Opinion ID: 1711978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the circuit court committed reversible error in applying an erroneous legal standard to claims for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence.

Text: ¶ 6. The trial judge ruled as follows: CAME ON for hearing Petitioner's Motion for Post Conviction Relief, and following two (2) hearings in this matter, and following a review of the allegations of Alvin Meeks' Petition, this Court does find as follows: (1) That no material facts have been shown by the Petitioner that were not previously presented at the trial of this cause; nor has the Petitioner shown any newly discovered evidence which, in this Court's opinion, would warrant a new trial or give this Court any reason whatsoever to believe that a different result would be reached at a retrial of this cause. (2) That Tana Meeks' testimony at the trial of this cause has not been recanted nor has credible evidence been offered that impeaches her prior testimony. (3) That the allegations of Petitioner were either not supported by credible evidence and/or not raised at all by the Petitioner in the two (2) previous hearings. Furthermore, no new evidence or theory, material to this cause has been demonstrated by the Petitioner. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court finds that Petitioner has totally failed to produce any material evidence whatsoever to warrant a new trial in this cause, and that the allegations made by the Petitioner are without merit, and the Motion is overruled and a new trial is hereby DENIED. (emphasis added) ¶ 7. Meeks argues that the circuit court applied an incorrect legal standard and therefore should be reversed. Meeks contends that the circuit court judge placed a higher burden of persuasion on him than required under the law of Mississippi by requiring him to produce evidence which would produce a different result at a retrial. ¶ 8. The criteria for considering a motion for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence are clearly set out in Smith v. State, 492 So.2d 260, 263 (Miss.1986), superseded by statute on other grounds, McClendon v. State, 539 So.2d 1375, 1377 (Miss.1989), which states: Even if the petitioner is successful in proving his allegations regarding the newly discovered evidence, there still must be a determination concerning the `probative effect of such evidence to produce a different result on a new trial.' Of course, if newly discovered evidence will not probably produce a different result or induce a different verdict, it is not sufficient to warrant the granting of a new trial. But conversely, if, by legal standards, it will probably produce a different result or induce a different verdict, it is sufficient and should require a new trial. This is the true rule. (internal citations omitted)(emphasis added). The Court adopted the following criteria to be read in conjunction with the above rule: To warrant the granting of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must appear that the evidence is such as will probably change the result if a new trial is granted, that it has been discovered since the trial, that it could not have been discovered before the trial by the exercise of due diligence, that it is material to the issue, and that it is not merely cumulative, or impeaching. Id. (emphasis added). Meeks argues that showing that the outcome of the trial would be different is a substantially higher burden of persuasion than the ordinary standard of showing that the outcome of the trial probably would be different. ¶ 9. Generally speaking, when on appeal we review findings of ultimate fact made by a trial court sitting without a jury, we enforce the familiar substantial evidence/clearly erroneous test, and it thus quite limits our scope of review. This premise has been applied to proceedings for post-conviction relief. McClendon v. State, 539 So.2d at 1377. This limitation upon our scope of review may be enforced, however, only where the factfinder applied the correct legal standard. Id. On the other hand, where ... the trial judge has applied an erroneous legal standard, we should not hesitate to reverse. Id. ¶ 10. The State contends that the circuit court judge applied the appropriate standard of proof when he stated that the burden of proof in this particular case is upon the Petitioner to prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence. In support of its argument, the State cites Turner v. State, 673 So.2d 382 (Miss.1996). In Turner the trial judge ruled as follows: The Petitioner has failed to prove to the Court in both cases by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged newly discovered evidence is of such nature that it would be practically conclusive that had such evidence been introduced at trial, it would have resulted in a different verdict. Id. at 383. Turner argued that the trial judge applied an incorrect standard of review. Id. at 384. He argued that the appropriate standard for when a new trial is warranted is when the newly discovered evidence will `probably produce a different result or verdict,' not when it is practically conclusive that it would produce a different verdict as stated in the trial court's order. Id. This Court explained that the appropriate standard of review is whether Turner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that material facts existed which had not been previously heard and which required the vacation of his conviction or sentence. Id. We held that Turner had not met this standard and that the error in the wording of the trial judge's ruling, if any, was harmless error. Id. ¶ 11. In the case sub judice, Meeks failed to meet the standard set out in Turner. Although Meeks alleges that Tana recanted her testimony, Tana unequivocally testified that she was not recanting and had never recanted her trial testimony. The testimony of Charles Smith, an admitted felon, only impeached Tana's testimony at best. As stated by this Court in Smith, testimony which only impeaches a witness's trial testimony does not constitute grounds for a new trial. Furthermore, Smith was impeached several times by the State during his testimony and in the end proved not to be an effective or credible witness. Meeks failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that material facts existed which had not previously been heard and which required the vacation of his conviction. Therefore, the error in the wording of the trial judge's ruling, if any, was harmless error.