Opinion ID: 1903170
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: On appeal, Rivera advances two arguments on this Court. First, he contends that the evidence presented at the hearing was not sufficient to show that he violated the terms of his probation by failing to keep the peace and be on good behavior. Second, he claims that the hearing justice inappropriately considered Mildred's living arrangement with defendant, her financial dependence on him, and the possibility of welfare fraud when he assessed the credibility of her testimony. Our review of a probation-revocation decision is limited to a determination of whether the hearing justice's decision was arbitrary or capricious. State v. Znosko, 755 A.2d 832, 834 (R.I.2000) (citing State v. Rioux, 708 A.2d 895, 897 (R.I. 1998)). A hearing justice need determine only that the state has proved by reasonably satisfactory evidence that the defendant has violated the terms of probation. Id. (citing State v. Kennedy, 702 A.2d 28, 31 (R.I.1997)). To comply with the terms of probation a defendant must keep the peace and    remain on good behavior[.] State v. Godette, 751 A.2d 742, 745 (R.I.2000) (quoting State v. Hie, 688 A.2d 283, 284 (R.I.1996)). Determining the relative credibility of witnesses at a probation-revocation hearing is uniquely the function of the hearing justice. State v. Waite, 813 A.2d 982, 985 (R.I.2003). Thus, the question for us to determine is whether, in weighing the testimony from both the state's and Rivera's witnesses, the trial justice rationally accepted Ann's testimony, and rejected the testimony of Rivera's witnesses. Our review of the record reveals that the hearing justice considered the testimony of two witnesses on behalf of the state and three witnesses on behalf of Rivera, including the defendant himself. After Mildred testified, the hearing justice questioned her briefly regarding her relationship to defendant, her living situation, and her financial dependence on defendant. We disagree with defendant's contention that the hearing justice improperly discredited Mildred's testimony because he disapproved of her domestic situation with defendant, or that he suspected her of welfare fraud. We see no support in the record for such a contention. Rather, it is obvious that the hearing justice considered Mildred's relationship with defendant and financial dependence on him as biasing her testimony to some degree. The hearing justice was completely within his discretion in evaluating these factors as he weighed the credibility of her testimony. Because we conclude that the hearing justice acted properly in considering the evidence before him, we hold that his finding that defendant had violated his probation was rational, and neither arbitrary nor capricious. See Znosko, 755 A.2d at 834. The statements made by the hearing justice that Ann's testimony had to be believed and that Mildred's testimony was unhelpful reflect a rational thought process that simply cannot be characterized as arbitrary or capricious.