Opinion ID: 729739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: AC&B Award

Text: 42 U.S.C. 1988 provides in relevant part: 14 In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[ ] . . . 1983 . . . of this title . . . the district court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. 15 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). Reasonable fees under 1988 are to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community, regardless of whether plaintiff is represented by private or non-profit counsel. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 79 L. Ed. 2d 891, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984). The burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the requested rates are in line with those [rates] prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. Id. at 895 n. 11.
16 There is no dispute here that the relevant community for the AC&B award is Guam. In setting the hourly rates, the district court properly considered declarations from Guam attorneys regarding the prevailing market rates. See Davis, 976 F.2d at 1547 (We recently pronounced that declarations of the 'prevailing market rate in the relevant community . . . [are] sufficient to establish the appropriate [billing] rate for lodestar purposes.') (alteration in original) (quoting Bouman, 940 F.2d at 1235). 17 Those affidavits clearly support the district court's determination that $175 per hour is the prevailing market rate for Ms. Arriola's services. For example, J. Bradley Klemm submitted an affidavit stating that $175 is reasonable and well within the range of billing rates for attorneys on Guam for a case of this magnitude and controversy. James S. Brooks, who has practiced law on Guam since 1968, submitted an affidavit stating that $300 an hour would be reasonable given the complexity of the case, Ms. Arriola's experience in class action litigation, and the considerable hostility the suit engendered in the community. He further stated that he was frankly surprised at AC&B's usual hourly rates and that those rates seemed low when compared to the rates of other firms with which he was familiar. G. Patrick Civille submitted an affidavit stating that his firm would charge $200 an hour for having a comparably experienced attorney handle a similar matter. Although defendants submitted affidavits suggesting that the prevailing market rate for Ms. Arriola's service would be less than $175 per hour, it was well within the district court's discretion to credit the affidavits supporting the $175 figure. 18 Our colleague in Dissent argues against an hourly rate of more than $150 for Ms. Arriola. Dissent at 14602. Were the standard of review de novo, our colleague might be on firmer ground. However, a district court's finding is not clearly erroneous simply because an appellate Judge would reach a different Conclusion. If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Service Employees Int'l Union v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 955 F.2d 1312, 1317 n. 7 (9th Cir.) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518, 105 S. Ct. 1504 (1985)), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1230 (1992). 3 19 Furthermore, it is perfectly appropriate for a district court to award an hourly rate higher than is customarily charged by the plaintiff's attorney or than is set forth in the retainer fee agreement. See Maldonado v. Lehman, 811 F.2d 1341, 1342 (9th Cir.) (counsel's customary rate is not controlling), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 990, 98 L. Ed. 2d 509, 108 S. Ct. 480 (1987); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96, 103 L. Ed. 2d 67, 109 S. Ct. 939 (1989) (pre-existing fee agreement does not limit the amount of fees awardable under 1988). 20 Having reviewed the affidavits, we conclude that the rates employed by the district court were in line with the prevailing market rates in Guam for attorneys of similar skill, reputation and experience handling similar matters. We further conclude, as did the district court, that the rates employed were fully justified quite apart from any consideration of contingency.
21 Upon remand, the district court again applied a 2.0 multiplier to the lodestar figure. Acknowledging that contingency did factor into its original decision to enhance the lodestar figure, the district court noted that the more important considerations . . . were the extreme undesirability of the case, the likelihood that no other attorney on island would have accepted the case, and the rare and exceptional nature of the case, particularly in the small island community of Guam. Thus, the district court found the 2.0 multiplier appropriate even without considering the contingency. The district court did not, as the Dissent suggests, consider that counsel was precluded from other employment because of the time spent on this litigation as a reason justifying the fee award we now affirm. Nor did the district court apply a multiplier because of the absence of other local counsel competent to handle this case. Dissent at 14603-04 & n.30. Rather, the district court found it unlikely that other qualified attorneys would have taken the case. 4 22 We disagree with defendants' contention that a multiplier may never be applied to increase a fee award after Dague. The Dague opinion only discussed the permissibility of applying a multiplier to reflect that the prevailing party's attorneys were retained on a contingency fee basis. Dague left undisturbed earlier Supreme Court case law allowing a fee applicant to recover more than the lodestar figure where the applicant has met the burden of showing that 'such an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee.' Dague, 505 U.S. at 562 (emphasis added) (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 898). 23 Moreover, we disagree with the Dissent that the unavailability of willing local counsel is not a proper factor justifying an enhancement of the lodestar. Such an enhancement is clearly necessary to a reasonable fee where the district court finds that the case is of the type that attorneys are unwilling to take for fear of ostracization and out of concern for their personal safety. Such a consideration is not ordinarily reflected in the lodestar, and we find that it was clearly not reflected in the lodestar in this particular instance. See Stewart, 987 F.2d at 1454 (recognizing that, after Dague, enhancement is still appropriate in limited circumstances on the basis of factors not fully reflected in the basic fee). 5 24 In the alternative, the Dissent contests the district court's factual finding that plaintiffs were unlikely to have found other local counsel. In this regard, the district court was faced with a credibility determination. Plaintiffs presented the affidavit of J. Bradley Klemm, who stated that most local firms would be unlikely to accept a case such as GSOBYN  given the position of the Catholic church on the issue and the class action nature of the lawsuit and that had AC&B not pursued this case, the plaintiffs would have found it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to obtain local experienced counsel. On the other hand, defendants presented the affidavit of Linda Ingles who stated she did not believe that the ACLU and the Plaintiffs would have experienced difficulty in obtaining local counsel so that the challenge to the law could proceed in federal court because the plaintiffs in a Guam asbestos class action suit had no difficulty obtaining local counsel. We cannot say that the district court clearly erred in choosing to believe one affidavit rather than the other, especially in this case, where the basis for Klemms' opinion appears more relevant. 25 Nonetheless, the Dissent insists that the district court's finding that there was a likelihood no other attorney on Guam would have taken the case is clearly erroneous because AC&B did take the case and GNA and Laurie Konwith were able to get off-island counsel. The Dissent also speculates that because plaintiffs were able to obtain declarations from various Guam residents who oppose the law, plaintiffs likely could have found other local counsel. 26 A district court's factual findings are reviewed in light of the record, not speculation. Although one could speculate that other attorneys on Guam might have agreed to represent plaintiffs if offered the opportunity because lawyers have a moral obligation to represent those with unpopular views and might be able to sign a million dollar book deal when the case is over (Dissent at 14615 n.38), one could just as easily speculate that only a lawyer with a strong pro-choice philosophy and extensive public interest law experience would have taken this case, of which one could speculate there are few on Guam. However, as Judges, we are not permitted to engage in such speculation. We are confined to the evidence in the record and those inferences that directly follow from that evidence. Based upon the record in this case, the district court was not clearly wrong in its Conclusion that plaintiffs were unlikely to find other local counsel. 27 Moreover, that two of the other plaintiffs hired off-island counsel, on this record, seems to us to support, rather than contradict, the district court's finding that there was a likelihood that no other attorney on island would have accepted the case. 28 Contrary to the Dissent's contention, neither the majority here nor the district court in its original order paint[ ] a picture of an island community where the public is virtually of one mind on the question of abortion, and where all Dissent on the issue is quickly stifled. 6 Rather, the district court cogently explained why it believed it was unlikely that plaintiffs could have obtained other local counsel: 29 The record reflects that plaintiffs' local attorneys accepted this case in the face of a unanimous Legislature, as well as a Governor who had taken a strong personal and political stand on the issue, despite both having been advised by the Attorney General that the law was unconstitutional. The Roman Catholic Church had also spoken publicly, even threatening excommunication of opponents of the law. Ms. Arriola's affidavit states that she received death threats, 7 and encountered overt hostility from members of the community. The Court notes, and the record supports, that Guam is a relatively small and predominantly Catholic community and that this lawsuit was particularly emotionally-charged. Declarations of other local attorneys also indicate that plaintiffs would have had much difficulty finding local counsel, due to the high visibility of the case, the small size of the island, and the many conflicts of interest occasioned by the many parties involved. There is no doubt in my mind that this case was deemed extremely undesirable in the community and that local counsel faced unusual and trying personal and professional pressures during the pendency of this lawsuit. 30 Not being residents of Guam and given the record on appeal, we are not in a position to doubt the district court's view of the dynamics surrounding this case. 31 Moreover, that the people of Guam are not of one mind or that plaintiffs were able to find various Guam residents, mostly health care providers whose livelihoods are directly affected by the law, who are willing to speak out against the law, does not in any way detract from the district court's finding that most lawyers on Guam would not have taken this case. 8 Although the United States is hardly of one-mind on the issue of abortion, physicians are more and more reluctant to provide abortions in this country because of threats of ostracization and violence. 9 It is not clearly wrong to find that, for similar reasons, lawyers are likely to be reluctant to provide legal representation to individuals challenging anti-abortion statutes. In sum, there is no reason to disbelieve Mr. Klemm's affidavit that plaintiffs would have found it extremely difficult, if not impossible to obtain experienced local counsel. Consequently, the district court did not err in enhancing the lodestar figure based upon this factor. Cf. Gomez v. Gates, 804 F. Supp. 69, 75 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (concluding that Dague does not preclude enhancement for undesirability of excessive force case). 32 Finally, defendants contend that because contingency was a factor in the original decision, the district court necessarily should have reduced the multiplier on remand. We disagree. As long as the district court's 2.0 multiplier can be justified on the bases it mentioned in its remand decision - without regard to contingency - it may be upheld. See Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco, 859 F.2d 649, 651 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming district court's choice of 2.0 multiplier despite its reliance on impermissible factors where the permissible factors alone amply supported the result). We find that the magnitude of the multiplier applied by the district court was reasonable in light of the factors upon which it relied.
33 The Dissent questions plaintiffs' litigation strategy; whether, for example, it was appropriate for counsel to engage in certain discovery 10 and to spend as much time as they did preparing the summary judgment motion. But the Dissent fails to mention that the reasonableness of the number of hours was irrelevant to the district court upon remand and irrelevant to us on appeal because defendants do not challenge the number of hours for which plaintiffs request fees 11 and we do not generally consider arguments not raised by the parties. See Blackburn v. Goettel-Blanton, 898 F.2d 95, 97 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1990). 34 Furthermore, although it may be easy, in hindsight, to tout this as an easy case, 12 plaintiffs cannot be faulted for their thoroughness under the circumstances. 13 Although one could argue that plaintiffs need only have pled the legal theory that actually carried the day rather than the six additional theories pled, one must remember the status of Roe was extremely tenuous after Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 106 L. Ed. 2d 410, 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), which was decided less than a year before this lawsuit was brought. 14 35 The Dissent questions the relevance of many of the affidavits submitted to support plaintiffs' claims. In fact, many of the criticized affidavits are directly relevant. For example, the affidavits regarding the effect of the statute on doctors and nurses were directly relevant to plaintiffs' claim that the statute is void for vagueness and violates the right to free speech. The affidavits regarding the subjugation of women on Guam and the medical benefits of abortion are relevant to plaintiffs' claim that the law violated the equal protection clause and the thirteenth amendment right to be free from slavery by robbing women of their bodily integrity and dignity and risking their lives and health. 36 Moreover, although it makes a much better study in contrasts to compare plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment with the eight paragraph opinion of the Guam Attorney General, the relevant comparison for purposes of determining whether plaintiffs' counsel spent inordinate amounts of time preparing their motion for summary judgment is between the motion and defendants' response in opposition. If plaintiffs' motion and accompanying declarations were as irrelevant and needlessly verbose as the Dissent contends, defendants did not deem it appropriate to bring it to the attention of the district court. Rather, they saw fit to file a 65 page response supported by 108 pages of declarations and other attachments touching on topics similar to those addressed by plaintiffs. For example, several of the declarations defendants submitted are personal testimonials of women who have undergone abortions and who describe the physical, psychological and emotional pain they experienced from their abortions. Other declarations touch on such topics as the concept that life begins at conception, 15 the developmental stages of embryos and fetuses, 16 words in the Chamorro language that refer to pregnancy and the birthing process, 17 and the various methods of performing abortions. 18 Defendants also include a newspaper article regarding physicians who do and do not perform abortions and the reasons why. 19 Even if the reasonableness of the number of hours for which fees were awarded was at issue, we could not say, on this record, that the district court abused its discretion in awarding fees for the hours it did.