Opinion ID: 2529919
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Respondent's Claims

Text: ¶ 90 In March of 2008, the circuit court of McLean County entered a default judgment terminating the parental rights of the respondent, Daryl Crockett. Prior to the entry of the judgment, respondent was twice served by publicationfirst in September of 2006, before the adjudication phase of the proceedings, and again in November 2007, before the termination phase. ¶ 91 In May of 2009, respondent filed a petition pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2008)), seeking to have the default judgment set aside. In his petition, respondent alleged that both publication notices were invalid and that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over him at the time it entered the default judgment. Thus, according to respondent, the judgment terminating his parental rights was void and should be set aside. The circuit court denied respondent's petition and the appellate court affirmed. No. 4-10-0267 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). ¶ 92 Before this court, respondent repeats his claims that both of the publication notices were invalid. With respect to the September 2006 notice, respondent's primary contention is that the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) failed to conduct a diligent inquiry to locate him, as required under section 2-16(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-16(2) (West 2006)), before serving him by publication. With respect to the November 2007 notice, respondent maintains that the Department and the McLean County State's Attorney had actual knowledge of his whereabouts and, for that reason, service by publication was improper. ¶ 93 The State, in response, initially contends that both of respondent's principal contentions regarding the publication notices are impermissible collateral attacks on the default judgment and, therefore, are not properly before this court. In so arguing, the State does not challenge the general rule which holds that a judgment entered by a court lacking personal jurisdiction is void ab initio and may be challenged at any time. See In re M.W., 232 Ill.2d 408, 414, 328 Ill.Dec. 868, 905 N.E.2d 757 (2009). Nor does the State dispute that respondent has alleged in his section 2-1401 petition that the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction when the court entered the judgment terminating respondent's parental rights. ¶ 94 Instead, the State focuses on the nature of the proof that must be offered to establish that a judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction. Citing to In re Custody of Ayala, 344 Ill.App.3d 574, 583-84, 279 Ill. Dec. 456, 800 N.E.2d 524 (2003), In re Marriage of Stefiniw, 253 Ill.App.3d 196, 200-01, 192 Ill.Dec. 398, 625 N.E.2d 358 (1993), and City of Rockford v. Lemar, 157 Ill.App.3d 350, 353-54, 109 Ill.Dec. 507, 510 N.E.2d 128 (1987), the State invokes a common law rule which recognizes that a judgment entered without jurisdiction is void and subject to collateral challenge at any time, but which holds that, in order to prove the judgment is void, the jurisdictional defect must appear on the face of the record. See generally 23A Ill. L. and Prac. Judgments § 158, at 15 (2008) (Want of jurisdiction to enter the judgment ordinarily must appear on the face of the record to furnish a basis for collateral attack.); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 77, cmt. a, at 224 (1982) (It was a rule in common law courts that a judgment appearing to be valid on its face could not be shown to be invalid by proof contradicting the record of the action in which the judgment was rendered.); 47 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 760 (2006). Pursuant to this `absolute verity' rule ( United States v. Bigford, 365 F.3d 859, 867 (10th Cir.2004)), if the jurisdictional defect does not appear on the face of the record, the judgment is not void and it may not be attacked at any time. Instead, according to the State, the judgment is merely voidable and it may only be attacked within the time limitations established by section 2-1401. ¶ 95 Applying this rule in the case at bar, the State contends that several of the arguments raised in respondent's petition, including both of respondent's principal contentions regarding the publication notices, do not rest on the face of the record alone but, instead, are dependent on evidence outside the record that was introduced in the hearings on respondent's section 2-1401 petition. Thus, the State maintains that respondent's contentions challenge the judgment as voidable, rather than void, and those contentions are subject to the time limits established by section 2-1401. Further, the State asserts that respondent's section 2-1401 petition was not filed within the applicable statutory time limit imposed by section 2-1401. Therefore, according to the State, respondent's contentions are impermissible collateral attacks on the default judgment. ¶ 96 The majority does not address or acknowledge the State's argument that the jurisdictional defects alleged by respondent do not appear on the face of the record. Given the importance of the argument in defining the scope of the issues we must consider, I would address it. I would reject the argument because this court has held that the absolute verity rule is inapplicable where, as here, the moving party alleges that notice was never received and no third party has acted in reliance on the judgment: If no rights of third parties have intervened, the defendant may have the judgment set aside even if the record shows affirmatively that he was served or that he appeared. ( Cassidy v. Automatic Time-Stamp Co. [,] 185 Ill. 431 [56 N.E. 1116 (1900)]; Kochman v. O'Neill, 202 Ill. 110 [66 N.E. 1047 (1903)]; Hilt v. Heimberger, 235 Ill. 235 [85 N.E. 304 (1908)]; Owens v. Ramstead [ Ranstead ], 22 Ill. 161 [(1859)].) Janove v. Bacon, 6 Ill.2d 245, 249, 128 N.E.2d 706 (1955). See also In re Estate of Young, 414 Ill. 525, 535, 112 N.E.2d 113 (1953) (The success of a collateral attack upon a judgment generally depends on a record showing lack of jurisdiction; [citations] an attack charging want of notice and opportunity to be heard, however, may be based on evidence dehors the record.). This exception to the absolute verity rule allowing the introduction of extrinsic evidence rests on the inherent power of a court to examine its own records and to expunge a judgment if satisfied that the judgment was rendered without due notice to a party (Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 77, cmt. a, at 224 (1982)), as well the unfairness of forbidding a litigant from contesting a judgment for which he or she never received notice (see Village of Algonquin v. Lowe, 2011 IL App (2d) 100603, ¶ 24, 352 Ill.Dec. 368, 954 N.E.2d 228 (noting that it is problematic to apply the absolute verity rule when personal jurisdiction is at issue)). ¶ 97 Respondent's challenge to the order terminating his parental rights was brought in the same court which entered that order and no third-party reliance is at issue. In these circumstances, the absolute verity rule is inapplicable. [3] Accordingly, contrary to the State's assertions, all of the contentions raised in respondent's section 2-1401 petition are properly before us.