Opinion ID: 2977642
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: supplemental arguments in pro se briefs

Text: Defendants themselves have filed a total of eleven pro se briefs in addition to the briefs filed by their lawyers. Most issues raised by defendants in these briefs echo claims already asserted by their attorneys in the opening briefs. Several claims that are not redundant are addressed below. Claims not addressed are entirely without merit.
Abrar claims that the district court had no jurisdiction over him because of an alleged Speedy 4 Some judges disagree with this reading of the law, see, e.g, United States v. Thompson, 515 F.3d 556, 569 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, J., dissenting), and United States v. Phinazee, 515 F.3d 511, 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, J., dissenting), and the Supreme Court arguably has not finally resolved the issue. 27 Trial Act violation. This argument was not raised before trial and is therefore waived on appeal. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2); United States v. White, 985 F.2d 271, 274-75 (6th Cir. 1993). Soon after beginning deliberations, the jury notified the court that several government exhibits had been mistakenly omitted from their materials. After a brief conference in camera with all the parties, the court decided to submit the missing materials without objection. Abrar challenges this sequence of events on three grounds. First, Abrar claims that he was improperly excluded from the in camera conference. Abrar’s counsel did not object to his absence and his presence was not required under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b)(3) (defendant’s presence not required for conferences or hearings on points of law). Second, Abrar claims that supplemental instructions to the jury were required on providing the missing exhibits. There is no authority for this proposition. And third, Abrar argues that the transcript from the in camera conference is incomplete because it refers to actions which took place off the record in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 753. Specifically, at the start of the transcribed proceedings, the court noted that the parties have retrieved the missing exhibits for review. That the decision to get a copy of the exhibits for the purposes of the in camera conference was not recorded verbatim in the record is of no consequence and Abrar cites nothing to suggest otherwise. Abrar disputes his money laundering conviction on the ground that the district court omitted the name of one of the alleged co-conspirators, Omar Abedrabbo, in reciting the count to the jury. Abrar suggests that the omission was deliberate, but presents no evidence to this effect and fails to explain why the omission was relevant. Because there was no objection on this point below, plain error review applies and nothing in the record suggests that this error was “likely produce a grave miscarriage of justice.” Combs, 33 F.3d at 669. 28 The government presented evidence that all conversations between Abrar and Abdelqader were surreptitiously recorded with Abdelqader’s consent. On one or two occasions, though, there was an equipment malfunction and conversations were not recorded as result. Abrar alleges that these malfunctions were orchestrated by the government to withhold exculpatory conversations. There is nothing in the record to corroborate these claims and counsel did not raise any objections to the malfunctions at trial. In response to Abrar’s counsel following the court’s order to stop playing a recorded conversation between Abdelqader and his estranged wife which had become inaudible, supra, the district court took judicial notice of the fact that Abdelqader was having marital problems. The court later forgot to instruct the jury on this point, without comment or objection by Abrar or his counsel. This omission was clearly not a sufficiently “grave miscarriage of justice” to justify reversal. Id.
At one point during the trial, the government attempted to show that certain unsigned tax documents had been prepared by defendants by reference to a “digital fingerprint” which indicated that the documents had been prepared with software in use at the firm. Rashid challenges this practice and cites various cases on reasonable doubt. His precise argument is difficult to follow, but it seems to suggest that this evidence was insufficient to prove guilt and/or that it was improperly admitted. Standing alone, this evidence would be insufficient to convict Rashid. For reasons already stated, however, the evidence presented at trial, taken as a whole, was sufficient to convict him. Claims about relevance are similarly unavailing. Evidence about the presence of a mark on these documents indicating that they had been prepared using software in the possession of defendants is 29 certainly relevant and admissible under the rules of evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403.