Opinion ID: 628682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion for Attorney Fees

Text: 13 The starting point in fashioning an award of attorney fees is to multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). This lodestar may then be adjusted for the results obtained. Id. at 435-437, 103 S.Ct. at 1940-41; Norman v. Housing Authority, 836 F.2d 1292, 1302 (11th Cir.1988). Although a district court has wide discretion in performing these calculations, Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941, the court's order on attorney fees must allow meaningful review--the district court must articulate the decisions it made, give principled reasons for those decisions, and show its calculations. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1304. 14 Ray requested attorney fees in the amount of $944,775 (2907 hours X $125/hr + enhancement factor of 1.6) plus $9671.23 in costs. The district court awarded Ray attorney fees of $50,400 (560 hours X $90) plus $3181.50 in costs. On appeal, Ray contends that the district court erred in fashioning his award by (1) using an hourly rate of $90, (2) inadequately explaining the reduction in claimed hours, (3) failing to enhance the award as requested, and (4) failing to award all the costs claimed. We review a district court's award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Popham v. City of Kennesaw, 820 F.2d 1570, 1581 (11th Cir.1987). Failure to adhere to the procedures we have set forth for the fashioning of fee awards constitutes an abuse of discretion. Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 931 F.2d 811, 814 (11th Cir.1991); NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332, 1334 (11th Cir.1987).
15 The first step in the computation of the lodestar is determining the reasonable hourly rate. A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonable comparable skills, experience, and reputation. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895-96 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547-48 n. 11, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984)). The party seeking attorney fees bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence that the requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates. Id. By satisfactory evidence, we mean more than affidavits containing statements that a given fee is reasonable. Id. See, e.g., Mayson v. Pierce, 806 F.2d 1556, 1557 (11th Cir.1987) (in addition to attorney affidavits, fee applicant presented evidence of rates charged to other clients, a national survey of hourly rates, and attorney fee awards in other cases in the district). 16 Ray requested an hourly rate of $125. In support of that rate, he presented the district court with three affidavits, all executed by attorneys in the Dade County area, all testifying that an hourly rate of $125 was reasonable. In opposition to these affidavits, the County Defendants submitted another attorney's affidavit, testifying that an hourly rate of $60-75 was reasonable. Plainly, none of these affidavits are satisfactory evidence. Given the deficiency in the affidavits, the district court was free to disregard them and make the fee award based on its own experience. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303. 17 Apparently relying on its own experience, the district court simply stated that [a] reasonable hourly rate of attorneys fee [sic] for this cause of action at the time in question for an attorney with the general legal background and experience of the movant is $75. Then looking to the difficulty of the case, the contingent nature of the fee and the time limitations imposed, the district court adjusted the hourly rate upwards to $90. 2 Although the district court was free to rely on its own experience in determining a reasonable hourly rate, it was not relieved from its obligation to provide an explanation of its reasoning. See Gilmere, 931 F.2d at 814 (remanding attorney fee award where district gave no explanation of how it arrived at reasonable rate). The district court adequately explained why it raised the $75 rate to $90. However, the district court failed to explain how it arrived at its initial hourly rate of $75. This failure constitutes an abuse of discretion. On remand the district court should explain how it arrived at this figure. 3
18 The next step in the computation of the lodestar is the ascertainment of reasonable hours. The party seeking attorney fees begins by submitting evidence of the hours worked. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939. The district court should then exclude (1) excessive or otherwise unnecessary hours, (2) redundant hours, and (3) hours spent on discrete and unsuccessful claims. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301-02. As we explained in Norman, excessive or otherwise unnecessary hours are those hours that would be unreasonable to bill a client, irrespective of the skill, reputation, or experience of counsel. Id. at 1301 (emphasis in original). Where the court believes that the attorney seeking fees is inefficient or unskilled, the court should adjust the hourly rate, not reduce the time billed. Perkins v. Mobile Housing Bd., 847 F.2d 735, 738 (11th Cir.1988). 19 Ray sought reimbursement for 2907 hours. In support of those hours, Ray submitted an 80-page typed summary of the hours spent on this case and the related state litigation as well as copies of his contemporaneous handwritten time sheets. The district allowed only 560 hours. In making that reduction, the court first found that a review of the movant's time sheets reflects a total of approximately 800 allowable hours devoted to this particular case. This statement fails to comply with the requirement set forth in Norman that the district court explain which hours are disallowed and show why an award of those hours would be improper. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1304. By failing to satisfy this requirement, the district court abused its discretion. 4 See Gilmere, 931 F.2d at 815 (remanding award that reduced claimed hours because those hours were excessive); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1318 (11th Cir.1989) (remanding award that reduced claimed hours because those hours were unreasonable); Perkins, 847 F.2d at 738 (remanding award that reduced hours claimed because those hours were excessive). 20 In this case, however, the district court's ability to explain its disallowance of hours was severely hampered by Ray's failure to submit his request in a form which would enable the court to determine how much time was spent on the federal litigation and how much time was spent on the state litigation and other matters. When the request for attorney fees does not permit easy division between compensable and non-compensable hours, the district court should require the party seeking fees to refashion its request. See King v. McCord, 707 F.2d 466, 468 (11th Cir.1983) (burden on party seeking fees to provide sufficient evidence for party to make correct division). Thus, rather that simply slashing Ray's requested fees as excessive, the district court should have required Ray to resubmit his request in a form which allowed the court to clearly delineate between the federal and state litigation.
21 After determining the lodestar by multiplying the reasonable hourly rate times the hours reasonably expended, the court must determine the necessity of an adjustment for the results obtained. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302. Only if the results obtained are excellent should the court award the full lodestar amount. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940. If the plaintiff obtains only partial or limited success, then a reduction in the lodestar is appropriate. Id.; Farrar v. Hobby, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 566, 575, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992). See also Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302 (discussing how to adjust lodestar downward). Finally, in certain rare and exceptional cases, some upward adjustment of the loadstar might be called for. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council, 478 U.S. 546, 565, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3098, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986). 22 Ray urged twelve grounds in support of his argument that the lodestar should be enhanced by a factor of 1.6--namely the twelve Johnson factors. The district court relied on three of these factors in ascertaining a reasonable hourly rate for purposes of the lodestar. However, the district court failed to address the other nine factors. Indeed, the district court's award contains no discussion of enhancement. On appeal, Ray argues that the district court's failure to address each of these factors was an abuse of discretion. 23 We do not agree with Ray that the district court was required to totemically recite the twelve Johnson factors in determining whether to enhance the award. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, those factors are appropriately considered as part of the lodestar itself. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 94-95, 109 S.Ct. 939, 944-45, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989); Delaware Valley Citizens Council, 478 U.S. at 564-65, 106 S.Ct. at 3097-98; Blum, 465 U.S. at 900, 104 S.Ct. at 1549; Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. at 1940 n. 9. Nevertheless, we are bound by precedent to hold that the district court abused its discretion by failing to discuss whether Ray's case was one of exceptional success. In NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir.1987), we reviewed a fee award where the prevailing plaintiff had sought enhancement based on several of the Johnson factors. Although we noted that those factors usually should not provide an independent basis for increasing the fee award, we remanded the award because the district court had failed to consider whether it was a case of exceptional success. Id. Following City of Evergreen, the district court on remand should consider whether adjustment of the lodestar upward or downward is appropriate.
24  'With the exception of routine office overhead normally absorbed by the practicing attorney, all reasonable expenses incurred in case preparation, during the course of litigation, or as an aspect of settlement of the case may be taxed as costs under section 1988' and 'the standard of reasonableness is to be given a liberal interpretation.'  City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d at 1337 (quoting Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181, 1192 (11th Cir.1983)). In its fee award, the district court awarded Loranger only $3181 of the claimed $9671.23 in costs. Given City of Evergreen's command to interpret reasonable expenses liberally, the district court abused its discretion by reducing Ray's allowed costs by $6489.77 without any explanation.