Opinion ID: 845600
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: people v. hill [3]

Text: Neither the felon-in-possession statute nor the felony-firearm statute defines the term firearm, but it is defined elsewhere in the Michigan Penal Code. MCL 750.222(d) provides: `Firearm' means a weapon from which a dangerous projectile may be propelled by an explosive, or by gas or air. Firearm does not include a smooth bore rifle or handgun designed and manufactured exclusively for propelling by a spring, or by gas or air, BB's not exceeding.177 caliber. Although this Court has not before been asked to determine the meaning of MCL 750.222(d), we did discuss a strikingly similar statute in People v. Hill . The two defendants in Hill faced the charge of possession of a short-barreled shotgun. MCL 750.224b. Each possessed separate parts that together made one shotgun. Hill, 433 Mich. at 466, 446 N.W.2d 140. To determine the meaning of the term shotgun, the Court turned to the definition of firearm. MCL 750.222 did not contain a definition of firearm at that time. Therefore, the Court referred to MCL 8.3t, which provides: The word firearm, except as otherwise specifically defined in the statutes, shall be construed to include any weapon from which a dangerous projectile may be propelled by using explosives, gas or air as a means of propulsion, except any smooth bore rifle or handgun designed and manufactured exclusively for propelling BB's not exceeding.177 calibre by means of spring, gas or air. The Court stated that the words of a statute should be read in the way that best harmonizes with the ends the Legislature sought to achieve. Hill, 433 Mich. at 474 n. 8, 446 N.W.2d 140. The following purpose was noted for the firearm laws: `Statutes making it unlawful to have or carry weapons are designed to suppress the act or practice of going armed and being ready for offense or defense in case of conflict with another, and to outlaw instruments ordinarily used for criminal and improper purposes.... The statutes should receive a reasonable construction in accord with the purpose of the legislature and in the light of the evil to be remedied, and they should be construed with the thought in mind that they are aimed at persons of criminal instincts and for the prevention of crime....    A deadly weapon does not cease to be such by becoming temporarily inefficient, nor is its essential character changed by dismemberment if the parts, with reasonable preparation, may be easily assembled so as to be effective.  [ Id. at 473, quoting 94 CJS, Weapons, § 2, pp. 479-480, and § 6, p. 489 (emphasis added).] Hill reasoned that, to effectuate this intent, the statute should not be limited to the narrowest of circumstances. Therefore, the Court concluded that a temporarily inoperable shotgun remains within the meaning of the term firearm. This is because the temporarily inoperable shotgun maintains its man-killing status. Id. at 477, 446 N.W.2d 140. The Court concluded: Thus, temporarily inoperable firearms which can be made operable within a reasonable time fall within the purview of the statutes that govern the use and possession of firearms. Id. The majority claims that Hill is not instructive because the Hill Court did not purport to interpret the concealed weapons and felony-firearm statutes. Ante at 201. I disagree. Whereas it is true that Hill is not controlling in this case, it is certainly instructive. MCL 8.3t and MCL 750.222(d) are nearly identical. The central components of the definitions, [a or any] weapon from which a dangerous projectile may be propelled, are identical. It is the words may be propelled that are the central focus of the case before us. At the very least, the interpretation of the identical words in a related statute should provide the Court guidance in reaching a conclusion in this case. The majority's contentions to the contrary are puzzling. [4] This Court should grant Hill its appropriate value as strongly influential precedent and reach the same conclusion as Hill did. That is, a weapon qualifies as a firearm only if it can be made operable within a reasonable time. This is true because the general intent behind the felon-in-possession statute and the felony-firearm statute is the same as the intent for the statute concerning possession of a short-barreled shotgun. Hill noted as much. Statutes making it unlawful to have or carry weapons are designed to suppress the act or practice of going armed and being ready for offense or defense in case of conflict with another .... Hill, 433 Mich. at 473, 446 N.W.2d 140 (emphasis added; citation omitted). A person carrying a gun that cannot be reasonably and readily repaired is not ready for offense or defense in case of conflict. Instead, that person is similarly situated to someone carrying a stick, a club, or a piece of metal. A person carrying a piece of iron rebar could not be convicted of felon in possession or felony-firearm, regardless of his or her intended use for that rebar. There is no reason to treat a person carrying a hunk of scrap metal that formerly functioned as a firearm any differently. Neither can be used to shoot someone, which is the man-killing status intrinsic in a firearm and which is what the Legislature intended to regulate. [5] The majority claims that, unless it reads a design requirement into the statute, a piece of pipe could constitute a firearm. Ante at 199. But, under the majority's interpretation of MCL 750.222(d), a piece of pipe that had once been part of a gun, for instance the barrel of a shotgun, would also constitute a firearm. This would be true even if there is no significant difference between the two pipes. The majority asserts that it makes little sense to rule that a piece of pipe constitutes a firearm. I question then, what sense would there be in finding that a former gun barrel constitutes a firearm? I submit that there is no sense in the majority's design requirement and that the Legislature never intended it to exist. In addition to adding a design requirement to the language of MCL 750.222(d), the majority has added a redesign defense to the crime. Ante at 204 n. 7. It has been obliged to do so to avoid an absurd result. If it did not, certain people would be guilty of felon in possession by sitting near or leaning on a plugged cannon on display in a park. But in fabricating its redesign defense, the majority has reverted to a defense based on operability, albeit one available only in special circumstances. Consider the cannon in the park. The sole redesign that has occurred and that is relevant is that which has rendered the cannon incapable of firing a projectile. The majority offers no explanation or support from the text of the statute for reading into the statute this redesign/limited operability defense. By contrast, Hill offers ample support for allowing all defendants to raise an inoperability defense when appropriate. The majority's discussion of the cannon in the park implies that a firearm can be redesigned to no longer constitute a firearm. But the majority fails to indicate at what point a redesigning occurs. And it fails to explain why a redesigning did not occur when the gun in this case was extensively damaged. At the very least, under the majority's ruling, the question of whether the scrap-metal gun was sufficiently redesigned should be a question of fact for the jury. The majority should explain what has justified it to take this question from the jury. Why has the case not been remanded for trial? Today's interpretation of MCL 750.222(d) raises more questions than it answers. Instead of raising unanswered questions by inventing a new redesign/partial operability defense as the majority has done, I would continue to follow the well-reasoned rule of law articulated in Hill. There is strong evidence that defendant, when arrested, carried no more than pieces of scrap metal that were once parts of a firearm. If this is true, they do not meet the definition of firearm in MCL 750.222(d). If the gun could not reasonably and readily be repaired, its essential character had changed. If it could not `be easily assembled so as to be effective,' it would no longer be a firearm. See Hill, 433 Mich. at 473, 446 N.W.2d 140 (citation omitted). Whether a gun is more than temporarily inoperable and therefore not a firearm is a question of fact that should be left to the jury. People v. Gardner, 194 Mich.App. 652, 655, 487 N.W.2d 515 (1992); see also Hill, 433 Mich. at 480, 446 N.W.2d 140. In this case, the trial court instructed the jury that a handgun need not be currently operable to qualify as a firearm. This instruction was insufficient to meet the requirements of MCL 750.222(d) and Hill. Anything more than temporary inoperability is a defense to a crime involving a firearm. [6] Defendant did not object to the trial court's instruction and did not ask for an instruction on inoperability. [7] However, the jury was improperly instructed, and the error constituted plain error requiring reversal. There are three requirements under the plain error rule: (1) the error must have occurred, (2) it must have been clear or obvious, and (3) it must have adversely affected the defendant's substantial rights. People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 763, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). Reversal is required if the error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or gravely and adversely affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Id., quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736-737, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). In this case, it is clear and obvious that the trial court failed to give an instruction on the defense of inoperability of the firearm. This adversely affected defendant's substantial right to a properly instructed jury and his substantial right to present a defense. Instructions to a jury must include material issues, defenses, or theories as long as there is evidence to support them. People v. Reed, 393 Mich. 342, 349-350, 224 N.W.2d 867 (1975). In this case, the operability of the firearm was crucial. Whether defendant possessed an actual firearm or a hunk of scrap metal was the central question. Because an instruction on this important issue was omitted, the jury instructions were inadequate to protect defendant's substantial right to a properly instructed jury. Id. It is basic law that a defendant must be allowed to confront the charges against him or her and defend against them. The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). In not instructing the jury on the inoperability of a firearm here, the court robbed defendant of his ability to fully defend against the state's accusation that he possessed a firearm. Therefore, he was not allowed to present an appropriate defense. Given that this raises due process questions, the failure adversely affected defendant's substantial rights. This plain error requires reversal. It meets both of the possible reasons for reversal articulated in Carines. First, because there was significant evidence that defendant possessed mere scrap metal, there is a legitimate chance that defendant is actually innocent. Second, failure to instruct the jury on the issue that was central to the case robbed defendant of his defense. Because this raises due process concerns, the error affects the fairness and the public reputation of the proceedings. Under such circumstances, defendant is entitled to a remand for a new trial. Carines, 460 Mich. at 763, 597 N.W.2d 130.