Opinion ID: 844288
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ineffective assistance of counselfailure to introduce evidence of Jerome Williams's description of the robber

Text: Defendant asserts trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance in failing to introduce evidence of Jerome Williams's description of the Florin Road robber. Defendant notes: Jerome Williams was the Florin Road employee and eyewitness who, in the hours immediately after the robbery-homicide, told a detective that the robber with the silver gun was ` approximately five foot seven, a hundred and forty to one hundred sixty pounds.'  This description tended to be exculpatory because defendant stands six feet three inches tall. According to defendant, Williams's statement to the detective was admissible under the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule, codified in Evidence Code section 1240, and defense counsel therefore was ineffective for failing to introduce it. As noted above, in order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ( People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 436.) We review deferentially counsel's reasonable tactical decisions. ( Ibid. ) At the threshold, we observe that it was not clear Williams's statements were admissible. At defendant's preliminary hearing, the prosecution called Sacramento Police Detective Richard Overton. On cross-examination by defendant's counsel, Overton testified he interviewed Jerome Williams, one of the Florin Road McDonald's employees, about 1:20 a.m. on September 29, 1994. The robbery had occurred several hours earlier, just before 11:00 p.m. Williams told Overton he had seen a single robber and, as indicated above, described his height and weight as inconsistent with defendant's. When asked to describe Williams's demeanor during the interview, Overton characterized him as [u]pset, frightened, sad, concerned. (28) In arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce Overton's statement, defendant relies first on Evidence Code section 1240, which provides: Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception. Defendant also relies on People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 541 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137], where we addressed that statute and said: `When the statements in question were made and whether they were delivered directly or in response to a question are important factors to be considered on the issue of spontaneity. [Citations.] But as we emphasized in People v. Washington, Neither lapse of time between the event and the declarations nor the fact that the declarations were elicited by questioning deprives the statements of spontaneity if it nevertheless appears that they were made under the stress of excitement and while the reflective powers were still in abeyance. ' ( People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 319 [246 Cal.Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082], quoting People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1170, 1176 [81 Cal.Rptr. 5, 459 P.2d 259], italics added in Poggi. ) We further explained: `The crucial element in determining whether a declaration is sufficiently reliable to be admissible under this exception to the hearsay rule is ... the mental state of the speaker. The nature of the utterancehow long it was made after the startling incident and whether the speaker blurted it out, for examplemay be important, but solely as an indicator of the mental state of the declarant. ... [U]ltimately each fact pattern must be considered on its own merits, and the trial court is vested with reasonable discretion in the matter.' ( Ibid. ) Here, the adjectives Overton used in describing Williams's demeanor during the interview[u]pset, frightened, sad, concernedalong with the relatively short period of time that had elapsed between Williams's observation of the robber and his interview with Overton, suggest Williams's statement to Overton may have been admissible under Evidence Code section 1240. (See, e.g., People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 893-894 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712] [a statement made 18 hours after an event was held spontaneous under Evid. Code, § 1240].) We need not decide whether the statement would have been properly admitted, however, because defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails for lack of prejudice. ( In re Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 974, 1019-1020 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 315, 70 P.3d 313]; Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697.) Contrary to defendant's argument, ample evidence connected him to the Florin Road crimes. On direct examination, prosecution witness and Florin Road McDonald's manager Jeffrey Hickey positively identified Proby as one of the two gunmen and described Proby as roughly five feet 10½ inches tall. Hickey described the second gunman as weighing between 185 and 200 pounds and as being approximately six feet two inches tall. Hickey also testified that from his experience working with defendant, the physical features of the second gunman, including height, weight, build, skin color, and age, were consistent with those of defendant. Towards the end of his direct testimony, Hickey stated that the only difference he noticed between the second gunman and defendant was that the voice used by the second gunman did not appear to be his natural voice. Earlier in his testimony, Hickey described the second gunman's voice as gruff and that he sounded like he was trying to sound mean to make me hurry up [in opening the restaurant safe], to make me worry. Although Hickey ultimately failed to positively identify defendant as the second masked gunman, he nevertheless testified that the second gunman's physical features, including his height, weight, build, skin color, and age, were consistent with defendant's. Further, as noted above, prosecution witness Vera Penilton testified that several hours after the robbery, she heard defendant admit to killing Ronald Lee. On this evidence, then, we see no reasonable probability that, had trial counsel introduced Williams's description of one of the gunmen to Detective Overton under Evidence Code section 1240, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ( People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 436.) As a result, we reject defendant's claim that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective.