Opinion ID: 1254804
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Fair representation of the group in relation to the number of such persons in the community.

Text: (5a) It is the second requirement of Duren that the Attorney General claims defendant has not adequately demonstrated: that the representation of the studied group in the jury pool is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community. The Attorney General claims that the primary flaw in defendant's statistical evidence is that it improperly compares the percentage of each cognizable group in the jury pool to the group's proportion of the total population rather than to its proportion among the group eligible to vote. The Attorney General implores this court to reject summarily any attempt to demonstrate disparate representation on the jury venire unless it is based on a comparison of ethnic breakdown among those registered to vote against the ethnic breakdown of the venire. Respondent misconstrues the thrust of defendant's argument. Defendant does not claim that the jury venires do not comprise a fair cross-section of the voter registration list. Defendant claims, and has produced statistical evidence showing, that there is a large and increasing proportion of the general population that fails to register to vote, and that the proportion of minorities failing to register is larger than that for the general population. The national figures show that in 1972, 27.7 percent of those eligible to vote did not register. In 1976, the percentage of unregistereds increased to 33.3 percent and in 1978 to 37.4 percent. For minority groups, the percentage of eligible persons registering to vote is significantly below that of the general population. [6] Thus, use of voter registration lists as the sole source of selection results in underrepresentation of minorities on jury venires as well as underinclusion of the general population, many of whom, though otherwise eligible to serve as jurors, fail to register to vote. Despite the known risk of drawing unrepresentative juries, many counties have used voter registration lists as the source for venires because the qualifications of eligibility to vote are roughly equivalent to those for jury service. [7] Thus, use of a voter registration list provides a population that is pre-screened for jury eligibility. Respondent's specific objections to Dr. Butler's methods and the accuracy of his figures do not undermine the conclusion that a gross disparity exists. Respondent contends that the 1970 census figures were inaccurate, the 1975 figures were based on the 1970 figures, the assumptions regarding underrepresentation were based on inaccurate figures, the study compared the entire population rather than those eligible for jury service, and the study was conducted for too short a period of time to draw any positive conclusions. In addition to these criticisms, the Attorney General finds fault with examining those who appeared at the courthouse rather than the original contact pool. As to the inaccuracy of the 1970 census, the evidence indicates that the census figures were inaccurate because they tend to undercount cultural minorities. Thus, any inaccuracy in the figures used for comparison for 1970 would tend to result in a lesser showing of a cross-sectional disparity than actually exists. It may be true that the three-month period of the study is not as long as would be ideal to assure a greater degree of reliability in the conclusions. However, the period is of sufficient length to suggest a pattern of gross disparity, and no suggestion has been made that if the study were conducted over a longer period of time, different results would appear. (6) We also reject respondent's objection that defendant's expert only surveyed those appearing at the courthouse, and not the original contact pool, some of whom failed to appear or were excused for various reasons. The panel which tried defendant was drawn from those jurors who appeared. The representative character of those jurors, not of the original contact pool, is the proper basis for comparison with the county population figures. Criticism has been appropriately leveled at the use of total population figures as the comparison base for showing underrepresentation. ( People v. Lewis (1977) 74 Cal. App.3d 633, 646 [141 Cal. Rptr. 614]; People v. Mooring (1982) 129 Cal. App.3d 453 [181 Cal. Rptr. 71]; People v. Spears (1975) 48 Cal. App.3d 397, 404 [122 Cal. Rptr. 93]; People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal. App.3d 107, 128-129 [115 Cal. Rptr. 109], cert. den. 420 U.S. 994 [43 L.Ed.2d 677, 95 S.Ct. 1435].) However, such criticism of the statistical short-comings of the use of total population figures fails to acknowledge the difficulty in obtaining more refined comparison groups. As Professor Kairys has observed, eligible population figures are almost impossible to obtain. (Kairys, supra, 65 Cal.L.Rev. at pp. 785-786, fn. 63.) The difficulty of the Federal Bureau of the Census in attempting to determine the citizenship status of Hispanics is illustrative: A reliable estimate of the number of undocumented aliens residing in the United States is not available and is unlikely for the immediate future. (Rep. to Cong. by Comptroller General, Number of Undocumented Aliens Residing in the United States Unknown, GGD-81-56 (Apr. 6, 1981) pp. 3-4.) [8] In view of the difficulty in arriving at reliable figures for the jury eligible population for any particular cognizable class, total population figures have been accepted where the disparity resulting from the use of those figures is somewhat greater than if the narrower jury eligible group were used. [I]t may be so difficult to obtain full and accurate figures for `jury eligibles' that to require such figures would  at least in some cases  place an insuperable burden on defendant.... [W]e will be content with a somewhat greater disparity when general population figures are used, simply because they do not clearly reflect the proper measure for a fair cross section: the number of persons actually eligible for jury service under valid statutory qualifications. ( United States v. Butera (1st Cir.1970) 420 F.2d 564, 570, fn. 13.) Comparing the makeup of the actual jury pool with that of the entire population of persons presumptively eligible for jury service would be preferable to comparing with total population because if the cognizable class has a lower percentage of jury eligibles than the general population, a showing that that class' representation in the jury pool is less than the group's percentage of the general population does not necessarily show that the group is underrepresented. Nevertheless, because it may be difficult to obtain full and accurate figures for jury eligibles and to require such data may place an insuperable burden on a litigant, this preference must accede to tolerance. ( Foster v. Sparks (5th Cir.1975) 506 F.2d 805, 833, Appen., An Analysis of Jury Selection Decisions by Hon. Walter P. Gewin, U.S. Circuit Judge.) The question raised by the difficulty of producing statistics concerning the precise proportion of jury eligibles is who should bear the burden of proof on whether a disparity exists. In our view, although more refined statistics would be preferable if available, when they are not, it is sufficient for the defendant to show a significant disparity based on the use of total population figures. The burden then shifts to the state to either show that when the group total population is reduced to jury eligibles, no underrepresentation exists, or to justify the underrepresentation by showing that a significant state interest be manifestly and primarily advanced by those aspects of the jury-selection process, such as exemption criteria, that result in the disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive group. ( Duren v. Missouri, supra, 439 U.S. at pp. 367-368 [58 L.Ed.2d 579 at p. 589].) We believe that this approach is supported by decisions of the United States Supreme Court holding that a prima facie case of underrepresentation is made on the basis of a disparity between the cognizable group's representation on jury panels and the percentage of those groups in the community as shown by total population census figures. The jury challenge in Duren v. Missouri, supra, 439 U.S. 357, involved a Missouri law that granted women who so requested an automatic exemption from jury service. The high court held that petitioner had satisfied the second prong of the prima facie test by use of statistics showing that women comprised 54 percent of the adult community, but only 15 percent of the jury venires from which juries were chosen. It rejected the speculation of the Missouri Supreme Court that changing population patterns and unequal voter registration between men and women rendered the census figures an unreliable frame of reference. ( Id., at p. 365 [58 L.Ed.2d at p. 587].) The court responded to those criticisms by declaring that the fair-cross-section requirement involves a comparison of the makeup of jury venires or other sources from which jurors are drawn with the makeup of the community, not of voter registration lists. ( Duren, supra, at p. 365, fn. 23; italics in original.) Although a final conclusion as to whether the fair-cross-section requirement has been met should ideally be based on comparison to the jury eligible community, we believe that the quoted language of the high court supports the conclusion that the initial burden may be met by showing significant underrepresentation of the cognizable group based on figures showing its total population in the community as a whole. Castaneda v. Partida, supra, 430 U.S. 482 also supports the proposition that total population figures are sufficient to make a prima facie case of underrepresentation. Castaneda involved an equal protection challenge to the makeup of grand juries in Hildago County, Texas. The defendant in that case introduced statistical evidence based on the 1970 census showing that 79.1 percent of the population was Mexican-American, on the assumption that all persons of Spanish language or Spanish surname were Mexican-Americans. During an 11-year period, the average percentage of Spanishsurnamed grand jurors was 39 percent. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that defendant failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination in grand jury selection on the ground that there was no showing by defendant regarding how many of the females who served on the grand juries were Mexican-Americans married to men with Anglo-American surnames, how many Mexican-Americans were excused for reasons of age or health, or other legal reasons, and how many of those listed by the census would not have met the statutory qualifications of citizenship, literacy, sound mind, moral character, and lack of criminal record or accusation. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. at pp. 489-490 [51 L.Ed.2d at p. 507].) The United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the showing made by the defendant shifted the burden of proof to the State to dispel the inference of intentional discrimination. ( Id., at pp. 497-498 [51 L.Ed.2d at p. 512].) Presumably, the inference of intentional discrimination might have been dispelled by a showing by the state that no disparity would have resulted if the comparison had been made to the jury eligible population. Making its own calculation of the proportion of illegal aliens based on breakdowns of native and foreign parentage and birth, the court concluded that the percentage of Mexican-Americans was somewhat less than the figure produced by the defendant. The court continued to refer to the total population figures, however, particularly since the State has not shown why those figures are unreliable. (430 U.S. at p. 487, fn. 6 [51 L.Ed.2d at p. 506].) Similarly, in this case, there has been no showing beyond speculative assertions that the gross disparity evidenced by use of total population figures would be diminished were a comparison made with the jury eligible minority populations. The respondent also describes defendant's use of the comparative disparity method of showing underrepresentation as a resort to statistical contrivance, and asserts that courts have universally relied upon absolute disparity in deciding underrepresentation cases. But, even using the absolute disparity method, based on the 1980 census figures showing that Blacks comprise 12.6 percent and Hispanics 27.6 percent of the population of Los Angeles County, underrepresentation of 7.1 percent for Blacks and 24.2 percent for Hispanics results. Contrary to respondent's assertions, courts have recognized the inadequacy of measuring underrepresentation based merely on absolute disparity. (See, e.g., Bradley v. Judges of Super. Ct. for Los Angeles Cty. (9th Cir.1976) 531 F.2d 413, 416, fn. 8.) Experts who have studied the question conclude that the comparative disparity method is preferable. The theory of the comparative disparity method is simply stated. [I]n a fair, cross-sectional system, the probability of any eligible person being included in the source (or in the final pool) would be the same for every eligible person, regardless of race, ethnic background, sex, age, or socio-economic status. The comparative disparity standard measures representativeness by the percentage by which the probability of serving is reduced for people in a particular category or cognizable class. (Kairys, supra, 65 Cal.L.Rev. at p. 790.) The primary advantage of the comparative disparity method is that its results are not affected by the proportion of the population in the specified category. [9] Thus, for example, in this case using the 12.6 percent figure for Blacks, under respondent's theory, all Blacks could be excluded from jury venires without producing an absolute disparity violative of the fair-cross-section principle. Clearly, the Constitution could not tolerate such a result. Respondent asserts that random selection from a voter registration list as the sole source of potential jurors has been found constitutionally valid, citing People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 749-750 [102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 497 P.2d 1121], certiorari denied 410 U.S. 947 [35 L.Ed.2d 613, 93 S.Ct. 1382], and that to find selection of jury panels from voter registration lists violative of the fair-cross-section requirement necessitates overruling Sirhan. In Sirhan, however, this court held that [t]he use of voter registration lists as the sole source of jurors is not constitutionally invalid [citations], at least in the absence of a showing that the use of those lists resulted `in the systematic exclusion of a cognizable group or class of qualified citizens' [citations], or that there was `discrimination in the compiling of such voter registration lists.' [Citations.] ( Id., at pp. 749-750.) However, it is exactly the requirement of Sirhan regarding exclusion of a cognizable group that defendant has attempted to show. (7) Since Sirhan, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that unlike equal protection analysis, when the defendant alleges violation of the Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section principle, no showing of intent to discriminate is required. [E]qual protection challenges to jury selection and composition are not entirely analogous to the case at hand. In the cited cases, the significant discrepancy shown by the statistics not only indicated discriminatory effect but also was one form of evidence of another essential element of the constitutional violation  discriminatory purpose. Such evidence is subject to rebuttal evidence either that discriminatory purpose was not involved or such purpose did not have a determinative effect. [Citations.] In contrast, in Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section cases, systematic disproportion itself demonstrates an infringement of the defendant's interest in a jury chosen from a fair community cross section. The only remaining question is whether there is adequate justification for this infringement. ( Duren v. Missouri, supra, 439 U.S. 357, 368, fn. 26 [58 L.Ed.2d 579, 589].) (5b) We conclude that defendant has made a showing sufficient to satisfy the second prong of Duren, that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community. ( Duren, supra, 439 U.S. at p. 364 [58 L.Ed.2d at p. 587].)