Opinion ID: 1059274
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First Amendment and Virginia Constitutional Claims

Text: The trial court and the parties have framed the constitutional questions in terms of standing. Unfortunately, that analysis is not helpful in the present case and context. The Commonwealth and the newspapers agree that the press has a right of access to criminal trials under the First Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Virginia. This controversy is about the definitional reach of the concept of access. The right of access to judicial proceedings and records is well-established. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the public's right to attend criminal trials was implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment. Similarly, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 574, 585, 281 S.E.2d 915, 921 (1981) (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 581, 100 S.Ct. 2814), relying upon Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Virginia, we held that ralbsent an overriding interest ... [pretrial hearings] must be open to the public. The press does not have a right of access greater than the public at large under the First Amendment, Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978), or under Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Virginia. The right of access is not limited to attendance at criminal proceedings. Under certain circumstances and with qualifications, it extends to inspection of documents filed in connection with such proceedings. In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir.1986). None of the proceedings in the criminal case against Roger Keith Coleman was closed to the public or the press. No one has suggested that access to evidence presented at trial or post-trial proceedings has been denied. As the term has been used in every case cited to us by the newspapers, access has not been denied. What the newspapers seek to do in this case is expand the definition of access to include the right to conduct independent testing of evidence in criminal proceedings. [3] The newspapers have been given access to the DNA test results from the post-trial proceedings. What the newspapers want is the ability to cause the biological material to be re-tested and generate a new scientific report, thereby altering, manipulating, and/or destroying existing evidence in order to create new evidence. Historically, the constitutional right of the public and the press to have access to criminal proceedings has applied to hearings and trials and inspection of documents and records that have been introduced at such proceedings. Here, the newspapers seek access to something that does not exist, namely, new evidence in the form of new test results. No appellate decision of any court, state or federal, is cited by the newspapers in support of such a novel extension of the concept of access. The newspapers urge this Court to employ the test articulated in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). In Press-Enterprise Co., the Supreme Court considered the exclusion of the public and press from a preliminary hearing in a criminal case and the denial of requests for transcripts of the proceedings. Id. The Court stated the following: In cases dealing with the claim of a First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings, our decisions have emphasized two complementary considerations. First, because a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience, we have considered whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public. . . . . Second, in this setting the Court has traditionally considered whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in ... If the particular proceeding in question passes these tests of experience and logic, a qualified First Amendment right of public access attaches .... [T]he presumption may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Id. at 8-9, 106 S.Ct. 2735 (internal citations omitted). It is obvious from the opinion that the definition of access does not include the right of the public at large or the press to subject evidence in a criminal case to testing. Even if the place and process language in Press-Enterprise Co. could be stretched to include the right to test the evidence, the newspapers' argument would fail the subsequent analysis. Certainly, the right to test evidence in a criminal case has not been historically extended to the press and general public. Indeed, the newspapers concede that except for an isolated trial court decision in Georgia, [4] they know of no case that has ever permitted such testing. Additionally, expanding the reach of the right of access to include the right of the public and press to test evidence in a criminal trial could not be restricted in any principled way to only cases in which a death sentence has already been imposed. The practice, if permitted, would logically apply to all criminal proceedings. It does not take much imagination to envision requests for access to test substances alleged to be illegal or weapons alleged to have been used in assaults. When the items to be tested are limited in quantity or subject to destruction when tested, how would a court supervise such testing? How would competing claims of rights to access be handled when quantity or integrity of the items are an issue? We have no difficulty concluding that permitting testing of this type would not play a significant positive role in the functioning of the judicial process. We conclude that the newspapers have no right under the First Amendment or Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Virginia to obtain the biological material in question and subject it to re-testing.