Opinion ID: 2634810
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Heading: The Privette Doctrine

Text: Our discussion begins with a review of Privette and its progeny. In Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 854 P.2d 721, a roofing contractor was responsible for installing a new tar and gravel roof on a duplex. An employee was injured transporting five gallon buckets of hot tar up to the roof on a ladder, not using the kettle and pumping device previously employed. The employee sought workers' compensation benefits, but also sued in tort the owner of the duplex who had hired the contractor for whom the employee worked, although the owner was not present during the roofing process and did not participate in the contractor's decision to have the employee hand carry the buckets. ( Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 692-693, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 854 P.2d 721.) The employee eventually focused on a single theory of liability, that because of the inherent danger of working with hot tar, [the owner] should, under the doctrine of peculiar risk, be liable for injuries to [the employee] that resulted from [the contractor's] negligence. ( Ibid. ) The lower courts denied the owner's summary judgment motion, but we reversed, rejecting application in this context of the peculiar risk doctrine found in the Restatement Second of Torts, section 416. As we explained: At common law, a person who hired an independent contractor generally was not liable to third parties for injuries caused by the contractor's negligence in performing the work. [Citations.] Central to this rule of nonliability was the recognition that a person who hired an independent contractor had `no right of control as to the mode of doing the work contracted for.' [Citations.] The reasoning was that the work performed was the enterprise of the contractor, who, as a matter of business convenience, would be better able than the person employing the contractor to absorb accident losses incurred in the course of the contracted work. This could be done, for instance, by indirectly including the cost of safety precautions and insurance coverage in the contract price. ( Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 693, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 854 P.2d 721.) We further explained that numerous exceptions to the rule of nonliability developed over the years, including the peculiar risk doctrine. The basis for that exception, as explained in a leading English case, was that a `man who orders a work to be executed, from which, in the natural course of things, injurious consequences to his neighbor must be expected to arise . . . cannot relieve himself of his responsibility by employing some one else. . . .' [Citation.] . . . [T]he English court held a landowner liable for damages to his neighbor's property when an independent contractor hired by the landowner to tear down an old house on his land and to build a new one on the same site, but with a deeper foundation, undermined the ground supporting the neighbor's house. ( Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 694, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 854 P.2d 721.) The courts adopted the peculiar risk exception to the general rule of nonliability to ensure that innocent third parties injured by the negligence of an independent contractor hired by a landowner to do inherently dangerous work on the land would not have to depend on the contractor's solvency in order to receive compensation for the injuries. [Citations.] It was believed that as between two parties innocent of any personal wrongdoing  the person who contracted for the work and the hapless victim of the contractor's negligence  the risk of loss occasioned by the contracted work was more fairly allocated to the person for whose benefit the job was undertaken. [Citation.] Also, by spreading the risk of loss to the person who primarily benefited from the hired work, the courts sought to promote workplace safety, a concern of great significance to the public. ( Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 694, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 854 P.2d 721.) We concluded that the justifications for the peculiar risk doctrine did not apply to situations in which a contractor's employee is injured and workers' compensation is available. As we explained, the peculiar risk doctrine seeks to ensure that injuries caused by contracted work will not go uncompensated, that the risk of loss for such injuries is spread to the person who contracted for and thus primarily benefited from the contracted work, and that adequate safety measures are taken to prevent injuries resulting from such work. [Citation.] But in the case of on-the-job injury to an employee of an independent contractor, the workers' compensation system of recovery regardless of fault achieves the identical purposes that underlie recovery under the doctrine of peculiar risk. It ensures compensation for injury by providing swift and sure compensation to employees for any workplace injury; it spreads the risk created by the performance of dangerous work to those who contract for and thus benefit from such work, by including the cost of workers' compensation insurance in the price for the contracted work; and it encourages industrial safety. ( Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 701, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 854 P.2d 721.) Several cases after Privette extended and elaborated upon its doctrine. In Toland, supra, 18 Cal.4th 253, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 878, 955 P.2d 504, we rejected a hirer's liability to an independent contractor's employee under Restatement Second of Torts, section 413, which provides that a person who hires an independent contractor to do inherently dangerous work, but who fails to provide in the contract or in some other manner that special precautions be taken to avert the peculiar risks of that work, could be held liable for the resultant injury. The plaintiff attempted to distinguish section 413 from section 416 at issue in Privette, which imposes liability for peculiar risks even though the employer has provided for [special] precautions in the contract or otherwise. ( Toland, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 260, 263, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 878, 955 P.2d 504.) The plaintiff argued that section 416 imposed vicarious liability whereas in section 413 liability was direct. We disagreed: [P]eculiar risk liability is not a traditional theory of direct liability for the risks created by one's own conduct: Liability under both sections is in essence `vicarious' or `derivative' in the sense that it derives from the `act or omission' of the hired contractor, because it is the hired contractor who has caused the injury by failing to use reasonable care in performing the work. ( Toland, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 265, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 878, 955 P.2d 504.) Therefore, contrary to plaintiff Toland's assertion, our decision in Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th 689, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 854 P.2d 721, bars employees of a hired contractor who are injured by the contractor's negligence from seeking recovery against the hiring person, irrespective of whether recovery is sought under the theory of peculiar risk set forth in section 416 or section 413 of the Restatement Second of Torts. In either situation, it would be unfair to impose liability on the hiring person when the liability of the contractor, the one primarily responsible for the worker's on-the-job injuries, is limited to providing workers' compensation coverage. ( Toland, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 267, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 878, 955 P.2d 504.) In Camargo, supra, 25 Cal.4th 1235, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 617, 25 P.3d 1096, we held that an employee of a contractor is barred from suing the hirer of the contractor under the negligent hiring theory set forth in [the Restatement Second of Torts,] section 411. Under section 411, a hirer is liable for physical harm to third persons caused by the hirer's failure to exercise reasonable care to employ a competent contractor to perform work that will involve a risk of physical harm unless it is skillfully and carefully done, or to perform any duty the hirer owes to third persons. We rejected the argument that Privette and Toland were distinguishable on the ground that in a negligent hiring case the hirer is, in a sense, being taxed with his own negligence, making his liability direct. `[T]he same could be said with regard to an action brought under the peculiar risk theory set forth in section 413. More importantly, under both sections 411 and 413, the liability of the hirer is in essence `vicarious' or `derivative' in the sense that it derives from the `act or omission' of the hired contractor, because it is the hired contractor who caused the injury by failing to use reasonable care in performing the work. [Citation.] Therefore, in a negligent hiring case under the theory set forth in section 411, just as in peculiar risk cases under the theories set forth in sections 413 and 416, it would be unfair to impose liability on the hiring person when the liability of the contractor, the one primarily responsible for the worker's on-the-job injuries, is limited to providing workers' compensation coverage. [Citation.]' ( Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 205-206, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 853, 38 P.3d 1081.) In Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th 198, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 853, 38 P.3d 1081, a crane operator employed by an independent contractor to help construct a freeway overpass for the California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) would habitually retract the crane's stabilizing outrigger to allow other construction vehicles to pass. When Hooker attempted to swing the boom of the crane without first extending the outrigger, the weight of the boom caused the crane to tip over, and Hooker was thrown to the pavement and killed. ( Id. at p. 202, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 853, 38 P.3d 1081.) According to the Caltrans construction manual, Caltrans was responsible for compliance with safety laws and regulations, and its construction safety coordinator was supposed to ` recognize and anticipate unsafe conditions ' in its construction projects. ( Ibid. ) Hooker's estate contended there was a triable issue regarding whether Caltrans was liable under a retained control theory as described in the Restatement Second of Torts, section 414, which states: One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, but who retains the control of any part of the work, is subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control with reasonable care. We rejected Caltrans's categorical argument that we should, for public policy reasons, disallow any recovery by a contractor's employee, even when the hirer retains control over safety conditions. In arriving at this conclusion, we recalled the rationale of Privette that `[a]t common law, a person who hired an independent contractor generally was not liable to third parties for injuries caused by the contractor's negligence in performing the work. [Citations.] Central to this rule of nonliability was the recognition that a person who hired an independent contractor had `no right of control as to the mode of doing the work contracted for.' . . .' On the other hand, if a hirer does retain control over safety conditions at a worksite and negligently exercises that control in a manner that affirmatively contributes to an employee's injuries, it is only fair to impose liability on the hirer. ( Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 213, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 853, 38 P.3d 1081, italics in original, fn. omitted.) At the same time, consistent with Privette's rule against vicarious hirer liability, we concluded that it would be unfair to impose tort liability on the hirer of the contractor merely because the hirer retained the ability to exercise control over safety at the worksite. In fairness, . . . the imposition of tort liability on a hirer should depend on whether the hirer exercised the control that was retained in a manner that affirmatively contributed to the injury of the contractor's employee. ( Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 210, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 853, 38 P.3d 1081, first italics added.) We elaborated that [s]uch affirmative contribution need not always be in the form of actively directing a contractor or contractor's employee. There will be times when a hirer will be liable for its omissions. For example, if the hirer promises to undertake a particular safety measure, then the hirer's negligent failure to do so should result in liability if such negligence leads to an employee injury. ( Hooker, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 212, fn. 3, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 853, 38 P.3d 1081.) Accordingly, in Hooker, we concluded summary judgment was appropriate because Caltrans had not exercised its retained control in a manner that affirmatively contributed to the employee's injury. On the other hand, in the companion case, McKown, supra, 27 Cal.4th 219, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 868, 38 P.3d 1094, we upheld a jury verdict for an injured employee against the hirer of the contractor, because the hirer had furnished the employee with a defective forklift that had contributed to his injury. ( Id. at pp. 223-226, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 868, 38 P.3d 1094.) A useful way to view the above cases is in terms of delegation. As suggested by Privette, at common law, it was regarded as the norm that when a hirer delegated a task to an independent contractor, it in effect delegated responsibility for performing that task safely, and assignment of liability to the contractor followed that delegation. ( Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 693, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 854 P.2d 721.) For various policy reasons discussed in Privette, courts have severely limited the hirer's ability to delegate responsibility and escape liability. ( Id. at p. 694, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 854 P.2d 721.) But in Privette and its progeny, we have concluded that, principally because of the availability of workers' compensation, these policy reasons for limiting delegation do not apply to the hirer's ability to delegate to an independent contractor the duty to provide the contractor's employees with a safe working environment. In fact, the policy in favor of delegation of responsibility and assignment of liability is so strong in this context that we have not allowed it to be circumvented on a negligent hiring theory. Nonetheless, when the hirer does not fully delegate the task of providing a safe working environment, but in some manner actively participates in how the job is done, and that participation affirmatively contributes to the employee's injury, the hirer may be liable in tort to the employee. Using the framework of delegation, we can understand other cases in which the hirer's liability or potential liability has been found. In Ray v. Silverado Constructors (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1120, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 251, the employee of a subcontractor was killed when he was struck by a heavy wooden deck blown by a strong wind from a bridge he was helping to construct. He was hit while attempting to secure other construction materials that also had been blown from the bridge, after having stopped his truck so as to block traffic from traveling into the hazardous area. ( Id. at p. 1124, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 251.) His estate sued the general contractor on a negligent retention of control theory. The trial court granted summary judgment for the general contractor, but the Court of Appeal reversed. It reasoned that a highway contractor has a duty to exercise due care to protect the traveling public (see Breslin v. Fredrickson (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 780, 786, 313 P.2d 597), and that duty may have included the responsibility to close the road to prevent motorists from being harmed by the wayward construction materials. ( Ray v. Silverado Constructors, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1134-1135, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 251.) The court concluded there was a triable issue as to whether the general contractor retained the sole authority to close the road, and whether its failure to do so therefore constituted negligence that led directly to the employee's injury. ( Id. at pp. 1134-1136, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 251.) In other words, the general contractor may have been liable because its delegation of workplace safety to the subcontractor, the plaintiff's employer, was limited and did not authorize the subcontractor to undertake the one safety measure that might have saved the plaintiff's life. In Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Co. (1955) 44 Cal.2d 225, 282 P.2d 69, a case that predates Privette, the employee of an independent contractor hired by the cement company to work on its premises was electrocuted when the boom of a crane used to repair the company's rock crushing equipment became electrically charged by coming in contact with overhead power lines during nighttime operations. ( Id. at p. 229-231, 282 P.2d 69.) In affirming a verdict for the plaintiff, the court concluded there was evidence that these power lines posed a great hazard to the independent contractor's employees, particularly when the work was carried out at night and the power lines were invisible, and that it was negligent not to request that the power lines be deenergized. ( Id. at pp. 231-234, 282 P.2d 69.) It was also clear from the evidence that the company had the sole authority to request the state, which controlled the power lines, to deenergize the power lines, and that the contractor's supervisor had requested the lines be deenergized but the company superintendent refused because it would have required the plant to be shut down. ( Id. at pp. 230-232, 282 P.2d 69.) Therefore, because the hirer had not delegated to the contractor the authority to undertake a critical employee safety measure, and the contractor's employee was injured as a result of that measure not being undertaken, the court concluded the hirer could be liable to the employee. With these principles in mind, we review the doctrine of landowner liability and consider how this doctrine relates to the Privette doctrine.