Opinion ID: 403646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Regner's Prior Insurance Claims and Benefits

Text: 7 On cross-examination of Regner, the Government was permitted, over Regner's objections, to inquire into Regner's historical claims for and receipt of various insurance benefits. Regner proposes three errors regarding this inquiry. He argues that evidence of his past insurance claims was irrelevant, that such questioning exceeded the scope of direct examination and, once admitted, the district court erred by not giving a limiting instruction to the jury. 8 Regner's claim of irrelevance is founded upon Fed.R.Evid. 401, 402, and 403, especially the latter which provides that all relevant evidence is to be admitted unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, ... or misleading the jury.... Regner argues that any probative value of evidence of his prior insurance claims was outweighed by the prejudice that resulted from its receipt, that the evidence cast Regner as a scourge upon society in the eyes of the jury. 9 The trial court's determination under Fed.R.Evid. 403 is to be given great deference and this court will reverse only when there is an abuse of discretion. United States v. Larios, 640 F.2d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 1981), and cases cited therein. The district court admitted the inquiry for the limited purpose of rebutting Regner's testimony on direct exam to the effect that he lacked knowledge of filing insurance claims. The Government argued for admissibility also on the grounds that the evidence was probative of prior similar acts, presumably under Rule 404(b) as proof of motive, intent, plan, etc., However, the district court, in a sidebar conference, reserved judgment upon the admissibility of the inquiry under 404(b), and apparently was never called upon to provide a specific determination of that question. We will reserve judgment on that issue as well. 10 At least to the extent that the evidence was probative of Regner's credibility regarding his testimony that he was unfamiliar with insurance claims, we find no abuse of discretion in admitting this inquiry. For this same reason, we must reject Regner's argument that the examination of Regner's prior insurance claims was beyond the scope of his direct examination. 1 The examination was related to and probative of Regner's familiarity with filing insurance claims, an inquiry directly related to Regner's credibility. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. Carlson, 423 F.2d 431, 440 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 847, 91 S.Ct. 93, 27 L.Ed.2d 84 (1970). 11 Regner also claims that the district court erred in not giving an immediate instruction to the jury which would have informed them of the limited admissibility, for credibility purposes, of the evidence of Regner's prior insurance claims. This argument fails for a number of reasons. First, a district court is not required to give a limiting instruction to the jury unless counsel requests one. Fed.R.Evid. 105; United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 2232, 56 L.Ed.2d 401 (1978), reh. denied, 438 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 3127, 57 L.Ed.2d 1150 (1978). During the sidebar conference initiated by defense counsel's objections to the admissibility of evidence of Regner's prior insurance claims, defense counsel only requested that the record reflect that the evidence was being introduced for a limited purpose. Defense counsel did not request a limiting instruction at that time, and the court acknowledged that the record reflected the limited admissibility. In addition, any failure to give a limiting instruction in the absence of the request does not rise to plain error under the circumstances of this case. Cf. Drebin, supra, at 1325. 12 Finally, Regner fails to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the court's failure to give the limiting instruction. When ruling on defense counsel's objections to the admissibility of the inquiry into the past insurance claims, the district court declared in open court that (t)he matter is material because of the defendant's earlier testimony about seeming lack of knowledge of filing insurance claims, and only for that purpose am I allowing it in. R.T. at 122. We do not suggest that the court's response to counsel's objection would suffice as a limiting instruction where a specific request for such is made. However, under the circumstances of the trial in this case, the court's statement stood as a limiting admonition of sorts and serves to weaken Regner's claim of prejudice from the lack of any limiting instruction. Moreover, Regner's guilt was established by evidence independent of the evidence of the prior insurance claims. As will be set forth more fully below, the Government's evidence indicated that Regner had sent CNA fictitious hospital records and a receipt which was not for his own medical treatment, but for his stepson's. Such evidence was in and of itself sufficient to support the jury's verdict.