Opinion ID: 2604190
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reasonable Location

Text: The location of checkpoints should be determined by policy-making officials rather than by officers in the field. The sites chosen should be those which will be most effective in achieving the governmental interest; i.e., on roads having a high incidence of alcohol related accidents and/or arrests. (See State v. Coccomo, supra, 427 A.2d 131, 134.) Safety factors must also be considered in choosing an appropriate location. One state court has found a sobriety checkpoint unconstitutional largely because it was not at a permanent location. ( State v. Olgaard (S.D. 1976) 248 N.W.2d 392.) A decision of the Ninth Circuit also held that a border patrol stop at a temporary checkpoint was unlawful. ( United States v. Maxwell (9th Cir.1977) 565 F.2d 596.) We believe, however, that the temporary nature of sobriety checkpoints does not affect their constitutionality. The Olgaard court's concern with lack of permanency was solely based on its worry about surprise and lack of publicity in connection with the checkpoint. Although it is not precisely clear from the record in Olgaard, it is inferrable from the circumstances that the Olgaard checkpoint was set up on a surprise basis. The checkpoint was operated by only four officers utilizing nothing but the red flashing lights on several patrol cars. They stopped all traffic in both directions. No lights or signs were used that would have given advance notice of the checkpoint. There was no advance publicity about the checkpoint. The checkpoint plainly also lacked sufficient indicia of legitimacy in terms of staffing strength. In addition, there was no showing who made the decision to set up the checkpoint, or how the location was selected. Thus the Olgaard court appears to have acted with propriety in holding the checkpoint unlawful. Similarly, the temporary border patrol checkpoint at issue in Maxwell, supra, 565 F.2d 596, was deficient with respect to notice and indicia of legitimacy. The checkpoint was marked only by a stop ahead sign with battery operated blinking yellow lights, half a dozen traffic cones, one ordinary stop sign, and a border patrol car with a flashing red light. Whereas motorists know or may learn of a permanent immigration checkpoint, the checkpoint in Maxwell was in operation on an intermittent basis without advance notice. There were no structures or electrical equipment connections. So far as the motorist was concerned, he was called to a halt on a lonely road by a blinking red light which could belong to anybody. In addition, the location of the checkpoint may have been inappropriate for an immigration checkpoint. The immigration checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte, supra, 428 U.S. 543, was justified in part by its being placed on a major highway to prevent easy access by illegal aliens into the interior. Just as a sobriety checkpoint would be improper at a location without any significant traffic or incidence of drunk driving, the location of the Maxwell checkpoint on a route without any significant traffic, by illegal aliens or otherwise, may have been improper. ( United States v. Maxwell supra, 565 F.2d. 596, 597-598.) As was pointed out in People v. Scott, supra, 473 N.E.2d 1, at page 5, The fact that the [United States] Supreme Court has approved permanent roadblocks but disapproved roving patrol stops is not determinative. What is critical is the intrusiveness of the checkpoint in relation to the governmental purpose involved. The subjective effect upon a vehicle driver approaching a roadblock is unrelated to whether it is permanent or was established but a few minutes before the driver approached it; in either instance his or her observation of it will be measured in minutes if not seconds. The likelihood of there being the kind of fright or annoyance that invalidates a random stop made by a roving patrol is obviated in the case of a temporary checkpoint by the visible signs of authority which the checkpoint entails  signs announcing the purpose, lighting, and identifiable police vehicles and the observable fact that there is a uniform system for stopping cars [citations]. (Accord, Little v. State, supra, 479 A.2d 903, 914.) With respect to the Burlingame checkpoint, the lighting, signing, substantial uniformed police presence, official vehicles, etc., provided advance notice to the motorist sufficient to ward off surprise and fright. In fact, sufficient advance notice was provided so a motorist could choose to avoid the checkpoint altogether. The objective and subjective intrusion into Fourth Amendment rights was no greater than that resulting from a permanent checkpoint. The checkpoints at issue here were reasonable as to location.