Opinion ID: 387371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Issues of Material Fact

Text: 68 The overall problem I find in the district court's decision in the present case, is that it either ignored or decided adversely to plaintiffs certain factual disputes as to how the procedures actually operate, and their likely effect on the tenant's opportunity to challenge the landlord's good faith. 8 Without expressing a view as to the ultimate merits of plaintiffs' claims, I find factual disputes as to virtually all stages of the procedures in question. 69 First, it appears that there were material issues as to the adequacy of the notice given to a tenant by the rent control agency. The feature of the initial notice that I find immediately striking is the following boldface legend: 70 TO THE TENANT: THIS IS NOT AN EVICTION NOTICE. YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO MOVE UNTIL ORDERED BY A COURT 71 It does not appear that either this notice or the Notice of Conference which follows it informs the tenant that in order to avoid eviction he must successfully contest the issuance of a Certificate at the administrative level, and he will not be allowed to address the merits of the proposed eviction in court. Plaintiffs contend that tenants do not realize the significance of the notices they receive from the agency. They contend for example, that most tenants are not represented at the agency conferences; the Commissioner denies this (Keeler 9(g) Statement P 30, and response). 9 Considering the Commissioner's characterization of the response of certain plaintiffs as a token barren response, (response to Keeler 9(g) Statement PP 49, 50), it is entirely possible that the legend quoted above may lull many tenants into the false belief that the question of their eviction will be litigated in court, not in the administrative agency from which the notice was sent. And it may well be that this misimpression is not adequately dispelled by the later conference notice stating that the tenant may be represented by counsel and may bring witnesses and written evidence, and that failure to appear may result in a determination based upon the evidence in the record. So far as appears, nothing informs the tenant that the merits of his eviction will be conclusively determined before he gets to the court. It appears that a tenant may be similarly lulled into sleeping on his right to file a protest to the Commissioner on the District Rent Director's decision to issue a Certificate. The Order Granting Certificate of Eviction, which states that such a protest may be filed, also states as follows:NOTICE TO TENANT: This certificate does not order you to move, but only authorizes court action to be brought for your eviction or removal. The issuance of this certificate does not affect your rights under any present rental agreement. 72 The district court found that the notices given were adequate. I find it difficult to believe that these questions were appropriately dealt with on summary judgment. 73 Turning to the actual conduct of conferences, my principal objections to the district court's decision result from his findings that 74 the conferences before the hearing examiner, which are concededly always held, are adequate to satisfy due process in these proceedings. Tenants may, after all, request and obtain subpoenas for and/or produce witnesses, exhibits, affidavits (all of which are considered) inspect opposing papers and other materials and question opposing witnesses and/or present and file material in rebuttal. 75 489 F.Supp. 568, 573. Contrary to this statement, I observe in the record many issues as to which material facts appear either to be in dispute or simply not to support these findings; these include (1) whether conferences are always held, (2) whether tenants may obtain subpoenas, (3) whether tenants are always permitted to inspect opposing papers, (4) whether tenants are always permitted to question opposing witnesses, and (5) whether tenants are always permitted to file rebuttal material. 76 (1) Are conferences always held? It is far from clear that, as the district court supposed, this has been conceded by plaintiffs. The Keeler plaintiffs' 9(g) Statement P 21 asserted that the conferences are not mandatory; the Commissioner denied this and went on to assert that a conference/hearing is held in every eviction proceeding .... Plaintiffs did not respond to the Commissioner's assertion; but they were not required to respond, since the Commissioner did not cross move for summary judgment with his own statement as to facts allegedly not in dispute. 10 Moreover, since plaintiffs elsewhere pointed to an instance when the Rent Examiner met only separately with the tenant and with the landlord (see (3) and (4) below), one would suppose that plaintiffs would not concede that conferences are always held. 77 (2) Does the tenant have the right to subpoena? Plaintiffs asserted that (t)here are no procedures available for the issuance of administrative subpoenas when so requested by any party, although the agency has authority to issue such subpoenas. The Commissioner denied this. (Keeler 9(g) Statement P 26(i), and response.) On deposition, the Commissioner and his Senior Rent Examiner testified that they did not know of any procedure for procuring a subpoena. 78 (3) and (4) Are the tenants permitted to question opposing witnesses and inspect their documentary submissions? Plaintiffs have pointed to instances in which they were denied the opportunity to question the landlord: for example, when the landlord appeared at the conference and questioning by the tenant was curtailed (Ramos Affidavit), or when the landlord did not appear but sent his attorney in his stead (Genuard 9(g) Statement P 10), or when the Rent Examiner held separate conferences for the tenants and the landlord (Genuard 9(g) Statement P 7). As to two of these incidents, the Commissioner both denied that they occurred, and attempted to explain away the significance of their occurrence (see responses to Genuard 9(g) Statement PP 7, 10). Plaintiffs have pointed also to other ex parte collection of evidence by the Rent Examiner. They asserted, for example, that after a conference with the Keelers and their landlord, the Examiner, without giving notice to the Keelers, conducted an inspection of the premises and questioned the landlord's relative in the absence of the Keelers, and received from the landlord additional documents of which the Keelers were never given copies and never notified. The Commissioner both denied that these events occurred, and asserted that the Examiner proceeded in this way because the Keelers' opposition theretofore had been so weak (Keeler 9(g) Statement P 47, and response). 79 (5) Are the tenants permitted to file rebuttal material? The fair inference from the proffered fact that the tenants are not always notified of materials filed against them is that they do not always have the opportunity for rebuttal. 80 Finally, the district court's conclusion that there is little need for a recording or transcript of the conference also seems a premature finding of fact. For example, one plaintiff asserted that at the conference she had challenged the landlord's good faith need of her apartment on the grounds that there was already a vacant apartment in the building that the landlord could use instead of evicting her; there was no mention of any alleged vacancy in the Rent Examiner's report. (Ramos Affidavit.) The combination of no transcript and an incomplete report may be highly significant, especially if the Examiner's report is not available to the parties for review prior to the District Rent Director's decision. Is it available? Plaintiffs say it is not; the Commissioner says it is (Keeler 9(g) Statement P 26(j), and response). The deposition testimony of the Senior Rent Examiner supports plaintiffs' assertion. 81 On the basis of these and other material facts that the record reveals are in dispute I conclude that the Commissioner was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Consequently I would reverse the granting of summary judgment and remand for trial.