Opinion ID: 28916
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: employers.” Bocalbos v. Nat’l W. Life Ins.

Text: We review a summary judgment de novo Co., 162 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 1998); see and apply the same standards as did the district also 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1)-(3). “The court. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James, 276 enactment of the FMLA was predicated on F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002). Summary two fundamental concerns—the needs of the judgment is appropriate only if “the pleadings, American workforce, and the development of depositions, answers to interrogatories, and high-performance organizations.” 29 C.F.R. admissions on file, together with the affidavits, § 825.101(b). if any,” when viewed in the light most fa- 3 The FMLA both gives employees certain B. entitlements and forbids employers from inter- Williams alleges that Martin retaliated for fering with those entitlements.2 Bocalbos, 162 the exercise of FMLA rights. In Chaffin v. F.3d at 383. Among its entitlements, the John H. Carter Co., 179 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. FMLA gives an eligible employee a right to 1999), we held that the McDonnell Douglas twelve weeks of unpaid leave within a twelve- burden-shifting scheme for federal antimonth period to care for a newborn or newly discrimination claims applies to an FMLA adopted child, for a close family member who retaliatory discharge case.3 See McDonnell has a “serious health condition,” or for oneself Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). if one has a “serious health condition.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). An employee may take McDonnell Douglas burden shifting has this leave intermittently if medically necessary. three stages in an FMLA retaliatory discharge 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(1). After an employee case. First, the plaintiff must establish a prima returns from FMLA leave, he is entitled to facie case of retaliation by showing that he (1) return to the same or an equivalent job. 29 exercised rights guaranteed by the FMLA and U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). The FMLA also forbids (2) was discharged (3) as a result of exercising an employer from interfering with the exercise those rights. Bocalbos, 162 F.3d at 383. of these rights and from discriminating among Second, once the plaintiff establishes a prima employees who exercise these rights. 29 facie case, the defendant must articulate a U.S.C. § 2615(a). legitimate and non-retaliatory reason for the discharge. Id. Third, after the defendant of- When an employee needs FMLA leave for fers such a reason, the burden returns to the foreseeable medical treatment for himself or plaintiff to “produce substantial probative evifamily members, he has certain duties to his dence that the proffered reason was not the employer. First, he must make a reasonable true reason . . . and that the real reason was effort to schedule the treatment to avoid undue the plaintiff’s” exercise of FMLA rights. disruption to the employer’s operations. 29 Chaffin, 179 F.3d at 320. The plaintiff cannot U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2)(A). Second, he must succeed merely by showing that the proffered provide the employer with thirty days’ advance reason was pretextual, but must also show that notice of the treatment, or as much notice as retaliation “was the real reason.” Id. practicable if notice cannot be given thirty days in advance. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2)(B). C. 3 We reserved the question whether McDonnell Douglas burden shifting applies to a claim for de- 2 The FMLA does not apply to all employers or nial of the underlying FMLA benefits. 179 F.3d at employees . For example, the act covers only 319 n.13. For a persuasive explanation why Mcemployers with more than 50 employees, 29 U.S.C. Donnell Douglas burden shifting should not apply § 2611(4), and employees who worked at least to such a claim, see Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry 1,250 hours in the last twelve-month period, 29 Corp., 131 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 1997). Diaz also U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A). The parties, however, do not concludes, however, that “[i]t is not clear what a dispute that the FMLA applies to both Martin and burden-shifting approach could add” to a retaliWilliams. ation case. Diaz, 179 F.3d at 713. 4 As the district court did, and as so often purportedly to care for his daughters.5 Against happens with McDonnell Douglas burden this long record of absenteeism and tardiness, shifting, we assume arguendo that Williams Martin has more than satisfied its burden to presented a prima facie case of retaliatory dis- articulate a legitimate and non-retaliatory charge. We therefore concentrate on two reason for discharging Williams. main questions: (1) whether Martin articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the We further agree with the district court that discharge and (2) whether Williams raised a Williams produced no evidence to raise a gengenuine issue of material fact that any uine issue of material fact that this proffered proffered reason was pretextual and that the reason was pretextual and that Martin really true reason for his discharge was to retaliate discharged him for exercising his FMLA against him for exercising his FMLA rights. rights. Though a scintilla of evidence will not suffice to defeat a motion for summary We agree with the district court that Martin judgment, Williams could not produce even articulated a legitimate and non-retaliatory rea- that. As the district court aptly stated, son for Williams’s discharge, i.e., his habitual “[n]othing in the record suggests that [Martin] and unexcused absences and tardiness. Martin harbored a secret motive to deny Williams[’] notified Williams of the new measures to FMLA rights or to retaliate against him for the enforce its leave policies in late 1999. Nev- assertion of those rights.” ertheless, Martin missed work on eight separate occasions in the first six weeks of To the contrary, Martin seems the very pic2000, unrelated to his daughters’ sickle cell ture of a family-friendly employer. Lindsay anemia.4 flexibly allowed Williams to take off work from 1993 through 1999 to care for his Moreover, Williams’s supervisors met with daughters. Martin also gave Williams repeated him on four separate occasions to remind him chances to improve his work attendance before of the need for regular work attendance, to finally discharging him. Williams’s supervisors discipline him for absences, and to warn him even encouraged him to apply for FMLA that future violations would result in leave, but he refused their entreaties. 6 That discharge. Martin then excused Williams’s Martin finally fired Williams after he claimed first absence in April 2000 because of to leave work to care for his daughters cannot Williams’s improved attendance in March refute the overwhelming evidence of his poor 2000, but Martin apparently reached its wits attendance record and Martin’s good faith; end when Williams disobeyed Lindsay’s direct otherwise, an employer could never discharge order not to leave work on April 24, 2000, 5 Williams failed to give reasonable notice to Martin of his need for leave as required by the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2). 4 Williams twice missed work to take his 6 daughters to the dentist, but a dental appointment Martin was anything but a heartless employer. is not a “serious health condition” under the At Martin’s request, Lindsay once bailed Williams FMLA. 26 U.S.C. § 2601(11); see also 29 C.F.R. out of jail after he had been arrested outside of § 825.114(b). work for driving while intoxicated. 5 or even discipline an employee for good These exhibits came from Bass’s personnel reason in proximity to an allegedly protected files. Martin used these five exhibits to act. counter Williams’s claims of racial discrimination. The exhibits show that Martin