Opinion ID: 1392571
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: guilt phase ( brady motion)

Text: Plea bargaining is recognized as a legitimate exercise of a prosecutor's discretion; and it is not unusual for prosecutors to make independent plea agreements with co-defendants. When such an agreement is entered into, the accomplice usually receives some consideration in exchange for truthful testimony during the co-accomplice's trial. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States , 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed. (2d) 104 (1972); United States v. Boley , 730 F. (2d) 1326, 1333-34 (10th Cir.1984). However, the United States Constitution imposes restrictions on plea agreements. Under the Due Process Clause, prosecutors have a duty to provide an accused with all favorable evidence, including any plea agreement involving testifying accomplices, which is material to either guilt or punishment. United States v. Bagley , 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed. (2d) 481 (1985); Giglio v. United States, supra ; Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed. (2d) 215 (1963). See also State v. Hinson , 293 S.C. 406, 361 S.E. (2d) 120 (1987). In the instant case, the solicitor failed to disclose his assurance to Threatte's counsel that he would do everything that he could to see that Threatte was not imprisoned in the same facility as appellant and another convict. [1] The majority distinguishes this case from State v. Hinson , 293 S.C. 406, 361 S.E. (2d) 120 (1987), on the basis of the time elapsing between the testimony and the solicitor's nolle prosequi of the charges. The time factor alone is not determinative of the issue. Rather, the test should be whether, when considered together with all other surrounding circumstances, the events which transpired lead to the logical conclusion that an undisclosed plea agreement or a prior tacit understanding existed which infers a lack of adventitiousness in the solicitor's actions and inured to the benefit of the testifying codefendant. See State v. Hinson , 361 S.E. (2d) at 121-22. The majority goes further and states that assuming this assurance was given to Threatte, nondisclosure would not mandate reversal because there is no reasonable probability that disclosure would have changed the result of the guilt phase of appellant's trial. In view of the facts of this case, the jury's problem with duress, the jury's aggravating circumstances finding, the solicitor's pretrial assurance to Threatte and subsequent acceptance of a guilty plea with reduced sentencing exposure for Threatte, I disagree with the majority's holding. In my view, the solicitor's acceptance of a guilty plea from the only eyewitness would have created a reasonable probability that the results of the guilt phase and certainly the sentencing phase of appellant's trial would have been changed. See, e.g., Satterwhite v. Texas , ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 1797, 100 L.Ed. (2d) 284 (1988). As I read South Carolina's capital sentencing scheme, a defendant in a death penalty case is entitled to every reasonable doubt; and, particularly during the sentencing phase of the trial, to have the triers of the fact fully advised and cognizant of the culpability, responsibility and potential bias of all witnesses. Due process guarantees a defendant the right to a fair trial, and any evidence tending to impinge upon that right should be subject to disclosure and scrutiny by a jury. Under the facts of this case, Threatte's testimony is so tainted or presumptively unreliable that a new trial is mandated. United States v. Bagley , 105 S.Ct. 3375. I find the assurance was material to both phases of appellant's trial and should have been disclosed. Therefore, I should reverse and remand this case for a new trial.