Opinion ID: 1882336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Consideration of Mental Mitigation

Text: In issue eleven Rose argues that the trial court's finding on mitigation that Rose was not under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the offense is unsupported by the record. A great deal of unrebutted evidence, he advances, was presented to this effect, including his out-of-wed-lock birth, his troublesome childhood, his low IQ, his diagnosis of a borderline personality disorder, his neurological impairments, brain damage, and the evidence of intoxication on the night of the murder. Rose also argues that the court erred in refusing to accord each of the remaining mitigating circumstances greater weight. Dr. Toomer testified extensively for the purpose of establishing the following statutory mitigators: (1) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and (2) the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. [7] He testified that Rose suffered from a borderline personality disorder which caused him to do well for short periods of time but, because of his lack of coping skills and alcohol problem, resulted in his criminal problems. He also testified that tests results suggested the likelihood of some organic impairment or brain damage. With regard to a trial court's finding of a mitigating circumstance, we have held: The decision as to whether a mitigating circumstance has been established is within the trial court's discretion. Moreover, expert testimony alone does not require a finding of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Even uncontroverted opinion testimony can be rejected, especially when it is hard to reconcile with the other evidence presented in the case. As long as the court considered all of the evidence, the trial judge's determination of lack of mitigation will stand absent a palpable abuse of discretion. Foster v. State, 679 So.2d 747, 755 (Fla. 1996) (citations omitted). At first glance, the testimony paints a disturbing picture of Rose's emotional and mental state. Undoubtedly, we have found such circumstances to be of a significantly mitigating character. See, e.g., Hawk v. State, 718 So.2d 159, 162 (Fla. 1998) (clinical and statistical evidence of brain damage, mental illness, and intoxication at the time of crime constituted strong mitigation requiring reversal of death sentence). However, as stated in Foster, the trial court was not bound to find the submitted mitigators simply because of Dr. Toomer's testimony. Foster, 679 So.2d at 755. A close review of the record reveals that the State successfully attacked Dr. Toomer's findings through a combination of factors including: Rose's score of a ninety-nine on his most recent IQ test in prison; the rebuttal of Dr. Toomer's finding of a borderline personality disorder by the State's theory that Rose was a sociopath, as supported by various psychological reports done in the 1970's; indications from the reports that Rose's memory was intact, he was an outgoing person, and was of average intelligence; Dr. Toomer's oversight in not contacting any of the various doctors who had previously examined Rose; and Dr. Toomer's failure to interview any of the individuals closest to Rose. Considering this impeachment the trial court did not abuse its discretion on this point. See id. Testimony was also presented regarding whether Rose was intoxicated on the night of the murder. Sergeant Walker testified that Rose appeared to be under some influence, but [he] wouldn't say drunk, as he was cooperative and polite. Detective McLellan, who was there at the same time as Sergeant Walker, however, testified that he did not smell alcohol about Rose's person and felt that he was sober. The bartender at the bar Rose stated that he had gone to that night testified that she did not see him that night. Once again, the trial court did not abuse its discretion on this point. See Foster, 679 So.2d at 755.