Opinion ID: 2975389
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper Filing of the Jury Waiver

Text: Petitioner’s second alleged error is the substantive error underlying his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, namely, that the trial court was without jurisdiction to try him because the jury waiver form was not filed in accordance with O.R.C. § 2945.05. Unlike Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, this claim is procedurally defaulted, and cannot serve as the basis for granting relief to Petitioner. To reiterate, this Court employs a four part inquiry in determining whether a claim is procedurally defaulted. First, we must determine whether the petitioner failed to comply with an applicable state procedural rule. Maupin, 785 F.2d at 138. Second, we must determine whether the state courts actually enforce the state procedural rule. Id. Third, we must consider whether the state procedural rule constituted an independent and adequate state ground. Id. If all of the above are met, then the burden is on the petitioner to demonstrate that he had “cause” not to follow the rule and that he suffered prejudiced. Id.; see also Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 90-91. Applying this standard to the facts of this case, the Ohio courts have an applicable procedural rule barring defendants from challenging the trial court’s compliance with § 2945.05, except on direct review. In Pless, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[t]he failure to comply with [O.] R.C. [§] 2945.05 may be remedied only in a direct appeal from a criminal conviction.” 658 N.E.2d at 766 (syllabus). Furthermore, Petitioner failed to comply with Ohio’s procedural rule. Petitioner did not raise his improperly filed jury waiver claim on direct appeal, instead raising the claim for the first time before the Ohio Court of Common Pleas in his post-conviction proceedings pursuant to O.R.C. § 2953.21. The Ohio Court of Common Pleas denied Petitioner’s claim in accordance with Pless. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed on this basis. Haliym, 1998 WL 108139, at . Moreover, we can find nothing to suggest that the Ohio courts do not enforce the rule of Pless, or that the rule of Pless does not constitute an independent and adequate state ground for denying Petitioner’s claim. Finally, it follows from our denial of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim that Petitioner cannot demonstrate cause and prejudice to excuse his default.9 D. Knowing, Voluntary, and Intelligent Jury Waiver Petitioner’s next claim of error is that his election to waive his right to a jury and instead be tried by a three-judge court was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. 9 Because this claim potentially implicates subject matter jurisdiction, which can be raised at any time, we share the hesitancy of the Lott court in concluding that Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. Unlike the petitioner in Lott, however, Petitioner here does not argue that the jurisdictional nature of this claim renders a procedural default analysis inapposite. Whether O.R.C. § 2945.05 implicates subject matter jurisdiction is an issue that this Court need not decide. We consider it sufficient to hold that, to the extent that Petitioner’s claim raises an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, this issue is foreclosed on the merits by this Court’s prior determination in Lott, 261 F.3d at 610. No. 04-3207 Haliym v. Mitchell Page 13
Petitioner’s claim is, as the district court found, procedurally defaulted. Petitioner did not raise his claim on direct appeal; he first raised the claim in post-conviction proceedings. In doing so, he raised together in one assignment of error the issue concerning the voluntariness of the jury waiver and the issue of whether the jury waiver was properly filed (discussed above). The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected his claim; however, they construed the claim as only pertaining to whether the jury waiver form was properly filed, without addressing Petitioner’s contention that his waiver was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Although the holding of Pless–that the failure to challenge the application of O.R.C. § 2945.05 cannot be remedied on direct appeal–is inapplicable to Petitioner’s challenge to the voluntariness of the jury waiver, it is nevertheless clear that the Ohio Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of Petitioner’s voluntary and intelligent jury waiver claim. Thus, the court did not remove the procedural bar to our consideration of the merits of Petitioner’s claim. Applying the test from Maupin, Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted. Petitioner failed to comply with Ohio’s rule requiring that he raise this claim on direct appeal. See Maupin, 785 F.2d at 138. It is clear that Ohio courts enforce this rule, and that the rule constitutes an independent and adequate state ground. See id. Thus, the burden is on Petitioner to show cause and prejudice. See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 90-91. Petitioner, in his Murnahan application, did raise the issue of whether counsel’s failure to challenge his jury waiver constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.10 Petitioner is therefore not barred by Murray, 477 U.S. at 488-89, from demonstrating that his appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue constituted cause for the procedural default. To answer the question of whether Petitioner can make this showing, we turn to the merits of Petitioner’s claim, and conclude that he cannot.
The right to a jury is fundamental. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). “Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). “Whether or not there is an intelligent, competent, selfprotecting waiver of jury trial by an accused must depend upon the unique circumstances of each case.” Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 278 (1942). A defendant may waive his right to a jury trial if four elements are established: (1) the waiver must be in writing; (2) the government must consent to the waiver; (3) the trial court must consent to the waiver; and (4) the defendant’s waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 271 (6th Cir. 1983). A petitioner bears the burden of proving that his waiver of a jury trial was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. Sowell v. Bradshaw, 372 F.3d 821, 832 (6th Cir. 2004). Although this Circuit has not stated the precise formula for what constitutes the constitutionally minimum understanding that a defendant must possess in order to validly waive his right to a jury, 10 We disagree with the district court’s conclusion that Petitioner did not raise this claim in his Murnahan proceeding. Petitioner raised this claim before the court of appeals. See Frazier, 2001 WL 1002232, at  (construing Petitioner’s claim as that the “three-judge panel did not have jurisdiction to try him because the jury waiver statute, [O.] R.C. [§] 2945.05, was not fulfilled and because there is insufficient evidence that he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial” (emphasis added)). Although the Ohio Supreme Court did not specifically mention this claim, nothing in its analysis demonstrates that it severed this claim from the rest of Petitioner’s claims, which the court “reviewed . . . and [found] that Haliym has failed to raise ‘a genuine issue as to whether [he] was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on appeal’ as required by [Ohio R. App. P.] 26(B)(5).” Frazier, 772 N.E.2d at 1184. As with Petitioner’s challenge to the improperly-filed jury waiver, we conclude that this constitutes a judgment on the merits for the purpose of excusing Petitioner’s default of his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. No. 04-3207 Haliym v. Mitchell Page 14 a waiver satisfies the fourth element of the test if “the defendant ‘understood that the choice confronting him was, on the one hand, to be judged by a group of people from the community, and on the other hand, to have his guilt or innocence determined by a judge.’” Id. at 836 (quoting United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 597 (6th Cir. 1990)); see also Williams v. DeRobertis, 715 F.2d 1174, 1180 (7th Cir. 1983). Although an on-the-record colloquy with the court is advisable, it is not constitutionally required. Sowell, 372 F.3d at 832 n.5. In this case, it is undisputed that there was a written waiver, signed by Petitioner, and approved by the government and the trial court. The issue thus turns on whether Petitioner’s waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Although there is no record of a colloquy between Petitioner and the trial court, there is persuasive evidence that the court did inquire as to whether Petitioner voluntarily signed the jury waiver. Petitioner stated at his deposition that he was asked about the waiver form, and he confirmed that it was his signature on it. He could not recall if he was asked any other questions by the trial court. One of Petitioner’s trial attorneys, Timothy Koral, testified at his deposition that the trial judge read the waiver in open court. The record also contains evidence that Petitioner’s right to a jury was explained to him to some extent. Petitioner’s second trial attorney, Ralph DeFranco, who was in the jail cell with Petitioner when he signed the jury waiver form, testified that he explained to Petitioner that only three individuals were needed to convict him as opposed to a twelve member jury. Furthermore, on cross-examination at an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner testified that he understood that he had a right to a jury, and that he was, in effect, waiving that right. Given these facts, Petitioner has not shown that he did not understand that he was giving up his right to be tried before members of the community to instead be tried by a three-judge court. See id. at 836. As the district court noted, this case is somewhat analogous to Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363 (6th Cir. 2003). There, the defendant was a fifteen-year-old child who was tried as an adult for first-degree murder. Id. at 365. On habeas review, the defendant argued that his waiver of his right to a jury trial was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent. Id. at 370. He testified at an evidentiary hearing that he did not understand the right to a jury trial, that he simply did what his attorney told him to do, and there was no colloquy on the record (even though there was a court log showing the waiver approved and signed in open court). Id. at 371. The court denied his petition for habeas, concluding that given the passage of time and the bare record, the petitioner’s own testimony did not rebut the state court factual findings by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Petitioner tries to distinguish Spytma, arguing that in Spytma there were state court findings of fact that required clear and convincing evidence to rebut; here there are no explicit state court findings on this issue. While this is relevant, it cannot overcome the fundamental problem that in Spytma, the defendant testified that he did not understand the right he was relinquishing. Id. at 371. Petitioner, by contrast, testified that he did understand. Petitioner also argues that his waiver was invalid because he was never informed that waiving his right to a jury would reduce the sentencing phase of his trial from a two-step process whereby a judge and jury must determine that death is appropriate to a one-step process where the panel could impose the sentence of death. This Court has rejected this challenge on indistinguishable facts, albeit in an unpublished opinion. Gammalo v. Berlin, No. 04-4136, 138 F. App’x 731, 731 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (per curiam), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1032 (2006); see also Henderson v. Walls, 296 F.3d 541, 556 (7th Cir. 2002), vacated on other grounds, 537 U.S. 1230 (2003) (dismissing argument and noting that the Supreme Court has declined to grant certiorari on this issue (citing Jells v. Ohio, 498 U.S. 1111 (1991))). With no precedent in support of his No. 04-3207 Haliym v. Mitchell Page 15 contention, Petitioner cannot demonstrate that his appellate counsel was ineffective under Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.11 Because Petitioner cannot demonstrate cause, we need not reach the issue of whether Petitioner can demonstrate prejudice. We conclude that the district court properly refused to grant the petition on this ground. E. Confrontation Clause Petitioner argues that the trial court violated Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him by admitting the testimony of Albert, age seven, who was allegedly incompetent to testify and did not understand the oath. We agree with the parties and the district court that this claim has been properly preserved for review. Petitioner’s claim rests on two separate but related theories. First, Petitioner claims that Albert was incompetent, which effectively deprived Petitioner of any opportunity to cross-examine Albert, because Albert could not respond to questions in any meaningful sense. Second, Petitioner argues that, because Albert did not understand the oath, Petitioner was deprived of an opportunity to cross-examine Albert under oath, which, according to Petitioner, is a requirement implicit in the right to confront witnesses. Since this Court does not review state court evidentiary rulings, our review is limited to whether Petitioner can demonstrate a violation of his federal constitutional rights. Bell v. Arn, 536 F.2d 123, 125 (6th Cir. 1976). Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme Court’s findings of fact made in connection with the state evidentiary issues are binding for purposes of the constitutional inquiry absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Mitzel v. Tate, 267 F.3d 524, 537 (6th Cir. 2001). At trial, when Albert was administered the oath, the following exchange occurred: Judge Nugent: Raise your right hand up, will you? Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, as you shall answer to God? [Witness does not respond] Say “I do.” The Witness: I do. ... Judge Nugent: How old are you, Albert? The Witness: Seven [Questions by the prosecutor shortly thereafter] Q. What grade are you in? A. First going into the second. Q. . . . Where do you go to school? A. I forget. Q. You forget? Well, you just moved in with your grandmother not so long ago, right? Okay. 11 We express no opinion on the proper resolution of this claim if faced with the issue as a matter of first instance. We merely hold that, as no controlling precedent establishes this right, Petitioner’s appellate counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for their failure to challenge the jury waiver on appeal. No. 04-3207 Haliym v. Mitchell Page 16 Albert, you heard the Judge say – have you raise your right hand. You remember that? A. Yes. Q. And he had you swear to God. You know when he you told you that? A. Yes. Q. Do you know what that means? A. No. Q. Do you know the difference between a good boy and a bad boy? A. Yes. Q. What happens to you if you’re bad, and you tell lies? A. Going to get a whooping, get paddled. Q. You get a whipping and get paddled? Are you supposed to tell the truth all the time? A. Yes. Q. Do you and will you tell the truth? A. Yes. J.A. at 476-78. Before the Ohio Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that Albert’s testimony should have been excluded under Ohio Evidence Rule 601 because “Albert did not understand the nature of an oath, the necessity to tell the truth, and failed to demonstrate the intellectual capacity necessary to relate the events of the night in question.”12 Frazier, 574 N.E.2d at 486. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this argument and held that Albert was competent to testify: Albert appeared to have the ability to receive and recollect accurate impressions and relate the events of the night in question. . . . Albert consistently testified that if he did not tell the truth he would receive a “whooping.” Albert exhibited an understanding of truth and falsity and appeared to appreciate his responsibility to be truthful. ... Lastly, appellant argues that Albert was incompetent to testify since he did not understand the meaning of an oath. . . . The trial court administered the oath to Albert and was satisfied that he knew that he was required to tell the truth and that if he did not tell the truth he would be punished. . . . Accordingly we find that the witness was competent to testify; thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so finding. Id. at 487. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” “The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990). The Confrontation Clause “is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). “[T]he right guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause . . . (1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath–thus impressing him with 12 Ohio Evidence Rule 601 reads in relevant part: “Every person is competent to be a witness except: (A) Those of unsound mind, and children under ten years of age, who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts and transactions respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly.” No. 04-3207 Haliym v. Mitchell Page 17 the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; [and] (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth. . . .” Craig, 497 U.S. at 845-46 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)) (alternation in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. at 862 (Scalia, J. joined by Brennan, J.; Marshall, J.; and Stevens, J. dissenting) (“The Confrontation Clause guarantees not only what it explicitly provides for . . . but also implied and collateral rights such as cross-examination, oath, and observation of demeanor.”). The Confrontation Clause, however, “guarantees only ‘an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’” United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988) (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987)). In Walters v. McCormick, the Ninth Circuit considered a similar issue to the one we presently confront. 122 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 1997). Walters, the defendant, was convicted of sexual assualt and sexual intercourse without consent. Id. at 1174. The alleged victim was K.C., who was four years old at the time of trial. Id. K.C. was allowed to testify by video tape. Id. Her testimony was “riddled with inconsistencies,” and “varied, depending primarily on who was questioning her.” Id. at 1175. For example, K.C. testified both that Walters had molested her and that her mother had invented the story; she also testified that God smiles when you tell the truth, but sometimes he wants you to lie. Id. Walters filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his constitutional rights to confrontation and due process were violated by the Montana trial court’s admission of K.C.’s testimony. Id. This alleged violation existed because any confrontation of a witness as “vacillatory and manipulatable” as K.C. was not meaningful and could not constitute “confrontation” under the Sixth Amendment. Id. Moreover, K.C.’s testimony was allegedly infirm because she did not demonstrate an understanding of her duty to tell the truth or of the oath that she took. Id. The Walters majority rejected both of these claims. It rejected Walters’ claim that K.C.’s lack of capacity violated the Confrontation Clause by merely stating that “Walters cites no direct precedent for this novel proposition. We reject it.” Id. Rejecting Walters’ claim that K.C.’s testimony violated the Confrontation Clause because K.C. lacked the capacity to understand the duty to testify truthfully, the majority reasoned that it was the “‘literal right to ‘confront’ the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause.’” Id. (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 157). The court further stated that a witness’ incapacity to understand the duty to testify truthfully was not reason itself to exclude the testimony, at least where there was “reason to believe that the incriminating testimony will be truthful.” Id. at 1176. The court observed that “no federal court has held that the Constitution places limits on allowing even the youngest child to testify at trial.” Id. (citing Stincer, 482 U.S. at 742 n.12). It concluded that “[b]ecause Walters was allowed to make the jury fully aware of the child’s arguable incapacity [through cross-examination], the Confrontation Clause was satisfied.” Id.