Opinion ID: 1448513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: commits the crime of aggravated stalking.

Text: (Emphasis added.) An accurate instruction upon the basic elements of the offense charged is essential, and the failure to so instruct constitutes reversible error. Dougherty v. State, 86 Nev. 507, 509, 471 P.2d 212, 213 (1970). We conclude that the district court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct the jury that a necessary element of aggravated stalking is that the defendant must have threatened the victim. [4] We note that Rossana failed to object to the instruction in the proceedings below and that generally such an omission bars review on appeal. McCullough v. State, 99 Nev. 72, 74, 657 P.2d 1157, 1158 (1983). However, in this case, we conclude that a case of plain error has been viably asserted and thus this court may address any concomitant constitutional issues sua sponte. Id.; see Patterson v. State, 111 Nev. 1525, 1530, 907 P.2d 984, 987 (1995) (error is `plain' if the error is so unmistakable that it reveals itself by a casual inspection of the record.') (quoting Torres v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 106 Nev. 340, 345 n. 2, 793 P.2d 839, 842 n. 2 (1990)). The State argues that the given instruction included the statutory elements of aggravated stalking, identifying those elements as a subjective element (actually causes the victim to feel....); an objective element (cause[s] a reasonable person to feel . . .); and a specific intent element. NRS 200.575. The State asserts that the requirement of a threat in conjunction with stalking conduct (i.e., specific intent) is implicitly found by reading the objective and subjective elements together. We do not agree with this analysis. The State cites this court's law for the proposition that the district judge had broad discretion in deciding whether terms within the jury instruction need to be defined. Dawes v. State, 110 Nev. 1141, 1145-46, 881 P.2d 670, 673 (1994). We conclude that Dawes is inapposite to the issue at hand; Rossana does not complain that words defining threatening behavior were omitted; rather, he points out that the specific and necessary element of threatening conduct was expressly omitted from the instruction. It is true that the given instruction is not identical to the statutory definition of misdemeanor stalking (NRS 200.575(1)), in that the word intentionally has been added. Nonetheless, the way the instruction reads, a defendant need only have the intent to engage in a course of conduct which would cause a reasonable person to feel and actually causes a person to feel terrorized, etc., to have committed the offense of aggravated stalking. However, the crime of aggravated stalking requires something more in that the defendant must not only engage in intentional (i.e., volitional) conduct that causes a specific result, but that the defendant must threaten with the intent to cause the victim to be placed in reasonable fear of death or substantial bodily harm. NRS 200.575(2)(a). The defendant must threaten the victim. The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution mandates that the jury find all elements of a given crime; failing to instruct the jury about essential elements of a crime constitutes constitutional error in that the jury may convict the defendant without finding the defendant guilty of a necessary element of a crime. United States v. Caldwell, 989 F.2d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir.1993). We conclude that in Rossana's case, an essential element (i.e., defendant must stalk and threaten with intent to cause fear, etc.) was erroneously omitted from the jury instruction regarding aggravated stalking. Accordingly, we conclude that Rossana's due process rights have been compromised such that reversal of his conviction on this count is warranted.