Opinion ID: 110365
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Year 1

Text: The statute applying to Year 1 was signed by the President during the business day of October 1, 1976. By that time, the 4.8% increase under the Adjustment Act already had taken effect, since it was operative with the start of the monthand the new fiscal yearat the beginning of the day. The statute became law only upon the President's signing it on October 1; it therefore purported to repeal a salary increase already in force. Thus it diminished the compensation of federal judges. [29] The Government contends that Congress could reduce compensation as long as it did not discriminate against judges, as such, during the process. That the freeze applied to various officials in the Legislative and the Executive Branches, as well as judges, does not save the statute, however. This is quite different from the situation in O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U. S. 277 (1939). There the Court held that the Compensation Clause was not offended by an income tax levied on Article III judges as well as on all other taxpayers; there was no discrimination against the plaintiff judge. Federal judges, like all citizens, must share the material burden of the government . . . . Id., at 282. The inclusion in the freeze of other officials who are not protected by the Compensation Clause does not insulate a direct diminution in judges' salaries from the clear mandate of that Clause; the Constitution makes no exceptions for nondiscriminatory reductions. [30] Accordingly, we hold that the statute with respect to Year 1, as applied to compensation of members of the certified class, violates the Compensation Clause of Art. III. Year 2 Unlike the statute for Year 1, the statute for Year 2 was signed by the President before October 1, when the 7.1% raise under the Comparability Act was due to take effect. Year 2 thus confronts us squarely with the question of whether Congress may, before the effective date of a salary increase, rescind such an increase scheduled to take effect at a later date. The District Court held that by including an annual cost-of-living adjustment in the statutory definitions of the salaries of Article III judges, see supra, at 204, and n. 2, Congress made the annual adjustment, from that moment on, a part of judges' compensation for constitutional purposes. Subsequent action reducing those adjustments diminishes compensation within the meaning of the Compensation Clause. Relying on Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S., at 254, the District Court held that such action reduces the amount a judge . . . has been promised, and all amounts thus promised fall within the protection of the Clause. We are unable to agree with the District Court's analysis and result. Our discussion of the Framers' debates over the Compensation Clause, supra, at 219-220, led to a conclusion that the Compensation Clause does not erect an absolute ban on all legislation that conceivably could have an adverse effect on compensation of judges. [31] Rather, that provision embodies a clear rule prohibiting decreases but allowing increases, a practical balancing by the Framers of the need to increase compensation to meet economic changes, such as substantial inflation, against the need for judges to be free from undue congressional influence. The Constitution delegated to Congress the discretion to fix salaries and of necessity placed faith in the integrity and sound judgment of the elected representatives to enact increases when changing conditions demand. Congress enacted the Adjustment Act based on this delegated power to fix and, periodically, increase judicial compensation. It did not thereby alter the compensation of judges; it modified only the formula for determining that compensation. Later, Congress decided to abandon the formula as to the particular years in question. For Year 2, as opposed to Year 1, the statute was passed before the Adjustment Act increases had taken effectbefore they had become a part of the compensation due Article III judges. Thus, the departure from the Adjustment Act policy in no sense diminished the compensation Article III judges were receiving; it refused only to apply a previously enacted formula. [32] A paramountindeed, an indispensableingredient of the concept of powers delegated to coequal branches is that each branch must recognize and respect the limits on its own authority and the boundaries of the authority delegated to the other branches. To say that the Congress could not alter a method of calculating salaries before it was executed would mean the Judicial Branch could command Congress to carry out an announced future intent as to a decision the Constitution vests exclusively in the Congress. [33] We therefore conclude that a salary increase vests for purposes of the Compensation Clause only when it takes effect as part of the compensation due and payable to Article III judges. With regard to Year 2, we hold that the Compensation Clause did not prohibit Congress from repealing the planned but not yet effective cost-of-living adjustment of October 1, 1977, when it did so before October 1, the time it first was scheduled to become part of judges' compensation. The statute in Year 2 thus represents a constitutionally valid exercise of legislative authority. Year 3 For our purposes, the legal issues presented by the statute in Year 3 are indistinguishable from those in Year 2. Each statute eliminatedbefore October 1the Adjustment Act salary increases contemplated but not yet implemented. Each statute was passed and signed by the President before the Adjustment Act increases took effect, in the case of Year 3, on September 30. For the reasons set forth in our discussion of the issues for Year 2, we hold that the statute in Year 3 did not violate the Compensation Clause. Year 4 Before reaching the constitutional issues implicated in Year 4, we must resolve a problem of statutory construction. On its face, the statute in Year 4 applies in terms to executive employees, which includes Members of Congress. See supra, at 208. It does not expressly mention judges. Appellees contend that even if Congress constitutionally could freeze the salaries of Article III judges, it did not do so in this statute. We are satisfied that Congress' use of the phrase executive employees, in context, was intended to include Article III judges. The full title of the Adjustment Act is the Executive Salary Cost-of-Living Adjustment Act, but it is clear that it was intended to apply to officials in the Legislative and the Judicial Branches as well. [34] The title does not control over the terms of the statute. The statutes in the three preceding years undeniably applied to judges, and we can discern no indication that the Congress chose to single them out for an exemption when it was including Executive and Legislative officials. Most important, both the Conference Report and the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, speaking on the floor, made explicit what already was implicit: the limiting statute would apply to judges as well. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 96-513, p. 3 (1979); 125 Cong. Rec. 27530, 27532 (1979) (remarks of Rep. Whitten). [35] Having concluded that the statute in Year 4 was intended to apply to judges as well as other high-level federal officials, we are confronted with a situation similar to that in Year 1. Here again, the statute purported to revoke an increase in judges' compensation after those statutes had taken effect. For the reasons governing the statute as to Year 1, we hold that the statute revoking the increase for Year 4 violated the Compensation Clause insofar as it applied to members of the certified class.