Opinion ID: 6499580
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We begin by addressing whether we have jurisdiction to review Mr. Jordan’s appeal. Generally, on appeal from the Veterans Court, we have jurisdiction to review relevant questions of law. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1). Nonetheless, jurisdiction is not the panacea the government believes it to Case: 21-1811 Document: 34 Page: 4 Filed: 07/13/2022 4 JORDAN v. MCDONOUGH be. We have repeatedly rejected the government’s “overly broad” rule that precludes any review of the Veterans Court’s prejudicial error determinations. Tadlock v. McDonough, 5 F.4th 1327, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 2021); see also Slaughter v. McDonough, 29 F.4th 1351, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“We have expressly rejected the proposition that we lack any jurisdiction to review the Veterans Court’s prejudicial error determinations.”); Simmons v. Wilkie, 964 F.3d 1381, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (examining whether Veterans Court should have used “per se rule of prejudice” in prejudicial error analysis). Similarly, we have rejected the government’s argument that the Veterans Court “did not interpret” a statute or regulation where the Veterans Court decided that statute or regulation does not apply. See, e.g., Flores v. Nicholson, 476 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[T]o the extent that the appellant appears to disagree with the Veterans Court’s finding that § 103(d)(3) does not operate to restore benefits forfeited under § 6103(a), she raises a question regarding the interpretation of a statute over which this court has jurisdiction.”); see also Manzanares, 863 F.3d at 1376 (finding jurisdiction to consider whether 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.310(a) and 3.156(b) controlled effective date of secondary service-connected condition). Here, Mr. Jordan does not challenge a factual finding but instead disputes whether the Veterans Court used the correct legal standards. Appellant’s Br. at 15, 18–20. Thus, we have jurisdiction. B. Section 3.156(b) and the Prejudicial Error Rule Turning to the merits, we address § 3.156(b)’s applicability to the effective date of Mr. Jordan’s secondary service-connected condition and the legal standards governing the prejudicial error rule. First, we agree with the Veterans Court that § 3.156(b) does not control the effective date of Mr. Jordan’s secondary service-connected condition. Jordan, 2021 WL 19031, at –4 (“[S]econdary claims are Case: 21-1811 Document: 34 Page: 5 Filed: 07/13/2022 JORDAN v. MCDONOUGH 5 not derivative of primary claims for effective-date purposes. Accordingly, appellant has failed to demonstrate that § 3.156(b) applies to this matter[.]”). We rejected a similar argument in Manzanares, where we held that § 3.156(b) does not require the VA to treat a claim for a secondary service-connected condition “as having been filed” on the same date as a primary service-connected condition for effective-date purposes. 863 F.3d at 1376–79. Indeed, at oral argument, Mr. Jordan’s counsel conceded that “secondary claims are not derivative of primary claims for effective-date purposes” and that “[§] 3.156(b) is not an effective-date regulation.” Oral Arg. at 9:32–10:28, available at https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=21-1811_04042022.mp3. Mr. Jordan also argues that our decisions in Bond v. Shinseki, 659 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and Beraud v. McDonald, 766 F.3d 1402, 1407 (Fed. Cir. 2014), required the Board to make explicit findings as to § 3.156(b), such that it erred when it “failed to address the applicability of § 3.156(b) to determine the proper effective dates.” Appellant’s Br. at 18–21. We disagree. In Manzanares, we explicitly rejected that Bond and Beraud required a different outcome because “[n]either case dealt with secondary service connection, much less suggested that secondary service connection is part of a primary benefits claim.” 863 F.3d at 1379. Bond holds that to comply with § 3.156(b), “the VA must evaluate submissions received during the relevant period and determine whether they contain new evidence relevant to a pending claim, whether or not the relevant submission might otherwise support a new claim.” 659 F.3d at 1369. Beraud held that it was error for the VA not to consider whether evidence submitted during the appeal period was “new and material evidence, as required by § 3.156(b).” 766 F.3d at 1407. Neither case suggests § 3.156(b) requires that Mr. Jordan’s claim for service-connection of his secondary right-knee disability must have the same effective date as his primary left-knee disability. Case: 21-1811 Document: 34 Page: 6 Filed: 07/13/2022 6 JORDAN v. MCDONOUGH Manzanares, 863 F.3d at 1379. Because § 3.156(b) has no bearing on the effective date of Mr. Jordan’s secondary right-knee disability, the Board did not err in not discussing it. See Dye v. Mansfield, 504 F.3d 1289, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The Veterans Court correctly held that, in these circumstances, the two presumptions Dye invoked were irrelevant, and the Board therefore properly declined to discuss them.”). Second, even if we believed the Board’s omission constituted error—which we do not—we reject Mr. Jordan’s argument that the Veterans Court improperly placed the burden on him, the appellant, to demonstrate that error was prejudicial. Appellant’s Br. at 15. As explained in Shinseki v. Sanders, there is no error in placing the burden of establishing prejudice on the claimant. 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (“[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.”). Here, that party is Mr. Jordan. The Veterans Court did not simply find the alleged “error” to be harmless by resting on its conclusion that Mr. Jordan “failed to demonstrate . . . that the Board’s failure to address § 3.156(b) was prejudicial.” Jordan, 2021 WL 19031, at . Rather, it came to that conclusion after performing a “case-specific” analysis into the applicability of § 3.156(b). See Sanders, 556 U.S. at 407, 411. We see no error.