Opinion ID: 1520503
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: the fecal matter

Text: Calhoun opens his brief on this issue by stating: During the sentencing phase of the trial the State introduced evidence regarding an allegation that Mr. Calhoun had sprayed contents of a bottle, apparently containing a mixture of human waste, on a correctional officer. Mr. Calhoun was never tried and convicted of any criminal offense arising from the alleged incident and it was stipulated below that any charges which could have been brought are now barred by the statute of limitations. (Reference to record extract omitted.) [2] This incident and the record pertaining to it is discussed in Calhoun, 297 Md. at 596-601, 468 A.2d at 60-63. The objection made was, It's no relationship to any of the specifications of aggravating circumstances under the circumstances. We pointed out that this was not a general objection and hence under von Lusch v. State, 279 Md. 255, 264, 368 A.2d 468, 473 (1977), the right to challenge the evidence on other grounds was waived. We pointed out that this was not an objection on the grounds subsequently held in Scott v. State, 297 Md. 235, 465 A.2d 1126 (1983), to exclude evidence. We said: In the absence of an objection focusing on the point before the Court in Scott, the evidence here was admissible under Art. 27, § 413(c)(1)(v), which permits introduction of, `Any other evidence that the court deems of probative value and relevant to sentence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any statements.' 297 Md. at 601, 468 A.2d at 62-63. The post-conviction judge indicated that he disagreed with our assessment of the issue. However, he concluded his opinion by saying: As the particular evidence admitted here was highly damaging to the petitioner (very possibly determinative of the ultimate issue) and as the particular evidence was clearly inadmissible in the sentencing hearing had a valid objection been lodged, this court would order the sentencing phase of petitioner's trial stricken but for the holding of a majority of the Court of Appeals that counsel failed to make an effective objection. The determination of the matter by the Court of Appeals is binding on this court. The matter has been finally litigated. This court so holds. This issue has been finally litigated. Hence, under Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27, § 645A(b) it is not subject to further review on post-conviction. However, there is yet additional reason to overrule this point. In Huffington v. State, 304 Md. 559, 500 A.2d 272 (1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 3315, 92 L.Ed.2d 745 (1986), we dealt with the issue of institutional history, which this incident was. We said in Huffington: The section of the presentence investigation report pertaining to institutional history states: `On or about 12/6/83 the defendant, John Norman Huffington was cited for 1) refusing to obey a direct order and 2) creating a security threat. The defendant received ten days in disciplinary isolation for each of those infractions. `Evidently the defendant offered resistance to Deputy Minnick while being searched. As to the second infraction the defendant apparently interfered with the searching of other inmates in the cell block.' 304 Md. at 577, 500 A.2d at 281. We referred to Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 175, 297 A.2d 696 (1972), involving the Maryland death sentence cases remanded to us by the Supreme Court of the United States for reconsideration in the light of its holding in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). We pointed out that in discussing the procedure to be followed by trial judges in resentencing those defendants Chief Judge Murphy said for the Court: [T]o aid the sentencing judge in fairly and intelligently exercising the discretion vested in him, the procedural policy of the State encourages him to consider information concerning the convicted person's reputation, past offenses, health, habits, mental and moral propensities, social background and any other matters that a judge ought to have before him in determining the sentence that should be imposed. Skinker v. State, 239 Md. 234, 210 A.2d 716 (1965); Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 208 A.2d 575 (1965); Costello v. State, 237 Md. 464, 206 A.2d 812 (1965); Driver v. State, [201 Md. 25, 92 A.2d 570 (1952)]; Baker v. State, [3 Md. App. 251, 238 A.2d 561 (1968)]. The sentencing judge may, but need not, obtain a presentence report under Article 41, § 124(b). Of course, the sentencing judge may take into consideration the defendant's conduct after the offense was committed, viz., he may consider evidence of events occurring after the date of the original sentencing to whatever extent he may deem necessary. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949); Purnell v. State, [241 Md. 582, 217 A.2d 298 (1966)]; Gatewood v. State, 15 Md. App. 450, 291 A.2d 688 (1972). 267 Md. at 193-94, 297 A.2d at 706. (Footnotes omitted.) We referred to the more recent case of Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 425 A.2d 632 (1981), where Judge Digges said for the Court: In considering what is proper punishment, it is now well-settled in this State that a judge is not limited to reviewing past conduct whose occurrence has been judicially established, but may view `reliable evidence of conduct which may be opprobrious although not criminal, as well as details and circumstances of criminal conduct for which the person has not been tried.' Henry v. State, 273 Md. 131, 147-48, 328 A.2d 293, 303 (1974). 289 Md. at 481, 425 A.2d at 643. We concluded: We are not concerned here with crimes, as in Scott v. State, 297 Md. 235, 465 A.2d 1126 (1983), with which an accused was charged but had not yet been convicted. We believe that under our prior cases this institutional history was properly admissible. 304 Md. at 578, 500 A.2d at 281. The institutional infraction here was much more serious than that before the Court in Huffington. Huffington is further grounds for its admission.