Opinion ID: 2622532
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rhines was terminated when her position was eliminated in July 1993.

Text: The board treats the reorganization in July 1993 as the point of termination, while Rhines argues that the termination actually occurred on or about March 16, 1993. The statute does not define terminated. Rhines relies on a definition of terminated from Black's Law Dictionary noted by this court in M.L.D.  an ending, usually before the end of the anticipated term of the ... contract. [14] Yet, Black's also contains a definition for termination of employment, which it defines as a complete severance of relationship of employer and employee. [15] We conclude that the definition of termination of employment, requiring a complete severance between employer and employee, is the standard to be applied in employment cases. This conclusion is consistent with our decision in M.L.D., because in that case there was a complete severance of the employment relationship when the city sent a letter to M.L.D. informing him that he was terminated three months prior to the expiration of his contract. Black's definition of terminated used in M.L.D. begins with the qualifying statement, [w]ith respect to a lease or contract. [16] Such a definition was relevant in M.L.D. to point out that despite the contractual end date, the employment relationship did not continue after the city terminated his employment. However, that definition is not as useful as the definition of termination of employment because it is inapplicable to situations, like the one here, where there is no employment contract for a specified period of time. The definition of termination of employment is equally applicable to employment situations whether or not they are governed by contract. Rhines's employment is properly understood as terminating when she was laid off at the end of July 1993. Rhines's injuries in March 1993 did not cut off ties with her employer. Subsequent to her injury she requested a leave of absence, called the office on several occasions to talk to the office manager, and applied and interviewed for the fiscal officer job in order to hold the position open for her. The events after Rhines's injury do not show a complete severance or an end of the relationship between Rhines and UAF. Rhines goes on to argue that even though she might have been actually terminated for reasons other than her disability, the statute is intended to provide benefits for those who suffer the sort of disability that leads to termination of employment. She suggests that the actual reason for termination is irrelevant because her disability was the sort that would lead to termination eventually and was thus deserving of disability benefits. In part, Rhines relies upon two cases, Estate of Ensley v. Anglo Alaska Construction, Inc. [17] and State Public Employees Retirement Board v. Cacioppo, [18] to support her argument that events occurring subsequent to injury do not defeat benefits coverage. In Ensley, the claimant's workers' compensation payments for a work-related back injury were discontinued because he was subsequently stricken with non-work-related cancer. [19] We held that it was error not to consider whether the back injury constituted a disability regardless of the cancer. [20] Similarly, in Cacioppo, we held that a firefighter could recover occupational disability benefits even though his injury was arguably caused by both occupational and non-occupational injuries. [21] However, those cases are not relevant here for two reasons. First, each of them considers what caused the injury rather than what caused termination of employment. Specifically, they analyzed whether the claimed injuries were work-related or occupational despite subsequent events or additional injuries. The question whether Rhines's injury is occupational is not relevant to this appeal: There is no question that the injury is occupational. The issue is whether Rhines was terminated because of her injury. Second, the cases cited by Rhines discuss the proximate cause question of whether the work-related injuries were significant enough to merit some award of benefits. We instructed that the initial work-related injury should be considered when it is one of several causes of the disability. [22] However, Rhines has not shown that her disability was one of the several actual causes of her termination. Until she establishes actual causation, these cases are not relevant. Rhines contends that since her injuries amounted to an occupational disability, she should collect whether or not those injuries actually led to her termination. Yet the same argument could be raised by almost everyone who satisfies the injury requirement of AS 39.35.680(26). Anyone who has a condition that presumably permanently prevents an employee from satisfactorily performing the employee's usual duties for an employer or the duties of another comparable position [23] will almost certainly be prevented from continuing work as a result. Rhines's argument would effectively read the if employment is terminated because of language out of the statute and make the only requirement the existence of a total and permanent disability. [24] Such a reading would run against the plain language of the statute as well as previous decisions of this court applying the requirement that termination occur because of the disability. [25] In addition, this would violate the maxim that all sections of an act are to be construed together so that all have meaning. [26] We conclude that Rhines was terminated when her employer made a clear statement that the employment relationship was discontinued. Therefore, the examination of legal causation must focus on Rhines's termination as a result of the department's reorganization in July 1993.