Opinion ID: 389247
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Contractor Exception to the FTCA

Text: 13 The alternate theories on which Cannon's FTCA suit depends are that Lorton is a federal agency or that its employees were acting, with respect to Cannon, on behalf of a federal agency. Both fall if we conclude Lorton was a contractor with the United States or its functional equivalent under the applicable statutes. 14 In Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 93 S.Ct. 2215, 37 L.Ed.2d 121 (1973), the parents of a federal pretrial detainee who committed suicide while lodged in a county jail pursuant to a contract between the Bureau and the county sued the federal government for damages under the FTCA. 11 Like Cannon, they alleged that either the Nueces County jail was an agency of the United States or that the employees of that jail were acting on behalf of the federal government. 412 U.S. at 526, 93 S.Ct. at 2218. 15 The Court rejected both claims. 12 It held first that the jail could not be an agency of the federal government because it fell within the  'contractor' exemption from the definition of 'Federal agency' in § 2671. Id. The Court then considered the argument advanced by the judges of the Court of Appeals who had dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc 13 that even though the sheriffs' employees might not be 'employees' of a federal agency, they might nonetheless be 'acting on behalf of a Federal agency in an official capacity(.)'  412 U.S. at 530, 93 S.Ct. at 2220. Reasoning that since it would be a rare situation indeed in which an independent contractor would not be performing tasks that could be performed by a salaried federal employee, the Court found that reading the clause to render the government liable for the activities of any person assuming the statutory obligations of the United States would make the contractor exception meaningless. Id. at 531-32, 93 S.Ct. at 2221. Therefore, the Court concluded, after surveying the relevant committee hearings, that the language is designed to cover special situations such as the 'dollar-a-year' man ... or an employee of another employer who is placed under direct supervision of a federal agency(.) Id. at 531, 93 S.Ct. at 2221. In sum, Logue says that the federal government cannot be held liable for the torts of employees of an independent contractor jailer whether that liability is predicated on the agency or acting on behalf of language in the FTCA. 16
17 The statute nowhere defines the term contractor. The legislative history of the FTCA is also barren of any direct reference to this exception. 14 However, throughout the tortuous history of the Act, one theme continuously echoes: (t)he liability of the United States will be the same as that of a private person under like circumstance, in accordance with local law, except that no punitive damages and no interest prior to judgment may be recovered. S.Rep.No.1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1946). See also S.Rep.No.1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1942); H.R.Rep.No.2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1942). The Supreme Court has read that statement to indicate that the 'contractor' exemption from the definition of 'Federal agency' in § 2671 ... adopt(s) the common-law distinction between the liability of an employer for the negligent acts of his own employees and his liability for the employees of a party with whom he contracts for a specified performance. 15 Logue v. United States, supra, 412 U.S. at 526-27, 93 S.Ct. at 2218-19. Relying on both the modern common law as reflected in the Restatement of Agency 16 and the law of Texas, 17 the Court concluded in Logue that the distinction between the servant or agent relationship and that of independent contractor turn(s) on the absence of authority in the principal to control the physical conduct of the contractor in performance of the contract. Id. at 527, 93 S.Ct. at 2219. The law of the District, like the law of Texas, adopts the Restatement's control-of-physical-conduct test to distinguish between employees and independent contractors. 18 18