Opinion ID: 1404854
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Application of Recreational Use Statute to County

Text: Mr. Ravenscroft's claims against the County were based, in part, on common law premises liability and negligence theories. The trial court determined that the evidence could not support a conclusion that the County was an owner, or possessor in control, of the property. Based on this conclusion, the trial court ruled that the immunity granted in the recreational use statute was not available to the County and also ruled that Mr. Ravenscroft was unable to support his premises liability claims. In his petition for review, Mr. Ravenscroft asks this court to remand this case to the trial court, in part, to determine whether the County was a possessor of land in order to determine the nature of any duty that arose under the recreational use statute. Pet. for Review at 18. The County argues that this issue is not properly before the court as it was not raised by Mr. Ravenscroft in the Court of Appeals. In its first motion for summary judgment, the County argued that the claims against it should be dismissed because the County is considered an owner under the Recreational Use Statute. Clerk's Papers at 18. The trial court denied summary judgment and, after reviewing the facts and arguments before it, stated in its memorandum opinion that the county neither owns nor operates nor controls the river or Long Lake. Therefore... Spokane County is not an entity that would have the protection of RCW 4.24.210. Report of Proceedings at 66. In a subsequent motion for summary judgment on the other claims, the trial court dismissed all of Mr. Ravenscroft's common law premises liability claims after finding that there are no grounds for Plaintiffs' common law causes of action against Spokane County. Clerk's Papers at 406. The trial court stated that the issue was partially resolved in the first summary judgment decision where the court found that the County did not have sufficient control over the lake to take advantage of the recreational use statute. The trial court then determined that the County did not have sufficient control over the property to be liable under common law principles pertaining to premises liability. In his brief before the Court of Appeals, Mr. Ravenscroft sought review of the trial court's ruling on his common law premises liability claims. The issue now raised by Mr. Ravenscroftwhether the County is a possessor of land under the recreational use statuteis not properly before the court, and we decline to review it. Regardless of the procedural flaw in this court, Mr. Ravenscroft presents no reference to any fact that would support his position on this issue. Although the record shows the County had responsibility for boating safety and for marking hazards on all waterways in Spokane County, that responsibility does not result in ownership or possession and control of the property as required by the recreational use statute, RCW 4.24.210. If the County is not an owner or possessor or in control of the property for purposes of the recreational use statute, then it is not an owner or possessor under the common law and cannot be liable under a premises liability theory. However, the County may have statutory or regulatory duties toward recreational boaters. Such duties may be the basis of liability, subject to application of the public duty doctrine.