Opinion ID: 2825258
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: FELA Claims

Text: Our discussion begins with Sweatt’s FELA claims. The FELA affords redress to injured employees of railroad companies that are engaged in interstate commerce. 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.; see also Conrail v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542 (1994) (“Cognizant of the physical dangers of railroading that resulted in the death or maiming of thousands of workers every year, Congress crafted a federal remedy that shifted part of the human overhead of doing business from employees to their employers.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In crafting this remedy, Congress imposed a threeyear statute of limitations. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (“No action shall be maintained under this chapter unless commenced within three years from the day the cause of action accrued.”). In cases like this one, where the statute of limitations is at issue, the date of accrual is key. Accrual is defined in two parts: notice of injury and notice of cause. See Fries v. Chicago & Nw. Transp. Co., 909 F.2d 1092, 1095 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[O]nce a plaintiff is in possession of the critical facts of both injury and governing cause of that injury the action accrues even though he may be unaware that a legal wrong has oc- curred.”) (citation omitted). Actual notice is not required for accrual. Tolston v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 102 F.3d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 1996). After a condition manifests itself, the question becomes whether the plaintiff knew or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the cause of his injury. Id. Here, Sweatt was on notice of his injuries and the cause of his injuries as early as May or June 2009. Sweatt testified that he first observed his hand and shoulder pain in the summer months of 2009: “I started having [shoulder] pain No. 14-2451 11 during 2009 … like in the summer.” When asked if it was “in June or July or August,” he answered, “I know it was … warm. It might have been before then.” Dr. Coates corroborated that testimony. He testified that Sweatt first noticed his hand pain in May of 2009. And Nurse Practitioner Valentin’s notes from Sweatt’s November 19, 2009, appointment states that he experienced “pain in his hands for quite a while now.” Clearly then, Sweatt’s injury manifested itself well before November 30, 2009—the critical three-year mark from his filing in district court. See Green v. CSX Transp., Inc., 414 F.3d 758, 763 (7th Cir. 2005) (“When the specific date of injury cannot be determined because an injury results from continual exposure to a harmful condition over a period of time, a plaintiff’s cause of action accrues when the injury manifests itself.”). Sweatt’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. He first argues that “intermittent pain associated with a minor injury” is insufficient to trigger accrual of a claim under the FELA. We do not disagree with that proposition of law, see Green, 414 F.3d at 764; we disagree with its applicability to this case. Sweatt’s own testimony belies the notion that he experienced “intermittent pain associated with a minor injury.” Indeed, he described his shoulder pain as “unbearable,” particularly when using the claw bar.5 He testified that he needed help from his coworkers to use that tool. And by November 30, 2009 (exactly three years before he filed this action), Dr. Coates opined that Sweatt could no longer per- 5 We are unsure why Sweatt questions the district court’s reliance on this fact. It is beyond dispute that he testified to enduring “unbearable” pain. 12 No. 14-2451 form the work as a Trackman.6 To be sure, Sweatt testified that he did not miss work as a result of these injuries. But his effort in working in the face of injury does not forestall the date of accrual. Sweatt next argues that he was unaware that his malady was anything more than muscle soreness. This plea of ignorance is similar to the argument the appellant advanced in Fries. In that case, the appellant argued that the statute of limitations for his FELA claim was tolled until a doctor diagnosed him with the relevant injury. 909 F.2d at 1095. We rejected that argument, and held that a plaintiff cannot wait until he receives a medical diagnosis to begin pursuit of his claim. Id. We are not alone in this approach. In the cause-ofinjury context, the Fifth Circuit also rejects the use of a medical diagnosis as a starting point for the statute of limitations. See Emmons v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 701 F.2d 1112, 1122 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[W]e think it sufficient for purposes of commencement of the limitations period that the plaintiff knew his complained of condition was work related, and that it is not additionally necessary that he have been formally so advised by a physician.”). Regarding cause of injury, Sweatt immediately linked his pain to his employment with Union Pacific. He testified that he first noticed the pain when he started doing a lot of tamping on the railroad tracks. He called his shoulder pain “unbearable,” particularly when he would use the claw bar—a tool specific to his job at Union Pacific. Nurse Practitioner 6Dr. Coates performed corrective surgery on Sweatt’s shoulder in March 2010. No. 14-2451 13 Valentin’s November 19, 2009, note corroborates the workrelated nature of the injury. She wrote that Sweatt “does repetitive motion at his job” (emphasis added). And Dr. Coates also testified that Sweatt associated the pain with his work. This connection is no leap of logic. After all, Sweatt had performed heavy-duty jobs at Union Pacific for a period of nearly three years. Like a machinist who, after years working in a loud, industrial room, develops hearing loss, Fries, 909 F.2d at 1093–94, Sweatt knew or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that his injuries were caused by his work for Union Pacific. Based on our de novo review of the record, Sweatt’s FELA claims for the injuries to his shoulder and hands began to accrue well before November 30, 2009. That puts them outside the relevant three-year period, rendering them timebarred by the statute of limitations.