Opinion ID: 2543718
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: defendant's appeal to the utah court of appeals

Text: ¶ 7 On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, defendant claimed that (1) differences between the state lewdness statute and Salt Lake City's disorderly conduct ordinance rendered the ordinance invalid under preemption principles, Roberts, 2000 UT App. 201 at ¶ 4, 7 P.3d 789; (2) the facts did not support a finding that he willfully engaged in sexual conduct with another person, id. at ¶ 5; and (3) the trial court misconstrued the ordinance in concluding that his conduct occurred in a place open to public view. Id. at ¶ 7. ¶ 8 The court of appeals rejected defendant's first two claims. In reviewing his first claim, the court of appeals noted that ordinances passed by municipalities are valid unless they are inconsistent or conflict with state law. Id. at ¶ 4 (citing, inter alia, Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 624 P.2d 1138, 1144 (Utah 1981)). For guidance on what constitutes an inconsistency, the court of appeals relied on Salt Lake City v. Allred, 20 Utah 2d 298, 299, 437 P.2d 434, 435 (1968), in which we held that [m]unicipal ordinances and state law are not inconsistent when they share a common purpose and are `closely related in subject matter.' Roberts, 2000 UT App. 201 at ¶ 4, 7 P.3d 789 (quoting Allred, 20 Utah 2d at 302, 437 P.2d at 437). Applying the Allred standard to the disorderly conduct ordinance and the state lewdness statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702 (1996), the court of appeals concluded that the two provisions share the common purpose of prohibit[ing] sexual behavior in places where the public may be affronted or offended. Id. at ¶ 4 (applying Allred ). Having found no conflict between the state lewdness statute and the disorderly conduct ordinance, the court of appeals upheld the validity of the ordinance. Id. ¶ 9 The court of appeals also rejected defendant's claim that the evidence did not support the trial court's conclusion that he engaged in sexual conduct within the meaning of the ordinance. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. Reviewing this finding for clear error, the court of appeals concluded that the arresting officer's undisputed trial testimony that defendant kissed the exposed breasts of his female companion and exposed his genitals was sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant `engaged in sexual conduct' within the meaning of the ordinance. Id. at ¶ 6. ¶ 10 As to defendant's third claim, the court of appeals noted that, in concluding defendant's conduct occurred in a place open to public view, the trial court evidently did not consider the totality of the circumstances, but only the fact that it occurred in a place accessible to the public: The [trial] court apparently relied [solely] upon the fact that the conduct took place in a public parking lot, stating at [defendant's bench] trial, I think the problem is that the language [of the ordinance] is tough to deal with but I am not going to struggle with it too much. It was a public parking lot, in my view, it was [therefore] open to public view. Id. at ¶ 11 (first and second alterations added). ¶ 11 Reviewing the trial court's interpretation for correctness, id. at ¶ 7, the court of appeals first noted that no Utah appellate court has defined open to public view as used in the ordinance. Id. at ¶ 8. For guidance, the court turned to case law from other jurisdictions interpreting statutes criminalizing sexual activity in a public place. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9. In contrast to the trial court's reliance solely on the fact that defendant's conduct occurred in a public parking lot, these jurisdictions have interpreted public place as requiring a fact-intensive inquiry into whether the conduct is likely to be observed by the public. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9, 11. ¶ 12 Adopting this interpretation, the court of appeals ruled that the trial court erred in considering only the fact that defendant's conduct occurred in a public parking lot. Id. at ¶ 11. From the record before it, however, the court of appeals could not determine as a matter of law whether or not defendant's conduct occurred in a place likely to be observed by a member of the public. See id. at ¶ 12. Accordingly, the court remanded the case with instructions that the trial court make this determination. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 13. ¶ 13 One judge dissented from the majority's interpretation of a place open to public view and its decision to remand. Id. at ¶¶ 15-18 (Bench, J., dissenting in part). Specifically, the dissent contended that, in interpreting this language, instead of relying on case law from foreign jurisdictions, id. at ¶ 17, the majority should have drawn upon the court's significant experience from the Fourth Amendment search and seizure context in assessing what is open to public view. Id. at ¶ 16. In the Fourth Amendment context, the dissent noted, Utah courts have consistently allowed officers to seize evidence when the evidence is in open view from a position that is lawfully accessible to the public. Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). This standard, reasoned the dissent, better comports with the plain language of the ordinance than the majority's interpretation, which the dissent believed import[ed] into the ordinance the likely [to be] seen requirement. Id. at ¶ 17. Applying its interpretation to the facts of the case, the dissent concluded that, as a matter of law, defendant's sexual conduct occurred in a place open to public view because the officer witnessed this sexual conduct from a place lawfully accessible to any member of the general publicas he stood in the public parking lot. Id. Thus, the dissent would have affirmed defendant's conviction without remand. Id. at ¶ 18. ¶ 14 We granted Salt Lake City's petition for certiorari, and now reverse the court of appeals' interpretation of a place open to public view and remand.