Opinion ID: 2623122
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Denial of Holmes' pro se motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel

Text: Defense counsel filed a motion for new trial on August 19, 2002. See K.S.A. 22-3501. Holmes filed a pro se Motion to Declare Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, and Act of Preservation on August 22, 2002. The trial court held a hearing on these posttrial motions, as well as other motions filed by Holmes on September 27, 2002. The parties disputed whether the trial court could rule on the pro se motion for ineffective assistance of counsel. The prosecutor stated: I really don't know what to tell the Court to do. Um, at a 60-1507 hearing, the defendant gets a new attorney. So when this issue is raised pre-sentencing, I've tried to pull together some case law about how this works in this procedural [posture] of the case, and I'm not convinced that I have adequately exhausted that. . . . . . . . And so I think what the Court has to do is determine whether or not we can proceed today . . . . Holmes was afforded the opportunity to speak on his behalf but did not raise any additional arguments for his motion. The court, nevertheless, decided to rule on the motion. The trial judge stated: Well, I think that the Court is in a position that I can effectively rule on the Motion to Declare Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, and Act of Preservation. First, I'm going toafter considering all the arguments and the statements made in this motion, the motion itself is without merit and it is overruled. The defendant represented himself for the remaining motions, except for the motion for new trial and the Motion Implementing Disciplinary Action. The trial court set the latter two motions for a later hearing to allow defense counsel to withdraw from the case and for new counsel to be appointed. Newly appointed defense counsel filed a supplemental motion for new trial on October 21, 2002, which incorporated the ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in Holmes' earlier pro se motion. On November 7, 2002, the trial court heard the remaining motions pending from the previous hearing. To make the record clear, the prosecutor reviewed the motions that the court had previously ruled upon: however, the prosecutor mistakenly indicated that the motion for ineffective assistance of counsel and act of preservation was still pending. The court again overruled the motion, finding that there was no basis for Holmes' arguments after reviewing the pleadings filed. After the ruling, Holmes alerted the court that it had previously made the same ruling on the motion. Following that ruling, the trial court entertained the motion for new trial and the supplemental motion for new trial. Defense counsel was given the opportunity to argue those motions. However, defense counsel did not raise additional arguments specific to ineffective assistance of counsel or request that an evidentiary hearing be held. The trial court overruled the motion for new trial, stating that the evidence was admitted appropriately and that the State had met its burden of proof. A preliminary issue arises as the parties characterize the motions differently on appeal. Holmes construes them as K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 60-1507 motions, while the State labels them as pro se criminal ( i.e., posttrial) motions. We agree with the State. Holmes filed his pro se motions within the 10-day time period for motions for new trial but both motions were filed prior to sentencing. Supreme Court Rule 183(c) (2003 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 213) defines when the 60-1507 remedy can be invoked: The provisions of K.S.A. 60-1507 may be invoked only by one in custody claiming the right to be released. K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 60-1507(a) more specifically states: A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court of general jurisdiction claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States . . . [or] Kansas,. . . may . . . move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. (Emphasis added.) These motions are best characterized as posttrial motions rather than 60-1507 motions because sentencing had not been imposed. Regardless of whether characterized as either 60-1507 or posttrial motions, the fact remains that the court did not provide findings of fact and conclusions of law to assist this court to conduct a meaningful appellate review. Motions for new trials, like many 60-1507 motions, may be meritless and, thus, not entitled to evidentiary hearings. However, the district court must tell us what its findings are and why it concluded the motion to be without merit if we are to conduct any sort of meaningful appellate review. State v. Moncla, 269 Kan. 61, 65, 4 P.3d 618 (2000). Nevertheless, we find that remand is unnecessary in this case based upon our firm conclusion that Holmes' argument on this issue is without merit. When faced with a motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court is to make a preliminary examination to determine whether substantial questions of law or fact are raised, and if the findings are in the negative, the court may summarily deny the motion. State v. Davis, 271 Kan. 892, Syl. ¶ 1, 26 P.3d 681 (2001). The trial court's actions in summarily denying a motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Kirby, 272 Kan. 1170, 1194, 39 P.3d 1 (2002). Holmes did not identify what further evidence existed outside his pro se motion for ineffective assistance of counsel to necessitate an evidentiary hearing. Instead, he points to three ways that defense counsel failed to perform his duties: (1) Counsel failed to employ a drug expert to explain the effects of drug use, (2) counsel failed to impeach the forensic pathologist's testimony, and (3) counsel failed to impeach the statements of other witnesses. The State responds that further evidence was unnecessary because: (1) An expert was not needed because there was sufficient testimony on the drug use and (2) the cross-examination of the forensic pathologist was adequate and further bolstered the defendant's defense. When acting on a motion for a new trial, our court has held that the procedure is comparable to the procedure for a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. Moncla, 269 Kan. at 64. When acting on a 60-1507 motion, the court may determine that potential issues of fact are raised in the motion, supported by the files and record, and hold a preliminary hearing to determine if the issues in the motion are substantial. Gaudina v. State, 278 Kan. 103, Syl. ¶ 4, 92 P.3d 574 (2004). It is erroneous to deny a 60-1507 motion without an evidentiary hearing where the motion alleges facts which do not appear in the original record, which if true would entitle the movant to relief, and it identifies readily available witnesses whose testimony would support such facts or other sources of evidence. Floyd v. State, 208 Kan. 874, Syl. ¶ 1, 495 P.2d 92 (1972). The motion must set forth a factual background, names of witnesses, or other sources of evidence demonstrating movant's entitlement to relief. Sullivan v. State, 222 Kan. 222, 223-24, 564 P.2d 455 (1977). In his pro se motion, Holmes first contends that defense counsel failed to hire an expert in the drug field, that this failure to conduct an appropriate investigation was prima facie evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel, and as a result that an evidentiary hearing was warranted. He did not identify an expert witness that would have consulted on the case; rather, he simply alleged an expert witness would have explained that high drug usage can result in paranoid suspiciousness. Holmes bears the burden of demonstrating that trial counsel's alleged deficiencies were not the result of strategy. See Ferguson v. State, 276 Kan. 428, 446, 78 P.3d 40 (2003). The failure to present expert testimony resulting from reasonable trial strategy does not constitute deficient assistance for purposes of claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See 276 Kan. at 446-49. [T]he trial court, which observed counsel's performance and was aware of the trial strategy involved, is in a much better position to consider counsel's competence than an appellate court . . . and should be the first to make a determination of such an issue . . . . State v. Van Cleave, 239 Kan. 117, 119, 716 P.2d 580 (1986). A review of the record establishes that sufficient evidence of the substantial effects of drug use was placed before the jury through testimony from Smith's daughter, the crime scene investigator, the forensic pathologist, and Holmes. In fact, defense counsel addressed the effects of cocaine during his cross-examination with the forensic pathologist, such as paranoia and heightened awareness. Consequently, expert testimony regarding the effects of cocaine was presented to the jury. Holmes has not demonstrated that defense counsel's alleged deficiencies were not the result of strategy. Holmes next argues that his counsel failed to impeach the forensic pathologist for inconsistent statements made in the first trial regarding the extent of rigor mortis on Smith's body and that this impeachment was necessary to support his time line of events. In the first trial, the forensic pathologist testified that rigor mortis was present only in the face and finger tips; while in the second trial, the pathologist testified that some rigor mortis was present in Smith's lower extremities. The State concedes that counsel failed in this instance; however, it contends sufficient evidence was presented to corroborate Holmes' version of events. Defense counsel cross-examined the forensic pathologist's time of testing of Smith's body for rigor mortis. The pathologist stated that she had tested for rigor mortis at around 7:30 a.m. and that Smith appeared to have been dead for 2 hours. This information indicates that Smith's death occurred around 5:30 a.m., corroborating Holmes' time line of events. Holmes failed to provide evidence that defense counsel's failure to question the inconsistent statements regarding the extent of rigor mortis impeded his version of events. Finally, Holmes argued defense counsel failed to impeach Campbell's inconsistent statements regarding the time of the shooting and Schroeder's testimony regarding the location of the gun holster and Holmes' demeanor during the interrogation. However, defense counsel did cross-examine Campbell on this issue as just discussed and the failure to impeach Schroeder was cured since the crime scene photographs showing where the holster was located and the redacted videotape showing the interrogation were introduced at trial. The above analyses illustrate that no substantial questions of law or facts were raised. The district court did not err in summarily denying the motion for new trial based upon Holmes' pro se motion for ineffective assistance of counsel without an evidentiary hearing.