Opinion ID: 2653179
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fails to correct a false impression which

Text: the deceiver previously created or reinforced, or which the deceiver knows to be influencing another to whom he stands in a fiduciary or confidential relationship. 23 [N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4.] “Amounts involved in thefts . . . committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, whether from the same person or several persons, may be aggregated in determining the grade of offense.” N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2b(4) (emphasis added). See Cannel, supra, comment 3 on N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4 (noting that aggregation premised on continuing nature of illegal conduct). This Court has never addressed whether theft by deception is a continuing offense so that the statute of limitations commences to run only when the course of conduct is complete. In State v. Childs, 242 N.J. Super. 121, 134 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 321 (1990), and State v. Jurcsek, 247 N.J. Super. 102, 110 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 126 N.J. 333 (1991), the Appellate Division determined that theft by deception is a continuing offense for purposes of the statute of limitations when the defendant is engaged in a continuing scheme or course of behavior to obtain funds by deception. In Childs, supra, the defendant raised cash for his corporation by making false representations to induce investors to lend money in exchange for unsecured corporate notes that had no value. 242 N.J. Super. at 125-27. In Jurcsek, supra, the defendant implemented a fraudulent scheme to obtain bank funds in the form of student loans on a recurring basis. 247 N.J. Super. at 110; accord State v. Tyson, 200 N.J. Super. 137, 139 (Law Div. 1984) 24 (receipt of three forms of public financial assistance based on periodic certifications over nine years is continuing offense). Based on these cases, the Appellate Division recently concluded that our “[c]ourts have found a plain appearance that the Legislature intended to prohibit a continuing course of conduct in situations involving a common scheme of ongoing conduct and where, by the terms of the statute prohibiting the conduct, the amounts involved can be aggregated to form a single offense.” State v. Coven, 405 N.J. Super. 266, 276 (App. Div. 2009). In the typical case, the offense is complete as soon as every element of the offense occurs. Several discrete acts of theft by deception would not be a continuing offense because the harm caused by each theft would cease upon completion of each offense. On the other hand, if “the crime is not exhausted for purposes of the statute of limitations[,] as long as the proscribed course of conduct continues,” it is a continuing offense. Toussie, supra, 397 U.S. at 124, 90 S. Ct. at 865, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 167 (White, J., dissenting). Thus, the offense of official misconduct premised on an agreement between a borough attorney and a private citizen for the attorney to use his influence to guide legislative action for the benefit of the private citizen is a continuing offense. Weleck, supra, 10 N.J. at 374. This is so because the public official can influence the legislative business of the borough for the benefit of a 25 party other than the public entity as long as he is in office and the matter is before the governing body. By contrast, the offense of extortion is complete when money is demanded and taken. Id. at 375. We discern from these cases the need to scrutinize the statute to determine the conduct that is prohibited. We do so because the Legislature has not expressly stated that theft by deception is a continuing offense as it has done in N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8c (connecting or causing to be connected a device to obtain gas, electric or water without payment) or N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8d (tampers with devices that record electric usage).5 N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4 also does not contain language describing the circumstances when a litany of single offenses might constitute a continuing offense. Furthermore, the Legislature has declared that the various theft offenses addressed in Chapter 20, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1 to -38 are generally single offenses. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2a. Nevertheless, the Legislature has declared that the amounts involved in thefts may be aggregated to determine the grade of the offense when the thefts are part of “one scheme or course of conduct, whether from the same person or several persons.” N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2b(4). This approach undoubtedly 5 The Legislature amended each statute in 1985 to expressly provide that each was a continuing offense, L. 1985, c. 20, § 1, following an Appellate Division opinion holding to the contrary. State v. Insabella, 190 N.J. Super. 544, 553-54 (App. Div. 1983). 26 reflects recognition by the Legislature that theft by deception is not always an isolated event but may actually be a complex scheme involving many persons or businesses and play out over the course of many days, weeks, months, or even years. We hold that the scheme devised and implemented by defendant comprised a continuing offense. In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful that a continuing offense is not the norm. Although most theft by deception offenses are not continuing offenses, here, the scheme developed and implemented by defendant never contemplated a single act of theft by deception. Rather, the scheme depended on a series of actions to create the impression that PFP was a legitimate business engaged in the wholesale distribution of fresh produce and had the ability to pay its financial obligations in a timely manner as required by federal law. Having created the impression of a legitimate and financially responsible produce business, it initiated a course of conduct that did not cease until suppliers refused to provide any more produce. It placed multiple orders from fourteen wholesalers. Those wholesalers shipped produce under the impression, carefully cultivated by defendant, that they would be paid. Rather, defendant shipped the produce from the PFP warehouse to produce businesses he and co-defendant Fava controlled almost as fast as it arrived. Defendant commingled and sold the produce ordered by PFP with the produce purchased 27 by companies owned or controlled by co-defendant Fava. Little of the sums realized from the sale of PFP-acquired produce was ever returned to PFP’s accounts and ultimately to the fourteen produce suppliers. Their losses exceeded $1.7 million. Here, defendant devised and orchestrated a single scheme to defraud several businesses. The evidence adduced at trial demonstrates that every act taken by defendant and his business associates was to further the single scheme that produced ongoing harm to a targeted group of victims. We, therefore, hold that when a defendant engages in a course of conduct or single scheme to obtain property of another by deception from one or several persons, that conduct is a continuous offense for purposes of the statute of limitations. Having determined that the conduct devised by defendant qualifies as a continuing offense, we must determine when the last constituent act occurred. That inquiry in this case requires us to determine whether the last act is the receipt and acceptance of the produce or the failure to pay for the produce. A person cannot be convicted of theft by deception unless he has obtained the property of another by purposely creating a false impression. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4; see also State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 495 (1995) (holding that for act to constitute theft, stolen property must “belong to another”), overruled on other grounds by State v. Cooper, 151 N.J. 326, 378 (1997). The 28 term “obtain” is defined as a transfer of a legal interest in the property. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1f. The term “property” and “property of another” are defined broadly to include “anything of value.” N.J.S.A. 2C:20-1h. Thus, a builder who induced lenders to give him money based on false impressions which the builder created was guilty of theft by deception and the offense was complete when he received the funds which would not have been advanced but for his falsification of documents. State v. Rodgers, 230 N.J. Super. 593, 601-02 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 117 N.J. 54 (1989). Based on these principles, defendant contends he obtained the property of another when he received the produce for suppliers on credit, and the last shipment arrived on January 12, 2000. Therefore, the indictment is not timely. The State responds that the last act occurred when PFP failed to pay for the produce in accordance with the purchase agreement for the last shipments and that the record reveals that payment for the final shipments was not due until after February 1, 2000. The majority of jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have held that the statute of limitations for comparable theft offenses begins to run at the time of the receipt of property. William A. Harrington, When statute of limitations begins to run against criminal prosecution for embezzlement, fraud, false pretenses, or similar crimes, 77 A.L.R.3d 689, 694 29 (2009) (noting that in most cases involving prosecutions for crimes of theft involving fraud, “the limitation period was held to begin when the misappropriation or misuse of funds or property by the accused took place”). Although a minority of jurisdictions hold that the statute of limitations begins to run when the victim becomes aware of the fraud, see Harrington, supra, 77 A.L.R.3d at 712 (discussing cases “holding that statute begins to run on occurrence of event after misappropriation of funds or property”), this theory is inconsistent with our Code. Our “Code is drafted on the theory that it is ordinarily desirable to start the running of the period of limitation at the time when a crime is committed rather than at the time the offense is detected or the offender discovered.” Final Report, supra, § 2C:1-6 commentary 2 at 14. Here, the Appellate Division held that the last act occurred when PFP breached its contractual obligation to pay for the produce. Diorio, supra, 422 N.J. Super. at 459. The appellate court relied on a dissent in Rosborough, supra, 909 So. 2d at 776-78. Ibid. In Rosborough, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that any deceptive acts subsequent to the taking of the property did not constitute theft by deception, id. at 77576, and concluded that the limitation period began to run when Rosborough obtained funds for an investment that contemplated 30 monthly interest payments and a return of principal after five years, id. at 776.