Opinion ID: 780253
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Eleventh Amendment bars jurisdiction in this matter

Text: 9 Although we have grave doubts concerning the correctness of the district court's conclusion that the assessment for parking placards is a tax rather than a fee, we are free to affirm the judgment on any basis supported by the record. This is especially so where the underlying facts are undisputed. See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 629 (6th Cir.2002) (pointing out that [b]ecause this court's de novo review involves only application of legal propositions to the undisputed facts in the record, we may affirm on any grounds supported by the record even if different from the reasons of the district court). 10 The state has consistently contended that the Eleventh Amendment provides a jurisdictional bar to Angel's suit. It bases this argument on two points. First, it argues that this court's decision in Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276 F.3d 808, 811 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that Congress did not properly abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in equal protection claims brought under Title II of the ADA, but did properly do so in due process claims brought under that provision), bars Angel's equal protection-type claim under Title II of the ADA. Popovich was decided after the district court's dismissal of this case. Second, the state argues that Angel did not sue the appropriate official in order to obtain prospective injunctive relief. 11 Because the district court dismissed the complaint on the basis of the TIA, there is no Eleventh Amendment analysis in the district court's opinion. Angel has therefore had no opportunity to address this issue in her brief. A fair reading of the complaint, however, establishes that no due process argument is alleged. That being true, there is no way that Angel's action against the state can be successful in light of Popovich. We must therefore address the jurisdictional question that clearly exists, even though it was not addressed by the court below. See Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 206 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that state immunity is jurisdictional in the same sense as the complete diversity requirement or the well-pleaded complaint rule .... [A] federal court must examine each claim in a case to see if the court's jurisdiction is barred by the Eleventh Amendment) (emphasis in original; internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Because Angel has not pled facts sufficient to survive Popovich' s bar to Eleventh Amendment suits under Title II of the ADA, we affirm the district court's dismissal on this basis. 12 The state's second Eleventh Amendment argument relates to Angel's failure to name the appropriate county clerk who issued her the parking placard. It claims that the clerk is an indispensable party in order to meet the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity and to obtain prospective injunctive relief. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) (holding that in order to sue an officer of the state to enjoin the enforcement of an act alleged to be unconstitutional, the officer must be connected with the enforcement of the act). Angel is of course free to file a new suit against the appropriate county clerk for injunctive relief, but, as to her present suit against the state, it must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.