Opinion ID: 1826657
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in its determinations with regard to the defamation claims.

Text: Because many of the allegations of error hinge upon the classification of Cottrell and Williams as either public or private figures, the Court will first address the classification of Cottrell and Williams in the context of their defamation claims.
A court must determine as a matter of law a plaintiffs classification in the context of a defamation claim. White v. Mobile Press Register, Inc., 514 So.2d 902 (Ala.1987). This determination will establish the plaintiffs burden of proof. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). In defamation actions, a plaintiff is either a private person, a public official, or a public figure, either in general or for the limited purpose of a particular public controversy. Mead Corp. v. Hicks, 448 So.2d 308 (Ala. 1984). If a plaintiff is determined to be a public official, public figure, or limited-purpose public figure, then the plaintiff has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the defamatory statement was made with `actual malice'  that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280, 84 S.Ct. 710; Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974); and White, 514 So.2d at 904. If it is determined that the plaintiff is a private figure, then the plaintiff has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant negligently published the defamatory statement. Mead Corp., 448 So.2d at 312 (holding that defendants who made false defamatory statements about private figures may be held liable if their conduct created an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff). Whether an individual is a public figure, limited-purpose public figure, or private figure is a question of law to be determined by the court. Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. Faulkner, 372 So.2d 1282 (Ala. 1979). This determination must be made by the trial court before the jury is charged so that the court can properly instruct the jury. Faulkner, 372 So.2d at 1285. A public figure is one who either has gained notoriety from his achievements or seeks public attention through vigor and success. New York Times, supra. In Gertz, the United States Supreme Court reduced the public-figure question to a more meaningful context by looking to the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation. 418 U.S. at 352, 94 S.Ct. 2997. Thus, the Court recognized a limited-purpose public figure as an individual [who] voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy. 418 U.S. at 351, 94 S.Ct. 2997. In this case, the NCAA and Culpepper agree that neither Cottrell nor Williams is a public official or a general-purpose public figure. The NCAA and Culpepper, however, maintain that the evidence established that both Cottrell and Williams are limited-purpose public figures; Cottrell and Williams disagree, claiming that the evidence established that they are private figures. Therefore, we must determine whether the NCAA and Culpepper established that Cottrell and Williams were limited-purpose public figures.
In Gertz, the United States Supreme Court provided that it is the nature and extent of an individual's involvement in a public controversy, i.e., the extent to which the individual's participation is voluntary, the extent to which the individual has access to the media to counteract the false statements, and the prominence of the individual's role in the public controversy, that determines whether an individual is a limited-purpose public figure. 418 U.S. at 344-45, 94 S.Ct. 2997. In Little v. Breland, 93 F.3d 755, 757 (11th Cir.1996), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recognized that in Silvester v. American Broadcasting Co., 839 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir.1988), it adopted the three-pronged test from Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287 (D.C.Cir.1980), to determine whether a plaintiff in a defamation action is a limited-purpose public figure with regard to a public controversy. Under the test, a court determining whether a plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure must `(1) isolate the public controversy, (2) examine the plaintiffs involvement in the controversy, and (3) determine whether the alleged defamation [was] germane to the plaintiffs participation in the controversy.' In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. Ill, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979), and Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 99 S.Ct. 2701, 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979), the United States Supreme Court unequivocally established that it is the plaintiffs role in the controversy, not the controversy itself, that determines whether a person is a limited-purpose public figure with regard to the alleged defamatory statements. The three-pronged test applied in Little provides a workable means of determining whether a plaintiff in a defamation action is a limited-purpose public figure because of his role in a public controversy; this Court adopts it and will now apply it to the facts of this case.
In Waldbaum, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia provided the following discussion on how to address the first prong of this test, stating: As the first step in its inquiry, the court must isolate the public controversy. A public controversy is not simply a matter of interest to the public; it must be a real dispute, the outcome of which affects the general public or some segment of it in an appreciable way. . . . [A] public controversy is a dispute that in fact has received public attention because its ramifications will be felt by persons who are not direct participants. To determine whether a controversy indeed existed and, if so, to define its contours, the judge must examine whether persons actually were discussing some specific question. A general concern or interest will not suffice. [ Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. Ill (1979)]. The court can see if the press was covering the debate, reporting what people were saying and uncovering facts and theories to help the public formulate some judgment. It should ask whether a reasonable person would have expected persons beyond the immediate participants in the dispute to feel the impact of its resolution. If the issue was being debated publicly and if it had foreseeable and substantial ramifications for nonparticipants, it was a public controversy. 627 F.2d at 1296-98 (footnotes omitted). Several factors lead to the conclusion that a public controversy existed before, during, and after the NCAA investigated the alleged rule violations by The University in 2000 and imposed the severe penalties against The University in 2002. In 2000, The University and the public learned about the NCAA's investigation into Young's involvement in recruiting Means and the federal charges that had developed. In light of The University's being on probation and in light of the efforts in 1998 by The University to comply with the enforcement rules and the NCAA's apparent disregard for that effort, a public debate developed about the 2000 investigation, including speculation on the propriety of the involvement, of The University's compliance staff in the investigation, the benefit, if any, of The University's self-reporting NCAA rule violations, and the NCAA's treatment of The University. Additionally, discussion focused on the fairness of the investigation process itself and on the NCAA's accountability with regard to fitting the penalty imposed to the offense. Consequently, widespread local and statewide media coverage was generated for over three years as the media sought to unravel precisely what had happened that resulted in The University's being charged and found guilty of several rule violations. The public concern for The University and its football program was evidenced by the number of articles written and the detail of the information provided from the first allegations of a recruiting scandal in Memphis, the revelation of a secret witness assisting the NCAA, in establishing the rule violations by The University, the statements made by Yeager that The University of Alabama football program was staring down the barrel of a gun, the harshness of the penalties imposed, and the apparent inequity of the penalty in light of The University's efforts in compliance with the enforcement process. Moreover, the citizens of Alabama had a legitimate interest in the controversy because The University is a public institution that receives State funds. The football program provides revenue for The University and, in light of the football program's tradition and history, is a source of pride for many of its graduates and the citizens of this State. Therefore, when The University of Alabama football program was staring down the barrel of a gun  facing potential termination of its football program  public discussion of all the circumstances creating the risk that the program could be terminated was rampant; a public controversy existed. We reject Culpepper's argument that the public controversy included debate concerning the character, integrity, and fitness of Cottrell and Williams to coach and work for The University. Culpepper relies on the reasoning of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F.Supp. 1110 (N.D.Cal.1984), in defining the public controversy in that defamation case. In Barry, Barry, a former head coach for the basketball team at the University of San Francisco (USF) sued one of his former basketball players, alleging that the player had defamed him when the player accused him of assisting an athletic representative of the basketball team in making improper cash payments to the player in violation of NCAA rules. In determining whether Barry was a limited-purpose public figure, the district court held that a public controversy existed involving the alleged recruiting violations at USF before Barry's acceptance of the position of head basketball coach. 584 F.Supp. at 1116. The district court noted that USF had twice been the subject of NCAA investigations involving USF's basketball program, that one of those investigations had led to the resignation of one head basketball coach and the other had led to the firing of the head coach who had preceded Barry, and that USF had been trying to solve the problems of its basketball program for many years. Additionally, the court noted that the president of USF, when he appointed Barry as head coach, insisted upon a `clean' program. 584 F.Supp. at 1116. The court concluded that a public controversy existed because the reputation of USF was at stake and there was a dispute as to what the University should do about allegations of recruiting violations. Id. Culpepper argues that the public controversy surrounding the investigation into alleged NCAA rule violations by The University is analogous. He reasons that because The University, like USF, was a repeat offender, intense scrutiny and substantial discourse regarding the rule violations developed. He further argues that because Cottrell and Williams were named in various articles as the coaches who were involved in the controversy, because they were closely associated with Young, and because they had been interviewed by the NCAA, a public debate developed about their character, integrity, and fitness. Culpepper, however, fails to recognize that although The University, like USF, was a repeat offender of NCAA rules, the public controversy did not focus on the actions of the coaching staff. Allegations of violations of NCAA rules by The University and by Cottrell and Williams did not lead to the resignation or firing of any of the football coaches. Indeed, none of the articles submitted impugned the character of Cottrell or Williams. Additionally, the articles did not suggest that the major violation of the NCAA rules was an ongoing problem involving football coaches or that The University had an ongoing problem that it had been trying to solve for years. Indeed, the evidence established that The University was making every effort to run a clean program and that, if the NCAA or the SEC had informed The University of the situation in Memphis, of which they were aware, actions would have been taken to prevent the egregious violation by the athletic representative who was the focus of the investigation. Unlike the public debate at USF, the public debate in this case did not question the reputation of The University or the integrity of its coaches; rather, the public debate concerned how the NCAA would view the efforts of The University to run a clean program and to engage in self-enforcement of NCAA rules. Therefore, evidence established that the focus of the public controversy surrounding The University was different from the public controversy involving USF. Based on the content, context, and forum of the controversy surrounding The University as presented in the record, we refuse to conclude that the public controversy involved the character, integrity, and fitness of Cottrell and Williams to coach and to work for The University. In conclusion, a public controversy existed; therefore, we must now focus on the roles of Cottrell and Williams in the controversy.
Consideration of this prong involves the plaintiffs prominence in the public controversy, the plaintiffs access to channels of effective communication to counteract false statements, and whether the plaintiff voluntarily thrust himself or was drawn into the forefront of the public controversy. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45, 94 S.Ct. 2997. The court in Waldbaum stated: Once the court has defined the controversy, it must analyze the plaintiffs role in it. Trivial or tangential participation, is not enough. The language of Gertz is clear that plaintiffs must have `thrust themselves to the forefront' of the controversies so as to become factors in their ultimate resolution. . . . They must have achieved a `special prominence' in the debate. . . . The plaintiff either must have been purposely trying to influence the outcome or could realistically have been expected, because of his position in the controversy, to have an impact on its resolution. In undertaking this analysis, a court can look to the plaintiffs past conduct, the extent of the press coverage, and the public reaction to his conduct and statements. 627 F.2d at 1297 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). The evidence does not support a conclusion that Cottrell and Williams tried to purposely influence the outcome of the public controversy; therefore, we must determine whether Cottrell and Williams realistically could have been expected, because of their positions in the controversy, to have an impact on its resolution. Thus, this factor rests upon their prominence in the public controversy, their access to channels of communication, and the voluntary injection of themselves into the public controversy.
This inquiry involves evaluating whether the plaintiffs actions have resulted in his being embroiled in the public controversy. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 94 S.Ct. 2997 (holding that the limited-purpose public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies). Perhaps the main question presented is would a reasonable person have expected Cottrell and Williams to play a significant role in determining the outcome of the controversy. In this case, the outcome of the controversy relates to whether the NCAA would find that The University and its football program fully cooperated with the NCAA's investigation into the alleged rule violations and engaged in adequate self-policing and self-enforcement so as to avoid the death penalty. Cottrell and Williams argue that they did not play a prominent role in the controversy because, they say, the major focus of the investigation involved Young and his improper conduct in recruiting Means and did not focus on their alleged violations of NCAA rules. They assert that because they were minor participants in the investigation, they should not be considered as having any influence on the outcome of the controversy. The evidence, however, established that Cottrell and Williams did play a prominent role in the public controversy. Newspaper articles focused on their conduct, their interviews with Johanningmeier, the violations alleged against them, and how their conduct would impact the COI's view of The University. Both Cottrell and Williams were charged with not providing full disclosure of information during an interview. Although the enforcement staff dropped the charge against Williams, it pursued the charge against Cottrell. The COI found that Cottrell had not complied with the rules in this regard. Therefore, the conduct of Cottrell and Williams did influence the way the NCAA viewed The University's compliance with the rules. Additionally, the record established that Cottrell and Williams both associated with Young, who was the major focus of the NCAA investigation and the main reason for the severity of the penalties imposed. Both Cottrell and Williams admitted violating certain NCAA rules, and, although no penalty was imposed against either Cottrell or Williams, The University was penalized for Cottrell's and Williams's violations of various NCAA rules. Although the evidence indicated that Cottrell and Williams were caught up in the controversy against [their] will, the evidence adequately established that they had assumed by their actions and their association with Young a prominent position in its outcome. Breland, 93 F.3d at 758.
In determining a plaintiffs involvement in the controversy, consideration must also be given to the extent to which the plaintiff had access to channels of effective communication to counteract any false statements. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45, 94 S.Ct. 2997. The NCAA and Culpepper argue that Cottrell and Williams had adequate access to the media to effectively rebut the alleged defamatory statements. The NCAA and Culpepper submitted over 200 newspaper and Internet articles published over several years containing comments by Cottrell and Williams throughout their careers at The University. Additionally, the NCAA points out that at the time it published the false statements in the penalty-summary report neither Cottrell nor Williams were prohibited from talking with the press. Cottrell and Williams argue that although they did enjoy limited access to the press as assistant coaches who were questioned about various prospective student-athletes and enrolled student-athletes, the NCAA rules prohibited them from discussing the NCAA investigation with the press and prevented them from being able to defend their reputations in the press. They maintain that this gag order prevented them from having access to the media and precluded a finding as a matter of law that they were limited-purpose public figures. In Price v. Chaffinch, (No. 04-956, May 12, 2006) (D.Del.2006) (not reported in F.Supp.2d), the United States District Court addressed whether a gag order imposed by the defendant, which prevented the plaintiff from responding in the media to the defamatory statements made by the defendant, precluded a finding that the plaintiff was a limited-purpose public figure. In Price, the plaintiffs media access was nonexistent, in light of the defendant's imposition of a gag order. The federal district court held that although this fact cut against a finding that the plaintiff was a public figure, the plaintiff was aware that a public controversy existed, yet he voluntarily assumed a position in the controversy. The court balanced the gag order against the plaintiffs voluntary assumption of risk in the controversy and concluded that the plaintiff was a significant player in a controversy with high public interest. Consequently, the court held that the gag order imposed on the plaintiff was a factor to consider, but did not preclude a finding that the plaintiff was a limited-purpose public figure. A similar circumstance was also addressed in Sculimbrene v. Reno, 158 F.Supp.2d 8 (D.D.C.2001), in which a former FBI agent sued a media commentator, alleging that the commentator conspired with others to defame him. The commentator attacked the agent's credibility with regard to statements he had made to various congressional bodies. The agent was unable to respond in the media to the attack because the FBI refused to allow him access to the media. The court; when addressing whether the agent was a limited-purpose public figure who had been drawn into a public controversy, focused on the agent's role in the controversy. In conducting the analysis pursuant to the Waldbaum test, the court noted that the agent's access to the press, both prior to the relevant controversy and during the relevant controversy, was at all times, circumscribed by his employment by the FBI, and his employer prevented him from talking with the media. 158 F.Supp.2d at 23. Nevertheless, the court held that the agent was a limited-purpose public figure because his actions required the conclusion that the' agent had played a significant role in the outcome of the controversy. Therefore, although the gag order prevented the agent from having access to the media, this fact did not out-weigh the evidence indicating that the agent had played a prominent role in the controversy or preclude a finding that the agent was a limited-purpose public figure. We agree with the federal district courts that the imposition of a gag order does not necessitate a finding that an individual is not a limited-purpose public figure. It deserves weight in making the determination, but it does not prevent such a finding. Here, the gag order prevented Cottrell and Williams from discussing their role in the NCAA investigation with the press. However, the evidence that Cottrell and Williams played a prominent role in the public controversy significantly outweighs the effect of the gag order.

A private individual, however, is not automatically transformed into a public figure just by becoming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts public attention. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167, 99 S.Ct. 2701. In general, to be a limited purpose public figure, the plaintiff must voluntarily thrust himself into the vortex of the dispute. From the voluntary act is derived the notion of assumption of the risk and the consequent fairness in labelling the person a public figure. Marcane v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1083 (3d Cir.1985). In Waldbaum, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia elaborated on a plaintiffs voluntary injection into a particular public controversy, noting that a person becomes a limited-purpose public figure if he attempts to have, or realistically can be expected to have, a major impact on the resolution of the public controversy. 627 F.2d at 1292. A person who voluntarily injects himself into a particular public controversy invites attention and comment. See Hunter v. Hartman, 545 N.W.2d 699 (Minn.Ct.App.1996)(holding that a team doctor for a college football program was a limited-purpose public figure because he voluntarily commented in a book and on national television about the public controversy over a former head coach's coaching style); Daubenmire v. Sommers, 156 Ohio App.3d 322, 805 N.E.2d 571 (2004)(holding that a coach voluntarily injected himself into a controversy by injecting religion into public schools); Chevalier v. Animal Rehab. Ctr., 839 F.Supp. 1224 (N.D.Tex.1993)(holding that a zoologist voluntarily injected himself into a controversy by appearing on television, giving interviews, and attempting to orchestrate a counter letter-writing campaign); James v. Gannett Co., 40 N.Y.2d 415, 353 N.E.2d 834, 386 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1976) (holding that a belly dancer voluntarily injected herself into controversy by taking affirmative steps in the press to attract attention); and Oaks v. City of Fairhope, 515 F.Supp. 1004 (S.D.Ala.1981)(holding that a librarian voluntarily injected herself into controversy by presenting her case in press). Additionally, a person can voluntarily inject himself into a public controversy by choosing a position that thrusts the person into the public controversy. In White v. Mobile Press Register, Inc., supra, this Court held that John C. White was a public figure because of his choice of career as a high level executive in an industry that is the subject of much public interest and concern. 514 So.2d at 904. The Court reasoned that his choice of career exhibited a voluntary decision to place himself in a situation where there was a likelihood of public controversy. Id. In Fiacco v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity, 484 F.Supp.2d 158 (D.Me.2007), the district court held that David Fiacco, the director of judicial affairs at the University of Maine, was a limited-purpose public figure. With regard to the voluntariness factor of the determination, the court held that Fiacco, in light of his position, voluntarily injected himself into the public controversy. The court determined that newspaper articles in the record established that a public controversy existed concerning the student-disciplinary process at the University of Maine. The court observed that as director of judicial affairs, Fiacco had the capacity to investigate allegations of student misconduct, adjudicate cases, conduct hearings himself and proscribe sanctions or refer a case to a committee for its action. 484 F.Supp.2d at 163. The court reasoned that [t]he nature of the position thrust Fiacco into the public controversy surrounding the student disciplinary process. 484 F.Supp.2d at 172. The court concluded that because Fiacco voluntarily accepted the position of director of judicial affairs and that position placed him at the center of a public controversy, he had injected himself into the public controversy. We conclude that Cottrell and Williams also injected themselves into the public controversy. When Williams accepted his coaching position in 1994 and Cottrell accepted his position in 1997, both men knew that The University was a member of the NCAA, that they were expected to comply with NCAA rules in a highly competitive environment, and that their actions would come under close scrutiny. Cottrell and Williams were both responsible for recruiting prospective student-athletes to sign scholarships to play football for The University. Both coaches were expected to abide by NCAA rules when recruiting prospective student-athletes. The nature of their positions at The University and the responsibilities of their positions thrust them into the public controversy concerning The University's compliance with NCAA rules. Like White and Fiacco, Cottrell and Williams made career choices that thrust them into positions involving much public interest and concern. The public controversy surrounding The University's compliance with NCAA rules began in 1995. Thus, by accepting their coaching positions, Cottrell and Williams show[ed] a voluntary decision to place [themselves] in a situation where there was a likelihood of public controversy. Therefore, because Cottrell and Williams voluntarily accepted positions with The University's football program under such circumstances, we conclude that they injected themselves into the public controversy. [12]
A plaintiff is drawn into a public controversy when his actions invite comment and attention, despite the fact that the plaintiff does not actively try or even want to attract the public's attention. See, e.g., Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F.Supp. 440 (S.D.Ga.1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.1978)(holding that Rosanova was a limited-purpose public figure because he consistently associated with underworld contacts and voluntarily engaged in a course of activity that was bound to invite attention and comment). Therefore, a person can be drawn into a public controversy based on his status, position, or association to the public controversy. See Swate v. Schiffers, 975 S.W.2d 70 (Tex.App.1998)(holding that a doctor was drawn into public controversy about the quality of his medical practice in light of the 24 articles written over 10 years describing the atrociousness of the doctor's medical practice). The NCAA and Culpepper argue that Cottrell and Williams were drawn into the controversy because they played a role in the conduct that resulted in The University's being charged with various NCAA rule violations, they participated in the NCAA's investigation into those alleged rule violations, and they were the subject of numerous newspaper articles about the alleged rule violations. According to the NCAA and Culpepper, this evidence established that Cottrell and Williams were in positions that invite[d] attention and comment with respect to their participation in the controversy. The evidence unequivocally established that by their actions Cottrell and Williams invited public scrutiny and should have expected public and media attention with regard to their conduct and involvement in the NCAA investigation of alleged rule violations and the surrounding public controversy. Articles detailed Cottrell's and Williams's conduct throughout the controversy, including their close association with Young, their interviews with Johanningmeier, the alleged rule violations made against them and their responses, and the penalties, or lack thereof, imposed against them. Additionally, the evidence established that Cottrell and Williams proactively engaged in the conduct that was the subject of alleged rule violations and admitted certain violations. Furthermore, their close association with Young, who was the central focus of the investigation, indicated that their conduct invited public attention and comment. Without question, the evidence established that Cottrell and Williams engaged in a course of conduct with respect to the investigation and the surrounding controversy that was bound to invite attention and comment; therefore, Cottrell and Williams were drawn into the public controversy. Indeed, it appears that there are similarities between Cottrell and Williams's being drawn into the public controversy by virtue of their alleged commission of violations of various NCAA rules and a defendant who has been drawn into a public controversy by virtue of being accused of a crime. In Wolston, the United States Supreme Court held that a person who engages in criminal conduct does not automatically become a public figure. The Court noted that the status of the criminal defendant should be determined by focusing on the `nature and extent of an individual's participation in the controversy giving rise to the [alleged] defamation.' 443 U.S. at 167, 99 S.Ct. 2701 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352, 94 S.Ct. 2997). In Ruebke v. Globe Communications Corp., 241 Kan. 595, 600-03, 738 P.2d 1246, 1251-53 (1987), the Kansas Supreme Court held that Ruebke, a criminal defendant, was a limited-purpose public figure because of the intense media coverage of the investigation into the triple murders Ruebke had been charged with; Ruebke's voluntary act of turning himself in to the police to seek protective custody; and his arrest and indictment for the three murders. The court held that although no one factor standing alone would be sufficient to convey limited-purpose public-figure status on Ruebke, the factors considered as a whole sufficiently established that Ruebke was drawn into a situation that invited comment. The court stated: Individuals who do not seek publicity or consent to it, but through their own conduct or otherwise become a subject of public interest, may become limited public figures. Those who commit crime or are accused of it may wish to avoid publicity, but are nevertheless persons of public interest, concerning whom the public is entitled to be informed. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D, comment f (1976). 241 Kan. at 600, 738 P.2d at 1251. Although Cottrell's and Williams's conduct did not involve criminal activity, it did involve violations of NCAA rules, which impacted The University, its alumni, and the citizens of this State. Given the public nature of the conduct at issue here and the widespread media attention given the controversy, we hold that the evidence established that Cottrell and Williams were drawn into the public controversy.
The NCAA and Culpepper contend that the alleged defamatory statements were germane to Cottrell's and Williams's participation in the public controversy. Black's Law Dictionary 708 (8th ed.2004) defines germane as relevant; pertinent.
The statements made by the NCAA in the penalty-summary report involved the imposition of penalties for violations of NCAA rules by employees of The University. The statements indicated that a show-cause provision had been imposed against the recruiting coordinator and other employees of The University. These false statements were germane to the public controversy because a central issue of the public dispute was the nature of the penalties imposed by the NCAA against The University, its employees, and its representatives. As the NCAA stated, the statements made by the NCAA during the infractions process and in the erroneous penalty summary all were related to the NCAA investigation. Therefore, the NCAA's statements about Cottrell and Williams in the penalty-summary report published on the NCAA Web site were germane to the public controversy.
Cottrell contends that the statements made by Culpepper to the effect that Cottrell stole funds from the Shaun Alexander Foundation, that he and his assistant stole videotapes from The University's athletic department, and that he had abandoned his family in Tallahassee were not germane to the public controversy. In support of his contention, Cottrell emphasizes that these statements were not used by the NCAA or The University to substantiate any of the rule violations he allegedly committed. Cottrell reasons that because they were not relied upon in the investigation, the statements were not germane to the public controversy. The record establishes that the statements made by Culpepper were not relevant to the public controversy. The public controversy did not focus on Cottrell's character or his fitness to coach, but on the investigative process and the NCAA's treatment of The University. Although one can argue that the public controversy implicitly involved Cottrell's character or his fitness to coach, the wealth of articles presented to this Court defining the public controversy do not lend themselves to such a conclusion. Therefore, we conclude that the statements made by Culpepper about Cottrell were not germane to the public controversy.
Culpepper made statements to the effect that Williams was a recruiting cheater and that he had funneled money from Young to Means. These statements described rule violations the NCAA was investigating and, therefore, were germane to the public controversy.
Like the statements made by the NCAA in the penalty-summary report, these statements were germane to the public controversy because they were allegedly made during the NCAA investigation and involved information about various interviews and evidence relied upon by the NCAA in developing its charges of rule violations against The University and against Cottrell and Williams. Indeed, Cottrell and Williams do not refute the argument that these alleged defamatory statements were germane to the public controversy.
Because the evidence established that a public controversy existed, that Cottrell and Williams played a prominent role in the public controversy, and that the statements made by the NCAA in the penalty-summary report were germane to the public controversy, Cottrell and Williams were limited-purpose public figures with regard to the statements made by the NCAA in the penalty-summary report. Cottrell and Williams were also limited-purpose public figures with regard to the conspiracy claim against the NCAA and Culpepper alleging media leaks. With regard to the statements made by Culpepper about Williams, the evidence established that Williams was a limited-purpose public figure. Finally, the evidence established that Cottrell was a private person with regard to the statements made by Culpepper that Cottrell had abandoned his family and had stolen funds from the Shaun Alexander Foundation and videotapes from The University's athletic department. The trial court did not err in its rulings concerning the classifications of Cottrell and Williams in their defamation claims.
Culpepper contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment as a matter of law because, he says, his statements about Cottrell involved matters of public concern and Cottrell did not present clear and convincing evidence of actual malice to establish a prima facie case of defamation. [W]here it is determined that a private individual is alleging defamation, there must be a determination of whether the defamatory speech involves a matter of public concern. Ex parte Rudder, 507 So.2d 411, 416 (Ala.1987). If the matter is of public concern, then the defamed private individual must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the statements were made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that [the statements were] false or with reckless disregard of whether [they] were false or not. Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So.2d 1085, 1095 (Ala.1988). The jury held that the following statements by Culpepper about Cottrell were defamatory: 1. That Cottrell stole funds from the Shaun Alexander Foundation; 2. That Cottrell and his assistant stole video tapes from The University's athletic department; and 3. That Cottrell had abandoned his family in Tallahassee. With regard to Culpepper's statement that Cottrell stole funds from the Shaun Alexander Foundation, we conclude that this statement does not involve a matter of public concern. In Nelson, 534 So.2d at 1096, this Court held that a theft by an employee from a private company was not a matter of public concern. Similarly, we conclude that a theft by an individual from a foundation is not a matter of public concern. Theft of property from a private company or foundation does not involve a threat to public safety, a theft of public funds, or an abuse of public trust; therefore, statements made about thefts from private entities are not matters of public concern. Cf. Ex parte Rudder (holding abusive prescription-drug practices involved matter of public concern); Silvester (holding jai alai industry a matter of public concern); Rosanova (holding organized crime matter of public concern). Thus, because Culpepper's statement that Cottrell stole funds from the Shaun Alexander Foundation did not involve a threat to public safety or a misuse of public property or trust, the trial court did not err in denying Culpepper's motion for a judgment as a matter of law with regard to that statement. [13] Likewise, the trial court did not err in denying Culpepper's motion for a judgment as a matter of law with regard to Culpepper's contention that his statement that Cottrell had abandoned his family involved a matter of public concern. This general statement does not suggest a threat to public safety, public funding, or public trust; therefore, the statement does not involve a matter of public concern. [14] Finally, the trial court did not err in denying Culpepper's motion for a judgment as a matter of law with regard to his statement that Cottrell stole videotapes from The University's athletic department. Culpepper argues that the trial court erred in holding that his statement that Cottrell stole videotapes from The University's athletic department did not involve a matter of public concern. We agree. Cottrell was an employee of The University's athletic department. The videotapes were the property of The University's athletic department. The athletic department is a department within The University. The University is a public institution, governed by a board of trustees appointed by the Governor of Alabama and approved by the legislature, and funded by the citizens of Alabama. Because this statement involved a theft from a public institution by' an employee of the institution, this statement involved a matter of public concern. Thus, the trial court erred in holding that the statement was not a matter of public concern. Because Culpepper's statement that Cottrell stole videotapes from The University's athletic department involved a matter of public concern., Cottrell must present clear and convincing evidence of actual malice to satisfy his burden of proof for his defamation claim based on that statement to be submitted to the jury. Culpepper contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment as a matter of law because, he says, Cottrell did not present clear and convincing evidence of actual malice with regard to this statement. According to Culpepper, Cottrell's evidence did not establish that he made the statement with reckless disregard as to whether the statement was false or not. The evidence, however, established that in October 2000, Cottrell, in the presence of others, met with Culpepper and asked him to stop making statements that impacted his reputation. Culpepper made the statement at issue after December 2000. Viewed in a light most favorable to Cottrell, the evidence created a jury question as to Culpepper's state of mind when he made the false statements. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Culpepper's motion for a judgment as a matter of law in this regard.
Culpepper contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a judgment as a matter of law because, he says, his statement that Cottrell had abandoned his family in Tallahassee is not slander per se. [I]t is clear from our decisions that in a slander action, to constitute slander actionable per se, the alleged slander must impute an indictable offense involving infamy or moral turpitude. Marion v. Davis, 217 Ala. 16, 114 So. 357, 55 A.L.R. 171 (1927), quoted with approval in Tonsmeire v. Tonsmeire, 281 Ala. 102, 199 So.2d 645 (1967). We do not think the alleged slander here is actionable per se. We do not believe that being `fired and rehired' imputes an indictable offense involving infamy or moral turpitude; nor does `committing assault and battery' (assuming it is a part of the defamation charged). Dudley v. Horn, 21 Ala. 379 [(1852)]; Gillman v. State, 165 Ala. 135, 136, 51 So. 722 [(1910)]. `Infamy' is defined, by Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, as: `INFAMY. A qualification of a man's legal status produced by his conviction of an infamous crime and the consequent loss of honor and credit, which, at common law, rendered him incompetent as a witness, and by statute in some jurisdictions entails other disabilities. State v. Clark, 60 Kan. 450, 56 P. 767.' `Moral turpitude signifies an inherent quality of baseness, vileness, depravity.' Gillman v. State, supra. However, as the court pointed out in Marion v. Davis, supra, viz: `This distinction, however, does not deny the right to maintain an action for slander founded on oral malicious defamation subjecting the plaintiff to disgrace, ridicule, odium, or contempt, though it falls short of imputing the commission of such crime or misdemeanor. In such case the law pronounces the words actionable per quod only, and the plaintiff must allege and prove special damages as an element of the cause of action. ' . . . [Emphasis supplied] `Per quod' is defined in Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Ed., at p. 1293: `PER QUOD. Lat. Whereby. When the declaration in an action of tort, after stating the acts complained of, goes on to allege the consequences of those acts as a ground of special damage to the plaintiff, the recital of such consequences is prefaced by these words, per quod, whereby; and sometimes the phrase is used as the name of that clause of the declaration. `Words actionable per quod are those not actionable per se upon their face, but are only actionable in consequence of extrinsic facts showing circumstances under which they were said or the damages resulting to slandered party therefrom. Smith v. Mustain, 210 Ky. 445, 276 S.W. 154, 155, 44 A.L.R. 386.' It seems clear that since no allegation of special damages is made in the complaint, the demurrers were properly sustained by the trial court. Brown v. W.R.M.A. Broad Co., 286 Ala. 186, 188, 238 So.2d 540, 541-42 (1970) (footnote omitted). A decision whether a statement is reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning is a question of law. Harris v. School Annual Publ'g Co., 466 So.2d 963. 964 (Ala.1985). At the close of the evidence, the trial court held that Culpepper did not establish special damages; therefore, the statements were not actionable as slander per quod. Cottrell does not contest this ruling; therefore we will not review it. Thus, for Culpepper's statement that Cottrell had abandoned his family to be actionable, he must establish that the statement is slander per se, i.e., the statement imputed an indictable offense involving infamy or moral turpitude. When determining whether a statement is actionable as slander per se, a court must give the language used `that meaning that would be ascribed to the language by a reader or listener of average or ordinary intelligence, or by a common mind.' Camp v. Yeager, 601 So.2d 924, 927 (Ala.1992), quoting Loveless v. Graddick, 295 Ala. 142, 148, 325 So.2d 137, 142 (1975). . . . [T]he alleged slanderous statement must be construed in connection with the other parts of the conversation, in order to determine the context in which the statement was made. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Daugherty, 840 So.2d 152, 157-58 (Ala.2002). Cottrell contends that Culpepper's statement that he abandoned his family described a violation of § 13A-13-5, Ala. Code 1975, which states, in pertinent part: A man or woman commits the crime of abandonment of a child when, being a parent, guardian or other person legally charged with the care or custody of a child less than 18 years old, he or she deserts such child in a place with intent wholly to abandon it. Cottrell contends the statement also describes a violation of § 13A-13-4, Ala.Code 1975, which provides, in part: A man or woman commits the crime of nonsupport if he or she intentionally fails to provide support which that person is able to provide and which that person knows he or she is legally obligated to provide to a dependent spouse or child less than 19 years of age. We, however, cannot conclude that the statement that Cottrell had abandoned his family imputed the above indictable offenses. In Blevins v. W.F. Barnes Corp., 768 So.2d 386 (Ala.Civ.App.1999), the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals held that a statement that the plaintiff tried to extort money out of me because I refused to pay his demands was not slander per se. The Court of Civil Appeals reasoned that because the word extort had at least two meanings, the statement at issue was not slander per se. Like the word extort, the word abandon is not limited in meaning to that defined by the criminal statutes. Abandon is defined as: 1a: to give up to the control or influence of another person or agent b: to give up with the intent of never again claiming a right or interest in . . . 2: to withdraw from often in the face of danger or encroachment . . . 3: to withdraw protection, support, or help from . . . 4: to give (oneself) over unrestrainedly 5a: to cease from maintaining; practicing, or using . . . b: to cease intending or attempting to perform. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1-2 (11th ed.2003). The term abandon has too many meanings to necessarily suggest the indictable criminal offenses. Additionally, the record does not contain portions of Culpepper's conversation discussing Cottrell's alleged abandonment of his family to establish the context of the statement. Because the word abandon has more than one meaning and because we have no facts to establish the context in which the statement was made, we cannot conclude that Culpepper's statement that Cottrell had abandoned his family charged an indictable offense. Therefore, the statement is not slander per se. Because the statement is not slander per quod and because Cottrell did not establish that the statement that he had abandoned his family was slander per se, the trial court erred in denying Culpepper a judgment as a matter of law on this claim of defamation.
Williams appears to inartfully challenge the trial court's rulings with regard to Culpepper's statements about him. Culpepper contends that the trial court properly entered a judgment as a matter of law for him with regard to Williams's claims of defamation because, he says, the trial court properly concluded that the statements were not actionable. The trial court held that the evidence did not establish that Culpepper's statements were slander per quod and Williams does not challenge this holding. Therefore, Williams had to establish that Culpepper's statement were slander per se. Neither the statement that Williams was a recruiting cheater nor the statement that he funneled money from Young to Means imputed a crime of infamy or moral turpitude. Therefore, these statements were not slander per se. Because Williams did not establish that Culpepper's statements were actionable; the trial court properly entered a judgment as a matter of law for Culpepper in this regard. II. Whether the trial court erred in its rulings involving the defamatory statements made by the NCAA in the penalty-summary report posted on the Web site, including the claim of invasion of privacy, which also stemmed from, the statements made in the penalty-summary report. In Butler, this Court defined the elements of the tort of invasion of privacy, stating: `This Court defines the tort of invasion of privacy as the intentional wrongful intrusion into one's private activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities.' . . . . . . . . . . [T]his Court has adopted the following definition for `false light' invasion of privacy: `One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if `(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and `(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.'  Schifano v. Greene County Greyhound Park, Inc., 624 So.2d 178, 180 (Ala.1993)(emphasis omitted)(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977)). A false-light claim does not require that the information made public be private; instead, the information made public must be false. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E cmt. A. (1977). 871 So.2d at 12. Cottrell and Williams contend that they presented clear and convincing evidence that the NCAA made the false statements in the penalty-summary report with actual malice, creating, they say, a question for the jury to resolve. Specifically, they argue that the evidence established that the NCAA knew that the statements made in the penalty-summary report were false and that the NCAA exhibited a reckless disregard for the veracity of the statements when they published the penalty-summary report without proofreading the report for accuracy. Therefore, with regard to this claim Cottrell argues that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment for the NCAA, and Williams argues that the trial court erred in entering a judgment as a matter of law for the NCAA. `In a [defamation] action brought by a public figure, summary judgment for the defendant is appropriate unless the plaintiff produces the clear and convincing evidence that a reasonable jury would need in order to find that the defendant published the defamatory material with actual malice.' McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., 91 F.3d 1501, 1508 (C.A.D.C.1996); see Finebaum v. Coulter, 854 So.2d 1120, 1128-29 (Ala.2003). `[T]here is no genuine issue [of material fact] if the evidence presented in the opposing affidavits is of insufficient caliber or quantity to allow a rational finder of fact to find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.' Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Pemberton v. Birmingham News Co., 482 So.2d 257, 259-60 (Ala.1985). This standard is satisfied by proof that a false statement was made `with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.' Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 659, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989)(quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. [254] at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710 [(1964)]). A defendant acts with `reckless disregard' if, at the time of publication, the defendant `entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [its] publication or acted with a high degree of awareness of . . . [its] probable falsity.' McFarlane, 91 F.3d at 1508 (quoting St. Amant [ v. Thompson ], 390 U.S. [727] at 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323 [(1968)])(emphasis added). `The actual malice standard is subjective; the plaintiff must prove that the defendant actually entertained a serious doubt.' Id. (emphasis added). See Sanders v. Smitherman, 776 So.2d 68, 71 (Ala.2000); Finebaum, 854 So.2d at 1124; see also Revell v. Hoffman, 309 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir. 2002); Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1131 (9th Cir.2002); Chafoulias v. Peterson, 668 N.W.2d 642, 654 (Minn. 2003). Malice can be shown by circumstantial evidence showing, for example, `that the story was (1) fabricated, (2) so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put [it] in circulation, or (3) based wholly on a source that the defendant had obvious reasons to doubt, such as an unverified anonymous telephone call.' McFarlane, 91 F.3d at 1512-13 (quoting St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732, 88 S.Ct. 1323). However, malice cannot be `measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing.' St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323 (emphasis added). Indeed, the failure to investigate does not constitute malice, unless the failure evidences `purposeful avoidance,' that is, `an intent to avoid the truth.' Sweeney v. Prisoners' Legal Servs., 84 N.Y.2d 786, 793, 647 N.E.2d 101, 104, 622 N.Y.S.2d 896, 899 (1995) (quoting Connaughton, 491 U.S. at 693, 109 S.Ct. 2678); see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 332, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). Smith v. Huntsville Times Co., 888 So.2d 492, 499-500 (Ala.2004). Viewed in a light most favorable to Cottrell and Williams, the evidence indicates that DeWees, the creator of the penalty-summary report, made a clerical error when she was posting the report on the NCAA's Web site and does not indicate actual malice. Her deposition testimony and her testimony at trial clearly indicates that she was unaware that the statements were false and that the error was at most negligence. A mistake is clearly insufficient to support a finding of actual malice. Medure v. Vindicator Printing Co., 273 F.Supp.2d 588, 598 (W.D.Pa.2002); Gulf Publ'g Co. v. Lee, 434 So.2d 687 (Miss.1983); Long v. Arcell, 618 F.2d 1145, 1148 (5th Cir.1980)(a defendant who merely is careless may not be held liable for defaming a public figure). Additionally, the evidence does not support a finding of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers. Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 158, 87 S.Ct. 1975 (holding that such evidence of extreme departure from reasonable publishing standards can indicate actual malice). The trial court properly entered a summary judgment for the NCAA on Cottrell's claims of defamation and invasion of privacy involving the posting of the false statements on the NCAA Web site. Likewise, the trial court properly entered a judgment as a matter of law for the NCAA with regard to Williams's claims involving the Web site. Williams contends that because the trial court changed his classification to a limited-purpose public figure at the close of his case-in-chief and thereby elevated his burden of proof to require that he present evidence of actual malice to establish a prima facie case of defamation, he was prejudiced and should be granted a new trial. When the trial court reevaluated Williams's classification at the close of his case-in-chief and determined that he was a limited-purpose public figure, the trial court permitted Williams to reopen his case to present evidence of actual malice with regard to the penalty-summary report. Williams presented DeWees's testimony. Williams did not argue that he had additional evidence of actual malice that he had been prevented from presenting. Additionally, he did not argue that the timing of the trial court's ruling impacted his trial strategy to his detriment or prevented him from presenting evidence. There is no evidence in the record that lends itself to a conclusion that Williams was prejudiced by the reclassification, and Williams did not, in his briefs to this Court or during oral argument, direct this Court to any evidence of prejudice. Therefore, any error in the trial court's changing Williams's burden of proof at the close of the evidence, in light of the trial court's allowing Williams to reopen his case and present additional evidence, was at most harmless. Rule 45, Ala. R.App. P. Cottrell further maintains that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment for the NCAA on his claims of defamation and invasion of privacy with regard to the false statements in the penalty-summary report because, he says, the trial court erred in not considering the deposition of Shepard C. Cooper, the director for the COI, before making its determination. This issue, however, is not preserved for our review. The trial court conducted a hearing on the summary-judgment motions on June 23, 2005; the order was issued on July 7, 2005; Cottrell deposed Cooper on July 8, 2005, and the trial began on July 12, 2005. At the June 23 hearing, the trial court stated that Cottrell could supplement his motion in opposition to summary judgment with the deposition testimony of DeWees and Cooper. Cottrell, however, was unable to depose Cooper until July 8, 2005, the day after the trial court issued its order. This Court recognizes that the transcription of Cooper's deposition required time; however, the record does not contain any request by Cottrell after the trial court issued its order for leave to file Cooper's deposition or a request that the trial court reconsider its summary-judgment decision in light of Cooper's testimony. The purpose of requiring a specific objection to preserve an issue for appellate review is to put the trial judge on notice of the alleged error, giving an opportunity to correct it before the case is submitted to the jury. Ex parte Works, 640 So.2d 1056, 1058 (Ala.1994). Moreover, [t]his Court cannot consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal; rather, our review is restricted to the evidence and arguments considered by the trial court. Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So.2d 409, 410 (Ala.1992); Shiver v. Butler County Bd. of Educ., 797 So.2d 1086, 1089 (Ala.Civ.App.2000)(holding that an appellate court will not consider an issue on which the trial court was not given the opportunity to rule).