Opinion ID: 787956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Our Jurisdiction to Address Walker's Procedural Due Process Claim.

Text: 24 Walker submits that he has a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a state-created liberty interest against being force-fed. 17 He also claims that the Constitution requires procedural safeguards to ensure that a decision to force-feed someone is neither arbitrary nor erroneous, and that the prison officials and Lasky ignored those procedural safeguards. 18 25 Before we can address the merits of Walker's constitutional claims, we must first address the parties arguments about whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives us of jurisdiction over those claims. 19 26 The Rooker-Feldman 20 doctrine arises from 28 U.S.C. § 1257 which states in relevant part that `[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a state in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court....' 21 Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 296 (3d Cir.1992). Since Congress has never conferred a similar power of review on the United States District Courts, the Supreme Court has inferred that Congress did not intend to empower District Courts to review state court decisions. Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir.2003) (citations omitted); see also Port Auth. Police Benevolent Assoc., Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J. Police Dept., 973 F.2d 169, 179 (3d Cir.1992) ([T]he fundamental principle of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine [is] that a federal district court may not sit as an appellate court to adjudicate appeals of state court proceedings.). 27 To ensure that Congress's intent to prevent the lower federal courts from sitting in direct review of the decisions of a state tribunal is given effect, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits District Courts from adjudicating actions in which the relief requested requires determining whether the state court's decision is wrong or voiding the state court's ruling. 22 Desi's Pizza, 321 F.3d at 419 (citations, internal quotations, bracket and ellipses omitted). Although § 1257 refers to orders and decrees of the highest state court, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been applied to final decisions of lower state courts as well. Port Auth. Police Benevolent Assoc., 973 F.2d at 178. 28 Thus, a claim is barred by Rooker-Feldman under two circumstances: first, if the [federal] claim was `actually litigated' in state court prior to the filing of the federal action or, second, if the [federal] claim is `inextricably intertwined with [the] state adjudication,' meaning that `federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong.' Desi's Pizza, 321 F.3d at 419 (citation omitted). In either case,  Rooker-Feldman bars a litigant's federal claims [and] divests the District Court of subject matter jurisdiction over those claims. Id. at 419. 29 Determining whether a plaintiff actually litigated a federal claim in the state court for Rooker-Feldman purposes is not always as easy as may at first appear because Rooker-Feldman has a close affinity to the principles embodied in the legal concepts of claim and issue preclusion. Valenti, 962 F.2d at 297. Therefore, a plaintiff cannot ordinarily litigate one constitutional claim in state court and then raise a related constitutional claim in the district court. Id. In Valenti, plaintiffs litigated an equal protection claim in state court and then sought to raise a First Amendment claim in the district court. We held that Rooker-Feldman deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the First Amendment claim. We explained: 30 [Plaintiffs] each had an opportunity to raise a first amendment challenge [in state court] and failed to do so. They cannot be allowed to escape Rooker-Feldman by raising a new constitutional theory in federal court. Under principles of claim preclusion, they had a full and fair opportunity to litigate their first amendment claim in the state court, and here they merely seek a second bite at the apple. 31 Valenti, 962 F.2d at 296. 32 A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with an issue adjudicated by a state court when: (1) the federal court must determine that the state court judgment was erroneously entered in order to grant the requested relief, or (2) the federal court must take an action that would negate the state court's judgment. Desi's Pizza, 321 F.3d at 421 In the first circumstance ... Rooker-Feldman bars the plaintiff's federal claim because granting the plaintiff relief would require the federal court to conclude that the State Court made an incorrect factual or legal determination. In cases falling into this category, federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong. Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). That inquiry requires that we identify the pillars on which the state-court judgment rests. To do this, we consider the questions of state law that the state court was obligated to reach in order to render its decision. Id. In the second situation discussed above, the plaintiff's federal claim is precluded because the relief sought would undo or prevent the enforcement of the state court's order. Id. at 422. In other words, Rooker-Feldman does not allow a plaintiff to seek relief that, if granted, would prevent a state court from enforcing its orders. Id. 33 Here, prison officials argue that Walker's procedural due process claim is, in essence, a request to a lower federal court to review a state court injunction authorizing the prison officials to force-feed Walker. They claim that a finding in Walker's favor on his procedural due process claim would necessarily be a federal ruling that the state court order was wrong. They are thus claiming, in Rooker-Feldman terminology, that Walker's due process claim is inextricably intertwined with the state court adjudication. Therefore, say the prison officials, the procedural due process claim is barred by Rooker-Feldman and the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over that claim. 34 In making this argument, they rely heavily on Port Authority Police Benevolent Association, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department, 973 F.2d 169 (3d Cir.1992). There, the Port Authority obtained an injunction from a state court prohibiting a nonprofit organization employed by the Police Benevolent Association from soliciting contributions from Port Authority tenants. In state court, the Police Benevolent Authority unsuccessfully argued that solicitation was protected speech under the First Amendment and that the Port Authority regulations prohibiting soliciting tenants violated its First Amendment rights. 35 The Police Benevolent Association then went to federal court and asserted the same constitutional claim they had asserted in the state court action. They asked the district court for an injunction preventing the Port Authority from enforcing its antisolicitation regulations. The Association conceded that the federal injunction would effectively enjoin the enforcement of the state court's injunction if granted, and the district court abstained under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). On appeal, we held that the district court properly abstained under Younger, but also noted that the district court could have dismissed the complaint pursuant to Rooker-Feldman because assertion of jurisdiction over the compliant would have required the district court to decide issues that were inextricably intertwined with the state court's decision. 973 F.2d at 177. 36 The prison officials argue that Port Authority Police Benevolent Association controls because Rooker-Feldman prevents the district court from ruling on the propriety of the state court order allowing Walker to be force-fed. Walker counters by arguing that his procedural due process claim does not require the district court to review the propriety of the state court injunction or to find that the state court's decision was wrong. Admittedly, Walker's due process claim is not a frontal attack on the propriety of the state court order. However, it nevertheless questions the propriety of the state court's order. Walker's constitutional claim is bottomed on his theory that the prison officials had inadequate procedural safeguards to insure that the state court's ruling would be based upon accurate and complete information. Walker correctly claims that the state court's order was based exclusively on Lasky's affidavit. However, says Walker, Lasky never examined him and, in fact, confused him with another prisoner. Moreover, says Walker, the complaint seeking state injunctive relief did not include an affidavit from Dr. Young, who had examined him several times, or a copy of relevant medical records. In Walker's view, had there been a Department of Corrections requirement that his medical records and an affidavit of his treating physician be attached to the complaint, the state court would have learned that Walker was being examined by a physician on a daily basis, was not dehydrated, sustained no weight loss between August 26 and August 30, 1995, and was otherwise in good health. However, says Walker, because of the lack of procedural safeguards, the state court record lacked the information necessary to guarantee that the state court's decision was not arbitrary or erroneous. He writes: Had minimal procedural safeguards been provided, the state court would have learned that the affidavit [of Lasky] was incorrect and that force-feeding was not warranted because Mr. Walker's treating physician had concluded that Mr. Walker was in good health. Walker's Br. at 14. 37 In our view, Walker is simply saying that the state court's decision was wrong and blaming the error on certain alleged procedural deficiencies. For example, Walker argues: 38 [b]ecause Dr. Lasky never examined Mr. Walker and, ... confused [him] with another inmate ... important statements in [Lasky's] affidavit were erroneous ... As a result, the state court was completely misled ... Had Mr. Walker been given notice and the opportunity ... to participate in the proceeding, the state court would have learned that statements in Mr. Lasky's affidavit were erroneous. Moreover had DOC regulations required defendants to attach to their application for ... ex parte relief a copy of Mr. Walker's medical records or an affidavit from the treating physician, it would have been immediately apparent to the state court that Dr. Lasky's affidavit was incorrect. Walker's Br. at 16-17 39 Walker is clearly claiming that had he been given adequate procedural due process, the state court would not have entered an erroneous order to force-feed him. Thus, Walker's due process claim is inextricably intertwined with the state court adjudication. He cannot prevail on his procedural claim unless we pull the thread that will unravel the constitutional fabric of the state court's order. Consequently, Rooker-Feldman bars Walker's due process claim and the district court had no subject matter jurisdiction over it. Accordingly, we need not address Walker's argument that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to the defendants on his procedural due process claim. 23 40