Opinion ID: 795867
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Even if the Home Visits are Searches, they are Reasonable

Text: 16 [W]hether a particular search meets the reasonableness standard is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 652-53, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court found that the Project 100% home visits, even if considered searches, were reasonable under Wyman. Although we need not reach the question to decide Appellants' Fourth Amendment challenge, because the home visits do not constitute searches under Wyman, we agree with the district court that even if the home visits are searches under the Fourth Amendment, they are reasonable. 9
17 In Wyman, the Court concluded that the home visits, even if considered a search, were valid under the Fourth Amendment because [they] did not descend to the level of unreasonableness ... which is the Fourth Amendment's standard. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 318, 91 S.Ct. 381. The Court weighed several factors in balancing the governmental interest in conducting home visits against the intrusion into the welfare applicant's privacy. Id. at 318-24, 91 S.Ct. 381. Relevant to this analysis were: (1) the public's strong interest in the protection of dependent children and ensuring that aid provided from tax revenue reaches its intended and proper recipients; (2) the statute's focus on assistance and rehabilitation; (3) that the home visit was not a criminal investigation and did not involve police or uniformed authority; (4) the visits' procedural safeguards, including providing advanced written notice and prohibiting forced entry or snooping within the home; and (5) the serious administrative difficulties posed by a warrant requirement in the welfare context. Id. 10 18 Here, as in Wyman, the home visits serve the important governmental interests of verifying an applicant's eligibility for welfare benefits and preventing fraud. As the Court acknowledged in Wyman, the public has a strong interest in ensuring that aid provided from tax dollars reaches its proper and intended recipients. Id. at 318, 91 S.Ct. 381. While the visits in this case differ from those in Wyman in that they are conducted by peace officers, this distinction does not transform a Project 100% visit into a search in the traditional criminal law context. Id. at 317, 91 S.Ct. 381. 11 The investigators are not uniformed officers and will only enter the applicant's home with consent. Although the investigators will report any evidence of criminal activity for potential prosecution, this is not the underlying purpose of the visit, and no criminal prosecutions for welfare fraud have stemmed from inconsistencies uncovered during a Project 100% home visit since the program's inception in 1997. 12 19 The Project 100% home visits also have many of the same procedural safeguards that the Wyman Court found significant. See Wyman, 400 U.S. at 320-21, 91 S.Ct. 381. Applicants are given notice that they will be subject to a mandatory home visit and visits generally occur only during normal business hours. When the investigators arrive to conduct the visit, they must ask for consent to enter the home. If the applicant does not consent to the visit, or withdraws consent at anytime during the visit, the visit will not begin or will immediately be terminated, as the case may be. 13 20 Finally, the Court's concern that a warrant requirement would pose serious administrative difficulties in the welfare context is also present in this case. Id. at 323-24, 91 S.Ct. 381 (The warrant procedure, which the plaintiff appears to claim to be so precious to her, even if civil in nature, is not without its seriously objectionable features in the welfare context.). As the Court in Wyman explained, if a warrant could be obtained, it presumably could be applied for ex parte, its execution would require no notice, it would justify entry by force, and its hours for execution would not be so limited as those prescribed for home visitation. Id. This type of warrant requirement would make home visits more intrusive than the County's current suspicionless home visit program because welfare applicants' rights and privacy would be subject to greater infringement. 21 Therefore, because the Project 100% visits serve an important governmental interest, are not criminal investigations, occur with advance notice and the applicant's consent, and alleviate the serious administrative difficulties associated with welfare eligibility verification, we hold that the home visits are reasonable under the Supreme Court's decision in Wyman.
22 While Wyman provides adequate, independent grounds for holding that the Project 100% home visits are reasonable, the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has evolved significantly since Wyman, providing further support for this conclusion. Subsequent to Wyman, the Court articulated its special needs exception to the warrant requirement, holding that [a] search unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional . . . when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court's special needs analysis involves two steps: (1) determining whether the government has articulated a valid special need; and, (2) analyzing whether the proposed administrative search is justified in light of that articulated special need. United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 869-72 (9th Cir.2006). 23
24 In Griffin, the Supreme Court examined whether the State's operation of its probation system was a special need that justified the warrantless search of a probationer's home, based on reasonable grounds to suspect the presence of contraband. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 872, 107 S.Ct. 3164. The Court held that the operation of a probation system was a valid special need, explaining that the system worked towards genuine rehabilitation through intensive supervision and that a warrant requirement would interfere to an appreciable degree. Id. at 873-76, 107 S.Ct. 3164. 25 More recently, in Earls, the Court reaffirmed its special needs reasoning, holding that a public school's policy of requiring suspicionless drug testing for student athletes was justified in light of the school's special need to prevent and deter drug use among its students. Earls, 536 U.S. at 838, 122 S.Ct. 2559. The Court emphasized that the searches were not conducted for law enforcement purposes, and explained that the special need justified the intrusion on the student's privacy without individualized suspicion. Id. at 829, 122 S.Ct. 2559. 26 In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001), however, the Court held that a public hospital's policy of identifying and testing mothers whose children tested positive for drugs at birth was not justified under the special needs doctrine because the immediate objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes. Id. at 83, 121 S.Ct. 1281 (emphasis in the original). The Court explained that the central and indispensable feature of the policy from its inception was the use of law enforcement to coerce the patients into substance abuse treatment, and concluded that the purpose actually served by the [ ] searches is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control. Id. at 81, 121 S.Ct. 1281 (internal quotation marks omitted). 27 Ferguson turned on the fact that the searches at issue were conducted for general law enforcement purposes. See id. The Court emphasized that while the drug testing program partially served a non-criminal purpose, the program's efficacy was ultimately tied to the successful prosecution of mothers whose children tested positive for drugs. Id. at 82-84, 121 S.Ct. 1281. In Wyman, however, the Court specifically noted that home visits in the welfare context primarily serve the administrative function of eligibility verification, which is not a general law enforcement purpose. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 326, 91 S.Ct. 381. As discussed supra, the primary purpose of the Project 100% home visits is to verify eligibility for welfare benefits. While there may be a fine line between verifying eligibility and investigating fraud, the record here supports that the visits are indeed used primarily for verification and prevention purposes. Since the program's inception in 1997, not a single criminal prosecution for welfare fraud has resulted from inconsistencies uncovered during a Project 100% home visit. While investigators are required to report evidence of criminal violations for potential prosecution, this does not make the home visits criminal investigations. See Wyman, 400 U.S. at 317, 91 S.Ct. 381. Moreover, unlike in Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-84, 121 S.Ct. 1281, Project 100%'s efficacy is not dependent upon the prosecution of suspected welfare fraud cases. 28 Therefore, because the underlying purpose of the home visits is to verify eligibility for welfare benefits, and not for general law enforcement purposes, we conclude that San Diego County has articulated a valid special need. 29
30 Because we conclude that the administration of the County's welfare system presents a special need beyond those of normal law enforcement, we must now determine whether this need is important enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest [and] sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized suspicion. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997). [W]hether a particular search meets the reasonableness standard is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-53, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, we consider: (1) the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search intrudes; (2) the character of the intrusion; and (3) the importance of the government interest at stake. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 830-34, 122 S.Ct. 2559; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-61, 115 S.Ct. 2386. 31 Here, the nature of Appellants' privacy interest is significant because the government is conducting searches of their homes, a traditionally protected area of personal privacy. 14 As illustrated by Griffin, however, a person's relationship with the state can reduce that person's expectation of privacy even within the sanctity of the home. When eligibility depends, in part, upon a person's physical residence in the state and actual presence at the place designated as their residence, verification of eligibility may be reasonably required in the form of the home visit under review here in order to ensure that funds are properly spent. Moreover, the home visits are conducted with the applicant's express consent, thus, further reducing the applicant's expectation of privacy. 15 Therefore, it is reasonable for welfare applicants who desire direct cash governmental aid to undergo eligibility verification through home visits. 32 Next, we must weigh the character of the intrusion on Appellants' privacy. Appellants argue that the home visits are virtually unlimited in scope. As discussed above, however, the record demonstrates that the procedures used in conducting the home visits are designed to reduce the intrusion on the applicant's privacy. Investigators only examine areas of the home that they believe will provide relevant information pertaining to the applicant's welfare eligibility. If at any point before or during the visit, the applicant refuses to consent, or withdraws consent, the visit ends immediately. Additionally, inspections are completed in a reasonable amount of time and there is no evidence that any of the applicants has been subjected to abusive behavior during the home visits. 33 Finally, we must analyze the need for the intrusion in light of its efficacy in achieving the governmental interests at stake. Appellants argue that there is no statistically significant evidence that Project 100% has actually reduced welfare fraud. The County, however, produced data showing that, during the five-year period during which Project 100% was implemented, the overall denial rate increased from 40.6% to 47.7%, and there was an additional 4-5% increase in application withdrawals. While it is difficult to measure the precise efficacy of Project 100%, these empirical observations support the logical connection between the home visits and their intended purpose. Moreover, the visits are an effective method of verifying eligibility for benefits, and, at a minimum, the visits provide an important deterrent effect. 34 Appellants also contend that all necessary information for purposes of verification can be obtained from other sources and that the home visits merely duplicate the intake interviews. The Supreme Court has stressed, however, that the Fourth Amendment does not require that the government use the least intrusive means because the logic of such elaborate less-restrictive alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-seizure powers. Earls, 536 U.S. at 837, 122 S.Ct. 2559. More importantly, the Court has already rejected a similar argument in Wyman, explaining that [a]lthough . . . secondary sources might be helpful, they would not always assure verification of actual residence or of actual physical presence in the home, which are requisites for AFDC benefits . . . . Wyman, 400 U.S. at 322, 91 S.Ct. 381. 35 Accordingly, because the Project 100% home visits are conducted in a reasonable manner, and serve an important administrative purpose, the Supreme Court's special needs line of cases provides further support for our conclusion that the home visits are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 16 II California Claims 36 A. Article I § 13 of the California Constitution 37 Appellants argue that the Project 100% home visits violate their right to be free from unreasonable searches under Article I § 13 of the California Constitution. Appellants rely on People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal.3d 528, 119 Cal.Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099 (1975), superseded on other grounds by In re Lance W., 37 Cal.3d 873, 210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744 (1985), for the proposition that California courts interpret Article I § 13 as demanding broader protection than the Fourth Amendment. 17 38 The California Supreme Court has made clear, however, that [t]he touchstone for all issues under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 13 of the California Constitution is reasonableness. Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal.3d 1321, 241 Cal.Rptr. 42, 743 P.2d 1299, 1304 (1987). This language indicates that the right to be free from unreasonable searches under Art. I § 13 of the California Constitution parallels the Fourth Amendment inquiry into the reasonableness of a search. See e.g., Smith v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors, 104 Cal.App.4th 1104, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 700 (2002) (applying the Supreme Court's special needs rationale and Wyman to deny a similar challenge to a Los Angeles County welfare eligibility verification program arising under the state and federal constitutions); see also Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 Cal.4th 1, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633, 650 (1994) (The `privacy' protected [under state law] is no broader in the area of search and seizure than the `privacy' protected by the Fourth Amendment or by article I, section 13 of the California Constitution.). Accordingly, for the reasons discussed in Part I.B, supra, even assuming that Project 100% home visits qualify as searches, they are reasonable under the California Constitution. 39 Appellants nonetheless maintain that the California Supreme Court's decision in Parrish v. Civil Service Commission, 66 Cal.2d 260, 57 Cal.Rptr. 623, 425 P.2d 223 (1967), demonstrates that the California Constitution provides broader protection than its federal counterpart in the context of this case. Parrish, however, does not purport to expand the protections granted by the California Constitution beyond those granted by the United States Constitution, and instead, explicitly relies on federal law. See id. at 227 (citing Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 79 S.Ct. 804, 3 L.Ed.2d 877 (1959)). 18 Moreover, Parrish is easily distinguished from the instant case. 40 In Parrish, the Alameda County welfare department conducted a series of suspicionless, unannounced early-morning raids of the homes of the county's welfare recipients in order to detect the presence of unauthorized males. Id. at 225. The purpose of the raids on recipients not suspected of fraud was to persuade the public that the incidence of welfare fraud falls below popular estimates. Id. at 232. The raids were conducted at 6:30 a.m. on a Sunday by a pair of social workers. Id. at 225. The welfare recipient's social worker would knock on the recipient's door and request entry. Id. at 225-26. Refusal to consent could serve as a basis for terminating welfare benefits. Id. at 228. If consent was given, the caseworker would immediately proceed to the back door to admit his or her partner, with the pair proceeding to search the entire residence for evidence of welfare fraud. Id. at 226. 41 The court rejected the County's argument that the searches were administrative searches that could properly be conducted without probable cause and a warrant. Id. at 226-28. The court reasoned that the searches were very inconvenient to the occupant, were conducted without suspicion of fraud, and were far removed from orderly daytime administrative searches. Id. at 227-28. The court also reasoned that the raids could not be justified by consent because [t]he request for entry by persons whom the beneficiaries knew to possess virtually unlimited power over their very livelihood . . . nulli[fied] the legal effectiveness of the apparent consent. Id. at 229-30. 42 Even assuming that Parrish was decided under the California Constitution, and that the California Constitution provides broader protection than the Fourth Amendment, it is nonetheless clearly distinguishable and, thus, inapplicable under the facts of this case. Parrish involved mass raids, conducted without advance warning, on a Sunday morning at 6:30 a.m. Id. at 225-26. The purpose of the raids in Parrish was to demonstrate the efficiency of welfare fraud detection to the public. Id. at 225. On the other hand, the Project 100% home visits are orderly daytime administrative searches conducted to verify welfare eligibility and prevent fraud. The Project 100% investigators provide the welfare applicants advance notice that they will be subject to a home visit and only conduct visits during business hours. As the Parrish court itself noted, there is a great gulf which separates an `orderly' afternoon visit from the searches conducted shortly after dawn in the present case. Id. at 228. 43 We conclude therefore that Parrish provides no support for the hypothesis that Article I § 13 of the California Constitution provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment in the context of this case. We conclude that the Project 100% home visits are reasonable under Article I § 13 of the California Constitution. 44 B. Article I § 1 of the California Constitution 45 Appellants also argue that the Project 100% home visits violate their right to privacy under Article I § 1 of the California Constitution. As the California Supreme Court has recognized, however, in In re York, 9 Cal.4th 1133, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 308, 892 P.2d 804 (1995), in the search and seizure context, the article I, section 1, privacy clause of the California Constitution has never been held to establish a broader protection than that provided by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or article I, section 13 of the California Constitution. Id. at 813 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hill, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d at 650 n. 9. Therefore, Appellants' contention that Project 100% violates Article I § 1 of the California Constitution also fails because, as we have held, Project 100% searches are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article 1 § 13 of the California Constitution.