Opinion ID: 3012646
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: conclusion

Text: The ALJ categorized Massaro’s cashier’s job as light work and found Massaro could return to it because she had a residual functional capacity for light work. “Light work” is work which: involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). `Massaro relies on Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1979), and Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 (3d Cir. 1981), in arguing that the ALJ did not adequately discuss which evidence he relied on and which evidence he rejected in reaching the conclusion that she had the residual functional capacity for light work. Her reliance is misplaced. In Dobrowolsky, two medical reports maintained that Dobrowolsky was disabled. A vocational expert, on the other hand, testified that he was capable of sedentary work. The 6 ALJ denied benefits based on this testimony and failed to explain why he afforded great weight to the vocational expert in light of the other medical evidence. Dobrowolsky, 606 F.2d at 405. Similarly, in Cotter, the ALJ gave great weight to a third physician’s medical report that did not contain a clinical report or observation. The ALJ’s failure to explain his implicit rejection of other expert medical testimony or even acknowledge its presence was deemed error. Cotter, 642 F.2d at 707. There was no such failure here where, also unlike Dobrowolsky and Cotter, the medical reports supported one another and suggested that Massaro suffered from a progressively debilitating disease. Parenthetically, and unfortunately for Massaro, the medical reports did not indicate that she was disabled before December 31, 1993. See Manzo v. Sullivan, M.D., 784 F.Supp. 1152, (D.N.J. 1991) (finding existence of progressive impairment that is not at a disabling level at relevant time insufficient to establish disability); DeNafo v. Finch, 436 F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1971) (same). Indeed, Massaro did not even apply for disability insurance benefits until June 1995, perhaps because, as both the government and the evidence suggests and as the ALJ adequately explained, she did not experience significant functional limitations until that time. B. Are the ALJ’s Findings Supported by Substantial Evidence Massaro next alleges various errors, which she contends illustrate that the ALJ’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. For example, she cites a passage 7 from the ALJ’s decision where he notes that her testimony regarding her ability – or inability – to stand, push and pull is inconsistent with her testimony about her ability to perform chores. Massaro asserts that this testimony is consistent because she testified to performing chores in shifts, with breaks. Be that as it may, the ALJ did not rely solely on Massaro’s testimony regarding chores to refute her testimony about her ability to sit and stand. The ALJ also questioned that testimony based on the medical reports, gaps in treatment, and the fact that Dr. McEliece and Dr. Davis seemed to question her motivation and effort. Massaro also complains that the ALJ’s definition of “light work” is not the same as the definition that the Commissioner has adopted. See supra at 6. The ALJ characterized light work as: “Work which requires maximum lifting of twenty pounds and frequently lifting of ten pounds; some light jobs are performed while standing, and those performed in the seated position often require the worker to operate hand or leg controls.” Tr. 18. Not only does a plain reading of the ALJ’s definition of light work lead to the conclusion that it does not diverge from the Commissioner’s definition, but substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Massaro could perform light work2 C. Did the ALJ Fail to Properly Consider Complaints of Pain Allegations of pain are also to be considered in determining residual functional 2 Because we find for the Commissioner at step four, we need not discuss the ALJ’s alternative finding at step five. 8 capacity. Allegations of subjective symptoms such as pain must be consistent with objective medical evidence, see Hartranft, 181 F.3d at 362 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529), and an ALJ must explain the reasons for rejecting such allegations. See Van Horn v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir. 1983). In Hartranft, we also noted that determining the extent to which pain affects one’s ability to work “[o]bviously requires the ALJ to determine the extent to which a claimant is accurately stating the degree of pain or the extent to which he or she is disabled by it.” Id. at 362. Massaro argues that the ALJ discounted her complaints of pain by omitting relevant portions of her testimony while distorting others, complaining, for example, that the ALJ took her ability to do housework out of context. We disagree. Massaro also takes issue with the fact that the ALJ only mentioned that she took Orudis, even though Dr. Nishitani also prescribed Relafen and Ultram. Dr. Nishitani’s progress notes, however, confirm that during the relevant period, he only prescribed Orudis, a drug that Massaro herself confirmed was alleviating her pain. The ALJ appropriately considered the medical findings, the sporadic treatment, and Massaro’s activities, and concluded that her statements regarding pain were not entirely credible. In the words of Hartranft, the ALJ carefully determined “the extent to which . . . [Massaro] accurately stat[ed] the degree of pain [and] the extent to which [s]he [wa]s disabled by it.”