Opinion ID: 1125717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest?

Text: 1. Appellant contends the evidence before the trial court was so favorable to him that the trial court erred in granting judgment in favor of respondent and that no reasonable minds could disagree upon the conclusion to be gained from the evidence. We have read the record of the testimony, and disagree. There was substantial evidence in the record to support the lower court's decision. It will not be disturbed on appeal. Utley v. Airoso, 86 Nev. ___, 464 P.2d 778 (1970); Havas v. Alger, 85 Nev. 627, 461 P.2d 857 (1969); Price v. Sinnott, 85 Nev. 600, 460 P.2d 837 (1969); Coleman v. Benson, 85 Nev. 594, 460 P.2d 158 (1969); Richfield Oil Corp. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 85 Nev. 185, 452 P.2d 462 (1969). This rule is particularly applicable where the evidence is conflicting and the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given evidence is in issue. Havas v. Alger, supra; Douglas Spencer and Associates v. Las Vegas Sun, Inc., 84 Nev. 279, 439 P.2d 473 (1968); Briggs v. Zamalloa, 83 Nev. 400, 432 P.2d 672 (1967); LeMon v. Landers, 81 Nev. 329, 402 P.2d 648 (1965); Miller v. Lewis, 80 Nev. 402, 395 P.2d 386 (1964); Quijada v. Southern Pipe & Casing Co., 78 Nev. 271, 371 P.2d 661 (1962); Bird v. Mason, 77 Nev. 460, 366 P.2d 338 (1961); Berto v. Wilson, 74 Nev. 128, 324 P.2d 843 (1958); Carlson v. McCall, 70 Nev. 437, 271 P.2d 1002 (1954); Ormachea v. Ormachea, 67 Nev. 273, 217 P.2d 355 (1950); Garaventa v. Gardella, 63 Nev. 304, 169 P.2d 540 (1946). The rule applies even if the facts create grave suspicions and doubt, LeMon v. Landers, supra; Bird v. Mason, supra, and even where the evidence was all in writing, the trial court's findings will not be set aside unless clearly or manifestly against the weight of the evidence, or without any reasonable support therein. Garaventa v. Gardella, supra, 63 Nev. at 312, 169 P.2d at 544. 2. Prejudgment interest runs from the time the money becomes due. NRS 99.040. When the money becomes due is a matter to be resolved by the trial judge upon trial by determining when performance was due. Paradise Homes v. Central Surety, 84 Nev. 109, 116, 437 P.2d 78 (1968). The trial court may not speculate as to when the sum becomes due nor decide that question upon the premise of what appears to be a fair and equitable time for the beginning of the running of interest. Thus, its award of prejudgment interest as of October 15, 1963, upon the reason assigned was error. The trial court should have awarded interest from the dates the various obligations fell due after October 15, 1963. However, we have examined the record, and it is undisputed by either party to this action that as of May 15, 1964, all the obligations stemming from the transactions of the parties had become due. Accordingly, we modify the judgment and direct that prejudgment interest at the rate of 7% per annum run from May 15, 1964, rather than October 15, 1963, on the amount of $7,345, and conclude as a matter of law that as of that day the money was due respondent from appellant. Paradise Homes v. Central Surety, supra, at 117, 437 P.2d 78; Close v. Isbell, 86 Nev. ___, 471 P.2d 257 (1970) (June 24, 1970). Affirmed as modified. ZENOFF, BATJER, MOWBRAY and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.