Opinion ID: 2355224
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: specimen recommended instructions.

Text: In view of the foregoing, the proper instructions in this case would have been substantially as follows: INSTRUCTION NO. 1 AUTHORIZED VERDICTS You shall find the Defendant not guilty under these Instructions unless you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of one of the following offenses: A. Murder under Instruction No. 3; OR B. First-degree manslaughter under Instruction No. 4; OR C. Second-degree manslaughter under Instruction No. 5 or Instruction No. 7B(2); OR D. Reckless homicide under Instruction No. 6 or Instruction No. 7B(1). INSTRUCTION NO. 2 DEFINITIONS Intentionally A person acts intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct when his conscious objective is to cause that result or to engage in that conduct. Wantonly A person acts wantonly with respect to a result or to a circumstance when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. Recklessly A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. Extreme Emotional Disturbance Is a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one's judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from the impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes. It is not a mental disease in itself, and an enraged, inflamed, or disturbed emotional state does not constitute an extreme emotional disturbance unless there is a reasonable explanation or excuse therefor, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the Defendant's situation under circumstances as the Defendant believed them to be. Serious Physical Injury Means physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health, or prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ. Physical Force Means force used upon or directed toward the body of another person. Deadly Physical Force Means force which is used for the purpose of causing death or serious physical injury or which the Defendant knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious physical injury. INSTRUCTION NO. 3 MURDER You will find the Defendant guilty of Murder under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: A. That in this county on or about December 24, 1998 and before the finding of the Indictment herein, he killed John Allen Brown by stabbing him with a knife; AND B. That in so doing: (1) He caused the death of John Allen Brown intentionally and not while acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance; OR (2) He was wantonly engaging in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another and thereby caused the death of John Allen Brown under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life. AND C. That he was not privileged to act in self-protection. INSTRUCTION NO. 4 FIRST-DEGREE MANSLAUGHTER If you do not find the Defendant guilty of Murder under Instruction No. 3, you will find the Defendant guilty of First-Degree Manslaughter under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: A. That in this county on or about December 24, 1998 and before the finding of the Indictment herein, he killed John Allen Brown by stabbing him with a knife; AND B. That in so doing: (1) He intended to cause the death of John Allen Brown; OR (2) He did not intend to kill John Allen Brown, but intended to cause serious physical injury to John Allen Brown; AND C. That he was not privileged to act in self-protection. INSTRUCTION NO. 5 SECOND-DEGREE MANSLAUGHTER If you do not find the Defendant guilty under either Instruction No. 3 or Instruction No. 4, you will find the Defendant guilty of Second-Degree Manslaughter under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: A. That in this county on or about December 24, 1998 and before the finding of the Indictment herein, he killed John Allen Brown by stabbing him with a knife; AND B. That in so doing, he was acting wantonly as that term is defined in Instruction No. 2. AND C. That he was not privileged to act in self-protection. INSTRUCTION NO. 6 RECKLESS HOMICIDE If you do not find the Defendant guilty under Instruction No. 3 or Instruction No. 4 or Instruction No. 5, you will find the Defendant guilty of Reckless Homicide under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: A. That in this county on or about December 24, 1998, and before the finding of the Indictment herein, he killed John Allen Brown by stabbing him with a knife; AND B. That in so doing, he was acting recklessly as that term is defined in Instruction No. 2. AND C. That he was not privileged to act in self-protection. INSTRUCTION NO. 7 SELF-PROTECTION Even though the Defendant might otherwise be guilty of an offense described in Instruction No. 3, 4, 5, or 6, if at the time the Defendant killed John Allen Brown (if he did so), he believed that John Allen Brown was then and there about to use physical force upon him, he was privileged to use such physical force against John Allen Brown as he believed to be necessary in order to protect himself against it, but including the right to use deadly physical force in so doing only if he believed it to be necessary in order to protect himself from death or serious physical injury at the hands of John Allen Brown. A. INITIAL AGGRESSOR QUALIFICATION: Provided, however, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was the initial aggressor in the use of physical force, the defense of self-protection is not available to him, unless: (1) He did not initially intend to cause death or serious physical injury to John Allen Brown and his initial physical force was not such that he thereby created and knew he was creating a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to John Allen Brown; AND (2) The force returned or threatened by John Allen Brown was such that the Defendant believed himself to be in imminent danger of death or serious physical injury. B. WANTON OR RECKLESS BELIEF QUALIFICATION: Provided further, however, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was mistaken in his belief that it was necessary to use physical force against John Allen Brown in self-protection, or in his belief in the degree of force necessary to protect himself, AND (1) That when he killed John Allen Brown, he failed to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he was mistaken in that belief, and that his failure to perceive that risk constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would have observed in the same situation, then, if you would otherwise find the Defendant guilty of Murder under Instruction No. 3, or First-Degree Manslaughter under Instruction No. 4, or Second-Degree Manslaughter under Instruction No. 5, you shall not find him guilty of that offense, but shall instead find him guilty of Reckless Homicide under this Instruction No. 7B(1) and so state in your verdict; OR (2) That when he killed John Allen Brown, he was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he was mistaken in that belief, and that his disregard of that risk constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would have observed in the same situation, then if you would otherwise find the Defendant guilty of Murder under Instruction No. 3, or First-Degree Manslaughter under Instruction No. 4, you shall not find him guilty of that offense, but shall instead find him guilty of Second-Degree Manslaughter under this Instruction No. 7B(2) and so state in your verdict. INSTRUCTION NO. 8 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE A. The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of a crime and the Indictment shall not be considered as evidence or as having any weight against him. You shall find the Defendant not guilty unless you are satisfied from the evidence alone and beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty. If upon the whole case you have a reasonable doubt that he is guilty, you shall find him not guilty. B. If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant would be guilty of intentional Murder under Instruction No. 3B(1), except that you have a reasonable doubt as to whether at the time he killed John Allen Brown, he was or was not acting under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, you shall not find the Defendant guilty of Murder under Instruction No. 3B(1), but shall find him guilty of First-Degree Manslaughter under Instruction No. 4B(1). INSTRUCTION NO. 9 RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT A defendant is not compelled to testify and the fact that the Defendant did not testify in this case cannot be used as an inference of guilt and should not prejudice him in any way. INSTRUCTION NO. 10 VERDICT The verdict of the jury must be in writing, must be unanimous and must be signed by one of you as foreman. This _____ day of _____________ ____________ JUDGE FORM VERDICTS NO. 1 We, the jury, find the Defendant not guilty. ________________________________ FOREPERSON NO. 2 We, the jury, find the Defendant guilty of ______________________ under Instruction No. ____. ____________________________ FOREPERSON The law is so certified. LAMBERT, C.J., GRAVES, JOHNSTONE and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur. KELLER, J., concurs by separate opinion in which STUMBO, J., joins.