Opinion ID: 2585503
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Refusal to Permit Defendant to Introduce Favorable Character Evidence

Text: After hearing from several witnesses who testified on defendant's behalf, defendant called his aunt, Mary McGowan, to the stand. When defense counsel asked her whether she had feelings about the decision between life and death regarding defendant, the prosecutor objected on the ground the proposed testimony was cumulative to that of previous witnesses. After a sidebar discussion, the trial court sustained the objection, specifically citing Evidence Code section 352. Defense counsel asked no further questions, but later renewed his request to ask the witness about her feelings regarding the [life or death] decision. The prosecutor indicated he had a continuing objection, and the trial court indicated his previous ruling sustaining the objection would stand. Defendant contends the trial court, by excluding McGowan's testimony as cumulative, violated his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as analogous provisions of the California Constitution. He correctly argues that the evidence was admissible ( People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 456, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442 [A defendant may offer evidence that he or she is loved by family members or others, and that these individuals want him or her to live]) and contends the evidence was not cumulative, as the trial court found. In particular, he observes that several defense witnesses testified to having warm and loving feelings towards defendant, but that none (save one) actually stated a preference between life and death. The one exception was defendant's mother, Catherine Williams, who testified she believed staying [in prison] for life is just as bad as being put on death row or the death penalty. Evidence Code section 352 permits the exclusion of evidence on the ground that it is cumulative. A trial court's exclusion of evidence on this ground will not be reversed on appeal unless the court abused its discretion. (See People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 213, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710.) We need not decide whether the trial court abused its discretion here, because the exclusion of McGowan's testimony, if error, was harmless in that it is not reasonably possible defendant would have obtained a different verdict but for the error. (See People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 103, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506 [state law error at the penalty phase tested by the reasonable possibility test]; People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 448, 250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135 [same].) Here, the jurors could readily have inferred from previous defense witnesses that they preferred defendant be spared the death penalty. For example, defendant's aunt, Louise Matthews, was asked: Do you have feelings about that decision [between life and death] you want to express to the jury? She replied: I just feel he just, he never had a chance in growing up. Similarly, Angela Matthews, defendant's cousin, was asked: Do you have feelings for your cousin that you want to express regarding the decision that the jury has to make? She replied: I love my cousin dearly. I don't want to see anything happen to him. It is not reasonably possible the jury would have reached a different result had it heard from Mary McGowan. In addition to the question whether the evidence was properly found to be cumulative, defendant also argues the exclusion of McGowan's testimony violated his right to due process and reliability in the penalty determination under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. A defendant in a capital case is entitled to have the jury consider any relevant mitigating evidence. { Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1.) However, [exclusion of such evidence ... does not automatically require reversal, but is instead subject to the standard of review announced in Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, that is, the error is reversible unless it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1117-1118, 31 Cal. Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36; see also People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006,1031-1032, 245 Cal.Rptr. 185, 750 P.2d 1342.) In light of the many other defense witnesses who testified in defendant's favor at the penalty phase, we find the exclusion of McGowan's testimony, if error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.