Opinion ID: 2582263
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Impact of Patten

Text: This historical review reveals the doctrinal inconsistency and confusion that abounds in multiplicity cases. The result was two divergent lines of cases. One line of cases culminated with the decision in Groves, 278 Kan. 302, which appropriately applied the precedent cited in that case. The other line culminated in Patten, 280 Kan. 385, which followed a long line of cases in which [i]t has been repeatedly held by this and other courts that the same acts may constitute a violation of two separate statutes and such fact does not amount to placing the defendant in jeopardy twice. Dionne v. Hudspeth, 166 Kan. 72, 73, 199 P.2d 176 (1948). The confusion resulting from having these two divergent and unreconciled lines of cases is illustrated by the presence of another case argued before this court on the same docket as this case in which virtually identical multiplicity arguments were made. In that case, State v. Unruh, (No. 90,498, this day decided), a Court of Appeals panel analyzed the arguments using the elements test only and did not discuss the single act/merger analysis which was applied by the Court of Appeals panel in this case. This dichotomy is understandable. It is difficult to discern a coherent pattern for when the single act of violence/merger paradigm applies and when it does not. As concluded in Patten, it seems that the test which is applied depends upon how the parties have argued the case, not upon doctrinal consistency. 280 Kan. at 393. This brings us back to the issue raised in this case. Will the divergent theories continue, especially in light of the recent holding in Patten clarifying that a strict elements test applies rather than an evidence test? The answer is no. We conclude that the single act of violence/merger analysis should no longer be applied when analyzing double jeopardy or multiplicity issues in the context of multiple description cases where a defendant has been convicted of violations of multiple statutes arising from the same course of conduct. We reach this conclusion for several reasons. First, use of the single act/merger test broadens the scope of protection beyond that provided under the Fifth Amendment. While we can recognize a broader right under the Kansas Constitution, we have not explicitly done so in our multiplicity cases. Generally, provisions of the Kansas Constitution which are similar to the Constitution of the United States have been applied in a similar manner. See, e.g., State v. Morris, 255 Kan. 964, 979-81, 880 P.2d 1244 (1994) (right to counsel under § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provides same protection as accorded by Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution); State v. Schultz, 252 Kan. 819, 824, 850 P.2d 818 (1993) (§ 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights identical in scope to Fourth Amendment); State ex rel. Tomasic v. Kansas City, Kansas Port Authority, 230 Kan. 404, 426, 636 P.2d 760 (1981) (§ 1 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights given same effect as Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). No reason has been suggested why we should do otherwise in the area of double jeopardy. Second, as discussed, we have previously stated that the Fifth Amendment provides the same protection as does the Kansas Constitution. E.g., State v. Cady, 254 Kan. 393, 396-97, 867 P.2d 270 (1994). Third, rejecting the single act of violence/merger doctrine in the context of multiple description cases reconciles the difference in the treatment of single act of violence cases dealing with felony murder and the treatment of all other cases dealing with a single act of violence paradigm. Fourth, rejecting the single act of violence/merger doctrine in the context of multiple description cases reconciles the difference in the treatment of successive prosecution cases, which have been analyzed in a manner consistent with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, with the treatment of multiple description cases, which have not been analyzed in a manner consistent with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Edgington, 223 Kan. 413, 416, 573 P.2d 1059 (1978). Fifth, there is no justification for continuing to apply commonlaw multiplicity doctrines, at least in the context of multiple description cases, in light of the passage of K.S.A. 21-3107, which has been recognized as setting limitations on the parameters of multiplicity. K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 21-3107 provides: (1) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one crime under the laws of this state, the defendant may be prosecuted for each of such crimes. Each of such crimes may be alleged as a separate count in a single complaint, information or indictment. (2) Upon prosecution for a crime, the defendant may be convicted of either the crime charged or a lesser included crime, but not both. (Emphasis added.) The statute is a clear statement of legislative intent to have multiple convictions when separate statutes describe the criminal conduct except when one of the statutes proscribes a lesser included crime of another. In light of those provisions, there is no basis for application of the common law in multiple description cases. See State v. Berberich, 248 Kan. 854, 858, 811 P.2d 1192 (1991) (finding that prior to the 1969 adoption of the Kansas Criminal Code, Kansas followed the traditional common-law rule on instructing the jury on lesser included offenses, i.e., the elements test, and that statute had replaced common law); see Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368-69 (cumulative punishment constitutional when a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe the `same' conduct under Blockburger ). Sixth, if we were to continue applying the single act/merger doctrine we would be doing so based upon case law which is impossible to reconcile and holdings that have not been consistently applied. Finally, we recently adopted the same-elements test in Patten. In doing so, we stated: What most recommends the strict elements analysis is its logical, mechanical ease of application and, hence, certainty. Consideration of the facts proved, in contrast, puts multiplicity on a case-by-case basis. Patten, 280 Kan. at 393. To continue application of the single act/merger doctrine would immediately undermine this rationale. For these reasons we hold that the test to determine whether charges in a complaint or information under different statutes are multiplicitous is whether each offense requires proof of an element not necessary to prove the other offense; if so, the charges stemming from a single act are not multiplicitous. We further hold that this same-elements test will determine whether there is a violation of § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights when a defendant is charged with violations of multiple statutes arising from the same course of conduct. Because the single act of violence/merger analysis has resulted in outcomes which cannot be reconciled with cases applying the same-elements test, lack of predictability as to outcome, disparate analysis, broader protection than required by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights and contravention of K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 21-3107, the single act of violence/merger analysis will no longer be applied to analyze double jeopardy or multiplicity issues. We disapprove any language in previous cases which utilized a single act of violence/merger rationale as the basis for holding that two convictions which were based upon different statutes were multiplicitous or resulted in a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment or § 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.