Opinion ID: 1785882
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffectiveness Due to Conflict of Interest

Text: Larzelere argues that the trial court erred in denying her claim that Wilkins operated under a conflict of interest and was ineffective because he pursued his own financial and legal interests to the detriment of Larzelere's defense. Larzelere believes that Wilkins was conflicted because he could not have her declared indigent for purposes of costs without drawing attention to his impermissible contingency fee contract and because he did not want his eventual payment to be impacted by a claim by the county against any insurance proceeds collected by Larzelere. Larzelere asserts that Wilkins performed deficiently in that he failed to have her promptly declared indigent for costs, failed to consult and hire needed defense experts, and fired his investigator in an effort to minimize costs. This Court has explained that Florida follows the legal principles set forth in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), and Strickland, when analyzing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a purported conflict of interest: [I]n order to establish an ineffectiveness claim premised on an alleged conflict of interest the defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. A lawyer suffers from an actual conflict of interest when he or she actively represents conflicting interests. To demonstrate an actual conflict, the defendant must identify specific evidence in the record that suggests that his or her interests were compromised. A possible, speculative or merely hypothetical conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction. [U]ntil a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance. Sliney v. State, 944 So.2d 270, 279 (Fla. 2006) (citations omitted) (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708). Prejudice is presumed where an actual conflict is shown to have adversely affected a client's representation. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50, 100 S.Ct. 1708. The question of whether a defendant's counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel's performance is a mixed question of law and fact. Sliney, 944 So.2d at 279. Accordingly, this Court applies a mixed standard of review, deferring to the lower court's factual findings but reviewing its ultimate legal conclusions de novo. Coney, 845 So.2d at 133. In considering whether Wilkins operated under an actual conflict as defined by Cuyler, the trial court found that Wilkins' contract and investigator McDaniel's contract were not contingency fee arrangements and that the insurance proceeds would be sufficient to cover fees and costs as outlined in the contracts. Thus, the trial court held that Larzelere provided nothing but mere speculation that Wilkins failed to hire experts or seek indigency status because he wanted to maximize the amount of insurance proceeds he would receive. Postconviction Order II at 21. We affirm the trial court's denial of relief on this claim. We agree that Larzelere did not demonstrate that her counsel had an actual conflict of interest because she failed to identify specific evidence in the record that suggests that . . . her interests were impaired or compromised for the benefit of her attorney. Herring v. State, 730 So.2d 1264, 1267 (Fla.1998); see also Brown v. State, 894 So.2d 137, 159 (Fla. 2004) (finding defendant failed to prove actual conflict where trial court made factual finding that counsel did not attempt to gain proprietary interest in defendant's life story, recordings, and poetry until after close of representation and defendant did not identify specific evidence in the record that suggested that his interests were impaired or compromised for the benefit of the lawyer or another party). Wilkins testified that his contract, which was signed by Larzelere and her sister, Jeanette Atkinson, provided for a $100,000 retainer, $3000 per day while in trial, and costs. Wilkins believed that he would be able to collect his fee and costs against any of Larzelere's and Atkinson's assets, but anticipated that he likely would be paid from the insurance proceeds. Wilkins admitted that there was a risk of nonpayment. However, he consulted trusted civil attorneys regarding Atkinson's likelihood of collecting on the insurance policies, and they informed him that her chances of collecting a good portion of the two to three million dollars were substantial. This appraisal alleviated Wilkins' doubts enough for him to take the case under these terms. [9] Rodney Lilly, one of the consultants, testified at the evidentiary hearing and confirmed that he told Wilkins that the insurance case was worth pursuing, even on a contingency fee basis because the insurer would have to prove fraud in the inducement to avoid paying the policies, a difficult claim to prove. Lilly's assessment of the insurance case implies that it would likewise be worth pursuing the criminal case in hopes of being paid from the insurance proceeds. Moreover, Gladys Jackson, Wilkins' office manager and bookkeeper at the time of Larzelere's case, testified that she did not recall ever telling Wilkins that a requested action, such as taking a deposition, could not be done in the Larzelere case due to insufficient funds. Thus, Larzelere did not prove that Wilkins failed to hire experts and have her declared indigent because of a financial conflict resulting from the fee arrangement and Wilkins' personal financial problems. She did not prove that Wilkins had an interest in not hiring experts, other than that which any attorney paid by a client or third party would have, because he believed his costs would be paid. As for investigator McDaniel's contract, Wilkins testified that he did not ask Volusia County to pay the investigative expenses because McDaniel agreed to be privately retained and paid from the insurance proceeds. McDaniel first testified that he was to be paid from Wilkins' retainer, but he later testified, consistent with Wilkins' testimony, that he was hired directly by Larzelere, Jason, and Atkinson, and was to be paid from the insurance proceeds. McDaniel admitted that he agreed to be paid as the money came in from the insurance policies. The record also refutes Larzelere's suggestion that Wilkins fired McDaniel in order to minimize costs. McDaniel testified that Wilkins and Howes would not pay for him to go to California to interview Norman Karn and Ronald Lee Hayden, state witnesses, as he requested to do. However, McDaniel acknowledged that he and his company were terminated for not following Wilkins' and Howes' instructions, rather than due to a dispute over expenses. This evidence supports the trial court's finding that Larzelere failed to prove that McDaniel was fired due to a financial conflict of interest. Further, even if the decision to fire McDaniel was purely financial, Larzelere did not demonstrate that this act was adverse to her representation because the evidence shows that Wilkins and Howes hired another investigator, Don Carpenter, to continue McDaniel's work. Overall, Larzelere failed to show that any interest her attorney may have had in minimizing costs was an actual, not merely potential, conflict that adversely affected her representation.