Opinion ID: 2626647
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Issue 4: Claim for damages for violation of duties imposed by contract

Text: [¶ 33] In his amended complaint, Mr. Cramer pleaded a third cause of action he entitled Claim for Damages for Violation of Duties Imposed by Statute, Regulation and Contract. In it, he alleged that PRC's policies, practices, and procedures violated the federal Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. 801 (MSHA), and regulations promulgated under that Act. He also alleged that PRC's conduct violated duties imposed by statute, law, regulation, contract, as well as by the Wyoming Constitution. While no particular contract was identified in this cause of action, it appears from later pleadings that Mr. Cramer's claim related to alleged violations of duties imposed by PRC's federal coal leases. There are several such leases covering the Caballo Mine, and within them are various provisions setting forth obligations such as a duty to maintain a safe working environment and to carry on all operations . . . having due regard for the prevention of injury to life, health, or property. [¶ 34] PRC moved to dismiss this cause of action. The district court granted the motion, explaining that it was unable to locate anywhere a recognized claim such as the one listed as Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action. Upon dismissing this as a stand alone claim, the district court also stated that: Evidence of the Defendants' alleged implementation of what the Plaintiff feels are illegal policies, practices and procedures may go to demonstrating the standard of care, as the MSHA regulations may be used to demonstrate that the Defendant[s] owed some duty of care to this Plaintiff. Therefore, the court is not foreclosing use of the evidence . . . for purposes of establishing a duty and/or standard of care. In his appeal brief, Mr. Cramer indicates that he is not appealing the district court's decision with regard to duties imposed by statute or regulation. That is because, at trial, the district court allowed Mr. Cramer to present evidence concerning certain MSHA regulations, and instructed the jury that regulatory violations could be used as evidence in support of Mr. Cramer's negligence claim. What Mr. Cramer does challenge on appeal is the district court's decision to dismiss his cause of action relating to duties imposed by contract. [¶ 35] We review a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss using this standard: When reviewing W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, we accept the facts stated in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. We will sustain such a dismissal when it is certain from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert any fact which would entitle him to relief. Ballinger v. Thompson, 2005 WY 101, ¶ 9, 118 P.3d 429, 433 (Wyo.2005) (internal citation omitted). [¶ 36] It is hornbook law, Mr. Cramer contends in his brief, that a duty may arise by contract. In support of that contention, he cites three Wyoming cases, all of which contain language very much like this: There are four elements to a negligence cause of action: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to conform to a specified standard of care; (2) the defendant breached the duty of care; (3) the defendant's breach of the duty of care proximately caused injury to the plaintiff; and (4) the injury sustained by the plaintiff is compensable by money damages. Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court and may arise based upon common law, contract or statute. Downtown Auto Parts, Inc. v. Toner, 2004 WY 67, ¶ 8, 91 P.3d 917, 919 (Wyo.2004) (internal citation omitted); see also Becker v. Mason, 2006 WY 143, ¶ 6, 145 P.3d 1268, 1270 (Wyo.2006); Natrona County v. Blake, 2003 WY 170, ¶ 6, 81 P.3d 948, 951 (Wyo. 2003). All three cases support the proposition that a contract may give rise to a duty, and that duty is one of the elements of a negligence claim. They do not support Mr. Cramer's contention that PRC's alleged breach of contract provided him a basis for pursuing a separate tort claim against PRC apart from the negligence claims he pursued at trial. The cases cited by Mr. Cramer do not establish that the district court erred in dismissing this claim as a separate cause of action. [¶ 37] What these cases do support is the district court's decision that a contractual breach may be used as evidence to support a negligence claim. The district court had explicitly stated that it was not foreclosing the use of such evidence for purposes of establishing a duty or standard of care. As noted above, Mr. Cramer did present evidence at trial suggesting that PRC had violated certain regulations, and used that as evidence to support his negligence claim against PRC. In contrast, he never attempted to offer into evidence any contract or lease that might have established PRC's duty or standard of care, nor did he offer any evidence that PRC had breached any contractual obligations. The district court's ruling did not preclude Mr. Cramer from introducing evidence that PRC may have violated duties imposed by contract, and accordingly, we cannot conclude that the ruling was in error.