Opinion ID: 1640348
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: waiver of counsel: admission as direct evidence

Text: The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, inter alia, guarantees a defendant the right to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. US Const, Am VI. This right was adopted in those very same words in Const 1963, art 1, § 20, where it is stated that the accused shall have the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense .... While both of the above provisions guarantee the right to counsel, in rendering our decision today, we rely solely upon the Michigan Constitution. Const 1963, art 1, § 20. Since Const 1963, art 1, § 20 provides an adequate state ground for our decision, we find it unnecessary to address the issues before us under the United States Constitution. Although we do not reach the federal question, we will, however, look to cases construing the Sixth Amendment. Inasmuch as Const 1963, art 1, § 20 and the Sixth Amendment are identical in language insofar as the right to counsel is concerned, a review of relevant federal cases can guide us in interpreting our constitution. There are certain rules associated with the art 1, § 20/Sixth Amendment right to counsel that simply cannot be questioned. A person is entitled to the assistance of counsel at least at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him.... Brewer v Williams, 430 US 387, 398; 97 S Ct 1232; 51 L Ed 2d 424, reh den 431 US 925; 97 S Ct 2200; 53 L Ed 2d 240 (1977), quoting Kirby v Illinois, 406 US 682, 689; 92 S Ct 1877; 32 L Ed 2d 411 (1972). Any interrogation after that date without the presence of an attorney constitutes a violation of the defendant's right to counsel, unless the defendant has waived his right. Brewer v Williams, supra, pp 401-404; Massiah v United States, 377 US 201, 204-206; 84 S Ct 1199; 12 L Ed 2d 246 (1964). [T]he right to counsel does not depend upon a request by the defendant.... Brewer v Williams, supra, p 404. In the instant case, there is no question that the inculpatory statements were deliberately elicited from the defendant after judicial proceedings had been initiated against him. The only question might be whether the judicial proceedings had ended, because the inculpatory statements were not elicited until after sentencing. In this regard we agree with the Court of Appeals that the right to counsel is applicable to post-trial statements when appeal is not final. See Cahill v Rushen, 501 F Supp 1219 (ED Cal, 1980) [aff'd 678 F2d 791 (CA 9, 1982)]. People v Gonyea, 126 Mich App 177, 183; 337 NW2d 325 (1983). If the right to counsel is to remain appropriately meaningful, the right must extend until the appeal is final. An attorney's advisory role does not end at sentencing. See Cahill v Rushen, 678 F2d 794-795; Cahill v Rushen, 501 F Supp 1223. This is especially true in light of the fact that the appellate process is not the end of a defendant's prosecution, and may very well be just a new beginning, in that frequently trial errors result in the ordering of new trials on appeal. See Cahill v Rushen, 678 F2d 794-795; Cahill v Rushen, 501 F Supp 1223. Thus we hold that the defendant here did have the right to counsel after sentencing when he was with the detectives. Since the defendant had the right to counsel at the time when the inculpatory statements were deliberately elicited from him, the only real issue is whether he waived this right. In Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464; 58 S Ct 1019; 82 L Ed 1461 (1938), the Court stated: A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. This basic test was reaffirmed in Brewer v Williams, 430 US 387, 404; 97 S Ct 1232; 51 L Ed 2d 424 (1977): [I]t was incumbent upon the State to prove `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US at 464.