Opinion ID: 2551468
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Granting Prosecution's Motion to Excuse for Cause

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court violated the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when it excused certain prospective jurors. He claims that he received a lack of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and denial of his right to a reliable penalty determination under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. A juror may be excused for cause based on his or her views concerning capital punishment only if they would prevent or substantially impair the performance of the duties defined by the trial court's instructions and the juror's oath. ( Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 85, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 [speaking of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment].) As a general matter, `the determinant is whether the juror's views about capital punishment would prevent or impair the juror's ability to return a verdict of death in the case before the juror. ' [Citation.] If the prospective juror's responses to voir dire questions are conflicting or equivocal, the trial court's determination of the juror's true state of mind is binding upon the reviewing court. ( People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1318-1319, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) On Hovey voir dire ( Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80-81, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301), the trial court granted the prosecution's challenges to excuse Prospective Jurors Marie B., Fidela C, and Bertram E. for cause. When the trial court asked Marie B. if she would vote against a first degree murder verdict or find false a special circumstance allegation just to avoid the penalty issue, she stated, I would have to avoid the penalty issue. I do not believe in capital punishment and the death penalty. In response to another question, she stated that it would be difficult to impose the death penalty no matter what evidence was presented. On examination by counsel for defendant, Marie B. retreated somewhat from the implications of her initial comments, or gave answers inconsistent with them. She clarified that she could find defendant guilty or not guilty despite her opposition to the death penalty. Still, she found the punishment barbaric and she could not impose it. In response to another question, however, she stated that she could put aside her feelings and follow the court's instructions, even if she did not believe I could be in favor of anyone getting the death penalty. But on further examination by the prosecutor, Marie B. agreed that the prosecution would be wasting its time, in the prosecutor's words, to ask her to return a verdict of death. The trial court ruled in essence that Marie B.'s opposition to the death penalty either substantially impaired or entirely negated her ability to follow her oath as a juror. Fidela C. also stated, in answer to the trial court's question, that it would be difficult to impose the death penalty no matter what evidence was presented. On examination by counsel for defendant, the prospective juror wavered. She answered essentially in the affirmative leading questions about her ability to follow her oath. But then she volunteered that she did not want to be part of a jury if it comes to a death penalty or life in prison, because it is going to be in my conscience. I don't want to be the one who decides on life or death. Counsel reverted to leading questions, and Fidela C. stated that she thought she could follow the law. Examined by the prosecutor, Fidela C. gave inconsistent answers. She denied being in the group of people who would be so preoccupied with the question of penalty that she could not consider defendant's guilt or the truth of the special circumstance allegations. This answer came in answer to a compound question that asked her, in part, whether she could not sit on a death penalty case because she opposed the penalty. The nature of the question left her response ambiguous. In the next question, the prosecutor asked directly whether Fidela C. would want to decide on life or death, and she said no, because she opposed capital punishment. But asked whether that feeling would make it very difficult for you to return a verdict of death, no matter what you heard, she responded, I don't know. I don't really know now. The prosecutor continued. She asked her own series of leading questions, which generated equivocal answers. Defense counsel asked more questions, receiving more equivocal answers; the trial court could not hear one of them. Finally, the trial court asked Fidela C, are you indicating ... that assuming that you are at the penalty phase and assuming that in your heart you felt that death was the appropriate penalty, would you be able to come into court and voice a vote for the death penalty? Would you be able to do that? She answered, I don't think so, your Honor. After hearing argument from both parties, the trial court ruled that Fidela C. would be excused for cause. It is painfully clear, the court explained, that the notion of a death penalty verdict is something that she would be incapable of doing even if the evidence justifies that in her mind.... Her whole demeanor was one of trepidation, fear, and indeed extreme emotional pain just at the thought of being included on this particular jury, [f] I think it is also clear ... just during the first phase of the trial that she would be substantially impaired because of a preoccupation with maybe having to deal with the issue of the death penalty, that she could not be fair to the facts or the parties. Bertram E., who had served on approximately three juries, answered the court's questions by stating that he did not believe in the death penalty .... [¶] ... [¶] [u]nder certain circumstances, and that he would be prepared to say the person isn't guilty. I kind of feel the death penalty hasn't proved anything heretofore as far as being a deterrent to murder. Questioned by counsel for defendant, Bertram E. retreated, stating that he could follow an instruction to consider guilt without contemplating punishment. Bertram E. also stated that he was not automatically opposed to the death penalty. He could impose it in cases involving airplane hijacking with hostages or the sale of large amounts of narcotic drugs. With regard to murder simpliciter, he stated, we have murdered other people because they murdered somebody. That hasn't deterred it in the past.... I don't think it will deter [murder] in the future. Consequently, I don't think that it's effective. He also stated that if he were punished for murder, he would prefer execution to life imprisonment. Informed by defense counsel that the case involved allegations of the sale of narcotics, and over the prosecution's objection that she was asking the prospective juror to prejudge the case (an objection that the trial court later agreed was proper, but overruled anyway so as to obtain the most information possible), Bertram E. said that you can't kill a person for having a few marijuana cigarettes in his pocket. But if he had a couple hundred thousand ... marijuana cigarettes in his possession, he's affecting that many people, cocaine, or heroin, or whatever. Then I would come down much harder on that person.... Thus, he agreed in response to counsel's words, which are quoted in this sentence, that the involvement of a large quantity of drugs would be a factor that could lead him to impose a more severe punishment. The prosecutor then questioned Bertram E. She asked him again whether he would avoid convicting defendant of a crime or finding true a special circumstance allegation that would make him death eligible. Bertram E. hesitated, then said, I would have to say my answer is yes on that. The prosecutor pointed out that the case was a murder case, not a drugs or hijacking case, and Bertram E. acknowledged that under that circumstance he would only vote for life imprisonment, even if he was able to consider the presence of drugs as a circumstance of the crimes during the penalty phase. Counsel then argued whether Bertram E. should be excused for cause. Defendant's counsel agreed that his answers were in clear conflict and equivocal. The trial court ruled that Bertram E. was very clear that he ... would not consider the death penalty for a triple homicide. It ruled that the prospective juror did not have an open mind, and that his ability to follow the law was substantially impaired. In excusing the prospective jurors for cause, the trial court ruled that they could not impose the death penalty against defendant even if they thought the evidence merited it. That determination of their state of mind is binding on us. State law required the court to excuse them, for they acknowledged their inability to act with the `entire impartiality' required of jurors. ( People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 183, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480; see now Code Civ. Proc., § 225, subd. (b)(1)(C) [same].) There was no constitutional impediment to the exercise of state law, for their ability to perform their duties was at least substantially impairedin fact their views prevented them from following the law. The court did not deprive defendant of due process or violate any other constitutional guaranty by excusing the prospective jurors.