Opinion ID: 1841302
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Duration Provision

Text: ¶ 73. Upholding the constitutionality of the statute does not automatically validate every compact term negotiated by a governor under the statute. ¶ 74. Before the 2003 amendments, the FCP Gaming Compact provided that the state or the FCP Tribe could serve a written notice of nonrenewal on the other party, so long as it did so at least 180 days before the existing term expired. If the requisite notice of nonrenewal were provided, the FCP Gaming Compact would expire at the end of that five-year term. Conversely, if no notice were given, the compact would automatically renew for another five years, with the parties capable of negotiating amendments. ¶ 75. The 2003 amendments repeal these provisions. Under the terms of the 2003 amendments, the state gives up the right to periodically withdraw from the FCP Gaming Compact. [25] In fact, if the new duration provision is found in some manner to be unenforceable or invalid  that is, if the state is legally able to repudiate the substance of the new duration provision  the state could become obligated to pay the tribe millions of dollars. [26] Because the state would pay a heavy financial price if it were able to lawfully and unilaterally repudiate the duration provision, the refund provision of the 2003 amendments resembles a sort of poison pill, akin to what one might encounter in the world of corporate takeovers. [27] If the duration provision were somehow voidable, the financial penalty attending success in voiding it provides a serious barrier to pursuing that remedy. ¶ 76. The petitioners suggest that the Governor has irrevocably bound future legislatures and future governors, and as a result, has intruded upon the core powers of one branch and surrendered the core powers of the other to make or initiate policy, violating separation of powers principles. They assert that the Governor exercised power that he is constitutionally forbidden to exercise, even if the legislature intended to give him such power. According to the petitioners, the Governor has neither inherent nor delegated authority to agree to compact terms that place matters of public policy and statecraft outside of the legislature's ability to influence. ¶ 77. The Governor, however, asserts that giving up the periodic right to unilaterally withdraw from the FCP Gaming Compact does not offend the principles of separation of powers. The Governor relies on § 14.035 to support his position that the legislature intended him to exercise full discretion with respect to any Indian gaming compact negotiated under IGRA, and therefore also intended that he be given free rein to agree to compacts of whatever duration he deems reasonable. Moreover, the Governor points to similar agreements that demonstrate, as a general matter, that terms such as he negotiated in 2003 are not inherently unreasonable. For instance, the Governor directs our attention to interstate compacts as well as state-tribal gaming compacts from other states, both of which yield examples of states binding themselves to compacts of indefinite duration without any unilateral right to withdraw. ¶ 78. We agree with the petitioners that the Governor did not have the authority to commit the state to the type of duration term set forth in the 2003 amendments. However, we do not fully subscribe to the petitioners' rationale. The concern is not principally with the nature of the power given up. [28] The concern is that the Governor unexpectedly gave away power delegated to him so that the legislature cannot take it back. This action circumvents the procedural safeguards that insure that delegated power may be curtailed or reclaimed by future legislative action. ¶ 79. Under Wisconsin's contemporary nondelegation doctrine, the nature of the power delegated to another branch is not the primary focus of judicial review. The presence of adequate procedural safeguards is the paramount consideration. [29] If the Governor's action with respect to the duration term were allowed to stand, all the procedural safeguards that might possibly rein in the Governor's authority would be ineffective. The legislature would be powerless to alter the course of the state's position on Indian gaming by repealing or amending § 14.035. [30] The electorate might be able to voice its displeasure, and the Governor might in theory pay a heavy political price, but the voters would be powerless to elect a governor who could impact the terms that had already been agreed to. ¶ 80. The Governor responds that other states have agreed to compacts with indefinite terms in which states have given up the right to unilaterally withdraw. The parties have stipulated that Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota, and Mississippi all have such provisions. However, without appellate decisions from these states approving of the process by which these terms were reached, we are unable to speculate as to whether these indefinite compacts comport with the law of their respective jurisdictions, much less Wisconsin. Simply stated, without more information, it is impossible to conclude that the processes by which these compacts were agreed to would withstand scrutiny in this state. ¶ 81. The Governor also compares compacts under IGRA to interstate compacts, many of which have binding terms of indefinite duration. Indeed, [a]n interstate compact is an exception to the rule that one legislature may not restrict its successors. Jill Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of Permanency, 49 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1997). However appropriate or inappropriate it is to import the principles of interstate compacts into the tribal gaming compact area, [31] the fact that a state may, under the federal constitution, bind itself to another state as a matter of federal law, [32] does not mean that a governor may bind the state to a gaming compact with an Indian tribe indefinitely and without notice to or approval by the legislature. Further, while the Governor notes that Wisconsin itself is a signatory to an interstate compact of indefinite duration, the Midwest Interstate Low-level Radiation Waste Compact, we understand that the legislature ratified this compact. Wis. Stat. § 16.10; see also § 14.76 (authorizing state agencies to agree to compacts not affecting the sovereignty of the United States, but subjecting such agreements to a legislative approval requirement before the agreements become effective); 5 Wisconsin Statutes: Appendix 6123 (2001-02) (listing active Interstate Compacts to which Wisconsin is a party, all of which have been ratified by the legislature). ¶ 82. We conclude that the legislature has not delegated to the Governor the authority to agree to a duration provision that circumvents the procedural safeguards that sustain the legislature's ability to delegate that power in the first place. We think it is extremely unlikely that, in the factual and legal atmosphere in which § 14.035 was enacted, the legislature intended to make a delegation that could terminate its ability to make law in an important subject area. See ¶¶ 19-20, supra. [33] If such a far-reaching delegation were in fact intended, the delegation would be unconstitutional. The power to enter into tribal-state compacts under IGRA is legislative, and the Governor has no inherent authority to agree to bind the state. Without inherent authority, and in the absence of legislative delegation, the Governor was without authority to agree to the duration provision under the 2003 amendments.