Opinion ID: 786352
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Degree of Similarity of the Marks

Text: 62 The single most important factor in determining likelihood of confusion is mark similarity. A & H, 237 F.3d at 216; see also id. at 214 ([W]hen goods are directly competing, both precedent and common sense counsel that the similarity of the marks takes on great prominence.). Marks are confusingly similar if ordinary consumers would likely conclude that [the two products] share a common source, affiliation, connection or sponsorship. Fisons, 30 F.3d at 477. The proper test is not side-by-side comparison but whether the labels create the same overall impression when viewed separately. Id. (quotation and citation omitted). Courts should compare the appearance, sound and meaning of the marks in assessing their similarity. Checkpoint, 269 F.3d at 281 (quotation omitted). There is no simple rule as to when marks are too similar. The degree of similarity... needed to prove likely confusion will vary with the difference in the goods ... of the parties. Where the goods ... are directly competitive, the degree of similarity required to prove a likelihood of confusion is less than in the case of dissimilar products. 3 McCarthy, supra, § 23:20.1. 63 The district court made no findings as to the degree of similarity of the ADVICOR and ALTOCOR marks; it merely concluded that this factor does not favor Kos. 64 The facts predicate to this analysis are manifest and undisputed. The facial similarity of the marks is apparent on their face. Both are seven-letter, three-syllable words that begin and end with the same letters and the same sounds. The marks are also similar in that both are coined word[s], not found even in approximation in the English or any other familiar language. Telechron, Inc. v. Telicon Corp., 198 F.2d 903, 905 (3d Cir.1952). Fanciful marks are ... given an expansive scope of judicial protection ... as to more variations of format. 2 McCarthy, supra, § 11:6. Two names that look and sound similar will naturally seem even more similar where there are no differences in meaning to distinguish them. Nor can the similarity of coined marks be explained by, or ameliorated by virtue of, any relationship between the marks and the products identified. See, e.g., Telechron, 198 F.2d at 909 (Defendant cannot claim that he is exercising the normal privilege of using ordinary language ... [in] a case of a first coined word and a second coined word resembling it.); Lambert Pharmacal Co. v. Bolton Chem. Corp., 219 F. 325, 326 (S.D.N.Y.1915) (Hand, J.) (One who has adopt[ed a] ... trade name, arbitrary in character, ... has the right to insist that others in making up their arbitrary names should so certainly keep away from his customers as to raise no question.). 65 Andrx would differentiate the marks by distinguishing what it deems unimportant features (namely, the first letter `A' and the suffix `COR') from those that are salient (the first syllables). Appellees' Br. at 19-20. Andrx argues that the  first syllables (AD compared to AL) ... create a completely different sight, sound and impression. Id. at 20 (emphasis added). But the proper legal test is not whether there is some confusing similarity between sub-parts of the marks; the overarching question is whether the marks,  viewed in their entirety,  are confusingly similar. A & H, 237 F.3d at 216 (emphasis added). Cf. Fisons, 30 F.3d at 478 ([T]he district court misapprehended the legal standard when it undertook a detailed analysis of the differences in the marks rather than focusing on the overall impression created by them.). 66 Andrx attempts to, but cannot, justify its approach by characterizing statements Kos made in European trademark proceedings as admissions that directly contradict its position before this Court and the district court. Appellees' Br. at 10. The European proceeding involved different marks (ADVICOR v. ACTIVOR), different goods, and different legal standards than those at issue here. Kos's statements in those proceedings show that the material facts are not equivalent. For example, Kos distinguished Advicor from the over-the-counter stimulants and preparations to build up vitality at issue there by arguing, inter alia, that their functions do not overlap, and that they have different channels of distribution, method[s] of purchase and ... targeted customer[s]. JA at 329, 333. More importantly, Kos's claims in those proceedings are all premised on European Community law. Trademark standards do not traverse international borders. The concept of territoriality is basic to trademark law; trademark rights exist in each country solely according to that country's statutory scheme. Fuji Photo, 754 F.2d at 599 (finding it error to admit evidence of the parties' foreign trademark practices); see also E. Remy Martin & Co. v. Shaw-Ross Int'l Imports, Inc., 756 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th Cir.1985) (district court erred in considering status of parties' marks in France; Our concern must be the business and goodwill attached to United States trademarks, not French trademark rights under French law.) (quotation omitted); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir.1956) ([W]hen trade-mark rights within the United States are being litigated in an American court, the decisions of foreign courts concerning the respective trade-mark rights of the parties are irrelevant and inadmissible.). 67 Andrx also claims that [t]he FDA and the USPTO have determined that the marks are not confusingly similar. Appellees' Br. at 19. But neither of those proceedings can supplant the required Lanham Act analysis. First, the FDA applies a standard different from the Lanham Act likelihood of confusion test at issue here. The FDA reviews proposed drug names to predict potential confusion that may arise in the actual prescription process.  3 McCarthy, supra, § 19:149 (emphasis added); see also id. at § 19:150 (FDA likelihood of confusion test [is] wholly distinct from the test employed by the PTO). As discussed above, misdispensing is not the only type of confusion actionable under the Lanham Act. Indeed, to the extent that the FDA's proprietary name review is relevant here, the reviewing division's statement that the name Advicor looks and sounds similar [to] Altocor actually supports Kos's claim. See JA at 269. 68 Second, the PTO has not allowed Andrx to register the ALTOCOR mark. As stated above, Kos's opposition remains pending. Andrx's claim about a favorable PTO determination presumably rests on the examining attorney's decision approving publication of the ALTOCOR mark for opposition. 11 The record contains no information about the basis for the publication decision or about what information was before the examining attorney at that time. Thus, the record does not show that the PTO actually considered the registrability of ALTOCOR over ADVICOR, much less that it found the marks not to be confusingly similar. Cf. Marketing Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 934 (6th Cir.1999) (rejecting claim that registration of allegedly infringing mark creates inference that the trademark examining attorney at the PTO actually examined the [earlier] mark and found that the [registered] mark did not infringe it), rev'd on other grounds, 532 U.S. 23, 121 S.Ct. 1255, 149 L.Ed.2d 164 (2001). Indeed, even where the record shows that an examining attorney has explicitly considered a prior mark, we have held that an initial PTO determination ... may be considered [but] need not be given weight when the PTO attorney did not review all the evidence available to the District Court. A & H, 237 F.3d at 221 (affirming decision that gave no weight to low-level preliminary decision even though examiner assessed likelihood of confusion with prior mark). 69 We hold that the district court clearly erred in failing to recognize that this factor weighs in Kos's favor. It does.