Opinion ID: 1837273
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Actions of Officer Williams

Text: Section 6-5-338(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides immunity from tort liability for every peace officer whose duties include: the enforcement of, or the investigation and reporting of violations of, the criminal laws of this state, and who is empowered by the laws of this state to execute warrants, to arrest and to take into custody persons who violate, or who are lawfully charged by warrant, indictment, or other lawful process, with violations of, the criminal laws of this state .... The officer shall have immunity from tort liability arising out of his or her conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties. § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code 1975. Immunity extends only to peace officers and governmental units or agencies authorized to appoint peace officers. § 6-5-338(b), Ala.Code 1975; Telfare v. City of Huntsville, 841 So.2d 1222, 1227 (Ala.2002). Immunity from tort liability must arise out of the peace officer's performance of any discretionary function within the line or scope of his or her law-enforcement duties. Section 6-5-338(a), Ala.Code 1975. Thus, under § 6-5-338, a law-enforcement officer is entitled to State-agent immunity if the officer was performing a discretionary function. Ex parte City of Gadsden, 781 So.2d 936, 938 (Ala.2000). Since [ Ex parte] Cranman [, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000)], we analyze immunity issues in terms of `State-agent' immunity rather than `under the dichotomy of ministerial versus discretionary functions.' [ [3] ] ... Thus, we will address the applicability of peace-officer immunity under the principles set forth in Cranman.  Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So.2d 201, 203 (Ala.2003)(quoting Ex parte Hudson, 866 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Ala.2003)). [4] In Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000), we held: A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent's (1) formulating plans, policies, or designs; or (2) exercising his or her judgment in the administration of a department or agency of government, including, but not limited to, examples such as: (a) making administrative adjudications; (b) allocating resources; (c) negotiating contracts; (d) hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or supervising personnel; or (3) discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner for performing the duties and the State agent performs the duties in that manner; or (4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or attempting to arrest persons; or (5) exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons of unsound mind, or educating students. 792 So.2d at 405. Paragraph (4) of the Cranman test is directly applicable to the case at hand; it provides: A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent's ... exercising judgment in enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including but not limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or attempting to arrest persons.  (First emphasis in original; second emphasis added.) Thus, the Cranman standard answers in the affirmative the question whether arresting a person is an exercise of judgment  a discretionary function  and therefore clothes the officer in State-agent immunity. As this Court also stated in Telfare, arrests and attempted arrests are generally classified as actions requiring an officer to exercise judgment. 841 So.2d at 1228. Even if the Cranman standard did not expressly provide that law-enforcement officers arresting or attempting to arrest persons are clothed in State-agent immunity, Officer Williams's gathering of information and subsequent arrest of Swan demonstrates that he was exercising his judgment. Officer Williams testified that the information he relayed to the dispatcher was Swan's driver's license number, his name and date of birth, or his Social Security number. In choosing which information to relay to the dispatcher so that the dispatcher could run the NCIC check and, in later deciding to arrest Swan upon confirmation a warrant was outstanding, Officer Williams was exercising judgment in the enforcement of criminal laws within the meaning of Cranman.