Opinion ID: 2586091
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Remaining Procedural Challenges

Text: The master addressed the petition for thirty-day commitment and the petition for the administration of psychotropic medication in the same hearing. We now turn to Wetherhorn's challenges to the procedures followed in that hearing.
Dr. Jan Kiele was the sole witness to testify at the hearing on the two petitions. At the beginning of the hearing, Master Duggan stated that Dr. Kiele has previously been sworn, so just a reminder that he is still under oath. And also, he's been qualified as an expert in the field of psychiatry. Although Wetherhorn did not object to this method of reminding Dr. Kiele that he remained under oath at the hearing, Wetherhorn now argues that the failure to require Dr. Kiele to give an oath before each case and to qualify him as an expert in her particular case constituted plain error. Alaska Evidence Rule 603 requires every witness to declare that he or she will testify truthfully. The intent of the rule is expressed in its requirement that a witness be sworn in a manner calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind with the duty to [testify truthfully]. [70] This purpose was satisfied by the master's reminder to Dr. Kiele that he had been previously sworn and remained under oath. Furthermore, Wetherhorn makes no argument or showing that injustice resulted from the failure to swear in Dr. Kiele. Because the intent of the rule was satisfied and because no injustice was shown to have resulted, we conclude that the failure to swear in Dr. Kiele in this case does not constitute plain error. Alaska Evidence Rule 702(a) requires that a witness be qualified as an expert before proceeding to provide expert opinion testimony. [71] Wetherhorn argues that the failure to qualify Dr. Kiele during her hearing constitutes error because no record was produced from which the trial or appellate courts could determine that his qualifications were proper. But Wetherhorn does not argue that a psychiatrist working for API would not be qualified as an expert in psychiatry or that a psychiatrist already qualified as an expert in another case would fail to be similarly qualified in her case. Dr. Kiele also made no attempt to hide his limited knowledge of Wetherhorn's case. Because it is unclear what injustice resulted from the failure to qualify the API psychiatrist, we conclude that it did not constitute plain error.
Wetherhorn additionally contends that she was deprived of her right to counsel during the hearing because her counsel failed to deploy a number of strategies that may have changed the outcome of the hearing. She raises this claim for the first time on appeal. The right to counsel provided for in AS 47.30.725(d) necessarily includes both the right to effective counsel and the right to challenge court orders based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. But because such a claim cannot be effectively reviewed for the first time on appeal, we decline to address the merits of the claim in this case. Alaska Statute 47.30.725(d) provides: [t]he respondent has the right to be represented by an attorney, to present evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses who testify against the respondent at the hearing. Alaska Statute 47.30.700(a) provides that an attorney shall be appointed for the respondent within forty-eight hours of the initial investigation. Because, as we have already noted, a respondent's fundamental rights to liberty and to privacy are infringed upon by involuntary commitment and involuntary administration of psychotropic medication proceedings, the right to counsel in civil proceedings is guaranteed by the due process clause of the Alaska Constitution. [72] As we noted in V.F. v. State , whenever the right to counsel is constitutionally guaranteed in a particular proceeding, the effective assistance of counsel is also constitutionally required. [73] And the right to challenge a court order based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel derives necessarily from the right to the effective assistance of counsel. But as has been previously discussed in the criminal context, it is difficult for an appellate court to review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless a record has been developed that includes findings of facts and conclusions of law regarding the claim. [74] Therefore, in Barry v. State , the court of appeals require[d] that the question of ineffective assistance of counsel be argued first to the trial judge either in a motion for a new trial or an application for post-conviction relief. [75] In this case, we cannot review a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel without an explanation in the record for counsel's actions; otherwise we become engaged in the perilous process of second-guessing. [76] Because in this case no record has been developed, we do not review the issues. We therefore require respondents to establish a record concerning counsel's challenged acts or omissions by applying to the trial court to seek a new commitment and medication hearing by a motion for relief under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b) or by a Civil Rule 86 habeas corpus petition. [77]