Opinion ID: 63383
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Brown is an Invitee of OOSI

Text: OOSI first contends that Brown cannot be its invitee because OOSI was not an “occupant” of the CAPE COOK. See Blanks, 766 F.2d at 894 (defining “invitee” in part as someone invited by the “occupant”). According to OOSI, occupancy requires physical presence on or actual use of the vessel, and OOSI merely chartered the CAPE COOK for Williams’s use, immediately turned the vessel over to Williams, and never had any personnel aboard the vessel. Sea Mar, on the other hand, asserts that OOSI was an occupant of the CAPE COOK because as the charterer of the vessel, OOSI had control and command of the vessel, including where the vessel was to go and for what the vessel was to be used. Blanks does not define “occupant,” and Louisiana case law recognizes that the term is “susceptible of different meanings.” Reed v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 741 So. 2d 1285, 1288 (La. Ct. App. 1999). Consequently, both parties follow Reed in using the customary meaning of “occupant” as set forth in Black’s Law Dictionary: “[o]ne who has possessory rights in, or control over, certain property or premises.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1108 (8th ed. 2004). Contrary to OOSI’s assertions, this definition does not require than an occupant actually use or be physically present on the premises. Control of or a possessory right in the property or premises is sufficient. OOSI contends that it gave up the right to control the vessel when it turned the vessel over to Williams, from whom Sea Mar was taking direction at the time of the alleged injury. Pursuant to the Charter Agreement, however, the vessel was under the control of OOSI; the master of the CAPE COOK was obligated to follow the direction of OOSI and allow on board those persons or parties that OOSI requested.2 If OOSI instructed Sea Mar to stop taking 2 Section 5(a) of the Charter Agreement provides: “The whole of the vessel shall be at Charterer’s [OOSI’s] disposal[,] reserving proper and sufficient space for the vessel’s master, 5 No. 07-30112 direction from Williams, Sea Mar was required to comply. As the district court correctly concluded, the CAPE COOK was under the ultimate direction, control, and command of OOSI, which could decide where the vessel went and who could come on board. OOSI was therefore an “occupant” of the vessel. The Blanks definition of “invitee” also requires an “expressed or implied invitation” and that the invitee be present “on business of the occupant or for their mutual advantage.” Blanks, 766 F.2d at 894. Blanks cites Arcement v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 517 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1975), a diversity suit in Louisiana. In Arcement, one man was killed and another injured when their truck crossed a railroad trestle, which collapsed. Id. at 731. The trestle and adjacent wharf had been leased to the National Molasses Company by Southern Pacific, which the court noted retained considerable control over the premises. Id. at 733 n.6. The master of a molasses boat lying alongside Southern Pacific’s wharf had requested a delivery of lube oil, and the men were delivering that lube oil on behalf of their employer when they attempted to cross the trestle. Id. The jury found liability against Southern Pacific, and we held on appeal that the jury properly determined that the men were invitees of Southern Pacific. We explained: Neither party contends that [the men] had Southern Pacific's actual invitation (or permission) to drive their truck onto the trestle. . . . Southern Pacific of course argues that it did not benefit from vehicle deliveries made over the trestle to ships tied at the wharf, but even if it did, that the usual inference of invitation was rebutted by its sporadic attempts to keep cars and trucks off the structure. We disagree. Under Louisiana law it is enough to create invitee status (1) that the injured person was never specifically warned to stay off the property and (2) that he was present for some purpose connected officers, crew . . . .” Section 5(c) provides: “The master, although appointed by the Owner, shall be under the general direction of the Charterer [OOSI] in regards to the employment of the vessel, agencies, or other arrangements, and shall not unreasonably refuse any request to undertake operations or carry out any order or direction specified by Charterer.” 6 No. 07-30112 with the defendant's business. There is no requirement of a tangible, immediate gain by the owner or occupier. Id. at 734 (emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted). The Arcement case is helpful to our application of the Louisiana common law definition of “invitee.” Here, OOSI provided the CAPE COOK to Williams specifically so that Williams could use it for painting and sandblasting operations. Brown was an employee of L&L Sandblasting, the company Williams hired to perform painting and sandblasting operations. OOSI therefore extended an implied invitation to—or at the very least did not countermand Williams’s invitation to—L&L Sandblasting and its employees to come aboard the CAPE COOK to perform that work. The fact that Williams may have also extended an invitation to Brown does not alter this analysis. In addition, Brown boarded the vessel to the mutual advantage of Brown (and L&L Sandblasting) and OOSI—Brown’s work was clearly “connected with” OOSI’s business of providing a vessel that would carry painting and sandblasting workers. The fact that Brown’s presence may have also been to Williams’s advantage and to Sea Mar’s advantage likewise does not alter this analysis. Consistent with Arcement, therefore, we hold that the district court correctly found that Brown was an invitee of OOSI.