Opinion ID: 2633795
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First-Party Claim

Text: {28} Intentional infliction of emotional distress claims most frequently arise from a preexisting relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. Givelber, supra, at 63. The relationship may have a formal legal basis, such as employer-employee, id. at 63-64, or it may be more informal, such as a situation where one party has an obligation to the other that is regulated by the State. Id. at 70. One of the first academic articles on intentional infliction of emotional distress noted that the early version of the tort had most frequently been applied to innkeepers and common carriers, and raised the question of how far this liability for insulting conduct will be extended to other relationships. Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L.Rev. 1033, 1051-53 (1936). The Restatement also recognizes the importance of relationships: The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the other, which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or power to affect his interests. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. e; see also Restatement (Third) of Torts § 45 cmt. c ([W]hether an actor's conduct is extreme and outrageous depends on the facts of each case, including' the relationship of the parties). {29} Most of the intentional infliction of emotional distress cases in New Mexico have involved such relationships. See, e.g., Trujillo, 2002-NMSC-004, ¶¶ 1-2, 131 N.M. 607, 41 P.3d 333 (employer-employee and Human Rights Act); Coates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999-NMSC-013, ¶ 1, 127 N.M. 47, 976 P.2d 999 (employer-employee and Workers' Compensation Act); Jaynes v. Strong-Thorne Mortuary, Inc., 1998-NMSC-004, ¶ 13, 124 N.M. 613, 954 P.2d 45 (contract for burial); Sanders v. Lutz, 109 N.M. 193, 194, 784 P.2d 12, 13 (1989) (agreement granting easement); Newberry v. Allied Stores, Inc., 108 N.M. 424, 425, 773 P.2d 1231, 1232 (1989) (employer-employee); Silverman v. Progressive Broad., Inc., 1998-NMCA-107, ¶ 1, 125 N.M. 500, 964 P.2d 61 (employer-employee and federal Civil Rights Act); Stock v. Grantham, 1998-NMCA-081, ¶¶ 1, 22, 125 N.M. 564, 964 P.2d 125 (employer-employee and Human Rights Act); Stieber v. Journal Publ'g Co., 120 N.M. 270, 271, 901 P.2d 201, 202 (Ct.App.1995) (employer-employee); Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 173, 812 P.2d at 1321 (husband-wife); Dominguez, 97 N.M. at 212, 638 P.2d at, 424 (employer-employee and Human Rights Act). {30} Oregon has formally recognized the significance of the relationship between the parties in cases alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. For example, Rockhill v. Pollard, 259 Or. 54, 485 P.2d 28 (1971) (en banc), involved a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress that arose when a physician turned away accident victims who sought his help. The Oregon Supreme Court noted that the particular relationship between the parties was an important factor in the case. Id. at 31. The Oregon court later clarified this statement, noting that the special relationship between the parties is a factor in determining whether the defendant's conduct is outrageous. McGanty v. Staudenraus, 321 Or. 532, 901 P.2d 841, 850 (1995) (en banc) (analyzing claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the context of an employer-employee relationship). In fact, almost all successfully pleaded claims in Oregon involved a special relationship. Delaney v. Clifton, 180 Or.App. 119, 41 P.3d 1099, 1107 n. 7 (2002). {31} Other courts have followed Oregon's lead. The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that Rockhill and similar cases from other jurisdictions emphasize the relationship between the parties as being a factor to consider in determining whether conduct is outrageous. Lucchesi v. Frederic N. Stimmell, M.D., Ltd., 149 Ariz. 85, 716 P.2d 1022, 1027 (Ct.App.1985). A federal court, applying Washington state law, noted that the extreme and outrageous nature of a defendant's conduct must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and that whether a special relationship exists between the parties is a factor in that determination. Masood v. Saleemi, 2007 WL 2069853, at  (W.D.Wash. July 13, 2007); see also Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 799 (6th Cir. 2005) ([I]n Michigan, a special relationship between the parties may lower the level of conduct needed to be actionable.); Robinson v. Intercorp, 512 F.Supp.2d 1307, 1315 (N.D.Ga.2007) ([T]he existence of a special relationship between the actor and victim, such as that of employer to employee, may make otherwise non-egregious conduct outrageous.) (citing Trimble v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 220 Ga.App. 498, 469 S.E.2d 776 (1996)); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269, 596 S.W.2d 681, 688 (1980) ([T]here are cases in which the extreme and outrageous nature of the conduct arises not so much from what is done as from the abuse by the defendant of a relationship with the plaintiff which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interests.) (citing William L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 Cal. L.Rev. 40, 47 (1956)); Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 706 A.2d 685, 695 (1998) (surveying cases in several states that found [T]he employer-employee relationship has been regarded as a special relationship which is a factor to be considered in determining whether liability should be imposed.) (quoting J.D. Lee & Barry A. Lindahl, 3 Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation § 32.03, at 133-34 (rev. ed.1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). {32} In this case Plaintiffs allegations that Defendant is subject to various statutes and regulations could support a finding that Defendant has a special relationship with Plaintiffs. As Defendant points out, federal law seemingly requires Defendant to establish procedures for [n]otifying appropriate fire . . . officials of gas pipeline emergencies and coordinating with them both planned responses and actual responses during an emergency. 49 C.F.R. § 192.615(a)(8) (2006). This regulation requires more than just establishing procedures: Defendant is also required to establish and maintain liaison with appropriate fire . . . officials. Id. § 192.615(c). The purpose of this liaison is for Defendant to (1) Learn the responsibility and resources of each government organization that may respond to a gas pipeline emergency; (2) Acquaint the officials with the operator's ability in responding to a gas pipeline emergency; (3) Identify the types of gas pipeline emergencies of which the operator notifies the officials; and (4) Plan how the operator and officials can engage in mutual assistance to minimize hazards to life or property. Id. (emphasis added). {33} This regulation requires more of both parties than the typical relationship of a member of the general public with the local fire department. It requires more than even a business owner or landlord who must abide by a fire code and pass inspections. This regulation requires active cooperation between Defendant and Plaintiffs. In particular, Section 192.615(c)(4) requires. Defendant and Plaintiffs to work together to minimize the exact risk that Plaintiffs allege led to their injuries in this case. {34} We now must evaluate Defendant's conduct in the context of this potential relationship. We first note that it is highly unlikely that calling firefighters in response to an emergency will ever be considered extreme and outrageous conduct. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. g ([C]onduct, although it would otherwise be extreme and outrageous, may be privileged under the circumstances.). It is always appropriate for firefighters to respond to an emergency, even one caused by an intentional act such as arson, and we do not want to discourage any member of the public from calling for assistance. Thus, we look not to Defendant's response to the emergency, but to Defendant's alleged acts leading up to the emergency. {35} According to Plaintiffs' complaint, Defendant is required to properly design and maintain its pipelines, and Defendant failed to take the steps necessary to insure the safety of the pipeline at issue. Defendant knew the consequences of such failure: Defendant had been cited for past safety violations, and had experienced at least two previous pipeline explosions, one of which involved severe burns. With respect to the pipeline at issue in this case, Defendant knew that the area around it was used for camping. Defendant also knew, or should have known, that this area of pipeline suffered from the same problems that resulted in the explosions in other pipelines nearby. Despite this knowledge, and its obligation to coordinate with firefighters, Defendant did not share any of this information with Plaintiffs. {36} Given the nature of Defendant's relationship to Plaintiffs, we find that these facts show Defendant's conduct could be considered extreme and outrageous. We are aware of no cases where a firefighter's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress has been decided on the merits, and thus find little guidance in the precedent of either New Mexico or other jurisdictions. Instead, we look for circumstances that indicate an abuse by the defendant of a relationship with the plaintiff, M.B.M. Co., 596 S.W.2d at 688, or a disregard for the plaintiff[ . under particularly trying circumstances. Rockhill, 485 P.2d at 32. The allegations that Defendant knew about the specific risks inherent in failing to maintain its pipelines, and that Plaintiffs would be exposed to those risks, if proven could support a finding of such abuse or disregard. {37} Plaintiffs must also show that Defendant's conduct was intentional or in reckless disregard of Plaintiffs. [5] Recklessness, is `the intentional doing of an act with utter indifference to the consequences.' Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Diamond D Constr. Co., 2001-NMCA-082, ¶ 59, 131 N.M. 100, 33 P.3d 651 (quoting UJI 13-1827 NMRA); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. i (defining recklessness as deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress will follow). The prior explosions with injuries, and Defendant's failure to remedy the problems with its pipelines, could show recklessness. See Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 120 N.M. 133, 147, 899 P.2d 576, 590 (1995) (finding that prior acts are relevant to recklessness, and failure to remove defective products from the market demonstrate[s] a reckless disregard for the safety of others). {38} Finally, Plaintiffs must show that their mental distress is extreme and severe, and that there is a causal connection between Defendant's conduct and Plaintiffs' mental distress. As we discussed under our analysis of the firefighter's rule, supra, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to show that their distress is severe. That stress arose from witnessing the physical injuries to the victims, injuries caused by Defendant's failure to maintain the pipeline at issue. {39} Plaintiffs have thus alleged sufficient facts to support each element of a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. These facts allow Plaintiffs' claim to survive Defendant's Rule 1-012(B)(6) motion, but Plaintiffs must still prove their case. In evaluating the outrageousness of Defendant's conduct and the severity of Plaintiffs' distress, we must remember that emotional distress is part of a firefighter's job; what might be outrageous conduct or severe distress to a typical member of the public may just be part of an ordinary day to a firefighter.