Opinion ID: 2489946
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court erred in refusing to sever counts i and ii of the indictment.

Text: ¶ 21. We review a trial court's denial of a motion to sever multiple counts of an indictment for abuse of discretion. Rushing v. State, 911 So.2d 526, 532 (Miss. 2005) (citing Brawner v. State, 872 So.2d 1, 6-7 (Miss.2004)). Both multicount indictments and multi-offense trials are allowed under certain circumstances. Id. In trials concerning multi-count indictments, severance is unnecessary in Mississippi if the acts or transactions are connected together as part of a common scheme or plan and if the indictment was otherwise proper. Id. The authority to charge and try a defendant for multiple counts in the same indictment is provided by Mississippi Code Section 99-7-2 (Rev.2007), which provides: (1) Two (2) or more offenses which are triable in the same court may be charged in the same indictment with a separate count for each offense if: (a) the offenses are based on the same act or transaction; or (b) the offenses are based on two (2) or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. (2) Where two (2) or more offenses are properly charged in separate counts of a single indictment, all such charges may be tried in a single proceeding. (3) When a defendant is convicted of two (2) or more offenses charged in separate counts of an indictment, the court shall impose separate sentences for each such conviction. (4) The jury or the court, in cases in which the jury is waived, shall return a separate verdict for each count of an indictment drawn under subsection (1) of this section. ¶ 22. In Corley v. State, 584 So.2d 769, 772 (Miss.1991), we recommended the following procedure to trial judges who are faced with an issue of severance: [W]e recommend that a trial court hold a hearing on the issue. The State, then, has the burden of making a prima facie case showing that the offenses charged fall within the language of the statute allowing multi-count indictments. If the State meets its burden, a defendant may rebut by showing that the offenses were separate and distinct acts or transactions. When deciding whether a multicount indictment was proper, the trial court should consider the following factors: (1) the time period between the offenses, (2) whether the evidence proving each count would be admissible to prove each of the other counts, and (3) whether the crimes are interwoven. Id. (citing Allman v. State, 571 So.2d 244, 248 (Miss.1990); McCarty v. State, 554 So.2d 909, 914-16 (Miss.1989)). ¶ 23. Richardson contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever Counts I and II of his indictment. Richardson's indictment contains two counts: (1) capital murder with the underlying felony of robbery under Mississippi Code Section 97-3-19(2)(e) (Rev.2006); [2] and (2) felon in possession of a firearm under Mississippi Code Section 97-37-5(1) (Rev.2006). Richardson filed a pretrial motion to sever the two counts, arguing that the nature of the two crimes prevented him from having a fair trial and that the crimes were not based on the same act or transaction. A pretrial hearing was held on the motion, and the trial court denied Richardson's motion to sever. ¶ 24. On appeal, Richardson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion because of the explosive nature of the capital-murder charge. Richardson contends that the two crimes were separate and distinct and that the evidence needed to establish the second count of being a felon in possession of a firearmspecifically evidence of his prior aggravated-assault convictionwas unduly prejudicial. ¶ 25. After Richardson had filed his motion to suppress, the trial court held a pretrial Corley hearing. [3] After both sides presented their arguments on the motion, the trial court discussed each of the Corley factors. The trial court first discussed the time period between the occurrences (the first Corley factor) and found that the time period was insignificant. Corley, 584 So.2d at 772. We agree with the trial court's finding. Richardson robbed Evans around 2:00 p.m. and purchased two guns later that same afternoon. In Patrick v. State, 754 So.2d 1194, 1196 (Miss.2000), we held that separate counts of aggravated assault, armed robbery, burglary, and grand larceny properly were tried together when the crimes occurred within a seven-hour period. Notably, the crimes in Patrick involved three separate incidents, each having different victims. Id. Similar to Patrick, the crimes in today's case occurred within a relatively short time period. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the period of time between the two crimes did not warrant severance of the two counts in Richardson's indictment. ¶ 26. The trial court then considered the second Corley factorwhether the evidence proving each count would be admissible to prove each of the other counts. Corley, 584 So.2d at 772. The trial judge made the following statement when considering the second factor: There may be some different witnesses and different evidence, because in the firearm charge you're going to have to show that he was prior-convicted of some felony offense, and Iso you're going to have some different witnesses that may testify that may not necessarily testify about the capital murder. There may be some additional witnesses that would be brought in. Richardson now contends that the evidence of his prior aggravated-assault conviction would not have been admissible in a capital-murder trial. He thus argues that the evidence of his prior felony conviction was unduly prejudicial. ¶ 27. At trial, evidence of Richardson's prior felony conviction was introduced to establish that he previously had been convicted of a felony when he purchased the firearms on September 19, 2006. During the pretrial severance hearing, the trial court noted that, if the defense wished to stipulate that Richardson had a prior felony conviction, the State would be bound by that stipulation and the court would allow it. The defense, however, never attempted to stipulate to this fact. Although Richardson filed a pretrial motion to sever the counts, Richardson did not object to the entry of evidence of his aggravated-assault conviction at trial. Further, Richardson never requested that a limiting instruction be given to the jury. ¶ 28. In Williams v. State, 991 So.2d 593, 605-06 (Miss.2008), we addressed when trial courts should allow the parties to stipulate to a defendant's prior conviction and issue limiting instructions on the prior conviction. We stated: Where evidence of a prior conviction is a necessary element of the crime for which the defendant is on trial (i.e., possession of a firearm by a convicted felon), but the evidence of the specific nature of the crime for which the defendant was previously convicted (i.e., armed robbery), is not an essential element of the crime for which the defendant is on trial, as it is in DUI cases, the trial court should accept a defendant's offer to stipulate and grant a limiting instruction. Id. In Williams, the defendant was on trial for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and offered to stipulate to his status as a convicted felon. Id. at 606. The trial court refused to allow the stipulation, and we reversed. Id. ¶ 29. In Armstead v. State, 978 So.2d 642, 648-49 (Miss.2008), we held that multiple counts did not need to be severed simply on the basis that evidence in one count would not be admissible as to the other count if the two were tried separately. We stated that: There is no authority for restricting the multi-count-indictment statute because some element of proof necessary as to one charge would be inadmissible on another charge if tried separately. Whenever a defendant is tried on a multi-count indictment, the possibility that a jury will infer guilt on all counts from guilt on one individual count does not warrant reversal so long as the jury is instructed that each count must be considered separately, and each count is supported by substantial evidence and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 649 (internal citations omitted). ¶ 30. In Golden v. State, 968 So.2d 378, 383 (Miss.2007), the defendant was tried for two counts of rape, occurring approximately three hours apart. While discussing whether the trial court had erred in refusing to sever the two counts, we stated that the issue of whether the evidence to prove one count would be admissible to prove the other is problematic. Id. During a Corley hearing, the trial court in Golden recognized that the two counts would have some evidence in common and some evidence not in common. Id. On appeal, we found that the trial court took into account the factors which were common, and those which were not, and we are unable to say that the trial court abused his discretion. Id. ¶ 31. Based on the forgoing discussion, we cannot say that the trial court in today's case abused its discretion by finding that Richardson's counts should be tried together, despite evidence being needed to prove each count that would not be admissible to prove the other count. The trial court recognized that there would be different witnesses and different evidence for the two crimes. We note, however, that some of the witnesses at trial testified concerning both the murder and the firearm charges. For example, Investigator Cooper gave significant testimony as to both counts. He testified about Richardson's confession, in which Richardson admitted to hitting Evans in the head with a baseball bat and stealing both of Evans's wallets. Investigator Cooper also located both of the guns that Richardson had purchased. Sarah Gibson also gave testimony relating to both counts. She testified that, on the day of the attack, Richardson had stated to her that he had done something bad. She also testified that she later had witnessed Richardson's purchase of two guns. Also, Richardson's counsel did not request a limiting instruction, nor did Richardson's counsel offer to stipulate that Richardson had a previous felony conviction. Also, defense counsel did not object at trial to evidence of Richardson's previous conviction. See Harper v. State, 478 So.2d 1017, 1025 (Miss.1985) (citing Newell v. State, 308 So.2d 71, 78 (Miss.1975)) ([T]he lower court may not be put in error for failure to instruct the jury on any point of law unless specifically requested in writing to do so.). See also Rushing, 911 So.2d at 539 (citing Brown v. State, 890 So.2d 901, 913 (Miss.2004)). ¶ 32. For the sake of emphasis, we state again that, during the pretrial severance hearing, the trial court offered to allow defense counsel to stipulate that Richardson had a prior felony conviction, and if so stipulated, then the State would be bound by that stipulation. However, defense counsel never stipulated to this fact. We quote the trial judge on this point: But if the defense wishes to stipulate that [Richardson] has a prior conviction, then the State would be bound by that stipulation, as the Court recalls, from the U.S. Supreme Court. [4] But II think they meetthe Court finds that they meet that test, that they're interwoven, that the time period is insignificant, and that there's going to be some bleed-over in the witnesses that can prove one count and the other. Presented with this golden opportunity to stipulate before the jury to the prior felony conviction, without any reference to the nature of the offense (aggravated assault) for which Richardson was convicted, or any other details of the prior conviction, the defendant, through counsel, chose not to stipulate to the prior conviction for the purpose of proof of an element of the offense of felony firearm possession. ¶ 33. Finally, we take note that the trial court did instruct the jury that the two counts were separate offenses and should be considered separately. ¶ 34. The final Corley factor that the trial court should consider is whether the crimes are interwoven. Corley, 584 So.2d at 772. In Rushing, 911 So.2d at 537, we found that three counts of prescription forgery occurring in a five-month period were interwoven because they involve too many similar factors when viewed together, to be anything but clearly linked and part of the same common scheme or plan. In Harris v. State, 908 So.2d 868 (Miss.Ct.App.2005), the Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not err in denying a motion to sever a felon-in-possession-of-a-handgun charge from other counts of burglary and sale of a stolen firearm. The defendant in Harris broke into a mobile home and stole a Glock 19 pistol. Id. at 870. Approximately two months later, the defendant sold the stolen gun to a police informant. Id. at 871. In finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever the counts, the Court of Appeals stated: The common thread running through each of the counts is the gun. It was taken in the burglary, it was possessed, and it was sold. Each of the offenses are based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. It seems that the scheme or plan was to commit a burglary and get items which could be sold illegally for cash. Id. at 875. ¶ 35. Similar to Harris, we find that Richardson's charges have a common threadthe money stolen from Evans. The underlying felony in Richardson's murder charge is robbery. After Richardson hit Evans on the head with a baseball bat, he stole Evans's wallet, which contained a large amount of cash. Shortly thereafter, Richardson used the money he had stolen from Evans, among other things, to purchase two guns. Based on this connection, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Richardson's two charges were interwoven. ¶ 36. In the background of our analysis, we also consider the policy behind prohibiting multicount indictments in some cases, but allowing multicount indictments in other cases. In Corley, we stated: We have been, and remain, unwilling to allow separate and distinct offenses to be tried in the same criminal proceeding. We do so in order to avoid potential problems of a jury finding a defendant guilty on one unproven count due to proof of guilt on another, or convicting a defendant based upon the weight of the charged offenses, or upon the cumulative effect of the evidence. Corley, 584 So.2d at 772 (citations omitted). Based on the facts of this case most notably, the overwhelming evidence supporting the jury verdicts for both countswe find that the well-settled law in Corley, protecting defendants from convictions based on evidence of separate and distinct offenses, is not in jeopardy. ¶ 37. While we have found that the overwhelming weight of the evidence supports the jury verdicts in today's case, we also note, alternatively, that even if we were to find that the trial court had abused its discretion in today's case (which we do not find), the result would be harmless error. Harmless-errors are those which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction. Williams, 991 So.2d at 599 (quoting Tran v. State, 962 So.2d 1237, 1247 (Miss.2007)). We have the duty to be fair, not only to the defendant, but to the State as well. Tran, 962 So.2d at 1246. Harmless-error analysis is often necessary to prevent unfair prejudice to the State, and the State is certainly prejudiced where convictions are reversed based on errors which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Id. (citations omitted). In conducting [a] harmless-error analysis, this Court has the power and duty to review the record de novo in order to determine the error's effect. Id. at 1247 (citations omitted). Both of Richardson's convictions are supported by overwhelming evidence. Richardson confessed to both crimes. He also admitted to several other witnesses that he had robbed Evans. Richardson inquired of Investigator Cooper as to Evans's condition and apologized several times for what he had done to Evans. Barbara Tenney, a witness for the defendant, testified, inter alia, that Richardson had informed her that he needed new pants because of blood on his pants. Tenney also testified that Richardson had told her that I hope [Evans] didn't die. His eyes rolled back in his head when I hit him. There was also eyewitness testimony that he had purchased handguns on the day of the murder. Accordingly, even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court in today's case erred in denying Richardson's motion to sever, we find the error was harmless and did not result in Richardson's trial being fundamentally unfair. ¶ 38. In sum, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Richardson's motion to sever. The trial court held a pretrial Corley hearing and properly considered all of the Corley factors. This issue is without merit.