Opinion ID: 1837873
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proposition Two

Text: Amendment 328, § 6.11, through its express reference to the common law, afforded Alabama litigants no guarantees that were not already provided by § 11. The principal opinion properly recognizes that the fundamental function of the common law jury was to resolve disputed issues of fact. Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 55 S.Ct. 890, 79 L.Ed. 1636 (1935). Based on its application of Proposition One, however, the opinion attempts to distinguish § 11 from the Seventh Amendment, concluding that, unlike the Seventh Amendment, § 11 did not preserve that factfinding function. Enigmatically, it then likens the two constitutional provisions, stating: The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution was ratified approximately 28 years before Alabama's first Constitution was ratified. So, we look to the historical events surrounding the Seventh Amendment for enlightenment as to what was excepted out of the state's general powers of government to `forever remain inviolate'... insofar as `the right of trial by jury' is concerned.  At 195. (Emphasis added.) In attempting to distinguish the protections afforded under the two provisions, the principal opinion goes seriously awry. The Seventh Amendment is not materially different from Section 11. Poston v. Gaddis, 335 So.2d 165, 167 (Ala.Civ.App.), cert. denied, 335 So.2d 169 (Ala.1976). Both constitutional provisions preserve the right to trial by jury as it was at common law. Poston, 335 So.2d at 167. Consequently, issues regarding the scope of § 11 protections have always been resolved by our courts through an analysis of the function of the jury in the same or analogous cases at common law. See, e.g., Ex parte LaFlore, 445 So.2d 932 (Ala.1983) (question of competency to stand trial was for the jury at common law; therefore, accused was guaranteed that right by § 11 of the Constitution of 1901); Kelley v. Mashburn, 286 Ala. 7, 236 So.2d 326 (1970) (Ejectment was known to the common law; therefore, § 11 preserves right to jury trial in such cases); Ex parte Thompson, 228 Ala. 113, 152 So. 229 (1933) (nonjury disbarment proceedings did not violate § 11 because, under English common law, power to disbar was inherent in the judiciary and juries were not employed in such cases); Thomas v. Bibb, 44 Ala. 721, 724 (1870) (right preserved by § 11 extends to cases in which it was conferred by the common law, to suits which the common law recognized amongst its old and settled proceedings and suits); Boring v. Williams, 17 Ala. 510, 517 (1850) (summary remedy against tax collector for allegedly delinquent collections did not violate right to jury trial where summary remedies in such cases were the practice from a period long anterior to the adoption of the constitution); see also Crowe v. State, 485 So.2d 351 at 363 (Ala.Crim.App.1984) (advisory nature of jury's sentence verdict did not violate § 11 because English common law juries did not determine criminal sentence and the purpose of § 11 is to preserve the right to trial by jury as it existed in the English common law). Moreover, this Court has long acknowledged the common law matrix that produced the guarantees contained in the Declaration of Rights and in § 11 in particular. In Mayor of Mobile v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 53 Ala. 570 (1875), this Court stated: A state constitution is always interpreted in the light of the common law, and if it be not the first constitution, in the light of its predecessors. Id. at 577 (emphasis added). The guaranties for the security of property and of personal liberty, found in the bill of rights, are borrowed chiefly from magna charta, and for their interpretation we look to the common law.  Id. (emphasis added); see also State v. Alabama Power Co., 254 Ala. 327, 333, 48 So.2d 445, 449 (1950); Crowe v. State, 485 So.2d 351, 363 (Ala.Crim.App.1984) (section 11 has remained virtually unchanged since the first state constitution was adopted in 1819 and it draws its meaning from that early history), rev'd on other grounds, 485 So.2d 373 (Ala.1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 909, 106 S.Ct. 3284, 91 L.Ed.2d 573 (1986). To suppose that the framers of the Alabama Constitution of 1819 contemplated a role for Alabama juries entirely different from that envisioned by our common law ancestors defies ordinary logic. [7]