Opinion ID: 2709086
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the evidence against Ford

Text: First, Ford challenges her wire fraud conviction. We re‐ view the district court’s denial of Ford’s motion for acquittal de novo. United States v. Boender, 649 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2011). Nonetheless, in considering sufficiency‐of‐the‐ evidence challenges, we “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” and then “ask whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Here, we answer that question in the affirmative. Ford contests her conviction on the theory that the fraudulent transactions were always completed before she became involved. She argues that the relevant wire trans‐ missions—i.e., the transfers of the loan funds from the mort‐ gage lender to the escrow account at Title Zone—always oc‐ curred before the closings. At the time of the closing, she maintains, the lender had already approved the loan on the 3 We asked the defendants to avoid redundancy in their briefing by join‐ ing each other’s arguments, and they obliged. As we ultimately find no grounds for reversal, we see no need to specify which defendant adopt‐ ed which argument. Nos. 11‐3240, 12‐1207, 12‐1295 9 basis of White’s fraudulent mortgage application. Thus, once the wire transfers took place, the scheme was complete; Ford says her contributions during the closings consisted of en‐ tirely separate conduct dealing only with the scheme’s “pro‐ ceeds.” But Ford’s understanding of wire fraud is mistaken. To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, the government must prove that Ford participated in a scheme to defraud, that she intended to defraud, and that an interstate wire was used in furtherance of the scheme that she participated in. See United States v. Powell, 576 F.3d 482, 490 (7th Cir. 2009). There is no requirement that Ford personally cause the use of the wire. United States v. Turner, 551 F.3d 657, 666 (7th Cir. 2008). Rather, the third element of wire fraud is met if the use of a wire “will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended.” Id. (quoting Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1954)). The jury could easily conclude that Ford, an experienced closing agent for a title company, would be aware that wire transfers would routinely take place in a scheme involving loaned funds. Cf. United States v. Sheneman, 682 F.3d 623, 630 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding it “well within reason for the jury to conclude that [the defendant], given his involvement in the real estate market, could rea‐ sonably foresee that lending banks would use wire transfers to transmit loan proceeds in the course of real estate transac‐ tions”). Moreover, the timing of the wire transfer does not de‐ termine the scheme’s end‐point. The transfer is merely a ju‐ risdictional prerequisite for the federal statute’s application. For that reason, the transfer need not be the scheme’s objec‐ 10 Nos. 11‐3240, 12‐1207, 12‐1295 tive; it need only be “a step in [the] plot.” Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710–11 (1989) (alteration in original).4 Here, the transfer of the loan funds from the mortgage lend‐ er to Title Zone was just an intermediate step—the EHNS scheme was not complete until the defendants had the pro‐ ceeds in their pockets. For this to happen, EHNS needed Ford to act as the closing agent and submit the proper (or rather, improper) documentation to the lender. Only once the lender was satisfied that everything was in order would it authorize the release of the funds from the escrow account, and only then could White and Helton enjoy the equity pay‐ outs that Ford distributed to them. Ford’s contributions dur‐ ing the closings—her drafting the false HUD‐1 settlement statements, her failure to tell the lenders that the buyer was not the one providing the down payment, and her fabricat‐ ing the cut‐and‐pasted cashier’s checks—were integral to the scheme’s success. The fact that these contributions happened to take place after the wire transfer is immaterial to her cul‐ pability. The government established that Ford was an integral participant in a scheme to defraud in which the use of a wire was foreseeable. Accordingly, her challenge to the sufficien‐ cy of the evidence fails. 4 Though we are discussing wire fraud, we may draw upon reasoning from mail fraud cases, as “cases construing the mail fraud statute [18 U.S.C. § 1341] are applicable to the wire fraud statute [18 U.S.C. § 1343].” United States v. Gimbel, 830 F.2d 621, 627 (7th Cir. 1987). Nos. 11‐3240, 12‐1207, 12‐1295 11