Opinion ID: 6107541
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: 34661e Voluntariness of Miranda Waiver on March 31st

Text: Even when a suspect initiates further discussions, the burden remains on the prosecution to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the suspect knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the rights he had previously invoked. ( Connecticut v. Barrett (1987) 479 U.S. 523 , 527, 107 S.Ct. 828 , 93 L.Ed.2d 920 ; Connelly , supra , 479 U.S. at p. 168, 107 S.Ct. 515 ; Bradshaw, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 1044, 103 S.Ct. 2830 , plur. opn. of Rehnquist, J.; People v. Davis , supra , 46 Cal.4th at p. 596, 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 322 , 208 P.3d 78 .) We independently review the validity of the waiver  'in light of the record in its entirety, including all the surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the [encounter] ....'  ( People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63 , 80, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650 , 72 P.3d 280 .) At the station, Dudek again read the Miranda rights, and defendant acknowledged that he understood them. He concedes that his willingness to talk after affirming that he understood his rights is sufficient to establish an implied waiver. (See  Berghuis v. Thompkins , supra , 560 U.S. at pp. 383-385, 130 S.Ct. 2250 ; North Carolina v. Butler (1979) 441 U.S. 369 , 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 .) He argues, however, that his waiver was not voluntary because the officers lied to obtain the initial waiver, disregarded his invocations of the right to counsel, and engaged in impermissible softening-up tactics. His arguments are unpersuasive. As explained, the officers' ruse did not invalidate defendant's initial waiver. Moreover, by the time defendant was re- Mirandized on March 31, he knew that he had been arrested for McKenna's homicide. There is no colorable claim of police deception as to defendant's second waiver. Nor did the officers disregard defendant's invocation of the right to counsel. When defendant asked for counsel during the San Quentin questioning, the officers immediately ended the interview. In the car ride to the station, defendant asked whether he would be assigned a public defender and be allowed to talk to that counsel before questioning. In response, Sergeant Dudek directly affirmed defendant's right to the assistance of counsel, explained just how to make such a request, and affirmed: [T]hat's entirely up to you. Defendant did not make an unequivocal request for counsel at that time. Defendant argues that the officers coerced him into waiving his Miranda rights at the station by engaging in improper softening-up techniques. Specifically, he claims the officers disparaged the victim and appealed to defendant's desire to mend his relationship with his children. He relies primarily on People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150 , 141 Cal.Rptr. 698 , 570 P.2d 1050  ( Honeycutt ). There the defendant was initially hostile to one of the interrogating officers. Without administering Miranda warnings , a different officer who had known him for about 10 years had a 30-minute unrecorded discussion with him. ( Id . at p. 158, 141 Cal.Rptr. 698 , 570 P.2d 1050 .) They discussed past events and former acquaintances, and the officer made disparaging comments about the victim. ( Ibid . ) The defendant  'soften[ed] up'  and agreed to talk about the underlying offense, after which he was advised of and waived his Miranda rights and confessed to murdering the victim. ( Id . at p. 158, 141 Cal.Rptr. 698 , 570 P.2d 1050 .) Honeycutt held the defendant's Miranda waiver involuntary. ( Honeycutt , supra , 20 Cal.3d at p. 161, 141 Cal.Rptr. 698 , 570 P.2d 1050 .) It framed the issue as follows: Detective Williams had, prior to  explaining the Miranda rights, already succeeded in persuading defendant to waive such rights. Thus the critical question is what effect failure to give a timely Miranda warning has on the voluntariness of a decision to waive which is induced prior to the Miranda admonitions. ( Id . at p. 159, 141 Cal.Rptr. 698 , 570 P.2d 1050 .) Honeycutt concluded that, When the waiver results from a clever softening-up of a defendant through disparagement of the victim and ingratiating conversation, the subsequent decision to waive without a Miranda warning must be deemed to be involuntary for the same reason that an incriminating statement made under police interrogation without a Miranda warning is deemed to be involuntary. ( Id . at pp. 160-161, 141 Cal.Rptr. 698 , 570 P.2d 1050 .) Defendant's reliance on Honeycutt is misplaced. First, unlike that case, defendant here was well aware of his Miranda rights, having previously and successfully invoked them. Dudek affirmed defendant's right to counsel during the very discussion defendant claims was intended to soften him up. A key predicate to the Honeycutt holding, the absence of Miranda warnings, does not exist here. Second, defendant was not hostile to the officers, and Dudek did not exploit a personal relationship to encourage his waiver of rights. Third, in his interview with Deputy District Attorney Sweet, defendant confirmed that he waived his rights voluntarily, stating that it was his decision to talk and that [i]n my mind, [the officers] didn't press the issue, understand me? He affirmed that the officers said or did nothing that made him think he had to speak with them. All of these factors weigh heavily against defendant's argument that his decision to waive his right to counsel and speak with the officers was not voluntary. Defendant argues that, as in Honeycutt , the officers here disparaged the victim in an attempt to minimize the crime and ingratiate  themselves. He observes that the officers questioned him about McKenna's drug use and whether she favored multi-party sex. Dudek commented that he knew McKenna was not an angel. Honeycutt did cite the officer's disparaging comments about the victim before any Miranda admonition as one of several factors that  combined to render the defendant's waiver involuntary. ( Honeycutt , supra , 20 Cal.3d at pp. 158, 160, 141 Cal.Rptr. 698 , 570 P.2d 1050 .) But here, as noted, the other factors were absent: defendant was not hostile or reluctant to speak; the officers did not exploit a long-standing relationship; and he was forewarned of his Miranda rights. The officers' brief comments about the victim, standing alone, did not render defendant's waiver involuntary. The same is true of Dudek's comments to defendant about mending his relationship with his children. Dudek did not threaten defendant's children with prosecution or other harm if he failed to confess. (See Lynumn v. Illinois , supra , 372 U.S. at pp. 531-532, 83 S.Ct. 917 ; People v. Steger (1976) 16 Cal.3d 539 , 550, 128 Cal.Rptr. 161 , 546 P.2d 665 ; In re Shawn D . (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 200 , 212, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 395 .) As defendant's own statements indicate, he was motivated to confess because he was tired of living with the guilt of killing McKenna. He believed that officers would be coming for him, and emphasized that if you didn't come, I would have came to you. He acknowledged that his public defender would tell him not to cooperate, but commented that he doesn't have to wear my shoes. Defendant wanted an expedited resolution, perhaps to spare himself and his family the stress of a trial. He commented, I know what I did. All right. And I just want to get it over with. The Fifth Amendment is not concerned with moral and psychological pressures  to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion. ( Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298 , 304-305, 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 .) In sum, the conversation during the car ride did not improperly soften-up defendant or render his waivers involuntary. His statement at the police station was properly admitted.