Opinion ID: 2083899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Strict Product Liability

Text: Squarely presented to this Court for the first time is the applicability in this jurisdiction of the doctrine denominated as strict product liability as embodied in Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (1965). The doctrine was charged by the trial court as against the defendant Triumph. No claim is here made that it was incorrectly charged; the contention is that it should not have been charged at all, because it was not specifically pleaded, because its essential elements were not proven, and because it is not the law of this state. The section in question reads as follows: § 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller. Three caveats follow the statement of the rule, none being applicable to the instant case. An extensive review of the history and development of the doctrine embodied in the Restatement would serve little purpose. Current legal literature abounds with such discussion. Suffice it to say that, with its roots in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963), it has gained rapid acceptance in many jurisdictions. Annot., 13 A.L.R.3rd 1057, 1065 (1967). Various reasons have been advanced for its adoption, including availability of proof, reliance on advertising and reputation, increasingly high standards, increased complications of marketing, and assignment of liability as a cost of manufacture or sale. Cf. Am.Jur.2d, Products Liability, § 124. As pointed out by Prosser (Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1134 (1960)), the doctrine is simply a logical extension of the strict liability heretofore applied to animals, abnormally dangerous activities, nuisance, workmen's compensation, and respondeat superior cases. Its adoption in this state has been forecast, and partially developed, in decided cases. Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1970), charging the substance of the Restatement; O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 125 Vt. 158, 212 A.2d 69 (1965), abrogating the defense of lack of privity and emphasizing liability imposed by law from the nature of the transaction and the circumstances of the parties; Rogers v. W. T. Grant Co., 132 Vt. 485, 321 A.2d 54 (1974), emphasizing the implied warranty of merchantability under the Uniform Sales Act; 9A V.S.A. §§ 2-313 to 2-318, inclusive, imposing warranties and extending their applicability. Indeed, a careful examination of Rothberg v. Olenik, 128 Vt. 295, 262 A.2d 461 (1970), reveals that this Court, in extending the doctrine of implied warranty to a newly constructed home, did so by analogy to the sale of an automobile or other manufactured product, and expressly approved quoted language from Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1960), a leading case applying the doctrine of strict liability to a manufacturer of personal property. Having approved a further development of the doctrine, rejection of the doctrine itself would be most illogical. We hold that the trial court correctly charged the rule of strict product liability, embodied in the quoted § 402A, as the law of this jurisdiction. Triumph's further objection that the doctrine was not sufficiently pleaded or proved is not well-founded. True it is that there is no specific count in plaintiff's complaint labelled strict liability. But an examination of the factual allegations indicates that all the essential elements of such a theory of liability, as outlined in the quoted section, § 402A, of the Restatement of Torts, are pleaded. An examination of the record indicates that, viewed in the light favorable to plaintiff, there was evidence to support the allegations. Indeed, Triumph points out no shortcomings whatever in this particular. All of this supporting evidence came in without the objection now asserted. Nor do we find the objection in Triumph's post-judgment motions, or its exceptions to the charge, which simply asserted the non-existence of the general doctrine in Vermont. We think that the spirit, if not the precise letter, of V.R.C.P. 8(a) (requiring a short and plain statement of the claim), of V.R. C.P. 8(e) (requiring each averment to be simple, concise and direct), of V.R.C.P. 8(f) (requiring pleadings to be construed to do substantial justice), and of V.R. C.P. 54(c) (permitting final judgments for any relief to which the pleader is entitled, even though not demanded), has been amply complied with. Even were this not so, the general conduct of the trial, as outlined, indicates the defendant pleaded, and attempted to prove, all defenses available to it under any theory. We see no reason to treat issues which were fully litigated as if they had not been litigated, where no prejudice to the appellant has been suggested or is apparent from the record. Wasik v. Borg, supra, 423 F.2d at 46. Accord, Alvarez v. Felker Mfg. Co., 230 Cal.App.2d 987, 41 Cal.Rptr. 514 (1964). All facts essential for recovery having been pleaded and no available defenses having been precluded, the failure to make below the objection to the sufficiency of the pleadings now asserted is waived. Vaillancourt v. Dutton, 115 Vt. 36, 50 A.2d 762 (1947). See also V.R.C.P. 15(b), permitting amendment to conform to the evidence even after judgment, and providing that failure to amend does not affect the result of trial as to issues actually tried. The judgment in chief against the two defendants jointly must be affirmed.