Opinion ID: 667662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Invocation of the Fifth Amendment Privilege

Text: 7 The INS argues that the Fifth Amendment privilege is personal and cannot be invoked by counsel. In this case, we need not rule on that general proposition. We assume arguendo that it is true as a general proposition. We decide only that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the invocation of the privilege was effective. The privilege in this case was clearly invoked, albeit by counsel rather than Bigby himself. The INS did not object to the privilege having been invoked by counsel. The immigration judge recognized that the privilege had been invoked and noted the objection, but overruled it and required Bigby to testify. We conclude that the only reasonable reading of this record is that all parties, counsel, and the court treated the privilege as having been invoked. Had an objection been made to invocation of the privilege by counsel, it is clear that Bigby would have personally raised the privilege. On these facts, we hold that the Fifth Amendment privilege was effectively invoked. 8 The argument of the INS is based on the proposition that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is personal to the witness. See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328, 93 S.Ct. 611, 616, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973). Although this is a well-recognized general rule, the principle is derived from cases fundamentally unlike the present situation. For example, Couch held that no privilege existed against the production of documents held by the accountant of a taxpayer claiming the privilege. The Fifth Amendment prohibits compelling a witness to testify against himself, but does not bar the eliciting of incriminating statements from another. See Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458, 33 S.Ct. 572, 572, 57 L.Ed. 919 (1913). Because the government in Couch was not seeking information directly from the taxpayer, she could not invoke her Fifth Amendment right to prevent the production of documents in the possession of another. Couch, 409 U.S. at 328, 93 S.Ct. at 616. Thus the observation in Couch that the privilege is personal is not applicable to the instant situation. 3 9 Likewise, our decision in United States v. White, 846 F.2d 678 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 984, 109 S.Ct. 538, 102 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988), relied on by the INS, addressed a fundamentally different situation. In White, several criminal defendants had earlier given civil depositions regarding events related to the criminal cases. The depositions were taken under a standard stipulation that most objections need not be made until the time of trial. The defendants challenged the admissibility of statements made in the depositions, claiming that they had not invoked their right against self-incrimination because it was understood that objections need not be raised during the deposition. We held that the defendants could not seek shelter under the Fifth Amendment, citing three significant facts: (1) a witness who testifies rather than invoking the Fifth Amendment generally waives the privilege; (2) the stipulation in the civil depositions was designed to allow evidentiary objections at the time of trial, which are not equivalent to assertions of privilege; (3) the defendants and their attorneys did assert their Fifth Amendment privileges at other times during the depositions, suggesting that they understood that the stipulation did not protect their Fifth Amendment rights. White, 846 F.2d at 690. The INS argues that this case is like White because Petitioner relied on evidentiary objections to protect his assertion of privilege. We disagree. Bigby's counsel clearly was not just making evidentiary objections; he was invoking, on his client's behalf, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The simple failure of Bigby himself to utter the words does not render his attorney's action a mere evidentiary objection. Neither did Bigby ever answer a contested question without first raising (through his attorney) his Fifth Amendment privilege, unlike the defendants in White. The INS can claim no support from that case. 10 The BIA noted that the District Court for the Southern District of Florida--the court with jurisdiction over the place of venue of Bigby's case--has held that the Fifth Amendment privilege must be invoked by the witness himself, rather than his attorney, when the interrogating party stands on the requirement that the witness must personally invoke the privilege. State ex rel. Butterworth v. Southland Corp., 684 F.Supp. 292, 294-95 (S.D.Fla.1988). We pass no judgment as to the correctness of Southland, because its holding applies to a situation significantly different than that in the instant case: when the questioning party insists that the witness personally invoke the privilege. At the time Bigby's attorney invoked the privilege, the INS's counsel did not object to the manner in which it was raised, nor did he insist that Bigby raise the privilege himself. The record is clear that both parties--and, significantly, the immigration judge--assumed that the privilege had been properly invoked. 4 Allowing an after-the-fact objection, at a time when a personal invocation is no longer possible, would raise serious fairness concerns. 11 Of the cases relied upon by the INS, only United States v. Schmidt, 816 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir.1987), provides arguable support to its position. Schmidt noted in dicta that [o]nly the appellants, not their counsel, are the proper parties to interpose a claim of privilege personal to themselves to prevent compelled disclosure. Id. at 1481 n. 3. As noted above, we need not decide whether this is an accurate statement of the general rule. We merely hold that on the particular facts of this case--i.e., when an attorney invokes the Fifth Amendment on his client's behalf, the questioning party does not contemporaneously challenge the manner in which the privilege was raised, and all present including the presiding judge assume the privilege has been invoked--the invocation of the privilege is effective. 5 12 Thus, the cases relied upon by the INS provide no support for its attempt to retroactively challenge the effectiveness of an invocation of the privilege that was accepted at the time by all parties, counsel, and the court as having been effective. We hold that the privilege was effectively invoked. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the BIA and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 6 13 B. Telephone Hearing Before the Immigration Judge 14 Bigby maintains that holding the hearing over the telephone violated the applicable statute. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that [d]etermination of deportability in any case shall be made only on a record made in a proceeding before a special inquiry officer. 7 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1252(b). Petitioner claims that before means in front of and in the presence of, mandating that the judge be physically present at the hearing. In support, Bigby cites Purba v. INS, 884 F.2d 516 (9th Cir.1989), in which the Ninth Circuit adopted this construction of Section 1252(b). The Purba court found that the relevant dictionary definition of before supported the construction urged here by Bigby and disallowed telephonic deportation hearings. Id. at 517. We respectfully disagree with the Ninth Circuit's holding that before, as used in Section 1252(b), has only one clear meaning. Another definition of before in the dictionary employed by the Purba court states that the word may mean to be judged or acted on by, or under the official or formal consideration of, as in the case went [before] the court. Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 197 (1976). This definition, which unquestionably fits the context of the statute, has no implication of actual physical presence. The word before is used in a jurisdictional sense in other contexts; for example, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 46(c) provides for rehearings before en banc courts of appeals. Although most en banc cases are decided after oral argument, there is no absolute requirement of argument upon rehearing. See 11th Cir. Internal Operating Procedure No. 5 for Fed.R.App.P. 35 (providing that a ballot for en banc rehearing will indicate whether the voting judge desires oral argument). We therefore find no clear congressional intent regarding the meaning of before in the statute. 15 In the absence of unambiguous congressional intent, we defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Bigby claims there is no agency interpretation in the present case because no regulations regarding telephonic hearings have been adopted by the INS. However, the telephone hearing was considered to be an appropriate procedure during administrative proceedings in the instant case; this itself is an agency interpretation entitled to deference. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 156-57, 111 S.Ct. 1171, 1179, 113 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991). The INS does not argue for a broad rule that telephonic hearings are always proper. Rather, the Service contends--and we so hold--that when credibility determinations are not in issue, 8 an immigration judge may hold a hearing by telephonic means.