Opinion ID: 3214213
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the habitual offender act

Text: In 1927, Michigan enacted the HOA as part of Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 24 It contains three sections to enhance sentences imposed on recidivist offenders. MCL 769.10 applies to those sentenced for their second felony convictions, MCL 769.11 applies to those sentenced for their third felony convictions, and MCL 769.12 applies to those sentenced for their fourth or higher felony convictions. This Court has repeatedly stated that, by enacting the HOA, “the legislature did not intend to make a separate substantive crime out of being a habitual offender but rather, for deterrent purposes, intended to augment the punishment for second or subsequent offenses.” 25 Importantly, in 1998 the Legislature expressly instructed courts when enhancement under the HOA is inapplicable. Each of the three enhancement sections states: “A conviction shall not be used to enhance a sentence under this section if that 22 People v Cunningham, 496 Mich 145, 156 n 8; 852 NW2d 118 (2014). 23 Id. (“[T]he Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure ‘relate generally to the same thing and must therefore be read in pari materia . . . .’ ”), quoting People v Smith, 423 Mich 427, 442; 378 NW2d 384 (1985). 24 See 1927 PA 175. 25 People v Shotwell, 352 Mich 42, 46; 88 NW2d 313 (1958). 7 conviction is used to enhance a sentence under a statute that prohibits use of the conviction for further enhancement under this section.” 26 We presume, as we must, that the Legislature was well aware of these provisions of the HOA when it amended SORA in 1999 to create SORA-1, SORA-2, and SORA-3. 27 We also presume that the Legislature was aware that Michigan courts had applied the HOA to other recidivism criminal statutes at the time the pertinent provisions of SORA became law. 28 Significantly, the Legislature added nothing to SORA to exempt it from application of the HOA. The Legislature has also demonstrated that when it intends to do so, it is able to exclude particular categories of felonies from the HOA. 29 For example, the HOA was amended in 1978 to explicitly exclude application of the HOA to subsequent major 26 MCL 769.10(3), MCL 769.11(3), and MCL 769.12(3), all as amended by 1998 PA 317. 27 See Gordon Sel-Way, Inc v Spence Bros, Inc, 438 Mich 488, 506; 475 NW2d 704 (1991) (“[T]he Legislature is presumed to act with knowledge of statutory interpretations by the Court of Appeals and this Court.”). 28 E.g., People v VanderMel, 156 Mich App 231, 232; 401 NW2d 285 (1986). The defendant in that case pleaded guilty of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(b), and having committed a second criminal sexual conduct offense, MCL 750.520f, and was sentenced as a second-offense habitual offender under MCL 769.10. The Court of Appeals held that both the recidivism criminal sexual conduct statute, MCL 750.520f, and the habitual-offender statute, MCL 769.10, could be concurrently applied. Id. at 235-237. In so holding, the Court of Appeals stated, “Because the Legislature has not prohibited concurrent application of MCL 750.520f and the habitual offender statutes, we decline to do so . . . .” Id. at 236-237 (citation omitted). 29 People v Bewersdorf, 438 Mich 55, 72; 475 NW2d 231 (1991). 8 controlled substance offenses by adding the following language to MCL 769.10 and substantially similar language to MCL 769.11 and MCL 769.12: If the subsequent felony is a major controlled substance offense, the person shall be punished as provided by Act No. 196 of the Public Acts of 1971, as amended, being saections 335.301 to 335.367 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.[30] The HOA makes no such exception for convictions under SORA’s recidivism provisions, MCL 28.729(1)(a), (b), and (c). The Legislature has amended various criminal statutes to expressly prohibit application of the HOA to an offense, 31 but it has not seen fit to adopt 30 MCL 769.10(1)(c), as amended by 1978 PA 77. See also MCL 769.11(1)(c), and MCL 769.12(1)(c), both as amended by 1978 PA 77. The reference was to the former Controlled Substances Act. Subsequently, 1988 PA 90 revised the reference to Chapter 74 of the Public Health Code, MCL 333.7401 et seq. 31 For example, in 1998 PA 311, the Legislature revised the first-degree retail fraud statute, MCL 750.356c, to state: If the sentence for a conviction under this section is enhanced by 1 or more prior convictions, those prior convictions shall not be used to further enhance the sentence for the conviction pursuant to section 10, 11, or 12 of chapter IX of the code of criminal procedure, 1927 PA 175, MCL 769.10, 769.11, and 769.12. [MCL 750.356c(6).] Similar prohibitions against application of the habitual-offender sentence enhancements can be found in MCL 750.79(4) (intent to commit arson); MCL 750.131(5) (checks drawn on insufficient funds); MCL 750.157s(4) (use of revoked or canceled financial transaction devices with intent to defraud); MCL 750.157w(4) (use of financial transaction device in excess of funds with intent to defraud); MCL 750.174(11) (embezzlement); MCL 750.218(10) (false pretenses); MCL 750.356(9) (larceny); MCL 750.362a(8) (refusal/neglect to return rented vehicle); MCL 750.377a(4) (malicious destruction of personalty); MCL 750.535(11) (receiving or concealing stolen property); and MCL 750.540g(4) (unauthorized use of telecommunications services). “Courts cannot assume that the Legislature inadvertently omitted from one statute the language that it placed in another statute, and then, on the basis of that assumption, apply what is not there.” Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 210, 501 NW2d 76 (1993). 9 a similar exception for SORA-2 and SORA-3 convictions, although it has had numerous opportunities to do so. 32 There being no statutory bar to the application of the HOA to SORA, the trial court sentenced defendant as a second-offense habitual offender under MCL 769.10(1)(a), which states: If a person has been convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony . . . and that person commits a subsequent felony within this state, the person shall be punished upon conviction of the subsequent felony . . . as follows: (a) If the subsequent felony is punishable upon a first conviction by imprisonment for a term less than life, the court . . . may place the person on probation or sentence the person to imprisonment for a maximum term that is not more than 1-1/2 times the longest term prescribed for a first conviction of that offense or for a lesser term. [Emphasis added.] Defendant maintains, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the words “that offense” refer to violations of SORA generally under MCL 28.729(1). Defendant’s position is premised on the notion that MCL 28.729(1)(a) to (c) are merely sentenceenhancement provisions applicable when there are repeat violations of SORA. The prosecution contends, and the trial court agreed, that the words “that offense” refer to separate felony convictions under MCL 28.729(1), in this case SORA-2, MCL 28.729(1)(b). Accordingly, we must determine whether SORA sets forth a single 32 The Legislature has amended SORA several times since its enactment and has elected to not preclude application of the habitual-offender provisions to a SORA-2 or SORA-3 conviction. 10 substantive offense with enhanced punishments for subsequent violations or whether SORA provides three separate and distinct substantive offenses for recidivist behavior.