Opinion ID: 786802
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Miller's Claim Regarding the Scope of His Involvement

Text: 37 In his separate appeal, Miller asserts that the District Court erroneously conflated the jury's general conspiracy conviction with the court's conclusion that Miller should be held liable for all losses related to the conspiracy under the relevant conduct provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. Miller contends that even if a defendant has been convicted of a conspiracy charge, the trial court must make particularized findings as to the scope of each conspirator's involvement in order to increase the conspirator's sentence under Section 1B1.3. 38 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant's offense level is subject to increase depending on the amount of loss caused by the fraud. Section 1B1.3(a) provides that the district court should adjust the specific offense level by taking into account all conduct relevant to the offense. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a). This includes all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of [a] jointly undertaken criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). 39 Miller asserts that United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985 (3d Cir.1992), requires that we remand this case in light of the District Court's lack of findings as to the precise scope and timing of his agreement to join the conspiracy. 5 In Collado, we stated that the district court must consider whether the loss resulting from the actions of co-conspirators was 1) in furtherance of the ... jointly-undertaken ... activity, 2) within the scope of the defendant's agreements, and 3) reasonably foreseeable in connection with the criminal activity the defendant agreed to undertake. 975 F.2d at 995 (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, application note 1); see also United States v. Duliga, 204 F.3d 97, 100 (3d Cir.2000). We held that the relevant conduct provision depends upon each defendant's role in the conspiracy and stated that courts must conduct a searching and individualized inquiry into the circumstances surrounding each defendant's involvement in the conspiracy in order to ensure that the defendant's sentence accurately reflects his or her role in the conspiracy. Collado, 975 F.2d at 995. We added that district courts also should consider other factors, such as whether the defendant profited or assisted others in the conspiracy. Id. at 991-94. We further clarified that a conspiracy conviction does not obviate the need for analysis under the relevant conduct provision. Id. at 993, 997. 40 Collado dealt with the liability of two brothers involved in a larger drug conspiracy. The district court had not made any factual findings as to the scope of the brothers' involvement in the conspiracy or in each other's transactions, but instead only adopted the findings of the presentence report in attributing to each of them the drug quantity from the conspiracy. Although we required individualized inquiry, we did not impose an immutable requirement that the district court hold extensive hearings to make explicit, particularized findings as to the exact date on which each defendant committed to the conspiracy or the precise contours of each conspirator's agreement. We instead employed a more flexible approach. We remanded the case to the district court to determine when the defendants had joined the larger conspiracy because the district court had made no finding on the issue and the record was not clear on this issue. 41 Critically, however, we also affirmed the district court's attribution to one brother the amounts the other brother supplied to the conspiracy. We affirmed this finding based on our review of the record, despite the district court's lack of explicit findings on this issue. Because the record was clear on its face, the district court's lack of particularized findings was not dispositive. We instead concluded that the district court's accomplice attribution conclusion between the brothers was supported by the record evidence of their awareness of and assistance to each other in drug transactions. See id. at 997. 42 More recently, in Duliga, we reaffirmed the proposition that even absent explicit findings on the precise scope of a defendant's involvement, a district court's decision may be affirmed if it is adequately supported by the trial court record. 204 F.3d at 101 n. 2. Although the district court in that case did not necessarily undertake a searching and individualized inquiry before attributing the entire amount of [fraud] loss ... to Duliga, we affirmed without remanding because we were convinced that the attribution of the fraud loss was firmly supported by the record. Id. 43 Here, the record evidence suffices to support the conclusion that Miller had agreed to the conspiracy by at least August 1990 and should be held liable for the full amount of loss caused by the conspiracy. In contrast to Collado' s under-developed record, the record in this case included Miller's opinion letters on fraudulent stock transactions, his demand letters to protect artificially inflated stock quotes, and his letters advising the removal of restrictive stock certificate legends so that nonmarketable shares would appear to be tradeable. Miller played a critical role, enabling the conspiracy to function and providing it an imprimatur of legitimacy. The record evidence of Miller's extensive involvement in the conspiracy supports the District Court's application of the relevant conduct provision. 6 As with Duliga, we see no reason to remand the case only to have the district court reach the same sentencing decision. 204 F.3d at 101 n. 2.
44 Miller also contends that the District Court abused its discretion by denying his request to submit additional evidence that allegedly would have had a direct bearing on the scope and timing of his involvement in the conspiracy and his inability to foresee the total fraud loss caused by the conspiracy. In particular, Miller attempted to submit evidence to dispute 1) his presence at the first meeting between Rennert and Teale in August 1990 (the time at which the Government suggested that Miller joined the conspiracy); 2) Forum Rothmore's designation of payments to Miller as legal fees or leasing fees in its financial records; and 3) the timing of Miller's first discussion with the owners of the gold mine corporation (with which Ecotech merged) about receiving Ecotech stock in order to bolster Ecotech's financial statements. Because the District Court found that the issue of foreseeability was subsumed in the jury verdict, it stated that it would not permit Miller to re-try an issue that the jury had already determined. We consider each piece of Miller's evidence below. 45 Even assuming Miller was not present at Rennert and Teale's August 1990 meeting, several of Miller's other actions evidence his involvement in the conspiracy by August 1990. For example, in June 1990, two months before the Rennert-Teale meeting, Miller provided Rennert with an opinion letter to support Forum Rothmore's practice of leasing worthless assets. On July 13, 1990, Miller authored an opinion letter recommending the re-issue of the restricted Ecotech stock held by Jensen, Rennert, and Miller without a restrictive legend. This made it appear that Forum Rothmore could provide Teale with millions of marketable shares. In an August 28, 1990 letter, one week after the Rennert-Teale meeting, Miller wrote to Teale expressing his interest and commitment to what he termed the credit enhancement program that forms the basis of the fraud charges against the defendants, along with a $25 million offer of stocks from Ecotech and other corporations. Supp.App. at 638-47. Regardless of whether he was present at the Rennert-Teale meeting, the remainder of Miller's actions strongly support the District Court's conclusion that he had joined the conspiracy by or before August 1990. 46 Miller responds that he undertook the aforementioned actions in good faith. Miller Reply Br. at 8-9. Yet, the cumulative effect of Miller's aforementioned actions (the June opinion letter, the July letter recommending re-issue of stock, and the August letter to Teale) suggests that Miller was too central to the operation to believe naively that he and his associates were all within the bounds of the law. Based on the record evidence, Miller's explanation is not credible and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Miller's attempt to submit evidence regarding his presence at the Rennert-Teale meeting. 47 Miller also attempted to submit evidence from his personal records and journals that he contended showed that he was not paid to provide stock to Forum Rothmore with knowledge of his co-defendants' fraudulent activities, but only received legal fees and a loan. Miller emphasizes that Forum Rothmore's faulty accounting system improperly denominated his payments as stock provider fees, rather than traditional payments for legal fees. 48 As the Government points out, the designation of Forum Rothmore's payments as leasing fees or legal fees is inconsequential because the payment was made in exchange for Miller's services in advancing a fraudulent scheme. Because Miller does not contest the District Court's finding that he used his legal skills in furtherance of the fraud, the fact of payment for fraudulent services is the critical point while the form of his payment is irrelevant. Moreover, as we noted in Miller, Miller's services could not be categorized as simple legal advice. Miller, slip op. at 7. 49 Although Miller responds that he was acting in good faith when he rendered the legal services for which he received remuneration and was not aware that his legal services were being misused for a criminal conspiracy, the record does not support his contention. We also note that Miller's argument that Forum Rothmore only paid him for good-faith legal services, rather than fraudulent stock-leasing activities, goes to whether or not he acted in furtherance of the conspiracy. The jury's verdict shows that it decided that issue adversely to Miller. Despite Miller's insistence that his new evidence only pertained to the timing or scope of his commitment, Miller also attempted to argue that he was entitled to submit evidence to attempt to nullify the jury's conspiracy connection, especially in his earlier pleadings. We emphasize that Collado does not entitle a defendant to relitigate his or her guilt or innocence and thus, the issue of whether he was paid to fraudulently provide stock is not the subject of a Collado analysis. 50 Lastly, Miller attempted to submit evidence to counter the Government's allegation that he falsified records to deceive his accountant and regulatory authorities regarding the value and marketability of Ecotech's assets. In particular, Miller states that in September and October of 1991 or earlier, he discussed providing restricted, non-marketable Ecotech stock to the gold mine corporation with which Ecotech merged. As such, Miller suggests that he should only be accountable for losses incurred after fall 1991, but not before. 51 Even if Miller did not falsify records until late 1991, there were still enough other indicia of his involvement in 1990, discussed above, to support the conclusion that he already had committed to the conspiracy in 1990, regardless of whether he committed additional frauds in connection with Ecotech's merger with the gold mine corporation. In sum, even assuming that Miller would have been permitted to submit his proffered evidence, Miller's evidence would not have been sufficient to undermine the basis in the record for imposing accomplice liability. We hold the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Miller's proffer of the evidence.