Opinion ID: 411938
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: approach to the pre-enforcement facial challenge

Text: 9 Appellant contends that the Act is overbroad and vague on its face. In evaluating this claim, we first reach the overbreadth issue and inquire whether the prohibitions of the Act reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. After examining the overbreadth claim, we will turn to a consideration of appellant's vagueness arguments. The overbreadth and vagueness arguments will be examined only with respect to the acts prohibited by M.C.A. Sec. 45-10-104, because appellant alleged that he feared prosecution only under this section. We will then turn to appellant's equal protection claim. After considering these arguments, we shall discuss appellant's standing to object to the advertising prohibitions.
10 To be overly broad, the Act must reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. Flipside, 102 S.Ct. at 1191. In evaluating this claim, we must consider both the ambiguous and the unambiguous scope of the state's enactment. 102 S.Ct. at 1191, n. 6. It is, of course, solely within the province of the state courts to authoritatively construe state legislation. See United States v. 37 Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 1404, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971). When as here those courts have not spelled out the meaning of a statute, this Court must extrapolate its allowable meaning ... in a manner that affords the widest latitude to state legislative power consistent with the United States Constitution. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 174, 82 S.Ct. 248, 257, 7 L.Ed.2d 207 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also High Ol' Times v. Busbee, 673 F.2d 1225, 1230 (11th Cir.1982). 11 Appellant argues that the Act is overly broad because it infringes on his constitutionally protected right to operate a business and to earn a livelihood. Appellant contends that Flipside, because it considered only a licensing statute, did not reach this question. Appellant also argues that the expansive list of factors in M.C.A. Sec. 45-10-102 allows a trier of facts to consider such things as alternative and unpopular lifestyles, thus implicating appellant's rights of association and speech. 12 We decline to accept appellant's arguments. The Supreme Court, in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613-615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916-18, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973), indicated the strong policy against applying the overbreadth doctrine in a facial review. The only exception to this policy is in the First Amendment area. The appellant failed to make out such a claim with respect to M.C.A. Sec. 45-10-104. The only protected right arguably implicated by the Act is commercial speech. Even that right, however, is not constitutionally protected in this instance because the statute is expressly directed at commercial activity promoting or encouraging illegal drug use. Thus, [i]f that activity is deemed 'speech,' then it is speech proposing an illegal transaction, which a government may regulate or ban entirely. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 388, 93 S.Ct. 2553, 2560, 37 L.Ed.2d 669 (1973). Flipside, 102 S.Ct. at 1192. 13 Appellant, moreover, has only a limited right to engage in prohibited sales in this case. As the Supreme Court noted in Flipside, A retailer's right to sell smoking accessories, and a purchaser's right to buy and use them, are entitled only to minimal due process protection. Here, the village presented evidence of illegal drug use in the community. Regulation of items that have some lawful as well as unlawful uses is not an irrational means of discouraging drug use. Flipside, 102 S.Ct. 1192, n. 9 (citations omitted).
14 Upon finding no overbreadth, the Supreme Court instructs that a court next, examine the facial vagueness challenge and, assuming the enactment implicates no constitutionally protected conduct, should uphold the challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. A court should therefore examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law. Flipside, 102 S.Ct. at 1191 (footnote omitted, emphasis added). 15 Appellant challenges several provisions of the Act as unconstitutionally vague. While we share some of appellant's concerns, we disagree, in light of the pre-enforcement nature of appellant's challenge, that the law is invalid in toto--and therefore incapable of any valid application--or is overbroad or vague--and therefore no person can properly be convicted under the statute until it is given a narrowing or clarifying instruction .... Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1223, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974) (citations omitted). 16 The void for vagueness doctrine is designed to protect citizens from three consequences of unclear laws: 17 First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a vague statute abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms. Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to  'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' ... than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked. 18 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (footnotes omitted). 19 We now turn to the various provisions of the Act to see if they warrant any of these concerns.
20 M.C.A. Sec. 45-10-101 defines drug paraphernalia as any item used, intended for use, or designed for use in several activities related to the production or consumption of drugs. Appellant claims that this standard would allow a merchant's conviction based upon the transferred intent of a manufacturer or purchaser. Appellant also claims that the imprecise definition of drug paraphernalia admits of arbitrary enforcement against those stores or merchants that a community dislikes merely because of differing lifestyles. 21 The Supreme Court in Flipside specifically held that the language of the Hoffman Estates ordinance, requiring the licensing of any goods designed for use or marketed for use with drugs was not impermissible. The court found that the designed for use standard referred to objective criteria of an item that made it principally used with illegal drugs and thus there was no danger of a finding of guilt by transferred intent. The court also found that the marketed for use standard was clear because it relied upon the retailer's intent and actions in selling the item. The ordinance, so construed, gives adequate notice of that which it prohibits. 22 We first overcome the appellant's objections to our reliance upon Flipside. Even though the ordinance in Flipside may properly be characterized as an economic regulation, the Supreme Court undertook a more rigorous analysis than this fact alone would indicate. The Court explained that: 23 [T]he village concedes that the ordinance is quasi-criminal, and its prohibitory and stigmatizing effect may warrant a relatively strict test. Flipside's facial challenge fails because, under the test appropriate to either a quasi-criminal or a criminal law, the ordinance is sufficiently clear as applied to Flipside. 24 Flipside, 102 S.Ct. at 1194 (footnote omitted). Moreover, the Flipside ordinance and the criminal statute in the instant action regulate business activity of the same nature. The Court recognized that, businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action. Id. at 1193. 25 We feel free, in light of the strictness of the Supreme Court's analysis, to apply its interpretation of designed for use to the Montana Act. We are somewhat troubled, however, by the Act's use of the phrase intended for use rather than marketed for use, the language of the Hoffman Estates ordinance. The intended for use terminology less obviously refers to the acts of the defendant-merchant. Rather, it may permit some ambiguity in that it could refer to the intent of the manufacturer or of the purchaser. Flipside suggests that intended for use is a broader standard than marketed for use. The Court, referring to the latter standard, states, [t]he standard requires scienter, since a retailer could scarcely 'market' items 'for' a particular use without intending that use. Flipside, 102 S.Ct. at 1195. 26 The Seventh Circuit, in Record Head Corp. v. Sachen, 682 F.2d 672 (7th Cir.1982), was persuaded that the intended for use language, when combined with factors similar to those in M.C.A. Sec. 45-10-102 and absent any explicit state of mind requirement, is impermissibly vague. The ordinance in the Record Head case focuses on drug paraphernalia and minors and is not modeled closely after the MDPA. The Seventh Circuit, in another post-Flipside case, upheld a MDPA-style statute. Levas & Levas v. Village of Antioch, Illinois, et al., 684 F.2d 446 (7th Cir.1982). In Levas, the Seventh Circuit adopted the district court's construction of the definition of drug paraphernalia as an inartful, yet legitimate attempt to assign the appropriate scienter requirement to each type of offender. Thus, to be subject to prosecution, the user merely is required to possess an item used to produce or consume drugs (use), a manufacturer must design an item that objectively is for use with drugs (designed for use), and the retailer or distributor must sell or market an item with the intent that it be used with drugs (intended for use). Under this reading, there is no problem of transferred intent; that is, an innocent retailer may not be convicted for the state of mind of a manufacturer or a purchaser. This interpretation, with which we concur, minimizes the risk of arbitrary enforcement or of inadequate notice. The intent referred to in M.C.A. Sec. 45-10-101 is that of the person who has control of the prohibited drug paraphernalia. 27 The broad language of M.C.A. Sec. 45-10-101 does not disturb us because there are so many forms of drug paraphernalia. A definition which casts a wide net is necessary to accomplish the objectives of the Act. All that we must find to sustain the facial constitutionality of the Act is a single clear application of the Act to the appellant. In this case, the sale of a roach clip, an item specified in M.C.A. Sec. 45-10-101 and sold by appellant falls within the core conduct prohibited by the Act and obviates any facial vagueness challenge. 4 28 Thus, Amicus California Progressive Business Association's claim that the seller of a garden hose is subject to liability because the hose could be used to water a garden of marijuana plants not only contradicts our interpretation of the Act, but is legally irrelevant under the standard for facial vagueness review established by the Supreme Court in Flipside.
29 MDPA-style statutes are unusual in that the proscribed acts contain in effect two state of mind requirements. The first, for the merchant involved in sales of drug paraphernalia, is that he or she must intend that the item be used to produce or consume drugs. In addition, under M.C.A. Sec. 45-10-104, the merchant must, upon delivery of an item, know or be in a position where he or she reasonably should know that the item will be used in the production or consumption of drugs. Several circuits have held that this reasonably should know language is so vague a standard that it presents the risk of arbitrary enforcement. 30 The court in Levas excised this language from the act because it reasoned that a merchant should not be subject to criminal liability for a mere negligent failure to know the intent of a purchaser. The First Circuit, in New England Accessories Trade Association, Inc. v. City of Nashua, 679 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1982), similarly expressed its disapproval of this language, but upheld the challenged act because of the unusual posture of that case. The Sixth Circuit, in Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, 638 F.2d 916, 935-36 (6th Cir.1980), originally held that the reasonably should know language was unconstitutionally vague because it defined the prohibited offense in terms of ... an individual's ability to perceive rather than his criminal intent. The Sixth Circuit's opinion has since been twice vacated by the Supreme Court. 451 U.S. 1013, 101 S.Ct. 2998, 69 L.Ed.2d 384 (1981) and 102 S.Ct. 2227, 72 L.Ed.2d 840 (1982). Finally, the Fifth Circuit, in upholding the constitutionality of the Louisiana MDPA-style statute, explicitly noted that the Act omitted the reasonably should know language. Tobacco Accessories & Novelty Craftsmen Merchants Association of Louisiana v. Treen, 681 F.2d 378, 385 (5th Cir.1982). 31 We disagree for several reasons that the reasonably should know language of M.C.A. Sec. 45-10-104 is constitutionally deficient. First, the Supreme Court repeatedly has held that inclusion of a specific mens rea element may alleviate vague notice of conduct prohibited by a law. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 n. 13, 99 S.Ct. 675, 685 n. 13, 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-03, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1035-36, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945). Second, the fact that a defendant reasonably should have known something is established in substantially the same manner as actual knowledge. Florida Businessmen for Free Enterprise v. City of Hollywood, 673 F.2d 1213, 1219 (11th Cir.1982). Third, in light of the unusual nature of the layered state of mind requirements imposed by M.C.A. Secs. 45-10-101 and 104, the merchant must have already intended that an item be sold for drug use, under the intended for use standard, before his or her knowledge of its use by a buyer comes into play. Once the merchant has passed this threshold, the merchant is required to be aware only of the objective facts that would fairly put him or her on notice of the use for which the product was purchased. Casbah, Inc. v. Thone, 651 F.2d 551, 561 (8th Cir.1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 1005, 102 S.Ct. 1642, 71 L.Ed.2d 874, reh. denied 456 U.S. 950, 102 S.Ct. 2023, 72 L.Ed.2d 476 (1982). Accord, New England Accessories Trade Association, Inc. v. Tierney, 691 F.2d 35 (1st Cir.1982). 32 The Eighth Circuit's reading of the reasonably should know language is supported by the drafters of the MDPA. In their comments, the drafters explained their own understanding of the proper construction of that language: 33 The knowledge requirement of Section B is satisfied when a supplier: (i) has actual knowledge an object will be used as drug paraphernalia; (ii) is aware of a high probability an object will be used as drug paraphernalia; or (iii) is aware of facts and circumstances from which he should reasonably conclude there is a high probability an object will be used as drug paraphernalia. Section B requires a supplier of potential paraphernalia to exercise a reasonable amount of care. He need not undertake an investigation into the intentions of every buyer, but he is not free to ignore the circumstances of a transaction. Suppliers of objects capable of use as paraphernalia may not deliver them indiscriminately. Since each element of section B must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, legitimate, prudent suppliers will not be affected by this section. 34 MDPA Comments, Art. II. 35 The requirements for criminal liability under the Act's reasonably should know standard appear no less specific than the requirements under a host of other criminal statutes upheld by various courts. See, e.g., Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 63 S.Ct. 1265, 87 L.Ed. 1674 (1943) (unlawful to sell restricted drugs where seller should know physician buyer was distributing illegally); Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 27-28, 61 S.Ct. 429, 433-34, 85 L.Ed. 488 (1941) (unlawful to convey information under Espionage Act if reason to believe information transfer will injure United States); Danovitz v. United States, 281 U.S. 389, 397, 50 S.Ct. 344, 345, 74 L.Ed. 923 (1930) (moonshine paraphernalia); United States v. Brooks, 611 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir.1980) (unlawful under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922 to sell firearms where know or reason to believe buyer not resident of state); United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119, 1121-22 (5th Cir.1972) (unlawful to teach use of firearms or explosives under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 231(a) if know or have reason to know will further civil disorder); United States v. Novel, 444 F.2d 114 (9th Cir.1971) (unlawful under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2512 to send device that know or have reason to know is primarily useful for surreptitious interception of communications). 5 36 This Court feels it is appropriate to take notice of the danger of discriminatory enforcement of the Act against those who may hold politically unpopular beliefs or lead unusual lifestyles. Yet we have no clear indication that the Act will be enforced in this manner. The possibility that the Act will be enforced arbitrarily, is of no due process significance unless the possibility ripens into a prosecution. Flipside, 102 S.Ct. at 1196 n. 21. The appellant, or any other party, is not prevented by our actions today from attacking the Act once it has been enforced against him.
37 Appellant argues that the actual purpose of the Act is to put headshops out of business. He claims that this discriminatory purpose, articulated in M.C.A. Sec. 45-10-102 factor 11, 6 will shift the benefits of sales of items that have permissible as well as prohibited uses to favored legitimate businesses such as tobacco stores. Appellant suggests that the appropriate standard for review of the Act is that set forth by Justice Marshall in his dissent in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-22, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2569-71, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976). The test proposed by Justice Marshall, which he contended was the de facto test already employed by the Court in equal protection analysis, examines whether any classification meets the actual goals of regulation for vital yet non-fundamental rights. Appellant thus contends, because his right to earn a livelihood is implicated and because the Act is not mere economic regulation but involves symbols bordering on First Amendment assertions, that this Court should engage in a more rigorous review than a minimum scrutiny of the relation between the Act's ends and means. Appellant also argues that the Act should not be upheld even under the minimum scrutiny standard because purchasers will continue to be able to obtain drug paraphernalia on the black market. 38 After parsing appellant's claims, we fail to see how an equal protection analysis threatens the constitutionality of the Act. Appellant's argument on the language of M.C.A. Sec. 45-10-102(11) really is a claim of potential discriminatory enforcement. We have already expressed our concerns on this matter but dismissed the relevance of this claim in a pre-enforcement context in our discussion of appellant's vagueness argument. Also, we earlier dismissed appellant's argument that the Act implicates vital or fundamental rights. See discussion supra on overbreadth. Thus, even if we were to accept a sliding scale approach to equal protection, we would not find any equal protection violation. 39 Appellant does not challenge the power of the state government to regulate drug misuse under its health, safety, morals, or general welfare police powers. We find sufficient authority to support the state's regulatory power in this regard. See Record Head, 682 F.2d at 679. We disagree with the appellant that there is no rational relationship between the goal of stemming the tide of drug abuse by the means of prohibiting the sale of drug paraphernalia. Moreover, we fail to see any classification in this Act by a type of store. Rather, the Act prohibits certain intentional conduct by all merchants, thus distinguishing between merchants who engage in that conduct and those who do not. Such classification is eminently rational and not on its face discriminatory. See Flipside, 102 S.Ct. 492 to 93, n. 9. 40