Opinion ID: 2981099
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The January 7, 2009 Continuance

Text: The trial was initially set for January 12, 2009. On December 17, 2008, Richardson, who was proceeding pro se at the time, moved for a continuance of the trial date. On December 31, 2008, Richardson asked to be represented by counsel, and the court made arrangements to appoint an attorney Richardson had chosen. The court suggested a trial date of March 30, 2009, and Richardson’s newly appointed counsel indicated that he could be prepared by then. At the close of the conference, the court noted that the continuance was in the interest of justice for both Richardson and codefendant Welti, stating “I will designate the period between now and the current trial date of March 30th as a period of delay that is in the interest of justice, and that the continuance outweighs the best interest of the public and the two defendants in this case in a speedy trial.” (Page ID # 1768.) The court also noted that the documents were voluminous, but many of them were the same as the evidence produced in the first indictment. Richardson responded that his counsel needed time to review the documents. On January 7, 2009, the court entered an order stating that the delay was in the interests of justice because the defendants needed time to review the substantial evidence in the case. No. 11-3127 United States v. Richardson Page 6 “Defense counsel’s need for additional time to prepare an unusually complex case is an appropriate reason for granting a continuance.” Stone, 2012 WL 432251, at . Therefore, there is no abuse of discretion in subtracting this continuance from the speedy-trial clock. Furthermore, the court put its specific reasoning—that the defense needed time to review records and prepare for trial—on the record three separate times, so this ends-of-justice continuance was properly excluded from the speedy-trial clock. Zedner, 547 U.S. at 506–508.