Opinion ID: 1059146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Juror Baffer

Text: Relying on the following series of questions, Jackson claims that the circuit court erred in refusing to strike prospective juror Baffer for cause: [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Do you hold the belief that death is the appropriate punishment for a person who commits a murder, rape and/or robbery unless he can convince you otherwise? MR. BAFFER: Yes. [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Why is that? MR. BAFFER: Because I believe in the State of Virginia, the Penal Code in the  it's prescribed.    [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: You were asked an automatic question by the Commonwealth. Would you automatically vote to impose the death penalty on a person you determine beyond a reasonable doubt constituted a continuing serious threat to society? MR. BAFFER: Yes. This isolated portion of juror Baffer's voir dire is misleading because this prospective juror, when asked by the Commonwealth whether he would automatically impose the death penalty if the defendant were found guilty of capital murder, answered No. The circuit court then engaged in the following exchange with prospective juror Baffer: THE COURT: Mr. Baffer, let me ask you one question. [Defense counsel] asked you a question. He said that if you found beyond a reasonable doubt that a consideration of the Defendant's history and background there is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society, he asked you if you found that, would you always vote to impose the death penalty, and you said yes. Is that your understanding of what the law in Virginia is? MR. BAFFER: I'm not sure what the law of Virginia is on that. You said automatically impose the death penalty? THE COURT: If you found  you convicted the Defendant of capital murder and then you made a second finding, go to the second phase where evidence is presented regarding the possible sentence. You have two possible sentences, life in prison or death, and the Court would instruct you that before you could impose the death penalty, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that after consideration of the Defendant's history and background, there is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society, you made that finding, is it your understanding that you must then impose the death penalty? MR. BAFFER: I don't know that I must impose. I mean, get him out of society. Life without parole removes him from society. THE COURT: That's correct. MR. BAFFER: If he would pose a danger, that would be adequate that he doesn't come back into society. THE COURT: What would be adequate, life without parole? MR. BAFFER: That would be adequate too, life without parole. THE COURT: The question [defense counsel] asked you is if you found that this future danger existed, would you automatically vote to impose the death penalty? MR. BAFFER: No, I would say no to that, if the alternative is he got life without parole, that would be adequate. THE COURT: Well, that is your alternative. You only have two choices. If the Defendant is found guilty of capital murder, you have two choices: One is the death sentence; the other is life in prison without parole. They are your only two options, and if you were to find the Defendant guilty of capital murder, and if you found the condition of future dangerousness existed, could you consider both? MR. BAFFER: I could consider both. THE COURT: Would you automatically impose the death penalty if you found future dangerousness existed? MR. BAFFER: No, if he was removed from society. As stated previously, we must consider this juror's entire voir dire. See Vinson, 258 Va. at 467, 522 S.E.2d at 176. Upon doing so, it is clear that, while prospective juror Baffer stated at one point, in response to confusing questions by defense counsel, that he would automatically impose the death penalty, he subsequently clarified his position and stated that he would follow the court's instructions and consider both sentencing alternatives. We have held that it is improper to ask prospective jurors speculative questions regarding whether they would automatically impose the death penalty in certain hypothetical situations without reference to a juror's ability to consider the evidence and follow the court's instructions. Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 141, 547 S.E.2d 186, 196 (2001). Thus, we conclude that the circuit court ruled properly in seating this juror.