Opinion ID: 50255
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Shepard Violation

Text: 8 Jenkins next contends that the district court violated Shepard v. United States by relying on the PSR's characterization of his prior offenses for enhancement purposes. Because Jenkins did not specifically object to the district court's consideration of the PSR, we also review this issue for plain error. See Villegas, 404 F.3d at 358. 9 The Supreme Court held in Shepard that a sentencing court is generally limited to examining the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented. 544 U.S. at 16, 125 S.Ct. at 1257. Interpreting Shepard, this court holds that a district court errs when it solely relies upon the PSR's characterization of a defendant's prior offenses for enhancement purposes. See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 274 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 298, 163 L.Ed.2d 260 (2005); see also United States v. Ochoa-Cruz, 442 F.3d 865, 867 (5th Cir.2006) (per curiam). Although the PSR characterized Jenkins's prior convictions as felonies, the record is silent regarding whether the court examined any supporting documents. 10 Nevertheless, the district court had the benefit of Jenkins's own characterization of his prior offenses. Jenkins admitted at sentencing that his prior convictions were for two separate felonies. That admission was sufficient for the district court to conclude that Jenkins's prior convictions were felonies without regard to the categorical approach for sentence enhancements. See id. (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990)). Thus, when a defendant admits before a sentencing court that his prior convictions are felonies, the court may rely upon his characterization of the offenses without violating Shepard or Taylor. See Shepard, 544 U.S. 13, 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 1257, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005) (courts may examine transcript of plea colloquy); see also United States v. Martinez-Vega, 471 F.3d 559, 563 & n. 3 (5th Cir.2006) (reliance on PSR is error but reliance on defendant's admission of facts within the PSR is not); United States v. White, 465 F.3d 250, 254 (5th Cir.2006) (per curiam), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1167, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2007) (district court can use all facts admitted by the defendant in ascertaining the basis of a prior conviction for enhancement purposes (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Mendoza-Sanchez, 456 F.3d 479, 483 (5th Cir.2006) (per curiam) (district court can use all facts admitted by the defendant in determining whether the prior conviction qualifies as an enumerated offense under § 2L1.2). The district court did not err by apparently relying on Jenkins's admission at sentencing. See Martinez-Vega, 471 F.3d at 563 & n. 3 (5th Cir.2006); Ochoa-Cruz, 442 F.3d at 867. 11 In addition, Jenkins has not asserted or demonstrated on appeal that his prior convictions are not felonies. His failure to show that the enhancement was wrong affords another reason why Jenkins cannot meet his burden under plain-error review. See Ochoa-Cruz, 442 F.3d at 867; see also Villegas, 404 F.3d at 364.