Opinion ID: 1058560
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Application of the Holding in Jones v. Garrett

Text: We have held that the amended version of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) (Supp.2003) does not apply retroactively to this case. Thus, the former version of section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) (2001) may be applicable in this matter. The next issue is whether Jones v. Garrett, 92 S.W.3d 835 (Tenn.2002), governs the applicability of section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) to the facts of this case. Jones held that the grounds for terminating parental rights under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)[9](A) (1996 & Supp.1999) do not apply to persons who are legal parents at the time of the termination proceeding. Id. at 839. In Jones , an unwed mother wanted her child to be placed for adoption, and the father did not. Id. at 836-37. The father's parental rights were terminated under the statutory provisions applying only to individuals who had not established legal parentage, see id. at 837, which at the time of the Jones opinion, specifically stated: The parental rights of any person who is not the legal parent or guardian of a child or who is described in § 36-1-117(b) or (c) may also be terminated based upon any one (1) or more of the following additional grounds: (i) The person has failed, without good cause or excuse, to pay a reasonable share of prenatal, natal, and postnatal expenses involving the birth of the child in accordance with the person's financial means promptly upon the person's receipt of notice of the child's impending birth; (ii) The person has failed, without good cause or excuse, to make reasonable and consistent payments for the support of the child in accordance with the child support guidelines promulgated by the department pursuant to § 36-5-101; (iii) The person has failed to seek reasonable visitation with the child, and if visitation has been granted, has failed to visit altogether, or has engaged in only token visitation, as defined in § 36-1-102(1)(C); (iv) The person has failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child; (v) Placing custody of the child in the person's legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child; or (vi) The person has failed to file a petition to establish paternity of the child within thirty (30) days after notice of alleged paternity by the child's mother, or as required in § 36-2-318(j), or after making a claim of paternity pursuant to § 36-1-117(c)(3). Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(8)(A) (Supp.1999) (now codified as § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) (2001 & Supp.2003)). The trial court in Jones specifically terminated the father's parental rights based on his failure to establish legal paternity within thirty days of notice of the child's birth. 92 S.W.3d at 837. On appeal, this Court held that the additional grounds of termination for individuals who are not legal parents, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A), [9] apply only when no legal relationship between the parent and child has been established. Id. at 840. Because the father in Jones had established paternity prior to the hearing on the termination petition, this Court found that the additional grounds for terminating the parental rights of an individual who is not the legal parent or guardian of a child were inapplicable. Id. at 839-40. Mid-South contends that the holding in Jones is limited to the subsection concerning the thirty-day window for making a claim of paternity after notice of the birth of a child. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(vi) (2001 & Supp.2003). Consequently, subsection (iii), which allows termination of parental rights for the parent's failure to seek reasonable visitation, and subsection (iv), which allows a termination of parental rights because of the parent's failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the child, would remain valid grounds for termination against a legal parent who established parentage after the termination petition was filed. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(iii), (iv) (2001 & Supp.2003). Addressing Mid-South's claim that the holding in Jones is limited to section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A)(vi), we need only quote our holding in Jones : [t]he legislature's use of the present tense (`is not the legal parent') indicates that the grounds for terminating parental rights under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)([9])(A) do not apply to persons who are legal parents at the time of the proceeding. 92 S.W.3d at 839. Accordingly, we find Mid-South's argument unpersuasive, and we also find that Jones prevents the application of section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) to Cope because Cope established his paternity prior to the termination proceeding. [10]