Opinion ID: 447055
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Duty to Inform Instruction.

Text: 7 The trial judge instructed the jury that Lloyds and National Union had a duty to inform Aegis Corporation of its uninsured motorist coverage options so as to enable Aegis Corporation to make an informed decision regarding the amount of uninsured motorist coverage, if any, it desired. Record at 708, 711. We find that there is no such duty under Florida law and, thus, that this instruction was erroneous. 8 Two recent Florida Supreme Court decisions make it clear that the requirement under Florida law of a knowing and informed rejection or selection does not translate into an absolute duty on the part of the insurer to inform the insured of the uninsured motorist options. In American Fire & Indemnity Co. v. Spaulding, 442 So.2d at 209, and Kimbrell v. Great American Insurance Co., 420 So.2d at 1088, the court recognized that the insured might know of the availability of coverage without being expressly informed of such by the insurer, and thus that the failure of the insurer to so inform the insured, though relevant, is not dispositive of the question of whether there was a knowing selection [or rejection]. 9 Appellees admit that statements made by the court in Spaulding and Kimbrell suggest that there is no duty to inform. But they maintain that such statements are dicta because the insurers in both cases had expressly informed the insureds of the uninsured motorist options at the time the policies were initially taken out. Appellees point out that the insurers had simply failed to reinform the insureds of the options later when the insureds made material changes to the policies, 2 even though, under Florida law, the making of such changes gave the insureds another opportunity to elect uninsured motorist coverage equal to the amount of bodily injury liability coverage. Appellees thus claim that Spaulding and Kimbrell held only that where an insurer has informed the insured of the uninsured motorist options at the time the policy is initially purchased, it does not have a duty to reinform the insured of the options when the insured later makes a material change in the policy. 10 Regardless of whether the more general statements in Kimbrell and Spaulding are dicta, we believe them to indicate that, in the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court, not only is there no duty to reinform, there is also no absolute duty to inform in the first instance. Our conclusion is supported by the reasoning employed in those decisions, as well as by the court's language. In deciding Kimbrell and Spaulding, the Florida Supreme Court did not focus on the fact that the insureds at one time had been informed of the uninsured motorist options, but rather on the fact that at the time the insureds made the material changes to the policies they were well aware of their uninsured motorist options. Indeed, the court made it very clear that the controlling consideration is whether the insured is aware of his statutory rights, not how that knowledge was acquired. In Spaulding, 442 So.2d at 209, for example, the court stated, 11 [c]learly, despite the absence of an express offer at the time of the policy changes, Suder was aware of his statutory right to higher uninsured motorist coverage and knowingly elected to continue his selection of the lower amount. Thus, the statutory requirement of a knowing selection has been met. 12 We also note that appellees are unable to cite a single Florida Supreme Court decision that in any way suggests that even though the insured is sophisticated and fully aware of the uninsured motorist options, he cannot have made an informed rejection or selection unless he was expressly informed of those options by his insurer. 3 In the absence of such authority, the alleged dicta of the Florida Supreme Court, found in the only two cases in which that court appears to have touched on the matter, are very persuasive indeed. 13 In addition to finding that the duty to inform instruction was erroneous, we determine, upon reviewing the entire jury charge, that the error was harmful and warrants reversal. McCullough v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 587 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir.1979). The judge essentially instructed the jury that Aegis could not have made a knowing rejection or selection unless the appellants had expressly informed Aegis of the uninsured motorist options. 4 Since the evidence indicated that neither appellant had expressly informed Aegis of those options, appellants clearly were prejudiced by the erroneous duty to inform instruction, which in essence directed that a verdict must be entered against the appellants. We thus reverse the judgment against appellants. 14