Opinion ID: 1844081
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Firearm Enhancement Provision.

Text: Mehner challenges the constitutionality of Iowa Code section 204.401(1)(e) (1989 Supp.) which provides: A person in the immediate possession or control of a firearm while participating in a violation of this subsection shall be sentenced to two times the term otherwise imposed by law, and no such judgment, sentence, or part thereof shall be deferred or suspended. Subsection 204.401(1) makes it unlawful for any person to deliver or possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance. When the controlled substance is cocaine, subsection 204.401(1)(c) provides that the violation is a class C felony and shall be punished by a fine of not less than $1000 nor more than $50,000. Upon conviction, a person guilty of a class C felony shall be confined for no more than ten years. Iowa Code § 902.9(3). Mehner claims the penalty enhancement provision is vague and overly broad. We have recently reviewed the principles to be followed when a criminal statute is challenged for constitutional vagueness. State v. Duncan, 414 N.W.2d 91, 95-97 (Iowa 1987). In Duncan we stated: The person challenging a statute carries a heavy burden of rebutting the presumption of constitutionality. If the statute can be made constitutional by a reasonable construction, the court will give it that construction. Thus, a statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably and without doubt, infringes the constitution. The unconstitutional vagueness of a criminal statute must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt. A statute is not unconstitutionally vague if the meaning of the words used can be fairly ascertained by reference to similar statutes, other judicial determinations, the common law, the dictionary, or the common and generally accepted meaning of the words themselves. (Citations omitted). 414 N.W.2d at 95. Mehner argues the statutory requirement of immediate possession or control is facially vague. The word possession has more than one meaning. It is interchangeably used to describe actual possession and constructive possession. However, when the word immediate is used to modify the word possession, the term immediate possession becomes clear without double meaning. Using some of the reference material identified in Duncan, the term immediate possession has a clear meaning. For example, the dictionary defines the word immediate as near at hand, not far apart or distant. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1129 (1971). The term immediate control or possession has also been judicially equated to mean the area which may be searched incident to arrest. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). Other courts have referred to immediate control or possession in the same or substantially similar manner. See 33 Words and Phrases, Possession, 89 (1971 & Supp.) and cited cases. Finally, immediate possession has been described in terms of actual possession: `possession' means having something in one's power. Actual possession exists when the thing is in immediate possession or control of the party. Rodella v. United States, 286 F.2d 306, 311 (9th Cir.1961) (citations omitted). Here, the court instructed the jury as follows: The word possession includes actual as well as constructive possession.... A person who has direct physical control of something on or around his person is in actual physical possession of it. A person who is not in actual possession, but who has both the power and the intention to later take control over something either alone or together with someone else, is in construction possession of it.... To have immediate possession of a firearm it must be actual possession of it as defined above. The term immediate possession is not vague. It specifically states what is prohibited and what must be shown in the prosecution. The jury was properly instructed as to the meaning of this term. Mehner has also failed to establish that the statute is overbroad for constitutional purposes. We review Mehner's challenge in accordance with the following standard: A statute is overbroad, for constitutional purposes, if it not only forbids conduct constitutionally subject to proscription, but also sweeps within its ambit those actions ordinarily deemed constitutionally protected. State v. Todd, 468 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Iowa 1991) (citations omitted). Although Mehner argues the constitution gives him the right to possess firearms, the statute involved prohibits only the possession of firearms while participating in a drug offense; a criminal activity. The statute does not forbid conduct which is constitutionally protected.