Opinion ID: 854050
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Doyle Error

Text: Willsey contends that the State impermissibly used a request for an attorney that she made after the conclusion of her recorded statement as evidence that she was conscious of her guilt. She says her request was an invocation of the right to remain silent. The use of a defendant's assertion of the right to remain silent either to impeach or as substantive evidence violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986). The assertion of the right to remain silent includes the statement... of a desire to remain silent until an attorney has been consulted. Wainwright, 474 U.S. at 295 n. 13, 106 S.Ct. 634. See also Lynch v. State, 632 N.E.2d 341 (Ind.1994) (State's use of defendant's invocation of the right to an attorney was Doyle error). Willsey did not object to the prosecutor's conduct on these grounds at trial. To avoid waiver she contends that a Doyle error is fundamental citing Wilson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ind.1987) (holding a Doyle error to be fundamental and not subject to waiver); Bevis v. State, 614 N.E.2d 599, 604 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993). Even if available on appeal, however, we do not find a Doyle error. Willsey points to the following testimony from Trooper Johnson, describing his dealing with Willsey after he had ended the formal interview with Willsey and turned off the tape recorder: State: Did the defendant continue to talk to you after the formal interview had been concluded? Johnson: Yes the defendant did. State: Okay, did the defendant make any statements regarding Mr. Biddle's death at that time? Johnson: Yes, the defendant spoke to several of us there in the room.... .... State: What statement did the defendant make regarding Mr. Biddle's death? Johnson: Towards the end, just prior to the time that, uh, I quit talking with the defendant, she makes a comment to the effect that, Oh my God I don't believe I'm saying this. She says, I'll tell you if you want to know how Mr. Biddle died, she said, If you'll call my attorney, Woody, if you want to know how Mr. Biddle died, I'll tell you then, which lead [sic] me to believe that, you know, she, uh, there was something that she was wanting to tell me she just wouldn't cross that bridge. State: Well you ... once the defendant asked for an attorney, you can't continue taking statements if they're going to talk about a specific event, is that correct? Johnson: Correct, ma'am, yes. State: And her indication was that she would talk to you about Mr. Biddle's death if you would get her attorney present? Johnson: Yes. In Doyle two defendants, tried on identical evidence, refused to talk to police after their arrest but at trial offered an exculpatory version of events. To impeach the defendants' testimony, on cross-examination the prosecutor repeatedly asked the defendants why they did not offer this version to police after their arrest but instead chose to remain silent. The Supreme Court held that it was fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to advise defendants of their right to remain silent and then to punish them if they chose to exercise that right. In other words, the prosecution may not use a defendant's decision to stand mute in order to create an inference of guilta proposition fleshed out in a number of decisions. See United States v. Tenorio, 69 F.3d 1103 (11th Cir.1995); United States v. Kallin, 50 F.3d 689 (9th Cir.1995); Williams v. Zahradnick, 632 F.2d 353 (4th Cir.1980); Henson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind.1987); White v. State, 647 N.E.2d 684 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). The Court expanded this holding in Wainwright to bar use of the defendant's decision to remain silent and to request an attorney as evidence that the defendant was rational, and not insane as was claimed at trial. See also Lynch, 632 N.E.2d at 342; Wilson, 514 N.E.2d at 284. In all these cases, the prosecution used the silence or the request for counsel itself to implicate the defendant in some way. According to Johnson, the formal interview had ended when Willsey decided to initiate further conversation. She began without reference to her Fifth Amendment rights, as if making an admission of some kind: Oh my God, I don't believe I'm saying this.... I'll tell you if you want to know how Mr. Biddle died. Surely catching the attention of the police officers present, she followed up her offer with a condition: If you'll call my attorney, Woody, if you want to know how Mr. Biddle died, I'll tell you then. Johnson made the natural inference that there was something Willsey knew about Biddle's death, but she just wouldn't cross that bridge and tell the police. The damaging inference, if any, stems from Willsey's admission that she knew something about the circumstances of Biddle's death and not from the fact that she mentioned her attorney. By contrast, in Doyle and Wainwright the prosecution used the act of the defendant's silence or the fact of the request for counsel itself as indicative of guilt or damaging to credibility. As the Seventh Circuit noted in describing Doyle analysis, the central constitutional inquiry is the particular use to which the post-arrest silence is being put.... Doyle does not impose a prima facie bar against any mention whatsoever of a defendant's right to request counsel, but instead guards against the exploitation of that constitutional right by the prosecutor. Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir.1991) (no Doyle error where the inadvertent mention of petitioner's request for counsel was not argued to the jury nor was it ever used to impeach petitioner); see also United States v. Higgins, 75 F.3d 332, 333 (7th Cir.1996) (A statement such as `I told the suspect that he could remain silent, and he did' does not ask the jury to infer guilt from silence.). Cf. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 764, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (no Doyle error where after improper question about defendant's silence prosecutor was not permitted to make specific inquiry or argument respecting the silence). A suspect may not package a confession of guilt with a request for counsele.g., I did it. I want to speak with an attorneyand then seek to exclude the confession. Here, the State took advantage of Willsey's implication of sinister knowledge, not the request for counsel. Accordingly, Doyle error did not occur and the trial court did not err in admitting Johnson's testimony.