Opinion ID: 1173304
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Inconsistency between the Ordinance and the Judgment.

Text: The majority come to the conclusion that the growth ordinance does not run afoul of the stipulated judgment. They arrive at this strained interpretation by picking and choosing among the provisions of each to discern any compatible language. Essentially, the majority decide that the growth ordinance regulates only the timing of development, while the judgment relates exclusively to zoning. However, a more objective examination of both documents reveals obvious inconsistencies between the ordinance and the judgment. The ordinance discloses on its face a purpose to affect more than the timing of development. Section 20.04 (f) declares that the City must be able to control the rate, distribution, quality and economic level of proposed development .... (Italics added.) To achieve this control, the ordinance sets up a system whereby each developer must withstand extensive evaluation in order to obtain the allotments necessary for the issuance of building permits. (§§ 20.09 & 20.10.) The evaluation procedure is decidedly substantive. Developers must compete in such areas as the capacity of proposed water, sewer and drainage systems, the ability of the fire department to serve the new area without building a new station, the design quality of the proposed buildings in terms of size, height, color, and location, and the amount of open space provided in the plan. (§§ 20.09A & 20.09B.) If a developer does not obtain a certain number of points, awarded by the residential development evaluation board, that developer will not be allowed a single allotment. Thus, based on the board's qualitative evaluation, a developer's project could be completely frozen until 1995. With inflation pushing labor and material costs higher each year, it is naive to conceive that such a substantive delay is only a matter of timing. The majority's contention that the earlier judgment relates only to zoning, and not timing, overlooks the clear wording and intent of that document. A consent judgment is binding as to the issues in the stipulation. ( Rappenecker v. Sea-Land Service, Inc. (1979) 93 Cal. App.3d 256, 263 [155 Cal. Rptr. 516].) This does not mean, as the majority appear to believe, that only those issues in the underlying suit may be considered. It means that all subjects covered in the judgment are settled and binding as to the parties. Paragraph 17 of the judgment provides that the city  shall issue to [Pardee] all necessary use, building and other permits and approvals upon [ Pardee's ] request and compliance with all legal requirements.... Further, paragraph 19 declares that the city shall not be precluded in the proper exercise of its police power from adopting any ordinance ... so long as such ordinance is not inconsistent with the provisions of this judgment.  (Italics added.) It is patently obvious that the ordinance, which allows the city to deny Pardee any building permits until 1995, and the judgment, which provides that Pardee is entitled to all building permits it requires upon its request, are inconsistent. It is also clear that paragraph 19 of the judgment thus prevents the city from enforcing as to this plaintiff the very species of ordinance at issue in this case. The majority attempt to limit the judgment to its effect on the city's power to change the zoning applicable to Pardee. But it is apparent that the judgment has a far broader purpose: i.e., to prevent the city from interfering in any significant way with Pardee's development plans. This broad purpose is manifested in paragraphs 17 and 18, which bear no relation to zoning. Paragraph 18 declares that the City shall take no action which is inconsistent with the spirit and intent of the settlement agreement and this judgment. As quoted above, paragraph 17 requires the city to issue all necessary use, building and other permits to Pardee. Thus, city interference quite apart from zoning was considered by the parties and precluded by the judgment. The ordinance constitutes a direct violation of this mandate. [1]