Opinion ID: 1290968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: recovery based on strict liability

Text: In Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., Colo., 544 P.2d 983, this court expressly adopted the doctrine of strict liability in tort, based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. Pust's strict liability claims were for: (1) design defects in the conveyor; and (2) failure to adequately warn of the hazards of working at the nip point of the conveyor. [1]
This court has heretofore never had the occasion to decide whether a defect in the design of a product can form the basis of a claim in strict liability. The Colorado Court of Appeals declared, in Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 33 Colo.App. 99, 517 P.2d 406, that § 402A is available in Colorado as a theory of recovery for design defects. We agree and now hold that if a product is unreasonably dangerous because of a defect in its design strict liability may lie. [2] We perceive no valid reason not to extend strict liability to design defects. A defective product may be equally hazardous to the ultimate user or consumer whether its defect arises from a flaw in manufacture or from a flaw in design. We observe that if a defect is in the design of a complete product line it is potentially dangerous to many more people than a physical flaw in one product would be. A defect in design may be more difficult to legally establish than a defect in manufacture, but courts and juries constantly wrestle with similar problems of proof in other areas of the law. See Twerski et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products LiabilityDesign Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 Cornell L.Rev. 495 (1976). Pust argues that this conveyor was defective in design for failure to attach safety guards and for failure to provide an automatic cleaning device. A number of cases have specifically held that the failure to provide safety devices can be the basis of a § 402A design defect case. E. g., Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal.3d 465, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 467 P.2d 229; Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill.App.2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465. Pust further contends that Union Supply may be held strictly liable both as a designer and as a manufacturer of the component parts of a defectively designed conveyor system. We agree that each of these questions should have been submitted to the jury for its determination.
Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to Pust, we find ample evidence that Union Supply was a designer of this conveyor system. There was evidence that Union Supply added the mechanical and structural design, together with the necessary engineering specifications, without which the conveyor could not be built. Other evidence showed that Union Supply redesigned and modified each of the sections of the conveyor. One expert testified that while Holly Sugar did the performance designhow much sugar beet pulp the conveyor would carry and how much power was neededUnion Supply did the mechanical design necessary for the conveyor to be operational. There was evidence that Union Supply had subcontractors do the component work and that Union Supply only charged Holly Sugar one price for the system. Based on this evidence, a jury could find Union Supply to be a designer of the conveyor. We observe that in certain situations more than one party could be the designer of a product. Where two or more parties collaborate and where each substantially contributes to the final design, each is a designer of the final product. Design appears to involve: that part of the manufacturing process requiring decisions as to general structure, shape, size, material, and methods or processes of construction. Comment, Foreseeability in Product Design and Duty to Warn CasesDistinctions and Misconceptions, 1968 Wis.L.Rev. 228, at 231. It is conceivable that a jury could determine that both Holly Sugar and Union Supply were designers of the conveyor. [3] If Union Supply is found by the trier of fact to be a designer and if the other elements of a § 402A design defect case are established, then Union Supply will be strictly liable for Pust's injuries.
Pust contends that even if Union Supply is not found to be a designer, it may still be held strictly liable as the manufacturer of component parts of a defectively designed conveyor system. The court of appeals agreed with this argument and specifically held:    that a fabricator, who manufactures a product according to plans submitted by the ultimate user cannot avoid liability even if the design submitted is unsafe, provided it is feasible for him to install safety devices. Although we do not embrace the expansive view of the court of appeals, we agree that the manufacturer of component parts may be held strictly liable in certain situations. We follow the majority view that a manufacturer of component parts may be held strictly liable for injuries to a consumer caused by design defects in the component parts when they are expected to and do reach the consumer without substantial change in condition. Accord, Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182; Burbage v. Boiler Engineering & Supply Co., Inc., 433 Pa. 319, 249 A.2d 563. In Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., supra , it was suggested that the manufacturer of a component part that undergoes no change when incorporated into something larger can be liable in strict tort for defects in that part. [4] The present case reaches further because it involves alleged design defects in parts that may have undergone some change before reaching the consumer. Our view of the scope of a strict liability case against a manufacturer of component parts is more circumscribed than that of the court of appeals. Thus, we review what we believe to be the proper elements of a strict liability cause of action based on design defects against a manufacturer of component parts. The first element is that component parts must be in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. [5] It will undoubtedly be difficult to decide whether a defect is in the design of certain component parts or in the design of the conveyor system as a whole. Unlike defects in manufacturesuch as a defective tire assembly in an automobile or a defective fuse in a hand grenadedefects in design are not easily attributed to one component part or group of parts. Cf. Nowakowski v. Hoppe Tire Co., 39 Ill.App.3d 155, 349 N.E.2d 578; Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir.). Nonetheless, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff here, a jury could find that there was a design defect, in not including safety guards at the nip point or in not attaching a cleaning device, in the conveyor sections manufactured by Union Supply. The second element is that the product is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. Restatement ( Second ) of Torts § 402A(1)(b). When applied to this case, the question is whether the sections manufactured by Union Supply were expected to reach the user (Pust) and did so without undergoing a substantial change in design. The element of without substantial change has been strictly adhered to in most decisions that have held component part manufacturers strictly liable. [6] For example, in the landmark case of Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182, the Illinois Supreme Court held the manufacturer of a defective automobile brake system strictly liable, noting that the automobile assembler had made no substantial change in the system. Likewise, in Burbage v. Boiler Engineering & Supply Co., 433 Pa. 319, 249 A.2d 563, a valve manufacturer was held strictly liable for injuries caused by the explosion of a boiler since the defective boiler valve did not undergo substantial change. On the other hand, a few courts have occasionally excused a plaintiff from showing that a product was not expected to and did not undergo a substantial change in condition. E. g., Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281. The authors of the Second Restatement expressed no opinion on this issue. Caveat (3) and comment q, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. In our view, however, this element is important and a showing should be made that the defectively designed component parts were not expected to and did not undergo a substantial change after they left the manufacturer's hands. We emphasize, though, that the expected change in the parts must be substantial; small changes and minor processing will not relieve the component part manufacturer of liability. Of course, even substantial changes which do not affect a pre-existing design defect in parts do not absolve the manufacturer of liability. The third element is that the design defect must be the cause of the plaintiff's injury. Union Supply does not dispute that Pust received his injuries at the nip point of this conveyor. If it is shown that design defects in sections manufactured by Union Supply made the conveyor unreasonably dangerous at the nip point to Pust, then the element of causation has been shown. Union Supply has argued that many conditionssuch as Pust's knowledge of the risk, the patent nature of the danger at the nip point, and a substantial change in the partswere intervening causes of Pust's injury. Each of these conditions is more properly considered as a defense based on assumption of the risk. Union Supply argues that it should be permitted to introduce evidence that it reasonably expected Holly Sugar to add safety guards, and that Holly's failure to do so constitutes an intervening cause. This evidence injects into the case the irrelevant negligence issue of who had the duty to install safety guards. In strict liability cases, we are not concerned with who had the duty to provide guards, but rather with whether the conveyor was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous because of the failure to provide safety guards before it reached the ultimate user or consumer. See Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., supra . The fourth element of the component part design strict liability case is that the defendant sold this product and is engaged in the business of selling such products. Restatement ( Second ) of Torts § 402A(1)(a). The final element, of course, is that the plaintiff has sustained damages as a result.
In the case of Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., Colo., 544 P.2d 983, we held that:    [A] failure to warn adequately can render a product, otherwise free of defect, defective for purposes of § 402A. This defective condition is unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer if the manufacturer does not give sufficient warnings of dangers inherent in the product or in its intended use in order to make it safe. Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal.App.2d 855, 32 Cal.Rptr. 754. See also comment j, Restatement ( Second ) of Torts § 402A. Pust's claim for failure to adequately warn of dangers present at the nip point of the conveyor is based on the theory of strict liability, and not negligence. This is an important distinction to make, although the same evidence will frequently be used to show both. The court of appeals has aptly distinguished the two theories as follows:    Under strict liability, the test is whether the failure of    [the manufacturer] to adequately warn of the potentially dangerous propensities of its product rendered that product unreasonably dangerous. It is of no import whether this drug manufacturer's warning comported with the warning a reasonably prudent drug manufacturer would have given. Hamilton v. Hardy, Colo.App., 549 P.2d 1099. Under the principles announced in Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., supra , we hold that a jury question was presented as to whether Union Supply should be liable on this theory. [7] It could certainly be found that a failure to attach warnings at the nip point created a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. The other elements of a failure to warn strict liability claim are the same as those already discussed for strict liability based on design defect. This, of course, includes the extension of liability to a component part manufacturer.
There has been some confusion in this case regarding the available defenses to a strict liability action. Since this case is being remanded for a retrial, we will briefly comment on what we perceive to be appropriate defenses. Assumption of the risk as stated in § 402A is a defense to strict liability. Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., supra . In this context, it is defined as: voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger. Comment n, Restatement ( Second ) of Torts § 402A. More particularly, the defendant must demonstrate that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the specific danger posed by the defect in manufacture or design, and not just a general knowledge that the machinery could be dangerous. Culp v. Rexnord & Booth-Rouse Equipment Co., Colo.App., 553 P.2d 844. [8] The defendant has the burden of establishing this defense. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal.3d 136, 104 Cal.Rptr. 443, 501 P.2d 1163. We stress that ordinary contributory negligence, consisting of failure to exercise due care to discover a defect or to guard against its possible existence, is not a defense to strict liability. Comment n, Restatement ( Second ) of Torts § 402A. Our view is in accord with the great weight of authority. E. g., Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 104 Cal.Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153; Shields v. Morton Chemical Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857; Deem v. Woodbine Manufacturing Co., 89 N.M. 50, 546 P.2d 1207. Cf. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 298 N.E.2d 622. Union Supply asserts that it can also use what has become known as the open and obvious defense. It argues that since the dangers of the conveyor were obvious to everyone no warning was necessary to alert intended users, and thus Union Supply cannot be liable for a failure to give a warning. See Tomicich v. Western-Knapp Engineering Co., 292 F.Supp. 323 (D.Mont.), aff'd, 423 F.2d 410 (9th Cir.). The apparent origin of the open and obvious rule was in the case of Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802, which has been recently overruled in Micallef v. Miehle Co., Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115. From its inception, it has been frequently attacked by courts and legal scholars. One commentator has perceptively argued that:    [t]his [use of the `open and obvious' defense] amounted to applying an assumption of the risk defense as a matter of law, with the added disadvantage that the defendant was relieved of the burden of proving that plaintiff had subjectively appreciated a known risk. Rheingold, The Expanding Liability of the Product Supplier: A Primer, 2 Hofstra L.Rev. 521, 541 (1974). We hold that the alleged patent nature of a defect is not in and of itself a defense to strict liability. Simply because a hazard is open and obvious does not prevent it from being unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. Approval of the rule would be contrary to sound public policy. As the Washington Court of Appeals has commented:    [T]he manufacturer of the obviously defective product ought not to escape because the product was obviously a bad one. The law, we think, ought to discourage misdesign rather than encouraging it in its obvious form. Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713.