Opinion ID: 222783
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Shigemura's Appeal of the Denial of the Motion to Suppress

Text: Mr. Shigemura argues that the district court should have granted the motion to suppress because the traffic stop and search of the vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights in a number of ways. Specifically, Mr. Shigemura argues that (1) the traffic stop was not justified at its inception; (2) the ensuing detention was not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances of the traffic stop; (3) Meco's drug sniff constituted an unreasonable general search in light of the widespread contamination of currency with cocaine residue; and (4) Meco was not a sufficiently reliable narcotics dog. As discussed below, each of these contentions fails.
In assessing a denial of a motion to suppress, this court accepts the factual findings of the district court, and its determination of witness credibility, unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Chavez, 534 F.3d 1338, 1343 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal alteration and quotation marks and omitted). Moreover, this court must view the evidence presented at the suppression hearing in the light most favorable to the Government. United States v. White, 584 F.3d 935, 941 (10th Cir.2009). Judging the credibility of the witnesses, determining the weight to be given to evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences and conclusions from the evidence are within the province of the district court. United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir.1998). Ultimately, however, this court must review de novo the reasonableness of the government's action under the Fourth Amendment. Chavez, 534 F.3d at 1343. We also keep in mind that the government bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of a search or seizure. Id.
In applying the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Supreme Court has recognized three types of police-citizen encounters: consensual encounters, investigative detentions, and arrests. White, 584 F.3d at 944-45. Because a routine traffic stop is more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest, the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), guide this Court's determination as to the reasonableness of a traffic stop. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d at 1348. Specifically, we examine whether the traffic stop was (1) justified at its inception, and (2) reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868. A traffic stop is justified at its inception if an officer has (1) probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred, or (2) a reasonable articulable suspicion that a particular motorist has violated any of the traffic or equipment regulations of the jurisdiction. United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1134 (10th Cir.2009). Thus, the government need not show a violation actually occurred to justify an initial traffic stop. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d at 1348. We look only at whether the stop was objectively justified; the officer's subjective motives are irrelevant. Chavez, 534 F.3d at 1344 (internal quotation marks omitted). At the suppression hearing in this case, Trooper Hyde testified that he pulled Mr. Shigemura over because he observed Mr. Shigemura make at least two unsafe lane changes. Specifically, Trooper Hyde testified that Mr. Shigemura failed to signal when he left the right lane of the two main traffic lanes of I-44 to enter into the toll-plaza area, and again, once inside the toll-plaza area, when he crossed over to reach the open toll booth on the far right side of the toll plaza. On appeal, Mr. Shigemura does not contest the fact that he failed to use a turn signal; rather, he argues that he committed no traffic violation because he was not legally required to use a turn signal under the circumstances. Mr. Shigemura is incorrect. Under Oklahoma law, a motorist crossing a traffic lane is required to use a turn signal. Section 11-309 of Title 47 of the Oklahoma Statutes states as follows: Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic, the following requirements in addition to all others consistent herewith shall apply. . . . . 2. A vehicle shall not be moved from the lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety and then given a signal, not less than the last one hundred (100) feet traveled by the vehicle, of his intention to change lanes. Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 11-309. In an effort to get around this statute, Mr. Shigemura argues that because signs on I-44 designated the right lane of the turnpike as the cash lane for the toll plaza well before the turnpike branched off, no separate lane formed between this right lane and the toll-plaza area, and thus no signal was required. [6] However, the Tenth Circuit, applying Oklahoma law, has squarely addressed this issue, and has concluded that a turn signal is always required when entering a toll-booth area from the main turnpike. See United States v. Manjarrez, 348 F.3d 881, 885 (10th Cir.2003) (considering similar argument involving Stroud toll plaza (the same toll plaza involved in our case), and agreeing with district court that leaving the turnpike to go on to the toll plaza is leaving a lane as contemplated by Oklahoma statutes and therefore, precipitates an obligation to signal (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, Mr. Shigemura's failure to signal as he exited the turnpike and entered into the toll-plaza area constituted a violation of Oklahoma law, and thus the traffic stop was justified at its inception. We therefore need not reach the second issue of whether Mr. Shigemura was required to signal again once he was in the toll-plaza area.