Opinion ID: 1253673
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of the Recreational Use Statute

Text: In 1968, our legislature enacted a Recreational Use Statute (RUS), codified at §§ 27-3-10 through -70, which limits the liability of a landowner under certain conditions. In pertinent part, these sections provide as follows. § 27-3-10. Declaration of purpose. The purpose of this chapter is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes. § 27-3-20. Definitions. (c) Recreational purpose includes, but is not limited to, any of the following, or any combination thereof: hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking, pleasure driving, nature study, water skiing, summer and winter sports and viewing or enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic, or scientific sites. (d) Charge means the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land. § 27-3-40. Effect of permission to use property for recreational purposes. Except as specifically recognized by or provided in § 27-3-60, an owner of land who permits without charge any person having sought such permission to use such property for recreational purposes does not thereby: (a) Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for any purpose. (b) Confer upon such person the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed. (c) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by an act of omission of such persons. § 27-3-60. Certain liability not limited. Nothing in this chapter limits in any way any liability which otherwise exists: (a) For grossly negligent, willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity. (b) For injury suffered in any case where the owner of land charges persons who enter or go on the land for the recreational use thereof .... (emphasis added). It is undisputed that on the day George drowned, the driver of the car in which George was a passenger paid a three-dollar parking fee at SCE&G's recreational site on Lake Murray. The fee is a per-vehicle charge and is not related to the number of visitors in the vehicle. People who enter on foot or by bicycle are charged no fee. The trial court ruled that the parking fee was not a charge within the meaning of the RUS and therefore SCE&G was entitled to the protection of the RUS. Cole contends the parking fee is a charge that fits within the exception to landowner immunity stated in § 27-3-60(b). However, subsection (d) specifically defines charge as the admission price or fee asked in return for invitation or permission to enter or go upon the land. (emphasis added.) This definition limits a charge to a general charge for admission to the property. Courts interpreting this phrase have consistently held that a parking fee does not qualify as a charge because not everyone must pay it for admission to the property. See Stone Mountain Mem. Assoc. v. Herrington, 225 Ga. 746, 171 S.E.2d 521 (1969); City of Louisville v. Silcox, 977 S.W.2d 254 (Ky.App.1998); Hanley v. State, 837 A.2d 707 (R.I.2003); see generally Moss v. Dep't of Nat. Resources, 62 Ohio St.2d 138, 404 N.E.2d 742 (1980) (admission fee is a charge necessary to utilize the overall benefits of a recreational area). We concur in this view and conclude a parking fee does not fit within the statutory definition of charge. The trial court therefore properly held SCE&G is entitled to immunity for simple negligence under the RUS.