Opinion ID: 2219911
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Refusal of the Defendants' Offers of Proof Regarding William Ellzey

Text: Finding that defendant is entitled to a new trial, we will address, for the purposes of that new trial, defendant's claims regarding certain offers of proof. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow evidence showing that William Ellzey, a reputed gang leader and drug supplier against whom Forrest had testified, also had a motive to kill Forrest. This court has recognized that evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Robinson, 217 Ill.2d 43, 62, 298 Ill.Dec. 37, 838 N.E.2d 930 (2005); People v. Pulliam, 176 Ill.2d 261, 276, 223 Ill.Dec. 610, 680 N.E.2d 343 (1997). The controlling principles concerning the admissibility of evidence are well settled. The court must ask whether the proferred evidence fairly tends to prove or disprove the offense charged and whether that evidence is relevant in that it tends to make the question of guilt more or less probable. People v. Caffey, 205 Ill.2d 52, 114-15, 275 Ill.Dec. 390, 792 N.E.2d 1163 (2001), quoting People v. Ward, 101 Ill.2d 443, 455-56, 79 Ill.Dec. 142, 463 N.E.2d 696 (1984). It is entirely within the discretion of the trial court to reject offered evidence on grounds of irrelevancy if it has little probative value due to its remoteness, uncertainty, or possibly unfair prejudicial nature. People v. Harvey, 211 Ill.2d 368, 392, 286 Ill.Dec. 124, 813 N.E.2d 181 (2004), citing Ward, 101 Ill.2d at 455, 79 Ill.Dec. 142, 463 N.E.2d 696. Defendant points to the principle that each party is entitled to present evidence which is relevant to its theory of the case. People v. Molsby, 66 Ill.App.3d 647, 23 Ill.Dec. 309, 383 N.E.2d 1336 (1978). Moreover, defendant notes that one accused of a crime may prove facts and circumstances tending to show that the crime was committed by someone other than himself. People v. Dukett, 56 Ill.2d 432, 450, 308 N.E.2d 590 (1974), quoting People v. Nitti, 312 Ill. 73, 90, 143 N.E. 448 (1924). While this is true, it is also true that defining the precise limits controlling the admission of such evidence is difficult and if the evidence is too remote in time or too speculative to shed light on the fact to be found, it should be excluded. Dukett, 56 Ill.2d at 450, 308 N.E.2d 590, quoting Nitti, 312 Ill. at 90, 143 N.E. 448. The defense argues that its proffered evidence regarding Ellzey would have countered and weakened the motive evidence presented by the State. Specifically, defendant argues that showing the jury that Forrest was an informant in other cases and had testified against William Ellzey, the highest ranking Gangster Disciple in Decatur, would show that someone other than defendant had a motive to kill Forrest. This evidence would have been bolstered by the rejected evidence that Forrest lost some of Ellzey's drugs; was behind in payments to Ellzey; had been physically disciplined for presenting Ellzey with a gold necklace instead of a cash payment; and had some relationship with Ellzey's girlfriend. Additionally, the evidence would have been supported by testimony from Forrest's grandmother, which the trial court did not allow, expressing her apprehension about Demetrian's safety after he testified against Ellzey. Evaluating evidentiary rulings, this court only finds an abuse of discretion where the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Caffey, 205 Ill.2d at 89, 275 Ill.Dec. 390, 792 N.E.2d 1163. This is not such a case. In People v. Morgan, 142 Ill.2d 410, 440, 154 Ill.Dec. 534, 568 N.E.2d 755 (1991), rev'd on other grounds, Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992), we held that the fact that a third party had threatened the victim with a handgun a week before the victim's murder was not enough to link that third party to the murder. We held the evidence concerning the third party's threat remotely speculative    at best because the defendant in that case presented no other evidence linking the third party to the crime. Accordingly, we found the proffered evidence properly excluded. Morgan, 142 Ill.2d at 442, 154 Ill.Dec. 534, 568 N.E.2d 755. In this case, the evidence concerning Ellzey is even more speculative. As our appellate court pointed out, Ellzey had no connection to the scene of the crime and, in fact, was in prison at the time of the murder. No evidence was offered that Ellzey arranged for Forrest's murder. No evidence was offered establishing that any other member of the Gangster Disciples was present at the scene of the crime nor was any evidence offered indicating that other members of the Gangster Disciples even cared about Ellzey's downfall. Further, we agree with the appellate court that the testimony of Demetrian Forrest's grandmother concerning her apprehension due to his testimony against Ellzey was irrelevant. Her testimony did not tend to make the existence of any fact of consequence to the determination of defendant's guilt more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. See People v. Illgen, 145 Ill.2d 353, 365-66, 164 Ill.Dec. 599, 583 N.E.2d 515 (1991). Furthermore, we note that the trial court informed defendant that he was free to argue that someone else murdered Forrest, just not Ellzey in particular. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing defendant's offers of proof.