Opinion ID: 162322
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Mirelez and Johnson each challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting one count of their respective convictions. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the government, and limiting our inquiry to determining whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
Mirelez argues that the government failed to provide sufficient evidence to support a conviction for conspiracy with regard to Count 47. A conviction for conspiracy requires “(1) an agreement with another person to violate the law, (2) knowledge of the essential objectives of the conspiracy, (3) knowing and voluntary involvement, and (4) interdependence of the alleged conspirators.” United States v. Carter, 130 F.3d 1432, 1439 (10th Cir. 1997). Mirelez argues that he intended to defraud Bench by taking his money and never delivering drugs. Mirelez therefore argues that there was never an agreement to commit an illegal act. However, the evidence presented in the - 14 - record is consistent with Knudsen and Mirelez conspiring to sell Bench a substance that contained methamphetamine, but in a greatly diluted form. There is sufficient evidence for the jury to make such an inference. We find ample evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Mirelez conspired to violate the law.
Johnson challenges Count 57 of the indictment, which involved a conspiracy among Michael Steward, Robert Dale, Wayne Davis, and Knudsen. Johnson also challenges the underlying Counts 58 and 61, use of a telephone to facilitate a conspiracy. Johnson delivered one-sixteenth of an ounce of methamphetamine. He argues that this amount is inconsistent with distribution, and that he therefore lacks the requisite intent necessary for a conspiracy to distribute. Nonetheless, the record indicates that Dale made clear to Johnson that he wished to purchase a larger amount, which would have been consistent with distribution. Thus, sufficient evidence exists from which a rational jury could have inferred that Johnson was guilty of conspiracy to distribute.