Opinion ID: 2034362
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court's Obligation under Darden

Text: In the present case, the trial court prohibited defendant from cross-examining Detective Neenan about the confidential informant's identity. The court, however, declined to follow the Darden procedure, holding that it could rely on the information provided by the informant without examining him in camera. That ruling was error. At the outset, we reject the People's contention that probable cause could be established without the informant's statements, which would render a Darden hearing unnecessary. The People argue before us that John Thomas' identification of defendant as the person who shot him provided an independent basis for his arrest. The People, however, did not raise that theory before the trial court; they argued only that Thomas' identification of defendant from a single photograph was confirmatory of the information provided by the confidential informant and other unnamed sources. The People's current argument is therefore unpreserved. In any event, Thomas did not identify defendant until after he was arrested; indeed, the identification was made from defendant's arrest photograph. We likewise reject the People's argument that the trial court's refusal to follow the Darden procedure was a proper exercise of discretion. Where, as here, the informant's testimony is necessary to establish probable cause, the court must grant the defendant's request for a Darden hearing. To be sure, there are exceptions to the Darden rule. Informants need not be produced, for example, if they cannot be located despite the People's diligent efforts ( see, People v Fulton, 58 NY2d 914, 916), or if they refuse to appear because they fear personal injury ( see, People v Carpenito, 80 NY2d 65, 68). In such cases, the People may instead establish the existence of confidential informants through extrinsic evidence after demonstrating that the informant is legitimately unavailable ( id. ). Moreover, informants who previously testified before the Magistrate who issued a warrant need not be produced for a Darden hearing, since their existence and statements have already been verified ( see, People v Serrano, 93 NY2d 73, 76-77). The existence of these exceptions reinforces our holding that Darden did in fact establish a rule. If, as the People contend, Darden had established only a discretionary procedure, there would have been no need for exceptions. Further, our precedents speak of Darden hearings as required rather than discretionary. In People v Serrano (93 NY2d, supra, at 77), for example, this Court stated that a Darden hearing is required `where there is insufficient evidence to establish probable cause apart from the testimony of the arresting officer as to communications received from an informer' (quoting People v Darden, supra, 34 NY2d, at 181 [emphasis added]). The Court explained that an in camera hearing is necessary to allay any concern that the informant is wholly imaginary and his statements to the police fabricated ( People v Serrano, supra, at 77). [3] Similarly, in People v Adrion (82 NY2d 628, 634), we held that a trial court's order to produce an informant for an in camera examination is mandatory, and the prosecutor must comply on pain of suppression. The Court described the Darden hearing as a requirement, stating that once the defendant has challenged the informant's existence or identity, the People are required to produce the police informant for an in camera inquiry unless they can demonstrate that the informant is unavailable and cannot be produced through the exercise of due diligence ( id. ). Further, as we stated in Serrano and Adrion, a Darden rule is necessary in order to fulfill the underlying purpose of Darden: insuring that the confidential informant both exists and gave the police information sufficient to establish probable cause, while protecting the informant's identity. The surest way to accomplish this task is to produce the informant for an in camera examination. In addition, this rule gives clear guidance to lower courts and guarantees that the protections of the Fourth Amendment have not been circumvented (2 LaFave, Search and Seizure, supra, § 3.3 [g], at 203). [4] People v Huggins (36 NY2d 827, 828), on which the People rely, is not to the contrary. In Huggins, the Court held that the trial court's failure to order in camera examination of a confidential informant was not an abuse of discretion, noting that Darden provides guidelines to assist the courts in exercising their discretionary powers    to hold in camera inquiries ( id. ). Significantly, the suppression hearing in Huggins took place before Darden was decided. Cognizant of that fact, the Huggins Court could not say that the trial courtwhich did not have the benefit of Darden abused its discretion as a matter of law, and did not address whether Darden established a mandatory procedure for subsequent cases. Thus, Huggins is inapplicable here. Furthermore, any language in Huggins suggesting a discretionary standard is contradicted by our strong endorsement in Adrion of a mandatory procedure and by our subsequent statement in Serrano that Darden creates a requirement. Nor is a Darden hearing unnecessary if the police officer's testimony satisfies the Aguilar-Spinelli test. That test provides that a tip from a hearsay informant (which may include an anonymous informant) may not be used unless the source of his knowledge is revealed and the informant is of known reliability ( see, People v DiFalco, 80 NY2d 693, 696-697; People v Elwell, 50 NY2d 231, 236; see generally, Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410; Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108). [5] The People contend that since this test applies even to an anonymous informant, it should apply to a confidential informant as well, and where the officer's testimony establishes both the informant's reliability and basis of knowledge, the information may be used to establish probable cause without a Darden hearing. In Adrion, however, this Court rejected that very argument, holding that the concerns are different when a confidential informant is involved, since the reason for the Darden rule is to verify the informant's existence not merely to establish the reliability of a tip ( see, People v Adrion, supra, at 634-636). Further, while the defendant has free reign to cross-examine the officer about any relevant subject where an anonymous tip is used, the defendant cannot cross-examine the officer about any matter that may reveal the identity of a confidential informant. Therefore, in the case of a confidential informant, an in camera inquiry is necessary to properly test the officer's credibility. Moreover, unlike anonymous tipsters, it is possible to bring confidential informants before the Judge to verify their existence and statements. Finally, contrary to the Appellate Division, defendant was not required to make any threshold showing in order to be entitled to a Darden hearing ( see, Matter of Pierre H., 260 AD2d 320, 320-321; People v Ferron, 248 AD2d 962, 963, lv denied 92 NY2d 879). Obviously, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a defendant to present evidence that a confidential informant did not exist or was unreliable. It was error for the Appellate Division to place a burden on defendant that he could not reasonably have been expected to meet ( see, 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure, supra, § 4.4 [d], at 505 [discussing a defendant's duty to make a threshold showing to challenge a warrant: where the defendant cannot discover the identity of the informer, the defendant should not be deemed to have failed in his `threshold showing' merely because he has no information as to whether the informant lied to the officer-affiant    or the officer-affiant lied to the magistrate]). Defendant, therefore, is entitled to remittal to Supreme Court for a Darden hearing, at which the court shall conduct an in camera examination of the confidential informant. Alternatively, if the People demonstrate that one of the exceptions to the Darden rule applies, they may establish the informant's existence and reliability through other evidence. Defendant's remaining contention is without merit. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division, insofar as appealed from, should be modified by remitting to Supreme Court for further proceedings in accordance with this Opinion and, as so modified, affirmed. If, on remittal, Supreme Court determines that probable cause to arrest was lacking, then the judgment of conviction under Indictment Number 3299/94 should be vacated and the motion to suppress granted. If Supreme Court determines that probable cause to arrest existed, then the judgment should be amended to reflect that result. Order, insofar as appealed from, modified, etc.