Opinion ID: 2765321
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Step Three Determination

Text: “At step three, the ALJ determines whether the claimant’s impairment is equivalent to one of a number of listed impairments that the Secretary acknowledges -3- as so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity.” Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Ms. Perez-Leeds bears the burden of establishing that her impairments meet or equal a listed impairment. See Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 733 (10th Cir. 2005). She contends that the record contains evidence showing that she meets the criteria of Listing 12.04 (affective disorders) and Listing 12.06 (anxiety-related disorders). The ALJ determined that Ms. Perez-Leeds did not meet either of those listings because she did not satisfy the “B” criteria. To satisfy the “B” criteria, the impairment must result in at least two of the following: “Marked restriction of activities of daily living”; “Marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning”; “Marked difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace”; and “Repeated episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 §§ 12.04B.1-4; 12.06B.1-4. The ALJ concluded that Ms. Perez-Leeds had only moderate restrictions or difficulties in the three relevant areas and no episodes of decompensation. On appeal Ms. Perez-Leeds contends that the ALJ erred in this conclusion because the evidence shows she had more than moderate limitations in the three functional areas. We address each area in turn.
Citing to our decision in Clifton, Ms. Perez-Leeds asserts that the ALJ erred in finding that she has only moderate limitations in social functioning because he gave -4- no reason to support his finding. In Clifton we noted that the ALJ did not identify the relevant listings, discuss the evidence, or give any reasons for determining that the claimant was not disabled at step three. See 79 F.3d at 1009. Instead, the ALJ merely stated a summary conclusion that the claimant’s impairments did not meet or equal a listing. See id. We ruled that “[s]uch a bare conclusion is beyond meaningful review.” Id. In contrast, the ALJ here identified the relevant listings, discussed the evidence as it pertained to the relevant criteria in the listings, and concluded that Ms. Perez-Leeds did not meet the listings because she did not show marked limitations in any of the functional areas identified in paragraph B of the listings. While it is true that the ALJ did not discuss specific evidence with respect to his conclusion that Ms. Perez-Leeds had only moderate limitations in social functioning, “an ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence,” Clifton, 79 F.3d at 1009-10. Significantly, Ms. Perez-Leeds does not cite to any evidence related to her social functioning that the ALJ failed to discuss and that would demonstrate she has a marked limitation in this functional area. And the record includes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion that Ms. Perez-Leeds has moderate limitations in social functioning. None of the doctors who evaluated Ms. Perez-Leeds found that she had marked limitations in social functioning. Dr. Janeanne Snow observed that Ms. Perez-Leeds was a “cooperative, pleasant young woman” and “[h]er demeanor can certainly be seen as an asset.” Admin. R. -5- at 347. Dr. Joseph Sadek noted that Ms. Perez-Leeds was “alert, pleasant, and cooperative”; was “appropriately and casually dressed”; and during the two days of testing “presented as socially appropriate but reserved.” Id. at 351. And Dr. Mark Simpson concluded that Ms. Perez-Leeds had mild or no limitations in all three areas of social functioning he evaluated. See id. at 319. Consistent with these first-hand assessments, the consultative examiner who reviewed the record concluded that Ms. Perez-Leeds was not significantly limited in the area of social functioning, see id. at 108-09, and “could relate adequately to supervisors and co-workers,” id. at 109. Thus, as in Barnett v. Apfel, 231 F.3d 687, 689 (10th Cir. 2000), Ms. PerezLeeds “has not directed our attention to any medical evidence that was disregarded.” And, as in Barnett, our review of the record supports the conclusion that the ALJ reasonably considered the evidence. See id. Under these circumstances we can adequately review the ALJ’s findings. Ms. Perez-Leeds has not shown that the ALJ committed reversible error in determining that she has only moderate limitations in social functioning.
Ms. Perez-Leeds contends that the ALJ’s finding that she has only moderate restrictions in activities of daily living is not supported by the record and is premised on incorrect legal standards. She states that “[t]he ALJ cited [her] ability to drive her children to school, shop, cook, and perform household chores as the sole reason for finding that [she] was only moderately limited in this domain.” Aplt. Br. at 10. She -6- then asserts that “the record shows that [her] ability to perform those tasks was not unlimited as the ALJ suggests,” and goes on to recite evidence indicating that she had difficulties with household chores, cooking, shopping, and organizing her home and budget. Id. (emphasis added). The ALJ, however, did not suggest that Ms. Perez-Leeds’s ability to perform activities of daily living was “unlimited.” Contrary to Ms. Perez-Leeds’s argument that the ALJ mischaracterized the extent of her daily activities, the ALJ specifically noted that she “experiences difficulties while performing daily activities.” Admin. R. at 14. The ALJ’s conclusion that she has moderate restrictions in activities of daily living reflects his consideration of her stated difficulties with some of these activities. Ms. Perez-Leeds also contends that the ALJ “ignored the report from Dr. Joseph Sadek which summarized [her] performance on a battery of psychological tests.” Aplt. Br. at 11. But the ALJ did not ignore Dr. Sadek’s report. The ALJ discussed the report as part of the evidence in support of his RFC determination, and concluded that Dr. Sadek’s opinion deserved less weight because it overstated her limitations as compared to her demonstrated ability to perform activities of daily living, including driving her children to and from school and being able to use a computer to access the internet and exchange e-mail. Ms. Perez-Leeds next argues that “[r]esults from testing and clinical interview performed by Dr. Simpson also indicated marked limitations in [her] ability to perform activities of daily living.” Aplt. Br. at 11-12. But in Dr. Simpson’s “Mental -7- Status Consultative Examination,” he did not specifically assess Ms. Perez-Leeds’s ability to perform activities of daily living or reach a conclusion on that issue. See Admin. R. at 314-19. Ms. Perez-Leeds further asserts that “Dr. Simpson noted that [she] had cognitive impairments that caused difficulty multitasking and preparing and completing tasks in the home environment.” Aplt. Br. at 12. This assertion gives the impression that Dr. Simpson reached this conclusion based on his own independent evaluation; but that is not an accurate characterization of the record. Dr. Simpson’s summary of Ms. Perez-Leeds’s recitation of her history states that she reported “having cognitive delays that included processing information, and having difficulty multitasking.” Admin. R. at 314. Ms. Perez-Leeds also told him that “[b]oth at home and in the work environment it takes her a long time to prepare and complete tasks.” Id. at 314-15. These statements reflect Ms. Perez-Leeds’s assessment of her abilities, not Dr. Simpson’s assessment.1 The ALJ did not err in evaluating the medical evidence or in concluding that Ms. Perez-Leeds has only moderate restrictions in activities of daily living. 1 The ALJ found Ms. Perez-Leeds’s statements concerning the limiting effects of her symptoms credible to the extent they were consistent with his RFC assessment. His RFC found her capable of performing a full range of work at all exertional levels, subject to certain nonexertional limitations. Ms. Perez-Leeds has not challenged the ALJ’s assessment of her credibility. -8-
Ms. Perez-Leeds argues that the ALJ’s conclusion that she has moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace is not supported. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ noted Dr. Sadek’s assessment that she “demonstrates functional restriction because of pervasive developmental disorder NOS, especially in the area of maintaining attention.” Admin. R. at 15. But the ALJ also noted Ms. Perez-Leeds’s testimony that she could use a computer to access the internet and carry on correspondence via email; read magazines; and seek and receive unemployment benefits. The ALJ properly acknowledged Dr. Sadek’s opinion, but reasonably concluded that Ms. Perez-Leeds had demonstrated only moderate difficulties in this functional area. Ms. Perez-Leeds contends that “other evidence not mentioned by the ALJ indicates that [she] had marked limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace.” Aplt. Br. at 12. She refers to her receiving “assistance and accommodation from her mother in her past work”; her former employer’s ordering a psychological evaluation from Dr. Snow; and Dr. Sadek’s opinion that she “could not organize a job search on her own or attain employment without the assistance of others” and “that she required at least twice as much time as her peers to complete tasks.” Id. at 13. But the ALJ did refer to this evidence in the decision. For example, the ALJ recognized Ms. Perez-Leeds’s testimony that “she receives help from her mother on a relatively frequent and consistent basis.” Admin. R. at 16. The ALJ also noted that “Dr. Snow -9- examined the claimant, and reported that her employer was concerned about her job performance involving clerical duties in his law office.” Id. at 17. Finally, the ALJ discussed Dr. Sadek’s report but concluded that his opinion “apparently overstates the claimant’s limitations” and is inconsistent with Ms. Perez-Leeds’s own testimony. Id. Ms. Perez-Leeds ends this section with the conclusory assertion that the evidence noted above “indicate[s] a marked rather than moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, and pace.” Aplt. Br. at 13. Our role, however, is not to reweigh the evidence, see Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084, and Ms. Perez-Leeds has not shown that the ALJ committed reversible error in finding that she had only a moderate limitation in this functional area. In sum, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Ms. Perez-Leeds did not demonstrate that she satisfied the listing requirement of having marked limitations in two of the three identified functional areas. The ALJ properly found Ms. Perez-Leeds not disabled at step three.