Opinion ID: 1367717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Defendant's Motion to Recuse Santa Barbara County District Attorney Sneddon

Text: The District Attorney of Santa Barbara County, Thomas Sneddon, personally prosecuted this case from its inception until shortly before the preliminary hearing, when he assigned it to Deputy District Attorney Martinez for the preliminary hearing. Later, Sneddon reassigned the case to Deputy District Attorney Van Camp for trial. As previously noted, when Van Camp's participation in the destruction of the tape recording came to light, Sneddon removed Van Camp from the case and personally assumed the role of trial prosecutor. Defendant subsequently moved to have District Attorney Sneddon recused. The trial court denied the motion. (18) Section 1424 states that a motion to recuse a district attorney shall not be granted unless it is shown by the evidence that a conflict of interest exists such as would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial. [A] `conflict,' within the meaning of section 1424, exists whenever the circumstances of a case evidence a reasonable possibility that the DA's office may not exercise its discretionary function in an evenhanded manner. ( People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 148 [193 Cal. Rptr. 148, 666 P.2d 5].) In determining whether a ruling on a motion to recuse was proper, a reviewing court applies the abuse-of-discretion standard. [Citations.] ( People v. Hamilton (1988) 46 Cal.3d 123, 140 [249 Cal. Rptr. 320, 756 P.2d 1348].) (19) Defendant contends District Attorney Sneddon should have been recused because (1) he prematurely terminated his investigation of Van Camp's misconduct, (2) he filed a Vehicle Code section 10851 charge against defendant, knowing it was not supported by substantial evidence, and (3) he had a personal interest in obtaining a conviction in order to protect himself and his office from negative publicity. The trial court concluded there was no evidence Van Camp's misconduct regarding the tape recording would prevent defendant from receiving a fair trial, once Van Camp had been removed from the case. The trial court further found that Inez Blanco's denial that she gave defendant permission to take her automobile constituted a reasonable basis for the filing of a Vehicle Code section 10851 charge but that, even if it was improper for that charge to have been filed, any error was cured when the charge was dismissed. Nothing suggested defendant could not receive a fair trial on the remaining charges. Finally, the trial court ruled that the remaining allegations of misconduct, considered singly or cumulatively, did not create a reasonable possibility that defendant could not receive a fair trial. In urging that the trial court erred in denying the recusal motion, defendant points to a letter to Van Camp in which Sneddon condemned Van Camp's actions. We fail to perceive how this letter supports defendant's claim that Sneddon should have been recused. Sneddon's condemnation of Van Camp's unethical conduct was entirely appropriate. The letter apparently was an initial step in the imposition of administrative discipline. To the contrary, there would have been cause for concern had Sneddon failed to take such action, or had he otherwise appeared to condone Van Camp's misconduct. Defendant also asserts Sneddon terminated his internal investigation into Van Camp's misconduct when the trial court required the prosecution to disclose to the defense any information uncovered by that inquiry. Assistant District Attorney Steven Plumer testified that when Van Camp's involvement with the tape recording was disclosed on October 27, 1986, Sneddon instructed Plumer to inform defense counsel and to have district attorney investigator Charles Watkins interview Van Camp, Heidt, and others who might possess relevant information. On October 28, 1986, Plumer appeared before the trial court and related the information he had received concerning the discovery and destruction of the envelope containing the cassette. The trial court scheduled a hearing for the following day. At the hearing on October 29, 1986, Plumer brought investigator Watkins's handwritten notes of his interviews and provided copies to the defense at its request. The court advised Sergeant Heidt that the hearing would be continued to the next day in order to allow him an opportunity to consult with an attorney. Defense counsel then requested that the district attorney's office be restrained from conducting any further investigation of the destruction of the tape recording or, in the alternative, be required to reveal to the defense any information received from that investigation. The trial court ordered that any such information obtained by the district attorney's office be disclosed to the defense. On that same day, Plumer advised Sneddon of the information he had received from Watkins. Sneddon directed that the investigator prepare a summary of his investigation. On October 30, 1986, a hearing was held at which Deputy District Attorney Van Camp, Sergeant Heidt, Chief of Police Hebert, investigator Watkins, and others testified. Following this hearing, Sneddon instructed Plumer that no further investigation be conducted by the district attorney's office, and the matter subsequently was referred to the Attorney General's office. On October 31, 1986, Plumer relieved Van Camp of his duties relating to this case and placed him on administrative suspension. As noted above, Sneddon represented to the court that Van Camp subsequently was demoted, resulting in a decrease in salary from $52,000 per year to approximately $27,000 per year. Nothing in the record before us suggests the district attorney had an improper motive in discontinuing the investigation that was being conducted by his office. An evidentiary hearing had been held regarding the destruction of the tape recording, and the matter later was referred to the Attorney General's office. (Cal. Const., art. V, ง 13; Gov. Code, ง 12550.) Defendant does not explain what purpose would have been served had the district attorney's office continued its own investigation. The trial court rejected defendant's additional claim that Sneddon acted unethically in filing the Vehicle Code section 10851 charge, knowing it was not supported by substantial evidence, the court instead finding that Inez Blanco's denial that she had given defendant permission to take her automobile constituted a reasonable basis for the filing of the charge. This finding is supported by substantial evidence. The circumstances that Sneddon filed the Vehicle Code section 10851 charge at a time when Inez Blanco's degree of participation in the crimes was unclear, and later moved to dismiss that charge following further investigation, does not constitute unethical conduct or demonstrate that Sneddon had an improper motive in prosecuting the case. Defendant asserts that Sneddon had a personal stake in avoiding negative publicity, and thus was led to attempt to obtain a conviction at all costs. This improper motive is demonstrated, according to defendant, by Sneddon's introduction of the multiple-hearsay statements of Perez, Inez Blanco's preliminary hearing testimony, and other evidence which would not have been introduced by other prosecutors. We have held that the trial court properly admitted the multiple-hearsay statements of Perez as well as Inez Blanco's preliminary hearing testimony. We find unpersuasive defendant's unsupported claim that these and other unspecified items of evidence would not have been introduced by other prosecutors. Defendant also makes reference to the fact that on October 31, 1986, the day following the initial evidentiary hearing concerning the destruction of the tape recording, the district attorney's office made a plea bargain offer to defendant of a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole in the event he were to enter a plea of guilty. It was stated this offer would be withdrawn if not accepted that day. This circumstance was not raised as a ground for recusal, and was brought to the trial court's attention only in another context and more than one month after the court had denied the recusal motion. Defendant is therefore precluded from now arguing on this basis that the trial court erred in denying the recusal motion. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to recuse District Attorney Sneddon.