Opinion ID: 1430307
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Compelled Pre-Trial Disclosure of Expert's Report.

Text: After the shooting Gipson threw the gun into a snow-covered field near the Lodge. The gun eventually came into the possession of Gipson's attorney. The gun was sent to a firearms expert in Minneapolis for testing. After the expert returned the gun, Gipson's attorney arranged for it to be turned over to the Alaska State Troopers. See Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200, 1206-12 (Alaska 1978). That same day, only five days before trial, the state moved successfully for disclosure of the results of any testing that had been done on the gun. [3] The record pertaining to this issue is quite sparse. The discovery motion was argued in an omnibus hearing on May 6, 1977, but that hearing has not been transcribed, although the log notes for the hearing are included in the record on appeal. At the hearing the judge ordered Gipson to produce the report of the firearms expert and an unidentified letter, but he limited the state's use of such evidence to cross-examination and rebuttal. The report was apparently duly produced, but it too is not part of the record on appeal. Gipson argues that compelled production of the firearm expert's report violated his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. He relies primarily on Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974), in which the defendant, charged with rape, challenged an order to produce names and addresses of all witnesses, to produce all written or recorded statements of witnesses, and to give advance notice to the prosecution of intent to rely on an alibi defense. In Scott, this court held that extensive pretrial prosecutorial discovery in criminal proceedings was prohibited by the constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Id. at 785. In reaching that conclusion we applied a three-fold test: Is the evidence testimonial; is it incriminating; and is it compelled? Id. There is no question that the production of the expert's report in the instant case was compelled. It appears also that, under the broad standard approved in Scott, it was probably incriminating. It does not appear, however, that the report was testimonial  the third requirement of the test. In Loveless v. State, 592 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1979), this court held that testimony of a psychologist regarding the defendant's conduct and mental status shortly after arrest did not violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Although the testimony in part relied on the defendant's verbal responses to questions, we held that the evidence elicited from the [defendant] was of the nature of `real' or non-testimonial evidence to which the right against self-incrimination does not attach. Id. at 1209 (footnote omitted). In the instant case, the expert's report, based on his examination and testing of the gun, is even less testimonial than the psychologist's testimony in Loveless. In fact, the report appears more akin to evidence such as fingerprints, handwriting exemplars or photographs, all of which have been determined to be beyond the privilege. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 916 (1966) (compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of `real or physical evidence' does not violate [the privilege]). The non-testimonial nature of the challenged evidence is fatal to Gipson's constitutional argument. Gipson also contends, however, that the compelled disclosure was in violation of Criminal Rule 16(c)(2). [4] Rule 16(c)(2) provides (emphasis added): (c) Disclosure to the Prosecuting Attorney ..... (2) Reports or Statements of Experts. The trial court may require that the prosecuting attorney be informed of and permitted to inspect and to copy or photograph any reports or statements of experts made in connection with the particular case, including results of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests, experiments or comparisons which are intended by the defendant to be used at trial. Information obtained by the state under the provisions of this section shall be used only for cross-examination or rebuttal of defense testimony. According to the plain language of the rule, the state was entitled to the firearms expert's report only if the report was intended by the defendant to be used at trial. Since there is no indication that Gipson ever intended to use the report at trial, we conclude that the superior court erred in compelling its disclosure. [5] See Howe v. State, 589 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1979). We further conclude, however, that disclosure of the expert's report had little effect on the trial that followed. It is quite apparent, certainly, that it did not appreciably affect the jury's verdict against Gipson. The error committed was therefore harmless. Love v. State, 457 P.2d 622, 629-32 (Alaska 1969).