Opinion ID: 879106
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dvorak's negligence claims

Text: Dvorak begins his argument under this issue by noting that at the time he was injured, he was an employee of Beall, Inc. Dvorak further notes that Beall was in turn an independent contractor employed by defendant Matador. The general common law rule, which Montana follows, is that an employer is not liable for the negligence or wrongdoing of an independent contractor. See, Storrusten v. Harrison (1976), 169 Mont. 525, 549 P.2d 464. However, there are some very important exceptions to this general rule. Dvorak argues that Matador falls under two common exceptions to the independent contractor rule: (1) the peculiar risk or inherently dangerous activity doctrine; and (2) the employer's liability for his own negligence. Dvorak asserts the District Court, in imposing summary judgment, held that Montana does not recognize the inherently dangerous activity exception and that, in any event, the exception would not apply to the facts of this case. With regard to the employer's own negligence exception, the trial court apparently recognized the exception but held that Matador could not be liable on that basis. Dvorak argues the trial court erred in its conclusions. First, with regard to the inherently dangerous activity exception, Dvorak argues that Montana has long recognized this doctrine. This doctrine basically provides that where the acts to be performed by an independent contractor are of an inherently dangerous nature, the employer will be held vicariously liable for any resultant injury caused by the negligence or wrongdoing of the independent contractor. To establish that Montana has adopted the peculiar risk or inherently dangerous activity exception, Dvorak directs this Court's attention to the recent cases of Kemp v. Bechtel Construction Co., et al. (Mont. 1986), 720 P.2d 270, 43 St.Rep. 1022 and Cash v. Otis Elevator Co. (Mont.1984), 684 P.2d 1041, 41 St.Rep. 1077. It is also important to note, Dvorak argues, that employees of independent contractors are protected under the inherently dangerous activity exception. In other words, the exception extends not only to third persons, but also to employees of an independent contractor. Therefore, an employer (i.e. Matador) who hires an independent contractor (i.e. Beall) to engage in an inherently dangerous activity will be liable for negligent acts which injure the contractors own employees (i.e. Dvorak). See, Kemp, supra, and Stepanek v. Kober Construction (Mont.1981), 625 P.2d 51, 38 St. Rep. 385. In light of Montana's clear recognition of the inherently dangerous activity exception, Dvorak argues, the only remaining issue is whether the exception applies to this case. In other words, whether the repairing and fabrication by Beall of tanks which contain hydrogen sulfide contaminated matter is an inherently dangerous activity thereby making Matador vicariously liable for Beall's negligence or wrongdoing. Dvorak argues this issue is a question of fact which can only be determined by a jury. Consequently, Dvorak asserts, this case must be reversed and remanded for trial. Dvorak argues the second exception to the general rule that an employer is not liable for the tortious acts of an independent contractor is that if the employer is himself negligent in his own dealings with the independent contractor, this can give rise to employer liability. In the instant case, Dvorak primarily argues that Matador's conduct falls under this exception because Matador negligently failed to advise or warn Beall that special precautions were necessary when dealing with hydrogen sulfide. Dvorak contends that Beall was ignorant of the reasonable particular protections necessary against hydrogen sulfide's dangers and that Matador knew of Beall's ignorance. Thus, it was reasonably foreseeable to Matador that a Beall employee (i.e. Dvorak) would be injured. Dvorak bases his theory of negligence on § 413 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In response to Dvorak's contentions under this issue, Matador argues it is not vicariously liable for Beall's wrongful conduct. Matador acknowledges there appears to be several exceptions to the general rule that an employer is not vicariously liable for the tortious acts of his agent if the latter is an independent contractor. The exceptions relied on by Dvorak are: (1) the inherently dangerous activity exception; and (2) the employer's liability for his own negligence exception. Dvorak's objective, Matador notes, is to establish that Beall was an independent contractor employed by Matador thereby making Matador vicariously liable for Beall's tortious conduct under the exceptions noted above. However, Matador argues, this whole line of argument by Dvorak simply begs the question and entirely misses the point. We agree. We agree with Matador that Beall is simply not its agent in the sense in which the proferred doctrines apply and vicarious liability simply does not attach to the instant case. Working through the exceptions to the independent contractor rule is, therefore, to no avail since the underlying agency relationship upon which vicarious liability rests does not exist. Matador points out the independent contractor rule provides that a principal (employer) will not be liable for the tortious acts of his agent (employee) if the latter is an independent contractor, with certain limited exceptions. In the instant case, however, Matador argues that Beall is not its agent in the first place. Matador did not engage Beall to undertake activities on behalf of Matador in Matador's relations with third parties or the public generally. Rather, Matador engaged Beall to perform tasks for Matador, not tasks which Matador had undertaken to perform for others and was delegating to Beall. This is simply not an agency case and no principle of vicarious liability can be applied. We agree with Matador that Dvorak simply attempts to stretch to the point of misapplication the cases which do properly apply exceptions to the independent contractor rule. For example, such doctrines (i.e. the inherently dangerous activity exception) are especially prevalent in construction cases because clearly a subcontractor is an agent of the contractor (principal) for purposes of performing work which the contractor had agreed to perform for the owner (third party). See, Kemp, supra (although the inherently dangerous activity exception was ultimately held not to apply to this fact situation). In such an arrangement, there may very well be a situation in which the contractor is vicariously liable for the acts of the subcontractor, even though an independent contractor relationship exists. In the present case, however, the agency relationships which form the framework of the doctrines are absent. Therefore, Matador can not be vicariously liable for Beall's wrongful conduct. It is also important to note, Matador argues, that it is not liable to Dvorak under any general negligence theory, whether associated with an exception to the independent contractor rule or not, because Beall's conduct was the sole proximate cause of Dvorak's injuries. Matador asserts that since Beall knew of the presence and dangers of hydrogen sulfide in the subject tank, had the responsibility to clean the tank prior to employee entry, failed to adequately do so, and then ordered Dvorak into the tank despite his protests that the tank was unclean and unsafe, Beall, and not Matador, is liable for Dvorak's injuries. Matador notes the District Court came to this same conclusion and granted its motion for summary judgment. We agree. Matador points out that Dvorak under a general negligence theory, is basically arguing that the defendants are liable for his injuries because Matador failed to exercise reasonable care in advising or warning Beall that special precautions were necessary when dealing with hydrogen sulfide. Even assuming Matador owed such a duty to Beall at all (which is highly questionable), and then breached such a duty, the law and facts clearly establish that Beall's conduct, and not Matador's conduct, was the proximate cause of Dvorak's injuries. Matador strongly relies on the case of Rost v. C.F. & I. Steel Corp. (Mont.1980), 616 P.2d 383, 37 St.Rep. 1657, to establish that Beall's conduct was the proximate cause of Dvorak's injuries. The Rost case was a products liability action against the manufacturer of an elevator cable for injuries sustained when the frayed and torn cable broke and the elevator fell. The plaintiffs in the Rost case settled their dispute against the store owner and proceeded to trial against the cable manufacturer on the theory that the defendant failed to warn the store owner of the dangerous use of the cable. In affirming a jury verdict in favor of the cable manufacturer, this Court found that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligent conduct of the store owner in failing to properly maintain and inspect the cable and not any failure to warn on the part of the manufacturer. The Court characterized the store owner's conduct, as a matter of law, as the superseding intervening force or operative conduct leading to the plaintiff's injuries. We find the circumstances of the Rost case are analogous to the circumstances of the instant case. Dvorak's injuries occurred because Beall did not clean the tank, as it was expected and required to do, and then forced Dvorak to enter the tank even after the unclean conditions had been brought to the attention of Dvorak's foreman. We find without Beall's grossly negligent conduct the accident would not have occurred and, therefore, Beall's conduct was the operative conduct or superseding force which intervened as the proximate cause of Dvorak's injuries. A warning from Matador to Beall as to the risks of hydrogen sulfide (if such a duty existed at all) would have been to no avail, and consequently, a failure to warn could not have been the proximate cause of the accident.