Opinion ID: 38607
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Education

Text: 16 First, Perez argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's finding that he possesses a high school education. The regulations define education as formal schooling or other training which contributes to [one's] ability to meet vocational requirements, for example, reasoning ability, communication skills, and arithmetical ability. 20 C.F.R. § 15.64(a). The Social Security Administration uses six categories to evaluate an applicant's educational level: (1) illiteracy, (2) marginal education, (3) limited education, (4) high school education and above, (5) inability to communicate in English, and (6) other. Id. § 404.1564(b)(1)-(6). In this case, the ALJ found that Perez falls into the fourth category high school education and above. In making that determination, the ALJ relied on Perez's own testimony that he graduated from high school in 1978. San Marcos Independent School District records confirm Perez's testimony. 17 Perez argues that the ALJ erred in finding that he possesses a [h]igh school education or above under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b)(4) instead of [m]arginal education or [l]imited education. Although Perez received a high school diploma, he was not enrolled in traditional high school classes. Rather, he was found to have a slow learning disability that necessitated his enrollment in special education classes through the tenth grade. Throughout his eleventh and twelfth grade years, Perez did not take academic courses but rather received credit through a work program in which he worked as a painter. Perez claims that he has difficulty spelling and cannot even fill out a job application. Thus, he argues, the ALJ should not have relied on his testimony that he graduated from high school, as well as the school records that confirm his graduation, and should have instead found that Perez possesses some level of education lower than [h]igh school education or above. If the ALJ had done so, Perez contends, the VE would have evaluated the hypothetical employment prospects of someone in a lesser educational category. 18 The ALJ's finding that Perez has a high school education is supported by substantial evidence: Perez's testimony and school records. 5 Yet even if Perez should have been found to possess a marginal or limited education, his education is just one of several factors that this court must weigh in determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Perez was not disabled prior to December 31, 1995. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v) (RFC, age, education, and work experience); Wren, 925 F.2d at 126 (objective medical facts; diagnoses and opinions; subjective evidence of pain; education, age, and work history). Perez does not allege that he would have been deemed disabled but for the ALJ's finding that he has a high school education. Nor does Perez allege that a finding of marginal or limited education would prevent him from performing the sedentary jobs that the VE testified a hypothetical person with Perez's characteristics could perform—e.g., small parts assembler, parking lot cashier, or surveillance system monitor. In fact, Perez's counsel failed to ask the VE a single question, much less present the expert with his own hypothetical question concerning a claimant in a lower educational category. 19 Rather, Perez simply argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's educational finding because he completed high school through special education classes and a work program. One federal district court recently rejected a similar argument in Lipson v. Barnhart, 347 F.Supp.2d 1182 (M.D.Ala.2004). There, Lipson argued that the Commissioner's decision denying her disability benefits should be reversed because the ALJ's finding that she had a tenth grade education was not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 1186. Specifically, Lipson argued that the ALJ had erroneously determined Lipson's level of education by accepting Lipson's testimony as to what grade she completed. Id. Other evidence showed that Lipson had taken special education classes since the sixth grade. Id. Standardized tests administered by a doctor revealed that Lipson had borderline intellectual functioning. Id. Although Lipson had acknowledged that she could read, the tests showed that she was illiterate and reading at less than a third grade level. Id. Thus, although Lipson testified that she had a tenth grade education, her actual level of education attained was significantly lower. Id. 20 Nevertheless, the district court held that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding that Lipson had a tenth grade education. Id. at 1187. Critical to the court's decision was the fact that [the doctor's] assessment made no findings regarding [the impact of Lipson's reading skills and intellectual functioning upon her ability to perform vocational tasks]. Id. at 1187-88. Lipson argued that the ALJ should have assumed that her diminished intellectual functioning rendered her unable to perform the jobs listed by the VE, including assembler, sorter, and facilities attendant. Id. at 1187. However, the district court held that despite the evidence of Lipson's low reading level, in the absence of evidence of [impact], the court cannot conclude that the ALJ's determination was unsupported by the record. 6 Id. at 1187-88. 21 Here, the ALJ determined that Perez possesses a high school education based on his own testimony and San Marcos Independent School District records. Perez now makes the same argument that the plaintiff in Lipson made: the ALJ should not have based its educational assessment on Perez's own testimony but should have looked to other evidence that points to a lower educational level. Yet despite his educational limitations, Perez worked as a painter and oil field worker before the onset of disability. Perez has not provided any impact evidence; that is, he has not shown how his less-than-high-school education affects his ability to perform the jobs suggested by the VE, or how these jobs require more intellectual ability than did his past relevant work as a painter and oil field worker. 22 In light of the highly deferential standard of review and Perez's failure to develop his argument or support it by citing to any relevant authority, Perez's assertion that his special-education and work-program evidence entitles him to summary judgment or remand is not persuasive. The ALJ's finding that Perez has a high school education is supported by substantial evidence.