Opinion ID: 187183
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: District's Long-Arm Statute

Text: Eisenberg and FCIG claim that the district court has general personal jurisdiction over IFX because IFX maintains a website that allows District residents to engage in frequent and large value currency, precious metal and other transactions. Appellants' Br. 14. [4] D.C.Code § 13-334(a) permits courts to exercise `general jurisdiction' over a foreign corporation as to claims not arising from the corporation's conduct in the District[ ] if the corporation is `doing business' in the District. [5] Gorman, 293 F.3d at 509 (quoting D.C.Code § 13-334(a); citing AMAF Int'l Corp. v. Ralston Purina Co., 428 A.2d 849, 850 (D.C.1981)). Under the Due Process Clause, such general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is only permissible if the defendant's business contacts with the forum are `continuous and systematic.' Id. at 510 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)). The D.C. Court of Appeals has indicated that the reach of `doing business' jurisdiction under § 13-334(a) is co-extensive with the reach of constitutional due process. Id. (citing Hughes v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 490 A.2d 1140, 1148 (D.C. 1985)). Under certain circumstances, a foreign corporation's maintenance of a website that is accessible in the District can satisfy general jurisdiction requirements. See, e.g., id. at 513. But [t]he mere accessibility of [a] defendant['s] website[ ] . . . does not establish the necessary minimum contacts required for general jurisdiction. Id. at 512 (quotations and alterations omitted). Two additional criteria must be met. First, the website must be interactive. See id. at 511. An `essentially passive' website through which customers merely access information is insufficient. Id. at 512 (quoting GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1348 (D.C.Cir.2000)). Moreover, District residents must use the website in a `continuous and systematic' way. Id. at 512 (quoting GTE, 199 F.3d at 1350); see id. at 513 ([D]etermining whether Ameritrade is actually `doing business' in the District requires an examination of the frequency and volume of the firm's transactions with District residents.); see also Atlantigas Corp. v. Nisource, Inc., 290 F.Supp.2d 34, 52 (D.D.C. 2003) ([T]he question is not whether District of Columbia residents `can' transact business in the District with the non-resident defendant through the defendant's website, but if they actually `do' engage in sustained business activities in a continuous and systematic way. (citing Gorman, 293 F.3d at 512-13)). Although the district court found that IFX's website failed to meet both requirements, we focus only on the second requirement. [6] The district court noted that the plaintiffs alleged only one District of Columbia resident has ever opened an online account with [IFX], and it was open for just six months in 2003. FC Inv. Group, 479 F.Supp.2d at 37 (citing Mem. in Opp'n 8). Eisenberg and FCIG disagree. They claim it was IFX that asserted that there had been only one District user. See Appellants' Brief 18. In their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Eisenberg and FCIG alleged that IFX had at least one user in the District. Appellants' Mem. in Opp'n 8 (emphasis added). The district court's error is nonetheless harmless. According to an IFX compliance officer, her search of IFX's records for customers residing in the District with account[s] opened for use with the IFX online trading system revealed only one such customer. See Walsh Decl. ¶¶ 2, 3, 5. That account was open for approximately six months during the latter half of 2003. Id. ¶ 5. The record thus supports the court's conclusion that IFX had only one customer resident in the District. This limited contact with a single District customerunrelated to the plaintiffs or their claimsdoes not support the district court's exercise of general jurisdiction. See El-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 675 (D.C.Cir.1996) (isolated and sporadic contacts unrelated to the claims in the instant case insufficient to establish general jurisdiction); cf. Pacas v. Showell Farms, Inc., 83 F.3d 415, 1996 WL 192058, at  (4th Cir.1996) (unpublished) (sales to a single customer. . . does not constitute the requisite minimum contacts necessary to satisfy `fair play and substantial justice' and to establish general jurisdiction for a suit not related to the sale of that product); Atlantigas, 290 F.Supp.2d at 53 (exercising general jurisdiction over foreign corporation with only three District customers would stretch the concept of general jurisdiction beyond what either the [long-arm] statute or due process permits).