Opinion ID: 784432
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Catchall Provision

Text: 12 Although the government eschews the argument that residential burglary is a crime of violence, apart from the argument that it can be a burglary of a dwelling, the dissent insists that because residential burglary involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, residential burglary, no matter how broadly worded, should qualify as a crime of violence under the catchall provision of § 4B1.2(a)(2). 4 Because this approach renders the limitation on the classification of burglaries as a crime of violence to burglaries of dwellings mere surplusage, we respectfully disagree with the dissent. Under the dissent's reasoning all burglaries, whether or not they are burglaries of a dwelling, would qualify for an enhancement under § 4B1.2(a)(2). What then, one must ask, was the purpose of the Sentencing Commission in specifically listing burglary of a dwelling as a crime of violence? 5 13 It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that a statute should not be construed so as to render any of its provisions mere surplusage. See, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140-41, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994) (noting that statutory language should not be construed so as to render certain words or phrases mere surplusage); Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 833, 103 S.Ct. 1587, 75 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983) (restating the settled principle of statutory construction that we must give effect ... to every word of the statute). The dissent's approach also violates another fundamental principle of statutory construction that the specific trumps the general. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989) (A general statutory rule usually does not govern unless there is no more specific rule.); Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228-29, 77 S.Ct. 787, 1 L.Ed.2d 786 (1957) (Specific terms prevail over the general in the same or another statute which otherwise might be controlling.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Cal. ex rel. Sacramento Metro. Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. United States, 215 F.3d 1005, 1013 (9th Cir.2000) (It is fundamental that a general statutory provision may not be used to nullify or to trump a specific provision.). Finally, the dissent's approach eviscerates the requirement that the state statute of conviction not exceed the scope of the federal definition. See United States v. Becker, 919 F.2d 568, 570 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that the categorical approach established in Taylor applies to the Sentencing Guidelines). Here, the Guidelines specifically provide that burglary of a dwelling is a crime of violence. Given that specific inclusion, it is unsound statutory interpretation to use the general, catchall conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury provision to include all other burglaries as crimes of violence. 14 The dissent bases its analysis on United States v. M.C.E., 232 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir.2000). Although M.C.E. addressed the Washington statute under which Wenner was convicted, it did not assess whether Washington residential burglary met the Sentencing Guidelines' definition of a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a). Rather, M.C.E. determined that Washington residential burglary is a crime of violence only for the purpose of transferring a juvenile to adult prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Id. at 1257. Unlike the Sentencing Guidelines, however, § 5032 does not separately and specifically list burglary of a dwelling as a crime of violence. Thus, our decision in M.C.E., unlike the dissent, did not render any statutory language in the statute involved, § 5032, superfluous. That decision also did not favor a general statutory provision over a specific one. 15 In M.C.E., we noted that the language in § 5032 is virtually identical to the language used in Becker, in which we held that residential burglary under a California statute constituted a crime of violence because it was an offense `that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing that offense.' M.C.E. 232 F.3d at 1256 (quoting Becker, 919 F.2d at 569). Significantly, however, in Becker we considered an earlier version of the Sentencing Guidelines, which did not list any specific crimes in defining a crime of violence. 6 Becker, 919 F.2d at 572. Thus, neither M.C.E. nor Becker considered whether a state conviction for residential burglary constitutes a crime of violence because it is burglary of dwelling for the reason that neither the 1988 version of the Guidelines nor 18 U.S.C. § 5032 limited eligible burglaries to burglary of a dwelling. 7 16 For these reasons, we decline to adopt the dissent's broad reading of § 4B1.2(a)(2)'s catchall provision, which would render the specific inclusion of burglary of a dwelling in the same section surplusage.