Opinion ID: 2320997
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deference to the Authority of the Board

Text: [¶ 42] The next question presented is whether we can or should defer to the expertise of the Board in interpreting the ambiguous phrase. That question requires us to determine whether the Board was acting within its realm of expertise. Here, we are guided by the authority conferred on the particular agency by the Legislature. When an agency is created contemporaneously with a statute and is given the authority to implement a new statutory scheme at that time, we will defer to that agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. See Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. State Tax Assessor, 562 A.2d 672, 674 (Me.1989) (stating that an agency's interpretation is especially persuasive when the interpretation is contemporaneous with the statute (quotation marks omitted)). Further, when the Legislature has expressly imposed upon an agency the duty to make a statute operative, the agency's construction of the statute is entitled to great deference. Id. (citing Kelley v. Halperin, 390 A.2d 1078, 1080 (Me.1978)). [¶ 43] Here, the Legislature explicitly established the Board to supervise the operations of Dirigo Health. 24-A M.R.S. § 6904 (2006). The members of the Board must meet particular qualifications that require expertise in health-care-related fields or in state management and budgeting, 24-A M.R.S. § 6904(1), (2)(A); they must avoid identified conflicts of interest, id. § 6904(2)(B); and they are immune from liability in carrying out their supervisory functions, 24-A M.R.S. § 6905 (2006). [¶ 44] Accordingly, we will defer to the Board's interpretation of the ambiguous statute if the interpretation is reasonable because the Board was created contemporaneously with the Act and the Legislature expressly directed it to perform the task of determining the aggregate measurable cost savings realized during Dirigo Health's first assessment year. See Ga.-Pac. Corp., 562 A.2d at 674. [¶ 45] In our review, we are mindful that the Board acts for an agency created and governed entirely by the Legislature. Because the Board acts within the confines of a broader statutory scheme to administer a highly specialized, legislatively created agency, we are particularly reluctant to disrupt the interpretations of law reached by the Board. We have exercised similar restraint in the field of workers' compensation law, recognizing that legal determinations are often inextricably linked to the Legislature's policy goals. See Am. Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Murray, 420 A.2d 251, 252 (Me.1980). Thus, the Board is an agency whose interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to deference from the courts if the statute is ambiguous and the Board's interpretation is reasonable. [¶ 46] Accordingly, we next examine whether the Board acted reasonably in construing the ambiguous language of section 6913(1)(A) in light of its legislative history, or whether the statute, viewed in the context of its adoption and amendment, compels a narrower interpretation. See Cyr v. Madawaska Sch. Dep't, 2007 ME 28, ¶ 9, 916 A.2d 967, 970; Hannum, 2006 ME 51, ¶ 9, 898 A.2d at 396; Cobb, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 13, 896 A.2d at 275.