Opinion ID: 762539
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: DiMilta's Title VII Suit Against Thalbo

Text: 8 In the meantime, after the Company refused to reinstate her, DiMilta commenced an action in federal district court, asserting sexual harassment claims under Title VII, along with claims under state law, against the Company and her former supervisor Helmut Rothermel for events that had occurred prior to her leave of absence (the Title VII lawsuit). The case was tried before a magistrate judge, who, in a decision issued in March 1995, dismissed the complaint against Rothermel but found the Company liable. See DiMilta v. G.B. Motel Management, Inc., 92 Civ. 6468 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 1995) (DiMilta v. G.B. Motel ). 9 In analyzing DiMilta's sexual harassment claims, the magistrate judge noted that in order to succeed, DiMilta was required to show that the harassment affected a term, condition or privilege of [her] employment, DiMilta v. G.B. Motel, slip op. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted), and that the harm targeted by Title VII  ' is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination, '  id. at 9 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986))). The magistrate judge noted that  '[a] discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees' psychological well-being, can and often will ... discourage employees from remaining on the job ....'  DiMilta v. G.B. Motel, slip op. at 9 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct. 367) (emphasis in magistrate judge's opinion). He proceeded to find that 10 Rothermel's conduct, which might have subjected him to a criminal sanction, was physically threatening and humiliating. It would have discouraged a reasonable individual from remaining on the job.... The Court is persuaded that the test for an abusive work environment has been met in this case. 11 DiMilta v. G.B. Motel, slip op. at 9. 12 But the magistrate judge did not find that DiMilta herself had been discouraged from remaining on the job or from seeking to return after recovery from her illness. For example, although DiMilta contended that the ailment that forced her leave of absence was caused by the stress engendered by Rothermel's sexual harassment, the magistrate judge apparently rejected that contention, as he found that she voluntarily undertook sick leave, id. at 11, and concluded that she therefore was not entitled to back pay for the period of time that she was disabled and unable to work because she would not have been entitled to her salary during this time, id. at 12. 13 Further, the magistrate judge found that Rothermel's sexual harassment was not the reason DiMilta did not return to work at the Hotel. He noted that in most cases the victim of this type of behavior would not be eager to return to working for the same errant supervisor; in this case, however, DiMilta, believing the circumstances would eventually be changed or could be controlled, wanted to return to work. Id. at 7 n. 9. Nor was the sexual harassment related to Thalbo's refusal to reinstate DiMilta. The magistrate judge found that the reason for Defendant's failure to rehire her stemmed from her employer's retaliation for activity protected by federal labor law and not from Rothermel's pique. Id. at 7 n. 7; see also id. at 8 ([T]he reprisal visited upon [DiMilta] in the form of not being rehired was not the result of Plaintiff's reaction to Rothermel's conduct, but rather stemmed from her employer's reaction to her union organizing efforts.). 14 In sum, the magistrate judge did not find that DiMilta was constructively discharged, for he did not find that she had left her job at the Hotel as a result of the sexual harassment, or that she had been loath to seek reinstatement, or that the refusal to reinstate her had any relationship to sexual harassment. Nor did he find that while working at the Hotel she had suffered any diminution in her compensation as a result of the sexual harassment. 15 Nonetheless, in fashioning relief for the abusive work environment it found had existed, the court awarded DiMilta what it termed back pay, e.g., id. at 12, 13, for a period beginning with Thalbo's denial of reinstatement and ending in August 1991 when DiMilta found work as a bartender at a military academy bar called the Stewart Officers' Club (Stewart). DiMilta's job at Stewart lasted only until October 1992, when she was laid off. The magistrate judge concluded that no award was appropriate for the period following her layoff at Stewart, in light of a deposition given by DiMilta in the lawsuit, in which she stated in part as follows: 16 Q Besides the job at Stewart ..., have you had any other jobs since you left Ramada? 17 A No. 18 Q And why did you leave that job at Stewart? 19 A At Stewart, my husband and I had a deal that when I turned 45, I can retire. I just pushed it up six months. 20 Q So, is it fair to say that you are in retirement at this point? 21 A Yes. 22 (Deposition of Paulette DiMilta, February 9, 1993, at 48.) The magistrate judge stated that, as to the period following DiMilta's employment with Stewart, her 23 deposition testimony supports the conclusion that since then she has not been aggressive in seeking another job because, through an arrangement with her husband, she is currently in retirement, a retirement the commencement of which coincides with the layoff in October 1992. 24 DiMilta v. G.B. Motel, slip op. at 12. 25 The district court concluded that DiMilta should receive back pay measured with reference to what she would have earned at the Hotel for the period from February 8, 1991, through August 1991. Making a rough approximation of those earnings, and exercising discretion to make adjustments for what it viewed as anomalies or uncertainties, the court concluded that an appropriate award for the Title VII sexual harassment claim was $7,521. The court also awarded $1,000 under N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (McKinney 1993) for emotional distress. The Company paid the judgment. 26