Opinion ID: 2198154
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Laches from Delay with Deaths

Text: Less than two years ago, in Fike v. Ruger, [52] this Court ruled that [i]n applying laches, a plaintiff is chargeable with such knowledge of a claim as he or she might have obtained upon inquiry, provided the facts already known to that plaintiff were such as to put the duty of inquiry upon a person of ordinary intelligence. [53] This Court further stated that in the context of laches prejudice can be found where a party dies while the other party sits on its claim. [54] This Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's judgment that barred the plaintiffs' claim by laches since the plaintiffs' were on inquiry notice of their claim for only three years prior to filing suit and the defendants were prejudiced in the interim by the death of the joint venture's accountant and one of the joint venturers. [55] Anna was on inquiry notice of her claim since 1978. When Anna filed her complaint in 1996, the deaths of three out of the four parties to the disputed 1978 real estate transaction prejudiced John Hudak. The three parties to the 1978 real estate transaction were Helen and her parents, the Proceks. The attorney who conducted the 1978 real estate settlement died in 1989. Helen died in 1990. John Procek died in 1993. In the interim, John Hudak inherited the property from Helen in 1990 and settled Helen's estate. The facts in Fike are analogous to those that are extant in this case. The death of the settlement attorney parallels the death of the accountant in Fike. The deaths of both Helen and John Procek are more than analogous to the death of one joint venturer in Fike. Moreover, Anna was less timely in filing suit than the plaintiff in Fike. Anna did not file her complaint until eighteen years after the 1978 real estate transaction, six years after Helen's death and three years after her husband's death. Twenty years ago, in Adams v. Jankouskas, [56] this Court held that Register of Wills inventories are not mere ministerial chore[s] to be taken lightly, but rather provide for the expeditious settlement of estates for the benefit of all concerned. [57] This Court stated that an executor who files an inventory places a party on public notice as to claims of ownership of the decedent's property, which could justify the imposition of laches. [58] Following Helen's death in 1990, the listing of the property as an asset in the inventory of Helen's estate placed the Proceks on public notice that the property conveyed by the 1978 real estate transaction was being included in Helen's estate. More specifically, John Hudak's filing of that inventory constituted public notice to the Proceks that their alleged interest was being adversely affected. It provided the Proceks with knowledge of their alleged claim against Helen's estate and or John Hudak. In addition to the constructive public notice of John Hudak's inheritance from the inventory filed in Helen's estate, the record reflects that the Proceks had actual immediate notice that Helen had left the 1978 property to John Hudak in her will. The Proceks were on inquiry notice of their claim since 1978 when they knew the property was titled in Helen's name. Their obligation to act became paramount, however, when the property was transferred by Helen's will to a third party, John Hudak. Within two months of Helen's death, however, the validity of John Hudak's title to the property was expressly acknowledged by John Procek in an agreement that gave Anna and John Procek lifetime rights in the house. In Hudson v. Layton, [59] this Court stated that [i]t is the established doctrine of courts of equity to refuse their aid, or to interfere, after a considerable length of time. [60] This Court recognized that the doctrine of laches is founded on the difficulty of doing entire justice, when the original transactions have become obscure by time, and the evidence may be lost, or depends on the precarious memory of witnesses. [61] The Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's ruling that barred a plaintiff's claim for specific performance of an agreement for the conveyance of land since more than a twenty-year lapse occurred creating conjecture and uncertainty as to the initial transaction. [62] Anna's eighteen-year delay in bringing her claim prevented the Court of Chancery from doing entire justice when the original disputed transaction became obscure due to the death of two parties and the death of another key witness. Anna's failure to assert her claim for eighteen years prevented those three parties from providing testimony as to the intent of the 1978 real estate transaction. This led to the uncertainty and conjecture reflected in the record of this case. By delaying her claim until after the death of the three parties, Anna prejudiced John Hudak's ability to defend the validity of his inheritance. In Hammond v. Hopkins , [63] the United States Supreme Court stated that the doctrine of laches is peculiarly applicable where the difficulty of doing entire justice arises through the death of the principal participants in the transactions complained of, or of the witness or witnesses, or by reason of the original transactions having become so obscured by time as to render the ascertainment of the exact facts impossible. [64] Similarly, the death of two principal participants, Helen and John Procek, and the death of a witness (the settlement attorney) to the transaction prevented the Court of Chancery from doing entire justice through the lack of crucial testimony as to the parties' intentions in 1978. In Mackall v. Casilear, [65] the United States Supreme Court stated that a court of equity will not aid a plaintiff where the difficulty of doing entire justice through the death of principal witnesses or from the original transaction becoming obscured by time is attributable to gross negligence or deliberate delay. [66] The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling that barred the plaintiff's claim for filing suit against his father for fraudulent conveyances after his father's death and only a five-year delay. [67] In reaching that conclusion, the United States Supreme Court found it was significant that the son had not only refused to challenge the transaction while his father was alive, but that the son also accepted benefits from the transaction which he subsequently decided to attach. Similarly, in this case, Anna and John Procek not only declined Helen's offers to convey the property while all three of them were alive, but Anna accepted a life interest in the property pursuant to the 1990 agreement, which acknowledged the validity of John Hudak's inheritance from Helen. The Court of Chancery has also specifically addressed the doctrine of laches in several cases where a defendant incurs prejudice due to the death of a principal participant to the transaction during the plaintiff's delay. In Cooch v. Grier, [68] the Court of Chancery ruled that in a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance the right to assert the defense of laches is available. [69] The Court of Chancery held that laches barred the plaintiff's claim for a lien on real property since a fourteen-year delay prejudiced the defendant through the death of the grantee. [70] The Court of Chancery noted that [i]t has been said that laches will apply where there is an unexplained delay in prosecuting the claim until death has closed the lips of the interested parties. [71] Similarly, death silenced the testimony of not only the sole grantee, Helen, but death also silenced another principal participant  her father, John Procek  as well as the attorney who conducted the 1978 real estate transaction. In this case, the record reflects the Court of Chancery expressed concern that the three parties were dead: I acknowledge that the two other principal parties who knew the circumstances surrounding the initial transaction in 1978 will never be heard because they have since died. I would have liked to have heard from the settlement attorney to learn what Helen did or did not tell him about the $70,000 Procek transaction, but he too died before trial. [72] The unavailability of the testimony from those three parties is attributable exclusively to Anna's eighteen-year delay in filing her complaint. In Sharpley v. Sharpley, [73] a plaintiff sought specific performance of an alleged agreement between cotenants to partition property more than fourteen years after the alleged agreement was made. [74] The Court of Chancery held that the plaintiff's claim was barred by laches where death had silenced the testimony of a principal participant to the disputed transaction. [75] The Court of Chancery further stated that it would be inequitable to order specific performance where parties who were alleged to have arranged to exchange deeds during their lifetimes failed to do so: [I]t would seem that laches is a bar to the relief asked. The complainant allowed at least fourteen years to go by after the alleged partition was made before appealing to this court for relief. In the meantime death had silenced the lips of his brother, the one person who more than all others was competent to give his version of the matter. The widow and children are driven to grope around as best they may in search of the truth. The complainant says that he and his brother on several occasions arranged to exchange deeds, but neglected to do so. If, when he had the opportunity throughout ten years of his brother's lifetime to effect the division in an unmistakable way, he failed to do so, the fault is his own. It would be inequitable for this court under all the circumstances to supply what his own want of diligence has occasioned. [76] Similarly, Anna should not be permitted to have the Court of Chancery impose a resulting trust eighteen years later, when Helen offered to convey the property to the Proceks during her lifetime and the Proceks declined to have Helen make that conveyance. As in Sharpley, the fact that John Procek and Helen are dead and cannot testify is prejudicial to John Hudak's (the widower's) ability to defend his inheritance.