Opinion ID: 2488447
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of La. C.Cr.P. art. 496

Text: As a general matter, a statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the burden of showing otherwise falls to the challenger. State v. Muschkat, 96-2922, pp. 4-5 (La.3/4/98); 706 So.2d 429, 432. Criminal statutes are given a genuine construction according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in context, and with reference to the purpose for the provision. La. R.S. § 14:3; Muschkat, 96-2922 at 4-5, 706 So.2d at 432; State v. Griffin, 495 So.2d 1306, 1308 (La.1986). When the constitutionality of a statute is at issue, and under one construction it can be upheld, while under the other it cannot, a court must adopt the constitutional construction. State v. Interiano, 03-1760, p. 4 (La.2/13/04); 868 So.2d 9, 13 (citing State v. LeCompte, 406 So.2d 1300, 1311 (La.1981)). A court may avoid constitutional problems by adopting a narrowing construction of the statute as long as that interpretation remains consistent with the overall purpose behind the legislation. Id. (citing Muschkat, 96-2922 at 10, 706 So.2d at 434 (stating [w]hile we recognize our duty to interpret statutes in a manner consistent with our state and federal constitutions, we may only preserve a statute by a constitutional construction provided that the saving construction is a plausible one.) (citations omitted)). In addition to criminal statutes being strictly and narrowly construed, any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the accused. State v. Williams, 00-1725, p. 12 (La.11/28/01); 800 So.2d 790, 800; State v. Carr, 99-2209, p. 4 (La.5/26/00); 761 So.2d 1271, 1274. Article 496 provides, When an indictment has been found or an information filed against a defendant who is not in custody or at large on bail for the offense charged, the court shall issue a warrant for the defendant's arrest, unless it issues a summons under Article 497. The district court declared article 496 unconstitutional to the extent it directs a court to issue an arrest warrant solely upon the filing of a bill of information without first determining whether probable cause exists for the arrest. A prior determination of probable cause is fundamental to the issuance of warrants. Article I, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 as well as the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution declare that [N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. In Shadwick v. City of Tampa, the Supreme Court held [t]he warrant traditionally has represented an independent assurance that a search and arrest will not proceed without probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person or place named in the warrant is involved in the crime. 407 U.S. 345, 350, 92 S.Ct. 2119, 2122-23, 32 L.Ed.2d 783 (1972). To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the Supreme Court has required the existence of probable cause be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 112, 95 S.Ct. at 862. In Gerstein, the Supreme Court considered whether a person arrested and held for trial under a prosecutor's information is constitutionally entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for pretrial restraint of liberty in the context of a class action suit for declaratory and injunctive relief brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 420 U.S. at 111, 95 S.Ct. at 861. In Florida, indictments were required only for the prosecution of capital offenses; prosecutors could charge all other crimes by information, without a prior preliminary hearing and without obtaining leave of court. Id., 420 U.S. at 105, 95 S.Ct. at 859. When Pugh and Henderson were arrested in Dade County and charged with several offenses under a prosecutor's information, [16] Florida courts had held the filing of an information foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing. Id., 420 U.S. at 106, 95 S.Ct. at 859. Pugh and Henderson filed a class action against Dade County officials in the Federal District Court, claiming a constitutional right to a judicial hearing on the issue of probable cause and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief. Id., 420 U.S. at 106-07, 95 S.Ct. at 859. The district court granted the relief sought and held the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments give all arrested persons charged by information a right to a judicial hearing on the question of probable cause. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 107, 95 S.Ct. at 860. The district court subsequently adopted an order detailing a postarrest procedure to be followed in Florida, which included a fully adversarial hearing at which a magistrate would determine probable cause. Id., 420 U.S. at 108, 95 S.Ct. at 860. The Fifth Circuit stayed the district court's order pending appeal, but while the case was awaiting decision, the Dade County judiciary voluntarily adopted a similar procedure of its own. The Fifth Circuit then remanded the case for specific findings on the constitutionality of the new system. Id., 420 U.S. at 109, 95 S.Ct. at 860. Before the district court issued its findings, the Florida Supreme Court amended its procedural rules governing preliminary hearings statewide. Under the amended rules, persons arrested would receive a preliminary hearing within 24 hours of arrest unless they were charged by information or indictment. Id. The district court found the amended rules had not answered the basic constitutional objection, since a defendant charged by information could still be detained pending trial without a judicial determination of probable cause. Reaffirming its original ruling, the district court declared the continuation of this practice was unconstitutional. Id., 420 U.S. at 109, 95 S.Ct. at 860-61. The Fifth Circuit affirmed after modifying the district court's decree in minor particulars. Id., 420 U.S. at 109-10, 95 S.Ct. at 861. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to resolve two issues: whether a person arrested and held for trial on an information is entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause for detention, and if so, whether the adversary hearing ordered by the district court and approved by the court of appeals is required by the Constitution. Id., 420 U.S. at 111, 95 S.Ct. at 861. The Supreme Court's answers were yes and no, respectively. The Supreme Court initially noted the Fourth Amendment requires the existence of probable cause be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible. Id., 420 U.S. at 112, 95 S.Ct. at 862. While recognizing that requiring a magistrate's review of the factual justification prior to any arrest would ensure maximum protection of individual rights, the Court concluded such a requirement would constitute an intolerable handicap for legitimate law enforcement. Id. Consequently, the Court has sanctioned a practical compromise, under which a policeman's on-the-scene assessment of probable cause will also provide legal justification for an arrest. Id., 420 U.S. at 113-14, 95 S.Ct. at 863. The Court rejected Florida's assertion that the prosecutor's decision to file an information is itself a determination of probable cause comparable to that of a police officer who performs a warrantless arrest. Id., 420 U.S. at 117, 95 S.Ct. at 864. The Court explained, [although a conscientious decision that the evidence warrants prosecution affords a measure of protection against unfounded detention, we do not think prosecutorial judgment standing alone meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, we think the Court's previous decisions compel disapproval of the Florida procedure. Id. The court noted it had consistently held a prosecutor's responsibility to law enforcement is inconsistent with the constitutional role of a neutral and detached magistrate and probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant must be determined by someone independent of police and prosecution. Id., 420 U.S. at 117-18, 95 S.Ct. at 865 (citations omitted). To the extent article 496 can be construed as directing a district court to issue an arrest warrant without first determining whether probable cause exists, it runs afoul of federal and Louisiana jurisprudence and the plain language of the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. In Interiano, however, this Court reaffirmed the notion that when the constitutionality of a statute is at issue, and under one construction it can be upheld, while under the other it cannot, a court must adopt the constitutional construction. 03-1760 at 4, 868 So.2d at 13 (citing State v. LeCompte, 406 So.2d 1300, 1322 (1981)). This Court further stated, a court may avoid constitutional problems by adopting a narrowing construction of the statute as long as that interpretation remains consistent with the overall purpose behind the legislation. Id. (citing State v. Muschkat, 96-2992, p. 10 (La.3/4/98); 706 So.2d 429, 434). As the indigent defender and the amicus brief filed by the Public Defender's Office point out, article 496 was enacted in 1966 and modeled after Fed.R.Crim.P. Rule 9(a), which originally did not require a probable cause determination before a warrant was issued based upon a bill of information or an indictment. [17] In response to Gerstein, however, the rule was amended in 1979 to require that an affidavit accompanying the information establish probable cause for the arrest. The Advisory Committee notes explain the rule was amended to make explicit the fact that a warrant may issue upon the basis of an information only if the information or an affidavit filed with the information shows probable cause for the arrest. This had generally been assumed to be the state of the law even though not specifically set out in rule 9. ... Article 496, however, has never been amended in response to Gerstein. Although article 496 does not expressly require a judicial determination of probable cause before a warrant is issued based on a bill of information, we find the general requirements for issuing an arrest warrant must apply to article 496. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 202 provides that an arrest warrant may only be issued if two requirements are met: (1) the complainant executes an affidavit under oath specifying, to his best knowledge and belief, the nature, date, and place of the offense, the name of the offender if known, and of the person injured if there be any; and (2) the magistrate has probable cause to believe an offense was committed and that the person against whom the complaint was made committed it. As both articles govern the issuance of arrest warrants, we conclude articles 202 and 496 must be read in pari materia, such that the requirements set forth in article 202 must be met before an arrest warrant can be issued based upon a bill of information under article 496. Relying upon this Court's holding in Interiano and Muschkat, we find article 496 can be upheld as constitutional by adopting this narrow construction that a warrant may issue upon the basis of a bill of information only if an affidavit filed with the information shows probable cause for the arrest. This statutory interpretation comports with the requirement that when faced with different constructions of a statute, a court must adopt the constitutional construction. Le- Compte, 406 So.2d at 1311. We find further support for this narrow construction from the fact that article 496 was modeled after Fed.R.Crim.P. Rule 9(a), which now expressly requires the information or an accompanying affidavit show probable cause for an arrest premised upon a bill of information. Just as the Advisory Committee notes to Fed. R.Crim.P. Rule 9(a) mention this had generally been assumed to be the state of the law even though not specifically set out in rule 9, we conclude the same must be true here. Although article 496 does not expressly require a probable cause determination before an arrest warrant is issued, article 202 governs the issuance of arrest warrants and states all of the requirements therein, including the filing of an affidavit and a judicial determination of probable cause, must be met before an arrest warrant can issue. Reading the two articles in pari materia, we find the requirements set forth in article 202 must apply with equal force to an arrest warrant issued pursuant to article 496 based upon an information. This construction is consistent with the overall spirit of the legislature, which is to prevent arbitrary arrests that are not sufficiently warranted by the facts and circumstances. Article I, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution also supports this narrow construction because it affords Louisiana citizens greater protection than the United States Constitution, and specifically states [n]o warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation. We conclude article 496 is constitutional and a warrant may issue upon the basis of an information only if an affidavit filed with the information shows probable cause for the arrest. The district court erred in finding article 496 is unconstitutional. For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court and hold article 496 is constitutional under the narrow construction that an arrest warrant may issue pursuant to article 496 only if an accompanying affidavit establishes probable cause for the arrest. REVERSED.