Opinion ID: 2612406
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Distrust of informant's testimony.

Text: (6) Defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to instruct on its own motion that the testimony of a jailhouse informant should be viewed with distrust. We have rejected the contention in other cases, concluding that jailhouse informants have no inherent motive to lie and that the standard instructions on credibility adequately guide the jury's assessment of a jailmate's testimony. ( People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 553 [257 Cal. Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244]; People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 118-119 [246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37]; People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 565-566 [244 Cal. Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776]; see People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 623-624 [205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126].) We reach a similar conclusion here. The jurors knew Acker was a convicted murderer with a motive to cooperate. They received standard instructions that they should consider a witness's bias or interest, that a witness false in part is to be distrusted, that the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness should be carefully evaluated, and that a defendant's oral admissions should be viewed with caution. Discrepancies in informant Acker's testimony, and his possible motives for giving testimony favorable to the prosecution, were explored at some length in cross-examination and in argument. The court's failure to give a further jailhouse informant instruction sua sponte is not reversible error. [5] An assertion that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a cautionary instruction must also fail. For the reasons expressed above, the absence of the instruction does not undermine confidence in the trial outcome. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052]; People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 584 [189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144].) [6]