Opinion ID: 1169839
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Option Three

Text: Finally, Option Three i.e., that Act 1 left the Director's discretion under HRS § 286-261(b), accorded by the adoption and codification of Act 188, completely intact and unchangedis likewise unacceptable. As noted in section III.B.2.f. of this opinion, supra, Act 1, section 20 provided, inter alia, that the substantive provisions of Act 1 superseded those of Act 188 to the extent that the two were in conflict. As configured in Act 188, see section III.B.2.c. of this opinion, supra, HRS § 286-261(c) expressly declared that the periods of administrative revocation enumerated in HRS §§ 286-261(b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) were minimum[s]both with respect to arrestees who submitted to breath or blood testing and those who refused to do soand expressly granted the Director the discretion to impose periods of administrative revocation longer than those minimums. Accordingly, HRS § 286-261(c), as originally codified, enabled the Director to ensure that arrestees who refused to be tested for blood alcohol concentration could always be subject to periods of administrative revocation that were enhanced beyond those of their non-refusing counterparts. [28] Act 1, however, materially revised HRS § 286-261(c) from its originally codified form, inter alia, by stripping it of the term minimum, by which Act 188 had established that the Director generally possessed the discretion to revise upward the enhanced revocation periods to which refusers were subject. See section III.B.2.f. of this opinion, supra. Thus, HRS § 286-261(c), as amended by Act 1, merely provided that [t]he license of an arrestee who refuses to be tested after being informed of the sanctions of this part shall be revoked under subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), or (3) for a period of one year, two years, and four years, respectively. (Emphasis added.) See id. At the same time, HRS § 286-261(b) retained the prefatory phrase [t]he periods of administrative revocation which may be imposed, thereby preserving the Director's power to exercise discretion regarding the duration of administrative revocations imposed upon non-refusing arrestees pursuant to subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) thereof. See section III.B.3.a. of this opinion, supra. Construing HRS §§ 286-261(b) and -261(c) in pari materia, see HRS § 1-16, supra at note 15, the inference is inescapable that Act 1 divested the Director of the discretion to vary the periods of administrative revocation for refusing arrestees enumerated in HRS § 286-261(c). See In re Tax Appeal of Fasi, 63 Haw. at 626-27, 634 P.2d at 101. To that extent, Act 1 was in conflict with Act 188 and therefore superseded it. By the same token, the inference is inescapable that HRS § 286-261(c), as amended by Act 1, was intended to limit the Director's discretion, under HRS § 286-261(b), to increase the periods of administrative revocation imposed upon non-refusing arrestees pursuant to subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3). Were this not so, the Director could, as a discretionary matter, subject a non-refusing arrestee to a greater period of administrative revocation under HRS § 286-261(b) than would be imposed, as a mandatory and nondiscretionary matter, upon the arrestee's refusing counterpart under HRS § 286-261(c). In light of the legislative history of HRS § 286-261, see generally section III.B.2. of this opinion, supra, such a result would be inconsistent with the purposes of HARDLA and, therefore, illogical and absurd. See Griffin, 83 Hawai`i at 108 n. 4, 924 P.2d at 1214 n. 4; Toyomura, 80 Hawai`i at 20, 904 P.2d at 905; HRS § 1-15(3).