Opinion ID: 2514340
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Decisions Regarding Unwed Fathers

Text: Several decisions of the United States Supreme Court establish this principle and emphasize the importance of an actual relationship of parental responsibility as distinguished from a mere biological relationship. In the earliest of the Supreme Court decisions involving an unwed father, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972), the Court clarified that the liberty interest of a natural parent could attach to an unwed father. Therefore, an Illinois statute that conclusively presumed every father in such circumstances to be an unfit parent was declared unconstitutional. Peter Stanley, Sr., although not married to his children's mother, had always acted as a parent to them and had lived periodically with their mother for 18 years. When the mother died, the children were immediately made wards of the state and were eligible for adoption. Stanley claimed he was denied due process of the law because he was refused a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were declared wards. The Supreme Court agreed, finding he was entitled to a hearing. 405 U.S. at 658-59, 92 S.Ct. 1208; compare Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 550, 85 S.Ct. 1187 (recognizing divorced natural father's liberty interest in parental relationship, requiring notice of adoption proceedings to satisfy due process). Six years after Stanley, the Court decided Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511, reh. denied 435 U.S. 918, 98 S.Ct. 1477, 55 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978), addressing the rights of an unwed father in a stepparent adoption and whether those rights were protected adequately by application of a `best interests of the child' standard. Under Georgia law, an unwed father who had not legitimated his child was not permitted to object to an adoption. Leon Webster Quilloin had not petitioned to legitimize his 11-year-old before the adoption petition was filed; and he had never sought actual or legal custody or otherwise assumed any significant responsibility with respect to the child's supervision, education, protection, or care. In these circumstances, the Court held, Quilloin had not grasped his opportunity to assert his constitutional rights, and due process did not require any more than a finding that the adoption and denial of legitimation were in the best interests of the child. 434 U.S. at 255, 98 S.Ct. 549. The Court followed its Quilloin decision with Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979). In Caban, a putative father challenged a New York statute that allowed an unwed mother to veto the adoption of her child by withholding consent but prevented an unwed father from doing so without showing the adoption was not in the best interests of the child. Appellant Abdiel Caban had developed substantial relationships with his 6-and 4-year-old children before the adoption proceedings began. The Court held that New York did not have a compelling interest in treating Caban differently from the children's mother and thus the statute violated equal protection. 441 U.S. at 394, 99 S.Ct. 1760. Although the Court stated that a difference between maternal and paternal roles in the care of a newborn might justify distinct treatment, it suggested that any gender distinction between parents would become less acceptable as a basis for legislative line drawing as a child grows older. 441 U.S. at 388-89, 99 S.Ct. 1760. The analysis in Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban, which established that an unwed father who admitted paternity and had established a substantial relationship with his child would be able to protect his rights under due process and equal protection theories, provided the necessary stepping stones for the Court's 1983 opinion in Lehr, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, which focused upon the right to notice in an adoption proceeding. Jonathan Lehr, an unwed father, was not given actual notice of his 2-year-old child's proposed adoption and sought to have it declared void because the lack of notice violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. During his child's life, Lehr did nothing to protect his legal interest; he filed no legal actions and did not file with New York's putative father registry. In discussing whether Lehr had a liberty interest, the Court reaffirmed its holdings in Caban, Quilloin, and Stanley, noting that a mere biological connection did not give rise to a liberty interest. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261, 103 S.Ct. 2985. Further echoing its previous holdings, the Court emphasized the natural father's opportunity ripens into a liberty interest only when he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future. 463 U.S. at 262, 103 S.Ct. 2985. The Court warned that if the father fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie. 463 U.S. at 262, 103 S.Ct. 2985. Throughout the opinion, the Court continued to emphasize the constitutional importance of the distinction between an inchoate and a fully developed relationship. 463 U.S. at 261 n. 17, 103 S.Ct. 2985. Comparing Stanley and Caban, in which the Court recognized a developed parent-child relationship, with Quilloin, in which the relationship was not recognized, the Court contrasted the strength of the resulting due process protection: When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by `com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,' [citation omitted], his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause.... But the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection. 463 U.S. at 261, 103 S.Ct. 2985. The Court held Lehr did not have a fully protected interest, stating: In this case, we are not assessing the constitutional adequacy of New York procedures for terminating a developed relationship. Appellant has never had any significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship with [his child], and he did not seek to establish a legal tie until after she was two years old. (Emphasis added.) 463 U.S. at 262, 103 S.Ct. 2985. The majority did not expand upon the facts that gave rise to this conclusion. In contrast, the dissenting opinion focused upon Lehr's efforts, discussing Lehr's substantial attempts to develop a personal and financial relationship with his child and, albeit late, a legal relationship. The dissent explained that Lehr lived with the child's mother during the pregnancy, and the mother acknowledged to friends and relatives that Lehr was the child's father. After the child was born, Lehr visited the hospital every day. The mother falsely told Lehr she had identified him as the child's father on state forms. Upon her discharge from the hospital, however, the mother thwarted any future relationship between Lehr and his child. Over the next 2 years, the mother attempted to conceal the child. Occasionally, Lehr would locate the mother and child, at which times he would visit the child to the extent the mother would allow. Each time, the mother would move again. At one point Lehr hired a detective agency when he was unable to locate his child. Through these efforts, he again made contact and learned that the mother had married. At that point, the mother threatened Lehr with arrest if he did not stay away. As a result, Lehr hired an attorney and requested visitation. During this time, Lehr's offers of financial assistance had been refused. As soon as Lehr threatened legal action, the mother's husband initiated adoption proceedings with the mother's consent. Lehr was not given notice of the proceeding, and, in a different court, he filed a petition requesting a determination of paternity, an order of support, and reasonable visitation privileges. At some point before the adoption was finalized, the mother's attorney advised the judge of the pending paternity action. The judge in the adoption proceeding stayed the paternity action, and, as a result of the stay, Lehr became aware of the adoption proceeding. Lehr's attorney then called the judge in the adoption proceeding and was advised the adoption had been finalized earlier in the day. Apparently, none of these facts was relevant to the majority's determination of the case because the majority did not mention Lehr's efforts to establish a relationship with his child or the mother's efforts to thwart the development of the relationship; the majority noted only that Lehr had not filed with New York's putative father registry or otherwise protected his legal rights until after the adoption was filed. The Supreme Court's focus was upon whether the state of New York had adequately protected his opportunity to form such a relationship. 463 U.S. at 262-63, 103 S.Ct. 2985. Considering New York's statutes regarding notice requirements in adoption proceedings, the Supreme Court concluded the provisions adequately protected putative fathers and were designed to include putative fathers who are likely to have assumed some responsibility for the care of their natural children. If this scheme were likely to omit many responsible fathers, and if qualification for notice were beyond the control of an interested putative father, it might be thought procedurally inadequate. 463 U.S. at 263-64, 103 S.Ct. 2985. The classifications into which most responsible fathers were deemed to fall included men who had married the mother, had been identified as the father by the mother in a sworn statement, had filed with the putative father registry, had been adjudicated as the father, had been identified as the father on the birth certificate, or had lived with the mother and child and held himself out as the father. Lehr was not a member of any of those classes. Of these various classifications and available remedies, the district court had focused upon Lehr's failure to file with New York's putative father registry, a remedy totally within his control, and concluded he was not entitled to notice because he had not registered. On appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that imposing a registration requirement was not arbitrary because strict compliance with the procedure furthered the State's legitimate interest in facilitating adoptions. The court noted an open-ended notice requirement would burden adoptions, threaten the unwed birth mother's privacy, and impair the finality of adoptions. Given those goals, the Court rejected an argument that ignorance of the registry should excuse the failure to file a putative father notice. 463 U.S. at 264-65, 103 S.Ct. 2985. Ultimately, the Supreme Court determined there were steps that Lehr could have taken that made the right to receive notice ... completely within [Lehr's] control, and his failure to take advantage of available legal procedures doomed his assertion that he had fully seized the opportunity to establish a relationship with his child. See 463 U.S. at 264, 103 S.Ct. 2985; see also Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549 (holding Georgia statute requiring unmarried father to legitimate child in order to have veto authority over adoption did not deprive him of due process or equal protection rights). The Court also rejected Lehr's equal protection claim, reasoning that Lehr and the child's mother were not similarly situated because the mother had had a custodial relationship with the child while Lehr had not. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267-68, 103 S.Ct. 2985.