Opinion ID: 208961
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Presumption of Surrender

Text: We first consider which amendmentif anygave rise to a presumption of surrender of claim scope encompassing the equivalent at it issue. The limitation at issue here is the gasket limitation. That limitation was not contained in original independent claim 1, but was present in dependent claim 7. In Felix's first amendment on September 10, 1999, he cancelled original claim 1 and rewrote original dependent claim 7 in independent form as claim 14 to contain all of the limitations of claims 1 and 7. J.A. 490-91. It was this first amendment that had the effect of adding the channel and gasket limitations of dependent claim 7 to the broader claim that was cancelled. [T]he rewriting of dependent claims into independent form coupled with the cancellation of the original independent claims creates a presumption of prosecution history estoppel. Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1134. Thus, Felix's decision in the first amendment to cancel original claim 1 and to rewrite original claim 7 in independent form as claim 14 gave rise to a presumption of surrender. [4] The interesting wrinkle in this case is that even after Felix cancelled original independent claim 1 and rewrote original dependent claim 7 in independent form, the examiner still did not allow the rewritten dependent claim. In other words, even though Felix amended the claim and thereby narrowed its scope in an effort to secure allowance, that effort did not succeed. [5] It was only after claim 8 was rewritten in independent form to include the limitations of claims 1, 7, and 8 that the claim was allowed. The fact that the first amendment did not succeed and that a further amendment was required to place the claim in allowable form, however, is of no consequence as to the estoppel. It is the patentee's response to a rejection not the examiner's ultimate allowance of a claimthat gives rise to prosecution history estoppel. See Festo, 535 U.S. at 727, 122 S.Ct. 1831 (When the patentee responds to the rejection by narrowing his claims, this prosecution history estops him from later arguing that the subject matter covered by the original, broader claim was nothing more than an equivalent. (emphasis added)); id. at 734, 122 S.Ct. 1831 ([A patentee's] decision to forgo an appeal and submit an amended claim is taken as a concession that the invention as patented does not reach as far as the original claim. (emphasis added)); id. at 740, 122 S.Ct. 1831 (A patentee's decision to narrow his claims through amendment may be presumed to be a general disclaimer of the territory between the original claim and the amended claim. (emphasis added)); Deering Precision Instruments, L.L.C. v. Vector Distribution Sys., Inc., 347 F.3d 1314, 1325 (Fed.Cir.2003) (Deering's addition of [a rewritten independent claim], coupled with the clear surrender of the broader subject matter of the deleted original independent claim presumptively bars Deering from arguing infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.). We therefore hold that the presumption of prosecution history estoppel attaches when a patentee cancels an independent claim and rewrites a dependent claim in independent form for reasons related to patentability, even if the amendment alone does not succeed in placing the claim in condition for allowance. It is also immaterial in this case that the cancellation and amendment were to application claims 1, 7, and 14 rather than to application claims 8 and 16, which resulted in the asserted claim. The presumption of surrender applies to all claims containing the [added] [l]imitation, regardless of whether the claim was, or was not, amended during prosecution. Deering, 347 F.3d at 1326. See also Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1142 ([T]he fact that the scope of the rewritten claim has remained unchanged will not preclude the application of prosecution history estoppel if, by canceling the original independent claim and rewriting the dependent claims into independent form, the scope of subject matter claimed in the independent claim has been narrowed to secure the patent.); Builders Concrete, Inc. v. Bremerton Concrete Prods. Co., 757 F.2d 255, 260 (Fed. Cir.1985) ([T]he prosecution history of all claims is not insulated from review in connection with determining the fair scope of [the asserted claim]. To hold otherwise would be to exalt form over substance and distort the logic of this jurisprudence, which serves as an effective and useful guide to the understanding of patent claims. The fact that the [the limitation in question] was not itself amended during prosecution does not mean that it can be extended by the doctrine of equivalents to cover the precise subject matter that was relinquished in order to obtain allowance of [another claim].). Thus, in this case, the cancellation of original independent claim 1 coupled with the rewriting of original dependent claim 7 as independent claim 14 gave rise to a presumption of surrender applicable to all limitations, found in any of the claims of the '625 patent, that correspond to the limitations of claim 7. We next turn to the scope of the presumptive surrender. [W]hen a claim is rewritten from dependent into independent form and the original independent claim is cancelled ... the surrendered subject matter is defined by the cancellation of independent claims that do not include a particular limitation and the rewriting into independent form of dependent claims that do include that limitation. Equivalents are presumptively not available with respect to that added limitation. Honeywell, 370 F.3d at 1144. Equivalents are therefore presumptively not available as to any of the subject matter added in Felix's first amendment. It is immaterial that Felix chose to add both the channel and the gasket limitations, rather than just one. The resulting estoppel attaches to each added limitation. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 525 F.3d 1200, 1218 (Fed.Cir.2008) (It is not relevant to the determination of the scope of the surrender that the applicant did not need to amend the claims [as they were amended] in order to overcome the prior art.); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Dakocytomation Cal., Inc., 517 F.3d 1364, 1381 (Fed.Cir. 2008) (The fact that narrowing the claim... may not have been necessary to distinguish over the prior art does not change the analysis.); see also id. ([I]t frequently happens that patentees surrender more through amendment than may have been absolutely necessary to avoid particular prior art. In such cases, we have held the patentees to the scope of what they ultimately claim, and we have not allowed them to assert that claims should be interpreted as if they had surrendered only what they had to. (quoting Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 432 F.3d 1356, 1361-62 (Fed.Cir.2005))). Felix is therefore presumptively barred from relying on the doctrine of equivalents to prove that Honda's In-Bed Trunk meets the gasket limitationone of the two limitations added by amendment.