Opinion ID: 391427
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: application of hudgens

Text: 9 Application of the standard that section 7 rights and private property rights must be accommodated with as little injury to each right as possible requires that we approve the conclusion reached by a three-member panel of the Board in this case that the union should be allowed to station picketers in the 46th floor foyer. The presence of a limited number of picketers in the foyer conducting themselves in a manner that does not impede the use of those facilities on that floor not associated with the restaurant would not substantially injure the petitioner's property rights. A burden of this magnitude is justified because the petitioner has sanctioned an invitation to the public to patronize the restaurant. 10 Barring the picketers from the foyer, on the other hand, would substantially injure the union because stationing picketers outside the building is not an effective substitute for picketing in front of the restaurant. This is especially clear in the case of lunchtime customers of the restaurant. The parties stipulated that a significant portion of the lunchtime clientele works in the building. While these customers may have noticed the picketers when they entered the building, they may have forgotten their message hours later at lunchtime. 7 The situation is different with respect to dinnertime clientele, an insignificant portion of which works in the building. Most of this group would see picketers outside the building immediately before dining. 11 In the final analysis, our approval of the Board's conclusion that pickets should be allowed on the 46th floor rests on the peculiar nature of picketing. Even if the union can adequately inform most of the restaurant's customers of the existence of the strike without stationing picketers on the 46th floor, the union cannot fully implement its section 7 rights without confronting the customers in front of the restaurant. Picketing is more than mere dissemination of information. The loyalties and responses evoked by picket lines are unlike those flowing from appeals by printed words. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465, 70 S.Ct. 718, 721, 94 L.Ed. 985 (1950). The union's picketing is clearly much more effective on the 46th floor, where restaurant customers and nonstriking employees are identifiable, than at the entrance to the building. Restricting picketing to the entrances to the building would substantially dilute the union's section 7 rights since the effectiveness of a picket line depends on the location. United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492, 499-500, 84 S.Ct. 899, 904, 11 L.Ed.2d 863 (1949); Hudgens v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 161, 168 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 424 U.S. 507, 96 S.Ct. 1029, 47 L.Ed.2d 196 (1976). While a union does not have an absolute right to picket at every point of optimum effect..., Hudgens v. NLRB, supra, 501 F.2d at 169, allowing picketing on the 46th floor permits the union to implement its section 7 rights effectively. Since this may be allowed while accommodating the petitioner's private property rights, the decision of the Board that the petitioner violated section 8(a)(1) is affirmed. 12 To support its argument that the picketers should be barred from the 46th floor, the petitioner points out that the Supreme Court has held that in organizational picketing cases the union has the burden of showing that no other reasonable means of communicating its message to the employees exist. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112, 76 S.Ct. 679, 684, 100 L.Ed. 975 (1956); see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 205, 98 S.Ct. 1745, 1762, 56 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978). A reasonable, although not perfect, means exists here, the petitioner asserts, and therefore picketers should be confined to the exterior of the building. We disagree. Organizational picketing is more restricted than picketing in support of a strike. Under section 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976), it is an unfair labor practice for a union to picket in support of organizational activity unless certain specified conditions are met. And it is possible to reach the targets of organizational activity by telephone or in person, while potential customers can usually only be reached by picketing. We do not think the burden imposed on the union in organizational cases is invariably appropriate in economic strike activity cases. 13 The Court in Hudgens stated that the proper accommodations between section 7 rights and private property rights may vary depending on the nature and strength of the section 7 rights. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522, 96 S.Ct. 1029, 47 L.Ed.2d 196 (1976). The right to picket in support of an economic strike is at the core of section 7. See United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 376 U.S. 492, 499, 84 S.Ct. 899, 904, 11 L.Ed.2d 863 (1961); Teamsters Local 807, 87 N.L.R.B. 502, 504-05 (1949). Accordingly, unions should be allowed to picket in support of a strike in an effective manner whenever possible. A different accommodation might be appropriate if some activity not at the core of section 7, such as area standards picketing, were at issue. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 214, 98 S.Ct. 1745, 1766, 56 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); but cf. Giant Food Markets, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 6 (June 10, 1977) (area standards picketing permitted on private property). 14 The petitioner also argues that Hudgens is inapposite because picketing in an office building is different than picketing in a shopping center mall. We acknowledge the situations are different. The mall in Hudgens was apparently quite large, since most of the sixty stores in that shopping center could only be entered from the mall. 424 U.S. at 509, 96 S.Ct. at 1031. 8 The 46th floor foyer of the Seattle-First National Bank Building is quite small when compared to the Hudgens mall. Although the mall may not be the functional equivalent of a small town business district, see Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. at 520, 96 S.Ct. at 1036; Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 332-33, 88 S.Ct. 1601, 1615-1616, 20 L.Ed.2d 603 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting), Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946), it more resembles one than does the foyer. The foyer is both smaller and normally quieter. While these differences do not require reversal of the Board's decision permitting picketers on the 46th floor, we do believe that the Board should take account of the differences in formulating its order. 15 This it has not done. As written, the Board's order is too broad. 9 It seemingly permits any protected economic strike activity in the 46th floor foyer. But some activity that is normally permitted during a strike is inappropriate in a foyer of a 50-story office building. For example, a large number of picketers patrolling with placards and chanting slogans might disturb business conducted in that portion of the 46th floor not occupied by the restaurant, disturb business on other floors, interfere with persons changing elevators to go to the 47th floor, or otherwise cause congestion that might lead to violence or damage petitioner's property. 16 We recognize that there is no evidence in the record that such behavior has occurred. Thus far the union has stationed no more than two persons in the foyer and they have not carried placards but have placed handbills in front of them to form a picket line. But we believe the Board's order must be revised to ensure that the number of persons on the floor and their behavior there is properly restricted. 10 It is appropriate that the Board first consider these matters and revise its order to place proper limits on union activity. This is necessary to accommodate the section 7 rights of the union and the petitioner's private property rights under the circumstances presented in this case with as little destruction of each right as possible. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 522-23, 96 S.Ct. 1029, 1037-1038, 47 L.Ed.2d 196 (1976). 17 The case is remanded to the Board with instructions that it revise its order in accordance with this opinion. 18 Remanded. 19