Opinion ID: 625333
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disparaging Defense Counsel

Text: Defendants argue that the prosecutor disparaged defense counsel in closing argument, affecting their right to a fair trial. Defendants challenge three sets of statements by the prosecutor. First, the prosecutor said, The government is not in this for a game. This is a very serious offense... and the defense wants to make this into a game? Second, he said, You heard me objecting a couple of times where [defense counsel] tried to slip in some stuff. Finally the prosecutor compared the Defendants' defense to the Wizard of Oz, stating that the defense counsel was telling the jury to pay no attention to the evidence and said, Don't let them pull the Wizard of Oz trick on you, ladies and gentlemen. Don't let them distract you with the smoke, and you get distracted by the facts. Defendants objected, without success, to the first two statements, but there was no objection to the third challenged statement. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion on the first two statements. They did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. The prosecutor's remarks stating that the trial was not a game did not make the trial unfair both because of the truth that a criminal trial is not a game, and because such comments can be seen as a reasonable response to the argument that had just been made by defense counsel. Defendants in their closing argument had analogized the trial to a game, referring to a government witness and saying, He is part of a team. He plays for that side. In circumstances where the defense has by analogy suggested the trial was like a game with a government witness on the government's team, it is not fundamentally unfair for a prosecutor to respond that the trial is not a game. [T]hat a prosecutor's remarks were made in response to defense counsel's arguments, as an `invited reply,' may justify the remarks. United States v. McChristian, 47 F.3d 1499, 1508 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Young, 470 U.S. at 14-20, 105 S.Ct. 1038). This does not give the prosecutor leeway to say anything at all in response. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 659 F.3d 1252, 1256-57 (9th Cir.2011). However, the statement here was not sufficiently inflammatory to constitute error offending due process so as to negate the trial and jury verdict. Second, the government's argument that defense counsel tried to slip in some stuff also does not amount to reversible error. The defense counsel was equally accusatory during its closing, accusing the prosecutor of giving the jury a string of distractions, of putting spin on facts, and comparing the government's argument of evidence to one of those chewy dog toy guns that you chew on, and it makes a lot of noise and it squeaks. The government's statements are not like those made in Bruno v. Rushen, where we expressed our disapproval of prosecutors' attacks on defense attorneys. 721 F.2d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir.1983). There the prosecutor tried to destroy the credibility of the defendant by implying that defense counsel fabricated the defendant's story and instructed him to repeat it on the stand. United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1380 (9th Cir.1996) (describing Bruno ). The prosecutor's suggestion that the defense had tried to slip in some stuff does not present a model of polite professionalism, but in context did not render the trial unfair. Because Defendants did not object to the Wizard of Oz comments made by the prosecutor, we review those comments for plain error. Those comments were similar to ones made in United States v. Matthews, 240 F.3d 806 (9th Cir.2000). [4] There the prosecution insinuated that defense counsel was trying to hide the truth, referred to the defense as an octopus squirting ink, and asserted that they gotta hide all the facts, cloud the facts, throw up all kinds of dirt, squirt the ink. Id. at 819. We held that the remarks may have crossed the line, but that given the circumstances of the case, the remarks did not amount to plain error. Id. The proper application of the protections given criminal defendants by the due process clause does not mean that every jarring or badly selected metaphor renders a trial fundamentally unfair. A criminal trial, whether it should be or not, in practice is more like a football or basketball game than like a pleasant tea or game of croquet. The prosecution and defense confront each other and there will be some contact in strong language that is not avoidable. We expect counsel on both sides to exhibit professionalism, but a trial will usually be a hard-fought contest. So long as the prosecutor's vigorous closing argument is within normal bounds of advocacy and does not render a trial fundamentally unfair, a jury's criminal conviction upon proper jury instructions, and without other supervening constitutional error, should not be upset by an appellate court.