Opinion ID: 2638704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Lawfulness of Inmate Monitoring and Recording Prior to De Lancie

Text: Prior to our 1982 De Lancie opinion, inmate monitoring and recording such as occurred below was lawful in California and the rest of the country. In addition to rejecting the claims that monitoring violated an inmate's justifiable expectation of privacy, California courts also rejected former section 2600 as a basis for insulating custodial conversations from oversight. We described the import of that statute: In this state we have long since abandoned the medieval concept of strict `civil death' and have replaced it with statutory provisions seeking to insure that the civil rights of those convicted of crime be limited only in accordance with legitimate penal objectives. The 1968 amendments ... which resulted in the enactment of section 2600 in its present form, represent the most recent legislative effort in this direction. ( In re Harrell (1970) 2 Cal.3d 675, 702, 87 Cal.Rptr. 504, 470 P.2d 640 ( Harrell ), italics added.) The Harrell standard allowed the secret recording of custodial conversations. In Estrada, supra, 93 Cal.App.3d 76, 155 Cal. Rptr. 731, the defendant's sister, and, on another occasion, his brother-in-law, visited him in jail. Jail officials monitored and taped the conversations. (Id. at pp. 86, 98, 155 Cal.Rptr. 731.) The Court of Appeal found this surveillance complied with Harrell. ( Estrada, at pp. 99-100, 155 Cal. Rptr. 731.) While the deprivation of a prisoner's rights or privileges requires penological objectives, the legitimacy of jailhouse monitoring of inmate conversations is based on precisely these objectives, and is in no way restricted to the maintenance of institutional security. Even assuming that in this case the security of the institution was not the interest of the officials in monitoring the instant conversations, a wide range of concerns remain to justify the imposition of certain restrictions upon the rights of prisoners. (Ibid.) Most apposite to the instant case is Owens, supra, 112 Cal.App.3d 441, 169 Cal. Rptr. 359. Police arrested Owens and another suspect, who offered conflicting statements. They were placed together in an interview room where they made inculpatory statements that were secretly recorded. (Id. at p. 444, 169 Cal.Rptr. 359.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the validity not only of the taping but also of what we later characterized as the public interest in detecting a suspect's fabrication. ( Donaldson v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 24, 33, 196 Cal.Rptr. 704, 672 P.2d 110, fn. 6 ( Donaldson ) (plur. opn. of Broussard, J.).) The monitoring system ... was used to overhear a discussion between two recently arrested felony suspects who had just made factually divergent statements in separate interviews. Thus, in addition to the compelling interest in maintaining jail security we must consider the public interest in acting on a well-founded suspicion that the detainees would take the opportunity to get their stories straight and that their conversation would touch on criminal activity. ( Owens, at p. 449, 169 Cal.Rptr. 359.) Therefore, prior to De Lancie, the prevailing law recognized as legitimate the interest in ferreting out and solving crimes. ( People v. Seaton (1983) 146 Cal. App.3d 67, 81, fn. 11, 194 Cal.Rptr. 33, citing Owens, supra, 112 Cal.App.3d at pp. 449-450, 169 Cal.Rptr. 359.) We thus observed that [p]rior to De Lancie, the fact that a particular conversation was monitored not for security purposes but to gather evidence did not argue against admissibility. ( Donaldson, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 33, 196 Cal.Rptr. 704, 672 P.2d 110, fn. omitted.) This principle conformed to federal law, which also found this motive legally insignificant. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals approved taping in a case where police placed two codefendants in a room in the hope that the two would discuss the crime and make some incriminating admissions. ( Williams v. Nelson (9th Cir.1972) 457 F.2d 376, 377 (Nelson) .) [4] Had the taping in this case occurred prior to De Lancie, there would have been no valid basis for objection.