Opinion ID: 1200929
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: preemption of smc 21.49.110

Text: The City contends that it relied on the authority of RCW 35.92.050 [17] when it enacted SMC 21.49.110. That statute allows the City to regulate and control the use, distribution, and price [of electricity]. The City asserts that the ordinance adopted in 1980, on its face, insulates it from damages for electrical interruption from any cause. The City argues that the phrase from any cause in the ordinance includes power loss or interruption caused by City Light's own acts of negligence. The phrase from any cause is followed by examples of causes the City Council had in mind when it enacted the ordinance. [18] However, the City admitted that the ordinance could not be read as absolving it from liability for acts of gross negligence, recklessness or intentional misconduct. It does argue, however, that the ordinance grants the City immunity from ordinary negligence. [4, 5] The City may exercise only such power as is delegated to it by the Legislature. [19] It is a general requisite to the validity of an ordinance that it conform to, and not violate, general statutes. [20] In case of conflict, the ordinance is void. Attached to every ordinance or resolution affecting, or adopted by, a municipality, is the implied condition that the same must yield to the predominant power of the state, when that power has been exercised.... [W]here there is conflict between a statute and an ordinance, the latter must give way. [21] [W]here the state ... has ... asserted its jurisdiction over a given subject-matter, and there is no room for concurrence, the municipal charter or ordinance must give way. [22] [A] municipal corporation[] is limited in its powers to those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted, and also those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation. If there is a doubt as to whether the power is granted, it must be denied. [23] [6, 7] The City may enact an ordinance addressing the same subject matter as a state statute if the city ordinance does not conflict with the general laws of the state and the state law does not show on its face an intent to be exclusive. [24] The test for determining whether a municipal ordinance conflicts with a state statute was set forth in Bellingham v. Schampera. [25] In that case, this court stated that whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa ... [is] [j]udged by [the] test ... [of whether the] ordinance is in conflict if it forbids that which the statute permits. [26] Applying this test, the ordinance in this case is in conflict with state statutes. The City argues that the ordinance forbids suits for damages for loss of electrical service occasioned by acts of negligence. State statutes, to the contrary, authorize such suits and permit recovery of damages for negligently caused losses. [27] The City argues that the purpose of the ordinance is to provide for setting of reasonable rates, and that the City's ability to do that is affected by the ruling of the Superior Court. The City further argues that if it has to defend itself in lawsuits like this, it raises the specter of higher rates for the average citizen. This is a specious argument which is manifestly without merit. We affirm the decision of the trial court declaring the ordinance, SMC 21.49.110(S), invalid for the reasons that (1) it contravenes state statutes and invokes sovereign immunity; and (2) it is preempted by state statutes. DORE, C.J., and UTTER, DOLLIVER, DURHAM, GUY, and JOHNSON, JJ., concur. BRACHTENBACH and ANDERSEN, JJ., concur in the result. Reconsideration denied January 15, 1992.