Opinion ID: 2199758
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Was there a variance between the crime charged in the indictment and the State's proof?

Text: (Rodriguez and Vega claim the State failed to establish a prima facie case against them and there should have been a judgment of acquittal. These points will be held and disposed of hereafter together with the issue that the same verdicts are against the weight of the evidence.) The present indictment charges all the defendants willfully, feloniously and of their malice aforethought did make an assault and with a gun did shoot and wound    George Booris and that he died from the wounds so inflicted. It then recites:    and so the Grand Inquest aforesaid, do say that the said Felipe Nieves Rios, alias Utita, Jose Cruz, alias Mayaree, Joaquin Rodriguez, and Gabriel Vega, him, the said George Booris in manner and form and by means aforesaid willfully, feloniously and of their malice aforethought did kill and murder, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S. 2 A :113-1, and against the peace of this State, the Government and dignity of the same. Rodriguez refers to the State's proceeding on the theory of a conspiracy to commit robbery and a death ensuing therefrom and asserts it was at complete variance with an indictment for murder resulting from an assault with a gun. In substance, the claim is the indictment was defective, counsel saying: It was not a mere allegation of a technicality that is so often characterized in a criminal proceeding and all of which our courts have said tend to bring law and the administration of justice into disrepute but rather is an expression by the defendant of his constitutional right to be tried upon a specific violation of the law when so charged in an indictment. He concludes the variance was such as would have entitled the defendant to an acquittal. The primary purpose of an indictment is to inform the defendant of the nature of the offense charged against him so he may adequately prepare his defense and at the same time protect himself against another indictment for the same offense. State v. LeFante, 12 N.J. 505 (1953); State v. Winne, 12 N.J. 152, 178 (1953). The sufficiency of the indictment is to be determined in the light of the pertinent rules of court and judicial decisions. R.R. 3:4-3( a ) (formerly Rule 2:4-11), referring to the contents of an indictment, says: The indictment or accusation shall be a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.    An indictment    charging the violation of a statute    shall state    the statute    which the defendant is alleged therein to have violated. R.R. 3:4-3( b ) provides: It shall be sufficient in every indictment for murder to charge that the defendant did willfully, feloniously and of his malice aforethought, kill and murder the deceased. In Graves v. State, 45 N.J.L. 347, 357 ( E. & A. 1883), it was held that an indictment for murder need charge only that the defendant did willfully, feloniously and with malice aforethought kill and murder the deceased. This rule was followed and adopted in State v. Bunk, 4 N.J. 461, 466 (1950), where R.R. 3:4-3( b ) (then Rule 2:4-11) was termed to be merely directory. We stated (at pages 466-467): Where several defendants are charged with murder as actual participants in a robbery during which the killing was perpetrated, an indictment charging murder in the language of the statute is sufficient, without charging the defendants as principals or as accessories, and without setting forth the robbery as part of the crime. The indictment was in simple form in State v. Juliano, 103 N.J.L. 663 ( E. & A. 1927). One of the reasons advanced for its being faulty was that it did not apprise the defendants that robbery was part of the crime. The court held (at page 667): As to the indictment, it set forth the crime of murder in the language of the statute and charged all of the defendants as principals. As actual participants in a robbery they were all principals and as such were tried, convicted, and sentenced. Nor was it necessary to incorporate in the indictment the fact of robbery as part of the crime charged. The indictment in the case sub judice complies with the standards passed upon in the adjudications above referred to. The criticism best fitted to the document under discussion surely could not be for failure to apprise or make known to the defendants the charge they were supposed to meet. If anything, it stated too much and not too little, and, indeed, a motion to strike a portion of the indictment as surplusage was made and denied before the start of the trial. The full record reveals beyond doubt that all the defendants were adequately cognizant of the charge made against them and all of the details and circumstances, which permitted them to fully prepare their defenses.