Opinion ID: 2379421
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard To Be Used In Granting A New Trial Based On Newly Discovered Evidence

Text: Maryland Rule 770 b provides, in part, that a court may, in a criminal case, grant a new trial or other appropriate relief on the ground of newly discovered evidence. No standard is set forth in the rule to guide a trial judge, except to denote the exercise of discretion through the use of the word may. The appellant argues that error was committed when the trial judge, citing Ginnelly v. Continental Paper Co., 57 N.J. Super. 480, 155 A.2d 154 (1959), held the test (standard) to be applied is whether the newly discovered evidence would probably alter the judgment. We are urged to adopt the less stringent standard of might alter the judgment, as a murder conviction may not rest on probabilities. Under the circumstances present in this case we need not decide which standard should apply because the trial judge expressly found, as noted above, that the state's evidence without Michaelson's testimony overwhelmingly pointed to appellant's guilt. Thus, in essence, the trial judge implicitly concluded that the newly discovered evidence was not material to the outcome of the case. Whether or not the evidence is material to the result is thus a threshold question. It should be decided in the affirmative before the court inquires into the possible impact the newly discovered evidence would have on the outcome of the trial. Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87 (7th Cir.1928), is the case credited with establishing the might rule that appellant urges this Court to adopt. The court held that a new trial must be awarded if it is established: a) that a material witness has testified falsely, and b) that without his testimony the jury might have reached a different conclusion. However, the court there finds that the evidence amply supports the verdict ..., id. at 87, and that the testimony was cumulative. Id. at 88. Additionally, as the trial judge found in the case sub judice, in Larrison there also was sufficient evidence to convict ... without [this] testimony. Id. at 88. Therefore, because the defendant did not overcome the initial materiality inquiry, the court never considered whether the jury might have reached a different verdict. Similarly, the cases adopting the might rule also make materiality a key factor. See United States v. Strauss, 443 F.2d 986, 990 (1st Cir.) (issue was the possible impact of newly discovered evidence on the credibility of a key prosecution witness), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851, 92 S.Ct. 87, 30 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971); United States v. Meyers, 484 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir.1973) (an important factor in the government's case depended upon perjured testimony); United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863, 866 (4th Cir.1976) (might rule applied for perjured testimony of material witness); Newman v. United States, 238 F.2d 861, 863 (5th Cir.1956) (trial testimony of principal witness rather than affidavit of recantation was true); Gordon v. United States, 178 F.2d 896, 900 (6th Cir.1949) (trial testimony of principal government witness was true), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 935, 70 S.Ct. 664, 94 L.Ed. 1353 (1950); United States v. Briola, 465 F.2d 1018, 1022 (10th Cir.1972) (trial court noted and applied rule and found elements not satisfied), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108, 93 S.Ct. 908, 34 L.Ed.2d 688 (1973); United States v. Persico, 339 F. Supp. 1077, 1088 (E.D.N.Y.) (court not satisfied that trial testimony of the material witness was false), aff'd, 467 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 946, 93 S.Ct. 1360, 35 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973); State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 586 (Minn. 1982) (the testimony was damning  and it was false. It was unquestionably material; its significance should not be underestimated.); Marshall v. State, 305 N.W.2d 838, 841 (S.D. 1981) (new trial not granted because jury had overwhelming evidence at trial to base a verdict of guilt without testimony of witness; The jury would have concluded that the defendant was guilty had ... not testified.); Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 13, 77 S.Ct. 1, 7, 1 L.Ed.2d 1, 9 (1956) (key government witness had apparently testified untruthfully in similar proceedings). On the other hand, several courts have rejected the Larrison rule but still require an initial showing of materiality. See United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 247 (2d Cir.1975) (key issue in dispute would not have been affected by new evidence), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819, 97 S.Ct. 65, 50 L.Ed.2d 80 (1976); United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir.1979) (when a key witness's testimony is false it may be probable that an acquittal would result on retrial; this may not be so when a rather inconsequential witness has prevaricated on a minor or collateral issue.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942, 100 S.Ct. 1337, 63 L.Ed.2d 775 (1980); United States v. Jackson, 579 F.2d 553, 557 (10th Cir.) (recanting testimony did not affect the evidence) (additionally the court stated: We observe that this court in Briola, supra, did not necessarily adopt the Larrison rule.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981, 99 S.Ct. 569, 58 L.Ed.2d 652 (1978). Other courts still adhere to the majority probable rule without having considered the Larrison rule. However, materiality is still a key factor for consideration. See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 387 F.2d 331 (5th Cir.1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 876, 89 S.Ct. 172, 21 L.Ed.2d 147 (1968); Anderson v. United States, 369 F.2d 11 (8th Cir.1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 976, 87 S.Ct. 1171, 18 L.Ed.2d 136 (1967). The Court of Special Appeals also recognized that one of the principles which governs the grant of a new trial in criminal cases is that the evidence must be material to the issues involved. Angell v. Just, 22 Md. App. 43, 321 A.2d 830 (1974); Jones v. State, 16 Md. App. 472, 477, 298 A.2d 483, 486, cert. denied, 268 Md. 750 (1973); see also 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 1453 (1961); 58 Am.Jur.2d New Trial, § 175 (1971). Thus, no matter which rule is followed in a particular jurisdiction, they all require a finding of materiality to the result of the case. If the requirement of materiality is not demonstrated, there is no necessity to consider whether knowledge of the falsity by the factfinder might or probably would have resulted in a different verdict. Accordingly, when the trial court found that the evidence of guilt was so overwhelming that the verdict would have been the same without Michaelson's testimony, the fact of the alleged false testimony relating to Michaelson's academic credentials was not material to the outcome of the case. From our review of the record we cannot say the trial judge was in error, and thus there was no abuse of discretion.