Opinion ID: 4540025
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Carr Analysis

Text: Substantial evidence supports the Board’s analysis of the Carr factors with respect to the fitness for duty order The parties agree that the fitness for duty examination and suspension both constitute personnel actions within the meaning of the statute. Case: 19-2022 Document: 37 Page: 7 Filed: 06/09/2020 CERULLI v. DEFENSE 7 and the 10-day suspension. 2 As explained below, the Board reasonably found that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel actions in the absence of Mr. Cerulli’s protected disclosure.
As to the first Carr factor, the Board found strong evidence supporting the agency’s decision to order a fitness for duty examination. The Board relied on the fitness for duty order itself, which described specific instances of Mr. Cerulli’s conduct that gave the agency concern as to whether he was mentally and emotionally stable enough to continue performing the duties of a Fire Protection Inspector. These instances include: (1) Mr. Cerulli abruptly leaving work without permission on December 30, 2016, despite the fact that Mr. Danley was not present on that day; (2) hypervigilance by way of arming himself with a paring knife, seeking leave, and monitoring Mr. Danley’s activities on January 2, 2017; (3) discussions regarding Mr. Cerulli’s prior PTSD diagnosis; and (4) Mr. Cerulli’s feelings of being “violated” and “sick to [his] stomach” from a heated conversation with Mr. Eskew and Mr. Castro on January 3, 2017. J.A. 263. Moreover, the Board cited the testimony of Mr. Watkins, who described Mr. Cerulli’s physical appearance during their January 10 meeting as “very upset and emotional, his face was red, and his eyes teared up.” J.A. 24. Mr. Castro also testified that he ordered the fitness for duty examination out of concern for Mr. Cerulli’s “emotional wellbeing” and “safety of the organization” because “it 2 The Board’s Carr analysis is premised on the un- disputed finding that Mr. Cerulli’s December 30, 2016, email constitutes a protected disclosure that was a contributing factor in the agency’s personnel actions. We address Mr. Cerulli’s arguments regarding whether there were additional protected disclosures infra (§ II). Case: 19-2022 Document: 37 Page: 8 Filed: 06/09/2020 8 CERULLI v. DEFENSE could be very dangerous . . . if [he was] not a hundred percent there.” J.A. 702. While acknowledging that Mr. Cerulli did not threaten anyone, the Board nonetheless emphasized his decision to arm himself with a knife, observing that no other employee—including the three witnesses to Mr. Danley’s statements—was so greatly concerned that they “absented themselves from working with [Mr. Danley] or armed themselves as a defensive measure.” J.A. 25. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that “the agency had a legitimate reason to order [Mr. Cerulli] to undergo a fitness for duty examination.” Id. The Board also found “strong evidence in support of the 10-day suspension” imposed on Mr. Cerulli. J.A. 26. It is undisputed that Mr. Cerulli did not attend his scheduled fitness for duty examination on January 24, 2017, and that he was suspended for failing to follow orders. The Board rejected the argument that the 10-day suspension was unwarranted because the fitness for duty order was itself improper. Instead, the Board observed that even if an order is improper, “an employee must comply with a lawful order and grieve the propriety of that order later.” Dias v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 102 M.S.P.R. 53, 57 (2006), aff’d, 223 Fed.Appx. 986 (Fed. Cir. 2007). On appeal, Mr. Cerulli argues that the fitness for duty order was not just inappropriate, but unlawful, and any personnel action resulting from his failure to follow the order cannot satisfy the first Carr factor. Relying on the Board’s finding that the fitness examination included “a psychiatric component,” J.A. 13-14, Mr. Cerulli cites Harris v. Department of Air Force, 62 M.S.P.R. 524 (1994), for the proposition that an employee may not be disciplined for Case: 19-2022 Document: 37 Page: 9 Filed: 06/09/2020 CERULLI v. DEFENSE 9 refusing to participate in a psychiatric examination that violates 5 C.F.R. § 339.301(e)(1). 3 Id. at 527-29. Section 339.301(e)(1) states that an agency may only order a psychiatric examination under two circumstances: (i) a properly-ordered physical examination “indicates no physical explanation for behavior or actions which may affect the safe and efficient performance” of the employee or others; or (ii) “a psychiatric examination or psychological assessment is part of the medical standards for a position . . . or required under a medical evaluation program.” Id. In Harris, the Board ruled in favor of an employee who was wrongly disciplined for failing to cooperate in a psychiatric examination violating § 339.301(e)(1). With respect to § 339.301(e)(1)(ii), 4 the Board found that “there [was] no 3 Mr. Cerulli also argues that the fitness for duty order violates 5 C.F.R. § 339.301(e)(2), which requires a psychiatric examination authorized under (e)(1) to be conducted “by a licensed physician certified in psychiatry by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology or the American Osteopathic Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, or by a licensed psychologist or clinical neuropsychologist.” Id. While the Board found that Dr. Hull was not qualified under § 339.301(e)(2), we find that the order itself does not violate § 339.301(e)(2). Nothing in the order requires Mr. Cerulli to receive his examination from a physician that does not meet the requirements of § 339.301(e)(2). The order merely specifies that the examination will be conducted by a “physician at the Occupational Health Office.” J.A. 264. 4 The Board in Harris also found that § 339.301(e)(1)(i) did not apply because there was no evidence that the employee’s behavior or actions affected the safe and efficient performance of herself or others. 62 M.S.P.R. at 528. Case: 19-2022 Document: 37 Page: 10 Filed: 06/09/2020 10 CERULLI v. DEFENSE allegation or evidence to indicate that [the employee] held a position that had medical standards.” 62 M.S.P.R. at 528. Here, unlike in Harris, the record supports that Mr. Cerulli’s position does require medical standards implicating a psychological assessment. Specifically, a description of the Fire Protection Inspector position enclosed with the fitness for duty order states that the position requires the “[a]bility to maintain alertness, self-control, and emotional stability to work in conditions of stress, confusion, panic, and physical injury and even death.” J.A. 269. We therefore find Mr. Cerulli’s argument that the fitness for duty order violates § 339.301(e)(1) unavailing.
With respect to the second Carr factor, the Board properly found little retaliatory motive by the agency officials involved in recommending or issuing the fitness for duty order and 10-day suspension. As an initial matter, the Board found no evidence that Mr. Castro or Mr. Eskew were beholden to Mr. Danley or “implicated directly in the disclosure.” J.A. 27. The Board relied on undisputed evidence that, at the time of Mr. Cerulli’s disclosure, his supervisors had already initiated an investigation into Mr. Danley’s December 19, 2016, statements and placed him on administrative leave. The Board further remarked that “perhaps most telling as to whether the agency retaliated against [Mr. Cerulli], there is no evidence in the record that the agency retaliated against other employees who reported Danley’s comment, including Reinhard, who was first to report his concern of the threat.” J.A. 29. Based on this evidence, the Board could not “conclude that any of the agency officials had a strong motive to retaliate.” J.A. 27. Mr. Cerulli, however, argues that his disclosures differed from that of other employees who reported Mr. Danley’s comments because his December 30 email “created a written record” that “reached several levels of his supervisory chain.” Appellant’s Br. 50. Mr. Cerulli further argues Case: 19-2022 Document: 37 Page: 11 Filed: 06/09/2020 CERULLI v. DEFENSE 11 that the repeated nature of his disclosures threatened the agency’s “ability to stifle discussion of Danley’s behavior.” Appellant’s Br. 51. However, this ignores the fact that a written record was already under development in the ongoing investigation (J.A. 359-66), and Mr. Danley’s behavior was already an active topic of discussion in the workplace. The weight to be given to the evidence of record is a “judgment call[] that rest[s] primarily within the discretion of the Board.” Koenig v. Dep’t Of Navy, 315 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Based on the record before us, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that the evidence of motivation to retaliate was relatively weak. C. Treatment of Others Who Were Similarly Situated As to the third Carr factor, the Board correctly found the comparator evidence submitted by the agency weighed in the agency’s favor. With respect to the fitness for duty examination, the Board considered a comparable case, MD, who was accepted into a leadership program within the agency but was dismissed within a week. The agency recommended 5 that MD undergo a fitness for duty examination based on “unusual behaviors.” J.A. 311. Specifically, MD had told various lies, took oxycodone without a valid prescription, and admitted to having had a “mental break from reality.” Id. With respect to the 10-day suspension, the Board found EA to be comparable. EA was suspended for failing to follow instructions to provide medical documentation in connection with a fitness for duty examination to determine whether he was cleared to return to work. Similar to Mr. Cerulli’s situation, a 30-day suspension was originally 5 The agency offered for MD to undergo a fitness for duty examination but could not require him to submit due to the nature of his position. Case: 19-2022 Document: 37 Page: 12 Filed: 06/09/2020 12 CERULLI v. DEFENSE proposed, which was subsequently mitigated to 14 days. Neither MD nor EA were whistleblowers. Mr. Cerulli argues that neither MD nor EA are appropriate comparators. According to Mr. Cerulli, his concern for Mr. Danley’s behavior and desire to protect himself was reasonable whereas MD’s drug use and lying was not. However, as the Board stated in its decision, what makes MD an appropriate comparator is the fact that both MD and Mr. Cerulli “demonstrated behavior that caused an objective concern” to management regarding the “ability to perform essential functions of [the] position,” and in both situations, the agency proposed a fitness for duty examination. J.A. 28. While not a rigorous comparison, we find that substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination that this comparator evidence weighs in favor of the agency. Mr. Cerulli further argues that EA is not an appropriate comparator because EA’s suspension was justified whereas his was not. Specifically, Mr. Cerulli contends that a demand for medical information must be followed whereas an unlawful order for a psychological examination need not be followed. However, as explained above, the fitness for duty order was lawful and failure to comply with it provided the agency with a legitimate reason to suspend Mr. Cerulli. We therefore find this argument unpersuasive and conclude that the Board reasonably determined EA’s circumstances to be “very similar.” J.A. 28. Mr. Cerulli also argues that the Board failed to consider a comparator that the government did not proffer: Mr. Danley. According to Mr. Cerulli, Mr. Danley “made a threat of violence,” was investigated, and was ultimately only issued a letter of warning, despite prior complaints of bullying. Appellant’s Br. 56. In contrast, Mr. Cerulli was supposedly “accused of similar misconduct” but was given a fitness for duty order and suspended without any investigation. Id. at 56-57. We disagree that Mr. Cerulli and Case: 19-2022 Document: 37 Page: 13 Filed: 06/09/2020 CERULLI v. DEFENSE 13 Mr. Danley are similarly situated. As an initial matter, we note that the nature of the “misconduct” differs. Mr. Danley was accused of a verbal threat, which management determined to be an “avoidable” incident of “perception and misunderstanding rather than an attempt . . . to intimidate an insubordinate” after investigation. J.A. 430. While expressing disappointment over his poor interpersonal skills as a manager, Mr. Danley’s supervisors did not express any concerns over his mental or emotional stability or ability to perform the essential functions of his position. Mr. Cerulli, on the other hand, acknowledged that he had armed himself with a knife, and his supervisors perceived increasing levels of emotional distress and hypervigilance that cast doubt on his ability to perform the essential functions of his position. We therefore find that the Board reasonably excluded Mr. Danley as an appropriate comparator. Based on the record, substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision that the agency properly established by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel actions even absent Mr. Cerulli’s protected disclosure.