Opinion ID: 2054629
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Driving or Attempting to Drive Under Section 16-205.1(a)(2).

Text: Respondent's primary contention in his cross-appeal is that he was not driving or attempting to drive as set forth in Section 16-205.1(a)(2) at the time Officer Mondini responded to the fire and rescue call at 3121 Automotive Boulevard because he was legally parked on the side of the road and not moving the vehicle. On this basis, he asserts that the implied consent provision for blood alcohol content testing was not triggered by this incident. [10] We disagree with respondent's contention, however, because Officer Mondini responded to the scene and found respondent sitting awake in the driver's seat with the keys in the ignition and the car engine running. The statute defines the term drive as used throughout Maryland's vehicle law as meaning to drive, operate, move, or be in actual physical control of a vehicle, including the exercise of control over or the steering of a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle. Md.Code, § 11-114 of the Transp. Art. (emphasis added). Respondent urges that our decision concerning what constitutes being in actual physical control of a vehicle as set forth in Atkinson v. State, 331 Md. 199, 627 A.2d 1019 (1993) controls our decision in this case and mandates the conclusion that Atterbeary was not driving or attempting to drive his vehicle at the time of his arrest. The facts of the case sub judice are distinguishable from our decision in Atkinson. In Atkinson, the appellant was parked lawfully on the side of the road, sleeping, with the keys in the ignition but the engine not running. Id. at 202, 627 A.2d at 1020. Based on those facts, we held that Atkinson was not in actual physical control over the vehicle at the time of his arrest, and thus, could not be driving or attempting to drive his vehicle while intoxicated. Id. at 215, 627 A.2d at 1027 (We believe that the General Assembly, particularly by including the word `actual' in the term `actual physical control,' meant something more than merely sleeping in a legally parked vehicle with the ignition off.). We provided the following rationale for our holding: Neither the statute's purpose nor its plain language supports the result that intoxicated persons sitting in their vehicles while in possession of their ignition keys would, regardless of other circumstances, always be subject to criminal penalty.... Although the definition of driving is indisputably broadened by the inclusion in § 11-114 of the words operate, move, or be in actual physical control, the statute nonetheless relates to driving while intoxicated. Statutory language, whether plain or not, must be read in its context.... In this instance, the context is the legislature's desire to prevent intoxicated individuals from posing a serious public risk with their vehicles. We do not believe the legislature meant to forbid those intoxicated individuals who emerge from a tavern at closing time on a cold winter night from merely entering their vehicles to seek shelter while they sleep off the effects of alcohol. As long as such individuals do not act to endanger themselves or others, they do not present the hazard to which the drunk driving statute is directed. Thus, rather than assume that a hazard exists based solely upon the defendant's presence in the vehicle, we believe courts must assess potential danger based upon the circumstances of each case. Id. at 212-13, 627 A.2d at 1025-26 (internal citations omitted)(emphasis in original). In reaching our holding in Atkinson, we set forth six factors which must always be taken into account when assessing the potential danger presented by the various circumstances of each case: 1) whether or not the vehicle's engine is running, or the ignition on; 2) where and in what position the person is found in the vehicle; 3) whether the person is awake or asleep; 4) where the vehicle's ignition key is located; 5) whether the vehicle's headlights are on; 6) whether the vehicle is located in the roadway or is legally parked. Id. at 216, 627 A.2d at 1027. No one factor will be dispositive of whether an individual was in actual physical control of the vehicle. Id. at 216, 627 A.2d at 1028. Thus, we review the ALJ's decision in light of the six factors for assessing whether an individual was in actual physical control as annunciated in Atkinson. The record before the ALJ demonstrated that at the time Officer Mondini arrived on the scene, Atterbeary was not simply passively sitting in his car sleeping off his intoxication outside of a tavern. It is undisputed that upon the officer's arrival, respondent was awake and seated in his parked car on Automotive Boulevard outside of a car dealership with the engine running. Officer Mondini acknowledged that the car had power windows and that he had been informed by the fire and rescue personnel that they had asked Atterbeary to open the window. The record does not indicate whether the engine of Atterbeary's vehicle was running when fire and rescue responded to the scene, nor did Atterbeary state whether he had only started the ignition at the request of the fire and rescue personnel for the sole purpose of lowering his window. The circumstances of the present case are also distinguishable from the hypothetical scenarios posed in Atkinson where an individual leaves a tavern intoxicated and proceeds to sleep off the intoxication in a legally parked car in the parking lot of the drinking establishment. See Atkinson, 331 Md. at 212, 627 A.2d at 1025-26. Rather, we must consider what the evidence showed [Atterbeary] was doing or had done, and whether these actions posed an imminent threat to the public. See id. at 216-17, 627 A.2d at 1028. In the present case, because Atterbeary was sitting in the driver's seat, awake, and with the engine running, he was capable of attempting to drive his vehicle at the time the officers arrived at Automotive Boulevard. Atterbeary was not taking shelter passively in his car while sleeping off the effects of his inebriation. To the contrary, the facts of this case provide strong indicia that Atterbeary posed an imminent threat to public safety. We conclude, therefore, that the record provided a sufficient basis for the ALJ to determine that Officer Mondini had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Atterbeary had been in actual physical control of the vehicle upon his arrival at the scene as used in the statutory definition of the term to drive, thereby triggering the implied consent testing provision of Section 16-205.1(a)(2). See Gore v. State, 74 Md.App. 143, 149, 536 A.2d 735, 738 (1988)(holding that appellant was driving where the evidence showed that although the driver was not moving the vehicle at the time of the officer's arrival, the car key was in the ignition in the `on' position, with the alternator/battery light lit; that the gear selector was in the drive position; and that the engine was warm to the touch). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the Circuit Court for Howard County. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.