Opinion ID: 1136091
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Discrimination in Juror Selection

Text: In selecting the jury for this case, Ford used 9 of his 10 peremptory challenges to remove white veniremembers from the jury panel; this resulted in a jury composed of 10 black jurors and 2 white jurors. Before the jury was empaneled and sworn, Breland contested the composition of the jury on the ground that the selection process violated constitutional equal protection guarantees. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). After Ford explained his strikes on the record, the trial court denied Breland's Batson motion and the jury was empaneled. Breland now contends that Ford's explanations as to why he struck jurors No. 26, No. 59, and No. 66 were merely pretextual. These explanations were as follows: VENIREMEMBER 26: I noticed throughout the proceedings this morning that she was the only juror to be writing. I don't know if she was taking notes, but it appeared to me that she was taking notes and she distinguished herself by taking notes. I have had bad experience with people who take notes when other people don't. .... VENIREMEMBER 59: [He] has a military background, he has also had an insurance agency for a long period of time here in Marion that I know about, and he was an ... independent agent. But he has had the experience of passing on and reviewing claims to determine liabilities. .... VENIREMEMBER 66: [She] indicated that she was a client of mine and she is.... (Emphasis added.) The taking of notes by jurors is a practice having both proponents and critics. Silas, Write it Down? Jurors' Note Taking Debated, 70 A.B.A.J. 35, April 1984 (noting that as of 1979, [f]ive states prohibited the practice). Opposition is often predicated on the ground that the juror who has taken the most notes may unduly influence other jurors during deliberation. Id. Another objection to the practice is that as a result, `jurors may place too much emphasis on a point that may not be important.' Id. Although Alabama does not prohibit jurors from taking notes, Glover v. State, 347 So.2d 592 (Ala. Crim.App.1977), the fact that the practice is prohibited in some states, and is discretionary with the trial court in other states, is sufficient to sustain a peremptory strike on that ground. As to veniremember No. 26, therefore, we cannot conclude that Ford's explanation was a sham or a pretext for racial discrimination. We reach a similar conclusion as to Ford's explanation for his challenge to veniremember No. 59. Burlington Northern R.R. v. Whitt, 575 So.2d 1011 (Ala.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 948, 111 S.Ct. 1415, 113 L.Ed.2d 468 (1991), involved a contention that the trial court erred to reversal by permitting the plaintiff to inquire on voir dire whether any member of the venire was an insurance adjuster. Id. at 1017. In holding that the question was valid, this Court explained: Besides, we believe that the question `Anybody here who is an insurance adjuster?' was proper. It is undisputed that attorneys have the broad right to question venire members as to any matter that might disclose a prospective juror's bias, prejudice, or interest in the outcome of a trial.... In attempting to strike a fair and impartial jury, attorneys have a legitimate interest in learning about any associations the venire has with the case, including the kind of work the prospective jurors and members of their families engage in. `It is a fact of life that no matter how honest and conscientious an individual may be, he is most likely to be influenced, if not actually biased, by his past or present occupational experiences.'  Landers v. Long, 53 Ala.App. 340, 343, 300 So.2d 112, 114 (Ala.Civ.App.1974). 575 So.2d at 1018. The past or present occupational experiences of veniremember No. 59 were a subject of valid inquiry, particularly as to their potential to affect his view of the proper amount of compensation or other damages for Ford's injuries. We cannot, therefore, conclude that the challenge of veniremember No. 59 on the ground that he might be influenced by his occupational expertise in evaluating claims was a sham or pretext for racial discrimination. Finally, the sufficiency of Ford's explanation for striking veniremember No. 66, who was a client of Ford's counsel, requires no protracted discussion. The explanation was clearly race-neutral. For these reasons, the trial court did not err in overruling Breland's Batson motion. There being no grounds for reversing of the trial court's judgment, it is affirmed. AFFIRMED. ALMON, SHORES, KENNEDY, and BUTTS, JJ., concur. HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, J., dissent.