Opinion ID: 2674005
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Identification of Cocaine

Text: Defendant also argues that there was insufficient evidence that the substance exchanged in the December transaction was cocaine. He acknowledges that our precedent does not require a chemical test of the substance, but he argues that the “anecdotal” evidence that was presented by the government is not sufficient. Aplt. Br. at 12. When a chemical substance is not identified by a scientific test, the government “must [present] enough circumstantial evidence to support an inference that the defendant actually did possess the drugs in question.” United States v. Hall, 473 F.3d 1295, 1307 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have said that such evidence “may include”: 6 [1] Evidence of the physical appearance of the substance involved in the transaction, [2] evidence that the substance produced the expected effects when sampled by someone familiar with the illicit drug, [3] evidence that the substance was used in the same manner as the illicit drug, [4] testimony that a high price was paid in cash for the substance, [5] evidence that transactions involving the substance were carried on with secrecy or deviousness, and [6] evidence that the substance was called by the name of the illegal narcotic by the defendant or others in her presence. Id. at 1307–08 (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant treats this list as if it were a six-factor test. He argues that evidence of type 2 or 3 was not present and that evidence of types 1, 4, and 6 was not firmly established. But we have not stated that the evidence must include all these items, or even any of the specific types listed. See id. In any event, there was sufficient evidence of the listed types to support a reasonable juror in finding that the substance involved in the transaction was cocaine. Knowles, who had special training in narcotics, had been working in narcotics for six years, and had seen cocaine at least a hundred times before, testified that the substance looked like cocaine and had the “[s]ame consistency” and “same color” as cocaine. R., Vol. 3 at 50. There was also evidence that the price of the substance matched the high price of cocaine and “that transactions involving the substance were carried on with secrecy or deviousness.” Hall, 473 F.3d at 1307 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, in the conversation between Defendant and Knowles, Knowles referred to the substance they had been dealing with as coke; and when there was a disagreement about 7 how the transaction would be executed, Defendant said, “[W]hen you buy drugs that’s the way it is.” Suppl. R., Vol. 1 (Tr. of Gov’t Ex. 4) at 4. This evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict. See United States v. Castaneda, 368 F. App’x 859, 861, 863 (10th Cir. 2010) (defendant discussed cocaine transaction in intercepted telephone call, and an officer believed the substance was cocaine); United States v. Sanchez, 722 F.2d 1501, 1506 (11th Cir. 1984) (DEA agent testified that he believed substance was cocaine and participants in transaction called the substance cocaine); cf. United States v. Sanchez DeFundora, 893 F.2d 1173, 1175–76 (10th Cir. 1990) (evidence was sufficient to show substances were cocaine even though no cocaine was actually introduced into evidence; witnesses testified that they ingested substances that affected them like cocaine and that they were able to resell some substances as cocaine).