Opinion ID: 1624236
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: were sanford's answers warranties or representations?

Text: If, in answering the question about speeding, Sanford was making a warranty, then the materiality of his false answer is of no consequence, since a warranty must be literally true and its materiality cannot be inquired into... . Colonial Life & Acc. Inc. Co. v. Cook, 374 So.2d 1288, 1291 (Miss. 1979). If, on the other hand, Sanford was making a mere representation when he answered the question, then the materiality and the substantial truth of the statement become very important, because a representation, if substantially true and not material to the risk, will not invalidate the policy in the absence of fraud. Id. The language of Sanford's policy is inconsistent as to whether the answers on the application are warranties or representations. On the application form itself, the following language appears above Sanford's signature: I hereby warrant that the answers to the questions above and on the reverse side hereof are complete and true and it is agreed that any untrue statements or answers contained therein or any facts concealed intentionally or otherwise will render any insurance issued on this application void. I further agree to be bound by the proxy on the reverse side hereof. (emphasis added) Although the above-quoted language is actually in the application rather than the policy, there is language in the policy incorporating the application, thereby making the application a part of the contract. Interstate Life and Accident Insurance Co. v. Flanagan, 284 So.2d 33, 35 (Miss. 1973). It is in the incorporation provision that the following language appears, contradicting the application's reference to warranties: By acceptance of this policy the insured named in the declarations agrees that the statements in the declarations are his agreement and representations, that this policy is issued in reliance upon the truth of such representations and that this policy embodies all agreements existing between himself and the Company or any of its agents relating to this insurance. (emphasis added) Thus, what is referred to as a warranty in the application, is referred to as a representation in the policy. Although this Court has never been presented with a case involving this particular ambiguity, the leading treatise on insurance is very clear on this point: To constitute a warranty, the language of the policy must be definite and unambiguous. If there is doubt, arising from the contract, as to whether the provisions are to be treated as warranties or as representations, the courts will regard them as representations only. Thus, if there are contradictory or inconsistent terms used in different parts of the policy, so that statements are termed warranties in one place, and qualified in another, or the term representation is also employed in describing the statements, the courts will resolve any such ambiguity in favor of recovery. Similarly, where there is any ambiguity or doubt about the statement claimed to amount to a warranty, as to its meaning, the matter will be construed most strongly against the insurer. It is necessary, of course, where some of the statements in the contract appear to be warranties and others representations to construe the whole of the statements in determining whether they are intended as warranties or as representations. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 7342. Moreover, we have held 1) that where there is an ambiguity between the policy and the application, the terms of the policy will govern, and 2) that ambiguities in an insurance contract are to be strongly construed against the insurer. National Life and Accident Co. v. Miller, 484 So.2d 329, 337 (Miss. 1985). As such, the contradictory language in the contract requires that the answers be construed as representations, rather than as warranties.