Opinion ID: 418125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: NLRB v. Magnavox Co.

Text: 35 In Magnavox, the union challenged a company rule that prohibited employees from distributing literature anywhere on company property at any time. The no-distribution rule had been maintained for some 16 years, antedating the first collective bargaining agreement between Magnavox and the union. The collective bargaining agreement provided that the company could issue Rules and Regulations for the maintenance of orderly conditions, and that such rules [would] not be unfair or of a discriminatory nature. The Magnavox Company of Tennessee, 195 N.L.R.B. 265, 269 (1972). The company agreed to provide bulletin boards for the posting of union notices; another rule, not challenged, prohibited [s]oliciting of any kind on Company Property during working hours. Id. at 268 n. 2. The Board found that the blanket no-distribution rule violated fundamental employee rights that could not be waived by the union in collective bargaining, and it ordered the company to cease and desist from enforcing the rule to bar solicitation for or against any union. 6 Id. at 265-67. The Sixth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order, ruling that the union could waive, and had waived, the employees' on-premises distribution rights. Magnavox Co. v. NLRB, 474 F.2d 1269 (6th Cir.1973). The Supreme Court reversed, upholding the Board's order. 415 U.S. 322, 94 S.Ct. 1099, 39 L.Ed.2d 358 (1974). 36 To place in context the Supreme Court's discussion in Magnavox, it will be helpful to describe first the then-existing legal climate. In a series of decisions beginning with Gale Products, Div. of Outboard Marine Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 1246 (1963), enforcement denied, 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir.1964), the Board had adopted the view, with regard to employee activities on company property on nonworking time, that an incumbent union had the power to waive employees' rights to distribute and solicit on behalf of the incumbent union but could not waive their rights so to act on behalf of any rival union. The question of the incumbent union's power to waive employee distribution and solicitation rights divided the courts of appeals into three camps. The Fifth Circuit, in NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Products, supra, which involved a total on-premises ban of distribution and solicitation, agreed with the Board that the incumbent could waive employee rights of solicitation and distribution in its favor but could not waive employee rights to solicit or distribute in favor of a rival: 37 Where union and employee interests are one it can fairly be assumed that employee rights will not be surrendered except in return for bargained-for concessions from the employer of benefit to employees. But the rationale of allowing waiver by the union disappears where the subject matter waived goes to the heart of the right of employees to change their bargaining representative, or to have no bargaining representative, a right with respect to which the interests of the union and employees may be wholly adverse. Solicitation and distribution of literature on plant premises are important elements in giving full play to the right of employees to seek displacement of an incumbent union. We cannot presume that the union, in agreeing to bar such activities, does so as a bargain for securing other benefits for the employees and not from the self-interest it has in perpetuating itself as bargaining representative. 38 A waiver of the right to solicit and distribute literature does not hamper the union as it does the union's adversaries. The union can communicate through the bulletin board, union meetings and the force of status as bargaining representative, enjoying an advantage in preserving the status quo. Its adversaries will not have equal access to and communication with their fellow employees. 39 403 F.2d at 705. The Fifth Circuit therefore enforced a Board order that invalidated the company's rule only insofar as it banned solicitation or distribution for a rival union or against the incumbent. 40 Other circuits rejected this bifurcated view of the union's power to waive employee rights to engage in on-premises solicitation or distribution during nonworking time, but they divided over whether the union had the power to waive totally or had no power to waive. Thus, the Eighth Circuit ruled that a no-distribution rule was invalid because the union had no power to waive employee distribution rights, either on its own behalf or on behalf of a rival. See IAM, District 9, supra, 415 F.2d at 116. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits, on the other hand, ruled that the incumbent union had the power to waive distribution or solicitation rights as to both itself and its rivals. E.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 344 F.2d 621 (6th Cir.1965) (distribution); NLRB v. Gale Products, Division of Outboard Marine Corp., 337 F.2d 390 (7th Cir.1964) (distribution and solicitation). 41 In Magnavox, the Board changed its bifurcated rule and adopted the Eighth Circuit's view that the union had no power to waive employee distribution rights on behalf of either itself or another union. When the Sixth Circuit persisted in its own interpretation by refusing enforcement of the Board's order in Magnavox, the Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the conflict of the Sixth Circuit's view with that of the Eighth Circuit and that of the Fifth Circuit. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. at 324, 94 S.Ct. at 1101. 42 At the outset of its discussion in Magnavox, the Supreme Court framed the issue before it. Noting that a ban on the distribution of union literature or the solicitation of union support by employees at the plant during nonworking time may constitute an interference with Sec. 7 rights, id., and that the Court had previously upheld the Board in interpreting solicitation outside working hours but on company property [to be] protected by Sec. 7 and invalidating a rule that prohibited such solicitation, id. (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801-03, 65 S.Ct. 982, 987-88, 89 L.Ed. 1372 (1945)), the Court stated that the sole issue [before it] concern[ed] the power of the collective-bargaining representative to waive those rights, 415 U.S. at 325, 94 S.Ct. at 1102. The Court observed that although some types of employee rights could be waived by the union in order to obtain employer concessions during collective bargaining, waivers are tolerable only if there is fair representation, and the selection of the employees' bargaining representative remains free. Id. The Court stated that where what is involved is the right to choose a bargaining representative--whether to have no bargaining representative, or to retain the present one, or to obtain a new one--it should not be presumed that an incumbent union fairly represents the interests of the employees. Id. 43 When the right to such a choice is at issue, it is difficult to assume that the incumbent union has no self-interest of its own to serve by perpetuating itself as the bargaining representative. [Citation omitted.] The place of work is a place uniquely appropriate for dissemination of views concerning the bargaining representative and the various options open to the employees. So long as the distribution is by employees to employees and so long as the in-plant solicitation is on nonworking time, banning of that solicitation might seriously dilute Sec. 7 rights. 44 Id. 45 The Court proceeded to make clear that the no-distribution rule in Magnavox could not properly be enforced against solicitation in favor of a rival union because the alternative avenues of communication were presumptively inadequate to protect the employees' right to support such a union: 46 [A]s the Fifth Circuit said in the Mid-States case the bulletin board may be an adequate medium for preserving the status quo and yet not give a union's adversaries equal access to and communication with their fellow employees. 403 F.2d at 705. 47 Id. at 326, 94 S.Ct. at 1102; see also id. at 327, 94 S.Ct. at 1103 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that a union cannot contractually waive the right of disaffected employees to distribute in nonwork areas and during nonwork time literature advocating the displacement of the incumbent collective-bargaining representative). On the other hand, a majority of the Court found that, in fairness to the employees who are to choose between unions, if on-premises distribution of literature is to be allowed to oppose the incumbent, it must be allowed in favor of the incumbent as well: 48 [A] limitation of the right of in-plant distribution of literature to employees opposing the union does not give a fair balance to Sec. 7 rights, as the Board ruled in the present case. For employees supporting the union have as secure Sec. 7 rights as those in opposition. 49 415 U.S. at 326, 94 S.Ct. at 1102. Accordingly, the Court upheld the Board's ruling that Magnavox's no-distribution rule was not enforceable, regardless of whether the distributions were on behalf of the incumbent or on behalf of a rival. 7 50 We do not view the Supreme Court's ruling in Magnavox as altering the principles set forth in United Aircraft. Rather, it appears to us that the focus of the Court's decision was the interplay between two factors--neither of which was at issue in United Aircraft --to wit, the employees' rights to choose their bargaining representative, see Prudential Insurance Co. v. NLRB, 661 F.2d 398, 400-01 (5th Cir.1981) (Courts which have invalidated a clear contractual waiver of an employee's individual statutory right have done so only when the waived right affects the employee's right to exercise his basic choice of bargaining representative. (citing Magnavox )), as those rights might be affected by a complete ban on union-related distribution or solicitation on company property. Notwithstanding the fact that the Magnavox rule at issue banned only distribution of literature and not oral solicitation, it is clear that the rule resulted in the total elimination of such distribution, and the Court framed the issue before it in terms of the unions' power to consent to the total elimination of either distribution or solicitation. Thus the Court referred to a ban on the distribution of union literature or the solicitation of union support, 415 U.S. at 324, 94 S.Ct. at 1101 (emphasis added), to rules prohibiting onpremises solicitation outside of working hours, id. (emphasis added), and to the banning of in-plant solicitation on nonworking time, id. at 325, 94 S.Ct. at 1102 (emphasis added). We see no indication that the Court intended to deal with the unions' power to bargain with respect to mere limitations on the time and place of union solicitation, as contrasted with the complete elimination of such solicitation. Indeed, the Court ended its opinion by noting that as respects employers, the rights of solicitation of employees by employees concerning Sec. 7 rights are not absolute, id. at 326, 94 S.Ct. at 1102, and stating that its Magnavox decision was not an appropriate occasion for reviewing Board determinations as to the propriety of employers' limiting in-plant communication, id. at 327, 94 S.Ct. at 1103. 51 United Aircraft did not involve a total ban on union solicitation, or even on any particular form of solicitation; it dealt merely with time and place limitations. The collective bargaining agreement and rule at issue barred union solicitation only during time for which the employee was being paid; they allowed such solicitation at all other times, i.e., before work, after work, and at lunchtime. Thus, as the respondent union in Magnavox, supporting the Board's view that total waiver was impermissible, pointed out in its reply brief to the Supreme Court, 52 [i]n United Aircraft [, supra ], the court considered the right to be free from anti-union discrimination to be fundamental and non-waivable, but held that a regulation of the time, place and manner of soliciting union membership on company property was non-fundamental and thus subject to the bargaining process so long as reasonable access to company property for that purpose is preserved. That analysis is consistent with ... the Board's decision herein, because the rule here was not thus limited. 53 (Reply brief of International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers at 11 n. 3.) 54 We agree that the analysis in United Aircraft is consistent with the Board's Magnavox position that unions cannot consent to a rule eliminating the employees' rights to engage in on-premises union-related distributions. 8 And we see in the Supreme Court's approval of that position no indication that the Court sought--where employees are free, as in United Aircraft, to engage in any type of union solicitation they choose, whether for or against the incumbent or any other union, on company property before work, after work, or at lunchtime--to rule that the union had no power to bargain away employee rights to engage in solicitation at other times.