Opinion ID: 1436706
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Factual and Legal Adequacy of the Board's Second Statement

Text: We defer consideration of Walton's first argument at this juncture of our decision. The second argument concerns the factual and legal adequacy of the Board's second statement. [17] The adequacy of the second statement insofar as it bears upon the trial court's determination that sufficient evidence existed to support the Board's order, is clearly before us on appeal, regardless of whether Walton initially exhausted his administrative remedies on the first written statement. The trial court determined that the second written statement complied with the pertinent provisions of the LRAA. The trial judge did not explain the basis for his conclusion, but incorporated by reference the arguments contained in the reply of the defendants . . . in opposition to plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment, defendants' Cross-motion to Dismiss the complaint, the defendant's response to the court's April 21, 1993, order, the memorandum of points and authorities filed in support therefore, and the entire record. . . . The Board's second statement, although not the model of clarity, noted that Walton admitted to have had [sic] shoots [homemade wine] in his cell. [18] The trial court was, therefore, correct in concluding that the second written statement contained the Board's finding as to the resident's involvement, and the factual information upon which the finding is based, as required by 28 DCMR § 512.7. Assuming that all of Walton's factual allegations are true, the record reveals that Walton admitted to having at least two gallons of grapefruit juice in his cell at Lorton, in a container. [19] He denied that the substance was homemade wine, but did not deny that there was a smell in his cell. Although the alcoholic content of the juice was found to be less than one percent, 28 DCMR § 502.11 defines possession of major contraband to include possession of, making, or attempting to make any intoxicating beverage. In addition, 28 DCMR § 503.10 defines possession of contraband to include use of any article in a manner contrary to the intent or provisions of issuance, purchase or authorization.. . . Based upon Walton's admission that there were two gallons of grapefruit juice in a container in his cell and his failure to deny the smell in his cell, the Board and the trial court could reasonably conclude that a prisoner who accumulates two gallons of grapefruit juice in a container in his cell and who fails to deny that there was a smell in his cell, attempted to make an intoxicating beverage. With respect to the charge abuse of privileges in violation of 28 DCMR § 504.4, Walton conceded that he retained the fruit juice in his cell without permission. Hence, there was ample factual evidence that Walton violated the LRAA, as charged. Accordingly, neither the Board's second written statement, nor the trial court's August 13, 1993, order was factually or legally inadequate.