Opinion ID: 871169
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Family Court Was Correct To Apply The Good Cause Standard For Bifurcating The Divorce Proceedings.

Text: The family court entered the divorce decree on October 1, 2007, which dissolved Aaron and Bonnie's marriage and divided a portion of their marital property. The court reserved jurisdiction to divide the remainder of Aaron and Bonnie's marital property in a trial scheduled for December 7, 2007. HRS § 580-47(a), which governs the family court's ability to bifurcate divorce proceedings, states in relevant part: Upon granting a divorce, or thereafter if, in addition to the powers granted in subsections (c) and (d), jurisdiction of those matters is reserved under the decree by agreement of both parties or by order of court after finding that good cause exists, the court may make any further orders as shall appear just and equitable (1) compelling the parties or either of them to provide for the support, maintenance, and education of the children of the parties; (2) compelling either party to provide for the support and maintenance of the other party; (3) finally dividing and distributing the estate of the parties, real, personal, or mixed, whether community, joint, or separate; and (4) allocating, as between the parties, the responsibility for the payment of the debts of the parties whether community, joint, or separate, and the attorney's fees, costs, and expenses incurred by each party by reason of the divorce. HRS § 580-47(a) (2006) (emphases added). [2] Aaron acknowledges that HRS § 580-47(a) recites a good cause standard for bifurcation, but argues that numerous ICA cases have added a stricter standard. Aaron cites the following passage from Eaton in support of his argument: Hawaii divorce cases involve a maximum of four discrete parts: (1) dissolution of the marriage; (2) child custody, visitation, and support; (3) spousal support; and (4) division and distribution of property and debts. Black v. Black, 6 Haw.App. [493], 728 P.2d 1303 (1986). In Cleveland v. Cleveland, 57 Haw. 519, 559 P.2d 744 (1977), the Hawaii Supreme Court held that an order which finally decides parts (1) and (4) is final and appealable even if part (2) remains undecided. Although we recommend that, except in exceptionally compelling circumstances, all parts be decided simultaneously and that part (1) not be finally decided prior to a decision on all the other parts, [ [3] ] we conclude that an order which finally decides part (1) is final and appealable when decided even if parts (2), (3), and (4) remain undecided; that parts (2), (3), and (4) are each separately final and appealable as and when they are decided, but only if part (1) has previously or simultaneously been decided; and that if parts (2), (3), and/or (4) have been decided before part (1) has been finally decided, they become final and appealable when part (1) is finally decided. Eaton, 7 Haw.App. at 118-19, 748 P.2d at 805 (emphasis added, footnote omitted); see also Aoki v. Aoki, 105 Hawai`i 403, 404, 98 P.3d 274, 275 (App.2004) (quoting Eaton ); Camp v. Camp, 109 Hawai`i 469, 477, 128 P.3d 351, 359 (App.2006) (same); Ferreira v. Ferreira, 112 Hawai`i 225, 229, 145 P.3d 768, 772 (App. 2006) (same). In Eaton, the family court had ordered the dissolution of marriage and spousal support, but had not fully and finally divided and distributed all of the property and debts of the Plaintiff and the Defendant over which it had jurisdiction. Eaton, 7 Haw.App. at 119, 748 P.2d at 805. Because the family court's decisions and orders regarding the division of property and debts were not final, the ICA sua sponte concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to review them. Id. at 118-19, 748 P.2d at 805-06. The Eaton court's decision did not address whether bifurcation was appropriate. [4] Rather, its analysis focused on whether it had appellate jurisdiction to review the family court's non-final property division decisions. Thus, its recommendation that dissolution of marriage should not be finally decided prior to a decision on all other parts of a divorce case except in especially compelling circumstances is dictum. See Black's Law Dictionary 1177 (9th ed. 2009) (defining obiter dictum as [a] judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be considered persuasive).). Likewise, the decisions in Ferreira, Aoki, and Camp were not decided on the issue of bifurcation, despite quoting the exceptionally compelling circumstances language in Eaton. See Ferreira, 112 Hawai`i at 229-231, 145 P.3d at 772-774 (concluding that because the family court's amended decree did not specify the dollar amount of child support to be paid or provide for the division and distribution of all marital property, the amended decree was not final and appealable with respect to these issues); see also Aoki, 105 Hawai`i at 413-14, 98 P.3d at 284-85 (concluding that there was no appellate jurisdiction over an order dividing marital property and debts because that order promised future action by the family court and was therefore not final); Camp, 109 Hawai`i at 469-80, 128 P.3d at 351-62 (concluding that the family court did not have jurisdiction to enter a divorce decree where husband died prior to entry of the divorce decree, but after the family court entered a decision and order finding that the husband was entitled to a divorce.) In the present case, the ICA, citing HRS § 580-47(a), concluded that [t]he Family Court may bifurcate dissolution and final property distribution upon agreement of the parties or a finding of good cause. SDO at 3. The ICA further concluded that Eaton evinces a recommendation and not a new standard. It does not expressly or implicitly modify the good cause requirement established by statute. Aaron has not cited, and we have not found, any cases adopting the exceptionally compelling circumstances language as a new standard, separate from the good cause requirement. We therefore conclude that the Family Court did not err in failing to find exceptionally compelling circumstances. Id. at 3-4. Based on the foregoing analysis, we agree with the ICA's conclusion that good cause is the proper standard for bifurcating the dissolution of marriage from the remaining parts of a divorce case. The exceptionably compelling circumstances recommendation in Eaton does not supplant the good cause standard established by HRS § 580-47(a). Aaron further argues that this court adopted the exceptionally compelling circumstances standard in Johnson v. Murakami, No. 30409, 2010 WL 1697182 (April 26, 2010). In Johnson, the family court denied the petitioner's motion to bifurcate the proceedings and grant an immediate divorce. Johnson, 2010 WL 1697182 at . In our order granting the petition for writ of mandamus, we found that the petitioner had presented clear and convincing evidence that [she was] terminally ill and that [the] divorce action could be abated by [her] death. Id. We further stated that [t]he possible abatement of the divorce action constitutes: (1) good cause under HRS § 580-47(a) (2006) for granting petitioner a divorce and reserving jurisdiction over all other matters; (2) an exceptionally compelling circumstance for dissolving petitioner's marriage before deciding all other parts of the divorce; see Camp v. Camp, 109 Hawai`i 469, 477, 128 P.2d [P.3d] 351, 359 (App.2006); and (3) a basis for bifurcating petitioner's divorce action under HFCR [Hawai`i Family Court Rules] 42(b) to avoid prejudice. Id. (emphasis added). Aaron argues that, absent this court's finding of exceptionally compelling circumstances, bifurcation would not have been ordered. We disagree. Our citation to Camp is instructive. In Camp, one of the parties died after the family court entered a decision and order stating that a divorce ... shall be granted to Plaintiff effective upon the signing and filing of a Divorce Decree to be prepared by Plaintiff[,] but before the family court entered the decree of absolute divorce. Camp, 109 Hawai`i at 469-75, 128 P.3d at 351-57. The ICA concluded that the party's death extinguished the family court's jurisdiction to enter the divorce decree, and that the divorce case should be dismissed. Id. at 478-80, 128 P.3d at 360-62. Thus, the clear and convincing evidence in Johnson that the petitioner was terminally ill and that the divorce action could be abated by petitioner's death was an exceptionally compelling circumstance to bifurcate the proceedings. However, the reference to exceptionally compelling circumstance[s] in Johnson was not intended to replace the good cause standard for bifurcation mandated by HRS § 580-47(a). Aaron further argues that a majority of other states similarly disfavors bifurcation and restricts its use to unusual or exceptional circumstances. As discussed above, HRS § 580-47(a) states that good cause is the standard for bifurcation in divorce cases. Thus, the fact that other states have adopted a more stringent standard is irrelevant. Finally, Aaron argues that [s]trong policy reasons support requiring family courts to decide all four parts [of a divorce case] at the same time[] absent exceptional circumstances. Such reasons include avoiding piecemeal divorce trials, which could result in multiple appeals, clogging both trial calendars and appellate dockets. Though there may be valid policy reasons for imposing a stricter standard for bifurcation in divorce proceedings, HRS § 580-47(a) states that the appropriate standard to be applied is good cause. [5] See HRS § 580-47(a). As the ICA correctly stated, [i]t is not the role of this court to alter a statutory requirement in order to effect policy considerations that are vested in the legislature. SDO at 4 (citing TMJ Hawaii, Inc. v. Nippon Trust Bank, 113 Hawai`i 373, 384 n. 6, 153 P.3d 444, 455 n. 6 (2007)). Accordingly, the family court was correct to apply the good cause standard in deciding whether to bifurcate the dissolution of Aaron and Bonnie's marriage from the remaining parts of the divorce proceeding. [6] See HRS § 580-47(a); see also Fisher, 111 Hawai`i at 46, 137 P.3d at 360.