Opinion ID: 2803227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fatico

Text: Khandrius also challenges the district court’s denial of his request for a hearing pursuant to United States v. Fatico, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979). We review the denial of an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29, 54 (2d Cir. 2013). While a district court must afford the defendant an opportunity to rebut disputed factual allegations relevant to sentencing, neither the Due Process Clause nor the Guidelines require the 3 We note, however, that Rizzo’s treatment of the evidentiary burden with respect to foreseeability under Section 1B1.3 is at odds with other of our cases applying post-1992 versions of the Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d 662, 677–78 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 119 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Firment, 296 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2002). In these cases we relied on Negron and its progeny for the proposition that the defendant must prove that the acts of co-conspirators were not foreseeable. However, these decisions did not address the effect, if any, of the 1992 amendment. While we harbor doubt as to the continued viability of Negron, we need not resolve this apparent tension today, as this line of precedent does not control the burden of proof at issue here. 4 district court to hold a formal evidentiary hearing. United States v. Phillips, 431 F.3d 86, 93 (2d Cir. 2005). Khandrius, however, argues that in declining to hold a Fatico hearing the district court erred by (1) viewing the issue of the scope of his agreement as a legal, rather than factual, dispute, and (2) leaving disputes of fact regarding the scope of his agreement unresolved. Upon review of the sentencing transcript, we are satisfied that the district court properly apprehended the factual nature of Khandrius’s request for a Fatico hearing and did not abuse its discretion in denying this request. Through a sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hearing Khandrius objected to the scope of the conduct attributed to him. This opportunity to challenge the government’s evidence was sufficient to satisfy due process. See id. Shelikhova’s Appeal As to Shelikhova, we have reviewed her attorney’s Anders motion and brief, Shelikhova’s pro se response, and the government’s motion to dismiss her appeal. We agree with Shelikhova’s counsel and the government that there are no meritorious issues to be raised on appeal because (1) Shelikhova’s guilty plea was valid; (2) her waiver of appellate rights was knowing and voluntary; and (3) her plea agreement clearly specified that she would not appeal a “term of imprisonment of 240 months or below.” We are satisfied that counsel here diligently searched the record and properly concluded that an appeal would be frivolous. See United States v. Burnett, 989 F.2d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 1993). We therefore grant both motions. We have considered the remainder of appellants’ arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court as to Defendant-Appellant Khandrius is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for resentencing consistent with this order. Attorney Volkell’s motion to withdraw from representation of Defendant-Appellant Shelikhova is GRANTED, and the government’s motion to dismiss Shelikhova’s appeal is GRANTED. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 5