Opinion ID: 683061
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims under the Local Constitution.

Text: 15 Canez contends that his right to due process under the Local Constitution was also violated. Alleged constitutional violations are cognizable in federal court under Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185 (1985), as potential contract violations. Woodell v. IBEW, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93 (1991).
16 First, Canez asserts that he should have had a full hearing before his dismissal on August 10, 1990. The Local Constitution provides for such a hearing in Article XII. We agree with the district court that we must defer to the General Executive Board's finding that the emergency action of the Executive Board was permissible under the Local Constitution. See Building Material and Dump Truck Drivers, Local 420 v. Martino, 867 F.2d 500, 511 (9th Cir.1989) (courts should be highly deferential to a union's interpretation of its own governing documents). 17 Next Appellant argues that he was entitled to a full hearing on the charges within thirty days of his dismissal. The General Executive Board agreed that Canez's full hearing came later than it should have. (E.R. 16, p 10). The Board also found, however, that [b]ecause Canez was removed from office for misconduct, he suffered no injury by the Executive Board's failure to provide him a hearing on disciplinary charges within a reasonable period after his removal on August 8. (E.R. 16, p 19). 18 The question whether constitutional due process rights have been violated is not a results-oriented inquiry. Union members are entitled to due process whether or not they are guilty. Canez's rights under the Local Constitution were violated when he did not receive his hearing on time, even though he had been dismissed for misconduct. In some situations, the timing of a hearing could prove critical to a plaintiff. In this case, however, Canez has failed to suggest any kind of specific prejudice. We therefore agree with the district court that this issue does not need to be tried because Canez has failed to present any evidence to show that he suffered any harm.
19 Canez next contends that his Local constitutional rights were violated when Ramon Morales, then a member of the Executive Board, did not impanel a Trial Board to hear his case. We agree with the district court that this argument lacks merit. The Local Constitution provides that members of the Executive Board of the Local Union will constitute the Trial Board that hears charges against an officer. Uniform Local Union Constitution, Article XII, section 3. Members are disqualified if they are the charging party, or interested in the litigation. The Local Constitution further provides that [w]here the entire Executive Board ... appears to be disqualified, the matter may be referred to the General President.... Id. 20 All the members of the Executive Board signed the charges against Canez. Canez argues that Morales, though he also signed the charges, was not interested because he did not take part in the hearings on October 8th and 10th. The Local Constitution is clear: Morales signed the charges and was therefore disqualified. He had no duty to impanel a Trial Board, and Canez's hearing was properly referred to International's President.
21 Canez claims that he had a right to have his charges voted on by the general union membership. Canez asserts that the Local Constitution provides a way for union leadership to bypass the general union membership by referring hearings to the General President. When the Trial Board conducts the hearing, the local union votes on its findings. Local Constitution, Article XII, section 6. When the case is referred to the General President, however, it may remain with the General Executive Board for final decision and disposition. Id. section 3. 22 Canez brings his claim under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185, claiming that he did not receive due process under the Local Constitution. But the process he protests is provided by the Local Constitution itself. Canez thus has no claim under Sec. 185. 23