Opinion ID: 896360
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Development of Tests

Text: [¶45] In the ex post facto context, the United States Supreme Court has not established any single test to determine when a sanction rises to the level of “punishment.” See Russell v. Gregoire , 124 F.3d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 1997) (“the Supreme Court has not articulated a ‘formula’ for identifying the legislative changes that fall within the [Ex Post Facto] prohibition”); Roe v. Farwell , 999 F. Supp. 174, 183 (D. Mass. 1998) (the Supreme Court has not produced a single standard and “the applicability of any such framework to sex offender registry provisions is blurry”); State v. Cook , 700 N.E.2d 570, 580 (Ohio 1998) (the Supreme Court “has declined to set out a specific test for determining whether a statute is criminal or civil for purposes of applying the Ex Post Facto Clause”). [¶46] Several earlier decisions addressing the ex post facto implications of sex offender registration and notification laws have employed, as the majority does, the “test” from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez , 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), to determine whether such laws were “punitive.” See, e.g. , State v. Ward , 869 P.2d 1062, 1068 (Wash. 1994); State v. Noble , 829 P.2d 1217, 1221 (Ariz. 1992). Mendoza-Martinez involved a civil statute which divested American citizenship for draft evaders or military deserters. 372 U.S. at 146. Addressing whether the law was effectively penal in nature and thereby triggering the procedural protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the Court enumerated factors “traditionally applied to determine whether an Act of Congress is penal or regulatory in character”: [1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned . . . . Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted) (brackets added). The Court declared the factors were to be considered in relation to the statute on its face in the absence of “conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the penal nature of a statute.” Id. at 169. [¶47] Other courts, however, have refused to utilize the Mendoza-Martinez factor analysis. See Artway v. Attorney General of State of N.J. , 81 F.3d 1235, 1262 (3rd Cir. 1996) (concluding “ Mendoza-Martinez is inapplicable outside the context of determining whether a proceeding is sufficiently criminal in nature to warrant criminal procedural protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments”); Doe v. Poritz , 662 A.2d 367, 397, 400-403 (N.J. 1995) (rejecting the use of the Mendoza-Martinez factors in an ex post facto “punishment” analysis). [¶48] The decisions rejecting use of the Mendoza-Martinez factor analysis generally rely on a trio of Supreme Court cases, (footnote: 8) which, it is argued, cast doubt on the notion that the Mendoza-Martinez factors properly frame the ex post facto inquiry. These cases generally have given expressed legislative intent significant deference and have weakened the protections of the ex post facto clause. The courts rejecting the Mendoza-Martinez factor analysis, however, either failed to consider or did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Ursery , 518 U.S. 267 (1996) and Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U.S. 346 (1997). [¶49] In Ursery , the Court considered whether the purportedly “civil” forfeiture of property used to facilitate marijuana violations constituted a second punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. In holding such forfeiture proceedings were not “punishment,” 518 U.S. at 272, the Court took particular care in distinguishing Kurth Ranch , Austin , and Halper . Id. at 278-88. The Court concluded these cases had not altered settled precedent holding that “in rem civil forfeitures are neither ‘punishment’ nor criminal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” 518 U.S. at 292. [¶50] After confining Kurth Ranch , Austin , and Halper to their specific factual circumstances, the Ursery Court identified the method of inquiry into whether a statute “punishes” for Double Jeopardy purposes. This inquiry requires an evaluation of (1) whether the legislature intended the sanction to be punitive, and (2) whether “the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate” the legislative intent to establish a remedial, nonpunitive statute. Ursery , 518 U.S. at 278 (quoting United States v. Ward , 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)). Echoing Ward , the Court emphasized, at the second prong, the challenger must show by “the clearest proof” the sanctions imposed “are so punitive in form and effect as to render them criminal despite [the legislature’s] intent to the contrary.” Id. at 290. [¶51] Because Ursery was a Double Jeopardy case, and because the Court warned against lifting a standard for punishment from one constitutional provision and applying it to another, 518 U.S. at 285-87, it remained open to question whether the same analysis should be applied in the ex post facto context. A year later, the Supreme Court implicitly answered this question in the affirmative. In Hendricks , the Court held a Kansas statute requiring the involuntary commitment of sexual predators with mental and personality infirmities did not impose punishment in violation of either the Double Jeopardy Clause or Ex Post Facto Clause. 521 U.S. at 371. The Court undertook only the analysis espoused in Ursery to answer both constitutional challenges. See id. at 361-71. [¶52] However, the Court’s decisions in Hendricks and Ursery alter only slightly the Mendoza-Martinez analysis. It is now clear a challenger carries a heavy burden to establish “the clearest proof” that the sanctions at issue are punitive in effect. Hendricks , 521 U.S. at 361. It is also clear the factors delineated in Mendoza-Martinez are “neither exhaustive nor dispositive” and are to be used merely as guideposts, not as a pass/fail test or in checklist fashion. Ward , 448 U.S. at 249. Mendoza-Martinez factors are most helpful where a civil statute must be tested to determine whether constitutional protections have been violated. The statute applied to Burr was part of the criminal code. [¶53] Several federal and state courts have recently applied what has been termed the “intent-effects” (footnote: 9) test. This test synthesizes the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hendricks , Ursery , and Ward . See, e.g. , Russell v Gregoire , 124 F.3d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 1997); State v. Cook , 700 N.E.2d 570, 580 (Ohio 1998). The intent-effects test provides a two-part test to determine whether the registration and notification requirements of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15 are punitive. Courts examining sexual offender statutes sometimes add a third prong (footnote: 10) not pertinent to Burr and I believe it decisive in this case to examine our statute under the two-part test.