Opinion ID: 714054
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 34 Hickok challenges the sufficiency of the evidence introduced by the Government at his trial and asks this court to reverse his convictions for mail fraud and conspiracy. He follows in the footsteps of countless criminal defendants who have made similar arguments in this court, and, like them, he bears a heavy burden, United States v. James, 923 F.2d 1261, 1267 (7th Cir.1991), and faces a nearly insurmountable hurdle. United States v. Teague, 956 F.2d 1427, 1433 (7th Cir.1992). Usually, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, defer to the credibility determinations of the jury, and overturn a verdict  '[o]nly when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'  Id. (quotation omitted); United States v. Bolen, 45 F.3d 140, 142 (7th Cir.1995). However, this is not an ordinary case because, although Hickok made a motion for acquittal at the close of the Government's case, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29, he did not renew this motion at the close of all the evidence or within seven days of the verdicts. 9 Consequently, under well-established precedent in this circuit, Hickok has waived an appellate challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and may obtain a reversal only if he demonstrates a manifest miscarriage of justice. United States v. Archambault, 62 F.3d 995, 998 (7th Cir.1995); Bolen, 45 F.3d at 142; James, 923 F.2d at 1267; United States v. Caudill, 915 F.2d 294, 296-97 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Berardi, 675 F.2d 894, 902 n. 16 (7th Cir.1982). First of all, we wish to make it clear that a manifest miscarriage of justice has not occurred in this case. Indeed, the evidence supporting Hickok's convictions is so abundant that, in our opinion, his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence would fail even under the standard of review that normally applies. In other words, even if Hickok had properly preserved the sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue (by renewing his motion for judgment of acquittal in a timely fashion), we would still affirm his convictions. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we are of the definite opinion that a rational trier of fact could, would, and should have found that the Government established the essential elements of mail fraud and conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
35 Hickok was convicted of two counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, which provides that: 36 Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud ... for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail ... any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 37 In order to sustain a conviction under the federal mail fraud statute, the Government must introduce evidence sufficient to establish three elements: (1) the defendant's participation in a scheme to defraud; (2) the defendant's intent to defraud, and (3) use of the mails in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. United States v. Walker, 9 F.3d 1245, 1249 (7th Cir.1993) (upholding mail fraud conviction against sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge). The evidence introduced by the Government at Hickok's trial amply supports each of these elements. 38 The evidence clearly establishes that Hickok participated in a scheme to defraud USC. The Supreme Court has held that the words to defraud in the mail fraud statute refer 'to wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes,' and 'usually signify the deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching.'  McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 2881, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987) (quotations omitted). Hickok used a variety of devices to obtain things of value that properly belonged to USC: telephone equipment, cellular telephone service, money derived from bogus commissions, promotional coupons, and internal USC files. While the methods for obtaining these items varied, Hickok's modus operandi consistently involved using DeWitt's financial problems and his position at USC to his own advantage. 39 The evidence also establishes that the defendant acted with the intent to defraud USC. Mail fraud is a specific intent crime. United States v. Ashman, 979 F.2d 469, 480 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Draiman; 784 F.2d 248, 254 (7th Cir.1986). Hickok, not surprisingly, claims that he never intended to defraud USC. Hickok testified that he was under the impression that the telephones he acquired from DeWitt (while both men were in Arizona) belonged to DeWitt and not USC. Regarding the part of his fraudulent scheme that unfolded in Indiana, Hickok denied receiving commissions to which he was not entitled and claimed that he intended to pay for his outstanding USC service bills and the large amount of equipment obtained on open invoice at a later date. There are two reasons why Hickok's testimony is not dispositive: first, the jury obviously found this testimony less credible than that of the Government's witnesses and second, the jury was entitled to draw inferences from all of the evidence introduced at the trial (circumstantial or otherwise) to conclude that Hickok intended to defraud USC. Id. (intent may be inferred 'when the scheme has [a fraudulent] effect as a necessary result of carrying it out.' ) (quotation omitted). Indeed, almost all of the evidence with the exception of Hickok's testimony made clear that the defendant deliberately and repeatedly used his advantageous relationship with DeWitt as part of a scheme to cheat and defraud USC out of inventory and cash. This evidence included DeWitt's testimony (which contradicted Hickok's on a number of points) 10 and Hickok's signed statement admitting to the practice of kickbacks. Additionally, Kim Emery and Jodie Oldham both testified as to the quid pro quo nature of the relationship between Hickok and DeWitt. At USC, Emery was in a position to observe the special favors extended to Hickok. She testified that she and other employees at USC suspected DeWitt was in trouble. She also stated that Hickok alluded to the special arrangement he had with DeWitt by asking DeWitt You think we should let Kim know what's going on? Jodie Oldham, at CIC, knew that Hickok's company had more or less unlimited access to USC inventory and realized that this practice was out of the ordinary. According to Oldham, Hickok characterized this special treatment as payback for favors and/or loans he had extended to DeWitt. 40 Much ink has been spilled on the third and final element of mail fraud: use of the mails in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. See, e.g., Kendra M. Matthews & Therese Myers, Tenth Survey of White Collar Crime: Mail and Wire Fraud, 32 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 481, 492-96 (Winter 1995). However, in most cases this element is fairly easy to satisfy, and we are convinced that it was in fact sufficiently established by the Government in this case. The two mailings alleged in the indictment and proven at Hickok's trial involved commission checks that USC in Chicago sent to Hickok via U.S. mail; the first was a check for $14,700 dated August 18 (representing July commissions), and the second was a check for $30,550 dated October 12 (representing September commissions). 41 As an initial matter, we note that it does not matter that ... these mailings [i.e., the checks themselves] contained no false or misleading information, because even routine and innocent mailings can ... supply an element of the offense of mail fraud. United States v. Brocksmith, 991 F.2d 1363, 1368 (7th Cir.1993). 42 Furthermore, it is irrelevant that the defendant did not personally mail the [checks] in question, United States v. Koen, 982 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir.1992), for [a] mailing by a third party suffices if it is 'incident to an essential part of the scheme.'  United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir.1993) (quotation omitted). The use of the mails element is satisfied if a defendant knowingly cause[s] the mails to be used in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. Brocksmith, 991 F.2d at 1367. According to the Supreme Court, [w]here one does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended, then he 'causes' the mails to be used for purposes of the mail fraud statute. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9, 74 S.Ct. 358, 362-63, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954) (emphasis added). 43 Obtaining commissions to which he was not entitled was an essential part of Hickok's scheme to defraud USC, although it was by no means the only way in which Hickok cheated the company. Moreover, the use of the mails was incidental to this part of Hickok's scheme, even if it was not strictly necessary or indispensable to the success of the scheme. Brocksmith, 991 F.2d at 1367. In order to receive commission money which he had not earned and to which he was not entitled, Hickok had to (and did) submit commission reports, which were processed by USC in Logansport and then forwarded to the Chicago office, which in turn issued the actual commission checks by mail. In these fraudulent commission reports, according to the testimony of Emery and DeWitt, Hickok claimed duplicate commissions and commissions for sales that never took place. DeWitt, for his part, overlooked charge backs that ought to have been made (i.e., deductions from the commissions for customers of Hickok's who canceled their service within a short time, see note 4 supra ). Obviously, the use of the mails to send commission checks from Chicago to Logansport followed in the ordinary course of business, or was at least reasonably foreseeable by Hickok. 44 To summarize our position with respect to the use of the mails element, we hold that the Government introduced evidence sufficient to establish that: (1) the use of the mails was incidental to an essential part of the scheme to defraud USC, i.e., obtaining bogus commissions, and (2) Hickok, by submitting fraudulent commission reports in order to receive commission checks, knowingly caused the mails to be used in furtherance of a scheme to defraud USC.
45 Hickok also argues that the Government failed to introduce evidence sufficient to sustain his conviction for conspiracy. A jury convicted Hickok of conspiring to commit an offense against the United States (i.e., mail fraud), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. In order to convict a defendant of conspiracy, the Government must prove that (1) there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act, (2) the defendant was a party to the agreement, and (3) an overt act 11 was committed in furtherance of the agreement by one of the co-conspirators. United States v. Tuchow, 768 F.2d 855, 869 (7th Cir.1985). Our decisions are very clear that for purposes of appellate review these elements must be supported by substantial evidence. United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221, 1229 (7th Cir.1990). However, it is also true that we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and accept circumstantial evidence as support, even sole support, for a [conspiracy] conviction. Id. Moreover, the Government need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence so long as the total evidence permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Campbell, 985 F.2d 341, 344-45 (7th Cir.1993). 46 We are of the opinion that substantial evidence supports all three elements of the conspiracy charge against Hickok. Not surprisingly, much of the same evidence that supports Hickok's mail fraud convictions (i.e., the testimony establishing his participation in an intentional scheme to defraud USC) also supports the jury verdict finding Hickok guilty of conspiracy. 47 With respect to the first element of conspiracy (an agreement between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act), we note that [t]he Government is not required to demonstrate the existence of a formal agreement to conspire. United States v. Mojica, 984 F.2d 1426, 1432 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Castaneda v. United States, 508 U.S. 947, 113 S.Ct. 2433, 124 L.Ed.2d 653 (1993). Rather, proof of this element may rest upon circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom concerning the relationship of the parties, their overt acts, and the totality of their conduct. Id. Moreover, when a jury may reasonably infer [an] ... agreement ... the jury verdict must be upheld. Id. Our review of the record indicates that Hickok and DeWitt were parties to such a conspiratorial agreement. In other words, there was substantial evidence that DeWitt and Hickok enjoyed an ongoing cooperative relationship which facilitated the success of a common [unlawful] venture, id., namely, ripping off USC. Perhaps the most damning evidence of an agreement, apart from DeWitt's testimony, was Jodie Oldham's statement that Hickok and CIC were allowed special treatment (i.e., favors at the expense of USC) because DeWitt owed Hickok. Kim Emery's testimony, similarly, suggested that the defendant and DeWitt had a collusive understanding that involved siphoning money and property from USC to Hickok. Hickok's own characterization of the payments to DeWitt as kickbacks 12 is, in our view, even further proof of an agreement. 48 Our cases often describe the second element of conspiracy (defendant's membership therein) as requiring the Government to demonstrate a participatory link between the defendant and the conspiracy, i.e., proof that the defendant knew of the conspiracy and that he intended to join and associate himself with its criminal design and purpose. Campbell, 985 F.2d at 344-45. This element may also be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence. United States v. Vega, 860 F.2d 779, 793 (7th Cir.1988). Again, much of the evidence supporting Hickok's participation in a scheme to defraud USC also supports this element of conspiracy. As discussed in the previous section of this opinion, the record contains substantial evidence that Hickok was a knowing and willing participant in a conspiracy to defraud USC. Much of the initiative in the relationship between DeWitt and Hickok came from the defendant and it is all too clear that the defendant repeatedly took advantage of DeWitt in order to obtain what rightfully belonged to USC. 49 Finally, we think it obvious that the Government established the third element of conspiracy: the overt act requirement. Under the general conspiracy statute, an overt act is defined as any act to effect the object of the conspiracy. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (emphasis added). An overt act need not be a completed offense or the ultimate goal of the conspiracy ... [it] need only be an action taken in furtherance of the conspiracy by one or more of the conspirators. United States v. Murzyn, 631 F.2d 525, 534 (7th Cir.1980). Testimony at Hickok's trial established that Hickok made payments to DeWitt for equipment belonging to USC, obtained a loan to cover DeWitt's $9,800 shortfall, requested open invoice status at USC in Logansport, instructed his office manager not to pay the USC service bills, and filed fraudulent commission reports. Any of these measures (to say nothing of the things that DeWitt did to advance the conspiracy) could be considered an overt act because each of them advanced the goal or object of the conspiracy, which was to defraud USC.
50 We wish to emphasize that when called upon to review the sufficiency of the evidence, our role is exceedingly narrow, United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 503 (7th Cir.1986) (citations omitted), and we will not second-guess a jury on credibility issues. While this court's review is confined to the cold pages of an appellate transcript, the jury had an opportunity to observe the verbal and non-verbal behavior of the witnesses, including the subject's reactions and responses to the interrogatories, their facial expressions, attitudes, tone of voice, eye contact, posture and body movements. United States v. Lakich, 23 F.3d 1203, 1210-11 (7th Cir.1994) (quotation omitted). Essentially, Hickok argues that his own testimony was stronger and more credible than that of the prosecution and invites us to re-assess and re-weigh the evidence introduced at his trial. We decline this invitation, because [i]t is not the task of this appellate court to reconsider the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Mojica, 984 F.2d at 1435. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, and deferring to the jury's evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses, we are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to support Hickok's conviction. Accordingly, there was no manifest miscarriage of justice. See Bolen, 45 F.3d at 143. 51