Opinion ID: 1327202
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Present Psychiatric Mitigating Evidence as Presented in the Habeas Proceeding

Text: The habeas court found that trial counsel's failure to discover and present to Dr. Grant Lee's life history as set out in the affidavit testimony discussed above and the records from the Charlton County Training Center, which Lee attended during the summer prior to entering kindergarten, led to Dr. Grant's incomplete diagnosis of Lee. The habeas court found that the fact that Lee was mistakenly diagnosed as mentally retarded while at the Training Center would have demonstrated the negative impact of his deprived environment and provided Lee's mental health expert with the information to support a theory that Lee was less culpable as the result of his childhood and impairments. However, our review of the record shows that trial counsel actually did obtain and submit to Dr. Grant as a part of Lee's school records an evaluation of Lee performed in kindergarten that contained the information that Lee's classification of functioning had been in the Mild level of Mental Retardation according to previous results of a test administered at the Training Center. Dr. Grant indicated during his testimony at trial that he found this kindergarten evaluation significant. Thus, we conclude that Lee was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to obtain the Charlton County Training Center records. As to the affidavit testimony, Dr. Grant testified in the habeas court that had he possessed the additional information that the affidavits provided, he would have diagnosed Lee as also suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), would have testified to that diagnosis, and also would have testified to and explained how the chaos, neglect, and abuse in Lee's life had a clear nexus to the crimes in this case. However, Dr. Grant did not explain how Lee's PTSD was related to the murder. Although he noted the vague flashbacks that [Lee] recalled during [his] interview with him, Dr. Grant did not claim that, at the time of the murder, Lee was experiencing a flashback or was in a disassociative state as a result of his PTSD. In order to show that a mental health expert who was fully informed of Lee's background could have provided the jury with an explanation of how Lee's mental impairments related to the murder, the habeas court quoted extensively from the affidavit of another psychologist retained by Lee's habeas counsel, Dr. Catherine Boyer. However, the critical issue in a case such as this is what the expert consulted at the time of trial would have been willing to testify to had [that expert] been provided the materials trial counsel allegedly failed to provide. Schofield v. Holsey, supra, 281 Ga. at 813, 642 S.E.2d 56. Further, contrary to the implication in the habeas court's order that Dr. Boyer also diagnosed Lee with PTSD, Dr. Boyer made no diagnosis of Lee's mental condition at the time of her interview or at the time of the crimes and, in fact, conducted no psychological testing of Lee. Rather, she testified that, while PTSD would be a very reasonable diagnosis of Lee's mental condition at the time of the crimes based upon her interview with Lee and her review of the affidavits, the records Dr. Grant reviewed, and the pre-trial testing of Lee that Dr. Grant performed, she could not make a diagnosis of Lee's pre-trial mental condition, because she did not see Lee at that time. In that portion of her affidavit testimony relied upon by the habeas court to connect Lee's mental impairments or significant emotional problems with the crimes, Dr. Boyer testified that Lee's impaired impulse control, impaired emotional control, high levels of distress, and inability to structure or stabilize his own life made him particularly vulnerable to involvement in the murder. Even assuming it were proper to allow her testimony connecting Lee's undiagnosed mental impairments or emotional problems with the crimes to substitute for testimony connecting Dr. Grant's new diagnosis of PTSD and the crimes, we do not find that portion of her testimony significantly different from Dr. Grant's trial testimony regarding the effects of Lee's environment and ADHD upon him that are discussed above. Lee argues that a diagnosis of PTSD is more compelling than a diagnosis of ADHD, because PTSD is an Axis I diagnosis and this Court has found ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel failed at the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial to present evidence of another Axis I diagnosis, major depression. See Hall v. McPherson, supra, 284 Ga. at 235, 663 S.E.2d 659. However, in determining prejudice, this Court evaluates the totality of the evidence both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding[.] Williams v. Taylor, supra, 529 U.S. at 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Here, Lee's trial expert failed to connect his new diagnosis of PTSD to the crimes, and the connection that his habeas expert made between his undiagnosed mental impairments and the crimes is similar to the connection his trial expert made between his diagnosis of ADHD and the crimes. Thus, there is no reasonable probability that a jury confronted with the psychiatric mitigating evidence as presented in Lee's habeas proceeding, including Dr. Grant's new diagnosis of PTSD, would have returned a different sentence. Compare Hall v. McPherson, supra, 284 Ga. at 234-235, 663 S.E.2d 659 (finding prejudice where counsel failed to present evidence of defendant's childhood abuse and neglect by his mother, his early exposure to alcohol and drugs, and readily available expert psychiatric testimony explaining how that background led to his major depression, where the only argument by the State in favor of a death sentence was that the defendant chose his life of drug addiction, although others, particularly his mother, had tried to help him).