Opinion ID: 78296
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Charge an Offense

Text: According to the Appellants, Counts Two, Four, and Six of the First Superseding Indictment failed to charge an offense because they did not identify the requisite state of mind necessary to violate § 1956(a)(3). [11] The Appellants contend that this absence meant that the grand jury failed to make the appropriate specific intent findings and that their subsequent convictions on these charges therefore violated their rights under the Fifth Amendment. They thus assert that the district court erred in failing to dismiss these counts. We review de novo the legal question of whether an indictment sufficiently alleges a statutorily proscribed offense, though a district court's denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Pendergraft, 297 F.3d 1198, 1204 (11th Cir.2002). We will not uphold a criminal conviction if the indictment upon which it is based does not set forth the essential elements of the offense. United States v. Gayle, 967 F.2d 483, 485 (11th Cir.1992) ( en banc ). [I]f the facts alleged in the indictment warrant an inference that the jury found probable cause to support all the necessary elements of the charge, the indictment satisfies the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Fern, 155 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir.1998). Additionally, we need not find an indictment defective simply because it fails to allege mens rea so long as the allegation that the crime was committed with the requisite state of mind may be inferred from other allegations in the indictment. United States v. Woodruff, 296 F.3d 1041, 1046 (11th Cir.2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). As a general rule, practical, rather than technical, considerations govern the validity of an indictment. United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725, 735 (11th Cir.1991) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Finally, we note that several of our sister circuits have held that where, as here, the defendant challenges the indictment after the government's case has ended, the indictment should be construed in a liberal manner in favor of validity. See United States v. Sabbeth, 262 F.3d 207, 218 (2d Cir.2001); United States v. Gooch, 120 F.3d 78, 80 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210, 1218 (8th Cir.1991). Counts Two, Four, and Six of the indictment charged as follows: On or about [date], in the Northern District of Georgia, the defendants ... did knowingly and intentionally conduct a financial transaction, namely, sold [description of jewelry] for [amount] in United States currency, involving property represented to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity by a law enforcement officer, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1956(a)(3)(B) and 1956(a)(3)(C). R1-31 at 2-5. Sections 1956(a)(3)(B) and (C), referenced in these counts, state the necessary intent for a money laundering offense. [12] Under the former subsection, an offender must have the intent to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of property believed to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B). The latter provision requires that the offender intend to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State or Federal law. Id. § 1956(a)(3)(C). At issue is whether the indictment's statutory references warrant an inference that the grand jury found probable cause for all the essential elements of the offenses charged. The most analogous case appears to be Fern, in which the indictment charged the defendant with making false statements in violation of the Clean Air Act. Fern, 155 F.3d at 1325 (quotation marks omitted). Though the indictment referenced the relevant statute, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2), it did not mention the materiality of these statements, an essential element of the offense. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(2)(A); id. at 1326. We concluded that this charge was sufficient for Fifth Amendment purposes because the indictment's reference to a particular statutory subsection created a reasonable inference that the grand jury found that the false statements mentioned therein were material. See Fern, 155 F.3d at 1326. Similarly, in United States v. Arteaga-Limones, 529 F.2d 1183, 1199 (5th Cir. 1976), we addressed an indictment that did not mention that the defendant imported marijuana knowingly or intentionally, an essential element of the charged offense. However, the indictment referenced the relevant statutory sections, which discussed those scienter requirements. See Arteaga-Limones, 529 F.2d at 1199. We found that the elements of the offense did not have to be alleged in terms and focused on whether the indictment fairly import[ed] knowledge or intent. Id. Given this framework, we concluded that the statutory references were sufficient to make the indictment not defective, particularly since the court instructed the jury that it had to find knowledge or intent to convict the defendant. See id. at 1200. These cases indicate that the Fifth Amendment is satisfied if the indictment makes a specific statutory reference to an essential element of the offense and contains some other indication from which we can infer that the grand jury found that element to be present. See Fern, 155 F.3d at 1326. The indictment in this case did not spell out the different forms of intent required for the offenses alleged in Counts Two, Four, and Six. However, it did include the word intentionally as well as specific references to the statutory provisions which described the different forms of intent required to violate the money laundering statute. This combination of statutory citation and reference to the essential element discussed in that statutory subsection serves as a reasonable basis for inferring that the grand jury found that the Appellants committed money laundering with the intents described in those statutory subsections. See id. In fact, the rationale for making such an inference arguably is even stronger here than in Fern, since here the statutory reference is to a specific subsection rather than to a section in general. [13] See id. Appellants contend that this interpretation of Fern conflicts with United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 8 S.Ct. 571, 31 L.Ed. 516 (1888). They specifically refer to language in Hess stating that [t]he omission [of an essential element of the crime] cannot be supplied by intendment or implication, and the charge must be made directly, and not inferentially, or by way of recital. Hess, 124 U.S. at 486, 8 S.Ct. at 573. However, the Court in Hess was addressing whether the indictment sufficiently alleged the factual circumstances comprising a mail fraud scheme, not the legal elements of the offense. See id. at 487, 8 S.Ct. at 573 (noting that the absence of all particulars of the alleged scheme renders the count as defective as would be an indictment for larceny without stating the property stolen, or its owner or party from whose possession it was taken). In addition, Hess focused on whether the defendant had proper notice of the charges, rather than on whether the grand jury could find the essential elements of the charge. See id. at 487, 8 S.Ct. at 573. We thus read the language cited by the Appellants as referring to the omission of facts pertaining to the charge, not to the omission of legal elements from the charge, as occurred here. [14] Hess therefore would not alter our analysis of the indictment in this case. We note, however, that, even if Hess did apply to legal issues, we would still find the indictment here sufficient for Fifth Amendment purposes. The indictment identified the particulars of the offense committed, and there was no need to infer scienter since the statutes pertaining to intent were specified in the indictment. Accordingly, we find that the indictment did not fail to charge an offense and presented no Fifth Amendment violation. The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants' motion to dismiss Counts Two, Four, and Six on this basis.