Opinion ID: 2500056
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Lack of Compliance With W.R.Cr.P. 32

Text: [¶ 16] W.R.Cr.P. 32 provides in relevant part as follows: Rule 32. Judgment and sentence. .... (c) Sentence.  .... (2) Contents.A written sentence shall be signed by the judge and entered by the clerk of court without delay. The sentence may be included in the judgment or separately entered .... as a minimum the sentence shall: .... (D) If probation is not granted, state whether probation was considered by the court[.] [¶ 17] Considering this rule in Trumbull, ¶ 16, 214 P.3d at 982, this Court said: [T]he district court's handling of the issue of probation at sentencing involves a fundamental right, and we consider it too important to be decided on the basis of treating the district court's absolute silence as a tacit consideration of probation. In the face of the matter having been broached to the trial court, an implied, but not actually expressed rejection of probation simply does not suffice. The rule we adopt today requires that the district court meaningfully adhere to the requirement that probation be considered as an alternative sentence in accordance with the governing rule and our many precedents on that subject (excepting cases punishable by death, life without parole, or a life sentence). Failure to express that plainly in the written sentence will result in reversal of the sentence. Relying on this holding, Ms. Clark asserts she is entitled to a reversal of her sentence because the district court did not express in the written sentence that it considered probation. [¶ 18] In Trumbull, the primary issue before the district court at sentencing was whether it would place the defendant on probation as recommended in the PSI. The district court, however, imposed a term of imprisonment without ever mentioning the word probation at any point in the proceedings or in the written judgment and sentence. Under those circumstances, we concluded the sentence must be reversed and the case remanded for reconsideration of the sentence. In reaching that result, the Court held that the failure to state in the written sentence that probation was considered would result in reversal. [¶ 19] In contrast to Trumbull where the district court never mentioned probation during the sentencing hearing or in its written sentence, the district court in Ms. Clark's case clearly did consider probation during the sentencing hearing. After listening to defense counsel's arguments as to why any sentence imposed should be suspended in favor of probation in order to allow Ms. Clark to continue treatment, the district court stated: Ms. Clark, there are twoas I'm required to do, as I always do, I consider probation. Thethere are a number of things I must consider. One is about how you're doing in rehabilitation and how you're going to come about and how things are going to work out for youwhat is the best course for you. Secondly, I also have to think about the safety of the community. And of course punishment. And ... from what I read and ... from what I'm hearing, and from what [defense counsel] has told me, I'm convinced that you have some issues with emotional stability, and so forth. I'm also struck by the seriousness of what happened here. You at the time were in your mid 30s, and you were having sex with some kid. It's something that can't happen. It's wrong. It's ... completely criminal behavior. And especially when you were in a position of authority over this child at the time. .... I think thatbecause of what I'm hearing, I think that there is probably some component here that may mitigate this a little bit in the sense of your emotional well-being, but, nevertheless, I have to treat this case seriously, and it has to be treated in a way that is commensurate also with the crime. So I'm going to sentence you to prison.... There is no question the district court in this case considered probation during the sentencing hearing. It seems clear the district court's failure to state in the written sentence that it had considered probation was inadvertent. Given that the district court clearly did consider probation before imposing a prison sentence, we decline to order a new sentencing hearing as we did in Trumbull; instead, we remand to the district court with directions to enter an amended sentence reflecting that it considered probation in accordance with W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(2)(D). [¶ 20] We affirm Ms. Clark's conviction and sentence and remand to the district court for entry of an amended sentence in accordance with this opinion.