Opinion ID: 3061872
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence for Conspiracy Charge

Text: Third, Evans contends that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to show a conspiracy between Evans and Willingham, the leader of the conspiracy. He argues that: (1) his transactions were for personal use quantities and thus they were not linked to the larger conspiracy; (2) he did not participate in the conspiracy goal of maximizing profits; (3) there was not a meeting of minds or shared goals with respect to the ongoing drug-related business; and (4) Willingham contradicted himself in his testimony and made no statement indicating a continuous ongoing business arrangement with Evans. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v. Suba, 132 F.3d 662, 671 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). “The relevant question . . . is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation omitted). “We resolve all reasonable inferences and credibility evaluations in favor of the jury’s verdict; we will uphold the jury’s verdict if a reasonable fact 9 finder could conclude that the evidence establishes the defendants’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). The credibility of witnesses is the exclusive province of the jury. United States v. Chastain, 198 F.3d 1338, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999). “To sustain a conviction for conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that a conspiracy existed; (2) that the defendant knew of it; and (3) that the defendant, with knowledge, voluntarily joined it.” United States v. Molina, 443 F.3d 824, 828 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). “[P]articipation in a criminal conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; a common purpose or plan may be inferred from a development and collocation of circumstances.” Suba, 132 F.3d at 672 (quotation omitted). “The Government need only produce sufficient evidence that the defendants conspired to commit a single object.” Id. “Because secrecy is an essential element of conspiracy, such an agreement may be proved by circumstantial as well as direct evidence.” United States v. Hernandez, 921 F.2d 1569, 1575 (11th Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted). “In the case of a purchaser of narcotics, . . . agreement may be inferred when the evidence shows a continuing relationship that results in the repeated transfer of illegal drugs to the purchaser.” United States v. Mercer, 165 F.3d 1331, 1335 10 (11th Cir. 1999). The evidence showed that Evans regularly purchased large amounts of cocaine and marijuana from Willingham, amounts too large to be merely for personal use. See United States v. Dekle, 165 F.3d 826, 829–30 (11th Cir. 1999). Further, Evans sold Willingham high quality marijuana that Willingham sold to other clients. Moreover, Evans offered to sell Willingham large amounts of cocaine when Willingham’s supply of cocaine encountered problems. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Evans conspired with Willingham to distribute drugs.