Opinion ID: 2648104
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Souza Factors

Text: Next, Mr. Christy argues that the district court misapplied the factors set forth in Souza in finding that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered. Aplt. Br. 21-26. In cases like this one, where the theory of inevitable discovery is that a warrant would have been obtained but for the illegal search, the district court must determine “how likely it is that a warrant would have been issued and that the evidence would have been found pursuant to the warrant.” Souza, 223 F.3d at 1204. In Souza, we adopted four factors from the Second Circuit to aid in this determination: 1) the extent to which the warrant process has been completed at the time those seeking the warrant learn of the search; 2) the strength of the showing of probable cause at the time the search occurred; 3) whether a warrant ultimately was obtained, albeit after the illegal entry; and 4) evidence that law enforcement agents ‘jumped the gun’ because they lacked confidence in their showing of probable cause and wanted to force the issue by creating a fait accompli. Id. (quoting United States v. Cabassa, 62 F.3d 470, 473-74, 473 n.2 (2d. Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Factors (1) and (3) are of particular importance. Id. Ultimately, the court must examine each contingency that would need to have been resolved in favor of the government and apply the inevitable discovery doctrine “only when it has a high level of confidence” that - 11 - the warrant would have been issued and the evidence obtained. Id. at 1205. Mr. Christy challenges the court’s treatment of factors (2) and (4)—the strength of probable cause and whether the officers “jumped the gun” to sidestep the warrant requirement. Aplt. Br. 24, 26. Factors (1) and (3) are undisputed—the government concedes that the officers took no steps to obtain a warrant before the search, Aplee. Br. 32, and Mr. Christy concedes that a warrant was ultimately obtained, albeit after the illegal entry, Aplt. Br. 24. As to factor (2), the district court concluded that Officer Carvo had strong probable cause that Mr. Christy committed the California crime of unlawful sexual intercourse and the federal crime of coercion or enticement. Christy, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1276-78. The California crime consists of sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of 18, Cal. Penal Code § 261.5(a), (c), and the federal crime consists of persuading or enticing someone to cross state lines to engage in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a). The district court found that Officer Carvo knew that K.Y. was a minor, there was a large age difference between her and Mr. Christy, the two exchanged sexually explicit pictures, and that Mr. Christy traveled across state lines with K.Y. Christy, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1277-78. Given those factual findings, it is a reasonable inference that a sexual relationship existed between Mr. Christy and K.Y. Officer Carvo also knew that K.Y. was potentially suicidal, had left her - 12 - depression medication behind, and ran away from home with Mr. Christy. Aplt. App. 166. Based on that knowledge, Officer Carvo’s belief that K.Y. was at risk for sexual victimization and assault was reasonable. Thus, Officer Carvo had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Christy engaged in sexual activity in violation of California law and coerced or enticed K.Y. to travel across state lines to engage in criminal sexual activity in violation of federal law. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). The district court was correct in weighing this factor in favor of applying inevitable discovery. Next, Mr. Christy argues that the deputies “jumped the gun” by forcing entry into his home due to their lack of confidence about probable cause. Aplt. Br. 26. Yet as the district court found, no evidence supports the theory that the deputies forced entry for that reason. Christy, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1279. Instead, the deputies forced entry because they believed K.Y. was in danger. Aplt. App. 423-25. Mr. Christy argues that the search was not in fact justified by exigent circumstances and points to the district court’s conclusion that it was not. Aplt. Br. 26. But that is beside the point. The record fully supports the reasonableness of the deputies’ assessment of danger. The district court was correct in weighing this factor in favor of the government. Thus, the district court did not err in applying the Souza factors.