Opinion ID: 764675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Johnson's Liability

Text: 9 The Supreme Court has stated an unambiguous preference that we consider the merits first in qualified immunity cases, see Medeiros v. O'Connell, 150 F.3d 164, 169 (2d Cir.1998) (relying on County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1714 n. 5, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998)). Consistent with that view, we deem it advisable to begin by analyzing whether Clue and Little had a constitutional right to engage in their New Directions advocacy free from retaliation by Johnson. There is no doubt that retaliation against public employees solely for their union activities violates the First Amendment. See, e.g., Boals v. Grey, 775 F.2d 686, 693 (6th Cir.1985). Johnson's position, however, is that her alleged retaliation against Clue and Little does not support a First Amendment claim because their activities were on behalf of a minority union faction rather than on behalf of the union itself. We disagree and conclude that Clue and Little had a constitutional right to be free from retaliation for their New Directions activities.
10 We assume, for purposes of this opinion, that to obtain protection under the First Amendment Clue and Little's activities must have involved a public concern. 2 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). Once that threshold requirement is met, a public employee's speech rights must be protected unless, under all the circumstances, the employee's interest in free comment is outweighed by the State's interest in the efficiency of its public services. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). The thrust of Johnson's argument is that Clue and Little's activities do not involve a public concern because they involve an intraunion dispute. 11 There may well be intraunion disputes that do not raise enough of a public concern to trigger First Amendment protection. And there undoubtedly exist intraunion conflicts that manifestly raise matters of public concern because the faction's activity would be tantamount to core union activity. For example, if the union leadership was so much under the thumb of management that the union was nothing more than a company union, the activities of a minority union faction could properly be viewed as representing the only genuine ongoing union activity. Since retaliation solely for union activity clearly raises a public concern under Connick, see, e.g., Boals, 775 F.2d at 693, the actions of the above mentioned faction would also do so. 12 A more difficult question is posed by the facts in the record before us. New Directions based its challenge to the TWU leadership on the ground that union leaders were in bed with management and supported management policies that redounded to the disadvantage of workers. In other words, although the TWU leadership was admittedly independent of management control, New Directions nevertheless criticized the stance that the TWU leadership had taken toward management and sought to change that relationship. This type of factional activity falls into a grey area that may or may not state a public concern under Connick. 13 We are persuaded, however, that Clue and Little's activities on behalf of New Directions did involve a public concern even if one characterizes those activities as factional rather than as tantamount to union activity. The intraunion dispute here did not merely involve internal union affairs. Instead, it was a struggle over the labor policies of the Transit Authority and what role the TWU ought to play in changing those policies. In waging that fight, New Directions strongly criticized management to the point where management officials themselves testified that they were well aware of the criticism. We believe that activities on behalf of a union faction that necessarily entail a substantial criticism of management raise matters of public concern under Connick. Accordingly, we hold that Clue and Little's advocacy of New Directions involved a public concern. Moreover, under the balancing test set forth in Pickering, we conclude that Clue and Little's First Amendment rights were not outweighed by the Transit Authority's interest in the efficiency of its services.
14 Having determined that Clue and Little raised a First Amendment claim, we must address the issue of whether Johnson had qualified immunity. The defense of qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability if the official's conduct did not violate constitutional rights that were clearly established at the pertinent time or if it was objectively reasonable for the official to believe that the conduct did not violate such rights. Cecere v. City of New York, 967 F.2d 826, 829 (2d Cir.1992). 15 In determining whether a particular right was clearly established at the time defendants acted, this Court has considered three factors: (1) whether the right in question was defined with reasonable specificity; (2) whether the decisional law of the Supreme Court and the applicable circuit court support the existence of the right in question; and (3) whether under preexisting law a reasonable defendant official would have understood that his or her acts were unlawful. 16 Jermosen v. Smith, 945 F.2d 547, 550 (2d Cir.1991). 17 Although we believe factional activities of the type Clue and Little participated in are constitutionally protected from employer retaliation, no court had so held when the retaliation occurred in December 1995. We had implied that such a situation might warrant First Amendment protection. See Connecticut State Fed. of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 471, 479 (2d Cir.1976). But we did so only in a passing hypothetical. See id. As such, our comment was insufficient to meet the standard of clarity that precedents require before qualified immunity is overcome. 3 See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Greenwood v. State of New York, 163 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir.1998). As a result, we conclude that Johnson is protected by qualified immunity in this case and that the judgment against her must be reversed.