Opinion ID: 1979227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to modify jury instructions.

Text: Defendant unsuccessfully objected to two proposed jury instructions and requested that they be modified. He now contends trial court erred in these rulings. The principles for reviewing jury instructions are well established, and will not be repeated here. See State v. Lindsey, 302 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Iowa 1981). We proceed to an examination of the two controverted instructions.
Trial court submitted Iowa Uniform Jury Instruction No. 108, defining reasonable doubt, as its Instruction No. 4. Defendant objected to this instruction and requested the court to include the limiting words by the State in two places as follows: [I]f, after considering all of the circumstances as disclosed by the evidence [by the State], you find your mind wavering or vacillating, then you have a reasonable doubt.... If, after a careful and impartial consideration of all of the evidence in the case [by the State], you have a full and abiding conviction of the guilt of the defendant, then you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, otherwise you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant argues this limiting language was required to inform the jury that the State had the burden of proof. We have approved the uniform jury instruction defining reasonable doubt. In Lindsey we found that the jury was correctly instructed on the reasonable doubt standard. The trial court utilized Uniform Jury Instruction, No. 108, which had previously been approved by this court on several occasions. In addition, the trial court submitted five other instructions to the jury specifically stating that the State had the burden of proving defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. These instructions made clear what the State's burden of proof was. 302 N.W.2d at 103 (citations omitted). Here, as in Lindsey, trial court submitted numerous instructions indicating the State had the burden to prove defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and defendant had no burden of proof and was under no obligation to produce evidence. Viewing the instructions as a whole, trial court did not err in refusing to modify Instruction No. 4.
Defendant also objected to Instruction No. 17, which was Iowa Uniform Jury Instruction No. 105 on general credibility of witnesses. He requested trial court should instruct the jury to consider whether a witness was paid as bearing on credibility and to scrutinize testimony of paid informants because they have an interest in the outcome of the case. Trial court overruled defendant's objection and request. Instruction No. 17 informed the jury they were the sole judges of the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses. In addition, the instruction told the jury that in passing on the credibility of witnesses they should consider the means of knowledge of matters of which [the witnesses] speak, ... their interest or lack of interest in the result of the trial, the motives, if any, actuating them as witnesses, their ... bias or prejudice, [and] ... whether their testimony is corroborated or contradicted. We have held `[t]he proper practice is [for the trial court] to give a general [credibility] instruction ... applicable to all witnesses alike.' State v. Harrington, 284 N.W.2d 244, 250 (Iowa 1979) (quoting State v. Milliken, 204 N.W.2d 594, 596-97 (Iowa 1973)). Under the general credibility instruction the jury would consider impeaching evidence in determining the weight accorded to a particular witness' testimony, even though their attention was not specifically drawn to such evidence. Id. At trial, the jury's attention was drawn repeatedly to evidence of Menke's compensation as a paid police informant. Defense counsel aggressively attempted to undermine Menke's credibility by interrogating both Diamond and Menke about payments to the latter for undercover work. This effort, coupled with the court's Instruction No. 17, undoubtedly forced the jury to consider Menke's credibility in determining whether to accept or reject his testimony. We conclude trial court did not err in giving this instruction and in refusing to give the requested instruction.