Opinion ID: 1908635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the conspiracy jury instruction.

Text: Appellant Landon contends that the trial court gave erroneous jury instructions on the elements of conspiracy. Landon had requested the standard eight-page conspiracy instruction that appeared in the then-current third edition of Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 4.92, at 298-305 (1978), but the trial court expressed concern that the instruction was too long. Instead, the trial court decided to give a much shorter instruction offered by both the prosecutor and counsel for appellant Green which had been developed by Superior Court Judge A. Franklin Burgess, Jr. Landon did not state any particular reason that he preferred the longer conspiracy instruction but simply registered an objection. Now, on appeal, Landon contends that the so-called Burgess instruction omitted an essential element of the offense, viz., that the defendant intended to commit the unlawful objective of the conspiracy. The Burgess instruction, barely more than two pages long, now appears as the recommended conspiracy instruction in the fourth edition of Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 4.93 (1993). [16]
Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 30, No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which that party objects and the grounds of the objection. (Emphasis added.) In other words, objections to jury instructions must be specific enough to direct the judge's attention to the correct rule of law; a party's request for jury instructions must be made with sufficient precision to indicate distinctly the party's thesis. Russell v. United States, 698 A.2d 1007, 1012 (D.C.1997). A defendant's failure to raise objections in the manner required by Rule 30 limits the scope of our review to plain error. See Robinson v. United States, 649 A.2d 584, 586 (D.C.1994); see also Watts, supra, 362 A.2d at 708-09. Landon's general objection was neither distinct nor specific enough to preserve this issue for appeal. Rule 30 requires a distinct statement of what was wrong with the instruction and a precise explanation of the grounds for the objection. See Russell, supra, 698 A.2d at 1012. The purpose of Rule 30 is to give the trial court the opportunity to correct errors [in] and omissions from the charge to the jury, ( Linwood) Johnson v. United States, 387 A.2d 1084, 1089 (D.C.1978) (en banc), a purpose that is ill-served by a party's unexplained insistence on its own proffered instruction. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for this jurisdiction has held, under the federal version of Criminal Rule 30, mere objection to instructions without specification of the ground of the objection does not fulfill Rule 30's purpose and is insufficient to satisfy the rule's requirements. United States v. Williams, 172 U.S.App. D.C. 290, 296, 521 F.2d 950, 956 (1975). We think Landon did not adequately alert the trial judge to the rather specific error which he now claims occurred by simply objecting to the Burgess instruction and demanding nothing less than the eight-page alternative. We therefore review for plain error and find none. See Robinson, supra, 649 A.2d at 586. Indeed, as will be shown, even if we were arguendo to review the instruction as if the claim of error were properly preserved, we would not reverse.
In Gibson v. United States, 700 A.2d 776, 779 (D.C.1997), we identified three elements of conspiracy: (1) an agreement between two or more persons to commit a criminal offense; (2) knowing participation in that agreement with intent to commit the criminal objective; and (3) during the life of the conspiracy, and in furtherance of its objective, the commission by at least one conspirator of at least one of the overt acts specified in the indictment. (Emphasis added.) The italicized language dealing with a requisite intent of the conspirator is the element that Landon contends was omitted from the instruction actually given by the trial court. [17] The longer instruction proposed by Landon and contained in the prior third edition specifically required as an essential element of the offense of conspiracy that the defendant knowingly participated in this conspiracy, with the intent to commit the offense which was the object of the conspiracy[.] Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 4.92, at 298 (3d ed.1978). Similar language appears in many other definitions of conspiracy. See United States v. Treadwell, 245 U.S.App. D.C. 257, 263, 760 F.2d 327, 333 (1985) (the defendant knowingly participated in the conspiracy with the intent to commit at least one of the offenses charged); United States v. Haldeman, 181 U.S.App. D.C. 254, 335, 559 F.2d 31, 112 (1976) (en banc) (per curiam) (the specific intent required for the crime of conspiracy is in fact the intent to advance or further the unlawful object of the conspiracy); see generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4(e)(1)-(2), at 76-79 (1986) (explaining that conspiracy involves two separate intents, the intent to agree and the intent to achieve the criminal objective). The conspiracy instruction given in this case, however, described the second element of the offense in the following manner: [T]he government must prove that the defendant, each defendant, intentionally joined in the agreement. It is not necessary to find that a defendant agreed to all the details of the crime or that a defendant knew the identity of all the other people the government has claimed were participating in the agreement. A person may become a member of a conspiracy even if that person agrees to play only a minor part, as long as that person understands the unlawful nature of the plan and voluntarily and intentionally joins in that plan. Even if the defendant was not part of the agreement at the very start, a defendant can become a member of the conspiracy later if the government proves that the defendant intentionally joined the agreement. Different people may become part of the conspiracy at different times. But mere presence at the scene of the agreement or of the crime, or merely being with the other participants[,] does not show that the defendant knowingly joined in the agreement. Also, unknowingly acting in a way that helps the participants or merely knowing about the agreement itself[,] without more[,] does not make the defendant part of the conspiracy. See Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 4.93, at 517 (4th ed.1993) (providing virtually identical description). At the end of the instruction, the trial court summarized the second element of conspiracy as the defendant intentionally joined in that agreement. See id. at 518 (same). The issue, then, becomes whether the language in the new model jury instruction adequately instructs on the element of intent that Landon now claims was omitted. When reviewing a jury instruction for an alleged error, this court should consider the instruction as a whole in the context of the entire charge. See Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1027 (D.C.1990); Watts, supra, 362 A.2d at 709; see also United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674, 95 S.Ct. 1903, 44 L.Ed.2d 489 (1975). We think the new instruction, when read in context, adequately explained the requirement that Landon intended to commit the unlawful objective here, namely, the robbery of McWeay's cocaine. The trial court instructed the jury on the first element of conspiracy that the government must prove that an agreement existed ... to commit the crime of robbery.... It is enough that the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a common understanding... among those who were involved to commit the crime of robbery.... Thus the intent element of conspiracy was partly incorporated into the agreement element. The jury was instructed that the purpose of the agreement must be to commit the unlawful object of the conspiracy, and that all participants must share a common understanding that their agreement is to commit that crime. As to the second part of the instruction, the intentionally joined element of conspiracy, the trial court instructed the jury that the government must prove that the defendant ... intentionally joined in the agreement and that [a] person may become a member of the conspiracy even if that person agrees to play only a minor part, as long as that person understands the unlawful nature of the plan and voluntarily and intentionally joins in that plan. Thus, in toto, the jurors were instructed that they had to find both (1) the existence of an agreement to rob and (2) that Landon joined the agreement with an understanding of its objective and with the intent to assist in its accomplishment. We conclude that, while the instruction may not necessarily be beyond any possible improvement, [18] the jury was adequately told that the defendant must intend to commit the unlawful objective of the conspiracy. To intentionally join the agreement in this context necessarily means that the defendant understands the unlawful purpose and wants to join anyway, particularly where the instruction emphasizes that even a minor player could be deemed to join the conspiracy as long as that person understands the unlawful nature of the plan and voluntarily and intentionally joins in it. Accordingly, we find no error at all in the instruction on the elements of conspiracy and a fortiori no plain error, the standard of review applicable to this appeal.