Opinion ID: 2590797
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Prior Consistent Statement of David Brunyer

Text: ¶ 55 At trial, the State sought to introduce the testimony of Brunyer's daughter, along with a letter she had written before Brunyer began cooperating with the police. In that letter, she detailed how Brunyer became involved in the cleanup of evidence and what he witnessed during that process. [8] ¶ 56 The State sought to admit this evidence after the defense suggested during Brunyer's cross-examination that he had received favorable treatment from the State in exchange for his cooperation in Pinder's prosecution. The State argued that the defense's line of questioning made the testimony of Brunyer's daughter, and the letter she had composed, admissible as prior consistent statements because the evidence tended to establish that Brunyer's trial testimony was consistent with statements he made prior to the time he went to the police  i.e., statements given at a point before which Brunyer believed he could obtain leniency in exchange for his cooperation with the prosecution. [9] According to the State, allowing evidence of Brunyer's prior consistent statements would rehabilitate him in the eyes of the jury. The trial court found the State's argument persuasive and admitted the evidence. ¶ 57 On appeal, Pinder advances a new, overarching theory, one not presented during trial, that Brunyer and Ruiz committed the murders of Flood and Tanner. Under this new theory, Pinder argues that Brunyer's motivation to lie arose simultaneously with his participation in the murders. As a result, Pinder contends the letter prepared by Brunyer's daughter, as well as her testimony concerning the contents and creation of that letter, does not provide evidence of consistent statements that predate the time when Brunyer had a motive to lie. Accordingly, Pinder argues that the trial court erred by admitting the evidence. ¶ 58 Pinder's current argument was not presented during trial, and the trial court considered the argument waived when ruling on Pinder's motion for a new trial. [10] As a result, we conclude that the argument Pinder now advances was not properly preserved. Because Pinder has failed to argue that the admission of the evidence constituted plain error or that appellate review is otherwise justified by exceptional circumstances, we decline to consider the merits of his argument. See supra ¶ 45; Coleman, 2000 UT 98 at ¶ 9, 17 P.3d 1122. ¶ 59 Having concluded that Pinder's evidentiary arguments were waived, we now address his final allegation of error in relation to the underlying trial before addressing his newly discovered evidence claim.