Opinion ID: 1610587
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 31

Heading: Was Nixon denied his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel during the hearing of his motion for new trial?

Text: On the morning Nixon's motion for a new trial was to be argued, Nixon requested his attorneys, Tabb and Townsend, be discharged and that Mr. Clive A. Stafford Smith (counsel on appeal) be appointed. Mr. Smith was not present in court but he had filed, via Mr. Ken Rose, a motion for continuance to allow himself thirty days to have transcribed and to become familiar with the trial record. In light of those events, Mr. Townsend moved ore tenus to withdraw as Nixon's counsel. [6] After being assured that Nixon did not wish to proceed pro se, and after being assured by Mr. Townsend that he had adequately prepared for the hearing and that he would perform his representation to the best of his ability, the trial judge overruled Nixon's motion to discharge his attorneys and Mr. Townsend's motion to withdraw as counsel. The trial judge was concerned with the disorderly administration of justice that would follow if criminal defendants were allowed to change lawyers at the last minute for the purpose of causing delay. Subsequently, Mr. Townsend presented his arguments supporting the motion for new trial, but the motion was overruled. On appeal, Nixon contends his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the motion for new trial was denied. This Court disagrees. Although the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases is absolute, an accused's right to a particular counsel is not. Richardson v. Lucas, 741 F.2d 753, 756 (5th Cir.1984). A defendant's interest in obtaining counsel in whom he trusts must co-exist with the court's authority to maintain judicial proceedings in an orderly manner. Lockett v. Arn, 740 F.2d 407 (6th Cir.1984); see generally, LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 11.4, pp. 38-40 (1984). The instant record reflects that approximately thirty days had elapsed between Nixon's filing his motion for new trial and the hearing on said motion. In addition, no action to change counsel was taken until the eve of the hearing. To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the hearing on the motion for new trial, Nixon must satisfy the two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984): A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. (Emphasis added) See also Odom v. State, 498 So.2d 331, 334 (Miss. 1986); Coleman v. State, 483 So.2d 680, 682 (Miss. 1986). Having reviewed the record, this Court concludes that Nixon has failed to meet either component of the Strickland v. Washington test. Therefore, this Court holds there is no error under this assignment.