Opinion ID: 3030141
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the seizure was reasonable

Text: [6] Having established that, in this case, the legality of the seizure does not depend on the rangers’ authority under tribal law, we turn to the question whether, under Fourth Amendment standards, the stop was reasonable. “The Fourth Amendment requires only reasonable suspicion in the context of investigative traffic stops.” Haynie v. County of Los Angeles, 339 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Because Becerra-Garcia did not challenge the district court’s finding that the rangers had reasonable articulable suspicion to investigate for criminal trespass until his reply brief, we leave that finding undisturbed. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003). Notably, the scope of the rangers’ intrusion was minimal: they merely turned their jeep around, followed the van, and turned on their emergency lights. Thus, the stop was reasonable. Becerra-Garcia urges us to hold otherwise, suggesting that we adopt what, at bottom, is a bright-line rule for determining reasonableness: that a stop is automatically unreasonable if the officers lacked authority to conduct the seizure. The difficulty with this argument is that it seeks, in effect, to undo the general principle that federal law, not state or tribal law, governs the inquiry. [7] The reasonableness of a seizure is generally analyzed on a case-by-case basis, not according to bright-line rules. 1454 UNITED STATES v. BECERRA-GARCIA See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17, 20-21 (1968) (rejecting a “rigid all-or-nothing model of justification and regulation under the [Fourth] Amendment” in favor of a flexible model that considers the scope of the intrusion and its justification); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) (“There is no formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances”). Following the longstanding principle that reasonableness cannot be reduced to per se rules, we have never held that a stop that exceeds an officer’s tribal authority is automatically unreasonable. We decline to embrace Becerra-Garcia’s sweeping rule because it runs counter to the flexible notion of reasonableness. The claim that the rangers lack specific tribal authority to stop vehicles does not transform this otherwise reasonable stop into an unreasonable one. Our holding is consistent with our general recognition that Indian tribes are sovereigns with the power to enforce internal laws. See, e.g., United States v. Enas, 255 F.3d 662, 666 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). Intrinsic in tribal sovereignty is the power to exclude trespassers from the reservation, a power that necessarily entails investigating potential trespassers. See Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. Schmuck, 121 Wash.2d 373, 381 (Wash. 1993) (relying on Ortiz-Barraza to hold that tribal authorities have the power to stop vehicles to investigate violations of tribal law). Holding that the minimally intrusive investigatory stop was reasonable evinces our respect for both the Fourth Amendment and tribal sovereignty. AFFIRMED.