Opinion ID: 2519712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: plaintiffs' excessive speed and kindred theories of liability are preempted by federal law

Text: ¶ 19 The FRSA permits continued state regulation of railroad safety concerns until such time as the Secretary of Transportation prescribes regulations or issues an order covering the subject of the state requirement. [26] The Secretary issued regulations in 1971 assigning to railroad track a numerical classification based upon various track characteristics such as gage, alignment, curvature and elevation, surface uniformity, and the physical condition of the rails. [27] The Secretary also issued regulations at that time setting the maximum permissible speed for each class of track. [28] The regulations give the railroads the primary responsibility for classifying track and hence for setting their own speed limits. [29] In Easterwood, the United States Supreme Court held that the speed limits were set with safety concerns in mind, [30] and should be understood as covering the subject matter of train speed with respect to track conditions, including the conditions posed by grade crossings. [31] Consequently, any state-tort-law claim against a railroad based on a theory of excessive speed is preempted so long as the train in question was operating within the federally approved speed limit. ¶ 20 Plaintiffs alleged that the train in question was traveling at a speed which was greater than reasonable, prudent, or proper for the crossing. Defendants moved for summary rejection of this theory. In support of their motion, defendants attached the affidavit of Dan Armstrong, the railroad's track inspector, who stated that it was his duty to inspect the track for compliance with federal regulations regarding track classification, that the Highway 19 crossing was among the track over which he had inspection duties at the time the accident in question occurred, and that on the date of the accident the track at the Highway 19 crossing was classified as Class 3. Defendants also attached the railroad timetable which showed the speed limit for the track intersecting Highway 19 to be forty (40) miles per hour. ¶ 21 Plaintiffs concede that the speed limit for Class 3 track is 40 miles per hour and that the train with which plaintiffs' decedent collided was traveling within the speed limit, but argue that the motion should have been denied because defendants' evidentiary material failed to establish that the track in question was actually Class 3 at the time of the collision. They insist that proof of the track's classification cannot be in the form of conclusory statements by the railroad's track inspector but must consist of the inspection reports required by the federal regulations [32] or of some other affirmative showing that at the time of the accident the track actually met the Federally mandated standards for Class 3 track. We disagree. ¶ 22 The track inspector's affidavit meets the requirements of District Court Rule 13 that it be made on personal knowledge and that it state specific facts that would make it admissible in evidence. [33] By stating that the track was classified as Class 3 track, Mr. Armstrong was stating that the track met the federally mandated standards for that class of track. Once defendants produced this affidavit, the burden then shifted to plaintiffs to set forth specific facts which, if true, would show either that the track inspector did not have personal knowledge of the track's classification or that the track did not meet the criteria for Class 3 track at the time of the collision. [34] Plaintiffs' evidentiary material did neither. The only material they submitted was a copy of the federal regulations regarding track classification. This did nothing to show that the track in question was not Class 3 track. Speculation that the track might not have met the standards for its classification does not establish a material factual dispute over the track's classification. [35] ¶ 23 Plaintiffs next contend that defendants are not automatically entitled to preemption of all theories involving speed even if they have complied with all the preconditions for speed preemption. In this contention plaintiffs are correct. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged in Easterwood that the FRSA's preemption provision, § 20106, is not absolute. It contains a saving clause under which a state may enact or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation or order pertaining to a safety concern already regulated by the Secretary of Transportation, provided that the state law (1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard, (2) is not incompatible with any federal law, rule, regulation, order, or standard, and (3) does not create an undue burden on interstate commerce. [36] ¶ 24 In Easterwood, the widow of a truck driver who was killed when his vehicle was struck by a train pressed a negligence claim against the railroad on the theory that even if the train was traveling within the federally permitted speed limit, the railroad could still be held liable for breach of its common-law duty to operate the train at a moderate and safe speed given the time and place. The United States Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that common-law speed restrictions are not preserved by the preemption section's saving clause. The Court stated: The state law on which respondent relies is concerned with local hazards only in the sense that its application turns on the facts of the case. The common law of negligence provides a general rule to address all hazards caused by lack of due care, not just those owing to unique local hazards. Respondent's contrary view would completely deprive the Secretary of the power to pre-empt state common law, a power clearly conferred by § 434 [now § 20106]. [37] In other words, for a state law to meet the requirements of the FRSA saving clause, it must be narrowly addressed to a particular (essentially) local safety hazard. [38] Because the FRSA removes from states the authority to establish statewide standards with respect to railroad safety, [39] it preempts any law that creates a general standard by which the reasonableness of a train's speed is to be weighed on a case-by-case basis at any crossing in the state. [40] ¶ 25 Plaintiffs argue that the Highway 19 crossing was ultrahazardous and that the conditions making it so constituted an essentially local safety hazard within the meaning of the preemption provisions's saving clause. Whether the conditions at the Highway 19 crossing at the time of this collision might arguably have constituted an essentially local safety hazard which the state could have regulated had it chosen to do so is immaterial because there is no evidence that the state did so. The sine qua non of § 20106 is the enactment of a state law which is necessary to reduce or eliminate an essentially local safety hazard. Plaintiffs urge this court to find such a law in the common law of negligence, but Easterwood makes clear that state tort law does not address local safety hazards in the sense contemplated by § 20106. Plaintiffs have failed to identify any state law enacted for the purpose of reducing or eliminating alleged safety hazards at the Highway 19 crossing. In light of Easterwood, we hold that the saving clause of § 20106 does not contemplate the survival of an excessive speed claim based upon the generalized application of state tort law to what are characterized as ultrahazardous conditions. [41] ¶ 26 Plaintiffs also argue that they may premise liability on the theory that the railroad breached a common-law duty to stop or reduce its speed to avoid a specific, individual hazard. This argument is derived from a footnote in Easterwood in which the United States Supreme Court suggested in obiter dictum that some common-law negligence claims related to speed such as the duty to slow or stop a train to avoid a specific, individual hazard might yet be viable despite the FRSA. Because Mrs. Easterwood's allegation that the train was traveling too quickly given the `time and place' presented nothing more than an excessive speed claim, the Court in Easterwood declined to address the FRSA's pre-emptive effect on such related claims. [42] ¶ 27 The Supreme Court has not further opined on the scope or meaning of its obiter dictum in Easterwood, [43] and state and lower federal court decisions have not been uniform in fleshing out the content of the specific, individual hazard concept. [44] In light of Easterwood and having considered the various views espoused in its progeny, we hold that a specific, individual hazard is a person, vehicle, obstruction, object, or event which is not a fixed condition or feature of the crossing and which is not capable of being taken into account by the Secretary of Transportation in the promulgation of uniform, national speed regulations. [45] In short, a specific, individual hazard refers to a unique occurrence which could lead to a specific and imminent collision [46] and not to allegedly dangerous conditions at a particular crossing. [47] ¶ 28 Plaintiffs proffered evidence of many conditions that allegedly made the Highway 19 crossing ultrahazardous as well as evidence that the railroad was aware of these conditions. [48] While these factors might have warranted state action to regulate the Highway 19 crossing as an essentially local safety hazard, they do not constitute a specific, individual hazard because they have nothing to do with the avoidance of a specific collision. Hazards posed by track conditions, including those existing at grade crossings, are capable of being taken into account by the Secretary and are covered by the federal speed regulations. [49] Factors such as general knowledge that a crossing is dangerous, traffic conditions, a crossing's accident history, sight distances, multiple crossings in close proximity, sun glare, a railroad's internal policies regarding speed, and inadequate signal maintenance are not specific, individual hazards. [50]