Opinion ID: 3027744
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The prejudice standard

Text: Our cases have not heretofore had occasion to put into sharp focus the proper formulation of the standard by which prejudice is to be measured in considering a Fifth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings. Those cases that have touched on the question have described the standard in a variety of ways. E.g., Ponce-Leiva v. Ashcroft, 311 F.3d 369, 377 (3d Cir. 2003) (asking whether petitioner “was prevented from reasonably presenting his case”); Zheng, 422 F.3d at 107 n.6 (finding no prejudice because “Zheng ha[d] given us no reason to believe” that, if counsel had acted competently, the Board “might have reversed the IJ’s . . . decision”).24 The government, in a supplementary letter brief, contends that useful guidance is provided by Charleswell, supra, a recent case dealing with analogous legal issues in the context of a criminal prosecution for illegal reentry into the United States. In (1945)). 24 In the Sixth Amendment context, where we have had more opportunities to apply the prejudice standard, we have generally followed the Strickland formulation requiring that “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, and defining a “reasonable probability” as “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” id. See Fischetti v. Johnson, 384 F.3d 140, 155 (3d Cir. 2004); Sistrunk, 96 F.3d at 670. However, we have also phrased the standard as a requirement that the defendant “must show . . . a reasonable likelihood that he would not have been convicted.” Thomas v. Varner, 428 F.3d 491, 502 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 928 (2007); see also Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 311 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[Defendant must show a] reasonable likelihood that the totality of the available mitigating evidence . . . might have led to a different result.”); cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 (noting that defendant must “show[] that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors”). 26 Charleswell, a defendant subject to prosecution for illegal reentry sought to mount a collateral challenge to the underlying order of removal based on a denial of due process in the deportation proceedings. See 456 F.3d at 349. One requirement to succeed on such a challenge is a showing that the underlying deportation proceeding was “‘fundamentally unfair.’” Id. at 351 (quoting United States v. Torres, 383 F.3d 92, 99 (3d Cir. 2004)). A showing of fundamental unfairness in the context faced by the Charleswell court required “both that some fundamental error occurred and that as a result of that fundamental error [the alien] suffered prejudice.” Id. at 358. Noting that “our Court ha[d] never spoken directly to the issue of prejudice” in that context, the Charleswell court adopted the position of “the majority of courts that ha[d] addressed” the issue and held that a showing of “prejudice requires a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different if the error in the deportation proceeding had not occurred.” Id. at 361–362. In so ruling, the Charleswell court observed that “this standard appears to be analogous to the standard required . . . to prove an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Id. at 361. Indeed, in the case cited by Charleswell for this proposition—United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004)—the Second Circuit expressly adopted the Strickland Sixth Amendment standard governing prejudice from alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings as the standard to be applied, under the Fifth Amendment, to determine prejudice from an alleged denial of due process in removal proceedings. Copeland, 376 F.3d at 73 (“[T]he appropriate test for prejudice is the one used to decide ineffective assistance of counsel claims, namely, prejudice is shown where ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)).25 25 Like Charleswell, Copeland concerned a collateral challenge to an underlying order of removal, based on an asserted denial of due process in the underlying deportation proceedings. The error alleged in the underlying proceedings in Copeland was the IJ’s failure to inform the alien of his right to 27 We agree with the government that the Charleswell “reasonable likelihood” standard—or its equivalent, the “reasonable probability” standard26—is also appropriate to the prejudice inquiry in the context of an alleged denial of due process in removal proceedings due to ineffective assistance of counsel. Charleswell and Copeland applied the “reasonable likelihood” standard to determine prejudice from denials of due process in removal proceedings, in instances where the alleged defect was not ineffective assistance of counsel, in part because the alleged defect in the proceedings was “analogous to” ineffective assistance of counsel. We therefore view it as entirely appropriate to apply the “reasonable likelihood” standard in the “close-fitting,” Copeland, 376 F.3d at 73, circumstance where the alleged defect in the removal proceedings is ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, apply for discretionary relief from removal. See Copeland, 376 F.3d at 70. In adopting the Strickland standard as the proper one for determining prejudice from such an error, the Copeland court explained that: Th[e] analogy [between the Copeland facts and a case involving alleged ineffective assistance of counsel] is close-fitting because the denial of an opportunity to apply for [discretionary] relief will generally be the result either of a lawyer having caused an eligible alien to fail to apply, or of an IJ, owing special duties to a pro se alien, having failed to give notice of such an opportunity. In the latter case, therefore, prejudice is shown where there is a reasonable probability that, but for the IJ’s unprofessional errors, the alien would have been granted [discretionary] relief. Copeland, 376 F.3d at 73 (citations omitted). 26 See supra note 24 (“reasonable likelihood” and “reasonable probability” used as equivalent terms in Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance-of-counsel case law); compare also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“reasonable probability”), with id. at 696 (“reasonably likely”). 28 the standard is a familiar one and properly requires the alien to show not just that he received ineffective assistance in his removal proceedings, but that the challenged order of removal is fundamentally unfair, because there is a significant likelihood that the IJ would not have entered an order of removal absent counsel’s errors. For these reasons, we find that an alien claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings must, in addition to showing that his lawyer committed unprofessional errors, show that there was a “reasonable likelihood that the result would have been different if the error[s] . . . had not occurred.” Charleswell, 456 F.3d at 362. B. The BIA’s analysis The BIA’s two-paragraph treatment of Fadiga’s ineffective-assistance claim as to withholding of removal under the INA and protection under the CAT reads as follows: We now turn to the [Fadiga’s] remaining applications for relief. With regard to his application for withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the Act, we find that even if this Board were to assume the truth of [Fadiga’s] claim, the record fails to establish that it is “more likely than not” that he would be in danger of future persecution as either a member of Sekou Toure’s family or as a member of the RPG party. [Fadiga] is not a victim of past persecution; therefore, he does not qualify for a presumption of future persecution. Furthermore, although the Department of State verified isolated incidents of harassment of RPG members in 2003; inasmuch as [Fadiga] has failed to provide any additional evidence corroborating the validity of the arrest warrant he previously submitted, we find that the record fails to demonstrate a clear probability that he would be targeted for future persecution. Likewise, following consideration of the evidence submitted in support of [Fadiga’s] motion, as well as the evidence of record, we find that [he] has failed to demonstrate his eligibility for relief under the [CAT]. We find that not only is the record is [sic] 29 devoid of any evidence that [Fadiga] has ever been tortured in the past, but there is also is [sic] insufficient evidence to demonstrate a clear probability that he would be subject to future torture in Guinea. Accordingly, [Fadiga] has failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for either withholding of removal under [the INA] or protection pursuant to the [CAT]; and as a result, we do not find that [Fadiga] has demonstrated that he has been prejudiced by the actions of his former attorney. E.R. at 5 (citations and footnote omitted). Although the Board stated that it was applying a “prima facie eligibility” standard, the Board’s analysis reveals that the Board, in fact, held Fadiga to a higher standard—requiring him to demonstrate eligibility for relief under the ultimate standards applicable to claims for withholding of removal and protection under the CAT, i.e., the “more likely than not” or “clear probability” standards.27 This was error, because those standards are more demanding than the showing properly required to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief. In Sevoian, we explained that “the prima facie case standard for a motion to reopen . . . requires the applicant to produce objective evidence showing a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that he can 27 See, e.g., Shehu v. Att’y Gen., 482 F.3d 652, 657 (3d Cir. 2007) (withholding of removal under INA requires showing of “clear probability of persecution” in the proposed country of removal); id. at 658 (protection under the CAT requires showing that alien is “‘more likely than not’ to be tortured with the consent or acquiescence of the . . . government” in the proposed country of removal). In this context, the “clear probability” and “more likely than not” standards are equivalent, and both standards are equivalent to a “preponderance of the evidence.” INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424 & n.19 (1984). 30 establish that he [merits relief under the applicable standard].” 290 F.3d at 175; see also Guo, 386 F.3d at 563. And in Guo, we emphasized that “a ‘reasonable likelihood’ means merely showing a realistic chance that the petitioner can at a later time establish that asylum should be granted.” Guo, 386 F.3d at 564. Because the Board had required Guo to “establish” (i.e., by a preponderance of the evidence) eligibility for relief, we found that it had erred by applying an “excessively rigorous standard.” Guo, 386 F.3d at 564.28 Likewise, in ruling on the motion to reopen in Fadiga’s case, the BIA applied an “excessively rigorous standard” to the inquiry whether Fadiga had established the prejudice component of his underlying claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. As established in our discussion supra, the proper standard was whether there was a “reasonable likelihood” that the outcome of Fadiga’s hearing in the Immigration Court would have been different absent the errors allegedly made by his counsel. While a “reasonable likelihood” of a different outcome 28 We said: The Board, . . . in its denial of Guo’s motion . . ., stated that she must proceed to end-game and “establish that there is a pattern or practice [of enforcing the family planning policy against Chinese nationals with foreign-born children] in her homeland” (emphasis added). In this context, “establish” means the evidence for asylum outweighs the evidence against. A “reasonable likelihood” means merely showing a realistic chance that the petitioner can at a later time establish that asylum should be granted. The distinction may at first appear to be subtle shading, but without it “prima facie” (meaning at first sight) would lack meaning. Guo, 386 F.3d at 563–64 (bracketed and parenthetical material in original). 31 requires more than a showing of “a plausible ground for relief from deportation,” Charleswell, 456 F.3d at 361 (internal quotation marks omitted), it does not require that a different outcome was more likely than not. The latter point has been made clear in the Sixth Amendment context by repeated pronouncements of the Supreme Court and this Circuit. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986) (“[A] defendant need not establish that the attorney’s deficient performance more likely than not altered the outcome in order to establish prejudice under Strickland.”). Most recently, in Thomas v. Varner, 428 F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 928 (2007), we explained that [t]he prejudice component requires [the defendant] to show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. He “need not show that counsel’s deficient performance ‘more likely than not altered the outcome in the case’—rather, he must show only ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Jacobs [v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 105 (3d Cir. 2005)] (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693–94). “This standard is not a stringent one.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 428 F.3d at 502 (parallel citations omitted).29 Notably, the Ninth Circuit has had occasion to address a BIA error very similar to the Board’s error in the case at bar. In 29 In Obleshchenko v. Ashcroft, the Eighth Circuit applied this Sixth Amendment standard of proof to a claim of “ineffective assistance of counsel at deportation or exclusion proceedings.” 392 F.3d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that the required prejudice inquiry “ask[s] whether there is a reasonable probability that the IJ would have altered his judgment had the [alien] been represented by . . . competent counsel,” “where ‘reasonable probability’ means ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)). 32 Maravilla Maravilla v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 855 (9th Cir. 2004), the BIA denied a motion to reopen an order directing the removal of a Mexican married couple. Id. at 857. The motion to reopen challenged the removal order on ineffective-assistance grounds. Id. As the Ninth Circuit explained, the BIA “conclud[ed] that petitioners failed to show that their case outcome ‘would have been different but for the alleged ineffectiveness’ of counsel.” Id. at 857 (quoting BIA opinion). Finding that it was error for “the BIA [to] directly adjudge[] the question of whether petitioners would win or lose their claim,” the Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded for “the BIA to consider whether competent counsel would have acted otherwise, and, if so, to consider under the correct standard whether petitioners were thereby prejudiced.” Id. at 859. Because, in the case at bar, the BIA applied too rigorous a standard in denying Fadiga’s motion to reopen—requiring Fadiga to establish not a “reasonable likelihood” but a “clear probability” of gaining the relief sought (or that he “more likely than not” would prevail)—this court could, following the practice of the Maravilla Maravilla court, remand this case to the BIA to afford that tribunal an opportunity to determine whether Pell’s representation of Fadiga was deficient and, if so, whether the deficient representation undercut Fadiga’s opportunity to present his claims in the Immigration Court.30 In the present circumstances, however, we think that it would be an act of supererogation for this court to ask the BIA to determine whether Pell’s representation fell below minimal 30 Fadiga contends that the BIA has already addressed the first question—whether Pell’s representation of Fadiga was deficient—and has “accepted that ineffective assistance occurred.” Petr.’s Br. 7. We read the BIA’s opinion differently. We think the BIA merely assumed arguendo that Pell’s representation of Fadiga was deficient, focusing instead on what the BIA then found to be an absence of prejudice. See E.R. at 4 (“[E]ven if the performance of [Fadiga’s] prior counsel had been deficient, [Fadiga’s] motion must . . . be denied because he has failed to establish [prejudice].”). 33 professional standards, thereby prejudicing Fadiga. The full record of that representation is before us, and we are competent to assess what transpired. C. Application of the error-and-prejudice test to Fadiga’s claim of ineffective assistance The Pell affidavit submitted to the BIA—corroborating and expanding on Pell’s oral proffer to the IJ—makes it plain that the faulty I-589 was prepared by a law student, was not reviewed by Pell, and was not discussed with Fadiga by Pell in advance of the hearing before the IJ. “Further, [Pell] did not advise Mr. Fadiga to produce witnesses or declarations regarding his familial ties to former President . . . Sekou Toure, his membership in the R.P.G., . . . the treatment of R.P.G. members by the government, or . . . treatment of [Touré’s] family members . . . by the government.” E.R. at 41 (Pell. Aff.) ¶ 13. Moreover—Pell advised the BIA in his affidavit—Pell was “quite certain . . . that Mr. Fadiga could and would have produced witnesses or affidavits or declarations to prove” Fadiga’s relationship to Sekou Touré, Fadiga’s membership in the RPG, and the targeting of both Touré family members and RPG “members and/or officials” by the incumbent Guinean government. Id. ¶ 15. These attestations, which are uncontroverted in the record, make clear that Pell’s performance “fell below an objective standard of ‘reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.’” Sistrunk v. Vaughn, 96 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668). It does not require Pell’s coda—“I deeply regret and sincerely apologize for the problems that I have caused this Court, the government attorneys, and Mr. Fadiga, in not having been more thorough in presenting his case from an evidentiary standpoint. I know better.” E.R. at 42 (Pell Aff.) ¶ 16—to establish that Pell’s failures severely compromised Fadiga’s capacity to present his claims cogently in the Immigration Court.31 31 Little wonder that, merely on the basis of what Fadiga and Pell told the IJ at the hearing (i.e., before Pell’s proffer at the hearing took formal shape as the Pell affidavit submitted to the 34 Was Fadiga prejudiced by Pell’s deficient representation? In our view, the record establishes that Fadiga was prejudiced—i.e., that there would have been a “reasonable likelihood” of Fadiga achieving a favorable outcome at the May 7, 2004 hearing had Pell performed effectively. The IJ’s decision was based in large part on doubts about the credibility of Fadiga’s testimony—doubts that were predicated on evidentiary inconsistencies which would have been avoided by competent counsel. See supra Parts I.B.2–4, I.C.1. In addition, the IJ discounted the probative value of Fadiga’s other, documentary evidence in part because it was “not supported by detailed affidavits or testimonial corroboration,” E.R. at 34, and it is clear from the record that at least some such corroboration would have been available given competent advice and preparation by counsel. Thus, counsel’s errors contributed directly to the evidentiary defects that led the IJ to deny relief. Cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 (“[A] court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the [fact-finder]. Some of the factual findings will have been unaffected by the errors, and factual findings that were affected will have been affected in different ways.”). We are also mindful of the ambivalence in the IJ’s opinion, see, e.g., supra note 14 and accompanying text. The IJ stated that “[t]his is not an easy case for the Court to decide because of the preparation issues raised by [Fadiga],” E.R. at 28—concerns to which the IJ adverted more than once. E.g., E.R. at 34, 36, 37. Cf. Strickland, supra at 696 (“[A] conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.”). In sum, we find that there is at least a “reasonable BIA), the IJ noted that “[a] reviewer of this record[,] if an appeal is taken, will . . . have to determine whether or not the evidence presented in these proceedings, given [Fadiga’s] testimony and the representations of counsel, resulted in a fundamentally fair hearing.” E.R. at 37. (The IJ went on to state that “[a]s of today, the Court does not find that the fundamental[] fairness prescription has been abrogated.” Id.) 35 likelihood” that, absent the avoidable evidentiary inconsistencies, and with the addition of witnesses who could have corroborated Fadiga’s testimony and his documentary evidence, the IJ would have granted Fadiga withholding from removal under the INA, protection under the CAT, or both. Because the record, viewed in light of the correct legal standard for determining prejudice, thus establishes that Fadiga was denied due process, the Board abused its discretion by denying the motion to reopen. Finally, in consideration of the already protracted history of the case, we pretermit further review by the BIA of Fadiga’s motion to reopen. It is clear that the IJ must be directed to reexamine Fadiga’s claims. “While we cannot yet say that [Fadiga] is entitled to [relief], we are persuaded that [he] at least deserves a hearing.” Guo, 386 F.3d at 564.