Opinion ID: 1702721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sixth Amendment Right to Speedy Trial

Text: A defendant's right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right imposed on the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). See also La. Const. (1974) art. 1, § 16. The underlying purpose of this constitutional right is to protect a defendant's interests in preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration, limiting possible impairment of his defense, and minimizing his anxiety and concern. Barker, 407 U.S. at 515, 92 S.Ct. 2182. The United State Supreme Court made the following observations concerning a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial in Barker: The right to a speedy trial is a more vague concept than other procedural rights. It is, for example, impossible to determine with precision when the right has been denied. We cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate. As a consequence, there is no fixed point in the criminal process when the State can put the defendant to the choice of either exercising or waiving the right to a speedy trial. If, for example, the State moves for a 60-day continuance, granting that continuance is not a violation of the right to speedy trial unless the circumstances of the case are such that further delay would endanger the value the right protects. It is impossible to do more than generalize about when those circumstances exist.... Thus, as we recognized in Beavers v. Haubert, [198 U.S. 77, 25 S.Ct. 573, 49 L.Ed. 950 (1905)], any inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case: The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights of a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice. 198 U.S., at 87[, 25 S.Ct. 573].... The amorphous quality of the right also leads to the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the indictment when the right has been deprived. This is indeed a serious consequence because it means that a defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go free, without having been tried. Such a remedy is more serious than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial, but it is the only possible remedy. Id. at 522-23, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (footnote omitted). In determining whether a defendant's right to speedy trial has been violated, courts are required to assess the following factors: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182; State v. Alfred, 337 So.2d 1049, 1054 (1976) [on rehearing]. Under the rules established in Barker, none of the four factors listed above is either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right to speedy trial. Id. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Instead, they are related factors and must be considered together ... in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. Id.