Opinion ID: 339203
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Speedy Trial Allegations

Text: 9 After discharge of the jury, defendant moved for Judgment of Acquittal on the grounds that his trial was unnecessarily delayed in violation of his Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial. On appeal, defendant asserts that the district court should have allowed his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. 10 The following is a brief summary of the time sequence and events leading up to the beginning of defendant's trial. 11 Defendant was arrested on November 21, 1974, for allegedly committing the crime in question. On March 20, 1975, defense counsel moved for an order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244 directing a psychiatric examination of defendant which was allowed on that date. Pursuant to the court's order, Dr. Mark Slutsky conducted an examination of defendant on April 4 and April 9, 1975. 12 In his report filed on April 15, 1975 (Tr. 139), Dr. Slutsky concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial, but was temporarily insane at the time of the crime. 13 The Government, on May 16, 1975, moved pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244 for an order directing the psychiatric examination of defendant by Dr. Werner Tuteur. On May 30, 1975, the court granted the Government's motion and ordered the second psychiatric examination of defendant. Dr. Tuteur examined defendant on August 2, 1975, and concluded that defendant was not insane at the time of the crime. 14 Defendant's trial began on November 10, 1975. The jury returned with a verdict of guilty on November 13, 1975. 15 From the time of his arrest through commencement of trial defendant was in jail. 16 Relying on analysis in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), defendant asserts that he has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial. Defendant points out that the Government has not offered an explanation for the long delay of approximately one year between arrest and trial. Defendant also asserts that from April 15, 1975, the date on which Dr. Slutsky filed his report, defendant was ready for trial. Defendant states that a letter 1 from defendant to Judge Decker dated October 6, 1975, should be construed as a demand for trial and an assertion of defendant's right to a speedy trial. Finally, defendant asserts that he has suffered prejudice due to the delay between Dr. Slutsky's examination and Dr. Tuteur's examination. According to defendant, the effect of this delay was that a physical reaction indicative of mental disease which was observed by Dr. Slutsky was no longer in existence at the time of Dr. Tuteur's examination. 17 In response, the Government contends that the allegedly prejudicial delay between the two psychiatric examinations was not excessive. First, the Government claims that delay resulting from conducting psychiatric examinations to determine mental condition at the time of the crime is not usually considered in a speedy trial context. In addition, the Government asserts that the 31-day delay (April 15, 1975, to May 16, 1975) before filing its motion for psychiatric examination of defendant was reasonable in light of the time needed for 1) review of Dr. Slutsky's report, 2) determining whether a second examination was needed, 3) selection of a second psychiatrist, and 4) drafting and filing a motion. Similarly, the Government asserts that the 64-day delay following the district court's approval of the Government's motion for a second examination of defendant (May 30, 1975, to August 2, 1975) resulted from Dr. Tuteur's heavy schedule. The Government also argues that the claimed prejudice allegedly suffered by defendant due to the delay between the two examinations is only speculative. Finally, the Government points out that defendant's letter dated October 6, 1975, was written long after the claimed prejudice arose and did not refer to prejudice arising from delay in holding the second examination. 18 For the following reasons we agree with the Government that defendant has not been deprived of his right to a speedy trial. 19 The right to a speedy trial is a vague concept, incapable of precise definition. Thus, an inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the case . . . . Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2188, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The Court in Barker identified the following four factors which should be assessed in determining whether a defendant has been deprived of his right to a speedy trial: length of delay, reason for delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. We will deal with each of the above four factors separately. Delay 20 An initial question which must be addressed before deciding the weight to be given to the delay in a balancing of factors is what is the actual duration of the delay. A measurement of the duration of the delay is important since the longer the delay, the heavier the weight to be given it in the balance: 21 It is manifest that prejudice, always a difficult thing to ascertain, must, at some point, be presumed to result from an inordinate delay in bringing a defendant to trial. Exactly where that point lies on the spectrum of pretrial delay is uncertain, but it is clear that the longer the delay, the heavier the weight to be given it in the balance. United States v. Macino, 486 F.2d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 1973). 22 (T)he Sixth Amendment speedy trial provision has no application until the putative defendant in some way becomes an 'accused.'  United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313, 92 S.Ct. 455, 459, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). A defendant can become an accused when actual restraints (are) imposed by arrest. 404 U.S. at 320, 92 S.Ct. at 463; Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 96 S.Ct. 303, 46 L.Ed.2d 205 (1974). The delay in the present case, therefore, runs from the time of defendant's arrest on November 21, 1974, to the beginning of trial on November 10, 1975. 23 A certain amount of prejudice must be presumed to flow from the approximately one year delay between arrest and trial. United States v. DeTienne, 468 F.2d 151, 156 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 410 U.S. 911, 93 S.Ct. 974, 35 L.Ed.2d 274. Thus, there is necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182; United States v. Fairchild, 526 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 96 S.Ct. 1682-83, 48 L.Ed.2d 186. However, the duration of the delay alone does not establish a denial of speedy trial since there is no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or months. Barker, 407 U.S. at 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182; DeTienne, 468 F.2d at 156-157. Explanation for Delay 24 Barker is instructive with regard to the weight to be assigned the Government's explanation for delay: 25 Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to justify the delay. Here, too, different weights should be assigned to different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay. 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. 26 The Government has failed to offer an explanation for the period of time running from the date of arrest (November 21, 1974) to the date on which Dr. Slutsky filed his report (April 15, 1975). However, an examination of the record for this time period demonstrates that the passage of time was largely attributable to defendant. 2 In addition, defendant has not alleged prejudicial effects from the passage of time prior to April 15, 1975. 27 The Government did offer an explanation for the portion of delay running from the date on which Dr. Slutsky submitted his report (April 15, 1975) to the date on which Dr. Tuteur examined defendant (August 2, 1975). As indicated above, the Government states that the delay in question resulted largely from time required for analysis of Dr. Slutsky's report and arranging for a second examination. This explanation offers a neutral reason for this portion of the delay and, as such, should be weighted less heavily. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182. 28 The Government has failed to give an explanation for the period of time running from August 2, 1975, to the date of trial. Failure to account for delay may be weighed against the prosecution. United States v. Lockett, 526 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Scherer, 523 F.2d 371 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 1108, 47 L.Ed.2d 315. The defendant, however, has not asserted that prejudice arose from the passage of this period of time. In addition, it was not until October 6, 1975, that defendant complained of delay. 29 The absence of explanation by the Government for this portion of the delay is not crucial since the period of time was not extreme. Assertion of Right 30 Defendant contends that he asserted his right to a speedy trial in his letter dated October 6, 1975, to Judge Decker. 31 As the court pointed out in DeTienne, it is difficult to assess the importance of defendant's failure to assert at an earlier date his right to a speedy trial: 32 Although in Barker the Supreme Court finally put to rest the demand-waiver rule, (t)his does not mean, however, that the defendant has no responsibility to assert his right. Id. (407 U.S.) at 528, 92 S.Ct. at 2191. In making the defendant's assertion or failure to assert his right one factor to be thrown into the balance, whose weight is dependent upon the surrounding circumstances, the Court emphasize(d) that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial. Id. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. 468 F.2d at 157. 33 Defendant's position is also rendered more difficult by the fact that he asserted his desire for a speedy trial only once. 34 In addition to the late date of his letter, the Government also questions the relevance of the letter to the prejudice alleged by defendant. The Government correctly points out that the letter refers solely to the effects of incarceration and does not refer to the allegedly prejudicial delay between examinations. 35 The fact that neither defendant nor his counsel made a contemporary objection relating to the prejudice asserted on appeal does not, however, in this case render defendant's position less viable. If, as suggested, defendant was manifesting physical symptoms indicative of mental illness which disappeared over a period of time, this court cannot assume that defendant was sophisticated enough to be aware of that fact and thereby regard defendant's failure to contemporaneously object as indicative of lack of prejudice. 36 It is apparent from the letter dated October 6, 1975, that, at least in a general way, defendant was asserting a desire for a speedy trial. Therefore, defendant's assertion of right, however tardy, must be placed into the balance. Prejudice 37 Delay of a trial inevitably carries the threat that a defendant will thereby suffer prejudice. The ability of the Government to successfully present its case is equally susceptible to prejudice from delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 521, 92 S.Ct. 2182; United States ex rel. Little v. Twomey, 477 F.2d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 846, 94 S.Ct. 112, 38 L.Ed.2d 94. The relevant inquiry for this court is not so much with the inherent possibility of prejudice in the general sense as with whether there was specific prejudice to (defendant) in his defense. Twomey, 477 F.2d at 771. 38 The Court in Barker offers the following guidelines for inquiry into prejudice: 39 A fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown. 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. 40 This court recognizes that anxiety and stigma inevitably attach to arrest and indictment. United States v. Macino, 486 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1973); see United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). Allegations of anxiety and depression alone, however, do not result in a constitutional violation. United States v. Annerino, 495 F.2d 1159, 1163-1164 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Jackson, 508 F.2d 1001, 1004 (7th Cir. 1975). In the present case defendant did not make even a conclusory allegation of emotional stress. 41 Although defendant's pretrial incarceration for approximately one year supports a presumption of prejudice, such prejudice unenhanced by tangible impairment of the defense function and unsupported by a better showing on the other factors than was made here, does not alone make out a deprivation of the right to (a) speedy trial. DeTienne, 468 F.2d at 158. 42 The central question, then, is whether the defense function was tangibly impaired. Defendant asserts that he suffered prejudice from the delay between the psychological examinations of Dr. Slutsky and Dr. Tuteur due to the disappearance of physical symptoms indicative of mental illness. However, the analysis and conclusions by both Dr. Slutsky and Dr. Tuteur were a matter of opinion and speculation. As Dr. Tuteur testified: 43 . . . the entire issue remained speculative anyhow since I was not present and did not examine him during or immediately after the felony, and so a reasonable time interval and this number of months, in my opinion, is reasonable really is not too decisive in reaching such a speculative opinion. (Tr. 244) 44 Thus, the question of the weight to be given the conflicting conclusions of the two psychiatrists based in part upon varying dates of examination of defendant was properly a matter for the jury. 3 See Little, 477 F.2d 767, 774. 45 Weighing the four factors together, this court finds that defendant has not suffered a deprivation of his right to a speedy trial. The length of delay was neither extreme nor prejudicial when evaluated in light of the gravity of the offense. Little, 477 F.2d at 770.