Opinion ID: 156780
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instruction Given by Court

Text: 36 Title VII prohibits retaliation against an employee because he or she has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he [or she] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To establish a prima facie Title VII retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show: (1) he or she was engaged in opposition to Title VII discrimination; (2) he or she was subjected to adverse employment action subsequent to or contemporaneous with the protected activity; and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Murray v. City of Sapulpa, 45 F.3d 1417, 1420 (10th Cir.1995). It is well settled that the burden of persuading the factfinder that the defendant intentionally discriminated remains at all times with the plaintiff. A showing of retaliatory motive has long been relevant to the causation prong of a retaliation claim, see, e.g., Burrus v. United Tel. Co. of Kansas, Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir.1982), but in Purrington v. University of Utah, 996 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir.1993), we made it clear that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's action was intentionally retaliatory. See id. at 1033; see also Padilla v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 92 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir.1996) (A plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim 'has the ultimate burden of persuasion to demonstrate that the challenged employment decision was the result of intentional retaliation.' ) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1274, 117 S.Ct. 2453, 138 L.Ed.2d 211 (1997). 37 In light of these principles, the district court instructed the jury that: 38 In order to establish a claim of retaliation, plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, each of the following elements: 39
40 (2) adverse action by an employer contemporaneous with or subsequent to the employee's protected activity; 41 (3) a causal connection between such activity and the employer's action; 42 (4) the employer's action constitutes intentional discrimination. 43 In this case, the first element--protected action by plaintiff--requires determination by the jury whether the filing of a grievance by plaintiff for alleged sexual harassment constituted protected activity in opposition to discrimination; the second element--adverse actions by defendant--requires determination by the jury whether actions which adversely affected Plaintiff were taken by defendant Utah Valley State College contemporaneously or shortly after the grievance was filed; the third element--causation--requires determination by the jury whether a motivation of the actions of Utah Valley State College was retaliation for the filing of the grievance by plaintiff; the fourth element--intentional conduct--requires determination by the jury whether the actions of Utah Valley State College constituted intentional retaliation. 44 The court then gave the jury specific instructions as to each element. 45 Gunnell challenges the court's instructions on the second element of adverse action by an employer and the fourth element of intentional conduct. The second element instruction stated: 46 The second element of the [claim] concerns alleged adverse action by the employer, Utah Valley State College. 47 An employer, such as Utah Valley State College, may be liable for discriminatory retaliation by reason of the actions of persons in supervisory positions who had significant control over the Plaintiff's hiring, firing, or conditions of employment, or by management-level employees who have ultimate authority to hire, fire and to control conditions of employment. The fourth element instruction stated: 48 The fourth element is intentional discrimination. 49 An employer, such as Utah Valley State College, can be held liable for intentional retaliatory acts of an individual, but such an individual must be a management-level employee or an employee in a supervisory position over plaintiff and exercise significant control over Plaintiff's hiring, firing, or conditions of employment. Intentional discriminatory acts of retaliation may be shown either directly by evidence that the employer, Utah Valley State College, acted with a discriminatory motive or indirectly by showing that the stated reasons for the adverse employment actions were a mere pretext for retaliation. 50 Gunnell argues that the district court's instructions incorrectly foreclosed a finding of liability where the acts of retaliation were committed by co-workers (as opposed to management or supervisor-level employees), but where management-level employees knew or should have known that her co-workers were intentionally retaliating against her and failed to take action. She contends that because negligent employers may be held liable for sexual harassment by coworkers, negligent employers should be liable for retaliation by co-workers as well. 51 Deciding whether hostility or harassment by co-workers may support a retaliation claim requires us to analyze two questions: first, whether the actions of co-workers can constitute an adverse employment action, as required by the second prong of the prima facie case; and second, whether retaliatory acts of co-workers can be considered the intentional conduct of the employer, as required by the second and third prongs of the prima facie case and by Purrington. 52 First, we address whether the actions of co-workers can constitute an adverse employment action. Several of our sister circuits have narrowly defined the term adverse employment action, holding that campaigns of hostility and harassment directed against plaintiffs, whether by co-workers or by supervisors, are insufficient to establish adverse employment action. See Manning v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir.1997) (hostility and personal animus directed at plaintiffs by supervisors insufficient to show retaliation [a]bsent evidence of some more tangible change in duties or working conditions that constituted a material employment disadvantage.); Munday v. Waste Management of North America, Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir.1997) (In no case in this circuit have we found an adverse employment action to encompass a situation where the employer has instructed employees to ignore and spy on an employee who engaged in protected activity, without evidence that the terms, conditions, or benefits of her employment were adversely affected.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1053, 140 L.Ed.2d 116 (1998); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir.) (adverse action must be an ultimate employment decision[ ], such as hiring, compensating, promoting, granting leave, or firing; Hostility from fellow employees, having tools stolen, and resulting anxiety, without more, do not constitute ultimate employment decisions, and therefore are not the required adverse employment actions.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 336, 139 L.Ed.2d 260 (1997). In contrast, at least two other circuits have indicated, in dicta, that coworker hostility or retaliatory harassment which is known about and acquiesced in by supervisors or management may be considered an adverse employment action. See Knox v. State of Ind., 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir.1996) (No one would question the retaliatory effect of many actions that put the complainant in a more unfriendly working environment.... Nothing indicates why a different form of retaliation--namely, retaliating against a complainant by permitting her fellow employees to punish her for invoking her rights under Title VII--does not fall within the statute.); Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir.1994) (per curiam) (citing 3 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Employment Discrimination § 87.20, at 17-101 to 17-107 (1994), which includes among adverse employment actions, toleration of harassment by other employees as example of retaliatory activity). 53 Although we have never addressed the precise question whether co-worker hostility may qualify as an adverse employment action, in our retaliation cases we have liberally interpreted the phrase adverse employment action. In Jeffries v. Kansas, 147 F.3d 1220, 1231-32 (10th Cir.1998), we recently stated, In recognition of the remedial nature of Title VII, the law in this circuit liberally defines adverse employment action. Rather than defining a set rule regarding what constitutes an adverse employment action, we noted that this court takes a case-by-case approach to determining whether a given employment action is 'adverse.'  Id. (citing Corneveaux v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Group, 76 F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir.1996), and Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986-87 (10th Cir.1996)). In Berry, for example, where the district court found that management caused plaintiff's co-worker to initiate a criminal complaint against plaintiff, we found that malicious prosecution may constitute an adverse employment action. See 74 F.3d at 986-87. Under our circuit precedent we believe that co-worker hostility or retaliatory harassment, if sufficiently severe, may constitute adverse employment action for purposes of a retaliation claim. 54 We must next decide under what circumstances such co-worker hostility can be considered intentional retaliation on the part of the employer. We perceive at least three factual scenarios involving co-worker retaliatory harassment: (1) co-workers, without the knowledge of supervisory or management personnel, independently take it upon themselves to harass the plaintiff in retaliation for engaging in protected activity; (2) supervisory or management personnel know about and acquiesce in or condone the retaliatory harassment by the plaintiff's co-workers; and (3) supervisory or management personnel orchestrate the campaign of co-worker harassment. Gunnell, by advocating a known or should have known standard, would hold employers liable in each of the three scenarios. However, because harassment must be intentional on the part of the employer, we hold that an employer can only be liable for co-workers' retaliatory harassment where its supervisory or management personnel either (1) orchestrate the harassment or (2) know about the harassment and acquiesce in it in such a manner as to condone and encourage the co-workers' actions. See Knox, 93 F.3d at 1333-35 (in dicta, approving an instruction that would hold an employer liable for retaliation ... committed by co-workers with the knowledge and acquiescence of the employer.) An employer may not be held liable for the retaliatory acts of co-workers if none of its supervisory or management-level personnel orchestrated, condoned, or encouraged the co-workers' actions, and no such management participation could occur if the supervisory or management-level personnel did not actually know of the co-workers' retaliation. 55 Our conclusion that an employer may be liable for the retaliatory acts of co-workers, however, does not require us to reverse the jury verdict in this case in favor of UVSC. The instruction given restricted UVSC's liability to the acts of management-level and supervisory personnel. As we have explained, for UVSC to be liable for a campaign of co-worker harassment, management-level or supervisory personnel must either have orchestrated or have known about and condoned the conduct of Gunnell's co-workers. Consequently, the instruction correctly alerted the jury that it would have to find some management or supervisory involvement in the retaliatory conduct to hold UVSC liable for coworker retaliation. The jury chose not to so find. 56 In addition, the record on appeal tends to show that most of Gunnell's allegations pertained to retaliatory acts which Gunnell complained were allegedly committed directly by management-level or supervisory personnel. 6 We doubt that the few actions identifiably taken by co-workers, which generally seem to involve incidents of rudeness, are sufficient to support a claim for retaliation, given that Title VII neither is a general civility code nor does it make actionable the  'ordinary tribulations of the workplace.'  Faragher, 524 U.S. at ---- - ----, 118 S.Ct. at 2283-84 (quoting B. Lindemann & D. Kadue, Sexual Harassment in Employment Law 175 (1992)); see also Jeffries, 147 F.3d 1220, 1232-33 (suggesting that tense personal relationships do not rise to the level of actionable retaliation). As a result, any error in the instructions given by the district court regarding co-worker liability would be harmless.