Opinion ID: 2681345
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Instruction on kidnapping

Text: At trial, defendant challenged the kidnapping charge and the kidnappingmurder special-circumstance allegation on the ground that the prosecution had not proved the absence of consent, arguing that the evidence suggested that Gonzales willingly went with defendant and Jackson to exchange sex for drugs. He argues on appeal that the trial court‘s instruction on consent (CALJIC No. 9.56) was misleading. He also argues that the assertedly erroneous instruction violated his constitutional rights to a trial by jury, to have every element of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to a fair trial. Defendant failed to object in the trial court, but to the extent he is claiming that the instruction was erroneous (and not merely that the court should have clarified certain terms within it), his claims are reviewable under section 1259. (See People v. Whalen, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 81-82 [― ‗failure to request clarification of an otherwise correct instruction forfeits the claim of error for purposes of appeal‘ ‖].) We conclude that the trial court here did not err. The relevant inquiry here is whether, ―in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury was misled to defendant‘s prejudice.‖ (People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1189.) Also, ― ‗ ―we must assume that jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given.‖ [Citation.]‘ ‖ (People v. Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, 1321.) The trial court here instructed the jury on the definition of kidnapping, in the language of CALJIC No. 9.50: ―Every person who unlawfully and with 32 physical force or by any other means of instilling fear steals, takes, or holds, detains or arrests another person and carries such person without her consent for a substantial distance, that is, a distance more than slight or trivial, is guilty of the crime of kidnapping in violation of Penal Code Section 207(a). In order to prove such crime, each of the following elements must be proved: One, a person was unlawfully moved by the use of physical force, or by any other means of instilling fear; . . . Two, the movement of such person was without her consent; and Three, the movement of such person was for a substantial distance, that is, a distance more than slight or trivial.‖ Thereafter, the trial court here explained the meaning of consent, in the language of then-worded CALJIC No. 9.56: ―When one consents to accompany another, there is no kidnapping so long as such condition of consent exists. To consent to an act or transaction, a person must: One, act freely and voluntarily and not under the influence of threats, force, or duress; Two, have knowledge of the true nature of the act or transaction involved; and Three, possess sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent choice whether or not to do something proposed by another person. Mere passivity does not amount to consent. Consent requires a free will and positive cooperation in act or attitude.‖ Defendant asserts that the consent instruction was misleading because the jury may have interpreted the phrase ―have knowledge of the true nature of the act‖ (italics added) to require that the victim not only knew that she was being moved but also knew the intention of the people who moved her. According to defendant, the jury here might have found that Gonzales did not consent to going with Jackson and defendant, because she did not know that they intended to move her in order to rape or kill her. In other words, the jury may have found that she was tricked into accompanying Jackson and defendant, and it may have wrongly believed that such trickery could support a kidnapping finding. 33 It is true that ― ‗asportation by fraud alone does not constitute general kidnapping in California.‘ ‖ (People v. Majors (2004) 33 Cal.4th 321, 327.) This court has, however, in past decisions explained that, although the version of CALJIC No. 9.56 given here is ―not well-worded,‖ it nonetheless correctly states the law. (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 517.)7 ―The phrase ‗act or transaction,‘ which appears twice in the instruction, refers to the earlier phrase ‗to accompany another.‘ Thus ‗knowledge of the true nature of the act or transaction involved‘ refers to the act or transaction of accompanying another, i.e., physical asportation.‖ (Ibid.) We reject defendant‘s claim that Davis was wrongly decided on this point, and defendant has not persuaded us that Davis can be distinguished. Defendant next claims that CALJIC No. 9.56 was misleading in its final two sentences, which said: ―Mere passivity does not amount to consent. Consent requires a free will and positive cooperation in act or attitude.‖ Defendant argues that these sentences set the consent threshold too high, making it easier for the jury to find an absence of consent (and thus a kidnapping). He asserts that the jury may have concluded that Gonzales actually subjectively consented to going with Jackson and defendant but that it may have nevertheless found a kidnapping because Gonzales did nothing that amounted to ―positive cooperation.‖ The most natural understanding of the sentences at issue is to clarify that consent must be an exercise of ―a free will.‖ Thus, one who is unable to form any preference at all (perhaps due to unconsciousness or intoxication) is not consenting by way of passivity. Rather, a person who consents must exhibit some 7 CALJIC No. 9.56 has since been modified. The phrase ―have knowledge of the true nature of the act or transaction involved‖ was replaced by the phrase ―[h]ave knowledge that [he][she] was being physically moved.‖ 34 ―positive cooperation in act or attitude.‖ (Italics added.) We discern no error in the instruction. A person who is conscious and able to make a choice can express consent merely by being cooperative in attitude, but if Gonzales exhibited no positive cooperation even in attitude, then, despite her passivity, she was not consenting. Kidnapping does not require that the victim express some form of protest or resistance. Defendant‘s third assertion focuses on the statement in CALJIC No. 9.56 that the consenting person must ―act freely and voluntarily and not under the influence of threats, force, or duress.‖ The trial court here did not clarify for the jury that ―ordinarily the force element [of kidnapping] . . . requires something more than the quantum of physical force necessary to effect movement of the victim from one location to another.‖ (In re Michelle D. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 600, 605-606.) Defendant asserts that, by not clarifying the quantum of physical force necessary to vitiate consent, the jury instruction in question erroneously permitted the jury here to find the absence of consent based only on slight force, such as the force that would have been involved in helping the victim into the car. The consent instruction as a whole, however, conveyed to the jury that the required force must be enough that the victim‘s acts were not free and voluntary, and the prosecutor did not argue otherwise to the jury. Therefore, the trial court did not err in giving the instruction at issue.