Opinion ID: 852827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Searches of Trash

Text: This Court first addressed the legality of trash searches under Article I, Section 11 in Moran v. State , where the totality of the circumstances test was also first articulated. In that case, the Indiana State Police initially identified Andrew Holland and Dominick Moran based on their purchases at a hydroponic equipment store operated by ISP for the purpose of identifying potential marijuana growers. Further investigation revealed excessive energy consumption at Holland's home, and unusual warm areas were observed through thermal imaging surveillance. Id. at 537-38. At about 5:00 a.m. on a day scheduled for trash pickup, two ISP officers drove to Holland's house where they found several trashcans about one foot from the street in front of the house, near the mailbox. Id. at 538. The officers emptied the cans into the back of their truck and a subsequent search revealed marijuana clippings. Id. Based in part on this evidence, officers obtained a warrant to search the house and found both marijuana cuttings and several growing plants. Id. Holland and Moran were then charged with possession of marijuana. Id. They moved to suppress all evidence and testimony related to the warrantless search of the trash and the house based on their contention that the search of the garbage violated Article I, Section 11. The majority in Moran explained: Because we read this section of our constitution as having in its first clause a primary and overarching mandate for protections from unreasonable searches and seizures, the reasonableness of the official behavior must always be the focus of our state constitutional analysis. Id. at 539. The Court held that this reasonableness is to be determined based on a totality of the circumstances. Id. at 541. The Court concluded that the search was reasonable, explaining that one who places trash bags for collection intends for them to be taken up, and is pleased when that occurs, and that the officers conducted themselves in a similar manner to trash collectors and did not cause a disturbance. Id. The majority also noted, however, that Hoosiers are not entirely comfortable with the idea of police officers casually rummaging through trash left at curbside. Id. The Moran dissent argued that the search of Moran's trash was not reasonable and concluded that because a person's trash may reveal intimate details of the person's life and because it is unreasonable to dispose of one's trash anonymously, trash ought to be protected under Article I, Section 11. Since Moran, the Court of Appeals has grappled with several cases arising from searches of trash. In Lovell v. State, 813 N.E.2d 393 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied, police officers went to Lovell's home where they smelled a strong odor of ether. Id. at 395. There was no response when they knocked on the door, so they parked in a nearby parking lot and observed the residence. Id. After four people left the home, the officers retrieved three garbage bags that had been placed by the mailbox. Id. A search of the bags revealed evidence of the manufacture and use of methamphetamine. Id. The officers then obtained a warrant, searched Lovell's automobile and home, and found additional evidence. Id. at 396. Lovell was charged with dealing in methamphetamine and possession of chemical reagents or precursors with intent to manufacture. Id. at 397. She moved to suppress the evidence found in the trash bags and the evidence found pursuant to the resulting search warrant. Id. The trial court denied her motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that the search was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 398. The court pointed out many other houses had garbage bags next to their mailboxes and apparently Lovell's and the others' bags had been placed out for trash pickup. Id. The court also noted that the officers seized the garbage in the same way that garbage collectors would and did not trespass onto the Lovell's property. Id. In State v. Stamper, 788 N.E.2d 862, 863 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) trans. denied, Stamper placed a garbage bag at the bottom of a garbage pile on his property an undetermined distance from the end of his driveway. A No Trespassing sign was posted on the property near the garbage pile. Police went onto the property and retrieved the bag. A search of the bag revealed evidence of marijuana use. The Stamper court held the search unreasonable based on the police entry onto Stamper's property. Id. at 866 n. 2. The court explained, If we were to hold otherwise, police could search everyone's opaque garbage bags on their property without reason and thereby learn of their activities, associations, and beliefs. Id. at 867 (citing State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276 (1985)). The Court of Appeals in this case acknowledged Stamper, but disagreed with a test of reasonableness based on whether the trash is on public or private property. Litchfield v. State, 808 N.E.2d 713, 716 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). The Litchfields urge us to adopt the reasoning in Stamper that whether police commit a trespass when searching a person's garbage is the decisive factor in determining the reasonableness of the search. They argue that we should hold that because Ringer entered their property to retrieve their garbage, the search of that garbage was unreasonable. The State argues that the Stamper court improperly applied Moran by affording too much weight to the fact that the police trespassed on Stamper's property. The State urges that whether or not police trespassed on a person's property is only one factor in the totality of circumstances Moran directs that whether the police enter unto the subject's property be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a search. We think that the reasonableness of officer conduct in searching a citizen's trash does not turn on whether or not the police entered onto the citizen's property. Property lines are wholly irrelevant to the degree of suspicion of a violation or the need for enforcement and largely irrelevant to the degree of intrusion inflicted by the search or seizure. Moreover, the precise boundaries of a piece of real estate are not always apparent to one viewing the property, and various easements may well complicate the effort to identify whether trash barrels are fair game. We also disagree with the view that searches of trash are per se unreasonable. Some states have invalidated all official searches of garbage. Most of them acknowledged, as stated in Greenwood, that a person may expect that his or her garbage is readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public. They reasoned explicitly or implicitly that people may nevertheless hold a different expectation as to access by police. State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, 576 A.2d 793, 805 (1990); see also People v. Krivda 5 Cal.3d 357, 96 Cal.Rptr. 62, 486 P.2d 1262, 1268 (1971) (defendants had a reasonable expectation that their trash would not be rummaged through and picked over by police officers acting without a search warrant); Tanaka, 701 P.2d at 1276-77 (people reasonably believe that police will not indiscriminately rummage through their trash bags to discover their personal effects); State v. Boland, 115 Wash.2d 571, 800 P.2d 1112, 1117 (1990) (while a person must reasonably expect a licensed trash collector will remove the contents of this trash can, this expectation does not also infer an expectation of governmental intrusion). We do not find the arguments for a per se rule persuasive. Seizure of trash that is in its usual location for pickup is no intrusion at all on the owner's liberty or property interests. The owner wants and expects the trash to go away, and who removes it is normally a matter of indifference. If the trash is located in the place where it is normally picked up, the trash collection agency, whether public or private, is invited onto the property to the extent necessary to gather and empty the trash. Police officers can perform the same acts with no greater intrusion. It is not the intrusion, but rather the concern for unwarranted official snooping that makes the identity and purpose of the collector significant. But even that consideration is more formal than substantive. At the point the trash is removed by the authorized collector it is presumably fair game. See Mast v. State, 809 N.E.2d 415, 417 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). Prohibiting officers from examining trash before it is collected thus imposes burdens on law enforcement by forcing officers to accompany or follow trash collectors or work at the city dump to do what might be much more easily accomplished but provides no real protection to the citizen. In sum, because there is no intrusion, if properly justified by other factors, a search of trash is reasonable. We think, however, that it is not reasonable for law enforcement to search indiscriminately through people's trash. As the majority explained in Moran, although a search of a person's garbage may be reasonable under specific circumstances, Hoosiers are not entirely comfortable with the idea of police officers casually rummaging through trash left at curbside. 644 N.E.2d at 541. We also agree with the conclusion of the Stamper court that police should not be permitted to enter a person's property and search his or her garbage without reason. 788 N.E.2d at 867. We think the concern for reasonable searches of trash is best addressed by the requirement that, in order for a search or seizure to be reasonable, trash must be retrieved in substantially the same manner as the trash collector would take it. If garbage has been placed out for collection at the usual place for collection and is easily accessible to any member of the public, in the absence of a mistake, any claim to possessory ownership has been abandoned. The citizen expects that trash to be collected and has effectively ceded all rights in it. See Moran, 644 N.E.2d at 541. There is therefore no material intrusion into the citizen's ordinary activities. As already noted, however, an important factor in evaluating a reasonable search is appropriate restriction on arbitrary selection of persons to be searched. We believe a requirement of articulable individualized suspicion, essentially the same as is required for a Terry stop of an automobile, imposes the appropriate balance between the privacy interests of citizens and the needs of law enforcement. Allowing random searches, or searches of those individuals whom the officers hope to find in possession of incriminating evidence gives excessive discretion to engage in fishing expeditions. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Bulington, 802 N.E.2d at 440; Baldwin, 715 N.E.2d at 337. In Article I, Section 11 terms, that is unreasonable. The police need not go to the lengths elaborated in Mast v. State, 809 N.E.2d 415 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), where police rode in the trash pickup and searched it only after it was taken by its usual collectors. But police do need to ensure that they do not cause a disturbance or create the appearance of a police raid of the residence. In this case, it is undisputed that the seized trash was left in barrels on the property in its regular place for collection. The Litchfields therefore abandoned it and exposed it to the public. It seems clear that the police acted reasonably by quickly and quietly retrieving the trash from the place it was ordinarily collected without creating undue embarrassment or indignity. However, we cannot determine from this record whether the information supplied by the DEA enabled the state police to be reasonably certain that the Litchfields had responded to an advertisement in High Times, or merely informed the police that the Litchfields had purchased from a vendor that coincidentally had advertised in that publication. There may be other facts bearing on whether the officers possessed articulable individualized grounds for suspicion that the Litchfields were involved in illegal activity. At the time of the suppression hearing, we had not yet expressly adopted the requirement that a search of a person's garbage be based on reasonable suspicion. There was no evidence presented on this issue and the trial court made no finding. We therefore remand this case to the trial court for a finding as to whether or not the officers possessed reasonable suspicion sufficient to obtain and search the Litchfield's garbage.