Opinion ID: 1376262
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Judgment on Hinkle's Complaint

Text: Cadle makes two arguments in support of its position that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Hinkle's complaint: First, that Hinkle failed to present a prima facie case because it did not establish the reasonableness of its fees; second, that even if Hinkle did present a prima facie case, Cadle rebutted that prima facie case and raised a genuine issue of fact as to the reasonableness of the fees. We consider each of Cadle's arguments separately.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party demonstrates that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Peck v. Title USA Ins. Corp., 108 N.M. 30, 32, 766 P.2d 290, 292 (1988). The moving party must first make a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment. Id. If a prima facie case is made, the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. See id. Accordingly, when Hinkle moved for summary judgment on its complaint, it had the initial burden of showing that no genuine issues of material fact existed and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The first issue debated by the parties is whether Hinkle's burden of showing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law required it to demonstrate the reasonableness of its fees. Cadle, citing Calderon v. Navarette, 111 N.M. 1, 800 P.2d 1058 (1990), asserts that an attorney seeking to recover on a contract with a client has the burden of proving that its fees are reasonable. See id. at 3, 800 P.2d at 1060 (It is fundamental that the attorney bears the burden of proving the value of the legal services rendered.). Hinkle responds by distinguishing Calderon, in which an attorney sought recovery based on quantum meruit, from the present situation, in which Hinkle seeks recovery based on contract. It argues that the attorney in Calderon, by suing in quantum meruit, placed the value of his services in issue. In contrast, Hinkle argues that because it is suing in contract, it has not placed the value of its services in issue and therefore should not bear the burden of proof of reasonableness. We think that Hinkle bore the burden of establishing the reasonableness of at least part of its fee. As stated above, the fee agreement was not for an agreed amount. While the parties apparently agreed to an hourly rate, they did not agree to the number of hours to be expended. Hinkle had the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the terms not expressly agreed to by the parties, i.e., the burden of showing that the amount of time expended was reasonable and that the time was fairly and properly used. See Jacobs v. Holston, 70 Ohio App.2d 55, 434 N.E.2d 738, 742 (1980) (when attorney and client had agreed to a fee based on a stated hourly rate, attorney seeking to enforce the agreement had burden of proving reasonableness of time expended). We further believe that Hinkle met its burden of showing reasonableness. Cadle argues that the affidavit of Stuart Shanor, who stated that Hinkle's charges were reasonable in amount and necessarily incurred, was conclusory and insufficient to establish reasonableness. Cadle asserts that the attorney must present evidence substantively supporting the reasonableness of the fee. We agree that Shanor's affidavit alone was insufficient to prove reasonableness. However, Cadle virtually ignores the additional substantive evidence that Hinkle submitted in support of its motion: the monthly invoices that itemized the tasks performed by Hinkle, the attorney who performed each task, the amount of time expended on each task, and the amount billed for each task. Those invoices, along with Shanor's affidavit, established that Hinkle had performed its claimed legal services and that those services were reasonable in amount. It would be impractical to require Hinkle to present more detailed evidence, as suggested by Cadle, of the skill involved in the various tasks Hinkle performed and the results it obtained. Accordingly, we find that Hinkle presented a prima facie case of the reasonableness of its fees, and that the burden then shifted to Cadle to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on this issue.
As previously noted, Cadle submitted an affidavit by Timothy Taber in response to Hinkle's motion, incorporating by reference two of Cadle's answers to Hinkle's interrogatories. The trial court struck Taber's affidavit insofar as it offered expert opinion and then concluded that [u]nrebutted expert legal opinion established that Hinkle's fees were reasonable. The trial court apparently believed that expert testimony was necessary to raise an issue of fact as to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of an attorney's fee. Consequently, not only did it refuse to consider Taber's affidavit insofar as it purported to express expert opinion, but it also refused to consider the affidavit and the answers to interrogatories attached to it as nonexpert testimonial and documentary evidence. The trial court erred to the extent it believed expert testimony is always necessary to create a genuine issue of fact concerning the reasonableness of attorney's fees. As a general rule,  any one sufficiently familiar with the commercial value of services may testify to the value of those services. 3 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 715, at 52 (rev. ed. 1970); see also 2 Stuart M. Speiser, Attorneys' Fees § 18:14 (1973) (testimony of expert witness is generally not essential on question of value of legal services). When the issue concerns the value of professional services, such as legal services, some courts hold that only a member of the particular profession is sufficiently familiar; other courts disagree. Wigmore, supra, § 715, at 52. Taber was sufficiently familiar with the commercial value of Hinkle's legal services to testify on the alleged unreasonableness of Hinkle's charges. As noted, Taber is the Vice President and General Counsel of Cadle. Taber testified in his affidavit that since 1989 he had reviewed invoices from approximately 100 outside counsel for Cadle, including four New Mexico firms (excluding Hinkle). He also stated that he was familiar with Hinkle's representation of Cadle and had reviewed Hinkle's invoices. This knowledge made Taber qualified to testify as to the unreasonableness of the fees, notwithstanding the trial court's finding that Taber was not competent to offer expert testimony. We further hold that Taber's affidavit, when considered with the answers to interrogatories, rebutted Hinkle's prima facie case and raised a genuine issue of fact on the reasonableness of the fees. The answers to interrogatories identified the specific charges that Cadle found objectionable and gave various reasons why Cadle objected to those charges. These objections were sufficiently detailed to raise a question of fact concerning the reasonableness of Hinkle's fees. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Hinkle on its complaint.