Opinion ID: 1631067
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Exclusion of expert testimony from Tim Corbitt on the issues of yielding right-of-way and immediate hazard

Text: ś 72. Carla next argues that the trial court erred by finding as a matter of law that (1) forty to forty-five miles per hour is not an unreasonably slow speed, and (2) two-and-one-half miles is insufficient to create an immediate hazard. This argument is tied to Carla's arguments on the corresponding proposed jury instructions P-17 and P-18, respectively. ś 73. The trial court determined that the slow speed and the two-and-one-half miles entry on the highway by R & R before the collision did not create an immediate hazard. The evidence at trial showed that Hunter stated that he was going about forty to forty-five miles per hour when the accident occurred. Trooper Shive stated that Hunter had told him at the scene of the accident that he had been traveling about forty miles per hour. The posted speed limit was sixty-five miles per hour. Highway 61 had no minimum posted speed. Additionally, Highway 61 was not a limited-access road. This meant that vehicles could enter Highway 61 at countless points along the roadway, and that a driver on Highway 61 would have to be alert for other vehicles entering the highway at various points. ś 74. The accident occurred close to midnight, and no testimony was solicited that there was any flow of traffic other than R & R's truck and Preston's vehicle on the flat stretch of road where the accident occurred. Further, the testimony revealed that the right-hand lane was considered the slow lane. Hunter had left the R & R lot and had traveled approximately two and one-half miles south of the facility before the collision. When Hunter left the R & R lot, he immediately pulled into the right-hand lane, although he conceded that the truck may have tipped into the left-hand lane as he was entering the highway. However, Hunter immediately pulled the truck into the right-hand lane. The R & R truck traveled in the right-hand lane, and the accident occurred in the right-hand lane. ś 75. Corbitt opined that forty to forty-five miles per hour was too slow a speed, impeding the flow of traffic and creating an unusual or emergency situation. However, based on the described testimony at trial, the trial court did not err by refusing Carla's instruction, P-17, as there was no evidence that Hunter drove the R & R truck at a speed or in a manner that constituted a hazard to the flow of traffic. ś 76. The trial court did not err by finding that there was insufficient evidence that two and one-half miles was insufficient to create an immediate hazard and, thus, refusing proposed jury instruction P-18. Jury instruction P-18 stated, in part, that the operator of a vehicle about to enter or cross a street from a road or driveway is under a duty to yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on the street so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. The instruction further stated that if the jury found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Hunter was about to enter or cross Highway 61 at the time when Preston was approaching on the road so close as to constitute an immediate hazard, and Hunter failed to yield the right-of-way, and the failure to yield was the sole proximate cause or the proximate contributing cause of Preston's injuries, then, the verdict should be for the plaintiff. ś 77. The evidence, as already discussed, showed that Hunter entered the highway and traveled a distance of two and one-half miles prior to the collision. There was no evidence that Hunter pulled in front of Preston on the highway.
ś 78. The general rule with regard to jury instructions is that the trial court has considerable discretion when instructing the jury, and the instructions are to be read as a whole. Bickham v. Grant, 861 So.2d 299, 301 (Miss.2003). A litigant is entitled to have jury instructions that present his theory of the case. Young v. Guild, 7 So.3d 251, 259 (Miss.2009). However, a trial judge may refuse a proposed jury instruction that is an incorrect statement of the law, repeats a theory covered in other instructions, or has no proper foundation in the evidence before the court. Cato, 15 So.3d at 423. On appeal, the appellate courts analyze whether a jury instruction correctly stated the law and was supported by the evidence. Young, 7 So.3d at 259 (citing Beverly Enters. v. Reed, 961 So.2d 40, 43-44 (Miss. 2007)). Nonetheless, [i]f other instructions granted adequately instruct the jury, a party may not complain of a refused instruction on appeal. Id. (quoting Southland Enters. v. Newton County, 838 So.2d 286, 289 (Miss.2003)). When analyzing jury instructions as a whole, `[d]efects in specific instructions will not mandate reversal when all of the instructions, taken as a whole fairlyâ although not perfectlyâ announce the applicable primary rules of law.' Id. (quoting Beverly Enters., 961 So.2d at 43).
ś 79. Carla argues that the trial court erred by denying jury instruction P-7 on proximate cause. Instead, the trial court gave jury instruction C-10 on proximate cause. Jury instruction C-10 stated: A cause constitutes a proximate cause of an injury when such injury results from a chain of a natural and unbroken sequence from the defendant's negligent act. A defendant is not liable for damages which are remote or collateral, or which result from a remote, improbable, or extraordinary occurrence, although such occurrence is within the range of possibilities flowing from the defendants' negligent act. If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the death of Preston Jimmy Utz resulted from a chain of natural and unbroken sequence (sic) from the defendants' failure to comply with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, then your verdict shall be for the plaintiff. However, if you find the death of Preston Jimmy Utz was the result of a remote, improbable, or extraordinary occurrence, although within the range of possibilities flowing from the defendants' negligence, your verdict shall be for the defendants. The record reveals that, when opposing counsel and the trial court were discussing jury instructions, the trial court did not like either of the parties' jury instructions on proximate cause and suggested its own jury instruction. After discussion from all parties, the trial court approved jury instruction C-10. When asked for comment by the trial court, the response by counsel for Carla was I'm okay with that instruction. In other words, Carla had no objection to the trial court giving the proximate-cause jury instruction C-10. ś 80. On appeal, Carla now claims that the trial court erred by giving this instruction, as it was a misstatement of law and incomplete. This Court has held that where counsel fails to raise an objection to a jury instruction, the issue is procedurally barred. Jordan v. State, 995 So.2d 94, 114 (Miss.2008) (citing Rubenstein v. State, 941 So.2d 735, 779 (Miss.2006)). Carla did not object to jury instruction C-10 being a misstatement of law or incomplete during the discussion of instructions. ś 81. Notwithstanding this bar, Carla contends that the language that the death of Preston was a result of a remote, improbable, or extraordinary occurrence, although within the range of possibilities is an incorrect statement of law. She maintains that the proper statement of law is that the standard of care applicable when a party charged with negligence is whether the person acted as a reasonable and prudent person would have under the same or similar circumstances. In Dillon v. Greenbriar Digging Service, Ltd., 919 So.2d 172, 178 (Miss.Ct.App. 2005), the Court of Appeals upheld similar language in a jury instruction. Like the instruction in Dillon, jury instruction C-10 was similar to language contained in one of the Mississippi Model Jury Instructions. [9] The Court of Appeals upheld a jury instruction in Dillon that had language similar to the Mississippi Practice Model Jury Instruction Civil Section 15:2, which states, in part, that there is no liability to a defendant for damages which are remote or collateral, or which result from a remote, improbable, or extraordinary occurrence, although such occurrence is within the range of possibilities that flow from a defendant's negligent act. Furthermore, a jury instruction providing the standard of care for negligence case was given by the trial court. Jury instruction C-4 provided: Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care is that degree of care which a reasonably careful person would use under like or similar circumstances. Negligence may consist either in doing something that a reasonably careful person would not do under like or similar circumstances, or in failing to do something that a reasonably careful person would do under like or similar circumstances. A party cannot complain about a refused instruction where the instruction, as given, adequately instructs the jury. Young, 7 So.3d at 259. This Court analyzes jury instructions as a whole. Id. In considering whether the grant or refusal of an instruction constitutes reversible error, we read the instructions actually given as a whole and will not reverse a verdict so long as the instructions, taken together, fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice. Mariner Health Care, Inc. v. Estate of Edwards ex rel. Turner, 964 So.2d 1138, 1154 (Miss.2007) (citing Whitten v. Cox, 799 So.2d 1, 16 (Miss.2000)). The trial court did not err by refusing jury instruction P-7 or by giving jury instruction C-10. When the jury instructions were read as a whole, they fairly informed the jury of the law and created no injustice to Carla.
ś 82. Carla contends that the trial court erred by denying jury instructions P-10 through P-16 relating to R & R's and Hunter's alleged violation of numerous FMCSRs. She argues that the trial court's denial of jury instructions P-10 through P-16 was erroneous because the evidence supported the instructions, and the FMCSR violations showed the proximate cause of Preston's death. More specifically, the trial court denied jury instructions P-10 (general failure to comply with the FMCSRs); P-11 (failure to have reflective tape); P-12 (failure to conduct a pre-trip inspection); P-13 (failure to conduct a post-trip inspection); P-14 (operating the trailer in such a condition as to likely cause an accident); P-15 (failure to inspect and repair a trailer while in defendants' control); and P-16 (failure to operate the trailer with reflective tape). Having resolved to give jury instruction C-13, the trial court refused Carla's jury instructions P-10 through P-16 and, in the denial of post-trial motion, characterized these instructions as superfluous. ś 83. As to jury instruction C-13, which was given to the jury, Carla argues that C-13 denied her the right to present multiple and separate FMCSR violations by R & R and Hunter to the jury. Additionally, Carla contends that, while C-13 instructs the jury that R & R's and Hunter's failure to comply with the FMCSRs is negligent, thereby seemingly being a negligence-per-se instruction, it then requires her to show that this negligence proximately caused Preston's death. Coupled with these arguments is Carla's further contention that the trial court erred because it prohibited her from admitting evidence of FMCSR violations via expert testimony on taillight visibility, the trailer being out of service, and failure to use reflective tape, as discussed in previous issues. ś 84. The trial court allowed jury instruction C-13, which provided: The court instructs the jury that the defendants, Running & Rolling Trucking, Inc., and Anthony Q. Hunter were negligent in failing to comply with the requirements of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. However, the fact that this court has directed a finding of negligence against these defendants does not, in and of itself, mean that these defendants are liable for the death of the deceased. Before you may find these defendants liable for the death of Preston Jimmy Utz, you must also find that such negligence, the failure of the defendants to comply with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, was a proximate cause and/or proximate contributing cause to the death of Preston Jimmie Utz. ś 85. In Thomas v. McDonald, 667 So.2d 594, 596-597 (Miss.1995), this Court stated: [W]here there is a statute, the statute will be the controlling law for the parties' action or failure to act. See Haver v. Hinson, 385 So.2d 605, 608 (Miss. 1980) (statutes delineate negligent conduct). Violations of statutes generally constitute negligence per se. Travis v. Hartford, 630 So.2d 337, 342 (Miss.1993); U-Haul Co. v. White, 232 So.2d 705, 708 (Miss.1970). ś 86. The Court further stated: The principle that violation of a statute constitutes negligence per se is so elementary that it does not require citation of authority. When a statute is violated, the injured party is entitled to an instruction that the party violating is guilty of negligence, and if that negligence proximately caused or contributed to the injury, then the injured party is entitled to recover. Thomas, 667 So.2d at 596-597 (quoting Bryant v. Alpha Entertainment Corp., 508 So.2d 1094, 1096 (Miss.1987)). ś 87. While Thomas provides that violations of statutes constitute negligence per se, this does not relieve a party from the burden of showing that the negligence of the opposing party proximately caused or contributed to the injury suffered by a complainant. Thomas, 667 So.2d at 596-97. Thomas states that when a statute is violated, a party is entitled to an instruction on negligence. However, in order to recover damages for an injury, that negligence (violation of a statute) must have proximately caused or contributed to the injury. Id. In other words, a violation of a statute, in and of itself, does not dictate that either (1) the violation was the proximate or contributing cause of an injury suffered by a party, or (2) recovery for damages is imminent. Granted, the FMCSRs are regulations, not statutes, nevertheless, the logic holds true for the instructions at issue before this Court. Further, jury instruction C-13 provided that R & R and Hunter were negligent for failure to follow the FMCSRs. Carla's contention that the instruction required her to prove that R & R's and Hunter's negligence proximately caused or contributed to the injury is without merit, because this requirement is supported by Mississippi law. Thomas, 667 So.2d at 596-97. Accordingly, the trial court properly refused Carla's instructions.
ś 88. Carla next contends that the trial court erred by denying jury instruction P-17 concerning negligence of a driver operating a vehicle at a speed and manner which would constitute a hazard to the flow of traffic or to other vehicles traveling in the same roadway. The trial court determined that the evidence was insufficient to support the instruction. When discussed further, the trial court also found that the tractor-trailer's speed was not unreasonably slow as a matter of law. ś 89. Hunter, the tractor-trailer driver, testified that he was traveling between forty to forty-five miles per hour in the right-hand lane at the time of the collision. The posted speed limit at the site of the collision was sixty-five miles per hour. Trooper Shive testified that Highway 61 had no minimum speed limit, and vehicles regularly traveled at forty to forty-five miles per hour. He also stated that the right lane is for slower traffic. Trooper Shive was called to the scene of the accident at 11:50 p.m., and he arrived shortly thereafter at 11:59 p.m. No evidence suggested that any other vehicles were traveling on that stretch of Highway 61. ś 90. Carla cited Wheat v. Teche, 181 Miss. 408, 179 So. 553 (1938), for the holding that the operation of a motor vehicle at less than the fixed rate of speed may be negligent and is a question for the jury. Id. at 555. The trial court considered Wheat during discussions on jury instructions and found the facts distinguishable from Carla's case. We agree. In Wheat, this Court reversed and remanded a trial court's grant of directed verdict in favor of Teche Lines. Id. Wheat was standing by the side of the roadway in front of his truck when a Teche Lines bus passed within one foot of Wheat, causing particles from rocks and slag to strike Wheat and injure his eye. Id. at 554. The roadway at that particular point had a gravel-like surface, was red-flagged, and had thirty-six feet of clear space, yet the Teche Line bus drove within one foot of Wheat at no more than fifty miles per hour. Id. The Court found that under those facts, the jury should determine whether the bus driver was traveling on the roadway at a reasonable rate of speed, exercised reasonable care, and could have reasonably foreseen the possibility of injury. Id. at 554-55. ś 91. The facts in Carla's case are distinguishable from Teche. The statutes at issue were different in the two cases, and no evidence was presented to show a hazard to the flow of traffic. This is true because Hunter drove no more than forty-five miles per hour, traveled in the right-hand lane of two southbound lanes, and the accident occurred two and one-half miles from Hunter's point of entry onto Highway 61. This Court has held that a trial court may refuse a jury instruction that is not supported by the evidence. Cato, 15 So.3d at 423. The trial court did not err, because the evidence was insufficient to support the instruction.
ś 92. Carla next argued that the trial court erred by refusing jury instructions P-18 and P-19, as they established some of her theories of liability. Both instructions concerned yielding the right-of-way. Jury instruction P-18 stated in part that an operator of a vehicle about to enter or cross a street from a road or driveway is under a duty to yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on the street so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. Jury instruction P-19 stated in part that a driver must yield the right of way to another vehicle that has already established control of the driving lane. [10] The trial court refused both instructions because of insufficient evidence. ś 93. The record revealed that Hunter came to work at approximately 10:30. When he left the R & R lot located in Merigold, Mississippi, in the tractor-trailer, he drove south on Highway 61. When Hunter entered the highway, he probably tipped the left-hand lane, however he immediately got into the right-hand lane. The accident occurred approximately two or two and one-half miles after Hunter entered Highway 61. ś 94. With regard to P-18, Carla relies on Reese v. Summers, 792 So.2d 992 (Miss. 2001) (citing Thomas, 667 So.2d at 596) to support her position that whether a particular circumstance rises to the level of an emergency or unusual situation is a question for the jury. However, the trial court did not err by refusing these instructions. The record contains no evidence to show that Hunter or Preston were in close proximity to each other at an intersection when Hunter entered Highway 61. The accident occurred two and one-half miles after Hunter had entered the highway from the R & R lot and had been traveling in the right hand lane. This Court has held that a trial court has considerable discretion when instructing the jury. Bickham, 861 So.2d at 301. A jury instruction may be refused by a trial court when it is unsupported by the evidence. Cato, 15 So.3d at 423. Based on the evidence provided, this Court cannot say that the trial court erred by refusing these instructions.
ś 95. Carla contends that the trial court erred by refusing jury instruction P-20, which concerned Mississippi Code Section 63-3-701. [11] The statute governs starting a stopped, standing, or parked vehicle when movement could not be made with reasonable safety. The trial court refused the instruction because it found no evidence to support it. ś 96. Carla argued that R & R and Hunter were violating the FMCSRs, thus the tractor-trailer could not be operated or moved safely. The record reveals that Hunter entered Highway 61 in a southbound direction. Some two to two and one-half miles later, the collision occurred between the tractor-trailer driven by Hunter and the vehicle driven by Preston. There was no evidence that Hunter had stopped or parked the tractor-trailer after he had entered Highway 61. The jury was instructed, via jury instruction C-13, that R & R and Hunter were negligent by violating the FMCSRs. Indeed, the jury, in special interrogatory C-19, found that R & R's and Hunter's negligence for violating the FMCSRs was not a proximate cause and/or a proximate contributing cause of the death of Preston. This Court finds that the trial court did not err by refusing P-20, as there was no evidence to support the instruction that the tractor-trailer could not be operated or moved safely at the time it left R & R's lot. Cato, 15 So.3d at 423; Young, 7 So.3d at 259.
ś 97. Carla argues that the trial court erred by refusing jury instructions P-21 and P-29, which concerned an unusual condition or emergency. Jury instruction P-21 stated in part that generally when two vehicles are traveling in the same direction the driver of the second vehicle is not negligent for striking the rear of the first vehicle when the collision is a result of an unusual condition or emergency created by the first vehicle. Jury instruction P-29 stated in part that [g]enerally, when two cars are traveling in the same direction, the primary duty of avoiding collision rests with the second driver in the absence of an emergency or unusual condition. The trial court refused both instructions based on insufficient evidence. In its post-trial order, the trial court also stated that the lack of reflective tape, as noted in P-21, or failure to comply with the FMCSRs, as noted in P-29, bordered on a theory of strict liability, and the lack of reflective tape was not the type of unusual condition or emergency contemplated in the statute. The trial court also found that the instructions were superfluous. ś 98. The trial court did not err by refusing P-21 and P-29. The jury was instructed that R & R and Hunter were negligent for violating the FMCSRs in jury instruction C-13. After hearing all the evidence, including that the trailer had no reflective tape, the jury found in favor of R & R and Hunter, indicating that the lack of reflective tape and the violations of the FMCSRs were not the proximate cause or proximate contributing cause of the collision. No other facts inferred an unusual condition or emergency. The trial court has considerable discretion when instructing the jury. Bickham, 861 So.2d at 301. A trial judge may refuse a proposed jury instruction that has no proper foundation in the evidence before the court. Cato, 15 So.3d at 423; Young, 7 So.3d at 259. This issue is without merit.
ś 99. Carla argued that the trial court erred by giving jury instruction D-1, which was submitted as C-14. She claims that the instruction placed an absolute duty on Preston to avoid the collision. Carla cited to White v. Miller, 513 So.2d 600, 601 (Miss.1987), for authority that a driver does not have an absolute duty to avoid a collision. ś 100. In White, a vehicle traveling in front of the Whites' vehicle made a turn. White, 513 So.2d at 601. The Whites had stopped their vehicle for at least thirty seconds to allow the preceding vehicle to make the turn when Miller struck the rear of the Whites' vehicle. Id. Miller testified that she was traveling one car length behind the Whites when she saw their brake lights and they stopped, however, when she applied her brakes, she could not stop her vehicle. Id. However, the Court in White clearly made a distinction between a vehicle that suddenly darts out into the path of a driver versus an object, such as the Whites' vehicle, that is discernible and in the range of vision or clearly in the distance ahead of a driver. Id. at 601-02. This Court stated: This Court has never adopted a per se rule that the driver of the following car is negligent if he collides with the rear of a preceding vehicle, nor do we in this case. Rather we would mind the warning stated in Jones v. Hatchett, 504 So.2d 198, 204 (Miss.1987), that instructions on a driver's duty to drive at a speed sufficiently slow to enable him to stop within his range of vision should not be interpreted or applied to impose on a driver an absolute duty to avoid a collision. Such an interpretation would indicate that a driver had a duty to avoid a vehicle which suddenly darted out into his path ten feet in front of him. But a car that suddenly darts into a driver's path ten feet in front of him is not an object discernible in the range of his vision or in the assured clear distance ahead, as was the White vehicle in relation to Mrs. Miller. Id. This Court reversed the decision for failure to direct a verdict on the issue of negligence and remanded the case on the issue of damages. Id. at 603. ś 101. The trial court noted Carla's objection and stated that the case law supported the word absolute given in the instruction. The instruction stated: You are instructed that under the law of this state a motorist has an absolute duty to see that which is in plain view or open and apparent and to take notice of obvious objects and vehicles ahead on a highway. A motorist also has a duty to be alert on a highway and has no right to assume a highway is clear. If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the trailer pulled by Anthony Q. Hunter would have been visible to a reasonably prudent driver in the position of Preston Utz at a point where the accident could have been avoided through the exercise of reasonable care, then you must find Preston Utz was negligent. If you find that negligence on the part of Preston Utz, if any, was the sole proximate cause of the accident, then it is your sworn obligation to return a verdict for the Defendants. However, if you find that this negligence on the part of Preston Utz, if any, was a proximate contributing cause of the accident, then you must assign a percentage of fault to Preston Utz, as explained later in these instructions. ś 102. In Dennis By and Through Cobb v. Bolden, 606 So.2d 111, 113-114 (Miss. 1992) this Court had held: The driver of a car is charged with the duty of keeping a proper lookout and being on alert for vehicles, objects and persons ahead in the highway. Fowler Butane Gas Co. v. Varner, 244 Miss. 130, 141 So.2d 226 (1962); Belk v. Rosamond, 213 Miss. 633, 57 So.2d 461 (1952). The driver is charged with the absolute duty of seeing what he should have seen. Tippit v. Hunter, 205 So.2d 267 (Miss.1967); Campbell v. Schmidt, 195 So.2d 87 (Miss.1967); Layton v. Cook, 248 Miss. 690, 160 So.2d 685 (1964). He is also required to have his car under proper control, to be on the alert on the highway, and avoid striking plain objects. Barkley v. Miller Transporters, Inc., 450 So.2d 416 (Miss.1984); Shideler v. Taylor, 292 So.2d 155 (Miss. 1974). Bolden, 606 So.2d at 113-14 (emphasis added). While Bolden states that the driver has an absolute duty to see what he should have seen, the caselaw on which it relies for authority did not require an absolute duty. Id. (citing Tippit v. Hunter, 205 So.2d 267 (Miss.1967); Campbell v. Schmidt, 195 So.2d 87 (Miss.1967); Layton v. Cook, 248 Miss. 690, 160 So.2d 685 (1964)). Notwithstanding the use of the term absolute, giving the instruction is not reversible error. But for the use of absolute, the statement of law was accurate. The instruction did not place, as Carla claimed, an absolute duty on Preston to avoid the collision. The instruction provided that the jury should find Preston negligent only if the trailer would have been visible to a reasonably prudent driver in Preston's position and the accident could have been avoided through the exercise of reasonable care. Further, Carla's argument that White provides no absolute duty to avoid a collision is somewhat misplaced, because the instruction does not concern a vehicle following too closely behind another, and the record contains no facts that Hunter's vehicle suddenly darted in front of Preston's vehicle. We find that the instruction should not have included the term absolute, however, the instruction did not rise to the level of reversible error.
ś 103. Next, Carla argues that the trial court erred by admitting instruction D-2, submitted as C-15. She claims that the instruction was peremptory, a misstatement of law, a misstatement of the facts, cumulative, compound, and placed an absolute duty on the plaintiff. This instruction stated, in part: [A] motorist has a duty to operate his vehicle at a reasonable rate of speed under the circumstances then confronting him. A motorist also has a duty to keep a reasonable lookout to the front of his vehicle in order to keep it under reasonable and easy control and to anticipate and expect the presence of other vehicles in front if him on the roadway.... ś 104. In Church v. Massey, 697 So.2d 407, 412 (Miss.1997), this Court upheld a jury instruction almost identical to jury instruction D-2, submitted at C-15. In Massey, the jury instruction stated: You are instructed that it was the duty of the Plaintiff, Gary W. Church to drive his motorcycle at a reasonable rate of speed under the circumstances then confronting him. It was also his duty to keep a reasonable lookout to the front and sides of his moving motorcycle to keep it under reasonable and easy control and anticipate and expect the presence of other vehicles which were also using 8th Street at the same time. Massey, 697 So.2d at 412. See also Fielder v. Magnolia Beverage Co., 757 So.2d 925, 935-36 (Miss.1999). Carla correctly stated that Massey held that the failure to yield the right-of-way and failure to maintain proper lookout are two separate theories of liability. Massey, 697 So.2d at 411. However, she also argues that the instruction that was given was compound. Jury instruction D-2 was proper because it was similar to language this Court affirmed in Massey. In Massey, one of the issues was whether the trial court erred by refusing a lookout theory of negligence on the basis that it was adequately covered in another instruction, P-3. Id. This Court found that jury instruction P-3 addressed the failure to yield the right-of-way only, and not the failure to keep a reasonable lookout. Id. The Court reversed and remanded partly due to the trial court's refusal of a lookout instruction. Id. at 414-15. The instructions as given did not adequately instruct the jury on the theories of liability. Id. at 411. ś 105. The fact that jury instruction C-15 may be compound does not invalidate the instruction. Further, the instruction was not cumulative, as each of R & R's instructions covered different legal principles. [12] The instruction also does not place an absolute duty on the plaintiff; indeed the term absolute is not in the instruction. Also, the the jury could have inferred that Preston did not operate his vehicle at a reasonable rate of speed given the circumstance, or failed to keep a reasonable lookout, or failed to keep his vehicle under reasonable and easy control, or failed to expect the presence of other vehicle in front of him based on the evidence. The jury could have inferred that Preston failed to operate the vehicle at a reasonable rate of speed under the circumstances confronting him on that night. Likewise, Trooper Shive testified that he could easily see the lights from the truck at a distance and the lights were glowing. Richard stated that he could see the truck lights a mile down the road. In addition, the jury had numerous photographs of the truck at the scene of the accident depicting the lights on the back of the truck. The jury also heard testimony that the truck was white and that the collision occurred on an eight-tenths of a mile section of a flat, Delta roadway. Given the facts presented to the jury, the instruction was proper. This Court finds that the trial court did not err by giving jury instruction C-15, and this issue is without merit.
ś 106. Carla contends that the trial court erred by admitting jury instruction D-3, submitted as C-16. She argued that instruction imposed a strict-liability standard and a peremptory standard. This instruction referred to a motorist's duty to drive a vehicle within the speed limit. The instruction stated: You are instructed that under the law of this state a motorist has a duty to drive his vehicle at a rate of speed not greater that the posted speed limit. If you find that Preston Utz, at the time he confronted the trailer pulled by Anthony Q. Hunter, was traveling at a speed in excess of the posted speed limit of 65 miles per hour, then you must find that Preston Utz was negligent. If you find that this negligence on the part of Preston Utz, if any, was the sole proximate cause of the accident, then it is your sworn obligation to return a verdict for the Defendants. However, if you find that this negligence on the part of Preston Utz, if any, was a proximate contributing cause of the accident, then you must assign a percentage of fault to Preston Utz, as explained later in these instructions. (Emphasis added.) The trial court determined that caselaw supported the instruction which essentially imposed negligence, not strict liability, if Preston had exceeded the speed limit and/or failed to keep a proper lookout and control of his vehicle. See Fielder, 757 So.2d at 935-36 (Miss. 1999); Miss.Code Ann. § 63-3-501 (Rev. 2004). The instruction was not peremptory by instructing the jury that you must find that Preston Utz was negligent as Carla asserts in her argument. Instead the instruction provides that  If you find that Preston Utz ... was traveling at a speed in excess of the posted speed limit of 65 miles per hour, then you must find that Preston Utz was negligent. (Emphasis added.) This conditional language does not compel the jury to find negligence on the part of Preston. The plain language also did not place the burden on Preston to avoid the accident regardless of whether R & R and Hunter were at fault, as argued by Carla. Additionally, there is no peremptory language that requires that you must assign a percentage of fault to Preston Utz. When the instruction was read in context, the conditional language plainly stated that  if you find that his negligence on the part of Preston Utz, if any, was a proximate contributing cause of the accident, then you must assign a percentage of fault to Preston Utz, as explained later in these instructions. Further, the language required that a percentage of fault be assessed only if Preston's negligence was a proximate contributing cause and did not require the jury to relieve R & R and Hunter of an assessment of fault unless the rate of speed was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Accordingly this issue is without merit.