Opinion ID: 402379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Object of the Conspiracy

Text: 12 Dr. Albert also claims that the conspiracy conviction cannot stand because the object of the alleged conspiracy was improperly defined. This argument proceeds in several different disguises, but we find them all to be transparent and the argument to be correspondingly without merit. In essence, Dr. Albert argues that laypersons such as the Francises cannot conspire to dispense drugs illegally, since the law against dispensing applies only to medical practitioners. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(10) (1981); 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a)(19). 6 13 The essence of Dr. Albert's argument misses the point that (a) person may be guilty of conspiring, although incapable of committing the substantive offense. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 86, 35 S.Ct. 682, 684, 59 L.Ed. 1211 (1915). Thus, the Francises need not themselves be able to dispense drugs. Rather, they must only have knowingly participate(d) in a conspiracy with Dr. Albert, a licensed physician, to dispense controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). United States v. Hicks, 529 F.2d 841, 844 (5th Cir. 1976). This the evidence shows. See part II, supra. 14 Accordingly, we find no error in the indictment's failure to allege that the Francises were dispensers. The indictment did allege that Dr. Albert was a dispenser and the Francises were coconspirators; this is all that a charge of conspiracy to dispense requires. Likewise, the indictment gave Dr. Albert notice of the charge against him-a conspiracy whose object was to dispense controlled substances unlawfully. A conspiracy to dispense simply does not depend on the coconspirators' ability to dispense or distribute the drugs beyond the physician's initial dispensation, and the indictment need not allege it. 7 Finally, the jury instruction on conspiracy adequately conveyed the requirement that the coconspirators must know of the conspiracy's unlawful object. The instruction required the jury to find that Dr. Albert and the Francises came to a mutual understanding to try to establish a common and unlawful plan as charged in the Indictment, and the indictment in turn charged a conspiratorial plan to dispense drugs unlawfully. Thus, the jury properly had to find that the Francises knowingly conspired with a medical practitioner to dispense drugs not in the course of professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose. As shown above, the evidence clearly supports such a finding. We therefore reverse the trial court's grant of the motion for acquittal and reinstate the verdict of the jury. 15 REVERSED.