Opinion ID: 2257779
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tailoring the Charge to the Facts

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court insufficiently tailored the charge to the facts of the case, thereby denying him a fair trial. Specifically, defendant argues that the court barely discussed the application of the facts to the law, and failed entirely to give any guidance to the jury that took into account the defendant's version of the events. Our examination leads us to conclude, however, that the charge as a whole did not contain reversible error. Because defendant objects to the charge for the first time on appeal, we review the objection under the plain error standard. R. 2:10-2; see State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 54, 697 A. 2d 529 (1997); State v. Gartland, 149 N.J. 456, 473, 694 A. 2d 564 (1997). Under that standard, defendant has the burden of proving that the error was clear and obvious and that it affected his substantial rights. State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30, 82, 695 A. 2d 1301 (1997); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1778, 123 L.Ed. 2d 508 (1993) (It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.). During the charge, the trial court used an overhead projector and handouts to delineate the elements of the various offenses. In addition, the court distributed a verdict sheet that provided further guidance to the jury. Defendant contends that specific portions of the charge demonstrate the court's failure to tailor the charge to account for his theory of the case. Our review of the charge as a whole, however, leads us to the opposite conclusion. The trial court specifically instructed the jury, consistent with defendant's theory of the case, that mere presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient to find defendant guilty of murder. In addition, during the instructions on accomplice liability and conspiracy, the court informed the jury of the legal significance of a determination that Bryant, rather than defendant, committed the actual murder. At times, the court wove the facts into the charge, and charged the jury that its comments on the facts were not binding on the jury. In sum, the charge neither presented a biased account of the facts nor foreclosed the jury's consideration of defendant's theory of the case. See Gartland, supra, 149 N.J. at 474, 694 A. 2d 564; State v. Bryant, 288 N.J. Super. 27, 37, 671 A. 2d 1058 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 589, 677 A. 2d 761 (1996). Additionally, the facts were not so complex or confusing as to require an intricate discussion in the charge. See State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 44-45, 524 A. 2d 130 (1987) ( Biegenwald I ). Defendant's mere presence defense did not require the jury to distinguish among several possible mental states of the accused. Cf. State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 18, 573 A. 2d 1359 (1990) (noting that, for nettlesome proposition[s] like causation, criminal knowledge, or intent, a discussion of the facts should be woven into the charge); State v. Concepcion, 111 N.J. 373, 380, 545 A. 2d 119 (1988) (holding, in case involving a determination of several degrees of intent, that a thorough discussion of the facts should have been woven into the charge). When measured by the plain error standard, even cases involving more complex determinations do not necessarily require an intricate explication of the facts. See Gartland, supra, 149 N.J. at 474, 694 A. 2d 564 (holding no plain error in failing to weave facts into charge when charge did not foreclose jury's consideration of facts favorable to defendant and did not confuse or mislead jury in its deliberations). Compare State v. Delibero, 149 N.J. 90, 106, 692 A. 2d 981 (1997) (holding no plain error in jury instruction that was not erroneous, but simply capable of being improved), with Afanador, supra, 151 N.J. at 56, 697 A. 2d 529 (holding incorrect jury instruction to be plain error). In summation, moreover, defense counsel forcefully argued that defendant was merely present, but had not participated in the stabbings. The argument of counsel, although not a substitute for a correct charge, can mitigate the prejudicial effect of an erroneous charge. See Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 145, 586 A. 2d 85. In sum, the jury was aware of defendant's theory of the case, and the charge provided the jury with an opportunity to accept or reject that theory.