Opinion ID: 852106
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Inextricably Intertwined Exception Under Section 13.

Text: We agree with the U.S. Supreme Court in Cobb that a primary concern in assessing the scope of the constitutional right to counsel protections is society's interest in the ability of police to talk to witnesses and suspects, even those who have been charged with other offenses. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 171-72, 121 S.Ct. 1335. Furthermore, proper Miranda warnings can alleviate many concerns in the context of custodial interrogations. Compare id. at 171, 121 S.Ct. 1335, with Malinski, 794 N.E.2d at 1076-80. However, Miranda protections will not arisemuch less be sufficientwhere, as here, there is no custodial interrogation involved and the defendant is wholly unaware that he is being questioned by a de facto agent of the state. And more importantly, the state's interest in protecting society by investigating potential criminal activities must be balanced with the defendant's right to aid of counsel before facing the full power of the prosecutorial state. Furthermore, Justice Breyer's observations in Cobb seem well taken. See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 183, 121 S.Ct. 1335 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Blockburger testand the correlative test for double jeopardy developed under our cases applying Article 1, Section 14, of the Indiana Constitution is deliberately narrow in scope. The test seeks to determine whether a single act or criminal transaction constitutes a violation of two or more separate and distinct statutory crimes. See Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 & 50 n. 41 (Ind.1999). That determination is not at issue here. Here, the question is whether two or more acts or criminal transactions are so closely related that the right to counsel for one offense must necessarily apply to the other. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1223. Simply put, we conclude that the Blockburger test is a little out of place on questions like the one before us. In light of our traditional view that Article 1, Section 13 provides broader protection than the Sixth Amendment, we believe the inextricably intertwined exception is appropriate under our Constitution. It properly reflects the balance we seek to maintain between society's legitimate law enforcement needs and a defendant's right to counsel. The inextricably intertwined exception to the general rule that Section 13's right to counsel protection is offense specific applies when it was objectively foreseeable that the pending offense, for which the right to counsel has already attached, was so inextricably intertwined with the offense under investigation that the right to counsel for the pending offense could not be constitutionally isolated from the right to counsel for the offense under investigation. [13] The inquiry focuses on the nature of the conduct involved rather than on the elements of the offenses. A reviewing court must examine and compare all the facts and circumstancesas known at the time of the investigation related to the conduct, including the nature of the conduct, the identity of the persons involved (including the victim, if any), and the timing, motive, and location of the crimes. [14] None of those factors is particularly dispositive, nor do all factors need to tip in favor of the exception for it to apply. However, the greater the commonality of the factors and the more directly linked the conduct involved, the more likely it is that the two offenses are inextricably intertwined.