Opinion ID: 220788
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bruton and Progeny

Text: Trials with multiple defendants create opportunities for violations of the Sixth Amendment right of cross-examination. Bruton held that, in a joint trial, a defendant's right under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is violated by introducing a non-testifying codefendant's confession that implicates the defendant as a participant in the crime. Such statements violate the Sixth Amendment even when the jury is explicitly instructed that the testimony at issue is only to be considered as evidence against the codefendant. [10] This is because jurors in joint trials cannot be expected to perform the overwhelming task of considering a codefendant's confession in determining the guilt or innocence of the declarant and then of ignoring it in determining the guilt or innocence of any codefendants.... Bruton, 391 U.S. at 131, 88 S.Ct. 1620. [11] In these circumstances, jury instructions are intrinsically ineffective because the inadmissible confession cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors. Id. at 129, 88 S.Ct. 1620. The Supreme Court elaborated on Bruton 's core holding in a case issued the same day, Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 194, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987). When a defendant's confession substantially interlocks with the non-testifying codefendant's confession, this exacerbates the potential for a Bruton violation rather than rectifying it. Id. at 192, 107 S.Ct. 1714. This is because it is not the reliability of the codefendant's confession that is at issue in Bruton situations, but the likelihood that the jury is not able to disregard it. Id. at 192-93, 107 S.Ct. 1714. The more interlocking the codefendant's confession, the less likely jurors will be capable of putting it out of their minds in deciding the defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. Thus, while a codefendant's confession will be relatively harmless if the incriminating story it tells is different from that which the defendant himself is alleged to have told, [it would be] enormously damaging if it confirms, in all essential respects, the defendant's alleged confession. Id. at 192, 107 S.Ct. 1714. The damage to the defendant might be less devastating if [he] were standing by his confession.... Id. (emphasis in original). However, in the real world of criminal litigation, [when] the defendant is seeking to avoid his confession, the damage is significant, like that in Bruton. Id. (emphasis in original). Two subsequent cases addressed the thorny issue of redacted statements of non-testifying codefendants. In Richardson v. Marsh, the Court held that when any reference to [the defendant's] existence has been removed and the confession bec[omes incriminating] only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial, limiting instructions may cure what would otherwise be a Bruton violation. 481 U.S. 200, 211, 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). While the testimony in Bruton directly named the defendant, in Richardson the confession was not incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked with the defendant's testimony. Id. at 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702. The Court noted that [w]here the necessity of such linkage is involved, it is a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction to disregard the evidence. Id. However, the distinction between directly naming a codefendant and indirect linkage is not rigid. Even redacted confessions that remove the defendant's name completely, using a blank space or neutral pronoun instead, may sometimes violate Bruton. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998). Redactions that simply replace a name with an obvious blank space or a word such as `deleted' or a symbol or other similarly obvious indications of alteration... so closely resemble Bruton 's unredacted statements that ... the law must require the same result. Id. at 192, 118 S.Ct. 1151. An obvious deletion is likely to call the jurors' attention specifically to the removed name and may overemphasize the importance of the confession's accusation. Id. at 193, 118 S.Ct. 1151. Jury instructions are likely to exacerbate the situation, as the instruction itself will provide an obvious reason for the [redaction]. Id. In limiting Richardson, Gray noted that inference [connecting a codefendant's statement to the defendant] pure and simple cannot make the critical difference between a Bruton violation and permissible testimony under Richardson. Id. at 195, 118 S.Ct. 1151. It is the  kind of, not the simple fact of, inference that might lead a jury to infer that testimony incriminated a codefendant in some redacted statements but not others. Id. at 196, 118 S.Ct. 1151 (emphases in original). Thus, context is relevant to determining whether a Bruton violation has occurred, regardless whether the challenged testimony has been redacted or curative instructions given. For example, our Court held in Vazquez v. Wilson, 550 F.3d 270 (3d Cir.2008), that even when neutral pronoun substitution or its equivalent is used (in that case, my boy or the other guy), if there is a strong implication that the non-testifying codefendant's confession refers to the defendant, it may still violate Bruton despite the substitution and use of jury instructions. [12] In addition, the number of codefendants that could be implicated in a Gray analysis, where redactions or substitutions have been used, is also important. Compare United States v. Richards, 241 F.3d 335, 341 (3d Cir.2001) ( Bruton violated where only three people were involved in crime) with Priester v. Vaughn, 382 F.3d 394, 400-01 (3d Cir.2004) (another guy did not implicate any particular person given that at least 15 persons were involved in the crime, and the placeholder used was bereft of any innuendo [linking] them to particular defendants, in contrast to Richards in which redactions were tantamount to an explicit reference to a codefendant). Under AEDPA's deferential review standard, our Court in Vazquez rejected the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's seeming bright-line rule that when terms like `my boy,' the `other guy,' or the `other man' are used [as substitutions,] ... there cannot be a Bruton violation. Vazquez, 550 F.3d at 281. Rather, as Vazquez instructs, using a bright line is an unreasonable application `of clearly established Federal law under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States' given the necessity of determining how strongly a codefendant's statement implicates the defendant and the likelihood that it would be disregarded by the jury. Id. at 282.