Opinion ID: 145566
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reconsideration of Cottier I

Text: In Robertson Oil, this court, sitting en banc, concluded that the court  should not accept a party's motion for rehearing en banc of a decision after a second remand to open up the entire litigation. 14 F.3d at 376 n. 5 (emphasis added). Specifically, the court observed that [t]he dissent's willing acceptance of this opportunity reveals a different view of the principles of the law of the case which a majority of the judges of this court so firmly endorsed in our order denying rehearing en banc in Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Elgin Warehouse and Equipment, 4 F.3d 567, 573 (8th Cir.1993). Indeed, the dissent would take this rehearing of Robertson III to vacate Robertson I, in which we denied rehearing, and vacate Robertson II, in which we denied rehearing, and remand the case for a new trial. Id. The majority is correct that the view expressed in Robertson Oil is contrary to the prevailing view among our sister circuits that [a] ruling by a panel ... does not ... establish the law of the case if a later appeal is heard by the court en banc. 18B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478.2 (2d ed.2002). The prevailing view maintains that [a] court en banc surely is free to limit the matters it considers en banc, and may exercise its discretion to refuse reconsideration of some issues resolved by a panel on an earlier appeal. There is no reason why en banc reconsideration of all issues must follow the determination that one or more issues in a case warrant the grudgingly rationed resource of en banc consideration. All ordinary law-of-the-case concerns supplement this particular concern. Nonetheless, the court en banc has a special authority that supports a special freedom to redetermine important issues without feeling bound in the same way as successive panels. Should successive appeals in the same case come to be heard by the court en banc, there is force in the view that ordinary law-of-the-case principles should apply. The en banc court, however, has a special authority and responsibility for the law of the circuit, and may properly assert an extra measure of freedom to reconsider important issues. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). But even if this court, sitting en banc, possesses the power to overrule any panel decision that a majority of the active judges believes was wrongly decided, Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 590 F.2d 433, 437 n. 9 (2d. Cir.1978) (en banc), including in cases where prior en banc review of the panel's decision was previously denied, the relevant question is under what circumstances the court should exercise this discretionary power. I respectfully suggest that we should not exercise such power if a party would be seriously prejudiced as a result, id., or if reconsideration of a prior panel's opinion would undermine stability in the lawa sort of permanence and sureness in decision apart from the make-up or composition of the particular tribunal so far as the person of the Judges is concerned, Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Roosth, 306 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir.1962). As the Fifth Circuit explained: In more tranquil days and times, an appeal from a second trial would be heard by the same Court as the first appeal. Now, that is highly unlikely, and where it occurs, it isat least in this Courtdue entirely to the laws of chance. That puts a premium on multiple appeals. That is so because, without implying any improper purpose to litigants or their counsel, or acknowledging anything more than, as human beings, Judges will unavoidably have differences in emphasis, approach, or views on close questions in given areas, if the practice is followed for each succeeding panel to arrive at its own decisions, the losing party on the first appeal will naturally strive to bring it back a second, or a third, or a fourth time until all are exhausted. This possibility involves something other than simply more grist for our mill and as to which we should be indifferent.    We think that in a multi-Judge Court it is most essential that it acquire an institutional stability by which the immediate litigants of any given case, and equally important, the bar who must advise clients or litigants in situations yet to come, will know that in the absence of most compelling circumstances, the decision on identical questions, once made, will not be re-examined and redecided merely because of a change in the composition of the Court or of the new panel hearing the case. Id. at 114 (emphasis added). In the present case, I conclude that nothing about this case warrants our exercising the undoubted power to overrule the prior decision reached by the Court on the first appeal. On the contrary, any effort to re-examine the merits and now declare a resulteither the same or a different oneindependent of the former decision leads to consequences much more serious to the permanent, objective, administration of justice under law than any supposed individualized injustice to one or all of the litigants. Id. First, neither party asked this court to reconsider the prior panel decision in Cottier I; instead, the en banc court sua sponte raised the question. Second, no factual circumstances have changed since Cottier I was decided to justify reconsideration of the panel's opinion; instead, a majority of the court sitting three years laterwould merely apply the law to the same facts differently. We should not encourage parties to bring multiple appeals in the same litigation in the hope that the en banc court will overrule long-established prior panel opinions in that litigation. See Lincoln, 306 F.2d at 114. Lastly, reconsideration of Cottier I unfairly prejudices plaintiffs. Plaintiffs commenced the instant litigation on April 3, 2002. Cottier, 466 F.Supp.2d at 1181. The district court's decision rejecting plaintiffs' claims was entered on March 22, 2005. See March 2005 Order. The appeal in Cottier I was orally argued on January 9, 2006, and the panel filed its opinion, as corrected, on May 8, 2006. This court denied rehearing en banc on June 28, 2006. Thus, at the time this case was orally argued to the en banc court on September 23, 2009, over three years elapsed since Cottier I was first submitted to this court. During this period of time, plaintiffs have functioned with the belief that they established the City's § 2 liability under the VRA. No compelling circumstances, such as changed facts or law, justify reexamining and redeciding Cottier I. Indeed, applying Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, this case, at its present posture, neither presents a necessity to secure or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions nor involves a question of exceptional importance. [6]