Opinion ID: 619103
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendants' Challenges to Their Convictions

Text: On appeal of a motion to suppress, the district court's findings of facts are reviewed for clear error, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. The district court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  United States v. Hernandez, 647 F.3d 216, 218 (5th Cir.2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We review de novo a district court's decision to deny a defendant's Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 motion for acquittal. United States v. Girod, 646 F.3d 304, 313 (5th Cir.2011). The jury's verdict will be affirmed if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude from the evidence that the elements of the offense were established beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We do not evaluate the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses, but view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, drawing all reasonable inferences to support the verdict. Id. A district court's decision to grant or deny a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 motion for a new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Piazza, 647 F.3d 559, 564 (5th Cir.2011). We are necessarily deferential to the trial court because the appellate court has only read the record and, unlike the trial court, did not see the impact of witnesses on the jury or observe the demeanor of witnesses. Id. at 565 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id. For mixed questions of law and fact, we review the underlying facts for an abuse of discretion, but the conclusions to be drawn from those facts de novo. Id.  Brady/Giglio claims raised in a motion for a new trial are reviewed de novo. United States v. Davis, 609 F.3d 663, 696 (5th Cir.2010), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1676, 179 L.Ed.2d 621 (2011). While review of the Brady question is de novo, we must proceed with deference to the factual findings underlying the district court's decision. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Dalton first argues that the district court should have granted his motion to suppress, and therefore granted him a judgment of acquittal or a new trial, because Perez's and Williams's trial testimony conclusively established that the [NOPD]'s version of the events surrounding the stop and searches [on February 19, 2008] w[as] rife with inconsistencies and simply cannot be trusted. Br. of Dalton Bennett at 30. The inconsistencies in testimony Dalton points to involve credibility determinations made by the district court during the suppression hearing or by the jury during trial. [6] Such inconsistencies are not conclusive proof that one version of events must be credited over another, and do not overcome our deferential standard of review of credibility determinations. See United States v. Valentine, 401 F.3d 609, 614 (5th Cir.2005) (affirming the denial of a motion for acquittal based on an officer's inconsistent testimony at the suppression hearing and at trial because [t]he district court was able to observe the demeanor of the witness at the suppression hearing and trial and thus was in a unique position to gauge credibility). Dalton next argues that the district court should have granted his motion for acquittal because it is now crystal clear that the government suppressed highly probative evidence of [Moore]'s history of writing false police reports and then lying about it to the FBI. Br. of Dalton Bennett at 32. Dalton claims that had the defense known what the government knew at the time of the suppression hearing and at the time of the trial, the defense could have more aggressively impeached the already tainted credibility of government witnesses. Id. at 33-34. When a defendant seeks a new trial on the basis of a Brady violation, he must show that (1) the prosecution did not disclose the evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) the evidence was material. Davis, 609 F.3d at 696 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Evidence is material if, had it been disclosed, there is a reasonable probability the result would have been differentthat is, a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. Moore's subsequent indictment for lying to the FBI is not material because its disclosure would probably not have changed the result of Dalton's trial. First, at the time of Dalton's suppression hearing, Moore had not yet even made the false statement to the FBI for which he was later indicted. It is therefore unclear how Dalton could have used false statements that had not yet occurred to impeach Moore at the suppression hearing. Further, Perez corroborated Moore's testimony at the suppression hearing, and therefore it is likely that the district court would still have denied Dalton's motion to suppress. Moreover, because Moore did not testify at trial and likely would have exercised his right to avoid self-incrimination had he had been called to testify, the outcome of the trial would probably not have been different had Dalton and the other Defendants known that the FBI was currently investigating Moore for filing false police reports. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Dalton's motion for acquittal or a new trial.
Lance argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of conspiring to obstruct a federal proceeding. In particular, he argues that the Government failed to offer any evidence showing a nexus between Lance's agreement to sign the false affidavit taking responsibility for the handgun and crack in the truck and the federal charges brought against Dalton. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), it is a crime to corruptly . . . obstruct[], influence[], or impede[] any official proceeding, or attempt[] to do so. The official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1). The government must, however, prove beyond a reasonable doubt some nexus between the obstruction and the official proceeding. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 707-08, 125 S.Ct. 2129, 161 L.Ed.2d 1008 (2005). In a phone call the morning after Dalton was arrested, Dalton told Lance: I need you to take this charge, bro. You ain't gonna get nothin' but provation [sic], bro. I'm a get Jason Williams for your lawyer, and I'm a bond you out and you gonna fight this shit on the street bro. Lance responded, I'm a do it. Dalton then told Lance: But, uh, man, y'all gotta go, y'all go, you got to find [Miller] and, and go down there with Jason Williams and try to take this, this bro, before the feds accept it bro cause, which you they ain't gonna fuck which you like that, bro. That phone call alone provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find a nexus between Lance's agreement to sign the affidavit and the particular official proceeding that affidavit would obstruct, influence, or impede. See id. at 708. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Lance's motion for acquittal or a new trial.
Miller first argues that there was insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could determine that he was guilty on Count One, conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack. The jury acquitted him on Counts Two, Three and Five, which charged Miller with possessing with intent to distribute the crack found in the truck, possessing the handgun found in the truck in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Accordingly, he argues, the jury did not believe any testimony linking him to that crack and there was no other evidence of his involvement in his co-defendant's crack-selling conspiracy. The elements of conspiracy with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack are: (1) an agreement with one other person to possess with intent to distribute at least [50 grams of crack]; (2) defendant's knowledge of the agreement; and (3) defendant's voluntary participation in the conspiracy. United States v. Percel, 553 F.3d 903, 910 (5th Cir.2008). A conspiracy can be proven by circumstantial evidence. Id. The jury heard a phone call during which Dalton asked Miller you got somethin' to keep yourself goin' huh? Miller responds, Ye-, yeah. DB: Well then you good. You, you like still able to do things? DM: Yeah. DB: Oh, you good then, man. You know it's good when I come out there. DM: Right, I ain't trippin' DB: But still man, you should be tryin' to get to the four spot, man. Just [UI] . . . DM: I already know, I'm . . . DB: Yeah . . . DM: Yeah. DB: . . . meet me halfway on some shit, yeah. DM: Yeah, you know I'm tryin' it. DB: Yeah, halfway and I give you the other half of it, ya heard me. DM: Yeah. DB: Yeah, man. `Cause you know, Black . . . DM: Fuckin' right. DB: . . . gotta be like, yeah, by the time I get, y'all should be four strong man, on that. DM: Yeah, I know. Williams testified that this conversation was about drugs, that Dalton was asking Miller whether he still had drugs to sell, and that Miller should work up to four and a half ounces of crack (about 127 grams) by the time Dalton gets out. From this conversation, a reasonable jury could infer that Dalton and Miller had an agreement to sell crack together, Miller knew about that agreement, and Miller voluntarily took part in that conspiracy. See id. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Miller's motion for acquittal or a new trial. Miller next attacks his conviction for obstructing an official proceeding, arguing that it is impossible to know which official proceeding the jury had in mind when it convicted him. [7] Miller's appeal on this issue lacks merit because in explaining the elements of obstructing an official proceeding, the district court specifically instructed the jury that the trial of the United States versus Dalton Bennett, Lance Bennett, and Danquell Miller is an official federal proceeding and is a trial of a criminal case.