Opinion ID: 976
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Curtis Reed

Text: Fourth, Mahdi asserts the court erroneously refused to delay the trial to secure the attendance of Curtis Reed to testify. Appellant's Br. 35. Mahdi sought Reed's testimony to contradict Hooker's assertion that after one of the charged shootings, Mahdi told Hooker he had hidden the murder weapon in Reed's house. According to Mahdi's counsel, Reed would testify he had never seen Mahdi with a gun and would not allow anyone to bring a gun into his house and no one had ever done so. 7/15am Tr. 10-11. Because Reed was attending school in Tennessee, the court issued a subpoena which the Marshals Service attempted unsuccessfully to serve at the Tennessee address Mahdi's counsel had provided. The Marshals Service so informed the court and the defense said nothing further on the matter. We cannot say the court abused its discretion when it failed sua sponte to order a continuance Mahdi's counsel did not request. Finally, we note that the testimony of Gates, Tyler, Washington and Reed would at best have contradicted minor points made by two government witnesses. Given the overwhelming unimpeached evidence of Mahdi's guilt provided by numerous witnesses, wiretaps and videotapes, exclusion of these four witnesses' impeachment testimony was, if error at all, harmless under Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239.
Next, Mahdi challenges the VICAR prosecution on three grounds. We find none of them persuasive. First, Mahdi asserts that VICAR is facially unconstitutional as it violates the Commerce Clause. We have already rejected this argument in United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336 (D.C.Cir.2006). As we explained there: [I]t is impossible to see how a statute regulating conduct within the District of Columbia could exceed congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. As in the U.S. Territories, Congress has plenary authority in the District of Columbia. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see also, e.g., Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 491, 24 S.Ct. 816, 48 L.Ed. 1087 (1904). Within the District, Congress did not need to rely on its Commerce Clause authority. Even if there were some doubt about § 1959's constitutionality outside the District of Columbia, we need not find the language of [§ 1959] constitutional in all its possible applications in order to uphold its facial constitutionality. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971). Carson, 455 F.3d at 368 (footnote omitted). Our analysis in Carson remains both correct and controlling. See Nat'l Inst. of Military Justice v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 512 F.3d 677, 682 (D.C.Cir.2008) (We are, of course, bound to follow circuit precedent absent contrary authority from an en banc court or the Supreme Court.) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Second, Mahdi contends VICAR is unconstitutional as applied because [e]ven if some criminal acts, such as murder for hire, may substantially affect interstate commerce and could be prosecuted under VICAR, the violent crimes at issue here are unrelated to interstate commercial activity. Appellant's Br. 42 (citing United States v. Garcia, 68 F.Supp.2d 802 (E.D.Mich.1999)). As we just explained, however, under Carson, the Commerce Clause is simply irrelevant to the VICAR statute as applied in the District. Third, Mahdi argues the VICAR prosecution in this case violates the Department of Justice VICAR prosecution manual which states: In deciding whether to approve a prosecution under Section 1959, the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section will analyze the prosecution memorandum and proposed indictment to determine whether there is a legitimate reason the offense cannot or should not be prosecuted by state or local authorities. For example, federal prosecution may be appropriate where local authorities do not have the resources to prosecute, where local authorities are reasonably believed to be corrupt, where local authorities have requested federal participation, or where the offense is closely related to a federal investigation or prosecution. A prosecution will not be authorized over the objection of local authorities in the absence of a compelling reason. Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering  18 U.S.C. § 1959: A Manual for Federal Prosecutors at 3-4 (Dec.2006). The gist of Mahdi's argument is that because the U.S. Attorney prosecutes all crimes in the District, there is no distinction between federal and local authorities to justify prosecuting under VICAR rather than under other federal or D.C. statutes. The manual itself, however, specifically provides that its policies and procedures are internal Department of Justice policies and guidance only and are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to, create any right, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal. Nor are any limitations [t]hereby placed on otherwise lawful litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice. Id. at i. Accordingly, Mahdi's argument is foreclosed. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Judith Miller), 438 F.3d 1141, 1152-53 (D.C.Cir.2006) (upholding reservation in U.S. Attorney's Manual guidelines which expressly state[s] that they do `not create or recognize any legally enforceable right in any person') (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(n)).
Finally, Mahdi contends that, if his convictions are affirmed, his sentence should be remanded for two reasons: (1) many of the D.C. counts merge with the corresponding federal counts; and (2) under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the district court erroneously made factual findings exclusively within the jury's province and applied the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory. We address his two grounds in reverse order. First, as to his Booker argument, the government concedes that there is no indication that the court  sentencing pre- Booker  treated the Guidelines as anything but mandatory. Appellee's Br. 74. Nonetheless, [b]ecause [Mahdi] did not preserve [his] challenge to this error before the trial court, we review the district court's decision under the plain error standard set forth in [ United States v. ] Coles,  403 F.3d 764 (D.C.Cir.2005). Carson, 455 F.3d at 383. Applying this standard, we must determine whether the district court's error affected the defendant's `substantial rights in a material way,' that is, `whether there would have been a materially different result, more favorable to the defendant, had the sentence been imposed in accordance with the post- Booker sentencing regime.' Id. (quoting Coles, 403 F.3d at 767) (footnote omitted). The answer is no and this case is counted among those in which we can `be confident that [the] defendant has suffered no prejudice'  and therefore affirm the sentence. Id. (quoting Coles, 403 F.3d at 769). As in Carson, [n]o remand is needed ... because [VICAR], 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1), and not the Guidelines, mandates that [Mahdi] receive[] a life sentence for [his VICAR] conviction[], id. at 384  in this case, VICAR requires a minimum sentence of life for the murder of Curtis Hattley (Count 12). See 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1) (defendant shall be punished  (1) for murder, by death or life imprisonment, or a fine under this title, or both.). [13] In addition, the consecutive 7-and 25-year sentences imposed for Counts 27-32 are mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Accordingly a remand would not benefit Mahdi. Second, we need not decide Mahdi's merger argument here because even if there is a merger, his D.C. convictions will merge into the federal counts and his federal mandatory statutory sentences will not change. See United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 859 (D.C.Cir.1993) (per curiam); United States v. Boyd, 131 F.3d 951, 954-55 (11th Cir.1997) (The proper remedy for convictions on both greater and lesser included offenses is to vacate the conviction and the sentence of the lesser included offense.). In any event, as we concluded supra Part II.A, Mahdi failed to establish that any of the counts of conviction is multiplicitous and he adds no new arguments here. Finally, the government concedes that a limited resentencing remand is appropriate because six convictions for simple distribution of, or PWID, drugs (Counts 38-43) merge into the analogous convictions for distribution of, or PWID, drugs within 1,000 feet of a school (Counts 44-49). For the foregoing reasons, Mahdi's convictions and sentences are affirmed except that we vacate Counts 38-43 and remand for limited resentencing to reflect the merger of Counts 38-43 into Counts 44-49. See United States v. Whren, 111 F.3d 956, 959-60 (D.C.Cir.1997) ([U]nless the court of appeals expressly directs otherwise, the district court may consider only such new arguments or new facts as are made newly relevant by the court of appeals' decision  whether by the reasoning or by the result.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1119, 118 S.Ct. 1059, 140 L.Ed.2d 120 (1998). So ordered.