Opinion ID: 2817828
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Unjust Enrichment & Massachusetts 93A

Text: Finally, we affirm dismissal of Philibotte's remaining claims for unjust enrichment and violations of Massachusetts 93A. A claim for unjust enrichment generally cannot stand where there is an existing, express contract, unless the contract See CCCDA, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140D, § 1; RISSA, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 255D, § 1. 12 This is particularly true where, as here, existing state precedent governing RISSA may complicate the interaction between the Massachusetts exemption for the CCCDA and the scope of federal TILA coverage for this type of transaction. Cf. McKenna, 693 F.3d at 211 (noting the existence of unsettled questions as to what federal rights are displaced and what others remain where, as is the case with Massachusetts, the Federal Reserve has exempted a state from various TILA's provisions on the grounds that state law establishes 'substantially similar' requirements); McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418, 422 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that CCCDA is to be construed similarly to TILA); Silva, 912 N.E.2d at 951 (interpreting analogous definition under RISSA); Saia, 2012 WL 1145913, at  (determining whether lease of hot water heater was a credit sale under CCCDA without straightforwardly applying standard articulated in Silva). - 17 - is not valid. See Okmyansky v. Herbalife Int'l of Am., Inc., 415 F.3d 154, 162 (1st Cir. 2005) (collecting cases); see also Zarum v. Brass Mill Materials Corp., 134 N.E.2d 141, 143 (Mass. 1956). Philibotte contends that the contract's existence does not bar her claim because Nisource procured the contract by fraud. Specifically, she argues that Nisource mischaracterized the transaction as a lease when the transaction was, in fact, a disguised credit sale or retail installment sale to which disclosure requirements apply. But we have already rejected her contention that the lease was, in fact, a credit sale or retail installment sale agreement within the meaning of the relevant statutes. Because Philibotte does not allege any other fraud that might render the lease invalid, the existing lease agreement bars her claim for unjust enrichment.13 See Okmyansky, 415 F.3d at 162. Philibotte's 93A claim fails for a similar reason: the only basis she offers for her 93A claim is that [a] violation of CCCDA or the RISSA is as a matter of law a violation of [93A]. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140D, § 34. We have already rejected her contention that the lease violated either the CCCDA or RISSA, and so affirm dismissal of her 93A claim. 13 Philibotte does not develop -- and so has waived -- any argument that the lease was a disguised conditional sale even if it does not meet the statutory definitions for (disguised) credit or retail installment sales under CCCDA and RISSA. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). - 18 - Affirmed. Costs are assessed against Philibotte. - 19 -