Opinion ID: 2644041
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unsworn Witness Claim

Text: Under certain circumstances, an attorney who has “first-hand knowledge of the events presented at trial” may impermissibly act as an unsworn witness. United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 933 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Ciak v. United States, 59 F.3d 296, 304-05 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that defense counsel acted as an unsworn witness when he sought to impeach a government witness regarding statements that the government witness had previously made to counsel), abrogated in part on other grounds as stated in Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172 n.3 (2002). An attorney who acts as an unsworn witness should be disqualified as counsel, in part to prevent the attorney from “subtly impart[ing] to the jury his first-hand knowledge of the events without having to swear an oath or be subject to cross examination.” Locascio, 6 F.3d at 933. Without more, however, a prosecutor does not become an unsworn witness merely because 2 he has first-hand knowledge of the events that culminated in a defendant’s trial. See United States v. Regan, 103 F.3d 1072, 1083 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Standing alone, the mere fact that a prosecutor took part in grand jury proceedings in which a defendant presented false testimony should not bar that prosecutor from participating in a subsequent trial for perjury.”). A problem arises, we have suggested, where there is some “indication in the record that [the prosecutor] sought to use [his] first-hand knowledge of [the] case to influence the jury.” Id. Because defense counsel did not object to the line of questioning in which the prosecutor is claimed to have acted as an unsworn witness, we review this issue for plain error. See United States v. Kaiser, 609 F.3d 556, 564 (2d Cir. 2010). Under this standard, Jalil must demonstrate that any error “(1) is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (2) affected [his] substantial rights—i.e., that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial; and (3) seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 565 (internal quotation marks omitted, alteration in original). Jalil claims that the prosecutor acted as an unsworn witness by eliciting testimony from two government witnesses regarding the prosecutor’s own role in the events leading to the filing of the § 1001 charge against Jalil. Most significantly, this testimony highlighted the prosecutor’s role in deciding that Jalil would not be appearing before a grand jury to testify regarding his knowledge of a murder after he falsely disavowed a prior statement made to law enforcement about that murder. Even assuming that the elicitation of this testimony was improper, however, there is no basis for concluding that it affected the outcome of the trial. Contrary to Jalil’s argument, the challenged testimony was not sufficiently integral to the materiality of his false statement to warrant a finding of prejudice. Under § 1001, “[a] false statement is material if it has a ‘natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the 3 decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.’” United States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 163 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999)). Jalil fails to demonstrate that, absent the challenged testimony, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would not have found that his false disavowal of his prior statement—which contained a substantial amount of detailed information implicating certain individuals in a murder—had the tendency or capability to influence the government’s investigation of that murder. Jalil thus cannot make the requisite showing of plain error in connection with his claim that the prosecutor acted as an unsworn witness at trial.