Opinion ID: 658544
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Imposition of Consecutive Sentences

Text: 22 The 1987 version of Guidelines Sec. 5G1.3 provided as follows: 23 If at the time of sentencing, the defendant is already serving one or more unexpired sentences, then the sentences for the instant offense(s) shall run consecutively to such unexpired sentences, unless one or more of the instant offense(s) arose out of the same transactions or occurrences as the unexpired sentences. In the latter case, such instant sentences and the unexpired sentences shall run concurrently, except to the extent otherwise required by law. 24 1987 Guidelines Sec. 5G1.3 (emphasis added). Compare 1987 version with Sec. 5G1.3 as amended eff. November 1, 1989 (If the instant offense was committed while the defendant was serving a term of imprisonment ..., the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to the unexpired term of imprisonment.). The commentary to the 1987 version of Sec. 5G1.3, citing 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3584(a) (1984), noted that the Guidelines section reflected the statutory presumption that sentences imposed at different times ordinarily run consecutively, 1987 Guidelines Sec. 5G1.3 Commentary, but went on to state that [t]his presumption does not apply when the new counts arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as a prior conviction, id. The commentary concluded that [d]eparture would be warranted when independent prosecutions produce anomalous results that circumvent or defeat the intent of the guidelines. Id. For several reasons we uphold the district court's imposition of the federal sentence consecutively to Vega's State sentence. 25 Preliminarily, we note that though the district court found that Vega's federal offense arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the state sentence (S.Tr. 14), we are skeptical of this conclusion. We infer that the district court was referring to the Organization, the conspiracy itself, when it made this statement, and we have no doubt that despite the 1985 arrest the Organization was ongoing, see, e.g., United States v. Arrington, 867 F.2d 122, 130 (2d Cir.) (arrest of some coconspirators does not necessarily mean that the conspiracy has come to an end), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817, 110 S.Ct. 70, 107 L.Ed.2d 37 (1989), and Vega continued his participation, see, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 797 F.2d 90, 98 (2d Cir.1986) (arrest does not necessarily terminate arrestee's membership in the conspiracy). We doubt, however, that such a conspiracy itself is what the Guidelines meant by the terms transaction[ ] and occurrence[ ], for those terms, which are not defined in the Guidelines, usually connote discrete acts or events rather than an ongoing operation or course of conduct that encompasses many such acts or events. Vega's State sentence was based on events that occurred prior to his 1985 arrest, and the transactions that occurred prior to that arrest, though similar, were not the same transactions that occurred in 1986, 1987, and 1988. Thus, we do not endorse the district court's premise that 1987 Guidelines Sec. 5G1.3 required, absent a discretionary decision to the contrary, that the sentence to be imposed on Vega be concurrent. 26 Assuming that that premise was correct, however, we find no error in the district court's exercise of discretion. The court took the view (a) that 1987 Guidelines Sec. 5G1.3 did not deprive it of the discretion conferred by 18 U.S.C. Secs. 3584 and 3553(a) to decide whether the sentence for the federal offense should be imposed concurrently with or consecutively to Vega's State sentence, and (b) that in any event the Sec. 5G1.3 commentary gave it discretion to impose a consecutive sentence as a departure. Section 3584 provides, in part, that if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or consecutively, and that in determining whether to sentence concurrently or consecutively, the court should consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(a). Those factors include the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense ... [and] to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. Id. Secs. 3553(a)(2)(A) and (B). The court concluded that a concurrent sentence would fail entirely to reflect these concerns for if Vega were sentenced concurrently, the result could be that he would serve a prison term totaling only five years for crimes that were horrendous. It found that a concurrent sentence would produce an anomalous result which could circumvent and defeat the intent of the guidelines. (S.Tr. 21.) It concluded therefore that the proper exercise of its discretion required consecutive sentencing. Vega argues that neither the statutory sections nor the departure provisions of the Guidelines gave the court the power to impose consecutive sentences on him. We disagree. 27 Other courts of appeals that have considered whether the 1987 version of Sec. 5G1.3 deprived the sentencing court of discretion to choose between consecutive and concurrent sentences have unanimously concluded that the court retains the power to make such a choice. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 903 F.2d 341, 345-49 (5th Cir.1990) (collecting cases). The courts have, however, divided with respect to rationale. Some have concluded that the Guidelines cannot override the discretion conferred by Sec. 3854. See, e.g., United States v. Nottingham, 898 F.2d 390, 393-95 (3d Cir.1990) (holding that Sec. 5G1.3 purports to but does not eliminate court's discretion with respect to consecutive versus concurrent sentences, and vacating consecutive sentence imposed by judge who believed he had no discretion to impose concurrent sentence); United States v. Wills, 881 F.2d 823, 826 (9th Cir.1989) (upholding district court's discretion to impose a concurrent or consecutive sentence, as a matter of law, under section 3584(a)). Others have concluded that Sec. 5G1.3 restricts the court to making its choice by means of a Guidelines departure. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 903 F.2d at 348-49 (affirming judgment imposing consecutive sentence where district court indicated that it believed it had the power to, but declined to, impose concurrent sentence by way of departure); United States v. Rogers, 897 F.2d 134, 137-38 (4th Cir.1990) (vacating judgment imposing consecutive sentence where court believed it had no discretion, by means of departure, to make sentences concurrent); United States v. Fossett, 881 F.2d 976, 980 (11th Cir.1989) (affirming imposition of consecutive sentence where instant offense did not arise out of same transaction or occurrence, and stating that imposition of concurrent sentence could be imposed only by way of departure). 28 We need not choose between these two views in the present case, since Judge Spatt found the imposition of a consecutive sentence to be permissible and appropriate regardless of which principle applied. We think it clear that if the court did not retain discretion to impose a consecutive sentence on Vega as a matter of law, it surely had the power to do so as the departure envisioned by the commentary to Sec. 5G1.3, for it would be anomalous indeed for the initial sentencing of a defendant to confer on him an effective immunity for the continuation thereafter of his criminal conduct.