Opinion ID: 2423913
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Misfeasance by Camp Sunshine

Text: [¶ 28] Gniadek relies on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B (1965) comment e(D) to support her claim that the Camp affirmatively created a risk to her by compiling and distributing contact lists. Although the law may impose a duty to protect someone from the danger created by the defendant, see Bryan R., 1999 ME 144, ¶ 14, 738 A.2d at 845, we have not expressly adopted section 302B. That section defines what constitutes a negligent act where a third party inflicts the harm. It states: An act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B. [¶ 29] An actor is required to guard against the intentional misconduct of others where the actor's own affirmative act has created or exposed the other to a recognizable high degree of risk of harm through such misconduct, which a reasonable man would take into account. Id. § 302B cmt. e. For example, [w]here the actor has brought into contact or association with the other a person whom the actor knows or should know to be peculiarly likely to commit intentional misconduct, under circumstances which afford a peculiar opportunity or temptation for such misconduct, the actor may be negligent. Id. § 302B cmt. e(D). In assessing the applicability of this principle, factors to be considered are the known character, past conduct, and tendencies of the person whose intentional conduct causes the harm, the temptation or opportunity which the situation may afford him for such misconduct, the gravity of the harm which may result, and the possibility that some other person will assume the responsibility for preventing the conduct or the harm, together with the burden of the precautions which the actor would be required to take. Id. § 302B cmt. f. [¶ 30] Other courts have found the peculiar[ ] likel[ihood] and the peculiar opportunity described in section 302B comment e(D) when a wife encouraged children to use her swimming pool while her husband supervised, knowing her husband had molested children in the past, and her husband molested some of these children, Pamela L. v. Farmer, 112 Cal. App.3d 206, 169 Cal.Rptr. 282, 283-84 (1980), and when the police disclosed an assault victim's name and address to the newspaper without her consent and before the assailant was arrested, and the victim was terrorized by the assailant on seven occasions after publication of the information, Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251, 253, 257-58 (Mo.Ct.App.1982); see also Golden Spread Council, Inc. No. 562 of the Boy Scouts of America v. Akins, 926 S.W.2d 287, 289, 290-92 (Tex. 1996) (holding that a duty may exist where a boy scout troop recommended a scout master to another organization after learning he had been messing with some boys, and the scout master went on to commit further sexual abuse). [¶ 31] Newton's known character, past conduct, and tendencies did not include conduct demonstrating a particularly high risk that he would sexually assault a camper. His interaction with the female volunteer counselor was insufficient to establish that he posed a peculiar risk of committing a sexual assault, and the Camp was unaware of the allegation that he patted young females on the buttocks and rubbed their shoulders. Moreover, making available a contact list that included Cooper-Morin's contact information did not create a peculiar opportunity for misconduct. It is nowhere alleged that Newton could not have obtained Cooper-Morin's phone number even without the contact list had he wanted to reach Gniadek after they met at Camp. Further, Cooper-Morin consented to inclusion on the contact list.