Opinion ID: 23930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: bettersworth's access claim

Text: Subsection 552a(d)(1) of the Privacy Act provides that each agency that maintains a system of records shall: (1) upon request by any individual to gain access to his record or to any information pertaining to him which is contained in the system, permit him and upon his request, a person of his own choosing to accompany him, to review the record and have a copy made of all or any portion thereof in a form comprehensible to him, except that the agency may require the individual to furnish a written statement authorizing discussion of that individual's record in the accompanying person's presence. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1). Subsection 552a(a)(5) defines “system of records” as follows: (5) the term “system of records” means a group of any records under the control of any agency from which the information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5). Subsection 552a(g)(1) provides a civil remedy for violation of subsection 552a(d)(1). The threshold issue in any claim alleging denial of access under the Privacy Act is whether the records sought by the 10 plaintiff are maintained in a system of records retrievable by an identifying particular assigned to the plaintiff. This qualifying language in the statute reflects a statutory compromise between affording individuals access to those records relating directly to them and protecting federal agencies from the burdensome task of searching through agency records for mere mention of an individual's name. Many of the published Privacy Act cases are aimed at giving meaning to this statutory requirement. See, e.g., Gowan v. United States Dep’t of the Air Force, 148 F.3d 1182, 1191 (10th Cir. 1998) (file marked ethics was not a surrogate identifier for plaintiff under ethics investigation and thus records were not accessible under the Privacy Act, even though the file contained information about the plaintiff); Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d 1193, 1206 (6th Cir. 1997) (records not accessible under the Privacy Act because not retrievable by the plaintiff’s name); Henke v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 83 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (records not accessible under the Privacy Act, even though agency could search for the records by the plaintiff’s name, because the agency as a practical matter did not use the information that way); Cuccaro v. Secretary of Labor, 770 F.2d 355, 359-60 (3d Cir. 1985) (documents relating to agency’s investigation of accident involving plaintiff were not tied to plaintiff’s name and thus not accessible under the Privacy Act); Wren v. Heckler, 744 F.2d 86, 90 (10th Cir. 1994) (records not accessible under the 11 Privacy Act because not retrievable by the plaintiff’s name, even though the information related to plaintiff). The district court held that the records Bettersworth wants, primarily information retrieved by Reserve Bank examiner Johnson from various agencies and then included in Reserve Bank files concerning ComCorp’s application for BHC status, were not maintained in a system of records retrievable by Bettersworth’s name, and were therefore not accessible under § 552a(d)(1). There does not appear to be any dispute about the fact that the records were maintained in files referencing the banks with which Bettersworth was associated, rather than Bettersworth personally. Further, there does not appear to be any dispute about the fact that the files were maintained for the purpose of discharging the responsibilities vested by federal law with the defendant agencies. Bettersworth urges the Court to interpret the statute broadly to require that he be given access to the agencies’ records in this case because the records pertained to him. Alternatively, Bettersworth maintains that the agencies used the bank files as surrogate identifiers for records pertaining to him. We decline to interpret the statute in a manner that would deny meaning to the statutory language requiring that the records be retrievable “by some identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5); id. § 552a(d)(1). Moreover, Bettersworth's assertion that the agencies 12 used the bank files as a surrogate identifier for information relating to him finds no support in the record. For these reasons, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Bettersworth's claim that he was denied access to records subject to disclosure under the Privacy Act.