Opinion ID: 2538439
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Transition instructions

Text: A transition instruction guides jurors in proceeding from the consideration of a primary charged offense to the consideration of a lesser-included offense. Other jurisdictions are split on the appropriate form of a transition instruction. There are four different approaches. The first approach is to give an acquittal first instruction, requiring unanimous agreement on acquittal as to the primary charged offense before the jurors may proceed to deliberations on the lesser-included offense. [9] This was the approach utilized by the district court below. The second approach is to give a modified acquittal first instruction, permitting the jurors to consider both the greater and lesser offenses in whichever order they choose, but requiring that they unanimously acquit the defendant of the charged offense before returning a verdict on a lesser-included offense. [10] The third approach is to instruct the jurors that they may consider a lesser-included offense if they have reasonably tried, but failed, to reach a verdict on the primary charge. [11] This involves a so-called unable to agree instruction. [12] The fourth approach is an amalgam of the acquittal first and unable to agree approaches. This optional approach permits the defendant to choose between the acquittal first and the unable to agree instructions. However, if the defendant does not affirmatively choose one of those instructions, the trial court may properly use either transition instruction. [13] The district court in the present case used the following two acquittal first instructions. Jury instruction thirty stated in part: In order to find the defendant guilty of the lesser crime of misdemeanor stalking, you must unanimously agree that the accused did not threaten the victim with death or substantial bodily harm, and did not intend to cause her to be placed in reasonable fear of death or substantial bodily harm. Jury instruction thirty-seven stated in part: After you have unanimously agreed that the defendant is not guilty of [aggravated stalking], you then must determine whether or not the defendant is guilty of the lesser included crime of Misdemeanor Stalking. If you unanimously agree that the defendant is guilty of Misdemeanor Stalking, you will sign and date the verdict form provided and present it, and your not guilty verdict for the Aggravated Stalking charge to the court. .... You will note from this instruction that you must unanimously agree that the defendant is not guilty of the charged crime before you may find the defendant guilty or not guilty of any lesser charge. [14] We have not yet had an occasion to review a criminal conviction based upon the use of an acquittal first instruction as a guideline for jury deliberations on lesser-included offenses. In our view, use of an acquittal first instruction improperly invites compromise verdicts. If members of a jury believe that the defendant is guilty of some offense, an inability to unanimously agree to convict or acquit manifestly increases the likelihood that the jury will compromise by convicting the defendant of the primary or charged offense, rather than risk a mistrial and free a guilty defendant by returning no verdict at all. As one court has stated: When the jury is instructed in accordance with the acquittal first instruction, a juror voting in the minority probably is limited to three options upon deadlock: (1) try to persuade the majority to change its opinion; (2) change his or her vote; or (3) hold out and create a hung jury. [15] Thus, given these choices, it is possible a jury would return a verdict even though not all members of the jury were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence supported their verdict. We adopt the unable to agree instruction embraced by Arizona, Hawaii and Oregon as the correct transition instruction. Use of the unable to agree instruction reduces the risk of compromise verdicts by enabling the finders of fact to better gauge the fit between the evidence adduced at trial and the offenses being considered. The instruction also reduces the risk of hung juries and the significant costs involved with retrial. While Green urges us to adopt the optional approach, we decline to do so because, in the absence of an affirmative choice by the defendant, the optional approach would give the district court discretionary power to choose the acquittal first instruction. The district court should not have the discretion to use that instruction and the unable to agree instruction should be the only transition instruction given in Nevada. We therefore adopt the unable to agree instruction as the proper method of instructing juries on the consideration of lesser-included offenses. Consistent with this approach, when a transition instruction is warranted, the district court must instruct the jury that it may consider a lesser-included offense if, after first fully and carefully considering the primary or charged offense, it either (1) finds the defendant not guilty, or (2) is unable to agree whether to acquit or convict on that charge. [16] Given our rejection of the acquittal first instruction, we hold that the district court erred in taking the acquittal first approach. But we further conclude that this error did not affect Green's substantial rights because there is overwhelming evidence of Green's guilt of aggravated stalking. [17] To explain, for the jury to convict Green of aggravated stalking, rather than misdemeanor stalking, it must have found that Green placed Ms. Linzie in reasonable fear of death or substantial bodily harm. [18] Ms. Linzie, her friends and co-workers testified to Green's continuing telephone calls and threats of violence, including threats to douse Ms. Linzie in gasoline, set her on fire and to bomb her place of residence, all of which placed her in reasonable fear of death or substantial bodily harm. [19] Green's own statements did little to rebut the overwhelming evidence of his guilt on both of the charges upon which the jury found him guilty. Thus, while the district court erred in using an acquittal first jury instruction, we are convinced that the result at trial would not have been different had the jury been properly instructed and therefore this error did not affect Green's substantial rights. Because this error did not affect Green's substantial rights, it does not warrant relief under the plain error rule.