Opinion ID: 211765
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Submission of the Video

Text: 13 In support of his argument regarding the materiality of the video, Frazier raises numerous challenges to the district court's findings of fact. Frazier argues that there was insufficient proof to show that the examiner was misled by the video because the claimed lens system was capable of producing the shots on the video. Frazier credits his own recreation of the disputed video footage using the P/F lens system covered by the claims of the '236 patent and his experts' testimony as to the capabilities of the P/F lens system as evidence that the district court erred in finding the submission of the video material. Frazier's numerous arguments directed to materiality overlook the fact that mere submission of the video with footage shot with other than the claimed invention constituted a sufficiently material misrepresentation without regard to whether the P/F lens could create the same shots. As we explained in General Electro Music Corp. v. Samick Music Corp.: 14 Samick thus appears to argue that Maxwell's statement that he conducted a prior art search was not false because he could have truthfully stated that he had good knowledge of the prior art. Samick's argument misses the point. The issue is not whether an alternative statement would have been truthful, but whether Maxwell's actual statement that a prior art search was conducted was false. 15 19 F.3d 1405, 1410 (Fed.Cir.1994); see also Perseptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed.Cir. 2000) ([T]he materiality of intentional false statements may be independent of the claims of the patent.); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1571 (Fed.Cir.1983) (In contrast to cases where allegations of fraud are based on the withholding of prior art, there is no room to argue that submission of false affidavits is not material.). Moreover, the district court found that the P/F lens system was incapable of reproducing the footage on the video shot with the Al lens. Frazier's own expert admitted at trial during cross examination that the P/F lens would be unable to recreate the caterpillar shot as it was captured by the Al lens and submitted to the PTO. Trial Tr. at 128 (Dec. 4, 2001) (testimony of Allen Mann). The district court's finding of materiality is not clearly erroneous. 16 Frazier additionally challenges the district court's finding of intent. Essentially, Frazier argues that the district court did not give adequate weight to the testimony of Neil, Solum, and Frazier that they had no intent to deceive. The district court, however, based its finding of intent on Frazier's conduct alone. Any testimony as to the absence of intent from Neil and Solum on this issue was irrelevant. Indeed, the district court's finding of intent was based on Frazier's failure to inform Solum or the PTO that portions of the video were not shot with the claimed lens system even though Frazier was fully aware of this fact when the video was submitted. The district court found that Frazier's claimed lack of intent to mislead was not credible based on his repeatedly testifying to different versions of events under oath. Frazier does not challenge the district court's finding that he was not credible. Nor does Frazier challenge the district court's finding that he knew that portions of the video were not shot with the claimed lens system when it was submitted to the PTO. Instead, Frazier argues that he could not have intended to deceive unless he believed that the P/F lens system was incapable of achieving the depth of field of the Al lens. Frazier's argument, if correct, would require proof that he subjectively believed the video submission was deceptive. This court has repeatedly said that direct evidence of intent is unavailable in most cases and unnecessary in any event. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs. Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1354 (Fed.Cir.2005) (`Intent need not, and rarely can, be proven by direct evidence.' Rather, in the absence of a credible explanation, intent to deceive is generally inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding a knowing failure to disclose material information. (quoting Merck & Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 873 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed.Cir.1989))); Ulead Sys., Inc. v. Lex Computer & Mgmt. Corp., 351 F.3d 1139, 1146 (Fed.Cir.2003) (Direct evidence of deceptive intent is not required; rather it is usually inferred from the patentee's overall conduct.). The district court's unchallenged findings establish that Frazier allowed a video to be submitted to the PTO in order to represent the capabilities of the claimed lens, knowing that portions of the video were shot with a different lens. 1 The district court's finding of intent is not clearly erroneous on these facts. 17 Finally, Frazier points out that the district court also relied on other evidence to support its finding of intent regarding the submission of the video. The district court relied on evidence of a possible attempt by Frazier's associate Diana Serrano to expedite the PTO's handling of the patent application by exploiting political contacts. The district court also relied on evidence that Frazier provided Solum with photographs taken with an aerial image lens or wide angle lens, and that Frazier falsely represented to Solum that the photographs were taken with a prototype lens. Frazier argues that this evidence should not properly have been considered because it was irrelevant to the question of intent in submitting the video to the examiner. We are convinced that even if the district court had not considered this evidence, it still would have reached the same result. Frank's Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. PMR Techs., Ltd., 292 F.3d 1363, 1376 (Fed.Cir.2002) (holding that we may sustain a district court's finding of inequitable conduct if we are convinced that absent any irrelevant evidence relied upon by the district court it would have reached the same conclusion). 18