Opinion ID: 285525
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: legality of the hershey directive's deferment policy.

Text: 87 Although appellants, who moved for summary judgment below, now seek reversal on the merits, appellee has chosen to rest on procedural contentions; and he does not suggest that any disputed issues of fact make summary judgment inappropriate. Nonetheless, we would be reluctant to decide the merits if the legal question were complex or uncertain. It is neither. And since its resolution does not turn on any issue of fact, no purpose would be served by remanding to permit initial consideration by the District Court. 88 Insofar as the individual classification decisions of the Selective Service System are unreviewable in theory or in practice, the Hershey directive's deferment policy establishes the System as the final arbiter of the legality of protest activities under the law and the validity of laws regulating protest under the Constitution. Such authority vested in draft boards could itself survive First Amendment challenge only if required by an imperious public interest that could be served by no means which would sweep less broadly over legitimate dissent. 51 Since prosecution of illegal and unprotected conduct under the criminal laws, subject to traditional procedural safeguards and to judicial scrutiny of the laws themselves, is a narrower alternative means to the ends served by the Hershey policy, that policy appears to be constitutionally unsound. In any event, the constitutional doubts are sufficiently grave that it could be authorized only by the most explicit statutory language. And far from containing such language, the Selective Service Act appears to exclude protest activity as a relevant basis for classification. 89 The exemption and deferment provisions of the Act vary in the breadth of discretion they accord the President and, through him, the Selective Service System. In some cases, they make no mention of any presidential discretion. For example, the statute provides unequivocally that ordained ministers shall be exempt. 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(g) (1964). Similarly, it directs that nothing in it shall be construed to require military service by conscientious objectors. 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(j) (Supp. III, 1965-67). In other cases, the President is required to defer a specified class of registrants, but is expressly given discretion to implement this requirement by prescribing rules and regulations. Thus, Section 456(h) (1) says that he shall, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, provide for the deferment    of persons satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of instruction at a college [or] university, 90 and declares that such student deferments, once granted, shall continue until the student graduates, backslides academically, or grows too old, or until the President makes a finding that the needs of the Armed Forces require their termination. 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(h) (1) (Supp. III, 1965-67). Still other provisions define classes of registrants the President may, but need not, defer according to such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, if he finds their designated activities to be necessary to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest. 50 U.S.C.App. § 456 (h) (2) (Supp. III, 1965-67). 91 The justiciable portion of the Hershey directive purports to authorize reclassification, independently of the delinquency regulations, of any registrant who engages in illegal protest activity. We have denominated this portion the deferment policy in order to distinguish it from the policy of reclassification pursuant to the delinquency regulations. There is, however, no reason to believe that the deferment policy intends any distinction between deferments and exemptions. It asserts without qualification that, upon receipt of evidence relating to the basis of classification arising out of illegal demonstrations, a local board may reopen the classification of the registrant and classify him anew.    52 This policy is in blatant conflict with the statutory language prescribing mandatory relief from military obligation for ministers and conscientious objectors. 53 92 The conflict is only somewhat less apparent where the President is specifically given discretion to prescribe rules and regulations, or to deny deferments to an entire class. 54 The clear pattern of the Act is to define classes of persons whose deferment or exemption Congress has concluded either is in fact, or may be, in the national interest, and to allow the President more or less discretion to decide who falls within each designated class. It would do extreme violence to this pattern to hold that the President by regulation — much less the Selective Service Director by directive — may exclude from the statutory class persons who plainly fall within the contours Congress has defined. Such a holding would license the Selective Service System to defeat rather than to implement the apparent Congressional purpose. 93 Nor does the fact that local boards are given final authority to determine a registrant's eligibility for a class which Congress has directed the President to defer mean that such boards may use any criteria of membership that they or their Director may think proper. So construed, the statute would make the boards freewheeling agencies meting out their [own] brand of justice  , and would raise serious questions as to whether Congress could delegate such power without setting any limiting standards. Oestereich v. Selective Service System, supra, 393 U.S. at 237, 89 S.Ct. 414. We think the test of eligibility for any deferment or exemption to be applied by the local boards is the definition of the deferrable class prescribed by Congress, as supplemented by regulations reasonably and consistently lending precision to that definition. 94 General Hershey's asserted authority rests on the following syllogism: deferments are given only when they serve the national interest; illegal activity which interferes with recruiting or causes refusal of duty    is not in the national interest; therefore it follows that such activity may deprive a registrant of his deferment. Even if both premises were conceded, the conclusion does not follow. That some of a man's activities are contrary to the national interest has no necessary bearing on the value to the nation of the activities or pursuits for which he was deferred. The research activities of a doctor or atomic scientist are no less in the national interest because he also cheats on his income tax, distributes pornography, beats his wife, or marches for peace. Until Congress says that deferments are conditioned on good behavior we must assume that it meant to defer those who engage in the activities it declared to be in the national interest, and not only those whose general deportment is above a draft board's reproach. 55 95 Accordingly, we hold that the deferment policy announced in the Hershey directive is unauthorized and contrary to the law. Cf. Wolff v. Selective Service Local Board No. 16, supra. Aside from violations covered by the delinquency regulations — the legality of which is not properly before us — a registrant's protest activities are not to be considered in determining his selective service classification. 96 For many reasons we do not, however, grant the requested injunction to accompany this declaratory judgment. The practical problems of enforcing an injunction against every local and appellate draft board are staggering. In view of the wide and largely final discretion enjoyed by these boards, it will often be impossible to detect any use of illicit criteria. Indeed, we do not even know that the offending portion of the directive is in fact being widely applied. Moreover, respect for the integrity of a coordinate branch of government argues for judicial restraint. Finally, we have no reason to believe that draft board members would act contrary to the law as judicially declared. 56 97 We remand to the District Court for entry of a declaratory judgment not inconsistent with this opinion. 98 Reversed.