Opinion ID: 454760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Pretrial Disclosure

Text: 51 Kendall also claims that the Government's refusal to disclose its Rule 404(b) evidence before trial violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process and his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and cross-examination. He argues that (1) given the risk of unfairness inherent in Rule 404(b) evidence, due process requires that a defendant be given pretrial notice of such evidence the Government intends to use, and (2) without such notice, a defendant cannot adequately prepare his case and is effectively prevented from meaningful confrontation and cross-examination at trial. 52 There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 846, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977); See Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1339 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 601, 83 L.Ed.2d 710 (1984). The Government is generally not required to disclose its witnesses or their testimony before trial. See Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 559, 97 S.Ct. at 846; United States v. Rosales, 680 F.2d 1304, 1305 (10th Cir.1981); United States v. Pennick, 500 F.2d 184, 186 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1051, 95 S.Ct. 629, 42 L.Ed.2d 647 (1974); United States v. Baca, 494 F.2d 424, 427 (10th Cir.1974). The one significant exception to this rule is exculpatory evidence; the government's failure to disclose such evidence before trial is a violation of due process. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1339-40. The Supreme Court has made it clear, however, that Brady does not extend beyond such exculpatory evidence. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 559, 97 S.Ct. at 845. Cf., United States v. Flores, 540 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir.1976) (Brady does not create any pretrial discovery privileges not contained in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). Because the evidence of which Kendall complains was not exculpatory or discoverable under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Government's failure to disclose its 404(b) evidence does not violate due process. 6 Kendall cites no authority, nor have we been able to discover any, for the proposition that pretrial disclosure of Rule 404(b) evidence is required by the Sixth Amendment. Given the clear language of Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 559, 97 S.Ct. at 846, we conclude that there is no general Sixth Amendment right to such pretrial disclosure. 53 Kendall also argues that even if pretrial discovery of Rule 404(b) evidence is not constitutionally required, the lack of such disclosure in his case so impaired his ability to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and resulted in such unfairness and prejudice, that reversal is required. We are not persuaded. 54 To begin with, Kendall has made no showing whatsoever of how his right to a fair trial or ability to confront and cross-examine witnesses was adversely affected by the lack of pretrial disclosure. His vague and broad claim of unfairness and prejudice is not supported by any showing of how pretrial disclosure of Rule 404(b) evidence could have influenced the conduct of the trial. Furthermore, the current limitations on the use of Rule 404(b) evidence afford a defendant sufficient protection against unfair and unduly prejudicial effect. See Nolan, 551 F.2d at 271; Biswell, 700 F.2d at 1317-18. These requirements were fully met by the Government in this case, and all such evidence was properly admitted. Finally, the pretrial order, prohibiting the Government's use of 404(b) evidence without prior court approval, provided Kendall with substantial additional protection against the risks inherent in the use of 404(b) evidence. 55 This case does not fall within that line of decisions where a defendant is found to have been unduly prejudiced by the use of surprise evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 599 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Baum, 482 F.2d 1325, 1331-32 (2d Cir.1973). As these decisions recognize, a defendant confronted with such surprise evidence at trial must be afforded a fair opportunity to meet it and to adjust his trial strategy if necessary. If a defendant is not given this opportunity, such as a grant of a continuance, then the resulting unfairness may require reversal. In Kendall's case, however, no objection was made, on the basis of surprise, to the introduction of any of the Government's Rule 404(b) evidence. At no time did defense counsel request a continuance, nor does the record show that defense counsel was unable to respond to the evidence or the reasons offered for its admission. The Government's refusal to provide its 404(b) evidence before trial was not reversible error. 56 AFFIRMED.