Opinion ID: 2083209
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Suppress Identification Testimony.

Text: Clark claims that the judge erred in denying a motion to suppress the identification testimony of John Hunter. Clark argued to the judge that Hunter's identification testimony should be suppressed because Hunter was unable to provide an unequivocal identification of the defendant. Clark further argued to the judge that a photograph which Hunter picked out of an array of photographs shown to him should be suppressed because the Commonwealth had not established that the photograph was a picture of the defendant. [5] On appeal, Clark asserts that the testimony should have been suppressed because it resulted from a constitutionally impermissible pretrial photographic identification procedure. [6] None of the defendant's arguments relating to Hunter's identification testimony is properly before us. [7] A defendant is not permitted to raise an issue before the trial court on a specific ground, and then to present that issue to this court on a different ground. Commonwealth v. Flynn, 362 Mass. 455, 472 (1972). See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 371 Mass. 862, 867 (1977); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 346 Mass. 373, 383 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 933 (1964). Nonetheless, to avoid a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, we have reviewed the record to determine whether any of the defendant's arguments has merit. Commonwealth v. Lovett, 374 Mass. 394, 403 (1978). See G.L.c. 278, § 33E. See also Commonwealth v. Johnson, supra at 867. We find no error in the denial of the defendant's motion to suppress. [8] The facts relating to the identification testimony indicate that during the early morning hours of December 20, 1972, Hunter was the sergeant on security duty at the Chelsea Naval Hospital. After the gatehouse guard allowed an automobile containing three men to enter the grounds, the guard reported the incident to Hunter and Hunter followed the vehicle to the hospital emergency entrance. Hunter then entered the hospital and questioned two of the individuals who had arrived in the automobile. Hunter stated that he never saw or spoke with the man who was being treated for the gunshot wound. Hunter provided a detailed description of each of the men whom he questioned, and stated that the shorter of the two had given the name Irving Mallory, and gave an address of 29 Wyoming Street. Hunter also stated that Mallory had subsequently made a telephone call, and that Hunter was close enough to the man to overhear the conversation. The man said, Lewis Brown ha[s] been shot and I think we're in big trouble. Approximately three weeks after the incident, Hunter went to the Cambridge police station where he was shown an array of thirteen photographs. All of the photographs were of black men of approximately the same age and build. Eleven of the photographs were of the mug shot variety, showing two views of the individual pictured. The other two photographs were snapshots: one showed a man standing upright; the other showed an individual wearing a necktie. Hunter picked out one of the double-view photographs as showing an individual with the same hairstyle as one of the men he had questioned at the hospital. Hunter picked out the snapshot of the man wearing the necktie as bearing a striking resemblance to the man who had given the name Irving Mallory at the hospital. According to Hunter, he picked the snapshot because of the resemblance to the facial features of the ... gentleman in question. On appeal, Clark bases his challenge to Hunter's identification testimony on the assertion that Hunter's identification was the product of a pretrial photographic identification procedure which was unquestionably unduly suggestive. Specifically, Clark argues that the fact that Clark's photograph was one of two snapshots shown to the witness along with eleven mug shots unfairly attracted the witness's attention to Clark's photograph and was conducive to irreparable mistaken identification since the suggestive photograph, once chosen, was unlikely to erase itself from the witness' mind. The defendant relies primarily on Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), to support his claim. In Simmons, the Supreme Court held that convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Id. at 384. We do not think that the photographic identification procedure after which Hunter identified the defendant is prohibited by Simmons. [9] The defendant's argument that the photographic array was impermissibly suggestive rests solely on the fact that the defendant's photograph was one of two snapshots in a group with eleven mug shots, since all thirteen photographs were of black males of roughly the same description. Clark's argument boils down to the assertion that any difference in the size, shape or type of photograph in the array is always inherently suggestive. We do not agree. The difference in the photographs here in no way suggested to the witness the person that the police had under investigation. The defendant does not claim that the difference in photographs was used impermissibly to suggest to the witness which photograph was that of the suspect. [10] Rather, he suggests that the difference alone was impermissibly suggestive and thus both the photographic and the in-court testimony of Hunter must be suppressed. The difference between [the defendant's] photograph and the other mug shots would hardly suggest to an identifying witness that [the defendant] was more likely to be the culprit; nor did the photograph single out any distinguishing personal characteristics of defendant not possessed by the men in the other photographs. United States v. Magnotti, 454 F.2d 1140, 1142 (2d Cir.1972) (witness shown array of seven mug shots and a fullview photograph of the defendant). Thus the difference in the photographs, taken alone, does not make the array impermissibly suggestive. United States v. Sherry, 318 A.2d 903, 904-905 (D.C. 1974) (single-view snapshot of defendant in array with eleven double-view photographs, all of similar white males, not unfairly suggestive). United States v. Harrison, 460 F.2d 270,271 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 862 (1972). See Whitt v. State, 266 Ind. 211, 215-216 (1977); State v. Cass, 356 So.2d 936, 942 (La. 1977). Cf. Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 523-524 (1976); United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 995 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978); United States v. Cunningham, 423 F.2d 1269, 1271-1273 (4th Cir.1970); People v. Fox, 65 App. Div.2d 880, 881 (N.Y. 1978); State v. Davis, 294 N.C. 397, 405-406 (1978); Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 481 Pa. 284, 289-290 (1978). The circumstances surrounding Hunter's identification of the defendant's photograph provide added support for the conclusion that Hunter's identification was not the product of an impermissibly suggestive procedure. Hunter testified that while his attention was drawn to the defendant's photograph because it was different from most of the others, he chose the photograph solely because of the man's facial characteristics. See Commonwealth v. Mobley, 369 Mass. 892, 894-895 (1976). Significantly, the defendant's photograph was not the only snapshot in the array, and Hunter rejected the other single-view snapshot. Compare United States v. Sherry, supra (array including defendant's photograph as the only single-view snapshot in array of twelve photographs not impermissibly suggestive); United States v. Magnotti, supra at 1141. Hunter's care in examining all of the photographs is also evidenced by the fact that he identified one of the double-view photographs as showing the hairstyle of the other man he had seen at the Chelsea Naval Hospital. Further, at the time Hunter viewed the array of photographs, police had made no arrests in this case, which involved a homicide. Thus the police had little alternative than to resort to photographic identification. [11] See Simmons v. United States, supra at 384-385. Finally, the defendant argues that in any event the photograph should not have been admitted as evidence. We think that [t]he introduction of the photograph in evidence was permissible as an aid to the jury in matching the description given by the witness with the features of [the defendant]. Commonwealth v. Locke, 338 Mass. 682, 687 (1959) (witness testified that photograph of the defendant resembled facial characteristics of driver of getaway vehicle). See Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 460 n. 29 (1978). Cf. Commonwealth v. Hicks, 377 Mass. 1, 7 (1979). See also United States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748, 758 (5th Cir.1978), modified on other grounds on rehearing en banc, 590 F.2d 1379, cert. denied sub nom. Bertolotti v. United States, 440 U.S. 962 (1979) (The fact that an identification is less than positive does not render it inadmissible); United States v. Eatherton, 519 F.2d 603, 609 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975). Moreover, since the photograph was the subject of conflicting testimony it was clearly appropriate for the judge to admit it as evidence for the jury's consideration. Viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the pretrial photographic identification procedure used by police in this case is not so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Simmons, supra at 384. Accord, Commonwealth v. Mobley, supra at 895-897. There was no error.