Opinion ID: 536265
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The quantity of drugs relevant in sentencing.

Text: 36 Appellant Alston also complains that the district court erred in determining a base offense level under the Guidelines which reflected a cocaine conspiracy involving three kilograms of cocaine. Alston asserts that the quantity of drugs involved in the conspiracy was six ounces, the amount actually sold to Carter by Brennon; and that neither Brennon nor Alston had any capacity to obtain three kilograms of cocaine. As with appellant Alston's other assertions of error, the determination of the quantity of cocaine involved in a conspiracy for the purposes of sentencing is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard. 37 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the amount of the drug being negotiated, even in an uncompleted distribution, shall be used to calculate the total amount in order to determine the base level. United States v. Perez, 871 F.2d 45, 48 (6th Cir.1989). Guidelines section 2D1.4 states that [i]f a defendant is convicted of participating in an incomplete conspiracy or an attempt to commit any offense involving a controlled substance, the offense level shall be the same as if the object of the conspiracy or attempt had been completed. See United States v. Roberts, 881 F.2d 95, 104-05 (4th Cir.1989) (quantity of drugs sought in conspiracy, not amount actually obtained, is used to set offense level). The version of Application Note 1 to Guidelines Sec. 2D1.4 in effect between November 1, 1987 and November 1, 1989, 8 states, in relevant part, that 38 If the defendant is convicted of an offense involving negotiation to traffic in a controlled substance, the weight under negotiation in an uncompleted distribution shall be used to calculate the applicable amount. Where the defendant was not reasonably capable of producing the negotiated amount, the court may depart and impose a sentence lower than the sentence that would otherwise result. If the defendant is convicted of conspiracy, the sentence should be imposed only on the basis of the defendant's conduct or the conduct of co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy that was known to the defendant or was reasonably foreseeable. 39 The conspiracy conviction, itself, is not before us; appellant claims instead that the district court was erroneous in finding a three-kilogram, rather than a one-kilogram or six-ounce, conspiracy. Determining whether the evidence supported a finding that Alston and Brennon were reasonably capable of producing the negotiated amount requires a sensitive assessment of the facts by the district court. 40 Appellant Alston was present when his co-conspirator Brennon stated that he could deliver three kilograms of cocaine to Agent Carter. The evidence in this case indicates that although Brennon's local source would only give him one kilo, Brennan agreed, with Alston's enthusiastic support, to attempt to arrange for the delivery of several more kilos of cocaine through his Florida contacts, or a combination of his local and Florida sources. The district court also heard other evidence at the sentencing hearing to indicate that the conspiracy involved a three-kilogram transaction. 9 The district court was not clearly erroneous in finding that Brennon was reasonably capable of producing the negotiated amount. U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.4, comment. (n. 1) (Jan. 1988). 41 3. The propriety of considering quantities of drugs not included in the count upon which the defendant is convicted. 42 Appellant Brennon pled guilty to one count of distributing four ounces of cocaine to Agent Carter and agreed to testify against appellant Alston in exchange for the government's agreement to dismiss a conspiracy count and other related charges. At sentencing for the count to which he pled guilty, the district court considered evidence that Brennon was involved in a conspiracy to distribute a quantity of cocaine ranging from one kilogram to five kilograms. 10 The court noted that although there was substantial evidence that Brennon was involved in a three-kilogram conspiracy, it would find as a matter of fact that the conspiracy encompassed the sale of only one kilogram. Thus, the district court determined the base offense level for the count of conviction on the basis of the total amount of cocaine involved in the scheme and not merely the four ounces charged in the count to which Brennon had entered his plea. 43 We hold that the district court was correct in considering the total quantity of cocaine involved in the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction under Sentencing Guidelines Sec. 1B1.3(a)(2). In so doing, we join six out of seven circuits that have addressed this question. See United States v. Blanco, 888 F.2d 907 (1st Cir.1989); United States v. White, 888 F.2d 490 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Fernandez, 877 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Mann, 877 F.2d 688 (8th Cir.1989); United States v. Sailes, 872 F.2d 735 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Sarasti, 869 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.1989). Cf., United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204 (11th Cir.1989) (upholding district court's consideration of 18 postal thefts to which defendant did not plead guilty and for which government agreed to drop charges, as conduct relevant in calculating a sentence). 11 But see United States v. Restrepo, 883 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.1989) (forbidding sentencing consideration of drug amounts not reflected in the offense of conviction). 44 The facts at issue in the Blanco decision are almost identical to those involved in this case. Mr. Blanco pled guilty to possessing with intent to distribute 125 grams of cocaine. The government recommended dismissal of other counts which charged Blanco with conspiring to distribute a larger amount of cocaine during the same time period he possessed with intent to distribute the 125 grams of cocaine. Just as appellant Brennon asserts in this case, Mr. Blanco argued that the Guidelines do not permit a sentencing judge to take into account conduct not covered by the counts of conviction. The Blanco court analyzed the question as follows: 45 [Defendant Blanco] notes that the additional drugs in question here were not covered by Counts I, II and III, to which he pled guilty, but, rather, they were the subject of other counts of the indictment (Counts IV, V, and VI), which the Government dropped. The Guidelines, however, specifically instruct the court to take conduct of this sort into account when the crime at issue concerns drugs. They say that: 46 (i) [T]he base offense level where the guideline specifies more than one base offense level ... shall be determined on the basis of the following: 47 ... (2) solely with respect to offenses of a character for which Sec. 3D1.2(d) [the fungible items/drugs/money part of the multiple counts guideline] would require grouping of multiple counts, all such acts and omissions that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. 48 Guidelines Sec. 1B1.3(a) (emphasis added). Let us apply this language mechanically: (1) the drug guideline relevant to this case, Sec. 2D1.1, is a guideline that has many different base offense levels, each correlated with a different amount of drug (e.g., the base offense level corresponding to 500 grams to 1.9 kilograms of cocaine is 26). 49 (2) A glance at the relevant cross-reference in the multiple-count guideline Sec. 3D1.2(d) reveals Sec. 2D1.1 listed there as fungible items crime. See Guidelines Ch. 1 Pt. A4(e). And, (3) the court properly found that the extra drugs at issue here were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. Indeed, the Guidelines commentary specifically says that in a drug distribution case, quantities and types of drugs not specified in any count of conviction are nonetheless included in determining the offense level if they were part of the same course of conduct or part of a common scheme or plan as the count of conviction. Guidelines Sec. 1B1.3(a)(2), background commentary. Hence, the court must apply Sec. 1B1.3 to determine the proper base offense level,.... 50 Blanco, 888 F.2d at 909 (emphasis added). 12 51 The idea that a sentencing court may consider conduct not covered by the counts of conviction is neither new nor radical. Prior to the enactment of the Guidelines, sentencing courts relied upon such information in arriving at sentences. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 2418-19, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986). That practice was acknowledged and incorporated into the sentencing calculus prescribed by the Guidelines. As long as the drugs not included in the count(s) of conviction are part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction, there is nothing improper about applying the Guidelines in this manner to determine the base offense level for the count(s) of conviction. 52 The sentence imposed is limited to that provided in the Guideline applicable to the specific crime of which the defendant stands convicted. If the real offense characteristics found to apply constitute crimes themselves, the defendant is not exposed to another sentence because of them. If the government wishes the defendant to be sentenced for that conduct, the government must obtain a conviction. Nevertheless, the real offense characteristics may be taken into consideration in determining the base defense level and sentence that applies to the particular crime for which the defendant was convicted. See Blanco, 888 F.2d at 911. See also, Bryer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromise Upon Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L.Rev. 1, 8-12, 25-28 (1988). 53 4. The standard of proof for conduct not covered by the counts of conviction. 54 Appellant Brennon suggests in his Statement of the Issues that even if under the Guidelines a sentencing judge can consider conduct not covered by the count(s) of conviction, the Due Process Clause requires that such conduct be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. The Blanco court rejected a similar argument. See 888 F.2d at 909. See also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 2418-19, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (pre-guidelines sentencing court found facts without any prescribed burden of proof at all; preponderance standard satisfies due process requirements); United States v. White, 888 F.2d 490, 499 (7th Cir.1989) (Guidelines' standard for resolving disputes is a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond reasonable doubt); United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441-42 (1st Cir.1989) (sentencing court can rely upon facts proven by a preponderance of evidence); United States v. Lee, 818 F.2d 1052, 1057 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956, 108 S.Ct. 350, 98 L.Ed.2d 376 (1987) (disputed allegations in presentence report to be evaluated by preponderance standard). See also U.S.S.G. Sec. 6A1.3 (Jan. 1988) (sentencing court may consider all relevant information that has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy). 13 55 Appellant Brennon's other allegations of error are without merit and do not warrant discussion.