Opinion ID: 1497818
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: denial of instruction on lesser included offense

Text: Webb argues that there was sufficient evidence in the record to justify having the trial court charge the jury on sexual assault, [14] a lesser included offense of first degree rape. In support, he relies on some statements in the victim's testimony that Webb fondled her, which he argues supported conviction for sexual assault. Webb's contention fails for deficiency of proof. A lesser included offense is appropriate only when [t]here is a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting [a] defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense[]. 11 Del.C. § 206(c). This standard applies even where the defendant denies any involvement in the charged offense. Miller v. State, Del. Supr., 426 A.2d 842, 845 (1981). Where the evidence supportive of a requested lesser included offense is such that no reasonable jury could convict the defendant of the lesser rather than indicted charge, however, the trial court need not charge the lesser included offense. [15] Slater v. State, Del.Supr., 606 A.2d 1334, 1338 (1992); Ward v. State, Del. Supr., 575 A.2d 1156, 1159 (1990). In the instant case, some parts of the victim's testimony would have supported a conviction for sexual assault. That same evidence was also supportive of the charged offense, however. The evidence supportive of sexual assault overlapped, rather than being mutually exclusive of, the evidence for first degree rape. Having failed to highlight any evidence in the record that provides a rational basis for acquittal of first degree rape and conviction for sexual assault, Webb's argument must fail.