Opinion ID: 1674515
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Abandonment by Counsel

Text: Oddly, Ervin argues that the motion court clearly erred in considering his 29.15 claims. He reasons that because the amended motion was not timely filed, his counsel abandoned him. Ervin argues that this abandonment merits reversal and remand for appointment of new counsel, the filing of a proper and timely amended motion, and a new hearing on Ervin's claims. Ervin correctly notes that the failure of post-conviction counsel to comply with the time requirements of Rule 29.15(f) constitutes a form of abandonment by post-conviction counsel. Sanders v. State, 807 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. banc 1991). The proper forum to address claims regarding the failure of post-conviction counsel to comply with the time requirements of Rule 29.15(f) is in the circuit court where the motion is being prosecuted by movant. Sanders, 807 S.W.2d at 495. The motion court, however, shall order relief only where the movant is free of responsibility for the failure to comply with the requirements of the rule. Id. If the untimeliness of the amended motion is the exclusive result of counsel's action or inaction, the court shall consider the amended motion as having been timely filed and proceed according to the provisions of the rule. Id. In most circumstances, remand is proper so that the motion court may determine the cause of the untimeliness. However, where motion counsel admits in a motion for the extension of time that the delay was precipitated entirely by a burdensome caseload, no inquiry by the motion court is necessary. The record is barren of any indication that Ervin had any part in causing the five-day delay. Furthermore, as indicated, Ervin's counsel presented evidence on the amended claims at the evidentiary hearing; the 29.15 court rule on the merits of all of the claims in Ervin's amended motion including those filed late. Remand to the motion court would serve no purpose beyond delay. The point is denied.