Opinion ID: 683810
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: McCoy

Text: 29 McCoy asserts she was prejudiced by the district court's refusal to re-open Dunn's case-in-chief. This argument lacks merit. 30 The decision whether to grant a motion to reopen a case-in-chief is within the discretion of the district court and should not be disturbed without a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. United States v. Wade, 364 F.2d 931, 936 (6th Cir.1966). Considerable latitude in discretion is vested in the district court when deciding whether to allow a party to submit new evidence after they have closed their case-in-chief. United States v. Walker, 772 F.2d 1172, 1177 (6th Cir.1985) (citations omitted). When deciding whether to reopen a case-in-chief, the district court must consider the following factors: 1) the timeliness of the motion; 2) the character of the evidence; 3) the effect of granting the motion; and 4) the explanation of the party seeking to reopen their case-in-chief. Id (citations omitted). There has been no showing of an abuse of discretion, by the district court. 31 Although Dunn's motion was timely, his motion failed because he could not provide the court with a reasonable explanation why the evidence was not presented during his case-in-chief. Dunn wanted to reopen his case-in-chief to expand on his testimony regarding the amount of money he had made and to deny any drug dealing. Dunn was provided with every opportunity to testify, and elected to cut his testimony short. His failure to discuss certain points during his original testimony was a tactical decision. 32 McCoy may well have been prejudiced by her decision to call Dunn as a witness. Any prejudice caused to McCoy, from Dunn testifying, was the result of her ill-advised decision to recall Dunn to the stand. The district court committed no error, however, by refusing to allow Dunn to reopen his case-in-chief.