Opinion ID: 783283
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Claims to the Accused Products

Text: 60 The district court concluded that there is no literal infringement of the '363 patent family based on its construction of the claim terms. Anchor, 252 F.Supp.2d at 848. First, the district court determined that the Classic block does not mate as defined by the patents at issue because: (1) [T]he extension does not mate with the sidewalls by any definition; and (2) The protrusion and sidewall of defendants' blocks do not cooperate to restrain the block's setback in both a forward and backward direction. Id. at 849 n. 12. The district court also determined that the Classic block does not have a `back surface' matching the construed definition, id. at 849, because the Classic block has a partial back side portion with pointed side extensions that do not abut each other when placed adjacently in a course of blocks, id at 849 n. 13. Finally, the district court determined that the Classic block lacks the characteristic of a `protrusion' having a central narrow portion, id. at 849, because [t]he `protrusion' on the Classic block is ... a square extension extending from the bottom surface of the block. The district court also concluded that Cottage Stones II, III, and IV did not literally infringe the '015 patent family, because [a] bottom face with a concave portion is not parallel to a top face that is perfectly planar. Id. at 852. 61 As discussed above, Part III.A, supra, the district court's findings with respect to no literal infringement of the '363 and '015 patent families are premised on erroneous or omitted constructions of the claim limitations back surface, protrusion, mate, generally parallel, and substantially horizontal. We cannot determine with certainty, based on the factual record before us, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact regarding infringement by the accused products in light of our revised claim construction. Accordingly, we remand the portion of the district court's judgment of noninfringement pertaining to the '363 and '015 patent families for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
62 Additionally, with respect to infringement of claims 38 and 50 of the '015 patent under the doctrine of equivalents, the district court held that this court's en banc holding in Festo, 234 F.3d 558, which was under consideration by the Supreme Court at the time the district court's decision was rendered, required an absolute bar to the application of the doctrine of equivalents in this case, because the applicant made a narrowing amendment to claims 38 and 50 of the '015 patent during prosecution. Because the Supreme Court rejected the absolute bar approach to prosecution history estoppel, Festo, 535 U.S. 722, 122 S.Ct. 1831, 152 L.Ed.2d 944, that analysis is now incorrect, and we vacate that portion of the district court's judgment. We agree with Anchor that the case should be remanded to the district court to determine, in the first instance, whether Anchor can rebut the Festo presumption. See Schwing GmbH v. Putzmeister Aktiengesellschaft, 305 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed.Cir.2002) (remanding rebuttal of presumptive bar to district court for determination in first instance). Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the district court's judgment of noninfringement of the asserted claims of the '015 patent under the doctrine of equivalents and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 63 Finally, with respect to claim 70 of the '713 patent, the parties dispute whether the district court properly granted partial summary judgment on the issue of noninfringement by equivalents. Anchor contends that the district court only established that Cottage Stone III and IV do not literally infringe claim 70 of the '713 patent, but that genuine issues of material fact remain with respect to infringement of this claim by equivalents. Rockwood, in contrast, responds that Anchor failed to show a fact issue remains for infringement of claim 70 of the '713 patent under the doctrine of equivalents. 64 The district court concluded that the Cottage Stone III and IV do not literally infringe the limitation that the second parts [of the sidewall surfaces] intersect[ ] the back surface at an angle of less than 90 degrees, because the Cottage Stone III and IV lack a second part that joins a respective sidewall surface first part to the back of the surface.... Only the third parts intersect the back surface and they do not do so at an angle of less than 90 degrees. From this, it would appear that the district court granted partial summary judgment to Rockwood only with respect to literal infringement and did not address infringement of claim 70 of the '713 patent under the doctrine of equivalents. 65 Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents frequently turns on questions of fact, such as whether the allegedly infringing device performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result as the claimed invention. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997). The district court did not provide findings with respect to whether any such triable issues of fact remain in this case. To the extent that the district court's judgment constituted a grant of partial summary judgment of noninfringement of claim 70 of the '713 patent under the doctrine of equivalents, we vacate that portion of the judgment and remand to the district court to articulate whether any triable issues of fact with respect to infringement of this claim by equivalents exists. If none exists or the issue was never briefed or argued to the district court, summary judgment in Rockwood's favor may be appropriate. Otherwise, trial on this issue, and resolution of any other relevant issues remaining in this case (e.g., validity) would be appropriate.