Opinion ID: 1823282
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the circuit court erred in ordering Ford to pay more than $200,000 in attorney's fees and expenses.

Text: ¶ 57. As previously noted, the issue of attorney's fees falls within the sound discretion of the trial court. Smotherman, 741 So.2d at 269. However, where the basis for the award is itself a product of abused discretion, so too is the award. See, e.g., City of Jackson v. Powell, 917 So.2d 59, 76 (Miss.2005) (violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 not proven, so award of fees pursuant thereto reversed); Moses v. Moses, 879 So.2d 1036, 1041 (Miss.2004) (court reversed contempt judgment, so award of attorney's fees also reversed); Madison County v. Hopkins, 857 So.2d 43, 51 (Miss. 2003) (chancellor's finding of a conflict of interest held erroneous, so award of fees based thereon reversed); Anderson v. B.H. Acquisition, Inc., 771 So.2d 914, 922 (Miss.2000) (trial court's finding that claim was frivolous was erroneous, so award of fees based thereon reversed). In this case, the trial court's finding of multiple, intentional discovery violations was erroneous, so the award of attorney's fees and expenses to the plaintiffs (presumably under Miss. R. Civ. P. 37(e)) was consequently an abuse of discretion. ¶ 58. That is not to say, though, that the plaintiffs were not owed some amount of reasonable attorney's fees and expenses. Pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4), once a trial court has entered an order granting a motion to compel, as the trial court did in this case on April 22, 2003, with respect to the plaintiffs' interrogatories 5, 6, and 7, and requests for production 12 and 13: the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party . . . whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Therefore, the trial court, after a hearing, could have assessed Ford the reasonable expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in bringing the February 24, 2003, motion to compel referenced in the order. [8] See Willard v. Paracelsus Health Care Corp., 681 So.2d 539, 545 (Miss.1996); Barnes v. A Confidential Party, 628 So.2d 283, 291 (Miss.1993). ¶ 59. Likewise, under Miss. R. Civ. P. 37(b), a trial court may impose sanctions for the failure to comply with an order. As previously stated, the only order not fully complied with by Ford was the trial court's order to submit allegedly privileged documents for in camera review by the start of trial. Ford ultimately complied with the order two days late. Pursuant to Rule 37(b), the trial court shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Therefore, the trial court could have assessed Ford the reasonable expenses incurred by the plaintiffs caused by its compliance with the court's ruling two days later than ordered. ¶ 60. [A]ny testimony by attorneys with respect to [reasonable attorney's fees] is purely advisory and not binding on the trial court. Mauck v. Columbus Hotel Co., 741 So.2d 259, 269 (Miss.1999). Under Miss.Code Ann. Section 9-1-41 (Rev. 2004): In any action in which the court is authorized to award reasonable attorneys' fees, the court shall not require the party seeking such fees to put on proof as to the reasonableness of the amount sought, but shall make the award based on the information already before it and the court's own opinion based on experience and observation; provided however, a party may, in its discretion, place before the court other evidence as to the reasonableness of the amount of the award, and the court may consider such evidence in making the award. See also Regency Nissan, Inc. v. Jenkins, 678 So.2d 95, 103 (Miss.1995). ¶ 61. This Court has also instructed trial courts to refer to the factors set forth in Rule 1.5 of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct when determining the reasonableness of an attorney's fee. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Cook, 832 So.2d 474, 486 (Miss.2002). These factors include: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. See also McKee v. McKee, 418 So.2d 764, 767 (Miss.1982). Any award of attorney's fees and expenses should be supported with factual determinations by the trial court. Browder v. Williams, 765 So.2d 1281, 1288 (Miss.2000). ¶ 62. The trial court may assess reasonable attorney's fees and expenses against Ford related to the order described supra and pursuant to the guidelines discussed. We remand the award of attorney's fees and expenses to the plaintiffs for reconsideration by the trial court.