Opinion ID: 2306033
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Threats Convictions

Text: Hunter contends that his two felony threat convictions should merge because they are based on the same conduct, namely one threat to two individuals. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense. Lennon v. United States, 736 A.2d 208, 209 (D.C. 1999) (citation omitted). Hunter contends that the government tried his case on the theory that he committed two counts of felony threats when he uttered a single threat directed collectively at Annie Mae Parker and her daughter, LaTonya. We review claims of violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause and the merger of convictions de novo, Joiner-Die v. United States, 899 A.2d 762, 766 (D.C.2006), employing a fact-based analysis to determine whether two violations of the same statute merge. Ellison v. United States, 919 A.2d 612, 615 (D.C.2007). If there was only one threat, the two convictions should merge, but [t]he Fifth Amendment does not prohibit separate and cumulative punishment for separate criminal acts. Owens v. United States, 497 A.2d 1086, 1094-95 (D.C.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1085, 106 S.Ct. 861, 88 L.Ed.2d 900 (1986). Hunter argues that the government presented evidence of only one threat addressed to two individuals, and that the conduct described by Annie Mae and LaTonya Parker amount to the same conduct. He argues that we should follow our holding in Smith v. United States, 295 A.2d 60 (D.C.1972). In Smith, the defendant threatened two men, a father and son, who pursued him after catching him breaking into the father's car. Smith patted his pocket and told the men he had a gun. They broke off their pursuit, fearing for their safety. Id. We vacated one of Smith's threat convictions, holding that there was only one threat, and that [t]he statute evidences no clear intent to transform this one act into as many offenses as there [were] individuals threatened. Id. at 61. We decline to follow Smith in this instance, as Hunter's conduct represents two distinct threats to two individuals. We are guided in our decision by our holding in Joiner v. United States, 585 A.2d 176 (D.C.1991). In Joiner, the appellant threatened two men who had identified him in a police lineup a few days earlier. He pointed to each man, first touching [the first victim's] nose and then striking [the other victim] above the eye, while uttering `I will remember this,' `I will get you for this' and `[I don't] forget faces.' Id. at 178. We reasoned that it was clear from these facts that appellant distinctly singled out and focused on each of the two victims while uttering words and physically touching them, one after the other. Id. at 179. We concluded, on that basis, that Joiner committed two separate offenses under the felony threats statute. As was the case in Joiner, Hunter issued two distinct threats to two different victims. A defendant is guilty of threats if he utters words to another person, those words were of such a nature as to convey fear of serious bodily harm to the ordinary hearer, and the defendant intended to utter the words as a threat. Jenkins v. United States, 902 A.2d 79, 86 (D.C.2006). Here, Hunter uttered one threat directed to Annie Mae Parker when he told her, I will bust you in your face. I will blow your f king head off. He uttered a new, distinct threat when he directed his attention to LaTonya, striking her and uttering a second threat, directed to both victims collectively, as he left the premises. Since these threats took place sequentially, as opposed to being one act directed at an undifferentiated group of victims, the convictions do not merge.