Opinion ID: 73227
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Voluntariness of Baldwin’s Confessions17

Text: 16 Under the prejudice prong, Baldwin must show that “the errors at trial actually and substantially disadvantaged his defense so that he was denied fundamental fairness.” McCoy, 953 F.2d at 1261. He must demonstrate “not merely, that the errors at . . . trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). He has failed in this regard with respect to all of his barred claims. Additionally, Baldwin has not demonstrated that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from this court’s declining to consider the merits of his defaulted claims. Baldwin has not showed that he was “actually innocent” to overcome his guilt-phase defaults, or that “no reasonable juror could have found him eligible for the death penalty under [state] law[]”to overcome his sentencing-phase defaults. Hill, 81 F.3d at 1023 (internal quotation marks omitted). 17 Although Baldwin did not raise the issues in Parts II.C and II.D of this opinion in his state coram nobis petition, the district court addressed the claims on the merits. We assume, without deciding, that the claims are not procedurally barred and accordingly, also conduct a merits review of them. 29 Baldwin contends that the state trial court failed to make a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that his custodial statements were voluntary, because the court admitted the confessions after stating that they were “prima facie voluntary.” After considering, on its own initiative during Baldwin’s direct appeal, whether the trial court properly admitted Baldwin’s custodial statements, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial court properly admitted the statements. See Baldwin, 372 So. 2d at 28-30. Baldwin asserts that the independent determinations of the Alabama appellate court and the district court may not remedy the trial court’s failure to make a preponderance finding prior to admitting the statement. We agree with the district court that Baldwin unduly focuses on semantics, and reject Baldwin’s implied assertion that trial courts must use exact words when determining the admissibility of custodial statements. “On review of a habeas [corpus] petition, we make an independent assessment of the voluntariness of the [petitioner’s] confession.” Waldrop v. Jones, 77 F.3d 1308, 1316 (11th Cir.) (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985)), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 247 (1996); see also McCoy, 953 F.2d at 1263. In so doing, we presume the state court’s subsidiary and historical findings of fact to be correct pursuant to section 2254(d). See Waldrop, 77 F.3d at 1316; McCoy, 953 F.2d at 1263 (stating that subsidiary findings, such as the circumstances of the defendant’s interrogation and the actions of law enforcement officers, “are entitled to a presumption of correctness if fairly supported by the record[]”); Harris v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 756, 762 (11th Cir.) (“As the Court stated in 30 Miller, ‘. . . subsidiary factual questions, such as . . . whether in fact the police engaged in the intimidation tactics alleged by the defendant . . . are entitled to the § 2254(d) presumption.’”) (quoting Miller, 474 U.S. at 112), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1011 (1989). In addition, “[w]hen a state court fails to make explicit findings, a state court’s denial of the claim ‘resolves all conflicts in testimony bearing on that claim against the criminal defendant.’” Waldrop, 77 F.3d at 1316 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 604-05 (1961)). This court must assess Baldwin’s claim under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statements. Waldrop, 77 F.3d at 1316; Harris, 874 F.2d at 761 (“A confession is voluntary if, under the totality of the circumstances, it is the product of the defendant’s free and rational choice.”). After reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence in this case is substantial that law enforcement officers advised Baldwin of his constitutional rights before taking each of his statements, that Baldwin understood and waived those rights, and that the officers did not use promises, threats, force or coercion to induce Baldwin into making the statements. The trial court conducted an in camera evidentiary hearing, at which Baldwin testified and presented witnesses, to determine the admissibility of his custodial statements. Although Baldwin testified that his statements were coerced through threats and physical beatings, the witnesses that he called to testify on his behalf did not corroborate his story. The district court found that law enforcement officers read Baldwin the Miranda warnings on five separate occasions before questioning him or obtaining statements from him -- the first time in connection with their questioning him 31 only about the stolen truck in which he was arrested and not about the murder -- and that Baldwin signed at least four separate forms waiving his Miranda rights. In addition, at the state evidentiary hearing, the state presented testimony from the law enforcement officer who took Baldwin’s statement, that he, or anyone in his presence, did not threaten or physically abuse Baldwin to induce him to confess. We agree with the district court and conclude that Baldwin made his statements knowingly and voluntarily.