Opinion ID: 1841181
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Donaldson's Petition for Detachment

Text: ถ 74. The statute on detachment requires a lake district board to make an individual determination whether specific property is or is not benefited by continued inclusion in the lake district. The petitioner has the burden of persuading the board and creating a record. A petitioner should (1) clearly state the grounds for detachment; (2) append documents, whenever possible, that tend to support these grounds; and (3) request the opportunity to testify and present evidence. The district board must respond by setting out the rules and procedures it intends to follow, and eventually it must marshal arguments and evidence to support its decision. 17 ถ 75. Under principles of certiorari review, the circuit court is limited to the facts contained in the record from the proceeding under review, unless a statute expands the scope of review. [21] This principle is somewhat difficult to apply when a lake district board makes findings that go beyond the evidence adduced at the hearing, because the petitioner will not have had notice of the need to address this evidence. ถ 76. A court is not powerless in the face of an inadequate record. If the record is inadequate because the petitioner failed to make a compelling case or failed to make a compelling offer of proof, the petitioner should lose. If the record is inadequate because the lake district did not permit the petitioner to present evidence, the lake district board would violate the spirit if not the letter of the detachment statute and would subject itself to due process review. ถ 77. In this case, Arthur Donaldson testified, a consultant to the District testified, and one of the commissioners submitted photographs. Consequently, the Rock-Koshkonong Lake District Board cannot be faulted for any failure to permit Donaldson to present evidence. However, the Lake District Board did make findings that went beyond the evidence presented at the hearing. ถ 78. We now examine the record under the standards for statutory certiorari. ถ 79. The first component of certiorari that we review here is whether the District acted according to law. Law refers not only to the applicable statutes but also to the guaranties of due process found in the state and federal constitutions. State ex rel. Wasilewski v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 14 Wis. 2d 243, 263, 111 N.W.2d 198 (1961), (citing State ex rel. Ball v. McPhee, 6 Wis. 2d 190, 199, 94 N.W.2d 711 (1959)). [18] ถ 80. The court of appeals focused on the question whether the lake district board acted according to law and concluded that it did: Donaldson's petition for detachment was properly denied on the basis that he failed to show a change in circumstance. Donaldson, 260 Wis. 2d 238, ถ 21. Because we conclude that this is not a correct statement of law in a situation where the county board has not made and articulated an individual determination of benefit to the petitioner's property, we reverse the court of appeals. [19] ถ 81. The Lake District Board also relied on this principle. The Board's first three reasons in support of its conclusion relate to its premise that the county board made a legislative decision to include property in the district because such property will be benefited by inclusion in the district. Thus, according to the Board, the Lake District Board not only had no obligation to second-guess the county board about any of this property but also should not have second-guessed the county board about this property, in the absence of a change of circumstances. We reject this premise as inconsistent with the statutory scheme. Except in those rare instances in which a county board takes the time to address individual parcels and articulates the basis for a finding that these parcels will be benefited by inclusion in the district, the lake district board is expected to make its own determination whether each parcel is or is not benefited by continued inclusion in the district. Thus, the Board relied in substantial part on an incorrect theory of law. ถ 82. Looking to another legal issue, we note that in State ex rel. Riley v. Department of Health & Social Services, 151 Wis. 2d 618, 445 N.W.2d 693 (Ct. App. 1989), the court of appeals stated: On certiorari review, we determine de novo whether the department . . . acted according to applicable law, whether the action was arbitrary or unreasonable, and whether the evidence supported the determination . . . An important component of the analysis is whether the department followed its own rules, for an agency is bound by the procedural regulations which it itself has promulgated.  Id. at 623 (emphasis added). [20-22] ถ 83. This analysis is inapposite in reviewing a pure exercise of legislative power. Courts are reluctant to inquire into whether the legislature has complied with legislatively prescribed formalities in enacting a statute. This reluctance stems from separation of powers and comity concepts. State ex rel. La Follette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 364-65, 338 N.W.2d 684 (1983). [C]ourts generally consider that the legislature's adherence to the rules or statutes prescribing procedure is a matter entirely within legislative control and discretion, not subject to judicial review unless the legislative procedure is mandated by the constitution. If the legislature fails to follow self-adopted procedural rules in enacting legislation, and such rules are not mandated by the constitution, courts will not intervene to declare the legislation invalid. Id. at 365. ถ 84. Although the Lake District Board adopted criteria to consider in reviewing a detachment petition, it did not make the consideration of these criteria mandatory. Consequently, we do not see a due process violation in the Board's failure to discuss each of the relevant criteria. Rather, we consider the Board's failure to discuss all the relevant criteria under a different component of certiorari review. [23] ถ 85. The second component of certiorari review in this case is whether the Board's decision was arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable, representing its will and not its judgment. ถ 86. In Resolution 99-3, the Lake District Board listed seven criteria that it might consider in reviewing a detachment petition. In reviewing Donaldson's petition, the Lake District Board enumerated eight reasons why it concluded that the territory is benefited by continued inclusion in the District. ถ 87. Three of the reasons stated by the Board relate to one of the seven criteria; namely, F. Whether circumstances surrounding the property's inclusion in the District have changed. This was discussed in ถถ 59 and 81 above and found to be legally incorrect on the facts of this case. ถ 88. The Lake District Board did not discuss four of the seven criteria, namely A. The physical characteristics of the property, B. Its use (recreational, commercial, residential, etc.), E. Whether detachment of the property will result in any `hole' or `island' in the boundaries of the District, and G. Any other factors relevant to whether the property is benefited by continued inclusion in the District. Each of these criteria tends to support Donaldson's position. His two parcels consist of agricultural land near an interstate highway. They are zoned agricultural. They are used for agriculture, and Donaldson said he has no intention to change their use. There are no improvements on the parcels except for highway signs, and no one lives on these parcels. Detachment of the two parcels would not create any holes in the District. The District did not discuss other relevant factors or rebut Donaldson's arguments directly. ถ 89. This leaves two of the seven criteria that the Board itself listed as factors for consideration. The Board's third criterion, C, reads as follows: C. [The land's] relationship to the lake in terms of whether: 1. It is riparian; 2. It has private access rights to the lake; 3. Its proximity to public access to the lake; 4. It is within view of the lake; and 5. It is within the watershed or groundwater table of the lake. Criterion Cโ โ which specifically refers to lakeโ โ is the source of four of the Board's eight reasons for finding that Donaldson's parcels are benefited. ถ 90. The Board states that both tracts are in near proximity to Lake Koshkonong and the portion of the Rock River within the District. The northerly tract is located approximately one mile from the Rock River; the southerly tract is located approximately a half-mile from the Rock River. Significantly, the Board does not indicate the distances between the two parcels and Lake Koshkonong. Instead, it shifts focus, citing distances to the Rock River because Donaldson's parcels are closer to the river than to the lake. By doing so, the Board turns Donaldson's argument on its head, using the distances he cited to establish that he is not benefited as proof that his parcels are in near proximity to the river. ถ 91. In reviewing the Board's near proximity rationale, we cannot say that a legislative finding that property located one mile from a lake is benefited by its proximity, is an irrational finding. Similarly, we would have difficulty dismissing out of hand a legislative determination that property located five miles from a lake or river is benefited by its proximity. What is evident in this case, however, is that the Lake District has no consistent rationale about proximity. The Lake District Board has not established a consistent standard for determining near proximity, has switched from lake to river in its analysis, and has not explained how non-riparian agricultural land located a half-mile or a mile from the river is benefited by its proximity more directly than many similar parcels not included in the District and not subject to its added layer of taxation. ถ 92. In 1999 the University of Wisconsin Extension did a study on the potential impacts of removing the Indianford Dam. See David W. Marcouiller, et al., University of Wisconsin-Extension, Assessing Potential Economic and Ecological Impacts of Removing the Indianford Dam (Dec. 8, 1999). The study focused on the towns of Albion, Milton, Sumner, and Koshkonong. It did not study the town of Fulton in which Donaldson's properties are located, presumably because Fulton has no riparian property on Lake Koshkonong. In the course of their analysis, the investigators indicated that they studied property within a half-mile of Lake Koshkonong. In general, there is a rough overlap between the identified parcels within 1/2 mile and [the] newly created lake district. Marcouiller, supra, at 22. The investigators acknowledged that the boundaries do not match exactly with their half-mile calculation. However, most property in the district appears to be within a half-mile of the lake. ถ 93. When property is a half-mile or more from the river, is not riparian, and has no private access to the lake or river, the benefit derived from proximity is not so self-evident that it requires no explanation in a detachment decision. In this case, the Board failed to link proximity to benefit. ถ 94. The Board gave another reason for opposing detachment. It stated: Both tracts are within the Rock River watershed and within the sub-watershed areas that drain into portions of the Rock River and Lake Koshkonong within the boundaries of the District. Judge Welker addressed this reason, saying: There is a very great deal of land in Rock County [as well as Jefferson and Dane Counties] which is within the Rock River watershed or drains into the Rock River or Lake Koshkonong which is not included in the District. ถ 95. Under cross-examination, the Board's witness, Steve Hjort, acknowledged that all land in Wisconsin is within some watershed. Consequently, the fact that property is located in a watershed or sub-watershed tells us very little about how that property affects a lake or river or how that property is benefited by inclusion in a lake district. Again, the Lake District Board provides a fact without showing how that fact is relevant to benefit. As Judge Welker put it, the fact or reason was not one of any controlling probity. ถ 96. As another reason, the Lake District Board stated: Although neither parcel is riparian, both parcels are located in close proximity to public boat launch facilities. It explained that the northern parcel is located approximately 2.5 miles from the DNR boat launch site on Ellendale Road and one mile from several private boat launching facilities. The southern parcel is located approximately 1 mile from the DNR boat launching site. It did not explain that this DNR site is on the Rock River, not the lake. ถ 97. If Donaldson's parcels consisted of residential property, inhabited by boaters and potential boaters, the Board's reason might be relevant. But Donaldson's parcels consist of agricultural land with no residents and no improvements. There are no potential boaters on the property to take advantage of proximity, and no boats are stored there. The District must acknowledge in emphasizing this reason that Donaldson's property is not riparian and has no private access rights to the lake or river. As a result, Donaldson's property is not markedly different from property in Edgerton or Milton, or even Janesville, except that trailering a boat from one of his two agricultural parcels to a public launch site would take a few minutes less time than trailering a boat from residential property in one of these communities. Moreover, there are properties closer to the DNR public launch site than Donaldson's properties that are not in the Lake District. ถ 98. As its final C-criterion reason, the Board states: The southerly tract has a direct view of the Rock River. This reason was supported at the hearing by a photograph taken from Knutson Road near Donaldson's southern parcel and is not disputed. In reviewing this rationale, we note that it is undisputed in the record that neither parcel has a direct view of Lake Koshkonong, and there is no evidence that there is a direct view of the river from the northern parcel. Hence, this reason for opposing detachment applies only to the southern parcel. In citing this reason, the Lake District Board is contending that agricultural land located more than eight football fields away from the river is benefited by a direct view of the river. This evidence is not compelling. ถ 99. We turn now to the Board's final reason for opposing detachment, a reason related to the Lake District Board's fourth criterion, D. [22] The Board states: The value of both tracts will be enhanced if the water quality and recreational value of the Lake Koshkonong and associated reaches of the Rock River within the District are improved and will be diminished if the Indianford Dam were removed or if water quality and recreational value of the lake and associated reaches of the Rock River were further degraded. ถ 100. In reviewing this reason, we are reminded of the legislature's findings and declaration of intent. Wis. Stat. ง 33.001(1). In 1974 the legislature determined that the protection and rehabilitation of the public inland lakes of this state are in the best interest of the citizens of this state and the public health and welfare will be benefited thereby. Id. In other words, in a broad legislative sense, residents of Milwaukee, La Crosse, Superior, Marinette, and all Wisconsin, are benefited by a clean, healthy Lake Koshkonong, as well as other inland lakes, because protected, rehabilitated public inland lakes benefit the public health and welfare. This does not mean, however, that residents of Milwaukee, La Crosse, Superior, and Marinette could reasonably be included in the Rock-Koshkonong Lake District because they are not directly affected by a deteriorated condition of this lake. ง 33.001(2)(b). The same analysis must be applied in evaluating Donaldson's parcels. Are the parcels directly affected by some condition of these waters? ถ 101. Is the value of Donaldson's two tracts enhanced by the quality of Lake Koshkonong and the Rock River? The Board bases its reason on contingencies: the value of the parcels will be affected if the water quality and recreational value are improved, or if the Indianford Dam were removed, or if water quality and recreational value were degraded. The Board does not reference what actions it has taken, is taking, or will take in this regard, nor has it explained how these actions have affected or will affect the value of non-riparian agricultural land. The Board relies on the relationship between Donaldson's properties and the Rock River but does not explain how removal of the Indianford Dam would affect his properties or any properties linked to the Rock River. In all likelihood, any increased land value would depend on the conversion of the land to residential use instead of agricultural use. This contingency is inconsistent with Donaldson's testimony. Once again, the Lake District Board has failed to articulate the linkage between its reason and present benefit to the particular parcels of land. ถ 102. To sum up, the Lake District Board exercised its will and not its judgment. It placed heavy emphasis on a requirement for a change in circumstances in a situation in which a change in circumstances was not required. It failed to address or rebut the grounds given by the petitioner. In so doing, it failed to discuss several criteria it had identified in its own rules. Although the Board gave several reasons for its decision beyond the absence of a change in circumstances, it consistently failed to explain why these reasons were relevant in showing direct benefit to Donaldson's property and why Donaldson's property was more directly benefited than many other properties not included in the Lake District. The Lake District Board consistently failed to discuss how its past, present, and future actions were benefiting Donaldson's parcels. In short, the Board was arbitrary and unreasonable. Were we to conclude that the Board's hollow, ritualistic enumeration of reasons was sufficient to sustain its refusal to detach the Donaldson properties, we would render the detachment procedure meaningless. ถ 103. There is one additional component for certiorari review that we should mention: whether the evidence was such that the Board might reasonably make the determination in question. We conclude that the evidenceโ โ the reasoningโ โ cited by the Lake District Board was not sufficient to sustain its decision. As noted, the Board failed to link several of its reasons to a finding of benefit and failed to justify its disregard of the reasons proffered by Donaldson.