Opinion ID: 1759329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: enforceability of contract

Text: Enforcement of the contract between Johnny Rufus Lanier and the State would result in a sentence which is not authorized by law. Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(1) (Supp. 1993), the sentencing options available to one convicted of capital murder are life imprisonment or death. Life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is not an option unless the convict is adjudged an habitual offender. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-19-81, 99-19-83 (Supp. 1993). Lanier was not indicted as, and apparently was not, an habitual offender; therefore a life sentence qualified by the preclusion of parole is not available to Lanier. Enforcement of the contract would also yield a result beyond the power of this Court to produce. The legislature has established our parole system and the extent of possible sentences for crimes. See Miss. Code Ann. Title 47, Chapter 7 (Probation and Parole) and Titles 97 and 99 (Crimes, Criminal Procedure). The judiciary is responsible for trying those accused of crimes and for imposing sentences authorized by the legislature. But it is the executive branch, via the parole board, that implements the legislature's parole policies and determines the actual time served by those convicted of crimes. Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-5(3) (1972). It follows that enforcement of the contract by this Court would effect judicial encroachment on an executive function. In other words, enforcement would bind the parole board, which took no part in the negotiations with Lanier. Although the right to contract is fundamental, contracts contrary to public policy are unenforceable. Hertz Commercial Leasing v. Morrison, 567 So.2d 832, 834 (Miss. 1990); First Nat. Bank of Vicksburg v. Caruthers, 443 So.2d 861, 864 n. 3 (Miss. 1983). Our statutes are enactments of the public policy of this state. Grisham v. Hinton, 490 So.2d 1201, 1209 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J., concurring). Indeed, regarding invalidation of contracts on public policy grounds, this Court has said that the public policy of this state is found in its constitution and statutes, `and when they have not directly spoken, then in the decisions of the courts and the constant practice of the government officials.' Cappaert v. Junker, 413 So.2d 378, 380 (Miss. 1982), quoting State ex rel Knox v. Hines Lbr. Co., 150 Miss. 1, 48, 115 So. 598, 605 (1928). The contract between Lanier and the State relates not merely to the parties' private business, but to matters of public concern. Both Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101 and this Court's interpretation of this statute have consistently allowed only two sentencing options for one convicted of capital murder: death or life imprisonment, not qualified by preclusion of parole. The contract at issue is an attempt to circumvent § 99-19-101, and as such, this contract is void ab initio on the ground that it violates the public policy of this state. [2] As a result, both parties are placed back in the positions which they occupied prior to entering into the agreement. Sullivan v. Pouncey, 469 So.2d 1233, 1234 (Miss. 1985). Lanier once again has the right to be sentenced by a jury and the State once again has the right to seek the death penalty.