Opinion ID: 2361851
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: unpaid commissions

Text: [¶ 2] Bernier worked as an engineer for Merrill from 1988 through March of 1997. In 1993, Merrill's president signed a memorandum promising engineers a three percent commission. [1] In 1996, after disputing the method of calculating the commission, Bernier received a letter from Merrill's accountant that stated: As in the past these commissions will be paid if the cash is available at the time and the engineer is with the company at the time the job closes out (all customer payments received). [¶ 3] From the time the commission program was created until Bernier left the company, Bernier received commissions periodically but not necessarily at the end of each project. While still employed at Merrill, Bernier qualified for but had not received three commissions. As he was leaving, Bernier made a written request for payment. In response, Bernier received a note from the president that the commissions would only be paid after assessing Merrill's cash flow. Bernier demanded his commissions to no avail in two subsequent letters. [¶ 4] Bernier filed suit against Merrill to recover, inter alia, unpaid commissions. Following a bench trial, the court found that Merrill was liable for past commissions. Pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A. 626, [2] the unpaid commissions were trebled and attorney fees were granted for that portion of the award. [¶ 5] Merrill's cross-appeal contends that the court erred in granting Bernier the commissions because the commissions were contingent on the availability of cash. Because the commission agreement indicates that other conditions may be announced later, Merrill contends that the subsequent correspondence mentioning cash availability and the practice of distributing lump sum commissions at various times, not necessarily after a project closed, supplemented the original commission agreement. Furthermore, Merrill contends that because the commissions were not due until cash was available, the conditions in the commission agreement had not been satisfied, and as a result, section 626 is not applicable. [¶ 6] Bernier contends that the requirements for the commission to vest were that (1) he sign the proposal and (2) he be at Merrill when the final invoice is paid by the customer. The court implicitly agreed with Bernier's reading of the memo and stated: The suggestion that the payment of commissions was permanently contingent upon the availability of cash is rejected as just an unreasonable reading of the memo that created the entitlement to commissions. In addition, the court stated that the payment of the commissions was not contingent on the availability of cash because [i]t is clear to me from the evidence presented that the financial affairs of Merrill Air Engineers were throughout the period of time in question in disarray... and [the commissions] must at some point either at a reasonable time or when they became due under the Wage Statute have become due and payable .... [¶ 7] We review issues of law de novo and issues of fact for clear error. Spottiswoode v. Levine, 1999 ME 79, ¶ 16, 730 A.2d 166, 172 (citations omitted). [A] factual finding will be set aside as clearly erroneous only if there is no competent evidence in the record to support it. Purdy v. Community Telecomm. Corp., 663 A.2d 25, 29 (Me.1995) (citation omitted). [¶ 8] The commission agreement itself is devoid of language that indicates that availability of cash is a prerequisite to receiving the commissions. Bernier testified that he did not believe that his commission was contingent on cash availability. In addition, the court's conclusion that cash flow was a continuous problem and could not have been a qualification for receiving the commissions was supported by the president's testimony. Thus, the court's determination that the commissions were not contingent on the availability of cash is not clearly erroneous. [¶ 9] After finding that the commissions were not contingent on the availability of cash, the court applied section 626. The employment agreement, not section 626, governs how wages are earned and, if specified, when wages are to be paid. Burke v. Port Resort Realty Corp., 1998 ME 193, ¶ 5, 714 A.2d 837, 839 (citation omitted). Because the court did not find that the availability of cash was a contingency that could be read into the agreement, the court concluded that pursuant to the agreement the commissions were due. The court did not err in concluding that the unpaid commissions should be trebled and attorney fees awarded to Bernier.