Opinion ID: 1844436
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpretation of Section 324A(a)

Text: The majority misinterprets section 324A(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). Majority op. at 1187-88. Section 324A states: One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm.... The question under subsection (a) is whether Clay Electric's failure to exercise reasonable care in maintaining the streetlights increased the risk of harm beyond the risk that existed before Clay Electric's alleged agreement to maintain the streetlights. The answer is obviously no, because the failure to maintain an installed streetlight does not create a greater risk than that created by the absence of a streetlight. It simply reverts the circumstances to the status quo ante darkness. Other courts have interpreted section 324A(a) consistent with this analysis. They hold that, for liability to attach, the defendant's conduct must have increased the risk beyond that existing before the defendant undertook the conduct. See, e.g., Turbe, 938 F.2d at 432 (concluding that sections 323(a) and 324A(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts only apply when the defendant's actions increase the risk of harm beyond the risk that would have existed had the defendant never provided services initially); Vaughan, 719 N.E.2d at 525 (same). The majority stands alone in its new interpretation of section 324A(a). It implicitly concludes that liability attaches if the defendant's conduct left the plaintiff in a worse position than the plaintiff was in when the services were begun. Majority op. at 1187. Under the majority's analysis, the relative risk to the plaintiff is measured when the streetlights were already installed, and were simply being maintained. Therefore, under the majority's view, because walking across a dark street at night is riskier than walking across a lighted one, once Clay Electric began maintaining the streetlights it incurred a duty to maintain them forever. The majority cites no case interpreting section 324A(a) in such a fashion, and I can find none. To the contrary, many of the cases refusing to find a duty did so where the allegation was negligent maintenance. See Vaughan, 719 N.E.2d at 523 (holding that ordinarily an electric company under contract to make repairs and maintain street lights has no common law duty to third persons who are injured); White, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d at 437 (noting that the failure to maintain an installed streetlight does not create a risk greater than the risk created by the total absence of a streetlight); Fishbaugh, 969 P.2d at 406 (holding that [b]ecause a municipality has no common law duty to light its streets, it has no duty to maintain such lights that it has nevertheless elected to install). In fact, virtually every case involves streetlights that allegedly were inadequately maintained, because allegations of negligent installation are extremely rare. The majority's opinion is the first and only case creating a distinction between the installation of streetlights (for which no duty exists) and their maintenance (for which a duty does exist). Florida stands alone among the fifty states in such a jurisprudence. The majority's holding has far-reaching consequences that not even the majority has contemplated. It essentially imposes a duty on those who provide a benefit to the public or to an individual to continue doing so forever. [22] Nothing in our lawor any states' lawsuggests imposing such a heavy burden.