Opinion ID: 73176
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Penalty Stage Issues

Text: 1. Whether errors during the guilt phase require vacating the death sentence Sims claims that numerous errors occurred during the guilt phase which require vacating his death sentence. These alleged errors were ineffectiveness of counsel, unnecessary use of shackles and excessive security measures, unreliable identification testimony, and the prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony. The Florida Supreme Court rejected Sims's contention on appeal from the denial of Sims's motion for post-conviction relief, 602 So.2d at 1253, 1258; however, the district court determined that these alleged errors cumulatively resulted in prejudice to Sims during the sentencing phase. The district court's holding is erroneous. The district court's reliance on the ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt stage claim is based upon the hypnosis issue which is foreclosed by binding precedent, see Spaziano, and it is inconsistent with the district court's holding that counsel was not ineffective at the guilt phase because the prejudice component had not been established. ROA, Vol. 3, Tab 33, pp. 11-17. The district court's holding as to the shackling/excessive security measures claim is incorrect because this claim was never pled by Sims. Sims raised this claim in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and the district court properly denied relief. Id. at pp. 8-9. Thus, the substantive shackling claim is procedurally barred because it was never presented to the state courts, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), and the district court's reliance on it to grant sentencing stage relief is erroneous. 27 The district court also relied on the unreliable hypnotically induced identification testimony as cumulative error which prejudiced Sims. As stated previously, this claim is barred by the non-retroactivity doctrine of Teague. Accordingly, the district court's reliance on this claim is misplaced. The final cumulative error component was the district court's finding that the State knowingly used perjured testimony when the prosecutor argued that Halsell's plea agreement included a ten year sentence which he had begun to serve at the time of the trial knowing that Halsell had not yet been sentenced. This finding is inconsistent with the district court's finding that there was no Giglio violation. ROA, Vol. 3, Tab 33, p. 19. Accordingly, the district court erred in finding cumulative guilt stage error which prejudiced Sims during the penalty phase. 2. Whether the Hitchcock error requires vacating the death sentence Sims also alleges that there was constitutional error with regard to his sentencing because the jury, trial judge, and the reviewing court were limited in their consideration of mitigating evidence.12 Sims contends that a violation of Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), occurred which entitles him to penalty phase relief. The Florida Supreme Court found Hitchcock error, but concluded that it was harmless. 602 So.2d at 1257. The district court reached a contrary conclusion. ROA, Vol. 3, Tab 33, p. 44. We disagree with the district court's conclusion because it committed several legal errors in determining that the Hitchcock error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 12 These specific claims were listed in Sims's federal habeas petition as issues XI, XII, XIII, and XV. See ROA, Vol. 2, Tab 20, pp. 106-162. 28 As the Florida Supreme Court noted, the jury instruction was not a model of clarity. 602 So.2d at 1257. In its instruction, the trial court listed the aggravating factors which the jury could consider, see R. Vol. 5, p. 43-45, then mentioned the mitigating circumstances. The pertinent portion of the instruction read: The mitigating circumstances which you may consider if established by the evidence among others are these: ... Id. at 45. The trial court then listed the statutory mitigating factors for the jury to consider. The trial court's only reference to non-statutory mitigating factors was the phrase among others. Defense counsel did present non-statutory mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing via testimony from a young woman with whom Sims had lived, the woman's mother and daughter, and a fellow inmate at the jail who testified to Sims's attempt to counsel another inmate away from a life of crime. Id. at pp. 8-12, 13-20, 21-23, & 24-27. We conclude that the trial court's instructions did not limit the jury's consideration of non-statutory mitigating circumstances and therefore did not constitute a Hitchcock error. See Buchanan v. Angelone, --- U.S. ----, ----, 118 S.Ct. 757, 761, 139 L.Ed.2d 702 (1998)(reiterating the principle that a sentencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence.). Sims's sentencer was not precluded from considering all relevant mitigating evidence. The trial court instructed the jury to consider certain mitigating factors, among others. This instruction did not preclude the jury from considering all the mitigating evidence presented by defense counsel but, instead, instructed them to consider all the evidence that was presented. Accordingly, there was no Hitchcock error in this case. Assuming arguendo that there was a Hitchcock error, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We employ the Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993), harmless error analysis to the Hitchcock error. See Williams v. Singletary, 114 29 F.3d 177, 180 (11th Cir.1997)(Brecht applies only at the second step of the inquiry in determining if an already established error is harmless.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 712, 139 L.Ed.2d 654 (1998). In Booker v. Singletary, 90 F.3d 440, 442 (11th Cir.1996), we stated: In Brecht, the Court held that Chapman 's [v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) ] standard of harmless beyond a reasonable doubt was inapplicable to habeas corpus review. In place of Chapman, the Court substituted the standard established by Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), for resolving the harmless error issue on the direct review of a criminal conviction. The Kotteakos standard asks whether the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. By substituting Kotteakos ' standard for Chapman 's, the Court in Brecht made it easier for a state to show that a constitutional violation did not prejudice an habeas petitioner's case. 90 F.3d at 442 (11th Cir.1996) (citations omitted). We have held that Hitchcock errors are trial type errors governed by Brecht. See e.g., Horsley v. State of Ala., 45 F.3d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir.1995); Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547 (11th Cir.1994). The Florida Supreme Court found that there was other non-statutory mitigating evidence that could have been presented to the jury for their consideration, but it was not overwhelming in light of the aggravating factors. 602 So.2d at 1257. The district court disagreed and found that there was no evidentiary support for the allegedly valid aggravating factors. The district court found that the only evidence relating to the first factor (that Sims had previously been convicted of a violent felony) was a stipulation read by the prosecutor which informed the jury that Sims had previously been convicted of assault with attempt to commit robbery. The district court cites no authority for the proposition that a stipulation is not adequate evidence. The district court found that the second aggravating factor (that the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of the robbery) was established, but this factor alone cannot be sufficient to support a 30 death sentence. As to the third factor, the district court found no evidence in the record from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest. As its basis for this finding, the district court stated that there is no evidence in the record that the victim was a deputy sheriff. On the contrary, we find sufficient support in the record for this aggravating factor. One of Sims's co-defendants, Halsell, testified that Sims came to the motel room bleeding and said he killed a cop. R. Vol. 2, pp. 316, 350. Baldree also testified that Sims stated he killed a cop. R. Vol. 3, p. 437. A bystander testified that she saw a deputy draw a gun. R. Vol. 3, p. 470. Accordingly, the district court clearly erred in finding no evidentiary support for the valid aggravating factors. The district court found that in light of the other non-statutory mitigating evidence which could have been presented, if counsel had been effective, the death sentence was not appropriate considering the lack of evidentiary support of the valid aggravating factors. We first observe that most of the non-statutory mitigating evidence which Sims's asserts was not presented actually was presented. Defense counsel presented the testimony of a woman with whom Sims had lived and nursed while she was ill, the woman's mother and daughter, and a fellow inmate. The only specific information defense counsel did not present was evidence of Sims's troubled childhood. Sims argues that counsel's failure to present this evidence was ineffective assistance. We disagree. Defense counsel stated at the Rule 3.850 hearing that Sims specifically told them not to bother his family members. R. Vol. 13, p. 230. His attorneys explained the necessity of mitigation to Sims, but he would not provide them any information. Counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to present additional evidence of mitigation of which they were unaware due to Sims's refusal to assist them in obtaining the information. The record discloses that defense counsel performed well. 31 Accordingly, the district court erred in finding that Sims's attorneys were ineffective in failing to present non-statutory mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. The district court also determined that it was error for the sentencing court not to consider the evidence of sentencing disparity between Sims and his co-defendants. This error, according to the district court, also contributed to the substantial and injurious effect or influence underlying the jury's sentencing recommendation. The Florida Supreme Court specifically held that the disparity between Sims's sentence and the sentences his co-defendants received is not a mitigating factor. 602 So.2d at 1257. We reject Sims's argument that his co-defendant's lesser sentences constituted a mitigating factor, since the evidence shows that Sims was the triggerman. See Marek v. Singletary, 62 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir.1995). As elicited from counsel at oral argument before this panel, the jury and the court knew that one of the co-defendants was only going to receive a two-year sentence and thought the other defendant was receiving a ten-year sentence. Thus, the court knew most of the sentence disparity facts anyway and this fact negates Sims's contention. Accordingly, this alleged mitigating factor was not really mitigating after all and the district court erred in concluding that it had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's sentencing determination. The district court then enumerated several sentencing stage errors which, in the court's judgment, preclude a finding that the Hitchcock error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 32 ROA, Tab 33, pp. 48-49.13 The first three reasons14 are a restatement that there was a Hitchcock error. As we stated previously, there was no Hitchcock error and even assuming that there was error, it was harmless. Thus, we disagree with the district court's determination that numerous guilt stage and penalty stage errors preclude a finding that the Hitchcock error was harmless. First, the district court found that the trial judge and jury would not have sentenced Sims to death or recommended a death sentence, respectively, if they had properly weighed the aggravating factor or factors. As stated previously, the aggravating factors were valid and supported by record evidence. Second, the district court also found that the jury was not informed of the importance of its recommendation. The district court cites no authority for this holding. Assuming, however, that this is a cognizable claim under Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985)15, the Teague bar would apply because Caldwell announced a new rule of law which does not come within Teague 's exception for watershed rules fundamental to the integrity of the 13 The district court also enumerated four guilt stage errors which preclude a finding that the Hitchcock error was harmless: (1) prosecutorial misconduct; (2) use of hypnotically enhanced testimony; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel as to the hypnotically enhanced testimony; and (4) the heightened security could have made the death penalty vote more likely. As stated previously, none of these claims merits guilt stage relief and, accordingly, cannot form the basis of sentencing stage relief. 14 These enumerated reasons are: (1) the trial judge failed to properly charge the jury regarding nonstatutory mitigating factors; (2) the trial judge permitted the prosecutor to make final argument which told the jury that they could only consider the statutory mitigating factors; and (3) when the jury's confusion concerning mitigating and aggravating factors was made known by way of a request for a copy of the Florida statute which set forth the factors to be considered, the trial judge failed to clear up the confusion and recharged the jury with the same inadequate charge given previously. 15 In Caldwell, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment may be violated when a prosecutor minimizes the jury's sense of responsibility in its determination that death is the appropriate punishment. 472 U.S. at 340, 105 S.Ct. 2633. 33 criminal proceeding. See Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 229, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990). Next, the district court found that the prosecutor made improper and prejudicial arguments relating to the victim which had the result of inviting the jury to consider impermissible aggravating factors. This claim is based on Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), which was overruled in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). The net result is that victim impact statements and arguments are permissible. Thus, the district court's reliance on this claim is misplaced. Fourth, the district court found that the jury was not properly advised of the alternative sentence of life with a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years. We are at a loss to understand the district court's reliance on this claim since it was never raised in the state courts and, thus, is procedurally barred. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). Fifth, the district court found that the trial court improperly considered a 1958 common law robbery conviction in aggravation when no evidentiary basis existed for the conviction. This ignores the fact that there was another conviction supporting that aggravating circumstance—a 1971 assault with intent to commit robbery. 602 So.2d at 1258. Accordingly, any error involving the 1958 conviction was harmless. Id. Sixth, the district court relied on the fact that the prosecutor failed to provide evidence relating to the sentencing disparities of Sims and the co-defendants. As stated previously, this is not a mitigating circumstance because Sims was the triggerman. Lastly, the district court found that trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing. The district court concluded that the defense attorneys did not take their responsibilities at the sentencing stage 34 seriously. We disagree. The record discloses that defense counsel presented non-statutory mitigating evidence at the sentencing stage. The record also reveals that defense counsel made an effective argument at the sentencing stage. A defense attorney has limited resources and must make the best decisions possible regarding allocating resources based upon his or her knowledge and experience. As the trial court noted, defense counsel did a commendable job. R. Vol. 4, p. 768. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's grant of sentencing stage relief and remand this case with directions that the district court reinstate the death penalty. We affirm the district court's denial of habeas relief as to the guilt stage errors. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. 35