Opinion ID: 2278866
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Commensurate Funding

Text: The principal question in these appeals is whether SBE properly construed and applied ED § 9-109(a). As noted, that section, enacted in 2003 as part of the comprehensive law governing public charter schools, requires a county board of education to disburse to a public charter school an amount of county, State, and federal money for elementary, middle, and secondary students that is commensurate with the amount disbursed to other public schools in the local jurisdiction. The city and county boards commence their attack on the SBE's rulings by noting that the General Assembly declined to provide, itself, a specific funding formula for public charter schools but instead adopted the commensurate standard. With a supposed logic that escapes us, they then seem to complain that, because the Legislature failed to provide such a specific and detailed formula, SBE had no right to create one. They urge that the determination of what funding is commensurate with the amounts disbursed to the other public schools must, as a matter of law, be left mainly in the hands of the local boards, by methodologies of their choosing  that it is a local matter. Such a conclusion, of course, raises the specter of 24 disparate methods of implementing a uniform State law and would denigrate SBE's long-established authority to explain the true intent and meaning of the public education laws that it is charged with enforcing. From that premise, they attack first SBE's use of per pupil expenditures as a measure of commensurate funding, arguing that [h]ad the General Assembly intended that funding be based on `per pupil expenditures,' it would have said so. They then urge that SBE was required by law to exclude from its calculation of per pupil expenditures huge categories of expenses  transportation expenses, all grant funded instructional costs, all maintenance expenses, and all administrative expenses. Finally, they dispute SBE's determination that the entire funding must be in money, rather than partly, or, theoretically, wholly, in services. We start with the clear fact that the statute is patently ambiguous. All parties agree, and necessarily so, that the county school boards do not disburse funds to the other public schools in the local jurisdiction. The school boards do not send checks, wire funds, or deliver wads of cash to the principals for the payment of teachers' salaries or the salaries of anyone else, or for the purchase of textbooks, other instructional materials, or incidental supplies and equipment, or for the maintenance of their respective facilities, or to provide transportation, lunch, or health or guidance services for the students. The phrase disbursed to other public schools in the local jurisdiction therefore cannot be read literally. No one can calculate a precise dollar amount disbursed to the X Middle School in order to determine a commensurate amount that should be disbursed to the Y Public Charter Middle School, because there is no such disbursement. The whole comparative framework, therefore  what the disbursement to the public charter schools should be commensurate with  requires interpretation. It is not even close to being clear on its face. In light of such an ambiguity, two precepts, fortunately converging ones, come into play. The first is the heavy deference that must be accorded to SBE interpretations of the public school laws, especially interpretations that go beyond purely legal determinations and affect or implement significant educational policy. So long as the SBE interpretation is not patently wrong, we would ordinarily defer to it. See ante. To the extent that we desire to look further, we would apply the most relevant rules of statutory construction to determine the legislative intent, and, in that regard, may consider legislative history and the statutory purpose. See Twine v. State, 395 Md. 539, 550, 910 A.2d 1132, 1138 (2006). In this case, legislative history is especially pertinent. ED § 9-109 did not spring live and instantaneously from the head of Zeus in 2003 but was the product of six years of deliberation and obvious compromise. In September, 1996, SBE, reacting to what was going on around the country and at the Federal level, created a Public Charter School Study Group to assist the Board in developing a policy position regarding public charter schools. In its January, 1997 Report to SBE, the Study Group, citing a February, 1996 report to the Education Commission of the States, observed that the key issues of concern regarding public charter schools seemed to be: (1) inadequate capital funding and facilities; (2) cash flow problems and the difficulty in securing credit; (3) a large number of laws and regulations (and paperwork reporting) which continue to be required of charter schools; (4) struggles in obtaining local school board sponsorship; (5) difficulties managing the business of the schools; and (6) inadequate planning. See Report of the Public Charter School Study Group to the Maryland State Board of Education, January 28, 1997, at 3 [hereafter Report], citing Charter Schools: Initial Findings, Louann A. Bierlein, Louisiana Educational Policy Research Center, Louisiana State University, p. 8. Although the Study Group concluded that the local school boards already had the authority to establish charter schools and that legislation was not necessary for that purpose, it recognized that the local boards had little guidance on the issues to be considered in granting a charter and that Statewide legislation was likely, and it therefore offered a number of recommendations, among which were: (1) Charter schools should utilize unique approaches to teaching and learning to create conditions that encourage education reform. Report, at 4. (2) Charter schools should be non-profit, non-religious, non-sectarian, and not based in private homes. Id. at 4. Tuition must not be charged. Id. at 7. (3) Charter schools would have the legal status of the other public schools within the jurisdiction and could, as any public school, request waiver of local rules, State regulations, and State and federal statutes other than those relating to health, safety, civil rights, and disabilities. Id. at 5. In that regard, the Study Group noted that local school boards had a procedure to waive their own rules, that they could request SBE to waive State regulations deemed unnecessary for the operation, enhancement of academic achievement, and student performance of any local public school, and that SBE had been delegated the authority by the U.S. Department of Education to waive certain federal requirements that might inhibit the flexible operation and management of a school. Id. at 5. The Study Group expressed the caveat, however, that, notwithstanding any waiver, educational achievement should continue to be measured by the same standards used by SBE to assess achievement in the public schools. (4) Charter schools should be eligible for local, State, and federal funds as calculated for `like-kind' of students and services in other public schools (i.e., disabilities, gifted and talented, reasonable transportation, etc.) and that [l]ocal school systems should expect State funding for local charter schools to be commensurate with State funding for the system's public schools. Report at 6. (5) All teachers in the charter school should be employees of the school system, with all of the rights, responsibilities, and benefits granted to the teachers by law, including the right to join the local union for collective bargaining purposes. Id. at 7. (6) Appeals of controversies relating to a charter school should continue to go to SBE, but the standard of review should be somewhere between `arbitrary, capricious, or illegal' and ` de novo. ' Id. at 8. Based on those recommendations, the State Department of Education, in July, 1997, adopted Guidelines for local boards to use when considering charter school applications. With respect to funding, the departmental Guideline noted: It is expected that Maryland public charter schools authorized by local education authorities will receive a fair per pupil foundation grant that is at least equal to the calculated operating costs for educating the like kind of students in existing public schools within that jurisdiction. The per-pupil calculation should include eligible local, state, and federal funds in the calculations. Other fiscal support such as transportation may be part of the negotiations between the charter requestor and the local education authority. Guidelines for Use by Local School Systems in Considering Charter School Applications, Maryland State Department of Education, July, 1997, at 8. Legislation to govern the creation and operation of charter schools and to codify some of the recommendations of the Study Group was introduced into the 1998 Session of the General Assembly as HB 999. As does the current law, HB 999, through a new title 9 to the Education Article, would have provided for and set conditions on the granting of charters and the operation of public charter schools, prohibited a charter school from charging tuition, and provided instead for public funding. Proposed ED § 9-103(b) provided that public charter schools were to be managed by their respective boards of trustees and operated independently of the county board[s]. ED § 9-113 required the county board to pay directly to the public charter school, for each student enrolled in [the school] who resides in the county, an amount not less than 90% nor more than 100% of the per pupil operating costs for educating the same kind of student in the existing public schools of the county and made the charter school eligible for county, State, and Federal funds in the same manner as calculated for like-kind students of regular public schools in the county.. The bill was opposed, in whole or in part, by the local school boards, the county school superintendents, and the two major teachers' unions (which maintained their opposition year after year). All of its provisions were stripped, and it was completely revamped to do nothing more than create a Task Force to study the matter and recommend legislation for the 1999 Session. As so amended, it was enacted as 1998 Md. Laws, ch. 720. A second try was made in 1999, in the form of HB 116 and SB 761, which took different approaches. As introduced, HB 116 would have required the county board to pay directly to the school, for each enrolled student, an amount that is the equivalent of the amount that the county board pays for the education of the same kind of student at a public school in the county as determined by [the State Department of Education]. That provision was deleted in the House Ways and Means Committee and replaced with one directing that each student enrolled in a charter school shall receive the per pupil basic current expense figure calculated under § 5-202 of this Article and that the school and the county board could negotiate for additional funding. The substituted provision would have tied the funding mandate to a specific statutory formula. [9] The Senate Economic and Environmental Affairs Committee objected to that amendment and restored the original provision, which was consistent with the approach taken in SB 761 and required payment, for each enrolled student, of the amount the county board pays for the same kind of student at a public school, adding that this amount includes the State share of basic current expenses. The differences were significant. According to the Fiscal Note prepared by the Department of Legislative Services, the House version would have produced a per pupil payment of $3,901, whereas the Senate version would have required a per pupil payment of $6,688. Neither bill passed. Bills were introduced into both Houses in the 2000 Session  SB 543 and HB 526. This time, the two were together with respect to the funding provision, set at the lower level. They each would have required that the county board pay directly to a public charter school, for each enrolled student, an amount that is equivalent of the amount that the county board would pay for the education of the student at a traditional public school in the county as determined by the [State Department of Education], which amount would include the State share of basic current expenses. The Department of Legislative Services, in its Fiscal Note, construed that provision as requiring payment of the basic current expense of $4,005, which was $3,518 less than the estimated average per pupil operating expenditures for public schools. The House Ways and Means Committee struck that provision and substituted the language it had used in 1999, requiring payment of the per pupil basic current expense figure calculated under ED § 5-202, with the ability to negotiate for more, but, according to the Revised Fiscal Note, the fiscal effect was the same  $3,518 per pupil less than the estimated average per pupil operating expenditures in the public schools. Again, neither bill passed. The same fate awaited three bills in 2001. House Bill 29 used the language previously insisted upon by the Ways and Means Committee  requiring payment of the per pupil basic current expense calculated under ED § 5-202 with the ability to negotiate for more. That approach would have produced $4,126 per pupil, or $3,700 per pupil less than the estimated 2002 average per pupil operating expenditures in the public schools. Senate Bill 721, using the language favored by the Senate, would have required the same level of funding provided to traditional public schools, which would have produced a payment of approximately $7,700 per pupil. Senate Bill 604 was a shorter bill that authorized charter schools but had no funding provision at all. The Fiscal Note assumed that existing State and local funds at the $7,700 level per pupil would be used. Senate Bill 604 passed the Senate but was amended in the House to conform with House Bill 29, which passed the House. The House refused to appoint members to a Conference Committee, however, and so the bills were not enacted. The stand-off between the Senate and House of Delegates continued in 2002. Senate Bill 213 was a repetition of Senate Bill 604 from 2001. It provided for charter schools but had no funding provision. It passed the Senate but was rewritten in the House of Delegates to conform with the House's consistently held view that the charter schools should receive only the per pupil basic current expense calculated under ED § 5-202. The Senate refused to concur in the House amendments, the House refused to recede from those amendments, and a Conference Committee was unable to resolve the differences. As a result, the bill died. The impasse was finally broken in 2003. In part, that may have been influenced by the major change that the legislature made in 2002 with respect to the level of, and method of determining, general State funding of public education. See 2002 Md. Laws, ch. 288. The 2002 law promised a significant increase in State funding for public education programs. Among other things, it repealed the concept and definition of basic current expenses in § 5-202, to which the House of Delegates had pegged its charter school funding formula, and substituted the concept of the annual per pupil foundation amount. Senate Bill 75, as introduced, followed the model of Senate Bill 213 in 2002 (and Senate Bill 604 in 2001) and contained no funding provision. As before, the Department of Legislative Services, in its Fiscal Note, assumed that existing State and local funds would be used to operate the schools and estimated the total per pupil expenditures for public schools in FY 2004 to be $9,500. The Senate Education Committee considered an amendment to provide that a county board shall disburse the commensurate rate of county, State, and Federal money for elementary, middle, and secondary students to a public charter school as is disbursed to other public schools in the local jurisdiction. (Emphasis added). It apparently rewrote that amendment, however, for the Committee amendment actually added was in the form ultimately adopted  that the county board shall disburse to a public charter school an amount of county, State, and Federal money for elementary, middle, and secondary students that is commensurate with the amount disbursed to other public schools in the local jurisdictions. (Emphasis added). In assessing that language, a Revised Fiscal Note observed that [a]verage pupil expenditures in fiscal 2004 are estimated at $8,800, ranging from $7,300 in low spending districts to $10,500 in high spending districts. These estimates exclude teachers' retirement payments, capital outlays, and debt service. As it had done in the past, the House Ways and Means Committee rewrote the bill, and the House of Delegates passed it as so amended, thus setting up another Conference Committee. This time, the Conference Committee rejected the House amendments, both Houses concurred in the Conference Committee Report, and the bill was enacted and signed by the Governor essentially as the Senate had passed it. We learn several things from this history. One is that for six years the Legislature struggled with trying to fashion a formula for public funding. It considered several alternatives, some tying the funding to the basic current expense model, some using an equivalence to expenditures for the same kind of student in other public schools, one pegging the funding at between 90% and 100% of such expenditures, and yet another requiring disbursement of a commensurate rate. In the end, the compromise was not a specific formula or actual equivalence but an amount commensurate with the amount disbursed to other public schools. That necessarily left some room for interpretation  what was commensurate and how was the amount disbursed to other public schools to be determined when no amounts were actually disbursed to public schools? We presume that, when the Legislature enacted such a law as the lynchpin of a new and untested public education endeavor that was six years in the making, it must have envisioned that SBE  the body it has consistently vested with the ultimate administrative authority to interpret, explain, and apply the public education laws  would have the primary authority to interpret, and the ultimate authority to implement, that provision. There is nothing in the legislative record to suggest an intent to vest such ultimate authority in the local school boards, which, as noted, could lead not only to disparate methodologies for implementing a uniform State law but allow the very entities that had consistently opposed the legislative effort to throttle it through their administratively unreviewable funding policies. The second thing that emerges rather clearly from the legislative history  both the various drafts and the Fiscal Notes prepared by the Department of Legislative Services  is that the determination of commensurate funding would necessarily be on a per pupil basis. In Exhibit 2 to the SBE opinions, the Board explained that there was no Statewide methodology for how county boards fund their schools, that various methods were used nationally with respect to charter school funding, and that, in choosing average per pupil funding, the Board was following the approach of the legislatively-created Commission on Education, Finance, Equity, and Excellence (the Thornton Commission, named for its chairman, Alvin Thornton), later adopted by the General Assembly in the Bridge to Excellence in Public Schools Act (2002 Md. Laws, ch. 288). The Board concluded that the average per pupil approach had the virtues of both simplicity and flexibility and that there was as yet no enrollment history at the three charter schools upon which to base a more refined enrollment-driven allocation of funds. Once such a history develops, the Board added, that issue could be revisited. We find no legal error in the Board's use of the average per pupil funding approach. As part of their general attack on the SBE methodology, the city and county boards complain about the requirement that the funding be disbursed in cash, rather than in services, inclusion of Title I and special education expenses, and the limitation of the deduction for administration expenses to 2% in the calculation of commensurate funding. We find no error in any of these respects. The final version of ED § 9-109(a) requires the disbursement of an amount of county, State, and federal money.  (Emphasis added). SBE was not in error in construing that to mean what it says  disbursement of money. The SBE rulings allow the charter schools to negotiate for the provision of services, if they would rather have the services, for which they would be required to reimburse the county boards. Services are not prohibited; they just cannot be forced on the charter schools at the whim of the county boards. Because ED § 9-109(a) requires the county boards to disburse an amount of county, State, and federal money for elementary, middle, and secondary students that is commensurate with the amounts disbursed to the other public schools, SBE, in the exercise of its statutory authority to explain the true intent and meaning of that requirement, was clearly entitled to conclude that such funding must include Title I and special education funds, to the extent that students in the charter schools are eligible for those services. With respect to the 2% deduction for central administration expenses, the Board was simply unwilling to allow the city and county boards to deduct amounts for the entire range of administrative expenses they choose to incur and instead adopted the approach already in place with respect to grant administration, which the Board found to be reasonable. Implicit in that determination was that the charter schools, being somewhat autonomous, would not need and should not be subject to the full range of control exercised by the central administration over the regular public schools, and that they therefore should not be charged with a share of that total expense. We find no legal error in that determination. For all of these reasons, we believe that the Court of Special Appeals reached the right conclusions and properly reversed the decisions of the two circuit courts. JUDGMENTS OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS IN NOS. 100 AND 121 AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS. BELL, C.J. and RAKER, J. dissent. RAKER, J., dissenting, BELL, C.J., joining. The majority in this case asserts that the State Board of Education (SBE) was well within its discretion to proceed in the manner it did-adjudicating the cases before it and offering `guidance' to other applicants, rather than proceeding with more formal and binding regulations. Maj. op. at 346, 929 A.2d at 126. I disagree. The declaratory rulings issued by SBE resulted in regulations in effect, if not name. The policies adopted within those rulings are meant to have general and widespread application, and, in my opinion, should have been the subject of formal rulemaking procedures. Prior to issuing its declaratory rulings in these cases, SBE had never interpreted Md.Code (1978, 2006 Repl.Vol.) § 9-109(a) of the Education Article. [1] See Maj op. at 336, 929 A.2d at 120. In its rulings, which provided neither the legislative components of formal rulemaking, nor the quasi-judicial components of administrative adjudications, SBE created policies interpreting § 9-109(a) that it intended to apply to every school board in the State. In my opinion, these policies should not have been adopted through a declaratory ruling. This Court has never addressed when, if, or to what extent agencies may implement policies through declaratory rulings. Our cases addressing situations when agencies must proceed through formal rulemaking, as opposed to adjudication, are, however, instructive on this point. We have noted that agencies do not possess absolute discretion to establish policy through ad hoc adjudication alone. In CBS v. Comptroller, 319 Md. 687, 575 A.2d 324 (1990), we addressed the Comptroller of the Treasury's decision to change the method by which it calculated corporate taxes for out-of-state businesses. We held that it was error for the Comptroller to change its methods through adjudication, and required the agency to engage in formal rulemaking procedures. We acknowledged initially that the administrative process is enhanced when an agency is allowed substantial flexibility to decide between establishing policy by way of rule or by way of adjudication. Id. at 687, 694, 575 A.2d 324, 327. We noted that discretion to choose may, however, be abused, explaining as follows: As a number of the cases requiring rulemaking indicate, this mode of procedure adds an aspect of fairness when an agency intends to make a change in existing law or rule. That fairness is produced by prospective operation of a new rule and by the public notice, public hearing, and public comment processes that accompany rulemaking, but that are sometimes absent from administrative adjudication. The advantages of rulemaking in certain circumstances reinforce the view that this procedure may sometimes be required. Id. at 695-96, 575 A.2d at 328 (internal citations omitted). While we refused to adopt an all-encompassing rule dictating when rulemaking is required, we concluded that when a policy of general application, embodied in or represented by a rule, is changed to a different policy of general application, the change must be accomplished by rulemaking. Id. at 696, 575 A.2d at 328. In Dept. of Health v. Chimes, 343 Md. 336, 681 A.2d 484 (1996), we addressed the Developmental Disabilities Administration's decision to implement a growth cap to control costs for community-based health care providers. We explained that both the statute underlying the program and its implementing regulations required DDA to limit expenditures. Therefore, the `growth cap' merely effectuated these policies, but did not change the law. Id. at 346, 681 A.2d at 489. Formal rulemaking was therefore not required. We stated as follows: DDA did not formulate new rules of widespread application, change existing law, or apply new standards retroactively to the detriment of an entity that had relied upon the agency's past pronouncements. The `growth cap' at issue here applied only to a limited number of providers in their capacity as contractors with a state agency pursuant to contracts between the parties subject to termination by either side. Id. Similarly, in MD HMO's v. Cost Review, 356 Md. 581, 741 A.2d 483 (1999), we addressed the Health Services Cost Review Commission's decision to adopt an inflation adjustment system (IAS) which was applied to particular health facilities on a case-by-case basis. Although we found formal rulemaking procedures unnecessary, we noted that the underlying adjudication did not involve the formulation of new rules, a change in existing law, or the application of standards that had a retroactive effect. Id. at 602, 741 A.2d at 494. We explained as follows: The IAS is simply a methodology, long in use, to effectuate the law. It reflects policies set forth by the General Assembly. It is a starting point from which the Commission proceeds case-bycase in order to take into account the individualized costs and needs of the particular hospitals. Id. See also Balto. Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 305 Md. 145, 169, 501 A.2d 1307, 1319 (1986) (finding rulemaking unnecessary because the adjudication was not one in which materially modified or new standards were applied retroactively to the detriment of a company that had relied upon the Commission's past pronouncements); Consumer Protection v. Consumer Pub., 304 Md. 731, 756, 501 A.2d 48, 61 (1985) (finding formal rulemaking unnecessary because the adjudication did not change existing law or even formulate rules of widespread application). Alternatively, in Massey v. Secretary, Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Services, 389 Md. 496, 886 A.2d 585 (2005), we found that formal rulemaking procedures were required after addressing the validity of certain directives adopted by the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services. The appellant was an inmate in the Maryland State prison system who had been subjected to discipline and had lost diminution credits after being found to have violated the challenged directives. Before this Court, the appellant argued that the directives at issue were regulations that should have been subjected to formal rulemaking procedures. We agreed. Judge Wilner, writing for the Court, explained as follows: [The challenged directives] constitute statements that have general application throughout all of the correctional institutions in DOC and apply to all inmates in those institutions; they have future effect; they were adopted by a `unit' to carry out laws that the unit administers; and they are in the form of rules, standards, statements of interpretation, and statements of policy. Id. at 507-508, 886 A.2d at 592. We noted further that the directives were not exempt from formal rulemaking as regulations concerning only the internal management of the Division of Correction. Because the directives were regulations, and had not been adopted through formal rulemaking procedures, we held them to be invalid. Id. at 500, 886 A.2d at 587. The above cases demonstrate that administrative agencies do not possess unfettered discretion to issue policies through whatever procedure they choose. We have noted repeatedly that an administrative agency's discretion should be limited where it (1) changes existing law, (2) applies new standards retroactively, or (3) creates rules of widespread application. Further, we have concluded that an agency must engage in formal rulemaking when it changes existing laws or creates new standards that have retroactive effect. CBS, 319 Md. at 696, 575 A.2d at 328. The majority states that formal rulemaking was unnecessary in this case because the rulings at issue here were specific to three individual cases that happened to involve some common issues relating to the construction of ED § 9-109. Maj. op. at 346, 929 A.2d at 126. I disagree. It is clear that in issuing its declaratory rulings, SBE created new policies of general and widespread application where none existed before. SBE should have engaged in formal rulemaking procedures. As noted, prior to issuing these declaratory rulings, SBE had never interpreted § 9-109(a). With limited input from the parties involved, and none from outside parties with an interest in the interpretation of § 9-109(a), SBE adopted a general formula to determine the appropriate amount of funding to be disbursed to public charter schools, required that each charter agreement must be completed within 30 calendar days from the date of the decision approving the charter application, and mandated that the total average per pupil amount shall be adjusted by a 2% reduction as a reasonable cost to the charter school for these required central office functions. These are not rulings specific to three individual cases. SBE noted as much when it stated as follows: We have issued this Opinion as guidance and direction not only to the parties in this appeal but also to the other charter school applicants and local school systems in Maryland . . . Formal rulemaking was necessary to create the policies at issue. A declaratory ruling, which failed to provide even the quasi-judicial protections of an administrative adjudication, was an inappropriate mechanism for the formation of such widespread policies. [2] As the Attorney General noted in an opinion letter to Audie G. Klingler, D.C. President of the State Board of Chiropractic Examiners: The history of [Md.Code (1984, 2004 Repl.Vol., 2006 Cum.Supp.) § 10-304 et seq. of the State Government Article] suggests that it was not intended as an alternative to rulemaking when the issue before an agency applies generally to all those subject to its regulatory jurisdiction. Rather, the declaratory ruling procedure was meant to enable persons concerned with a more narrowly focused issue to obtain binding advice about their particular situation.    The declaratory ruling procedure of the APA is not likely to be a satisfactory alternative to rulemaking if the issue before the agency affects all persons subject to the agency's jurisdiction equally; if the issue affects persons not directly subject to the agency's jurisdiction; if the adjudicative facts presented by the petitioner are probably insufficient to allow informed resolution of the issue; and if the legislative facts that are essential to resolving the issue are disputed. Professor Bonfield, a leading scholar of state administrative law, suggests that an agency should decline to issue a declaratory ruling `where the ruling, though technically binding only on the agency and petitioner, would necessarily determine the legal rights of other parties who have not filed such a petition, and who are opposed to the resolution of the issue by declaratory ruling procedures . . . or who are unrepresented in that declaratory ruling procedure.' A. Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Iowa L.Rev. at 819 (emphasis in original). 76 Op. Att'y Gen. 3, 15-17 (1991). The APA provides rulemaking procedures to ensure fairness and mature consideration of rules of general application. 75 Op. Att'y Gen. 37, 43 (1990). The Act serves the important function of safeguarding public rights and educating administrative lawmakers. Id. The policies enumerated by SBE in its declaratory rulings are the type contemplated in the APA's rulemaking procedures. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgments of the Court of Special Appeals and remand with directions to affirm the judgments of the Circuit Courts for Baltimore City and Prince George's County. Chief Judge BELL has authorized me to state that he joins in this dissenting opinion.