Opinion ID: 561296
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Barrett's Claims

Text: 10 Barrett first alleges that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to convict him on counts 1 and 5 because of a failure to prove a conspiracy, 2 and count 8, because the amount of marijuana seized demonstrates possession for purposes of personal consumption and not distribution. 11 In order to establish a drug conspiracy pursuant to 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846, the government must prove that a conspiracy existed, that the accused knew of the conspiracy, and that he knowingly and voluntarily joined it. United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203, 211 (6th Cir.1986). A trier of fact may infer knowledge of and participation in the common purpose and plan of a conspiracy based on defendant's actions and reactions to the circumstances. Id. (citing United States v. Garcia, 655 F.2d 59 (5th Cir.1981)). The government may demonstrate that a defendant had the requisite knowledge by showing that defendant knew the essential object of the conspiracy. The government need not show that a defendant participated in all aspects of the conspiracy; it need only prove that defendant was a party to the general conspiratorial agreement. Id. Further, [t]he connection of the defendant to the conspiracy need only be slight, if there is sufficient evidence to establish that connection beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (quoting United States v. Batimana, 623 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1038, 101 S.Ct. 617, 66 L.Ed.2d 500 (1980)). 12 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the government. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). A conviction will be upheld if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789 (emphasis in original). 13 We conclude that the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to convict defendant on the conspiracy charge. The evidence showed that Reed told Lawson that Barrett would be able to supply cocaine to Lawson on August 3rd; that Barrett told Lawson that he had spoken with the supplier and had set up a meeting; that Barrett drove with Reed and the Lawsons to meet the cocaine supplier and consummate the transaction; that Barrett told Lawson in a recorded conversation that he could keep Lawson pretty well supplied; that Barrett offered to set up another drug deal after the first aborted attempt; and that police seized marijuana and drug paraphernalia at Barrett's residence. A rational trier of fact could conclude that Barrett was a participant in the alleged conspiracy. 14 Further, the evidence is sufficient to uphold the conviction based on count 8 of the indictment. Barrett alleges that the evidence adduced at trial demonstrates an intent to use the drugs for personal consumption and not distribution. Barrett proffered evidence showing a violation of and the jury was specifically instructed on the lesser included offense of simple possession, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 844. The jury considered both offenses, intent to distribute and simple possession, and found Barrett guilty of the intent to distribute charge. Sufficient evidence was introduced to support this finding. 15 Barrett next alleges that his convictions based on the conspiracy and attempt charges under a single statute, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846, violate his double jeopardy rights, or in the alternative, render him a victim of cumulative punishment. The Supreme Court recently reiterated that [t]he Double Jeopardy Clause embodies three protections: 'It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.'  Grady v. Corbin, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 2090, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969)). Barrett apparently alleges a double jeopardy violation based either on multiple prosecutions or on multiple punishments. 16 Barrett's allegation based on multiple prosecutions is without merit. With respect to multiple prosecutions, the Court made clear in Grady that the double jeopardy clause protects against the danger of  'repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity....'  Id., 110 S.Ct. at 2091 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957)). Further, multiple prosecutions allow the government to refine its presentation of a case by virtue of repetition, thus increasing the likelihood of erroneous conviction. Id., 110 S.Ct. at 2091-92. Accordingly, the double jeopardy clause in this context protects against the danger of separate proceedings for charges arising out of a single transaction or course of conduct, not multiple charges in the same proceeding. The double jeopardy clause protection against multiple prosecutions is not implicated in the instant case because the government prosecuted defendant for numerous charges stemming from a single course of conduct in a single proceeding. 17 We now turn to Barrett's alternate argument regarding cumulative punishment. 3 Recently, we held that the imposition of consecutive sentences based on convictions for distribution and attempted distribution arising from a single transaction violates the double jeopardy clause. Costo v. United States, 904 F.2d 344 (6th Cir.1990). In Costo, we struck down consecutive sentences on double jeopardy grounds because: (1) the sentences imposed were based on two offenses and one of the offenses, attempted distribution, constituted a lesser included offense of the other offense, completed distribution; and (2) both convictions arose from a single transaction. 18 Barrett urges us to extend our holding in Costo to prohibit the imposition of concurrent sentences for convictions based on conspiracy and attempt arising from the same transaction. See United States v. Touw, 769 F.2d 571 (9th Cir.1985). In Touw, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant could be convicted for both conspiracy and attempt, but may be punished for only one of these convictions. The Touw court reasoned that Congress did not intend to punish a defendant more than once for convictions of conspiracy and attempt arising from a single course of conduct. Barrett essentially urges us to focus only upon the source of the charged offenses--whether they arose from a single course of conduct--and discard any analysis of the elements of the charged offenses. 19 We decline to follow Barrett's suggestion and to reach a conclusion similar to that of the Touw court. The Supreme Court in Grady appears to indicate that the Blockburger test remains the sole test to determine whether the double jeopardy clause bars multiple punishments. The Court observed that the test established in Blockburger focuses on the statutory elements of the two crimes with which a defendant has been charged, not on the proof that is offered or relied upon to secure a conviction. Grady, 110 S.Ct. at 2097 (construing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932)). If each [offense] requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the Blockburger test is satisfied, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n. 17, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1294 n. 17, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975). Hence, the Blockburger test focuses upon the statutory elements of the charged offenses, not the transaction which gives rise to the charged offenses. 20 Conspiracy and attempt are separate offenses, each requiring proof of an element not required by the other. No merger of offenses occurs in such a situation. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954). Although Pereira dealt with charges of conspiracy and the substantive crime, we find this reasoning equally applicable to charges of conspiracy and attempt. The attempted distribution charge does not require multiple persons for its commission; a single individual could do this. A conspiracy to distribute charge is an agreement between or among individuals to distribute controlled substances in violation of section 846. No overt act is required. See United States v. Dempsey, 733 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 983, 105 S.Ct. 389, 83 L.Ed.2d 323 (1984). The imposition of multiple punishments therefore passes the Blockburger test and no double jeopardy violation occurs. See United States v. Savaiano, 843 F.2d 1280, 1292 (10th Cir.1988). 4 21 Finally, Barrett contends that the District Court erred by not granting his motion for severance of trials. Prior to and during the course of trial, appellants moved pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 14 for a severance of trials on the grounds of insufficient evidence to prove conspiracy and prejudice arising from joinder. After presentation of the government's case-in-chief, the court found that the government had established the existence of a conspiracy and the participation by appellants therein. Accordingly, the District Court denied the motion for severance. 22 Generally, parties who are jointly indicted should be tried together. United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194, 1207 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007, 107 S.Ct. 3234, 97 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987). Defendants may be joined in a single indictment if 'they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses.'  United States v. Pickett, 746 F.2d 1129, 1134 (6th Cir.1984) (quoting Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(b)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1226, 105 S.Ct. 1222, 84 L.Ed.2d 362 (1985). This is especially true in conspiracy cases, and separate trials should be permitted only upon a showing of specific and compelling prejudice resulting from a joint trial which can be rectified only by separate trials. Id. (quoting United States v. Howell, 664 F.2d 101, 106 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1005, 102 S.Ct. 1641, 71 L.Ed.2d 873 (1982)). The burden rests with defendant to show such prejudice. Id. We will reverse a denial of a motion for severance under Fed.R.Crim.P. 14 only if the trial court abused its discretion. Davis, 809 F.2d at 1207. 23 Upon review of the record, we are satisfied that the District Court did not err in denying Barrett's motion for severance. Barrett contends that the jury convicted him on the offenses charged in the indictment and disregarded the lesser offense instructions. Barrett further contends that the jury did not carefully view the evidence as to him. These contentions do not rise to the level of a specific and compelling demonstration of prejudice.