Opinion ID: 786794
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Posttrial Motions and Kerman III

Text: 57 Following the entry of judgment, Kerman promptly moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 for correction of the judgment to reflect that the jury had found in his favor on the Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure and state-law false imprisonment claims. He also moved pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 for a new trial with respect to damages on those claims. At the hearing on those motions, Crossan argued that the jury had found against Kerman on liability because it found that Kerman had not proved that Crossan's restraints without probable cause were the proximate cause of the injuries he claimed. (Posttrial Hearing, July 10, 2002 (Posttrial Tr.), at 5-8, 12-13; see also id. at 31 (The jury said there is no liability).) To parry Kerman's anticipated response that the jury must have found liability because it found that nominal damages should be awarded ( see id. at 9-10), Crossan argued that the court c[ould] examine this verdict form and find that it's consistent by inferring that the jury had found that, though there was no probable cause to detain Kerman and send him to Bellevue, Kerman ha[d] suggested that he [wa]s willing to go ( id. at 17; see id. at 14-17). 58 In addition, at the oral argument of these motions, Crossan argued for the first time that the court should leave the judgment undisturbed because he was entitled to qualified immunity. Kerman argued that Crossan was not entitled to judgment on that basis because, inter alia, he had not asked that the questions necessary for the resolution of all of the factual issues material to that defense be put to the jury ( see Posttrial Tr. 23), and because the Kerman II opinion held that, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Kerman, Crossan was not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law ( see id. at 40). At the request of the district court, the parties thereafter briefed the issue of qualified immunity. 59 In an opinion dated February 11, 2003, Kerman v. City of New York, No. 96 Civ. 7865(RPP), 2003 WL 328297 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.11, 2003) ( Kerman III ), the district court stated that Kerman's Rule 60 motion is granted, though mooted, id. at , ; and as discussed in Part II.C. below, the court found no merit in Kerman's Rule 59 motion for a new trial, see id. at -. As to the Rule 60 motion, the court stated that 60 [t]his Court entered judgment in favor of Defendants because the jury found that (1) Plaintiff had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the continued custody of Plaintiff after the search for the gun was a proximate cause of injury to Plaintiff and (2) Plaintiff had suffered no actual damages; and because Plaintiff's summation did not ask the jury for an award of nominal damages based solely on a deprivation of his Constitutional rights. 61 Id. at . The court concluded that Kerman's Rule 60 motion had merit because a Fourth Amendment violation could warrant a judgment for nominal damages without proof of actual damages. See id. However, the court ruled that the judgment should nonetheless remain unchanged because any correction of the judgment would be mooted by reason of the court's conclusion in Kerman III that Crossan was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the ground of qualified immunity. Id. at , . 62 In ruling that Crossan was entitled to qualified immunity, the district court held both that Crossan's actions did not violate clearly established law and that it was objectively reasonable for Defendant Crossan to believe that his action did not violate existing law. Kerman III, 2003 WL 328297, at . The court held that the law was not clearly established because the court ha[d] been referred to no Supreme Court or Second Circuit authority which states on what grounds a police officer may determine to place an emotionally disturbed person in custody and send him to the hospital for evaluation. Id. at . 63 In determining that Crossan's actions were objectively reasonable, the court stated that it w[ould] disregard the defense testimony that Kerman was screaming and yelling, was incoherent, and would not calm down, given Kerman's testimony to the contrary; but it found that there is no dispute that Defendant Crossan and his fellow police officers ascertained that Plaintiff was under psychiatric care and was conducting himself in a manner that was likely to result in serious harm to himself and others. Id. at . The evidence not disregarded by the court was, apparently, testimony that Kerman refus[ed] to respond to questions or to allow a complete physical examination to be taken by EMS paramedic, Pontrelli, id. at . The court also found that [t]he filthy conditions in Plaintiff's apartment [were] testified to by the officers and admitted by Plaintiff, id., and that those conditions and Kerman's appearance — `wearing nothing' and `covered in kitty litter,' id. at  (quoting Tr. 122) — provided signs that [Kerman] was unable to care for himself, id. 64 The court also ruled that Crossan was entitled to immunity under state law: 65 Lastly, § 9.59 of the New York Mental Hygiene Law provides that any police officers ... who are taking into custody and transporting a person to a hospital ... shall not be liable for damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by such person ... unless it is established that such injuries... [were] caused by gross negligence. Defendant Crossan's actions do not rise to the level of gross negligence, i.e. reckless disregard or intentional wrongdoing. See e.g., Woody v. Astoria General Hospital, 264 A.D.2d 318, 319, 694 N.Y.S.2d 41[](1999). 66 Kerman III, 2003 WL 328297, at . 67 Thus, the April 23, 2002 judgment, dismissing all of Kerman's claims, remained unchanged. This appeal followed.