Opinion ID: 432032
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Recognition of the Hazard

Text: 11 The broad issue that we face today is whether the Commission's findings are supported by substantial evidence. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 660(a). This court is bound by the Commission's findings on questions of fact and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom if they are supported by substantial evidence on the record, even if we could justifiably reach a different result de novo. H.B. Zachry Co. v. OSHRC, 638 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir.1981); see also, NLRB v. United Ins. Co., 390 U.S. 254, 260, 88 S.Ct. 988, 991, 19 L.Ed.2d 1083 (1968). Furthermore, this substantial evidence review focuses on the Commission's final order; the Commission and not the ALJ occupies the factfinder's role under the Act. Champlin Petroleum Co. v. OSHRC, 593 F.2d 637, 640 (5th Cir.1979); Acu-Namics, Inc. v. OSHRC, 515 F.2d 828, 834 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 903, 96 S.Ct. 1492, 47 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976). 12 Establishing that a hazard was recognized requires proof that the employer had actual knowledge that the condition was hazardous or proof that the condition is generally known to be hazardous in the industry. Georgia Electric Co. v. Marshall, supra, 595 F.2d at 321. Whether or not a hazard was recognized constitutes a matter of objective determination. Id. Kelly labels the Tarr testimony as a kitchen chemistry approach, maintaining that Mr. Tarr testified only as to abstract scientific principles. The company also points to Mr. Tarr's admission that he didn't specifically know what the general belief in the tire-making industry is. Kelly claims that reliance on his statements is inconsistent with the recognition standard articulated in Georgia Electric Co., supra. 13 These contentions are without support. Labeling Mr. Tarr's statements as a kitchen chemistry approach mischaracterizes his testimony. He declared, without reservation, that Kelly's operation of dust collector No. 4 constituted a hazard. Record, 202. He also indicated that an explosion was a predictable and foreseeable consequence. Record 202-206. His inability to specifically testify to the subjective beliefs of those in the tire-making industry is not dispositive. A finding of industry recognition does not require direct evidence of the subjective beliefs of those working in the relevant industry. Courts have, in various circumstances, found a hazard to be recognized absent direct evidence of subjective belief. For example, where a hazard is obvious and glaring, the Commission may determine that the hazard was recognized without reference to industry practice or safety expert testimony. Tri-State Roofing v. OSHRC, 685 F.2d 878, 880 (4th Cir.1982); Cape & Vineyard Div. v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148, 1153 (1st Cir.1975). In addition, where a practice is plainly recognized as hazardous in one industry, the Commission may infer recognition in the industry in question. St. Joe Minerals v. OSHRC, 647 F.2d 840, 845, n. 8 (8th Cir.1981); Usery v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 568 F.2d 902, 910 (2nd Cir.1977). 5 14 The recognition standard centers on the common knowledge of safety experts who are familiar with the circumstances of the industry or activity in question. National Realty and Construction Co. v. OSHRC, supra, 489 F.2d at 1265, n. 32. Mr. Tarr, held by the Commission to be such an expert, stated his recognition of a hazard. His explication of so called, abstract scientific principles served to indicate why other safety experts would recognize a hazard. Mr. Rutledge, an employee in the industry that manufactured the dust collection systems, stated that he would recommend explosion panels given a history of fires and low water levels in a dust collector. Viewing this evidence in the light of the standard announced in National Realty, 6 we hold that the Commission could reasonably infer that the hazard was recognized. 7 15