Opinion ID: 1543478
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Matter is Properly Preserved.

Text: The State argues that this Court need not reach the merits of the mitigation argument because, by acquiescing in the trial court's ruling, the petitioner waived the issue, thus failing to preserve it for appellate review. The petitioner rejoins that the matter clearly is preserved, maintaining that [c]ounsel's acknowledgment and respectful deference to the ruling of the court simply is not indicative of acquiescence or agreement with the court's decision. Even though defense counsel's response of Okay to the trial court's ruling denying the petitioner the right to present mitigation evidence is not an objection, whether the petitioner objected is not the dispositive inquiry in this case. In State v. Lyles, 308 Md. at 134, 517 A.2d at 764, we noted the right to allocute was not a fundamental, constitutional right and accordingly may be waived if not asserted at trial. See also Harris v. State, 306 Md. at 357, 509 A.2d at 126 ([T]he right of allocution ... is waived if not asserted by the defendant before sentencing.). Waiver consists of failing to request an opportunity to address the court personally. Lyles, 308 Md. at 134, 517 A.2d at 764. This makes sense inasmuch as Rule 4-342 places the onus on the court to afford the defendant the opportunity ... to make a statement and to present information in mitigation of punishment. When a defendant requests, or otherwise makes clear that he or she wants the opportunity to introduce mitigating evidence, Rule 4-342 requires that he or she be permitted to present such evidence as he or she may have. Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 425 A.2d 632, is inapposite. There, the trial court offered the defendant a chance to speak, which the defendant declined. During the time for allocution [the trial judge asked the defendant if he] `care[d] to be heard from[.]' The reply was made by defense counsel in the presence of his client: `No Your Honor.' To this answer no objection or other register of disagreement was made by the defendant; nor, after the imposition of sentence, was there any objection noted.... Thus, [the defendant] forfeited his right to appellate review of the allocution issue. Id. at 487, 425 A.2d at 646. To be sure, the U.S. Supreme Court also has addressed the effect of a violation of a rule similar to Rule 4-342, Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure [6] , and held that under the circumstances there presented, the violation was not reversible error. See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S.Ct. 468, 471, 7 L.Ed.2d 417, 421 (1962). It was the posture of the case, and not the fact of the rule violation, that proved dispositive, however. In Hill, the defendant was convicted in a Federal District Court of transporting a kidnapped person and a stolen vehicle in interstate commerce. 368 U.S. at 424-25, 82 S.Ct. at 469, 7 L.Ed.2d at 419. At sentencing, the trial judge made no inquiry as to whether the defendant had mitigating evidence to present to the court. Id. at 425, 82 S.Ct. at 469-70, 7 L.Ed.2d at 419. That failure on the part of the trial judge was not objected to, nor was it raised as an issue on appeal. Four years later, the defendant collaterally attacked his sentence by filing a motion, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Federal custody; remedies on motion attacking sentence], to vacate his sentence. He argued, among other things, that, at the time of sentencing [he] had been `denied the right under Rule 32(a) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure... to have the opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment.' Id. at 425, 82 S.Ct. at 470, 7 L.Ed.2d at 419. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the limited issue of whether a Rule 32 violation could be used to collaterally attack a sentence. Id. The Court acknowledged that there was no doubt as to what the Rule commands, id. at 426, 82 S.Ct. at 470, 7 L.Ed.2d at 420, and it was equally clear that the defendant was not given an express opportunity to make such a statement, nor did the defendant raise the issue. Id. The Supreme Court, however, was not convinced that an error of that nature constituted a successful collateral attack. Id. The Rule, it held, was not automatic, more must be present, for instance: It is to be noted that we are not dealing here with a case where the defendant was affirmatively denied an opportunity to speak during the hearing at which his sentence was imposed. Nor is it suggested that in imposing the sentence the District Judge was either misinformed or uninformed as to any relevant circumstances. Indeed, there is no claim that the defendant would have had anything at all to say if he had been formally invited to speak. Id. at 429, 82 S.Ct. at 472, 7 L.Ed.2d at 422. Although we need not address whether violating Md. Rule 4-342 is a viable basis for a collateral attack, the aggravated circumstances referenced by the Court in Hill is precisely what is present in this case: a defendant desiring to present mitigating evidence, a defense counsel ready to present that information, and a trial court under the mis-impression that it is bound by a ruling of the appellate court. It was not. When the petitioner, through his counsel, expressed an interest in allocution, in accordance with Md. Rule 4-342, the trial court was permitted to hear and consider the information before imposing the sentence. That the Court of Special Appeals' mandate contained particular instructions to merge two of the charges did not preclude the trial court from complying with its primary taskthe resentencing of the petitioner, which required it to take steps to ensure that the petitioner had a fair sentencing. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REMAND TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY FOR NEW SENTENCING. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE.