Opinion ID: 2811263
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disclosure of Grand Jury Transcripts

Text: On December 14, 2011, Madrid was indicted on an 11-count indictment which included allegations that (1) all of the $3,000 checks LKG provided to Zavala were mailed to her using the United States Postal Service (USPS), including the check from LKG to Zavala dated December 21, 2006, and (2) the February 3, 2012, the next docket call; therefore, he says, the Speedy Trial Act nonetheless was violated because over 70 non-excludable days passed between when the clock began to run again on February 3, 2012 and the commencement of trial on December 3, 2012. As the government argues, however, at the time it filed its motion to toll the speedy trial clock, the February 3 docket call date was already set and thus, had it meant to toll the clock only until the date of the next docket call, the government could have inserted that date in its proposed order. Madrid’s argument does not demonstrate that the district court’s finding that it tolled the speedy trial clock via text order to a date not certain, which allowed for continuance until September 7, 2012, was clearly erroneous. 15 “[T]he Supreme Court has held that ‘the Act is clear that the findings must be made, if only in the judge’s mind, before granting the continuance,’ and failure to make any express finding on the record cannot be harmless error.” United States v. Dignam, 716 F.3d 915, 92122 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Zedner, 547 U.S. at 506–07). “‘[T]hose findings must be put on the record by the time a district court rules on a defendant’s motion to dismiss under § 3162(a)(2).’” Id. Here, in its order denying Madrid’s motion to dismiss based on speedy trial grounds, the district court adequately articulated its reasons for its January 31 order. The district court reasoned that it granted the continuance “due to the complexity of the case and the large volume of discovery . . . [and because, therefore,] the interest of justice would be served by granting the Motion to Continue, and that such ends of justice outweighed the interests of the public and Madrid in a speedy trial.” “[B]ecause the district court ‘set forth specific findings’ that were made in the judge’s mind before granting the continuance, its reasoning . . . satisf[ies] the requirements of § 3161(h)(7)(A).” Id. (citing Zedner, 547 U.S. at 507; United States v. Hale, 685 F.3d 522, 535 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. McNealy, 625 F.3d 858, 863 (5th Cir. 2010)). 16 Case: 13-50414 Document: 00513091274 Page: 17 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 13-50414 bribery of Briones was intended, in part, to assist LKG in fraudulently “obtaining” the contract to provide evaluation services under the SAMHSA grant. On July 27, 2012, after pretrial proceedings began, Madrid filed a motion for disclosure of grand jury transcripts, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(E)(ii). In this motion, Madrid alleged (and supported his claims with documentary evidence), 16 that the government had reason to know before presenting its case to the grand jury that the December 21 check was not sent from LKG to Zavala via USPS but, rather, was handdelivered by Garcia, and that Briones was not bribed to help LKG “obtain” the evaluation services contract, which was awarded on October 10, 2005, but rather that she was bribed on later dates to help “maintain and renew” the contract. Based on these facts, Madrid asserted that “someone in the government made these representations to the Grand Jury through sworn testimony.” On August 15, 2012, however, before the district court ruled on the motion, the grand jury returned a 3-count superseding indictment. Counts 1 and 2 were substantively unchanged from the original indictment, but the superseding indictment, inter alia, omitted the allegations that the check to Zavala dated December 21, 2006, had been sent via USPS and, instead of alleging that Briones had been bribed to help “obtain” the evaluative services contract, averred that Madrid and Garcia had bribed Briones to “maintain the evaluation services contract . . . , support defendant LKG’s participation in the 16 Madrid attached FBI reports indicating that Zavala met with the FBI on April 10, 2010, and again on November 21, 2011, and at both times indicated that the December 2006 check was hand-delivered to her by Garcia. Despite the government’s knowledge of this fact, the indictment indicates in both the introduction, and under the description of the actions that constitute Count 1, that Garcia mailed all checks to Zavala. Likewise, Madrid points to the FBI’s reports regarding its interviews of Briones, which indicates that Briones “did not accept the money from Garcia and LKG in exchange for her vote [to obtain the contract]. . . . [She] accepted the money in exchange for helping LKG keep [the County’s] evaluation contract.” Accordingly, Madrid says, the documents suggests that the government knew that Madrid did not conspire to obtain the LKG contract. 17 Case: 13-50414 Document: 00513091274 Page: 18 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 13-50414 [Collaborative,] [and] defend LKG’s performance to SAMHSA.” On September 5, 2012, the district court denied Madrid’s motion to disclose the grand jury transcripts, concluding that “because the Government has filed a superseding indictment omitting the substantive mail fraud charges and the allegation that [Briones] assisted defendants in obtaining the contract, the issues raised are no longer relevant” and “[a]ccordingly,” the motion “is DENIED as MOOT.” A district court’s ruling on a motion to disclose grand jury transcripts is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Miramontez, 995 F.2d 56, 59 (5th Cir. 1993). “The proper functioning of the grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings.” Id. “The burden is on the party seeking disclosure to show that ‘a particularized need’ exists for the materials that outweighs the policy of secrecy.” Id. The party seeking disclosure “must demonstrate that (1) the material he seeks is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, (2) the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy, and (3) his request is structured to cover only material so needed.” Id. First, Madrid argues that without the incorrect allegation in the original indictment that the December 21 check was sent via USPS, that Count 3, charging him with conspiracy to commit mail fraud, would have been timebarred. Madrid correctly argues that because the relevant statute of limitations is five years, 17 he cannot be liable for criminal activity that was completed more than five years before the original indictment was returned on December 14, 2011. Consequently, he contends, because LKG’s check to Zavala dated December 21, 2006, was hand-delivered and not mailed, and because all of the other checks mentioned in the indictment were mailed to Zavala before December 14, 2006, all of the mail fraud charges alleged in the 17 18 U.S.C. § 3282; see United States v. Edelkind, 525 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2008). 18 Case: 13-50414 Document: 00513091274 Page: 19 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 13-50414 original indictment are barred by the statute of limitations. However, as noted, the allegation as to the December 21 check to Zavala was deleted from the superseding indictment. Count 3 of the superseding indictment alleges three acts in furtherance of mail fraud crimes, all of which occurred after December 14, 2006, and within the limitations period. Specifically, Count 3 of the superseding indictment alleges that Madrid and his coconspirators caused to be sent via USPS “checks, letters, reporting documents and other correspondence as a result of and in support of the contract entered into between LKG and the County of El Paso” on December 31, 2006, January 31, 2007, and March 29, 2007. 18 These allegations as to the mailings on December 31, 2006, January 31, 2007, and March 29, 2007, were included in the original indictment and have been retained in the superseding indictment. Therefore, Madrid’s assertion that, but for the inclusion of the erroneous allegation 18 As the Supreme Court has explained, to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, “any ‘mailing that is incident to an essential part of the scheme satisfies the mailing element,’ even if the mailing itself ‘contain[s] no false information[.]’” Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 647 (2008) (quoting Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 712, 715 (1989)). “In addition, the defendant need not personally effect the mailing.” United States v. Traxler, 764 F.3d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 2014). “It is sufficient that the defendant ‘cause’ the mailing, or ‘act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended.’” Id. (quoting Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954)). Here, Count 3 of the superseding indictment alleged that on December 31, 2006, the County mailed to SAMHSA the Fourth Year Annual Report, which included the County’s calculations of the payments provided to LKG in exchange for evaluation services as well as the total in-kind contributions the County received. The report thus relied, in part, upon LKG’s fraudulent representations regarding its in-kind contributions and services performed. Count 3 also alleges that on January 31, 2007, a letter concerning LKG’s performance was mailed to LKG, and that on March 29, 2007, a letter cancelling LKG’s contract was mailed to LKG, each via the USPS. The Annual Report relying upon false representations made by the coconspirators during the course of the conspiracy, as well as the letters concerning LKG’s failure to perform under its contract and the eventual termination of the contract, are “incidental to the essential part of the scheme” to fraudulently obtain federal funds by false pretenses and thus suffice to establish the mailing element of Count 3. See id. 19 Case: 13-50414 Document: 00513091274 Page: 20 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 13-50414 regarding the December 21 check to Zavala, all of the mail fraud charges against Madrid would have been time-barred is mistaken and without merit. Second, Madrid contends that the denial of his motion to disclose the grand jury transcripts foreclosed him from moving to dismiss the indictment in its entirety based on the government’s knowing presentation of perjured testimony to the grand jury—a claim he cannot substantiate without access to the grand jury transcripts. He argues that if the judge had examined the grand jury testimony and discovered perjury, the entire indictment might have been dismissed, possibly with prejudice, thereby barring Madrid’s prosecution. However, the mere fact that the original indictment may have erroneously set forth charges that the government would have been unable to prove—which required the corrections made by the superseding indictment—does not necessarily demonstrate perjury. Rather than a sign of knowingly false testimony, the discrepancy may have been due to an unintentional drafting error. Moreover, as a general rule, “[a]fter indictment, the judiciary’s role in policing the credibility of witnesses before a grand jury is minimal.” United States v. Strouse, 286 F.3d 767, 771 (5th Cir. 2002). As the Supreme Court decisions make clear, “the supervisory power can be used to dismiss an indictment because of misconduct before the grand jury, at least where that misconduct amounts to a violation of one of those ‘few, clear rules which were carefully drafted and approved by this Court and by Congress to ensure the integrity of the grand jury’s functions.’” United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 46 (1992) (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 74 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment)) (footnote omitted). Because Madrid failed to allege or show a violation of any such clear rule in the present case, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion. 20 Case: 13-50414 Document: 00513091274 Page: 21 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 13-50414