Opinion ID: 619929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Attempted Possession Counts

Text: One week before oral argument in this case, the government informed us in a letter that it had discovered a legal error in the superseding indictment that was tried to the jury: Count 3, against Dritan and Shain Duka, [19] and Count 4, against Mohamad Shnewer, each charged a non-existent crime, namely, attempted possession of firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). [20] The government explained that, because § 924(c) does not contain an explicit attempt provision and there is no general federal attempt statute, attempted possession of firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) is not a legally cognizable crime. The government also has informed us that it will not defend Shnewer's Count 4 conviction, as the indictment and verdict slip framed Count 4 solely as an attempt offense. Accordingly, we will vacate Shnewer's conviction and sentence for Count 4 and remand so that the District Court can dismiss Count 4 and remove (or refund) the associated $100 special assessment. At the same time, the government urges us to affirm the convictions of Dritan and Shain Duka on Count 3. That count differs from Count 4 because the indictment charged possession or attempted possession of seven specific firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence under § 924(c)(1)(A), and therefore contained both valid and invalid theories of liability. The government argues that any charging error on that count was not plain and, in all events, was harmless under Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 129 S.Ct. 530, 172 L.Ed.2d 388 (2008) (per curiam), because its theory against Dritan and Shain on Count 3 at trial was that they actually possessed the seven specified firearms and the evidence established beyond any doubt that Dritan and Shain actually possessed those guns. [21] Dritan and Shain argue that we must vacate their convictions on Count 4 because the jury may have relied on the invalid attempt theory. We first consider what standard applies to our review of this issue. The Supreme Court made clear in Pulido that questions involving juries that are instructed on multiple theories of liability, one of which is improper, are trial errors subject to harmless-error review. [22] 555 U.S. at 60-61, 129 S.Ct. 530. Dritan and Shain argue that their convictions on Count 4 were not harmless because it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted them absent the attempt theory. See United States v. Saybolt, 577 F.3d 195, 206 (3d Cir.2009) (An error is harmless when it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The government argues that, because Dritan and Shain failed to raise this issue in the District Court, the more stringent plain-error standard applies. We agree. Defense counsel certainly should have brought to the District Court's attention the fact that the indictment charged their clients with a non-existent crime. Moreover, as a legal matter, Pulido holds that alternative-theory errors are trial errors, not structural errors. 555 U.S. at 60-61, 129 S.Ct. 530. Accordingly, they are not subject to the structural error exception to the plain-error rule. See United States v. Marcus, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 2164-65, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010). Where, as here, an issue was not raised in the district court, we are not aware of any other basis for avoiding Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)'s plain-error rule. Review for plain error proceeds in four steps, with the burden placed on defendants. We must determine whether Dritan and Shain have demonstrated that: (1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant's substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 2164 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The government has conceded an error that is clearthe first two prongs of the analysisby admitting that the indictment charged Dritan and Shain with an attempt crime that does not exist. This point appears to be well taken, as several statements from other courts support the proposition that an attempt to violate § 924(c)(1)(A) is not a legally cognizable offense. See, e.g., United States v. Douglas, 525 F.3d 225, 251 (2d Cir.2008) (because there is no general federal attempt statute, an attempt to commit criminal conduct `is ... actionable only where ... a specific criminal statute makes impermissible its attempted as well as actual violation ' (second omission and emphasis in original)); United States v. Anderson, 89 F.3d 1306, 1314 (6th Cir. 1996) (§ 924(c), among other things, makes it a crime to use or carry a firearm during a drug trafficking offense; it does not specifically criminalize an attempt to use or carry a firearm during such an offense. (citations omitted)). See generally United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 185 (3d Cir.1973) (Federal criminal law is purely statutory; there is no federal common law of crimes.). Thus, we turn to the third prong, whether the error affected Dritan and Shain's substantial rights, i.e., whether it affected the outcome of the district court's proceedings. Marcus, 130 S.Ct. at 2164 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We agree with the government that it did not because the evidence at trial clearly established Dritan and Shain Duka's actual, as opposed to attempted, possession of the firearms at issue in Count 3. In contrast with the allegations in Count 4 that Shnewer only attempt[ed] to possess an unspecified AK-47 machinegun and/or semiautomatic assault weapon,, Count 3 of the superseding indictment charged Dritan and Shain Duka with possess[ing] or attempt[ing] to possess seven particular firearms, each identified by make, model, and serial number. The government entered each of the specified firearms into evidence, along with testimony from a law enforcement officer that he placed those weapons in the apartment of confidential informant Mahmoud Omar on the evening of May 7, 2007. (Joint App. 233-34.) Omar's eyewitness testimony, and audio and video recordings from FBI surveillance equipment installed in Omar's apartment, established that, on May 7, 2007, Dritan and Shain Duka came to Omar's apartment, handed over $1,400 in cash to Omar, and took possession of the seven weapons. Federal and state law enforcement agents arrested Dritan and Shain inside Omar's apartment that evening as they prepared to take the guns out to their car. (Joint App. 238.) The government's sole argument to the jury on Count 3 against Dritan and Shain was that the May 7th recording provided overwhelming evidence that they actually possessed the relevant firearms. [23] (Joint App. 1282.) We acknowledge that the jury instructions did not clearly distinguish between the attempt and actual possession theories of liability ( see Joint App. 1250-51) and the verdict slip allowed the jury to convict Dritan and Shain on Count 3 if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that they possessed or attempted to possess firearms in furtherance of the conspiracy and attempt offenses charged in Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment. But we conclude in light of the evidence and the way the government argued the case to the jury that there is no reasonable possibility that the jury convicted Dritan and Shain of the unlawful attempt, as opposed to the proper actual possession, offense. Dritan's and Shain's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. They rely on other evidence concerning their attempts to acquire weapons before the May 2007 transaction and the prosecution's comments on that evidence during its summation. But that evidence does not speak to the seven specific weapons identified in Count 3 of the indictment, and the prosecution only used it to bolster its argument that defendants were serious about attacking the military. The evidence concerning the Dukas' previous attempts to obtain firearms does not negate the extensive, direct evidence of the May 7th transaction or the fact that the prosecution clearly focused on Dritan's and Shain's actual possession of weapons on May 7th as its sole theory of liability against them on Count 3.