Opinion ID: 1878785
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Was it proper for the prosecutors to discuss race in their opening and closing arguments?

Text: ¶ 30. The district attorney accused Tate during his opening statement of uttering racial slurs when he confronted the fishers at his ponds. The district attorney listed for the jury what he saw as the real issue in the case and what he thought the evidence would show. That list included accusing Tate of us[ing] racial epitaphs [sic]. This first mention of race in the state's opening statement would later become an apparent foreshadowing of the theme that would underlie the State's case. ¶ 31. The State closed its case with a two-part closing argument. An assistant district attorney told the jury, inter alia: And what did Mr. Velton [Townsend] say, he said, I told him [Tate] I was sorry. He said, I kept saying, man, if these is your fish, I'm sorry. I will put them back. I'm sorry. And what does he [Tate] say, you God d   n    . Y'all are going to put my fish back.... Later in her closing argument, the assistant district attorney stated [t]hen when [Tate] gets to the deputy, Deputy Harold Keys, calls him a boy. I ain't got nothing else to say to you, boy. ¶ 32. The district attorney concluded the State's closing argument by telling the jury: There's also an issue here that we've got to confront head-on and to try to avoid it begs the issue, and it's race. There's no question about it. That plays a part in here. And you know and I know, and anybody who's lived in the South knowsand Alabama is in the South anybody who's lived in the South knows that there is no worse derogatory statement that you can make to a black citizen than calling him a n    . Second only to calling him a boy. Does that tell you what the attitude of Roy Tate was when he confronted these people out there? ¶ 33. Criminal convictions are not to be based upon race. That no man shall be convicted upon an appeal to the race issue is a firm and settled proposition in this Court. Gore v. State, 155 Miss. 306, 124 So. 361 (1929). The race question and all of its vexations and perplexities should be dropped at the outer door of all courts of justice ... under no circumstances should the court permit the officers of the state to say or do anything which might in the remotest degree prejudice the jury against the defendant on account of race or color or social standing. Clark, 102 Miss. at 768, 59 So. at 888. We have on numerous occasions reversed convictions in cases wherein prosecutors improperly used race as an issue. Reed v. State, 232 Miss. 432, 99 So.2d 455 (1958); Harris v. State, 209 Miss. 141, 46 So.2d 91 (1950); Herrin v. State, 201 Miss. 595, 29 So.2d 452 (1947); Funches v. State, 125 Miss. 140, 87 So. 487 (1921); Hardaway v. State, 99 Miss. 223, 54 So. 833 (1911). ¶ 34. The sole question before the jury was whether the force used by Tate (who is white) against Townsend (who is black) was reasonably necessary in order for Tate to protect his property. Both defense witnesses were white, and all four State's witnesses were black. The only likely effect the issue of race had in this case was to prejudice the jury against Tate. We find that the prosecutors' comments regarding race, made during opening and closing statements, were improper and prejudicial.
¶ 35. Tate argues that the trial judge should have, sua sponte, admonished the prosecution in the presence of the jury for bringing up the issue of race. In support of this argument, Tate cites Clark v. State, 102 Miss. 768, 59 So. 887 (1912). In that case, the trial court refused proposed jury instructions propounded by a black defendant which essentially instructed the jury to try him in the same manner that a white defendant would be tried. This Court affirmed the trial court's refusal of the defendant's proposed jury instructions and added that the trial judge should sua sponte rebuke the prosecutor in the presence of the jury if the State offers a jury instruction directing the jury's attention to the defendant's race. Id. at 888. The State offered no such jury instruction in the case sub judice; therefore, we find this assignment of error is without merit.