Opinion ID: 1244833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Exclusion of WEs

Text: None of our prior opinions regarding death qualification actually address the empirical data establishing the conviction-prone nature of the class of jurors whose attitudes make them death qualified. Even in Moore, we merely posited that this data may well be correct and then rejected the claim on other grounds. 697 P.2d at 237. Therefore, I deem it appropriate to summarize briefly the accumulated evidence, which now includes over a dozen additional studies not before us in Moore. [10] For over twenty-five years, empiricists have studied the correlation between an individual's disposition to impose capital punishment and that individual's attitudes toward criminal defendants and the criminal justice system. As Justice Marshall observed, The chief strength of [these studies] lies in the essential unanimity of the results obtained by researchers using diverse subjects and varied methodologies. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 189, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1773, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Describing these results, Justice Marshall wrote: The data strongly suggest that death qualification excludes a significantly large subset โ at least 11% to 17% โ of potential jurors who could be impartial during the guilt phase of trial. Among the members of this excludable class are a disproportionate number of blacks and women. The perspectives on the criminal justice system of jurors who survive death qualification are systematically different from those of the excluded jurors. Death-qualified jurors are, for example, more likely to believe that a defendant's failure to testify is indicative of his guilt, more hostile to the insanity defense, more mistrustful of defense attorneys, and less concerned about the danger of erroneous convictions. This pro-prosecution bias is reflected in the greater readiness of death-qualified jurors to convict or to convict on more serious charges. And, finally, the very process of death qualification โ which focuses attention on the death penalty before the trial has even begun โ has been found to predispose the jurors that survive it to believe that the defendant is guilty. Id. at 187-88, 106 S.Ct. at 1772-73 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In essence, some two dozen studies suggest that jurors who withstand death qualification tend to be significantly less solicitous of a defendant's due process rights and significantly more eager to convict. As one report stated, From a social scientist's viewpoint the empirical question [whether death-qualified juries are biased against the defendant on the issue of guilt] has been conclusively answered. Rick Seltzer et al., The Effect of Death Qualification on the Propensity of Jurors to Convict: The Maryland Example, 29 How.L.J. 571, 581 (1986). As Justice Marshall also suggested, The true impact of death qualification on the fairness of a trial is likely even more devastating than the studies show. McCree, 476 U.S. at 190, 106 S.Ct. at 1774 (Marshall, J., dissenting). This is so, Justice Marshall explained, for two reasons: First, under Wainwright v. Witt , [11] courts may actually exclude for cause a broader class of persons than most of the studies assumed would be excluded under Witherspoon. Second, the prosecution's exercise of peremptory challenges to excuse additional jurors not suitably committed to capital punishment will exclude greater numbers of those individuals statistically likely to possess heightened sensitivity to due process protections. Id. at 190-92, 106 S.Ct. at 1773-75 (Marshall, J., dissenting). After extensively reviewing the evidence, at least three lower federal courts had concluded prior to Lockett that death qualification creates an unjustifiable risk of empaneling a conviction-prone jury. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 237 (8th Cir.1985), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986); Keeten v. Garrison, 578 F.Supp. 1164, 1167 (W.D.N.C.1984), rev'd, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.1984); Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F.Supp. 1273 (E.D.Ark.1983), aff'd, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir.1985), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986). Unfortunately, despite Justice Marshall's lucid dissent in McCree, the majority of the Supreme Court in that case dismissed the studies, holding that even if the empirical conclusions were correct, the resulting conviction-prone nature of the death-qualified jury did not violate the federal constitution. 476 U.S. at 173, 106 S.Ct. at 1764-65. [12] The Court explained: [T]he Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross section of the community is impartial, regardless of the mix of individual viewpoints actually represented on the jury, so long as the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular case. Id. at 184, 106 S.Ct. at 1770-71. McCree has settled the federal claim for now, but I do not find McCree persuasive with respect to the Utah constitutional issue. Nor am I the first state jurist to believe that state constitutions may still prohibit death qualification of the guilt phase jury. In a 1987 New Jersey Supreme Court case, Justice Handler would have held that death qualification violated state constitutional guarantees of a fair and impartial jury. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d 188, 348 (1987) (Handler, J., dissenting). Justice Handler reviewed the empirical evidence regarding the conviction-prone nature of these juries and then pointedly challenged his colleagues: The question, ultimately, is whether the state's putative interest in `neutrality' on the issue of penalty may be vindicated at the expense of the defendant's interest in a fair trial if both interests may be accommodated by using different procedures. Id. at 347-48. One of his colleagues, although not ready to hold that death qualification violated the state constitution, insisted that in the exercise of our judicial supervision over the criminal justice system in New Jersey, the New Jersey court should prohibit death qualification because it is inconsistent with New Jersey's traditional sense of fairness and justice. Id. at 295 (O'Hern, J., concurring in the result). One year later, Justice Handler added: While no one insists that procedure can be made perfect, in no other context has this Court accepted the proposition that mere prosecutorial convenience โ or any state interest โ justifies procedures that render the jury `somewhat more conviction prone.' State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 548 A.2d 887, 923 (1988) (Handler, J., dissenting) (quoting McCree, 476 U.S. at 173, 106 S.Ct. at 1764-65). Justice Handler continues to become more adamant as the evidence accumulates. See State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 586 A.2d 85, 199-204 (1991) (Handler, J., dissenting); State v. Hunt, 115 N.J. 330, 558 A.2d 1259, 1289-97 (1989) (Handler, J., dissenting). We must examine closely the cost of ignoring the implications of the empirical data. In Witherspoon, the United States Supreme Court, restating the obvious, wrote that a State may not entrust the determination of whether a [defendant] is innocent or guilty to a tribunal `organized to convict.' 391 U.S. at 521, 88 S.Ct. at 1776 (quoting Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 294, 67 S.Ct. 1613, 1630, 91 L.Ed. 2043 (1947)). Yet the lead opinion in this case allows precisely this result. Young has made a prima facie showing that bias probably will result from death qualifying the guilt phase jury. Until the State rebuts this showing, we must conclude that by excluding an entire class of impartial jurors from ever participating in guilt determination in capital trials (and thereby restricting the class of jurors eligible for capital jury service to a group who, to a statistically significant degree, demonstrate attitudes accurately labeled conviction-prone), the State has violated Young's right to an impartial jury, without a compelling reason for doing so. Given the data, requiring defendants to endure death qualification disadvantages them in an unconstitutional manner. Even if the data turn out in the future to be flawed, abandoning death qualification for guilt phase jurors would in no way disadvantage the state, while it would still protect a capital defendant's rights. We therefore distort justice when we insist that capital defendants establish their empirical claim more convincingly before we will dispense with death qualification. See Stephen Gillers, Proving the Prejudice of Death-Qualified Juries After Adams v. Texas, 47 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 219, 240-42 (1985).