Opinion ID: 1938175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: whether the death sentence was disproportionately imposed.

Text: ¶ 54. Byrom next argues her death sentence was disproportionately imposed. She raised this issue on direct appeal, alleging there was insufficient evidence of the single aggravating factor, that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, and that the trial judge failed to give proper consideration to the mitigating factors she requested. This Court found no error in the trial judge's decision. See Byrom, 863 So.2d at 881-83. ¶ 55. Byrom now argues her death sentence is disproportionate because (1) her son and Joey Gillis, one of whom shot and killed the victim, received lesser sentences, and (2) the decision in Ring v. Arizona mandates that a jury, and not a judge, make the findings as to aggravating and mitigating factors that lead to the death sentence. The State argues first that because this issue was raised on direct appeal, Byrom is procedurally barred by res judicata from raising the issue under Miss.Code Ann. Section 99-39-21(3). We agree that this issue is procedurally barred, but procedural bar notwithstanding, we consider the merits of this issue. ¶ 56. Though Byrom did raise this issue on direct appeal, she supports this issue with different arguments here. Byrom first argues Mississippi's statutory scheme relating to felony murder cases fails to sufficiently narrow the class of persons who are deatheligible as a result of the commission of felony murder, citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); and, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). The State responds first that Byrom was convicted of capital murder which is perpetrated by any person who has been offered or has received anything of value for committing the murder under Miss.Code Ann. section 97-3-19(2)(d), and that this is thus not a felony murder case. Second, the State points out that even if the merits of this argument were reached, this Court has considered this argument in other cases and has found it to be without merit. See Grayson v. State, 879 So.2d 1008, 1013 (Miss.2004). ¶ 57. Byrom also argues that either her son or Joey Gillis actually fired the shots that killed Edward Byrom, Sr., and because they did not receive the death penalty, and she did, her sentence is disproportionately severe, citing Randall v. State, 806 So.2d 185 (Miss.2001), and White v. State, 532 So.2d 1207 (Miss.1988). Edward, Jr. pled guilty to conspiracy to commit capital murder, accessory before the fact to grand larceny, and accessory before the fact to burglary of a dwelling with intent to commit assault. He was sentenced to a total of fifty years, with twenty years suspended and thirty years to serve. Gillis pled guilty to conspiracy to commit murder and accessory after the fact to capital murder and received a total of twenty-five years, with ten years suspended and fifteen years to serve. In White, the defendant's death sentence was reversed because there was insufficient evidence supporting the Enmund factors. 532 So.2d at 1220-22. In Randall, we stated: Randall correctly assert[ed] that all of the cases relied on by the State involve a defendant who was (1) found to have killed, attempted to kill and/or intended to kill, (2) was at least the instigator or mastermind of the crime, and/or (3) the codefendant was also sentenced to death or was not subject to sentencing by a jury. While the codefendants testified that Randall and Stokes both pointed guns at Daniels, there is no proof as to who actually killed him. The jury specifically declined to find that Randall killed or attempted to kill Daniels. Additionally, Stokes only received life in prison and the other co-defendants entered into plea agreements which spared their lives. Because the only fact, as found by the jury, was that Randall contemplated lethal force, the death sentence was disproportionate based on the findings of fact as determined by the jury. However, on retrial, other facts may be developed sufficient to support a death sentence. Randall, 806 So.2d at 234. ¶ 58. The State does not respond to this argument. Inasmuch as the prosecution presented evidence which supported the finding that Byrom intended that her husband be killed and that she was the instigator or mastermind of the crime, Byrom's case may be distinguished from Randall. This Court reached similar decisions in Simmons v. State, 869 So.2d 995 (Miss. 2004) and Ballenger v. State, 667 So.2d 1242 (Miss.1995), rev'd on other grounds, 761 So.2d 214 (Miss.2000), in affirming death sentences for persons who did not actually cause the death of the victim. ¶ 59. Byrom next argues her death sentence is disproportionate because the trial judge alone determined the mitigating factors did not outweigh the aggravating factors. She argues that under the recent decision of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), any aggravating circumstance in a capital case must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The State does not respond to this argument. ¶ 60. While there is little authority on whether the right to a jury sentencing discussed in Ring may be waived, other states considering this question have found that a defendant who knowingly and intelligently waives a jury in the penalty phase of a capital case also waives any argument based on Ring. See Bryant v. State, 901 So.2d 810 (Fla.2005); Thacker v. State, 100 P.3d 1052 (Okla.Crim.App.2004). We find here, because the record clearly reveals Byrom made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of her right to have the jury determine her sentence, it necessarily follows that she has waived her rights under Ring. ¶ 61. Byrom finally cites cases from other states which she claims are more factually similar to her case, including Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 31 Mass. App.Ct. 917, 576 N.E.2d 1374 (1991); State v. Anderson, 785 S.W.2d 596 (Mo.Ct.App. 1990); Boyd v. State, 321 Md. 69, 581 A.2d 1 (1990); and People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758 (Colo.Ct.App.1991). These cases involve situations where women who were allegedly battered by their husbands hired or otherwise persuaded someone to kill their husbands. Unlike Byrom's case, none of the women in these cases received the death penalty, and it is unclear from a reading of these cases if any of these women were even eligible for the death penalty. In some of the cases there is little or no analysis of the sentence. We find these cases to be of no benefit to Byrom. ¶ 62. For these reasons, we find this issue to be without merit.