Opinion ID: 2514340
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Finalization of A.A.T.'s Adoption

Text: In this case, M.P. did not utilize the legal procedures available to him in New York, nor did he pursue any procedures in Kansas, either during the first trimester of the pregnancy or later when he suspected that N.T. was still pregnant. Both states had established processes sufficient to protect his interest. Having failed to protect himself, M.P.'s right to notice was contingent upon N.T. advising the court of sufficient information to result in actual notice. Instead of assuring M.P. received notice, N.T., by affidavit, provided a surname other than M.P.'s as the putative father and, as a result, M.P. was not identified as a possible father of the child. Following the statutory procedure, the district court fulfilled its obligation to determine by affidavit the identity of the father. Neither the court nor the parties to the adoptionthe adoption agency and the adoptive parentshad any way of knowing the affidavit or the information N.T. provided the GAL was false. Thus, to all concerned, a putative father was identified. Once identified, the putative father is entitled to notice under K.S.A. 59-2136(e)(6) (notice be given to every person identified as a father or a possible father); see also K.S.A. 59-2136(f). Notice is to be provided by certified mail or in any manner the court may direct. K.S.A. 59-2136(f). Because an exact address for the identified father was not given by N.T., notice by publication was allowed. The statute provides further: (g) If, after the inquiry, the court is unable to identify the father or any possible father and no person has appeared claiming to be the father and claiming custodial rights, the court shall enter an order terminating the unknown father's parental rights with reference to the child without regard to subsection (h). If any person identified as the father or possible father of the child fails to appear or, if appearing, fails to claim custodial rights, such person's parental rights with reference to the child shall be terminated without regard to subsection (h). K.S.A. 59-2136(g). In reliance upon this provision, after the court utilized the statutory procedures to identify the putative father, the adoption of A.A.T. was finalized based upon the court's and parties' belief that the father had been identified but had not appeared. Under the statute, if a father does not appear, the father's rights shall be terminated and, thereby, the adoption can be finalized. By calling for the termination of parental rights, the provision brings finality to the adoption. A different procedure applies if the mother identifies the putative father, notice is given, and the father enters an appearance in the adoption proceeding. If the father appears and asserts parental rights, several rights attach, including the right to appointed counsel and a hearing regarding whether paternal rights can be terminated. K.S.A. 59-2136(h) defines the criteria to be applied in the termination proceeding. When applying K.S.A. 59-2136(h), Kansas appellate courts have strongly endorsed the parental preference doctrine, required strict compliance, and diligently enforced the clear and convincing evidence standard. See, e.g., In re Adoption of X.J.A., 284 Kan. at 881, 166 P.3d 396; In re Adoption of Baby Boy B., 254 Kan. 454, 456, 866 P.2d 1029 (1994); In re Adoption of F.A.R., 242 Kan. 231, 747 P.2d 145 (1987); In re Adoption of Trent, 229 Kan. at 228, 624 P.2d 433; In re Adoption of Baby Girl S., 29 Kan.App.2d 664, 667, 29 P.3d 466 (2001) aff'd 273 Kan. 71, 41 P.3d 287 (2002); In re Adoption of Baby Boy S., 22 Kan.App.2d 119, 912 P.2d 761, rev. denied 260 Kan. 929, cert. denied 519 U.S. 870, 117 S.Ct. 185, 136 L.Ed.2d 123 (1996); In re K.D.O., 20 Kan.App.2d 559, 889 P.2d 1158 (1995); In re Baby Boy N., 19 Kan.App.2d 574, 874 P.2d 680, rev. denied 255 Kan. 1001, cert. denied 513 U.S. 1018, 115 S.Ct. 581, 130 L.Ed.2d 496 (1994); In re Lathrop's Adoption, 2 Kan.App.2d 90, 575 P.2d 894 (1978). Although M.P. makes it clear the provisions of K.S.A. 59-2136(h) are not at issue in this appeal, his arguments imply that Kansas' parental preference doctrine should be given weight even after the adoption is finalized. His position creates a tension with the rights of the adoptive family and the State because voiding the adoption would be in derogation of the matured rights of the State and the adoptive family. See K.S.A. 38-1111 (defining parent and child relationship as the legal relationship existing between a child and the child's biological or adoptive parents.); see also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844 n. 51, 845-46, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977) (noting adoption was the legal equivalent of biological parenthood and holding that liberty interests may in some cases arise from positive-law sources making it appropriate to ascertain from state law the expectations and entitlements of the parties). Undoubtedly, the human and emotional tensions of this case are enormous, creating sympathy for M.P.'s position and little doubt about the sincerity of his present desire for custody. Nevertheless, the critical fact remains that the opportunity to assert his interest in parenting slipped away without any involvement of the State. The interests of the State and the adoptive family justify a conclusion that M.P.'s opportunity to demonstrate his commitment to parenting passed without developing into a liberty interest. We hold that M.P. did not have a liberty interest in a relationship with A.A.T. and that the State did not deny him the opportunity to establish such a relationship. Consequently, we affirm the district court's conclusion that the adoption is not void.