Opinion ID: 1159477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Additional Asserted Errors Relating to the Penalty Trial

Text: For the guidance of the court at the penalty retrial we consider several additional contentions by defendants regarding their penalty trial. (19) Baker contends that it was error to admit testimony by Patterson concerning certain extrajudicial statements by Brawley without deleting the part implicating Baker. At the penalty trial the prosecution made an offer of proof that Patterson would testify, among other things, to discussions by Brawley of plans by Brawley and other inmates, including Baker, to escape. Baker's attorney asked that the witness be instructed to omit Baker's name, and the court declined to do so. Thereafter Patterson testified that Brawley stated in part that, if the trial went against him, he and others would kill a deputy, get the keys and open the cell to free Baker, and the prosecutor elicited further testimony from Patterson that Brawley and Baker had opportunities to talk together and did so. The court limited Patterson's testimony regarding Brawley's extrajudicial statements to Brawley, but there was, of course, a possibility that the jury might have been unable to follow this instruction, have drawn an inference from the evidence that Baker was a party to the escape plan, and have considered this matter in determining Baker's penalty. Under the rationale of Bruton v. United States, supra, 391 U.S. 123, and People v. Aranda, supra, 63 Cal.2d 518, it is clear that if Patterson's testimony is offered at the penalty retrial and Baker askes that Patterson be instructed to omit Baker's name the court, outside the presence of the jury, should comply with the request. Bruton and Aranda were concerned with the danger that the jury would be unable to follow limiting instructions regarding a defendant's extrajudicial statements that implicate a codefendant, and, although those decisions involved a confession, the same danger exists for the statement here in question. Baker's name could be effectively deleted from Brawley's extrajudicial statements without prejudice to Brawley. (20) Defendants further contend that at the penalty trial the court erred in refusing to give a requested instruction that aggravating or mitigating circumstances must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury may consider them. [7] However, decisions have held that such instructions erroneously limit the jury's absolute discretion in the selection of the penalty. ( People v. Hines, supra, 61 Cal.2d 164, 173 [37 Cal. Rptr. 622, 390 P.2d 398]; People v. Howk, 56 Cal.2d 687, 697 et seq. [16 Cal. Rptr. 370, 365 P.2d 426]; People v. Purvis, 56 Cal.2d 93, 95-96 [13 Cal. Rptr. 801, 362 P.2d 713].) Here the jury was correctly instructed that other crimes must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury may consider them. ( People v. Polk, supra, 63 Cal.2d 443, 450-451 [47 Cal. Rptr. 1, 406 P.2d 641]; People v. Terry, 61 Cal.2d 137, 149, fn. 8 [37 Cal. Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381].) Defendants urge that the rule in Polk and Terry be extended to all aggravating or mitigating circumstances. However, that rule was established as an exception to the normal standard of proof at the penalty trial since evidence of other crimes may have a particularly damaging impact on the jury's determination whether the defendant should be executed. (See People v. Polk, supra, at pp. 450-451.) (21) Defendants further assert that failure to instruct regarding the quantum of proof necessary to establish mitigating or aggravating circumstances violates due process. However, attacks upon the constitutionality of Penal Code section 190.1 on the ground that it failed to provide standards for the guidance of the jury at the penalty trial have been rejected ( In re Anderson, supra, 69 Cal.2d 613, 621-628; People v. Hill, supra, 66 Cal.2d 536, 568-569 [58 Cal. Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908] [cert. den. 389 U.S. 993 [19 L.Ed.2d 884, 88 S.Ct. 838] and 390 U.S. 911 [19 L.Ed.2d 884, 88 S.Ct. 838]]; People v. Seiterle, 65 Cal.2d 333, 340 [54 Cal. Rptr. 745, 420 P.2d 217] [cert. den. 387 U.S. 912 [18 L.Ed.2d 633, 87 S.Ct. 1699]]), and the present assertion likewise lacks merit. (22) Defendants contend that at the penalty trial the court erred in refusing to give a requested instruction informing the jury that their determination of penalty must be a rational decision, that they must not allow their passions to be inflamed by the color photographs of the victim or the exhibits showing his blood, and that this evidence was received for the limited purpose of showing the manner in which the decedent was killed. [8] Failure to give the instruction was not prejudicial error since the court instructed the jury that both sides demand and expect, that you conscientiously and dispassionately consider and weigh the evidence [which, of course, included the photographs and exhibits] and apply the law of the case and that you will reach a just verdict. Defendants also complain that at the penalty trial they were allowed to make but one argument whereas the prosecution was allowed to make two. The trial preceded People v. Bandhauer, 66 Cal.2d 524, 530-531 [58 Cal. Rptr. 332, 426 P.2d 900], and upon the penalty retrial the court undoubtedly will comply with Bandhauer. Defendants further claim that comments by the prosecutor during his argument at the penalty trial constituted prejudicial misconduct. It is unnecessary to consider this claim since Witherspoon requires a reversal of the death penalties and the same arguments may not be repeated on retrial. Defendants also adopt by reference the arguments advanced in In re Anderson, supra, 69 Cal.2d 613, attacking the constitutionality of the death penalty and the procedures followed in imposing it. Those arguments, however, are settled by our decision in Anderson. The judgments are reversed insofar as they relate to the penalty for the murder; in all other respects they are affirmed.