Opinion ID: 1980708
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Excusal of Juror Manjunath for Cause

Text: On appeal, defendant initially alleges that the trial court abused its discretion and denied him a fair sentencing hearing when it excused juror Manjunath for cause. During voir dire, the following exchange occurred between the juror and the trial judge: Q. Do you have any feelings, strong feelings or not as to the issuance of a death penalty? A. At this time, I have no strong. Except in the Dahmer case.       Q. And if you did reach a conclusion in your own mind along with the other jurors, you could sign your name to a verdict one way or the other saying, no, he shouldn't receive the death penalty or, yes, he should? A. Yes. The prosecutor then questioned the juror, concluding with this exchange: Q. You will [impose a capital sentence] if the facts and the law require it. Is that right? A. That's right. Manjunath was accepted, sworn, and sent home for the weekend. When he returned the following Tuesday, he notified the court that he may have a problem serving as a juror. He was bothered that the case involved a possible death penalty and believed that the length of the trial would interfere with his work. The State then had an opportunity to question him regarding his views on capital punishment: Q. Mr. Manjunath,    you are still of mind that you could vote to impose a sentence of death; is that correct? A. See, that was what bothered me, I am worried about the after effects of that. So I am really concerned about that. Q. You understand that when you were selected and sworn on Friday, you [said] that you could follow the law and impose a sentence of death. Are you still saying that you could do that? A. At this point I am not sure because it's been bothering me for the weekend. I am worried about the after effects of it. Q. You mean the fact that the defendant will be put to death if you sign a death verdict? A. Right. Q. You understand that is what you said on Friday you would do in the appropriate case? A. At that time, yes. Q. Will you do that? A. I think I am not in that position because it bothered me over the weekend, and I am really worried about my health. So I'd like to be excused. Q. What do you mean by that, sir? A. If I do sign my name on a death penalty, then I think I will have something of a religious thing bothering me later. Q. Are you saying right now that regardless of the circumstances, contrary to what you said on Friday, that regardless of what the facts are you won't sign your name to a death verdict? Is that what you're saying? A. Right. After then discussing Manjunath's workrelated barriers to jury service, the State moved that he be excused for cause. Defense counsel questioned Manjunath, who stated that he knew he would be excused if he refused to sign a death verdict and that he did not know that when he was examined on the preceding Friday. He also admitted that he had notified his employer about his upcoming jury service but the employer had not indicated any problems. The court granted the State's motion and excused Manjunath for cause, over a defense objection claiming that Manjunath's explanations were a pretext to avoid jury service. Defendant argues (1) that it was improper to reopen voir dire after the juror had been sworn and (2) that the trial court abused its discretion when it excused Manjunath for cause. As to defendant's first contention, the trial court did not act improperly in reopening voir dire to reexamine Manjunath after he had been selected and sworn as a juror. After Manjunath notified the court that he may have a problem, it was necessary for the court to question him further to determine if he was qualified to serve as a juror. See People v. Childress (1994), 158 Ill.2d 275, 293, 198 Ill.Dec. 794, 633 N.E.2d 635 (after a sworn juror informed the court that he would have difficulty in considering a death sentence,    [i]t was entirely proper for the judge to then question the juror further). With regard to defendant's second claim, a prospective juror in a capital case can be excused for cause when the juror's views on the death penalty would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-52, quoting Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589.) A trial court can excuse a juror for cause if it is the court's impression that he could not be impartial in making a decision regarding the death penalty. ( Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852, 83 L.Ed.2d at 851-52.) Furthermore, a trial court's decision to exclude a juror is entitled to deference since it is in the best position to weigh a prospective juror's responses to voir dire. ( Childress, 158 Ill.2d at 293-94, 198 Ill.Dec. 794, 633 N.E.2d 635.) After considering a juror's remarks as a whole, a trial court may exclude a juror even though that juror fails to communicate a view on the death penalty with absolute precision. Childress, 158 Ill.2d at 293-94, 198 Ill.Dec. 794, 633 N.E.2d 635. Considering Manjunath's responses as a whole, we believe the trial court properly exercised its discretion in excusing Manjunath. (See Childress, 158 Ill.2d at 289-94, 198 Ill.Dec. 794, 633 N.E.2d 635 (trial court properly excused juror who stated that he would have great difficulty voting to impose a death sentence).) Manjunath's responses showed that he could not be impartial regarding the death penalty and that in fact he would not sign a death verdict no matter the circumstances. Defendant argues that Childress is distinguishable on the basis of factual variations regarding the form of the juror's initial response and the level of precaution imposed by the trial court against pretextual statements. The Childress juror's initial response was silence when his panel was asked whether they had scruples against the death penalty ( Childress, 158 Ill.2d at 290, 198 Ill.Dec. 794, 633 N.E.2d 635), whereas Manjunath made an initial affirmative response that he could be impartial. Childress is not distinguishable on that basis. The nature or certainty of Manjunath's initial response is not determinative where the trial court has otherwise concluded that he could not serve impartially. Defendant further argues that Childress is distinguishable in that the trial court in the instant case took no precautions to ensure that Manjunath's views were not merely a pretext to avoid jury service. In Childress, the juror sat for the guilt-innocence phase and then, after further voir dire, was excused. ( Childress, 158 Ill.2d at 293, 198 Ill. Dec. 794, 633 N.E.2d 635.) However, such precautions against pretextual statements are unnecessary when the trial court has already determined that a juror is unable to be impartial regarding the death penalty. See Childress, 158 Ill.2d at 293, 198 Ill.Dec. 794, 633 N.E.2d 635 (prior to the guilt-innocence phase, the judge had not yet concluded that the juror could not be impartial regarding the death penalty).