Opinion ID: 1744995
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ongoing Criminal Activity

Text: Next, Jones contends that the State violated his due process rights by failing to disclose Prim's ongoing criminal activity and drug use. We reject this claim. We find, as did the trial court, that Jones has failed to demonstrate that Prim was or is addicted to drugs or that he was under the influence of drugs at the time of his testimony at either trial, or during the period of time he shared a cell with Defendant. Additionally, the record demonstrates that the State was equally unaware of Prim's criminal activity directly before, during, or after Jones's trial. Prim was involved in various robberies on several dates in 1992: October 24, November 11, and November 19. However, he was connected to and arrested for these crimes less than 24 hours before Jones was sentenced. Prosecutor Wade testified that he did not receive any evidence of Prim's criminal activity in or around the trial; in fact, he was not informed of Prim's crimes until well after Jones was convicted and sentenced. While we recognize that Brady requires prosecutors to disclose evidence known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor, Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995), we find it unreasonable to expect the prosecutor in this case, having no knowledge of Prim's illegal activity, to become informed of and disclose such information in the less than twenty-four-hour period between Prim's arrest and Jones's sentencing hearing. See Breedlove v. State, 580 So.2d 605, 607 (Fla.1991) (rejecting the defendant's Brady claim because the detectives' knowledge of the witnesses' criminal activities was not readily available to the prosecution). Therefore, Jones has failed to establish that the State withheld favorable evidence in violation of Brady. Moreover, even if the State inadvertently withheld such evidence, Jones cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the nondisclosure. A defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the jury verdict would have been different had the suppressed information been used at trial. Smith v. State, 931 So.2d 790, 796 (Fla.2006) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. at 289, 119 S.Ct. 1936). In other words, the favorable evidence must place the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Id. (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 290, 119 S.Ct. 1936). Jones argues that the evidence provided a basis for impeaching Prim, but we find that the evidence would have been cumulative. See Guzman v. State, 868 So.2d 498, 508 (Fla.2003) (finding that, in light of the significant impeachment evidence presented at trial, the additional evidence would have merely been cumulative). Defense counsel spent a majority of Prim's cross-examination exploiting his repeated acts of dishonesty. The jury learned about Prim's five felony grand theft convictions and his pending grand theft charge. Thus, Prim's capacity for truthfulness was already significantly impeached. Also, Prim was not the only trial witness to testify about Jones's confession. Jones's cellmate, Jay Watson, corroborated Prim. He testified that he heard Jones confess to killing a man. Thus, Jones fails to show a reasonable probability that had the additional arrests been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.