Opinion ID: 1421920
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: J.N.O.V./Directed Verdict.[4]

Text: In reviewing a denial of a motion for directed verdict or a motion for J.N.O.V. this court asks whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, reasonable jurors could differ in their assessment of the particular issue. Blackford v. Taggart, 672 P.2d 888, 890 (Alaska 1983). We will not weigh conflicting evidence or judge of the credibility of witnesses. Grimes v. Haslett, 641 P.2d 813, 819 (Alaska 1982). Kavorkian argues that the superior court erred by denying his J.N.O.V. motions on three different issues. These issues correspond to the three primary elements of a cause of action predicated on AS 04.16.030 and AS 04.21.020: [5] (1) Did Tommy's act with criminal negligence in serving Pears that evening, (2) was Pears a drunken person while in Tommy's that evening, and (3) was Tommy's conduct a proximate cause of the accident?
Under AS 04.16.030, Tommy's is liable to Kavorkian only if it acted with criminal negligence in serving Pears. [6] Criminal negligence is defined as follows: a person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a provision of law defining an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists; the risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation; AS 04.21.080(a)(1) (emphasis added). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Tommy's, we conclude that reasonable jurors could have disagreed on the question of whether the employees of Tommy's acted with criminal negligence in serving Pears. Kavorkian emphasizes that Tommy's' bartender, Terry Costello, not only failed to observe Pears and Hill enter Tommy's, but also never examined Pears before serving drinks which Costello knew were intended for Pears. [7] Relying on the legislative history of AS 04.16.030, Kavorkian argues that Tommy's had an affirmative duty to assess Pears' sobriety before serving him. The legislative history of AS 04.16.030 supports Kavorkian's argument that the statute does impose an affirmative duty on the employees. This section places a duty upon the seller ... of intoxicating beverages before he or she sells ... intoxicating beverages to a person to use their powers of observation to see that which can easily be seen, and hear that which can easily be heard ... and to determine whether the person is ... drunken. Senate Journal, Supplement No. 23, Vol. 1, pp. 15-16 (1980). Costello, the bartender, testified that he did not become aware that Pears was in the bar that night until Pears was leaving. Before that time, however, Costello had seen Hill playing foosball with a man, and had served her drinks at the bar which she took back to the foosball table. Costello observed nothing abnormal about the way they were playing foosball. Costello explained his failure to observe Pears before providing him drinks by noting that the foosball table is part of the waitress' station. [8] When Costello saw Pears leave, Pears looked fine  no problem. Arguably, Costello satisfied his statutory duty of see[ing] that which can easily be seen, and hear[ing] that which can easily be heard. Whether his failure to observe Pears more closely before serving him alcohol constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation, AS 04.21.080(a)(1), is a question for the jury. Indeed, another passage in the legislative history of AS 04.16.030 specifically states: On the charge of selling ... intoxicating liquor to a drunken person, the facts constituting the alleged outward manifestations should be presented, and it is ordinarily the province of a jury to determine whether or not they were such as to be observable and recognizable as the usual indications of a drunken or overly intoxicated person. Senate Journal, Supplement No. 23, Vol. 1, p. 16 (1980). In light of the legislative history and Costello's testimony, we hold that reasonable jurors might well have disagreed on whether Tommy's acted with criminal negligence in serving Pears alcohol. We thus conclude that the superior court's denial of Kavorkian's motion for J.N.O.V. on this basis was not error.
Under AS 04.21.080(b)(7) the term drunken person is defined as: a person whose physical or mental conduct is substantially impaired as a result of the introduction of an alcoholic beverage into his body and who exhibits those plain and easily observed or discovered outward manifestations of behavior commonly known to be produced by the overconsumption of alcoholic beverages[.] In arguing that the superior court erred by denying the J.N.O.V. motion as to whether Pears was a drunken person when he was served at Tommy's, Kavorkian relies upon six witnesses who testified that they thought that Pears was very intoxicated that evening. Twelve witnesses for Tommy's, however, testified that they did not think Pears was drunk. In light of the applicable standard of review, under which this court is not to weigh conflicting evidence or to judge the credibility of witnesses, Grimes v. Haslett, 641 P.2d at 819, we conclude that reasonable jurors might well have disagreed about whether Pears was a drunken person within the meaning of the relevant statutes. Pears admitted that he was drunk on the night of the accident. He further agreed that he was physically and mentally substantially impaired while in Tommy's. Kathy Hill, who spent a substantial portion of the evening with Pears, testified that Pears was staggering when they arrived at her house. Pears broke a lotion bottle while using Hill's bathroom. His driving, both between Los Amigos and Hill's house and between Hill's house and Tommy's, was fast and reckless. He experienced difficulty walking to the foosball table once inside Tommy's. At the service station Pears was staggering and slurring his words. Tommy's emphasizes other passages from Hill's testimony. Pears' conduct while playing foosball wasn't bad. He operated the controls without difficulty. He did not spill his drink and was not loud or abusive at Tommy's. In Hill's opinion, Pears' reckless driving that evening was due not to a lack of control over the truck, but rather to his disregard for the rules of the road. Other witnesses, who observed Pears for a shorter period of time than did Hill, formed various opinions about his sobriety. [9] Joseph Wotopka, who saw Pears leave Los Amigos, described him as wasted, and saw him bang into a table on his way out. Milo and Iris Jackovich talked and drank with Pears for some twenty minutes earlier in the evening at Los Amigos. They both testified that he seemed fine, not drunk. Two [10] of the three witnesses who saw Pears at Hill's house testified that he appeared to be drunk and one [11] testified that he did not. Of the three witnesses (other than Hill) who saw Pears at Tommy's, one [12] said that he was obviously drunk and two [13] testified that he was not. Three more witnesses testified about Pears' condition at the scene of the accident. Richard Monsey, who found Pears in his truck after the crash, watched him do a back flip out of the passenger door and land on his feet. Monsey testified that Pears looked like he'd been drinking a little bit. Officer Whitney testified that he didn't think Pears met the definition of a drunken person within the meaning of the statutes. Isaac Tolliver also witnessed Pears' back flip, but suspected that Pears might have been drinking only on the basis of what Pears said after the accident. Obviously, the foregoing testimony is conflicting. The legislative history of AS 04.16.030, as noted previously, reflects an intent to let the jury evaluate whether or not a patron of a bar has exhibited such outward manifestations as to be recognizable as a drunken person. We conclude that reasonable jurors might well have disagreed over the extent, if any, of Pears' physical and mental impairment. The superior court thus acted properly in denying Kavorkian's J.N.O.V. motion on the issue of whether Pears was a drunken person.
The superior court ruled that Tommy's could not argue, or present evidence, that Pears had already had so much to drink by the time he got to Tommy's that the two drinks consumed there did not make any difference. The superior court based its ruling on Yukon Equipment, Inc. v. Gordon, 660 P.2d 428, 433 (Alaska 1983), where this court recognized that the `but for' rule [of causation] is inapplicable in the situation where two or more forces operate to bring about an injury. Reiterating its prior ruling at a later stage in the trial, the superior court relied on Nazareno v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671, 677 (Alaska 1981), where we stated that: [a]ccepting an argument that bar owners cannot be held liable for continuing to serve an intoxicated patron because the patron would have committed the same acts without the additional alcohol would be contrary to the public policy at stake in prohibiting service to intoxicated persons. Kavorkian argues that the superior court's rulings established as a proximate cause of the fatal collision the drinks Tommy's served Pears that evening. Thus, Kavorkian claims that the superior court erroneously denied its J.N.O.V. motion as to the issue of proximate causation. We hold that the question of causation was properly submitted to the jury. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 434 (1977) describes the respective functions of court and jury with regard to the issue of causation: (1) It is the function of the court to determine (a) whether the evidence as to facts makes an issue upon which the jury may reasonably differ as to whether the conduct of the defendant has been a substantial factor in causing the harm to the plaintiff; (b) whether the harm to the plaintiff is capable of apportionment among two or more causes; and (c) the questions of causation and apportionment, in any case in which the jury may not reasonably differ. (2) It is the function of the jury to determine, in any case in which it may reasonably differ on the issue, (a) whether the defendant's conduct has been a substantial factor in causing the harm to the plaintiff, and (b) the apportionment of the harm to two or more causes. [14] The superior court ruled that Tommy's could not argue that the accident would have occurred without any act by Tommy's. This does not mean that the jury could not or should not have considered Pears' preexisting inebriation in evaluating whether Pears' consumption of two drinks at Tommy's was a substantial factor in bringing about the accident. [15] In light of the evidence indicating that Pears was intoxicated before he arrived at Tommy's, and the different inferences of causation that such evidence might support, we conclude that the superior court did not err by requiring that the jury decide whether Tommy's act of serving alcohol to Pears proximately caused the accident.