Opinion ID: 1324254
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: Compelling Governmental Interest and Least Restrictive Means

Text: The majority refuses to hold that spraying treated sewage effluent on Humphrey's Peak imposes a substantial burden on the Indians' exercise of religion. It therefore does not reach the question whether the burden can be justified by a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that purpose. Because I would hold that the Snowbowl expansion does constitute a substantial burden on the Indians' religious exercise, I also address this second step of the RFRA analysis. Requiring a State to demonstrate a compelling interest and show that it has adopted the least restrictive means of achieving that interest is the most demanding test known to constitutional law. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534, 117 S.Ct. 2157. In applying this standard, we do not accept a generalized assertion of a compelling interest, but instead require a case-by-case determination of the question, sensitive to the facts of each particular claim. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431, 126 S.Ct. 1211 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 899, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)). The Forest Service and the Snowbowl have argued that approving the use of treated sewage effluent to make artificial snow serves several compelling governmental interests. The district court characterized those interests as: (1) selecting the alternative that best achieves [the Forest Service's] multiple-use mandate under the National Forest Management Act, which includes managing the public land for recreational uses such as skiing; (2) protecting public safety by authorizing upgrades at Snowbowl to ensure that users of the National Forest ski area have a safe experience; and (3) complying with the Establishment Clause. 408 F.Supp.2d at 906. I would hold that none of these interests is compelling. First, the Forest Service's interests in managing the forest for multiple uses, including recreational skiing, are, in the words of the Court in O Centro, broadly formulated interests justifying the general applicability of government mandates and are therefore insufficient on their own to meet RFRA's compelling interest test. 546 U.S. at 431, 126 S.Ct. 1211. Appellees have argued that approving the proposed action serves the more particularized compelling interest in providing skiing at the Snowbowl, because the use of artificial snow will allow a more reliable and consistent operating season at one of the only two major ski areas in Arizona. I do not believe that authorizing the use of artificial snow at an already functioning commercial ski area in order to expand and improve its facilities, as well as to extend its ski season in dry years, is a governmental interest of the highest order. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215, 92 S.Ct. 1526. Second, while the Forest Service undoubtedly has a general interest in ensuring public safety on federal lands, there has been no showing that approving the proposed action advances that interest by the least restrictive means. Appellees have provided no specific evidence that skiing at the Snowbowl in its current state is unsafe. Third, approving the proposed action does not serve a compelling governmental interest in avoiding conflict with the Establishment Clause. The Forest Service has not suggested that avoiding a conflict with the Establishment Clause is a compelling interest served by the proposed action. Only the Snowbowl has made that argument. The argument is not convincing. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Constitution affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984). Anything less would require the `callous indifference' we have said was never intended by the Establishment Clause. Id. (citations omitted); see also Hobbie v. Unemp. App. Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144-45, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987) (This Court has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the Establishment Clause.). Refusing to allow a commercial ski resort in a national forest to spray treated sewage effluent on the Indians' most sacred mountain is an accommodation that falls far short of the sort of advancement of religion that gives rise to an Establishment Clause violation.