Opinion ID: 2007417
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: KRS 17.545 Reasonably Advances A Vital Public Safety Aim.

Text: The final questions, then, are whether KRS 17.545 rationally serves a valid non-punitive purpose, and whether the disabilities it creates are excessive in light of that purpose. As our sister courts have held, residence restrictions have the vital, non-punitive purpose of protecting children from sexual assaults and other crimes. In Smith, supra , the Supreme Court noted that a statute's rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose is a `most significant' factor in our determination that the statute's effects are not punitive. 538 U.S. at 102, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (citation omitted). The majority acknowledges, as it must, the General Assembly's legitimate, regulatory concern with public safety, but opines that KRS 17.545 is an irrational means to serve the public safety end because it does not solve the recidivism problem by eliminating any and all opportunities for a sex offender to reoffend. The majority has applied far too strict a standard. The General Assembly is not obligated to fashion perfect statutes, Cornelison v. Commonwealth, 52 S.W.3d 570 (Ky.2001), nor is it precluded from addressing part of a problem and leaving other parts for another day. Holbrook v. Lexmark International Group, Inc., 65 S.W.3d 908 (Ky.2001). As the United States Supreme Court stated in Smith, [a] statute is not deemed punitive simply because it lacks a close or perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance. 538 U.S. at 103, 123 S.Ct. 1140. As in Smith , the imprecision the majority relies upon does not suggest that [KRS 17.545]'s nonpunitive purpose is a sham or mere pretext. Id. at 103, 123 S.Ct. 1140 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). On the contrary, while residential restrictions cannot eliminate all contacts between potential recidivists and their potential child victims, particularly where perpetrator and victim are related, they are clearly a rational means of decreasing those contacts, and thus the General Assembly could reasonably believe that they would enhance the overall safety of children. In denying the reasonableness of that belief, the majority disregards the General Assembly's right to address problems in part, rather than comprehensively, and improperly substitutes its policy judgment for that of the General Assembly.