Opinion ID: 1399120
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jury and venue issues

Text: (1a) Defendant contends he was denied his right to trial by a jury chosen from a representative cross-section of the community in that hearing-impaired individuals were systematically excluded from the jury panel because courtroom facilities made it impossible for such persons to serve as jurors. Defendant has failed to establish he is entitled to relief. Although five prospective jurors who identified themselves as hearing-impaired were questioned and not excused due to the impairment, defendant claims systematic exclusion of hearing-impaired jurors due to the excusal of one prospective juror, who was unable to hear out of his left ear and suffered from Meniere's disease and vertigo, for which he took medication. After testing the prospective juror's ability to hear while seated in the jury box, the trial court declined to accept his hearing-impairment hardship excuse. However, defense counsel questioned whether it was practicable for the prospective juror to serve, and the trial court excused him. (2) A criminal defendant is entitled to trial by an impartial jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. ( People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36, 48 [201 Cal. Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433]; U.S. Const., Amends. VI, XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) To establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, a defendant must show that: (1) the group allegedly excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (2) the group's representation in jury venires is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) the under-representation is due to the systematic exclusion of such persons in the jury selection process. ( Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357, 364 [58 L.Ed.2d 579, 586-587, 99 S.Ct. 664].) (1b) Defendant did not object to the panel or move to quash the venire on the basis that he had been denied his right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community; accordingly, the point is waived. ( People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1159 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315]; Code Civ. Proc., § 225, subd. (a)(1); see former § 1060, repealed by Stats. 1988, ch. 1245, § 21, p. 4155.) Even if he had made a timely objection, however, he would not be entitled to relief because he has failed to meet his burden of establishing any of the elements of the Duren test. First, he does not demonstrate that hearing-impaired persons constitute a distinctive group within the community. Although he notes the Legislature has recognized that persons with hearing loss are competent to serve as jurors (Code Civ. Proc., § 203, subd. (a)(6)), he does not persuasively link that characteristic with the purposes of the fair cross-section requirement. ( Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 174-175 [90 L.Ed.2d 137, 148-149, 106 S.Ct. 1758].) Second, he fails to demonstrate that the representation of hearing-impaired persons in the venire was unreasonably small in proportion to the number of such persons in the community. Finally, he falls short of establishing that the lack of hearing-impaired persons on the jury resulted from systematic exclusion. He fails to address the five prospective jurors with hearing impairments who were not challenged on the basis of their impairments. Indeed, it was defense counsel who asked that the only identified hearing-impaired prospective juror to be seated in the jury box be excused. Defendant's claim that he was denied his right to a jury chosen from a representative cross-section of the community must fail.
(3a) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a change of venue based on pretrial publicity. The error, he contends, deprived him of his rights to due process, to a fair trial by an impartial jury, and to a penalty determination that is not arbitrary or unreliable, as guaranteed him by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution. (4) Change of venue is warranted when it appears there is a reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be held in the county. (§ 1033, subd. (a).) The determination requires consideration of such factors as the nature and gravity of the offense, the size of the community, the status of the defendant, the popularity and prominence of the victim, and the nature and extent of the publicity. (5) On appeal after a judgment following the denial of a change of venue, the defendant must show both that the court erred in denying the change of venue motion, i.e., that at the time of the motion it was reasonably likely that a fair trial could not be had, and that the error was prejudicial, i.e., that it was reasonably likely that a fair trial was not in fact had. The trial court's essentially factual determinations as to these factors will be sustained if supported by substantial evidence. We independently review the trial court's ultimate determination of the reasonable likelihood of an unfair trial. [Citations.] ( People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 807 [1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436].) (3b) Consideration of the gravity and nature of the offense does not compel the conclusion that venue should have been changed. Although defendant was charged with capital murder, the most serious of offenses, this case lacked the sensational overtones of other killings that have been held to require a change of venue, such as an ongoing crime spree, multiple victims often related or acquainted, or sexual motivation. ( People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 46 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) We have often upheld denial of venue change in capital cases. (See, e.g., People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 806-809.) The size and nature of the community do not support a venue change. The population of Ventura County in 1987 was 619,300, making it the 13th largest county in the state. (Cal. Statistical Abstract (27th ed. 1987) Dept. of Finance, sec. B, p. 20.) Venue changes are seldom granted from counties of such a large size; the larger the local population, the less likely it is that preconceptions about the case have become embedded in the public mind. ( People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 178 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480] [motion to change venue from Kern County, 14th largest in state, properly denied].) Defendant argues for a different conclusion because death penalty trials are not very common in Ventura County, and because Ventura is less urban in character than, for example, Los Angeles. We reject defendant's argument. (See Odle v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 932, 938 [187 Cal. Rptr. 455, 654 P.2d 225] [upholding denial of venue change from Contra Costa County, as much suburban as rural].) Although we have observed that the `adversities of publicity are considerably offset if trial is conducted in a populous metropolitan area' ( People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935, 949 [171 Cal. Rptr. 679, 623 P.2d 240], quoting People v. Manson (1976) 61 Cal. App.3d 102, 189 [132 Cal. Rptr. 265]), defendant fails to support his implicit contention that capital trials should be held exclusively in major metropolitan centers experienced in such cases. The third and fourth factors, the community status of the defendant and the victim, do not suggest a change of venue should have been granted. Defendant makes much of the fact that he is, and was reported in local media as, a New Mexico resident. However, he fails to show that he was associated with any organization or group that aroused community hostility. ( People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 233 [253 Cal. Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906].) The victim, although a longtime resident of Oxnard, was not prominent, and his death did not engender unusual emotion in the community. ( People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 179.) One juror knew of Urell, but his hazy recollections of Urell dated back some 10 to 15 years. The juror stated that his knowledge of Urell would not affect his decision in the case. (See People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1002 [248 Cal. Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017].) As defendant left that juror as an alternate on the jury, defendant apparently agreed. We are unable to conclude that the juror's vague knowledge of Urell made it unlikely that defendant would receive a fair trial in Ventura County. The most significant factor in the venue determination, for purposes of this case, is the nature and extent of news coverage. In support of his venue change motion, trial counsel submitted seven newspaper articles and several transcripts of media news broadcasts covering November 11-13, 1987. [2] The articles and broadcasts discussed the crime, defendant's confession and the district attorney's decision to pursue the death penalty despite its suppression, and the arrest of Brian Buckley. Media coverage continued during trial, with cameras from local television stations present during the arraignment, preliminary examination, and portions of the trial. Additionally, Oxnard and Ventura newspapers obtained permission to use still cameras in the courtroom. Posttrial review of the denial of a motion for change of venue is retrospective, taking into account prospective jurors' exposure to pretrial publicity as revealed in voir dire. ( People v. Harris, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 949.) Our examination of the record persuades us that pretrial publicity had no prejudicial effect. Few of the 186 prospective jurors had any recollection of the media coverage. Of those who reported hearing or seeing coverage of the case, most had read only a headline or part of an article. Only two prospective jurors had heard about defendant's confession in the media; they were excused. [3] Of the 12 jurors who decided this case, 9 had heard nothing in the media. The remaining three jurors reported minimal exposure to media coverage. One said she saw an article, but on seeing the name of the case, she avoided reading it. Another said he read a part of an article, but stopped when he realized it was about this case. The remaining juror said he had read something about another person being implicated, but was unsure whether it was about the same case. In summary, the jurors' exposure to pretrial publicity in this case was considerably less than that found in other cases in which we have held venue change to be unnecessary. (See People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1168.) (6) It is not necessary that jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved in the case; it is sufficient if they can lay aside their impressions and opinions and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. ( People v. Ainsworth, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1002.) (3c) Nothing in the record suggests the few jurors who had any exposure to pretrial publicity did not do so. Further, defendant used only 17 of his 26 available peremptory challenges to select the jury and expressed no dissatisfaction with the jury as selected. The failure to exhaust peremptories is a strong indication that the jurors were fair, and that the defense itself so concluded. ( People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 180.) The record thus shows that pretrial publicity did not deny defendant his right to a fair and impartial jury. ( People v. Harris, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 950.) Defendant's assertions of other constitutional error in the denial of his venue change motion must likewise fail.