Opinion ID: 689953
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Absolute Immunity for Witnesses at Common Law

Text: 18 Curtis argues that this case is controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986), rather than by Briscoe and the appellate decisions that have granted absolute immunity to police officers who testify as witnesses in pretrial proceedings. Curtis rejects the applicability of these appellate decisions because they did not consider the distinction drawn in the common law--and noted in Malley --between complaining and lay witnesses. 4 19 In Malley, the Supreme Court denied absolute immunity to a police officer for statements made in an affidavit submitted to a magistrate for the purpose of obtaining an arrest warrant. The Court noted that, at common law, a complaining witness who procured the issuance of an arrest warrant by submitting a complaint could be held liable if the complaint was made maliciously and without probable cause. Id. at 340-41, 106 S.Ct. at 1096. Because the police officer's actions were analogous to those of a complaining witness, absolute immunity did not apply. Id. at 340, 106 S.Ct. at 1095-96. Curtis suggests that the role played by Officer Bembenek in directly causing his arrest is akin to a complaining witness, and complaining witnesses were not absolutely immune at common law. Id. 20 We note that the complaining witness theory is closely associated with the common law cause of action for malicious prosecution. 5 The term complaining witness has been defined by one appellate court as the person who actively instigated or encouraged the prosecution of the plaintiff. Anthony v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395, 1399 n. 2 (10th Cir.1992). Similarly, in a malicious prosecution action, one of the essential elements that a plaintiff must allege and prove is the defendant's role in instituting criminal proceedings against the plaintiff. Id. (citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts Sec. 119 (5th ed. 1984)). Other elements that must be alleged and proved in a malicious prosecution action include malice; the absence of probable cause for the proceeding; and termination of the proceeding in favor of the plaintiff. See Heck v. Humphrey, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2371, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994); White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956, 959 (2d Cir.1988); Misselhorn v. Doyle, 257 Ill.App.3d 983, 986, 195 Ill.Dec. 881, 883-84, 629 N.E.2d 189, 191-92 (5th Dist.1994). 21 We do not read Curtis' complaint to state a claim for malicious prosecution. 6 He has set forth a somewhat amorphous cause of action, alleging for example, that Bembenek's false testimony direct[ly] cause[d] his false imprisonment, and that aside from Bembenek's malicious testimony, there was no other testimony submitted at the [preliminary] hearing to cause or perpetuate my false imprisonment. (Compl. at 7.) Significantly, however, Curtis has not alleged that the underlying criminal proceeding concluded in his favor. Compare Anthony v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir.1992) (remanding malicious prosecution action of acquitted plaintiff against defendant officer to determine whether deputy acted as a complaining witness with respect to preliminary hearing testimony). Even construing Curtis' complaint liberally, as we must, we find no suggestion that Curtis received a favorable termination of his prior criminal prosecution. See Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir.1994) (failure of arrestee to allege a different element of malicious prosecution--absence of probable cause--rendered deputy sheriff absolutely immune for testimony in adversarial pretrial suppression hearing). Because Curtis has not stated a claim for malicious prosecution, his reliance on the complaining witness theory is inapplicable. 22 The district court properly dismissed this case on the grounds that defendant enjoyed absolute immunity from Sec. 1983 liability for his testimony at Curtis' preliminary hearing and again at the hearing on the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.