Opinion ID: 2544268
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Omission of Substantial Step

Text: I posit the majority's application of the strict construction standard is inconsistent with the above cited precedent. Use of dictionary definitions (and synonyms from a thesaurus) to strictly construe an otherwise vague and inartful information lacks support from the overwhelming weight of authority. See, e.g., McCarty, 140 Wash.2d at 426-28, 998 P.2d 296; Taylor, 140 Wash.2d at 247-50, 996 P.2d 571 (Johnson, J., dissenting); Johnson, 119 Wash.2d at 149-50, 829 P.2d 1078; Khlee, 106 Wash.App. at 25, 22 P.3d 1264; Johnstone, 96 Wash.App. at 844, 982 P.2d 119; Ralph, 85 Wash.App. at 85-86, 930 P.2d 1235; Bacani, 79 Wash.App. at 704-05, 902 P.2d 184. In any event, resorting to such external sources cannot cure the fundamental flaw in the charging document  the essential element of a substantial step was omitted whereas the constitution requires it not be. On this basis alone we should reverse Borrero's conviction. [5] Even if we were to ignore our most recent opinion in McCarty and other case law, as our majority does today, the majority must nonetheless come to grips with a principle discernible from the Taylor majority and Khlee. Those opinions indicate that if it is at all possible to imagine a scenario where behavior described in the information does not constitute a violation of the law sought to be enforced, then the information is insufficient. See Taylor, 140 Wash.2d at 245, 996 P.2d 571 (One does not, without intent, push, kick or punch another.); Khlee, 106 Wash.App. at 25, 22 P.3d 1264 (One can knowingly possess a gun without knowing it to be stolen.). Under this approach the question here would be whether it is possible to imagine a scenario where one is attempting to murder another but has not yet taken a substantial step toward doing so. I submit the answer is yes. To attempt to commit the crime, for example, one may solicit the services of another. However, solicitation alone does not constitute a substantial step. State v. Gay, 4 Wash.App. 834, 839-40, 486 P.2d 341 (1971). Similarly, when attempting to carry out the criminal act, a person may first purchase a map to find the route to the victim's house. However, such an act  merely preparatory as it is  does not amount to a substantial step. See State v. Workman, 90 Wash.2d 443, 449, 584 P.2d 382 (1978); see also 11A Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 100.05 (2d ed. 1994) (WPIC). The term attempt fails to reveal the key element of a substantial step. If dictionary definitions are the majority's answer, I would direct it to Black's Law Dictionary: Attempt ... is the most common of the preliminary crimes. It consists of steps taken in furtherance of an indictable offence which the person attempting intends to carry out if he can. As we have seen there can be a long chain of such steps and it is necessary to have some test by which to decide that the particular link in the chain has been reached at which the crime of attempt has been achieved; that link will represent the actus reus of attempt .... Black's Law Dictionary 123-24 (7th ed.1999) (emphasis added) (quoting J.W. Cecil Turner, Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law 79 (16th ed.1952)). In Washington, the essential element of a substantial step is crucial to understand the test to determine the actus reus for an attempt. This is underscored by the fact other jurisdictions use different tests. Criminal law commentators have deduced numerous different formulations, the substantial step test used in Washington being just one of them. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 27.06[B] (1995) (categorizing eight different tests); 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 6.2(d) (1986) (categorizing four different tests). By merely using the word attempt, any of these formulations could apply. Every act done with [the requisite] intent is not an attempt, for it may be too remote from the completed offence to give rise to criminal liability, notwithstanding the criminal purpose of the doer. I may buy matches with intent to burn a haystack, and yet be clear of attempted arson; but if I go to the stack and there light one of the matches, my intent has developed into a criminal attempt. Black's Law Dictionary, supra, at 123 (quoting John Salmond, Jurisprudence 387 (Glanville L. Williams ed., 10th ed.1947)). Simply using the word attempt only identifies the actus reus problem; it does not identify the essential substantial step test used in this state to resolve it.