Opinion ID: 2009468
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Felony Murder Eighth Amendment Narrowing

Text: During the penalty hearing, Ferguson moved to strike the statutory aggravating circumstance that he was engaged in the commission of a robbery with respect to his conviction for felony murder. 11 Del.C. §§ 636(a)(2), 4209(e)(1)j. The Superior Court denied the motion to strike. Thus, the jury was permitted to consider the robbery as a statutory aggravating circumstance to felony murder. In this appeal, Ferguson contends that the Superior Court erred as a matter of constitutional law by applying the Delaware death penalty statute in a manner which failed to genuinely narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty as required by the Eighth Amendment. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2742, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). Ferguson argues that, because the statutory aggravating circumstance of robbery essentially duplicates an element of the capital offense, felony murder, the requisite narrowing did not occur. This Court has previously addressed similar contentions and found them to be without merit. Whalen v. State, Del.Supr., 492 A.2d 552, 565-69 (1985); Riley v. State, Del.Supr., 496 A.2d 997, 1021 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022, 106 S.Ct. 3339, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986). In Whalen, we held that it is not unconstitutional to allow consideration of the underlying felony as a statutory aggravating circumstance in a felony-murder case. Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d at 568. In Riley, we reaffirmed this holding. Riley v. State, 496 A.2d at 1021. Subsequent to this Court's decisions in Whalen and Riley, the United States Supreme Court clarified the constitutional principles involved in the narrowing function required by the Eighth Amendment. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). In Lowenfield, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the Louisiana death penalty statute, even where the sole aggravating circumstance found by the jury was identical to an element of the capital offense of first-degree murder: The use of aggravating circumstances is not an end in itself, but [one] means of genuinely narrowing the class of death-eligible persons and thereby channeling the jury's discretion.       The fact that the sentencing jury is also required to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance in addition is no part of the constitutionally required narrowing process, and so the fact that the aggravating circumstance duplicated one of the elements of the crime does not make this sentence constitutionally infirm. Id. at 244-46, 108 S.Ct. at 554-55. In Lowenfield, the Supreme Court further explained: [T]he narrowing function required for a regime of capital punishment may be provided in either of these two ways: The legislature may itself narrow the definition of capital offenses, ... so that the jury finding of guilt responds to this concern, or the legislature may more broadly define capital offenses and provide for narrowing by jury findings of aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase. Id. at 246, 108 S.Ct. at 555. In the context of felony Murder in the First Degree, the Delaware death penalty statute accomplishes the narrowing function using the first method described in Lowenfield. Under Section 4209(e)(2), a defendant's conviction of first-degree felony murder constitutes an automatic statutory aggravating circumstance. 11 Del.C. § 4209(e)(2). In effect, the statute defines first-degree felony murder as being a death-eligible offense as a matter of law. See Byrne v. Butler, 845 F.2d 501, 515 n. 12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1242, 108 S.Ct. 2918, 101 L.Ed.2d 949 (1988). Ferguson's contention in this appeal is essentially that the Eighth Amendment requires a second narrowing to occur during the penalty phase. According to Ferguson, in this second narrowing, defendants convicted of first-degree felony murder who are eligible for the death penalty would have to be separated, as a matter of law, and aside from the consideration of mitigating circumstances, from those who could actually be sentenced to death. Pursuant to Ferguson's argument, this second narrowing would be accomplished only by the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance that does not duplicate the elements of the underlying felony. [7] Ferguson's argument is actually a challenge to the legislative policy, reflected in Section 4209(e)(2), that certain crimes, including the commission of a felony murder, should expose the actual killer to a death sentence. Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d at 567. Such legislative judgments are properly within the purview of the General Assembly. The fact that one of the statutory aggravating circumstances established at the penalty hearing duplicated one of the elements of felony murder does not make the imposition of a death sentence constitutionally infirm. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. at 246, 108 S.Ct. at 555. Accord Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d at 565-69. Accordingly, in the case sub judice, we conclude that when the jury found Ferguson guilty of one count of felony Murder in the First Degree, the narrowing required by the Eighth Amendment was completed. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988).