Opinion ID: 1738279
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant weeks's motion for a mistrial based on the district attorney's improper comment regarding weeks's right to testify or remain silent under amendment v of the united states constitution and article three, section twenty six of the mississippi constitution of 1890.

Text: ¶ 39. Weeks contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion for a mistrial for the State's improper comments pertaining to his right to testify or remain silent under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 3, § 26 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890. In specific, Weeks contends that the State's comments concerning his right to testify or remain silent amounts to reversible error and the case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. This Court finds this contention to be without merit. ¶ 40. On cross-examination, the defense questioned FBI Agent Mike Beaver (Beaver) about the use of videotapes to record statements for accuracy. In the pretrial hearing, the prosecution agreed not to use the tapes in its case-in-chief, and the tapes were not used in trial. Beaver stated that Weeks did not make an admission on the videotape. Defense counsel continued in his line of questions concerning the general procedures and use of videotapes and indicated that Weeks apparently denied any involvement in the case. ¶ 41. During redirect examination the State questioned Beaver, concerning a videotape of Weeks and the following comment by the State is in contention. Q. I notice that in asking you, notwithstanding all this stuff about the best evidence and the verbatim being, I don't recall [defense counsel] asking you to play the tape. Do you? A. No, sir. Q. Do you? I mean the best evidence of it, with his theory, wouldn't you expect him to run out and get a TV and plug this in and say, See my client? He's innocent. (Emphasis added). ¶ 42. The defense requested a bench conference. The State did not object to the defense playing the videotape. Defense counsel objected on Fifth Amendment grounds. The trial judge overruled the objection stating that the defense opened the door in previous cross-examination questions concerning the videotape and the State had a right to rebut the testimony. At the close of the State's case, defense counsel renewed the objection concerning the videotape comments and moved for a mistrial based on prejudice to the jury. The trial court overruled the objection without comment. ¶ 43. On issues of comments concerning a defendant's failure to testify, each case shall be considered on an individual basis. Logan v. State, 773 So.2d 338, 348 (Miss.2000) (citing Conway v. State, 397 So.2d 1095, 1099 (Miss.1980)). [T]he intention of the [prosecutor] is immaterial; the test is whether the language can be reasonably construed to be a comment upon the failure of the defendant to take the stand. Logan, 773 So.2d at 348 (quoting Lambert v. State, 199 Miss. 790, 793, 25 So.2d 477, 478 (1946)). ¶ 44. Considering the facts in the case sub judice, the defense questioned Beaver about the videotape. The videotape was not played to the jury. In fact, the prosecution agreed in the pretrial hearing not to use the tape at all in its case-in-chief. At one point, Beaver commented that Weeks did not make an admission. Defense counsel later commented that Weeks apparently denied involvement. The State, in an attempt rebut some of the defense's questions, merely stated that would seem reasonable in the defense's theory of the case to play the video to demonstrate his client's innocence. The prosecutor's comment cannot be either directly or by innuendo or insinuation be inferred to be a comment on Weeks' right to testify or remain silent. At most, the prosecutor speculated on defense counsel's theory of the case, not the defendant's right to remain silent. The trial judge was within her discretion to deny the motion for mistrial based on the prosecutor's comments.
¶ 45. Weeks contends that the trial court erred in ruling three different statements were admissible. The first statement was from Weeks to Sheriff Jones. The second and third statements were from Weeks to Juantray Bradford (Bradford), a cellmate. The trial court determined that the alleged statement to Sheriff Jones and the first statement to Bradford were admissible, and the second statement to Bradford, a tape recorded conversation between Bradford and Weeks, was admissible under Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990), ruling that Weeks's Sixth Amendment rights had not attached and he was not entitled to Miranda warnings. This Court finds this contention to be without merit.

¶ 46. As a preface, the second statement, concerning a tape-recorded conversation between Bradford and Weeks, was not entered into evidence. The prosecution agreed on the record before the trial judge to not use the tape recorded statement in its case-in-chief. Therefore, any discussion on this issue is moot.
¶ 47. Weeks generally cites the motion to suppress in his issue caption, but he never made any specific argument in his brief on the exclusion of this statement. He only specifically cites the tape-recorded statement in the brief. He does argue, however, that Bradford was an agent of the State. It is unclear whether this contention is made for the first statement. Therefore, the issues will be addressed. ¶ 48. During a suppression hearing, the trial judge sits as a fact finder. Hunt v. State, 687 So.2d 1154, 1160 (Miss.1996). The trial judge can only be reversed for manifest error if the decision is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 49. The only testimony in the record relating to Bradford's status as an agent came from Sheriff Jones at the pretrial hearing and later Bradford himself at trial. Both testified that Bradford was not an agent of the State at the time of this first statement by Weeks. No testimony to the contrary was offered by the defense. ¶ 50. In light of the testimony and the holding in Hunt, the trial judge did not err, and the finding is not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Consequently, the trial judge's ruling on this issue is affirmed.
¶ 51. In addition, Weeks contends that the State failed to demonstrate that he waived his rights and the motion to suppress testimony from Sheriff Jones concerning a March 16, 1997, statement should have been granted. The main assertions are that (1) the right to counsel attached when he was charged with possession of a firearm, and (2) the right to counsel attached for the murder charge when he made a affirmative response, as evidenced by a circle and check on number three of the Miranda form. ¶ 52. The record does not reflect the exact date that Weeks was detained initially at the Humphreys County Jail, or the exact dates Weeks was charged with possession of a firearm or capital murder. However, it appears that Weeks was at the jailhouse on or before March 6, 1997, when Special Agent Beaver completed a report concerning Weeks's statements to Bradford. In any event, Sheriff Jones stated that on March 16, 1997, Weeks was being held on a weapons charge. Weeks signed a statement of Miranda Rights and Waiver of Rights form on March 4, 1997, and made a statement concerning the possession of a firearm charge. There was no testimony in the record to the effect that Weeks ever requested a lawyer. However, defense counsel implied at trial and also contend in their brief, that the check and circle around Miranda right number three, pertaining to a request for counsel, is an affirmative showing that Weeks invoked a right to counsel. ¶ 53. Sheriff Jones testified that on March 16, 1997, he received a call from the Chief Deputy stating that Weeks confessed and requested the Sheriff to go to the jail. Sheriff Jones arrived at the jail and read Weeks his Miranda rights. The State questioned Sheriff Jones about the Waiver of Rights form. In particular, Sheriff Jones testified that he checked each right as he read them as noted; Weeks refused to sign the document as noted, and despite refusing to sign the document Weeks orally agreed to speak with him about the information. The Sheriff testified that the statement was voluntarily given by Weeks. No right to counsel was requested by Weeks. Sheriff Jones testified that Weeks stated he was at the Rosses' home drinking and when he left in his car he heard a thump. He came out of the car and saw the victim. At this point, Weeks was frightened and told Sheriff Jones that he put the victim into his car, drove south of Belzoni, and placed her body on the ground near the river. Later, Weeks returned and placed the body in the river. On cross examination, Sheriff Jones indicated that there was no statement signed by Weeks, only a police report. ¶ 54. This Court has held that under both the United States and the Mississippi constitutions, an accused is entitled to be assisted by counsel during criminal proceedings against him. Ormond v. State, 599 So.2d 951, 956 (Miss. 1992). See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Miss. Const. art. 3, § 26 (1890). The only difference between the two is the time of attachment. Id. In Mississippi the Sixth Amendment right attaches at the accusatory stage. Id. (citing Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868, 876 (Miss.1987)). However, the defendant must be able to show some adverse effect or prejudice to his ability to conduct his defense before denial of this right to counsel constitutes reversible error. Id. ¶ 55. The United States Supreme Court has held that incriminating statements related to other crimes are admissible at trial for those offenses if the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached at the time they were made. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2208, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific and does not attach until prosecution begins, whereas the Fifth Amendment right to counsel would not bar questioning during an interrogation, if the suspect properly waived his Fifth Amendment right against self-incriminate and right to counsel. 501 U.S. at 174-77, 111 S.Ct. at 2207-08. ¶ 56. The trial judge ruled all the evidence admissible and denied the motion to suppress. In regard to the tape-recorded statement of March 6, 1997, the trial judge ruled that no Sixth Amendment right had attached and no Miranda warning was necessary. Logically, this means that, as to all three statements, this determination would also apply to any statements by Weeks. ¶ 57. In the case sub judice, Weeks's Sixth Amendment right to counsel for the murder charge did not attach when he was charged with the possession of a firearm. Weeks was charged with murder on March 31, 1997, well after his March 16, 1997, statement to Sheriff Jones. As to whether Weeks ever invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, the trial judge sits as a fact finder. Hunt v. State, 687 So.2d at 1160. The trial judge's finding can only be reversed for manifest error if the decision is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 58. The Sheriff testified that Weeks did not invoke his rights as evidenced by the waiver form. The only indication that Weeks ever did invoke his rights is his assertion that the check and circle mark on number (3) three concerning a right to counsel signified his affirmation of right to counsel. However, the Sheriff explained that in the past he used to circle each right as he read them, but he later began to check each right, in conformity with other law enforcement. In this case, the Sheriff explained that he probably circled the right, saw the circle and then checked it so that it was all uniform. In light of these facts, the trial judge correctly ruled that Weeks's statement to the Sheriff was admissible. There was no showing of manifest error or that the finding was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
¶ 59. Weeks contends that the trial judge abused her discretion and erred in granting a motion in limine to exclude evidence of a past criminal conviction of the witness, Sheriff Jones. Weeks asserts that Sheriff Jones had two prior convictions punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year involving dishonesty or false statements. This Court concludes that the issue is procedurally barred for lack of a specific and timely objection at trial and the contention is without merit. ¶ 60. The State presented a motion in limine to exclude questions concerning Sheriff Jones's prior convictions based on the age of the prior convictions. The trial judge granted the State's motion in limine without comment. At this time, the defense made no initial objection. Prior to Sheriff Jones's testimony, a bench conference occurred in which defense counsel contended that M.R.E. 609 allowed exceptions. A discussion ensued in which the State claimed that no written notice was received from the defense to use the testimony. The trial judge again granted the motion without comment. Defense counsel's only response was to request the proffering of the information at a later time. ¶ 61. The defense did not state a specific objection at the pretrial motion hearing pertaining to this assertion. The defense only referenced an exception. In addition, defense did not raise this assertion during the trial. As previously noted, this Court held in Oates v. State, 421 So.2d at 1030, that in order to preserve a question for appellate review, [o]bjections to the admissibility of evidence must specifically state the grounds, otherwise the objection is waived. In addition, this Court held that [i]f no contemporaneous objection is made, the error, if any, is waived. Walker v. State, 671 So.2d at 597 (citing Foster v. State, 639 So.2d at 1270). Applying the law to the case sub judice, Weeks is procedurally barred on this issue for lack of a specific objection during the pretrial motion hearing and lack of a timely objection at trial. ¶ 62. Procedural bar and waiver aside, this Court held in Wilcher v. State, 697 So.2d 1087, 1102 (Miss.1997), that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding a sheriff's seven-year-old prior extortion conviction. In Wilcher, the admissibility of the sheriffs conviction was within the trial judge's discretion, depending on whether he found that the probative value of the conviction outweighed the prejudicial effect of its admission. Id. at 1103. In the case sub judice, the trial judge had the discretion as to the admissibility of this evidence, and there was no abuse of discretion. ¶ 63. Furthermore, M.R.E. 609(b) clearly states that in order for evidence of a prior conviction that is more than ten years old, as calculated in the rule, to be admissible, the proponent must give the opposing party advanced written notice. Weeks did not provide the written notice in this case; and therefore, the objection is waived. In addition, the record excerpts only show the date that the sheriff was to begin his confinement, which was more than ten years prior to the trial date. The excerpts lack an actual date of release from detention, and there is no verification of anything other than the conviction and the initial date the sheriff was confined. Therefore, under Rule 609, the conviction was not admissible because it was over ten years old at the time of trial.
¶ 64. Weeks contends that of the evidence is not legally sufficient to support the jury verdict of guilty of capital murder and the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for new trial. While the defense fails to cite the issue of overwhelming weight of the evidence in the issue caption, it is addressed in the body of the brief. Therefore, both legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence will be addressed in this contention. This Court finds that the assertions are without merit. ¶ 65. Weeks was indicted for the capital murder of Shantwana Ross on August 25, 1997, in violation of Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) which provides: The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be capital murder in the following cases: (e) When done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of the crime of ... kidnaping ... ¶ 66. As to legal sufficiency, this Court held in Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329, 353 (Miss.1988), that reversal can only occur when evidence of one or more of the elements of the charged offense is such that reasonable and fair minded jurors could only find the accused not guilty. (citations omitted). ¶ 67. As to the weight of the evidence, this Court held in McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130, 133 (Miss.1987), that it has limited authority to interfere with a jury verdict. The Court looks at all the evidence in the light that is most consistent to the jury verdict. Id. The prosecution is given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Id. [I]f there is in the record substantial evidence of such quality and weight that, having in mind the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable and fair-minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgement might have reached different conclusions, the verdict of guilty is thus placed beyond our authority to disturb. Id. at 133-34. ¶ 68. In the case sub judice, the evidence met the legal sufficiency test and the weight of the evidence tests for considering a motion for a JNOV and a new trial. The main evidence showed that the victim, Shantwana Ross, was found dead on March 28, 1997, by a levee in Holmes County. The State pathologist determined that Shantwana was a homicide victim, even though the exact cause of death was undetermined due to the advanced state of decomposition of her body. Testimony by Gray indicated that the victim was last seen going outside in the vicinity of Weeks. Sheriff Jones testified that Weeks told him that after running over the victim, he placed her in his car and took her to an area with a levee, woods and water. In addition, Bradford testified that Weeks confided in him in the Humphreys County Jail. Weeks told Bradford that he put the victim in his car and took her to Deovolente in an attempt to have sex with her, but later returned her home. Based on all evidence received at trial, the jury found Weeks guilty of capital murder beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court finds Weeks's contention to be without merit.
¶ 69. Weeks contends that the conviction should be reversed based upon individual numerous errors. These errors are listed as erroneous rulings on pretrial motions, jury selection process, in the course of the trial, and in the closing arguments. In the event this Court finds no individual error, then, the case should be reversed based upon the impact of cumulative error. This Court finds this contention without merit. ¶ 70. In Wilburn v. State, 608 So.2d 702, 705 (Miss.1992), this Court held that individual errors, not reversible in themselves, may combine with other errors to make up reversible error. The question that must be asked in these instances is whether the defendant was deprived of a fundamentally fair and impartial trial as a results of the cumulative effect of all errors at trial. Id. If there is no reversible error in any part, so there is no reversible error to the whole. McFee v. State, 511 So.2d at 136. ¶ 71. Finding no reversible error for each individual issue, we find that there is no cumulative effect for all the alleged errors and, therefore, Weeks had a fundamentally fair and impartial trial. This contention is without merit.