Opinion ID: 777761
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Premiere's Agreement to Indemnify Santa Fe's Contractors and Subcontractors

Text: 16 Additional language in Section 15.1, which language did not appear in the provision at issue in Corbitt, even more compellingly indicates that Premiere owes indemnification to Santa Fe in the instant case. Specifically, Section 15.1 expressly indicates Premiere's intent to indemnify not only Santa Fe, but also Santa Fe's contractors and subcontractors for the covered obligations. Contrary to Premiere's assertion that Premiere owes no duty to indemnify for obligations arising due to Santa Fe's contractual relationships with third parties, prior decisions by this court interpreting analogous indemnification provisions in like circumstances indicate that such language in Section 15.1 expresses clear intent by Premiere to indemnify Santa Fe for amounts paid due to an injury claim filed against Santa Fe's third-party contractor, Ensco. In six cases since Corbitt, we confronted circumstances indistinguishable from those in Corbitt and the instant case in all material respects except that the indemnification provisions at issue — unlike the provision in Corbitt but like Section 15.1 — included agreement by a party such as Premiere to indemnify third-party contractors, subcontractors, and/or invitees of a party such as Santa Fe. In all six cases, we found based on such language that the party situated similarly to Premiere owed indemnification to the party such as Santa Fe. See Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., Inc., 280 F.3d 492 (5th Cir.2002); Campbell v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 27 F.3d 185 (5th Cir.1994) ( Campbell II ); Campbell v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 979 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.1992) ( Campbell I ); Babcock v. Cont'l Oil Co., 792 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir.1986) (per curiam); Mills v. Zapata Drilling Co., Inc., 722 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir.1983), overruled on other grounds, Kelly v. Lee's Old Fashioned Hamburgers, Inc., 908 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir.1990) (per curiam); Lirette v. Popich Bros. Water Transp., Inc., 699 F.2d 725 (5th Cir.1983). 17 In Campbell I & II, for example, after an employee of a casing services contractor was injured on a drilling operation, the employee sued the owner of the drilling vessel. See Campbell II, 27 F.3d at 186-87. The vessel owner and the casing services employer maintained no direct contractual relationship. Id. A party situated similarly to Santa Fe, Union Texas Petroleum (UTP), contracted separately with the casing services employer and the vessel owner for each to supply services on the UTP drilling operation. Id. Thus, the casing services employer of the injured plaintiff was situated similarly to Premiere, and the vessel owner was situated similarly to Ensco. 18 Pursuant to the contract between UTP and the defendant vessel owner, in which UTP agreed to indemnify and defend the vessel owner, UTP undertook defense of the vessel owner. UTP further impleaded the casing services employer. Id. at 187. In the contract between the casing services employer and UTP, the employer agreed to indemnify not only UTP, but also  contractors engaged by UTP, such as [the vessel owner,] `for injury to... [the casing services employer's] employees....' Id. (emphasis added). In Campbell I, we had enforced [the casing services employer's] indemnity obligation under the UTP/[employer] contract, affirming a ruling requiring [the employer] to defend and indemnify [both the vessel owner] and UTP. See Campbell II, 27 F.3d at 187 (describing Campbell I, 979 F.2d at 1115). 19 In Campbell II, however, the casing services employer contended that it did not owe full, but only half, indemnity under the circumstances and that UTP owed the other half. Id. The employer thus filed for contribution from UTP. Id. In rejecting that claim in Campbell II, and thus affirming our decision in Campbell I, we reasoned that the employer's duty to indemnify [the vessel owner] flows from its contract with UTP because the employer expressly agreed to indemnify contractors of UTP. Id. We further rejected an argument by the employer based on Corbitt, which is similar to the argument made by Premiere, contending that the employer owed no reimbursement of UTP because UTP independently contracted to indemnify the vessel owner. Id. In so doing, we noted that unlike in Corbitt, the employer in Campbell I & II agreed with UTP to indemnify both UTP and [its contractor, the vessel owner]. See id. (emphasis added). We stated that the employer cannot insulate itself from paying its full indemnity obligation on the basis that UTP's liability to [the vessel owner] is contractual. Id. at 188 (citing Lirette, 699 F.2d at 725). We concluded that [s]imilarly to the employer of the injured plaintiff in Lirette, the employer's duty to indemnify UTP fully for amounts UTP owes [the vessel owner] for the [injured employee's] claims arises from [the employer's] express undertaking to indemnify both UTP and [the vessel owner] [for] such losses. The Corbitt argument fails. Id. (citing Lirette, 699 F.2d at 728). Like the employer in Campbell I & II, Premiere expressly agreed to indemnify not only Santa Fe, but also Santa Fe's contractors and subcontractors, thus including Ensco, for obligations that arise due to claims of injury brought by Premiere employees. Consequently, under the consistent reasoning of this court, as in Campbell I & II, we conclude that Premiere is obligated to indemnify, and thus to reimburse, Santa Fe for any amounts owing for indemnification and defense provided by Santa Fe to Ensco on account of Sumrall's tort claim. See also Demette, 280 F.3d at 504; Babcock, 792 F.2d at 1351-53; Mills, 722 F.2d at 1174-75; Lirette, 699 F.2d at 725. 20 In an unusually poor alternative argument, Premiere contends that even if it has a duty to indemnify Santa Fe for tortious, contractual or any other type of obligations, the language by which it agrees to indemnify from and against all claims ... which are asserted by or arise in favor of [Premiere] or any of its ... employees  limits its duty to indemnify. (emphasis added). Premiere contends that it owes indemnification for only those obligations flowing from actions filed directly against Santa Fe by Premiere or Premiere employees. Premiere thus asserts that any contractual obligation arising from Santa Fe's indemnification of Ensco is not included in Premiere's duty because neither Premiere nor any Premiere employee was party to any contractual claim filed directly against Santa Fe. 21 None of the indemnification provisions at issue in our Lirette line of decisions contains precisely the same in favor of language as that relied on by Premiere for this argument. The corresponding relevant language in the provision at issue in Lirette, for example, reads: `Owner... agrees to indemnify ... Charterer ... from any claims or suits resulting from injury or damage to Owner's ... employees....' 699 F.2d at 726 n. 4. However, the presence of language that is similar, if not identical, to the in favor of language of Section 15.1 in the provisions at issue in Lirette and its progeny did not alter our findings in favor of the parties situated similarly to Santa Fe in those materially indistinguishable decisions. See, e.g., Lirette, 699 F.2d at 729; Campbell II, 27 F.3d at 186-88. Consequently, we reject Premiere's preferred reading of the in favor of language in Section 15.1 as wholly specious. 22 The district court did not err in finding as a matter of law that Premiere owes indemnification to Santa Fe in the instant case based on the express language of their agreement in Section 15.1. 23