Opinion ID: 428380
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appealability of the Commission's Order.

Text: 10 The Union contends that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the Commission's order, because the order, in remanding the case to the ALJ, does not finally determine the merits of the case. 3 We believe, however, that the Commission's order falls within the class of collateral orders reviewable under the doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). 11 In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2458, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978), the Supreme Court defined the scope of the collateral order exception: 12 To come within the small class of decisions excepted from the final-judgment rule by Cohen, the order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. 13 We think the Commission's order meets the three Coopers & Lybrand criteria. First, the order conclusively determines the issue before us--whether a union has a right to present objections, on issues other than the reasonableness of the abatement time, to a settlement entered into by the Secretary and an employer. Second, the issue of the Union's right to be heard, which presents an important question of statutory construction and of the respective powers of the Secretary and the Commission, is completely separate from the merits of the underlying dispute over whether the violation was serious and whether it warrants a civil penalty. Finally, the question of the Union's right to object to settlement will likely not be reviewable on appeal of a final judgment. If the ALJ, after hearing the Union's objections, again upholds the settlement, the Secretary will not stand aggrieved and so will not have grounds to appeal. If the ALJ disapproves the settlement, and the case goes to the Commission for a full hearing on the merits of the original citation, the Secretary will have to await a decision on the merits to appeal. But if the Secretary wins on the merits of the original citation (that is, if the violation is adjudicated serious and a penalty assessed), he will not be in a position to argue that Whirlpool should have the benefit of the more favorable terms of the rejected settlement. On the other hand, if the Secretary decides the case is not worth prosecuting on the merits--perhaps a reason why he was willing to settle in the first place--he will never get a final order of any kind and will never have the opportunity to raise the issue which is before the court now. 14 Therefore, we conclude that the Commission's remand order is reviewable here, notwithstanding that it does not finally adjudicate the merits of the Whirlpool citation. Our failure to reach the question of the Union's right to object to an OSHA settlement in these circumstances would likely leave an important issue in the administration of the Act undecided. We follow the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits, then, and hold the remand order reviewable. See Donovan v. OSHRC, supra, 713 F.2d at 922-25; Marshall v. OCAW, 647 F.2d 383, 386-87 (3d Cir.1981); Marshall v. OSHRC, 635 F.2d 544 (6th Cir.1980). 4 15