Opinion ID: 2550875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Invocation of First Amendment Protection

Text: Respondent asserts that this proceeding somehow violates his First Amendment rights. He cites no fact or law to support this contention, except his allegation that the underlying ethical complaints made him unable to accept work representing other clients. Respondent's brief contains no coherent argument as to how his First Amendment rights were violated. His discussion on this issue centers on an alleged conflict of interest of Hazlett and the Disciplinary Administrator's office, as well as accusations against Judge Pierron, Paretsky, and Oldham. Respondent does cite to a Tenth Circuit case for the proposition that [i]t is public policy . . . everywhere to encourage the disclosure of criminal activity, Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850, 853 (10th Cir. 1972); and he further states that the public policy interest is clearly in the respondent representing James Bolden and David Price lawfully to accomplish their goals. The Disciplinary Administrator suggests that Respondent intends to argue that he has a right to make the accusations contained in his pleadings against members of the judiciary, judicial staff members, opposing counsel, city officials, and others and that this right is guaranteed by the First Amendment. During the hearing, Respondent testified that he believed the First Amendment gave him immunity to make the claims he had made. In re Johnson, 240 Kan. 334, 729 P.2d 1175 (1986), was a contested case in which this court found a respondent should be disciplined for false, unsupported criticisms of and misleading statements about his opponent in a county attorney election campaign. In our discussion of the First Amendment in relation to attorney speech, we said: A lawyer, as a citizen, has a right to criticize a judge or other adjudicatory officer publicly. To exercise this right, the lawyer must be certain of the merit of the complaint, use appropriate language, and avoid petty criticisms. Unrestrained and intemperate statements against a judge or adjudicatory officer lessen public confidence in our legal system. Criticisms motivated by reasons other than a desire to improve the legal system are not justified. Johnson, 240 Kan. at 336. Likewise, in State v. Russell, 227 Kan. 897, 610 P.2d 1122, cert. denied 449 U.S. 983 (1980), a respondent made false statements while running for a position on the Board of Public Utilities, and the comments were not deemed to be protected speech. Upon admission to the bar of this state, attorneys assume certain duties as officers of the court. Among the duties imposed upon attorneys is the duty to maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and to judicial officers. A lawyer is bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility in every capacity in which the lawyer acts, whether he is acting as an attorney or not, and is subject to discipline even when involved in nonlegal matters, including campaigns for nonjudicial public office. State v. Russell, 227 Kan. 897, 610 P.2d 1122, cert. denied 449 U.S. 983 (1980). State v. Johnson, 240 Kan. at 337. The case at bar does not involve an attorney acting in nonlegal matters. It involves the conduct of an attorney acting in his professional capacity. In either situation, when a lawyer's unbridled speech amounts to misconduct that threatens a significant state interest, it is clear that a State may restrict the lawyer's exercise of personal rights guaranteed by the Constitutions. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405, 83 S. Ct. 328 (1963). Respondent has made and continues to make serious accusations against members of the judiciary, court staff, attorneys, municipal officers and employees, and others. The panel found that he failed to provide even one scintilla of proof of such wrongdoing, through exhibits, witnesses, or his own testimony. The panel further found that [i]t is patently obvious that the Respondent either failed to conduct any investigation whatsoever into the claims made by his client or that he personally invented the serious allegations of wrongdoing. Moreover, the panel found that Respondent had based many of these allegations on information provided to him by his client, Price. At the hearing, the presiding officer asked whether, after the passage of a couple of years, Respondent now believed that some of these statements were untrue. Respondent replied No, sir, I don't know of anything that is not true. Rather, he went on to reaffirm the accusations against the court employees, Judge Pierron, Vincent, and others. When asked about his allegation that now Justice Luckert backdated an entry of appearance in a previous case involving Price, Respondent admitted he was uncertain whether such an entry of appearance even existed. The First Amendment provides no defense for the inflammatory and false accusations that Respondent has repeatedly made in his pleadings and motions, and which he maintained orally in the panel hearing and in oral argument before this court.