Opinion ID: 2371662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: rsa 231:40-:42

Text: Blagbrough argues that RSA 231:40-:42 (1993) required A & T to petition the selectmen before it created a right-of-way to remove timber via the road. In short, Blagbrough's position seems to be that the well easement operated to give it standing to privately enforce the provisions of RSA 231:40-:42. The trial court ruled that the requirements of RSA 231:40-:42 were not triggered because those statutes cannot be read to require defendant to obtain a right-of-way from the selectmen to remove timber from his own land merely because plaintiff may have an easement to obtain well water from defendant's property. RSA 231:40 provides: Upon petition, when it becomes necessary for the convenient removal of lumber, wood or other material, to pass through the lands of a person other than the owner of the land from which such lumber, wood or other material is to be removed, the selectmen of the town within which said lands are situated, in their discretion, may lay out a right-of-way through the land of any person for the purposes aforesaid, and, upon notice to and hearing of the owner of the lands, shall determine the necessity for and assess the damages occasioned by the laying out of such right-of-way, and such damages shall be paid by the person applying for such right-of-way before the same shall be open for use. Any person aggrieved by the action hereunder of the selectmen shall have the same right of appeal as provided by this chapter. RSA 231:41, in turn, sets forth the conditions under which such a right-of-way may be used and discontinued. RSA 231:42 then sets forth the notice and hearing requirements that must be followed before the selectmen may lay out such a right-of-way, discontinue it, or award damages arising out of its use. We hold that RSA 231:40-:42 do not provide a basis upon which Blagbrough may prevail here. Although RSA 231:40 provides an appeal mechanism for a person aggrieved by a decision of a board of selectmen laying out such a right-of-way, we have been provided with no such decision by the selectmen in this case. To the extent that Blagbrough seeks damages based upon an asserted violation of RSA 231:40-:42, it has not directed us to any statutory or other legal authority establishing a private right of action to seek both a declaration that RSA 231:40-:42 have been violated and damages. Nor does Blagbrough make any argument as to why we should find an implicit, private right to seek such a declaration and damages. Where there is no explicit or implicit private right of action to seek a declaration of the statute's violation, we will conclude that the statute does not do so. Cross v. Brown, 148 N.H. 485, 487, 809 A.2d 785 (2002).