Opinion ID: 655893
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: court's clarification of pinkerton

Text: 22 During its deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court inquiring whether one or more members of a conspiracy can be found innocent of a count in which other members of the conspiracy are found guilty. The court responded, yes, if it was unforeseeable that another member of the conspiracy would have committed that crime. (Uriel ER at 166) Umansor-Alvarez and Uriel contend that the court's response wrongly failed to remind the jury that in order to find a conspirator guilty of a crime committed by a co-conspirator, the crime must have been in furtherance of the conspiracy. Instruction 23, however, informed the jury that vicarious liability for another's crime required a finding that the crime was both foreseeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Neither the jury's question nor the court's response disturbed the previous instruction. 23 Second, Umansor-Alvarez contends that the response did not clarify that, in order to find a defendant guilty of his co-conspirator's crime, the jury must find that the crime was done in furtherance of the charged conspiracy. This challenge is frivolous. When responding to the jury's inquiry, the court spoke of the  conspiracy. The use of this article refers back to the overall conspiracy charged in count one, and in no way suggests that the jury could find the defendant guilty of a crime committed in furtherance of some other conspiracy. 24 Finally, Uriel argues that the government's burden was reduced because the court failed to say that the crime must be reasonably unforeseeable to a defendant. If anything, by omitting the requirement of reasonableness, the court may have increased the government's burden by shifting the jury's focus to the question of whether a defendant actually did not foresee the use of a weapon, notwithstanding that he should have foreseen its use. Uriel also argues that the court's response shifted the burden to the defendants to prove that the crime was unforeseeable. Again, Instruction 23 properly instructed the jury on the government's burden. The way the court framed its answer to the jury was a result of the way the jury had framed the question: it wanted to know when it could find a defendant innocent of vicarious liability. Thus, we find no error in the court's response to the jury's inquiry. C. FIREARM INSTRUCTION 25 Umansor-Alvarez contends that the court abused its discretion in its formulation of Instruction 53, which defined the meaning of the words use and carry as used in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Instruction 53 tracks the language we approved in United States v. Guy, 903 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir.1990). We affirm the district court's formulation of Instruction 53. 26 Umansor-Alvarez also alleges that Instruction 54, which explained the meaning of the terms in relation to and during as used in § 924(c), misstated the law because it failed to inform the jury that a defendant must have knowledge that a firearm was available to him. The degree of knowledge required by a defendant is covered by Instruction 52, which stated that, in order for a defendant to be found guilty of using a firearm in violation of § 924(c), the jury must find that the defendant knowingly used or carried, or aided and abetted or caused the use and carrying of the weapon. Instruction 54 was proper. D. DISTRIBUTION INSTRUCTION 27 Instruction 28 defined the words distribute and deliver in relation to the possession and distribution counts. The court told the jury that deliver means the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of a narcotic, whether or not there exists an agency relationship between the persons involved. Umansor-Alvarez objects to the instruction on the ground that the average juror would not understand the words constructive or agency. No juror, however, asked for clarification. So too, instructions 36, 37, 70, and 71, which dealt with the four specific possession charges against Umansor-Alvarez, simply and succinctly informed the jury of the elements of possession. We affirm. E. CONSPIRACY INSTRUCTIONS 28 Umansor-Alvarez challenges all of the court's instructions regarding the charged conspiracy. First, he challenges the last paragraph of the multiple conspiracy Instruction 24, which stated that a single conspiracy may involve several sub-agreements or sub-groups of co-conspirators. Umansor-Alvarez argues that this instruction allowed the jury to find the existence of a single conspiracy notwithstanding that the government had proved only the existence of several similar conspiracies. 29 Instruction 21 clarified that in order to find a single conspiracy, the jury must find that at least two defendants met, [and] discussed matters of common interest ... or perhaps helped one another. In addition, the court told the jury that it must find that there was a joint plan among at least two defendants. In regard to membership, Instruction 21 stated that in order to find that a defendant was a member of the single conspiracy, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant joined the conspiracy previously described while knowing of the unlawful plan and intending to help carry it out. Taken together, these two instructions clarify that the jury had to find some relationship between various conspiracies before it could find a single conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1167 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981). 30 Next, Umansor-Alvarez argues that Instruction 22, which concerned participation in a conspiracy failed to tell the jury that the object of the conspiracy must be unlawful. Instruction 21, however, informed the jury that in order to find a defendant guilty, it must find that he or she joined the conspiracy and did so knowing of the unlawful plan and intending to help carry it out. This challenge is frivolous. 31 Finally, Umansor-Alvarez objects to Instruction 42, which defined the meaning of the word facilitate in relation to 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). Section 843(b) prohibits the use of a communication facility to facilitate the commission of a felony. The court told the jury that the word facilitate was to be given its common and ordinary meaning, gave the jury a dictionary definition of the word, and then placed the word in context by making reference to the use of a telephone to facilitate a crime. Although Umansor-Alvarez contends the reference to a telephone improperly distracted the jury. He does not say how. We thus affirm.