Opinion ID: 1666866
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: construction and perpetuities

Text: The Rule against Perpetuities is not a rule of construction but a peremptory command of law. It is not, like a rule of construction, a test, more or less artificial, to determine intention. Its object is to defeat intention. Therefore, every provision in a will or settlement is to be construed as if the rule did not exist and then to the provisions so construed, the rule is to be remorselessly applied. Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities, 4th ed. § 629. Applying that statement to this case, our first duty is to construe the will exactly as we would if the Rule against Perpetuities did not apply, and interpret the words of the testator wholly without reference to it. We now construe the testator's will with the foregoing principles in mind. Construing the will, it is apparent to us that the testator made separate gifts to his widow, his daughter, my grandchildren and to the descendants then living of such grandchild. . . dying. The question is: do any of these gifts violate the Rule against Perpetuities? We hold that they do not, and reverse the trial court's conclusion to the contrary. The widow was living on the date of the testator's death. The gift to her vested at that time. It is valid. The gift to the daughter vests at the time both the testator and his widow are deceased. Although the daughter is specifically named as a beneficiary, there remains the condition that she survive both the testator and his widow before she may take her life interest. In any event, the interest in the daughter will vest, if at all, either at the death of the testator or a life in being (the widow), plus twenty-one years. It is valid. The bequest to my grandchildren vests at the time of the death of the survivor of the widow or the daughter. As we have previously stated, at the testator's death, he had two grandchildren then living. Because the testator's daughter survived him, there remains the possibility that additional grandchildren may be born after testator's death. Plainly, the life interest to both Andrea and Wayne Coker, grandchildren who were living at the time of the testator's death, would be valid. It is equally plain that the interest of a grandchild born to the testator's only daughter after the testator's death would be valid, because it would vest, if at all, at a time within twenty-one years after the measuring life of testator's daughter. It is the bequest under (B)(5) to the descendants of a grandchild which poses the problem in this case, especially as it relates to descendants of a possible grandchild born after the testator's death. Construing the will, the words my grandchildren would include grandchildren born after the testator's death, but before distribution. It is perfectly clear that since the testator did not specify his two living grandchildren by name, other grandchildren could be born after his death, and the interest given to descendants of any afterborn grandchildren under (B)(5) could vest at a time beyond that allowed by the Rule against Perpetuities. This, without more, could make the gift invalid. Leach discusses the rule as it would apply in a hypothetical situation which is quite similar to that presented by Item (B)(5). Leach states: Second is the rule that where there is a gift to a class of sub-classes the gift to a particular sub-class can be valid even though the gift to another sub-class is too remote. Thus, T bequeaths a fund in trust to pay the income to A for life, then to pay the income to the children of A for their lives, and upon the death of any child of A to pay the principal upon which such child was receiving the income to the children of such child. A has two children: C1, who was born before the death of T, and C2, who was born after the death of T. Plainly the life estates to both C1 and C2 are valid. Equally plainly the remainder to the children of C2 is invalid. The question concerns the remainder to the children of C1. The share which is to be divided between them will be known at the death of A, since thereafter no children of A can be born; the fraction which each of the children of C1 is to take in the share will be known at the death of C1; therefore all interests will vest within the life of the survivor of A and C1, both of whom were in being at T's death, and the gift is, of itself, valid. The fact that the contemporaneous gift to the children of C2 fails is immaterial. 51 Harv.L.Rev. 638, 650. [1] We find that the gifts under Item (B)(5) to the descendants of Andrea and Wayne constitute bequests of a specific portion of the trust to separate and distinct subclasses. The portion being given is that share which Andrea and Wayne will respectively enjoy during their lifetime. Their shares will be known at the time of their mother's (the daughter's) death, since thereafter, no child of her can be born. Since these shares are certain, the fraction which each of the descendants of Andrea and Wayne will take, will be known at the respective deaths of Andrea and Wayne; therefore, the gifts to these subclasses will vest within the life of the survivor of lives which were in being at the testator's death (i. e., Andrea and Wayne). They are valid. As previously noted, the share which might go to any afterborn grandchild will vest within a period allowed by the rule, and will be known at the death of the daughter. It is clear, however, that the share which would be divided among the subclass of the descendants of such afterborn grandchild, could vest at a time beyond that allowed by law, and such gift would be invalid; the fact that this gift to a subclass would fail, however, does not mean that the gift to the subclasses of the descendants of Andrea and Wayne must fail, as Leach notes in his hypothetical example. Under the subject will, however, even the gift to the descendants of a grandchild who was not living at the time of the testator's death is validated. The testator specifically included language in the will which we will refer to as a saving clause which reads as follows: The trusts created herein shall in no event continue for a period of time longer than the time allowed by law for the vesting of the share of any beneficiary in the trust estate. At the expiration of said time, unless said trust shall have sooner terminated in accordance with the provisions of this will, the property being held in trust herein shall immediately at the end of such period of time allowed by law, be transferred and paid over free from trust, to the beneficiary or beneficiaries then enjoying the use and benefit of the trust estate, and in the same proportions as in this will provided, irrespective of their ages at the time, and the trust shall immediately cease and terminate. We are of the opinion that the saving clause, properly construed, prevented any violation of the Rule against Perpetuities as to any bequest made under the will. A provision will not be construed as violating the rule against perpetuities where there is a provision in the will that, if any of its provisions should become susceptible of an interpretation creating an estate of longer duration than permitted under the law, such provisions should be revoked as to the period of time beyond that permitted by law. 70 C.J.S. Perpetuities § 35, p. 626. Likewise, the annotation at 91 A.L.R. 771, 772, states that . . . it seems clear upon principle, and is in fact well established by the decisions, that even though a will in the first instance provides for the postponement of vesting for a stated number of years, or until a stated date, no rule against perpetuities is violated if the will, as a dominant limitation, further expressly provides (or provides by inference) that the interest shall vest during or at the expiration of such number of lives in being as may be validly used to designate a period of contingency or restraint. In Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321, 29 S.Ct. 106, 53 L.Ed. 202 (1908), Mr. John Chipman Gray and Mr. Roland Gray, the author and editor, respectively, of the work, The Rule Against Perpetuities, argued successfully to the Supreme Court of the United States that the words `. . . for as long a period as is legally possible, the termination or ending of said trust to take place when the laws require it under the statute,' validated a gift made under a will because the time set for the distribution is not too remote, because the testator has expressly said it shall not be too remote; he has said it shall be legally possible. It is a necessary qualification of the time for distribution that it shall not be too remote. Dates which are too remote are expressly excluded by the testator. The Supreme Court of the United States agreed, holding: The whole of the language of the will must be considered, and while it says the trust is to continue as long as it is legally possible, it must also be remembered that a distribution of the whole estate is to be made, and therefore the continuation of the trust must also be limited by the direction to distribute; or, in other words, the trust is to continue as long as is legally possible and as shall be consistent with making the distribution as directed by the will. This distribution must be made at a time which is not too remote, that is, a time within which the trust would be valid,for the testator provided that the trust should only last that long. 211 U.S. 321, at 332, 29 S.Ct. 106, at 110, 53 L.Ed. 202, at 207. Applying the saving clause to section (B)(5), we hold that the trust must terminate twenty-one years after the death of the survivor of the testator's widow, his daughter, and two grandchildren living at his death (all lives in being at the testator's death). Under the provisions of the will, the corpus will vest immediately in the persons enjoying the income of the trust if the trust has not terminated sooner. Because the trust must terminate, by its own provisions within the time limit for vesting, there is no violation of the Rule against Perpetuities. Any gift which has a possibility of remote vesting has been limited by the saving clause so as to make remote vesting an impossibility.