Opinion ID: 3163997
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Background And Pre-Trial Proceedings

Text: Benjamin Francis died of lung cancer in December 2004. Dolores Hunter, the personal representative of his estate, filed a wrongful death action against Philip Morris USA Inc., Altria Group, Inc., and the Alaska Commercial Company, alleging that the cigarettes they collectively sold to Francis were responsible for his death and that they were liable under various theories related to fraud and products liability. Philip Morris answered, and the parties prepared for trial.1 In the months before the trial, both parties filed a number of motions in limine. Of particular relevance in this appeal is a Philip Morris motion that sought to preclude Hunter from referring to the findings of fact and conclusions of law from a 1 The claims against Philip Morris’s co-defendants were dismissed before trial. -2- 7071 federal lawsuit, United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc.2 In that case, Judge Gladys Kessler of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued an extensive opinion finding that Philip Morris and other cigarette manufacturers had violated the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act by jointly and fraudulently deceiving the public about the health consequences of smoking and secondhand smoke, the addictiveness of nicotine, the health benefits of “light” cigarettes, and design choices aimed at sustaining nicotine addiction.3 In addition to finding Philip Morris liable in that case, Judge Kessler enjoined the corporation from engaging in a wide variety of practices, including “conveying any express or implied health message or health descriptor for any cigarette brand.”4 To that end, Judge Kessler specified that words such as “low tar,” “light,” “ultra light,” “mild,” “natural,” and related terms could not be used in any branding, advertising or other informational material.5 In its motion in limine, Philip Morris argued that references to Judge Kessler’s injunction and findings of fact and conclusions of law would constitute inadmissible hearsay and otherwise confuse and unduly prejudice the jury. It therefore requested that the superior court rule that Hunter would not be permitted to introduce the findings directly, have a witness reference the findings, or cross-examine a defense witness using the findings. Hunter opposed Philip Morris’s motion. She claimed that she did not “seek to have Judge Kessler’s Opinion, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law or granting of 2 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006). 3 Id. at 27. 4 Id. at 938. 5 Id. -3- 7071 remedies admitted into evidence in this action, unless the door is open to such.” But she did request that the superior court “enforce Judge Kessler’s injunction” highlighting language from the opinion in the federal case that “prohibited [the defendants in that case] from making, or causing to be made in any way, any material, false, misleading or deceptive statement or representation concerning cigarettes that is disseminated in the United States.”6 Her motion concluded that, “[a]s a matter of comity, [the superior court] must enforce Judge Kessler’s injunction” and that Philip Morris’s counsel and witnesses therefore “should be prohibited from introducing evidence or argument that involves any of the findings made by Judge Kessler.” The superior court granted Philip Morris’s motion in limine, concluding that the judicial findings at issue were inadmissible hearsay. The superior court’s order noted that “it is not at all clear what plaintiff means in asking the court to ‘enforce’ the injunction,” and expressed the court’s “considerable doubt it has the authority to enforce an injunction entered by a federal court when plaintiff is not a party to the case.”