Opinion ID: 2419596
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Confession Obtained by False Promises

Text: Appellant contends that his confession should be suppressed because the officers made false promises that induced him to confess. He claims that the eliciting of the confession violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rights because it was not a voluntary statement. Pyles contends that Officer Donald Steven Howard promised him that he would help him in every way in the world. Pyle's version of the interrogation is that the officers repeatedly told him that if the murder was done in self-defense, a court would be more lenient. Following a long interrogation of several hours by other officers, Officer Howard began to interrogate Pyles. Officer Howard testified that he knew Pyles prior to the arrest through baseball and that he visited with Pyles about that. He testified that he told Pyles that it was important for him to tell the truth and that they knew he did it. He also testified that he told Pyles that he did not believe that Pyles was a cold-blooded killer and that he told Pyles that he would do everything in the world [he] could for him. Pyles claims that he confessed after Officer Howard made this statement. The State concedes that a questionable promise may have been made to the appellant. In Davis v. State, 275 Ark. 264, 630 S.W.2d 1 (1982), this Court examined a confession challenged as involuntary by the appellant. We held that we would examine such challenges on a case-by-case basis and make and determine whether a confession was voluntary based upon the totality of the circumstances. Additionally, we held: If a police official makes a false promise which misleads a prisoner, and the prisoner gives a confession because of that false promise, then the confession has not been voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. In determining whether there has been a misleading promise of reward we look at the totality of the circumstances. The totality is subdivided into two main components, first, the statement of the officer and second, the vulnerability of the defendant. Because these two factors create such a multitude of variable facts, it has been impossible for us to draw bright lines of substantive distinction. Id. at 267. In determining the totality of the circumstances the statements of the officer are first examined. If statements are clearly promises it is not necessary to look farther. Id. In Gardner v. State, 263 Ark. 739, 569 S.W.2d 74 (1978), we determined that a confession is not voluntary if the officer makes statements which are calculated to deceive. We have found no fault with an interrogator trying to persuade an accused to tell the truth or to answer questions, even though there may be misrepresentations of fact made by the interrogator, so long as the means employed are not calculated to procure an untrue statement and the confession is otherwise voluntarily made. Id. A misrepresentation will not invalidate a confession by the defendant as long as it does not constitute an improper influence. Rouw v. State, 265 Ark. 797, 581 S.W.2d 313 (1979). In Free v. State, 293 Ark. 65, 732 S.W.2d 452 (1987), the appellant challenged the voluntariness of his confession. He voluntarily went to the station for questioning in a rape case involving his nephew. Upon his arrival, he was informed of his Miranda rights, and during questioning for approximately one hour, he maintained his innocence. A sergeant then related to Free information which he had learned at a seminar on sexual abuse; he told Free that adult males who have preference for young males are extremely difficult to treat, and the first step is to admit the existence of the problem. He also stated that a court could order counseling and that penitentiaries might have counseling available. It was shortly after this discussion that Free confessed to having had oral sex with the victim on five separate occasions. This court upheld the validity of that confession and noted that the sergeant was trying to persuade Free to tell the truth and that there was no evidence that his statement was meant to mislead Free. Often it is difficult to determine whether an officer's statement is a promise of reward or leniency, a statement meant to deceive, or merely an admonishment to tell the truth. In Wright v. State, 267 Ark. 264, 590 S.W.2d 15 (1979), we allowed a statement by an interrogating officer that, things would go easier if you told the truth. However, in Tatum v. State, 266 Ark. 506, 585 S.W.2d 957 (1979), we determined that the statement, I'll help you any way that I can was a false promise. On several occasions, we have held statements to be false promises: when the officer claimed he would do all that he can, Hamm v. State, 296 Ark. 385, 757 S.W.2d 932 (1988) and when the officer said I'll help all that I can. Shelton v. State, 251 Ark. 890, 475 S.W.2d 538 (1972) The second factor pointed out in Davis v. State, supra , is the vulnerability of the defendant; in instances where it is difficult to ascertain the meaning of a statement, the vulnerability of a particular defendant becomes important. In the case before us, the record reflects that Pyles became emotional when he was interrogated by Officer Howard. Both Pyles and Officer Howard testified that Pyles held the officer's hands and wept. Pyles testified that he was emotional and tired from a long interrogation. The statement that Officer Howard made closely resembles those which we held unacceptable in Tatum , Hamm , and Shelton, supra . Therefore, we must conclude that the officer's action constituted a false promise that resulted in an involuntary confession. We, therefore, reverse on this point. We address only those remaining points that are likely to arise upon retrial.