Opinion ID: 792064
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: UPS satisfied FEHA's safety-of-others defense.

Text: 61 FEHA does not prohibit an employer from refusing to hire or discharging an employee ... where the employee, because of his or her ... disability ... cannot perform [the job's essential] duties in a manner that would not endanger ... the health or safety of others even with reasonable accommodations. Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(a)(1). This aspect of the statute has been expressed in the FEHC's regulations (and in the Commission's decisions) as the safety-of-others defense: 62 It is a permissible defense for an employer or other covered entity to demonstrate that after reasonable accommodation has been made, the applicant or employee cannot perform the essential functions of the position in question in a manner which would not endanger the health or safety of others to a greater extent than if an individual without a disability performed the job. 63 Cal.Code Regs., tit. 2, § 7293.8(d) (emphasis added). 12 The employer must prove this affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Raytheon Co. v. Cal. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 212 Cal.App.3d 1242, 1251, 261 Cal.Rptr. 197, 203 (1989). 64 Applications of this defense by the California courts and the FEHC convince us that the defense is satisfied with respect to Intervenors here. The decisions demonstrate that even a modest increase in the risk that a problem will occur is significant when the potential consequences of that problem are very serious. For example, the Commission decided that a 25 percent chance that a truck driver's herniated discs could cause symptoms in the future, possibly including paralysis or disabling pain, was sufficient to establish a significant potential for harm to others in the event that the symptoms appeared while he was driving was sufficient to establish the defense. DFEH v. Di Salvo Trucking Co., Dec. No. 87-14, 1987 WL 114862, at  (Cal.F.E.H.C.1987). Likewise, because [c]onstant mental alertness is an essential requisite of operating a locomotive and train, a train engineer who was susceptible to dizziness and blackouts posed a significantly greater danger to others despite his extensive and completely safe record as an engineer. DFEH v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., Dec. No. 80-33, 1980 WL 20906, at  (Cal.F.E.H.C.1980) (precedential decision); cf. Quinn v. City of L.A., 84 Cal.App.4th 472, 484, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 914, 921 (2000) (stating that the public safety concerns involved with the day-to-day work of a patrol officer made a police department's hearing requirements eminently reasonable). 65 Similar safety considerations justified the imposition of weight requirements for ambulance drivers in McMillen v. Civil Service Commission, 6 Cal.App.4th 125, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 548 (1992). The employer in that case presented studies demonstrating that excess fat or obesity could affect agility and the ability to lift and climb, cause fatigue, and create a risk of back injury; [b]ecause sudden incapacitation of an ambulance driver could be life-threatening, the employer imposed weight limitations on its ambulance drivers. Id. at 128, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d at 549. The court held that such limitations may be prescribed by an employer where there is a rational basis for such limitations, as shown by supportive analytical factual data rather than stereotypical generalizations. Id. at 130, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d at 550. The employee's failure to meet the weight requirements posed a risk which, based on the studies the department had before it, could not be countenanced. Id. at 131, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d at 551. The court stated: 66 We agree with the trial court's observation that the department need not wait for disaster to strike before taking action: the department owes a duty to the public and its employees affirmatively to avert disaster, rather than simply wait and hope it does not occur. 67 Id.; see also Hegwer v. Bd. of Civil Serv. Comm'rs, 5 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1025, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 389, 397-98 (1992) (finding that statistical studies justified weight limitations for paramedics under FEHA, that the [employee]'s loss of agility and endurance demonstrated a danger to the safety of others, and that [g]reater imminency of disaster is not required to meet standards of reasonableness). 68 Finally, in a decision frequently cited by Intervenors in support of their threshold showing of disability, the FEHC determined that a monocular applicant for a position as a police officer posed a significantly greater risk to the health and safety of others than a police officer with binocular vision. City of Merced, 1988 WL 242649, at  5. The Merced Police Department presented an extraordinary showing through two expert witnesses who testified, with reference to medical publications and vision validation studies, that binocularity was required for the safe performance of the job of police patrol officer. Id. 69 We acknowledge that FEHA's safety-of-others defense requires an individualized showing that safety would be compromised by each Intervenor's performance of driving duties. See, e.g., Sterling Transit Co. v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 121 Cal.App.3d 791, 796, 175 Cal.Rptr. 548, 551 (1981) (applying the danger-to-self defense); DFEH v. City of San Jose, Dec. No. 84-18, 1984 WL 54298, at  (Cal.F.E.H.C.1984) (Like the defense of danger to the complainant, the defense of danger to others must be specific to the particular complainant before us.). But the FEHC also has stated that [t]here is no ground for barring the application of categorical evidence to individualized defenses, such as the safety-of-others defense. DFEH v. Orange County Sheriff-Coroner Dep't, Dec. No. 82-26, 1982 WL 36770, at  (Cal.F.E.H.C.1983). Categorical evidence can be relevant—as it was in McMillen and City of Merced —so long as it provides a sufficiently strong showing that people whose impairments closely match the complainant's are disqualified. Id. at -5. In Orange County, where a study clearly indicate[d] that individuals with 20/200 or worse uncorrected vision can be expected to pose significantly greater danger to other persons by driving patrol cars and in shoot/no-shoot situations, the Commission was able to infer that the applicant herself would pose such a danger. Id. at . In McMillen, the court held that an individualized showing that the employee did not meet generally applicable weight requirements themselves sufficiently demonstrated a safety risk, where the generally applicable requirements were a reasonable means of ensuring public safety. 6 Cal.App.4th at 130, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d at 551. 70 We agree with UPS that the safety-of-others defense is established here. The district court concluded that the literature generally supports the proposition that monocular drivers as a whole are involved in more accidents than others as a whole, although not dramatically more. EEOC, 149 F.Supp.2d at 1144. In particular, the district court recognized that peripheral vision plays an important role in avoiding accidents and that the monocular driver has less opportunity to see a child or any other pedestrian or cyclist or car darting from the impaired side. Id. at 1142 (emphasis omitted). Just as the employer in McMillen demonstrated that excess weight compromised an emergency worker's ability to perform safely, UPS demonstrated that decreased peripheral vision compromises a driver's ability to perform safely as compared to a person without that impairment. 71 Yet, although significant risks are posed by the absence of peripheral vision in one eye, not all monocular individuals lack peripheral vision in the affected eye. Hogya, for instance, has useful sight in [his affected] eye at the periphery. Id. at 1151. And the district court found that the absence of central vision acuity in one eye does not affect an individual's ability to drive safely, so long as the individual retains peripheral vision. Id. at 1142, 1144. According to the expert evidence relating to central-vision acuity, the court found, one excellent eye is as good as any two. Id. at 1142. We agree with UPS that, for purposes of FEHA's safety-of-others defense, this finding is clearly erroneous. The Vision Protocol requires drivers to retain visual acuity of at least 20/200 in the affected eye because 20/200 vision is the threshold for gross object perception and, thus, even in the case of a[driver] getting something in the better eye, he/she would still be able to get to a safe stop until the vision cleared in the better eye. Id. at 1131; see also Orange County, 1982 WL 36770, at  (finding that people with 20/200 or worse uncorrected vision pose a significantly greater danger to others while driving patrol cars). This reasoning, which the district court found to have laid the foundation for UPS's Vision Protocol, was dismissed because it was based on the anecdotal experience of Dr. Witkin, who developed UPS's Vision Protocol, rather than on statistical studies. EEOC, 149 F.Supp.2d at 1132. 13 But, apart from that criticism, the district court did not address the merits of Dr. Witkin's reasoning in reaching its conclusion that the Vision Protocol is unnecessarily onerous in requiring a minimum level of central vision in both eyes. See id. at 1142-43. The absence of supportive studies does not make an expert's opinion, which generally is a conclusion drawn from clinical experience, per se unreasonable. In view of the seriousness of the potential consequences of a complete loss of central vision while driving, we conclude that UPS's requirement of some central vision in both eyes is reasonable. 72 It is undisputed that none of the Intervenors meets the central vision acuity standard set forth in the Vision Protocol. 14 73 This fact is a sufficiently individualized determination to satisfy the safety-of-others defense because, as in McMillen, each applicant was tested for compliance with specific criteria that themselves are a reasonable means of ensuring the safety of its employees and members of the public. 6 Cal.App.4th at 130-31, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d at 551. The district court acknowledged that the potential for traffic fatalities is a serious problem. EEOC, 149 F.Supp.2d at 1169. Indeed, the California decisions discussed above suggest that the potential for endangerment of human life justifies safety-based restrictions even when the risk of occurrence is modest. For that reason, we conclude that Intervenors' failure to meet the Vision Protocol demonstrates that their performance of the duties of a full-time package car driver would endanger the health and safety of others to a greater extent than if an individual without a disability performed the job, Cal.Code Regs., tit. 2, § 7293.8(d). 74 We do not suggest that any vision protocol would pass muster. But because the UPS Vision Protocol rests on objective and statistical evidence that monocular drivers are involved in somewhat more accidents than binocular drivers, because the risk of harm to others is high, because the UPS standard does not categorically exclude monocular individuals from working as full-time package car drivers, and because the application of the Protocol is individualized to each employee or applicant, we are persuaded that UPS must prevail on its safety-of-others defense. 75