Opinion ID: 2538558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the psc's order was unlawful

Text: The PSC is a creature of statute and can function only in accordance with its enabling statutes. State ex rel. Monsanto Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 716 S.W.2d 791, 796 (Mo. banc 1986). Its powers are limited to those conferred by... statutes, either expressly, or by clear implication as necessary to carry out the powers specifically granted. Util. Consumers' Council of Missouri, Inc., 585 S.W.2d at 49; see also § 386.040 [4] (creating the PSC and vesting it with the powers and duties ... specified, and also all powers necessary or proper to enable it to carry out fully and effectually all the purposes of its governing statutes). If a power is not granted to the PSC by Missouri statute, then the PSC does not have that power. Though section 386.610 provides that statutes pertaining to the PSC shall be liberally construed with a view to the public welfare, this provision does not authorize the Court to vest the PSC with authority that the legislature has not granted it either expressly or by clear implication. Cf. Reichert v. Bd. of Educ. of City of St. Louis, 217 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Mo. banc 2007) ([T]he Court has no authority to read into a statute legislative intent contrary to the intent made evident by the plain language.). The powers and duties of the PSC are set forth principally in chapter 386. As pertains to natural gas, section 386.250 extends the PSC's jurisdiction [t]o the manufacture, sale or distribution of gas, natural and artificial ... within the state, and to persons or corporations owning leasing, operating or controlling the same; and to gas and electric plants, and to persons or corporations owning, leasing, operating or controlling the same. § 386.250(1) (emphasis added). As the Missouri legislature has recognized in section 386.030, those powers granted to the PSC by Missouri statute are limited by the doctrine of preemption as to matters affecting interstate commerce. [5] Congress has preempted regulation of interstate gas pipelines by providing authority for such regulation to the FERC pursuant to the Natural Gas Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 717; Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 300-01, 108 S.Ct. 1145. As noted earlier, all parties agree that MoGas is an interstate gas pipeline subject to regulation by the FERC. Therefore, the PSC has authority to act as to MoGas only (1) as it specifically is granted such authority by Missouri statute and (2) as permitted by FERC regulations and other federal law.
Though the PSC alleges that several provisions within both state and federal law can be interpreted to vest the PSC with authority to intervene in FERC proceedings, for the reasons detailed below, the PCS's arguments are unavailing.
First, the PSC cites section 386.210.1, [6] which states: The [PSC] may confer in person, or by correspondence, by attending conventions, or in any other way, with the members of the public, any public utility or similar commission of this and other states and the United States of America, or any official, agency or instrumentality thereof, on any matter relating to the performance of its duties. (emphases added). The PSC asserts that because section 386.210.1 authorizes the PSC to confer with other similar commissions, this means that it can intervene in matters before the FERC because: (1) the FERC is a commission of the United States that is similar to the PSC and (2) intervention in FERC proceedings is [an]other way by which the PSC may confer with the FERC. The PSC's argument depends entirely on interpreting the word confer to include intervention by the PSC as a party in a regulatory proceeding of another state or the federal government. The PSC cites no published case or other direct authority of any kind in support of this interpretation of the word confer. Indeed, it concedes that this is a matter of first impression and that were this Court to interpret the PSC's authority to confer with other commissions to include the power to intervene, it would be the first court to do so. The PSC nonetheless says that this Court should find intervention as a party in a federal regulatory proceeding is a form of conferring with that federal regulatory body because some other state public utility commissions also intervene with no more authority than this and, so, the PSC also should be permitted to do so. But the PSC admits that the authority of these other commissions to intervene has not been challenged, just as the authority of Missouri's PSC to do so was not challenged until the instant case, nor has the PSC cited any governing authority from other state commissions specifically interpreting the word confer to encompass intervention as a party in FERC proceedings. The PSC's power and authority proceeds from Missouri statutes. While a review of the reasoning of other states in permitting such intervention would have been informative had there been any such cases, there are none, and the unchallenged conduct of other state regulatory agencies provides no authority for the PSC to act beyond its statutory powers. This Court, therefore, turns to the words of the PSC's governing statutes, for it is this Court's duty to ascertain the intent of the Missouri legislature from the language it used in drafting section 386.210.1. See State ex rel. Nixon v. Karpierz, 105 S.W.3d 487, 489-90 (Mo. banc 2003). In considering whether the word confer as used in section 386.210.1 includes the right to intervene, the Court notes that the word is not defined in chapter 386. Accordingly, this Court begins with the well-established principle that [i]n the absence of a statutory definition, words will be given their plain and ordinary meaning as derived from the dictionary. State v. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d 437, 446 (Mo. banc 2009). The verb confer means to contribute, to compare, or to hold conversation or conference ... typically on important, difficult, or complex matters. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 475 (1993). None of these terms encompass or overlap the meaning of the term intervene, which means to become a party to an action or other legal proceeding begun by others for the protection of an alleged interest. Id. at 1183. Intervention is a legal term, however, so review of the meaning of confer and intervene in legal dictionaries might be expected to be more helpful. Black's Law Dictionary does not define the word confer but defines intervene as [t]he entry into a lawsuit by a third party who, despite not being named a party to the action, has a personal stake in the outcome. Id. at 897 (9th ed.2009). Other legal dictionaries draw a clear distinction between the terms confer and intervene. See, e.g., W. Statsky, West's Legal Thesaurus/Dictionary 168, 424 (1986) (defining confer as to consult and intervene as interfere or encroach). Synonyms of confer have been expressed variously as [c]ompare notes, discuss, deliberate, discourse, talk, talk over, consult, palaver, confide, parley, advise counsel, negotiate, West's Legal Thesaurus/Dictionary at 168, and as to advise, compare opinions, consult with, interchange views and talk over. W. Burton, Legal Thesaurus 98 (1980). The synonyms of intervene are become a party to an action, intercede and step in. Id. at 294. As is evident, the term confer does not include within its definition or its synonyms the word intervene or any similar concept, and visa versa. Moreover, section 386.210 itself indicates that it uses the term confer in the sense of communicate, for section 386.210.2 refers collectively to the various ways of conferring with the public or other commissions permitted in section 386.210.1 as communications. [7] Communication is the act or action of imparting or transmitting and the interchange of thoughts or opinions. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 460 (1993); see also Black's Law Dictionary 316 (9th ed.2009) (defining communication as an expression or exchange of information by speech, writing, gestures, or conduct). Nowhere in these definitions is there support for the PSC's view that in permitting the commission to confer or communicate with the FERC, section 386.210.1 expressly or by clear implication authorizes the PSC to intervene as a party in FERC proceedings. Intervening parties do more than communicate, converse, discuss, consult or engage in an interchange of opinions about pending proceedings. Rather, intervenors exercise control over litigation by engaging in oral arguments, presenting evidence and cross-examining witnesses. Matter of Additional Magistrates for St. Louis Cnty., 580 S.W.2d 288, 293-94 (Mo. banc 1979). Indeed, the PSC admits that the very reason it intervenes in FERC proceedings is to reap the benefits of being an intervening party. Parties who appear at oral argument or who file briefs are not conferring with the court. One who seeks to intervene before the FERC in order to file a brief or to engage in oral argument is not conferring with the FERC in any normal sense of the word. It is seeking affirmative relief; it is obtaining a stake in the controversy. If the PSC simply wishes to communicate its views to the FERC, it would do so not as a party, but as an interested body, in a role akin to amicus curiae. But the PSC wants to do more than this; it wishes the benefit of being a party because it believes this would be beneficial to Missouri consumers. To the extent this is true, the PSC should apply to the legislature for authority to intervene in FERC proceedings  and indeed, the parties indicate that it is in the course of seeking such express authority. Because confer carries none of the connotations of power and control associated with intervention, the right to confer with the FERC given the PSC by section 386.210.1, cannot reasonably be construed to include intervention. In the absence of such authority, section 386.210.1 can be read only to authorize the PSC to confer with commissions similar to the FERC by contributing its opinion for the purpose of assisting the [commissions] in cases of general public interest. 3B C.J.S. Amicus Curiae § 1 (2003). Just as an amicus is not made a party simply by virtue of the fact that it has information that may be useful to the proceedings, the PSC may not assume the role of an intervening party merely because the legislature has authorized it to confer with the FERC.
The PSC asserts that even if section 386.210.1 does not vest the commission with the right to intervene in FERC actions, such authorization can be found in its authority to engage in joint investigations with other public utility commissions under section 386.210.7, which provides, in pertinent part: The [PSC] may make joint investigations, hold joint hearings within or without the state, and issue joint or concurrent orders in conjunction or concurrence with any railroad, public utility or similar commission, of other states or the United States of America, or any official, agency or any instrumentality thereof.... The PSC's argument ignores the distinction between being a party to an action and being the adjudicator of that action. Implicit in the use of the word joint is that the PSC must be acting in concert with its counterpart commission in conducting these investigations or hearings. See Black's Law Dictionary 913 (9th ed.2009) (defining joint as combined, united, or sharing with another); W. Statsky, West's Legal Thesaurus/Dictionary 436 (1986) (defining joint as [s]hared by or between two or more and listing as synonyms the words collaborative, combined, concerted, common, acting in common, allied, united). When the PSC intervenes in a FERC proceeding, it does not intervene as a second judge, sitting with the FERC and ruling on matters presented by the parties. It intervenes as a party in the proceedings. As an intervenor, the PSC functions as an interested litigant rather than as a neutral adjudicator. A party and a judge do not jointly investigate or hold hearings, any more than a party appearing at oral argument in this Court is holding a hearing jointly with this Court. The party appears at a hearing and presents a case, which the court adjudicates. Similarly, while section 386.210.7 clearly authorizes the PSC to investigate matters or hold hearings jointly with the FERC or other regulatory agencies, the conduct at issue here was not the holding of a joint investigation or hearing but an attempt to become an additional party to a regulatory hearing before the FERC. Nothing in section 386.210.7 authorizes the PSC to assume such a role. [8]
In the absence of any other statutory provision granting the PSC power to intervene in matters before the FERC, the PSC suggests that the fact that it has the authority to sue and be sued in its official name, see § 386.120.4, and the fact that section 386.071 authorizes the PSC's general counsel to intervene in proceedings involving any question under chapter 386 if directed to do so by the commission [9] empowers the commission to intervene in FERC matters as well. The PSC's argument fails to acknowledge that it cannot direct its general counsel to engage in an activity the legislature has not authorized the PSC itself to undertake. Stated differently, the general counsel's authority under section 386.071 can extend no further than the PSC's own power. Section 386.071 expressly states that the PSC's general counsel may only prosecute in the name of the state when authorized by law. § 386.071 (emphasis added). Chapter 386 authorizes the PSC to bring actions concerning utilities subject to its jurisdiction, and its general counsel may intervene in actions involving questions related to that chapter. See, e.g., McBride & Son Builders, Inc. v. Union Elec. Co., 526 S.W.2d 310 (Mo.1975) (the PSC intervened in a suit because it had issued an order prohibiting a utility company from making certain payments plaintiff claimed it had a right to receive from defendant). Were chapter 386 to contain a provision authorizing the PSC to intervene in proceedings before the FERC, the PSC would be correct in asserting that section 386.071 then would permit the commission's general counsel to intervene on the PSC's behalf in that forum also. But, in merely specifying the authority of the PSC's general counsel, section 386.071 in no way expands the PSC's powers beyond those set forth in the remaining sections of chapter 386. As noted, no provision within chapter 386 vests the PSC with authority to intervene in FERC proceedings.