Opinion ID: 1286655
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court's Refusal to Suppress Testimony Regarding Defendant's Refusal to Perform Field Sobriety Tests

Text: The trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress testimony regarding his refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test but refused to suppress testimony regarding his refusal to submit to the field sobriety tests. We conclude that the court did not err in doing so. This case presents an opportunity to correct the error we made in State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723 (S.D.1981) ( Neville I ); and in State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425 (S.D. 1984) ( Neville II ). That error was our holding that Neville's refusal to submit to a blood test is evidence of a testimonial nature and thus within the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination. 346 N.W.2d at 429. We should have limited our holding to the ground relied upon by the United States Supreme Court, i.e., that the statute requiring a motorist to choose between agreeing to submit to a chemical test of his blood and thereby giving evidence against himself or refusing to take the test and suffering the consequences of that refusal does not involve unconstitutional coercion within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983). In State v. Roadifer, 346 N.W.2d 438, 440 (S.D.1984), we held that [d]exterity tests are real physical evidence and are not protected by the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. City of Wahpeton v. Skoog, 300 N.W.2d 243 (N.D.1980). These tests are based on the loss of coordination, balance and dexterity that results from intoxication, they do not force the subject to betray his subjective knowledge of the crime through communication or testimony. These tests merely compel the suspect to demonstrate his physical characteristics and condition at that time as a source of real or physical evidence to which observers may testify. We also held that an audio tape that showed the manner in which a defendant performed verbal field sobriety tests would be admissible. Our holding in Roadifer was in accord with the substantial weight of authority that roadside sobriety tests do not fall within the provisions of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., People v. Ramirez, 199 Colo. 367, 609 P.2d 616 (1980), and cases cited at note 8 therein. As the Supreme Court of Hawaii recently held in a case challenging the introduction of the results of field sobriety tests, The State of Hawaii sought neither communications nor testimony from Jacqueline Wyatt. What it sought of her was an exhibition of physical characteristics of coordination, State v. Arsenault, 115 N.H. [109] at 113, 336 A.2d [244] at 247 [(1975)], since she was a possible source of physical evidence. Consequently, the field sobriety test was not rendered infirm by the constitutionally guaranteed privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. State v. Wyatt, 687 P.2d 544, 551 (Hawaii 1984). It is true that if a motorist performs the field sobriety tests he provides evidence. He also provides evidence if he breathes, speaks, holds his eyes open, or leaves his vehicle at the officer's request and walks back to the officer's vehicle. Indeed, by the halting, fumbling, ineffectual manner in which a motorist produces his driver's license at the investigating officer's request, he may very well demonstrate beyond per adventure that he is under the influence of alcohol. In State v. Anderson, 359 N.W.2d 887 (S.D.1984), we held that SDCL 32-23-1.2 permits implementation of the PBT as a field sobriety test, which, like the traditional mental and physical dexterity tests, may be given upon reasonable suspicion that a person has violated SDCL 32-23-1. 359 N.W.2d at 892. Having held in Neville II that the proscription of South Dakota Constitution Art. VI, § 9, is no broader than the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we now hold that the fact of the refusal to perform tests that do not themselves constitute communicative or testimonial evidence is equally non-communicative and non-testimonial in nature. To the extent that Neville I and II are to the contrary, those holdings are overruled.