Opinion ID: 1940131
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: When a party moves to pass the case, the trial justice must assess the prejudicial impact of the statements. State v. Toole, 640 A.2d 965, 974 (R.I.1994). When he decides whether or not to declare a mistrial, the trial justice should consider if the evidence was of such a nature as to cause the jurors to become so inflamed that their attention was distracted from the issues submitted to them. State v. Pacheco, 763 A.2d 971, 979 (R.I.2001) (quoting State v. Brown, 619 A.2d 828, 831 (R.I.1993)). However, there is no fixed formula for determining prejudice. See State v. Hoyle, 122 R.I. 45, 48, 404 A.2d 69, 70 (1979). It is viewed in the context in which it appeared and in light of the attendant circumstances. Id. at 48, 404 A.2d at 71 (quoting State v. Marrapese, 116 R.I. 1, 7, 351 A.2d 95, 98 (1976)). Nevertheless, even if the trial justice determines that the remark was prejudicial, he is not required to pass the case. Toole, 640 A.2d at 974. If the trial justice determines that the prejudice is curable, he or she must issue a timely and effective instruction. Id. Applying these principles to the present case, we do not believe that the trial justice abused his discretion when he denied Susan's motion for a mistrial. In our opinion, the witness's comment was not of such an incendiary nature so as to cause the jurors to become inflamed or prevent their calm and dispassionate examination of the evidence. See State v. Parkhurst, 706 A.2d 412, 427 (R.I.1998). Furthermore, the trial justice's timely curative instructions, his thoughtful and measured subsequent efforts through voir dire to ensure that the jury would be able to comply with his admonition, and his instruction before the panel retired for deliberation more than sufficed to counteract whatever prejudice that had possibly arisen as a result of the witness's statement. See Mendoza, 889 A.2d at 159 (trial justice's admonition and subsequent efforts were sufficient to cure minimal prejudice). Susan, however, argues that the information about time-shares was inherently prejudicial to a defendant in a welfare fraud case because the jurors themselves are the victims as taxpayers, and any instructions, therefore, would be futile. We do not disagree that in a vacuum time-share ownership may be prejudicial in a case such as this; however, we determine the effect of a potentially prejudicial remark by examining it within its factual context. See Pugliese, 117 R.I. at 26, 362 A.2d at 126-27; see also State v. Anil, 417 A.2d 1367, 1373 (R.I.1980) (On review, we shall consider ad hoc the prejudicial effect of challenged remarks in light of the context in which they were uttered.). Our conclusions are further solidified by an examination of the entire record. Given the context in which the witness's comment was made, it was unclear whether the jurors even had heard the statement. Furthermore, the record reveals that the comment was both unelicited and fleeting, and the testimony was interrupted by several objections both before and after the words escaped the witness's mouth. The trial justice, therefore, had sufficient grounds to question whether the comment had any prejudicial effect. [7] See Toole, 640 A.2d at 974 (trial justice must assess if statement caused prejudice). To cure any prejudice, the trial justice also gave a curative instruction within minutes of the testimony. He instructed the jurors to disregard the comment, invoked his earlier instructions analogizing their task to un-ringing a bell, and reminded the jurors of their duty to disregard testimony when instructed to do so and to act in accordance with their oath as jurors. This Court assumes that a jury has followed a trial justice's instructions as they were given. State v. Young, 743 A.2d 1032, 1035 (R.I.2000). Furthermore, during the individual voir dire, all the jurors candidly affirmed that they would not be influenced by the comment and that that they would not consider the testimony. See id. at 1034-35 (affirming denial of motion for mistrial after jurors in individual voir dire stated they were not prejudiced by another juror's improper remark). Susan, however, challenges the effectiveness of the trial justice's instructions and voir dire, arguing that the voir dire merely served to exacerbate the prejudice and that it created a quandary for the jury: the trial justice asked them what testimony they heard last, yet they were simply told to disregard it. We see little merit in the contention that the voir dire was futile or counterproductive. During voir dire, the trial justice refrained from calling undue attention to the time-shares comment by asking the jurors only about the last testimony they heard. Furthermore, it is clear from the record that the trial justice was able to adequately probe the jury on the effect of the time-shares remark. Defense counsel and the prosecutor were allowed to pose their own questions to the jurors, and the trial justice, when necessary, asked follow-up questions to determine exactly what the jurors heard. By way of illustration, one juror initially responded that he did not hear the testimony because he was told to disregard it. Counsel, however, pressed him further, and he acknowledged hearing something about wages, although he had trouble hearing the testimony. Another juror commented that he remembered the testimony but was told to forget it, so he crossed off the testimony in his notes. The trial justice, however, inquired further, and the juror replied that the witness kept saying he didn't understand financially, how, you know, they could survive. She was working at CVS and the factthat's about it. Counsel then asked, do you recall what was said exactly before I objected? The juror answered that the witness kept repeating the same things and counsel kept cutting him off so he didn't bother going any further. Still another juror recalled, he said something about how could a parent, a single parentI remember it, but you told me to forget it so it doesn't count. Defense counsel then asked, what exactly did you hear before I objected? The juror responded, I thought they were trying to find outhe was that's why he was investigating because he thought that a single parent with three children couldn't afford a lifestyle that they had. These interviews reveal that the trial justice was able to effectively and fairly discern what the jurors heard and what impact the witness's comment had on them, if any. The juror interviews also demonstrated that the jurors understood their oaths and underscored their readiness to comply with the court's instructions to disregard Martinez's testimony. Therefore, after viewing Martinez's comment in the context of the testimony in which it was given, and in light of the curative instruction and voir dire, we believe the trial justice was not clearly wrong when he determined that the jury was not affected by any prejudice arising from Martinez's regrettable remark about the time-shares. For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he denied the defendant's motion to pass the case.