Opinion ID: 2632408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Defendant's Statements to Police

Text: On March 25 and 26, 1991, defendant was in police custody and was interrogated by Richmond police officers. Defendant contends that admission of his confession violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. [4] He argues that several factors rendered his statements involuntary and unreliable: 1) defendant's mental impairments made him particularly vulnerable during the interviews; 2) he was misled about the time necessary to obtain counsel; 3) the detectives failed to readminister Miranda warnings at the beginning of the second interview; 4) the fictitious Neutron Proton Negligence Intelligence Test administered by police was coercive; and 5) the audiotapes of defendant's interviews are incomplete.
After defendant's arrest on Monday, March 25,1991, police officers brought him to the Richmond police headquarters. Detectives interviewed defendant twice. The first interview began on the evening of March 25 and lasted six hours, concluding in the early morning hours of March 26; the second interview began in the afternoon of March 26 and lasted approximately an hour and a half. At the outset of the first interview, Detective Kimura advised defendant of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. [5] Defendant asked Detective Kimura if I don't talk to you now, how long will it take for me to talk to you `fore a person sent a lawyer to be here? Before Detective Kimura could answer the question, defendant told the detective I could wait `til next week sometime. Detective Kimura said: Maybe, yeah. Defendant then told the detective: I'll talk to you now. I don't got nothing to hide. Defendant initially was informed that he was under investigation for automobile theft. Defendant stated that he had been approached by Joseph and two other men, who wanted defendant's help opening a safe. After later being told that he was under investigation for murder, defendant admitted that he had been present at the apartment during the murders, but told the detectives that Joseph and two other men had killed Dorsey and Martin. At the end of the interview, Detective Kimura booked defendant into custody for murder. The second interview began less than 12 hours after the conclusion of the first interview and lasted for about an hour and a half. Detective Kimura asked defendant, whether he remembered being read his Miranda rights during the previous interview and whether he was still comfortable talking about the case. Defendant had no objections to speaking about the case, telling Detective Kimura that he pretty much remembered the Miranda advisements and had no objections to talking further about the case. Detective Kimura concluded that defendant did not want or need a Miranda readvisement. During the second interview, Detective Kimura told defendant that he wanted to conduct a test called the Neutron Proton Negligence Intelligence Test that purportedly would determine whether defendant had recently fired a gun. No such test exists. In the first step of the test, the detectives sprayed defendant's hands with soap and patted them with a paper towel. In the second step, they used a field test kit used for testing substances suspected of being cocaine, which the detectives knew inevitably would turn color. Detective Kimura told defendant that the test had provided proof that defendant had recently fired a gun. Defendant continued to deny `shooting Dorsey and Martin. However, defendant did admit that only he and Joseph were involved in the murders, and that the two other men he had said were involved in the crimes had not been present. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to exclude his statements. Among other things, he argued that his statements were involuntary because he was misled about the time necessary to obtain counsel, the detectives failed to readminister Miranda warnings at the beginning of the second interview, and the fictitious Neutron Proton Negligence Intelligence Test administered by police was coercive. Defendant did not argue that the statement was rendered involuntary because the audio tapes of defendant's interviews are incomplete, and it is not clear that defendant sufficiently raised the argument that his mental impairments made him particularly vulnerable during the interviews at trial. The trial court denied the motion, noting that defendant had consistently denied being the shooter during both interviews: Mr. Smith was steadfast in his position, and [the detectives] could never shake him from that despite their continued questioning.
The federal and state Constitutions both, bar the use of involuntary confessions against a criminal defendant. { Jackson v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 368, 385-386, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 778, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 380.) A confession is involuntary if it is not `the product of a rational intellect and a free will' ( Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 398, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, italics omitted), such that the defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed. ( Lynumn v. Illinois (1963) 372 U.S. 528, 534, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922.) In assessing allegedly coercive police tactics, [t]he courts have prohibited only those psychological ploys which, under all the circumstances, are so coercive that they tend to produce a statement that is both involuntary and unreliable. ( People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 340, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846.) Whether a statement is voluntary depends upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. ( People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 79, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650, 72 P.3d 280.) In Miranda v. Arizona , the high court held that police must advise a criminal suspect who is in custody of specified Fifth Amendment rights prior to questioning. ( Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.) As we have held: Under the familiar requirements of Miranda, ... a suspect may not be subjected to custodial interrogation unless he or she knowingly and intelligently has waived the right to remain silent, to the presence of an attorney, and to appointed counsel in the event the suspect is indigent. ( People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 440, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992.)  Miranda holds that `[t]he defendant may waive effectuation' of the rights conveyed in the warnings `provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.' [Citation.] The inquiry has two distinct dimensions. [Citations.] First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the `totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. [Citations.] ( Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410; see also People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 845, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) In reviewing Miranda issues on appeal, we accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences as well as its evaluations of credibility if substantially supported, but independently determine from undisputed facts and facts found by the trial court whether the challenged statement was legally obtained. ( People v. Storm (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1007, 1022-1023, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 110, 52 P.3d 52; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 992, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.)
Defendant contends that his particular mental state at the time of the interviews rendered his statements involuntary. In particular, defendant asserts that he had a family history of physical, psychological, and sexual abuse, had previously been committed to a mental hospital, and had significant brain damage. It is not clear from the record that defendant sufficiently raised this argument at trial. However, respondent does not object to the claim on this ground, and we will address the merits of this claim. Insofar as a defendant's claims of involuntariness emphasize that defendant's particular psychological state rendered him open to coercion, this court has noted that the Fifth Amendment is not `concerned with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.' ( People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1041, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544, quoting Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298, 304-305, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222; see also Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 165, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 [while mental condition is relevant to an individual's susceptibility to police coercion, a confession must result from coercive state activity before it may be considered involuntary].) The record does not convince us that the interrogating officers were aware of, or exploited, defendant's claimed psychological vulnerabilities in order to obtain statements from him.
Defendant also maintains that Detective Kimura misrepresented the availability of counsel when advising defendant of his Miranda rights and thereby unconstitutionally induced defendant into waiving his right to counsel. During the Miranda advisement process, defendant asked Detective Kimura how long it would take to get an attorney appointed. Before Detective Kimura could answer, defendant told him that he could wait until next week sometime. In response, Detective Kimura said [m]aybe, yeah. Miranda requires that a suspect be informed that he has the right to an attorney before and during questioning, and that an attorney would be appointed for him if he could not afford one. ( Duckworth v. Eagan (1989) 492 U.S.' 195, 204, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166, fn. omitted.) In Duckworth, the high court approved of Miranda warnings that explained that the suspect had a right to consult with counsel before being questioned, but that an attorney would be appointed `if and when' he appeared in court. ( Ibid. ) The court in Duckworth noted that [t]he Court in Miranda emphasized that it was not suggesting that `each police station must have a station house lawyer present at all times to advise prisoners.' [Citation.] If the police cannot provide appointed counsel, Miranda requires only, that the police not question a suspect unless he waives his right to counsel. [Citation.] Here respondent did just that. ( Ibid. ) In other words, Miranda does not require that attorneys be producible on call, or that police keep a suspect abreast of his various options for legal representation. ( People v. Bradford supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1046, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544.)' Here, defendant was told in no uncertain terms that he had the right to consult with, to be represented by, and to have an attorney present before and during questioning, and the further right to have counsel appointed if he was indigent. Defendant never requested an attorney or indicated that he wished to end the interview. (See People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 249-250, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 949 P.2d 18.) Contrary to defendant's contention that Detective Kimura lied about the availability of counsel, Detective Kimura did not actively mislead defendant. Detective Kimura never told defendant that it would take a week for counsel to be appointed, but merely responded equivocally to defendant's statement that he could wait up to a week for counsel to be appointed. The detective never represented to defendant that it actually would take up to a week for counsel to be appointed. Although defendant posits that Kimura should have corrected defendant's assumption that it, could take up to a week to get counsel, he cites no authority for the proposition that a suspect who has received and understood the Miranda advisements cannot properly waive his Fifth Amendment rights if he labors under any misapprehension of the mechanics of when and how counsel is appointed. Indeed, several federal circuit courts have held that a suspect's Miranda waiver remains valid even if interrogating officers mislead the suspect about how long it will take to appoint counsel. (See Soffar v. Cockrell (5th Cir. 2002) 300 F.3d 588, 591, 596 [holding that a detective's speculation that it could take as little as one day or as long as a month for a suspect to obtain counsel did not invalidate the suspect's Miranda waiver]; Richardson v. Duckworth (7th Cir.1987) 834 F.2d 1366, 1367, 1371 [holding that defendant had been fully apprised of his constitutional rights where he was given a Miranda advisement and told upon two occasions that he had the right to speak to a lawyer before being questioned, made an incriminating statement, and then, upon inquiry, was told by the detective that a lawyer would be appointed in court].)
Defendant further faults Detective Kimura for failing to readvise him of his Fifth Amendment rights when the second interview began. This court repeatedly has held that a Miranda readvisement is not necessary before a custodial interrogation is resumed, so long as a proper warning has been given, and the subsequent interrogation is `reasonably contemporaneous' with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver. ( People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140,170, 284 Cal.Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290 ( Mickle ); People v. Braeseke (1979) 25 Cal.3d 691, 701-702, 159 Cal.Rptr. 684, 602 P.2d 384, vacated and cause remanded (1980) 446 U.S. 932, 100 S.Ct. 2147, 64 L.Ed.2d 784, reaffd. (1980) 28 Cal.3d 86, 168 Cal.Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149.) We have established several factors to determine whether readvisement is necessary prior to a subsequent interrogation held after an earlier valid Miranda waiver: 1) the amount of time that has passed since the initial waiver; 2) any change in the identity of the interrogator or location of the interrogation; 3) an official reminder of the prior advisement; 4) the suspect's sophistication or past experience with law enforcement; and 5) further indicia that defendant subjectively understands and waives his rights. ( Mickle, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 170, 284 Cal.Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290.) In Mickle, we found that readvisement was unnecessary when 36 hours had elapsed between interrogations, because the defendant was still in custody, was interviewed by the same interrogators, was reminded of his prior waiver, was familiar with the justice system, and there was nothing to indicate he was mentally impaired or otherwise incapable of remembering the prior advisement. ( Id. at p. 171, 284 Cal.Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290.) In this case, the second interrogation occurred less than 12 hours after the first interrogation ended. Defendant remained in custody in the interim. The same officers conducted the interrogation, in the same office, and asked defendant whether he remembered the Miranda warnings, or if he would like to hear them again. Defendant declined, stating that he remembered the advisements and still wished to speak with the officers. There is no indication on the record that the officers should have suspected that defendant was mentally impaired or otherwise incapable of remembering the prior advisement. Finally, because defendant had been incarcerated in the California Youth Authority and arrested for domestic violence in 1990, defendant was quite familiar with the criminal justice system. Under these circumstances Detective Kimura was not required to readvise defendant of his Miranda rights.
During the second interview, the officers conducted what they told defendant was called the Neutron Proton Negligence Intelligence Test. As we have described, this test was a sham. When the officers indicated that the test was positive, and that defendant had fired a gun recently, defendant repeatedly and vehemently denied ever shooting a gun. After the test was given, and defendant had been told that the result was positive for gunshot residue, defendant recanted the portion of his statement implicating the two unnamed men; according to defendant, only he and Joseph were involved, and Joseph had been the shooter. Defendant now contends that the officers' use of a sham test was a deceptive tactic that rendered defendant's incriminating statements involuntary. Police deception does not necessarily invalidate an incriminating statement. ( People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 411, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) Courts have repeatedly found proper interrogation tactics far more intimidating and deceptive than, those employed in this case. (See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp (1969) 394 U.S. 731, 739, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 [officer falsely told the suspect his accomplice had been captured and confessed]; People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 299, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890 [officer implied he could prove more than he actually could]; People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 167, 266 Cal.Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857 [officers repeatedly lied, insisting they had evidence linking the suspect to a homicide]; In re Walker (1974) 10 Cal.3d 764, 777, 112 Cal. Rptr. 177, 518 P.2d 1129 [wounded suspect told he might die before he reached the hospital, so he should talk while he still had the chance]; People v. Watkins (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 119, 124-125, 85 Cal.Rptr. 621 [officer told suspect his fingerprints had been found on the getaway car, although no prints had been obtained]; and Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart (9th Cir.1997) 121 F.3d 486, 495 [suspect falsely told he had been identified by an eyewitness].) Indeed, at least one Court of Appeal has approved of the particular practice used in this case. ( People v. Partisan (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 529, 537,187 Cal.Rptr. 123 [police falsely told suspect a gun residue test produced a positive result].) After examining the circumstances surrounding the Neutron Proton Negligence Intelligence Test, it does not appear that the tactic was so coercive that it tended to produce a statement that was involuntary or unreliable. In any event, we also note that the officers' tactic in using the fake test was unsuccessful in eliciting a confession; defendant never confessed to having been the shooter, but instead steadfastly denied having shot the gun. Defendant contends that the deceptive tactic, though unsuccessful in eliciting a confession to firearm use, coerced him into revising his story and telling police that the two other men he had implicated were not involved. However, it is evident that the test was designed to elicit a confession related to firearm use. The absence or presence of the two men has little relation to whether defendant shot a firearm on the night of the murders.
Both interrogations of defendant were tape-recorded by the interrogating officers. However, one half-hour segment of the first interrogation was either not recorded or taped over. Defendant now contends that the lapse in the recording occurred during a critical period in the interrogation. He argues that immediately before the unrecorded portion of the interrogation, defendant had not seriously incriminated himself, and that it was only after the unrecorded portion that he made self-incriminating statements. Defendant argues that, without a recording of this critical period, the People cannot meet their burden of proving that the statement was voluntary. Defendant did not argue at trial that the court should exclude his statements because of the lapse in the audio recording. However, the trial court reviewed the tapes independently while considering defendant's pretrial motion to exclude the statements and noticed the lapse. At the beginning of the pretrial hearing on the motion, the trial court pointed out to counsel that one side of one tape was blank. Although defense counsel had also noticed the blank portion of the recording, he seems not to have considered it problematic. He explained, There is a blank one and-on one side `cause it puzzled me the first time I listened to it, but it seemed that the chronology continued on on the next tape. There was no discussion during the hearing of whether the lapse should have affected the trial court's decision as to whether defendant's statement was voluntary. Defendant has forfeited this claim by failing to object in the trial court to the incomplete recording of defendant's interviews. ( People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589-590, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 853 P.2d 1093.) Because the trial court had no opportunity to address any possible factual disputes about what occurred during the lapse in recording, we will not address this claim for the first time on appeal. ( People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 339, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846 [where defendant sought suppression of his confession at trial only on the ground that there was a delay in advising him of his Miranda rights, his claim that the confession was involuntary because it was given in exchange for a promised benefit was forfeited on appeal].) Defendant also alleges that the police did something to make defendant change his story during the unrecorded portion of the tape. However, defendant acknowledges that his argument relies upon matters outside of the record in this case, which may not be considered on appeal. The mere fact that there was a lapse in the recording of the first interrogation in no way establishes that defendant's subsequent statements were involuntary or coerced.