Opinion ID: 2306390
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of Claims Due to Prejudicial Delay

Text: Appellant next contends that the PCRA court erred in concluding that his claims were subject to dismissal due to prejudicial delay pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(b), because the ineffective assistance of counsel claims were raised five years after trial counsel's death. [10] Section 9543(b) provides: Even if the petitioner has met the requirements of subsection (a), the petition shall be dismissed if it appears at any time that, because of delay in filing the petition, the Commonwealth has been prejudiced either in its ability to respond to the petition or in its ability to re-try the petitioner. A petition may be dismissed due to delay in the filing by the petitioner only after a hearing upon a motion to dismiss. This subsection does not apply if the petitioner shows that the petition is based on grounds of which the petitioner could not have discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the delay became prejudicial to the Commonwealth. 42 Pa.C.S § 9543(b). Appellant argues that this section cannot serve as the basis for dismissal because the statutory language expressly precludes dismissal of a petition absent a hearing on the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss. He submits that no such hearing was conducted, and that the Commonwealth has not sustained its burden of proving that the delay in filing the claims prejudiced its ability to either respond to the petition or retry Appellant. Finally, Appellant refutes the notion that his ineffectiveness claims should have been raised on direct appeal when trial counsel was alive and Appellant was represented by new direct appeal counsel. [11] He maintains that if he had raised the ineffectiveness claims in his direct appeal filed in 1990, trial counsel, who died on April 21, 1991, would likely have already been deceased before any evidentiary hearing was conducted. We agree with Appellant that dismissal pursuant to Section 9543(b) is not warranted here. While the Commonwealth presented argument based on that statutory provision in its motion to dismiss, the PCRA court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing at which the Commonwealth demonstrated how it was prejudiced by Appellant's delay in raising the claims. This Court has ruled that, absent a hearing on the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss, Section 9543(b) specifically precludes the dismissal of a PCRA petition based upon prejudicial delay. Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 865 A.2d 761, 776 (2004); see also Commonwealth v. (Damon) Jones, 590 Pa. 202, 912 A.2d 268, 290-91 (2006) (plurality) (lower court must conduct an evidentiary hearing on the defense of prejudicial delay in commencing post-conviction litigation prior to dismissing PCRA petition pursuant to Section 9543(b)). Thus, we conclude that dismissal of Appellant's petition on this basis alone is improper. [12] Nevertheless, Section 9543(b) was not the exclusive basis for the PCRA court's dismissal of Appellant's petition. Instead, the court reviewed the substance of Appellant's claims and found each of them to be without merit.