Opinion ID: 1680711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prejudicial Comments at Trial

Text: In its opening statement to the jury, the State made the following comment: One month later  we go to August 27, 2001. That was a Monday. That Monday night the defendant just after midnight which would be the morning of the 28th, drove up from Martin county where he lived and he went to Ms. Martin's house. He went there armed with a very small knife that he always carried and he went there, ladies and gentlemen, for two reasons. Perez's trial counsel objected to the comment that Perez always carried a knife as irrelevant and moved for a mistrial. In response, the State argued to the judge that Perez had acknowledged that he carried a knife. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion, reasoning that the statement was not overly prejudicial and that the information was relevant to the issue of whether the crime was committed with a switchblade, consistent with Perez's statement, or another type of knife. Perez claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial because he asserts that whether he personally carried a knife was a major issue as to both guilt and penalty. Thus, the prosecutor's comment with regard to a knife was unduly prejudicial to him. Moreover, Perez contends that the curative instruction given was not likely to clear any confusion caused by that which had transpired. [A] trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. Goodwin v. State, 751 So.2d 537, 546 (Fla.1999). Moreover, [w]ide latitude is permitted in arguing to a jury.... The control of comments is within the trial court's discretion, and an appellate court will not interfere unless an abuse of discretion is shown. Breedlove v. State, 413 So.2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1982) (citations omitted). Under the abuse of discretion standard, a trial court's ruling will be upheld unless the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, .... discretion is abused only where no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court. Trease v. State, 768 So.2d 1050, 1053 n. 2 (Fla.2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Huff v. State, 569 So.2d 1247, 1249 (Fla.1990)). The comments challenged by Perez were made during opening statements, the purpose of which was for counsel to outline what he in good faith expected to be established by the evidence presented at trial. See Conahan v. State, 844 So.2d 629, 640 (Fla.2003); Occhicone v. State, 570 So.2d 902, 904 (Fla.1990). Perez has failed to demonstrate that the statements at issue here were misleading or made in bad faith. Rather, we conclude that the attorney for the State made the comments in good faith with the expectation that they would be established by evidence he anticipated presenting during trial. Although the transcript of Perez's interview with the police reveals that Perez did not indicate that he always carried a knife, it was clear that he did admit that he carried a knife. Additionally, although the trial court ruled it inadmissible, the State proffered testimony from Perez's brother-in-law that he knew Perez to carry knives. Based on the foregoing, Perez's reliance on Jackson v. State, 818 So.2d 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (holding that it was error to deny motion for mistrial where prosecutor extensively recited damaging testimony in opening that was never presented at trial), Gore v. State, 719 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1998) (holding that latitude permitted in opening does not extend to permit comment on evidence ruled inadmissible prior to trial), and Mills v. State, 875 So.2d 823 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that it was error to deny mistrial where prosecutor improperly suggested the existence of corroborating evidence that was never presented at trial), is misplaced. Additionally, Perez's objection to the comments as irrelevant was properly rejected by the trial court. The indictment charging Perez indicated that he, in the course of committing the robbery[,] carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, to wit: a knife. Therefore, whether Perez owned a knife or carried a knife was relevant at trial, and therefore the relevancy objection was properly denied. Given the evidence that the State anticipated presenting at trial and the overall nature of the single isolated comment made by the prosecutor, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Perez's motion for a mistrial. Perez also challenges a statement made by Detective Beath during his testimony at trial, specifically, Beath's testimony that Perez had indicated to Beath that [Perez] did carry a knife on a regular basis. Perez's trial counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, claiming that a habit had not been established and therefore the testimony was irrelevant. At this point, the State conceded that Beath's testimony did not reflect precisely what Perez had said with regard to carrying a small blade knife. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion for a mistrial but gave the following curative instruction to the jury at the defense's request: Members of the jury, the exhibit 52 admitted into evidence is the videotape of portions of the interview with Mr. Perez. It is the best evidence of what Mr. Perez said so you need to rely on your determinations about what is said off that videotape. (Emphasis supplied.) The transcript of Perez's interview with the police, which the jury had while viewing the videotape of the interview, reveals the following exchange between Beath and Perez regarding Perez's knife: BEATH: Do you normally carry a pocketknife or anything like that? PEREZ: When I'm at work. BEATH: Okay. Any other times you normally carry knives or anything like that? Do you have collections of knives, or anything? PEREZ: I have one. Um, as far as carrying it all over the place all the time? No. There's occasions where I, I have it in my pocket, like after I get off of work or something, I'll have it in my pocket. But it's, it's a little, the one I have now? It's a, it's a little lock blade, it's like a, not even a, a 3 blade. BEATH: You have it on you? PEREZ: No. . . . . BEATH: You use it for work? PEREZ: Yeah, it's for cuttin' open wardrobe boxes. BEATH: So, it's pretty sharp to, I mean you could take it and (cutting motion through paper)? PEREZ: Yeah, when I sharpen it. . . . . BEATH Okay. So, do you keep it, I mean, is it a knife that you keep it, well maintained? PEREZ: Yeah. BEATH: Okay. All right. Um, you take it to work with you? PEREZ: Yeah. BEATH: You still do? PEREZ: Yeah. In light of the curative instruction given by the trial court, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Perez's motion for mistrial based on Beath's testimony. A motion for mistrial is properly denied where the matter on which the motion is based is rendered harmless by a curative instruction. See Buenoano v. State, 527 So.2d 194, 198 (Fla.1988); Ferguson v. State, 417 So.2d 639 (Fla.1982); Johnsen v. State, 332 So.2d 69 (Fla.1976); Rivera v. State, 745 So.2d 343, 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); see also 55A Fla. Jur.2d Trial § 284 (2000). The comment made by Beath was a short one-sentence statement during a lengthy direct examination. Moreover, when the statement was made, Perez's trial counsel objected and the trial court immediately gave a curative instruction at the defense's request in which the jury was instructed that the videotape of Perez's interview was the best evidence of what Mr. Perez had stated and the jury should rely on your determinations about what is said off that videotape. Given the above, Perez's motion for a mistrial was properly denied. Notwithstanding our conclusion above, we also note that the error, if any, resulting from the prosecutor's opening statement and the detective's testimony was harmless because we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict. Mansfield v. State, 758 So.2d 636, 644 (Fla.2000). In relation to the prosecutor's comments during opening statement, we note that the trial judge specifically instructed the jury on five separate occasions that the comments of the attorneys did not constitute evidence. Just subsequent to empanelling the jury, the trial court properly instructed and cautioned the jury as follows: [T]he attorneys will have an opportunity to make an opening statement. The opening statement gives the attorneys a chance to tell you what evidence they believe will be presented during the trial. What the lawyers say is not evidence and you're not to consider it as such. (Emphasis supplied.) Again, prior to both the opening statement and closing argument, during closing arguments themselves, and again during the trial court's final instructions, the jury was reminded that the attorneys' words and arguments did not constitute evidence. Additionally, as we previously stated, any harm resulting from the detective's comment was rendered harmless by the trial court's instruction to the jury that the videotape was the best evidence of what Mr. Perez said for purposes of jury consideration. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that any error, if any, that resulted from these comments was harmless and therefore Perez's motion for mistrial was properly denied.