Opinion ID: 1210826
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: estes is precluded from raising the issue of fraud for the first time on appeal.

Text: In Beco Construction Co. v. City of Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859, 865 P.2d 950 (1993), this Court recognized the general rule that a cause of action not raised in a party's pleadings may not be considered on summary judgment nor may it be considered for the first time on appeal. Id. at 865, 865 P.2d at 956. Estes argues that she asserted the essential elements of fraud in her complaint. However, a review of her complaint indicates that she asserted only two causes of actionCount I was a breach of contract claim and Count II was a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A claim of fraud must be pled with particularity. I.R.C.P. 9(b). See also G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 518, 808 P.2d 851, 855 (1991) (The party alleging fraud must support the existence of each of the elements of the cause of action for fraud by pleading with particularity the factual circumstances constituting fraud.); Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 165, 168, 722 P.2d 474, 477 (1986) (to the extent that a plaintiff's claim is premised on fraudulent acts of the defendant, it is essential that [the plaintiff] plead with particularity factual allegations of such fraud.). Estes' complaint does not plead with particularity the factual circumstances constituting fraud. Nevertheless, Estes claims that, even if she did not plead fraud with particularity, the fraud issue is properly before this Court because the parties had both argued the issue below and the district court had specifically ruled on the issue. Estes cites to Christensen v. Ransom, 123 Idaho 99, 844 P.2d 1349 (Ct.App.1992), in support of her argument. In Christensen, the Court of Appeals addressed the question of whether the statute of frauds issue had been properly preserved for appeal, despite the fact that the issue had not been raised in the pleadings below. Citing to Rule 15(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.), the court determined that the issue had been raised below, through the implied or express consent of the parties. Id. at 104, 844 P.2d at 1354. Rule 15(b) provides: When issues not raised by the pleading[s] are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Noting that the district court had ruled on the statute of frauds issue, the Christensen court concluded that the issue must have been raised and considered below and, therefore, was proper for appellate review. Id. Christensen involved a trial on the merits; whereas, the present case was disposed of in summary judgment proceedings. Rule 15(b) applies only to unpled theories that are litigated through the submission of evidence at a trial of the cause on the merits, and not to factual issues raised in a motion for summary judgment. See Fila U.S.A., Inc. v. Kim, 884 F.Supp. 491, 494 n. 1 (S.D.Fla.1995), cited in 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1494, at 6 (Supp.1998) (construing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) which is identical to Idaho's I.R.C.P. 15(b)). The real question in this case is whether Beco is controlling or whether the Court should follow the reasoning in Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 117 Idaho 351, 787 P.2d 1159 (1990), in which the Court decided a constitutional issue that was apparently not raised by the plaintiff before the trial court. The Court in Northcutt decided the constitutional question, in part, on the basis that the issue had been presented to the trial court by the defendant and the trial court [had] held the Act constitutional. Id. at 356, 787 P.2d at 1164. This case falls within the reasoning of Beco and not Northcutt. Fraud is a cause of action that must be pled with particularity and which requires clear and convincing evidence to establish. On the other hand, the plaintiff's claim in Northcutt that the statute in issue was unconstitutional did not constitute a cause of action, nor was there any requirement that the complaint assert that the statute was unconstitutional. The question of constitutionality only arose when the defendant relied upon the statute as a defense and noted that similar statutes had been determined to be constitutional. Id. at 353, 787 P.2d at 1161. In addition, the constitutional issue was raised before the trial court by the very party that contended the issue was not properly before the Supreme Court. Unlike Northcutt, the Barrys did not raise the fraud issue before the district court. Rather, they expressly objected to consideration of the issue by the district court, affording Estes the opportunity to seek amendment to properly assert the fraud claim. The fraud issue was not preserved for review simply because the district court ruled on the issue. The district court ruled on the fraud issue (ultimately finding it to be without merit) only after first acknowledging the Barrys' objection that the issue should not be considered because it had not been properly pled. By addressing the fraud issue, the district court was simply preserving the record for review, giving the appellate court the benefit of its thinking both as to the question of whether the unpled claim should be addressed and whether the unpled claim had any merit. In sum, because Estes' complaint did not plead with particularity the factual circumstances constituting fraud, nor was the fraud issue expressly or impliedly tried by consent of the parties, Estes is precluded from raising the issue for the first time on appeal.