Opinion ID: 2624540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: denial of motion to sequester witnesses

Text: Prior to the commencement of trial testimony, Brinklow moved to sequester the witnesses. The trial court noted that there was authority to sequester witnesses at a preliminary hearing but opined that in the absence of an agreement from the State, the district court did not have authority to order witness sequestration at trial. Accordingly, when the prosecutor objected, the trial court summarily denied the sequestration motion. A trial court has discretion to order the sequestration of witnesses. See State v. Heath, 264 Kan. 557, 588-90, 957 P.2d 449 (1998). Therefore, as the Court of Appeals noted, the trial court was clearly mistaken about its authority to grant the motion to sequester witnesses. Brinklow, slip op. at 6. Ordinarily, this court reviews a trial court's sequestration decision for an abuse of discretion, and absent evidence that the defendant was prejudiced by a witness' presence, the decision will not be reversed on appeal. State v. Dunn, 243 Kan. 414, 428, 758 P.2d 718 (1988). However, we have clarified that the highly deferential abuse of discretion standard is affected by the district court's failure to properly consider or apply the correct legal standard. See State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 38, 127 P.3d 986 (2006). Likewise, the district court's failure to exercise its discretionary authority can be grounds for reversal. See State v. Anderson, 40 Kan.App.2d 403, Syl. ¶ 5, 192 P.3d 673 (2008) (trial court's deference to jailer's decision as to whether the defendant should remain shackled while in court was a failure to exercise court's own discretion and was therefore an abuse of that discretion). Notwithstanding the trial court's application of an erroneous legal standard and the corresponding failure to exercise its discretion, the Court of Appeals found that reversal was not required because Brinklow had not shown that he was prejudiced by the error. Specifically, the opinion declared that Brinklow fails to cite any testimony demonstrating that witnesses tailored their testimony based on the testimony of others, the problem that sequestration is aimed to prevent. Brinklow, slip op. at 6. A review of the mother's trial testimony reveals that she tailored her testimony to that of the victim, A.C. The mother was present during A.C.'s testimony in which A.C. described the particulars of the alleged criminal acts. In the direct examination of the mother, the prosecutor did not ask the mother to relate what A.C. had told her about the alleged abusive touching. Rather, the prosecutor asked, Did she tell you, or describe for you the same thing she testified to earlier today? The response was simply, Yes. The mother did not merely tailor her testimony to match that of A.C.; the mother adopted A.C.'s testimony by reference. The prosecutor's question was tantamount to asking the mother if her testimony would be the same as A.C.'s testimony. One would be hard-pressed to conceive of a more direct example of one witness tailoring his or her testimony to that of another witness. Moreover, at a pretrial motion conference, Brinklow's attorney advised the district court that part of the defense strategy was to establish that the mother had a great deal of influence over A.C. Obviously, the defense had to establish that the mother and A.C. were acting together in making a false accusation. That task was hampered by both witnesses being in the courtroom together, so that the mother could simply adopt her daughter's testimony. In addition, Brinklow complains that he was prejudiced by the trial presence of Betty Jo Mitchell. She testified to being present in the Brinklow home on May 27, 2001, when A.C. related the accusations to the police officer. However, the police officer did not place Mitchell at the residence during the interview. Brinklow argues that he was prevented from challenging Mitchell's presence at the residence by testing her knowledge of what transpired that night because Mitchell was able to learn what happened by observing the testimony of both A.C. and the mother. The Court of Appeals did not specifically address this complaint. Given our ruling on the mother's testimony, we need not analyze the prejudicial effect on Mitchell's testimony. In conclusion, the district court erred in ruling that it did not have authority to sequester witnesses and consequently erred in failing to exercise its discretion to determine whether witnesses should have been sequestered in this case. The record reveals that the State elicited testimony from the mother which was directly tailored to the testimony of the victim. We cannot declare that the defendant did not suffer any prejudice from the trial court's error. See State v. Hebert, 277 Kan. 61, 96, 82 P.3d 470 (2004) (prejudice shown when the error could have affected the result of the trial).