Opinion ID: 2582226
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: The Court's Opinion

Text: ¶ 3 The court and the author of the statement in concurrence argue that population-based classifications are not repugnant to § 46 if they are not arbitrary and capricious. In other words, a general law that is local in its application is not offensive to § 46. They interpret the aberrational pronouncement in Edmonds [3] as declaring all non-arbitrary population-based classifications harmonious with § 46. Because the statute under construction in Edmonds was permissive [4] rather than obligatory, the except as otherwise provided language of § 46 was properly invoked. [5] The statute here before us is not permissive. It requires certain municipalities to deal with their workers by application of collective bargaining process. To apply § 46's permissive language to obligatory acts expands the exception to swallow the rule. ¶ 4 Obligatory acts on prohibited subjects which apply to some counties on a population-based classification are clearly repugnant to § 46. To suggest otherwise perpetuates the fiction that general law with restricted local application, such as that found in this Act, and special law that passes constitutional muster are to receive identical legal treatment. [6] Both are permissible under § 59 but not so under § 46. To say both are to be treated alike confuses the analysis fitting under § 59 with that which is required under § 46. The court and the author of the statement in concurrence are actually applying a § 59 analysis to a § 46 legal problem for which they fashioned a falsely-crafted dichotomy. ¶ 5 Assuming arguendo that obligatory acts with population-based classifications are permissible under § 46, the court and the author of the statement in concurrence still erroneously conclude the Act is a general law by finding the intent of the Act to be congruent with the classification. [7] Their approach is violative of the basic canon of construction that requires legislation to be construed in light of its identified purpose. [8] The expressly stated intent of the legislation here under scrutiny was to protect by collective bargaining process the employees of all municipalities in the State of Oklahoma. It is thus expressly incongruent with the Act's dichotomous division of municipalities. This is so because the population classification does not allow all similarly situated employees of all municipalities to be embraced within a single class. The Act is fraught with the vice of underinclusiveness because its sweep embraces less than an all-inclusive . . . class. [9] ¶ 6 Furthermore, the court and the author of the statement in concurrence fail to recognize that § 46 and Art. 18 § 3 analyses are incompatible. If municipal workers' bargaining rights are a matter of state interest, any regulation of this arena ought to be extended to all municipalities. Conversely, any law that affords disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals cannot be said to cover matters at large within the state. [10] The Act at issue is either a general law with local application affecting municipal matters [11] or, if it is of general application, the Act is unconstitutionally underinclusive. It does not embrace all similarly situated municipalities. The Act cannot be said to deal with a general matter of statewide concern and, in the same breath, have a restricted local application. ¶ 7 In summary, the Act's dichotomous division of cities by population for application to collective bargaining for city employees is not general but special law on a constitutionally impermissible subject. It offends the § 46's mandated norms of uniformity, symmetry and evenhanded treatment. The court's opinion and the author of the statement in concurrence confuse the prohibition of § 46 with the § 59 analytical framework and expand, without textual warrant, the permissive clause found in the former section. The § 46 and Art. 18 § 3 analyses which the court and the author of the statement in concurrence offer today are incompatible. ¶ 8 I hence dissent from the court's judgment, from its pronouncement, and from the statement in concurrence. TAYLOR, J., with whom WATT, C.J., and OPALA and COLBERT, JJ., join, dissenting. ¶ 1 The majority opinion holds the Oklahoma Municipal Employees Collective Bargaining Act (Act), [1] is a general law of statewide concern that operates upon a legitimate class of municipalities with more than 35,000 inhabitants. In my opinion, the Act is contrary to the Oklahoma Constitution, art. 5, §§ 46 and 59. I write in dissent to address the requirements of these two sections in our constitution and their application to the Act. ¶ 2 As detailed below, I read art. 5, § 46 as an injunction against the Legislature regulating the affairs of some, but not all, cities. In my opinion, art. 5, § 46 specifies cities as a group and requires that legislation regulating a municipal affair must operate uniformly upon all cities throughout the state. To test the Act's compliance with art. 5, § 46, we must identify the cities upon which the Legislature imposed the burden of collective bargaining. The Act, by its own terms, does not regulate the labor affairs of all cities in the State, rather it operates upon only a few cities. By limiting the Act's operation to only those municipalities with more than 35,000 inhabitants, the Legislature enacted a special law that is prohibited by art. 5, § 46 of the Oklahoma Constitution. ¶ 3 As also detailed below, I read art. 5, § 59 as a mandate to the Legislature to give uniform operation throughout the State to any law of a general nature. As a statewide concern, non-uniform municipal employees across the state have an interest in the right of collective bargaining. As a statewide concern, collective bargaining for non-uniform municipal employees is a subject of a general nature. To test the Act's compliance with art. 5, § 59, we must identify the municipal employees to whom the Legislature granted the right of collective bargaining. The Act, by its own terms, does not grant the right of collective bargaining to all interested non-uniform municipal employees throughout the State, rather it operates upon the employees of only a handful of cities in the State. By limiting the Act's operation to only those cities with more than 35,000 inhabitants, the Legislature prevented uniform operation of this law of a general nature contrary to the statewide uniformity mandate of art. 5, § 59 of the Oklahoma Constitution. ¶ 4 The Oklahoma Constitution, art. 5, § 46, provides in pertinent part: The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law authorizing: . . . Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, towns, wards, or school districts.... (Emphasis added.) ¶ 5 Included in the part of the original constitution entitled Limitations, art. 5, § 46 specifically prohibits the Legislature from passing local or special laws relating to twenty-eight subject areas. One of the twenty-eight subject areas listed in art. 5, § 46 is regulating the affairs ... of cities. This constitutional provision is designed to prevent legislators from interfering with local management by passing laws that single out some localities but leave others unaffected by the law. Bradford v. Cole, 1923 OK 571, 217 P. 470. At oral argument before this Court, all parties agreed the challenged Act regulates the affairs of cities and the majority opinion concludes the Act falls within this provision in art. 5, § 46. ¶ 6 In my opinion, laws relating to the twenty-eight subject areas listed in art. 5, § 46 must operate throughout the state so as not to be local or special. [2] That is, § 46 requires any statute regulating the affairs of cities to operate upon all cities throughout the state so as not to be a special law. It requires state legislation regulating the affairs of cities to embrace all cities in the state. This is the only meaningful reading of art. 5, § 46. Any other reading would allow the Legislature to regulate the affairs of some cities but not all cities, rendering the provision meaningless. ¶ 7 To test the Act's compliance with art. 5, § 46, we must determine if the Act operates upon all cities in the state. There are more than 150 cities in Oklahoma according to recent U.S. Census information in the appellate record. The Act expressly limits its operation to municipalities with more than 35,000 inhabitants, which, at the present time, is eleven cities. [3] Clearly, the Act does not embrace all cities in the state. It singles out a few cities upon which it imposes the burden of collective bargaining with non-uniform municipal employees, leaving all other cities unaffected. ¶ 8 We have said art. 5, § 46 is an absolute and unequivocal prohibition against special legislation in the listed subject areas. Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, ¶ 21, 760 P.2d 816, 824. I am cognizant of the general principles that the exercise of the legislative power has no limitations except by specific declarations in the state and federal constitutions and that the Legislature is presumed to have carefully observed the requirements in the constitution in enacting statutes. Way v. Grand Lake Ass'n, Inc., 1981 OK 70, ¶ 39, 635 P.2d 1010, 1017. When the Legislature has very obviously ignored an unequivocal constitutional prohibition, as in this case, the legal presumption of constitutional obedience rings empty and cannot save the legislation. In my opinion, legislation requiring only a handful of cities to engage in collective bargaining with their employees is special legislation contrary to the provisions of art. 5, § 46. ¶ 9 Article 5, § 46 prohibits the Legislature from reaching down into the city council chambers in a few cities and regulating their labor affairs through a collective-bargaining mandate. Article 5, § 46 is a restraint against the very kind of disparate legislative regulation of cities meted out in the Act. Were I writing for the Court, I would find that art. 5, § 46 classifies municipalities into two groupscities and townsand that any legislation attempting to regulate municipal affairs must affect all cities and/or all towns, unless and until the Legislature enacts a general law classifying cities and/or towns based on population for organizational and operational purposes under art. 18, § 1. [4] ¶ 10 The majority opinion and the separate concurring opinion view art. 5, § 46 as authorizing class legislation in the listed subject areas. I do not. In my view, the subject areas specified in art. 5, § 46 are subjects of interest to inhabitants across the state, inhabitants in every town or city or county or school district. They are subjects that are general in nature. Under art. 5, § 46, citizens across the state must be subjected to the same rates of interest, the same procedure to file a mechanics' and materialmen's lien and the same periods of time for tax assessments. Although the differences in the highly-populated and the sparsely-populated areas of this state might present a reasonable basis for classifying localities for some purposes, it is not reasonable to prescribe different rates of interest to be paid by the citizens based on population or different procedures for filing mechanics' and materialmen's liens against the property of citizens based on population or different periods for assessment of property taxes against the citizens based on population. Until today, § 46 prohibited such special legislation. With today's opinion, the Legislature could pass a law requiring adoptions to be filed only in the more populated counties where the services are more available for determining whether an adoption should be approved. The criminal laws, divorce laws, judgment enforcement laws and the rules of evidence, as well as municipal labor laws, are all matters of statewide concern that have no relationship to the population density of a county or municipality. ¶ 11 The Oklahoma Constitution, art. 5, § 59 reads: Laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the State, and where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be enacted. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 12 Both § 46 and § 59 of art. 5 were included in the original Constitution of the State of Oklahoma. While § 46 prohibits the Legislature from passing special laws relating to specific subject areas, § 59 requires the Legislature to give statewide uniform operation to all laws of a general nature. At statehood, the meanings of the terms special law, general law and law of a general nature were established. [5] A law of a general nature related to a subject matter of common interest to the whole state; a general law related to a subject matter of common interest to the whole state and embraced the whole subject or a whole class related to the subject; and a special law related to particular persons or things of a class. J.G. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction, 148-150 (1891). We should read these constitutional provisions to give effect to the intent of the framers and the people in adopting them. Boswell v. State, 1937 OK 727, 74 P.2d 940. ¶ 13 The prototype for art. 5, § 59 was in the Constitution of Kansas, art. 2, § 17, which read: All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state; and in all cases where a general law can be made, no special law shall be enacted. [6] Before it was included in Oklahoma's Constitution, this provision was unique to Kansas. Rambo v. Larrabee, 67 Kan. 634, 73 P. 915, 916 (1903). ¶ 14 Our early jurisprudence relied upon Kansas law in deciding whether the Legislature violated art. 5, § 59. Anderson v. Ritterbusch, 1908 OK 250, ¶¶ 25-27, 98 P. 1002; State ex rel Smith v. Brown, 1909 OK 199, ¶¶ 7-8,103 P. 762. In explaining the uniformity requirement for a law of a general nature, the Anderson court, at ¶ 26, quoted Noffzigger v. McAllister, 12 Kan. 315 (1873): . . . Whenever a law of a general nature is passed by the Legislature for the whole state, and is not applied by the Legislature to any particular locality thereof, and has no words prohibiting its operation in any particular locality thereof, it is a law having a uniform operation throughout the state, within the meaning of said constitutional provision, although it may not practically have operation in every part of the state. ¶ 15 In construing the Kansas prototype, Rambo, 73 P. at 916, explained that the constitutional section was adopted as an injunction against the custom of state legislatures carving out from the body of citizenship special individuals and special classes of individuals to grant them privileges or immunities which should have been accorded to all those of the class to which the favored ones belonged. It was to prevent limited application of laws of a general nature. Id. at 918. ¶ 16 Rambo held that whether a law is general in its nature is a judicial question and not a legislative question. The courts were to determine the nature of the law by identifying the rights, benefits or immunities it granted and the burdens it imposed and determining whether the state had a common interest in the subject matter. Discussing a similar provision in the Ohio Constitution, Rambo observed that the uniform operation requirement for laws of a general nature was adopted to remedy the evil of the Legislature declaring certain acts to be crimes in certain localities but not in others as the legislature or the electors might decide. See, Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607 (1853); McGill v. The State, 34 Ohio St. 228 (1877). ¶ 17 The challenged legislation in Rambo required the county to provide a transcript to an indigent convicted of murder or manslaughter in any county containing more than 65,000 inhabitants. Inquiring into the nature of the act relating to criminal procedure, Rambo found that the subject matter of the act interested all persons in the designated class, no matter where they resided in the state; that every poor, condemned person residing anywhere in the state had an interest in having the conviction reviewed in a higher court; and that no reason could be shown why the public should not afford this right to one residing in a county of 10,000 inhabitants as well as a county of 65,000. ¶ 18 In addition to the Kansas experience, several other states had experience with the uniformity requirement for laws of a general nature upon which the framers of Oklahoma's Constitution likely relied. In his treatise Statutes and Statutory Construction, J.G. Sutherland devoted an entire chapter to the requirements of general laws. In the second half of the Nineteenth Century, several state constitutions required statewide uniform operation of laws of a general nature. Id. at 144. The provision was intended to require just and equal laws and to prevent, as far as possible, enactments which were not such. Id. It was intended to prevent the granting of privileges to any citizens or class of citizens which was not granted to all the citizens upon the same terms. Id. at 151. The frequency and inconvenience of local and special legislation in public acts led to the adoption of the uniformity requirement. Id. at 147. ¶ 19 Sutherland explained that legislation is not of a general nature because it is a public law; [7] it is general because the subject matter is of common interest to the whole state and the provisions embrace the whole state or a whole class. Sutherland recognized that generic subjects of legislation may be divided. For instance, laws dealing with people may be divided into classes such as voters, sane and insane persons, minors, husband and wife, parents and children. He also explained that the subject of a statute may be general, but if the statute is limited in its scope, it may be a special statute. Id. at 151. For instance, fees for local officers is a general subject and extends to every political subdivision in the state, but a statute prescribing fees for particular counties is a special law on a general subject. Id. at 152. He further explained that a law on a subject general in nature may operate only upon a class if the class has peculiar characteristics which require exclusive legislation. Id. at 162. ¶ 20 Many of these concepts relating to the uniformity requirement were set out in the early case of Burks v. Walker in deciding that the Superior Court Act was not contrary to art. 5, § 59: In order for a law to be general in its nature and to have a uniform operation, it is not necessary that it shall operate upon every person and every locality in the state. A law may be general and have a local application or apply to a designated class if it operates equally upon all the subjects within the class for which it was adopted. To determine whether or not a statute is general or special, courts will look to the statute to ascertain whether it will operate uniformly upon all the persons and parts of the state that are brought within the relation and circumstances provided by it. People ex rel. [Grinnell] v. Hoffman, 116 Ill. 587, 5 N.E. 596, 8 N.E. 788, 56 Am. Rep. 793; Nichols v. Walter et al., 37 Minn. 264, 33 N.W. 800. And the operation is uniform if it affects alike all persons in like situation. But where a statute operates upon a class, the classification must not be capricious or arbitrary and must be reasonable and pertain to some peculiarity in the subject matter calling for the legislation. As between the persons and places included within the operation of the law and those omitted, there must be some distinctive characteristic upon which a different treatment may be reasonably founded and that furnish a practical and real basis for discrimination. Nichols v. Walter, supra . (Emphasis added.) 1909 OK 317, ¶ 23, 109 P. 544, 549. ¶ 21 Faced with the task of bringing Oklahoma Territory and Indian Territory together as a single governmental entity, the framers of our constitution, undoubtedly, wanted to prevent legislation that would grant privileges to some persons but not others in the same circumstances or conditions. Article 5, § 59 was designed to require uniform operation of a law of a general nature upon all the interested persons throughout the state. Reynolds, supra. ¶ 22 The majority opinion applies the two-prong reasonable basis/rational relation test for uniform operation of a law of general nature to test the Act for conformity with art. 5, § 46. As to the first prong, the majority opinion finds that the evidence showing the differences between larger cities and smaller cities establishes a reasonable basis for the legislative classification. As to the second prong, the majority opinion offers a bare conclusion that the 35,000-population classification is closely related to the Act's objective without any supporting analysis or reasoning. As to art. 5, § 59, the majority opinion concludes the Act has uniform operation throughout the state because it applies to all eleven cities that have more than 35,000 inhabitants. ¶ 23 The majority opinion correctly recognizes that the key to a legitimate legislative classification is whether it embraces all of the given class. However, the opinion fails to identify the class that is the actual object of the legislation. An appropriate analysis of a legislative classification examines the persons, things or places that benefit from the legislation. Hudgins v. Foster, 1928 OK 243, ¶ 30, 267 P. 645, 649. Even though the Act classifies cities based on population, the stated object and purpose of the legislation is to benefit municipal employees by granting them the right to bargain collectively: The Legislature of the State of Oklahoma declares that it is the public policy of this state and the purpose of the Legislature in the enactment of this act to promote orderly and constructive employment relations between municipal employers and their employees, to increase the efficiency of state and local government throughout the state, and to ensure the health and safety of the citizens of this state. The Legislature has determined that these policies and purposes may best be accomplished by: 1. Granting to municipal employees the right to associate with others in organizing and choosing representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining; 2. Requiring municipal employers to recognize, negotiate and bargain with employee organizations representing municipal employees and to enter into written agreements evidencing the result of bargaining; and 3. Encouraging labor peace through the establishment of standards and procedures which protect the rights of the municipal employer, the municipal employee and the citizens of the state. 11 O.S.Supp.2004, § 51-201. ¶ 24 The express purposes of the Act relate to the need to encourage labor peace and prevent labor strikes in all municipalities in the state. The persons to benefit under the Act are non-uniform municipal employees. But without explanation, the Act embraces only some members within the entire class of non-uniform municipal employees. The majority opinion does not articulate how collective bargaining for some but not all of the state's municipal employees is reasonably related to the object and purposes of the Act. It fails to analyze the legitimacy of the classification of municipal employees based solely on population. See, Elias v. City of Tulsa, 1965 OK 164, ¶¶ 15-18, 408 P.2d 517, 520-521 (explaining that when the act itself discloses that the classification by population includes some but excludes others in the same or similar situation, it does not embrace all of the class that should naturally be embraced; it is a special law rested on a false or deficient classification that creates preference and inequality; and the classification may be a subterfuge designed to give the legislation an appearance of general law). ¶ 25 The inquiry should not be whether large municipalities are different from small municipalities as set out in the majority opinion. The proper question is whether the Legislature is prohibited from granting privileges to the public works employees of a city of 36,000 population but not granting the same privileges to the public works employees of a city of 34,000 population. This question requires this Court to determine whether there are distinctive characteristics between the public works employees of cities with more than 35,000 populations and the public works employees of cities with less than 35,000 populations. ¶ 26 There are no distinct differences between public works employees in some cities and public works employees in other cities, and legislation providing different treatment of public works employees based solely on population is constitutionally offensive. This Court said much the same in Maule v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 9 of Tulsa County, 1985 OK 110, ¶ 13, 714 P.2d 198, 204, when it concluded that [d]iscrimination between teachers employed by school districts based solely on population offends art. 5 § 46. (Emphasis added.) The majority opinion tacitly overrules Maule in this regard. ¶ 27 The majority opinion declares that the Act addresses an important statewide concern that will promote orderly and constructive employment relations between municipal employers and their employees. And then the majority opinion inexplicably turns that statewide concern and the promotion of constructive employment into a matter for only eleven cities in our state. How can a statewide concern be legitimately granted to the employees of only eleven cities? ¶ 28 Collective bargaining for non-uniform municipal employees is truly a statewide concern, as the majority opinion recognizes, and the Act should apply to all cities. Over the years the legislature has granted collective bargaining rights to policemen, firemen and teachers. [8] In each instance, those labor rights were conferred on these groups of public employees on a statewide basis and without regard to population or layers of personnel management. With the stated purpose and object of the legislation, the Act should embrace all non-uniform municipal employees or none of them. Population has absolutely no relation to the subject matter or the stated purpose and object of the Act. ¶ 29 The Act before us is a special law because it only applies to a small number of the state's non-uniform municipal employees and a small number of cities. The Act should be declared unconstitutional because it attempts to regulate the labor affairs of only a few cities. The Act should be declared unconstitutional because the population-based classification of cities is not reasonably related to the express purposes of the Act to promote orderly and constructive employment relations between municipal employers and their employees, to increase the efficiency of state and local government throughout the state, and to ensure the health and safety of the citizens of this state. The Act simply cannot promote constructive employment relations, efficient local government and citizen health and safety throughout the state because it affects only eleven cities in Oklahoma. The population-based classification of municipalities in the Act destroys rather than accomplishes the intended statewide labor peace and citizen health and safety. ¶ 30 In upholding the Oklahoma Municipal Employees Collective Bargaining Act and its selective operation upon eleven cities in the state, the majority opinion eviscerates the two-prong reasonable basis/rational relation test of classification developed under art. 5, § 59, adopts a single-prong reasonableness test and then liberally applies the reasonableness test for compliance with art. 5, § 46. Today's opinion renders art. 5, § 59 ineffective and envelopes § 46 into an ineffective § 59. Today's opinion approves of the very legislative mischief that the constitutional framers attempted to preventdisparate treatment of the people of this state in regard to the general subjects listed in art. 5, § 46 and disparate operation of a law of a general nature. I respectfully dissent.