Opinion ID: 3035332
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent

Text: Tyree claims the police failed to scrupulously honor his invocation of the right to remain silent after he said that he did not want to answer further questions. The Supreme Court has held that once a defendant in custody invokes the right to remain silent, police 6 officers must “scrupulously honor[]” that request. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). In the context of an accused invoking the right to counsel, police must stop questioning only where s/he unambiguously invokes that right; “if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). The inquiry is an objective one. See id. After waiving his Miranda rights before Ryan, Tyree admitted his involvement in the bank robbery but repeatedly stated that it was not his idea and that he did not want to “snitch.” App. at 191. He ultimately disclosed the name of his accomplice, where the BB gun used in the robbery could be found, and what he did with his share of the money. After this line of questioning, Tyree was asked about other robberies, including the Dunkin’ Donuts robbery, and this exchange ensued: [Ryan:] We would like to talk to you about the robbery at 12th Street Market. [Tyree:] That wasn’t me – that wasn’t me. [Ryan:] Who was it? [Tyree:] I already went through this – it was not me – I gave my own name out. I don’t want people thinking I put their name out. .... [Ryan:] Dunkin Donuts? No one got killed in that either – did you intend to hurt anyone in that one? [Tyree:] I told you I didn’t even want to do none of this at all. Supp. App. at 10. Tyree claims this last statement was an invocation of his right to 7 remain silent; Ryan testified that he understood it to refer “to him not wanting to be the rat, not wanting to be the snitch, not wanting to talk about the other people involved in these robberies with him.” App. at 206. The District Court found that Tyree’s statement was ambiguous, and thus was not a clear invocation of his right to remain silent. Although the Davis requirement of unambiguity applies expressly to the right to counsel, “every circuit that has squarely addressed the issue has applied the same standard to the right to remain silent.” App. at 12 n.5 (citing Bui v. DiPaolo, 170 F.3d 232, 239 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing cases)). See, e.g., United States v. Hurst, 228 F.3d 751, 759-60 (6th Cir. 2000); Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1100-01 (11th Cir. 1995). The other circuits have left the issue open, see, e.g., James v. Marshall, 322 F.3d 103, 108 (1st Cir. 2003); Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588, 594 n.5 (5th Cir. 2002), but none has held, as Tyree argues, that the test is “whether a reasonable officer would have felt the need to clarify whether the suspect was invoking his right to remain silent.” Appellant’s Br. at 33-34. We conclude that Tyree’s statement, considered in context, “did not constitute even an equivocal invocation of his right to remain silent,” United States v. Ramirez, 79 F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir. 1996), and thus we need not decide whether the Davis standard applies. Assuming, however, that it does apply to the right to remain silent, Tyree’s statement, viewed in context, “did not require the cessation of questioning since his silence certainly did not constitute a ‘clear[ ]’ request that all further questioning cease.” Id. 8