Opinion ID: 1726966
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: trial judge's recusal

Text: Finally, we address Harris' argument that the court committed reversible error in the postconviction proceedings when the trial judge granted the State's motion to recuse himself from presiding. At a hearing on the recusal motion, the State called a witness who testified that the trial judge had previously expressed his view that this court should have reversed for a new trial in Harris I. Also, the trial judge's court reporter testified that the trial judge had expressed his view that we should have granted a new trial in Harris I and that the trial judge was inclined to grant a postconviction relief for the defendant. The court reporter was unsure, however, whether the trial judge's statements referred to the ultimate result of postconviction proceedings, or only to the decision to grant an evidentiary hearing on Harris' petition for postconviction relief. The trial judge concluded that a reasonable person might conclude that as the finder of fact in this case, I am predisposed. The trial judge stated that this required him to grant the State's motion, and he accordingly entered an order of recusal. The postconviction action was then reassigned to another judge. Citing the First Circuit cases of Blizard v. Frechette [18] and In re Union Leader Corporation, [19] Harris argues that the trial judge had a duty to remain as the judge for the postconviction action absent objective facts requiring his removal. He asserts that the facts alleged at the recusal hearing were insufficient to require his removal. Harris asserts that the trial judge is uniquely situated to understand the issues relating to a postconviction action and that parties must be prevented from too easily obtaining a strategic disqualification. [9] Because the trial judge is uniquely situated to understand the issues relating to a postconviction action, it is true that we do not condone recusals based on the simple fact that the postconviction judge was also the judge at trial. However, it does not follow that a defendant has a cognizable right to have the trial judge be the judge presiding over a postconviction action. Generally, while a defendant may be entitled to an impartial judge, [20] a defendant does not have the right to have his or her case heard before any particular judge. [21] Harris does not contend that the postconviction judge was not fair and impartial or that the recusal resulted in prejudicial delay. [10,11] A motion to disqualify a trial judge on account of prejudice is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. [22] A judge must be careful not to appear to act in the dual capacity of judge and advocate. [23] We find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's decision to recuse himself in this case.