Opinion ID: 1576778
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Supporting the Second Count

Text: ¶ 16. We first address whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that Williams had sexually abused his younger daughter, Ann. On appeal, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 843 (Miss.2005) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). In addition, Should the facts and inferences considered in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence point in favor of the defendant on any element of the offense with sufficient force that reasonable men could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty, the proper remedy is for the appellate court to reverse and render. Edwards v. State, 469 So.2d 68, 70 (Miss.1985) (citing May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 781 (Miss.1984)); see also Dycus v. State, 875 So.2d 140, 164 (Miss. 2004). However, if a review of the evidence reveals that it is of such quality and weight that, having in mind the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions on every element of the offense, the evidence will be deemed to have been sufficient. Edwards, 469 So.2d at 70; see also Gibby v. State, 744 So.2d 244, 245 (Miss.1999). Id. ¶ 17. The only evidence that Ann had been sexually abused was Dr. Marcy's testimony. During trial, Dr. Marcy was shown two photographs of Ann's anus, and he testified for several pages of the transcript that it was inflamed, swollen, misshapen, and torn. Part of Williams's defense was that the injury was caused by the child's having been constipated. When the State was examining him, Dr. Marcy testified as follows: Q: So it wouldn't be consistent with a bowel movement. Would this be consistent with an object or even a finger from the outside coming in? A: Yes, it would be more consistent with that than a bowel movement. Q: Now, as far as your expert medical opinion looking at your report, what was your conclusion as to whether there had beenor whether [Ann's] symptoms were consistent with child sexual abuse? A: I felt like it was very consistent with anal penetration. ItI came to the next to the highest level of suspicion of probable  Q: And that's withoutand I'myou had no background, I mean no witnesses, this was just based on the medical findings? A: Yes. I believe we were seeing her because allegations had been made about her sister and they just wanted the baby checked. So, yeah, there were no allegations at all. Q: And you found that her condition was very consistent with child sexual abuse? A: Yes. . . . Q: So, again, in this case, going back to this case, with [Ann's] tear on her anus was it very consistentI'm going to put that at the top of your probable area, I'm going to ask was it very consistent with sexual abuse? A: Yes. As I said, very consistent with anal penetration, very consistent with anal penetration. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 18. Earlier, Dr. Marcy had explained that he considered four levels of suspicion of child abuse, namely, unlikely, possible, probable, and definite. He testified that definite is very hard to come to, and that he would only categorize his findings of sexual abuse as definite maybe five or six times out of a thousand. Dr. Marcy had found a probable level of suspicion from both Jane and Ann's examinations. However, Dr. Marcy testified that Jane's injuries were definitely consistent with someone who had been sexually abused to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. As the above testimony demonstrates, Dr. Marcy did not recount his findings in such unequivocal terms when discussing Ann; the physician's testimony was that Ann's injuries were very consistent with anal penetration. ¶ 19. [B]efore a qualified expert's opinion may be received, it must rise above mere speculation. Goforth v. City of Ridgeland, 603 So.2d 323, 329 (Miss. 1992) (citing Fowler v. State, 566 So.2d 1194 (Miss.1990)). [O]nly opinions formed by medical experts upon the basis of credible evidence in the case and which can be stated with reasonable medical certainty have probative value. Catchings v. State, 684 So.2d 591, 596 (Miss.1996) (quoting Magnolia Hosp. v. Moore, 320 So.2d 793, 799 (Miss.1975)). Although an expert need not use the exact phrase, reasonable degree of medical certainty, this does not diminish the requirements for admissibility. Catchings, 684 So.2d at 597. This physician couched his opinion in terms of suspicion of probability, which, standing alone, absent additional corroborating evidence, is insufficient in a criminal case. ¶ 20. Dr. Marcy did not express his medical opinion that Ann had been sexually abused to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, even though he did so concerning Jane. Additionally, in Jane's case, her testimony and testimony from her foster mother and counselor provided substantial support for Dr. Marcy's findings. With Ann, there was no evidence to support the conviction for sexual battery other than Dr. Marcy's testimony. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for the sexual battery of Ann beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the evidence, which was entirely circumstantial with regard to the charge concerning the younger child, Ann, fell far short of the applicable standard of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. Therefore, we reverse and render the conviction of Williams on the sexual battery charge related to Ann.