Opinion ID: 1604196
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: the trial court erred in denying the proposed defense instruction on the burden of proof at the first phase of the trial.

Text: Chase requested jury instruction D-2, a circumstantial evidence instruction. This instruction was refused. The court based its decision on the fact that there was testimony by Chase and accomplice Washington and therefore this was not a purely circumstantial case. The proposed jury instruction D-2 reads as follows: The Court instructs the jury that because this case is based on circumstantial evidence, the burden of proof on the State is greater than the burden to prove the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty. In order to convict in this case, the jury must find the evidence is so completely conclusive as to exclude very [sic] other reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. Chase argues that the instruction contains essential language defining the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Chase's argument that this a proper case for a circumstantial evidence instruction is found in footnote only. Chase, of course, was not entitled to a circumstantial evidence instruction. Both he and Robert Washington, an accomplice and eyewitness to the murder of Elmer Hart, testified at trial. A circumstantial evidence instruction should be given only when the prosecution can produce neither an eyewitness nor a confession by the defendant. Stringfellow v. State, 595 So.2d 1320, 1322 (Miss. 1992); Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743, 750 (Miss. 1991); Clark v. State, 503 So.2d 277, 279 (Miss. 1987); Keys v. State, 478 So.2d 266 (Miss. 1985); Mack v. State, 481 So.2d 793 (Miss. 1985). Chase does not point out why reasonable doubt needs further definition and why he did not submit a separate jury instruction on this point apart from the one on circumstantial evidence. This Court has held that reasonable doubt defines itself and needs no further definition by the court. Barnes v. State, 532 So.2d 1231 (Miss. 1988); Boutwell v. State, 165 Miss. 16, 143 So. 479 (1932). Instruction D-7, requested by Chase and granted by the court, states as follows: The Court instructs the Jury that in order for the State to meet its burden of proving the Defendant guilty beyond any reasonable doubt, the State must prove each and every essential element of the offense charged; and that before the Jury may convict, they must be convinced of each and every essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. There are eight other instructions granted by the court in which the jury is told that reasonable doubt is the standard by which they are to consider the case presented against Chase. Any additional language Chase thought necessary to define beyond a reasonable doubt could have been included in either D-7 or one of the other instructions. The concurring opinions cited by Chase do not support Chase's argument. In King v. State, 580 So.2d 1182 (Miss. 1991) and Mack v. State, 481 So.2d 793 (Miss. 1985), Justices Robertson and Banks argue against any distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. 580 So.2d at 1192-1194 (no instruction mentioning `circumstantial' or `direct' evidence should ever be granted.); 481 So.2d at 796-797 (I would have our juries instructed that the law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence... .) In Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), cited by Chase, the United States Supreme Court, per curiam, condemned an effort by a Louisiana court to define reasonable doubt, including reference to `moral certainty' rather than evidentiary certainty... . 498 U.S. at 41, 111 S.Ct. at 330, 112 L.Ed.2d at 342. In Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445, 462 (Miss. 1984) this Court noted that to a moral certainty is not the correct burden of proof in a circumstantial evidence case. There was no error in refusing to grant a circumstantial evidence instruction in this case.