Opinion ID: 2967632
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contemporary and Traditional Practice

Text: The practice of courts applying the guidelines is in accord with our determination that it is permissible to impose consecutive sentences for grouped offenses. Indeed, this court has already stated (arguably in dicta) that section 5G1.2, in conjunction with section 3D1.2, requires that a sentence on a conspiracy count shall run concurrently with the sentence on substantive counts that were included within the conspiracy, except to the extent necessary to produce a sentence within the appropriate sentencing guidelines range. Watford, 894 F.2d at 669 (emphasis added). In addition, numerous cases decided by this court and other courts of appeals implicitly countenance consecutive sentences for grouped offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 256 F.3d 231, 257 (4th Cir.) (holding that imposition of sentences UNITED STATES v. CHASE 7 exceeding statutory maximum did not violate substantial rights because district court was obliged to stack sentences for grouped offenses to achieve same total punishment), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 633 (2001); see also United States v. Feola, 275 F.3d 216, 219 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (explaining sentencing procedure for multiple counts, including both grouping and stacking). This approach is consistent with pre-guidelines practice. Before the guidelines were enacted, district courts enjoyed virtually unbridled discretion to choose between concurrent and consecutive sentences, even for closely related offenses. Watford, 894 F.2d at 667; cf. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981) (upholding consecutive sentences for single conspiracy encompassing two objectives). The main limitation on district court discretion in the preguidelines era was the doctrine of merger, which applied (and still applies) to bar separate sentences in certain circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 204 F.3d 541, 544 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that district court erred in imposing separate sentences for greater offense and lesser included offense). Merger is primarily a function of legislative intent; thus, when a defendant has been convicted of multiple offenses, the sentencing court must determine whether Congress intended to authorize separate punishments for those offenses. See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 336. If courts were required to impose concurrent sentences for all grouped offenses, then grouping would curtail the sentencing authority of district courts to the same extent as merger, regardless of any congressional purpose to authorize cumulative punishments. Here, for example, the total maximum penalty for Chase’s conspiracy and substantive drug trafficking offenses would be 240 months—the same as the maximum applicable to each offense —despite the well-settled rule that substantive crimes committed in the execution of a conspiracy may be punished separately from the conspiracy itself, see Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946). This possibility of obstructing congressional purposes by requiring concurrent sentences for grouped offenses reinforces our conclusion that grouping does not preclude stacking.