Opinion ID: 2543459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Photo Array and Out-of-Court Identification

Text: As an initial matter, we address the standard of review required when reviewing the trial court's conclusion that the out-of-court identification procedure did not violate Bernal's due process rights. The ultimate question as to the constitutionality of pretrial identification procedures is a mixed question of law and fact. Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597, 102 S.Ct. 1303, 71 L.Ed.2d 480 (1982). Thus, while the trial court's findings of historical fact are entitled to deference, an appellate court may give different weight to those facts and may reach a different conclusion in light of the legal standard. Id.
Suggestive lineups are disapproved because they increase the likelihood of misidentification and have, in the past, too often brought about the conviction of the innocent. In United States v. Wade , the United States Supreme Court observed: A major factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has been the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification.... Suggestion can be created intentionally or unintentionally in many subtle ways.[ ] And the dangers for the suspect are particularly grave when the witness' opportunity for observation was insubstantial, and thus his susceptibility to suggestion the greatest. 388 U.S. 218, 228-29, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967)(footnote omitted). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has noted that, once an eyewitness has chosen a suspect from a line-up, that witness is not likely to go back on his word later on, so that in practice the issue of identity may (in the absence of other relevant evidence) for all practical purposes be determined there and then, before the trial. Id. at 229, 87 S.Ct. 1926. The danger of misidentification is further increased in prosecutions where the victim is the witness, such as in a robbery, because there is a particular hazard that a victim's understandable outrage may excite a vengeful or spiteful motive. Id. at 230, 87 S.Ct. 1926. Subsequent experience and empirical evidence support the Supreme Court's conclusions. For example, a study of forty cases in which the convicted persons were later exonerated through DNA testing revealed that ninety percent (90%) of the convictions were obtained, at least in part, by erroneous eyewitness identifications. Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 Law & Hum. Behav. 603, 605 (1998). The study concluded that mistaken eyewitness identification is responsible for more of these wrongful convictions than all other causes combined, and that eyewitness identification evidence is among the least reliable forms of evidence and yet is persuasive to juries. Id. The study further demonstrated that accuracy of description is a rather poor predictor of identification. Id. at 608. A different study revealed that recognition accuracy was found to be poorer when the perpetrator was holding a weapon. Vaughn Tooley et al., Facial Recognition: Weapon Effect and Attentional Focus, 17 J. of Applied Social Psychology 845, 854 (1987).
Recognizing the inherent dangers of pretrial identification, the United States Supreme Court set out the standard for viewing photographic displays in Simmons v. United States . The Supreme Court stated: [E]ach case must be considered on its own facts and ... convictions based on eye witness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). This standard has developed into a two-part analysis. First, a court must determine whether the photo array was impermissibly suggestive, which the defendant has the burden of proving. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); United States v. Sanchez, 24 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir.1994). If this burden is not met, no further inquiry is necessary. Sanchez, 24 F.3d at 1262. Second, if the defendant's burden is met, the burden shifts to the People to show that despite the improper suggestiveness, the identification was nevertheless reliable under the totality of the circumstances. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977); Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. 375; Sanchez, 24 F.3d at 1261-62. It is important to note that these two steps must be completed separately; it is only necessary to reach the second step if the court first determines that the array was impermissibly suggestive. Sanchez, 24 F.3d at 1262. In evaluating whether a pretrial photo identification procedure is impermissibly suggestive, a number of factors may be relevant. These include the size of the array, the manner of its presentation by the officers, and the details of the photographs themselves. United States v. Wiseman, 172 F.3d 1196, 1208 (10th Cir.1999); Sanchez, 24 F.3d at 1262. Although courts have held that a photo array with as few as six pictures is not per se a due process violation, see, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 898 (2d Cir.1969), courts have recognized that the size of a photo array, specifically the number of pictures in it, is a factor affecting the weight a court gives to the irregularities in the array. Sanchez, 24 F.3d at 1262. The more pictures used in an array, the less likely it is that a minor difference, such as background color or texture, will have a prejudicial effect on selection. Id. In contrast, when relatively few photographs are used in an array, minor differences such as background color make a picture stand out and can repeatedly draw a witness's eyes to that picture. Id. In Sanchez, the court noted: Common sense dictates that slight irregularities are more likely to jump out at a witness when reviewing a single sheet of paper with only six photographs on it than at a witness reviewing a large mug book containing hundreds of photographs. Upon continued inspection, the witness may begin to believe that the oddball picture was taken under different circumstances than the others. This fact can suggest a number of things to the witness, the most dangerous of which is that the similar pictures were taken together to form a pool or control group, and that the one picture that stands out is the suspect. Id. Thus, the fewer photographs used by the officers in a photo array, the closer the array must be scrutinized for suggestive irregularities. Id. When the number of photographs shown has not been so small as to make the presentation itself unfairly suggestive, and there is nothing in the officials' manner of presentation that renders the procedure surrounding the array suggestive, the principal question is whether the picture of the accused, which matches descriptions given by the witness, so stood out from all of the other photographs as to `suggest to an identifying witness that [that person] was more likely to be the culprit.' Jarrett v. Headley, 802 F.2d 34, 41 (2d Cir.1986)(quoting United States v. Archibald, 734 F.2d 938, 940 (2d Cir.1984)). In other words, the array must not be so limited that the defendant is the only one to match the witness's description of the perpetrator. United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 974 (2d Cir.1990). The police do not have to provide a photo array containing only exact replicas of the defendant's picture; all that is required is that the photos are matched by race, approximate age, facial hair, and a number of other characteristics. People v. Webster, 987 P.2d 836, 839 (Colo.Ct.App. 1998); People v. Borrego, 668 P.2d 21, 23 (Colo.Ct.App.1983); United States v. Fernandez, 456 F.2d 638, 641 (2d Cir.1972). Thus, a photo array in which the individual characteristics of the accused, such as race, stand in stark contrast to the other photographs is impermissibly suggestive. State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1989). But see Williams v. Weldon, 826 F.2d 1018, 1021 (11th Cir.1987)([S]imply being of a different race or ethnic group from others placed in a lineup does not necessarily make the lineup impermissibly suggestive, especially where. . . the other individuals had roughly the same characteristics and features of the accused.). In United States v. Fernandez , the court found that a photographic array was impermissibly suggestive when witnesses had described the bank robber as a light-skinned Black man with an Afro haircut, and of the six photographs presented, only that of the defendant showed a Black man having a light skin tone. 456 F.2d at 641-43. Similarly, in United States v. Gidley, 527 F.2d 1345, 1350 (5th Cir.1976), the court found a photographic display impermissibly suggestive because none of the other pictures displayed the defendant's Asian appearance nor did any of the men pictured, except the two defendants, have long black hair. The court noted that [a]nyone who had gotten a glimpse of two robbers with long black hair would have found only [the defendants'] pictures in this group to resemble those robbers. Id. Although it is not required that all of the photographs in the array be uniform with respect to one given characteristic, Jarrett, 802 F.2d at 41, a photographic array that includes a photo that is unique in a manner directly related to an important identification factor may be held impermissibly suggestive. See Grubbs v. Hannigan, 982 F.2d 1483, 1490 (10th Cir.1993)(Although a photo-lineup is not necessarily suggestive merely because the individuals in the lineup differ in facial characteristics, . . . here the differences were either strikingly apparent, such as a swollen eye, or they related to an important component of [the victim's] description of her assailant, his hair style.). If the court finds a photo array impermissibly suggestive, it must then proceed to the second step of the analysis and determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the suggestive procedure created a very substantial likelihood of misidentification. Manson, 432 U.S. at 116, 97 S.Ct. 2243. The factors to be considered in determining whether, despite a suggestive array, the identification was nonetheless reliable are: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. 375; People v. Monroe, 925 P.2d 767, 771-72 (Colo.1996). In conducting this analysis, a court must balance the suggestiveness of the procedures employed against indicia of reliability surrounding the identification to determine whether the identification should be suppressed. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243; Grubbs, 982 F.2d at 1490. Reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony. Manson, 432 at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243. As long as the totality of the circumstances does not indicate a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, no constitutional impediment to the admission of the identification testimony exists. Id. at 116, 97 S.Ct. 2243.
In this case, Bernal argues that his due process rights were violated by the admission of testimony concerning an impermissibly suggestive photo array. The determination of whether there was a violation of Bernal's due process rights requires the application of the two-part analysis described above. Under the first part of the analysis, Bernal challenges the photographs themselves, arguing that they are impermissibly suggestive because, of the six men shown, he was the only obviously Hispanic man. Our examination of the photo array reveals it to be impermissibly suggestive. Our review of the record indicates that ethnicity was a controlling and overriding characteristic of the witnesses' description of the robber. In their initial descriptions to the police immediately after the robbery, none of the witnesses provided any sort of detailed description of the robber. Rather, their description was based on race and ethnicity: Both eyewitnesses stated that the robber was Hispanic. [6] The ethnicities of most of the other men in the photo array are conspicuously different, specifically not Hispanic, so as to make the defendant's photo stand out as clearly different from the others. Although it has been suggested that one of the men shown with Bernal could possibly have been Hispanic, in the context of the descriptions given by the eyewitnesses in this case, this photograph is not similar to Bernal's. In this case, the witnesses chose to use the term Hispanic. Because the term Hispanic can refer to people with different skin colors, eye colors, and hair colors, and even to people of different races, it might be considered to be a poor descriptive term. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Ethnicity & Nationhood: Melting Pot or `Ring of Fire'?: Assimilation and the Mexican American Experience, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 1259, 1291-92 (1997). However, when a witness uses the term Hispanic to describe a suspect it may reasonably be presumed that she is using that term to denote a person with discernable and distinctive physical characteristics that comprise the stereotype of an Hispanic individual. Here, only Bernal's photograph is stereotypical. Although we disagree with the use of such stereotypes to homogenize what in reality is a multi-racial, diverse population, it is undisputed that the term Hispanic is used as a descriptive term and has, in essence, reduced this diverse group of individuals into one group. See Wendy Chung, Ethnicity and Organizational Diversity: A Study of Social Cognition and Psychological Climate Perception 59 (1997). Specifically, the stereotype has been described as dark-complexioned with more indigenous features. Johnson, supra, at 1290-91. Some courts have described the stereotypical characteristics of someone who is Hispanic as black hair, dark skin, and dark eyes. Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1038 (9th Cir.1999); see also, e.g., United States v. Ramos, 753 F.Supp. 75, 76 (W.D.N.Y.1990) (light brown skin); People v. Gonzalez, 292 Ill.App.3d 280, 226 Ill.Dec. 406, 685 N.E.2d 661, 663 (1997) (light brown skin, dark brown hair, and dark eyes); State v. Mareno, 530 So.2d 593, 595 (La.Ct.App.1988) (a `kind of Hispanic appearance' described as an individual 5'7-5'8, with an olive complexion, medium build, [and] brown hair). Thus, although the photo array may not be perceived as suggestive to someone who is aware of the diversity of individuals in the Hispanic population, it is highly suggestive to a person who chooses to describe a person as Hispanic in the stereotypical sense of describing what many people consider a monolithic group. See Johnson, supra, at 1290. Here, there is nothing to suggest that the witnesses meant anything other than the commonly understood, stereotypical characteristics of an Hispanic individual. Thus, we infer that Hispanic, as used by the two eyewitnesses, was meant to describe the features of people of Mexican heritage, the predominant Hispanic population in the southwestern United States. See Ramos, 753 F.Supp. at 78 n. 5 (It is apparent that appearing Mexican is the functional equivalent of appearing Hispanic.). The stark fact is that Bernal leaps out as the one person who is different because of his ethnicity, a judgment that can be made even without knowledge of what the witnesses said. In addition, Bernal's photograph was the only one with a clear white background. The other photographs were taken against neutrally colored venetian blinds. This seemingly minor detail of the background compounds the already-mentioned deficiencies of the photo array because, as noted in Sanchez, the likely inference that Bernal's picture was taken under different circumstances suggests that the other photos were assembled to provide a pool or control group, as indeed they were. Wiseman, 172 F.3d at 1209. Moreover, the small number of photos in the array, which in this case consisted of six, cannot dilute the suggestiveness of the array. Id. For these reasons, we conclude that the photo lineup is impermissibly suggestive. Having found the pretrial identification procedure to be impermissibly suggestive, we must next proceed to the second step of the analysis, namely a determination whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was nonetheless reliable. This determination involves consideration of the five factors identified by the Supreme Court in Biggers. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243; Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. 375. As to the first two Biggers factors, the record is fairly well developed because these factors were pertinent to issues raised at trial. Thus, regarding the first Biggers factor, the opportunity of the witnesses to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the evidence showed that the robbery lasted several minutes and took place in a well-lighted area. However, there was also evidence that the robber was behind McBride during most of the robbery, and that McBride only got slight glances of the robber. In addition, the robber concealed his appearance with a baseball hat and sunglasses. With regard to the second Biggers factor, the witnesses' degree of attention, the evidence showed that the witnesses had received training regarding robberies. In this case, however, the witnesses were instructed not to look at the robber, and when they did, he struck them with his weapon. As to the rest of the Biggers factors, because the trial court failed to hear the offered testimony, the record is inadequate. Thus, regarding the third Biggers factor, the accuracy of the witnesses' prior description, the witnesses' initial descriptions to the police were very general. The witnesses described the robbers as roughly the same height, medium complexion, and Hispanic. Wagner also described the robber as having a rough complexion. Because the witnesses were not allowed to testify at the suppression hearing, it is unclear what they meant by the term Hispanic. In addition, there is nearly a foot of difference between the height of the two men arrested for the robbery. Rodarte measures five feet two inches tall, while Bernal is over six feet tall. And, contrary to Wagner's description, Bernal does not have a rough complexion. In fact, he was described as having a very nice complexion. Concerning the fourth Biggers factor, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witnesses at the confrontation, it is unclear what the witnesses' degree of certainty was when they chose Bernal's photograph. At the suppression hearing, Grose testified that the witnesses stated that they had made a positive identification. When defense counsel attempted to question Grose regarding the witnesses' level of certainty, the trial court intervened and refused to permit Grose to testify, stating: They can't be any better than positive I don't think. The evidence only showed that Wagner chose Bernal's photograph after examining the array for two minutes and that McBride spent one minute reviewing the array before choosing Bernal. Finally, with regard to the last Biggers factor, the length of time between the crime and the confrontation, there was a six-week gap between the robbery and the photo array. Again, because the witnesses were not allowed to give testimony, it is unclear how much weight should be placed upon this fact. Given that the trial court failed to hear testimony and failed to make adequate factual findings, we cannot complete the review necessary to determine whether the out-of-court identification is, despite its suggestiveness, reliable. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court for a reliability determination. Upon remand, the trial court, in determining the reliability of the out-of-court identification, should not limit itself to the specific evidence we have just discussed. Instead, the court should, in addition to the above evidence, consider any new testimony that may be offered that it finds pertinent to the Biggers factors. For example, the trial court might inquire as to what the witnesses meant when they used the term Hispanic to describe the robber and whether they would describe any of the other five men depicted in the photo array as Hispanic.