Opinion ID: 2979949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver of Oscar’s appellate rights

Text: Oscar’s remaining argument is that even if the appellate-waiver provision is valid, he did not waive the right to challenge the reasonableness of his sentence because the district court was obligated to sentence him in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). That may indeed be true, but there is still no merit to his argument that this alleged obligation somehow grants him the right to appeal the reasonableness of his sentence. “It is well settled that a defendant in a criminal case may waive any right, even a constitutional right, by means of a plea agreement.” United States v. Calderon, 388 F.3d 197, 199 (6th Cir. 2004). Oscar expressly agreed to a broad waiver of his appellate rights under the plea agreement: The defendant is aware that Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742, affords the defendant the right to appeal the sentence imposed in this case. Acknowledging this, in exchange for the undertakings made by the United States in this plea agreement, the defendant hereby waives all rights conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3742 to appeal any sentence imposed except for the grounds that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum penalty. (Emphasis added.) The above language unambiguously encompasses Oscar’s sentence. He was sentenced to 87 months’ imprisonment, far less than the statutory maximum penalty for his offense, which is life imprisonment, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Oscar therefore cannot avail himself of the sole exception in the appellate-waiver provision. Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 3742 is the “exclusive avenue” for a party to “appeal a sentence imposed as the result of a run-of-the-mill plenary sentencing proceeding following a conviction.” United States v. Bowers, 615 F.3d 715, 719 (6th Cir. 2010) -7- (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Oscar waived all rights conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3742 to appeal any sentence that did not exceed the statutory maximum penalty, Oscar has no basis to avoid his appellate waiver. Moreover, the proper procedure was followed by the district court below in accepting Oscar’s plea. The prosecutor set forth the terms of the appellate-waiver provision in open court and the district judge made sure that Oscar understood those terms before accepting his guilty plea. See United States v. McGilvery, 403 F.3d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 2005) (summarizing the proper procedure for accepting guilty pleas where the plea agreement contains an appellate-waiver provision). Although Oscar correctly states the well-settled principle that “a defendant who waives his right to appeal does not subject himself to being sentenced entirely at the whim of a district court,” his procedural- and substantive-reasonableness challenges do not rise to the level that this principle contemplates. See United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 471-72 (6th Cir. 2006) (illustrating the narrow scope of this principle by noting the following two examples of nonwaivable rights: (1) the right to appeal sentences above the statutory maximum, or (2) the right to “attack sentences based on constitutionally impermissible criteria like race”).