Opinion ID: 2814719
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Requirements for a Franks Hearing

Text: The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable intrusion by the government. This protection stems from the Amendment's instruction that no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and -11- particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. As we have repeatedly emphasized, [a]n affidavit supporting a search warrant is presumptively valid. United States v. Gifford, 727 F.3d 92, 98 (1st Cir. 2013). Still, a defendant may attempt to rebut this presumption and challenge the veracity of the affidavit. Id.; see also Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. To do so, he or she must make two substantial preliminary showings. United States v. Rigaud, 684 F.3d 169, 173 (1st Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). First, the defendant must show that a false statement or omission in the affidavit was made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. Id.; see also Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56; Grant, 218 F.3d at 77. Second, this falsehood or omission [must have been] necessary to the finding of probable cause. Rigaud, 684 F.3d at 173. In the case of an omission, this means establishing that the inclusion of the omitted information would have led to a negative finding by the magistrate on probable cause. Id. at 173 n.5. A failure to make a showing on either of these two elements dooms the defendant's challenge. Id. at 173. If, however, this preliminary showing is made, the defendant is entitled to a hearing -- known as a Franks hearing -- where he or she can try to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the affiant did in fact make a false statement or -12- omission knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth and that with the recklessly omitted information added to the affidavit, the reformed affidavit fails to establish probable cause. Gifford, 727 F.3d at 98 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Franks, 438 U.S. at 156; Rigaud, 684 F.3d at 173. Should the defendant establish by proof that these standards have been met, the warrant is voided and the fruits of the search are excluded. Gifford, 727 F.3d at 98; see also Franks, 438 U.S. at 156; Rigaud, 684 F.3d at 173. As to the second prong, a warrant is based on probable cause when 'the affidavit upon which a warrant is founded demonstrates in some trustworthy fashion the likelihood that an offense has been committed and that there is sound reason to believe that a particular search will turn up evidence of it.' United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 279 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Aguirre, 839 F.2d 854, 857-58 (1st Cir. 1988)). It is not necessary, however, for that 'belief [to] be correct or more likely true than false.' United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (plurality opinion)); see also United States v. Khounsavanh, 113 F.3d 279, 283 (1st Cir. 1997) ([P]robable cause need not be tantamount to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Probability is the touchstone. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Instead, we examine [an] affidavit in -13- a practical, commonsense fashion. United States v. Woodbury, 511 F.3d 93, 98 (1st Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Feliz, 182 F.3d at 86).