Opinion ID: 543769
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Standard to this Case

Text: 31 Following the analytical model used in Gibson, Richards, H.L. Hayden and Valley Liquors, we shall examine the evidence of record to determine if Market Force's case can survive a motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, we shall first examine Market Force's evidence of a conspiracy among the defendants. Second, we shall examine whether the defendants have offered evidence tending to show that the conduct of which Market Force complains is as compatible with the defendants' legitimate business activities as it is with illegal conspiracy. Finally, if we conclude that the foregoing analysis leaves the evidence of conspiracy ambiguous, we shall then determine whether Market Force can point to any evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the defendants were pursuing their legitimate independent interests.
32 In its effort to establish a conspiracy, Market Force submitted evidence of a) the defendant companies' mutual awareness of each others' policies; and b) hostile comments allegedly made about Market Force. 33 a) the circulation of policy statements 34 Market Force submitted evidence that some defendants had circulated buyers' broker commission rates and other firms had adopted policies regarding buyers' brokers after receiving the circulations. In late October 1987, Wauwatosa mailed to all members of the Milwaukee MLS copies of its policy expressing its intention to pay 20% of the selling agent's commission to buyers' brokers. After James Bruce, Coldwell Banker's chief operating officer, received a copy of the Wauwatosa policy, Coldwell Banker issued its own policy, setting the amount given as a commission at 20% of the total commission--half of the normal selling agent commission. 6 Other firms subsequently adopted similar policies. Equitable/Stefaniak Realty issued a policy identical to Wauwatosa's that became effective December 15, 1987. A copy of the policy was mailed to all Milwaukee MLS members. On December 16, 1987, Realty World-Bloomfield Realty mailed its policy statement. Its policy was identical to the higher Coldwell Banker rates. Copies of the policy were mailed to all MLS members. 35 There is evidence that these mailings prompted at least one real estate broker to adopt such a policy. Andrew Dean, president of Realty World-Dean Realty, adopted a buyers' broker policy on December 24, 1987. He testified at a deposition that he knew of no buyers' brokers operating in Milwaukee. Nevertheless, he wanted to be one of the brokers in the area doing what everyone else is doing. R.87 Ex. 8 at 23. 36 Market Force characterizes Wauwatosa's circulation as an implicit invitation to their competitors to adopt similar policies. Appellant's Br. at 32. 7 However, evidence that brokers were aware of other brokers' policies regarding buyers' brokers before enacting their own policy is nothing more than a restatement of conscious parallelism. Since conscious parallelism by itself is not enough to support an antitrust conspiracy case, 8 Market Force cannot rest only on examples of conscious parallelism to support its case. 37 Moreover, it is well established that evidence of informal communications among several parties does not unambiguously support an inference of a conspiracy. See Riverview Invs., Inc. v. Ottawa Community Improvement Corp., 899 F.2d 474, 484 (6th Cir.1990); Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Center, 891 F.2d 810, 827 (11th Cir.) (That the defendants might have talked among themselves about [the plaintiff's business difficulties] is also insufficient to permit an inference of conspiracy.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1960, 109 L.Ed.2d 322 (1990); Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 878 F.2d 801, 805-06 (4th Cir.1989) (evidence that dealers agreed with a ban on discounters not sufficient to support the inference of a conspiracy); cf. Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656, 662 (7th Cir.) (evidence of meetings among the defendants is ambiguous at best and does not help to exclude the possibility of independent action), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977, 108 S.Ct. 488, 98 L.Ed.2d 486 (1987). 38 b) hostile statements by defendants 39 As further evidence of conspiracy, Market Force also points to hostile statements attacking Market Force that were made by the defendants to home buyers, Market Force agents, and the MLS. The district court determined that the evidence put forward was insufficient to avoid summary judgment. We agree. The evidence before the district court suggests that there were several incidents in which harsh words were spoken. However, the incidents do not foreclose the conclusion that the competitors were not engaged in a conspiracy. The evidence of hostility appears as likely as not to be isolated incidents or merely sales hype. 9 40
41 The defendants also offered legitimate business reasons for the actions that Market Force suggested were evidence of an illegal conspiracy. Coldwell Banker submits that the reason it sent out its policy was to inform other brokers that it would pay a lower fee to buyers' brokers. R.59 at 2. Wauwatosa asserts that the executive vice-president of the MLS told Joann Glawe that firms other than Market Force were acting as buyers' brokers, and that an appropriate way to inform them was to send the policy to all brokers. R.67 at 10-11. If the exchange of information regarding the commissions that the firms would pay is not unreasonable business behavior, then it is not an illegal agreement. Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400, 1407 (9th Cir.1986); cf. City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co., 872 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir.1989) (noting that competitors may exchange price information for legitimate business reasons), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1126, 107 L.Ed.2d 1032 (1990). 42
43 Because the evidence of the existence of a conspiracy among the brokers in Milwaukee is ambiguous, the plaintiff may survive summary judgment only by putting forth evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the defendants were pursuing ... independent interests. Gibson v. Greater Park City Co., 818 F.2d 722, 724 (10th Cir.1987). 44 According to Market Force, [t]he lame nature of the excuses the companies muster for their referral policies is circumstantial evidence that the policies were adopted for other reasons. The reasonable inference is that the companies' real motivation was their predatory intent to drive buyers' brokers from the market before they could establish a foothold. Appellant's Br. at 43. However, in her affidavit, Joann Glawe of Wauwatosa enumerated several specific reasons for adopting a referral policy regarding buyers' brokers, including (1) that Wauwatosa paid the listing sales associate a greater commission in a sale involving Market Force, or allocated the gross commission among the listing and selling brokers and paid a referral fee to Market Force; (2) that a selling broker may still be involved in the transaction, as in the case of a sale generated from an open house; and (3) that a listing sales associate must do more work when there is no selling broker. 10 R.67 at 4-7. The district court concluded that there were plausible reasons for the firms each to adopt a policy about buyers' brokers. The court noted that Wauwatosa and Coldwell Banker put forth independent business reasons ... [which were] not economically irrational. 706 F.Supp. at 1394. We agree. Market Force has not met its burden of providing specific factual support for its allegations of conspiracy tending to show that the defendant was not acting independently. Richards v. Neilsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.1987). Accordingly, we cannot say that there is any genuine issue of triable fact requiring the reversal of summary judgment.