Opinion ID: 2613958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Instruction on Sentencing Discretion

Text: The court gave the 1986 version of CALJIC No. 8.84.2, which reflects the changes suggested in People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440] reversed on other grounds sub nom. California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837], as follows: [I]t is now your duty to determine which of the two penalties, death or confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole, shall be imposed on the defendant. [¶] After having heard all of the evidence, and after having heard all of the, after having heard and considered the arguments of counsel you shall consider, take into account, and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating, and mitigating circumstances upon which you have been instructed. [¶] The weighing of aggravation, aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. In weighing the various circumstances you simply determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. To return a judgment of death each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating evidence is so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. [¶] Now you shall now retire and select one of your number to act as your foreman, who will preside over your deliberations. In order to make a determination as to the penalty all twelve jurors must agree. [¶] Any verdict that you reach must be dated and signed by your foreman on a form that will be provided and then shall be returned, and then you shall return with it to this courtroom. (Italics added.) [90] Defendant claims that above italicized words rendered the instruction vague, misleading and constitutionally defective. However, if defendant believed the instruction was unclear, he had the obligation to request clarifying language. (See People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 53.) In any case, we have repeatedly rejected arguments identical to defendant's ( People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1244-1245; People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 590-591 [286 Cal. Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893]; see also People v. Wader, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 662-663; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 315-316 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585]), and decline to reconsider our determinations. (68) Defendant next claims that the trial court erred in failing to instruct that even if no evidence in mitigation was found, or if the circumstances in aggravation were found to outweigh those in mitigation, the jury nevertheless had discretion to impose life without parole if it determined that such a sentence was the appropriate penalty under all of the circumstances. (See People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 979 [281 Cal. Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131] [jury may determine even in the absence of mitigating evidence that the aggravating evidence is insubstantial].) In particular, defendant complains that the instructions given in this case were inadequate and led to a constitutionally flawed result because: (1) their wording required that there be some evidence in mitigation as a prerequisite for imposing a sentence less than death; and (2) they presupposed that such evidence was introduced at the penalty phase. We disagree. Defendant's failure to request such clarifications at trial bars appellate review of the issue. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 52.) In any event, no error appears. We recently concluded that a trial court did not err in failing to give substantially similar clarifications where it instructed the jury pursuant to instructions identical to those given here (former CALJIC No. 8.84.2). Under such instructions, [n]o reasonable juror would assume he or she was required to impose death despite insubstantial aggravating circumstances, merely because no mitigating circumstances were found to exist. (6 Cal.4th at p. 52; cf. People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 921 [8 Cal. Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712].) Thus, the trial court in this case adequately informed the jury of its sentencing responsibilities. No more was required.