Opinion ID: 1926324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Collateral Appeal Motion for New Trial

Text: Gaither and the government agree that the court applied an incorrect legal standard to Gaither's Brady claims when it applied the Manson v. Brathwaite [10] test for determining the admissibility of identification testimony. Nevertheless, each urges that this court can reverse or affirm on the undisputed facts before it. Gaither argues that he is entitled to a new trial because, based on undisputed facts, the government withheld evidence that materially impeached Fennel, the government's principal witness. The government contends that the record before the court is sufficient to affirm Gaither's conviction because the motions court did not credit Fennel's recantation and that an acquittal would not likely result from a jury's consideration of the claimed newly-discovered evidence, given that Fennel was soundly impeached at trial and any newly-discovered evidence was merely further impeachment material. Alternatively, both Gaither and the government agree that a remand is necessary should we conclude that the findings are insufficient to affirm or reverse. We conclude that a remand is necessary. A violation of due process under Brady occurs when the prosecution fails to disclose, before or during trial, evidence favorable to the defense, see Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194; see also Black v. United States, 755 A.2d 1005, 1010 (D.C.App.2000), and there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); see also Black, at 1010. A reasonable probability of a different result exists when the government's evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); see also Farley v. United States, 694 A.2d 887, 889 (D.C.1997). Impeachment evidence... as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within the Brady rule. Such evidence is evidence favorable to an accused, so that, if disclosed and used effectively, it may make the difference between conviction and acquittal. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (citations and quotations omitted); see also Coleman v. United States, 515 A.2d 439, 448 (D.C.1986). In his motion for a new trial Gaither identified a number of items of impeachment evidence the cumulative effect of which, he argued, warranted a new trial. See supra part I.C. The court made a limited number of findings regarding this evidence, finding that there was no evidence that Fennel told prosecutors he could not identify the killer or that prosecutors knew Fennel was on drugs or stealing witness vouchers during and shortly after the trial. [11] Although it is clear that the court found Fennel's recantation of his identification of Gaither to be incredible, it is not clear from a reading of the order denying Gaither's new trial motion that the court completely rejected other aspects of Fennel's testimony. For instance, the motions court did not reject Fennel's allegation that the prosecutors engaged in suggestive conduct when Fennel identified Gaither. Rather, because its analysis was concerned with credibility, the motions judge ignored the Brady consequences of Fennel's testimony, simply noting that [e]ven giving [Fennel] the benefit of the doubt as to his allegations of suggestive conduct . . . the Court is persuaded that Fennel was not misdirected to an identification he could not make. We do not read this as a finding that there was no suggestive procedure, nor can we infer that, even if there was a suggestive procedure, the motions court determined that the government's failure to disclose it did not undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 445, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (noting that Brady evidence can be used to attack the thoroughness and even the good faith of the investigation). The court also made no finding concerning Gaither's claim that the government improperly paid Fennel to appear at the United States Attorney's Office on ten to twenty occasions, which the government claimed were for witness preparation. At the new trial motion hearing, Fennel testified that he was compensated through the United States Marshal's Service for daily voluntary appearances at the United States Attorney's Office for the month. . . two weeks, two [weeks;] it might be longer, at a time other than when he was under subpoena. The government concedes that if Fennel's testimony is credited in this regard, the government paid Fennel daily for between two weeks and one month for appearing at the United States Attorney's Office, not for witness fees. [12] The motions court, however, made no findings concerning the extent of these payments, [13] as well as the prosecutor's loan, and other favors perceived by Fennel. Nor did the motions court apply the ultimate test for Brady evidence, by considering the probability of whether evidence of improper suggestions and payments by the government to Fennel would materially influence the jury's assessment of Fennel, a witness whom the motions court judged to be a very fluid individual in the sense that he goes with the flow, whatever it may be, and is anything but a principled human being. [14] Rather, the motions court observed that [e]ven if accepted as true ... [the] one-day loan to Fennel of $100, free lunches, and promises of help and friendship are not matters the government is obliged to disclose under Brady . . . [unless] Fennel's recantation is believed. In conducting our review of appellant's Brady claims, we rely on findings of fact made by the trial court, and it is useful to have the trial court's assessment of the alleged Brady material because the trial judge was on the scene. He was in a far better position than we are to assess the atmospherics of the case and determine whether the failure to disclose materially prejudiced the defendant. Edelen v. United States, 627 A.2d 968, 972 (D.C.1993). [15] Consequently, we remand for the court to make complete findings of fact and to apply the correct legal standard to its findings.
Gaither also argues that the motions judge applied the wrong legal standard to his motion for a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence, because the motions judge restricted himself to consideration of the credibility of Fennel's recantation, but failed to consider whether other newly-discovered evidence required a new trial. Although Gaither does not challenge the court's finding that Fennel's recantation was incredible, [16] Gaither claims that the motions court failed to make findings as to the other newly-discovered evidence alleged in his motion for a new trial: The prerequisites for granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are that: (1) the evidence must be newly discovered; (2) the moving party must show diligence in efforts to procure the new evidence; (3) the material must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) it must be material to the issues involved; and (5) of such a nature that an acquittal would likely result from its use. Byers v. United States, 649 A.2d 279, 287 (D.C.1994); see also ( Joel) Smith v. United States, 466 A.2d 429, 432-33 (D.C.1983). The court will carefully scrutinize the offer of evidence from one who has little to fear in offering exculpatory evidence. Cf. Byers v. United States, 649 A.2d 279, 287 (D.C.1994) (co-defendant has little to fear in attempting to exculpate others after conviction). Each case ... must be judged on its own particular facts. Prophet v. United States, 707 A.2d 775, 778 (D.C.1998). The decision to deny the motion is within the trial court's discretion, and we review for abuse of that discretion. See Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314, 1339 (D.C.1985), cert. denied sub nom. Grayson v. United States, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1738, 100 L.Ed.2d 201 (1988). The motions court's order sets out the correct legal standard for granting a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence, but primarily considered whether the recantation qualified as newly-discovered evidence warranting a new trial. Having found Fennel's recantation to be incredible, and his identification of Gaither reliable, the motions court dismissed the claim that Assistant United States Attorney L. Jackson Thomas, II, manipulated Fennel into giving false testimony. The trial court also found that Fennel's testimony alleging improper manipulation by the prosecutor was undermined by his recantation testimony that the prosecutor always wanted me to tell the truth. The court did not make specific findings, however, concerning Gaither's remaining claims of newly-discovered evidence, specifically, that Fennel was on drugs during the incident and at trial, falsely testified about where he saw the bullets hit the decedent, illegally obtained duplicate vouchers, and lied to the trial judge concerning his tardiness at trial which he claimed resulted from a threat against his niece because of his testimony against Gaither. The government argues that we need not remand for findings to dispose of the new trial motion because the proffered evidence fails the legal prerequisite that the evidence must not merely be ... impeaching. Byers, 649 A.2d at 287. We agree that each of the remaining claims speak to Fennel's credibility and are thus impeachment evidence. At trial Fennel was impeached with the discrepancy in the sign-in sheets to the halfway house on the night of the murder, numerous previous convictions, differences between his grand jury, pre-trial and trial testimony, the possibility of bias resulting from government assistance with pending charges, and the circumstances surrounding his original identification of Gaither. Given the scope of this impeachment, we conclude that the alleged newly-discovered evidence, even if credited, is impeachment evidence not of such a nature that an acquittal would likely result from its use. Id. Because Gaither's proffered evidence fails the third and fifth requirements for a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence, there is no need to remand for further consideration of Gaither's new evidence claims. Accordingly, we affirm in part and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. So ordered.