Opinion ID: 1925404
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mr Ponto

Text: Mr. Ponto, a Canadian citizen who lives in Edmonton, Alberta, was arrested in Baltimore County on January 25, 2005, and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. Trial was scheduled in District Court in Towson for February 22, 2005. Responding to a mailed solicitation from Ficker, Ponto contacted Ficker on February 14 about possible representation and informed him that he (Ponto) would be unable to attend court in Maryland on February 22. There is some dispute whether Ficker assured Ponto that he would have no difficulty obtaining a continuance or simply said that he would ask for one. It is clear, however, that neither Ficker nor any associate in his office would have been available to appear in court on February 22. On February 16, Ponto retained Ficker by making a credit card payment in the amount of $799, and, that same day, Ficker forwarded by Federal Express a line of appearance and a motion for continuance to the clerk of the District Court in Towson. The next day, February 17, Ficker was advised by the clerk that the motion for continuance had been denied. Ficker immediately sent an e-mail to Ponto informing him of the denial and advising that Ponto had to be in court on the 22nd or face the prospect that a warrant would be issued for his arrest. Ficker also asked one of his former associates, Jason Kobin, who then practiced in Baltimore County, to go to court on the 22nd and seek reconsideration of the order denying the requested continuance. An associate of Mr. Kobin did appear and make the request, but it was denied, and a warrant was issued for Ponto. In July, 2005, Ponto retained other counsel. The warrant eventually was quashed, Mr. Ponto was found guilty of a related offense, and he was fined and placed on probation. Judge Debelius noted that, when Ficker was first contacted on February 14, and when he accepted the fee and entered his appearance on February 16, he knew that neither he nor any of his associates were available to appear on February 22. The judge rejected Ficker's excuse that he thought that other attorneys, such as Mr. Kobin, with whom he had no association, might be able to appear: [Ficker] was not associated with any of these attorneys, nor did Ponto hire any of these attorneys to represent him, nor did [Ficker] notify Ponto that one of these attorneys would be representing his interests. Ficker stated that he later learned that his motion for continuance was denied because he had failed to attach to it documents that would verify that he had conflicting court appearances, which the judges of the District Court in Towson apparently require. [3] Judge Debelius observed that Ficker had failed to mention in his motion for continuance his client's business obligations in Western Canada that would render him unable to appear on February 22. The judge also noted that the entire $799 received by Ficker had been placed in the firm's operating account, notwithstanding Ficker's knowledge that he had not yet earned that fee. On these facts, Judge Debelius found that Ficker had violated MRPC 1.15(a) by not placing the unearned $799 fee in a separate escrow account, and that, by entering his appearance to represent Ponto, knowing that he would be unable to do so on February 22, Ficker violated MRPC 8.4(d) (Conduct prejudicial to administration of Justice). He was not persuaded that Ficker had violated MRPC 1.1 by failing to familiarize himself with the requirement imposed in the District Court in Baltimore County that motions for continuance based on a lawyer's conflict contain documentation of the conflict. Bar Counsel filed an exception challenging Judge Debelius's failure to find a violation of MRPC 1.1 in the Ponto case. Ficker has taken exception to most of Judge Debelius's rulings: (1) the violation of MRPC 8.4(d) in the Ponto case; (2) the violations of MRPC 1.3 and 8.4(d) in the Paulk case, and (3) the violation of Rules 1.1, 1.3, and 5.1, in the Robertshaw case. He concedes violation of Rule 1.4 in the Robertshaw case but argues that he has since instituted corrective measures. We shall overrule all of the exceptions. The factual findings by Judge Debelius are all supported by substantial competent evidence, and we find no error of law in any of them. As we observed initially, this is the fifth time that Ficker has run afoul of his obligation to manage his office in a proper manner. He was warned twice by this Court, in 1990 and in 1998, and, despite his claimed improvements, seems not to have learned enough from those warnings. As the result of his cavalier attention to proper office management (1) one client (Robertshaw), facing incarceration, was virtually abandoned until the eve of trial and then was represented by an associate who had not read the entire file, who was unaware that his client had two prior convictions, and who first presented the available options to her in the lobby of the courthouse on the day of trial, (2) another client (Paulk), facing criminal charges that could have resulted in incarceration, was abandoned on what she assumed would be a trial date and which, only by fortuitous circumstance unknown to her or Ficker, had been limited to an advice of rights proceeding, and (3) a third client (Ponto) ended up having an arrest warrant issued against him. We see in these violations an inexcusable lack of concern on Ficker's part for the welfare of his clients, an unwillingness, after four warnings, to make the necessary improvements to his office management. Accordingly, we believe that the appropriate sanction is an indefinite suspension from the practice of law, with the right to reapply for admission no earlier than one year from the effective date of the suspension. Pursuant to Md. Rule 16-760(a), to allow . . . a reasonable opportunity to comply, the suspension shall commence 30 days after the filing of this Opinion, except that Ficker shall accept no new clients and undertake no new work for existing clients as of the date of this Order. Although we are not inclined, at this point, to set other conditions on an application for reinstatement that cannot be filed for at least a year, we suggest that, should Ficker seek reinstatement, he be prepared to demonstrate that he will have in place specific and reliable systems and procedures necessary to ensure that the problems that have plagued his practice for the past seventeen years do not recur. IT IS SO ORDERED. RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND AGAINST ROBIN K.A. FICKER; SUSPENSION SHALL COMMENCE 30 DAYS AFTER THE FILING OF THIS OPINION. CATHELL, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by CATHELL, Judge. I concur with the findings of the majority. I dissent, however, from the imposition of the sanction imposed by the majority, i.e., an indefinite suspension with the right to reapply after one year. As the majority succinctly points out, respondent has been sanctioned previously for similar negligence, incompetence, and lack of diligence on four separate occasions. In the present case, arising itself out of three different complaints, the hearing judge found, and the majority concurs, that he exhibited incompetence, lack of diligence, and failure to communicate with his client in the Robertshaw matter; lack of diligence and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in the Paulk matter; and that respondent had failed to place an unearned fee in a separate escrow account, had committed conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in the Ponto case. If disbarment is not warranted in this case for these types of issues, with a respondent with this history, it will never be warranted. If it is never going to be warranted in these types of cases, we should modify the rules to say so. I would disbar.