Opinion ID: 1614964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intentional Interference with Existing Contract.

Text: Our law imposes tort liability on a person who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract between another and a third person. Financial Mktg. Serv., Inc. v. Hawkeye Bank & Trust, 588 N.W.2d 450, 458 (Iowa 1999); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1979). An essential element of the tort is that the interference be intentional and improper. Compiano v. Hawkeye Bank & Trust, 588 N.W.2d 462, 464 (Iowa 1999). However, when the contract at issue in a claim for intentional interference is terminable at will, we require substantial evidence that the defendant's predominate or sole motive of the interference was to damage the plaintiff. Id. We agree with the district court that there was insufficient evidence to establish any predominate or sole motive by Wisner's to damage Condon. Crick had a track record of moving from dealership to dealership, and even Condon hired Crick from a dealership in Kentucky. There was no substantial evidence to suggest a plan or motive by Wisner's at any level to cause financial harm to Condon, or undermine its business, by hiring Crick. The contact between Crick and Stamoulis may have been improper, but this evidence was insufficient to establish the necessary higher standard of proof for contracts terminable at will.