Opinion ID: 1697772
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Giglio and Stumpf Claims

Text: Raleigh's final two claims challenge the State's differing uses of Figueroa's pretrial statements between the trial of Raleigh and the trial of Figueroa. The first of these two claims alleges that the State violated Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), by presenting testimony it knew was false. To establish a claim under Giglio, the defendant must prove (1) the testimony given was false; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the statement was material. Suggs v. State, 923 So.2d 419, 426 (Fla.2005). In reviewing this claim, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact but independently determine whether the facts are sufficient to establish the elements required in each claim. Id. The thrust of Raleigh's Giglio claim is that, at his trial, the State only introduced Figueroa's statement to investigator Horzepa without mentioning or introducing the statement Figueroa made to his uncle. Because Figueroa's statement to his uncle arguably contradicts portions of his statement to investigator Horzepa, Raleigh claims that the State knowingly presented false testimony. Raleigh has not established that Figueroa's statement to investigator Horzepa was false, much less that the State knew it was false. Therefore, this claim is without merit. Raleigh's second related claim is that the State violated his right to due process under Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 2398, 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005), by taking inconsistent positions in Raleigh's and Figueroa's trials as to the identity of the principal actor in the murder of Eberlin. [18] At Raleigh's penalty phase, the prosecutor argued that Raleigh was the principal actor in the murder of both victims. This argument was not materially inconsistent with Figueroa's statement to investigator Horzepa that Raleigh had killed both victims. However, during closing argument at Figueroa's trial (at which both of Figueroa's statements were introduced into evidence), the prosecutor commented upon the conversation between Figueroa and his uncle as follows: []Hey, man, tell me what you did. Tell me what you did,[] [Figueroa's uncle] said. []Tell me.[] This is the next day, if you remember. Finally, [Figueroa] says, []man, it was really bad. It was bad. I killed one and Bobby killed one.[] It doesn't sound like there is a whole lot of hesitation that I might have killed one or it's possible that I killed one or I am not sure if I killed one. I mean, he told his uncle the truth. I killed one and Bobby killed one. Raleigh claims that this argument is an assertion that Figueroa, not Raleigh, actually killed Eberlin. Relying on Stumpf, Raleigh asserts that due process precludes the State from taking such an inconsistent position. In Stumpf, the state first tried Stumpf under the theory that he was the principal actor in the shooting death of the victim. Id. at 2403-04. Then, based upon new evidence that came to light after Stumpf had been tried and convicted, the state tried Stumpf's codefendant under the inconsistent theory that the codefendant was the principal actor in the shooting death of the same victim. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that the use of such inconsistent theories warranted remand to determine what effect this may have had on Stumpf's sentence and to determine whether the death penalty violated due process. Id. at 2407-08. No such due process concerns are present in this case. Unlike the situation in Stumpf, the State did not first try Raleigh as the principal actor in Eberlin's murder and then inconsistently prosecute Figueroa as the principal actor in the same death. Instead, the State argued consistently in both trials that Raleigh was a principal actor in the death of Eberlin. The difference in Figueroa's trial was that, using Figueroa's second statement to his uncle, the prosecutor argued that Figueroa played a greater role in the crime than he had admitted in his statement to investigator Horzepa. In particular, the prosecutor argued that Figueroa's statement to his uncle (consistent with the forensic evidence) established that Figueroa had formed the necessary intent in Eberlin's death to be convicted of first-degree murder. The essence of this argument was that Figueroa was no less culpable for the murder of Eberlin than Raleigh. Specifically, the prosecutor began his closing argument in Figueroa's trial by reading the definition of killing with premeditation and presenting to the jury this theory: Whether or not [Figueroa] actually was the one who killed him doesn't matter. The fact of the matter is what was his intent at the time. The intent was to kill Mr. Eberlin. To support this theory, the prosecutor argued that Figueroa may have shot at Eberlin two times, giving him time to reflect while shooting Eberlin. [19] The prosecutor acknowledged that [y]ou can argue this evidence as far as how the shots took place to your heart's content. There's a zillion ways that could have happened. It was in this context that the prosecutor argued that Figueroa's statement to his uncle demonstrated that he had formed the intent to kill Eberlin. To summarize, the State did not take an inconsistent position as the prosecution did in Stumpf. In Figueroa's trial, the State never contradicted the position it took at Raleigh's trial regarding Raleigh's culpability. It did not change course by seeking to prove that Figueroa, not Raleigh, was the principal actor in Eberlin's death. Therefore, the due process concerns raised in Stumpf do not apply. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of Raleigh's Giglio claim and deny relief on his Stumpf claim.