Opinion ID: 2351922
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Former Officer Reason Employment Ended Confrontation Rights Denied

Text: The next issue raised on appeal originated at trial during Snowden's cross-examination of Officer Koumpias. Snowden asked Officer Koumpias if he was then currently employed by the City of Wilmington Police Department. After Officer Koumpias responded in the negative, Snowden attempted to elicit the reason Officer Koumpias was no longer a police officer. The prosecutor objected. At a sidebar conference [8] during cross-examination of Officer Koumpias, the attorney for the State essentially acknowledged that Officer Koumpias had been fired. The sidebar conference concluded with the objection being sustained. [A] primary interest secured by [the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment] is the right of cross-examination.... Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1076, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965). Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). [9] Nevertheless, the right of cross-examination is not without limits. On the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on... cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). This Court has identified several factors to guide the trial court in the exercise of its discretion: [T]he trial judge should consider (1) whether the testimony of the witness being impeached is crucial; (2) the logical relevance of the specific impeachment evidence to the question of bias; (3) the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, and undue delay; and (4) whether the evidence of bias is cumulative. Weber v. State, Del.Supr., 457 A.2d 674, 681 (1983). The record does not reflect whether the Superior Court considered these factors. The prosecution's objection was sustained without elaboration. Although a trial judge has wide latitude in controlling cross-examination, that discretion is not absolute. In matters of credibility, especially those relating to potential bias, this Court has held: When the cross-examination relates to impeachment evidence, the test for determining if the trial judge's limitation on cross-examination violated the defendant's confrontation right is whether the jury had in its possession sufficient information to appraise the biases and motivations of the witness.... More specifically, we look to the cross-examination permitted to ascertain (1) if the jury was exposed to facts sufficient for it to draw inferences as to the reliability of the witness and (2) if defense counsel had an adequate record from which to argue why the witness might have been biased.... Id. at 682. The Third Circuit recently reviewed a civil trial during which the appellants had only been permitted to elicit from a former correctional officer that he had been terminated from his position. Douglas v. Owens, 50 F.3d 1226, 1231 (3d Cir.1995). [10] In Douglas, the Third Circuit concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion by not allowing the appellants an opportunity to question the former officer with regard to the circumstances surrounding his discharge. Id. The Third Circuit concluded that the word terminated and even the word fired were not sufficient to effectively convey to the jury any alleged bias, lack of credibility, or motives of the former officer. Id. The Third Circuit noted that the officer could have been terminated or fired for any number of neutral reasons which would not suggest to the jury that he was biased in favor of either party. Id. The Third Circuit held that, without further inquiry, the jury did not have sufficient information with which to make a discriminating appraisal of the former officer's motives or bias. Id. The bias of a witness is subject to exploration at trial and is `always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.' Van Arsdall v. State, Del.Supr., 524 A.2d 3 (1987) ( quoting 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence, § 940 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970)). See also Weber v. State, 457 A.2d at 680; Michael v. State, Del.Supr., 529 A.2d 752, 759 (1987). A certain threshold of cross-examination is constitutionally required by both the United States and Delaware Constitutions. Weber v. State, 457 A.2d at 682. The discretion of the trial judge may not be interposed to defeat it. Id. In the Douglas decision, two possible methods of achieving this goal were suggested: (1) allow a limited cross-examination to set forth only the facts of the officer's discharge; or (2) allow an extensive cross-examination and provide the jury with a limiting instruction which explains that the purpose of the cross-examination was to reveal the bias of the witness. Douglas v. Owens, 50 F.3d at 1231 n. 9. The Third Circuit concluded that either of these methods would be acceptable, if, as a consequence, the jury receives adequate information with which to evaluate the bias and credibility of the witness. Id. The only record which Snowden was permitted to develop before the jury by cross-examination was that Officer Koumpias had left the City of Wilmington police force. The Superior Court's blanket restriction on further cross-examination regarding the reasons why Officer Koumpias' employment has ended violated Snowden's confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment and Article I § 7 of the Delaware Constitution. Id. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). Van Arsdall v. State, 524 A.2d at 7. Accord State v. Santiago, 224 Conn. 325, 618 A.2d 32 (1992).