Opinion ID: 1559080
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grounds for a JML

Text: Our standard of review of a ruling on a motion for a JML is well settled. We `use[] the same standard the trial court used initially in granting or denying a JML.... Regarding questions of fact, the ultimate question is whether the nonmovant has presented sufficient evidence to allow the case or the issue to be submitted to the jury for a factual resolution.' Myrick v. Barron, 820 So.2d 81, 83 (Ala. 2001) (quoting Delchamps, Inc. v. Bryant, 738 So.2d 824, 830 (Ala.1999)). We `determine whether the party who bears the burden of proof has produced substantial evidence creating a factual dispute requiring resolution by the jury,' and we `view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and entertain[] such reasonable inferences as the jury would have been free to draw.' Myrick, 820 So.2d at 83 (quoting Delchamps, 738 So.2d at 830-31).
The issue, as the Company correctly frames it, is whether [the Company's] actions on the day(s) of its alleged negligence fell below the required degree of skill and prudence observed at that time. The Company's brief, at 83. It is well established that `[t]hose dealing with dangerous commodities, such as [natural] gas, must use a degree of care commensurate with the dangers involved; this degree of care is the same degree of care and vigilance which persons of skill and prudence observe under like circumstances.' Sungas, Inc. v. Perry, 450 So.2d 1085, 1088 (Ala.1984), abrogated on other grounds, Garner v. Covington County, 624 So.2d 1346 (Ala.1993) (quoting Chilton Butane Gas, Inc. v. Marcus, 289 Ala. 292, 296, 267 So.2d 140, 143 (1972)). A gas company is guilty of negligence if a leak in a customer's... appliances causes injury ..., provided the company has sufficient notice of such leak ..., and having such notice (a) negligently inspects or negligently repairs; (b) agrees and assumes to inspect and repair, and then fails to do so; [or] (c) refuses to inspect and repair knowing a dangerous condition exists, and with such knowledge fails to shut off its gas until the owner can have his pipes and appliances properly repaired. Miller v. Wichita Gas Co., 139 Kan. 729, 732, 33 P.2d 130, 132 (1934). [W]hen a [gas] company has actual knowledge of a dangerous defect in a customer's equipment or appliance, it has a duty to exercise reasonable care to shut off the service to such equipment or appliance. Hegwood v. Virginia Natural Gas, Inc., 256 Va. 362, 369, 505 S.E.2d 372, 377 (1998) (emphasis added). See also Bellefuil v. Willmar Gas Co., 243 Minn. 123, 128, 66 N.W.2d 779, 783 (1954) (whenever a gas company is in possession of facts that would suggest to a person of ordinary care and prudence that an appliance of a customer is leaking or is otherwise unsafe for the transportation of gas, the company has a duty to investigate, as a person of ordinary care and prudence similarly situated and handling such a dangerous substance would do, before it continues to furnish additional gas). When a gas company has knowledge of a hazardous defect in a customer's appliance, the question whether on the particular facts that gas company acted diligently to avert the ensuing... asphyxiation goes to the jury. Rosado v. Boston Gas Co., 27 Mass.App. Ct. 675, 678, 542 N.E.2d 304, 306 (1989). Thus, the Company's argument for a JML must be rejected if there is substantial evidence indicating that the Company, armed with its knowledge of the circumstances and the condition of the CHU, breached the standard of care in installing a meter at the residence and providing natural-gas service before the known danger posed by the CHU had been eliminated. In that connection, Robinson presented the expert testimony of George Yon. Yon had written and implemented polices and procedures for the Company in response to the carbon-monoxide deaths and injuries that occurred in 1985. He testified that, in literally thousands of cases of which the Company had record, its customers had continued to use appliances that the Company had, by its red-tag procedure, declared to be out-of-service. Yon's policies attempted to address that specific problem by designating certain hazards as serious enough to require the Company to turn off the meter or disconnect the service. Among such hazards were those that were present in this case, namely, an [a]ppliance producing unsafe levels of CO [carbon monoxide], because of [b]adly corroded burners, [i]noperative or disconnected controls affecting safe operation, and [p]roducts of combustion spill[ing] at [the] diverter. During Yon's testimony, the following colloquy occurred: Q. [By Robinson's counsel:] Based on your training and experience in the policy and procedures that you wrote, do you have an opinion as to whether gas service should have been initiated on June 3, 2004, by Mobile Gas? A. [By Yon:] Absolutely not.  (Emphasis added.) It is undisputed that, after Yon retired, the Company discontinued these policies, and there was evidence indicating that they were discontinued for financial reasons. Nevertheless, similar standards were reflected in training materials promulgated by the Midwest Gas Association, Inc. [3] In particular, training module 322 stated, in pertinent part: Follow these six steps to check appliances and connections. 1. Locate all gas appliances and gas outlets. . . . . 2. Inspect appliances for unsafe conditions.  Don't establish service if unsafe conditions are not corrected.  Disconnect or turn the appliance off at the appliance valve to correct unsafe conditions. (Emphasis added.) There was evidence indicating that the Company actually used these training materials in the years between Yon's retirement and the carbon-monoxide-poisoning incident at Robinson's residence. Thus, there was substantial evidence indicating that gas-industry standards include the duty to turn off the meter or disconnect the service to a residence containing unrepaired hazardous appliances of which the Company has knowledge. Although [p]roof of industry practices . . . cannot conclusively establish the defendant's duty, they are admissible for the jury's consideration in its application of the `reasonable care' standard. Dunn v. Wixom Bros., 493 So.2d 1356, 1360 (Ala.1986). Whether the Company has effectively shut off the gas under the circumstances is a question for the jury. Fields v. Missouri Power & Light Co., 374 S.W.2d 17, 24 (Mo.1963) (emphasis added). The Company had examined the CHU at Robinson's residence on three occasions between August 25, 1999, and the time of the incident that is the subject of the underlying action, and had observed the same hazardous conditions each time, despite the Company's red-tag warnings. Moreover, the Company had a record of other rental properties owned by Tyrone Wilson, which its records showed contained appliances that had been repeatedly tagged for the same hazards. In other words, the Company knew in June 2004 when it initiated service at Robinson's residence that Wilson was notably remiss in addressing the problems indicated on the hazardous-appliance reports relating to his properties. Consequently, the Company had no reason to trust that repairs to the CHU would be made expeditiously. Based on what it knew of the repair history of appliances in buildings owned by Wilson, the Company could not close its eyes to the known danger posed by its supply of natural gas to the residence in the hope that Wilson would remedy the defects in the CHU before the CHU was put back into use. Thus, Robinson presented substantial evidence indicating that the Company failed to use the degree of care commensurate with the dangers involved;... the ... degree of care and vigilance which persons of skill and prudence observe under like circumstances. Sungas, 450 So.2d at 1088.
The Company also contends that any wrongful conduct on its part was not the proximate cause of the carbon-monoxide incident at Robinson's residence. This is so, because, it argues, the conduct of Wilson and Harris in putting the unrepaired CHU back in service on December 23, 2004, was, as a matter of law, a superseding, intervening cause. We disagree. `The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in the natural and probable sequence of events, and without the intervention or coming in of some new or independent cause, produces the injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred.' Hicks v. Vulcan Eng'g Co., 749 So.2d 417, 424 (Ala.1999)(quoting trial court's jury charge). `[I]f a new, independent act breaks the chain of causation, it supersedes the original act, which thus is no longer the proximate cause of the injury.' Riojas v. Grant County Pub. Util. Dist., 117 Wash.App. 694, 697, 72 P.3d 1093, 1095 (2003). `[A]n [act] is superseding only if it is unforeseeable. A foreseeable intervening [act] does not break the causal relationship between the defendants' actions and the plaintiffs' injuries.' Kelly v. M. Trigg Enters., Inc., 605 So.2d 1185, 1190 (Ala. 1992) (emphasis added). `Ordinarily, it is a jury question whether consequences of an act are reasonably foreseeable . . . .' Sly v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 387 So.2d 137, 140 (Ala.1980). Alabama Power Co. v. Moore, 899 So.2d 975, 979 (Ala.2004). It is undisputed that the cause of the carbon-monoxide incident in this case was the operation of the CHU without the blower door in place. Operating the CHU without the blower door in place created `negative pressure in the heating closet' which pulled the products of combustion into the conditioned air. The Company's brief, at 38. Such operation was made possible by the manual bypass of the safety device, of which the Company had actual knowledge. Nevertheless, according to the Company, the injuries would not have occurred `but for' the conduct of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Harris, who negligently put the [CHU] in service with the blower door off.  The Company's brief, at 39 (emphasis in original). According to the Company, it could not, as a matter of law, have foreseen that a heating technician, Mr. Harris, would put a gas heater into service and leave the blower door off. The Company's brief, at 46. We disagree. As we discussed in the preceding subpart of this opinion, the Company well knew that Wilson was remiss in addressing the problems indicated on its hazardous-appliance reports for rental properties owned by Wilson. This knowledge was based on its record of homes owned by Wilson in which appliances had been tagged, but not repaired. Thus, the Company had no reason to trust that a heating technician would attend to the CHU. In fact, the Company admits that it had no knowledge of Harris's activities at the Robinson residence until after the incident. The Company's brief, at 37. In other words, it was not unforeseeable as a matter of law that the CHU would be placed back in service in the same unrepaired and hazardous condition in which it was last observed by the Company's service technician in June 2004. Whether the activities of Wilson and Harris were, therefore, an intervening cause of the accident could not be answered as a matter of law. In short, there was substantial evidence indicating that if the Company had refused to initiate service at the gas meter in June 2004 because of the hazards it discovered at that time, this accident would not have occurred. Thus, the Company was not entitled to a JML.