Opinion ID: 3054164
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review & Analytical Framework

Text: To determine whether attempted escape from custody constitutes an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(S), we first apply the “categorical approach” set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). See Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, ___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 5192056, at - (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2008) (applying the Taylor categorical approach to determine whether a conviction for failure to appear in court SALAZAR-LUVIANO v. MUKASEY 16687 constitutes an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(S)) (citing Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). According to the categorical approach, our task is to determine what Congress meant by “an offense relating to obstruction of justice” by reference to the generic federal definition of the crime. Renteria-Morales, 2008 WL 5192056, at . Because Congress itself did not define the phrase “offense relating to obstruction of justice” in the INA, we defer to the BIA’s “interpret[ation of] the elements of a generic obstruction of justice offense under § 1101(a)(43)(S) [as set forth in] In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889 (BIA 1999).” Id. at - (according Chevron deference to EspinozaGonzalez with respect to interpretation of § 1101(a)(43)(S)). After determining the elements of the generic crime listed in § 1101(a)(43)(S), we next identify the elements of the specific crime of conviction, in this case 18 U.S.C. § 751.2 We do “not defer to the BIA’s interpretations of state law or provisions of the federal criminal code,” id. at  (citing Parrilla v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2005)), and instead must “review de novo whether the specific crime of conviction meets the INA’s definition of an aggravated felony,” id. (citing Li v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 2004); Randhawa v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002)). If the elements of the specific crime of conviction are narrower than or the same as the elements of the generic crime, then the specific crime of conviction categorically 2 Salazar’s aiding and abetting conviction is technically a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. That Salazar was convicted of aiding and abetting, however, makes him liable as a principal of the underlying offense. See, e.g., OrtizMagana v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 2008) (because “there is no material distinction between an aider and abettor and principals in any jurisdiction of the United States,” aiding and abetting an aggravated felony is “functional equivalent [to] personally committing that offense” directly). 16688 SALAZAR-LUVIANO v. MUKASEY counts as an offense under § 1101(a)(43)(S). Id. (citing Fernandez-Ruiz, 466 F.3d at 1125). If, however, the elements of attempted escape from custody are broader than the elements of obstruction of justice as defined in the INA, we must “go beyond the mere fact of conviction” and consider, de novo, whether Salazar-Luviano was necessarily convicted of all the elements of the generic crime. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. “In making this determination, we . . . ‘conduct a limited examination of documents in the record of conviction.’ ” Renteria-Morales, 2008 WL 5192056, at  (quoting Ferreira v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 2004)). Because Salazar-Luviano pled guilty to the offense, the examination of the record is “limited to the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this information.” Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005). “ ‘If the record of conviction does not establish that the offense the petitioner committed qualifies as an aggravated felony, the government has not met its burden of proving that the defendant committed an aggravated felony.’ ” Renteria-Morales, 2008 WL 5192056, at  (quoting Ferreira, 390 F.3d at 1095).