Opinion ID: 1362793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Extrinsic Aids

Text: Counsel have referred us to a congeries of other documents, some of which merit comment. Consider, for instance, the Attorney General's letter of March 14, 1979, which reads in part: [W]e invite the court's attention to the view of Alan Sieroty, Chairman of the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice in a colloquy with Louis Katz, an attorney from San Diego, representing the Criminal Defense Lawyers (see attachment โ excerpts from hearing, supra ). This makes it clear that the chairman of the committee understood that the discretion of the court to strike the allegation had been eliminated. This is consistent with all of the legislative history presented to the court, and although it is a view expressed subsequent to the passage of the legislation, it may be considered. That is a puzzling inference. The paraphrased colloquy was reported as follows (italics added): CHAIRMAN SIEROTY: An armed robbery case, Mr. Katz, is kind of interesting. Under our law now, the judge would have no discretion to grant them probation. MR. KATZ: That's right; under SB 42. CHAIRMAN SIEROTY: No, under 287, was it? 278. That man would go to prison. He would not have any opportunity for probation. The only opportunity would be that you could convince the district attorney, as to what to say, and he might change the charge, or something else. MR. KATZ: Well, if they strike the allegation ... CHAIRMAN SIEROTY: Strike the allegation of utilization of a weapon in robbery. Then there would be a different situation. So what that bill has done is to change who exercises the discretion? MR. KATZ: The district attorney instead of the judge. CHAIRMAN SIEROTY: That's right. That is what I see happening in this process. MR. KATZ: And that's what really concerns me that the charging authority, the district attorney, will have the power to decide who does, or doesn't, go to prison. Without the benefit of the Judicial System, the district attorney relies on the police report, and true, he has, maybe, the man's past record, but then about how he charges the defendant is deciding either he goes to trial, or how the man is going to be sentenced, because if they charge an allegation of being armed, the judge has no discretion, and this is the thing we're concerned about.... What exactly was meant by the chairman's words, Strike the allegation of utilization of a weapon in robbery. Then there would be a different situation. ? The only justifiable inferences, I submit, are (1) that both the chairman and Mr. Katz indeed did know about the ง 1385 exception, and (2) that the chairman regarded strike cases as different, relevant generally perhaps but nonetheless beyond the scope of his on-going inquiry into Senate Bill No. 278, ง 1203, and ง 1203.06. There are also letters from the Attorney General to the Assembly and its committee, to the Senate committee, and to the Governor. I have appended them here (as annexes D, E, F, G) first, because starkly they decorate footnote 8 in Justice Tobriner's opinion; [4] and second, because it will be seen that none of them contains any hint that its author's concerns in any way extended beyond ... the provisions of Section 1203.