Opinion ID: 78313
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Bribery, Conspiracy and Related Mail Fraud Counts[18]

Text: Defendants argue that the sole evidence of any explicit quid pro quo in connection with Siegelman's appointment of Scrushy to the CON Board was Bailey's testimony regarding the conversation he had with Siegelman following the meeting at which Scrushy delivered the first $250,000 check to Siegelman, and that this evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury's finding of a quid pro quo. We disagree. Bailey testified that after the meeting, Siegelman showed him the check, said that it was from Scrushy and that Scrushy was halfway there. Bailey asked what in the world is he going to want for that? Siegelman replied, the CON Board. Bailey then asked, I wouldn't think that would be a problem, would it? Siegelman responded, I wouldn't think so. Defendants assert that this conversation shows that there was not an explicit or express agreement at this time between Siegelman and Scrushy. They argue that the conversation on its face indicates that, at best, there was only some vague expectation about the future. Defendants assert that Bailey's testimony shows at most that: Governor Siegelman knew, or at least thought, that Scrushy wanted a C.O.N. Board appointment in recognition of the contributionand that Governor Siegelman didn't think that making such an appointment would present a problem. According to defendants, even if the conversation between Bailey and Siegelman took place exactly as Bailey recounts, no one can `infer' from the alleged conversation recounted by Bailey that a true explicit promise or agreement had happened behind closed doors. What is missing in this record, according to defendants, is any evidence of a discussion between Governor Siegelman and Scrushy to the effect of I will make this contribution, and in exchange for this contribution you will appoint me. Are we agreed on that? Yes we are. [19] In the absence of such evidence, according to the defendants, no reasonable juror could infer an explicit agreement between Siegelman and Scrushy. We disagree. Inferring actors' states of mind from the circumstances surrounding their conversation, from their actions, and from their words spoken at the time is precisely the province of the jury. As we noted above, the [jury] is quite capable of deciding the intent with which words were spoken or actions taken as well as the reasonable construction given to them by the official and the payor. See Evans, 504 U.S. at 274, 112 S.Ct. 1881 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In making these judgments, jurors are presumed to use their common sense and are free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence. See United States v. Mosquera, 779 F.2d 628, 630 (11th Cir.1986). Bailey's testimony was competent evidence that Siegelman and Scrushy had agreed to a deal in which Scrushy's donation would be rewarded with a seat on the CON Board. The jurors were free to give it a different construction, but they did not. Furthermore, this was not the sole evidence that Scrushy bribed Siegelman. The jury was entitled to construe this conversation in the context of the substantial additional testimony they had heard regarding Scrushy's donation to the lottery campaign fund. For example, Bailey repeatedly testified, without qualification, that Siegelman and Scrushy had an explicit agreement to exchange money for a seat on the CON Board. [20] . Bailey also testified that Siegelman met with Eric Hanson, an outside lobbyist for HealthSouth, and told him that because Scrushy had contributed at least $350,000 to Siegelman's opponent in the general election that Scrushy needed to do at least $500,000 in order to make it right with the Siegelman campaign. Bailey testified that Siegelman was referring to the campaign for the lottery initiative, and that Hanson was to relay this conversation to Scrushy. Bailey also testified that, in another conversation, Hanson told Bailey that Scrushy wanted control of the CON Board. Martin corroborated Bailey's testimony when he stated that [h]e [Scrushy] told me that if we raised that money, then we would have a spot on the CON Board, and We were making a contribution . . . in exchange for a spot on the CON Board. Martin also testified that Hanson bragged about getting HealthSouth a seat on the CON Board with the help of the IHS check. Cline testified that Siegelman told him that Scrushy was responsible for the first $250,000 check and that there was another $250,000 that would be coming. Cline also testified that the receipt of the checks by the Foundation was not reported until after newspaper articles questioning the Foundation's finances. [21] McGahan's testimony regarding Scrushy's solicitation of him to make the donation also supported an inference that the donation was illicit. Loretta Skeleton, HealthSouth's lawyer, testified that, although she was responsible for Health-South political contributions, she was told nothing about the $500,000 donations. Finally, the close relationship in time between the first check and Siegelman's appointment of Scrushy was also some evidence of quid pro quo. In sum, the evidence was sufficient such that a reasonable juror could have concluded that Siegelman and Scrushy explicitly agreed to a corrupt quid pro quo, thereby proving the bribery, conspiracy and the two related mail fraud counts (Counts 6 and 7).