Opinion ID: 2513925
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Beaubien Document

Text: As evidence of a grant of rights from Carlos Beaubien, the landowners rely primarily on the Beaubien Document. The document was written by Beaubien in 1863, one year before his death. One English translation of the document reads, in part: Plaza of San Luis de la Culebra, May 11, 1863. It has been decided that the lands of the Rito Seco remain uncultivated for the benefit of the community members (gente) of the plazas of San Luis, San Pablo and Los Ballejos and for the other inhabitants of these plazas for pasturing cattle by the payment of a fee per head, etc. and that the water of the said Rito remains partitioned among the inhabitants of the same plaza of San Luis and those from the other side of the vega who hold lands almost adjacent to it as their own lands, that are not irrigated with the waters of the Rio Culebra. The vega, after the measurement of three acres from it in front of the chapel, to which they have been donated, will remain for the benefit of the inhabitants of this plaza and those of the Culebra as far as above the plaza of Los Ballejos.... Those below the road as far as the narrows will have the right to enjoy the same benefit.... [No one may] place any obstacle or obstruction to anyone in the enjoyment of his legitimate rights .... Likewise, each one should take scrupulous care in the use of water without causing damage with it to his neighbors nor to anyone. According to the corresponding rule, all the inhabitants will have enjoyment of benefits of pastures, water, firewood and timber, always taking care that one does not injure another. (Emphases added.) The landowners assert that this document evidences an express grant of settlement rights on the Taylor Ranch land. The trial court concluded that the Beaubien Document did not vest any rights in the Taylor Ranch. The court noted that although the document lists rights of pasture, water, firewood, and timber, the only locations specified for access are the Rito Seco and the vega, two areas that the parties agree are not part of the Taylor Ranch. The trial court did admit extrinsic evidence to determine whether there was a latent ambiguity in the document. However, because the court ultimately found that the document was unambiguous, it ruled that extrinsic evidence could not be considered in interpreting the document. The court of appeals affirmed. Lobato, 13 P.3d 821. The appeals court agreed that the Beaubien Document was ultimately unambiguous and that the trial court properly treated the extrinsic evidence of Beaubien's intent. Id. at 832. The court then applied 1863 Colorado property law and concluded that the Beaubien Document did not meet the formal requirements for conveying rights to the landowners' predecessors in title. Lobato, 13 P.3d at 831. Moreover, the court held that profits must be expressly granted and thus rejected any claim of implied rights. Id. at 832-33. We agree that the Beaubien Document does not meet the formal requirements for an express grant of rights. However, we find that the document, when taken together with the other unique facts of this case, establishes a prescriptive easement, an easement by estoppel, and an easement from prior use. Extrinsic evidence is relevant in interpreting the Beaubien Document. In Lazy Dog, we articulated when a court could examine extrinsic evidence in order to ascertain the nature of an easement. In that case, we expressly followed the Restatement and concluded that [o]ur paramount concern in construing a deed is to ascertain the intentions of the parties. Lazy Dog, 965 at 1235. We also recognized that circumstances surrounding the grant may be relevant to interpreting the language of the grant. Id. at 1236; see also Restatement, supra, § 4.1(1)(noting that an easement should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties ascertained from the language used in the instrument, or the circumstances surrounding creation of the servitude, and to carry out the purpose for which it was created). Moreover, the question of whether or not the document is ambiguous may be answered by reference to extrinsic evidence. Lazy Dog, 965 P.2d at 1235. Here, we look to extrinsic evidence to construe the Beaubien Document for two reasons. First, as Lazy Dog tells us, extrinsic evidence may reveal ambiguities. Second, the document is ambiguous on its face with respect to where the landowners could exercise their rights. Lazy Dog tells us that extrinsic evidence may reveal ambiguities in modern documents; that principle can be only more true with respect to the Beaubien Document. We are attempting to construe a 150 year-old document written in Spanish by a French Canadian who obtained a conditional grant to an enormous land area under Mexican law and perfected it under American law. Beaubien wrote this document when he was near the end of his adventurous life in an apparent attempt to memorialize commitments he had made to induce families to move hundreds of miles to make homes in the wilderness. It would be the height of arrogance and nothing but a legal fiction for us to claim that we can interpret this document without putting it in its historical context. For the most part, the document is reasonably specific in identifying places where rights are to be exercised. [5] That is not true with respect to the rights asserted by the landowners. The key language reads: According to the corresponding rule, all the inhabitants will have enjoyment of benefits of pastures, water, firewood and timber, always taking care that one does not injure another. Thus, given the specificity of other parts of the document, the lack of specificity in this sentence creates an ambiguity. We cannot determine from the face of the document what lands were burdened by the rights Beaubien conveyed to the first settlers. Following Lazy Dog, we look to the extrinsic evidence in this case. Amici assert that the contrast between the specificity of the majority of the Beaubien Document and the casual reference to the settlement rights at the end of the document can best be explained by the events surrounding the execution of the document. Beaubien penned the document at a time when settlement was moving to the northern area of the grant, which lies northwest of the Taylor Ranch area. At that time, he wrote the Beaubien Document to establish common rights to the area in and around San Luis and at the same time memorialize settlement rights that had already been in existence in the more southern areas of the grant, where Taylor Ranch is located. We agree with the amici. From the trial court findings, expert testimony, the documents associated with the grant, and a review of the settlement system under which Beaubien and the settlers were operating, we draw two conclusions. First, we conclude that the location for the settlement rights referenced in the Beaubien Document is the mountainous area of the grant on which Taylor Ranch is located. Second, we conclude that Beaubien meant to grant permanent access rights that run with the land. We first discuss the location for the rights. The evidence in this case establishes that the reference to pasture, water, firewood, and timber in the Beaubien Document refers to access on the mountain area of the grant of which Taylor Ranch is a part. First, the trial court found that the landowners or their predecessors in title accessed the Taylor Ranch land for over one hundred years to exercise the rights outlined in the Beaubien Document. This strongly suggests that the parties understood that the Taylor Ranch land was the location of their access rights. Second, experts testified that the resources listed in the document were only available in the Taylor Ranch area of the grant. Expert testimony established that summer grazing, wood, and timber were only available in the mountain area of the grant. [6] This is perhaps the most significant evidence that points to the Taylor Ranch as the location of the rights. Third, the landowners' access rights are expressly mentioned in Taylor's deed. The deed subjects his property interest not only to rights of way of record, but also to all rights of way heretofore located and now maintained and used on, through, over, and across the same. It further subjects the conveyance to claims of the local people by prescription or otherwise to rights to pasturage, wood, and lumber and so-called settlement rights in, to, and upon said land. (Emphasis added.) This resolves any doubt that the access rights were meant to burden Taylor's land. There is also ample evidence that the document was meant to create permanent rights that run with the land. Both the settlement system under which Beaubien and the settlers were operating and the Gilpin agreement are strong evidence of this. Access to common areas was an integral feature of the settlement system under which the settlers and Beaubien were operating. Under Spanish and Mexican law, the government awarded community and private grants for the purpose of settling the frontier. See Malcolm Ebright, Land Grants and Lawsuits in Northern New Mexico 23 (1994). The Mexican grants were issued under specific procedures. The governor would refer a petition to the local alcalde (mayor) for his recommendations on whether the grant should be made. Availability of pasture, water, and firewood on common lands was among the primary considerations: The primary considerations were whether the land was being used or claimed by others, the sufficiency of the petitioner's qualifications, and in the case of a community grant, the availability of resources like pasture, water, and firewood. Id. (emphasis added). Large private grants were made during the Mexican period. If the recommendation from the alcalde was favorable, the governor would make the private grant to an individual. The individual's ownership, however, was conditional upon successful settlement of the grant. Agriculture and stock raising were the primary means of subsistence for the settlers on the grants. Id. at 25. The settlers supplemented their irrigated plots by use of commonly accessible community or private grant lands for gathering firewood and grazing livestock: The pattern of land tenure and use was the foundation for these tightly knit communities. Produce from their small irrigated plots supplemented by the use of common lands for gathering firewood and for grazing a few head of livestock furnished the bare necessities for the village families, a lifestyle to which they were accustomed. Ira G. Clark, Water in New Mexico, A History of Its Management and Use 34 (1987) (emphasis added). Under colonial and Mexican law, the difference between a community grant [7] and a private grant was that the common lands of the community could not be sold; the grantee of a private grant could sell the lands. See Ebright, supra, at 25. Expert reports submitted in this case reveal that Beaubien and the original settlers operated under this traditional system. Common areas were not only a typical feature but a necessary incentive for settlement. As discussed above, because the Sangre de Cristo grant was part of the United States at the time permanent settlement began, this Mexican settlement tradition is not the source of the landowners' rights. However, because the settlers and Beaubien were so familiar with the settlement system, it is highly relevant in ascertaining the parties' intentions and expectations. The express language in the Gilpin agreement, recorded one year after the Beaubien Document, further supports the conclusion that the rights referenced in the Beaubien Document were meant to burden the land. Gilpin was Beaubien's immediate successor as owner of the grant land. The Gilpin agreement contains an express condition confirming the settlers' rights: [Gilpin agrees to the] express condition that the settlement rights before then conceded by said Charles Beaubien to residents of Costilla, Culebra & Trinchera, within said Tract included, shall be confirmed by the said William Gilpin as confirmed by him. This deed also recites that the settlers paid consideration to Beaubien for those rights and that Gilpin succeeds to the settlers' obligations to Beaubien, including payments due on promissory notes held by Beaubien and his agents. The Gilpin agreement is in Taylor's chain of title and Taylor's own deed expressly refers to the landowners' settlement rights. Thus, we conclude both that rights were granted and exercised from the time of settlement and that the Beaubien Document memorialized them. Moreover, we conclude that the location for the rights is the mountain portion of the grant of which Taylor Ranch is a part, and that the benefit and burden of these rights were meant to run with the land. We do not take issue with the court of appeals' application of 1863 Colorado property law to the Beaubien Document. It is not surprising that Carlos Beaubien failed to comply with the nuances and technical requirements of the conveyance of real property rights. Beaubien's failure to comply with the territorial property law, however, is not the end of the inquiry. The territorial supreme court made it clear that rights to access and use the property of another landowner could be found in the law of implied easements. Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551 (1872). The law of implied easements recognizes that rights may be implied even though they were not properly expressly conveyed. This well-established area of property law is concerned with honoring the intentions of the parties to land transactions and avoiding injustice.