Opinion ID: 4664557
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: gibbs stated valid discrimination claims

Text: The “substantive standards for determining liability [under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act] are the same.” McDonald v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, Polk Ctr., 62 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1995). So we analyze Gibbs’s claims together. 4 For either claim, Gibbs must plausibly allege three elements: that he was disabled, was qualified for the job, and suffered discrimination because of his disability. Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). He has plausibly alleged all three.
The ADA and Rehabilitation Act protect a job applicant not only if he is mentally impaired, but also if an employer wrongly “regard[s]” him as impaired. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). The test is whether the employer “perceived” him as impaired, “whether or not the [perceived] impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” § 12102(3)(A). Although Gibbs’s ADHD was under control, the psychologists allegedly thought it was a handicap and fixated on it in rejecting him. So he has plausibly alleged that they regarded him as disabled.
Gibbs claims that he was qualified to be a policeman because five other police departments hired him, and even Pittsburgh made him a conditional job offer. Pittsburgh responds that Gibbs lacked one qualification: passing the psychological test. That response misses the point. Gibbs claims that he failed the test because the psychologists were biased. When a plaintiff claims that job criteria were applied in a discriminatory way, of course he does not need to satisfy those criteria to bring a discrimination claim. He need show only that he was qualified based on all the other, nondiscriminatory criteria. See § 12112(b)(6) (banning the use of discriminatory job 5 qualifications unless they are job-related and necessary for the business); Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 306 (5th Cir. Unit A Nov. 1981). Gibbs claims that he would have been hired but for failing the allegedly biased test. So he has plausibly claimed that he was qualified. In finding Gibbs unqualified, the District Court relied on Cook v. City of Philadelphia, 649 F. App’x 174 (3d Cir. 2016). Cook is not precedential, and it does not help Pittsburgh. In Cook, we reasoned that a psychological test for police officers was a valid qualification, but only after the plaintiff had pointed to no “facts that would support a claim of bias.” Id. at 177. Yet here, Gibbs alleges bias. To be sure, we will not excuse a plaintiff from missing qualifications just because he says they were discriminatory. He must plausibly allege (and later prove) that they were. We now turn to that third element.
discrimination To plausibly allege discrimination, Gibbs does not have to have detailed evidence. For now, he need only give Pittsburgh fair notice of his claim and “raise the reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover evidence of discriminatory motive.” Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Gibbs has done that. He claims that once the psychologists learned that he had ADHD, they fixated on his childhood misbehavior without considering whether it was currently under 6 control. He also claims that his ADHD was under control and that five other police departments thought so. And he claims that Pittsburgh hired other policemen who had likewise misbehaved as children but did not have ADHD. He has thus explained why he thinks he suffered discrimination. If his allegations are true, there is a reasonable chance that discovery will unearth more evidence of it. So he has plausibly stated a claim. The District Court thought that Gibbs had to allege that Pittsburgh itself was biased, not just the psychologists that it had hired. But at oral argument, Pittsburgh disavowed that reasoning. We reject it too. Under the ADA, discrimination includes “participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting a . . . qualified applicant . . . to . . . discrimination.” § 12112(b)(2). Thus, “[a]n employer cannot evade its obligations under the ADA by contracting out personnel functions to third parties.” Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 31 (1st Cir. 2002). That includes “us[ing] a preemployment examination as conclusive proof of an applicant’s [mental] capabilities.” Id. So if the psychologists discriminated against Gibbs, Pittsburgh would be liable for relying on them. The District Court also said that state law required Pittsburgh to screen out Gibbs. The parties debate whether that is true, but it makes no difference. Under the Supremacy Clause, an employer may not shield itself from federal antidiscrimination liability just by saying that it was trying to follow state law. EEOC v. Allegheny Cty., 705 F.2d 679, 682 (3d Cir. 1983). “[T]he demands of the federal Rehabilitation Act [or ADA] do not yield to state laws that discriminate against the 7 disabled; it works the other way around.” Barber ex rel. Barber v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 562 F.3d 1222, 1234 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). As Pittsburgh thus conceded at argument, its trying to follow Pennsylvania law would not be a defense.