Opinion ID: 683154
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standards for absolute immunity

Text: 13 The presumption is that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect government officials in the exercise of their duties. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 1939, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991). State actors who seek absolute immunity bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that scope. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2910, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). 14 Judges enjoy absolute immunity from personal liability for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). The tradition of judicial immunity dates back to English common law. Butz, 438 U.S. at 508, 98 S.Ct. at 2911. Without insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation and would thus lose 'that independence without which no judiciary can either be respectable or useful.'  Id. at 509, 98 S.Ct. at 2912 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872)). The absolute immunity of a judge applies  'however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff.'  Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200, 106 S.Ct. 496, 499, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985) (quoting Bradley, 13 Wall. at 347). 15 Judges have absolute immunity not because of their particular location within the Government but because of the special nature of their responsibilities. Butz, 438 U.S. at 511, 98 S.Ct. at 2913. Thus, absolute immunity has been extended to individuals performing duties closely associated with the judicial process. Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 200, 106 S.Ct. at 500. For example, a federal probation officer preparing presentence reports acts as an arm of the court and thus has absolute immunity to personal liability for damages. Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133, 137-38 (2d Cir.1987). 16 Whether non-judicial officers merit quasi-judicial absolute immunity depends upon the functional comparability of their judgments to those of the judge. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n. 20, 96 S.Ct. 984, 991 n. 20, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). The functional comparability analysis is made by considering the following six factors, among others, characteristic of the judicial process: 17 (a) the need to assure that the individual can perform his functions without harassment or intimidation; (b) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct; (c) insulation from political influence; (d) the importance of precedent; (e) the adversary nature of the process; and (f) the correctability of the error on appeal. 18 Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 202, 106 S.Ct. at 500 (citing Butz, 438 U.S. at 512, 98 S.Ct. at 2913). 19 Applying this analysis, the Supreme Court held in Butz that administrative law judges or hearing examiners within the executive branch who act pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), are entitled to absolute immunity. As the Court noted, [t]he conflicts which federal hearing examiners seek to resolve are every bit as fractious as those which come to court. Butz, 438 U.S. at 513, 98 S.Ct. at 2914. The Court went on to justify absolute immunity on the ground that administrative adjudications contain many of the same procedural safeguards that characterize judicial proceedings. For example, 20 [administrative] proceedings are adversary in nature. They are conducted before a trier of fact insulated from political influence. A party is entitled to present his case by oral or documentary evidence, and the transcript of testimony and exhibits together with the pleadings constitute the exclusive record for decision. The parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record. 21 Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, the Court stated that the position of administrative hearing examiners is structured to provide for a high degree of independence from the agency. 22 When conducting a hearing ..., a hearing examiner is not responsible to, or subject to the supervision or direction of, employees or agents engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecution functions for the agency. Nor may a hearing examiner consult any person or party, including other agency officials, concerning a fact at issue in the hearing, unless on notice and opportunity for all parties to participate. Hearing examiners must be assigned to cases in rotation so far as is practicable. 23 Butz, 438 U.S. at 514, 98 S.Ct. at 2914 (citations omitted). 24 In contrast, the Court has found prison officials, such as members of a prison disciplinary committee, who hear cases in which inmates are charged with rules infractions, not entitled to absolute immunity. Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 194, 206, 106 S.Ct. 496, 503. The Court found the committee members lacked independence: 25 They are not professional hearing officers, as are administrative law judges.... They are employees of the Bureau of Prisons and they are the direct subordinates of the warden who reviews their decision. They work with the fellow employee who lodges the charge against the inmate upon whom they sit in judgment. The credibility determination they make often is one between a co-worker and an inmate. They thus are under obvious pressure to resolve a disciplinary dispute in favor of the institution and their fellow employee. 26 Id. at 203-04, 106 S.Ct. at 501-02. 27 Furthermore, the Cleavinger Court found that a prison disciplinary proceeding contained few of the procedural safeguards relied upon in Butz to insure the avoidance or correction of constitutional errors. For example, 28 [t]he prisoner was to be afforded neither a lawyer nor an independent nonstaff representative. There was no right to compel the attendance of witnesses or to cross-examine. There was no right to discovery. There was no cognizable burden of proof. No verbatim transcript was afforded. Information presented often was hearsay or self-serving. The committee members were not truly independent. 29 Id. at 206, 106 S.Ct. at 503. Because the Agriculture Department hearing examiners in Butz displayed many more of the characteristics associated with the judiciary than did the prison disciplinary officers in Cleavinger, the Court found that even though the former were entitled to quasi-judicial absolute immunity the latter were entitled to qualified immunity only.