Opinion ID: 1466624
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: evidence of appellant's refusal.

Text: Appellant asserts that it was error to admit evidence that he refused to take the blood alcohol test. At trial, this refusal was mentioned in Stack's testimony when he described why he called Lassiter to obtain a search warrant and also during Stack's cross-examination during which he stated that he interpreted Appellant's statement that he would not take the test until he had contacted his attorney as a refusal. Lassiter also testified to the refusal when he described the telephone call he received from Stack advising that Appellant had refused the tests and asking Lassiter to obtain a warrant. The prosecutor briefly mentioned the refusal in his opening statement when describing the sequence of events and again in his closing argument as evidence of Appellant's own knowledge that he was intoxicated. KRS 189A.105(2)(a)(1) requires that the arrestee be advised inter alia: That, if the person refuses to submit to such tests, the fact of this refusal may be used against him in court as evidence of violating KRS 189A.010. Of course, Appellant was neither indicted for nor convicted of violating KRS 189A.010. And KRS 189A.105(2)(a)(1) does not purport to establish a rule of evidence but only recites what an arrestee must be advised before a refusal can be considered voluntary. Nevertheless, Appellant's operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated was a primary fact relied upon by the Commonwealth to prove the aggravated wantonness element of wanton murder. Obviously, an implied admission of intoxication as evidenced by a refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test is highly relevant evidence that the person refusing the test is intoxicated. The issue becomes whether the refusal was voluntary. In order for there to be a refusal, there must first be a specific request that the person take the test, not just an inquiry whether the person would like to take it. Commonwealth v. Powers, Ky., 453 S.W.2d 260, 262-63 (1970) (interpreting former implied consent statute, KRS 186.565). Stack's request satisfied this requirement. In addition to a valid request, there must also be a positive refusal to take the test. This refusal can be express or implied by conduct. Commonwealth v. Hayden, Ky., 484 S.W.2d 97, 99 (1972). Appellant refused to take the test but only because he was denied the right to contact an attorney. The only remaining issue is whether Stack's violation of KRS 189A.105(3) in refusing Appellant's request to contact an attorney before taking the test rendered the refusal involuntary, thus inadmissible as evidence of his intoxication. This is an issue of first impression in Kentucky. Two states have held that when a person is wrongfully denied the right to contact counsel prior to submitting to blood alcohol testing and subsequently refuses to take the test, there is no valid refusal. It was held in Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d 285 (N.D.1987), that if an arrestee is denied the statutory right to counsel prior to submitting to a blood alcohol test, failure to take the test is not viewed as a refusal for purposes of revoking that person's driver's license. Id. at 290. The Missouri Court of Appeals held in Brown v. Dir. of Revenue, 34 S.W.3d 166 (Mo.Ct.App.2000), that a refusal is invalid for purposes of revoking driving privileges if the arrestee was denied his statutory right to contact an attorney. Id. at 175. We agree. As Stack's request that Appellant take the test did not meet the requirements of KRS 189A.105(3), and Appellant's refusal was expressly predicated upon the denial of his statutory right to counsel, his refusal was involuntary and should not have been admitted as evidence of his intoxication. The Commonwealth's assertion that KRS 189A.105(3) does not apply to Appellant because he was not under arrest is patently false. In the first place, the statute does not condition the right to contact an attorney on whether the person has been formally arrested. Secondly, as evidenced by the videotape of the field sobriety tests, Stack had, in fact, placed Appellant under arrest for DUI. However, the error in admitting Appellant's refusal as evidence of his intoxication was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence of Appellant's intoxication at the time of the collision was overwhelming. In addition to Earls's testimony as to Appellant's drinking, Appellant admitted to Stack that he had been drinking basically all day. Mr. Rains testified that Appellant smelled of alcohol at the scene. Centers testified that she could smell the alcohol on Appellant from nine feet away, that Appellant's eyes were only half open and very bloodshot, and that he was very well intoxicated. Mahan testified that Appellant smelled strongly of alcohol and was unsteady on his feet. Stack testified that Appellant smelled of alcohol and that his speech was very slurred. Finally, the videotape of the field sobriety tests permitted the jurors to observe Appellant's condition for themselves. Considering the evidence as a whole, we are unable to conclude that the result of this case would have been different had the evidence of Appellant's refusal to take the blood test been excluded. RCr 9.24; Abernathy v. Commonwealth, Ky., 439 S.W.2d 949, 952 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Blake v. Commonwealth, Ky., 646 S.W.2d 718 (1983).