Opinion ID: 202396
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Expert Testimony on Manufacturing Defects

Text: 12 Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, it is the responsibility of the trial judge to ensure that an expert is sufficiently qualified to provide expert testimony that is relevant to the task at hand and to ensure that the testimony rests on a reliable basis. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993); United States v. Díaz, 300 F.3d 66, 73 (1st Cir.2002). We review a district court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony for abuse of discretion, giving broad deference to the determination made by the district court as to the reliability and relevance of expert testimony. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997); Hochen v. Bobst Group, Inc., 290 F.3d 446, 452 (1st Cir.2002). 13 In Daubert, the Supreme Court set forth four general guidelines for a trial judge to evaluate in considering whether expert testimony rests on an adequate foundation: (1) whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested; (2) whether the technique has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) the technique's known or potential rate of error; and (4) the level of the theory or technique's acceptance within the relevant discipline. United States v. Mooney, 315 F.3d 54, 62 (1st Cir.2002) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786). However, these factors do not constitute a definitive checklist or test, and the question of admissibility must be tied to the facts of a particular case. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). 14 The Beaudettes make several arguments to support their contention that the district court erred in excluding Dobson's expert testimony. Each of these arguments is meritless, and we address them briefly. The Beaudettes first argue that the district court applied the wrong legal standard by requiring that expert witness testimony be based upon generally-accepted scientific methods. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (stating that a general acceptance requirement is incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence). However, the district court clearly based its decision upon a Daubert analysis, and the district court's order does not even mention the general acceptance test. 15 The second argument is that the district court improperly turned the Daubert hearing into a mini-trial on the issue of causation. In support of their argument, the Beaudettes cite only one case for the proposition that the Daubert regime should be employed only with great care and circumspection at the summary judgment stage. Cortés-Irizarry v. Corporación Insular de Seguros, 111 F.3d 184, 188 (1st Cir.1997). We have reviewed the record and found no error in the proceedings. 16 Third, the Beaudettes argue that even without the application of the ANSI standard, Dobson's expert opinion was bolstered by the basic principles of physics, engineering, and material science. Again, we see no error by the district court. 17 The Beaudettes also claim that Louisville Ladder is judicially estopped from arguing that Dobson is unqualified to testify as an expert due to his inability to define what constitutes good commercial practice under the ANSI Standard. The doctrine of judicial estoppel generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001) (quoting Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227, n. 8, 120 S.Ct. 2143, 147 L.Ed.2d 164 (2000)). This Court has held that a claim of judicial estoppel requires the proponent to show that the party to be estopped succeeded previously with a position directly inconsistent with the one it currently espouses. SEC v. Happ, 392 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The Beaudettes, however, have not shown that Louisville Ladder has ever taken contradictory positions in this proceeding. Although Louisville Ladder may have participated in the creation of the relevant ANSI standard, the ANSI standard is not contradictory to their current position, and its creation was nevertheless not a prior phase of this case. 18 The Beaudettes have not shown any error in the district court's decision to exclude Dobson's expert testimony, and we find no abuse of discretion by the district court.