Opinion ID: 2805758
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pre-Trial Competency and Sanity Examinations

Text: After pleading not guilty, Nelson provided notice of his intention to pursue an insanity defense and filed an unopposed motion for a psychiatric or psychological examination to determine competency and sanity. In support of the motion, Nelson alleged that he suffered Post–Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) 3 Case: 14-11995 Date Filed: 06/04/2015 Page: 4 of 41 while in the Air Force. A magistrate judge granted Nelson’s motion for a psychiatric or psychological evaluation, and Nelson was subsequently evaluated at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (“MCC”), a federal prison in New York. MCC forensic psychologist Dr. Kari Schlessinger prepared lengthy competency and criminal responsibility reports that were submitted to the district court on June 10, 2013. The evaluations included information about Nelson’s background reported by Nelson himself, including that during his service in the Air Force he was sent to learn Arabic and Mandarin at the Defense Language Institute. During his service he was incarcerated for six months for a conspiracy to commit murder charge unrelated to this case. 1 Nelson claimed that, during this incarceration, he suffered physical and sexual abuse that he did not initially report to anyone. As a result of the abuse, beginning in 2002, he suffered from PTSD, including experiencing nervousness, nightmares, flashbacks, and panic attacks. However, Nelson did not seek any treatment for his PTSD symptoms because he was concerned about maintaining his military security clearance. Instead, according to Nelson, he was formally diagnosed with PTSD in 2010 when he underwent a Veterans Affairs (“VA”) disability screening. During that 1 The record indicates that Nelson eventually was exonerated of the conspiracy to commit murder charge but does not explain whether Nelson was acquitted or the charge was otherwise dropped. 4 Case: 14-11995 Date Filed: 06/04/2015 Page: 5 of 41 screening, Nelson told the evaluator about his recurring nightmares and panic attacks but not the sexual assault. Nelson’s competency and criminal responsibility reports also included a section on the findings of Dr. Tin Chin, a contract psychiatrist at MCC, who conducted a routine psychiatric evaluation of Nelson. During the evaluation, Nelson reported that he was honorably discharged from the Air Force in 2010. Nelson identified the bank robbery as the cause of his arrest but stated he could only “vaguely recall what occurred or the reasons for his actions.” He also reported the 2002 sexual abuse, as well as the flashbacks and insomnia that resulted from the abuse. Dr. Chin concluded that Nelson may have suffered an episode of impulsive behavior followed by a period of dysphoric mood. Based on Nelson’s self-reported symptoms, Dr. Chin diagnosed him with bipolar disorder and prescribed risperidone, an antipsychotic medication. Dr. Schlessinger’s competency and criminal responsibility reports further noted that Nelson’s performance on psychological tests indicated “possible exaggeration of symptoms and a cry for help.” Based on the psychological tests, the reports indicated Nelson’s intellectual abilities to be above average. In the reports, Dr. Schlessinger diagnosed Nelson with PTSD based on his reported symptoms from his sexual assault. She also diagnosed him with personality disorder and schizoid and narcissistic personality traits. 5 Case: 14-11995 Date Filed: 06/04/2015 Page: 6 of 41 In support of the schizoid and narcissistic personality traits diagnosis, the competency and criminal responsibility reports noted Nelson’s preference to spend time alone, overestimation of his abilities and inflation of his accomplishments, “pervasive pattern of grandiosity,” sense of self importance, and lack of empathy. The reports noted that he “embellished his job skills,” and presented himself as “haughty” and “all-knowing” during the interviews. Ultimately, Dr. Schlessinger concluded that Nelson was both competent to stand trial and sane at the time of his offenses. 2 As to competency, Dr. Schlessinger noted that, despite Nelson’s PTSD, he possessed an understanding of the criminal proceedings, the capacity to assist counsel in his defense, and could rationally make decisions regarding legal strategy. As to criminal responsibility, Dr. Schlessinger concluded that, at the time of the offenses, Nelson’s PTSD did not impair his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. The report acknowledged Nelson’s claim that his memory of the crime consisted only of “disjointed ‘still frame pictures’ of the incident.” Leading up to the robbery offense he recalled feeling depressed, missing his children, having a panic attack, and buying a larger gun in case he decided to commit suicide. He described the details of his robbery offense as a “mystery” and recalled being arrested in the woods and waking up in jail. 2 Following Dr. Schlessinger’s reports, the parties stipulated to Nelson’s competency to stand trial. 6 Case: 14-11995 Date Filed: 06/04/2015 Page: 7 of 41 Dr. Schlessinger reasoned, however, that the statements and reports of the investigating officers regarding the robbery revealed that Nelson’s conduct on the day was not “erratic, bizarre, or unusual.” For example, the bleach on Nelson’s items that were recovered near the scene of the robbery suggested that he planned ahead and anticipated using the bleach to clean items if given a dye pack at the bank. His other conduct showed “clear intent, strategic thinking, . . . premeditation, . . . [and] prudence and effort in minimizing the risk of detection,” including purchasing and loading a gun, disguising his identity, and instructing the bank tellers not to insert dye packs. Thus, although Nelson suffered from PTSD, he was rational at the time of the robbery offense, understood his conduct, and was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. D. Pre-Trial § 3006A(e) Motion for Appointment of Mental Health Experts, a Private Investigator, and Additional Legal Counsel In July 2013, following the submission of Dr. Schlessinger’s reports, Nelson moved pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) for appointment of independent psychiatric or psychological experts, as well as a private investigator and additional legal counsel, to assist in the development and presentation of an insanity defense. In the motion, Nelson’s counsel asserted that based upon the totality of the criminal responsibility report, including the PTSD diagnosis by Dr. Schlessinger and the bipolar disorder diagnosis by Dr. Chin, Nelson had a basis for raising an insanity defense. Nelson’s counsel also opined that Nelson’s behavior 7 Case: 14-11995 Date Filed: 06/04/2015 Page: 8 of 41 on the day of the robbery was “bizarre[] based upon his character and past,” given that he had a clean criminal record and was formerly employed as a contractor for the National Security Agency (“NSA”), “extremely intelligent,” and fluent in Arabic and Mandarin. The § 3006A(e) motion was also based, in part, upon claims by some of Nelson’s family members that he possibly suffered from multiple personality disorder. In support of the request for a private investigator, Nelson’s counsel stated that Nelson’s ex-wife potentially had information concerning his mental health but was not being cooperative, and thus assistance was needed to obtain information from her. The § 3006A(e) motion requested the assistance of additional counsel due to the complexity of the insanity defense. Finally, the motion also noted that Nelson was receiving VA benefits following the determination that he was “50% disabled based upon his mental condition.” E. Pre-Trial § 3006A(e) Hearing On July 30, 2013, the district court held a hearing on Nelson’s § 3006A(e) motion, at which “the issues of Nelson’s sanity and competency were explored.” Responding to questions from both his counsel and the district court, Nelson testified that, during his time in the Air Force, he studied languages at the military language school in Monterey, California, and served as a cryptologic linguist. He studied both Chinese and Arabic and received an associate’s degree in Arabic. 8 Case: 14-11995 Date Filed: 06/04/2015 Page: 9 of 41 Nelson also testified that he was sexually assaulted while in the Air Force but never reported the assault for fear of jeopardizing his security clearance. During his “out-processing” from the Air Force, he was diagnosed with PTSD after suffering depression and thoughts of suicide. As a result, Nelson received $810 per month in VA disability benefits. Following his discharge from the Air Force, he worked as a contractor for the NSA. Linda Nelson (“Linda”), Nelson’s mother, testified that she believed her son suffered from manic depression. She had seen him experience depression in the past, including in middle school when he was almost institutionalized after cutting himself. Linda had also heard of Nelson using the identity “Jacob Kane” in public and online. Linda claimed that Nelson was highly intelligent and received bad grades in school only because he failed to apply himself. The district court continued the July 30, 2013 hearing for further inquiry, stating that it wished to consider additional information and review Nelson’s Air Force and VA records. Three weeks later, on August 20, 2013, the district court issued a written notice setting the continued hearing for two days later, August 22, 2013.3 At the August 22, 2013 hearing, the district court indicated that, to rule on the necessity of appointing mental health experts, it needed to test Nelson’s alleged 3 There is no indication that Nelson or his counsel requested a continuance of the August 22 hearing. 9 Case: 14-11995 Date Filed: 06/04/2015 Page: 10 of 41 “fluency” in foreign languages. 4 The district court noted that Nelson’s foreign language skills were not “determinative of anything,” but indicated that it viewed Nelson’s claimed fluency in Arabic and Mandarin as relevant to his credibility in alleging mental illness. Accordingly, the district court called two foreign language experts, Walter Cheng and Christopher Pratt, to test Nelson’s foreign language skills in Mandarin and Arabic, respectively. Nelson’s attorney did not object to the appointment or calling of these witnesses. Prior to the language examinations, Nelson addressed the district court and represented that he could speak Mandarin only “conversational[ly]” but claimed that he had far more experience with—and could read and write—Arabic. Nelson indicated that he had not used Mandarin since 2002 but had used Arabic more recently. Court-appointed expert Cheng tested Nelson’s verbal and reading abilities in Mandarin and found that Nelson spoke “very few” words, could not read basic questions, and did not have even a “kindergarten” level of proficiency in the language. Nelson’s attorney declined the opportunity to question Cheng about his qualifications as a linguist in English and Mandarin. On cross-examination by Nelson’s attorney, Cheng conceded that an individual would likely lose their 4 On the day of the August 22, 2013 hearing, the district court entered a written order specifically ordering that Nelson be tested on his foreign language skills and appointing two language experts to that end. 10 Case: 14-11995 Date Filed: 06/04/2015 Page: 11 of 41 ability to speak or understand Mandarin if that individual did not use the language for ten years. Court-appointed expert Pratt tested Nelson’s verbal and written skills in Arabic and found that Nelson scored a 2 out of 10 in verbal proficiency and a 7 out of 10 in written proficiency. Nelson’s attorney extensively cross-examined Pratt on his method of testing Nelson and whether the dialect of Arabic to which Nelson had been exposed would have any effect on his abilities. F. District Court’s Order Denying § 3006A(e) Motion Following the hearing, the district court issued a detailed and comprehensive 34-page order denying Nelson’s § 3006A(e) motion for the appointment of an independent mental health expert, investigator, and additional counsel. The district court found that Nelson was not entitled to “investigative, expert, or other services” under § 3006A(e) because he had not shown that the expert services were necessary for adequate representation. Specifically, Nelson had not demonstrated that he had a plausible insanity defense. In support of its finding that Nelson’s insanity defense was implausible, the district court reviewed four categories of evidence presented at, or submitted in connection with, the hearing on Nelson’s § 3006A(e) motion. First, the district court thoroughly described Dr. Schlessinger’s reports, including her conclusion that Nelson was criminally responsible for his crimes. The court found that Dr. 11 Case: 14-11995 Date Filed: 06/04/2015 Page: 12 of 41 Schlessinger’s evaluation of Nelson, including her observation that he had an inflated sense of self worth, “hit the nail on the head,” and the court “fully adopted and endorsed” her reports. Second, the district court extensively examined Nelson’s VA records, which included medical records from an Army medical center at Fort Gordon, Georgia, where Nelson was seen multiple times during his time in the Air Force.5 The court noted that, although the medical records dated back to July 2005, the first mention of any mental issue was not until October 2009. Specifically, on October 26, 2009, Nelson presented to the medical center’s psychology department with complaints of depression, anxiety, and sleep disturbances based on problems at work and home, including the pending divorce from his wife. Nelson also stated that his depression, anxiety, and nightmares resulted from the 2002 incident in which he was falsely accused and imprisoned. Nelson reported cynicism of the justice system and distrust of law enforcement following the incident, but he denied any sexual contact without his consent. Nelson was diagnosed with “Major Depression Single Episode Moderate.” On November 18, 2009, Nelson appeared for an appointment with the medical center’s psychology department. He was diagnosed with “Adjustment 5 The district court noted that Nelson was never deployed to combat during his military career. 12 Case: 14-11995 Date Filed: 06/04/2015 Page: 13 of 41 Disorder with Depressed Mood” but was not prescribed any medication. Nelson’s medical center records included no further entries from the psychology department. Between June and October 2010, Nelson presented repeatedly to the Army medical center with back pain and was prescribed pain medications and antiinflammatories. At multiple times during these visits Nelson denied having any symptoms of depression or sleep disturbances. During this same time period, on August 16, 2010, Nelson appeared at the medical center as protocol for his involuntary separation from the Air Force. The medical report from that date states that Nelson was not claiming any disability benefits. On October 27, 2010, Nelson came to the medical center both because of claimed back pain and to complete paperwork for his discharge from the Air Force. Nelson reported that he was not experiencing any depression and requested a waiver of his exit physical exam. A physician signed the necessary paperwork for Nelson to receive a waiver of the physical exam. On November 8, 2010, however, Nelson filed a VA form claiming entitlement to benefits based on the following disabilities: “low back pain with radiculopathy,” “adjustment disorder with depressed mood,” “insomnia,” and “anhedonia,” all with a listed onset date of October 2010. 6 6 Nelson subsequently withdrew his claim for disability based on back problems. 13 Case: 14-11995 Date Filed: 06/04/2015 Page: 14 of 41 Because of the claimed adjustment disorder, the VA sent Nelson to an independent contractor, QTC Medical Services. On June 3, 2011, Nelson reported to the QTC Medical Services examiner that he was stabbed during his 2002 incarceration. As a result, he alleged suffering from “panic attacks more than once a week, impairment in short and long term memory (e.g. retention of only highly learned material, forgetting to complete tasks), . . . disturbances of motivation and mood[,] . . . [and] difficulty establishing and maintaining relationships because of irritability and anxiety.” Based on this single evaluation and “Nelson’s self-reports,” the examiner gave Nelson a 50 percent disability rating for “PTSD (claimed as adjustment disorder with depressed mood, insomnia and anhedonia).” The examiner also noted that Nelson’s reported symptoms during his November 2009 visit to the Army medical center, although diagnosed as adjustment disorder, were consistent with PTSD. The VA records of Nelson’s disability benefits also “indicate[d] that Nelson’s PTSD diagnosis [was] non-sexual in nature.” In September 2012, less than six months before the bank robbery, Nelson received a lump-sum disability payment of $16,413, retroactive to the November 2, 2010 onset date of his PTSD. Thereafter he received $810 per month for his disability. 14 Case: 14-11995 Date Filed: 06/04/2015 Page: 15 of 41 Third, the district court considered Nelson’s recent financial records. The district court noted that, after Nelson’s discharge from the Air Force, he worked as an independent contractor at Fort Gordon, reportedly earning $62,500 per year. Although Nelson became unemployed in November 2012, his bank account records revealed that his usual financial habits—including spending large amounts of money on entertainment and clothing—“continued unabated.” For example, in the month after he became unemployed, Nelson spent nearly $1,500 on clothing, made cash withdrawals totaling $3,000, purchased Cirque de Soleil tickets for more than $500, and spent hundreds of dollars on trips. Based on Nelson’s bank records, the district court found that in the months leading up to the bank robbery, contrary to defense counsel’s claim that Nelson was “a depressed man suffering from PTSD,” Nelson was “well-groomed, well fed, thoroughly entertained, and well-traveled.” It further appeared that, by the time of the bank robbery, Nelson, “having burned through his disability money and his salary and relying solely upon the monthly disability check, . . . was at a crossroad between have and have not.” The district court found that the expenditures were consistent with Dr. Schlessinger’s conclusion that Nelson had a narcissistic personality. Fourth, the district court reviewed the inconsistencies in Nelson’s testimony and his VA records. In particular, the district court focused on the language 15 Case: 14-11995 Date Filed: 06/04/2015 Page: 16 of 41 experts’ assessment of Nelson’s claimed fluency in Arabic and Mandarin, noting that Nelson had “failed, miserably,” in communicating with the experts. The district court indicated that it had tested Nelson’s purported foreign language abilities to gauge his credibility in light of Dr. Schlessinger’s observations that “Nelson embellished his job skills and presented himself in a haughty, all-knowing way” and demonstrated “narcissistic personality.” Given Nelson’s exaggerated claims of fluency in foreign languages, the district court concluded a “closer look” at his credibility was “in order,” and it recounted several additional inconsistencies bearing on Nelson’s credibility. For example, Nelson falsely reported to Dr. Schlessinger that he received outpatient treatment for his PTSD and that he had been honorably discharged from the Air Force when in fact he had been involuntarily separated following a demotion. In light of the above-described evidence, the district court found that Nelson’s insanity defense was implausible. 7 The district court recognized that Nelson had been diagnosed with PTSD but found that this did “not end the inquiry”: [A] closer look at the circumstances behind the PTSD disability rating, which no doubt played into [Dr. Schlessinger’s] determination, leaves a distaste for the process that only serves to lend incredulity to the diagnosis. It appears that Nelson’s claim of disability was an 7 The district court also found, independent of Nelson’s stipulation to his competency to stand trial, that Nelson was competent to stand trial under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 based on Dr. Schlessinger’s competency report. 16 Case: 14-11995 Date Filed: 06/04/2015 Page: 17 of 41 afterthought—perhaps suggested by the out-processing clerk who filled out the VA [benefits] application for Nelson’s signature. The district court noted that Nelson received a 50 percent disability rating based upon one episode of depression and self-reports of nightmares and panic attacks. In any event, the district court reasoned, “whatever the extent of Nelson’s PTSD, it did not interfere with Nelson’s ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct on the day of the robbery.” Based on the criminal responsibility report and the district court’s own “examination of the circumstances behind Nelson’s PTSD diagnosis and of Nelson himself,” the district court observed: Nelson has an inflated sense of self and from what I have observed, he is an opportunist and a highly manipulative one. This time, he saw an opportunity to exploit his PTSD diagnosis, his alleged loss of memory, and his idiosyncrasies to convince his counsel to claim that he is not criminally responsible for his actions. The Court, however, is not convinced. In short, the defense of mental disease or defect is implausible. G. First Jury Trial In December 2013, Nelson’s case proceeded to trial. The jury was unable to reach a verdict, however, and the district court declared a mistrial. The district court reset the trial for February 2014. H. District Court’s § 3006A(f) Order Following the district court’s examination of Nelson’s bank account records in connection with the § 3006A(e) insanity motion, the court determined that Nelson’s earlier affidavit of indigency was “far from complete” and developed 17 Case: 14-11995 Date Filed: 06/04/2015 Page: 18 of 41 “grave concerns about Nelson’s potential for manipulation or abuse of Criminal Justice Act funds.” Accordingly, in January 2014, the district court entered an order, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f), directing $8,000 to be paid from Nelson’s bank account to the clerk of the court. 8 The district court noted that Nelson likely had received more than $27,000 from the VA over the past 18 months and presently had more than $8,000 in his bank account. At the time of the order, Nelson’s legal expenses amounted to at least $12,227 for legal representation as well as expert witness fees and travel costs, and the district court found “no reason in the world why Nelson’s own money ought not be tapped and used to pay his witnesses or the lawyer.” Nelson moved to reconsider the order, arguing his child support obligations should take priority over the CJA payments. The reconsideration motion noted that Nelson’s wife testified at his first trial and that “withholding child support could create a hostile witness environment.” Attached to the motion were Nelson’s divorce decree and child support documentation, showing that he was obligated to pay his ex-wife $2,000 per month in child support. The district court denied Nelson’s motion for reconsideration. 8 Section 3006A(f) provides that if a district court finds funds are available from or on behalf of a person furnished CJA representation, it may direct the funds be paid to the appointed attorney or to the court to reimburse it for paying the attorney. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(f). 18 Case: 14-11995 Date Filed: 06/04/2015 Page: 19 of 41