Opinion ID: 203028
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of the Continuance Motion

Text: The decision whether to grant a continuance is a matter of discretion for the trial judge, and assessing whether denial of a request to postpone the start of trial constitutes an abuse of discretion requires a careful review of the facts of the particular case. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964); see also United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 770 (1st Cir.1995) ([E]ach case is sui generis. ); United States v. Torres, 793 F.2d 436, 440 (1st Cir.1986) (In deciding whether denial of a continuance constitutes an abuse of discretion, we cannot apply a mechanical test, but must evaluate each case on its own facts.). The relevant factors include the reasons contemporaneously presented in support of the request, the amount of time needed for effective preparation, the complexity of the case, the extent of inconvenience to others if a continuance is granted, and the likelihood of injustice or unfair prejudice attributable to the denial of a continuance. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d at 770. We will find an abuse of discretion only if defendants show that the court exhibited an `unreasonable and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.' United States v. Rodriguez-Marrero, 390 F.3d 1, 21-22 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Rodriguez Cortes, 949 F.2d 532, 545 (1st Cir. 1991)). Identifying prejudice from the ruling is essential. See, e.g., Saccoccia, 58 F.3d at 770 ([T]he decision below must endure unless the party who moved for the continuance can demonstrate that, in withholding relief, the trial court indulged a serious error of law or suffered a meaningful lapse of judgment, resulting in substantial prejudice to the movant.). In this case, the district court held a status conference on September 30, 2005  two weeks after defendants' arraignment  and told counsel at its conclusion that the trial would begin on October 24 and that that was a [f]irm date. On October 13, the government filed a motion requesting a three-week continuance, noting that it was still in the process of finalizing discovery and, to date, had provided approximately 1,000 pages of discovery to defense counsel. The government also reported that plea negotiations had begun and expressed its belief that a brief extension of time is needed in order for the attorneys to timely review the discovery and discuss it with their respective clients. The court denied the motion the next day without comment and subsequently denied five additional continuance requests made by various defendants between October 19 and October 23, also without explanation. Meanwhile, activity in the case was proceeding along two fronts: the government continued to release discovery material, and it exchanged plea offers with defendants. On October 17, the government told defense counsel by letter that it would consider plea offers, and it recommended that a proposed package deal be submitted by the close of business the next day. The letter also identified three witnesses the government intended to call at trial [22] and stated that it would provide all of the defendants' post-arrest statements to all parties on October 18. The record indicates that three additional discovery packages were provided: on October 17, defendants received four pages of documents and a CD that contained nautical charts and deck plans for the Sea Atlantic ; on October 18, they received about 30 pages of materials consisting of Reports of Investigation concerning each defendant and waiver of rights forms dated September 3, as well as a CD containing navigation charts; and on October 22, the government released 150 pages consisting of Statement of Rights and Interview Notes for each defendant, as well as ion scan results, a Coast Guard prisoner log, a photograph of narcotics, and miscellaneous documents from USCG Officers Cieblik and Young. On October 19, before the defendants were able to respond to the government's October 17 invitation for plea offers, the government sent counsel a letter offering to recommend a deal in which the defendants would plead guilty to both substantive counts of the indictment in exchange for sentences between 135 and 168 months' imprisonment; the government said it would not oppose a sentence at the lower end of that range and also invited reasonable counter-offers. On October 22  the Saturday before the Monday start date for the trial  defendants responded with an offer to accept seventy months' incarceration in lieu of trial. The government rejected the offer, noting that [t]his could have been a possible recommended sentence if a formal counter-offer had been received in a timely fashion. However, because trial was about to begin, a jury panel had been summoned, witnesses had flown in from San Diego, and the government has spent valuable time and resources in preparing for trial, the government rejected the offer. One final plea attempt was made on the second day of trial, when the defendants submitted a joint offer in writing for ninety-six months' imprisonment, with an enhancement to be imposed on the captain for special skills and knowledge. Additionally on that day, trial proceedings began with Rodríguez-Durán's counsel reporting to the judge that defendants wished to enter a straight plea to a single count of the indictment, while preserving the option to argue their duress defense at sentencing. The court engaged in an extended colloquy with counsel and ultimately concluded that the case was not ripe for a plea, in part because more than one attorney expressed concern about losing the opportunity to introduce evidence of the duress defense. In addition, the court indicated concern that some of the defendants were being pressured to go along with a plea, [a]nd counsel may not even be aware of what the pressures are. The court noted that, [i]t seems to me that a lot more talking has to take place among defendants before I take this plea, but insisted that any further discussion take place during the lunch recess because [t]here is no way I am going to continue wasting time with this. In arguing that the court abused its discretion in refusing to delay the trial's start date, defendants point in particular to their need for more time to complete plea negotiations  reflected in both the government's refusal to consider their offer on October 22 and the court's observation that more discussion was needed on the October 25 plea offer  and also emphasize their inability to fully analyze the voluminous discovery material so that they could prepare effectively for trial. Although the government originally sought a continuance for those same purposes, it argues on appeal that the court's refusal to delay the trial was not an abuse of discretion. It maintains that the record does not show that defendants had inadequate time to mount a meaningful defense  citing in support the acquittals of most of them on the conspiracy charge-and it further argues that the facts surrounding the plea negotiations demonstrate that more time would not have been productive. We recognize that the arrest-to-trial period here was extraordinarily short, particularly for a case in which nine separate defense counsel needed to coordinate schedules in order to collaborate on trial strategy. We also intimacy with the many pages of discovery materials. `The focus, [however], is on what constitutes a reasonable period of time for preparation, not on defense counsel's subjective satisfaction with his level of preparedness.' United States v. Moore, 362 F.3d 129, 135 n. 7 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Marrero-Ortiz, 160 F.3d 768, 777 (1st Cir.1998)). Even if we were to conclude that the court erred in pushing the case to trial so quickly, [a] defendant is generally not entitled to a new trial unless he or she can identify specific ways in which the court's erroneous denial of a continuance prejudiced his or her defense. Rodriguez-Marrero, 390 F.3d at 22. Here, in neither the continuance motions themselves, nor in their appellate briefs  the latter prepared after trial, with the advantage of time and perspective  have defendants developed their prejudice claims sufficiently to demonstrate actual harm from the short pre-trial period. The Supreme Court has said that, in assessing the circumstances surrounding a continuance request, we should give particular attention to the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied. Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589, 84 S.Ct. 841; see also Torres, 793 F.2d at 440. In addition, because lack of time to identify supportable defenses or crucial evidence frequently will be the harm alleged from denial of a continuance in a criminal case, evidence of prejudice developed during or after trial that is consistent with the original request for delay also may play a pivotal role in our review. Indeed, it may only be on appeal, after counsel has had time to carefully review the record, that the magnitude of the prejudice can be specifically shown. For example, when a defendant seeks a continuance because of voluminous discovery material, his later claim of prejudice from a denial will be enhanced if he identifies particular significant, exculpatory evidence that would have been available to him if the continuance had been granted. Cf. Rodriguez-Marrero, 390 F.3d at 22 (Although [defendant] states that the government produced twenty thousand pages of documents and tape recordings relating to thirty-five individuals, he fails to identify (with the one exception already noted) any material document that he was unable to review due to the time pressures.). Here, defendants' motions largely asserted generalities  the complexity of the case and the thousands of pages to review, the challenge of preparing a defense for foreign defendants unfamiliar with the United States' justice system, [23] the desire to continue plea negotiations and the need to find maritime experts. Even with the benefit of hindsight, they have pointed to no pivotal evidence or theories that realistically could have made a difference had they been allotted more time to prepare for trial. We now briefly address each point that has been raised on appeal, explaining why we conclude that none merits vacating the judgments.
Defendants cite the government's rejection of their October 22 plea offer based on the imminent start of trial as evidence that a postponement in the trial date would have enabled them to successfully complete plea negotiations. Even assuming, for argument's sake, that denying or curtailing the time to conduct plea negotiations can be a basis for a claim of abuse of discretion  a matter on which we do not opine  no such abuse occurred here. The defendants' and the government's expectations for a deal remained far apart, [24] and, as reflected in the colloquy described above, at least some defendants remained ambivalent about entering a plea. Consequently, the possibility that a plea bargain acceptable to all could have been reached within a reasonable period of time is too speculative to factor significantly into our assessment. Defendants had no right to negotiate a plea, see Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) ([T]here is no constitutional right to plea bargain; the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.), and even if some of the group had been able to reach agreement with the government, the court had the prerogative  which it indicated it might exercise  to reject a deal that did not embrace all defendants. Cf. United States v. Ventura-Cruel, 356 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir.2003) (It is well settled that a defendant does not have an absolute right to plead guilty.) (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971)). It is apparent that the negotiations were not on the brink of completion, and defendants' general claim that an unspecified amount of additional time would have made a difference falls far short of showing the substantial prejudice necessary to justify a new trial. [25]
Defendants Morelis, De La Rosa and Rodríguez-Durán complain that they needed more time to obtain direct evidence from Bolivia to challenge the validity of the Coast Guard's consent to board the Sea Atlantic. However, defendants received copies of the official certification document on September 29. They concede that the certification is all that is required under the MDLEA to prove consent, see 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c)(1), and they fail to explain how more time would have enabled them to challenge the document or the consent it reflects. In his brief and at oral argument, Rodríguez-Durán also contended that the certification contained an incorrect location for the vessel and that more time was needed to retain a maritime expert to explore the implications of that mistake. Specifically, his counsel asserted at argument that he believed the vessel was located in Panamanian waters and that the Coast Guard thus lacked jurisdiction to board. Officer Cieblik admitted at trial that the location description on the certification erroneously indicated the vessel was boarded northeast of Aruba, rather than northwest, and attributed the discrepancy to a mistaken notation. To the extent that error reflected an actual jurisdictional problem  and we have no basis for thinking it does  we fail to see why defendants could not have addressed the point in the three weeks between receiving the certification and the start of trial. Certainly in the year between trial and the filing of appellate briefs, any real jurisdictional flaw could have been substantiated. Consequently, we conclude that the alleged lack of time to pursue this issue lends no support to defendants' claim that the court erroneously denied a continuance.
Before Agent Santiago testified about Morelis's statement admitting that Tejeiro told him that the Sea Atlantic would carry contraband, the court observed that no voluntariness issue had been raised with respect to the statement. Morelis's counsel responded that he had not yet done so, but had filed a continuance motion because he had not had time to explore the whole contents of all the documents. De La Rosa points to this exchange in arguing that the court's denial of a continuance was an abuse of discretion. Neither De La Rosa nor Morelis develops this point, however, by showing that Morelis's counsel could have raised a viable voluntariness challenge to the statement if he had had more time to scrutinize the documents and interview his client. Given counsel's opportunity to examine the relevant documents since the time of trial, we can only conclude that the documents, in fact, do not support a voluntariness challenge and that the district court's continuance ruling is not vulnerable on that basis.
At oral argument on appeal, counsel for Rodríguez-Durán asserted for the first time that a continuance was necessary so that he could travel to Venezuela to investigate an alleged abduction of his client's daughter. Counsel implied that such an investigation would substantiate Rodríguez-Durán's claim that Tejeiro had threatened to retaliate against his family if he refused to cooperate in the drug trafficking scheme. At trial, Rodríguez-Durán testified that Tejeiro had told him that, in particular, his daughter and mother-in-law were being watched, and stated that Tejeiro had made contact with his family in Puerto Cabello. He further testified that he felt that serious injury or death may be placed upon her. [26] However, Rodríguez-Durán never sought a continuance based on the need to travel to Venezuela and did not raise, let alone explain, the need to do so in his brief on appeal. Even were the issue not waived, see United States v. Jiminez, 498 F.3d 82, 88 (1st Cir.2007) (noting the well-settled appellate rule that `issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived') (quoting United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990)), we would have no factual basis for assessing its relevance to the district court's continuance ruling.
Finally, we find no merit in the miscellaneous generalities invoked by defendants, including their characterization of this case as complex and their invocation of the foreign citizenship of the defendants. Although the government provided a substantial quantity of discovery, the factual circumstances were not particularly complicated; the indictment stemmed from a single episode with a fixed cast of participants. Cf. Rodriguez-Marrero, 390 F.3d at 5, 9, 22 (considering continuance claim in case involving an alleged four-year drug conspiracy, four-week trial, more than forty witnesses, at least 4,500 pages of discovery, and twelve defendants charged in a twelve-count second superseding indictment). The defendants' foreign nationalities are likewise without significance absent some identifiable, particular prejudice from their status, such as a language barrier that prevented their meaningful participation in the proceedings. In sum, [w]hile the trial judge held defendants to a tough schedule, in the absence of a showing of unfair prejudice to defendants, there was no manifest abuse of discretion. United States v. Orlando-Figueroa, 229 F.3d 33, 41 (1st Cir.2000).