Opinion ID: 2566838
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: forfeiture of wuc 57-3442

Text: ¶ 31 We now turn to the cross-appeal. As outlined above, PPOC claimed that BCWDC had forfeited the water rights covered by WUC 57-3442. PPOC based its claim on section 73-1-4 of the Utah Code, which provides: When an appropriator or his successor in interest abandons or ceases to use water for a period of five years, the right ceases, unless, before the expiration of the five-year period, the appropriator or his successor in interest files a verified application for an extension of time with the state engineer. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4(1)(a) (1998). [2] We read this statute in conjunction with section 73-1-3, which provides that [b]eneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to the use of water in this state. Id. § 73-1-3. Forfeiture thus occurs when an appropriator has ceased to use water, or has ceased to use water in a beneficial manner, for a continuous five-year period. ¶ 32 At trial, PPOC argued that BCWDC engaged in only limited, non-beneficial use of its water between April 1982 and April 1990, thereby resulting in a forfeiture of all or part of the water rights. The trial court disagreed, ruling in BCWDC's favor. On appeal, PPOC presents three main arguments. First, PPOC asserts that the trial court clearly erred in finding that BCWDC actively used the water for irrigation during the alleged forfeiture period. Second, PPOC asserts that the trial court erred in giving weight to the state engineer's proposed determination, which identified BCWDC as the owner of WUC 57-3442. Finally, PPOC asserts that the trial court erred in determining that BCWDC beneficially used the water. We address each argument in turn.
¶ 33 PPOC's first argument necessitates a review of the trial court's factual findings. Water forfeiture rulings generally depend heavily on questions of fact (e.g., whether and how much water was diverted and when, where, and to what end the diverted water was used). We will reverse the trial court's findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.). Factual findings are clearly erroneous if they are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). In addition, because the trial judge actually visited BCWDC's property to put the evidence in perspective, we are particularly reticent to second-guess his factual findings. See In re Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 11 Utah 2d 77, 355 P.2d 64, 66 (1960). ¶ 34 PPOC disputes the trial court's factual finding that BCWDC actively used its water for irrigation throughout the forfeiture period, arguing that [i]n this case the evidence shows that BCWDC, having failed in its efforts to grow trees, simply let the water run over the ground. At trial, PPOC offered evidence that BCWDC failed in creating and maintaining an active system of diversions and ditches for irrigation. Two individuals who resided in the Pinecrest area during the alleged forfeiture period testified that they did not see diversion works suitable for irrigation on the property. One of the residents testified that he saw a small hand-dug ditch that meandered around the property, but that the ditch contained no water. PPOC's expert witnesses, who examined the property in 1989, likewise testified that they saw no maintained system of irrigation, although one expert testified that he observed randomly placed hand-dug ditches in a state of disrepair. ¶ 35 In contrast, Walsh testified that he managed multiple diversion points and check dams, directing water through a planned system of ditches. He also testified that he planted and transplanted vegetation along the irrigated areas, and otherwise did not fail to use the water for any five-year continuous period. A witness who visited the property in 1996 testified that she saw places of irrigation and ditches around which the plants were more lush. In addition, the official from the office of the state engineer who inspected the property in 1982 testified that he saw established diversion works on the property at that time. ¶ 36 After considering all evidence, the trial judge ruled in favor of BCWDC, finding that the evidence shows that BCWDC has used the water during the time period in question. While the trial judge found that the tree farm was not ultimately successful, he concluded that, through Walsh's irrigation efforts, the water at issue satisfied aesthetic desires, encouraged indigenous plants to proliferate, reduced fire hazard, and created property line buffers. ¶ 37 In prosecuting its forfeiture claim, PPOC accepted the burden of producing clear and convincing evidence of forfeiture. [3] With this burden in mind, we find that the trial court's factual findings are adequately supported by the record. Our review does not lead us to a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball, 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990) (`[W]e do not set aside the trial court's factual findings unless they are against the clear weight of the evidence or we otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.' (quoting W. Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 (Utah 1987))). We therefore uphold the trial court's finding that BCWDC actively used the water with no intervening five-year period of non-use.
¶ 38 We next address PPOC's contention that the trial court accorded undue deference to the state engineer's proposed determination regarding WUC 57-3442. The appropriate deference to be accorded to the state engineer's determination is a question of law that we review for correctness. Wilson Supply Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, ¶ 11, 54 P.3d 1177 (Generally, we review a trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, according the trial court no particular deference. (citation omitted)). ¶ 39 The trial court gave great weight to the state engineer's determination, which supported BCWDC's claim to WUC 57-3442. PPOC argues that the trial court did so improperly, thereby abdicating its role as sole arbiter of law and fact. While PPOC acknowledges that determinations of the state engineer are generally entitled to at least some weight, it reasons that the claims and circumstances presented by this particular case render the state engineer's determination irrelevant. The state engineer agrees that the proposed determination was not relevant to the allegations of forfeiture in this case. ¶ 40 We have previously explained the singular role played by the state engineer in the process of water rights adjudication. See, e.g., Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, ¶¶ 28-30, 84 P.3d 1134; United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, ¶ 14, 79 P.3d 945; In re San Rafael River Drainage Area, 844 P.2d 287, 289-90 (Utah 1992); In re Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 11 Utah 2d 77, 355 P.2d 64, 65 (1960). The state engineer is an executive, not a judicial officer, and does not have authority to adjudicate the rights of water users. Green River Canal Co., 2003 UT 50 at ¶ 30, 84 P.3d 1134 (citations omitted). Accordingly, courts are not obligated to defer to the state engineer's proposed determinations. [4] United States Fuel Co., 2003 UT 49 at ¶ 14, 79 P.3d 945 (While courts may consider the state engineer's determination persuasive in determining parties' respective rights, they are under no obligation to defer to his or her findings.). At the same time, however, we have recognized that the state engineer has `special training in the operation and control of natural streams and irrigation and other artificial use and control of water and water rights' and that `he is especially qualified to understand the facts involved in these problems.' Green River Canal Co., 2003 UT 50 at ¶ 31, 84 P.3d 1134 (quoting E. Bench Irrigation Co. v. State, 5 Utah 2d 235, 300 P.2d 603, 606 (1956)); see also In re Escalante, 355 P.2d at 65 ([The state] engineer's determination is not an arbitrary thing but is based upon many things, including an extensive survey of the area and its water systems and ditches.). ¶ 41 The proposed determination in this case recommended that WUC 57-3442 be awarded to BCWDC. The proposed determination, published in 1983, was based on field inspections of BCWDC's property conducted in October 1981 and February 1982. However, PPOC's forfeiture claim was based on the period of April 1982 to April 1990. Given that the dates of alleged forfeiture extend far beyond the dates of the state engineer's field inspections, we agree with PPOC that the state engineer's recommendation could have only limited bearing on the forfeiture determination in this case. Nevertheless, we do not find that the trial court's consideration of the proposed determination necessitates reversal of the trial court's ruling because the trial court independently assessed the evidence offered by the parties and was unable to find, based upon the evidence offered, that BCWDC[ ] forfeited its water right under WUC 57-3442, based upon non-use. The trial court, in making its own factual findings, stated that the evidence shows that BCWDC has used the water during the time period in question. This finding did not rely on the state engineer's proposed determination and was itself sufficient to deny PPOC's claim.
¶ 42 We now turn to PPOC's argument that the trial court erred in finding that BCWDC's irrigation efforts constituted beneficial use. PPOC argues that BCWDC failed to put the water at issue to beneficial use, with the exception of the water used to irrigate the tree farm. Because the trial court found that Walsh's attempts at cultivating a tree farm were not ultimately successful, PPOC argues that BCWDC entirely forfeited its rights to the water at issue. Alternatively, PPOC would have this court recognize a partial forfeiture of all water beyond the amount needed to support a hypothetical mature tree farm.
¶ 43 The question of whether Walsh put the water to beneficial use is a mixed question of fact and law. A mixed question involves `the application of law to fact or, stated more fully, the determination of whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law.' Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, ¶ 57 n. 11, 82 P.3d 1076 (quoting State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 26 n. 3, 63 P.3d 650) (further citation omitted). If a case involves a mixed question of fact and law, we afford some measure of discretion to the trial court's application of law to a given fact situation. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-38 (Utah 1994); see also Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Utah 1998). The measure of discretion afforded varies, however, according to the issue being reviewed. Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at ¶ 26, 63 P.3d 650 (citing Pena, 869 P.2d at 937-38). ¶ 44 [W]e decide how much discretion to give a trial court in applying the law in a particular area by considering a number of factors pertinent to the relative expertise of appellate and trial courts in addressing those issues. Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1244 (citing Pena, 869 P.2d at 938-39). In Pena, we identified three factors to be considered when determining the appropriate deference to accord mixed questions of law and fact. These considerations are (1) whether the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied are so complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance of all these facts can be spelled out; (2) whether the situation to which the legal principle is to be applied is sufficiently new to the courts that appellate judges are unable to anticipate and articulate definitively what factors should be outcome determinative; and (3) whether the trial judge has observed `facts,' such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate courts. Pena, 869 P.2d at 938-39; see also Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1244; Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 351 (Utah 1997). We also consider whether there are countervailing policy reasons for not granting broad discretion, such as the interest in creating standard uniformity among trial courts addressing the question. Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1244; see also Pena, 869 P.2d at 939 (discussing interest in having uniform legal rules regarding consent to police searches given the substantial Fourth Amendment interests lost as a result of such consents). ¶ 45 We begin with the first Pena consideration, which requires us to evaluate the complexity and variety of possible factual issues. In this regard, we note that beneficial use determinations rely heavily on the facts and circumstances of each case, with the underlying facts varying significantly in each dispute. This variety of factual scenarios supports a broad, rather than narrow, grant of discretion to the finder of fact. See Dep't of Human Servs. ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997) (The variety of fact-intensive circumstances involved [in equitable estoppel cases] weighs heavily against lightly substituting our judgment for that of the trial court. Therefore, we properly grant the trial court's decision a fair degree of deference when we review the mixed question of whether the requirements of the law of estoppel have been satisfied in any given factual situation.); Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910, 912 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (When the decisions are more fact-dependent, or when the credibility of the witnesses has a strong bearing on the decision, broader discretion is generally granted to the trial court.). ¶ 46 In addition, we note that the concept of beneficial use is not static. Rather, it is susceptible to change over time in response to changes in science and values associated with water use. Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 Envtl. L. 919, 942 (1998) (`What is a beneficial use, of course, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. What may be a reasonable beneficial use, where water is present in excess of all needs, would not be a reasonable beneficial use in an area of great scarcity and great need. What is a beneficial use at one time may, because of changed conditions, become a waste of water at a later time.' (quoting Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 225 Cal.App.3d 548, 570, 275 Cal.Rptr. 250 (1990) (further citation omitted))); id. at 946 (Beneficial use is a somewhat flexible concept, changing over time to accommodate developments in thinking about water use, such as changes in science and values.). Accordingly, beneficial use must remain a flexible and workable doctrine. Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1245 (applying the Pena considerations to unjust enrichment rulings and granting trial courts broad discretion). ¶ 47 The second Pena consideration requires us to evaluate the relative novelty of the applicable legal principle. In examining this consideration, we note that the doctrine of beneficial use has roots dating back to the turn of the last century. See Neuman, 28 Envtl. L. at 920-21. However, our cases and statutes addressing beneficial use have generally used the term without defining it and have failed to identify any standard factors to be considered in evaluating whether a particular use is beneficial. Stated in terms of the Pena metaphor, trial judges in this state confront a pasture that has yet to be narrowly fenced in individual determinations of beneficial use. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 937-38 (analogizing the extent of a trial judge's discretion to a pasture that diminishes in size as it is fenced by existing laws and clarifications by appellate courts). Consequently, this consideration also supports a relatively broad grant of discretion to the trial court. See Carrier, 944 P.2d at 352 (granting limited discretion to a trial court's rule 47(c) decisions because, in part, this court had already fenced off many scenarios that might arise in such cases, and few possible scenarios remained). ¶ 48 The third Pena consideration emphasizes the special ability of trial courts to weigh contradictory evidence from witnesses, assess credibility and demeanor, and make factual findings. 869 P.2d at 939; Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1245. As previously mentioned, beneficial use determinations are generally dependent on the trial court's findings of fact. The same is true in the case now before us, and this consideration thus weighs in favor of our granting broad discretion to the trial judge in determining whether BCWDC put its water to beneficial use. ¶ 49 While the first three Pena considerations suggest that the trial court's determination of beneficial use is entitled to broad discretion, we must also consider whether any countervailing policy reason dictates a contrary result. Such a policy reason exists in this case. We have repeatedly recognized the importance of insuring that the waters of our state are put to beneficial use. See, e.g., Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770, 775-76 (Utah 1991) ([T]he state is ... vitally interested in seeing that none of the waters are allowed to run to waste or go without being applied to a beneficial use for any great number of years. (quotation and citation omitted)); Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 23 Utah 2d 97, 458 P.2d 861, 863 (1969) (Because of the vital importance of water in this arid region both our statutory and decisional law have been fashioned in recognition of the desirability and of the necessity of insuring the highest possible development and of the most continuous beneficial use of all available water with as little waste as possible.). ¶ 50 In view of the importance of beneficial use determinations in this state, we hold that the discretion afforded to the trial court should be somewhat narrowed. In Pena, we described a spectrum of discretion ... running from `de novo' on the one hand to `broad discretion' on the other. 869 P.2d at 937. In beneficial use determinations, the appropriate degree of deference to the trial court falls somewhere in between the two ends of the spectrum. Accordingly, in reviewing the trial court's ruling on beneficial use, we will afford the trial court significant, though not broad, discretion.
¶ 51 Having determined the applicable standard of review, we now address PPOC's claim that BCWDC's irrigation efforts did not qualify as beneficial use. Our legislature has declared that beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to the use of water in this state. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3 (1998); see also id. § 73-3-1 (stating that appropriation must be for some useful and beneficial purpose). Accordingly, [a]n appropriative water right depends on beneficial use for its continued validity. Eskelsen, 819 P.2d at 775. Beneficial use is more than use alone; thus, a finding of beneficial use requires more than a mere diversion of water. Richfield Cottonwood Irrigation Co. v. Richfield, 84 Utah 107, 34 P.2d 945, 949 (1934) (The mere fact that the city of Richfield has for many years diverted water from Cottonwood creek does not give it the right to the use of such water nor establish a right thereto. It must be made to appear that the water diverted has been put to a beneficial use.); see also Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Assoc. v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 54 (Colo.1999) (Diversion of water by itself cannot ripen into a water right if the water is not used beneficially.). Similarly, a diversion of water merely to serve purposes of speculation or monopoly will not constitute beneficial use. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8 (1998). ¶ 52 As developed in the courts, beneficial use has two different components: the type of use and the amount of use. Neuman, 28 Envtl. L. at 926. PPOC's forfeiture claim turns on the first of these components, namely, whether Walsh's irrigation of natural vegetation was the type of use that could be considered beneficial. ¶ 53 At trial, Walsh testified that his irrigation of BCWDC's property allowed him to successfully cultivate various plants of a type indigenous to the area, including plants he purchased at a nursery and relocated to the property. Walsh further testified that he was able to harvest berries and also trees to gift to friends and family, and that the enhanced foliage provided feed and cover for animal life in the area. The trial court found that Walsh's irrigation produced the benefits of, among other uses, satisfy[ing] aesthetic desires, reduc[ing] the fire hazard, and creat[ing] property line buffers. The trial court then ruled that the use of water to these ends, under the circumstances of this case[,] does constitute a beneficial use. The trial court did not cite, nor did BCWDC provide, any case law recognizing the use of water to these ends as beneficial. [5] Instead, the trial court relied on the notion that beneficial use as a concept has evolved beyond the traditional requirement that a use result in economic benefit, stating, The early cases holding that a beneficial use meant an agricultural crop, or use in a heavy industrial setting, did not necessarily exclude uses that might be recognized today as a beneficial use, such as enhancing or maintaining indigenous foliage and vegetation. ¶ 54 Whether Walsh put the water to a beneficial type of use is a close question. We are particularly skeptical of ends that appear to be merely incidental to water use and that are declared as beneficial only in hindsight. However, because the trial court is entitled to significant discretion in applying principles of beneficial use, we affirm the trial court's finding that the water available under WUC 57-3442 was put to beneficial use during the alleged forfeiture period and its corollary holding that PPOC failed to establish its forfeiture claim. We caution, however, that our holding should not be interpreted to imply that irrigation of natural vegetation generally constitutes beneficial use. Such an interpretation would not only be inaccurate, it would expand the concept of beneficial use beyond any meaningful application in future disputes. ¶ 55 While watering indigenous vegetation generally is not a beneficial use and may, in fact, be wasteful, a determination of beneficial use relies on the individual facts and circumstances of a given situation. In cases such as this, consideration of the ends to which the irrigation has been applied is particularly relevant. For example, it is conceivable that one water user would irrigate natural vegetation for purposes of land reclamation or cultivation of vegetation for grazing, [6] while another might inattentively run water through fallow fields merely as a subterfuge to maintain a water right or to hoard water for speculation. While the former situation could conceivably constitute beneficial use, the latter could not.
¶ 56 As an alternative to total forfeiture, PPOC alleged partial forfeiture of BCWDC's water rights. While PPOC provided no evidence that BCWDC failed to irrigate any specific amount of acreage or that BCWDC failed to divert any specific portion of the water to which it was entitled, PPOC offered considerable evidence as to the amounts of water consumed by specific types of trees. PPOC's experts testified that a full farm of blue spruce trees, such as Walsh had intended to cultivate, could consume only 3.3 acre-feet of water per year. PPOC then argued that BCWDC's water rights should be restricted to that amount inasmuch as any additional water could not have been put to beneficial use. Because we have affirmed the trial court's finding that BCWDC put its water to a beneficial type of use outside of any efforts to cultivate a tree farm, we need not address this argument. [7] ¶ 57 PPOC also seeks partial forfeiture on the basis that BCWDC used more water than was reasonably needed to irrigate the natural vegetation on the property. PPOC did not, however, support this argument by presenting specific evidence as to what portion of the water would be sufficient to irrigate the vegetation, nor did PPOC offer authority for the diminution of water rights based on the specific types of plants a water user has cultivated. [8] PPOC's testimony at trial regarding the measure of water needed to irrigate the vegetation indicated only that it would likely be some small amount. In the face of this lack of evidence as to the portion of the water necessary to irrigate the natural vegetation, the trial court properly rejected PPOC's partial forfeiture claim.