Opinion ID: 1581908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Priority for Appointment

Text: Barbara and Paul also contend that if a conservator was necessary, then the county court should have appointed Barbara and Paul because Barbara is Robert's daughter, the primary beneficiary of his will, and one of his attorneys in fact. Tricia and Lee argue that the county court correctly found that it was in the best interests of Robert to pass over Barbara and Paul. They contend that the bank is in a better position to manage Robert's property. They also contend that Robert is entitled to a full accounting from Barbara and Paul and a recovery of all property and funds which have been improperly gifted or otherwise taken by them. Section 30-2639(b) provides in relevant part: (b) Persons who are not disqualified under subsection (a) of this section and who exhibit the ability to exercise the powers to be assigned by the court have priority for appointment as conservator in the following order: (1) A person nominated most recently by one of the following methods: .... (ii) A person acting under a power of attorney or durable power of attorney; or .... (5) An adult child of the protected person. Because Barbara is Robert's only living adult child and because Barbara and Paul were Robert's attorneys in fact, they had priority for appointment as Robert's conservator under the statute. Platte Valley National Bank had no priority for appointment under § 30-2639(b). But subsection (c) of § 30-2639 allows a court, acting in the best interest of the protected person, [to] pass over a person having priority and appoint a person having lower priority or no priority. Section 30-2639 instructs a court that the best interests of the protected person are the paramount consideration in making an appointment for a conservatorship, the purpose of which is to protect an estate for the owner's benefit, not the potential heirs or devisees. See, e.g., In re Guardianship and Conservatorship of Sim, 225 Neb. 181, 403 N.W.2d 721 (1987); In re Estate of Wagner, 220 Neb. 32, 367 N.W.2d 736 (1985). Other jurisdictions have concluded that the appointment of a disinterested third party is in a ward's best interests when the applicant with priority has interests adverse to those of the protected person. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Hebeisen, 347 N.W.2d 62 (Minn.App.1984) (affirming trial court's appointment of trust officer as guardian of adult person and her estate when court had reasonable basis to believe that applicant, who had informally managed estate for several years, had misappropriated large sums of money from estate and shared it among her siblings). See, also, Couch v. Couch, 824 S.W.2d 65 (Mo.App.1991); Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, 441 Pa.Super. 230, 657 A.2d 34 (1995). The evidence in this case indicates that Barbara and Paul may be accountable to the conservator of Robert's estate for all of the property transferred to them or members of their family. See § 30-2667(1) (attorney in fact is accountable to subsequently appointed fiduciary). Thus, the county court had a reasonable basis for believing that Barbara's self-interest in her potential liability as an attorney in fact would conflict with a fiduciary's duty of absolute fidelity to Robert's welfare and the interests of his estate. See Neb.Rev. Stat. § 30-2653(c)(24) (Reissue 1995) (giving conservators power to prosecute ... actions, claims or proceedings in any jurisdiction for the protection of estate assets). Moreover, the court had little reason to believe that Barbara and Paul would protect the estate's assets as conservators when they had already made unauthorized transfers to themselves under their durable power of attorney. When reviewing an order for errors appearing on the record, the appellate court's inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. In re Estate of Jakopovic, 261 Neb. 248, 622 N.W.2d 651 (2001). Under these facts, the county court properly found it was in Robert's best interests to pass over Barbara and Paul despite their statutory priority. Accordingly, the county court did not err in dismissing the cross-petition filed by Barbara and Paul.