Opinion ID: 848648
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: plaintiff's claim against ford

Text: It is the case in this area of the law that employer responsibility for sexual harassment can be established only if the employer had reasonable notice of the harassment and failed to take appropriate corrective action. Chambers, supra at 312, 614 N.W.2d 910. In Chambers, we also held that notice of sexual harassment is adequate if, by an objective standard, the totality of the circumstances were such that a reasonable employer would have been aware of a substantial probability that sexual harassment was occurring. Id. at 319, 614 N.W.2d 910. Thus, actual notice to the employer is not required; rather, the test is whether the employer knew or should have known of the harassment. Radtke, supra at 396 n. 46, 501 N.W.2d 155. [24] As is apparent, the issue is whether Ford knew or reasonably should have known, under the totality of the circumstances, of Bennett's harassment of plaintiff. Plaintiff claims she made a prima facie showing of notice when she told two low-level supervisors of Bennett's exposure, and that Ford was also put on notice by the letters her psychologist and son-in-law sent to Ford. We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that plaintiff's notice evidence was insufficient to allow the case to be submitted to the jury. We first consider whether plaintiff's telling two low-level supervisors in confidence that Bennett had exposed himself to her constituted notice to Ford. We find that it did not. It must be recalled that, if an employee is sexually harassed in the workplace, it is that employee's choice whether to pursue the matter. In other words, the victim of harassment owns the right whether to notify the company and start the process of investigation. Until the employee takes appropriate steps to start the process, it is not started. As stated in Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1014 (C.A.7, 1997): [T]he law against sexual harassment is not self-enforcing. A plaintiff has no duty under the law to complain about discriminatory harassment, but the employer in a case like this one will not be liable if it had no reason to know about it. Thus, when an employee requests confidentiality in discussing workplace harassment, and the request for confidentiality is honored, such a request is properly considered a waiver of the right to give notice. [25] Thus, we conclude that plaintiff's telling two supervisors in confidence about one instance of Bennett's improper conduct does not constitute notice, notwithstanding Ford's policy that required the supervisors to report the information to human resources personnel. [26] Our holding is consistent with other courts that have considered this issue. For example in Hooker v. Wentz, 77 F.Supp.2d 753, 757-758 (S.D.W.Va., 1999), the court held there was no notice to the employer where the plaintiff confided in her immediate supervisor about sexual advances but asked that he not report it to others. And, in Faragher v. Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1530 (C.A.11, 1997), rev'd on other grounds 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998), the court held that, for vicarious-liability purposes, notice to a manager does not constitute notice to management when the complainant asks the manager, as a friend, to keep the information confidential. With regard to the letters that were sent to Ford, we concur with the Court of Appeals that where the evidence showed that plaintiff had filed numerous grievances and labor relations complaints over the years against Bennett and others that were unrelated to sexual harassment, [27] the mentioning of the word harassment alone or the phrase hostile environment in the letters was insufficient to give Ford notice that sexual harassment was being claimed. This is especially true where plaintiff was aware, and the employer was aware that she was aware, of the terminology at issue because she had previously filed a written complaint asserting that her UAW committeeman had sexually harassed her. [28] Accordingly, even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, we conclude that Ford was entitled to a directed verdict because, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable employer would not have been on notice of a substantial probability that sexual harassment was occurring. [29] Plaintiff argues in the alternative that, even if her evidence of notice to Ford was insufficient, it would have been sufficient if the trial court had not erroneously granted the motion in limine that precluded introduction of evidence of Ford's knowledge of Bennett's indecent exposure conviction. This conviction had been expunged before the trial in this matter. We conclude that the trial court's ruling was not an abuse of discretion. First, we note that MCL 780.623(5) provides: Except as provided in subsection (2) [pertaining to certain law enforcement purposes], a person, other than the applicant, who knows or should have known that a conviction was set aside under this section and who divulges, uses, or publishes information concerning a conviction set aside under this section is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 90 days or a fine of not more than $500.00, or both. Pursuant to this statute, evidence of Bennett's expunged misdemeanor conviction was not admissible. While this statute clearly made evidence of the conviction inadmissible, that leaves the question whether the facts that led to the conviction, which occurred while Bennett was not at work and involved individuals with no connection to Ford, were admissible to establish that Ford knew or should have known that Bennett was sexually harassing plaintiff. The trial court ruled that the evidence was inadmissible because the prejudice to Ford would substantially outweigh any probative value the evidence might have. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. [30] Indeed, we question how Ford's knowledge of Bennett's improper off-site behavior involving nonemployees could constitute notice to Ford that plaintiff's work environment was sexually hostile. Context is important; improper behavior of a given type is not an inevitable predictor of other types of improper behavior especially where, as here, they occur at entirely different locales and under different circumstances. Tomson v. Stephan, 705 F.Supp. 530, 536 (D.Kan., 1989). And, as we stated in Chambers, supra at 315-316, 614 N.W.2d 910, an employer can be vicariously liable for a hostile work environment only if it failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action upon reasonable notice of the creation of a hostile [work] environment .... (Emphasis added.) Here, the trial court and the Court of Appeals properly held that plaintiff's notice evidence was insufficient to allow the case to be submitted to the jury.