Opinion ID: 2302675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Enforceability of the Consent Decree's Performance Standards

Text: [¶ 32] For the reasons we have stated, the City has general authority to resolve land use litigation by consent decree that includes a judicial declaration that a particular land use  here, quarrying  is grandfathered for purposes of the City's land use ordinance. We turn now to consider Artel's additional challenge to the detailed performance and use standards adopted by the consent decree that will supersede otherwise applicable provisions of the City's zoning ordinance. [¶ 33] As described by the court, [t]he Consent Order contains numerous and detailed performance standards, prescribing the areas where and the method by which Pike will be able to continue its mining operation. The consent decree addresses the enforcement of those standards in paragraph 57, entitled Violations of Performance or Use Standards. The provision states: The City may enforce any violations of this Consent Order pursuant to the provisions of 30-A M.R.S.A. § 4452. [¶ 34] Title 30-A M.R.S. § 4452 provides for the enforcement of local laws and ordinances by the municipal officials who are designated by ordinance or law with the responsibility to enforce them. 30-A M.R.S. § 4452(1). [5] The judicial process that governs land use violation proceedings in the District Court is laid out in M.R. Civ. P. 80K, but section 4452 actions may also be heard in the Superior Court pursuant to that court's general jurisdiction. See M.R. Civ. P. 80K(a); City of Biddeford v. Holland, 2005 ME 121, ¶¶ 7-9, 886 A.2d 1281. Section 4452(5) states that it applies to the enforcement of land use laws and ordinances or rules that are administered and enforced primarily at the local level and includes a list of twenty such laws, ordinances, and rules. 30-A M.R.S. § 4452(5). [6] Absent from the list are consent decrees and other court judgments, and none of the laws, ordinances, and rules identified in section 4452(5) are so closely analogous to consent decrees that we could infer that the Legislature intended consent decrees to be within the ambit of the statute. [¶ 35] The consent decree's adoption of 30-A M.R.S. § 4452 in paragraph 57 as a mechanism for the enforcement of its provisions is, therefore, not authorized by law. Nor does the City otherwise have the authority, outside the ambit of the land use statutes, to adopt land use regulations like the performance standards here. [7] See 30-A M.R.S. §§ 4351-4361; 30-A M.R.S. § 4452; Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 526, 106 S.Ct. 3063 (noting that parties may not bind themselves in ways that are contrary to law); Oeste, 534 A.2d at 684. [¶ 36] In addition, and contrary to the assertion of Pike and the City, the distinction between executive and legislative acts does not change the analysis. The executive authority of a municipality is no more or less subject to the express limitations on municipal home rule authority established by the land use regulation statute, 30-A M.R.S. §§ 4351-4361, than is its legislative authority. See 30-A M.R.S. § 4351. In restricting municipal home rule authority to regulate land use, the Legislature did not distinguish between executive and legislative acts. Further, it is not implicit in section 4351 that such a distinction should be drawn. If the restrictions apply only to municipal acts deemed legislative but not those deemed executive, municipalities would be free to regulate land use through contracts, executive orders, or, as in this case, consent decrees, free from the Legislature's stated intention of imposing limitations on home rule authority. See League of Residential Neighborhood Advocates v. City of Los Angeles, 498 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir.2007) (rejecting any argument that the City may circumvent its zoning procedures by referencing its general authority to settle litigation). There is no basis in the land use regulation statute's language or purpose to infer such an exception. [8] See Peters v. O'Leary, 2011 ME 106, ¶ 13, 30 A.3d 825 (A statute will be interpreted according to its plain meaning to discern the intent of the Legislature.). [¶ 37] Although the City, Pike, and IDEXX may have intended to treat the decree's performance standards as the legal equivalents of ordinances subject to enforcement under section 4452, [9] unless and until they are adopted as such through a contract zoning agreement or the amendment of the City's land use ordinance, they are not ordinances subject to section 4452. This gap in enforceability is highlighted by the effect it has on the public's rights under the City's zoning ordinance. Because the decree's performance standards are not embodied in a contract zoning agreement or, more generally, in the City's zoning ordinance, the right otherwise afforded to any person by the zoning ordinance to file[ ] a complaint with the Code Enforcement Officer that [the] Ordinance is being violated, thus requiring the CEO to immediately examine the subject of the complaint and take appropriate action, will not apply to Pike's property. See Westbrook, Me., Zoning Ordinance § 604.4 (July 11, 2011); [10] see also Indus. Commc'ns & Elecs., Inc. v. Town of Alton, 646 F.3d 76, 80 (1st Cir.2011) (noting citizens' legal interest under state law in the protection that the zoning laws afford to their property); Stewart E. Sterk, Structural Obstacles to Settlement of Land Use Disputes, 91 B.U. L.Rev. 227, 266-67 (2011) (discussing the impact that land use consent decrees may have in preclud[ing] neighbors from raising legal issues that they previously had standing to raise, even though they were not parties to the proceeding that cut off their rights). [¶ 38] This does not mean that the performance and use standards agreed to by the City, Pike, and IDEXX cannot be achieved through a consent decree absent the Legislature's amendment of section 4452. Here, the court may preliminarily approve the consent decree, with its final approval conditioned on the City Council's adoption of the consent decree's performance and use standards in a contract zoning agreement or as amendments to the zoning ordinance, following the completion of the applicable procedures. [11] See 30-A M.R.S. § 4352(8) (2011) (authorizing contract zoning); Westbrook, Me., Zoning Ordinance §§ 106.2 (discussing process for amendments), 107 (discussing process for contract zoning). This approach would keep Pike's property within the framework of the City's zoning ordinance, thus subjecting Pike's property to land use enforcement pursuant to section 4452. [¶ 39] Accordingly, although we affirm the court's determination that the City had the authority to settle this land use litigation through a consent decree that declares Pike's operation of a quarry on its property to be a grandfathered use under the City's zoning ordinance, we vacate the judgment for the reasons we have stated and remand for further proceedings. We have considered and are not persuaded by the remaining arguments presented by the parties and conclude that we need not address them further. The entry is: Judgment affirmed as to the court's denial of an evidentiary hearing and its determination that the City has the authority to settle this litigation through a consent decree declaring Pike's operation of a quarry on its property to be a grandfathered use under the City's zoning ordinance; judgment otherwise vacated and remanded to the Business and Consumer Docket for proceedings consistent with this opinion.