Opinion ID: 4014803
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: district court proceedings on remand

Text: On remand, the district court, in April to July 2014, “granted Petitioner’s multiple requests for additional time to investigate and develop Petitioner’s remaining claims for relief and authorized Petitioner to expend resources in excess of the statutory cap set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 3599(g) (2) for investigative and expert assistance.” 8 On November 13, 2014, the district court held a status conference concerning pending motions, 9 and it entered an order granting in part Trevino’s motions for additional time and for expert funding that same day, which reads, in part: After hearing arguments from both parties, for the reasons discussed at length during the hearing, the parties are directed to file amended pleadings designed to clarify the issues remaining in this cause and Petitioner should be permitted to proceed with some, but not all, of the expert examination of Petitioner requested in the motion for expert assistance. Once the parties have clarified their positions and the issues are more focused, the Court will hold another hearing to ascertain how best to proceed with the remainder of this cause. 10 On February 2, 2015, Trevino filed his second amended federal habeas petition, and the state filed its response on May 26, 2015. On June 11, 2015, without holding a hearing or otherwise alerting the parties to its impending decision, the district court sua sponte issued its 36page memorandum opinion and order, based on the pleadings, denying all 7 Trevino v. Stephens, 740 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2014). 8 Trevino v. Stephens, No. CIV. SA-01-CA-306-XR, 2015 WL 3651534, at  (W.D. Tex. June 11, 2015) (citations omitted). 9 See Minutes of Civil Proceedings, Docket Number SA-01-CA-306-XR, ECF Doc. 137 (Nov. 13, 2014). 10 See Order Granting in Part Motion for Expert Funding and Setting New Filing Deadlines, Docket Number SA-01-CA-306-XR, ECF Doc. 138 (Nov. 13, 2014). 8 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 9 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 relief under the second amended habeas petition and denying a COA. 11 The court noted that it had rejected all five claims presented in Trevino’s first amended habeas petition on the merits and had alternatively held that two of them were procedurally defaulted, including the ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim now presented in his second amended petition. 12 In its new order, it reasoned that Trevino failed to show cause for excusing his procedural default even under Martinez/Trevino, but even if he could overcome the procedural default, his claim would still be subject to dismissal on the merits because none of the “new” mitigating evidence referred to in the second amended petition changed the district court’s analysis set out in its earlier opinion, as discussed below.
With respect to the Martinez/Trevino issue, the district court concluded that Trevino still had failed to overcome the procedural default bar. Specifically, it held that Trevino failed to sufficiently allege that his state habeas counsel was ineffective, on the ground that the evidence at issue was not available to the first state habeas counsel at the time. 13 The court explained that none of the “new” mitigating evidence (including testimony from Trevino’s mother and evidence about his background and history) had been gathered by his state trial counsel. 14 The district court reasoned that Trevino’s state habeas counsel cannot reasonably be faulted, much less declared “ineffective,” for failing to develop and present an ineffective assistance claim during Petitioner’s initial state habeas corpus proceeding premised upon “new” mitigating evidence absent some showing this “new” mitigating evidence was reasonably available to said 11 2015 WL 3651534. 12 Id. at . 13 Id. at -6. 14 Id. 9 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 10 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 counsel at the time of Petitioner’s initial state habeas corpus proceeding. 15 On this basis, the district court held that Trevino had failed to show cause under Martinez/Trevino for his procedural default, and that his claim was still subject to dismissal on this ground alone. The district court also held that even if Trevino had overcome the procedural default bar, his claim should be dismissed on the merits.
On its merits determination, the district court relied extensively on its alternative holding in its 2009 opinion that the “new” mitigating evidence (concerning Trevino’s character, childhood abuse and neglect, alcohol and narcotics abuse, school performance, and possible FASD) could not outweigh the substantial aggravating evidence presented at trial. 16 The district court listed some of the aggravating evidence, including Trevino’s “callous comments” following the murder of Salinas, his participation in the violent assault, and his gang membership, but the district court placed special emphasis on “the complete and total absence of any indication the Petitioner has ever expressed sincere contrition or genuine remorse over Salinas’ murder.” 17 In the district court’s estimation, Trevino’s apparent lack of remorse seemed to be the primary piece of aggravating evidence: The latter point cannot be over-emphasized. Salinas’ murder was particularly brutal and senseless. Yet Petitioner has consistently refused to acknowledge his role in her murder, even to his own trial 15 Id. 16 Id. at -4 (quoting Trevino v. Thaler, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 471–72). The court also stated that “neither the Fifth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has rejected this Court’s legal conclusions or factual findings underlying its determination that Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance by his trial counsel asserted in his first amended petition lacked merit,” id., but it is more accurate to say that neither the Fifth Circuit nor the Supreme Court addressed the merits at all. 17 2015 WL 3651534 at -4. 10 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 11 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 counsel, claiming instead to have been “too stoned” to remember exactly what happened that evening. Petitioner’s own affidavit, executed June 11, 2004, contains not even a scintilla of sincere contrition; instead Petitioner expresses hostility and blames his trial counsel for allegedly misrepresenting the terms of a proffered plea bargain for a life sentence without accepting any responsibility for his own rejection of the offer after it was accurately described to Petitioner. Absent some indication the Petitioner has willingly accepted responsibility for his role in Salinas’ brutal rape and murder, the evidence showing Petitioner’s long history of alcohol and drug abuse, long history of criminal misconduct, and membership in violent street and prison gangs precludes this Court from finding this aspect of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims herein satisfies the prejudice prong of Strickland. There is simply no reasonable probability that, but for the failure of Petitioner’s trial counsel to present Petitioner’s capital sentencing jury with the additional, double-edged, mitigating evidence now before this Court, the outcome of the punishment phase of Petitioner’s capital trial would have been different. 18 The district court concluded that the second amended petition did not change the balance because the “new” mitigating evidence was fundamentally the same “double-edged” evidence it had addressed in its earlier opinion. 19 The district court summarized the “new” evidence as follows: Petitioner asserts that trial counsel could have called various witnesses who would have offered supportive testimony (e.g., Janet Cruz, the mother of his two children; Mario Cantu, friend; Ruben Gonzalez, employer; Jennifer DeLeon, his sister). One of the experts recently retained opines that Petitioner “presents with characteristics of Fetal Alcohol Affect”, and a “low average range of intellectual functioning.” She further opines that his “history of Fetal Alcohol Affect, along with his history of physical and emotional abuse” contributed to his “inability to make appropriate decisions.” She opines that this may also have 18 Id. (quoting Trevino, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 471-72). 19 Id. at . 11 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 12 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 contributed to Petitioner rejecting the plea offer made to him that would have spared him from the death sentence. Another expert opines that based on his preliminary assessment, Petitioner suffers from “8 domains” of poor “cognitive functioning,” (i.e., academics, verbal and visuospatial memory, visuospatial construction, processing speed, executive functioning, communication skills, daily living skills and socialization skills). This expert states that although his assessment is a “critical component in the FASD diagnostic process,” the diagnosis of FASD must be made by a medical doctor. According to this expert, yet unexamined is whether Petitioner’s “FASD has resulted in an organic brain disorder.” In summary, Petitioner argues that, had the “jury been able to consider [Petitioner’s] mixed up and unexplainable turbulent and chaotic life history on the mitigating side of the scale, there is unquestionably a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance.” 20 The expert “recently retained” was Dr. Rebecca A. Dyer, Ph.D., of Forensic Associates of San Antonio, whose 18-page report dated May 6, 2004, was attached to Trevino’s earlier habeas petition that was the subject of the district court’s 2009 opinion, and was again attached to his second amended habeas petition. 21 The district court correctly set out the standards for uncalled witnesses and uninvestigated facts as follows: “To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim based upon uncalled witnesses, an applicant must name the witness, demonstrate that the witness would have testified, set out the content of the witness’s proposed testimony, and show that the testimony would have been favorable.” Gregory v. Thaler, 601 F.3d 347, 352 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 911, 131 S. Ct. 265, 178 L. Ed. 2d 175 (2010). “An applicant ‘who alleges a failure to investigate on the part of his counsel must allege with specificity what the 20 Id. at -8 (footnotes omitted). 21 2015 WL 3651534 at  n.12. 12 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 13 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 investigation would have revealed and how it would have altered the outcome of the trial.’” Id. 22 Applying these standards, the district court addressed two distinct categories of proposed evidence: (1) character witness testimony and (2) evidence pertaining to Trevino’s possible FASD. 23 The district court explained that although the character witness testimony did contain some mitigating evidence, it contained a great deal of aggravating evidence as well, which would serve to bolster the prosecution’s case. 24 Among the aggravating evidence was testimony that Trevino was “always high” from sniffing spray paint, that he was abusive to the mother of one of his children and had two sides to his personality, that he was “always jealous,” “angry,” “violent,” and “impulsive” even when he was not drunk, and that he always had a gun. 25 Thus, the district court concluded that the “new” character witness testimony was “double-edged” and, if introduced, could not have affected the outcome. Next, the district court found that the FASD evidence was also “doubleedged,” though the court’s language suggested that the FASD evidence may be more mitigating than aggravating: Finally, this Court has previously noted the double-edged nature of a diagnosis of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome or Fetal Alcohol Effects. This Court has also noted that a diagnosis of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome or Fetal Alcohol Effects or Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder was not within the mainstream of psychological diagnosis and treatment at the time of Petitioner’s 1997 capital murder trial. In sum, the “new” evidence presented by Petitioner, while admittedly containing some mitigating aspects (particularly those concerning Petitioner’s mother’s alcoholism and the likelihood Petitioner suffers from Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder), also 22 Id. at . 23 Id. at -10. 24 Id. 25 Id. 13 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 14 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 contains a plethora of information which would have assisted the prosecution in obtaining an affirmative answer to the Texas capital sentencing scheme’s future dangerousness special issue. 26 After characterizing all of the proposed “new” evidence as “doubleedged,” the district court turned to the question of whether Trevino’s trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, setting out the same standards we will apply here: To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and to establish prejudice he must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390–91, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). A few highlights from Strickland should be noted. “Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. “Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards” are mere guides. Id. 27 The district court concluded that Trevino had failed to satisfy either the performance or prejudice prong of Strickland. On the performance prong, the district court essentially concluded that the evidence simply was not available to his trial counsel at the time of his trial and therefore counsel’s failure to investigate it could not constitute deficient performance. 28 The district court stated that “trial counsel was not wholly inattentive to developing mitigating 26 Id. at  (footnotes omitted) (citing Sells v. Thaler, 2012 WL 2562666,  (W.D. Tex. June 28, 2012), COA denied, 536 F. App’x 483 (5th Cir. July 22, 2013), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S. Ct. 1786, 188 L. Ed. 2d 612 (2014) (“[P]ursuit of a defense at the punishment phase of petitioner’s trial premised upon petitioner suffering from fetal alcohol syndrome or fetal alcohol effects would have amounted to an admission by petitioner’s trial counsel that petitioner would, in fact, pose a substantial risk of future violent conduct.”)). 27 2015 WL 3651534 at -11. 28 Id. at . 14 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 15 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 evidence,” in that he interviewed Trevino’s stepfather, and Trevino “failed to assist his trial counsel in identifying any family members or others who may have provided mitigating testimony.” 29 With respect to the evidence of Trevino’s mother’s alcohol abuse during pregnancy, the court noted that Trevino’s mother did not provide a sworn statement until 2004 and did not state that she would have been available to testify at the 1997 trial. 30 “Accordingly, it is difficult to understand how trial counsel could reasonably be blamed for not locating Ms. Trevino prior to Petitioner’s 1997 capital murder trial and presenting potentially mitigating evidence from this witness.” 31 The court also found that the FASD claim should be denied primarily on the performance prong because Trevino failed to show that the evidence was available at the time of trial. 32 In sum, the district court found that there was no evidence that Trevino’s state trial counsel knew or should have known about additional character witnesses or about the factual basis for a possible FASD claim. On the second prong of Strickland, the district court concluded that, even if Trevino could show that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard, that failure did not result in prejudice. Again, the district court set out the correct legal standards, which are also applicable to this COA application, but the district court focused primarily on the character witness testimony: In evaluating prejudice in the context of the punishment phase of a capital trial, a federal habeas court must re-weigh all the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence (had the Petitioner’s trial counsel chosen a different course). Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 20, 130 S. Ct. 383, 175 L. 29 Id. 30 Id. 31 Id. 32 Id. at . 15 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 16 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 Ed. 2d 328 (2009); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2003). Strickland does not require the State to “rule out” or negate a sentence of life in prison to prevail; rather, it places the burden on the defendant to show a “reasonable probability” that the result of the punishment phase of a capital murder trial would have been different. Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. at 27. The prejudice inquiry under Strickland requires evaluating whether there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Brown v. Thaler, 684 F.3d 482, 491 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S. Ct. 770, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011)), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S. Ct. 1244, 185 L. Ed. 2d 190 (2013). Federal habeas corpus petitioners asserting claims of ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure to call a witness satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis only by naming the witness, demonstrating the witness was available to testify and would have done so, setting out the content of the witness’ proposed testimony, and showing the testimony would have been favorable to a particular defense. Woodfox v. Cain, 609 F.3d 774, 808 (5th Cir. 2010); Day v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 527, 538 (5th Cir. 2009). 33 The district court found it sufficient that Trevino’s trial counsel presented the testimony of his aunt, “albeit in a cursory fashion,” to explain “the facts that Petitioner’s mother was an alcoholic and Petitioner’s family lived on welfare in public housing.” 34 The court concluded that the proposed “new” character witness testimony could not have changed the result because, “in addition to noting that Petitioner was raised in a very troubled household and neighborhood, and that he was kind and caring at times, these individuals also have described Petitioner as a man quickly prone to angry and violent 33 2015 WL 3651534 at -13. 34 Id. at . 16 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 17 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 outbursts.” 35 In the district court’s view, the character witness testimony is only weakly mitigating and contains highly aggravating evidence, so there is no reason to believe it would serve any meaningful mitigation purpose. In summing up its conclusion that the “new” evidence could not have changed the outcome (i.e., the failure to introduce it was not prejudicial under Strickland), the district court focused on the heinous nature of the crime, the fact that there was a great deal of aggravating evidence, and the fact that the proposed character witness testimony contained additional aggravating evidence in addition to fairly inconsequential mitigating evidence. 36 In short, it concluded that the “new” mitigating evidence simply could not outweigh the aggravating evidence because it was “double-edged,” placing greater emphasis on the character witness testimony. Because the district court concluded that Trevino failed to satisfy either prong of Strickland, it denied relief on the merits.
The district court did not hold an evidentiary hearing because it found Trevino “has failed to allege specific facts which, if proven, would entitle Petitioner to federal habeas corpus relief in this cause.” 37 Because it based its decision on the pleadings, an evidentiary hearing could not affect the outcome.
Based on all the above, the district court denied all relief under the second amended petition. It also denied a COA. Although it noted that “[i]n death penalty cases, any doubt as to whether a CoA should issue must be resolved in the petitioner’s favor,” it concluded there was no such doubt here, 35 Id. 36 Id. at . 37 2015 WL 3651534 at . 17 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 18 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 at least with respect to the Martinez/Trevino procedural default issue (i.e., whether Trevino sufficiently alleged that his state habeas counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to raise the ineffective-assistance-of-trialcounsel claim) and the prejudice prong of Strickland. 38