Opinion ID: 1678867
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equal Protection Under art. I, sec. 1

Text: We now proceed to examine the scheme of financing under the constitutional provision for equal protection. Wisconsin Constitution art. I, sec. 1 provides: All people are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. The same alleged deficiencies in the system of school finance are asserted as the basis for appellants' equal protection argument. More specifically, the theoretical basis of appellants' position is that the finance system fails to treat similarly situated students equally to the extent that the quality of education a student receives depends upon his or her place of residence. The appellants further assert that the right to an equal opportunity for education is a fundamental right and that, consequently, the legislative classification is subject to strict scrutiny as opposed to the lesser rational basis standard. Recently, this court restated the basis for determining the standard to be applied to equal protection challenges as follows: '[U]nless a statute may be said to affect a fundamental right or to create a classification based on a suspect criterion, the standard this court uses in reviewing the constitutionality of a statutory classification is the rational basis test.' Treiber, 135 Wis.2d at 70 (quoting Hilber v. State, 89 Wis.2d 49, 54, 277 N.W.2d 839 (1979)). Appellants have not asserted that the alleged discrimination affects a suspect class. We would, furthermore, have rejected a claim of wealth discrimination constituting a suspect criterion had such a claim been made. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, reh'g denied 411 U.S. 959 (1973) (school finance system which allegedly resulted in wealth discrimination did not affect suspect class). Cf. Will v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 397, 402, 267 N.W.2d 357 (1978). [3] However, we do agree with appellants that equal opportunity for education is a fundamental right: The involvement of the legislature from the framing of the constitution to the present and the many cases which have come before this court, emphasize that the equal opportunity for education as defined by art. X, sec. 3, is a fundamental right. Buse, 74 Wis. 2d at 567 (emphasis added). We qualify this finding by emphasizing that equal opportunity for education does not mandate absolute equality in districts' per-pupil expenditures. In fact, such complete equalization is constitutionally prohibited to the extent that it would necessarily inhibit local control. Id. at 570-72. [4] Moreover, to the extent that art. X delineates state distribution of resources on an equal per-pupil basis, to assert that equal opportunity for education mandates an entirely different scheme of financing requiring the state to distribute resources unequally among students to respond to the particularized needs of each student is inconsistent with the intent evidenced in the express language of art. X. Accordingly, since the deficiency allegedly exists not in the denial of a right to attend a public school free of charge, nor in the less affluent districts' failure to meet the educational standards delineated under sec. 121.02, Stats., nor in the state's failure to distribute state resources to the less affluent districts on at least an equal per-pupil basis as distribution is made to wealthier districts, no fundamental right is implicated in the challenged spending disparity. Our decision today upholding the constitutionality of the school finance system is consistent with principles articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. However, our analysis differs conceptually regarding the appropriate standard to be applied to review the constitutionality of a school finance system under an equal protection challenge. Specifically, in Rodriguez, the Court held that there is no fundamental right to education, on the basis of its finding that such right was neither explicitly nor implicitly protected under the federal Constitution. Id., at 35. This holding was reaffirmed, although somewhat qualified, in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, reh'g denied 458 U.S. 1131 (1982), where the Court again stated that education is not a fundamental right, but stated that there could be no rational basis for the complete denial of education unless the discrimination furthered some substantial goal of the State. Id. at 224. Further clarification of the appropriate standard to be applied regarding a federal equal protection analysis concerning education was provided in Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986). In Papasan, the Court reiterated that in Rodriguez the Court did not foreclose the possibility that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either [the right to speak or the right to vote]. Id. at 284, quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36. However, allegations asserting the denial of a minimally adequate education were rejected in Papasan, where the claim focused upon spending disparities rather than alleging that the school children are not taught to read or write ... [or] that they receive no instruction on even the educational basics.... Id. at 286. Accordingly, in Papasan, the Rodriguez rational basis standard was applied. [5] Therefore, notwithstanding our recognition that education is, to a certain degree, a fundamental right, we apply, as did the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez, a rational basis standard because the rights at issue in the case before the court are premised upon spending disparities and not upon a complete denial of educational opportunity within the scope of art. X. A similar analysis was applied by the Supreme Court of Arizona in Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 90, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (1973), in which the court held that the education clause in the constitution providing for a general and uniform public school system created a fundamental right to basic education. However, the court nevertheless applied a rational basis standard in its examination of the spending disparities created by the school finance system. The court upheld the finance system and noted that [a] school financing system which meets the educational mandates of our constitution, i.e, uniform, free, available to all persons aged six to twenty-one, and open a minimum of six months per year, need otherwise be only rational, reasonable and neither discriminatory nor capricious. 110 Ariz. at 90, 515 P.2d at 592. Prior to embarking upon an investigation of a rational basis, we note that ch. 121, Stats., does not facially discriminate against appellants or like districts. In fact, any facial discrimination under ch. 121 discriminates in favor of property-poor districts in pursuit of the goal of minimizing the impact of wealth disparities upon educational opportunities. To the extent that district per-pupil expenditures may differ as a consequence of the operation of ch. 121, this difference is a result of decisions made at the local levela variation whose legitimacy is grounded in the constitutional requirement that control be retained by localities. As we stated in Buse, 74 Wis.2d at 572: Considering the expressed provisions of art. X, sec. 4; the expressed concern of the framers of the constitution that local interest in local school systems be maintained; and the contemporaneous construction evidenced by sec. 40, ch. 19, Revised statutes of 1849, it is evident that the power possessed by local districts to determine what educational subjects it will offer over and above those required by the state, and to raise funds therefor, is not merely a delegated power. Rather the state-local control dichotomy in that limited regard is part and parcel of the constitution. That dichotomy has been an essential feature of our educational system since the adoption of the constitution and that fact in itself is entitled to some weight. Board of Education v. Sinclair, [65 Wis.2d 179, 222 N.W.2d 143 (1974)]. Local districts retain the control to provide educational opportunities over and above those required by the state and they retain the power to raise and spend revenue ... for the support of common schools therein,... (Emphasis added.) These rights of the local districts have their foundations in the constitution. The principle of local control in Wisconsin, therefore, is not merely a theoretical notion, but rather is a constitutionally based and protected precept as to which the framers of our constitution were firmly committed. The Court in Rodriguez likewise respected the need to permit localities the retention of control in education. At issue in Rodriguez were spending disparities among districts which existed under the challenged school finance system. The finance system was a foundation plan which permitted district supplements from local property taxes and, consequently, the system resulted in spending disparities. The Court described the nature of the educational finance dilemma as follows: 'The history of education since the industrial revolution shows a continual struggle between two forces: the desire by members of society to have educational opportunity for all children, and the desire of each family to provide the best education it can afford for its own children.' 411 U.S. at 49, quoting J. Coleman, Foreword to G. Strayer & R. Haig, The Financing of Education in the State of New York (1923). The Court found the balance between the two described forces to have been properly struck in the Texas school finance system: While assuring a basic education for every child in the State, it permits and encourages a large measure of participation in and control of each district's schools at the local level. In an era that has witnessed a consistent trend toward centralization of the functions of government, local sharing of responsibility for public education has survived. The merit of local control was recognized last Term in both the majority and dissenting opinions in Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). Mr. Justice Stewart stated there that [d]irect control over decisions vitally affecting the education of one's children is a need that is strongly felt in our society. Id., at 469. The Chief Justice, in his dissent, agreed that [l]ocal control is not only vital to continued public support of the schools, but it is of overriding importance from an educational standpoint as well. Id., at 478. Id. [12] The Court in Rodriguez also emphasized that the school finance system implicated issues of fiscal policy and educational policy, both as to which the legislature should be accorded deference: [W]e stand on familiar ground when we continue to acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues. Yet, we are urged to direct the States either to alter drastically the present system or to throw out the property tax altogether in favor of some other form of taxation. No scheme of taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, income, or purchases of goods and services, has yet been devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become subjects of criticism under the Equal Protection Clause. In addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case also involves the most persistent and difficult questions of educational policy, another area in which this Court's lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference with the informed judgments made at the state and local levels. Education, perhaps even more than welfare assistance, presents a myriad of intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. [471] at 487 [(1970)]. The very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide public school system suggests that there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of solving them, and that, within the limits of rationality, the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems should be entitled to respect. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. [535], at 546-547 [(1972)]. Id. at 41-42 (quoted in part in Treiber, 135 Wis. 2d at 66-67). [6] This court has previously expressed deference to legislative policy involving fiscal-educational decisions: If character of instruction was all that was required to be as nearly uniform as practicable under the mandate of the constitution, then it was left up to this court to ultimately determine what subjects were to be included in character of instruction and to the legislature to determine what uniformity was practicable. Buse, 74 Wis. 2d at 566 (emphasis added). While our deference would abruptly cease should the legislature determine that it was impracticable to provide to each student a right to attend a public school at which a basic education could be obtained, or if funds were discriminatorily disbursed and there existed no rational basis for such finance system, we will otherwise defer to the legislature's determination of the degree to which fiscal policy can be applied to achieve uniformity. Consequently, we hold, for the reasons discussed above, that in the present case there is a rational basis justifying any disparities in per-pupil expenditures resulting from the operation of ch. 121, Stats., the rational basis being the preservation of local control over education as mandated by art. X of the Wisconsin Constitution. [13] Because issues such as equality in education are peppered with political perceptions and emotionally laden views, we have carefully restrained our consideration of the constitutional issues before us from becoming so flavored. [14] Therefore, our approach to the case at bar has been with a `disciplined perception of the proper role of the courts in the resolution of our State's educational problems, and to that end, more specifically, judicial discernment of the reach of the mandates of our State Constitution in this regard.' Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Ed., 295 Md. 597, 658, 458 A.2d 758, 790 (1983) (quoting Bd. of Ed., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 49 n. 9, 439 N.E.2d 359, 369 n. 9, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 654 n. 9 (1982)). To do otherwise would be an unwise and unwarranted entry into the controversial area of public school financing, whereby this Court would convene as a `super-legislature,' legislating in a turbulent field of social, economic and political policy. McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 644, 285 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1981) (quoting Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 798, 537 P.2d 635, 640 (1975)). Finally, because we find the general equalization formula under ch. 121 to be constitutional under both art. X, sec. 3 and art. I, sec. 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, we have not needed to incorporate into our constitutional analysis the legislation which was enacted subsequent to the commencement of this litigation. [15] However, because our deference to the legislature was with recognition that the deficiencies addressed by appellants and, in part, conceded by respondents, are significant, we note that many of the specific concerns of the appellants have been subsequently addressed by the legislature. Specifically, we note the following statutory provisions enacted in 1985 Wis. act 29 and 1987 Wis. act 27: sec. 115.44, Stats., (establishing early identification program to assist minority and economically disadvantaged pupils in grades 8 to 12 in pursuing higher educational opportunities by providing direction toward attainment of career goals); sec. 121.004(7)(c), Stats. (providing that a pupil attending a five-year-old kindergarten requiring full-day attendance shall be counted as one pupil); sec. 115.45(4)(a), Stats., (providing grants for programs including structured educational experiences for four-year-old pupils focusing on the needs of low-income pupils); sec. 121.85(6)(g), Stats. (providing additional. 2 weighting factor for children in minority census tract exceeding base year enrollment); sec. 118.153, Stats. (state aid for programs for children at risk); and sec. 121.10, Stats. (providing for minimum state aid to school districts based upon median household income). More recently, additional legislation was enacted and was targeted to respond to the problems of educationally and economically disadvantaged students. This legislation, which amended ch. 119, Stats., was contained within the budget bill, 1987 Wis. act 399. Those provisions of 1987 Wis. act 399 which addressed educational problems associated with poverty included the following: (1) Section 371d, creating sec. 119.71, Stats., which provided grants to Milwaukee public schools for expansion of the half-day five-year-old kindergarten program to a full-day program for children who meet federal income eligibility standards for free lunch; (2) sec. 371h, creating sec. 119.72, Stats., which provided aid to Milwaukee public schools for early childhood education for four- and five-year-olds, targeting educationally disadvantaged pupils; (3) sec. 371mp, creating sec. 119.74, Stats., which provided for the establishment of mentor programs for economically or educationally disadvantaged pupils. The sum appropriated to finance the kindergarten and early childhood education programs for Milwaukee public schools provided under secs. 371d and 371h, respectively, is 3.1 million dollars. 1987 Wis. act 399, sec. 20.255(2)(ec). Thus, the legislature has been responsive to the problems before the court. Additionally, while societal action in the form of support of local schools cannot be compelled, it may be applauded. It would appear that applause is warranted, due to a renewed interest in improving education with community involvement. Examples of community effort to work in conjunction with the public school system may be found in programs such as the One on One program for at-risk youth initiated by the Greater Milwaukee Committee, providing mentors to assist students with school. This program is premised upon the following principles: The business community must recognize that it has both a role and a responsibility in the education of our young people. These boys and girls are an important part of the future workforce in Milwaukee. The widely-reported conditions which adversely affect many city childrenminority unemployment and poor housing conditions, truancy, delinquency, high drop out rate, near-rampant teen pregnancy, excessive television viewing, disinterest in learningand the resulting widespread lack of skills basic for both employment and citizenshipmust be the concern of business as well as schools, city and county service providers, families, churches and community groups. It is in the self-interest of companies both large and small to assist in addressing these problems and to help our public schools prepare our children for the world of work. Some will suggest that, in so doing, the business community is meddling in someone else's area of responsibility. We reject this parochial notion. If we are to succeed in improving the quality of education, all sectors, including business, must participate. While we concede that we are not experts in education delivery, we should be involved in education design and outcomes. We want those primarily responsible for the learning process to have a better chance for success with all students. We want to work collaboratively with Board members, administrators and teachers to create a climate conducive to widespread levels of greater achievement. Greater Milwaukee Committee, Education Committee, First Annual Report, April 6, 1987. See also Greater Milwaukee Committee, Greater Milwaukee's One on One, An Initiative for At-Risk Youth, September 14, 1987. A recent study discussed the benefits of community involvement: One way to encourage systemic reforms is to involve the entire community in efforts to solve the dropout problem. It is evident from the various surveys and program inventories discussed here, that few school districts use the resources of social service agencies, community and business groups, parents, or religious and civic organizations as integral components of their dropout programs. It is also clear that the dropout problem is extremely complex and that schools should not be expected to solve it in isolation. Several recent initiatives speak to this understanding.    Perhaps the strongest argument for community-wide intervention to reduce the school dropout rate rests in that sense of ownership. If it is recognized as a collective problem, and that working together on it can generate societal benefits which are greater than the personal costs of participation, then the community is more likely to cooperate, to coordinate its resources, and to make the extraordinary effort that is required to save many of our floundering youth. Clark, Preventing School Dropouts: What Can Be Done?, 7 Citizens Budget Commission No. 4, at 6-7. See Gill, No Easy Answers To Dropout Problem, Milwaukee Sentinel, Apr. 7, 1988, Part 1 at 16. See also newly created sec. 119.74, Stats. (providing for grants for establishment of mentor programs). Certainly such community efforts are consistent with the framers' purpose of assuring that an adequate interest was felt by the people, in common schools.... Journal and Debates, supra p. 488, at 335. [7] What has been challenged in the case at bar is not that less affluent schools have insufficient funds to provide for basic education, but that they have inadequate funds to provide specialized programs and to meet the particularized needs of students related to the effects of poverty. We recognize that more and improved programs are needed in the less affluent or overburdened districts but find that these legitimate demands may not be correctly described as claims for uniformity under Wis. Const. art. X, sec. 3 or equal treatment under Wis. Const. art. I, sec. 1, but rather constitute demands for that amount of resources necessary to meet the additional costs imposed by the student constituency of these districts. Such demands cannot be remedied by claims of constitutional discrepancies, but rather must be made to the legislature and, perhaps, also to the community. By the Court The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. STEINMETZ, J. (concurring). The legislative formula which is challenged in this case is the formula which provides the basis for distribution of public funds for the financing of public elementary and secondary education. Under the state's general aid formula, the largest portion of state aid is distributed under the label of equalization aid. I agree with the result reached by the majority; however, in coming to this conclusion, I find the appellants have not met their burden of proving the school finance system unconstitutional. The majority devotes attention to the protection of local control. I do not find local control arguments relevant to whether the formula contravenes either the uniformity provision or the guarantee of equal protection. The majority's description of the school finance formula on pages 476-481 of the majority demonstrates its complexity. Although the issue is not its complexity, it would have been helpful for one of the parties to set forth the formula in a clear fashion, if possible. The issue in this case is whether the formula has been proven unconstitutional, either on its face or in application. The appellants argue that the school financing system violates art. I, sec. 1 [1] of the Wisconsin Constitution which guarantees equal protection of the laws and art. X, sec. 3 [2] which requires that the legislature provide school districts that are as nearly uniform as practicable. Therefore, the state constitution guarantees an equal opportunity of an education that is as nearly uniform as practicable as that in another area of the state. The legislature is only required to present an equal opportunity for an education to the students. If the students are not able to take advantage of the opportunities, there is no way a change in the formula can force those opportunities upon them. I believe the standard of proof in this type of action should be clearly set forth by this court. The United States Supreme Court in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1973) stated: [W]e stand on familiar ground when we continue to acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues. Yet, we are urged to direct the States either to alter drastically the present system or to throw out the property tax altogether in favor of some other form of taxation.... Education, perhaps even more than welfare assistance, presents a myriad of intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. [471] at 487 [1970)]. The very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide public school system suggests that there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of solving them, and that, within the limits of rationality, the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems should be entitled to respect. Jefferson v. Jackney, 406 U.S. [535] at 546-47 [(1972)]. This court stated in Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 566, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976), as to deference to legislative policy involving fiscal-educational decisions: If character of instruction was all that was required to be as nearly uniform as practicable under the mandate of the constitution, then it was left up to this court to ultimately determine what subjects were to be included in character of instruction and to the legislature to determine what uniformity was practicable. Without a showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislature has unconstitutionally denied a uniform opportunity for education or has treated students unequally, I agree with the majority that, we [the court] will otherwise defer to the legislature's determination of the degree to which fiscal policy can be applied to achieve uniformity. Majority at 503. The school funding system is declared in a statute. A statute is presumed constitutional and a party challenging its constitutionality must prove it unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Soo Line R. Co. v. Transportation Dept., 101 Wis. 2d 64, 76, 303 N.W.2d 626 (1981). I believe, as does the majority, that education is a fundamental right in Wisconsin and that where a statutory classification adversely affects or interferes with a fundamental constitutional right, the classification is subject to strict scrutiny and the normal presumption of constitutionality will not apply. Buse, 74 Wis. 2d at 580 (quoting Town of Vanden Broek v. Reitz, 53 Wis. 2d 87, 93, 191 N.W.2d 913 (1971)). However, in this case the appellants do not challenge any statutory classification. They merely challenge the statutory method by which public schools are funded the statutory method of implementing the constitutional mandate. Similarly, the challenge as to the degree of uniformity resulting from the statutory scheme only questions legislation. Buse, 74 Wis. 2d at 568. Thus, the appellants carry the burden of proving that the statutory scheme is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Treiber v. Knoll, 135 Wis. 2d 58, 64, 398 N.W.2d 756 (1987). Whether a degree of uniformity is practicable is a policy decision and in the province of the legislature. This court stated in Buse, 74 Wis. 2d at 568: Whether absolute uniformity of an equal opportunity for education in all school districts of the state is socially desirable, is not for this court to decide. We can only conclude that the plain meaning of sec. 3, art. X does not mandate it. With that previous statement by the court, it is difficult to show that the lack of uniformity rises to the level of unconstitutionality. If a party could prove that the Milwaukee Public School System deteriorated to a point so as to not be comparable to other districts, the legislature would be required to take action under art. X, sec. 3. As long as the level of education funded is reasonably acceptable, the funding system is not unconstitutional. I do not believe the appellants met their burden. The circuit court decision recapitulated the evidence offered by the appellants which indicated that certain areas of the state would benefit from additional and specialized programs. The appellants have shown by test results that additional funds are needed because currently the funds do not cover the expenses incurred by disciplinary problems and early educational needs, i.e., headstart programs, early kindergarten. Additional funds may not be the exclusive answer but they may help in providing wanting children with supplies so they do not start the school day without the tools to learn and providing funds for expenses incurred because of disciplinary problems so that teachers can devote their time and energies to their expertise of teaching students. These are concerns of both a state and local nature. No one refutes that additional public support would be beneficial. Yet the constitution simply does not mandate such expenditures. The state constitution requires that an education system which is as nearly uniform as practicable be presented to each student. It does not require the legislature to allocate funds to provide a school system which produces students who are educated to a level as nearly uniform as practicable, although the latter may be desirable. [3] This case has been a public cry to the legislature, disguised as a constitutional attack, that additional funds are necessary to improve education in some districts. [4] The challenge that the formula fails to treat similarly situated students equally to the extent that the quality of education a student receives depends upon his or her place of residence also has not been demonstrated as causing a constitutional equal protection violation of art. 1, sec. 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Although I rely on different grounds, I concur with the majority's result. WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.(dissenting). The majority characterizes this case as one of spending disparities. That is not at all the focus of this case. The primary issue is whether the state, through its system of school financing, has met its constitutional obligation to provide an equal opportunity for education to all children of this state, rich and poor alike. As the record amply demonstrates, it has not. Every member of this court agrees on four basic points: 1) that it is a fundamental right of every child in this state to have an equal opportunity for education; 2) that the state is constitutionally mandated to provide that opportunity; 3) that the method the state has chosen to fulfill its constitutional responsibility is the statutorily created system of financing K-12 public education; 4) that the trial record clearly establishes that the educational needs of a significant number of school children in this state, primarily those from high poverty districts, are very great, and these needs are not being met. These children come to school unready to learn. Compensatory education programs are unavailable to remedy their learning deficiencies. Supportive services and exceptional educational needs are insufficient to assist them. The little money that is channeled into these programs comes at the expense of the regular educational programs, thereby shorting the regular programs. The result, as one educator at trial stated, is that until you meet those (social and emotional) needs, you're not going to be doing much educating.... Circuit Court dec. at 18. The reason these educational needs are not being met was established beyond any doubt in the trial court: the state system of financing K-12 public education is fundamentally flawed. The fundamental flaw of the state formula is that it distributes dollars without regard to educational needs. It assumes that every child in this state begins his or her educational journey from the same starting point. If all children began that journey from the same starting point, then the formula would provide no constitutional objection: every child would start with the same opportunity. That may well have been the reality, with few exceptions, in 1848. It is not even close to reality today. The result is that a significant number of school children in this state are denied an equal opportunity to become educated people. To use an analogy which everyone can understand, while a majority of our children are handed the educational ball on the twenty yard line, a significant number are handed this ball on the one yard line with a three-hundred pound lineman on their back. Unquestionably both groups of youngsters have the opportunity to score an educational touchdown. The opportunity, however, is far from equal. I conclude that the uniformity clause of art. X, sec. 3, of the Wisconsin Constitution mandates that the state provide a character of instruction in the state schools such that each child is provided with a uniform opportunity to become an educated person. Neither absolute uniformity nor absolute equality is required. The funding may come in part from the state and part from local government, or in whole from the state. However it comes, the opportunity to become an educated person must be relatively equal across the state. To use the analogy once more, the uniformity clause does not mandate that the character of instruction be such that everyone must score a touchdown; it does mandate that everyone on the playing field have an equal opportunity to do so. Because the state has the constitutional responsibility to provide this equal opportunity, and because it has failed to do so, I respectfully dissent.