Opinion ID: 766623
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Passing Score Standards

Text: The Uniform Guidelines provide: 134 Where cutoff scores are used, they should normally be set so as to be reasonable and consistent with normal expectations of acceptable proficiency within the work force. 29 C.F.R.S 1607.5(H). We have previously applied that standard in our own cases. See, e.g., Craig, 626 F.2d at 6655 (upholding a passing score cutoff as reasonable and consistent with normal expectations of performance in the . . . program). 135 Courts reviewing cutoff scores on exams with a disparate impact frequently quote from a thorough discussion that appears in the Second Circuit's decision in Guardians Ass'n of New York City Police Dept., Inc. v. Civil Service Commission of City of New York, 630 F.2d 79, 105 (2d Cir. 1980): 136 When a cutoff score unrelated to job performance produces disparate racial results, Title VII is violated. Consequently, there should generally be some independent basis for choosing the cutoff . . . .[A] criterion-related study is not necessarily required; the employer might establish a valid cutoff score by using a professional estimate of the requisite ability levels, or, at the very least, by analyzing the test results to locate a logical break-point in the distribution of scores. 137 (internal citations omitted). 138 In Guardians, the Second Circuit rejected a cutoff score when the employermerely chose as many candidates as it needed, and then set the cutoff score so that the remaining candidates would fail. Id. The cutoff was derived solely from the employer's staffing needs, without any reference to the job requirements. 139 Plaintiffs allege that the District Court erred in upholding a twelve-of-sixteen cutoff score on the reading component of the CBEST when an empirical study demonstrates that the proper, job-related passing score on the CBEST writing subtest is nine or ten. 140 The District Court concluded that the passing scores on the CBEST reflect reasonable judgments about the minimum level of basic skills competence that should be required of teachers. AMAE II, 937 F. Supp. at 1420. The District Court described in detail the process used to develop passing score cutoffs for the original CBEST. The District Court found that then-California Superintendent of Education Bill Honig, who had the ultimate responsibility for setting the score cutoffs, had before him the results of the Wheeler and Elias study, the results of the field test, and the recommendations of the [Commission] and the [CBEST] Advisory Board. Id. at 1421. 141 Superintendent Honig testified that he did consider both the results of the Wheeler and Elias study and the [Commission]'s advice when he made his decision, though he ultimately disagreed with both recommendations. Id. at 1422. The data show that almost twenty percent of educators polled either thought a score of eleven-out-of-sixteen was not passing or were not certain. The Superintendent located a logical breaking point based upon professional estimates when he established the bottom passing score at twelve out of sixteen instead, which all readers agreed was a passing score. In the terminology of Guardians, the Superintendent concluded that twelve of sixteen was a logical break point.  As such, District Court did not clearly err in finding Superintendent Honig's score cutoffs were reasonable. 142 E. The District Court's Appointment of a Technical Advisor 143 Plaintiffs claim that the trial court's rulings were procedurally tainted by the unreported influence of Dr. Stephen Klein, a RAND Corporation scientist who advised the District Court through exparte communications with the judge but was not appointed by the court as an expert witness, was not subject to cross-examination, and did not supply an expert's report. 144 According to the Order Appointing Technical Advisor, the District Court appointed Dr. Klein as a technical advisor, not as an expert witness. Courts have inherent authority to appoint technical advisors, although such appointments should be the exception and not the rule, and should be reserved for truly extraordinary cases where the introduction of outside skills and expertise, not possess by the judge, will hasten . . . just adjudication. Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 156 (1st Cir. 1988). Recently, in General Electric Co. v. Joiner, Justice Breyer wrote separately to endorse such a practice: 145 I therefore want specially to note that, as cases presenting significant science-related issues have increased in number . . . judges have increasingly found in the Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure ways to help them overcome the inherent difficulty of making determinations about complicated scientific or otherwise technical evidence. Among these techniques are . . . the appointment of special masters and specially trained law clerks. 146 118 S.Ct. 512, 520 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring). 147 This case involves the highly technical field of psychometrics, and presents problems of unusual complexity beyond the normal questions of fact and law with which judges routinely grapple. Under the approach identified by Justice Breyerand applied by the First Circuit in Reilley, this case is a fitting case for the use of a technical advisor. The District Court invited the parties to object to Dr. Klein's appointment and plaintiffs did not do so. 148 The District Court advised the parties that, consistent with its usual practice, it expected to put Dr. Klein on the stand towards the end of the trial, ask him his views, and permit the parties to cross-examine him. Had the District Court done so, Dr. Klein would have become an expert witness and his testimony would therefore have become a part of the evidence considered by the Court in its role as the finder of fact. In addition, under Fed. R. Evid. 706(a), the parties could have cross-examined Dr. Klein as a matter of right to test this evidence. 149 However, the District Court did not call Dr. Klein, and there is no evidence that the District Court relied on Dr. Klein's opinions as a source of evidence. To the extent that the District Court relied on Dr. Klein to assist the Court in understanding the evidence submitted by the parties, Dr. Klein remained within the role of a technical advisor as defined in Reilly, similar to the role of a specialized law clerk. 31 Because Rule 706 does not apply to technical advisors, Reilly, 863 F.2d at 155, the District Court no more erred in refusing cross examination of Dr. Klein than it would have erred in refusing cross examination of its law clerks. Likewise, the District Court did not err in not requiring that Dr. Klein furnish an expert's report. 150 F. The District Court's Denial of Costs to the Defendants 151 1. This Court Reviews the Denial of Costs For An Abuse of Discretion 152 Pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, costs shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party unless the court directs otherwise.  F.R.C.P. 54(d)(1). Rule 54 thus creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to the prevailing party. National Info. Servs., Inc. v. TRW, 51 F.3d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1996). The District Court's denial of costs is reviewed by this Court for an abuse of discretion. United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., 171 F.3d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 1999). 153 2. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Entirely Denied Costs to the Defendants 154 Although the decision to award costs resides within the discretion of the district court, a court generally must award costs unless the prevailing party is guilty of some fault, misconduct, or default worthy of punishment. National Info. Servs., 51 F.3d at 1472. 155 In this case, the District Court explicitly found that the Defendants had not committed any misconduct that would require a denial of costs. Order filed Feb. 12, 1997 at P2 (Order). Nevertheless, the District Court observed that our holding that a court generally must award costs implied that there were exceptional cases in which the court might deny costs. Id. (Emphasis added in original Order). In this case, the District Court found that the suit involved an issue of substantial public importance, that the issues were reasonably close and difficult, and that there was some merit to the Plaintiffs' case. Order, PP 3-4, 6-7. The District Court also noted the substantial disparity of resources between the resources of the parties. Order, P 5 (citing National Org. for Woman v. Bank of California, 680 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982) and Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 478 (9th Cir. 1983)). On this basis, the District Court concluded that it was withinits discretion to completely deny costs to Defendants, and thereupon did so. Order, P 8. 156 We agree with the District Court that our precedent allows a court to consider the limited resources of a Title VII plaintiff when assessing costs. Moore, 708 F.2d at 478; Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hosp., Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1358 (9th Cir. 1984). However, these precedents must be read in light of our more recent decision in National Info. Servs. We held in National Info. Servs. that the denial of costs is by nature a penalty, 51 F.3d at 1472, and that such punitive measures cannot be imposed absent wrong-doing because a district court cannot punish a party by denying costs unless the party has done something to deserve it. Id. Congress has included nothing in the language of Title VII that would justify the imposition of such a penalty on an exonerated defendant. As a consequence, we conclude that a court may consider the limited resources of a Title VII plaintiff, but may not entirely deny costs to a prevailing defendant as a result. 157 We also conclude that there is no exception to Rule 54(d) that entitles a court to punish a defendant simply because the case involves an issue of national importance. The District Court relied heavily upon a sliver of language contained in two Seventh Circuit cases, which both mentioned landmark cases of national importance. Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Colbert, 692 F.2d 489, 490 (7th Cir. 1982) and Popeil Bros., Inc. v. Schick Elec., Inc., 516 F.2d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 1975). However, neither case suggested that an exception to Rule 54(d) in fact existed for landmark cases; rather, both cases expressly declined to consider the possibility of such an exception because neither case could have been considered a landmark case of national importance. Delta Airlines, 692 F.2d at 490; Popeil Bros., 516 at. 776. One could not even characterize as dicta the Seventh Circuit's position on this point, because the Seventh Circuit simply has not expressed any opinion. Turning to our own cases and to the text of Rule 54(d), we find nothing that would support such an exception, and we explicitly hold today that there is no such general exception to Rule 54(d) beyond the exception for civil rights plaintiffs. 32 158 Turning to the District Court's remaining grounds for the denial of costs, we observe that National Info. Servs. specifically rejected the denial of costs on the basis that the plaintiff's position had  `merit.'  National Info. Servs., 51 F.3d at 1471. It also specifically held that  `difficulty' alone does not justify penalizing the prevailing parties. Id. at 1473. These factors should not be considered in the assessment of costs and it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to consider those factors. 159 Finally, none of the precedents relied upon by the District Court involved thecomplete denial of costs to a prevailing party, 33 and to the extent that they might suggest a complete denial of costs, such a suggestion would not survive our holding in National Info. Servs. As with the defendants in National Info. Servs., there is no impropriety on the part of the defendants in this case that would justify denying them their due costs under Rule 54(d)(1). Id. We therefore remand the case to the District Court for a determination of the proper costs.