Opinion ID: 1907107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Nixon/Cronic Claim

Text: Zack argues that trial counsel was ineffective for conceding guilt at trial without his permission, which violates the mandates of Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So.2d 618 (Fla.2000), and United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). He also argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a Nixon/Cronic claim on appeal. The issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is not properly raised in a 3.851 motion; rather, it is appropriately raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Parker v. State, 904 So.2d 370, 381 (Fla.2005) (The proper method by which to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is by petition for writ of habeas corpus directed to the appellate court which considered the direct appeal.) (quoting Ragan v. Dugger, 544 So.2d 1052, 1054 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)). We find no merit in Zack's claim that trial counsel was ineffective. Zack relies on this Court's decision in Nixon v. Singletary , which held that Cronic rather than Strickland is the standard for assessing ineffectiveness of counsel when a defendant's attorney concedes guilt to the crime charged without the defendant's express consent. Under Cronic, counsel's deficiency is presumed. See Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So.2d at 622. However, the United States Supreme Court recently overruled the standard applied in Nixon and stated that a defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel challenge based upon counsel's concession of guilt to the crime charged, even without the defendant's consent, must be evaluated under the standard set forth in Strickland. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004). Thus, in a case such as this, the defendant must show that counsel's strategy to concede guilt was unreasonable. See id. Because Zack confessed to the killing, trial counsel's strategy was to dispute the intent element of first-degree murder. Trial counsel made a strategic decision to discuss the evidence that was admitted at trial in an attempt to alleviate the damage it would cause if he ignored the evidence. His goal was to get Zack a life sentence, which was a reasonable trial strategy. In closing argument at trial, counsel agreed with the State's argument concerning the messiness and evident brutality of the crime scene. At the postconviction hearing, trial counsel stated that the word brutality was not equal to premeditation, and he wanted to show that the murders were the result of an unintended rage. Trial counsel stated that he knew the crime scene photos would be shown, and those photos made the crime scene look real bad and they would not have made sense unless they were shown to have been created by a person who was not in control of his own impulses. Trial counsel stated that he wanted to maintain his credibility with the jurors. The trial court found that, taking all of counsel's remarks in the context of the entire trial, counsel's intent was to dilute the damaging testimony that the jury would hear. We agree with the trial court's findings, and conclude that there was no deficient performance. Failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Thus, relief on this claim is denied.