Opinion ID: 670485
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: 15 The first issue that we must determine is the appropriate standard of review on appeal. Generally, appellate review of a sentencing decision involves three questions: 1) are the departure related circumstances of a sort that the sentencing court can appropriately rely upon to justify its departure; 2) does the record support a finding of fact establishing the existence of such circumstances; and 3) does the record support the direction and degree of departure. United States v. Mendez-Colon, 15 F.3d 188, 189 (1st Cir.1994); United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 49 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 862, 110 S.Ct. 177, 107 L.Ed.2d 133 (1989). In United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942 (1st Cir.1993), we elaborated on the appropriate standard of review which we would employ to address certain sentencing departure issues. 16 Plenary review is ... appropriate where the appellate court, in deciding whether the allegedly special circumstances are of a kind that permits departure, will have to perform the quintessentially legal function ... of interpreting a set of words, those of an individual guideline, in light of their intention or purpose, in order to identify the nature of the guideline's heartland (to see if the allegedly special circumstance falls within it). 17 Id. at 951 (citations omitted). Thus, where departure decisions reflect a determination of the purpose of, or an interpretation of the language in, a guideline or statute, plenary review is appropriate. United States v. Rosales, 19 F.3d 763, 769 (1st Cir.1994) (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted). 18 The district court issued a Sentencing Memorandum to support its downward departure in United States v. LeBlanc, 825 F.Supp. 422 (D.Mass.1993). We quote this memorandum at length, in order to have a complete understanding of the basis for the district court's decision: 19 Congress has empowered district courts to impose a sentence outside the guideline range when the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(b); U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.0. This case presents just such a circumstance. It involves behavior that falls outside of the heartland of a typical money laundering offense....Here, LeBlanc acted as a bookmaking agent, an offense for which the guidelines set forth a base offense level of 12. It is difficult for this court to conceive of gambling being conducted or transacted in any form other than by money or monetary instruments. Yet, by participating in conduct which calls for a base offense level of 12, LeBlanc was charged with money laundering, which calls for an offense level of 17, given LeBlanc's acceptance of responsibility. In essence, LeBlanc finds himself facing a sentence far in excess of that which is commensurate with his actual conduct. 20 While LeBlanc's conduct may technically constitute money laundering--an offense to which he has pled guilty--this court finds that sentencing him pursuant to the strictures of the money laundering statute would present an inequity not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission. See [Rivera, 994 F.2d at 947-49]; cf. United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1214 (10th Cir.1991) (Congress aimed the crime of money laundering at conduct that follows in time the underlying crime rather than to afford an alternative means of punishing the prior 'specified unlawful activity' ), cert. denied, [--- U.S. ----,] 112 S.Ct. 3037 [120 L.Ed.2d 906]. LeBlanc took checks from bettors and either negotiated them himself or turned them over to his supervisors, Dickhaut and Byrne. When all of the verbiage and terminology in the indictment are stripped away, that is the sum and substance of the conduct for which he was charged. Accordingly, this court finds that a 5 level downward departure is warranted, resulting in an offense level of 12. 21 United States v. LeBlanc, 825 F.Supp. at 423-24. 22 In United States v. Weinstein, 828 F.Supp. 3 (D.Mass.1993), the court, citing LeBlanc, based its downward departure on an identical rationale. The court reiterated its belief that because it could not conceive of a manner in which gambling operations could be conducted without the exchange of money, application of the money laundering statute to someone who is a bookmaker would always result in a simultaneous application of the money laundering statutes, which would be an impermissible alternative means of punishing the prior specified unlawful activity. Weinstein, 828 F.Supp. at 5. 23 In both cases, the sentencing court suggested that money laundering offenses that stem from the prior specified unlawful activity of operating an illegal gambling business fell outside of the heartland of the money laundering guidelines. The court's decisions were not factually tied to the specifics of the cases of LeBlanc or Weinstein. Rather, the decisions were categorical, legal conclusions centered on the intent and scope of the money laundering statutes, and thereby, the nature of the applicable sentencing guideline's heartland. This was a quintessentially legal question, and as such, subject to plenary review.