Opinion ID: 2821046
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rico’s Appeal

Text: A. Rico first raises issues regarding the constitutionality and the proper interpretation of § 1591. Rico attacks the statute on the basis that it is void for vagueness. We disagree. In the first place, he did not raise this argument before the district court 1 See 18 U.S.C. § 1591. All references to § 1591 hereafter are to 18 U.S.C. § 1591. Moreover, unless otherwise stated, all references to § 1591 are to its provisions before it was amended on May 29, 2015, by the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, § 108, 129 Stat. 227, 238–39. 2 See 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c); see also id. § 1591. 2 and we therefore review for plain error,3 but the standard is of little importance because whether reviewing for plain error or on our usual de novo standard,4 there was no error in the first place. “A conviction fails to comport with due process if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited . . . .” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1845, 170 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2008). We must examine the statute “as applied to the defendant.” United States v. Jae Gab Kim, 449 F.3d 933, 942 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Williams, 553 U.S. at 304, 128 S. Ct. at 1845; United States v. Purdy, 264 F.3d 809, 811 (9th Cir. 2001). Rico’s conviction is based on the provisions of § 1591 which preclude knowingly enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, obtaining or maintaining a person “knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, . . . that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act,”5 with the addition that “[i]n a prosecution . . . in which the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person . . . the 3 See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776, 123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993); United States v. Mitchell, 568 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2009). 4 See United States v. Mincoff, 574 F.3d 1186, 1191–92 (9th Cir. 2009). 5 § 1591(a). 3 Government need not prove that the defendant knew that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.”6 Rico first argues that the whole of § 1591(a) & (c) is vague because two other courts of appeals have construed the statute in different ways. Compare United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 31–32 (2d Cir. 2012), with United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1281–82 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 422, 190 L. Ed. 2d 305 (2014). We agree that their interpretations differ. However the mere fact that “‘other courts of appeals differ in their definitions of a term[] does not mean that the term is void for vagueness.’” United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1434 (9th Cir. 1994). As it is, we do not think the statute is unduly vague as applied to Rico. While we find the Second Circuit’s explication of the provisions persuasive, we need not decide the question because on either reading, the facts of this case would bring Rico well within the statutory terms. We do note, however, that Congress has now amended the statute to comport with the Second Circuit’s approach. See Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, 129 Stat. 227; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) (2015) (if a defendant had the opportunity to observe the victim, “the Government need not prove that the defendant knew, or recklessly disregarded the fact” of the victim's age). Thus, this 6 § 1591(c). 4 issue should not trouble courts in the future. Rico also argues that the phrase “a reasonable opportunity to observe” is itself impermissibly vague and ambiguous. However, the terms used in the phrase “are not esoteric or complicated terms devoid of common understanding.” United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2014). Again, even if there could be circumstances when the statute would be unduly vague as to a defendant, the facts and circumstances of this case place it well within the plain prohibitions of the statute. Rico next attacks the district court’s instructions regarding the elements of the crimes. The district court instructed the jury in accordance with the construction of the statute approved in Robinson. Rico’s principal argument is, in effect, that the district court should have used the construction set forth in Mozie. Here, again, we see no reason to resolve that particular dispute. Based on the evidence before the jury, even if the instruction was in error, that error was harmless because “it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.” United States v. Anchrum, 590 F.3d 795, 801 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The evidence that Rico knew, had a reasonable opportunity to observe, and recklessly disregarded the victim’s age was powerful. Thus, any error was harmless beyond a 5 reasonable doubt. See United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Rico also argues that the district court erred when it imported its definition of the substantive crime into the conspiracy count, because in charging conspiracy the indictment did not specifically mention the § 1591(c) portion of the substantive crime. That, he asserts, constituted a constructive amendment of the indictment. See United States v. Hartz, 458 F.3d 1011, 1019–20 (9th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Garcia-Paz, 282 F.3d 1212, 1215–16 (9th Cir. 2002). We disagree. An indictment count that charges conspiracy “need not allege the offense that is the object of the conspiracy with the same precision as would be necessary where that offense is itself the crime charged.” United States v. Lo, 231 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2000). There can be little doubt that, taken as a whole, reasonable observation was an evident part of both counts of the indictment in the eyes of the grand jury. See United States v. Berger, 473 F.3d 1080, 1103 (9th Cir. 2007). Moreover, Rico could not have been misled or blind-sided. See Hartz, 458 F.3d at 1022–23. B. Other Issues (1) Rico argues that the district court erred when it admitted as a business record a letter sent by Time Warner to a government agent in response 6 to a subpoena, which was seeking an internet protocol address. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). We agree. The letter was not prepared in the regular course of business; it was prepared for use in litigation. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 321–22, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2538, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2009); United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1238 (9th Cir. 1985). Thus, it was improperly admitted. However, it added very little to the evidentiary mix, and did not substantially affect the verdict. See United States v. Morales, 720 F.3d 1194, 1199, 1203 (9th Cir. 2013). In short, the error was harmless. (2) Rico also asserts error in the district court’s sustaining of an objection to a question asked of the victim by Rico’s counsel. We disagree. The district court did not abuse its discretion7 when it sustained the objection on the basis that the question sought irrelevant evidence.8 The district court had previously indicated that it would allow questions about the victim’s mode of dress if they were limited to the relevant time frame. The question was not so limited. (3) Rico finally claims that we should reverse because the district court erred when it quashed a subpoena directed by his counsel to the counsel for a co-defendant. The subpoena sought materials and testimony with 7 See United States v. Alvarez, 358 F.3d 1194, 1216 (9th Cir. 2004). 8 See United States v. Shabani, 48 F.3d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1995). 7 which to impeach the testimony of the co-defendant. While, as we will explain hereafter, we do not find an abuse of discretion,9 even if we did, the error would be harmless.10 The subpoena was issued in order to obtain information with which to impeach the witness if she appeared to testify untruthfully, which she did not. Thus, Rico neither suffered nor points to any prejudice. Therefore, we affirm Rico’s conviction.