Opinion ID: 1890662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Return of Contribution

Text: After revoking Mr. DiPrete's retirement benefits, the trial justice granted Mr. DiPrete's request to have his retirement contributions returned to him in their entirety. Section 36-10.1-4(a) requires the return of contributions when a public official/employee's retirement benefits have been entirely revoked. Section 36-10.1-4(a) provides: Any public official or public employee whose retirement or other benefits or payments are revoked pursuant to this chapter shall be entitled to a return of his or her contribution paid into the relevant pension fund(s), without interest. Applying this language literally, the trial justice entered judgment in favor of Mr. DiPrete in the amount of $42,066.17, which represents the total amount that he contributed to the state's retirement system. Although the General Assembly directs that the entire pension contribution be returned to the miscreant in the case of total revocation, it clearly and unambiguously called for the pro rata return of contribution in the event of a pension reduction. Section 36-10.1-4(b). Because a portion of the revoked benefits may be awarded to Mrs. DiPrete, the return of contribution provision outlined in § 36-10.1-4(a) no longer applies. Rather, the return of contributions should be made in accordance with § 36-10.1-4(b), which applies when retirement benefits have been reduced. Section 36-10.1-4(b) directs that any public official/employee whose benefits are reduced shall be entitled to a pro rata return of a portion of his or her contribution paid into the relevant pension fund(s) in an amount proportionate to the amount of any such reduction, without interest. Clearly, a partial continuation of benefits awarded to an innocent spouse constitutes a reduction for purposes of § 36-10.1-4(b). Therefore, § 36-10.1-4(b) applies to the issue before us, and the calculation of benefits that shall be returned to Mr. DiPrete shall be made in accordance with that section. The Retirement Board presents two arguments opposing the return of any portion of Mr. DiPrete's retirement contributions. First, apparently inspired by Mr. DiPrete's tax argument discussed above, the Retirement Board contends that any return of contributions provided for in § 36-10.1-4 is superseded by § 36-8-20 because such a return threatens the tax benefits otherwise available to Rhode Island's retirement system. This argument, however, was raised for the first time at oral argument and is consequently waived. See Bowen Court Associates v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 818 A.2d 721, 728 (R.I.2003) (holding that a party's failure to include a particular issue in his, her, or its brief on appeal results in a waiver of that issue). Although that argument is waived, based on our disposal of Mr. DiPrete's related tax argument, we reiterate our skepticism of any claim that any provision of PEPRRA has been superseded by § 36-8-20. Second, the Retirement Board avers that a return of contributions is not appropriate if the public official/employee already has collected pension payments in excess of his or her contributions before the benefits were revoked. [15] The General Assembly, however, failed to include such a provision in § 36-10.1-4. It is worth repeating that, when a statute expresses a clear and unambiguous meaning, the task of interpretation is at an end and this [C]ourt will apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the words set forth in the statute. State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776, 779 (R.I.1996). `If the language is clear on its face, then the plain meaning of the statute must be given effect' and this Court should not look elsewhere to discern the legislative intent. Henderson v. Henderson, 818 A.2d 669, 673 (R.I.2003) (quoting Fleet National Bank v. Clark, 714 A.2d 1172, 1177 (R.I.1998)). When a statutory provision is unambiguous, there is no room for statutory construction and we must apply the statute as written. In re Denisewich, 643 A.2d 1194, 1197 (R.I. 1994). Section 36-10.1-4 does not, as the Retirement Board argues, limit the amount of contributions that shall be returned depending on a particular amount that the public official/employee may have collected before the pension was disturbed. Although the General Assembly could enact such a limiting provision, it did not. We shall not interpret a statute to include a matter omitted unless the clear purpose of the legislation would fail without the implication. State v. Feng, 421 A.2d 1258, 1264 (R.I.1980). According to the Retirement Board, the purpose behind § 36-10.1-4 was to avoid potential takings claims and to minimize the inequity of revoking an individual's pension while retaining his or her contributions. Accepting this statement as true, the purpose behind § 36-10.1-4 would not fail in the absence of an implied limitation that contributions shall not be returned if the individual has already collected in excess of his or her contributions. The Retirement Board cites other statutory provisions to demonstrate how § 36-10.1-4 should be applied. Specifically, it cites G.L.1956 § 36-10-23(a), which provides that upon death a benefit shall be payable consisting of the excess    of the total contributions of the member at the date of retirement, without interest, over the aggregate amount of all retirement allowance payments received by the member prior to his or her death. The language in § 36-10-23, however, only strengthens our conclusion. If the General Assembly intended to limit the return of contributions in the manner advocated by the Retirement Board, PEPRRA would have included language similar to the language contained in § 36-10-23. It did not. Based on the express language of § 36-10.1-4(b), the retirement contributions paid by Mr. DiPrete shall be returned to him in an amount inversely proportionate to the amount awarded to Mrs. DiPrete.