Opinion ID: 1199801
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Omission of an Instruction on Involuntary Manslaughter

Text: (14) Manslaughter is deemed to be related to murder as a lesser included offense. (See, e.g., 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) Defenses, § 327, p. 379; compare Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) [defining murder as the unlawful killing of a human being ... with malice aforethought] with id., § 192 [defining manslaughter as the unlawful killing of a human being without malice].) As relevant here, manslaughter is voluntary, i.e., upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion ( id., § 192, subd. (a)), or involuntary, i.e., in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection ( id., § 192, subd. (b)). The court instructed the jury on murder. It also instructed on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense. Defendant had so requested. By contrast, it did not instruct on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense. Defendant had not so requested. In discussing proposed instructions, defense counsel Soria had stated: I don't think this is an involuntary [manslaughter] situation. (15) Defendant contends that the court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense. There was no error. A court is not obligated to instruct sua sponte on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense unless there is substantial evidence, i.e., evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 325 [185 Cal. Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311]) that the defendant killed his victim in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (b)). Such evidence is lacking here. To be sure, one might speculate that defendant killed Hildreth as he perpetrated some unspecified misdemeanor or performed some unspecified act with criminal negligence. But speculation is not evidence, less still substantial evidence. (See People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 250 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643].) Any error, however, would not have required reversal. Indeed, it would necessarily [have been] harmless in light of the jury's special circumstance finding that defendant killed [Hildreth] in the perpetration of [rape]. Under this finding, the [Hildreth] killing was necessarily felony murder. ( People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 464.) [9]