Opinion ID: 2605818
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: authority to manage the resource

Text: [1] The Washington law governing respondents' authority has a checkered judicial history. A summary of that history, insofar as it relates to the department's authority to allocate salmon among fishermen using different types of gear, is found in Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 92 Wn.2d 939, 946-47, 603 P.2d 819 (1979) ( Gillnetters II). There we stated: This court has consistently held that the State Departments of Fisheries and Game can regulate for conservation only. Gillnetters, supra at 681 (Department of Fisheries); Hartman v. State Game Comm'n, 85 Wn.2d 176, 532 P.2d 614 (1975) (Department of Game). However, the power to manage a fishery for conservation purposes only is not a restrictive one; it enables the agency to collect data regarding the size, placement, and harvest of runs, to regulate the type of gear and times at which it can be employed in fishing specific varieties and runs of fish, to discriminate among classes of users by gear and purpose, to artificially enhance the fishery through hatchery programs, and even to force the owners of existing dams to improve fish passage facilities. See Department of Fisheries v. Chelan County PUD 1, 91 Wn.2d 378, 588 P.2d 1146 (1979); Washington Kelpers Ass'n v. State, 81 Wn.2d 410, 502 P.2d 1170 (1972); Frach v. Schoettler, 46 Wn.2d 281, 280 P.2d 1038 (1955); McMillan v. Sims, 132 Wash. 265, 231 P. 943 (1925); Vail v. Seaborg, 120 Wash. 126, 207 P. 15 (1922). It has in the past included the power to exclude from state regulation Indians fishing under federal regulation. State ex rel. Campbell v. Case [182 Wash. 334, 47 P.2d 24 (1935)] supra at 340-41. Salmon have been allocated among fishermen using different types of gear ever since it became necessary to manage the resource. We do not agree for the reasons stated below with the assertion of the Puget Sound Gillnetters Association in its brief in opposition to the motion of the State and the Director of Fisheries, that the Department of Fisheries has no statutory authority to participate in allocation. The gillnetters, and their fellow reefnetters, purse seiners and salmon trollers, have all benefited from department regulations limiting the fishing of other user groups to insure each class of fishermen a share of the State's salmon resources.... Limiting an agency to conservation regulation has consistently had only one real effect  it prevents the agency from allocating fish among competing claimants for purposes other than conservation, Gillnetters, supra at 683, i.e., to any user of the same class. Gillnetters, supra at 692; see also Kelpers, supra at 421-22. (Italics ours.) Gillnetters II thus clarified that the Department of Fisheries can allocate among noncompeting users for purposes other than conservation. That conclusion is consistent with our earlier authority, for nonconservation measures have been invalidated only when violative of equal protection. Gillnetters II, at 947; Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wn.2d 799, 810, 567 P.2d 205 (1977). Recognizing this and given the United States Supreme Court's ruling that treaty and nontreaty fishermen are not competing users, we stated: [A]llocation among treaty and nontreaty fishermen user classes is necessary to prevent depletion of the resource and to reestablish and maintain the economic well-being and stability of the commercial fishing industry in the state of Washington. RCW 75.08.012. Regulations necessary to manage the fishery in a manner consistent with implementation of tribal treaty rights can be promulgated by the State of Washington. Gillnetters II, at 949. [2] That mandate to allocate, as well as its rationale, applies with equal force to nontreaty sports and commercial fishermen. The latter, like treaty and nontreaty fishermen, are not competing users within the same class. See Gillnetters II, at 947-48; Purse Seine, at 810. Appellants' arguments are therefore untenable after Gillnetters II. They are also not sustained by the language of the statutes. The overriding purpose of the statutes is to provide for wise use of the resource, which is the broadest possible definition of conservation. They specifically grant the department the authority to manage, allocate, and perform other necessary functions. RCW 75.08.012, for example, provides: It shall be the duty and purpose of the department of fisheries to preserve, protect, perpetuate and manage the food fish and shellfish in the waters of the state and the offshore waters thereof to the end that such food fish and shellfish shall not be taken, possessed, sold or disposed of at such times and in such manner as will impair the supply thereof. For the purpose of conservation, and in a manner consistent therewith, the department shall seek to maintain the economic well-being and stability of the commercial fishing industry in the state of Washington. While emphasizing the word conservation, the direction of the last sentence of the statute, to act [f]or the purpose of conservation, and in a manner consistent therewith directs the department to engage in other related activities so long as they are consistent with conservation and do not impair the fish supply. These activities, as indicated in the first sentence of the statute, are to preserve, protect, perpetuate and manage the food fish and shellfish in the waters of the state and the offshore waters ... Other statutes also recognize the department's duty to manage within the parameters of conservation. RCW 75.08.020 [3] requires the director to enforce laws and regulations relating to propagation, protection, preservation, and management of the fishery. RCW 75.08.080 [4] delineated the scope of the director's power with regard to the time, place, gear and size, sex, numbers and amounts of various classes of food fish and shellfish that may be taken, possessed, sold, or disposed of. RCW 75.08.085 [5] empowers the director to promote orderly recreational fisheries and allows him or her to take into consideration factors of navigation, law enforcement, recreational fishery enhancement, environmental concerns and public recreation. RCW Title 77, while dealing with a different fishery and regulatory scheme, unambiguously identifies the relationship between regulation and conservation. RCW 77.12.010 provides: [G]ame fish shall only be taken at such times or places, by such means, in such manner, or in such quantities as will in the judgment of the commission maximize public recreational opportunities but not impair the supply thereof ... It provides for regulation in any manner not inconsistent with preservation. This statutory scheme, as well as Gillnetters II, establishes the authority to allocate among noncompeting users, absent some impairment to the resource. And contrary to appellants' position, that authority is not limited by the Columbia River Compact. The compact states: All laws and regulations now existing, or which may be necessary for regulating, protecting, or preserving fish in the waters of the Columbia River, over which the States of Oregon and Washington have concurrent jurisdiction, or any other waters within either of said States, which would affect said concurrent jurisdiction, shall be made, changed, altered, and amended in whole or in part, only with the mutual consent and approbation of both States. 40 Stat. at 515 (1918). [3] The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the scope of the compact and, as a result of its interpretation, we have stated that the compact does not prevent either state from adopting regulations so long as they do not undertake to permit the taking of fish at a time, in a manner, by means of appliances not permissible at the time the compact was made. State ex rel. Gile v. Huse, 183 Wash. 560, 563, 49 P.2d 25 (1935), quoting P.J. McGowan & Sons, Inc. v. Van Winkle, 21 F.2d 76, 77 (D. Ore. 1927), aff'd, 277 U.S. 574, 72 L.Ed. 995, 48 S.Ct. 435 (1928). Accord, Olin v. Kitzmiller, 259 U.S. 260, 66 L.Ed. 930, 42 S.Ct. 510 (1922). The compact therefore prevents the states only from permitting what was otherwise not permissible in 1918, the year in which it was enacted. Allocating among dissimilar users does not fall within that prohibition and consequently, once the representatives agreed on a season, RCW 75.40.020 [6] authorized the director to enact all regulations necessary to effectuate it. See Purse Seine, supra . Purse Seine indicates that a director must implement, within the limits of statutory authority, the terms agreed to by compact members.