Opinion ID: 4521334
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Sliding Scale Analogy

Text: Some district courts in this circuit, including the district court below, have grafted onto the ad hoc approach additional considerations. One such consideration is what collective plaintiffs describe as a sliding scale analogy, because the district courts employing the analogy reason that [t]he similarly situated analysis can be viewed, in some respects, as a sliding scale. Gardner v. W. Beef Props., Inc., No. 7-cv-2345, 2013 WL 1629299, at , 6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2013). The analogy is straightforward: The more opt-ins there are in the class, the more the analysis under § 216(b) will mirror the analysis under Rule 23. Id. at . As a result, the court will import the more rigorous requirements of Rule 23 into the similarly situated inquiry in rough proportion to the number plaintiffs who have chosen to opt-in. In so doing, the courts relying on this analogy conflate the requirements for class certification under Rule 23 with the requirements to proceed as a collective under § 216(b). 8 8 See, e.g., Mendez v. U.S. Nonwovens Corp., No. 12-5583, 2016 WL 1306551, at  (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016) (noting that [a]lthough the standard for establishing that the collective members are similarly situated under the FLSA is less stringent than the Rule 23 commonality standard, courts in this district have noted that these two standards are 33 This has led, in turn, to courts assessing the predominance requirement . . . almost always reach[ing] the same conclusion about whether proceeding collectively is appropriate. Whilliam C. Jhaveri-Weeks & Austin Webbert, Class Actions Under Rule 23 and Collective Actions Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 23 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol'y 233, 264 (2016); see also Ruiz v. CitiBank, N.A., 93 F. Supp. 3d 279, 298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ([I]t is not mere coincidence that courts facing parallel motions to decertify an FLSA collective action under Section 216(b) and to certify a class action under Rule 23 have tended to allow either both actions or neither to proceed on a collective basis.). For the reasons discussed below, we hold that analogies to Rule 23, including the sliding scale analogy, are inconsistent with the language of § 216(b) and that the question of whether plaintiffs may proceed as a collective under the FLSA is to be analyzed under the separate and independent requirements of § 216(b). functionally similar); Ruiz v. CitiBank, N.A., 93 F. Supp. 3d 279, 298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting the harmony of animating principles underlying collective actions under § 216(b) and class actions proceeding under Rule 23); Indergit v. Rite Aid Corp., 293 F.R.D. 632, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that although conditional certification, decertification, and Rule 23 class certification are subject to disparate legal standards, courts nonetheless have recognized that the 'similarly situated' analysis for purposes of FLSA certification can be viewed, in some respects, as a sliding scale). 34 First and foremost, it is already well established that the FLSA's similarly situated requirement is independent of, and unrelated to Rule 23's requirements, Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2004), and that it is quite distinct from the much higher threshold of demonstrating that common questions of law and fact will 'predominate' for Rule 23 purposes, Myers, 624 F.3d at 555-56. Nearly every circuit to consider the relationship between the modern Rule 23 and § 216(b) has reached the same conclusion. See Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1111 (holding that § 216(b) analogies to Rule 23 lack[] support in either the FLSA or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Calderone v. Scott, 838 F.3d 1101, 1104 (11th Cir. 2016) (describing Rule 23 as more demanding than § 216(b)); O'Brien v. Ed Connelly Enters., Inc., 575 F.3d 567, 584-85 (6th Cir. 2009) (describing Rule 23 as a more stringent standard than § 216(b)); Thiessen v. Gen. Electric Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1105 (10th Cir. 2001) (Congress clearly chose not to have the Rule 23 standards apply to [collective actions], and instead adopted the 'similarly situated' standard. To now interpret this 'similarly situated' standard by simply incorporating the requirements of Rule 23 . . . would effectively ignore Congress' directive.); LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1975) (describing actions under § 216(b) and Rule 23 as 35 mutually exclusive and irreconcilable); see also Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 1062, 1078 (3d Cir. 1988). But see Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705 F.3d 770, 772 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that the provisions of Rule 23 are intended to promote efficiency . . . , and in that regard are as relevant to collective actions as to class actions because there isn't a good reason to have different standards for the certification of the two different types of action[s]). This conclusion is supported by the language and structure of § 216(b) and the modern Rule 23, which bear little resemblance to each other. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Under § 216(b) of the FLSA, employees have a right to maintain a collective action for and in behalf of . . . themselves and other employees similarly situated. Section 216(b) has nothing comparable to Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirements of predominance or superiority. And Rule 23's requirements of adequacy and typicality are intended to protect the due process rights of absent class members, which is not a consideration in a nonrepresentative action such as a collective action under § 216(b). See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12 (1985); see also Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1112. Indeed, Congress amended § 216(b) in 1947 expressly to put an end to representational litigation in the context of actions proceeding under §216(b), and 36 at the same time required that workers affirmatively opt-in by filing written consent as a condition to proceeding as a collective. Compare Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, 1069 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)) (providing that employees proceeding under § 216(b) may designate an agent or representative to maintain such action for and in behalf of all employees similarly situated), with Portal to Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 8049, 61 Stat. 84, 87 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1946 Supp. II)) (banning representative actions and providing that [n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought). In 1966, Rule 23 was amended to resemble its modern form, including for the first time Rule 23(a)'s requirements of commonality, typicality, numerosity, and adequacy, and Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirements of predominance and superiority. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (1966). Along with these revisions, the drafters also omitted the opt-in requirement contained in the former spurious class action device and replaced it with Rule 23(b)(3)'s opt-out requirement. Id. The opt-out requirement of the modern Rule 23(b)(3) directly conflicts with the express opt-in requirement of § 216(b). Accordingly, the drafters of the 1966 37 revisions explicitly noted that the present provisions of [§ 216(b)] are not intended to be affected. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's notes to 1966 amendment; see also Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp., 675 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2012). Moreover, Rule 23 and § 216(b) serve fundamentally different purposes. Rule 23 provides a general procedural mechanism for the resolution of claims on a class-wide basis subject to the sound discretion of the district court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Section 216(b), by contrast, is tailored specifically to vindicating federal labor rights, and where the conditions of § 216(b) are met, employees have a substantive right to proceed as a collective, a right that does not exist under Rule 23. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see also Hoffman-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 173; Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC, 860 F.3d 389, 396–97 (6th Cir. 2017); O’Brien, 575 F.3d at 586. We conclude by noting that the FLSA not only imposes a lower bar than Rule 23, it imposes a bar lower in some sense even than Rules 20 and 42, which set forth the relatively loose requirements for permissive joinder and consolidation at trial. Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1112. Whereas [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] 20 and 42 allow district courts discretion in granting joinder or consolidation, the FLSA, which declares a right to proceed collectively on 38 satisfaction of certain conditions, does not. Id.; see also O’Brien, 575 F.3d at 58485; Grayson, 79 F.3d at 1095-96; Lusardi, 855 F.2d at 1078. Furthermore, joinder under Rule 20 requires, in addition to a common question of law or fact, that the plaintiffs assert a right to relief arising from the same transaction[ ] [or] occurrence[]. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1)(A). No such condition exists in the text of the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see also Campbell, 903 F.3d at 1112. For these reasons, we hold that the requirements for certifying a class under Rule 23 are unrelated to and more stringent than the requirements for similarly situated employees to proceed in a collective action under § 216(b). Accordingly, it is error for courts to equate the requirements of § 216(b) with those of Rule 23 in assessing whether named plaintiffs are similarly situated to opt-in plaintiffs under the FLSA.