Opinion ID: 210274
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Criticism of Prior Art

Text: The second reason Toyota contends that the jury's equivalence verdict cannot stand relates to Paice's criticism of two patents issued to Berman et al. and assigned to TRW, Inc.: U.S. Patent Nos. 3,566,717 (the '717 patent) and 3,732,751 (the '751 patent) (collectively, Berman/TRW). [9] Both Berman/TRW patents describe a hybrid drive train similar to those in the accused vehicles in that the Berman/TRW drive train design employs an ICE, a traction motor, and a generator coupled to a planetary gear unit. See '751 patent, col. 2, l. 48-col. 3, l. 9. However, unlike Toyota's drive train, the Berman/TRW drive train has two operator-selectable modes of operation, one being designed for lower speeds and the other being designed for higher speeds. See, e.g., id. at col. 4, II. 48-62. Although the Berman/TRW design employs various controllers containing transistors and other electronic circuitry, see id. at figs. 4-5, there is no controlling microprocessor choosing the most appropriate mode of operation. J.A. 1255. The written description of the '970 patent describes the Berman/TRW design as providing [a] more promising `parallel hybrid' approach than other prior art, '970 patent, col. 2, l. 67-col. 3, l. 1, but it nevertheless points to disadvantages of the Berman/TRW design compared to the '970 invention: The present invention relates to such a parallel hybrid vehicle, but addresses certain substantial deficiencies of the Berman et al design. For example, Berman et al show two separate electric motor/generators powered by the internal combustion engine to charge batteries and to drive the vehicle forward in traffic. This arrangement is a source of additional complexity, cost and difficulty, as two separate modes of engine control are required, and the operator must control the transition between the several modes of operation. Further the gear train shown by Berman et al appears to be quite complex and difficult to manufacture economically. [10] Id. at col. 3, II. 16-27 (emphases added). Given this criticism and disavowal of Berman/TRW in the written description, Toyota argues that its drive trainswhich are allegedly based on the configuration of the prior art Berman/TRW patentscannot be captured by Paice's invocation of the doctrine of equivalents. This court has addressed the effects of criticism and disavowal in several cases. For example, in SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., the technology at issue related to [b]alloon dilatation catheters . . . used in coronary angioplasty procedures to remove restrictions in coronary arteries. 242 F.3d 1337, 1339 (Fed.Cir.2001). Such catheters were made in one of two configurations: the dual (or adjacent) lumen configuration, or the coaxial lumen configuration. Id. The question on appeal was whether the claimswhich merely specified that the two lumens be separatewere limited in scope, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, to the coaxial lumen configuration. Analyzing the claim language in light of the written description, we held, inter alia, that the patentee had distinguish[ed] the prior art on the basis of the use of dual lumens and [had] point[ed] out the advantages of the coaxial lumens used in the catheters that [were] the subjects of the [patents in suit]. Id. at 1343. We read this as support[ing] the conclusion that the claims should not be read so broadly as to encompass the distinguished prior art structure. Id. We further explained that the most compelling portion of the specification was the patentee's statement that the coaxial configuration is `the basic sleeve structure for all embodiments of the present invention contemplated and disclosed herein.' Id. at 1344 (quoting the written description). We were thus led to the inescapable conclusion that the separate limitation was literally limited in scope to the coaxial configuration. Id. at 1342. Relying again on the patentee's criticism of the prior art and the all embodiments statement, we arrived at the same conclusion with respect to equivalent claim scope. However, our analysis turned on a narrower rationale: The principle articulated in [several cited] cases is akin to the familiar rule that the doctrine of equivalents cannot be employed in a manner that wholly vitiates a claim limitation. See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., [520 U.S. 17, 29-30, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997)]; Athletic Alternatives, [Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996)] (specific exclusion principle is a corollary to the `all limitations' rule). Thus, if a patent states that the claimed device must be nonmetallic, the patentee cannot assert the patent against a metallic device on the ground that a metallic device is equivalent to a non-metallic device. The unavailability of the doctrine of equivalents could be explained either as the product of an impermissible vitiation of the non-metallic claim limitation, or as the product of a clear and binding statement to the public that metallic structures are excluded from the protection of the patent. [T]he foreclosure of reliance on the doctrine of equivalents in such a case depends on whether the patent clearly excludes the asserted equivalent structure, either implicitly or explicitly. Id. at 1346-47. Thus, because the patentee had clearly exclude[d] one of only two possible structures, competitors and the public were free to draw the reasonable conclusion that the patentee was not seeking patent protection for catheters that used a dual lumen configuration. Id. at 1347. This court was confronted with a similar fact pattern in Gaus v. Conair Corp., where the technology at issue related to a safety mechanism that prevents fatal shocks to users of electrical appliances such as hairdryers due to immersion of the appliance in water. 363 F.3d 1284, 1285 (Fed.Cir.2004). In particular, the safety mechanism of the patented invention employed protective circuitry designed to detect the invasion of water before any such water could reach the voltage-carrying components of the appliance itself. Id. at 1289. The safety mechanism of the accused appliance, however, would not react until water reached the voltage-carrying components of the appliance. Id. at 1290. This would result in the user experiencing a brief, but non-fatal shock. Id. Ironically, we noted, one of the principal advantages of the claimed invention [over the prior art] touted in the patent's specification was the invention's ability to protect [] the user from such a shock. Id. at 1289. Thus, we held that the patentee's criticism of this prior art characteristic amounted to a surrender of claim scope that the patentee could not reclaim . . . by invoking the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 1291; see also Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1016 (Fed.Cir.1998) (holding that statements in the written description touting the ability of the patented invention to overcome disadvantages in the prior art strongly suggest, if not mandate, judgment in [the defendant's favor] where the accused products suffered the very same disadvantages). In this case, Toyota analogizes the '970 patent's criticism of the Berman/TRW design to the criticism of prior art discussed in SciMed, Gaus, and Dawn Equipment. We disagree. As the written description of the '970 patent reveals, the primary disadvantage of the Berman/TRW design is its control system, which relies upon a human operator to select the mode of operation. '970 patent, col. 3, II. 24-25 ([T]he operator must control the transition between the several modes of operation.). Paice overcame this disadvantage by using a microprocessor to determine the most appropriate mode of operation based on its monitoring of control inputs from the driver, as well as several other variables. Id. at col. 6, II. 19-26. Toyota's drive trains use a microprocessor in the same manner as the '970 patent, i.e., the microprocessor determines the most appropriate mode of operation based on its monitoring of control inputs from the driver, as well as several other variables. J.A. 1225. Therefore, the '970 patent's discussion of the Berman/TRW design's disadvantages does not preclude the application of the doctrine of equivalents to Toyota's accused transaxle units. To be sure, the written description of the '970 patent does point out that the Berman/TRW gear train . . . appears to be quite complex and difficult to manufacture economically. Col. 3, II. 26-27. However, to the extent Paice drew a distinction between its design and the Berman/TRW design, the distinction is clearly secondary and equivocal at best. Moreover, it is far from obvious which portion of the gear train is supposed to be quite complex and difficult to manufacture economically. Paice may have been referring to the arrangement of the motors, engine, and planetary gear set, or to the control system described in the Berman/TRW patents. The intrinsic evidence simply does not provide any resolution to this ambiguity. Consequently, this is not a case like SciMed where the patentee selected one configuration for all embodiments of the invention to the exclusion of the only other known configuration. Nor is this a case like Gaus or Dawn Equipment where the patentee touted the invention's improvements over the very same subject matter sought to be recaptured under the doctrine of equivalents. Thus, we find nothing in the written description of the '970 patent that amounts to a disavowal sufficient to overturn the jury's finding of infringement. In spite of the above-mentioned differences between the Berman/TRW design and Toyota's design, Toyota argues that Paice is bound by various statements it made equating the Berman/TRW design to Toyota's design. According to Toyota, Paice's disavowal of the Berman/TRW design relative to the limitations of the '970 claims acts as a disavowal of Toyota's accused transaxle units. In the written description of the '672 patent, Paice distinguished Toyota's Prius I transaxle unit (which also uses a planetary gear unit to combine torque): Various articles describe several generations of Toyota Motor Company hybrid vehicles, stated soon to be available commercially. . . . Toyota describes this vehicle as a series-parallel hybrid; regardless of the label applied, its powertrain appears to be similar to that of the Berman patents described above, that is, torque from either or both of an internal combustion engine and an electric motor are controllably combined in a power-split mechanism and transmitted to the drive wheels through a planetary gearset providing the functionality of a variable-ratio transmission. '672 patent, col. 8, II. 45-65 (emphases added). This statement, however, merely acknowledges what we have already observed, i.e., that both designs utilize a planetary gear unit to output combined torque. That observation does not imply that the Berman/TRW and Prius I designs are identical relative to the limitations of the '970 claims. Indeed, the written description of the '672 patent touts the advantages of its clutch-based design over both the CTTU-based design of the '970 patent and the planetary gear unit design of the Prius I. Id. at col. 9, II. 38-51; col. 12, II. 17-21. This is entirely consistent with the jury's finding that Toyota's planetary gear unit design infringes the CTTU-based design of the '970 patent but not the clutched-based design of the '672 patent. To further buttress its argument that Paice equated the Berman/TRW design with the accused drive trains and disclaimed them, Toyota cites a host of extrinsic evidence, including a Paice business plan explaining the cost disadvantages of the Berman/TRW design, J.A. 12235; a confidential document written by Paice founder Dr. Alex Severinsky describing [t]he Toyota Hybrid Drive as an  EXACT copy of the Berman/TRW design, J.A. 12089; an article quoting a co-inventor of the '088 patent as describing the Toyota TMS system to be a one-on-one copy of the Berman/TRW design, J.A. 15754; a page from Paice's marketing materials asserting that the Toyota Prius is the realization of the 1971 TRW patent, J.A. 15348; an email from Dr. Severinsky to Toyota stating that Paice's technology is quite opposite to your Prius, J.A. 12097; and the following notations hand written by Dr. Severinsky in the margin of an article describing the Prius I: J.A. 12085 (notations read This is TRW not Toyota and This is TRW invention). [11] Although the parties disagree as to whether extrinsic evidence may give rise to a disavowal of subject matter, we need not address this point. Simply put, we reject Toyota's contention that Paice's statements equating the Berman/TRW design to Toyota's design amount to a complete disavowal of the accused transaxle units.