Opinion ID: 798880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Withdrawal of Fifth Amendment Privilege

Text: Smart contends that he should have been permitted to withdraw his assertion of the Fifth Amendment and have his declarations considered in opposing summary judgment. We disagree. The Fifth Amendment allows an individual to not answer official questions put to him in any ... proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.Ct. 316, 38 L.Ed.2d 274 (1973). But to prevent a party from converting the Fifth Amendment privilege from its intended use as a shield against compulsory self-incrimination into an offensive sword, a district court may strike conclusory testimony if the witness asserts the Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid answering relevant questions, yet freely responds to questions that are advantageous to his cause. United States v. $148,840 in U.S. Currency, 521 F.3d 1268, 1277 (10th Cir.2008). A district court's order denying a party's withdrawal of a previously asserted Fifth Amendment privilege in a civil case is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Davis-Lynch, Inc. v. Moreno, 667 F.3d 539, 546 (5th Cir.2012). Similarly, we review the district court's decision to strike Smart's declarations for abuse of discretion. See Lighton v. Univ. of Utah, 209 F.3d 1213, 1227 (10th Cir. 2000). We have not yet defined the parameters in a civil case for withdrawing an invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Other Circuits have, however, and the Fifth Circuit in particular has recently provided a useful distillation of the analysis. See Davis-Lynch, Inc., 667 F.3d at 546-48. Withdrawal is dependent on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Id. at 546. Generally, [t]he court should be especially inclined to permit withdrawal of the privilege if there are no grounds for believing that opposing parties suffered undue prejudice from the litigant's laterregretted decision to invoke the Fifth Amendment. Conversely, withdrawal is not permitted if the litigant is trying to abuse, manipulate or gain an unfair strategic advantage over opposing parties. Id. at 547 (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Certain Real Prop., 55 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir.1995)). An example of impermissible withdrawal is when [a party] invoked the privilege throughout discovery and then sought to withdraw the privilege either to support or defend against a motion for summary judgment. Id. (collecting cases). Under those circumstances, the opposing party is often placed at a significant disadvantage because of increased costs, delays, and the need for a new investigation. Id. at 548. On the other hand, factors that favor permitting withdrawal include the pro se status of the party who asserted the privilege and now seeks its withdrawal, coupled with a lack of awareness of the consequences of taking the Fifth, and possession by the opposing party of sufficient substitute evidence from the invoking party. See id. (citing SEC v. Graystone Nash, Inc., 25 F.3d 187, 193-94 (3d Cir.1994)). The circumstances of Smart's invocation of the Fifth Amendment reveal that he was using the privilege to manipulate the litigation process. When Smart invoked the Fifth Amendment during discovery, he had failed to attend his own deposition the prior day, and he offered no satisfactory explanation for the failure. And when the SEC offered to reschedule, Smart did not respond. Further, Smart took the Fifth during the deposition of Smart Assets after conferring with the company's counsel. Even if we assume that Smart was unaware of the potential consequences for invoking the Fifth Amendment at that time, Smart had taken the Fifth on the advice of his own counsel three months earlier, during the SEC's investigatory process. Thus, there was ample time for him to become aware of the consequences of re-asserting the Fifth Amendment during the litigation. Moreover, Smart did not attempt to withdraw his assertion of the Fifth Amendment until after the SEC had moved for summary judgment and the discovery cutoff date had expired. Given the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Smart leave to withdraw his assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and in striking his declarations.