Opinion ID: 2638116
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Unconstitutionality of California's Death Penalty Statute

Text: Defendant presents no claims of error specific to his penalty trial, but contends generally that California's death penalty statute and procedures are unconstitutional for a number of reasons. Defendant again cites the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 15, 16 and 17 of the California Constitution. We have recently and repeatedly rejected these general claims and do so here as well without extensive discussion. The special circumstances listed in section 190.2, together with other aspects of California homicide law, adequately narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty. ( People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 43, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229; People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514,573,26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1,108 P.3d 182; People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 125-126,132 Cal.Rptr 2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) Section 190.3, factor (a), permitting the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime as a factor in aggravation or mitigation, is not so vague as to allow for unconstitutionally arbitrary application and is not otherwise constitutionally improper as a sentence selection factor. ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-976, 114 SCt. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750; People v. Proctor, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 550-651, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100.) Our statute is not invalid for failing to require (1) written findings or unanimity as to aggravating factors, (2) proof of all aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) findings that aggravation outweighs mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, or (4) findings that death is the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) No instruction on burden of proof is required in a California penalty trial because the assessment of aggravating and mitigating circumstances required of penalty jurors is inherently `normative, not factual' [citation] and, hence, not susceptible to a burden-of-proof quantification. ( People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 79,14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118; accord, People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 43, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229; People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 236, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496.) Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, requiring that certain sentencing findings be made by a jury, are inapposite for reasons previously explained: `[U]nder the California death penalty scheme, once the defendant has been convicted of first degree murder and one or more special circumstances has been found true beyond a reasonable doubt, death is no more than the prescribed statutory maximum for the offense; the only alternative is life imprisonment without possibility of parole. (§ 190.2, subd. (a).) Hence, facts which bear upon, but do not necessarily determine, which of these two alternative penalties is appropriate do not come within the holding of Apprendi' [(People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 589-590, fn. 14, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.)] The high court's recent decision in Ring v. Arizona [, supra,] 536 U.S. 584[, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556] does not change this analysis. Under the Arizona capital sentencing scheme invalidated in Ring, a defendant convicted of first degree murder could be sentenced to death if, and only if, the trial court first found at least one of the enumerated aggravating factors true. ( Id. at p. 603[, 122 S.Ct. 2428].) Under California's scheme, in contrast, each juror must believe the circumstances in aggravation substantially outweigh those in mitigation, but the jury as a whole need not find any one aggravating factor to exist. The final step in California capital sentencing is a free weighing of all the factors relating to the defendant's culpability, comparable to a sentencing court's traditionally discretionary decision to, for example, impose one prison sentence rather than another. Nothing in Apprendi or Ring suggests the sentence in such a system constitutionally must find any aggravating factor true beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126, fn. 32, 132 Gal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749; accord, People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 41, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229.) [W]e also disagree with defendant that our statute is unconstitutional because it does not require jurors to agree unanimously on the existence of particular factors in aggravation. [Citations.] While all the jurors must agree death is the appropriate penalty, the guided discretion through which jurors reach their penalty decision must permit each juror individually to assess such potentially aggravating factors as the circumstances of the capital crime (§ 190.3, factor (a)), prior felony convictions ( id., factor (c)), and other violent criminal activity ( id., factor (b)), and decide for himor herself `what weight that activity should be given in deciding the penalty.' [Citation.] The series of normative judgments involved in deciding whether a particular circumstance is indeed aggravating and, if so, what weight it should be given, cannot be fitted into a scheme of unanimous jury factfinding. ( People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 41, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407,137 P.3d 229.) Comparative intercase proportionality review by the trial or appellate courts is not constitutionally required. ( People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749; accord, e.g., People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 237, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496; People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 574, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182.) `International law does not compel the elimination of capital punishment in California.' ( People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 127, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) Defendant's argument that the use of capital punishment `as regular punishment for substantial numbers of crimes' violates international norms of human decency and hence the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution fails, at the outset, because California does not employ capital punishment in such a manner. The death penalty is available only for the crime of first degree murder, and only when a special circumstance is found true; furthermore, administration of the penalty is governed by constitutional and statutory provisions different from those applying to `regular punishment' for felonies. (E.g., Cal. Const, art. VI, § 11; §§ 190.1-190.9, 1239, subd. (b).) ( People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 43-44, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407,137 P.3d 229.)