Opinion ID: 214784
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Tucker's Proposed Mere Presence Jury Instruction

Text: A party's claim that the district court's instructions did not adequately cover the theory of the defense is reviewed de novo. United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 629 (9th Cir.2000). A defendant is entitled to have the judge instruct the jury on his theory of defense, provided that it is supported by law and has some foundation in the evidence. United States v. Mason, 902 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.1990). A court may reject a defendant's theory of the case instruction if the other instructions given in their entirety cover the defense theory. United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1337 (9th Cir.1981). So long as the instructions fairly and adequately cover the issues presented, the judge's formulation of those instructions or choice of language is a matter of discretion. United States v. Echeverry, 759 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th Cir.1985). A district court may properly refuse to give a `mere presence' instruction when the government's case rests on `more than just a defendant's presence, and the jury is properly instructed on all elements of the crime. . . .' United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 925 (9th Cir.2009) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1282 (9th Cir.1992)). Tucker argues that his only link to the firearm was his presence in the apartment and his statements that he had briefly handled the firearm on an earlier date, and therefore the district court should have issued a mere presence or mere handling jury instruction. The record shows that the government's case was not limited to evidence regarding presence or handling. The government presented evidence that (1) Tucker was the only adult occupant of the apartment on September 7; (2) the gun was in the same bedroom that Tucker was using, near his personal effects; (3) Tucker knew what gun the officers were talking about before they showed it to him on September 7; and (4) Tucker had handled the gun in the past and thought his fingerprints would be on it. This evidence goes beyond mere presence, and makes a mere presence instruction unnecessary. See United States v. McKnight, 953 F.2d 898, 903 (5th Cir.1992) (holding that a mere presence instruction was unnecessary where defendant owned and lived in the house where contraband was found because [t]he dominion and control associated with owning and living in a small, open house . . . is utterly inconsistent with the legal conclusion that [the defendant] was ` merely present.' (italics in original)). We recognize that the facts in this case fall somewhere between cases where we have required a presence-based instruction, such as Negrete-Gonzales, and those where we have not required the instruction, such as Howell. Compare Howell, 231 F.3d at 629 (holding that a mere presence instruction was not necessary where there was witness testimony that the defendant had placed the cocaine in the witness's bag, instructed the witness to carry it, and promised the witness money for her role in its delivery, and the defendant had confessed to picking up the cocaine), with Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d at 1277, 1282 (holding that defendant was entitled to a mere presence instruction where the government's case was based on evidence that he accompanied a witness to a parking lot where some drug sale negotiations took place and performed some counter surveillance activity, and that he was physically in the housebut not in the relevant bedroomwhen the drug sale took place). On balance, we determine that the facts are closer to those in Howell, and therefore a mere presence instruction was not necessary. We conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to give the mere presence instruction, particularly as the jury was properly instructed on the elements of the felon in possession statute. See Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d at 1282 (stating that [i]f the government's case is based on more than just a defendant's presence, and the jury is properly instructed on all elements of the crime, then a `mere presence' instruction is unnecessary.). [6] Pursuant to these instructions, the jury could not find Tucker guilty based on his mere presence or handling of the shotgun. Rather, the jury had to find that Tucker knowingly ha[d] the power and . . . intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over the shotgun and that the government had shown a sufficient connection between Tucker and the shotgun to support an inference that [Tucker] exercised dominion and control over it. We conclude that the jury instructions adequately covered Tucker's theory of defense, and therefore the district court did not commit reversible error.