Opinion ID: 1670353
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Heading: dual paternity in louisiana

Text: Promotion and protection of the family unit were the principal reasons behind Louisiana's historically harsh treatment of illegitimate children. See Note, All in the Family: Equal Protection and the Illegitimate Child in Louisiana Succession Law, 38 La.L.Rev. 189 (1977). For example, until 1981, Civil Code provisions prohibited fathers with legitimate descendants, ascendants or collaterals, or a surviving spouse, from bequeathing a mortis causa donation to their illegitimate offspring. LSA-C.C. art. 919, repealed by Acts of 1981, No. 919 § 1. [2] Children of maternal adulteries usually escaped the sanctions accorded illegitimates, however, because they were considered the legitimate offspring of their mother's husband. See Succession of Robins, 349 So.2d 276 (La.1977) [discussion of the inequities existing between maternal adulteries and paternal adulteries]; Tannehill v. Tannehill, 261 La. 933, 261 So.2d 619 (1972) [unless the birth of the child has been concealed from the father, disavowal is prohibited when sought because of adultery of the wife, citing LSA-C.C. art. 185]. With the social and legal stigmas which attached to illegitimacy, it is not surprising that the courts rigorously applied the presumption of LSA-C.C. art. 184, that the law considers the husband of the mother as the father of all children conceived during the marriage. Tannehill v. Tannehill, supra . [3] The policy was to protect innocent children against attacks upon their paternity and the presumption was the strongest known in law. Tannehill v. Tannehill, supra ; Mock v. Mock, 411 So.2d 1063 (La. 1982); Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So.2d 119 (1952); Phillips v. Phillips, 467 So.2d 132 (La.App. 3d Cir.1985); Burrell v. Burrell, 154 So.2d 103 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1963). The presumption was so rigorously applied that in Tannehill, which was written in 1972, this court acknowledged it had never allowed a disavowal of paternity (although we recognized two appellate court decisions had permitted disavowels in cases where the children were born more than 300 days after judgments of separation had been rendered). 261 So.2d at 621. Not even Mr. Tannehill's disavowal action succeeded, as the statutory prohibition against disavowal for natural impotence was also found to prohibit disavowal for sterility due to childhood disease. The Article 184 presumption was not without flaws. While it promoted the policy against bastardizing children, it often failed to conform with reality. A husband, who could not possibly be or who clearly was not the biological father, was nonetheless conclusively presumed to be so. Mock v. Mock, supra ; Succession of Mitchell, 323 So.2d 451 (La.1975) [noting appellate decisions that have been uniformly criticized for their inflexible, unrealistic and unjust application of the presumption of paternity to one born during an undissolved marriage, where the mates have long since been living separate and apart and where the mother has been living in stable union with another, who is the actual biological father of the children.]. Consequently, in an attempt to moderate the prevailing statutory and jurisprudential rules, on the recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute, the Legislature amended the Civil Code articles on paternity by Act 430 of 1976. Mock v. Mock, supra . These codal amendments made the irrebuttable presumption of Article 184 rebuttable. Id.; [4] Phillips v. Phillips, 467 So.2d 132 (La.App. 3d Cir.1985); In re Murray, 445 So.2d 21 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1984), writ den., 447 So.2d 1079 (La.1984); see also Acts 1989, No. 790 amending LSA-C.C. arts. 187, 188. But the amendments did not alter the rule that only the husband or his heir may disavow paternity. LSA-C.C. arts. 187, 190. Direct legislative policy decisions were not the only encroachments on the Article 184 presumption. Indirect attacks, from interest groups such as children entitled to the presumption of legitimacy, from the state, and from biological fathers, also made an impact. The first impeller, Warren v. Richard, 296 So.2d 813 (La.1974), introduced to Louisiana the notion of dual paternity and found Article 184's presumption did not preclude an illegitimate child from recovering for the wrongful death of her biological father though, at the same time, she was also the legitimate child of another man under the law. The jurisprudential trend which followed allowed legitimate children to establish their true parentage, notwithstanding the legal presumptions of LSA-C.C. art. 184, et seq. Griffin v. Succession of Branch, 479 So.2d 324 (La. 1985), rehearing den.; Malek v. Yekani-Fard, 422 So.2d 1151, 1154 (La.1982) [the mother's marital status is irrelevant except for any weight it may have at trial in proving or disproving filiation. `[I]t is the biological relationship and dependancy which is determinative of the child's rights in these cases, and not the classification into which the child is placed by the statutory law of the State.' Warren v. Richard, 296 So.2d 813 at 817 (La., 1974).]; Succession of Mitchell, 323 So.2d 451 (La. 1975); Starks v. Powell, 552 So.2d 609 (La. App. 2d Cir.1989); Thomas v. Smith, 463 So.2d 971 (La.App. 3d Cir.1985); Succession of Levy, 428 So.2d 904 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983); IMC Exploration Co. v. Henderson, 419 So.2d 490 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1982), writ den., 423 So.2d 1150 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983). This jurisprudential attitude spawned the state's paternity and support actions against biological fathers. Consequently, regardless of the existence of a legal or presumptive father, the state often succeeded in its criminal non-support actions against biological fathers. State in interest of Poche v. Poche, 368 So.2d 175 (La. App. 4th Cir.1979), writ den., 370 So.2d 577 (La.1979) [It sufficed to simply determine that the child was in fact the biological child of the alleged father. The fact that the law considered the child to be the legitimate child of another will not alter the result and `cannot deprive her of a right which illegitimate children generally may have ...,' citing Warren v. Richard, supra . ]. Biological fathers were the third group to impact on the presumption. When they have shown an actual relationship with their illegitimate child, biological fathers have received substantial protection and recognition of their due process and substantive rights through the United States Supreme Court constitutional interpretations. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978), rehearing den., 435 U.S. 918, 98 S.Ct. 1477, 55 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) [the existence or nonexistence of a substantial relationship between parent and child is a relevant criterion in evaluating both the rights of the parent and the best interest of the child]; but see Michael H. v. Gerald D., ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989), rehearing den., ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 22, 106 L.Ed.2d 634 (1989) [due to the legal presumption of paternity and the extant marital union, the biological father who had established a relationship with his child did not possess due process liberty interests to obtain parental prerogatives]. Similarly, Louisiana courts, citing federal cases, determined the failure of the presumptive father to timely disavow would not conclusively operate to deny a biological father his right to avow paternity. Finnerty v. Boyett, 469 So.2d 287 (La.App. 2d Cir.1985); Burr v. Blue, 454 So.2d 315 (La.App. 3d Cir.1984), writ den., 461 So.2d 304 (La. 1984). Cf. Lamana v. LeBlanc, 526 So.2d 1107 (La.1988); In re Necaise Applying for Adoption, 544 So.2d 1197 (La.App. 5th Cir.1989). Interpreting Article 184's presumption as irrebuttable would deprive biological fathers of the opportunity to develop a relationship with their child and thereby deprive them of their due process rights. Finnerty v. Boyett, supra . Consequently, biological fathers have been allowed to bring avowal actions despite the Article 184 presumption. Id.; Durr v. Blue, supra. Through these avenues, the legal fiction, that the mother's husband was the only father the law would recognize, was being wittled down. Then in 1981, the legislature followed the recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute and amended the filiation provisions in Civil Code articles 208 and 209. While true parentage and dual paternity were recognized as being consistent with the 1980 version of these articles, [5] some thought it unclear whether Act 720 of 1981 [6] put an end to the presumptively legitimate child's right to establish his or her dual parentage. Griffin v. Succession of Branch, supra . Act 720's changes were interpreted by some commentators and courts to impl[y] that the child who enjoys legitimate filiation, or is legitimated formally or acknowledged cannot institute the proceeding to establish filiation.... (emphasis in the original) Spaht, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981: Persons, 42 La.L.Rev. 403, 405-406 (1982) (but see n. 24); Fontenot v. Thierry, 422 So.2d 586 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1982), writ den., 427 So.2d 868 (La.1983) [did not apply Act 720 of 1981 retrospectively; therefore, allowed mother to bring paternity and child support action against the biological father notwithstanding the Article 184 presumption]; IMC Exploration Co. v. Henderson, supra ; see also Thomas v. Smith, 463 So.2d 971 (La.App. 3d Cir.1985) [did not apply Act 720 retrospectively; allowed two children enjoying the Article 184 presumption of legitimacy to establish their true parentage]; Durr v. Blue, supra; Alex v. Heirs of Alex, 479 So.2d 664, 666 (La.App. 3d Cir.1985) (Domengeaux, J. concurring); State, through DHHR v. Williams, 471 So.2d 1064, 1067 (La.App. 3d Cir.1985) (Domengeaux, J. concurring); State v. Jefferson, 448 So.2d 907, 909 (La.App. 3d Cir.1984) (Domengeaux, J. concurring); Succession of Payne v. Payne, 426 So.2d 1355, 1360 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1983) (Domengeaux, J. concurring). Their interpretation was bolstered by the Act's inclusion of an amendment to the Child Support Enforcement Program, LSA-R.S. 46:236.1 (F). The statute, as amended, authorized the Department of Health and Human Resources to institute filiation proceedings against alleged biological fathers notwithstanding the existence of a presumptive father. From the DHHR authorization, combined with the language changes to Article 209, it was inferred that Act 720 intended to proscribe children with legitimate filiation from establishing dual paternity. Id. The operative language of the 1980 version of Article 209 read: ... any child may establish filiation, regardless of the circumstances of conception ... LSA-C.C. art. 209, as amended by Act 549 of 1980. This phrase, however, was deleted from Article 209 by Act 720. And, included in the replacement language was the phrase, [a] child not entitled to legitimate filiation ... must prove filiation ... The lower courts and commentators, therefore, concluded that when reading the Article 209 changes together with the LSA-R.S. 46:236.1 (F) amendment, the discernible legislative intent is that a child presumed to be that of the husband of the mother may not institute a proceeding to establish filiation to another man. Spaht, 42 La.L. Rev. 403, 407; Fontenot v. Thierry, supra ; IMC Exploration Co. v. Henderson, supra ; see also Thomas v. Smith, supra . In Griffin v. Succession of Branch, supra , however, this court determined we could not subscribe to such a wholesale preclusion of children who may enjoy legitimate status, but wished to establish their true parentage. In Griffin, we adopted the First Circuit's interpretation of Act 720 as expressed in Succession of Levy, 428 So.2d 904 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983), that the phrase a child not entitled to legitimate filiation means a child who is not entitled to legitimate filiation to the parent to whom he is attempting to prove filiation. 479 So.2d at 327. Cf. State, through DHHR v. Hinton, 515 So.2d 566 (La.App. 1st Cir.1987); Cormier v. Cormier, 479 So.2d 1069 (La.App. 3d Cir.1985); Finnerty v. Boyett, supra . The legal relationship between the child and the parent with whom the child is seeking to prove his filiation determines whether the child is relieved of the obligations under Article 209, because it is this relationship which determines if the child falls into one of the classes enumerated in that article. Griffin v. Succession of Branch, supra . Moreover, this interpretation is supported by the legislative history of Act 720. The Louisiana State Law Institute's recommended amendments for Articles 208 and 209 were introduced as House Bill No. 818 of 1981. The Law Institute's proposals were intended to address the potential succession problems created by Succession of Brown, 388 So.2d 1151 (La.1980). [7] No evidence suggests the recommendations were intended to prohibit legitimate children from establishing their true parentage. Approximately two weeks prior to the introduction of House Bill No. 818, the Council of the Louisiana State Law Institute briefly discussed a request from the DHHR for the adoption of an Article 209 presumption to aid the DHHR's child support collection efforts. Minutes, Louisiana State Law Institute Council Meeting, April 10, 1981. It was suggested by the DHHR that proof of a man having lived in open concubinage with the mother of a child at the time of conception would raise the presumption that he was the child's father. Council members, however, considered it unwise to adopt this proposal without first giving careful consideration to the proposal's effect upon family relationships generally. As a result, the proposal was rejected. Id. The portion of Act 720 amending LSA-R.S. 46:236.1 was added to House Bill No. 818 by the House on June 9, 1981, the day before the bill was received by the Senate. The amended bill merely codified jurisprudence already recognizing the state's right to bring paternity actions against biological fathers despite the Article 184 presumption of paternity. Finnerty v. Boyett, supra ; State in interest of Poche v. Poche, supra . Thus, it appears the amendment to LSA-R.S. 46:236.1 (F) was made solely to satisfy the interests of the DHHR. It was not intended to imply that children who enjoyed legitimate filiation had lost their right to establish dual paternity or otherwise limit the movement sparked by Warren v. Richard .