Opinion ID: 2787038
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wiretap Orders and Necessity

Text: Donald Turner unsuccessfully moved to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the Title III wiretap orders issued during the investigation. On appeal, he asserts the district court erred in concluding the government had shown the requisite necessity to justify the issuance of the orders. The Wiretap Act requires that any application for a wiretap include “a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). “If law enforcement officers are able to establish that conventional investigatory techniques have not been successful in exposing the full extent of the conspiracy and the identity of each coconspirator, the necessity requirement is satisfied.” United States v. West, 589 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). When reviewing a lower court’s finding that the necessity requirement has been satisfied to support authorization for a wiretap order, this Court reviews for clear error. Id. In this case, the affidavits in support of the application for each Title III wiretap order set forth the investigative techniques law enforcement had used, as of that point, content contained in their phones, through the use of stand-alone PLI warrants. Although PLI is different than recorded phone conversations or photographs stored on a phone, the standing analysis in Stringer remains relevant; the defendant must establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone tracked with a PLI warrant, just as he must establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in a phone searched for other reasons. -6- to gather evidence of the purported conspiracy: interviews with confidential sources, use of confidential informants to conduct controlled buys of drugs from suspected conspirators, monitored and/or recorded telephone calls initiated by cooperating individuals, physical surveillance, limited use of pole cameras and GPS devices, pen registers, trap and trace devices, and some collected financial information. The affidavits also described techniques unlikely to be successful or too dangerous to undertake under the circumstances. The affiant explained that the use of undercover agents would not likely “further the objectives of the investigation” and might place an undercover agent in danger, because those involved in the conspiracy were either part of the Turner family or close friends, making it difficult to infiltrate the organization. The affiant also discussed the fact that those involved in the conspiracy were closely monitoring their surroundings and were possibly using surveillance cameras of their own, so physical surveillance, trash searches, and the use of additional pole cameras by law enforcement would not provide access to the desired information. GPS devices had been used to track suspects’ cars, but some suspects had taken to driving rental or borrowed vehicles to purchase drugs to avoid being tracked. The affiant also explained that, while traditional investigative techniques had uncovered a great deal of information about the criminal activities of the targets, the familial nature of the enterprise and the counter-surveillance techniques used by participants in the conspiracy prevented law enforcement from determining who was supplying the drugs, where the drugs were being stored, or what the full structure of the organization looked like. Donald Turner counters that one of the confidential informants—CI #1—was a member of the family. As a family member, Donald Turner argues, CI #1 was in a position to obtain inside information to assist the police investigation, rendering a wiretap or other electronic surveillance unnecessary. The government responds, and the district court agreed, that although CI #1was able to learn some information about the family drug business, he was unable to get information about the source of the -7- drugs, where the leaders of the business hid drugs after transporting them from the source, or how the distribution of drugs and assets was done by higher-level members of the criminal enterprise. Additionally, CI #1 was set to return to custody, rendering him unable to assist the government by conducting controlled buys or providing inside information for much longer. Wiretaps should not be “routinely employed as the initial step in an investigation.” United States v. Macklin, 902 F.2d 1320, 1326 (8th Cir. 1990). But § 2518(1)(c) “does not require that law enforcement officers exhaust all possible techniques before applying for a wiretap.” Id. Even if CI #1 could have provided some additional useful information, that fact alone does not render the issuance of the wiretap unlawful. As the magistrate judge found, “the efforts of the investigative team in this case established what measures had been taken to attempt to fully investigate the conspiracy and that those measures did not yield the full information the investigative team sought and required to go forward with the prosecution of those it found responsible.” The district court adopted these findings. We cannot say the district court clearly erred in this determination. See West, 589 F.3d at 939 (concluding the district court did not clearly err in finding the government proved necessity by showing its attempts to investigate the suspects and that options aside from a wiretap would be ineffective or dangerous if utilized); United States v. Shaw, 94 F.3d 438, 441–42 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding the district court did not clearly err in finding the government had utilized all ordinary measures likely to be successful and had adequately set forth that other methods of investigation were likely to fail or were too dangerous to attempt).