Opinion ID: 1902143
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: This Case Harmless Error Review

Text: The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was admitted, albeit by stipulation, during Dawson's capital sentencing hearing in violation of Dawson's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S.Ct. at 1098. Accordingly, the State now bears the burden of demonstrating, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the violation of Dawson's First and Fourteenth amendment rights, during his capital sentencing hearing, was a harmless error. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. In determining whether the State has met that burden, this Court must adhere to the teachings of Chapman and its progeny. The capital sentencing proceeding in Dawson's case was conducted in accordance with the applicable Delaware statute, prior to its recent amendment. See State v. Cohen, Del.Supr., 604 A.2d 846 (1992). Pursuant to that unamended statute, a unanimous finding by the jury of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and a consequent recommendation of death, supported by the evidence was binding upon the Superior Court. 11 Del.C. § 4209(d)(1)(b). Conversely, the unamended Delaware statute provided that, if the jury could not unanimously find the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance and unanimously recommend death, the [Superior] Court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the benefit of probation or parole. 11 Del.C. § 4209(d)(3). Thus, when Dawson's capital sentencing hearing was conducted, the unamended Delaware statute vested the jury with absolute discretion not to impose a sentence of death, after consideration of all factors in aggravation and mitigation. Whalen v. State, Del.Supr., 492 A.2d 552, 562 (1985). In fact, one of the purposes of amending the Delaware death penalty statute was to change the role of the judge and the jury in the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial. Cohen v. State, 604 A.2d at 849. The jury now functions, under the amended statute, only in an advisory capacity. Id. In the case sub judice, the State argues that the admission of the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was harmless. Nevertheless, the State has candidly acknowledged in its briefs before the United States Supreme Court and this Court upon remand: When they turned to Dawson's character, the prosecutors waived Dawson's criminal record, his self-identification as Abaddon, and his embrace of the Aryan Brotherhood into a central theme that Dawson had an incorrigible character with his entire life showing repeated decisions to reject any redeeming paths. After the United States Supreme Court carefully examined the presentation of the Aryan Brotherhood evidence by the State during Dawson's capital sentencing hearing, it concluded that on the present record one is left with the feeling that the Aryan Brotherhood evidence was employed simply because the jury would find these beliefs morally reprehensible. Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S.Ct. at 1098. Given the United States Supreme Court's characterization of the Aryan Brotherhood evidence presented by the State, and the State's acknowledgement that the purpose of presenting that evidence was to weave Dawson's embrace of the Aryan Brotherhood into a central theme that Dawson had an incorrigible character with his entire life showing repeated decisions to reject any redeeming paths, it is impossible for this Court to conclude the State has demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Superior Court's error in admitting the evidence about the Aryan Brotherhood did not contribute to the death sentences obtained by the State. Accord Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988). See Sochor v. Florida, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at ___ (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 24, 26, 87 S.Ct. at 829).