Opinion ID: 751718
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Formal Findings are Unnecessary

Text: 18 McClanahan suggests that the court failed to articulate the basis for his sentence. He complains that because he perceives no reason for the severity of the sanction, the district court must have erred or, in the alternative, the sentence must be plainly unreasonable. 19 Section 3583(e) permits the court, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a), to revoke a defendant's supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Section 3553(a), in turn, provides that the sentencing court shall consider a number of factors, including: the nature and circumstances of the offense; the characteristics and the history of the defendant himself; the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense and to promote respect for the law; the need to provide adequate deterrence and to protect the public from possible future criminal conduct by the defendant; and the kinds of sentences and the sentencing range available based on the defendant's conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Our holding in United States v. Hale has made it clear that while a sentencing court is required to consider the section 3553(a) factors, this circuit ha[s] never required a sentencing judge to make findings addressed to each of the relevant factors at the risk of having the sentence vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. 107 F.3d at 530; accord, Pelensky, 129 F.3d at 69; Davis, 53 F.3d at 642; United States v. Lee, 957 F.2d 770, 774-75 (10th Cir.1992); Blackston, 940 F.2d at 893-94. Rather, it is sufficient if the sentencing court made comments reflecting that the appropriate factors were considered. Hale, 107 F.3d at 530. 20 Parsing the court's language in the instant case, the sentencing court noted the nature and circumstances of McClanahan's offense ([W]hile on supervised release, you have been convicted of a state felony involving cocaine.); his relevant criminal history ([Y]ou have been convicted of another cocaine violation.); the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense and to protect the public from the crimes of the defendant (This drug business is just tearing our society apart. It's rending the fabric of everything that we stand for in this country, and it's horrible.); the need for the sentence to promote respect for the law (We simply cannot have supervised release violated in this manner as here by conviction for cocaine after serving supervised release on a cocaine charge and conviction.); and the need for the sentence to afford adequate deterrence ([Y]ou've got to clean up the act. You can't have anything to do with these drugs. The next time they will back a dump truck loaded with bricks and just dump them right on you, whether it's state court or here. If you get a third one, boy, ... that's tough.... We're talking about possibly a 20 year minimum.). The record further reveals that the court considered the applicable Revocation Table ranges, Chapter Seven's advisory policy statements and controlling case law, after which it imposed a twenty-four month term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). 21 There is nothing to suggest that the court failed to consider the factors set out in subsection 3553(a). Neither, given the seriousness of the conduct that triggered the revocation and the breach of the trust placed in McClanahan by the court, is there any evidence on which to conclude that his twenty-four month sentence was plainly unreasonable.