Opinion ID: 2444639
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scope of Review in Supreme Court

Text: It is the Commission's initial point that the findings and conclusions of the Commission are binding on this court and only the recommendation of discipline is subject to review here. This point is overruled and the reasons therefor will appear infra in connection with the Commission's second position which is that this court's review is limited to a determination as to whether there is substantial evidence to support a finding or conclusion and that this court cannot, under the constitution, make an independent review of the findings made by the Commission. In this connection, a substantial part of the Commission's motion for rehearing, brief and argument, concerns the court's holding in the earlier opinion that the court is not bound by the findings and conclusions of the Commission and the credibility, weight, and value of the witnesses and the determination of all fact issues necessary to a decision in the case are for this court. . .in short, that this court must make a de novo review of the factsciting In re Schiff, 542 S.W.2d 771 (Mo. banc 1976), a lawyer disciplinary case, and In re Duncan, 541 S.W.2d 564 (Mo. banc 1976), a judge disciplinary case where we adopted the preponderance of evidence as the burden of proof because that was the burden in lawyer disciplinary matters. In re Duncan at 568, and In re Fullwood, 518 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Mo. banc 1975), recognized that the Missouri constitutional provision is patterned after the California constitutional provision. However, neither the standard of proof nor scope of review issue were the subject of challenge or detailed discussion in Duncan or Fullwood . The Commission argues this court must defer to the Commission's findings of fact and restrict its review of such matters to the question of whether there is competent and substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings and not conduct a de novo review; that the attorney disciplinary case of In re Schiff, supra , is not sufficient or relevant authority for adopting a scope of review which requires this court to undertake a de novo evaluation of the evidence. Although the court is of the view that an independent evaluation is required in this type proceeding, the complaint regarding Schiff as being inadequate authority has merit. Prior to the 1970 amendment to art. 5, sec. 27, Mo.Const., the only method of removing a judge from office for misconduct in office was by way of impeachment under art. 7, sec. 1, Mo.Const. Although In re Mills, 539 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. banc 1976), an attorney disbarment proceeding, is cited by the Commission as an alternative to impeachment prior to the amendment creating the Commission, the Mills case does not support an assertion that a disbarment proceeding can be utilized to oust a judge from office for judicial misconduct. The removal of a judge from office for judicial misconduct by action of the Commission and this court is controlled by art. 5, sec. 27, Mo.Const., and the provisions pertinent to the instant matter are as follows: Art. 5, sec. 27.1. There shall be a commission on retirement, removal, and discipline, composed of . . .. The commission shall receive and investigate. . . all complaints concerning misconduct of judges, magistrates, . . . Art. 5, sec. 27.3. Upon recommendation by an affirmative vote of at least four members of the commission, the supreme court en banc, upon concurring with such recommendation, shall remove, suspend, or discipline any judge or magistrate of any court . . . for the commission of a crime, or for misconduct, habitual drunkenness, willful neglect of duty, corruption in office, incompetency or any offense involving moral turpitude, or oppression in office. No action taken under this section shall be a bar to or prevent any other action authorized by law. Art. 5, sec. 27.6. Recommendations to the supreme court by the commission shall be made only after notice and hearing. Rules for the administration of this section and for the procedures thereunder shall be prescribed by supreme court rule unless otherwise provided by law. Rule 12 was adopted by this court pursuant to subsection 6, supra, to implement art. 5, sec. 27. Rule 12.08(a) and (b) in part requires the Commission to make an informal investigation of complaints, which are not obviously unfounded or frivolous, of misconduct, etc., and upon completion of the investigation, if four members of the Commission who have read the investigation find there is probable cause to believe the judge is guilty, the Commission is to institute a formal proceeding against the judge. Rule 12.08 in part provides: Upon completion of the formal proceedings, if at least four members of the Commission who shall have been present and heard all the evidence find that the person proceeded against is guilty and further find that such person should be removed from office, suspended from the performance of his duties for a period of time or otherwise disciplined, the Commission shall make written findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the issues and shall make its recommendations to this Court. The Commission shall prepare a transcript of the record of all evidence and of all proceedings therein which shall also include its findings of fact and conclusions of law and recommendations, and shall file two copies thereof with the clerk of this Court. After respondent has had an opportunity to proceed as provided in Rule 12.09, this Court shall review the record, consider the recommendation of the Commission and make such order as to respondent as it deems just. It is noted here that the constitution does not, per se, require the Commission to make findings of fact or conclusions of law. The constitutional provision requires the Commission to, when the Commission deems it advisable, make a recommendation of discipline to this court. However, in order for this court to know what the underlying facts were which formed the basis of the conclusions and ultimate recommendation, the court by rule provided that findings of fact and conclusions of law be set forth by the Commission. The constitution, art. 5, sec. 27.3, does not require the court to agree with the recommendation of the Commission. Indeed, the wording of art. 5, sec. 27.3, provides that the court shall discipline only upon concurring with the recommendation. It seems clear, therefore, that the court may constitutionally not concur. This provision is the one which makes discipline discretionary with this court. It is also clear that the Commission cannot effect discipline. The constitution requires that discipline, when adjudicated, be adjudicated and imposed by the Supreme Court en banc, and, although deference should be shown to the recommendations of the Commission, the court is not bound by them. How, then, can the court go about deciding whether or not to concur with the Commission's recommendation of discipline? It would seem that the court would, of necessity, examine into the evidence to decide whether it concurs with the fact findings and then whether it concurs with the conclusions that certain violations occurred. In other wordsprovide an independent review of the case. It is difficult to understand how this court could concur with the recommendation if it were not in agreement with the factual findings or the inferences drawn from those factual findings and set forth as conclusions of law. The recommendations of the Commission do not come to this court as a judgment as do appeals from administrative agencies. Judgments are enforceable without approval of any appellate court; however, in the case of judicial discipline under art. 5, sec. 27, the recommendations are not enforceable of their own authority. That is because the constitution does not empower the Commission to effect discipline of its own authority. The body in which the constitution places the power to discipline judges is the Supreme Court. Art. 5, sec. 27.3. As such, it becomes the obligation of this court to satisfy itself as to the facts underlying the adjudication of discipline. The motion for rehearing correctly asserts that the power to discipline attorneys is derived from the inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law within the judicial branch of government and not from any other specific grant of authority in the constitution. Likewise, the motion correctly asserts that the authority to discipline judges is derived from art. 5, sec. 27, which provides for the Commission, its power and duties, and assigns to the Supreme Court the duty to finally decide judicial discipline. The twoattorney discipline and judicial disciplineare similar in that it is the Supreme Court in both instances that must finally adjudicate the discipline if any is to be assessed. The master in the case of attorney discipline proceedings and the Commission in the case of judicial discipline proceedings make recommendations, not judgments. The Commission's motion for rehearing cites many cases where the court held that the reviewing court's scope of review over an administrative agency is limited to deciding whether the findings of the agency are supported by competent and substantial evidence. Respondent's suggestions in opposition cite a number of cases from other states where the courts held that the scope of review the court must employ in reviewing a recommendation of a judicial disciplinary commission is that of an independent evaluation of the evidence. The reply suggestions of the Commission acknowledge an awareness of the judicial discipline cases from other states but argues they are irrelevant because, it is argued, the constitution of Missouri is different from that of other states, particularly California, Alaska, and North Carolina. The constitution of Missouri has been quoted extensively supra but the provisions pertinent to this issue will be restated for ready reference. It is art. 5, sec. 27.3: Upon recommendation by an affirmative vote of at least four members of the commission, the supreme court en banc, upon concurring with such recommendation, shall remove, suspend, or discipline any judge or magistrate of any court or any member of any judicial commission or of this commission. . .. (Emphasis supplied.) The reply suggestions of the Commission set forth the provisions of the following constitutions: The California constitution provides in art. 6, sec. 18: (c) On recommendation of the Commission on Judicial Performance the Supreme Court may (1) retire a judge for disability that seriously interferes with the performance of the judge's duties and is or is likely to become permanent, and (2) censure or remove a judge for action occurring not more than 6 years prior to the commencement of the judge's current term that constitutes wilful misconduct in office, persistent failure or inability to perform the judge's duties, habitual intemperance in the use of intoxicants or drugs, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. . . . (Emphasis supplied.) The Alaska statute provides in sec. 22.30.070: (c) On recommendation of the commission, the supreme court may (1) retire a judge for disability that seriously interferes with the performance of his duties and is or is likely to become permanent, and (2) censure or remove a judge for action occurring not more than six years before the commencement of his current term which constitutes wilful misconduct in the office, wilful and persistent failure to perform his duties, habitual intemperance, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. (Emphasis supplied.) North Carolina provides in sec. 7A-376: . . . Upon recommendation of the Commission, the Supreme Court may censure or remove any justice or judge for wilful misconduct in office, wilful and persistent failure to perform his duties, habitual intemperance, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. . . . (Emphasis supplied.) Before proceeding further, it should be noted that, as stated in the Commission's reply suggestions, the Commission is a constitutional body established by the constitution to investigate complaints, determine probable cause and initiate charges, hold evidentiary hearings and, as per the constitution, make recommendations of discipline to this court. Further, it is noted that if the Commission finds in favor of the judge, the file is closed and the matter is concluded. This is no small measure of power, authority and responsibility. The constitution does not, however, vest the Commission with the authority to, by its recommendations, put into effect the discipline it recommends. Absent a discipline order or judgment of this court, no discipline obtains. From the tenor of the Commission's brief and argument, it appears that the Commission feels the court has slighted it or denigrated its importance. This certainly was not intended then or now. The Commission is necessary to our judicial system and is very much needed and appreciated. It is necessary, however, to construe and apply our constitution and when that constitution places the authority to do an act in one body rather than another, this court must say so and abide by the constitutional mandate. The issue of the scope of review of a commission's recommendations has been directly considered by the courts of other states but, except for preliminary or passing statements in some prior judicial disciplinary cases here, it has not been specifically decided. First, as to our constitution as compared with those of some other states. As noted supra, the phraseology of our constitution differs facially from California, Alaska, and North Carolina. The constitutional provisions of those states, when referring to a review of the recommendations of the commissions, say their supreme courts may retire a judge, censure him, etc. Each constitution provides what the court may do with respect to a specific matter and when it may act, to wit, Upon recommendation of the Commission, the Supreme Court may . . . . These constitutions do not speak of the court concurring with the recommendations but simply use the word may with reference to the court's options. Our constitution does not use the word may. Shall, which is a mandatory word, is used, but neither the Commission nor anyone else suggests that the word shall means the court must assess the discipline recommended by the Commission or that the court is required to concur with the Commission. It seems clear that the phrase upon concurring with the recommendation simply means that the court has the alternative to not concur with the recommendation. Our constitution by qualifying what the court shall do by making it (shall) contingent upon the court's concurrence with the Commission's recommendation, but not requiring concurrence, leaves it to the court to decide whether to concur or not. This grant of discretionary authority to the court makes our constitutional provisions, in essence, similar to the others cited supra. The brief of the Commission emphasizes the word shall and tends to ignore the contingency phrase upon concurring with. Of course, the entire section must be read as a whole in order to discern its true meaning. The Commission contends the constitution requires the court to agree with the findings of the Commission or, in short, to accept the findings of the Commission. If this is so, then what is the court to base a nonconcurrence upon? The underpinnings of the Commission's recommendation must, it would seem, be the Commission's findings upon which it then makes certain inferences and conclusions from which the Commission decides upon disciplineits recommendation. Thus, it would seem reasonable that the court must consider the underpinnings of the recommendation (evidence and findings) in order to decide whether it should concur with the resultthe recommendation. That is what the court has done in the instant case and because of the importance of the Commission and its work, has undertaken to delineate with particularity the basis upon which the court arrived at its judgment in the matter. Shall the court review the evidence and make an independent evaluation thereof? The Commission argues we cannot or should not do so but, alternatively, to accept the Commission's findings the court must or should be limited to a determination of whether the Commission's findings are supported by substantial evidence. The substantial evidence rule requires the court to concur in a finding even though the court, upon examining the evidence, is of the belief the finding was wrong, if there was substantial evidence favoring the finding. There can, of course, be substantial evidence pro and con as to any issue. This rule, nevertheless, has merit when the body from which the matter comes (administrative agency, court, or commission) has the power to make an adjudication of the matter which, absent appeals or mandatory review, is final. In the type of proceeding that is before the court, the body from which it came (Commission) did not, under the constitution of Missouri, have the power to make an adjudication of discipline which, absent supreme court action, could take effect or be final. In the words of the constitution, the Commission can recommend discipline but it (discipline) is not effective upon the Commission's recommendationit is only effective when imposed or adjudicated by this court. The Commission agreed that art. 5, sec. 27.3, places the ultimate responsibility for decision with respect to discipline in the supreme court. As will be seen infra, this fact was the principal basis upon which the supreme courts of California, Alaska, North Carolina, and others have determined they must conduct an independent review and not simply apply the substantial evidence test. As noted supra, the constitutional provisions of Missouri were patterned after California, as was our implementing Rule 12. Also, as noted supra, art. 5, sec. 27.3 does not mandate this court's concurrence with the Commission's recommendation but permits nonconcurrence. Additionally, as noted supra, art. 5, sec. 27.3 places the ultimate dispositive decision as to discipline in the supreme court en banc. In Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal.3d 270, 110 Cal.Rptr. 201, 515 P.2d 1 (Cal. banc 1973), the court had this precise issue before it, and in In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303 (Alaska 1975), the same issue was presented to and decided by the Alaska Supreme Court. In an earlier case, In re Robson, 500 P.2d 657 (Alaska 1972), the Alaska Supreme Court said the substantial evidence rule was applicable to the review of judicial disciplinary commission recommendations. As noted, the substantial evidence rule restricts a court to a determination of whether or not there was substantial evidence to support a commission's finding. Subsequently, in Hanson, supra , the Alaska court reversed the holding in Robson, supra , and concluded that an independent review, as required by California, was necessary. The part of the Alaska court's opinion, which includes portions of the California court's opinion in Geiler on this issue, appears in Hanson at 532 P.2d 308-309 as follows: The second preliminary matter which requires our examination involves the scope of this court's review of the evidence adduced before and the recommendation of the Commission. In In re Robson , we observed: Regarding the scope of review which this court should exercise in reviewing findings of fact of the commission, we see no reason to depart from the substantial evidence test which we have heretofore employed in reviewing matters coming to this court from administrative agencies and other governmental bodies. In our opinion in In re Robson , we noted that the question of the scope of judicial review had `not been alluded to in the parties' briefs.' Here the question has been briefed in connection with the instant petition, and we thus consider this an appropriate occasion to reexamine the scope of this court's review in judicial qualifications proceedings. It appears that Alaska is the only jurisdiction which follows the substantial evidence test in reviewing Commission factual findings. In other states, including California, the supreme court undertakes an independent evaluation of the evidence and the recommendation of the Commission. In Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal.3d 270, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201, 515 P.2d 1 (1973), the Supreme Court of California described its role as follows: We must . . . decide the appropriate standard for this court to employ in reviewing a recommendation by the Commission. Were this recommendation of independent force and effect absent further action by this court, our review of the evidentiary basis for that recommendation might properly be limited to a determination whether the Commission's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. . . . [However], since the ultimate, dispositive decision to censure or remove a judge has been entrusted to this court, we conclude that in exercising that authority and in meeting our responsibility we must make our own, independent evaluation of the record evidence adduced below. After conducting such a review we may then decide as a question of law whether certain conduct, which we may have found as a fact to have occurred, was `wilful misconduct in office' or `conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.' (Cal. Const., art VI, § 18.) Finally, it is to be our findings of fact and conclusions of law, upon which we are to make our determination of the ultimate action to be taken, to wit, whether we should dismiss the proceedings or order the judge concerned censured or removed from office. Article IV, section 10 of the Alaska Constitution and AS 22.30.070(c) unambiguously establish the Supreme Court of Alaska as the body entrusted with the ultimate dispositive decision in a judicial qualifications matter. In light of this constitutional grant and adopting the reasoning of Geiler , we conclude that this court's scope of review in a judicial qualifications proceeding should be that of an independent evaluation of the evidence. (Footnotes omitted.) In Hanson, supra , the Alaska court also had presented to it a due process claim wherein it was contended that petitioner was denied due process because the Alaska commission had power both to conduct a preliminary investigation and to adjudicate and make a recommendation to the supreme court. This is, of course, what the Missouri commission does. This point is referred to here because of what the Alaska court said, in addition to other reasons, for rejecting the due process claim, 532 P.2d 307: In reaching our holding on petitioner's due process claim, we are additionally influenced by the fact that article IV, section 10 of the Alaska Constitution lodges in the Supreme Court of Alaska the exclusive adjudicatory power to suspend, remove from office, retire, or censure a justice or judge in the Alaska Court System. Since this constitutional provision vests in us the ultimate authority in disciplinary matters affecting the judiciary, we hold that petitioner's constitutional rights to the protection afforded by due process have not been impinged upon. The foregoing holding in Hanson preceded the decision that the review in the supreme court must be an independent one and we believe the recognition that the Supreme Court of Alaska has the exclusive adjudicatory power to discipline, as does this court here, was a significant factor in rejecting the due process claim as well as in adopting the independent review rule. The reply suggestions assert the California and Alaska cases, cited supra, are distinguishable because in those cases the hearing was held before a master or masters, but not the commission itself. California's rule 907 provides, . . . the Commission shall order a hearing to be held before it concerning the censure . . . , or the Commission may request the Supreme Court to appoint three special masters . . . in the event that two-thirds of the . . . Commission vote that this procedure be followed in a specified case, . . . In Alaska, rule 9 allows the commission to order a hearing to be held before it or it may appoint a master to hear and take evidence. In re Hanson, supra, footnote 15 at 307. Neither decision was predicated on whether the commission in California or Alaska held the hearing or a master held it. The commissions are, however, required to make their own findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation if discipline be recommended. The importance of these findings are set forth in Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 13 Cal.3d 778, 119 Cal.Rptr. 841, 844, 532 P.2d 1209, 1212-1213, footnote 5, which appear below in our footnote two. [2] An exhaustive review of the problems of and procedures for judicial discipline on a nationwide basis is found in 54 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1-235 (1977), in a series of articles which compose the Judicial Discipline and Disability Symposium. This symposium also contains the standards for judicial discipline adopted by the American Bar Association in 1978. It is not possible to summarize this entire article. However, it is stated that thirty-one states have followed what is commonly known as the commission plan. There are a number of varieties in terms of size of commissions and various operating procedures but basically all have a permanent commission composed of judges, lawyers and nonlawyers that investigates, conducts hearings and recommends imposition of discipline to the highest court of state. Missouri is one of these thirty-one states that has adopted the unitary commission plan. 54 Chicago-Kent L.R. at 21. The court has considered in depth all of the suggestions, arguments, and authorities put forth by the Commission and the respondent. Additionally, the Chicago-Kent L.R. reviews the disciplinary procedures in various states, including scope of review. In all states having a unitary commission proceeding where the commission recommends discipline, the scope of review is that of an independent review of the evidence and fact findings of the commission. The underlying common ground for this is that in those states, as in Missouri, the commission makes a recommendation which the supreme court is not required to adopt, and the ultimate responsibility for discipline is placed in the supreme court. No cases are cited by the Commission to the contrary and we have found none. The Proposed Standards Relating to Judicial Discipline and Disability Retirement which were adopted by the American Bar Association House of Delegates, February 14, 1978, became the Standards and represent a codification of the unanimous view found in court decisions with respect to scope of review of unitary commission recommendations. They are Standards 7.8 and 7.9 and appear at p. 229 of the Chicago-Kent L.R., supra, as follows: 7.8 Determination of Facts. The court should reach its own conclusion as to the facts found by the commission and as to the recommendation that discipline be imposed. 7.9 Review on the Record. The court should make an independent evaluation of the findings and recommendations of the commission. For the foregoing reasons, the scope of review of judicial disciplinary matters in this court is an independent review as set forth in Standards 7.8 and 7.9. The court will, of course, give substantial consideration and due deference to the Commission's ability to judge the credibility of witnesses appearing before it. After doing so it will make its adjudication in accordance with the rules set forth supra. It is apparent from the resource material published for the National Conference of Judicial Disciplinary Commissions, the Chicago-Kent L.R., supra, and the Standards adopted by the American Bar Association, supra, that the unitary commission plan, as exists in Missouri, is the preferred method of dealing with judicial misconduct. This same literature makes it abundantly clear, as Judge Dowd, who is Chairman of the Missouri Commission, has done on appropriate occasions, that the contribution of nonlawyers and nonjudges to the work of these commissions has been of inestimable value to the total judicial system of this and other states. This court sincerely appreciates the dedicated work of the entire Commission.