Opinion ID: 751343
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury instruction on purpose of the crimes.

Text: 16 Tse asserts that the court's jury instruction on the purpose of the crimes was in error. The judge charged that for Tse to be convicted under § 1959(a) it must find that Tse conspired and/or attempted murder for the purpose of maintaining his position in the enterprise. See 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a). The court further instructed the jury that this maintenance of position need not be Tse's sole or principal motive and that the prosecution could satisfy its burden by proving that Tse committed the acts because he knew it was expected of him by reason of his membership ... or that he committed the ... acts in furtherance of that membership. Tse objected, asserting that the jury must find that maintenance of position in the enterprise was his sole or principal motive. Because Tse challenges the district court's interpretation of § 1959(a) rather than only the wording of the instruction, our review must be de novo. See U.S. v. Pitrone, 115 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1997) (When ... the alleged error involves the interpretation of the elements of a statutory offense, it poses a question of law and sparks plenary review.). 17 The Second and Fourth Circuits have held that § 1959 does not require the government to prove that increasing or maintaining position in an enterprise be the sole or principal motive in committing a crime for conviction under § 1959. See U.S. v. Fiel, 35 F.3d 997, 1004-5 (4th Cir.1994); U.S. v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 380 (2d Cir.1992). In Concepcion the defendant was a member of a narcotics enterprise known as the Unknown Organization. The evidence showed that Concepcin killed and conspired to kill individuals who were members of rival gangs and individuals who made demands on his gang. Id. at 375-76. Concepcin asserted that the prosecution must prove that he had the specific intent of maintaining his position in the enterprise to secure a conviction under § 1959. Id. at 380. The court rejected this contention, noting that the legislative history of § 1959 indicated that, with regard to purpose, Congress meant to proscribe all violent crime committed as an aspect of membership in a racketeering organization. Id. at 381; see also S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 304-07 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3483-87. In other words, the Concepcion court stated, the crime need only have been committed in furtherance of the defendant's membership in the enterprise or because it was expected of him by reason of his membership. Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 381. 18 We agree with the Second and Fourth Circuits. By enacting § 1959 Congress intended to curtail the violent criminal activity that is often associated with racketeering enterprises. See S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 304-07 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3483-87. Nowhere does the statute or its legislative history indicate that the government must prove that the crime was solely motivated by a desire to maintain or increase a particular position within the enterprise. The evidence showed that Tse ordered the attempted murders of Meng and Keung because they had threatened the security and supremacy of his leadership and of his enterprise. By instructing the jury that Tse's general motive must have been the maintenance of his position in the organization, and that he acted to further his membership in the enterprise, the district court correctly applied the requirements of § 1959.