Opinion ID: 658352
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Confinement in Maximum Security Institution

Text: 60 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5035 (1988) provides in part: 61 A juvenile alleged to be delinquent may be detained only in a juvenile facility or such other suitable place as the Attorney General may designate.... The Attorney General shall not cause any juvenile alleged to be delinquent to be detained or confined in any institution in which the juvenile has regular contact with adult persons convicted of a crime or awaiting trial on criminal charges. 62 Because Rupley, Jr., was under 21 and stood accused of violating federal law prior to his eighteenth birthday, he was [a] juvenile alleged to be delinquent within the meaning of the statute. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5031. During the 15 months between his arrest and indictment in October 1986 and his transfer to adult status, however, Rupley, Jr., was confined with his codefendants in a maximum security prison. Rupley, Jr., argues that the government's violation of Sec. 5035 requires reversal of his convictions. The government concedes that the statute was violated but argues that no prejudice resulted and that reversal is not warranted. Because Rupley, Jr., although represented by counsel at all times subsequent to his initial arrest and indictment, did not raise this argument in the district court, we review for plain error. Calabrese, 825 F.2d at 1346. 63 Section 5035 does not prescribe a remedy for its violation, and no court has addressed the specific issue. Under the circumstances of this case, we do not find the government's lapses so egregious as to require reversal. See Doe, 862 F.2d at 780. There is no presumption or general rule that for every duty imposed upon the court or the Government and its prosecutors there must exist some corollary punitive sanction for departures or omissions, even if negligent. United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 717, 110 S.Ct. 2072, 2077, 109 L.Ed.2d 720 (1990). Had Rupley, Jr., objected to the conditions of his detention as violating Sec. 5035, the proper remedy would likely have been dismissal of the juvenile charges without prejudice. 6 He did not make such an objection. In September 1987, the government filed a superseding indictment charging Rupley, Jr., with two adult offenses as well as several committed before his eighteenth birthday. The superseding indictment mooted the earlier indictment and any procedural violations that may have tainted it. From that time on, Rupley, Jr., was properly detained in an adult facility, and any non-civil remedies that might previously have been available were waived. Moreover, Rupley, Jr., was eventually transferred to adult status and received credit at sentencing for the full period of his pretransfer confinement, thus minimizing any prejudice from the government's error. See Doe, 862 F.2d at 780-81. We therefore need not invoke the exceptional remedy of reversal for plain error to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process. United States v. Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Bustillo, 789 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir.1986)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 858, 110 S.Ct. 167, 107 L.Ed.2d 124 (1989).