Opinion ID: 1689769
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Court erred in failing to make a full determination as to Brooks' competency to conduct voir dire of the jury and assisting in making closing arguments, thereby denying Brooks' right to counsel and depriving him of a fair trial.

Text: ¶ 15. Although this Court has elected to reverse and remand as to issue II, we nevertheless deem it appropriate to consider Brooks' third point of error, given that this point of error contains issues likely to arise once again on remand. At trial, Brooks made repeated requests to be allowed to represent himself at trial. The trial judge allowed Brooks to conduct voir dire, but after observing Brooks' performance, the judge concluded that he would restrict Brooks' ability to further conduct his own defense. ¶ 16. While every accused has the constitutional right to be represented by an attorney, it must be balanced against the right of an accused to represent himself, that is, to present his own case pro se without an attorney. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Metcalf v. State, 629 So.2d 558, 562 (Miss.1993). This Court has held that [e]ven where the issue of competency to stand trial has not been raised by defense counsel, the trial judge has an ongoing responsibility to prevent the trial of an accused unable to assist in his own defense. Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1248 (Miss.1993). ¶ 17. This Court has indicated that the test for competency to stand trial must be met before a defendant can be said to be capable of intelligently and knowingly waiving the right to counsel. Howard v. State, 701 So.2d 274, 280 (Miss.1997). The test for competency to stand trial mandates that a defendant be one (1) who is able to perceive and understand the nature of the proceedings; (2) who is able to rationally communicate with his attorney about the case; (3) who is able to recall relevant facts; (4) who is able to testify in his own defense if appropriate; and (5) whose ability to satisfy the foregoing criteria is commensurate with the severity and complexity of the case. Howard, 701 So.2d at 280 (citing Conner, 632 So.2d at 1248). ¶ 18. This Court has recognized the difficult position faced by judges in ruling on the present issue, and we have also recognized the potential for defendants to play games in this context. This Court stated in Evans v. State, 273 So.2d 495, 499 (Miss.1973) that: [W]e have recognized a right of a defendant to proceed without counsel and to refuse the representation of assigned counsel.... [H]e may not use this right to play a `cat and mouse' game with the court, ... or by ruse or stratagem fraudulently seek to have the trial judge placed in a position where, in moving along the business of the court, the judge appears to be arbitrarily depriving the defendant of counsel. (citing United States v. McMann, 386 F.2d 611 (2d Cir.1967)). ¶ 19. In the present case, the trial judge refused Brooks' direct and repeated requests to be allowed to cross-examine prosecution witnesses. The following exchange took place at trial between Brooks and the trial judge: By the Court: All right, Mr. Brooks, on yesterday I made a ruling that having observed your demeanor and behavior during voir dire that you lack the capacity to make a knowing and intelligent waiver on your important right to have this trained lawyer conduct this trial, and so I am not going to allow you to conduct any cross-examination or direct examination of any witnesses. You can consult with your lawyer, but the conduct of the case is in the hands of your attorney as far as how he wants to manage the trial of the case. So I'm not going to allow youI'm going to deny your request for what you're seeking now. . . . . By the Defendant: (A)s far as interrogating or questioning the witnesses if there is any provision of the law I ask, your Honor, to give me at least one opportunity in that particular area because that was before me yesterday was totally different than what I had prepared for. By the Court: I understand what you're saying, but having observed the way that it went yesterday, I have made a finding that you lack the capacity to waive your right to a lawyer. By the Defendant: I'm not waiving my right. By the Court: Well, you are partially waiving your right to have your lawyer conduct this trial by requesting to conduct the cross-examination of this witness, and I have already made a ruling on that, and so I'm not going to reverse my ruling. By the Defendant: Okay. I'm aware of that, but how am I supposed to get the truth to the court? By the Court: Well, that's the job of the lawyer, and he knows a lot more about how to do it than you do. By the Defendant: Okay. So I have to get him to read the questions? By the Court: That's correct. By the Defendant: Okay. And if he refuses? By the Court: That's the business of how he wants to conduct this trial because it's notit's his decision. He's the lawyer. By the Defendant: If he refuses, I just sit there? See, there are mitigating circumstances surrounding this whole trial. By the Court: Well, your lawyer is trained and experienced in knowing what is the best approach to take to present this case to the jury, and that's why he's entrusted with that important duty. So he's going to make those decisions. By the Defendant: All right. By the Court: Let's proceed. ¶ 20. This appeal is a difficult one on the present issue, for several reasons. First, the trial judge expressly found that Brooks lack(ed) the capacity to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. The judge accordingly concluded that he had erred in allowing Brooks to conduct voir dire, and the judge resolved not to compound this error by allowing Brooks to cross-examine prosecution witnesses. However, the judge did permit Brooks to conduct portions of the remaining trial, including the majority of the defense's closing argument. ¶ 21. The circuit judge's finding notwithstanding, it is far from clear that Brooks lacked the capacity to waive his right to counsel. This Court's test for capacity to waive the right to counsel, as discussed in Howard, is not an onerous one, merely inquiring as to whether the defendant has the capacity to understand the proceedings, communicate with his attorney, recall relevant facts, and testify in his own behalf. 701 So.2d at 280. While this Court has not had the opportunity to observe Brooks' demeanor, the record does contain a great deal of Brooks' statements, testimony, and an abundance of motions filed with this Court, in Brooks' own handwriting. It is apparent that Brooks is not an experienced practitioner of the law, but he is more than able to make coherent, and even intelligent, arguments, and a thorough reading of Brooks' statements in the record casts serious doubt upon the trial judge's conclusion that Brooks lacks basic mental capacity. Indeed, the trial judge's own statements to Brooks, quoted supra, indicate that the judge was motivated largely by a (justified) belief that Brooks' lawyer was better qualified to conduct his defense than Brooks. ¶ 22. The issue is further complicated by the fact that Brooks' attorney argues in his appellate brief that Brooks did in fact lack the capacity to waive his right to counsel, and that the trial court erred in allowing him to conduct any part of his defense at all. This Court finds this argument to be without merit. The trial judge's decision to allow Brooks to conduct most of his closing argument is consistent with Article 3, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution, which guarantees a defendant the right to be heard by himself or counsel, or both. Brooks had a constitutional right to participate in his own defense, if mentally competent, and there is little support in the record for the trial court's finding that he lacked the capacity to waive his counsel. ¶ 23. Having rejected the argument that the trial court erred in permitting Brooks to participate in his defense at all, the question arises as to whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow Brooks to have even greater participation in his defense, including cross-examining witnesses. Although Brooks' attorney has not raised these arguments in his brief, Brooks has filed with this Court emergency motions asking for substitution of counsel, and these motions include arguments that his counsel was ineffective in not properly cross-examining the prosecution witnesses at trial. [1] ¶ 24. While Brooks' arguments of ineffective assistance of counsel would have been more appropriate in the context of a PCR motion, this Court may properly take notice of the fact that Brooks has resisted the participation of his attorney in the present case from the earliest stages of the trial, and this resistance continues unabated to the present day. Although the performance of Brooks' counsel at trial appears to have been competent, and Brooks' performance in his own defense much less so, the fact remains that Brooks has a constitutional right, if mentally competent, to conduct his own defense. ¶ 25. The U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized that the fact that a defendant may be foolish to waive his right to counsel by no means should bar a mentally competent defendant from exercising his constitutional right to conduct his own defense: Personal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages. The right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of `that respect for the individual' which is the lifeblood of the law. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1064, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). ¶ 26. This Court should not ignore a defendant's persistent pleas that he be allowed to exercise a constitutional right, even if it appears that the defendant would have been wiser to waive the right in question. It should be noted, however, that the trial judge did not completely deny, but merely limited, Brooks his right to represent himself at trial. In considering a defendant's rights in the present hybrid representation context, the United States Supreme Court has stated that: (T)he primary focus must be on whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his case in his own way.... First, the pro se defendant is entitled to preserve actual control over the case he chooses to present to the jury. This is the core of the Faretta right. If standby counsel's participation over the defendants' objection effectively allows counsel to make or substantially interfere with any significant tactical decisions, or to control the questioning of the witnesses, or to speak instead of the defendant on any matter of importance, the Faretta right is eroded. Second, participation by standby counsel without the defendant's consent should not be allowed to destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178-79, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984). ¶ 27. In the view of this Court, there is question as to whether the first part of the McKaskle test was violated in the present case. The trial judge expressly refused Brooks' request to be permitted to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses, and McKaskle clearly dictates that a mentally competent defendant be permitted to control the questioning of witnesses. As noted supra, the trial judge specifically informed Brooks that: By the Defendant: Okay. So I have to get him to read the questions? By the Court: That's correct. By the Defendant: Okay. And if he refuses? By the Court: That's the business of how he wants to conduct this trial because it's notit's his decision. He's the lawyer. By the Defendant: If he refuses, I just sit there? See, there are mitigating circumstances surrounding this whole trial. By the Court: Well, your lawyer is trained and experienced in knowing what is the best approach to take to present this case to the jury, and that's why he's entrusted with that important duty. So he's going to make those decisions. The trial judge thus informed Brooks that his attorney had the final discretion in directing the questioning of witnesses. Assuming that Brooks was in fact mentally competent, then his rights were at least arguably violated in this regard. ¶ 28. Given that this Court has elected to reverse as to Issue II, it is unnecessary to determine whether the trial court committed reversible error in denying Brooks' request to cross-examine prosecution witnesses. Instead, this Court merely directs that, at retrial on remand, the trial court should take note of the established precedent of the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court in ruling upon any requests by Brooks to participate in his own defense. The judgment of the Leflore County Circuit Court is reversed, and this case is remanded to that court for a new trial consistent with this opinion. ¶ 29. REVERSED AND REMANDED. PITTMAN AND BANKS, P.JJ., McRAE AND WALLER, JJ., CONCUR. SMITH, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY MILLS, COBB AND DIAZ, JJ.