Opinion ID: 1951790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Misuse Cause

Text: In the proposed notice of Frost's termination, the employer alleged that one of the causes for his proposed removal was: Misuse, mutilation or destruction of District property or funds, to wit, willful mutilation and alteration of official Government records. On or before February 6, 1986, you willfully destroyed the existing super users code and managers code for the Fortune System and created a new code without informing anyone. Your actions were discovered on February 6, 1986, when Mr. Elliott Kindred, System Supervisor, attempted to provide Mr. Michael Hawkins with a pass code to enter the Fortune System, but was unable to do so. Your destruction of these codes prevented appropriate personnel from taking necessary financial management actions for a period of days, including but not limited to, keying data into the System, giving or deleting other pass codes and updating the System's database. This situation prevented the District Government from developing and generating accurate financial forecasts. The hearing examiner found, based upon the uncontroverted evidence, that the alleged harm due to Frost's conduct, i.e., the consequences described in the second paragraph following the statement of the cause, was not proven. In short, the hearing examiner concluded that there was no evidence that Frost's actions prevented District employees from taking necessary action related to the computer system or that the government was prevented from making financial forecasts. The employer does not contend otherwise. [6] The hearing examiner ruled, based on that finding, that the charge of Misuse, mutilation, or destruction of District property or funds was not proven by a preponderance of the evidence and could not be sustained. OEA reached a contrary result, however, concluding that Frost's willful concealment of the access code constituted misuse of District property. A corrective or adverse action ... may not be taken against any employee except for cause. 30 D.C.Reg. § 1604.3, at 5883 (1983). Included in the definition of cause are Insubordination, Dishonesty, and Misuse, mutilation, or destruction of District property. Id.; D.C.Code § 1-617.1(d)(5), (6), (14) (1992). OEA regulations also provide that the causes specified in § 1604.3 shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, the infractions or offenses under each cause, as specified in subsection 1608.6 of this chapter. 30 D.C.Reg. § 1604.4, at 5885 (1983). The majority of the three-member OEA panel concluded, citing 30 D.C.Reg. § 1608.6(14)(c), at 5900 (1983), that misuse, mutilation, or destruction of District property includes [w]illful concealment, removal, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of government property or official records. OEA's panel majority determined that by willfully concealing the newly-created access codes, Frost was guilty of misuse, mutilation, or destruction of government property within the meaning of D.C.Code § 1-617.1(d)(14) (1987). In this court the employer contends that it must prove only that the employee's conduct amounted to misuse as defined by the regulation. At most, it is argued, only the underlined portion of the cause must be established: Misuse, mutilation or destruction of District property or funds, to wit, willful mutilation and alteration of official Government records. The employer maintains that the material contained in the two paragraphs following are merely descriptive, and therefore need not be proven. On the other hand, the hearing examiner found that all the elements of the cause, including the allegations set forth in those two paragraphs, must be established before the employee can be disciplined. [7] Before any sanction can be imposed, an employer is required to provide an employee, against whom an adverse action is recommended, with advance written notice stating any and all causes for which the employee is charged and the reasons, specifically and in detail, for the proposed action.  30 D.C.Reg. § 1604.6, at 5885 (1983) (emphasis added). The purpose of requiring a specification of the details is to apprise the employee of the allegations he or she will be required to refute or the acts he or she will have to justify, thereby affording the employee a fair opportunity to oppose the proposed removal. Sokoloff v. United States, 4 Cl.Ct. 140, 143 (1983) (quoting Burkett v. United States, 185 Ct.Cl. 631, 634, 402 F.2d 1002 (1968)); see also Money v. Anderson, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 130, 133, 208 F.2d 34, 37 (1953) (charges for removal must be specific enough to provide a fair opportunity for refutation); 4 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 12.257.15, at 578 (3d ed. 1992) (removal charges must contain sufficient specifications of the grounds or causes for action to enable the employee to prepare an explanation or defense). Thus, the employer was required to set forth, in the notice of proposed removal, the conduct which formed the basis for employee's cause for removal. There is no contention that the employer failed to provide adequate specifications. Rather, Frost maintains that the employer was required to prove all of the specifications in his notice of proposed removal in order to establish the cause, and the employer's failure to do so precludes a finding against him on the misuse charge. [8] Frost was charged with misuse based on his alleged willful alteration of the access code. In addition, the misuse cause specified that Frost's actions interfered with the District government's ability to operate and develop financial information for a period of days. The hearing examiner could only have concluded that the latter allegation went to the heart of the claim against Frost since it was the employer's failure to establish the alleged harm to the District that formed the only contested ground for the examiner's holding that the misuse charge had not been proven. [9] OEA did not reach a contrary conclusion, but ruled that the employer had otherwise established the misuse charge. Thus, this case comes to us in the following posture: Frost urges us to uphold the hearing examiner's ruling that the employer must prove both the actual charge made and the consequences that were alleged to have resulted from Frost's conduct. There is no dispute that the employer failed to meet that burden and, in reaching a contrary result, the OEA majority did not rule that the hearing examiner was wrong in concluding that both charge and consequences must be proven. Instead, OEA held that the misuse charge was proven, based on a different ground, and the employer argues that we should affirm that result. Since we conclude, however, that the alternative basis relied upon by OEA cannot be supported, we do not address the question of whether both the charge and consequences must be established as found by the hearing examiner. OEA's ruling against Frost was premised entirely upon its conclusion that Frost willfully concealed the access code. [10] The governing statute establishes cause for removal for misuse, mutilation or destruction of District property. D.C.Code § 1-617.1(d)(14). No definition of those terms is provided in the statute; however, OEA relied on a regulation which interprets misuse, mutilation or destruction to include [w]illful concealment, removal, mutilation, alteration, or destruction of government ... official records. DCOP Regulation § 1603.6(14)(c) (emphasis added). In the proposed notice of termination, in the to wit clause, Frost was charged only with the conduct italicized above, i.e. mutilation and alteration (to wit, willful mutilation and alteration of official Government records). He was not charged, however, with concealment. In short, Frost was never informed that the charge leveled against him was willful concealment; therefore, he could not have been expected to prepare to defend against such a claim. [11] Moreover, substantial evidence was lacking to support a finding of misuse premised upon the allegations actually made. See Bufford, supra, 611 A.2d at 522 (this court reviews the agency record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support OEA's findings of fact). The Government records involved was the access code. The parties stipulated that Frost changed the code; thus there is no question that the evidence supports a finding that Frost altered a government record. That finding does not, however, establish that Frost misused government property since the parties also stipulated that it was his duty to ensure the integrity of the office computer system ... [and that] [t]his duty previously resulted in his having changed the manager and other related codes upon discovery of breaks in security. Thus, although Frost certainly did alter an official government record, it is clear that it was his duty to do so. Therefore, he cannot be disciplined for that conduct. In sum, the hearing examiner found that on February 3, 1986, Frost was confronted with a breach of security and was thus required, as part of his official duties, to change the access code. There is no claim that the hearing examiner's finding on that point is not supported by substantial evidence. See Gunty, supra, 524 A.2d at 1198. Moreover, the hearing examiner concluded that the only difference between the present code change and prior code changes made by Frost was that on this occasion Frost failed to disclose the new code to his supervisor. In the misuse cause, however, there was no allegation that Frost should be held accountable for failing to disclose the new code to his supervisor. Indeed, failure to disclose, as the hearing examiner ruled, actually related to the insubordination cause. OEA did not dispute any of the hearing examiner's factual findings. Instead, the panel simply concluded that Frost's willful concealment of the access code amounted to misuse of government property or official records as defined in the regulations, even though he was not charged with such conduct as a violation. OEA's holding was based upon the regulation that describes willful concealment of government property or official records as a category of misuse. 30 D.C.Reg. § 1608.6(14)(c), at 5900. It may well be, under appropriate circumstances, that a finding of willful concealment would constitute misuse. In this case, however, Frost was not charged with willful concealment of the access code. Rather, he was charged in the notice of proposed termination with willful mutilation and alteration of the code. As we have shown, Frost cannot be disciplined for such conduct since it was his duty to have so acted. Having so charged Frost with misuse, the employer cannot prevail premised upon a finding of willful concealment of a government record.