Opinion ID: 2571651
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: a public road was created

Text: There are three potential theories identified in this case under which a public road or right-of way could have been created: 1) the federal statute creating R.S. 2477 roads, 2) the 1901 road creation statute, 3) common law declaration.
The federal statute creating R.S. 2477 roads provided that [t]he right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted. 43 U.S.C.A. § 932 (1866) (repealed 1976). While this statute has been repealed, otherwise valid leases, permits, patents and similar rights created under it are valid if they existed before October 21, 1976. Pub.L. 94-579, § 706(a) (1976). To be valid it must be shown that the local government accepted the road from the federal government. This Court explained in Kirk v. Schultz, 63 Idaho 278, 282-83, 119 P.2d 266, 268 (1941), that in order for there to be an acceptance of a congressional grant of a right-of-way for a public highway under this statute, there must be either user [sic] by the public for such a period of time, and under such conditions as to establish a highway under the laws of this State; or there must be some positive act or acts on the part of the proper public authorities clearly manifesting an intention to accept such grant with respect to the particular highway in question. Under R.S. 2477 a public road may be created under the state road creation statute or where there is a positive act of acceptance by the local government. The Kirk case is not explicit as to whether the second approach is independent of the state statute or if both of the two requirements for R.S. 2477 roads are reiterations of the requirements as already found in the state statute. The difference is important since the second method requiring any positive act is more lax than the requirements set forth in the state road creation statute. Considering the language in Kirk it appears that there are two separate methods and that a positive act of acceptance need not be coextensive with the road creation statute.
The Board of County Commissioners' minutes stated in 1901 that be it resolved by the Board that the dedication of same [Indian Creek Road] be and the same is hereby accepted, and it is hereby ordered that said above described road be added to and made a part of Road District No. 11 and said road with plat as presented be recorded as provided by law. The petition from the miners is pasted in the old leather-bound County book, and the minutes are there as well. There was a clear manifestation of an intent to accept the road.
The record also establishes that a road was created by common law dedication. The elements of a common law dedication as established in Pullin v. Victor are (1) an offer by the owner, clearly and unequivocally indicated by his words or acts evidencing his intention to dedicate the land to a public use, and (2) an acceptance of the offer by the public. 103 Idaho 879, 881, 655 P.2d 86, 88 (Ct.App.1982). The court in Worley Highway District v. Yacht Club of Coeur D'Alene, Ltd., found that [t]he act of filing and recording a plat or map is sufficient to establish the intent on the part of the owner to make a donation to the public. 116 Idaho 219, 224, 775 P.2d 111, 116 (1989) (quoting ( Boise City v. Hon, 14 Idaho 272, 279, 94 P. 167, 168-69 (1908)). The second elementacceptance of the offer by the publicis not evidenced by the subjective intent of purchasers of property whose instruments of title make specific reference to a plat, but rather by the fact that lots had been sold or otherwise conveyed with specific reference to the apposite plat. Id. at 225, 775 P.2d at 117. There are two separate conveyances at issue here to which appellants claim the doctrine of common law dedication applies: the 1901 transaction between the miners and the County and the subsequent homestead patents granted by the federal government. However, the 1901 petition by the miners and quitclaim was not a common law dedication. A common law dedication requires that the offeror be an owner of the land, and the miners had no ownership interest in the unreserved federal land. Therefore the petition for dedication and quitclaim is not a valid common law dedication. The second transaction, however, is a valid common law dedication of the road. The federal government was the owner of the land, and it filed and recorded a valid plat. That is sufficient under Worley to show intent on the part of the owner to dedicate public areas of the plat. The district court decision on this issue cited Nesbitt v. Demasters, 44 Idaho 143, 255 P. 408 (1927), for the proposition that a valid common law dedication offer and description must be clear and certain. That the road was clearly marked and labeled on the plat and patent is sufficient to create an offer to dedicate a public road. In a case where the roads are not yet built and the plat is part of a subdivision plan, it makes more sense to require a metes and bounds type of description, but where, as here, there is already a road in existence and labeled and marked on the map, the offer requirement is met. Furthermore, the grant of homestead patents constitutes a valid acceptance of a common law dedication. In Worley this Court reversed a trial judge for incorrectly looking to the intentions of the purchaser to determine if the purchaser intended to accept the government's implied offer of dedication. 116 Idaho at 225, 775 P.2d at 117. In this case the fact that a plat was validly filed and patents sold referencing the plat and the road constitutes common law dedication. In Smylie v. Pearsall, the court stated that [w]hen an owner of land plats the land, files the plat for record, and sells lots by reference to the recorded plat, a dedication of public areas indicated by the plat is accomplished. This dedication is irrevocable except by statutory process. 93 Idaho 188, 191, 457 P.2d 427, 430 (1969). The patents were granted to the homesteaders with reference to the valid plats and with the Indian Creek Road marked and labeled. There was a common law dedication of the road independent of the intent of the homesteaders.