Opinion ID: 775498
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is Cockrel's Speech Constitutionally Protected?

Text: 49 Given our determination that Cockrel's decision to bring industrial hemp advocates into her class is speech, the next question we must ask is whether that speech is constitutionally protected. As stated earlier, speech of a public employee is protected by the First Amendment only if it touches on matters of public concern, and only if the employee's interest in commenting upon matters of public concern ... outweigh[s] the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Leary, 228 F.3d at 737 (quotation omitted). If Cockrel's speech cannot meet both of these standards, then her First Amendment retaliation claim cannot go forward. 50
51 In determining whether Cockrel's speech touched on a matter of public concern, we turn to Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), the Supreme Court's most instructive case on this issue. In Connick, the Court stated that matters of public concern are those that can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community[.] Id. at 146. There is no question that the issue of industrial hemp is a matter of great political and social concern to many citizens of Kentucky, and we believe that Cockrel's presentations clearly come within the Supreme Court's understanding of speech touching on matters of public concern. 52 In support of this conclusion, we first turn to the district court's opinion, which unequivocally stated that the issue of industrial hemp is politically charged and of great concern to certain citizens. J.A. at 36 (Dist. Ct. Mem. Op.). Second, in the past year alone, industrial hemp advocacy in Kentucky has made news on several occasions, revealing the significant extent to which industrial hemp has become an important and publicly debated issue in the State. In October, presidential candidate Ralph Nader, in a campaign stop in Kentucky, spoke out in favor of the legalization of industrial hemp and of the benefits it would have for small family farmers. Al Cross, Nader Blasts Foes in Visit to Louisville, The Courier-Journal (Louisville, KY), Oct. 12, 2000, at A1. In December, after the Drug Enforcement Agency confiscated industrial hemp being grown on the Pine Ridge, South Dakota Indian Reservation, members of the Kentucky Hemp Growers Association, including former Kentucky governor Louie B. Nunn, traveled to South Dakota and, in a ceremony at the base of Mount Rushmore, delivered legally imported industrial hemp to the tribe as a sign of its solidarity. David Melmer, Kentucky Hemp Farmers Aid Pine Ridge, S.D., Indians After Crop Destruction, Knight-Ridder Trib. Bus. News, Dec. 11, 2000. These examples only scratch the surface of the extent to which industrial hemp has become an issue of contentious political and economic debate in Kentucky. 53 While discussion of industrial hemp plainly meets the broad concept of public concern as defined by the Supreme Court, some courts have focused on other portions of the Supreme Court's Connick decision in concluding that a teacher's classroom speech does not touch on matters of public concern. See Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368-69 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 813 (1998); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 797-99 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926 (1990). These cases pay particular attention to the following portion of the Connick Court's holding: 54 [W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior. 55 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. Based upon this language, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have determined that a teacher, in choosing what he will teach his students, is not speaking as a citizen, but rather as an employee on matters of private interest. Boring, 136 F.3d at 368-69; Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 800. 56 We believe that the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have extended the holding of Connick beyond what the Supreme Court intended. Under the courts' analyses in Boring and Kirkland, a teacher, regardless of what he decides to include in his curriculum, is speaking as an employee on a private matter. Boring, 136 F.3d at 368-69; Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 800. This essentially gives a teacher no right to freedom of speech when teaching students in a classroom, for the very act of teaching is what the employee is paid to do. Thus, when teaching, even if about an upcoming presidential election or the importance of our Bill of Rights, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits' reasoning would leave such speech without constitutional protection, for the teacher is speaking as an employee, and not as a citizen. 57 The facts in Connick indicate that the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have read the Supreme Court's language too broadly. InConnick, an assistant district attorney, following a disagreement with a supervisor, prepared a questionnaire seeking the opinions of her co-workers on issues such as office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns. Connick, 461 U.S. at 141. Connick was later fired for circulating the questionnaire on the grounds of insubordination. Id. The Court held that, while many of the questions simply reflected the plaintiff's efforts to gather information to use against her supervisors in her private employment dispute, Myers's question regarding the pressure to work on political campaigns did touch on a matter of public concern. Id. at 149. Thus, the Court held that, even though Myers was speaking as an employee out of her private interest in combating her supervisors' decision to transfer her, the fact that one of her questions dealt with the fundamental constitutional right not to be coerced into campaigning for a political candidate was enough to make this particular issue touch on a matter of public concern. Id. 58 If the Fourth and Fifth Circuits' interpretation of Connick were correct, then any time a public employee was speaking as an employee, like Myers was when she asked her question about employees being pressured to campaign, the speech at issue would not be protected. As the Supreme Court made clear in its analysis, however, the key question is not whether a person is speaking in his role as an employee or a citizen, but whether the employee's speech in fact touches on matters of public concern. Id. 148-49. Thus, even if a public employee were acting out of a private motive with no intent to air her speech publicly, as was the case with Myers, so long as the speech relates to matters of political, social, or other concern to the community, as opposed to matters only of personal interest, it shall be considered as touching upon matters of public concern. Id. at 146-49. 59 In Cockrel's case, although she was speaking in her role as an employee when presenting information on the environmental benefits of industrial hemp, the content of her speech, as discussed supra, most certainly involved matters related to the political and social concern of the community, as opposed to mere matters of private interest. Thus, contrary to the analyses in Boring and Kirkland, we hold that Cockrel's speech does touch on matters of public concern. 5 60
61 Having held that Cockrel's speech touches on matters of public concern, we must now weigh the employee's interest in speaking against the employer's interest in regulating the speech to determine if the speech is constitutionally protected. InPickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), the Supreme Court endeavored to strike a balance between a public employee's speech rights on matters of public interest (in that case a public school teacher's speech outside of school) and the State's interest as an employer in maintaining a productive workplace. In accordance with the balancing test created inPickering, public employee speech, even if touching on matters of public concern, will not be constitutionally protected unless the employee's interest in speaking on these issues outweigh[s] 'the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.' Leary, 228 F.3d at 737 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568)). In striking the balancebetween the State's and the employee's respective interests, this court has stated that it will consider whether an employee's comments meaningfully interfere with the performance of her duties, undermine a legitimate goal or mission of the employer, create disharmony among co-workers, impair discipline by superiors, or destroy the relationship of loyalty and trust required of confidential employees. Williams v. Kentucky, 24 F.3d 1526, 1536 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 947 (1994) (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987)). 62 Before engaging in a particularized balancing of the competing interests at stake in this case, Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, it is important to note that if an employee's speech substantially involve[s] matters of public concern, an employer may be required to make a particularly strong showing that the employee's speech interfered with workplace functioning before taking action. Leary, 228 F.3d at 737-38 (quotation omitted). In this case, it is clear that Cockrel's speech did substantially involve matters of public concern, and thus the defendants will have to make a stronger showing that their interests in regulating plaintiff's speech outweighed Cockrel's interests in speaking. 63 Weighing in plaintiff's favor in this analysis is the fact that her speech substantially involved matters of significant public concern in Kentucky. Defendants claim, however, that their interest in maintaining loyalty, efficient operation of the schools, and workplace harmony outweighs the plaintiff's interest in speaking about industrial hemp. Appellees' Br. at 27. We first note that the defendants do not claim that Cockrel's presentations on industrial hemp meaningfully interfered with the performance of her teaching duties. Defendants would have a difficult time making this argument, however, considering they openly acknowledged in a public statement to CNN that there was educational value in teaching students about industrial hemp as an alternative crop. J.A. at 265 (Statement for CNN). We further note that defendants' purported interest in maintaining loyalty is inapposite in this case. While this circuit has stated that it would consider in its balancing whether employee speech operated to destroy the relationship of loyalty and trust required of confidential employees[,] Williams, 24 F.3d at 1536, a public school teacher, we believe, is hardly the type of confidential employee the court had in mind. Thus, any loyalty concerns that the defendants may have will not be taken into consideration in our weighing of the competing interests at stake. 64 Turning to the defendants' proffered interests in an efficient operation of the school and a harmonious work environment, there is evidence that plaintiff's speech has led to problems in both of these areas. For example, following Harrelson's first visit to Simpsonville, numerous members of the school's faculty and staff circulated and or signed letters addressed to school officials criticizing Cockrel's actions in advocating the use of industrial hemp to her students. Cockrel thereafter expressed her displeasure with her co-workers' sentiments on several occasions. As discussed earlier, following D.A.R.E. officer Yeager's criticism of the Harrelson visits, Cockrel no longer wanted the officer in her classroom instructing her students. Cockrel asked Slate to find a replacement for Yeager as well. Cockrel's termination letter detailed several instances of disputes Cockrel had with co-workers, including an instance in which Cockrel jerked a phone away from a co-worker who had signed one of the letters speaking out against the Harrelson visit, and an incident in which Cockrel told two co-workers not to waste their breath after they said 'good morning' to [her.] J.A. at 54, 245-46. At least one of these co-workers had also signed a letter critical of Cockrel's decision to speak about industrial hemp. 65 Many parents and members of the school community also expressed great concern over Cockrel's decision to invite speakers to her class who advocated the use of industrial hemp. Parents wrote letters to Principal Slate and Superintendent Mooneyhan in opposition to Cockrel's industrial hemp presentations, and a small number came to Simpsonville Elementary to protest on the final two occasions Harrelson was scheduled to visit. In addition, the PTA passed a position statement recommending that Cockrel no longer teach in the Shelby County School District. 66 Although this evidence of a contentious and periodically disrupted work environment weighs in favor of the defendants, the amount of weight we should give this evidence is an entirely different question. We are troubled by the fact that, whereas school officials gave plaintiff prior approval to host all three of the industrial hemp presentations at issue in this case, defendants now forward concerns of school efficiency and harmony as reasons supporting their decision to discharge Cockrel. Principal Slate approved all of Harrelson's scheduled visits in advance, and Slate openly stated that he had no problem with Cockrel teaching her students about industrial hemp. Cockrel also met the conditions of the new visitors policy implemented after the initial Harrelson visit, including obtaining the permission of each student's parents before a child could participate in the presentation. We do not believe that defendants can use the outcry within the school community protesting Cockrel's speech, speech that was approved by school officials in advance, as a shield for their decision to discharge her. While ordinarily we would give substantial weight to the government employer's concerns of workplace efficiency, harmony, and discipline in conducting our balancing of the employee's and employer's competing interests, we cannot allow these concerns to tilt the Pickering scale in favor of the government, absent other evidence, when the disruptive consequences of the employee speech can be traced back to the government's express decision permitting the employee to engage in that speech. 6 67 Accordingly, we hold that, on balance, the defendants' interests in an efficient operation of the school and a harmonious workplace do not outweigh the plaintiff's interests in speaking about the benefits of industrial hemp, an issue of substantial political and economic concern in Kentucky. Thus, because Cockrel's speech touches on matters of public concern and because the balancing of interests under Pickering weighs in her favor, her speech is constitutionally protected. 7 We now proceed with an examination of the remainder of the elements of plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim. 68 c. Did the Plaintiff Suffer an Injury as a Result of Her Speech That Would Chill an Ordinary Person From Continuing to Engage in Such Speech? 69 For the next element of Cockrel's retaliation claim, she must show that the defendant[s'] adverse action caused [her] to suffer an injury that would likely chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity[.] Leary, 228 F.3d at 737. There is no question that, by being terminated, Cockrel has suffered an injury that would chill an ordinary person from continuing to engage in speech on the environmental benefits of industrial hemp. d.Was the Decision to Terminate Cockrel Motivated, at Least in Part, by Plaintiff's Decision to Speak About Industrial Hemp? 70 The final element of Cockrel's First Amendment retaliation claim requires her to show that defendants' decision to discharge her was motivated, at least in part, by the exercise of her free speech rights. Id. This circuit has stated that the nonmoving party may not rely on the mere fact that an adverse employment action followed speech that the employer would have liked to prevent. Rather, the employee must link the speech in question to the defendant's decision to dismiss her. Bailey, 106 F.3d at 145 (citation omitted). In other words, to survive defendants' motion for summary judgment, Cockrel must present sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that her speech, at least in part, motivated the defendants to discharge her. Id. 71 Although there certainly is significant evidence that Cockrel's behavior at school, apart from the industrial hemp presentations, was often inappropriate, we believe that Cockrel has presented enough evidence such that a reasonable jury could find that the defendants, in terminating her, were at least partially motivated by her decision to speak on industrial hemp. Several pieces of evidence work in her favor. First, Principal Slate initiated early evaluations of Cockrel in the 1996-97 school year following Harrelson's first visit to her class on the last day of the 1995-96 school year. In the 1996-97 school year, Cockrel was the only tenured teacher Slate reviewed on a schedule of more than one evaluation for every three years. In addition, based on the parents' and teachers' complaint letters following the initial Harrelson visit, Superintendent Mooneyhan initiated an open-ended investigation into Cockrel's school conduct. Finally, the deposition testimony shows that the March 1997 summative evaluation served as the basis upon which Principal Slate recommended to Mooneyhan that Cockrel be fired, and was also a factor in Mooneyhan's ultimate decision to terminate Cockrel. Attached to this evaluation were several letters from parents and staff critical of Cockrel's decision to teach her students about industrial hemp. 72 After examining this evidence, we conclude that a jury could find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendants' decision to discharge Cockrel was motivated, at least in part, by her decision to teach her students about industrial hemp. The temporal proximity between the Harrelson visits and Cockrel's series of unscheduled evaluations, as well as the influence the parent and teacher complaints appeared to have on the defendants in the wake of the Harrelson visits, constitute sufficient evidence for Cockrel to establish the causation element of her First Amendment retaliation claim. 73