Opinion ID: 2630926
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Attempted Rape (Letner, Tobin)

Text: Defendants contend that the evidence presented in the prosecution's case-in-chief was insufficient to establish that an attempted forcible rape was committed and, even if the crime was committed, which of the defendants participated either as a perpetrator or an aider and abettor. We disagree. (18) Conviction of the crime of attempted forcible rape requires proof the defendant formed the specific intent to commit the crime of rape and performed a direct but ineffectual act, beyond mere preparation, leading toward the commission of a rape. [Citations.] The elements of the crime of forcible rape are `an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [w]here it is accomplished against a person's will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person of another.' (§ 261, subd. (a)(2).) ( People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 138 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 454, 180 P.3d 224], fns. omitted ( Rundle ).) (19) The felony-murder special circumstance, section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), requires that [t]he murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting to commit one or more of the enumerated felonies. At the time Pontbriant was murdered, the law provided that, as to the actual killer, intent to kill [was] not an element of the felony-murder special circumstance; but when the defendant [was] an aider and abett[o]r rather than the actual killer, intent must be proved before the trier of fact can find the special circumstance to be true. ( People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1138-1139 [240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306] ( Anderson ).) [20] To summarize the evidence (drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution), Pontbriant's body was found unclothed except for her brassiere, which was around her waist, and her socks. Her sweater had been cut at the neck and ripped the rest of the way down to the bottom, but the sleeves were intact. Because her hands were tied behind her back, the condition of her sweater indicated she was bound after having been undressed. Her pants and underwear had fecal matter on them. Pontbriant had been severely beaten, and several clumps of her hair had been pulled from her head. Several of Letner's hairs, which had been pulled out of his head, and several hairs that could have been pubic hairs from an unidentifiable donor, were found on Pontbriant's chest when her body was rolled over. Semen that could have been deposited by Tobin, but not Walter Gilliland, and blood consistent with Tobin's, were found in the bedroom, along with a baseball hat that contained several of Letner's hairs. A beer bottle was tightly wedged between Pontbriant's legs, near her genitals. This evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that defendants attempted to rape Pontbriant. The jury also reasonably could have found the murder was committed for the purpose of preventing Pontbriant from reporting the attempted rape to the authorities, and accordingly had occurred while defendants were engaged in the commission of the attempted rape, or their immediate flight after committing the crime. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17); People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 952 [248 Cal.Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917].) Defendants point out that there was no evidence of sexual activity or trauma on Pontbriant's genitals. Defendants, of course, were charged with an attempted rape, not a completed rape, and thus the absence of evidence that Pontbriant actually was raped does not preclude a finding of guilt. Furthermore, contrary to defendants' suggestion, there is no requirement that the prosecution establish why an attempted rape was unsuccessful. [21] Nonetheless, a rational trier of fact could have found that the plan to have sexual intercourse with Pontbriant was abandoned because she had defecated in her clothing and had fecal matter on her body. Thus the lack of evidence of sexual activity on Pontbriant's body reasonably may be explained, in contrast to those prior cases in which we have considered the lack of evidence of a sexual assault as an indication that an attempted rape or rape did not occur. (Cf. Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 139 [recognizing that the absence of evidence of a sexual assault may rebut other inferences suggesting that the perpetrator intended to have sexual contact with the victim, but holding that, in that case, the inconclusive nature of the evidence (because of the decomposition of the victim's body) concerning whether a sexual assault had occurred did not rebut such inferences].) Defendants observe that we previously have held that the unclothed state of a murder victim is, by itself, insufficient to prove that a rape or attempted rape has occurred. (See People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 41 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673].) In the present case, however, a number of other circumstances, considered in conjunction with Pontbriant's nearly total nudity, support the jury's verdict. The jury reasonably could have found Pontbriant had been bound after defendants forcibly undressed her, supporting the inference that they planned to do something to her that would be facilitated by her being unclothed, and in which she would not be a willing participant. In addition, the presence of sperm in the bedroom that could have been deposited by Tobin (but not Gilliland), the hairs found on Pontbriant's chest, and the bottle that was wedged between her legs near her genitals reasonably could be viewed as evidence of a sexual component of defendants' actions. Defendants are correct in asserting that there is no direct evidence establishing which one of them performed which act against Pontbriant (other than Tobin's testimony that he had nothing to do with what happened to her, which the jury clearly rejected). The jury's reliance upon circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence, in determining whether both defendants were guilty, does not demonstrate, as defendants urge, that the verdict was the result of speculation. Rather, the evidence and the ensuing inferences adequately support the jury's finding that defendants both were guilty of attempting to rape Pontbriant and of intentionally killing her while they were engaged in committing that crime. (20) The evidence established that defendants had a history of acting in concert. They had been friends for several years, they resided together in various dwellings during their time in Visalia, and they engaged together in activities such as selling items at the local swap meet, practicing karate, and drinking and conversing at the Break Room Bar. There was, in fact, evidence demonstrating that they supported each other in criminal activities: Jeanette Mayberry testified that while Tobin assaulted her at the apartment on Bridge Street two days before Pontbriant's murder, Letner, in addition to yelling insults at Mayberry, encouraged Tobin to continue striking her. The evidence together with reasonable inferences established that defendants went together to Pontbriant's house on the night of the murder, left together in her car after she was killed, both lied to Officer Wightman regarding where they were going, fled to Iowa together, and eventually were arrested together. Neither of them had steady jobs or employment prospects in Visalia, and both of them had tenuous living arrangements: they were soon to be evicted from the Murray Street apartment for failing to pay the rent, and Jeanette Mayberry had just thrown Tobin out of the Bridge Street apartment after a dramatic fight between them. Forensic evidence reasonably could be viewed as indicating that both defendants directly were involved in attempting to rape the victim: Letner's hairs, which had been forcefully removed from his head, were found on Pontbriant's body, and semen and blood, consistent with having come from Tobin, were found in the bedroom. Although defendants attack the significance of the evidence and offer alternative explanations for its existence, we cannot say that no rational trier of fact could have determined that the evidence supported the finding that defendants, acting according to a common plan to attack Pontbriant and steal her car in order to leave town, committed an attempted rape, that Pontbriant's murder occurred during the course of the attempted rape, and that defendants shared an intent to kill her in order to facilitate their escape. (See § 31 [defining as principals in a crime all persons who commit the crime or aid and abet in its commission]; People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1023 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 163, 183 P.3d 1146] ( Richardson ) [`An aider and abettor is one who acts with both knowledge of the perpetrator's criminal purpose and the intent of encouraging or facilitating commission of the offense.']; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1130 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1] [the evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer that the attackers' actions were coordinated pursuant to a joint plan].)