Opinion ID: 682237
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sentencing as a career criminal

Text: 16 Lastly, Dia argues that the district court erred in sentencing him as a career criminal under the Sentencing Guidelines, Secs. 4B1.1, 4B1.2 (1992), arguing that he did not have two prior violent felony convictions within the meaning of the Guidelines. This contention is well-taken. 17 We review de novo a district court ruling that a prior conviction is a violent felony within the meaning of U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B.1. United States v. Robinson, 967 F.2d 287, 293 (9th Cir.1992). Dia had two prior felony convictions, a 1978 assault on a federal officer and a 1986 conviction for sexual conduct with a minor. He concedes that the 1978 crime was a crime of violence within the meaning of the Guidelines, but argues that 1986 conviction did not have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person as required by the Guidelines. As he argues, the Arizona statute under which he pled guilty does not denounce conduct that is inherently violent, nor does it have violence as one of its elements. See Rev.Ariz.Stat. Sec. 13-1405(A) (1986). The conduct the statute proscribes--sexual intercourse or oral sexual conduct with a person under eighteen--does not necessarily present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.2, comment n. 2. 18 The district court nonetheless found that Dia had committed a crime of violence in light of testimony that Dia's conduct in the 1986 case was violent and presented a serious potential risk of physical injury. This was error. Under the law of this Circuit, a sentencing courts may not look to the underlying facts or circumstance of the prior offense in determining that the prior offense is an act of violence within the meaning of the career offender provision of the Guidelines. See United States v. Lonczak, 993 F.2d 180, 181-83 (9th Cir.1993); United States v. Sahakian, 965 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir.1992); United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1005-1009 (1988). Under Sec. 4B1.2(1), the court must look to the offense of conviction. No evidence in the record suggests that Dia's 1986 offense of conviction involved violence or that the count to which he pled guilty set forth (i.e. expressly charged) conduct which by its nature presents a serious potential risk of physical injury. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4B1.2, comment (n. 2). 19 Thus, while the district court's belief that Dia ought to be sentenced as a career offender is understandable--given the evidence in the record that Dia committed rapes in 1976, 1985, and 1986--under the Guidelines, the district court must look only to the offense of conviction. Because, for whatever reasons, Dia was convicted only of sex with a minor, he must be sentenced on that basis unless, on remand, the government shows that he was convicted of conduct meeting the requirements of Sec. 4B1.1. Cf. Lonczak, 993 F.2d at 182 (noting that we were not presented with the indictment). 20 Dia's conviction is AFFIRMED; his sentence is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for resentencing in accordance with this decision.