Opinion ID: 3008407
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Paragraph 10(a) of the 2009 Agreed Order

Text: Paragraph 10(a) of the 2009 Agreed Order states, in part, that the “DHHR shall provide for increased pay for direct care workers at Bateman and Sharpe in order to (i) be able to recruit staff and retain existing staff . . . .” (emphasis added.). The DHHR argues that it did not view paragraph 10(a) as contemplating increased staring salaries for future hires in direct care positions; rather, this language only applied to increased salaries for existing employees. To the extent there is any doubt as to the meaning of paragraph 10(a), the DHHR asserts that constitutional considerations require resolution in its favor. The DHHR adds that requiring the state to expend additional funds not previously approved or anticipated raises questions concerning the circuit court’s power to limit the Legislature’s authority over the DHHR’s budget. The respondents argue that the circuit court’s unappealed order entered December 18, 2012, settled any issue as to whether increased salaries for new employees was required. The respondents assert that the lower court compelled the DHHR’s compliance with the 2009 Agreed Order in its December 18 ruling by ordering that HSTs, HSWs, HSAs, 37 and LPNs employed “on or after January 1, 2013” were entitled to pay raises. Because this language clearly contemplates new employees, the respondents maintain the issue is moot. The DHHR’s extreme difficulty in recruiting persons to permanent positions at Bateman and Sharpe is undisputed.49 Consequently, the DHHR’s argument that paragraph 10(a) does not require it to increase base salaries for new employees is simply unsupportable when considering the impetus behind both the 2009 Agreed Order and West Virginia Code § 5-5-4a. Testimony offered by the DHHR during the hearings held in 2009, 2012, and 2014 clearly demonstrated a unanimous belief that increasing salaries would aid in employee recruitment, as well as retention. The plain language of paragraph 10(a) of the 2009 Agreed Order expressly requires the DHHR to increase pay for direct care workers in order to “be able to recruit staff[.]” By common definition, “recruit” means to “enroll (someone) as a . . . worker in an organization,”50 or to “secure the services of: engage, hire.”51 Further, West Virginia Code 49 The appendix record reflects that when a DHHR official was questioned concerning the recruitment tools currently being utilized to attract employees, he responded by reciting traditional methods, such as advertising, attending employment fairs, and maintaining relationships with schools. The circuit court noted that these were the same tools being used when the parties were before the court in 2009. 50 See New Oxford American Dictionary 1460 (3rded. 2010). 51 See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1041 (11thed. 2005). 38 § 5-5-4a provides that the DHHR, in conjunction with the DOP, “shall develop pay rates and employment requirements to support the recruitment and retention of” direct care workers at Bateman and Sharp. Id. (emphasis added). It is axiomatic that “the word ‘shall,’ in the absence of language in the statute showing a contrary intent on the part of the Legislature, should be afforded a mandatory connotation.” Syl. Pt. 1, Nelson v. West Virginia Pub. Employees Ins. Bd., 171 W.Va. 445, 300 S.E.2d 86 (1982). Consequently, we find no merit to the DHHR’s argument that paragraph 10(a) of the 2009 Agreed Order did not contemplate an increased salary rate for new direct care employees. Further, we agree with the respondents that to the extent the DHHR had any doubt in that regard, it was resolved and clarified through the circuit court’s order entered December 18, 2012,52 stating: “employees in the LPN and Health Service Trainees, Workers, and Assistants classifications employed on or after January 1, 2013, are entitled to pay raises . . . as provided for in the Order entered December 11, 2012.” Evidence presented during the April 2014 hearings indicated that the DHHR provided the required raises to those employed on January 1, 2013, but failed to increase the starting salaries for those individuals hired after that date. 52 The DHHR conceded during a hearing held in October of 2012 that the HSTs, HSWs, and HSAs did not receive the salary increases required under the 2009 Agreed Order. 39 Notwithstanding the DHHR’s clear obligations under the 2009 Agreed Order, the December 2012 orders, and West Virginia Code § 5-5-4a, the evidence demonstrated that in 2014, the base starting salaries for the HSTs, HSWs, and HSAs remain at the same rates in effect prior to the 2009 Agreed Order. Consequently, we find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by compelling the DHHR to develop a plan that included the means to accomplish what it agreed to do five years earlier: increase salaries of direct care workers at Bateman and Sharpe in order to be able to recruit staff and retain existing staff and eliminate the pervasive and excessive use of mandatory overtime and temporary workers.53 See Matin IV, 223 W.Va. at 381, 674 S.E.2d at 242 (“The circuit court also has the power to enforce a Consent Order it previously issued.”); Syl. Pt. 1, in part, Seal v. Gwinn, 119 W.Va. 19, 191 S.E. 860 (1937) (“ A court may . . . enter such orders and decrees as may be necessary to enforce [prior] decrees[.]”). Turning to the DHHR’s budgetary argument, as we explained in Matin I, “[w]hen the Legislature enacts a law giving a group of individuals a clear and explicit right, there is also created an implicit corresponding duty on the part of the State to grant or enforce that right.” Matin I, 168 W.Va. at 257, 284 S.E.2d at 237. Indeed, “[i]nherent in the republican form of government established by our State Constitution is a concept of due process that insures that the people receive the benefit of legislative enactments.” Syl. Pt. 53 Under West Virginia Code § 5-5-4a, the salaries of direct care workers at Bateman and Sharpe must be at “regional market rates.” 40 1, Cooper v. Gwinn, 171 W.Va. 245, 298 S.E.2d 781 (1982). Consequently, “[a] legislatively conferred right is an entitlement that cannot be arbitrarily abrogated by an executive officer. Such a course of action, or in this case inaction, abhors the concept of rule of law.” Cooper v. Gwinn, 171 W.Va. 245, 256, 298 S.E.2d 781, 792 (1981). In the context of inmates in our state prisons, we stated that the lack of funds is not a valid excuse for denying inmates, and society as a whole, the constitutional right to the benefit of legislative enactments which clearly establish the duty of the Department of Corrections to rehabilitate individuals charged to its care, and the concommitant [sic] right of those individuals to demand the benefit of those laws. Id., 171 W.Va. at 255, 298 S.E.2d at 791-92. The Legislature has provided certain rights to patients confined in our state psychiatric hospitals. W.Va. Code § 27-5-9. Accordingly, “[i]t is the obligation of the State to provide the resources necessary to accord [patients] of State mental institutions the rights which the State has granted them under W.Va. Code, 27-5-9 [1977].” Matin I, 168 W.Va. 248, 284 S.E.2d 232, syl. pt. 3. To that end, the appendix record reflects the DHHR’s intent in the fall of 2014 to fund its court-approved plan within its current budget by using “various funds . . . within the [DHHR] . . . controlled by the Secretary” and through savings on expenditures that were otherwise paid to short-term contract employees. If those means 41 proved insufficient, then it planned to seek additional funding from the Legislature.54 Consequently, we find no merit in the DHHR’s contention that the circuit court has limited the Legislature’s authority over the DHHR’s budget.