Opinion ID: 769400
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discharge of Mary Craig

Text: 25 Main Street next challenges the Board's finding that it violated § 8(a)(1) by discharging Craig for engaging in protected concerted activity. It is well established that discharging an employee for engaging in activity protected by § 7 constitutes a violation of § 8(a)(1). See, e.g., Arrow Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 155 F.3d 762, 767 (6th Cir. 1998) (enforcing Board's determination that employer violated § 8(a)(1) by discharging employees for activity protected by § 7). We must therefore determine whether the Board properly concluded: (1) that Craig engaged in protected concerted activity under § 7; and (2) that Craig was discharged for engaging in this activity.
26 It is well settled that an individual employee may be engaged in concerted activity when he acts alone. NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1984). For an individual's complaints to constitute concerted action, this court requires that the complaints 'must not have been made solely on behalf of an individual employee, but [they] must be made on behalf of other employees or at least with the object of inducing or preparing for group action.' Talsol Corp., 155 F.3d at 796 (quoting Manimark Corp. v. NLRB, 7 F.3d 547, 550 (6th Cir. 1993)) (alteration in original); see also NLRB v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 651 F.2d 442, 445 (6th Cir. 1981) (An individual employee's complaint is 'concerted' if it is related to group action for the mutual aid or protection of other employees.); Compuware Corp. v. NLRB, 134 F.3d 1285, 1288 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1123 (1998) (quoting this language). Additionally, it is not necessary that an employee be appointed by his fellow employees in order to represent their interests. See, e.g., Talsol Corp., 155 F.3d at 796. The relevant inquiry in determining whether an employee's action was concerted, therefore, is whether the employee acted with the purpose of furthering group goals. Compuware Corp., 134 F.3d at 1288. 27 Concerted employee activities are protected by § 7 where the activities can reasonably be seen as affecting the terms or conditions of employment. Gatliff Coal Co. v. NLRB, 953 F.2d 247, 251 (6th Cir. 1992). We have held that protests of wages, hours, and working conditions, as well as the presentation of job-related grievances are activities protected by § 7. See Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 651 F.2d at 445. 28 The Board concluded that Craig engaged in protected concerted activity with respect to April Craig, Rigby, Jackson, the nurse whom she told to file a grievance, and McKenzie. The Board's determination that an employee engaged in protected concerted activity is entitled to great deference. Compuware Corp., 134 F.3d at 1288. The Board's determination that Craig's efforts to remedy the wage-related problems of April Craig, Rigby, and Jackson constituted protected concerted activity is clearly correct. As Main Street acknowledges, although Craig often confronted management alone, she was at all times acting as a representative of at least one other employee. Furthermore, Craig's complaints concerned matters protected by § 7, as they related to wages. 29 Main Street's principal argument is that Craig's statement to McKenzie that [i]f we had a union they would not treat any of us this way was not concerted activity, but was rather the product of a personal dispute. For this proposition, Main Street relies on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Scooba Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB, 694 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984). In Scooba Manufacturing, an employee had a vigorous argument with her supervisor that was sparked by the employer's decision to fire her son. The argument escalated and turned to the employee's own work performance and absenteeism. Before leaving her supervisor's office, the employee angrily proclaimed: It would be nice if it [sic] was a union here. A whole lot of things going on wouldn't be going on. Id. at 83. The Board found that the employee's discharge as a result of this heated dispute violated § 8(a)(1), but the Fifth Circuit denied enforcement of the order, concluding that the employee's comment did not constitute a protected concerted activity. The Fifth Circuit explained that the employee's action was not concerted because the employee was not acting on behalf of her fellow employees and because she had never discussed the possibility of unionization with other employees. Her remark, therefore, was the product of a purely personal dispute. Id. at 84. 30 In Scooba Manufacturing, the employee's remark was not concerted because no collective worker action was contemplated; the employee had simply used the word union in a personal dispute with a supervisor. In contrast, Craig's remark was made during a conversation with a fellow employee regarding unionization. Additionally, unlike the employee in Scooba Manufacturing, Craig had engaged in other protected activity on behalf of fellow employees in the past. Contrary to Main Street's arguments, Craig's remark was not the product of a purely personal dispute. Accordingly, the Board's finding that this conversation was protected concerted activity is reasonable and is affirmed.
31 Main Street has consistently maintained that Craig was discharged not for her engagement in protected concerted activity, but rather for disruptive behavior stemming from her inability to get along with co-worker Bob Monson 4 . In casesinvolving a question of employer motivation, the trier of fact employs the test articulated by the Board in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). This test, approved by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., requires the general counsel of the NLRB to make a showing sufficient to support the inference that the protected conduct was a motivating factor in the employer's decision. At that point, the burden shifts to the employer to establish that the adverse action would have taken place in the absence of the protected conduct, in the nature of an affirmative defense. Arrow Elec. Co., 155 F.3d at 766 (citation and footnote omitted). 32 Because employers rarely admit that an employee's discharge was due to her engagement in protected concerted activity, circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to support a finding of unlawful motivation. See Gatliff, 953 F.2d at 251. An employer's motivation is a factual question, and the Board's determination in this regard must therefore be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. See NLRB v. A & T Mfg. Co., 738 F.2d 148, 149 (6th Cir. 1984). Furthermore, credibility determinations must be accepted unless it is clear that there is no rational basis for them. Talsol Corp., 155 F.3d at 793 (quotation omitted). 33 Main Street first argues that the Board improperly considered Craig's remark to McKenzie as evidence of unlawful motivation because, it contends, there is no evidence that it had knowledge of the remark 5 . However, the Board's finding that Main Street was aware of this statement is supported by substantial evidence. First, Craig testified that she made the comment loud enough for the director of nursing to hear, and her testimony was explicitly credited by the ALJ. 6 Second, Craig testified that the director of nursing looked up when Craig made this comment, which suggests that the director heard the statement. Finally, the ALJ drew a negative inference from the fact that [t]he director of nursing did not testify at the hearing herein to deny that he heard what Mary Craig said in her conversation with McKenzie on Thursday December 11, 1997. Main Street, 1999 WL at . Although Main Street takes issue with the reliance upon this negative inference, it was not improper. See Gatliff Coal Co., 953 F.2d at 252 (noting that the Board's negative inferences about the absence of testimony from witnesses who should have been able to provide supporting testimony for [the employer] supported the Board's finding of unlawful motivation). 7 34 Substantial evidence also supports the Board's finding that Craig's engagement in protected concerted activity was a motivating factor in her discharge. The most convincing evidence of unlawful motivation is Main Street's departure from its progressive disciplinary policies in Craig's case, and its disparate treatment of Craig. Until the time of her discharge, Craig had been an excellent employee, as is evidenced by her October 1997 evaluation, in which Jeffers gave her the best overall mark and recommended her continued employment. 8 She was discharged ostensibly for her inability to get along with co-worker Monson and for the disruptions that she caused as a result. Main Street's policy was to give employees a warning for most instances of misconduct. J.A. at 126 (Jeffers Test.) (stating that employees should first receive a written warning for improper behavior and speech); J.A. at 87-88 (Employee Handbook) (noting that an oral reminder should be given for [f]ailure to work together as a team and develop good working relationships and for [r]ude or improper behavior or speech). However, Craig did not receive any reprimands, written or verbal, for the behavior that allegedly resulted in her discharge. Instead, Craig was immediately terminated, despite the fact that the employee handbook reserves termination for the most serious misconduct, such as abuse of residents and felonious behavior. Moreover, two dietary department employees who had recently been discharged, Abby Caldwell (who was discharged because Main Street had received complaints of rudeness from the family members of residents) and Ruth Konkle, both received reprimands before their termination. The fact that Craig, who had been an outstanding employee, was given no warning that her behavior was problematic prior to her termination -- in contravention of Main Street's policy and practice -- is strong support for the Board's inference of unlawful motivation. See, e.g., Tel Data Corp. v. NLRB, 90 F.3d 1195, 1198 (6th Cir. 1996) (sustaining finding of unlawful motivation in part because in contrast to other employees when confronted [with the same misconduct], Frederick, a nine-year employee with no history of disciplinary problems, was given no opportunity to explain his actions before his termination); NLRB v. Aquatech, Inc., 926 F.2d 538, 547 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that discriminatory application or lax administration of policies may indicate that employees are being singled out for union activities). 35 Additionally, the timing of Craig's discharge strongly suggests an impermissible motivation. Craig was fired on December 15, just four days after her statement that Main Street would be a better place to work if it were unionized. See Kentucky General, Inc., 177 F.3d at 436 (noting that the employer's decision to lay off both men only a few days after they engaged in picketing bolsters the inference that [the employer] terminated them because of their union activities); Aquatech, Inc., 926 F.2d at 545 (explaining that the proximity in time of protected concerted activity and discharge is suggestive of improper motivation). Although it is true that Craig had acted on behalf of other employees in regard to wage issues since nearly the start of her employment at Main Street, Craig's December 11 statement was the only pro-union statement she had made and could thus have been viewed by Main Street as more threatening. Moreover, Jeffers had expressed disapproval of Craig's protected concerted activity prior to her termination; April Craig testified that Jeffers told herto resolve her problems without the aid of Craig. 36 Because the Board properly concluded that the general counsel made a prima facie showing that Craig's conduct was a motivating factor in the decision to fire her, Main Street was then required to establish that her termination would have taken place in the absence of protected conduct. Main Street contended at the hearing that Craig was fired solely for her inability to work with Monson and the disruptions resulting from her hostility toward Monson. The Board found that Main Street had not made the requisite showing that Craig would have been terminated for this behavior regardless of her protected activity. The Board accepted the ALJ's explanation that Main Street's proffered reasons did not withstand scrutiny: There was no investigation [of Craig's alleged misconduct], and what Jeffers allegedly said [to Cochran], when examined in the light of the record made herein, would not justify terminating someone. Main Street, 1999 WL at . Main Street's failure to give Craig any warning before terminating her, in contravention of company policy, provides substantial evidence to support the Board's finding. See NLRB v. Transp. Mgt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 404 (1983) (finding the Board's conclusion that the employee would not have been discharged in the absence of protected conduct justified in light of evidence that the employee had not been disciplined prior to his termination), abrogated on other grounds by Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994); Health Care Logistics, Inc., 784 F.2d at 238 (rejecting employer's assertion that employees would have been fired for performance-related reasons even absent their protected activity because neither employee had been warned about any aspect of his work prior to termination); Dayton Typographic Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 778 F.2d 1188, 1193 (6th Cir. 1985) (rejecting employer's argument that employee was laid off for his bad attitude toward work, explaining that both of the alleged incidents in which the employee displayed a bad attitude occurred considerably before his discharge and the employer had not disciplined the employee for these incidents).