Opinion ID: 1380225
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standards for review of denial of post-conviction relief

Text: This Court's review of the motion court's denial of post-conviction relief is limited to a determination of whether the findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. Moss v. State, 10 S.W.3d 508, 511 (Mo. banc 2000). A judgment is clearly erroneous when, in light of the entire record, the court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. Id. The motion court's findings are presumed correct. Black v. State, 151 S.W.3d 49, 54 (Mo. banc 2004). In order to be entitled to post-conviction relief, a movant is required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that: 1) counsel failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney under similar circumstances, and 2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 425 (Mo. banc 2002). Mr. Worthington bears a heavy burden in attempting to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, for he must overcome a strong presumption that counsel provided competent representation by showing that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Deck, 68 S.W.3d at 425-426. See also Rule 29.15(i); Middleton v. State, 103 S.W.3d 726, 732 (Mo. banc 2003). This standard is met by identifying specific acts or omissions of counsel that, in light of all the circumstances, fell outside the wide range of professional competent assistance. Id. at 425. It is presumed that counsel's conduct was reasonable and effective. Clayton v. State, 63 S.W.3d 201, 206 (Mo. banc 2001). Reasonable choices of trial strategy, no matter how ill fated they appear in hindsight, cannot serve as a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance. Cole v. State, 152 S.W.3d 267, 270 (Mo. banc 2004); Knese v. State, 85 S.W.3d 628, 633 (Mo. banc 2002). It is also not ineffective to pursue one reasonable trial strategy to the exclusion of another reasonable trial strategy. Clayton, 63 S.W.3d at 207. To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, a movant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Middleton, 103 S.W.3d at 733. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. In order to show prejudice in a guilty plea case, a defendant must prove that, but for the errors of counsel, he would not have pled guilty and would have demanded a trial. State v. Roll, 942 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Mo. banc 1997). Because the penalty phase was tried to a judge, it is particularly difficult to meet this standard. In court-tried cases judges are given great latitude in the admission of evidence because of the presumption that they will not give weight to incompetent evidence. Pike v. Pike, 609 S.W.2d 397, 403 (Mo. banc 1980). Because of this, it is difficult to base reversible error on the erroneous admission of evidence in a court-tried case. Blackburn v. Richardson, 849 S.W.2d 281, 291 (Mo. App. S.D.1993). Erroneous admission of such evidence constitutes harmless error if other properly admitted evidence supports the judgment. Id. Further, because judges are presumed to not consider improper evidence at sentencing, State v. Carter, 955 S.W.2d 548, 560 (Mo. banc 1997), this Court presumes that inadmissible evidence relevant to sentencing is neither prejudicial nor fundamentally unfair in court-tried matters. Id.