Opinion ID: 2287196
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Heading: Nexus between Occupancy of Automobile and Decedent's Injury

Text: The policy provision for uninsured-motorist coverage does require that the injury must arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured motor vehicle.  In Novak the Supreme Court of Florida construed this phrase as not meaning proximately caused by but as having a broader meaning that simply required some nexus between the motor vehicle and the injury. The court further suggested that there had been a wholly sufficient connection between the decedent's use of the motor vehicle and the event causing her fatal injury. The court went on to say that it was unnecessary that the automobile be the instrumentality of the injury; neither would the type of conduct that causes the injury of necessity be foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the vehicle. In substance the majority opinion enunciated the principle that the clause arising out of the use of the motor vehicle is framed in general, comprehensive terms in order to express the intent to effect broad coverage. Such terms should be construed liberally because their function is to extend coverage broadly. Valdes v. Smalley, 303 So.2d 342 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). Similarly we believe that there was a substantial nexus in the case at bar between the decedent's status as a passenger in the insured motor vehicle and her being attacked with a dangerous weapon by an enraged motorist while she was waiting to be interviewed concerning the circumstances of an accident. Other Florida courts have come to similar conclusions when dealing with violent acts on the part of uninsured motorists that caused injury to covered persons. See Halpin v. Hilderbrand, 493 So.2d 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (battery by uninsured motorist after the insured had inadvertently cut off his vehicle); Fortune Insurance Co. v. Ferreiro, 458 So.2d 834 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (covered passenger injured by gunshot wound inflicted by uninsured motorist). We are aware that other courts in various jurisdictions have come to contrary conclusions. We have considered these cases and find them less persuasive than the Florida opinion. See, e.g., Rustin v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 254 Ga. 494, 330 S.E.2d 356 (1985); Foss v. Cignarella, 196 N.J. Super. 378, 482 A.2d 954 (1984); Day v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 261 Pa.Super. 216, 396 A.2d 3 (1978). Essentially we conclude that the breadth of the language that defines coverage in the uninsured-motorist section of the policy under the liberal interpretation that should be given to effectuate such definition requires us to hold that this tragic accident arose out of the use by the operator of the uninsured-motorist vehicle. Nothing contained in this opinion should be construed to prevent an insurance company from limiting its liability by appropriate exclusionary language so long as such language does not violate statutory policy. The reasoning in respect to the uninsured-motorist claim would apply as well to the medical-payments section of the policy. The decedent's death was caused by an accident as that term is construed herein, while she was constructively occupying a covered motor vehicle as a passenger. The decedent was, therefore, a covered person as defined in Part B of the policy. For the reasons stated, the defendants' appeal is sustained and the declaratory judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff is reversed. The case may be remanded to the Superior Court with directions to enter judgment requiring the plaintiff to proceed to arbitration pursuant to the requirements of the policy.