Opinion ID: 2721621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Amount of Child Support Arrearage

Text: [¶24] Sullivan does not dispute that he owes back child support or the amount of income attributed to each party used to calculate the support amounts. He argues that the court clearly erred in finding that he owes $38,019 in back child support primarily because, according to Sullivan’s trial testimony, the child lived 10 with him during periods in 2007 through 2011 for which, he argues, he should have received credit deducted from the child support arrearage.3 [¶25] “Past support is calculated by applying the current support guidelines to the period for which past support is owed.” 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(2) (2013); see also 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1553, 2002 (2013).4 There is a rebuttable presumption that the child support obligation derived from the child support guidelines is the amount to be ordered, absent special circumstances or a deviation from the guidelines, and the court must order the party not providing primary residential care to pay that party’s share of the total basic support to the party providing primary residential care. 19-A M.R.S. §§ 2005, 2006(4), (5), 2007 (2013). [¶26] We review the trial court’s award of child support for an abuse of discretion and the underlying factual findings for clear error. Foley v. Ziegler, 2007 ME 127, ¶ 8, 931 A.2d 498. We do not disturb the court’s findings if there is any competent record evidence to support them. Id. [¶27] The court made no subsidiary findings to support its determination that Sullivan owes Doe $38,019 in child support arrearages. However, as 3 Contrary to Sullivan’s additional contention that the court wholly adopted the Department’s and Doe’s calculations of his child support debt, it is evident that the court reviewed the evidence and applied its independent judgment upon expressly finding the calculations to be reliable. See Bonville v. Bonville, 2006 ME 3, ¶ 9, 890 A.2d 263. 4 Pursuant to the Uniform Act on Paternity, 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1551-1570 (2013), the child support provisions in 19-A M.R.S. §§ 2001-2012 (2013) apply in this case to an award of past support. 19-A M.R.S. § 1553. 11 previously noted, Sullivan requested no further findings of fact, and we therefore assume that the trial court made all of the necessary subsidiary findings, if those findings are supported by competent record evidence, to support its determination. See Efstathiou, 2009 ME 107, ¶ 10, 982 A.2d 339; Fitzpatrick, 2006 ME 140, ¶ 17, 910 A.2d 396. Competent record evidence supports the court’s finding of the arrearage amount. [¶28] Although at times Doe and the child lived with Sullivan, Doe testified that they did so sporadically for a few months at a time and that Sullivan did not financially support the child during those periods. The trial court acted within its province to credit that testimony. See Charette, 2013 ME 4, ¶ 9, 60 A.3d 1264; Wong v. Hawk, 2012 ME 125, ¶ 16, 55 A.3d 425. Therefore, the record supports the court’s implicit determinations that Sullivan was not the child’s primary care provider during the identified time periods and that the parties did not provide substantially equal care during those times.5 See 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(4), (5)(D), (D-1); Jabar v. Jabar, 2006 ME 74, ¶ 17, 899 A.2d 796. [¶29] Additionally, if Sullivan sought a deviation from the child support guidelines to receive credit for times when, he claims, the child lived with him, he 5 “‘Primary residential care provider’ means the party who provides residential care for a child for more than 50% of the time on an annual basis if the parents do not provide substantially equal care as defined in subsection 8-A.” 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(8) (2013). “‘Substantially equal care’ means that both parents participate substantially equally in the child’s total care, which may include, but is not limited to, the child’s residential, educational, recreational, child care and medical, dental and mental health care needs.” 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(8-A) (2013). 12 was required to provide to the court written proposed findings showing that the presumptive child support amount would be inequitable or unjust. 19-A M.R.S. §§ 2005, 2007. There is no indication that he did so. The court did not abuse its discretion in not deviating from child support guidelines. See Potila v. Nadeau, 2014 ME 5, ¶ 4, 85 A.3d 1290; Wong, 2012 ME 125, ¶¶ 16-18, 55 A.3d 425; Johnson v. Smith, 1999 ME 168, ¶ 14, 740 A.2d 579; Bojarski v. Bojarski, 2012 ME 56, ¶ 29, 41 A.3d 544. [¶30] Finally, Sullivan asserts that the amount of arrearages is erroneous because he had previously paid a portion of the arrearages; however, as Sullivan acknowledges, the record does not include evidence to that effect, and we do not further address the merits of the issue because there is no indication that Sullivan brought the alleged error to the trial court’s attention. See Akers v. Akers, 2012 ME 75, ¶ 9, 44 A.3d 311 (declining to address on appeal the issue of a possible error in the court’s calculation of credit towards child support because the party did not bring the error to the court’s attention); see also M.R. Civ. P. 52, 59(e), 60. [¶31] In short, the court did not err or abuse its discretion in determining child support arrearages. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. 13 ______________________________ On the brief: Dawn D. Dyer, Esq., Law Office of Dawn D. Dyer, Windham, for appellant Richard S. Sullivan Jane Doe did not file a brief Bridgton District Court docket number FM-2011-242 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY