Opinion ID: 201506
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Policymaker determination

Text: 58 To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate not only that a custom caused a deprivation of his rights, but also that the challenged practices were so widespread or flagrant that in the proper exercise of [their] official responsibilities the [municipal policymakers] should have known of them. Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1157. The Department now argues that the jury verdict cannot stand because Baron and the court failed to identify a specific Department policymaker who knew of the custom of a code of silence enforced by retaliatory harassment and who condoned it or acquiesced in it. 59 The Department sought judgment as a matter of law at multiple points during the trial. It did not, however, specifically assert the claim now before us, as is indicated by the court's response when the Department finally did raise the issue in a post-trial motion: The defendant argues that there was no evidence with regard to who is a policymaker of the Sheriff's Department.... This was not an issue pressed at trial. Baron had presented evidence that Feeney, the Department deputy superintendent and superintendent during the relevant period, was aware of the code of silence and consequences for violating it, and was also aware of Baron's harassment complaints. Feeney testified that he was third-in-command in the Department and was responsible for overseeing the day-to-day operations of the House of Correction. This testimony suggested that Baron believed Feeney to be the relevant policymaker for purposes of this litigation. The Department gave no indication at trial that it disagreed with that assessment. 60 The Department's proposed jury instructions were similarly mute as to who it believed was the final policymaker for purposes of establishing municipal liability. It failed to object in the pre-charge conference or in open court to the court's instruction to the jury that for purposes of determining the liability of the Sheriff's Department, the Department was the official entity responsible for establishing final policy with respect to investigating complaints of employee misconduct and imposing appropriate discipline. It was not until after the jury returned its verdict that the Department pressed the policymaker issue for the first time, arguing that it was entitled to a new trial on the basis of this jury instruction. Because the Department forfeited its objection on this point by failing to raise it in a timely manner, our review is only for plain error. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 51(d)(2). Under this standard, we will notice an error only if it is clear and prejudicial, and if a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735-36, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (internal quotation marks deleted). 61 The Department assigns error to the district court's identification of the Department as the relevant policymaker, arguing that the failure to identify a specific final policymaker within the Department was erroneous because it allowed the jury to find municipal liability if any Department employee knew of Baron's harassment claims. This overstates the point. Although the district court's instruction would be error if understood this way, see Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (concluding that a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory), it must be read as qualified by the court's later statement that liability could be imposed only if Department policymakers were aware of the custom of retaliation and Baron's situation. It is highly unlikely that the jury interpreted the phrase Department policymakers to mean any Department employee, particularly in light of evidence that the Department superintendent, not just any employee, was aware of Baron's complaints. 62 Yet, even this qualified version of the court's statement might be too broad under the case law because it is only a policy made by the final policymaker that exposes a municipality to liability, see, e.g., Silva v. Worden, 130 F.3d 26, 31 (1st Cir.1997) (explaining that municipal liability for acts taken pursuant to a policy attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Therefore, in a case alleging an affirmative wrongful policy (as opposed to a custom acquiesced in), the court would have to identify an individual or body as the final policymaker, and the jury would have to determine whether the policy at issue could be attributed to that policymaker. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989). 63 However, Baron claims not that an individual or body adopted an unconstitutional policy but that the Department had a custom tolerated by policymakers who should have intervened to correct it. In this custom context, our past language has sometimes referred to policymakers in the plural, rather than to a final policymaker. See, e.g., Silva, 130 F.3d at 32 (rejecting a § 1983 claim based on custom because there was not sufficient evidence that the City's policymaking officials could be said to have had actual or constructive knowledge of the practice). The requirement in the affirmative policy cases that the district court identify a final policymaker may therefore not apply in those cases based on custom. See Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir.2003) (explaining that in a § 1983 suit based on custom, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a longstanding practice or policy to the satisfaction of the factfinder but that in a suit premised on an act by a person with final policymaking authority, the court must decide, as a matter of state law and before the case may be submitted to the jury, whether the person who committed the violation had final policymaking authority); but see Jett, 491 U.S. at 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702 (noting the requirement that the court identify a final policymaker without distinguishing between § 1983 suits based on custom and those based on policy). We need not resolve this question here; under the plain error standard, it is enough that any error in the district court's reference to Department policymakers without identification of a specific final policymaker is not clear. 64 Moreover, even if the district court should have identified a final policymaker in this custom case, the Department is not entitled to a new trial because it cannot show prejudice resulting from the error. In a post-trial ruling, the district court concluded without explanation that the superintendent and deputy superintendent set policy for the jail in the relevant areas, implying that it believed Feeney was the relevant policymaker. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123, 108 S.Ct. 915 (policymaker is official responsible for making policy in that area of the [municipal entity's] business). If Feeney did set final policy for the House of Correction, the Department was not prejudiced by the verdict because he admitted that he knew that the code of silence existed, that there could be consequences for violating it, and that Baron had complained of harassment. In other words, the jury could have found that Feeney had knowledge of the custom that resulted in a deprivation of Baron's constitutional rights and that he acquiesced in the custom by failing to take actions to stop it. 65 The Department asserts, however, that Sheriff Rouse, not Feeney, was the final policymaker under state law. Although there is no evidence on this issue in the record, it seems self-evident that the sheriff is the final policymaker within the Department as a matter of law. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 126, § 16; 15 cf. Jeffes, 208 F.3d at 58 (under New York law, the county sheriff is final policymaker with respect to conduct of staff members toward fellow officers). Emphasizing that Baron did not present any evidence regarding the Sheriff's actual knowledge of the code of silence and retaliatory harassment, the Department contends that a legal determination that the Sheriff was the final policymaker conclusively establishes prejudice. On this point, the Department is wrong. 66 It is true that Baron did not demonstrate that the Sheriff actually knew of the custom that led to his constructive discharge. Although Rouse may not have had actual knowledge of the custom, however, municipal liability can also be based on a policymaker's constructive knowledge — that is, if the custom is so widespread that municipal policymakers should have known of it. Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1157. If the jury had been instructed that Rouse was the policymaker, it might have agreed that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he acquiesced in or condoned enforcement of the code of silence. On the other hand, the jury might also have concluded that if Superintendent Feeney was aware of the code of silence as third-in-command in the Department, constructive knowledge was also attributable to Rouse. 16 Prejudice in this case is far from clear. Pursuant to the plain error standard, the Department has the burden of establishing prejudice. The uncertainty of the prejudice is also fatal to its claim. See Acevedo-Garcia v. Monroig, 351 F.3d 547, 571 (1st Cir.2003) (declining to award a new trial where prejudice to the aggrieved party is not manifest on the face of the record). 67 Nor has the Department established that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand. The Stern Report urged an aggressive attack on the code of silence, explaining that [s]taff [in the Department] consistently expressed concern that if they reported misconduct of fellow staff, they could expect retaliation from their peers. The fact that this was a consistent concern among Department employees demonstrates that the existence of the code of silence and the possibility of retaliatory harassment were well-known throughout the Department during Rouse's tenure. In short, the code of silence charged by Baron was real and pervasive. Viewing the verdict against this background, we conclude that the jury instruction's failure to identify a policymaker was not an error (if an error at all) that seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (quotation marks omitted).