Opinion ID: 2600470
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Special Jury Instructions

Text: Defendant proposed 10 special jury instructions during the penalty phase. The trial court gave one of the proposed instructions, refused five of them, and defendant withdrew the remaining four. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for four of the refused instructions and two that he withdrew, in violation of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.
Defendant requested a special instruction regarding sympathy: In the guilt phase of this case, you were instructed that you should not base your verdict on various irrelevant matters, including sympathy. You are now instructed that sympathy does play a legitimate part in determination of whether a defendant shall suffer death, or be imprisoned for life without the possibility of parole. If after consideration of all the circumstances, you feel sympathy for the defendant that is based on the evidence you have heard, and based on such sympathy you are inclined to extend mercy to the defendant, the law permits you to act upon such sympathy and fix the penalty at life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The court refused to give this instruction because it is argumentative. The court instructed the jury that in determining the proper penalty it should disregard the instructions given at the guilt phase of the trial and consider any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record, adding again, You must disregard any jury instruction given to you in the guilt or innocence phase of this trial which conflicts with this principle. The jurors further were instructed that they were free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. We have suggested that `in appropriate circumstances' a trial court may be required to give a requested jury instruction that pinpoints a defense theory of the case. . . . But a trial court need not give a pinpoint instruction if it is argumentative [citation] [or] merely duplicates other instructions [citation]. . . . ( People v. Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th 515, 558, 127 Cal. Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.) We agree with the trial court that defendant's requested special instruction on sympathy was argumentative and, in any event, the proposed instruction properly was denied because it duplicated other of the court's instructions.
Defendant also requested two special instructions regarding mitigating factors. One stated: The weight to be given to the factors in aggravation and mitigation is a matter for each juror to determine. Each juror must assign the factors present in this case whatever weight the juror finds to be appropriate. For this reason, one mitigating factor can sometimes outweigh a number of aggravating factors in a particular case. No juror is ever required to vote to impose the penalty of death if the juror is not convinced that death is the appropriate penalty under the circumstances shown by the evidence. The court denied this instruction as duplicative and argumentative. The other requested instruction on mitigating factors stated: With regard to factors in mitigation, offered by the defendant as reasons to impose a sentence [of life imprisonment without parole] [less than death], each juror must make his or her own individual assessment of the weight to be given to such evidence. There is no requirement that all jurors unanimously agree on any matter offered in mitigation. Each juror makes an individual evaluation of each fact or circumstance offered in mitigation of penalty. Each juror should weigh and consider such matters regardless of whether or not they are accepted by other jurors. The court refused this instruction as argumentative and duplicative. The court instructed the jury that [t]he weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. In weighing the various circumstances you determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. We need not, and do not, decide whether the trial court was correct that these proposed special instructions on mitigating factors were argumentative because, in any event, the trial court properly denied the requested instructions because they duplicated the court's instructions.
Defendant further asked the court to instruct the jury that the list of aggravating factors is exclusive: I have previously read to you the list of aggravating circumstances which the law permits you to consider if you find that any of them is established by the evidence. These are the only aggravating circumstances that you may consider. You are not allowed to take account of any other facts or circumstances as the basis for deciding that the death penalty would be appropriate punishment in this case. The court refused the instruction, stating it saw no reason to give it. In addition to reading the list of factors set forth in section 190.3 and recounted in CALJIC No. 8.85 that the jury should consider in determining the penalty, the court instructed the jury that [a]n aggravating factor is any fact, condition or event attending the commission of a crime which increases its guilt or enormity, or adds to its injurious consequences which is above and beyond the elements of the crime itself. We previously have rejected the argument that the court must instruct the jury that it cannot consider nonstatutory aggravating evidence. The court gave the standard sentencing instruction (see CALJIC No. 8.85), and we have held that instruction is proper despite its failure expressly to limit aggravating evidence to the enumerated statutory factors, and to exclude nonstatutory factors as a basis for the death penalty. [Citation.] ( People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1180, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 34 P.3d 937; People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 899, 85 Cal. Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15.)
Defendant requested the following jury instruction: One of the factors for you to consider in determining the penalty is the age of the defendant at the time of the offense(s). Chronological age, by itself, is a matter over which the defendant has no control, and which is not relevant to the choice of penalty. However, the factor relating to `defendant's age,' as set forth in these instructions, refers to any matter concerning defendant's age, maturity, and judgment which common experience or morality might indicate to be relevant to the issue of penalty. You shall therefore give any age-related factors and argument consideration in arriving at a judgment as to penalty. Defendant later withdrew this instruction: The Court: I do not believe . . . that this instruction is pertinent to any evidence that I've heard in this case. [Defense Counsel]: Withdraw this one. The Court: All right. The court later instructed the jury that in determining the penalty it should consider The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. Defendant was 24 years old at the time of the first charged crime. Defendant argues that trial counsel withdrew the requested instruction only in response to the court's request, adding that trial counsel obeyed the court and withdrew the instruction. But the court did not order, or even ask, trial counsel to withdraw the request, it merely observed that the proposed instruction did not appear to pertain to any evidence introduced at trial. Rather than explain why the proposed instruction was proper and request a ruling, trial counsel simply withdrew the proposed instruction. In order to preserve an issue for review, a defendant must not only request the court to act, but must press for a ruling. The failure to do so forfeits the claim. ( People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 813, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 46, 101 P.3d 994; see also People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 599, fn. 19, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) Even had defendant properly preserved the issue for appeal, the claim lacks merit because the instruction given as to age was sufficient. Defendant argues that merely instructing to jury to consider [t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime does not provide adequate guidance as to how the jury should apply age to the penalty determination. Defendant cites People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 302, 247 Cal.Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052, in which we held that age cannot be solely a mitigating factor and observed that the word `age' in statutory sentencing factor (i) is used as a metonym for any age-related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experience or morality that might reasonably inform the choice of penalty. Accordingly, either counsel may argue any such age-related inference in every case. ( Ibid. ) As the trial court correctly observed, no age-related matter was suggested by the evidence in this case. (Cf. People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1004, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171 [mental age a mitigating factor].) Accordingly, the court's instruction to consider defendant's age, without further elaboration, was sufficient in this case.
Defendant submitted the following proposed jury instruction: Statements by some jurors during jury selection showed an awareness of news reports concerning other cases where sentences of death were not carried out for legal reasons or where persons sentenced to life imprisonment have been considered for parole. Under the 1978 Death Penalty Law, which governs this case, the only possible penalties are death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In the past, other cases were decided under other laws which are no longer in effect. You must not consider other cases or news reports, or speculate about actions for other authorities in arriving at a penalty verdict in this case. Those are matters that must not affect your verdict. Defendant later withdrew this instruction: The Court: . . . I think this is an area that I would not and in fact I am bound not to bring forth unless the jury itself raises the question during their deliberations. I think to give this instruction would be error and I'm going to ask you to withdraw it. [Defense Counsel]: Withdrawn. The Court: Thank you. Defendant contends that trial counsel withdrew the requested instruction only in response to the court's request, adding that trial counsel obeyed the court and withdrew the instruction. But the court did not order trial counsel to withdraw the request, it merely asked him to do so after explaining why the court concluded the proposed instruction was improper. Trial counsel could have respectfully disagreed and asked the court to rule on his request but, instead, withdrew the proposed instruction, thus forfeiting this issue. ( People v. Braxton, supra, 34 Cal.4th 798, 813, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 46, 101 P.3d 994.) In any event, the proposed instruction was improper. As defendant acknowledges, we repeatedly have rejected the claim that the court should instruct the jury that a sentence of death means the defendant definitely will be executed and a sentence of life in prison without parole means the defendant never will be paroled because such an instruction would be inaccurate. The Governor may ameliorate any sentence by use of the commutation or pardon power . . . . ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th 92, 172, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980; People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 220, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717.) We have further determined that refusal to so instruct does not contravene any constitutional requirement. [Citation.] ( People v. Ward, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 220, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717.)