Opinion ID: 2309465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Compensability Issue

Text: Evidence adduced at the hearing on remand supports the Commissioner's findings of fact, as facts found additional to those previously described in Oliver I, that: (1) [t]he private road [Head of the Falls located on the employer's premises] was icy and slippery; (2) there were snowbanks about six (6) feet high on each side of the Head of the Falls Road and said snowbanks extended into the intersection of the Falls Road and Front Street [the public street]; (3) these snowbanks created a hazard to petitioner's egress from the premises of the employer on to Front Street because they obstructed petitioner's vision of traffic approaching along Front Street from petitioner's left; and (4) the hazard thus created contributed to the automobile collision causing petitioner's injury. We conclude that the case now before us is precedentially governed by the decision in Oliver I since the Commissioner's controlling findings make plain that a hazard created by a condition existing on the employer's premises was a cause of petitioner's injury. [1] That the hazard involved was not unique to Wyandotte employeeswhether because high snowbanks are a fact of life during Maine winters or because non-employees sometimes use Head of the Falls Roadis without legal consequence. It was the fact of petitioner's employment which required her to make the egress from the Head of the Falls Road situated on the premises of her employer onto the public street, Front Street. On this predicate the thrust of Oliver I is that a hazard to the employee's egress from her work situs created by a condition on the premises constituting the work situs is fairly attributable to the employment. Consequently, as is generally the rule in regard to dangers to employees arising from their employment, it is immaterial to the issue of compensability that the dangers happen to be of a kind commonly confronted by non-employees. [2] Notwithstanding, however, that (1) the snowbanks thus created an employment-related hazard to petitioner, and (2) the Commissioner found that this employment-related hazard causally contributed to the accident producing petitioner's injury, the employer and insurance carrier contend that the injury is not compensable because the hazard created by the snowbanks was not the controllingly effective cause of the accident in which petitioner was injured. [3] The contention is unsound. It has always been the law of this State that an injury arises out of employment when there exists a causal connection between conditions of the employee's employment and the injury received. Sullivan's Case, 128 Me. 353, 147 A. 431 (1929); Washburn's Case, 123 Me. 402, 123 A. 180 (1924); Martin v. City of Biddeford, 138 Me. 26, 20 A.2d 715 (1941). This rule was reiterated in Oliver I and underlay the decision of the Court that Mrs. Oliver's injury would be compensable if a hazard on the employer's premises was in fact a cause of the employee being injured after she had reached the street. (p. 863) (emphasis supplied) The Commissioner found, here,in findings supported by the evidencethat an employment-related hazard contributed to petitioner's accident and injury. Since it is not legally requisite that the employment-related hazard be a predominant causational factor, the causational element of compensability was sufficiently established. There was no error in the Commission's conclusion that petitioner's injury was compensable.