Opinion ID: 1189791
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: failure to designate spalding as an accomplice

Text: The trial court refused both at trial and upon Martinez' motion for a new trial to designate Spalding as an accomplice. Martinez argues that the district court erred in failing to designate Spalding as an accomplice or, at least, in failing to submit her status as such to the jury. According to Martinez, the prosecution relied on Spalding's testimony as a nonaccomplice for the purpose of corroborating Wystrach's testimony. It is only the testimony of Wystrach and Spalding which link the defendant to the crime; there is no other independent evidence to establish such a link. According to Martinez, since Spalding was an accomplice, her testimony could not be used to corroborate Wystrach's testimony. As to the trial court's alleged error in its failure to designate Spalding as an accomplice at trial, Martinez relies on the fact that she was indicted by the same grand jury which indicted him. [5] As to the trial court's alleged error in failing to grant a new trial on this issue, Martinez relies on events which occurred after trial which, according to him, reveal the trial court's error. This evidence was presented to the trial court in Martinez' motion for a new trial on this issue. Specifically, Martinez points to evidence that at defendant Jones' trial, which took place after Martinez' trial, Wystrach testified that Spalding drove the car for Martinez and Jones the night of the murder. At Martinez' trial, Wystrach testified that Spalding did not drive the car. In addition, Martinez argues that in the course of discovery involving other defendants indicted in the murder, certain evidence of Spalding's role as an accomplice was discovered, which evidence was not revealed to the defendant during discovery preceding his trial. This evidence includes statements by Spalding's brother and his roommate to authorities made in 1979 and 1980 that Spalding was an accomplice. In denying Martinez' motion for a new trial, the trial court rejected this argument because it found that even if Wystrach had testified at another trial that Spalding drove the car the night of the murder, it does nothing more than create a factual dispute because Wystrach testified to the contrary at Martinez' trial. The trial court also noted that if faced with a conflict between Wystrach's testimony and that of Spalding, it would find Spalding's testimony more credible. We find no error. First, the district court did not err in failing to designate Spalding an accomplice at trial. The only evidence cited by Martinez in support of this argument is that Spalding was indicted by the grand jury as was Martinez. This is not enough to make her an accomplice. There was no evidence presented at Martinez' trial that Spalding was involved in the murder in any way. Thus, the trial court's initial refusal to designate Spalding as an accomplice is not grounds for reversal. See generally State v. Bruno, 119 Idaho 199, 203, 804 P.2d 928, 932 (Ct.App.1990) (if there is no factual dispute, the trial court need not submit the accomplice question to the jury). Second, we agree with the trial court's reasoning in its denial of Martinez' motion for a new trial that this newly discovered evidence, assuming arguendo that it is such, merely goes to the impeachment of Spalding. Evidence which is merely cumulative or impeaching is not a sufficient basis for the grant of a new trial. State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 972, 978 (1976).