Opinion ID: 2708803
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The SIU Defendants

Text: Summary judgment was also properly granted on Shields’ § 1983 claims against SIU, Dr. Olysav, and Dr. Froelich. Shields makes no arguments regarding SIU itself on appeal, so any claim against SIU is waived. Puffer, 675 F.3d at 718. Shields also has not shown that either Dr. Olysav or Dr. Froelich acted under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983. Whether a medical provider is a state actor is a functional inquiry, focusing on the relationship between the state, the medical provider, and the prisoner. Rodriguez, 577 F.3d at 826. A business like Wexford that contracts to provide medical care to prisoners undertakes “freely, and for consideration, responsibility for a specific portion of the state’s overall [constitutional] obligation to provide medical care for incarcerated persons,” id. at 827, and thus acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. On the other hand, we have held that medical providers who have “only an incidental or transitory relationship” with the penal system generally are not considered state actors. Id. at 827. The undisputed facts show here that Dr. Olysav and Dr. Froelich each had only an incidental and transitory relationship with the penal system. Neither was not acting under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. Wexford referred Shields to Dr. Olysav for a one-time examination, which he performed with the help of Dr. Froelich. Dr. Olysav recommended physical therapy and had nothing more to do with the patient. Neither Dr. Olysav nor Dr. Froelich scheduled follow-up appointments with Shields or retained responsibility for his course of treatment, so they did not have a sufficiently direct relationship with him to find that they were acting under color 30 Nos. 12-2746 and 13-1143 of state law. See Rodriguez, 577 F.3d at 828. Their relationship with Wexford was similarly too attenuated to support the conclusion that they were acting under color of state law. Shields correctly points out that Drs. Olysav and Froelich both indicated that they had treated inmates before and that Wexford had made the arrangements for those treatments. However, there is no evidence that Drs. Olysav and Froelich had a contract with Wexford or the prison, that their practices focused on treating inmates, or even that they regularly treated inmates as part of their practices. Standing alone, merely having treated inmates before does not establish the kind of close relationship between the doctors and Wexford required to find that they were state actors. In other words, the undisputed facts show that Dr. Olysav and Dr. Froelich had only incidental and transitory relationships with both Wexford and Shields. The undisputed facts do not allow a reasonable inference that these doctors acted under color of state law when they took the referral from Wexford. Summary judgment was properly granted for them on Shields’ § 1983 claims. Accordingly, the district court also did not abuse its discretion by declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims for medical malpractice against these defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).