Opinion ID: 2263509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Constitutional Right to Privacy.

Text: The lower court found that the Ordinance unduly intrudes into the rights of privacy of County employees, their spouses and children, by requiring the disclosure of relevant and irrelevant private financial affairs and is not limited to only such disclosure regarding holdings as might be affected by duties of a particular public office or employment. The court said: The financial disclosure requirements of Chapter 20A before this Court encompass indiscriminately persons holding employment for Montgomery County and its offices, agencies and departments, regardless of the nature or scope of activity of such offices, agencies, and departments. The defendant County Council made no effort to relate the disclosure to financial dealings or assets which might be expected to give rise to a conflict of interest; that is, to such dealings which might have some rational connection with or bearing upon, or which might be affected by, the functions, duties, responsibilities or jurisdictions of any particular employee. Finding that the restrictions in the Ordinance were broader than those reasonably required to effectuate its purpose, the court held that it violated the 1st, 4th, 9th and 14th amendments to the federal constitution and Articles 2, 7, 8, 19, 23, 35, 40, and 45 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In so concluding, the court relied upon Supreme Court cases recognizing a constitutional right of privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), the decision of the Supreme Court of California in City of Carmel-by-the -Sea v. Young, 2 Cal.3d 259, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 466 P.2d 225 (1970), and Maryland cases recognizing invasion of privacy as a tort, Beane v. McMullen, 265 Md. 585, 291 A.2d 37 (1972); Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 177 A.2d 841 (1962). To override an infringement of this right of privacy, the court said that the County had to demonstrate a compelling interest, show that its financial disclosure Ordinance was necessary and not merely rationally related to, the accomplishment of permissible [County] policy, and prove that this policy could not be achieved by alternative and narrower means. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960). After examining various provisions of the Ordinance, the court, relying primarily on the latter ground, struck down the Ordinance as violative of the constitutional right of privacy. [3] It is, of course, no longer open to question that the right of privacy is protected by the federal constitution and that where the right is applicable, regulation limiting it must be justified by a compelling state interest. Doe v. Commander, 273 Md. 262, 329 A.2d 35 (1974). The Supreme Court emphasized in Roe v. Wade, supra, 410 U.S. at 152, however, that only personal rights that can be deemed fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty are included in the constitutional guarantee of personal privacy. Stated another way, [i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1038, 31 L.Ed.2d 349, 362 (1972). If these pronouncements hint that the constitutional right of privacy is of limited scope and not to be lightly applied, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973), makes it explicit. In that case, the Court referred to the right of privacy, as developed in Griswold and Wade, as the right to intimacy and said that [t]his privacy right encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing. 413 U.S. at 65-66. It is thus clear that the Supreme Court has yet to extend the right to privacy much beyond the context of intimate relationships. It is not, therefore, coextensive with every intrusion actionable under the tort of invasion of privacy, nor does it protect rights merely important and not fundamental. Cf. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). That protecting the confidentiality of individual financial matters is important cannot be doubted; that it is a fundamental right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty is anything but certain. Thus, in Illinois State Employees Association v. Walker, 57 Ill.2d 512, 315 N.E.2d 9 (1974), Cert. den. sub. nom., Troopers Lodge No. 41 v. Walker, 419 U.S. 1058, 95 S.Ct. 642, 42 L.Ed.2d 656 (1974), a case involving the constitutionality of financial disclosure requirements in Illinois, the Supreme Court of that state rejected the contention that employees' rights to privacy were implicated, saying: They [the employees] argue: `If, in Griswold, the State could not invade the zone of privacy that a married couple may enjoy on top of the mattress, we might well question what right the State has to invade the zone of privacy that a married couple might enjoy in what they have tucked inside the mattress.' In our opinion this argument debases the Griswold opinion, and we find it completely unacceptable. We do not deal in this case with the most intimate relationships of husband and wife or with an effort by the State to control their decisions as to whether and when to have their children. We deal rather with a requirement that the financial affairs of persons who are paid by the public and who occupy positions of high public trust be disclosed. 315 N.E.2d at 16. [4] But even if an individual has legitimate expectations of privacy of his personal finances, California Bankers Association v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 39 L.Ed.2d 812 (1974) (concurring opinion of Justices Powell and Blackmun), we think the County Ordinance facially demonstrates a compelling interest necessary to the accomplishment of County policy to which is subordinated any resulting infringement on the right of privacy. The State Act and Ordinance have a common purpose  to assure that citizens maintain the highest trust and confidence in their public officials. These laws are concerned not just with actual conflicts of financial interest, but also with appearances. [5] More than a mere collection of prohibitions aimed solely at public officials, such legislation seeks to foster a climate of honesty perceptible by the public at large. It can hardly be denied that the County has a compelling interest, on behalf of its citizens, in ensuring that its public officials and employees act with honesty, integrity, and impartiality in all their dealings, and that their private financial holdings and transactions present no conflict of interest between the public trust and private interests. For these reasons, it is readily apparent, as stated by Mr. Justice Douglas, who authored Griswold for the Court, that the County has an undeniably strong interest in placing beyond question the integrity of its public service. Troopers Lodge No. 41 v. Walker, supra, 95 S.Ct. at 643 (concurring in denial of certiorari). In the first of five decided cases dealing with the constitutionality of public financial disclosure laws, the court in City of Carmel-by-the -Sea v. Young, supra , struck down a statute on the ground that it constituted an overbroad intrusion into the private financial affairs of persons seeking to hold, or holding, public office. The court's major objection to the statute was that [n]o effort is made to relate the disclosure to financial dealings or assets which might be expected to give rise to a conflict of interest. 466 P.2d at 232. The court noted, however, that the legislature, in a properly drawn statute, could constitutionally require a broad disclosure of assets, income or receipts relevant to the duties and functions of a public officer or employee. 466 P.2d at 234. In Stein v. Howlett, 52 Ill.2d 570, 289 N.E.2d 409 (1972), appeal dismissed, 412 U.S. 925, 93 S.Ct. 2750, 37 L.Ed.2d 152 (1973), it was held that a statute requiring public officials to publicly disclose various business connections and interests was not overbroad as an unconstitutional invasion of privacy; the court there found that the statute promoted a compelling governmental interest which was paramount to the rights of the individual. In Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash.2d 275, 517 P.2d 911, appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 902, 94 S.Ct. 2596, 41 L.Ed.2d 208 (1974), a statute requiring detailed public disclosure of the financial affairs of elected officials was found to promote a compelling state interest and not to constitute an unwarranted intrusion into the privacy of candidates or public officeholders. The court there noted: ... The right of the electorate to know most certainly is no less fundamental than the right of privacy. When the right of the people to be informed does not intrude upon intimate personal matters which are unrelated to fitness for public office ... [citing Griswold v. Connecticut, supra ], the candidate or office holder may not complain that his own privacy is paramount to the interests of the people. 517 P.2d at 925. In Illinois State Employees Association v. Walker, supra, no constitutional deprivation of the right of privacy was found to exist by reason of a governor's executive order compelling designated state employees to make a detailed financial disclosure, which included filing their income tax returns with their disclosure statements. In County of Nevada v. MacMillen, 11 Cal.3d 662, 114 Cal. Rptr. 345, 522 P.2d 1345 (1974), the Supreme Court of California, revisiting the ground it had originally tested in City of Carmel, was called upon to review a new conflict of interest and financial disclosure law covering both elected and appointed officials and requiring detailed disclosure of many financial interests. The court found that the new law seems specially tailored to meet and satisfy the primary concerns of our Carmel ruling; that it appears to accomplish its legitimate aims in a less intrusive, and considerably more limited, fashion; and that it contains sufficient assurances [on its face] that unnecessary intrusions into personal privacy will not occur. 114 Cal. Rptr. at 349-50. Citing Fritz and Stein, the court said: These cases support our view that neither the right to privacy, nor the right to seek and hold public office, must inevitably prevail over the right of the public to an honest and impartial government. 114 Cal. Rptr. at 351. While the facts and regulatory schemes involved in each of these cases differed among themselves, and also differ from those in the Ordinance now before us, our review of the purpose and provisions of the Ordinance, in light of the cases, convinces us that the constitutional right of privacy here asserted is without application in the circumstances of this case. We think it plain that to limit disclosure requirements to financial information that on its face relates to County activities or to the functions and duties of a particular official or employee would not guarantee the absence of financial conflicts of interest. In this connection, we note what the court in Stein v. Howlett, supra , said: [T]he plaintiff questions how the disclosure of a business connection, unrelated to any activity of the State serves to avoid the conflicts of interest hoped to be disclosed and obviated by the statute. We acknowledge that the disclosure of a business connection which is truly unrelated to any State activity cannot help to achieve the desired purpose. But who is to say whether or not there is a business connection or relation with the State? Who is to say that the business within the State which does not do business directly with the State, but which supplies another company which does, has no connection with the State? Who is to say that a capital gain from the sale of an asset to a stockholder of a company doing business with the State has no connection with the position of the public official? 289 N.E.2d at 413. In a similar vein, the court in Fritz v. Gorton, supra , said: It would be, however, an insurmountable legislative task to tailor disclosures to each of literally a myriad of public posts, and an anomaly to require each individual to make a personal determination as to what items of his financial affairs would be relevant. 517 P.2d at 926. That the Ordinance compels a degree of disclosure by spouses and children of the official or employee does not mean that the law is fatally overbroad. Similar disclosures were involved in Stein, Fritz, and Walker. As the court in County of Nevada v. MacMillen, supra , observed: Although the 1973 act may to some extent invade the privacy of the official's spouse or dependent children, we think the public's interest in an honest and impartial government outweighs the interests of such persons in maintaining complete privacy in their financial affairs. 114 Cal. Rptr. at 353 n. 10. With regard to disclosure by spouses and children, the County makes this forceful observation: The requirement is neither novel nor unreasonable. Men have been known to conceal their assets by placing title thereto in the name of their wives, sons, or brothers; and it is merely common sense to realize that an official may act to enhance the financial interests of his family members, even if he exercises no direct control over them. Excluding such interests from disclosure, then, would not ensure the official's integrity and impartiality or the public's confidence therein. One does not have to assume  as the trial court suggested that the framers of Chapter 20A did  that all county employees and their spouses and children `are crooks,' in order to find a rational connection between the requirement for disclosure of family members' assets and income and assuring the public that an employee is free from potential conflicts of interest in the performance of his duties. We conclude that the disclosure provisions of the Ordinance, although broad, are drawn to achieve a legitimate objective and do not sweep unnecessarily broadly into the area of protected freedoms. In a case involving a statute prohibiting state employees from seeking political office or taking part in the affairs of a political party or in a political campaign, the Supreme Court responded to a claim that the provisions were overbroad by stating: [P]articularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. It is our view that ... [the statute] is not substantially overbroad and that whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2918, 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 842 (1973). In holding that the provisions of the Ordinance do not go beyond what may properly be deemed necessary to achieve the County's goal, we point out that the wisdom of imposing such financial disclosure requirements is a matter for legislative, not judicial, judgment. To be able to find fault with a law is not to demonstrate its invalidity. It may seem unjust and oppressive, yet be free from judicial interference. The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations,  illogical, it may be, and unscientific. Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70, 33 S.Ct. 441, 443, 57 L.Ed. 730, 734 (1913). In other words, if legislation is constitutional, the wisdom of it is beyond the purview of the courts. In re Trader, 272 Md. 364, 325 A.2d 398 (1974).