Opinion ID: 2455572
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: impugning defense counsel

Text: ¶ 61 It is not misconduct for a prosecutor to argue the evidence does not support the defense's theory of the case. Russell, 125 Wash.2d at 87, 882 P.2d 747. However, a prosecutor must not impugn the role or integrity of defense counsel. See Warren, 165 Wash.2d at 29-30, 195 P.3d 940; State v. Negrete, 72 Wash.App. 62, 67, 863 P.2d 137 (1993); Bruno v. Rushen, 721 F.2d 1193, 1194-95 (9th Cir.1983). ¶ 62 Thorgerson claims the prosecutor impugned defense counsel in two ways. First, the prosecutor intentionally failed to object to evidence he considered irrelevant and asked the defendant argumentative questions concerning trial strategy on cross-examination in order to set up a later argument that defense counsel was engaged in sleight of hand. III VRP at 150-52, 195-96. Second, the prosecutor referred to the defense's arguments as bogus and the result of desperation. III VRP at 171-72. ¶ 63 The State argues that the prosecutor's comments were proper. It asserts that the comments disparaged defense counsel's argument, not defense counsel himself. Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 8. Moreover, the State points out that the cases relied upon by Thorgerson are distinguishable because they contain much more egregious statements regarding defense counsel than the case at hand. Id. at 9. ¶ 64 The comments made by the prosecution in the cases cited by Thorgerson are more blatantly improper than those of the prosecutor in this case. In Negrete, 72 Wash.App. at 66, 863 P.2d 137 (quoting court record), the prosecutor said defense counsel was ` being paid to twist the words of the witnesses. ' The court held the statement was improper but not irreparably prejudicial. Id. at 67, 863 P.2d 137. In State v. Gonzales, 111 Wash.App. 276, 283, 45 P.3d 205 (2002), the prosecutor directly contrasted the roles of prosecutor and defense counsel. Similarly, in Bruno, 721 F.2d at 1194 n. 2, the obvious import of the prosecutor's comments was that all defense counsel in criminal cases are retained solely to lie and distort the facts and camouflage the truth. In contrast, isolated remarks calling defense arguments bogus and desperate, while strong and perhaps close to improper, do not directly impugn the role or integrity of counsel, and such isolated comments are unlikely to amount to prosecutorial misconduct. See Brown, 132 Wash.2d at 566, 940 P.2d 546 (prosecutor's characterization of defense argument as ludicrous was a strong but fair editorial comment on the evidence). ¶ 65 On the other hand, the prosecutor's statement that [t]he entire defense is sleight of hand is more troublesome. III VRP at 195. Sleight of hand implies trickery or wrongdoing and can be interpreted as an attack on counsel rather than on counsel's arguments. There is a fine line between disparaging an argument and disparaging defense counsel, and arguments must be made carefully or the line is crossed. Sleight of hand suggests an act by an actor; in this case the actor was defense counsel. Here the prosecution twice used the term sleight of hand regarding the defense. ¶ 66 Moreover, the prosecutor admits that he intentionally did not object to evidence he considered irrelevant and aggressively questioned the defendant in cross-examination on the defense strategy specifically in order to make the sleight-of-hand claim in closing. Thus the prosecutor planned to make the sleight-of-hand argument and thereby imply trickery and wrongdoing on the part of defense counsel. These remarks impermissibly impugned defense counsel and were improper.