Opinion ID: 594189
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Detention of the Defendants in the Patrol Car

Text: 17 An officer who makes a valid investigatory stop may briefly detain those he suspects of criminal activity to verify or quell that suspicion. United States v. Winfrey, 915 F.2d 212, 216 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 709 (1991). The Constitution permits detention and investigative methods, id. (citing Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682),  'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.'  Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). We examine the nature and quality of the detention, in light of the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop, id. at 685, to determine if the seizure was so minimally intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion. Id. (citations omitted). 18 No bright line test exists to evaluate whether an investigatory seizure was so invasive as to constitute an arrest requiring probable cause. Id.; United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (probable cause necessary for warrantless arrest). Instead, we are guided by common sense and ordinary human experience. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685. Moreover, intrusiveness is not measured in the abstract. Id. at 687. The question is not simply whether some ... [less intrusive means] was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or pursue it. Id. 19 Without question, Stout acted lawfully when he placed the defendants in his patrol car. The officer, already suspecting both defendants of illegal drug activity and having noticed a drive-out tag, began his investigation by asking some simple questions. Hood stated that he did not know whose car he was driving and identified the passenger as Timothy Thomas. Thomas, a few moments later, identified himself as Timothy Brown. At that point, Stout, not unreasonably, also thought the car might be stolen and needed the VIN to confirm or dispel that suspicion. 20 Stout testified that he feared that, if unsecured, the defendants might run away while he checked the VIN. Stout did not raise his voice, handcuff the suspects, or tell them that they were under arrest. He merely placed them in the back of a locked patrol car which does not, per se, require probable cause. United States v. Parr, 843 F.2d 1228, 1230 (9th Cir.1988). The defendants acknowledge the absence of a bright line test, yet they maintain that United States v. Richardson, 949 F.2d 851 (6th Cir.1991); United States v. Thompson, 906 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.1990); and United States v. Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir.1980); govern the resolution of this issue. The factual scenarios in those cases differ markedly from the situation in the present case, rendering them far from dispositive when considering this appeal. 21 In Richardson, the defendant was detained in a squad car for upwards of fifteen minutes while another suspect was questioned, and this court found that the defendant's detainment in the squad car constituted an arrest. 949 F.2d at 854, 857-58. The court in Thompson found the defendant had been arrested when placed in a squad car because seven squad cars were present at the scene, the investigatory stop lasted for one and one-half hours, and the arresting officer characterized his action as an arrest. 906 F.2d at 1296-97. Finally, in Chamberlin, the court found that the defendant's twenty-minute stay in the back seat of a patrol car, coupled with the fact that the officer on the scene questioned the defendant and observed his demeanor, constituted an arrest. 644 F.2d at 1267. In the present case, Stout did not confine one suspect in the patrol car at length while questioning another, cf. Richardson; did not question or observe the demeanor of either suspect while they were in the patrol car, cf. Chamberlin; did not have the support of six other patrol cars, cf. Thompson; and did not allow the investigatory stop to last any longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of his stop. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). 22 Although defendants suggest otherwise, their inability to leave at this point did not convert the stop into a de facto arrest. See United States v. Prior, 941 F.2d at 427 (6th Cir.) (reasonable suspicion sufficient to support lone officer holding suspect at gunpoint until other officers' arrival), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 613 (1991); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972) (The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow ... a criminal to escape.). We cannot imagine how Stout, alone with the defendants, might have met his obligation to protect the public in a less intrusive manner. Accordingly, we find that this seizure was fully supported by Stout's suspicion of criminal activity. 4