Opinion ID: 2769744
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Course and Scope of Employment

Text: Turning to the merits, Zurich argues the district court erred in affirming the finding of the Appeals Panel that Jasso was acting in the course and scope of his employment within the meaning of Tex. Lab. Code § 401.011(12). This court reviews the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Haverda v. Hays Cnty., 723 F.3d 586, 591 (5th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is proper only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Further, “[o]n cross-motions for summary judgment, we review each party’s motion independently, viewing the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable 8 Case: 13-51097 Document: 00512900336 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/13/2015 No. 13-51097 to the nonmoving party.” 2 Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Emp’rs Mut. Cas. Co., 592 F.3d 687, 691 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 2001)). We “may affirm the district court’s decision on any basis presented to the district court.” Haverda, 723 F.3d at 591 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For an injury to be compensable under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, the injury must arise out of and in the course and scope of employment. Tex. Lab. Code § 401.011(10). Course and scope of employment is defined as “an activity of any kind or character that has to do with and originates in the work, business, trade, or profession of the employer and that is performed by an employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of the employer.” Id. § 401.011(12). This includes activities conducted on the premises of the employer and at other locations. Id. One statutory exclusion from course and scope is implicated in this case: “transportation to and from the place of employment.” Id. § 401.011(12)(A). This exclusion is commonly referred to as the “coming and going” exclusion. If an employee’s ultimate destinations are home and work, despite any intermediate stops in-between, the “coming and going” exclusion merits analysis. Leordeanu v. Am. Prot. Ins. Co., 330 S.W.3d 239, 246 (Tex. 2010) (“The ‘coming and going’ rule developed . . . specifically for travel between home and work.”); see Zurich Am. Ins. Co., v. McVey, 339 S.W.3d 724, 727−29 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. denied) (analyzing the “coming and going” exclusion because the travel was between work and home even though the injury 2 The district court order stated that in “[v]iewing the facts most favorable to Defendant, these summary facts establish that DCP required Jasso to travel as part of its business.” The district court then relied on this finding in granting Sandra Jasso’s motion and denying Zurich’s. In truth, there are no disputed facts, and the motions turn on the issue of whether, as a matter of law, Jasso’s travel was in the course and scope of his employment with DCP. 9 Case: 13-51097 Document: 00512900336 Page: 10 Date Filed: 01/13/2015 No. 13-51097 occurred while the employee was first on his way to pick up a co-worker and then to a mandatory work conference in another city). However, even when the “coming and going” exclusion must be analyzed, the activity might still be excepted from this exclusion if one of the following is satisfied: (i) the transportation is furnished as part of the contract of employment or is paid for by the employer; (ii) the means of the transportation are under the control of the employer; or (iii) the employee is directed in the employee’s employment to proceed from one place to another place. Tex. Lab. Code § 401.011(12)(A)(i)−(iii) (emphasis added). Satisfying an exception to the “coming and going” exclusion does not necessarily mean the travel falls within the course and scope of employment; it only means that this exclusion does not keep the activity outside the course and scope of employment. McVey, 339 S.W.3d at 729. Once the exclusion is deemed excepted from, courts then examine whether the activity originated in the work of the employer and whether the employee was engaged in or about the furtherance of the business of the employer. Id. at 730. It is undisputed that Jasso was traveling to and from work in a truck provided by DCP at the time of his accident. Thus, while the “coming and going” exclusion is implicated, Jasso’s activity is excepted from this exclusion. See Leordeanu, 330 S.W.3d at 249 (stating that the employee “was driving a car provided by her employer at the time of her accident and therefore [was] excepted from the ‘coming and going’ rule”). 3 3 Zurich argued that the district court erred by disagreeing with its argument that since Jasso’s vehicle was not a necessity to his contract of employment with DCP, the provision-of-the vehicle exception was ineffective. Under this theory, if the vehicle was not a necessity to the contract of employment, it would be excluded under the coming and going exclusion. Texas jurisprudence disagrees with this application. See Leordeanu, 330 S.W.3d at 249 (applying the provision-of-the vehicle exception without considering necessity). As discussed infra, necessity is only considered at the origination stage. See, e.g., Seabright Ins. 10 Case: 13-51097 Document: 00512900336 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/13/2015 No. 13-51097 Jasso’s activity still may be in the course and scope of his employment with DCP, as long as it satisfies the origination and furtherance requirements. Outside of the commuting context, furtherance may be a more complicated question, but “[a]n employee’s travel to and from work makes employment possible and thus furthers the employer’s business, satisfying” this requirement. Id. at 242. As it is undisputed that Jasso was traveling to and from work at the time of the accident, his activity satisfies the furtherance requirement. The only remaining requirement is that the activity “originates in the work, business, trade, or profession of the employer.” Tex. Lab. Code § 401.011(12). In Texas, “there is no bright line rule for determining if employee travel originates in the employer’s business as each situation is dependent on the facts.” Seabright Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 427 S.W.3d 442, 448 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. filed May 9, 2014). Further, “[n]o single fact is dispositive; rather, [courts] consider the nature of the employee’s job, the circumstances of the travel, and any other relevant facts.” Id. Courts are tasked with “determin[ing] whether the relationship between the travel and the employment is so close that it can fairly be said that the injury had to do with and originated in the work, business, trade or profession of the employer.” Leordeanu, 330 S.W.3d at 242 (citation omitted). We start with the assumption that an employee’s travel to and from work does not ordinarily satisfy origination, as “[t]he risks to which employees are exposed while traveling to and from work are shared by society as a whole and do not arise as a result of the work of employers.” Id. (quoting Evans v. Ill. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau, 790 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. 1990)). However, as a Co. v. Lopez, 427 S.W.3d 442, 448−49 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. filed May 9, 2014) (discussing the concept of necessity as related to origination). 11 Case: 13-51097 Document: 00512900336 Page: 12 Date Filed: 01/13/2015 No. 13-51097 general rule, an employee’s travel originates in his employer’s business if the travel was pursuant to the express or implied requirements of the employment contract. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jerrols, 385 S.W.3d 619, 630 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet. h.). In situations where “the employer requires the employee to travel as part of its business—i.e., pursuant to the contract of employment—the risk of traveling stems from that business and properly can be said to arise as a result of the employer’s business.” Id. (quotation omitted). Further, “only employer-provided transportation that amounts to a necessity from the employer’s perspective, and not just a gratuitous accommodation to the employee, is sufficient, without more,” to satisfy the origination requirement. Seabright, 427 S.W.3d at 448−49 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). It is clear, however, that even if the vehicle was not a necessity to the contract, the court can still find that the travel originated in the employer’s business. See id. (holding that “the company truck was furnished to [the employee] gratuitously” and even still, as a matter of law, the employee’s travel originated in and furthered the employer’s business). The Seabright court found that origination was satisfied based on the additional evidence that the employee and his wife resided 450 miles away from the jobsite, “[the employer] paid [the employee] a per diem while he was working at the . . . jobsite that was not paid to its workers at its home office[,] . . . and [the employee] used his per diem to stay at a motel about forty miles [from the jobsite].” Id. at 459. This additional evidence “illustrate[d the employer] clearly knew the only reason employees . . . would be present in the area of [the jobsite] was their job.” Id. at 450. “As such, a commute to the jobsite [was] not only expected, but in reality, required.” Id. In finding that the travel satisfied origination, the Seabright court stated “a strong nexus 12 Case: 13-51097 Document: 00512900336 Page: 13 Date Filed: 01/13/2015 No. 13-51097 between [the employee’s] employment and travel [existed] on the day of the accident.” Id. In the present case, the evidence in the record indicates that DCP’s provision of the truck to Jasso was not a necessity to the contract of employment because Jasso was required to pay income tax for his use of the truck between work and home. There was no contravening evidence to suggest the provision of the truck was anything more than gratuitous. Thus, DCP’s provision of the truck does not establish on its own that Jasso’s travel was within the course and scope of employment, and we must consider the remaining evidence. See Seabright, 427 S.W.3d at 448−49. Facts that tend to show there was a strong nexus between Jasso’s travel and his employment with DCP are: (1) DCP supplied Jasso with the truck and a fuel card; (2) DCP required Jasso to travel to the field sites away from the Fullerton office; (3) Jasso traveled to field sites about 20% of the time; and (4) the wellness physical was encouraged by DCP. Facts that do not tend to show strong nexus are: (1) Jasso had to pay income tax for the use of his truck between work and home; (2) this was not over-night and across-state travel as in Seabright, but travel from Jasso’s home to an off-site work location; (3) Jasso was on the same route he would have been on during his normal commute; and (4) Jasso left later than normal and stopped by his doctor’s office before heading to the worksite. Regarding the fact that Jasso was on the same route he would have been on during his normal commute, it is true that “[t]he risks to which employees are exposed while traveling to and from work are shared by society as a whole and do not arise as a result of the work of employers.” Leordeanu, 330 S.W.3d at 242. But Jasso was in fact traveling to the off-site Love Discharge Facility, not the home office in Fullerton—which DCP required him to do—and which created extra travel and extra risk for Jasso. Evidence in the record indicated Jasso would be returning to the Fullerton office after his trip to the Love 13 Case: 13-51097 Document: 00512900336 Page: 14 Date Filed: 01/13/2015 No. 13-51097 Discharge Facility. Jasso was on the only major road going north out of Odessa, which happens to be along the same route as the home office. This was extra travel and extra risk created by the requirements of Jasso’s employment with DCP. It would be arbitrary for the compensability of Jasso’s injuries to be based solely on the geographic placement of his off-site work location. Additionally, it is not of particular import that Jasso left his home later than normal, especially in light of the fact that DCP encouraged Jasso to undergo the wellness physical. Further, while the travel required by DCP was not hundreds of miles away from the home office, as in Seabright, DCP nonetheless required Jasso to travel beyond his ordinary commute. There was a strong nexus between Jasso’s travel to the Love Discharge Facility on July 20, 2010, and his employment with DCP. We conclude that Jasso’s travel to the off-site Love Discharge Facility on the day of his accident originated in the business of DCP. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s finding that Jasso’s travel was in the course and scope of his employment with DCP.