Opinion ID: 1277611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Charge Voluntary Manslaughter

Text: Rocheville maintains that the trial court erred in refusing to charge voluntary manslaughter. Although Rocheville admits duress or coercion is not a defense to murder, he maintains that duress may reduce the murder to voluntary manslaughter. Rocheville argues that fear like passion may so cloud the mind as to eliminate malice. First, the evidence presented in this case does not support duress. Duress requires evidence showing that the degree of coercion [was] present, imminent, and of such a nature as to induce a well grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. State v. Robinson , 294 S.C. 120, 363 S.E. (2d) 104 (1987). According to Rocheville's confession, Longworth gave the gun to Rocheville and told him it was either Rocheville or Green. When Rocheville held the loaded gun in his hand, the necessary imminent nature of the duress was removed. There was no evidence indicating Longworth had any other weapon readily available in the van although a four-inch kitchen knife and a tire knocker were found under the front seat of Longworth's Grenada car, along with a .44 Magnum revolver. Rocheville could have taken the gun given to him by Longworth and escaped safely with Green. Accordingly, no duress was present at the time of the murder of Green. Second, duress, as Rocheville concedes, is not a defense to murder. The rationale of the defense of duress is that if the only means of avoiding greater harm is for the defendant to engage in illegal conduct resulting in a lesser harm, he should not be held criminally liable for the illegal conduct. W. McAninch & W. Fairey, The Criminal Law of South Carolina 552 (2d ed. 1989). The commission of the crime which results in a lesser harm is therefore justified. However, when the crime is the murder of an innocent person, the choice of two evils rationale is unavailing. The resulting harm, the murder of an innocent person, is at least as great as the threatened harm, the death of the defendant. Rocheville argues duress negates the element of malice and, therefore, should mitigate the punishment so that a charge of voluntary manslaughter would have been appropriate. We find for the same reason as duress is not a complete defense to murder, it cannot be used to mitigate the crime to voluntary manslaughter. Accord United States v. LaFleur , 971 F. (2d) 200 (9th Cir.1991); State v. Nargashian , 26 R.I. 299, 58 A. 953 (1904). We note some states have by statute included intentional killing under duress under the definition of the crime of voluntary manslaughter. See e.g. , Minn. Stat. § 609.20 (1987). Our statute defines manslaughter simply as the unlawful killing of another without malice. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-50 (1985). [5] With no further statutory definition, this Court has followed the common law definition which requires sudden heat of passion upon a sufficient legal provocation. State v. Gardner , 219 S.C. 97, 64 S.E. (2d) 130 (1951). Both legal provocation and heat of passion are required. State v. Tyson , 283 S.C. 375, 323 S.E. (2d) 770, cert. denied , 471 U.S. 1006, 105 S.Ct. 1873, 85 L.Ed. (2d) 165 (1985). Accordingly, duress does not mitigate murder to voluntary manslaughter under South Carolina law. Our legislature has provided, however, that duress is a statutory mitigating factor to be considered in sentencing. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(5) (Supp. 1991). Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err in refusing to charge voluntary manslaughter.