Opinion ID: 1763575
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Biting Incident

Text: Ohnstad contends that the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding the biting incident which occurred on November 1, 1982, in direct defiance of our decision in State v. Stevens, 238 N.W.2d 251, 257-59 (N.D.1975), and Rule 404(b), N.D.R.Ev. Rule 404(b), N.D.R.Ev., reads as follows: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. However, it may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Rule 404(b) is basically a formal recitation of the prior existing rule we discussed in State v. Stevens, supra, at 257, that evidence of prior acts or crimes cannot be received as evidence unless it is substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show a probability that a defendant committed a crime charged because he is a man of criminal character. State v. Forsland, 326 N.W.2d 688, 691-92 (N.D.1982). In Stevens, the defendant was convicted of causing the death of a two-year-old child by beating. The evidence was circumstantial. It consisted of evidence as to the injuries from which the child died, a showing that the injuries could have occurred during an eight-hour period when the defendant had charge of the child and three other children, and that the child had suffered prior injuries during other periods of time when the defendant was present and the mother of the child was not. The State, however, also presented evidence of prior injuries which occurred when the defendant was not present and presented opinions of physicians that the fatal injuries were not accidental, based in part upon evidence of all the injuries received, including those not attributable to the defendant. We concluded in Stevens, after balancing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect, that evidence of those prior injuries to the decedent were not sufficiently connected to the defendant and should not have been offered or received into evidence for any purpose. Our reasons for concluding so were that most of the evidence of prior injuries was really evidence of injuries which individually might have been accidental or might have been caused by other persons, no direct evidence existed that the defendant had ever struck or abused the decedent or any other child, and, the evidence was such that the mother, just as well as the defendant, could have been charged with the crime. We said: If there were any substantial evidence that the defendant had exhibited a tendency toward child abuse, or if there were any direct evidence of his commission either of the act charged or of his having caused the prior injuries intentionally, or even if he were the only logical suspect, we might be more inclined to uphold the verdict, .... As the evidence stands, we cannot. Stevens, supra, at 259. Ohnstad's admission that she bit Shannon on the cheek certainly satisfies the requirement adopted in Stevens that evidence of the prior act be substantial or clear and convincing. Id. at 257. Ohnstad also relies on Stevens in arguing that the biting incident was the only evidence presented by the State which tended to prove the culpability requirement and therefore no independent evidence existed that Ohnstad culpably committed the alleged act. In Stevens, we said that before other crimes or acts evidence may be considered at all, there must be proof of commission of the crime charged. Id. In discussing this requirement we said: The jury was correctly instructed on this point by the court's giving of an instruction adapted from the second paragraph of North Dakota Jury Instruction 1316, as follows: `Evidence of other acts of a like nature cannot be considered for any purpose, unless you first find that other evidence in the case, standing alone, establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the particular act charged in the Information.'  Id. [Emphasis added.] Thus, there must be proof of the commission of the particular act charged; i.e., in this case that Ohnstad caused the death of another human being. If such evidence exists, then the prior crimes, wrongs, or acts may be considered for the purpose for which they are admissible under Rule 404(b). There is no doubt that this requirement serves to insure that prior crimes, wrongs, or acts are not used to show that a person of certain character has acted in conformity with that character, by first requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the particular act charged. We believe, as our resolution of the first issue indicates, that the State presented sufficient independent circumstantial evidence to prove that Ohnstad caused the death of Shannon. In State v. Forsland, 326 N.W.2d 688, 692 n. 3 (N.D.1982), we quoted favorably, from 2 Weinstein's Evidence, ¶ 404[08], p. 404-49, a procedure which we believed would eliminate or substantially reduce difficulties in applying Rule 404(b): `Rule 404(b) is a specialized rule of relevancy. Accordingly, as with any determination pursuant to Rule 401, counsel must be prepared to 1) identify the consequential fact to which the proffered evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is directed ..., 2) prove the other crimes, wrongs or acts ..., and 3) articulate precisely the evidential hypothesis by which the consequential fact may be inferred from the proffered evidence .... Evidence which passes muster up to this point must, in addition, satisfy the balancing test imposed by Rule 403 which requires the probative value of the other crimes evidence to outweigh the harmful consequences that might flow from its admission....' At trial the State's attorney argued to the trial court as follows: MR. HOY: ... The defense viewpoint is this was purely an accident. The State's viewpoint is that it's not, that she did something to abuse and beat and hurt and injure this child. And the fact that that is our allegation, this prior biting the child out of her frustration and loss of patience with this child shows that it was no accident on this occasion. It shows her motive for causing the injury, being her frustration and lack of patience with the child. It in general terms conveys the intent necessary for this crime, that is, negligence or reckless conduct involved. The trial court determined that evidence of the biting incident goes to the other purposes [articulated in Rule 404(b)] that are admissible. In concluding that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the court noted that the biting incident occurred in a short period of time from 10 days that the child was in the home. We do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the biting incident, which occurred just two days prior to the alleged offense. Ohnstad was charged, in part, with the crime of manslaughter under Section 12.1-16-02(1), N.D.C.C., to which `there must be a substantial and unjustifiable risk of homicide to establish recklessness, and the risk must be perceived and ignored by the actor.' State v. Trieb, supra [quoting ALI Model Penal Code and Commentaries, supra, § 210.3(1)(a), at 51]. The admissibility of evidence of other acts to establish intent and absence of mistake or accident is well established in child abuse cases. State v. Holland, 346 N.W.2d 302, 309 (S.D.1984) [In prosecution for second-degree murder and manslaughter of child, trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of prior abusive acts of defendant because evidence was directed at whether the child's injuries could happen by accident, as maintained by the defendant, and whether or not the defendant could be identified as one who may have harmed the child.]; United States v. Harris, 661 F.2d 138, 142 (10th Cir.1981) [Where father accused of murdering eight-year-old son claimed the fatal injuries occurred because he tripped while carrying the child on his shoulders, evidence of many bone fractures sustained by the child two to three months before were admissible, because particularly in child abuse cases the admissibility of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to establish intent and an absence of mistake or accident is well established, citing United States v. Colvin, 614 F.2d 44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945, 100 S.Ct. 2174, 64 L.Ed.2d 802 (1980); United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 979, 94 S.Ct. 1566, 39 L.Ed.2d 875 (1974)]. See United States v. Grady, 481 F.2d 1106 (D.C.Cir.1973).