Opinion ID: 2718900
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: CERCLA and Section 9658

Text: “Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 ‘to promote the timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to ensure that the costs of such cleanup efforts were borne by those responsible for the contamination.”’ CTS, 134 S. Ct. at 2180 (quoting Burlington N. & S.F.R. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 602 (2009)). “The Act provided a federal cause of action to recover costs of cleanup from culpable entities but not a federal cause of action for personal injury or property damage.” Id. “Instead, CERCLA directed preparation of an expert report to determine ‘the adequacy of existing common law and statutory remedies in providing legal redress for harm to man and the environment caused by the release of hazardous substances into the environment,’ including ‘barriers to 4 Because of this conclusion, we declined to “consider whether we should apply the rule of ‘construing ambiguous statutes of limitations in Government action in the Government’s favor.’” NCUA, 727 F.3d at 1267 n.21 (quoting O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 92 (1996)). We observed, however, that we saw “no reason why this rule would not apply to Securities Act claims by the NCUA.” Id. 5 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. -7- recovery posed by existing statutes of limitations.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9651(e)(1), (3)(F)). Issued in 1982, the “Study Group Report” “noted the long latency periods involved in harm caused by toxic substances and ‘recommend[ed] that all states that have not already done so, clearly adopt the rule that an action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury or disease and its cause.’” Id. at 2181 (quoting Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Superfund Section 301(e) Study Group, Injuries and Damages from Hazardous Wastes—Analysis and Improvement of Legal Remedies, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 256 (Comm. Print 1982) (hereinafter Study Group Report or Report)). “The Report further stated: ‘The Recommendation is intended also to cover the repeal of the statutes of repose which, in a number of states[,] have the same effect as some statutes of limitation in barring [a] plaintiff’s claim before he knows that he has one.’” Id. (quoting and altering Study Group Report pt. 1, at 256). Although the Study Group Report called upon states to change their laws, in 1986 Congress amended CERCLA “to add the provision now codified in § 9658,” id., which provides in pertinent part as follows: (a) State statutes of limitations for hazardous substance cases
In the case of any action brought under State law for personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment from a facility, if the applicable limitations period for such action (as specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a commencement date which is earlier than the federally required -8- commencement date, such period shall commence at the federally required commencement date in lieu of the date specified in such State statute.
Except as provided in paragraph (1), the statute of limitations established under State law shall apply in all actions brought under State law for personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment from a facility. ..... (b) Definitions ..... (2) Applicable limitations period The term “applicable limitations period” means the period specified in a statute of limitations during which a civil action referred to in subsection

The term “commencement date” means the date specified in a statute of limitations as the beginning of the applicable limitations period.
(A) In general Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term “federally required commencement date” means the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that the personal injury or property damages referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned. (B) Special rules In the case of a minor or incompetent plaintiff, the term “federally required commencement date” means the later of the date referred to in subparagraph (A) or the following: -9- (i) In the case of a minor, the date on which the minor reaches the age of majority, as determined by State law, or has a legal representative appointed. (ii) In the case of an incompetent individual, the date on which such individual becomes competent or has had a legal representative appointed. 42 U.S.C. § 9658. Section 9658 generally provides that “the statute of limitations established under State law shall apply in all actions brought under State law” for personal injury or property damage stemming from industrial pollution, id. § 9658(a)(2), except when “the applicable limitations period” under state law “provides a commencement date which is earlier than the federally required commencement date,” id. § 9658(a)(1). In such cases, instead of the state law commencement date, the “period shall commence at the federally required commencement date”—that is, “the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known)” that his personal injury or property damage stemmed from a “hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant.” Id. § 9658(a)(1) & (b)(4)(A). Despite the Study Group Report’s distinction between “statutes of limitations” and “statutes of repose,” however, § 9658 did not employ the term “statute of repose.” D. The Supreme Court’s Decision in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger In CTS, property owners in North Carolina brought a state-law nuisance action based on well contamination against CTS Corporation, which ran an electronics plant on their land from 1959 to 1985. CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2181. Although CTS sold the property in 1987, the plaintiffs did not discover their well water was contaminated until - 10 - 2009. Id. They filed suit in 2011. Id. CTS moved to dismiss the claim under North Carolina’s statute of repose, which bars any tort suit brought more than 10 years after the last culpable act of the defendant. N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1-52(16); CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2181. The district court granted CTS’s motion to dismiss. CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2181. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that CERCLA’s federal commencement date preempted North Carolina’s statute of repose. See id. at 2181-82. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Because “[i]t is undoubted that the discovery rule in § 9658 pre-empts state statutes of limitations that are in conflict with its terms,” the Court limited its focus to “whether § 9658 also pre-empts state statutes of repose,” id. at 2180—that is, whether § 9658’s federal commencement date modifies the starting date under state law for both statutes of limitation and statutes of repose when it refers to “the ‘applicable limitations period,’” id. at 2185 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9658). The Court concluded (for the reasons discussed below) that the “applicable [state] limitations period” displaced by CERCLA’s federal commencement date does not include state statutes of repose, and thus the plaintiffs’ claims were barred under North Carolina’s 10-year statute of repose.