Opinion ID: 2378023
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Violation of McCaslin's right to confrontation

Text: McCaslin also claims the prosecutor committed misconduct with a specific question asked during his cross-examination of McCaslin. As set forth in Issue 1, the prosecutor asked McCaslin, Are you aware that [A.D.'s] friend said . . . she never would have had sex with you? Defense counsel objected on the grounds of stating facts not in evidence and was overruled. Borrowing its argument from the evidentiary context in Issue 1, the State asserts that McCaslin failed to preserve this misconduct claim for appeal. More particularly, the State appears to again argue that McCaslin improperly has changed his trial objection stating facts not in evidenceto now argue confrontation as his basis. After carefully reviewing McCaslin's brief, we conclude his purported change is not as straightforward as the change in Issue 1. In King, 288 Kan. at 346-49, 204 P.3d 585, we held that a failure to timely and specifically object under K.S.A. 60-404 to a prosecutor's questions that are truly evidentiary could not be disregarded even when the issue had been characterized by defendant as prosecutorial misconduct. However, here McCaslin did object at trial. Moreover, we conclude he has not changed his objection on appeal for the misconduct claim. According to his brief, [T]he prosecutor introduced evidence of statements made by individuals who were not called to testify. We acknowledge that after stating the prosecutor's full question, McCaslin then mentioned a violation of his right to confront the witnesses against him. However, we do not interpret his argument to be that a confrontation violation now serves as the basis for his appellate objection; rather, the violation was the result of the evidence's admission over his objection. While a close call, we hold that this prosecutorial misconduct claim is premised on the prosecutor's assuming facts not in evidence, a basis which was not abandoned or changed on appeal. Accordingly, the issue of prosecutorial misconduct is preserved. We begin our analysis on the merits by noting that the friend, or friends, were never identified, much less called to testify, contrary to KRPC Rule 3.4(e) (A lawyer shall not . . . (e) in trial, allude to any matter that. . . will not be supported by admissible evidence.). See State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 330, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (A prosecutor may not make assertions of fact in the form of questions to a witness absent a good faith basis for believing the asserted matters to be true.). We acknowledge the trial court's overruling of McCaslin's objection could have led the prosecutor to briefly forego providing the usual good-faith evidentiary basis for the question. While the prosecutor eventually alleged a good-faith basis in the hearing on McCaslin's motion for new trial, the problem is the jury never heard a good-faith basis for his question. By asking questions that have no basis in fact, the questioner can leave in the minds of the jurors all kinds of damaging and prejudicial but false or inadmissible facts, facts which can't be adequately rebutted by witness' testimony or instructions by the court. State v. Holsinger, 124 Ariz. 18, 21, 601 P.2d 1054 (1979). A prosecutor is not just an advocate. See Pabst, 268 Kan. at 510, 996 P.2d 321. As we stated in State v. Gonzalez, 290 Kan. 747, 760, 234 P.3d 1 (2010): The prosecutor's role in our criminal justice system is unique, and it carries concomitant responsibilities. The prosecutor is a representative of the government in an adversary criminal proceeding, which means he or she must be held to a standard not expected of attorneys who represent `ordinary' parties to litigation. We went on to say in Gonzalez: The comments to KRPC 3.8, Comment [1] (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 565) make this explicit: `A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.' 290 Kan. at 761, 234 P.3d 1; see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 87-88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1934), overruled on other grounds Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (Because the prosecutor is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer [,]. . . [i]t is as much his duty is to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.). On a more fundamental, and critical, level, the prosecutor's question also did not call for, and could not have engendered, a substantive response from McCaslin. The prosecutor himself essentially admitted that McCaslin could not respond: Q. [PROSECUTOR:] Are you aware that [A.D.'s friend] said you would not be aware because it's not in the police reports that she said she would never she never would have had sex with you? (Emphasis added.) Despite admitting that McCaslin could not respond because McCaslin would not be aware that the friend said A.D. never would have had sex with him, the prosecutor nevertheless persisted in demanding a McCaslin response, i.e., if he was aware. [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Objection, Your Honor. He's stating facts not in evidence. [PROSECUTOR:] I'm asking if he's aware of that.  (Emphasis added.) In short, the fact of McCaslin's awareness could not be proven through McCaslin. And the prosecutor knew it. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function, Standard 3-5.6(b) (3d. ed. 1993) (A prosecutor should not knowingly and for the purpose of bringing inadmissible matter to the attention of the . . . jury . . . ask legally objectionable questions.). Tosh again provides guidance. There, we reviewed the prosecutor's questions during cross-examination of Tosh, which suggested the defendant had told his wife that he was guilty or was going to plead guilty. Citing KRPC 3.4(e), we found no good-faith basis for the questions because the State had never supplied a factual basis for them or argued there was one. Despite the lack of defense objection to the questionswhich today King would find fatalwe held that the cross-examination of defendant was inflammatory, egregious, and prejudicial. In other words, it was prosecutorial misconduct. 278 Kan. at 89, 93, 91 P.3d 1204. For all of these reasons, we easily conclude the prosecuting attorney engaged in misconduct during this episode. We now proceed to step two of the analysis. After reviewing the record, we simply are aware of no legitimate reason for this question by the prosecutor The jurors were informed by the prosecutor, without evidence, that the rape and murder victim never would have had sex with McCaslin. The inference by the jury is clear: McCaslin's testimony about consensual sex the morning of her death should not be believed. While the trial court's overruling of McCaslin's objection could have led the prosecutor to believe no good-faith basis for the question needed to be shown at that time, none was ever shown during trial. Moreover, the prosecutor's reference to this purported evidence became particularly troubling when coupled with his acknowledgment that McCaslin would not be aware of its existence, i.e., it was impossible to prove through McCaslin. In this respect, the conduct could be considered worse than the prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant in Tosh. Accordingly, we agree with McCaslin that this question demonstrated ill will, lack of good faith, and was gross and flagrant. See Tosh, 278 Kan. at 93-95, 91 P.3d 1204. Whether this otherwise constituted reversible conduct, i.e., after reviewing the amount of the evidence in light of the state and federal standards, will be discussed later in the opinion.