Opinion ID: 2783215
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Context of the Statute

Text: The crux of the Maryland Security Guards Act is the licensing scheme of security guard agencies, not the imposition of civil liability. The majority of the Act governs how an agency applies for and obtains the required licensure from the State to conduct a security guard agency. The “Miscellaneous Provisions” of the Act, of which § 19-501 is a part, however, contain sections addressed to the civil liability of security guard agencies. See the Maryland Security Guards Act §§ 19-504 (requiring a minimum amount of general liability insurance for agencies with more than five employees); 19-505(a)-(b) (requiring consent to venue); 19-505(f) (allowing for service of legal process under certain circumstances on Maryland Secretary of State). The internal structure of the 12 Codification of the common law is not a meaningless legislative activity. Much of the Maryland Code is devoted to codification of significant areas of the common law. 12 Maryland Security Guards Act contributes nothing to illumination of the intentions of the General Assembly. The broader context of the Maryland Code provides some support for the Appellants’ interpretation of the Maryland Security Guards Act § 19-501. In other statutory schemes within the Code, the General Assembly uses the common law term “scope of employment.” See, e.g., Md. Code (1999, 2007 Repl. Vol.), Agriculture Art., § 4-127 (“when construing or enforcing any provision of this subtitle, every act, omission, or failure of any person acting within the scope of employment or office and acting for or employed by another person is the act, omission, or failure of that person as well as of the person committing the act”); Md. Code (1999, 2007 Repl. Vol.), Business Occupations & Professions Art., § 12-501(b)(2) (using the term “scope of employment” regarding insurance requirements for licensed plumbers); Md. Code (1992, 2010 Repl. Vol.), Business Regulation Art., §9A-402(b)(2) (using the term “scope of employment” regarding insurance requirements for licensed heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning workers); Md. Code (1974, 2013 Repl. Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art., § 5- 303(b) (“a local government shall be liable for any judgment against its employee for damages resulting from tortious acts or omissions committed by the employee within the scope of employment with the local government”); Md. Code (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.), Criminal Law Art., § 10-108 (creating an exception to the criminal statute for possession of “a tobacco product or cigarette rolling paper by a minor who is acting as the agent of the minor’s employer within the scope of employment”); Md. Code (1978, 2014 Repl. Vol.), Education Art., § 6-111(a) (providing for full pay for employees absent due to 13 disability resulting from an assault “while in the scope of board employment”); Md. Code (2007), Human Services Art., §3-406 (prohibiting the State from paying judgments awarded against an employee under the section for acts or omissions occurring “outside the scope of employment”); Md. Code (1988, 2010 Repl. Vol.), Tax-General Art., §1-101 (defining “Comptroller” to include “an employee of the Comptroller acting within the scope of employment”). It seems from this that the General Assembly is well acquainted with the common law term “scope of employment,” and is not averse to sprinkling it across the broad legislative landscape. Considering the language of the Maryland Security Guards Act §§ 19-501 in the foregoing context of the Maryland Code adds some weight to the Appellants’ interpretation. One might anticipate that the General Assembly would use the term “scope of employment” here if it intended to codify common law respondeat superior. In isolation, however, the absence of this term in § 19-501 does not provide sufficiently clear evidence of the General Assembly’s intent to abrogate the common law.