Opinion ID: 2972746
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Though Ketz raised the issue of qualified immunity in his motion for summary judgment, J.A. at 103 (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Mot. for Summ. J. at 3), the district court did not specifically address the issue in its cursory opinion. The district court simply stated that the deposition testimony was “sufficient to create genuine issues of material fact as to liability.” J.A. at 57 (Dist. Ct. Op. at 3). As the Supreme Court has noted, however, a government official’s claim of qualified immunity is an assertion of a “right not to stand trial on the plaintiff’s allegations.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985). Therefore, by denying Ketz’s motion for summary judgment, the district court implicitly found that Ketz was not entitled to qualified immunity. “[A] district court’s denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final judgment.” Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530. In such cases, “the 7 appealable issue is purely a legal one: whether the facts alleged (by the plaintiff, or, in some cases, the defendant) support a claim of violation of clearly established law.” Id. at 528 n.9. By contrast, “a defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a district court’s summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1995). Therefore, as we have stated, “[a] denial of qualified immunity on purely legal grounds is immediately appealable. A denial of qualified immunity that turns on evidentiary issues is not.” Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 427 (6th Cir. 1997) (internal citation omitted). In this case, there are several factual disputes critical in determining liability which preclude Ketz’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, there are material factual disputes about what exactly occurred during the incident: whether Bultema ever kicked Anderson or Anderson instead was hit by the screen door, whether Ketz applied the pepper spray to Bultema after he was already handcuffed, and whether Ketz ever hit Bultema in the head. The district court also found that there was a genuine factual dispute about whether Ketz was even acting in his capacity as a sheriff’s deputy or instead as a private security guard. To the extent that any part of Ketz’s argument raises these factual issues, we are without jurisdiction to hear his interlocutory appeal. In his brief to this court, Ketz does not raise these factual issues, however, but instead argues that even under Bultema’s alleged facts, he is entitled to qualified immunity. See Appellants’ Br. at 19 (noting that “even if Appellee’s facts are accepted as true, his allegations fail to establish Constitutional violations”). Thus, the sole issue presented before us is a “neat abstract issue of law,” Turner, 119 F.3d at 428, whether the facts as alleged by Bultema in this case demonstrate a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1291 over Ketz’s appeal of the district court’s denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity.