Opinion ID: 3160286
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Seizure of the Family Dog

Text: Plaintiffs contend that Officer Duncan violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizure when he shot and killed their family dog. Officer Duncan contends that he was entitled to qualified immunity from this claim because his actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. This court has held that the killing of a dog can constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Grant v. City of Houston, 10 Case: 15-20182 Document: 00513294978 Page: 11 Date Filed: 12/04/2015 No. 15-20182 No. 14-20653, ___ F. App’x ___, 2015 WL 5255102, at  (5th Cir. 2015). The Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure be objectively reasonable. In making such a determination, we look to the totality of the circumstances, balancing “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). “We analyze this question from the perspective ‘of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight[,]’” and “‘allo[w] for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.’” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 (2014) (second alteration in original) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396– 97). The only witnesses to the shooting of the dog were Officer Duncan and Karlton. Officer Duncan testified that as he approached Karlton, the dog surprised him and growled or barked. Officer Duncan further stated that the dog jumped on him and bared its teeth, at which point Officer Duncan discharged his weapon once, and the dog retreated. Karlton testified that his dog was not on a leash at the time that Officer Duncan arrived, but that the dog was very friendly and was not aggressive. Karlton testified that his dog did not jump at Officer Duncan, but looked like it was “smiling.” Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovants, we conclude that Plaintiffs have not produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a constitutional right was clearly established such that a reasonable officer in Officer Duncan’s situation would have understood that his conduct violated that right. Officer Duncan did not know there would be a dog present during his encounter with Karlton and was surprised by its presence. While Karlton knew his family pet to be friendly and nonaggressive, Officer Duncan 11 Case: 15-20182 Document: 00513294978 Page: 12 Date Filed: 12/04/2015 No. 15-20182 did not. Officer Duncan was startled by a large dog that was showing its teeth (whether baring them aggressively or “smiling”). Officer Duncan was forced to make a split-second judgment in a tense situation and he acted to protect himself. See Grant, 2015 WL 5255102, at  (granting qualified immunity where an officer shot a dog after being surprised when the dog showed its teeth and charged towards the officer’s legs); cf. Kincheloe v. Caudle, No. A-09-CA010 LY, 2009 WL 3381047, at  (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2009) (fact issues precluded summary judgment where a plaintiff testified that a police officer fired two shots, killing a pit bull who was merely walking toward bushes in the front yard); Romero v. Bexar Cty., 993 F. Supp. 2d 658, 662 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (“It is objectively reasonable for an officer to shoot a dog that he reasonably believes poses a threat.” (citing Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194, 206 (4th Cir. 2003))). Accordingly, we conclude that Officer Duncan is entitled to qualified immunity on these claims. D. Municipal Liability Claims Against Chief McClelland Plaintiffs appear to appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Chief McClelland on their municipal liability claims. Plaintiffs allege that Chief McClelland was actually or constructively aware of a custom or policy wherein officers would charge individuals with unwarranted evading arrest or detention charges. The district court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support an inference that it was the practice of the Houston Police Department (“HPD”) to file unsupported evading arrest charges. In order to bring a § 1983 claim for municipal liability, a plaintiff must allege a constitutional violation resulting from a municipal custom or policy. Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 657, 690–94 (1978). To the extent that Plaintiffs assert this claim on behalf of their son, Karlton Stephenson, the court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal. See supra, Part II. To the 12 Case: 15-20182 Document: 00513294978 Page: 13 Date Filed: 12/04/2015 No. 15-20182 extent that Plaintiffs assert this claim on their own behalf, they have failed to identify a constitutional violation that they suffered as a result of the alleged municipal policy of unwarranted evading arrest charges: there is no evidence in the record that either Mr. or Mrs. Stephenson was arrested or charged, or even detained for evading arrest. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against Chief McClelland in his official capacity. AFFIRMED. 13