Opinion ID: 494478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Classic Car Loans

Text: 20 Defendants argue that the district court erred by permitting the prosecution to introduce evidence concerning the 'Classic Car loans,' which, according to defendants, was a 'blatant attempt by the prosecution to show other crime evidence in order to establish bad character and propensity to commit crimes.' Rule 103 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires that an objection be 'timely' if it is to be preserved for appellate review. '[T]he appropriate time for raising an objection is as soon as the ground for objection is known, or could reasonably have been known to the objector--unless some special reason makes its postponement desirable and not unfair to the opposition.' United States v. Gibbs, 739 F.2d 838, 849 (3d Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); see also 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, supra, Sec. 5037, at 188. Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion and not exclusion, and defendants' oblique comment that the evidence was 'in the nature of 404(b) evidence,' when considered in context, was not sufficient to alert the district court that defendants considered the evidence inadmissible evidence of character. Moreover, defendants' subsequent motion to strike on the basis of Rule 404(b) was untimely because the basis of defendants' objection was apparent prior to introduction of the evidence. Thus, we must consider defendants' argument under the plain error standard of review. 21 'Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.' However, evidence of other crimes or acts may 'be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.' Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); see also Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d at 78-79. Coyle's testimony concerning the Classic Car loans was introduced for the proper purpose of establishing that the motive behind defendants' scheme was to procure bank funds for personal use. Although admissible for a proper purpose, evidence may still 'be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.' Fed. R. Evid. 403. While highly probative, the evidence of the Classic Car loans was not inflammatory and presented little danger of unfair prejudice. Thus, the district court's failure to exclude the evidence does not rise to the level of plain error. 22 Defendants did, however, make a timely request that the jury be instructed with respect to the limited purpose for which the evidence of the Classic Car loans was admitted. Rule 105 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that '[w]hen evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.' (emphasis added). While the district court's policy of not commenting on the evidence was obviously not a sufficient basis to deny the instruction, the refusal to give the instruction was harmless. The district court later instructed the jury that 'defendants are not on trial for any act not charged in the indictment,' and the evidence of defendants' guilt was overwhelming.