Opinion ID: 2581959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Continuance of April 24, 2002, Trial Date

Text: [¶ 22] The district court held a hearing April 23, 2002, to address the appellant's pending motions and determined at the outset that the appellant was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs and did not suffer from any mental impairment that would interfere with his ability to understand the proceedings. The appellant informed the district court that within the past two weeks, the appellant discovered that the minivan had been destroyed, photographs of the minivan were never looked into, there were rumors that the police knocked me off the road, causing me to strike the pedestrian and the police department had investigated those rumors. The appellant stated that this information wasn't brought out to me. [¶ 23] In order to receive further information from trial counsel on the issue, the district court excluded everyone except the appellant, trial counsel and co-counsel, the bailiff, and the court reporter, from the hearing. At this point, trial counsel detailed his understanding of what had occurred throughout the case, including the evolution of the defense's trial strategy. Much of what trial counsel stated is contained in our prior discussion of the facts leading up to this point in the proceedings. [¶ 24] With respect to the minivan specifically, trial counsel stated that he had received the crime scene photographs of the minivan, but did not notice the rear end damage (scrape marks on the minivan's right rear quarter panel) depicted in the photographs until the appellant brought it to my attention within the last couple of weeks. Counsel noted that what I saw [in the photographs], your Honor, is not consistent with what I, as a lay person, believe would be consistent with a vehicle being bumped in the right, quarter panel. [¶ 25] Trial counsel began looking into the matter further. He spoke with Lieutenant Mitch Allmaras and Chief Russell Harvey of the Evanston police department and learned that they had investigated a rumor that one of the police vehicles involved in the pursuit had forced the appellant off the road. The officers inspected Officer Vranish's patrol vehicle within days after the incident and did not observe any physical damage to the vehicle. They also then had all of the patrol vehicles that were present during the pursuit photographed, and informed trial counsel that no physical damage to the vehicles was (or would be) evident in the photographs. The photographs apparently had not been developed, but trial counsel was assured that the photographs would be developed and provided to trial counsel. At the April 23, 2002, hearing, trial counsel added that he had been working on trial preparation and had not had time to run over and get the photographs from the police department. [¶ 26] Trial counsel also demanded in writing that the prosecution produce the minivan. The minivan had been released from the prosecution's possession, but the prosecution located the minivan at a salvage yard in Nebraska. Trial counsel informed the district court that as a result, the minivan had been produced and was available. He was even provided a digital photograph of the minivan situated at the salvage yard, and the strafe mark at issue was visible in the photograph. According to trial counsel, as of the April 23, 2002, hearing: We're to the point now, if Mr. Whitney wants to include this as part of his defense, we're ready, willing and able to include it as part of his [defense.] We're ready, willing and able to go to [Nebraska,] if we have to, load the van back on a flat bed, bring it back to Wyoming .... But, in essence, have someone look at not only those scrapes but look at the van for any other indications that it had been bumped[.] Quite frankly, I haven't done it before because there hadn't been a scintilla of evidence to suggest that, your Honor. [¶ 27] The district court responded as follows: The reason I'm saying that, the fact that it's not discovered or whatever until later on, doesn't mean you're ineffective. That happens all the time. But the question now comes at this point, as I can see it is... we're going to be starting a trial tomorrow. You've located the van. It would appear to me that at least to, as best you can, put your client's mind at ease, that the Defense, maybe, ought to have their own accident reconstruction expert review the reports and go look at the van, itself, and see if [Mr. Lankford] is right, you know, whether it looks like it's scraped by a building or whether it, in fact, was  and there may be tests that can be made on the scrapes to find out whether it's paint or cinder blocks or whatever else. ... ... But the problem we've got is we're here on the eve of trial now, Mr. Whitney, and this is where I'm at. You can  in a sense, here's where you are. I mean, sometimes  the speedy trial right is primarily your right to have the case brought to a speedy conclusion, so you don't have the anxiety and the uncertainty of the charges hanging over your head. Now, you're, in a sense, sitting here, kind of on the horns of a dilemma. One, if you want a continuance for sufficient time to allow an examination of this stuff by a defense expert that may help you in trial, I'll grant it, you know, so that you can come to trial prepared. On the other hand, you may have concluded that your best defense is to whine about the quality of your defense attorney, thinking that you are just going to be convicted so you would rather start out doing that. But if you want to really try to defend your case, I'll grant a motion for a continuance, but you've got to ask for it. I'm not going to order it because you have a right to a speedy trial. Trial counsel noted that he had informed the appellant that in order to pursue the matter further, it would entail a trial delay, and the appellant refused, basically, to direct me to do that. The appellant then stated that he just want[ed] a fair trial. I want my evidence brought up to my trial so I can see it. The following transpired: THE COURT: ... But it appears to me given where we are, at least with regard to the  you have a question in your own mind, at least, with regard to these scrapes, whether or not they are caused by a collision or whether or not they're caused by scraping a building. And I think in fairness to you, in terms of where it is, you  that should be investigated by someone independent of the State's expert. Again, here's where I'm at, though. If you were arraigned on October  what was it, the 29th? [TRIAL COUNSEL]: 31st, your Honor. ... [TRIAL COUNSEL]: April 30 would be the 180th day, your Honor. THE COURT: And that's really where we're at. You can't have both. You can't have a speedy trial and be able to get the investigation done. DEFENDANT WHITNEY: Yes, your Honor, I understand that. And based on that fact, you know, I wrote [trial counsel].. and I explained to him on January 30 and prior to January 30 that I wanted to go to trial. I wanted to get this investigation done. He said the case was being delayed because of an expert witness and because we needed the documents.... THE COURT: Well, wait a minute. You're back, pointing your finger at your lawyer. ... THE COURT: You're here, faced with a trial tomorrow, and you're not going to be able to present any evidence or do anything about that scrape other than have the photograph saying Here's a scrape on this. ... THE COURT: Now, let me finish. It's time for you to fish or cut bait. Whatever happened, I'm offering an opportunity to at least remedy part of what you're complaining about. DEFENDANT WHITNEY: Okay. ... THE COURT: All right. Mr. Whitney, I want to just explain one thing to you here. Your attorney has requested a continuance to have an expert review, essentially, your theory of defense; and it appears to me your most plausible theory of defense.... ... THE COURT: Well, how much time, [trial counsel], are you going to need to have your expert review  examine the vehicle, review the photographs, review the reports of the other  the State's expert? [TRIAL COUNSEL]: A minimum of sixty days, your Honor.... ... THE COURT: Well, let me tell you one other thing, Mr. Whitney. You filed a motion to dismiss. I could grant that but it would be without prejudice. The State would refile again and start the whole process again. Do you understand what I'm saying? DEFENDANT WHITNEY: Yes, your Honor. I do understand. THE COURT: So denying that, I'm at least keeping the thing on. Either way, you're likely to be held in  you know, under the current bail situation. I think the best thing is just to move things along in terms of where we are. ... THE COURT: ... I just want to get one other matter, at least, with regard to him. Given where we are, do you have any objection to  yourself, to us continuing the trial so that this investigation can be completed? DEFENDANT WHITNEY: No, your Honor, I don't, just for the fact that my evidence can be brought into court. But the only objection I really have is the time of incarceration.... I still cannot come up with the money, your Honor. I have been in the jail. The prosecutor was allowed back into the hearing, at which time the district court informed him that the appellant needed about sixty days to  at least sixty days to complete that investigation, so they've asked for a continuance. The Defendant has agreed to that, although he has  and we're going to take that up  a concern about his bail. [¶ 28] The district court proceeded to address the appellant's remaining pending motions. The district court also considered bail, substantially reduced the appellant's bail, and the appellant was apparently released from jail shortly thereafter. [9] The district court indicated that it would need a written motion for a continuance and support it with an affidavit indicating the need to  because of the recent developments with regard to an expert. [¶ 29] On April 26, 2002, the appellant, by and through trial counsel, filed a Motion to Continue Jury Trial, requesting that the April 24, 2002, trial date be continued. The motion stated that additional time was required to have a vital piece of evidence, the mini-van driven by Defendant, examined by an accident reconstruction expert for the defense, that the minivan had been released by law enforcement without consulting with Defendant, and pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 48, requested a continuance to a date to be determined by the Court. In an affidavit accompanying the motion, trial counsel additionally stated that he could readily obtain the services of an expert in Nebraska to travel to the location of the mini-van and ... conduct an examination of said vehicle for and on behalf of Defendant, that he believed this could be accomplished within the next sixty (60) days, and that it was essential to the defense of the case to have this additional time to conduct this investigation and examination. On May 1, 2002, the district court continued the April 24, 2002, trial setting, and reset the trial for July 17, 2002.