Opinion ID: 3215867
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Denial of Freeman’s Claim

Text: The crux of the DOL’s decision was that Freeman failed to show that her father had been diagnosed with CBD. On appeal, Freeman argues that the DOL admitted that Ezra’s “medical records showed findings consistent with” CBD, yet it arbitrarily denied Freeman’s claim for survivor benefits. See Appellant Br. at 36. She asserts that “interstitial fibrosis” is a diagnosis that establishes CBD, and Ezra’s medical records show that he was diagnosed with “interstitial lung disease” with “basilar fibrosis,” and with “interstitial infiltration.” See id. Freeman’s argument is unavailing for a number of reasons. First, Freeman relies too heavily on the DOL’s conclusion that her father’s medical records “showed findings consistent with CBD.” See 2009 Final Decision, R. 44, Page ID 463 (emphasis added). While the DOL noted that some findings in Ezra’s records were consistent with CBD, it also noted that two doctors on two separate occasions opined that—notwithstanding some consistencies—the medical evidence “was insufficient to support a diagnosis of CBD[.]” Id. at Page ID 465 (emphasis added). 7 No. 15-6189, Freeman v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor Second, Freeman’s argument regarding Ezra’s diagnosis for interstitial lung disease is unpersuasive. The District Medical Consultant reviewed the medical records and concluded that although “[a] few readings of conventional chest radiographs refer to signs of fibrosis in several areas of the lung[,]” “[t]he reports of the chest CT scans” showed no interstitial fibrosis or other abnormalities characteristic of or consistent with CBD. Freeman essentially asks this court to reinterpret the medical evidence despite the medical consultant’s opinion and the DOL’s reliance on that opinion—something this court cannot do. See McAlister v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, No. 15-5801, 2016 WL 2343030, at  (6th Cir. May 4, 2016) (“[W]e are not medical specialists and that judgment is not ours to make.”) (quoting Elliott v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 473 F.3d 613, 622-23 (6th Cir. 2006)); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43 (noting that under arbitrary and capricious review, “a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency”). Therefore, this argument is similarly unavailing. Lastly, there is no indication that the agency relied on improper factors, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of Freeman’s claim, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or that its decision was implausible. See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 658. Indeed, it appears the agency gave Freeman opportunity after opportunity to succeed on her claim—it vacated its first denial after receiving more evidence from Freeman, it held a hearing, had two independent doctors review Freeman’s file on two separate occasions, and gave Freeman the benefit of the presumption of beryllium exposure. Ultimately, Freeman was unable to provide evidence showing three out of the five criteria required to establish CBD for diagnoses before January 1, 1993, foreclosing her claim.2 Under 2 We do not find persuasive Freeman’s argument—made for the first time in her reply brief—that the DOL “improperly” relied on the opinions of the District Medical Consultants because the medical records clearly met the statutory criteria, and to the extent they were 8 No. 15-6189, Freeman v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying Freeman’s claim. See Watson v. Solis, 693 F.3d 620, 626 (6th Cir. 2012) (where the claimant fails to provide evidence that is required under the Act, the DOL does not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying benefits).3