Opinion ID: 2591920
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: admissibility of prior drug use evidence

Text: Marler complains that there was no pretrial hearing to determine whether evidence of his prior drug use was relevant to prove plan, preparation, or the nature of the relationships within the Marler family, so as to be admissible under K.S.A. 60-455. He describes the offending evidence as the State's reference to Marler's drug usage during opening statements; Pam Marler's testimony that she and Marler did drugs and that he possessed Valium, Xanex, and methamphetamine; Captain Hawkins' testimony that Marler admitted during their interview that he and his wife had been using methamphetamine over an 8-month period; and Marler's eight-page written confession in which he blamed his actions on his methamphetamine use. However, in arguing against the admissibility of the evidence, Marler refers generally to his prior drug use, rather than identifying a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion. K.S.A. 60-455. Nevertheless, we need not analyze the propriety of admitting any of the evidence of Marler's prior drug use under the provisions of K.S.A. 60-455. Marler's brief contains the concession that Mr. Marler did not object to the admission of this K.S.A. 60-455 evidence. K.S.A. 60-404 instructs us that Marler's conviction cannot be reversed or set aside by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless there appears of record objection to the evidence timely interposed and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of objection. The record in this case does not reflect that Marler filed a motion to suppress or a motion in limine to restrict the evidence which the State could produce, nor does it contain any objection based upon K.S.A. 60-455 during the trial. In short, Marler did not preserve the issue for appeal. See, e.g., State v. Riojas, 288 Kan. 379, 385, 204 P.3d 578 (2009). Marler does not explicitly argue that an exception to the contemporaneous objection rule should apply, and we do not view this case as an appropriate candidate for any such exception. The principal rationale for requiring a contemporaneous objection is to give ``the trial court the opportunity to conduct the trial without using the tainted evidence, and thus avoid possible reversal and a new trial.' State v. Moore, 218 Kan. 450, 455, 543 P.2d 923 (1975).' State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 342, 204 P.3d 585 (2009) (quoting State v. Fewell, 286 Kan. 370, 389, 184 P.3d 903 [2008]). The record in this case does not reflect that the trial court had any such opportunity with respect to Marler's prior drug use, either before or during the trial. Moreover, we discern a distinct possibility that Marler's failure to object to the evidence of his drug use might have been intentional. The evidence that he and his wife did drugs together would have helped explain the defense theory that his wife was the real culprit. Likewise, in Marler's written statement, he relied on the evidence of drug use to attempt to diminish his culpability for his participation in the plan. In conclusion, we find that Marler's challenge to the admissibility of evidence of his prior drug use was not preserved for appeal, and we decline to address the issue.