Opinion ID: 2625308
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substitution of Alternate Juror

Text: [¶ 6] Initially, Alcalde contends that a district court lacks the authority to substitute an alternate juror for a regular juror once deliberations have commenced. Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 24(e), Alcalde argues that it is mandatory for the district court to discharge any alternate jurors when the jury retires to consider a verdict. In an alternative argument, Alcalde contends that even if an alternate juror can be substituted for a regular juror after deliberations have begun, the district court in this case failed to take adequate procedural safeguards to protect the deliberative process. [¶ 7] We begin our analysis with the language from the relevant portion of W.R.Cr.P. 24(e) (emphasis added): Alternate jurors. The court may direct that not more than six jurors in addition to the regular jury be called and impanelled [ sic ] to sit as alternate jurors. Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become or are found to be unable or disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take the same oath and shall have the same functions, powers, facilities and privileges as the regular jurors. An alternate juror who does not replace a regular juror shall be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict. Each side is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed by law if one or two alternate jurors are to be impanelled, two peremptory challenges if three or four alternate jurors are to be impanelled, and three peremptory challenges if five or six alternate jurors are to be impanelled. The additional peremptory challenges may be used against an alternate juror only, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by these rules may not be used against an alternate juror. Alcalde cites the use of the mandatory word shall to support his contention that an alternate can only replace a regular juror prior to the time the jury retires to deliberate and that once the jury does retire, the alternate must be discharged. [¶ 8] Prior to 1999 the corresponding federal rule was identical to Wyoming's. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(c) (1999). In those circumstances, we have generally looked to federal case law for guidance in the interpretation of the rules of criminal procedure. Brock v. State, 981 P.2d 465 (Wyo.1999). The federal courts adopted the view that the substitution of an alternate juror during mid-deliberations violated the plain language of the rule. United States v. Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir.1992). However, the federal courts applied a harmless error standard and would reverse a conviction only if the defendant had suffered prejudice by the substitution. Id. The federal appellate courts evaluated prejudice to the defendant by examining, among other things, the length of the jury's deliberations before and after substitution of the alternate and the district court's instructions to the jury upon substitution charging the jury to begin its deliberations anew. Id. (citing United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 at 995-96 (5th Cir.1981)). Consideration was also given to whether or not the trial court had ensured that the alternate juror had not discussed the case with anyone nor been exposed to extrinsic information about the case in the interim between his discharge and the time of substitution. [2] Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d at 420; United States v. Guevara, 823 F.2d 446, 448 (11th Cir.1987). [¶ 9] The majority of the state courts to consider the issue have adopted the federal approach. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 2000-NMSC-021, ¶¶ 16-22, 129 N.M. 284, 6 P.3d 486, ¶¶ 16-22 (2000) (collecting cases); and generally, David B. Sweet, Annotation, Propriety, Under State Statute or Court Rule, of Substituting State Trial Juror With Alternate After Case Has Been Submitted to Jury, 88 A.L.R.4th 711 (1991). In People v. Burnette, 775 P.2d 583 (Colo.1989), the Colorado Supreme Court held that recalling a discharged alternate to replace a regular juror after deliberations have begun violated Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(e), which at that time was identical to the Wyoming Rule at issue here. Id. at 586-87. The Colorado court noted the potential prejudices inherent when substitution of a regular juror occurs in mid-deliberation: The potential for prejudice occasioned by a deviation from the mandatory requirements of Crim.P. 24(e) is great. Where an alternate juror is inserted into a deliberative process in which some jurors may have formed opinions regarding the defendant's guilt or innocence, there is a real danger that the new juror will not have a realistic opportunity to express his views and to persuade others.... Moreover, the new juror will not have been part of the dynamics of the prior deliberations, including the interplay of influences among and between jurors, that advanced the other jurors along their paths to a decision.... Nor will the new juror have had the benefit of the unavailable juror's views.... Finally, a lone juror who cannot in good conscience vote for conviction might be under great pressure to feign illness in order to place the burden of decision on an alternate. Burnette, 775 P.2d at 588 (citations and footnote omitted). While noting that the substitution raises a presumption of prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial, the court held that the presumption could be overcome by a showing that the trial court took adequate procedural precautions to obviate the danger of prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 587-88. In its analysis, the Colorado court cited the following safeguards: (1) whether the alternate juror was adequately instructed upon discharge not to discuss the case and avoid extrinsic information about the case that could influence him; (2) whether the alternate was questioned about his activities during the period from his discharge to recall and his present ability to serve on the jury; and (3) whether the remaining regular jury members had been instructed to recommence deliberations anew and whether they would be capable of disregarding their previous deliberations and any opinions formed during those deliberations. Id. at 590-91. [¶ 10] We concur with the authorities noted above and hold that the plain language of W.R.Cr.P. 24(e) does not permit the substitution of an alternate juror for a regular juror once deliberations have commenced. The substitution of an alternate juror in those circumstances raises a presumption of prejudice to a defendant that can, however, be rebutted upon a showing that adequate procedural safeguards were undertaken by the trial court to ensure that the defendant received a fair trial. Specifically, the trial court must: (1) instruct the alternate upon discharge that his oath is still applicable and until a verdict has been rendered and the regular jury discharged, he must refrain from discussing the case with anyone and avoid extrinsic information that may affect his ability to impartially judge the case; (2) upon recall, inquire on the record whether the alternate juror did, in fact, comply with the court's instructions; (3) instruct the reconstituted jury to begin deliberations anew; and (4) inquire on the record whether the remaining members of the original jury can ignore the previous deliberations and set aside any opinions formed during them. If the trial court cannot establish that all of these safeguards are met, then the court may not substitute the alternate, and the matter may proceed pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 23(b); otherwise, a mistrial may be declared. [¶ 11] In this case, the record clearly shows that adequate procedural safeguards were not taken. The district court properly instructed the alternate before discharging him and, upon recall, inquired whether he had complied with those instructions. The district court then sent the alternate into the jury room. The reconstituted jury was not instructed to begin deliberations anew. Nor was there an inquiry as to whether or not the remaining regular jurors could set aside their previous deliberations and any opinions formed during those deliberations. This failure raises the potential for prejudice noted by the Colorado Supreme Court. The potential for prejudice in this situation is evidenced by the fact that the original jury deliberated for the previous afternoon without reaching a verdict but managed to reach a verdict with the participation of the alternate juror in less than an hour. Accordingly, we must reverse Alcalde's conviction and remand for a possible new trial.