Opinion ID: 4469816
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kearnice Overton

Text: Overton pleaded guilty to conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute 100 grams and more of a mixture and substance containing heroin and 100 kilograms and more of a mixture and substance containing marijuana, 2 Moore argues that United States v. Miller was wrongly decided, but “[i]t is a cardinal rule in our circuit that one panel is bound by the decision of a prior panel.” Owsley v. Luebbers, 281 F.3d 687, 690 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). -4- in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), 846, and 851. In determining that Overton’s base offense level was 32, the presentence report attributed quantities of heroin, marijuana, and cocaine to him. Overton objected, arguing that his plea agreement prevented the government from presenting evidence of cocaine distribution and that any cocaine distribution was not relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. The district court overruled Overton’s objections and determined that his base offense level was 32, that his total offense level was 37, that his criminal history category was VI, and that his Guidelines sentencing range was 360 months’ to life imprisonment. The district court varied downward and imposed a 300-month sentence. Overton first argues that the district court erred in concluding that the government did not breach the plea agreement by presenting evidence of cocaine distribution. He claims that the government stipulated in the plea agreement that the conspiracy involved only heroin and marijuana. We review de novo issues concerning the interpretation and enforcement of a plea agreement. United States v. DeWitt, 366 F.3d 667, 669 (8th Cir. 2004). “Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and should be interpreted according to general contract principles.” Id. Although the plea agreement specified heroin and marijuana as types of drugs that would be used to calculate Overton’s Guidelines sentencing range, it did not exclude other types of drugs from that calculation. Overton admitted that the object of the conspiracy was to “manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances including marijuana and heroin.” The plea agreement stated that the advisory Guidelines sentencing range would be “based upon factors determined to be present in the case, which include, but are not limited to . . . [t]he type and quantity of drugs involved in the offense.” The parties did not stipulate to Overton’s base offense level, but instead agreed “that the conspiracy involved more than 100 grams of heroin and more than 100 kilograms of marijuana the exact amount of drugs to be attributed to the defendant (above the amount admitted here) will be determined by the court at the time of sentencing based upon U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.” -5- Moreover, the plea agreement reserved to both parties the right to “make whatever comment and evidentiary offer they deem appropriate at the time of sentencing . . . , provided that such offer or comment does not violate any other provision of this Plea Agreement.” We conclude that the government did not violate any provision of the plea agreement when it presented evidence that Overton distributed cocaine. See United States v. Leach, 491 F.3d 858, 864 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the government did not breach the plea agreement because it “did not advocate for anything inconsistent with the stipulations of the plea agreement; it advocated for something that was not resolved by the plea agreement”). We disagree with Overton’s contention that our decisions in United States v. Lara, 690 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2012), and United States v. DeWitt, 366 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2004), control here. In those cases, “we held that the Government breached a plea agreement when it stipulated to a drug quantity and corresponding base offense level and then initiated an effort at the sentencing hearing to obtain a higher drug quantity and base offense level.” See United States v. Noriega, 760 F.3d 908, 911 (8th Cir. 2014). In this case, the government did not stipulate to a drug type or quantity or to a base offense level. The parties merely agreed that the conspiracy involved at least 100 grams of heroin and 100 kilograms of marijuana—the drug types and quantities charged in the indictment—and allowed the district court to determine the drugs and drug quantities to be attributed to Overton at sentencing. See United States v. Guardado, 863 F.3d 991, 993 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding that the government did not breach the plea agreement when it urged the district court to sentence the defendant based on a quantity of drugs greater than the amount to which the defendant stipulated in the factual basis statement of the plea agreement, because the plea agreement did not specify the amount of drugs that would be used to calculate the defendant’s sentencing range and it allowed both parties “to present at sentencing any evidence and argument on issues not explicitly agreed to or decided in the document”). -6- Overton next argues that the district court erred in determining his base offense level. He contends that the district court should not have included cocaine in its drug quantity calculation because any cocaine distribution did not constitute relevant conduct. According to Overton, the alleged cocaine distribution occurred well before he entered into the conspiracy to distribute heroin and marijuana. Overton also challenges the credibility of the confidential informants who told law enforcement that Overton distributed cocaine after 2011. He notes that law enforcement found no cocaine or cocaine residue in any of its searches. The base offense level for Overton’s conspiracy conviction is based upon drug quantity. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). “[I]n a drug distribution case, quantities and types of drugs not specified in the count of conviction are to be included in determining the offense level if they were part of the same course of conduct or part of a common scheme or plan as the count of conviction”—that is, if they were part of the defendant’s relevant conduct. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. background. Factors to be considered in determining whether uncharged conduct is part of a common scheme or plan include the similarity, regularity, and temporal proximity of the charged and uncharged conduct. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.5(B)(ii). We review the district court’s relevant conduct findings for clear error. United States v. Ault, 446 F.3d 821, 823 (8th Cir. 2006). The district court did not clearly err in finding that Overton’s cocaine distribution was relevant conduct. Overton admitted in his plea agreement that the conspiracy to distribute marijuana and heroin began “[s]ometime prior to October of 2013.” Law enforcement officers testified at sentencing that confidential informants, whom the officers found to be reliable, had purchased cocaine from Overton from 2011 to 2012 and from 2013 to early 2014. A witness testified that Overton had supplied him with cocaine for distribution from 2011 until the witness was arrested in 2013. The witness further testified that the conspiracy changed while he was in prison. Upon his release in 2016, “[i]t was no longer crack cocaine and cocaine, it was strictly marijuana.” Another witness testified that Overton had taught him how -7- to cook cocaine into crack cocaine and that he had purchased cocaine from Overton from 2009 until the witness’s arrest in 2011. The government’s evidence thus showed that Overton’s conduct with respect to cocaine distribution and the charged conspiracy involved some of the same participants and partly overlapped in time. The record supports the court’s credibility findings, as well as its finding that Overton was involved in an “ongoing criminal conspiracy to distribute narcotics,” in which the drugs distributed “change[d] over time, but the players stayed the same.”