Opinion ID: 1903266
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Promissory Estoppel Counterclaim

Text: The defendant asserts that the trial justice erred in finding that she failed to demonstrate an ownership interest in the house under a promissory estoppel theory. She argues that she was entitled to rely upon Anthony Sr.'s promises and Audrey's silent acquiescence in his frequent and self-aggrandizing claims that he purchased the home as a wedding gift. Although we agree that defendant may not prevail on her promissory estoppel counterclaim, we disagree with the path taken to arrive at that result. Promissory estoppel operates to make a promise binding if the promise was [a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person, the promise does induce such action or forbearance in reliance on that promise, and injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. Filippi v. Filippi, 818 A.2d 608, 625 (R.I. 2003) (quoting Alix v. Alix, 497 A.2d 18, 21 (R.I.1985)). To invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel, a promisee must demonstrate the existence of: 1. A clear and unambiguous promise; 2. Reasonable and justifiable reliance upon the promise; and 3. Detriment to the promisee, caused by his or her reliance on the promise. Id. at 626. The trial justice addressed the elements of a promissory estoppel claim, finding that there were certain statements made by Anthony [Sr.] which a reasonable person would have expected would have caused the promisee, Cynthia   , to take some action or to forebear from taking certain action. The trial justice went on to find that Cynthia was induced to act by Anthony Sr.'s promise to convey the house, and if the only parties to this matter were Anthony [Sr.] and Cynthia   , then    justice could only be afforded by enforcing the promise. According to the trial justice, it was Audrey's co-ownership of the house that tipped the scales back in plaintiffs' favor. However, our careful review of the record reveals that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived crucial statements Cynthia made bearing on the clarity of Anthony Sr.'s promise. At trial, Cynthia testified to a conversation she had with Anthony Sr. about the house: [Anthony Sr.] simply stated that [the house] was a wedding gift to Anthony [Jr.] and I [ sic ], and at that point we would no longer get anything else. He [said that he] would like to see us save our money and[,] in time[,] put the deed in our name [ sic ]. The defendant also testified that Anthony Sr. told her that he would put the house in our name [ sic ] if we saved our money. (Emphasis added.) To make an inter-vivos gift, a donor must have a present true donative intent and some manifestation such as an actual or symbolic delivery of the subject of the gift so as to completely divest the donor of dominion and control of it. Black v. Wiesner, 112 R.I. 261, 267, 308 A.2d 511, 515 (1973). When a gift consists of real property, the donor must manifest his or her intent by delivering a deed to the parcel. Wetherill v. Moore, 73 R.I. 140, 144, 54 A.2d 388, 390 (1947). The defendant's own testimony illustrates that Anthony Sr.'s statements did not amount to a clear and unambiguous promise to make a gift of the property, notwithstanding Audrey's silence. The defendant produced no evidence of a time frame set by Anthony Sr. and Audrey for delivering the deed, the amount of money Cynthia and Anthony Jr. must save to effectuate the gift, or that the couple otherwise met this condition. We are satisfied that Anthony Sr.'s statements did not manifest a clear and unambiguous promise to divest himself of dominion and control over the property. Because defendant cannot satisfy the first element of a claim for promissory estoppel, her counterclaim must fail, without regard to whether Audrey's silence in the face of Anthony Sr.'s promise was sufficient to bind her on that promise.