Opinion ID: 1624645
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the jury instructions failed to address every material element in the indictment.

Text: ¶ 11. Neal claims that a jury instruction on murder constructively amended the indictment. Neal was charged and convicted under Mississippi Code Section 97-3-19(1)(a), which states that the killing of a human being will be considered murder [w]hen done with deliberate design to effect the death of the person killed, or of any human being. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1)(a) (Rev.2006). Neal's indictment charged that Neal on or about the 22nd day of August ... 2006 ... did willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously decapitate Lakeshia Cleveland, a human being; Jermaine Neal acted with the deliberate design to effect the death of Lakeshia Cleveland, in direct violation of Section 97-3-19(1)(a). [2] , [3] The jury was instructed that it could find Neal guilty of murder if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Neal had killed Cleveland with the deliberate design to effect her death, and not in necessary self-defense. Thus, the murder instruction allowed the jury to return a verdict of guilt if it believed that Neal had killed Cleveland in some manner other than by decapitation. ¶ 12. Neal also argues that the State's evidence showed that he killed Cleveland by shooting her in the head; therefore, the evidence was insufficient to enable a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he had killed Cleveland by decapitation as charged in the indictment. In support of this contention, Neal avers that the report of Cleveland's autopsy, which was not requested to be admitted into evidence by either party, states that Cleveland's decapitation was post-mortem. Essentially, Neal contends that the murder instruction should have been redrafted to require a jury finding that he had killed Cleveland by decapitation, and that if the redrafting had been accomplished, the evidence would have entitled him to a directed verdict of acquittal. ¶ 13. We find that this issue is procedurally barred; alternatively, we find that the murder instruction was not fatally defective for permitting the jury to find that Neal had killed Cleveland by any method. This Court has held on numerous occasions that an offended party's failure to object to jury instructions at trial procedurally bars the issue on appeal. Smith v. State, 835 So.2d 927, 939 (Miss. 2002) (citing Walker v. State, 729 So.2d 197, 202 (Miss.1998)). Neal did not object contemporaneously to the granting of the jury instruction, and he raises this issue for the first time on appeal. Neal's indictment alleged every essential element of murder; his failure to object to the jury instruction as constructively amending the indictment waives this issue on appeal. Rubenstein v. State, 941 So.2d 735, 774 (Miss.2006); see McDowell v. State, 984 So.2d 1003, 1012-1013 (Miss.Ct.App.2007). ¶ 14. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, this issue is without merit. The major purpose of an indictment is to furnish the accused such a description of the charges against him as will enable him to adequately prepare his defense. Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798, 804 (Miss.1984) (internal citations omitted). [A]s a general rule, an indictment which tracks the language of a criminal statute is sufficient to inform the defendant of the charge against him. Jordan v. State, 995 So.2d 94, 109 (Miss.2008) (quoting Stevens v. State, 808 So.2d 908, 919 (Miss.2002)). In contrast, the main purpose of jury instructions is to tell the jury what facts they have to find and who has the burden of proving or disproving those facts. Harris v. State, 861 So.2d 1003, 1016 (Miss.2003). ¶ 15. In Duplantis v. State, 708 So.2d 1327, 1343 (Miss.1998), Duplantis was indicted for felony murder while engaged in the commission of a robbery under Mississippi Code Section 97-3-19(2)(3). Duplantis's indictment charged that he had killed the victim with malice aforethought. Duplantis, 708 So.2d at 1343. However, the felony-murder statute under which Duplantis was indicted prescribes that the killing have been done with or without any design to effect the death. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) (Rev.2006). Two jury instructions tracked the language of the felony-murder statute, thus permitting the jury to find Duplantis guilty without a finding that he had killed with malice aforethought. Duplantis, 708 So.2d at 1343. On appeal, Duplantis argued that the jury instructions constructively and unconstitutionally amended the indictment because they broaden[ed] the elements of the offense, thereby allowing him to be convicted on a ground not alleged by the grand jury. Id. ¶ 16. This Court rejected Duplantis's argument. Id. at 1344. We stated that it was permissible to allege deliberate design in a felony-murder indictment and that jury instructions should track the indictment. Id. at 1343-44. However, because intent to kill is not an element of felony murder in the course of a robbery, we held that the jury instruction omitting the indictment's intent-to-kill language was not fatally defective. Id. at 1344. We stated, [a]lthough the instructions may not accurately follow the indictment, they do accurately follow the requisite elements of the crime. Id. ¶ 17. As in Duplantis, the murder instruction at issue in this appeal was not fatally defective. Neal's indictment charged that Neal had decapitated Cleveland with deliberate design to effect her death and in violation of section 97-3-19(1)(a). Although the murder instruction did not restrict the jury to a finding that Neal had killed Cleveland by the method alleged in the indictment, it accurately followed the requisite elements of murder prescribed by Section 97-3-19(1)(a). Therefore, the murder instruction was not fatally defective. Duplantis, 708 So.2d at 1344. This issue is without merit.