Opinion ID: 834956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process and Preindictment Delay

Text: We turn to the second issue: whether the Due Process Clause prohibited the state from indicting defendant more than eight years after the crimes were committed. Defendant argues that his right to due process was violated by the delay, notwithstanding the applicable nine-year statute of limitations. In particular, defendant contends that his ability to defend himself was prejudiced by the destruction of evidence and the deaths of three potential witnesses during the delay. Defendant concedes that the state did not delay his indictment in bad faith, but urges that the state acted in reckless disregard of the probable prejudice caused by a delay of over eight years, which defendant asserts violated due process. The state responds that the statute of limitations is the primary protection against prejudicial delay and that preindictment delay violates due process only when (1) the government intentionally delayed for tactical advantage and (2) that delay substantially prejudiced the defendant. According to the state, defendant can show neither of those elements. [13] We recently addressed a similar due process claim in State v. Davis, 345 Or. 551, 564, 201 P.3d 185 (2008). In Davis, we explained that the Supreme Court has declined to announce a bright-line test for a successful due process claim of preindictment delay. Id. at 569-71, 201 P.3d 185. Two of that Court's decisions have addressed the issue: United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971) and United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). From Marion and Lovasco, two requirements of a successful due process claim are clear: (1) actual, nonspeculative prejudice; and (2) some level of government culpability. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 789-90, 97 S.Ct. 2044. With regard to the second requirement government culpabilityit is also clear that so-called investigative delay never violates a defendant's due process rights. Id. at 796, 97 S.Ct. 2044. Rather, the Court has explained that statutes of limitation generally provide `the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges' and the Due Process Clause has a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive delay. Id. at 789, 97 S.Ct. 2044 (quoting Marion, 404 U.S. at 322, 92 S.Ct. 455). Neither Marion nor Lovasco, however, identify the level of government culpability a defendant must show in a successful due process claim of preindictment delay. See Davis, 345 Or. at 570, 201 P.3d 185 (discussing the same). The Court in Marion accepted the government's concession that due process would require dismissal of the indictment if it were shown at trial that the pre-indictment delay in this case caused substantial prejudice to appellees' rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused.  404 U.S. at 324, 92 S.Ct. 455 (emphasis added). The Court then stated, we need not, and could not now, determine when and in what circumstances actual prejudice resulting from pre-accusation delays requires the dismissal of the prosecution. Id. Six years later, in Lovasco, the Court similarly stated that it could not determine in the abstract the circumstances in which preaccusation delay would require dismissing prosecutions. 431 U.S. at 796, 97 S.Ct. 2044. The Court concluded, [w]e therefore leave to the lower courts, in the first instance, the task of applying the settled principles of due process that we have discussed to the particular circumstances of individual cases. Id. at 797, 97 S.Ct. 2044. Since Lovasco, as we explained in Davis, the lower federal courts have divided into two camps on the question of whether reasons for preindictment delay, other than an intentional delay to obtain a tactical advantage, may rise to the level of a due process violation. Davis, 345 Or. at 570-71, 201 P.3d 185. A majority of the federal circuits have adopted a test that is reflected in the state's argument here, requiring a showing of intentional, tactical delay. Id. at 571, 201 P.3d 185; see also U.S. v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497, 1511 (5th Cir.1996) (discussing majority test). The Ninth and the Fourth Circuits, by contrast, have established a different test. Davis, 345 Or. at 571, 201 P.3d 185. Under that minority test, a court consider[s] the government's reasons for the delay, balancing the prejudice to the defendant with the government's justification for the delay. U.S. v. Uribe-Rios, 558 F.3d 347, 358 (4th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing U.S. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 403 (4th Cir.1985)). Recklessness or even negligence on the government's part may satisfy the minority test, if actual prejudice to the defendant weighs substantially in the balancing. United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670, 678 (9th Cir.1977) ([A]lthough weighted less heavily than deliberate delays, negligent conduct can also be considered   .). [14] As we will explain, we conclude that the minority test more closely follows the consistent threads in the Court's decisionsthe disinclination to announce specific requirements for every case, the reliance on broad due process principles, and the insistence that the statute of limitations is a defendant's primary protection in this area, making due process violations unusual. The majority test, by contrast, forecloses the possibility that something other than intentional, tactical delay may violate due process. The Court in Lovasco explained that the appropriate inquiry is only whether the action complained of    violates those `fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions' and which define `the community's sense of fair play and decency.' 431 U.S. at 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044 (citations omitted). The Court has left open the possibility that a delay caused by something less than intentional government tactics may violate those fundamental conceptions of justice. We will do the same, until and unless the Court changes or narrows its course. [15] The majority test relies heavily on the passage in Marion in which the Court accepted the government's concession regarding tactical delay. When taken in context, however, the relevant comments did not foreclose the minority test. The entire discussion reads: [T]he statute of limitations does not fully define the appellees' rights with respect to the events occurring prior to indictment. Thus, the Government concedes that the Due Process Clause    would require dismissal of the indictment if it were shown at trial that the pre-indictment delay in this case caused substantial prejudice to appellees' rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused. However, we need not, and could not now, determine when and in what circumstances actual prejudice resulting from pre-accusation delays requires the dismissal of the prosecution. Marion, 404 U.S. at 324, 92 S.Ct. 455 (citations omitted). In accepting the government's concession, the Court cited two of its previous due process cases, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (due process violated when government suppresses evidence material to the defense), and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) (due process violated when government knowingly allows false testimony to go uncorrected). See also Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-98, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972) (discussing both cases). In accepting the government's concession based on those cases, the Court seems to have been acknowledging that, when tactical delay is prejudicial, it is usually because of lost evidence, and Brady and Napue have established that due process would be violated by an intentional, tactical loss of evidence by the state. The Court did not expressly require tactical government delay for a due process violation, however. The minority test is consistent with the government's concession in Marion as well as with the Court's adherence to elementary standards of due process. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 795, 97 S.Ct. 2044; see also Marion, 404 U.S. at 325, 92 S.Ct. 455 (due process claim of preindictment delay necessarily involve[s] a delicate judgment based on the circumstances of each case). The flexibility in the minority test is faithful to the Court's due process jurisprudence in general, which in a variety of contexts favors multi-factor tests and balancing over bright-line rules. E.g., BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996) (describing three guideposts to analyze whether a punitive damages award violates due process); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (announcing a three-part balancing test to determine whether a property or liberty deprivation violates due process). Consistently with the Court's overriding concern with fair play and decency, Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 795, 97 S.Ct. 2044, the minority test allows for the possibility that prejudicial preindictment delay may violate the Due Process Clause, based on the circumstances of the case, where the government culpably caused that delay, although not for a tactical advantage. We begin our analysis under the minority test with whether defendant has met his burden of showing actual, nonspeculative prejudice. Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the destruction of evidence and the death of possible witnesses. He urges that some speculation is inevitable in any claim that lost evidence was prejudicial, but that here, where the state intentionally destroyed evidence that it could have retained, his burden to show actual prejudice should be relaxed, or shifted to the state. We may readily resolve defendant's request to relax or shift the burden on the prejudice inquiry. As we earlier discussed, the Supreme Court has explained that statutes of limitation, and not due process, protect defendants against the possible prejudice caused by preindictment delay. Marion, 404 U.S. at 322-24, 92 S.Ct. 455. That distinction reflects a reality observed by the Court in Marion: Possible prejudice is inherent in any delay, however short; it may also weaken the Government's case. Id. at 322, 92 S.Ct. 455. Indeed, the destroyed evidence in this case may have supported the state's case; both parties were forced to proceed without it. [16] Under Marion, the possibility for prejudice inherent in any delay is the province of the statute of limitations; due process is concerned only with actual prejudicial delay. Id. The burden to demonstrate actual prejudice is properly placed on defendant here, because he was prosecuted within the statute of limitations. We note that defendant points to destroyed evidence and dead witnesses that relate only to the assault of the first victim; he claims no prejudice regarding the delay of indictment for the assault of the second victim. As to the charges involving the first victim, defendant asserts that his defense was prejudiced by the destruction of the rape kit, the victim's clothing, and the towels and clothing seized from defendant's house. Presumably, defendant would contend that the rape kit, clothing, and towels may have been inconsistent with the state's theory, although defendant does not offer a specific reason why the loss of that evidence was prejudicial. Indeed, without knowing the quality of that evidence, defendant can only speculate that it might have helped his defense. That speculation, however, is insufficient to demonstrate actual prejudice and cuts against defendant as sharply as it cuts in his favor. See Davis, 345 Or. at 575, 201 P.3d 185 ([T]he light they [the pieces of evidence] shed might have been favorable to defendant. Or they might have had no evidentiary value, or they might have bolstered the case against defendant. Either conclusion requires speculation.). The fact that the police in good faith purged physical evidence does not, on its own, demonstrate actual prejudice. Defendant also points to the deaths of three potential witnesses and to the destruction of the 9-1-1 tape, but his argument in that regard is equally unavailing. Defendant emphasizes that the first victim's roommate, who picked up the first victim from a 7-Eleven store after the crime, and whom defendant's first attorney (retained in 1996) had on a list of people to interview, could have testified as to the first victim's demeanor shortly after the crime. [17] In particular, defendant contends that the roommate might have testified that the victim had a calm, rather than agitated demeanor shortly after the assault. Defendant makes the same argument for why the destruction of the 9-1-1 tape was prejudicialit might have shown that the victim had a calm demeanor after the crime. Defendant can point to no evidence, however, supporting a conclusion that the roommate or the 9-1-1 tape was more likely to help rather than hurt defendant's case. He can only speculate as to the victim's demeanor. Again, due process is concerned solely with delay that is actually prejudicial. See id. at 575, 201 P.3d 185 (The loss of the [9-1-1] recording does not establish actual prejudice, because the asserted value of its contents is, again, entirely speculative.); see also United States v. Pallan, 571 F.2d 497, 501 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 436 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 2249, 56 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978) (protection from lost testimony `generally falls solely within the ambit of the statute of limitations') (quoting 61 Minn. L. Rev. 509, 517, (1977)). Defendant has therefore failed to show substantial, actual prejudice. To be sure, some of the reason that defendant can only speculate as to the value of the missing evidence is that so much of the evidence is missingno piece of clothing remains to indicate the value of the towels from defendant's house, no portion of the 9-1-1 tape remains to indicate whether the roommate's testimony would have supported the defense. Further, because the delay was prolonged, more evidence was destroyed or otherwise lost ( e.g., the victim's clothing was destroyed in March 1999, the rape kit was destroyed in May 2000, and the roommate died in 2002). Nevertheless, defendant has demonstrated only the slightest potential prejudice caused by the delay, which, [e]ven if    sufficient to be placed on the scale for purposes of the minority balancing test,    at most would weigh very lightly. That, in turn, would mean that the reasons for delay must weigh heavily in defendant's favor and against the state. Davis, 345 Or. at 576, 201 P.3d 185 (citing Mays, 549 F.2d at 678). Here, defendant asserts that the delay was caused by the state's incorrect assumption that defendant would serve a life sentence in California and its resulting conclusion that defendant did not pose a threat to public safety in Oregon. When defendant was released from custody eight years later, the state determined that defendant was a risk to public safety and ought to be prosecuted. Defendant's statement of the facts is undisputed, but his conclusionthat those reasons for delay are sufficiently reckless to violate due process in this casedoes not follow. This is not a case in which prosecutors ever intentionally delayed defendant's indictment, and defendant concedes that this is not a case of bad-faith delay. The state initially closed the case based on the good-faith belief that defendant would serve a life sentence. A different prosecutor made an independent decision eight years later to reopen the case. While the case was open, the state was investigating and moving the case forward; only one month passed between defendant's release in California and defendant's indictment in Oregon. That cannot be classified as investigative delay, which, under Lovasco, never violates due process. 431 U.S. at 796, 97 S.Ct. 2044. Neither, however, can the circumstances be classified as negligence by the state. Defendant urges that the prosecutorial decisions here were reckless, because the state could have resubmitted the charges to a grand jury in 1996, obtained an indictment, and lodged a detainer against defendant while he was in custody in California. See ORS 135.775 (enacting the Agreement on Detainers). Instead, in defendant's view, the state chose to close the case and then reopen it eight years later. The choice that defendant perceives is one that arises only by hindsight, however. When the state closed the case in 1996, it did so without any expectation that it would proceed against defendant in the future. Therefore, from the state's perspective at that time, obtaining a detainer against defendant would have served no apparent purpose. In 2004, based on a change in circumstances, the state chose to proceed. Charging decisions require consideration of a wide range of factors    in order to determine whether prosecution would be in the public interest. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 794, 97 S.Ct. 2044. Due process does not prevent a prosecutor from making decisions based on good faith judgments simply because the predicates for those decisions may change over time. See, e.g., People v. Horning, 34 Cal.4th 871, 893, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 305, 102 P.3d 228 (Cal.2004) (describing as practical and neutral under a Sixth Amendment speedy trial analysis a district attorney's initial decision that it was not worthwhile expending the necessary resources to extradite the defendant, who was sentenced to life in prison in another state). [18] Contrary to defendant's assertions, under these facts, the state was entitled to change its position regarding the danger that defendant posed to public safety over the course of eight years. The state did not close the case because it saw defendant as nonthreatening; it closed the case based on a conclusion that defendant's California sentence minimized his threat and, in light of that, pursuing defendant's prosecution in Oregon was not a good use of public resources. When the state's initial calculation turned out to be incorrect, the statute of limitations had not yet run. The sequence of events was not idealevidence had been destroyed and, eight years after the initial dismissal of the charges, the case had not yet been resolved. But in terms of the reason for those events, the state's actions do not demonstrate the government culpability and the degree of actual prejudice that violate due process.