Opinion ID: 6342695
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Regulation’s Ordinary Meaning

Text: As always, our “review of a regulation centers on the ordinary meaning of the text.” Jaroslawicz v. M&T Bank Corp., 962 F.3d 701, 710–11 (3d Cir. 2020). A task we approach using “all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, n.9); see also Arcos Sanchez v. Att’y Gen., 997 F.3d 113, 119 (3d Cir. 2021). When “a reviewing court employs all of the traditional tools of construction, the court will almost always reach a conclusion about the best interpretation.” Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779, 788 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (quoting Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)). That is the case here. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(A)–(H), the Board may summarily dismiss an appeal in eight specific circumstances. One of those relates to the failure to file a supporting brief: A single Board member or panel may summarily dismiss any appeal or portion of any appeal in any case in which . . . [t]he party concerned 5 indicates on Form EOIR-26 or Form EOIR-29 that he or she will file a brief or statement in support of the appeal and, thereafter, does not file such brief or statement, or reasonably explain his or her failure to do so, within the time set for filing. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E). There are no exceptional or unusual meanings in this text, only discretion to summarily dismiss when a brief is promised but, without explanation, not provided. Understandably, Argueta-Orellana does not directly challenge that reading. Instead, he sees conflict in context. But we are not persuaded, as following the text of § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E) is not an abuse of discretion.