Opinion ID: 1730477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: the trial court erred in denying carr's motion to dismiss the charges or the prosecutor due to prosecutorial misconduct and unfair prejudicial publicity.

Text: As a result of the extensive pretrial publicity this case received, the trial court ordered all attorneys involved to abide by Rule 4.01 of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice as well as the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Court also ordered the files pertaining to discovery sealed. As a result of a perceived violation of the court order, Carr filed a Motion to Dismiss Due to Prosecutorial Misconduct and Unfairly Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity, or in the alternative, For Order Requiring District Attorney to Withdraw From the Cases. An amended motion was later filed seeking an order prohibiting the State from seeking the death penalty. A hearing on the matter followed, and the trial court issued an order and opinion denying the Motion. Carr requested the trial court to certify the order for immediate interlocutory appeal to this Court. The request was denied. Review of the denial was sought by means of a Petition for Leave to Appeal From Interlocutory Appeal Order. This Court denied this request on June 13, 1990. Carr contends that he was denied a fair trial by the trial court's refusal to dismiss the indictment, or in the alternative, its refusal to remove District Attorney Lawrence Mellen as prosecutor. One of the allegations Carr makes against the District Attorney is that he placed responses to certain motions, which had been designated closed, in the open file in the Quitman County Circuit Clerk's office. At the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, Brenda Wiggs, the Circuit Clerk for Quitman County, testified that the prosecution's responses had been filed by one of the assistant district attorneys at 6:55 p.m. on April 27, 1990. The clerk's office was open late that day for voter registration. Ms. Wiggs stated that there was no discussion between the assistant district attorney and herself regarding whether the responses to the motions should go into the closed file. She also admitted that placing the responses in the wrong file was the mistake of the clerk's office; it was the responsibility of the clerk's office to see that the responses were placed in the proper file. Carr also alleges that District Attorney Mellen made statements that were not based on the whole story and statements linking Carr to the crime without mentioning the presumption of innocence as required by the Rules of Professional Conduct. Carr maintained that Mellen should have been held responsible for the statements. Mellen took the stand during the hearing and admitted he did make statements linking Carr to the crime without adding that the defendant was presumed innocent. As to other statements attributed to him, Mellen explained that some of the conversations he had off the record ended up in print. The trial court ruled: The Court does not find any evidence that the District Attorney intentionally misfiled the two responses that should have been filed in the sealed file. The Court does find, however, he had an affirmative responsibility, after all that had gone on regarding this sealed file, to follow up and see to it that they were properly placed in the closed file. This Court finds that the effort to shift the blame to the Circuit Clerk simply is without merit.       This error of the prosecutor in failing to file Rule 4.06 information in the closed file as ordered is going to require some remedial measures in this case because of the publicity... . It is going to be a matter that will have to be taken up on a procedure and case by case basis as we move these cases along to and through trials. This Court recognizes its responsibility to make, or to find some remedies for what has occurred to the extent that it can. However, it is clear ... that the bell has rung, and the Court can't unring the bell... . The Court is not going to grant the relief asked for the defendant. It is not going to dismiss the indictments; it is not going to dismiss the death penalty; and doubts that the Court has the authority, and would not do it in any event, but certainly doesn't feel it wouldn't even have the authority to remove the District Attorney from the case.... The change of venue motion was later granted, moving the trial to Alcorn County. The State submits that the change of venue afforded Carr relief from any potential prejudicial effects of the pretrial publicity and from any prosecutorial misconduct. One of the means for vindicating the right of an accused to a fair trial is a change of venue. Fisher v. State, 481 So.2d 203 (Miss. 1985). The danger of the prosecutor's remarks and the misfiling of a sealed document was that the pretrial publicity from such actions would be damaging to Carr's right to a fair trial by an impartial, unbiased jury. Such actions may have prejudiced his rights in Quitman County. However, there is no evidence that Carr received anything but a fair trial in Alcorn County after the motion for a change of venue was granted. This Court has previously admonished district attorneys for trying cases in the newspapers, rather than in the courtroom. See Foster v. State, 508 So.2d 1111, 1117 (Miss. 1987). District Attorney Mellen's actions in this case involving his remarks to the media and his misfiling of the sealed document in an open file are breaches of his duties as a prosecutor to protect the rights of an accused person to a fair trial, and he is admonished concerning any such future conduct. However, there is no evidence that the change of venue did not cure any damage that may have been done. We find that Carr was given a fair trial by an unbiased, impartial jury. This assignment of prosecutorial error, although having merit, is found to be harmless.