Opinion ID: 796392
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unauthorized Disclosure of Grand Jury Materials

Text: 19 JDC also contends that the Government violated Rule 6(e)(3)(B) through the unauthorized disclosure of grand jury materials separate and apart from the disclosures authorized by the district court's ex parte orders. Specifically, it contends that the use of Special Agent Smith as the lead investigator on the simultaneously conducted civil investigation of XYZ and criminal investigation of JDC was improper because Special Agent Smith had access to grand jury materials as part of the criminal investigation that he would not have had access to had he solely been investigating the civil matter. JDC argues that, at a minimum, it established a prima facie case of a violation by Special Agent Smith and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on its claim. The district court disagreed and dismissed JDC's motion, holding that in the absence of any evidence of misuse of the materials by Special Agent Smith, there were no grounds to find a violation of Rule 6(e). 20 When considering a district court's ruling regarding a rule of criminal procedure, we review the district court's legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Shepard, 462 F.3d 847, 861 (8th Cir.2006) (internal marks omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, ___ S.Ct. ___, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, No. 06-7647, 2006 WL 3245008 (2006); see also United States v. Pardue, 363 F.3d 695, 697 (8th Cir.2004) (holding that a district court's interpretation of the applicability of a criminal rule of procedure was reviewed de novo); United States v. Olsen, Nos. 93-30186 & 93-30353, 1995 WL 46187, at  (9th Cir. Feb.6, 1995) (unpublished) (noting that a decision regarding whether or not material fell under the protection of Rule 6(e) was reviewed de novo as a mixed question of law and fact). 21 We first note that Rule 6(e) protects the secrecy of the grand jury in two similar, but distinct ways, through regulation both of the use and the disclosure of grand jury information. Disclosure, the sharing of information with another, is prohibited except in a few limited circumstances. Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(2)-(3)(A); (e)(3)(E); see United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 785 F.2d 206, 212 (8th Cir.1986) (defining disclosure under Rule 6(e) as requiring that information be shared with another), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1028, 107 S.Ct. 1952, 95 L.Ed.2d 525 (1987); United States v. John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. 102, 108-09, 107 S.Ct. 1656, 95 L.Ed.2d 94 (1987) (same). In addition, the rule also limits how certain persons can use grand jury information that has been properly disclosed to them. Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(B). 22 Disclosure of grand jury materials is permitted to any government personnel . . . that an attorney for the government considers necessary to assist in performing that attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law. Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(A)(ii). How a person can use information disclosed to them under this rule is limited, as the information may be used only to assist an attorney for the government in performing that attorney's duty to enforce federal criminal law. Fed. R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(B). Because JDC does not contend otherwise, we assume without deciding that Special Agent Smith was properly allowed access to the grand jury materials through his work as an investigator of the criminal matter. Thus, the issue of improper disclosure to Special Agent Smith is not before us on appeal; we must only determine if there was a violation regarding the limitations on the use of grand jury materials. 23 JDC argues that Special Agent Smith's simultaneous work as an investigator into the civil matter involving XYZ is itself enough to violate Rule 6(e). It contends that the use of a dual investigative agent violates the principle that a grand jury investigation should not be used as a form of civil discovery—arguing in general that it is a per se violation of Rule 6(e)(3)(B). See generally United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 432, 103 S.Ct. 3133, 77 L.Ed.2d 743 (1983) (noting that unfettered disclosure to government attorneys for civil use poses a significant threat to the integrity of the grand jury itself). The district court disagreed, stating that there is no rule against the same investigator participating in both a criminal and civil investigation, and concluding that without any real evidence that Special Agent Smith misused any grand jury information, there was no violation of Rule 6(e). 24 We have not previously been presented with the issue of an investigator simultaneously working on both a civil and a criminal case. In Archer-Daniels-Midland, we held that it was not a violation of Rule 6(e)(2) (prohibiting disclosure) for an attorney who had been assigned to the criminal grand jury investigation to later be involved in a civil investigation into the same company and matter. 785 F.2d at 212; see also John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. at 108-09, 107 S.Ct. 1656, 95 L.Ed.2d 94 (1987) (holding that Rule 6(e)'s disclosure rule did not prevent a government attorney from working on a grand jury investigation and then later on a civil case involving the same matter, because [t]he Rule does not contain a prohibition against the continued use of information by attorneys who legitimately obtained access to the information through the grand jury investigation). The issue involved was whether the attorney had violated the rule regarding disclosure of grand jury materials by later being involved in litigating the civil case. Archer-Daniels-Midland, 785 F.2d at 212. The court held there was no disclosure violation because a disclosure required that information be transferred from one person to another, and in this instance a person was simply retaining information and not disclosing it. Id.; see also John Doe, Inc. I, 481 U.S. at 408-09, 107 S.Ct. 1825 (quoting Archer-Daniels-Midland ). 25 Turning to the more directly related issue of the use of grand jury material, the Supreme Court held in Sells Engineering that Government attorneys involved in a grand jury investigation could not provide uncontrolled access to grand jury information to their civil counterparts. 463 U.S. at 430-31, 103 S.Ct. 3133. If the civil attorneys, who were not themselves involved in the grand jury investigation, wanted access to grand jury materials, the Government would have to get permission from the court before that information could be disclosed for use in the civil matter. Id. (noting that [i]f, in a particular case, ordinary discovery is insufficient for some reason, the Government may request disclosure). Thus, while the grand jury disclosure rules do not prevent the same Government attorney from working on both a criminal and a civil investigation, the criminal prosecutor may not disclose material to his civil litigation colleagues without court authorization. That is exactly what occurred here when the Justice Department's criminal prosecutor went to the district court and received permission to disclose various documents to another Department's civil attorneys. 26 As we noted, the rule preventing disclosure of grand jury material, Fed. R.Crim.P. 6(e)(2)(B), differs slightly from the one at issue here, which prevents those to whom information has been properly disclosed from using information for any purpose other than to assist an attorney in upholding federal criminal laws, Fed. R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(B). We have assumed, ante, that Special Agent Smith was properly granted access to grand jury materials as an investigator assisting an attorney in a criminal investigation. However, unlike attorneys, those to whom information has been disclosed to assist in a criminal investigation have a further limitation, and they are prevented from using the information for any other purpose. Fed. R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(B). A prohibition against using information is not violated just because a person has access to the information. 5 The fact that Special Agent Smith was also working on a related civil investigation, involving a different target, does not mean that he was necessarily availing himself of the grand jury information while conducting that civil investigation. Simultaneous criminal and civil investigations into related companies (or the same company) are not uncommon. While most of the cases involving attorneys have involved subsequent, not simultaneous, criminal and civil investigations, no court has yet prevented such simultaneous involvement by an attorney or investigator, and we decline to do so in this instance on this record purely as a preventative measure. 6 If an attorney is not barred from legitimately participating in both the criminal and civil sides of the case, it does not seem logical that an investigator should be so barred in all circumstances. Subsequent investigations must comply with the same rules regarding grand jury secrecy as a simultaneous investigation. The secrecy rules do not cease to apply when a grand jury ends its investigation, even if there is no indictment. In re Grand Jury Proceedings Relative to Perl, 838 F.2d at 307 (noting that while the interests in grand jury secrecy may be reduced when a grand jury investigation has ended, they are not eliminated); see also Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222, 99 S.Ct. 1667 (stating that the interests in grand jury secrecy, although reduced, are not eliminated merely because the grand jury had ended its activities). Thus, the rationale behind the rules and the interest in protecting grand jury secrecy apply to both subsequent and simultaneous civil investigations. See Illinois v. Abbott & Assocs., Inc., 460 U.S. 557, 567 n. 11, 103 S.Ct. 1356, 75 L.Ed.2d 281 (1983) (recognizing that [e]ven after the conclusion of a particular grand jury's investigation, continued secrecy protects the reputations of the innocent and safeguards witnesses . . . [and] stringent protection of the secrecy of completed grand jury investigations may be necessary to encourage persons to testify fully and freely before future grand juries). 27 JDC relies heavily on a Fourth Circuit case upholding a district court's decision to quash a grand jury subpoena that it determined had been issued for improper purposes—to further civil discovery (which had been stayed) rather than a criminal investigation. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 175 F.3d 332, 337-38 (4th Cir.1999). One of the three reasons given by the district court in that case to support the determination of an improper purpose was that the criminal investigator in the case had not been walled off from the civil investigation. Id. The other two reasons involved evidence that the criminal and civil prosecutors colluded on several matters and motions, and it was likely more than a mere coincidence that the criminal subpoena for documents mirrored an earlier civil discovery request. Id. In upholding the district court's decision, the court stated that none of the reasons alone were likely sufficient to quash the subpoena, but together they supported a finding that the district court had not clearly erred in determining that the grand jury investigation was a ruse for discovery in the civil matter. Id. at 338-39 (Taking these three grounds for the district court's finding—at least in the aggregate—we cannot conclude that the district court's finding . . . was clearly erroneous.). In the instant case, while Special Agent Smith was not walled off from the civil investigation, there was no indication or finding by the district court of any of the other issues that were present in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Under Seal, or other similar problems. In the case at bar, the Government was involved in a legitimate criminal investigation of JDC, and there is no evidence of collusion with the attorneys investigating XYZ. The Fourth Circuit case does not support the proposition that the fact of a concurrent investigator, in and of itself, is enough to find a violation of the grand jury secrecy rules. In addition, we cannot ignore the fact that both the analysis and issue before our sister circuit are easily distinguishable. A court's determination that a grand jury subpoena was issued for an improper purpose differs greatly from our determination of whether or not the rules of grand jury secrecy have been breached. 28 Our reading of Rule 6(e) and the related case law leads us to the conclusion that even when a criminal investigator has properly been made privy to grand jury materials and is also involved in a related civil investigation, no per se violation of Rule 6(e)(3)(B) occurs. In order to violate the rule, there must be evidence that the knowledge of matters before the grand jury held by the investigator has been put to use in some way other than to further the criminal investigation. 29 JDC contends that it produced sufficient evidence of misuse of grand jury information to warrant, at a minimum, an evidentiary hearing on the matter. At oral argument JDC conceded that there was no direct evidence of misuse of information by Special Agent Smith. In addition, most of the arguments advanced by JDC in support of its request for an evidentiary hearing have no bearing on how Special Agent Smith may have used the grand jury information that he was privy to, but instead simply support the premise that Special Agent Smith was in possession of grand jury materials—something the Government does not dispute. There is no evidence that Special Agent Smith used grand jury information as part of his work in the civil investigation. Without evidence that actual misuse has occurred, a court cannot find a violation of the rule. JDC has failed to produce evidence to establish a prima facie case of a violation of the rule, and as such the district court did not err in refusing to grant an evidentiary hearing. See In re Sealed Case, 250 F.3d 764, 770 (D.C.Cir.2001) (stating that once a prima facie case of a Rule 6(e) violation is shown, ordinarily the district court must then order an evidentiary hearing); Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1551 (11th Cir.1988) (holding that if there is no prima facie case of a Rule 6(e)(2) violation, then the court must dismiss . . . without an evidentiary hearing). While we have reviewed the district court's interpretation of Rule 6(e)(3)(B) de novo, we review the ultimate decision that the Government did not violate the rule for clear error. Shepard, 462 F.3d at 861. Looking at the record as a whole, including the fact there is no direct or circumstantial evidence of misuse, we find no clear error in the district court's determination that no violation occurred and in its refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing.