Opinion ID: 777161
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the District Court Properly Awarded Punitive Damages.

Text: 35 An award of punitive damages is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. Pavon v. Swift Transp. Co., 192 F.3d 902, 909 (9th Cir.1999). See also EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 903 (9th Cir.1994). 36 The Supreme Court has held that punitive damages may be assessed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when a defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or if it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). 37 Fair Housing requested $200,000 in punitive damages, which it calculated to be one full year of gross revenues from Combs' Waters Edge property. The district court found that Combs acted with at least a reckless disregard for the federally protected rights of blacks who were either tenants or potential tenants and awarded punitive damages of $74,400. It arrived at that figure by relying on the stipulated facts in the record and focusing on Combs' behavior against two black tenants who were replaced by white tenants. 38 The court found that Combs generated ninety-three (93) months of all-white revenue from the two apartment units. The record reflects that Combs offered vacant apartments for $800-$825 per month during the time of his discrimination. The district court took the lower number ($800) and multiplied that by 93 months of Combs' all-white revenue for those two apartment units for a punitive damage award of $74,400. The district court made specific calculations when awarding punitive damages and carefully limited them to the present case, specifically noting that although it was aware that other African-American tenants had previously been tenants at Waters Edge ... the circumstances of their departures are not part of this record and that the punitive damages sum derived from the above calculation is sufficient and reasonable under the circumstances. 39 Combs does not challenge the methodology of the district court's punitive damages calculation. Rather, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. In this Circuit, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a punitive damage award must be rejected if the award is supported by substantial evidence. Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1012 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc). We define substantial evidence as such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion even if it is possible to draw two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence. Landes Const. Co., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., 833 F.2d 1365, 1371 (9th Cir.1987) (citing St. Elizabeth Community Hosp. v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 587, 592 (9th Cir.1984)). 40 Here, the district court did look to the full record before it and found that the record on liability is damning, and Combs' conduct is punishable on its own merits while making sure that the court did not make [Combs] a vehicle for redressing similar injuries he did not cause. 41 The full record indicates, among other things, that Combs 1) knew that it was illegal to discriminate on the basis of race; 2) treated Fair Housing's African-American testers less favorably than its white testers; 3) told a tester and other tenants that Combs wanted an all-white building; 4) used offensive and racially derogatory language when telling several tenants that he did not want to rent to African-Americans; 5) and told one tenant that he could use the pretext of bad credit to refuse to rent to African-Americans. 42 The full record shows that Combs' conduct met at least the reckless or callous indifference standard for punitive damages and is sufficient to satisfy and uphold the district court's punitive damages award. 43 IV. Whether the District Court Properly Awarded Attorney's Fees and Costs in the Amount of $508,606.78. 44 This Court must give deference to a district court's determination of reasonable attorney's fees, but the district court has to provide some indication or explanation as to how it arrived at the amount of fees awarded. Chalmers v. City of L.A., 796 F.2d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir.1986), amended by 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir.1987). 45 Combs argues on appeal that the district court erroneously awarded attorney's fees to Fair Housing because Fair Housing achieved only limited success in its litigation against him. Without regard to the merits of this argument, however, Combs did not make this argument in the district court and it is therefore waived. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1130-31 (9th Cir.1998) (citing Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1487 n. 4 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that failure to raise issue before the district court constitutes a waiver of that issue)). 46 At first glance the amount of the attorney's fees awarded seems very high. It is more than five times the amount of the compensatory and punitive damage awards combined. 47 The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the notion that attorney's fees in civil rights cases should be proportionate to the amount of damages a plaintiff recovers. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986) (upholding attorney's fees award of $245,456.25 where compensatory and punitive damages were $13,300 from federal claims and $20,050 from state-law claims). See also Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989) (upholding attorney's fees of $4 million in school desegregation case); Quesada v. Thomason, 850 F.2d 537 (9th Cir.1988) ([t]he district court should not have reduced the attorney's fees simply because the damage award was small); Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359 (9th Cir.1996) (vacating district court's award of attorney's fees because it was calculated improperly and too low; district court awarded only $20,000 in attorney's fees even though civil rights plaintiff had won compensatory damages of $17,500 and included extensive and detailed explanations as to why the lodestar figure of $134,759.75 was a reasonable fee in this case). 48 The magistrate judge held a hearing with respect to attorney's fees and made careful findings and calculations in making the recommendation, which the district court adopted in its entirety. With respect to the hourly billing rates, the magistrate judge found ample evidence, including declarations by expert witnesses, that the hourly billing rates plaintiff's counsel requested were reasonable. The magistrate judge further noted that [d]efendant's challenge ... lacks substantial evidentiary support. 49 With respect to the actual number of hours spent, the magistrate judge began his analysis by noting that the documents submitted by plaintiff's counsel were detailed, thorough, and apparently reliable. The magistrate judge also stated that plaintiff's counsel exercised considerable billing judgment.... [T]hey reduced the number of hours by a substantial margin in order to adjust for any excessive, redundant, or unnecessary hours. The magistrate judge found that the number of hours plaintiff's counsel claimed were not excessive, given the consistently high quality of the plaintiff counsel's work and the circumstances involved. The magistrate judge stated that he 50 identified no claims for discrete pretrial events or submissions with respect to which we are confident that the time devoted by counsel for plaintiff was obviously more than could reasonably be justified ... [w]hen we began our consideration of [attorney's fees] we felt some concern about the number of hours claimed ... [b]ut those concerns have evaporated as we have more closely examined the papers — and focused on their quality, the research that they evidence, and the detailed and fact specific work that was required to prepare them. While the hours claimed for this work are substantial, we cannot say, when we take all pertinent considerations into account, that the hours are excessive. 51 Because of this thorough analysis, reviewed under the standard of review required in such cases, Combs has not convinced this Court that the district court abused its discretion or committed clear error by adopting the magistrate judge's recommendations as to attorney's fees and costs. 52 AFFIRMED.