Opinion ID: 1137001
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Municipalities are Different

Text: The relationship between municipalities and the other three governmental taxing entities (counties, school boards, and special districts) is different because the constitution grants municipalities an express exemption from taxation in article VII, section 3(a), which reads as follows: All property owned by a municipality and used exclusively by it for municipal or public purposes shall be exempt from taxation. A municipality, owning property outside the municipality, may be required by general law to make payment to the taxing unit in which the property is located. Such portions of property as are used predominantly for educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes may be exempted by general law from taxation. (Emphasis added.) Municipalities are not immune from taxation. Therefore, the framers of the 1968 Florida Constitution had to expressly provide an exemption for municipal property used for municipal or public purposes. In fact, the constitution goes one step further. It provides that municipalities owning property outside their municipal limits may be forced, by general law, to make payment to the taxing unit in which the property is located. A payment is different from an ad valorem tax. In fact, this provision limits intergovernmental taxation by requiring the legislature to establish the method of payment. Recently, we addressed the municipal exemption in the unique factual situation presented by Capital City Country Club, Inc. v. Tucker, 613 So.2d 448 (Fla.1993). In that case, Capital City Country Club leased 192 acres of land owned by the City of Tallahassee. The term of the lease was ninety-nine years. Rent of one dollar per year was paid to the City of Tallahassee. The lease contained a provision that required the club to be responsible for all ad valorem taxes levied against the property. The club conceded that the golf course was not being used for municipal or public purposes. We held that the golf course property was subject to real estate taxation and, by reason of its agreement with the city, the club was obligated to pay those taxes. We further rejected the club's contention that the imposition of real estate taxes on the land and the imposition of intangible taxes on the leasehold interest constituted double taxation. The Capital City case is inapposite here. Specifically, we limited Capital City by noting that it is a municipality which owns the property rather than some other governmental entity.  Id. at 450 (emphasis added). In addition, I note that the City of Tallahassee was not a party in Capital City and the issue of taking city revenues to pay these taxes was not before the Court. More importantly, though, the constitution does in fact treat municipalities differently. There is, however, no separate provision for special districts. In the absence of a separate provision, special districts should be viewed similarly to those governmental entities (counties and school districts) with which they repeatedly appear in the constitution. To do otherwise is to create an ugly duckling governmental taxing entity. Counties and school districts are immune. Municipalities are constitutionally exempt. Special districts would fall into a third category. Such a third category would be judicially created by this Court and would find no basis in the constitution. Special districts, governmental entities with important public responsibilities, should not be treated as ugly ducklings.