Opinion ID: 849242
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Continued Viability of the Diminished Capacity Defense in Michigan

Text: Since its inception in the United States, the diminished capacity defense has been the subject of much debate. [8] At present, there is a wide divergence of views among the states concerning the admissibility of evidence of mental illness short of insanity. See, generally, 1 Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses, § 64(a), pp 272-279. A common criticism is that the subtle gradations of mental illness recognized in the psychiatric field are of little utility in determining criminal responsibility: [T]o the psychiatrist mental cases are a series of imperceptible gradations from the mild psychopath to the extreme psychotic, whereas criminal law allows for no gradations. It requires a final decisive moral judgment of the culpability of the accused. For the purposes of conviction there is no twilight zone between abnormality and insanity. An offender is wholly sane or wholly insane. [ State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn., 1982) (citations omitted).] In State v. Wilcox, 70 Ohio St.2d 182, 192-193, 436 N.E.2d 523 (1982), the court expressed a similar view: Theoretically the insanity concept operates as a bright line test separating the criminally responsible from the criminally irresponsible. The diminished capacity concept on the other hand posits a series of rather blurry lines representing gradations of culpability. We need not join the affray because we agree with the prosecution that our Legislature, by enacting the comprehensive statutory framework described above, has already conclusively determined when mental incapacity can serve as a basis for relieving one from criminal responsibility. We conclude that, through this framework, the Legislature has created an all or nothing insanity defense. Central to our holding is the fact that the Legislature has already contemplated and addressed situations involving persons who are mentally ill or retarded yet not legally insane. As noted above, such a person may be found guilty but mentally ill and must be sentenced in the same manner as any other defendant committing the same offense and subject to psychiatric evaluation and treatment. MCL 768.36(3). Through this statutory provision, the Legislature has demonstrated its policy choice that evidence of mental incapacity short of insanity cannot be used to avoid or reduce criminal responsibility by negating specific intent. As a final matter, we note that even persons acquitted of an offense by reason of insanity may be confined and required to undergo evaluation and treatment. MCL 330.2050. As we explained in People v. Webb, 458 Mich. 265, 281, 580 N.W.2d 884 (1998), M.C.L. § 330.2050 is a measure to promote public safety. Persons acquitted by reason of insanity, particularly where the facts are grave, cannot be allowed simply to walk out the front door of the courthouse. The statute is clearly designed to establish a procedure by which it can be determined whether the person can safely reenter society. We agree with the Supreme Court of Wisconsin that [w]here ... the statutes provide that a person found not guilty by reason of insanity is to be committed to a mental treatment facility until recovered and until his return to society presents no danger to the public, the introduction of evidence of mental condition on the question of impaired capacity to form intent during the guilt phase of the trial could well be required to acquit the defendant, sane or insane, without ever inquiring into the issue of sanity and without regard to the provisions of the statute requiring treatment of those pleading and establishing insanity. [ Steele v. State, 97 Wis.2d 72, 91, 294 N.W.2d 2 (1980) (citation omitted).] Similar sentiments were expressed in Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 90-91 (D.C.App., 1976), a decision that is widely cited for the view that the diminished capacity defense should be rejected: Under the present statutory scheme, a successful plea of insanity avoids a conviction, but confronts the accused with the very real possibility of prolonged therapeutic confinement. If, however, psychiatric testimony were generally admissible to cast a reasonable doubt upon whatever degree of mens rea was necessary for the charged offense, thus resulting in outright acquittal, there would be scant reason indeed for a defendant to risk such confinement by arguing the greater form of mental deficiency. Thus, quite apart from the argument that the diminished capacity doctrine would result in a considerably greater likelihood of acquittal for those who by traditional standards would be held responsible, the future safety of the offender as well as the community would be jeopardized by the possibility that one who is genuinely dangerous might obtain his complete freedom merely by applying his psychiatric evidence to the threshold issue of intent. Like the Supreme Court of Ohio, we decline to adopt an alternative defense to legal insanity that could swallow up the insanity defense and its attendant commitment provisions. Wilcox, supra at 189, 436 N.E.2d 523. [T]he concepts of both diminished capacity and insanity involve a moral choice by the community to withhold a finding of responsibility and its consequence of punishment. Bethea, supra at 90, n. 55. [9] Accordingly, we hold that the insanity defense as established by the Legislature is the sole standard for determining criminal responsibility as it relates to mental illness or retardation. [10] Defendant, however, maintains that it would violate due process to preclude a defendant from introducing evidence that, although not legally insane, he lacked the mental capacity to form a specific intent. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 66 S.Ct. 1318, 90 L.Ed. 1382 (1946), dispositively answers this contention in the negative. The defendant in Fisher sought an instruction in his District of Columbia murder trial that would have permitted the jury to weigh evidence of his mental deficiencies, which were short of insanity in the legal sense, in determining the fact of and the accused's capacity for premeditation and deliberation. Id. at 470, 66 S.Ct. 1318. In upholding the refusal of the trial court to give such an instruction, the Supreme Court noted that [f]or this Court to force the District of Columbia to adopt such a requirement for criminal trials would involve a fundamental change in the common law theory of responsibility. Id. at 476, 66 S.Ct. 1318. The Court concluded that [s]uch a radical departure from common law concepts is more properly a subject for the exercise of legislative power or at least for the discretion of the courts of the District. The administration of criminal law in matters not affected by Constitutional limitations or a general federal law is a matter peculiarly of local concern. [ Id. at 476, 66 S.Ct. 1318.] Given the clear message of the Court's decision in Fisher, the reliance by both defendant and the dissent on other United States Supreme Court decisions not addressing the issue presented here is not persuasive. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Fisher to reach the same decision we do today: [A] state is not constitutionally compelled to recognize the doctrine of diminished capacity and hence a state may exclude expert testimony offered for the purpose of establishing that a criminal defendant lacked the capacity to form a specific intent. Muench v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1124, 1144-1145 (C.A.7, 1983); see also Mott, supra at 541, 931 P.2d 1046 ( Fisher stands for the proposition that state legislatures, without violating the constitution, may preclude defendants from offering evidence of mental and psychological deficiencies to challenge the elements of a crime).