Opinion ID: 203107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Obstructive Conduct.

Text: The district court also found, as had the hearing officer, that the parents' precipitous actions had prevented the consummation of the IEP. See Five Town, 2007 WL 494994, at . The court found that the parents harbored a fixed purpose: to effect a residential placement for their daughter at the School District's expense, come what may. See id. at , . Once the parents realized that the School District was focused on a non-residential placement, they essentially lost interest in the IEP process. See id. That finding, which was not clearly erroneous, [4] supported an inference of parental obstruction. See MM, 303 F.3d at 535. In turn, the finding Of obstructionism, coupled with the finding of incompleteness, underbraced the court's decision to consider extrinsic evidence. Viewed in context, that decision makes perfect sense: while considering extrinsic information in the adequacy calculus may not be appropriate in the mine-run of cases, that course is peculiarly appropriate where, as here, the record reveals with conspicuous clarity that all the participants in the October 12 PET meeting wanted Dr. Miller's input in order to develop a proper crisis plan and positive behavior support plan for A.S. as part and parcel of a final IEP. Neither plan had been formulated when the School District transmitted the October 18 IEP to the parents. The parents cannot ignore these facts, nor expect a reviewing court to blind itself to them. Cf. Doe v. Defendant I, 898 F.2d 1186, 1190 (6th Cir.1990) (approving consideration of extrinsic information when parents, as part of the team, had all of the information required, even though all the particulars were not contained within the four corners of the IEP). From this point forward, the court, like the hearing officer, considered whether a public school day placement was appropriate and what benefits a finalized IEP would have provided. See Five Town, 2007 WL 494994, at . It supportably concluded that a public school non-residential placement constituted the least restrictive environment. It also concluded that, had the parents allowed the process to run its course, the School District would have developed a sound behavioral support plan and formulated a menu of psychiatric services to be offered to A.S. (which were in line with the goals limned in the proposed IEP). Id. at -35. And, finally, it held that because the resultant IEP would have been adequate to afford A.S. a FAPE, the parents' claim failed. Id. at . In the last analysis, we need not probe too deeply into the adequacy of the IEP. Given the district court's comprehensive factual findings, we can decide this case on a less nuanced ground. We explain briefly. Congress deliberately fashioned an interactive process for the development of IEPs. In so doing, it expressly declared that if parents act unreasonably in the course of that process, they may be barred from reimbursement under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(III) (providing that [t]he cost of reimbursement . . . may be reduced or denied . . . upon a judicial finding of unreasonableness with respect to actions taken by the parents). Here, the School District argues persuasively that the parents' conduct was unreasonable and that this unreasonableness precludes relief. Although the district court drew no conclusions with regard to this provision of the IDEA, we are free to affirm its decision on any alternative ground that is evident from the record. See InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 141 (1st Cir.2003); United States v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78, 91 (1st Cir.2000). Moreover, where the evidence supports a district court's findings of fact, we may realign those findings under a different legal matrix and decide the case on that basis. See, e.g., Wine & Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 481 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2007) (explaining that [a] trial court's findings of fact, made in connection with one legal theory, may often be treated as fungible in connection with another [legal theory]); Ferrara v. United States, 456 F.3d 278, 281 (1st Cir.2006) (relying on district court's subsidiary findings of fact to decide appeal under a different articulation of the applicable rule of law); see also Societé des Produits Nestle v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 642 (1st Cir.1992). This is such a case. The district court supportably found that the parents' actions disrupted the TER process, stalling its consummation and preventing the development of a final IEP. Moreover, the court found, the parents did so despite their knowledge that the School District planned to complete the unfinished portions with the parents' help. Tellingly, the court determined that the cause of the disruption was the parents' single-minded refusal to consider any placement other than a residential one. Five Town, 2007 WL 494994, at . Such Boulwarism, whether or not well-intentioned, constitutes an unreasonable approach to the collaborative process envisioned by the IDEA. See Roland M., 910 F.2d at 995. Here, that attitude sufficed to undermine the process. To sum up, the district court found that the October 18 IEP was incomplete and that the parents' unreasonable actions had frustrated the completion of the IEP process. [5] Given these warrantable findings of fact, section 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(III) provides a solid ground for resolving the case against the parents. Their unreasonable obstruction of an otherwise promising IEP process fully justifies a denial of reimbursement under the IDEA. See M.S. v. Mullica Tp. Bd. of Educ., 485 F.Supp.2d 555, 568 (D.N.J.2007) (denying reimbursement because parents failed to cooperate in completion of IEP).