Opinion ID: 1476880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Make-Whole Relief and Attorney's Fees

Text: Appellant maintains that because she established that Groom discriminated against her in the manner and terms of her release, she should have been awarded make-whole relief, including attorney's fees. [9] She contends that the panel exceeded its authority and disregarded applicable law by failing to do so. Because the panel did not exceed its authority or otherwise disregard the law, and because this court is without power to reevaluate the panel's factual findings on appellant's claim of discrimination, we reject these arguments. See, e.g., Umana v. Swidler & Berlin, 745 A.2d 334, 339 (D.C.2000) (court [does] not have authority to set aside an arbitral award based on [its] review of the merits of the arbitrators' decision); Tauber & Associates v. Trammell Crow Real Estate Services, Inc., 738 A.2d 1214, 1219 (D.C. 1999) (court will not vacate or modify an arbitration decision on the ground that the arbitrator misinterpreted the facts). As we have said, this court has authority to vacate an arbitration award only when there is evidence that the panel exceeded its power or manifestly disregarded the law. See D.C.Code § 16-4311(a); Lopata, 735 A.2d at 940. Appellant's assertion that the panel did so in this case must fail, primarily because the relevant statutes provide only that the court (or in this instance, as agreed by the parties, the arbitration panel) may allow or may grant appropriate relief, including attorney's fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k); D.C.Code § 2-1403.16(b). [10] From the panel's failure to grant appellant the relief she requested, it does not follow that it disregarded the law simply because it followed the statutory guidelines and chose not to award make-whole relief or attorney's fees. Moreover, while appellant cites several decisions [11] which collectively hold that when a party prevails on a statutory civil rights claim, that party should be entitled to attorney's fees, appellant's victory here was only on the limited question of whether Groom had discriminated against her in the manner and terms of [her] separation from the firm, not in her larger claim that her release itself was the result of discrimination. As the Supreme Court has said, [w]hen a plaintiff recovers only [minimal] damages . . . the only reasonable [attorney's] fee is usually no fee at all. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) ([a] reduced fee award is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole). Further, [w]here recovery of private damages is the purpose of . . . civil rights litigation, [an arbitration panel], in fixing fees, is obligated to give primary consideration to the amount of damages awarded as compared to the amount sought. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114, 113 S.Ct. 566 (quoting City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 585, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring)). In this case, appellant was successful on only one of her eight claims against Groom and received limited relief as a result. She initially sought almost $2 million in damages but was awarded only about three percent of that figure. Given that result, we cannot conclude that the panel either exceeded its authority or disregarded the law by not granting additional relief. As the trial court noted in its order of October 16, 2001, appellant seems unwilling or unable to accept the fact that the arbitration results were largely adverse to her position. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (one of the most important factors in determining whether an award of fees is reasonable is the degree of success obtained); Nghiem v. NEC Electronic, Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1440 (9th Cir.1994) (a party cannot challenge an arbitration panel's authority simply because it received an unfavorable result). Thus, because appellant's success was minimal, we will not set aside or alter the panel's award because it chose not to grant her attorney's fees or other relief. Because appellant found employment less than a month after leaving Groom, the arbitration panel awarded her only one month's back pay. Appellant contends that because she suffered financial losses at her new job, Groom should be held responsible. Aside from the fact that this was a factual issue decided by the arbitration panel and thus was not appropriate for judicial second-guessing, see Tauber, 738 A.2d at 1219, the ability to recover back pay or to obtain make-whole relief terminates when a plaintiff finds substantially equivalent employment. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231, 102 S.Ct. 3057, 73 L.Ed.2d 721 (1982). Since appellant found substantially equivalent employment as a partner at another law firm, this form of relief is unavailable.