Opinion ID: 179811
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Second-Degree Home Invasion

Text: Defendant conceded at his initial sentencing that his plea-based conviction for second-degree home invasion was properly counted as a crime of violence. On remand, defendant argued for the first time that, in fact, the house could not have been an occupied dwelling under Michigan law because the residents had died and the house was vacant. See People v. Hider, 135 Mich.App. 147, 351 N.W.2d 905, 907-08 (1984). In essence, however, this is a challenge to the factual basis of the underlying conviction; not to whether the conviction was for a crime of violence. Second-degree home invasion is defined under Michigan law as committed by one who breaks and enters a dwelling with intent to commit a felony, larceny, or assault in the dwelling, or enters a dwelling without permission with intent to commit a felony, larceny, or assault in the dwelling, or enters a dwelling without permission and, at any time while he or she is entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling, commits a felony, larceny, or assault. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.110a(3). As this court has previously recognized, a conviction for second-degree home invasion under Michigan law is the equivalent of the enumerated offense of burglary of a dwelling and therefore constitutes a crime of violence. See United States v. Hart, 104 Fed.Appx. 469, 470 (6th Cir.2004); United States v. Horton, 163 Fed.Appx. 378, 382 (6th Cir.2006); United States v. Howard, 327 Fed.Appx. 573, 575-76 (6th Cir.2009).