Opinion ID: 1391736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: (21) Necessity for Manslaughter Instructions

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the principles of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192). Our review of the record herein discloses, however, that there was no substantial evidence deserving of consideration which might have led reasonable jurors to reach a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. (See People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684 [160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1].) Voluntary manslaughter is statutorily defined as the unlawful killing of a human being without malice upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. (§ 192, subd. 1.) As we recently observed, If a killing, even though intentional, is shown to have been committed in a heat of passion upon sufficient provocation the absence of malice is presumed. [Citation.] ... [¶] Because the existence of malice is presumed when the circumstances of a killing suggest an intent to kill ... provocation and heat of passion must be affirmatively demonstrated. [Citations.] ( People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 719 [112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913], italics in original.) Heat of passion has been defined as `such a passion as would naturally be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person under the given facts and circumstances....' ( People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 515 [134 Cal. Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777], quoting from an earlier case.) As for the element of provocation, there is no specific type of provocation required by section 192 and ... verbal provocation may be sufficient. [Citation.] ( Ibid. ) In Berry, for example, we held that the provocative conduct by defendant's wife which could arouse a passion of jealousy, pain and sexual rage in a man of average disposition was sufficient to require instructions on voluntary manslaughter. In the present case, the record indicates that defendant may have become enraged and brutally attacked and killed on of his elderly victims because she awakened during the burglary and began to scream. No case has ever suggested, however, that such predictable conduct by a resisting victim would constitute the kind of provocation sufficient to reduce a murder charge to voluntary manslaughter. (See, e.g., People v. Morse (1969) 70 Cal.2d 711, 734-735 [76 Cal. Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 607].) We noted in People v. Flannel, supra , that if the evidence which supports a manslaughter theory is minimal and insubstantial, the trial court need not instruct on that theory. (25 Cal.3d at pp. 684-685.) We conclude that defendant presented no substantial evidence that he killed either of his victims in a heat of passion on sufficient provocation. Because of this conclusion, we need not resolve the further question whether the failure to give a manslaughter instruction was harmless error under the test announced in People v. Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d 703, 721.