Opinion ID: 741779
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Buchannan's Base Offense Level

Text: 29 Buchannan's base offense level, for sentencing purposes, depends rather dramatically on whether he sold cocaine powder or cocaine base (crack). The district court accepted Buchannan's proffered base offense level of 32 in preference to the level 38 suggested by the government. The government argues that the sentence should be vacated because the district court failed to make the required factual findings to support its choice of offense level. See United States v. Beler, 20 F.3d 1428, 1432 (7th Cir.1994). The first paragraph of the police report that was prepared after Buchannan's arrest for parole violations, states that Buchannan admitted to selling one and one-half kilograms of cocaine during the preceding two months. Additional paragraphs of the report reveal some of Buchannan's suppliers. All of the paragraphs that detail cocaine purchases or sales by Buchannan distinguish between crack cocaine and powder cocaine--except the first paragraph. Agent Smith, the agent who prepared the report, stated that Buchannan was referring to crack cocaine in the first paragraph. Buchannan claims that he was talking about one and one-half kilograms of powder cocaine. Buchannan further claims that he neither bought nor sold this cocaine; he was merely aware that it was coming into the area. Obviously, it makes a great deal of difference whom the district court credited. 30 The district court failed to make any express findings about the amount or type of cocaine that supported the defendant's sentence. Normally, we would remand the case for findings by the district court regarding the amount and type of drugs attributable to the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, 85 F.3d 275, 281-83 (7th Cir.1996). We have, in rare cases, upheld a sentence where the district court's implicit findings seemed sufficient. See United States v. McKinney, 98 F.3d 974, 980-81 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1119, 137 L.Ed.2d 319 (1997) (affirming the sentence despite a lack of express findings where it was clear from the sentencing transcript that the district court adopted the drug quantities in the presentence report); United States v. DePriest, 6 F.3d 1201, 1213 (7th Cir.1993) (when a district court fails to make specific findings ... resentencing is not required in every case). This is one of those rare cases where a lack of express findings does not mandate resentencing. 31 It is apparent from the transcript of the sentencing hearing that the court considered the presentence investigation report and Buchannan's testimony and ultimately concluded that the government had failed to carry its burden of proof. 4 Thus, the court properly erred on the side of caution and adopted the defendant's version of the amount and type of drugs involved. See Acosta, 85 F.3d at 282. 32 It is always preferable for the district court to expressly state the amount and quantity of drugs upon which the defendant's sentence is based. It is the rare case where the district court's implicit findings are sufficiently obvious and the factual basis sufficiently adequate that we will uphold a sentence absent express factual findings.