Opinion ID: 1246974
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: witherspoon errors

Text: I disagree with the majority's opinion that jurors Rogers and Willis were properly excluded for cause under the constitutional standards enunciated in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770]. The majority assert that these two jurors made it unmistakably clear that under no circumstances would [they] impose the death penalty. Although these jurors did initially express an automatic opposition to the death penalty under any circumstances, they later expressly retreated from their prior position by stating that they could consider the death penalty under certain circumstances and they never thereafter repudiated this latter view. These two jurors affirmatively indicated an ability to consider the death penalty under certain circumstances. Thus the instant case presents a much clearer violation of Witherspoon than the many previous cases which we have reversed for Witherspoon error because of the exclusion for cause of jurors who, although expressing opposition to the death penalty, were not questioned sufficiently so as to make clear that this opposition was automatic and immutable. In contrast to such prior cases, the two jurors in the present case were questioned at length concerning their opposition to the death penalty and expressly indicated that their opposition was not automatic and immutable. At the outset of voir dire both Miss Rogers and Mr. Willis indicated they would not vote for the death penalty under any circumstances. [1] Had the voir dire of these jurors ended at this point, I would agree that they were properly excluded for cause under Witherspoon. However, upon questioning by defense counsel thereafter, Miss Rogers stated that she did not know whether she could impose the death penalty in a case such as the aggravated hypothetical case posed to her and that whether she could impose the death penalty if the proper case were presented depends on the degree and on all the facts. Mr. Willis expressly adopted these answers given by Miss Rogers and added that with him too it would be a question of degree. Miss Rogers and Mr. Willis thereby expressly retracted their initial statements and indicated a willingness to consider the death penalty in certain cases. Neither juror subsequently repudiated this view either expressly or impliedly. Defense counsel's questioning of Miss Rogers and Mr. Willis was as follows: MR. BOAGS: Miss Rogers, it is your belief that no matter what the person did that you could not vote the death penalty? MISS ROGERS: Yes, that is my opinion. Q BY MR. BOAGS: No matter how heinous the crime? A Yes, sir. O You cannot think of a situation where you could say the death penalty would be a proper one? A No. Q What if  I would like to give you an example. Say, if a person is proven he killed 10 persons, children and women, and very heinous-type crimes. Then this person, after he was arrested, said, `Yes, I did it and if released I will do it again, and that besides the 10 I killed, for every $100 that you give me, I will show you where the body of another is that I killed.' And if all those facts are proven and the man testified in court substantially the same way, do you think you could impose the death penalty on that person? A I don't know about that type of person. I never heard of that type of person. Q Well, if you were sitting on a case like that, do you think you could impose it? A I don't really know. Q What I am getting at is this. In the abstract, you know, it is easy to discuss these subjects about death and life, and what I believe is that it is always a question of degree. A That is right. Q And what I am trying to find out from you is if you agree with me that the death penalty is a question of degree? A Yes. Q And would it be fair to say, then, if the proper case was presented to you that you possibly could vote the death penalty, is that right? A All I can say is it depends on the degree. Q If the proper case was presented, you would vote it? A I don't know. I would have to get all the facts. Q Right. I would assume that. May I have a moment, your Honor? (Pause.) MR. BOAGS: Mr. Willis, you have heard the questions I have just asked, is that correct, sir? MR. WILLIS: Yes, sir. Q Would it be fair to say if I asked you the same questions, your answers would be substantially the same? A Yes. Q Also, with you it would be a question of degree, is that right? A Sure. The majority misinterpret the record when they state that by his initial testimony and by adopting the answers previously given by Miss Rogers, juror Willis made it unmistakably clear that under no circumstances would he impose the death penalty.... It is true that Mr. Willis' initial testimony did indicate an opposition to the death penalty no matter what the circumstances. However, the voir dire transcript above quoted clearly demonstrates that the answers of Miss Rogers that Mr. Willis adopted were those indicating that she was uncertain whether she could vote for the death penalty in the aggravated hypothetical case and that whether she could impose the death penalty in the proper case depends on the degree. Mr. Willis' adoption of these answers, far from making clear an unalterable opposition to the death penalty under any circumstances, indicated that there were indeed circumstances in which he would consider the death penalty. Moreover, Mr. Willis, in addition to adopting the answers of Miss Rogers, stated that imposition of the death penalty was a question of degree. Thus Mr. Willis expressly retreated from his initial position by indicating that he would be willing to consider the death penalty in certain cases, and it is clearly incorrect to hold  as the majority do  that by his initial testimony and by adopting the answers previously given by Miss Rogers, Juror Willis made it unmistakably clear that under no circumstances would he impose the death penalty.... Moreover, it should be noted that Mr. Willis' statements made after his expression of willingness to consider the death penalty under certain circumstances are consistent with that expression. The majority do not contest this point; they do not contend that his later statements justified his exclusion. Mr. Willis subsequently stated that he was opposed to sitting on the robbery-murder case before him for the reason the death penalty was sought and that he could not be fair to the State in the case before him. He was then asked if he had a bias or prejudice in the proceeding, and replied I am against capital punishment, yes. He was thereupon excused for cause. These final statements by Mr. Willis indicated merely a general opposition to the death penalty, and, as such, are not only clearly insufficient in themselves as a ground for his exclusion, according to the repeated holdings of this court, [2] but also are not inconsistent with his earlier statements that he could consider the death penalty in certain circumstances and therefore clearly cannot be construed as a retraction of those earlier statements. In view of his expressed ability to consider the death penalty in the proper case, Mr. Willis did not  as the majority argue  make it unmistakably clear that under no circumstances would he impose the death penalty.... Quite the contrary, his statements clearly left open the possibility that in some case [he] might impose the death penalty ( People v. Vaughn, supra, 71 Cal.2d 406, 416), and therefore he was improperly excluded under Witherspoon. (See id., at pp. 413-416; Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 510, 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 784, 88 S.Ct. 1770].) The erroneous exclusion of Mr. Willis alone requires reversal of the penalty trial. (E.g., People v. Washington, 71 Cal.2d 1170, 1177 [81 Cal. Rptr. 5, 459 P.2d 259]; In re Arguello, 71 Cal.2d 13, 15-16 [76 Cal. Rptr. 633, 452 P.2d 921]; People v. Bradford, supra, 70 Cal.2d 333, 344-345; In re Anderson, supra, 69 Cal.2d 613, 619.) It is also apparent that Miss Rogers did not repudiate her expressed uncertainty toward the hypothetical case and ability to consider the death penalty in the proper case. When asked by the prosecutor whether she would be willing to vote for a death verdict under any particular circumstances, she equivocally replied I can't think of any circumstances now. Such a response falls far short of the unambiguous response demanded by Witherspoon. (See People v. Vaughn, supra, 71 Cal.2d 406, 413.) Moreover, when the hypothetical case was thereafter again posed to her she once again expressed uncertainty as to whether she could impose the death penalty in such a case, stating that I don't know if I would or not. I really couldn't say. Finally, the prosecutor asked each juror then present [3] whether he would be willing and have the courage to vote for a verdict of death in this case if he thought this was a proper case for the death penalty. [4] Miss Rogers answered No to the question whether she would be willing and have the courage to vote for a verdict of death if she thought that this was a proper case for the imposition of the death penalty, ... (Italics added.) The prosecutor then asked her, Even if you thought it was a proper case, you would not have the courage to vote for a verdict of death? (italics added), to which she replied, No, I wouldn't. She was then excused by the court. The word it in the latter question clearly refers to the words this ... case in the prior question  so that both of Miss Rogers' answers indicated only her inability to return the death penalty in this case. This court has held, in an opinion written by the author of the majority opinion in the instant case, that it is not sufficient grounds for exclusion under Witherspoon for a juror to indicate an inability to return the death penalty in this case. ( People v. Risenhoover, 70 Cal.2d 39, 55 [73 Cal. Rptr. 533, 447 P.2d 925].) Such an attitude does not necessarily preclude the juror from concurring in such a verdict in all cases or in this case irrespective of the evidence that might be introduced at the trial, and thus it is not ... `unmistakably clear' that [such a juror] `would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial....' ( Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. 510, 522, fn. 22 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 785].) ( People v. Risenhoover, supra, 70 Cal.2d 39, 55.) It should be noted that at the time Miss Rogers stated she would not impose the death penalty in this case, she knew only that the case before her involved a robbery and a killing during the commission of the robbery; she had not been informed that at the penalty trial evidence would be introduced as to prior armed robberies allegedly committed by the defendants. Since the introduction at trial of defendant's priors is an extremely important factor in a jury's decision to impose the death penalty ( A Study of the California Penalty Jury in First-Degree-Murder Case (1969) 21 Stan.L.Rev. 1297, 1326-1327), it cannot even be said that Miss Rogers' responses indicate that she would not impose the death penalty in the particular case before her irrespective of the evidence that might be introduced at the trial. [5] In summary, Miss Rogers stated to the defense attorney that whether she could impose the death penalty in the proper case depends on the degree and on all the facts and stated to both the defense attorney and the prosecutor that she did not know whether she would vote for the death penalty in the hypothetical situation. Her subsequent statements that she would not be willing to vote for the death penalty in this case after being informed that the case before her involved a robbery-murder clearly cannot be construed as a repudiation of her earlier expressions of ability to consider the death penalty in certain circumstances. In view of her expressed ability to consider the death penalty in certain circumstances, she did not  as the majority contend  make it unmistakably clear that under no circumstances would she impose the death penalty, ... Like Mr. Willis, Miss Rogers clearly left open the possibility that in some case [she] might impose the death penalty ( People v. Vaughn, supra, 71 Cal.2d 406, 416), and thus she was improperly excluded under Witherspoon. The majority suggest an alternative ground for upholding the exclusion of Miss Rogers: Although the instant trial preceded the decision in Witherspoon, the standards which the trial court imposed comported fully with those announced in Witherspoon. Therefore, we could base our decision as to Miss Rogers upon the rule that `Where a prospective juror gives conflicting answers to questions relevant to his impartiality, the trial court's determination as to his state of mind is binding upon an appellate court. [Citations.]' ( People v. Linden, 52 Cal.2d 1, 22 [338 P.2d 397].) First, whether the standards imposed by the trial court comported fully with those announced in Witherspoon is the very point at issue, and for the reasons set forth at length above, I disagree with the majority on this point. It might be noted in this regard that, since the instant trial took place prior to the Witherspoon decision  when the state of the statutory and case law was materially different from the constitutional standard enunciated in Witherspoon and it was proper to excuse for cause prospective jurors who cannot be excluded under Witherspoon ( In re Anderson, supra, 69 Cal.2d 613, 618-619)  it would be entirely fortuitous for the judge to have applied standards which were in accordance with Witherspoon. ( People v. Williams, 71 Cal.2d 614, 629 [79 Cal. Rptr. 65, 456 P.2d 633].) Moreover, it is doubtful that the rule quoted from Linden, if applied in the scrupled-juror situation, could ever comport fully with the Witherspoon holding that it must be unmistakably clear the excluded juror would automatically vote against the imposition of the death penalty. If the juror gives conflicting answers to the question as to whether he could ever impose the death penalty and the conflict is not subsequently resolved on voir dire, it simply cannot be said that his automatic opposition to the death penalty is unmistakably clear. For the above reasons, it is my opinion Miss Rogers also was improperly excluded in the present case. Each of the erroneous exclusions  that of Mr. Willis and that of Miss Rogers  independently requires reversal of the penalty trial.