Opinion ID: 216296
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rejection and/or Failure to Develop Evidence of Depression Impairment

Text: The analysis of this issue is divided into two parts, one based on the record before the ALJ and the other based on the augmented record before the Appeals Council. As to the former, we agree with the district court that Mr. Krauser had not presented evidence demonstrating the existence of a medically determinable impairment. There was no medical testing for, let alone diagnosis and treatment of, any impairment regarding depression. Indeed, a report from Mr. Krauser's treating physician shortly before the hearing specifically noted no abnormal findings where indications of various psychological conditions, including depression, were to be assessed. App. Vol. 2 at 390. A couple of isolated, passing references to depression buried in the record hardly suggested that the medical personnel who examined Mr. Krauser had missed or ignored a serious mental illness, [1] undercutting his contention that the ALJ should have sent him for a consultative examination. There simply was not evidence sufficient to suggest a reasonable probability that a severe impairment exist[ed]. Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir.1997) (setting out claimant's burden to demonstrate issue requiring development by Commissioner); Cf. Carter v. Chater, 73 F.3d 1019, 1021-22 (10th Cir.1996) (noting Commissioner had a duty to develop issue where medical records showed depression had been diagnosed). After the ALJ issued his decision on October 31, 2007, Mr. Krauser sought and obtained a referral for possible depression, reporting he feels sad all the time because of his current economic and health situation. App. Vol. 2 at 397. A medical report from January 18, 2008, notes a diagnosis of major depression and a prescription for an anti-depressant. Id. at 398-99. Mr. Krauser argues that in light of this new evidence, submitted to and considered by the Appeals Council, he had either established a medically determinable mental impairment or at least demonstrated the existence of an issue that required further development. Because of the circumstances of its admission, the proper treatment of this evidence is somewhat unclear, as it implicates a potential tension in our case law. The basic principle, derived from the relevant regulations, is well-established: the Appeals Council must consider additional evidence offered on administrative reviewafter which it becomes a part of our record on judicial reviewif it is (1) new, (2) material, and (3) related to the period on or before the date of the ALJ's decision. Chambers v. Barnhart, 389 F.3d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir.2004) (discussing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(b), 416.1470(b)). If the evidence does not qualify, the Appeals Council does not consider it and it plays no role in judicial review. Id. Here, the district court held that the new evidence submitted to the Appeals Council failed to satisfy the third requirement because it pertained to dates after the ALJ's final decision, and, therefore, cannot be given merit in evaluating plaintiff's alleged mental impairment. App. Vol. 1 at 43. This ruling begs the question: who decides whether evidence qualifies as new, material, and related to the relevant period? One line of our cases suggests that we do: we have repeatedly held that whether evidence is new, material and chronologically pertinent is a question of law subject to our de novo review. Threet v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 1185, 1191 (10th Cir.2003); see Chambers, 389 F.3d at 1142. But we have also held that when the Appeals Council accepts additional evidence, that is an implicit determination [that it is] . . . qualifying new evidence, requiring the Appeals Council to consider it and this court to include it in our review of the ALJ's decision, without separate consideration of the requirements for qualification. Martinez v. Barnhart, 444 F.3d 1201, 1207-08 (10th Cir.2006); Hill v. Astrue, 289 Fed.Appx. 289, 293 (10th Cir.2008); Foy v. Barnhart, 139 Fed.Appx. 39, 41-42 (10th Cir.2005). These two lines of cases do not clash where the Appeals Council rejects new evidence as non-qualifying and the claimant challenges that ruling on judicial reviewin that event, Martinez does not apply and our general rule of de novo review permits us to resolve the matter and remand if the Appeals Council erroneously rejected the evidence. Chambers, 389 F.3d at 1142. But, as has been remarked, our cases do present a potential conflict if the Appeals Council accepts new evidence: do we revisit the matter de novo (per Threet) or are we bound by the agency's decision to accept the evidence (per Martinez )? See Haddock v. Astrue, No. 08-cv-00393-PAB, 2009 WL 3162170, at  n. 2 (D.Colo. Sept. 29, 2009). Identifying the limited ground of potential conflict here actually suggests the path out of it. When the Appeals Council accepts new evidence, the claimant obviously benefits (he may not succeed with such evidence, but that is a separate issue), hence the only aggrieved party that could object is the agency. But the agency would be objecting to its own ruling. In supporting a denial of benefits on judicial review by challenging its own rulings as to the admission of the evidence on which the denial was based, the agency would inherently be offering a new, post-hoc rationale for its decision contrary to the general rule of SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94-95, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943), and SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947). See generally Haga v. Astrue, 482 F.3d 1205, 1207-08 (10th Cir.2007); Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1174-75 (10th Cir.2007). Thus, there may be good reason to hold the agency to its own decision when the Appeals Council accepts new evidence, even though we exercise de novo review when the claimant challenges the Appeal Council's rejection of such evidence. We need not definitively resolve the matter here, however, since we can in any event affirm the ALJ's rejection of a depression impairment even with the new evidence considered by the Appeals Council augmenting our record. As noted above, the only evidence of diagnosis and treatment of depression is in a report prepared two and a half months after the ALJ's decision. And that report does not purport to retroactively diagnose a condition existing in the period preceding the ALJ's decision, much less does it indicate any impaired functioning relating back to that period. Indeed, Mr. Krauser's post-decision complaints in this regard are expressly framed in terms of his then-current circumstances (worsened economically by the ALJ's decision itself): Patient reports he is currently overwhelmed by his condition and report[s] he feels sad all the time because of his current economic and health situation. App. Vol. 2 at 397. It bears repeating that there were no indications of depression in Mr. Krauser's medical records in the months immediately leading up to the hearing before the ALJ; rather, his doctor specifically noted he had no psychological abnormalities. Finally, Mr. Krauser mentioned being depressed just once, in passing, at the hearing before the ALJ, id. at 51 (I'm depressed, you know, feel pretty well useless in life.), admitted that he had never been tested or treated for depression, id., and never suggested any functional impairment in this regard. On this record, we cannot say the ALJ erred in his handling of the issue of depression. [2] That, of course, does not deny the reality of the evidence indicating that Mr. Krauser has since developed a condition that could impact a determination of disability for a period following the decision in this case. Ordinarily, this would be relevant only to a new application for benefits commencing after the ALJ's decision here. But, as explained below, we remand this case to the Commissioner for further proceedings in light of other error, extending the potential period of disability through the next date of decision, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.620(a), 416.330 (providing that applications for disability benefits remain in effect until ALJ issues final decision); id. §§ 404.984(a), 416.1484(a) (providing that, if case is remanded by courts for further consideration, ALJ's decision on remand becomes final decision of Commissioner). Accordingly, the ALJ should consider the impact of the new evidence of depression on the determination of disability for that additional period. Cf. Hargis v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1482, 1493 (10th Cir. 1991) (remanding for further proceedings on account of other error and noting agency will need to determine effect of new evidence submitted in the interim).