Opinion ID: 482450
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: promotion to gs-13

Text: 14 The essence of Johnson's claim of entitlement to a GS-13 level position is that the district court failed to fully employ the make whole remedial directives of Title VII. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). Johnson claims that but for the established discrimination she would have been promoted to a GS-13 level position. Relying on Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C.Cir.1976), and Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C.Cir.1981), she argues that it was incumbent upon the Government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she would not have attained a GS-13 level position. Johnson's reliance on these two cases is misplaced. 15 At the outset, we note that this court has recognized that in Title VII cases the questions of statutory violation and appropriate statutory remedy are conceptually distinct. Smith v. Secretary of the Navy, 659 F.2d 1113, 1120 (D.C.Cir.1981). To determine whether an employer's conduct constitutes a statutory violation, the court must employ the following allocation of burdens and order of proof: 16 First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. 17 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (citations omitted). In order to make out a prima facie case of discrimination for failure to promote, 18 the plaintiff must show that she belongs to a protected group, that she was qualified for and applied for a promotion, that she was considered for and denied the promotion, and that other employees who were not members of the protected group were indeed promoted at the time plaintiff's request for a promotion was denied. 19 Bundy, 641 F.2d at 951 (citation omitted). Here, Johnson established a prima facie case and proved that her employer's articulated non-discriminatory reasons for failing to repromote her to a GS-12 level position were pretext. Thus, she established a statutory violation with respect to the agency's failure to repromote her to a GS-12 level position. 20 When a statutory violation is established, the case proceeds to the remedy phase. At this phase the goal is to make the plaintiff whole by placing him, as near as may be, in the situation he would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 418-19, 95 S.Ct. at 2372 (quoting Wicker v. Hoppock, 6 Wall. 94, 99, 18 L.Ed. 752 (1867)). To accomplish this goal, section 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g), gives the district courts the power to order such affirmative action as may be appropriate. In reviewing a district court's determination of an appropriate remedy for discriminatory conduct, we look to whether the District Court was 'clearly erroneous' in its factual findings and whether it 'abused' its traditional discretion to locate 'a just result' in light of the circumstances peculiar to the case. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 424, 95 S.Ct. at 2375 (quoting Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541, 51 S.Ct. 243, 247, 75 L.Ed. 520 (1931)). 21 In Day v. Mathews, the defendant acknowledged discrimination had hindered the plaintiff's application for a particular job. This court held that because the plaintiff had established a statutory violation with respect to that particular position, the case proceeded to the remedy stage and the burden shifted to the employer to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff, even absent the discrimination, would not have been promoted to that particular position. Day, 530 F.2d at 1085. 22 In Bundy v. Jackson, we applied the Day holding to a case involving two distinct claims for relief from sexual harassment. There, because the plaintiff had already proved illegal discrimination on her first claim (for an injunction barring management from making unsolicited sexual advances on the job), on her second claim for back pay and promotion we: 23 adjust[ed] the McDonnell formula to Bundy's claim as follows: To establish a prima facie case of illegal denial of promotion in retaliation against the plaintiff's refusal of sexual advances by her supervisors, the plaintiff must show (1) that she was a victim of a pattern or practice of sexual harassment attributable to her employer (Bundy has, of course, already shown this); and (2) that she applied for and was denied a promotion for which she was technically eligible and of which she had a reasonable expection. 24 Bundy, 641 F.2d at 952-53. Applying Day, we held that because the plaintiff established the above-described abbreviated prima facie case of discrimination with respect to her employer's failure to promote her, the case proceeded directly to the remedy stage and the burden shifted to her employer to prove by clear and convincing evidence, that he had legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for denying ... the promotion. Id. at 953. As in Day, the plaintiff in Bundy made no claims of entitlement to a promotion beyond the position she alleged, in her prima facie case, had been denied her. 6 25 Johnson's reliance on Day and Bundy tends to blur the distinction between the statutory violation phase and the remedy phase of her case. This court's decisions indicate that the clear and convincing proof requirement of Day comes into play only after the plaintiff has established a statutory violation. See, e.g., Toney v. Block, 705 F.2d 1364, 1370 (D.C.Cir.1983) (Tamm, J., concurring); Milton v. Weinberger, 696 F.2d 94, 98 (D.C.Cir.1982); McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 77 (D.C.Cir.1982). Thus, in a case such as Day, the plaintiff would already have proven by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of discrimination with respect to the particular position for which he sought retroactive relief. The additional gloss placed upon this standard by Bundy comes into play only when a plaintiff establishes a pervasive discrimination in the work place that causes injury apart from a failure to promote. 26 As the district court noted, Johnson had repromotion rights only to [a] GS-12 level position, not to a GS-13 level position. As such, the claim for failure to promote to a GS-13 position is distinct from the claim for failure to repromote to a GS-12 position. Plaintiff's proof that defendant violated Title VII in failing to repromote her to a GS-12 position does not automatically shift to defendant the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff would not have been promoted to a GS-13 position as well. The plaintiff must establish, via the process set out in Burdine, see supra p. 223 a basis for shifting that burden to the defendant. The plaintiff must establish that her failure to achieve a GS-13 position resulted from defendant's statutory violation. 27 Although Johnson has put on some evidence reflecting that her failure to achieve a GS-13 position may have resulted from discrimination, 7 she did not establish a statutory violation with respect to GS-13. Only two GS-13 level positions were filled by competitive staffing during the period that Johnson established there was discrimination with respect to GS-12 positions. The first GS-13 level position was outside of the ETA and was obtained by Patricia Challenger. But Johnson did not apply for that job, and therefore did not make out the required prima facie case. The second position, which was in ETA, went to Jeanette Cohen, who held a GS-13 contract-specialist position prior to the RIF. The evidence is unclear on whether Johnson applied for this position, but in any event, she failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Government's justification--that Cohen got the job because of better qualifications--was mere pretext. 28 Our review of the record thus does not leave us with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed by the district court. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). 29