Opinion ID: 775389
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of Fifth Amendment Rights

Text: 39 Although the government concedes that it improperly elicited some testimony that commented on Velarde's silence, it contends that this was only a passing reference and that this brief reference was simply a shorthand way of saying that Velarde's demeanor did not change in reaction to this news. The government does not specify which testimony it concedes was a comment on silence, and which it contends was a comment on demeanor. It argues, however, that the bulk of Agent Salazar's testimony and the entirety of the government's closing arguments commented on Velarde'sdemeanor, not his silence. We agree that the government may offer evidence of demeanor, see United States v. Barbosa, 906 F.2d 1366, 1368 (9th Cir. 1990), and may also offer physical evidence, see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). At issue here, however, is neither demeanor nor physical evidence. Agent Salazar's testimony about Velarde's lack of response when confronted with the sixty-three pounds of marijuana in his gas tank was testimony about Velarde's silence during the pre-Miranda questioning. 40 The Supreme Court has distinguished physical and demeanor evidence from testimonial evidence, holding that evidence of the former does not engender Fifth Amendment protection. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 592 (1990). Demeanor evidence often involves the admission of evidence concerning a defendant's slurr[ed ] speech, Muniz, 496 U.S. at 592, apparent nervousness, Barbosa, 906 F.2d at 1368, or a defendant's demeanor during a polygraph test, even though the results may not be admissible, Rothgeb v. United States, 789 F.2d 647, 651 (8th Cir. 1986). Likewise, physical evidence includes one's fingerprints, handwriting, vocal characteristics, stance, stride, gestures, or blood characteristics. See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764 (blood test was physical, not testimonial evidence and thus not protected by the Fifth Amendment). 41 Here, however, Velarde did not physically or emotionally react when confronted with incriminating evidence; in the words of Agent Salazar, he just sat there. From this lack of response, otherwise known as silence, derives the entirety of the government's pre-Miranda demeanor  evidence. In describing Velarde's pre-Miranda non-responsiveness, Agent Salazar testified that Velarde didn't look surprised or upset; that [t]here was no response; that he did not say anything; and that he did not deny knowledge. Each of these comments described the same thing -that Velarde did not react at all, but remained silent in the face of confrontation. 42 Silence is defined as the fact of abstaining from speech (altogether, or on a particular subject); a state or condition resulting from this; muteness, taciturnity. The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary 2861 (4th ed. 1993). The non-reaction the government seeks to introduce as demeanor evidence is not an action or a physical response, but a failure to speak. There was no outward physical manifestation to comment upon other than Velarde's state or condition of silence. 43 The prosecutor did not ask Agent Salazar, What was Velarde's physical response (to being confronted with the sixty-three pounds of marijuana in his car)? The word physical appears nowhere in the colloquy at issue. Rather, the prosecutor's question, and what was his response  called for a statement as to Velarde's testimonial response, and the answer he just sat there was a figure of speech connoting silence. We do not quarrel with the notion that the prosecutor could have asked about Velarde's non-testimonial physical response, but that was not the question asked. For example, testimony that Velarde was sweating or vomiting would have been admissible. On the other hand, the prosecutor could not have asked about Velarde's communicative physical response. For example, testimony that Velarde shook his head to signify no would have been inadmissible. 44 The similarity between the government's use of testimony about Velarde's non-response and the government's use of testimony about Whitehead's silence to incriminate each defendant is striking. In Whitehead, testimony elicited in the government's case-in-chief and closing argument relied upon Whitehead's failure to respond to his arrest: 45 Inspector Garcia leads him in there, pats him down-you know, T.V.-takes off his shoes and his belt and puts him in a cell. What do you do at that point? What do I do? What would anyone of us do? What is going on here? What the heck is going on? Why am I being treated like this? Why am I being arrested? But you don't say that, if you know; and the defendant didn't say a word because he knew. He knew there were drugs in the car. 46 Whitehead, 200 F.3d at 638 (closing arguments). We held that this use of the defendant's failure to respond to his arrest plainly infringed upon Whitehead's privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 639 (citation omitted). 47 The government attempts to distinguish Whitehead by arguing that the majority of the disputed evidence in Whitehead was silence and the bulk of the evidence in the present case is demeanor evidence. We cannot place constitutional significance on the government's post-hoc characterization of the evidence. Whether the government argues that a defendant remained silent or describes the defendant's state of silence, the practical effect is the same -the defendant's right to remain silent is used against him at trial. To hold otherwise would circumvent the constitutional protection against self-incrimination: introducing evidence at trial that the defendant remained silent in the face of incriminating evidence would violate the Fifth Amendment, but describing what a defendant looked like in remaining silent would not. This distinction would undermine our well-established rule that the government may not use evidence of a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence at trial, for impeachment or during its case-in-chief, because such evidence penalizes the exercise of a constitutional right. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618 ([I]t would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 n.37 ([I]t is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation.); Whitehead, 200 F.3d at 637 (noting that the government may not comment on post-arrest silence because such comments would constitute a penalty on the right to remain silent); Veloria, 136 F.3d at 652 (The right to remain silent carries an implicit assurance that silence will carry no penalty.); Douglas, 578 F.2d at 267 (The introduction of such testimony [regarding silence] acted as an impermissible penalty on the exercise of the petitioner's right to remain silent.). 48 Moreover, if we were to permit the use of silence in the face of questioning about incriminating evidence, we would be allowing the government to manufacture additional incriminating evidence for later use at trial. When confronted with evidence of a large quantity of drugs in his car, Velarde was faced with a Catch 22: if he remained silent, the government could use, as it did, his silence as powerful and persuasive evidence that Velarde was the consummate drug carrier -hired for his lack of emotion, and fully knowledgeable about the drugs he carried. If, on the other hand, Velarde denied the existence of the drugs, a response wholly consistent with innocence, the government would be able to impeach him with the physical or other evidence tending to discredit him. Thus, whatever Velarde's response, the government would now have available to it additional cumulative evidence of guilt to be argued to the jury. It is the self-incriminating nature of this evidence that the Fifth Amendment protects against. 49 The only other circuit to directly address whether it is permissible for the government to characterize silence or non-responsiveness as demeanor evidence is in accord. United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 537-38 (1st Cir. 1985); cf. United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991) (suggesting in dicta that it may be impermissible to characterize non-responsiveness or silence as demeanor in some contexts, but declining to reach this issue). The First Circuit held that admitting evidence of a defendant's non-responsiveness as demeanor evidence is a derogation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Elkins, 774 F.2d at 536-38. In Elkins, the government argued that admitting testimony as to a defendant's non-responsiveness does not constitute a Fifth Amendment violation because the testimony should be treated as demeanor evidence that is not protected by the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 536 n.4, 537. Relying on Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618, the First Circuit squarely rejected this argument: 50 Doyle cannot be avoided simply by treating testimony as to a defendant's non-responsiveness after receiving Miranda warnings as demeanor  evidence. Doyle has been strictly applied so that any description of a defendant's silence following arrest and Miranda warning, whether made in the prosecutor's case in chief, on cross-examination, or in closing arguments, constitutes a violation of the Due Process Clause. 51 Id. at 537. The court concluded that [a] Doyle violation occurs not only when the objectionable comments explicitly refer to a defendant's failure to answer questions put to him or her, but when the reference to defendant's silence is more oblique. Id. 52 Although Elkins involved post-arrest, post-Miranda silence, its rationale supports our conclusion. We reaffirm our decision in Whitehead and hold that the district court erred by allowing the government to comment on Velarde's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence.