Opinion ID: 844274
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal of Defense Special Instructions

Text: The trial court refused to give three special instructions requested by the defense. Defendant now claims this ruling violated various federal constitutional guarantees. We conclude the ruling was an appropriate exercise of the court's discretion. Special instruction No. 1 advised that the mitigating circumstances identified in CALJIC No. 8.85 were merely examples, that jurors could consider other mitigating facts related to the case or defendant, that any one mitigating factor could be sufficient to reject a death sentence, that mitigating factors need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, that mitigation could be based on any evidence . . . no matter how weak, and that jurors could rely on mercy, sympathy, and/or sentiment in deciding what weight to give each mitigating factor. Special instruction No. 2 was entirely duplicative of special instruction No. 1. It stated that jurors could reject the death penalty based on compassion or sympathy alone, that mitigating factors need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and that mitigating factors could be found based on any evidence . . . no matter how weak. (43) These proposed instructions were largely duplicative of CALJIC No. 8.85, which was given. CALJIC No. 8.85 is both a correct and an adequate explanation of how jurors should consider aggravating and mitigating factors. ( People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 875 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 376, 209 P.3d 596].) Accordingly, the court has no obligation to give pinpoint instructions regarding what mitigating evidence the jury may consider, or special instructions regarding mercy and compassion. [Citations.] ( People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 309-310 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 605, 180 P.3d 351]; see also People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 328-329 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 187 P.3d 363].) We have repeatedly held that instructions on the burden of proof are unnecessary in the penalty phase of a capital trial ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 417-418), and thus jurors need not be instructed that mitigating factors do not have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt ( People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 767 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754]). In addition, [b]oth proposed instructions were argumentative in directing that `[a] juror may find that a mitigating circumstance exists if there is any evidence to support it no matter how weak the evidence is[,]' without a similar direction as to aggravating evidence. (See People v. Carter [, supra, ] 30 Cal.4th [at p.] 1225 . . . .) ( People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1069 [71 Cal.Rptr.3d 675, 175 P.3d 632].) Special instruction No. 8 dealt specifically with victim impact evidence. It directed that such evidence could not be considered to divert [jurors'] attention from [their] proper role of deciding whether defendant should live or die, and a death sentence could not be imposed based on an irrational or emotional response to such evidence. The instruction further stated: On the other hand, evidence and argument on emotional though[] relevant subjects may provide legitimate reasons to sway the jury to show mercy. This proposed instruction was clearly argumentative because it invited the jury to draw inferences favorable only to one side. ( People v. Carter, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1225.) It told jurors they could not base a decision to impose the death penalty on an emotional response to victim impact evidence but also told jurors they could rely on emotional evidence and argument to show mercy toward defendant. In contrast, the jury was properly instructed by CALJIC No. 8.84.1 that both sides had a right to expect jurors to consider all the evidence, follow the law, exercise [their] discretion conscientiously, and reach a just verdict. The court did not err in rejecting defendant's duplicative and argumentative proposed instruction.