Opinion ID: 741731
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Relevant Factors Considered Under 41(a)(2)/Standard of Review

Text: 22 Once a defendant files an answer, as was the case here, a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss an action only upon order of the court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2). We review the district court's decision to deny a voluntary dismissal under such conditions for abuse of discretion. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bic Corp., 931 F.2d 1411, 1412 (10th Cir.1991). Absent legal prejudice to the defendant, the district court normally should grant such a dismissal. See Andes v. Versant Corp., 788 F.2d 1033, 1036 (4th Cir.1986) (voluntary dismissal should not be denied absent substantial prejudice to the defendant); McCants v. Ford Motor Co., 781 F.2d 855, 856-57 (11th Cir.1986) (in most cases a dismissal should be granted unless the defendant will suffer clear legal prejudice). The parameters of what constitutes legal prejudice are not entirely clear, but relevant factors the district court should consider include: the opposing party's effort and expense in preparing for trial; excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the movant; insufficient explanation of the need for a dismissal; and the present stage of litigation. Phillips U.S.A., Inc. v. Allflex U.S.A., Inc., 77 F.3d 354, 358 (10th Cir.1996). Each factor need not be resolved in favor of the moving party for dismissal to be appropriate, nor need each factor be resolved in favor of the opposing party for denial of the motion to be proper. Id. at 358. 23 The above list of factors is by no means exclusive. Id. at 358. Any other relevant factors should come into the district court's equation. In fact, in the context of this Hague Convention proceeding, the district court was impressed with a duty to exercise its discretion by carefully appraising any additional factors unique to the context of this case, including the interests in comity, uniform interpretation of the Convention and the importance of giving import to the Hague Convention's intended purpose as relevant to the motion to dismiss. 24 The district court should endeavor to insure substantial justice is accorded to both parties. 9 Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2364 at 278 (2d ed. 1994). A court, therefore, must consider the equities not only facing the defendant, but also those facing the plaintiff; a court's refusal to do so is a denial of a full and complete exercise of judicial discretion. Id. at 297. In a complex, emotional case such as this, it is critically important when considering a motion to dismiss, the court give the equities of the plaintiff the attention deserved. 25 Finally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court must remember the important factors in determining legal prejudice are those involving the parties, not the court's time or effort spent on the case. Clark v. Tansy, 13 F.3d 1407, 1411 (10th Cir.1993). A court abuses its discretion when denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 41(a)(2) based on its inconvenience. Id. at 1411. 26 In sum, the district court was obligated to consider the novelty of the circumstances surrounding this case. Instead, the court did not consider the merits of Ms. Ohlander's motion due exclusively to her contumacious conduct. It is true Ms. Ohlander blatantly violated the court's orders and absconded to Sweden with Julia in tow. We refuse to condone such conduct. However, neither can we condone a court ignoring its duty to consider the merits of a motion to dismiss simply because a party has violated its orders. Whether a motion to dismiss under Rule 41(a)(2) may be granted is a matter initially left to the district court's discretion, but such discretion does not excuse a court's failure to exercise any discretion, nor does it save an unpermitted exercise of discretion from reversal. Alamance Indus., Inc. v. Filene's, 291 F.2d 142, 146-47 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 831, 82 S.Ct. 53, 7 L.Ed.2d 33 (1961). A clear example of an abuse of discretion exists where the trial court fails to consider the applicable legal standard or the facts upon which the exercise of its discretionary judgment is based. See McNickle v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 888 F.2d 678, 680 (10th Cir.1989) (reviewing a district court' § 60(a) motion under an abuse of discretion standard). We believe the district court's decision to deny Ms. Ohlander's motion solely on the grounds of her contempt and without considering any additional circumstances, amounts to a failure to exercise discretion, and is, consequently, an abuse of that discretion. 27