Opinion ID: 1232858
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Matter of Compensability

Text: Apparently counsel for the state and counsel for the owners would like us to discuss and decide whether damage resulting from being placed on a frontage road, with loss of direct access to a main highway, is a compensable item in eminent domain. The Highway Commission would like us to embrace and adopt for this state the rule of State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Danfelser, 72 N.M. 361, 384 P.2d 241, 246, cert den 375 U.S. 969, 84 S.Ct. 487, 11 L.Ed.2d 416, to the effect that an abutting property owner's right of access is only to the system of public highways, but not necessarily directly to the main traveled portion thereof; and that an abutter having access to a frontage road which provides reasonable access to the main traveled highway is afforded access to the public road system, and any circuity of travel, once that access is given, is noncompensable. See also State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Mauney, 76 N.M. 36, 411 P.2d 1009. Counsel for the property owners, on the other hand, argue access to a highway is a property right which cannot be taken away without compensation. They would like for us to embrace and adopt the rule of People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799, 804, to the effect that property owners possess the right to direct access to the through highway; and that while damages are not predicated upon diversion of traffic from the highway, it is proper to allow damages to be based on diversion of the highway from direct access to property of the owners. If the state, in the instant case, had requested the trial court to instruct the jury on damages according to the Danfelser case, and if the court had declined to do so, it is conceivable that we would then have been called upon to decide whether the New Mexico rule is or is not correct. Or, if the court, over objections of the state, had instructed according to the Ricciardi case, we might have been called upon to say whether the California rule is or is not correct. We do not ordinarily consider it wise to pass upon matters not presented to or decided by the trial court. See 5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error § 545, p. 29; and Buckman v. United Mine Workers of America, 80 Wyo. 199, 200, 339 P.2d 398, 402, reh den 342 P.2d 236. As we have already indicated, in the case before us no error is claimed relative to the trial court's handling of the question of damages, and nothing is therefore presented for our decision on that subject. Indeed, appellant has no reason to complain or ask for relief in this case, because the court instructed the jury that the abutting landowner has a right of access to the public roads system; but that it does not necessarily follow that he has a right of direct access to the main-traveled portions thereof. The court then said, as appellant now argues:    Circuity of travel, as long as it is not unreasonable and so long as it is reasonably convenient, and any supposed loss in land value by reason of diversion of express traffic, are non-compensable. As we have already pointed out, we cannot assume the jury disregarded this instruction, especially since there was evidence before the jury from which it could believe the substituted access in this instance was not reasonably convenient. We cannot say the jury was biased or prejudiced, or that it disregarded the instructions of the court.