Opinion ID: 900579
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Probable Cause to Issue All Persons Search Warrant

Text: [¶ 12.] Jackson asserts that there was insufficient probable cause presented to the judge to support the issuance of an all person warrant. A prerequisite to the issuance of such a warrant, she suggests, is that the affidavit must show that the place to be searched is used solely for illegal purposes and that every person present at the location will possess incriminating evidence. The State contends that it was reasonable to infer that persons arriving at this residence at the time the search was conducted would probably be involved in illegal drug activity themselves. [1] [¶ 13.] We have not previously reviewed a challenge to an all persons search warrant. Generally, before any search warrant may be issued, there must be a finding of probable cause, supported by an affidavit describing with particularity the place and person to be searched. U.S. Const. amend. IV; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 11. The Fourth Amendment requires a nexus ... between the item to be seized and criminal behavior. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 1650, 18 L.Ed.2d 782, 792 (1967). Some courts condemn warrants directing a search of any and all persons because they constitute general warrants authorizing the indiscriminate searching of people without naming or describing anyone. Crossland v. State, 266 P.2d 649, 652 (Okla.Crim.App.1954); see Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5(e), at 545-46 (3rd ed. 1996). Other courts do not forbid these warrants, finding that it is no longer an open question that such warrants are valid; the only question is the existence of probable cause to justify them. State v. Doyle, 918 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah Ct.App.1996). See State v. Hinkel, 365 N.W.2d 774 (Minn.1985); State v. De Simone, 60 N.J. 319, 288 A.2d 849 (N.J. 1972); People v. Nieves, 36 N.Y.2d 396, 369 N.Y.S.2d 50, 330 N.E.2d 26 (1975); Commonwealth v. Graciani, 381 Pa.Super. 626, 554 A.2d 560 (1989); State v. Blevins, 968 P.2d 402 (Utah Ct.App.1998); Morton v. Commonwealth, 16 Va.App. 946, 434 S.E.2d 890 (1993). [¶ 14.] In our view, all persons warrants will not perforce offend the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Horn, 15 Kan. App.2d 365, 808 P.2d 438, 439 (1991). Instead, the validity of an all persons warrantlike the validity of any search warrantdepends on the probable cause offered to support it. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 342, 62 L.Ed.2d 238, 245 (1979); see Marks v. Clarke, 102 F.3d 1012, 1029 (9th Cir. 1996). In DeSimone, a decision frequently cited in analyzing all persons search warrants, the court explained: On principle, the sufficiency of a warrant to search persons identified by their presence at a specified place should depend upon the facts. A showing that lottery slips are sold in a department store or an industrial plant obviously would not justify a warrant to search every person on the premises, for there would be no probable cause to believe that everyone there was participating in the illegal operation. On the other hand, a showing that a dice game is operated in a manhole or in a barn should suffice, for the reason that the place is so limited and the illegal operation so overt that it is likely that everyone present is a party to the offense. Such a setting furnishes not only probable cause but also a designation of the persons to be searched which functionally is as precise as a dimensional portrait of them.    And, with regard to the Fourth Amendment demand for specificity as to the subject to be searched, there is none of the vice of a general warrant if the individual is thus identified by physical nexus to the ongoing criminal event itself. In such a setting, the officer executing the warrant has neither the authority nor the opportunity to search everywhere for anyone violating a law. So long as there is good reason to suspect or believe that anyone present at the anticipated scene will probably be a participant, presence becomes the descriptive fact satisfying the aim of the Fourth Amendment. The evil of the general warrant is thereby negated. To insist nonetheless that the individual be otherwise described when circumstances will not permit it, would simply deny government a needed power to deal with crime, without advancing the interest the Amendment was meant to serve. DeSimone, 288 A.2d at 850-51. [¶ 15.] The question, therefore, is whether the affidavit gave sufficient particularity to conclude that there was good reason to believe that anyone present would probably be a participant in the illegal drug activities at Mallulla and Maurer's house. See LaFave, supra, § 4.5(e) at 547. The key to assessing an all persons warrant is to examine whether there was a sufficient nexus among the criminal activity, the place of the activity, and the persons in the place to establish probable cause. People v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Colo.Ct.App.1990). Those courts upholding all persons warrants find such nexus and those courts striking them down conclude no such nexus was shown. See id. at 1160 (collecting cases). [¶ 16.] Based on several factors, we conclude that the all persons warrant was legitimate in this case. Agent Evans, the law enforcement officer who submitted the affidavit, documented the actuality of persistent drug dealing activity by Mallula and Maurer from their present and prior homes. The informant told Agent Evans that he had just purchased illicit drugs from Mallula at his present address. Also, the informant said he had made similar purchases on six earlier occasions at Mullula's prior residences. This informant's reliability was immediately confirmed with a controlled buy at the Monroe Street residence. The earlier purchases were circumstantially verified by Agent Evans' own observation of drug dealing materials found in his searches of the prior residences. [¶ 17.] Of course, the number of purchases the informant reported could not be precisely confirmed. This informant, recently released from prison, had a strong impetus to exculpate himself as he faced returning to the penitentiary. However, as the Supreme Court explained in Gates, even if we entertain some doubt as to an informant's motives, his explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case. 462 U.S. at 234, 103 S.Ct. at 2330, 76 L.Ed.2d at 545. Moreover, the information given by this informant confirmed criminal activity previously known to Agent Evans, and the substance of this information was independently corroborated. [¶ 18.] In State in Interest of L.Q., 236 N.J.Super. 464, 566 A.2d 223 (Ct.App.Div. 1989), the affidavit in support of the all persons search warrant stated that a reliable confidential source had reported that cocaine was being sold inside a residence. Sporadic surveillance of the house revealed that persons came to the house and stayed for only a short time, which according to law enforcement experience was typical of houses where narcotics were being sold. A successful controlled cocaine purchase was accomplished at the subject house. Additionally, officers observed a lookout posted to warn those in the house of police presence in the neighborhood. The court upheld the warrant: The evidence was sufficient to create a well-grounded suspicion or belief that numerous sales of [drugs] were being conducted in the premises. Although the affidavit did not exclude the possibility of other activities on the premises, the description of the activity actually observed provided a firm foundation for the suspicion or belief that any person in the private premises was involved in the overt unlawful activity of sale and possession of cocaine. Such a suspicion or belief is not limited to persons already there when the police arrive, but reasonably extends to a person who enters the premises during the search. Id. at 226 (footnote omitted). [¶ 19.] We think it important that the search was of a private house, not a public business or multi-family dwelling where innocent persons might more likely be subject to an unjustified search. The persons living at 105 E. Monroe Street were Mallula and Maurer, both indisputably involved in long-term illicit drug activity. In Hinkel an all persons present search warrant was upheld as the police were dealing with illegal afterhours activity in a house where it would be unlikely that nonparticipants in the unlawful activity would be present. Hinkel, 365 N.W.2d at 776. See also Morton, 434 S.E.2d at 893 (upholding all persons present search warrant of private apartment). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court uses a three-factor approach in evaluating the validity of these warrants: [1] the premises or area to be searched are small, confined and private; [2] the nature of the criminal activity is such that the participants (in general) constantly shift or change so that it is, practically, impossible for the police to predict that any specific person or persons will be on the premises at any given time; and [3] the items specifically described in the warrant as the target of the search are of a size or kind which renders them easily and likely to be concealed on the person. Commonwealth v. Smith, 370 Mass. 335, 348 N.E.2d 101, 107 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 944, 97 S.Ct. 364, 50 L.Ed.2d 314 (1976) (footnote omitted). Other decisions have endorsed this approach. Blevins, 968 P.2d at 404; State v. Covington, 904 P.2d 209, 212 (Utah Ct.App.1995). [¶ 20.] Another factor leading us to uphold this warrant is that it was executed at night, making it improbable that innocent people would show up by happenstance. The search did not begin until 8:30 p.m. on October 1, 1998. Jackson arrived sometime after that. See Hinkel, 365 N.W.2d at 776 (late night search makes it unlikely that nonparticipants would be present). Compare this circumstance with those cases striking down all persons warrants because the search took place during the afternoon when any number of people could legitimately be there. State v. Otis, 487 N.W.2d 928, 931 (Minn.Ct.App.1992); State v. Anderson, 415 N.W.2d 57, 61 (Minn.Ct.App.1987). Unlike this case, in State v. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d 218 (Minn. 1996) the Minnesota Supreme Court ordered the suppression of evidence seized with an all persons search warrant because [b]y the terms of the search warrant, it was to be executed only during daytime hours. During the day, relatives, guests or hired workpeople could have been present on the residential premises to be searched. Id. at 221. [¶ 21.] Jackson contends that there was no proof of sufficient numbers of drug sales at 105 E. Monroe Street to justify a belief that all persons coming to the residence would probably be involved in drug activity. Over the years, Mallula and Maurer lived in different residences. Yet their drug activity continued. That some of these activities occurred at their previous dwellings does not weaken the probable cause for an all persons search at their latest home; it strengthens it, as it shows persistent illegal enterprise no matter where they resided. Furthermore, volume of drug activity is not the test. [¶ 22.] What amount of evidence is required to form probable cause is not a question susceptible to formulaic solutions. People v. Fino, 14 N.Y.2d 160, 250 N.Y.S.2d 47, 199 N.E.2d 151, 153 (1964). Probable cause is a fluid concept turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular contextsnot readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of [legal] rules. State v. Farndon, 22 Ohio App.3d 31, 488 N.E.2d 894, 898 (1984) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, 103 S.Ct. at 2329, 76 L.Ed.2d at 544). It includes a balancing of the government's need to enforce the law with a citizen's right to privacy, and must endeavor to accommodate those interests, often at odds with each other, to serve both while attempting not to obstruct either. State v. Kasabucki, 52 N.J. 110, 244 A.2d 101, 104 (N.J.1968). [¶ 23.] We agree that all persons warrants require greater factual support than other warrants. See Nieves, 369 N.Y.S.2d 50, 330 N.E.2d at 34. However, to hold that an affidavit must contain facts showing that nothing but illegal activity is taking place in a location before an all persons warrant may be issued would simply deny government a needed power to deal with crime, without advancing the interest the [Fourth] Amendment was meant to serve. See De Simone, 288 A.2d at 851. We cannot compare the probable cause supplied in large cities where crack houses exist and where the volume of drug dealing far exceeds what occurs in South Dakota. Probable cause is a common sense determination based on the totality of circumstances as they exist in the locality. [¶ 24.] The issuance of an all persons search warrant does not require a guarantee that everyone who might appear during the search must be involved in drug activity. That is too high a burden. As one court explained: Though it is certainly possible, even probable, that innocent third parties who happen to be at the wrong place at the wrong time may be subjected to searches under such warrants, the nexus between the person to be searched and the nature and the seriousness of the criminal conduct suspected on probable cause, nonetheless, renders the probability of their culpable participation in the crime suspected sufficient to warrant a search of their person.... Graciani, 554 A.2d at 562-63. [¶ 25.] We do not sanction the routine use of all persons warrants. However, we uphold the warrant in this case because the facts to support it include: (1) proof of the sale of a controlled substance at the residence within twenty-four hours before the warrant was issued; (2) a reliable indication of six earlier purchases of drugs from the same persons by the same informant who made the controlled buy; (3) two law enforcement searches of the suspects' prior residences indicating not only the presence of drugs but also evidence of ongoing drug dealing activity; (4) the search of a private dwelling, rather than a multi-family residence or business where innocent persons would more likely be present; (5) the nature of the criminal activity was such that participants constantly shifted or changed making it practically impossible for law enforcement to predict that any specific person or persons would be on the premises at any given time; (6) the search was conducted at a time of day when it was unlikely that innocent citizens would arrive at the residence; and (7) the subject of the search was illicit drugs which can be easily hidden on a person's body. See Morton, 434 S.E.2d at 892-93 and Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 369 Pa.Super. 398, 535 A.2d 611, 615 (1987) (using similar factors to uphold all persons warrants). Examining the issuing judge's probable cause determination with great deference, we conclude that there was at least a substantial basis for finding that grounds existed for the issuance of the all persons search warrant. [¶ 26.] Affirmed. [¶ 27.] MILLER, Chief Justice, and GILBERTSON, Justice, concur.