Opinion ID: 1817595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Claims against the University.

Text: In the federal suit, Penn raised § 1983 and § 1985 constitutional claims based upon the malicious prosecution of the sexual harassment complaint. In the state action, Penn raises numerous claims based upon the same factsthe prosecution of the sexual harassment claim. All of these claims stem from the same facts and evidence alleged in the federal law suit. In fact, the petitions are nearly identical, save the added state law claims. This case is controlled by Shumaker v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 541 N.W.2d 850 (Iowa 1995). Shumaker filed a federal claim alleging employment discrimination and sexual harassment by the Iowa Department of Transportation and her supervisors. Shumaker, 541 N.W.2d at 851. She also pleaded her state law remedy under Iowa Code chapter 601A (1989). Id. The federal court granted Shumaker relief for her Title VII claims, but dismissed her claim under chapter 601A as moot because she conceded `an action under . . . [chapter] 601A is not permitted under the facts of this case and the Eleventh Amendment.' Id. Shumaker later filed a petition against the same defendants in state court, alleging the same Title VII and chapter 601A violations, as well as some added tort and contract claims. Id. at 852. We determined Shumaker abandoned her state claim in federal court, she failed to seek an adjudication under the court's pendent jurisdiction, [1] and her state action was barred by claim preclusion. Id. at 854-55. We stated [c]laim preclusion applies not only to matters actually determined in an earlier action but to all relevant matters that could have been determined.  Id. at 852 (emphasis added). However, claim preclusion does not apply if the claim could not have been presented in the first action based upon subject matter jurisdiction limitations. Id. Shumaker endorsed the position set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments that if the court in the first action would clearly not have had jurisdiction to entertain the omitted theory or ground (or, having jurisdiction, would clearly have declined to exercise it as a matter of discretion), then a second action in a competent court presenting the omitted theory or ground should be held not precluded. Id. at 854 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 25 cmt. e (citation omitted) (emphasis added)). As in Shumaker, claim preclusion applies to Penn's state law claims because he should have raised them in the federal action and requested the federal court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Although it is unknown whether the federal court would have exercised supplemental jurisdiction, as we noted in Shumaker, [a]ny doubts concerning the federal court's exercise of pendent jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of joinder. Id. We find Penn's allegations that he did not gain access to certain documents until June 7, 1991 insignificant to our analysis. He filed his federal claim on January 3, 1992, well after discovery of any unknown causes of action. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment based upon claim preclusion. Because we have resolved all of the claims against the University on the ground of claim preclusion, it is unnecessary to address the parties' alternative theories and arguments.