Opinion ID: 1897530
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Freedom of Intimate Association

Text: [B]ecause the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State. Id. at 618, 104 S.Ct. at 3250, 82 L.Ed. 2d at 471. The freedom to maintain personal relationships or to engage in intimate associations is thus a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights. Rotary Club, supra, 481 U.S. at 545, 107 S.Ct. at 1945, 95 L.Ed. 2d at 484. Although the Supreme Court has never set the precise boundaries of this freedom, [t]he intimate relationships to which [it] has accorded constitutional protection include marriage, the begetting and bearing of children, child rearing and education, and cohabitation with relatives. Id. at 545, 107 S.Ct. at 1945-46, 95 L.Ed. 2d at 484 (citations omitted). The freedom of intimate association, however, is not restricted to family relationships; rather, the Court has emphasized that the First Amendment protects those relationships... that presuppose `deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences and beliefs but also distinctly personal aspects of one's life.' Id. at 545, 107 S.Ct. at 1946, 95 L.Ed. 2d at 484 (quoting Roberts, supra, 468 U.S. at 619-20, 104 S.Ct. at 3250, 82 L.Ed. 2d at 472). Two seminal cases have considered the claims of national membership organizations that the intimate association rights of their members had been abridged by the application of state laws similar to the LAD. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees , the Jaycees brought an action contending that application of Minnesota's public accommodations law requiring the organization to admit women as regular members violated the male members' intimate association rights. Under the Jaycees' Bylaws, men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five were eligible for regular membership, whereas only associate membership was available to women. Roberts, supra, 468 U.S. at 613, 104 S.Ct. at 3248, 82 L.Ed. 2d at 468. Unlike regular members, associate members could not vote, hold office, or participate in certain leadership training and awards programs. Ibid. Nonetheless, as associate members, women attend[ed] various meetings, participate[d] in selected projects, and engage[d] in many of the organization's social functions. Id. at 621, 104 S.Ct. at 3251, 82 L.Ed. 2d at 473. Based on those facts, the Supreme Court concluded that the Jaycees chapters lack[ed] the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to the decision of its members to exclude women. Id. at 621, 104 S.Ct. at 3251, 82 L.Ed. 2d at 474. Specifically, the Court emphasized that the local chapters of the Jaycees are neither small nor selective, and that much of the activity central to the formation and maintenance of the association involves the participation of strangers to that relationship. Ibid. At the time of trial, the local chapters involved in the suit had approximately 400 members, id. at 621, 104 S.Ct. at 3251, 82 L.Ed. 2d at 473, and the organization had 295,000 members nationwide, id. at 613, 104 S.Ct. at 3246, 82 L.Ed. 2d at 468. Furthermore, [a]part from age and sex, neither the national organization nor the local chapters employ[ed] any criteria for judging applicants for membership. Ibid. In Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, the Court again considered a First Amendment challenge to a state antidiscrimination statute requiring a national membership organization to admit women. There, the charter of a local chapter of Rotary International was revoked by the national organization because it admitted women members. Rotary Club, supra, 481 U.S. at 541, 107 S.Ct. at 1943, 95 L.Ed. 2d at 482. Under the Rotary constitution, women were excluded from membership, although women [were] permitted to attend meetings, give speeches, and receive awards. Id. at 541, 107 S.Ct. at 1943, 95 L.Ed. 2d at 481. The local chapter and two of its female members brought an action challenging the national organization's exclusionary policy under the California civil rights statute. Id. at 541, 107 S.Ct. at 1943, 95 L.Ed. 2d at 482. Rotary International argued that requiring it to admit women would infringe on its right of intimate association. Once again the Court concluded that the relationship among [the organization's] members is not the kind of intimate or private relation that warrants constitutional protection. Id. at 546, 107 S.Ct. at 1946, 95 L.Ed. 2d at 484-85. The Court noted that local chapters ranged in size from fewer than 20 [members] to more than 900, and that the national organization did not set an upper limit on the membership of any local Rotary Club. Id. at 546, 107 S.Ct. at 1946, 95 L.Ed. 2d at 485. The Court also emphasized Rotary International's inclusive membership policy, pointing to the organization's own declaration that [t]he purpose of Rotary `is to produce an inclusive, not exclusive, membership.'  Ibid. In order to fulfill this purpose, [t]he clubs ... [were] instructed to `keep a flow of prospects coming' to make up for ... attrition and gradually to enlarge membership. Ibid. Most important, Rotary International's membership policy was designed to `enabl[e] the club to be a true cross section of the business and professional life of the community.' Ibid. On these facts, the Court concluded that [s]uch an inclusive `fellowship for service based on diversity of interest,' ... does not suggest the kind of private or personal relationship to which we have accorded protection under the First Amendment. Id. at 546-47, 107 S.Ct. at 1946, 95 L.Ed. 2d at 485. Those cases teach us to consider, among other things, size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship, when we examine membership organizations to determine whether a protectable intimate association right is present. Id. at 546, 107 S.Ct. at 1946, 95 L.Ed. 2d at 485; see also Roberts, supra, 468 U.S. at 620, 104 S.Ct. at 3251, 82 L.Ed. 2d at 473 (stating that factors ... relevant [to an intimate association analysis] include size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent). As applied to Boy Scouts, we find that its large size, nonselectivity, inclusive rather than exclusive purpose, and practice of inviting or allowing nonmembers to attend meetings, establish that the organization is not sufficiently personal or private to warrant constitutional protection under the freedom of intimate association. As a preliminary matter, contrary to Boy Scouts' assertion, whether we evaluate the Boy Scout organization at the national or local troop level, the result would be the same. See supra at 598 n. 9, 734 A. 2d at 1215 n. 9. Either way, Boy Scouts cannot claim the right of intimate association for its members. Because Boy Scouts' argument is necessarily stronger at the smaller troop level, we will consider the intimate association factors as applied to local troops. Boy Scouts informs us that a typical Boy Scout troop consists of between fifteen and thirty boys and several adult leaders. In Rotary Club, the Supreme Court specifically held that a local club with as few as twenty members did not qualify as the kind of intimate or private relation that warrants constitutional protection. 481 U.S. at 546, 107 S.Ct. at 1946, 95 L.Ed. 2d at 484-85. Moreover, Boy Scout troops are unselective in their membership. See supra at 599-602, 734 A. 2d at 1216-17. Any boy between the ages of eleven and seventeen can join; indeed, Boy Scouts has quite clearly said that any boy is welcome. See id. at 601, 734 A. 2d at 1217. Boy Scouts also has not set an upper limit on the number of boys who can join, but instead, actively seeks to interest as many boys as possible through advertising and other outreach methods. See id. at 590-91, 734 A. 2d at 1211. Even if Boy Scouts is more selective in choosing its leaders, leaders do not substitute for the boys' parents, see id. at 602-03, 734 A. 2d at 1218; nor do they have private or intimate relationships with troop members. Relationships within the troop are simply not the kind of ... personal relationship[s] to which [the Supreme Court has] accorded protection under the First Amendment. Rotary Club, supra, 481 U.S. at 547, 107 S.Ct. at 1946, 95 L.Ed. 2d at 485. Boy Scouts' inclusive purpose deserves further discussion in this context. Like the Rotary Clubs analyzed by the Supreme Court, the purpose of Boy Scouts is to produce inclusive, not exclusive membership. Id. at 546, 107 S.Ct. at 1946, 95 L.Ed. 2d at 485. Boy Scouts has made a commitment to ensure that its membership is representative of all of the population. See supra at 598, 734 A. 2d at 1215. Such an inclusive fellowship ... based on diversity of interest, however beneficial to the members is also not indicative of a protectable form of intimate association. Rotary Club, supra, 481 U.S. at 546-47, 107 S.Ct. at 1946, 95 L.Ed. 2d at 485. Boy Scouts' practice of inviting or allowing nonmembers to attend certain troop meetings further persuades us that Boy Scouts cannot claim the right of intimate association. In Rotary Club, the Supreme Court observed that [m]any of the Rotary Clubs' central activities [were] carried on in the presence of strangers .... [and that] clubs [were] encouraged to seek coverage of their meetings and activities in local newspapers. Id. at 547, 107 S.Ct. at 1946-47, 95 L.Ed. 2d at 485. In the Court's view, this negated Rotary International's claim that the California Civil Rights Act interfere[d] unduly with the members' freedom of private association. Id. at 547, 107 S.Ct. at 1947, 95 L.Ed. 2d at 485. Likewise, Boy Scouts' practice of inviting nonmembers to School Nights and other similar activities undermines its intimate association claim. See supra at 572, 734 A. 2d at 1201. We conclude that Boy Scouts has not demonstrated a protectable intimate association right under the First Amendment.