Opinion ID: 1989907
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Minimum Test Sample Criteria

Text: As we have explained, the Alcotest is programmed to require that a test subject produce a breath sample that meets four minimum criteria before the sample is considered to be sufficient for purposes of deriving an accurate test result. The Special Master recommended approval, in general, of four minimum criteria for a breath sample, which are: (1) minimum volume of 1.5 liters; (2) minimum blowing time of 4.5 seconds; (3) minimum flow rate of 2.5 liters per minute; and (4) that the IR measurement reading achieves a plateau (i.e., the breath alcohol does not differ by more than one percent in 0.25 seconds). However, the Special Master also found that there was credible evidence to support lowering the minimum breath volume from 1.5 to 1.2 liters for women over the age of sixty. He recommended that the State reprogram the device to reflect that finding, but found no need to lower the minimum volume for the general population. Although both defendants and the State agreed with these recommendations, the amicus NJSBA suggested that the minimum breath volume be reduced to 1.2 liters for all persons, so as to avoid a potential equal protection challenge to the tests. Because no party has raised a challenge to any of these criteria other than the minimum required volume and because the Special Master's findings as to the other minimum criteria are based on substantial credible evidence, we consider only the minimum breath volume issue.
Breath alcohol concentration increases, in general, as exhalation continues and deep alveolar air is expelled. The rate of increase in alcohol concentration declines as a person exhales, but the breath alcohol concentration itself continues to increase until exhalation ends. The record reflects that the minimum breath volume for the Alcotest in New Jersey was fixed at 1.5 liters because the State's experts believe that this volume will exceed the point after which most of the relatively rapid rise in concentration has occurred and the average person is in a fairly level part of the exhalation curve. In addition, the State's experts contend that 1.5 liters is the minimum volume necessary for an accurate BAC calculation because samples of lesser volume, in general, do not include deep lung air. At present, the most commonly used minimum breath sample among the states is 1.5 liters. That requirement, however, is not universal. For example, Alabama, where the Alcotest is currently in use, has adopted a minimum sample requirement of 1.3 liters for all test subjects. Moreover, although the experts generally agreed that 1.5 liters is the optimal minimum, some people may be incapable of providing that sample. In particular, the record demonstrates that as women age, they have an increasingly difficult time producing a 1.5 liter breath sample. Data from Alabama introduced during the proceedings shows that women aged sixty to sixty-nine have more difficulty producing the 1.5 liter minimum requirement than their younger counterparts. One of the State's experts cited a study from Germany [23] that demonstrated that women from age sixty- to sixty-nine have an average breath volume of 1.4 liters, women seventy and over have an average of 1.3 liters, and women eighty and over have an average volume of 1.2 liters. The German study included data that demonstrates that men, regardless of age, were capable of producing a sample of 1.5 liters. Indeed, Brettell also conceded that his own study data confirmed the accuracy of the assertion that older women were the only ones unable to produce a sample of 1.5 liters. Based on this data and the expert opinions offered during the hearing, the Special Master recommended that the minimum breath sample be fixed at 1.5 liters for all test subjects except for women over the age of sixty. He suggested that the device be reprogrammed to require women over the age of sixty to provide a 1.2 liter minimum sample for a valid test result. Although defendants and the State agreed with these recommendations, the NJSBA suggests that this Court should instead require that the minimum required sample volume for all subjects be reduced from 1.5 to 1.2 liters in order to avoid a future potential equal protection challenge. There is substantial credible evidence in the record to support the Special Master's findings and recommendations concerning the required minimum breath sample volume. The assertion by the NJSBA that adopting a different standard for women over the age of sixty than we apply to all other test subjects might give rise to an equal protection challenge, however, requires our careful consideration. The minimum breath volume is significant, in and of itself, because the Alcotest is programmed to determine whether the four minimum criteria have been met in a precise order, the first of which is the volume analysis. A sample that falls short of the currently required 1.5 liter volume measurement will be found to be unacceptable. In that event, the Alcotest will report the amount of air delivered and will display an error message which reads: minimum volume not achieved. The Alcotest permits up to eleven attempts to collect two breath samples, after which, the only options that the device offers are terminate or refusal. If the operator chooses terminate, the Alcotest will reset and the subject can then be given the opportunity for eleven more attempts. If the operator chooses refusal, the test sequence ends, but the operator is not required to issue a summons for refusal. N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. Charging an arrestee with refusal remains largely within the officer's discretion. See generally State v. Widmaier, 157 N.J. 475, 724 A. 2d 241 (1999). Although an Alcotest operator has several options if the device reports that the test sample is inadequate, the fact remains that one of them, refusal, carries with it the possibility of severe sanctions. See N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. In the face of abundant evidence in the record that there is an identifiable group in the test population who may be physiologically incapable of complying, the risk of permitting the device to reject samples from members of that group and, by extension, authorizing the issuance of a summons for refusal, is unjust. By the same token, however, if the machine were reprogrammed to accept the lowered volume from a woman of the appropriate age, even if she could produce the ordinarily required higher volume but attempted to limit her breath output to avoid producing the deep lung air needed for the most accurate analysis, the machine would reject the sample because it would not achieve the plateau. It is therefore clear that lowering the volume for this identifiable group of test subjects will not, in reality, afford them any advantage over others. The constitutional question raised by the NJSBA, however, also requires us to consider whether it will disadvantage the other individuals required to take the test.
Lowering the minimum breath volume for women over sixty implicates both age and gender classifications and requires us to consider a potential challenge brought pursuant to both the federal and state constitutions. Because these standards are different and because the decision-making paradigm is different in the federal and state courts, we address them in turn. The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution mandates that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed. 2d 313, 320 (1985). The federal equal protection analysis looks to the characteristics of the impacted protected class or the nature of the right being affected by the government action. The federal test used to evaluate an age-based challenge is concerned with whether the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. The rationality commanded by the Equal Protection Clause does not require States to match age distinctions and the legitimate interests they serve with razorlike precision. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83, 120 S.Ct. 631, 646, 145 L.Ed. 2d 522, 542 (2000). On the other hand, if the government distinguishes between males and females, the classification is subject to a heightened scrutiny. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 1978, 155 L.Ed. 2d 953, 963 (2003). For a gender classification to survive this scrutiny, the government must show `at least that the [challenged] classification serves `important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed' are `substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.'' United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2275, 135 L.Ed. 2d 735, 751 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336, 73 L.Ed. 2d 1090, 1098 (1982) (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150, 100 S.Ct. 1540, 1545, 64 L.Ed. 2d 107, 114 (1980))). Unlike its federal counterpart, the New Jersey Constitution does not contain an equal protection clause. Instead, we have found that [a] concept of equal protection is implicit in Art. I, par. 1 of the 1947 New Jersey Constitution. . . . McKenney v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 304, 316, 412 A. 2d 1041 (1980). Therefore, even though Article I, paragraph 1 of our Constitution does not include the phrase equal protection, it is well settled law that the expansive language of that provision is the source for [this] fundamental constitutional guarantee [ ]. Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 177 N.J. 318, 332, 828 A. 2d 306 (2003). Although conceptually similar, the right under the State Constitution can in some situations be broader than the right conferred by the Equal Protection Clause. Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 94, 662 A. 2d 367 (1995). Indeed, we have held that our Constitution provides analogous or superior protections to our citizens in the context of equal protection. Peper v. Princeton Univ. Bd. of Trs., 77 N.J. 55, 79, 389 A. 2d 465 (1978). [W]here an important personal right is affected by governmental action, this Court often requires the public authority to demonstrate a greater public need than is traditionally required in construing the federal constitution. Specifically, it must be shown that there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment. [ Taxpayers Ass'n of Weymouth Twp. v. Weymouth Twp., 80 N.J. 6, 43, 364 A. 2d 1016 (1976) (citing Collingswood v. Ringgold, 66 N.J. 350, 370, 331 A. 2d 262 (1975)).] In considering equal protection-based challenges, we have not followed the traditional equal protection paradigm of the federal courts, which focuses rigidly on the status of a particular protected class or the fundamental nature of the implicated right. Instead, when analyzing equal protection challenges under New Jersey's Constitution, we have applied a balancing test that weighs the nature of the affected right, the extent to which the governmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the restriction. Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 178 N.J. 460, 473, 842 A. 2d 125 (2004) (quoting Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 99 N.J. 552, 567, 494 A. 2d 294 (1985)). Finally, in addressing equal protection challenges raised in the context of the exercise of police power, we have held that [t]he constitutional principles of due process and equal protection demand that the exercise of the power be devoid of unreason and arbitrariness, and the means selected for the fulfillment of the policy bear a real and substantial relation to that end. Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 20 N.J. 114, 123, 118 A. 2d 824 (1955). There are, in theory, two potential equal protection challenges to the adoption of a different minimum volume standard for women over the age of sixty. First, one could argue that the lowered volume allows testing of a smaller sample of shallower depth and therefore results in a lower BAC reading. As to this challenge, it is undisputed that the device will not accept a sample that has not reached a plateau. An older woman who is capable of producing a greater volume of air but does not do so can be identified by her failure to meet the plateau. Therefore, we can be certain that all test subjects, regardless of age or gender, will only achieve a valid sample when the deeper lung air is included. Second, one could argue that the differentiation permits older women who produce a sample with a volume between 1.2 and 1.5 liters to avoid being charged with refusal but exposes both younger women and all men who provide samples of the same volume to be prosecuted with that offense. The record on which the differentiation between the test groups is based, however, demonstrates that the older women, and only the older women, may be physically incapable of producing the larger sample. The right to equal protection does not require us to scrutinize gender distinctions that are based on real physiological differences to the same extent we would scrutinize those distinctions when they are based on archaic, invidious stereotypes about men and women. See State v. Vogt, 341 N.J.Super. 407, 418, 775 A. 2d 551 (App.Div.2001) (recognizing that [t]he Equal Protection Clause . . . does not demand that things that are different in fact be treated the same in law, nor that a state pretend that there are no physiological differences between men and women). Similarly, the federal courts have recognized that not all sex-based differentiations are actionable. For example, in the employment context some standards that appropriately differentiate between the genders are not facially discriminatory. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F. 3d 1104, 1109-10 (9th Cir.2006); see Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F. 3d 128, 132 (3d Cir.1996) (recognizing that gender may, in certain defined circumstances, be a bona fide occupational qualification for employment). Applying the principles we have derived from both the federal and state constitutional analyses, we discern no meritorious ground for an equal protection challenge to the proposed two-tiered approach for minimum breath sample volume, regardless of which level of scrutiny we apply. Viewed against our flexible approach to equal protection challenges as derived from Article I, paragraph 1 of our Constitution, the system survives the constitutional challenge. The governmental policy of achieving accurate breath samples as part of law enforcement's role in ridding our roads of drunk drivers is appropriately coupled with the authority to prosecute for refusal. The proposed two-tiered system for minimum breath volume, however, is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary for it advances these goals without holding the identified class, older women, to a standard that they cannot meet. In this manner, the policy goals are fulfilled through means . . . [that] bear a real and substantial relation to that end. Katobimar, supra, 20 N.J. at 123, 118 A. 2d 824. Similarly, under either the rational relationship test applicable to age-based classifications, or the heightened level of scrutiny applied to gender-based classifications under the federal constitution, the lowered requirement for women over sixty passes constitutional muster. The policy goals we have identified for our state constitutional analysis are, in federal parlance, important governmental objectives, see Hibbs, supra, 538 U.S. at 728-29, 123 S.Ct. at 1978, 155 L.Ed. 2d at 963. The selection of the two tiers for this aspect of the test requirements is both rationally related to those goals and substantially related to their achievement. Ibid. Notwithstanding the concern voiced by the NJSBA, there is no scientific or other ground in the record to direct that the minimum volume be lowered for all test subjects. On the contrary, there is ample support for the Special Master's two-tiered approach and we discern no equal protection violation in lowering the required breath volume to 1.2 liters for women over the age of sixty.
Our conclusion that the firmware must be revised to accept a minimum breath volume sample of 1.2 liters from women over the age of sixty requires us to consider the impact of this directive for pending prosecutions. We presume that there may be women who meet this criteria and whose prosecutions have been stayed pending our decision on these issues. For the sake of completeness of our analysis, we address briefly the possible factual scenarios relevant to these defendants. First, there may be defendants who attempted but failed to achieve a sufficient volume for an acceptable sample. These individuals will be readily identified by an AIR with a breath volume error message. Obviously, proof of the charge of drunk driving for these women can only be based on observational proofs because there will be no reportable BAC results in an AIR. The significance of the lowered breath sample volume, however, rests less in the evidence utilized to support a charge of drunk driving and more in its relationship to a charge of refusal. In light of the scientific evidence that we have found to be persuasive, in the absence of some other evidence that supports the conclusion that any such individual was capable of providing an appropriate sample, by volume, we must assume that she was unable to do so. For these individuals, then, an AIR demonstrating insufficient breath volume may not be used as proof on a charge of refusal. On the other hand, if the AIR demonstrates that a woman over the age of sixty was able to provide at least one sample that was deemed to be sufficient for purposes of the 1.5 liter volume requirement, but she failed to do so on a subsequent attempt, the AIR demonstrating those facts may be utilized as evidence, albeit not conclusive proof, in support of a refusal charge.