Opinion ID: 6317300
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion for a New Trial as to Liability

Text: Leveraging the same arguments presented in its motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50, Doctors' Center contends that the district court erred by denying its motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Under Rule 59, [t]he court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues -- and to any party -- . . . after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). A district court's power to grant a motion for new trial is much broader than its power to grant a [Rule 50 motion.] Jennings v. Jones, 587 F.3d 430, 436 (1st Cir. 2009). A trial judge may grant a new trial if the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence or if action is required in order to prevent injustice. Id. at 436. A district court can independently weigh the evidence when evaluating a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 and therefore can determine that a witness or evidence lacks credibility; in other words, the court need not take the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. At the same time, trial judges do not sit as thirteenth jurors, empowered to reject any verdict with which they disagree. - 13 - Id. Indeed, when reviewing a denial of a motion for new trial that was, at bottom, based on sufficiency of the evidence, the standards under Rule 50 and Rule 59 effectively merge. See Dimanche v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 893 F.3d 1, 8 n.9 (1st Cir. 2018). Moreover, our review of the district court's denial of Doctors' Center's motion for a new trial is only for abuse of discretion. Jennings, 587 F.3d at 435-37. Considering the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard alongside the reality that Doctors' Center's arguments under Rule 59 and Rule 50 are based on the same sufficiency-ofthe-evidence grounds, we affirm the district court's denial of Doctors' Center's motion for a new trial as to its liability. In other words, consideration of the same facts that lead us to affirm the district court's denial of the motion as brought under Rule 50 likewise lead us to affirm as to Rule 59. Dr. Halbridge was a qualified expert witness who testified that Doctors' Center's nurses breached the applicable standard of care during RodríguezValentin's labor and DALR's birth. He explained why that breach of the standard of care caused or aggravated DALR's injuries. The jury was entitled to credit Dr. Halbridge's testimony over that of Doctors' Center's experts. The district court did not abuse its discretion in deferring to the jury's credibility findings. Doctors' Center points to no facts that convince us the jury's verdict as to liability was against the weight of the - 14 - evidence or was otherwise unjust. Indeed, the district court's analysis of the evidence presented at trial was accurate, thoughtful, and thorough, leaving us with no doubt that the decision was within its considerable discretion. See id. at 441. III. Motions for a New Trial on Damages or Remittitur of Future Life Care Costs Award Lastly, Doctors' Center contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying its motion for a new trial or remittitur on the ground that the jury's $12,966,000 award for DALR's future life care costs was excessive and unsupported by the evidence. Specifically, Doctors' Center argues that the award for future care costs should be reduced, or a new trial on damages granted, because Rodríguez-Valentin presented no expert testimony about DALR's life expectancy and because Pennachio based her calculations on erroneous assumptions. As with motions for a new trial on liability, appellate review for denial of a motion for a new trial on damages or remittitur under Rule 59 is for abuse of discretion. See id. at 435-36. The denial of such a motion will be reversed only if 'the jury's verdict exceeds any rational appraisal or estimate of the damages that could be based on the evidence before the jury.' Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden Am., Inc., 591 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Smith v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19, 29 (1st Cir. 1999)). When evaluating a motion for a new trial on damages, - 15 - or for remittitur, the court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Wortley v. Camplin, 333 F.3d 284, 297 (1st Cir. 2003). Under Rule 59, an award for future life care costs is rational when it is supported by the evidence, reasonable inferences from that evidence, and the jury's common sense, as opposed to speculation or conjecture. See Astro-Med, Inc., 591 F.3d at 13; Climent-García v. Autoridad de Transporte Marítimo y Las Islas Municipio, 754 F.3d 17, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2014). And a district court does not abuse its discretion by declining to reduce a jury's verdict or award a new trial where the grounds for doing so derive from the movant's speculation about what the jury might have found or what evidence not presented might have demonstrated. See Loan Modification Grp., Inc. v. Reed, 694 F.3d 145, 154 (1st Cir. 2012). Here, the jury's verdict was not beyond any rational appraisal or estimate of the damages that could be based upon the evidence before the jury. See id. Doctors' Center's arguments fail to convince us otherwise. First, Doctors' Center contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying its motion under Rule 59 because Rodríguez-Valentin did not present expert testimony about DALR's life expectancy. Specifically, Doctors' Center argues that, under Puerto Rico law, an award for future care costs is speculative unless the plaintiff submits expert testimony about his or her - 16 - life expectancy. Given the procedural posture of this case and waivers by Doctors' Center, as explained below, we do not reach the legal question of whether Puerto Rico law requires such expert testimony. Doctors' Center did not timely argue to the district court that the jury could consider DALR's future care costs only by reference to expert testimony. Similarly, Doctors' Center did not timely argue that the jury had to make an estimate of DALR's life expectancy, or even that it needed to calculate DALR's future care costs in any particular way. Indeed, Doctors' Center's life expectancy argument was not part of its motion for judgment as a matter of law. It was neither reflected in any of Doctors' Center's proposed jury instructions nor posed as an objection. Likewise, Doctors' Center did not ask for a special verdict form that would have required the jury to decide or agree upon DALR's life expectancy. Instead, Doctors' Center first argued that expert testimony on life expectancy was required after the jury delivered an adverse verdict, in the context of a motion for a new trial or remittitur reviewable only for abuse of discretion.8 Because the district court had, without objection, already instructed the jury 8 In its earlier motion in limine, Doctors' Center argued that Pennachio should be precluded from testifying about DALR's life expectancy. Doctors' Center did not argue that the jury could not award future costs without expert testimony about life expectancy. - 17 - on how to calculate damages for future life care costs, Doctors' Center's argument that the jury could not, as a matter of law, return a damages award for future life care costs without expert testimony on life expectancy came much too late. In other words, Doctors' Center knew before the jury was instructed that no expert testimony had been presented on life expectancy and that none would be. Nonetheless, Doctors' Center neither moved for judgment as a matter of law on that ground nor offered a jury instruction asking the jury to estimate and agree on DALR's life expectancy or to calculate that figure in any particular way. See Cheshire Med. Ctr. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 49 F.3d 26, 35-36 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirming denial of motion for a new trial where moving party failed to object precisely on the pertinent ground and failed to propose[] to the trial judge an acceptable instruction to the jury). And, Doctors' Center voiced no objection to the district court's instruction on calculating damages, which was, in short, to award Rodríguez-Valentin fair compensation of a reasonable amount to compensate her and DALR for physical, emotional, and economic injuries to whatever extent Doctors' Center was legally liable. With no pertinent argument made by Doctors' Center before the case was submitted to the jury, the district court's jury instructions are the law of the case. United States v. Oliver, 19 F.4th 512, 517 (1st Cir. 2021) (Because the defendant - 18 - neither objected to the district court's instructions below nor assigns error to them on appeal, we treat the instructions as the law of the case.); United States v. Kilmartin, 944 F.3d 315, 32829 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding that an unobjected-to jury instruction that is neither patently incorrect nor internally inconsistent becomes the law of the case); Moore v. Murphy, 47 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1995) (The failure to object to the instructions at the time, and in the manner, designated by Rule 51 is treated as a procedural default, with the result that the jury instructions, even if erroneous, become the law of that particular case.). At best, we can review the district court's instructions on this issue for plain error. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(c)-(d) (stating when objections to jury instructions must be made and that the consequence for failing to timely object to a jury instruction is review for plain error that affects substantial rights); Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2018) (It is black-letter law that claims of instructional error not seasonably advanced in the district court can be broached on appeal only for plain error.); see also P.R. Hosp. Supply, Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 426 F.3d 503, 505 (1st Cir. 2005) (In general, 'a party may not appeal from an error to which he contributed, either by failing to object or by affirmatively presenting to the court the wrong law.'). For Doctors' Center to prevail under plain error review, we must at least conclude that the claimed error was - 19 - clear or obvious. See Sindi, 896 F.3d at 19-20; Babcock v. Gen. Motors Corp., 299 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 2002).9 We cannot do so here. Doctors' Center offers no authority demonstrating that it is clearly the case under Puerto Rico law that a plaintiff must present expert testimony about life expectancy to receive damages for future care costs in a medical malpractice action. Although we agree with the district court that presenting expert testimony about life expectancy is the best practice in a medical malpractice case involving an uncommon and severe medical condition and a request for future costs, we can find no authority clearly establishing that such expert testimony is necessary to recover damages for future care costs as a matter of law in Puerto Rico. Rather, the only arguably relevant authorities offered here are the Puerto Rico Supreme Court cases relied on by the district court in denying Doctors' Center's motion, Zambrana v. Hospital Santo Asilo de Damas, 9 P.R. Offic. Trans. 687, 692 (1980), and Suro v. E.L.A, 111 P.R. Dec. 456, 461 (1981), which merely stand for the general principle that damages need not be computed with mathematical rigor or precision. 9As we conclude that there was no clear or obvious error, we need not reach the other aspects of plain error, which include whether the claimed error affected the appellant's substantial rights and seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Fothergill v. United States, 566 F.3d 248, 251-52 (1st Cir. 2009). - 20 - Thus, if there were any error under Puerto Rico law in the district court's instructions on how to calculate damages, it was not plain. See Sindi, 896 F.3d at 19-20; Babcock, 299 F.3d at 65. Considering those instructions, the evidence that was presented, and Doctors' Center's failure to timely raise its legal argument on the need for expert testimony on life expectancy, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Finally, Doctors' Center takes issue with Pennachio's opinion about DALR's future life care costs because Pennachio did not discount her calculations to present value, used numbers based on costs in Massachusetts instead of Florida, and did not offset her calculations for possible contributions by insurers or the government. The jury, however, heard extensive evidence about DALR's condition and the care that he required. The district court allowed Doctors' Center substantial leeway in cross-examining Pennachio about the accuracy of her calculations.10 Doctors' Center's cross-examination of Pennachio included questions about whether she discounted her numbers to present value, whether she used accurate regional cost-of-living expenses, and whether she considered potential offsetting contributions. And Pennachio 10On appeal, Doctors' Center challenges the methodology of Pennachio's opinions and does so only in the context of a new trial or remittitur, as opposed to admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Doctors' Center does not challenge Pennachio's expertise. - 21 - explained, as one example, that her methodology did not require discounting her numbers to present value because the prospect of inflation offset the discount rate. The jury was therefore able to assess Pennachio's testimony, including Doctors' Center's criticisms of her methodology, in fashioning its damages award. See Casco, Inc. v. John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co., 990 F.3d 1, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2021) (rejecting argument that a new trial or remittitur was necessary due to claimed methodological errors by plaintiff's damages expert). Doctors' Center's other arguments regarding the jury's damages award -- including its contention that the damages are excessive in light of comparable cases -- are unpersuasive and do not merit discussion. At bottom, the jury's verdict was not beyond any rational appraisal or estimate of the damages that could be based upon the evidence before the jury. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Doctors' Center's motion for a new trial and, in the alternative, remittitur.