Opinion ID: 854050
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Willsey's Statement

Text: Willsey contends that the trial court erred in admitting Trooper Johnson's testimony recounting Willsey's post arrest statements in response to police questioning. Specifically, she maintains that before she was questioned or read the Miranda warnings she invoked her Fifth Amendment rights by making repeated requests to speak with her attorney. She contends police failed to honor her requests and initiated the interrogation, rendering her statements inadmissible under Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990), Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [3] This issue turns on whether Willsey did in fact invoke the right to counsel. Willsey filed a motion to suppress these statements and objected to their introduction at trial. At the hearing on her motion to suppress Willsey testified that she asserted her right to counsel on at least three occasions and that the police ignored her requests. Despite this testimony, neither Willsey nor the State framed the suppression argument in terms of Edwards, which requires that any statements made by a suspect in custody after a request for counsel be suppressed unless the suspect initiates a resumption of the dialog. Instead both parties at the hearing focused on whether Willsey's waiver of rights and her statement were voluntary. Willsey's failure to raise Edwards explicitly may explain why the State's witnesses did not directly confirm or contest Willsey's claim that she requested counsel and the trial court made no explicit findings on the point. Nevertheless, Willsey's testimony at the hearing clearly presented a claim under Edwards. See Ind. Evidence Rule 103(a)(1) (for error to be preserved the specific ground of objection must be stated unless it is apparent from the context). In ruling on the motion, the trial court registered a single comment reflecting its low appraisal of Willsey's credibility, and summarily denied the motion without any findings. Where a ruling turns on disbelief of the only testimony in the record, it would be very helpful if the trial court had made an explicit finding. The Indiana Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require such a finding, however. Cf. FED.R.CRIM.P. 12(e) (Where factual issues are involved in determining a [pre-trial] motion, the court shall state its essential findings on the record.). Rather, in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the record for substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's ruling. Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 536 (Ind.1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 858, 139 L.Ed.2d 757 (1998). We do not reweigh the evidence. We resolve conflicting evidence in favor of the trial court and consider any substantial uncontroverted evidence. Haviland v. State, 677 N.E.2d 509, 513 (Ind.1997). If the basis for the ruling on a motion to suppress is unclear, we will uphold the trial court if a reasonable view of the evidence supports the trial court's decision. Cf. Benham v. State, 637 N.E.2d 133, 138 (Ind.1994). Cf. also United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir.1994) (failure of trial court to make findings pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(e) does not necessitate remand if decision is supported by any reasonable view of the evidence); accord United States v. Griffin, 7 F.3d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir.1993); United States v. Harley, 990 F.2d 1340, 1341 (D.C.Cir.1993); United States v. Yeagin, 927 F.2d 798, 800 (5th Cir.1991). The credibility of witnesses is for the trial court to determine. [4] Warner v. State, 579 N.E.2d 1307, 1310 (Ind.1991). Cf. United States v. Stribling, 94 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir.1996) (Because the resolution of a motion to suppress is necessarily fact-specific, we give special deference to the district court that heard the testimony and observed the witnesses at the suppression hearing.). Under this standard of review, although the trial court did not specifically address whether Willsey requested counsel, there are grounds in the record to affirm the trial court. The issue turns on whether Willsey requested counsel as she asserts. The record supports the conclusion that by denying the motion, the trial court simply disbelieved Willsey based on its perceptions of her demeanor and veracity. First, although there are no findings that explain the trial court's ruling, as discussed below it is clear from the record that the trial court did not find Willsey to be a credible witness on the question of whether she signed the rights waiver form. Further, there is substantial circumstantial evidence surrounding Willsey's interrogation that supports a finding that Willsey did not request counsel as she asserts. At the hearing on the motion to suppress Willsey testified that after her arrest, but before being questioned or read the Miranda rights, she made three separate requests to speak with her attorney. Willsey was arrested at her home in the presence of three officers: Trooper Johnson, Deputy Larry Keller, and Sheriff Paul Curry. She testified that she made one request to Curry in the driveway of her home outside of his squad car when only she, Curry and a neighbor, Beverly Crawford, were present. Crawford testified that she overheard Willsey tell Curry two times that she wanted to talk to her lawyer and that Curry did not respond. Willsey said she again requested an attorney when she was alone with Curry in his squad car but that Curry told her she would have to wait until they got to the jail. Curry did not testify at the suppression hearing. Willsey's and Crawford's account of these requests is thus not directly contested. Willsey also testified that she requested an attorney a third time when she and Trooper Johnson were at the jail on their way to the interrogation room, shortly before Johnson read her the Miranda warnings. She said that Johnson responded that it was too late in the day and that he wanted to question her while everything was fresh. Johnson was called by Willsey and in response to Willsey's counsel's question whether he heard Willsey request an attorney at the residence Johnson answered that he had not. Willsey gave her testimony after Johnson had testified, and Johnson was not recalled to verify or refute whether Willsey made this request. Accordingly, it too is not directly contested. Willsey's credibility was tangibly called into doubt during her testimony. Willsey testified that she had no recollection of (1) being read her rights, (2) being presented with a rights waiver form, (3) initialing a form, or (4) signing a form. When presented with a rights waiver form and asked to confirm that her signature and initials were on the form, she claimed that she could not read without glasses. However, as the trial court commented in denying the motion to suppress, Willsey was able to read without glasses at the same hearing from a list of technical names of prescription drugs. The record also clearly reflects challenges to the veracity of Crawford, but contains no evidence or finding by the trial court that is helpful. Aside from the issue of credibility, however, the trial court's decision was supported by conflicting evidence. Johnson testified that in the presence of two other officers he read the Miranda warnings to Willsey, and that she waived them in writing. A signed waiver was produced. Willsey's recorded conduct from the time she waived her rights to the end of the interrogation does not suggest a person who had made unequivocal, repeated requests for an attorney. Willsey claimed she did not recall being read her rights, and hinted that it may not have been she who signed the rights waiver form. However, the transcript offered at the hearing on the motion to suppress indicates that Willsey acknowledged that she had been read and had waived her rights: Johnson: Okay Debbie, I told you the reason we're in here. Just prior to the interview, I read you your [M]iranda rights, I explained to you what they were, I asked you to initial next to each one of the sentences correct? Willsey: Mm Johnson: And uh ... saying that you understood what they were. And I told you that the reason you're here today, is that uh ... it's ... leading into the events surrounding the death of Robert E. Biddle. Willsey: Mm. Johnson: Correct? Willsey: Right. During the entire ninety minute recorded interview, Willsey did not request an attorney, indicate that she had ever requested one, or ever express any hint of frustration that her alleged repeated requests were not honored. We emphasize that the prophylactic nature of Miranda warnings is designed to prevent a person in custody from being coerced into waiving her rights or bullied into giving a statement. However, no such assertion is made here and the record does not support one. Rather, Willsey appears to have been willing to talk and cooperative if not always forthright. At one point, Willsey specifically mentioned her attorney, stating that she would not take a polygraph examination without her attorney present. Johnson responded asking [a]re you telling me you want to talk to your attorney or are you just telling me you don't want to take a polygraph? Willsey answered: I'm not going to take no polygraph, because I don't believe in them. Thus when Willsey was explicitly asked if she was requesting counsel, she did not respond affirmatively. If Willsey had asserted her right, evidence that she failed to assert it again or waived her right at the behest of police would not vitiate the effect of the right's invocation. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 487, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378. But in this case the written waiver, explicit reference to it at the outset of the recorded interview, and Willsey's conduct in the interrogation are relevant to her credibility on the question of whether she asserted the right at all. In sum, reviewing the conflicting evidence in favor of the trial court's ruling, we conclude that there was substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's conclusion that Willsey's Fifth Amendment right to counsel was not invoked, and therefore was not violated. [5]