Opinion ID: 1224644
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Disposition Hearing of RCW 13.40.150

Text: RCW 13.40.150 provides: (3) Before entering a dispositional order as to a respondent found to have committed an offense, the court shall hold a disposition hearing, at which the court shall: ... (f) Determine the amount of restitution owing to the victim, if any; ... (Emphasis added.) The initial question in this case is whether the court has discretion to determine and enter an order of restitution at any time other than the time of the disposition hearing. RCW 13.40.150 recites a series of issues the juvenile court must address in a disposition order, and unambiguously states the court shall determine the restitution amount at the disposition hearing. This imperative language does not permit restitution to be determined at any time subsequent to the disposition hearing, and is therefore even more restrictive than the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) for adult offenders, which permits restitution to be determined after sentencing. In State v. Krall, 125 Wash.2d 146, 881 P.2d 1040 (1994), we interpreted language in the SRA regarding adult restitution hearings. Former RCW 9.94A142(1) (1994) provided, When restitution is ordered, the court shall determine the amount of restitution due at the sentencing hearing or within sixty days. The State did not seek restitution until 108 days after the sentencing hearing, and did not obtain it until 185 days after the hearing. The issue before the Court was whether the language of the statute was mandatory or directory. After review of the legislative history, we held the word shall in the statute was mandatory. Notably, the Court overruled an earlier Court of Appeals case, State v. Hartwell, 38 Wash.App. 135, 684 P.2d 778 (1984), because that case failed to recognize the general rule that `shall' is presumptively mandatory. Krall, 125 Wash.2d at 149, 881 P.2d 1040. The Court of Appeals here chose not to apply Krall 's strict interpretation of the word shall. Rather, the Court of Appeals observed the Juvenile Justice Act differs from the SRA insofar as the Juvenile Justice Act states as one of the equally important purposes of the Act restitution to the victims of crime, RCW 13.40.010(2)(h), whereas the SRA does not list restitution as one of its purposes. Mollichi, 81 Wash.App. at 476, 914 P.2d 782. Thus, while the Court of Appeals acknowledged Krall held shall to be presumptively mandatory in the context of the SRA it ruled the same conclusion was not required in the context of the Juvenile Justice Act. The Court of Appeals' reasoning is not persuasive as to the meaning of shall. First, the SRA itself makes restitution a key component for adult sentencing. See RCW 9.94A.120(18) ( requiring restitution whenever the offender is convicted of a felony that results in injury to any person or damage to or loss of property,: absent extraordinary circumstances); RCW 9.94A142(3) ( requiring restitution in all cases where victim is entitled to benefits under RCW 7.68, the crime victims' compensation act); see also RCW 7.69.030(15) (listing as a right of victims of crime entry of an order of restitution in all felony cases). [2] It is hard to discern a stronger policy supporting restitution in juvenile sentencing than adult sentencing. Second, in State v. Moen, 129 Wash.2d 535, 919 P.2d 69 (1996), the Court said, Our unanimous holding in Krall recognizes that the statutory time mandate prevails over victims' rights to restitution. Id. at 542, 919 P.2d 69. Moreover, the statutory requirement to determine the restitution amount only at the disposition hearing might be indicative of legislative intent to adopt a more strictly determinative approach to disposition and restitution in the case of juveniles. Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a statute's meaning must be derived from the wording of the statute itself. Human Rights Comm'n ex rel. Spangenberg v. Cheney Sch. Dist No. 30, 97 Wash.2d 118, 121, 641 P.2d 163 (1982). See also Erection Co. v. Department of Labor and Indus., 121 Wash.2d 513, 852 P.2d 288 (1993); Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wash.2d 97, 107, 922 P.2d 43 (1996) (under our rules of statutory construction, a statute clear on its face is not subject to judicial interpretation). We have no license to rewrite explicit and unequivocal statutes. Thus, under the mandatory language of RCW 13.40.150(3)(f), restitution must be set at the juvenile's disposition hearing in accordance with the time frame specified in RCW 13.40.130(8) and JuCR 7.12(a). Unlike the SRA, which allows a separate restitution hearing, the statute does not contemplate a subsequent, separate restitution hearing. While the Legislature is, of course, free to amend the Juvenile Justice Act to provide for a separate restitution hearing for juveniles [3] or longer time periods for setting the disposition hearings for juveniles, we must interpret the present unambiguous, mandatory language of the Act as requiring restitution to be set at the disposition hearing set in accordance with RCW 13.40.130(8).