Opinion ID: 2354102
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Recusal from Determining Sanctions

Text: Allen argues for his third point on appeal that the trial judge should have recused from deciding sanctions. We agree. For the purposes of this particular case, we hold that Judge Rutledge should have recused from deciding sanctions. Therefore, this court need not reach the merits of the other points on appeal. In Clark v. State, 287 Ark. 221, 697 S.W.2d 895 (1985) this court held: These remarks indicate that the judge became embroiled in a personal dispute, [ U.S. v. ] Meyer, supra, [462 F.2d 827 (C.A.D.C. 1972)] with the appellant. Even though the judge's objectivity may not have been affected by the appellant's attack, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 75 S.Ct. 11, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954). Accordingly, the trial judge under these circumstances should have recused from hearing the contempt charge. As stated by Chief Justice Taft in Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925): [A]ll of such cases ... present difficult questions for the judge. All we can say on the whole matter is that where conditions do not make it impracticable, or where the delay may not injure public or private rights, a judge called upon to act in a case of contempt by personal attack upon him, may, without flinching from his duty, properly ask that one of his fellow judges take his place. By our holding we do not intend that all contempts not committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, must be tried by a third party. But where a direct personal attack is made on a judge which is the subject of a contempt charge by that judge, or contemptuous conduct occurs which necessitates a factual hearing on the allegations made against the judge (as seems to have been contemplated in this case), to ensure a fair and impartial hearing the judge must recuse. Clark, 287 Ark. at 227, 697 S.W.2d 895. Here, Judge Rutledge was required to recuse from the Rule 11 sanction issue because of his obvious bias toward Allen. Due process requires not only that a judge be fair, but that he also appear to be fair. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927). The colloquies in this case demonstrate the wisdom of the Clark rule, because Judge Rutledge misread, at least the second motion to recuse, and repeatedly shut Allen off when Allen sought answers to his questions. In Bennett v. NAACP, 236 Ark. 750, 755, 370 S.W.2d 79, 82 (1963), this court stated, Our form of government guarantees to all of us the right of free and uninhibited access to the judiciary, and this certainly implies that we must not be so fearful of every day and common acts that this access to the judiciary is actually fettered because of fear. Further, Article 2, ?4, of the Arkansas Constitution states: The right of the people peaceable to assemble to consult for the common good, and to petition, by address or remonstrance, the government, or any department thereof, shall never be abridged. Rule 11 is employed to sanction attorneys who have unjustifiably failed to carry out a responsibility as an officer of the court. A criminal contempt citation may be used to penalize attorneys and nonattorneys alike for an insult to the authority of the court. In this case, Judge Rutledge should have recused from deciding the sanction issue. His comments and rulings indicate that he was biased. During the hearing on the recusal motions, Judge Rutledge stated, I'm not up here to answer your questions, and prior to the hearing referred to Ms. Grady as Jo Hart Jr., a former law partner of Judge Rutledge, and, I can do anything I want to. I'm the Judge. These remarks, along with the overall biased tone of Judge Rutledge's comments, indicate that he should have recused himself from hearing and deciding the Rule 11 sanctions issue. Reversed and remanded. GLAZE, J., dissents.