Opinion ID: 1693754
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the doctrine of negligent entrustment

Text: This is the first case, insofar as I can tell, which seeks to impose liability upon a person who entrusts a chattel to an incompetent when the incompetent harms himself. This Court has for many years permitted third persons injured as a result of the negligence of an incompetent minor to recover from the party who negligently entrusted the vehicle to the incompetent. Rush v. McDonnell, 214 Ala. 47, 106 So. 175 (1925). The gravamen of the cause of action was stated in Paschall v. Sharp, 215 Ala. 304, 110 So. 387 (1926): Any person under 16 years of age is conclusively presumed incompetent to drive an automobile on the public highways of Alabama; and any person who allows such a vehicle to be operated by a person, a minor, under 16 years of age, upon the public highways of this state, unaccompanied by an adult person, is guilty of negligence as a matter of law. (Emphasis added.) Recovery is permitted on the theory that the statutes were enacted in order to protect the public from those persons whom the legislature has deemed to be incompetent to operate a motor vehicle. McDermott v. Hambright, 286 Ala. 249, 238 So.2d 876 (1970). This Court, in McDermott, by dicta, apparently thought that the negligent entrustment doctrine permitted recovery only by third persons, because the Court there stated: Since we conclude that plaintiff's complaint is demurrable on other grounds, we do not decide whether there is a cause of action in Alabama for the death of the bailee himself on a theory of negligent entrustment. However, as defendant points out in brief, the negligent entrustment doctrine does seem to have been limited to injuries to third persons. The reason for this doctrine, as a Texas Court of Civil Appeals indicates in Rodgers v. McFarland, 402 S.W.2d 208, 210 (1966) is: `... It is founded in tort-the negligence of the owner in turning the incompetent loose on the public.' [Emphasis added.] The McDermott court wrote too much. In the first place, the Texas case (Rodgers), used by this Court in McDermott as authority for the proposition that the incompetent could not sue for harm caused to himself, was not a suit by the incompetent against the owner, but, rather, was a suit by a third person ; therefore, the portion of the opinion in Rodgers v. McFarland , which was quoted in McDermott, was dicta. I am pleased that the majority has not followed the dicta in McDermott, but has held that one who supplies a chattel for use by a person known to be incompetent can be held liable for harm which the entrustee causes to himself. The critical question is: When and under what circumstances should a supplier of a chattel to a known incompetent be held liable for harm suffered by the incompetent himself which is caused by his own act? Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 (1965), discusses the question and states the rule as follows: § 390. Chattel for Use by Person Known to be Incompetent One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them. (Emphasis added.) It is clear that the Restatement does not single out the incompetent and say he must go without a remedy. The majority correctly adopts the same reasoning by adopting the Restatement. By adopting the Restatement, the Court has adopted a rule which is reasonable, because it leaves to the trier of fact the critical questions regarding liability in such cases. Other courts have left these triable issues to juries. In Greenwood v. Gardner, 189 Kan. 68, 366 P.2d 780 (1961), the Supreme Court of Kansas, in a negligent entrustment case involving the violation of a statute, held that a cause of action was stated, and held that the issue of proximate causation was a jury question. Greenwood involved a ten-year-old child who sued his grandfather for damages he allegedly sustained because his grandfather permitted him to drive an automobile. The legislature has made the entrustment of an automobile to a person under sixteen a misdemeanor (Code 1975 § 32-5-65) and this Court has stated that any person under sixteen years of age is conclusively presumed incompetent to drive an automobile.... Rush v. McDonnell, supra . I recognize that Code 1975, § 32-5-64, provides that it is a juvenile offense when a child under sixteen operates a motor vehicle, but does the minor's violation of this statute bar his, or his parents', right to recover for harm occasioned by the entrustment of an automobile to him in violation of Code 1975, § 32-5-65? I think not, and I will discuss this point in this dissent under the section dealing with allowable defenses. Juvenile offenders are treated differently under our laws. A child's lack of capacity to commit the offense would be an available defense to the child in a juvenile proceeding involving the child's violation of the statute. I would conclude that the statutes prohibiting a child under the age of sixteen from driving an automobile and the statute prohibiting another from permitting a child under sixteen to drive were enacted for the protection of the child as well as the public. The crucial issue always is the capacity of the child whether presented in a criminal or civil case. In a negligence suit, capacity is a jury question, regardless of the age of the incompetent. In resolving the capacity issue, I would point out that the statutory scheme of legislation pertaining to juvenile offenses is that juveniles generally lack the capacity and maturity to appreciate the dangers associated with their conduct ; therefore, the legislature has provided a separate scheme of punishment or treatment, whichever is the appropriate term, for the juvenile offender. It was a jury question whether the person allowing this young child to drive could have reasonably foreseen that she might harm herself. This is especially true here where the defendant is shown to have violated a statute. The injury here was of a type contemplated by the statute. As I have previously stated, the statute is designed not only to protect the public from harm, but also is designed to protect the incompetent driver as well. It naturally follows that one of the harms that the child must be protected from is the child's own personal injury or death which results from his operation of the automobile. An automobile in the hands of a known incompetent can be a dangerous instrument. [Cf. McGowin v. Howard, 246 Ala. 553, 21 So.2d 683 (1945)]. Unquestionably, the injury to the alleged incompetent in this case was of a type contemplated by the statute. In any event, whether the negligent entrustment of the vehicle to the alleged incompetent child proximately caused the injury is yet to be determined. I would hold that the question of proximate causation is one for the trier of fact.