Opinion ID: 756419
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The ADA and the Chapter 151B Claims Against the Hospital

Text: 14 Laurin first contends that the Hospital was not entitled to summary judgment on the ADA and Chapter 151B claims because the issue as to whether shift rotation was an essential function of her former position presented a quintessential question of fact for the jury. 2 An ADA claimant alleging handicap discrimination must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she was a qualified individual, i.e., that either with or without reasonable accommodation she was able to perform the essential functions of her former position; and (3) her discharge was due, in whole or in part, to her disability. See EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 141 n. 2 (1st Cir.1997); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir.1996). 15 It is well settled that an employer need not accommodate a disability by foregoing an essential function of the employment position. See, e.g., Miller v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 107 F.3d 483, 484 (7th Cir.1997) (Under the ADA, the employer avoids all liability if the plaintiff would have been fired because incapable of performing the essential functions of the job....); Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir.1995) (similar); H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 73 (1990); accord Scheer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 956 F.Supp. 1496, 1502 (N.D.Iowa 1997) ([T]he request to perform only some of the essential functions of a job is not a request for reasonable accommodation.). 3 EEOC interpretive regulations afford guidance in assessing whether a particular job requirement is an essential function for purposes of the ADA: 16 (1) In general. The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. The term essential functions does not include the marginal functions of the position. 17 (2) A job function may be considered essential for any of several reasons, including but not limited to the following: 18 (i) The function may be essential because the reason the position exists is to perform that function; 19 (ii) The function may be essential because of the limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed; and/or 20 (iii) The function may be highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function. 21 (3) Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to: 22 (i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; 23 (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; 24 (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; 25 (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; 26 (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; 27 (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or 28 (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n); see Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 672 (1st Cir.1995) (noting that EEOC regulations interpreting the ADA, while not controlling, constitute  'a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts ... may properly resort for guidance' ) (citation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 30 The initial salvo by Laurin is aimed at what she considers the inappropriately high level of deference the district court accorded the Hospital's determination, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i), that shift-rotation is an essential function. Such deference is not appropriate, Laurin says, because she had adduced direct evidence of the Hospital's discriminatory attitude toward her particular handicap. Cf. Amego, 110 F.3d at 145 (endorsing considerable deference to employer's judgment as to essential function [w]here the plaintiff has presented no evidence of discriminatory intent, animus, or even pretext) (emphasis added). Specifically, Laurin contends that the Hospital and her supervisors responded to her requests for accommodation with incredulous refusal[s], declined to take them seriously, and belittled her medical condition as a mere lifestyle problem. On the contrary, close inspection of Laurin's record citations, even viewed in their most favorable light, belie her contention. 31 Assuming arguendo that Laurin plausibly interprets Amego, the only concrete allegation among the lot is that her direct supervisors (viz., Claire Margosiak and the director of nursing, Joan Richter) reacted in a laughing manner to her initial request for accommodation. Even assuming as much, Laurin's claim is nonetheless flawed, since she was not diagnosed as having a seizure disorder until later, after experiencing her second episode. Such spontaneous remarks, made long before the supervisors had an opportunity adequately to assess the merits of the requested accommodation, could be considered only marginally probative of any discriminatory animus on their part. 32 Furthermore, the supervisors explained to Laurin that the shift-rotation requirement would be rendered obsolete were the Hospital to waive it for all staff nurses with small children who might experience episodes of fatigue. Nor was their characterization of Laurin's medical condition--as a lifestyle problem--particularly surprising or remarkable, let alone suspect, given that her own neurologist had opined that Laurin's medical condition likely had been induced by the fatigue associated with her frenetic daily activities--childcare, work, and school. Viewed in context, therefore, the supervisors' observations rationally cannot be considered expressions of animus towards persons afflicted with Laurin's medical condition. 33 Even assuming that a rational factfinder could draw so tenuous an inference, however, Laurin failed to adduce competent evidence that her immediate supervisors played a meaningful role in the subsequent Hospital decision to deny the requested accommodation and discharge her. Instead, as Laurin concedes, the supervisors advised her that they would check into it, thus strongly suggesting that any final decision must be made at a higher level. Nor is it surprising in the least that the decision would be made by higher-ups, given that any decision to waive the shift-rotation requirement for the first time in Hospital history plainly would implicate important institutional considerations. Cf. Santiago v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 138 F.3d 1, 6 n. 8 (1st Cir.1998) (noting that  'stray remarks in the workplace ..., statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself'  normally are insufficient to establish discriminatory animus) (citation omitted); Lehman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 74 F.3d 323, 329 (1st Cir.1996) (Isolated, ambiguous remarks are insufficient, by themselves, to prove discriminatory intent.). Consequently, the letter rejecting Laurin's request for accommodation--and instead proposing a temporary six-week accommodation--came from David Tatro, the director of the Hospital's human resources department, not from Laurin's supervisors. It is noteworthy as well that the Tatro letter in no way indicated what, if any, role either Richter or Margosiak played in the Hospital decision not to waive its longstanding, consistently-enforced shift-rotation policy. See also Letter from Margosiak to plaintiff (7/6/95) (I heard from Human Resources today ... [that] the decision has been made to extend your temporary [accommodation]....). Accordingly, Laurin's suppositional direct evidence of discriminatory animus came up well short of its target. 34 Absent direct evidence that the Hospital harbored a discriminatory animus in maintaining that shift-rotation was an essential [job] function, Laurin had no option but to resort to the familiar McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting paradigm to establish a circumstantial case. See Jacques v. Clean-Up Group, Inc., 96 F.3d 506, 511 (1st Cir.1996); see also Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1206 (8th Cir.1997). Thus, initially Laurin was required to demonstrate a prima facie case on all three essential elements of her claim, see supra: (1) disability, (2) qualification, and (3) causation. See Amego, 110 F.3d at 141. Only at that point would the Hospital be required to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment actions. See Jacques, 96 F.3d at 511: 35 This entails only a burden of production, not a burden of persuasion; the task of proving discrimination remains the plaintiff's at all times. Once such a reason emerges, the inference raised by the prima facie case dissolves, and the plaintiff is required to show, unaided by the original inference of discrimination, that the employer's proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination.... [Plaintiff] must muster proof that enables a factfinder rationally to conclude that the stated reason behind the adverse employment decision is not only a sham, but a sham intended to cover up the proscribed type of discrimination. 36 Dichner v. Liberty Travel, 141 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir.1998) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see Snow, 128 F.3d at 1206 (The ultimate burden of proving unlawful discrimination always rests with the plaintiff.); Miller, 107 F.3d at 484 ([T]he burden of proof on the [essential-function] issue is not on the employer but on the plaintiff.). 4 37 Laurin vainly string-cites cases which acknowledge that the § 1630.2(n)(3) essential function inquiry tends to be fact-intensive, such that it is relatively rare that a trial court may enter summary judgment. See, e.g., Barber v. Nabors Drilling U.S.A., Inc., 130 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir.1997). Nevertheless, since an ADA plaintiff ultimately must shoulder the burden of establishing that she was able to perform all essential functions of her position, at summary judgment Laurin--and not the Hospital--bore the burden of adducing competent evidence from which a rational factfinder could have found in her favor, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). See, e.g., Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 104 F.3d 683, 686-87 (4th Cir.1997) (resolving essential function issue in employer's favor at summary judgment); Amego, 110 F.3d at 147 (citing Martinson with approval); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1124 (10th Cir.1995) (Although ordinarily a fact question to be decided on a case-by-case basis, plaintiffs have presented no evidence to rebut the [employer's] conclusion that speed is essential to the [plaintiffs'] selector job.) (citation omitted). Nor could Laurin satisfy her rebuttal burden under Rule 56 by relying upon  'conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.'  Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 259 (1st Cir.1994) (citation omitted). 38 Even assuming arguendo that Laurin adduced sufficient evidence for a prima facie case of qualification, the Hospital in turn met its burden by articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for denying the request for accommodation. Indeed, all the competent evidence relating to the seven nonexclusive factors identified in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) weighed overwhelmingly in favor of the Hospital. 5 Hospital witnesses uniformly attested that since the evening and night shifts were less desirable than the day shift, it was essential that the Hospital cover the shortage of straight-evening and straight-night nurses by making shift-rotation an essential function of all non-senior daytime nursing positions in its 24-hour maternity unit. Thus, the Hospital has always required all non-senior staff nurses to rotate shifts, and it has never made an exception. See Milton, 53 F.3d at 1124 (The initial inquiry in determining ['essential function'] is whether an employer actually requires all employees in the position to perform the allegedly essential function.). 39 Perhaps most importantly, a 24-hour hospital unit imposes exceptional nurse-scheduling demands upon the hospital-employer. For example, since maternity-room patients need nursing services twenty-four hours a day, normally it will not be possible for the hospital-employer to allow its maternity nurses to work only the more desirable or convenient shifts, where to do so would jeopardize its ability to staff its maternity unit during the less desirable evening and night shifts. 6 Medical needs and emergencies--many potentially life-threatening--do not mind the clock, let alone staff-nurse convenience. 40 At least in the instant context, to suggest otherwise would be tantamount to maintaining that night work is not an essential function of a night watchman's job, even though that is the only time the premises are not otherwise occupied. Cf., e.g., Martinson, 104 F.3d at 687 (noting that provision of store security is of such a nature that it cannot reasonably be abandoned for even 'a brief period' ); Salmon v. Dade County Sch. Bd., 4 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1162-63 (S.D.Fla.1998) (Unlike other jobs that can be ... deferred until a later day, a guidance counselor must counsel students at the school during the hours in which the children are in attendance.). The 24-hour hospital unit setting thus affords a particularly compelling context in which to defer to rational staffing judgments by hospital employers based on the genuine necessities of the hospital business. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (defining term discriminate to include the use of qualification standards ... [in]consistent with business necessity ) (emphasis added). 41 Section 4.05 of the CBA likewise supported the Hospital's judgment that shift rotation is an essential function of a daynurse position in its maternity unit. See supra note 1. By specifying but one criterion which excuses day nurses from shift rotation--namely, the prescribed levels of seniority--the CBA plainly implied that other criteria did not warrant waivers of the shift-rotation requirement, see, e.g., Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 495 (1st Cir.) ( '[T]he doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius instructs that when certain matters are mentioned in a contract, other similar matters not mentioned were intended to be excluded.' ) (citation omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2511, 138 L.Ed.2d 1014 (1997), and for good reason. Were the Hospital to waive the shift-rotation requirement for Laurin, either other non-senior nurses or senior nurses would have to be called upon to cover Laurin's evening and night shifts, which at the very least would violate the Hospital's commitment under CBA § 4.05(E) to reduce the rotation obligations of its nurses, see Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir.1997) ([T]he ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a [CBA].); cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1050, 140 L.Ed.2d 113 (1998); accord Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 789-90 (1st Cir.1989) (same, under analogous provisions of Rehabilitation Act), or else the Hospital would have to try to hire new nurses to cover the less desirable off-shifts. See, e.g., Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1094 (5th Cir.1996) (noting that employer has no straight day-shift chemical operator positions--all operator positions are on rotating shifts [--so that] [m]oving one operator to a straight day shift would place a heavier burden on the rest of the operators in the plant); Milton, 53 F.3d at 1125 (An accommodation that would result in other employees having to work harder or longer hours is not required.); Krennerich v. Inhabitants of Town of Bristol, 943 F.Supp. 1345, 1351 (D.Me.1996) (noting that ADA does not require employers  'to assign existing employees or hire new employees'  to perform abandoned essential functions of plaintiff's job position) (quoting Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 644 (2d Cir.1991)). 42 Laurin attempts to demonstrate triable factual issues on other fronts as well. First, she cites evidence that the Hospital had accommodated her in the past by allowing her to work less than full-time hours while she pursued her education, and that the Hospital probably violated the CBA by offering her those new part-time positions without posting them in advance. Be that as it may, we fail to see how such evidence is relevant to whether or not shift-rotation is an essential function. Instead, at most it tends to show that full-time status may not have been an essential function of Laurin's staff-nurse position, which is not the subject matter of CBA § 4.05. Moreover, Laurin acknowledges that the Hospital continued to insist that she rotate shifts even after 1993, when she assumed less-than-full-time status. 43 Second, we reject Laurin's claim that the temporary eight-week accommodation, during which the Hospital allowed her to work the straight-day shift, undercuts the Hospital's contention that it could not cover all three shifts without the shift-rotation requirement. From a labor-management policy standpoint, it would be perverse to discourage employers from accommodating employees with a temporary breathing space during which to seek another position with the employer. Here, the Hospital actively counseled Laurin in a bona fide attempt to locate a non-rotating position within the Hospital. An employer does not concede that a job function is non-essential simply by voluntarily assuming the limited burden associated with a temporary accommodation, nor thereby acknowledge that the burden associated with a permanent accommodation would not be unduly onerous. See Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827, 831 (3d Cir.1996) (employer's temporary creation of a new position for ADA plaintiff is irrelevant to essential function inquiry). 44 Third, Laurin maintains that the deposition testimony of her supervisor, Claire Margosiak, gave rise to a trial-worthy issue. Margosiak explained that in her experience it had been easier to find applicants willing to work straight-evening shifts than days-rotating. As Laurin views it, this testimony undermined the contention that the Hospital could not cover evening shifts without rotating day nurses to the evening shift. We disagree. 45 To repeat, Laurin--and not the Hospital--bore the burden of proof on the essential function element. See Dichner, 141 F.3d at 30. Once the Hospital articulated a legitimate reason for insisting upon shift-rotation as an essential function--i.e., that it could not attract enough nurses to work the off-shifts--Laurin had to adduce specific evidence to debunk the Hospital's rationale; in other words, to support a reasonable inference that the articulated rationale was pretextual. See Martinson, 104 F.3d at 687 (noting that once [defense witnesses] repeatedly testified that maintaining store security was an essential function ... [,] [plaintiff] offered no evidence to the contrary). 46 Absent further context the Margosiak testimony fell well short of the mark. For instance, absent evidence as to how many day nurses had enough seniority to be entitled to relief from shift-rotation, it is impossible to infer from the Margosiak comparison that the Hospital had enough evening nurses to cover all shifts. The Margosiak comparison--that it might be easier to fill straight-evening shifts than day positions--would not necessarily prove that the Hospital currently was able to employ all the evening nurses it needed, and without such proof Laurin could not establish that the Hospital did not need to tap its non-senior day nurses to fill the void. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(ii) (job function may be essential because of the limited number of employees available to assume a necessary function). 7 47