Opinion ID: 891704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Improper Joinder and Harmless Error Analysis

Text: {18} We now address the consequences of an improper joinder at the appellate level. We emphasize that while we held in Gallegos that by its very nature, Rule 5-203(C) does not come into play unless and until there is a proper joinder pursuant to Rule 5-203(A), this language should not insinuate that severance is only available in the event of proper (but prejudicial) joinder. 2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 16, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828. A trial judge is not precluded from severing charges that have been improperly joined under Rule 5-203(A). The distinction between a Rule 5-203(A) claim and a Rule 5-203(C) claim at the trial level is that a severance of improperly joined offenses under Rule 5-203(A) does not require a showing of prejudice, whereas a severance of properly joined offenses under Rule 5-203(C) does require a showing of prejudice. See Gallegos, 2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 19, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828. At the appellate level, the distinction between a Rule 5-203(A) claim and a Rule 5-203(C) claim becomes blurred since the basis for the prohibition against both misjoinder and prejudicial joinder [(Rule 5-203(C))] is, essentially, prejudice to the defendant. State v. Strickland, 683 So.2d 218, 226 (La.1996). {19} Defendant argues that once improper joinder has been established prejudice should be assumed and the case should be reversed ipso facto.  However, prior to Gallegos, this Court in State v. Jacobs rejected the adoption of a per se rule requiring reversal in the case of improper joinder. 2000-NMSC-026, ¶ 17, 129 N.M. 448, 10 P.3d 127. In Jacobs, joinder was proper and, therefore, the issue of improper joinder was never reached. Id. With no New Mexico case law addressing the consequences of improper joinder, United States v. Lane guides our analysis. 474 U.S. 438, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986). In Lane, the United States Supreme Court held that improper joinder is subject to a harmless error analysis, id. at 446, 106 S.Ct. 725, and requires reversal only if the misjoinder results in actual prejudice because it had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict, id. at 449, 106 S.Ct. 725 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {20} In Gallegos, this Court listed factors to consider when determining whether a defendant was actually prejudiced by the joinder of offenses. 2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 41, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828. Although Gallegos addressed a Rule 5-203(C) denial of a motion to sever claim, the same enumerated factors are relevant in a Rule 5-203(A) improper joinder analysis to determine whether the improper joinder actually prejudiced the defendant or if it resulted in a harmless error. Factors that tend to show prejudice, which were present in this case, include the defendant being convicted on all counts and a conviction on a charge where the evidence is thin. Gallegos, 2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 41, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828. {21} The main focus of the State's case-in-chief was the eight charges related to the shooting incident. Evidence in support of the shooting charges was presented through the testimony of Officer Ralph Monget and several eye witnesses, whose testimony pointed toward Defendant being the shooter. Officer Monget testified that the bullets' trajectories indicated that they were fired near the front passenger area of the van. Several eyewitnesses testified that Defendant was seated in the passenger side of the van. A bystander who heard the gunshots testified that he saw a man getting into the passenger side of the van with a revolver. Mata testified that Defendant exited the van with a .44 caliber gun. {22} In contrast, the drug trafficking charge comprised a small portion of the State's case-in-chief with little evidence linking Defendant to drug trafficking. When searching Defendant's residence for evidence relating to the shooting, cocaine was found in a sneaker inside a shoe box and near the red striped shirt Defendant was said to have been wearing the day of the shooting. Drug paraphernalia, including a digital scale, a hand scale, and clear plastic bags were also found in Defendant's residence. A detective testified that these items are commonly used to traffic drugs. {23} To convict Defendant of trafficking a controlled substance by possession with intent to distribute, the State was required to prove that Defendant had the cocaine in [his] possession, was aware that it was cocaine, and intended to transfer it to another. State v. Chandler, 119 N.M. 727, 730, 895 P.2d 249, 252 (Ct.App.1995); accord NMSA 1978, § 30-31-20(A)(3) (2006). The State put on little evidence to support that Defendant had knowledge of cocaine in the residence. See State v. Gonzales, 86 N.M. 556, 558, 525 P.2d 916, 918 (Ct.App.1974) (concluding that in a drug trafficking case, the State must prove that the defendant had knowledge of the presence and narcotic character of the object(s) possessed), overruled on other grounds by State v. Bender, 91 N.M. 670, 671, 579 P.2d 796, 797 (1978). {24} In State v. Becerra, the Court of Appeals held that [w]hile knowledge of the presence of drugs may be inferred where exclusive possession of the premises is shown, where exclusive possession is not shown, additional evidence is required to support such an inference. 112 N.M. 604, 607, 817 P.2d 1246, 1249 (Ct.App.1991). In this case, Defendant's father also lived at the residence where the search warrant was executed. When the police arrived at the residence, Defendant and a couple other subjects were inside. Furthermore, while conducting the search warrant, one of the detectives testified that he did not recall who else may have been living there; Defendant may have had another relative coming in and out, but [he was] not sure. The drug trafficking evidence was found in the living room of Defendant's residence, but the detective did not confirm whether or not the evidence belonged to Defendant. Rather, the detective inferred that the evidence belonged to Defendant because the drugs were found in the living room near lots of shirts that are consistent with what someone [Defendant's] age would wear, shirts and jeans and sneakers. Without proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was in possession of the cocaine, the State's evidence as to the drug trafficking count was thin at best. {25} The risk of prejudice can be offset by the defendant being acquitted of some charges and proper jury instructions that adequately make clear to the jury that it must not consider evidence inadmissible to a particular count when coming to a verdict on that count. Gallegos, 2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 41, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828. Although a limiting jury instruction was given in this case, it was too vague to be curative. The jury was instructed that [e]ach crime charged in the [indictment] should be considered separately. UJI 14-6004 NMRA. However, the trial court never emphasized to the jury that they should consider the evidence related to the shooting charges independent of the evidence related to the drug trafficking charge and vice versa. This may have assisted in reducing the prejudice to Defendant, especially because the same detectives provided simultaneous testimony as to the drug trafficking charge and the shooting charges. {26} Defendant was actually prejudiced by the improper joinder of offenses, and therefore, we reverse and remand all of Defendant's convictions for a new trial.