Opinion ID: 2639962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: under a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis

Text: ¶11 In our probable cause cases, we have consistently employed Gates' flexible totality-of-the-circumstances standard. See State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, ¶ 14, 48 P.3d 872; State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1233 (Utah 1996); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1993); State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 991 (Utah 1989); State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987); State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1985); State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984). We have recognized that an informant's reliability and basis of knowledge are but two relevant considerations, among others, in determining the existence of probable cause under a totality-of-the-circumstances. They are not strict, independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case. A weakness in one or the other is not fatal to the warrant so long as in the totality there is substantial basis to find probable cause. The indicia of veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are nonexclusive elements to be evaluated in reaching the practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances, there is a fair probability that the contraband will be found in the place described. Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 233-34). ¶12 In this case, after detailing McCarthy's experience and training in the investigation of narcotics-related offenses, the affidavit includes the following information: [McCarthy] is investigating Anthony A. Saddler for usage and distribution of controlled substances, specifically marijuana and cocaine. [McCarthy] received information from a confidential informant, hereinafter referred to as CI. [McCarthy] ask[s] the courts not to require [McCarthy] to publish the CI's name. [McCarthy] believes that the CI may be harmed if CI's name were published. [McCarthy] was told the following by the CI: 1. CI has known the suspect, Saddler for over 1 year, 2. CI has observed the suspect use cocaine and marijuana on numerous occasions during the last year, 3. CI has used marijuana with the suspect on several occasions, 4. CI has been to the premises numerous times, the most recent being within the last week to ten days, and observed approx. 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana, 5. CI has observed three scales inside the home, that the suspect uses to weigh out repackaged marijuana for resale, 6. CI has observed cocaine inside the premises, along with packaging material, 7. CI has observed the suspect carry marijuana and cocaine on his person, 8. The suspect has told the CI that the suspect sells marijuana and cocaine, 9. CI has observed the suspect sell and use controlled substances, inside the named premises, 10. CI has been told by the suspect that the suspect recently purchased the listed premises, 11. CI states that the suspect's only legitimate source of income is from a part time waiter's job at a Salt Lake City restaurant, BACCI's, 12. CI states that the suspect sells controlled substances to be able to afford his own usage and as a separate source of income, 13. CI provided a description of the home, a vehicle frequently used by the suspect (female companion of suspect), and hours of operation of the suspect, 14. CI states that the suspect is home infrequently and usually during the late evening hours. ¶13 In the affidavit, McCarthy stated that he believed that the observations of the CI are first hand, accurate and truth full [sic], for the following reasons. CI's observations are first hand and from a person that has used marijuana and would recognize[] the substance when observed. CI has not been promised nor paid for any of the information provided. CI has provided the information out of a sense of guilt and desire to stop the sales and usage of controlled substances into the community. CI's observations were over a long period of time, even though the suspect has only recently occupied the listed premises, within the last couple of months. CI states that the illicit sales and operation is ongoing and has been long term. ¶14 The affidavit further describes McCarthy's efforts to corroborate the information he received from the confidential informant: [McCarthy] was performing surveillance on [Saddler] at his home address in West Valley on 6/14/00. During the initial surveillance [McCarthy] did not observe anyone at the residence, the surveillance was intermittent from 2000 hours until 0600 6/15/00. During the surveillance on 6/15/00 [McCarthy] observed some short term traffic which [he] believes was drug related. [McCarthy] had West Valley City Police Patrol perform a traffic stop on one of the vehicles leaving the listed premises. During the aforementioned traffic stop the driver was arrested for outstanding warrants and later found to be in possession of marijuana, approximately one half ounce. During the search of the vehicle, a small section of plastic bag was found, by [McCarthy], and appears to have residue of cocaine inside the twist section of the bag. [McCarthy] assisted in the search of the vehicle and would like to inform the courts that no drug paraphernalia, used in the ingestion of marijuana or cocaine, was located . . . . . . . . . . . [McCarthy] believed this evidence shows that the marijuana was purchased from the listed premises [Saddler's home]. ¶15 Other corroborated details in the affidavit include the following: [McCarthy] observed vehicles described by CI at the named premises and the registered owner was a[s] described by CI. McCarthy's observations also confirmed that Saddler was only at home during the late evening hours. In addition, to verify Saddler's employment at the restaurant, [McCarthy] checked on 6/15/00 and [Saddler] was not at work and it was unknown when he was scheduled to return. ¶16 We agree with the magistrate that, viewed in its entirety and in a common sense fashion, McCarthy's affidavit sets forth sufficient underlying circumstances to support the reliability and credibility of the confidential informant and McCarthy's corroborative efforts. However, the court of appeals and Saddler have excessively parsed several statements in the affidavit in order to reach the opposite conclusion. While McCarthy's affidavit may not be a paragon of clarity, this court has held that reviewing courts should rely on a magistrate's reasonable construction of ambiguity in an affidavit. Babbell, 770 P.2d at 992; see also id. at 991 ([T]he reviewing court should pay `great deference' to the magistrate's decision. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 236)). ¶17 In at least three specific instances, the court of appeals construed passages in the affidavit against the issuing court's reasonable construction, proving fatal to the warrant. The first instance concerned McCarthy's request to conceal the informant's name. In the affidavit, he stated: Your affiant [McCarthy] received information from a confidential informant, hereinafter referred to as CI. Your affiant ask[s] the courts not to require your affiant to publish the CI's name. Your affiant believes that the CI may be harmed if the CI's name were published. ¶18 The court of appeals stated that, according to this language, it was unclear whether the confidential informant had revealed his name. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82 at ¶ 16 (We do not know whether CI told McCarthy his name.). However, we conclude that a magistrate could reasonably construe Officer McCarthy's knowledge of CI's name from the affidavit's language. Id. at ¶ 34 (Billings, J., dissenting). This knowledge, in turn, bolsters the confidential informant's reliability because, by identifying himself to the police and admitting to smoking marijuana, he was clearly making statements against his penal interest. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583 (1971) (Admissions of crime . . . carry their own indicia of credibilitysufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search.). ¶19 The court of appeals, on the other hand, concluded that the confidential informant made no statement against his penal interest because he was unknown to the police. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82 at ¶ 16 n.3. Further, the court of appeals determined that, even if McCarthy knew the confidential informant's identity, the confidential informant made no statement against his penal interest because there is no other evidence against him to support his admission. Id. ¶ 18. However, this judgment is contrary to the United States Supreme Court's guidance in Harris. In that case, an unnamed informant who had been purchasing illegal liquor over a period of two years came forward to the police. Harris, 403 U.S. at 583. The police used the informant's statement in an affidavit when applying for a search warrant. Id. The Court found that the informant's statement against his penal interest greatly enhanced his reliability stating that the informant's admission that over a long period and currently he had been buying illicit liquor on certain premises, itself and without more, implicated that property and furnished probable cause to search. Id. at 584 (emphasis added). ¶20 In contrast, the court of appeals here concluded that the confidential informant's participation in crime made him less reliable. Yet we have upheld the judgment of magistrates who have reasonably relied on informants involved in criminal activity. See, e.g., State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1986) (police used confidential informant to perform a controlled buy from suspect); State v. Williamson, 674 P.2d 132, 133-34 (Utah 1983) (officers obtained reliable information about location of contraband from burglar who had stolen contraband from warehouse). Ultimately, such a judgment of the confidential informant's reliability should be made with reference to the totality of the facts and circumstances presented. ¶21 Furthermore, even if the confidential informant's reliability were in question, this would not necessarily be fatal to the warrant under the totality-of-the-circumstances standard. In Gates, information came to the police in an anonymous letter with no means of verifying the identity of the informant or his basis of knowledge. Gates, 462 U.S. at 225-27. Nevertheless, the Court found that the warrant was supported by probable cause because of the detailed information that the police were able to corroborate. Id. at 241-42. ¶22 Here, McCarthy's corroborative effort was significant. Between 8:00 p.m. on June 14, 2000, and 6:00 a.m. on June 15, 2000, Detective McCarthy was watching the Saddler house. During his surveillance on the 15th, he observed short visits to the house that he considered consistent with the sale of drugs. He had local police stop one of the visitors who was leaving the house. While searching the individual, police officers found both marijuana and cocaine, but no paraphernalia normally required to use the drugs, leading McCarthy to believe the drugs had been recently acquired. ¶23 The court of appeals concluded that this information did not verify the informant's statement that Saddler sold drugs from his home nor that his hours of operation were in the late evening. It stated that in this part of the affidavit McCarthy provides only conclusory information about this corroborative effort. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82 at ¶¶ 23-24. We disagree with this characterization of McCarthy's corroboratory information. We find that it was reasonable for the magistrate to conclude from this information, especially in light of McCarthy's nineteen years of experience, that Saddler was likely to be selling drugs from his home. ¶24 In addition, McCarthy was able to verify other, more innocent details provided by the confidential informant, namely, that vehicles described by the confidential informant were at Saddler's home, that the registered owner of a vehicle at Saddler's home was as described by the confidential informant, and that Saddler worked at BACI'S restaurant. This corroboration of innocent details further boosts the confidential informant's credibility. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 (`Because an informant is right about some things, he is more probably right about other facts.' (quoting Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 427)). [2] ¶25 Finally, while the court of appeals determined that the confidential informant had an adequate basis of knowledge, it failed to recognize the value of the confidential informant's first-hand observation of criminal activity. The court of appeals reasoned that [w]hile basis of knowledge tells us how CI acquired his information, it does not tell us whether he was qualified to assess the information, whether he relayed the information accurately, or whether he is trustworthy. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82 at ¶ 12 n.2. ¶26 We have held just the opposite. In Hansen, we addressed the sufficiency of an affidavit based on statements from a confidential informant that he had seen large quantities of marijuana in the suspect's home five days previously. 732 P.2d at 129. We concluded: The reliability of the confidential disclosure was also enhanced by the informant's personal observation of the large quantity of marijuana that was being sold in smaller quantities. His information, relied upon by police, was not some remote hearsay or assumption based on circumstantial events. The statement that the drug and its sale were personally observed in defendant's apartment adequately sets forth the informant's basis of knowledge. The circumstances as a whole adequately indicate that the informant's report was truthful. Id. at 130; see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 234 ([E]ven if we entertain some doubt as to an informant's motives, his explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed first-hand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case.). McCarthy's affidavit states: CI has been to the premises numerous times, the most recent being within the last week to ten days, and observed approx. 3 to 4 pounds of marijuana. Clearly this first-hand knowledge bolsters his credibility.