Opinion ID: 2107127
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Denial of Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on Kidnapping

Text: The defendant's final argument on appeal is that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the two kidnapping counts because, in his view, the kidnappings were incidental to and merged with the robbery charges. [37] The defendant argues that the confinement and the rather minimal asportation of the two jewelry salesmen was incidental to the commission of the robberies and therefore cannot constitute the separate offense of kidnapping. The Rhode Island kidnapping statute, G.L.1956 § 11-26-1(a), provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Whoever, without lawful authority, forcibly or secretly confines or imprisons another person within this state against his or her will, or forcibly carries or sends another person out of this state, or forcibly seizes or confines or inveigles or kidnaps another person with intent either to cause him or her to be secretly confined or imprisoned within this state against his or her will    shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years. Under Rhode Island law, confinements that are incidental to the commission of a crime are not punishable under § 11-26-1. State v. Innis, 433 A.2d 646, 655 (R.I.1981). For the confinement of another to fall within the reach of the kidnapping statute, the confinement must have some independent significance. Id. Accordingly, the movement of a victim during the course of a crime cannot be punished as a kidnapping unless such movement exceeds that necessary to facilitate the crime at hand. Id. ; see State v. Pablo, 925 A.2d 894, 899 (R.I.2007); State v. Taylor, 562 A.2d 445, 457 (R.I.1989). The salesman whom we have referred to as James testified that he was bound and confined in the closet for five or ten minutes. [38] The salesman referred to as Howard testified that he arrived at the jewelry store at 1:30 p.m. on the day of the robberies and was almost immediately escorted to the back room. Upon entering the room, he was attacked, bound and confined in the closet. Howard further testified that he thereafter freed himself, bolted from the closet, and again struggled with defendant and William. At the end of this struggle, he was again bound and confined in the closet with James. Howard testified that he believed the entire incident (from the time he was first attacked until he was able to finally escape from the closet and call the police) lasted between twenty and twenty-five minutes. When defendant and his co-conspirators left the jewelry store, the victims were left bound and confined in the closet. The victims were not detained simply for the purpose of robbing them; it is very significant to us that they were not released once the robberies were complete. Confining these victims to a small closet and leaving them there was clearly a confinement that exceeds that which was necessary for the commission of the robberies. In our view, these deplorable confinements cannot be classified as having been merely incidental to the robberies. See Pablo, 925 A.2d at 900 (holding that the kidnapping had independent significance when the defendant moved and confined the victim to a concealed location in order to make it more difficult for the victim to escape and detection less likely); State v. Lambert, 463 A.2d 1333, 1340 (R.I.1983) (finding that the victim's confinement and movement exceeded that which was necessary to facilitate the crimes of robbery and sexual assault). The defendant's actions in confining the victims to the closet exposed both victims to a greater harm than the robbery itself initially posed. This is especially true since both victims had been physically assaulted and sprayed with Mace. The defendant's actions made it significantly more difficult for the victims to escape thereby concealing his criminal activity for a time. See, e.g., Pablo, 925 A.2d at 900. Viewing the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and drawing all reasonable inferences consistent with guilt, we are satisfied that the trial justice did not err in denying the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charge. The testimony of the various witnesses for the prosecution was more than sufficient to establish that the crimes had independent significance.