Opinion ID: 150289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gender as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification

Text: Title VII's BFOQ exception provides: [I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of [ ] religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). As its language indicates, see Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 201, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 113 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991), the BFOQ is an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex that may be invoked only when the essence of the business operation would be undermined by hiring individuals of both sexes. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333-34, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977) (citing Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.1971)). To justify discrimination under the BFOQ exception, an employer must prove by a preponderance of the evidence: 1) that the job qualification justifying the discrimination is reasonably necessary to the essence of its business; and 2) that [sex] is a legitimate proxy for the qualification because (a) it has a substantial basis for believing that all or nearly all [men] lack the qualification, or. . . (b) it is impossible or highly impractical. . . to insure by individual testing that its employees will have the necessary qualifications for the job. EEOC v. Boeing Co., 843 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir.1988) (quotations omitted). NDOC has not explicitly articulated the job qualification for correctional lieutenants for which it claims sex is a legitimate proxy. We are left to try to adduce what that qualification might be from the declarations by NDOC officials on which the defendants rely in their briefs as justification for the facially discriminatory policy. NDOC Director Crawford offered the following explanation for the decision to exclude men from the correctional lieutenant positions:  [T]he number of officers who were supervisors [when CCA operated the facility] were males . . . They were the individuals who alleged that they did not know anything about the drugs, alcohol, and sex.  [Correctional lieutenants] are the individuals that can monitor and best, you know, gauge if there is something going on.  We wanted upper management to be able to monitor, to understand, and notice anything that went on. We had so many people telling us during the private sector that nothing was going on. . . . We just felt comfortable with doing this. Glen Whorton, the director of NDOC from 2005 to 2007, declared that the employment of male correctional lieutenants at SNWCF would create a real risk . . . if female inmates were sexually assaulted abused by male correctional lieutenants and/or male . . . subordinates and such abuse was kept silent by the male correctional lieutenants. . . because they were protecting themselves and/or their . . . subordinates (code of silence). Whorton described the risks entirely in terms of the opportunities for misconduct inherent in the correctional lieutenant role: [M]ale correctional lieutenants would have the opportunity to place male correctional subordinates in situations lending themselves to sexual misconduct with female inmates. . . . Male correctional lieutenants would have the opportunity not to take action against male correctional subordinates that sexually abused female inmates. . . . male correctional lieutenants would have the opportunity to allow contraband to enter SNWCF . . . in exchange for sexual favors. Female correctional lieutenants, according to Whorton, are more inclined to monitor and discipline the wrongful conduct of correctional subordinates and to take steps of prevention with respect to female inmates as their very nature, womanhood, is more conducive to dealing with the complexities and differences of female inmates. Crawford also testified that she wanted correctional lieutenants who understand[ ] management of women. I think that women do have an innate ability to manage women. . . . To understand[ ] some of the emotional outbreaks. . . . With womenI don't believe that they can be manipulated . . . I just believe [women] are more patient. They're probably more maternal. . . . they have an instinct and an innate ability to discern what is real and what isn't. . . . the female officers were able to better discern, you know, what's really happening here. From this panoply of explanations, it appears that NDOC administrators sought to reduce the number of male correctional employees being compromised by female inmates, and that they believed the gender restriction on shift supervisors would accomplish this because (1) male correctional lieutenants are likely to condone sexual abuse by their male subordinates; (2) male correctional lieutenants are themselves likely to sexually abuse female inmates; and (3) female correctional lieutenants possess an instinct that renders them less susceptible to manipulation by inmates and therefore better equipped to fill the correctional lieutenant role. [5] The first theory fails because NDOC has not shown that all or nearly all men would tolerate sexual abuse by male guards, or that it is impossible or highly impractical to assess applicants individually for this qualification. Boeing, 843 F.2d at 1214. As to the second theory, there is no basis in fact, Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335, 97 S.Ct. 2720, for believing that individuals in the correctional lieutenant role are particularly likely to sexually abuse inmates. The third theoryand, to a significant degree, the first tworelies on the kind of unproven and invidious stereotype that Congress sought to eliminate from employment decisions when it enacted Title VII. We begin our analysis by surveying the decisions applying the BFOQ exception in the prison context. Dothard, the only Supreme Court case on the subject, concerned a peculiarly inhospitable maximum security prison for men where conditions were so atrocious as to be constitutionally intolerable, and a substantial portion of the inmate population [was] composed of sex offenders mixed at random with other prisoners. 433 U.S. at 334, 336, 97 S.Ct. 2720. In the context of this extreme environment, the Supreme Court upheld a regulation prohibiting women from working in positions requiring continual close physical proximity to inmates, id. at 325, 97 S.Ct. 2720, finding [m]ore [ ] at stake . . . than an individual woman's decision to weigh and accept the risks of working in a prison system where violence is the order of the day. Id. at 335-36, 97 S.Ct. 2720. The Court found a basis in fact for expecting that sex offenders who have criminally assaulted women in the past would . . . do so again if access to women were established within the prison. Id. at 335, 97 S.Ct. 2720. The likelihood that inmates would assault a woman because she was a woman would pose a real threat to . . . the basic control of the penitentiary. Id. at 336, 97 S.Ct. 2720. As the Court later noted, [s]ex discrimination was tolerated [in Dothard ] because sex was related to the guard's ability to do the job-maintaining prison security. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 202, 111 S.Ct. 1196. In other words, Dothard 's finding of a BFOQ was premised on a level of violence among inmates atypical even among maximum security facilities. See Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1085 (8th Cir.1980) (distinguishing Dothard 's finding of a BFOQ, which was premised on the prison's rampant violence and inhuman conditions, as inapplicable to a medium security institution) (quotation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). Appellate courts, including this court, have followed Dothard in requiring prison administrators to identify a concrete, logical basis for concluding that gender restrictions are reasonably necessary. [6] 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). In Everson v. Michigan Department of Corrections, 391 F.3d 737 (6th Cir.2004), the Sixth Circuit upheld a gender restriction imposed by the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) to eradicate rampant sexual abuse of female prisoners. Id. at 739. MDOC had pledged . . . to minimize access to secluded areas and one-on-one contact between male staff and female inmates pursuant to settlement of two lawsuits, one brought by the United States Department of Justice, alleging that the failure to protect female inmates from ongoing sexual abuse violated their constitutional rights. Id. at 743. To effectuate the settlement agreements, MDOC employed only female guards in the housing units of women's prisons. MDOC data showed that most allegations of sexual abuse, and all of the sustained allegations, involved male employees, and that sexual abuse occurred most frequently in the housing units. This data, the court held, established that the exclusion of male [guards] will decrease the likelihood of sexual abuse. Id. at 755. In Henry v. Milwaukee County, 539 F.3d 573 (7th Cir.2008), a juvenile detention center decided to staff each housing pod with at least one guard of the same sex as the juveniles housed on that pod, to achieve a direct role model/mentoring form of supervision. 539 F.3d at 583. During the day, one of the two guards on each male pod could be female, but the sole night shift slot on each pod had to be staffed by a man. The Seventh Circuit accepted the administrator's professional judgment that same-gender mentoring was necessary to achieve the [facility's] mission of rehabilitation. Id. Yet, the court found no factual support for the administrator's conclusion that the program's effectiveness required same-sex staff at all times, including on the night shift, when the juvenile inmates were sleeping. Id. In Robino, we held that even had the gender-based restriction on assignments been actionable under Title VII, it fell within the BFOQ exception. The prison, based on a study conducted by a specially appointed task force in compliance with an EEQC settlement agreement, designated as female-only those posts that require[d] the [guard] on duty to observe the inmates in the showers and toilet areas . . . or provide[d] unsupervised access to the inmates. 145 F.3d at 1110-11. Because a person's interest in not being viewed unclothed by members of the opposite sex survives incarceration, we held that protecting inmate privacy and preventing sexual misconduct warranted the restriction. Id. at 1111. These cases illustrate that, even in the unique context of prison employment, administrators seeking to justify a BFOQ must show a high correlation between sex and ability to perform job functions. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 202, 111 S.Ct. 1196. Moreover, the particular staffing restriction at issue must match those job functions with a high degree of specificity to be found reasonably necessary. See id. (noting that in Dothard the Court refused to allow employers to use sex as a proxy for strength although it might be a fairly accurate one); Robino, 145 F.3d at 1111 (concluding that guard's gender directly affected female inmates' privacy concerns). In Henry, for example, the application of the gender restriction on the night shift would not address privacy concerns, as the vast majority of the time that the juveniles were unclothed occurred during [] daytime shifts when women were permitted to staff the pods, 539 F.3d at 582, and was not justified by the mentoring objective because the opportunity. . . to interact with the juveniles on the [night] shift [wa]s very minimal. Id. at 585. Applying this high correlation requirement, NDOC's first rationale for restricting the supervisory correctional lieutenant positions to women cannot suffice. Crawford's testimony suggests that because the supervisors employed by CCA were male and had failed to prevent sexual abuse, NDOC was entitled to conclude that men as a class were incapable of adequately supervising front line staff in female prisons. While we must defer to the reasoned judgment of prison administrators, see Robino, 145 F.3d at 1110, CCA's acknowledged leadership failure falls far short of providing a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all [men] would be unable to safely and effectively perform the duties of the job, or that it would be impossible or highly impracticable to determine job fitnesshere, the ability to enforce workplace rules prohibiting sexual misconducton an individualized basis. Williams v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 806 F.2d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir.1986). [7] The fundamental switch in operational responsibility to NDOC, moreover, made any inference from the experience under CCA's extremely poor management all the weaker. NDOC's second rationale fares no better. There is no evidence indicating that any correctional lieutenant at SNWCF had sexual relationships with an inmate. [8] In contrast, in Everson, copious data about the actual incidence of sexual abuse in Michigan's women's prisons supported the conclusion that the gender restriction on guards in the housing units would be effective. 391 F.3d at 755. In Robino, prison administrators used a study by a specially appointed task force and an extensive inventory of post duties to limit the gender restriction to those posts that provide[d] unsupervised access to the inmates. 145 F.3d at 1111. NDOC, however, offers neither data nor logical inferences about the opportunities for abuse inherent in the correctional lieutenant position to support the restriction. In fact, the one substantiated case of sexual abuse Crawford mentioned was the front line guard who impregnated an inmate, yet NDOC continues to employ men in thirty percent of these positions. See Everson, 391 F.3d at 761 ([n]either the district court nor the plaintiffs have explained how redeployment of female supervisors to the housing units [the alternative advocated by the plaintiffs,] would cure problems stemming from the very presence of male [guards] in the housing units.). When asked why the complete prohibition on the hiring of men was limited to correctional lieutenants, Crawford stated, We did not want to go globally on this. We wanted to be specifically, what can we do to bring this thing under control. . .? And it was the recommendation that we just look at . . . not the line level, but the supervisor level. This explanation falls short of the reasoned decision-making process, based on available information and experience, Robino, 145 F.3d at 1110, that can support a BFOQ. [9] Even if there were a factual basis to believe that any correctional lieutenant sexually abused any inmate, there is no basis to presume that sexual abuse, by correctional lieutenants or by guards with their supervisors' tacit permission, would continue after the state resumed control over the prison. CCA's lax oversight provided male correctional lieutenants the opportunity not to take action against male correctional subordinates that sexually abused female inmates. That opportunity cannot be presumed to exist after the wholesale change of SNWCF's leadership, designed precisely to cure wholesale management defects going well beyond the sexual abuse issue. To hold otherwise would be to absolve NDOC from their fundamental responsibility to supervise their staff, from wardens to front-line guards. In Dothard, the inmates' violent behavior, which prison administrators could not directly control, rendered the gender restriction reasonably necessary. Neither Dothard nor any of the cases on which NDOC relies support finding a BFOQ based on the bald assertion that it would be impossible . . . to ensure that any given male correctional lieutenant will take action to prevent and stop sexual misconduct. Where, as here, the problem is employee behavior, prison administrators have multiple resources, including background checks, prompt investigation of suspected misconduct, and severe discipline for infractions, to ensure compliance with institutional rules. NDOC has not demonstrated that these alternative approachesincluding the Inspector General's suggestion of enhanced training for both supervisors and front-line guardsare not viable. See Henry, 539 F.3d at 581 (Milwaukee County offered no reasons why the numerous alternatives to same-sex staffing . . . would not have mitigated any concern.); Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210, 1216 (2d Cir.1980) (upholding a district court order prohibit[ing] the stationing of male guards at locations where inmates could be viewed . . . unclothed but reversing a ban on male guards during the night shift because inmate privacy could be protected by means that did not infringe on employment rights); Gunther, 612 F.2d at 1087 (holding that gender was not a BFOQ where administrative changes in job functions and procedures would adequately protect inmate privacy). Whorton's conclusory assertion that more training is not a cure for this serious issue is, without more, wholly inadequate. Even the NIC report, on which NDOC purportedly relied, recommends improving training programs to heighten staff awareness of [sexual abuse] and its consequences. Disturbingly, in suggesting that all men are inherently apt to sexually abuse, or condone sexual abuse of, female inmates, NDOC relies on entirely specious gender stereotypes that have no place in a workplace governed by Title VII. NDOC's third theory, that women are maternal, patient, and understand other women, fails for the same reason. To credit NDOC's unsupported generalization that women have an instinct and an innate ability to discern . . . what's real and what isn't and so are immune to manipulation by female inmates would violate the Congressional purpose to eliminate subjective assumptions and traditional stereotyped conceptions regarding the . . . ability of women to do particular work. Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir.1971); see also Diaz, 442 F.2d at 386 (rejecting an airline's contention that the special psychological needs of its passengers . . . are better attended to by females). The harmful effects of occupational cliches, Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir.1982), are felt no less strongly when invoked as a basis for one gender's unique suitability for a particular job than when relied on to exclude members of that sex from employment. Simply put, we are beyond the day when an employer could . . . insist[ ] that [employees] matched the stereotype associated with their group. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). A BFOQ can be established only by objective, verifiable requirements [that] concern job-related skills and aptitudes. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 201, 111 S.Ct. 1196. Though the professional judgment of prison administrators is entitled to deference, see Robino, 145 F.3d at 1110, [t]he refusal to hire a[man] because of [his] sex based on assumptions of the comparative employment characteristics of [men] in general will not support a BFOQ. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1); see also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982) ([A] gender-based classification. . . must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.); Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333, 97 S.Ct. 2720 ([I]t is impermissible under Title VII to refuse to hire an individual woman or man on the basis of stereotyped characterizations of the sexes.); Torres, 859 F.2d at 1527 (Myths and purely habitual assumptions about a woman's or a man's inability to perform certain kinds of work are no longer acceptable reasons for refusing to employ qualified individuals.) (quoting City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 55 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978) (brackets omitted)); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir.1981) ([S]tereotypic impressions of male and female roles do not qualify gender as a BFOQ.). In sum, NDOC has not met its burden of showing a basis in fact, Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335, 97 S.Ct. 2720, for concluding that all male correctional lieutenants would tolerate sexual abuse by their subordinates; that all men in the correctional lieutenant role would themselves sexually abuse inmates; or that women, by virtue of their gender, can better understand the behavior of female inmates. Nor has it refuted the viability of alternatives that would achieve that goal without impeding male employees' promotional opportunities.