Opinion ID: 1060393
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: jury question regarding the manner of serving life sentences

Text: During sentencing deliberations, the jury submitted a written question asking the trial court, If James Dellinger and Gary Sutton were given life in prison from Sevier County and they are given life in prison in Blount Countywill the prison terms be consecutive and/or concurrent? The trial court responded in writing, You should concern yourself with the sentences in these cases only. Dellinger and Sutton maintain that the sentencing process was prejudiced because the jury would be more likely to impose the death penalty without knowing when the defendants might be released if they were given a life sentence. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Federal Constitution neither requires nor prohibits instructions to capital sentencing juries on the possibility of commutation, pardon, or parole. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-14, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983) (the wisdom of the decision to permit juror consideration of possible commutation is best left to the States). It is true that Ramos stands for the broad proposition that we generally will defer to a State's determination as to what a jury should and should not be told about sentencing. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 168, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994). This Court has previously addressed a similar question in State v. Smith, 857 S.W.2d 1 (1993). In Smith, the jury sent a note to the trial judge during sentencing deliberations asking that the court define life sentence, define consecutive and concurrent life terms and explain which would apply if a second life sentence were given, and explain when parole would apply. Id. at 10. The trial court declined to answer the jury's questions and instructed the jury to resume deliberations. Id. This Court approved the trial court's response to the jury's question. We held that instructions on the nature of life sentences, concurrent and consecutive sentencing, and parole eligibility create the possibility of jury speculation on the length of time a defendant would have to serve and could breed irresponsibility on the part of jurors premised upon the proposition that corrective action can be taken by others at a later date. Id. at 11. This Court held that instructing the jury on such specific sentencing information could result in sentences of death based on sheer speculation and on factors not enumerated by statute and not sanctioned under the United States Constitution or the Tennessee Constitution. Id. We continue to adhere to this proposition and agree with the trial court's refusal to answer the jury's question in this case. See also State v. Burns, 979 S.W.2d 276, 295-96 (Tenn.1998) (approving trial court's instructions to the jury to refer to the charges and instructions and continue deliberations in response to jury's specific sentencing questions).