Opinion ID: 1405904
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Inform Appellant He Was Suspected of Murder.

Text: (9) Boyde argues that the failure to inform him he was a suspect in the robbery-murder rendered his January 22 statement involuntary because his decision to waive his rights to remain silent and to consult counsel was not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. He acknowledges that no California decision had held that Miranda warnings ( Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436) must specify the actual charge pending against the person being interrogated and that the Court of Appeal rejected such an argument in People v. Neely (1979) 95 Cal. App.3d 1011, 1017 [157 Cal. Rptr. 531]. He also acknowledges that the Court of Appeal has held that new Miranda warnings are not necessarily required whenever an interrogation about one crime leads to discussion of another. ( People v. Schenk (1972) 24 Cal. App.3d 233, 236 [101 Cal. Rptr. 75].) He urges that the position taken by a minority of courts which require such information to implement Miranda is the better approach. Boyde relies upon United States v. McCrary, supra, 643 F.2d 323, Schenk v. Ellsworth (D.Mont. 1968) 293 F. Supp. 26, and Commonwealth v. Dixon (1977) 475 Pa. 17 [379 A.2d 553]. The argument does not fit the facts of this case. On January 22 Boyde volunteered information about these crimes, and as noted above, admitted no complicity but claimed to know that others had committed the offenses. This statement was damaging because it led directly to the later statements in which Boyde admitted his guilt, but was incriminating only by comparison to those later statements.