Opinion ID: 2357828
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The crimes against Richard Dunbar

Text: Christie Hervey identified defendant as the gunman who walked swiftly toward her and who looked back at the body of Mr. Dunbar. (See ante, pt. I.A.1.a.) Defendant claims Ms. Hervey's testimony was insubstantial because she was 100 feet away, could have seen the man only briefly, had to study the photo lineup for 20 minutes before identifying defendant, and could not say whether the man had a mustache or beard. His argument fails. According to Ms. Hervey and Detective Cade, Ms. Hervey was 40 to 75 feet from the gunman. The scene was brightly lit and her view was unobstructed. (See ante, pt. I.A.1.a.) Ms. Hervey not only identified defendant in the photo lineup, but also at the preliminary hearing and again at trial. ( Ibid. ) Moreover, defendant admitted to Glenn Johnson that he killed a man during a failed carjacking at the West Palms apartment complex, the scene of Dunbar's murder. Johnson saw him in possession of the pistol used to kill Dunbar. ( Ibid. ) Finally, the same pistol was used in the attempted murder of Miguel Cortez, and Mr. Cortez identified defendant as his attacker. (See ante, pt. I.A.2.)
Defendant claims the evidence of robbery was insubstantial because no one saw him take Mr. Dunbar's car keys, he did not admit having taken them, and they were not discovered in his possession. However, there was substantial circumstantial evidence of the taking. Mr. Dunbar left his apartment with his keys and used them to drive to the murder scene. They were not found on his person or at the scene, although his other personal effects were. (See ante, pt. I.A. 1.a.) We held substantially similar circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a robbery-murder special circumstance finding in People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1]. The victim was last seen in Maury's company. She had a roll of cash and announced her intention to buy marijuana with it. However, neither money nor drugs were found when her body was later discovered. We concluded the jury could reasonably infer that Maury had stole[n] either the money or marijuana from [her]. ( Id. at p. 402.)
Defendant claims the evidence of attempted carjacking was insubstantial. He argues it was far more likely than not that there was no intent or attempt to take the vehicle, as the victim was incapacitated and nothing prevented the assailant from taking the victim's car. To the contrary, the jury was entitled to conclude that defendant, having taken Mr. Dunbar's car keys, would have taken the car itself, but that the gunshots drew the security guard to the scene and may have prompted neighbors to call the police, as Ms. Hervey did. (See ante, pt. I.A. 1.a.) Defendant himself told Glenn Johnson that he killed a man at the West Palms complex because he resisted an attempted carjacking. Further, the gun defendant later abandoned was conclusively linked to the murder through ballistics evidence. ( Ibid. )
(2) As with the underlying crimes, substantial evidence supported the special circumstance finding that the murder occurred in the commission of robbery or attempted carjacking. From evidence that a defendant killed another person and at the time of the killing took substantial property from that person, a jury ordinarily may reasonably infer that the defendant killed the victim to accomplish the taking and thus committed the offense of robbery. ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 357 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432]; People v. Kipp [(2001)] 26 Cal.4th [1100,] 1128 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450]; People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 688 [268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887].) ( People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 553 [[127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931] [special circumstance finding supported by substantial evidence].)