Opinion ID: 792181
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rejection of Psychological Evidence

Text: 26 Appellant next contends the district court committed an error of law when it substituted its lay opinion of his mental capacity in place of contrary evidence submitted by medical professionals. We cannot adopt this contention. In determining whether a downward departure is warranted on the basis of diminished capacity, a district court is not required to accept evidence concerning a defendant's mental and emotional states offered by defendant's own expert, but rather may rely on its own assessment of defendant's mental state based upon its observations, even when they conflict with those of the expert. See United States v. Leandre, 132 F.3d 796, 807 (D.C.Cir.1998). 27 Dr. Berrill administered a battery of tests that determined defendant had an IQ of 55, thus concluding that Valdez had mild mental retardation. While considering the psychological reports and this testimony, the district court relied on its own observations of Valdez and his proven criminal conduct in concluding that defendant's mental capacity was not sufficiently reduced to warrant a departure. The rejection of the conclusions of Valdez's experts is not an error of law because there is no rule that obliges a trial court to adopt expert testimony. See, e.g., United States v. White, 71 F.3d 920, 929 (D.C.Cir.1995) (holding that a district court may deny defendant's request for downward departure on grounds of diminished capacity and reject contrary expert testimony); United States v. Ramirez, 154 F.Supp.2d 774, 777 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (same). As a consequence, the sentencing court is free to make its own analysis of Valdez's condition, so long as such analysis is based upon findings that are not clearly erroneous. United States v. Silleg, 311 F.3d 557, 564 (2d Cir.2002). III The District Court's Factual Findings 28 Appellant also asserts he is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding because the district court's factual finding that defendant did not have mental and emotional afflictions that could serve as the basis of a downward departure for diminished capacity was clearly erroneous. In reviewing a district court's decision not to downwardly depart, we review for clear error the factual findings from which such a decision arose. Id.; Bonner, 313 F.3d at 112; United States v. Haynes, 985 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Mickens, 977 F.2d 69, 72 (2d Cir.1992). 29 We do not think the district court's findings in this case were clearly erroneous because they were well supported by the record evidence. The district court explicitly recognized that appellant had emotional and mental impairments, and simply questioned whether those impairments were of such severity as to support a diminished capacity downward departure. It concluded they were not. 30 The determination that the impairment was not severe was validated by various pieces of proof, including the nature of the fraudulent scheme. The scheme's complexity is manifested dramatically by the hundreds of written records kept by Valdez, proof that defendant was able to execute this fraudulent plan for a period of years by opening numerous accounts, going to such extreme lengths as assuming different identities, and by obtaining access to countries with high barriers to fraudulent entry. As such, it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to find that Valdez's abilities, as shown by his criminal conduct, were far from extremely limited. Although the results of Valdez's IQ test indicate otherwise, Dr. Berrill, the defendant's own expert, noted that defendant appeared to be distracted during his aptitude tests and was likely to have not done his best. The district court, in light of this, did not err in finding that Valdez malingered on the IQ tests. 31 Moreover, the evidence supported the district court's finding that appellant failed to establish the requisite causal link between his participation in the offense and his reduced mental capacity. Defendant maintained that his dependence upon others caused him to be taken advantage of. Yet, he told Dr. Berrill that he had refused to pay Guillermo, suggesting that Guillermo did not really exercise much, if any, control over him. This finding is bolstered by the Secret Service agents' observation of defendant operating on his own. Although appellant declared the person to whom he sold a card was actually Guillermo, the district court did not err in finding this incredible because it is illogical that Guillermo, the supposed teacher, would purchase a card from Valdez, the proclaimed student. 32 Valdez also insists his receipt of mental health treatment following his arrest warranted a departure for extraordinary rehabilitation. As previously stated, we do not ordinarily review, except in several defined situations, a district court's refusal to downwardly depart. United States v. Fernandez, 127 F.3d 277, 282 (2d Cir.1997). Valdez contends appellate review is appropriate here under these exceptions because the denial of this departure was based upon the district court's allegedly erroneous assessment of his mental and emotional abilities and its allegedly illegal dismissal of the opinions of the defendant's expert. We have previously rejected these arguments and Valdez has not asserted any grounds for us to review the district court's decision to deny a downward departure for extraordinary rehabilitation.