Opinion ID: 1035557
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limitations on Defense Counsel’s Cross-

Text: Examinations of CS1 and CS2 With respect to its limitations on defense counsel’s ability (i) to re-question CS1 about her possible involvement in her husband’s drug trafficking; and (ii) to question CS2 about his tax reporting practices for past drug trafficking income, the district court did not abuse its discretion. “[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on . . . cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. Here, the duplicative question to CS1 was “repetitive” at a minimum. Moreover, the question to CS2 was, at best,“marginally relevant.” “The relevant inquiry is whether the jury had sufficient information to appraise the bias and motives of the witness.” Tansley, 986 F.2d at 886 (citation omitted). Here, cross-examination provided the jury with ample insight into CS1 and CS2’s respective associations and criminal pasts, and possibly self-interested 22 Case: 11-41376 Document: 00512323905 Page: 23 Date Filed: 07/29/2013 Nos. 11-41376 c/w 11-41392 motivations for cooperating with the government. The district court, which reminded defense counsel it remained “free to bring up bias or prejudice,” did not abuse its discretion by imposing its limitations on cross-examination.