Opinion ID: 1668976
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: common law liability

Text: Anderson first argues that since the trial court found that the work contracted for created an abnormally dangerous situation and since there is no question that the activity was a direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries, the trial court should have held Nashua strictly liable. Brief for appellant at 21. We disagree. It is true that the trial court, in its order granting Nashua's summary judgment, stated that [t]he evidence shows that the work contracted for and undertaken creates an inherently or abnormally dangerous situation. (Emphasis supplied.) However, we do not believe the trial court used the phrase abnormally dangerous in the sense in which Anderson asserts it was used. Anderson asserts the trial court used abnormally dangerous as a term of art. As a term of art, abnormally dangerous is considered interchangeable with ultrahazardous to define an activity that, when conducted, proximately causes harm to another, for which a possessor of land is held strictly liable. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 78 at 555-56 (5th ed. 1984). Despite Anderson's assertion to the contrary, it is apparent from reading the trial court's order that the phrase abnormally dangerous was used as a synonym for inherently dangerous, a different term of art. Nowhere in the order was the phrase abnormally dangerous used alone; it was always immediately preceded by the words inherently or, so as to read inherently or abnormally dangerous. Throughout the order, the trial court used the phrase only in the context of the nondelegable duty exception to the general rule that the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for the negligence of the independent contractor. If we assume, as Anderson asserts, notwithstanding the foregoing, that the trial court used the phrase abnormally dangerous to mean ultrahazardous as that term is commonly used in the context of strict liability, we would not hold Nashua strictly liable for the injuries Anderson sustained while painting the underground tank. Anderson has cited no authority to support the imposition of strict liability in this case. He merely relies upon NJI2d Civ. 8.41 comment at 540, which is the Burden of Proof part of the Statement of the Case instruction for damages allegedly caused by ultrahazardous activities.... Apparently, Anderson considers the instruction to be evidence of the law of Nebraska. To the contrary, the instructions contained in the second edition of the Nebraska Jury Instructions are designed to be used when they reflect the law and the pleadings and evidence call for such an instruction. Neb.Ct.R. Regarding Nebraska Jury Instructions. The first issue we must address is whether Nebraska has adopted the doctrine of strict liability for ultrahazardous (or abnormally dangerous) activities. It is clear that the issue has never been expressly addressed by this court. In Wendt v. Yant Construction Co., 125 Neb. 277, 280, 249 N.W. 599, 600 (1933), this court stated that one who uses dynamite in blasting, so as to cause likelihood of risk to property, is liable, if damage to the property results, whether from direct impact of rock thrown out by the explosion or from concussion. However, that case was tried to the jury on a negligence theory. In affirming the jury's verdict, this court stated the following: The jury had testimony to warrant their verdict on the question of negligence. Certainly the appellants cannot complain that appellee was required to show more than the rule of law as to liability in this case. Id. at 280-81, 249 N.W. at 601. In Krance v. Faeh, 215 Neb. 242, 338 N.W.2d 55 (1983), a strict liability instruction was given to the jury at trial. In that case, we held that the giving of the strict liability instruction was erroneous because the doctrine of strict liability was inapplicable given the relationship between the parties, which was that of lessor-lessee. Most recently, in Fitzpatrick v. U S West, Inc., 246 Neb. 225, 518 N.W.2d 107 (1994), we declined to impose the doctrine of strict liability on an employer of a public utility which had been hired to reconnect electrical power to a building. In light of these cases, it appears that the doctrine of strict liability for ultrahazardous activities has not been adopted in Nebraska, but neither has it been repudiated. In any event, we decline in this case to rule on the applicability of the doctrine of strict liability for ultrahazardous activities. There is an insufficient basis for concluding that the activity undertaken is ultrahazardous.