Opinion ID: 179337
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Transcripts of Wiretapped Telephone Conversations

Text: Appellants challenge the district court's decision to (1) admit the government's transcripts of twenty-four wiretapped telephone conversations into evidence; (2) allow the jury to use transcripts that identified the alleged speakers by name; and (3) permit the jury to view the transcripts during deliberation. We review these rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Breland, 356 F.3d 787, 793-95 (7th Cir.2004). Appellants also argue that the district court committed reversible error when instructing the jury on the proper role of the transcripts. We review the district court's instructions de novo. United States v. Jefferson, 334 F.3d 670, 672 (7th Cir.2003). Although district courts exercise wide discretion when determining whether juries may use written transcripts as aids while listening to audiotape recordings, this court has noted that [t]ranscripts of recorded conversations are a virtual necessity when the conversations take place in Spanish and are admitted into evidence before an English-speaking jury. Breland, 356 F.3d at 794; United States v. Nunez, 532 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir.2008). If the recorded conversations were played for the jury (as was the case here), the district court has the discretion to permit the use of transcripts during jury deliberations. Breland, 356 F.3d at 794. The names of the alleged speakers may be printed on the transcripts if a person familiar with the voices testified as to the identity of the speakers. Breland, 356 F.3d at 795. However, when a district court admits a transcript into evidence, the court must instruct the jury that the tape is the primary evidence, that the transcript is given to assist the jury in evaluating the recording, and that if the jury determines that the transcript is in any respect incorrect, it should disregard it to that extent and rely on its own interpretation of the recording. Nunez, 532 F.3d at 651. We afford the district court substantial discretion with respect to the precise wording of the instruction, remembering that reversal is allowed only when the instruction as a whole insufficiently informs the jury of the law. United States v. Madoch, 149 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir.1998); United States v. Macey, 8 F.3d 462, 468 (7th Cir.1993). There is nothing in the record or Appellants' briefs to suggest that the district court abused its discretion in (1) admitting the transcripts at trial; (2) allowing the jury to use transcripts that named the Appellants as the speakers; and (3) permitting the jury to use the transcripts during deliberations. Appellants' briefs merely appear to urge this court to reverse its longstanding precedent. We decline the invitation to do so. However, Appellants' arguments about the proffered jury instructions require more attention. Before these transcripts were admitted into evidence and used by the jury, the district court gave the following oral instruction: These transcripts, ladies and gentlemen, are provided to aid you in understanding the telephone calls. These telephone calls for the most part are in Spanish. I don't understand them; I don't think you would understand them either. Even if you did have some type of knowledge of the Spanish language, you may have a different interpretation than others on the jury who may know a little bit of Spanish or may know none. Why we have interpreters in the Court during these trials is so that you all will be considering the same evidence. ... You make a determination regarding the credibility and trustworthiness of the witness and the translation. That's your job to do. But the reason we do have interpreters is so that we have one interpretation so that you all consider that, and if each of you knew a different version of the Spanish language, I would tell you and instruct you [that] you cannot consider your own knowledge of Spanish; you must go with the translation. ... The evidence is the tapes, the audio, and the translation is to give you an assistance in understanding the evidence as it comes from the audio. Transcript of Jury Trial, Volume II, at 241-42, United States v. Cruz-Rea, (2009) (No. 07 CR 41). Appellants contend that the district court improperly instructed the jury to (1) consider the translation, not the recording, as the evidence; and (2) consider only the transcripts to the extent that the transcripts and the recording differed. We disagree. Appellants focus their attention on the portion of the instruction that prohibits the jurors from considering their own knowledge of Spanish, but they ignore the portion of the instruction clarifying the purpose of the transcripts: Even if you did have some type of knowledge of the Spanish language, you may have a different interpretation than others on the jury. ... Why we have interpreters in the Court during these trials is so that you all will be considering the same evidence. To avoid any lingering confusion, the judge clarified that [t]he evidence is the tapes. We find that an instruction informing the jury to consider only the transcripts before it, as opposed to fashioning its own translation, cannot be read as an instruction to treat the transcripts as the evidence. This instruction did not misstate the law, mislead the jury, omit relevant portions of the law, or unduly emphasize any part of the evidence. See United States v. Jordan, 223 F.3d 676, 690 (7th Cir.2000). Although the district court judge could have phrased the instruction differently, the instruction sufficiently informed the jury of the law and the jury's role. See Madoch, 149 F.3d at 599. We therefore affirm the district court's rulings on the transcripts and their accompanying instructions.