Opinion ID: 654201
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The percentage of this amount, if any, due to legal malpractice is:

Text: 100 60 The defendants contend that this answer makes clear that the jury found that malpractice was the sole cause of the harm to Loughman. First, the defendants argue that regardless of whether this answer is consistent with the rest of the verdict, Loughman and the Pollock defendants are bound by the district court's construction of the verdict because, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 49 or 51, they have effectively waived their right to complain by failing to object to the instructions or interrogatories, failing to suggest different or additional interrogatories, and failing to seek to have the verdict reconciled or clarified while the jury was still empaneled. Alternatively, the defendants argue that the jury's answers to interrogatories are consistent and that the judgment entered by the district court was a rational construction of those harmonious answers. 61 To the extent that the defendants' argument is premised on the parties' failure to object to the instructions or interrogatories under Fed.R.Civ.P. 51, we are unpersuaded. The question before us is not whether there was error in the instruction or in the interrogatories, but the legal effect of the jury's answers, and, more specifically, whether the jury's answers can be reconciled. We agree, however, that if there is an inconsistency in those answers, the failure of plaintiffs to object might create serious problems under Fed.R.Civ.P. 49. 62 Rule 49 provides a court with alternatives to submitting a case under a traditional general verdict. Rule 49 is split into two subsections, subsection (a), which provides for the use of special verdicts, 13 and subsection (b), which provides for the use of a general verdict to be accompanied by written interrogatories. 14 The defendants argue that regardless of which subsection applies, Loughman and the lawyers' arguments are foreclosed. 63 If the case was submitted on special verdicts, pursuant to Rule 49(a), the defendants contend that, because Loughman and the lawyers did not submit any question about joint and several liability in connection with the legal malpractice claim, the district court was permitted to make its own finding with regard to that issue, which it did consistent with the law and the remainder of the jury's answers. Alternatively, the defendants submit that the issue was covered by Question A of Interrogatory 59 and that the district court rendered a judgment that endorsed the jury's already harmonious answers or provided a rational and at least minimally plausible view of those answers, which bars speculation by Loughman and the Pollack defendants as to what other harmonious explanations might exist. 64 If, however, the case was submitted on a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories, pursuant to Rule 49(b), then the defendants assert that Loughman and the attorneys waived any purported inconsistency in the answers to interrogatories by failing to raise them prior to the dismissal of the jury. 15 Alternatively, the defendants submit that the jury's specific finding that the malpractice was the sole cause of Loughman's injuries trumps any inconsistent general verdicts. 65 The critical question here is whether the jury's answers in the verdict are necessarily inconsistent with each other. 16 More specifically, we must first determine whether the district court's construction of the verdict harmonized the jury's answers. If it did not, then we must determine whether, as Loughman and Pollock assert, the jury's findings on civil liability and fraud may be reconciled with its finding that 100% of Loughman's damages were due to legal malpractice. 66 First, we note that a district court must render a judgment that makes the jury's answers consistent if such a construction is possible. SeeMcAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d 750, 763-64 (3d Cir.1990). 17 Here, we conclude that the district court's construction of the judgments cannot stand because it does not successfully harmonize, or provide a minimally plausible explanation, for the jury's findings. The district court theorized that the jury had found that the defendants engaged in a civil conspiracy but had concluded that that conspiracy had not damaged Loughman. This explanation, however, is untenable in light of the instructions given the jury. 67 In its charge on civil conspiracy, the court instructed the jury: 68 Plaintiffs are required to prove each of the following in order to prevail on this claim: (1) the existence of some object to be accomplished; (2) an agreement among the alleged conspirators on the course of action to be taken; (3) one or more overt acts in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy; and (4) that the plaintiffs suffered damages as a result thereof. 69 (emphasis added). The jury's verdict cannot be reconciled by assuming that the jury failed to follow the court's instruction in arriving at its verdict. To the contrary, we must assume that the jury understood and followed the court's instructions. See, e.g.,Zauber, 857 at 154; United States v. Restaino, 405 F.2d 628, 630 (3d Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 904, 89 S.Ct. 1012, 22 L.Ed.2d 216 (1969). Accordingly, any harmonization of the jury's answers must account for a finding that Loughman was damaged by the civil conspiracy. 18 The district court's construction plainly does not account for that finding. Accordingly, the defendants' argument that the judgment rendered by the district court represented a rational, consistent construction of the jury's answers must fail. 70 We must therefore determine whether the jury's conclusion that the conspirators damaged Loughman can be reconciled with its finding that Loughman's damages were 100% due to the Pollock defendants' malpractice. We conclude that such an explanation exists. The essential flaw in the defendants' argument is the assumption that the jury's finding that Loughman's damages were 100% due to legal malpractice means that the malpractice was the sole cause of those damages. There is, however, an alternative, and we believe more sensible, explanation of the jury's answer; namely, that Pollock's malpractice was a but for cause of Loughman's losses in the sense that, had Pollock not committed the malpractice, she would not have accepted the fraud-laden offer for her property. 71 This explanation is supported by the jury charge on malpractice. The jury was instructed: 72 To award damages to the plaintiff on this claim, you must find that the following elements have been established by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that Ewing Pollock undertook to provide legal services on plaintiff's behalf; (2) that Ewing Pollock failed to exercise ordinary skill, knowledge and judgment in rendering these legal services; (3) that Dorothy Loughman suffered monetary injury; and (4) that Dorothy Loughman would not have suffered monetary injury but for Ewing Pollock's failure to exercise the skill and knowledge required of him under the law. 19 73 Thus, in finding Pollock liable for legal malpractice, the jury necessarily concluded that but for the fact that Pollock failed adequately to advise Loughman, she would not have taken the fraudulently low sales price for her land. The jury then was faced with a question requiring it to state what percentage of the loss was caused by the legal malpractice. It logically follows from the jury's determination of liability for malpractice, by which it necessarily concluded that there would have been no loss but for the malpractice, that the loss that eventually resulted was 100% due to legal malpractice. 74 It does not necessarily follow, however, that the jury also concluded that the malpractice was the sole cause of the loss. As both tort law and common sense tell us, there may be multiple but-for causes of a single loss and each, as a but-for cause, may be responsible for the entire loss in the sense that had that party not acted as it did, there would have been no loss. 75 As explained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts: 76 Certain kinds of harm, by their very nature, are normally incapable of any logical, reasonable, or practical division.... Where two or more causes combine to produce such a single result, incapable of division on any logical or reasonable basis, and each is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, the courts have refused to make an arbitrary apportionment for its own sake, and each of the causes is charged with responsibility for the entire harm.... 77 Such entire liability ... is imposed where either cause would have been sufficient in itself to bring about the result, as in the case of merging fires which burn a building. It is imposed also where both are essential to the harm, as in the case of [two negligently driven vehicles colliding and killing a bystander]. 78 It is not necessary that the misconduct of two or more tortfeasors be simultaneous. One defendant may create a situation upon which the other may act later to cause the harm. One defendant may leave combustible material, and the other set it afire; one may leave a hole in the street, and the other drive into it. 79 Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 433 A, cmt. i (1965); see also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts Sec. 52, at 347-48 (5th ed. 1984). Pennsylvania has expressly adopted the Restatement's approach to the apportionment of damages for indivisible injuries. SeeMartin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 515 Pa. 377, 528 A.2d 947, 949 (1987) (The rules in this Commonwealth governing the apportionment of damages are consistent with those expressed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts....); 20 see also Corbett v. Weisband, 380 Pa.Super. 292, 551 A.2d 1059, 1076 (1988) (applying the principles of the Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 433 A, cmt. i). 80 The present case presents such an indivisible injury. As discussed supra, in adhering to the court's charge, the jury necessarily found that both the conspiracy to commit fraud (for which all defendants except Reese and Wilson are liable) and Pollock's malpractice combined to cause Loughman to accept the price offered for her property. It is impossible to apportion Loughman's loss between these causes, however, because both were necessary precursors to the ultimate single, indivisible harm. 81 In sum, the jury's finding that 100% of the loss was attributable to malpractice was merely its alternative way of saying that malpractice was a but for cause of the loss, as the jury was instructed it must find in order to hold the Pollock defendants liable for malpractice. 21 Under this interpretation, there is no inconsistency within the interrogatory answers and hence the putative Rule 49 problem, whatever its incarnation, disappears. 22 SeeAtlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364, 82 S.Ct. 780, 786, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962) (Where there is a view of the case that makes the jury's answers to special interrogatories consistent, they must be resolved that way.); Barnhart v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 595 F.2d 914, 917 (3d Cir.1979). 23 Therefore, we will reverse and remand with direction for the district court to enter judgment for Loughman's compensatory damages jointly and severally against all defendants except Reese and Wilson.