Opinion ID: 762456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Indiana Constitution

Text: 17 Klunk also alleged a supplemental state law claim, alleging that the defendants violated his rights under the Indiana Constitution. Article I, Section 9, of the Indiana Constitution provides that: 18 No law shall be passed, restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever: but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible. 19 Klunk contends that this provision provides greater protection than the First Amendment; the district court disagreed, noting that no Indiana case established greater protection for government employees under this provision than provided by the First Amendment. 20 Where state law provides the rule of decision, the federal courts must predict how the highest court of the state would decide the case if presented with the case today. See McGeshick v. Choucair, 72 F.3d 62, 65 (7th Cir.1995); Konradi v. United States, 919 F.2d 1207, 1213 (7th Cir.1990). To the extent that the state's highest court has not addressed an issue, we examine the decisions of the lower state courts. See, e.g., King v. Damiron Corp., 113 F.3d 93, 95 (7th Cir.1997). 21 We first note that the Indiana Supreme Court has not addressed a claim such as Klunk's with regard to the state constitution. In Price v. Indiana, the Indiana Supreme Court addressed Art. I, § 9 in the context of a prosecution for disorderly conduct. Price was charged with disorderly conduct (and public intoxication) after loudly berating a police officer in the early morning hours. 622 N.E.2d 954, 960 (Ind.1993). The Supreme Court addressed whether her conviction violated Art. I, § 9. The Court noted that expression is a core constitutional value under the Indiana Constitution, on which the government may not impose a material burden. It then weighed the speaker's interest in political speech with other individuals' rights to order and public peace. It struck a balance between the two by holding that if the speaker merely caused a public nuisance, the lack of a specific injury to any person would preclude a finding of abuse, and therefore, Art. I, § 9 would protect such expression. However, Price also noted that expression does not hold the same preferred place under the Indiana Constitution that it does under the United States Constitution and declined to endorse the overbreadth analysis which we apply under the First Amendment. Id. at 958. 22 A subsequent case, Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1363 (Ind.1996), also involved a conviction for disorderly conduct. In this case, Whittington began yelling and shouting after police officers arrived at the scene of a domestic disturbance. The Indiana Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that all expression is protected, but that if the government has a rational basis for curbing speech or expression, that basis will be respected by the courts. Id. at 1369. The Court then held that if the expression was political in nature, the State must show that it has not materially burdened the speaker's right to political expression. Id. To do so, the State may prove that the freedom of speech was only slightly impaired, or that particularized harm would be inflicted on readily identifiable private interests. Id. at 1370. 23 Thus, we see that in both Price and Whittington, the Indiana Supreme Court balanced the interests of the private individual in speaking against the State's interests in order and peace. From this methodology, we conclude that the Indiana Supreme Court would also apply a balancing test to Klunk's case, where Klunk's interest in running for the School Board would be balanced against the St. Joseph County Juvenile Probation Department's interests in administering impartial and non-political services. 24 The Indiana Supreme Court has not yet addressed a situation where the government employee seeks protection under Art. I, § 9. However, the Indiana Supreme Court applied the Pickering balancing test to a First Amendment claim of a government employee in Indiana Dept. of Highways v. Dixon, 541 N.E.2d 877 (Ind.1989). The Court held that the State may not fire or discipline one of its employees for making statements if the speech meets the three part test developed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 882. But the Indiana Supreme Court did not specifically mention the state constitution. Thus, as the decisions of the Indiana Supreme Court do not specify how it would address a state employee claim under Art. I, § 9, we turn to the decisions of Indiana's lower courts. 25 The Indiana Courts of Appeals have concluded that the Pickering balancing test is equally applicable to the free expression protected under the Indiana Constitution. In Lach v. Lake County, 621 N.E.2d 357, 360 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), the appellate court applied the Pickering balancing test to a government employee's free expression claim, noting that Indiana's Constitution, statutory provisions, and common law requires a finding that Lach's statements constituted protected speech for which Lach was improperly disciplined. And in Davidson v. City of Elkhart, 696 N.E.2d 58, 61 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), the Court of Appeals stated that the Pickering balancing test has been adopted by the courts of this state. Based on these decisions, we conclude that the Indiana Supreme Court would adopt a balancing test in Klunk's case, and we find persuasive the view of Indiana's lower courts, that the Indiana Supreme Court would apply the Pickering balancing test to government employees claiming an infringement of Art. I, § 9 of the Indiana Constitution. 26 Klunk can point to very little to contradict this conclusion. He notes that in Lach the Court of Appeals quoted Chief Justice Randall Shepard of the Indiana Supreme Court, writing in a law review article, in support of the proposition that Art. I, § 9 provides greater protection than the First Amendment. 621 N.E.2d at 358 n. 1. Despite this statement, the Lach court applied the Pickering balancing test to the facts of the case. As Lach itself did not give any content to the greater protection under Indiana's Constitution, we choose to give weight to what Lach held rather than to its offhand remark, contained in a footnote, regarding a law review article by one Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court. 27 Our own research also turned up § 33-1-17-3 of the Indiana Code, which states that: Except when on duty or acting in an official capacity and except where otherwise provided by state or federal law, a court employee may not be: (1) discouraged from engaging in political activity; or (2) denied the right to choose to refrain from engaging in political activity. This statute, enacted in 1995, about a year after Klunk was terminated, has not yet been addressed by state or federal courts. This text of the statute appears ambiguous: If the phrase except where otherwise provided by state or federal law incorporates the Pickering test, then the statute is merely descriptive of current law. On the other hand, if the statute is intended to indicate that judicial employees are to be treated as private citizens, Indiana law would provide greater protection than the First Amendment. Regardless of how this ambiguity is resolved in the future, it holds no moment for this case. Klunk was terminated before it existed, and he did not advance this statute before the district court or this court. Moreover, we believe that decisions of the Indiana Court of Appeals are more persuasive than this ambiguous statute, and it does not persuade us that the Indiana Supreme Court would not adopt the Pickering test. 28 Thus, the district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendants on both the federal and state law claims. 29 AFFIRMED.