Opinion ID: 606718
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Relevant Standard

Text: 25 The Commission also contends that the district court did not instruct the jury on the correct test for determining whether subject-to-call time is compensable working time. The court instructed the jury that: 26 Time spent away from the employer's premises under conditions that are so circumscribed that they restrict the employee from effectively using the time for personal pursuits constitutes compensable hours of work. Time spent at home subject-to-call may or may not be compensable, depending on whether the restrictions placed on the employee thereby effectively preclude that employee from using such time for his or her personal pursuits. Where the conditions placed on the employee's activities are so restrictive that the employee cannot use the time effectively for personal pursuits, such time spent on call is compensable. An employer is required to pay an employee for the time the employee spends working for the employer. Waiting time may be working time as well. An employee is working if he or she is spending his or her time for the employer's benefit. The test is not whether an employee's leisure is completely and totally curtailed, but rather whether it is so restricted that it cannot reasonably and effectively be utilized for the employee's benefit. 27 Trial Transcript vol. VII, at 1293-94. 28 The Commission argues that this instruction does not properly instruct the jury that time spent by employees in subject-to-call status must be spent predominantly for the employer's benefit in order to be compensable. Therefore, the Commission contends that this instruction impermissibly deviates from the standard set forth in Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133, 65 S.Ct. 165, 168, 89 L.Ed. 118 (1944) (trier of fact must determine [w]hether time is spent predominantly for the employer's benefit or for the employee's). 29 It is true that this particular jury instruction does not specifically include the phrase predominantly for the employer's benefit. We think, however, that the language cited by the Commission fairly states the law and the standard that the jury must apply. See Cross v. Arkansas Forestry Comm., 938 F.2d 912 (8th Cir.1991). Even if this language, standing alone, does not adequately and fairly state the law to be applied, we must read the instructions in their entirety, rather than in isolation. Valentec Kisco, 964 F.2d at 731. An evaluation of the jury instructions as a whole reveals that the court incorporated the predominantly for the employer's benefit standard into other instructions including the sentences immediately preceding the ones cited by the Commission. These preceding sentences instructed the jury that: 30 If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that the plaintiffs have proved that any of their subject-to-call time was spent predominantly for the defendant's benefit, then your verdict should be for the plaintiffs. But if, on the other hand, you find from the evidence that the plaintiffs have not so proved, then your verdict should be for the defendant. 31 Trial Transcript vol. VII, at 1293 (emphasis added). We find that the instructions as a whole correctly state the applicable law, and the district court did not commit reversible error. 32 The Commission raises a number of additional issues. We have carefully considered the arguments they set forth and find them to be lacking in merit.