Opinion ID: 1982561
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the opinion of the trial court

Text: In denying the Motion for Enforcement of Plea Agreement, the hearing judge delivered an opinion from the bench. He put his finger on the key to the controversy at the beginning of his opinion. He said: The question ... which is presented here is whether or not there was an agreement prior to the State's withdrawal of its plea agreement, whether there was an agreement that a polygraph would be taken, and that the parties would be guided by the results of that polygraph. As was his obligation as the fact finder, the judge resolved the conflicts in the evidence with respect to these issues. He found that there was a plea agreement prior to its withdrawal by the State, that there was an agreement that a polygraph be taken, and that the parties were to be guided by the results of that polygraph. He obviously accepted Brown's version as the correct one. He said: Mr. Brown's testimony in substance ... boils down to there being an agreement struck, and a part of that agreement was that Mr. Allgood would testify truthfully before the Grand Jury. And that sometime thereafter, doubt developed as to Mr. Allgood's truthfulness, and it was then agreed that a polygraph would be administered to Mr. Allgood. Obviously the purpose and expressed purpose was that a favorable result would impose on the State the burden to keep its agreement, and on the contrary, that an unfavorable result would ... put the State in the position that it could have the option of not pursuing the agreement. On the evidence before the court, set out above, this judgment was not clearly erroneous, and we may not set it aside. Rule 886. There was no contention at the hearing that the polygraph test was other than unfavorable to Allgood. The report of the polygraph examiner was received in evidence. It is clear on its face that the results of the examination were not favorable to Allgood. It can only be construed as showing that Allgood failed the test. It was the opinion of the examiner that Allgood was deceptive in answering five key questions concerning the crime, including [r]egarding that robbery and murder [of Harris] do you intend to answer truthfully each question about that? It follows that the repudiation of the plea agreement by the State was not improper. By failing the polygraph examination, Allgood was not entitled to the enforcement of the plea agreement. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Allgood's motion to enforce it. The judgment of the court was not in conflict with the court's assertion that polygraph results play no part in determining, as far as the Court is concerned, determining truthfulness or the absence of truthfulness. In resolving whether Brown's view or Ellis's view was correct, the court was not concerned with the veracity vel non of Allgood. The issue before the court was not whether Allgood was, in fact, telling the truth and thereby complying with an underlying obligation to tell the truth, but whether the parties had agreed to abide by the results of the polygraph test in determining the viability of the plea agreement. Therefore, the status of polygraph evidence in our administration of criminal justice was immaterial. But see, Guesfeird v. State, 300 Md. 653, 658, 480 A.2d 800 (1984); Kelley v. State, 288 Md. 298, 302, 418 A.2d 217 (1980); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 380-389, 391 A.2d 364 (1978); Lusby v. State, 217 Md. 191, 194-195, 141 A.2d 893 (1958). We note that the judgment on the decisive issues was sound whether the provision to take the polygraph examination was a part of the original plea agreement or was a subsidiary agreement subsequent to the plea agreement. In any event, the court found that it was a part of the overall agreement between the State and the defendant relative to the plea bargain, and this was not clearly erroneous. The judge gave an alternative reason why Allgood was not entitled to the enforcement of the plea bargain. He observed that a term of the plea agreement required that Allgood reveal to the State's Attorney's Office of Baltimore City, prior to any sworn testimony, the truth concerning the murder of Mr. Marion Harris, leaving nothing out that he reasonably should remember. He concluded from the testimony ... that there was a breach of this portion of the agreement which standing alone would be grounds for invalidating the agreement. He asserted: It is uncontradicted that statements made to Mr. Brown by Mr. Allgood were not true. At the conclusion of the judge's opinion, defense counsel promptly challenged this statement. He claimed that There is no, absolutely no evidence other than the polygraph test which you had indicated at the beginning of your statement that that would not control this Court. Other than that, there is no evidence that I am aware of that my client lied to Mr. Brown or the State's Attorney or the Grand Jury or anybody else. The judge did not elaborate on his challenged assertion. All he said was: I think the record is clear. It may well be that the judge was clearly erroneous in his alternative reason. The evidence does not support his acceptance that statements made by Mr. Brown to Mr. Allgood were not true. In light of the judge's declaration that polygraph results would play no part in determining, as far as the Court is concerned, truthfulness or the absence of truthfulness, defense counsel was correct; there was no other tangible evidence that Allgood was lying. Brown recounted what Harris's relatives told him was Harris's fixation about answering the door. This may have been enough to raise doubts about Allgood's version, but, as Brown's pursuit of the matter indicated, it was not sufficient to satisfy that Allgood was, in fact, lying. We note that neither of the relatives testified at the hearing. Technically, it may be correct that it was not contradicted that what Allgood told Brown was not true, but there was no evidence adduced, discounting the results of the polygraph examination, legally sufficient to establish that Allgood was not truthful. If he was in fact lying, it was up to the State to prove it, and it did not do so under the condition described by the court. In any event, we base our decision on the first reason stated by the court and, thus, we do not reach the second reason. Whether the court was right or wrong as to its alternative reason is not pertinent to our resolution of this appeal. It will be recalled that defense counsel argued at the hearing that if Allgood did not tell the whole truth, any false statements he made were not substantial enough to warrant repudiation of the plea agreement. He claimed that 95% of what Allgood had given the State was the truth and that, he urged, was sufficient to satisfy the agreement. But whether Allgood had substantially performed his promises under the plea agreement was not the issue as the motion was decided. The hearing court found that the enforceability of the agreement depended on the results of the polygraph test, and when Allgood failed the test he lost his entitlement to have the plea agreement enforced. The hearing judge had no need to address the matter of substantial performance (he distinguished State v. Brockman, supra , however, upon which Allgood relied), nor do we. [1]