Opinion ID: 774533
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Third Party Requirement

Text: 16 In the R&R, the magistrate judge stated: Our Circuit recently discussed the test used to determine when the possible destruction of evidence will satisfy the exigent circumstances requirement. Quoting from United States v. Gaitan-Acevedo, 148 F.3d 577, 585 (6th Cir. 1998), the magistrate judge stated: 17 This Circuit has adopted a two-pronged test to determine when the possibility of the destruction of evidence might constitute exigent circumstances sufficient to justify a warrantless entry into a home. Warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence 'is justified if the government demonstrates: (1) a reasonable belief that third parties are inside the dwelling; and (2) a reasonable belief that the loss or destruction of evidence is imminent.' United States v. Straughter, 950 F.2d 1223, 1230 (6th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1515 (6th Cir. 1996) (warrantless entry to prevent a suspect's escape is also permissible if supported by probable cause). The magistrate judge then stated: 18 Here, no question exists concerning the presence of third parties inside Campbell's home. The police knew to an absolute certainty that Campbell was inside the home. Where Campbell was and what he may have been doing, however, were not known to the police. Accordingly, the critical question is whether the activation of the transmitter hidden in the package, created a reasonable belief in the minds of the officers that the loss or destruction of the methamphetamine was imminent. 19 In his brief on appeal, Campbell argues, for the first time, that the magistrate judge's conclusion with respect to the third party issue was wrong. 1 Campbell asserts that the magistrate judge's conclusion completely misunderstands and misstates the case law. Mr. Campbell was not a third party, he was the suspect, the only suspect. However, Campbell did not include this as an objection when he filed his objections to the magistrate judge's R&R. The R&R contained the following notice: 20 Within ten (10) days after being served a copy of these proposed Findings and Recommendation, any party who wishes to object must file and serve written objections or further appeal is waived. Thomas v. Arn, 728 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1984), aff'd., 474 U.S. 140 (1985). 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). 21 In order to preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant is required to file objections with the district court to the findings of the magistrate judge. United States v. Hunter, 2001 WL 128297 at  (6th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949 (6th Cir. 1981)). Because Campbell failed to file any objections regarding this third party issue, the issue has been waived. (Id.). 22 Even if Campbell had not waived this issue, his claim that the evidence must be suppressed because he was not a third party is without merit. Campbell argues that under United States v. Gaitan-Acevedo, 148 F.3d at 585, and United States v. Straughter, 950 F.2d at 1230, exigent circumstances only exist when the government demonstrates . . . a reasonable belief that third parties are inside the dwelling. (Def.'s Br. at 13)(emphasis added). In deciding whether exigent circumstances existed, the courts in Gaitan-Acevedo and Straughter applied a two-prong test that originated in United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501 (6th Cir. 1988). In Sangineto-Miranda, the Sixth Circuit, relying on Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L. Ed.2d 409 (1970), stated: 23 We believe, consistent with Vale, that a police officer can show an objectively reasonable belief that contraband is being, or will be, destroyed within a residence if he can demonstrate: (1) a reasonable belief that third parties are inside the dwelling; and (2) a reasonable belief that these third parties may soon become aware that the police are on their trail, so that the destruction of evidence would be in order. 24 Id. at 1512. (emphasis added). However, Gaitan-Acevedo, Straughter and Sangineto-Miranda all involved factual situations where a suspect was arrested outside of a dwelling, but third parties were present inside the dwelling whom the police believed would destroy evidence. 25 Application of the two-prong Sangineto-Miranda test, requiring the presence of third parties, is appropriate in situations where a suspect is arrested outside of a dwelling, but third parties whom the police believe will destroy evidence are inside the dwelling. In those limited factual situations, the exigent circumstance of imminent destruction of evidence could not exist if there was no third party present in the dwelling, because the suspect was already in police custody outside the dwelling. 26 None of the cases cited above can be read as requiring the presence of a third party in cases where it is the suspect himself who is inside the dwelling and is also the individual the police believe may destroy evidence inside the dwelling. Rather, the more general test for whether or not exigent circumstances exist is as we stated in Sangineto-Miranda, relying on Vale: Before exigent circumstances are present ... the police must have a reasonable basis for believing there is someone in the house who would likely destroy evidence. Id. at 1512. Accordingly, Campbell's argument that there must be a third party present before exigent circumstances exist must fail.