Opinion ID: 2633236
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lifetime supervision

Text: Avery argues his guilty plea was invalid because he was not aware before entering the plea that he would be subject to lifetime supervision. We held in Palmer that lifetime supervision is a direct consequence of a guilty plea and that when a defendant pleads guilty to an offense that is subject to lifetime supervision, the record must demonstrate that the defendant was aware of the consequence of lifetime supervision before entering his or her plea of guilty. [3] However, Palmer was decided after Avery's conviction became final. [4] Consequently, Avery's claim must be rejected unless our holding in Palmer applies retroactively, a question this court has not previously addressed. [5] We conclude that it does not. With two narrow exceptions, a new rule of criminal procedure will not be applied retroactively. [6] The threshold question, then, is whether Palmer announced a new rule. In Colwell v. State , we explained: There is no bright-line rule for determining whether a rule is new, but there are basic guidelines to follow. As this court has stated, When a decision merely interprets and clarifies an existing rule ... and does not announce an altogether new rule of law, the court's interpretation is merely a restatement of existing law. Similarly, a decision is not new if it has simply applied a well-established constitutional principle to govern a case which is closely analogous to those which have been previously considered in the prior case law. [7] We conclude that Palmer did announce a new rule. Far from merely interpreting or clarifying an existing rule, in Palmer we explored whether lifetime supervision was a direct consequence or a collateral consequence of a guilty plea to a sexual offense. We also concluded that lifetime supervision was not analogous to previously considered cases, e.g., we specifically concluded that lifetime supervision was not analogous to parole, which we had previously determined was a collateral consequence of a guilty plea. [8] Our conclusion that the rule is new, however, does not end our inquiry. As we held in Colwell: When a rule is new, it will still apply retroactively in two instances: (1) if the rule establishes that it is unconstitutional to proscribe certain conduct as criminal or to impose a type of punishment on certain defendants because of their status or offense; or (2) if it establishes a procedure without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. [9] Our holding in Palmer  that the mandatory sentence of lifetime supervision is a direct consequence of a guilty plea of which a defendant must be previously aware before entering the plea  neither holds that it is unconstitutional to proscribe any conduct, nor that it is unconstitutional to impose a type of punishment on certain defendants because of their status or offense. Thus, the first exception is not at issue in this case. We further conclude that our holding in Palmer does not fall within the second exception. We can envision few cases in which the accuracy of a conviction of a defendant who pleads guilty to a sexual offense will be seriously diminished by the failure to advise the defendant of a mandatory sentence of lifetime supervision. While such advice may influence some defendants to reject a plea offer and insist on going to trial, decisions to plead guilty will generally turn on other factors, including the potential sentence, the State's agreement to forgo other charges, the risk of habitual criminal adjudication, prior convictions, the strength of the State's case, and any other concessions or sentencing recommendations the State may be willing to make. In sum, we conclude that Palmer did not announce a procedure without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. The failure to advise a defendant of the consequence of lifetime supervision is especially unlikely to diminish the likelihood of an accurate conviction, or to influence a defendant's decision to reject a plea and insist on going to trial, where, as here, the defendant is fully and completely advised that a guilty plea will subject him to a potential sentence of life in prison. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in rejecting Avery's claim that his plea was entered in violation of our holding in Palmer.