Opinion ID: 2027363
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: ¶ 5. Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(2a) [6] requires that a condemnor negotiate with the property owner in good faith before issuing a jurisdictional offer to purchase. It is not contested for purposes of this review that the DOT did not do so. ¶ 6. In Arrowhead Farms, Inc. v. Dodge County, 21 Wis. 2d 647, 124 N.W.2d 631 (1963), we discussed the effect of failing to negotiate in good faith before making a jurisdictional offer to purchase. Id. at 651-52. We explained that such negotiation is a necessary condition of conferring jurisdiction upon the administrative body and the court to determine just compensation . . . . Id. at 652. We grounded the requirement of good faith negotiation in a primary purpose of statutory condemnation: to provide just compensation to the property owner. Id. at 651. ¶ 7. In Herro v. Natural Resources Board, 53 Wis. 2d 157, 192 N.W.2d 104 (1971), we reaffirmed that a failure to negotiate before issuing the jurisdictional offer is a jurisdictional defect. Id. at 171 (citations omitted). We explained the nexus between good faith negotiation prior to issuing a jurisdictional offer and the ability to exercise the power of eminent domain: [U]nless there is a bona fide attempt on the part of the condemnor to induce the owner to sell the land at a reasonable figure, the condition under which the power is granted is not fulfilled, and in such case any attempted exercise of eminent domain is unauthorized and consequently void and of no effect . . . . Id. (quoting 6 Nichols, Eminent Domain § 24.62(1) at 85 (3d ed.). ¶ 8. In examining the negotiation efforts made in Herro, we reiterated that ch. 32 provides the exclusive procedure in condemnation actions, including the requirement to negotiate before making a jurisdictional offer to purchase. Herro, 53 Wis. 2d at 171. We explained that we strictly construe the portions of ch. 32 that apply to condemnation by requiring that the condemnor complete all of the statutory steps because condemnation is in derogation of the common law. Id. (citing City of Madison v. Tiedeman, 1 Wis. 2d 136, 83 N.W.2d 694 (1957) and Schroedel Corp. v. State Highway Comm'n, 34 Wis. 2d 32, 148 N.W.2d 691 (1967)). ¶ 9. It cannot be disputed that the DOT must issue a jurisdictionally sufficient jurisdictional offer to purchase before it has the statutory right to proceed with the condemnation of property. Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(4) establishes that requirement. It states, in relevant part: How notice of jurisdictional offer is given. The giving of such notice is a jurisdictional requisite to a taking by condemnation. . . . Such notice shall be called the jurisdictional offer. ¶ 10. However, not every defect in a jurisdictional offer to purchase is a jurisdictional defect. Jurisdictional defects are fundamental defects. Schaefer, 250 Wis. 2d 494, ¶ 25. Other defects in a jurisdictional offer to purchase may be merely technical defects. See id. In order to rise to the level of a fundamental defect, the error must go to the primary purpose underlying the statute that required the action. See id., ¶¶ 26, 28 (citing Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 167 Wis. 2d 524, 533, 481 N.W.2d 629 (1992); Schlumpf v. Yellick, 94 Wis. 2d 504, 288 N.W.2d 834 (1980)). In contrast to a fundamental defect, a technical defect does not go to the primary purpose underlying the statutory process, and if it does not prejudice the opposing party, it is insufficient to cause dismissal of the action. Schaefer, 250 Wis. 2d 494, ¶ 27 (citing Gaddis v. La Crosse Prods., Inc., 198 Wis. 2d 396, 407, 542 N.W.2d 454 (1996)). ¶ 11. The analysis of whether a defect is fundamental or technical is important to our consideration of the DOT's argument that Wieczorek v. City of Franklin, 82 Wis. 2d 19, 260 N.W.2d 650 (1978), controls the outcome in this case. In Wieczorek, the property owners contested the city's right to condemn their property. Id. at 20. After they had presented their case, the circuit court granted judgment in the property owners' favor because of a defect in the jurisdictional offer to purchase. Id. at 20-21. The defect was the failure to include a proposed date of occupancy, as Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3)(c) requires. Id. at 21. The Wieczoreks claimed the right to litigation expenses based on that defect. Id. at 22. The city argued that the jurisdictional offer to purchase had only a procedural defect that could be cured by issuing an amended jurisdictional offer and therefore, the Wieczoreks had no right to attorney fees. Id. at 22. While we did not directly state that the failure to indicate a proposed date of occupancy was a procedural defect, we quoted United States v. 4.18 Acres of Land, 542 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1976) with approval where a procedural error was held to be insufficient to sustain an award of attorney fees under a federal condemnation statute. Wieczorek, 82 Wis. 2d at 25. ¶ 12. In City of Racine v. Bassinger, 163 Wis. 2d 1029, 473 N.W.2d 526 (Ct. App. 1991), the court of appeals explained that it was possible to have a variety of procedural defects in condemnation proceedings, some of which were jurisdictional and some of which were not. The court of appeals quoted the circuit court with approval as saying: The procedural steps which [in other cases] have been found to be jurisdictional in condemnation proceedings all have two significant features in common. The first is that they are contained within the particular statute [that] sets forth the condemnation procedure, that is, the things [that] must be done to have and to exercise the power to acquire property by eminent domain in each particular case. The second is that the statute expressly or impliedly denies the power of the condemnor to act unless the particular step is taken, and no other statutory remedy is provided for a failure to perform the particular step. The only remedy [that] exists is to challenge the condemnation itself under Sec. 32.05(5) or 32.06(5), Wis. Stats. Id. at 1036-37 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original). This reasoning is persuasive. When we apply it to the procedural error in Wieczorek, we conclude that failing to include a proposed date of occupancy is not a jurisdictional defect. While Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3)(c) requires the jurisdictional offer to indicate a proposed date of occupancy, that task relates only to stating a proposed date. Indicating a proposed date of occupancy goes to neither the condemnor's power to act nor to a primary purpose of the condemnation procedure, providing just compensation to the property owner. See Arrowhead Farms, 21 Wis. 2d at 651-52. ¶ 13. Therefore, failing to state a proposed date of occupancy is not comparable to failing to enter into good faith negotiation before issuing a jurisdictional offer. As we have explained, a primary purpose of negotiation is to achieve a consensual sale of the property with fair compensation to the property owner. See Herro, 53 Wis. 2d at 171-73. Good faith negotiation facilitates sales that are not forced by a court decision based on the power of eminent domain, but rather, consensual sales arrived at through negotiation. Because achieving fair compensation for the property owner is the driving force behind the condemnation statutes, failing to negotiate prior to issuing a jurisdictional offer strikes at the heart of that legislative purpose. By contrast, failing to list a proposed date of occupancy does not undermine the primary legislative purpose that drives the condemnation statutes: achieving just compensation for the property owner. Furthermore, the Wieczoreks were not prejudiced by the lack of a proposed date of occupancy in the jurisdictional offer. Accordingly, we conclude that the defect in the jurisdictional offer to purchase in Wieczorek was only a technical, procedural defect. As such, it had no effect on the statutory right to condemn the property and does not control our decision in this matter.