Opinion ID: 2266260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Modification of Alimony Award By Agreement of Parties Contract Standards Applicable

Text: One of the articulated purposes of the Delaware Divorce and Annulment Act (the Act) is to promote the settlement of divorce disputes. Gertrude L.Q. v. Stephen P.Q., 466 A.2d at 1217. Subsection 1519(b) contemplates settlements in the form of written alimony agreements between parties to a divorce without a judicial determination. Id. This Court has noted that Section 1519(b) does not, however, incorporate other requirements of the Act into such agreements (e.g., the standard of Section 1519(a)(4) for modification or termination). Id. In fact, this Court has held that a stipulated alimony agreement of the parties, pursuant to Section 1519(b), is not a court order within the meaning of Sections 1518 and 1519(a)(4). Id. Consequently, the statutory real and substantial change standard in Section 1519(a)(4) for termination or modification of a court order is inapplicable to a Section 1519(b) agreement between the parties which becomes part of a Family Court order. Id. The purpose of making the parties' agreement with regard to alimony an order of the Family Court is to confer jurisdiction upon the Family Court to construe the agreement in the event of a future dispute. Sanders v. Sanders, Del.Supr., 570 A.2d 1189, 1191 (1990). See also Gertrude L.Q. v. Stephen P.Q., 466 A.2d at 1217. Nevertheless, the voluntary settlement agreement between a husband and wife concerning alimony is and remains a contract. Sanders v. Sanders, 570 A.2d at 1191. This Court has held generally, and with regard to alimony agreements specifically, that Delaware follows the well-established principle that in construing a contract a court cannot in effect rewrite it or supply omitted provisions. Gertrude L.Q. v. Stephen P.Q., 466 A.2d at 1217 ( citing Conner v. Phoenix Steel Corp., Del.Supr., 249 A.2d 866 (1969)); In re International Re-Insurance Corp., Del.Ch., 86 A.2d 647 (1952). In the family law context, Delaware courts consistently have declined to rewrite marital agreements. Gertrude L.Q. v. Stephen P.Q., 466 A.2d at 1218; Harry M.P. v. Nina M.P., 437 A.2d at 159; Wife, B.T.L. v. Husband, H.A.L., Del. Ch., 287 A.2d 413, 415 (1972), aff'd, Del.Supr., 336 A.2d 216 (1975). In this case, the Family Court relied upon its own precedent which distinguished between an agreement of the parties regarding alimony that is merely incorporated into a final divorce decree and one which merges into the final decree. Murphy v. Murphy, Del.Fam., 467 A.2d 129 (1983). In Murphy, the Family Court concluded that if the agreement is merely incorporated into the decree, it retains its contractual character. Therefore, the Family Court does not have the power, unless contractually given to it by the parties, to modify the agreement by applying the statutory standard. Id. at 132. However, according to the Murphy holding, if the agreement is merged into the decree, the rights, privileges and obligations of the parties under the agreement are displaced by the judgment or decree. The Family Court then has full judicial power to modify the agreement according to statutory standards. Id. This Court has concluded that there is no substantive difference between an alimony agreement which becomes a Family Court order by means of stipulation, incorporation, or merger. See Gertrude L.Q. v. Stephen P.Q., Del.Supr., 466 A.2d 1213 (1983). Consequently, with regard to alimony awards, the stipulation, merger, or incorporation of the parties' voluntary agreement into a court order does not divest that agreement of its contractual nature. 13 Del.C. § 1519(b). To the extent that the holding in Murphy suggests otherwise, it is disapproved. Accordingly, unlike a prior judicial determination of alimony, the Family Court cannot modify an agreement between the parties regarding alimony, pursuant to the real and substantial change statutory standard enunciated in 13 Del.C. § 1519(a)(4).