Opinion ID: 4521869
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure To Redact Recorded Conversation

Text: In his pretrial motion in limine to exclude the entire recorded conversation with Smith, defendant alternatively requested that the trial court redact the statement if admitted. He challenged the conversation’s references to hiring a hitman to kill Moya, certain “inflammatory” remarks Smith made, and statements defendant made on other “extraneous matters,” such as defendant’s sex life, his meetings with the National Security Agency, and his admitted forgeries of Pamela’s will and counterfeit $100 bills. The trial court rejected defendant’s request, noting that the entire recorded conversation had probative value: “Now you can make your argument that it is an Oscar award-winning performance and it was not worth anything, but I think the People are entitled to bring that, in all of its glory, in front of the jury.” On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous and that the admitted evidence was extraneous, inflammatory, and ultimately prejudicial to him. “A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewable for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 292.) As their recorded conversation revealed, defendant and Smith spent much time talking about defendant hiring a purported hitman Smith knew named “Tony” to kill Moya. (See ante, at pp. 19-20.) Defendant argues that the evidence of the uncharged conduct about hiring a hitman to kill Moya was inadmissible because he was never charged with a postoffense crime against Moya. (See People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 404-405.) Even if admitted for a proper purpose to show defendant’s consciousness of guilt, he maintains that the evidence was unduly prejudicial under Evidence Code section 26 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. 352. The evidence, defendant adds, was also “insubstantial and undependable” because it was Smith who “encouraged and prodded” defendant to hire a hitman Smith knew to kill Moya. Finally, this evidence purportedly showing defendant’s consciousness of guilt as to Pamela’s murder was cumulative because the conversation already included defendant’s statements about killing Pamela. We reject this claim on all points. Here, the prosecution’s theory was that defendant perpetrated Pamela’s murder by soliciting Moya (who in turn enlisted Marquez and Simmons) to kill Pamela. Thereafter, because of fears that Moya could turn on defendant and become a witness against him, defendant sought to hire another hitman, Smith’s fictional friend, “Tony,” to kill Moya; in that regard, Smith took care to portray Tony as dying of cancer and therefore not a risk to defendant after killing Moya. This evidence of defendant soliciting the murder of a potential witness is highly probative of defendant’s guilt of Pamela’s murder. Contrary to defendant’s contention, this evidence was not cumulative. Rather, it showed a common plan in that defendant sought to kill whoever threatened him or his livelihood. (See People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402.) Though the record does not disclose how the two first discussed the idea of defendant hiring a hitman (see ante, at p. 18) and defendant appeared reluctant at times when discussing the plans, defendant’s assertion that the evidence, therefore, was insubstantial or undependable lacks merit. Although Smith may have prodded or coaxed defendant to talk at certain points, defendant’s initial hesitation gave way to extended diatribes of how Moya and others bungled previous attempts to kill Pamela and how defendant did not want to be worried that 27 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. Moya would turn on him. Moreover, any hesitation could be attributed to defendant seeking Smith’s assurances that Tony would be more competent and effective than Moya. Defendant also admitted he would have killed Pamela himself but that he would never “get away with it. Never.” We also reject defendant’s challenge to the other admitted evidence. Smith’s pejorative references to Mexicans and women were brief and were not inflammatory; in any event, defendant fails to show how Smith’s offensive statements—to which defendant showed little reaction—would prejudice defendant. Likewise, defendant fails to show how Smith’s bravado and graphic details about hiring hitmen to commit various murders would prejudice defendant. Finally, any extraneous details, such as the forging of the will, lent credibility to defendant’s admissions because he trusted Smith enough to reveal this information. In sum, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to redact the statement and admitting it in its entirety.