Opinion ID: 2317416
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: The OCCA's resolution of DeRosa's claims

Text: DeRosa raised these same arguments (except for his argument regarding a member of the Plummer family gesturing to him) on direct appeal. In doing so, however, he did not argue that Janet Tolbert's first-stage testimony constituted unofficial victim-impact testimony. Instead, he argued simply that she provided prejudicial testimony, and he argued that her testimony in that regard, when combined with the alleged prosecutorial misconduct, violated his right to a fair trial. In a separate part of his direct appeal brief, DeRosa argued that the second-stage testimony of Tolbert and Milligan constituted improper victim-impact testimony. The OCCA rejected DeRosa's challenge to Tolbert's first-stage testimony (i.e., what DeRosa now classifies as unofficial victim-impact testimony), stating as follows: DeRosa argues that the trial court should at least have sustained Appellant's objection and admonished the jury to disregard Tolbert's uncalled for comment. DeRosa did not, however, actually object to Tolbert's testimony or ask for such an admonishment, which, based upon the rest of the trial, would certainly have been given if it had been requested. This Court finds that although Tolbert's comment was improper, the record does not suggest that the State could have anticipated her response; nor does it suggest that the comment was so prejudicial that it contributed to DeRosa's convictions or his sentences. DeRosa I, 89 P.3d at 1145 (internal footnote omitted). In turn, the OCCA concluded that, even when considered with some of the district attorney's remarks [that] crossed the line of appropriate representation, Tolbert's first-stage testimony did not violate due process, or result in DeRosa's death sentence [being] obtained through a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1149. The OCCA also rejected DeRosa's challenge to the second-stage testimony of Tolbert and Milligan: DeRosa argues that the victim impact testimony of Tolbert and Milligan amounted to a hyper-emotional plea for revenge and focused too much on the emotional impact of the murders. The governing Oklahoma statute defines victim impact evidence as follows: information about the financial, emotional, psychological, and physical effects of a violent crime on each victim and members of their immediate family, . . . circumstances surrounding the crime, the manner in which it was perpetrated, and the victim's opinion of a recommended sentence. [footnote omitted] This Court has recognized that victim impact testimony should generally be restricted to these issues, though it can also be used to give the jury a quick glimpse of the life of the victim, to demonstrate those unique characteristics which define the individual who has died, and to show why the victim should not have been killed. [footnote omitted] While a substantial portion of the victim impact testimony of Tolbert and Milligan did address the emotional and psychological toll that the Plummer murders caused in their lives, their testimony was not exclusively emotional. Tolbert testified that the murder of her parents caused her to have sleepless nights, nightmares, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Milligan testified that the murders caused her many sleepless nights, nightmares, acid reflux and upset stomach, post-traumatic stress disorder and all of its components, such as memory loss, depression, tearsoh, so many tearsanger, and physical pain in my heart. Milligan also noted that the loss of her sister left her without someone to consult with about what to do about our mother. Both women, who lived near the Plummer home, mentioned that they had interacted with Curtis and Gloria Plummer on a daily basis and now could no longer do so. In addition, both women offered a quick glimpse into the lives and character traits of the Plummers.FN133 This Court finds that the testimony of Tolbert and Milligan did not go beyond the bounds of acceptable victim impact testimony in this regard, and rejects DeRosa's first challenge to it. FN133. Tolbert noted that they were good, hard-working people and had helped a lot of people in this county. Milligan testified that they were wonderful people who helped so many people, had many friends, loved their family, and loved life. DeRosa also argues that the victim impact evidence presented during his trial contained inappropriate characterizations of his crime and an improper recommendation regarding his sentence. He makes a general challenge to this evidence, as well as a challenge to the particular evidence presented in his case. DeRosa first asserts that this Court has erroneously interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Payne v. Tennessee , [footnote omitted] to allow for victim recommendations regarding the defendant's sentence, as well as victim characterizations of the crime. This Court has recently noted that although the Supreme Court had earlier forbidden such evidence, the decision in Payne left open the question of the validity of such evidence.FN135 The legislature of this State has specifically provided for the admission of this kind of victim impact evidence. [footnote omitted] And this Court has rejected claims like DeRosa's in the past. [footnote omitted] The Court will not re-examine the issue here. FN135. See Murphy v. State, 2002 OK CR 24, 47 P.3d 876, 885 (noting that Payne opinion explicitly left open the question about admissibility of victim impact evidence regarding characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence); see also Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n. 2, 111 S.Ct. at 2611 n. 2 (recognizing that although Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), held that the admission of a victim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, the Court's ruling in Payne was limited to its conclusions about the admissibility of evidence about the victim and the effect of the victim's death on the family, since other types of victim impact evidence were not at issue in Payne ). Regarding the specific testimony presented during his trial, DeRosa argues that the testimony of Tolbert and Milligan exceeded the bounds of an appropriate sentencing recommendation and contained improper characterizations of his crime.FN138 This Court has reviewed all of the victim impact testimony and finds that the testimony did go too far, particularly in terms of Tolbert's emotional plea for the death penalty and Milligan's speculative and inflammatory claims about the victims' experience of their attack. [footnote omitted] Nevertheless, the testimony was not so unduly prejudicial that it rendered DeRosa's trial fundamentally unfair or his sentencing unreliable. [footnote omitted] This Court rejects DeRosa's specific challenges to the testimony of Tolbert and Milligan, as well as his claim that the overall effect of their victim impact testimony created an unconstitutional risk that his jury would be unable to make a reliable sentencing determination in his case.FN141 FN138. Tolbert recommended that the jury sentence DeRosa to death, saying, I ask you, the jury, for justice. Although this will not bring them back to us, it will give us some peace of mind. Our family has suffered enough because of this man. My family pleads with you to give the death penalty. Although Milligan did not provide a sentencing recommendation, she did provide a number of characterizations of the crime. In particular, she referred to the horrible, heinous way in which they died and that Gloria Plummer suffered pain and terror in her last moments and that she felt horror and betrayal from people that they knew and trusted. Milligan also referred to the Plummers as helpless, knowing they were going to die. . . . FN141. The victim impact statements in this case raise very serious questions, particularly Tolbert's sentencing recommendation, which violates our clearly established caselaw regarding the authorized concise and unamplified format for such recommendations. Nevertheless, this was a premeditated, gruesome, heinous crime against two innocent victims, and the rest of the trial was remarkably error free. There is no real doubt about DeRosa's guilt. Similarly, there is virtually no doubt that the jury in this case would have imposed two death sentences even without the erroneous victim impact testimony. Although I personally have qualms about whether we should ever substitute our judgment for that of a jury, I recognize that this Court has applied a harmless error analysis in this context before, see Cargle v. State, 909 P.2d 806, 835 (Okla.Crim. App.1995), and I really have no doubt that the erroneous victim impact testimony had no bearing on the jury's decision to sentence DeRosa to death for his crimes. Id. at 1151-52.