Opinion ID: 106534
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Perez and Trop Cases.

Text: The basic principles here involved, the gravity of the issue, and the arguments bearing upon Congress' power to forfeit citizenship were considered by the Court in relation to different provisions of the Nationality Act of 1940 in two cases decided on the same day less than five years ago: Perez v. Brownell, 356 U. S. 44, and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86. In Perez, § 401 (e), which imposes loss of nationality for [v]oting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory, was upheld by a closely divided Court as a constitutional exercise of Congress' power to regulate foreign affairs. The Court reasoned that since withdrawal of citizenship of Americans who vote in foreign elections is reasonably calculated to effect the avoidance of embarrassment in the conduct of foreign relations, such withdrawal is within the power of Congress, acting under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Since the Court sustained the application of § 401 (e) to denationalize Perez, it did not have to deal with § 401 (j), upon which the Government had also relied, and it expressly declined to rule on the constitutionality of that section, 356 U. S., at 62. There were three opinions written in dissent. The principal one, that of THE CHIEF JUSTICE, recognized that citizenship may not only be voluntarily renounced through exercise of the right of expatriation but also by other actions in derogation of undivided allegiance to this country, id., at 68, but concluded that [t]he mere act of voting in a foreign election, however, without regard to the circumstances attending the participation, is not sufficient to show a voluntary abandonment of citizenship, id., at 78. In Trop, § 401 (g), forfeiting the citizenship of any American who is guilty of [d]eserting the military or naval forces of the United States in time of war, provided he is convicted thereof by court martial and as the result of such conviction is dismissed or dishonorably discharged. . . , was declared unconstitutional. There was no opinion of the Court. THE CHIEF JUSTICE wrote an opinion for four members of the Court, concluding that § 401 (g) was invalid for the same reason that he had urged as to § 401 (e) in his dissent in Perez, and that it was also invalid as a cruel and unusual punishment imposed in violation of the Eighth Amendment. JUSTICE BRENNAN conceded that it is paradoxical to justify as constitutional the expatriation of the citizen who has committed no crime by voting in a Mexican political election, yet find unconstitutional a statute which provides for the expatriation of a soldier guilty of the very serious crime of desertion in time of war, 356 U. S., at 105. Notwithstanding, he concurred because the requisite rational relation between this statute and the war power does not appear . . . , id., at 114. Justice Frankfurter, joined by three other Justices, dissented on the ground that § 401 (g) did not impose punishment at all, let alone cruel and unusual punishment, and was within the war powers of Congress.