Opinion ID: 2585503
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Consideration of Unadjudicated Criminal Conduct

Text: Defendant contends the trial court violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as analogous provisions of the California Constitution, by permitting the jury to consider unadjudicated criminal conduct as aggravating factors. This argument is, in fact, a facial attack on the constitutionality of section 190.3, factor (b), which provides: In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account any of the following factors if relevant: [¶] ... [¶] (b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. As defendant admits, we long ago rejected this argument. Thus, in People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 205, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480, we stated: we must also reject defendant's argument that other crimes are inadmissible per se in a penalty trial. Contrary to defendant's suggestion, admission of evidence of uncharged criminal violence does not impose the death penalty for a noncapital offense of which defendant was never convicted. Rather, the evidence of criminality, if proved beyond a reasonable doubt ( [People v.] Robertson [ (1982) ] 33 Cal.3d [21,] 53-55 [188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279]), is simply one factor the penalty jury is to consider in deciding the appropriate punishment for the capital offense. Although defendant urges this court to reconsider Balderas, he provides no persuasive reason to do so. As we recently held, [w]e repeatedly have rejected claims, identical to that made by defendant, that criminal activity occurring subsequent to the commission of the charged offense is inadmissible under section 190.3, factor (b). ( People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 648-649, 85 Cal. Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683.) Defendant argues the trial court compounded the alleged error by failing to instruct the jury on the elements of these other crimes. He asks: How could the jury determine that defendant was guilty of the uncharged offenses and consider them in aggravation if the trial judge fails to provide them with the proper tools and guidance to make such a finding? There was no error. As we have explained: [A] criminal defendant may have tactical reasons to forgo lengthy instructions on the elements of alleged other crimes. [Citation.] We fail to see how forcing a capital defendant to forgo this tactical option vindicates his federal constitutional rights. As we made clear in Phillips ... if a defendant requests an instruction explaining the elements of the other crimes at issue, he is entitled to have the jury so instructed. ( People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 207, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781, citing People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72, fn. 25, 222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423.) Defendant did not request such instructions. Finally, defendant complains that the trial court directed a verdict with respect to one of the instances of unadjudicated criminal conduct. Although its instructions to the jury regarding the unadjudicated crimes were all couched in terms of the alleged violations, the court described one of the alleged crimes as if it had already been found true. Thus, the court, in describing the various unadjudicated crimes, stated: The incident occurring on or about November 5th, 1988, in which the defendant committed an assault with a firearm on Monica [R.] and Gloria [A.], a violation of Penal Code section 245(a)(2). Defendant claims this violated [his] right to have the jury decide the facts of the case and instead took the fact-finding function away from the jury in violation of [defendant's] Sixth Amendment rights. Given that the trial court spoke of the other crimes by saying the defendant is alleged to have committed (italics added), it seems clear the court merely misspoke. Indeed, when describing the evidence of attempted robbery against Sharon Baker, the court stated: The incident occurring on or about January 27, 1988, in which the defendant committed, committedexcuse me, in which it is alleged the defendant committed. ... (Italics added.) Reading the instructions as a whole, it seems extremely unlikely the jury believed it was required to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether defendant committed the other crimes, but was to accept that defendant in fact committed an assault with a firearm on Monica R. and Gloria A. Any error was harmless.