Opinion ID: 2044456
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appointment of an Expert

Text: Defendant alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to investigate defendant's mental condition and to use the evidence he would have discovered (1) to support defendant's motion to suppress statements; (2) to present an insanity defense; and (3) as mitigation during defendant's sentencing hearing. To support these claims, defendant requested that the trial court appropriate funds to allow him to hire an expert. Defendant explained that his medical records and examinations by other experts reveal that he needs to be examined by a neuropsychiatrist. In support of his motion, defendant attached medical records that include a notation that defendant should be evaluated for temporal lobe epilepsy as a possible cause of rage attacks. Defendant also attached affidavits from Harry Gunn, a clinical psychologist, and Jonathan Hess, a clinical neuropsychologist. Gunn's affidavit states that neuropsychological testing is highly recommended. Hess's affidavit states that, since childhood, defendant has suffered from a seizure disorder and that defendant has never been diagnosed or treated by a behavioral neurologist or neuropsychiatrist who is educated in the psychiatric consequences of seizure disorders. Defendant's history reveals that violent behavior often follows one of his seizures. Based upon his examination of defendant, Hess believes that defendant suffers from episodic discontrol, or rage attacks. A person suffering from a rage attack would be unable to control his behavior or to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law. Finally, Hess states that, to properly diagnose defendant, either a behavioral neurologist (who is also an epileptologist) or a neuropsychiatrist will have to conduct a 24-hour ambulatory EEG. Defendant therefore requested funding for an ambulatory EEG. Defendant's attorney averred that he had contacted Dr. Lyle Rossiter, Jr., who had agreed to perform an ambulatory EEG and to examine and evaluate defendant. The cost for the test, test interpretation, and evaluation of defendant totaled $3,786. The trial court denied defendant's motion to retain Dr. Rossiter. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying this motion. Trial courts are permitted to exercise a great deal of discretion in resolving post-conviction petitions. People v. Wright, 149 Ill.2d 36, 54, 171 Ill.Dec. 424, 594 N.E.2d 276 (1992). This is done to ensure that defendants are permitted an opportunity to advance claims of constitutional deprivation. Wright, 149 Ill.2d at 54. 171 Ill.Dec. 424, 594 N.E.2d 276. Whether to allow a defendant's motion for the appointment of an expert in a post-conviction proceeding is a matter that lies within the trial court's discretion. People v. Hall, 157 Ill.2d 324, 339, 193 Ill.Dec. 98, 626 N.E.2d 131 (1993); Wright, 149 Ill.2d at 58. 171 Ill.Dec. 424, 594 N.E.2d 276. The key question to consider is whether the testimony would assist the court in deciding the question before it. Hall, 157 Ill.2d at 339-40, 193 Ill.Dec. 98, 626 N.E.2d 131. To decide that question here, we must consider the claims under which defendant's request for an expert arises. Defendant alleges that the expert is needed to allow him to demonstrate that his attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate defendant's mental condition. In particular, defendant contends that, had trial counsel properly investigated defendant's mental health, counsel could have (1) presented evidence during the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress to demonstrate that defendant's statements should have been suppressed; (2) presented an insanity defense; and (3) demonstrated during the sentencing hearing that a statutory mitigating factor was present. To succeed in his claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, defendant must allege facts to demonstrate that his attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984). Because a defendant must satisfy both prongs of the test, the failure to satisfy either prong precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. People v. Shaw, 186 Ill.2d 301, 332, 239 Ill.Dec. 311, 713 N.E.2d 1161 (1998). We now address individually each of defendant's claims.