Opinion ID: 8916
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Dillard’s Preliminary Injunction

Text: On July 27, 1994, Dillard moved for a preliminary injunction proscribing monopolization and barring the enforcement of arbitration clauses if brokerage firms required traders to sign them as a precondition to trading in securities. The district court denied the injunction without entering findings of fact or conclusions of law, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Dillard appeals the denial of his motion and the failure to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. We have jurisdiction over the ruling on the preliminary injunction.3 We review the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1107 (5th Cir. 1991). The prerequisites for a preliminary injunction are: (1) substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable injury; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the damage the injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) no adverse effect on the public interest. Id. 3 After the district court denied Dillard’s motion for a preliminary injunction, Dillard timely filed motions for new trial and amendment of the judgment under rules 52(b) and 59. The district court denied these motions on March 27, 1995, the same date on which it issued the final orders forming the basis of this appeal. Dillard again timely moved for new trial or reconsideration under rules 52(b) and 59, which motions the district court again denied. Dillard then timely appealed to this court. Furthermore, while the preliminary injunction is moot with regard to SIA, it is not moot with regard to Merrill Lynch and Security Pacific. 10 Dillard cannot prove irreparable injury because he has an adequate remedy at law--namely, arbitration and this action for damages--and because he waited nearly six years to request injunctive relief, strongly implying that delay was not causing irreparable harm. See, e.g., Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Pub. Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1985) (long delay implied lack of irreparable harm in newspaper’s action for Sherman Act antitrust violation). As our discussion above demonstrates, Dillard also cannot prove substantial likelihood of success on the merits. When it denied the injunction, the district court failed to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Dillard timely filed motions under Rule 52(b) and 59, asking the court to reconsider or clarify its ruling on the preliminary injunction, and also filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The district court denied these motions after entering findings of fact and conclusions of law in its final orders of March 27, 1995, the orders from which Dillard now appeals. These findings of fact and conclusions of law suffice under Rule 52(a).