Opinion ID: 2365318
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: we decline to affirm the district court on alternate grounds

Text: ¶ 18 In addition to its contention that we should affirm the district court's application of the permit exception, the State asks this court to affirm the district court's decision based on two alternative arguments: First, that the plaintiffs' negligence claims fail because the State owed no duty to protect Samuel Ives under the public duty doctrine. Second, that the natural condition exception of the Governmental Immunity Act [25] applies in this case. The State is undaunted by its failure to argue these issues below and simply asserts that we should exercise our discretion to affirm the district court on either of these alternate grounds. ¶ 19 It is well established that this court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court. [26] Of course, the converse is also true: we will not affirm a judgment if the alternate ground or theory is not apparent on the record. [27] To hold otherwise would invite [each] party to selectively focus on issues below, the effect of which is holding back issues that the opposition had neither notice of nor an opportunity to address. [28] Thus, to be apparent on the record requires more than mere assumption or absence of evidence contrary to the [alternate] ground or theory. The record must contain sufficient and uncontroverted evidence supporting the ground or theory to place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that the prevailing party may rely thereon on appeal. [29] ¶ 20 We addressed the apparent on the record requirement in Bailey v. Bayles. [30] In that case, we affirmed a court of appeals' decision that held that the court of appeals did not err when it affirmed the trial court on alternate grounds because [t]he record [was] rife with references to the Cohabitation Abuse Act that formed the basis for the affirmance. [31] We also noted that the verified petition itself referenced a provision of the Act and the record clearly indicated that the parties had proceeded for a time under the assumption that the Act was applicable: both parties submitted motions that relied on the Act, and the appellee explicitly referenced and based her position on the Act during the bench trial. [32] We also found that the appellant's claim that he was surprised when the court of appeals affirmed the trial court based on the Act was disingenuous at best given the fact that he relied earlier in the course of the action upon the very statute used by the court of appeals. [33] ¶ 21 In contrast, the two alternative arguments the State now presents to this court are entirely absent from the record. The State never mentioned the issue of duty choosing instead to concede negligence for the purposes of its motion for judgment on the pleadings. The State also failed to mention the natural condition exception at any time. Furthermore, the State has not disclosed to this court any reason whatsoever why it believes the two issues are apparent on the record. Perhaps the State believes that the reasons are so self-evident that they require no explanation. If so, this belief reflects a perilous way to present an appeal. Although this court may affirm a decision of the district court on alternate grounds, it falls to the party seeking the benefit of the rule to explain why it is eligible to have the alternative arguments considered. The State here has chosen not to do so and the record contains no mention of either alternate argument. We decline, therefore, to affirm the decision of the district court on alternate grounds.