Opinion ID: 4512964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentencing Findings

Text: Finally, Frazier contends that the district court’s findings at sentencing related to obstruction of justice and drug quantity were unsubstantiated. Not so. A district court’s factual findings related to obstruction of justice and drug quantity made at sentencing are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Pena, 751 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2014) (obstruction of justice); United States v. Snow, 462 F.3d 55, 72 (2d Cir. 2006) (drug quantity). Ultimately, both of the district court’s factual findings that Frazier now challenges turn on the district court’s decision to credit a government source over Frazier after both testified during a Fatico hearing. When “credibility determinations are at issue, we give particularly strong deference to a district court finding.” United States v. Murphy, 703 F.3d 182, 189 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has observed that “when a trial judge’s finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). Frazier points to no extrinsic evidence that directly contradicts the source’s testimony and fails to identify any substantive internal inconsistencies in his statements. Specifically, looking 5 at the district court’s findings as to obstruction of justice, the source’s testimony offered ample basis to conclude that Frazier had intimidated him: not only did the source appear scared while testifying, but he was aware of Frazier’s gang affiliation, his violent criminal history, and threats Frazier had made towards the source and his family. Accordingly, the district court properly resolved any conflict between the competing testimony of Frazier and the source by crediting the source. As to the court’s drug quantity findings, Frazier relies primarily on United States v. Pauling, 924 F.3d 649, 657–58 (2d Cir. 2019). But that case does not support Frazier’s position. Not only did Pauling involve a higher burden of proof, as it reviewed a conviction following trial rather than a sentencing finding, but the government there relied on brief and vague statements not uttered by either member of a conspiracy and general assertions of an ongoing drug-trafficking relationship to establish a specific drug quantity. Id. at 659–61. Conversely, here, the district court had specific testimony from a co-conspirator and, to the extent it extrapolated total drug quantity, it did so in a manner consistent with our prior cases. See, e.g., United States v. Blount, 291 F.3d 201, 215–16 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Adames, 727 F. App’x 12, 14 (2d Cir. 2018). In sum, the district court did not clearly err by crediting the source or by relying on his testimony to support its findings as to drug quantity and obstruction of justice.