Opinion ID: 1784137
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Donnie's Arrears

Text: Donnie's first assigned error presents the question of whether he should have been ordered to pay any arrears when he was financially unable to comply with the decree. Miss.Code Ann § 93-5-2 (Supp. 1990) governs modifications of divorce decrees issued on the ground of irreconcilable differences. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 574 So.2d 1376, 1380 (Miss. 1991); Morris v. Morris, 541 So.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Miss. 1989). After the agreement has become incorporated into the judgment, it may be modified as other judgments for divorce as set forth in Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-23. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2 (Supp. 1990). Once the provisions of § 93-5-2 have been met, the custody, support, alimony and property settlement agreement becomes a part of the final decree for all legal intents and purposes. Lawrence, 574 So.2d at 1380, citing Switzer v. Switzer, 460 So.2d 843, 845 (Miss. 1984). In order to justify changing or modifying the divorce decree, there must have been a material or substantial change in the circumstances of one or more of the interested parties: the father, the mother, and the child or children, arising subsequent to the entry of the decree to be modified. Lawrence, 574 So.2d at 1380; Morris, 541 So.2d at 1042-43; Tedford v. Dempsey, 437 So.2d 410, 417 (Miss. 1983). Donnie cites Kincaid v. Kincaid, 213 Miss. 451, 57 So.2d 263 (1952), to support the proposition that he was financially unable to comply with the divorce decree. In Kincaid, the Court quoted Amis on Divorce and Separation in Mississippi, Section 206, in holding that: ... a husband may not ask for modification of the original decree without showing that he has performed it or that its performance has been wholly impossible... [and] if the husband undertakes to exonerate himself because of his inability to pay, his proof must conform to those rules, namely: `That he earned all he could, that he lived economically and paid all surplus money above a living on the alimony decreed to the wife' ... [a]nd such proof must be made with particularity and not in general terms. Id. 213 Miss. at 456, 57 So.2d 263. The Court further stated: The payment of other debts or expenses will not excuse or justify his default, unless such payment was necessary in order to continue his business or occupation, because his wife's right to alimony is a prior and paramount claim on his earnings. Id. In Taylor v. Taylor, 348 So.2d 1341, 1343 (Miss. 1977), we followed Kincaid in holding that a husband could not request a modification in a divorce decree to reduce alimony when he was unable to show in particular and not general terms that he had complied with the decree or that it was impossible to fully comply with the decree. See Hooker v. Hooker, 205 So.2d 276, 278 (Miss. 1967). The record reveals that Donnie failed to offer substantial evidence which was particular and not general to support his contention that he was financially unable to meet his child support obligations. Moreover, Donnie's argument that he had to pay other bills before making payments to Charlotte is meritless. Kincaid holds that the payment of other debts or expenses will not excuse or justify his default because the alimony payments are paramount. Kincaid, 57 So.2d at 264. The fact that Donnie additionally failed to pay for one-half of the medical expenses from 1986 to 1988 and one-half of private school expenses in 1989 indicates that financial hardship was not the sole factor in Donnie's failure to make payments, since he held a well paying job after August of 1986. The chancellor's finding that Donnie should pay child support arrearage was correct.