Opinion ID: 2453721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Field Preemption and Presumption

Text: The presumption is often noted in this court's cases dealing with preemption. Simply stated, `[i]n the absence of express preemption in a federal law, there is a strong presumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law.' [Citation omitted.] Zimmerman, 289 Kan. at 975, 218 P.3d 400. However, the presumption does not apply if the area of regulation is one where the interests at stake are uniquely federal in nature. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988); see Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347, 121 S.Ct. 1012, 148 L.Ed.2d 854 (2001) (The Court declined to apply the presumption because [p]olicing fraud against federal agencies is hardly `a field which the States have traditionally occupied'. . . . To the contrary, the relationship between a federal agency and the entity it regulates is inherently federal in character. . . .; United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000) (holding presumption applies `in [fields] which the States have traditionally occupied,' but declining to apply it because national and international maritime commerce is not such a field)). Kanza argues preemption occurs because we are dealing with a field traditionally occupied by the federal governmentrailroads and railroad rights-of-wayand Miami County argues we are dealing with an area typically occupied by the stateshistoric police powers. These arguments are closely related to the first of the two types of implied preemption, known as field preemption. Field preemption applies when Congress' intent to pre-empt all state law in a particular area may be inferred [because] the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive or `the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.' Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 [1947]). In sorting out the parties' opposing viewpoints, we recognize that, without question, Congress has regulated some aspects of railbanking. The historical roots of this regulation begin with the federal regulation of railroads, which is both pervasive and comprehensive. See, e.g., Chicago & N.W. Tr. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 318, 101 S.Ct. 1124, 67 L.Ed.2d 258 (1981). Numerous court decisions recognize that Congress has exercised preemptive, if not exclusive, power to regulate the railroads. See, e.g., Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Train Dispatchers, 499 U.S. 117, 128, 111 S.Ct. 1156, 113 L.Ed.2d 95 (1991) (Congress' intent to exempt railroads from antitrust laws and all other laws, including state and municipal laws, was clear, broad and unqualified); Chicago & N.W. Tr. Co., 450 U.S. at 320, (ICC's [now STB's] abandonment authority is plenary and exclusive); Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Stroud, 267 U.S. 404, 408, 45 S.Ct. 243, 69 L.Ed. 683 (1925) (Congress' acts concerning interstate commerce are supreme and exclusive). In addition, through other legislation, Congress has exercised federal authority over railroad rights-of-way when possessed for railway purposes. For example, the STB preemption statute provides that the STB's jurisdiction over the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, or facilities . . . is exclusive. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (2010). This provision continues with an express statement of preemption: [T]he remedies provided under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State law. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b). As this statutory provision indicates, the federal government exclusively regulates the abandonment or discontinuance of a railroad right-of-way, and railbanking is clearly a part of that regulatory process. As the United States Supreme Court found, when Congress amended the Trails Act again in 1983, it sought to `preserve established railroad rights-of-way for future reactivation of rail service, to protect rail transportation corridors, and to encourage energy efficient transportation use.' [Citations omitted.] Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 18, 110 S.Ct. 914, 108 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). Further, under the plain language of 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d), the subject provision in this case, it is clear that railbanked rights-of-way remain part of the national rail transportation system subject to the jurisdiction of the STB. In other words, the STB retains jurisdiction for future railroad use. See Preseault, 494 U.S. at 5 n. 3, 110 S.Ct. 914; Good v. Skagit County, 104 Wash.App. 670, 675-76, 17 P.3d 1216, rev. denied 144 Wash.2d 1013, 32 P.3d 283 (2001). But it must be emphasized that the STB's role in a railbanking proceeding is largely ministerial. Goos v. I.C.C., 911 F.2d 1283, 1296 (8th Cir.1990). This is obvious in that Congress has determined that every inactive railroad right-of-way is appropriate for recreational trail use. Under 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) and 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a)(2) (2009), the STB must issue a Notice of Interim Trail Use in an exempt abandonment proceeding, 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(d), or a Certificate of Interim Trail Use in a regular abandonment proceeding, 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(c), when a private party files a statement of willingness to assume financial responsibility, and the railroad agrees to negotiate. Goos, 911 F.2d at 1286, 1295; see, e.g., Citizens Against Rails-To-Trails v. S.T.B., 267 F.3d 1144, 1153 (D.C.Cir.2001); see also Buffalo Tp. v. Jones, 778 A.2d 1269, 1276 (Pa.Commw.2001) (Nowhere in Section 1247[d] does the Act require a municipality, which has accepted full responsibility for management of the right-of-way, including legal and financial liability arising out of its use as a recreational trail, to obtain approval from the ICC in order to take advantage of the protections of the Act.). In addition, the focus of the federal regulation of rail-trails is on the ability to restore the right-of-way to railroad use at a later date and to ensure that any present use does not interfere with the future potential. Specifically, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) requires that the interim use be subject to subsequent restoration of rail use and that the interim trail user (operator) takes responsibility for management of the right-of-way and all associated liability and taxes. See 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a). The federal government's occupation of the field of regulating the rail-trail ends there, however. While the Supreme Court in Preseault, 494 U.S. at 17-18, 110 S.Ct. 914, recognized that the Trails Act serves the dual purposes of preserving established railroad rights-of-way in case of future activation and encouraging the development of trails for recreational use on an interim basis, the Trails Act does nothing to regulate the use of the trails during that interim. In other words, nothing in the federal regulatory scheme addresses specifics of the operation of a rail-trail. This distinction has been recognized by the STB in a written decision, Idaho N. & Pac. R.R.Abandonment & Discontinuance ExemptionIn Washington & Adams Counties, ID, STB Docket No. AB-433 (Sub-No. 2X) (STB served April 1, 1998). In that decision, the STB emphasized that a trail operator must ensure satisfaction of the federal objective that nothing occur that would preclude a railroad's right to reassert control over the right-of-way at some future time to revive active service but must also use the right-of-way so that it does not become a public nuisance. STB Docket No. AB-433 (Sub-No. 2X), at 9. The second obligation is a state or local requirement, not a Board requirement. Federal preemption does not extend to the legitimate exercise of police power by states and localities. STB Docket No. AB-433 (Sub-No. 2X), at 9. The STB continued, stating: `We note, however, that a trail use must comply with State and local land use plans, zoning ordinances, and public health and safety legislation. . . . This local regulation can address the Landowners' concerns about such issues as vandalism or noise. . . . Indeed, the State and local agencies in the area are attuned to the specific interests and needs of their communities. . . . Nothing in our Trails Act rules or procedures is intended to usurp the right of state, regional and local entities to impose appropriate safety, land use, and zoning regulations on recreational trails.' [Citation omitted.] STB Docket No. AB-433 (Sub-No. 2X), at 9-10. See also Bingham Twp. v. RLTD R. Co., 228 Mich.App. 154, 159 n. 4, 576 N.W.2d 731 (1998) (stating that local regulations may, for example, provide for the enforcement of criminal and civil laws, construction and maintenance of fencing, and limitation of noise related to rails). Accordingly, numerous states have enacted recreational use statutes that regulate the use and safety of rail-trails. See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Res. Code Annot. § 5070 et seq. (West 2001); Fla. Stat. § 260.011 to § 260.018 (2010); Iowa Code § 465B.1 to 465B.4 (2011); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 148.610 et seq. (Michie 2009); Md. Nat. Res.Code Ann., § 5-1010 (Michie 2005); Minn.Stat. § 84.029 et seq. (2010); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 1519.01 to § 1519.99 (2007); 32 Pa. Cons.Stat. § 5611 et seq. (1997); Wash. Rev.Code § 64.04.180 et seq. (2010); W.Va.Code Annot. § 5B-1A-1 et seq. (Michie 2010). Although these statutes vary widely in their content, nearly all such statutory schemes contain limitations on liability for various parties impacted by trail systems. Additionally, in various forms, many of the statutes define the scope of the state's police power as it relates to the maintenance and use of rail-trails. The enactment of these statutes as part of the exercise of the states' police powers is consistent with a historical distinction between the role of the ICC/STB in regulating rail transportation and the states' role in regulating health and safety in ways that do not interfere with the operation or conduct of rail service. See, e.g., Ridgefield Park v. N.Y., Susqu. & Western Ry., 163 N.J. 446, 459, 750 A.2d 57 (2000) (Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, specifically 49 U.S.C. § 10501[b] [1996], does not preempt `non-discriminatory' public health and safety regulations that do not foreclose or restrict a railroad's ability to conduct its operations); see also Sunflour R.R., Inc. v. Paulson, 670 N.W.2d 518, 523 (S.D.2003) (exclusive and preemptive jurisdiction granted to the STB is over attempts to impose economic regulation on rail transportation, but state law claim for rent not established to be regulation); In re Vermont Railway, 171 Vt. 496, 503, 769 A.2d 648 (2000) (affirming preemption decision on zoning issues that appears to have drawn the line between conditions that purported to regulate the operation of the railroad, including the transport of goods by the railway, and conditions that merely regulated activity regarding motor vehicles coming and going from the facility and the storage of materials at the facility). This distinction suggests that the federal government has not traditionally regulated the sort of public health and safety issues that arise from use of a railroad right-of-way as a recreation trail. In other words, traditional public health and safety issues related to the use of recreational trails are not issues that are uniquely federal in nature. Hence, we conclude that the presumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law applies in this case. See Buckman Co., 531 U.S. at 348, 121 S.Ct. 1012; Zimmerman, 289 Kan. at 975, 218 P.3d 400. Similarly, as this discussion reveals, federal law is not sufficiently comprehensive nor the federal interest so dominant for us to find an intent to preempt state or local laws that regulate land use and health and safety issues related to the maintenance of a rail-trail. In summary, the doctrine of field preemption does not apply.