Opinion ID: 2972365
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-Termination Hearing

Text: Moss also contends that his due process rights were violated because neither the MSCPA nor the Governor of Michigan in fact provided him with a post-termination hearing. We disagree. In order to qualify for the protections it provides to veterans, the Michigan VPA requires that a written protest against an adverse employment action be filed within thirty days of the challenged action: [When a] veteran has been removed, transferred, or suspended other than in accordance with the provisions of this act, he shall file a written protest with the officer whose duty under the provisions of this act it is to make the removal, transfer, or suspension, within 30 days from the day such veteran is removed, transferred, or 4 As Moss waived all rights available to him under the Michigan Veterans Preference Act (“Michigan VPA”) by failing to comply with the written-protest requirement, we need not address whether Moss’s positive test for marijuana metabolites was sufficient to support suspension or termination under the Michigan VPA. 8 suspended; otherwise the veteran shall be deemed to have waived the benefits and privileges of this act[.] MICH. COMP. LAWS § 35.402. Moss concedes that he did not file the required written protest within the statutory thirty-day period, but rather waited to do so until forty-two days after his dismissal. Appellant Br. at 52. Moss provides no explanation as to why he failed to file a written protest within the statutory period. Although there may be situations where a requirement of a written protest within a thirty-day period would violate Loudermill’s procedural mandate, see Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541, we see no reason to reach such a conclusion in this case. Absent any explanation of why Moss did not file a written protest within the thirty-day statutory period, we decline to hold that such a requirement violated his federal due process rights. Instead of providing such an explanation, Moss makes several arguments as to why the written-protest requirement should not bar his due process claim. These arguments are without merit. First, Moss contends that a violation of his due process rights was complete once MSCPA terminated him without providing “a proper pre-termination hearing,” Appellant Br. at 37, and it was accordingly not necessary for him to file a protest within the statutory period to preserve his federal due process claim. As we have determined above that Moss in fact received all pre-termination process that he was due, no violation of his due process rights occurred during the pre-termination proceedings. Second, Moss asserts that because both MSCPA and the Michigan Governor’s Office adopted the position that the Michigan VPA did not apply, a written protest was unnecessary. Had Moss filed a timely written protest, and had MSCPA and the Michigan Governor’s Office nonetheless refused to provide a post-termination hearing, we would then be called upon to determine whether the available state remedies were inadequate. However, we are not faced with 9 such a situation. Although both MSCPA and the Governor’s Office have asserted that they were not required to provide Moss with a Michigan VPA hearing, we can only speculate as to whether they would have maintained the same position if Moss had filed a timely written protest. Third, Moss contends that Michigan courts would not enforce the thirty-day statutory period as it would violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the Michigan Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. We are not convinced that the Michigan courts would have declined to enforce a requirement that Moss file a written protest within thirty days. Moss correctly points out that the Michigan Supreme Court has consistently refused to apply certain statutory notice requirements in personal-injury cases involving claims against the state highway department or county road commissions.5 However, Moss points to no authority — and we are aware of none — extending this skeptical view of notice requirements to the Michigan VPA’s written-protest requirement. Moreover, there is authority to the contrary. See Cook v. Jackson, 249 N.W. 619 (Mich. 1933) (holding that mandamus petitioner waived the benefits of an earlier version of the Michigan VPA when he filed a written protest two days after his discharge with the prison warden discharging him, 5 See generally Reich v. State Highway Dep’t, 194 N.W.2d 700, 702 (Mich. 1972) (holding that sixty-day notice requirement applicable to claims against only government tortfeasors violated state and federal Equal Protection Clauses); Carver v. McKernan, 211 N.W.2d 24, 26 (Mich. 1973) (holding that six-month notice requirement for claims against Motor Vehicle Accident Claim Fund would be enforced only on a showing that the government had been prejudiced by the failure to file timely notice); Hobbs v. Michigan State Highway Dep’t, 247 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Mich. 1976) (holding that 120-day notice period applicable to claims against government tortfeasors would be enforced only on a showing that government had been prejudiced by the failure to file notice); Brown v. Manistee County Road Comm’n, 550 N.W.2d 215, 221 (Mich. 1996) (reaffirming Hobbs and holding that sixty-day notice period for claims against county road commissions violated equal protection when 120-day notice period applied to similar claims against other political subdivisions of the state). But see Forest v. Parmalee, 262 N.W.2d 653, 657 (Mich.1978) (upholding two-year statute of limitations for claims against government tortfeasors despite three-year statute of limitations applicable to claims against private tortfeasors). 10 but failed to file a protest with the governor within thirty days); Sherrod v. Detroit, 625 N.W.2d 437, 443 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that thirty-day written-protest requirement “is akin to a preservation requirement in that the employee must either file a written protest within the specified period or waive the privileges of the [Michigan] VPA”) (citing Cook, 249 N.W. 619); cf. Glover v. City of Kalamazoo, 296 N.W.2d 280, 282 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (treating the thirty-day writtenprotest requirement as generally applicable, but finding that it was tolled during the period of time that criminal proceedings were pending against the plaintiff). Accordingly, we decline to hold that the Michigan courts would generally fail to enforce the Michigan VPA written-protest requirement. Cf. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 27-28 (1989) (upholding 60-day notice provision in federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, and explaining that “[t]he equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory requirements when the procedural default is caused by petitioners’ failure to take the minimal steps necessary to preserve their claims.”); Coal Operators & Assocs., Inc. v. Babbitt, 291 F.3d 912, 917 (6th Cir. 2002) (“In this case, plaintiffs failed to comply with [federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977] notice provision and, since such notice provisions delimit the extent to which the sovereign has waived immunity, they cannot rely upon this section as a means of obtaining jurisdiction.”); Bd. of Tr. of Painesville Township v. City of Painesville, 200 F.3d 396, 400 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that compliance with notice provision in the federal Clean Water Act “is a jurisdictional prerequisite to recovery under the statute”). 11