Opinion ID: 1399696
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony about other drug deals with Haynes

Text: The district court justified its admission of testimony about other drug transactions between Harris and Haynes because such testimony was intricately related to the conduct charged in the indictment, see id. at 517; United States v. Strong, 485 F.3d 985, 989-90 (7th Cir.2007), and because the evidence was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Harris contends that the district court improperly admitted the testimony because it was not intricately related to the charged conduct and because it was improper propensity evidence. See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b); United States v. Simpson, 479 F.3d 492, 496-97 (7th Cir. 2007). Rule 404(b) prevents the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove that a person acted in conformity with his prior conduct. Fed. R.Evid. 404(b). In other words, Rule 404(b) plainly prohibits the government from introducing evidence of prior bad acts to show that the defendant's character is consistent with a propensity to commit the charged crime. Simpson, 479 F.3d at 497. But evidence may be properly admitted under Rule 404(b) for a non-propensity purpose, such as to prove `motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.' United States v. Sebolt, 460 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir.2006) (quoting Fed. R.Evid. 404(b)). A district court properly admits evidence of prior acts under Rule 404(b) if: (1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a matter in issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged; (2) the evidence shows that the other act is similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant to the matter in issue; (3) the evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendant committed the similar act; and (4) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. United States v. Moore, 531 F.3d 496, 499 (7th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Ross, 510 F.3d 702, 713 (7th Cir.2007)); United States v. Dennis, 497 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir.2007) (quoting Sebolt, 460 F.3d at 916). Acts that are intricately related to (or inextricably intertwined with) a crime charged in the indictment are generally admissible ... and are not subject to the constraints of [Rule 404(b)]. Strong, 485 F.3d at 989-90; see also United States v. James, 464 F.3d 699, 709 (7th Cir.2006); United States v. Senffner, 280 F.3d 755, 764 (7th Cir.2002). But we recently noted that the `inextricably intertwined' formula ... is unhelpfully vague. United States v. Taylor, 522 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir.2008). We explained that intent and absence of mistake are express exceptions to the Rule 404(b) bar; there is no need to spread the fog of `inextricably intertwined' over them. Almost all evidence admissible under the `inextricably interwoven' doctrine is admissible under one of the specific exceptions in Rule 404(b).... Id. at 735. After reviewing the record, we believe that there is no need to spread the fog of the intricately related doctrine in this case because Haynes's testimony about his other drug transactions with Harris was admissible under Rule 404(b). Haynes's testimony related to several non-propensity issues, including Harris's intent to distribute the drugs recovered during the police searches, his knowledge of the drugs, and the absence of mistake. Evidence that Harris sold drugs to Haynes was relevant to show that Harris intended to sell the drugs found during the police searches, and Harris's intent was automatically at issue because the indictment charged him with specific intent crimes. See Ross, 510 F.3d at 713 (Because conspiracy is a specific intent crime, whether Wilson intended to conspire to rob the post office was automatically in issue.); United States v. Puckett, 405 F.3d 589, 596 (7th Cir.2005) (The crime of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), is a specific intent crime making the defendant's state of mind an element of the crime which is to be determined by the finder of fact.); see also Moore, at 499. In fact, Harris also placed his intent squarely at issue by claiming that he possessed the drugs merely for personal use. The evidence of other transactions directly rebutted Harris's asserted defense to the possession-with-intent-to-distribute charge by showing that Harris had engaged in drug deals in the past. See Moore, at 499; Taylor, 522 F.3d at 734; United States v. Jones, 455 F.3d 800, 808 (7th Cir.2006); Puckett, 405 F.3d at 596. The testimony from Haynes also disproved Harris's contention that the drugs and the firearms seized during the searches of 1904 Green-tree Street and 1844 South 14th Street belonged to his girlfriend and other tenants: the fact that Harris had engaged in other drug transactions proved that Harris had knowledge of the drugs and firearms recovered. See United States v. Best, 250 F.3d 1084, 1092 (7th Cir.2001). The testimony from Haynes was also relevant to rebut the allegations of mistake that Harris raised by claiming that he was an innocent bystander and that Haynes set him up. See Moore, at 499. Harris's counsel argued multiple times that Haynes provided evidence against Harris in an attempt to procure lenient treatment after officers discovered crack cocaine in a baby seat at Haynes's house. And Harris's counsel repeatedly noted that the audio and video recordings presented at trial lacked discussion about drugsthe recordings revealed a conversation between Harris and Haynes about basketball shoes, and showed Harris counting cash. By combining these points, Harris's counsel accused Haynes of fabricating evidence against Harris. The government therefore needed to introduce evidence of the illicit history between Harris and Haynes in order to elucidate their ongoing business relationship and rebut Harris's attempt to downplay his role in the controlled purchases. See Moore, at 499; Taylor, 522 F.3d at 733 (The buyers' previous knowledge about [the defendant] related to the accuracy (hence absence of mistake) of their testimony concerning the controlled buys that provided crucial evidence for the government's case.). The evidence of identical prior transactions related to the accuracy of the testimony concerning the controlled purchases by explaining how Haynes's relationship with Harris developed to the point that Haynes could easily purchase drugs from Harris after only a quick phone call. The prior transactions also helped explain why Harris did not answer the initial telephone call placed from the DEA office phone (presumably a number unknown to Harris), but accepted the call placed from Haynes's personal cell phone. Similarly, the evidence of prior drug transactions at Harris's girlfriend's house tied Harris to the house (where those items were found) and helped explain why he would possess the items. Cf. Strong, 485 F.3d at 990 (upholding admission of evidence under the intricately related doctrine). The testimony from Haynes also satisfies the other prongs of our test for review under Rule 404(b). The testimony was similar enough and close enough in time to the charged conductin fact, the transactions were limited to a two-year period and involved identical amounts of the same drug as those charged in the indictment. See Ross, 510 F.3d at 713; United States v. Ruiz, 178 F.3d 877, 880-81 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Gibson, 170 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir.1999). The evidence was also sufficient to support a jury finding that Harris engaged in the prior drug transactions with Haynes: the evidence of the controlled purchases and the items recovered from the residences, as well as Powers's and Brown's testimonies, corroborated Haynes's coherent story. See United States v. Mallett, 496 F.3d 798, 802 (7th Cir.2007). And the evidence satisfies the final prong of our Rule 404(b) admissibility inquirythe balancing test incorporated from Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Moore, at 499 (quoting Ross, 510 F.3d at 713). Rule 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 403. [A]dmission of evidence under Rule 403 is entitled to special deference. `Only in an extreme case are appellate judges competent to second-guess the judgment of the person on the spot, the trial judge.' Wantuch, 525 F.3d at 518 (quoting Strong, 485 F.3d at 991); see also United States v. Gardner, 211 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th Cir.2000). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only if it will induce the jury to decide the case on an improper basis, commonly an emotional one, rather than on the evidence presented. Wantuch, 525 F.3d at 518. We have already explained that the testimony about other drug transactions between Harris and Haynes had a great amount of probative value on the issues of intent, absence of mistake, and knowledge, especially in light of Harris's asserted defenses. See Moore, at 499. Contrary to Harris's suggestion, the district court did not allow the government to directly elicit testimony that Harris and Haynes had engaged in hundreds of drug transactionsHaynes testified to a pattern of prior drug transactions that occurred at regular intervals involving the same amounts of the same drug charged in the indictment. We do not believe that the protocol that Haynes described was inherently emotional or incendiary. See Strong, 485 F.3d at 991. Still, the number of other drug transactions was not probative to explain the charged crime, and the government conceded at oral argument that testimony regarding the prior drug deals between Harris and Haynes could have been elicited in a way that prevented Haynes from stating that he purchased crack cocaine several times per week and then several times per day over lengthy periods of time. Standing alone, evidence regarding a vast number of similar drug deals might allow a jury to improperly convict a defendant based on his propensity to sell drugs. See Simpson, 479 F.3d at 499. But in this case, Haynes's testimony did not stand alone. The district court gave numerous and detailed limiting instructions on the issue. These instructions alleviated any potential prejudice caused by the testimony. See United States v. Hearn, 534 F.3d 706, ____, No. 07-1613, slip op. at 14 (7th Cir.2008); Moore, at 499; Wantuch, 525 F.3d at 518; Mallett, 496 F.3d at 802. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence of other drug transactions between Harris and Haynes.