Opinion ID: 2599148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judicial determination of attorney-client privilege

Text: The State first argues the circuit court erred when it dismissed the indictment against Stone and the Wongs because the State did not seek judicial review before it presented Frunzi's testimony to the grand jury. The State opines it was not required to seek judicial review before it presented Frunzi's testimony to the grand jury. We disagree. Rule 104 of the Hawai`i Rules of Evidence provides, with stunning clarity, that [p]reliminary questions concerning ... the existence of a privilege ... shall be determined by the court[.] More than twenty years ago, this court set out the procedure to be followed when issues about the attorney-client privilege or exceptions to the privilege are raised. This court said the burden of establishing the privilege was upon the party asserting it and set out the manner in which privilege could be proven. The court instructed that [p]roper practice requires preliminary judicial inquiry into the existence and validity of the privilege and the burden of establishing the privilege rests on the claimant [,] . . . [and observed] Any other rule would foreclose meaningful inquiry into the existence of the relationship, and any spurious claims could never be exposed. Sapp v. Wong, 62 Haw. 34, 38-39, 609 P.2d 137, 140(1980) (citations omitted; emphasis added). See also DiCenzo v. Izawa, 68 Haw. 528, 536, 723 P.2d 171, 176 (1986) (A proper application of the codified privilege ... requires preliminary judicial inquiry into the existence and validity of the privilege ... [o]therwise, meaningful inquiry into the existence of an attorney-client relationship ... and the character of the communication ... would be foreclosed.) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In addition, a host of foreign case authority states, in sum, that the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, the burden of establishing the attorney-client privilege falls upon the client, and the burden of establishing the crime fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege falls upon the proponent of the exception. See, e.g., Swidler and Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 118 S.Ct. 2081, 141 L.Ed.2d 379 (1998) (grand jury subpoena; scope of privilege); In re Sealed Case, 223 F.3d 775 (D.C.Cir.2000) (grand jury subpoena); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 187 F.3d 996 (8th Cir.1999)(grand jury subpoena; motion to compel); Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394 (4th Cir.1998) (pretrial motion to compel); In re Richard Roe, Inc., 168 F.3d 69 (2d Cir.1999) (appeal from civil contempt order for defiance of order requiring testimony and disclosure of documents to grand jury); In re Sealed Case, 162 F.3d 670 (D.C.Cir.1998) (motion to quash grand jury subpoena); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Grand Jury No. 97-11-8, 162 F.3d 554 (9th Cir.1998) (appeal from order requiring former attorney to testify before grand jury); In re Bruce R. Lindsey, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C.Cir.1998) (motion to compel grand jury testimony); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 144 F.3d 653 (10th Cir.1998) (motion to compel grand jury testimony); United States v. Rakes, 136 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1998) (pre-trial motion to suppress); United States v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504 (9th Cir.1997) (trial testimony); In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46 (D.C.Cir.1997) (appeal from contempt citation for failure to testify and produce documents); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 102 F.3d 748 (4th Cir.1996) (action to quash grand jury subpoenas); United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir.1996) (appeal challenging order denying motions to quash grand jury subpoena); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87 F.3d 377 (9th Cir.1996) (appeal from district court order requiring former corporate counsel to testify before grand jury); Olson v. Accessory Controls and Equipment Corp., 254 Conn. 145, 757 A.2d 14 (2000)(review of protective order in wrongful termination action); Lahr v. State of Indiana, 731 N.E.2d 479 (Ind.App. 2000) (criminal appeal; trial testimony); Purcell v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 424 Mass. 109, 676 N.E.2d 436 (1997)(motion to quash subpoena to testify at trial); In re Grand Jury of Philadelphia County, 527 Pa. 432, 593 A.2d 402 (1991) (appeal from orders entered in conjunction with supervision, administration, and operation of grand jury; notes seized pursuant to search warrant); Morley v. MacFarlane, 647 P.2d 1215 (Colo.1982) (appeal from order denying injunctive relief); Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.Crim.App.1998)(criminal appeal; trial testimony); People v. Paasche, 207 Mich.App. 698, 525 N.W.2d 914 (1994) (criminal appeal; search warrant for attorney's files); State v. Fodor, 179 Ariz. 442, 880 P.2d 662 (Ct.App.1994) (criminal appeal; wiretap conversation between attorney and client); Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 469 N.W.2d 512 (Minn.Ct.App.1991) (civil appeal from protective order); In re Grand Jury Subpoena ad Testificandum Served on Louis Gonnella, Esq., 238 N.J.Super. 509, 570 A.2d 53 (1989) (motion to quash grand jury subpoena); In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Lynne Stewart, 144 Misc.2d 1012, 545 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Supr.Ct.1989) (motion to quash grand jury subpoena). [6] Imposition of burdens of proof or persuasion necessarily require that questions concerning attorney-client privilege must be put before and decided by a judge, whether the testimony is sought in criminal or civil proceedings, before a grand jury, in discovery, or at trial. To the extent the circuit court concluded the State should have sought judicial review before presenting Frunzi's testimony to the grand jury, the circuit court was correct as a matter of law and did not abuse its discretion. In sum, when a prosecutor seeks arguably privileged testimony, the prosecutor must either (1) give notice to the person who might claim the privilege and the person's counsel, so that the person or the person's attorney can seek judicial review of any claim or privilege or waive the privilege, or (2) give notice to the person's counsel and, if the person's counsel does not raise the privilege and seek judicial review, the prosecutor must seek the court's ruling on the privilege issue. In the latter instance, the prosecutor should proceed with the understanding that if the person who might claim the privilege has not been given notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue of privilege, a court's allowance of testimony may be overturned after the holder of the privilege can be heard by the court. [7]