Opinion ID: 185300
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 18 The instant litigation presents two distinct jurisdictional issues, one general and one specific to this case. Citing the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135 (2000), petitioners now suggest that § 1017(a)'s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to this court might apply only to actions challenging regulations promulgated pursuant to Title I, and not Title IV, of the OPA. As such, this court would not have original jurisdiction to hear petitioners' mandamus claims. See Telecommunications Research and Action Ctr., 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984) [hereinafter TRAC]. For its part, the Coast Guard argues that § 1017(a) does apply, but that petitioners could have, and therefore should have, brought their mandamus claims as separate petitions for review of the earlier §§ 4110 and 4116(c) rulemakings. That being the case, the Coast Guard claims, petitioners cannot now circumvent § 1017(a)'s 90-day jurisdictional time limit for filing challenges to final agency action. 19 Petitioners are wrong in their suggestion that this court does not have exclusive jurisdiction over this case pursuant to § 1017. And the Coast Guard is wrong in its contention that petitioners' claims are untimely. 20
21 Where a statute commits final agency action to review by this court, we also retain exclusive jurisdiction to hear suits seeking relief that might affect [our] future statutory power of review. TRAC, 750 F.2d at 72. This includes mandamus actions challenging an agency's unreasonable delay. Id. We must therefore determine whether the OPA vests this court with jurisdiction in the first instance to hear challenges to regulations, like those at issue here, promulgated pursuant to Title IV of the Act. 22 Section 1017(a) of the OPA states: Review of any regulation promulgated under this Act may be had upon application by any interested person only in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States for the District of Columbia. § 1017(a), 104 Stat. at 504 (emphasis added). On its face, the term this Act would seem to suggest broad application of the review provision to all titles of the OPA. Petitioners, however, point to a possible complication. The Supreme Court earlier this year held that § 1018's pre-emption savings clause-the provision immediately following § 1017 in Title I of the OPAapplied only to the pre-emptive effect of provisions like those contained in Title I, and not those contained in the remainder of the Act. See Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1146. Petitioners argue that, in so holding, the Supreme Court interpreted this Act, as used in § 1018, to refer only to Title I of the OPA. Why, they ask, should it be interpreted more broadly in the context of § 1017(a)? Petitioners fundamentally misunderstand both the holding and reasoning of Locke. 23 Locke involved a claim that various federal oil cargo statutes, including the OPA, pre-empted the State of Washington's rules governing tanker vessel manning, operation, and design. The Court of Appeals had held that § 1018 of the OPA effectively saved all state tanker provisions from its, and the other statutes', pre-emptive reach. Section 1018 reads in pertinent part: 24 (a) Preservation of State Authorities ... Nothing in this Act or the Act of March 3, 1851 shall 25 (1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempting, the authority of any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to 26 (A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State; or 27 (B) any removal activities in connection with such a discharge; ... 28 (C)Additional Requirements and Liabilities; Penalties. Nothing in this Act ... shall in any way affect, or be construed to affect, the authority of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof 29 (1) to impose additional liability or additional requirements; or 30 (2) to impose, or to determine the amount of, any fine or penalty (whether criminal or civil in nature) for any violation of law; 31 relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of a discharge, of oil. 32 § 1018, 104 Stat. at 505-06 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2718) (emphasis added). Relying in large part on Congress' placement of the provision in Title I, the Supreme Court held that Congress intended these savings clauses only to preserve state laws of a scope similar to the matters contained in Title I of OPA. Locke, 120 S. Ct. at 1146. The Court's conclusion was fortified by § 1018(c)'s use of the phrase relating to the discharge, or substantial threat of discharge, of oil, for Congress had used these same key words in declaring the scope of Title I. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a), which codified § 1002(a), 104 Stat. at 489). In other words, Congress intended to save from pre-emption only those State laws having to do with liability and compensation regarding an oil spill. Because the State provisions at issue dealt with tanker manning, operation, and design, rather than liability and compensation, the Court concluded that they were subject to pre-emption. Id. at 1148-50. 33 At no point in its analysis did the Court profess to interpret the phrase this Act or suggest that it was limited to Title I of the OPA. At no point did the Court hold that § 1018 disarmed the pre-emptive effect of Title I provisions alone. Rather, the Court merely held that § 1018 insulates only those state regulations of the type contained in Title I, whether it be from provisions contained in other titles of the OPA or any provision contained in one of the other named statutes. Because Locke gives us no reason to part from the natural interpretation of § 1017(a)'s this Act, we turn now to the jurisdictional claims specific to this case. 34
35 1. TLPM Device Challenge-s 4110 The Coast Guard asserts that its 1997 temporary, and nowexpired, rulemaking constitutes its final word on § 4110. The Coast Guard said as much in its November 1999 Notice of Completed Action. The Government does not contend here that petitioners should have challenged the 1999 Notice of Completed Action, nor could it given § 1017(a)'s restriction on review to final regulations. Rather, the agency contends that petitioners' present mandamus action is tantamount to an untimely petition for review of the agency's completed 1997 temporary rulemaking. In other words, according to the Coast Guard, petitioners cannot now, over two years after the 1997 rulemaking, attempt to circumvent § 1017(a)'s jurisdictional 90-day filing limit by fashioning their petition as one for unreasonable delay. This is a specious argument and we reject it. 36 At the outset, it is important to recall what the 1997 temporary rulemaking did not do. The Coast Guard never addressed § 4110(b)'s distinct use and installation mandate, deferring any action on that front until compliant equipment had been identified. See, e.g., 46 C.F.R. § 32.22T-1(c) (During the effective period of this subpart no owner or operator is required to install any tank level or pressure monitoring device meeting the performance standards of this subpart unless required by the Coast Guard in a separate regulation.); 60 Fed. Reg. at 43,427 col. 3 (Requirements for the installation and use of the devices will be proposed separately.). Nor did the Coast Guard make clear, at any point in the rulemaking, that it would not take further action pursuant to § 4110 upon expiration of the 1997 temporary regulations. Rather, the agency merely said that the temporary rule [would] only be in effect for 2 years from the effective date. 62 Fed. Reg. at 14,829 col. 3. 37 The temporary regulations questioned whether, in light of phase out schedules, it would be economically feasible to require installation of tank level and pressure monitoring devices if such devices were not developed within two years. Id. But this question was raised because the agency knew that the temporary regulations proposed very high standards, i.e., standards that arguably embodied technology-forcing requirements that were beyond the current capacity of the affected industry. The Coast Guard never suggested, however, that the standards proposed in the temporary regulations were the only viable options to address the statutory mandate compelling the agency to establish some sort of rules as to both compliance standards and use requirements. Indeed, the temporary regulations were an experimental first-step toward achieving the required standards and requirements, nothing more, nothing less. They certainly did not forewarn anyone that the Coast Guard meant to say this is it. 38 The Coast Guard is correct that petitioners cannot use the present mandamus action to challenge the substance of the 1997 temporary regulations. See In re United Mine Workers of America Int'l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Florida Power & Light Co. v. EPA, 145 F.3d 1414, 1419 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Petitioners are not, however, challenging anything that theCoast Guard did in 1997. Nor do they challenge the Coast Guard's 1997 decision not to take certain actions or implement permanent regulations at that time. Rather, petitioners challenge what the Coast Guard has since failed to do: it has never established permanent § 4110(a) regulations; and it has put off, and now disregards, addressing § 4110(b)'s use and installation requirements. 39 [A]n agency's failure to regulate more comprehensively [than it has] is not ordinarily a basis for concluding that the regulations already promulgated are invalid. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [hereinafter HWTC]. Likewise, an agency's pronouncement of its intent to defer or to engage in future rulemaking generally does not constitute final agency action reviewable by this court. See American Portland Cement Alliance v. EPA, 101 F.3d 772, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Florida P & L, 145 F.3d at 1418 (establishing three-factor test for identifying reviewable final regulations). Nothing in § 1017(a), the OPA's judicial review provision, suggests departure from these general principles. With this in mind, petitioners argue that, had they challenged the deferral or incompleteness of the rules as the Coast Guard claims they should have, this court would have dismissed their petition on ripeness grounds. See American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 216 F.3d 50, 68-69 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (A decision to defer has no binding effect on the parties or on EPA's ability to issue a ruling in the future.); HWTC, 861 F.2d at 287 (Unless the agency's first step takes it down a path that forecloses more comprehensive regulation, the first step is not assailable merely because the agency failed to take a second.). 40 We are guided by our recent United Mine Workers decision. There, the union sought an order compelling the agency to establish permissible exposure limits (PELs) for diesel exhaust from mining equipment. The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) argued, much as the Coast Guard does here, that the union should have raised the PEL issue in the context of an earlier equipment standards rulemaking. The court disagreed: 41 From the outset, the agency disavowed any intention to consider new PELs for the diesel exhaust gases during its diesel equipment rulemaking, stating that the PELs would be reexamined as part of its omnibus air quality rulemaking. The UMWA does not take issue with that decision, or any other aspect of the diesel equipment rules. Although the PELs are plainly related to the equipment rules, since the latter incorporate them for certain equipment standards, the UMWA's challenge is to the content of the PELs and not to the agency's decision to incorporate them into the equipment rules. Indeed, had the UMWA challenged the diesel equipment rules on the ground that MSHA had failed to include revised PELs for diesel exhaust gases, we might well have denied its petition as premature. 42 United Mine Workers, 190 F.3d at 548-49 (citations omitted). Here, too, petitioners do not challenge the substance of the earlier regulations. Here, too, the Coast Guard clearly took only temporary, experimental action on § 4110(a) standards and deferred § 4110(b) use and installation regulations until compliant equipment had been located. By adopting a temporary § 4110(a) standard, the Coast Guard set in motion a two-year trial period during which such equipment might be invented. Petitioners could not have predicted that none would be found. Nor did petitioners have good reason to suppose that the absence of certain devices would result in no standards or requirements whatsoever. 43 Despite the express incompleteness of the temporary regulations, and despite any clear warning that it would abandon § 4110 rulemaking altogether following sunset, the Coast Guard argues that petitioners still should have construed the 1997 rulemaking as the agency's final action on § 4110. This is so, says the Coast Guard, because the statutory deadline for agency action had long since passed. This argument is wholly unconvincing. 44 The Coast Guard points us to Hercules Inc. v. EPA, 938 F.2d 276 (D.C. Cir. 1991). There, we recognized a limited exception to the general rule against reviewing the incompleteness of a regulation: when the statutory deadline for issuing regulations has passed, the promulgated regulation must be deemed the agency's 'complete response in compliance with the statutory requirements' ... [and] 'even if [the agency] promulgates additional ... rules sometime in the future, petitioners' claim that existing final regulations are unlawful remains reviewable by this court.'  Id. at 282 (emphasis in original) (quoting Colorado v. Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 481, 485-86 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). Grabbing hold of the phrase must be deemed, the Coast Guard attempts to turn § 4110's clear and long-passed deadlines--the very concern animating petitioners' complaints--on their head. This argument resting on Hercules fails. 45 In Sierra Club v. EPA, 992 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1993), we held that passage of a statutory deadline rendered an agency's action final only when the respondent agencies themselves considered their actions to be complete and sufficient responses to the relevant statutory requirements. Id. at 346. Though the statutory deadline for promulgating regulations had passed, the court held that, 46 [f]ar from claiming that its actions are complete, the Agency explicitly states its intention to issue revised criteria for non-municipal facilities when it has the data necessary to do so. In such circumstances, it would be incongruous to categorize the Agency's rule as the 'final' regulation concerning the issue of non-municipal facilities. 47 Id. at 347. Likewise, in the present case, the 1997 temporary regulations explicitly stated the Coast Guard's intention to defer implementation of permanent § 4110(a) compliance standards and to delay rulemaking on § 4110(b) requirements. 48 In short, under Sierra Club, it is doubtful whether petitioners could have challenged the 1997 temporary regulations, for such a challenge would have appeared premature. But this really is beside the point in this case. Petitioners do not here challenge the 1997 temporary regulations, either for what they did or did not do; those regulations have expired. Whatever issues could have been raised regarding their legality are moot. What is at issue in this case is the absence of any regulations under § 4110. The statute compels the agency to establish both compliance standards and use requirements. There are no such standards or requirements in existence-none-and the agency has no present intention to promulgate any. Petitioners argue, rather convincingly, that the agency's current we-will-not-promulgate-regulations position is a blatant violation of the Act. That is the question that is before this court. The issues that petitioners have raised are timely and they are fully cognizable in connection with their request for mandamus relief. 3. Other Waters Challenge-s 4116(c) 49 Petitioners interpret the use of the term including in § 4116(c) to require the Coast Guard to initiate rulemaking to define other waters to be included with the three named areas for which dual-escort towing regulations must be implemented. Though the Coast Guard, by its 1994 rulemaking, established final dual-escort requirements for the specificallynamed areas, it has not yet initiated rulemaking extending the requirements to other waters. Petitioners challenge this ongoing failure. As with § 4110, the Coast Guard argues that petitioners should have brought the present challenge in a petition for review of the earlier § 4116(c) rulemaking. For many of the reasons articulated above, we again disagree-petitioners are not challenging the 1994 rulemaking, but rather the Coast Guard's failure to follow through on expressly deferred and, petitioners argue, mandated promises. Petitioners' challenge is not untimely. We take up the issue of whether § 4116(c) indeed contains such an other waters requirement in the next section.