Opinion ID: 1681743
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Fourth District's Analysis in McDonald

Text: In McDonald, the Fourth District receded from a series of its prior decisions extending this Court's holding in Grant to the question of whether the imposition of concurrent sentences under the 10-20-LIFE statute and the PRR statute was permissible. [3] The issue we addressed in Grant was whether a sentence under section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1997), the Habitual Felony Offender (HFO) statute, could be imposed concurrently with a sentence under the PRR statute where both sentences were of equal duration, but where the HFO sentence allowed for gain time and the PRR sentence did not. 770 So.2d at 659. Based on the language of the PRR statute expressing the Legislature's intent that qualifying offenders be punished to the `fullest extent of the law,' including the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences, this Court held that the HFO sentence could be imposed concurrently with the PRR sentence only if the HFO sentence was greater than the PRR sentence. Id. (quoting § 775.082(8)(d)(1), Fla. Stat. (1997)). This holding rested upon the conclusion that the imposition of an equal or lesser sentence under the HFO statute, which includes gain time, would violate the express provisions of the PRR statute mandating that the greater PRR sentence be served in full. Id. [4] Prior to McDonald, the Fourth District had extended the holding in Grant to cases involving concurrent sentencing under the PRR and 10-20-LIFE statutes. McDonald, 912 So.2d at 75-76. [5] It had held that equal or lesser 10-20-LIFE sentences could not be imposed concurrently with a greater PRR sentence. However, in McDonald, after thoroughly reviewing the language of the 10-20-LIFE statute, the Fourth District receded from its prior decisions. The pertinent language of the 10-20-LIFE statute provides as follows: 775.087 Possession or use of weapon; aggravated battery; felony reclassification; minimum sentence. . . . . (2)(a)1. Any person who is convicted of a felony or an attempt to commit a felony, regardless of whether the use of a weapon is an element of the felony, and the conviction was for: . . . . c. Robbery; . . . . n. Carjacking; . . . . and during the commission of the offense, such person actually possessed a firearm or destructive device as those terms are defined in s. 790.001, shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of 10 years. . . . . . . . (c) If the minimum mandatory terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this section exceed the maximum sentences authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, then the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed. If the mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment pursuant to this section are less than the sentences that could be imposed as authorized by s. 775.082, s. 775.084, or the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921, then the sentence imposed by the court must include the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment as required in this section. (d) It is the intent of the Legislature that offenders who actually possess, carry, display, use, threaten to use, or attempt to use firearms or destructive devices be punished to the fullest extent of the law, and the minimum terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to this subsection shall be imposed for each qualifying felony count for which the person is convicted. The court shall impose any term of imprisonment provided for in this subsection consecutively to any other term of imprisonment imposed for any other felony offense. (Emphasis added.) In McDonald, the Fourth District reasoned that the plain meaning of this statutory language, in particular the emphasized language of subsection (c), clearly expresses the Legislature's intent that the mandatory minimum sentence under the 10-20-LIFE statute should be imposed where the criminal possessed a firearm during the commission of the crime regardless of whether a greater sanction may be imposed under another statutory provision. 912 So.2d at 75-76. In other words, the Fourth District concluded that the plain language of the 10-20-LIFE statute clearly mandates that the mandatory minimum sentences under the 10-20-LIFE statute and the PRR statute be imposed concurrently even where, as here, the 10-20-LIFE sentence is less than the PRR sentence. Id. The Fourth District further concluded that the legislative intent expressed in section 775.087(2)(d), that violators be punished to the fullest extent of the law, is the same clear intent expressed in section 775.082(9)(d)(1) that was noted by this Court in Grant. Thus, the Fourth District concluded that the two statutes have a common legislative purpose and should be read in pari materia. McDonald, 912 So.2d at 76 (citing Mills v. State, 822 So.2d 1284, 1288 (Fla.2002), for proposition that in the absence of contrary legislative intent related statutes should be read in pari materia ). The Fourth District further reasoned that [t]o the extent the provision of the PRR statute and the 10-20-LIFE law could be seen as conflicting, the specific provisions of the 10-20-LIFE law should control over the general provisions of the PRR statute. Id. (citing Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1959), explaining that a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same other subjects in general terms).