policy or practice of the landlord that is not intentionally discriminatory but is neutral on its face. See Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1501; Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 933 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 488 U.S. 15, 109 S.Ct. 276, 102 L.Ed.2d 180 (1988) (per curiam). Disparate impact theory requires a plaintiff to show that the landlord's rule or policy, when applied, results in a discriminatory effect; that is, the policy affects one group or class of people differently from another group or class of people. See Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 933-34. Thus, whether a plaintiff alleges discrimination based on familial status, race, national origin, or any of the other bases listed in section 3604(b), a plaintiff must show either (1) intentional disparate treatment, or (2) disparate impact, without proof of discriminatory intent. See Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1501. [12] ¶ 28 In the case before us, Sparks fails to distinguish whether her discrimination claim is for disparate treatment or disparate impact. Citing disparate impact cases, Sparks merely contends that Malibu's one-family rule and the seven-day notice had a discriminatory effect upon her. Regardless, Sparks' allegation of a 3604(b) violation fails under either a disparate impact or a disparate treatment theory. Sparks' claim fails under a disparate impact argument because she points to no general policy of Malibu that has caused a differential impact on a particular group or class of people. [D]iscriminatory impact cannot be established where you have just one isolated decision. Coe v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 646 F.2d 444, 451 (10th Cir.1981); see also Michigan Protection & Advocacy Sera, Inc. v. Babin, 799 F.Supp. 695, 706 (E.D.Mich.1992) (Plaintiffs complain about a single allegedly discriminatory transaction. As such, the scope of this case is too narrow to qualify as one involving a discriminatory impact.), aff'd, 18 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir.1994). The single act of Sparks' eviction, including the purported discriminatory effect therefrom, is insufficient to constitute disparate impact. ¶ 29 Sparks' claim also fails under disparate treatment theory because she fails to refute valid justifications Malibu presented for her eviction. A plaintiff can show disparate treatment through one of two methods. The first method, also known as the direct method, requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant has taken an action that is explicitly, facially discriminatory. See Kormoczy v. Secretary, HUD, 53 F.3d 821, 824 (7th Cir.1995); Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1500 & n. 16. The defendant must then show that it would have taken action against the plaintiff anyway. See Kormoczy, 53 F.3d at 824. The direct method does not apply in the case before us because Sparks has failed to establish that the seven-day notice demonstrates, on its face, an intent to discriminate. The ambiguous directive in the seven-day notice fails to so demonstrate. ¶ 30 Even if the direct method were applicable to the case before us, as Justice Durham suggests, no dispute of material fact would preclude summary judgment in favor of Malibu. Justice Durham's conclusion to the contrary ignores Sparks' burden in contesting summary judgment. When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the party opposing summary judgment must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). ¶ 31 Applying rule 56 and the direct method to the instant case, no dispute of material fact exists, even assuming Sparks has shown that the notice constituted facial discrimination. See Kormoczy, 53 F.3d at 824. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Malibu presented numerous good-faith bases for evicting Sparks, and argued (as Kormoczy and Justice Durham would require) that it would have evicted Sparks even if her family were not multi-generational. The burden in opposing summary judgment then shifted to Sparks to show that Malibu would not have evicted Sparks if her family were not multi-generational. To show that her eviction was based entirely on her multi-generational family, Sparks necessarily had to controvert Malibu's justifications for evicting her. She utterly failed to meet her burden in this regard. Indeed, she has openly admitted that she failed to cure numerous violations of her lease agreement with Malibu. Thus, Sparks has failed to show that Malibu would not have taken the same action against her absent the fact of her multi-generational family. As a result, under the direct method, any dispute as to Malibu's purported discriminatory intent in issuing the seven-day notice is immaterial and does not preclude summary judgment. ¶ 32 The second method through which a plaintiff may establish disparate treatment requires a plaintiff to show that a defendant's purported justification for an allegedly discriminatory action is merely a pretext for discrimination. See Gamble, 104 F.3d at 305-06; see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (Title VII); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (Title VII). If a plaintiff then fails to produce evidence of pretext, the plaintiff's disparate treatment claim fails as a matter of law under either Title VII or Title VIII. See, e.g., Gamble, 104 F.3d at 305-06 (finding for defendant under Title VIII because defendant asserted valid justification for alleged discrimination and plaintiff failed to show evidence of pretext); Shumway v. UPS, 118 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir.1997) (notwithstanding evidence of discrimination, affirming summary judgment in favor of employer under Title VII because employee failed to show that employer's justification for discharge was pretextual); Essex v. UPS, 111 F.3d 1304, 1309 (7th Cir.1997) (same); Murray v. City of Sapulpa, 45 F.3d 1417, 1421-22 (10th Cir.1995) (same). Thus, if a landlord presents multiple good faith justifications for an eviction, the tenant must show that the justifications are merely a pretext for discrimination. Otherwise, any alleged instance of discrimination is immaterial and the tenant cannot recover under a disparate treatment theory. ¶ 33 In this case, Malibu has set forth multiple valid, good-faith justifications for evicting Sparks. Therefore, to recover for disparate treatment, Sparks must show that Malibu's justifications for evicting her are merely a pretext for discrimination. Sparks has failed to do so. She admits that she failed to cure all of the violations listed in the seven-day notice. Thus, because Sparks has failed to show pretext, the alleged discrimination by Malibu in the seven-day notice is immaterial, and Sparks' allegation that Malibu violated section 3604(b) and its Utah Code counterpart, section 57-21-5(1)(b), fails as a matter of law.
¶ 34 Sparks also alleges that Malibu's one-family rule and the seven-day notice are statements indicating discrimination on the basis of familial status in violation of section 3604(c) of the FFHA and section 57-21-5(2) of the UFHA. However, these allegations are not properly before this court. Sparks did not raise any claim or defense under sections 3604(c) and 57-21-5(2) before the trial court and therefore waived any right to raise such a claim or defense in appealing the trial court's grant of summary judgment. See Certified Sur. Group, Ltd. v. UT Inc., 960 P.2d 904, 906 n. 3 (Utah 1998); State Farm, Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Utah 1996). Thus, Sparks' argument under section 3604(c) of the FFHA and section 57-21-5(2) of the UFHA fails.