Opinion ID: 78067
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Definition of a Vessel

Text: The BELLE OF ORLEANS' status as a vessel is crucial to establishing admiralty jurisdiction over both of the Board's claims, so we will address this issue first. [9] Our determination of whether the BELLE OF ORLEANS is a vessel is guided by the Supreme Court's decision in Stewart v. Dutra Const. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 125 S.Ct. 1118, 160 L.Ed.2d 932 (2005), and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Pleason v. Gulfport Shipbuilding Corp., 221 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1955), which addressed precisely the legal issue we face in the instant case. [10] In Pleason, the court addressed whether the CAROL ANN, a Navy salvage and repair vessel which had been converted into a shrimp-processing plant, was a vessel subject to a maritime lien under 46 U.S.C. § 971. [11] 221 F.2d at 623. In 1951, the CAROL ANN was grounded in shallow water [near Belize] and her shaft alleys and engine room were flooded. Id. at 622. She was floated and towed to Texas where the lien claimant furnished the materials and performed the services necessary to fully convert the Carol Ann into a shrimp-processing plant. Id. At the time of the repairs, the CAROL ANN was in the following condition: [H]er propellers and propeller shafts had been removed; she had no crew; none of her machinery was in operation; she had no light, heat, or power in operation; her main engines had been completely removed; and her steering apparatus, with the exception of the rudder, had been removed and sold; her superstructure and masts were intact; her navigation lights were in place, though not operable; her compartmentation, including cargo holds, was intact; and she contained in her crew quarters and elsewhere some articles of furnishing, including bunks, tables, chairs and stoves. Id. at 622-23. Following her repairs, the CAROL ANN was towed across the Gulf of Mexico, without crew, motive power, or operative steering device; was moored to a dock by steel cables and ropes; received telephone and electric lines from land; and was used to receive shrimp from trawlers for processing, freezing, storing and resale in commerce, in the same manner as a similar plant would operate on land. Id. at 623. The court emphasized the phrase capable of being used within the definition of vessel in 1 U.S.C. § 3, and held: The Carol Ann was an artificial contrivance capable of being used as a means of water transportation. It was afloat.... [I]t was towed. ... It had a deck; it had cabins, it had superstructure. It had no motive power of its own; no steering mechanism; but it definitely was capable of being used as a means of transportation under tow. ... [I]t is plain to us that the Carol Ann was a vessel subject to a maritime lien, enforceable by suit in rem. Id. Here, the BELLE OF ORLEANS, too, was moored to the dock with steel cables, received utility lines from land, and engaged in a business that could have physically, if not legally, been conducted on shore; yet, under the reasoning of Pleason, this made her no less a vessel. Like the CAROL ANN, the BELLE OF ORLEANS was certainly afloat; she was towed across the Gulf of Mexico for purposes of repair; and she had a deck, cabins, and superstructure. Further, unlike the CAROL ANN, the BELLE OF ORLEANS was capable of being used as a means of transportation without the assistance of tow, operated with a captain and a crew aboard, and had maintained her engines, generators, and equipment in working order at all times prior to Hurricane Katrina. Thus, if we are to be bound by Pleason, the BELLE OF ORLEANS is a vessel subject to maritime lien. The district court and the BELLE OF ORLEANS fail to cite Pleason and rely heavily on a line of Fifth Circuit cases beginning with Pavone v. Mississippi Riverboat Amusement Corp., 52 F.3d 560 (5th Cir.1995). Pavone arose when two employees, stationed on a moored, dockside casino in Biloxi, Mississippi, known as the Biloxi Belle filed suit under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688, to recover for injuries they received while at work. [12] 52 F.3d at 562-63. The court's Jones Act analysis required it to determine whether the Biloxi Belle was a vessel. The Biloxi Belle was constructed as a barge with a steel hull, a raked bow to facilitate its being towed, bilge pumps, functional ballast tanks, an auxiliary generator to supply emergency electrical power, and below-deck features including storage facilities and a galley for employee meals and work breaks. Id. at 564. The Biloxi Belle was Coast Guard certified, yet she ha[d] no engine, no captain, no navigational aids, no crewquarters and no lifesaving equipment. Id. at 564-65. Her pilot house, antique wheel, ring buoys, and nonfunctional paddlewheel were purely for visual effect and to allow her to be certified under Louisiana's gaming laws. Id. [T]he Biloxi Belle was moored to shore by lines tied to sunken steel pylons that were filled with concrete. The first level of the Biloxi Belle was connected to the pier by steel ramps, and the second level was joined to a shore-side building. In addition, numerous shore-side utility lines  telephone, electric, gas, sewer, domestic fire and water, cable TV, and computer  were connected permanently (or at least indefinitely) to the Biloxi Belle. Only by removing steel pins from the ramps and letting loose all lines and cables could the Biloxi Belle be disconnected from the shore. Id. The Fifth Circuit assumed arguendo that [the Biloxi Belle] was built and used for nonvessel purposes, was moored other than temporarily to the bank, and either had been `withdrawn from navigation' or was being used as a `work platform,' or both. Id. at 568. The Fifth Circuit applied its existing Jones Act precedent with regard to crafts no longer in navigation or serving as work platforms and focused on the purpose for which the craft [was] constructed and the business in which it is engaged. Id. at 570. Using this precedent the court held: When the undisputed facts of the instant cases are plugged into (1) the Desper/Hawn withdrawn-from-navigation factors, or (2) the Bernard/Gremillion work-platform attributes, or both, and are compared to the functional and nautical characteristics and mooring statuses of the various craft that in earlier cases were held as a matter of law to be nonvessels for Jones Act purposes, there can be little doubt that indefinitely moored, shore-side, floating casinos, such as the Biloxi Belle, must be added to that list. Id. at 570. [13] Despite the arguments of the Board and the district court, we find Pavone to be factually and legally distinguishable from the instant case. [14] Legally, Pavone arose under the Jones Act rather than under a maritime contract giving rise to a maritime lien. See Stewart, 543 U.S. at 496, 125 S.Ct. 1118 (noting that courts have historically tended to more narrowly construe the definition of a vessel in Jones Act cases); Bunge Corp. v. Freeport Marine Repair, Inc., 240 F.3d 919, 925 n. 7 (11th Cir.2001) ([A]t least twenty-four maritime cases or maritime related statutes suggest slightly different wordings for the definition of vessel. We refuse to adopt the definition of vessel that Freeport urges, as it is based on unrelated statutes.). Further, the court assumed arguendo in applying its Jones Act analysis that the Biloxi Belle was built and used for nonvessel purposes. Pavone, 52 F.3d at 568. While this assumption might have been appropriate for the Biloxi Belle, it is not for the BELLE OF ORLEANS, which was built as a passenger vessel and cruised on Lake Pontchartrain from 1995 through 2001. Factually, the Biloxi Belle was a much different watercraft than the BELLE OF ORLEANS in question. The BELLE OF ORLEANS' pilot house, antique wheel, ring buoys, and paddlewheel were functioning rather than purely for visual effect. She could operate under her own power rather than purely by tow; she maintained an engine, a steering mechanism, and a captain; and further, she maintained a reduced maritime crew rather than a mere casino staff. We are bound to follow the panel's decision in Pleason, as it addresses the same issue of law, unless it has been overruled by this court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court of the United States. [15] We may only decline to follow Pleason if such action is necessary to give full effect to the rationale of an intervening decision of the Supreme Court. Lufkin v. McCallum, 956 F.2d 1104, 1107-08 (11th Cir. 1992). Both parties contend that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481, 125 S.Ct. 1118, 160 L.Ed.2d 932 (2005), is relevant to this matter. The Board contends that Stewart endorses the analysis in Pleason, while the BELLE OF ORLEANS contends and the district court agreed that Stewart embraces the holding in Pavone. See Bd. of Comm'rs of the Orleans Levee Dist. v. M/V Belle of Orleans, 439 F.Supp.2d at 1193 (far from overruling Pavone v. Mississippi Riverboat Amusement Corp., 52 F.3d 560 (5th Cir.1995) and its progeny, Stewart [543 U.S. at 494, 125 S.Ct. 1118] embraced Pavone, and its semi-permanently floating casino, as a clear and indisputable example of a non-vessel, that is, a watercraft not capable of being used for maritime transport in any meaningful manner.); Appellant's Brief at 25 (In reaching its conclusion, the Pleason court engaged in the analysis dictated forty years later [by] the United States Supreme Court in Stewart  whether the craft was capable of being used as a means of transportation on water.). Stewart addressed whether a dredge [was] a `vessel' under § 2(3)(G) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 44 Stat. (Pt. 2) 1425, as added by § 2(a) of Pub.L. 98-426, 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G). 543 U.S. at 484, 125 S.Ct. 1118. Stewart's core holdings were that (1) 1 U.S.C. § 3 is a codification of the general maritime law and provides the definition of vessel throughout the United States Code; and (2) [u]nder § 3, a `vessel' is any watercraft practically capable of maritime transportation, regardless of its primary purpose or state of transit at a particular moment. Id. at 490, 497, 125 S.Ct. 1118. The Supreme Court made clear that the focus of the vessel inquiry is the craft's capability, not its present use or station; [a] ship long lodged in a drydock or shipyard can again be put to sea, no less than one permanently moored to shore or the ocean floor can be cut loose and made to sail. The question remains in all cases whether the watercraft's use `as a means of transportation on water' is a practical possibility or merely a theoretical one. Id. at 496, 125 S.Ct. 1118. We are unpersuaded by the district court's argument that Stewart dictates that we must follow the court in Pavone and hold that all moored casinos are not vessels. The Supreme Court stated: Simply put, a watercraft is not capable of being used for maritime transport in any meaningful sense if it has been permanently moored or otherwise rendered practically incapable of transportation or movement. This distinction is sensible: A ship and its crew do not move in and out of Jones Act coverage depending on whether the ship is at anchor, docked for loading or unloading, or berthed for minor repairs, in the same way that ships taken permanently out of the water as a practical matter do not remain vessels merely because of the remote possibility that they may one day sail again. See Pavone v. Mississippi Riverboat Amusement Corp., 52 F.3d 560, 570 (5th Cir.1995) (floating casino was no longer a vessel where it was moored to the shore in a semi-permanent or indefinite manner); Kathriner v. UNISEA, Inc., 975 F.2d 657, 660 (9th Cir.1992) (floating processing plant was no longer a vessel where a large opening [had been] cut into her hull, rendering her incapable of moving over the water). Even if the general maritime law had not informed the meaning of § 3, its definition would not sweep within its reach an array of fixed structures not commonly thought of as capable of being used for water transport. Stewart, 543 U.S. at 494, 125 S.Ct. 1118. This citation must be read in context with the facts of Pavone, which characterize the Biloxi Belle, a watercraft which has never sailed without tow and which is unable to do so, as a work platform that has been removed from navigation and was built for nonvessel purposes. In this context, the Supreme Court's citation of Pavone does nothing to bind us to Pavone's holding; rather, the Supreme Court simply cites Pavone for the principle that a craft can remain out of navigation long enough that it loses its vessel status. See id. at 493-94, 125 S.Ct. 1118 (There is a distinction drawn by general maritime law between water craft temporarily stationed in a particular location and those permanently affixed to shore or resting on the ocean floor.). Further, we believe that Stewart supports the analysis we applied in Pleason. Both decisions use the definition of vessel found in 1 U.S.C. § 3 and direct their focus to whether a watercraft is practically capable of serving as a means of transportation upon water rather than her owner's intended use or her actual mobility at the time in question. However, the parenthetical the Supreme Court inserted after Pavone, floating casino was no longer a vessel where it `was moored to the shore in a semi-permanent or indefinite manner,' leaves it unclear as to how long a craft must be moored to lose its vessel status. Stewart, 543 U.S. at 494, 125 S.Ct. 1118. In Pleason, the vessel had been moored for only a number of months when the relevant claims took place, and she continued to be moored for the majority of the four years while the litigation was pending. Here, the BELLE OF ORLEANS had been moored for four years when the claims occurred, and she is destined to be moored again following her repairs. Both the Fifth and the Seventh Circuits have addressed the meaning of permanently moored or otherwise rendered practically incapable of transportation or movement post- Stewart. In De La Rosa v. St. Charles Gaming Co., 474 F.3d 185 (5th Cir.2006), the Fifth Circuit endorsed Pavone's holding and stated that [e]ven after Stewart, an indefinitely moored floating casino like the Crown Casino is not a `vessel' for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 188 (The Crown Casino had cruised until 2001 when Louisiana changed its gaming laws and has been moored ever since.). The court focused on Louisiana gaming law and the owner's intention to continue operating as a casino and held that although the Crown Casino was still physically capable of sailing, such a use was merely theoretical. Id. at 187. The Seventh Circuit addressed the issue in Tagliere v. Harrah's Ill. Corp., 445 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir.2006). The court stated, there has been no showing that the boat in our case, though stationary for the past two years, is permanently moored in the Court's sense (disabled from sailing) and is thus the equivalent of landfill; therefore, the district court cannot dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction unless the parties can show that the boat was permanently, not indefinitely, moored. Id. at 1014 (emphasis in original). The Seventh Circuit analogizes to the difference between domicile and residence and suggests without holding that a boat may be permanently moored when its owner intends that the boat will never again sail, while it might be indefinitely moored if he has not yet decided its ultimate destiny. Id. at 1016. Under the language of Stewart, however, we find that neither court articulates an appropriate test. Both focus on the intent of the shipowner rather than whether the boat has been rendered practically incapable of transportation or movement. 543 U.S. at 494, 125 S.Ct. 1118. The owner's intentions with regard to a boat are analogous to the boat's purpose, [16] and Stewart clearly rejected any definition of vessel that relies on such a purpose. See id. at 497, 125 S.Ct. 1118. (Under § 3, a `vessel' is any watercraft practically capable of maritime transportation, regardless of its primary purpose ....). Further, such a test is incompatible with the Supreme Court's focus on providing uniformity within admiralty jurisdiction. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 394 F.3d at 902 ([T]he purpose behind the exercise of this Court's admiralty jurisdiction is to provide for the uniform application of general maritime law.). Under Tagliere and De La Rosa, a boat may enter and leave admiralty jurisdiction on the basis of state law and the individual thoughts of the boat owner as to what use of the boat is most desirable. As the Louisiana legislature demonstrated by its actions in 2001, state law can change. Further, if legal navigability is the test for vessel status, any ship with an expired Coast Guard certification becomes a non-vessel, and those working upon it and around it lose their protection under the Jones Act or the LHWCA. Such a result is clearly not what the Supreme Court intended. See Stewart, 543 U.S. at 494, 125 S.Ct. 1118 (noting that seamen do not lose their protection under the Jones Act due to minor changes in ship location). Also, an owner's intentions may change in ways never anticipated. We need look no further than the Star of India for an example. In 1973, the Southern District of California rejected the Coast Guard's designation of the Star of India as permanently moored and her owner's statement that he did not intend to sail her again, and declared her subject to admiralty jurisdiction. Luna v. Star of India, 356 F.Supp. 59, 66 (S.D.Cal.1973) (The fact that the Star currently rests at dockside detracts not at all from her colorful past nor her future capacities.). A mere three years later, the Star of India was put to sea for the first time in fifty years, and she continues to sail annually. [17] With this in mind, we will place our primary focus, as Stewart directs, on whether the BELLE OF ORLEANS was rendered practically incapable of transportation or movement when her owner moored her in 2001. As our analysis under Pleason above states, the BELLE OF ORLEANS maintained functioning machinery and was capable of moving under her own power. The district court made minimal factual findings, but it appears that all her crew would have had to do was unmoor her cables and start up her engine and the BELLE OF ORLEANS would have been able to sail. Further, as she illustrated most recently in 2005, the BELLE OF ORLEANS was capable of moving over water, albeit to her detriment, and was capable of being transported under tow. As such, we hold that the BELLE OF ORLEANS is a vessel for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction.