Opinion ID: 549840
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Authority or Agency Relationship Aiding Harasser

Text: 46 In Hicks, the court identified section 219(2)(d) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958), as a possible basis for employer liability for hostile work environment sexual harassment. That section provides that a master may be liable for the acts of a servant acting outside the scope of delegated authority if the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he [or she] was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation. The district court held that: 47 Section 219(2)(d) properly imputes an employee's actions to the employer whose delegation of authority empowered the agent to undertake them. Here, Galvan did not purport to act on behalf of the institution by his inappropriate actions toward plaintiff. The only conceivable way Galvan was aided by the agency relationship in the accomplishment of the tort is that he would not have been there but for his job. This is too broad a reading of 219(2)(d). The second half of 219[ (2) ] (d) which reads or is aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation,[] must be read in [the] context of what immediately precedes it. 48 Dist.Ct.Op. at 19. We agree. 49 Plaintiff presented no evidence suggesting that, as a Captain at CNMCF, Galvan had any supervisory authority over plaintiff's position whatsoever. Indeed, it is clear from the record that plaintiff's supervisor was Dr. Schwartz. Although Galvan had authority over his subordinate security guards, there was no evidence indicating that Galvan ever invoked that authority in order to facilitate his harassment of plaintiff. 7 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's ruling that defendants are not liable for Galvan's harassment of plaintiff under section 219(2)(d).