Opinion ID: 1011830
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: csx’s ownership and control

Text: Sheppard first argues that the district court erred in finding that CSX did not own or control the railcar scale house. A negligence claim cannot lie unless a party can show a duty or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks. Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 405 S.E.2d 474, 476 (Ga. 1991) (internal 6 SHEPPARD v. CSX TRANSPORTATION quotation marks omitted). Sheppard claims that CSX had a duty to warn under a theory of premises liability. See Ga. Code Ann. § 51-3- 1 (2003) (creating duty for landowners to exercise reasonable care towards invitees). To succeed on a claim for premises liability, however, Sheppard must first show that CSX owned the property in question. A court attempting to determine if a party owns property should examine whether the party has control of the property, whether or not [the party] has title thereto and whether or not [the party] has a superior right to possession of property which is in the possession or control of another. Georgia Bldg. Serv., Inc. v. Perry, 387 S.E.2d 898, 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Sheppard has failed to adduce any evidence that CSX possessed anything more than a limited right to maintain the railcar scale itself. The Private Sidetrack Agreement explicitly disclaims CSX’s ownership in the railcar scale house and only provides that CSX shall maintain the track scale apparatus. (J.A. at 331.) CSX employees were not permitted to wander freely around the industrial site, and were required at all times to follow DSM’s rules and regulations. Furthermore, after the accident occurred, DSM and Austin Industrial implemented a number of remedial safety measures.3 CSX was not contacted regarding these measures and did not participate in their formulation or implementation. CSX also did not play a role in creating the accident report. These facts all show that CSX did not maintain control or possession over the railcar scale house. CSX had a limited right to maintain the track scale apparatus, but it did not own or control the railcar scale house, where the accident occurred. Because CSX did not own the railcar scale house, it did not owe a duty to Sheppard under the doctrine of premises liability. 3 Fed. R. Evid. 407 states that evidence of subsequent remedial measures cannot be admitted to show liability, but can be admitted for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control. SHEPPARD v. CSX TRANSPORTATION 7
Sheppard next argues that CSX operated the railcar scale house in a joint venture with DSM Chemicals, and therefore is liable under some joint venture theory of liability. This theory of liability appears nowhere in the complaint and is not cognizable here. See Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that issues raised for the first time on appeal generally will not be considered). Even if this theory were properly before us, it offers Sheppard no relief. Assuming that CSX is not immune from tort liability as a joint venturer with DSM as a result of DSM having paid Sheppard worker’s compensation benefits,4 any state law tort claim would be preempted by the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C.A. § 51-60 (West 1986). If a joint venture did exist, Sheppard was an employee of CSX because he engaged in the activities of the joint venture. See Seckinger & Co. v. Foreman, 314 S.E.2d 891, 893 (Ga. 1984). If Sheppard was an employee of CSX, he would have to file any claim for injury suffered during the course of employment under FELA, not state tort law. See New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 153 (1917) (holding that FELA preempts state negligence and worker’s compensation laws as applied to interstate rail carriers). Therefore, any state tort claim by Sheppard based on a joint venture theory of liability is preempted.