Opinion ID: 2301466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: dissent of board member paul l. knight

Text: After considering the two espionage statutes in question, namely 18 U.S.C. § 793(b) and § 794(a), I am not convinced that they involve moral turpitude per se. The statutes in question prohibit a very broad range of conduct, some of which may not offend the generally accepted moral code of mankind or implicate moral depravity as that term is used and defined in In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160 (D.C.1979) (en banc). Respondent was convicted of aiding and abetting attempted espionage, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 794(a) & 2, aiding and abetting the obtaining of national defense information, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(b) & 2, and making false statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. The elements of aiding and abetting attempted espionage, summarized from the instructions used during Respondent's trial, are: (1) that she aided and abetted an attempt to transmit documents or information relating to the national defense to a foreign government or its agents; (2) that she acted with the intent, or with reason to believe, that the documents were to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation; and (3) that she acted willfully. See Brief of Bar Counsel, Tab D. The elements of her conviction for aiding and abetting the obtaining of national defense information are: (1) that she aided and abetted the taking, copying or obtaining of national defense documents; (2) that the national defense documents were taken, copied or obtained with the intent, or with reason to believe, that the information was being used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation; and (3) that she acted willfully. See id. Both the indictment and the jury instructions show that Respondent's purpose in obtaining the documents was charged in the disjunctive. She could have been found guilty by the jury regardless of whether her purpose was to harm the United States or to help another country. If the offense only involved the attempt to harm the United States, it might well involve moral turpitude per se; however, trying to help a foreign country might not. For example, a lawyer could be found guilty of violating these statutes even if the foreign country was a close ally, such as Canada or Great Britain, an even if the national defense information was provided free of any quid pro quo and for purely humanitarian purposessuch as, hypothetically, to help either of these countries rescue their citizens who were in mortal danger due to a terrorist threat. Under the least culpable defendant analogy, it is possible that such a misguided but wellintentioned lawyer could be convicted under either 18 U.S.C. § 793 or § 794. Such a conviction might not inherently involve moral turpitude. While the majority opinion correctly points out, per Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 61 S.Ct. 429, 85 L.Ed. 488 (1941), that a conviction for violating §§ 793 and 794 requires those prosecuted to have acted in bad faith, the use of the term bad faith does not equate to evil purpose. In United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir.1989), the requirement of bad faith was more fully explained: In order to prove the offenses charged under 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(b) & 794(a), the government must show that [the defendant] intentionally performed the acts charged and that he did so with intent or reason to believe that the information [delivered] is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign government. Contrary to the suggestion of [the defendant], this showing is all that the Supreme Court required when it stated that a person may not be convicted under these statutes absent a showing of bad faith. See Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 27-28, 61 S.Ct. 429, 433-34, 85 L.Ed. 488 (1941). Id. at 1277-78. Thus, the contention of the defendant in Miller that the government should have been required to show that the defendant acted with bad faith, namely with the purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law, was expressly rejected. Id. at 1277. In fact, a person can be convicted under these espionage statutes if a jury concludes that the person's belief was that his actions in disclosing information would in fact benefit the United States, if such belief was not objectively reasonable. Id. at 1279; United States v. Smith, 592 F.Supp. 424, 429-30 n. 2 (E.D.Va.1984), vacated on other grounds, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir.1985) (en banc). With regard to 18 U.S.C. § 793(b), it even allows the prosecution of individuals who can, in the normal course of their employment, lawfully possess such national defense information. This lawful possession becomes a criminal offense only if there is additional proof of an intent by the possessor of this information that it was to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation. If this possession was solely under the second prong, i.e., with intent to give advantage to a foreign nation, such conduct, while illegal, might well stem from humanitarian underpinnings and not involve moral turpitude. It is also significant that there is no requirement under § 793(b) that any national defense information actually be transmitted to a person or country not entitled to receive it. That activity, i.e., the actual transmission of such national defense information, is prohibited by § 793(d), if the national defense information was lawfully obtained, and by § 793(e), if the acquisition of such information was by unauthorized means. Based on a review of the elements of these offenses, it does not appear that they necessarily involve moral turpitude per se. Since there is an issue, we should err on the side of having an evidentiary hearing and developing the facts. See Colson, 412 A.2d at 1165 n. 10. It is my recommendation that this matter be directed to a Hearing Committee with directions to determine whether there is moral turpitude under the facts of this case, not only on the two espionage statutes but also to Respondent's conviction of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. s/ Paul L. Knight Paul L. Knight dated; March 9, 2001