Opinion ID: 2598792
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voluntariness of Defendant's Narrative Testimony and Supposed Waiver of Counsel

Text: As previously noted, defendant testified at the penalty phase, against the advice of his counsel. He cautioned the jurors that persons serving life terms often get into more trouble, and told them he would choose the death penalty if the decision were up to him. Defendant now complains that the trial court failed to determine whether he made a knowing and voluntary decision to waive counsel and testify against counsel's advice. He also argues the trial court failed adequately to caution him against giving narrative testimony. These contentions lack merit. The record shows that, once defense counsel indicated that defendant intended to testify against his advice, the court held a brief hearing to discuss the matter with defendant. The court first explained to him that although he had the right to testify, he might want to reconsider rejecting his counsel's advice. The court explained that defendant would be subject to cross-examination and limited as to the scope of his testimony. The court then gave him four hours to reconsider his position. At the close of presentation of other defense witnesses, the court revisited the issue, observed again that defendant's counsel advised him against testifying, and explained that he would be subject to cross-examination. Defendant remained adamant that he wished to testify. The prosecutor, evidently concerned about possible appellate claims of incompetent counsel, suggested the court hold a Marsden -type hearing outside his presence. (See People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 123-124, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44.) Thereafter, outside the prosecutor's presence, defense counsel explained to the court that his client had not indicated what he intended to say, and that counsel was concerned defendant might say something negative that could be exploited on cross-examination. Counsel, although not agreeing to defendant's tactic, advised him to testify in narrative form, without any questioning from defense counsel, as counsel had no idea what the testimony would be. The court asked defendant if he wished to comment regarding his proposed testimony, and he replied [n]ot personally. The court asked defendant whether he believed he needed the court's or counsel's assistance to help him make his statement, or whether he could present it without such assistance. He replied, Yeah. Following some inaudible whispered conversation between defendant and the court, the prosecutor returned to the courtroom and defendant made his narrative statement as described above. As noted, defendant now contends the court failed to determine whether he made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. Of course, any such waiver, and the consequent absence of counsel, was limited to defendant's narrative statement itself, as his counsel was fully available before and after the statement was given, including cross-examination. Defendant also complains of the court's failure specifically to advise him of his right to counsel's assistance during his testimony, of the dangers of narrative testimony, and of counsel's ability to conduct the direct examination himself, rather than permitting defendant to make a narrative statement. Our review of the proceedings leads us to conclude that the trial court adequately and repeatedly admonished defendant regarding his refusal to follow counsel's advice and the dangers of taking the stand and testifying, and that the court committed no error in allowing defendant to exercise his right to address the jury. Defendant had a fundamental right to testify in his own behalf, even if contrary to the advice of counsel. [Citation.] ( People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 962, 248 Cal.Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917 ( Guzman) ; accord, Rock v. Arkansas (1987) 483 U.S. 44, 49-53, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37; People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 534-535, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 779, 862 P.2d 779.) Seen in this light, defendant at no time before, after, or during his narrative testimony waived his right to counsel's assistancehe merely exercised his fundamental right to testify. Defendant observes that in Guzman, the trial court gave the defendant a panoply of additional warnings prior to his narrative testimony, advising him that his testimony would be subject to evidentiary objections, impeachment through prior convictions, and possible adverse inferences if he failed to explain or deny negative evidence. The court also explained to the defendant that he had a constitutional right not to testify and that no adverse inferences could be drawn from his silence. ( Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 941-942, 248 Cal.Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917.) We note, however, that nowhere in our Guzman opinion did we suggest that such an array of admonishments was a necessary or constitutional prerequisite to receiving a defendant's testimony against advice of counsel. We explained in Guzman that because counsel's assistance was, as here, available during all other stages of trial, it was not necessary that the trial court's warnings about the dangers of self-representation be as complete as would be necessary for a defendant who sought to conduct his entire defense. ( Guzman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 946, 248 Cal.Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917.) Here, as previously observed, defendant's counsel understandably suggested that defendant testify in narrative form without defense questioning, because counsel lacked any knowledge of what his client planned to say. We conclude the trial court did not err in failing more extensively to warn defendant regarding the various rights he would forgo in testifying in narrative form, or to secure an express waiver of those rights.