Opinion ID: 2185279
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Improper Evidence of Prior Convictions

Text: Defendant next claims that he was denied a fair trial when the court permitted the prosecution to impeach him with his 1990 conviction of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, which the court referred to as felony offense of unlawful use of a weapon, and with his 1984 conviction for escape. Defendant argues that the court admitted evidence of both offenses without first balancing their probative value against their prejudicial impact as required by this court in People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill.2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971). As the State correctly observes, this issue is waived because defendant failed to object at trial when the certified copies of his convictions were discussed and further failed to raise this issue in his post-trial motion. Moreover, defendant does not ask this court to review his claims under the doctrine of plain error. Defendant, however, argues that defense counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The rules governing the admission of evidence of prior crimes stem from this court's adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 609 in People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill.2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695 (1971). Under Montgomery, a trial court may allow impeachment of a witness with any felony conviction, or any conviction involving dishonesty or false statement, so long as the witness' conviction or release was within the previous 10 years. Montgomery, 47 Ill.2d at 516, 268 N.E.2d 695. Before any such evidence will be admitted, however, the trial court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Montgomery, 47 Ill.2d at 516, 268 N.E.2d 695. Defendant claims the court failed to apply the Montgomery balancing test before admitting evidence of defendant's prior convictions. The record, however, belies defendant's claims. First, the trial judge specifically mentioned Montgomery by name when considering whether defendant's prior convictions were admissible. While not dispositive, the judge's statements contradict defendant's contention that the record shows no consideration by the court of the relevant factors for and against admission of the evidence. More importantly, the judge clearly did take steps to ensure defendant was not unduly prejudiced by declining defense counsel's request to introduce only the mere fact of defendant's prior felony conviction rather than mentioning the offense by name. The judge refused to do so on the basis that the jury could infer defendant was convicted of murder or some other more serious felony than unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. The trial judge also minimized the prejudicial impact of defendant's conviction by requiring the State refer to it as felony unlawful use of a weapon, thus removing the fact that defendant was already a felon when he committed the crime from the jury's consideration. Lastly, the judge demonstrated consideration of the previous convictions' prejudicial impact by insisting the State provide a limiting instruction telling the jury that it could only consider evidence of defendant's previous convictions as it may affect his believability and not as evidence of his guilt of the instant charges. Although the trial judge did not explicitly state on the record that she was balancing the probative value of defendant's prior convictions against their prejudicial impact, this court has declined to find error when the transcript makes clear that the trial judge was applying the Montgomery standard, even though the judge did not expressly articulate it (see People v. Williams, 173 Ill.2d 48, 83, 218 Ill.Dec. 916, 670 N.E.2d 638 (1996); People v. Redd, 135 Ill.2d 252, 325-26, 142 Ill.Dec. 802, 553 N.E.2d 316 (1990)). We therefore reject defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object at trial or in his post-trial motion because any such objection would have been unsuccessful. Consequently, defendant suffered no prejudice from trial counsel's failure to do so. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699.