Opinion ID: 2208549
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Swan's Allegations of Error

Text: Swan first argues that the trial judge should have granted him a new trial because, during the guilt phase of the proceedings against him, the Governor of Delaware nominated Swan's attorney, David Jones, for a position as a Family Court Commissioner. Kenneth Warren's aunt is Delaware State Senator Nancy Cook. Swan claims Senator Cook's ability to influence other Senators who would vote in Jones' confirmation resulted in a conflict of interest. This Court reviews a trial judge's denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. [3] During one of Jones' initial interviews with Swan, Jones told Swan that he discussed a nomination for an appointed position with Senator Cook the previous year, that Jones would continue to seek the nomination, but that Jones did not have a personal relationship with Senator Cook and had only spoken to Senator Cook on one or two prior occasions. Swan moved for new counsel approximately one year before the trial took place. The trial judge denied the motion. Swan raised the same objection when he moved for a new trial during the penalty phase of his trial. Specifically, Swan claimed that the relationship between Senator Cook and Jones created an appearance of impropriety that may have affected Swan's Sixth Amendment rights. In response, the trial judge noted that Senator Cook abstained from voting on Jones' confirmation as a Commissioner. The trial judge also noted that Swan did not present any evidence of improper conduct by Jones. The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel provides for representation free from conflicts of interest or divided loyalties. [4] This right applies irrespective of whether the attorney is appointed or privately retained. [5] Though the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant effective assistance of counsel, it does not provide the defendant counsel of his or her choice. [6] Delaware Lawyers' Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(b) provides: A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client consents after consultation. [7] The comments to Rule 1.7 note that an inquiry into a conflict of interest must include an analysis of the likelihood that actual conflict will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise. [8] When a judge is alerted to possible conflicts of interest, the judge must take adequate steps to determine whether the conflicts warrant separate counsel. [9] In the recent decision of Mickens v, Taylor, the United States Supreme Court held that when a trial judge fails to inquire into a potential conflict of interest that he knew or reasonably should have known existed, a defendant, in order to establish a Sixth Amendment violation, must demonstrate that the conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. [10] We do not need to decide whether the Delaware Constitution affords a defendant more protection than the United States Constitution when the trial judge fails to inquire into a potential conflict of interest. When Swan alerted the trial judge about a possible conflict of interest, the trial judge took adequate steps to determine whether the conflict warranted new counsel. After receiving Swan's pro se motion, the trial judge sent a letter to Swan's counsel and asked for a response. Defense counsel then submitted a detailed response denying the existence of a conflict. The trial judge then ruled on Swan's claim at the proof positive hearing on June 29, 2000. The trial judge took proper steps to determine whether a conflict of interested existed after Swan filed his motion. The trial judge also properly determined that Swan's attorney did not have a conflict of interest. The trial judge concluded that Senator Cook had no role in the nomination process of a judicial candidate and that she had abstained from voting on Jones' confirmation. The trial judge further noted that the Senate did not confirm Jones until after the guilt phase of the trial and, therefore, there was no reason for any interaction between Senator Cook and Jones at that time because his name had not yet been submitted to the Senate. The Senate did confirm him before the penalty phase but Senator Cook did not vote on his confirmation. The trial judge explained that Swan had done no more than ask the court to speculate that Senator Cook acted in some way to influence voting Senators because he could produce no evidence of improper conduct on anyone's part. [11] We agree with the trial judge's conclusion that Jones did not have a conflict of interest when he represented Swan. Up until the release of Jones' nomination during the guilt phase of Swan's trial, Jones merely intended to submit his name if a position for Commissioner became open in the future. The Comments to Rule 1.7 note that an inquiry into a conflict of interest must include an analysis of the likelihood that actual conflict will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise. Here, the likelihood of conflict was remote. Neither Jones nor Senator Cook could have known when a position would become available. The trial judge also correctly determined that Swan failed to demonstrate any prejudice as a result of his counsel's alleged conflict of interest. Swan made no claim of deficient performance. He never specified what he believed Jones did or failed to do in light of the alleged conflict that he argued could have prejudiced his defense. Thus, Swan's argument reduces itself to the claim that the conflict created an appearance of impropriety. [12] The trial judge further noted that Jones' defense of Swan was highly skilled and vigorous, evidenced by the fact that the jury deliberated four days before convicting Swan and on horrendously unfavorable facts recommended the death penalty by only a seven to five vote. Given the trial judge's thoughtful inquiry and reasoned conclusion, we cannot find that he abused his discretion when he denied Swan's Motions to Disqualify Counsel or for a New Trial.
Swan argues that his co-defendant's various hearsay statements, admitted into evidence after Norcross invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Swan argues that the statements were not reliable because Norcross provided several different versions of the incident to different witnesses. He also argues that the use of plural pronouns and phrases in redacted statements were intended to inculpate him. He complains that Mathew Howell's testimony about Norcross' statements was admitted without redaction. He complains generally about hearsay testimony from Bridget Phillips and that the trial judge erred by not granting a mistrial when the State played a tape of Gina Ruberto's statement that included a plural phrase. This Court reviews de novo claims alleging the infringement of a constitutional right and evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. [13] Since Swan's codefendant Norcross invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, he was unavailable for trial. The State was forced to rely on the statement against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule to enter Norcross' statements into evidence. [14] The trial judge ordered that any references to Swan be redacted where 804(b)(3) was relied upon for admission as well as any plural usage that in the context of the statement could unfairly implicate Swan as the accomplice. The trial judge also redacted any statement that suggested Norcross' accomplice fired the fatal shot. The trial judge permitted plural usage for statements where Swan was not implicated and Norcross was not shifting the blame. This Court has held that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause imposes strict requirements for admission of statements against penal interest if those statements also inculpate someone other than the hearsay declarant. [15] Swan relies on Barrow v. State [16] and Lilly v. Virginia [17] to argue that Norcross' statements were not truly self-inculpatory. However, Norcross' statements are analogous to the footnote in Barrow where this Court explained that a statement that the hearsay declarant participated in the robbery, without stating his role, would be truly self-inculpatory. [18] Norcross specifically admitted to Howell and Phillips that he shot Kenneth Warren. In addition, Norcross fully implicated himself in the conspiracy, burglary, robbery, and murder in speaking with Gina Ruberto and the police. No reasonable person in Norcross' position would have made such statements unless he believed them to be true. Furthermore, Swan conceded at trial that those parts of Norcross' statements confessing that he was one of the two people who broke into the Warren house and planned the robbery were admissible under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. The trial judge correctly admitted Norcross' statements to his co-worker, Matthew Howell under the co-conspirators exception to the hearsay rule. [19] A statement is not hearsay if made by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy; provided that the conspiracy has first been established by a preponderance of the evidence to the satisfaction of the court. [20] This Court has held that the trial court may rely on the statement itself to establish the conspiracy. [21] Howell's statements meet the requirements of this exception because Norcross attempted to solicit Howell to join the conspiracy to commit robbery. The trial judge properly allowed Bridget Phillips to relay Swan's adopted admissions pursuant to D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A) & (B). Phillips testified that Norcross admitted that he and Swan were involved in the murder of Kenneth Warren. With Swan present, Norcross told Phillips that Swan was shot during the scuffle with the victim. Norcross pointed to a scar on Swan's shoulder and stated that the scar was the result of a gunshot wound that occurred during the robbery. Swan, present at the time Norcross made the statement, confirmed it. Swan then stated that the bullet is still in there, gesturing with his hand toward the scar. These statements and actions manifested Swan's adoption of belief of the truth of Norcross' statements made while Phillips was present. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying Swan's motion for a mistrial where one plural reference was not redacted from a taped statement made by Norcross' former girlfriend, Gina Ruberto. In the statement, Ruberto repeated an account of the robbery and murder that Norcross gave her shortly after the murder had occurred. Despite the trial judge's order that references to any accomplice be redacted, the State failed to redact one plural pronoun reference where Ruberto mentioned that Norcross had said they parked the red car near the victim's home. Upon defense objection, the trial judge immediately provided a curative instruction to the jury: A portion of the tape you have just heard and a portion of the transcript ... contained material that I have ruled inadmissible. I believe that it got in there inadvertently, but I don't know that for sure. In any event, I have stricken that tape and that transcript from the record. They are no longer in evidence and you are to disregard anything you might recall, either from the tape or from the transcript. You may be guided by the testimony that Ms. Ruberto has given from the stand and the cross-examination you are about to hear. And the very first tape, the short tape, is still in evidence. But the tape that was just played for you is no longer evidence in this case. [22] This instruction neutralized prejudice to the defendant, and the jury must be presumed to have followed the court's instructions. [23] The trial judge took great pains to ensure that the portions of Swan's accomplice's statements (Norcross' confession to the police and his out-of-court statements to Howell, Ruberto, and Phillips) that inculpated Swan were redacted, as well as any portions which appeared to shift blame from Norcross to Swan, or anyone else. Norcross' statements contain sufficient guarantees of reliability and are consistent in their essential elements: that Norcross and another person dressed in camouflage clothing broke into a home occupied by a family, shot the husband, and a stole a purse. Aside from Norcross' confession, the statements made to his co-worker, his girlfriend, and his wife were not made under the pressure of a police interrogation, where a declarant, arguably, is more likely to shift blame to others in order to curry favor with authorities.
Swan challenges several comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument. He contends that the comments deprived him of his right to a fair and impartial trial. All the comments were made during the guilt phase of trial. Swan objected to two of the comments claiming the first comment asked the jury to place themselves in the place of the victim and the second comment expressed the prosecutor's own opinion. Swan argues that the trial judge should have granted a mistrial upon the defense objection to those comments. The remaining comments were not objected to at trial and Swan now complains that they constituted plain error. The law in this area is well settled. The prosecutor represents all the people, including the defendant and must seek justice, not merely convictions. [24] In pursuing both goals, the prosecutor should abide by the American Bar Association's standards governing prosecution and defense functions. [25] Consistent with those standards, the prosecutor should not: (i) express personal beliefs as to the credibility of witnesses; (ii) misrepresent the evidence presented at trial; (iii) comment on the fact that a defendant exercised the right to remain silent; (iv) denigrate the role of defense counsel; (v) misrepresent the legal effect of defendant's statements; (vi) appeal to the jury's sense of personal risk or the level of safety in the community; or (vii) attempt to inflame the prejudices of the jury by name-calling or other pejorative language. [26] Objectionable statements that were not objected to at trial are reviewed for plain error. [27] To be plain, the error must affect substantial rights, generally meaning that it must have affected the outcome of the trial. [28] Under plain error review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights so as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial. [29] The burden of persuasion is on the defendant to demonstrate that a forfeited error is prejudicial. [30] In the first challenged remark, Swan claims the prosecution violated the golden rule by asking the jury place themselves in the place of the victim. Think about home. What is home? Come back from vacation, you want to sit there. Defense counsel immediately objected on the grounds that, the prosecutor is asking the jury to place themselves in the place of the victim. The trial judge sustained this objection and the prosecutor rephrased the comment by referring specifically to the victim's home. [31] The trial judge correctly and promptly sustained defense counsel's objection to the prosecutor's invocation of the golden rule argument. The prosecutor's reference to the sanctity of the home effectively asked the jury to place themselves in the place of the victim. Swan next claims the prosecutor injected his personal opinion to the jury, although defense counsel made no objection to the following comments: I'm suggesting, ladies and gentlemen, that the  that what Michael Stewart's memory of that event is with regard to his involvement with Swan, the evidence would suggest, ladies and gentlemen, that perhaps Michael's mistaken. [32] Swan claims that the prosecutor again injected his own opinion in the argument. This time, defense counsel raised an objection: A bullet goes boom, like that. Can't it just go there? He even gave Mr. O'Connor a tough time about three-eights of an inch or 7/16s, whatever the nonsense was. But doesn't it  conceptualize  unless I'm just slow or something, it seems to me that a bullet can go through- MR. JONES: Again, your Honor, objection to injecting the prosecutor's personal opinion into the argument. THE COURT: Yes, it's getting to be that, Mr. O'Neill. Let me tell you about what we're fussing about here. Our Supreme Court has said that it's improper for an attorney to say, In my personal opinion, or In my opinion, the Supreme Court thinks [it] is improper. The attorneys should use, the evidence suggests, or things like that. They're not to put their own personal opinion or personal credibility on the line. I've seen it happen over and over again, the I slips in, sometimes inadvertently, so just - MR. O'NEILL: I understand, your Honor. THE COURT:  a warning shot. MR. O'NEILL: And I  the State will continue. It is a well-established principle that the prosecutor has a special obligation to avoid assertions of personal knowledge. [33] The prosecutor's use of the word I only serves to emphasize for the jury that prosecutor's personal belief about the point being argued to the jury. [34] However, the objection and the trial judge's immediate intervention prevented the State from finishing its arguably improper presentation concerning the bullet related evidence. In addition, the prosecutor's use of I in discussing the testimony of Michael Stewart was later qualified by the use of the the evidence suggests. Thus, neither comment improperly denied Swan a fair trial. [35] In reviewing the remaining four statements, our analysis includes a review of both the statements' individual and cumulative effect. [36] Improper prosecutorial comments in closing argument only constitute plain error if credibility is a central issue, the case is close, and the comment is so clearly prejudicial that defense counsel's failure to object is inexcusable and the trial judge must intervene sua sponte in the interest of fundamental fairness. [37] None of the remarks challenged for the first time on appeal satisfy this three-part plain error analysis. The prosecutor's remark that, Friends and relatives lost a good man, a hardworking honest man in the victim was not improper. The State is permitted to draw legitimate inferences from the record. This inference is a fair comment on the evidence and is supported by the record. The prosecutor's remark that, It is time to do what is right as supported by the evidence. Justice demands it is neither inflammatory nor prejudicial as the prosecutor is merely asking the jury to decide the case on the basis of the evidence. Noting that the trial against the accused is also the victim's day in court does not constitute plain error. [38] Tina Warren corroborated the prosecutor's comment that Norcross' statement indicated that Norcross committed the murder with another individual. The prosecutor merely emphasized that another witness confirmed Norcross' account. He did not impermissibly attempt to bolster a witness' credibility. After reviewing all the prosecutor's remarks that Swan claims violated his right to a fair trial, we conclude that only the prosecutor's reference to the golden rule was improper. However, once a prosecutor's remarks are found to be improper, the inquiry does not end. The court must consider whether the remark prejudicially affected the defendant's right to a fair trial. [39] The three factors to be considered in making this determination are: (i) the closeness of the case, (ii) the centrality of the issue, and (iii) the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error. [40] As discussed more fully in the sections of this opinion addressing Swan's claim that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the crimes alleged and this court's automatic review of Swan's sentence, this was not a close case. In addition, although a curative instruction would have been beneficial, the trial judge did sustain defense counsel's motion and the prosecutor changed his argument to specifically refer to the victim's home. This limited, improper comment did not, standing alone or with other comments, deprive Swan of a fair trial.
Swan argues for the first time on appeal that the trial judge erred by refusing to give the jury specific instructions that clearly separated the State's theories of intentional murder and accomplice liability. According to Swan, the trial judge should have provided a Chance [41] instruction commanding the jury to find either that Swan was the principal in committing first degree murder by firing the fatal shot, or that he was the accomplice by firing the other shots that did not kill the victim. Swan contends that the trial judge's instruction violated Swan's Sixth Amendment rights by confusing the jury to the point where some jurors may have convicted Swan as Norcross' accomplice, while others convicted him as the principal. This Court reviews jury instructions for plain error when the parties fail to raise an objection at trial. [42] When a case involves two people and a single incident where the State may have difficulty proving the two's respective roles, specific unanimity instructions need not be given because a general unanimity instruction serves to prevent both persons from escaping criminal responsibility where there is compelling evidence that they jointly planned and carried out the criminal enterprise. [43] Swan and Norcross were engaged in the same enterprise, at the same time and cannot escape liability simply because the State cannot prove which defendant inflicted the fatal wound. The jury need not unanimously decide whether Swan fired the fatal shot where both theories of liability required the jury to determine that Swan participated in the robbery and was one of the assailants that fired a weapon. As we noted in Liu, in a case involving two people and a single incident where the State my have difficulty proving their respective roles, a general unanimity instruction serves to prevent both persons from escaping criminal responsibility, where there is compelling evidence that they jointly planned and carried out the criminal enterprise. [44] The bullets removed from Warren's body were shot from two different guns, and the record reveals that both Swan and Norcross were both active participants in the murder. Were a Chance instruction required under these circumstances, this Court would face the same problem noted in Liu. Since the jurors cannot determine who was the principal and who was the accomplice, both Swan and Norcross could escape liability because the jury could not make a specific culpability assessment for each defendant. As the jury may find both defendants guilty of the first degree murder offense without definitively finding one the principal actor, the jury must also be permitted to assign the same level of culpability to both actors since they were involved in the same criminal enterprise and where one could conclude it to be equally possible for both to have fired the fatal shot. There is here no credible argument, as in Chance, that Warren's death was an unintended consequence of either Swan's or Norcross' actions. Therefore, the trial judge did not err by refusing to give an instruction setting forth the varying degrees of culpability for accomplice liability.
Swan argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the crimes alleged. He argues that the State's case consisted only of the uncorroborated hearsay statements of his co-defendant without any physical evidence connecting Swan to the crimes. He also argues that the jury's deliberation of four days illustrate that this is a close case. Despite these claims, Swan failed to move for a directed verdict or a judgment of acquittal at trial nor did he raise a claim of insufficient evidence in his motion for a new trial. In the absence of a motion for directed verdict or for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict, this Court reviews claims of insufficient evidence for plain error. [45] Swan bears the burden of demonstrating actual prejudice and the error complained of must be apparent from the face of the record. [46] This claim essentially summarizes Swan's previous arguments about the hearsay statements admitted at trial. Though the evidence was primarily circumstantial, this Court does not require direct evidence to sustain a verdict. [47] The jury deliberated for four days because this was a complicated case. The trial involved numerous witnesses whose testimony assembled the picture of the man who invaded the Warren home with Norcross that fateful night. Tina Warren corroborated many of Norcross' statements when she testified that two armed and masked men burst through the rear door of her home, shot Kenneth Warren in front of Tina and their young son, and took her purse after abandoning an attempt to take Kenneth's wallet. She also testified that one of the men appeared to have suffered an injury to his shoulder. Matthew Howell, Gina Ruberto, Tina Holotanko, and Swan's foreman at the concrete plant testified to seeing a wound or injury to his left shoulder around the time of the murder. Bridget Phillips overheard Norcross and Swan talking about a time when Swan been shot and observed a scar on Swan's left shoulder to which he pointed, informing her that the bullet was still there from the murder. Lillian Warren testified that she saw a small red sports car parked near her son's home on the night of the murder. Norcross told witnesses that he had driven to the residence in a red sports car, a red Dodge Daytona, and several witnesses testified that Swan owned a red Dodge Daytona, in which Norcross was a frequent passenger, and which Swan had painted dark blue/black in April 1997. Swan and Norcross both worked at a concrete plant in Middletown, the same plant where Tina's purse and its contents were discovered a few weeks after the murder. Prior to being laid off, Swan was placed on light duty at the concrete plant because of his injured left shoulder. Lastly, while in custody Swan warned Norcross in a note not to talk to his lawyer or if he had, to say that he lied. The note was intercepted and Swan told his cellmate that he had nothing to worry about as long as Norcross kept his mouth shut. There is ample evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict. Norcross' hearsay statements combined with Swan's admissions, post-arrest conduct, and various other pieces of circumstantial evidence established a prima facie case of first degree murder, felony murder, burglary, robbery, and conspiracy. Accordingly, there is no plain error evident from the record.
Swan argues that the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Ring v. Arizona [48] rendered the 1991 version of Delaware's death penalty statute unconstitutional. [49] Brice v. State, [50] decided after Swan advanced these arguments, resolves this issue. In Brice, this Court addressed several questions concerning the 2002 amendment to § 4209, and held that Ring only extends to the narrowing phase of the sentencing process. Thus, once a jury finds unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, the defendant becomes death eligible and Ring's constitutional requirement of jury fact-finding is satisfied. [51] In this case, Swan was sentenced under the 1991 version of § 4209, which did not require the jury to find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt. But the jury did meet the Brice standard, since it convicted Swan unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt of, among other crimes, two counts of felony murder under 11 Del. C. § 636(a)(6). A conviction under § 636(a)(2)-(7) establishes the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance under § 4209(e)(2). In Brice and Norcross, this Court held that § 4209(e)(2) satisfies Ring. Thus, we conclude that the 1991 version of § 4209 is constitutional as applied to Swan.
Pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4209(g)(2), this Court conducts an independent review of any death sentence imposed by the Superior Court. The purpose of that review is to determine whether: (i) the evidence supports a finding of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance; (ii) the death penalty was imposed arbitrarily or capriciously; and (iii) the sentence is disproportionate when compared to similar cases arising under the statute. [52] This Court recognizes the importance of its statutory responsibility, inasmuch as death as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability. [53]