Opinion ID: 625172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Brown's Equal Protection Claim

Text: In addition to suggesting that the alleged unequal treatment constitutes an exception to our holding in Joseph, Brown specifically argues that the Appellees did not afford him equal protection of the law when they refused to extend him the benefits and privileges white officers receive in internal disciplinary proceedings and in prosecutions and dispositions of criminal charges. Brown contends that he should not have been investigated in the first place and, in any event, the SPD should have become involved in his investigation and worked with the State Police and District Attorney to achieve a more favorable outcome for him. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is `essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.' Diesel, 232 F.3d at 103 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985)). We have recognized a selective enforcement claim where a plaintiff proves that (1) the [plaintiff], compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person. Id. at 103 (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). Despite this broad language, we have recognized that the injury of which Brown complains is not actionable. We held in Diesel that civil damages are not available by reason of a police officer's refusal to turn a preferentially blind eye toward another's serious infraction. Id. at 104. At the same time, we posited that a vigorous investigation motivated by plaintiff's protected speech, race, or sex that went beyond how the authorities treat members of the general public could form the basis of an action. See id. at 104. Claims that police officers, with discriminatory motive, investigated a fellow officer for alleged administrative violations could also survive. Id. Our decision in Leather v. Ten Eyck, 2 Fed.Appx. 145, 150 (2d Cir.2001) (summary order), while not precedential, provides a good example of the type of conduct from which an equal protection claim may still arise. It also illustrates why Brown's claim is without merit. The plaintiff in Leather had voiced unpopular opinions within the sheriff's office. After this happened, three officers kept him under surveillance while he dined with his wife; they watched him drink one or more alcoholic beverages and then pulled him over and arrested him for driving while intoxicated. Id. at 146. The plaintiff brought a retaliation lawsuit against the officers who had surveilled and arrested him. The jury found that the defendants watched and arrested the plaintiff in a calculated move to punish him for having spoken out on an important topic. We affirmed the verdict and judgment. Id. at 150. In contrast, the plaintiff in Diesel was found passed out and bloodied in a police vehicle on the side of the road and was believed to be intoxicated. Diesel, 232 F.3d at 97-99. He had previously been involved in an internal affairs investigation, and he alleged that his fellow officers failed to ignore or conceal his drunken driving as retaliation for his protected activity. Id. at 96. We disagreed that he was entitled to a blue wall of silence, behind which he expected his fellow officers to cover up his misconduct as he allege[d] is done for other officers. Id. at 104. The important distinction between Diesel and Leather is that the plaintiff in Leather was discriminatorily sought out and investigated (rather than being caught by non-discriminatory means and then denied the benefit of `professional courtesy.') Leather, 2 Fed.Appx. at 150. Here, it is uncontroverted that there was no discrimination at play in the initiation of the investigation involving Brown. He was identified and ultimately caught by non-discriminatory means, namely, the girl's mother's complaint to the State Police and the girl's own statement that Brown had in fact rented her the hotel room. The allegations against Brown were brought to the investigating and commanding officers' attention not through some selective process or vendetta of racist officers. We cannot find constitutional injury where the officers acted reasonably in suspending him with pay pending the criminal investigation. See Diesel, 232 F.3d at 104. Nor is there constitutional harm when the SPD merely refused to intervene on Brown's behalf in the State Police criminal investigation. Moreover, to recognize a constitutional violation here based on a failure to extend a professional courtesy would create bizarre incentives encouraging officers to meddle with criminal investigations of a fellow officer's misconduct in order to avoid being subject to liability. This would stand the Equal Protection Clause on its head. Id. Accordingly, even if Brown's allegations were true, they do not constitute a cognizable equal protection claim.