Opinion ID: 2441608
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Appraisal Issues

Text: Mr. DeSilva contends that the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion in limine to exclude Mr. Lennhoff's PGH appraisal report. The District asserts that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. DeSilva's motion. We review a trial court's rulings on motions in limine to exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. Oh, supra, 7 A.3d at 1009 n. 21 (citing Coulter v. Gerald Family Care, P.C., 964 A.2d 170, 185 n. 11 (D.C. 2009)). Judicial discretion must . . . be founded upon correct legal principles. Haqq v. Dancy-Bey, 715 A.2d 911, 913 (D.C.1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 362-63 (D.C. 1979) (discussing the exercise of judicial discretion). Mr. DeSilva advances several specific points regarding the trial court's denial of his motion in limine. First, the PGH appraisal should have been excluded because it did not comply with pertinent appraisal standards. Specifically, he asserts that Mr. Lennhoff did not follow the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act (URA), 42 U.S.C. § 4651. [7] While it appears that the URA is applicable to the District of Columbia, [8] the plain words of § 4651 show that the URA policies are relevant before the initiation of condemnation litigation, that is, at the time negotiations commence for the acquisition of land. For example, § 4651(3) uses the phrase [b]efore the initiation of negotiations and the introductory paragraph to § 4651 specifies that one purpose of the URA policies is to avoid litigation and relieve congestion in the courts. One court has stated emphatically: Section 4651 does not relate to takings by eminent domain. Rather, the statute explicitly encourages federal agencies to negotiate for the purchase of real property in an effort to avoid eminent domain actions, and sets guidelinesto be followed to the greatest extent possiblefor agencies negotiating such purchases. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. New England Power, C.T.L., Inc., 6 F.Supp.2d 102, 104 (D.Mass.1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4651). Moreover, courts have held that § 4651 creates no rights in landowners [and] in essence is no more than a statement by Congress of what it perceives to be the preferred method of dealing with landowners when the Government wants to acquire their land. United States v. 410.69 Acres of Land, 608 F.2d 1073, 1074 n. 1 (5th Cir.1979) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4602(a)); [9] see also United States v. 416.81 Acres of Land, 525 F.2d 450, 454 (7th Cir.1975) (Section 4651 is entirely exhortatory). In 416.81 Acres of Land, appellants argued that the testimony of the government's appraisers should be excluded because they did not comply with the request that the landowners accompany the appraisers during their visit to the property, as the URA's implementing regulations require. [10] Id., 525 F.2d at 454. Mr. DeSilva makes essentially the same argument with respect to Mr. Lennhoff's visit to his property. The court rejected the argument in light of 42 U.S.C. § 4602(a) and because of the court's conclusion that § 4651 is entirely exhortatory. Id. Second, Mr. DeSilva complains about the statement in the PGH appraisal report that the market has increased at roughly 3% per year; he maintains that there is no reliable factual basis for that assumption. Our review of the record reveals that Mr. DeSilva did not raise these points in the trial court. Therefore, he has waived them. See Comford v. United States, 947 A.2d 1181, 1189 n. 32 (D.C. 2008) (citing United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1200 (10th Cir.1998) (motion in limine will not preserve an objection unless it is renewed at the time the evidence is introduced unless the issue was fairly presented to the court and can be determined in a pretrial hearing)). Third, Mr. DeSilva argues that [t]he District has not established that the PGH appraisal has been certified as the agency's approved appraisal [and] [w]ithout such certification, the agency's approved appraisal remains the Millenium appraisal which set the fair market value at $600,000. The first Millenium appraisal was conducted as part of NCRC's negotiations with Mr. DeSilva to acquire his property prior to the commencement of a condemnation proceeding. Mr. DeSilva did not accept the District's offer of $600,000.00. After authority for the redevelopment of Skyland was transferred to the District, the District perceived flaws in the Millenium appraisal and turned to PGH Consulting for an appraisal. As Mr. DeSilva notes in his brief, there is conflicting authority as to whether a pre-condemnation proposed offer to compensate a landowner for his property is admissible at trial as proof of the land's value. See Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land in Montgomery Cnty., Maryland, 548 F.2d 1130, 1131 (4th Cir. 1977) (We hold that a landowner who rejects a pre-condemnation offer made pursuant to [42 U.S.C. § 4651] may not introduce that offer as proof of value when the government condemns the property.); Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land in Prince George's Cnty., 342 F.Supp.2d 378, 382 (D.Md.2004) (pre-condemnation appraisal allowed into evidence with reference to the appraiser's relationship to the government excluded, but pre-condemnation offer to landowner excluded from evidence). Here, Judge Josey-Herring did not exclude all evidence of the pre-condemnation estimated value of the property. After listening to the parties and reviewing case law, she ruled as follows: Based on the arguments of plaintiff's counsel, I do believe that it is appropriate to reverse my earlier decision that indicated that the $600,000 deposit into the court's registry could be presented to the jury as having been made by the District as evidence of but not dispositive of, as evidence of just compensation for the taking in this case. However, I will not make a finding that the defendant in this case, or any party for that matter, may not, in light of the Government's arguments, seek to present a witness to testify as to an opinion regarding the value of the property. . . . . Effectively, I've reversed my finding . . . in my July 23, 2009 order, that the $600,000 deposit made into the [c]ourt's registry by the District is just compensation, can be used by the defendant as evidence of the fair market value of the property at the time of the taking. However, I did indicate thatjust so that my order is clearthat I did not make a finding that defendant could not present or plaintiff, for that matter, opinion testimony as to what the value of . . . the property is. That's certainly permissible in any event. So that's my ruling. We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. See Delaware v. Rittenhouse, 634 A.2d 338, 342 (Del.1993) (declaring after a review of federal case law: We hold that the sum deposited into the Superior Court by a governmental authority. . . is not admissible in a subsequent condemnation proceeding as evidence of just compensation.) (citation omitted); see also United States v. 75.13 Acres of Land, 693 F.2d 813, 817 (8th Cir.1982) (concluding with respect to money deposited with the court as just compensation: It is settled. . . that this `estimated compensation' is not evidence of the value of the property taken) (citation omitted). Furthermore, we see nothing in the District's eminent domain statute that required the District to certify the PGH appraisal as the agency's approved appraisal, and Mr. DeSilva cites no authority for this proposition. [11] Fourth, Mr. DeSilva asserts that the PGH appraisal should have been excluded because [t]he comparable sales used in [it] are not comparable to the Naylor Road property; [t]he PGH appraisal is . . . difficult to credit as reliable and accurate due to vague and unsubstantiated qualitative adjustments, data and assumptions; and his expert, Mr. Riley, testified about the structural flaws in one of the comparable sales in the PGH appraisal. In terms of our review of these contentions, we are mindful that the trial court `is vested with large discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence.' Oh, supra, 7 A.3d at 1011 (citing Hannan v. United States, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 118, 120, 131 F.2d 441, 443 (1942)). Significantly, [t]he weighing of the evidence in a condemnation proceeding is within the sole purview of the fact-finder, and it is not for this court to reweigh the evidence. United States v. 6,162.78 Acres of Land, 680 F.2d 396, 398 (5th Cir.1982) (citation omitted). Mr. DeSilva's arguments relating to the PGH appraisal pertain to the weight of that evidence. It was within the province of the jury to examine and determine the weight of testimony by Mr. Lennhoff and Mr. Riley. We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's admission of Mr. Lennhoff's testimony and PGH's appraisal, and there is no legal basis for the appellate court to substitute its analysis of the expert testimony presented for that of the jury. Finally, Mr. DeSilva insists that the trial court should have admitted into evidence the assessed value of the Naylor Road property, as determined by the District's Office of Tax and Revenue. But, Johnson & Wimsatt, Inc. v. Reichelderfer, 60 App.D.C. 186, 187, 50 F.2d 336, 337 (1931), a case that is binding on us, [12] declared: It is widely recognized that appraisements of property by tax assessors for purposes of taxation are not reliable guides of market value, and consequently not admissible in condemnation proceedings. Thus, Mr. DeSilva's attack on the rationale of Johnson & Wimsatt, as well as his citation to contrary case law in other jurisdictions, cannot succeed.