Opinion ID: 1377247
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Appellant's last contention is that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Specifically, appellant contends that the state    failed to prove either a threat, express or implied, sufficient to place the victim in fear of immediate death or serious physical injury to herself, or earnest resistance on the part of the victim, sufficient to support a conviction for first-degree sexual assault. Appellant moved for a dismissal of the charges against him at the close of the state's case, and renewed the motion after the defense rested. Both motions were denied, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty to the charge of first degree sexual assault. § 6-2-302(a)(i)-(ii). The method for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases is:    [I]t is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for us, but rather whether it is sufficient to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by the jury when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State.    It is not our function to weigh the evidence for a determination as to whether or not it is sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We have consistently held that even though it is possible to draw other inferences from the evidence presented, it is the responsibility of the jury to resolve the conflicts in the evidence. [Citations.] Broom v. State, Wyo., 695 P.2d 640, 642 (1985). See also Jozen v. State, Wyo., 746 P.2d 1279, 1282 (1987). Pursuant to the instructions given by the court regarding the elements of the crime charged, the state had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) appellant inflicted sexual intrusion on the victim by (2) causing submission of the victim through the actual application of physical force which was reasonably calculated to cause the victim's submission and by (3) threat of death, serious bodily injury or extreme physical pain to be inflicted upon the victim, and (4) the victim reasonably believed that the appellant had the present ability to execute these threats. Appellant was charged under § 6-2-302(a)(i)-(ii). It is interesting to note that the elements contained in the instruction, as read to the jury, do not exactly mirror the elements of the offense of first degree sexual assault as contained in § 6-2-302(a), which reads: (a) Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first degree if: (i) The actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application, reasonably calculated to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or forcible confinement; (ii) The actor causes submission of the victim by threat of death, serious bodily injury, extreme physical pain or kidnapping to be inflicted on anyone and the victim reasonably believes that the actor has the present ability to execute these threats; (iii) The victim is physically helpless, and the actor knows or reasonably should know [that] the victim is physically helpless and [that] the victim has not consented; or (iv) The actor knows or reasonably should know that the victim through a mental illness, mental deficiency or developmental disability is incapable of appraising the nature of the victim's conduct. (Emphasis added.) The difference between the instruction and the statute quoted above is that the instruction made the elements contained in subparagraphs (i) through (iv) conjunctive, rather than disjunctive, as they appear in the statute. However, appellant did not object to the instructions at trial. The failure to object to instructions at trial before the jury begins its deliberations operates to preclude appellate review of those instructions, which become the law of the case unless a plain or fundamental error can be shown to prevail. Cutbirth v. State, Wyo., 663 P.2d 888, 891 (1983). Here, no fundamental or plain error can be shown. At the very least, the court's characterization of the elements of the offense afforded appellant greater protection, in that the state was required to prove more facts to meet its burden of proof than is usually true in a first degree sexual assault case. Even with this additional burden the state proved its case sufficiently for the jury to find appellant guilty. Appellant's argument is that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because it fails to establish that he threatened the victim in such a way as to place her in fear of immediate death or serious physical injury, or that the victim earnestly resisted the assault.    In earlier cases this court recognized a principle to the effect that forcible rape can be established without proof of violence to the victim and that the victim need not always resist the assault. The gravamen of sexual assault in the first degree is lack of consent to the sexual penetration or intrusion which can be shown by resistance. [Citation.] Our cases have also recognized the proposition that lack of resistance by a victim does not necessarily demonstrate consensual intercourse. Resistance by a victim is not required when (1) resistance would be futile, (2) the victim is `overcome by superior strength,' or (3) the victim is `paralyzed by fear.'    Seeley v. State, Wyo., 715 P.2d 232, 240-241 (1986). At trial, the victim testified that appellant penetrated her vagina with his finger. Section 6-2-301(a)(vii)(A), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), defines sexual intrusion as: (A) Any intrusion, however slight, by any object or any part of a person's body, except the mouth, tongue, or penis, into the genital or anal opening of another person's body if that sexual intrusion can reasonably be construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, appellant's actions clearly constitute sexual intrusion as defined by the statute. The victim also testified that when she returned to her car after making the telephone call, the man in the phone booth, appellant, appeared at her car door. Appellant then pushed his way into her car. As he did this, the victim screamed and bit appellant's hand. In retaliation, appellant bit the victim on the nose. Once inside the car, the two struggled over the car keys. When asked what he was planning to do, appellant replied,    Shut up. I will stab you. Shut up or I will hit you   , and kept pushing on the victim. The victim testified that at that point: I knew that he was stronger than I was, and it was like he had his hands in front, and there was a possibility that he had a knife somewhere. I wasn't about to question him at this time to show me the knife or to display it. I was really scared. I was frightened for my life at this point. He tried to drive away. He said he would stab me. I was very upset and trying to collect my thoughts, I guess, at the same time for survival.    (Emphasis added.) Appellant's actions clearly constituted physical force reasonably calculated to cause the victim's submission. Further, appellant threatened the victim with death or serious bodily injury if she did not cooperate by indicating that he would stab or hit her. Finally, based on the victim's testimony quoted above, it is clear that the victim was in fear of her life, and she reasonably believed that appellant had the present ability to execute his threats. We do not believe there was any deficiency in the evidence in this respect. The evidence proved that the victim was overcome by superior strength and that resistance on her part would have been futile. Each element of the charged crime was proven beyond a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury such that it could find appellant guilty. Despite this, appellant maintains that he was not the perpetrator of the crime. Appellant concedes that he made a sexual remark to the victim as she approached the telephone booth, but contends that after making the statement he left the area. Clear evidence to the contrary was before the jury. The victim gave a written description of appellant to the investigating officers the evening she was assaulted. She later picked appellant's picture out of a photo array and made an in-court identification of appellant, testifying that her memory of the perpetrator's face was very strong in her mind. The evidence at trial was sufficient to support appellant's conviction. Affirmed.