Opinion ID: 2978321
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The unions jointly move for sanctions

Text: On June 8, 2006, the unions certified mailing of notice of their intention to move for sanctions against plaintiffs and Appellant for violating Rule 11(b); they filed a joint motion eight days later, June 16. The unions said that Mrs. Uszak could not bring a claim under 301/dfr because she was not a union employee, and the IBT did not owe a duty of fair representation to Uszak because it was not the certified bargaining representative of Uszak or any YT employee, nor a signatory to the NMFA. C. The district court sets deadline for amending pleadings On June 16, 2006, the district court issued a case management order setting July 17, 2006, as the cutoff date for amending pleadings and adding new parties. D. Plaintiffs move to amend complaint On July 17, 2006, plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint. The amended complaint: (1) Dropped Mrs. Uszak from the 301/dfr claims in count 1; (2) Elaborated on the claims against YT for wrongful discharge in count 2; (3) Added count 3, a state claim by Mr. and Mrs. Uszak for assault against Curtis; (4) Added count 4, a state claim by Mr. Uszak for intentional tort against YT; (5) Added count 5, a state claim by Mrs. Uszak for loss of consortium, presumably arising from the assault and intentional tort claims; and -4- Uszak et al. v. Yellow Transportation, Inc., et al. No. 08-4026 (6) Added count 6 (mislabeled “Fifth Count”), a state claim by Mr. and Mrs. Uszak for punitive damages. Three months later, the district court granted plaintiffs’ motion to amend. E. The district court imposes rule 37 sanctions upon granting YT’s motion to compel discovery Also in July YT made a written discovery request that plaintiffs sign medical releases. Plaintiffs refused to sign the releases on the basis that no such provision exists under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the requirement for blanket releases would violate their right to confidentiality under the physician-patient privilege. On September 20, 2006, YT filed a motion to compel discovery. Thirty-five days later, plaintiffs responded in opposition. After a status conference regarding outstanding discovery disputes, the district court granted the motion; its order, issued in late October, read in relevant part: Because Plaintiffs have put the physical and mental condition of Michael T. Uszak and Judy C. Uszak at issue in this case, and since, pursuant to R.C. § 2317.02(B)(1)(a)(iii), the physician-patient privilege is waived by the filing of a civil action as to communications historically and causally related to claimed physical and mental injuries, Plaintiffs are ordered to immediately sign and return the medical authorization and releases served upon them by Defendant Yellow Transportation. This Court notes the authority cited by Plaintiffs in their tardy response to Defendant’s Motion to Compel, cited as Mann v. University of Cincinnati, 824 F. Supp. 1190 (S.D. 1993), is clearly distinguishable from the instant situation. In Mann, counsel for the University issued subpoenas to its own client seeking production of the plaintiff-student’s medical records, without an order of court or the patient’s releases. Here, Defendant, Yellow Transportation, provided the appropriate releases for Plaintiffs’ signatures, and sought a court order after the executed releases were not returned. If Plaintiffs’ counsel believed, after consultation with his clients, that certain information was privileged or beyond the scope of relevancy, he should have submitted a motion, rather than refuse to have his clients execute the documents. This Court agrees with the district judge in Mann, who opined that the existence of relevancy or privilege is not a unilateral determination -5- Uszak et al. v. Yellow Transportation, Inc., et al. No. 08-4026 for the attorney seeking the discovery, nor for the attorney representing the patient. Mann, supra at 1201. It is the Court’s province to decide when a colorable privilege claim is asserted — upon consideration of an appropriately-filed motion to quash or motion for protective order. The court found Appellant engaged in four months of unnecessary, obstructive delay in discovery by refusing to provide medical releases without pursuing good faith discussions with opposing counsel or raising the problem with the court pursuant to the Federal Rules and the court’s case management order. The court said the existence of relevancy or privilege is not a unilateral determination for the attorney seeking discovery, nor for the attorney representing the patient, and Appellant could have filed a motion to quash or for protective order. The order went on to impose Rule 37 sanctions against Appellant only. F. The district court grants the unions’ joint motion for rule 11 sanctions In the order that imposed Rule 37 sanctions, the district court dismissed the second count of the amended complaint and imposed Rule 11 sanctions against Appellant only. The district court did not state the form of the sanctions. The court identified the following as the two “most egregious pleading infirmities”: (1) Naming Mrs. Uszak as a plaintiff in a duty of fair representation claim when she is not a union member and has no standing under existing federal law; and (2) Naming the IBT as a defendant. The district court offered no analysis of these issues nor any indication that it had considered plaintiffs’ arguments from briefing or the status conference. The district court did note that although -6- Uszak et al. v. Yellow Transportation, Inc., et al. No. 08-4026 the two deficiencies were cured by the filing of the amended complaint in July,1 the original complaint was filed three months earlier and the amendment was not made until after defendants filed motions to dismiss and for sanctions. The district court identified several more reasons for sanctions, including that the complaint was also brought against YRC, which was not the entity that employed Uszak. G. The district court dismisses Mrs. Uszak and the IBT On January 11, 2007, the district court dismissed all of Mrs. Uszak’s claims two months after plaintiffs moved for her voluntary dismissal. On January 12, 2007, the court dismissed the case against the IBT immediately after Uszak moved for voluntary dismissal following receipt of answers to interrogatories. H. Appellant offers sanction settlement On May 9, 2007, Appellant offered Appellees $7,500 to resolve the matter of sanctions but no settlement was reached. I. The magistrate judge rules on the attorney fee applications On June 6, 2007, under an order of referral from the district court, the MJ held an evidentiary hearing on the fee applications submitted by attorneys for Appellees. The next month the MJ issued a 28-page MJRR recommending sanctions as summarized in the table above. As noted, the record is not clear as to how the MJ apportioned the awards of the sanctions between the two issues of Mrs. Uszak’s 301/dfr claim and the naming of the IBT as a defendant. 1 The court said the amended complaint eliminated from count 1any allegations against the IBT and any claims by Mrs. Uszak. -7- Uszak et al. v. Yellow Transportation, Inc., et al. No. 08-4026 The MJRR stated that any fees related to “the naming of YRC Worldwide as a Plaintiff [sic]” would be considered but there was no further discussion and no indication that Rule 11 fees were assessed on this issue. J. The district court grants summary judgment to YT and Local 407 On June 18, 2007, the district court, as noted above, granted Local 407 and YT’s motions for summary judgment, declining to exercise jurisdiction over the pendant state claims. This court affirmed. K. The district court adopts the MJRR In July 2007 Appellant filed objections to the MJRR. One year later, the district court issued a two-paragraph order stating that it had reviewed de novo the MJRR and the issues raised in Appellant’s objections, and it fully agreed with and adopted the MJRR.