Opinion ID: 1124985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alternatives to the Death Penalty

Text: Porter argues that he was denied his right to due process at sentencing when the district court allegedly failed to consider alternatives to the death penalty. The district court did not specifically state that it considered alternatives. However, the district court's findings stated that a sentence of death was the least sentence that would not unduly deprecate the seriousness of the crime in question. Additionally, the record reflects that the district court perceived its sentencing decision as involving the discretion to impose imprisonment, rather than death, because the district court explained in its findings that Porter ha[d] no capacity for rehabilitation. A district court has discretion to impose the death penalty. State v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320, 321-22, 806 P.2d 413, 414-15 (1990). This Court, therefore, reviews a district court's imposition of a death sentence under the abuse of discretion standard set forth in Sun Valley Shopping Center, 119 Idaho at 94, 803 P.2d at 1000. Although this Court has not recognized that a district court specifically must state that it has considered alternatives, this Court reversed a sentence of death in State v. Leavitt because the trial court failed to give adequate consideration of the alternatives which exist between the distant poles of `rehabilitation and possible probation,' or the death penalty. 116 Idaho 285, 294, 775 P.2d 599, 608, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 923, 110 S.Ct. 290, 107 L.Ed.2d 270 (1989). We believe that the district court in the present case properly, though implicitly, considered alternatives to the death penalty. It clearly addressed the four goals of sentencing, including rehabilitation, and stated that this sentence was the only way to accomplish justice. Moreover, the district court properly followed the statutory procedure for imposing the death penalty, see I.C. § 19-2515, perceived its decision as one involving discretion, and acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the sentencing choices available. Consequently, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Porter to death.