Opinion ID: 8288
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidentiary Hearing on Juror Bias

Text: Johnson-Bey argues that the district court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing on his claim that Juror Barbee intentionally failed to disclose two prior instances of jury service, indicating bias. The magistrate judge rejected this claim without an evidentiary hearing, finding that although Barbee failed to remember accurately the details of his prior jury service, nothing in his voir dire examination [] in any way indicates he was secreting or hiding information. To receive a federal evidentiary hearing, a habeas corpus petitioner must allege facts that, if proved, would entitle him to relief. Wilson v. Butler, 825 F.2d 879, 880 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1079 (1988). [T]he remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982). To obtain relief on a claim that a venire member concealed information, a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for challenge for cause. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984); United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 698 (5th Cir. 1988) (applying the McDonough test in a criminal case). 5 We conclude that the district court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing on this claim because, even if JohnsonBey's allegations are true, Barbee would not have been subject to a challenge for cause on the basis of the omitted information. In his jury questionnaire and upon voir dire, Juror Barbee stated that he had served as foreman on a criminal jury in an assault case in 1971, but he also stated on voir dire that he did not remember all the details about his service. Johnson-Bey alleges that court records reveal that Barbee had served on a jury in a murder case, and had served as foreman of a jury in a robbery case, in 1970 and 1972, respectively. The magistrate judge found that Barbee had not intentionally concealed the additional jury service, but merely had forgotten the details of his service, as he stated in voir dire. This factual finding is not clearly erroneous. See Barnard v. Collins, 958 F.2d 634, 636 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 990 (1993). Furthermore, even if Johnson-Bey could prove at an evidentiary hearing that Barbee deliberately concealed his service on a murder jury, prior service on a murder jury and as foreman of a robbery jury would not have supported a challenge for cause. See Kirkland v. State, 786 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Tex. App.--Austin 1990, no pet.) (It is well settled that it is not a ground for disqualification that prospective jurors have served on a jury in a case against another defendant charged with an offense of the same character.); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.16 (Vernon 1989). 6 Johnson-Bey additionally argues that we should presume bias solely from the alleged fact that Barbee deliberately concealed material information, relying on, inter alia, United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1988), and Burton v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1991). We again note that the district court's factual finding that Barbee simply forgot, rather than intentionally concealed, his jury service history is not clearly erroneous. Because Johnson-Bey does not allege facts which, if true, would entitle him to habeas relief, we affirm the district court's denial of habeas relief on this ground without an evidentiary hearing.