Opinion ID: 521957
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Constitutional Claim

Text: 17 Yalkut's remaining claim alleges that defendants violated 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 by violating his civil rights. 18 Section 1983, however, applies only to actions taken under the color of state law that violate constitutional or federal statutory rights. Yalkut makes no allegation of state action, nor can he, because defendants' actions were purely federal in nature. Even construing Yalkut's complaint to allege a violation of his constitutional rights by federal officials, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), however, it cannot survive, as defendants are immune from suit. 19 Federal officials are protected from suit for civil damages for alleged constitutional violations if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Before Harlow, an official acting maliciously was not immune from suit. Harlow, however, rejected this test and the presence of malice is now irrelevant to the question of immunity. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3041-42, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); see also Pollnow v. Glennon, 757 F.2d 496, 501 (2d Cir.1985). The question whether a right is clearly established is one of law, Giacalone v. Abrams, 850 F.2d 79, 85 (2d Cir.1988), and is not dependent on disputed factual issues, and thus this issue is properly raised on appeal. Defendants violated no clearly established right of Yalkut, and therefore they are immune from suit in this case. 20 Yalkut's complaint alleges that defendants violated his civil rights, and cites section 1983. Upon review of the record, we believe the only right possibly implicated by the complaint is Yalkut's constitutional right to due process. We see no other constitutional right at issue, and Yalkut has directed us to none. Nor has he set forth an alleged violation of a federal statutory right. It is doubtful, however, that a taxpayer's right to due process could be violated by an IRS levy carried out in accordance with federal law and IRS policy. See Baddour, Inc. v. United States, 802 F.2d 801, 807 (5th Cir.1986) (levy pursuant to section 6331 does not violate due process); Jackman v. D'Agostino, 669 F.Supp. 43, 46-47 (D.Conn.1987) (no due process claim where there exists a statutory mechanism for refund of overpaid taxes); see also Cameron v. Internal Revenue Service, 773 F.2d 126, 128-29 (7th Cir.1985) (heavy-handed, insensitive, and careless actions of IRS agents do not give rise to damage remedy); Flank v. Sellers, 661 F.Supp. 952, 954-55 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (no Bivens action lies based on allegation IRS auditor made mistake of law). These cases are sufficient to establish, at the very least, that defendants' actions violated no right to due process that is clearly established. 21 Because Yalkut's complaint alleges no actions by defendants that violated a clearly established constitutional right to due process, defendants are immune from suit. The district court therefore should have dismissed Yalkut's complaint as to the claim of violation of his civil rights.