Opinion ID: 1058201
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Question of Maternity

Text: In addressing the question of maternity, we review findings of fact by the trial court de novo upon the record, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn.1993). Our standard of appellate review for questions of law is de novo with no presumption of correctness. Presley v. Bennett, 860 S.W.2d 857, 859-60 (Tenn.1993).
Historically, gestation proved genetic parentage beyond doubt, so it was unnecessary to distinguish between gestational and genetic mothers. Roosevelt, 39 Santa Clara L.Rev. at 97. However, recent developments in reproductive technology have caused a tectonic shift in the realities which underlie our legal conceptions of parenthood. With the technological development of a number of processes of procreation, most notably in vitro fertilization, the conceptive and gestational phases of reproduction can now be separate. Thus, the genetic and gestational mothers of a child are no longer necessarily the same person, which can result in a child having several possible parents. These new reproductive technologies and arrangements give rise to the fundamental question of who should be recognized as the parents of a child born as a result of various parties making distinct contributions to the process of procreation. Campbell, 77 A.L.R.5th at 574, § 2[a]. This technological fragmentation of the procreative process, insofar as it includes techniques for egg and sperm donation and preservation, has engendered a bewildering variety of possibilities which are not easily reconciled with our traditional definitions of mother, father, and parent. We now live in an era where a child may have as many as five different parents. These include a sperm donor, an egg donor, a surrogate or gestational host, and two nonbiologically related individuals who intend to raise the child. Indeed, the process of procreation itself has become so fragmented by the variety and combinations of collaborative-reproductive methods that there are a total of sixteen different reproductive combinations, in addition to traditional conception and childbirth. John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a Parent? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 353, 355 (1991). The degree to which current statutory law governs or fails to govern these realities provides the initial framework for our analysis.
Parentage is an area of law governed primarily by statute. Unfortunately, Tennessee's parentage and related statutes do not contemplate many of the scenarios now made possible by recent developments in reproductive technology. We now review Tennessee's statutory scheme. When construing statutes, we must ascertain and carry out the legislature's intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute's coverage beyond its intended scope. Premium Fin. Corp. of Am. v. Crump Ins. Servs. of Memphis, Inc., 978 S.W.2d 91, 93 (Tenn.1998). In ascertaining the intent of the legislature, this Court may look to `the language of the statute, its subject matter, the object and reach of the statute, the wrong or evil which it seeks to remedy or prevent, and the purpose sought to be accomplished in its enactment.' State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 275 (Tenn.2000) (quoting State v. Lewis, 958 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tenn.1997)). The Tennessee Code provides a single cause of action for establishing parentage. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-301 (2001). A court may enter an order of parentage upon the agreement of the mother and father unless the court on its own motion orders genetic testing. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-305(a) (2001). Alternatively, a complaint to establish parentage of a child may be brought by the child, the child's mother, a man claiming to be the child's father, or the Tennessee Department of Human Services. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-305(b)(1). The parentage statutes define mother as the biological mother of a child born out of wedlock. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-302(4) (2001) (emphasis added). Similarly, parent is defined as the biological mother or biological father of a child, regardless of the marital status of the mother and father. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-302(5) (emphasis added). The parentage statutes do not define biological mother. Consequently, we adduce definitions provided by Tennessee's adoption statutes. Statutes in pari materia  that is, statutes relating to the same subject or having a common purpose  are to be construed together. Lyons v. Rasar, 872 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn.1994). The adoption statutes define biological parents as the woman and man who physically or genetically conceived the child. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-102(10) (2001) (emphasis added). Code section 36-1-102(10) focuses solely on conception, making no reference to giving birth. The verb conceived is modified by two disjunctively related adverbs. On the one hand, physically is an adverb meaning in a physical manner and in respect to the body, Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 1707, and which thus means in a manner which relates to or stands in accordance with the laws of nature, id. at 1706 (defining physical). As used in the statute, physically . . . conceived therefore means having caused conception through natural means (coitus) as opposed to artificial means. On the other hand, genetically conceived means having caused conception in a manner pertaining to genetic makeup and phenomena. Id. at 946 (defining genetics). Genetic conception thus entails the contribution of one's genes [5] to a child. By providing for genetic conception in addition to physical or natural conception, Code section 36-1-102(10) implicitly accounts for genetic procreation via technological assistance. If practicable, a statute is to be construed so that its component parts are reasonably consistent. Marsh v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 42, 424 S.W.2d 193, 196 (1968). Every word used is presumed to have meaning and purpose, and should be given full effect if so doing does not violate the obvious intention of the Legislature. Id. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Cindy falls outside the statutory scope of the parentage and adoption statutes, which do not expressly control the circumstances of this case. It is appropriate to construe the parentage and adoption statutes narrowly insofar as this case involves such fundamental constitutional rights as parenthood and the right to procreate. See Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 578-79 (Tenn.1993); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600-01 (Tenn.1992). Further, we refrain from speculating about the significance of provisions which are not included in [a] statute, finding it more effective to consider the words actually used. Fletcher v. State, 951 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tenn.1997). First, although the definition of biological parents in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(10) implicitly accounts for assisted conception by distinguishing between physical (natural) and genetic conception, see supra, the adoption and parentage statutes do not further elaborate upon this distinction. Second, even the definition of surrogate birth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(48)(A) (2001) assumes the existence of a marital relationship between the intended parents on whose behalf the surrogate carries a child. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-102(48)(A)(i) (The union of the wife's egg and the husband's sperm which are then placed in another woman who carries the fetus to term and who, pursuant to a contract, then relinquishes all parental rights . . . .) (emphasis added); § 36-1-102(48)(A)(ii) (The gestational surrogate shall relinquish the child to the biological father and the biological father's wife. ) (emphasis added). As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, this definition of surrogate birth is expressly based on the predicate that the surrogate entered into a contract by which she relinquished all parental rights. Moreover, this statutory definition assumes that the intended mother is a woman other than the gestator. However, in this case not only was there no marriage or surrogacy contract, there is also no evidence in the record to suggest that Cindy gave birth on behalf of anyone but Charles and herself. [6] Third, the parentage statutes generally fail to contemplate dispute over maternity. For example, the rebuttable presumptions of parentage provided in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-2-304 (2001) focus exclusively on establishing paternity. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-304(a) (A man is rebuttably presumed to be the father of a child if . . . .) (emphasis added). The statutes also employ the term mother in a way that assumes we already know who the mother is, see, e.g. Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 36-2-303, 36-2-305(b)(1)(B) (2001), whereas references to father include such phrases as a man claiming to be the child's father, Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-305(b)(1)(C), alleged father, Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-305(b)(4), and putative father, Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-318 (2001). Similarly, the statute providing for an order of parentage is concerned solely with the establishment of paternity. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-311(a) (2001) (Upon establishing parentage, the court shall make an order declaring the father of the child.) (emphasis added). The statutes lack corresponding language concerning the establishment of maternity. The legislative history of the parentage statutes reinforces our conclusion that they fail to contemplate or to control the circumstances of this case. Where the plain language of a statute does not clearly resolve an issue, it is appropriate to consider the history and purpose of legislation in order to ascertain legislative intent. See Lavin v. Jordon, 16 S.W.3d 362, 365-66 (Tenn.2000). In 1997, the Tennessee General Assembly completely overhauled the statutes concerning paternity and legitimation. See 1997 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 477. The primary purpose of this change was to streamline and to simplify the formerly separate causes of action for paternity and legitimation by combining them into a single parentage action. See Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 36-2-101 to -115 (1996) (paternity) and §§ 36-2-201 to -210 (1996) (legitimation), repealed by 1997 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 477 (codified at Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 36-2-301 to -322 (2001)); Tape H-C & FA # 1 (Tennessee House of Representatives Children and Family Affairs Committee Mar. 26, 1997) (This bill is an effort to try to revise our statutes and bring us into the twentieth century and develop one system for determining and establishing the parentage of children born out of wedlock.) (statement of Rep. Kim McMillan). The 1997 legislation was also designed to correct a particular constitutional infirmity of the prior statutes. [7] Significantly, the legislative history shows that the current parentage statutes were not designed to control questions of parentage where sperm or egg donation is involved. In response to the observation that the new parentage statutes could potentially allow a sperm donor to file a parentage claim, Mr. Steve Cobb stated as follows: I can tell you that the clear intention, discussed intention, of this [bill] was not to deal with sperm donors at all.... [W]e wanted to put that off for another day.... The intent, and it should be stated by the sponsor in a colloquy on the floor if necessary, is not to affect that issue at all. Tape S-Jud. # 4 (Tennessee Senate Judiciary Committee May 13, 1997). Concerning the question of maternity where egg donation is involved, the legislative history contains no indication that this matter was ever contemplated as a potential issue. In sum, we conclude that Tennessee's parentage and related statutes do not provide for or control the circumstances of this case. Contrary to the position taken by the dissent which would restrict the basis for legal maternity to genetic consanguinity alone, we determine that these statutes simply do not apply to all conceivable parentage determinations. In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeals.
In the absence of express guidance from the legislature, the Court of Appeals looked to case law from other jurisdictions to resolve the dispute of maternity in this case. Among the few jurisdictions which have addressed cases like this one, where a gestational carrier implanted with donated eggs seeks parental status of the resulting children and where legislation does not clearly resolve the matter, two tests for maternity have arisen. Some courts have focused on intent, holding that under such circumstances the intended mother is to be deemed the legal mother. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal.4th 84, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 494, 851 P.2d 776 (1993); In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal.App.4th 1410, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 280 (1998); McDonald v. McDonald, 196 A.D.2d 7, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y.App.Div.1994). Other courts have instead focused on genetics and gestation, holding that genetic connection to the children is of paramount importance in determining legal maternity. See, e.g., Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 435 Mass. 285, 756 N.E.2d 1133 (2001); Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc.2d 54, 644 N.E.2d 760 (1994). The intent test has developed primarily in California. In Johnson , a married couple was unable to have children naturally because the wife had undergone a hysterectomy, yet the wife could still produce eggs. 851 P.2d at 778. The couple entered into a surrogacy agreement with a third-party female who agreed to give birth to a child on their behalf in exchange for $10,000 and other consideration. One of the wife's eggs was fertilized with her husband's sperm and was successfully implanted in the surrogate's uterus. However, when the relationship between the couple and the surrogate deteriorated, litigation over maternity and custody ensued. Id. Under California's version of the Uniform Parentage Act, both genetic consanguinity and giving birth were equally cognizable bases for establishing maternity. Id. at 780-81. The Court declined to recognize two legal mothers. Id. at 781 n. 8. In order to break the tie, the California Supreme Court held that when gestation and genetic consanguinity do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the childthat is, she who intended to bring about the birth of the child that she intended to raise as her ownis the natural mother under California law. Id. at 782. [8] The Johnson Court justified its holding in part by strongly affirming the validity of surrogacy contracts. Id. at 784. The genetic test has been set forth most thoroughly by the Ohio Court of Common Pleas in Belsito . In Belsito , a married couple wanted children, and the wife could produce eggs but could not sustain a pregnancy. 644 N.E.2d at 760-61. By agreement, one of the wife's eggs was fertilized with the husband's sperm and then implanted in the uterus of a gestational surrogate (the wife's sister). Without objection from the surrogate, the couple sought a declaratory judgment of maternity and paternity. Id. at 761-62. Like California, Ohio had adopted a version of the Uniform Parentage Act which provided that maternity can be established by identifying the natural mother through the birth process or by other means, including DNA blood tests, as provided by statute. Id. at 763 (citing Ohio Rev.Code Ann. ch. 3111). Also declining to recognize two legal mothers, id., the court applied a two-stage analysis for establishing maternity. First, if the male and female genetic providers have not waived parental rights, they must be declared the legal parents. Second, if the female genetic provider has waived her parental rights, then the gestator is the legal mother. See id. at 767. On this basis, the court held that the married couple, as the child's genetic progenitors, were the legal parents. Id. at 767. Significantly, Tennessee's statutory framework for establishing maternity differs markedly from the California and Ohio statutes under consideration in Johnson and Belsito . Compare Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-302(4) (defining mother as the biological mother of a child born out of wedlock) and Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-102(10) (defining biological parents as the woman and man who physically or genetically conceived the child) with Cal. Civ.Code § 7003(1) (West 1983) (The parent and child relationship may be established... [b]etween a child and the natural mother ... by proof of her having given birth to the child, or under this part.), repealed by 1992 Cal. Stat. c. 162 (A.B.2650), § 4 and Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 3111.02 (West 1992) (The parent and child relationship between a child and the child's natural mother may be established by proof of her having given birth to the child or pursuant to [other sections of the Ohio Revised Code].). Consequently, neither California's intent test nor Ohio's genetic test is strictly apposite to our statutory scheme. Further, both the intent test and the genetic test suffer from inadequacies. For example, in Johnson the California Supreme Court crafted an unnecessarily broad rule which could afford maternal status even to a woman who failed to qualify under either of California's two statutory bases for maternity. See Johnson, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 494, 851 P.2d at 783. According to Belsito , the intent formulation of Johnson has discarded both genetics and birth as the primary means of identifying the natural maternal parent, Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 764, and provides for, in effect, a private adoption process that is readily subject to all the defects and pressures of such a process, id. at 766. In Tennessee, unlicensed and unregulated adoption is statutorily prohibited and subject to criminal penalties. See Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 36-1-108 to -109 (2001). However, the genetic test of Belsito also has significantly broad implications. In the event that a dispute were to arise between an intended mother who had obtained eggs from a third-party donor and a gestational surrogate in whom the eggs had been implanted, the genetic test would implicitly invalidate any surrogacy agreement. The genetic test could also have practical effects similar to the adoption-default model criticized by In re Marriage of Buzzanca, see 72 Cal.Rptr.2d at 289, in that an intended mother who employs techniques for assisted reproduction including egg donation would by default have to submit to government-controlled adoption procedures to attain a secure legal status as mother. Policy-wise, the requirement of such regulation may or may not be sound. Consequently, we decline to adopt either the intent test or the genetic test as a general rule for resolving this case. We thus vacate the adoption of the intent test of Johnson by the courts below.
In light of the foregoing analysis, we deem it appropriate to decide this case on particularly narrow grounds. In Davis the primary issue hinged on the constitutional right to avoid procreation, see 842 S.W.2d at 601-02, but in the instant case the issue surrounds the maternity and custody of children who have already been born as the result of techniques for assisted reproduction and egg donation. Children, of course, are not property, and the State's interest in the welfare of children is eminently greater than the State's interest in controlling preembryos. The distinction between Davis and this case thus highlights the complexities involved in determining whether the affirmative attempt to procreate via technological assistance including egg or sperm donation is more closely analogous to procreative autonomy with its corresponding right of privacy or more closely analogous to a private form of adoption and thus more susceptible to governmental regulation in the interest of child welfare. Such a determinationwhich strikes at the very roots of current social valuesis inherently policy-laden and both administratively and fiscally momentous, and its resolution on a broad scale is properly reserved for the legislature. Therefore, in resolving this case we focus closely on its particular facts. Charles and Cindy, an unmarried couple, wanted to start a family and agreed to rear a child together permanently as father and mother, not suspecting that their own relationship would eventually fall apart. Given Cindy's age, they agreed to fertilize anonymously donated eggs with Charles's sperm and to implant the fertilized eggs in Cindy's uterus. Before the procedure, Charles and Cindy executed the Recipient Consent in which Charles acknowledged Cindy's status as mother and in which Cindy agreed to accept all the responsibilities of parenthood: I, Cindy (wife), understand that the child(ren) conceived by this method will not have my genetic material, but will have that of the oocyte [egg] donor and my husband [sic]. However, regardless of the outcome, I will be the mother of any child(ren) born to me as a result of egg donation and hereby accept all the legal responsibilities required of such a parent. Cindy was impregnated and carried not just one but three fetuses to term. After a complicated pregnancy, she gave birth via caesarian section to triplets. Charles allowed Cindy to be named the mother on the children's birth certificates. After the children were born, Charles and Cindy lived together in an arrangement where both Charles and Cindy performed the role of parent. Having recounted these events, we now discuss the relevant factors which we consider to be significant for deciding this case.
Both statute and sound policy support genetics as an important factor in establishing legal maternity. Human reproduction as we now know it cannot take place without the involvement of genetic material. As analyzed above, Tennessee's domestic relations statutes provide for the establishment of legal maternity based on genetic consanguinity. See §§ 36-2-302(4) (defining mother as the biological mother of a child born out of wedlock), 36-1-102(10) (defining biological parents as the woman and man who physically or genetically conceived the child). In emphasizing genetics, Belsito recognizes and honors an individual's decision to procreate or to refrain from procreating. 644 N.E.2d at 766 (The procreation of a child, that is, the replication of the unique genes of an individual, should occur only with the consent of that individual. (citing Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 588)). As we held in Davis , such decisions enjoy constitutional protection. 842 S.W.2d at 600-01. However, our recognition in Davis of the constitutional right to control the disposition of one's genetic material does not mean that Davis stands for the proposition that genetics must be paramount in all parentage determinations. In cases such as this one, where a woman has become intimately involved in the procreation process even though she has not contributed genetic material, factors other than genetics take on special significance.
Before the children's birth, both Cindy and the genetic father, Charles, voluntarily demonstrated the bona fide intent that Cindy would be the children's legal mother, and they agreed that Cindy would accept all the legal responsibility as well as the legal rights of parenthood. We consider the intent to take on both parental rights and responsibilities as one important factor among others for resolving this controversy. Although our decision in Davis does not control this case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that it is nonetheless instructive. In Davis , this Court had to decide whether a man could prevent donation and implantation against his will of a preembryo (an early-stage fertilized egg) containing his genes. 842 S.W.2d at 589-90. We held that just as an individual enjoys a constitutionally-protected right to procreate, an individual also has a similar right to avoid procreation. Id. at 600-01. We concluded that disputes over the control of preembryos are to be resolved first by looking to the agreement of the progenitors and second, in the absence of agreement, by weighing the relative interests of the male and female providers of reproductive cells. Id. at 604. Davis thus underscored the importance of intent and agreement with respect to the disposition of an individual's reproductive and genetic material. Although Tennessee's parentage statutes recognize maternity on the basis of genetics, see Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 36-1-102(10), 36-2-302(4), as we have seen that the parentage statutes do not expressly control this case and thus do not necessarily confine the establishment of legal maternity to genetics alone. To the contrary, we determine that taking intent into consideration as a factor is consistent with policy implicit in Tennessee's domestic relations statutes. Significantly, the artificial insemination statute of Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-3-306 (2001) supports the consideration of intent as a factor for establishing legal maternity. This section is entitled Birth from artificial insemination and is contained in the part of the Tennessee Code which addresses vital records. It provides as follows: A child born to a married woman as a result of artificial insemination, with consent of such married woman's husband, is deemed to be the legitimate child of the husband and wife. Tenn.Code Ann. § 68-3-306. Like the parentage statutes, Code section 68-3-306 does not expressly govern this case because the statute contemplates and provides for an agreement within the context of marriage; Charles and Cindy were not married, and in any event there is now a lack of consent. Notwithstanding, it is significant that Code section 68-3-306 confers parental status on a husband even though the child conceived in his wife via artificial insemination is not necessarily genetically related to him. The artificial insemination statute thus reflects a policy which favors taking into account intent in establishing parentage when technological assistance is involved.
Cindy became pregnant and gave birth to the children with the intent of raising them as her own. As mentioned above, historically gestation proved genetic parentage beyond doubt and thus was conclusive of maternity. See Roosevelt, 39 Santa Clara L.Rev. at 97; see also Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining Motherhood in the Era of Assisted Human Reproduction 17 Cardozo L.Rev. 497, 501 (1996) (When the two functions of genetic contribution and gestation were inextricably bound, the issue of legal motherhood at birth was not disputable. The ancient maxim, mater est quam gestation demonstrat (by gestation the mother is demonstrated), unqualifiedly applied to all births.). The common law thus has presumed that the birth mother is the legal mother of the child. See Coleman, 17 Cardozo L.Rev. at 524. It is only quite recently that modern technology has made it possible to separate and to distribute among multiple persons or environments the genetic and gestational roles. We consider gestation as another important factor in determining legal maternity in this case. To be sure, as discussed above, genetics remains an irreplaceable component of human reproduction, and as such genetic consanguinity is and should be particularly important to parentage determinations. And as our analysis above has shown, Tennessee's domestic relations statutes expressly account for genetics in parentage determinations. See Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 36-1-102(10), § 36-2-302(4). However, as our analysis above has also shown, Tennessee's parentage and related statutes were simply not designed to control the circumstances of this case. To restrict legal maternity to genetic consanguinity alone where, as in this case, the genetic mother is an egg donor who has waived her parental rights and who has been and remains permanently anonymous would result in the absurdity of children having, for all practical purposes, no legal mother. A child's knowledge that he or she has an anonymous and inaccessible mother somewhere in the world would provide only cold comfort, and demanding such a result in cases like this one could hardly promote the best interests of children. Courts must presume that the Legislature did not intend an absurdity and adopt, if possible, a reasonable construction which provides for a harmonious operation of the laws. Fletcher, 951 S.W.2d at 382 (citing Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tenn.1995) and Epstein v. State, 211 Tenn. 633, 366 S.W.2d 914 (1963)). We further observe that in this case the genetic mother has donated her eggs to another and has correspondingly waived her parental rights, thereby relinquishing her status as legal mother. As Belsito correctly concludes, a genetic test cannot be the only basis for determining who will assume the status of legal parent. 644 N.E.2d at 767. Although giving birth is conspicuously absent from Tennessee's parentage statutes, as discussed above, there is no indication that the General Assembly sought to exclude it as a basis for legal maternity or even sought to decide questions of maternity at all. In this regard, the artificial insemination statute is once again significant. In addition to recognizing paternity where artificial insemination is involved, Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-3-306 confers parental status on a wife when she gives birth to a child as the result of artificial insemination. This statute displays a policy which favors recognizing gestation and giving birth as a basis for legal maternity. Accordingly, we conclude that sound policy and common sense favor recognizing gestation as an important factor for establishing legal maternity. Although current technology allows the separation between gestation and genetic contribution, it does not follow that gestation is now a less important part of parenthood. Coleman, 17 Cardozo L.Rev. at 517. In our view, the dissent accords too little significance to gestation as a factor for deciding this controversy.
Another factor to consider in resolving this case is the nature of the controversy. Here we are not faced with a controversy between a birth mother and a genetic mother where the genetic and gestational roles have been separated and distributed among two women. In this case, the genetic mother has fully waived her parental rights and remains anonymous. Nor is this a case involving a dispute between a traditional or gestational surrogate and a genetically-unrelated intended mother who wishes to raise the child as her own. Rather, Cindy became pregnant and gave birth to triplets on her own behalf, and the sole dispute is between her and the genetic father, Charles. The other kinds of conflicts present different questions and ones which would be inappropriate for us to decide here. Instead, we limit our holding today to cases where there is no controversy between the gestator and the genetic mother.
Deciding this case narrowly based on its particular facts, we affirm on separate grounds the holding of the courts below that Cindy is the legal mother. Our holding that Cindy is the legal mother of C.K.G., C.A.G., and C.L.G. with all the legal rights and responsibilities of parenthood is based on the following factors. First, prior to the children's birth, both Cindy, the gestator, and Charles, the genetic father, voluntarily demonstrated the bona fide intent that Cindy would be the children's legal mother and agreed that Cindy would accept the legal responsibility as well as the legal rights of parenthood. Second, Cindy then became pregnant, carried to term, and gave birth to the three children as her own. Third, this case does not involve a controversy between a gestator and a female genetic progenitor where the genetic and gestative roles have been separated and distributed among two women, nor does this case involve a controversy between a traditional or gestational surrogate and a genetically-unrelated intended mother; our holding today is not designed to control such controversies. Even though Cindy lacks genetic connection to the triplets, in light of all the factors considered we determine that Cindy is the children's legal mother. We further conclude that in light of the factors considered, Charles's genetic paternity does not give him a parental status superior to that of Cindy. Having thus concluded that Cindy is the children's legal mother, the question of estoppel is moot, and we vacate the holding of the Court of Appeals that Charles is estopped to deny Cindy's maternal status.
Given the far-reaching, profoundly complex, and competing public policy considerations necessarily implicated by the present controversy, we conclude that crafting a general rule to adjudicate all controversies so implicated is more appropriately accomplished by the Tennessee General Assembly. [9] Cf. Taylor v. Beard, 104 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tenn.2003) (declining to create a previously unrecognized common law cause of action where doing so would have far-reaching social and legal consequences in an area that we have consistently left to legislative discretion). The General Assembly is better suited than the courts to gather data, to investigate issues not subject to current litigation, and to debate the competing values and the costs involved in such an issue as deciding whether generally to subject procreation via technological assistance to governmental oversight, and if so, to determine what kind of regulation to impose. Cf. Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738, 747 (Tenn.1987) (The Court simply does not function as a forum for resolution of ... generalized public issues; rather, it must decide the legal case or controversy presented by the particular parties before it.). Even courts which have crafted and applied the intent and genetic tests have been cognizant of the need for legislative action concerning technologically assisted human reproduction. [10] Although the courts have the power to determine public policy in the absence of any constitutional or statutory declaration, Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845, 851 (Tenn.1998) indeed, in this case we have crafted a judicial rule, albeit a particularly narrow one which we find to be consistent with policy implicit in the Tennessee Codefor us to declare a policy of sweepingly general and administratively grave effect based on the very narrowly circumscribed data before us in this controversy would cause us to intrude upon the legislative function, see Cavender v. Hewitt, 145 Tenn. 471, 239 S.W. 767, 768 (1922). [11]