Opinion ID: 481036
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claims Against Sylvester Gould

Text: 26 Wrenn next challenges the district court's dismissal of his actions against defendant Gould on the irrelevant ground that: 27 The District Court clearly exceeded its authority when it dismissed ... Gould.... It was not the responsibility of Plaintiff-Appellant to have Defendant Gould appear at the trial, and since he did not appear the Appellant should have been awarded judgment by default.... 3 28 The district court dismissed all of Wrenn's claims against Gould because Wrenn, through his attorney, explicitly joined in the plaintiff's motion to voluntarily dismiss those claims. 29 Wrenn suggests no basis for this court to set aside the dismissal of the claims against Gould, and we decline to do so.V. Title VII Claims Against the Center 30 We turn then to Wrenn's claim that the district court erred in entering judgment for the Center upon Wrenn's claim of unlawful retaliatory discrimination in passing him over to hire Ms. Hill. 31 When reviewing the district court's factual findings in a Title VII discrimination case, we may not reverse unless we find that the district court committed clear error. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985): 32 If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible ... the court of appeals may not reverse it even though ... it would have weighed the evidence differently. 33 Id. 470 U.S. at 573, 105 S.Ct. at 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d at 528. Although this is true of all findings of fact in a Title VII action, credibility determinations require even greater deference: 34 [W]hen a trial judge's finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one or two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error. 35 Id. 470 U.S. at 575, 105 S.Ct. at 1513, 84 L.Ed.2d at 529-30. See also West v. Fred Wright Construction Co., 756 F.2d 31 (6th Cir.1985). 36 Furthermore, the Ohio Civil Rights Commission finding no probable cause of discrimination should be accorded substantial weight, Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9 (6th Cir.1972). See also Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). A. 37 Wrenn makes several arguments that can be disposed of rather quickly. He first argues that the fact that the candidate eventually hired, Ms. Hill, is, like Wrenn, a black person is irrelevant to his retaliation claim. He further claims the Center's hiring of Ms. Hill was merely an afterthought on defendant's part after the two preferred non-minority candidates rejected the Center's offer. For this argument he relies on several race discrimination cases stating that as long as racial reasons were the root of the disparate treatment, the race of the successful applicant does not, in itself, defeat a plaintiff's prima facie case. While we do not question the correctness of the rule, it has no application here for at least two reasons. First, the record does not support plaintiff's contention that the preferred candidates, Vanu Bagchi and the unknown gentleman from Cleveland, were non-minorities. Second, the argument is irrelevant because neither the district court nor defendants relied upon Ms. Hill's race to deny Wrenn's retaliation claim. Therefore, we need address those arguments no further. 38 Next, Wrenn argues that an employment practice need not be unlawful in itself to violate Title VII. We need not reach this question, as the district court's decision rested solely upon its finding that the Center's employment decision was not pretextual, not on whether it was illegal. 39 Wrenn next argues that the district court's decision in this case is inconsistent with this court's decision in Wrenn v. Wernert, 765 F.2d 147 (6th Cir.1985). 4 We merely observe that the district court's decision is not inconsistent with Wernert. The portions of Wernert cited to us by Wrenn deal with Wrenn's allegations of race discrimination and merely list some of the many non-pretextual reasons Wernert and Mental Health Emergency Services refused to hire Wrenn. The opinion does not purport to exhaustively list all the possible non-pretextual grounds upon which an employer may reject an applicant. 40 Furthermore, in dealing with Wrenn's retaliation claim in Wernert, the Sixth Circuit adopted District Judge Potter's holding that: 41  'Finally, the Court will grant defendants summary judgment on plaintiff's claims of retaliation under Title VII. 42  'The affidavit[s] of ... Wernert and ... Prebe ... both indicate that the fact that plaintiff had filed discrimination charges against the Ohio Department of Mental Health was not considered during the selection process. In light of these affidavits, the Court finds that plaintiff's deposition testimony fails to raise genuine issues of material fact....'  43 Id. The facts of Wernert are virtually identical to those in the case at bar vis-a-vis the retaliation claim. Wrenn had claimed that the defendants in that case had refused to hire him because he had earlier filed suit against the Ohio Department of Mental Health and Retardation. In both Wernert and this case, the affidavits of the many people involved in the selection process stated that Wrenn's previous suit filing had no effect whatever upon the decision not to hire him. The only inconsistency between Wernert and the district court's decision in this case operates in Wrenn's favor. The Wernert court summarily disposed of Wrenn's retaliation claim, finding no causal link. In this case, however, the district court found that Wrenn had established a prima facie case of retaliatory nonhiring, but had failed to show that the Center's proffered reasons for not hiring him were pretextual. B. 44 The sole issue in this case warranting extensive consideration on Wrenn's appeal is whether the district court's finding that the Center's reasons for hiring Ms. Hill rather than Wrenn were not pretextual is clearly erroneous. 45 Wrenn begins his pro se argument with the incorrect assertion that the Center had the burden of proving that its reasons for hiring Ms. Hill were non-pretextual. That claim simply misconstrues the proper allocation of the burden of proof in Title VII cases. 46 Federal law proscribes discrimination against an applicant for making charges opposing racially discriminatory employment practices. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-3. Proof of a retaliation claim under Title VII is governed by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and its progeny. It is elemental that the ultimate burden of proving that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains with the plaintiff at all times. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The now familiar labyrinthine course of shifting burdens in Title VII cases begins with the plaintiff's duty to establish a prima facie case by showing such facts as give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. That is a burden easily met. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093; International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n. 44, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1866 n. 44, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). 47 In Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir.1982), the Ninth Circuit set forth the following elements as establishing a prima facie retaliation claim: (1) that plaintiff engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) that the exercise of his civil rights was known by the defendant; (3) that, thereafter, the defendant took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff; and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See also Burrus v. United Telephone Co., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071, 103 S.Ct. 491, 74 L.Ed.2d 633 (1982); Smalley v. City of Eatonville, 640 F.2d 765, 769 (5th Cir.1981); Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1296 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 979, 101 S.Ct. 1513, 67 L.Ed.2d 814 (1981); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 622 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir.1980). The Tenth Circuit has held this causal connection may be demonstrated by the proximity of the adverse action to the protected activity. Burrus, 683 F.2d at 342. 48 The district court correctly found that Wrenn's proofs established a prima facie case. That being so, the burden of proceeding with the evidence then shifted to the Center to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to hire Ms. Hill rather than Wrenn. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824; see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093; Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25, 99 S.Ct. 295, 58 L.Ed.2d 216 (1978); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978). Even though the burden of going forward with evidence to answer Wrenn's prima facie case, once established, moved to the Center, the ultimate burden of persuasion never shifted from the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093; Jackson v. RKO Bottlers of Toledo, Inc., 743 F.2d 370, 375 (6th Cir.1984); Haynes v. Miller, 669 F.2d 1125, 1126-27 (6th Cir.1982). See generally Sweeney, 439 U.S. at 24, 99 S.Ct. at 295. 49 Once defendant articulates the nondiscriminatory reasons, the Burdine presumption of discrimination flowing from the prima facie case automatically drops out of the case. Weems v. Ball Metal & Chemical Division, Inc., 753 F.2d 527, 529 n. 2 (6th Cir.1985). Defendant need not persuade the court it was actually so motivated, but need merely raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it in fact intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1481, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094; Sweeney, 439 U.S. at 25, 99 S.Ct. at 295; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824; West v. Fred Wright Construction Co., 756 F.2d 31, 33-34 (6th Cir.1985); Burnett v. Chickasaw Area Development Comm., 662 F.2d 1210 (6th Cir.1981). 50 The nondiscriminatory reasons articulated by the Center for hiring Ms. Hill instead of Wrenn were the following: 51 First, Ms. Hill received glowing recommendations from former director Borders and from her former employer, Hough-Norwood; second, hiring Ms. Hill would greatly boost lagging employee morale, as evidenced by the employees' petition which demanded that she be hired; third, hiring Ms. Hill would provide continuity at a minimum cost in that Ms. Hill was already performing the work without an assistant and would not require the training a replacement would need; fourth, Ms. Hill was actively involved in renovating the Center's facilities; and fifth, hiring Ms. Hill was financially beneficial to the Center in that she had begun a plan which would bring the Center's indicators into the compliance with federal regulations needed to retain its funding, and she had extensive and positive relations with the federal and state officials responsible for the Center's funding. 52 Because the ultimate burden of persuasion rested with Wrenn, once the Center came forward with legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for hiring Ms. Hill, Wrenn had to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Center's reasons for hiring Ms. Hill were pretextual. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-56, 101 S.Ct. at 1094-95; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. at 1825; Jackson v. Pepsi-Cola, 783 F.2d 50 (6th Cir.1986), appeal pending; Fields v. Bolger, 723 F.2d 1216, 1219 (6th Cir.1984); Canham v. Oberlin College, 666 F.2d 1057, 1061 (6th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 977, 102 S.Ct. 2242, 72 L.Ed.2d 851 (1982). The district court found that Wrenn did not prove that the Center's reasons for hiring Hill were a mere pretext. Wrenn claims, however, that the manifest weight of the evidence established that Hill was hired as a mere pretext to avoid hiring him and that he was the only qualified candidate for the position. 53 It may be worthwhile to note here that Title VII does not diminish lawful traditional management prerogatives in choosing among qualified candidates, United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 207, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 2729, 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979). So long as its reasons are not discriminatory, an employer is free to choose among qualified candidates, Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259, 101 S.Ct. at 1096; Canham, 666 F.2d at 1061; Leiberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 67 (2d Cir.1980). An employer has even greater flexibility in choosing a management-level employee, as is the case here, because of the nature of such a position. Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 70 (6th Cir.1982). See also Manson v. Continental Illinois National Bank, 704 F.2d 361 (7th Cir.1983); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir.1979); Frausto v. Legal Aid Society of San Diego, Inc., 563 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir.1977). 54 But Wrenn claims that he was not rejected from a pool of qualified candidates. Rather, he argues he was the only qualified candidate. 55 The Center's search committee, the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, the employees of the Center, former director Borders, Hough-Norwood, and the district court all considered Ms. Hill qualified. Yet, Wrenn claims that on the strength of the advertisement which listed two required qualifications, he was the only qualified applicant. There are several problems with this contention. 56 First, the search committee was free to decide what qualifications were necessary for the job--no regulations, articles of incorporation, or bylaws tied their hands. The search committee preferred an applicant with a master's degree and five years' experience; but those were not requirements. The search committee decided the Center needed an individual who could take over management without any disruption of several key ongoing activities. They wanted someone with extensive, positive working relations with government officials. They needed someone who could save them money and preserve their funding, and they needed someone who could improve employee morale. The search committee determined that Hill had all of these qualifications and was therefore qualified for the job. 57 Second, Wrenn had been informed, even before disclosing that he had previously sued the state, that a master's degree was preferred, but not required. Wrenn contends that the job description, wherein he was advised that a master's degree was merely preferred, is irrelevant because the ad is the public quote contract with the applicant as opposed to the job description. 5 In a Title VII case, however, we look to the employer's motivation, not the applicant's perceptions, or even an objective assessment, of what qualifications are required for a particular position. Wrenn knew from the start that the search committee considered a master's degree to be preferred and not required. In a Title VII claim, it is the employer's motivation and intent, not its business judgment, that is at issue. Loeb, 600 F.2d 1003. Wrenn must show that in not hiring him, the Center was motivated by retaliation and that the Center's reasons for hiring Ms. Hill were a pretext, not just bad judgment. Furnco, 438 U.S. 567, 98 S.Ct. at 2943; Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251 (6th Cir.1981). Wrenn's perception of his competence, and the incompetence of those competing against him, is irrelevant; the search committee's perceptions and motivations are key. Smith v. Flax, 618 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir.1980); Cohen, 686 F.2d at 798. The search committee preferred the master's degree but did not require it. Wrenn points to no evidence that the search committee was motivated by discriminatory animus. 58 Third, not even Wrenn fully met the advertised required qualifications. He did not have 5 years' progressive management experience. Therefore, even were we to accept that these were required as opposed to preferred qualifications, Wrenn cannot claim to have been the only qualified applicant, as he, too, was unqualified. 59 Finally, Wrenn argues that the fact that Ms. Hill was dismissed from the executive director position because she had misrepresented her educational qualifications proves that the Center's reasons for hiring her were pretextual. Ms. Hill had claimed on her resume that she had received a bachelor's degree. Shortly after the Center hired her, the Center received an anonymous letter stating that she was unqualified for the job. The Center investigated this charge and discovered that Ms. Hill had never received a bachelor's degree. She was thereupon dismissed. 60 Wrenn states that it is incredible that the Center would not have checked Ms. Hill's credentials before hiring her. But the Center's failure to check Ms. Hill's credentials occurred long before Wrenn had ever disclosed that he was suing the state for discrimination. She had been in defendant's employ long before Wrenn interviewed with the Center for the executive director position. The Center could not have refrained from checking Ms. Hill's credentials in retaliation against Wrenn, because their inaction occurred before they knew of his prior civil rights claim. See Cohen, 686 F.2d at 797. See also Weems, 753 F.2d 527. 61 Furthermore, the poor business judgment of the Center in failing to check Ms. Hill's credentials is an issue only if discriminatory motive can be inferred therefrom, see Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259, 101 S.Ct. at 1096; Furnco, 438 U.S. 567, 98 S.Ct. at 2943; Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 103 S.Ct. 1478. Recently, in Goostree v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 854 (6th Cir.1986), we reiterated that discrimination, not some other factor, must be the basis for claimed preferential hiring. Wrenn may have shown the Center guilty of poor business judgment for relying on Ms. Hill's resume rather than checking her credentials; however, 62 We, of course, defer to the district court with respect to matters of credibility and sustain the district court's findings if we find such plausible ... we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in finding that the defendants did not act with a statutorily prohibited animus in rejecting [plaintiff] for the job. 63 Id. Wrenn has made no showing of this statutorily prohibited animus on the Center's part, and the district court found none. The district court's findings are not clearly erroneous. 64 The district court committed no clear error in holding that Wrenn failed to prove to a preponderance that the Center's reasons for hiring Ms. Hill were pretextual. Therefore, we affirm the district court in granting judgment to defendant on plaintiff's Title VII claim.