Opinion ID: 1875481
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of Motion for a New Trial

Text: We note that typically RCr 10.02 motions based upon newly discovered evidence should be made within one year of the rendering of a final judgment. However, RCr 10.06(1) allows entry of a motion for a new trial based upon the ground of newly discovered evidence . . . made within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment or at a later time if the court for good cause so permits.  (emphasis added). Similarly, CR 60.02 permits, On motion a court may, upon such terms as are just, relieve a party or his legal representative from its final judgment, order, or proceeding upon the following grounds: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59.02; [ten days after judgment] (c) perjury or falsified evidence; (d) fraud affecting the proceedings, other than perjury or falsified evidence; (e) the judgment is void, or has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (f) any other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and on grounds (a), (b), and (c) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this rule does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. (emphasis added). However, as we recognized in Bowling v. Commonwealth, 168 S.W.3d 2, 5 (Ky.2004), [u]nlike RCr 10.06(1) ... CR 60.02 contains no provision for extending the time limit past one year for reasons of newly discovered evidence. Yet, as we implicitly noted in Bowling, and as is explicitly present in the rule, justifications under CR 60.02(d), (e), or (f) may be asserted outside of this one year time frame. See Bowling, 168 S.W.3d at 6 n. 3 ( quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Lewis, 296 S.W.2d 228, 231 (Ky.1956)) (noting that CR 60.02(f) must be explicitly invoked to be applicable). While such consideration is not an issue in the present instance as Appellant, here, specifically pleaded relief under both RCr 10.06(1) and CR 60.02(f), we now call into question the efficacy of a rule which fails to acknowledge that an extraordinary nature may likewise exist under CR 60.02(b), such is the case here. An extraordinary circumstance under CR 60.02(f) always establishes good cause under RCr 10.06(1) and thus, if good cause is shown, a motion for a new trial can be made outside of the one year limitations period. Here, it should not be overlooked that the DNA technology which gave rise to this newly discovered evidence did not exist in the time frame when it could have been timely brought under CR 60.02(b). Despite the disconnect between the permissive time frame of RCr 10.06(1) and the more rigid time frame under CR 60.02, Appellant is permitted to make a motion for a new trial because he proceeded under both RCr 10.06(1) and CR 60.02(f). Therefore, as Appellant has demonstrated good cause, the one year limitation is not applicable here.