Opinion ID: 1383145
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the jury's verdict apportioned more than fifty percent of fault to Nationwide Insurance Company's insured.

Text: It was stipulated that Nationwide's damages totaled $37,739.89, which represents the amount it paid Raymond and Vivian Ross for the damage to their home as a result of the fire. Not only was this document entered as evidence, but it was read to the jury during trial. Appellant contends, and the record reflects, that at the completion of all the evidence, the case was submitted to the jury, without objection, on a comparative-fault instruction that required that Nationwide's damages be reduced by the percentage of the fault of Raymond and Vivian Ross. Arkansas law concerning comparative fault is set by statute. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-64-122 (Supp.1999) states in pertinent part: (a) In all action for damages for personal injuries or wrongful death or injury to property in which recovery is predicated upon fault, liability shall be determined by comparing the fault chargeable to a claiming party with the fault chargeable to the party or parties from whom the claiming party seeks to recover damages. (b)(2) If the fault chargeable to a party claiming damages is equal to or greater in degree than any fault chargeable to the party or parties from whom the claiming party seeks to recover damages, then the claiming party is not entitled to recover such damages. (c) The word fault as used in this section includes any act, omission, conduct, risk assumed, breach of warranty, or breach of any legal duty which is a proximate cause of any damages sustained by any party. Here, the jury's verdict, awarding only $11,336.32 in favor of Nationwide when the amount of damages was stipulated to be $37,739.89, may indeed indicate that it apportioned fault to Gibson well below the required fifty-one percent required by law for Nationwide to recover. However, appellant failed to abstract the comparative-fault instruction which was submitted to the jury, upon which it relies in order to prove that the jury was intentionally making the apportionment Gibson contends it made. We have consistently held that our review on appeal is limited to the record as abstracted, and we will not reach the merits of a case when documents in the transcript that are necessary for an understanding of the case are not abstracted. See Warnock v. Warnock, 336 Ark. 506, 988 S.W.2d 7 (1999); Burns v. Carroll, 318 Ark. 302, 885 S.W.2d 16 (1994). Rule 4-2(a)(6) of the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals provides, in relevant part: The appellant's abstract or abridgment of the record should consist of an impartial condensation, without comment or emphasis, of only such material parts of the pleadings, proceedings, facts, documents, and other matters in the record as are necessary to an understanding of all questions presented to the Court for decision.... (Emphasis added.) Clearly, without the ability to consider the comparative-fault instruction the jury was given, since it was not abstracted as required, it is impossible for this Court to determine, without resorting to speculation, whether the jury followed said instruction. Moreover, appellant did not request that the jury be given special interrogatories, which would have required them to clearly apportion fault, if that is indeed what they were doing. Further, appellant did not object to or seek clarification regarding the verdict before the jury was discharged. This court has held that the time to object to an irregularity or inconsistency in the verdict is prior to the discharge of the jury. See P.A.M. Trans., Inc., v. Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 315 Ark. 234, 868 S.W.2d 33 (1993); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Kelton, 305 Ark. 173, 806 S.W.2d 373 (1991); Center v. Johnson, 295 Ark. 522, 750 S.W.2d 396 (1988). Appellant contends that these cases do not apply because there was no inconsistency or irregularity in the jury's verdict. In fact, appellant contends that the verdict was very clear in articulating the jury's intent to apportion seventy percent of the fault to Nationwide. Appellant contends that this verdict was not factually impossible, but it was simply legally unrecognizable, in light of the comparative-fault statute. Appellant states on the one hand that the verdict is not inconsistent, but then on the other hand argues that the verdict is inconsistent with the comparative-fault instruction the jury was given. As stated above, given that the instruction in question was not abstracted, and further that no objection was made nor clarification sought from the jury before it was discharged, this Court is left only to speculate about what the jury's verdict means. As such, we will not question the jury's verdict.