Opinion ID: 2405385
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Evidentiary Issue Involving Defendant's Resignation from the Police Force

Text: At trial in the Superior Court, the trial judge granted the defendants' motion in limine seeking exclusion of any evidence pertaining to defendant Sutton's resignation from the Wilmington Police Department. The trial court ruled that Sutton could not be cross-examined on this evidence pursuant to D.R.E. 608(b) because: (1) the evidence was not relevant under D.R.E. 401; and (2) to the extent the evidence had probative value, this value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice pursuant to D.R.E. 403. This Court reviews for abuse of discretion the decision of a trial court to disallow cross-examination of a witness on the subject of specific instances of misconduct. D.R.E. 608(b); Scott v. State, Del.Supr., 642 A.2d 767 (1994). Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence and a new trial must be granted. Delaware Rule of Evidence 608(b) allows cross-examination of a witness concerning specific incidents of misconduct which bear on the witness' credibility or reputation for truthfulness. As a general rule, the decision to permit or deny this type of cross-examination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). The trial court may not, however, exercise this discretion so as to defeat a party's right to effective cross-examination. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held, [t]o properly evaluate a witness, a jury must have sufficient information to make a discriminating appraisal of a witness's motives and bias. It is an abuse of discretion for a ... judge to cut off cross-examination if the opportunity to present this information is not afforded. Douglas v. Owens, 3d Cir., 50 F.3d 1226, 1230 (1995) (citations omitted). Accordingly, this Court has established criteria to guide judicial discretion in this area. Snowden, 672 A.2d at 1025; see also Weber v. State, Del.Supr., 457 A.2d 674, 681 (1983). As stated in Weber and Snowden, the trial court must consider: (1) whether the testimony of the witness being impeached is crucial; (2) the logical relevance of the specific impeachment evidence to the question of bias; (3) the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, and undue delay; and (4) whether the evidence is cumulative. Snowden, 672 A.2d at 1025 ( quoting Weber, 457 A.2d at 681). Although Snowden and Weber were criminal cases, we find the criteria announced in those cases to be equally applicable in a civil setting. Applying these criteria to the case at bar, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by disallowing cross-examination of Officer Sutton concerning his termination for the following reasons. First, Officer Sutton's testimony was crucial to the disposition of the case. Apart from Garden, Sutton was the only eyewitness to the accident. Moreover, Sutton's version of the events at issue was completely at odds with the account given by the plaintiff. In this posture, the case turned on a credibility assessment. See Weber, 457 A.2d at 682 (jury [must be] ... exposed to facts sufficient for it to draw inferences as to the reliability of the witness). Second, under the facts presented, this evidence bears logical relevance for a number of reasons. There is a real danger that the jury ascribed undue weight to Sutton's testimony because he was a former police officer. A witness' association with the police department tends to provide an independent guarantee of trustworthiness. Since Sutton was no longer a police officer at the time of trial and had not left the police force of his own volition, the jury was entitled to know the circumstances of his resignation in order to temper any undue assumptions made about Sutton's trustworthiness. The circumstances of the reckless burning incident also give some indication of Sutton's truthfulness. The offer of proof was that Sutton, a married man, set fire to a car belonging to a woman with whom he was having an affair and that Sutton lied to this woman, creating false pretenses to allow him access to the vehicle. Circumstances surrounding a witness' misconduct which go directly to truthfulness are important in assessing admissibility. Third, the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues and undue delay were not sufficient to tip the scales against admissibility. Some prejudice to the defense would arise from the admission of this evidence. This prejudice is outweighed by the probative value of the evidence, however. Confusion of the issues does not present a problem as long as a proper limiting instruction is given confining the jury's consideration of the evidence to the question of witness credibility. No problem of undue delay is implicated, since the alleged circumstances of Sutton's discharge were known to the plaintiff and cross-examination could have proceeded immediately had it been allowed. Finally, the evidence offered here was not cumulative. In fact, the excluded evidence was the only impeachment evidence available to the plaintiff. Garden does not have a recollection of the events sufficient to rebut Sutton's account, and no other negative character evidence has been brought to light. Thus, the proffered cross-examination can hardly be considered cumulative. In Snowden, which presented a similar factual situation, we found that the defendant's confrontation right had been infringed by the trial court's refusal to permit cross-examination on the subject of the arresting officer's discharge from employment. Although Garden's confrontation rights are not implicated in this civil matter, we find the reasoning of Snowden equally compelling in this context. Accordingly, in light of Snowden, cross-examination on the subject of Sutton's resignation should have been allowed. See Douglas, 50 F.3d at 1231 (holding that trial court's refusal to allow cross-examination concerning police officer's termination was abuse of discretion in civil case).