Opinion ID: 1247774
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Use of Unadjudicated Criminal Activity.

Text: Former section 190.3 permitted the presentation of penalty phase evidence of other criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence, and provided that criminal activity does not require a conviction. At defendant's penalty trial Ernest F. and Catherine A. testified to defendant's attacks upon them. In neither instance had charges been filed against defendant. (8) Defendant contends that admission of prior unadjudicated incidents of criminal activity violates due process. We considered and rejected a similar claim in People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480], decided under the 1978 death penalty law. (Accord, People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1202 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301].) As defendant acknowledges, the 1977 law is identical in relevant part. (See generally People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 69-72 [222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423].) Because defendant advances no persuasive reason to reconsider Balderas, we adhere to that decision.
(9) Relying on Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d 29, and section 15, defining a crime in part by the punishments imposed after conviction, [7] defendant asserts that because prosecution of the 1973 Ernest F. attack and the 1977 Catherine A. attack was barred by the statute of limitations, he could not be convicted of either incident; hence neither constituted a crime within the meaning of the death penalty statute. Although defendant failed to advance a statute of limitations objection below, we nevertheless consider the objection here. (Cf. People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 756-757 [170 Cal. Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837].) In Phillips we held the term criminal activity in former section 190.3 includes more than prior felony convictions, but excludes offenses for which the defendant has been acquitted and nonoffenses for which the defendant could not even be tried. (41 Cal.3d at pp. 71-72.) As subsequent language in Phillips makes clear, our purpose was to define the kinds of behavior by the defendant the statute makes relevant to choice of sentence  to wit  actual conduct involving violence or threat of violence that demonstrates the violation of a penal statute. ( Id. at p. 72 & fn. 24; cf. People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1203 [probative value of conduct, not conviction, in penalty phase].) To exclude violent criminal behavior simply because its prosecution is time-barred would be to ignore the plain terms of former section 190.3 as well as its underlying purpose  i.e., that the trier of fact, in determining penalty, make an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the offender as well as the circumstances of the offense. (See Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 879 [77 L.Ed.2d 235, 103 S.Ct. 2733]; People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 981-982 [251 Cal. Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475] [1978 law]; see generally People v. Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 69-72.) The conduct underlying the Ernest F. and Catherine A. attacks clearly falls within one or more penal statutes (e.g., §§ 261 [rape], 207 [kidnapping], 288a, subd. (c) [forcible oral copulation], 286, subd. (c) [forcible sodomy]); hence it was properly considered as other criminal activity. (See generally People v. Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 981-982.) Defendant argues additionally that because the statute of limitations had run on the incidents, evidence of the alleged offenses was inadmissible under the due process clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. In support, he argues the evidence related to attacks remote in time and thus difficult to defend against. We doubt whether either attack  that on Ernest F. in 1973 or on Catherine A. in 1977  can properly be characterized as remote. Nor does the statute of limitations of itself embody a due process limit on the time within which a defendant can be required to defend against a particular charge. Rather, as the United States Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Marion (1971) 404 U.S. 307, 322 [30 L.Ed.2d 468, 92 S.Ct. 455], statutes of limitation represent legislative assessments of relative interests of the State and the defendant in administering and receiving justice; ... That these assessments are flexible and not immutable is demonstrated, inter alia, by the Legislature's frequent amendment of section 800, proscribing the limitations period for serious felonies, including defendant's criminal activity. (See Historical Note, West's Ann. Pen. Code (1985 ed.) foll. § 800, p. 194.) In People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 14-15 [249 Cal. Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843] we rejected the claim that a time-barred felony may not form the predicate for a felony-murder special circumstance. A fortiori, there is no bar to consideration of [time-barred] felonious conduct involving force or the threat of force as an aggravating factor. ( Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 982.)
(10) Defendant objected to admission of the Ernest F. and Catherine A. evidence on Evidence Code section 352 grounds. The court overruled the objection, but granted defendant leave to move to strike the evidence at a later time. Defendant failed to make a subsequent motion to strike and expressly withdrew his objection to the evidence. He now argues the court erred in failing to make an explicit on-the-record finding that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. ( People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 25 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) Defendant, having withdrawn his objection to the evidence, cannot now complain of its admission. (11) Further, we reject the proposition that at the penalty phase of a capital trial the court has discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity involving violence. To the contrary, the evidence is expressly made admissible by former section 190.3. (See People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 641 [250 Cal. Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189] [1978 law].)
(12a) Defendant complains evidence of the Ernest F. and Catherine A. offenses was unreliable, as each was established by only a single witness. Our law, however, expressly provides that the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to establish a fact. (Evid. Code, § 411.) Any contradictions, as defendant asserts, or other weakness in the witness's testimony are matters to be explored on cross-examination and argued to the trier of fact. The reliability of the evidence is safeguarded by the requirement that the trier of fact may consider the evidence only if it determines the other crimes have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Robertson I, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 53-55.) Defendant maintains that in neither instance did the evidence establish criminal activity beyond a reasonable doubt. (13) In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, our task is to determine `whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576 [162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, 16 A.L.R.4th 1255], quoting Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 99 S.Ct. 2781], italics in original; accord, People v. Guerra (1985) 40 Cal.3d 377, 385 [220 Cal. Rptr 374, 708 P.2d 1252].) (12b) Applying this test, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had used force or the threat of force to compel F. and A. to commit oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)).
(14a) Before defendant's first trial the prosecution gave notice that it would introduce evidence of the Kim P. attack in aggravation at the penalty phase, which it did. The prosecution did not give notice that it would introduce evidence of the Ernest F. and Catherine A. attacks, nor did it attempt to introduce such evidence. More than three months before commencement of the penalty phase retrial, however, the prosecution gave notice that it would introduce in aggravation evidence concerning the Ernest F. and Catherine A. attacks, as well as the Kim P. attack. Defendant claims the Ernest F. and Catherine A. evidence was inadmissible under the notice requirement of former section 190.3. [8] The record is unclear that defendant raised the notice objection below. Assuming arguendo that he did so, he subsequently, for tactical reasons, expressly withdrew his objections to the Ernest F. and Catherine A. evidence; hence he may not raise the claim on appeal. ( People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 547-548 [146 Cal. Rptr. 732, 579 P.2d 1048].) Defendant's objection in any event lacks merit. The meaning of trial varies depending on the context of its use. (See generally People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 896 [lead opn. of Broussard, J.], 902-903 [dis. opn. of Grodin, J.; Lucas, J. and Panelli, J., conc.] [231 Cal. Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288].) (15) As it is commonly and ordinarily construed, the word trial refers broadly to the formal examination of the matter in issue in a judicial tribunal for the purpose of determining such issue. (See Webster's Third New Internat. Dict. (1961) p. 2439, col. 3, definition 2.) (14b) Where the question of notice arises in the context of the initial trial in which the guilt and penalty phases occur in immediate sequence and thus are part of a unitary proceeding, we have construed trial as the whole proceeding; hence notice must be given in advance of the guilt phase. ( People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 96-97 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].) Where, however, as here, the notice issue arises in the context of a second trial  i.e., a retrial  following a successful appeal, trial must reasonably be construed to mean the judicial proceeding in which the matter in issue is again examined and resolved. Only this construction serves both the evident purpose of the notice provision  viz., to advise an accused of the evidence against him so that he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense at the penalty trial ( Miranda, supra, at p. 96 [1978 law])  and the overriding purpose of section 190.3 that the jury be made aware of all of the factors bearing on the penalty decision ( People v. Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 987 [1978 law]). We conclude, therefore, that the trial to which former section 190.3 refers embraces the original trial, as defined above, or the retrial, be it of the entire proceeding or the penalty phase only. Pursuant to the foregoing, former section 190.3 required the prosecution to give notice of aggravating evidence at a reasonable time prior to trial or retrial. By filing its notice more than three months prior to retrial of the penalty phase, the prosecution satisfied the notice requirement of the statute.
(16) By analogy to the constitutional prohibition against retrial after acquittal or increased charges or punishment following a successful appeal (e.g., Blackledge v. Perry (1974) 417 U.S. 21 [40 L.Ed.2d 628, 94 S.Ct. 2098]; North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711 [23 L.Ed.2d 656, 89 S.Ct. 2072]), defendant argues that because the prosecution failed to introduce the F. and A. incidents at his first trial, double jeopardy principles preclude their use at retrial. (See Arizona v. Rumsey (1984) 467 U.S. 203, 210-211 [81 L.Ed.2d 164, 104 S.Ct. 2305].) Defendant's argument is meritless. The prohibition against double jeopardy protects a defendant from being placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. (U.S. Const. Amend. V; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; see generally People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 756, fn. 17 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741].) The prohibition has no bearing on the kind or quantity of evidence that may be introduced in successive trials of an issue. Defendant was never once in jeopardy for any offense arising out of the attacks against Ernest F. and Catherine A. The prosecution was plainly entitled to introduce evidence of these incidents at the second time.