Opinion ID: 1764966
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: appellate review for leniency

Text: The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 does not specifically authorize this court to review, modify or vacate a sentence because of leniency. Arguably, we could substitute our judgment for that of a trial judge under our supervisory jurisdiction even though the sentence he has imposed is fully consistent with the constitution and the law. The constitutional grant of supervisory authority to this court is plenary, unfettered by jurisdictional requirements, and exercisable at the complete discretion of the court. La.Const. of 1974, Art. 5, § 5(A); Loeb v. Collier, 131 La. 377, 59 So. 816 (1912); State ex rel. Union Sawmill Co. v. Summit Lumber Co., et al., 117 La. 643, 42 So. 195 (1906); Hargrave, The Judiciary Article of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 37 La.L.Rev. 765 (1977); Tate, Supervisory Powers of the Louisiana Courts of Appeal, 38 Tul.L.Rev. 429 (1964); Comment, Supervisory Powers of the Supreme Court of Louisiana over Inferior Courts, 34 Tul.L.Rev. 165 (1959). In practice, however, certain limitations upon the use of this power are recognized by this court out of respect for the independence of other courts in the determination of questions confided to their judicial discretion, and to avoid usurping merely appellate jurisdiction not conferred upon us by the constitution. Tate, supra; Comment, supra. We have generally restricted the use of supervisory jurisdiction to those cases where there is a clear usurpation of power not confided by law, or a refusal to perform some duty plainly imposed by law, and which [the lower courts] have no discretion to refuse, and when there is an entire absence of other adequate remedy. State ex rel. City of New Orleans v. The Judge of the Sixth District Court, 32 La.Ann. 549 (1880). In order for us to set aside a constitutionally and statutorily permissible sentence, therefore, the trial court's action must clearly fall within one of these recognized exceptional categories. This is not such a case. The transcript of the proceedings indicates that the defendant appeared in court on the morning of his trial date and proffered pleas of guilty. The assistant district attorney dismissed another pending charge against defendant and announced to the court that the state would accept his pleas without a recommendation as to sentence. The defendant contends that the sentence had been agreed upon between the state, the court and the defendant, but the record is silent on this issue. The record shows, however, that the defendant had not previously been convicted of a felony, although he had pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor for possession of marijuana seven years before; and that the state did not disclose any additional aggravating circumstances to the judge before sentencing. Thereupon, the trial court fined the defendant $3,500 and imposed a concurrent suspended sentence of three years at hard labor on each count, conditioned upon his actually serving a 120-day jail term. At the time of sentencing, neither the state nor the defendant requested that the judge state the facts and reasons supporting the sentences or called his omission of this duty to his attention. We cannot say on the evidence presented for our review that the trial judge clearly misused his discretion, refused to perform his duty, or usurped power not confided by law. We do not know the circumstances of the crime or the facts taken into consideration by him in deciding upon the sentences. In the absence of a record which clearly demonstrates to the contrary, we will presume that a judicial officer properly exercised his sentencing discretion. [1] The trial judge failed to perform his legal duty to articulate the reasons for his sentence, but there is other adequate remedy for this dereliction. A judge is required by law to state for the record the considerations taken into account and the factual basis therefor in imposing sentence. La.C.Cr.P. art. 894.1. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2. His judicial duties include all the duties of his office prescribed by law. Id. Canon 3. A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. Id. Canon 3(A)(1). The Judiciary Commission is authorized upon receiving a complaint, not obviously unfounded or frivolous, alleging facts indicating that a judge is guilty of willful misconduct relating to his official duty, or willful and persistent failure to perform his duty, to investigate and determine whether there is good cause for this court to discipline a judge. La. Sup.Ct. Rule 23. On recommendation of the Judiciary Commission, this court may censure, suspend with or without salary, remove from office, or retire involuntarily a judge for willful misconduct relating to his official duty or willful and persistent failure to perform his duty. La.Const.1974, Art. 5, § 25. In short, the disciplinary proceedings provide adequate remedy for a judge's willful refusal or persistent failure to comply with Article 894.1(C). In accordance with our well settled supervisory jurisdiction procedure, we will not interfere with the trial judge's exercise of discretion in this matter. Except for the other issues presented in this case, this writ would have been improvidently granted.