Opinion ID: 387875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Cross-examination of Thomas Johnson.

Text: 10 Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), which prescribes the manner of cross-examining a witness by showing his prior bad acts, provides in part: 11 Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified. 12 The rule recognizes that the trial court must have discretion to apply the overriding safeguards of rule 403 (excluding evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by dangers of prejudice, confusion or delay) and rule 611 (barring harassment and undue embarrassment of a witness). The trial court's discretion is not, however, absolute; it may not foreclose a legitimate inquiry into a witness's credibility. See United States v. Banks, 520 F.2d 627, 630-31 (7 Cir. 1975). Rule 608 authorizes inquiry only into instances of misconduct that are clearly probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, such as perjury, fraud, swindling, forgery, bribery, and embezzlement. See 3A Wigmore on Evidence § 982 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); McCormick on Evidence § 42 (2d ed. 1972). 13 We recognize the broad discretion rule 608(b) grants to district courts in determining what matters may be raised on cross-examination. We hold, however, that the district court in this case erred in exercising that discretion because it mistakenly relied on United States v. Walton, 602 F.2d 1176 (4 Cir. 1979), in ruling that defense counsel could not question Johnson about many of the fraudulent activities in which he had been involved. In Walton, we decided only that rule 608(b) proscribes the use of extrinsic evidence in cross-examining a witness concerning prior bad acts. See 602 F.2d at 1180. Walton does not therefore address the proper scope of cross-examination under rule 608(b), and is irrelevant to a case such as this one not involving the attempted use of extrinsic evidence of past conduct. By relying on Walton, the district court failed to consider the proper factors to be employed in measuring the scope of cross-examination: the importance of the testimony to the government's case, the relevance of the conduct to the witness's truthfulness, and the danger of prejudice, confusion, or delay raised by evidence sought to be adduced. See McCormick on Evidence § 42 (2d ed. 1972); Fed.R.Evid. 403 and 611. 14 The district court's limitation of defense counsel's cross-examination of Johnson was clearly prejudicial error. The conduct of Johnson that defense counsel sought to expose was probative of Johnson's truthfulness. The questions defense counsel asked Johnson outside of the jury's presence and the document defense counsel placed in the record listing the matters he sought to inquire about indicate that Johnson had been indicted in New Jersey for obtaining money under false pretenses, a warrant for his arrest for defrauding an innkeeper had been issued in North Carolina, six checks drawn by him had been returned for insufficient funds, numerous default judgments had been entered against him in civil actions seeking repayment of loans, and he, or firms that he controlled, had entered numerous contracts to build churches, received payment, but failed to complete the work due under those contracts. 2 These matters certainly establish a pattern of fraudulent activity that, if revealed, would have placed Johnson's credibility in question. 3 15 As we have shown, Johnson's testimony was crucial to the prosecution's case. Johnson was the only witness who testified that the defendants had falsely claimed him to be an employee of Innovative. He also said that Leake and Faulkner had asked him to sign false documents that they could use to prove that he had worked for Innovative. Had Johnson been questioned about his various fraudulent activities before the jury, it might have disbelieved Johnson's testimony, and the defendants found not guilty. There is no question, then, that the district court's error was prejudicial and not harmless. See United States v. Nyman, 649 F.2d 208, (4 Cir., 1980) (test of harmlessness for nonconstitutional error is whether it is probable that the error could have affected the verdict reached by the particular jury in the particular circumstances of the trial at issue). 16