Opinion ID: 800656
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard for Evaluating Unlawful-Seizure Claims in the Child-Removal Context

Text: By way of footnote, the district court decided that Woo was entitled to summary judgment with respect to the claim that the removal was unlawful. In doing so, the court assumed that a seizure of a child without a court order is constitutionally justified under the Fourth Amendment only if there are exigent circumstances. See Southerland II, 521 F.Supp.2d at 234 n. 29. This Court, however, has yet to articulate definitively the legal standard that applies to a Fourth Amendment unlawful-seizure claim brought by a child alleging that his or her removal without parental consent or prior judicial authorization was not supported by sufficient cause. In Tenenbaum, we considered this question, apparently for the first time. See 193 F.3d at 603-05. We described, in dicta, three possible modes of determining whether a seizure was `reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment ... in cases where the state seizes a child in order to prevent abuse or neglect. Kia P., 235 F.3d at 762 (citing and discussing Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 603-05). As one mode, we referred to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement that is well-established in the law-enforcement context. See Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 604 (noting that it is core Fourth Amendment doctrine that a seizure without consent or a warrant is a `reasonable' seizure if it is justified by `exigent circumstances'); see generally United States v. Klump, 536 F.3d 113, 117-19 (2d Cir.2008) (describing and applying the exigent circumstances exception in law-enforcement context), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1061, 129 S.Ct. 664, 172 L.Ed.2d 638 (2008); United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 769-70 (2d Cir.1990) (en banc) (elaborating standards). We concluded that such an exception would be viable in the child-removal context too. Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 604-05. We suggested that that exception would apply when a child is subject to the danger of abuse if not removed ... before court authorization can reasonably be obtained. Id. at 605. As another mode, we said that a seizure conducted in accordance with the ordinary probable-cause standardthe standard that applies in the law-enforcement contextmight also suffice. Under such a rule, a caseworker could lawfully remove a child from his or her home without parental consent or prior judicial authorization if the caseworker knew facts and circumstances that were sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that a child was abused or neglected. Id. at 602-03 (internal quotation marks omitted). Alternatively, we noted that under some circumstances an even lesser, special needs, standard might apply, in which case only reasonable cause would be necessary to render lawful a warrantless seizure. See id. at 603-04. That would reflect the principle that there are some agencies outside the realm of criminal law enforcement where government officials have `special needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement [that] make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.' Id. at 603 (quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (plurality opinion)) (alterations in Tenenbaum ). We observed, however, that case law in our sister circuits suggested that the emergency removal of a child by caseworkers is not such a `special needs' situation. Id. at 603-04 (collecting cases). We did not decide in Tenenbaum which of those three standards should apply as the constitutional floor in child-removal casesi.e., the standard below which an officer could not go without violating the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 605; see also Kia P., 235 F.3d at 762-63 (reserving same question). But we did conclude that, at least where information possessed by a state officer would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that a child is subject to the danger of abuse if not removed from school before court authorization can reasonably be obtained, the `exigent circumstances' doctrine ... permits removal of the child without a warrant equivalent and without parental consent. Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 605 (citing Hurlman, 927 F.2d at 80); see also Phifer, 289 F.3d at 60-61 (recognizing and applying this holding in the context of a Rooker-Feldman analysis). And, subsequent to Tenenbaum, we have assumed that the standard to be applied to such claims cannot be any less than probable cause. See Nicholson, 344 F.3d at 173 (We have not addressed ... the question whether[,] in the context of the seizure of a child by a state protective agency[,] the Fourth Amendment might impose any additional restrictions above and beyond those that apply to ordinary arrests. (emphasis added)). Again here, we need not adopt a standard. We observe first, as we did in Tenenbaum, that this case does not present circumstances in which the special needs test applies, if ever it does in the child-removal context. Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 603. [27] In this case the requirement of obtaining the equivalent of a warrant where practicable [would not] impose[ ] intolerable burdens on the government officer or the courts, [and] would [not] prevent such an officer from taking necessary action, or tend to render such action ineffective, Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 604. The elimination of a possible special needs approach leaves either the probable-cause or exigent-circumstances standard applicable to the merits of whether Woo's behavior violated the Children's constitutional rights. [28] But we need not decide between themat least not yet. As explained below, regardless of which standard applies, Woo cannot establish as a matter of law on the current record that he would be entitled to qualified immunity or that no reasonable jury could find in favor of the Children on the merits of their Fourth Amendment seizure claim.