Opinion ID: 1182352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the transferability of privately owned water in hawaii

Text: The second major branch of McBryde I was that private water rights, however acquired, [22] are subject to the strictures of the common law doctrine of riparianism. Under that doctrine, the ownership of a parcel of land abutting the ripa of a stream carries with it the right to flow of [the] stream in the form and size given it by nature. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, supra, 54 Haw. at 192-193, 504 P.2d at 1342. The court held that a corollary of this right at common law is the privilege of riparian landowners to prohibit the diversion of water by one such landowner unless he returns it to its original watercourse substantially undiminished in quantity. See Hutchins 95; L. Teclaff, What You Have Always Wanted to Know about Riparian Rights, But were Afraid to Ask, 12 Natural Resources J. 30, 39-53 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Teclaff ]. The court's reasoning was bottomed wholly on section 7 of the Enactment of Further Principles, originally published as L. 1850, ง 7, at 202, and presently compiled in HRS ง 7-1 [23] which, in its English version, guarantees to the people ... a right to drinking water [and] running water, and also declares that [t]he springs of water [and] running water shall be free to all, on all lands granted in fee simple. Based on this language, and the historical generalization that the missionaries, many of whom came from Massachusetts, not only brought the Christian religion to the Hawaiian people, but also brought with them the English common law as recognized in Massachusetts, 54 Haw. at 193, 504 P.2d at 1342, the court concluded that privately owned water may only be used in connection with the land to which it is appurtenant and may not be transported to kula land elsewhere. This conclusion followed, it was thought, from the cases and authorities on common law riparianism which were examined with considerable care in McBryde I. Id. at 193-197, 504 P.2d at 1342-1344. While McBryde I may have been adequate in its exegesis of the law of riparianism as a general matter, it is my opinion that the court erred in holding that the Enactment of Further Principles codified that law as the system by which to measure water rights in Hawaii. While the array of authorities affirming my position in this respect are persuasive as a matter of water policy, [24] I base my conclusions primarily on statutory construction and an analysis of Hawaiian usage and judicial precedent during the Hawaiian monarchy and thereafter. Under HRS ง 1-1, [25] it would be the responsibility of the court to declare riparianism to be the law of this State unless it was able to discern Hawaiian judicial precedent ... or ... Hawaiian usage indicating that a different legal doctrine had been followed in Hawaii prior to January 1, 1893. [26] As will be demonstrated, however, Hawaiian history and case law establish that privately owned water is severable from the land to which it was originally appurtenant and is freely transportable to other lands both within and without the same watershed โ a doctrine fundamentally at odds with the riparian theory espoused by McBryde I.
Subsequent to the Great Mahele, all lands in Hawaii were divided into three main categories: Crown Lands (retained by the King for his own private estate), Konohiki Lands ( maheled into the private ownership of the chiefs and konohikis ), and Government Lands (established as the property of the King as sovereign of Hawaii). See 1 Kuykendall 288-89. All of these lands, however, were made subject to the rights of tenants ( hoaainas ) by virtue of An Act Relating to the Lands of His Majesty the King and of the Government, RLH 1925, Vol. II p. 2152 (originally enacted as L. 1848, at 22). Events made it clear, however, that the phrase rights of tenants was not self-explanatory, and that legislation was needed to define hoaaina rights with greater particularity. Accordingly, the Privy Council undertook to delineate the specific meaning that the Great Mahele had for the hoaainas living on the three principal categories of maheled land. See generally J. Chinen, The Great Mahele: Hawaii's Land Division of 1848, at 29-31 (1958). As a result of their deliberations, on December 21, 1849 the Privy Council adopted four resolutions which were enacted by the Legislature as the first four sections of the Enactment of Further Principles on August 6, 1850. These four sections, together with sections 5 and 6 passed by the Legislature on August 15, 1850, afforded hoaainas the private ownership of those parcels of land which they had traditionally dwelled upon and cultivated, and also established procedures by which hoaainas could receive allodial title to their kuleanas by way of grants from the Land Commission. It was not until nearly one year later, however, that the Legislature added section 7 to these provisions. The legislative history of this section shows that it was intended to be the sole and exclusive measure of the rights of the hoaainas as against the konohikis of the land within which the kuleanas were situated. See Oni v. Meek, 2 Haw. 87, 94-96 (1858) (Robertson, J.). [27] See also Carter v. Territory, 24 Haw. 47, 67 (1917). Subsequent to the adoption by the Privy Council of the first six sections of the Enactment of Further Principles, but prior to their passage by the Legislature, the King had expressed concern that a little bit of land, even with allodial title, if they [the hoaainas ] were cut off from all other privileges, would be of very little value. Privy Council Minutes (July 13, 1850). This concern matured into the enumeration of specific hoaaina rights contained in section 7, adopted by the Privy Council on August 27, 1850. The measure was the product of deliberations among the native members of the Privy Council presided over by the King, Privy Council Minutes (August 17, 1850) (emphasis added), an historical circumstance which severely undercuts the assumption in McBryde I that section 7 was the product of haole missionaries with backgrounds in English common law. Section 7 was finally enacted by the Legislature in June of 1851, and signed into law by the King on July 11, 1851. L. 1851, at pp. 98-99. It was passed and printed in both the Hawaiian and English languages. As indicated previously, the English version of the statute provided that [t]he people shall also have a right to drinking water, and running water, and the right of way, [and t]he ... running water, and roads shall be free to all, on all lands granted in fee simple. (Emphasis added). The word people in this section was properly interpreted by Mr. Justice Robertson in Oni v. Meek, supra at 96, to mean the hoaainas within the boundaries of the konohiki's land. McBryde I held that the right of these hoaainas to drinking water and running water in the English version of the statute meant the right to the natural flow of a stream in accordance with riparian doctrine โ a right which passed to successors in interest to their kuleana lands. However, the Hawaiian version of the statute does not bear out the court's interpretation. The original Hawaiian text is as follows: I ka alodio ana o kekahi Konohiki i kona aina, a mau aina paha, aole no e nele na kanaka o kona aina ponoi a mau aina paha i ke kii ana i wahie, a i laau hele, a i aho, a i kaula a i pili, a i lai nona iho, aole nae i mea kuai i mea e waiwai ai oia, e loaa no hoi ia lakou ka pono o ka wai inu, a me ka wai hookahe, a me ke ala hele. A o na punawai a me na wai e kahe ana, a me na ala hele e noa no ia i na kanaka a pau mai o a o, ma na aina Alodio. Aole nae pili keia i na punawai, a me na hawai i hanaia e pono ai lakou iho. (Emphasis added). I have independently investigated the meaning of the Hawaiian, with particular focus and the phrases wai hookahe and wai e kahe ana, which were translated in the English to mean running water. [28] While it is true that [w]henever there is found to exist any radical or irreconcilable difference between the English and Hawaiian version of any of the laws of the State, the English version shall be held binding, HRS ง 1-13 (emphasis added), [29] the difference between the two versions in this case is not radical or irreconcilable, and hence the Hawaiian can be used as an aid in the interpretation of the English. [30] This analysis is particularly appropriate with respect to section 7, in view of the fact noted above that the native members of the Privy Council, presided over by the King, initially drafted that provision and hence would logically be expected to have expressed themselves first in their native tongue. I have consulted three dictionaries of the Hawaiian language [31] and Mrs. Zelie D. Sherwood, an expert translator of Hawaiian, [32] and all four sources independently confirm that, properly translated, the phrase wai hookahe means water made to flow or to irrigate, and the phrase wai e kahe ana means water already flowing. [33] Mrs. Sherwood has provided her translation of the whole text of section 7, and it would be instructive to quote the translation in full. It reads: When a konohiki acquires Allodial Title to his land or lands, the native tenants on his own land or lands shall not be deprived of gathering fire wood, and wood for homes, twine, rope, pili and ti leaf for his own use, not, however for personal gain, they shall also have the right to drinking water, to bring about the flowage of water and a pathway. The wells and water already flowing and the pathways shall be free to all native tenants from one end of the Allodial lands to the other. This, however, does not include wells and aqueducts made for their own personal gain. (Emphasis added). In my opinion, the foregoing translation accurately reflects the original meaning of section 7, which was merely that kuleana plots were guaranteed the right to appurtenant water for domestic and irrigation purposes, and in that context, the English translation reserving to hoaainas the right to running water is inherently ambiguous. Running water can mean many things, including water used for irrigation and domestic purposes, and therefore the more precise Hawaiian terms wai hookahe and wai e kahe ana (both denoting such limited uses of water) should be read by this court to qualify and limit the English. Compare Metcalf v. Kahai, 1 Haw.  (1856). This is an instance in which the English and Hawaiian texts are not in radical or irreconcilable conflict within the meaning of HRS ง 1-13, but rather is an instance in which the meaning is obscure, or the contradiction slight, and hence in which the two languages may ... be used to help and explain each other. Hardy v. Ruggles, 1 Haw. , 259 (1856); see notes 29 & 30 supra. The foregoing analysis manifests the error of McBryde I. Section 7 of the Enactment of Further Principles guaranteed the right of hoaainas to water for irrigation and other domestic purposes. The obviously limited scope of this provision belies the court's interpretation of it as a wholesale codification of the common law doctrine of riparianism. Indeed, the right to use water for irrigation is wholly antithetical to riparianism as it existed in mid-nineteenth century England and Massachusetts. See Hutchins at 95; Teclaff 44-45. It follows that the reliance on this statute in McBryde I was misplaced. Analysis must therefore turn to whether Hawaiian judicial precedent or usage prior to January 1, 1893 established a system of water regulation different from the riparian doctrine that would otherwise be the law of this State by virtue of HRS ง 1-1. [34]

As indicated previously in this opinion, see pt. II.B. supra, central to Hawaiian culture prior to the advent of western influence was a sophisticated system of water regulation. Early Caucasian explorers, including Cook in 1778, Vancouver in 1798, and Campbell in 1809 commented with amazement and admiration on the complicated and technically advanced network of canals utilized by the Hawaiians in irrigating their crops. See Wadsworth 125. Modern historians of Hawaiian civilization confirm the existence of these irrigation systems. See, e.g., E.S. Handy & E.G. Handy, Native Planters in Old Hawaii 62-63 (1972); R. Kuykendall & A. Day, Hawaii: A History 9, 91 (1948); A. Perry, A Brief History of Hawaiian Water Rights 3-7 (1912); Wadsworth 125-36. It has been noted already that under the ancient system of land tenure, the konohiki of an ahupuaa or ili kupono was given control over the surplus water originating on the land, albeit subject to the king's ultimate power of disseizin. The konohiki had plenary authority to demand the production of labor for the construction and maintenance of auwais, and also to marshal the water resources of the ahupuaa or ili kupono according to his perception of the relative agricultural and domestic needs of the hoaainas living thereupon. Wadsworth 129-31. Traditionally, it was always within the power of the konohiki to divert water from lands on the ripa of a stream to other lands which were not appurtenant to the stream and which, indeed, had always theretofore been kula. See Territory v. Gay, 31 Haw. 376, 399-400 (1930); Hutchins 84-85. While it is true that these diversions from wet taro lands to kula lands for the most part occurred within the confines of a single watershed, this was probably only due to the absence of the technology required for the transportation of water across mountain ridges. [35] See Wong Leong v. Irwin, 10 Haw. 265, 271-272 (1896). As stated in Irwin, however, [t]here is no difference in principle between a transfer [of water] from one place to another in the same ahupuaa and a transfer from one ahupuaa to another [outside the watershed of the first ahupuaa]. Id. at 272. By hypothesis, both kinds of transfers assume water to be both the private property of the transferor and capable of permanent diversion from its original watercourse โ characteristics which are inherently inimicable to the theory of riparianism which was expounded in McBryde I. See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, supra 54 Haw. at 193-197, 504 P.2d at 1342-1344. [36]
With the advent of large-scale sugar cane cultivation in the last half of the nineteenth century, irrigation and water rights acquired a new dimension of importance in Hawaii. [37] The estimated requirement of a ton of water to produce one pound of refined sugar, 3 Kuykendall 62, made the securing of ample supplies of water essential for sugar producers. The first irrigation auwai built expressly for sugar cane was in 1856 on Kauai, and another was dug ten years later on Maui. See R. Kuykendall & A. Day, Hawaii: A History 119-20 (1948). While early producers made use of ancient auwais, the phenomenal growth in the number of acres of land under sugar cane cultivation during the period of 1874-98, [38] especially when much of that land was in relatively arid locales theretofore uncultivated, resulted in the construction of costly and elaborate new irrigation systems. The first such system of any size was the Hamakua ditch on the Island of Maui, built in 1878 for the purpose of irrigating sugar cane on the arid lands of central Maui with water from the northern side of the island. 3 Kuykendall 62-66; Wadsworth 144. A great many other aqueducts were built thereafter, at considerable cost and for the purpose of irrigating kula land both inside and outside the watersheds from which the water was drawn. See generally id. at 150-58. Indeed, by 1890-91, an irrigation system for the transportation of water from the Hanapepe Valley to Makaweli on the Island of Kauai was completed and in operation. See Territory v. Gay, 52 F.2d 356 (9th Cir.1931); 3 Kuykendall 66. It seems clear that the foregoing history of ancient and nineteenth century Hawaiian water practices, sanctioned by contemporaneous judicial precedent, see pt. III.D.1. infra, establishes an Hawaiian usage fundamentally at odds with the common law doctrine of riparianism. This being the case, HRS ง 1-1 does not compel the court to read that doctrine in toto into our legal system dealing with regulation of water rights.

The Peck decision was the product of Hawaii Supreme Court Chief Justice Allen sitting as a single justice in an equity proceeding in Superior Court. As indicated previously in this opinion, the case involved a controversy between landowners within a single ahupuaa with respect to one landowner's right to divert water which was appurtenant to a particular parcel of land from that land to another, kula parcel. Although the opinion discussed common law riparianism, the Chief Justice impliedly rejected that doctrine when he held as follows: The Court is of opinion, however, that the defendant had the right to use the water of his kalo [taro] land on other lands, if in the transfer or passage of water over his own land no injury was done to others. He is limited to the same quantity of water to which he was entitled on his kalo land by immemorial usage. Id. at 666. The indication in McBryde I that this passage was dictum, 54 Haw. at 181, 504 P.2d at 1336, was unjustified, since essential to the resolution of the controversy in Peck was a decision on the question of water transferability. Cf. State v. Tominaga, 45 Haw. 604, 612-613, 372 P.2d 356, 361 (1962). Peck was the only decision prior to January 1, 1893 which squarely dealt with the question of water transferability. Cf. Kahookiekie v. Keanini, 8 Haw. 310 (1891). Notwithstanding its status as a single justice opinion, Peck stands as judicial precedent within the meaning of HRS ง 1-1, establishing the proposition that privately owned water is freely transferable to kula land and therefore that riparianism is not the law of this State. All subsequent opinions have so interpreted the case, and in view of the Hawaiian usage contemporary with Peck and in ancient times, the court should give effect to its holding.
A brief review of the cases decided by this court on the subject of water transferability since Peck will highlight the incorrectness of McBryde I. Lonoaea v. Wailuku Sugar Co., 9 Haw. 651 (1895) involved the question of the transferability of water from a river to kula land within the same watershed. The court held: We find no objection either in law or reason to allowing the owner of land which is entitled to water from transferring the same amount of water to other land providing he thereby works no injury to others. Id. at 665. This holding was reiterated on similar facts in Horner v. Kumuliili, 10 Haw. 174 (1895). In Wong Leong v. Irwin, 10 Haw. 265 (1896), the defendant had diverted water from one watershed to kula land in another watershed. The court held specifically that the owner of land with the appurtenant or prescriptive right to water could transfer that water to any other land, whether in the same watershed or in another watershed, so long as the water rights of others were not thereby compromised. Id. at 270-272. The same reasoning was followed in Palolo Land & Improvement Co. v. Wong Quai, 15 Haw. 554 (1903), although that case involved the transfer of water to land in a single watershed. The next case in sequence of time was Carter v. Territory, 24 Haw. 47 (1917). Carter dealt with a controversy between konohikis of two ahupuaas over storm and freshet surplus water which on occasion ran in a stream passing through both ahupuaas. The court held that the konohikis must share these storm and freshet waters according to the principles of common law riparianism. Although the reasoning of the Carter court is highly unsatisfactory in this regard, the result is nonetheless defensible on the ground that in ancient times the Hawaiians rarely availed themselves of storm precipitation and that therefore no Hawaiian usage under HRS ง 1-1 existed to supplant common law riparianism as to this class of water. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, supra 54 Haw. at 205-206, 504 P.2d at 1348 (Marumoto, J., concurring and dissenting); see Hutchins 94. Regardless of the wisdom of Carter in terms of overall water policy, see id. at 94-98, its impact is probably not of great practical importance in Hawaii, where the characteristic drainage areas are short and steep, where the flood waters of many streams come down in great quantities and flow for brief periods, and where practicable means of storing large quantities of flood water are not available. Id. at 95. Moreover, the holding of Carter has acquired over the course of more than half a century a special force as a rule of property law which is long established and conformed to and which therefore should not be overturned by this court. In re Austin, 33 Haw. 832, 839 (1936); see note 20 supra. The decision in McBryde I to overrule this aspect of Carter does violence to this basic principle of stare decisis. The limited scope of the riparian doctrine announced in Carter was soon accentuated in Foster v. Waiahole Water Co., 25 Haw. 726, 733-735 (1921), which held that normal surplus water was never appurtenant to any particular parcel of an ahupuaa or ili kupono and that it was freely conveyable by the konohiki apart from its land of origin. Cf. In re Taxes Waiahole Water Co., 21 Haw. 679 (1913). Finally, Territory v. Gay, 31 Haw. 376 (1930) applied Wong Leong v. Irwin, supra , to normal surplus water and held that the konohiki of the ahupuaa or ili kupono on which such water arose could transport it wherever he wished, including to kula land in an entirely different watershed. In doing so, a divided court expressly rejected riparianism as applied to any other class of water than the storm and freshet surplus dealt with in Carter. See note 19 supra. As Mr. Chief Justice Perry indicated: While it is, perhaps, technically true that, as stated in the Carter case, private water rights in Hawaii are governed by the principles of the common law of England except so far as they have been modified by or are inconsistent with Hawaiian statutes, custom or judicial precedent, that statement is of very little, if any, consequence or significance in view of the widely prevailing Hawaiian customs and the judicial precedents long since established with reference to water rights in this Territory. Our system of water rights is based upon and is the outgrowth of ancient Hawaiian customs and the methods of Hawaiians in dealing with the subject of water. No modifications of that system have been engrafted upon it by the application of any principles of the common law of England. 31 Haw. at 394-395. In my opinion, the foregoing statement correctly articulates the relationship between Hawaiian water law and common law riparianism except in the limited circumstances of the Carter case, and therefore the court should adhere to it in lieu of the analysis of the subject contained in McBryde I.