Opinion ID: 3008873
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of an omnibus hearing

Text: The first issue is whether the circuit court erred in failing to grant the Petitioner’s motion for an omnibus evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner argues that the circuit court failed to make any specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as to why an evidentiary hearing was not necessary. The Petitioner maintains that the issues raised established probable cause that he may be entitled to relief and an evidentiary hearing was necessary to rule upon the disputed facts. The Petitioner further contends that had an evidentiary hearing been held he would have sought to present the expert testimony of Dr. William Hauda, an expert in the field of forensic science, who would have testified regarding the problems with the State’s purported identification of seminal fluid, an attorney expert with expertise in the area of professional responsibility and competence of attorneys, a forensic psychologist expert regarding the scientific inability to diagnose a child as a victim of sexual abuse, and other fact witnesses who would have testified regarding Paul Lane’s [,the Petitioner’s trial counsel’s,] mental condition following his head injury. Through the evidentiary hearing, . . . [the Petitioner] also requested discovery regarding forensic testing, that had previously not been disclosed, as well as independent testing of the preserved evidence. The State responds that the circuit court issued a twenty-eight page order 12 denying the Petitioner habeas relief. In its order, the circuit court discusses the merits of all the Petitioner’s habeas claims and finds that a hearing would provide no further evidence warranting relief. Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Proceedings in West Virginia provides as follows: If the petition is not dismissed at a previous stage in the proceeding, the circuit court, after the answer is filed, shall, upon a review of the record, if any, determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required. If the court determines that an evidentiary hearing is not required, the court shall include in its final order findings of fact and conclusions of law as to why an evidentiary hearing was not required. (Emphasis added). In syllabus point one of Perdue, this Court held: A court having jurisdiction over habeas corpus proceedings may deny a petition for a writ of habeas corpus without a hearing and without appointing counsel for the petitioner if the petition, exhibits, affidavits or other documentary evidence filed therewith show to such court’s satisfaction that the petitioner is entitled to no relief. 156 W. Va. at 467, 194 S.E.2d at 658 (emphasis added); see W. Va. Code 53-4A-7(a) (2008) (“If the petition, affidavits, exhibits, records and other documentary evidence attached thereto, or the return or other pleadings, or the record in the proceedings which resulted in the conviction and sentence, or the record or records in a proceeding or proceedings on a 13 prior petition or petitions filed under the provisions of this article, or the record or records in any other proceeding or proceedings instituted by the petitioner to secure relief from his conviction or sentence, show to the satisfaction of the court that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, or that the contention or contentions and grounds (in fact or law) advanced have been previously and finally adjudicated or waived, the court shall enter an order denying the relief sought.”). Further, in State ex rel. Valentine v. Watkins, 208 W. Va. 26, 537 S.E.2d 647 (2000), this Court discussed the standard for review of a circuit court’s decision to grant or to deny a habeas corpus petition. “When considering whether such a petition requesting post-conviction habeas corpus relief has stated grounds warranting the issuance of the writ, courts typically are afforded broad discretion.” Id. at 31, 537 S.E.2d at 652. We also stated in Gibson v. Dale, 173 W. Va. 681, 319 S.E.2d 806 (1984), “the post-conviction habeas corpus statute leaves the decision of whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing or to compel the State to produce evidence in its possession in large part to the sound discretion of the court before which the writ is made returnable.” Id. at 688, 319 S.E.2d at 813. The discretion afforded circuit courts is not unlimited; “the court must be guided by the necessities of each particular case.” Id. at 688-89, 319 S.E.2d at 813. In determining whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the 14 Petitioner habeas relief without affording him a hearing, we readily dispense with the Petitioner’s argument that the circuit court failed to make any specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as to why an evidentiary hearing was not necessary. Regarding its decision to not hold an omnibus hearing, the circuit court expressly stated in its order that “[h]aving been fully briefed14 on the matters, this Court finds that it would not be aided by further discussion and dispenses with the need for a hearing.” The circuit court then proceeded to address each issue raised in the petition, including specific references to the trial transcript. Consequently, we find the circuit court’s findings adequately support its determination that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary. We also disagree with the Petitioner’s argument that an evidentiary hearing was necessary to rule upon the disputed factual issues raised in his petition. The Petitioner maintains that the primary purpose of an evidentiary hearing was for the circuit court to consider expert testimony in the areas of forensic science, professional responsibility and competency of attorneys, and forensic psychologist expert relating the diagnosis of the victim being sexually abused. Thus, the need for expert testimony was solely for the purpose of attacking the Petitioner’s trial counsel’s strategy. 14 The brief filed in the circuit court by the Petitioner regarding his habeas claims was seventy pages. 15 Thus, when examining the need for an evidentiary hearing in this case, we are guided by our law, which we have firmly adhered to, that the primary purpose of an omnibus hearing is grounded in providing the Court with evidence from “the most significant witness, the trial attorney,” in order to give that individual “the opportunity to explain the motive and reason behind his or her trial behavior.” State v. Miller, 194 W. Va. 3, 15, 459 S.E.2d 114, 126 (1995). It is the need for the trial attorney’s testimony that generally precludes this Court from reviewing any ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. See id. at 15, 459 S.E.2d at 126; see also State v. Meadows, 231 W. Va. 10, 24, 743 S.E.2d 318, 332 (2013); State v. Woodson, 222 W. Va. 607, 620-21; 671 S.E.2d 438, 451-52 (2008); State v. Frye, 221 W. Va. 154, 155-58, 650 S.E.2d 574, 575-78 (2006). As we stressed in Miller, “[t]he test of ineffectiveness has little or nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what most good lawyers would have done.” 194 W. Va. at 16, 459 S.E.2d at 127. Rather, the focus of any habeas evidentiary hearing as it relates to ineffective assistance of counsel is affording a petitioner’s trial counsel an opportunity to explain his actions during the underlying trial. See id. at 17, 459 S.E.2d at 128 (stating “we intelligently cannot determine the merits of . . . ineffective assistance claim[s] without an adequate record giving trial counsel the courtesy of being able to explain his trial actions.”). In the instant case, as discussed in greater detail infra in section III. B. of this opinion, we find that the Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are all grounded in trial strategy. Due to the Petitioner’s trial counsel’s death, the most critical witness for determination of the 16 Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims cannot testify at an evidentiary hearing and offer any explanation that could assist the trier of fact. This Court has upheld the denial of habeas relief where the circuit court has determined that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary. See State ex rel. Farmer v. Trent, 206 W. Va. 231, 523 S.E.2d 547 (1999); State ex rel. Waldron v. Scott, 222 W. Va. 122, 663 S.E.2d 576 (2008). Specifically, in Waldron, we stated: Upon review of the final order, it is clear that the circuit court concluded that an evidentiary hearing on the appellant’s habeas petition was not necessary. The circuit court issued a lengthy order meticulously addressing each of the six issues raised by the appellant and explaining in detail why the alleged errors were without merit. To the extent that the court erred by failing to specifically state in its order that an evidentiary hearing was not required, this Court has acknowledged that, “[m]ost errors, including constitutional ones are subject to harmless error analysis.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). Likewise, this Court has held that: “‘“Failure to observe a constitutional right constitutes reversible error unless it can be shown that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Syl. pt. 5, State ex rel. Grob v. Bailey [Blair],158 W. Va. 647, 214 S.E.2d 330 (1975).’ Syllabus Point 1, Maxey v. Bordenkircher, [175] W. Va. [49], 330 S.E.2d 859 (1985).” Syllabus Point 3, State v. Barrow, 178 W. Va. 406, 359 S.E.2d 844 (1987). In this case, the circuit court addressed and disposed of each issue set forth in the appellant’s habeas petition in such an exhaustive manner that there is no question as to why the appellant was denied an evidentiary hearing. 222 W. Va. at 125-26, 663 S.E.2d at 579-80. Unlike the Waldron case, the circuit court in the case sub judice expressly determined, based upon the extensive briefing in this case, that 17 an evidentiary hearing was not needed for it to determine the Petitioner’s habeas claims. In an extensive twenty-eight page order the circuit court painstakingly addressed each and every claim for habeas relief raised by the Petitioner leaving no question why it found that an evidentiary hearing was not needed. Moreover, that the most significant witness could not testify regarding the decisions he made during trial lends further support for the trial court’s determination on this issue. B. Petitioner’s Ineffective assistance of counsel claims The Petitioner sets forth numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel including his trial counsel: 1) failed to object to the ex post facto imposition of an enhanced statutory sentence for the Petitioner’s conviction for first degree sexual assault at sentencing;15 2) ineffective assistance regarding forensic evidence purportedly identifying seminal fluid on the lips of the child victim;16 3) failed to litigate the admissibility of the 15 See supra n.12. Concerning the Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim associated with this alleged error, the Petitioner cannot meet his burden of prejudice set forth in syllabus point nineteen of State v. Thomas, 157 W. Va. 640, 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974) (“In the determination of a claim that an accused was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel violative of Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, courts should measure and compare the questioned counsel’s performance by whether he exhibited the normal and customary degree of skill possessed by attorneys who are reasonably knowledgeable of criminal law, except that proved counsel error which does not affect the outcome of the case, will be regarded as harmless error.”). We therefore find that the circuit court correctly denied the Petitioner habeas relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on this issue. 16 This allegation encompasses the Petitioner’s claims that his trial counsel failed to (continued...) 18 Petitioner’s statement to police prior to it being entered into evidence through Corporal Link; 4) failed to object to testimony from Corporal Link concerning the Petitioner’s refusal to submit to DNA testing where the Petitioner had invoked his right against self-incrimination and right to counsel; 5) allowed an inadmissible out-of-court statement made by the victim to be entered into evidence through the cross-examination of Corporal Link; 6) failed to properly object to the victim’s statements being entered into evidence through a forensic nurse and the victim’s mother; 7) failed to disclose his expert, Dr. Krieg, until the day before trial, leading the trial court to hold a Daubert hearing, which resulted in the exclusion of portions of Dr. Krieg’s anticipated trial testimony; and 8) failed to object to the State’s expert, Chanin Kennedy, who testified that the victim was diagnosed as sexually abused. We set forth the standard for assessing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in syllabus points five and six of Miller: In the West Virginia courts, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be governed by the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984): (1) Counsel’s performance was deficient under an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. 16 (...continued) investigate the forensic evidence by requesting additional testing, failed to seek expert testimony, and failed to cross-examine the State’s forensic experts about the “validity of the forensic testing identifying seminal fluid.” 19 In reviewing counsel’s performance, courts must apply an objective standard and determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the broad range of professionally competent assistance while at the same time refraining from engaging in hindsight or second-guessing of trial counsel’s strategic decisions. Thus, a reviewing court asks whether a reasonable lawyer would have acted, under the circumstances, as defense counsel acted in the case at issue. 194 W. Va. 6-7, 459 S.E.2d at 117-18; see Thomas, 157 W. Va. at 643, 203 S.E.2d at 449, Syl. Pt. 19. Consequently, “[w]here a counsel’s performance, attacked as ineffective, arises from occurrences involving strategy, tactics and arguable courses of action, his conduct will be deemed effectively assistive of his client’s interests, unless no reasonably qualified defense attorney would have so acted in the defense of an accused.” Id. at 643, 203 S.E.2d at 449, Syl. Pt. 21. As we discussed in Miller, [u]nder these rules and presumptions, the cases in which a defendant may prevail on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel are few and far between one another. This result is no accident, but instead flows from deliberate policy decisions this Court and the United States Supreme Court have made mandating that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential” and prohibiting “[i]ntensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance[.]” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90, 104 S.Ct. at 2065-66, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694-95. In other words, we always should presume strongly that counsel’s performance was reasonable and adequate. A defendant seeking to rebut this strong presumption of effectiveness bears a difficult burden because constitutionally acceptable performance is not defined narrowly and encompasses a “wide range.” 20 194 W. Va. at 16, 459 S.E.2d at 127 (emphasis added). We further noted that [t]he widespread use of the tactic of attacking trial counsel by showing what “might have been” proves that nothing is clearer than hindsight--except perhaps the rule that we will not judge trial counsel’s performance through hindsight. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694 (“[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight”). As is often said, nothing is so easy as to be wise after the event. In reviewing counsel’s performance, courts must apply an objective standard and determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the broad range of professionally competent assistance while at the same time refraining from engaging in hindsight or second-guessing of trial counsel’s strategic decisions. Miller, 194 W. Va. at 17, 459 S.E.2d at 128. 1. Petitioner’s Ineffective Assistance Claim Regarding Forensic Evidence The primary focus of the Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims is based upon his trial counsel’s “failure to investigate and contest the forensic testing that purportedly identified seminal fluid on a lip swab taken from . . . [the victim.]” The Petitioner challenges the testing that was used by the State in its determination that seminal fluid was present, arguing that other types of testing would have been better and could have resulted in a determination that there was no seminal fluid. Thus, the Petitioner argues that his trial counsel failed to request additional forensic testing; failed to retain a forensic expert to offer an opinion, consult with or perform independent testing; failed to cross-examine the 21 State’s witnesses regarding the purported identification of seminal fluid on the victim’s lips; failed to understand the significance of the forensic evidence; and failed to offer logical argument regarding the evidence. The circuit court thoroughly examined the Petitioner’s claims regarding the forensic evidence and found the “Petitioner’s argument that independent testing would have resulted in a different result” without merit. Further, the circuit court found the Petitioner offer of a “long list of preferred DNA testing methods as well as hindsight strategy decisions . . .” was “simply second[-]guess[ing] trial counsel’s strategy.” We agree with the circuit court. A hearing was held on May 21, 2007, to determine whether the State could perform additional testing in order to ascertain whether any DNA was present. To do the additional testing meant that the State would consume the entirety of the second lip swab and the sample area on the pillow. The Petitioner’s trial counsel, after discussing the issue with the Petitioner, told the trial court that “I explained to . . . [the Petitioner] again the consequences of agreeing to allow the state to – the State Police Lab to utilize the entire sample. And he wished to decline that.” So the trial court ordered the State to refrain from any additional testing until the Petitioner’s trial counsel notified the State of the name of the Petitioner’s expert. The trial court gave the Petitioner thirty days to find an expert. The 22 Petitioner’s trial counsel then stated on the record: “And in the interim, if we do – obviously if we do find the finances preclude that possibility, we’ll of course notify the state also.” Subsequently, at an October 22, 2007, hearing, which occurred after the Petitioner’s trial counsel’s accident, the prosecuting attorney represented that in conversation she had with trial counsel before his accident, both the prosecutor and the Petitioner’s trial counsel thought that the additional testing could be done at the State Police Lab. There was no viewing area at the State Police Lab, however, so they agreed that they would need to send the sample to an independent lab in order for the Petitioner’s expert to observe the testing. As the prosecutor represented to the trial court regarding her conversation she had with the Petitioner’s trial counsel: [W]e were anticipating that his independent expert would be able to watch the testing done at the state lab and neither of us had been aware that there is no viewing area at the state lab. So we actually have to now send it out to an independent lab to get it done if in fact the defendant wants his own expert to be viewing that. So that was the nature of the conversation and then obviously with the hospitalization of Mr. Lane [trial counsel], everything kind of got put on the back burner as far as being able to work through that because I believe while he had identified his own independent expert, the fact that the testing has to be done at an outside lab was going to be additional expenses for his client. . . . The Petitioner’s trial counsel responded: I can say after discussing the matter further with my client and discussing with the expert retained through TASA. . 23 . , which is a well-known defense attorneys assistance agency, we are going to elect not to have an expert at the official testing. However, I do want to reserve the right, depending upon the results of the test, to utilize an expert to challenge the state’s results. So we’ll not have an expert at the testing. We won’t go to that length. We want to reserve the right to challenge the results through cross-examination. The trial court then inquired of the Petitioner whether he understood the discussion and whether he agreed with what his trial counsel had advised the trial court. The Petitioner responded affirmatively to both inquiries. The record demonstrates that contrary to the Petitioner’s claims, his trial attorney did consult with experts, as the circuit court found, before deciding to embark on a calculated trial strategy to hold off on retaining an expert until the results of the additional testing conducted were obtained. Further, because none of the State’s testing of the forensic evidence connected the Petitioner to the crime charged due to the lack of any DNA evidence, the Petitioner and his trial counsel found it unnecessary to hire an expert. Rather, the record of the trial demonstrates that the Petitioner’s trial counsel effectively cross-examined every State forensic expert, as well as Corporal Link, who obtained the evidence collected from the victim and her home, regarding the complete lack of any scientific forensic evidence that connected the Petitioner to the alleged crime. Thus, we agree with the circuit court that the Petitioner now is seeking that we 24 embark on a journey filled with second-guessing a trial attorney’s strategic decision in dealing with the investigation of forensic evidence, to the decisions made regarding experts, to the examination of witnesses, to the arguments made in closing. Miller, 194 W. Va. at 6-7, 203 S.E.2d at 117-18, Syl. Pt. 6; Thomas, 157 W. Va. at 643, 203 S.E.2d at 449, Syl. Pt. 21. We decline to do so. We find the Petitioner’s arguments to be grounded in speculation and hindsight. “As is often said, nothing is so easy as to be wise after the event.” Miller, 194 W. Va. at 17, 459 S.E.2d at 128. We further agree with the circuit court’s determination that, [e]ven if trial counsel would have employed the methods of discovery and cross-examination requested in the instant petition, there is no evidence or persuasive argument that the results of the Petitioner’s trial would have been different. The jury heard corroborating testimony regarding who was in the home and had access to . . . [the victim.] The victim made three consistent disclosures to adults shortly after the incident as to who assaulted her. This Court cannot find a reasonable probability that but for these alleged unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Accordingly, [the] Petitioner has failed to establish a right to relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. 2. Petitioner’s Remaining Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel The remainder of the Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are lumped together in his brief. The Petitioner first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to contest the admissibility of the Petitioner’s statement to Corporal Link based upon voluntariness. See State v. Farley, 192 W. Va. 247, 452 S.E.2d 50 (1994). The record supports that the Petitioner’s trial counsel did not file a motion to suppress the Petitioner’s 25 statement because there was no factual basis to do so. The trial court correctly found that the “Petitioner does not allege that his statement was coerced or involuntary or would have been excluded had Trial Counsel objected. As such, this complaint fails to state error.” Next, the Petitioner complains that his trial counsel failed to object to Corporal Link’s testimony concerning the Petitioner’s initial refusal to submit to DNA testing where the Petitioner had invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel. The Petitioner argues that the failure to object “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and left the jury with the impression that . . . [the Petitioner] had something to hide by refusing the test.” The record, however, again supports the circuit court’s determination that the Petitioner’s trial counsel’s decision to refrain from objecting to this question was due to trial strategy. By not objecting, the Petitioner’s trial counsel allowed the witness to testify that the reason the Petitioner had a problem with the initial request for DNA was due to his alleged mentally deranged wife obtaining semen from him and putting it in his stepdaughter’s mouth. Getting this evidence admitted indirectly was strategically important in light of the fact that the Petitioner did not testify. Thus, the circuit court did not err in declining any habeas relief on this claim. The third instance of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel stems from the Petitioner’s trial counsel’s cross-examination of Corporal Link, in which the officer testified 26 about the victim’s out-of-court statement. The trial court had determined that the child victim’s statement was properly admissible through her mother and the forensic nurse, Ms. Leahy, under exceptions to the hearsay rule set forth in West Virginia Rules of Evidence 803 and 804. The trial court, however, had determined that the statement was not admissible through Corporal Link as there was no applicable hearsay exception. A review of the trial transcript shows that contrary to the Petitioner’s argument, his trial counsel did not “elicit[] inadmissible and inculpatory evidence against his client. . . .” Rather, the Petitioner’s trial counsel sought to obtain testimony from the officer that showed flaws in the victim’s statement, including testimony from the officer that they tried to get more information from the victim to no avail, that the child did not have a real recollection of the event, and that it was a difficult interview – all of which went to the Petitioner’s trial strategy of showing that the victim was coached by her mother. Furthermore, even if we found trial counsel’s performance deficient on this ground, it is axiomatic that because the child victim’s statement was properly admitted through both her mother and Ms. Leahy, the Petitioner cannot overcome his burden of proof as to how the outcome of the trial would have changed in his favor if the statement had not come in through the officer’s testimony as well. See Miller, 194 W. Va. at 6, 459 S.E.2d at 117, Syl. Pt. 5. The Petitioner next argues that his trial counsel erred in failing to “properly object to . . . [the victim’s] statement being entered into evidence through forensic nurse, 27 Cynthia Leahy, and . . . [the victim’s mother] where the State failed to properly lay a foundation for [the] medical exception to the hearsay rule and where the unavailability motion was not made until the day of trial.” A review of the record demonstrates that the Petitioner’s trial counsel objected to the State’s motion to find the victim unavailable and to allow the victim’s statement to be admitted through other witnesses on the grounds that it violated his client’s right to confront witnesses. The standard by which we review whether a trial counsel’s performance was so ineffective as to warrant relief in habeas is not simply that the Petitioner’s current appellate counsel would have done things differently. That the Petitioner’s trial counsel objected to the evidence in the manner he did is well within the standard of an effective counsel’s performance and we find no error in the circuit court’s denial of habeas relief on this ground. The Petitioner next complains that his trial counsel failed to disclose his expert, Dr. Krieg, until the day of trial. In a three-sentence paragraph, the Petitioner argues that “[h]ad trial counsel disclosed Dr. Krieg’s report in a timely manner, a more full Daubert hearing may have been able to be held prior to the trial and Dr. Krieg’s testimony may have been found to be admissible.” The Petitioner further argues that had the Daubert hearing been held at an earlier time, his trial counsel “would have been able to plan and adjust his argument and presentation accordingly.” First, as previously mentioned, contrary to the Petitioner’s argument, his trial counsel did disclose Dr. Krieg as an expert prior to trial. The 28 Petitioner, however, had not provided the State with a copy of Dr. Krieg’s report prior to trial. It is significant that the State did not object to the late disclosure of Dr. Krieg’s report. Moreover, there was no exclusion of any portion of the report due to late disclosure. Rather, the State challenged the scientific testing or methodology that Dr. Krieg used in order to reach the opinion that the Petitioner did not fit the profile of a sex offender. On that issue, the trial court conducted a Daubert hearing and determined that Dr. Krieg’s own report lacked any scientific basis for his opinion. The Petitioner failed to offer any argument either before the circuit court or this Court regarding any prejudice from the late disclosure of the report, which is the claimed ineffectiveness of counsel, other than an earlier hearing “may” have resulted in a different ruling on admissibility. Additionally, the Petitioner fails to even assert that the outcome of his trial would have been different had the late disclosure not occurred. See Miller, 194 W. Va. at 6, 459 S.E.2d at 117, Syl. Pt. 5. Thus, the circuit court did not err in finding that it could grant no relief in habeas on this issue. Lastly, we find no merit in the Petitioner’s argument that his trial counsel failed to object to the testimony of the State’s expert, Chanin Kennedy, concerning Ms. Kennedy’s diagnosis that the child victim was a sexually abused child and that the child victim did not appear to be coached.17 Citing State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W. Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 17 Regarding the expert’s testimony that the victim was not a suggestible child, the circuit court found that (continued...) 29 (1990), the Petitioner conceded before the circuit court that “the West Virginia Supreme Court has allowed the use of expert testimony on whether a child has been sexually-abused.” However, the Petitioner argued that “such testimony is not reliable, not scientific, and unfairly prejudicial.”18 Given the Petitioner’s concession before the circuit court, we would be hardpressed to find his trial counsel deficient for failing to make an objection that has no legal basis in the law of this State. This Court held in syllabus point seven of Edward Charles L., that [e]xpert psychological testimony is permissible in cases involving incidents of child sexual abuse and an expert may state an opinion as to whether the child comports with the psychological and behavioral profile of a child sexual abuse 17 (...continued) Petitioner’s trial strategy undermined the prior statements of . . . [the victim], calling her suggestibility directly into question. Accordingly, it would have been proper to admit expert testimony supporting the child’s credibility. As such, Trial Counsel made a shrewd strategic decision in not objecting to the statement as it would likely have only brought more attention to the testimony. Consequently, this ground only criticizes strategy, which cannot sustain a petition for habeas corpus. We find no error in this finding by the circuit court. 18 The Petitioner also assigns as error that his “conviction was based, in part, upon scientifically invalid expert testimony about . . . [the victim] being diagnosed as a sexuallyabused child.” The Petitioner argues that while this Court allows the introduction of this type of expert testimony, the Petitioner invites the Court to overturn this precedent. See Edward Charles L., 183 W. Va. at 644, 398 S.E.2d at 126, Syl. Pt. 5; see also State v. James B., 204 W. Va. 48, 511 S.E.2d 459 (1998); Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Wood, 194 W. Va. 525, 460 S.E.2d 771 (1995). The circuit court found that “[t]he law is well settled in this State[] that this type of evidence is permissible.” We agree and decline the Petitioner’s invitation to revisit our law on this issue. 30 victim, and may offer an opinion based on objective findings that the child has been sexually abused. Such an expert may not give an opinion as to whether he personally believes the child, nor an opinion as to whether the sexual assault was committed by the defendant, as these would improperly and prejudicially invade the province of the jury. 183 W. Va. at 644, 398 S.E.2d at 126, Syl. Pt. 5. Our review of the record confirms the circuit court’s determination that “[a]ll the testimony that Petitioner complains of falls squarely within the protected confines” of the Edward Charles L. decision. Finding no merit to the Petitioner’s argument on this issue, the circuit court did not err in denying habeas relief. The constant theme throughout each of the Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims was that due to his trial counsel’s traumatic brain injury that caused “cognitive difficulties” his trial counsel was so ineffective that “there is a reasonable probability that a jury would have acquitted . . . [the Petitioner]” but for his trial counsel’s performance. The Petitioner over and over again tries to paint a picture of his trial counsel being so confused and mentally inept due to his traumatic brain injury that he was wholly deficient in his representation of the Petitioner. Despite the Petitioner’s assertion, it is significant that at the close of this trial, after the jury had been excused to deliberate, Judge Gina Groh, who presided over the trial before her appointment to the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, stated on the record to both the prosecutor and the Petitioner’s counsel: “I want to compliment you all on your professionalism, and I think this case can go either way due to the good efforts put in by both the state and the 31 defense counsel. I think you both did an excellent job.” (Emphasis added). Our review of the record comports with the trial court’s observations. That is not to say that every part of the trial below was absolutely perfect; but, as we acknowledged in State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995), with “the reality of the human fallibility of the participants, there can be no such thing as an error-free, perfect trial, and that the Constitution does not guarantee such a trial.” Id. at 684, 461 S.E.2d at 190 (quoting, in part, U.S. v. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 508–09 (1983)).19