Opinion ID: 2010467
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Textual Analysis of Statutory Scheme

Text: To determine whether the Appellate Court properly disposed of the petitioner's appeal, we first must determine whether the meaning of the term record of the investigation set forth in § 54-47g encompasses the order and application referred to in § 54-47e. We begin by noting that neither the term record of the investigation nor the more general term record is defined in § 54-47b. [20] We begin our analysis by focusing on § 54-47e. [21] This statute, more than any other in the grand jury statutes, illustrates the carefully drawn distinctions among the key terms. There are essentially three main parts to § 54-47e, all contained within a single paragraph. The first part expressly declares that the application and order shall be sealed by the panel. General Statutes § 54-47e. Next, the statute directs the panel to submit, among other things, a summary of the scope of the investigation, which shall be public unless the panel determines, by majority vote, that such summary be sealed.... General Statutes § 54-47e. The final part provides that [a]ny investigation by the investigatory grand jury shall be conducted in private, provided the panel, by a majority vote, may order the investigation or any portion thereof to be public when such disclosure or order is deemed by the panel to be in the public interest. General Statutes § 54-47e. Thus, the legislature clearly distinguished the application and order, on the one hand, from the finding and record of the investigation, on the other. By sealing the application and order, and making the summary public, § 54-47e strikes an explicit and careful balance between the need for confidentiality in the grand jury process and the public's right to scrutinize the endeavors of state law enforcement officials. The juxtaposition of the three parts of § 54-47e is instructive. Unlike the summary and investigation itself, the provision requiring the sealing of the application and order does not contain any exception allowing disclosure of these documents, nor does it contain any standard that would serve to guide such a decision. This fact suggests that the sealing of the application and order is absolute. Moreover, we fail to discern the purpose of the separate summary of the scope of the investigation, which is presumptively public, if in fact the legislature intended that the application and order could be publicly disclosed at the discretion of either the panel or the grand jury, or by the request of a third party pursuant to the disclosure provisions of § 54-47g. In light of the foregoing, the existence of the final portion of § 54-47e, which allows the panel to open the entire investigation to the public from the outset, also strongly indicates that the grand jury statutes consistently treat the application and order as distinct from the investigation itself. Under § 54-47e, the investigation itself is presumptively private from its inception, and the panel must determine that opening any part of the ongoing investigation to the public is in the public interest for that presumption to be overcome. It is revealing that the application and order are specifically and expressly exempted from the panel's discretion to disclose under the public interest exception. It appears that the presumptively public summary of the scope of the investigation was intended as a compromise, mitigating any consequences of the mandatory sealing of the application and order. A review of the other relevant provisions in the grand jury statutes that address the key terms also demonstrates that the legislature intended to treat the application and order as separate and distinct from the actual conduct of the investigation and any record thereof. This consistent approach supports the panel's claim that the disclosure provisions in § 54-47g relating to the record of the investigation could not have been intended to apply to the application and order. Indeed, at each stage of the process, the application and order are treated as distinct from the investigation itself. For instance, General Statutes § 54-47c sets forth, in detail, the procedure that must be followed to apply for an investigatory grand jury. [22] Next, General Statutes § 54-47d(a) provides:  If the panel approves the application and orders an investigation into the commission of a crime or crimes, the Chief Court Administrator shall (1) appoint an investigatory grand jury to conduct the investigation, and (2) designate the court location in the judicial district where ... any findings and records of the investigation shall be filed. (Emphasis added.) This language clearly indicates that a [record] of the investigation exists only if the application is approved and an investigation ordered. General Statutes § 54-47d(a); see also General Statutes § 54-47c(d) ([t]he panel may approve the application and order an investigation [emphasis added]). In fact, in the statutes dealing with the application for, and appointment of, an investigatory grand jury, the phrase record of the investigation or records of the investigation always is used conditionally and discussed in the future tense. For instance, General Statutes § 54-47d(a) provides that, in the event that an application is approved, the chief court administrator shall designate the court in which any ... records of the investigation shall be filed. General Statutes § 54-47e similarly directs the panel to provide a recommendation about where the record of the investigation is to be filed. This language can be read sensibly only when it includes the implicit caveat, once the investigation is completed. Importantly, General Statutes § 54-47e mandates that any application filed with the panel ... shall be sealed without regard to the ultimate disposition of such application. It is difficult to fathom how an unapproved application can be considered a part of the record of an investigation that is never conducted, and there is no provision in the grand jury statutes providing for the public disclosure of any preliminary documents if the panel ultimately decides not to order an investigation. On the other hand, the two grand jury statutes that directly concern the conduct and conclusion of the grand jury's investigation, namely, General Statutes §§ 54-47f and 54-47g, refer to the record of the investigation as if it were created contemporaneously with the investigation itself. First, General Statutes § 54-47f(g) provides: An official stenographer of the Superior Court or his assistant shall record any testimony taken at the investigation.  (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 54-47g(a) further directs that [t]he stenographer shall file any record of the investigation with the [designated] court.... [23] (Emphasis added.) It is unlikely that the stenographer would have access to the sealed order and application during the normal course of performing his ministerial duties, or that his duties would require the filing of such documents. Moreover, General Statutes § 54-47g(b) provides that [t]he finding [of the investigation] may include all or such part of the record as the investigatory grand jury may determine and that [t]he finding of the investigation shall be open to public inspection and copying unless the chief state's attorney or a state's attorney files a timely objection with the grand jury. It seems incongruous with the grand jury statutes as a whole that the application and order, sealed by the panel from the outset by statutory directive, could be made public at the discretion of the grand jury and without input from the panel merely by virtue of their inclusion in the finding. Indeed, this highlights a flaw in the Appellate Court's reasoning. The Appellate Court first concluded that the application and order transmitted by the panel pursuant to § 54-47d(b) are part of the record of the investigatory grand jury. In re Judicial Inquiry No. 2005-02, supra, 104 Conn.App. at 406, 934 A.2d 248. The Appellate Court subsequently declared that the application for the investigatory grand jury and the panel's order thereon must be sealed at the outset of the investigation and remain so unless, following the conclusion of the investigation and the filing of the finding and record of the investigatory grand jury, a majority of the panel deem[s] their disclosure to be in the public interest.  (Emphasis added.) Id., at 413, 934 A.2d 248. These conclusions are clearly inconsistent. If the application and order are included in the record of the investigation, then they may be disclosed as the investigatory grand jury may determine, without the panel's approval. General Statutes § 54-47g(b). If, on the other hand, the application and order are not within the scope of the record of the investigation, they cannot be disclosed at the grand jury's discretion, as subsections (a) [24] and (d) [25] of § 54-47g provide only a means for requesting that a part of the record of the investigation be unsealed. Thus, contrary to the Appellate Court's conclusion, the application and order cannot be a part of the record of the investigation and simultaneously be sealed at the outset of the investigation and remain so unless ... a majority of the panel deem[s] their disclosure to be in the public interest. In re Judicial Inquiry No. 2005-02, supra, at 413, 934 A.2d 248. Finally, we note that the grand jury statutes include two separate sealing directives, which would make little sense unless the legislature intended the application and order to be treated differently from the record produced as a result of the grand jury's investigation. As we previously discussed, General Statutes § 54-47e provides in relevant part that the application and order shall be sealed.... The grand jury statutes do not thereafter expressly provide for the possibility of unsealing or disclosing the application and order. General Statutes § 54-47g (b) provides in relevant part that [t]he finding of the investigation shall be open to public inspection ... [and it] may include all or such part of the record as the investigatory grand jury may determine.... General Statutes § 54-47g(a) provides in relevant part that any part of the record of the investigation not disclosed with the finding pursuant to subsection (b) of this section shall be sealed, provided any person may file an application with the panel for disclosure of any such part of the record.... (Emphasis added.) It is unclear why, if the application and order are part of the record of the investigation, there is a need for those documents to be sealed under § 54-47e, and then sealed again under § 54-47g(a), assuming they are not disclosed by the grand jury with its finding. This apparent duplication further bolsters our understanding that the application and order are distinct from the record of the investigation. Despite this strong structural and textual evidence in support of a restrictive construction of the term record of the investigation, there is one element of the statutory scheme that the Appellate Court found to be particularly troubling. General Statutes § 54-47d(b) provides in relevant part that, at the time the grand jury is appointed, [t]he panel shall retain a copy of the order and the original application and shall transmit to the investigatory grand jury, appointed pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the original order and a copy of the application filed with the panel. The Appellate Court found this to be persuasive evidence for its conclusion that [these] materials constitute part of the record of the investigatory grand jury. [26] In re Judicial Inquiry No.2005-02, supra, 104 Conn.App. at 405, 934 A.2d 248. The petitioner also relies heavily on this reasoning, arguing that, [o]nce transmitted, the order and the application necessarily, and as a matter of common sense, become part of the documents contained in the file of the clerk of the court [where] the grand jury investigation has been assigned. [27] Although we are not persuaded that such a formulation is in any way necessary or a matter of common sense, we do agree that there is more than one reasonable manner in which this specific language of § 54-47d(b) may be read. Once appointed, the grand jury receives the panel's original order and a copy of the application. In our view, this fact does not necessarily imply that these items become a part of the record of the yet to be conducted investigation, as the petitioner asserts. The petitioner's position, however, is not an entirely unreasonable interpretation of the effect of § 54-47d(b) on the status of the application and order. Because we conclude that it is unclear, at this point in the grand jury process, how the legislature intended for the application and order to be treated, we believe that an examination of relevant extratextual evidence is appropriate to clarify our understanding of the key statutory terms.