Opinion ID: 1394283
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Opinion evidence was properly admitted.

Text: Appellant argues the trial court erred in permitting Sergeant Jay Postlewaite to testify as an expert regarding his opinions on how damage occurred to the victim's vehicle. Of primary importance to Appellant, Officer Postlewaite opined that damage to the victim's vehicle was consistent with hitting the parked cars found at the scene of the crime. During rebuttal, Postlewaite was also permitted to opine, based on an examination of a photograph of Appellant's vehicle, that damage on the left front bumper of the vehicle appeared consistent with damage that is typically caused by forces acting from below the vehicle. Postlewaite then offered several examples in which damage can be caused from below the vehiclesuch as backing over a curb. Finally, Postlewaite opined that he would have expected to see more paint transfer on both vehicles and more parallel damage located higher up on Appellant's vehicle if the damage in the photograph was caused by the fender of another vehicle running into Appellant's vehicle. Appellant complains that Postlewaite's testimony was unreliable and thus, inadmissible. See Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Ky.2006) (expert testimony not admissible unless it meets reliability standards of KRE 702). We review reliability determinations for clear error. Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 916 (Ky.2004). Upon review of the record, we find no clear error in the trial court's determination that Postlewaite's testimony met the threshold reliability standards set forth in KRE 702. Appellant does not challenge whether Postlewaite is generally qualified, based on his significant training and experience, to offer opinions in the area of accident reconstruction. Rather, Appellant challenges whether Postlewaite conducted a sufficient investigation and analysis to support his opinions in this particular case. Notably, Postlewaite testified that since the fatality in this case was not caused by a vehicle collision (but rather a firearm), a formal accident reconstruction was not performed. His purpose at the scene of the crime, therefore, was not to perform an accident reconstruction but to collect evidence and document the scene for the purpose of conducting a homicide investigation. Appellant argues that since all of the documentation and analysis generally performed in a formal accident reconstruction were not performed in this case, Postlewaite was not qualified to offer opinions regarding how any of the vehicles may have been damaged. Appellant further argues that a simple photograph of damage to Appellant's vehicle was not sufficient to allow Postlewaite to speculate as to how the damage may have been caused. We disagree. Although he was at the scene for other purposes, Postlewaite testified that he was nonetheless qualified to offer opinions in the area of accident reconstruction since he was able to personally observe and analyze the scene, photographs, and other evidence. On cross-examination, Postlewaite noted that most, but not all, of the documentation and analysis involved in a formal accident reconstruction were performed in this case. Finally, Postlewaite testified that it was not unusual for him to be able to analyze and draw conclusions regarding the cause of damage to vehicles based on photographs alone. The trial court concluded that although Postlewaite's investigation was not as extensive as it might have been had he performed a formal accident reconstruction, it was extensive enough to satisfy the minimum threshold requirements of KRE 702. It further ruled that Postlewaite's significant training and experience were sufficient to allow him to analyze and draw conclusions based on the photograph alone. We find no error in these admissibility determinations. As the trial court noted, Appellant's objections were appropriate to address the weight of Postlewaite's opinions, but were not sufficient to render his testimony completely inadmissible.