Opinion ID: 4535302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unlawful Reentry Prosecution

Text: Reyes-Romero returned to the United States without inspection and, after he was found and detained, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging him with unlawful reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He did not contest any of the elements of that offense—that he had been “removed” and was later “found in” the country without express consent, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Instead, Reyes-Romero moved to dismiss the indictment under a statutory provision allowing him to “challenge the validity of the [removal] order” on which the prosecution was based, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). Under § 1326(d), a defendant bears the burden of showing that (1) he “exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the [removal] order”; (2) the removal proceedings “improperly deprived [him] of the opportunity for judicial review”; and (3) the “entry of the [removal] order was fundamentally unfair.” Richardson v. United States, 558 F.3d 216, 223 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(1)–(3)). “Fundamentally unfair” means “both [(a)] that some fundamental error occurred and [(b)] that as a result of that fundamental error [the defendant] suffered prejudice.” United States v. Charleswell, 456 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2006). Reyes-Romero’s motion advanced two arguments. First, the 2011 administrative removal proceeding, with its contradictory forms and the “inconsisten[t]” selections on the I-826, “had an impermissible tendency to mislead” him and invalidated any waiver of his rights. App. 71. Second, the proceeding was “fundamentally unfair” because he had not committed 6 an aggravated felony and therefore was entitled to a full hearing before an immigration judge (IJ). 3 App. 72. The Government resisted on both fronts. In its view, Reyes-Romero’s I-851 waiver was valid and overcame any inconsistency on the I-826, and as a result he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies or seek judicial review as required by § 1326(d)(1) and (2). And in any event he failed to show prejudice as required by § 1326(d)(3) because he had not demonstrated “a reasonable likelihood that the result”—i.e., the removal order—“would have been different” but for the errors he identified. App. 225 (quoting Charleswell, 456 F.3d at 362). The District Court held a hearing on the § 1326(d) motion. It first addressed the I-851 waiver and its effect on § 1326(d)’s 3 In Baptiste v. Attorney General, 841 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 2016)—a case involving the same offense of which ReyesRomero was convicted—we held that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), the “residual” clause of the federal crime-of-violence definition, is void for vagueness. 841 F.3d at 615–21. Baptiste’s reasoning was ultimately embraced by the Supreme Court in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2018). But Baptiste avoided the question whether New Jersey second-degree aggravated assault qualifies as a crime of violence under § 16(a), the crimeof-violence definition’s “elements” clause. 841 F.3d at 606 n.4. As discussed below, that question turns on whether a state crime capable of commission by reckless conduct can categorically satisfy the elements clause, an issue that remains unresolved. See Borden v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1262 (2020) (granting certiorari on this issue). 7 exhaustion and judicial-review requirements. The Court expressed concerns not only with the “inconsistent” nature of the I-826 and I-851 forms but also with the I-851’s time stamps suggesting Reyes-Romero had been informed of his rights after signing the waiver—an argument Reyes-Romero had not developed in his brief. The Court told Adam Hallowell, the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) prosecuting the case, that the Government was “in a deep hole” because the immigration forms were “facially at odds with themselves.” App. 283. The Government called Officers Darji and Alicea as witnesses. Each had no memory of Reyes-Romero or his proceeding and had handled a substantial number of immigration cases in the years since 2011, so they testified only to general practices. Darji explained that he often worked with native Spanish speakers like Alicea to serve immigration forms on noncitizens in DHS custody. Noncitizens charged with having committed aggravated felonies would first receive the “more general” I-826 form before receiving the I-851 form “specific to administrative removal.” App. 294. The noncitizen would typically “hold the pen” and make necessary selections. App. 291. If the noncitizen made contradictory or nonsensical selections, the officers would confirm his intent but otherwise leave those selections untouched. The District Court, interposing its own questions at the hearing, pressed Officer Darji about Reyes-Romero’s forms: THE COURT: . . . [A]m I reading the[se forms] accu- rately that within moments of 9 o’clock in the morning on June 23rd, 2011, several things had occurred pretty much all at once. This defendant was told he had a right 8 to request a hearing. He requested a hearing. He said he didn’t want a hearing. And he was told he couldn’t have a hearing. Am I reading those forms correctly, sir? THE WITNESS: Yes. THE COURT: Does that make any sense at all to you, sir? THE WITNESS: No, Your Honor. App. 331. The District Court took Officer Darji’s response to mean that “the process that was used” in Reyes-Romero’s removal proceeding did not “ma[k]e . . . sense.” App. 476. Based on that concession and the defects in Reyes- Romero’s forms, the District Court made clear it was “highly likely . . . [to] conclude that there was no voluntary and intelligent waiver” and therefore that “the first two prongs of [§ 1326(d)] will have been fulfilled.” App. 474–75. The parties’ attention therefore turned to the “only open issue”: prejudice. App. 543. At first, Reyes-Romero repeated the argument he had advanced in his brief: that the misidentification of his crime of conviction as an aggravated felony itself constituted prejudice. But after the District Court pressed him about “the reasonable likelihood of some different result” in the removal proceeding, App. 442, he switched gears, arguing that he could have sought asylum or withholding of removal. To bolster that novel argument, he offered testimony from relatives who had suffered abuses in El Salvador or in neighboring Honduras. Seeking more support, Reyes-Romero requested his relatives’ A-files, and the parties set out on a multiweek process to get them from DHS. The Court held Reyes- 9 Romero’s motion while that process was underway and requested supplemental briefing to be filed once it was complete. While his § 1326(d) motion was pending, Reyes-Romero moved for bond. The District Court expressed concern that, were Reyes-Romero to be released, DHS officials would detain him, reinstate the 2011 removal order, and remove him to El Salvador. The Court also wondered aloud whether DHS would take different action if Reyes-Romero were released after the Government had “move[d] to dismiss the indictment,” App. 566. The Government soon came back with a surprise: a motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48. 4 It explained that based on the evidence at the first hearing “and on additional factual information that ha[d] come to [its] attention” since then, dismissal was “in the interests of justice.” App. 603. In another surprise, ReyesRomero opposed the Government’s motion, contending the District Court should grant it only if it also intervened in future immigration proceedings by expressly “barr[ing] [the Government] from removing [him] on the basis of the [2011 removal] [o]rder.” App. 608. When the parties convened for a hearing to address the Government’s motion to dismiss, the Government clarified that the “additional . . . information” to which it had referred came from Reyes-Romero’s relatives’ A-files, some of which “support[ed] the testimony” he had offered in support of relief 4 “The government may, with leave of court, dismiss an indictment . . . .” Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a). 10 from removal. App. 645. The Government’s decision to seek dismissal, it explained, was based on the “litigation risk to th[e] [§ 1326(d)] affirmative defense” and the “time and expense” necessary to continue the prosecution. App. 646. But the District Court was hesitant, asking the Government whether Reyes-Romero risked detention or removal even after dismissal with prejudice, to which the Government replied that it “c[ould] [not] speak for DHS,” App. 617. The Court also noted its views that the DHS officers’ testimony had been “bizarre” and possibly untruthful, App. 634–35, and that ReyesRomero’s 2011 removal “was not . . . consistent with the highest traditions of the American legal system,” App. 657. Still, the Court made clear it was not accusing the prosecution “of any wrongdoing whatsoever,” App. 634, and suggested the Government’s decision not to proceed with the prosecution was “how we want the system to work,” App. 635. Yet when the hearing resumed the next day, the District Court’s assessment had evolved. It now expressed the view that the DHS officers’ testimony was not just “bizarre,” but a mix of “lies” and “law enforcement outrageousness.” App. 677. And it recalled Officer Darji’s answer to its line of questioning to have meant not just that “the process . . . used” in the removal proceeding did not “ma[k]e any sense,” App. 476, but that “his [own] testimony made no sense,” App. 678 (emphasis added). Most significant, the Court no longer deemed AUSA Hallowell blameless, but as needing to make a “choice” about whether he would “continue to rely on th[e] [officers’] testimony.” App. 678–79. Even if the prosecution was not responsible for errors in the removal proceeding, it said, there “come[s] a point where” the Government 11 “adopt[s]” those errors as its own. App. 679. The Court again held all motions open pending further briefing. In an effort to respond to the concerns voiced by the District Court, the Government filed a supplemental brief raising two points: First, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to condition a Rule 48 dismissal on the actions of an independent department—here, on DHS’s forgoing future removal proceedings based on the 2011 order. Second, the Government made unambiguous that it was not “rely[ing] on or adopt[ing]” the DHS officers’ testimony and was no longer contesting any element of the § 1326(d) defense “other than the issue of prejudice.” App. 755. But the Government’s brief came with yet another surprise. At the start of the prosecution, the U.S. Attorney’s Office had received black-and-white copies of Reyes-Romero’s A-file from DHS and had shared those files with Reyes-Romero’s counsel. Neither counsel had previously asked to inspect the originals. But before filing its supplemental brief, the prosecution obtained the original documents, which revealed that the two inconsistent checks on the I-826—one requesting a hearing, the other waiving it—were made in different colors. And based on the ink color, it appeared the DHS officer who signed the form had filled in the box corresponding to ReyesRomero’s waiver of rights. Even more odd, the waiver box featured a blue mark drawn over a pre-printed black “x,” suggesting the DHS officers had given Reyes-Romero a pre-filled form. AUSA Hallowell immediately disclosed the color versions of the documents to Reyes-Romero’s counsel and to the Court. 12 After reviewing the color copies, the District Court was “more convinced than ever” that the DHS officers’ testimony was a “combination of nonsense . . . [and] lies.” App. 792. And it continued to criticize the prosecution. The Court took issue, for instance, with AUSA Hallowell’s repeated statements that, as an AUSA assigned to a criminal prosecution, he could not unilaterally bind DHS to a specific course of conduct in future immigration proceedings. It also criticized the Government for not adequately “disclaim[ing]” the DHS officers’ testimony: MR. HALLOWELL: Your Honor, we are saying that we will not rely on that testimony moving forward in this case. THE COURT: Why? Why won’t you rely on it? MR. HALLOWELL: Your Honor, we don’t feel that that testimony can support a verdict for the Government on the first two prongs of [§ 1326(d)]. THE COURT: If believed, it’s legally insufficient? Or I shouldn’t believe it? MR. HALLOWELL: We understand that Your Honor will make the final decision as to whether that testimony could be believed or not. . . . THE COURT: Well, I understand that. I’m asking the lawyer for the United States of America, should I believe that testimony? MR. HALLOWELL: Your Honor, you should give it as much weight as you see fit. 13 App. 795, 797. In the Court’s view, AUSA Hallowell’s refusal to “take a[] position” on the testimony conflicted with his obligations as a prosecutor. App. 798–99. And the District Court suggested that the Government had moved to dismiss in “bad faith” to ensure DHS officials could use the 2011 order in future immigration proceedings against Reyes-Romero rather than instituting a new removal proceeding through service of a notice to appear (NTA). App. 822–24. In response, the Government pointed out that months earlier, DHS officials had attempted to do just that, offering Reyes-Romero an NTA that would have led to new proceedings before an IJ rather than reinstatement of the 2011 administrative removal order. But Reyes-Romero had rejected it. He gave two reasons for having done so: a theory that the Government’s choice to prosecute him for unlawful reentry precluded it from starting new removal proceedings 5 and a desire to 5 In support, Reyes-Romero cited several district court opinions holding that if a noncitizen is prosecuted for a criminal offense and is granted pretrial release, he cannot be seized by DHS officials under an immigration detainer during the criminal proceeding. E.g., United States v. Hernandez-Bourdier, No. 16-cr-222-2, 2017 WL 56033, at  (W.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2017). That line of cases is contrary to what we and our sister circuits have had to say on the matter, see, e.g., United States v. Soriano Nunez, 928 F.3d 240, 247–27 (3d Cir. 2019); United States v. Lett, 944 F.3d 467, 470–71 (2d Cir. 2019) (collecting decisions and joining the consensus), and in any event, nothing in those cases suggests the decision to bring a § 1326 prosecution forfeits DHS’s right to pursue immigration 14 ensure that the District Court would reach the merits of his § 1326(d) motion. With the District Court’s continued deferral of a ruling, the parties filed supplemental briefing on prejudice. ReyesRomero’s supplemental brief expanded the argument that but for the defects in his 2011 removal proceeding, there was “a reasonable likelihood,” Charleswell, 456 F.3d at 362, that he would have received asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Government responded that Reyes-Romero was ineligible for asylum because his assault conviction qualified as an aggravated felony; that he was ineligible for withholding of removal because the assault offense was a “particularly serious crime,” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii); and that he was not reasonably likely to prevail in seeking CAT protection or any other form of relief from removal. In his reply brief, Reyes-Romero unearthed a new argument: dicta from Charleswell, an early decision on § 1326(d), suggesting “[t]here may be some cases where the agency’s violations of a [noncitizen’s] rights [ar]e so flagrant, and the difficulty of proving prejudice so great, that prejudice may be presumed.” 456 F.3d at 362 n.17 (citation omitted). The District Court ultimately granted Reyes-Romero’s § 1326(d) motion. It ruled that the I-826 and I-851 forms were “shams” and that any waiver on those forms was invalid; that, “in light of the invalid waivers,” any failure to exhaust administrative remedies or seek judicial review as required by proceedings against the noncitizen after the criminal prosecution ends. 15 § 1326(d)(1) and (2) must be excused; that the irregularities in Reyes-Romero’s removal proceeding constituted fundamental errors; and that those errors caused him prejudice, both because his claims for relief from removal were reasonably likely to succeed and because “the procedural defects were so central . . . that prejudice must be presumed” under footnote 17 of Charleswell. The Court therefore granted Reyes-Romero’s motion to dismiss “on the merits.” App. 1028. Doing so, the Court explained, would “serve[] to limit [Reyes-Romero’s] exposure to future” immigration proceedings “reliant on the . . . 2011” order. App. 1031. Given that disposition, the District Court denied as moot Reyes-Romero’s pending motion for bond. But it did not do the same with the Government’s pending motion to dismiss. Instead, it took the “unusual” step, App. 1030, of proceeding to analyze the Government’s motion on the merits and denying it as “clearly contrary to manifest public interest.” Id. (quoting In re Richards, 213 F.3d 773, 787 (3d Cir. 2000)). The Court found that the Government’s subjective motivation for its motion to dismiss was a desire to guarantee that DHS could rely on the 2011 removal order in future immigration proceedings. That motivation, it explained, “taint[ed]” the Government’s effort to have the case dismissed. App. 1032–33. Similarly problematic, the Court continued, was the Government’s “taking . . . a noncommittal position as to the credibility of” Officers Darji and Alicea, which the Court deemed inconsistent with the Government’s duty to correct a witness’s statement that is “obvious[ly]” untrue. App. 1037–38 (quoting United States v. Harris, 498 F.2d 1164, 1169 (3d Cir. 1974)). 16 The District Court thus dismissed the indictment with prejudice. The Government did not appeal the District Court’s rulings on the motions to dismiss or the order of dismissal. 6