Opinion ID: 3013566
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Waiver of Jurisdictional Objections

Text: Finally, Cunningham argues that the RRB waived its exhaustion of administrative remedies argument and rendered the April 23, 2002 decision a final decision when it mailed a cover letter, along with a copy of the Board’s April 23, 2003 decision, inadvertently advising Cunningham that she “may seek judicial review of the Board’s opinion by filing a petition for review with an appropriate United States court of appeals.” Petitioner relies heavily on two cases in support of her waiver argument: Sipple v. Califano, 455 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.W. Va. 1978), and Funderburk v. Califano, 432 F. Supp. 657 (W.D.N.C. 1977). In Funderburk, the claimant had sought disability benefits but had been denied such benefits by an administrative law judge. The decision was upheld by the Appeals Council on September 15, 1976. 432 F. Supp. at 658. By regulation, the claimant had 60 days, until November 19, 1976, in which to file a petition for review with a district court. Id. Several days before the expiration 17 of the 60-day period, the Legal Aid Society assumed representation of claimant and requested that the Appeals Council keep open claimant’s file pending submission of additional evidence. Id. In a letter dated November 16, 1976, just three days before the expiration of the 60-day judicial review period, the Appeals Council agreed. Id. The claimant, represented by new counsel, proceeded to submit new evidence to the Appeals Council, which nonetheless eventually denied the claim again. Id. Petitioner thereafter initiated suit on February 25, 1977 in district court, well outside the 60-day period from the September 15, 1976 decision, and the government argued that this barred judicial review. Id. The district court disagreed and found that the 60-day period had been waived when the government placed the claimant in a “Catch22”: The government “should not be entitled to assert the statute here where the Appeals Council invited plaintiff to submit additional evidence three days before the time limit for filing suit expired, forcing plaintiff to choose whether to pursue additional administrative channels or to institute a possibly needless civil action.” Id. at 659. Similarly, in Sipple, after his denial of benefits was affirmed by the Appeals Council, the claimant, through his counsel, requested that his claim be reopened to consider additional evidence and that he be granted an extension of the 60-day period in which to file a petition for review in district court. 455 F. Supp. at 529. After failing to respond to several earlier requests, the Appeals Council, in a letter dated only 10 days prior to the expiration of the 60-day period, agreed to consider additional evidence submitted by claimant. In subsequent litigation, the district court found that the government had waived the 60-day period by placing the claimant in the impossible position of having to decide whether to submit new evidence to the Appeals Council in the remaining 10 days at the risk of missing the deadline to file suit in federal court, or appeal to the district court immediately, thereby foregoing the invitation to submit additional evidence. Id. at 530 (citing Funderburk). This case is unlike either Sipple or Funderburk. Although, as we discussed above, the jurisdictional provision of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), at issue in Sipple and Funderburk 18 is similar to 45 U.S.C. § 355(f), they differ in one important respect. Whereas 45 U.S.C. § 355(f) contains express language requiring that “all administrative remedies within the Board will have been availed of and exhausted,” no similar language appears in § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, although courts have been willing to read in and allow waiver of an exhaustion requirement under the Social Security Act in certain circumstances, see, e.g., Bacon, 969 F.2d at 1522, we note that the exhaustion requirement under the RUIA is itself jurisdictional, defining the terms under which this Court may sit in review of decisions of the RRB. Because Cunningham has not exhausted her administrative remedies before the RRB, we are not in a position to ignore the jurisdictional prerequisite of 45 U.S.C. § 355(f) on account of the cover letter mailed by the RRB.12 In addition, we find Sipple and Funderburk distinguishable to the extent that Cunningham had not been placed in any “Catch22” situation where she was forced to choose between pursuing additional administrative remedies or seeking an immediate appeal 12 At oral argument, counsel for the RRB stated that it was the Board’s position that the exhaustion requirement of 45 U.S.C. § 355(f) was in fact waivable. The Board was concerned that a ruling that exhaustion was not waivable could serve to undermine the administrative scheme by which the Board permits claimants to file late appeals on motions to reopen upon a showing of good cause, even though such claimants had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing a timely appeal in the first place. We need not decide in this case whether the Board’s administrative scheme excusing untimely appeals for good cause is consistent with 45 U.S.C. § 355(f). We note, however, that this provision governs the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals over decisions of the RRB, and not the scope of authority of the RRB to set its internal review procedures. In holding that exhaustion is a non-waivable jurisdictional element, we only acknowledge the limits on our power of review imposed by Congress, which is distinct and separate from the ability of the RRB to reopen a prior final decision. 19 to this Court. To the contrary, after the Board issued its April 23, 2003 decision finding no good cause to reopen, Cunningham no longer had any further administrative remedies before the RRB and had simply run out of options. While the RRB’s erroneous cover letter to Cunningham may have created a false sense of hope in her right to appeal, it did not in any way force her to choose between two unenviable options or otherwise prejudice her administrative or judicial remedies. The standard form cover letter, which was prepared by the secretary to the Board as part of her ministerial duties, did not request additional information or evidence as the agency had done in Sipple and Funderburk. Its purpose was solely to inform Cunningham of the deadline for filing with the Court. We thus find no waiver.