Opinion ID: 454755
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiff's Constitutional Claim

Text: 21 In addition to finding liability by individual defendants, the district court awarded Bivens- type compensatory and punitive damages against the United States and the United States Air Force absent an express waiver--and despite the spirited assertion--of sovereign immunity. 568 F.Supp. at 1171. We reverse. 22 The district court viewed its order awarding damages directly against the United States as the natural and logical extension of Supreme Court precedent recognizing and extending liability for so-called constitutional torts. 568 F.Supp. at 1167. Relying upon both Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), and subsequent cases concerning the scope of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, 4 the district court held that[n]ot overlooking the fact that the Owens [sic] decision addressed the issue of a municipality being held liable in a Sec. 1983 action, the issue of a federal sovereign violating its own Constitution is indistinguishable. Accordingly, this Court finds that the federal government is not immune from an action brought against it as a result of its agents having violated the Fifth Amendment rights of a United States citizen.... We cannot help but recognize and enforce the natural and logical extension of Butz and Owens [sic], which leads us inescapably to conclude that just as state agencies and state officers are both liable for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, so also federal agencies and federal officers should be and are liable for constitutional violations under Bivens. 23 568 F.Supp. at 1167 (emphasis in original). 24 We cannot accept the district court's proposition that Bivens and Owen logically compel the United States to be held liable in damages for the constitutional torts of its officers. 5 It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 2965, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983). Admittedly, there is considerable appeal to the proposition that a remedy for a constitutional violation ought not to be defeated by the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. 6 We consider the issue foreclosed against plaintiff, however, by a long line of Supreme Court cases, see, e.g., Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 409, 413, 13 L.Ed. 185 (1850); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 196, 207, 1 S.Ct. 240, 249, 27 L.Ed. 171 (1882); Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388, 59 S.Ct. 516, 517, 83 L.Ed. 784 (1939); Mitchell, supra. The proposition is also contrary to the implication of our own decision in Holloman v. Watt, 708 F.2d 1399, 1401-02 (9th Cir.1983), where we held a Bivens remedy unavailable against federal officials being sued, not in their individual capacity for their individual actions, but simply because of the offices they hold. See also Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971, 980 (9th Cir.1984). It follows that the district court's award of compensatory and punitive damages against the United States and the United States Air Force must be reversed.
25 In awarding Bivens damages against individual defendants, the district court held that the failure of defendants fully to process Clemente's discrimination claims violated her right to due process as secured by the fifth amendment. Defendants contend that even if plaintiff's Bivens claims are not precluded by Title VII, 7 they must fail because (1) civil service administrative remedies provide the relief for an alleged deprivation of protected civil service statutes, and (2) plaintiff has not otherwise demonstrated a deprivation of liberty or property sufficient to implicate the due process clause. We agree with both of the defendants' contentions. 26 To the extent that the district court based its due process Bivens ruling on plaintiff's property interest in her GS-7 position, 568 F.Supp. at 1168, it is contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 2417, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983). There, the Court held that the comprehensive system established by Congress to remedy violations of constitutional rights in connection with federal employment and personnel policy was exclusive; it could not be augmented by non-statutory Bivens-type relief. Bush v. Lucas accordingly precludes Bivens relief based directly on injury to plaintiff's interest in her GS-7 position. 27 The district court purported, however, to find an independent property interest arising from the court's order to process plaintiff's complaint fully. See, e.g., 568 F.Supp. at 1164, 1168 and 1169. A mere command to follow certain procedures, however, does not create an underlying property interest, even when the command is derived from the Constitution. Such an interest must be created by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law--rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and support claims of entitlement to those benefits. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). The district court's order creates no such property interest. While violation of the order might constitute contempt, it does not give rise to a Bivens constitutional tort claim. 28 The district court also grounded its finding of a deprivation of due process in the Air Force's failure to follow its own regulations: 29 The Air Force established procedures for evaluating combined RIF appeals and discrimination complaints as well as complaints of reprisal and reemployment priority rights. See AFR 40-713.... Having once established these procedures, they must be followed or plaintiff's due process rights will be violated.... The Air Force, however, repeatedly failed to abide by these procedures.... 30 568 F.Supp. at 1168. 31 Notwithstanding this finding that the Air Force failed fully to follow its own regulations, such procedural requirements, without more, do not create constitutionally cognizable property interests. To hold otherwise would immediately incorporate virtually every regulation into the Constitution. 8 This court has repeatedly held that[p]rocedural requirements ordinarily do not transform a unilateral expectation into a constitutionally protected property interest. A constitutionally protected interest has been created only if the procedural requirements are intended to be a 'significant substantive restriction' on ... decision making. If the procedures required pose no significant limitation on the discretion of the decision maker, the expectation of a specific decision is not enhanced enough to establish a constitutionally protected interest in the procedures. 32 Goodisman v. Lytle, 724 F.2d 818, 820 (9th Cir.1984) (citations omitted); see also Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir.1984); Parks v. Watson, 716 F.2d 646, 657 (9th Cir.1983); Jacobson v. Hannifin, 627 F.2d 177, 180 (9th Cir.1980); Hayward v. Henderson, 623 F.2d 596, 597 (9th Cir.1980); Russell v. Landrieu, 621 F.2d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir.1980). 33 Here, AFR 40-713 expressly provided for review of the entire matter, including the merits of the action, once a complainant elects to proceed under Part 713. The outcome of that review, however, is left to the discretion of the base commander. 9 Although the commander's decision is appealable to the Civil Service Commission or the courts, A.F.R. 40-713, paragraphs 28 & 29, the regulation provides no significant restrictions on the commander's decision-making, Goodisman, 724 F.2d at 820, nor does it provide articulable standards to guide his discretion. Parks, 716 F.2d at 657. As a result, plaintiff cannot successfully claim a constitutionally cognizable property interest arising from the Air Force's regulation. 34 None of the foregoing should be read as abrogating the well-settled rule that regulations validly prescribed by an agency are binding upon it. 10 See, e.g., Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267, 74 S.Ct. 499, 503, 98 L.Ed. 681 (1954); United States v. Newell, 578 F.2d 827, 834 (9th Cir.1978); Mendez v. INS, 563 F.2d 956, 959 (9th Cir.1977); Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir.1976); Note, Violations by Agencies of their Own Regulations, 87 Harv.L.Rev. 629 (1974). Our holding is simply that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the existence of a constitutionally protected property interest, deprivation of which would entitle her to damages. See Hayward v. Henderson, 623 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir.1980). 35 Much of what we have just said applies as well to plaintiff's alleged liberty interest. Clemente does not possess a liberty interest [in] her Civil Service career. 568 F.Supp. at 1168. The mere fact of dismissal does not cause a deprivation of liberty. Loehr, 743 F.2d at 1310, 1317 (citing Roth, 408 U.S. at 575, 92 S.Ct. at 2708; Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2079, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) ). Instead,  '[t]o implicate constitutional liberty interests, ... the reasons for dismissal must be sufficiently serious to stigmatize or otherwise burden the individual so that he is not able to take advantage of other employment opportunities.'  Id. (citing Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank, 650 F.2d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948, 102 S.Ct. 1449, 71 L.Ed.2d 662 (1982) ). No such stigmatization has been shown here. The district court's decision awarding Bivens relief against the individual defendants must accordingly be reversed.