Opinion ID: 2612437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: As we recently stated in Alhambra School District v. Superior Court, 165 Ariz. 38, 796 P.2d 470 (1990), it is the general policy of Arizona appellate courts to decline jurisdiction when special action relief is sought from a denial of summary judgment. Id. at 40 n. 3, 796 P.2d at 472 n. 3. It is generally even more unwise to take special action jurisdiction simply to affirm the trial court's denial of summary judgment, as was done in this case. As we have mentioned many times in the past, we do not favor special action proceedings asking the appellate system to review trial court denials of motions for summary judgment. Id. If our appellate courts were to welcome such requests, the system would be inundated by petitions from disappointed movants. Instead of a method for expeditious resolution of meritless claims, summary judgment would be transformed into a fertile field of appellate practice, further complicating our system of civil adjudication. This case illustrates the needless burdens imposed by liberal grant of jurisdiction. Ft. Lowell requested special action relief from the court of appeals after the trial court denied its motion for summary judgment. That court accepted jurisdiction, reversing the denial of summary judgment on one count, and remanding for further proceedings, which of course would include trial. Jula then petitioned for review by this court as to the grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Ft. Lowell. Because we disagreed with the opinion of the court of appeals, we were compelled to accept jurisdiction, vacate the opinion of the court of appeals, and, finally, affirm the trial judge's denial of summary judgment. Both the court of appeals' opinion and ours accomplish the same end as the trial judge's denial of summary judgment  an order that the case be tried. However, it has taken almost two years, two appellate proceedings, and two opinions for the case to return to the trial judge's hands and be scheduled for trial. We again caution that, except in very unusual cases, denial of summary judgment is not an appropriate matter for the exercise of special action jurisdiction. See, e.g., King v. Superior Court, 138 Ariz. 147, 149-50 and n. 3, 673 P.2d 787, 789-90 and n. 3 (1983). This is especially so when the denial is to be affirmed.