Opinion ID: 608853
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Purchase of the G-III

Text: 21 Defendant next asserts that plaintiff lacks standing to bring the G-III claim because plaintiff assigned the agreement and thus never purchased the G-III. Defendant's argument seems to be predicated on the assumption that only a purchaser can have antitrust standing. 22 Almost fifty years ago, the Supreme Court rejected such an argument. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236, 68 S.Ct. 996, 1006, 92 L.Ed. 1328 (1948) (The statute does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers.... The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated. (emphasis added)). On their face, the antitrust laws purport to provide a remedy to [a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.... 15 U.S.C. § 15. Recent Supreme Court cases have espoused a narrower reading of the statutes' coverage. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 529 & n. 19, 103 S.Ct. at 904 & n. 19 (quoting Mandeville; rejecting argument that statute is as broad as its words suggest). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has never intimated that only purchasers have standing. 23 In addition, even if this court accepted the view that standing should generally be limited to purchasers, defendant's argument seeks to exalt form over substance. Admittedly, plaintiff assigned its rights in the plane and purchase agreement and never took title to the G-III. Thus, plaintiff was not a purchaser in the ordinary sense of that word. Nevertheless, plaintiff executed a purchase agreement and remained contractually bound to pay the G-III's total purchase price up to and including the date of delivery. We believe in these circumstances that plaintiff's continuing contractual obligation nullifies this objection to its standing and, thus, summary judgment was properly denied.c. Assignment of the G-III Purchase Agreement 24 Defendant next argues that plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action because it unconditionally assigned its antitrust rights in January of 1984 when it transferred its interest in the G-III and purchase agreement to JB & A Aircraft, Inc. Under the terms of that assignment, plaintiff [sold], assign[ed], transfer[red] and set over ... all of its rights, title and interest in and to the [G-III] and the Purchase Agreement.... (J.A. at 356). This action was commenced against defendant in June of 1985, eighteen months after the assignment. 25 In a pretrial ruling, the district court recognized that antitrust claims are assignable, but rejected the argument that plaintiff had assigned its antitrust claim in this case. It contrasted this case with one previously decided by our court which involved, in part, an express assignment of antitrust rights and noted that no language in plaintiff's assignment ... so much as allude[d] to rights under the antitrust laws. (J.A. at 58). The court stated: On this record, the Court will not infer an assignment of plaintiff's Clayton Act rights. The defendant takes issue with that ruling. 26 Under controlling federal law, as the district court recognized, antitrust claims are assignable. In re Fine Paper Litig., 632 F.2d 1081, 1090 (3rd Cir.1980). The critical question is whether the general assignment here encompassed plaintiff's federal antitrust claim despite the fact that it is not specifically identified in the assignment that transferred all of plaintiff's interest in the G-III and the purchase agreement. 27 In its separate opinion, the majority of this court holds that federal rather than state law controls the issue as to whether there has been an assignment of an antitrust claim and that such law requires specific reference thereto in the assignment to transfer such claim. The author of this opinion is dubitante as to the majority determination because he believes that the case for the application of state law rather than federal common law may be more compelling and thus dictate a contrary conclusion. However, since the vote of the majority constitutes the holding of this court, it follows that there is no merit to defendant's argument that, because of the general assignment here, plaintiff lacked standing to maintain this antitrust action. 28