Opinion ID: 891697
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: depraved mind murder in new mexico

Text: {8} New Mexico law defines depraved mind murder as an unintentional first degree killing caused by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind regardless of human life. Section 30-2-1(A)(3). First degree murder is a capital felony. Id. Accordingly, a defendant convicted of first degree murder is subject to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. NMSA 1978, § 31-18-14 (1993). {9} New Mexico is one of only three states to classify depraved mind murder in the first degree. Other jurisdictions typically classify depraved mind killings in the second degree, reserving the first degree designation for killings characterized by some indicia of premeditation and deliberation. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave & David C. Baum, Substantive Criminal Law § 14.7 (2d ed. 2003); see also State v. Lacquey, 117 Ariz. 231, 571 P.2d 1027, 1030 (1977) (in banc) (That this crime was brutal there can be no doubt, but brutality alone cannot, in itself, support a finding of premeditation and deliberation.). Only Colorado and Washington join New Mexico in classifying depraved mind killings in the first degree. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-3-102(1)(d) (2000); Wash. Rev.Code § 9A.32.030(1)(b) (1990). Because first degree murder is subject to our most serious criminal sanction, we have repeatedly emphasized the importance of ensuring that only the most heinous and reprehensible killings fall under the depraved mind category. See State v. Garcia, 114 N.M. 269, 272, 837 P.2d 862, 865 (1992); see also Reed, 2005-NMSC-031, ¶ 17, 138 N.M. 365, 120 P.3d 447; State v. Brown, 1996-NMSC-073, ¶ 15, 122 N.M. 724, 931 P.2d 69. {10} To that end, this Court has recognized a number of elements to be considered in appraising whether a defendant has displayed the requisite depraved mind pursuant to Section 30-2-1(A)(3). Reed, 2005-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 22-24, 138 N.M. 365, 120 P.3d 447. Our development of these criteria is directed by the plain language of the statute and the recognition that the Legislature intends only the most reprehensible unintentional homicides to be classified in the first degree, clearly distinct from homicides that warrant punishment as second degree murder. Reed, 2005-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 17, 36, 138 N.M. 365, 120 P.3d 447; Brown, 1996-NMSC-073, ¶ 13, 122 N.M. 724, 931 P.2d 69. Thus, we have developed these elements for the express purpose of limiting the application of depraved mind murder to only those rare unintentional murders that warrant the first degree murder punishment. See Reed, 2005-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 24, 25, 138 N.M. 365, 120 P.3d 447 ([D]epraved mind murder . . . is not a fallback position available whenever the State fails to prove deliberation.). {11} First, as directed by Section 30-2-1(A)(3), we require that more than one person be endangered by the defendant's act. This element conforms to the statute's plain language, which requires any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others.  Id. (emphasis added); State v. DeSantos, 89 N.M. 458, 461, 553 P.2d 1265, 1268 (1976) (holding that a depraved mind instruction was improper because defendant's actions were only dangerous to one person). Second, we require that the defendant's act be intentional and of an extremely reckless character. Reed, 2005-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 17, 25, 138 N.M. 365, 120 P.3d 447 ([T]he accused must subjectively intend to commit an act that has a great likelihood of resulting in death.). Mere recklessness will not suffice for a depraved mind murder conviction. Id. ¶ 43. Third, we require that the defendant possess subjective knowledge that his act was greatly dangerous to the lives of others. State v. McCrary, 100 N.M. 671, 672-73, 675 P.2d 120, 121-22 (1984). By imposing this mens rea standard, we ensure that only an actor who was aware of the extremely reckless nature of his conduct can be held to account for first degree murder. Fourth and finally, we require that the act encompass an intensified malice or evil intent. Brown, 1996-NMSC-073, ¶ 15, 122 N.M. 724, 931 P.2d 69. This concept further differentiates between killings characterized by a depraved mind versus less reprehensible killings. Id. (Because the legislature has deemed that a killing performed with a depraved mind is an especially serious homicide, deserving of punishment equal to that imposed for other forms of first-degree murder, we conclude that the legislature intended the offense of depraved mind murder to encompass an intensified malice or evil intent.); see generally Rollin M. Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 60 (3d. ed. 1982) (identifying the presence of viciousness-an extreme indifference to the value of human life as a characteristic key to distinguishing unintentional killings constituting murder versus manslaughter).