Opinion ID: 550160
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Liebling's Standing to Compel Arbitration.

Text: 32 In their response to Liebling's motion to compel arbitration before the district court as well as on appeal, appellees challenge Liebling's standing to compel arbitration. Despite the fact that this is a threshold issue, 9 the district court did not resolve it, ruling instead that Liebling had waived arbitration. 33 Liebling does not directly address the standing issue, but instead generally stresses the federal policy favoring arbitration. However, according to the undisputed allegation of appellees, Liebling was not a party to the contract providing for arbitration. 10 As the Supreme Court has explained repeatedly, the Federal Arbitration Act was designed 'to overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate.'  Volt Info. Sciences v. Bd. of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 1253, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-220, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 1241-1242, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985)). Although the Act reflects a federal policy favoring arbitration, Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985), the Act does not confer a right to compel arbitration of any dispute at any time; it confers only the right to obtain an order directing that 'arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in [the parties'] agreement.'  Volt, 109 S.Ct. at 1253 (quoting 9 U.S.C. Sec. 4). The right to compel arbitration derives from a contractual right, and, as we held in Lorber Industries v. Los Angeles Printworks Corp., 803 F.2d 523 (9th Cir.1986), one who is not a party to a contract has no standing to compel arbitration. 34 Lorber, however, also suggests that a third party beneficiary or an agent of one of the parties to the contract may have standing to compel arbitration. The nature of Liebling's relationship with Gold Depository, as well as the intent of the parties to the contract and the scope of arbitrability, were neither analyzed by the district court nor briefed on appeal. We decline to address this issue on appeal and instead remand the case to the district court for further determination and fact-finding as to whether the parties intended that a person in Liebling's position have the benefits of the arbitration provision.