Opinion ID: 2354436
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: District court's failure to address Yellow Cab's NRS 706.473 argument

Text: Having concluded that the application of NRS 706.473 to the instant dispute is not barred on population grounds, we now turn to the district court's review of Yellow Cab's NRS 706.473-based independent contractor argument. Traditionally, a determination as to whether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor for the purposes of respondeat superior liability turns on the degree of control the purported employer exercises over the individual. See, e.g., Rockwell v. Sun Harbor Budget Suites, 112 Nev. 1217, 1223, 925 P.2d 1175, 1179 (1996) (explaining that liability for acts of the individual would attach for respondeat superior purposes if it is established that the individual was under the control of the purported employer and the individual's acts were within the scope of the employment). And this court has previously held that the determination of this issue is generally a factual question. Kornton v. Conrad, Inc., 119 Nev. 123, 125, 67 P.3d 316, 317 (2003) (stating that [g]enerally, the trier of fact determines `whether an employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment' when the tortious act occurred (quoting Evans v. Southwest Gas, 108 Nev. 1002, 1005, 842 P.2d 719, 721 (1992), overruled on other grounds by GES, Inc. v. Corbitt, 117 Nev. 265, 268 n. 6, 21 P.3d 11, 13 n. 6 (2001))). As Yellow Cab points out, however, NRS 706.473 specifically authorizes the licensing of a taxicab to an independent contractor if the requirements of that statute and any administrative regulations promulgated in accordance with NRS 706.475 are met. [5] Thus, under the statutory scheme, the existence of this statutorily created independent contractor relationship turns not on the issue of control, but on whether all of the statutory and administrative requirements for creating such an independent contractor relationship have been satisfied. The statute is silent, however, as to whether the creation of an independent contractor relationship under that statute acts to bar the application of respondeat superior liability as is the case under traditional independent contractor relationships. Unfortunately, despite the fact that the parties had briefed this issue, the district court failed to address Yellow Cab's NRS 706.473 argument. Instead, in denying Yellow Cab's summary judgment motion, the district court summarily concluded, without explanation or analysis, that whether Willis was an independent contractor or an employee was a question of fact for the jury to decide. As this issue was fully briefed, the district court should have determined whether a statutorily recognized independent contractor relationship, established through compliance with NRS 706.473 and the regulations promulgated in accordance with NRS 706.475, would allow Yellow Cab to avoid liability under a respondeat superior analysis. [6] If that question was answered in the affirmative, then the district court should have determined whether, in this case, all of the statutory and administrative requirements for creating an NRS 706.473-independent-contract relationship between Willis and Yellow Cab have been met. While the district court did not render a thorough resolution of the issues before it on summary judgment, this court will generally not exercise its discretion to consider a writ petition challenging a denial of summary judgment. [7] Smith, 113 Nev. at 1344, 950 P.2d at 281. Our denial of the writ petition, however, is without prejudice to the district court re-evaluating the propriety of summary judgment regarding Yellow Cab's NRS 706.473-based independent contractor argument in light of the analysis set forth in this opinion. We concur: DOUGLAS, C.J., and PICKERING, J.