Opinion ID: 3071807
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: PLRA Exhaustion.

Text: Under the PLRA, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions . . . by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[T]he PLRA pre-filing exhaustion requirement is mandatory and non-discretionary.” Gonzalez v. Seal, No. 11-31068, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 25371, at  (5th Cir. Dec. 12, 2012) (per curiam). The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is twofold. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006). First, it “protects administrative agency authority” by allowing the agency to “correct its own mistakes” rather than being immediately “haled into federal court.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Second, it promotes efficiency insofar as administrative review processes are generally faster and more economical than is litigation. Id. Even where the parties subsequently seek judicial remedies, the administrative-review process often produces a useful record to ease and expedite further proceedings. Id. See also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 150S51 (1992). In determining exhaustion under the PLRA, we look to the processes established by the prison and the parties’ use of these processes, beginning with the sufficiency of the inmate’s “complaint.” We “typically use a standard according to which a grievance should give prison officials ‘fair notice’ of the problem that will form the basis of the prisoner’s suit.” Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 516 (5th Cir. 2004). The complaint must be sufficient in detail to give officials “time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525 (2002). If the complaint meets those standards, and if there are no further avenues for administrative resolution, we will find exhaustion. Where the prisoner’s complaint addresses an ongoing problem or multiple 7 Case: 09-40400 Document: 00512093372 Page: 8 Date Filed: 12/21/2012 No. 09-40400 instances of the same type of harm, prisoners need not file a new grievance in each instance to quality for exhaustion. “As a practical matter,” a prisoner cannot be “expected to file a new grievance” each time he is harmed in the same manner.1 Further, TDCJ’s policies expressly direct prisoners not to file multiple grievances for a repeating harm, and they threaten sanctions for excessive filings.2 Where the original grievance complains of a general prison policy, changed circumstances will not necessarily necessitate re-exhaustion.3 Moussazadeh initially went through TDCJ’s entire grievance process before filing this suit. In Texas, prison grievances involve a two-step process. The inmate first files a Step 1 grievance, in which he must state the grievance and his proposed relief. If relief is denied, the inmate may then file a Step 2 grievance appealing the denial. Moussazadeh filed both claims. And indeed, before filing formal grievances, he sought the assistance of the prison chaplain and the kitchen captain in resolving the issue. In its denial of his Step 2 grievance, TDCJ told Moussazadeh that no further action could be taken regarding his request for kosher food. The district court held that Moussazadeh had not exhausted. There was a convergence of changed circumstances, it found, that required him to reexhaust. Namely, TDCJ put in place a kosher meals program and served Moussazadeh kosher meals from the prison kitchen during his time at Stringfellow. Thereafter, Moussazadeh was transferred to Stiles, which left him in a different position. The district court held that these facts required him to submit new grievances. We disagree. 1 Johnson, 385 F.3d at 521 (holding that a prisoner who suffered similar harassment on multiple occasions had sufficiently exhausted even though he had not filed new grievances at each instance of harassment). 2 See id. 3 Id. (citing Aiello v. Litscher, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1074 (W.D. Wis. 2000)). 8 Case: 09-40400 Document: 00512093372 Page: 9 Date Filed: 12/21/2012 No. 09-40400 Although Moussazadeh can purchase kosher food at Stiles and did receive kosher food for a time at Stringfellow, the claim that gave rise to his initial grievances and suit remains unchanged. His original grievance asked TDCJ to “grant [him] access to kosher meals in the prison dining hall.” In the “Action Requested to resolve your Complaint” field, Moussazadeh asked to “receive kosher meals from the unit kitchen and dining hall.”4 The grievance related to his ability to be fed a kosher, nutritionally adequate diet in the dining hall as a substitute for the nonkosher meals he was being served. His claim is for relief related to ongoing conduct—he is currently being denied kosher food. Even though he was granted the relief he requested for a time, it has been taken away from him. This is analogous to the situation in Johnson, in which a prisoner was being assaulted on a regular basis but not every single day. See Johnson, 385 F.3d at 521. We explained that the pattern of assault did not require multiple grievances. Id. Johnson did not have to be assaulted each and every day for the conduct underlying his grievance to be considered ongoing. Similarly, Moussazadeh’s claim relates to conduct that continues to occur. Further, even granting that Moussazadeh’s situation has changed with his transfer to Stiles and that he is now free to purchase kosher food, it would be improper to dismiss under the PLRA. This case has been ongoing for more than seven years. The administrative process has yet to yield a satisfactory result, and the final grievance response stated that TDCJ would “take no further action.” Insofar as the purpose of exhaustion under the PLRA is to provide notice of the prisoner’s grievances and a chance for the prison system to address 4 TDCJ asks us to apply an even narrower reading of Moussazadeh’s complaint. It suggests that his original grievance only requested “access” to kosher food. That strained understanding of the complaint does not comport with its clear language. Moussazadeh explicitly requested kosher meals served by the prison kitchen. 9 Case: 09-40400 Document: 00512093372 Page: 10 Date Filed: 12/21/2012 No. 09-40400 them, these proceedings have undoubtedly accomplished those objectives. TDCJ is fully aware of Moussazadeh’s requests and complaints. Nothing in the record suggests that, were Moussazadeh to file an administrative grievance, TDCJ would take any action. Forcing re-exhaustion would be fruitless and would needlessly extend already prolonged litigation. Finding the need for re-exhaustion here would also allow TDCJ and future potential defendants to take improper advantage of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. To avoid any future suit on grounds of not providing a kosher diet, TDCJ would merely have to transfer the complaining inmate to Stringfellow after a suit was filed, then move for dismissal. Once the suit was dismissed, TDCJ would have free reign to deny the inmate kosher food again. Even assuming good faith on the part of TDCJ, such a system, which would be allowable under the district court’s understanding of the PLRA, would be contrary to the purposes of the act. Finally, the statute states that “[n]o action shall be brought . . . until” administrative remedies have been exhausted. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added). Once those remedies are exhausted, the suit may be filed. All of our previous cases upholding dismissals under § 1997e have involved a failure to file grievances at all or a failure to see the administrative review process through to its conclusion.5 We have never before held that, once he has initially exhausted available remedies, an inmate must re-exhaust based on changed circumstances. The PLRA serves as a threshold; once it is met, a suit may not be dismissed so long as the claims remain the same. In seven years of litigation, Moussazadeh has not amended his initial complaint—in fact, the district court noted that he 5 See, e.g., Robinson v. Wheeler, 338 F. App’x 437, 438 (5th Cir. 2009) (upholding dismissal for lack of exhaustion where prisoner was told that he could re-file a grievance before the suit was initiated); Simkins v. Bridges, 350 F. App’x 952, 953 (5th Cir. 2009) (upholding dismissal for lack of exhaustion where prisoner did not appeal denial of his initial grievance as required). 10 Case: 09-40400 Document: 00512093372 Page: 11 Date Filed: 12/21/2012 No. 09-40400 did not need to file an amended complaint. Moussazadeh exhausted his administrative remedies in 2005 when he properly filed grievances. TDCJ has been on notice since that time of Moussazadeh’s complaints and his request for kosher food to be served in the dining hall. “Re-exhaustion” is not required; Moussazadeh has met the exhaustion as a matter of law.