Opinion ID: 865068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the glba

Text: ¶6. This Court applies a de novo standard of review to statutory interpretation. Warren v. Johnston, 908 So. 2d 744, 746 (Miss. 2005). The trial court is afforded considerable latitude in handling discovery matters, and its order will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. City of Jackson v. Internal Engine Parts Group, Inc., 903 So. 2d 60, 65 (Miss. 2005). The GLBA contains a statement of policy regarding protection of nonpublic personal information, as follows: It is the policy of the Congress that each financial institution has an affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those customers’ nonpublic personal information. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a). The statute goes on to state: Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, a financial institution may not, directly or through any affiliate, disclose to a nonaffiliated third party any 4 nonpublic personal information, unless such financial institution provides or has provided to the consumer a notice that complies with section 6803 of this title. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a). However, Congress also provided general exceptions to the notice and opt out provisions of Section 6802, including the following: (8) to comply with Federal, State, or local laws, rules, and other applicable legal requirements; to comply with a properly authorized civil, criminal, or regulatory investigation or subpoena or summons by Federal, State, or local authorities; or to respond to judicial process or government regulatory authorities having jurisdiction over the financial institution for examination, compliance, or other purposes as authorized by law. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(8). ¶7. There are two schools of thought concerning the application of this statute to discovery in civil suits. Capital One argues that the purpose of the GLBA is to protect the privacy of customers of financial institutions and that to allow circumvention of the privacy protections contained in the act would negate much of its effectiveness. It maintains that to permit a court to order disclosure of private information to a private plaintiff would eviscerate the protections established by the GLBA. ¶8. On the other hand, Page wants this Court to adopt the approach applied by the highest courts in West Virginia and Alabama, as well as federal district courts in Texas and West Virginia. These courts have decided that the judicial process exception in 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(8) allows for discovery of customer information in civil cases. See Choate v. State Farm Lloyds, No. Civ. A. 3:03-CV-2111- M, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Tex. May 5, 2005); Marks v. Global Mortgage Group, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 492, 496 (S.D.W. Va. 2003); Ex parte Nat’l W. 5 Life Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 218, 226 (Ala. 2004); Martino v. Barnett, 595 S.E.2d 65, 72 (W. Va. 2004). One basis for this view is articulated in Martino, 595 S.E.2d at 71: The legislative history indicates that the House Bill, which added the privacy protections to the GLBA, envisaged an independent judicial process exception. See H.R. 74, 106th Cong. 93, 108-09, [202] (1999) (discussing a judicial process exception without reference to government regulatory authorities having jurisdiction over the financial institution for examination, compliance, or other purposes authorized by law). Ex parte Mutual Savings Life Insurance Co., 899 So. 2d 986, 992-93 (Ala. 2004), states another reason for this approach: A plain reading of the GLBA reveals that the phrase to respond to judicial process is independent from the phrase to respond to ... government regulatory authorities having jurisdiction over the financial institution for examination, compliance, or other purposes authorized by law. See 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(8). Clearly, when a party discloses information pursuant to a court order, the party engages in a judicial process. See Ex parte Nat’l Western Life Ins. Co., 899 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 2004)(providing a thorough explanation of the reasons civil discovery falls within the judicial-proceedings exception to the GLBA). ¶9. Additionally, in an amicus brief in support of Page, the Mississippi Trial Lawyers Association (MTLA) argues that if this Court adopts the view Capital One advocates, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1), Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3605 and 3617, Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and § 2000(a-1)- 2000(e-4), and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962, will essentially be rendered void. For example, the requirements of a prima facie claim under the FHA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3605 and 3617 and the ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) include a showing by the claimant that: (1) he or she is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied for 6 and was qualified for a loan; (3) the loan application was rejected despite his or her qualifications; and (4) the lender continued to approve loans for applicants with qualifications similar to those of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Michigan Prot. and Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 346 (6th Cir. 1994). The same four elements are required to make a prima facie case under the CRA. See, e.g., Selden Apartments v. United States Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 785 F.2d 152, 159 (6th. Cir. 1986). In addition, the RICO statute requires the claimant to show a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b). The MTLA argues that if this Court accepts Capital One’s interpretation of 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(8), then the claimant will not be able to show a pattern of behavior to make out a prima facie case under the ECOA, the FHA, the CRA, and the RICO. ¶10. This Court has stated “[o]ur duty is to carefully review statutory language and apply its most reasonable interpretation and meaning to the facts of a particular case.” Pope v. Brock, 912 So. 2d 935, 937 (Miss. 2005). Further, the polestar consideration for this Court is legislative intent. Miss. Gaming Comm’n v. Imperial Palace of Miss., Inc., 751 So. 2d 1025, 1028 (Miss. 1999). To reiterate, 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(8) is an exception to the general rule that the names and addresses cannot be released, and it explicitly says: to comply with Federal, State, or local laws, rules, and other applicable legal requirements; to comply with a properly authorized civil, criminal, or regulatory investigation or subpoena or summons by Federal, State, or local authorities; or to respond to judicial process or government regulatory authorities having jurisdiction over the financial institution for examination, compliance, or other purposes as authorized by law. 7 The key inquiry is whether “judicial process” was meant to stand apart from the latter part of the sentence that states “having jurisdiction over the financial institution for examination, compliance, or other purposed as authorized by law.” ¶11. The contrary view is that the words “judicial process” stand apart from the rest of the sentence, meaning that the exception applies when a financial institution is acting to comply with judicial process, and/or when a government regulatory authority is investigating the institution. See Marks, 218 F.R.D. at 496. ¶12. When reading 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(8) on its face, both views represent fair interpretations. The legislative history reveals the discussion of a stand alone judicial process exception without reference to government regulatory authorities having jurisdiction over the financial institution for examination, compliance, or other purposes authorized by law. Martino, 595 S.E.2d at 71. ¶13. Further, while Capital One’s interpretation of 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(8) will not have as drastic an effect as the MTLA argues that it will, it would make it more difficult to show a pattern of behavior when making a prima facie case under the ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1), FHA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3605 and 3617, CRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 2000(a-1)-2000(e-4), and the RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962. It is illogical to believe that Congress intended to undercut these federal statutes. See Doe v. Bridgeport Police Dep’t, 198 F.R.D. 325, 341 (D. Conn. 2001) (Legislature is presumed to have intended a consistent body of law); see also Fla. E. Coast Ry. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 993, 996 (M.D. Fla. 1966) (“It is incumbent upon [the 8 court] to seek to rationalize the statutes involved here and make of them, to the extent that what Congress has written will permit, a harmonious functional body of law”). ¶14. Further, even if the words “judicial process” were not meant to be separated from “or government regulatory authorities having jurisdiction over the financial institution for examination, compliance, or other purposes as authorized by law”, that catch-all at the end of the sentence clearly allows for other purposes authorized by law. Having jurisdiction for other purposes authorized by law would reasonably include responding to an order compelling discovery in a court that has jurisdiction over the financial institution in a civil case.1 This interpretation of 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(8) is reasonable and faithful to the intent of Congress. ¶15. A major factor in this Court’s decision in the present case is the specificity of the trial court’s order requiring the parties to agree upon and prepare a confidentiality order to be entered by that court, “which shall provide, among other things” the following: that the list is provided solely for use in this litigation; that the information provided shall be held strictly confidential; that the list will not be used to solicit the persons on the list for any purpose including but not limited to legal representation; that the plaintiff’s attorney shall not in the future represent persons whose names appear on the list against Capital One with respect to transactions similar to the one here in issue and which have occurred prior to production of the list unless permitted to do so by further order of this court; and that the list shall not be shared with any person other than counsel of record for plaintiff who shall all be bound by the terms of the confidentiality order.