Opinion ID: 2569287
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: adequacy of voir dire proceedings

Text: ¶ 8 Reed's first point on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct adequate voir dire examination of the jury. Specifically, Reed argues that the trial court failed to ask a requested follow-up question to particular jurors who had personally known a victim of sexual abuse. The exact question defense counsel requested was: [W]hether they [the jurors] would tend to believe the victim over the person accused of the crime, simply because of their association with people that they know that have been accused [sic] in the past. ¶ 9 According to Reed, this question was necessary because jurors who knew abuse victims might be predisposed to believe the alleged victim rather than the accused. Reed argues that not asking the requested follow-up question was an abuse of discretion because no other question during voir dire adequately addressed this issue. ¶ 10 Our analysis is governed by State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861 (Utah 1998), in which we held: `Whether the trial court abused its discretion [in determining the scope of voir dire] turns on whether, considering the totality of the questioning, counsel was afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors.' Id. at 868 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988)); see also State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844-45 (Utah 1988). ¶ 11 We further stated in Piansiaksone that trial courts should liberally conduct voir dire proceedings `in a way which not only meets constitutional requirements, but also enables litigants and their counsel to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges and which attempts, as much as possible, to eliminate bias and prejudice from the trial proceedings.' Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 867 (quoting State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798 (Utah 1991)); see also State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983) ([V]oir dire examination has as its proper purposes both the detection of actual bias and the collection of data to permit informed exercise of the peremptory challenge. (citations omitted)). We also indicated that `failure to question jurors concerning issues in any certain way desired by counsel or to ask any specific question desired by counsel does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation so long as the relevant areas of bias have been covered.' Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d at 867 (quoting James, 819 P.2d at 798). ¶ 12 Viewing the totality of the questioning in this case, we conclude that the trial court adequately covered, either directly or indirectly, the area of potential bias identified by Reed. The trial court's first pre-trial instruction to the prospective jurors informed them that this case involved two counts of sodomy upon a child and one count of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. Thus, the prospective jurors knew at the outset that the victim in this case was a child. The trial court subsequently asked the prospective jurors whether they would automatically believe a child witness over an adult, or vice versa. The trial court also asked the prospective jurors whether they would accord proper credibility to the testimony of a witness, without regard to employment, age, or circumstances. ¶ 13 Furthermore, the trial court, in response to defense counsel's request, asked again whether the jurors would believe the testimony of a child simply because he or she was a child. Although the trial court did not use the exact terms defense counsel proposed, namely the victim and the person accused, in the context of this case the trial court's questioning clearly addressed Reed's concerns for potential bias. As was plainly known to all, the alleged victim was a child; therefore, asking the questions as the trial court did was sufficient to reveal any bias the jurors would have had in believing a victim rather than the person accused. ¶ 14 Additionally, Reed's reliance on State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951, is misplaced. In Saunders, we noted that a problem in some child sex abuse cases is that [s]ome are inclined to accept without any hesitation a child's accusation of abuse, even in circumstances where false charges of abuse are known to occur. Id. at ¶ 46. In the instant case, the trial court thoroughly questioned the potential jurors regarding the issue of whether they would be inclined to believe the alleged child victim over the alleged adult perpetrator. Therefore, the concerns noted in Saunders were adequately addressed during the examination of the potential jurors. ¶ 15 We are satisfied that the trial court properly probed the jurors for potential bias, allowing counsel to exercise informed peremptory challenges. The trial court did not restrict counsel in pursuing further questioning, and indeed invited counsel to submit additional questions. Defense counsel, therefore, had ample opportunity to engage in follow-up questions. Instead, defense counsel passed the jury panel for cause and was apparently satisfied with the voir dire and the trial court's management of it.