Opinion ID: 2464461
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence

Text: [¶8] After two of Mr. Baker's convictions were reversed in Baker I, ¶ 39, 223 P.3d at 557, he remained convicted on four charges: Count I for possession of a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007); Count II for conspiracy to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059(a)(iv); and Counts V and VI, child endangerment, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-405(a)(ii). On remand, he was sentenced to terms of six to eight years imprisonment on each of the first two counts, with the two sentences to run concurrently. He was sentenced to terms of eighteen to twenty-four months on each of the last two counts, with these two sentences to run concurrently, but consecutive to the sentences on the first two charges. [¶9] Mr. Baker's appeal issues revolve around the district court's order that his sentences on the last two charges would be served consecutively to the sentences on the first two charges. His brief includes this explanation of his claim: The maximum sentence allowed for Counts V and VI pursuant to W.S. § 6-4-405(c) is five (5) years incarceration. By the court sentencing [Mr. Baker] to consecutive sentences on Counts V and VI to Counts I and II [Mr. Baker] is now serving a maximum sentence of ten (10) years, double of that allowed for the maximum by statute. On that basis, he claims that his sentences are illegal, and the district court erred when it denied his motion to correct those sentences. [¶10] We review such claims using the following standard of review: This Court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence by using an abuse of discretion standard. However, this discretion is limited to a determination by the trial court as to whether the sentence was legal or illegal. . . . An illegal sentence is one which exceeds statutory limits, imposes multiple terms of imprisonment for the same offense, or otherwise violates constitutions or the law. Whether a sentence is illegal is determined by referencing the applicable statute or constitutional provisions, and is subject to statutory interpretation. The determination of whether the appropriate rule was applied to a set of facts is a question of law, requiring de novo review. McDaniel v. State, 2007 WY 125, ¶¶ 6-7, 163 P.3d 836, 838 (Wyo. 2007) (internal citations and punctuation omitted). [¶11] Mr. Baker contends that his consecutive sentences violate the holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2362-63, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), in which the United States Supreme Court explained that, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Baker argues that the imposition of consecutive sentences increased the penalty for his crimes beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, and therefore, Apprendi mandates that the decision to impose consecutive sentences be made by a jury, not the district court. [¶ 12] We considered this same contention in Gould v. State, 2006 WY 157, ¶ 24, 151 P.3d 261, 268 (Wyo.2006): The argument that judicial imposition of consecutive sentences violates the Sixth Amendment has been soundly rejected by other courts. The Hawaii Supreme Court stated: [O]ther jurisdictions, including several federal circuits, have aphoristically dismissed the proposition that either Blakely [v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004)] or Apprendi proscribes consecutive term sentencing, and this court does likewise. State v. Kahapea, 111 Hawai`i 267, [279,] 141 P.3d 440[, 452] (Haw.2006), and cases cited therein. We follow suit and conclude the district courts did not improperly enhance the appellants' sentences under the Sixth Amendment and the rationale of Apprendi or Blakely simply by imposing consecutive sentences for their separate crimes. We adhere to that ruling, and reject Mr. Baker's contention. [¶ 13] Mr. Baker's second issue is a variation on his first. Based again on Apprendi, he claims that he was improperly denied prior notice that he was charged with a crime for which the penalty could be enhanced by consecutive sentencing. However, consecutive sentences are not enhanced sentences subject to the rationale of Apprendi. Gould, ¶¶ 20-24, 161 P.3d at 267-68. Mr. Baker's second issue is, therefore, meritless. [¶ 14] Mr. Baker's third issue is a claim that the district court had no authority to impose consecutive sentences. However, we have long said that the district court has discretion in determining whether the sentences will be served consecutively or concurrently. Gould, ¶ 24, 151 P.3d at 267-68, citing Doles v. State, 2002 WY 146, ¶ 16, 55 P.3d 29, 33 (Wyo.2002), and Eaton v. State, 660 P.2d 803, 806 (Wyo.1983). Mr. Baker's third issue also lacks merit. [¶ 15] Finally, in Mr. Baker's fourth issue, he claims that his sentences violate his rights against being placed in double jeopardy because they represent multiple punishments for the same offense. He contends that he could not have been convicted on charges of child endangerment unless he was also convicted on charges relating to the manufacture of methamphetamine. He therefore contends that the district court was required to merge his convictions for purposes of sentencing. [¶ 16] In a previous case, we explained: Merger of sentences implicates a defendant's constitutional right to be free of multiple punishments for the same offense. Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 253 (Wyo. 2000). This right is one component of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Id. Consequently, the analytical framework necessary to resolve this issue is derived from the elements test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), and subsequently adopted by this Court. Bilderback, 13 P.3d at 253. Pursuant to the elements test, two offenses are different when each requires proof of an element that the other does not. Id. Najera v. State, 2009 WY 105, ¶ 11, 214 P.3d 990, 993-94 (Wyo.2009). We therefore begin this analysis with a review of the pertinent statutes, in order to determine whether the offenses are different because each requires proof of an element that the other does not. [¶ 17] On Count I, Mr. Baker was convicted of possession of a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059(a)(i), which provides that it is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally Possess a List I or II controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation. Based on this statute, the jury was instructed that, to find Mr. Baker guilty of this charge, it must find the following elements: 1. From on or about the 1st day of February, 2006 through on or about the 20th day of December, 2006; 2. In Natrona County, Wyoming; 3. The Defendant, David Dale Baker; 4. Knowingly or intentionally possessed a List II controlled substance precursor, to wit: Acetone and/or Iodine; 5. With the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation. [2] [¶ 18] On Count II, Mr. Baker was convicted of conspiracy to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059(a)(iv), which provides that it is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally Conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation. Based on this statute, the jury was instructed that, to find Mr. Baker guilty of this charge, it must find the following elements: 1. From on or about the 1st day of February, 2006 through on or about the 20th day of December, 2006; 2. In Natrona County, Wyoming; 3. The Defendant, David Dale Baker; 4. Knowingly or intentionally agreed with one or more other persons; 5. That they, or one of them, would engage in a clandestine laboratory operation. [¶ 19] On Counts V and VI, Mr. Baker was convicted of child endangerment, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-405(a), which provides that [N]o person shall knowingly and willfully cause or permit any child to:... (ii) Remain in a room, dwelling or vehicle where the person knows methamphetamine is being manufactured or sold. The jury was instructed that, to find Mr. Baker guilty of child endangerment, it must find the following elements: 1. From on or about the 1st day of February, 2006 through on or about the 20th day of December, 2006; 2. In Natrona County, Wyoming; 3. The Defendant, David Dale Baker; 4. Did knowingly and willfully cause or permit a child, to wit: [A.L.], born [in] 1998; [3] 5. To remain in a room or dwelling where the Defendant knew that methamphetamine was being manufactured. [¶ 20] It is readily apparent that the crime of child endangerment includes at least one element not found in the other two criminal statutes: the presence of a child. It is equally plain that the crimes of possession of a controlled substance precursor and conspiracy to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation include at least one element not found in the child endangerment statute: engaging, or intending to engage, in a clandestine laboratory operation. Mr. Baker is incorrect in asserting that he could not have been convicted of child endangerment without first being guilty of engaging in methamphetamine manufacturing. A person may be convicted of child endangerment even if he is not actively involved in the manufacturing of the drug. Under the test set forth in Blockburger and adopted by this Court in Bilderback, the offenses are different because each requires proof of an element that the other does not. The district court was not required to merge the different crimes for sentencing.