Opinion ID: 2293008
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver; Plain Error

Text: Appellant's second trial began on Monday, August 21, 2006. On the first day, the trial judge announced that the trial was to be completed by the end of the week because of his planned leave the following week. [6] Jury voir dire took place that day, and opening statements and testimony from several minor government witnesses consumed the following morning, Tuesday. Following the lunch recess, the prosecutor notified the court that although the government's main witness, Henrietta Harling, had been in court earlier in the day, she was not in the courtroom and could not be located. The government then asked for permission to locate her overnight and to reconvene the following morning. On Wednesday, August 23, 2006, the prosecutor informed the court that its efforts to locate Harling the previous night, after the court adjourned, had been unsuccessful. The prosecutor represented that investigators had contacted her family, had gone to two former addresses and to her former employer, and had visited her former boyfriend. The police were still looking, but [could not] find her. The prosecutor then moved that Harling be declared unavailable so as to allow the prosecution's case-in-chief to proceed by reading the transcript of her previous trial testimony to the jury. The trial judge assumed hypothetically that Harling had voluntarily chose[n] not to appear, and began to explore the timing and manner of the presentation of her prior testimony to the jury. Defense counsel objected and the following colloquy ensued: Defense Counsel: I think the issue is whether she is unavailable, not whether or not she is here. . . . . And it seems to me that what the [prosecutor] is telling you is, they can't find her, but they are not telling you that she is unavailable and I think there's a distinction there. I don't think the testimony should be read. If they don't have her here, they can proceed with what they've got. Court: That's not true. When a witness leaves, who's under court order, she didn't have a right to just walk away. That's not her prerogative. That order is essentially through me, through this documentation right here. She d[oes]n't have a right to walk away. Defense Counsel: I agree with the Court, but what I'm saying is, is walking away, the remedy is they can ask for a bench warrant. They can go out and look for her and try to bring her in, but as far as reading her testimony, because she turned around and walked away, it seems to me that doesn't indicate she is not available. Court: Well, how is she available, if the witness is dead, what would you do, you would read the witness's testimony. Defense Counsel: If the witness was dead, she would be unavailable. Court: Well, if you can't find her, do you think the jury is going to sit here and wait for us to find her? No. She's unavailable in my view, unless you've got some cases that say that's not unavailability. We [are] not going to wait three or four days while we're looking for some witness. Defense counsel informed the trial judge that there's some case law that indicates that [the government] can have some time to look for her if they want to. [7] After noting that any number of things could have happened, the trial court commented: The question is do we have the facility to get her back here in a reasonable amount of time given what we have. Now, you know, I could recess for a while, but I'm not going to recess forever. Now, once that recess runs out [the prior testimony will be read.] The trial judge then stated, So I think what I'm going to do is give you a chance to see if you can check with the hospitals and check with the police department and see if she got locked up. A lot of times people don't come back, because they are locked up. You don't know . . . . So I think at a minimum, you should check the hospitals, check to make sure she's not locked up. It's a little hard to get locked up in the surrounding jurisdiction unless she went far away during the lunchtime. If she's not locked up or in the jail, if we don't find her there, then I think there's some basis to suggest that the witness was (sic) voluntarily absented herself from these proceedings for whatever her reasons might be. Defense counsel suggested that calls should also be made to Virginia because Harling had previously been arrested there, but the prosecutor dismissed the suggestion, saying it had been established at the first trial there were no charges pending against Harling. The trial judge offered to allow the government time to determine overnight whether she had been admitted to a local hospital or jail; the judge anticipated, however, that Harling's testimony would be read into the record the following day, as the government has not given me any real expectation . . . that you can locate her. The prosecutor readily agreed that he did not expect to find her. After discussing the order of witnesses, and asking the government to make every effort that you can before starting to take testimony either the following day, or later that day, defense counsel stated that [o]ur preference, Your Honor, would be to plod on. If all they have to do is check with some hospitals to see if she's there, that involves just making perhaps five or [ten] telephone calls. (emphasis added). The trial court said it was willing to wait . . . to do that, and that the prosecutor should have that for the record after lunch. Defense counsel then agreed that after the phone calls were made during the lunch recess, the transcript of Harling's testimony at the first trial would be read to the jury. After lunch, the prosecutor stated that he had checked the jail and five hospitals in the District of Columbia, all of which reported that Harling was not present. Harling's testimony from the first trial was then read to the jury. The record does not support that appellant waived his claim that Harling was unavailable, which, as we discuss infra is a constitutional and evidentiary prerequisite for admission of prior recorded testimony. [A] strong presumption exists against waiver of a constitutional right, Turner v. United States, 459 A.2d 1054, 1056 (D.C.1983), and waiver determinations are to be carefully scrutinized. Nelson v. United States, 649 A.2d 301, 309 (D.C.1994). For a waiver to be valid, the government must prove an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 19 (D.C.2006) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). The colloquy among the judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel does not demonstrate that, by agreeing to plod on, appellant conceded that Harling's prior testimony should be read to the jury, or abandoned his objection that the government had not done enough to prove Harling was unavailable as the term is properly understood in this context. Defense counsel objected to the reading of Harling's prior testimony to the jury when the prosecutor proposed it, and reiterated the distinction between her absence and her unavailability (because she turned around and walked away, . . . doesn't indicate she is not available). The trial judge and the prosecutor both had said they had no expectation that Harling would be found. The trial judge had expressed his reluctance to continue the trial longer than the time necessary to phone D.C. hospitals and the jail because the jury would not sit here and wait while further efforts were made to find the witness, and the judge had already indicated that the trial had to be completed by the end of the week because of his planned absence the following week. See note 6, supra. Defense counsel reasonably perceived that the phone calls that remained to be made were pro forma (If all they have to do . . .). In our view, a fair reading of the record shows that counsel eventually acquiesced to the course the trial judge had charted, but did not intentionally relinquish his objection to admission of the missing witness's prior testimony. The government argues that our review is limited to plain error because defense counsel's objection at trial was not sufficiently specific to apprise the trial court that the objection was to the inadequacy of the prosecution's efforts to prevent Harling from disappearing. We find this argument unpersuasive as well. While an objection must be timely, Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009), and reasonably specific, see Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 34 n. 22 (D.C.1989), a party is not required to cite chapter and verse of the law the trial court is to apply. Here, counsel timely objected to admission of Harling's prior recorded testimony and argued that the government had not done enough to show Harling's unavailability, pointing to the distinction between her absence and the government's efforts to find her. As counsel pointed out, the government can proceed with what they've got or they can go out and look for her and try to bring her in. This was enough to apprise the court of the nature of his objection. Once an objection is lodged, and its basis asserted, it is the judge's responsibility to exercise judgment in accordance with applicable legal principles. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 361 (D.C.1979). Often counsel will offer relevant legal principles and citations, or the judge may request additional legal argument or briefing, or take some time to research the matter in chambers; but if an objection is preserved, our review is of the trial court's ruling, not counsel's performance. See, e.g., Hunter v. United States, 606 A.2d 139, 145 (D.C.1992) ([I]t is our function to review the record for legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge, not by counsel.) (quoting Irick, 565 A.2d at 33). Here, counsel did more than state his objection. He expressed dissatisfaction with the government's proposed actions and suggested to the trial judge that the prosecutor should ask for a bench warrant and be given additional time to make further efforts to locate the witness, adding that the prosecutor should also check in Virginia. Finally, we reject the argument that defense counsel's acquiescence prevented development of an adequate record of the government's efforts. The burden was on the government to establish that the witness is unavailable. See Coppedge v. United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 79, 84, 311 F.2d 128, 132 (1962); United States v. Montgomery, 998 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1993) ([I]t is not defendant's burden to show a failure of due diligence.) (citing United States v. Suarez, 939 F.2d 929, 932 (11th Cir.1991), and United States v. Pizarro, 717 F.2d 336, 343 (7th Cir.1983)); Velarde-Villarreal v. United States, 354 F.2d 9, 13 (9th Cir.1965). Defense counsel's acquiescence came after the government's overnight search, after the prosecutor and the trial judge said they had no expectation of finding the witness, after the prosecutor went along with the trial court's suggestion that a few calls be made to hospitals and the jail in D.C., and after the prosecutor rejected defense counsel's suggestion to search in Virginia. There is no indication, in other words, that the prosecutor would have taken any action beyond what had already taken place and the few calls about to be made. Counsel cannot be faulted for believing that, by then, the die had been cast, and that the question that remained was whether Harling's testimony would be read to the jury the same day, after the lunch recess, or the following morning. See United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 613 (2d Cir. 1966) (finding that colloquy sufficiently enlightened the court as to the point being raised, and that any further showing would have been an exercise of futility once objection was made and it was probable that court would adhere to decision). Thus, we conclude that appellant did not waive his right to confront the principal witness against him, and preserved his objection that the government's efforts were inadequate to establish she was unavailable. We turn to consider the merits of the claim on appeal that the trial court abused discretion in allowing Harling's prior testimony to be admitted in lieu of her taking the stand before the jury.