Opinion ID: 787760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence Related to Cooperation

Text: 61 Leavitt grumbles about the fact that the prosecutor elicited evidence about and commented upon, Leavitt's failure to cooperate with the investigation and to tell his ultimate story before he testified at trial. Most of his complaints arise out of his confusing true silence with lies, and cooperation with feints at cooperation coupled with suggestions to the jury that he had, in fact, cooperated. 62 A defendant who has received Miranda 13 warnings can, thereafter, remain silent without running the risk that the prosecutor will comment upon that fact. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-18, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2244-45, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). That part of the canon stated, however, it must be added that talking is not silence. Thus, when a defendant chooses to speak, the prosecutor can, surely, explore that speech and its implications. See Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408, 100 S.Ct. 2180, 2182, 65 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980) (per curiam). In that event, as the Supreme Court bluntly put it, the defendant has not remained silent at all. Id. 63 Thus, the prosecutor may point out inconsistencies. See United States v. Ochoa-Sanchez, 676 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.1982). The omission of critical details may also be explored. See id.; see also United States v. Makhlouta, 790 F.2d 1400, 1404 (9th Cir.1986). Similarly, when the defendant seeks to convey the impression that he cooperated with the police, the prosecutor can explore facts which suggest that the defendant did not do so. See McMillan v. Gomez, 19 F.3d 465, 469-70 (9th Cir.1994). 64 In this instance, statements that Leavitt made to the police psychologist were admissible to demonstrate inconsistencies with the story he told at trial and to cast doubt upon his claim of cooperation with the police. Leavitt conceded at trial that his decision to speak with the psychologist was voluntary, and there is no evidentiary support of Leavitt's claim that the police promised him use immunity in exchange for agreeing to talk with the psychologist. There was no error in admitting that evidence. 65 The same may not be quite as true of his silence at the special inquiry, which is arguably a judicial, 14 rather than a police, proceeding. The distinction between the two is enough to suggest that his silence at the special inquiry may not have been relevant to his claim of cooperation with the police, and that it was arguably improper to comment upon the exercise of his right to remain silent as to certain questions. However, in the context of all of the evidence in this case, including the myriad of other inconsistencies in his stories, any error was harmless as far as this habeas corpus proceeding is concerned. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1722, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). 66 Of the same ilk are Leavitt's ululations about the prosecutor's comment on the fact that a wholly new blood story surfaced at trial. When speaking to the police, Leavitt indicated that he had no idea how his blood could have been found at the murder scene, but by trial he had developed a wholly inconsistent explanation of its presence — the nosebleed scenario. His jeremiad about the prosecutor's exploration of his revenant memory avails him nothing. That surely was proper impeachment. See Anderson, 447 U.S. at 408-09, 100 S.Ct. at 2182; United States v. Harris, 726 F.2d 558, 559-60 (9th Cir.1984). It underscored his lies as well as his actual lack of cooperation. Then there was the cut on Leavitt's finger where, again, his trial explanation differed radically from his pretrial explanation. Again, his hope that he could misdirect the police investigation and claim cooperation at the same time must die aborning. See id.; Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1412-13 (7th Cir.1985). 67 In a slightly different vein, Leavitt complains of the prosecutor's showing that of all of the suspects, only Leavitt had refused to give a blood sample voluntarily. Leavitt asserts that it was improper to comment on the exercise of his right under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution to refuse to consent to a search. We have indicated that, taken by themselves, comments on the exercise of one's Fourth Amendment rights are improper. 15 See United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1350-52 (9th Cir.1978); United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 969 (9th Cir.1976); Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514, 518 (9th Cir.1969). But, again, Leavitt's argument is misdirected. Regardless of whether that Fourth Amendment rule should generally apply to habeas corpus cases, Leavitt's particular objection is answered by the much more banal and obvious rule that admission of the evidence was proper to attack his claim of cooperation. See United States v. McNatt, 931 F.2d 251, 257-58 (4th Cir.1991). Before there was ever any mention of the blood test, Leavitt had already launched himself on his theme of cooperation. The prosecutor was entitled to question that theme by showing that the leitmotiv was actually one of resistance. Again, we find no error. 16