Opinion ID: 3172155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ms. Bagwe’s Pay Discrimination Claims

Text: Ms. Bagwe also raises claims under § 1981, Title VII, and the IHRA that Sedgwick paid her a low salary relative to her peers on the basis of her race and national origin. Before we assess the merits of this claim, we must address two procedural obstacles. First, Sedgwick contends that all of Ms. Bagwe’s claims regarding compensation are time-barred and that we need not reach the merits on any claims of pay discrimination. That is not the case. Under § 1981, a complaint must be filed within four years of the alleged unlawful employment practice. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). Ms. Bagwe filed her complaint on April 12, 2011; therefore, in order to be timely, 58 her § 1981 claims must have arisen on or after April 12, 2007. 58 Ms. Bagwe’s other claims of pay discrimination have much shorter limitations periods. Under Title VII, a charge of employment discrimination must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also Roney v. Illinois Dep’t of Transp., 474 F.3d 455, 460 (7th Cir. 2007). Under the IHRA, a claim must be filed with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(A)(1), (A-1)(1). Ms. Bagwe filed her EEOC charge on December 9, 2009. Therefore, in order to be timely, the No. 14-3201 31 At the very least, Ms. Bagwe’s claim that she received a com59 paratively small merit increase in 2008 is not time-barred. Therefore, at least one of Ms. Bagwe’s pay discrimination claims must be considered on the merits. Second, Ms. Bagwe contends that Sedgwick only challenged the timeliness, but not the substance, of her pay claims. Therefore, she believes that summary judgment on her pay discrimination claims is inappropriate. See Sublett v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 463 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2006) (“As a general matter, if the moving party does not raise an issue in support of its motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party is not required to present evidence on that point, and the district court should not rely on that ground in its decision.”). Ms. Bagwe specifically contends that Sedgwick only addressed Ms. Bagwe’s claims about her raises and did not address claims about her salary. Ms. Bagwe is mistaken. Sedgwick clearly addressed Ms. Bagwe’s “complain[t]s about her cause for her Title VII claims must have arisen on or after March 19, 2009, and the cause for her IHRA claims must have arisen on or after July 7, 2009. Ms. Bagwe may also be able to state a claim based on the paychecks she received after these dates. See infra note 59. 59 Ms. Bagwe may also have claims based on each paycheck she received. Under the paycheck accrual rule, a new limitations period is triggered each time that a plaintiff is paid less than his or her colleagues. Groesch v. City of Springfield, Ill., 635 F.3d 1020, 1025–26 (7th Cir. 2011). The rule applies to Title VII claims, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A)(3) (Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act), and to § 1983 claims. Groesch, 635 F.3d at 1026. We have not determined whether this rule also applies to § 1981 claims. However, because we conclude that Ms. Bagwe cannot succeed on the merits of any of her pay discrimination claims, we need not reach this issue today. 32 No. 14-3201 60 2008 pay raise and her compensation.” We must consider whether summary judgment is appropriate on the merits. Turning to the merits, we observe that our conclusions on Ms. Bagwe’s discrimination claims based on termination necessarily prove fatal to any claim she has made based on unequal pay. As previously discussed, Ms. Bagwe has not presented any similarly situated employee who received a higher salary. Therefore, she cannot prevail under the indirect method of proof. She also has failed to present circumstantial evidence that would suggest that her employers had a discriminatory motive, and therefore she cannot prevail under the direct method of proof.