Opinion ID: 3154798
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Harmless Error Review of the Timely Objections

Text: First, we consider the three objections that were made in a timely fashion. Under harmless error review, we perform a de novo review of the record and determine whether the prosecutor’s actions were improper.5 If no misconduct occurred, the analysis ends. If misconduct has occurred, then we must determine “whether the misconduct prejudicially affected the defendant.”6 To determine whether the misconduct prejudicially affected the defendant, we apply the three factors indentified in Hughes v. 3 Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 148 (Del. 2006) (citation omitted). 4 The trial court reviewed, under the harmless error standard, one objection made during the State’s closing argument and two objections made immediately after. It reviewed the three objections made after trial under the plain error standard. 5 Kirkley v. State, 41 A.3d 372, 376 (Del. 2012) (citing Baker, 906 A.2d at 148). 6 Id. (citing Baker, 906 A.2d at 148). 6 State,7 which are: (1) the closeness of the case, (2) the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and (3) the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error (the “Hughes test”).8 “The factors in the Hughes test are not conjunctive and do not have the same impact in every case; for example, one factor may outweigh the other two.”9 Even if the conduct is not found to have prejudiced the defendant under Hughes, Delaware courts must apply the test articulated in Hunter v. State,10 which considers “whether the prosecutor’s statements are repetitive errors that require reversal because they cast doubt on the integrity of the judicial process” (the “Hunter test”).11 Thus, we first examine whether there has been prosecutorial misconduct through a harmless error review. Spence’s three timely objections include the following: (1) during the State’s closing argument, Spence objected to the statement, “[t]hat’s what Christopher Spence said in front of you, because he wants you to believe his story[;]” 12 (2) after the State’s closing argument, Spence objected to a PowerPoint slide that was displayed during the closing, which showed the word “MURDER” in large, red lettering and juxtaposed with an image of Williams’s body (“Slide 067”); and, (3) after the State’s closing argument, Spence objected to certain statements that, he argued, undermined the dangerousness of the Sure Shots at a time when the State was simultaneously prosecuting members of the gang for multiple acts of violence in other criminal proceedings. 7 437 A.2d 559 (Del. 1981). 8 Id. at 571 (quoting Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C. App. 1980)). 9 Baker, 906 A.2d at 149. 10 815 A.2d 730 (Del. 2002). 11 Id. at 733. 12 A126 (Tr. 27:1-3). 7 As to the first objection, the State’s comment referred specifically to prior testimony. We have held that “[p]rosecutors may refer to statements or testimony as a ‘lie’ . . . only if the ‘prosecutor relates his argument to specific evidence which tends to show that the testimony or statement is a lie.’”13 The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the prosecutor was referring to prior testimony regarding a Jamaican sign of music appreciation known as “bigging up a song.” Multiple witnesses testified that, in Jamaican reggae culture, pointing two fingers in the air and saying “blau, blau, blau” is a sign of appreciation for a song. However, during testimony, Spence stated that the gesture was used as a threat. The prosecutor’s statement, which Spence objected to, referred specifically to that testimony, and was not a general or sweeping comment that Spence was lying. Therefore, we agree with the trial court that the statement failed to rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct. The second objection concerns Slide 067. The slide displayed a picture of Williams’s body, splayed and bloodied, and read “Christopher Spence’s actions led to . . . Terror . . . Fear . . . And to the ultimate crime . . . MURDER[.]”14 The word “MURDER” appeared in large, red lettering. The picture used was an exhibit, which had been properly admitted into evidence during the trial. The slide was the last of the presentation and contained the photograph of the victim, displayed for the third time. On appeal, Spence contends that “[t]he State’s additional commentary and improper visual aids unfairly ignited the ‘flames of passion’ immediately prior to jury deliberations.” 13 Warren v. State, 774 A.2d 246, 256 (Del. 2001) (quoting Hughes, 437 A.2d at 571)). 14 A210. 8 As to Slide 067, the trial court stated that, “[w]hether this conduct amounted to prosecutorial misconduct at all is questionable.”15 In fact, it appeared that the trial court was prepared to provide, if one had been requested, a curative instruction. 16 But rather than make an explicit finding, the trial court determined that, “regardless of whether this conduct does in fact amount to misconduct, in order to determine whether reversal is warranted the remaining two steps of harmless error must be applied.” 17 It then found that any error was harmless. While a specific finding as to prosecutorial misconduct may not have been necessary in view of the remainder of the trial court’s analysis, we address this point specifically in order to provide guidance to the Bar, as the use of PowerPoint presentations and their acceptable boundaries in criminal prosecutions present issues of first impression in Delaware. Because this is a novel issue in this State, we have examined recent decisions from our sister courts across the country. The Supreme Court of Washington has addressed similar issues in two recent opinions. First, in In re Glasmann,18 the Supreme Court of Washington determined that the word “GUILTY,” displayed in red font across the booking photograph of the defendant, was an impermissible appeal to the jury’s emotions. It granted a new trial because the prosecution’s slideshow presentation contained multiple assertions of the defendant’s guilt, statements that the jurors could only acquit the defendant if they 15 State v. Spence, 2014 WL 2089506, at  (Del. Super. May 15, 2014). 16 A128 (Tr. 35:7-18). 17 Spence, 2014 WL 2089506, at . 18 286 P.3d 673 (Wash. 2012). 9 believed the defendant’s trial testimony, and improperly modified exhibits.19 In addition, the court found the misconduct to be so pervasive that it could not have been cured by an instruction. Second, and more recently, in State v. Walker,20 the Supreme Court of Washington reversed a defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecution “committed egregious misconduct in its closing PowerPoint presentation[.]”21 There, the court found that the prosecution’s slideshow was improper because it included multiple exhibits that were altered with inflammatory captions and superimposed text; it suggested to the jury that [the defendant] should 19 Spence also relies on State v. Rivera, a Superior Court of New Jersey case we find to be readily distinguishable. 99 A.3d 847 (N.J. App. Div. 2014). There, the court reversed the defendant’s convictions on the basis of the “cumulative impact of the prosecutor’s misconduct.” Id. at 865. The prosecutor, in Rivera, “declared [the defendant] guilty” twice. Id. at 854-55. In so declaring during its opening statement, the prosecution showed a PowerPoint, which “contain[ed] a photograph showing [the] defendant’s face and neck, which [was] displayed with a bright red border. It also include[d] text, printed in the same color and density, ‘Defendant GUILTY OF: ATTEMPTED MURDER.’ The words ‘Defendant’ and ‘GUILTY OF:’ appear[ed] on separate lines to the right of [the] defendant’s photograph, and ‘ATTEMPTED MURDER’ appear[ed] below the photograph in much larger typeface.” Id. at 854 (emphasis in original). In reversing the defendant’s convictions, the Rivera court recognized that New Jersey’s Supreme Court “has consistently condemned conduct that invades the exclusive province of the jury to resolve factual disputes, assess credibility and decide whether the State’s evidence establishes guilt.” Id. at 856 (citations omitted). Further, the court suggested that “[i]t is difficult to conclude that a prosecutor’s declaration of the defendant’s guilt before the first witness is sworn would not have invaded the province of the jurors.” Id. Finally, the Rivera prosecutor used the PowerPoint presentation in summations and “included statements about the law of self-defense that were so oversimplified as to be misleading.” Id. at 864. Four of the prosecution’s final five slides employed oversimplified summaries of the law of self-defense. Id. at 864-65. The court concluded that, despite the judge’s instructions to the jury, “the sheer quantity and variety of highly prejudicial remarks, visual displays and a courtroom antic, give us reason to have serious doubt about the jurors’ capacity to follow those instructions.” Id. at 865 (citations omitted). Because the prosecutor’s conduct here does not approach the degree of repetition in Rivera, we find the instant matter to be distinguishable. 20 341 P.3d 976 (Wash. 2015), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2844 (2015). 21 Id. at 985. 10 be convicted because he is a callous and greedy person who spent the robbery proceeds on video games and lobster; it plainly juxtaposed photographs of the victim with photographs of [the defendant] and his family, some altered with racially inflammatory text; and it repeatedly and emphatically expressed a personal opinion on [the defendant’s] guilt.22 The PowerPoint was approximately 250 slides in length, with over 100 such slides containing the heading “DEFENDANT WALKER GUILTY OF PREMEDITATED MURDER.” The court also noted that two slides had the heading “DEFENDANT WALKER GUILTY OF ASSAULT IN THE FIRST DEGREE,” and three had the heading “DEFENDANT WALKER GUILTY OF SOLICITATION TO COMMIT ROBBERY.” Additionally, the PowerPoint included the words “GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT” over the defendant’s booking photo. The lettering was bright red. The Supreme Court of Washington observed that “[c]losing argument provides an opportunity to draw the jury’s attention to the evidence presented, but it does not give a prosecutor the right to present altered versions of admitted evidence to support the State’s theory of the case, to present derogatory depictions of the defendant, or to express personal opinions on the defendant’s guilt.”23 It found the State’s misconduct to be so flagrant, pervasive, and prejudicial that it could not have been overcome with a timely objection and an instruction to the jury to disregard the improper slides.24 22 Id. at 985. 23 Id. (citation omitted). 24 Id. The court noted that “[t]he voluminous number of slides depicting statements of the prosecutor’s belief as to [the] defendant’s guilt, shown to the jury just before it was excused for deliberations, is presumptively prejudicial and may in fact be difficult to overcome, even with an instruction.” Id. at 986. 11 In Lopez-Bonilla v. State,25 the Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed a trial court’s judgment of conviction and considered a defendant’s argument that “the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during rebuttal closing argument by briefly displaying photographs of him and the co[-]defendant with the word ‘guilty’ across the front.”26 Notably, the trial court disallowed a PowerPoint presentation offered by the defendant “because it found some of the presentation to be extremely inflammatory, prejudicial, inappropriate, and biased.”27 Nonetheless, the trial court allowed the prosecution to display the marked photographs. Lopez-Bonilla’s co-defendant objected to the photographs, “conceding that their limited use was proper but objecting to any prolonged display, and the [trial] court sustained the objection” when the photographs were shown for a second time.28 The Supreme Court of Nevada upheld Lopez-Bonilla’s conviction, providing: “even assuming error, we conclude that [the defendant] fail[ed] to establish that [the photographs] affected his substantial rights.”29 A different result was obtained in the Supreme Court of Nevada in Watters v. State,30 where the prosecution, during its opening statement, utilized a PowerPoint slide showing the defendant’s booking photograph with the word “GUILTY” displayed “across his battered face.”31 While the offending slide was displayed to the jury, the prosecutor stated: “So after hearing the evidence in the case, we’re going to ask you to 25 2015 WL 1797303 (Nev. Apr. 15, 2015). 26 Id. at . 27 Id. at . 28 Id. at . 29 Id. (citations omitted). 30 313 P.3d 243 (Nev. 2013). 31 Id. at 245. 12 find the [d]efendant guilty on possession of stolen vehicle, guilty on grand larceny auto, and guilty on failure to stop on a police officer’s signal.”32 In reversing and remanding for a new trial, the Supreme Court of Nevada rejected the State’s harmless error argument, which was based upon the fact that “the PowerPoint was not admitted into evidence; the jury was instructed on the presumption of innocence at the beginning and end of trial; the slides were displayed only briefly; and the evidence of [the defendant’s] guilt was overwhelming.”33 In rejecting the State’s argument, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that, “in the presumption-of-innocence context, ‘[t]he actual impact of a particular practice on the judgment of jurors cannot always be fully determined,’ and the [United States] Supreme Court ‘has left no doubt that the probability of deleterious effects on fundamental rights calls for close judicial scrutiny.’”34 In State v. Kalmio,35 the Supreme Court of North Dakota declined to reverse a defendant’s conviction on the grounds that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by displaying slides with “images of a gun and red circles” that were not in evidence and which the defendant “claimed resembled blood.”36 The trial court sustained the defendant’s objections to the slides and instructed “the jury to disregard the images.”37 Further, the trial judge directed the jury “that any comments or statements by counsel concerning the evidence which are not supported by the evidence should be disregarded 32 Id. at 246 (emphasis in original). 33 Id. at 248. 34 Id. at 248-49 (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976)). 35 846 N.W.2d 752 (N.D. 2014). 36 Id. at 766. 37 Id. 13 and the jury member[s] should rely on their own recollection or observation.”38 In affirming the trial court’s judgment, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that “the prosecutor’s attempt to use two images during closing argument was not sufficiently prejudicial to violate [the defendant’s] due process rights because the [trial] court directed the images to be removed and the jury to disregard the images.”39 These cases demonstrate that the question of whether slideshow presentations rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct is a highly-contextualized and fact-specific analysis.40 As a general matter, PowerPoint presentations are not inherently good or bad. Rather, their content and application determines their propriety. This Court does not seek to discourage the use of technology in closing arguments to summarize and highlight relevant evidence for the benefit of the jury. But slides may not be used to put forward impermissible evidence or make improper arguments before the jury. A PowerPoint may not be used to make an argument visually that could not be made orally. While prosecutors are given latitude in making closing arguments, his or her comments must be limited to properly admitted evidence and any reasonable inferences or conclusions that can be drawn therefrom. The prosecutor may neither misstate the law nor express his or 38 Id. at 767 (citation omitted). 39 Id. 40 It would be, no doubt, perilous for this Court to attempt to derive specific rules regarding visual aids. For example, use of the color red is not always prejudicial. Use of capitalized letters does not necessarily constitute “shouting.” The word “guilty,” when presented as a written word in a visual aid, does not always constitute an improper expression of a prosecutor’s opinion of guilt. 14 her personal opinion on the merits of the case or the credibility of witnesses.41 A defendant should timely object to improper comments or slideshow presentations, so that the trial court is offered an opportunity to address any objections. In the instant matter, we conclude that the prosecutor’s use of Slide 067 was improper and that the display of Williams’s bloody body with the words “Terror,” “Fear,” and “MURDER” in red lettering served no purpose other than to attempt to inflame the jury. Closing arguments are an opportunity for counsel to argue reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. While the prosecutor is entitled to focus the jury’s attention on admitted evidence, a slide that achieves no end but to inflame the passions of the jury is improper. This conclusion flows from the recognition that prosecutors represent the people of the State and must act impartially in the pursuit of justice. Fanning the flames of a jury’s collective emotions through the use of improper PowerPoint slides to obtain a conviction does not serve the interests of justice.42 41 See generally Kyle C. Reeves, PowerPoint in Court: The Devil’s Own Device, or a Potent Prosecution Tool?, 48 PROSECUTOR 26, 28-29 (2014) (“An informal survey of cases reported in all 50 states found that 37 states . . . have appellate decisions in criminal cases that mention the use of PowerPoint by the prosecutor at some phase of trial—almost always in conjunction with a defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct. . . . Of the 37 states where the reported cases mention PowerPoint, seven states . . . have reported one or more criminal cases being reversed because of prosecutorial misconduct involving the use of PowerPoint.”) (citations omitted). 42 See Bennett v. State, 164 A.2d 442, 446 (Del. 1960) (“A prosecuting attorney represents all the people, including the defendant who [is] being tried. It is his [or her] duty to see that the State’s case is presented with earnestness and vigor, but it is equally his [or her] duty to see that justice be done by giving [the] defendant a fair and impartial trial.”); Mitchell v. State, 2014 WL 1202953, at  (Del. Mar. 21, 2014) (same); Miller v. State, 893 A.2d 937, 951 n.51 (Del. 2006) (same, and also noting that “prosecutors must resist the urge to win at all costs” (citation omitted) (internal quotation omitted)); Taylor v. State, 827 A.2d 24, 27 (Del. 2003) (quoting Bennett, 164 A.2d at 446) (referencing the prosecutor’s “dual obligation to present the State’s case ‘with earnestness and vigor’ while discharging ‘his duty to see that justice be done by giving defendant a fair and impartial trial’”); Price v. State, 858 A.2d 930, 941 (Del. 2004) (“A 15 The third objection raised at trial was with respect to statements which Spence argued undermined the dangerousness of the Sure Shots gang. At times during summation, the State asserted that Sure Shots was a violent gang, and, in its PowerPoint, stated that Spence could only recall two incidents involving the Sure Shots besides the so-called Palmer Murder. The State argued that, even though the gang was violent, Spence had knowledge of only a few violent incidents involving the Sure Shots, and none of the incidents involved the victims in the instant matter, and, thus, it was unlikely that Spence subjectively believed his life was in danger when he shot Williams and Allen. Based on the record, we agree with the trial court that the State maintained that the Sure Shots was a dangerous gang. The statements, both in the PowerPoint presentation and during the State’s closing, describe the Sure Shots as such. Because Spence’s subjective belief as to the danger he found at the time of the shooting was the focus of his defense, we agree with the trial court that these statements did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct.