Opinion ID: 771984
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Local Action Doctrine

Text: 44 The defendants urged the district court to dismiss this case under the local action doctrine for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, irrespective of the parties' diversity of citizenship and any of the other issues pertaining to this lawsuit. Under the local action doctrine, courts may not exercise jurisdiction over any local action involving real property unless the property at issue is found within the territorial boundaries of the state where the court is sitting. See Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U.S. 105, 107 (1895); Hayes v. Gulf Oil Corp., 821 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1987). The district court did not rule on the defendants' request to dismiss on the basis of this principle. The defendants, describing the local action doctrine as 'ancient but still vibrant,' urge us to conclude that the district court lacked diversity jurisdiction because of it. (Appellees' Brief at 37 n.10 (quoting Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting), vacated, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985))). 45 The local action doctrine is a relic of English common law imported into this country by Justice Marshall while riding circuit in Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 Fed. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8,411), and was last discussed by this Court in 1956, see Pasos v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 271, 272 (2d Cir. 1956) (applying the doctrine with much doubt). It has been taken to require that a suit, with federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, to recover damages for [a] defendant's alleged trespass upon, and unlawful use and occupation of, land in [a foreign country] . . . not be maintained in any jurisdiction except that in which the land was located. Id., 229 F.2d at 271. 46 The only two grounds for suit explicitly identified in the complaint were conversion and a violation of the law of nations cognizable in federal court pursuant to the Alien Tort Claims Act. 47 Conversion is not an action for damages to real property. See Garelick v. Carmel, 141 A.D.2d 501, 502, 529 N.Y.S.2d 126, 128 (2d Dep't 1988); Boll v. Town of Kinderhook, 99 A.D.2d 898, 899 472 N.Y.S.2d 496, 498 (3d Dep't 1984); 23 N.Y. Jur. 2d Conversion § 4 (1982). It is therefore not subject to the local action doctrine. The taking of property without just compensation because of the plaintiffs' religious faith that is alleged by the Bigios is no more limited by the local action doctrine than is any other action which, though touching upon land, is brought on the basis of a legal theory other than trespass. Such actions may be heard in a jurisdiction other than that in which the property is located. See Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148, 158-60 (1810); 15 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §3822 (2d ed. 1986). Thus, the only two causes of action explicitly identified in the complaint need not be brought in Egypt pursuant to the local action doctrine. 48 And the Bigios did not so much as mention the word trespass in their complaint. A claim for money damages based on trespass emerges from the complaint only upon application of the liberal rules governing notice pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36-37 (2d Cir. 2000) ([G]enerally a complaint that gives full notice of the circumstances giving rise to the plaintiff's claim for relief need not also correctly plead the legal theory or theories . . . supporting the claim. (quoting Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 712 n.4 (2d Cir. 1980))). 49 Not only is the claim of trespass against Coca-Cola not explicit in the complaint, but any such claim would logically follow from and depend on the non-local claim at the heart of the Bigios' complaint, the allegedly unlawful taking and refusal to return their property and refusal to compensate them for the taking of the property, all because of their religion. We decline to declare the plaintiffs' entire suit local in character, and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the district court, where the plaintiffs' non-local claims are predominant and the local claim is at most only implicit in the complaint. See Musicus v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 743 F.2d 503, 511 (7th Cir. 1984) (refusing to dismiss entire action as local where request for damages for trespass was joined with requests for damages based on breach of contract and fraud, and decision on trespass issue depended entirely on resolution of parties' respective contractual rights). 50 We therefore hold that the district court has jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.