Opinion ID: 2633504
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Claims Against Knickrehm

Text: At the close of Domke's case, Knickrehm moved for a directed verdict, arguing that he could not be personally liable for conspiring to interfere with Domke's contract or breaching Champion's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, because Knickrehm had acted within the scope of his employment. Domke conceded that Knickrehm had acted within the scope of his employment but maintained that he could nonetheless be personally liable if his actions in interfering with Domke's contract were intentional and malicious. The court dismissed the claims against Knickrehm, concluding as a matter of law that as an employee acting within the scope of his employment, Knickrehm could not interfere with a contract to which his employer was a party. Knickrehm maintains that the superior court correctly reached this conclusion. He also notes that we have previously recognized that agents cannot be personally liable for a breach of contract so long as the fact of their agency and the identity of the principal are disclosed. [30] Here, it is undisputed that Domke was aware that Knickrehm acted on behalf of Champion. Domke responds that a supervisor can be personally liable for his role in the interference with his subordinate's employment contract caused by his own independently tortious or malicious acts. In support of this contention, Domke cites Jones v. Central Peninsula Hospital, [31] where we favorably referred to Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, [32] an Arizona case that supports Domke's position. According to Domke, Jones's reliance on Wagenseller makes his theory the rule of law in Alaska. Domke claims that there was enough evidence to support a finding that Knickrehm engaged in independently tortious acts: According to Domke, Knickrehm failed to abide by Alyeska's policy against co-employment, lied to Champion about Domke's actions, and lied to Alyeska when he told [Alyeska] that Domke's termination had nothing to do with Disbrow. But we need not decide if Domke's theory of error has legal merit; even assuming for the sake of argument that it does, we conclude that Domke has failed to carry his burden of establishing that the alleged error actually caused any substantial prejudice. Initially, we note that the extent of the prejudice that Domke realistically might have suffered would have been relatively slight at most. As Domke conceded at trial, his implied covenant and tortious interference claims against Champion, which remained intact, accomplished essentially the same thing as his dismissed claim against Knickrehm could have accomplished. Thus, if the court had left Domke's interference claim intact and he had won a judgment against Knickrehm, there is no reason to suspect that his judgment would have exceeded the award he actually received on his judgment against Champion. At best, he might have had identical judgments against Knickrehm and Champion instead of a judgment against Champion alone. More important, even if the jury accepted Domke's description of Knickrehm's conduct, it would not necessarily have determined that Knickrehm acted maliciously or committed independently tortious acts, as would have been required for a finding of liability under Wagenseller and Jones. The conduct alleged by Domke could as easily have been seen as evincing Knickrehm's genuine desire to protect the interests of his employer, Champion. Domke does not explain why a finding of malicious or independently tortious actions would have been likely, and our own review of the record fails to persuade us of a fair probability that the jury would have made such a finding. We thus conclude that Domke has failed to make a showing of prejudicial error.