Opinion ID: 1136922
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Allowing the Mississippi Bar to introduce the deposition of Gwendolyn Catchings over the objection of Emil.

Text: In the course of the hearing on the merits, the Tribunal allowed the Bar to introduce the testimony of Gwendolyn Catchings. The document offered into evidence by the Bar was the transcript of Catchings's testimony from the investigatory hearing in July 1989. Ergo, the statement was taken under oath and Emil had opportunity to cross-examine Catchings at that time. The Bar sought to present Catchings's testimony pursuant to Rule 32(a)(1) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure rather than calling her as a live witness. Further, the Bar argued that Catchings's testimony was admissible under subsection (a)(3)(B) of Rule 32 which states: The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: ... that the witness is at a greater distance than one hundred miles from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the state, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition. M.R.C.P. Rule 32(a)(3)(B) (1995). The comment to Rule 32 states that: Mississippi Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) permits the introduction of the deposition testimony of an unavailable witness. Though the deposition of the unavailable witness need not have been taken in the same proceedings as that in which it is offered, the party against whom the deposition is offered ... must have had both an opportunity and a similar motive for cross-examination. See 4 J. Weinstein & Miss. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 801(D)(01) [01] (1985). M.R.C.P. Rule 32 cmt. (1995). Emil argued below that Catchings's testimony was not admissible under Rule 32 and Rule 804. He contended that he did not have a similar motive for cross-examination when Catchings's testified at the investigatory hearing. The investigatory hearing was not an adversary proceeding and Emil argued that he would have conducted his cross-examination entirely differently had he known that the testimony was going to be admitted into evidence at the hearing on the merits. Emil objected to the use of the deposition testimony on the ground that there was no evidence presented before the Tribunal which would authorize the use of the deposition under the provisions of Rule 32(a)(3) or Rule 804(b)(1). The question before this Court is whether the testimony was properly admitted under Rule 32(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure which refers to Rule 804(b)(1) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. The only reason that the testimony might be inadmissible under Rule 32 is that it is not a deposition, but earlier sworn testimony. This is a question of form over substance; it does not hinder the introduction of Catchings's testimony. The query then becomes whether it was properly admitted under Rule 804(b)(1) as an exception to hearsay. Under Rule 804, this Court must first determine if Catchings was unavailable. This concept in relevant part is defined by Rule 804(a)(5) as being absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure his attendance ... by process or other reasonable means. M.R.E. 804(a)(5) (1995). The proponent of the hearsay must carry the burden of proving unavailability. See Mitchell v. State, 572 So.2d 865, 869 (Miss. 1990). This Court has described this burden as that of a `diligent effort.' Stoop v. State, 531 So.2d 1215, 1220 (Miss. 1988). Mitchell, 572 So.2d at 869. If this burden is met and unavailability is proven, the statements must still fit one of the hearsay exceptions in Rule 804(b) in order to be admitted into evidence. Id. Thus, the first step is to determine if Catchings was unavailable to testify at the hearing on the merits. Second, this Court must determine if it falls into an exception listed in subsection (b)(1). Upon Emil's objection, the Tribunal requested the Bar to present testimony regarding its efforts to locate Catchings. The Bar stated that it called directory information to no avail. It contacted two attorneys with past connections with Catchings by telephone with no success. One of the attorneys stated that she had moved to California. The testimony also showed that an acquaintance of Catchings (Earline Mitchell) was called, and she said Catchings had moved to California three or four years ago, but she didn't know her whereabouts. On cross-examination, the witnesses offered by the bar admitted that they didn't contact law enforcement personnel about Catchings's last known location, did not send a certified letter to her last known address, and, in fact, did not talk to Earline Mitchell about the witness's location until only two days before the date the testimony was attempted to be offered into evidence. It was further developed that the Bar had encountered problems several months before the hearing in locating the witness, but notwithstanding this knowledge, no further efforts were made to locate her until the waning days before the hearing, and no notice was given to Emil's attorneys that the Bar had not located her until only two days before the hearing. It is a close call on whether or not the effort by the Bar constitutes a diligent effort. A review of the relevant case law provides a guideline for determining when a witness is unavailable. In Mitchell v. State, 572 So.2d 865 (Miss. 1990), this Court held that the prosecution had met its burden of proof and that the witness was unavailable. In an effort to locate the witness, the prosecution made the following diligent efforts: (1) Contact of the F.B.I. office in Jackson. (2) Contact of the police department in Cleveland, Ohio. (3) Contact of the welfare department in Cleveland, Ohio. (4) Recent notification by [the witness] that he had no address or phone number and that he was living in the streets. (5) Reports that [the witness] was periodically in Cleveland. (6) A lack of friends or relatives, including a brother who served as a deputy sheriff, that knew of [the witness's] whereabouts. (7) A one year search by Deputy Ellis that proved unsuccessful. (8) Relatives in Cleveland who were contacted and stated that they did not know of [the witness's] location. (9) Strong resistance by [the witness] when asked to reveal his location. Mitchell, 572 So.2d at 869. The Bar's attempts to locate Catchings come nowhere near the efforts in the Mitchell case. In Stoop v. State, 531 So.2d 1215 (Miss. 1988), the prosecution sought to introduce the transcript of one of its witnesses from a previous trial in the same case at the retrial of Stoop. In an effort to locate the witness, a subpoena was issued, but not to the witness's current residence. A call was made to the witness's estranged husband, but he was out-of-town and the prosecution never called back. Instead they called the witness's friend who told them she did not know where the witness was. Stoop, 531 So.2d at 1220. Although the estranged husband knew of the witness's whereabouts, the prosecution never found out because it was satisfied with the effort in calling the witness's friend. This Court held that the prosecution had not made a diligent effort to locate the witness, and therefore, the requirement of unavailability was not met. Id. The Bar did not even make the efforts made in Stoop. In Stoop a subpoena was issued even though it was no longer the current address. Id. The Bar did not ever contact law enforcement officers or attempt to obtain a subpoena. In the final analysis, the Bar neither made a credible showing that the witness was unavailable nor showed that she was out of state or located further than 100 miles from the hearing site. The evidence offered by the Bar totally failed to establish that the witness was unavailable for Rule 804(a)(5) and (b)(1) purposes, or that her deposition testimony was available for use under Rule 32(a)(3). Therefore, we find that the Tribunal erroneously admitted Catchings's testimony.