Opinion ID: 6343305
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The installers

Text: 1. Whether the work is part of the regular business of the employer {¶ 17} The bureau first determined that the cable-installation work rendered by the installers was part of Ugicom’s regular business. Notably, Ugicom has not contested that determination. But even if it had, the audit findings established that Ugicom was engaged in the business of installing underground cable for TWC and that the installers performed that work. Some evidence supported the bureau’s determination under this factor. 2. Whether the installers are engaged in an independent business {¶ 18} “[O]f prime importance,” Gillum at 377, is whether the installers were engaged in an independent business. In determining that the installers were not independent of Ugicom, the bureau pointed to the installers’ public image when working. The bureau cited Kibuuka’s testimony concerning the badges that the installers wore at the jobsites. An installer wore the badge, Kibuuka explained, because if a problem arose at a jobsite, law enforcement could confirm through 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO TWC’s dispatch department that the installer “work[ed] for Ugicom.” The bureau further pointed to evidence establishing that an installer had posted a sign on his vehicle stating “Ugicom Enterprises, Inc., Contractor for Time Warner Cable.” {¶ 19} In response, Ugicom cites evidence establishing that it was TWC, not Ugicom, that required the installers to wear the badges, that the installers wore reflective vests bearing TWC’s name, and that the bureau’s Form U-3S provides that coverage is elective for a limited liability company acting as a sole proprietor, which apparently is the business structure adopted by some of the installers. But even if those points tend to detract from the bureau’s decision, there is at least some evidence supporting its finding that the installers were not independent of Ugicom. See State ex rel. Packaging Corp. of Am. v. Indus. Comm., 139 Ohio St.3d 591, 2014-Ohio-2871, 13 N.E.3d 1163, ¶ 26 (“it is not an abuse of discretion for the commission to rely on evidence that is contradicted by equally persuasive evidence”). 3. Method of payment {¶ 20} The bureau determined that the method by which Ugicom paid the installers further indicated that the installers were not independent contractors. The bureau focused on the installers’ prospect of profits or losses. When asked how the installers were paid, Kibuuka testified that he would “make up” an amount to pay the installers for each type of service: “So, for instance if Time Warner pays me a hundred dollars to drill a sidewalk, then I will pay my contractor $80 to do that same sidewalk and Ugicom will keep the $20, something like that.” In other words, Ugicom’s rate of pay was nonnegotiable, meaning that Ugicom foreclosed the installers from submitting bids. The bureau reasoned that the installers were distinct from independent contractors in the construction industry who “maintain[] their own separate business [and] take[] into consideration all of their expenses when pricing work in order to make a profit and [are] at risk of a loss.” 8 January Term, 2022 {¶ 21} Ugicom advances several arguments in response. First, it correctly argues that the bureau erred in concluding that the installers’ receipt of piece-rate compensation (essentially, payment per job rather than payment per hour) was evidence of an employment relationship. The bureau reached this conclusion because aspects of piece-rate compensation are covered by regulations adopted under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. See 29 C.F.R. 778.109 and 778.111. The regulations cited by the bureau do not, however, explicitly account for the common-law right-to-control test. Indeed, as the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded in Garcia-Celestino v. Ruiz Harvesting, Inc., 898 F.3d 1110, 1122 (11th Cir.2018), the federal act and the common-law right-to-control test involve different standards for identifying an employment relationship. {¶ 22} Ugicom further faults the bureau’s failure to apply the law-of-thecase doctrine, see Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 3-4, 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984), arguing that both the bureau and the court of appeals in Ugicom II, 2014-Ohio4942, at ¶ 25, failed to honor the Ugicom I court’s statement that payment per job is indicative of an independent-contractor relationship. But we need not reach Ugicom’s law-of-the-case argument, because the bureau’s reliance on the regulations was otherwise erroneous. {¶ 23} Ugicom also argues that the installers faced opportunities for profits or losses and had to consider the cost of traveling to a job, the length of time required to complete the job, and the job’s complexity. And Ugicom correctly points out that the installers’ receipt of Forms 1099 rather than Forms W-2 supports a finding that they were independent contractors. See Northeast Ohio College of Massotherapy v. Burek, 144 Ohio App.3d 196, 203-204, 759 N.E.2d 869 (7th Dist.2001) (“The use of [Forms 1099] typically suggests that the parties were not acting in an employer/employee relationship but rather in that of an independent contractor relationship”). 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 24} Although Ugicom’s arguments are not without some force, the narrow question here is whether some evidence supported the bureau’s determinations. We conclude that some evidence supported the determinations, namely, the evidence showing Ugicom’s exertion of control over the installers through its method of payment. Ugicom’s take-it-or-leave-it approach to pricing the jobs, which foreclosed an installer’s ability to submit a bid, was a means of controlling the installers. 4. Length of employment {¶ 25} The bureau determined that Ugicom had an ongoing relationship with the installers. In support of that finding, the bureau pointed to the “high dollar amounts” reflected on the installers’ Forms 1099, which the bureau reasoned was indicative of large volumes of work performed by the installers. The bureau also inferred that the installers were involved in an ongoing relationship with Ugicom because there was no evidence showing that the installers had advertised their services to the community at large. {¶ 26} Ugicom challenges the bureau’s determination that Ugicom had an ongoing relationship with the installers, claiming that the bureau cited no legal authority permitting it to consider that factor. It also claims that an “ongoing relationship is not evidence of an employment relationship.” Ugicom is wrong on both counts. As the bureau noted in its decision, this court determined in Bostic that the “length of employment” is relevant to the analysis, 37 Ohio St.3d at 146, 524 N.E.2d 881. Nor does Ugicom persuasively contest the bureau’s rationale regarding the installers’ lack of advertising. Ugicom singles out evidence pertaining to Lule’s advertising expenses, but we fail to see how this bears on the installers’ worker status. Moreover, the most we can find in the record is a bare line item showing that Lule claimed a $20 advertising expense for one tax year. {¶ 27} Ugicom’s reliance on Barcus v. Buehrer, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-942, 2015-Ohio-3122, is also unavailing. Ugicom points to arguable 10 January Term, 2022 similarities between the contract that it used with its installers and the contract at issue in Barcus, highlighting each contract’s duration and notice provisions. But although the court of appeals in Barcus concluded that the worker in that case was an independent contractor, it did so for reasons unrelated to the contractual provisions to which Ugicom refers. See id. at ¶ 26-32. {¶ 28} In summary, some evidence supported the bureau’s determination under this factor. 5. Pertinent agreements or contracts {¶ 29} The bureau pointed to Ugicom’s independent-contractor agreement as evidence of Ugicom’s efforts to control the installers. Although the agreement labeled an installer as an independent contractor, the bureau determined that the significance of that label was undercut by the agreement’s noncompete clause, which provided that an installer “shall not provide during the agreement term services to any competitor of [Ugicom].” {¶ 30} Ugicom claims that the bureau assigned too much significance to the noncompete clause, arguing that the clause did not restrict an installer from performing work unrelated to Ugicom’s services. True, the agreement defined the term “competitor” as a “provider of services similar to those provided by [Ugicom].” But the agreement nevertheless restricted the installers’ freedom to work, which evinces a measure of Ugicom’s control over the installers. {¶ 31} Ugicom again invokes Barcus, 2015-Ohio-3122, at ¶ 26, claiming that the court of appeals in that case held that an independent-contractor agreement that included a noncompete clause was unequivocal evidence of an independentcontractor relationship. But Barcus is silent as to the effect of the noncompete clause in that case. The court of appeals’ decision in Americare Healthcare Servs. v. Akabuaku, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-777, 2010-Ohio-5631, which Ugicom also cites, is further afield because it concerned whether a noncompete clause could 11 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO be enforced, not whether it was indicative of a particular work relationship, id. at ¶ 21. {¶ 32} In summary, the independent-contractor agreement is some evidence of an employment relationship between Ugicom and the installers. 6. Whether the parties believed they were creating an employment relationship {¶ 33} In considering this factor, the bureau was unpersuaded by Ugicom’s evidence showing that some of the installers thought they were independent contractors. Specifically, the bureau gave no weight to uncontroverted affidavits submitted by two Ugicom installers attesting that they were independent contractors. The bureau reasoned that the substance of the work relationship, rather than its form, was the touchstone for determining the installers’ worker status. {¶ 34} Ugicom challenges the bureau’s disregard of the affidavits. But we have held that the bureau does not necessarily err when, as here, it disregards an uncontroverted affidavit. State ex rel. Cherryhill Mgt., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 116 Ohio St.3d 27, 2007-Ohio-5508, 876 N.E.2d 525, ¶ 13 (rejecting the argument that “absent contrary evidence, the commission must accept [the affiant’s] affidavit as persuasive”). {¶ 35} Ugicom also challenges the bureau’s refusal to assign weight to the independent-contractor label that Ugicom gave the installers in the independentcontractor agreement. Although the bureau was perhaps too dismissive of the contract—by suggesting that such a contract may be a “red flag”—the bureau’s conclusion that it was not bound by the parties’ labels was nevertheless correct, because “a description by the parties of their future relationship is not necessarily determinative when viewed in light of their actual subsequent activities,” N & G Constr., Inc. v. Lindley, 56 Ohio St.2d 415, 417, 384 N.E.2d 704 (1978), fn. 1 (declining to assign determinative weight to a contract’s declaration that the appellant in that case was an independent contractor). 12 January Term, 2022 {¶ 36} Mindful that the bureau is the “exclusive finder of fact” with the sole “responsibility to evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence,” State ex rel. Beyer v. Autoneum N. Am., 157 Ohio St.3d 316, 2019-Ohio-3714, 136 N.E.3d 454, ¶ 8, we conclude that the bureau did not abuse its discretion in failing to credit Ugicom’s evidence under this factor. 7. Tools for the job {¶ 37} Ugicom challenges the bureau’s refusal to give credit to the fact that the installers supplied their own vehicles, gasoline, cell phones, hand tools, and ladders. The bureau declined to accord any weight to that work arrangement because, in its reasoning, it is not uncommon in employment relationships for an employee to supply his own vehicle and tools and to receive mileage reimbursement. But the evidence supporting the bureau’s statement in that regard is not apparent in its decision. It follows that the bureau’s conclusion under this factor was not supported by some evidence. 8. The skill required in the particular occupation {¶ 38} The bureau determined that minimal skill was required to do the installers’ job. Some evidence supported this determination—the bureau quoted in its decision Eyink’s statement that the “skill level needed to bury the cable is not high or unique.” Ugicom challenges that statement in two ways, but neither is persuasive. First, it points to decisions by other courts determining that cable installers possess specialized skills. See Santelices v. Cable Wiring and S. Florida Cable Contrs., Inc., 147 F.Supp.2d 1313, 1320 (S.D.Fla.2001); Bennett v. Unitek Global Servs., L.L.C., N.D.Ill. No. 10 C 4968, 2013 WL 4804841, -10 (Sept. 9, 2013). But the core inquiry here concerns the facts, and the facts presented in other decisions may not substitute for those in this case. Second, Ugicom argues that in addition to burying the cable, the installers connected the cable to the connection box on the home and used a meter to ensure that the connection was successful. 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO But Ugicom does not develop a fact-based argument to show that these other tasks required specialized skills. {¶ 39} It suffices for the purposes of our review that the bureau’s determination under this factor was supported by some evidence. 9. Details and quality of the work {¶ 40} In considering this factor, the bureau assigned weight to Ugicom’s reliance on a quality-control inspector to ensure that the installers were doing their jobs correctly. But Ugicom correctly points out that the inspector’s purpose was to ensure that the installers were doing their jobs according to the standards prescribed by TWC, not Ugicom. And even if Ugicom had prescribed the standards, a contract provision stating that a job shall be performed subject to the “ ‘approval or satisfaction of the employer    is not an assumption by the employer of the right to control the person employed as to the details or method of doing the work, but is only a provision that the employer may see that the contract is carried out according to the plans.’ ” Gillum, 141 Ohio St. at 382, 48 N.E.2d 234, quoting 27 American Jurisprudence, Section 7, at 488. The bureau also found it significant that TWC would fine Ugicom for substandard work. But that is a mark of TWC’s control over Ugicom, not Ugicom’s control over the installers. {¶ 41} Ugicom next challenges the bureau’s finding that “[the installers’ work] is not the type of work where a supervisor must tell the worker where to dig a trench for each job order.” Ugicom correctly exposes a flaw in the bureau’s reasoning—in Gillum, this court recognized that a lack of supervision is indicative of a lack of control, id. at 381. Nor is it clear that there was some evidence to support the bureau’s statement that the installers’ decisions about where and how to bury a cable “are the same decisions made by competent employees.” {¶ 42} Ugicom correctly notes that it did not impose work requirements on the installers akin to those of employees. First, rather than requiring the installers to work from, say, 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., the installers needed only to respond to 14 January Term, 2022 service requests within two hours. This arrangement is not the same level of control as “[t]elling a hired person that he must work from this hour to this hour   , which suggests that the person is an employee.” Soloman v. Dayton Window & Door Co., L.L.C., 196 Ohio App.3d 16, 2011-Ohio-6182, 961 N.E.2d 1229, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.). Second, as noted above, the installers were free to accept or reject the jobs posted to Ugicom’s website. Neither of these facets of the work relationship reflect Ugicom’s control over the installers.3 {¶ 43} In summary, the bureau’s finding under this factor was not supported by some evidence. 10. The bureau’s ultimate conclusion {¶ 44} Although the evidence presented to the bureau concerning the installers’ worker status points in both directions, we are not called upon to reweigh it here; rather, our function is to determine whether the bureau abused its discretion by entering an order that is not based on some evidence in the record. See Digiacinto, 159 Ohio St.3d 346, 2020-Ohio-707, 150 N.E.3d 933, at ¶ 13. Applying that standard, we conclude that the bureau did not abuse its discretion in determining that the installers were Ugicom’s employees, because most (though not all) of the bureau’s conclusions under the factors were rooted in some evidence in the record.