Opinion ID: 2559893
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Habit Evidence

Text: [¶ 21] Jacob contends that the court erred by admitting Kippax's testimony regarding his routine practices in his treatment of patients, which she argues is not permissible habit testimony pursuant to M.R. Evid. 406. She also argues that the court erred by admitting expert testimony that she contends relied on this habit testimony, and that referenced the practices of oral surgeons in general. A court's determination on the issue of habit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Bickart, 2009 ME 7, ¶ 33, 963 A.2d 183, 192. [¶ 22] M.R. Evid. 406 states: (a) Admissibility. Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice. (b) Method of proof. Habit or routine practice may be proved by specific instances of conduct sufficient in number to warrant a finding that the habit existed or that the practice was routine. [H]abit describes one's regular response to a repeated specific situation so that doing the habitual act becomes semi-automatic. Arel v. Poirier, 533 A.2d 1285, 1287 (Me. 1987) (quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). [¶ 23] Kippax stated several times during his testimony that he lacked memory of his specific treatment of Jacob, but recounted in some instances his routine practices in performing the tasks described in his notes of her treatment. In State v. Van Sickle, we upheld the admission of a police officer's testimony regarding his routine procedures for marking and securing seized drugs as evidence that the officer likely followed the same procedure in that case, although he lacked a specific memory of his actions. 434 A.2d 31, 36-37 (Me.1981). There was no abuse of discretion in the admission of the testimony here. [¶ 24] Jacob further argues that the court erred in admitting the opinion testimony of Kippax's expert, contending that the expert testified as to Kippax's habits without reviewing any of Kippax's prior treatment of patients. Although the expert did refer to what Dr. Kippax did, he testified that his opinions were based on the procedures recorded in Kippax's notes, and that although he was not familiar with Kippax's particular habits, he was talking about the typical way [] a procedure is done. This was not habit testimony, and the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this testimony.