Opinion ID: 1231631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: authority to close streets

Text: Section 21101 provides: Local authorities may adopt rules and regulations by ordinance or resolution on the following matters: (a) Closing any highway to vehicular traffic when in the opinion of the legislative body having jurisdiction the highway is no longer needed for vehicular traffic.... [6] As noted above, only the interveners rely on section 21101. Though Berkeley has described its plan as one for street closures it never has attempted to justify its action under section 21101. It never has claimed that any street on which barriers were placed is no longer needed for vehicular traffic. Preliminarily we clarify the meaning of close and closure as used in this opinion. Installing the barriers did not close any street; even those with full barriers permit some traffic. The barriers at most effect a partial closure to certain traffic at certain points. They block through-travel in particular directions but leave all portions of the affected streets open for local use. (3) The crucial question is whether section 21101, subdivision (a) provides authority for that kind of partial closure. We conclude it does not. Subdivision (a) concerns streets no longer needed for vehicular traffic; it does not expressly permit a city to close a street to through traffic while allowing its use for neighborhood purposes. Since that authority must be expressly (not impliedly) declared by the Legislature ( Moore, supra, 229 Cal. App.2d, at p. 228; Holman v. Viko (1958) 161 Cal. App.2d 87, 93 [326 P.2d 551]), we should not imply a grant of authority here. That the words closing any highway to vehicular traffic mean exactly what they say is indicated by the first case that considered the statute (or more precisely its predecessor, § 145), Simpson v. City of Los Angeles (1935) 4 Cal.2d 60 [47 P.2d 474]. Apparently the statute in fact was enacted to cover the Simpson situation; i.e., the closing of Olvera Street in Los Angeles. Olvera Street was one-block long, bounded at each end by thoroughfares. It was used principally for parking of commercial vehicles and by pedestrians; it was little used for movement of vehicular traffic. In 1929 Los Angeles enacted an ordinance closing it to vehicular traffic. An abutting property owner disputed the city's right to close the street; the trial court upheld the enactment under the city's police power. When the ordinance was passed section 145 did not confer power to close streets; while the case was pending the Legislature in 1931 amended the section to permit closure when, in the view of the city's legislative body, the street was no longer needed for vehicular traffic. Addressing arguments that Los Angeles had authority to close streets that was implied in the delegation contained in the statute's earlier version, this court noted that the legislative intent was made manifest when in 1931 the express authority was added to the statute. [A] reversal of the judgment herein would avail the plaintiff nothing, said the court, inasmuch as the city council could immediately validly reenact the ordinance. Furthermore, it is represented in the record that the very purpose of enacting the 1931 amendment to section 145 was to preserve the validity of the ordinance in question. (P. 67.) The next case was Snyder v. City of South Pasadena (1975) 53 Cal. App.3d 1051 [126 Cal. Rptr. 320]. South Pasadena had erected a full-length barrier on a street at the boundary with Los Angeles, to prevent Los Angeles traffic from turning onto the street. The city council had resolved that the street was no longer needed and never had been needed as a conveyor of through traffic.... The trial court denied Los Angeles residents' request for an injunction; the Court of Appeal upheld the closure, finding authority (1) in the city's police powers, (2) in the delegated authority to maintain streets, (3) in the language of the Simpson case, and (4) in a liberal interpretation of subdivision (a) of section 21101. In our view the Court of Appeal erred. First, a city's police powers do not extend to control of vehicular traffic on its streets; that field has been preempted (§ 21). Second, the delegated power to maintain streets refers not to traffic control but to the power (and responsibility) to repair or improve streets and to construct overpasses, tunnels, or sidewalks (Gov. Code, § 40401; Irwin v. City of Manhattan Beach (1966) 65 Cal.2d 13, 22 [51 Cal. Rptr. 881, 415 P.2d 769]). Third, the Simpson decision was premised on the validation of the city's action by the Legislature's enactment of subdivision (a). Finally, the court in Snyder ignored the rule that delegations of power to cities regarding vehicular traffic will be strictly construed ( Moore, supra, 229 Cal. App.2d 221, 228; Holman, supra, 161 Cal. App.2d 87, 93), as well as the rule of construction that words normally should be read for their plain meaning. ( People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 884 [157 Cal. Rptr. 503, 98 P.2d 473]; Palos Verdes Faculty Assn. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650, 658 [147 Cal. Rptr. 359, 580 P.2d 1155]; Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 198 [137 Cal. Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148].) The only other case interpreting subdivision (a), City of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa (1979) 91 Cal. App.3d 749 [154 Cal. Rptr. 374], was decided four years later. Lafayette installed a gate across the entrance to Happy Valley Road, thereby closing it to traffic except for drivers with an accepted need to use the road; they were furnished gate-opening devices. The Court of Appeal held that subdivision (a) provided no authority for partial closure. The opinion referred to (1) state preemption (§ 21), (2) the requirement that authority be expressly conferred and delegations strictly construed, and (3) the fact that the statute authorizes only the closing of a street and, by its unambiguous text, permits only the complete shutting off of a street when it is no longer needed for traffic. The court concluded that subdivision (a) provides no authorization to limit a street to local traffic and that implying an authority to do so was contrary to law, and to the clear language of that statute. (91 Cal. App.3d at p. 757.) Lafayette's diverter, which permitted through traffic to some drivers and not others, was not precisely analogous to any of the three types of Berkeley barriers. Yet insofar as it permitted unimpeded travel to drivers on each side of the barrier the Lafayette device was comparable to all those installed in Berkeley. Whatever the subtle differences the principle is the same; the street has been partially closed or, more precisely, closed to some vehicular traffic. [7] Most traffic laws are to some extent discriminatory. In large measure they determine which traffic may use streets under what circumstances. Nonetheless, localities have no carte blanche and, absent express authority, may not determine which traffic shall and which shall not use streets. Interveners' argument that the Legislature intended section 21101, subdivision (a) to provide authority not only for complete closure but also for traffic control by restricting use does not withstand scrutiny. Interpretation of subdivision (a) to permit regulation by partial closure would render superfluous section 21100 (which specifies in detail how local governments may regulate traffic) as well as many other, more explicit, traffic control statutes. (See discussion post. ) We conclude that partial closing of the Berkeley streets is not authorized by section 21101, subdivision (a). [8]