Opinion ID: 800664
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Follow Procedures

Text: Kidwell also argues that the departments officials' failure to follow established procedures gives rise to an inference that his purportedly protected speech was a motivating factor in two of the termination charges filed against him. Specifically, Kidwell contends that the department officials did not follow the requirements of the Uniform Police Officers' Disciplinary Act (UPODA), 50 Ill. Comp. Stat. 725/1, et seq., when it questioned him after the Burlington, Iowa incident, and that the officials failed to follow the department's internal policies when investigating Kidwell's role in the accident during the high-speed chase. In another context, we stated that an employer's systematic abandonment of its hiring policies is circumstantial evidence of a retaliatory motive. Rudin, 420 F.3d at 723; see also Giacoletto v. Amax Zinc Co., 954 F.2d 424, 427 (7th Cir.1992) (holding that the employer's deviation from its established procedure when terminating the plaintiff was circumstantial evidence of retaliation). Nevertheless, we do not require that an employer rigidly adhere to procedural guidelines in order to avoid an inference of retaliation. Instead, we look for pretext in the form of a dishonest explanation, a lie rather than an oddity or an error. Kulumani v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n, 224 F.3d 681, 685 (7th Cir.2000). Moreover, when independent surrounding circumstances indicate that the employee's performance was seriously deficient and worthy of disciplinary action, a procedural abnormality will not suffice to establish a retaliatory motive. See Fortier v. Ameritech Mobile Commc'ns, Inc., 161 F.3d 1106, 1114 (7th Cir.1998). UPODA provides certain procedural protections to police officers who are subject to discipline. 50 Ill. Comp. Stat. 725/1. Specifically, police officers who are interrogated after allegedly violating departmental policy must be given written notice of the nature of the investigation being conducted, the opportunity to have an attorney present, and reasonable opportunities for rest. See id. 725/3.1-.11. UPODA defines an interrogation as the questioning of an officer pursuant to the formal investigation procedures of the respective State agency or local governmental unit in connection with an alleged violation of such agency's or unit's rules which may be the basis for filing charges seeking his or her suspension, removal, or discharge. Id. 725/2(d). Importantly, this definition does not include questioning (1) as part of an informal inquiry or (2) relating to minor infractions of agency rules which may be noted on the officer's record but which may not in themselves result in removal, discharge or suspension in excess of 3 days. Id. A formal investigation is defined as the process of investigation ordered by a commanding officer during which the questioning of an officer is intended to gather evidence of misconduct which may be the basis for filing charges seeking his or her removal, discharge or suspension in excess of 3 days. Id. 725/2(c). In contrast, an informal inquiry is defined as a meeting between supervisory personnel and an officer upon whom an allegation of misconduct has come ..., the purpose of which meeting is to mediate a citizen complaint or discuss the facts to determine whether a formal investigation should be commenced. Id. 725/2(b). Here, Kidwell only vaguely argues that he was not given the protections guaranteed by UPODA during the investigation into his actions during the Burlington incident. The only specific alleged violation of UPODA to which Kidwell points is an informal conversation he had with Thomason after the incident had occurred. Kidwell contends that Thomason relied on that conversation when filing one of the termination charges against him a year later. Kidwell argues that this was improper because Kidwell never received UPODA procedural protections. But Kidwell makes no effort to establish which protections were violated or how any such violations were a pretext for a retaliatory motive instead of simply errors. Without more, Kidwell's conclusory argument fails. Moreover, Kidwell cannot establish that his questioning was part of a formal investigation (as defined under UPODA), and thus that UPODA protections even apply. Indeed, other than Thomason's conversation with Kidwell after Kidwell's return from Burlington, there is no evidence that Thomason ordered an investigation pursuant to departmental policy. And to the extent that Kidwell argues that his conversation with Thomason could itself be construed as a formal investigation, that argument fails. As noted above, a formal investigation requires that the intent of supervisory personnel in questioning a police officer be to gather evidence that forms the basis of the charges seeking [the officer's] removal, discharge or suspension in excess of 3 days. Id. 725/2(c). There is no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Thomason's conversation with Kidwell was intended to gather evidence to seek Kidwell's removal, discharge, or suspension. True, the Burlington, Iowa incident formed the basis for one of the charges against Kidwell when the department sought his termination a year later, but the evidence shows that between the time of Thomason's conversation with Kidwell about the Burlington incident and the time the charges were filed, Thomason was open to Kidwell returning to work if he could pass a fit-for-duty evaluation. Therefore, there is no evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer that Thomason's conversation with Kidwell was an attempt to glean evidence from which Kidwell could be terminated. Instead, that conversation was at best an informal inquiry, and therefore Kidwell was never interrogated as defined by UPODA. See id. 725/2(d). The procedural protections therein simply do not apply in this case, and Kidwell's argument fails. Kidwell also contends that the police department officials failed to follow departmental policy when investigating his role in the accident that occurred during the high-speed car chase. The Danville Police Department Policy Manual states that, [w]henever a police vehicle is involved in a vehicle accident which involves death, serious injury, or major property damage, the on duty supervisor will request the accident to be investigated by either the Vermilion County Sheriff's Department or the Illinois State Police. Although the accident certainly resulted in serious injury and major property damage, Kidwell argues that Thomason's appointment of Detective Starka Danville police officerto head the ensuing investigation violated departmental policy and therefore is evidence of a retaliatory motive. Detective Stark's appointment was undoubtedly a technical violation of the written policy terms. But uncontroverted testimony from Thomason shows that this policy was construed to mean that an independent law enforcement agency would be appointed to head an investigation only if a death occurred in an accident involving a police and a civilian vehicle. Because there were no deaths that resulted from the accident, Thomason saw no need to appoint an outside agency. As another circuit has stated, [i]t is generally for an employer to interpret its own policies. Richey v. City of Independence, 540 F.3d 779, 786 (8th Cir.2008). Kidwell does not argue that this construction of the policy was disparately applied or that it was done for a retaliatory purpose. What is more, simply showing a violation of policy is not enough. Kidwell must point to a dishonest explanation [for deviating from policy], a lie rather than an oddity or an error. Kulumani, 224 F.3d at 685. He does not do so. Additionally, Kidwell cannot demonstrate a retaliatory motive based on a technical violation of policy when the circumstances reveal a pattern of deficient actions on his part. For example, in Fortier we acknowledged that an employer's failure to follow policies . . . may show . . . that the employer's asserted reason for termination (deficient performance) might be pretextual. Fortier, 161 F.3d at 1114. In that case, however, we found that even if the employer had failed to follow its established policies when terminating the plaintiff, because other evidence showed that the employer believed that the plaintiff's performance was seriously deficient, as indicated by previous warnings and counseling sessions given to the plaintiff, a technical violation of policy was insufficient to give rise to an inference of a retaliatory motive. Id. This case is similar; by the time the high-speed chase accident occurred, Kidwell had been issued a written reprimand, admonished verbally, and suspended for two days. Like the employer in Fortier, here the police department officials had determinedindependently of the high-speed chase accident investigationthat Kidwell's performance was seriously deficient. Under such circumstances, Thomason's failure to appoint an outside agency to head the accident investigation is not sufficient to raise an inference of a retaliatory motive.