Opinion ID: 865480
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: My nephew, his - - my sister-in-law’s boy.

Text: For the foregoing reasons, Chim contends that he did not validly waive his Miranda rights, and therefore the trial judge erred in finding otherwise. ¶13. We disagree. The trial judge’s finding that Chim validly waived his Miranda rights was based upon appropriate principles of law and supported by substantial evidence. Holland, 587 So. 2d at 860. In Le v. State, 913 So. 2d 913 (Miss. 2005), this Court addressed a similar contention. Le argued, in part, that the trial court erred in suppressing his confession, because he had limited skill with the English language and therefore had not knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional rights. Id. at 931. In denying Le’s motion, the trial court reasoned: . . . . The Court would find that the evidence presented, shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement made by the defendant was freely and intelligently and voluntary made without any improper inducement. There were no—The Court does not find that there were any promises of salvation or redemption. Basically the officer was getting to the point, or asking him about did he know—did he understand right from wrong, and he indicated that he did. The evidence further shows that the defendant reads, speaks and 6 understands English well. He was born in the United States, although from a Vietnamese family. He still went to English-speaking schools to the tenth grade, and in his testimony today spoke English fluently, and indicated that he understood English well and read English well, and as I said before, went to the tenth grade. So there was no—the Court finds there was no improper inducement made, and that his statement was a voluntary statement; that he understood his rights, and that he made a voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights; that the proper [Miranda] Warnings were given to him. He initialed each and every one of those and signed his name, which he signed the name that he uses, Tony. So I'm going to deny the motion. Le, 913 So. 2d at 931-932. This Court found the issue to be without merit, stating “the trial court did not apply an incorrect legal standard, did not commit manifest error, and his decision was not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Le, 913 So. 2d at 933. ¶14. Other jurisdictions also have considered this specific issue at length. In Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F. 2d 1014 (2nd Cir. 1989), the court rejected the defendant’s argument that his limited understanding of the English language prevented him from knowingly and intelligently waiving his Miranda rights. The defendant’s native language was Spanish, and he was advised of his Miranda rights only in English. Id. at 1020. In its analysis, the court noted that, on each occasion that the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, he indicated that he understood them. Id. The court found that the defendant’s argument lacked merit and found that the defendant’s understanding of the English language was sufficient to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights, even though the defendant spoke in broken English with an accent and occasionally lapsed into Spanish while speaking. Campaneria, 891 F. 2d at 1014. 7 ¶15. In United States v. Bernard S., 795 F. 2d 749 (9th Cir. 1986), the defendant was an Apache Indian who argued that the waiver of his Miranda rights was invalid because he was advised of his rights in English and had only a limited understanding of the English language. In holding that the trial court was correct in its determination that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights, the court stated: It is clear from the record that appellant does have some difficulty with English. He testified that he neither reads nor writes English, he occasionally spoke Apache with his mother and Lt. Stevens during the questioning to clarify some items, and he was assisted in his testimony at trial by an interpreter. On the other hand, he admitted that he studied English through the seventh grade and that he answered Agent Bedford's questions in English. Most importantly, after Bedford explained each of his rights to him in English, appellant stated that he understood his rights. Bedford testified that I asked him if he understood [his rights], if he understood all of the wording, and he stated that he did. He didn't have any questions. I also made sure that his mother understood what his rights were. And I explained to both of them and asked them if they understood. And they stated that they did. At no time did appellant indicate that he did not understand his rights. Id. at 752. ¶16. Similarly, in United States v. Marrero, 152 F. 3d 1030 (8th Cir. 1998), the Spanishspeaking defendant argued that the waiver of his Miranda rights was invalid because of his difficulty with the English language, in which his warnings were administered. In affirming the trial court’s determination that his waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the court stated: The evidence presented at the suppression hearing showed that, at all relevant times, defendant spoke in English (including when he was banging on the door yelling let me in and open the door) and that he never asked for an interpreter or indicated difficulty with the English language. Moreover, several law enforcement officers, including Officers Crader and Meyer, Detective Knapp, an immigration officer, and a probation officer, testified about 8 defendant's proficiency in English based upon their observations and conversations with him. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not clearly err in finding that defendant could understand English and that he effectively waived his Miranda rights, and we further hold, upon de novo review, that the totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that defendant's statements were voluntary. Id. at 1034. ¶17. In the instant case, we find that the trial court’s finding was based upon appropriate principles of law and supported by substantial evidence. Holland, 587 So. 2d at 860. Chim, originally from Guatemala, moved to the United States in 1998. He has completed nine years of formal education, which included two years of English classes. The State presented the testimony of all three officers who were present at the time that Chim confessed, all of whom were subject to cross examination by defense counsel. See Agee v. State, 185 So. 2d 671, 673 (Miss. 1966). All conversations between Chim and the arresting officers were in English. The arresting officers testified that Chim never asked the police officers to explain any English words to him. Furthermore, all the officers testified that Chim understood and spoke the English language without an interpreter. ¶18. Chim was given a chance to read the Miranda waiver form before signing it, and he gave his statement in English. The officers also testified that Chim was not threatened or intimidated, nor was he offered any promises, hopes, or rewards. Moreover, they testified that Chim appeared to understand his rights, and that he voluntarily waived his rights. Additionally, the prosecution offered the testimony of Kimberly Chim, Chim’s estranged wife, who testified that during their marriage, she was not fluent in Spanish; hence, she and Chim communicated in English. 9 ¶19. Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit. B. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Denying Chim’s Motion to Suppress his Confession. ¶20. “Where a trial judge finds at a preliminary hearing that a confession is admissible, ‘the defendant/appellant has a heavy burden in attempting to reverse that decision on appeal.’” Le, 913 So. 2d at 932 (quoting Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d 613, 634 (Miss. 1997) (citations omitted)). “‘Such findings are treated as findings of fact made by a trial judge sitting without a jury as in any other context.’” Hunt v. State, 687 So. 2d 1154, 1160 (Miss. 1996) (citation omitted). In reviewing the trial court’s denial of Chim’s motion to suppress his confession, this Court “will only reverse the trial court’s determination of this issue when such determination is manifestly wrong. . . . or contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Glasper v. State, 914 So. 2d 708, 716 (Miss. 2005) (citing Manix, 895 So. 2d at 180-81 (other citations omitted)). Moreover, “[w]here the evidence is contradictory, this Court ‘generally must affirm.’” Hunt, 687 So. 2d at 1160 (citing Lesley v. State, 606 So. 2d 1084, 1091 (Miss. 1992) (citations omitted)). ¶21. For reasons stated herein, we find that the trial court’s denial of Chim’s motion to suppress his confession was not manifestly wrong or contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Therefore, this assignment of error is without merit.