Opinion ID: 1407256
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecution For Continuing Offense

Text: Defendant maintains that the offense she was convicted of was a continuing crime with elements thereof occurring before January 1, 1973, the effective date of HRS § 708-831(1)(b). She therefore argues she should have been charged under prior existing law in accord with HRS § 701-101(1). [4] We agree the offense was a continuing one but disagree with the contention that she could only have been prosecuted under the prior statute. In People v. Howes, 99 Cal. App.2d 808, 222 P.2d 969 (1950), a California court held the applicable test in determining whether there is a continuing crime is whether the evidence discloses one general intent or discloses separate and distinct intents. It found if there is but one intention, one general impulse, and one plan, even though there is a series of transactions, there is but one offense. Id. at 818-19, 222 P.2d at 976; People v. Saling, 48 Cal. App.3d 724, 122 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975); People v. Neder, 16 Cal. App.3d 846, 94 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1971). A similar rationale was applied in Dawson v. Superior Court, 138 Cal. App.2d 685, 292 P.2d 574 (1956). There, the defendant received welfare payments to which she was not entitled by failing to disclose her employment status. She filed renewal applications and continued to receive payments although employed and receiving income. She was charged with two counts of grand theft rather than several petty thefts. The court held the charges proper, stating that where a person intends by his false representations to initiate an act which will cause him to receive illegally various sums of money, it is far more reasonable to consider the whole plan rather than its component parts. Id. at 689, 292 P.2d at 577. Accord, People v. Bailey, 55 Cal.2d 514, 360 P.2d 39, 11 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1961). Contra, People v. Lofton, 73 Misc.2d 285, 340 N.Y.S.2d 984 (1973). We have had no prior occasion to determine what constitutes a continuous offense and are persuaded that the California rule enunciated in Howes, supra, provides logical and appropriate guidelines for such a determination. Applying this analysis, we find but one intention and plan here and thus conclude there was one offense. We do not view each filing by defendant of a statement of facts supporting continued eligibility as necessarily constituting a new offense, since all statements were identical, representing that defendant was unmarried, unemployed, and not receiving social security benefits. Having concluded that defendant committed a continuous offense, we must still determine whether the State's election to prosecute her under an indictment covering only a part of the period of that offense was valid. In People v. Norwood, 312 Mich. 266, 20 N.W.2d 185 (1945), defendants were initially indicted for a conspiracy extending from June 1, 1933 to May 29, 1940. The indictment was twice amended, the final indictment charging a conspiracy from April 25 to May 29, 1940. Defendants claimed the splitting of a continuous offense had placed them in jeopardy. The court ruled that a conspiracy to violate existing laws is usually a continuing offense, extending over some period of time, and the prosecution may charge and prove the offense in any part of such period. Id. at 275, 20 N.W.2d at 188. Although it can be argued that the continuing offenses of theft and conspiracy are distinguishable, we see no greater legal obstacle to an indictment based on the continuing scheme of one person than on the continuing conspiracy of more than one. Bramblett v. United States, 231 F.2d 489, 491 (D.C. Cir.1956) (discussing application of statute of limitations to continuing offenses). The validity of a charge covering only part of the time span of a continuing crime is also inferentially supported by decisions holding that a conviction or acquittal of a continuous offense bars another prosecution for the same offense committed in a period overlapping any portion of the duration of the first. See Short v. United States, 91 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.1937); Bustamante v. People, 136 Colo. 362, 317 P.2d 885 (1957). A logical conclusion may be drawn therefrom that prosecutions premised on conduct extending over less than the whole period of a continuing offense are not precluded, assuming, of course, that all necessary elements can be proved for the shorter period. We find the State acted within legal bounds in prosecuting defendant under an indictment covering only part of the entire duration of a continuing offense.