Opinion ID: 1969298
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: res judicata/collateral estoppel in criminal cases

Text: The application of res judicata and collateral estoppel principles in criminal law is well established in the United States and has been applied both to the benefit of the defendant and the prosecution. When applied to the benefit of a defendant, it is primarily used to protect a defendant's double jeopardy right against further prosecution [3] or to estop the relitigation of various motions decided in the defendant's favor. [4] Similarly, when used by the prosecution against a defendant, courts have used it to preclude relitigation of pretrial evidentiary/suppression motions [5] or similar factual issues at trial, [6] as well as to preclude the relitigation of certain facts previously adjudicated that are later essential elements in a criminal prosecution. [7] Indeed, Professor Allan D. Vestal, the leading scholar with respect to res judicata and collateral estoppel, [8] espouses its application both against the prosecution and the defendant. See Vestal, Issue preclusion and criminal prosecutions, 65 Iowa L R 281, 312, 319-321 (1980). While conceding that use of these doctrines against a defendant does not often arise, [9] Professor Vestal contends that it is appropriately within the power of the courts [10] to apply it against a defendant, especially when the defendant was afforded the opportunity to exercise constitutional rights at the first trial  the defendant has had a day in court and the fact has been adjudicated against him. [11] Id. at 314, 312. Moreover, Professor Vestal is not alone in his interpretation. [12] Indeed, before the United States Constitution was ratified, English courts contemplated its use both for and against the defendant in a criminal trial. See comments, The use of collateral estoppel against the accused, 69 Colum L R 515, 523 (1969). In Rex v Duchess of Kingston, 20 Howell St Tr 355, 542 (1776), the court declared: [I]f the rule of evidence must be, as it is often declared to be, reciprocal; and that in all cases, in which sentences favourable to the prisoner, are to be admitted as conclusive evidence for him; the sentences, if unfavourable to the prisoner, are in like manner conclusive evidence against him.... However, unlike the instant case in which the prior proceeding was tried by a jury, the court questioned its application if the prior proceeding was tried by a judge and not a jury. Id. See also comments, supra at 523, n 63. Subsequently, and shortly after ratification of the United States Constitution, two other English courts adhered to this view, holding that a prior decision in a condemnation proceeding was conclusive evidence against the defendant in a later criminal proceeding. King v Matthews, 5 Price 202 (1797) (condemnation of a boat as found in a prior condemnation proceeding is conclusive evidence of the defendant's having broken the condition of his bond); Attorney General v Wakefield, 5 Price 202, 203 (1797) (the record of condemnation was conclusive evidence of the seized paper being liable to duty, and that it had been sent out from the defendant's mill before the officer had taken an account of it, as was stated in the record of condemnation). Following the lead of the English common law, the early American courts likewise applied the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata against criminal defendants, even when its use precluded the relitigation of essential elements of a crime. See, e.g., Commonwealth v Evans, 101 Mass 25, 27 (1869); Commonwealth v Ellis, 160 Mass 165; 35 NE 773 (1893). [13] Indeed, more recently, in a case addressing the exact issue as in the case at bar, the California Supreme Court held that in a retrial for felony murder, the prosecution could gain the benefit of prior convictions for various felonies affirmed on appeal and could use them to satisfy the predicate felony element of felony murder: It is obvious that the felony convictions obtained at the first trial substantially affected the prosecution and defense upon retrial of the murder charge. The burden upon the prosecution was lessened to the extent that it was permitted the benefit of the felony-murder rule without the necessity of having to prove the elements of the respective felonies. Nor was the defense permitted to dispute the fact that the necessary elements of the felonies had been conclusively found. These facts do not, however, compel the conclusion urged upon us by defendant. The doctrine of res judicata applies to criminal as well as civil proceedings and operates to conclude those matters in issue which the verdict determined though the offenses be different. Thus where a defendant is tried on multiple counts of a single information, each count being considered as a separate and distinct offense, the doctrine of res judicata operates to preclude the relitigation of issues finally determined upon retrial of only one count. It follows that the doctrine of res judicata justifies instructions, where relevant, that a defendant has been found guilty of crimes finally adjudicated which are charged as elements in another charge or charges then in the process of being retried. Accordingly, it was not error for the trial court to give appropriate instructions that defendant had been convicted of the various felonies, and that if they found that defendant's commission of such felonies was conjoined with his commission of the homicide, they might predicate their verdict on the felony-murder rule articulated in Penal Code, section 189. [ People v Ford, 65 Cal 2d 41, 50-51; 52 Cal Rptr 228; 416 P2d 132 (1966). Citations omitted.] Accordingly, from a review of the case law, it is clear that a significant number of courts and commentators have found the doctrines sound and applicable against a criminal defendant.