Opinion ID: 1989296
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Jury Instruction

Text: Collins next argues the trial court's jury instruction on the beyond a reasonable doubt standard was erroneous. As part of the explanation of reasonable doubt, the trial judge added: All that is necessary is that the State prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, beyond a doubt based on reason. In other words, you must be reasonably certain of the guilt of the accused in order to convict. You can have some doubt and still have the finding of guilt. The proof necessary is that which you would act upon in important matters involving important affairs in your own personal lives or businesses. Defense counsel excepted to this definition of reasonable doubt. The court then reinstructed the jury as follows: Also in the burden of proof that the State must meet ... is proof beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty. You must be satisfied to that extent as to each element of the various charges. Counsel maintains that the wording reasonably certain was misleading and significantly lowered the burden of proof. The use of the phrase reasonably certain allegedly conveyed a confusing message as to a vital component of every criminal trial. In Poole v. State, 295 Md. 167, 453 A.2d 1218 (1983), we discussed the adequacy of a reasonable doubt instruction in a death penalty case and stated: It is well settled that `when objection is raised to a court's instruction, attention should not be focused on a particular portion lifted out of context, but rather its adequacy is determined by viewing it as a whole.' Id. at 186, 453 A.2d at 1228; quoting State v. Foster, 263 Md. 388, 397, 283 A.2d 411, 415 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 908, 92 S.Ct. 1616, 31 L.Ed.2d 818 (1972). In an earlier case, Lambert v. State, 193 Md. 551, 559, 69 A.2d 461, 464 (1949), we noted that it is proper for a judge to comment or explain the meaning of reasonable doubt. A definition is not reversible error unless, by reason of peculiar circumstances or phraseology, such an instruction misleads or confuses the jury. Id.; see also Lansdowne v. State, 287 Md. 232, 241, 412 A.2d 88, 92 (1980); see also Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 155, 438 A.2d 490 (1981). Lambert found it was not erroneous to instruct the jury that evidence is sufficient to remove a reasonable doubt when it convinces the judgment of an ordinarily prudent man of the truth of a proposition with such force that he would act upon that conviction without hesitation in his own most important affairs. Lansdowne held a trial judge must give an instruction correctly explaining reasonable doubt if requested by the accused. Id. [287 Md.] at 243, 412 A.2d at 93. The current version of the Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions replaces the without hesitation phrase with an amended term without reservation so that the jury will not confuse the degree of certainty needed with an immediacy of acting upon the certainty. MPJI-Cr 2:02 (1987). In reviewing the instructions given as a whole in the instant case, including the reinstruction, we find that the trial judge repeatedly and properly focused on the term reasonable doubt as the appropriate standard of proof required. The court's reinstruction emphasized that the State must prove each and every element of the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Counsel's failure to except to the reinstruction is indicative of an acceptance and approval of the amended form used. Under these circumstances, defense counsel has failed to preserve the challenge to the court's instructions on reasonable doubt. Maryland Rule 4-325(e) provides that no party may assign as error the giving or failing to give an instruction unless the party objects on the record promptly after the court instructs the jury, stating distinctly the matter to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection. We have previously applied this rule in the context of a death penalty appeal. Mills v. State, 310 Md. 33, 68-69, 527 A.2d 3, 20 (1987), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988); Booth v. State, 306 Md. 172, 193, 507 A.2d 1098, 1108-09 (1986), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987). See generally Young v. State, 14 Md. App. 538, 565-66, 288 A.2d 198, 213-14 (1972) (Where there was no objection in the trial court to a judge's supplementary instructions to the jury, the appellant could not assign error as of right.).