Opinion ID: 3002136
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutor’s Remarks in Rebuttal

Text: The defendants argue that during closing argument the government improperly commented on their decisions not to testify. The prosecutor may comment on the weakness of the defense case in closing arguments. United States v. Stark, 507 F.3d 512, 519 (7th Cir. 2007). But the prosecutor may not make direct or indirect comments that invite the jury to draw an adverse inference from a defendant’s decision not to testify. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965); Stark, 507 F.3d at 519. Improper indirect comments occur “only if (1) the prosecutor manifestly intended to refer to the defendant’s silence or (2) a jury would naturally and necessarily take the remark for a comment on the defendant’s silence.” United States v. Mietus, 237 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2001). Where, as here, the defendants failed to object to the allegedly improper comment when made, this court reviews the comments for plain error. DeSilva, 505 F.3d at 717. Under this standard, the defendants have the burden of demonstrating that the remark was improper, that it denied them a fair trial, and that the outcome would have been different absent the remark. Id. at 718-19. If the remark is improper, the court determines whether the comment, considered in context of the record as a whole, denied the defendants a fair trial. Id. at 719. In so doing, we consider “(1) the nature and seriousness of the statement; (2) whether the statement was invited by the conduct of defense counsel; (3) whether the district court sufficiently instructed the jury to disregard such statement; (4) whether the defense could counter the improper 38 Nos. 06-3848, 06-4124, & 06-4399 statement through rebuttal; and (5) whether the weight of the evidence was against the defendant.” Id. The defendants have not shown that the prosecutor’s single comment in rebuttal that he was not sure he heard any explanation “from her” about where the $60,000 came from was improper. We agree that with the gov- ernment that its attorney, Mr. Hotaling, did not refer to Ms. Shaw’s silence but rather to the lack of explanation by her counsel, Ms. Winslow. The context of the rebuttal argument surrounding the remark supports this view. The prosecutor prefaced his rebuttal by stating that he was going “to talk a little bit about all of the different things that [the jurors] have heard from all of the different attorneys during the course of the trial—during the course of closing arguments. So I will just take it in the order that you heard it.” In her closing argument Ms. Winslow talked about the two wire transfers with which Ms. Shaw was alleged to have been involved, the typical patterns of money flow into and out of accounts in a fraudulent scheme, and the absence of such a pattern with Ms. Shaw’s account. She addressed Ms. Shaw’s alleged “spending spree,” the computers, wire transfers and reversals, and electronic fingerprints. Ms. Winslow specifically discussed the two $10,000 checks from Ms. Hubbard to Ms. Shaw that the government had attempted to show were a kickback for the Jackson wire transfer. This discussion fills one page of the trial transcript. Then Ms. Winslow moved on to the $60,000 check, saying: “There’s a lot to be said about this check and Bruce Jones . . . .” But while Ms. Winslow later Nos. 06-3848, 06-4124, & 06-4399 39 talked about Mr. Jones, she did not say much about the $60,000 check. The prosecutor merely pointed this out. We cannot conclude that the prosecutor was referring to the lack of evidence presented by Ms. Shaw herself (and inferentially the other defendants). But even if the prosecutor’s remark is viewed as improper, the defendants must show that it denied them a fair trial and that the outcome would have been different but for the remark. This burden proves insurmountable for them. The remark was not inflammatory. It was not a direct reference to the defendants’ failure to testify. The remark could be understood as a response to Ms. Winslow’s statement in closing that “there was a lot to be said about” the $60,000 check and Mr. Jones. Ms. Winslow really did not say much about why Mr. Jones gave Ms. Shaw the check. Her comments discussed what the evidence showed or did not show about what happened after Ms. Shaw received the money. No objection was made and no curative instruction was given at the time. Since the remark was made in rebuttal argument, the defendants had no opportunity to counter it. But this single remark was made in passing and certainly was not the emphasis of the government’s arguments. Furthermore, the district court instructed the jury—both at the beginning and at the end of trial—that the government has the burden of proving the defendants’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that this burden remains with the government throughout the case. The court further instructed that the defendants are never required to prove their innocence or to produce any evidence at 40 Nos. 06-3848, 06-4124, & 06-4399 all. The court specifically instructed: “A defendant has an absolute right not to testify. The fact that the defendants did not testify should not be considered by you in any way in arriving at your verdict.” Generally we may presume that the jury followed the court’s instructions. United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 683 (7th Cir. 2007), reh’g and suggestion for reh’g en banc denied, 506 F.3d 517 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Puckett, 405 F.3d 589, 599 (7th Cir. 2005). Nothing in this record suggests that the jury was unable, or chose not, to follow these instructions. And, significantly, as explained supra, the evidence against all defendants was overwhelming. Thus, even if the prosecutor improperly commented on Ms. Shaw’s right to remain silent, when viewed in context of the record as a whole, we cannot say that the remark deprived the defendants of a fair trial or that the outcome would have been different absent the remark.