Opinion ID: 2680044
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Invocation of the Privilege

Text: [¶8] The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment gives witnesses the privilege of refusing to give self-incriminating testimony. Hoffman v. United States, 5 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951); State v. Linscott, 521 A.2d 701, 702-03 (Me. 1987). This federal constitutional right applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964); Linscott, 521 A.2d at 702-03. [¶9] It is for the trial court to determine whether a witness has validly invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Robbins, 318 A.2d 51, 57 (Me. 1974) (“[I]t is the Judge’s responsibility to decide . . . whether the witness may invoke the privilege and decline to answer on the grounds of possible self-incrimination.”). A witness may invoke the privilege by declining to testify as to certain matters, based on a fear of possible self-incrimination that “‘will tend to a conviction when combined with evidence from other sources.’” Linscott, 521 A.2d at 703 (quoting In re Kave, 760 F.2d 343, 354 (1st Cir. 1985)). We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s determination of whether a witness has properly invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege. See United States v. Castro, 129 F.3d 226, 229 (1st Cir. 1997); Linscott, 521 A.2d at 703. [¶10] The State did not contest at trial whether Butsitsi properly invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege to protect himself against criminal liability.1 The trial 1 In response to the prosecutor’s questions, Butsitsi explained that he refused to answer because he did not want to involve his friend in the legal proceedings. After properly excusing the jury, the court allowed Butsitsi to discuss his options with his attorney, stating, “[Your attorney] can also make you aware of the consequences for people who refuse to answer questions after being directed to do that by the Court.” The following morning, Butsitsi’s attorney reported that Butsitsi “[felt] the necessity to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination” because the facts sought through the State’s question could form the basis of a separate criminal charge against Butsitsi. 6 court stated: “[W]hat I think I have to give the benefit of the doubt about is that it’s possible that the act of obtaining the gun was a criminal act, and if it was, it’s an uncharged crime.” Although the Fifth Amendment requires “[r]easonable cause on the part of the person questioned to really apprehend danger of prosecution,” we defer to the trial court “to decide whether the fear of self-incrimination entertained by the witness or party is real or imaginary.” Collett v. Bither, 262 A.2d 353, 358-59 (Me. 1970) (citing Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-87). Though the State did not contest the invocation, the court nonetheless considered the possible criminal repercussions and did not abuse its discretion in determining that Butsitsi actually invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege.