Opinion ID: 1658441
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: was the evidence sufficient to support a conviction on the charge of more than one kilogram of marijuana?

Text: Drane's indictment gives as its own statutory authority MCA § 41-29-139(2)(d). Correctly, it should have cited § 41-29-139(c)(2)(D). The statute reads, in pertinent part: It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess any controlled substance. .. . Any person who violates this subsection with respect to ... [o]ne (1) kilogram or more of marihuana upon conviction may be imprisoned in the state penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years... . The evidence showed that the police seized 912.3 grams of pure marijuana, together with 119.6 grams of marijuana-laden brownies. Drane contends that the state satisfied the statutory requirement of a kilogram only by aggregating the weight of the pure marijuana with the total weight of the brownies, and that such aggregation was improper. The status, with reference to the Controlled Substance Statute, of a mixture containing marijuana is an issue of first impression in Mississippi. Among the states, there are two principal approaches to the problem. Some states have statutes specifically criminalizing the possession of marijuana or any mixture containing it. In these states, courts have generally permitted the aggregation of bulk weights with pure marijuana to satisfy the statutory requirement. E.g. Belcher v. State, 161 Ga. App. 442, 288 S.E.2d 299 (1982); Grogg v. State, 417 N.E.2d 1175 (Ind. 1981); People v. Kidd, 121 Mich. App. 92, 328 N.W.2d 394 (1982); State v. Tyndall, 55 N.C. App. 57, 284 S.E.2d 575 (1981). Other states have statutes like ours, which make no mention of mixtures containing controlled substances. The state cites People v. Davis, 95 Misc.2d 1010, 408 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Dutchess Co.Ct. 1978), for the proposition that aggregation is permissible under a pure weight statute. A closer reading of this case should give the state less comfort. The Davis court speculated that aggregation would be permissible under certain circumstances in which extrapolation and statistical analogy from test samplings may legally establish the existence of pure marijuana in the unsampled remainder. 408 N.Y.S.2d at 250. But the court went on to warn that [p]ure weight drugs [such as marijuana] cannot as readily lend themselves to the process of analysis by extrapolation [as heroin]. Moreover, if marijuana cannot be quantified, then no amount of extrapolation can change that. The court then discussed the New York Statute in words that weigh heavily against the state in the present case: [T]he legislature converted marijuana to a pure weight standard... ... . . out of the fear that under an aggregate weight analysis, people may find themselves charged with and convicted of large scale or possessory crimes when, in reality, the marijuana constituted only a minute percentage of the entity, say, a two-pound brownie. (408 N.Y.S.2d at 751). No case was found in which aggregation was clearly rule permissible under a statute like ours, which contains no mention of a mixture. There is authority to the contrary in Lyons v. State, 455 So.2d 295 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984). Alabama's marijuana statute is similar to ours. In Lyons the defendant was charged with possession of 28 grams or more of cocaine. The evidence showed he had 27.2 grams of pure cocaine and 6.8 grams of some other substance. Lyons raised the same defense as Drane's in the present case. The Alabama court rejected this because the pertinent statute criminalized possession of the requisite amount of cocaine or of any mixture containing cocaine. It strongly implied that under the marijuana statute, which contained no mention of a mixture, the defense would have been successful. 455 So.2d at 297. The Alabama approach seems sounder than that urged by the state. Surely it would be dubious policy to allow criminal convictions to rest on such gossamer foundations as extrapolation and statistical analogy. Moreover, where the legislature has declined to place a mixture containing marijuana within the scope of the statute, the court could not expand the statute to include such mixtures without encroaching on the legislature's domain. Even under the most expansive possible reading, the state's case against Drane would not necessarily survive. At trial, the state's own expert, an official from the state crime laboratory, proved to be Drane's best witness. After testifying that it was impossible to determine the weight of the marijuana that had been baked into the brownies, she went on to say that there was a good chance that the total amount of marijuana seized was less than a kilogram. All in all, we have little trouble in holding that the state failed to carry its evidentiary burden. Although we hold that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for possession of more than a kilogram, and for intent to distribute, we are of the opinion that it clearly established Drane's guilt of the lesser offense of possessing more than one ounce, but less than one kilogram of marijuana. This offense is set out in a different subsection of the same statute  to-wit: MCA § 41-29-139(c)(2)(C) (Supp. 1985). In such a case, the proper procedure is to remand for resentencing on the lesser offense. Garvis v. State, 483 So.2d 312 (Miss. 1986); Bryant v. State, 427 So.2d 131, 133 (Miss. 1983); Hollingsworth v. State, 392 So.2d 515, 518 (Miss. 1981). REVERSED AS TO POSSESSION OF MORE THAN ONE KILOGRAM AND WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, AFFIRMED AS TO POSSESSION OF MORE THAN ONE OUNCE, BUT LESS THAN ONE KILOGRAM AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING. WALKER, C.J., and ROY NOBLE LEE, and HAWKINS, P.JJ., and DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.