Opinion ID: 167399
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unreasonable search claim

Text: 17 Ms. Bliss and Mr. Trask claim that the probation officers unreasonably searched their residence, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Both were living in the residence when the nonconsensual search occurred and had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their home. Thus, Ms. Bliss and Mr. Trask have standing to challenge the residential search and subsequent actions of the probation officers. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 367-68, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968). 18 The district court held that the probation officers' actions during the June 19, 2001 inspection were objectively reasonable, and it granted qualified immunity on the unreasonable search claim. The district court concluded: 19 [N]either the Defendants nor Plaintiff Bliss had knowledge of the fact that at the time of the search the probation had been terminated. Plaintiffs argue[] that it was unreasonable for Defendant Franco not to have followed up when he discovered that the probation order had been mistakenly prepared and forwarded to the judge. Failing to follow up the judge may have been negligent in May when he discovered that the probation should not have been discharged, but that negligence is not relevant to the Defendants['] conduct in June when the events at issue occurred. At the time of the search a reasonable person, not having seen an order discharging probation, and not having been informed by anyone, including the Plaintiff Bliss, that such an order existed, cannot be said to have violated clearly established rights. 20 Aplts' App. at 101-02. 21 The defense of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for civil damages arising from claims brought against them in their individual capacities. McFall v. Bednar, 407 F.3d 1081, 1087 (10th Cir.2005). In establishing the defense, the Supreme Court has attempted to balance the protection of civil rights and the need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). Individual government actors retain their immunity unless the plaintiff can show that they violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Id. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727. 22 On appeal, we review the award of summary judgment based on qualified immunity de novo, considering all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 971 (10th Cir.2001). Summary judgment is appropriate if the record shows there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c). 23 To prevail on summary judgment against a defendant who asserts a defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that (1) the official violated a constitutional or statutory right; and (2) the constitutional or statutory right was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred. Mimics, Inc. v. Village of Angel Fire, 394 F.3d 836, 841 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). We first determine whether plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). As to the second element, law is clearly established when a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision is on point, or if the clearly established weight of authority from other courts shows that the right must be as plaintiff maintains. Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1248 (10th Cir.2003). If the plaintiff satisfies the two-part test, the defendant bears the usual burden of a party moving for summary judgment to show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1299 (10th Cir.2004). 24 Ms. Bliss and Mr. Trask maintain that the probation officers violated their Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches when the officers conducted a field inspection of their residence more than one month after Ms. Bliss's probation had been discharged. They claim that their Fourth Amendment right to be free from a warrantless entry was clearly established at the time of the June 2001 search. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984). The probation officers respond that Ms. Bliss and Mr. Trask only identify an abstract Fourth Amendment right without the appropriate specificity. 25 Ms. Bliss and Mr. Trask satisfy their burdens under the first two prongs of qualified immunity analysis. Their allegations under the Fourth Amendment, if true, establish a constitutional violation. Moreover, the law regarding a warrantless residential search was clearly established in June 2001. It is true that probationers do not enjoy `the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only ... conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.' Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)). Ms. Bliss's probation, however, had already been discharged when the probation officers visited her home in June 2001. Thus, she enjoyed the full protection of the Fourth Amendment, including the clearly established right to be free from warrantless searches of her home. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) ([A] search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show ... the presence of `exigent circumstances.'). 26 We next consider whether the probation officers can demonstrate that no material issues of fact remain as to whether [their] actions were objectively reasonable in light of the law and the information [they] possessed at the time. Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 779 (10th Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). The probation officers acknowledge that their search of the residence was based on the mistaken belief that Ms. Bliss remained on probation. They contend, however, that their mistaken belief was reasonable. As a general rule, the Fourth Amendment does not invalidate warrantless searches based on a reasonable mistake of fact, as distinguished from a mistake of law. United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 865 (10th Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Whitfield, 939 F.2d 1071, 1073 (D.C.Cir. 1991)). 27 Here, the officers relied on the Probation Division's failure to receive a signed copy of the discharge order to infer that the state district court had noticed and refused to sign the erroneous proposed order, thus continuing Ms. Bliss's probation. The parties disagree as to whether that inference was reasonable. 28 Ms. Bliss and Mr. Trask contend that a reasonable officer would not have assumed that Ms. Bliss remained on probation on June 19, 2001, and instead would have taken more steps to notify the state court that a discharge order had been erroneously submitted. They provide an affidavit of a former probation officer stating that (1) a reasonable probation officer would have known that a non-violent offender's early discharge from probation was not uncommon, and (2) district courts rarely scrutinize proposed orders of discharge. Aplts' App. at 77-78 (Aff. of Tony Herrera). Officer Franco counters that he reasonably assumed the district court judge did not sign the order because a copy had not been forwarded to the Probation Division. According to him, the court generally forwards a copy of the probation order to the Probation Division after a judge signs an order of discharge. 29 Viewing evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Bliss and Mr. Trask, we conclude that a material factual dispute exists as to whether the probation officers reasonably believed that Ms. Bliss was still on probation on June 19, 2001. Some evidence and testimony support Ms. Bliss's and Mr. Trask's version of the facts, namely Mr. Herrerra's affidavit stating that (1) a non-violent offender may be discharged early from probation, and (2) district courts rarely scrutinize submitted orders of discharge. Also, Ms. Bliss contends that she was told eight months into her probation that she would be considered for early discharge. Id. at 83. However, the probation officers have offered evidence to support their contention that they acted reasonably: (1) the district court signed the order of discharge and filed it approximately May 11, 2001, but the court did not forward a signed copy of the order to the Probation Division until July 5, 2001; and (2) Ms. Bliss never told Mr. Franco that her probation had been discharged during field inspections in May and June of 2001. 30 Moreover, from the record before us, it is unclear how the Probation Division responds when its probation officers discover an error in a proposed discharge order that has been submitted to the district court. If the established practice is to notify immediately the district court of the error, then the probation officers' failure to do so here would support Ms. Bliss's and Mr. Trask's contention that the belief that she was still on probation was not reasonable. On the other hand, if there is evidence that district courts have regularly corrected mistakes in proposed discharge orders sua sponte, then that practice would support the probation officers' contention — that the failure of the Probation Division to promptly receive a signed copy of the discharge order indicated to them that the district court had not signed the order. 31 Accordingly, we reverse the award of qualified immunity to the probation officers on Ms. Bliss's and Mr. Trask's § 1983 claim of an unlawful residential search. Though the record only indicates Officer Franco's involvement in preparing the erroneous order, we presume communication among the three probation officers and impute Officer Franco's knowledge of Ms. Bliss's procedural history to Officers Lund and Smith. The probation officers stated in their answer to the complaint that all three believed the district judge had caught the discharge error and, during May and June of 2001, continued to monitor and perform their functions as probation officers. Id. at 16 (Answer to Compl., filed Sept. 8, 2003). Further, the three probation officers jointly conducted the inspection, and neither Officer Lund nor Smith contends that he should be treated differently from Officer Franco. See United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1504 (10th Cir.1996) (recognizing the value in imputing knowledge among [police] officers working closely together). 32