Opinion ID: 799617
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Closing Argument Issue.

Text: Close argues that the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument included egregious prosecutorial misconduct and that defense counsel's failure to object violated Close's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance. The district court considered all statements cited by Close and finds that none rise to a level warranting § 2255 relief. We agree. At trial, Polk County Deputy Sheriff Randy Tobey testified that he and another officer, executing a warrant to search Close's home, entered a back bedroom from which his wife had emerged. They saw Close roll off a bed, away from the officers and toward a dresser and nightstand. He appeared to be grasping for something underneath the bed with both hands. As the bed obstructed their view of Close below his chest, they drew their weapons and repeatedly ordered him to show his hands. He eventually complied. After securing Close, officers searched the bedroom. They found a 12-gauge shotgun, digital scale, and small amount of methamphetamine under the bed, where Close had been reaching; a semiautomatic pistol in the nightstand drawer with a loaded magazine either in or next to the pistol; a .22-caliber rifle behind the nightstand; shotgun shells and .22-caliber ammunition in the nightstand; and methamphetamine, drug packaging materials, and cash in a dresser. The bedroom also contained a sophisticated surveillance system showing four different exterior views of the home. Close appeared to be intoxicated on methamphetamine. Deputy Tobey testified that drug dealers use surveillance cameras to warn them of police and those who rob drug dealers, and that drug dealers use firearms to protect drugs and cash. Close testified that he was reaching under the bed to hide the digital scale and drugs. He denied having the firearms to protect him from people trying to break in to steal your drugs. Close and his wife testified the guns were acquired before they started selling methamphetamine to finance their addictions; that they seldom if ever sold drugs at the house; that the guns were for hunting and family protection and were kept in the bedroom to prevent their son from accessing them; and that the surveillance system was to protect their daughters' car stereos from repeated thefts. In his direct testimony, Close's recount of his arrest differed from Deputy Tobey's in certain rather minor respectswhether Close reached under the bed with one hand or two hands, whether the officers repeatedly yelled at him to show his hands, and whether the loaded magazine was in the pistol or lying nearby in the nightstand. On cross-examination, the prosecutor repeatedly asked Close if Deputy Tobey lied, to which Close answered yes, leading at the end to a heated exchange. In closing argument, defense counsel noted that Close had confessed and pleaded guilty to drug offenses and admitted his methamphetamine addiction and urged the jury to credit his testimony that the firearms were unrelated to his illegal drug trafficking. Recalling the prosecutor's cross exam regarding inconsistencies between the testimony of Close and Deputy Tobey, counsel argued: If you remember [the cross] examination of my client yesterday afternoon, when they got a little testy with each other, you will remember it was the United States Attorney who kept demanding yes or no answers. It was the United States Attorney that suggests that Mr. Close is claiming that the deputy lied and only putting him in that circumstance because he has to answer yes or no. Well, the reality of these things is people do recollect things differently. The reality of the situation is that people under stressand people are under stress when they've just been arrested for crimes like the conspiracy to sell methamphetamine or possession of methamphetamine with intent to distributethey can recollect conversations differently than police officers. In rebuttal, the prosecutor rose to the bait: Well, ladies and gentlemen, sitting here and listening to Mr. Hanson, I was debating whether I should give a rebuttal closing argument or whether I should go over and submit my resignation to the United States Attorney. Listening to Mr. Hanson almost has me caught in between a Perry Mason TV show and a cross with Mayberry R.F.D. with me being the hapless, incompetent prosecutor who forced lies from the witness stand and Deputy Tobey being my trusted sidekick, Barney Fife. If that's what you believe and that's what you think the evidence shows, then return a verdict of not guilty.      Deputy Tobey has been a sworn peace officer in the state of Iowa for 17 years. What motive does he have to lie to you about Gary Close? What? Does anything come to mind? If he's going to take the stand and lie about that, what are the potential repercussions? Lose his job, lose his pension, get criminally charged, go to prison. What motive would he have to lie to you? This argument foolishly focused the jury on an inconsequential issueDeputy Tobey's credibility. More significantly, it was improper. We have repeatedly held that prosecutors in closing argument may not personally vouch for the credibility of a government witness, and that it distorts the government's burden of proof to argue that if [defendant] told the truth in his testimony the government witnesses must have lied. United States v. Reed, 724 F.2d 677, 681 (8th Cir.1984). After Close's trial, citing cases from other circuits, we extended this burden-of-proof principle and held that the government made an improper argument when it stated that an acquittal required the jury to find that Officer Smith would jeopardize his future career as a police officer. United States v. Miller, 621 F.3d 723, 732 (8th Cir.2010). On direct appeal, because of the trial court's broad discretion in controlling closing argument, we reverse for this type of error only if the verdict could reasonably have been affected by the alleged misconduct. Id. at 730. The prosecutor's rebuttal, if given today, would clearly overstep the bounds of Miller. Even at the time of Close's trial, the rebuttal was inconsistent with Reed and our vouching decisions. Close argues defense counsel had no tactical reason for failing to object to such egregious prosecutorial misconduct. We disagree. Having irritated opposing counsel into a serious blunder, defense counsel could object, in which case the district court would likely sustain the objection and remind the jury that arguments, questions and comments by lawyers ... are not evidence, as they had already been instructed. Or counsel could remain silent, hoping the jury would be distracted from the incriminating physical evidence Close being found in his bedroom with guns, drugs, cash, and a surveillance systemand react negatively to the prosecutor's theatrical focus on an unimportant credibility issue. In our view, neither option was constitutionally deficient performance under Strickland. In addition, we conclude that the failure to object did not prejudice Close's defense. Under Strickland, the issue is not whether the prosecutor's rebuttal was improper, but whether Close has shown a reasonable probability that, `but for' counsel's [failure to object], the result would have been different. Kellogg v. Skon, 176 F.3d 447, 452 (8th Cir.1999). Close does not argue the improper rebuttal would have prompted a mistrial. And rightly soas the credibility of Detective Tobey was of far less importance than the physical evidence, no mistrial was warranted. Thus, an objection, if sustained, would have resulted only in a repetitive curative instruction that the jury should focus on the evidence and ignore arguments of counsel, a focus less likely to produce a favorable verdict than leaving the jury focused on an insignificant credibility issue manufactured by the prosecution. Bearing in mind the strength of the government's other evidence, Close has failed to show a reasonable probability the jury would have rendered a different verdict had counsel timely objected to the improper rebuttal.