Opinion ID: 2103477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidentiary Rulings Discretion Exercised Properly

Text: Lilly alleges the Superior Court abused its discretion in three rulings regarding the admission of evidence during the course of his trial. The parties properly agree that abuse of discretion is the appropriate standard of appellate review for each of the three evidentiary rulings at issue. See Tice v. State, Del.Supr., 624 A.2d 399, 401 (1993). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court has... exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances, [or] ... so ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Adams, Del.Supr., 541 A.2d 567, 570 (1988). [2] The first alleged abuse of discretion occurred during the State's case-in-chief. The Superior Court permitted Sandra Carter to testify, over Lilly's objection, about the contents of a writing. Lilly asserts that the Superior Court erred in allowing her testimony rather than requiring the State to introduce the actual document. Carter, a friend of Motter's, was allowed to testify regarding the contents of a tavern's sign-in book. The testimony was offered to establish Motter's presence in the tavern prior to the accident. Lilly contends that the best evidence of the contents of the sign-in book is the book itself. The best evidence rule provides that [t]o prove the contents of a writing, ... the original writing . . . is required, except as otherwise provided in [the Rules of Evidence] or by statute. D.R.E. 1002. The Rules of Evidence provide several exceptions. First, the writing is not required if it is not related to a controlling issue, i.e., if it only relates to collateral matters. D.R.E. 1004(3). Second, the writing is not required if it was lost or destroyed or could not be obtained by available judicial process or procedure. D.R.E. 1004(1), (2). The Superior Court ruled the testimony regarding the sign-in book was admissible because Motter's location before the accident was only collateral to the issues of the case. The central issues in the case revolved around Lilly's conduct. Based upon the state of the record at the time Carter testified, it was not an abuse of discretion to find that Motter's location earlier in the evening was not related to a controlling issue. The other two alleged abuses of discretion occurred during the presentation of Lilly's case. Both rulings precluded introduction of evidence regarding Motter's level of impairment from alcohol or cocaine. According to Lilly, each ruling was erroneous and prejudiced him by preventing the jury from fairly evaluating the role Motter's conduct may have played in her death. Decisions of the trial judge to exclude irrelevant evidence, or evidence that is more prejudicial than probative, are clearly within the discretion accorded to trial judges on evidentiary matters. D.R.E. 401; D.R.E. 403; Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc. v. Norman Gershman's Things To Wear, Inc., Del. Supr., 596 A.2d 1358, 1366 (1991). Delaware Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. D.R.E. 401. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. D.R.E. 402. The definition of relevance encompasses materiality and probative value. Getz v. State, Del.Supr., 538 A.2d 726, 731 (1988) (citing C. McCormick, Evidence, § 185, at 541 (Cleary 3d ed. 1984)). Evidence is material if the fact it is offered to prove is of consequence to the action. Id. Evidence has probative value if it advances the probability that the fact is as the party offering the evidence asserts it to be. Id. During the State's case, evidence was offered by accident reconstruction experts that Lilly collided head-on with the Motter vehicle while her vehicle was in its proper lane. During the trial, the defense did not seek to refute that conclusion. Lilly's own testimony established that he crossed the median and collided head-on with Motter. No evidence was offered to suggest that Motter had been driving in an improper place or manner. Given the preceding undisputed evidence, Lilly failed to establish a factual basis demonstrating the relevance of Motter's conduct. While evidence of Motter's blood alcohol content or level of impairment from cocaine may have been probative of her conduct that night, such evidence is not relevant if it was not asserted at trial that Motter's conduct was a cause of the accident. Therefore, the record reflects the Superior Court properly exercised its discretion in declining to admit evidence suggesting Motter was impaired.