Opinion ID: 2567623
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: Exceptions: second report

Text: Nothing in the referee's second report undermines the findings the referee made in his first report. Moreover, but for the finding that disclosure of McDonald's information would not have led the defense to useful evidence, the referee found in petitioner's favor on all of the additional questions we posed for the second reference hearing. As noted, the referee's second report finds that in addition to the Montez letter, the prosecution possessed but did not disclose evidence concerning Montez's statement to police that Saucedo had confessed to killing Hosey, the prosecution's arrangements with Montez to secure his future testimony against Saucedo, Barnes's statement to police that Saucedo had confessed to killing Hosey, the prosecution's arrangements with Barnes to secure his future testimony to convict Saucedo of murdering Hosey, Sanchez's statement to police that Saucedo had confessed to killing Hosey, and the prosecution's arrangements with Sanchez to secure his future testimony to convict Saucedo. Respondent does not dispute that these items existed or that the prosecution withheld them from the defense notwithstanding they were mainly favorable to petitioner. Respondent takes exception, however, to some portions of the referee's second report. Generally, respondent disagrees with the referee's findings concerning the impact the undisclosed evidence would have had if timely disclosed to the defense. First, respondent takes exception to the referee's statement that the prosecution told the jury that had there been any evidence that it was really Saucedo who killed Hosey, the defense would have presented it. In respondent's view, the referee's interpretation of the prosecutor's closing is incorrect because it takes the prosecutor's argument out of context. In closing, the prosecutor argued to the penalty phase jury: Finally, I think you can decide that if there were other people out there who were friends of [petitioner] who really knew that Joe [Saucedo] did it, because Joe was there, and since he has eliminated himself from the neighborhood and disappeared and become a rat, those people could have certainly been brought forward by the defense just as anyone could have been called from out of court to tell you some factors in mitigation about this man. The subpoena power of the county marshal and sheriff works for the defense as well as it does for us. They can say `please go do this,' and that subpoena would be served. They can say `appoint us an investigator' and that would be done, as it has been. It wasn't because it doesn't exist. Respondent argues that the prosecutor's assertion it doesn't exist was specifically directed to the lack of evidence of people from the neighborhood  who knew petitioner and Saucedo and presumably could have, but did not, come forward, and did not apply so as to suggest there was any lack of evidence from other quarters that Saucedo committed the crime. That is, according to respondent, the prosecutor's assertion it doesn't exist was not meant to encompass the evidence that did existevidence the prosecution possessed from its informants Montez, Sanchez, Barnes, and McDonaldnone of whom, respondent states, were acquainted with petitioner or from petitioner's neighborhood. We conclude the referee did not significantly mischaracterize the prosecutor's closing argument. It seems unlikely the jury would have understood the word it in the prosecutor's comment it doesn't exist to refer only to evidence coming from people who lived in petitioner's neighborhood, rather than evidence concerning Saucedo generally. While the prosecutor mentioned that Saucedo was from the neighborhood, he also remarked, broadly, that anyone could have been called from out of court to tell you some factors in mitigation and the subpoena power of the county marshal and sheriff works for the defense as well ate it does for us. Second, respondent takes exception to the referee's findings that the information contained in the Montez letter was credible, to the extent the Referee relies on jailhouse informant McDonald. As respondent points out, McDonald admits he lied to detectives 20 years ago when he told them that an inmate whose name I cannot recall (someone other than Saucedo) had confessed to the Hosey killing. McDonald's declaration was only one of many evidentiary sources for the referee's findings. As the referee observed, Saucedo's confession to Montez is corroborated by evidence from several other persons who each related that Saucedo confessed to them. In describing Saucedo's statements, each person's current description is consistent with the description that that person gave the District Attorney twenty years ago. At this point, there is no apparent reason for any of those persons to lie. Moreover, the record contains substantial evidence to support crediting McDonald's current declaration over his former statements. McDonald's declaration explains that, in fact, it was Saucedo who confessed in detail to the Hosey killing and that Saucedo told McDonald that if McDonald did not help him by lying to the detectives, he would kill me or that other Mexican inmates would kill me. [Saucedo] also said that if I did not cooperate, the Mexican Mafia would kill my family. I felt I had no choice but to cooperate with [Saucedo]. McDonald having thus provided an explanation for his contrary statements 20 years ago, and numerous other persons having provided similar corroborating testimony, the referee had substantial grounds for crediting McDonald's current testimony along with other evidence in finding Montez's evidence credible. Third, respondent takes exception to the referee's findings that the defense could have effectively cross-examined Saucedo regarding the information contained in the Montez letter and provided by Barnes and Sanchez, pointing out that Saucedo presumably would have denied confessing to anyone. But as petitioner argues, the weight of the evidence would have been against such denial. Nor does the fact Saucedo actually was impeached at petitioner's trial suggest that cross-examination of him based on the undisclosed witnesses' testimony would have had no independent or additional effect. [5] As petitioner points out, nothing that was actually presented at trial came close to presenting an equivalent picture of Saucedo's involvement in the Hosey killing. The prosecution, as the referee stated, presented Saucedo to the jury for a single purpose, i.e., to testify that [petitioner] stabbed and killed Hosey. Contrary to respondent's suggestion that the jury was presented with a fair picture of [Saucedo's] credibility, the prosecution painted Saucedo merely as a person who aided and abetted in this killing, while petitioner was touted as the man who was willing to do it. Saucedo denied having stabbed Hosey and painted himself as the Good Samaritan trying to stop the killing. As petitioner's trial counsel testified, disclosure of the persons to whom Saucedo had confessed would have allowed [the defense] to destroy Mr. Saucedo as a penalty phase witness. This evidence would have shown that Mr. Saucedo told at least five other people, all independent witnesses unknown to each other, that he, not [petitioner], had killed Hosey. Fourth, respondent takes exception to the referee's findings about what Saucedo told Barnes, Sanchez, and MaeDonald about his role in the Hosey killing, to the extent the referee fails to take into account that Saucedo denied making a confession at all. The record, however, reflects that the referee considered Saucedo's testimony and rejected it. Fifth, respondent takes exception to the referee's findings that Saucedo's statements to Barnes, Sanchez, and McDonald differed from his testimony at petitioner's trial but, again, only to the extent that Saucedo denied ever making a confession and asserts he told the truth when he testified at trial. The exception is not well taken. As has been discussed, the referee considered Saucedo's testimony, found it not credible, and rejected it in favor of other record evidence. Sixth, respondent takes exception to the referee's findings that the disclosure to the defense of information provided by Barnes and Sanchez would have led to useful defense evidence. Respondent's argument is difficult to fathom, as respondent concedes disclosure would have led the defense to Barnes and Sanchez, both of whom, of course, have declared they would have testified that Saucedo confessed to them that he (Saucedo), not petitioner, had killed Hosey. That Barnes and Sanchez, like the prosecution's star witness Saucedo, were jailhouse informants, while perhaps diminishing the value of their evidence to the defense, hardly would have rendered it useless, as respondent asserts. Seventh, respondent takes exception to the referee's finding that disclosure to the defense of information concerning the prosecution's bargains with Barnes, Sanchez, and others for their agreement to testify that Saucedo had admitted killing Hosey would have led to useful defense evidence. The referee found the defense would have used such information to argue that the prosecution lacked a good faith belief that Saucedo was truthfully describing petitioner's involvement in that killing. Respondent asserts the referee failed to consider that Saucedo, himself, had received a deal from the prosecution after Barnes and Sanchez were given their deals, indicating, according to respondent, that it was Saucedo the prosecution ultimately believed was truthful. The record demonstrates that the referee was well aware of the dates and details of the prosecution's various contacts and arrangements with Saucedo. We have no reason to assume the referee failed to consider any significant fact. ( In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 202, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 892 P.2d 1287.) Respondent's speculation concerning why the prosecution ultimately chose to deal with Saucedo is beside the point, as even if accurate it does not demonstrate the defense would have found evidence concerning the various deals useless. The referee, moreover, made no finding concerning the prosecution's beliefs; his findings on the point related only to how the defense would have used the undisclosed information at trial. Eighth, respondent takes exception to the referee's findings that had petitioner's trial counsel in the Hosey case possessed the undisclosed evidence, he would have advised petitioner not to plead guilty to the Hosey murder and that petitioner would not have so pleaded. While respondent does not attack the accuracy of these findings per se, he contends the referee inappropriately limited the scope of respondent's cross-examination of petitioner and counsel on this point. Before Attorney Garber and petitioner gave their evidence, the parties presented arguments to the referee concerning the scope of the third part of our second reference order. That part read: If the undisclosed evidence (the letter and the prosecution's arrangements with Barnes, Sanchez and McDonald) had been disclosed to petitioner, would petitioner's trial counsel in the Hosey murder case have advised him to plead guilty? Would petitioner have entered a guilty plea in that case? Petitioner argued that in the context of the second reference order as a whole, and in light of concerns about the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, petitioner and Garber should be asked the precise questions posed in our order and further examination limited. Respondent disagreed, noting a desire to delve into what went into [Garber's] decision-making process before advising petitioner to plead guilty in order that the referee might better judge the credibility of Mr. Garber and Mr. Miranda. In ruling on the scope of examination, the referee began by observing that in the first two parts of our second reference order, we posed particularized follow up, background, circumstantial sorts of questions while the questions in part 3 call for a yes or no answer. Accordingly, the referee ruled, I believe and find that the questions posed in part 3 are dependent upon the answers that we have reached in parts 1 and 2 and the [July 9, 2004, partial] findings that I have made, and I believe it's a yes or no response [to the questions in part 3] and will limit the hearing to that. Later, the referee modified this ruling by allowing for appropriate followup questions. Such questions, the referee indicated, would relate to trial counsel's ability to remember and perceivehaving the scope of does he remember the case, does he remember the parties, does he remember talking to so and so but would not get into the credibility of the informants and the credibility of the plea arrangements or deals covered by parts 1 and 2 of our second reference order. Detailed examination concerning counsel's and petitioner's thought processes and discussion, the referee opined, goes beyond the scope of question 3. Ultimately, respondent was permitted to cross-examine Garber concerning his memory of representing petitioner in the Hosey murder case. But when respondent attempted to delve further into the basis for Garber's assertion he would have advised petitioner not to plead guilty, the referee sustained petitioner's objection. After Garber testified, the referee obtained the parties' agreement that petitioner's response to the question whether, in light of the referee's July 9, 2004, partial findings, he would have pleaded guilty to the Hosey murder, would be obtained by way of declaration. Respondent acceded to this procedure only after renewing an objection to the court's earlier ruling limiting the scope of cross-examination. The referee was correct that the specific question our reference order posed whether petitioner's counsel would have advised petitioner to plead guilty if he had been apprised of the undisclosed evidencecalled for a yes-or-no answer. Nevertheless, respondent should have been allowed to test the credibility of counsel's assertion by asking him why he would have advised against a guilty plea. If counsel had been unable to supply a good explanation, his inability might have cast doubt on the credibility of his response. Any error in this regard, however, was harmless. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.) The evidence withheld in this case was sufficiently strong that its nondisclosure significantly altered the dynamics of petitioner's prosecution. Under the circumstances, we find it credible that a competent attorney in possession of the undisclosed evidence would have advised against a guilty plea to murder. Finally, respondent takes exception to the referee's not having admitted into evidence the transcript of Charles Bates's statement to the Los Angeles County District Attorney. Bates was an inmate in custody near petitioner at Parker Center in Los Angeles County who stated to prosecutors in 1980 that he had heard petitioner state that he had stabbed a Black guy while Saucedo held the guy down. Notwithstanding that our second reference order did not ask anything about Bates, respondent moved in limine before the second hearing to admit Bates's statement, arguing it was relevant to our questions concerning whether disclosure to the defense of information provided by Montez, Barnes, Sanchez, and McDonald would have led to useful defense evidence. The referee denied respondent's motion and made no finding concerning Bates. At the hearing, respondent argued Bates's statement was relevant because, if petitioner's counsel had presented Montez, Sanchez, Barnes, McDonald, and Molina on rebuttal, the prosecution would have presented the testimony of Mr. Bates. If Mr. Bates took the stand and denied the statements, he would have been impeached with a prior inconsistent statement. As respondent puts the point now: In determining what constitutes `useful' evidence, it is submitted that one must review not only what the defense evidence was, but also what evidence, if any, could be introduced to rebut that defense evidence. In other words, defense evidence is not `useful' if it could be impeached or rebutted so as to provide no advantage if presented. The major premise of respondent's exceptionthat if petitioner's counsel had presented Montez, Sanchez, Barnes, McDonald, and Molina on rebuttal, the prosecution would have presented the testimony of Mr. Batesappears implausible in light of the record, which includes most obviously the fact the prosecution did not call Bates to testify at petitioner's capital trial, as well as a note to the file written by then Deputy District Attorney Ito indicating that Bates had lied to prosecutors. Respondent's other premisethat defense evidence is not useful if it could be impeachedseems beside the point, as even if respondent's speculation that the prosecution might have called Bates to rebut Montez, Sanchez, Barnes, McDonald, and Molina is accurate, respondent fails to demonstrate that the undisclosed evidence concerning those persons would have afforded the defense  no advantage in the face of Bates's statement. Evidence obviously may be useful to a party even if it could be impeached or rebutted. In any event, Bates's statement was inadmissible hearsay. `A reference hearing following issuance of an order to show cause is subject to the rules of evidence as codified in the Evidence Code. (See Evid.Code, § 300.) Under those rules, an out-of-court declaration is hearsay, and unless subject to some exception permitting it to be admitted, should be excluded upon timely and proper objection.' ( In re Scott, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 822-823, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 605, 61 P.3d 402.) Unlike the declarations included in the exhibits to the parties' joint submission and the others admitted into evidence by stipulation of the parties, the parties did not agree to the admission of Bates's statement. To the contrary, petitioner objected to admission of Bates's statement on hearsay grounds. Respondent did not respond to the hearsay objection at the hearing nor does respondent presently dispute the objection's validity. Respondent asserts that if the referee had determined Bates's evidence was relevant but hearsay, respondent would have attempted to present Bates in person, but even if credited that assertion does not demonstrate the referee abused his discretion in excluding Bates's statement. As petitioner pointed out at the hearing, Bates was a surprise witness, in that respondent had not sought to include his statement when the parties were compiling their joint submission to our second reference order. In sum, respondent's exceptions to the factual findings contained in the referee's second report are not persuasive. Respondent neither disputes the existence and nondisclosure of the various items of evidence we asked the referee to inquire about, nor demonstrates that the referee lacked substantial evidence for his conclusions respecting their potential usefulness to the defense. As previously noted, in such circumstances the referee's findings are entitled to great weight. ( In re Johnson, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 461, 75 Cal. Rptr.2d 878, 957 P.2d 299.)