Opinion ID: 1059619
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Juvenile Transfer Issues

Text: Johnson argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motions to dismiss both sets of indictments. He first asserts that the original indictments were void because the circuit court failed to review the transfer record from the juvenile court under former Code § 16.1-296(B) before the original indictments were obtained. He also argues that the original indictments were void under Commonwealth v. Baker, 258 Va. 1, 516 S.E.2d 219 (1999)(per curiam), because the Commonwealth had failed to notify Johnson's father of the transfer hearing in the juvenile court. We disagree with Johnson's arguments. The requirement of former Code § 16.1-296(B), that the circuit court review the transfer documents from the juvenile court before allowing the Commonwealth to seek indictments, was inapplicable to Johnson's case. This review was not required because Johnson previously had been tried and convicted as an adult in the Circuit Court of Southampton County for the rape of Lavonda Scott. Code § 16.1-271 provides in relevant part: Any juvenile who is tried and convicted in a circuit court under the provisions of this article shall be considered and treated as an adult in any criminal proceeding resulting from any future alleged criminal acts.... All procedures and dispositions applicable to adults charged with such a criminal offense shall apply in such cases.... The provisions of this article regarding a transfer hearing shall not be applicable to such juveniles. The rape of Lavonda Scott occurred on July 2 or 3, 1994, and the present offenses took place days later on July 11, 1994. Thus, the rape and capital murder of Hope Hall were future alleged criminal acts within the meaning of Code § 16.1-271, and Johnson was not entitled to the protection that the transfer statutes afford a juvenile offender who has not previously been tried and convicted as an adult in a circuit court. Accordingly, since Johnson's prior conviction as an adult eliminated the requirement of former Code § 16.1-296(B) that the circuit court review the transfer proceedings, his claim that the review was not performed in a timely manner has no merit. The provisions of Code § 16.1-271 also invalidate Johnson's claim that the indictments were void because his father was not provided notice of the transfer proceedings in the juvenile court. Under the plain language of Code § 16.1-271, a juvenile who has been convicted as an adult in a circuit court is not entitled to a transfer hearing in the juvenile court. Since Johnson had no right to a transfer hearing, the notice requirements pertaining to such a hearing are inapplicable and do not provide a basis for challenging either set of indictments returned in this case. Johnson next contends that the Commonwealth's failure to try the charges against him within five months of his preliminary hearing violated his right to a speedy trial under Code § 19.2-243. He asserts that the 16-month interval between the preliminary hearing and trial is attributable solely to the Commonwealth's failure to seek a timely review of the transfer documents from the juvenile court. The record demonstrates that there is no merit to Johnson's claim. Johnson's preliminary hearing and resulting probable cause determination occurred in the juvenile court on March 20, 1997. Johnson either requested or agreed to every continuance granted by the circuit court under the original indictments, and Johnson conceded this fact in argument before the circuit court. When the time attributable to those continuances is subtracted from the total time this case was pending in the circuit court before trial, the record shows that Johnson was tried within the time restrictions imposed by Code § 19.2-243. [2] See Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 323, 362 S.E.2d 650, 659 (1987) cert. denied, 485 U.S. 971, 108 S.Ct. 1249, 99 L.Ed.2d 447 (1988); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 148, 155-56, 502 S.E.2d 704, 708 (1998); Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26 Va.App. 335, 347-48, 494 S.E.2d 859, 865 (1998). Johnson also argues that the trial court erred in incorporating in the present case, which was tried under the new indictments, all pleadings filed and rulings made under the original indictments. He contends that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to take this action after the original indictments had been terminated by nolle prosequi, asserting that a new preliminary hearing in the juvenile court was required. Johnson also contends that because the original indictments were terminated by nolle prosequi, all pretrial proceedings conducted under the original indictments were effectively nullified. Thus, he argues that there were no rulings or pleadings before the trial court that could have been incorporated in the prosecution on the new indictments. We disagree. As discussed above, since Johnson previously had been tried and convicted as an adult for rape, the Commonwealth was not required to institute new proceedings in the juvenile court. Code § 16.1-271. Instead, the Commonwealth was entitled to consider and treat Johnson as an adult and obtain new indictments in the circuit court. See Code § 19.2-217; Payne v. Warden of Powhatan Correctional Center, 223 Va. 180, 183, 285 S.E.2d 886, 887-88 (1982). The new indictments were identical to the old indictments and, thus, presented exactly the same issues that Johnson raised before the circuit court in the original indictments. The nolle prosequi of the original indictments did not invalidate the trial court's rulings in that case, but simply terminated the original prosecution and discharged Johnson from liability on those indictments. See Miller v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 929, 935, 234 S.E.2d 269, 273 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1016, 98 S.Ct. 735, 54 L.Ed.2d 762 (1978). The circuit court was not required to rehear the same matters and reissue the same rulings simply because the Commonwealth mistakenly had concluded that the original indictments may have been invalid. Thus, we hold that the circuit court's decision to incorporate the prior rulings in the present case was a proper exercise of the court's discretion. [3]