Opinion ID: 1822394
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Constitutional Challenges to Capital Sentencing

Text: Johnson claims Florida's capital sentencing law, section 921.141, Florida Statutes, and standard jury instructions in capital cases are unconstitutional on six grounds: (1) the defendant bears the burden of proving death is inappropriate; (2) a death sentence can rest on a nonunanimous jury recommendation based on facts that are not found beyond a reasonable doubt, contrary to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); (3) Florida's capital sentencing statute violates Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), because a conviction of first-degree murder without more makes a defendant eligible for the death penalty, which fails to adequately narrow the field of first-degree murderers sentenced to death; (4) the instruction that a jury should find a mitigator only if it is reasonably convinced of its existence violates separation of powers; (5) an instruction to the jury that its role is advisory denigrates its responsibility, contrary to Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985); and (6) no specific number of votes is required for jurors to find aggravators or mitigators. We reject each of these arguments. First, Florida's capital sentencing statute does not unconstitutionally place a burden of proof on the defendant to prove death inappropriate in the event of equipoise between aggravators and mitigators. Reynolds, 934 So.2d at 1150-51; see also Kansas v. Marsh, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 126 S.Ct. 2516, 2525, 165 L.Ed.2d 429 (2006) (finding that Supreme Court precedents do not impose a specific method for balancing aggravating and mitigating factors). In addition, the jury in this case received special instructions that it should determine whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that you find to exist, that the defense presentation of mitigating evidence should not be construed as to shift or minimize the State's burden, and that, regardless of your findings with respect to aggravating and mitigating circumstances, you are never required to recommend a sentence of death. Second, Johnson is not entitled to relief under Ring because the murder in the course of a felony aggravator rests on the separate convictions of kidnapping and sexual battery, which satisfies Sixth Amendment requirements. See Douglas, 878 So.2d at 1264 (concluding that the defendant was not entitled to relief under Ring where the jury found him guilty of both sexual battery and felony murder during the commission or attempted commission of a sexual battery). Third, this Court has previously rejected the Furman claim raised by Johnson. See Blanco v. State, 706 So.2d 7, 11 (Fla.1997) (rejecting the argument that Florida's capital felony sentencing statute is unconstitutional because every person who is convicted of first-degree felony murder automatically qualifies for the death penalty). We also note that in this case, the jury's special verdict finding that the murder was both premeditated and felony murder and its separate verdicts of guilty of kidnapping and robbery further weaken his claim that the murder conviction alone qualified him for death. Fourth, the fact that the instruction that jurors must be reasonably convinced that a mitigator exists does not unconstitutionally limit the jury's consideration of all relevant evidence. We have upheld the standard instructions on mitigation, concluding that [j]urors clearly are told they may consider anything relevant. Walls v. State, 641 So.2d 381, 389 (Fla.1994). Further, in Bogle v. State, 655 So.2d 1103 (Fla.1995), we rejected a similar argument that the language [i]f you are reasonably convinced that a mitigating circumstance exists, you may consider it established, erroneously restricted the evidence that the jury considered in mitigation. Id. at 1108. Johnson's argument on this issue is without merit. Fifth, the standard instruction to jurors that their role is advisory does not render capital sentencing unconstitutional. We have recently rejected Johnson's specific argument on this point. See Globe v. State, 877 So.2d 663, 673-74 (Fla.2004). Finally, Johnson cites no precedent holding that a specific threshold number or proportion of juror votes for either aggravating or mitigating circumstances is constitutionally required. A capital sentencing scheme passes constitutional muster if it rationally narrows the class of death-eligible defendants and permits the sentencer to consider any mitigating evidence relevant to its determination. Marsh, 126 S.Ct. at 2525-26. In Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976), the United States Supreme Court determined that the channeled discretion required by the Eighth Amendment is provided by Florida's scheme requiring statutory and mitigating circumstances to be found and weighed first by the advisory jury and then independently by the trial court. Id. at 248-52, 96 S.Ct. 2960. All of Johnson's constitutional challenges to this State's capital sentencing scheme are without merit.