Opinion ID: 1850348
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the funds currently held by the partnership for a healthy mississippi must be transferred to the mississippi health care trust fund

Text: ¶ 86. Having determined (1) that the Governor, Division of Medicaid and MHCTF had a right to intervene in this action for the purpose of challenging the chancery court order of December 22, 2000; and, (2) that the chancery court order of December 22, 2000, allocating $20 million per year to the Partnership, was not a valid and enforceable order (in other words, that the order was void ab initio ), we now turn to the final issue of whether the funds currently held by the Partnership as a result of the December 22, 2000, order must be transferred to the Health Care Trust Fund. This issue is raised on cross-appeal by the Governor, Division of Medicaid and MHCTF. [17] ¶ 87. Reiterating our finding in Issue II, supra, that the order of December 22, 2000, was void ab initio, we point out that, simply stated, the phrase void ab initio  means that [a] contract is null from the beginning if it seriously offends law or public policy in contrast to a contract which is merely voidable at the election of one of the parties to the contract. Black's Law Dictionary 1411 (5th ed.1979). In Samples v. Davis, 904 So.2d 1061 (Miss. 2004), we stated: In Guilford County v. Eller, 146 N.C.App. 579, 553 S.E.2d 235 (2001), the North Carolina Court of Appeals was faced with a similar issue of whether it was error for the trial court to sign and enter a written judgment not consented to by all parties. In its opinion, the court stated: A consent judgment is a contract of the parties entered upon the records of a court of competent jurisdiction with its sanction and approval. It is well-settled that `the power of the court to sign a consent judgment depends upon the unqualified consent of the parties thereto; and the judgment is void if such consent does not exist at the time the court sanctions or approves the agreement and promulgates it as a judgment. '  [A] consent judgment is void if a party withdraws consent before the judgment is entered.  If a consent judgment is set aside, it must be set aside in its entirety. The person who challenges the validity of a consent judgment, bears the burden of proof to show that it is invalid. Id. at 581, 553 S.E.2d at 236 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Samples, 904 So.2d at 1064. ¶ 88. This Court has consistently stated that a consent judgment is in the nature of a contract. Parker v. Parker, 434 So.2d 1361, 1362 (Miss.1983); Guthrie v. Guthrie, 233 Miss. 550, 553, 102 So.2d 381, 383 (1958). The 1997 Settlement Agreement and the chancellor's subsequent consent judgment approving the Settlement Agreement were in fact a contract between the Attorney General, for and on behalf of Mississippi's citizens, and the tobacco companies. ¶ 89. Any effort to amend the 1997 consent judgment would have to comport with the provisions of the Settlement Agreement. Clearly, the December 22, 2000, ex parte order was contrary to the express provisions of the 1997 Settlement Agreement and the subsequent court order approving the Settlement Agreement; therefore, the December 22, 2000, order was void ab initio. Because the December 22, 2000, order was void ab initio, it necessarily follows that the subsequently-entered orders of January 17, 2002, November 20, 2003, and December 21, 2004, were likewise void and that, therefore, the Partnership has no right to the monies received under these orders; therefore, the chancellor erred in failing to direct the Partnership to pay over all remaining funds derived from the December 22, 2000, order to the Health Care Trust Fund and subsequent orders. See Mellott v. Love, Supt. of Banks, 152 Miss. 860, 865-66, 119 So. 913 (1929) (when contract is void ab initio, parties are restored to the status in which they would have been if the contract had never been made).