Opinion ID: 1968563
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Instructions Given

Text: Although the government concedes that it might have been helpful for the trial court to expressly instruct the jury that consent evidence is relevant to the question of force, it first contends that no such instruction is mandated by In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), which held that the Due Process Clause requires the government to bear the burden of proving every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the government argues that because the trial court's general charge instructed the jury that the government must prove guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that this burden of proof never shifts throughout the trial, and because the jury was not specifically instructed that they could not consider Russell's consent evidence unless he had proved it by a preponderance of the evidence, the jury was not precluded from considering whether Russell's consent evidence raised a reasonable doubt on the element of force. We reject both contentions. The legal standard for reviewing jury instructions claimed to impermissibly restrict a jury's consideration of relevant evidence is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1198, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990); see also Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 6, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1243, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) (the proper inquiry is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury did apply the instruction in an unconstitutional manner). The general jury instruction on the government's burden to prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt is not necessarily sufficient, by itself, to overcome other confusing or ambiguous instructions on the burdens of proof. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 518-19 & n. 7, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2456-57 & n. 7, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979) (potential for impermissible interpretation of jury instruction on burden of proof was not removed by general instruction on government's burden to prove elements beyond a reasonable doubt). Here, the trial court gave the standard general instruction on the government's burden of proof, but did not inform the jury that it could consider Russell's evidence of consent with respect to the question of whether the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was accomplished by force. The government argues that the general instruction was sufficient to assure that the jury understood that the ultimate burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt never shifted to the defendant. However, in Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 94 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987), we think the Supreme Court made it quite clear that when a defendant raises an affirmative defense, and evidence has been presented by either the defendant or the government which is relevant to that defense, the jury must be free to consider that evidence, unless the legislature has properly provided otherwise, [8] in connection with its determination whether the government has proven the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the jury must be told that it can consider the evidence for that purpose. In Martin, the Court upheld an Ohio statute that required the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, an affirmative defense of self-defense to a charge of aggravated murder. Id. at 233, 107 S.Ct. at 1101-02. The Court was satisfied that the instructions given in that case did not prevent the jury from considering the defendant's self-defense evidence. See id. In addition, the Martin jury was specifically told that it could acquit the defendant if it found that the defendant had proved the elements of self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The Supreme Court concluded that [i]t would be quite different if the jury had been instructed that self-defense evidence could not be considered in determining whether there was reasonable doubt about the State's case, i.e., that self-defense evidence must be put aside for all purposes unless it satisfied the preponderance standard. Such an instruction would relieve the State of its burden and plainly run afoul of Winship's mandate. The instructions in this case could be clearer in this respect, but when read as a whole, we think they are adequate to convey to the jury that all of the evidence, including the evidence going to self-defense, must be considered in deciding whether there was a reasonable doubt about the sufficiency of the State's proof of the elements of the crime. Id. at 233-34, 107 S.Ct. at 1102 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The principle of law set out in the italicized material above has been applied, in circumstances similar to those present here, by virtually every federal and state court which has addressed the issue. In Humanik v. Beyer, 871 F.2d 432 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 812, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed.2d 25 (1989), the Third Circuit analyzed Martin and the prior case of Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977), [9] and concluded that the charge to the jury must make it clear that the jury can consider the defendants' evidence as it relates to the `element of the crime' issue ... regardless of whether the jury believes the defendants' evidence more likely true than not true. Otherwise, a conviction would violate the Winship rule.... Id. at 440. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit concluded that statutorily designated `affirmative' defenses, on which the defendant bears the burden of proof, may be defenses that also raise a reasonable doubt about the prosecution's case. Rhodes v. Brigano, 91 F.3d 803, 809 (6th Cir.1996) (citing Martin, supra, 480 U.S. at 234, 107 S.Ct. at 1102, for proposition that jury may not convict if the evidence offered by the defendant raises any reasonable doubt about the existence of any fact necessary for the finding of guilt). Likewise, in United States v. Westcott, 83 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (11th Cir.1996), the Eleventh Circuit cited the passage from Martin and held that a defendant's affirmative defense evidence of mental disease or defect constitutes evidence admissible to negate the mens rea element of the offense. [10] Before we adopt the principles set forth in the foregoing authorities we must examine the effect, if any, the Supreme Court's decision in Egelhoff has upon the conclusion reached in Humanik and the other cases cited. In the plurality opinion in Egelhoff, Justice Scalia, speaking for himself and three other justice, expressed the view that the quoted Martin passage was dictum, ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2023, while Justice O'Connor in her dissenting opinion, speaking for herself and three other justices, observed that [d]ictim or not, this observation explained our reasoning [in the Martin case] and is similarly applicable here.... Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2028. (In her separate opinion, the ninth justice, Justice Ginsberg, did not address the question of whether or not the passage was dictum.) In any event, even though the justices of the Supreme Court may not be in agreement about the binding effect of the Martin language we have quoted, the government has not argued that the passage is dictum. Rather, the government contends that quoted language does not say what the Humanik court says it does, i.e., that the charge to the jury must make it clear that the jury can consider the defendants' evidence as it relates to the `element of the crime' issue, which the government has the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt, regardless of whether the jury believes the defendants' evidence more likely true than not true. Humanik, supra, 871 F.2d at 440 (emphasis added). We are of the view that the Humanik court's reading of the quoted language from Martin is a fair one and should be applied by us. We recognize that the holding in Egelhoff, as discussed below, permits the legislature to place limits upon what evidence can be considered in this regard. However, because the Council here, like the legislature in Humanik, placed no such limits, we are satisfied that the language we have quoted from Humanik, should be applied. In Egelhoff the Court upheld, in the face of a due process challenge, a state statute making a voluntarily intoxicated person as responsible for his or her acts as a sober person. The Court was reviewing a Montana statute which provided that voluntary intoxication evidence was not relevant to a determination of the mental state which is an element of a criminal offense. Egelhoff, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2016. The Court held that a legislature may, consistent with due process, redefine any element of an offense by omitting some component that had previously been included, and declare that any evidence relating to that component is irrelevant, so long as the component excluded is not a fundamental principle of justice. Id. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2017. We can discern no indication here, and the government does not contend otherwise, that the Council has excluded consent evidence as relevant to the government's burden of proof, [11] as the Montana legislature had done with respect to voluntary intoxication evidence in the statute under review in Egelhoff. Therefore, because evidence relating to consent is relevant to the question of force, a failure to instruct the jury in that regard, where requested, does violate due process. See Humanik, supra, 871 F.2d at 440-41. The ruling in Egelhoff does not require a different result. On that point, we agree with the Ninth Circuit which recently observed in a post-Egelhoff case interpreting federal law: We recognize that [appellant] has no Due Process right to a defense of voluntary intoxication if the legislature chooses to exclude it. See Montana v. Egelhoff, ___ U.S. ___, [] 116 S.Ct. 2103, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996). When the defense is permitted by law, however, the defendant is entitled to have the jury consider it in order to determine whether the government has proved all the elements of the offense.... Thus a defendant has constitutional right to have the jury consider defense permitted under applicable law to negate an element of the offense. United States v. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1413-14 (9th Cir.1997); accord, State v. Delibero, supra, note 10, 692 A.2d at 983. In sum, although the government contends that the language in Martin should not be so read, we agree with Humanik and the other authorities cited, at least when the legislature has not specified otherwise, that the jury should be expressly instructed that it may consider the affirmative defense evidence when it determines whether the government has met its burden to prove all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, although we did not discuss Martin, we have previously held that failure to give an instruction embodying a defense theory that negates guilt of the crime charged, when properly requested and supported by any evidence, is necessarily reversible error. Gray v. United States, 549 A.2d 347, 350-51 (D.C.1988) (citations omitted). In Gray, the appellant presented evidence tending to support an alibi defense to drug distribution charges, but which could have been interpreted in a manner not supporting the alibi. We observed that while a claim of alibi is not, strictly speaking, an affirmative defense, evidence of alibi tends to negate one fact (that the defendant was present at the scene of the crime) the government must prove as part of its case, and thus an alibi need only raise a reasonable doubt about that fact. Id. at 349 and n. 3. We held that the trial court erred in denying a defense request for an alibi instruction, because the appellant's alibi evidence met the standard of any evidence and therefore he was entitled to an instruction stating the substance of his defense theory. Id. at 349-51. As we have said, the government does not dispute that Russell's evidence of consent is relevant to the question of whether the government proved the force element of the offense, and that it would have been desirable for the trial court to say more than it did on that point. Particularly in light of the trial record, which shows that the government and defense attorneys advocated conflicting interpretations of the new statute and that the trial judge was admittedly uncertain about his interpretation of the new statute, we have no difficulty in concluding that lay jurors would likewise have been confused by the instructions actually given. Because there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevent[ed] consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence, see Boyde, supra, 494 U.S. at 380, 110 S.Ct. at 1198, we hold that the jury instructions on first degree sexual abuse and on the affirmative defense of consent, as given, violated Russell's due process rights under the Constitution. [12]