Opinion ID: 2599731
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does the crime of attempted kidnapping during a carjacking require a completed carjacking?

Text: An attempted kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking is not defined within section 209.5. We look, therefore, to general principles governing attempt crimes. (See People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227-230, 109 Cal. Rptr.2d 315, 26 P.3d 1051 ( Toledo ) [recognizing crime of attempted criminal threat]; see also Lopez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1059, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 432, 79 P.3d 548.) An attempt to commit a crime is comprised of two elements: a specific intent to commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission. (§ 21a; see § 664 [prescribing punishment].) Other than forming the requisite criminal intent, a defendant need not commit an element of the underlying offense. (See People v. Superior Court ( Decker ) (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1, 58 Cal. Rptr.3d 421, 157 P.3d 1017; see also People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 453-454, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697 ( Dillon ); Jones, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 627, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 485.) [4] We have explained that under California law, `[a]n attempt to commit a crime is itself a crime and [is] subject to punishment that bears some relation to the completed offense.' [Citation.] ... [¶] ... `One of the purposes of the criminal law is to protect society from those who intend to injure it. When it is established that the defendant intended to commit a specific crime and that in carrying out this intention he committed an act that caused harm or sufficient danger of harm, it is immaterial that for some collateral reason he could not complete the intended crime.' [Citation.] ( Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 229-230, 109 Cal. Rptr.2d 315, 26 P.3d 1051.) Applying these general attempt principles, we conclude that a completed carjacking is not required for an attempt to violate section 209.5(a). Section 209.5(a) provides that a person who, during the commission of a carjacking and in order to facilitate the commission of the carjacking, kidnaps another person, is subject to a sentence of life with the possibility of parole. As the People argue, this language suggests that like the offense of robbery (§ 211), which combines elements of theft and assault ( People v. Sutton (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 264, 270, 110 Cal.Rptr. 635), section 209.5(a) combines the offenses of kidnapping and carjacking. An attempted robbery requires a specific intent to commit robbery and a direct, ineffectual act (beyond mere preparation) toward its commission. ( Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 455-456, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697; People v. Vizcarra (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 858, 861, 168 Cal.Rptr. 257.) Under general attempt principles, commission of an element of the crime is not necessary. (See ante, at 61 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 681-682, 161 P.3d at p. 191.) As such, neither a completed theft ( People v. Bonner (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 759, 764, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 642) nor a completed assault (see Vizcarra, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at pp. 862-863, 168 Cal.Rptr. 257), is required for attempted robbery. (See People v. Mullins (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1221, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 289 [to be guilty of related offense of attempted kidnapping to commit robbery (§§ 664, 209, subd. (b)), defendant need not complete kidnapping].) Likewise, the People contend only a specific intent to facilitate the commission of the carjacking (CALJIC No. 9.54.1), and a direct but ineffectual act in furtherance of both the planned kidnapping and the planned carjacking are required for an attempt to violate section 209.5(a). (See § 21a.) We agree with the People's reasoning. Thus, we conclude that neither a completed kidnapping nor a completed carjacking is necessary for an attempted kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking Defendant, however, argues to the contrary. Tracking the Court of Appeal dissent, he maintains that section 209.5(a) establishes a species of kidnapping in which the completed commission of a carjacking provides the context. He adds that the phrase during the commission of a carjacking in section 209(a) should be viewed as an enhancement or aggravator which punishes more severely a more serious species of kidnapping, and that an attempted kidnapping during an attempted carjacking is a non-crime. In other words, defendant maintains that this conduct is not a violation of section 209.5. Defendant relies on the reasoning of Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at pages 763-764, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 233, which concerned a completed violation of section 209.5(a). (See also Jones, supra, 75 Cal. App.4th at pp. 624-625, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 485; id. at p. 627, fn. 3, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 485 [it appears a completed carjacking would be a requirement for an attempt to violate § 209.5(a) ].) Arguing that the Legislature knows how to distinguish between a completed offense and attempted offense, he also points to the wording of various sentence enhancement statutes as support. [5] Contrary to defendant's argument, we conclude that section 209.5 should not be treated differently from other criminal offense statutes for purposes of defining the requirements of an attempt. First, there is no indication that the Legislature, which did not define attempts within section 209.5, intended the during the commission of a carjacking language to remove section 209.5(a) from the ambit of the general attempt statutes. (§§ 21a, 664.) As section 209.5(a)'s legislative history reveals, the Legislature added section 209.5 in 1993 while creating the new crime of carjacking (§ 215). (Stats. 1993, ch. 611, §§ 5, 6, p. 3508.) It previously included the attempt to take, a vehicle in the definition of carjacking. (Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 17, 1993.) After the Senate Judiciary Committee criticized that [proponents have not indicated why attempted carjacking should be [punished] differently from virtually all other attempts, the Legislature deleted the phrase. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Feb. 17, 1993, p. 4; Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 8, 1993; Lopez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 1059-1060, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 432, 79 P.3d 548.) We concluded that the Legislature's subsequent deletion of the `attempt to take' language from the definition of carjacking reflected a desire to maintain the general punishment scheme for attempted offenses, rather than a commentary on the substantive elements of the crime. ( Lopez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1059, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 432, 79 P.3d 548.) We likewise conclude that the Legislature most likely intended to treat attempted kidnappings during the commission of a carjacking (§§ 664, 209.5) the same way; that is, to be governed by the general attempt statutes (§§ 21a, 664). (See Phelps v. Stostad (1997) 16 Cal.4th 23, 32, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 360, 939 P.2d 760 [`the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole']; Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 453, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697 [target offense need not be completed].) A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. (2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (6th ed.2000) § 46:05.) Second, although defendant relies on Contreras's interpretation of the phrase during the commission of a carjacking (§ 209.5(a)), that case is distinguishable and its reasoning does not extend to attempts. Defendant Contreras was convicted of both carjacking (§ 215) and kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking (§ 209.5(a)). Seeking reversal of the carjacking conviction, Contreras maintained that carjacking is a necessarily included offense of section 209.5 because the phrase during the commission of a carjacking implies a completed carjacking. ( Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 763, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 233.) The Court of Appeal agreed. The Contreras Court of Appeal looked to the special circumstances statute (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), to determine the meaning of during the commission under section 209.5(a). Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), provides for either the death penalty or life without possibility of parole if the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting to commit one of the enumerated felonies. ( Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 764, 64 Cal. Rptr.2d 233.) Noting a distinct difference between the commission and attempted commission language in section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), the Court of Appeal reasoned that [t]he Legislature must have meant the phrase, `during the commission,' as used in section 209.5 to have the same meaning as `in ... the commission' as used in section 190.2, to wit, to refer to a completed offense. In fact, there is no semantic difference between the two phrases. ( Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 764, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 233.) Thus, the Court of Appeal concluded that a violation of section 209.5 `during the commission of a carjacking' requires a completed offense of carjacking, and held carjacking is a necessarily included offense of section 209.5. ( Contreras, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 765, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 233.) Contreras is inapposite because it did not deal with an attempted violation of section 209.5(a). Its emphasis on section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), along with defendant's reliance on other sentence enhancement statutes, is misplaced here. These statutes set forth an enhanced penalty for a conviction under certain circumstances; they do not outline the elements of a substantive crime. The distinction is important. (See People v. Le (1984) 154 Cal. App.3d 1, 11, 200 Cal.Rptr. 839 [if the Legislature had intended to include attempts in the enhancement provisions, it would have specifically stated the enhancement applies to the `commission or attempted commission' of specific crimes].) As a practical matter, prison or jail terms for attempt crimes are generally one-half of that for completed crimes. (§ 664, subds. (a) & (b).) Because a sentence enhancement is `an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term' ( Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 898, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 30, 69 P.3d 951), it makes sense that sentence enhancement statutes expressly encompass both completed and attempted offenses, which would result in different sentences. In contrast, attempts of most crimes are not defined within a statute, but are governed by the general attempt statute (§ 21a). (See Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 227-230, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 315, 26 P.3d 1051.) Thus, it is reasonable that such attempt language would not be necessarily included within section 209.5(a). Defendant claims, however, that requiring a completed carjacking for an attempted violation of section 209.5(a) would somehow further the Legislature's intent to protect victims from being removed from the scene of a carjacking. He posits that the evils to be remedied are better targeted by punishing those who actually accomplish a carjacking. We fail to see the logic in this argument, which is also contrary to section 209.5(a)'s legislative history. A direct offshoot of robbery, carjacking was made a separate offense because of perceived difficulties with obtaining convictions under the robbery statute. [Citation.] ( Lopez, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 1059, 1057, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 432, 79 P.3d 548.) The Legislature was specifically concerned with the ` considerable increase in the number of persons who have been abducted, many have been subjected to the violent taking of their automobile and some have had a gun used in the taking of the car. This relatively new crime appears to be as much thrill-seeking as theft of a car. If all the thief wanted was the car, it would be simpler to hot-wire the automobile without running the risk of confronting the driver. People have been killed, seriously injured, and placed in great fear, and this calls for a strong message to discourage these crimes.' ( Id. at p. 1057, 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 432, 79 P.3d 548, quoting Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) July 13, 1993, p. 1.) Such concern for the abduction and safety of a driver or passenger is particularly evident in section 209.5, which provides for significant punishment if the victim is also moved a substantial distance with the risk of increased harm. (§ 209.5, subd. (b).) While simple carjacking exposes a defendant to a prison term of three, five, or nine years (§ 215, subd. (b)) and simple kidnapping sets forth a prison term of three, five, or eight years (§ 208, subd. (a)), kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking carries a prison term of life with the possibility of parole. (§ 209.5, subd. (a).) [6] The Legislature evidently viewed the combination of kidnapping and carjacking as far more dangerous and serious than either one alone. As discussed above, `one of the purposes of the criminal law is to protect society from those who intend to injure it. When it is established that the defendant intended to commit a specific crime and that in carrying out this intention he committed an act that caused harm or sufficient danger of harm, it is immaterial that for some collateral reason he could not complete the intended crime.' [Citation.] ( Toledo, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 230, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 315, 26 P.3d 1051.) Indeed, no public purpose is served by drawing fine distinctions between those who have managed to satisfy some element of the offense and those who have not. ( Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 453, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697, fn. omitted.) Given the Legislature's view on the seriousness and dangerousness of section 209.5(a), it follows that the Legislature would perceive attempts to commit section 209.5(a) the same way. We conclude that extending the reach of this provision to encompass attempted kidnappings during an attempted commission of a carjacking would send a strong message to discourage such crimes. (Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 60 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) July 13, 1993, p. 1.) Based on the foregoing, we conclude the rule of lenity does not assist defendant. ( People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 58, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 38 P.3d 1 [although true ambiguities are resolved in a defendant's favor, an appellate court should not strain to interpret a penal statute in defendant's favor if it can fairly discern a contrary legislative intent].) Next, we address defendant's sufficiency of evidence claim in view of our holding above. Our role is limited here. We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment, and affirm the convictions as long as a rational trier of fact could have found guilt based on the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom. [Citations.] ( People v. Lewis & Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1044, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775.) We agree with the Court of Appeal majority that sufficient evidence supports defendant's five convictions for attempted kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking. Defendant's actions provide clear circumstantial evidence of his specific intent to kidnap the Perez family to facilitate a carjacking. Fleeing from the police, defendant ran to the Perez van, where he jumped into the driver's seat and tried to start the engine. Struggling with Rodriguez, defendant urged, [w]e got to go, we got to go. All the while wrestling with Rodriguez, who yelled at him to get out because her kids [were] in the van, he continued in vain to try to start the engine and move the van. When he saw the officer approaching the van, defendant ran off. The reasonable inference is that defendant intended to take the van and its occupants in order to escape from the police; there was also no evidence defendant told the family to get out. There was also sufficient evidence of defendant's direct but ineffectual acts to commit a kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking. (§§ 209.5(a), 21a.) There was uncontroverted evidence that defendant jumped into the Perez van and tried in vain to drive it. Despite the struggle with Rodriguez, defendant tried to start the ignition, put the van in gear, and move the steering wheel. Defendant's actions were ineffectual because he failed to start and move the van, thus failing to complete a carjacking or a kidnapping. However, we agree with the People that defendant's conduct from the time he approached the van until he gave up trying to start the engine and ran away was a direct but ineffectual act in furtherance of a kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that defendant's five convictions for attempted kidnapping during the commission of a carjacking should be affirmed.