Opinion ID: 150927
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant's Sentencing Based on Drug Quantity Responsibility

Text: When sentencing a participant in a drug-trafficking conspiracy, the district court must make an individualized finding concerning the quantity of drugs attributable to, or reasonably foreseeable by, the offender. Cintrón-Echautegui, 604 F.3d at 5 (citation omitted). Where, as here, a defendant admits that the conspiracy to which he belonged handled drug quantities sufficient to trigger a mandatory minimum sentence, he becomes potentially eligible for the mandatory minimum  but that provision cannot be applied in his case without an individualized finding that the triggering amount was attributable to, or foreseeable by, him. United States v. Colón-Solís, 354 F.3d 101, 103 (1st Cir.2004). Because the question of whether the district court's drug quantity determination was based on an individualized determination or not presents a question of law, our review is de novo. If, however, the district court has engaged in an individualized determination, our review is for clear error. Cintrón-Echautegui, 604 F.3d at 5 (citation omitted). The sentencing court must determine drug quantity only by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 6. A finding of drug quantity need not be exact so long as the approximation represents a reasoned estimate of actual quantity. In making such a reasoned estimate, the court is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from information contained in the sentencing record. Id. at 6-7 (citations omitted).
In entering a straight guilty plea, Appellant admits that the conspiracy as a whole, though not he himself individually, handled more than 4.5 kilograms of cocaine. Appellant's contention, however, that the district court used the conspiracy-wide findings to sentence Appellant is without merit. [9] The district court made an individualized drug finding as to Appellant's accountability and correctly stated that this individualized calculation has been extremely conservative. The district court assumed that Appellant sold 200 capsules per shift, during one shift, three times a week, for a total of 600 capsules per week. The district court's determination of the frequency with which Appellant worked was a reasonable inference from information contained in the sentencing record. Appellant admitted to working one shift a week. The district court reasonably inferred, from the fact that Las Avispas Dos operated continuously and the lack of credibility Appellant exhibited on other issues, [10] that Appellant worked more times per week than he admitted. The district court's determination of the number of capsules per shift Appellant sold was also a reasonable inference from information contained in the sentencing record. Appellant admitted to selling drugs during evening shifts. The district court reasonably inferred, from its conclusion that Las Avispas Dos could sell 700 capsules of crack cocaine during evening shifts and that multiple individuals operated as sellers simultaneously, that Appellant sold about one-quarter of the full amount Las Avispas Dos sold during the shift to which Appellant admitted working. These reasonable inferences make this an individualized finding specific to Appellant as well as different than the conspiracy-wide calculation. Although Appellant's individualized drug quantity determination yields the same base offense level as the conspiracy-wide amount because under the Sentencing Guidelines any amount over 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine would trigger a base offense level of 38, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1), the district court did indeed perform a separate calculation specific to Appellant himself. As the PSI Report noted, the sentencing court could have linked defendant to the full crack cocaine amount of the conspiracy, 109 kilograms of cocaine base, by applying U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), under which a defendant engaged in jointly undertaken criminal activity may be sentenced for all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken activity. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A); Cintrón-Echautegui, 604 F.3d at 5. As we stated in the companion case, Cintrón-Echautegui: In this instance, the court derived its drug quantity determination by making plausible extrapolations from the available information. The court used the average drug weight per capsule suggested by the scientific evidence and the average drug sales per shift suggested by the cooperating witness to arrive at a sensible starting point. 604 F.3d at 7. In sum, under de novo review, we determine that the district court made an individualized determination, and we do not find that the district court clearly erred in calculating Appellant's sentence according to the Sentencing Guidelines to determine that Appellant was individually responsible for at least 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine. Appellant's first claim of error thus fails.