Opinion ID: 2328716
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: taylor's other constitutional claims

Text: In addition to, and apart from, his ineffective assistance of counsel arguments, Taylor claims other, separate constitutional violations that factually overlap the ineffective assistance claims. Because Taylor did not raise these claims on his direct appeal, those claims also are procedurally barred absent a showing that they fall within a recognized Rule 61 exception. When reviewing a motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, this Court must first consider the procedural requirements of the rule before giving consideration to the merits of the underlying claims. [55] Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(5) creates an exception to the procedural default rule, in cases where there is a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction. [56] This provision, often referred to as the fundamental fairness exception, is a narrow one and . . . [is] applied only in limited circumstances, such as when the right relied upon has been recognized for the first time after the direct appeal. [57] To invoke this exception, there must be both a claim of a constitutional violation, and a showing that the claim is colorable and undermine(s) the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction. [58] Taylor identifies at least five constitutional violations that arguably might be considered under the fundamental fairness exception. [59] First, Taylor contends that because a defendant cannot constitutionally waive his mitigation defense in a capital case, his waiver was constitutionally invalid. Second, he contends that the trial court's consideration of the mitigation notebook, which was not provided to the jury, ran afoul of the United States Supreme Court's Gardner decision. Third, Taylor urges that the trial court's admission of prognosis testimony based on prior presentence reports violated constitutional rights recognized in Estelle v. Smith. [60] Fourth, Taylor claims that the prosecutor's allegedly improper remarks denied him due process and a fair penalty hearing. And fifth, Taylor asserts that the anti-sympathy instruction to the jury violated his constitutional right to a fair and reliable sentencing determination. Taylor's first claimthat his mitigation defense at the penalty hearing was not waivableis grounded upon Lockett v. Ohio. [61] There, the United States Supreme Court held that a capital defendant has a constitutional right to present mitigating evidence. [62] The problem with Taylor's argument, however, is that Lockett does not hold that that constitutional right cannot be waived. Taylor also relies on an intermediate New Jersey appellate court decision [63] for the proposition that his constitutional right to present mitigating evidence is undermined by allowing a waiver. But, several federal Courts of Appeal have held otherwise, [64] and we find those latter federal decisions more authoritative and persuasive. Taylor also cursorily asserts that his waiver violates Article I, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution, but provides no textual argument or authority to support that claim. [65] Because Rule 61(i)(5) requires a colorable claim of a constitutional violation, and Taylor has not made that showing, his no-waiver claim fails. Taylor next argues that the trial court's consideration of the mitigation notebook, submitted by defense counsel, denied him due process under Gardner. That argument, if accepted, would turn Gardner on its head. To reiterate, here, unlike Gardner, defense counsel was not deprived of the opportunity to view the mitigation material. Rather, defense counsel themselves created and submitted that material to the court. Because Gardner is inapposite, Taylor has not raised a colorable constitutional claim. That claim is, therefore, procedurally barred. Third, Taylor asks this Court to extend the United States Supreme Court's holding in Estelle v. Smith [66] to the facts of this case. In Estelle, the Supreme Court held that a psychiatrist's opinion of the capital defendant's future dangerousness constituted a Fifth Amendment violation, where that opinion relied on statements by the defendant during a court-ordered competency examination before which the defendant had not been given his Miranda rights. [67] Taylor asks us to hold, under Estelle, that the trial court's admission of the previous presentence reports' poor prognoses of Taylor during the penalty phase violated Taylor's Fifth Amendment rights, because the reports were based on non- Mirandized  [68] statements Taylor had previously made. Some federal Courts of Appeal have extended Estelle to presentence interviews by probation officers. [69] Other circuits have declined to apply Estelle to presentence interviews, at least in cases when those interviews were routine. [70] Notably, Taylor does not claim that the presentence interview conducted in this proceeding, in and of itself, violated his constitutional rights. Rather, Taylor's argument appears to be that the presentence officer's testimony at the penalty phase was constitutionally tainted because the officer described evidence from previous court-ordered presentence reportscompleted in 1988, 1992, and 1994based on interviews where Taylor was not read his Miranda rights beforehand. In each report, Taylor's prognosis was described as poor. The State, for its part, nowhere responds to, or addresses, the claimed Estelle violation in its brief. Assuming, but again without deciding, that this constitutional claim violation is colorable, Taylor has failed to show that violation undermine(d) the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction. [71] This is not a case when the right relied upon [was] recognized for the first time after the direct appeal, [72] nor is it one involving a clear miscarriage of justice. In Estelle, the psychiatrist testimony was that the defendant was a very severe sociopath, will continue his previous behavior, and that his condition will only get worse. [73] Here, however, the characterization to which Taylor now objects was simply that Taylor's prognosis was poor. We cannot conclude that that evidence undermined the integrity of the proceeding. The presentence investigator's prior prognoses of the defendant as poor told the jurors nothing they did not already know, given the undisputed background of Taylor's repeated violent criminal conducta background that eventually culminated in murder. Taylor has not met his burden to show a colorable Estelle violation that undermined the result of his sentencing. Therefore, this claim is also procedurally barred. Taylor's final two constitutional claims, regarding the prosecutor's allegedly improper comments and the court's anti-sympathy jury instruction, have been addressed previously in Section I supra. Taylor has not shown that the fundamental fairness of his trial was undermined as a result of either prosecutorial comment. And contrary to Taylor's claim that the anti-sympathy instruction violated Article I, Sections 4, 7, and 11 of the Delaware Constitution, our courts have interpreted anti-sympathy instructions as a requirement to guard against improper prejudice or passion being injected into any decision. [74] Taylor's conclusory claims based on the Delaware Constitution are procedurally barred because he has not established any colorable violation that fundamentally undermines the judgment in his case. [75] Because none of Taylor's constitutional claims are colorable, they are procedurally barred.