Opinion ID: 891567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Defendant's Conduct Toward the Police

Text: {24} The State argues that Defendant disturbed the peace by verbally attacking the police officers. The State posits that Defendant's provocative remarks amounted to fighting words, which `by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.' James M., 111 N.M. at 476, 806 P.2d at 1066 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942)) (emphasis added). Fighting words are measured by their likelihood of provoking an average person to react violently, although it is not necessary that the person who is insulted actually react. Id. {25} Our courts have upheld disorderly conduct convictions based on the use of provocative fighting words addressed to a non-police officer. See id. at 477, 806 P.2d at 1067 (upholding the defendant's disorderly conduct conviction where the defendant was arguing with a third party, yelling provocative fighting words, and appeared to be ready to fight). However, our Court of Appeals has previously held that police officers are not average persons when considering the likelihood of provocation, because `[p]olice officers, by the nature of their training, are generally expected to have a higher tolerance for offensive conduct and language.' State v. Hawkins, 1999-NMCA-126, ¶ 11, 128 N.M. 245, 991 P.2d 989 (quoting James M., 111 N.M. at 477, 806 P.2d at 1067). We follow this settled precedent in deciding the present dispute. {26} It is undisputed that Defendant yelled vulgar and profane statements at the police over the course of three hours. However, our Court of Appeals has previously considered similar conduct, and held that [s]creaming obscenities and yelling `get the hell out of the house' do not amount to `fighting' words, particularly when they are addressed to police officers, who are supposed to exercise restraint. State v. Wade, 100 N.M. 152, 155, 667 P.2d 459, 462 (Ct.App. 1983) (citation omitted) (reversing the defendant's conviction for abusing a policeman pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-1(D) (1981), when the defendant screamed obscenities at police, who entered the defendant's home in response to a domestic violence call by his wife); see also Hawkins, 1999-NMCA-126, ¶¶ 4, 15 (reversing the defendant's disorderly conduct conviction for yelling at the police, This isn't a f___ing crack house and Get out of my f___ing yard, because New Mexico is among the states that holds police officers to a higher standard of tolerance for abuse or offensive language.). Usually, arguing with a police officer, even when using profane and insulting words, will not be enough to constitute disorderly conduct, unless the words are coupled with threatening behavior. 12 Am. Jur.2d Breach of Peace and Disorderly Conduct § 32 (2009) (internal citations omitted); see also Salas, 1999-NMCA-099, ¶¶ 20, 37 (upholding the defendant's conviction for disorderly conduct where he spoke loudly, used profanity, and clenched his fists as he walked toward an officer); Hawkins, 1999-NMCA-126, ¶ 19 (distinguishing Salas because the defendant did not clench his fists or otherwise yell threats at the officer). {27} In the present case, the record does not reveal any threatening conduct accompanying Defendant's verbal insults toward the police. During the initial encounter, Defendant closed and locked a metal screen door to separate himself from the officers and to bar access to the inside of his home. The State did not present any evidence indicating that Defendant or Harrison moved to open the locked metal door or attempted to physically confront the officers. After this brief, thirty-second initial encounter, the record indicates that the officers had only two or three short interactions with Defendant over the next three hours. The officers testified that Defendant came out of the house to yell at the officers, but would advance only as far as the porch before quickly retreating inside to avoid arrest. Defendant's conduct, while cowardly and surely irritating, posed no threat to the officers present at the scene. {28} The State did not argue or otherwise present evidence that Defendant's conduct posed any actual threat of violence to the officers. Officer Maes testified that the officers thought we were going to be threatened, there was a possibility to be harmed. [10] However, in a similar case, the Court of Appeals reasoned that an officer's perception that a suspect might become combative was insufficient to support a disorderly conduct conviction. State v. Doe, 92 N.M. 100, 102, 583 P.2d 464, 466 (1978) (reversing the defendant's disorderly conduct conviction where he argued with police officers during traffic stop but was not combative and no act of violence was attempted). {29} It is also significant that Defendant's taunting, even though his words may have been threatening, occurred at a distance. The amount of provocation created by Defendant's words might have been greater if Defendant were closer to the officers. In this case, Defendant refused to leave his porch, indicating that he feared or sought to avoid actual confrontation with the officers. Indeed, Officer Townsend testified that the officers were waiting for Defendant to come outside so that they could place him under arrest for disorderly conduct. If Defendant had advanced beyond his porch or physically threatened the officers, they would have seized upon the opportunity to arrest him. {30} We are not indifferent to the officers in this case. Their valuable role in confronting situations of conflict often carries with it the unfortunate consequence of verbal abuse. The officers in this situation exercised admirable restraint in the face of Defendant's rude, obnoxious, and ... vulgar speech. However, it is because of their degree of skill, training, and experience that we rely on officers not to react to verbal provocation, at the risk of escalating a situation rife with conflict. Accordingly, without evidence of anything more than profane and vulgar remarks, the evidence is insufficient to support Defendant's conviction based on what he said to the officers. As our Court of Appeals noted in Hawkins, New Mexico decided this issue years ago, and the State has not provided us with any compelling reason that persuades us to overrule existing precedent. 1999-NMCA-126, ¶ 15, 128 N.M. 245, 991 P.2d 989 (citation omitted).