Opinion ID: 475301
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Road Authorities.

Text: 9 Lacey argues the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Crawford County and the City of Van Buren based on the statutory immunity of local governments from tort liability. He contends the statutory scheme violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by arbitrarily depriving a group of plaintiffs from access to judicial process. 10 Arkansas statutes generally provide that local governments are immune from tort liability, except that local governments must cover their own motor vehicles with liability insurance. 4 Under this exception, injured parties may recover against insurance carriers for damages caused by the negligent operation of government-owned motor vehicles under the direct action statute. Ark.Stat.Ann. Sec. 66-3240 (Repl.1980). There is no remedy in Arkansas for damages sustained as a result of other types of negligence by local governments, however. See Sturdivant v. Farmington, 255 Ark. 415, 500 S.W.2d 769 (1973). The Supreme Court of Arkansas has upheld this statutory scheme, recognizing the valid legislative purpose of making government entities bear some responsibility for wrongs to individuals harmed by their negligence, but also [protecting] these same entities from exposure to high judgments which would destroy them. Thompson v. Sanford, 281 Ark. 365, 663 S.W.2d 932, 934 (1984). 11 The equal protection clause generally requires that the state give equal treatment to persons who are similarly situated, unless a rational basis exists for discriminating among them. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955); see generally Hulva v. Arkansas State Board of Dental Examiners, 277 Ark. 397, 642 S.W.2d 296, 297-98 (1982). If, however, the challenged statute contains a classification based upon a suspect criterion, see e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-192, 85 S.Ct. 283, 287-89, 13 L.Ed.2d 222 (1964), or affects a fundamental interest, see e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336-342, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1003, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-631, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1329-30, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), the state must show a compelling interest to sustain it. A legislative classification is not generally suspect unless it classifies by race, alienage or national origin. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3255, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). 12 The district court correctly reasoned that because the legislative classification of tort victims was not based upon a suspect criterion and the right to bring a tort suit against the government is not fundamental, the statutory scheme need only have an underlying rational basis. The district court upheld the scheme as a valid legislative effort to provide a method and manner of relief to some victims of governmental tortfeasors. We hold that the district court did not err in sustaining the statute as rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 5 13