Opinion ID: 1159049
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Allegedly Negligent Act

Text: The analysis of negligence under the theory of respondeat superior should focus completely on the actions of the employee, without consideration of the acts of the employer. [5] A plaintiff need not show any act or fault of the employer when defining the allegedly negligent act in a respondeat superior claim. In Nordmark v. Hagadone, 1 Haw.App. 487, 620 P.2d 763 (1980), the president and general manager of a radio station (Employee) was involved in an accident. During normal working hours and while driving a company car under the influence of alcohol, Employee rammed into the rear of a car stopped at a red light, injuring that car's occupants. Employee frequently left the station and drove the company car as part of his employment, but the accident occurred in a neighborhood whose residents were not generally a part of the radio station's listening audience. Employee asserted as an affirmative defense, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, that at the time of the accident he was acting within the scope of his employment. The radio station argued that both the location of the accident and the fact that Employee was intoxicated indicated that he was not acting within the scope of his employment. Nonetheless, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed judgment for the plaintiff. In Nordmark, the ICA did not consider the question whether an employee's negligent act of drinking alcohol while aware that he or she must drive home is within the scope of employment. Hawai`i courts have addressed this issue, however, in Henderson, supra, Kang, supra, and Costa v. Able Distributors, Inc., 3 Haw.App. 486, 653 P.2d 101 (1982). In all three cases, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer. The first two decisions involved accidents taking place subsequent to the consumption of alcohol at parties located off the employment site. In Costa, the plaintiff failed to support his allegation that drinking on-site was within the scope of defendant's employment; meanwhile, the record indicated that the alcoholic consumption took place at a purely social event after work hours, with no evidence of any connection to the employer. The above cases do not preclude an assertion of negligence prior to the actual accident. For reasons set forth below, we hold that a respondeat superior claim may be predicated upon the actor's allegedly negligent act of drinking while aware of the need to drive, provided that the act takes place within the scope of employment. Thus, respondeat superior liability may be imposed notwithstanding the fact that the foreseeable effects of the actor's negligent conduct occur outside the scope of employment. In so holding, we adopt the relevant reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Chastain v. Litton Systems, Inc., 694 F.2d 957 (4th Cir.1982), the Oregon Supreme Court in Chesterman v. Barmon, 305 Or. 439, 753 P.2d 404 (1988), and the Washington Supreme Court's analysis of the issue in Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash.2d 457, 716 P.2d 814 (1986). [6] In Chastain, the court discussed the respondeat superior analysis in two parts: the negligent act, and whether that act was undertaken within the scope of employment. [W]e believe [becoming intoxicated] is the critical time for determining whether the doctrine of respondeat superior should be applied. Chastain, 694 F.2d at 962. [7] In Chastain, an employer was sued when one of its employees drove through a red traffic light, struck another car and killed Gail Chastain. Earlier in the day, the employee had attended a Christmas party sponsored by his employer; the party was held on the employer's premises during working hours. On appeal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment, the evidence (viewed in the light most favorable to the victim) showed that the employer, through its employees, furnished alcohol to the tortfeasor. The Fourth Circuit noted that applicable state law (North Carolina) and common law did not impose social host liability, but nonetheless reversed the trial court, based primarily on the conclusion that the employee's negligent act was within the scope of his employment. See discussion infra section III.A.2. In reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit obviously viewed the consumption of alcohol as the relevant act of negligence. Specifically, the court concluded that questions of fact remaining for the jury to decide included whether [the employee's] excessive drinking at the party constituted negligence on his part; and, if so, whether his negligent intoxication continued until the time he collided with [victim] and constituted a proximate cause of the collision. Id. In Chesterman, the Oregon Supreme Court acknowledged that for purposes of respondeat superior analysis, the important question relates to the act of the tortfeasor and not the consequences of the act. 305 Or. at 444, 753 P.2d at 407. The court explained that where, as here, there is a time-lag between the act allegedly producing the harm and the resulting harm[, t]he focus should be on the act on which vicarious liability is based and not on when the act results in injury. Id. (citing with approval Dickinson v. Edwards, 105 Wash.2d 457, 716 P.2d 814 (1986)) (emphasis added). In Chesterman, an employee and president of a corporation took a chocolate mescaline pill, while still on the property of potential customers, to counter feelings of depression and give him enough energy to drive his boat to work. While driving, he began to hallucinate and stopped near a house where he believed a former friend once lived, entered the house, broke into plaintiff's locked bedroom and sexually assaulted her. The court held that summary judgment in favor of the employer was not appropriate because the jury could find that the employee's allegedly negligent act of taking drugs 1) was within the scope of his employment, and 2) resulted in the commission of a tort against the plaintiff. Id. at 444, 753 P.2d at 406-07. In Dickinson, the Washington Supreme Court's analysis of the respondeat superior issue centered, as in Chastain, on the point in time that the alcoholic drinks were consumed; liability attached to all injuries and damages proximately caused from that moment on. [8] The employer in this case hosted a banquet to honor its long-term employees. The employer provided food and alcoholic beverages, paid for use of the banquet facilities and accompanying services, and deducted all expenses as a business expense. After consuming a large amount of alcohol, one of the employees left the banquet and drove to work the night shift at the employer's plant. The employee struck and severely injured a motorcyclist while driving his car the wrong way up a freeway ramp. One element of the court's analysis was whether [t]he employee negligently consumed alcohol to the point of intoxication when he knew or should have known he would need to operate a vehicle on some public highway upon leaving the banquet. Id. at 468, 716 P.2d at 820. The plaintiff was found to have stated a valid cause of action, for which summary judgment was not appropriate, where he asserted that the proximate cause of the accident occurred at the banquet, before the employee even attempted to drive away. Id. Arguably, Rellamas' act of drinking while aware of the need to drive home thereafter can be viewed as a negligent act that was a legal cause of the particular accident before us. [9] See Ono v. Applegate, 62 Haw. 131, 612 P.2d 533 (1980) (extending liability where the consumption, resulting inebriation, and subsequent injurious conduct were foreseeable intervening acts not sufficient to relieve the defendant of liability). [10] The record reveals that Rellamas was aware he had to drive home and yet, by becoming intoxicated, he impaired his ability to drive. Consequently, Rellamas' self-intoxication may have breached the general duty of due care he owed innocent members of the public and created a foreseeable risk of harm to them. Whether or not Rellamas breached this duty presents a question of fact for the jury. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support a jury finding that Rellamas breached his duty of due care owed to the public based on the autopsy report, which indicates that Rellamas' blood alcohol content was .08 percent. Furthermore, testimony that Rellamas consumed two to three beers at the party, and a reasonable inference that he consumed marijuana at HIRI that day, provide additional support for a finding of negligence.