Opinion ID: 1058489
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Deferral

Text: The circuit court's August 24, 2004 order stated that the evidence would support a finding of guilt but defers final disposition until August 15, 2005 . . . to which time this case is continued, and the bond is continued. The order continued the case but did not enter a final disposition. Additionally, the record in this case does not reveal any particular disposition that would be entered after deferral. Gibson's argument that it was understood that the charges would be dismissed at the end of the year is unsupported by the record. Gibson received the initial deferral of disposition for one year; however, no request for further deferral appears on the record. Although the December 15, 2005 order recites, counsel for the defendant noted his exceptions to the ruling, nothing appears in the order or in the written statement of facts revealing what, if any, objections Gibson made. After the December 15th order was entered find[ing] the defendant guilty, no additional request for deferral was made. Additionally, the final sentencing order does not reveal that a request for additional deferral was made. Finally, no objection was made to the sentencing order. Gibson further alleges that he received a double sentence, namely a deferred sentence and then an adjudication of guilt with sentences of confinement in jail. Gibson mischaracterizes what happened in the trial court. The initial August 24, 2004 order did not impose a sentence. The record does not reflect any understanding or agreement that the charges would be dismissed at the end of the deferral period. Finally, Gibson argues that he is entitled to the suspended imposition of sentence initially ordered on August 24, 2004 pursuant to the plethora of options available to a trial court to dispense justice under Code § 19.2-303. However, Code § 19.2-303 is inapplicable to this case because its terms only apply [a]fter conviction. Gibson was not convicted on August 24, 2004; rather, he was convicted on December 15, 2005. Gibson's fourth assignment of error is based upon a faulty premise concerning what actually transpired in the trial court. On the only occasion that Gibson requested a deferral of disposition to a later date, it was granted by the trial court. The record reveals no additional requests or motions for deferral. Consequently, the trial court never denied such a request or motion. Accordingly, the issue presented in Gibson's fourth assignment of error, namely that the trial court erred by not recognizing the courts [sic] authority to defer findings of guilt absent a specific legislative grant of authority is not properly before us because the record reflects no ruling of the trial court to that effect. We note that although the Court of Appeals addresses this issue in its opinion, the question was not properly before the Court of Appeals for the same reason. [2]