Opinion ID: 691765
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counterclaims Based on Prior Use of Run for the Border

Text: The district court dismissed Taco Bell's prior use counterclaims based upon a determination that HGI was the senior user of Run for the Border and that Taco Bell was unable to prove ownership of the Run for the Border mark. In so ruling, the district court ignored evidence supporting Taco Bell's claim of prior use. Although registration of a mark creates a rebuttable presumption of ownership, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1115(a), and prior use must be established by clear and convincing evidence, Wells Fargo & Co. v. Stagecoach Properties, Inc., 685 F.2d 302, 304 n. 1 (9th Cir.1982), HGI's registration of Run for the Border does not, as a matter of law, foreclose Taco Bell's counterclaims. Because Taco Bell raised genuine issues of material fact as to both actual prior use and the applicability of tacking, the district court erred by granting summary judgment to HGI on Taco Bell's counterclaim that Taco Bell's use of Run for the Border was prior to HGI's use of that trademark.
Use of a trademark in promotional activities may establish prior use if extensive enough to create an association of the mark and the goods with the user. See New West Corp. v. Nym Co., 595 F.2d 1194, 1200 (9th Cir.1979). In support of its claim of prior use, Taco Bell produced affidavits from two employees describing various promotional activities involving the phrase Run for the Border, a draft of a coupon distributed in Texas that contained the same phrase, a letter from an Ohio radio station manager to Taco Bell store managers explaining an upcoming Run For the Border Sweepstakes Contest, and an article in the magazine ADWEEK discussing Taco Bell's new Run for the Border advertising campaign. This evidence was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Taco Bell had established prior use.
The use of one mark may be tacked to the use of another if the two marks constitute legal equivalents that create the same continuing commercial impression. The legal equivalence standard is higher than that used in evaluating two competing marks: two marks may not be legal equivalents even if they are found to be confusingly similar. Van Dyne-Crotty, Inc. v. Wear-Guard Corp., 926 F.2d 1156, 1159 (Fed.Cir.1991). Applying this high standard, courts have upheld tacking claims where additional words in one mark do not help identify the origin of the goods--a theory potentially applicable to this case. See American Security Bank v. American Security & Trust Co., 571 F.2d 564, 567 (C.C.P.A.1978) (holding that AMERICAN SECURITY could be tacked on to AMERICAN SECURITY BANK). In rejecting Taco Bell's tacking theory, the district relied primarily on the conclusions of the examining attorney who considered Taco Bell's trademark application for Run for the Border. The findings of the examining attorney are entitled to little deference, however, because they were based on a skimpy record and were made at the lowest administrative level. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 801-02 (9th Cir.1970). Taco Bell presented only one example of its use of Run for the Border to the examining attorney. In contrast, Taco Bell offered several different examples to the district court and introduced evidence that Run for the Border had been used together with Make a Run for the Border in the same advertising campaign. Taken as a whole, Taco Bell's evidence was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Taco Bell's use of Make a Run for the Border and Run for the Border created the same commercial impression.