Opinion ID: 658172
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: exclusion of suicide evidence

Text: 41 Ignacio claims error in the trial court's exclusion of evidence about the suicide of John Santos, the victim's mother's boyfriend. There is no question that the defendant has the right to introduce evidence of third-party culpability. Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838, 105 S.Ct. 137, 83 L.Ed.2d 77 (1984); see also Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). The defendant's right to present evidence which may exonerate him, however, is not absolute and may have to bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). 42 In Perry, this court articulated the standard for balancing the defendant's undeniably strong interest in introducing such evidence with the state's compelling interest in reliable and efficient trials. 713 F.2d at 1451-1452. Evidence of third-party culpability is not admissible if it simply affords a possible ground of suspicion against such person; rather, it must be coupled with substantial evidence tending to directly connect that person with the actual commission of the offense. Id. at 1449 (quoting People v. Green, 27 Cal.3d 1, 22, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468 (1980)) (emphasis added). The Perry court upheld the trial court's exclusion of the third-party culpability evidence because [w]hile Perry's evidence [was] not actually irrelevant, it [was] sufficiently collateral and lacking in probity on the issue of identity ... Id., at 1455. 43 In this case, the trial court found that Ignacio had not presented substantial evidence connecting Santos to the crime charged. The defense attempted to link Santos to the sexual assault by asserting these facts: he committed suicide three months after the molestation occurred; he was the victim's mother's boyfriend and occasionally spent the night at the household; and he urged the victim's mother to pursue the incident with the police. 5 We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that these items together did not constitute substantial evidence.