Opinion ID: 614652
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Assault Weapons

Text: In arguing Heller requires holding unconstitutional the District's ban on certain semi-automatic rifles, the dissent relies heavily upon the idea that Heller held possession of semi-automatic handguns is constitutionally protected. The Court's holding in Heller was in fact narrower, condemning as unconstitutional a prohibition of all handguns, that is, a ban on the entire class of `arms' that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for [the] lawful purpose of self-defense. 554 U.S. at 628, 128 S.Ct. 2783. A narrower prohibition, such as a ban on certain semi-automatic pistols, may also fail constitutional muster, id., but that question has not yet been decided by the Supreme Court. [] Therefore, the dissent (at 1286) mischaracterizes the question before us as whether the Second Amendment protects semi-automatic handguns but not semi-automatic rifles.  The dissent at (1289 n. 16) insists it is implausible to read Heller as protect[ing] handguns that are revolvers but not handguns that are semi-automatic. We do not, however, hold possession of semi-automatic handguns is outside the protection of the Second Amendment. We simply do not read Heller as foreclosing every ban on every possible sub-class of handguns or, for that matter, a ban on a sub-class of rifles. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 101 (upholding prohibition on possession of handguns with serial numbers obliterated); cf. Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 375, 422 (2009) ( Heller avoided perhaps in part because it had little cause to considercategorization at the level of classification: that is, the creation of subcategories that may warrant only intermediate protection). [] The dissent, indulging us by assuming some level of heightened scrutiny applies, maintains (at 1288) D.C. cannot show a compelling interest in banning semi-automatic rifles. Why not? [B]ecause the necessary implication of the decision in Heller is that D.C. could not show a sufficiently compelling interest to justify its banning semi-automatic handguns. That conclusion, however, is neither to be found in nor inferred from Heller. As we explain above, the Court in Heller held the District's ban on all handguns would fail constitutional muster under any standard of scrutiny because the handgun is the quintessential self-defense weapon. See 554 U.S. at 629, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (There are many reasons that a citizen may prefer a handgun for home defense: It is easier to store in a location that is readily accessible in an emergency; it cannot easily be redirected or wrestled away by an attacker; it is easier to use for those without the upper-body strength to lift and aim a long gun; it can be pointed at a burglar with one hand while the other hand dials the police). The same cannot be said of semi-automatic rifles. Finally, in criticizing our application of intermediate scrutiny to the ban on assault weapons, our dissenting colleague says (at 1286, 1290) it is difficult to make the case that semi-automatic rifles are significantly more dangerous than semi-automatic handguns because handguns can be concealed. It is not our place, however, to determine in the first instance whether banning semi-automatic rifles in particular would promote important law-enforcement objectives. Our role is narrower, viz., to determine whether the District has presented evidence sufficient to establish the reasonable fit we require between the law at issue and an important or substantial governmental interest. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028.