Opinion ID: 1351466
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denying Challenge for Cause

Text: (2) Defendant contends that a prospective alternative juror who exhibited bias during voir dire should have been removed for cause. When the court refused defendant's for-cause challenge, he was compelled to exercise a peremptory challenge. The diminution of available peremptory challenges, he argues, led to the selection of a jury less favorable to him. We find no error. The prospective alternate juror in question, Ms. Lamprich, gave conflicting testimony as to her ability to be unbiased. On the one hand, she stated that she had several relatives employed as police officers and might tend to give greater credence to the testimony of such officers. On the other, she stated her intention to try to be an impartial juror. In general, the qualification of jurors challenged for cause are matters within the wide discretion of the trial court, seldom disturbed on appeal. ( Odle v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 932, 944 [187 Cal. Rptr. 455, 654 P.2d 225].) When, as here, a juror gives conflicting testimony as to her capacity for impartiality, the determination of the trial court on substantial evidence is binding on the appellate court. ( People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1089 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659]; People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 356 [197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680]; People v. Linden (1959) 52 Cal.2d 1, 22 [338 P.2d 397].) We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the challenge for cause of prospective juror Lamprich.