Opinion ID: 387362
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Quality of Representation

Text: 280 Under the majority's approach, in calculating an award of attorney's fees, the court should first multiply a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended on the lawsuit, the so-called lodestar fee. Adjustments to this figure then may be appropriate, the majority asserts, to account for the quality of representation in the particular case and the contingent nature of success. Another logical flaw in the majority's formula is that a consideration of the quality of representation in the particular case, like that of contingency, see Part II.A. supra, already inheres in the reasonable hourly rate, one of the two elements used in fixing the lodestar fee. The majority reveals this logical gap plainly, yet it does not seem to recognize it. 281 The majority states that a reasonable hourly rate is the product of a multiplicity of factors. Evans itself listed several of the relevant considerations (including, inter alia) the level of skill necessary (and) the attorney's reputation. 35 The attorney's reputation corresponds to a consideration of the quality of an attorney's work in general. As the court stated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 36 (from which the factors in Evans are drawn): Most fee scales reflect an experience differential with the more experienced attorneys receiving larger compensation. An attorney specializing in civil rights cases may enjoy a higher rate for his expertise than others, providing his ability corresponds with his experience. The level of skill necessary to perform the legal service properly also corresponds to a consideration of the quality of an attorney's representation in the particular case before the court. In Johnson the court explained that this factor required the trial judge to observe the attorney's work product, his preparation, and general ability before the court. 37 So, both the lawyer's skill in general (reputation) and that necessary in the particular case are already accounted for in the reasonable hourly rate. 282 Although the skill of the lawyer in the particular case thus is already included in the calculation of the reasonable hourly rate, the majority states that the 'lodestar' may be adjusted up or down to reflect 'the quality of representation.'  38 Under the majority's approach, then, the attorney presumable will be compensated for the quality of his representation twice: once when the court calculates the lodestar fee and a second time when an adjustment to the lodestar is made. 283 We might add that we do not find logically persuasive the majority's notion that a decrease in the lodestar may result if the quality of the representation was unusually poor. To be entitled to an award of attorney's fees, the attorney must prevail in the lawsuit. It stands to reason that the level of proficiency displayed will always be at least adequate (indicating no adjustment to the lodestar) if not exceptional (indicating an upward adjustment to the lodestar) in cases in which the plaintiff prevails. It is thus difficult to conceive how a downward adjustment would ever be justified. 284