Opinion ID: 72778
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the fire chief position

Text: The district court granted summary judgment on Arrington’s § 1983 claims for significantly different reasons from those recommended by the magistrate judge in its SR & 11 Appellees’ assertion that we should subject the factual findings of the district court only to a clearly erroneous standard of review finds no support in the precedents of this court. We find appellees’ inability to discuss even the standard of review in a straightforward and forthcoming manner to be disheartening. 17 R. Instead of relying on a Monell finding that the County did not have a “policy” or “custom” of discrimination, the district court based its ruling on the principle that a plaintiff may not use § 1983 to circumvent the administrative requirements for a Title VII claim. On appeal, Arrington argues that the district court erred because her § 1983 claim is based on a violation of her constitutional equal protection rights and not on any statutory violation of Title VII. To prevail on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate both (1) that the defendant deprived her of a right secured under the Constitution or federal law and (2) that such a deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Willis v. University Health Serv., 993 F.2d 837, 840 (11th Cir. 1993). Of course, an allegation of a Title VII violation cannot provide the sole basis for a § 1983 claim. See Allen v. Denver Pub. Sch. Bd., 928 F.2d 978, 982 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[S]ection 1983 cannot be used to assert the violation of rights created only by Title 18 VII.”); Hervey v. City of Little Rock, 787 F.2d 1223, 1233 (8th Cir. 1986) (same). As the district court observed, a plaintiff cannot bootstrap an untimely Title VII claim by bringing a § 1983 action based only on a statutory violation of Title VII. Cf. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375-78, 99 S. Ct. 2345, 2350-52, 60 L. Ed. 2d 957 (1979) (stating that plaintiffs may not bypass the Title VII administrative process by enforcing their statutory rights under Title VII through § 1985). Arrington, however, does not rest her § 1983 Fire Chief claim on any alleged violation of Title VII. Instead, Arrington satisfies the first element of § 1983 by alleging that Hightower violated her Fourteenth Amendment right of equal protection. See Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 114 F.3d 1089, 1092 (11th Cir. 1997), reh’g en banc denied, 124 F.3d 1372 (1997) (holding that Title VII does not preempt a Fourteenth Amendment cause of action for employment discrimination under § 1983); Hervey, 787 F.2d at 19 1233 (holding that a plaintiff whose Title VII claim is timebarred is “limited to proving that the [defendant] violated her equal protection rights under the fourteenth amendment in order to recover under § 1983.”).12 Thus, we conclude that the district court erred as a matter of law by granting summary judgment to the appellees on this issue.13 Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Arrington’s § 1983 Fire Chief claim against Hightower and 12 There is no dispute that Hightower acted under the color of state law in denying Arrington the promotion to Fire Chief, satisfying the second element of § 1983. 13 In their brief for this court, appellees ignore the district court’s confusion regarding the relationship between Title VII and § 1983; appellees strangely declare that the district court based its decision on the merits of Arrington’s § 1983 Fire Chief claim. Appellees’ contention that the district court reached the merits of this issue is, at best, misleading. Because the district court did not discuss the magistrate judge’s decision on the merits of appellants’ § 1983 Fire Chief claims, we decline at this stage to evaluate the merits of Arrington’s remaining Fire Chief claim against Hightower. We note, however, that Arrington has insisted that she seeks to pursue Hightower in his personal capacity. Given our liberal system of notice pleading, and appellees’ apparent understanding throughout their submissions to the magistrate judge and district court that Arrington sought to hold Hightower liable in his personal as well as in his official capacity, we expect that the district court will allow Arrington to amend her complaint as necessary to reflect the true nature of her claims. Cf. Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827, 829 (11th Cir. 1982) (rules of notice pleading apply to complaints in § 1983 actions). 20 remand this issue to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.14