Opinion ID: 2638434
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Restriction on cross-examination of Garrison

Text: Defendant next contends the trial court violated his constitutional rights to confrontation, due process and a fair trial (i) when it failed to curtail the prosecutor's practice of interposing numerous objections to defense counsel's questioning of Garrison about his prior sexual molestation of a small boy; (ii) by prohibiting questioning about an incident in which Garrison beat a 15-month-old baby with a belt; and (iii) when it prohibited counsel from introducing evidence that Garrison had minimized his responsibility in previous crimes. We address these claims seriatim. (i) Defense counsel resumed their cross-examination of Garrison on September 12, 1989, by asking him about his previous conviction for molesting a small boy. Counsel's point was to convey Garrison's belief that allowing the boy to live and testify against him had been a mistake, making it more likely that Garrison had killed Dolinka so as to leave no witnesses. Counsel also wished to demonstrate that in his prior crimes, Garrison had admitted culpability but had attempted to shift the majority of the blame elsewhere, thus bolstering the defense position that it was Garrison, not defendant, who actually killed Dolinka. The record shows that counsel was able to get Garrison to admit his prior sex crime without interruption. During subsequent defense questioning, however, the prosecutor interposed numerous objections, all of which the trial court overruled. Defendant now contends the prosecutor made so many frivolous objections that the flow and meaning of the cross-examination were lost, and the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to curtail the prosecutor's actions. [15] We note at the outset that counsel made no objection on this particular ground, so defendant must be heard to complain that the trial court violated a sua sponte duty to control the prosecutor. Although defendant presents a generalized argument on the acknowledged benefits of cross-examination, he fails to assert any argument or authority on the specific theory raised. (See, e.g., § 1044.) [16] We may reject his claim for that reason alone. Were we to address it further, we would conclude the record fails to demonstrate that the prosecutor's actions were so severely prejudicial the trial court was obligated to intervene, even in the absence of a defense objection. (See People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 159-160, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) (ii) Defendant next argues the trial court erred by precluding him from impeaching Garrison with evidence that he had beaten a 15-month-old child with a belt. Counsel argued the evidence was relevant to impeach Garrison's statements that he was not a violent man and that he would not use violence on another human being unless he was defending himself. The trial court explained that it was defense counsel, and not the prosecutor, who had elicited this testimony, and a party cannot ask a witness a question in order to later impeach him. ( People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 748, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485; People v. Lavergne (1971) 4 Cal.3d 735, 744, 94 Cal.Rptr. 405, 484 P.2d 77.) Although it sustained the prosecutor's objection to this line of questioning, the court noted it had allowed defendant's questioning about the sex crime, and the jury would undoubtedly consider that to be evidence of Garrison's violent nature. In any event, whether or not Garrison had beaten the infant with a belt was a collateral matter; trial courts have discretion to admit or exclude evidence offered for impeachment on a collateral matter ( People v. Mayfield, supra, at p. 748, 60 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485), and defendant does not demonstrate the trial court abused its broad discretion in this matter. Defendant also contends he was denied his constitutional right to present a defense by the trial court's subsequent decision to preclude him from calling as witnesses the mother and sister of the child involved in the beating incident. He claims their testimony would have been proper rebuttal evidence. As we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding defendant from questioning Garrison on this collateral matter, it similarly did not abuse its discretion in ruling defendant could not call witnesses to prove the same point. (iii) Defendant also argues the trial court erred in prohibiting him from introducing evidence of other crimes whose circumstances indicated that Garrison employed a habit of admitting some blame but then shifting the bulk of the blame elsewhere. It seems doubtful the proffered instances of prior misconduct demonstrate that Garrison engaged in blame-shifting as a habit or custom (as defense counsel argued), as distinct from the common tendency of criminal offenders generally to minimize their culpability (as the trial court suggested). In any event, it does not appear the trial court abused its wide discretion in this matter. As we explained in an analogous situation, defendant merely was precluded from proving [his point] with time-consuming hearsay and character evidence that was not particularly probative on the question. ( People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 305, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890.) To the extent defendant contends the alleged restrictions on his cross-examination of Garrison, addressed above, violated his rights to confrontation, due process, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty, we reject those claims as well: `As a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused's right to present a defense. Courts retain, moreover, a traditional and intrinsic power to exercise discretion to control the admission of evidence in the interests of orderly procedure and the avoidance of prejudice.' ( People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99]) ( People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 305, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890.) Defendant does not explain why the routine evidentiary rulings of which he complains rise to the level of a constitutional violation.