Opinion ID: 1230804
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Initial Order Granting Permanent Custody to Overfields

Text: Child custody battles are the closest modern Americans come to real tragedya playing out of conflict, commonly between members of the same family, that reveals what is thought to be the best intentions of the combatants, but in the end challenges the very concept of hope. The hectic edge of this conflict is manifest in this case where the judicial system is called upon to unravel an internecine battle involving two generations of the Overfield family who undoubtedly believe that they are doing what is best for the hopes and dreams of the third generation. It is the third generation, Aaron and Ashley Collins, that we in the judicial family are committed to protect. We first must address the Order entered June 24, 1991, which granted full care, custody and control of the minor children born to the respondents herein, namely Aaron Bradford Collins and Ashley Brook Collins to James W. Overfield and Shirley V. Overfield. It is an inaccuracy contained in this order that is at the core of many of the difficulties surrounding the question of whether the appellant transferred permanent or temporary custody of her children to her parents in April 1991. The Order of June 24, 1991 recites that [t]his action was commenced by the filing of the petition on May 7, 1991, and the issuance of a summons to both respondents [the appellant and Marc Anthony Collins] which neither filed a response or answer. This finding is clearly erroneous. [4] The certificate of service attached to the petition for custody and notice of hearing on that petition was served only on Marc Anthony Collins and not the appellant. Had the trial court noticed this deficiency in the service of the petition and the notice of hearing, the appellant would have had an opportunity to be heard as to what it was she thought she was doing when she signed the affidavit on April 30, 1991. What then, is the legal effect of the absence of any adversarial proceeding upon the Overfields' initial attempt to obtain custody immediately following the execution and delivery of the document that attempted to effect a transfer of custody? This Court has long recognized that the right of a natural parent to his or her infant child is paramount to that of any other person. In the law concerning custody of minor children, no rule is more firmly established than that the right of a natural parent to the custody of his or her infant child is paramount to that of any other person; it is a fundamental personal liberty protected and guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of the West Virginia and United States Constitutions. Syllabus Point 1, In re Willis, 157 W.Va. 225, 207 S.E.2d 129 (1973) (emphasis added). In determining whether a judicial act violates the due process clause in W.Va. Const. art. III, § 10, the threshold question is whether the act implicates a liberty interest. Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. Roy Allen S. v. Stone, 196 W.Va. 624, 474 S.E.2d 554 (1996). Beginning with In re Willis, West Virginia recognized that liberty, within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, embraces the rights of parenthood. State ex rel. Roy Allen S. v. Stone, 196 W.Va. at 631, 474 S.E.2d at 561. Given our recognition that the appellant, as a natural parent, acquires a liberty interest in maintaining a substantial parental relationship with her children vis-à-vis third parties, the Circuit Court of Monongalia County had no right to deprive her of that interest without due process of law. W. Va. Const. art. III, § 10 provides: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, and the judgment of his peers. The Due Process Clause is a commitment by the government to assure that no one will be arbitrarily deprived of a liberty interest unless the government provides that individual with a fair decision-making process, including the right to receive written notice of the attempt to affect that liberty interest, the right to present evidence, and the right to obtain a decision from a neutral, detached person or tribunal. We hold that any attempt by a non-parent to judicially change the care and custody of a child from a natural parent must precede that attempt with: (1) the filing of a petition setting forth all of the reasons why the change of custody is required; and (2) the service of that petition, together with a reasonable notice as to the time and place that petition will be heard. Following the filing and service of the petition and notice of hearing upon that petition, the natural parents whose rights are being affected shall have the right to: (1) present evidence as to the reasons why custody should not be changed; and (2) obtain a decision from a neutral, detached person or tribunal. Cf., In re Willis, 157 W.Va. 225, 207 S.E.2d 129 (1973) (holding that in an abuse and neglect proceeding, W. Va.Code 49-6-2 and the Due Process Clauses of the West Virginia and United States Constitutions prohibit the termination of parental rights without notice and the opportunity for a meaningful hearing). It is obvious that the appellant was not afforded any of these fundamental ingredients of a fair decision-making process prior to the entry of the order that granted a permanent change of custody from the appellant to her parents. The seminal order entered on the 24th day of June, 1991 is, therefore, void. Harloe v. Harloe, 129 W.Va. 1, 4-5, 38 S.E.2d 362, 364 (1946); see also Smith v. Smith, 140 W.Va. 298, 304-05, 83 S.E.2d 923, 927 (1954). [5] Because this order began a series of petitions filed by the appellant to regain custody that was permanently removed without a fair decision-making process, the dynamic of each of the subsequent petitions changed. Because it was determined that the Overfields had permanent custody of the children, the family law master and circuit court in all subsequent attempts to change that custodial relationship required the appellant to carry the burden of proof imposed upon a parent who has permanently transferred custody to a third person which demands that a parent seeking to regain custody of a child must prove that such a change of custody will materially promote the moral and physical welfare of that child. See State ex rel. Harmon v. Utterback, 144 W.Va. 419, 108 S.E.2d 521 (1959). The appellant contends in this Court that had she been given the opportunity to appear before the family law master at the time the initial petition was filed by the appellee, she would have informed the family law master and consequently the circuit court, that she had entered into the initial custody arrangement in order to temporarily provide her children with a more secure financial environment until she had fully recovered from her debilitating injuries. This contention, argues the appellant, requires the application of our holding in McCartney v. Coberly : When a parent transfers temporary custody of a child to a third person, the parent may reclaim custody without showing that the change of custody will materially promote the moral and physical welfare of the child. Syllabus Point 2, McCartney v. Coberly, 250 S.E.2d 777 (W.Va.1978). Our jurisprudence regarding child custody matters has recognized that the dichotomy of permanent and temporary custody shapes the nature of the proof required to regain custody. Because the predicate order vesting permanent custody in the Overfields is void, the appellant has been denied the opportunity to attempt to regain the custody of her children with proof adapted to a temporary rather than a permanent transfer of custody. Therefore, we must reverse the decision of the Circuit Court of Monongalia County and remand this case for further proceedings. In doing so, we take this opportunity to reexamine our legal standards relating to the burden and quantum of proof when a natural parent requests the return of a child after transferring either temporary or permanent custody of that child to a third person, as well as a reexamination of the formalities of a voluntary transfer of custody of a child from a natural parent to a third person. B.