Opinion ID: 1819622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Relevant Legislative History

Text: In 1995, the Legislature amended section 948.03, F.S., relating to terms or conditions of probation or community control by requiring mandatory special conditions of release for sexual predators and other specified offenders, under certain circumstances. Ch. 95-283, title, at 2651, Laws of Fla. As part of that amendment, the Legislature added what was then numbered section 948.03(5)(g). Ch. 95-283, § 59, at 2690, Laws of Fla. That subsection provided the following mandatory special condition of sexual-offender probation and community control: Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, a prohibition on viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually explicit material. Id. (emphasis supplied). Thus, the statutory section began as a total ban against sex offenders viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually explicit material. Id. (emphasis supplied). [23] From 1995 until 1996, section 948.03(5)(g) remained unchanged. In 1997, the Legislature amended section 948.03 inter alia to prohibit[] a sex offender from possessing telephone, electronic media, or computer programs or services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern. Ch. 97-308, title, at 5515, Laws of Fla. In the same law, the Legislature also imposed the following mandatory conditions of sexual-offender probation and community control: (1) an offender curfew; (2) a requirement that offenders submit to specified warrantless searches; (3) at least annual polygraph examinations of offenders; (4) offender maintenance of a driving log and a prohibition against offenders driving alone without prior permission; (5) a prohibition against offenders obtaining or using a post office box without prior approval; (6) HIV testing of offenders with the results released to the victims and their parents or guardians; and (7) electronic monitoring of offenders when deemed necessary. Ch. 97-308, § 3, at 5519-21, Laws of Fla. What is particularly relevant for our purposes is that the Legislature renumbered section 948.03(5)(g) as section 948.03(5)(a)(7) and provided the following revised language: Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, a prohibition on viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory explicit material, including telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern. Ch. 97-308, § 3, at 5520, Laws of Fla. [24] Consistent with the analysis in subpart A of my dissent, all that the Legislature accomplishedand intended to accomplish through this amendment was an expansion of sexually explicit material to sexually stimulating visual or auditory material and the addition of the illustrative including clause. Fla. S. Comm. on Crim. J., CS for SB 1930 (1997) Staff Analysis (Apr. 8, 1997) at 8 (on file with the Florida State Archives), at 8 [SB 1930 Staff Analysis]. The amended language did not alter the total ban against sexual offenders viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory explicit material. Ch. 97-308, § 3, at 5520, Laws of Fla. As the title of the session law states, the Legislature additionally intended to prohibit[] a sex offender from possessing telephone, electronic media, or computer programs or services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern. Ch. 97-308, title, at 5515, Laws of Fla. [25] The session law does not contain any language supporting the grammatically strained reading of the majority, which applies the including clause's relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern language to the total-prohibition clause by ignoring a preceding comma, an illustrative participle, and a string of intervening nouns. The relevant staff analysis, which the majority half-heartedly consults, likewise does not support its labored reading of section 948.03(5)(a)(7). [26] Cf., e.g., White v. State, 714 So.2d 440, 443 n. 5 (Fla.1998) ([W]e recognize that staff analyses are not determinative of final legislative intent, they are, nevertheless, `one touchstone of the collective legislative will.' (quoting Sun Bank/S. Fla., N.A. v. Baker, 632 So.2d 669, 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 115 S.Ct. 2021, 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995) (The rule of lenity applies only if, `after seizing everything from which aid can be derived,' we can make `no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.' (emphasis supplied) (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 239, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178, 79 S.Ct. 209, 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958))). [27] The majority focuses upon those portions of the staff analysis that propose an individualized treatment plan for sexual offenders, which would be administered by specialized correctional probation officers with limited caseloads. SB 1930 Staff Analysis, at 1, 8; see majority op. at 810-811. [28] While this is true in an abstract sense, a selective focus on this portion of the staff analysis ignores a fact of which the Legislature was well aware: section 948.03(5)(a)(7) is a default condition that applies to all convicted sexual offenders under their terms of probation and community control so long as they committed their relevant offenses on or after October 1, 1995. § 948.03(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). This section itself does not represent any type of individualized treatment or individualized tailoring of the offender's treatment plan. That tailoring, if any, occurs through the modification of the default prohibition in light of the offender's treatment plan. Cf. § 948.03(6), Fla. Stat. (1999) (The court may rescind or modify at any time the terms and conditions theretofore imposed by it upon the probationer or offender in community control.); § 948.03(2), Fla. Stat. (2007) (substantially similar). If no modification occurs, then the default prohibition applies and individual tailoring has not occurred. The introductory clause of section 948.03(5)(a)(7) could not make this point any clearer: Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, the default total prohibition applies. § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis supplied). It is the duty of the sexual-offender treatment program and the offender's triangle of supervisors (i.e., the treatment provider, the correctional probation officer, and the polygraph examiner) to craft, implement, and enforcewith the approval of the courtany individualized treatment plan. SB 1930 Staff Analysis, at 6-8. Individual tailoring is simply not accomplished through the plain text of the statute, which erects a broad default prohibition against  any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material. § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis supplied); see also Woodson v. State, 864 So.2d 512, 515 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (describing the default nature of the standard terms of probation and community control contained in section 948.03(5), Florida Statutes (2000)). That the staff analysis explains the five-part containment process outlined in the NIJ report merely bolsters the understanding that individualized tailoring occurs through the treatment plan, not through the plain text of the statute. SB 1930 Staff Analysis, at 6-8. In particular, the staff analysis explains that the NIJ-inspired sex offender-specific containment strategies, occur through: (1) the internal-control mechanisms that a trained therapist can hopefully instill in the offender; (2) the [o]fficial supervision and monitoring of the offender by the correctional probation officer; and (3) the promotion of vital management and compliance feedback to the treatment provider and correctional probation officer through the use of polygraph examinations of the offender. Id. As stated in the staff analysis, the treatment provider, the correctional probation officer, and the polygraph examiner form a triangle of supervision around the sex offender. Id. at 7. It is this group, rather than the plain text of section 948.03(5)(a)(7), that may lead to an individualized treatment plan. However, if such individualized tailoring and a corresponding modification of the offender's standard terms of probation and community control do not occur, then the default total prohibition remains in effect. This is the only logical, grammatically sound reading of the standard condition: Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, a prohibition on viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material, including telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern. § 948.03(5)(a)(7), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis supplied). This plain-text reading of the statute is also consistent with the staff analysis, which explains that: CS/SB 1930 would ... clarify the condition of probation, community control, and conditional release that prohibits the possession, viewing, or use of sexually `explicit' material to be sexually stimulating visual or auditory material that would include telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern. SB 1930 Staff Analysis, at 8 (emphasis supplied). The analysis of the majority is simply inconsistent with the plain text of the statute, the rules of grammar, and with legislative history, which includes the relevant staff analysis. This Court exists to interpret statutes, not rewrite them. [29] I would enforce the statute as written instead of creating a mirage of ambiguity.