Opinion ID: 864385
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d at 711. The court withheld its decision on the

Text: merits in order that the legislature might have an opportunity to consider adoption of a reapportionment act. For the sequel see Application of Lamb, 67 N.J. Super. 39, 46-47, 169 A.2d 822, 825-826. 16 Reapportionment was also the result in Magraw v. Donovan, D.C., 159 F. Supp. 901, where a federal three-judge District Court took jurisdiction, saying, D.C., 163 F. Supp. 184, 187: Here it is the unmistakable duty of the State Legislature to reapportion itself periodically in accordance with recent population changes. . . . Early in January 1959 the 61st Session of the Minnesota Legislature will convene, all of the members of which will be newly elected on November 4th of this year. The facts which have been presented to us will be available to them. It is not to be presumed that the Legislature will refuse to take such action as is necessary to comply with its duty under the State Constitution. We defer decision on all the issues presented (including that of the power of this Court to grant relief), in order to afford the Legislature full opportunity to heed the constitutional mandate to redistrict.'' See D.C., 177 F. Supp. 803, where the case was dismissed as moot, the State Legislature having acted. 156 So. 2d at 831-32 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 250 n.5 (Douglas, J., concurring)) (emphasis added). We conclude that, contrary to Mauldin’s contention, a more thorough reading of this Court’s holding and analysis in Glass affirms that the chancery courts of this state indeed have jurisdiction to ensure redistricting where (1) relief in equity is available and proper (2) the Legislature has failed in its duty to redistrict, and (3) time to redistrict is running out. ¶40. Likewise, in Lovorn v. Hathorn, 365 So. 2d 947 (Miss. 1978), this Court reversed and remanded to the chancery court a matter involving the proper means of electing state officials and never indicated that the chancery court was without jurisdiction. And in Carter v. Luke, 399 So. 2d 1356 (Miss. 1981), this Court addressed chancery court rulings concerning a school board trustee’s election and never suggested a lack of jurisdiction. In fact, this Court cited the “detailed decree of the Chancellor . . . outlin[ing] the election procedure,” and stated “[w]e think the lower court acted properly and within the 17 applicable statutes and law in entering [that] final decree. . . . Id. at 1358. These cases were consolidated for United States Supreme Court review, whereupon the Court held that the Mississippi state courts had the power to decide whether a proposed change in election procedure requires preclearance under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 268, 102 S. Ct. 2421, 72 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1982). These cases clearly involve election law, and thus political matters, although they were never reversed for lack of jurisdiction; each was adjudicated in the chancery court. ¶41. Further, in Adams County Election Commission v. Sanders, 586 So. 2d 829, 380 (Miss. 1991), this Court held that the chancery courts are not prohibited from hearing cases involving electoral matters. There, the chancery court enjoined pending county elections and set a new election schedule due to federal law violations. This Court held that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to decide whether § 5 of the Voting Rights Act applies to contemplated changes in election procedures. . . . We recognize that a state court clearly has jurisdiction to decide questions of violations of the one person, one vote standard under the 14th Amendment . . . as well as under Miss. Const. Art. 3, § 14. 586 So. 2d at 380 (emphasis added). This case implies that where there is a question regarding the oneperson, one-vote requirement, equity courts have jurisdiction. ¶42. As recently as 1994, however, this Court held that the “chancery courts in this state do not have the jurisdiction to enjoin elections or to otherwise interfere with political and electoral matters which are not within the traditional reach of equity jurisdiction.” In re McMillin, 642 So.2d 1336 (Miss. 1994). In fairly considering McMillin as dispositive, we are guided by two realizations.12 12 Immediately, I recognize that one must “interfere” with something; one cannot “interfere” with nothing, which is what the Legislature handed the citizens of this State when it adjourned repeatedly without a redistricting plan in the present case. Indeed, Branch did not seek that the chancery court 18 ¶43. First, McMillin, as did Mauldin in the present case, and, as did the federal district court in its order in this case, cited a line of precedent predating Baker v. Carr by, in some cases, nearly 35 years, for the proposition that the chancery is without jurisdiction over election matters. Id. Indeed, McMillin cited as supporting authority the following cases: Howard v. Sheldon, 151 Miss. 284, 294, 117 So. 839, 839 (1928), a 1928 case which held that courts cannot interfere with or regulate holding of primary elections or conventions by political parties; Barnes v. McLeod, 165 Miss. 437, 140 So. 740 (1932), a 1932 case holding that the chancery court does not have jurisdiction to enjoin county election commissioners from placing a Democratic nominee for county office on official ballots for general election due to fraud in primary election; Brumfield v. Brock, 169 Miss. 784, 142 So. 745 (1932), a 1932 case holding that chancery cannot enjoin primary and general elections for congressmen on the ground the then current redistricting act was void, where the only possible expense would be to slightly lengthen ballot; and Barnes v. Barnett, 241 Miss. 206, 129 So. 2d 638 (1961), a 1961 case holding that apportionment and reapportionment of the state legislature and of congressional districts is a political question and not a judicial one, and that the remedy for unfairness in districting and apportioning representation is at the ballot box and not by judicial decree. 642 So.2d 1336. McMillin also cited Todd v. Smith, 331 So. 2d 920 (Miss. 1976), which held that since the proper remedy of petitioning the county executive committee within 20 days after the election had not been sought, the chancery court had no jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief. Finally, the Court cited Goodman v. Rhodes, 375 So. 2d 991, 993 (Miss. 1979), which cited interfere with any legislative plan or legislative enactment. Also, Branch did not seek to enjoin an election. Instead, they seek equitable relief to ensure an election under a lawful plan, pursuant to the election schedule mandated by state law. 19 Barnes (1932) and Brumfield (1932) as its only authority to hold that chancery courts do not have jurisdiction to determine the candidates whose names should appear or not appear on a ballot. Id. ¶44. Thus the authorities upon which McMillin relies speak of a time in which political matters were considered nonjusticiable and /or indicate that injunctive relief was premature. In large measure, therefore, the case was erroneously reasoned. ¶45. The second realization is that this Court has since said that McMillin is not a bar to state court jurisdiction in election cases involving one-person one-vote issues. City of Grenada v. Harrelson, 725 So. 2d 770 (Miss. 1998). In City of Grenada , the circuit court declined to enjoin an election based on its reading of In re McMillin. Id. at 772. We, however, reversed, holding that the circuit court had jurisdiction to enjoin the election since the United States Attorney General had returned a § 5 preclearance letter to the proposed ward-line change submitted by the city council. The new wards were not properly adopted according to state law and allegedly violated the one-person, one-vote requirement. ¶46. Considering the foregoing, we reasoned that if the Legislature fails to redistrict, as required under both state and federal law, the constitutional voting rights of Mississippi voters are implicated. These implications clearly can occur in cases involving the absence of redistricting when election time is nearing, but the Legislature has nevertheless failed to redistrict. Under our case law after Baker v. Carr, our equity courts have jurisdiction. ¶47. If there is any remaining doubt as to the propriety of our equity courts taking over when the Legislature fails to enact a constitutional redistricting plan, Branch v. Smith and Growe v. Emison eliminate it. When the Legislature does not act, citizens may sue and, then, it is the judiciary's role to determine the appropriate redistricting plan. Growe , 507 U.S. at 33-34, 113 S. Ct. 1075; Scott v. 20 Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409, 85 S. Ct. 1525, 14 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1965) (per curiam); Maryland Comm. v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 676, 84 S. Ct. 1429, 12 L. Ed.2d 595 (1964). In any case, the Court stated that “[t]he power of the judiciary of a State to require valid reapportionment or to require a valid redistricting plan has not only been recognized by the Court, but . . . has been specifically encouraged.” Id. (quoting Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. at 409). As the Court explained, In the reapportionment context, the Court has required federal judges to defer to consideration of disputes involving redistricting where the State, through its legislative or judicial branch, has begun to address that highly political task itself. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. at 33 (emphasis in original). Pursuant to Growe, therefore, although the Legislature has initial responsibility to act in redistricting matters, that responsibility can shift to state judiciary if Legislature fails to act, and to the federal judiciary only once state legislature or state judiciary have demonstrated inability or disinclination to act. See, e.g., Brooks v. Hobbie, 631 So. 2d 883 (Ala. 1993). ¶48. It is when the law may not be clear as to jurisdiction that Branch v. Smith speaks. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s injunction strictly on the basis that our assertion of chancery court jurisdiction had not been precleared. However, the Court vacated the alternative constitutional ground that such assertion of jurisdiction violated Art. I, § 4 as a basis for the injunction. In vacating that ground, the Court reiterated that the constitutional analysis was not “binding upon state and federal officials should Mississippi seek in the future to administer a redistricting plan adopted by the Chancery Court.” 123 S. Ct. at 1437. Seeking administration of the chancery court plan is exactly what the Mississippi Attorney General has expressed as his intent. ¶49. Mauldin filed supplemental briefs to this Court following the Supreme Court decision which continue to press the argument that in the event of a legislative default, our courts are to abandon the field 21 entirely to the federal courts. Not only is our case law unsupportive of this position, Mississippi would be the only state having addressed this issue to say, as a matter of law, that its courts will undertake no such responsibility. I am unwilling to take this position. ¶50. Recently, the Oklahoma Supreme Court flatly rejected the notion that its lower courts did not have jurisdiction in redistricting cases in the event of a legislative default; and in doing so it flatly rejected the federal district court’s constitutional ruling here. Alexander v. Taylor, 51 P.3d 1204 (Okla. 2002). ¶51. However, even given the majority's erroneous conclusion the chancery courts are without jurisdiction, our residents still have an available Mississippi judicial forum. As stated in our Constitution and case law, the circuit courts would retain jurisdiction. See Miss. Const., Art. 6, §156 ([t]he circuit court shall have jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal in this state not vested by our constitution in some other court); Farrar v. State, 191 Miss. 1, 2 So. 2d 146, 147 (1941) ([The Mississippi Constitution of 1890] was intended to parcel out to the respective courts created or authorized therein the entire judicial jurisdiction of the State, and that none was left undisposed of.). Therefore, under the Mississippi Constitution there is a state court that has jurisdiction over this matter. ¶52. Furthermore, bringing an action in the wrong state court, is of no consequence in this matter. We have held that, in interpreting Section 147 to Article 6 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, reversal is not warranted merely for such a jurisdictional discrepancy. See Southern Leisure Homes, Inc. v. Hardin, 742 So. 2d 1088, 1091 (Miss. 1999). ¶53. The protection of voting rights is the purpose of redistricting, and the courts are the guardians of those rights. Therefore, it is entirely appropriate that our courts are open to ensure them. Accordingly, the majority errs in holding otherwise. 22