Opinion ID: 445463
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective Assistance in the Penalty Phase

Text: 10 Appellant contends that his attorney's failure to present evidence of mitigating circumstances at the sentencing portion of his trial denied him the effective assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment guarantees him. We perceive no merit in that claim. We also agree with the district court that the claim did not require an evidentiary hearing. 11 Our analysis necessarily flows from Strickland v. Washington, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), in which the Court established a two-prong test for deciding ineffective assistance claims. Under that test, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. --- U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. A court need not consider the deficiency prong if it concludes that the defendant has demonstrated no prejudice. Id. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 2070. The defendant, moreover, may not simply allege but must affirmatively prove prejudice. Id. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 2067. In a challenge to a death sentence, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the [counsel's] errors, the sentencer--including the appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence--would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Id. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. 12 Appellant contends that his lawyer's failure to put on evidence at the penalty phase prejudiced his ability to avoid the death sentence. The nature of the evidence appellant asserts his attorney should have presented, however, belies the argument. That evidence would have consisted virtually entirely of the testimony of appellant's relatives, friends, and employers who would have asserted appellant's affection for his family and friends, their affection for him, his willingness to work hard without complaint, his conscientiousness and dependability, his faith, and his non-violent disposition. Some of the witnesses would have pleaded for appellant's life. Other evidence would have shown that tests in 1973 showed appellant to have an I.Q. of 69, and that he committed the murder at the age of 25. 13 In light of the proffered evidence, we believe that our decision in Willie v. Maggio, 737 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir.1984), controls our disposition of appellant's claim here. A Louisiana jury had convicted Willie of murder and recommended the death penalty, finding aggravating circumstances in that Willie had committed the murder in the course of aggravated rape and in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. Willie grounded his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court in part on his allegation that his trial lawyer had failed to present evidence of mitigating circumstances. The evidence that Willie claimed his lawyer should have presented closely resembled the evidence that appellant asserts his counsel should have submitted to the jury. In rejecting Willie's claim, this court observed: 14 We do not believe that the outcome of the jury's deliberations, in light of the state's evidence showing the aggravated circumstances of the crime, would have been altered by other defense witnesses who merely told more about the defendant's troubled adoles[c]ence. The evidence presented by the state in support of its request for the death penalty was not only substantial but undoubtedly left a deep impression on the jury.... 15 In light of the foregoing, we conclude that even if Willie's counsel had offered the mitigating evidence that Willie has discussed in his petition, that there is no reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would have changed the jury's conclusion that, in the face of the overwhelming aggravating circumstances, the death penalty should be invoked. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. at 2071. 16 Willie, 737 F.2d at 1394. See also Milton v. Procunier, 744 F.2d 1091, 1100 (5th Cir.1984), where we held that [t]he decision to not offer evidence at the punishment phase was not defective in the constitutional sense. 17 We reach the same conclusion in this case. The testimony of appellant's parents could have added little to the penalty phase of the trial; both had just before testified during the guilt phase. The evidence of appellant's I.Q. would also have carried insignificant further weight in view of his lawyer's argument to the jury regarding appellant's psychological problems, impaired mental state during the crime, and his underprivileged background. 2 Moreover, the aggravating circumstances in this case exceeded those that the jury found to exist in Willie. The grisly manner of Mrs. Richard's death needs no reiteration. As the district court found, any evidence that appellant could have introduced in mitigation would have amounted to a plea for mercy. On the facts of this case, counsel's failure to put on such evidence did not so prejudice appellant as to violate appellant's constitutional right to effective counsel. 3 18 Nor do we find fault in the district court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing. Appellant does not suggest that a live hearing of the evidence that he describes in his petition would have assisted the district court in evaluating his claim of prejudice. In general, a district court need not conduct such a hearing where doing so would not produce further evidence in support of specific, non-conclusory allegations. Conclusory allegations in a petition for habeas corpus do not warrant such a hearing. Green v. McGougan, 744 F.2d 1189, 1191 (5th Cir.1984); Knighton v. Maggio, 740 F.2d 1344, 1349 (5th Cir.1984). In this case, appellant alleges generally that a hearing would elicit further evidence of prejudice. Such a bare claim did not provide grounds for an evidentiary hearing; neither, therefore, can it support the specific claim of prejudice to establish the threshold showing that would call for such a hearing. Where, as here, the evidence that a defendant claims his counsel should have introduced does not demonstrate prejudice and his allegation that other proof of prejudice exists is only conclusory, the district court in its discretion could properly refuse an evidentiary hearing. 4