Opinion ID: 1768740
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Police Officers As Experts

Text: Saul next claims that it was an abuse of the circuit court's discretion to allow Officer Lee to describe at trial how methamphetamine is made and whether the components were present to make methamphetamine in the case against Saul as well as how methamphetamine is usually manufactured and what items are present in most cases. Saul specifically maintains that Officer Lee's referral to common household items as tools of the trade for manufacturing methamphetamine and to scales as being used to weigh methamphetamine for selling purposes was highly prejudicial to Saul. This, he claims, was completely unnecessary for the jury to understand the evidence, since Saul was not charged with selling methamphetamine. Even if Officer Lee's testimony was relevant, he maintains, it was not necessary to assist the jury, but it only served to confuse and mislead the jurors. With respect to Detective Woodruff, Saul asserts that his testimony was far more prejudicial to his case. Detective Woodruff was permitted to state that Saul had a methamphetamine lab in 1998, despite the lack of a conviction for that offense at that time, as the police never made a determination of what certain chemicals were. Thus, Saul contends that Detective Woodruff's expert opinion offered at trial that Saul was cooking methamphetamine in 1998 resulted in excessive and severe prejudice to Saul and this prejudice warrants reversal of his conviction and a new trial. The State responds that neither Officer Lee nor Detective Woodruff were certified as experts, but, instead, they both testified as to matters where they had specialized knowledge. The State explains that Officer Lee testified about his extensive training in dealing with methamphetamine labs, including training in identifying the components of such labs and the process for manufacturing methamphetamine. Based on that foundation, Officer Lee testified about the role in that process each item discovered in Saul's van played. The State adds that Detective Woodruff similarly testified about his training and experience with regard to methamphetamine production. He explained that it was because of his training that he was able to recognize the precursors and paraphernalia that are commonly associated with methamphetamine labs. The State explains that it was on the basis of that foundation that Detective Woodruff testified in 1998 about the components of a methamphetamine lab which were found in Saul's vehicle. The law concerning expert testimony was summarized in a recent case: Rule 702 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence entitled Testimony of Experts reads: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. This court has held that if some reasonable basis exists demonstrating that the witness has knowledge of the subject beyond that of ordinary knowledge, the evidence is admissible as expert testimony. Brunson v. State, 349 Ark. 300, 79 S.W.3d 304 (2002). Whether a witness qualifies as an expert in a particular field is a matter within the trial court's discretion, and we will not reverse such a decision absent an abuse of that discretion. Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 297, 197 S.W.3d 468 (2004); Brunson, 349 Ark. 300, 79 S.W.3d 304. Flowers v. State, 362 Ark. 193, 210, 208 S.W.3d 113, 126-27 (2005). At a pre-trial hearing concerning whether Officer Lee would be qualified as an expert, the circuit judge said this to the prosecutor: If I determine that I will let Detective Lee testify, I am not going to rule that he's an expert, I'm just gonna let him testify. In other words, you can ask me to rule that he's an expert, but I'm concerned that that's a comment on the evidence. If I let him I will just say you may proceed in giving testimony. Additionally, the circuit judge said this to Saul's counsel: I'm not going to certify him as an expert. It will be up to the jury whether they accept it or not. I know he has to get by me first, and I will do that. I will rule on that. I'm just not going to in front of the jury say I certify him as an expert. At trial, upon Saul's objection to Officer Lee's testimony, the following colloquy occurred between Saul's counsel, the prosecutor, and the circuit court: DEFENSE COUNSEL: This is where he's talking about the process, and I think he needs to be an expert to do that. I don't think he's qualified as an expert to talk about the process. PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, he's at the point where he's telling how he cooked, what he cooked, and I can do more, I certainly can do more. But, you know, I think that this is the point where we would do that. THE COURT: I will overrule the objection to this testimony. It doesn't stop you getting up again. I think he's qualified to start talking. He said he was cooking and he did. I'm going to let him talk about it. Later during Officer Lee's testimony, Saul continues his objection to Officer Lee being used as an expert to discuss what is commonly used in the process of manufacturing methamphetamine. Based on these discussions between the court and the attorneys, it does not appear that Officer Lee was ever certified as an expert by the circuit court in front of the jury. Nevertheless, the court allowed him to testify as an expert with specialized knowledge under Rule 702. On this point, it is notable that this court has allowed police officers to testify about their experiences in drug cases. See, e.g., Marts v. State, 332 Ark. 628, 968 S.W.2d 41 (1998) (holding that the testimony from two police officers about how methamphetamine is packaged and sold was proper in light of the State's burden to prove that the appellant had possessed methamphetamine with the intent to deliver it); Hicks v. State, 327 Ark. 652, 941 S.W.2d 387 (1997) (holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed a police officer who was not qualified as an expert to testify on redirect examination about variations in drug purity levels within certain quantity of methamphetamine, as such testimony constituted, in the officer's experience, commonsensical explanations for why a batch of methamphetamine was not mixed thoroughly). Officer Lee and Detective Woodruff both had specialized knowledge relating to methamphetamine production. We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing them to testify as experts.