Opinion ID: 1465114
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Stafford Act's Discretionary Function Exception

Text: We review a district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Stiles v. GTE Sw., Inc., 128 F.3d 904, 906 (5th Cir.1997). In our de novo review ..., we apply the same standard as does the district court.... Wagstaff v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 509 F.3d 661, 663 (5th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under our traditional explication of the standard applied by the district court, the district court has the power to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on any one of three separate bases: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir.1981). Here, the district court did not resolve any disputed facts, so we, as did the district court, consider the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true. Id. at 412. [O]ur review is limited to determining whether the district court's application of the law is correct and, to the extent its decision [was] based on undisputed facts, whether those facts are indeed undisputed. Id. at 413. We then ask if dismissal was appropriate. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991) (`accept[ing] all of the factual allegations in [the plaintiff's] complaint as true' and ask[ing] whether the allegations state a claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 540, 108 S.Ct. 1954)). We are asked to determine whether the United States has waived sovereign immunity for its agencies' decision not to fund the Parish's requested debris removal. Plaintiff bears the burden of showing Congress's unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (holding that the party asserting the jurisdiction of a federal court bears the burden); Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency of the U.S., 362 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir.2004) (The party claiming federal subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving it exists.); Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir.1981) (holding that, when faced with factual attack on federal court's subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction); accord Cole v. United States, 657 F.2d 107, 109 (7th Cir.1981) (A party who sues the United States has the burden of pointing to a congressional act that gives consent. (citing Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 82 S.Ct. 980, 8 L.Ed.2d 168 (1962))). At the pleading stage, plaintiff must invoke the court's jurisdiction by alleging a claim that is facially outside of the discretionary function exception. [3] The basic rule of federal sovereign immunity is that the United States cannot be sued at all without the consent of Congress. Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 287, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983); see also Williamson v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 815 F.2d 368, 373 (5th Cir.1987) (The doctrine of sovereign immunity is inherent in our constitutional structure and ... renders the United States [and] its departments ... immune from suit except as the United States has consented to be sued.). Because [s]overeign immunity is jurisdictional in nature, F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994), Congress's waiver of [it] must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text and will not be implied, Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996) (internal citation omitted); see also Petterway v. Veterans Admin. Hosp., 495 F.2d 1223, 1225 n. 3 (1974) (It is well settled ... that a waiver of sovereign immunity must be specific and explicit and cannot be implied by construction of an ambiguous statute.). Plaintiff argues that Congress waived sovereign immunity for its present claims in three statutes: the FTCA, the APA, and the Stafford Act. Plaintiff alleges a claim under the FTCA for wrongful denial of funding under the Stafford Act. The FTCA authorizes suits against the United States for damages arising from: injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Thus, the FTCA waives sovereign immunity and permits suits against the United States sounding in state tort for money damages. In re Supreme Beef Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 248, 252 (5th Cir.2006). As long as state tort law creates the relevant duty, the FTCA permits suit for violations of federal statutes and regulations. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 728 (5th Cir.1995) (en banc) ([T]he violation of a federal statute or regulation does not give rise to FTCA liability unless the relationship between the offending federal employee or agency and the injured party is such that the former, if a private person or entity, would owe a duty under state law to the latter in a nonfederal context. If the requisite relationship and duty exist, then the statutory or regulatory violation may constitute or be evidence of negligence in the performance of that state law duty.). [4] The FTCA, however, excepts discretionary functions and duties from this waiver of sovereign immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). This discretionary function exception provides that the waiver of sovereign immunity in § 1346(b) does not apply to: Any claim ... based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. Id. The discretionary function exception is thus a form of retained sovereign immunity. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 521 F.3d 169, 190 (2d Cir.2008). It `marks the boundary between Congress' willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire to protect certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals.' Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954 (quoting United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense ( Varig Airlines ), 467 U.S. 797, 808, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984)). It is intended to assure protection for the Government against tort liability for errors in administration or in the exercise of discretionary functions. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 26-27, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) (citation omitted). In this case, plaintiff alleges a claim under the FTCA for FEMA's purported wrongful denial of nondiscretionary funding of the Parish's requested debris removal. Plaintiff also brings a claim pursuant to the APA for improper rulemaking under the Stafford Act. The APA is a broadly applicable statute that undoubtedly evinces Congress' intention and understanding that judicial review should be widely available to challenge the actions of federal administrative officials. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). Section 702 of the APA authorizes suits against the United States through a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for relief other than money damages related to an agency's regulatory action. See 5 U.S.C. § 702. The APA, moreover, permits judicial review of claims for specific relief that result in the payment of money  such as a claim seeking a declaratory judgment ordering that an agency comply with a mandatory funding requirement  because such actions are not for money damages, in the form of compensation for a loss that the plaintiff has suffered or will suffer but for specific relief related to agency action. See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 893, 901, 108 S.Ct. 2722, 101 L.Ed.2d 749 (1988). However, the waiver does not apply to the extent that  (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). In this case, the Parish alleges that FEMA's denial of full funding for its requested debris removal violated the APA, see id. § 553, and the Stafford Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 5165c, by altering FEMA's policy without providing notice and an opportunity to be heard. Thus, plaintiff has alleged claims under two generally applicable statutes, the FTCA and the APA, for violations of the Stafford Act and its corresponding regulations. Although the Stafford Act does not contain a waiver of sovereign immunity, see Graham v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 149 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir.1998), it does contain a discretionary function exception to governmental liability nearly identical to the one contained in the FTCA. See 42 U.S.C. § 5148. The Stafford Act's discretionary function exception provides that the United States will not be liable for: [A]ny claim based upon the exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a Federal agency or an employee of the Federal Government in carrying out the provisions of this chapter. Id. The Stafford Act's discretionary function exception exists, despite the lack of an express waiver of sovereign immunity, to protect the government from liability for claims based on its discretionary conduct brought pursuant to the FTCA, APA, or other statutes of general applicability. [5] Nonetheless, this provision preclude[s] judicial review of all disaster relief claims based upon the discretionary actions of federal employees. Rosas v. Brock, 826 F.2d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir.1987). The government argues that the Stafford Act's discretionary function exception applies to the funding decisions that form the basis of the present claims. The Parish counters that it has alleged facts that give rise to a nondiscretionary duty to provide funding  i.e., one not sheltered by the discretionary function exception. The first contention between the parties thus is the meaning of the term discretionary function or duty within the Stafford Act's discretionary function exception. [6] Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has considered this question. Plaintiff argues that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the term discretionary function or duty under § 2680(a) of the FTCA applies to define the same term under § 5148 of the Stafford Act because of the near identical phrasing of the two provisions. For the first time on appeal and despite its success under the Parish's proposed definition in the district court, the government argues that the Stafford Act's structure and its extraordinary purpose dictate that its discretionary function exception applies more broadly. According to the government, any activity of the United States undertaken to carry out the provisions of the Stafford Act will necessarily trigger § 5148 Stafford Act immunity. Thus, the government now recommends interpreting § 5148 to bar claims with a propinquity to a disaster and a close substantive nexus to disaster assistance. [7] We hold that discretionary function or duty has the same meaning in § 5148 as it does in § 2680(a). We reach this conclusion because the relevant language of the two provisions is identical, because anecdotal evidence shows that Congress intended to incorporate § 2680(a)'s standard into § 5148, and because our sister courts of appeals and most district courts have looked to § 2680(a) case law when applying § 5148. Whatever the arguable differences between the two statutes, those differences are not at play here, and we conclude that the meaning of discretionary function or duty is the same under § 5148 and § 2680(a). The starting point in statutory interpretation is `the language [of the statute] itself.' United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 604, 106 S.Ct. 3116, 92 L.Ed.2d 483 (1986) (citation omitted, alteration in original), abrogated in non-relevant part by Central Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 121 S.Ct. 1005, 148 L.Ed.2d 919 (2001). We are bound to apply the plain language of the statute, especially where... there is nothing in the statute or its legislative history to indicate a contrary intent. In re DP Partners Ltd., 106 F.3d 667, 671 (5th Cir.1997). Moreover, as a matter of statutory interpretation, in determining the meaning of a particular statutory provision, it is helpful to consider the interpretation of other statutory provisions that employ the same or similar language. Flowers v. S. Reg'l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 233 n. 4 (5th Cir.2001) (citations omitted). We must nonetheless respect differences in the texts and the overall statutory schemes to ensure that the purposes of both acts are served by interpreting them in the same manner. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 189 (5th Cir.2003). In this case, the language of § 5148 of the Stafford Act mirrors that of § 2680(a) of the FTCA. Compare § 5148 (exempting claims based on the exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty), with § 2680(a) (exempting claims based on the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty). Both provisions prevent subject matter jurisdiction arising from the same type of conduct  a discretionary function or duty. Thus, we hold that the phrase discretionary function or duty has the same meaning under both statutes. Ancillary evidence supports our conclusion. To start, the legislative history suggests that the nearly identical statutory language is the result of Congress's intentional incorporation of § 2680(a) into the Stafford Act. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 521 F.3d at 189 & n. 22 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 81-2727, at 1, 7 (1950) (Letter from Frank Pace, Jr., Sec'y of the Army, to Hon. Will M. Whittington, Chairman, Comm. on Pub. Works, House of Representatives (June 7, 1950) (recording that the Department of Defense recommended amending an early draft of the Stafford Act to ensure that the Federal Government shall not be liable for claims based upon the exercise of or the failure to exercise a discretionary duty as provided in section 2680(a) of title 28, United States Code  (emphasis added)))). Moreover, our conclusion is in agreement with the other courts of appeals to consider the issue. See, e.g., id. at 189-93 ([W]e consider the policies for the FTCA discretionary function exception, and prior interpretations of that exception, for guidance on the nature of the Stafford Act discretionary function immunity.); Dureiko v. United States (Dureiko II), 209 F.3d 1345, 1351, 1353 (Fed.Cir.2000) (applying Supreme Court precedent interpreting § 2680(a) to resolve the applicability of § 5148); Graham, 149 F.3d at 1006 (same); Rosas, 826 F.2d at 1008-10 (same). [8] In this regard, the Second Circuit's discussion in In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation is particularly instructive. Considering whether the district court's holding that § 5148 did not provide immunity to suit was an appealable interlocutory order, the Second Circuit held: The Stafford Act is not the only federal statute that provides a discretionary function immunity. The [FTCA] also contains a discretionary function exception. The statutes employ practically identical language: both provide protection for the exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a [F]ederal agency or an employee of the [Federal] Government.... Furthermore, we have previously considered the FTCA in analyzing other discretionary function immunities. Finally, it appears that the discretionary function defense in the Stafford Act was based upon the discretionary function exception in the FTCA. Thus, we consider the policies for the FTCA discretionary function exception, and prior interpretations of that exception, for guidance on the nature of the Stafford Act discretionary function immunity. 521 F.3d at 188-89 (internal citations omitted, some alterations in original). In light of the similarity in the statutory texts and this persuasive precedent, we too consider the policies for the FTCA discretionary function exception, and prior interpretations of that exception, for guidance on the nature of the Stafford Act discretionary function immunity. Id. at 189. The government's counterarguments do not show that Congress intended a discretionary function or duty to have a different meaning in § 5148 than in § 2680(a). The government first attempts to distinguish the two provisions by noting that § 2680(a) is a passive exception to a waiver of sovereign immunity while § 5148 is an active prohibition against the imposition of liability based on a statute that does not contain an express waiver of sovereign immunity. This structural distinction, while relevant to the question of whether Congress waived sovereign immunity in the Stafford Act, does not answer the question at handwhat constitutes a discretionary function or duty. The government also attempts to distinguish the two statutes by reference to the few differences in the statutes' wordings. Where relevant, however, these differences support our holding. First, § 5148 contains the phrase in carrying out the provisions of this chapter; whereas, § 2680(a) applies to all discretionary conduct from the myriad substantive sources of FTCA liability. This distinction narrows the applicability of § 5148 to discretionary functions under the Stafford Act but, again, does not clarify the meaning of discretionary function or duty. Second, § 5148 bars [a]ny claim. Of course, § 2680(a) also mentions any claim, but it only applies to tort claims for monetary relief (the only available relief under the FTCA). Although § 5148 covers all types of claims brought with respect to the Stafford Act, it does not cover all conduct, and our goal here is to identify the discretionary conduct that it covers. This difference in statutory language is not inconsistent with our conclusion. This distinction, however, undermines the government's next argumentthat interpreting § 2680(a) and § 5148 consistently would render the latter superfluous. Under our construction and contrary to the government's assertion, because § 5148 applies to any claim, it has an independent operational effect beyond that of § 2680(a): Where § 5148 is applicable, the government retains sovereign immunity for claims that are based on discretionary functions or duties, whether alleged under the FTCA, see Dureiko I, 1996 WL 825402, ; cf. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324, 111 S.Ct. 1267; the APA, see Rosas, 826 F.2d at 1008; or, ostensibly, the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. § 601-613, cf. Dureiko II, 209 F.3d at 1353. [9] In support of its argument that § 5148 would be superfluous under our reading, the government contends that because the § 2680(a) existed at the time of the passage of the Stafford Act, Congress must have intended to provide § 5148 with a distinct meaning. Our conclusion that § 5148 is not superfluous nullifies this argument, and in any case, the legislative history does not support the government's position. The government offers the statement of Representative Whittington, Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on Public Works, during the House of Representative's floor debate on the Stafford Act: We have further provided that if the agencies of the Government make a mistake in the administration of the Disaster Relief Act that the Government may not be sued. Strange as it may seem, there are many suits pending in the Court of Claims today against the Government because of alleged mistakes made in the administration of other relief acts, suits aggregating millions of dollars because citizens have averred that the agencies and employees of Government made mistakes. We have put a stipulation in here that there shall be no liability on the part of the Government. 96 Cong. Rec. 11895, 11912 (1950); see also H.R.Rep. No. 81-2727, at 3 (report of Rep. Whittington) (summarizing that the proposed legislation contained an amendment to provide that the Federal Government shall not be liable for any claims based upon the proper exercise or performance of a function or duty on the part of any Federal agency or any employee of the Government in carrying out the provisions of the section). Placed in proper context and in light of the clear language of § 5148, this statement is unpersuasive. Representative Whittington made his statement immediately after the text of § 5148, including the phrase a discretionary function or duty, was read to the House of Representatives. 96 Cong. Rec. at 11912. Thus, Representative Whittington's statement was in the context of the proposed statute's discretionary language. In addition, earlier in the debate, Representative Whittington commented that the version presented for passage was amended to ensure that the Government shall not be liable for any claim based upon the performance, or the failure to perform, a discretionary function on the part of an agency or employee of the government. Id. at 11897 (emphasis added). Thus, Representative Whittington verbalized § 5148's focus on discretionary conduct. [10] Overall, Representative Whittington's comment and one sentence from the committee's report cannot fairly be construed to override the clear, unambiguous language of § 5148. Our construction of discretionary function or duty thus does not render § 5148 superfluous and promotes a consistent application of congressional language intended to the have the same meaning. We therefore reject the government's arguments and conclude that a discretionary function or duty has the same meaning within § 5148 as it does within § 2680(a). Thus, we will rely on precedent interpreting that phrase under § 2680(a).