Opinion ID: 296468
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Possession of Literature and Mere Expression of Beliefs

Text: 82 Our holding that prisoners may not be punished for their beliefs carries the necessary corollary that we may not permit punishment for the mere expression of those beliefs. One can hardly speak of beliefs apart from their expression, cf. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F.Supp. 370 (D.D.C.1962). In the absence of arbitrariness or discrimination, see Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968); Rivers v. Royster, 360 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966); Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961), and Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961), we do not say on this record that Warden Follette would have exceeded his legitimate authority if he had confiscated the writings that guards found in Sostre's cell following his release from segregation. Whatever doubts we might have as to the wisdom of seizing an inmate's political writings, we would not lightly overturn a warden's judgment that possession of the writings might subvert prison discipline if there existed the risk of their circulation among other prisoners. 48 83 However, Sostre was punished simply for putting his thoughts on paper, with no prior warning and no hint that he intended to spirit the writings outside his cell. To sanction such punishment, even though in the judgment of prison officials the writings were 'inflammatory' and 'racist,' as in the instant case, would permit prison authorities to manipulate and crush thoughts under the guise of regulation. The intimidating threat of future similar punishment would chill a wide range of prisoner expression, not limited to that expression which Follette might in fact deem dangerous enough to discipline. The danger of undetected discriminatory punishment of ideas is particularly acutein the absence of statutory standards to guide the exercise of Follette's discretion. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 556-557, 85 S.Ct. 453, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939). Any real threat to prison security that Sostre's possession of his writings might have posed could have been met by confiscation rather than punishment. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960).