Opinion ID: 1620610
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Iowa Constitution Article 1, Section 9 (Due Process).[6]

Text: The certifying court in this case has concluded the denial of bail at the pre-trial stage did not violate the petitioners' substantive due process rights under the federal constitution. Atwood, 338 F.Supp.2d at 998. We are asked to decide the separate question whether petitioners are entitled to bail under the Due Process Clause in the Iowa constitution. See Iowa Const. art. I, § 9 (stating no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law). This court has traditionally considered the federal and state due process provisions to be equal in scope, import, and purpose. In re Det. of Garren, 620 N.W.2d at 284 (citing In re Interest of C.P., 569 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Iowa 1997); Exira Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 512 N.W.2d 787, 792 (Iowa 1994)). Although [w]e have an interest in harmonizing our constitutional decisions with those of the Supreme Court when reasonably possible, . . . we recognize and will jealously guard our right and duty to differ in appropriate cases. State v. Olsen, 293 N.W.2d 216, 219-20 (Iowa 1980). Substantive due process principles preclude the government from engaging in conduct that `shocks the conscience,' or interferes with rights `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2101, 95 L.Ed.2d 697, 708 (1987) (citations omitted). To assess the petitioners' substantive due process claim, we first define the nature of the involved right. In re Det. of Cubbage, 671 N.W.2d 442, 446 (Iowa 2003). [F]reedom from physical restraint `has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.' Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 2079, 138 L.Ed.2d 501, 511-12 (1997) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 1785, 118 L.Ed.2d 437, 448 (1992)). Although the liberty interest of an individual to be free from physical restraint has been described as a paradigmatic fundamental right, Knapp, 804 N.E.2d at 891, the Supreme Court has noted that the interest is not absolute. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356, 117 S.Ct. at 2079, 138 L.Ed.2d at 512. States, including Iowa, have in certain narrow circumstances provided for the forcible civil detainment of people who are unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety. Id. at 357, 117 S.Ct. at 2079, 138 L.Ed.2d at 512. Involuntary civil commitment statutes have withstood due process challenges if they authorize detention pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards. Id. at 357, 117 S.Ct. at 2080, 138 L.Ed.2d at 512. Petitioners do not advance here the broad notion that they have a due process right not be involuntarily detained prior to the adjudication of their status under chapter 229A. They instead make the narrower claim that once detained, they have a due process right to bail at the pre-trial stage under the Iowa Constitution. The question whether the claimed right is fundamental is one of first impression for this court. In In re Detention of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275 (Iowa 2000), we did not decide whether a detainee's liberty interest is fundamental because we concluded chapter 229A passed muster even when judged under a strict scrutiny standard. Id. at 286. [7] We also rejected Garren's claim that substantive due process required placement of SVPs in the least restrictive placement. Id. at 285 (noting that even if such a right did exist, it is not a `fundamental right' (citation omitted)). As in Garren, we conclude it is unnecessary for us to resolve the question whether the petitioners' claimed interest is fundamental. Even under strict scrutiny analysis, chapter 229A comports with substantive due process standards. The state's interest in detaining persons during the interim between the district court's finding of probable cause and the trial of the SVP claim is compelling. It is an interest in protecting the public from a small but extremely dangerous group of persons who are highly likely to engage in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence if not detained. See Iowa Code § 229A.1; In re Det. of Williams, 628 N.W.2d 447, 458 (Iowa 2001) (finding a compelling state interest in protecting society from a person prone to sexually assaulting children); In re Det. of Garren, 620 N.W.2d at 286 (finding the confinement of sexually violent predators in a secure facility served the compelling State interest in protection of the public). The restriction of liberty resulting from the denial of bail at the pre-trial stage in these cases is narrowly tailored. See City of Panora v. Simmons, 445 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Iowa 1989) (noting that a statute will survive strict scrutiny analysis only if it is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest). Pre-trial detention without access to bail is limited to a specific category of dangerous persons who have been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffer from a mental abnormality that makes them likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not confined in a secure facility. See Iowa Code § 229A.2(11). The significant procedural protections afforded detainees during the pre-trial stage in SVP cases strongly influence our determination that the statute is narrowly tailored. A person may not be detained under chapter 229A until after (1) the attorney general files a petition alleging that the person is a SVP and stating sufficient facts to support such an allegation (section 229A.4(1)), and (2) a district court has made a preliminary determination that the person named in the petition is a SVP (section 229A.5(1)). Once detained, the person is entitled to a hearing in the district court within seventy-two hours [8] to determine whether probable cause exists to believe the detained person is a SVP. See id. § 229A.5(2). At the probable cause hearing, the detainee has the right to appear in person with counsel, challenge the preliminary finding of probable cause by presenting evidence, cross-examine the state's witnesses, and access all petitions and reports in the possession of the court. See id. § 229A.5(2)( a )-( g ). If, after the hearing, the district court finds probable cause to believe the detainee is a SVP, the detainee is entitled to a timely trial to determine whether he is, in fact, a SVP. [9] Our decision today is consistent with a series of prior decisions upholding chapter 229A against substantive due process claims under the Iowa Constitution. We have repeatedly held that civil commitment of a SVP does not violate substantive due process. In re Det. of Darling, 712 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2006) (holding that civil commitment of a person with an untreatable condition was consistent with substantive due process under the Iowa Constitution); In re Det. of Betsworth, 711 N.W.2d 280, 289 (Iowa 2006) (same); In re Det. of Hodges, 689 N.W.2d 467, 470 (Iowa 2004) (holding that civil commitment on the basis of an antisocial personality disorder was consistent with substantive due process under the Iowa Constitution); In re Det. of Cubbage, 671 N.W.2d at 445-48 (Iowa 2003) (finding no fundamental right to be competent during SVP statute proceedings and, thus, that commitment of incompetent people is consistent with substantive due process under the Iowa Constitution).