Opinion ID: 612831
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish interdependence among Acosta-Gallardo, Alvarado, and Alvarado's Customers in Wyoming

Text: Acosta-Gallardo next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence related to the conspiracy charge presented at trial to sustain his conviction for Count One. We review sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges de novo, consider[ing] both direct and circumstantial evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Wardell, 591 F.3d 1279, 1286-87 (10th Cir.2009) (citing United States v. Weidner, 437 F.3d 1023, 1032 (10th Cir.2006)). We may not disturb the jury's credibility determinations, nor weigh the evidence in performing this analysis. Id. at 1287 (citing United States v. Waldroop, 431 F.3d 736, 742 (10th Cir.2005)). The evidence is sufficient under these tests if a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1286-87 (citing United States v. Willis, 476 F.3d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir.2007)). To prove a conspiracy, the government must show that (1) two or more persons agreed to violate the law; (2) the defendant knew the essential objectives of the conspiracy; (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily participated in the conspiracy; and (4) the alleged coconspirators were interdependent. United States v. Yehling, 456 F.3d 1236, 1240 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Small, 423 F.3d 1164, 1182 (10th Cir.2005)). The alleged co-conspirators must have a shared, single criminal objective, not just have similar or parallel objectives between similarly situated people. Small, 423 F.3d at 1182 (citing United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 671 (10th Cir.1992)). Acosta-Gallardo challenges only the interdependence fourth prong, arguing that he never spoke to or met co-defendant Robert Landry prior to trial. He also argues that his alleged co-conspirators  Kevin Watson, Charles Thunehorst, Brahnson Arnell, George Burkett, and Jason Freeman  were all cooperating witnesses for the government and that they testified that they purchased methamphetamine from either Landry or Alvarado, rather than from him. R., Vol. 3 at 451-58 [Watson testifying that he was purchasing drugs from Landry who was purchasing from a source unknown to him in Park City], R., Vol. 3 at 475-77 [Thunehorst testifying that he was buying drugs from Arnell, then from Alvarado starting in 2007]; R., Vol. 3 Tr. at 674 [Arnell testifying that his source was Alvarado], at 744-47 [Burkett testifying that he purchased methamphetamine from Landry], at 758 [Freeman testifying that he got methamphetamine from Alvarado]. Additionally, Acosta-Gallardo points out that Watson, Thunehorst, Arnell, and Burkett testified that they never knew or heard of Acosta-Gallardo. Aplt's Br. 19 (citing R., Vol. 3 at 469 [Watson]; R., Vol. 3 Tr. at 658 [Thunehorst], 701 [Arnell], 776 [Freeman]). These arguments, however, are unpersuasive because it is well-established that a conspirator need not know of the existence or identity of the other members of the conspiracy or the full extent of the conspiracy. See Evans, 970 F.2d at 669-70. The evidence must show that a conspirator has at least a general awareness of both the scope and the objectives of the conspiracy. Id. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, Alvarado-Gallardo was aware of the scope and objectives of the conspiracy. He supplied an estimated ten pounds of methamphetamine to Alvarado and Alvarado testified that he would generally purchase the drugs by the pound. See United States v. Caro, 965 F.2d 1548, 1556 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that a defendant's delivery of large quantities of drugs provides circumstantial evidence that he was not merely a customer of the conspiracy); United States v. Powell, 982 F.2d 1422, 1430 (10th Cir. 1992) ([T]he intent to distribute a controlled substance may be inferred from the possession of a large quantity of the substance.). Evidenced by the September 16, 2009 phone call, Alvarado also provided feedback on the quality of the drugs provided by Acosta-Gallardo. Alvarado returned to Acosta-Gallardo as a reliable supplier who could meet his volume demands and provide a better quality of drugs than Juvenal Garcia. Moreover, interdependence may be shown if a defendant's activities facilitated the endeavors of other alleged co-conspirators or facilitated the venture as a whole. United States v. Heckard, 238 F.3d 1222, 1230 (10th Cir.2001) (citing United States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1286 (10th Cir.1996)). Co-conspirators are interdependent when they `inten[d] to act together for their shared mutual benefit within the scope of the conspiracy charged.' United States v. Fishman, 645 F.3d 1175, 1189 (10th Cir.2011) (quoting Evans, 970 F.2d at 671) (emphasis and alteration in Fishman ). As the government argues, the evidence here is sufficient to support finding of a chain-and-link conspiracy where the overall objective was to possess and to distribute methamphetamine for profit. See United States v. Dickey, 736 F.2d 571, 582 (10th Cir.1984). Acosta-Gallardo's distributing drugs to Alvarado facilitated Alvarado's further distribution of drugs. In turn, some of Alvarado's customers further distributed the drugs to their own customers. Acosta-Gallardo's advancing drugs to Alvarado on credit facilitated Alvarado's ability to sell the drugs because he did not need to pay for them up front. Acosta-Gallardo could not profit unless Alvarado could successfully sell the drugs and pay Acosta-Gallardo back for the drugs advanced. Thus, there was ample evidence that Acosta-Gallardo's actions facilitated the venture as a whole. Acosta-Gallardo's argument that he and co-defendant Landry were not interdependent because they were involved in two separate conspiracies similarly fails. Acosta-Gallardo argues that Alvarado was involved in one conspiracy involving the purchase of drugs from three suppliers (of whom he was one), and in another conspiracy involving the distribution of drugs into the District of Wyoming. Whether sufficient evidence was presented to establish a single conspiracy is a question of fact for the jury to decide. Dickey, 736 F.2d at 581 (citing United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330, 1340 (10th Cir.1979)). When reviewing the jury's decision, we view the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the government, and all reasonable inferences and credibility choices must be made in support of the jury's verdict. Id. at 581-82 (citing United States v. Pilling, 721 F.2d 286, 288-89 (10th Cir.1983)). To make a finding of a single conspiracy, the jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged coconspirators possessed a common, illicit goal. Id. at 582 (citing United States v. Brewer, 630 F.2d 795, 799 (10th Cir.1980)). To satisfy this `common objective' test ..., the essential element of interdependence must be met... Id. (citing United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1326-27 (10th Cir.1979)). The government presented ample evidence of interdependence among Acosta-Gallardo, Alvarado, and their co-defendants. Acosta-Gallardo's ability to profit from his sales of drugs to Alvarado depended on Alvarado's ability to successfully sell the drugs to his customers, many of whom were in Wyoming. Drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the jury's verdict, ample evidence existed to support the jury's finding that Acosta-Gallardo and Landry were involved in a single conspiracy. Thus, Acosta-Gallardo's sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge fails. Accordingly, we AFFIRM Acosta-Gallardo's conviction.