Opinion ID: 2130336
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: MRE 801(d)(2)(D)

Text: Under the common-law rules of evidence, as well as under the Uniform Rules of Evidence, the statement of a party's employee is admissible as a nonhearsay admission of the party only if the statement meets the usual test of agency, that is, it was made by the employee while acting in the scope of employment. Uniform Rules of Evidence, 13 ULA, Rule 801(d)(2)(iv), p 682. The Michigan Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Evidence have liberalized the traditional rule somewhat by providing that such a statement is to be treated as nonhearsay even if it merely concerns a matter within the scope of employment. However, at the same time, the liberalized rules have carefully retained the important qualification that the statement by an employee must have been made during the existence of the employment relationship. [18] This venerable qualification would be negated if we were to hold that subparagraph (b) stands as an independent exception to the hearsay rule. Until today, this Court has not been required to defend the principle embodied in that qualification. It is axiomatic that the hearsay rule is designed to assure that evidence considered by the trier of fact has been subjected, with limited exceptions, to the test of cross-examination at trial. The hearsay exceptions set forth in MRE 803 and 804 offer, at least theoretically, some independent bases of reliability to compensate for the fact that the declarant of a hearsay statement is not available to be cross-examined before the trier of fact. On the other hand, the statement made by a party-opponent, denominated nonhearsay, represents a rare exception in that it embodies no inherent assurance of trustworthiness. [19] McCormick, Evidence (3d ed), § 262, p 775. See also Strahorn, A reconsideration of the hearsay rule and admissions, 85 U Pa L R 484, 564 (1937), and Advisory Committee Note, FRE 801. The rationale for admitting a party-opponent statement, despite the hearsay rule, rests not upon any notion that the circumstances in which it was made furnish the trier means of evaluating it fairly, but upon the adversary theory of litigation. A party can hardly object that he had no opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of credence save when speaking under sanction of an oath. Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 266. To put it more colloquially, the admissibility of a party-opponent statement springs from a sense of fundamental fairness captured in the phrase, You said it; you're stuck with it. The hearsay rule operates to prevent a party from being stuck with what others have said without an opportunity to challenge them directly before the trier of fact. However, there is no reason, given the adversarial nature of our system, to extend the rule's protection to a party's own statements. In the more elegant words of nineteenth century jurisprudence: [T]he general rule is  and it has few exceptions  that a man's acts, conduct, and declarations, wherever made, provided they be voluntary, are admissible against him, as it is fair to presume they correspond with the truth; and it is his fault if they do not. Truby v Seybert, 12 Pa 101, 104 (1849). While this rationale explains why a party's own statements are admissible against him despite the hearsay rule, such an explanation is less satisfying when the statement is made by the party's agent or servant. Nevertheless, the rationale continues to apply, albeit with diminished force. In this area, as in other areas of the law, we hold persons responsible for their choice of an agent or employee, and consequently for words spoken and actions taken by those they have chosen, during the period of time they choose to maintain the relationship. Although justification for the party-opponent admission has been extended without undue discomfort to statements of agents and employees made during the existence of their relationship with the party, we believe the rationale would be stretched beyond the breaking point if, after the relationship is terminated, any subsequent statement made by a former employee were to be treated for evidentiary purposes as if it were the employer's own statement. To return to our colloquialism, the fundamental fairness of sticking an employer with an employee's statement is served only if the statement is made by one who is an employee at the time the statement is made. [20] The fairness problem is compounded by the fact that it is not unknown for an employee, after termination of the relationship, to be hostile to a former employer. [21] The instant case requires us to consider whether this analysis is significantly altered by the single fact that an ex-employee's statement is made via deposition.