Opinion ID: 1652324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prior Threat

Text: For his final argument, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to exclude Nathaniel Anderson's testimony of his conversation with Appellant on the day of the shootings, in which Appellant instructed Anderson to tell Pfeifer that I got him. Appellant now attempts to argue on appeal that Anderson was incompetent, and that his testimony was irrelevant. This was not, however, the basis for his objection below. The exchange at trial took place as follows: MR. WALDEN: . . . . Q. He told you to tell Mistro what? A. That he got him. Q. That he got him? A. Yeah. Q. And what does that, what did that imply to you? MR. EVERETT: Whoa, whoa, whoa, what that implied in meaning to this man is not admissible evidence, Judge. He can say what the man said, it's up to the jury to determine what that means. MR. WALDEN: Your Honor, now we sat through a day of Voir Dire about ebonics and this man is in that vernacular and he is talking to these people, and I think he's entitled to say if he considered that a threat, or if he did not consider that a threat. I think he's entitled to give his testimony on that. MR. EVERETT: I don't think so, not this man. What this man thought of that, those words is [sic] not proper at all. MR. WALDEN: I'll try to lay some foundation. THE COURT: All right, go ahead and lay the foundation. MR. WALDEN: Q. When he said this to you, he said tell him I got him, is that an accepted terminology among you and your culture and your friends, does that have a particular meaning? A. Threat. Q. Pardon? A. It's a threat. MR. EVERETT: I will object to that. The fact of what it means among his culture and his friends doesn't mean that that's what it means to Eddie Parker. A. Well, can I say something? THE COURT: Overruled, overruled. . . . . MR. WALDEN: Q. Okay, let me go ahead. Now as I understand your testimony, you took that to be a threat? A. A threat. Q. And is that the way, in your opinion, is that how it was intended? A. Yes, sir. This court has repeatedly held that parties on appeal are limited to their arguments made below. Campbell v. State, 319 Ark. 332, 891 S.W.2d 55 (1995). One cannot change the basis for his or her objection on appeal. Id. Despite the procedural defect in this argument, we would still affirm the trial court's ruling. Arkansas Rule of Evidence 701 provides for lay-witness testimony: If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (1) Rationally based on the perception of the witness; and (2) Helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. This court addressed similar lay testimony in Nooner v. State, 322 Ark. 87, 907 S.W.2d 677 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1143, 116 S.Ct. 1436, 134 L.Ed.2d 558 (1996), ultimately rejecting the appellant's argument that testimony by two of the witnesses did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 701. Nooner asserted that neither of the two witnesses were sufficiently familiar with him to make an identification from a video surveillance tape and photographs. This court held: Jazmar Kennedy had known Nooner for about three years and had seen him regularly. She had even lived in the same apartment with him for a period of time. Martin testified that he had seen Nooner on five or six occasions and had seen him just a few hours before the murder. Both witnesses recognized the jacket and cap in the videotape and photographs and associated the clothing with Nooner. These were special facts otherwise unknown to the jury. The two witnesses then positively identified Nooner as the man with Scot Stobaugh. We hold that these witnesses had ample contact with Nooner to develop opinions based on their perceptions and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting them to relay their opinions to the jury. We next turn to the argument of whether this testimony was helpful to the jury. We believe that it was. The videotape and surveillance photographs are not crystal clear for identification purposes but are somewhat blurred and indistinct. Hence, any testimony from people who had a special familiarity with the suspect would qualify as an aid to the jury. Id. at 102-03, 907 S.W.2d at 685 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). This court concluded that the two witnesses reasonably formed their opinions based on their previous association with the appellant, and that they were familiar with the appellant's clothing and had sufficient time to observe him, giving them a special familiarity with the appellant. Here, Anderson testified that he had a conversation with Appellant in person; thus, Anderson's testimony was rationally based on his perception. Anderson had a special familiarity with the Appellant and was familiar with the neighborhood terminology. The foundation for the testimony aided the jury in determining the colloquial phrase and to prove Appellant's motive. We conclude that Anderson's testimony was helpful to the jury. Moreover, the jury was free to disregard Anderson's testimony about what the phrase meant among the neighborhood residents. We also refute Appellant's assertion that there was no other evidence of motive throughout the entire case. Janice Dollison testified about Appellant's prior threats to kill someone. Freddie Trice testified about the aborted drug transaction. We thus hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed Anderson to testify about what the phrase, I got him, meant. Accordingly, we affirm on this final issue.