Opinion ID: 4095572
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: 3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Because Brown and

Text: Darnell’s complaints for ‘fraudulent assessments’ are grounded upon fraud, which is a tort, the court lacks jurisdiction over those claims.”); Hickman v. United States, 629 F. App’x 988, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Because Ms. Hickman’s Complaint alleged injuries recognized as torts—i.e., misrepresentation, fraud, and conspiracy—the court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to hear her claims.”). The Court of Federal Claims therefore correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Hood’s allegations of fraud and conspiracy. 18 HOOD v. US The court further found that, to the extent Hood’s fraud allegations could be construed as claims of contract fraud, he failed to properly state a claim for relief. Hood, 127 Fed. Cl. at 212. We find no error in the court’s conclusion. Rule 9(b) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims, which is identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that, “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” As we have explained in the context of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must plead “the who, what, when, where and how” of the alleged fraud. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, the Court of Federal Claims found that, alt- hough Hood’s complaint in Case Number 15-1200 “alleges that defendant engaged in fraud,” he “does not specifically identify individuals who he asserts committed such fraudulent conduct.” Hood, 127 Fed. Cl. at 213. Nor does he allege underlying facts from which the court could infer that any of the government’s actions were “committed with the requisite state of mind.” Id. On appeal, Hood argues that the Court of Federal Claims should have allowed his fraud claims to go forward because he satisfied the pleading requirements set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). But those cases considered the pleading standard set forth in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not Rule 9(b). Indeed, citing Rule 9, the Court in Twombly specifically recognized that, “[o]n certain subjects understood to raise a high risk of abusive litigation, a plaintiff must state factual allegations with greater particularity than Rule 8 requires.” 550 U.S. at 569 n.14. Hood claims that he sufficiently pled “contract fraud and mistake” with particularity when he alleged that “the HOOD v. US 19 agency reasons for taking such action was to defraud me of my employment.” Informal Br. 11. In his amended complaint in Case No. 15-1200, Hood alleged that the Settlement Agreement “was the result of fraud, coercion, and I was under duress because of my psychiatric conditions.” Amended Compl., Hood v. United States, No. 1:15cv-1200 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 11, 2015), ECF No. 8 at 4. As the Court of Federal Claims found, however, Hood failed to identify any individual who committed the alleged fraudulent acts. Hood, 127 Fed. Cl. at 213. Nor has he alleged any facts from which a court could infer that a specific individual acted with the requisite state of mind. See Exergen, 575 F.3d at 1327. The Court of Federal Claims therefore correctly determined that Hood’s allegations were deficient under Rule 9(b).