Opinion ID: 2225706
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Victim's Reputation for Truthfulness

Text: Barger argues the court erred in allowing three of the State's witnesses, all teachers at the elementary school, to testify about the truth and veracity of the victim. No witness, whether lay or expert, is competent to testify that another witness is or is not telling the truth. Stewart v. State (1990), Ind., 555 N.E.2d 121, 125. Adult witnesses may be allowed, however, to state an opinion about the child victim's general competence and ability to understand the subject of sexual conduct. Id. Such testimony is allowed because of the special problem in assessing the credibility of children who are called upon as witnesses to describe sexual conduct. Lawrence v. State (1984), Ind., 464 N.E.2d 923. Direct assertions of the witness's belief in the child's testimony are prohibited. Stewart, 555 N.E.2d 121. The witnesses did not make such assertions in this case. The State asked two witnesses if they were acquainted with the victim's reputation for truth and veracity or how well they knew the victim, and the witnesses responded with their assessment of the victim as a student. The State asked a third witness how well she knew the victim, and whether she was acquainted with the victim's reputation for truth and veracity. This witness was the only one to indicate anything about the victim's truthfulness, and she did not directly assert her belief in the victim's testimony. None of the witnesses directly testified they believed the victim was telling the truth about the molestation. Barger's counsel attacked the victim's truthfulness on cross-examination. He questioned her about a discrepancy between her testimony in court and a prior statement she made to him, and asked her if she was lying. When a witness has been impeached by proof that he made prior inconsistent statements, the party may support that witness by proof of the witness's reputation for truth and veracity. Lutz v. State (1989), Ind. App., 536 N.E.2d 526. [4] It was not erroneous for the State to ask questions about the victim's general reputation for truthfulness. Barger also argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the testimony about the victim's reputation for truthfulness. Because it was not erroneous to admit this testimony, Barger's trial counsel was not ineffective for failure to object. Siglar v. State (1989), Ind., 541 N.E.2d 944 (to establish inadequate representation based on failure to object, defendant must show counsel's objections would have been sustained had they been made).