Opinion ID: 2708540
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deliberate or Reckless Disregard of Truth

Text: Glover’s second argument is more persuasive. The government’s response to Glover’s motion to suppress revealed Doe’s history as an informant, his multiple convictions, his prior gang affiliation, his use of aliases, and his interest in being paid for useful information. Glover renewed his request for a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), to determine whether the officer acted with reckless disregard for the truth by omitting the credibility information from the probable cause affidavit. To obtain a Franks hearing, the defendant must make a “substantial preliminary showing” of (1) a material falsity or omission that No. 13-2475 13 would alter the probable cause determination, and (2) a deliberate or reckless disregard for the truth. See United States v. McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2013). This is a burden of production. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is not required until the Franks hearing itself. Id. at 509. In this case, the omitted credibility information was clearly material for the reasons laid out above. Its omission undermined the issuing magistrate’s role in the probable cause determination. Only the inquiry into the officer’s state of mind remains. To meet his burden on that element, the defendant must offer direct evidence of the affiant’s state of mind or circumstantial evidence that the affiant had a subjective intent to deceive based on the nature of the omissions. See United States v. McNeese, 901 F.2d 585, 594 (7th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds, as recognized by United States v. Westmoreland, 240 F.3d 618, 632–33 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. A Residence Located at 218 Third Street, 805 F.2d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 1986). In denying Glover’s request for a Franks hearing, the district court made two errors. It found “no evidence that Officer Brown recklessly omitted any information he believed was material to the question of probable cause.” United States v. Glover, 2013 WL 788081, at  (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2013). The district court also noted a lack of evidence that the officer even prepared the affidavit—“in our experience it is the assistant state’s attorney who prepares the affidavit, not the police officer.” Id. The district court did not show that it considered whether the credibility omissions themselves, even in the absence of more direct evidence of the officer’s state of mind, provide 14 No. 13-2475 sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a reasonable and thus permissible inference of reckless disregard for the truth. We hold that they do. Although we credit the officer for having Doe appear at the probable cause hearing, that fact does not undermine the inference of recklessness arising from the withheld information. To hold otherwise would place a substantial burden on magistrates to double-check the availability or lack of all relevant information every time an informant appears. An officer’s omission from the probable cause affidavit of known and substantial adverse information about the informant’s credibility is sufficient to support a reasonable inference of recklessness, requiring that Glover’s request for a Franks hearing be granted. The district court’s observation that the officer may not have actually prepared the affidavit also put an improper burden on Glover, for two reasons. First, the identity of the preparer does not change the good faith analysis in this case. No matter who drafted the affidavit, the officer signed it under oath. He is responsible for its contents, and a misrepresentation made by one government agent (as opposed to a non-governmental informant) is not cleansed by another government agent’s sworn signature on the affidavit. See United States v. McAllister, 18 F.3d 1412, 1417 (7th Cir. 1994). The same reasoning applies to a deceptive omission. Second, to obtain a Franks hearing, the defendant need not overcome the court’s speculation regarding an innocent explanation for the falsity or omission. While reasonable explanations for the omission of the information might well exist, the defendant need not disprove them before the Franks hearing itself. See McMurtrey, 704 F.3d at 509. If a defendant falls short of the showing required for a Franks hearNo. 13-2475 15 ing, the district court has discretion to hold a “pre-Franks hearing” for the defendant to supplement his submissions. The government’s explanation of discrepancies raised by the defense must wait for the Franks hearing itself, however, where the defendant has the opportunity for full crossexamination. Id. The district court erred here by offering its own explanation for the omissions and relying on that explanation to deny a Franks hearing. The government argues that the good faith exception should apply here based on United States v. Taylor, 471 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Williams, 718 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2013). In Taylor, the attesting officer described the informant as a “concerned citizen” and referred to his assistance in past investigations, but the officer omitted the informant’s criminal background and receipt of cash payments. 471 F.3d at 840. The district court found that the officer did not intend to mislead the issuing judge, and we af- firmed. Id. at 836, 840. In Williams, we affirmed a finding that a police officer did not recklessly deceive the warrantissuing judge when he described the informant’s recent crim- inal activity but did not mention that he was under arrest when he provided the information. 718 F.3d at 653. We agree that Officer Brown’s omission of information about Doe’s credibility was similar to the omissions of information in both Taylor and Williams. But both cases are readily distinguishable from Glover’s case because the findings in both cases were made after the Franks hearings, which were needed because the defendants came forward with evidence sufficient to permit an inference of deliberate or reckless omission. See Williams, 718 F.3d at 653; Taylor, 471 F.3d at 836. The findings in those cases received deference because 16 No. 13-2475 the district courts properly held the required Franks hearings. Finally, the government argues that the officer might have omitted the information to protect Doe’s identity. Such an explanation may be offered at a Franks hearing, but the mere assertion of that rationale is not enough to avoid the hearing. See McMurtrey, 704 F.3d at 509. The government later provided the information about Doe to Glover in its response to his motion to suppress in the trial court. This later disclosure tends to suggest that withholding the information was not necessary to protect Doe’s identity, or perhaps that the other details in the affidavit had already been sufficient to identify him. But these are matters to be tested in a Franks hearing based on evidence, not resolved on appeal by our speculation. On remand the government may provide a satisfactory explanation for the omission of the damaging information about the informant’s credibility, but Glover is entitled to test its explanation. We therefore REVERSE the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress and REMAND for a Franks hearing.