Opinion ID: 2462392
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the charge in particulars

Text: The charge here given can be divided into five parts, each of which must be tested individually. [4] 1. This Case has been ably tried by lawyers, experienced, of long standing, and in the interest of justice, if you could end this litigation by your verdict, you should do so. This statement, taken alone, is innocent and not coercive. It does no more than call to mind again the oath of the jury and the purpose for which trials are held. The comment that the case had been ably tried by experienced lawyers could not affect the deliberations in one way or another, as it is but a neutral observation. The reference to a verdict in the interest of justice is likewise neutral and unobjectionable. 2. What is more, ending it will meet with the approval of the Court. Standing alone this statement is in direct conflict with the decision in Brown. An instruction that the court will be displeased with a non-productive jury is an implicit threat. As noted above, the jury cannot but be aware of the role of the trial judge and his power over them. This knowledge has been enhanced over the course of the trial and has been even further solidified by the realization that only the judge can allow them to end their deliberations and return to their normal affairs. For these reasons, the rule in Brown is well-based and this statement may be classified as possibly coercive. 3. I don't mean to say by that that any individual person on the jury should yield his own conscience and positive conviction, but I do mean that when you are in the jury room, you should discuss this matter among yourselves carefully and listen to each other, and try, if you can, to reach a conclusion on the issues. It is the duty of jurors to keep their minds open and free to every reasonable argument that may be presented by fellow jurors that they may arrive at the verdict which justly answers the consciences of the individuals making up the jury. A juryman should not have any pride of opinion, and should avoid hastily forming or expressing an opinion. He should not surrender any conscientious views founded upon the evidence unless convinced by his fellow jurors of his error. It was this portion of the instruction which the Court of Civil Appeals found to be violative of the rule announced in Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, supra , and followed in Reed v. Bates, 32 S.W.2d 216 (Tex.Civ.App.1930, no writ). We note first that the instruction in Reed was given prior to the retirement of the jury. [5] We further note that in both Johnson and Reed the instructions specifically mentioned the right or duty of the jury to make concessions or reconcile differences. See also, Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Finklea, 155 S.W. 612 (Tex.Civ. App.1913, no writ); Texas Midland R. R. v. Byrd, 41 Tex.Civ.App. 164, 90 S.W. 185 (1905, no writ); and Cornelison v. Fort Worth & R. G. Ry. Co., 46 Tex.Civ.App. 509, 103 S.W. 1186 (Tex.Civ.App.1907, no writ). The charge here given does not possess this flaw and the cited cases are, therefore, inapposite. Moreover, this charge is not erroneous as given because by its wording it does no more than advise the jury that they are to conduct themselves in a reasonable and mature manner. The charge specifically warns against an individual juror surrendering a conscientious conviction and thereby is further insulated from the taint of coercion. Standing alone, therefore, this part of the charge is not coercive. 4. It has cost the taxpayers of Harris County considerable expense to have this case tried before a Jury over the past week. On its face, and standing alone, this statement is in direct conflict with the rulings in Barber and Brown. See also, Baldwin v. Morton, 19 S.W.2d 948 (Tex.Civ. App.1929, no writ); Sunshine Oil Corp. v. Randals, 226 S.W. 1090 (Tex.Civ.App.1921, no writ); Hunter v. Hunter, 187 S.W. 1049 (Tex.Civ.App.1916, writ dism'd); Wootan v. Partridge, 39 Tex.Civ.App. 346, 87 S.W. 356 (1905, no writ); North Dallas Circuit Ry. Co. v. McCue, 35 S.W. 1080 (Tex.Civ.App. 1896, no writ). Cf. Cloudt v. Hutcherson, 175 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.Civ.App.1943, writ ref'd w. o. m.); Pecos & N. T. Ry. Co. v. Finklea, 155 S.W. 612 (Tex.Civ.App.1913, no writ). See, contra, Fleck v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 191 S.W. 386 (Tex.Civ.App.1916, no writ); Leland v. Chamberlin, 120 S.W. 1040 (Tex.Civ.App.1909, no writ); Houston & T. C. R. R. Co. v. Darwin, 47 Tex.Civ.App. 219, 105 S.W. 825 (1907, writ ref'd). These decisions are no longer viable, however, given the instructions which are prescribed by Rule 226a. In accordance with that rule, prospective jurors are cautioned that failure to follow the instructions of the judge could result in a retrial of the case and the attendant waste of time and expense to the litigants and the county. A supplemental charge which merely reiterates this instruction is not coercive. Barber and Brown are overruled to this extent. [6] In so doing we do not approve or sanction such a charge; rather, we hold that if it is given, it is not, without more, coercive. 5. I am satisfied ladies and gentlemen that you have not deliberated sufficiently so that, in good conscience, I can accept a report that you cannot arrive at an agreement. It will take considerably more time before anyone can satisfy me as to that. Accordingly, I return you to your deliberations. This statement, Travelers argues, threatened the jury with indeterminate confinement and was, therefore, coercive. A genuine threat to unreasonably detain a deliberating jury would, of course, be coercive. See, e. g., North Dallas Circuit Ry. Co. v. McCue, 35 S.W. 1080 (Tex.Civ. App.1896, no writ); Cf., Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Oakley, 181 S.W. 507 (Tex. Civ.App.1916, no writ); Hunter v. Hunter, 187 S.W. 1049 (Tex.Civ.App.1916, writ dism'd); Burgess v. Singer Mfg. Co., 30 S.W. 1110 (Tex.Civ.App.1895, no writ). Where, as here, however, the charge informs the jury only that the judge cannot, consistent with his duties, discharge them, it is not coercive. As noted above, the jury is aware of the power and function of the trial judge and this portion of the charge only reminds them of his duties and functions. Again, we do not approve this portion of the instruction as a desirable element of a supplemental charge; but hold that it is not coercive.