Opinion ID: 2572748
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Superior Court's Resolution of Credits David Sought To Offset the Amount of Money He Owed Annette for Interim Support Arrearages

Text: The superior court valued the Beals' 11th Avenue home at $1,100,000 and subtracted the principal balance of $765,219 and selling costs of $66,000 to arrive at an award to Annette of an equity value of $268,781 in its March 7, 2001 property division. David claims that the superior court undervalued the home because the equity value had been substantially increased by his mortgage payments during the pendency of the divorce. He also argues that the superior court erred by denying his request, made in response to Annette's March 28, 2001 filing of a Judgment for Unpaid Interim Support, for a credit to offset the alleged undervaluation of the home in the property division. Annette responds that David is precluded from challenging this issue on appeal because he failed to present evidence supporting his current valuation of the property at trial. We have previously held that the date of valuation should ordinarily be as close as practicable to the date of trial. [23] But while the property should be valued as of the date of trial, and while David did not present evidence supporting his current valuation at the trial, David argues that another avenue to relief is available to him in this case. In opposing Annette's post-trial motion for Judgment for Unpaid Interim Spousal Support, David demonstrated that [t]he huge mortgage payments on the property on 11th do reduce the principal, pointing to the bank's records, submitted by Annette, showing that the mortgage was about $709,000 whereas the court found that the principal was about $765,000. Thus, evidence was before the trial court, shortly after the court issued its valuation, that suggested that the court's findings were incorrect. Because the trial court must consider payments to maintain marital property from post-separation income when dividing marital property, [24] and because David presented his argument and pointed to the evidence supporting it shortly after the court issued its findings, we remand for the superior court to consider whether David should receive credit for post-separation mortgage payments that were part of his interim support payments. David also claims that he should be entitled to additional credit because Annette sold the home for $1,330,000 rather than the $1,100,000 that the court applied to her share of the marital assets in its valuation. This claim is without merit because property is valued for the purposes of division at the time of trial, rather than at the time it is sold. [25] Neither party challenged the $1,100,000 appraisal of the home at trial.
David claims that he should be credited with an offset for half of the health insurance premiums he paid for the children's insurance. David also claims that he should be reimbursed for the health insurance he provided Annette during the pendency of their divorce. In response to a question from Annette's attorney at the superior court hearing on interim support, David affirmed that he would continue paying for the family health insurance. He paid for this health coverage throughout that time period while under court order to make the interim support payments. Given David's offer to pay health insurance before the interim support order was entered, it appears that the superior court intended the interim support payments to be made in addition to the health insurance payments. Therefore, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in declining to credit David for these payments.
David claims that the superior court abused its discretion by awarding Annette $66,000 in selling costs for the 11th Avenue home. David claims that the superior court's award of selling costs to Annette and concurrent refusal to award selling costs on the property awarded to him was error because the superior court did not force Annette to sell the 11th Avenue house, while the large judgments against him effectively will force him to sell his properties. We have held that the superior court must consider sales costs when its property division is premised on an economically disadvantaged party being forced to sell a house. [26] The superior court expressly premised its property division on Annette being the economically disadvantaged party, and it is obvious from the findings that her earning capacity was clearly not enough to cover the household payments. David's argument is without merit, as the superior court's findings regarding the parties' relative earning capacities which is unassailableamount to a finding that Annette would have to sell the house while David could earn enough to maintain his properties. Because the disparate treatment of the parties with regard to selling costs was justified by the superior court's findings, the award of selling costs to Annette did not constitute error.
David claims that Annette's appraiser undervalued a rosewood table awarded to Annette under the assumption that the table was made of mahogany, and that the superior court erred by adopting the appraiser's valuation of the table. He seeks a credit for the alleged difference in value. Annette admits that the appraiser erred in thinking that the table was mahogany but argues that this did not lead to an error in valuation. David is correct that his lay testimony that the table was worth $30,000, as opposed to the $6,640 appraised value, is admissible to prove the table's value. [27] Nonetheless, we cannot say that it was clear error for the trial court to adopt a trained appraiser's valuation of a table over the evaluation of an owner of the table. We hold that the superior court did not err by declining to allow David any additional credit for the table.
David claims that Annette sold some of David's separate, pre-marital art to her friends at a discount in violation of AS 09.35.140. [28] The superior court approved Annette's sale of the selected art on February 4, 2000 in order to satisfy the January 4, 2000 judgment against David for unpaid interim support and to save the family home from foreclosure. Even though the details of the sale were clear at the time, David did not raise any objection to the sale based on the notice requirement of AS 09.35.140. Because this issue was not presented to the superior court, David cannot raise it on appeal. [29] 6. The superior court erred in failing to make any factual findings in conjunction with David's request for credit for gold allegedly missing from the family safe while it was under Annette's sole control. David claims that he should be credited for gold that was his separate property and that was allegedly removed from the safe in the 11th Avenue house while Annette was in sole control of the safe. David contends that there were forty-nine ounces of raw gold, gold bullion, and gold coins in the safe as of July 7, 1999, the last time he was allowed in the house. Annette's attorney acknowledged that David's gold at the 11th Avenue house was worth between $15,000 and $18,000. Almost all of David's gold in the safe [30] was sold to satisfy a judgment for unpaid interim support against him and to avoid the foreclosure of the 11th Avenue home, and David was credited for the sale of $9,685.13 in gold. Annette apparently admitted receiving a payment of $6,354 for more gold, but this payment was not accounted for in the property division or the April 10, 2001 judgment for unpaid interim support. Annette's only response to this claim is her assertion that she knows of no gold missing. If there had been any additional gold, [she] would have sold it too. That appears to be David's point: that Annette probably used the gold to support herself. Because it was reasonable for David to assume that the $6,354 of gold remaining after the judgment for unpaid interim support had been satisfied would be credited towards other unpaid interim support obligations, it was proper for him to seek compensation for the allegedly missing gold as a credit for unpaid interim support in April 2001. But the superior court failed to make any findings in this regard. We remand this issue for findings in regard to David's motion for credits for the alleged missing gold.