Opinion ID: 1293219
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Hernandez's Testimony

Text: In March 1984, Hernandez was arrested by Mexican police in Loreto, Mexico. Detective Johnson of the Anaheim Police Department was informed of the arrest shortly thereafter, and he and other United States police officers traveled to Mexico to return Hernandez to the United States. On arrival in Mexico, the United States officers informed the local police of the murders of Kreuger and Jones, showed them the affidavit for the arrest warrant, and provided them with some photographs. The Mexican officers informed the United States officers that they intended to question Hernandez, [3] and asked to borrow a tape recorder, which the Americans provided. The United States authorities were then advised that they would be contacted when the questioning was concluded. Mexican officials proceeded to question Hernandez. When they were unsuccessful in their initial inquiries, Hernandez claims they resorted to physical violence, subjecting him to a 15-20 minute beating. [4] Hernandez still did not talk. The Mexican police ceased the interrogation, but informed Hernandez that he could expect even worse treatment that evening. As promised, the officers returned later that evening. Hernandez had earlier noticed that one of them had carried an automatic weapon. The officers informed Hernandez that they were going to take him out to the beach. At this point, fearing for his life, Hernandez gave a full confession. His statement was typed and signed after he was told it would not be given to United States officials, but instead would simply be placed in the Mexican police files. Mexican police thereafter released Hernandez to United States authorities, and gave them a copy of Hernandez's statement. The United States officers escorted Hernandez across the border, where he was officially arrested, then taken to court in Anaheim for arraignment. Before he was arraigned, Hernandez was interviewed at the police station by Detective Johnson and Deputy District Attorney Rackacaus. Rackacaus did not give Hernandez the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974]; rather, he informed Hernandez that their discussion was to be off the record and that it could not be used against him at trial. Before informing him of the charges he faced and the possible penalties therefor, Rackacaus told Hernandez that he was in serious trouble. Rackacaus stated he wanted to know Hernandez's story to see if he could be used as a witness against defendant. Hernandez agreed to tell his story. Rackacaus then asked Hernandez if he wanted the interview taped, and Hernandez stated he did not. During the interview, Rackacaus never mentioned the alleged Mexican confession, nor did he inform Hernandez that United States authorities had any knowledge of it. Although Hernandez suspected that the American police may have been given the Mexican statement, he did not know if his suspicions were borne out. Rackacaus made no offer of leniency before the interview, but indicated afterward that if Hernandez cooperated, the charges against him might be reduced. During the interview, counsel for Hernandez arrived at the police station. Rackacaus told Hernandez of this fact, and Hernandez indicated he would finish giving his statement before speaking with counsel. Hernandez's statement conformed closely to the one he had given to the Mexican officials. He subsequently testified that his statements to Rackacaus were made freely and voluntarily. A few weeks after the interview, following negotiations between the prosecution and Hernandez's counsel, Hernandez was granted immunity in exchange for his testimony against defendant. [5] Defendant sought extraordinary writ relief in the Court of Appeal in an effort to vacate the order granting immunity. The court summarily denied relief and we rejected defendant's petition for review. The trial court next held a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402 on the voluntariness of Hernandez's statment to Rackacaus, and concluded beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that the statements by Hernandez were indeed voluntary here in the U.S. The court subsequently stated for the record that it had excluded the Mexican confession as involuntary.
Defendant asserts Hernandez's trial testimony was inadmissible as a matter of law because it was obtained by improper and coercive police and prosecution conduct, and that the trial court therefore erred in permitting its admission into evidence. He argues that (i) the coercive tactics employed by the Mexican police in extracting Hernandez's initial confession are attributable to United States authorities, (ii) the taint from the initial coerced confession was never purged (and was in fact aggravated by subsequent police and prosecutorial misconduct), and (iii) the testimony under grant of immunity was itself a form of coercion sufficient on these facts to mandate exclusion of the trial statements. As we explain below, we reject each contention.
As a preliminary matter, we address what law governs this issue. The murders of Kreuger and Jones occurred in August 1982. Before the offenses were committed, however, the voters of this state adopted the initiative measure designated on the ballot as Proposition 8. Section 3 of the initiative added section 28, subdivision (d), to article I of our state Constitution. That section, labeled the Right to Truth-in-Evidence provision, declares that relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding. In People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251, 258 [193 Cal. Rptr. 692, 667 P.2d 149], we held that Proposition 8 applied to offenses committed on or after its effective date of June 9, 1982. (4) Recently, in People v. Markham (1989) 49 Cal.3d 63, 65, 71 [260 Cal. Rptr. 273, 775 P.2d 1042], we determined that the Truth-in-Evidence provision of Proposition 8 abrogated the rule adopted in People v. Jiminez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 605 [147 Cal. Rptr. 172, 580 P.2d 672], imposing a stricter standard of proof on the voluntariness of confessions than that used by the federal courts. Thus, we determined that the voluntariness of confessions or admissions must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. ( Markham, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 71.) With this standard in mind, we review defendant's substantive arguments.
(5) Defendant correctly observes that the federal and California courts have consistently recognized that the admission at trial of improperly obtained statements which results in a fundamentally unfair trial violates a defendant's Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial. ( Wilcox v. Ford (11th Cir.1987) 813 F.2d 1140, 1148; see also United States v. Chiavola (7th Cir.1984) 744 F.2d 1271, 1273-1274; United States ex rel. Cunningham v. DeRobertis (7th Cir.1983) 719 F.2d 892, 895-896; United States v. Fredericks (5th Cir.1978) 586 F.2d 470, 480; LaFrance v. Bohlinger (1st Cir.1974) 499 F.2d 29, 34-35; People v. Leach (1985) 41 Cal.3d 92, 102-104 [221 Cal. Rptr. 826, 710 P.2d 893]; People v. Varnum (1967) 66 Cal.2d 808 [59 Cal.Rptr 108, 427 P.2d 772].) (6) But unlike those situations in which a defendant challenges his own prior involuntary statements (see Lego v. Twomey (1972) 404 U.S. 477, 489 [30 L.Ed.2d 618, 627, 92 S.Ct. 619] [the government must prove voluntariness of defendant's confession by preponderance of evidence]; Markham, supra, 49 Cal.3d 63, 71 [same]), when a defendant seeks to exclude the allegedly involuntary testimony of a witness or codefendant, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the admitted statements were involuntarily obtained ( Leach, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 102-104). As we observed in Leach, the heightened protections courts have traditionally afforded defendants in the self-incrimination context are designed to assure that an accused's coerced confessions will not be used against him, and to protect against evidence of guilt emanating from his own involuntary statements. (41 Cal.3d at p. 103.) [T]here is no such need for prophylactic rules directed at assuaging our fear of convicting the innocent  or even the guilty  by means of evidence obtained in violation of due process, when the victim of the violation is not the defendant. In such a case, we see no reason for departing from the ordinary rule that a party `claiming that a person is guilty of ... wrongdoing has the burden of proof on that issue.' (Evid. Code, § 520). ( Id. at p. 104.) (7a) Defendant fails to meet his burden here. Although he emphasizes the assertedly coerced Mexican confession and the subsequent informal interview between Hernandez and Rackacaus, this emphasis misperceives the limited nature of the exclusion recognized for coerced third party testimony. ( Leach, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 104.) Because the exclusion is based on the idea that coerced testimony is inherently unreliable, and that its admission therefore violates a defendant's right to a fair trial, this exclusion necessarily focuses only on whether the evidence actually admitted was coerced. Here, none of the statements made by Hernandez to the Mexican police was introduced at defendant's trial. Accordingly, defendant can prevail on his suppression claim only if he can show that the trial testimony given by Hernandez was involuntary at the time it was given. ( Ibid. )
We reiterate that even though the issue before us involves an alleged forced confession, it does not involve a violation of defendant's right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. Neither the People's discovery of Hernandez as a potential witness, nor Hernandez's trial testimony was gained from incriminatory statements made by defendant. (Cf. United States v. Ceccolini (1978) 435 U.S. 268 [55 L.Ed.2d 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054] [violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights may justify exclusion of live witness testimony discovered as a result]; accord People v. Superior Court ( Sosa ) (1982) 31 Cal.3d 883, 892-894 [185 Cal. Rptr. 113, 649 P.2d 696].) (8) Moreover, defendant lacks standing to object to any perceived violation of Hernandez's privilege against self-incrimination. That right is personal, and may not be vicariously asserted by another. (See, e.g., Wilcox v. Ford, supra, 813 F.2d at p. 1148, fn. 13; United States v. Fredericks, supra, 586 F.2d at p. 480; United States v. Shaffner (7th Cir.1975) 524 F.2d 1021, 1022; see also Alderman v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 165 [22 L.Ed.2d 176, 89 S.Ct. 961].) Any basis for excluding Hernandez's testimony must be found in a federal constitutional right personal to defendant. ( Markham, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 71.)
In Bradford v. Johnson (E.D.Mich. 1972) 354 F. Supp. 1331, one of the first cases to consider the exclusion of coerced testimony by a nondefendant, police officers arrested suspect Payne and subjected him to a prolonged period of beatings and torture, ceasing only after Payne implicated the defendant and agreed to testify against him at trial (apparently in exchange for the cessation of torture). In holding Payne's trial testimony was so untrustworthy as to violate the defendant's right to a fair trial, the court noted that Payne was physically tortured before arraignment. He appeared at arraignment visibly beaten and was returned by the magistrate to the custody of his torturers. He was tortured until he confessed and incriminated petitioner. He was promised cessation of his torture only after he incriminated another in addition to himself.... The [trial] testimony of a witness obtained by these means when he must surrender himself immediately after testifying to those persons who tortured him, does not comport with due process. ( Id. at p. 1336.) The Bradford court was careful to note, however, that [t]his does not mean that incriminations of others coerced by torture necessarily poison all future [trial] testimony. (354 F. Supp. at p. 1337; see also United States v. Ceccolini, supra, 435 U.S. at p. 278 [55 L.Ed.2d at p. 278] [we have specifically refused to hold that `making a confession under circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually disables the confessor from making a usable one after those conditions have been removed.'].) Indeed, in the numerous cases following Bradford, few, if any, have ordered suppression of trial testimony that was not itself shown to be unreliable or coerced. (See also United States v. Merkt (5th Cir.1985) 764 F.2d 266, 274 [recognizing distinction between suppressing reliable trial testimony following an earlier coerced statement, and suppressing only the coerced out-of-court statement itself]; DeRobertis, supra, 719 F.2d at p. 896 [in contrast to ... LaFrance and Bradford, the allegedly coerced confession [in this case] was not introduced at petitioner's trial. While the confession may have aided in the investigation of the crime, this use presents no basis for relief... if there was nothing improper about the trial itself [italics added]]; United States v. Shaffner, supra, 524 F.2d at p. 1022 [trial court not required to rule on whether codefendant's possibly coerced confession was voluntary because codefendant pleaded guilty, testified on behalf of the government, and stated the confession was voluntary]; cf. LaFrance, supra, 499 F.2d 29 [prohibiting use of coerced out-of-court statements for impeachment purposes when codefendant testified at trial recanting the coerced statements].) (7b) In the present case, defendant fails to demonstrate that Hernandez's trial testimony was coerced. Hernandez was not subjected to any violence by United States authorities, and thus, unlike the defendant in Bradford, was not forced to surrender himself immediately after testifying to those persons who tortured him. ( Bradford, supra, 354 F. Supp. at p. 1336.) [6] By contrast, Hernandez testified under a general grant of immunity, precluding use against him of any statements made in connection with his testimony. The immunity agreement was reached only after Hernandez consulted with counsel and after negotiations between counsel and the prosecution. (9) (See fn. 7.), (7c) The agreement required only that Hernandez testify truthfully as to his knowledge of the murders, and was not conditioned on consistency of his testimony with his earlier out-of-court statements, or on ultimate conviction of the defendant. (Cf. U.S. ex rel. Blackwell v. Franzen (N.D.Ill. 1981) 540 F. Supp. 151, 154 [coercion involving out-of-court confession by codefendant would taint codefendant's trial testimony when codefendant plea bargained to testify consistently with [his] challenged confession].) [7] Moreover, Hernandez testified under oath that his statements were made freely and voluntarily and were not compelled by the earlier statements that he made in Mexico. His trial testimony was subject to thorough cross-examination and impeachment. In a similar case, Wilcox v. Ford, supra, 813 F.2d 1140, the defendant was accused of murdering a victim whose body was not discovered until eight years after the crime was committed. The primary prosecution witness was Wrentz, an elderly, illiterate man, who had been in the company's employ for over 30 years. He testified, apparently under a grant of immunity, that he helped defendant and several other men load the victim's corpse into a box, after which they drove to a secluded spot where they buried the body. Defendant sought to exclude Wrentz's testimony on the ground that Wrentz's earlier consistent statement to police had been impermissibly coerced from him. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the claim, noting: Even assuming that the police employed improper interrogation techniques to obtain ... Wrentz's out-of-court statements implicating Wilcox in the crime, [they were not] introduced at trial.... There is no proof that Wrentz was incompetent to testify or that his trial testimony was coerced.... [¶] Even assuming, however, that the reliability of Wrentz's direct testimony ... was somewhat suspect, the defendant had adequate tools in hand to challenge the reliability before the jury. The defense had full knowledge of the nature of Wrentz's ... interrogation, had access to the tapes and transcripts of the interrogation sessions prior to trial, and had a full opportunity to use those materials in examining [him]. Furthermore, in addition to a full opportunity to cross-examine [the witness], Wilcox had adequate opportunity to put on independent evidence to discredit the challenged testimony and did in fact put on such evidence. Finally, the trial court gave the appropriate jury charges on reasonable doubt, credibility, and immunity to aid them in assessing the value of the evidence in question. Considering all of these factors, we conclude that Wilcox did receive a fundamentally fair trial in spite of any government misconduct that might have occurred. ( Wilcox v. Ford, supra, 813 F.2d at p. 1149.) Similarly, in the present case, defendant does not claim that Hernandez's allegedly coerced out-of-court statements were improperly admitted at trial. Rather, he challenges only Hernandez's trial testimony. Here, as in Wilcox, the accomplice's trial testimony was subject to cross-examination and impeachment, and defendant possessed adequate tools with which to challenge the reliability of Hernandez's testimony, being fully apprised of all of the circumstances surrounding Hernandez's earlier interrogation in Mexico. Moreover, we are unpersuaded that Hernandez was in any way subject to coercion at the time he testified at defendant's trial. Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the admission of Hernandez's trial testimony deprived defendant of a fair trial. Defendant maintains, nonetheless, that Hernandez's trial testimony and his out-of-court statements are inseparable for admissibility purposes, and that we must examine the totality of circumstances to determine voluntariness here. Analogizing to the successive confession cases in the Fifth Amendment context (e.g., Clewis v. Texas (1967) 386 U.S. 707 [18 L.Ed.2d 423, 87 S.Ct. 1338]; Lyons v. Oklahoma (1944) 322 U.S. 596 [88 L.Ed. 1481, 64 S.Ct. 1208]; see also People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815 [183 Cal. Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93]), defendant argues that the physical abuse and prior coerced confessions establish an unbroken chain of coercion culminating in Hernandez's testimony at the trial. Defendant contends that none of the events subsequent to the Mexican confession was sufficient to purge the taint of the earlier involuntary statements. Even assuming arguendo that such poisonous fruit analyses are applicable to cases in which a defendant challenges a third party's allegedly coerced statement, [8] we believe defendant's claim must fail on these facts. The federal [9] constitutional standard concerning successive confessions was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Lyons v. Oklahoma, supra, 322 U.S. 596. As here, the Lyons court was faced with a situation in which assertedly improper methods were used to obtain a confession, but that confession was not used at the trial. Later, in another place and with different persons present, the accused again told the facts of the crime. ( Id. at p. 602 [88 L.Ed.2d at p. 1485].) (10) Lyons observed that [t]he voluntary or involuntary character of a confession is determined by a conclusion as to whether the accused, at the time he confesses, is in possession of `mental freedom' to confess to or deny a suspected participation in a crime.... [¶] ... If the relation between the earlier and later confession is not so close that one must say the facts of one control the character of the other, the inference is for the triers of fact and their conclusion, in such an uncertain situation, that the confession should be admitted as voluntary, cannot be a denial of due process.  ( Id. at pp. 602-603 [88 L.Ed.2d at pp. 1485-1486].) (7d) Here, we are unpersuaded that the asserted facts surrounding Hernandez's confession in Mexico, as offensive as they may be to our notions of civilized conduct, necessarily control the character of the testimony given by Hernandez at trial. First, we disagree with defendant's assertions that the coercion applied by the Mexican authorities can somehow be attributed to the United States police, or that United States authorities were joint venturers in the Mexican interrogation. On the contrary, there is no evidence that the Mexican authorities were acting at the behest of United States officials, or that the United States authorities even had knowledge of the alleged beatings at the time they occurred. The fact that United States officials knew the Mexican police would question Hernandez, or that they shared information about the crime with Mexican authorities or lent them a tape recorder upon request, hardly indicates knowledge or approval by United States officials of the assertedly improper interrogation tactics utilized by the Mexican police. Moreover, we believe any taint remaining from Hernandez's Mexican confession was dissipated following Hernandez's escort across the border by United States officials. By Hernandez's own account, any remaining threat of beatings disappeared once he crossed the border, and he was confident that physical coercion could not and would not be used against him here. [10] He was at this point completely outside the reach of his earlier tormentors and had no reason to anticipate further mistreatment. (See Leon v. Wainwright (11th Cir.1984) 734 F.2d 770, 772-773 [subsequent confession found voluntary under Lyons v. Oklahoma, supra, 322 U.S. 596, when police obtained earlier statements by physical force and threats, but subsequent statements were obtained by a completely different group of police officers who meticulously explained defendant's constitutional rights before taking statement].) In addition, we note that Rackacaus, in his subsequent interview with Hernandez, scrupulously avoided any mention of the Mexican confession and, although Hernandez suspected possible United States awareness of his Mexican confession, he was never informed of or threatened with that fact. Nor was Hernandez offered leniency in return for his statements, although he was told of the potentially grave charges he faced and their possible penalties. Finally, although Rackacaus apparently did not read Hernandez his Miranda rights, and his arraignment was briefly delayed, he was told in the informal interview that his statements could not be used against him. Thus, we are not persuaded that Hernandez's statements to Rackacaus were unlawfully coerced, or that they were a direct product of the coerced Mexican confession. Accordingly, we conclude that subsequent events in the United States sufficiently purged any taint remaining after the Mexican confession. Even assuming that a successive confession analysis under Lyons v. Oklahoma, supra, 322 U.S. 596, is appropriate here, we are satisfied that Hernandez's trial testimony was sufficiently unrelated to his Mexican confession so as to dissipate any possible taint from the earlier statements. In sum, we conclude that defendant was not denied his constitutional right to a fair trial by virtue of the admission of Hernandez's trial testimony. (11) In so concluding, we must also reject defendant's claim that Rackacaus's alleged prosecutorial misconduct in obtaining Hernandez's initial statements merits reversal. If admission of Hernandez's testimony did not deprive defendant of a fair trial, a fortiori, pretrial prosecutorial efforts to secure that testimony did not impair defendant's right to a fair trial. (12) Finally, we reject defendant's claim that his conviction must be reversed because Hernandez's preliminary hearing testimony, made at a time when Hernandez was still a codefendant, was involuntary, and therefore should not have been relied on by the court in binding defendant over for trial. Illegalities in pretrial commitment proceedings, other than those which are `jurisdictional in the fundamental sense,' are not reversible per se on an appeal from the subsequent trial. Rather, `defendant [must] show that he was deprived of a fair trial or otherwise suffered prejudice as a result of the error at the preliminary examination.' ( People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, 529 [165 Cal. Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941].) ( People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 628 [205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126].) Because we conclude that defendant's trial was fair, his pretrial sufficiency of the evidence claim must fail. (See People v. Moore (1986) 185 Cal. App.3d 1005, 1017-1018 [230 Cal. Rptr. 237]; People v. Flint (1986) 180 Cal. App.3d 13, 17-18 [225 Cal. Rptr. 323].)