Opinion ID: 842341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: duty with regard to asbestos liability

Text: Because this Court has never addressed whether property owners owe a duty to protect people who have never been on or near their property from exposure to asbestos carried home on a household member's clothing, it is helpful to review the decisions of other courts that have addressed this issue. In CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Williams, 278 Ga. 888, 891, 608 S.E.2d 208 (2005), the Supreme Court of Georgia, answering a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, held that an employer does not owe a duty of care to a third-party, non-employee, who comes into contact with its employee's asbestos-tainted work clothing at locations away from the workplace. That court explained: `[I]n fixing the bounds of duty, not only logic and science, but policy play an important role.' However, it must also be recognized that there is a responsibility to consider the larger social consequences of the notion of duty and to correspondingly tailor that notion so that the illegal consequences of wrongs are limited to a controllable degree. The recognition of a common-law cause of action under the circumstances of this case would, in our opinion, expand traditional tort concepts beyond manageable bounds and create an almost infinite universe of potential plaintiffs. Accordingly, we decline to promulgate a policy which would extend the common law so as to bring the . . . plaintiff[s] within a class of people whose interests are entitled to protection from the defendant's conduct. [ Id. at 890, 608 S.E.2d 208, quoting Widera v. Ettco Wire & Cable Corp., 204 A.D.2d 306, 307-308, 611 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1994) (other citations omitted).] [11] In In re New York City Asbestos Litigation, 5 N.Y.3d 486, 840 N.E.2d 115, 806 N.Y.S.2d 146 (2005), New York's highest court held that the defendant owed no duty to the defendant's employee's wife, who was allegedly injured from exposure to asbestos that the employee introduced into the family home on soiled work clothes that the plaintiff wife laundered. That court explained: [I]n determining whether a duty exists, courts must be mindful of the precedential, and consequential, future effects of their rulings, and limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree. . . . Foreseeability, alone, does not define duty. . . . ... A specific duty is required because otherwise, a defendant would be subjected to limitless liability to an indeterminate class of persons conceivably injured by its negligent acts. . . . Moreover, any extension of the scope of duty must be tailored to reflect accurately the extent that its social benefits outweigh its costs. [ Id. at 493, 806 N.Y.S.2d 146, 840 N.E.2d 115, quoting Hamilton v. Beretta USA Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222, 232, 750 N.E.2d 1055, 727 N.Y.S.2d 7 (2001) (other citations and internal quotation marks omitted).] The court was concerned about limitless liability and questioned why, if a duty was owed to an employee's spouse, a duty would not also be owed to the employee's babysitter or an employee of a neighborhood laundry. In re New York City Asbestos Litigation, supra at 498, 806 N.Y.S.2d 146, 840 N.E.2d 115. [W]e must consider the likely consequences of adopting the expanded duty urged by plaintiffs. While logic might suggest (and plaintiffs maintain) that the incidence of asbestos-related disease allegedly caused by the kind of secondhand exposure at issue in this case is rather low, experience counsels that the number of new plaintiffs' claims would not necessarily reflect that reality. [ Id. ] The court explained, [T]he `specter of limitless liability' is banished only when `the class of potential plaintiffs to whom the duty is owed is circumscribed by the relationship.' Here, there is no relationship between the [defendant] and [the defendant's employee's wife]. Id., quoting Hamilton, supra at 233, 727 N.Y.S.2d 7, 750 N.E.2d 1055. The court held that because there was no relationship between the defendant and the defendant's employee's wife, no duty could be imposed. In Adams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 119 Md.App. 395, 705 A.2d 58 (1998), the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the defendant did not owe a duty to the defendant's employee's wife who was allegedly exposed to asbestos from her husband's clothes. The court explained: If liability for exposure to asbestos could be premised on Mary Wild's handling of her husband's clothing, presumably Bethlehem would owe a duty to others who came in close contact with Edwin Wild, including other family members, automobile passengers, and co-workers. Bethlehem owed no duty to strangers based upon providing a safe workplace for employees. [ Id. at 411, 705 A.2d 58.] In Zimko v. American Cyanamid, 905 So.2d 465, 482 (La.App., 2005), the Louisiana Court of Appeals, recogniz[ing] the novelty of the duty, held that the defendant owed a duty to the defendant's employee's son who was allegedly exposed to asbestos from his father's work clothes that he brought home. However, the Louisiana court relied exclusively on a New York intermediate appellate court decision that was subsequently reversed by New York's highest court. As explained by New York's highest court, The [ Zimko ] court summarized [New York's intermediate appellate court's] decision . . . and, without providing an independent analysis, concluded that the father's employer owed a duty of care to the son. In re New York City Asbestos Litigation, supra at 496, 806 N.Y.S.2d 146, 840 N.E.2d 115. Because the court in Zimko relied exclusively on a decision that has since been reversed, we do not find Zimko persuasive. After New York's highest court reversed the decision by New York's intermediate appellate court in In re New York City of Asbestos Litigation, the Louisiana Court of Appeals reaffirmed its decision in Zimko. Chaisson v. Avondale Industries, Inc., 947 So.2d 171 (La.App., 2006). However, Louisiana relies more heavily upon foreseeability in its duty/risk analysis. . . . Id. at 182. Unlike Louisiana, Michigan relies more on the relationship between the parties than foreseeability in determining whether a duty exists. In addition, in Louisiana, unlike in Michigan, a `no duty' defense in a negligence case is seldom appropriate, Zimko, supra at 482; resolution of a negligence case based on a finding that a defendant has `no duty' should be reserved for the exceptional situation, id. at 482-483, such as cases involving `failure to act, injuries to unborn victims, negligently inflicted mental anguish or purely economic harm unaccompanied by physical trauma to the claimant or his property,' id. at 482 n. 19 (citation and emphasis omitted). In Michigan, however, [o]nly if the law recognizes a duty to act with due care arising from the relationship of the parties does it subject the defendant to liability for negligent conduct. Friedman, supra at 22, 312 N.W.2d 585. See also Murdock, supra at 53, 559 N.W.2d 639 (Only after finding that a duty exists may the factfinder determine whether, in light of the particular facts of the case, there was a breach of the duty.). For these reasons, we do not find Chaisson persuasive. In Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 186 N.J. 394, 895 A.2d 1143 (2006), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that if the defendant owed a duty to the worker, the defendant owed a duty to the wife of the worker who was exposed to asbestos when she washed the clothes of her husband, who was hired by an independent contractor to perform work at the defendant's premises. [12] However, as explained by the New York Court of Appeals,  Olivo is distinguishable legally in that New Jersey, unlike New York, relies heavily on foreseeability in its duty analysis. In re New York City Asbestos Litigation, supra at 497, 806 N.Y.S.2d 146, 840 N.E.2d 115. In Olivo, supra at 402, 895 A.2d 1143, the New Jersey Supreme Court described foreseeability of harm as a crucial element in determining whether imposition of a duty on an alleged tortfeasor is appropriate. (Citations omitted.) It further explained, in respect of a landowner's liability, whether a duty of care can be owed to one who is injured from a dangerous condition on the premises, to which the victim is exposed off-premises, devolves to a question of foreseeability of the risk of harm to that individual or identifiable class of individuals. Id. at 403, 895 A.2d 1143. However, as explained above, Michigan, like New York, relies more on the relationship between the parties than foreseeability of harm when determining whether a duty exists. [13] For this reason, we do not find Olivo persuasive. [14]