Opinion ID: 177197
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State Law Controls

Text: As to the first argument, Appellants are incorrect: the question before us is governed by state, not federal, law. Our polestar is Federal Rule of Evidence 302, which provides: In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision is determined in accordance with State law. The advisory committee elaborated on the rule's import: It does not follow ... that all presumptions in diversity cases are governed by state law. In each case cited [where state law was applied], the burden of proof question had to do with a substantive element of the claim or defense. Application of the state law is called for only when the presumption operates upon such an element. Accordingly the rule does not apply state law when the presumption operates upon a lesser aspect of the case, i.e. tactical presumptions. Fed.R.Evid. 302, advisory committee's note. In the case at hand, Appellants contend that under Rule 302 the district court was required to apply federal law because the presumption is procedural rather than substantive. Teleflex responds that state law provides the rule of decision here because [t]he presumption at issue affects the core element of Plaintiffs' claim and Teleflex' defense: whether the cable was defective. Aplee. Br. at 16. Teleflex is correct. The presumption of section 13-21-403(3) operates with regard to the key substantive issue of defect vel non. The Colorado Supreme Court in Mile Hi clearly recognized this. In particular, the court understood that when section 13-21-403(3)'s presumption was given its ordinary effect under Colorado law, its application to the substantive question of defect rendered an instruction concerning the presumption meaningless. 842 P.2d at 205. Under Colorado Rule of Evidence 301, section 13-21-403(3)'s presumption did not alter the substantive law's allocation of the burden of proof. Id. And, under Colorado's substantive products liability law, plaintiff had the burden of going forward on the defect question. Id. Consequently, the Mile Hi court reasoned that, once the plaintiff had introduced sufficient evidence concerning the defect issue to survive a directed verdict, section 13-21-403(3)'s rebuttable presumption concerning the absence of a defect was  necessarily rebutted and the presumption no longer had any meaningful role to play. Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, it is patent from Mile Hi 's analysis itself that section 13-21-403(3)'s presumption operates with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision and, accordingly, the effect of that presumption must be determined in accordance with State law. [7] Fed.R.Evid. 302. [8] Appellants' arguments to the contrary are misguided and unavailing. Their reliance on Perlmutter and Wagner to support the view that federal law provides the rule of decision here concerning the effect of section 13-21-403(3)'s presumption is misplaced. These cases are certainly federal law in the sense that they are decisions of our court. However, in both Perlmutter and Wagner, we were interpreting state law in the diversity context, not independently applying federal law. It was only through that diversity lens that we determined that Colorado law, which at the time was defined by Mile Hi, did not permit the jury to be instructed on certain section 13-21-403 presumptions, including the one embodied in section 13-21-403(3). As we discuss infra, to the extent that Colorado's law has shifted direction on this instructional issue, we are obliged in the diversity context to follow suit. Furthermore, Appellants' assertion that [t]he decision of a federal court as to whether to give or refuse a tendered jury instruction ... is governed by federal law and rules, Aplt. Opening Br. at 28-29, is true. But it also is irrelevant. The question before us is not whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in [t]he admission or exclusion of a particular jury instruction. City of Wichita, 72 F.3d at 1495. Instead, the focus of the inquiry is whether the district court was authorized as a matter of law to instruct the jury concerning section 13-21-403(3)'s presumption. And the resolution of that inquiry principally turns on the legal effect that should be accorded to the presumptiona matter within the purview of Federal Rule of Evidence 302. Therefore, Appellants' attempt to frame the issue for decision as a question of federal law on the grounds that it relates to giving (or refusing) a particular tendered instruction is misguided. In sum, guided by Federal Rule of Evidence 302, we are confident that state law controls our assessment of whether the district court erred in instructing the jury concerning section 13-21-403(3)'s presumption.