Opinion ID: 2638996
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Second Motion to Suppress

Text: [¶ 27] In Mr. Gompf's second issue, he claims the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement prior to his arrest and the evidence obtained as a result of those statements. He argues his statements to Officer Stroup and Corporal McGrath were taken while he was in custody and the officers violated his constitutional rights by failing to provide a proper warning pursuant to Miranda. Mr. Gompf also claims that the district court should have suppressed his statement to Detective Wells because she did not provide an adequate Miranda warning and his statement was not voluntary. [¶ 28] On the night of March 10, 2003, the police officers first encountered Mr. Gompf in the basement of Ms. VanLitsenborgh's house. The occupants of the house were subsequently asked to move to the upstairs living room while the officers secured a warrant, thereby ensuring that evidence in the house remained intact. [¶ 29] The first instance of questioning took place when Officer Stroup asked Mr. Gompf to come outside onto the porch while the first warrant was being executed. First, he asked Mr. Gompf about the possibility of... there being a gun in the house, and about the possibility of finding any narcotics. Mr. Gompf replied that there might be a gun in the house, and that approximately one-quarter ounce of marijuana could be found in his bedroom. Officer Stroup further testified that he asked Mr. Gompf a couple more questions about the firearm. He did not advise Mr. Gompf of his rights, nor did he place him under arrest or in handcuffs. After their conversation, the two men returned to the living room. [¶ 30] Later, Corporal McGrath questioned Mr. Gompf when he asked him to accompany him outside while he smoked a cigarette. Once outside, Corporal McGrath told Mr. Gompf what was found during the execution of the first search warrant: a plant, approximately one pound of marijuana, some paraphernalia, pay-owe sheets, a scale. Mr. Gompf responded immediately that it was all for personal use. Mr. Gompf also stated that he used the scale so he didn't get ripped off and that the pay-owe sheets were used to keep track of friends that owed him money. Corporal McGrath testified his conversation with Mr. Gompf lasted less than five minutes and he never brandished his weapon, touched Mr. Gompf, or threatened him. Furthermore, Mr. Gompf volunteered a great deal of information to Corporal McGrath without being questioned. [¶ 31] A suspect is entitled to be warned pursuant to Miranda if he is in custody when interviewed by the police. CSC v. State, 2005 WY 106, ¶¶ 18-19 (Wyo. 2005). When the authorities make the proper advisements, statements made by a suspect while in custody are admissible into evidence. The corollary of this rule is that [s]tatements made during custodial interrogation must be excluded upon a showing that the defendant was not advised of his Miranda rights. Nevertheless, this Court adheres to the principle that the rights recognized in Miranda, including the right to counsel, apply only in the context of custodial interrogation. In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court defined custodial interrogation as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The determination of whether a suspect is in custody when questioned is made by considering the totality of the circumstances of the interrogation. In resolving the custodial status of a suspect we consider whether a reasonable man in [the suspect's] position would have considered himself to be in police custody. Id. (citations omitted). [¶ 32] According to the United States Supreme Court, two inquiries are essential to the determination of whether or not a suspect is in custody. In Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995), the Court outlined those inquiries: [F]irst, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Once the scene is set and the players' lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: was there a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Id. at 112, 116 S.Ct. 457. [¶ 33] This Court has outlined the numerous factors which may be relevant in determining whether a suspect has been subjected to custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda in Gunn, ¶ 7. Among them are: (1) whether a suspect is questioned in familiar or neutral surroundings; (2) the number of police officers present; (3) the degree of physical restraint and whether it is comparable to those associated with a formal arrest; and (4) the duration and character of the interrogation. See Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel and Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure § 6.6(c) at 527 (2nd ed.1999); see also Wunder v. State, 705 P.2d 333, 335 (Wyo.1985). Other important factors to consider include the nature of the interrogator, the nature of the suspect, the time and place of the interrogation, the progress of the investigation at the time of the interrogation, whether the suspect is informed that his detention would not be temporary, and the elapsed amount of time between questioning and the arrest. Id., at 335; J.F. Ghent, Annotation, What Constitutes Custodial Interrogation Within Rule of Miranda v. Arizona Requiring that Suspect be Informed of His Federal Constitutional Rights Before Custodial Interrogation, 31 A.L.R.3d 565 (1970). No one factor alone will necessarily establish custody for Miranda purposes, and not all factors are relevant to a given case. Hannon, ¶ 42. [¶ 34] As in most cases where the determinative issue is whether or not a suspect was in custody when questioned, there are factors in this case weighing both in favor of the conclusion that the encounters were noncustodial and factors which also could suggest that the encounters were custodial. CSC, ¶¶ 18-19. The fact that law enforcement was present in the residence for approximately eight hours and the occupants' movements were somewhat limited supports the suggestion they were in custody. On the other hand, the officers did not brandish their weapons, tell the occupants they could not leave, or advise them that they were under arrest. The occupants were not handcuffed or physically restrained in any way. Although the occupants of the house were not allowed to use the restroom unaccompanied because the officers were concerned about the possibility evidence could be destroyed, they were not prevented from using the restroom facilities. [¶ 35] The record clearly shows that the occupants were comfortable during their encounter with law enforcement. In fact, Mr. Gompf slept for a great deal of the time the officers were at the house. Neither Officer Stroup nor Corporal McGrath forced or coerced Mr. Gompf to go outside to visit with him. He was not handcuffed or physically restrained in any manner. The interviews were brief, and Mr. Gompf freely volunteered information. The officers did not tell him he was under arrest, threaten him, or promise anything to him. Thus, looking at the totality of the circumstances, the district court's finding that Mr. Gompf was not in custody when talking to Officer Stroup and Corporal McGrath is supported by the evidence. [¶ 36] Our conclusion is supported by this Court's rationale in a factually similar case entitled Southworth v. State, 913 P.2d 444 (Wyo.1996). In that case, police officers questioned the defendant while executing a search warrant based on a tip of stolen computer equipment. Id. at 446. We stated: Appellant does not make any claim of coercion, threats, promises, or deception. He had not been physically seized, he was not handcuffed, and no weapons were drawn when he made his remarks. The officers did not give any outward signs that they were restricting Appellant's ability to leave or any indication that Appellant was under arrest. In fact, Appellant was very friendly, polite, and talkative during the entire time that the officers were conducting their search. Additionally, Appellant was in his own home when he offered these statements. The other residents of the mobile home, whom Appellant had lived with on and off for about three and one-half years and whom he thought of as being family, were also present when this questioning took place. See, e.g., Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976) (holding that interrogation in the suspect's home was noncustodial); see also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.6(e) (1984) (the view that at-home questioning is noncustodial is strengthened when the suspect's friends or family members are present at the time). Furthermore, even though Appellant had been asked to stay in the living room until the mobile home was secured, he took his dog outside. Upon reentering the mobile home, he followed the officers around as they conducted their search rather than staying in the living room area as he was asked to do. Id. [¶ 37] In a very brief argument, Mr. Gompf contends the trial court erred in refusing to suppress his statement to Detective Wells because she did not properly advise him of his Miranda rights. He also claims that, even if he was properly advised of his rights, the district court erred by refusing to suppress his statements because they were involuntary. [¶ 38] Detective Wells awakened Mr. Gompf, who was asleep in a recliner, to question him. Detective Wells described her conversation with Mr. Gompf as follows: DW: I asked him to come in the bedroom. He gets up. We go in the bedroom. We sit on the bed. I tell him I think he's in a lot of trouble, and he kind of shrugs and says, yeah. We sit on the bed. I tell him that he's going to go to jail, and then I Mirandize him. He doesn't  he tells me that he understands his rights, but when I ask him with those in mind will he speak with me, he just kind of shrugs. So then I ask him  I tell him, I said, I'll ask questions. If you don't want to answer them, you don't have to. And that's how we got into our conversation. Q: Okay. Describe for the Court the questions you ask and his answer. DW: First thing I asked him about was did he live in this residence, and he told me that he did. He lived there approximately a year. That one of the bedrooms in the basement was his, and, in fact, the bedroom where we found the one package of marijuana. I asked him if that marijuana belonged to him, and he said that it did. I asked him about the 4 and a half, 5-foot plant, and he said that was his as well. At this point he's not making any comment about the other four or five bags of marijuana that we found in a kind of a little room off of his room. So I asked him whose marijuana that is, and he says, it's mine. I think we have some discussion about  Corporal McGrath had mentioned pay-owe sheets to me. I think I asked if he sells his marijuana. He tells me he does not sell marijuana. He gives it to his friends. I asked him what the numbers and the names are on the pay-owe sheets. He says those are his friends that he gives marijuana to. I had asked him if he'll give their names, and he says he won't. I asked him if he'll give me the name of who he purchased the marijuana from, and he said he would not. He said he'd comply with me with anything I wanted except people's names who either get marijuana from him or that he gets marijuana from. At that point we pretty well were through and I had officers take him to the detention center. Q. Okay. Did you have any further discussions with Mr. Gompf after he was arrested? DW: No, I did not. [¶ 39] Detective Wells testified that she recited the Miranda warning to Mr. Gompf from memory because she did not have a Miranda card on her person. She told him he had the right to remain silent; that anything he said would and could be used against [him] in a court of law, that he had [the] right to an attorney and if he could not afford one, one would be appointed for him, and that once we started talking that he could stop my questioning and not answer any questions if he wanted to. Detective Wells testified that Mr. Gompf indicated that he understood his rights. In contrast, Mr. Gompf testified at the suppression hearing that the detective did not advise him of his Miranda rights. [¶ 40] In Espinoza v. State, 969 P.2d 542, 544 (Wyo.1998), we concisely described the requirements for a proper Miranda warning: Miranda requires police to inform an accused during a custodial interrogation that 1) he has the right to remain silent, 2) that anything said may be used against him in court, 3) that he has the right to have an attorney present at questioning, and 4) that, if he cannot afford to retain an attorney, on will be appointed for him. After weighing the evidence and testimony presented at trial, the district court found Detective Wells to be credible and accepted her testimony that she properly advised Mr. Gompf of his Miranda rights. We find nothing in the record which causes us pause in accepting the district court's determination. This Court consistently defers to the district court in situations such as this, where the trial court assessed the credibility of the witnesses and weighed the evidence. Lindsay v. State, 2005 WY 34, ¶ 20, 108 P.3d 852, 857-58 (Wyo.2005). On this record, it is clear that Detective Wells properly advised Mr. Gompf of his rights under Miranda. [¶ 41] Mr. Gompf also argues that his statements to Detective Wells were involuntary and should have been suppressed. We have stated that even confessions obtained after Miranda warnings are subject to scrutiny for voluntariness. Eckenrod v. State, 2003 WY 51, ¶ 26, 67 P.3d 635, 643 (Wyo.2003). For statements to be voluntary, they must result from `free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.' Id. See also, Mitchell v. State, 982 P.2d 717, 721 (Wyo.1999). If a statement resulted from coercion, then it is inadmissible at trial for any purpose because its validity is suspect. Id. [¶ 42] The ultimate issue of whether a statement was voluntary is a question of law, and our standard of review is, therefore, de novo. Mitchell, 982 P.2d at 721. Nevertheless, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact on the voluntariness issue and do not disturb those findings unless they are clearly erroneous. We consider the totality of the circumstances to determine if the defendant's statements were voluntary. Id. [¶ 43] On appeal, Mr. Gompf suggests that his statements to Detective Wells were involuntary because he was under the influence of alcohol and marijuana at the time and was questioned during the early morning hours. He also claims that he was herded upstairs and kept there for hours with the rest of the house's occupants, and was only `allowed' to relieve himself when taken outdoors by one of the police. [¶ 44] The record contradicts Mr. Gompf's contention that his statement was the product of coercion. We recently addressed a claim that the defendant's intoxication rendered his statement involuntary in Gordon, ¶ 15. In that case, we stated: [F]or intoxication to render a confession involuntary, the impairment must be so great so as to deprive an individual of a capacity to understand the meaning of his statements.... [T]he fact that he understood what he was doing, carried on a conversation and responded to questions will render the statements admissible. Id. [¶ 45] Mr. Gompf does not direct us to any evidence in the record to suggest that he was so impaired by drug or alcohol use his statements were involuntary. Furthermore, Detective Wells' testimony indicates that Mr. Gompf was lucid during the interview and offered appropriate responses to her questions. In fact, although he answered some of the detective's questions, he refused to identify his drug supplier or customers. [¶ 46] We also reject Mr. Gompf's characterization of the atmosphere of the interview as coercive and intimidating. Detective Wells testified she and Mr. Gompf were in the room alone and he was unrestrained throughout the interview. Detective Wells characterized the interrogation as her posing questions to Mr. Gompf and he answered if he wanted to. He took advantage of that option by refusing to identify his supplier or customers. Moreover, despite the fact the occupants were watched to ensure that no evidence was compromised, they were basically allowed to do what they pleased. Mr. Gompf apparently slept for a great deal of the time the officers searched the premises, and, when he needed to relieve himself, the officers respected his choice to go outside rather than be accompanied to the restroom by an officer. [¶ 47] On this record, we are convinced that the totality of the circumstances support the conclusion that Mr. Gompf made the statements to Detective Wells of his own free and deliberate choice. The district court's findings were not clearly erroneous, and its decision that Mr. Gompf's statements should not be suppressed was correct. [¶ 48] We affirm the district court's denial of both of Mr. Gompf's motions to suppress.