Opinion ID: 1058602
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: testimony of crane's experts

Text: In its third assignment of error, Crane argues the trial court erroneously interpreted the disclosure requirement of Virginia Supreme Court Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i) resulting in a dramatic and unfair limitation of the expert testimony of Dr. Victor Roggli and Henry Buccigross. Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i) states: A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person whom the party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. In reviewing the trial court's decision to exclude expert testimony, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. Tarmac Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Smiley Block Co., 250 Va. 161, 166, 458 S.E.2d 462, 465 (1995).
The trial court sustained the Estate's objection to Dr. Roggli's testimony regarding his opinion on the amount of asbestos in the ambient air and its relationship to the cause of mesothelioma because this opinion was not disclosed pursuant to Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i). We have not previously examined the degree of specificity required by Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i). Nevertheless, any application of this rule begins with determining whether the opinion at issue was disclosed in any form. See, e.g., Griffett v. Ryan, 247 Va. 465, 468, 443 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1994) (reviewing trial court decision to allow expert testimony by first examining content of the pretrial disclosure). Crane made the following pretrial disclosure of Dr. Roggli's testimony: Dr. Roggli will testify as to the pathological diagnosis and the testing performed by him and others at Duke University to determine if a mesothelioma exists. Dr. Roggli may testify as to the association between asbestos (including the various types) and the alleged disease process involving the plaintiff. Dr. Roggli may testify as to the contribution, if any, of exposures to John Crane's products and products of other companies in the causation of plaintiff's asbestos-related disease. Finally, Dr. Roggli will testify as to the burden of asbestos (including the various types) in plaintiff's lungs and its contribution, if any, in causing plaintiff's asbestos-related disease if any. Dr. Roggli's reports have already been or will be provided. Crane subsequently provided the Estate with a report containing the results of Dr. Roggli's examination of tissue samples taken from Garland Jones' lungs. The report did not contain any reference to levels of asbestos in the ambient air. Crane argues that in excluding Dr. Roggli's testimony, the trial court interpreted Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i) too strictly. According to Crane, Dr. Roggli's opinions including those regarding asbestos in the ambient air, were well known to the Estate because it questioned Dr. Roggli about the opinions during his deposition. Thus, even if the disclosures were insufficient, according to Crane, the error was cured at Dr. Roggli's deposition. Nothing in Crane's disclosure reveals that Dr. Roggli might testify about asbestos in the ambient air. Furthermore, a party is not relieved from its disclosure obligation under the Rule simply because the other party has some familiarity with the expert witness or the opportunity to depose the expert. Such a rule would impermissibly alter a party's burden to disclose and impose an affirmative burden on the non-disclosing party to ascertain the substance of the expert's testimony. We reject this reading of Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Dr. Roggli's opinion testimony regarding asbestos in ambient air was inadmissible because Crane failed to comply with the disclosure requirement of Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i).
Prior to trial, Crane disclosed that Buccigross would offer testimony on, among other topics, his research and/or his testing of various asbestos insulation products, including Unibestos and Kaylo, as well as his research and testing of Crane products. [5] Although the disclosure referenced a report by Buccigross on his testing of Unibestos and Kaylo, Crane admitted the report was not attached to the disclosure. The trial court refused to allow Buccigross to testify about the tests he had conducted on Kaylo and Unibestos products because the Estate had not received Buccigross' report relating to this subject. Crane assigned error to this ruling. Crane argues, as it did to the trial court, that regardless of its failure to provide Buccigross' report, the Estate knew the substance of Buccigross' testimony because the Estate's counsel had cross-examined Buccigross at trial about his reports going back to the '90s. Crane also pointed out that the Estate had failed to depose Buccigross or to ask Crane for representative samples of Buccigross' testimony, either of which would have allowed the Estate to ascertain the actual substance of the testimony. Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i) requires that the substance of opinions to be rendered be disclosed. Here, while Crane did disclose the topic of Buccigross' testimony, Crane did not disclose the substance of Buccigross' opinions in the disclosure or through Buccigross' report. Crane thus failed to comply with the Rule and the trial court did not err by excluding the testimony. As we stated when considering Crane's challenge to the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of Dr. Roggli's testimony, an opponent's ability to depose an expert or familiarity with such expert through prior litigation does not relieve a party from complying with the disclosure requirements of Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i). Crane also argues that the trial court should have allowed the testimony of both Dr. Roggli and Buccigross because the Estate admitted that the disclosures regarding Roggli and Buccigross were exemplary, in comparison to Dr. Feingold's, another of Crane's intended expert witnesses. The record shows that the Estate's statement regarding the quality of Crane's disclosures at issue was made as a comparison to the fact that Crane had not disclosed any of the expected testimony of Dr. Feingold. The statement cannot be fairly taken as a concession that Crane complied with the requirements of the disclosure rule for all purposes. In summary, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the testimony at issue because Crane did not disclose that Dr. Roggli would render an opinion on asbestos in the ambient air and did not identify the substance of Buccigross' opinion as required by Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i).