Opinion ID: 3061767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count 3 – Attempt to Distribute Cocaine

Text: As to Count 3, Parks argues (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his Count 3 conviction; and alternatively (2) the government’s evidence materially criminal history category as category VI. 12 varied from the indictment because Count 3 charged him with attempting to distribute cocaine but the trial evidence tended to prove the separate offense of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. We review de novo the denial of a Rule 29 motion for acquittal and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Tampas, 493 F.3d 1291, 1297-98 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). “The jury is free to choose among alternative reasonable interpretations of the evidence, and the government’s proof need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Id. at 1298 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Where, as in this case, the jury convicted the defendant, we affirm the conviction “if a reasonable juror could have concluded that the evidence established [the defendant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Count 3 charged Parks with attempting to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(c)). Section 841(a)(1) makes it unlawful for a person to knowingly or intentionally distribute a controlled substance or to possess with the intent to distribute a controlled substance. “Distribute” is defined as “to deliver (other than by administering or dispensing) a controlled substance or a 13 listed chemical.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(11). Section 846 provides that “[a]ny person who attempts . . . to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense . . . .” 5 “The basic elements of an attempt are (1) an intent to engage in criminal conduct and (2) conduct constituting a ‘substantial step’ towards the commission of the substantive offense which strongly corroborates the defendant’s criminal intent.” United States v. Collins, 779 F.2d 1520, 1533 (11th Cir. 1986); accord United States v. Yost, 479 F.3d 815, 819 (11th Cir. 2007). It is the defendant’s “objective acts,” not his subjective intent, that must “mark the defendant’s conduct as criminal.” United States v. McDowell, 705 F.2d 426, 428 (11th Cir. 1983). Viewing, as we must, the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude the trial evidence was sufficient to sustain Parks’s Count 3 conviction. The evidence showed Parks took several substantial steps toward distribution in that: (1) he had obtained nearly $4,000 of cash in small bills, (2) he had obtained sizable amounts of cocaine, (3) he had acquired implements of drug distribution such as scales and razor blades, (4) he had divided up the cocaine into 30 small baggies of cocaine on his person, (5) there was a hole through the burglar bar in his front door through which drugs could be passed easily and safely, and (6) 5 Defendant Parks does not dispute that 21 U.S.C. § 846 applies to attempt charges. 14 law enforcement’s observation of the apartment building before the search showed several individuals coming and going, from which the jury may have inferred other completed drug transactions. A reasonable juror could have inferred from this evidence that Parks divided up the cocaine and then placed the cocaine in 30 small baggies intending to distribute them and that those objective acts were a substantial step in the commission of a distribution offense. Parks’s other argument—that the government’s trial evidence materially varied from Count 3—also fails.6 “A ‘variance’ occurs when the evidence at trial establishes facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment.” United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986). When the defendant claims a material variance between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial, we consider “[f]irst, whether a material variance did occur, and, second, whether the defendant suffered substantial prejudice as a result.” United States v. Chastain, 198 F.3d 1338, 1349 (11th Cir. 1999). “To determine whether a variance was material, we look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the government . . . .” United States v. Seher, 562 F.3d 1344, 1366 (11th Cir. 2009). In considering whether a variance caused the defendant substantial prejudice, we may 6 It appears that Parks did not raise this material variance claim in the district court. For example, his Rule 29 motion for acquittal on Count 3 argued only that the government could not convict him of Count 3 because “there’s simply no evidence whatsoever that he attempted to distribute cocaine . . . .” We need not determine whether only plain-error review applies because Parks’s material variance claim fails under even de novo review. 15 consider whether “the proof at trial differed so greatly from the charges in the indictment that the defendant was unfairly surprised and had an inadequate opportunity to prepare a defense.” Caporale, 806 F.2d at 1500. Parks has not shown error because the trial evidence did not materially vary from the charges in Count 3. Indeed, as outlined above, the evidence proved the Count 3 charge of attempting to distribute cocaine. That the evidence may have proved another offense—such as possession with intent to distribute—does not mean that it did not prove attempt to distribute cocaine too. Parks’s material variance argument is really another way of arguing the conduct proven against Parks was insufficient to prove an attempt to distribute offense. In any event, Parks has not shown that he was unfairly surprised by the evidence or was not afforded an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense, or was substantially prejudiced by the trial evidence. B. Count 5 – Felon in Possession of Firearms and Ammunition As to Count 5, Parks argues the government’s trial evidence was insufficient to establish that Parks actually or constructively possessed the firearms or ammunition found in the storage unit. As with Parks’s sufficiency challenge to Count 3, we review this issue de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility 16 choices in favor of affirming the jury’s verdict. Count 5 charged Parks, a convicted felon, with possessing the firearms and ammunition found in the storage unit, “[o]n or about January 13, 2004,” the date of the search, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).7 To establish a § 922(g) offense, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant “knowingly possessed a firearm and had been previously convicted of a felony.” United States v. Gunn, 369 F.3d 1229, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004).8 Possession can be either actual or constructive and can be sole or joint. United States v. Iglesias, 915 F.2d 1524, 1528 (11th Cir. 1990). “A defendant has constructive possession if he exercises ownership, dominion, or control over the firearm. A defendant also has constructive possession if he has the power and intention to exercise dominion or control. The defendant may exercise that dominion and control either directly or through others.” Gunn, 369 F.3d at 1235 (citations omitted). Constructive possession can be established by showing the defendant had “dominion or control over the premises or the vehicle” where the firearm was found. United States v. Derose, 74 F.3d 1177, 1185 (11th Cir. 1996). 7 “When the government charges that an offense occurred ‘on or about’ a certain date, the defendant is on notice that the charge is not limited to the specific date or dates set out in the indictment. Proof of a date reasonably near the specified date is sufficient.” United States v. Reed, 887 F.2d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). 8 Parks does not dispute now, and did not dispute at trial, that he was convicted of felony offenses within the meaning of § 922(g). 17 Here the trial evidence showed that Parks had constructive possession of the firearms and ammunition in the storage unit. Parks does not dispute that Gilmore and other law enforcement officers found the firearms and ammunition when they executed a search warrant on Unit # 4905, which Parks began renting on August 29, 2002 and which he was still renting at the time of the execution of the search warrant on January 13, 2004. Parks and his mother were the only two individuals who had access to the unit under the rental agreement. A rental facility employee testified that only Parks and his mother could have gained access to the unit, even if someone else had made a rental payment on Parks’s behalf or walked in with his identification.9 In order to access the storage unit, someone would need both (1) U-Haul’s key to unlock the U-Haul lock, which could be obtained by presenting identification at the U-Haul counter, and (2) the key to unlock the renter’s lock on the unit. Thus, Parks had dominion and control over the storage unit. Given this evidence of Parks’s dominion and control, Parks argues instead that because he was in custody during the four days between his January 9 arrest and the January 13 search of the storage unit, it is possible someone, presumably his mother, put firearms and ammunition in the storage unit without his knowledge during that four-day period, and thus he should not be held liable for possessing 9 Parks’s mother did not testify at trial. 18 them. We disagree. First, the fact that Parks’s mother had access to the unit does not preclude a jury from finding that Parks had constructive possession of the firearms and ammunition found in the unit. “Constructive possession need not be exclusive . . . .” United States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 1392 (11th Cir. 1989) (although defendant did not have exclusive control over her house, several other individuals lived there, and defendant had returned from a trip only minutes before the execution of the search warrant, the facts were sufficient for a jury to find that she constructively possessed cocaine found in the house because she owned and exercised dominion and control over the house); United States v. MontesCardenas, 746 F.2d 771, 778 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Constructive possession may be shared with others, and can be established by circumstantial or direct evidence.”); accord United States v. Marx, 635 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. Unit B Jan. 1981); see United States v. Faust, 456 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding evidence was sufficient to show defendant had constructive possession of cocaine in apartment even though his wife also lived there and was the sole signatory on the renewal lease). Moreover, Parks’s mother did not testify and there is no evidence of his mother accessing the storage unit during the relevant time frame. The second problem for Parks is that the indictment charged that he possessed these items “on or about” January 13, 2004. An indictment need not 19 charge dates with absolute specificity, and proof of conduct reasonably near the charged date, from which the jury was entitled to infer possession, is sufficient. The jury was entitled to infer that the presence of firearms and ammunition in a storage unit continuously rented by Parks established constructive possession – and we can reverse that determination only if no reasonable juror would have made that inference. Parks has not met this burden.10 C. Introduction of the Wallet at Trial Parks argues the government violated discovery rules by not informing him of the existence of the wallet after it was found by Investigator Gilmore around August 1, 2008, and that this violation caused enough prejudice that the district court should have excluded the wallet from evidence at trial. Parks asserts the 10 Parks cites United States v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079, 1089, modified in part on other grounds, 977 F.2d 538 (11th Cir. 1992), in support of his argument. That decision is materially distinguishable from this case. In Clavis, this Court held evidence was not sufficient to sustain a defendant’s conviction for possessing cocaine on the date charged in the indictment. Id. at 1089. The defendant was not present when law enforcement agents searched the house where the cocaine was found because the defendant, like Parks, was arrested five days before. Id. Importantly, however, the house was rented to a different person than the defendant, and two other people were in the house when it was searched. Id. at 1085. During the search, agents found an address book bearing defendant’s name, a Western Union money receipt bearing defendant’s name and the address of the house, and an application for a social security number bearing defendant’s name and the address of the house. Id. at 1085, 1089. This Court determined the evidence was sufficient to show the defendant had been living in the house, but not sufficient to show his possession of cocaine because of the intervening time lag and other individuals in control of the house and its contents at the time of search. Id. at 1089. In contrast, in this case the only evidence presented was that Parks rented the unit and that only he and his mother could have accessed it; and, there was no evidence that Parks’s mother ever entered the unit or stored any property there. The jury was entitled to infer from this evidence that Parks constructively possessed the weapons and ammunition in the storage unit. 20 government knew the wallet existed and withheld that information for approximately 10 months before the May 18, 2009 date of trial. We review discovery and evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.11 We will not reverse a defendant’s conviction on the basis of a discovery violation unless it violates that defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1399 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Camargo-Vergara, 57 F.3d 993, 998 (11th Cir. 1994). “Substantial prejudice exists when a defendant is unduly surprised and lacks an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense or if the mistake substantially influences the jury.” Bailey, 123 F.3d at 1399; accord CamargoVergara, 57 F.3d at 998-999. Criminal Rule 16 provides, in relevant part, that “[u]pon a defendant’s request, the government must permit the defendant to inspect and to copy or photograph books, papers, documents, data, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions of any of these items, if the item is within the government’s possession, custody, or control and: (i) the item is material to preparing the defense; (ii) the government intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial; or (iii) the item was obtained from or belongs to the 11 “We review cases dealing with discovery violations under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 using an abuse of discretion standard.” United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1989). 21 defendant.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E). Additionally, “[a] party who discovers additional evidence or material before or during trial must promptly disclose its existence to the other party or the court if: (1) the evidence or material is subject to discovery or inspection under this rule; and (2) the other party previously requested, or the court ordered, its production.” Id. 16(c)). Upon violation of Rule 16, the district court may order that the party permit discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, prohibit the violating party from introducing the undisclosed evidence, or enter any other just order. Id. 16(d)(2). Generally, “the district court should impose the least severe sanction necessary to ensure prompt and complete compliance with its discovery orders.” United States v. Turner, 871 F.2d 1574, 1580 (11th Cir. 1989). “Factors for the district court to consider in deciding to impose a sanction include reasons for the delay in complying with the discovery order, whether there was any bad faith on the part of the prosecution, prejudice to the defendant, and the availability of a means to cure the prejudice, including continuances and recesses.” Id. Parks has not shown either that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to exclude the wallet from the government’s trial evidence or that his convictions should be reversed because the government’s Rule 16 violation substantially prejudiced his case. The government informed Parks about the wallet 22 initially and disclosed a copy of a photograph showing the wallet in the safe with a package of cocaine. While the photograph does not show the contents of the wallet, Officer Gilmore did include the existence of the wallet and Parks’s identification found inside the wallet in the inventory of items seized that was returned to the judge after the execution of the search warrant. On February 7, 2007 (over two years before Parks’s trial), Officer Gilmore testified at an evidentiary hearing in the district court that he had found a wallet containing Parks’s identification inside the safe when he executed the warrant. For most of this case, the government believed in good faith that the wallet had been destroyed, and it informed Parks as such. At the beginning of trial, the government informed Parks it had found the wallet and intended to use it at trial. The district court then granted Parks a one-day continuance and permitted Parks to file a motion to exclude the wallet. Parks’s counsel did not request more time to prepare as to the wallet. The district court subsequently denied the motion to exclude because it found no bad faith by the government and no prejudice to Parks, because he had known about the existence of the wallet all along, even if he believed it had been destroyed. This Court has instructed district courts that usually the least-severe remedy is appropriate. Here, the district court granted a one-day continuance and fully 23 considered how the existence of the wallet itself would impact Parks’s case. The following day, after the district court denied Parks’s motion to exclude the wallet, the district court told Parks’s defense counsel it would hear any additional arguments regarding continuing the trial. In response, Parks’s defense counsel did not ask for additional time to prepare for trial beyond the one-day continuance, but instead stated, “Judge, we understand the court’s ruling, and we’re ready to go forward.” We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s conclusion. Alternatively, Parks has not shown that any Rule 16 violation prejudiced his substantial rights. Parks knew about the existence of the wallet and the photograph the government intended to introduce of the wallet in the safe, and about testimony from law enforcement agents describing the contents of the wallet. Parks also has not shown the late introduction of the actual wallet in the photograph prevented him from making an adequate defense. Indeed defense counsel stated he was ready to go forward with trial after the district court denied Parks’s motion to exclude. Finally, Parks was acquitted of a significant part of the conduct connected with the wallet, including possession of ammunition found in the safe (Count 1) and possession of crack cocaine found in the bedroom (Count 4). D. Sentencing Issues Parks argues his sentences of 293 months’ imprisonment on Count 5 and 24 240 months’ imprisonment on Count 3 are substantively unreasonable because the sentences are (1) based on conduct bearing no relationship to the crimes for which he was convicted, and (2) greater than necessary to fulfill the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). We review the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion using a two-step process. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008). We look first at whether the district court committed any significant procedural error and then at whether the sentence is substantively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Id. Parks does not challenge the district court’s guidelines calculations or argue that his sentences were procedurally unreasonable. Rather, Parks argues only that his sentences were substantively unreasonable. “In reviewing the ultimate sentence imposed by the district court for reasonableness, we consider the final sentence, in its entirety, in light of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th Cir. 2006).12 Although we do not apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence 12 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 25 imposed within a correctly calculated guidelines range, we ordinarily expect that such a sentence is reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). Moreover, “the party who challenges the sentence bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of both [the] record and the factors in section 3553(a).” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). The district court sentenced Parks to a total of 293 months’ imprisonment on Count 5, the high end of the advisory guidelines range, and 240 months for Count 3, neither of which Parks argues was incorrectly calculated. At sentencing, the government presented the testimony of: (1) Kendra Brooks, a minor, who submitted a statement to police that Parks had sexual relations with her from when she was 13 to 16 years old and that she had three pregnancies and miscarriages during her relationship with Parks; and (2) Kendra Brooks’s father, Henry Jeter, who testified that Kendra ran away from home at age 13 and was being held by Parks, who Jeter described as a “monster,” against her will. The district court had already concluded that the aggravated child molestation charge was not sufficiently connected to the weapons found in the storage unit to warrant an offense level of 34 under § 4B1.3(b)(3)(A). However, the district court allowed testimony from United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005) (summarizing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). 26 Brooks and her father in connection with the § 3553(a) factors. In considering Parks’s conduct as a whole before imposing the sentences, the district court noted that when law enforcement officers searched Parks’s apartment they found “stolen property, . . . dealing in drugs; minors there for sexual purposes. There’s everything in the world going on in this place.” The district court also noted that Parks’s criminal history illustrated the “sad truth . . . that [Parks] . . . built the history of over 20 years of conduct that’s just not appropriate.” The district court continued, addressing Parks directly: “You are not in the past contributing to society. You’re pulling it down. You’re putting drugs on the streets; you’re stealing property; you’re having children, runaways, staying in your house. There’s nothing good going on. . . . [W]hen I look at the 3553 factors, I just don’t find anything, that mitigates in your favor.” Parks argues the district court erred in considering the testimony of Brooks and her father Jeter. He contends that the government’s recommendation of 293 months’ imprisonment on Count 5 (firearms and ammunition in the storage unit) was based on the allegation that Parks committed aggravated child molestation with Brooks. Parks contends this testimony was irrelevant and the district court’s consideration of such testimony in determining his sentence was unreasonable. Parks notes that, under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1) and (a)(3), the guidelines limit the 27 “relevant conduct” on which the guideline range determination is to be based to acts and omissions committed by the defendant during the offense of conviction and to the harm that results from those acts and omissions. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. Parks’s argument is unpersuasive. First, § 1B1.3 identifies “relevant conduct” for the purpose of calculating a defendant’s advisory guidelines range, and not for the purpose of determining a reasonable sentence within that range under the factors listed in § 3553(a). See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 (titled, “Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guideline Range)”). The transcript from the sentencing hearing reveals that the district court explicitly refused to consider the aggravated child molestation charge in its calculation of the advisory guidelines range. In calculating Parks’s offense level under the armed career criminal enhancement in § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B), the district court sustained Parks’s objection to the use of the aggravated child molestation charge and concluded that Parks’s offense level should be 33 rather than 34 because there was insufficient evidence to connect Parks’s possession of firearms with the charge of aggravated child molestation. Furthermore, at the point in the hearing when the district court ruled that Parks had an offense level of 33 with a criminal history category of VI, neither Brooks nor Jeter had testified yet. Thus, it is clear from the record that the district court relied on Brooks’s and Jeter’s testimony only as to the determination of his 28 sentences within the advisory guidelines range, and not as to the calculation of that range. Second, as to the substantive reasonableness of Parks’s sentence, the district court did not err in considering Brooks’s and Jeter’s testimony. In fashioning a reasonable sentence, federal sentencing law provides: “No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3661. The § 3553(a) factors include, inter alia, “the history and characteristics of the defendant,” and “the need to protect the public.” Talley, 431 F.3d at 786. Parks has shown no error in the district court’s consideration of Jeter’s and Brooks’s testimony in determining reasonable sentences in this case. Parks also argues his 293-month sentence under Count 5 is greater than necessary to satisfy the § 3553(a) factors. Because he was 49 years old at sentencing, Parks asserts the 240-month sentence he requested would have been sufficient.13 The district court considered Parks’s total conduct, including his criminal history and acquitted offenses, in determining the sentence to impose. As 13 Despite arguing that both of his sentences are unreasonable, Parks contends in his brief on appeal that a 240-month sentence (the same length as his Count 3 sentence) would be reasonable and adequate in light of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Thus, Parks has conceded the reasonableness of his sentence under Count 3. Regardless, we conclude that both sentences are substantively reasonable under the circumstances. 29 the district court discussed at sentencing, Parks had an extensive criminal history of drug trafficking and firearms possession and was involved, albeit through acquitted conduct, with child molestation and providing illegal drugs to minors in exchange for sex. The district court was within its discretion to sentence Parks to an imprisonment term at the top end of the correctly-calculated advisory guidelines range. For all of these reasons, we affirm Parks’s convictions and sentence. AFFIRMED. 30