Opinion ID: 2417477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cross-examination of Dr. Quirk

Text: The guardians contend that the trial court erred in limiting the cross-examination of Dr. Gerald Quirk. They raise three evidentiary questions under this point. They contend that the trial court prevented them from cross-examining Dr. Quirk about his attitudes and temperament, his charting practices, and his past employment as a medical expert. Although we have already determined the judgment as to Dr. Quirk must be reversed, we discuss this argument as it is likely to arise at trial on remand. The guardians state that Dr. Quirk testified in a previous case that he was a street fighter from New York and this attitude was expressed in his daily life and in his verbal jousting with opposing attorneys. They assert that Quirk's temperament caused him to obstinately refuse to modify his manner of performing the delivery once complications arose and to instead employ physical force by using forceps to complete the delivery of Emily. The guardians further contend that these attitudes and temperament were part of the foundation of their case, and were relevant and probative to the issue of Quirk's credibility. At a pretrial hearing, the trial court concluded that testimony regarding Dr. Quirk's verbal discourse with lawyers was highly prejudicial. The trial court further stated that if the defendant were being called as an expert witness, the fact that he enjoyed engaging in verbal street fighting with lawyers in the courtroom would be admissible to show bias and prejudice, but as a fact witness, such testimony, is not probative but is prejudicial. At trial, when the guardians once again sought to cross-examine Dr. Quirk regarding his attitude and temperament, the trial court simply stated the questions were not relevant to the case. A trial court's ruling on the relevancy of evidence will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Thompson v. Perkins, 322 Ark. 720, 911 S.W.2d 582 (1995). Further, we will not reverse a trial court's weighing of probative value against unfair prejudice under Rule 403 unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. Id. Here the appellants have failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion regarding either determination. The guardians next submit the trial court improperly excluded evidence of Dr. Quirk's charting practices. They assert that during his deposition, Dr. Quirk stated that he does `skillful charting,' in that he never charts anything unfavorable about himself. As an example they allege that Dr. Quirk once misdiagnosed a baby as being dead, and later charted inaccurate information to hinder any later inquiry into the incident. Even assuming the guardians' characterization of the incident is accurate, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence. At the pretrial hearing, the guardians argued Dr. Quirk's charting practice was a habit and pertinent to show a practice of fraudulent charting. The trial court concluded Dr. Quirk was not on trial for the incident regarding the baby and it was not admissible, stating that perhaps the charting might be admissible. But the facts that were told to me would absolutely prejudice the jury in this case. The trial court further stated that I don't think the probative value anywhere closely measures to the prejudicial effect. On appeal, the guardians do not assert that the trial court abused its discretion regarding the prejudicial effect of the testimony; they simply assert the testimony is admissible under Ark.R.Evid. 404 and 608 which address character evidence. However, it is within the trial court's discretion to exclude otherwise admissible testimony under Ark.R.Civ.P. 403. Thompson, supra . We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony. For their third point, the guardians contend the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Quirk's past employment as a medical expert. They submit Quirk worked in the past as a medical expert witness on a very large number of cases for a plaintiff's attorney. The trial court initially concluded Quirk was a fact witness, not an expert witness, and Ark.Code Ann. § 16-114-207(3) provided he could not be required to give an opinion against himself. However, the trial court further stated that cross-examination of Dr. Quirk about his testifying as an expert witness would not be relevant and the prejudicial value would outweigh any probative value. On appeal, the guardians submit the testimony was clearly admissible under § 16-114-207(3) and was probative on several other counts as well. The guardians state that the evidence demonstrated Quirk had not merely testified on occasion; he had worked on approximately 200 cases for a single plaintiff's attorney and received $250 an hour for that work. Here, the guardians have also failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding the testimony was not relevant. See, Thompson, supra . Dr. Quirk's past experience as a medical expert for a plaintiff's attorney, though it may have been extensive, was not relevant in this case.