Opinion ID: 884273
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: Does § 45-5-221, MCA, violate Nye's right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II,Section 7 of the Montana Constitution? Nye argues on appeal that his acts of distributing the bumper stickers were meant to convey his beliefs and ideas, thus his conduct invokes his right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 7 of the Montana Constitution. He compares his conduct to that of the defendant in Texas v. Johnson (1989), 491 U.S. 397, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342, whose conviction for burning the American flag in violation of a Texas statute prohibiting the desecration of a venerated object was overturned by the United States Supreme Court as infringing on his First Amendment rights. Johnson was one of more than 100 political demonstrators who marched through the streets of Dallas, Texas, during the 1984 Republican National Convention. When the demonstrators reached Dallas City Hall, Johnson unfurled an American flag, doused it with kerosene, and set it on fire. He was the only demonstrator charged with a crime. In overturning Johnson's conviction, the Supreme Court held that the restrictions on Johnson's political expression were impermissibly content based. Johnson , 491 U.S. at 412, 109 S.Ct. at 2544, 105 L.Ed.2d 342. The Supreme Court also held that Johnson's actions were expressive conduct permitting him to invoke the First Amendment. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406, 109 S.Ct. at 2540, 105 L.Ed.2d 342. The Supreme Court has made it clear that to be protected as expressive conduct, the activity must be sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Spence v. State of Washington (1974), 418 U.S. 405, 409, 94 S.Ct. 2727, 2730, 41 L.Ed.2d 842. Nye has not shown that his conduct meets this test. In Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993), 508 U.S. 476, 113 S.Ct. 2194, 124 L.Ed.2d 436,the United States Supreme Court held that bias-motivated speech, coupled with assaultive or other nonverbal proscribed conduct, is not protected by the First Amendment. In that case, defendant's sentence for aggravated battery was enhanced because he intentionally selected his victim because of the victim's race. The Supreme Court concluded that violence or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact ... are entitled to no constitutional protection. Mitchell , 508 U.S. at 484, 113 S.Ct. at 2199, 124 L.Ed.2d 436 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984), 468 U.S. 609, 628, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3255, 82 L.Ed.2d 462). In Lilburn we noted that the Supreme Court has provided clear guidelines for distinguishing a content-neutral regulation from one which is impermissibly content-based: The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality ... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. The government's purpose is the controlling consideration. A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others. Lilburn , 875 P.2d at 1042 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989), 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 2754, 105 L.Ed.2d 661). The determination of whether a regulation is content-based turns not on whether its incidental effects fall more heavily on expression of a certain viewpoint, but rather on whether the governmental purpose to be served by the regulation is not motivated by a desire to suppress the content of the communication. Lilburn , 875 P.2d at 1042 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. (1986), 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29). In the case before us, the governmental purpose to be served by § 45-5-221, MCA, is not to suppress the content of the communication, rather, it is to prohibit conduct that violates other criminal laws, such as assault, criminal mischief, and trespass, and that are committed against another person because of that person's race, religion or national origin with the intent to intimidate, harass or annoy that person. Nye points out that many others in the Gardiner community have similar stickers affixed to their vehicles or in their windows as a protest against what they perceive to be objectionable practices of CUT. However, Nye fails to recognize that the difference between his conduct and that of others in the Gardiner community is that the others he refers to placed the stickers on their own property while Nye placed the stickers on other people's property without their permission. As the State asserts in its brief, if Nye had limited his attack on CUT to the display of a bumper sticker on his car or living room window, the First Amendment would have protected his right to do so. Nye lost his First Amendment protection when he coupled the message on the bumper sticker with defacement of the property of others. Nye has not argued that Article II, Section 7 of the Montana Constitution provides any different or greater protection for free expression than does the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Along those lines this Court has recognized that neither the First Amendment nor the Montana Constitution protect all speech: There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problems. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or fighting wordsthose which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas.... State v. Cooney (1995), 271 Mont. 42, 48, 894 P.2d 303, 307 (quoting State v. Lance (1986), 222 Mont. 92, 102, 721 P.2d 1258, 1265; Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire (1942), 315 U.S. 568, 571-72, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031). Furthermore, free speech does not include the right to cause substantial emotional distress by harassment or intimidation. Cooney , 894 P.2d at 307. Activities which are intended to embarrass, annoy or harass, as was the case here, are not protected by the First Amendment. State v. Helfrich (1996), 277 Mont. 452, 460, 922 P.2d 1159, 1164 (citing People v. Holt (1995), 271 Ill.App.3d 1016, 208 Ill.Dec. 515, 525, 649 N.E.2d 571, 581). Accordingly, we hold that § 45-5-221, MCA, does not violate Nye's right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article II, Section 7 of the Montana Constitution.