Opinion ID: 867235
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instructions on Mitigation

Text: ¶ 77 Prince argues that the jury instructions on mitigation given during the second penalty phase were inconsistent and confusing. We review de novo whether jury instructions correctly state the law, State v. Gallardo, 225 Ariz. 560, 567 ¶ 30, 242 P.3d 159, 166 (2010), read[ing] the jury instructions as a whole to ensure that the jury receives the information it needs to arrive at a legally correct decision, Granville, 211 Ariz. at 471 ¶ 8, 123 P.3d at 665 (citing Kauffman v. Schroeder, 116 Ariz. 104, 106, 568 P.2d 411, 413 (1977)). ¶ 78 At the close of the penalty phase, the judge instructed the jury that [m]itigating circumstances may be found from any evidence presented during this hearing. The judge then gave more specific instructions regarding mitigation: Mitigating circumstances are any factors that are a basis for a life sentence instead of a death sentence, so long as they relate to any sympathetic or other aspect of Mr. Prince's character, propensity, history or record, or circumstances of the offense. Mitigating circumstances are not an excuse or justification for the offense, but are factors that in fairness or mercy may reduce Mr. Prince's moral culpability. Mitigating circumstances may be offered by the defense or the State or be apparent from the evidence presented at this hearing. You are not required to find that there is a connection between a mitigating circumstance and the crime committed in order to consider the mitigation evidence. . . . . While all 12 of you must unanimously agree regarding the appropriate sentence, you do not need to unanimously agree on a particular mitigating circumstance. Each one of you must decide individually whether any mitigating circumstance exists. The defense bears the burden of proving the existence of any mitigating circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence. That is, although the defense need not prove its existence beyond a reasonable doubt, the defense must convince you by the evidence presented that it is more probably true than not true that such a mitigating circumstance exists. ¶ 79 Prince concedes that these instructions correctly stated the law, but argues they were likely to confuse the jury. Although the jury was instructed that the defense has the burden of proving the existence of mitigation, the jury was also told it could consider any evidence, even if adduced by the State, in making its final determination. According to Prince, the interplay between these instructions gave him the burden of persuasion, but not the burden of production, which is inconceivable to the lay person not educated in the law. Prince asserts that the confusing instructions could prompt the average juror [to] simply ignore any evidence that was not affirmatively introduced by the defense. Because Prince did not object on this ground at trial, we review for fundamental error only. See State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 225 ¶ 134, 141 P.3d 368, 400 (2006). ¶ 80 No error occurred, fundamental or otherwise. Jurors are presumed to follow jury instructions. State v. LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 437, 439, 924 P.2d 441, 443 (1996). Nothing in the record suggests that the final penalty-phase jurors were confused or failed to consider any evidence that could have been mitigating. Additionally, both instructions find support in Supreme Court case law. See Marsh, 548 U.S. at 170-71, 126 S.Ct. 2516 (allowing states to place on defendants the burden of proving mitigating circumstances); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) ([T]he sentencer may not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence.) (quotation omitted).