Opinion ID: 1910344
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Batson and its Progeny

Text: In 1986, the United States Supreme Court decided Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), which held that [t]he Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race[.] Id. at 86, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1900)). In so holding, the Batson Court delineated a tripartite test for determining whether a criminal defendant has been denied equal protection of the laws by the state's use of a peremptory challenge. [9] Id. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. First, the defendant must establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination[.] Id. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Finally, [t]he trial court then will have the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. In Batson and in subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has provided helpful guidance with respect to each of these three steps. Regarding the first inquiry, the Batson Court explained that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The Court continued: [T]he defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group    and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits `those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.'    Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. This combination of factors in the empaneling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire, raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination. Id. Five years later, in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), the Court eliminated the requirement that a criminal defendant share the same race as a challenged juror, explaining that [t]o bar petitioner's claim because his race differs from that of the excluded jurors would be to condone the arbitrary exclusion of citizens from the duty, honor, and privilege of jury service. Id. at 415, 111 S.Ct. 1364. With respect to Batson's second step, the Supreme Court counseled that a prosecutor's race-neutral explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Nevertheless, Batson made clear that a prosecutor cannot satisfy this burden merely by denying that he [or she] had a discriminatory motive or `[affirming] [his or her] good faith in making individual selections.' Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972)). In 1991, Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991), clarified that, at this second step, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral. Id. at 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859. Finally, concerning Batson's third step, the Supreme Court instructed that a trial justice must undertake `a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.' Batson, 476 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977)). In Hernandez, the Court further explained that the decisive question will be whether counsel's race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859. In Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (per curiam), the Court offered the following regarding the interplay between the second and third Batson steps: It is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevantthe step in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.    At that stage, implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination. But to say that a trial judge may choose to disbelieve a silly or superstitious reason at step three is quite different from saying that a trial judge must terminate the inquiry at step two when the race-neutral reason is silly or superstitious. The latter violates the principle that the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. Id. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769. It is because a trial justice's finding of purposeful discrimination at this third step largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712. 2