Opinion ID: 2978738
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lindsay (08-5602)

Text: 3 In United States v. Baker, 458 F.3d 513, 520 (6th Cir. 2006), we suggested that the lowerthreshold harmless error test applicable to other evidentiary errors applied to evidence admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause. The case we cited for that proposition, United States v. Pugh, 405 F.3d 390, 400 (6th Cir. 2005), in turn relied on Jordan v. Hurley, 397 F.3d 360, 363 (6th Cir. 2005). In Jordan, a habeas case, we made it clear that Confrontation Clause violations are reviewed for the harmless error review we apply to constitutional claims. Because Jordan was a habeas case, we applied the Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) standard that looks to whether the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” However, on direct appeal, we review such claims for harmless error under the harmless-beyond-a- reasonable-doubt standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). E.g. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681; United States v. Moses, 137 F.3d 894, 901 (6th Cir. 1998). To the extent Baker suggests otherwise, it is inconsistent with prior decisions by this court and the Supreme Court. 9
Lindsay argues that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated because he was not allowed to ask Eck questions about the testimony of other witnesses. This claimed error does not implicate the Confrontation Clause, because Lindsay had a full opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses. Instead, Lindsay contends that he should have been able to use Eck to contradict the testimony of the other witnesses, which implicates another one of his rights: his right to call witnesses on his behalf, “a fundamental element of due process of law.” Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967); United States v. Foster, 128 F.3d 949, 953 (6th Cir. 1997). Lindsay was able to secure Eck’s presence at trial; however, he was not able to compel him to testify because Eck invoked his privilege against self-incrimination. When such a conflict is present, “[a] defendant’s right to compel testimony yields to a witness’s assertion of his or her Fifth Amendment privilege when the claimed privilege is grounded on a reasonable fear of prosecution.” United States v. Highgate, 521 F.3d 590, 593 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Given that the government refused to state whether it planned to prosecute Eck, his claim of privilege was wellgrounded. Lindsay does not challenge the district court’s ruling that Eck could refuse to testify. Instead, he argues that “[f]airness” required that the government grant Eck immunity so that there could be no reasonable fear of prosecution. “To the extent that Defendant challenges the decision of the prosecution not to give [a witness] immunity in exchange for his testimony, such a claim is not cognizable.” United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 401 (6th Cir. 2001). Some courts have recognized a limited exception to this rule “when a witness possesses exculpatory testimony that is essential to an effective defense and that strongly outweighs the government’s interests in declining 10 to offer immunity.” Id. (citing United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 997 (6th Cir. 1999)).4 However, “this court has previously discussed and rejected” this exception. Talley, 164 F.3d at 997 (citing United States v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 1397, 1401 (6th Cir. 1991)). Even if we did require immunization under the “effective defense” theory, Lindsay has not shown that his right to present a defense was denied when the government declined to immunize Eck.
Lindsay also contends that the admission of Government’s Exhibit 4, the weapon attributed to Lindsay, was in error.5 We review the district court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion, United States v. DeJohn, 368 F.3d 533, 542 (6th Cir. 2004), but we ignore any error that does not affect the defendant’s substantial rights, Fed. R. Evid. 103(a); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). An exhibit may only be admitted if there is “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). At trial, Adkins testified that he witnessed on the video while it was happening Lindsay place the weapon behind a door, and that he went and retrieved it minutes later. He then took photographs of the weapon and lodged it into the prison’s evidence vault. Adkins testified that the weapon introduced at trial was the same 4 We have also recognized two additional exceptions – when the government selectively grants immunity to its own witnesses while denying it to a defendant’s, and when necessary to remedy prosecutorial misconduct, Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 401 & n.5 – but these exceptions are not applicable to this case. 5 Although the government does not argue waiver, it also appears that Lindsay did not preserve his objection. He initially objected when the weapon was first offered, and a sidebar conference was held where the judge overruled the objection “assuming that some additional questioning” of Adkins would provide a proper foundation. Three additional questions were asked of the witness, and the government again moved for its admission. There was no objection at this time. 11 weapon that was in the photographs and that it had not been altered. This satisfies the threshold admissibility requirement. Lindsay first challenges the exhibit’s admissibility by arguing that the government failed to establish a chain of custody of the exhibit, leaving open the possibility of tampering. As Lindsay concedes, we have repeatedly held that “[a]bsent a clear abuse of discretion,‘challenges to the chain of custody go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.’” United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 700 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 1990)). He contends that in this case there was such an abuse of discretion because the exhibit “was handled in such a negligent and cavalier manner and without proper safeguards.” Br. at 8. He does not explain this assertion further, and the record does not support this claim. The undisputed evidence presented at trial indicates that the officers carefully documented each step between recovery of the weapon and its placement into the evidence vault. Second, he argues that “the exhibit was never conclusively identified.” “Physical evidence is admissible when the possibility of misidentification or alteration is ‘eliminated, not absolutely, but as a matter of reasonable probability.’” United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 938 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Allen, 106 F.3d at 700). Here, there was no reasonable probability of misidentification. See id. (holding that district court did not plainly err when it admitted guns that had been given to a private citizen in between their seizure from the defendant and the trial, and noting that “there was no reasonable probability of misidentification”). To the contrary, Adkins made a positive identification at trial. Lindsay’s arguments go to the weight of the evidence, which is a matter for the trier of fact, not this appellate court. Finding no reversible error, we AFFIRM Lindsay’s conviction. 12