Opinion ID: 2569334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: instruction on diminished capacity

Text: Hedges had three court-appointed attorneys: a pretrial attorney, a trial attorney, and a post-trial attorney. Hedges' first attorney was aware of the applicable defense of mental disease or defect negating intent. See K.S.A. 22-3219(1). The trial attorney erroneously thought the defense of insanity was applicable. See K.S.A. 22-3219(1) (Ensley 1988). The third attorney appointed to represent Hedges in post-trial matters was aware of the law in effect at the time of the crime. Although requested by Hedges' trial attorney, the district judge refused to give an insanity defense instruction, but then without objection instructed the jury that diminished capacity may be considered in determining whether Hedges was capable of forming the necessary intent for the crimes charged. Hedges pointed out in his post-trial motions that the instructions given to the jury pertained to the law of diminished capacity as it applied to crimes committed prior to January 1, 1996, and his crimes were committed after that date. Hedges' trial attorney had argued for an insanity defense instruction based on the M'Naghten test, (see State v. Boan, 235 Kan. 800, 809, 686 P.2d 160 [1984]), which was not applicable at the time of Hedges' crime, and Hedges deferred to the judgment of his trial attorney. Hedges now erroneously claims that at the jury instructions conference his trial attorney had requested an instruction on the law in effect at the commission of the crime and the judge had refused to give the proper instruction. In a post-trial motion prior to sentencing, Hedges asserted that the trial court's failure to instruct on the law applicable to crimes committed after January 1, 1996, was reversible error and denied him the right to present a defense. In order to understand the problems which plagued the court and the parties as to Hedges' defense, it is necessary to review the statutory changes that have occurred relating to the defenses of insanity, diminished capacity, and mental disease or defect negating intent. Prior to January 1, 1996, there were two defenses relating to mental disease or defect: insanity and diminished capacity. Insanity. Prior to January 1, 1996, Kansas recognized an insanity defense under which criminal insanity was evaluated using the M'Naghten test. As explained in Note, Insanity Denied: Abolition of the Insanity Defense in Kansas, 8 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 253, 254 (Winter 1999), Under M'Naghten, the defendant should be found criminally insane only if the accused did not know the nature and quality of the act; or, if the accused did know it, where the accused did not know right from wrong with respect to the act. Under this standard, the defense had the burden of producing evidence to indicate the possibility of insanity, and then the burden shifted to the State to prove the defendant was not insane at the time of the act. State v. Linn, 251 Kan. 797, 806-07, 840 P.2d 1133 (1992). Pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3219, not more than 30 days after entry of a plea of not guilty, a defendant who intended to rely on the defense of insanity was required to give notice of such intention before trial. K.S.A. 22-3219(1) (Ensley 1988). By relying on such defense, the defendant thereby submitted himself or herself and consented to orders if the court might require a mental examination. K.S.A. 22-3219(2) (Ensley 1988). In State v. Boan, 235 Kan. at 814, this court emphasized that under the right or wrong prong of the M'Naghten test, wrong means prohibited by law rather than morally or socially wrong. This clarification is reflected in the applicable PIK instruction, PIK Crim.3d 54.10 (1995 Supp.), which states the test for insanity for crimes committed prior to January 1, 1996. Diminished Capacity. The defense of diminished capacity was formally recognized in Kansas in State v. Jackson, 238 Kan. 793, 714 P.2d 1368, cert denied 479 U.S. 821 (1986). In Jackson, this court stated that the defense of diminished capacity was not a substitute for a plea of insanity. Where a defendant is sane, he or she may use the doctrine of diminished capacity for the limited purpose of negating specific intent. Whether to instruct on diminished capacity is within the sound discretion of the trial court. 238 Kan. at 798. In State v. Maas, 242 Kan. 44, 744 P.2d 1222 (1987), this court reaffirmed the principles stated in Jackson and further suggested that it would be better practice for the trial court to give an instruction on diminished capacity where such an instruction is reasonably necessary to inform the jury of the effect of a defendant's diminished capacity on the specific intent required for the crime charged. Until the Pattern Instruction Committee of the Judicial Council has provided such an instruction, an instruction in the following form would be appropriate: `Diminished mental capacity of the defendant not amounting to insanity is not a complete defense to a criminal charge, but when a particular intent or other state of mind is a necessary element of the offense charged, diminished mental capacity may be taken into consideration in determining whether the accused was capable of forming the necessary specific intent or state of mind.' 242 Kan. at 52-53. The PIK committee eventually published the applicable instruction, PIK Crim.3d 54.12-B (1999 Supp.), which is a shortened version of the court's suggestion in Maas. The New Mens Rea Approach. The enactment in 1995 of K.S.A. 22-3220, and corresponding amendments to K.S.A. 22-3219 and other statutes, abolished the insanity defense for crimes committed on or after January 1, 1996. See generally, Note, 8 J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 253 (1999). K.S.A. 22-3220 provides: It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged. Mental disease or defect is not otherwise a defense. The provisions of this section shall be in force and take effect on and after January 1, 1996. References to the defense of insanity or other defense involving the presence of mental disease or defect formerly in K.S.A. 22-3219 were also removed, and the amended statute provides that a defendant who intends to rely on the defense that as a result of mental disease or defect [he or she] lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged must serve written notice of the defense within 30 days of the defendant's plea of not guilty. See L. 1995, ch. 251, § 25; K.S.A. 22-3219. The jury instruction applicable for the new mens rea approach to mental disease or defect as a defense, PIK Crim.3d 54.10 (1996 Supp.), states: 54.10 MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT (For Crimes Committed January 1, 1996 or Thereafter) Evidence has been presented that the defendant was afflicted by mental disease or defect at the time of the alleged crime. Such evidence is to be considered only in determining whether the defendant had the state of mind required to commit the crime. You are instructed the defendant is not criminally responsible for (his)(her) acts if because of mental disease or defect the defendant lacked the (set out the particular state of mind which is an element of the crime or crimes charged). Although Hedges' crimes were committed after the effective date of the new legislation, the trial court instructed on diminished capacity applicable to crimes committed before January 1, 1996. At the jury instructions conference, the court, the State, and the defendant's trial attorney operated under the misconception that the old law, on insanity (M'Naghten) and diminished capacity, was applicable. The arguments made to the court in support of and in opposition to the insanity defense instruction were phrased in terms of whether there was sufficient evidence that Hedges understood the nature of his acts or whether he understood the difference between right and wrong. The court denied trial counsel's request for an instruction on a M'Naghten insanity defense for several reasons, including (1) the evidence was insufficient under the M'Naghten test to send the issue of insanity to the jury and, relatedly, because Hedges' testimony ruled out the insanity defense; and (2) unfair surprise to the State because, despite timely notices of intent to rely on an insanity defense or a mental disease or defect defense, both of which had been given by Hedges' pretrial counsel, Hedges later stated that he did not want to and would not rely on the defense of insanity. It is important to note that Hedges' trial counsel, in opening statement, never informed the jury of an intent to rely on insanity and that after the evidence was submitted, the trial judge refused to give an instruction on the defense of insanity. After Hedges was convicted by the jury, he expressed dissatisfaction with his trial counsel, who was then replaced by a third attorney. The post-trial attorney realized the instruction error regarding the applicable law for mental disease or defect as a defense. The post-trial attorney filed a motion for new trial, arguing that because the jury had not been properly instructed on the mental disease or defect defense pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3219, Hedges was entitled to a new trial. Hedges' trial counsel did not request an instruction for mental disease or defect and wrongly argued that a M'Naghten insanity defense instruction was appropriate. Because an insanity defense was no longer applicable, the judge's failure to give the requested insanity instruction was not error. The effect of giving the inapplicable diminished capacity instruction is a different question. We note that there was no objection made to the diminished capacity instruction given by the trial court. In such circumstances, no party may assign as error the giving of an instruction unless he or she objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he or she objects and the grounds of his or her objection, unless the instruction is clearly erroneous. K.S.A. 22-3414. Instructions are clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is firmly convinced that there is a real possibility the jury would have rendered a different verdict if the trial error had not occurred. State v. Henry, 263 Kan. 118, 131, 947 P.2d 1020 (1997). Under the new mental disease or defect statute, evidence of mental illness is admissible only to the extent it relates to the defendant's ability to form the requisite intent to commit the crime. The court's instruction was actually beneficial to Hedges; he was given the possibility of an additional defense he was not entitled to receive under the law applicable to his case. Even if Hedges suffered from a mental disease or defect, there was no evidence that mental disease impaired Hedges' ability to form the requisite intent of the crimes. Furthermore, the instruction was not clearly erroneous. The substance of the diminished capacity instruction given and the proper mental disease or defect instruction focus on the defendant's ability to form intent. Therefore, the trial court's instruction to the jury was not reversible error. The district court correctly denied the defendant's post-trial motion for a new trial.