Opinion ID: 220150
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consideration of Impermissible Factors

Text: Defendant next argues that the district court abused its discretion when it considered uncharged or unreported crimes in which it believed Defendant may have been involved. Defendant “contend[s] that, neither 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) nor the United States Sentencing Guidelines appear to allow a sentencing court to assume that the defendant had committed other crimes for which he had not been apprehended when determining an appropriate sentence.” (Def.’s Br. at 16 (italics omitted).) During sentencing, the district court stated: What the career offender, what the three strikes laws are about are people that just can’t learn, either will not or cannot learn from their prior experiences in the criminal justice system. It’s about people who we punish at least twice, okay, and in the case it’s been, what, 20 times, something like that, and then they just come back. And, 6 No. 08-6546 you know, finally, society and the criminal justice system just say, that’s it. I mean, you know, this person is unable or unwilling to conform to society’s laws. There is another thing about the sentencing guidelines, let me say this, that we have this thing called proof beyond a reasonable doubt and so forth, but there is an assumption out there rightly or wrongly within the sentencing guidelines that most people who are convicted, you know, most people that are convicted do not get caught and punished every time they commit a crime. Now, to some extent we can’t take that into consideration, but, you know, there is something to that, because it’s the old experiment with a dog. If I, regardless of how rewarding it was, if I were caught and punished every time I did something, chances are I’d just quit doing that because it just wouldn’t be worth it anymore, so there is an assumption that we try to take that into consideration here. And that’s why Mr. Wright is facing the sort of sentence that he’s facing today is he just, he keeps coming back to some court, and this time it’s federal court, and usually that’s pretty tough, you know. And so that’s why. (Sent. Tr. at 12-13 (emphasis added).) Nothing in the record suggests that Defendant’s actual criminal history was more extensive than indicated in his PSR. Nonetheless, the district court articulated as a basis for its decision to sentence Defendant to 188 months of incarceration, at least in part, the unfounded belief that Defendant had committed other unknown crimes for which he had not been arrested, charged, or convicted. A district court’s “consider[ation of] a factor that has no relation to the § 3553(a) factors” may constitute substantive unreasonableness. United States v. Recla, 560 F.3d 539, 544-45 (6th Cir. 2009). While § 3553(a) requires a sentencing court to consider the nature of the offense before it and the defendant’s history, it does not permit the district court to speculate regarding potential crimes that the court has no factual basis for concluding were ever committed. See Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 499 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that “false information about additional victims and additional time periods during which [the defendant] engaged in criminal activity certainly would 7 No. 08-6546 appear to be material” in reference to whether “materially false information” was impermissibly relied upon during sentencing). “When the sentencing court considers an impermissible factor in calculating a defendant’s sentence, a reviewing court will vacate and remand for resentencing.” Recla, 560 F.3d at 545. “[I]t does not matter that the district court relied on a number, even a large number, of relevant facts in its sentencing, if it also relied on facts that it could not properly consider.” United States v. Hunt, 521 F.3d 636, 649 (6th Cir. 2008). Because the government has declined to file a brief on appeal, it has failed to present any argument that it may have had that the district court’s error was harmless.2 Generally, “[t]o establish harmless error such that this Court lets stand a defendant’s sentence in spite of errors at trial or sentencing below, the government must ‘prove that none of the defendant’s substantial rights [have] been affected by the error.’” United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 559, 564 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 381 (6th Cir. 2005)). The government’s burden under this analysis would be to demonstrate “with certainty that the error at sentencing did not cause[ ] the defendant to receive a more severe sentence.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. Keller, 498 F.3d 316, 324-25 (6th Cir. 2007). Though the fact that the district court imposed the lowest available within-Guidelines sentence tends to indicate that Defendant did not receive a longer sentence than he otherwise would have, absent some showing or argumentation on 2 The government declined to file an appellee brief in this matter, though it did send a letter to the Clerk of this Court “respectfully ask[ing] the Court to set a briefing schedule” on any meritorious issues that this Court might find after our independent review of the record. (Pl.’s Letter of 02/18/2011.) Needless to say, this Court is not required to respond to a party’s request that the Court assist the party with its briefing by identifying “meritorious” issues. 8 No. 08-6546 the part of the government, this Court cannot be sure upon this record that consideration of the impermissible factor did not influence the district court’s determination. Finally, because the district court was explicit in its statement that it was taking its assumption that Defendant had committed many crimes for which he had not been punished into consideration in crafting its sentence, the case must be remanded to the district court for resentencing.