Opinion ID: 1299986
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Austin's Appeal

Text: Austin essentially contends the trial judge erred in failing to award his request for attorney's fees and costs in its entirety for the amount of $49,936.50. In his post-trial motion, Austin requested to recover damages under all of the jury's verdicts in addition to attorney's fees and costs as statutorily-authorized under the Dealer's Act and the Federal Odometer Act. In his order addressing this request, the trial judge held Austin was required to elect one verdict as between the negligence, fraud, constructive fraud, and the Dealer's Act given Austin experienced one loss based on four different theories. In view of this holding, the trial judge implicitly denied Austin's request for attorney's fees and costs under the Dealer's Act. Given Austin's recovery under the Federal Odometer Act represented a separate cause of action, the trial judge awarded Austin $1,500 in actual damages and a reasonable attorney fee in the amount of $4,500, which represented the time spent on recovering under the Federal Odometer Act. [10] Because Austin was ordered to elect between the jury's verdicts of negligence, constructive fraud, fraud, and the violation of the Dealer's Act, Austin claims he was denied the statutorily-authorized attorney's fees and costs under the Dealer's Act [11] given he chose to recover for his fraud claim which yielded only actual and punitive damages. Election of remedies involves a choice between different forms of redress afforded by law for the same injury or different forms of proceeding on the same cause of action. Taylor v. Medenica, 324 S.C. 200, 218, 479 S.E.2d 35, 44 (1996). The basic purpose of election of remedies is to prevent double recovery for a single wrong. Save Charleston Found. v. Murray, 286 S.C. 170, 333 S.E.2d 60 (Ct.App.1985). When an identical set of facts entitle the plaintiff to alternative remedies, he may plead and prove his entitlement to either or both; however, the plaintiff may not recover both. Id. at 175, 333 S.E.2d at 64. Although novel in this state, we find Austin's contention is supported by case law from other jurisdictions. As we interpret these cases, they stand for the proposition that a plaintiff may recover attorney fees under a statutory claim in addition to punitive damages under a common law claim. The rationale for this position is that an award for both does not amount to double recovery for a single wrong given attorney's fees are intended to make such claims economically viable for private citizens whereas an award of punitive damages is designed to punish wrongful conduct and deter future misconduct. See, e.g., Miller v. United Automax, 166 S.W.3d 692, 697-98 (Tenn.2005) (holding, in suit involving buyers of a used car, election of remedies doctrine did not bar buyers from recovering attorney fees under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act after having elected to receive punitive damages on their common law misrepresentation claim in lieu of statutory treble damages); Wilkins v. Peninsula Motor Cars, Inc., 266 Va. 558, 587 S.E.2d 581, 583-84 (2003) (concluding, in a case involving a buyer of used car, election of remedies doctrine did not require the buyer to elect between verdicts of fraud and violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act where recovery of attorney fees under the Act was not duplicative of punitive damages awarded on the common law fraud claim). Because costly attorney fees may deter private citizens from bringing a claim under the Dealer's Act, a decision in favor of Austin facilitates the purpose of the Act which is to provide buyers a private right of action against dealers who engage in deceptive practices. Furthermore, given the recovery of attorney's fees under the Dealer's Act is not duplicative of the award of punitive damages, we do not believe a decision in favor of Austin would violate the election of remedies doctrine's prevention of double redress for a single wrong. As its name states, the doctrine applies to the election of remedies not the election of verdicts. Thus, an award of attorney's fees and costs would merely serve to fully compensate Austin for pursuing his statutorily-authorized private right of action under the Dealer's Act, which we believe epitomizes the definition of a remedy. See Black's Law Dictionary 1163 (5th ed. 1979) (defining remedy as [t]he means by which a right is enforced or the violation of a right is prevented, redressed, or compensated). Given our conclusion that Austin can recover attorney's fees and costs under the Dealer's Act, the question becomes whether he should be awarded the entire amount of his request or should the amount be limited to the fees incurred in establishing his claim under the Dealer's Act. Under the specific facts of this case, we find it would be difficult to dissect Austin's counsel's fee affidavit to ascertain how much time was spent on this particular claim given the violation of the Act was based on the same facts and circumstances underlying his claims for fraud and constructive fraud. Furthermore, to award Austin his claim in its entirety would be consistent with the precedent of this Court. Cf. Taylor v. Nix, 307 S.C. 551, 557, 416 S.E.2d 619, 622 (1992) (finding award of attorney fees under the Dealer's Act was warranted even though fee affidavit was not itemized for time spent for claim under the Act and that spent for the nonstatutory cause of action).
Austin contends the trial judge erred in declining to award him prejudgment interest. Because Stokes-Craven rejected Austin's demand to return the truck in exchange for the purchase price, Austin claims his actual damages were capable of ascertainment. In support of these assertions, Austin notes the jury awarded actual damages in the amount of $26,371.10 which equaled the purchase price of $25,981.10 plus $390.00 for the taxes and tags. The law permits the award of prejudgment interest when a monetary obligation is a sum certain, or is capable of being reduced to certainty, accruing from the time payment may be demanded either by the agreement of the parties or the operation of law. Historic Charleston Holdings, LLC v. Mallon, LLC, 381 S.C. 417, 435, 673 S.E.2d 448, 457 (2009); see S.C.Code Ann. § 34-31-20(A) (Supp.2009) (In all cases of accounts stated and in all cases wherein any sum or sums of money shall be ascertained and, being due, shall draw interest according to law, the legal interest shall be at the rate of eight and three-fourths percent per annum.). Generally, prejudgment interest may not be recovered on an unliquidated claim in the absence of agreement or statute. Charleston Holdings, LLC, 381 S.C. at 435, 673 S.E.2d at 457. The fact that the amount due is disputed does not render the claim unliquidated for purposes of awarding prejudgment interest. Id. Rather, the proper test is `whether [or not] the measure of recovery, not necessarily the amount of damages, is fixed by conditions existing at the time the claim arose.' Id. (quoting Butler Contracting, Inc. v. Court Street, LLC, 369 S.C. 121, 133, 631 S.E.2d 252, 259 (2006)). Although Austin is correct that prejudgment interest is statutorily authorized by the provisions of section 34-31-20 of the South Carolina Code, we find Austin's damages were not liquidated at the time his claim arose. Austin's lawsuit arose out of his dissatisfaction with the purchase of a used vehicle. Because Austin alleged claims of fraud, constructive fraud, negligence, and violations of state and federal motor vehicle acts his prospective damages were unliquidated and could not have been ascertained without evidence of the retail value of the truck. Given Austin's monetary recovery could not have been reduced to certainty, the trial judge correctly denied Austin's request for prejudgment interest.