Opinion ID: 1747260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Common Law Right to Accretion

Text: Additionally, we disagree with the First District's determination that section 161.191(2) results in a facial and unconstitutional taking of the littoral right of accretion. We do not find the littoral right to accretion applicable in the context of this Act. As we explained earlier, the right to accretion under Florida common law is a contingent right. It is a right that arises from a rule of convenience intended to balance public and private interests by automatically allocating small amounts of gradually accreted lands to the upland owner without resort to legal proceedings and without disturbing the upland owner's rights to access to and use of the water. See Medeira Beach, 272 So.2d at 212-13; Mexico Beach Corp. v. St. Joe Paper Co., 97 So.2d 708, 710 (Fla. 1st DCA 1957); see generally 1 Henry Philip Farnham, The Law of Waters and Water Rights § 71, at 326 (1904). As discussed above, [t]here are four reasons for the doctrine of accretion: (1) [D]e minimis non curat lex; (2) he who sustains the burden of losses and of repairs imposed by the contiguity of waters ought to receive whatever benefits they may bring by accretion; (3) it is in the interest of the community that all land have an owner and, for convenience, the riparian is the chosen one; (4) the necessity for preserving the riparian right of access to the water. Medeira Beach, 272 So.2d at 212-13. None of these doctrinal reasons apply here. First, the beach restoration provisions of the Act do not apply to situations involving de minimis additions or losses of land. See §§ 161.088, 161.101(1). More specifically, critically eroded shorelines can hardly be characterized as trifles with which the law does not concern itself. Cf. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.2004) (defining de minimis as trifling; minimal and so insignificant that a court may overlook it in deciding an issue or case). Similarly, the beach renourishment itself is a change to the shoreline that is more than de minimis. Second, by authorizing the creation of a buffer area of beach on sovereignty land, the Act removes the upland owner's concomitant risk of losses and repairs due to erosion. After renourishment, the risk of loss and repair lies more with the State than with the upland owner. Third, all land has an owner under the Act because the property line between private and public land is clearly and conveniently fixed at the ECL. See § 161.191(1). Fourth, the upland owner's littoral right of access is preserved under the Act. See § 161.201. Consequently, the common law rule of accretion, which is intended to balance private and public interests, is not implicated in the context of this Act. Having explained our disagreement with the First District regarding the right to accretion, we now discuss the First District's analysis of the supposed independent right of contact with the water.