Opinion ID: 2212618
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: current discovery procedures

Text: The rules of discovery applicable in civil proceedings in Indiana courts are not applicable as such in criminal proceedings. However, the techniques of discovery embodied in those rules will often be applicable in criminal proceedings and the trial court has the inherent power to implement such discovery techniques as are necessary to provide the defendant a full and fair hearing. Bernard v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 688, 230 N.E.2d 536; Johns v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 172, 240 N.E.2d 60. The guiding principle to be followed by trial courts in dealing with the area of criminal discovery was set down in Bernard v. State, supra . That case involved a request by a criminal defendant for a list of the names of witnesses to be used against him. In holding that it was error to deny such a motion this Court said: It is self-evident that a list of witnesses would have been beneficial in the preparation of appellant's case. We do not require that the State lay bare its case in advance of trial nor that the criminal defendant be allowed a fishing expedition, however these objections do not arise when a list of witnesses is requested and the State fails to show a paramount interest in non-disclosure.  (Emphasis added.) 248 Ind. at 692. This principle was followed in Johns v. State, supra , the Court saying: Under the doctrine outlined in Bernard v. State it is clear that the trial court, when requested by the defendant in a criminal proceeding has the duty to order the state to furnish the defendant with the names and addresses of those witnesses upon whom the state intends to rely in the prosecution of the case, unless the state is able to show a paramount interest in non disclosure. ... The purpose of the Bernard doctrine is to insure justice and fairness in criminal proceedings and it is axiomatic that an accused is not justly and fairly tried when his counsel is compelled to maneuver in a factual vacuum. Nor is fairness and justice enhanced when convictions are gained through surprise, or by the prosecution misleading the defense. (Emphasis added.) 240 N.E.2d 60. In Amaro v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 88, 239 N.E.2d 394, the principle was used to support the defendant's right to take pretrial depositions of prosecuting witnesses the court saying ... the denial was not within the discretion of the trial court in that the State failed to show a paramount interest nor did the trial court on its own motion make such a finding. See also Nuckles v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 399, 236 N.E.2d 818. We believe that the principle relied on in the above cases provides the basis for the review of the appellants' allegations of error.