Opinion ID: 2683270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claims Against Brand Defendants

Text: Johnson next contends that the district court erred in dismissing her claims against Brand Defendants under Rule 12(b)(6). Johnson alleges that Brand Defendants are liable for providing false and misleading information and failing to warn medical providers as to the risks associated with long-term use of Reglan. Brand Defendants respond that Johnson’s claims are barred by the Louisiana Products Liability Act (“LPLA”) because Johnson never ingested Reglan manufactured by Brand Defendants, only generic metoclopramide. In dismissing Johnson’s claims, the district court reasoned that the LPLA provides the exclusive remedy against manufacturers in products liability suits under Louisiana law, and that Johnson could not maintain claims against Brand Defendants under the LPLA because Brand Defendants did not manufacture the generic metoclopramide that caused Johnson’s injuries. The district court further reasoned that Johnson’s claims also fail because “brand name drug manufacturers do not owe a continuing duty to consumers of the generic drug equivalent.” “We review a district court’s decision on a 12(b)(6) motion de novo, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Stokes v. Gann, 498 F.3d 483, 484 (5th Cir. 2007). To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 9 Case: 12-31011 Document: 00512696002 Page: 10 Date Filed: 07/11/2014 No. 12-31011 As a preliminary matter, Johnson moves to certify to the Louisiana Supreme Court the question of whether a brand-name manufacturer can be held liable for injuries caused by a plaintiff’s ingestion of a generic product that was neither manufactured nor distributed by the brand-name manufacturer. We may certify a determinative question of Louisiana law to the Louisiana Supreme Court if there is “no clear controlling precedent” of that court. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:72.1. However, “[a]s a general proposition we are chary about certifying question of law absent a compelling reason to do so.” Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 106 F.3d 1245, 1247 (5th Cir. 1997). Standing alone, “the absence of a definitive answer from the state supreme court on a particular question is not sufficient to warrant certification.” Id. “Neither is certification a proper avenue to change our binding precedent.” Id. Furthermore, “[t]he court should be slow to honor a request for certification from a party who chose to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 1248 (quoting 17A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248 (2d ed. 1988)). We conclude that certification is not warranted in this case. Our conclusion is informed by a number of considerations, including this court’s prior decision in Demahy v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 702 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 57 (2013); the numerous other decisions interpreting Louisiana law on this subject; 2 Johnson’s decision to file suit in federal court; and the text of the LPLA. 2 See, e.g., Whitener v. PLIVA, Inc., No. 10-1552, 2014 WL 1276489, at -7 (E.D.La. Mar. 27, 2014); Cooper v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-CV-929, 2010 WL 4318816, at -3 (M.D.La. Oct. 26, 2010); Craig v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 3:10-00227, 2010 WL 2649545, at -4 (W.D.La. May 26, 2010); Washington v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-01343, 2010 WL 450351, at  (W.D.La. Feb. 8, 2010); Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-0854, 2009 WL 4064103, at -5 (W.D.La. Nov. 23, 2009); Stanley v. Wyeth, Inc., 991 So. 2d 31, 35 (La. Ct. App. 2008). 10 Case: 12-31011 Document: 00512696002 Page: 11 Date Filed: 07/11/2014 No. 12-31011 Turning to the merits of Johnson’s appeal, our prior decision in Demahy resolves Johnson’s claims against Brand Defendants. In Demahy, we addressed nearly identical claims brought by a consumer of generic metoclopramide against brand-name manufacturers, including claims for misrepresentation, fraud, and violation of LUTPA. Demahy, 702 F.3d at 18081. Demahy appealed the district court’s denial of her Rule 59(e) motion for relief from the district court’s dismissal of her claims against the brand-name manufacturers in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Mensing. Id. at 182. We affirmed the district court’s ruling. In doing so, we reasoned that prior to Mensing, Louisiana law did not provide liability against brand-name manufacturers for injuries caused by a plaintiff’s ingestion of a generic product, and that nothing in Mensing altered this conclusion. Id. at 182-84. We wrote: The Louisiana Products Liability Act (“LPLA”) provides that it is the exclusive remedy for products liability suits, stating that “[a] claimant may not recover from a manufacturer for damage caused by a product on the basis of any theory of liability that is not set forth in this Chapter.” La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.52. Under the LPLA, recovery is not available against a manufacturer if the manufacturer did not produce the offending product. Thus, according to pre-Mensing Louisiana caselaw, Demahy’s claims against [the brand-name manufacturers] fail because they did not manufacture the medication she actually consumed. Id. at 182-83 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We further explained that “the Supreme Court’s decision in Mensing had no effect on Louisiana state law.” Id. at 184. Following Demahy, we conclude that Johnson’s claims against Brand Defendants are foreclosed by the LPLA. Brand Defendants, like the brandname manufacturers in Demahy, are “manufacturers” within the LPLA’s exclusivity provision. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.52 (“A claimant may not recover from a manufacturer for damage caused by a product on the basis of any theory of liability that is not set forth in this Chapter.”); see also La. Rev. 11 Case: 12-31011 Document: 00512696002 Page: 12 Date Filed: 07/11/2014 No. 12-31011 Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.53 (defining “manufacturer” as, inter alia, “a person or entity who is in the business of manufacturing a product for placement into trade or commerce”). Johnson argues that Brand Defendants are not “manufacturers” under the LPLA because they did not manufacture the product Johnson consumed. However, we rejected this same argument in Demahy. See Demahy, 702 F.3d at 183 n.4 (“Demahy argues that the LPLA . . . does not apply to her claims because Wyeth and Schwarz are not ‘manufacturers,’ given that they have no connection to the product she actually consumed. This argument is unavailing. The vast majority of decisions have held that the LPLA broadly applies to all suits involving injuries from products, and these decisions rejected the argument that common law tort claims can still be brought for injuries stemming from products under facts nearly identical to those in the current case.”); see also Lashley, 750 F.3d at 477 (“This argument fails because brand defendants are, indeed, manufacturers—and were they not, there would be no relationship on which to presume liability (since they did not design the drug).”). As a result, the LPLA provides Johnson’s exclusive remedy against Brand Defendants, and Johnson’s non-LPLA claims are barred. See Demahy, 702 F.3d at 183. To the extent that Johnson’s complaint can be construed as bringing claims against Brand Defendants under the LPLA, these claims fail because “recovery is not available under LPLA against a manufacturer if the manufacturer did not produce the offending product.” Id. at 182; see also Stahl v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 260-61 (5th Cir. 2002); Jefferson, 106 F.3d at 1252. Therefore, consistent with Demahy, we hold that Johnson’s claims against Brand Defendants fail under Louisiana law because Brand Defendants did not manufacture the medication Johnson consumed. Also consistent with Demahy, we conclude that, even if the LPLA did not apply, Johnson has not established that Brand Defendants owed Johnson a 12 Case: 12-31011 Document: 00512696002 Page: 13 Date Filed: 07/11/2014 No. 12-31011 duty of care. See Demahy, 702 F.3d at 183 n.4 (“[E]ven if the LPLA did not apply, Demahy’s tort claims would fail since [the brand-name manufacturers] did not manufacture the generic product giving rise to Demahy’s claims, and thus owed Demahy no duty of care.”); Stanley v. Wyeth, Inc., 991 So. 2d 31, 3435 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (“[A] name brand drug manufacturer owes no legal duty to the consumer of a generic equivalent of its drug.”); Fricke v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 618 So. 2d 473, 475 (La. Ct. App. 1993); see also Solomon v. Walgreen Co., 975 F.2d 1086, 1089 (5th Cir. 1992) (“This court is Erie-bound to apply state law as it currently exists, and may not change that law or adopt innovative theories of recovery.”). Thus, to the extent that Johnson’s claims rely on a duty of care, these claims fail for an additional reason as well. 3 Accordingly, we perceive no error in the district court’s dismissal of Johnson’s claims against Brand Defendants.