Opinion ID: 2295717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellee Copley Press, Inc.

Text: Appellant argues, as he did in this Statement of Genuine Issues filed in opposition to Copley's motion for summary judgment, that the pretrial record in this case demonstrates the existence of several factual issues regarding Copley's actual malice in syndication of the de Toledano column. He does not directly dispute any of appellee Copley's statement of facts but rather asserts that a chain of permissible inferences of actual malice may be drawn from the asserted facts. Appellant first contends that a factual controversy exists as to whether Copley had obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of appellee de Toledano as a journalist. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 732, 88 S.Ct. at 1326. Appellant designates two factual bases in support of this contention: (1) Copley editor Donald Charles Ohl's deposition statement that de Toledano was known to him as an experienced journalist and a generally reliable columnist despite his admission that he had never read any of de Toledano's publications and had never met, spoken to, or corresponded with him before Copley's syndication of de Toledano's columns; and (2) Ohl's rejection of a few columns submitted by de Toledano for syndication prior to the January 1975 publication here at issue. From these facts, appellant suggests, a jury could infer that Copley had no knowledge of de Toledano's reliability as a journalist, and therefore published the allegedly libelous column with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. In January 1975, when the de Toledano column at issue was published, Ohl had editorial responsibility at Copley for news reports, features, editorials, and columns. He was the Copley employee charged with primary editorial responsibility for the de Toledano column. Ohl said that even though he did not recall having actually read of any of de Toledano's columns or books himself, he had heard of de Toledano and had seen his column printed in The San Diego Sun (a Copley-owned newspaper) prior to Copley's syndication of his columns. Although he did not personally contract on behalf of Copley with de Toledano for syndication of his column, Ohl stated he knew that at the time of the Copley-de Toledano agreement, de Toledano was regarded by Copley Press as a well-known author, reporter, and syndicated columnist. [12] According to Ohl, the fact that a total of 80 newspapers were subscribing to de Toledano's columns at the time Copley commenced syndication of the column provided a substantial indication to Copley that de Toledano was generally regarded as a good, solid factual columnist who was trusted by newspapers. [13] Ohl further stated that he personally shared Copley's opinion that de Toledano had a good reputation for truth and accuracy in the newspaper industry because of his large following among newspaper editors, whom Ohl had found during his 25 years of experience as a reporter, correspondent, and editor to be tough judges of truth and accuracy. Ohl's personal experience as editor of de Toledano's column reinforced his initial impression in this regard. During the six months of Copley's syndication of de Toledano's columns before the publication of the statement at issue in this case ( i. e., from July 1974 until January 1975), Ohl reviewed dozens of his columns. The columns provided by de Toledano never gave him any reason to doubt their truth or veracity; to the contrary, he found them to be generally reliable, and approved them for publication with only minor technical changes ( e. g., spelling, grammar, etc.). On the few occasions when he rejected de Toledano's submissions (perhaps as many as four, he recalled), Ohl explained he did so because he felt the quality of the writing was inferior or the subject matter discussed was irrelevant because it was outdated. In a couple of instances, Ohl insisted that changes be made in columns in which de Toledano criticized specific newspapers or journalists because he deemed it inappropriate to single out individual press members as targets of criticism. In those situations, Ohl stated the columns were not totally rejected, but were instead edited to reflect criticism of the press on a more generalized basis. Copley Vice-President and Editor John Pinkerman, a veteran journalist of 43 years, also stated by affidavit that he found de Toledano columns transmitted to Copley to be truthful and accurate in their reportage of facts and events, and that he had never received any complaints regarding the veracity of any of the de Toledano materials distributed by Copley prior to the initiation of the instant action. Appellant produced no evidence to demonstrate that Ohl, Pinkerman, or any other Copley employee had reason to doubt de Toledano's general accuracy or veracity as a journalist, or that Copley has found any de Toledano column submitted to it objectionable because of its inaccuracy or sheer falsity. Nor does appellant assert that any such evidence would be forthcoming in the event of trial. Appellant's contention that Copley knew nothing about de Toledano's reliability when it published the disputed column is thus without support in the record before the court. Contrary to appellant's assertion in this regard, the record establishes an unrebutted factual basis for Copley's belief as to de Toledano's general accuracy and reliability. Appellant has adduced nothing to show that the indicia of reliability on which Copley relied in formulating its opinion as to de Toledano's journalistic integrity were inherently incredible or even unreasonable. As the trial court correctly pointed out in its order granting summary judgment for Copley, viewing the evidence most favorable to appellant, the most that a jury could reasonably infer from these facts was that Copley lacked extensive first-hand knowledge about de Toledano's reliability at the time it agreed to distribute his column, and had only a limited opportunity to assess his accuracy as a columnist thereafter ( i. e., before January 1975). These inferences provide inadequate support for a finding of actual malice based on a publisher's lack of a rational basis for a belief in the journalist's reliability. Moreover, even assuming that the record would permit a jury to infer that Copley knew nothing about de Toledano's general reliability, and therefore published without reliance thereon, such an inference would afford an insufficient evidentiary basis for a conclusion of actual malice. A similar contention was rejected by the Keogh court's holding that a publisher has cause to suspect an article's accuracy where its author has proven himself to be persistently inaccurate. Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 125 U.S.App.D.C. at 38 & n.9, 365 F.2d at 971 & n.9. The court in that case declared that proof of isolated instances of inaccuracy in a journalist's work or of a journalist's controversial reputation, even of a reputation for indecency or vulgarity does not establish actual malice. Id. 125 U.S.App.D.C. at 38-39, 365 F.2d at 971-72. In sum, considering the evidence in light of the New York Times actual malice standard, we agree with the trial court that appellant has demonstrated no genuine issue of fact as to whether Copley had reason to doubt de Toledano's veracity. Appellant's next claim is that a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Copley had obvious reasons to doubt . . . the accuracy of the January 1975 de Toledano column. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 732, 88 S.Ct. 1323. Appellant contends that the very nature of de Toledano's statement, charging appellant with distortion and falsification of evidence in order to press an issue, is a sufficient basis for a permissible inference of its publication with reckless disregard of its truth. Appellant maintains that the statement, accusing appellant of a serious breach of honesty and integrity, was of startling nature and was so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have published the statement without independent verification of its accuracy. The inherent character and content of a publication, or the seriousness of a stated charge, is not dispositive of the issue of recklessness with regard to the truth. Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, supra, 125 U.S.App.D.C. at 36-37, 365 F.2d at 969-70. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 287-88, 84 S.Ct. 710. [14] Even if a legal inference of actual malice from the inherent nature of the charge was constitutionally permissible, appellant has adduced no cognizable factual data to buttress his position. Appellant merely asserts that his professional calling requires a high degree of reliability and accuracy and depends largely on his honesty. He fails to demonstrate that he has achieved such an impeccable reputation for truth and accuracy that any suggestion to the contrary must necessarily be of questionable validity. We note that appellant's career as a general public interest advocate has from its inception inspired intense controversy. The iconoclastic nature of many of the viewpoints he has espoused as well as the tactics he has employed have been the target of both high praise and sharp criticism in the arena of public debate. Appellant's assertions that this effectiveness as a public interest advocate requires a reputation for unquestionable integrity are mere conclusory allegations and thus do not qualify as the admissible factual evidence which Rule 56 requires of a party opposing a motion for summary judgment in order to establish a factual dispute. See 10 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2727, at 540. Although they underscore the detrimental impact which a statement such as de Toledano's may have, such contentions in themselves do not establish the inherent improbability of such a statement. We cannot say that the allegedly libelous statement is of such an extraordinary nature that it would suggest to a publisher a high probability of falsity giving rise to a duty of verification. Appellant finally maintains that a factual dispute as to Copley's malicious publication of the disputed column is created by Ohl's review and approval of the report for publication. [15] Ohl stated in his deposition that at the time he edited the January 1975 column, he was aware of the general Nader-GM controversy, and of Senator Ribicoff's distribution of a report regarding the Corvair debate because of the wide press coverage which it had been given. Although he had read news stories based on the report, he did not actually read the report before he approved the de Toledano column for distribution to Copley's subscribers. Nowhere in the press reports concerning the Ribicoff investigation did he read that the Committee found or alleged that Nader had falsified and distorted evidence. Appellant contends that Ohl's failure to read the Ribicoff report referred to in the column and his acceptance of de Toledano's statement  despite the absence of any press statement reporting a Congressional accusation or finding that Nader falsified evidence  demonstrate that there was no factual basis for Ohl's belief in the accuracy of the statement. Had the Congressional subcommittee made such a finding, appellant asserts, it would have been reported extensively in the press; thus, the fact that Ohl had never encountered such a statement in any of the press reports which he read about the investigation should have put him on notice as to the questionable accuracy of the column. A jury could infer from these facts, appellant argues, that Ohl approved the column for syndication with actual knowledge of the falsity of the disputed statement or with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. As Ohl's deposition reflects, his knowledge of the Ribicoff report was derived not from a firsthand reading of the report but from his recollection of press reports contemporaneous with the Congressional study release. He recalled as he reviewed the column that the press reports generally established that some of the charges made against the Corvair by Ralph Nader were not substantiated. He did not remember any reference in any news item relating to, and thus had no knowledge of, the subcommittee's inclusion of a good faith finding as to Nader's allegations against the Corvair, or of any information that tended to cast doubt on the accuracy of the de Toledano column. Ohl stated that his general knowledge of the substance of the press coverage of the report, his opinion as to de Toledano's general reliability for accurate reportage, and his belief that de Toledano's statement was based on a fair interpretation of the report's findings, see Time, Inc. v. Pape, supra , furnished the basis for his belief that the statement had a foundation in fact; he entertained no doubt as to its factual verity. In light of Ohl's deposition testimony, the most favorable inference which can be drawn from appellant's proffered supposition is that Copley was negligent in failing to verify independently the accuracy of de Toledano's statement. However, liability in this instance cannot be predicated upon such investigatory failure. In the absence of an evidentiary showing that a publisher had good reason to suspect its falsity, a statement does not create a duty of inquiry. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 733, 88 S.Ct. 1323; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 287-88, 84 S.Ct. 710; Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, supra, 125 U.S.App.D.C. at 39-40, 365 F.2d at 972-73. As we have stated above, the nature of the statement in this case in itself cannot give rise to an obligation. Furthermore, the statement's facial compatibility with Ohl's prior knowledge of the Congressional Report provided Ohl with a basis for his belief in its accuracy; thus, no duty of verification arose. Lacking any substantial indication of the necessity therefor, Copley's failure of verification forms no basis for a jury finding of actual malice. Any negligence in this regard is constitutionally inadequate to demonstrate the recklessness that will support a finding of actual malice. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 79, 85 S.Ct. 209. In summary, we find that appellant's proof has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to Copley's publication of the de Toledano column with actual malice with the convincing clarity which the New York Times standard demands, and is thus constitutionally deficient. Appellant cannot satisfy his obligation of showing the existence of a factual dispute that will defeat a summary judgment motion simply by merely asserting that a genuine issue of fact exists or by alleging insubstantial legal conclusions. 10 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2727, at 540-42. The inferences which appellant has suggested may permissibly be drawn from the record are insufficient to sustain a conclusion that Copley published the column at issue with a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity, or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 731-32, 88 S.Ct. 1323; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710. Because appellant has failed to demonstrate the existence of a jury triable issue of material fact, as required by New York Times and Super.Ct. Civ.R. 56(c), we hold that summary judgment was properly granted to appellee Copley Press, Inc. and hence affirm the trial court's ruling in this regard. Reversed in part, and affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.