Opinion ID: 1358916
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Child's Claim

Text: (3a) The second interest to consider in this case, the interest of Michelle in a legal determination of who her biological father is, has been treated by the other litigants as an appendage to the rights of the putative father. The guardian ad litem for Michelle is a family friend of Donald and Judith R. Michelle is represented by the same attorney as Donald R. and their interests have been continually asserted as being consistent with each other. Our concern is that Michelle is not the real actor behind this child paternity suit and that she may be asserting a right which may or may not be in her best interests. [6] We are not convinced under the circumstances of this case, that Michelle's rights are greater than those afforded to Donald R. In Estate of Cornelious, supra, 35 Cal.3d 461, we held that the guarantee of due process of law was not offended when a child was precluded from proving paternity by the operation of section 621. In Estate of Cornelious, as in the case at bench, we apply a balancing test to resolve an as-applied challenge to the statute in question. (35 Cal.3d at p. 467.) Because Michelle's rights have not been argued to be separate from Donald R.'s we cannot conclude that her interest in establishing paternity outweighs the state's interest in preserving and protecting the developed parent-child and sibling relationships which give young children social and emotional strength and stability. Given the facts that Michelle has a legal father and that he opposes this attempt to have Donald R. declared the biological father, we are unpersuaded that a judicial juggling of Michelle's family relationships is warranted by her abstract interest in establishing paternity. (4) We reject plaintiffs' suggestion that section 621 as applied to Michelle is constitutionally defective pursuant to the authority of Vlandis v. Klein (1973) 412 U.S. 441 [37 L.Ed.2d 63, 93 S.Ct. 2230]. In Vlandis the United States Supreme Court invalidated a permanent and irrebuttable presumption that students who were nonresidents when they applied to attend state universities remained nonresidents for purposes of assessing fees and tuition. [7] While Vlandis involved a purported factual determination of residency, section 621 does not purport to determine biological paternity. Rather, it is in actuality a substantive rule of law designed to further public policies. ( Kusior v. Silver, supra, 54 Cal.2d 603, at p. 619.) Furthermore, because we apply the balancing test utilized in Estate of Cornelious, we cannot conclude that the presumption of section 621 is necessarily irrebuttable. Simply because Donald R. and Michelle are unable to rebut the presumption does not mean that we interpret section 621 to be a conclusive and unchangeable presumption. ( Vlandis v. Klein, supra, 412 U.S. at p. 443 [37 L.Ed.2d at p. 66].) Rather, we merely conclude that the denial of Michelle's motion for blood tests was justified because the state interests outweighed her abstract interest in vindicating true parentage. (3b) Michelle is not being threatened with termination of her association with Donald R. She is not even being prevented from obtaining information as to who her biological father is. As stated by the United States Supreme Court, the extent to which due process must be afforded an individual is influenced by the extent to which he may be `condemned to suffer grievous loss.' ( Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) 397 U.S. 254, 262-263 [25 L.Ed.2d 287, 296, 90 S.Ct. 1011].) We cannot say that denying Michelle the opportunity to present blood test evidence in a court of law violates the guarantee of due process of law.