Opinion ID: 1057587
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Arbitration of Parenting Issues

Text: Although the above analysis is dispositive of the present appeal, we recognize that our holding will necessitate additional proceedings on remand. In the interest of judicial economy and in the exercise of our supervisory role, we take this opportunity to address the question on which we requested briefing and argument when granting Mother's application for permission to appeal: whether Tennessee law permits parties to submit to arbitration issues that implicate the trial court's duty to ensure that the best interests of children are protected. This issue presents a question of law, which we review de novo. See In re Sidney J., 313 S.W.3d 772, 774 (Tenn.2010). Tennessee statutes, taken together, impose a duty on trial courts to protect the best interests of children. The general custody provisions provide that the court may ... award the care, custody and control of ... children ... as the welfare and interest of the ... children may demand and that the court shall have the widest discretion to order a custody arrangement that is in the best interest of the child. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(1), (a)(2)(A)(i) (2005 & Supp.2009). Furthermore, in any ... proceeding requiring the court to make a custody determination regarding a minor child, the determination shall be made on the basis of the best interest of the child. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a) (Supp.2009). With respect to parenting plans, like the one at issue in this case, the General Assembly has stated that the best interests of the child shall be the standard by which the court determines and allocates the parties' parental responsibilities. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-6-401(a) (2005). [8] This statutory duty comports with the longstanding notion that the state stands in parens patriae of the minor children within its borders. As early as 1918, this Court stated, in the context of habeas corpus proceedings, that the state has a right paramount to any parental or other claim, to dispose of such children as their best interests require. The legal rights of a parent are very gravely considered, but are not enforced to the disadvantage of the child. State v. West, 139 Tenn. 522, 201 S.W. 743, 744 (1918). Nonetheless, relying on our decision in Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993), Mother argues that, absent a showing of substantial harm, divorced parents have a fundamental right to submit disputes concerning children to final and binding arbitration. Mother's reliance on Hawk is misplaced. Although we held in Hawk that the state lacks justification to interfere with the fundamental rights of parents in an intact marriage to raise their children absent a showing of harm to the child, id. at 582, we also held that harm to a child is implicit in a divorce proceeding. Id. at 580; see Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-6-401(a) (recognizing the detrimental effect of divorce on many children.); Lee v. Lee, 66 S.W.3d 837, 847 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) (identifying divorce as one circumstance that `invites, and indeed requires, governmental intervention' into the parents' constitutionally protected fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their children). Contrary to Mother's argument, there is nothing in Tennessee's statutes or the law of this Court to support the conclusion that by agreeing to arbitrate, parties may relieve the trial court of its duty to ensure that disputes between parents are resolved in the best interests of the children. Rather, it is well established that parents cannot bind the court with an agreement affecting the best interest of their children. We held in Berryhill v. Rhodes, for example, that parents may not enter into private agreements that circumvent statutory child-support obligations. 21 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tenn.2000). It follows that parents cannot bind the court by submitting child-related issues to an arbitrator. See Crutchley v. Crutchley, 306 N.C. 518, 293 S.E.2d 793, 798 (1982) (`Just as parents cannot by agreement deprive the courts of their duty to promote the best interests of their children, they cannot do so by arbitration.') (quoting Kovacs v. Kovacs, 98 Md.App. 289, 633 A.2d 425, 431 (1993)); Kelm v. Kelm, 92 Ohio St.3d 223, 749 N.E.2d 299, 303 (2001) ([I]f parents cannot bind the court by an agreement affecting the interests of their children, they cannot bind the court by agreeing to let someone else, an arbitrator, make such a decision for them.). Furthermore, as we explained in Pugh's, the limited review procedures that accompany binding arbitration are justified by the need to promote finality of arbitration awards. Pugh's, 320 S.W.3d at 257. Although an important factor, the need to promote finality is not the prevailing concern in resolving child-related matters. Rather, the prevailing concern is ensuring that the best interests of the child are protected. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-6-106(a); Kendrick v. Shoemake, 90 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tenn.2002) (holding that child custody awards are always subject to modification to ensure that the best interests of the child are protected). We therefore hold that parties may not submit parenting issues to binding arbitration. [9] Parties may submit such disputes to non-binding arbitration. If the parties agree with the result produced, the parties must submit the agreement to the trial court for a determination of the children's best interests.