Opinion ID: 2318796
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Accrual of Martin's Claims

Text: Statutes of limitations    promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49, 64 S.Ct. 582, 586, 88 L.Ed. 788, 792 (1944). Generally, a cause of action accrues and the applicable statute of limitations begins to run at the time of the injury to the aggrieved party. Plouffe v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 118 R.I. 288, 293, 373 A.2d 492, 495 (1977); Romano v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 114 R.I. 451, 459, 336 A.2d 555, 559-60 (1975). In some narrowly circumscribed factual situations, Renaud v. Sigma-Aldrich Corp., 662 A.2d 711, 714 (R.I.1995), however, when the fact of the injury is unknown to the plaintiff when it occurs, the applicable statute of limitations will be tolled and will not begin to run until, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the plaintiff should have discovered the injury or some injury-causing wrongful conduct. Compare Renaud v. Sigma-Aldrich Corp., 662 A.2d 711 (R.I.1995) (holding that, in a product liability case, statute of limitations began to run at the time of injury) with Anthony v. Abbott Laboratories, 490 A.2d 43 (R.I.1985) (holding that, in a drug product-liability case, the running of the statute of limitations begins when the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, his or her injuries); Lee v. Morin, 469 A.2d 358 (R.I.1983); Wilkinson v. Harrington, 104 R.I. 224, 243 A.2d 745 (1968). The reasonable diligence standard is based upon the perception of a reasonable person placed in circumstances similar to the plaintiff's, and also upon an objective assessment of whether such a person should have discovered that the defendant's wrongful conduct had caused him or her to be injured. If a reasonable person in similar circumstances should have discovered that the wrongful conduct of the defendant caused her injuries as of some date before the plaintiff alleged that she made this discovery, then the earlier date will be used to start the running of the limitations period. Anthony, 490 A.2d at 47. After briefly examining the above-cited tolling cases, it is apparent to us that none of them are helpful to Martin. In Wilkinson, this Court held that a medical malpractice cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered that he/she has been injured as a result of the physician's negligent treatment. This discovery rule later was codified in G.L.1956 § 9-1-14(b). In Lee, the Court held that the discovery rule applied to improvements in real estate, when the evidence of injury to property, resulting from the negligent act upon which the action is based, is sufficiently significant to alert the injured party to the possibility of a defect. 469 A.2d at 360. Again, in Anthony, we held that in a drug, product-liability action where the manifestation of an injury, the cause of that injury, and the person's knowledge of the wrongdoing by the manufacturer occur at different points in time, the running of the statute of limitations would begin when the person discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, the wrongful conduct of the manufacturer. Anthony, 490 A.2d at 46. Here, Martin seeks to toll the statute of limitations for her personal-injury claims beyond the time when both the alleged injury itself and the wrongful conduct causing that injury should have been known to a reasonable person. She argues that she did not appreciate the full nature and extent of her injuries at the time she first knew she had suffered harm because of Howard's alleged sexual abuse. Martin attributes this lack of appreciation to the exceptional undue influence by the defendant that shape[d] what the plaintiff [was] able to understand and know at a particular time. In Doe v. LaBrosse, 588 A.2d 605, 606 (R.I.1991), this Court examined for the first time the issue of applying the discovery rule to a civil sexual-assault case involving victims who were minors at the time of the alleged assault. The adult plaintiffs in the case had discovered many years after the fact that they had suffered sexual assaults as children and that these assaults were the cause of psychological injuries they suffered from as adults. Id. at 605. We remanded that case to the Superior Court for an evidentiary hearing to determine the date the plaintiffs discovered or reasonably should have discovered the causal connection between the defendant's acts and the plaintiffs' injuries. In the meantime, the Rhode Island General Assembly enacted G.L.1956 § 9-1-51, adopting a discovery rule for actions concerning crimes of childhood sexual abuse. [2] Doe v. LaBrosse, 625 A.2d 222, 222 (R.I.1993). Unlike the circumstances in LaBrosse, however, Martin has not alleged that she was a minor when she engaged in a sexual relationship with Howard or that she otherwise was legally incapacitated when she suffered her alleged injuries. This fact alone distinguishes her case from those of the sexually abused children for whom the General Assembly enacted the above-referenced sexual abuse and molestation statute. Here, ABCORI notified Martin in early 1995 that Howard had admitted his sexual misconduct and that the church defendants would engage in an internal mediation process in an attempt to address this situation. Thus, even if Martin had been uncertain before she communicated with ABCORI about the impropriety of Howard's conduct, the church defendants made it very clear to her that they considered his conduct to be improper, but that, from their standpoint, this situation and the problems it raised would have to be resolved through the process of an internal church mediation. Notification to Martin of the results of that mediation process allegedly took place in May 1995, when she was told that Howard would be placed on unpaid leave from his pastor's job for six months and that he had been requested to take certain steps to address his admitted misconduct. Thus, she was on notice in 1995 that the promised mediation had not resulted in her participation in the process, in any more substantial disciplinary measures against Howard (much less in his permanent ouster as pastor), or in any redress whatsoever of her personal-injury claims. Yet Martin still failed to sue within three years of any of these dates. In short, Martin's complaint shows that she should have known by the end of May 1995, at the latest, about the nature of her alleged injuries and the defendants' role in causing them; nevertheless, she did not file her personal injury claims until more than three years later  after the statutory period for doing so had expired.