Opinion ID: 2075533
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ill Supr.Ct.R. 772. In Minnesota, courts have adopted the following five criteria to evaluate alcoholism as a mitigating factor:

Text: (1) That the accused attorney is affected by alcoholism. (2) That the alcoholism caused the misconduct. (3) That the accused attorney is recovering from alcoholism and from any other disorders which caused or contributed to the misconduct. (4) That the recovery has arrested the misconduct and the misconduct is not apt to reoccur. (5) That the accused attorney must establish these criteria by clear and convincing evidence. In re Simonson, 420 N.W.2d at 906 (quoting from In re Johnson, Minn.Supr., 322 N.W.2d 616, 618 (1982)). See also Dumaine, 550 So.2d at 1202-3 (1989); In re Eads, 734 P.2d at 346 n. 17 (1987); In re Swartwout, 116 Wis.2d 380, 342 N.W.2d 406, 408 (1984). Still other courts have eschewed formal tests in favor of a simple determination of whether alcoholism caused the misconduct. See In re Billings, 787 P.2d at 622 (requiring proof of alcoholism, causation, and recovery); In re Miller, 553 A.2d at 203 (requiring proof that alcoholism substantially affected the charged misconduct); In re Hanson, 402 N.W.2d at 710 (requiring proof of causation). Cf. Mandel, 557 A.2d at 1331 (requiring proof of causation). [9] We need not formally adopt any of the judicial tests set forth above at this time because Clyne's alcoholism should not be considered a mitigating factor under any set of criteria. [10] He has failed to demonstrate by either a preponderance of or clear and convincing evidence that alcoholism caused his misconduct. Indeed, his defense appears to be only that anyone consuming twelve to fifteen drinks in a day cannot be responsible for his actions. Yet he admits that he was fully aware of what he was doing when he repeatedly lied to this Court, forged a document, and engaged in other fraudulent machinations, all of which he knew were wrong. Under the circumstances, Clyne's numerous deceptions to this Court, some exceptionally contrived, are not mitigated by the fact that he was or is an alcoholic, for he has failed to show that his dependency caused his repeated ethical transgressions. See In re Johnson, 114 Wash.2d 737, 790 P.2d 1227 (1990); In re Hanson, 402 N.W.2d at 710. Furthermore, Clyne's repeated deceptions to this Court undermine his assurances of recovery. His perjurious testimony of September 7, 1988 is completely consistent with his prior misrepresentations, and despite repeated warnings not to drink any alcohol at all, Clyne admitted that he drank as recently as one month before the disciplinary hearing. The lack of rehabilitation is a telling issue in this case. The Board concluded that Clyne continued to drink after his month-long treatment, and that his rehabilitative efforts were unsuccessful. When combined with his numerous instances of serious misconduct, the Board was fully warranted in concluding that Clyne was responsible for all charges against him. He provided no evidence sufficient to support his assurance of reform and to offset the gravity of his misconduct. In re Billings, 787 P.2d at 622; In re Eads, 734 P.2d at 348.