Opinion ID: 2083044
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Present Interpretation of Sections 3732 and 3735 of the Vehicle Code as Embodying a Requirement of Criminal Negligence

Text: Neither Section 3732 (homicide by vehicle) nor 3735 (homicide by vehicle/DUI) contains an express culpability element; [8] therefore, both are candidates for further examination to determine whether strict liability was intended, as many jurisdictions hold. The majority avoids such review, however, by divining from the statutes an intent requirement in the form of criminal negligence. Two sources of authority are offered in support of such requirement: 1) Section 302(a) of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, derived from the Model Penal Code; and 2) the decisions of this Court concluding that a requirement of criminal negligence applies to the offense of homicide by vehicle, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732. See Commonwealth v. Field, 490 Pa. 519, 417 A.2d 160 (1980); Commonwealth v. Heck, 517 Pa. 192, 535 A.2d 575 (1987). Although the majority's holding has the effect of avoiding difficult issues of statutory construction and, to a substantial degree, preempting questions of constitutional compliance associated with imposing absolute liability for such serious offenses, its inherent weakness is that neither the Crimes Code nor the cited decisions provides persuasive support for the requirement of criminal negligence imposed.
As the majority notes, Section 302(a) of the Crimes Code does, in fact, establish an elemental, minimum culpability requirement of criminal negligence in order to support a conviction for criminal offenses as a general rule. [9] However, the attachment of criminal negligence to individual offenses as a culpability element is closely limited. Indeed, Section 302 itself establishes a requirement of greater culpability, recklessness, as the default in instances in which the General Assembly has not specified culpability and no intent to impose absolute liability can be discerned. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(c). [10] Negligence, on the other hand, is treated as an exceptional basis of liability, and is therefore generally excluded from the bases that will support culpability for an offense unless explicitly prescribed by the legislature. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. (Official Draft 1962). [11] Since neither Section 3732 nor 3735 of the Vehicle Code designates criminal negligence as a culpability standard, Section 302 of the Crimes Code simply does not supply this culpability requirement as an element of those offenses. There is, however, a plausible argument to be made that other aspects of the Crimes Code's culpability scheme operate to supply the element of criminal negligence. To understand this line of reasoning, a closer review of the MPC culpability scheme, from which that of the Crimes Code is derived, is necessary. In addition to supplying the default culpability provision of recklessness, the MPC places express and substantial constraints upon the application of strict or absolute liability to criminal offenses. Indeed, the MPC would expressly limit absolute liability offenses to violations, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05(1)(a), defined as infractions punishable by fine or forfeiture but not by any possible incarcerative sanction, see id. § 1.04(5), [12] as well as offenses defined by other statutes insofar as a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability plainly appears, see id. § 205(1)(b). Correspondingly, the MPC would reduce the grade of any offense defined by another statute, as to which absolute liability is imposed with respect to any material element, to a violation. See id. § 205(2)(a). The MPC nonetheless allows for the charging and proof of the culpable commission of such an offense, see id. § 205(2)(b); in such instances, culpability must be established on the order of at least criminal negligence. See id. By their terms, these provisions operate either to reduce the grade of offenses or to implicate a culpability requirement of criminal negligence unless a subsequent statute otherwise provides. See id. § 205(2). Such restraints are described in the MPC commentary as reflecting a compromise between the legislative desire to enact absolute liability crimes and preservation of the elemental fairness ensured by the association of a mens rea element with serious offenses, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 comment (Official Draft 1962), with the MPC, like the common law, eschewing strict liability for offenses punishable by imprisonment. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 comment (characterizing Section 2.05 of the MPC as a frontal attack upon strict liability whenever the offense carries the possibility of criminal conviction, for which a sentence of probation or imprisonment may be imposed). The scheme established by Pennsylvania's comprehensive Crimes Code mirrors the MPC, with the substantial exception that the General Assembly replaced the concept of violations under the Model Penal Code with summary offenses, see 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 302, 305, which carry a maximum term of imprisonment of ninety days. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 106(c). Thus, in Pennsylvania, while absolute liability generally may be imposed only on a limited basis (summary offenses and offenses defined by statutes other than the Crimes Code where a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability ... plainly appears, 18 Pa.C.S. § 305(a)(1), (2)), [13] pursuant to the terms of the Crimes Code, such offenses may be punishable with imprisonment of up to 90 days as a general rule, and culpable commission may be established by proof of negligence to support the imposition of greater incarcerative sanctions. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 305(b). [14] The official commentary explains that Section 305, like its corollary in the MPC, serves to `tone down' absolute or strict liability in penal law as a whole, since such responsibility cannot be readily defended where the offense carries a possible jail sentence. 18 Pa.C.S. § 305, official cmt. [15] Also of significance, these provisions (like those of the MPC) are operative unless a subsequent statute otherwise provides. 18 Pa.C.S. § 305(b). If Section 305(b)(2) applies, therefore, homicide by vehicle/DUI is a summary offense, unless the culpable commission of the offense is charged and proved, in which case the elements would carry the minimum culpability requirement of criminal negligence. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 305(b)(2). The viability of such construction, however, depends upon the interpretation of the phrase unless a subsequent statute provides, as it conditions the applicability of Section 305(b). See 18 Pa.C.S. § 305(b), supra note 13. See generally Commonwealth v. Parmar, 551 Pa. 318, 331, 710 A.2d 1083, 1089 (1998)(opinion in support of affirmance)(explaining that [w]hen the General Assembly plainly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability, pursuant to Section 305(a)(2), the Commonwealth does not have to establish a mens rea element). [16] In State v. Cho, 297 Or. 195, 681 P.2d 1152 (1984), the Oregon Supreme Court determined that, in order for a subsequent statute to surpass Oregon's equivalent to Section 305(b)(2), the subsequent statute must, on its face, clearly indicate an intent to dispense with a culpable mental state requirement. See id. at 1152. Under the Cho interpretation, Section 305(b)(2) of the Crimes Code would apply to restrict the application of Section 3735 absent proof of culpability, since a legislative intent to dispense with a culpable mental state requirement is not clearly indicated upon an examination of the terms of the provision alone. However, in State v. Miller, 309 Or. 362, 788 P.2d 974 (1990), the Oregon court would appear to have disregarded its Cho construct in the process of determining that the state's DUI statute constituted a strict liability offense. Indeed, a dissenting jurist highlighted the court's divergence from Cho and advocated abandonment of Cho's reasoning. The dissent argued that the Oregon equivalent to Section 305(b) says to me that in statutes enacted outside the crimes code after January 1, 1972 [its effective date], wherein no culpable mental state is required ..., the offense is a violation, unless the legislature otherwise provides. . . . I would assert that the legislature, by establishing that violation of the DUII statute is a Class A misdemeanor, has otherwise provided; that is, the exception referent is to constituting a violation, not to the presence or absence of a culpable mental state requirement. Thus, under [the Oregon equivalent to Section 305(b)(2) ]which is the applicable provisionDUII is a strict liability crime because (a) the statute requires no culpable mental state, and (b) the legislature has otherwise provided that DUII is a Class A misdemeanor. Under this approach, the legislature has done all it must do to make a post-1971 statute outside the criminal code a strict liability crime. Miller, 788 P.2d at 982-83 (Carson, J., dissenting). I agree with this analysis. [17] Indeed, in order for Section 305(b)(2) to apply in the first instance, there must be a threshold determination that the General Assembly intended to impose strict liability with respect to at least some material element of the offense. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 305(b)(2); see also supra note 13. Once such intent is discerned from a subsequently enacted statute, it is rational to conclude that the General Assembly also intended the application of specified grading. Presumably, it is aware of the policies and precepts incorporated into the Crimes Code and could thus directly prescribe penalty provisions for post-1972 offenses corresponding with these policies if such were its intent. The most reasonable interpretation, then, is that the Legislature intended to allow itself a reasonable degree of flexibility in prescribing subsequent offenses, rather than burdening itself with a cumbersome series of required disclaimers to avoid the effect of prior statutes. To summarize the above, contrary to the majority's conclusion, Section 302(a) of the Crimes Code does not support the attachment of a criminal negligence requirement associated with the offenses of homicide by vehicle or homicide by vehicle/DUI, nor do other provisions of the Crimes Code afford persuasive support.
In addition to the Crimes Code's culpability provisions, the majority's rationale is predicated upon prior determinations of this Court in the homicide by vehicle setting, principally Field, 490 Pa. at 519, 417 A.2d at 160, and Heck, 517 Pa. at 192, 535 A.2d at 575. First, in Field, in addressing the argument that Section 3732 of the Vehicle Code violated constitutional precepts, the Court reasoned that the statute in fact included a culpability requirement deriving from the underlying summary Vehicle Code violation (there, driving on sidewalk, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3703), thus avoiding any constitutional impediment. See id. at 524-25, 417 A.2d at 163. [18] Field was vague in terms of identifying the precise nature of the culpability requirement discerned. See Heck, 517 Pa. at 197, 535 A.2d at 578 (noting that, in Field, the question of what culpability was required was left unresolved). Field, however, simply is unsupportable. Section 3703 of the Vehicle Code (like all other summary offenses under provisions of the Vehicle Code which lack a specific penalty term) constitutes a summary offense punishable solely by the imposition of a $25 fine. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 6502. Pursuant to the MPC and Section 305(a) of the Crimes Code, the culpability provisions are therefore wholly inapplicable to such infraction. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 305(a). Together with the strict limitation on the penalty, the absence of any express or default culpability requirement places such offense squarely among the purest forms of violations intended to be treated as absolute liability offenses and which are, almost beyond question, within the justifiable and permissible scope of absolute liability. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. See generally Parmar, 551 Pa. at 331, 710 A.2d at 1089 (opinion in support of affirmance)(stating that [a] criminal statute that imposes absolute liability typically involves regulation of traffic or liquor laws). Since the violation at issue clearly lacked any culpability requirement, Field's attempt to derive a culpability requirement for homicide by vehicle from the underlying driving on sidewalk infraction lacks justification. Field caused confusion in Pennsylvania courts on account of its flawed reasoning and by virtue of its failure to designate the degree of culpability necessary to support a conviction for homicide by vehicle. See Heck, 517 Pa. at 198-99, 535 A.2d at 578. Ultimately, this culminated in a divided, en banc decision of the Superior Court, Commonwealth v. Koch, 297 Pa.Super. 350, 443 A.2d 1157 (1982)(plurality). In the lead opinion, after expressing his disagreement with Field's reasoning, see id. at 355, 443 A.2d at 1160 (stating that, [i]n effect, our supreme court has saved section 3732 from the due process challenge of criminal liability without fault by a bootstrap analysis), Judge Wickersham concluded that this Court had effectively inserted a culpability requirement akin to civil negligence into Section 3732. See id. at 354-57, 443 A.2d at 1159-61. Judge Spaeth filed a concurring opinion also identifying errors in Field's reasoning, see Koch, 297 Pa.Super. at 362-66, 443 A.2d at 1162-65 (Spaeth, J., concurring), and arguing that the decision represented neither a persuasive precedent, nor one that forecloses further attack on the constitutional validity of the statute creating the crime of homicide by vehicle. Id. at 359, 443 A.2d at 1162 (Spaeth, J., concurring). This Court attempted to answer such criticisms and provide clarification in Heck, 517 Pa. at 192, 535 A.2d at 575, the second of the decisions relied upon by the majority in the present case. Although acknowledging the confusion, the Court admitted to no flaw in Field, but rather, maintained that Field definitively answered the issue of whether § 3732 requires culpable conduct to sustain a conviction. See id. at 197, 535 A.2d at 578. The Court then stated that the confusion occurred as a result of the Superior Court's reliance upon dicta from Field and another decision, Commonwealth v. Houtz, 496 Pa. 345, 437 A.2d 385 (1981). See id. [19] Specifically, in responding to the criticism concerning the erroneous derivation of a culpability requirement from the offense underlying the homicide by vehicle charge, the Court stated, [t]his criticism was unwarranted because the discussions of culpability in Field ... were not relevant to the issues which had been presented. Id. at 199, 535 A.2d at 579. Further, the Court indicated that its past decisions upholding the constitutionality of Section 3732 had effectively resolved the culpability question. See id. at 200, 535 A.2d at 579 (stating that, without ever having been presented with the issue of the level of culpability required under § 3732, the tenor of our prior opinions rejecting constitutional challenges to the statute would appear to have resolved the issue (citing Commonwealth v. Hicks, 502 Pa. 344, 466 A.2d 613 (1983))). The Court nonetheless indicated that it would not permit such a critical question to be answered by implication and offered the following conclusion: We now hold that ordinary negligence will not sustain a conviction for the offense of homicide by vehicle. The applicable mens rea requirements of culpability are those enumerated in 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(a).