Opinion ID: 694307
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applying New York Tolling Doctrine to Overall's Claims

Text: 36 The district court granted summary judgment for defendant on the grounds, inter alia, that no rational trier of fact could conclude that Overall was still under the influence of the duress caused by her father's abuse within a year of when she filed her complaint. On appeal, Overall contends that how long she remained under duress is a question of fact for the jury, not the judge. She argues that she presented enough evidence to create a genuine dispute as to whether her failure to bring suit until 1992 due to memory loss was caused by her father's abuse in the 1940's. Klotz replies that under New York law, Overall cannot qualify for duress tolling unless she can demonstrate some threats or abuse during the limitations period. Klotz is correct. 37 Whether or not Overall remained under the influence of her father's duress for forty years is indeed a factual inquiry, but ultimately an irrelevant one for purposes of deciding the statute of limitations question presented here. The central question is whether her father's tortious conduct spanned from 1949 until at least May 1990 (two years before she filed suit) and thus subjected her to a continuous wrong. 11 It does not matter for purposes of applying New York's statute of limitations that Overall may still suffer psychological scars from childhood abuse. 38 The district court assumed for the purposes of deciding the summary judgment motion that duress constituted an element of each of Overall's claims. Although in some sense each of her tort claims contains an element of duress, the precise injury that she purportedly suffered until 1991--memory suppression--does not alone constitute actionable duress within the meaning of those torts. In other words, Overall has not alleged that she was continually subjected to the tortious conduct which constitutes false imprisonment, assault, or intentional infliction of emotional distress since 1949. Accordingly, she has not suffered from a continuous wrong within the meaning of the duress tolling doctrine since she left her father's home in Texas, and we cannot toll the limitations period for duress beyond 1949. We address each of her claims in detail. 39 False imprisonment. Plaintiff contends that she was confined to her father's home and the convent schools as a result of her father's violent threats and acts which prevented her from calling for help. However, the duress that allegedly prevented plaintiff from escaping from false imprisonment ended in 1949, when her mother took her to New York. Even if her father's threats caused her to repress memories of those acts, any adverse effects on her memory cannot be considered a continuous wrong that is an extension of her false imprisonment claim. If we accepted plaintiff's definition of duress as only the effects of her father's tortious conduct, we would ignore the other element of duress--tortious conduct--that is also required to prove the tort of false imprisonment. 40 Furthermore, if we adopted Overall's one-sided definition of duress for the purposes of tolling, we would also have to accept that definition for purposes of defining the duration of the tort itself. Under Overall's theory, then, her false imprisonment claim would span from 1949 to 1991--a patently absurd conclusion. 41 Properly interpreted, duress tolling is applicable to a much more limited extent in Overall's case. Based on the alleged facts and proffered evidence, her cause of action for false imprisonment would have first accrued in 1947, when she began to live with her father. The statute of limitations would not have begun to run on her false imprisonment claim until two years later, when she moved to New York. 12 42 Assault and battery. Plaintiff also argues that duress is an element of her claims of assault and battery, because her father forced her through threats and violence to undergo an unwanted touching. However, she was not subjected to the threat of an unwanted touching (that is, the duress that constitutes an element of assault and battery) after 1949. Even if Overall suffered memory repression resulting from a series of assaults committed between 1947 and 1949, she was not subjected to continuous assaults through 1991. Again, the continuing duress (in the form of threats and violence) that Overall allegedly endured while she lived in Texas tolled the statute of limitations as to her earlier claims of assault, but only until 1949. 43 Intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff argues that she suffered emotional distress as the direct result of her father's physical and emotional abuse. As with Overall's other claims, however, the infliction of that duress concededly ended in 1949. That Overall still bears scars from abuse inflicted more than forty years ago speaks to the severity of that duress, but not to its continuing nature. Furthermore, it would make little sense to permit indefinite tolling for this tort solely on the grounds that the effects of the distress have persisted for 45 years, when (for example) a person whose hand was chopped off in an accident 45 years ago cannot similarly maintain suit on the grounds that he still suffers the effects of that injury. Yet that would be the logical result of characterizing her father's abuse as a continuous wrong.