Opinion ID: 797987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Error Analysis

Text: 14 Holly first argues the district court erred in instructing the jury that force may be implied from a disparity in size or coercive power between the defendant and the victim. He contends that such an instruction essentially directs a guilty verdict against the defendant in circumstances such as these because, as a sheriff, Holly necessarily had power over the prisoners. By allowing an inference of force from this fact alone, Holly argues, the instruction impermissibly reduced the government's burden of proof. 15 The term force is not defined by statute and this court has not previously defined it for purposes of § 242 or § 2241. Nevertheless, this court has construed the term in the context of USSG § 2A3.1(b)(1), which allows for a sentencing enhancement when the defendant's conduct violates § 2241(a) or (b). See United States v. Reyes Pena, 216 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir.2000). In doing so, this court held a force enhancement is appropriate when the sexual contact resulted from a restraint upon the other person that was sufficient that the other person could not escape the sexual contact. Id. (quotation omitted). We further stated that force may be inferred by such facts as disparity in size between victim and assailant, or disparity in coercive power. Id. This court has therefore explained the element of force within the meaning of aggravated sexual abuse does not require the brute force [commonly] associated with rape. Id. 16 Contrary to Holly's assertions, there is no reason for this court to distinguish between the definition of force in the context of USSG § 2A3.1(b)(1) and the definition of force in the context of § 2241. The Guideline provision at issue in Reyes Pena provides for a four-level enhancement [i]f the offense involved conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) or (b). USSG § 2A3.1(b)(1). Because application of the sentencing enhancement requires a violation of the statute, the requisite degree of force is identical. Other circuits addressing the meaning of force for purposes of § 2241 have similarly relied on cases interpreting the statute as part of a review of a sentencing enhancement. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 470 F.3d 1115, 1121 (5th Cir.2006) (citing United States v. Lucas, 157 F.3d 998, 1002 (5th Cir.1998)); United States v. Allery, 139 F.3d 609, 611 (8th Cir.1998) (citing United States v. Fire Thunder, 908 F.2d 272, 274 (8th Cir.1990)). Thus, this circuit's case law on the meaning of force for purposes of the application of USSG § 2A3.1(b)(1) applies with equal force outside the sentencing context. 17 This court also rejects Holly's contention that force may be inferred from a disparity in size or power only where the defendant is an adult and the victim is a child. Although this circuit's cases expressing the propriety of such an inference have often involved an act committed upon a child by an adult, there is no reason to limit its application to such facts. Rather, an adult/child relationship is offered as but one example of a disparity in size or coercive power. See Reyes Pena, 216 F.3d at 1211 (explaining force may be inferred from a disparity in size or power, such as that between an adult and a child). Indeed, one of the cases on which Reyes Pena relied referenced the inference in a case involving abuse perpetrated by a jail warden against an inmate. See Lucas, 157 F.3d at 1002 (5th Cir.1998). There is no reason to limit the inference of force from disparity in size or power to cases involving child victims and this court declines to do so in this case. 18 The district court therefore properly instructed the jury on the element of force. After properly stating the element of force does not require proof of actual violence, it then indicated, consistent with Reyes Pena, that [t]he requirement of force may be satisfied by a showing of restraint sufficient to prevent the victim from escaping the sexual conduct. The district court went on to instruct that this required showing could be implied, rather than proved directly, from a disparity in coercive power or in size. Contrary to Holly's claim that the instruction directed a guilty verdict, the instruction simply permitted such an inference rather than requiring it. Because the instruction was consistent with the prevailing case law, the instruction as to force was not error.
19 Holly challenges the district court's jury instruction on the element of fear in two respects. First, he argues it was error to instruct the jury that [t]he requirement of fear may be satisfied when the defendant's actions implicitly place the victim in fear of some bodily harm. Second, he argues it was error to allow the jury to infer fear from a disparity in power between the defendant and the victim or a defendant's control over a victim's everyday life. Because the district court's use of language suggesting the victim need only be placed in fear of some bodily harm impermissibly reduced the degree of fear necessary to sustain a conviction, this court concludes the instruction on fear was erroneous. 20 As noted above, a defendant commits aggravated sexual abuse in violation of § 2241(a)(2) only by threatening or placing [another] person in fear that any person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping. Although the victim's fear may alone support a conviction without the use of actual force, a specific and severe form of fear is required. It is this heightened degree of fear that distinguishes aggravated sexual abuse from the separate crime of sexual abuse set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2242. A violation of § 2242(1) merely requires that the defendant causes another person to engage in a sexual act by threatening or placing that other person in fear (other than by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any other person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping). Thus, § 2242(1) sets forth a lesser degree of fear than § 2241(a)(2). A defendant commits sexual abuse if he places the victim in fear, but commits aggravated sexual abuse only if that fear rises to the level of fear of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping. 21 The jury instruction given by the district court failed to make this critical distinction between §§ 2241(a)(2) and 2242(1). Although the court began by paraphrasing the statutory language of § 2241(a)(2), it then used language more closely resembling that of § 2242(1). By instructing the jury that the fear element is satisfied by fear of some bodily harm, the district court eliminated the heightened degree of fear required to support a conviction for aggravated sexual abuse. In doing so, the district court essentially made §§ 2241(a)(2) and 2242(1) identical, a result explicitly precluded by the language of the statutes. While it was not inappropriate for the court to describe circumstances that may generally give rise to fear, its use of the some bodily harm language constituted independent error, regardless of any other language used in the jury instruction. 22 In formulating its jury instruction, the district court relied on language derived from United States v. Lucas. 157 F.3d at 1002-03. To the extent that language defined the severity of fear required to support a conviction, however, it is inapposite because Lucas addressed the meaning of fear within § 2242(1), which expressly excludes the specific category of heightened fear necessary to satisfy § 2241(a)(2). Id.; see also United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 885 (10th Cir.1998) (using some bodily harm language in the context of § 2242). While fear of some bodily harm certainly satisfies the broad definition of ordinary fear under § 2242(1), it cannot sustain a conviction under § 2241(a)(2). Because the jury instruction did not clearly require the jury to find the heightened level of fear of death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping necessary to convict Holly of felony deprivation of rights under color of law, involving aggravated sexual abuse, the instruction was erroneous.