Opinion ID: 154172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ERISA's Procedural Requirements

Text: 10 Chambers devotes a significant portion of his brief to arguing that FHP failed to follow several of ERISA's procedural requirements in denying him benefits. Specifically, Chambers alleges that FHP failed to inform him of the specific reasons for its denial of coverage as required by 29 U.S.C. Section(s) 1133(1) and 29 C.F.R. Section(s) 2560.503-1(f)(1). Chambers also contends that FHP failed to tell him the type of information he needed to submit to FHP to appeal its initial decision as required by 29 C.F.R. Section(s) 2560.503-1(f)(3)-(4). Chambers next maintains that FHP failed to tell him the evidence that FHP relied upon in making its decision as required by 29 C.F.R. Section(s) 2560.503-1(g)(1)(iii). Finally, Chambers argues that FHP failed to conduct a full and fair review of the claim by refusing to review information submitted by Chambers and by refusing to collect and review reasonably available information from other sources as required by 29 U.S.C. Section(s) 1133(2) and 29 C.F.R. 2560.503.1(g)(1). 11 As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether Chambers may properly appeal these procedural claims despite his failure to raise the claims before the magistrate judge. Although the magistrate's Memorandum and Order did not discuss his procedural claims, Chambers nevertheless argues that because the record contains numerous references to FHP's alleged procedural violations he adequately preserved the issue for appeal. 12 Chambers asserts that the complaint, pretrial order, and his trial brief refer to FHP's violations of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. Section(s) 1001, et seq. He argues that this is a clear reference to all applicable ERISA sections and regulations, including ERISA's procedural requirements. We disagree that such a general reference is sufficient to preserve the issues for appeal. 13 Chambers also contends that both the complaint and pretrial order allege that FHP acted arbitrarily and capriciously to interfere with his rights. He maintains that such interference includes FHP's failure to follow ERISA procedures. We reject his contention that such broad language sufficiently raised the issue below such that it preserved his right to appeal his procedural claims. 14 Chambers next maintains that because he discussed FHP's procedural irregularities in his trial brief, he adequately preserved his procedural claims for appeal. The trial brief has some general discussion about FHP's investigation of PTE, the notice given to Chambers, the reasons for denying his claim, and the disclosure of the information FHP consulted. We find, however, that these allegations were made only to show that FHP's ultimate decision was arbitrary and capricious, not that FHP violated any particular procedural requirement. The failure of Chambers to cite any cases or regulations upon which he now relies bolsters our conclusion. 15 Finally, Chambers argues that he preserved his procedural ERISA claims because his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law requested that the magistrate judge find that FHP's actions and failures to act were arbitrary and capricious. We find that this conclusory language, coupled with his failure to cite any cases or regulations, fails to preserve his procedural claims for appeal. 16 Despite Chambers's failure to raise his procedural claims, we must determine whether we should nevertheless address the claims on appeal. Absent compelling reasons, we do not consider arguments that were not presented to the district court. Crow v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994). As in Crow, we see no reason to deviate from the general rule and will not adress the merits of his procedural claims. Id.