Opinion ID: 3171512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Juror Dismissals

Text: In the midst of trial, the court learned that Juror #2 received a letter inviting her mother to an investment seminar. The juror showed the letter to other jurors and even asked court personnel whether the FBI ought to investigate the seminar presenters. The court dismissed Juror #2, finding that she “lack[ed] the common sense to understand” the court’s instructions on juror conduct. Concerned that other jurors might have conflated the letter and the evidence, the court rehabilitated each and every juror. Each confirmed that he or she had not yet received all the evidence and therefore would not predetermine Bravata’s guilt. Neither defendant objected, and the trial continued. On appeal, Bravata contends that “prejudice is presumed” from the letter and that the government offered no proof rebutting that presumption. Accordingly, Bravata argues that he is entitled to a new trial. First, Bravata inaccurately states the law. He in fact bears the burden “to demonstrate that juror misconduct prejudiced his defense, and prejudice will not be presumed.” United States v. Johnson, 308 F. App’x 968, 973 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Wheaton, 517 F.3d 350, 361 (6th Cir. 2008)). Second, he fails to persuade us that prejudice resulted despite the court’s curative efforts. The court intercepted the letter, confirmed that each juror could still apply the presumption of innocence, and reinstructed the jury “not to bring anything extraneous outside into the room to talk about.” See, e.g., Johnson, 308 F. App’x at 973 (finding no prejudice when the - 24 - Case Nos. 13-2380, 13-2381, 13-2591, 15-1370, United States v. Bravata “danger that the jury might consider evidence that had not been admitted at trial was ameliorated by the district court’s cautionary instructions”); Wheaton, 517 F.3d at 361–62 (denying the defendant a new trial when the court asked the jurors whether the extrinsic evidence affected their decisionmaking and admonished them for outside investigation).
On the thirtieth day of trial, Juror #4 fell ill. When the court called for a five-minute break, Juror #4 announced, “I don’t know if I’m going to make it all day, Judge.” After a sixteen-minute recess, the court informed the parties that “[w]hat I’m going to do is excuse [Juror #4]” and seat an alternate juror. Defendants both objected and petitioned the court to keep Juror #4 if he “might be able to come back in a day or two.” The court heard arguments from counsel for both defendants and ruled: The Court is going to rule that this juror has indicated he is clearly not well today. We don’t know what’s going to happen tomorrow. In the past, earlier in the trial, I did take off a day when someone was sick. I don’t know how long he’s going to be sick. We’re in the seventh week of the trial and I believe in the management of the case that it is important that the trial continues. That’s why we have extra jurors. So that’s the ruling of the Court. I’m going to walk down to five and thank him for all of his service and then the trial will continue in about five minutes. On appeal, both defendants contend that the court abused its discretion in excusing Juror #4 and that it also engaged in ex-parte juror communications in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a). Finally, the defendants argue that the court erred in denying them a new trial based on newly discovered evidence—Juror #4’s affidavit. We find no merit to any of these arguments.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c)(1) allows a district court to seat an alternate juror when another juror is either “unable to perform” or “disqualified from performing” juror - 25 - Case Nos. 13-2380, 13-2381, 13-2591, 15-1370, United States v. Bravata duties. If the court has “‘reasonable cause’ to replace the juror,” it need not obtain defendants’ consent. United States v. De Oleo, 697 F.3d 338, 341 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Cantu, 229 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2000)). We review Rule 24 juror replacements for abuse of discretion, requiring a new trial only when a defendant clearly shows prejudice. Id. at 342. The defendants claim that the court abused its discretion by insufficiently inquiring into Juror #4’s ability to perform his duties. According to Antonio, the court knew that Juror #4 would be willing and able to return the next day, but excused him without making an adequate record. Antonio relies heavily on cases in which similarly perfunctory inquiries necessitated reversal. See United States v. Spence, 163 F.3d 1280, 1283 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding an abuse of discretion when the court dismissed a juror even though “everything that the district court knew . . . indicated that the juror would be able to return in the morning”); United States v. Araujo, 62 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding an abuse of discretion when the record lacked any indication how long the juror would be incapacitated); United States v. Patterson, 26 F.3d 1127, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same). Those cases are inapplicable—they employed the exacting “good cause” standard for excusing a juror when the resulting vacancy leaves only eleven jurors. Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b)(3). No such standard applies when the court replaces the excused juror with an alternate. Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(1). And to the extent Antonio invites us to impose a “good cause” standard for Rule 24 replacements, we decline. Under Rule 24, district courts may excuse jurors for arguing with a spouse, United States v. Brown, 571 F.2d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 1978), attending the first week of college classes, De Oleo, 697 F.3d at 342, sleeping during the trial, United States v. Warner, 690 F.2d 545, 555 (6th Cir. 1982), or most importantly, falling suddenly ill, United States v. Guess, 124 F.3d 200, at  (6th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 37 (6th Cir. 1975). - 26 - Case Nos. 13-2380, 13-2381, 13-2591, 15-1370, United States v. Bravata Cursory examinations into a juror’s ability to serve will suffice when deliberations have not yet begun and vetted alternate jurors are available. See Franks, 511 F.2d at 37; see also United States v. Simpson, 992 F.2d 1224, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[N]othing in [Rule 24(c)] or case law suggests that the judge must temper his discretion by performing any particular test to determine whether a juror is competent.”). Juror #4’s dismissal for illness fits comfortably within the bounds set by our precedents and we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s dismissing him.
The defendants next argue that the court’s ex parte communications with Juror #4 violated their rights to be present at “every trial stage.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)(2). Because “any error under Rule 43(a) can be deemed harmless under [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 52(a),” defendants must show prejudice to their substantial rights to merit reversal. Brown, 571 F.2d at 987. Defendants urge us to follow United States v. Gay, 522 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1975), and reverse. In that case, we found reversible error when a trial judge communicated with jurors and granted their requests for excusal off the record and without the defendants. Id. at 435. The error was not harmless, we concluded, because no record existed from which we could determine harmlessness. Id. Here, the defendants accuse the trial judge and court personnel of clandestinely meeting with Juror #4 and failing to make a record. But after combing the record, the relevant opinions, and Juror #4’s affidavit, we find no evidence of undisclosed ex parte communications. First, the trial judge stated on the record that “[w]e have had communications with [Juror #4]” just before dismissing Juror #4. Second, the trial judge disclosed that he “did go down . . . to the jury room to see for myself the condition of [Juror #4], to talk with him, because I had just - 27 - Case Nos. 13-2380, 13-2381, 13-2591, 15-1370, United States v. Bravata heard from other court people” about the juror’s condition. Reading these statements in harmony, we conclude that the judge freely disclosed the court staff’s communications with Juror #4 pre-dismissal, as well as the judge’s post-dismissal communications. See United States v. Florea, 541 F.2d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 1976) (finding no abuse of discretion when judge created record of juror communications). And Juror #4’s affidavit supports our conclusion. After he talked to court nurses and EMTs, he says that “a lady came in and told me, ‘We’re going to let you go. The judge is going to talk to you.’” Shortly thereafter, Juror #4 recalls that the “Judge and his assistant came in to speak with me.” No other personal communications between the trial judge and Juror #4 appear in the affidavit, and Juror #4’s recollection of his communications with the court staff comports with the judge’s statements in open court. We therefore reject the defendants’ accusations that the trial judge misrepresented or concealed court communications with Juror #4. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the better practice is to conduct all communication between the court and jurors on the record. Finally, defendants cannot show prejudice. The court reported the substance of the communications in open court, and the juror left immediately thereafter, “ensur[ing] that his ex parte contacts with the court did not taint the verdicts.” United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 354 (D.C. Cir. 2006).2 2 We do not credit defendants’ suggestion that they should have been present under Rule 43(a) while Juror #4 interacted with court nurses or EMTs. They cite no law supporting this proposition and for good reason: if Rule 43(a) applied to all housekeeping communications with court staff, defendants would trail the jury to lunch, to the break room, in and out of security, and so on. Otherwise, courtroom deputies, law clerks, and court security officers would be obliged to recount every interaction with a juror on the record, regardless of the general administrative nature of the communication. - 28 - Case Nos. 13-2380, 13-2381, 13-2591, 15-1370, United States v. Bravata
We may quickly dispense of defendants’ appeal of the denial of their renewed motion for a new trial. Their new evidence—Juror #4’s affidavit—was not material. See United States v. Willis, 257 F.3d 636, 642 (6th Cir. 2001) (requiring defendants moving for new trials based on newly discovered evidence to prove materiality). As we explained above, the affidavit mirrored the trial transcript and the court’s explanation of the relevant communications.