Opinion ID: 852061
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The State Is Entitled to a Set-Off

Text: The trial court held that the State was entitled to set off the amount owed to New Horizon on the breach of contract claim against the amount the State paid in operating the receivership of New Horizon, and which New Horizon then owed. (App. at 36-39.) We think this is correct. Indiana Code § 16-28-8-7 governs who pays the costs of a receiver's appointment in a health care facility. The version of the statute in place in 2002 provided that [t]he costs of placing a receiver in a health facility, excluding the cost of the receiver's bond, shall be paid by: (1) the health facility, if the receiver is not a state employee; or (2) the state, if the receiver is a state employee. Ind.Code § 16-28-8-7 (Supp.2000). [6] Moreover, in 2002 the General Assembly added Section 0.5 to this chapter, providing, As used in this chapter, `cost of receivership' may include the costs of placing a receiver in a health facility and all reasonable expenditures and attorney's fees incurred by the receiver to operate the health facility while the health facility is in receivership. Ind. Code § 16-28-8-0.5 (2008); see also Act of March 14, 2002, P.L. 29-2002, § 2, 2002 Ind. Acts 760-61. Costs of placing a receiver in a health facility had not been defined under the previous version of the statute. New Horizon claims that the previous version of the statute limited recovery by the State to the cost of placing a receiver in a health facility, and this did not encompass the amended language of reasonable expenditures and attorney's fees incurred by the receiver to operate the health facility while the health facility is in receivership. (Appellant's Br. at 25-26.) New Horizon says this must be so because [o]ne cannot reasonably assume that [the 2002 amendment] was just a `clarification,' because the Legislature used the word `and' not `such as' or `like' (`cost of placing a receiver in a health facility and all reasonable expenditures'), thereby distinguishing the two. (Appellant's Br. at 26). Therefore, New Horizon says, any attempt to levy costs of receivership against it, as defined by the 2002 amendment, would constitute an impermissible retroactive application of the current receivership statute. (Appellant's Br. at 26-31.) FSSA, however, argues that the 2002 amendment was merely a clarification of prior statutory law, and thus New Horizon's retroactivity argument is irrelevant. (Appellee's Br. at 25-26.) The trial court reached the same conclusion, and so do we. Under most circumstances, an amendment changing a prior statute indicates a legislative intention that the meaning of the statute has changed. United Nat. Ins. Co. v. DePrizio, 705 N.E.2d 455, 460 (Ind.1999). We presume, therefore, that the legislature intended to change the law unless it clearly appears that the amendment was passed in order to express the original intent more clearly. Id.; see also Ind. Dep't of Revenue v. Kitchin Hospitality, LLC, 907 N.E.2d 997, 1002 (Ind. 2009) (amendment to tax code defining tangible personal property clarified existing law when no previous statute defined the term). The same rudimentary analysis we used in Kitchin Hospitality, LLC applies. Prior to the 2002 amendment, there was no statutory provision defining the scope of those receivership costs that must be reimbursed to the State by a health care facility (and New Horizon points us to no other authority doing so). After the 2002 amendment, there was. It certainly seems to us that in this case the Legislature was clarifying existing law. Id. Because FSSA did not have any contractual or equitable obligation to pay the healthcare costs of the Medicaid-eligible patients at New Horizon during the post-decertification period, there is no bar to the State's counterclaim for a set-off pursuant to the receivership statutes.