Opinion ID: 2402880
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the hearing before the planning board.

Text: Section 4 of the act, N.J.S.A. 40:55-21.4, directs the planning board to cause a hearing to be held at a fixed time and place to hear persons interested in, or who would be affected by, a determination that the area is a blighted area,    and who favor or are against such a determination. Public notice of the hearing is required to be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality and a copy thereof must be mailed to the last owner of each parcel of property in the area according to the assessment records. The notice must contain the general boundaries of the area to be investigated, and must state that a map showing such boundaries and the location of the various parcels of property included therein has been prepared and can be inspected at the office of the municipal clerk. The objection is advanced that the public notice employed in this instance contained some additional material not required by the statute and that the proof does not show the preparation and filing of the map mentioned. But the surplus information did not destroy the efficacy of the otherwise satisfactory notice. And the record amply demonstrates the presence of the map in the clerk's office prior to the time of the giving of the notice. The nature of the hearing is specifically prescribed. The board is required to hear all persons interested in the investigation and shall consider any, and all, written objections that may be filed and any evidence which may be adduced in support of the objections, or any opposition to a determination that the area is a blighted area. N.J.S.A. 40:55-21.6. (Emphasis added) Plaintiffs assert that this section confers on them the right to a judicial hearing, that is, one where the proof is formally introduced subject to trial type examination and cross-examination. And they claim that it was prejudicially erroneous for the board to receive reports, maps and documents ex parte, and to make their own inspections of the area without specifically stating at open hearing and for the record what their observations disclosed. Further, they urge that it was improper to announce at the hearings that the board had no subpoena power, that persons subpoenaed by plaintiffs did not have to testify unless they wished to do so, and that persons who did make statements did not have to submit to cross-examination. And they insist, finally, that it was error to refuse to require the planning consultant who had prepared the principal report in the case to return for further cross-examination by counsel for certain of the property owners where the hearing adjourned at the end of the particular session before the examination to which he had submitted had been completed. It will be observed that the function of a planning board is to make a preliminary investigation, to determine if the area studied is blighted, and to report to the governing body. Final decision, both as to the condition of blight and as to whether the property in the area should be taken, rests with the latter body. No authority is given to the board to subpoena or to swear witnesses. They are directed to consider any and all written objections that may be filed. There is no legislative requirement that such persons must appear at the hearing or submit to cross-examination. Hearsay statements which need not be under oath and which are not required to contain information of their own knowledge, must be consider[ed]. Any conceivable document, map, article or photograph might be incorporated therein. In this context a distinction must be recognized between a legislative investigation and hearing and a judicial hearing. No adjudication of property rights is called for here nor is there any taking of property involved. There is simply preliminary investigation and report by a subordinate agency of government. These are typical of the legislative process. The situation is somewhat similar, although not even as proximate in terms of due process requirements, to that presented when a public body undertakes to exercise the right of eminent domain. In such cases, although the issue of whether the property acquisition is for public use is a judicial question, the necessity for the taking and the extent of the area to be taken are legislative matters for which no trial type hearing is required. In Ryan v. Housing Authority of City of Newark, supra , where it was claimed that the decision to take certain property in condemnation proceedings for public housing purposes without hearing was violative of due process, the court said: Where the intended use is public, the necessity and expediency of the taking may be determined by such agency and in such mode as the state may designate. They are legislative questions, no matter who may be charged with their decision, and a hearing thereon is not essential to due process in the sense of the Fourteenth Amendment. 125 N.J.L. at page 341. Such questions are purely political and are not the subject of judicial inquiry. Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 709, 43 S.Ct. 689, 67 L.Ed. 1186 (1923); Dayton Coal & Iron Co. v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P.R. Co., 239 U.S. 446, 36 S.Ct. 137, 60 L.Ed. 375 (1915); City of Trenton v. Lenzner, supra, 16 N.J. at page 473; Abbotts Dairies v. Armstrong, 14 N.J. 319, 332 (1954); State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 504, 523 ( E. & A. 1935); Zurn v. City of Chicago, supra . It seems plain that so far as the investigation of the matter of blight is concerned, the demands of due process did not call for a hearing at all. David Jeffrey Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 267 Wis. 559, 66 N.W. 2 d 362, 380 ( Sup. Ct. 1954); Robinette v. Chicago Land Clearance Commission, 115 F. Supp. 669, 672 ( D.C. Ill. 1951). That determination might constitutionally have been left for ex parte action by the governing body or the planning board. Of course, the Legislature in its discretion may, as was done here, lay down a mandate for a particular type of hearing. In this event, the procedure must be followed. But having in mind the nature of the public use involved and the fact that ordinarily the subject matter of the hearing is within the legislative domain, the language employed should be scrutinized carefully to determine if the lawmakers intended to yield the normal prerogative and function of their branch of the government. The argument that a trial type hearing was intended is predicated largely upon the direction, in section 6, supra, that among other factors, the board shall consider    any evidence which may be adduced in support of the objections,   . The idea is that the word evidence connotes proof conforming to the rules of evidence applicable to a judicial proceeding and submitted through the avenue of direct and cross examination in the formal setting of a trial type hearing. But a doctrinaire formalism cannot be applied in the consideration of a problem like this. The legislative intent can only be gathered by a study of the entire enactment. The significance of the word evidence must then be drawn from its position and association in the framework fashioned by the makers. As has been shown above, investigation or study of the desirability of acquiring private property for public use, as well as the decision to take, are preliminary matters which have always been regarded as legislative in character and not subject to the hearing requirements of due process. If this were not so, government could not function effectively. We must assume that the Legislature, in adopting the Blighted Area Act, knew the state of the law and the difference between a legislative and a judicial hearing. No sound argument can be made that, when the Legislature in writing the section directed the planning board to consider any, and all, written objections that may be filed, it intended to limit the proof to facts admissible under the rules of evidence. The very words any, and all, clearly point away from such a conclusion. The mandate to consider such objections is followed immediately by the crucial language and [shall consider] any evidence which may be adduced   . In context, it would be inconsistent and illogical to say that this clause contemplates a judicial hearing. The embracive word any before evidence manifests a design to permit the introduction of any factual data or argument which an objector feels bears upon his position and the question to be reported upon by the board. The purpose is to give objecting property owners unlimited and unhampered scope in the presentation of material which they deem to be in support of their opposition. The language fairly breathes such an objective. Note that the board is ordered to consider any and all written objections and any evidence which may be adduced in support of the objections.  The imposition of a duty on a legislative agency to receive and consider evidence in connection with a hearing provided for in a statute, does not per se signify that the hearing is to be of the trial type. For example, in Norwegian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 53 S.Ct. 350, 354, 77 L.Ed. 796 (1933), a source case in this field of the law, such was the holding. In that case it appeared that the Tariff Act of 1922 authorized the President to increase or decrease the rates of duty specified in the act if he found upon investigation that such action was necessary to equalize the difference in the cost of production in the United States and elsewhere. After prescribing certain factors to be considered, Congress provided also that no proclamation should be issued until an investigation to assist the President had been made by the United States Tariff Commission, which was authorized to adopt such reasonable procedure, rules and regulations as it deemed necessary. The act contained a mandate also that the commission shall give reasonable public notice of its hearings, and shall give reasonable opportunity to parties interested to be present, to produce evidence, and to be heard. (Emphasis added.) The Tariff Commission gave public notice that it would conduct an investigation as to the differences in cost of producing sodium nitrate in this country and elsewhere, and that it would hold a public hearing thereon on the date fixed in the notice. The investigation was made and considerable confidential data obtained from the principal domestic producers as to their production costs. At the public hearing, Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co., a corporation of Norway, demanded that all such data be submitted to it for study, that the investigators working for the Commission be required to produce them or be cross-examined about them. The Commission refused but said that as to all the subjects of inquiry Norwegian would be permitted to offer any evidence it was able to present, and to be heard in oral and written argument thereon. Norwegian then declined to offer any testimony. Subsequently, a report was made to the President and as the result he ordered an increase in the rate. Thereafter, the validity of the increases was attacked on an allegation that the type of hearing called for by the statute was not granted. The court held to the contrary, Justice Cardozo saying: What is done by the Tariff Commission and the President in changing the tariff rates to conform to new conditions is in substance a delegation, though a permissible one, of the legislative process.    The inference is, therefore, a strong one that the kind of hearing assured by the statute to those affected by the change is a hearing of the same order as had been given by congressional committees when the legislative process was in the hands of Congress and no one else. To be sure there has been a change of sanction. What was once a mere practice has been converted into a legal privilege. But the limits of the privilege were not meant to be greatly different from those of the ancient practice that has shaped the course of legislation. 288 U.S. at page 305, 53 S.Ct. at page 354. Nothing in the statute suggests a belief of the lawmakers that every producer or importer was to be viewed, like a party to a lawsuit, as the adversary of every other, with the privilege of examination and cross-examination extended through the series. `There must be a limit to individual argument in such matters if government is to go on.' Holmes, J., in Bi-Metallic Invest. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445, 60 L.Ed. 372 [375], 36 S.Ct. 141. 288 U.S. at page 308, 53 S.Ct. at page 355. The Tariff Commission advises; these others ordain. There is indeed this common bond that all alike are instruments in a governmental process which according to the accepted classification is legislative, not judicial.    Whatever the appropriate label, the kind of order that emerges from a hearing before a body with power to ordain is one that impinges upon legal rights in a very different way from the report of a commission which merely investigates and advises. The traditionary forms of hearing appropriate to the one body are unknown to the other. What issues from the Tariff Commission as a report and recommendation to the President, may be accepted, modified, or rejected. If it happens to be accepted, it does not bear fruit in anything that trenches upon legal rights. 288 U.S. at page 318, 53 S.Ct. at page 359. The statute of New Jersey, N.J.S.A. 4:12 A -1 et seq., authorizing the Director of the Milk Control Board to fix prices of milk, was the subject of the litigation in Abbotts Dairies v. Armstrong, supra . Section 23 thereof ordained that before fixing prices, the Director should give public notice, conduct a public hearing, and issue findings of fact and an order based upon the evidence adduced at said hearing. These are more stringent hearing regulations than those now before the court. But the hearing was recognized as legislative in character and no intimation appears in the opinion that the right of cross-examination was conferred thereby on interested persons. 14 N.J. at page 332. The authorities to which reference has been made, as well as the specific wording of the statute, lead irresistibly to the conclusion that the hearing provided for was legislative in character and that cross-examination of persons who appeared and made statements was not a matter of right. They are convincing also as to the absence of any right or duty on the part of the planning board to issue subpoenas for witnesses or to require those desiring to be heard to be sworn. The hearings held by the board were marked by repeated announcements from the chairman that anyone who wished to speak for or against the determination of blight would be heard. Twenty-five persons were heard, most of them being property owners of the area. A large number of photographs showing existing conditions of vacant land and residences and other types of structures were introduced. One was a large aerial photograph of the area; many of them were produced by the objecting property owners showing their own homes. A series of maps were produced showing (a) land use in the entire city, (b) topography of the project area, (c) housing conditions, (d) undeveloped land, (e) land not properly utilized, (f) extent of blighting factors, and (g) tax delinquent land, in the project area. Presented also was the elaborate report of the planning consultant who made a study of the conditions in the area with respect to blight. A number of letters of objectors were likewise introduced. It is not suggested that the appellants were not given ample opportunity to examine these various documents or to introduce evidence in refutation. However, they furnished no expert witness or report from such person in opposition to the findings of the expert engaged by the housing authority of the city. The latter expert, whose detailed report was marked in evidence, made a statement generally outlining its scope. Then he submitted to cross-examination by appellants' counsel for about 4 1/2 hours on two separate occasions. The rigorous questioning covers 113 pages of the stenographic transcript. On the third hearing date, he refused to appear further. Having in mind the legislative character of the proceedings, such failure did not invalidate the final action of the board.