Opinion ID: 259846
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the grunewald ground.

Text: 4 What we have called the Grunewald ground relates to the point decided in Part III of Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 415-424, 425-426, 77 S.Ct. 963, 980, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957), with respect to the defendant Halperin. When testifying at the trial on his own behalf, Halperin was cross-examined as to various matters on which he had been interrogated before a grand jury; he answered in a way consistent with innocence. The Government was allowed, over objection, to bring out that before the grand jury Halperin had pleaded the privilege against self-incrimination as to these very questions. The judge instructed that although the jury was 'not to draw any inference whatsoever as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant in this case by reason of the fact that he chose to assert his unquestioned right to invoke the Fifth Amendment on that previous occasion', it might consider 'his prior assertions of the Fifth Amendment only for the purpose of ascertaining the weight you choose to give his present testimony with respect to the same matters upon which he previously asserted his constitutional privilege.' We affirmed, 233 F.2d 556, 568 (2 Cir., 1956), relying on Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 46 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed. 1054 (1926), and our own previous decision in United States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360, 367, cert. denied 333 U.S. 860, 68 S.Ct. 738, 92 L.Ed. 1139 (1948), which in turn had cited United States v. Mortimer, 118 F.2d 266 (2 Cir.), cert. denied 314 U.S. 616, 62 S.Ct. 58, 86 L.Ed. 496 (1941); United States v. Groves, 122 F.2d 87 (2 Cir.), cert. denied 314 U.S. 670, 62 S.Ct. 135, 86 L.Ed. 536 (1941), and United States v. Klinger, 136 F.2d 677 (2 Cir.), cert. denied 320 U.S. 746, 64 S.Ct. 48, 88 L.Ed. 443 (1943). Judge Frank dissented, 233 F.2d 571-592. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. The opinion of the Court, by Mr. Justice Harlan, held that 'in the particular circumstances of this case the cross-examination should have been excluded because its probative value on the issue of Halperin's credibility was so negligible as to be far outweighed by its possible impermissible impact on the jury', to wit, as direct evidence of guilt. 353 U.S. at 420, 77 S.Ct. at 982. Recognizing that 'the question whether a prior statement is sufficiently inconsistent to be allowed to go to the jury on the question of credibility is usually within the discretion of the trial judge', the Court held that 'where such evidentiary matter has grave constitutional overtones, as it does here', the Court would 'draw upon our supervisory power over the administration of federal criminal justice in order to rule on the matter. Cf. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819).' 353 U.S. at 423-424, 77 S.Ct. at 983-984. Mr. Justice Black, for the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan and himself, did 'not, like the Court', rest his 'conclusion on the special circumstances of this case'; he could 'think of no special circumstances that would justify use of a constitutional privilege to discredit or convict a person who asserts it.' 353 U.S. at 425, 77 S.Ct. at 984. 5 The asserted bearing of Grunewald here is as follows: The Government's case against Sobell rested almost wholly on the testimony of Max Elitcher, who, in addition to testifying to some independent attempts at espionage by Sobell, linked him closely with Julius Rosenberg. The latter contradicted the testimony of Elitcher with respect to Sobell, as he also did the testimony of David and Ruth Greenglass and Harry Gold with respect to the disclosure of atomic secrets by him and his wife. Ethel Rosenberg corroborated many of her husband's denials of the testimony of the Greenglasses and Gold. Her evidence did not bear directly on Sobell, but there was no particular reason why it should, since Elitcher had not implicated her in any of Sobell's activities. Sobell did not take the stand. 6 Mrs. Rosenberg testified on direct and cross-examination about many matters upon which she had claimed the privilege before the grand jury. Repeatedly the prosecutor questioned her as to the supposed inconsistency between the versions of innocence to which she testified at the trial and her previous claim that answering questions about these same matters would tend to incriminate her. When objections or motions for a mistrial were made, the judge overruled or denied them, as he was required to do by the decisions of this Court cited in our opinion in Grunewald. Both during the trial and in his charge the judge made it crystalclear that Mrs. Rosenberg's 'failure to answer such questions (before the grand jury) is not to be taken as establishing the answers to any questions she was asked before the Grand Jury, but may be considered by you in determining the credibility of her answers to those same questions at this trial'-- a correct statement of the rule as then established in this circuit. The matters about which Mrs. Rosenberg was interrogated with respect to her prior claim of privilege included her admission at the trial that she had consulted a lawyer prior to appearing before the grand jury; her denial of having discussed the case with her brother, David Greenglass; her denial of having discussed David's atomic work with him or his wife, or with her husband; her memory of a furlough visit from David in January 1945; her denial of having seen Harry Gold until he appeared in the courtroom; and her denial of having ever met Anatoli Yakovlev. 7 As regards some of these items, there was greater inconsistency between Mrs. Rosenberg's claim of privilege before the grand jury and her testimony at the trial than in Halperin's case. It is hard, for example, to see how her claim before the grand jury that answering the questions about Harry Gold and Yakovlev would tend to incriminate her can be reconciled with the answers-- outright denials of knowing either man-- that she gave to these questions at the trial; it can scarcely be said, as the Supreme Court said of Halperin, that 'had (she) answered the questions put to (her) before the grand jury in the same way (she) subsequently answered them at trial, this nevertheless would have provided the Government with incriminating evidence from (her) own mouth.' 353 U.S. at 421-422, 77 S.Ct. at 982-983. Hence, as regards these questions, it is by no means certain that the test laid down by the majority of the Supreme Court in Grunewald, that of balancing probative value against danger of prejudice, would have led in this case to the same result. We need not decide whether, as Sobell contends, that result would nevertheless be required by other factors present in this case but absent in Grunewald, such as the prosecutor's interrogation as to whether the claims of privilege before the grand jury had been truthful, and as to the reasons why the privilege had been claimed. For the inquiry about the prior claim of privilege in regard to questions answered at the trial otherwise than by outright denials-- for example, those concerning Mrs. Rosenberg's relations with the Greenglasses and her consultation with her lawyer-- would fall under the analysis made by the majority in Grunewald. 8 Sobell contends that if the point had been made on Mrs. Rosenberg's appeal to this Court (where presumably it would not have prevailed at the time, despite Judge Frank's subsequent espousal of it in his Grunewald dissent), if the Supreme Court had granted certiorari, and if the Court had then decided as it did five years later in Grunewald, any new trial would have included Sobell, since the Government's evidence was broadly inconsistent with a conclusion that he alone was guilty. It could be said against this that, vis-a-vis her co-defendants, Mrs. Rosenberg was simply a witness, and that the improper denial of a claim of privilege by a witness normally is not a ground for granting a new trial on the appeal of a party, 'whose only grievance can be that the overriding of the outsider's rights has resulted in a fuller fact-disclosure than the party desires.' McCormick, Evidence (1954), p. 153 and see cases cited in fn. 8; 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961) pp. 112-113, 416. But the claim in this case is not merely the compulsion of testimony that was privileged but otherwise unobjectionable; the claim is that the jury was allowed-- properly, as the law then stood in this circuit-- to consider evidence which, under the rule later laid down in Grunewald, had a probative value 'so negligible as to be far outweighed by its possible impermissible impact on the jury'. 353 U.S. at 420, 77 S.Ct. at 982. In any event, this Court has held, on a direct appeal, that improper use of a witness' claim of Fifth Amendment privilege before the grand jury to impeach him at the trial can constitute a ground for reversing the conviction of the party for whom he testified, and, further, has followed the principle that 'where errors as to one defendant are so substantial and of such nature as to affect a co-defendant with whom he is tried jointly, appellate courts have reversed the convictions of both defendants   .' United States v. Tomaiolo, 249 F.2d 683, 690-692, 696 (2 Cir., 1957), and cases cited. Assuming all this in Sobell's favor, we thus arrive at the crucial issue of whether he is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. 9 That statute permits a federal prisoner to move at any time to vacate or correct his sentence 'upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.' The second ground is not claimed to be applicable, nor is the third as to the Grunewald point. Since we now know that a different ruling was required on the issue later decided in Grunewald, it is argued that Sobell comes under the first ground in that his sentence was 'imposed in violation of the laws of the United States.' But if we were to read the statute to mean that relief is to be granted in every such case, we would be saying that 2255 extends to any material error in a federal criminal trial, even one discernible only through hindsight-- a result manifestly not intended by the framers, as shown by the review of the legislative history in United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 210-219, 72 S.Ct. 263, 96 L.Ed. 232 (1952), and a reading that has been repudiated by the Supreme Court, Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962), as it had earlier been by this Court, United States v. Angelet, 255 F.2d 383 (2 Cir., 1958). 4 Moreover, different words are used in the third paragraph of 2255, dealing with the action to be taken on the motion: 'If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.' Here the broad reference of the initial paragraph to 'violation of the    laws of the United States' seems to have disappeared, at least if we can assume that the phrase 'that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law' in the third paragraph means the same as 'that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law' in the first; 5 and even 'a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner' does not call for relief unless it be 'such    as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack.' Juxtaposition of the two paragraphs thus suggests a reading that although any substantial claim of violation of federal 'law', see fn. 4, supra, will get a federal prisoner into court under 2255 in the sense of giving the court the power and duty to consider his motion, he can stay there and obtain relief only if he shows that the sentencing court was without jurisdiction, that the sentence was beyond the authorized maximum, or that the sentence or judgment is subject to collateral attack, leaving the meaning of this last phrase to be worked out by the courts-- with an indication that although constitutional rights stand on a particularly high plane, not every 'denial or infringement' even of them makes the judgment 'vulnerable to collateral attack.' But see, taking the view that relief is available under 2255 for any denial of a constitutional right, the dissent of three Justices in Hodges v. United States, 368 U.S. 139, 140, 82 S.Ct. 235, 7 L.Ed.2d 184 (1961). Under a more literal reading the judgment of conviction, as distinguished from the sentence, can be successfully challenged only for denial or infringement of rights protected by the Constitution itself; only then is 'the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack.' 10 If it be deemed futile to endeavor to draw much meaning from the rather murky language of 2255 and we turn for help to the decisions thereunder, we find these telling us that, in determining whether relief under 2255 ought be granted, we should look to the previous practice in habeas corpus with respect to federal prisoners; indeed, the Supreme Court has said that 'the legislation was intended simply to provide in the sentencing court a remedy exactly commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas corpus in the court of the district where the prisoner was confined.' Hill v. United States, supra, 368 U.S. at 427, 82 S.Ct. at 471. But this also does not get us far; the glass itself is a dark one. See Bator, supra, fn. 4, at 465-74, 493-95. Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 67 S.Ct. 1588, 91 L.Ed. 1982 (1947), sheds as much light as anything. Applying the standards limned in that and other opinions of the Supreme Court as best we can, we shall assume arguendo-- in all likelihood too favorably for appellant, and without qualifications which may well be needed in other factual settings 6 -- that he should have relief under 2255 if he has shown (1) a significant denial of a constitutional right, even though he could have raised the point on appeal and there was no sufficient reason for not doing so, 332 U.S. at 178-179 and fn. 8, 182, 67 S.Ct. 1590-1591 and 1592; see also United States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666, 671 (2 Cir., 1952), cert. denied 345 U.S. 965, 73 S.Ct. 949, 97 L.Ed. 1384 (1953); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 707 fn. 8 (2 Cir., 1962); or (2) a defect seriously affecting his trial, even though not of constitutional magnitude, if it was not correctible on appeal or there were 'exceptional circumstances' excusing the failure to appeal, 332 U.S. at 180-181, 184, 67 S.Ct. at 1592, 1593; see also Bowen v. Johnston,306 U.S. 19, 26-28, 59 S.Ct. 442, 83 L.Ed. 455 (1939); Jordan v. United States District Court of District of Columbia, 352 U.S. 904, 77 S.Ct. 151, 1 L.Ed.2d 114 (1956), reversing per curiam 98 U.S.App.D.C. 160, 233 F.2d 362, 367-369 (1956); Hill v. United States, supra, 368 U.S. at 428, 82 S.Ct. at 471. 11 Sobell does not bring himself within the first category on the Grunewald ground since this is not of constitutional dimensions as to him. On the view of the majority in Grunewald, the reversal was not for denial of a right guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment but because the trial judge had abused his discretion in determining that the probative effect of the evidence outweighed its potentially prejudicial impact. True, the potential prejudice lay in the probability of the jury's drawing an impermissible inference of guilt from the claim of privilege and the issue was thus thought to have 'grave constitutional overtones'. 353 U.S. at 423, 77 S.Ct. at 983. But the majority's invocation of the Court's 'supervisory power over the administration of federal criminal justice in order to rule on the matter', and its citation of McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943), show that the Court did not think it was enforcing a constitutional claim. The opinion of the four concurring Justices can be read as saying only that there is no basis for drawing any inference from a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination, and hence that a reference to such a claim can never be relevant to impeach credibility, and thus also as enforcing only a rule of evidence. See Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1, 7, fn. 14, 81 S.Ct. 941, 6 L.Ed.2d 84 (1961). On the other hand, a general proscription of drawing inferences form a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination sounds like constitutional doctrine, and has the same effect as an avowedly constitutional precept that any later reference to a claim under the Fifth Amendment is impermissible because it renders the claim of privilege too hazardous, a view suggested by other language in the concurring opinion and by the citation of Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 196-199, 63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed. 704 (1943). But even if the Supreme Court would now deem Grunewald to be constitutionally grounded, a sufficient answer here would be that any constitutional implications must be limited to the person whose claim of privilege was later used against him. 'The privilege is that of the witness himself, and not that of the party on trial.' McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 90, 91, 26 S.Ct. 385, 50 L.Ed. 671 (1906); see Sachs v. Government of the Canal Zone, 176 F.2d 292-296 (5 Cir.), cert. denied 338 U.S. 858, 70 S.Ct. 100, 94 L.Ed. 525 (1949); 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961), pp. 414-415; McCormick, Evidence (1954), p. 152. Although perhaps Sobell also may have been entitled to object on the ground of irrelevancy, namely, that at least in some instances there may have been on real inconsistency between Mrs. Rosenberg's claim of privilege before the grand jury and her testimony of innocence at the trial, the overruling of such an objection, even if this should now appear erroneous in the light of Grunewald, would not assume 'constitutional proportions', Sunal v. Large, supra, 332 U.S. at 182, 67 S.Ct. at 1593. Sobell, therefore, can succeed only by bringing himself within the second category outlined above. 12 Admittedly there was no procedural obstacle to the raising on appeal of the question here presented. Neither do we find any greater showing of exceptional circumstances justifying the failure to raise the question than in Sunal v. Large, supra. The defendants in the two cases there decided had faced a consistent line of lower court decisions adverse to their position, including a case, Rinko v. United States, in which certiorari had been denied,325 U.S. 851, 65 S.Ct. 1086, 89 L.Ed. 1971 (1945), before the conviction of one of them; here there had been a line of adverse decisions by this Court, with certiorari denied. There many of the lower court decisions had rested on a Supreme Court opinion, Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 64 S.Ct. 346, 88 L.Ed. 305 (1944), not reading precisely on point but erroneously thought to be decisive by the lower courts, as it later was by three Justices of the Supreme Court, Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 137-139, 145, 66 S.Ct. 423, 90 L.Ed. 567 (1946); here a similar role was played by Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 46 S.Ct. 566, 70 L.Ed. 1054 (1926). In fact, Raffel was distinguishable on the ground, whether satisfying or not, that it involved an inference from a defendant's failure to take the stand to challenge certain testimony at a previous trial, rather than from a claim of privilege before a grand jury, and that it 'did not focus on the question whether the cross-examination there involved was in fact probative in impeaching the defendant's credibility,' 353 U.S. at 420, 77 S.Ct. at 982; and Johnson v. United States, supra, afforded indication that Raffel would be rather closely confined. The road to ask the Supreme Court to test the distinction was open; when it was taken in Grunewald, the Court decided for the petitioner, without overruling Raffel as the four concurring Justices were willing to do. As in Sunal v. Large, 'The case, therefore, is not one where the law was changed after the time for appeal had expired. Cf. Warring v. Colpoys, 74 App.D.C. 303, 122 F.2d 642 (136 A.L.R. 1025). It is rather a situation where at the time of the convictions the definitive ruling on the question of law had not crystallized.' 332 U.S. at 181, 67 S.Ct. at 1592. 13 We think it important to emphasize, as did the Supreme Court in Sunal v. Large, the policy considerations underlying what may seem to some a hoary and technical rule-- 'that the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed to do service for an appeal,' 332 U.S. at 178, 67 S.Ct. at 1590. The problem, as Mr. Justice Douglas there said, 'has radiations far beyond the present cases.' 332 U.S. at 181, 67 S.Ct. at 1592. There is an inevitable attraction in the position that a person convicted of a serious crime should receive a new trial whenever a later decision of the highest court indicates that, with the benefit of hindsight, a different course should have been followed at his trial in any consequential respect. Yet for courts to yield broadly to that attraction not only would cause 'litigation in these criminal cases (to) be interminable' 332 U.S. at 182, 67 S.Ct. at 1593, but, in the sole interest of those already convicted of crime, would drastically impair the ability of the Government to discharge the duty of protection which it owes to all its citizens. If the point on which Sobell now relies had been raised and sustained on appeal, that would on no account have led to a direction for acquittal. Even under all the elaborate safeguards with which this country properly surrounds those charged with crime, it would have led only to a new trial, in which it seems unlikely that the result as to any of the defendants would have differed. When a claim is raised upon direct appeal as this could have been, and is there sustained, a new trial can be had seasonably, when witnesses are still available and their recollections still fresh. In contrast, collateral attack can come at any time. Yet normally it is quite academic to talk of a new trial ten or fifteen years after the event; in most cases to direct one after such an interval is in practical result to order a release from further punishment, although the defendant does not even contend he is entitled to that relief from the courts. When a defendant who has been tried fairly in accordance with the law as it was understood at the time seeks judicial relief because of new light on a point of law affecting an aspect of his trial, his request must be balanced against the rightful claims of organized society as reflected in the penal laws. All this is the wisdom behind the doctrine that limits collateral attack on criminal judgment. See Fuld, J., in People v. Howard, 12 N.Y.2d 65, 236 N.Y.S.2d 39, 187 N.E.2d 113 (1962). 14