Opinion ID: 2638240
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hurst v. Cook: Good Cause Common Law Exceptions

Text: ¶ 17 Our common law post-conviction procedural bar jurisprudence uses language similar to the statutory restriction set forth in the PCRA. As a matter of common law, we have held that courts will not review a post-conviction claim of error where the error is something which is known or should [have been] known to the party at the time the judgment was entered and therefore could have been raised at an earlier time. [26] Nevertheless, in our common law we created exceptions to this general rule, stating that the law should not be so blind and unreasoning that where an injustice has resulted the [petitioner] should be without remedy. [27] [I]t has long been our law[ ] that a procedural default is not always determinative of a collateral attack on a conviction where it is alleged that the trial was not conducted within the bounds of basic fairness or in harmony with constitutional standards. [28] Therefore, even where a claim of error could have been raised earlier, post-conviction relief may be available in those rare cases [29] or unusual circumstances where an obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right has occurred that would make it unconscionable not to reexamine the issue. [30] ¶ 18 Additionally, rule 65B(i)(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in effect until 1991, provided that all post-conviction claims shall be raised in the post-conviction proceeding brought under this rule and may not be raised in another subsequent proceeding except for good cause shown therein. [31] Rule 65B(i)(4) did not state what constituted good cause in this context. In our 1989 Hurst v. Cook [32] decision, we established five good cause exceptions pursuant to which a successive post-conviction claim may receive review on its merits: A showing of good cause that justifies the filing of a successive [post-conviction] claim may be established by showing (1) the denial of a constitutional right pursuant to new law that is, or might be, retroactive, (2) new facts not previously known which would show the denial of a constitutional right or might change the outcome of the trial, (3) the existence of fundamental unfairness in a conviction, . . . (4) the illegality of a sentence, or (5) a claim overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or abuse the writ. [33] We later clarified that this list of good cause exceptions is not exhaustive. [34] ¶ 19 In Gardner III, we stated that [w]ith the 1996 passage of the PCRA, only two of the five good cause factors enumerated in Hurst remain uncodified. The Act impliedly includes the first Hurst factor, the denial of a constitutional right pursuant to [retroactive] new law, since a claim predicated on fresh jurisprudence could clearly not have been raised in a prior post-conviction petition. Likewise, the Act also provides for relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence, thereby incorporating the second Hurst factor. Finally, the fourth Hurst factor is codified in Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e), which empowers the court to correct an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time. Consequently, the only Hurst . . . exceptions that have not been addressed by the legislature are the existence of fundamental unfairness in a conviction and a claim overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or abuse the writ. [35] ¶ 20 Despite the statutory enactment of three of the Hurst factors, however, we emphasized that all five common law exceptions retain their independent constitutional significance and may be examined by this court in our review of post-conviction petitions. [36] We stated, While we do not disagree with the legislature's enactment of the PCRA  which of course, embodies the popular will  and generally afford deference to its decisions, we nevertheless will continue to exercise our constitutionally vested authority where appropriate. [37] We noted that the power to review post-conviction petitions `quintessentially . . . belongs to the judicial branch of government' pursuant to article VIII of the Utah Constitution. [38] As such, the legislature may not impose restrictions which limit [post-conviction relief] as a judicial rule of procedure, except as provided in the constitution. [39] We concluded, Our state constitution is designed to prevent the unlawful, improper incarceration or execution of innocent individuals, and for that reason, we uphold the viability of the Hurst `good cause' exceptions. [40] As a result, it is possible for a successive post-conviction claim to be procedurally barred under the PCRA and yet receive substantive review on its merits under our independent good cause common law exceptions.