Opinion ID: 1353270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Estoppel to Assert Contributory Negligence

Text: (5) Plaintiff next contends that defendant should be estopped from asserting contributory negligence as a defense because its marine clerk, Noel, misled plaintiff by informing him that nothing could be done about the dangerous condition of the palletized cargo. But this contention is raised for the first time on appeal and was not a part of the theory on which the case was tried. Plaintiff did not claim in the trial court that he was misled by Noel's statement and he is not permitted to change his position ... on appeal. ( Ernst v. Searle (1933) 218 Cal. 233, 240-241 [22 P.2d 715].) Plaintiff seeks to bring himself within the exception to this rule which permits a change of theory if a question of law only is presented on the facts appearing in the record.... ( Panopulos v. Maderis (1956) 47 Cal.2d 337, 341 [303 P.2d 738]; see also Ward v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal.2d 736, 742 [336 P.2d 534].) We have said that the existence of an estoppel is generally a question of fact for the trial court whose determination is conclusive on appeal unless the opposite conclusion is the only one that can be reasonably drawn from the evidence. [Citation.] When the evidence is not in conflict and is susceptible of only one reasonable inference, the existence of an estoppel is a question of law. [Citation.] ( Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 297, 305-306 [61 Cal. Rptr. 661, 431 P.2d 245].) The crucial fact upon which plaintiff must base his estoppel argument is his purported conversation with Noel, defendant's employee, but all of the facts pertinent to that conversation were strongly disputed at trial. [11] Under the circumstances, we cannot conclude that as a matter of law defendant should be held estopped from asserting the defense of contributory negligence. To that defense we now direct our attention.