Opinion ID: 783829
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Question of Harris's Competence To Stand Trial

Text: 126 In his cross-appeal, Harris contends that he is entitled to habeas relief based on his claim that the state trial court violated his due process rights by failing to order a competence examination at the time of his trial. Harris acknowledges that there is no indication in the record before this Court that his trial counsel requested a competence examination at the time of Harris's trial. Nonetheless, Harris contends that, given the evidence before the trial court (the evidence of Harris's low I.Q., the fact that Harris had recently been shot in the head, Harris's request for a competence hearing approximately two months before the trial, along with Harris's reaction to questions at the earlier hearing), the trial court should have ordered a competence examination sua sponte. 127 The Appellate Division rejected this argument without specific comment. See People v. Harris, 160 A.D.2d at 726, 555 N.Y.S.2d at 608 (citing, inter alia, People v. Armlin, 37 N.Y.2d 167, 371 N.Y.S.2d 691, 332 N.E.2d 870 (1975), and People v. Corwise, 120 A.D.2d 604, 502 N.Y.S.2d 223 (2d Dep't 1986)). The District Court concluded that Harris was not entitled to habeas relief on this claim because Harris's trial counsel did not request a competence examination at the time of Harris's trial, and there was insufficient evidence to require the trial court to order a competence hearing sua sponte. 128 Although we disagree with several aspects of the District Court's analysis of Harris's competence claim, we agree with the District Court's ultimate conclusion that Harris is not entitled to habeas relief on this basis. After a review of all of the evidence before the trial court, we conclude that Harris has failed to establish that his federal constitutional rights were violated by the state court's decision that Harris was not entitled to a competence hearing before or at the time of his trial. See Gaines v. Kelly, 202 F.3d 598, 601 (2d Cir.2000) (To obtain habeas relief petitioner must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that his federal constitutional rights were violated. (emphasis added)).
129 The constitutional right to due process is violated when a person who is incompetent is convicted of a crime, whether the conviction follows a trial or a plea of guilty. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-73, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). As the Supreme Court explained in Cooper, [a] defendant may not be put to trial unless he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. 517 U.S. at 354, 116 S.Ct. 1373 (citations, internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). 130 Moreover, the right not to stand trial while incompetent is sufficiently important to merit protection even if the defendant has failed to make a timely request for a competency determination. Cooper, 517 U.S. at 354 n. 4, 116 S.Ct. 1373 (citing Pate, 383 U.S. at 384, 86 S.Ct. 836). As this Court explained in Nicks v. United States, 955 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.1992), a hearing must be held when there is reasonable ground for a [trial] court to conclude that the defendant may not be competent to stand trial. Id. at 168. Of course, [i]t is axiomatic that in reviewing whether this obligation was properly discharged only evidence before the court at the time its decision was made is pertinent. Id. 131 Finally, [t]here are ... no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated. Drope, 420 U.S. at 180, 95 S.Ct. 896. In the end, then, the inquiry is whether, `in light of what was then known [to the trial court], the failure to make further inquiry into [Harris's] competence to stand trial[] denied him a fair trial.' Nicks, 955 F.2d at 169 (citing Drope, 420 U.S. at 174-75, 95 S.Ct. 896). 132 When we inquire, on habeas review, into whether Harris was denied a fair trial, we must presume the state court's findings of fact are correct, unless the petitioner meets the `burden of rebutting th[is] presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.' LanFranco v. Murray, 313 F.3d 112, 117 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(1) and citing Brown v. Artuz, 283 F.3d 492, 498 (2d Cir.2002)). This presumption of correctness is particularly important when reviewing the trial court's assessment of witness credibility. Parsad v. Greiner, 337 F.3d 175, 181 (2d Cir.2003); Shabazz v. Artuz, 336 F.3d 154, 161 (2d Cir.2003). Furthermore, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief unless the state court applied the clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court to the facts of the petitioner's case in an objectively unreasonable manner. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); LanFranco, 313 F.3d at 118; see also Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 315 (2d Cir.2001) (Under § 2254(d)(1), we must determine not whether the state court was incorrect or erroneous in rejecting [petitioner's] ... claim, but whether it was `objectively unreasonable' in doing so.) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (plurality opinion)).
133 In analyzing Harris's claim, the District Court first held that the state trial court erred by failing to hold a competence hearing in October 1999 (when Harris made a motion seeking such a hearing under N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 730.30). The District Court stated that: 134 [I]t is patently obvious that during the proceedings held on October 17, 1984, Harris'[s] responsiveness and lack of understanding indicated his inability to comprehend the proceedings. For example, he did not know the day of the week, and he said he had not spoken recently to his attorney. The cursory questioning of Harris conducted by the court was insufficient to ascertain whether Harris may have been mentally incapacitated at that time and thus incapable of proceeding toward trial. 135 Harris, 115 F.Supp.2d at 345 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the District Court concluded that: [T]he circumstances before the trial court in October 1984 presented a reasonable ground for believing that Harris was, at that moment, incompetent to stand trial. Petitioner's mental deficiencies were never disputed by the People, nor did the People contest the fact that Petitioner had been shot in the head and was still recovering from that wound, nor the fact that Harris was taking medication at the time to assist his recovery. Moreover, defense counsel's statements that he could not communicate with Harris gave increased urgency to the issue, as did the bizarre responses given by Petitioner to the court during the hearing on the motion. 136 Id. at 346. 137 However, the District Court then concluded that the dispositive inquiry was not whether the trial court's failure to order a competence examination in October 1984 was error, but rather, whether the state trial court committed constitutional error by failing to make sufficient inquiry into Harris's mental condition at the time of Harris's trial in January 1985. Id. The District Court noted that incapacity or incompetence to stand trial can come and go, and the proposition that a defendant may be competent at one point and incompetent at a later point is equally valid in reverse. That is, a defendant may be incompetent at one point but competent later on, which may have been the case here. Id. at 347 (citing Drope, 420 U.S. at 181, 95 S.Ct. 896) (Even when a defendant is competent at the commencement of his trial, a trial court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial.). Based on this premise, the District Court rejected Harris's claim, reasoning as follows: 138 Despite having determined that Harris'[s] due process rights would and should have been better protected by a competency hearing or psychiatric examination in October 1984, the Court cannot ignore that the actual trial of this matter did not take place until some two and a half months later. Nor can the Court ignore the absence of any subsequent arguments or applications at trial regarding Harris'[s] mental state. Without any evidence to the contrary, and without any application or motion having been made on the record, the Court must presume that Harris was not incapacitated at the time of trial in January 1985. It is logical to presume that Harris'[s] condition — as far as the bullet wound — had improved between October 17, 1984 and January 2, 1985 when voir dire began. To the extent that Harris's medication was causing some or all of his difficulties in October, it is likely that the medication had been reduced or eliminated entirely by January 1985. Thus, despite the fact that the trial court should have ordered an examination in October 1984, the Court cannot say that the failure to do so deprived Harris of his constitutional right to a fair trial two and a half months later. 139 Id. at 346-47.
140 First, we take issue with one aspect of the District Court's articulation of the applicable standard of review. Although the District Court correctly noted that on habeas review, the state court's findings of fact, if any, are presumed correct, id. at 341 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)), the Court erroneously stated that [d]eference to the state courts' legal determinations arising from record facts is not required when considering an inquiry into a petitioner's mental condition under the Due Process Clause, id. at 342 n. 6. In support of this latter premise the District Court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Drope, 420 U.S. at 175 & n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 896. This portion of the standard of review applied in Drope, however, is not applicable in the present case. In Drope the Supreme Court reviewed the state court decision directly, rather than collaterally through a habeas petition. In the present case, because the state court adjudicated Harris's competence claim on the merits, our review of legal determinations by the state courts is limited, and we may not grant the writ ... unless [the state court] adjudication [of Harris's claim] `resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.' Cox v. Miller, 296 F.3d 89, 101 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495). 141 We express no view on the validity of the notion, relied upon by the District Court, that Harris's claim fails because he failed to request a competence hearing at the time of his trial, even though he sought (and, in the District Court's view, was improperly denied) such a hearing two months before trial. We need not do so because we conclude, for the reasons given below, that it was not objectively unreasonable, once appropriate deference is accorded to the factual determinations of the state trial court, for that court to have denied Harris's motion for a competence hearing in October of 1984, and that there was insufficient evidence to require that court to have, sua sponte, conducted a competence hearing at trial. 142 1. The State Trial Court's Denial of Harris's Motion for a Competence Hearing on October 17, 1984 143 Harris argues, and the District Court agreed, that the state trial judge erred by denying Harris's motion for a competence hearing on October 17, 1984. In support of this position, both Harris and the District Court cited four evidentiary factors: (1) evidence of Harris's low intelligence; (2) the fact that Harris had recently been shot in the head (and the bullet remained lodged in his brain); (3) the bizarre responses Harris gave when questioned by the trial judge; and (4) statements by Harris's trial counsel to the effect that he was having great difficulty communicating with Harris. However, as we explain below, the evidence Harris cites in support of his position neither supports his argument as effectively as he contends, nor was the only significant evidence before the state court. 144
145 First, we note that, contrary to the District Court's statement that [Harris's] mental deficiencies were never disputed by the People, the government did, in fact, challenge the severity and nature of Harris's mental deficiencies. To be sure, the government acknowledged that Harris's intelligence was below average. However, the prosecutor challenged Dr. Feldman's view that Harris was in the borderline intellectual functioning category and questioned the validity of the quantitative assessments ( e.g., I.Q. and reading ability) contained in the Hartford School Department records upon which Dr. Feldman relied. Additionally, the prosecutor suggested that Harris may have been malingering when he was examined by Dr. Feldman in order to bolster his argument that he had not voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. 146 When the state trial court denied Harris's motion to suppress, the court largely accepted the government's position. The court explicitly concluded that Harris's intelligence was in the low-normal range, as Dr. Feldman had initially concluded. Thus the court rejected Dr. Feldman's later testimony to the effect that Harris was in the lower borderline intellectual functioning range. This is a factual determination, which we presume to be correct. See Parsad, 337 F.3d at 181 ([The] presumption of correctness [mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ] is particularly important when reviewing the trial court's assessment of witness credibility.). The state trial court also appeared to accept the possibility that Harris was malingering. Although the court did not express these conclusions until it denied Harris's motion to suppress — a month and a half after the October 17, 1984 hearing — they nonetheless provide insight into the trial court's assessment of the credibility of Dr. Feldman's testimony about Harris's intellectual capabilities. 147 Finally, the effect of Harris's mental deficiencies on his competence to stand trial was addressed — albeit not in the form of a formal competence hearing — in the context of the pre-trial suppression hearing. In that hearing, the expert that examined Harris testified that, despite Harris's limited intelligence, Harris was competent to stand trial. The state trial court credited this portion of Dr. Feldman's testimony, see App. at 441, and Harris never challenged it. Therefore, again, we presume that the state trial court's factual determinations with respect to this issue are correct. 148
149 Thereafter, however, Harris did request a competency hearing, citing the fact that he had recently been shot in the head, and the bullet remained lodged in his brain. Although it is reasonable to assume (perhaps even to expect) that a person who suffers a gunshot wound to the head might, at least for a time, have a diminished mental capacity relative to that person's mental capacity before the gunshot wound, the mere existence of Harris's head injury was not enough to require a competence examination. Harris's head injury is only relevant if it actually produced a diminished capacity at the time of Harris's trial. 150 However, there is no evidence, other than the statements of Harris's trial counsel and the cryptic nature of Harris's response to the trial judge's questions at the October 17, 1984 hearing (both of which we discuss below), to support the notion that Harris suffered lingering effects of the gunshot wound of a type that might warrant a competence examination. In order to obtain habeas relief, Harris has the burden of showing that his federal constitutional rights were violated by the state judge. However, Harris's counsel failed to submit any medical documentation about the effects (if any) of the injury on Harris's competence. Nor did he submit a list of medications Harris was taking, or documentation about the side effects (if any) of any medication Harris was taking. We know that Harris was competent to stand trial before the shooting, but very little is presented to show the effect of the shooting on Harris's competency. 151 On the other hand, there was evidence proffered to the state trial court suggesting that Harris had recovered from the gunshot wound without any serious adverse effect on his mental capacity. During the October 17, 1984 hearing, the prosecutor stated that: (1) Harris had been released from the hospital and returned to the jail; and (2) jail personnel with whom the prosecutor had spoken that morning reported that [t]hey ha[d] no problem in communicating with [Harris] and ha[d] made no noticeable observation of any inability to communicate at th[at] time. 152 c. Harris's Response to the State Trial Judge's Questions During the October 17, 1984 Hearing 153 Another significant piece of evidence cited by Harris and the District Court is the bizarre nature of the responses Harris gave to the trial judge's questions at the October 17, 1984 hearing. The District Court concluded that it was patently obvious that during the proceedings held on October 17, 1984, Harris' responsiveness and lack of understanding indicated his inability to comprehend the proceedings. For example, he did not know the day of the week, and he said he had not spoken recently to his attorney. Harris, 115 F.Supp.2d at 345. We agree that evidence that a defendant did not know the day of the week and did not recall the last time he spoke to his attorney (when, in fact, it was obvious that he had spoken to his attorney several minutes prior) could be strong evidence that a competence hearing is warranted. However, we do not agree with the District Court's conclusion that Harris's answers to the trial judge's questions necessarily establish that he was unaware of the day of the week or when he last spoke to his attorney. 154 Based on the trial transcript alone, we cannot determine whether Harris was legitimately confused in his answers, or he was simply uncooperative. During the earlier suppression hearing, the government argued (and the trial court apparently agreed) that Harris was malingering — exaggerating his apparent mental limitations in order to bolster his legal arguments. Thus, another reasonable interpretation of Harris's responses to the trial judge's questions is that Harris was being deliberately uncooperative in order to support the perception that he was incompetent to stand trial. 155 Based solely on the bare language of the trial transcript, without neither detailed findings of fact nor evidence about Harris's demeanor during the hearing, it is impossible for us to determine which view of this evidence is the correct one. We do know that the trial judge had observed Harris conferring with counsel during the hearing, and that immediately following the strange answers the judge stated that, based upon his observations of defendant during questioning, he was constrained to deny the motion. In such circumstances, an appellate court should generally defer to the conclusions of the trial judge, who was present in the courtroom and in a position to assess the defendant's demeanor. See Donato v. Plainview-Old Bethpage Cent. Sch. Dist., 96 F.3d 623, 634 (2d Cir.1996) ([W]e must accord great deference to the trial court's findings regarding credibility because the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate a witness's demeanor and tone of voice as well as other mannerisms that bear heavily on one's belief in what the witness says.). This is especially appropriate in a habeas case, in which the state court's factual determinations are presumed to be correct and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief. 156 d. Statements by Harris's Trial Counsel 157 Finally, Harris argues that a competence hearing was required because Harris's trial counsel reported that he was unable to communicate effectively with Harris. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that representations [by defense counsel] concerning the competence of his client ... [are] unquestionably a factor which should be considered when determining whether that client is competent. Drope, 420 U.S. at 177 n. 13, 95 S.Ct. 896. In the instant case, the transcript reflects that the trial judge considered the representations of Harris's counsel regarding Harris's competence, asking the prosecutor directly: How do you respond to [Harris's counsel's] oral argument that irrespective of the fact that none of the personnel that you've described have difficulty in communicating with the defendant Harris that he [Harris's counsel] has difficulty communicating with [Harris] ... ? 158 However, it is indisputable that courts are not required to accept the representations of defense counsel without question. Id. On the contrary, such representations are merely one factor to be considered by the court, including, in this case, the court's own observation of the defendant's conduct and evidence concerning the effects of Harris's injury, as well as evidence adduced at Harris's pre-injury competence hearing. 159 e. The Cumulative Weight of this Evidence 160 The District Court concluded, citing the evidence discussed above, that the circumstances before the trial court in October 1984 presented a reasonable ground for believing that Harris was, at that moment, incompetent to stand trial. Harris, 115 F.Supp.2d at 346. However, the relevant question in this case is not whether the evidence presented a reasonable ground for believing that Harris was incompetent; instead we must ask whether it was objectively unreasonable for the state trial court to have concluded (and the state appeals court to have agreed) that the circumstances did not present a reasonable ground for believing that Harris was incompetent. See Ryan v. Miller, 303 F.3d 231, 245 (2d Cir.2002) (Under § 2254(d)(1), we must determine not whether the state court was incorrect or erroneous in rejecting petitioner's claim, but whether it was objectively unreasonable in doing so. (citation, internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)). 161 Considering all of the evidence before the state trial court at the time of the October 17, 1984 hearing, we cannot conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for the court to have denied Harris's motion for a competence hearing. Although there was evidence to support the notion that Harris was incompetent ( e.g., Harris's low I.Q., the fact of the recent gunshot wound to his head, and his attorney's statement that Harris was uncommunicative), there was also evidence to the contrary. The prosecutor proffered evidence that Harris had left the hospital, returned to the prison population and was recovering from his injury. There was evidence that Harris had, in fact, been conferring with his attorney (although there was no evidence about the substance of any conversations between Harris and his attorney at that time). Moreover, there was evidence suggesting that Harris had malingered in the past in order to bolster his legal arguments, and may have been doing so again. 162 The trial judge, having observed Harris in the courtroom over the course of several proceedings and heard several days of testimony about Harris's mental capabilities and demeanor, was in a better position to assess this evidence than are we. See United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1150 (2d Cir.1986) ([D]eference is owed to the [trial] court's determinations [about a defendant's competence] based on observation of the defendant during the proceedings.). Consequently, based on the evidence in the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court's denial of Harris's motion for a competence hearing was objectively unreasonable. 163 However, this question does not end our analysis. The ultimate question upon which Harris's claim turns is whether the state trial court committed constitutional error by failing to order sua sponte a competence hearing at the time of Harris's trial. The District Court held that it did not, and with this conclusion we agree. See Harris, 115 F.Supp.2d at 347. 164 2. The Trial Court's Failure To Order Sua Sponte a Competence Hearing at the Time of Harris's Trial 165 The evidence that Harris offers in support of his contention that the District Court erred by failing to order a competence hearing sua sponte at the time of Harris's trial is largely the same evidence as that offered in support of Harris's October 1984 motion for a competence hearing. The only evidence available to the state trial court at the time of Harris's trial that was not available at the time of the earlier hearing are the statements of Harris's counsel during the Sandoval hearing prior to trial. 166 However, although these statements — to the effect that Harris was unable to communicate effectively with his counsel or otherwise assist in his own defense — could, if credited, raise a question about Harris's competence, it appears that the state trial court did not credit them. For example, when Harris's counsel stated that he was unable to communicate with Harris, the trial court pointed out that counsel had repeatedly sought opportunities to confer with Harris during jury selection. Thereafter, the trial judge told Harris's trial counsel that he had seen no evidence ... to indicate to my satisfaction certainly that Mr. Harris can't participate with you, cooperate effectively and also aid you in the trial of this action. 167 Given the state trial court's apparent unwillingness to credit Harris's counsel's statements about the extent of Harris's ability to communicate with his counsel or participate in his own defense, we cannot hold that it was objectively unreasonable for the trial court not to order a competence hearing. By the time of Harris's trial, more than three months had elapsed since Harris was shot, and Harris had been out of the hospital for more than two months. Harris had not submitted any medical documentation about the lingering effects (if any) of his head injury. Moreover, although Harris's counsel complained that Harris was uncommunicative, Harris's counsel did not renew his prior motion for a competence hearing. Consequently, we cannot conclude that, in light of what was... known [to the state trial court at the time of the trial], the failure to make further inquiry into [Harris's] competence to stand trial[ ] denied him a fair trial. Nicks, 955 F.2d at 169 (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 174-75, 95 S.Ct. 896 (internal quotation marks omitted)). On the contrary, as the District Court noted, there is scant evidence in the [state] trial record to suggest [Harris's] competency was sufficiently in doubt at the time of his trial. Harris, 115 F.Supp.2d at 347. Accordingly, we affirm that portion of the District Court's decision which denied Harris habeas relief on his incompetence claim. 168