Opinion ID: 76258
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.

Text: 33 The Court's most recent case involving adult entertainment was City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 122 S.Ct. 1728, 152 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002), a case in which adult businesses challenged the constitutionality of a city zoning ordinance forbidding two or more such businesses from operating in the same building. The Supreme Court reversed a lower court judgment granting summary judgment to the adult businesses, holding that Los Angeles could reasonably rely, at this stage of the litigation, on a police department study of the effect of adult businesses on crime patterns to overcome summary judgment. Once again, however, no single rationale justifying the result enjoyed the assent of five Justices. 34 The narrow question presented in Alameda Books was the appropriate standard for determining whether an ordinance serves a substantial government interest under Renton.  122 S.Ct. at 1733. The plurality opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, found that by relying on a 1977 study showing that concentrations of adult establishments are associated with higher rates of prostitution, assaults, and other secondary effects, Los Angeles had complied with Renton's evidentiary requirement, at least for the purpose of surviving summary judgment motion. Id. Hence the plurality held that summary judgment for the adult businesses should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 1738. The plurality explained, however, that Renton 's requirement that a municipality act on evidence reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem of secondary effects does not mean 35 ... that a municipality can get away with shoddy data or reasoning. The municipality's evidence must fairly support the municipality's rationale for its ordinance. If plaintiffs fail to cast direct doubt on this rationale, either by demonstrating that the municipality's evidence does not support its rationale or by furnishing evidence that disputes the municipality's factual findings, the municipality meets the standard set forth in Renton. If plaintiffs succeed in casting doubt on a municipality's rationale in either manner, the burden shifts back to the municipality to supplement the record with evidence renewing support for a theory that justifies its ordinance. Id. at 1736. 12 36 Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment of the Court but wrote separately because he agreed with the dissent that the Los Angeles ordinance was not content-neutral, and because he feared that the plurality opinion might constitute a subtle expansion of Renton. Id. at 1739. On the issue of content-neutrality, the O'Connor plurality took the position that the Court should not decide whether the Los Angeles ordinance was content-neutral since the Ninth Circuit had not yet passed on the matter. Id. at 1737. Justice Kennedy disagreed, joining the four dissenters in characterizing the application of the content-neutral label to secondary effects ordinances like Los Angeles' as a fiction, because whether a statute is content neutral or content based is something that can be determined on the face of it; if the statute describes speech by content then it is content based.... These ordinances are content based and we should call them so. Id. at 1741. Nevertheless, unlike the dissent, Justice Kennedy held that secondary effects zoning ordinances were subject to intermediate scrutiny even though they were content-based. Accordingly, he concluded that the central holding of Renton is sound: A zoning restriction that is designed to decrease secondary effects and not speech should be subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny. Id. 37 With respect to Renton, Justice Kennedy distinguished two questions entering into whether an ordinance serves a substantial government interest under Renton: (1) what proposition does a city need to advance in order to sustain a secondary effects ordinance?, id. at 1741; and (2) how much evidence is required to support the proposition? Id. As Justice Kennedy saw it, the plurality gave the correct answer to the second question, but skipped the first, to which more attention must be paid. To justify a content-based zoning ordinance, he argued, a city must advance some basis to show that its regulation has the purpose and effect of suppressing secondary effects, while leaving the quantity and accessibility of speech substantially intact. Id. at 1742. The key issue, in other words, is how speech will fare under the ordinance: 38 [T]he necessary rationale for applying intermediate scrutiny is the promise that zoning ordinances like this one may reduce the costs of secondary effects without substantially reducing speech. For this reason, it does not suffice to say that inconvenience will reduce demand and fewer patrons will lead to fewer secondary effects.... It is no trick to reduce secondary effects by reducing speech or its audience; but a city may not attack secondary effects indirectly by attacking speech. 39 Id. 40 Turning to the second question, Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality that very little evidence was required of a municipality to support the claim that its ordinance serves to reduce secondary effects without substantially reducing speech. Id. at 1743. In this case, Los Angeles could reasonably conclude based on its 1977 study that preventing multiple adult businesses from operating under one roof was reasonably likely to cause a substantial reduction in secondary effects while reducing speech very little. Id. Justice Kennedy acknowledged that [i]f these assumptions can be proved unsound at trial, then the [Los Angeles] ordinance might not withstand intermediate scrutiny. Id. Nonetheless, he concluded that these considerations were sufficient to determine that the ordinance was not facially invalid and should survive a motion for summary judgment. Id. Because he concurred in the judgment of the Court on the narrowest grounds, Justice Kennedy's concurrence represents the Court's holding in Alameda Books under Marks. See, e.g., Ben's Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702, 722 (7th Cir.2003) (identifying Justice Kennedy's opinion as controlling); SOB, Inc. v. County of Benton, 317 F.3d 856, 862 n. 1 (8th Cir.2003) (same). 41