Opinion ID: 427222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: seizure and miranda rights

Text: 13 In order to determine whether appellant's fourth and fifth amendment rights were violated at the initial confrontation, we must determine if the encounter between Agent Kimbler and the appellant was the type of police-citizen encounter which would invoke the fourth and fifth amendment safeguards. This circuit, in United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.1982) (Unit B en banc ), specifically identified three types of police citizen encounters: communication between police and citizens involving no coercion or detention and therefore without the compass of the Fourth Amendment, brief 'seizures' that must be supported by reasonable suspicion, and full-scale arrests that must be supported by probable cause. Id. at 591. 14 In Berry we held that a stop was a seizure if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave. Id. at 591 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)). Although there was some contradiction as to the facts of the encounter Agent Kimbler and Mr. Burgos agreed that Mr. Burgos was not free to leave. During the hearing on the motion to suppress Agent Kimbler testified on cross-examination that Mr. Burgos would not have been able to leave until he answered the question. Record, Vol. II, p. 118. Mr. Burgos also testified that he did not believe he would have been allowed to leave had he asked for permission to leave. Record, Vol. II, p. 231. Given these circumstances, we conclude that a reasonable person would no longer have thought he was free to leave and the encounter thus constituted a seizure under the standards of Berry. 15 Once a stop has been held to be a seizure, it can be constitutional only if based upon reasonable suspicion. United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d at 591. The Supreme Court has defined reasonable suspicion as specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant intrusion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). At the time of the stop, Agent Kimbler had information that Mr. Kasha had been purchasing large quantities of firearms, without the proper license, for seven months. Mr. Kasha, again without the proper license, transferred these firearms to Mr. Burgos. The surveillance team had watched the purchase, the transfer and the unloading of the guns into Mr. Burgos' home. It is apparent that Mr. Burgos was also not qualified to purchase these firearms directly from the gun shops. Reasonable suspicion thus supported this seizure. 4 16 Having concluded that there was no violation of appellant's fourth amendment rights in the seizure, we must now focus upon whether or not there was a violation of appellant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) stated that the prosecution may not use any statements stemming from custodial interrogation of a defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. If Agent Kimbler failed to use the procedural safeguards mandated by Miranda, appellant's consent for the agents to enter his home should be vitiated since it was elicited in violation of appellant's fifth amendment rights. 17 A custodial interrogation takes place when a defendant is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. The court in United States v. Del Soccorro Castro, 5 573 F.2d 213, 215 (5th Cir.1978), set out four relevant factors to be considered by the court in determining whether or not there is a custodial interrogation which would necessitate Miranda warnings, to-wit: (1) the existence vel non of probable cause to arrest; (2) the subjective intent of the police; (3) the subjective belief of the defendant; (4) the focus of the investigation. 18 Applying these factors to the facts of this case there is little doubt that appellant was the subject of a custodial interrogation and that no Miranda warnings were given to him at this time. We have already concluded that the agents in this case had probable cause to believe that both men were committing the crime of dealing in unlicensed firearms. Agent Kimbler admitted that the appellant was not free to leave. Appellant stated in his testimony that he did not believe he would have been allowed to leave had he asked for permission to leave. There is no doubt that the investigation had focused on the appellant prior to the encounter. We therefore conclude that the agents did not have the appellant's consent for the warrantless entry. 6 Nevertheless we affirm the district court's denial of the motion to suppress because we find that the agents had probable cause to search the residence, under circumstances sufficiently exigent to validate the warrantless intrusion. 19