Opinion ID: 2232784
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver of the Right to a Jury Trial

Text: The United States [4] and Indiana [5] Constitutions guaranty the right to trial by jury. A defendant may waive this right if he does so in an intelligent and voluntary manner. Doughty v. State, 470 N.E.2d 69 (Ind. 1984). The defendant must express his personal desire to waive a jury trial and such a personal desire must be apparent from the court's record. Jones v. State, 544 N.E.2d 492 (Ind.1989); Brown v. State, 495 N.E.2d 178 (Ind.1986). A person charged with a felony has an automatic right to a jury trial; the defendant is presumed not to waive this right unless he affirmatively acts to do so. Hadley v. State, 636 N.E.2d 173 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied. Poore's filing of his signed jury trial waiver adequately reflects a personal desire to waive this right and constitutes the affirmative act necessary to do so for his felony charge. Kimball v. State, 474 N.E.2d 982 (Ind.1985). Our inquiry thus centers around whether Poore's waiver was intelligently and voluntarily made. For several reasons, we conclude that Poore made an intelligent and voluntary waiver of a jury as to both his misdemeanor and felony charges. First, thirteen days before he filed his waiver, the court informed Poore of his jury trial right through its Initial Hearing Rights form. Although the form was designed to inform Poore about the need to make an affirmative request for trial by jury on a misdemeanor, it did inform him generally and unambiguously: You have a right to a trial by jury. (R. at 38.) [6] Second, the record provides multiple grounds for inferring that Poore understood the proceedings and the choices he made. For example, the trial court's presentence investigation report shows that Poore completed the eleventh grade, received his G.E.D. in 1983, and had two years of undergraduate study at a Florida junior college. Moreover, the record of the initial hearing reflects a literate exchange between court personnel and Poore concerning a no contact order: The Judge: .... I want you to read this and then sign and date the bottom of it for me. Any violation of this will cause your bond to be revoked and you will be immediately placed in jail. Do you understand that? The Defendant: Will I be able to get my belongings with that understanding? The Judge: .... You will need to contact your lawyer ... to see if you can get your things ..., but I don't want you to have any contact with [Fleming]. Okay, would you mind giving that to him Ken. The Defendant: Do you want me to sign something? The Judge: Uhn uh. I want you to read it first. The Bailiff: Read over it first. Here is a clip board with a pen on the top of it and you can have a seat in the chairs. ( Id. at 53-54.) Dialogue such as the foregoing occurs daily in our trial courts in various permutations. Absent some question by the defendant or some evidence of a lack of understanding or an inability to read, a trial court is warranted in finding, as Judge Reichard did here, that a defendant who receives a misdemeanor jury advisement and proceeds to file a general waiver of trial by jury adequately understands that a bench trial will thus lie ahead. Third, and closely allied, a defendant's understanding may be inferred when he and his attorney both sign a written waiver of the jury trial right and file it in open court. The evidence tends to show that Poore could read and that he thus had the ability to understand the short waiver form he signed. Moreover, Poore's significant criminal history [7] suggests a high level of familiarity with the judicial process, making it quite likely that he knew what a jury was. Of course, his lawyer's signature on the waiver also implies that Poore acted upon advice and information of legal counsel. In the face of all this, Poore argues the record must explicitly show proof of his ability to read, proof that he understood what the jury trial right entailed, and proof that he knew that he was not required to demand jury as to his felony. Poore's case is in many ways similar to Hadley v. State, 636 N.E.2d 173 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994), trans. denied. Hadley signed the same waiver form in a Marion County trial court, was tried by the bench and found guilty, and then asserted on appeal a denial of his right to a jury trial. The facts are thus about the same as those in the case at bar, and, indeed, the same appellate lawyer presents about the same legal theory. In Hadley, as in this case, the appellant cited cases standing for the proposition that waiver of the right to trial by jury may not be presumed from a silent record, see, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, [395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) ]; Williams v. State, [263 Ind. 165, 325 N.E.2d 827 (1975) ], and that in order for a form written waiver of the right to a jury trial to be effective, the record must disclose that the defendant could read, did read, and understood the rights enumerated therein. See, e.g., Slone v. State, [590 N.E.2d 635 (Ind. Ct.App.1992) ]. Id. at 174-75. Just as this argument did not carry the day in Hadley, it does not succeed here. The cases [appellant] relies upon are not applicable here because each involves a defendant foregoing a trial and pleading guilty. In the case before us [appellant] did not plead guilty. Rather, he was tried before the bench. When a defendant pleads guilty either to a felony or a misdemeanor, he waives three federal constitutional rights: right to confront accusers, right to trial by jury, and privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Id. at 175. Indeed, one who pleads guilty gives up a great deal more than his three Boykin rights. Among other things, he gives up the opportunity to put the prosecution to its proof, the chance to offer his own exculpatory evidence, and his right to have this evidence weighed by a neutral finder of fact. One who waived jury and proceeds to trial before the bench retains these safeguards and others. Because of these substantial differences, the opinions arising out of guilty pleas are unavailing as precedent for a defendant who merely waived his right to a jury trial and received a bench trial instead. While it is advantageous for a trial judge to engage a defendant in colloquy concerning the consequences of waiving trial by jury, such an exchange is not required by either the United States or the Indiana constitutions, or by statute. Hutchins v. State, 493 N.E.2d 444, 445 (Ind.1986). We conclude that the record reflects sufficient evidence of Poore's ability to know and understand what he was doing when he waived his right to a jury trial.