Opinion ID: 4244584
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pre- and Post-Arrest Silence

Text: [¶22] Nobles contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in his closing argument when he referenced Nobles’s pre- and post-arrest silence with the police. He contends that, at the time of his arrest and just following his arrest, he had the absolute constitutional right to remain silent and that the 13 prosecutor’s argument violated his constitutional protection against compelled self-incrimination. [¶23] When a defendant does not testify at trial, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution5 may be violated if state prosecutors comment on the accused’s invoked silence, including pretrial silence. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965); State v. Lovejoy, 2014 ME 48, ¶ 22, 89 A.3d 1066 (“[I]ndividuals are endowed with the Fifth Amendment’s protections against compelled self-incrimination both before and after arrest.”); State v. Diaz, 681 A.2d 466, 467-69 (Me. 1996). [¶24] Although we have never required the use of any specific words for a person to invoke constitutional protection for his or her silence, we do require that the record demonstrate the defendant’s actual intention to exercise the constitutional right to remain silent. See Lovejoy, 2014 ME 48, ¶ 25, 89 A.3d 1066. Here, there is no such showing in the record. To the contrary, Nobles did not remain silent; he was cursing and was belligerent and offensive in making 5 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” 14 statements to the officers about getting out of his vehicle and about taking the breath test. [¶25] Moreover, when a defendant elects to testify in his own defense, the use of prearrest silence to impeach a criminal defendant’s credibility does not violate the Fifth Amendment. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980). “[I]mpeachment follows the defendant’s own decision to cast aside his cloak of silence and advances the truthfinding function of the criminal trial.” Id. Impeachment of a testifying defendant by the use of prearrest silence does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 240. [¶26] In this case, Nobles had not yet testified when the prosecutor asked the officers about Nobles’s statements and actions. Defense counsel had, however, announced during her opening statement that Nobles would be testifying, and she had summarized the version of the facts to which he would testify. Nobles’s later testimony was consistent with counsel’s opening statement and included testimony that he was driving on Route 11 to find a telephone and contact the police for protection, which was inconsistent with the observations of the officers in their initial encounter with Nobles. The prosecutor’s closing arguments were made after Nobles’s testimony. Because Nobles did not invoke his right to remain silent, did not actually remain silent, 15 and subsequently chose to testify at trial, he has not established any error, let alone obvious error “so clear under existing law that the court and the prosecutor were required to address the matter even in the absence of a timely objection.” Robinson, 2016 ME 24, ¶ 26, 134 A.3d 828 (quotation marks omitted). 2. Arguments Referring to Nobles’s Accountability [¶27] Nobles contends that the prosecutor’s repeated argument that the jury had a duty to determine his accountability amounted to prosecutorial misconduct because it improperly suggested to the jury that it had a civic duty to find him guilty, resulting in prejudicial error. [¶28] Here, the language preceding and following the prosecutor’s challenged statements provides important context. See Dolloff, 2012 ME 130, ¶ 70, 58 A.3d 1032. The prosecutor did not argue that the jury had an obligation to hold Nobles accountable; he instead indicated that it was the jury’s job to determine whether Nobles should be held accountable. Additionally, the prosecutor predicated the jury’s duty to make that decision on its consideration of the evidence, stating, “that’s what you should decide this case on. Based upon the evidence.” Although some of the prosecutor’s comments, viewed in isolation, may appear similar to the comments that led us to hold that there was 16 prosecutorial misconduct upon a preserved claim of error in State v. Begin, 2015 ME 86, ¶¶ 25-28, 120 A.3d 97, the comments here, read in context, do not demonstrate obvious error requiring that we vacate the judgment of conviction. [¶29] Moreover, any potential prejudice was fully remedied by the court’s full and effective instructions, including instructions that the attorneys’ arguments are not evidence and that the jury’s role is to consider the evidence to determine whether the State has proved each crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. ¶ 28.