Opinion ID: 4573020
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: R.C.P. 26(b)(1)(C).

Text: This provision mirrors its federal analog. The commentary to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 reveals that it was “intended to address the problem of ‘disproportionate’ discovery,” meaning that “it was no longer sufficient to show that the proposed discovery was relevant; the court was still required to limit the discovery if it would be unduly burdensome or expensive.” See 1 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and Commentary Rule 26. “The 1983 Committee Note pointed out that courts had long been limiting discovery on these or similar grounds, stating that this ostensibly new power ‘reflect[ed] the existing practice of many courts in issuing protective orders under Rule 26(c).’” Id. A plaintiff must show prejudice from a court’s grant of a protective order. Cosgrove By & Through Winfree v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 117 Idaho 470, 474–75, 788 P.2d 1293, 1297–98 (1989). This issue on appeal requires a few observations about the procedural context of Costco’s request. Costco sought a protective order arguing that the Second Set of Discovery was overly broad and burdensome. The Plaintiffs defended their requests as relevant and proportional to the needs of the case, but noted in its briefing that “it was willing to consider reasonable 24 limitations,” such as “the Court [limiting] Plaintiffs’ requests to information and documents relating to vehicle-pedestrian collisions in Costco parking lots within the United States, and pedestrian safety measures considered or implemented by Costco at its domestic locations, in the last ten years.” (emphasis added). After a hearing on the matter, the district court granted Costco’s motion, ruling that Costco was under no obligation to respond to the Second Set of Discovery. It later entered a written order to that effect. The district court noted that, as drafted, the Second Set of Discovery “call[ed] for Costco to disclose on a nationwide basis any incident in which it is aware of a vehicle impacting anything.” Here, we are satisfied that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Costco’s request for a protective order. While the district court did not expressly recognize its discretion to grant the protective order, its reasoning on the record and its comments about what it might find acceptable in a new request demonstrate that it appreciated the decision was within its discretion. In ruling on Costco’s motion, the district court recognized the outer boundary of its discretion by commenting on the two possible legal grounds for ruling on the motion: overbreadth and whether the request was likely to lead to admissible evidence. Recalling that a court can limit the extent of discovery if “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues,” the following comments by the district court show that the court acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and reached its decision by the exercise of reason: As a general matter the contention is that the various discovery requested in that set of discovery requests are overly broad and seek discovery that is, as a result, not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. For the most part, even if you could drill down or narrow down a number of these requests and find that they may call for—they make all four properly discoverable things along with a number of other things, there well beyond the bounds of discovery period so that’s, I suppose, a summary of Costco’s position. It would seem as though plaintiff’s[sic] at this point recognized that they have overbreadth problems with many of these requests, if not all of them. I will indicate, as I said before, I have reviewed all of these discovery requests. As I look through them, there isn’t a single one that I think isn’t overly broad. They, among other things, call for Costco to disclose on a nationwide basis any incident in which it is aware of a vehicle impacting anything. A vehicle isn’t supposed to impact within one of its parking lots anything, or anytime, a vehicle 25 in one of its locations, goes somewhere it shouldn’t go irrespective of any connection to the particular circumstances of the accident at issue in this case, so I think they’re unduly broad. I would—I would Say that I don't think that—that it is appropriate for one side to shoot for the moon, so to speak, and ask for everything in anything under the sun and then use a hearing on a motion for a protective order as a sort of negotiation whereby the court is expected to replace plainly unreasonable discovery requests with an arrow set that would be reasonable. I think this is just well beyond the bounds of reasonableness in terms of scope. They’re very much too broad. I would indicate that is even the case with respect to the request for admission. As I look at all those requests for admissions—I believe there numbered 27 through 34—if I were to assume hypothetically that Costco admitted all of those rather than seeking a protective order, I don’t believe the answers would be admissible at trial because the questions are so broad as to be meaningless in the context of the dispute that is to be litigated in this case. So for all those reasons, I’m going to grant the motion for a protective order. I’m just going to grant it completely. Costco is under no obligation to respond to this set of discovery requests whatsoever. Its objections have been sustained. Admittedly, the district court appears to have applied the incorrect evidentiary standard when discussing the request for admissions. That is, the district court appears to have assessed whether the admissions would be admissible at trial, rather than whether the admission would lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Phillips, 166 Idaho at 743, 463 P.3d at 377 (citing I.R.C.P. 26(b)(1)(A)). However, that reasoning was only an extraneous comment attached to the larger reason for its decision—that Plaintiffs were seeking everything under the sun with no reasonable limitations on scope and were using the hearing as a forum to negotiate the limits of discovery. Perhaps this is why Plaintiffs’ briefs offer little to defend the broad scope and expansive definitions used in the Second Set of Discovery. Plaintiffs sought information in documents relating to “vehicular accidents” and “vehicular incursions,” and defined those terms broadly. For example, “Vehicular accident” included “any contact between a vehicle and any other object, including a person or inanimate object.” “Inanimate object” was further defined to include “a signpost, a bollard, a planter, a building, a shopping cart, a tree, or a parking bumper or real stop.” Likewise, Plaintiffs asked Costco to identify all such incidents and incursions at any of Costco’s warehouses (presumably including its overseas locations) over the past 10 years. Plaintiffs also sought all documents relating to any studies, articles, inspections, or assessments 26 relating to vehicular accidents or incursions that either took place at their warehouses or that they were aware of. As written, the Second Set of Discovery includes requests that fall under the proportionality guidelines of Rule 26(C). Here, “substantially similar” would encompass a vehicle-on-pedestrian incident that occurred at or near a pedestrian only walkway. Under the Second Set of Discovery, however, Costco would not only be required to inquire and report all car-on-car accidents at Costco locations, (which one can fairly question the likelihood that such information could lead to admissible evidence given the pedestrian-focused nature of the cause of action), but also all car-on-shopping-cart collisions (which is very unlikely to lead to relevant evidence given the cause of action). Likewise, Plaintiffs failed to designate which employees or what categories of employees would need to have been aware of the news articles or studies for Costco to disclose it. Hypothetically, one may wonder how Costco might discover that one of its Omaha receipt-checkers read an article about pedal error in 2009. One may also question how that information might help the Plaintiffs’ case. While we are mindful that a purpose of Rule 26 is “to promote candor and fairness in the pre-trial discovery process,” Westby, 157 Idaho at 623, 338 P.3d at 1227, we fail to see how many of these request are “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” I.R.C.P. 26(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Given the discovery dispute before it, the district court properly exercised its discretion by striking the Second Set of Discovery and allowing the Plaintiffs to redraft their discovery. Plaintiffs next choose to assail the narrowness of the comments the district court voiced to the parties about what to consider moving forward with discovery. A review of the procedural record of these comments shows that they were merely the court’s thoughts and comments, and that Plaintiffs never actually secured an adverse ruling. To the extent the district court took an active interest in solving discovery disputes, we commend the court’s appropriate commentary and insights. Immediately after ruling from the bench, the district court offered comments and “general thoughts” on what it would likely permit. The court remarked that Plaintiffs might narrow their focus on matters of company-wide discovery such as “incursions into pedestrian walkways.” Or, the court explained, the Plaintiffs could try to seek information from a central risk-management database, or focus on situations where a vehicle surmounted obstacles similar to the Incident, noting that a car striking someone in the middle of the parking lot would likely not be relevant. 27 In a similar vein, the court suggested that Plaintiffs could focus on whether Costco had any knowledge of the various studies detailing the alleged problems that led to the incident. Importantly, the district court made clear to the parties that it was not making a ruling: Now, it does occur to me that it may make some sense to try to offer comments, not a ruling, on what I may permit if the parties are not able to work something out when the plaintiffs go back to the drawing board and serve presumably a narrower set of discovery requests. So I’ll offer some thoughts along those lines, and just, again, indicate that these fall short of rulings. (Emphasis added). Afterward, in response to the district court’s guidance, Plaintiffs submitted a “revised” Second Set of Discovery (Revised Second Set of Discovery). Costco again responded with a second motion for a protective order, arguing that the Revised Second Set of Discovery was not materially different from its precursor. Plaintiffs opposed, arguing that the Revised Second Set had significantly narrowed the scope of the previous Second Set of Discovery, and that Costco’s counsel had not met and conferred to try to resolve the dispute without court action. The district court, rather than granting or denying the motion, noted that Costco’s counsel had not complied with Rule 26(c) because he failed to attach an affidavit certifying that he “ha[d] in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action.” I.R.C.P. 26(c)(1). As such, the court reset the hearing on the motion to allow the parties a chance to meet and confer. The parties later met, conferred, and reached an agreement about how to narrow the issues, ultimately submitting a joint stipulation to continue the hearing on the second motion for a protective order. The parties’ agreement is evidenced by an email exchange, which provided that the parties agreed to:  Limit requests regarding prior incidents to those which occurred in ADA parking areas and adjacent sidewalks/paths, as well as sidewalks on the exterior premises of Costco warehouses;  Narrow the request regarding design standards relating to ADA parking areas and adjacent sidewalks/paths, as well as sidewalks on the exterior premises of Costco warehouses;  Narrow requests relating to the use of bollards or other barriers to ADA parking areas and adjacent sidewalks/paths, as well as sidewalks on the exterior premises of Costco warehouses; 28  Narrow requests related to “retail stores” to Costco warehouses which are open to the public, such as the Costco warehouse at issue and other similar Costco warehouses;  Narrow requests for studies to similar incidents in ADA parking areas and adjacent sidewalks/paths, as well as sidewalks on the exterior premises of Costco warehouses, in the 5 years prior to the construction of the Boise Costco warehouse. In the exchange of emails, Plaintiffs noted that they believed the Revised Second Set of Discovery was appropriate as written but were willing “to further narrow their requests” in an “attempt to resolve this dispute without the need to again involve the court.” Costco agreed, and indicated it would “proceed to respond to [the] narrowed requests.” Plaintiffs extended the original deadline for the Revised Second Set of Discovery, but, when Costco failed to submit its response on the extended deadline, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel discovery and have the requests for admissions deemed admitted. Costco filed responses, and, after a hearing, the Court ruled that the admissions were automatically deemed admitted under the Rules, but stated that it would consider a motion to withdraw the deemed admissions. Costco submitted that motion, and the district court granted it. No further court involvement in the discovery process appears in the record. Thus, the procedural history demonstrates that Plaintiffs never followed up and secured a ruling based on the district court’s earlier comments. Rather, the parties chose, as they are encouraged to do, to settle their disagreement without court involvement. Therefore, plaintiffs failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. “This Court does not review an alleged error on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling forming the basis for the assignment of error.” Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479, 491, 224 P.3d 1068, 1080 (2009) (quoting Ada Cnty. Highway Dist. v. Total Success Invs., LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 368–69, 179 P.3d 323, 331–32 (2008)). So, while Plaintiffs attack the district court’s “decision” and “ruling” narrowing the scope of discovery, the transcript shows the court’s remarks were merely comments to help the parties break their discovery deadlock. If anything, the court was providing helpful guidance to assist the parties come to an agreed upon resolution to their discovery dispute. To be clear, something more than “general thoughts” expressed to the parties by a judge are required to meet the adverse-ruling requirement for appellate review. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s handling of discovery, and will address the evidentiary record produced by the parties. 29 F. The district court erred by striking portions of Plaintiffs’ experts’ reports. Part of the evidentiary record produced by the parties for consideration on summary judgment was the reports of Plaintiffs’ experts, Adam Aleksander and Rob Reiter. The district court granted Costco’s motion to strike these reports “to the extent Reiter and Aleksander opine that the accident was foreseeable or that the walkway’s design was unacceptably risky.” It noted that both reports “contain opinions to the effect that the accident Oswald suffered was foreseeable and that the design of the walkway on which it occurred posed an ‘unacceptably high’ risk to pedestrians,” and such opinions were thus inadmissible legal conclusions. Even if these conclusions were factual assessments, the district court reasoned that the opinions were nevertheless inadmissible because they “concern[ed] conclusions or opinions that the average juror is qualified to draw from the facts utilizing the juror’s common sense and normal experience.” Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred because Costco never argued that the reports should be struck as legal opinions or because they contained opinions about matters within the experience and knowledge of the average juror. Plaintiffs further argue that while the experts’ opinions embraced an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury, neither expert gave an opinion on an ultimate issue of law or instructed the jury as to the applicable law. Likewise, Plaintiffs argue, the opinions were outside the jury’s common knowledge because they were “based on various technical and scientific studies, as well as the experts’ specialized knowledge and extensive experience.” Thus, Plaintiffs argue, the testimony would have assisted the jury to understand the evidence before it and to determine facts at issue—such as whether the Walkway is a dangerous condition, whether the incident was foreseeable, and whether Costco acted reasonably to protect Plaintiffs from vehicular incursions. In response, Costco contends that the district court only excluded specific legal conclusions, but considered the reports without the exclusions and that the experts’ statements on foreseeability were properly excluded because duty is a question of law. Lastly, Costco argues that the district court properly excluded the portions of the experts’ opinions that attempted to tell the jury what verdict to reach. Admission of expert testimony is within the discretion of the trial court. Stoddard v. Nelson, 99 Idaho 293, 581 P.2d 339 (1978). “This Court applies an abuse of discretion standard when determining whether testimony offered in connection with a motion for summary judgment 30 is admissible.” Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 15, 175 P.3d 172, 177 (2007) (citation omitted). “Summary judgment proceedings are decided on the basis of admissible evidence.” Campbell v. Kvamme, 155 Idaho 692, 696, 316 P.3d 104, 108 (2013). As a consequence, “[t]he admissibility of evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold matter to be addressed before applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule to determine whether the evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 271, 281 P.3d 103, 108 (2012) (citations omitted). Declarations submitted on summary judgment “must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the . . . declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” I.R.C.P. 56(c)(4). A party may object to a declaration filed by an opposing party. I.R.C.P. 56(c)(2). The standard for experts is no different: The admissibility of expert testimony . . . is a threshold matter that is distinct from whether the testimony raises genuine issues of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment. With respect to the threshold issue of admissibility, the liberal construction and reasonable inferences standard does not apply. Instead, the trial court must look at the witness’ affidavit or deposition testimony and determine whether it alleges facts which, if taken as true, would render the testimony of that witness admissible. Mattox v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 157 Idaho 468, 473, 337 P.3d 627, 632 (2014) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “To be admissible, the expert’s testimony must assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact at issue in the case.” Noel v. City of Rigby, 166 Idaho 575, 587, 462 P.3d 103, 115 (2020). Admissible expert testimony should not be rejected merely because it “embraces an ultimate issue.” Id. (citing I.R.E. 704). However, “[e]xpert testimony that concerns conclusions or opinions that the average juror is qualified to draw from the facts utilizing the juror’s common sense and normal experience is inadmissible.” Hansen v. Roberts, 154 Idaho 469, 474, 299 P.3d 781, 786 (2013) (citing State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 66, 253 P.3d 727, 740 (2011)). As a corollary, expert testimony consisting of legal conclusions may also be excludable for “invad[ing] the province of the court to determine the applicable law and to instruct the jury.” Ballard v. Kerr, 160 Idaho 674, 694, 378 P.3d 464, 484 (2016) (citing Torres v. Cnty. of 31 Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 150–51 (6th Cir. 1985)). “The best resolution of this type of problem is to determine whether the terms used by the witness have a separate, distinct, and specialized meaning in the law different from th[at] present in the vernacular. If they do, exclusion is appropriate.” Id. Here, Reiter is Plaintiffs’ “safety and vehicle incursion expert,” and Aleksander is Plaintiffs’ “human factors and engineering expert.” Both experts relied on numerous studies, publications, and news articles to arrive at their conclusions. Aleksander’s report summarized his findings as follows: 1. The characteristics of aged individuals and how they may affect the driving function have been described in the literature and are consistent with the behavior of Mr. Myers, at the time of the crash into Mr. Oswald. 2. Research has for many years identified the characteristics of handicapped or disabled (ADA) parking permit drivers, and indicate that as a group, they represent a higher risk of a loss of control incident in the ADA parking areas, as was the case with Mr. Myers. 3. These age and disability affected driver characteristics present an elevated hazard to pedestrians in an adjoining walkway such as the walkway at the Boise Costco. 4. Costco by their specific Walkway design funneled human traffic onto the Walkway offering a seemingly safe passage to pedestrians, shoppers with carts, adults with children, adults carrying infants, individuals from the ADA parking stalls, when in fact the walkway was (and is) an unacceptably high-risk area. 5. Costco, by their design and operation of the Boise Costco parking area, provided no protection, and unacceptably high levels of risk to the pedestrians in the Walkway, given that it was adjacent to the designated handicap parking area. 6. Alternative parking lot safety features and devices were available to Costco that would have increased protection to pedestrians, and significantly reduced or eliminated the high risk of a foreseeable hazard, namely an injury or fatal collision in the parking lot Walkway, in the form of bollards, barriers, or parking lot design changes. Plaintiffs summarized Reiter’s report in its opposition to Costco’s motion for summary judgment as follows: Reiter . . . discussed the foreseeability of the exact type of accident that occurred in this case (i.e., pedal and/or driver error in older and/or disabled drivers causing a vehicle to intrude into areas intended to be safe for customers) based upon extensive research, his own experience and a number of other similar accidents at Costco warehouses. . . . Reiter also opined about the numerous aspects of the Walkway that render it unreasonably and foreseeably hazardous, including (1) its layout, which has customers walking between high-risk drivers who are coming 32 directly at those customers while attempting to park; (2) the narrowness of the Walkway; (3) the Walkway being flush with the parking lot and ADA stalls; (4) the inadequate wheel stops; and (5) the lack of any safety barrier at all, including properly placed bollards, to protect Costco’s customers utilizing the Walkway from intruding vehicles. As a preliminary matter, the district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling on grounds it did even though those grounds were not argued by Costco. “A trial court has the discretion to decide whether an affidavit offered in support of or opposition to a motion for summary judgment is admissible under Rule 56(e), even if that issue is not raised by one of the parties.” Esser Elec. v. Lost River Ballistics Techs., Inc., 145 Idaho 912, 917, 188 P.3d 854, 859 (2008) (emphasis added) (citing Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 868 P.2d 1224 (1994)). When a party submits an expert affidavit in support or defense of a motion for summary judgment, admissibility is a threshold question. Mattox, 157 Idaho at 473, 337 P.3d at 632. Thus, the district court’s responsibility was to first assess whether the declarations were based on admissible evidence. To be sure, this Court has held that a district court does not abuse its discretion when it considers unobjected-to declarations or affidavits. See Esser Elec., 145 Idaho at 917, 188 P.3d at 859 (“If there is no timely objection, the trial court can grant summary judgment based upon an affidavit that does not comply with Rule 56(e).”). However, this Court has expressly held that the opposite conclusion is not true. Id. That said, the district court erred by determining that Reiter and Aleksander testified to legal conclusions. As outlined above, any questions about the foreseeability of a vehicle-onpedestrian accident is a factual question to be considered by the jury in assessing whether Costco took the appropriate measure to protect its invitees from harm. See Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 300–01, 796 P.2d 506, 509–10 (1990) (“Foreseeability is ordinarily a question of fact.”). Having determined that the experts did not invade the province of the court on the basis of legal conclusions, the next question is whether the opinions expressed by the experts improperly invaded the province of the jury by addressing issues within the knowledge and experience of laymen. The district court reasoned that a juror could come to her own conclusions about whether or not the Walkway was risky or whether vehicle incursions were foreseeable. For that reason, the district court struck the statements—not the entire reports—of the experts “to the extent Reiter and Aleksander opine that the accident was foreseeable or that the walkway’s design was unacceptably risky.” However, the touchstone rationale for this rule is that “to be 33 admissible the testimony must assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining an issue in fact.” Jones v. Crawforth, 147 Idaho 11, 17, 205 P.3d 660, 666 (2009). Incidents of pedal error are counterintuitive, or, at the very least, uncommon in the everyday experience of laymen. Reiter and Aleksander’s reports demonstrate not only that pedal incidents are not uncommon, but well known within the industry. Accordingly, their testimony would assist the trier of fact to determine whether Costco’s precautions measured up to the risk of harm. Likewise, while using a parking lot may be within the common knowledge of jurors, how to properly and safely design one is not. As such, the district court erred in striking portions of the expert reports. G. Plaintiffs put forward sufficient evidence to create a disputed issue of material fact on foreseeability. With the evidentiary record settled, we now turn to assess whether Plaintiffs put forward sufficient evidence to create a material issue of disputed fact on the issue of foreseeability. We conclude that they have. Given the proper focus on the type of harm (vehicle-on-pedestrian incidents) rather than the particular facts of this case, we are satisfied that Plaintiffs have produced sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment. Plaintiffs produced two experts who opined that vehicle-onpedestrian incidents occurred with some regularity on the premises of big-box retailers. Plaintiffs produced news articles that Costco stores had had prior incidents of vehicle-on-pedestrian incidents in pedestrian pathways at other Costco locations. Costco is charged with institutional knowledge of such prior accidents. The reports of Plaintiffs’ experts also contain evidence that some, but not all, retailers use bollards as protective measures. In light of these risks, Costco provided only three-inch tire stops as protection on the Walkway. While the signposts could offer some sort of barrier, they would seem to offer meager protection against an automobile at best. There were no warning signs indicating that vehicles may enter the Walkway. Unlike the other pedestrian pathways on Costco’s property, the Walkway did not have a raised curb. While Costco argues that it could not construct a curb and still provide ADA access, the designs provided by Plaintiffs’ experts show various designs where only portions of the pedestrian walkways are flush with the parking lot surface, such as where the access aisle is situated. Therefore, we find that Plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence to create a disputed issue of material fact as to whether Costco failed to 34 adequately take the foreseeability of the harm into consideration in its duty to prevent injuries to its invitees. Based on this evidence, we also disagree that no reasonable juror could find in Costco’s favor under the circumstances. There may very well be a disagreement among the jurors on whether a wheel stop and signpost were adequate protection based on the infrequent nature of pedal error. Likewise, there may be jurors who find that the lack of a curb or the failure to install bollards fell below the standard of care based on the same level of foreseeability. Others may say that Costco exceeded its duty given the rarity of the harm. But the fact remains that these are all reasonable views of the evidence; thus, it must be left to the jury to determine which view carries the day. H. There are disputes of material fact that preclude awarding summary judgment on the issue of causation. Before the district court’s ruling on foreseeability and duty, the parties were focused on the causation element. Costco argued that there was no evidence that the design solutions proposed by the Plaintiffs and Reiter (a wider walkway, a raised walkway, or bollards at the ends of the ADA parking spaces) would have prevented the accident, given the path and speed of Myers’ vehicle. In support, Costco relies on the expert report of Torrey Roberts, an accident reconstructionist. Costco also relies on the assumption that Plaintiffs’ position is that bollards should have been placed at the front center of each ADA parking stall. Based on Roberts’ opinion, Costco asserts that Myers’ car would have passed in between the proposed bollards, and the incident would have occurred no differently. Effectively, Costco argues that its expert’s reconstruction puts Myers’ car as going 12 mph, thus it would have surmounted any wheel stop and curb. Likewise, because Myers tried to park in a no-parking lined area, no bollard or protective measure properly placed in the parking area would have prevented the incident. In short, Costco argued that even if it were negligent in failing to take precautions in regards to the risk of harm presented by vehicle incursions, its negligence was not the cause in fact of Plaintiffs’ injury. We cannot agree. This argument requires a certainty about what the jury would find were appropriate protection measures in addition to a precise idea about the path of Myers’ vehicle. Neither of these facts can be presumed on summary judgment. To begin, these questions depend heavily on whether the jury will determine that Costco failed to take adequate precautions (which they very well might), and, if the jury does decide that Costco fell short of that duty, what type of precautions would have been commensurate with its 35 duty given the foreseeability of risk of harm. See Hayes v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 143 Idaho 204, 208, 141 P.3d 1073, 1077 (2006) (holding that questions as to whether a railroad complied with its common law duty to “provide such warnings and safeguards at its crossings as a reasonably prudent person would demand under the circumstances,” was “best left to a jury for determination.”). Thus, because it has not been resolved what precautions would have been necessary, if any, we cannot say whether or not it could have prevented the injuries in this case. Even assuming the jury found that a curb should have been installed and bollards placed at the front center of each ADA stall, it cannot be said with certainty that this would not have affected the outcome. While Myers’ car could have missed a bollard placed at the parking spot to the right of the access aisle he mistakenly tried to park in, his car could have nevertheless struck the bollard placed at the spot opposite the spot to the right, thus preventing Oswald from being pinned against the GMC Envoy. In addition, Roberts’ reconstruction is precisely that: A reconstruction. The police photographs from the accident’s aftermath show Myers’ car resting over wheel stops (of which the access aisle has none). Accordingly, there is enough to create a disputed issue of material fact as to whether Myers’ car would have struck a bollard placed in the front center of the parking spot to the right of the access aisle. Thus, there are disputed issues of material fact as to whether Costco’s negligence (if any) was the cause of Oswald’s injuries.