Opinion ID: 1707184
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: any proration of the claimant's disability is manifestly wrong.

Text: In his order of January 20, 1986, the Administrative Judge made the following finding of fact: Based upon the fact that the claimant had an existing inherited tendency to have the essential tremor at some point in her life, Dr. Graf expressed an opinion that fifty (50%) percent of her condition was the result of the pre-existing condition and fifty (50%) percent of her tremor condition was the result of the May 27, 1977, on-the-job episode. On behalf of the employer and carrier, the depositions of Dr. M.R. O'Neil, Dr. Terry French, Dr. Frank Harmon, Dr. Maria S. Diaz, Dr. Robert Currier, and Dr. William E. Bowlus were introduced into evidence in this cause. Having considered all of the evidence herein in compliance with the Full Commission Order dated August 24, 1983, I find that the claimant's essential tremor condition is permanent in nature: ... . ... and that fifty percent (50%) of the essential tremor condition suffered by the claimant is the result of her work-related episode that occurred at her place of employment on May 27, 1977, and fifty percent (50%) of her essential tremor condition is the result of the claimant's pre-existing condition. The Administrative Judge then ordered the employer to pay permanent partial disability in the amount of $31.33 per week beginning on December 14, 1979, and continuing for a period of 450 weeks. Employer contends that Dr. Graf changed his opinion of the extent of claimant's disability and that the proof is overwhelming that no drug can cause the manifestation of essential tremors. The employer cites Flintkote Company v. Jackson, 192 So.2d 395 (Miss. 1966) for the proposition that claimant must prove her injury is compensable. Jackson is distinguishable in this case. In Jackson, the claimant, prior to the incident which gave rise to his claim, suffered from cardiovascular disease for several years and had been hospitalized previously for that condition. His family doctor testified that Jackson's employment activities were not responsible for the stroke. 192 So.2d at 397. The claimant in this case did not display any symptoms of essential tremors before she ingested the Chex-it. The physician employed by Quitman Knitting Mills testified that only one week prior to the incident, claimant was fit to work. As stated in General Electric Co. v. McKinnon, 507 So.2d 363 (Miss. 1987): Section 71-2-7, Mississippi Code Annotated (1972), governs apportionment between the injury and the pre-existing malady. Bennett v. United Parcel Service, 382 So.2d 469 (Miss. 1982). That section provides in part: Where a pre-existing physical handicap, disease, or lesion is shown by medical findings to be a material contributing factor in which results following injury, the compensation which, but for this paragraph, would be payable shall be reduced by that proportion which such pre-existing physical handicap, disease, or lesion contributed to the production of the results following the injury. (a) Apportionment shall not be applied until the claimant has reached maximum medical recovery. (b) The employer or carrier does not have the power to determine the date of maximum medical recovery or percentage of apportionment. This must be done by the attorney-referee, subject to review by the commission as the ultimate finder of fact. (emphasis added) We have enunciated the burden of proof on the employer-carrier for showing a pre-existing condition for the purpose of apportioning permanent partial disability benefits. See Walls v. Hodo Chevrolet Co., Inc., 302 So.2d 862, 865 (Miss. 1974). In Walls we emphasized that the employer-carrier had to prove not only the pre-existing condition existed, but this proof must be supported by medical findings. Moreover, the employer-carrier must show that the pre-existing condition continued to exist and was a material contributing factor in the results following the present injury. 507 So.2d at 368. Employer relies on the testimony of Drs. O'Neil, French, Harmon, Diaz, Currier and Bowlus. Dr. Currier initially refused to give an opinion concerning the percentage of causation of claimant's tremors because he had not examined her. Then reluctantly he guessed at five percent (5%). Later on cross-examination he changed that figure to one percent (1%). Dr. Bowlus stated that the causal relationship was one to five percent (1% to 5%). On cross-examination, Dr. Bowlus admitted he was not familiar with Ms. Smith's case and even stated he did not recognize the described condition as essential tremors. Drs. O'Neil; Diaz; Harmon; and French testified concerning treatment of claimant's varied ailments. None gave an opinion concerning apportionment. Ms. Smith testified that she sought reemployment at Quitman Knitting Mills. They refused to re-hire her. Gilda Page, claimant's supervisor, confirmed this fact. Ms. Smith obtained employment at another mill but was terminated when her condition became apparent. As we stated in Marshall Durbin, Inc. v. Hall, 490 So.2d 877, 879 (Miss. 1986): Our function is to determine whether there is substantial credible evidence which would support the factual determination made by the Commission Georgia- Pacific Corporation v. Veal, 484 So.2d 1025, 1027 (Miss. 1986). If there should be such substantial credible evidence, we are without authority to disturb that which the Commission has found, even though that evidence would not be sufficient to convince us were we the factfinders. Olen Burrage Trucking Co. v. Chandler, 475 So.2d 437, 439 (Miss. 1985); South Central Bell Telephone Company v. Aden, 474 So.2d 584, 589-90 (Miss. 1985); Staple Cotton Services Association v. Russell, 399 So.2d 224, 228-29 (Miss. 1981); King & Heath Construction Co. v. Hester, 360 So.2d 692, 694 (Miss. 1978). Here, as in Hall, the employer and carrier blur the distinction between medical or physical impairment and industrial or occupational disability. Prior to the incident on May 27, 1977, Ms. Smith was gainfully employed. After this incident she was unable to earn the wages which she was receiving at the time of injury in the same or other employment. Therefore, the Commission's award of permanent partial disability beginning on December 14, 1979 and continuing for a period of 450 weeks is affirmed. The order of January 20, 1986, awarding claimant temporary total disability benefits of $62.66 per week from May 27, 1977, to December 13, 1979, and permanent partial disability beginning December 14, 1979, and continuing for a period of 450 weeks is affirmed. The order to pay medical bills is affirmed. This case is remanded for further hearings to determine the amount of medical costs incurred by claimant as a result of the condition. AFFIRMED IN PART, REMANDED IN PART. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON and PITTMAN, JJ., concur.