Opinion ID: 2518840
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claims Related to Termination

Text: Alyssa's next set of arguments relate to the judicial proceedings leading up to the termination order, entered in September 2006.
Alyssa argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying her peremptory challenge to Judge Smith before the termination trial; (2) Judge Smith erred in refusing to recuse himself for cause; and (3) Judge Smith erred in refusing to dismiss the case and disqualify himself due to an alleged pecuniary interest in the matter and cooperative agreement with Alyssa's adversaries. Under Civil Rule 42(c), a judge or master may be peremptorily challenged as a matter of right. [17] But Civil Rule 42(c)(4) provides that a party waives this right to change a judge if the party knowingly participates before that judge in [a]ny judicial proceeding which concerns the merits of the action and involves the consideration of evidence or of affidavits. [18] Shortly after receiving notice that a petition of termination had been filed and that a hearing on the petition had been scheduled before Judge Smith, Alyssa filed a Notice of Change of Judge, seeking to peremptorily challenge Judge Smith from the case. In challenging Judge Smith after receiving notice of the termination petition, Alyssa appears to have implicitly viewed the termination proceeding as a separate proceeding from the previous adjudication and disposition hearings in her case, over which Judge Smith had presided. But this view misconstrues the character of a termination proceeding. As recognized by Alaska's CINA Rules, when the state files a petition to terminate parental rights to a child who has already been adjudicated a child in need of aid, [t]he termination hearing is a disposition hearing to the court on the question of whether the parental rights to [the] adjudicated child in need of aid should be terminated. [19] Hence, a termination proceeding is simply a procedural continuation of the earlier proceedings in the existing CINA case. And because it does not initiate a new proceeding, the petition does not create the right to a new peremptory challenge under Civil Rule 42(c). [20] Accordingly, Alyssa's time for exercising the peremptory challenge to Judge Smith ran from the notice of his assignment in the initial proceedings in the CINA case. That time had long expired, and because Alyssa had knowingly participated in previous judicial proceedings concerning the merits of that action, she retained no right to peremptorily disqualify Judge Smith under Rule 42(c) upon receiving notice that he would still be handling the case after the state filed the petition to terminate Alyssa's parental rights. Alyssa's motion also sought to disqualify Judge Smith for cause, alleging that he was biased. [21] This claim lacks merit because Alyssa fails to show that Judge Smith abused his discretion in refusing to disqualify or recuse himself; she does not establish that Judge Smith had either a conflict of interest or bias against her. We also point out that Alyssa's claim for an independent judge was separately reviewed and denied by Superior Court Judge John Suddock. Alyssa fails to establish any abuse of discretion in Judge Suddock's ruling.
Alyssa argues that the trial court erred in denying her a jury trial at termination. We conclude that a jury trial is not required in a termination hearing for the same reasons it is not required in an adjudication hearing under Alyssa B.I. [22] First, the Alaska Constitution only preserves a jury trial for legal causes of action, not those which are equitable in nature, and [c]hild protection cases have historically been treated as matters of equity in Alaska. [23] Second, there is no due process right to a jury trial in CINA proceedings: Although [t]he private interest of a parent whose parental rights may be terminated . . . is of the highest magnitude, this interest must be balanced against the child's right to an adequate home and education and the state's interest in the child's welfare. Judges are well situated to make reliable findings in CINA cases, given their knowledge of and familiarity with the controlling law and the prior proceedings of the case. As for the government's interests, the department points out that jury trials in CINA proceedings could delay reunification or permanent placement, reduce judicial economy, increase the number of parents contesting adjudication instead of attempting to reach an agreement, and compromise the department's ability to maximize its resources.[ [24] ] We affirm the superior court's denial of a jury trial at termination.
Alyssa contends that she repeatedly requested that the court appoint her new counsel. She maintains that her advisory counsel, Laurel Bennett of the Palmer Public Defender Agency, refused to give her legal advice or become familiar with the case file; Alyssa goes so far as to argue that her advisory counsel actively connive[d] at [her] defeat. We have recognized that [a] parent has a due process right to effective assistance of counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding. [25] But Alyssa was not represented by an attorney. Instead she elected to proceed pro se. The court appointed an attorney to serve as Alyssa's advisory counsel. In S.B. v. State, we recognized that an advisory attorney appointed to help an unrepresented litigant present a case pro se does not serve the function of representing the litigant as an attorney. [26] Accordingly, we held that pro se defendants ordinarily may not raise claims of ineffective assistance against advisory counsel. [27] We identified only one exception to this rule, stating that an ineffective assistance claim could be raised when the advisory counsel oversteps his limited role and assumes a degree of control consistent with legal representation. [28] Alyssa makes no claim that her advisory counsel overstepped her bounds and took control of the case. [29] Because Alyssa's complaint is that the public defender did too little, and not too much, she therefore does not fall under the exception to the rule. As we put it in S.B., from the moment she decided to represent herself she lost the right to claim that any subsequent acts of advisory counsel constituted ineffective assistance. [30]

Alyssa argues that the trial court violated her due process rights by conducting the termination trial in her absence and over her objection. She claims that she was unable to proceed with the termination trial due to [her] situation and that she was not given sufficient notice to appear. Whether a parent's due process rights were violated in a termination proceeding is a question of law that we review de novo. [31] We set out the test for determining the requirements of due process in CINA proceedings in D.M. v. State : [I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.[ [32] ] In this case, Alyssa's private interest affected by the official action is of great importance: parental rights are `of the highest order.' [33] As to the second factor, [t]he crux of due process is [the] opportunity to be heard and the right to adequately represent one's interests. The provision of adequate notice commonly guarantees these rights. [34] The state maintains that the superior court took ample measures to provide Alyssa with adequate notice of the upcoming termination trial. Though Alyssa claimed at the beginning of trial that she had only received notice a week before the trial date, the record shows that the court made multiple attempts to provide her with notice. At trial, Judge Smith discussed the court's efforts to notify Alyssa: I double checked the log notes, and [Alyssa] was called while the motion for me to recuse myself was pending in front of Judge Suddock and so she was called and told basically we'll be in touch. And then we had a hearing the following week [May 18] and at that hearing we had a new address for [Alyssa], Mr. Winterrowd was there, we had a new address for [Alyssa], we didn't have a phone number for her. And so we didn't call her that day, but the notice of the hearing was sent out to her right after that to her address in Oregon. She then moved, and the address was sent and July 25th we got a notice that she was in California, and staff immediately sent the notice of hearing on July 25th, so she actually had quite a bit of notice that this hearing was happening. . . . And she spoke with Cindy Holtmann at some point after that, and Ms. Holtmann told her again when the hearing was. The due process analysis in this case requires consideration of the government's interest that the termination trial proceed as scheduled. Under CINA Rule 18(e), a trial on a petition to terminate parental rights must be held within six months after the date on which the petition is filed, unless the court finds good cause is shown for a continuance. [35] When determining whether to grant a continuance for good cause, the court must consider the age of the child and the potential adverse effect that the delay may have on the child. [36] Here, the termination petition was filed on March 23, 2005, yet the trial was not held until August 9, 2006  over sixteen months later. As the state points out, the delay in trial was caused by Alyssa's numerous motions to dismiss the case and disqualify the judge, requests to change court-appointed attorneys and advisory counsel, and appeals from trial court rulings. [37] The superior court accordingly made an express finding that Alyssa's failure to appear at trial was yet another attempt to delay the proceedings: [M]y finding is that [Alyssa's] effort today to continue this yet again is just an ongoing effort to delay this trial . . . and at this point I find that it is not appropriate or in the best interests of this child that we delay it any more and that there's absolutely no good cause to continue this trial yet again. The superior court's finding that Alyssa was deliberately avoiding trial demonstrates that extraordinary circumstances existed so that it was not improper for the trial court to proceed with the trial without Alyssa's participation. Furthermore, we also call attention to the interests of Jaclyn, which are of paramount importance. Jaclyn was last removed from Alyssa's custody in May 2002, when she was one and a half months old, and apart from a brief period spent in the custody of her father, has been in foster homes for all of her life. The superior court found at trial that the child needed permanency in the worst way. The court also found that the child was in a good setting with foster parents who wanted to adopt her and it determined that denying the termination petition would put the child in an unsettled situation. The superior court thus correctly recognized that if Alyssa caused the termination trial to be delayed yet again, Jaclyn's interests would have been seriously harmed. Given the circumstances created by Alyssa herself, we do not see any additional or substitute procedural safeguards the superior court could have taken to guarantee Alyssa's presence at trial. The court kept updated records of Alyssa's address, it sent notice of the trial to her at two separate addresses with the last notice being sent more than two weeks before the trial date, and it informed her again of the trial date when she spoke with court personnel via telephone. It was Alyssa's choice to waive her right to appointed counsel, to be on vacation in Mexico, and to refuse to participate telephonically at the trial. Taking these facts into account along with the state's and the child's strong interests in expeditiously finding a permanent home, we conclude that Alyssa was not deprived of procedural due process when the trial court held the termination trial without her.
In addition, as part of her claim that her rights were violated when the court conducted the trial without her, Alyssa argues that she was improperly prevented from calling witnesses at trial. [38] Because we have concluded that it was proper for the trial court to proceed in Alyssa's absence after she voluntarily failed to appear, it follows that she cannot complain of prejudice she suffered by losing testimony that she could have presented if she had chosen to be present at trial. Moreover, although Alyssa names the various witnesses she would have called, she provides nothing to indicate that they would have given testimony materially disputing the issues at trial. The psychologist who screened Alyssa for depression, for instance, expressly disclaimed the evaluation's relevance to child custody, insisting that the evaluation did not cover Alyssa's parenting or custody issues.
Alyssa argues that the trial court erred by incorporating previous `hearsay' testimony into its final order terminating her parental rights. But she does not specify what previous testimony was used in error. The department suggests that Alyssa is challenging the termination order's language incorporating findings based on testimony presented at the adjudication. At the termination stage, a trial court may rely on findings entered at the adjudication stage when they are made by clear and convincing evidence. [39] Here there is no indication that the superior court admitted hearsay testimony at the adjudication hearing  Alyssa gives no examples of the testimony that she characterizes as hearsay and does not point to any objections to such evidence raised at the hearing on adjudication. Because Judge Smith found by clear and convincing evidence that Jaclyn was a child in need of aid at the adjudication hearing and because Alyssa has failed to point out any inadmissible hearsay in the adjudication findings, we find no error in the superior court's reliance on those findings in its final order of termination.
Alyssa alleges that she submitted four psychological evaluations to the court indicating that she did not have a mental illness. She claims that the court ignored those evaluations and failed to acknowledge that she completed her case plan. It is only apparent from the record that Alyssa submitted two documents to the department containing psychological information. One document was a brief, handwritten progress report prepared by an unidentified psychologist on December 4, 2003. It does not appear to set out any formal diagnosis. The second document was a psychological evaluation from Dr. Anita Kemp, who Alyssa claimed was going to testify at trial on her behalf. Dr. Kemp's evaluation stated that there was no current evidence that Alyssa suffered from depression. The superior court did not ignore Dr. Kemp's evaluation, but rather found it to be unreliable for several reasons. First, Alyssa had not advised the department before the evaluation so that it could communicate with Dr. Kemp about the purposes of the evaluation and provide the doctor with collateral information. Second, the court found that Alyssa had thoroughly misled Dr. Kemp by circling zero for every indicator of depression and mental illness when Dr. Kemp evaluated her. And finally, during the trial, the state published into the record a more recent letter from Dr. Kemp stating that her earlier evaluation was not applicable in a matter of child custody because Dr. Kemp did not cover Alyssa's parenting or custody issues during the evaluation. We have consistently held that it is the role of the trial court, and not this court, to judge the credibility of any witnesses and to weigh conflicting evidence. [40] Because the record showed that Dr. Kemp's evaluation was not fully informed and was not directed to the custody issue, the superior court could properly discount the evaluation and give more weight instead to the testimony of the department's expert psychologist, who testified that Alyssa suffered from severe psychological problems.
Alyssa argues that the superior court erred by denying her requests to place Jaclyn with blood relatives. The record shows that on July 25, 2005, Alyssa filed six motions seeking to place Jaclyn with various blood relatives under AS 47.14.100(e). [41] The superior court denied the motions. Alyssa did not seek review of the court's ruling at the time it was made. There is currently no need to consider the placement decision, because the superior court's termination order now renders earlier issues of placement moot. [42] Accordingly, we decline to decide this claim.
Alyssa claims that she made many motions to remove Jaclyn from abusive foster homes but those motions were ignored by the court. On June 15, 2005, Alyssa moved for a placement review hearing to determine the best interests of Jaclyn, alleging that the state had placed the child in several foster homes where she had been physically and potentially sexually abused. On July 11, 2005, the superior court denied the motion. Because the denial was a final, appealable order, Alyssa was required to file a timely appeal in order to preserve this issue for appellate review. [43] Since she did not timely appeal the order, [44] we decline to consider the issue here.
Alyssa also contends that the court wrongly allowed the state's witnesses to provide hearsay and opinion testimony at the termination trial. This section of Alyssa's brief consists of two sentences and provides no citations to the trial log notes for examples of impermissible hearsay or opinion testimony. Given Alyssa's failure to identify any inadmissible hearsay, the state plausibly suggests that Alyssa objects to the testimony of the department's expert psychologist, Dr. Michael Rose. Dr. Rose testified after reviewing various records that, in his opinion, Alyssa suffered from severe psychological problems, and awarding custody to her would place Jaclyn at risk of harm. The state argues that Dr. Rose was qualified to offer his opinion as an expert in clinical psychology; it points out that Dr. Rose testified that it was customary for an expert in his field to rely on the types of documents he used in forming his opinion. Accordingly, the state contends, his testimony was explicitly allowed under Evidence Rules 702 and 703. [45] The state's position has merit. Under Evidence Rules 702 and 703, Dr. Rose's testimony did not involve inadmissible hearsay  it was admissible as expert scientific opinion. Because Alyssa identifies no other evidence addressed in her hearsay claim, we conclude that her claim lacks merit.