Opinion ID: 2621193
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the Defendant's ability to engender feelings of love and/or respect for him by his friends, fellow inmates, prison staff and correctional officers;

Text: (4) whether the Defendant has positively adjusted to the type of structured and institutionalized environment in which he will live the rest of his life if given a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole; (5) whether Defendant has made positive contributions to the prison environment in which he now lives and whether he will continue to make such contributions if he serves a sentence of life without the possibility of parole; (6) whether Defendant, by his advice and concern for others, has positively [affected] both inmates and staff with whom he has associated during his incarceration in prison; (7) whether Defendant has a calming and guiding effect upon younger inmates; (8) the Defendant's educational background and his willingness and ability to use that background for the benefit of other inmates; (9) whether the Defendant will contribute skilled labor which will help in the operation of the State Prison system; (10) the Defendant's willingness and ability to comply with the terms of a sentence of life without possibility of parole; (11) the Defendant's potential for [rehabilitation] and for contributing affirmatively to the lives of his friends and fellow inmates; (12) the likelihood that Defendant will not be a danger to others if sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole; (13) whether there are any other facts which may be considered as extenuating or reducing the Defendant's degree of moral culpability for the crimes he has committed, or which might justify a sentence of less than death even though such facts would not justify or excuse the offense. We repeatedly have concluded, however, that an instruction such as the one actually given in the present case, directing the jury that it may consider in mitigation any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial, adequately conveys the full range of mitigating evidence that may be considered by the jury. ( People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 841-842, 1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436; see also People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1007, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171; People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 416, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) In addition, we have explained that special instructions such as the one requested by defendant may be refused as argumentative and duplicative of standard instructions. ( People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 901, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15; People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 648, 15 Cal. Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160.) We reject defendant's claim that these grounds for the refusal of an instruction may not be considered unless relied upon below by the prosecution. ( People v. Braeseke (1979) 25 Cal.3d 691, 700, 159 Cal.Rptr. 684, 602 P.2d 384; see 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 340, pp. 382-383.)