Opinion ID: 2341531
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Points IV and XI

Text: Appellant's arguments on this issue challenge Finding No. 17 and the trial court's application of Essex Storage Electric Co., Inc. v. Victory Lumber Company, 93 Vt. 437, 108 A. 426 (1919) in its Conclusion of Law. Finding No. 17 states: As indicated in Finding No. 8, supra, we are not of the view that there was any business at the time of taking on the premises which were partially taken. Similarly, Finding No. 8, not excepted to, reads: At no time since 1930 and a fortiori at no time since plaintiff acquired title in 1954, has any business been conducted on the 12 acre parcel from which the area of taken came and on which the Baronial Quarry was located. Based primarily but not exclusively upon the fact the Baronial Quarry was not used for 36 years and had filled with water, that there was no existing market demand for the Baronial marble, and that the quarry did not enter into the business operations of the company, there appears to be ample evidentiary basis for Finding No. 17. The appellant claims because there was undisputed evidence of a proven, workable reserve of marble in the quarry that this reserve was a part of the common enterprise of Green Mountain. In Essex Storage Electric Co., Inc. v. Victory Lumber Company, supra, 93 Vt. at 446, 108 A. at 429, we held: Where two or more pieces of real estate, though separated even by an intervening fee, are used as one enterprise, and constitute fairly necessary and mutually dependent elements thereof, they are in the eye of the law a single parcel, and the taking of one necessitates payment for the injury to the others. The appellant seeks to show the Baronial quarry bears the same relationship to the Green Mountain operation as did the uncut timber in the Essex case. The burden of proof on the question of the use of the lands as a factual issue was also discussed in the Essex Storage Electric Co., Inc., supra, 93 Vt. at 447, 108 A. at 429, where it is stated: We agree with the contention that the question whether these lands were used as one project is one of fact, and that, being prima facie separate parcels, the burden lies on the defendant to establish its claim in this behalf. Thus, the appellant had the burden under Essex, supra, to show as a matter of fact the lands were used as one project, before it could take advantage of the damage formula set forth in Essex. It clearly appears that appellant failed to carry this factual burden.