Opinion ID: 1309652
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: hearing of june 21, 1974

Text: The action was brought by the State, so it had the burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the children were deprived. Sec. 27-20-29(3), N.D. C.C. The State's evidence consisted largely of the testimony of Paul Ellingson, the social worker who had filed the petition. It related to the period of time after the divorce when the mother was having emotional problems. He said that he, as her case worker, had not seen her actually having problems with taking care of the children; that he had seen her once when she got extremely upset with the children and . . . yelled; and that she told him about an incident when she was angry and spanked the little girl and that she had felt let's say, out of control. He also stated that the child was not bruised and that the information had been volunteered by the mother. He also testified to another incident when he visited the mother and told her that the father and his fiancee were looking around checking into seeing if they could possible get the children from her. Upon hearing this news, she got extremely upset and immediately ran for a bottle of pills . . . and started heading out the door for the car. The pills were tranquilizers. Later, she told Ellingson that she had attempted suicide. It apparently was these incidents which led to the commitment hearing and subsequent hospitalization. A Bismarck psychiatrist examined her and recommended approximately two months' therapy. Apparently these facts motivated Ellingson to file the deprivation petition. On cross-examination, Ellingson admitted that he knew of no occurrences when the children were not properly cared for other than the spanking incident and the suicide reference described above. He said that the children had never been left without proper food, clothing, or shelter, that the children and their mother displayed affection for each other, that the children appeared to be developing normally in every respect, and that the only reason he had petitioned the court for a finding of deprivation was the mental condition of the mother after her divorce. He was asked: Was there any indication that these children were deprived children, without parental care and proper control, prior to the indication that [the mother] was mentally ill? He answered: Not physically, no, and if emotionally, I had not noticed it. A neighbor testified that prior to the hospitalization the mother had made suicidal statements and once said she would like to see the children dead along with herself. The father, who has never asked the court to modify the divorce decree giving custody to the wife, testified that he was currently living with his fiancee who was obtaining a divorce in another State. He expressed his intention to marry her and set up a home suitable for the children in the event he should obtain custody. The foregoing is substantially all the evidence on the issue of deprivation before the trial court. The mother's attorney moved for a dismissal of the proceedings on the ground that the evidence of deprivation was inadequate to sustain the finding that the children were deprived, and he pointed out that apparently the disability of the mother would be of short duration, not more than two months if she sought proper treatment. The court denied the motion and held that the facts established deprivation by clear and convincing evidence. Although the point is not clearly before us, because in oral argument counsel for appellant conceded that the present appeal is only from the trial court's finding of deprivation at the second and third hearings, we note that this court held in In re J. V., 185 N.W.2d 487 (N.D.1971), where the mother was suffering from emotional stress, the child was placed in a licensed foster home selected by the county welfare board under a juvenile court order, and there was no evidence of a lack of proper care in the foster home, that the evidence did not support a finding of deprivation. The J. V. case concerned a final order of termination of parental rights, but it is analogous to the facts before us here because in both cases the mother was faced with losing custody of her children to another party. The present case is very nearly identical factually to In re J. V. It is uncontroverted that the mother's absence from the home was beyond her control, and yet it is her absence which the agency contends deprives her children of proper parental control under the section defining deprivation. If we were to agree to this proposition, we might be discouraging divorced custodial parents suffering from emotional disturbances in the aftermath of divorce from seeking treatment for fear they might lose custody of children either to the other parent or to a welfare agency. During the dispositional portion of the hearing, the trial court noted that it would review its findings in three months and instructed the mother to complete her therapy and admonished the father to straighten out his tangled housing situation with his fiancee. The court then ordered temporary placement of the children with the paternal grandparents.