Opinion ID: 2226681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver of the Statutory Privilege

Text: We nevertheless agree with the District Court that Green waived the statutory privilege by commencing the present lawsuit. By bringing a civil suit alleging that the police had used excessive force in apprehending him, Green placed at issue the very conduct for which he had been adjudicated a juvenile delinquentwhether he drove the Jeep at the police officers, which, in the District Court's eyes, justified their firing in response. While placing that conduct at issue, Green seeks to use the privilege of sections 380.1 and 381.2 to bar evidence of his delinquency adjudication. In essence, Green seeks to use the confidentiality provisions as a sword to obtain a result in the civil suit inconsistent with his delinquency adjudication. That he cannot do. Privileges, while important in the law, are not absolute. Indeed, most rights and privileges are waivable, even such constitutional rights as the right to a jury trial, the right to appeal and the right against self-incrimination ( see, People v Seaberg, 74 NY2d 1, 10). Further, when a privilege is designed to protect an individual by keeping certain information or conduct secret, that protection may be deemed waived where the individual affirmatively places the information or conduct in issue. In Dillenbeck v Hess (73 NY2d 278, 287), for example, this Court stated that a litigant waives the physician-patient privilege of CPLR 4504 when, in bringing or defending a personal injury action, that person has affirmatively placed his or her mental or physical condition in issue ( see also, Koump v Smith, 25 NY2d 287, 294). Otherwise, as we explained in Koump, a party would be able to use the privilege as a sword rather than a shield, and a party should not be permitted to assert a mental or physical condition in seeking damages    and at the same time assert the privilege in order to prevent the other party from ascertaining the truth (25 NY2d, at 294). As other New York courts have recognized, the confidentiality provisions of the Family Court Act may similarly be waived. In People v Johnson (90 Misc 2d 777, 780, revd on other grounds 78 AD2d 298), a juvenile witness in a criminal proceeding gave misleading testimony about the disposition of charges brought against him in Family Court. The court permitted the witness' juvenile records to be admitted as impeachment evidence, holding that the witness had waived the protection of the Family Court Act by giving misleading testimony ( id., at 780-782). The court stated that the witness was turning the shield of the privilege into a sword, and that the false implication created by the witness' testimony could not be permitted to stand unimpeached ( id., at 782). By the same token, in People v Harder (146 AD2d 286, 290-291), the court held that a criminal defendant would be entitled to examine confidential Family Court records of a prosecution witness if they contained information material to the defense, and ordered the trial court to inspect the records, on remittal, to determine if disclosure was required. As the court noted, the statutory privilege of confidentiality for Family Court records is not absolute ( id., at 290). By contrast, where the juvenile has not initiated the suit or otherwise affirmatively placed the prior proceedings at issue, the privilege may not be deemed waived ( see, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v Bongiorno, 237 AD2d 31; Holyoke Mut. Ins. Co. v Jason B., 184 AD2d 550, 552-553; Bartkowiak v St. Adalbert's R. C. Church Socy., 40 AD2d 306, 308-309; Murphy v City of New York, 273 App Div 492, 495). This case is also analogous to cases involving CPL 160.50, which mandates sealing of records where a criminal proceeding has been terminated in favor of the accused. Like sections 380.1 and 381.2 of the Family Court Act, the purpose of CPL 160.50 is to protect accused individuals from the unauthorized use of their records. Where, however, an individual affirmatively places the underlying conduct at issue by bringing a civil suit, the courts have consistently held that the statutory protection is waived ( see, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v Jones, 216 AD2d 967, 968; Matter of Abrams v Skolnik, 185 AD2d 407, 408-409; Kalogris v Roberts, 185 AD2d 335, 335-336; Taylor v New York City Tr. Auth., 131 AD2d 460, 462). The privilege of CPL 160.50 may not be used as a sword to gain an advantage in a civil action ( Taylor v New York City Tr. Auth., supra, at 462). Thus, we conclude that under the circumstances here, Green's delinquency adjudication may be used for collateral estoppel purposes. Green affirmatively placed his conduct at issue by bringing the damages action, and he may not use the confidentiality provisions of the Family Court Act to unfair advantage. Our holding today comports with the purpose of collateral estoppel, which is to preserve fundamental fairness by preventing a party from relitigating an issue that has already been decided against it ( Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449, 455). Accordingly, both certified questions should be answered in the affirmative. Following certification of questions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and acceptance of the questions by this Court pursuant to section 500.17 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.17), and after hearing argument by counsel for the parties and consideration of the briefs and the record submitted, certified questions answered in the affirmative.