Opinion ID: 2515281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the District Court Err in Granting a Summary Judgment Determining the Parties' Common Boundary East of the Fence?

Text: In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 46-47, 44 P.3d 1100, 1101-02 (2002). All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. If the matter will be tried to the court rather than the jury, the judge is free to determine what reasonable inferences should be drawn from the undisputed facts. Union Pac. Corp. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 139 Idaho 572, 575, 83 P.3d 116, 119 (2004). Since this case was to be tried by the court rather than a jury, the district judge was free to draw reasonable inferences from the undisputed facts. In its memorandum decision, the district court granted summary judgment based upon the doctrine of boundary by agreement. Boundary by agreement or acquiescence has two elements: (1) there must be an uncertain or disputed boundary and (2) a subsequent agreement fixing the boundary. Downey v. Vavold, 144 Idaho 592, 595, 166 P.3d 382, 385 (2007). [A]n agreement may be presumed to arise between adjoining landowners where such right has been definitely defined by erection of a fence or other monument on the line followed by such adjoining landowners treating it as fixing the boundary for such length of time that neither ought to be allowed to deny the correctness of its location. Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359, 365, 262 P.2d 1006, 1010 (1953); accord O'Malley v. Jones, 46 Idaho 137, 141, 266 P. 797, 798 (1928); Morrissey v. Haley, 124 Idaho 870, 873, 865 P.2d 961, 964 (1993) (using the word demarcation rather than monument). Often, the visible object on the ground is a fence. E.g. Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112, 117, 268 P.2d 351, 353 (1954) (a boundary was clearly marked by a `tight board fence'). However, other monuments or demarcations have been held as sufficient evidence of an agreed-upon boundary. Griffel v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 397, 401, 34 P.3d 1080, 1084 (2001) (farming lines); Hyde v. Lawson, 94 Idaho 886, 889, 499 P.2d 1242, 1245 (1972) (stakes driven into the ground). A fence or other visible demarcation is necessary in order to give subsequent purchasers constructive notice of the agreed-upon boundary. Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112, 117, 268 P.2d 351, 353 (1954); Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 506, 65 P.3d 525, 529 (2003). In its memorandum decision and order granting summary judgment, the district court only addressed that portion of the parties' common boundary marked by the fence dividing their back yards. The court wrote as follows: There was an uncertain boundary line between the properties. The parties were ignorant of the true boundary until approximately October 2005. The Plaintiff has provided an affidavit from the previous owner of the Defendant's property. The previous owner states that it was his belief that the fence constituted the boundary line. The law presumes that there is a boundary by agreement from the long recognition of the fence as the boundary line. The Plaintiff has established that there is no genuine dispute over the two elements needed to establish a boundary by agreement. Therefore summary judgment on this issue is GRANTED. When granting summary judgment, the district court did not address the location of the parties' common boundary extending east of the fence. The Gagnebins concede that the long-standing fence dividing their back yards is now the boundary between that part of their properties. What the parties do not agree upon is whether there is a boundary by agreement as to the remainder of their common boundary east of the fence. The presumption of a boundary by agreement from the long recognition of the fence as a boundary line only applies where the fence is located. It does not apply to the other half of the parties' common boundary. Although the district court did not address the unfenced portion of the parties' common boundary when granting summary judgment, it entered an amended judgment establishing that portion of their common boundary. Because that did not describe the location of that portion of the boundary according to where the Cecils claimed it should be, the court then entered a second amended judgment revising the location of that portion of the parties' common boundary. The Cecils argue that this Court should uphold the second amended judgment either by considering it the district court's findings regarding that part of the parties' common boundary or because the facts show an implied agreement as to the location of that part of their common boundary. We cannot do so. The boundary by agreement based upon the location of the fence is presumed from the long existence of the fence and the parties' treatment of it as the common boundary. Who built the fence, when it was built, and why it was built are unknown. The adjoining landowners who presumably agreed upon their common boundary as marked by the fence are predecessors in interest to the Cecils and the Gagnebins, and the Cecils and Gagnebins are bound by that agreement because the existence of the fence put them on constructive notice of it. There is no such presumption or constructive notice regarding that portion of their common boundary where there is no fence. The Cecils asserted in their brief that the facts show a boundary by agreement as to the portion of the common boundary east of the fence based upon the Gagnebins' conduct. That claimed boundary by agreement would be separate from the presumed boundary by agreement based upon the location of the fence. It would be a boundary by agreement allegedly entered into by the Cecils and Gagnebins, not by their predecessors in interest. The Cecils' complaint only alleges a boundary by agreement based upon the existence of the fence. They alleged: The fence line between the Cecils' and the Defendants' property has existed for over twenty years and has always been treated as the actual boundary line between the properties. Under the circumstances the fence line has become the true boundary line between the properties. They did not allege that they and the Gagnebins had entered into a boundary by agreement with respect to the portion of their common boundary east of the fence. In their complaint, they did not even mention the boundary line east of the fence. Any claim that the Gagnebins and the Cecils had entered into a boundary by agreement would be a cause of action not alleged in the complaint. A cause of action not raised in a party's pleadings may not be considered on summary judgment nor may it be considered for the first time on appeal. O'Guin v. Bingham County, 139 Idaho 9, 15, 72 P.3d 849, 855 (2003) (footnote omitted). Therefore, the district court erred in determining there was a boundary by agreement as to that portion of the common boundary east of the fence because that issue was not alleged in the complaint. For the same reason, this Court cannot consider that alleged agreement on appeal. Paragraph 1 of the second amended judgment sets forth the location of the parties' entire common boundary. It must be vacated because a portion of that boundary was not at issue in this case. Paragraph 2 of the second amended judgment requires the parties to have the entire common boundary surveyed. Because a portion of the common boundary was not at issue in this case, we vacate that paragraph of the judgment. Paragraph 3 of the second amended judgment orders the Gagnebins to restore the fence that they wrongfully removed. That portion of the judgment has not been challenged on appeal, so it can stand. Paragraph 4 of the second amended judgment states that the Cecils are the prevailing parties in this lawsuit. That portion of the second amended judgment will also have to be vacated for the court to reconsider based upon the outcome on remand. Because we have vacated a portion of the second amended judgment, we also vacate the judgment awarding costs and attorney fees.