Opinion ID: 1876719
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Doctrine of Charitable Immunity

Text: In Low, supra , we thoroughly discussed the development of the doctrine of charitable immunity; therefore, we need not discuss it in great detail here. However, before addressing Sowders's arguments, a brief review of the charitable-immunity doctrine is necessary. The essence of the [charitable-immunity] doctrine is that agencies, trusts, etc., created and maintained exclusively for charity may not have their assets diminished by execution in favor of one injured by acts of persons charged with duties under the agency or trust. George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 337 Ark. 206, 211, 987 S.W.2d 710, 712 (1999) (citing Crossett Health Ctr. v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1953)). Based upon the Clayborn court's distinction, albeit in dicta, between immunity from suit and immunity from liability, this court allowed the plaintiff in Scamardo to sue a charitable organization; however, the plaintiff could not collect on any judgment because the charitable organization was immune from execution. In Low , we overruled Scamardo , as well as the earlier dicta in Clayborn , and held that plaintiffs could not bring suit against charitable organizations. Plaintiffs alleging injury by charitable organizations can bring suit against the charities' liability insurers via the direct-action statute, Ark.Code Ann. § 23-79-210. Further, injured plaintiffs may bring suit against employees of charitable organizations.