Opinion ID: 1867766
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: denial of a speedy trial.

Text: ¶ 10. This Court has stated that the: [r]eview of a speedy trial claim encompasses the fact question of whether the trial delay rose from good cause. Under this Court's standard of review, this Court will uphold a decision based on substantial, credible evidence. If no probative evidence supports the trial court's finding of good cause, this Court will ordinarily reverse. DeLoach v. State, 722 So.2d 512, 516 (Miss. 1998) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Miller now argues, for the first time, that the delay in her trial violated a statutory right to a trial within 270 days of her arraignment under Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-1 [8] (Rev.2000) and a constitutional right to a speedy trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; [9] Article 3, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution; and the unanimous holding of the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). ¶ 11. As this issue is raised for the first time on appeal, the trial court was not afforded the opportunity to conduct an evidentiary hearing and consider evidence and/or testimony regarding the speedy trial issue. This Court is ill-suited to act as a fact-finder. See Southern v. Miss. State Hosp., 853 So.2d 1212, 1214 (Miss.2003) (The role of an appellate court is not to be a fact finder but rather determine and apply the law to the facts determined by the trier of fact.). Therefore, this issue is dismissed without prejudice. If properly filed, the circuit court, a court of record, with testimony and exhibits, is better positioned to assess Miller's claim of a speedy trial violation under the totality of the circumstances via an evidentiary hearing. At that evidentiary hearing, both the defendant and the State may address the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the timeliness and adequacy of Miller's assertion of her right, and prejudice to Miller, [10] along with other relevant circumstances. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182.