Opinion ID: 799756
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a prisoner's complaint during the screening process conducted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir.2009). Applying the same standard used for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, we construe the complaint in a light most favorable to Gomez and accept all wellpled factual allegations as true. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir.2011). Gomez's complaint asserts three claims for relief and we address each one in turn.
Gomez's first claim alleges that the unidentified corrections officer who fired two rounds from a shotgun into the inmate population used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The district court held that this claim was barred by the statute of limitations because Gomez failed to identify the unknown officer before the statute of limitations ran on May 16, 2011, exactly two years after Gomez's injury occurred. [1] Although the district court correctly noted that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim in Illinois is two years, see Dominguez v. Hendley, 545 F.3d 585, 588 (7th Cir.2008), it failed to recognize that the limitations period is tolled while a prisoner completes the administrative grievance process. Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir. 2008). In this case, Gomez filed his emergency grievance on May 16, 2009. Thus, the statute of limitations was tolled from that date until the grievance process was complete. Unfortunately, we cannot ascertain this latter date because Gomez no longer has a copy of the Administrative Review Board's final decision. Because of this uncertainty, the district court erred in dismissing Gomez's excessive force claim as untimely. Moreover, we believe Gomez's complaint properly states a claim for relief. [W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is. . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). Thus, a § 1983 plaintiff must establish that prison officials acted wantonly; negligence or gross negligence is not enough. Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1065 (7th Cir.2005). In this case, Gomez alleged that the unidentified officer on the catwalk fired two shotgun rounds at inmates who were not involved in the fight and located four cells away. In addition, Gomez asserts that the two inmates involved in the fight were unarmed and Dunlap and Palmer were able to break up the fight. Construing Gomez's pro se complaint liberally, there are enough factual allegations to infer that the unidentified officer acted maliciously in using deadly force against inmates who were not involved in the ongoing altercation. Accordingly, this claim was prematurely dismissed.
Next, Gomez asserts that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed this claim for three reasons: (1) Gomez's allegations were insufficient to meet the standard set forth in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); (2) none of the named defendants were involved in Gomez's injuries; and (3) any claim against an unnamed defendant was barred by the statute of limitations. As explained in the previous section, we reject the district court's statute of limitations rationale. A prisoner's claim for deliberate indifference must establish (1) an objectively serious medical condition; and (2) an official's deliberate indifference to that condition. Arnett, 658 F.3d at 750. Deliberate indifference is proven by demonstrating that a prison official knows of a substantial risk of harm to an inmate and either acts or fails to act in disregard of that risk. Id. at 751. Delaying treatment may constitute deliberate indifference if such delay exacerbated the injury or unnecessarily prolonged an inmate's pain. McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir.2010) ( citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05, 97 S.Ct. 285). Even a few days' delay in addressing a severely painful but readily treatable condition suffices to state a claim of deliberate indifference. Smith v. Knox Cnty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir.2012). We find that, at this early stage in the proceedings, Gomez's complaint asserts sufficient factual allegations to state a claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment and Estelle. First, Gomez has sufficiently pled that he was suffering from an objectively serious medical condition. A medical need is considered sufficiently serious if the inmate's condition has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or is so obvious that even a lay person would perceive the need for a doctor's attention. Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks and punctuation omitted). The medical condition need not be life-threatening; it could be a condition that would result in further significant injury or unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain if not treated. Id. ( quoting Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir.2010)). Here, Gomez alleges he suffered a shotgun wound and shortly thereafter experienced excessive bruising and bleeding around the wound. Gomez asserts that he was in pain and believed the wound was becoming infected. In addition, Dunlap, Palmer, and the medical technician all believed Gomez needed treatment shortly following his injury. This is enough to plead a serious medical need. Gomez has also sufficiently alleged deliberate indifference, at least with respect to the unknown medical technician and Sergeant Palmer. The medical technician told Gomez that she would bring him medical supplies to treat his injury, but he never received these supplies. Palmer became aware of Gomez's injury while he was on rounds and, although he agreed to check on Gomez's medical supplies, there is no evidence that he carried out that promise. Thus, despite these officials' knowledge of his injuries, Gomez did not receive treatment until four days later. And even though this delay did not exacerbate Gomez's injury, he experienced prolonged, unnecessary pain as a result of a readily treatable condition. See Smith, 666 F.3d at 1040. We have previously upheld similar claims for relief. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 832 (7th Cir.2009) (prisoner complaining of severe pain from his IV was not treated for four days); Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 830 (7th Cir.2007) (prisoner who dislocated his finger was not treated for two days); Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 916-17 (7th Cir.1996) (prisoners beaten and maced by prison guards were not treated until the following day). At this stage in the proceedings, Gomez has alleged enough to establish deliberate indifference as to Palmer and the unknown medical technician. Accordingly, this claim was also prematurely dismissed. Any claim against Corrections Officer Dunlap, however, was properly dismissed. After Dunlap first became aware of Gomez's injury, he returned approximately five minutes later with a medical technician. When the medical technician requested to take Gomez to the health care unit, Dunlap refused because the prison was on lockdown. The medical technician, in Dunlap's presence, assured Gomez that she would bring medical supplies to his cell. Dunlap and the medical technician then left the area together. These allegations do not establish that Dunlap acted or failed to act in disregard to Gomez's injury. Everything in Gomez's complaint indicates that Dunlap was not deliberately indifferent to Gomez's serious medical needs. Thus, the deliberate indifference claim against Dunlap was properly dismissed and Dunlap should no longer be a party to this case.
Finally, Gomez asserts a claim of retaliation in violation of his First Amendment right to use the prison grievance system. The district court failed to address this claim entirely in its opinion dismissing Gomez's complaint. Again, we find that Gomez's complaint properly states a claim for relief. To prevail on his First Amendment retaliation claim, Gomez must show that (1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was `at least a motivating factor' in the Defendants' decision to take the retaliatory action. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir.2009) ( quoting Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir.2008)). Gomez easily satisfies all three prongs at the pleading stage. First, Gomez alleges that he used the prison's grievance system to address his injury and the lack of treatment he received following his injury. A prisoner has a First Amendment right to make grievances about conditions of confinement. Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791, 798 (7th Cir.2010). In addition, Gomez suffered a deprivation when he was transferred from Stateville to Menard, where he had known enemies. [A]n act in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under Section 1983 even if the act, when taken for different reasons, would have been proper. Howland v. Kilquist, 833 F.2d 639, 644 (7th Cir.1987). Moreover, it can be inferred that this punishment would likely deter future First Amendment activity. Finally, Gomez alleges that the IA investigator, sent to intimidate him by IDOC Director Randle, threatened Gomez with a transfer to Menard. Even after Gomez indicated that he would no longer pursue his grievance or file a lawsuit if he could stay at Stateville, he was told it was too late. No other explanation for Gomez's transfer is available at this early stage in the proceedings. Thus, we conclude from Gomez's complaint that his grievance was a motivating factor in the defendants' decision to transfer him to Menard. Because Gomez properly asserted a claim for retaliation, his complaint was prematurely dismissed.