Opinion ID: 183141
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether lopez was denied an individualized sentencing determination (claim 7)

Text: We begin with Lopez's claim that he was denied an individualized sentencing determination because the state court ignored relevant mitigating evidence. As a preliminary matter, we note that the trial judgeat both Lopez's original sentencing in 1987 and resentencing in 1990expressly stated that he considered all the mitigating evidence and found that it did not warrant leniency. The Arizona Supreme Court also affirmed the sentencing court's analysis after an independent review of the record. Lopez I, 786 P.2d at 966; Lopez II, 857 P.2d at 1264-68, 1270-71. Nonetheless, Lopez argues that, at the time of his sentencing, Arizona law unconstitutionally barred consideration of mitigating evidence that was not causally related to the crime. Because the state court presumably adhered to this rule, Lopez argues, we should infer that it did not consider all the mitigating evidence and thus denied him an individualized sentencing in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (holding that Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require the individualized consideration of all mitigating factors in capital cases); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287, 124 S.Ct. 2562, 159 L.Ed.2d 384 (2004) (same). Lopez's claim is at odds with the law and the evidence. As we explained in Schad v. Ryan, [a]bsent a clear indication in the record that the state court applied the wrong standard, we cannot assume the courts violated . . . constitutional mandates. 606 F.3d 1022, 1047 (9th Cir.2010) (per curiam), petition for cert. filed, 79 U.S.L.W. 3129 (U.S. Aug. 27, 2010) (No. 10-305). See also Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455, 125 S.Ct. 847, 160 L.Ed.2d 881 (2005) (per curiam) (explaining that [f]ederal courts are not free to presume that a state court did not comply with constitutional dictates on the basis of nothing more than a lack of citation). Here, there is no indication that the state court applied an impermissible requirement of a causal nexus between mitigating evidence and the crime. Indeed, the state court said the oppositei.e., that it considered all the mitigating evidence on an independent review of the record and found that it did not warrant the exercise of leniency. As the Arizona Supreme Court forcefully stated: The trial judge in this case was not misled. . . . In his concluding portion of the special verdict he reiterated that the prosecution and the defendant have been permitted to rebut any information received at the hearing, including information presented at the trial, and were given fair opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of the information to establish the existence . . . of any mitigating circumstances whether listed in A.R.S. § 13-703(G) or not.  (emphasis added.) Lopez II, 857 P.2d at 1270. Contrary to Lopez's argument, we have no reason to presume that a tacit causation rule underpinned the state court's decision. Our recent decision in Schad makes this clear. In Schad, the petitioner similarly argued that, contrary to the Supreme Court's dictates in Lockett and Tennard, the [Arizona] state courts did not consider the evidence of his troubled childhood because they unconstitutionally required a `nexus' between his childhood abuse and his commission of [the] murder. 606 F.3d at 1045. Reviewing Arizona case law, we explained that, [b]efore Tennard was decided, Arizona courts recognized a nexus test, similar to that rejected in Tennard, to preclude consideration of evidence of childhood abuse unless the abuse bore a causal connection to the crime of conviction. Id. at 1045-46. After Tennard, the Arizona Supreme Court clarified that the nexus test affects only the weight of mitigating evidence, not its admissibility. Id. at 1046 (citing State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 132 P.3d 833, 849 (2006)). [2] However, the fact that the Arizona courts clearly did, at times, employ (or recognize[]) a causal nexus requirement does not mean that they always did so. Indeed, in Schad itself, we concluded that the Arizona courts did not apply a causation requirement when considering the defendant's mitigating evidence even though he was sentenced to death before Tennard was decided. Id. at 1046-47. Our review of the case law confirms Arizona's unsettled past with respect to this issue. Some cases decided prior to Tennard applied a causal nexus requirement in an impermissible manner. [3] Other cases, however, properly looked to causal nexus only as a factor in determining the weight or significance of mitigating evidence. [4] See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-15, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (holding that [t]he sentencer, and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence). Indeed, in several cases, the Arizona Supreme Court expressly took mitigating evidence into consideration when reducing a death sentence to life, regardless of any causal nexus to the crime. [5] In light of this backdrop, which highlights a range of treatment of the nexus issue, there is no reason to infer unconstitutional reasoning from judicial silence. Rather, we must look to what the record actually says. See Schad, 606 F.3d at 1046-47. Because the state court made clear that it considered all the mitigating evidence and found it wanting, Lopez's claim fails.