Opinion ID: 2750728
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: three senior officer promotions

Text: Where, as here, a Title VII plaintiff uses circumstantial evidence to prove discrimination, we apply the burden-shifting approach articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). Brown v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1181 (11th Cir. 2010). Under this approach, the plaintiff must first make a prima facie case of discrimination. Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010). If the plaintiff does so, a presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden of production, but not persuasion, shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the promotion decision. Kidd v. Mando Am. Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1205 (11th Cir. 2013). If the employer meets its burden, the burden shifts back to 11 Case: 14-11330 Date Filed: 11/13/2014 Page: 12 of 22 the plaintiff to produce evidence that the proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination. Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Group, Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007). While the intermediate burdens of production shift back and forth, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Id.
To state a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified and applied for the promotion; (3) he was rejected despite his qualifications; and (4) the position was filled with an individual outside the protected class. Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177, 1186, 1193 (11th Cir. 1998). In Walker, this Court concluded that the plaintiff need not establish as part of the prima facie case that the promoted employee was equally or less qualified than the plaintiff. Id. at 1193. Since Walker, some of this Court’s decisions state that the fourth element does require the plaintiff to show that the promoted employee was equally or less qualified. See, e.g., Brown v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1174 (11th Cir. 2010); Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004); Lee v. GTE Florida, Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir. 2000). We need not resolve this conflict because, even assuming arguendo that Holmes satisfied his prima facie case, Holmes failed to rebut the 12 Case: 14-11330 Date Filed: 11/13/2014 Page: 13 of 22 Board’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not promoting him. See Cuddeback v. Fla. Bd. of Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1235-36 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining that we may affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on any legal ground supported by the record, regardless of whether the district court relied on that ground). B. Pretext To show pretext, the plaintiff cannot recast the employer’s proffered reason, but must meet the reason “head on and rebut it.” Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The plaintiff must show both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason. Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006). At this stage, a “new level of specificity” applies, and the plaintiff must demonstrate “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Rioux v. City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Earley v. Champion Int’l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990) (explaining that the plaintiff must “present concrete evidence in the form of specific facts which show that the defendant’s proffered reason is mere pretext. Mere conclusory allegations and assertions will 13 Case: 14-11330 Date Filed: 11/13/2014 Page: 14 of 22 not suffice”). If the employer proffers more than one reason, the plaintiff must rebut each of them to survive summary judgment. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1037. 6 The Board proffered two reasons for its decisions not to promote Holmes to the three Senior Officer positions—Holmes’s disciplinary record and his specialization in pardon work in the Montgomery field office. Specifically, although Holmes’s disciplinary matters were not a bar to his promotion, they influenced his supervisors’ recommendations regarding whether to promote him. The Board further explained that while Holmes’s specialization in pardon work was a negative factor for promotion to a field office supervisor, it was a positive factor in 2013, when Holmes was promoted to Senior Officer within the Montgomery Central Office Pardon Unit. Holmes attempted to rebut the Board’s reasons by showing that he was more qualified than the promoted employees because he had a masters degree and had more years of experience as a parole and probation officer. Holmes pointed to the Board’s 2009 promotion protocol, which listed among its objective criteria the candidate’s advanced degrees and years in law enforcement. 6 We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, construing the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Moton v. Coward, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 14 Case: 14-11330 Date Filed: 11/13/2014 Page: 15 of 22 Holmes also relied upon his own declaration, in which he provided generalized information about Senior Officer promotions by race and gender between 2007 and 2011. Although Holmes’s declaration claimed that he “learned” this information from “examination of the discovery” materials the Board had produced, he did not submit any of those discovery materials to the district court. 7 The Board did submit some of those discovery materials, including State Personnel Department’s records of Senior Officer and District Manager promotions, which demonstrated that Holmes’s data was in fact inaccurate. Holmes further stated his own conclusory opinion that he was more qualified than all the individuals promoted because he was “more highly ranked and had superior education and experience.” Holmes’s declaration did not specifically address the qualifications of Causey, Carter, and Planer. Holmes claimed that “Carter was promoted with disciplinary warnings and reprimands in his file,” but did not provide any details or attach any supporting documents. Holmes made no claims about Causey’s and Planer’s disciplinary record and did not provide information about the three 7 Specifically, Holmes’s declaration stated that, based on his “examination of the discovery in this case,” he had “learned that 23 officers were awarded promotions” to Senior Officer between January 2007 and August 2011, and that “22 of these 23 promotions were awarded to officers who were nonwhite and/or female.” Holmes further stated that he learned “[f]rom [his] examination of the applications of these officers,” that “none of the 23 officers selected for promotion has more experience that [sic] [he] did, and 12 had less than three years’ experience” and that “18 of the 23 officers selected for promotion . . . did not possess a graduate degree.” But, Holmes did not submit any of the discovery he claimed to have reviewed. 15 Case: 14-11330 Date Filed: 11/13/2014 Page: 16 of 22 promoted officers’ work experience or areas of specialization. Further, Holmes did not dispute his own disciplinary record or that, as a pardons specialist, he ordinarily did not perform field duties. By focusing on his years of experience and advanced degree, Holmes merely quarreled with the wisdom of the Board’s reasons for not promoting him in 2011 and did not address those reasons “head on.” See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. Additionally, Holmes’s declaration made only conclusory assertions that the officers receiving promotions were less qualified, which is not sufficient to show pretext. Instead, Holmes needed to present “concrete evidence in the form of specific facts” rebutting the Board’s reasons. See Earley, 907 F.2d at 1081; see also Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining that “conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value” in opposing summary judgment). For example, Holmes did not present evidence that Causey, Carter, and Planer had similar disciplinary records or that they also specialized in pardon work. Indeed, Holmes failed to present almost any evidence at all of the three promoted employees’ qualifications, whether linked to the Board’s proffered reasons or not. Thus, Holmes failed to show that Causey, Carter, and Planer were less qualified than him, much less that there was a disparity in qualifications “of such weight and significance” that a reasonable 16 Case: 14-11330 Date Filed: 11/13/2014 Page: 17 of 22 person could not have chosen Causey, Carter, and Planer over Holmes. See Kidd, 731 F.3d at 1206. Holmes’s declaration also identified three officers (other than Causey, Carter, or Planer) who were promoted to Senior Officer positions even though they either had a disciplinary record or performed pardon work. Holmes argues that the fact that these other officers were promoted shows the Board’s reasons lack credibility. The Board, however, did not claim that a disciplinary record or pardon work is a bar to promotion, just that they influenced his supervisors’ recommendations of him for the three relevant Senior Officer promotions. Furthermore, evidence of comparators who are treated more favorably cannot show pretext unless those comparators are “similarly situated to the plaintiff in all relevant respects.” See Rioux, 520 F.3d at 1280 (quotation marks and alterations omitted). Holmes offered no other information about his proffered comparators except that they had a disciplinary record or performed pardon work and thus did not show they were “similarly situated” to him in all relevant respects. Accordingly, Holmes did not present evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the Board’s two proffered reasons were false and a pretext for discrimination. Finally, Holmes’s argument that the district court improperly shifted the burden of proof to him at summary judgment lacks merit. Consistent with Federal 17 Case: 14-11330 Date Filed: 11/13/2014 Page: 18 of 22 Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1), the Board both cited to record evidence showing the presence of some undisputed facts and also pointed out that Holmes’s own evidence was insufficient to carry his ultimate burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the failure to promote him to the three Senior Officer positions was discriminatory. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B) & advisory committee’s notes (2010 Amendments, Subdivision (c)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986) (explaining that the moving party need not affirmatively negate the opponent’s claim with affidavits or other materials, but instead may meet its summary judgment burden by showing there is a lack of evidence to support the essential elements the non-moving party must prove at trial); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining that, per Celotex, “under certain circumstances the movant may meet its Rule 56 burden without negating an element of the non-moving party’s claim and that under such circumstances it is sufficient to point to materials on file that demonstrate that the party bearing the burden of proof at trial will not be able to meet that burden”).