Opinion ID: 2331362
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Town's Duty to Trim Vegetation

Text: The LeBlancs argued in the alternative that the town breached its statutory duty to trim the vegetation growing alongside of Old Angell Road. They correctly pointed out that the act oftrimming shrubs or vegetation is one in which private persons ordinarily engage and is thus not shielded by the public duty doctrine. O'Gara v. Ferrante, 690 A.2d 1354, 1356 (R.I.1997) (per curiam). Moreover, as we explained in O'Gara, G.L.1956 § 24-5-1, G.L.1956 § 31-1-23, and G.L.1956 § 45-15-8 give rise to a statutory duty to keep the roadways clear that may be breached by a failure to trim shrubbery bordering a roadway. [2] O'Gara, 690 A.2d at 1356-57. Thus, the motion justice erred in concluding that trimming vegetation was a discretionary function    that    does not create a private duty to [a] particular person or persons involved in an accident because the city or town failed to trim vegetation or tree branches[.] To move successfully for summary judgment, the town must establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists about whether it breached this duty. Heflin, 774 A.2d at 29. The town has failed to meet this burden. It based its summary judgment motion on the argument that Nicholas had admitted to driving over the speed limit and had stated that the accident was caused by Yankee's car crossing the center of the roadway. The town maintained that this argument was inconsistent with any claim that overgrowth caused the accident. Nicholas's statements alone, however, are not dispositive of the causation factors involved in this accident. The LeBlancs offered additional evidence through Yankee's statements that the vegetationovergrowth along the roadway was a proximate cause of the accident. In fact, the motion justice agreed, and remarked that the vegetation overgrowth may have been a proximate cause of the accident. Furthermore, unrebutted evidence submitted by the LeBlancs indicated the existence of a question of material fact about whether the town was on notice of the dangerous condition and whether the town satisfied its duty to trim the vegetation. The LeBlancs argued that the town was on constructive notice of the dangerous condition posed by the vegetation overgrowth because it had assigned police officers to patrol the roadway. Moreover, the LeBlancs submitted evidence in the form of a deposition taken from a resident of Old Angell Road that the town had never do[ne] any work on either side of the [Old Angell] road on the brush or the trees before the accident. In passing on a motion for summary judgment it is the function of the motion justice to identify issues of material fact, not to resolve them. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Farr, 594 A.2d 379, 381-82 (R.I.1991). Consequently, the motion justice erred in purporting to determine which of these factors was a proximate cause of the accident because proximate cause is a question of fact and only under the most extreme circumstances will be taken as a question of law. Splendorio v. Bilray Demolition Co., 682 A.2d 461, 467 (R.I.1996).