Opinion ID: 2330522
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 11 Del. C. 621

Text: Under 11 Del. C. § 621(a)(1), a person is guilty of terroristic threatening when he threatens to commit any crime likely to result in death or in serious injury to person or property. To establish the commission of Terroristic Threatening, there must be proof of (1) a threat, (2) to commit a crime, (3) likely to result in death or serious injury to person or property. [26] Further, § 621 punishes mere words, because the statute is meant to protect against the fear threats engender. An intent to actually carry out the threat is immaterial. [27] Section 621 does not prescribe the requisite mens rea to commit terroristic threatening. 11 Del. C. § 251(b) provides that when a statute does not prescribe the mens rea required, the State must prove the defendant acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. [28] The State argues here that the evidence supports the mens rea of intent. [29] The State argues, however, that the only required intent is an intent to utter the words, but that somehow statements made in jest or in mere idle talk would be excepted. Section 621 cannot be so construed, however, and to do so would be unconstitutional. An intent to utter the words interpretation is fundamentally at odds with federal circuit decisions using objective reasonable person and subjective intent tests, and contradicts Watts ' instruction to consider the speech in context. A mere intent to utter the words interpretation would be unconstitutionally over-broad because it would place within the statute's ambit speech that is otherwise constitutionally protected. Therefore, we conclude that § 621 requires that the State prove not only that the defendant uttered words that facially threaten serious physical injury or death but also that in uttering them, the defendant intended to threaten the victim. The defendant need not intend to carry out the threat, but it is not enough to show only that the defendant merely intended to utter threatening words. Here, the trial judge found that Andrews committed terroristic threatening when he threatened to shoot Edmunds. [30] Reviewing the record in context, it appears that Andrews not only intended to speak the threatening words, but also that he intended Edmunds to hear his words as a threat of serious physical injury or death. Andrews stated that he used profane language towards Edmunds to get Edmunds to leave him alone. Even assuming Andrews's purposethat he used profanity to shock Edmunds and others into backing off and leaving him alone, weighing the words in contextthe trial judge did not err by finding that Andrews intended to intimidate Edmunds by threatening him with serious injury or death. Therefore, we conclude that the trial judge, did not clearly err by finding Andrews delinquent as a result of committing terroristic threatening as defined in 11 Del. C. § 621.