Opinion ID: 735363
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Medical Examinations of Plaintiff.

Text: 18 Defendants argue that the denial of a medical examination is in error because they were diligent--they did not have reason to request a medical examination until they were sandbagged on July 24, 1995 when they received notice of plaintiff's proposed expert testimony regarding the need for a multi-million dollar life plan. 19 Defendants' claims that they were sandbagged are belied by the facts. The discovery cut off was March 31, 1995. Defendants knew from day one that plaintiff's medical condition was an issue, yet they failed to request the medical examination until August 11, 1995. The need for a life plan--in other words, a prediction of high medical costs for the remainder of plaintiff's life--was clearly foreseeable from the nature of plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff suffered brain damage causing permanent physical and cognitive impairments. Defendants deposed plaintiff's personal physician a month before this request, and should have discovered then the opinion she expressed at trial (via a November videotaped deposition) that plaintiff will never be able to live wholly on his own. Defendants' protestations of diligence ring hollow. 20 To the extent defendants were taken by surprise by the life plan, they have only themselves to blame. According to defendants, they made a conscious decision not to move for a medical examination because they did not think they needed one. However, defendants knew all along that according to the schedule set by the court they would not receive plaintiff's experts' proposed opinions until after the close of discovery. When they decided not to move for a medical examination prior to the discovery deadline--which they knew was prior to any required expert disclosures--they also made the decision to remain in ignorance. 21 Defendants further argue that even if they already had a medical examination, they would need another to stay apprised of plaintiff's medical improvements. They argue that because they would have been entitled to a second examination, they should have been allowed a first, belated, examination. However, defendants failed to argue alleged improvements when they originally moved the district court for a medical examination. Thus, this argument is waived. Spears v. City of Indianapolis, 74 F.3d 153, 158 (7th Cir.1996); see also United States v. Rode Corporation, 996 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir.1993) (We consistently hold that arguments not made in the district court are waived.) (quoting Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop Treaty Abuse-Wisconsin, Inc., 991 F.2d 1249, 1258 (7th Cir.1993)). 22 Even had this argument been presented to the district court, the court still would be well within its discretion to refuse the medical examination. This argument is nothing more than an attempt to bootstrap out of defendants' failure to take a first examination. Second examinations are allowed for good cause, Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 85 S.Ct. 234, 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964), which exists if there has been a change in condition that would leave a party with outdated information. Vopelak v. Williams, 42 F.R.D. 387 (N.D.Ohio 1967); see also Peters v. Nelson, 153 F.R.D. 635, 638 (N.D.Iowa 1994); Moore v. Calavar Corp., 142 F.R.D. 134 (W.D.La.1992). However, when there has been no first examination, defendants are not left with outdated information. This is not a case where defendants are left unarmed to rebut a claim that plaintiff's condition deteriorated. Rather, defendants claim that Miksis' condition improved. Nor is this a case where defendants' own evidence will work against them because it reflects plaintiff's condition prior to improvement. Defendants have no such evidence because they apparently never believed Miksis' condition to be so severe. That is the very reason they assert they did not take the medical examination during the proper discovery period. Defendants' argument that they are entitled to a medical examination because, if they had taken a first, they would now be entitled to a second, is nothing more than an attempt to do an end run around their own lack of diligence. This attempt fails. 2 23 Defendants were far from diligent. The district court acted well within its discretion when it denied defendants' untimely motion for a medical examination. See Grassi v. Information Resources, Inc., 63 F.3d 596, 604 (7th Cir.1995) (affirming denial of untimely motion to compel discovery); Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Colorado Westmoreland, Inc., 112 F.R.D. 423 (N.D.Ind. 1986) (denying motion to compel answers to untimely interrogatories); Kirkpatrick v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railroad Co., No. 94-CV-270 (N.D.Ind. July 12, 1995) (unpublished order) (denying untimely motion for a medical examination). 24