Opinion ID: 1035248
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Property Receipt (75-3) will be issued for the

Text: luggage in accordance with the procedures outlined in Directive 91. 2. The luggage will be opened and inventoried in the presence of the person from whom it was seized. 3. The contents will be itemized on the Property Receipt. App. 274-75 (italics added for emphasis, underlines and capitalization in original). When the suppression hearing resumed on June 15, 2010, Officer Pomeroy was called to testify first. When asked why she opened Matthews’ bag, Pomeroy testified that “before I put personal belongings in my car, I’m going to go through it. It’s for safety, for my safety, my co-workers’ and . . . the defendant himself.” App. 297. She emphasized that this was not a search for contraband, but that she had “to make sure that bag is safe before [she] put it in [her] car.” App. 298. She testified that she had conducted this type of search “every single time” that she had made an arrest in the field prior to transporting the arrestee, and that “it’s how [officers were] trained to do it from the beginning in the academy.” App. 298. Pomeroy noted that if the arresting officer did 6 not search an arrestee’s property prior to transporting it to the police station, and the cell block attendant discovered “some kind of contraband, some kind of weapon [brought] into the cell block” when the arrestee was being booked, then the arresting officer “could actually be physically reprimanded.” App. 302. On direct examination she was not asked about, and never mentioned, Policy 99-14. On cross-examination, Matthews’ counsel questioned Pomeroy about Policy 99-14 and its edict that an arresting officer must obtain a search warrant when he or she has probable cause to believe that a bag may contain contraband. Pomeroy testified that this requirement did not apply to the search of Matthews’ backpack because she “had absolutely no reason to believe at that time that Mr. Matthews was involved in anything.” App. 315. However, she also testified that she had never before obtained a search warrant before opening an arrestee’s luggage or containers, nor knew of any other officers who did so under these circumstances. Lieutenant Francis Healy, special legal counsel to the Philadelphia Police Commissioner, also testified regarding departmental policies. According to Healy, the purpose of Policy 99-14 is to outline the circumstances under which a police officer can legally conduct a search of an arrestee’s bags. He testified that, according to the policy, if police officers do not have probable cause to believe a bag contains contraband, “they would just open it and inventory it in front of the defendant at that time, . . . catalogue the property, whatever it may be, and transport it along with the prisoner to the local [police station].” App. 322. The first purpose of such a search, he testified, is for officer safety and to ensure that hazardous materials are not permitted inside of a police facility. The 7 second purpose is to protect officers from allegations that an arrestee’s personal property was stolen. Healy testified that Pomeroy’s search of Matthews’ backpack was consistent with departmental policy. He also stated that had Pomeroy not opened the bag on the street, the bag inevitably would have been searched at the police station when Matthews was processed. In its briefing before the District Court, the Government emphasized that because Matthews was arrested “on a busy street in an urban setting[,] [t]he police were compelled to take his backpack with him upon his arrest at the intersection. They could not leave it in the street but had to transport it with the arrestee.” App. 268. C. The District Court Opinion Soon after the suppression hearing, the District Court denied Matthews’ motion to suppress. The Court held that the initial stop of Matthews was proper, as the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that Matthews was involved in criminal activity based on the totality of the circumstances, and that the arrest was proper due to Matthews’ outstanding warrants. 3 The District Court then considered whether the search of Matthews’ backpack could be justified under any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. The Court determined that the search could not be considered a valid search incident to Matthews’ arrest, as to qualify as such the backpack would have had to have been in an area within Matthews’ “immediate control” at the time of the search. Since Matthews was handcuffed and locked in the back of a police car at the time of the search, 3 Matthews does not contest this ruling on appeal. See Matthews’ Br. at 3-4. 8 it was clear that he “could not gain access to the contents of his backpack to harm the police officers or to destroy evidence.” United States v. Matthews, Crim. A. No. 09-612, 2010 WL 2671388, at  (E.D. Pa. July 1, 2010). However, the Court concluded that the search qualified as a valid inventory search, finding that Officer Pomeroy searched the backpack “pursuant to long-standing and clearly articulated Philadelphia Police Department policy on the search and seizure of luggage.” Id., at . The Court found that because Matthews’ arrest was based on warrants unrelated to the alleged attempted robbery, there was no probable cause to search his backpack. Thus, it found that the search fell under Section III.C of Policy 99-14 and did not require a search warrant. Id. In a footnote, the District Court observed that, even if the search was not a valid inventory search at the scene of the arrest, the contents of the bag were admissible because they “inevitably would have been discovered when the bag was inventoried at the police station.” Id., at  n.6. Matthews was convicted by jury of conspiracy, attempted robbery, carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and possessing a firearm after conviction of a felony, and was sentenced to 192 months’ imprisonment. He has filed an appeal challenging his judgment of conviction and sentence.