Opinion ID: 1791862
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Is Ring Retroactive in Florida?

Text: The holding of Ring clearly satisfies the first two prongs of Witt because the United States Supreme Court issued a new rule that is constitutional in nature. 387 So.2d at 930. Ring's retroactivity therefore depends on the third prong: whether the new rule constitutes a development of fundamental significance. Id. In Witt, we clarified that most developments of fundamental significance fall within two categories: changes which place beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties, and those which are of sufficient magnitude to necessitate retroactive application as ascertained by the three-fold test of Stovall and Linkletter.  Id. at 929. Ring does not fall within the first category because it does not prohibit the government from criminalizing certain conduct or imposing certain penalties. Thus, the question is whether Ring is of sufficient magnitude to require retroactive application under three factors: (a) the purpose to be served by the rule, (b) the extent of reliance on the prior rule, and (c) the effect that retroactive application of the new rule would have on the administration of justice. Id. at 926. [3] We address each factor in turn.
The first factor under Witt is the purpose to be served by the new rule. Id. The United States Supreme Court noted in Summerlin that its holding in Ring was not a substantive change to the law, but rather a prototypical procedural rule[], in that it regulates the manner in which culpability is determined but does not alter the range of conduct or class of persons that the law punishes. 124 S.Ct. at 2523. The Court also determined that Ring does not change the elements of the offense of murder punishable by death, and does not greatly enhance the fairness or accuracy of death penalty proceedings. See id. at 2524-26. Regarding the latter concern, the Court noted that because the burden of proof in Arizona for aggravating factors found by the trial court was beyond a reasonable doubt, the requirement of Apprendi that facts authorizing an increased sentence be found beyond a reasonable doubt was not at issue in Ring. Id. at 2522 n. 1. Florida law also requires that aggravating factors in death penalty cases be established beyond a reasonable doubt. See Rogers v. State, 783 So.2d 980, 992-93 (Fla.2001). The Supreme Court cautioned in Ring that its determination of who decides whether a defendant is eligible for the death penalty does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency of potential factfinders. 536 U.S. at 607, 122 S.Ct. 2428. The Court subsequently stated in Summerlin that for every argument why juries are more accurate factfinders, there is another why they are less accurate. 124 S.Ct. at 2525. Applying the Teague test, the Court concluded that [w]hen so many presumably reasonable minds continue to disagree over whether juries are better factfinders at all, we cannot confidently say that judicial factfinding seriously diminishes accuracy. Id. Deferring to the United States Supreme Court's assessment of its own decision in Ring, we conclude that the purpose of the new rule does not support retroactivity. [4] The purpose of the new rule in Ring is to conform criminal procedure to the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee, and not to enhance the fairness or efficiency of death penalty procedures. In Williams v. State, 421 So.2d 512, 515 (Fla.1982), we refused to apply a rule retroactively in part because it did not involve an attack on the fairness of the trial. As we recognized in Witt, new rules generally will not warrant retroactive application in the absence of fundamental and constitutional law changes which cast serious doubt on the veracity or integrity of the original trial proceeding. 387 So.2d at 929. Ring casts no such doubt. The first Witt factor therefore disfavors retroactive application.
The second Witt factor is the extent of reliance on the old rule. Id. at 926. Like the first factor, this one weighs heavily against retroactive application of Ring. Florida has relied to an immeasurably large extent on its capital sentencing scheme. Since Florida's reinstatement of the death penalty in 1972, hundreds of defendants have been sentenced to death employing the procedures in section 921.141, Florida Statutes, that call upon the jury only to render an advisory sentence by majority vote. Fifty-nine defendants have been executed. See Fla. Dep't of Corrections, Death Row Fact Sheet, available at http://www.dc.state. fl.us/oth/deathrow/ index.html. Our situation is very different, for example, from the one the Missouri Supreme Court faced when it applied Ring retroactively. That court concluded that only five collateral cases would potentially be affected. See State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 269 (Mo.2003). [5] In contrast, about 367 defendants currently reside on Florida's Death Row. Florida's reliance on its capital sentencing scheme has been entirely in good faith. The United States Supreme Court has examined and upheld Florida's capital sentencing statute for more than a quarter of a century. See Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 695 (citing cases). In Apprendi, decided two years before Ring, the Supreme Court specifically excluded death penalty cases from its holding and confirmed the validity of its prior decision upholding Arizona's sentencing scheme, Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990). Based on all of the information available at the time of Ring, Florida had every reason to believe that its capital sentencing scheme was constitutionally sound and worthy of reliance. We still have not held otherwise. That Florida has reasonably relied on its longstanding capital sentencing scheme is an important factor weighing against the retroactive application of Ring. See Williams, 421 So.2d at 515 (It was reasonable... to rely upon [the old] law. That significant reliance has been placed on the old rule is an important factor supporting [exclusively] prospective application of the new rule.); State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 64 P.3d 828, 835 (2003) (concluding under the Linkletter test that the [Arizona] justice system's good faith reliance on Walton v. Arizona weighs against retroactivity).