Opinion ID: 552781
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the wheelchair restraint claim

Text: 19 In view of the factual similarities between this case and Youngberg, we accept Shaw's statement of the legal standard applicable to determine whether a bodily restraint is constitutional: it is unconstitutional except when and to the extent professional judgment deems this necessary to assure ... safety or to provide needed training. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324, 102 S.Ct. at 2462. 2 We agree with the district court's conclusion, however, that the record contains insufficient evidence to support a threshold finding that Shaw was, at least for constitutional purposes, bodily restrained. 20 Numerous witnesses testified that Shaw could, when he wanted to, undo his seatbelt and leave his wheelchair to crawl around on the floor. Saunders testified, moreover, that Shaw could leave his wheelchair even when the seatbelt was fastened around his legs, which was only occasionally. For purposes of deciding this appeal, we must accept as true Shaw's proffered evidence that the belt, when fastened around his legs, was more restrictive than when fastened around his waist, and that it made his movement difficult. This is a far cry from the arm restraints at issue in Youngberg, which kept inmates shackled to [a] bed or chair for long periods of time each day. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 160 (3d Cir.1980) (en banc), vacated, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). Given Shaw's ability to exit the wheelchair, albeit with some difficulty, we conclude that the degree of restraint imposed by defendants' occasional use of the seatbelt around Shaw's legs is simply not great enough to trigger due process protection. 21 Shaw contends that the district court erred in disregarding the testimony of his experts, who concluded that the practice of wrapping Shaw's seatbelt around his legs was inconsistent with the exercise of professional judgment. The experts, of course, need not have observed Shaw's treatment personally in order to render an opinion as to its professional acceptability. See Fed.R.Evid. 703. To the extent that their opinions were predicated upon factual assumptions about the effect of the seatbelt on Shaw's freedom of movement, however, those assumptions must find some support in the record. Pennsylvania Dental Association v. Medical Service Association of Pennsylvania, 745 F.2d 248, 262 (3d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016, 105 S.Ct. 2021, 85 L.Ed.2d 303 (1985). In this case, each of the expert opinions explicitly assumed that Shaw was prevented from leaving his wheelchair when his seatbelt was wrapped around his legs. Because, as noted above, this assumption has no support in the record, the district court did not err in disregarding the experts' conclusions. See id. 22