Opinion ID: 1232597
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The State Interest in Protecting Citizens Against Defamation

Text: ¶ 149 Two features of Lassa's claim dilute the strength of the state's interest in protecting citizens from defamation. First, during an election campaign the state's interest in preventing defamation is counterbalanced by its interest in promoting political discourse. See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272, 91 S.Ct. 621, 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1971). A court's duty to protect speech involving a public figure is heightened during elections. See Roy, 401 U.S. at 272, 91 S.Ct. 621 (stating that the First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office). Courts must be solicitous of the reality that [t]he clash of reputations is the staple of election campaigns, and that campaigning necessarily entails bruised reputations. ¶ 150 As the Supreme Court explained: It is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. The importance to the state and to society of such discussions is so vast and the advantages derived are so great that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of the private persons whose conduct may be involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public welfare. The public benefit from publicity is so great and the chance of injury to private character so small that such discussion must be privileged. Id. (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281, 286 (1908)). [6] ¶ 151 Second, Lassa's suit presents a defamation claim by a public figure against a media or non-media defendant,  which will always involve a conditional constitutional privilege.  See Wis JICivil 2500 at 9 (emphasis added). [7] The central principles pertaining to public figure defamation were summarized by this court in Torgerson v. Journal/Sentinel, Inc., 210 Wis.2d 524, 563 N.W.2d 472 (1997): The First Amendment imposes a constitutional privilege on the publication of statements about public figures, even when those statements are false and defamatory. The privilege, however, is conditional, and the condition is the absence of actual malice. The requirement that actual malice be proven is a minimal accommodation of the reputational interests of public figures and the community's interest in unfettered public debate. . . . . Proof of actual malice requires a showing that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth. Id. at 535-36, 563 N.W.2d 472. ¶ 152 To discourage the use of defamation claims as a tool to suppress political speech, candidates for public office must meet a high standard to prove defamation. It is not that we love public officials less, but that we love freedom of expression more, that we must hold any public official to a high standard in a defamation suit. ¶ 153 I doubt that if this court were to engage in a sentence-by-sentence analysis of the Rongstad mailing (or take it as a whole), it would conclude that the mailing was defamatory under the United States Constitution. It is obvious that the majority shares this view, for it assiduously avoids any definitive pronouncement on defamation and attempts to recast the issues so that any such pronouncement is unnecessary. ¶ 154 In my view, the Rongstad mailing was offensive and unfair but not defamatory in a constitutional sense. Lassa had every right to be angry and to take steps to address the criticism she received. On the other hand, she was a public official with access to the news media and ample time before the upcoming April elections to rally people to her defense. There is no discernible reason why the court should have forced Rongstad to answer every question related to the 2002 mailing before determining that Lassa's suit could survive a motion to dismiss.