Opinion ID: 697081
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the robesky evidence

Text: 15 We review the evidentiary rulings of the district court for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1462 (9th Cir. 1994). We will reverse the district on the basis of an evidentiary ruling if the error more likely than not affected the verdict. United States v. Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 1991). 16 Siotos argues that the district court erred in admitting Robesky's testimony about drug deals involving Robesky, his roommate Hall, and Randall Steve Besich, because this evidence was not relevant, and because it was prejudicial. In response to this, the government asserts that Robesky's testimony provided direct evidence of the charged conspiracy by identifying Besich as a conspirator and confirming Besich's role in the conspiracy as the purchaser and ultimate distributor of the drugs. Red br. at 17 (emphasis in original). Therefore, contends the government, this evidence was highly probative of the charged conspiracy. 17 We disagree with the government. The Robesky evidence did not provide direct evidence of the charged conspiracy. The acts to which Robesky testified were not acts done in furtherance of the charged conspiracy. At most, the Robesky evidence provided circumstantial evidence as to the identity of Besich. 18 The court admitted the testimony and the telephone records on the theory that they provided evidence as to Besich's identity. In making its proffer to the court, the government complained that without Robesky, it would have only the testimony of Kouvlis to show that Besich is a drug dealer. SER 21-22. 19 In making that argument, the government ignored the fact that it not only had Kouvlis's testimony mentioning Besich and identifying him in a photograph, but it also had the testimony of Agent Alapa. Alapa testified that Siotos told her that Kouvlis was buying the drugs for Steve, and that Siotos also said that if he were guilty he would have run like that guy Steve. Moreover, the government also had three different types of physical evidence linking Besich to the conspiracy: (1) Besich's pager number in Kouvlis's pocket; (2) Besich's fingerprint on the money envelope; and (3) telephone records of calls between Besich and Siotos and Besich and Kouvlis. 20 Because the government had ample evidence from which it could establish Besich's identity, Robesky's testimony and the phone records of calls to Robesky were clearly cumulative. Thus their probative value was negligible. Furthermore, Siotos was undoubtedly prejudiced by the admission of testimony and phone records concerning a conspiracy that was not charged in the indictment and that was entirely separate from the drug sale at issue. 21 In balancing the minimal probative value of this evidence against the prejudice it engendered, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting it. We also believe that this error more likely than not affected the verdict. The only physical evidence linking Siotos to the cocaine sale was telephone records between him and Besich. The other evidence was in controversy. Alapa testified that she had certain conversations with Siotos, 3 and he denied it. Siotos also denied that he had worked out a deal with Kouvlis, in contrast to Kouvlis's testimony (which he gave pursuant to a plea agreement). The government then persuaded a reluctant court to admit evidence of a completely separate conspiracy, and it is quite probable that this damaging evidence affected the verdict. 22 We thus reverse Sioto's conviction, and remand for a new trial. 4