Opinion ID: 2259273
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. Anderson's Discretionary Duty

Text: To determine whether Dr. Anderson's connection to the report submitted to the Data Bank should be afforded absolute immunity, we analyze his actions in the context of our two-prong discretionary duty test. Specifically, we must determine whether Dr. Anderson's conduct (1) was within the outer perimeter of his official duties, and (2) was discretionary as opposed to ministerial. Moss, supra note 6, 580 A.2d at 1020 (citing Thompson, supra, 570 A.2d at 294 & n. 14). In Moss, this court noted that [d]etermining whether an act fell `within the outer perimeter of the [official's] line of duty,' Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575, 79 S.Ct. 1335, 3 L.Ed.2d 1434 (1959), calls for a relatively straight-forward identification of the act giving rise to the suit and an analysis of the official's proper functions and duties. Moss, supra note 6, 580 A.2d at 1020. Distinguishing between discretionary and ministerial functions, however, involves a more discerning inquiry which seeks to determine whether the government action at issue allows a sufficiently significant application of discretion to justify official immunity, in order to assure `fearless, vigorous, and effective' decisionmaking. Id. (quoting Thompson, supra, 570 A.2d at 297). Each case requires the court, as a matter of law, to balance the contending interests and determine if society's concern requires subordinating the vindication of private injuries otherwise compensable at law to the particular government conduct at issue in order to avoid the disruptive effects of civil litigation. Id. 580 A.2d at 1020-21. We employ four policy factors to aid in our task of distinguishing discretionary from ministerial functions: (1) the nature of the injury, (2) the availability of alternate remedies, (3) the ability of the courts to judge fault without unduly invading the executive's function, and (4) the importance of protecting particular kinds of acts. Id. at 1021. Further, this inquiry must necessarily recognize the tenet that the scope of immunity should be no broader than necessary to ensure effective governance. Id. (citing Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 298-99, 108 S.Ct. 580, 98 L.Ed.2d 619 (1988)). Looking at the applicable policy factors, we recognize that to the extent Dr. Simpkins' injuries from the alleged defamation are economic, and not physical, the first factor arguably cut[s] against [Dr. Anderson's] liability. Thompson, supra, 570 A.2d at 297. With regard to the remaining factors, however, we cannot discern from the record whether Dr. Simpkins had some alternative administrative remedies through the District of Columbia Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act [8] which could provide adequate redress; whether Dr. Anderson's actions reflect routine supervisory conduct or policy choices within his discretion; and whether Dr. Anderson's conduct reaches the level of importance which warrants protection from a civil action for defamation. Id. at 298. In short, absent further trial court findings as to the applicable policy factors, we cannot say as a matter of law whether [Dr. Anderson] ha[s], or ha[s] not, carried [his] burden of sustaining absolute immunity. Id. Accordingly, just as we are remanding Ms. Wilson's claim of absolute immunity for further findings, we also remand concerning Dr. Anderson's claim of absolute immunity to allow the trial judge the opportunity to properly weigh the pertinent factors and discern where the appropriate balance of interests lies. Moss, supra note 6, 580 A.2d at 1021. [9] Specifically, in following the guidelines we set out in Moss: [t]he judge should: (1) ascertain whether [Dr. Anderson's] communications to [Dr. Jean-Jacques] fell within the outer perimeter of his official duties, and (2), based upon findings on the policy factors identified above, as well as others the judge deems relevant, decide whether those acts involved the exercise of a choice whose contribution to effective government outweighs the harm to plaintiff that would result from application of official immunity  thus making the acts discretionary within the meaning of Thompson. Id. at 1021-22.