Opinion ID: 3037994
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency and Weight-of-the-Evidence

Text: O’Grady argues that the government failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Where, as here, the defendant did not preserve an insufficiency of the evidence claim by filing a timely motion for a judgment of acquittal, we reverse only if we find “plain error.” See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); U.S. v. Wolfe, 245 F.3d 257, 260-61 (3d Cir. 2001). We review the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the available evidence. Wolfe, 245 F.3d at 261. Regarding “Operation Bid Rig”, O’Grady argues the government failed to provide sufficient evidence of the intent and/or knowledge required. Counts 1 and 2 charged attempted extortion under color of official right, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). “[T]he Government need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts.” U.S. v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 768 (3d Cir. 2005). Count 3 charged O’Grady with bribery in connection with federal programs, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 661(a)(1)(B). The statute does not require proof of a specific quid pro quo, or payment in return for an identifiable official act. U.S. 8 v. Gee, 432 F.3d 713, 714-15 (7th Cir. 2005). The record is full of evidence and testimony from which a reasonable juror could conclude that O’Grady possessed the requisite mens rea required by both statutes. Regarding the ITCJ scheme, O’Grady argues that the government failed to prove the elements of Counts 4 and 5, which charged O’Grady with extorting cash payments and accepting bribes from the Appolonias. O’Grady argues that the only evidence in support of these charges was Palughi’s testimony, there was no direct evidence that the envelopes given to him by ITCJ contained cash, and there was no documentary evidence to corroborate the charges. These arguments lack merit. Even if the recorded conversations did not corroborate Palughi’s testimony, “uncorroborated accomplice testimony may constitutionally provide the exclusive basis for a criminal conviction.” See U.S. v. De Larsa, 450 F.2d 1057, 1060 (3d Cir. 1971) (citing Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470 (1917)). Furthermore, “[t]he government must prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt, but may do so solely by circumstantial evidence.” U.S. v. Dent,, 149 F.3d 180, 188 (3d Cir. 1998). A reasonable jury could infer from the evidence that O’Grady participated in this scheme and that the envelopes contained cash. O’Grady also argues that the jury’s verdict was against the reasonable weight of the evidence. This claim is waived because O’Grady’s Rule 33 motion was untimely filed and the government objected. See Eberhart v. U.S., 126 S. Ct. 403, 407 (2005). Even assuming O’Grady did not waive this claim, we find no basis for granting this extraordinary relief. 9 “New trials because the verdict is against the weight of the evidence are proper only when the record shows that the jury verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks the conscience.” Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1353 (3d Cir. 1991). We have reviewed the record and find no plausible basis to disturb the verdict.