Opinion ID: 2088344
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Negligent Infliction

Text: Appellee argues that appellant is unable to maintain a cause of action based upon a theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress. He relies on Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979) in which relief was allowed for a person outside the zone of danger. In that particular case the plaintiff was (1) a close family member, (2) located near the scene of the accident, and (3) the shock resulted from direct emotional impact from observing the accident. We agree with appellee's observation but not his conclusion. Appellant's case does not fit within the narrow confines of Sinn; however, we do not conclude that as a consequence of this that appellant is foreclosed from pursuing at trial an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Sinn v. Burd involved a situation where the plaintiff was not within the zone of danger. In that case a mother sued on the basis of emotional distress that resulted from witnessing her daughter being run down by the defendant's vehicle. Subject to the three above-mentioned elements being satisfied, the Supreme Court allowed recovery. Sinn was an exception to the rule laid down in Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970). Originally, a party had to allege a physical impact in order to properly aver a claim for negligent infliction. The Niederman Supreme Court said: We today choose to abandon the requirement of a physical impact as a precondition to recovery for damages proximately caused by the tort in only those cases like the one before us where the plaintiff was in personal danger of physical impact because of the direction of a negligent force against him and where plaintiff actually did fear the physical impact. Since appellant's complaint alleges facts which if proven will establish that the negligent force was aimed at him and put him in personal danger of physical impact, and that he actually did fear the force, this case must proceed to trial. Niederman, supra, 436 Pa. at 413, 261 A.2d at 90. It is this evolution of the law of which appellee has lost sight. To summarize, a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress initially required a physical impact. That element was declared not essential in Niederman if the plaintiff was in the zone of danger. Finally, the plaintiffs presence within that zone was held to be not necessary subject to the presence of Sinn's three elements. Niederman and Sinn are, thus, two alternate methods to establish a case for negligent infliction in the absence of physical impact. However, impact remains the basic means to plead the cause of action. Potere v. City of Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 589, 112 A.2d 100, 104 (1955). If impact is averred, the requirements of either Niederman or Sinn simply are not necessary. In the case before us there was a physical impact. Appellant's automobile impacted with the corpse of Sharon Wascavage. Although it is a gruesome thought, an automobile running over a corpse would cause the automobile to lurch and jostle or jar its occupants. This Court has held that the jostling and jarring of an automobile's occupants is enough physical impact to meet the physical impact element of a negligent infliction cause of action. Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa.Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961). It is this impact which takes the instant case out of the requirements of Sinn or Niederman. Therefore, plaintiff need not rely upon the doctrine laid down in Sinn or upon the rule in Niederman, nor need he meet the elements of Sinn or Niederman. In Zelinsky two vehicles  plaintiff's and defendant's  struck each other and thus the physical impact was substantially contemporaneous with the defendant's negligent act and resulted in the defendant striking the plaintiff. This will be the usual fact pattern; it is not, however, the only possible scenario. It is also possible that defendant's negligence will proximately cause an impact to occur at a later time and that the impact will not be with the defendant himself. Under traditional rules of negligence law this would also support a cause of action in negligence. This result is not changed by the fact that the particular claim is for infliction of emotional distress through negligence, rather than another type of negligence claim. In Potere, supra, the city negligently maintained a water line which leaked water into an underground tunnel dug by a contractor which caused subsidence and a cave-in of the road while plaintiff was driving a truck on it. One of plaintiff's claims was for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In Potere as here, the impact was not directly with the defendant, nor did it occur simultaneously with the negligent act. However, as long as the plaintiff's suffering or mental fright is directly traceable to the peril in which the defendant's negligence placed the plaintiff, then mental suffering is a legitimate element of damages. Potere v. City of Philadelphia, supra, 380 Pa. at 589, 112 A.2d at 104. The order dismissing the negligent infliction of emotional distress complaint is, accordingly, reversed.