Opinion ID: 744059
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conduct involving an unreasonable risk of harm

Text: 49 The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the defendant created an unreasonable risk of harm both by manufacturing Black Talons 10 and by marketing them to the general public. On appeal, the plaintiffs have pursued only their negligent marketing claim. 50 Could a New York jury find that there was an undue risk of harm, if not in producing Black Talons, then in advertising them for use by (and selling them to) the general public? Put differently, could a jury find that the benefit gained by making Black Talons available to the public was outweighed by their potential harm. 11 I believe that a reasonable jury could so find. 51 The distinctive feature of the Black Talon bullet is that it is designed to expand upon impact exposing razor-sharp edges at a 90-degree angle to the bullet. This expansion dramatically increases the wounding power of the bullets. McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger and Co., 916 F.Supp. 366, 368 (S.D.N.Y.1996); see also Winchester Halts Sale of Disintegrating Bullet to Public, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 23, 1993, at A4 [hereinafter Winchester Halts Sale ] (The 9mm bullets disintegrate upon impact into tiny razor-like claws that tear up tissues and organs.); Wendell Jamieson, Winchester Disarms a Killer Bullet, NEWSDAY (New York), Nov. 23, 1993, at 5 (noting that the devastating bullets ... bloom into claw-like prongs on impact and cause hideous, gaping wounds). The defendant marketed the product to civilian consumers in a slick black box bearing the words BLACK TALON surrounded by the sharp, gleaming claws of a bird of prey. It is certainly possible that a fact-finder would conclude that any benefit that comes from marketing and selling bullets with this additional destructive feature to private citizens is outweighed by their potential for significant harm. 52 There is nothing novel in finding negligence on these grounds. New York law recognizes that a defendant can be held liable for negligently marketing a product. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Eli Lilly and Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 492 N.Y.S.2d 584, 589, 482 N.E.2d 63, 68 (1985); Bikowicz v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 161 A.D.2d 982, 557 N.Y.S.2d 551, 552 (1990). And there is no reason why that principle should not allow recovery against a manufacturer who introduces a harmful product into general circulation, where the social utility of marketing that product to the public is outweighed by its risk of harm. See McClurg, supra; Joseph A. Page, Liability for Unreasonably and Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Does Negligence Doctrine Have a Role to Play?, 72 CHI.-KENT. L. REV . 87 (1996); 12 see also Ezagui v. Dow Chem. Corp., 598 F.2d 727, 736 (2d Cir.1979) (applying New York law) (finding a prima facie case of negligence because Parke-Davis, as a matter of law, owed plaintiff a duty to exercise reasonable care in the design and in the decision to market Quadrigen) (emphasis added). 13 53 The fact that the New York legislature has not chosen to forbid the distribution of Black Talons in no way alters the conclusion that the defendant may have been negligent in marketing them to the general public. 14 There are all sorts of situations in which the general distribution of an object is legal, but the decision to market and sell it to certain persons is nonetheless negligent because it poses an undue risk of harm. When fireworks were legal, it was still negligent to market and sell them to children. See Erwin v. Dunn, 201 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex.Civ.App.1947). Similarly, even in the absence of a statute, serving alcohol to intoxicated adults is negligent. And this is so despite the fact that serving alcohol to sober ones is not. See Morrissey v. Sheedy, 26 A.D.2d 683, 272 N.Y.S.2d 430, 431-32 (1966); Tyrrell v. Quigley, 186 Misc. 972, 60 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1946). Selling tanks to the armed forces is fine; selling them to the general public is, I would think, clearly negligent. 54 I therefore conclude that there is little doubt that if the New York Court of Appeals chooses not to allow this type of negligent marketing claim to go forward, it will do so not because it holds, as a matter of law, that the defendant's actions did not create an unreasonable risk of harm, but rather because it finds no duty, that is, because it believes that sound public policy does not dictate the imposition of liability, despite the fact that the defendant may have acted negligently. See infra Part II.A.4; McClurg, supra, at 795-99; Page, supra, at 98-99.