Opinion ID: 2738861
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court’s Reliance on Davis

Text: In the case at bar, the District Court refused to “stray[] from the limitations set forth in Davis and expand[] the good faith exception.” Katzin, 2012 WL 1646894, at –10. It viewed Davis as setting forth a requirement that there be relevant binding precedent within the circuit. Id. at . Because no binding Third Circuit precedent specifically authorized the agents’ actions, it reasoned that applying the good faith exception would involve “[e]xtending” the holding of Davis from binding appellate precedent to an area of unsettled law. Id. at , . Still, it acknowledged that “an argument could be made . . . that the more general good faith 16 exception language” permits “individualized determination” of whether law enforcement acted objectively reasonably in specific cases. Id. at . It also “hasten[ed] to emphasize” its lack of concern that the agents acted in a “calculated or otherwise deliberately cavalier or casual manner in the hopes of just meeting the outer limits of the constitutional contours of [Appellees’] rights.” Id. at  n.15. It admitted that the agents “could well profess surprise at the specific outcome of Jones.” Id. Despite these conclusions, however, the District Court refused “to move beyond the strict Davis holding,” and it suppressed the evidence against Appellees.8 Id. at . Appellees urge us to adopt the District Court’s interpretation of Davis. They argue that no binding appellate precedent under Davis existed upon which the agents could reasonably rely, and they warn us to refrain from “fabricat[ing] a new ground for application of the ‘good faith’ exception”: reliance on a “settled body of persuasive authority.” (Appellees’ Corrected Supplemental En Banc Brief (“Appellee En Banc Br.”) at 3–4.)