Opinion ID: 169420
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Abuse of a Position of Private Trust

Text: 94 Lastly, the district court appropriately enhanced Defendant's sentence two levels under § 3B1.3 for abusing his position as MetroBank CEO. The district court stated that Defendant's position rendered application of the enhancement almost self-proving and that the evidence clearly illustrated Defendant's coercive manner and deceptive actions. (App. at 2139.) Moreover, the district court correctly noted that every single count involved an abuse of private trust. D. Unreasonableness 95 Defendant argues that his sentence was patently unreasonable in part because of rhetorically charged statements made by the district court. (Appellant's Br. at 59.) He argues that these statements ignore the fact that MetroBank was not harmed financially and, therefore, that his sentence was wrongly calculated. In making this argument, Defendant reiterates his argument above related to the 12-level enhancement. As detailed above, we are not persuaded by that argument. In addition, it is clear from the sentencing transcript that the district court articulated well-grounded reasons under its § 3553 analysis. 96 Defendant also contends that the district court impermissibly departed upward by eighteen months without providing presentence notice of its intention to do so. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h) states: 97 Before the court may depart from the applicable sentencing range on a ground not identified for departure either in the presentence report or in a party's prehearing submission, the court must give the parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a departure. The notice must specify any ground on which the court is contemplating a departure. 98 When, as here, a district court enhances the recommended Guidelines range under the § 3553(a) factors, the increase . . . is called a `variance.' United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d 1099, 1101 n. 1 (10th Cir.2007). After United States v. Atencio, Rule 32(h) applies to both variances and departures. Therefore, district courts must give advance notice of their intent to sentence above or below the identified advisory Guidelines range. Id. at 1104. 99 On the first day of Defendant's sentencing, the district court acknowledged that, because it had not given notice of its intent to depart, that was not even an option. (App. at 2165.) It then stated simply that it would issue a Guidelines sentence or an outside-the-Guidelines sentence. This is plainly insufficient under Rule 32(h). See Atencio, 476 F.3d at 1104 (Rule 32(h) . . . leave[s] no doubt that the defendant has a right to know in advance the very ground upon which the district court might upwardly depart or vary.); see also United States v. Calzada-Maravillas, 443 F.3d 1301, 1304 (10th Cir.2006) (The notice requirement is not burdensome — its key component is that the parties have notice in advance of the sentencing hearing.). Before resentencing, the district court must provide the requisite detailed notice if it intends to vary from the recommended Guidelines sentence. 100 Even though Defendant was sentenced prior to Atencio, the notice requirement still applies. What does not apply, per Atencio, is the requirement that Defendant object to the lack of notice during sentencing in order to preserve the issue for appeal. Atencio, 476 F.3d at 1105 n. 6 (overruling United States v. Bartsma, 198 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir.1999), but applying objection requirement prospectively). E. Restitution 101 The district court ordered Defendant to pay $80,000: $40,000 each to Mike Campbell and Jon Reisig for defrauding them in connection with the Reisig real estate loan. Defendant asserts that the award should be cut in half or eliminated entirely because both buyer and seller received exactly what they expected. The district court, however, stated that Defendant manipulated the parties in a classic dishonest broker situation in order to carve out $40,000 for himself and co-defendant Solomon. (App. at 2214.) Defendant stripped Mr. Campbell of what he could have gotten absent the deceit, while Defendant led Mr. Reisig to overpay by $40,000 from the moment the sale was proposed. Given that Defendant victimized both parties to the sale, we find the district court's restitution award entirely appropriate.