Opinion ID: 352279
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 15 Before turning to the merits of the petition to review, we are presented with a threshold question with respect to this Court's jurisdiction. The Commission and intervenors Soo and ConAgra (referred to as respondents in this section of our opinion) claim that, because of the asserted lack of timeliness of the petition to review, we have jurisdiction to review only the Twin Cities summer rate, not the other three rates. We disagree. 16 It is common ground that a petition to review a final order of the Commission must be filed within sixty days of the entry of the order, 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1970), and the timeliness requirement is jurisdictional. See, e. g., Microwave Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 385, 389 & n. 24 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 17 Respondents argue that the sixty day period began to run on August 5, 1975, the date of service of the Commission's June 27, 1975 order. That order denied petitioners' request for reconsideration of the Commission's initial decision of June 18, 1974 which approved three of the four rates here in question. Respondents contend that the denial of reconsideration was a final order with respect to the three rates which earlier had been approved, in that the denial of reconsideration impose(d) an obligation, den(ied) a right, or fix(ed) some legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative process. C & S Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 104, 113 (1948); see Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 211 F.2d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Federal Maritime Board v. United States, 347 U.S. 990 (1954). Respondents stress particularly that a final order need not necessarily be the very last order. Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, supra,211 F.2d at 55. 18 Respondents' argument would be persuasive if all the petitions for reconsideration had been denied in all respects. Respondents contend that the order of June 27, 1975 terminated the proceedings as to all but the Twin Cities summer rate as completely as if the Commission had not agreed to reconsider that rate. Whatever might be said as to this theoretical contention, it wholly ignores the essential nature of the proceedings. The rates were proposed as an interrelated set of rates, not as independent tariffs. Although the Commission denied reconsideration of the three rates previously approved and granted reconsideration of the one previously disapproved, all four rates continued in effect pending reconsideration. The rate initially found to be unlawful was not cancelled, and new schedules were not filed. 19 Moreover, the Commission itself seems to have viewed the proceeding as still pending as a whole, notwithstanding its denial of reconsideration. In its final report and order of January 27, 1976, it discussed all the rates and affirmed and adopted the conclusions previously made with respect to the three rates as to which reconsideration technically had been denied. This was necessary because the Twin Cities summer rate was tied to the Twin Ports summer rate. 9 20 As a practical matter, it would have been judicially imprudent for us as a reviewing court to consider piecemeal the initial order while the proceeding as a whole remained pending before the Commission. Indeed the Commission acknowledges in its brief before us that (s)hould a court action be commenced under these circumstances, the Court could, in its discretion, decide to stay proceedings pending completion of the ancillary administrative proceedings. That hardly comports with our view of finality. 21 Even assuming that petitioners could have filed a petition to review the order approving three of the four rates immediately after denial of their petition for reconsideration, a point upon which we express no view, we are satisfied that they were justified in awaiting the outcome of the proceeding as a whole. Respondents have not shown that they were prejudiced by the passage of time. Especially in view of the deeply rooted policies of the federal courts against piecemeal appeals and in favor of allowing administrative proceedings to run their course without interference from the courts, we hold that the instant petition to review was timely with respect to the four rates in question. 10 III. SECTION 3(4) CLAIM 22 Turning to the merits of the petition to review, we shall consider first the claim that the Commission's order failed to protect certain lake carriers against allegedly discriminatory and prejudicial rail rates in violation of § 3(4) of the Act. 11 23 Section 3(4) prohibits carriers from discriminat(ing) in their rates, fares, and charges between connecting lines. . . . The term connecting line as used here means the connecting line of any carrier subject to the provisions of (part I) or any common carrier by water subject to (part III). 24 The Commission did not reach the question whether the proposed unit train rates discriminate against the lake carriers because it found that the lake carriers are not entitled to the protection of § 3(4). 346 I.C.C. at 852. The Commission ruled that the lake carriers are outside the scope of the protection of § 3(4) because (s)o far as the record shows, protestant's members are not regulated carriers and, therefore, not entitled to protection under section 3(4). The Commission also ruled that the lake carriers are not connecting lines within the meaning of the statute. 25 We hold that the Commission erred with respect to both branches of its § 3(4) ruling. 12 26 (A) Exempt Water Carriers Are Entitled to Section 3(4) Protection 27 The basis of the Commission's ruling on this issue is unclear. Its ruling and supporting reasoning is confined to the following two sentences: 28 Insofar as is pertinent to the issues in this proceeding, a connecting line is defined as a common carrier by water subject to part III of the act. So far as the record shows, protestant's members are not regulated carriers and, therefore, not entitled to protection under section 3(4). 346 I.C.C. at 852. 29 Intervenor Soo, in its brief before us, argues that the Commission meant that there was no evidence in the record that the protesting lake carriers are subject to part III of the Act. The Commission, however, was fully aware that some water carriers on the Great Lakes are subject to Part III. 13 30 We interpret the Commission's ruling on this issue to mean that carriers exempted from regulation when they carry commodities in bulk 14 are not subject to part III for purposes of protection under § 3(4). We disagree. Just because a water carrier is exempt from regulation when it transports commodities in bulk does not mean that it is not subject to part III. 15 31 We hold that the water carriers here involved on the Great Lakes are entitled to the protection of § 3(4) although their carriage of wheat in bulk exempts them from regulation under § 303(b) of the Act. See ICC v. Mechling,330 U.S. 567, 576 (1947) (Black, J.); ICC v. Inland Waterways Corp., 319 U.S. 671, 697 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting) (an earlier proceeding which eventually led to the Mechling decision); Valley Line Co. v. United States,390 F.Supp. 435, 438-39 (W.D.Pa.1975) (three-judge court); Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. United States, 233 F.Supp. 199, 210 (D.N.J.1964) (three-judge court); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. United States, 194 F.Supp. 438 (D.Kan.1961) (three-judge court); Arrow Transportation Co. v. United States,176 F.Supp. 411, 419 (N.D.Ala.1959) (three-judge court), aff'd sub nom. State Corporation Commission v. Arrow Transportation Co., 361 U.S. 353 (1960) (per curiam). 16 (B) Meaning of Connecting Line 32 The Commission ruled that, even if protestants were entitled to the protection of § 3(4), there would be no merit to their argument. The Commission went on to state, Section 3(4) is designed to discourage unequal treatment of connecting carriers at a given point. The proposed all-rail route passes well south of Buffalo and Erie does not extend unequal treatment at Buffalo as between carriers. 346 I.C.C. at 852. In its brief before us, the Commission supplemented this with the following explanation: The all-rail route here involved does not reach Buffalo, the point at which New York says its connection within the meaning of section 3(4) takes place. The fact that Erie serves Buffalo on other routes does not change this conclusion. We disagree. 33 Respondents concede that a common point of interchange is not a prerequisite to the applicability of § 3(4). 17 Rather, they argue that somewhere along the all rail route there must be a point of interchange with the water carrier. In other words, so the argument goes, the point need not be the same as the point of interchange with a connecting rail line, but the respective rail and water interchanges at least must be located on the same route. We decline the invitation to adopt this construction of the statute. Respondents have not cited any authority for their interpretation. Petitioner's interpretation, on the other hand, finds persuasive support in Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. United States, supra, 18 and in the Commission's own decision in Ingot Molds, Ohio & Pa. to Cypress, Texas, 349 I.C.C. 102 (1975). 19 34 We hold, on the facts of this case, that the lake carriers are connecting lines, because they serve a point also served by the railroad so that interchange at that point can be, and in fact is, effected. See note 19 supra. 35 (C) Discriminatory Rates 36 The Commission, having decided that the lake carriers are not connecting lines within the meaning of § 3(4), and that they would not be protected by that section even if they were, did not reach the question whether the rates were discriminatory. 20 We therefore remand the case to the Commission for the limited purpose of determining whether the proposed rates discriminate against the lake carriers as connecting lines.