Opinion ID: 2081732
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of Review on Certiorari.

Text: The brief of the attorney general contends that when review is sought by certiorari of a decision of an administrative agency, such as the defendant board in the instant case, the sole question is whether the agency acted within its jurisdiction. We are satisfied that this is too narrow an interpretation of the scope of such review. This is borne out by the declaration of this court in State ex rel. Progreso Development Co. v. Wisconsin R. E. Brokers' Board (1930), 202 Wis. 155, 168, 231 N. W. 628, that a reviewing court in certiorari will inquire to ascertain not only whether the subordinate officer or board kept within its jurisdiction but also to see whether or not he or it acted according to law. Construing the phrase acted according to law, we deem the word  law  means not only any applicable statutes but also the common-law concepts of due process and fair play and avoidance of arbitrary action. As Mr. Justice FRITZ well stated in State ex rel. Madison Airport Co. v. Wrabetz (1939), 231 Wis. 147, 153, 285 N. W. 504, the cardinal and ultimate test of the presence or absence of due process of law in any administrative proceeding is the presence or absence of the `rudiments of fair play long known to our law.' The Minnesota court in Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Commissioner (1956), 247 Minn. 6, 10, 76 N. W. (2d) 107, 111, recently stated in a certiorari case that it is well settled that, ... this court will go no further than to determine: (1) Whether the board kept within its jurisdiction; (2) whether it proceeded on correct theory of the law; (3) whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was such that it might reasonably make the order or determination in question. In Elwood v. State ex rel. Griffin (1932), 203 Ind. 626, 180 N. E. 471, 81 A. L. R. 1027, the Indiana court had before it a teachers' tenure statute similar to sec. 37.31(1), Stats., which provided that the school board's action in discharging a teacher shall be final. In a mandamus proceeding brought in behalf of a lady teacher who had been discharged because she had married, the court ordered reinstatement on the ground that such fact of marriage was not a statutory ground for discharge. In discussing the scope of review the court stated (203 Ind. 631, 180 N. E. 473): If a school board dismisses a teacher for a cause named in the statute, such action is conclusive and is not subject to review by the courts, unless the board in taking the action acted in bad faith, arbitrarily, corruptly, fraudulently, or in gross abuse of its discretion.  (Emphasis supplied.) This same court later decided Peru v. State ex rel. Youngblood (1937), 212 Ind. 255, 7 N. E. (2d) 176, arising under the same tenure statute, in which a discharged teacher sought reinstatement by mandamus, and the trial court's judgment of reinstatement was reversed. The court found that the school board had complied with all the requirements of the teachers' tenure statute in making the discharge, and concluded with this statement (212 Ind. 268, 7 N. E. (2d) 181): Under the circumstances here presented, the jurisdiction of the trial court was limited to a consideration of whether or not there was substantial evidence before the board to support the charges against the appellee. (Emphasis supplied.) We deem that the foregoing quotations from the cited court decisions, which bear on the scope of court review in certiorari or mandamus of a decision of an administrative agency, merit our approval and are applicable to the instant appeal.