Opinion ID: 3063358
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Government's Statements

Text: According to Appellants, the prosecutor made some improper remarks during trial that deprived them of a fair trial. 7 Although we have held that where the evidence is equally or nearly equally consistent with innocence as it is with guilt, a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt, O'Laughlin v. O'Brien, 568 F.3d 287, 301 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 323 (1st Cir. 1995)), that is not the case here, where the evidence establishing guilt was very strong. -21- Some of these remarks were objected to by some appellants at trial, while others were not. We discuss each in turn. This court reviews de novo whether objected-to remarks by the prosecution were improper and/or constituted misconduct. See United States v. Sepúlveda-Hernández, 752 F.3d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Appolon, 695 F.3d 44, 66 (1st Cir. 2012). If we conclude that statements were improper or constituted misconduct, we must then determine whether such statements resulted in prejudice to the Appellants. United States v. Rodríguez, 675 F.3d 48, 62 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Azubike, 504 F.3d 30, 38-39 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Joyner, 191 F.3d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 1999) ([W]e review for harmless error, that is, whether the argument was 'sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial under the circumstances' (quoting United States v. Rosales, 19 F.3d 763, 767 (1st Cir. 1994))). In determining whether the prosecutor's remarks were harmless, we evaluate the . . . comments as a whole, not in isolation, Joyner, 191 F.3d at 53 (quoting Rosales, 19 F.3d at 767), and we focus on (1) the severity of the misconduct, including whether it was isolated and/or deliberate; (2) whether curative instructions were given; and (3) the strength of the evidence against the [Appellants]. United States v. González-Pérez, 778 F.3d 3, 19 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing Rodríguez, 675 F.3d at 62). The prosecutor's improper statements are considered harmful if they 'so poisoned the well that the trial's -22- outcome was likely affected, thus warranting a new trial.' Id. (quoting Rodríguez, 675 F.3d at 62). Any unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed for plain error. Id.; Rodríguez, 675 F.3d at 64 (requiring defendant to prove there was an error, which was clear or obvious, that affected his substantial rights, and seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings).
During her opening statement, the prosecutor stated: You'll hear the Judge inform you that jurisdictional aspects is not an issue for you to determine. It's already been determined by this Court that the United States had jurisdiction over this vessel and that these individuals were on board this vessel which we had jurisdiction over with the intent and knowledge to possess and distribute the narcotics. Now, in this case there are no -- Peña-Santo's defense counsel immediately objected to the statement saying, I object to that, Your Honor. That's not what the Court determined. That they knew that there were drugs on board is something for the jury. That's an issue of fact for the jury to decide. Gil-Martínez's counsel joined his objection and added that the district court's ruling was regarding the jurisdiction, not that there were drugs inside the vessel. Faced with these objections, the prosecutor responded, I don't believe I stated -23- that. You will have to determine whether those drugs were on board, and you'll see the video of them throwing them overboard. Because only Peña-Santo and Gil-Martínez preserved this argument, our review of their claim is for harmlessness. While our review of Vicente-Arias and Liriano's claim would ordinarily be for plain error, because Appellants' claim fails under both standards of review, we limit our discussion to the more defendant-friendly standard. The prosecutor's statement gave the impression that the court had already determined that Appellants had the intent and knowledge to possess and distribute the narcotics, which was not correct and, thus, was improper. However, we still need to determine whether the statement was prejudicial. A review of the record does not reveal that the prosecutor intended to mislead the jury. Rather, it suggests that she simply misspoke when trying to list a series of issues the government wanted to address as an introduction to the government's case. Furthermore, the prosecutor's improper statement was isolated and not deliberate. See González-Pérez, 778 F.3d at 19. Defense counsel for Gil-Martínez and Peña-Santo immediately objected to the statement and, although the district court made no comment or ruling after the objection, the prosecutor immediately retracted the statement by saying: I don't believe I stated that. -24- You will have to determine whether those drugs were on board, and you'll see the video of them throwing them overboard.8 Also, while the district court did not give a curative instruction at the time, we note that one was not requested. Moreover, the district court repeatedly instructed the jury that attorneys' arguments were not evidence. During the preliminary instructions, the court stated, [r]emember these are arguments. It's what the Government intends to prove in the case. It's not the actual evidence. The actual evidence will be coming in after the witnesses start coming in and presenting exhibits. Then, during the final jury instructions, the district court reiterated that it was the government who had to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, it stated, [f]or you to find a defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the Government has proven each of these things beyond a reasonable doubt . . . that the defendants agreed to import cocaine and heroin . . . [and] did so knowingly and intentionally. This militates against finding prejudice. See United States v. Gentles, 619 F.3d 8 We note that the correction itself is problematic because it suggested that the video showed the defendants throwing packages overboard, whereas it was agreed that the defendants could not be identified as doing so from the video. No contemporaneous objection was made, so we review for plain error. As with the government's initial statement, the inaccurate reference in the correction does not amount to plain error, particularly given the admission in the testimony of the government's witness Agent Perry, that the defendants could not be identified in the video as throwing the packages overboard. -25- 75, 82 (1st Cir. 2010) (finding no error where defendant failed to request a curative instruction and court gave general instructions before deliberation as to what the jury could and could not consider as evidence (citing United States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 387, 398 (1st Cir. 2007))); see also González-Pérez, 778 F.3d at 21 ([W]e ordinarily presume that juries follow instructions.). Finally, we find it unlikely that any prejudice surviving the instructions could have affected the outcome of the case. The evidence of Appellants' guilt was strong enough to prevent any prejudice surviving the instructions from affecting the outcome of the case. In addition, the fact that this statement was made at the beginning of the trial also makes it less likely to have affected the outcome of the case. See United States v. Mooney, 315 F.3d 54, 60 (1st Cir. 2002) (The context of the prosecutor's comments also weighs against finding that they likely affected the outcome of the trial. The comments occurred during opening arguments, not during summation where the last words the jury hears have significant potential to cause prejudice.). In sum, because we do not find that the prosecutor's statement so poisoned the well that the trial's outcome was likely affected, González-Pérez, 778 F.3d at 19 (quoting Rodríguez, 675 F.3d at 62) (internal quotation marks omitted), Appellants' claim fails. -26-
On direct examination, Ms. Cacho, the chemist, testified about the tests she performed on some of the drugs in order to conclude that they were heroin and cocaine. During cross-examination, Gil-Martínez's defense counsel asked Ms. Cacho whether she knew if other tests -- such as fingerprint analysis and DNA testing -- had been performed on the packages containing the drugs. Defense counsel's point was that no tests linked the Appellants to the drugs. Ms. Cacho testified that she did not do anything other than analyze the chemical composition of the substances. On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Ms. Cacho, Did you watch the video of the defendants throwing the drugs into the water? Gil-Martínez's defense counsel objected and stated that [t]hat was not part of the cross-examination. The district court allowed the question, to which Ms. Cacho responded, No. Although they did not object at trial to the prosecutor's question to Ms. Cacho on redirect examination, Peña-Santo and Vicente-Arias now argue that it was a loaded and speaking question that aimed to confuse the jury by making them believe that there was direct evidence linking them to the crimes charged. They allege that, because there was no direct evidence or witness identifying them as throwing anything into the water and no one -27- could tell from the video whether they were the ones throwing the drugs overboard, they are entitled to a new trial. Since Peña-Santo and Vicente-Arias failed to object to the question at the trial level, our review is only for plain error.9 Their claim falls short because, at the very least, they failed to establish plain-error review's third and fourth prongs. Specifically, Peña-Santo and Vicente-Arias have not shown that their substantial rights were affected and that the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of their judicial proceedings were seriously impaired, especially because Ms. Cacho responded to the question in the negative. Although they argue that the question wrongly gave the impression that direct evidence (the video) showed them throwing the drugs overboard, the fact that Ms. Cacho responded that she had not seen the video -- coupled with the fact that the jury examined the evidence (including the video) from which the government could lawfully suggest that the jury draw an inference that Appellants were the ones throwing the drugs overboard10 -- sufficiently attenuated any effect that the question 9 We note that only Gil-Martínez objected to the prosecutor's question at the trial level, but he did so on different grounds -- that the question went beyond the scope of the cross-examination -- and neither Peña-Santo nor Vicente-Arias joined his objection. 10 The government may suggest to the jury which inferences should be drawn from the evidence as long as the government does not know that the suggested inferences are false or has very strong reasons to doubt those inferences. See United States v. Kasenge, 660 F.3d 537, 542 (1st Cir. 2011) (stating that [a]lthough it is the jury's job to draw the inferences, there is nothing improper in the -28- alone could have had. This is just not the kind of blockbuster error for which plain error review tends to afford relief. Rodríguez, 675 F.3d at 64.
Peña-Soto and Vicente-Arias also challenge the following statement made by the government during its closing argument: That's not someone's personal drug stash right there. $3.2 million is not something that the four of them are going to use casually at parties. Those are drugs that the four of them are going to sell at a profit, $3.2 million. Although they did not object to the statement at the trial level, Peña-Santo and VicenteArias assert that it satisfies the plain error standard of review since there was no evidence, either circumstantial or direct, that they intended to sell drugs for profit or that they stood to gain millions of dollars in profit. Relying on Arrieta-Agressot v. United States, 3 F.3d 525, 527 (1st Cir. 1993), they claim that the challenged statement was inflammatory by referring to money and wealth, and that the evidence showed, at most, that they acted as couriers (mules) or may have assisted on the boat. We disagree. Although there was no direct evidence that Appellants intended to sell the drugs for profit, there is no error -- plain Government's suggesting which inferences should be drawn, but noting that it is error for the government to propound inferences that it knows to be false, or has a very strong reason to doubt) (citations omitted). -29- or otherwise -- in referencing the amount or worth of the drugs and inviting the jury to draw the inference that the drugs were not for personal use. See United States v. Bergodere, 40 F.3d 512, 518 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that we have long recognized that factors such as the quantity and purity of the drugs confiscated by the authorities can support an inference of intent to distribute); see also United States v. Meadows, 571 F.3d 131, 144-45 (1st Cir. 2009) (At closing argument, the prosecution may ask jurors to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.). And, even if the Appellants would not be the ones actually to sell the drugs and were instead couriers or mules, they were still part of the same conspiracy to import and distribute (and eventually sell for profit) controlled substances, which were the charged offenses. Furthermore, Peña-Santo's and Vicente's reliance on Arrieta-Agressot is misplaced. The improper comments in Arrieta-Agressot had to do with the evil effect that the defendants' actions had on society. There, we established that a prosecutor's statement is improper if it serves no purpose besides inflaming the passions and prejudices of the jury. 3 F.3d at 527. Here, however, the prosecutor's reference to the worth of the drugs had the legitimate purpose of both refuting the Appellants' mere presence defense and suggesting that the jury draw an inference as to the required element of intent. See Bergodere, 40 F.3d at 518. Thus, their plain error claim fails. -30-