Opinion ID: 2518032
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Strike Testimony of Fred Joseph[19]

Text: Before Fred Joseph testified about the events at his market on April 20, 1986, defense counsel objected that the incident involved only damage to property and did not qualify as aggravating evidence under factor (b). The prosecutor advised that a Molotov cocktail was thrown at Joseph's business while it was open and employees were present. On this representation, the court admitted Joseph's testimony. On direct examination, Joseph testified that two carloads of young men pulled into the parking lot of his market shortly before 9:00 p.m. He ran inside the store because he was frightened. Three weeks before, defendant had threatened him. On that earlier occasion, defendant was standing at the back door of the market, intimidating customers and asking for money. Joseph's brother told defendant to leave. Joseph approached and defendant started getting wise with him. Joseph went back inside the store at his brother's direction. The brother later told Joseph that defendant threatened to kill Joseph. On cross-examination, Joseph volunteered additional details regarding the earlier incident. He testified that defendant returned to the store about an hour after he was told to leave. When Joseph saw defendant and another man walk across the parking lot, Joseph ran upstairs behind the security gates while the police were called. Joseph watched as defendant and the other man walked up and down the aisles and then left. Joseph said the police arrested defendant and found a knife, but they let him go because it was an illegal search. Joseph told defense counsel that after this incident, he contacted Judge Jack Gold of the juvenile court and the probation department to get [defendant] locked up. When asked by defense counsel if he knew whether Judge Gold had any contact with defendant, Joseph replied, I have only heard hearsay that [defendant] was looking for Jack's house. And they got [defendant] sent to Florida or something after that. Joseph also volunteered on cross-examination that he contacted people down the street that [defendant] had threatened at the stained glass shop. It wasn't only me that he threatened in the area. Additionally, with regard to events on April 20, Joseph told defense counsel that the burned area of the parking lot was about 150 feet from his store, where trash cans are located. Following Joseph's testimony, defense counsel renewed his argument that the incident on April 20 did not involve violence against a person. Defense counsel argued against further testimony absent an offer of proof and requested the jury be admonished to disregard Joseph's testimony. The prosecutor stated that she had not expected Joseph's testimony regarding the location of the fire, but nevertheless argued that the incident still satisfied the requirements of factor (b). After extended colloquy, the trial court continued the matter and requested briefing on the issue. Following briefing and argument, the trial court was inclined to strike Joseph's testimony. The court noted the distance between the store and the area actually burned. It reasoned, somewhat obscurely, that in order for the jury to conclude the act was intended as a threat to Joseph, it had to rely on hearsay evidence of defendant's earlier threat to kill Joseph. The trial court also expressed concern regarding Joseph's account of other acts by defendant. Citing Evidence Code section 352, the court believed that the jury would have a tendency not to focus on whether or not [the Molotov cocktail] was possessed in order to threaten Mr. Joseph, but would focus on all the other aspects that had been introduced ... and I think that would be more prejudicial than probative. Nevertheless, after further argument from the prosecution, the court did not rule at that time. The next day, the court revisited the issue and explained that it had done more research. It expressed significant reservations with Joseph's testimony, but concluded it did not have the authority to exclude all evidence of the incident. Defense counsel responded that he and the prosecutor both agreed that it would be counterproductive to recall Joseph, and that [s]imilar problems are engendered if the jury is instructed in some fashion or another to disregard or not pay attention to the testimony of Mr. Joseph. They have in fact heard it. Defense counsel suggested that a stipulation or instruction could resolve problems caused by Joseph's testimony regarding other incidents. The prosecutor recited a proposed limiting instruction. The trial court suggested additional language, which defense counsel accepted. When the court asked if both counsel could agree on an instruction, defense counsel answered, I believe so. We discussed it quite a bit over the noon hour and I think our thought processes are pretty close. The instruction submitted by counsel and read to the jury was as follows: With respect to the testimony of Mr. Fred Joseph, you are advised that anything he testified to which he claimed was related to him by others is not to be considered by you for the truth of those facts. [¶] You are only to consider such testimony as it may have affected Mr. Joseph's state of mind. Mr. Joseph's state of mind cannot be imputed to the defendant. Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to strike Joseph's testimony regarding uncharged crimes committed by defendant. He claims he was not given notice under section 190.3, which provides in pertinent part that no evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial. In view of the prosecutor's anticipated evidence, there was no failure of notice. Preliminarily, we note that defendant moved to strike Joseph's testimony in the trial court only because the evidence failed to demonstrate a threat of violence to a person. It was the trial court, not defendant, who raised the issue of Joseph's references to other bad acts. The trial court described Joseph as very hard to control as a witness. Later, in its ruling on defendant's motion for a new penalty trial, the court stated that Joseph had volunteered acts of violence by defendant that had not been included in the notice provided by the prosecutor. The court stated it was not assigning fault because counsel had no way of knowing from one minute to the next what Joseph would say during his outbursts. There is no evidence in the record that the prosecutor was aware that Joseph would testify regarding additional acts by defendant. With the exception of the threat made by defendant three weeks before the Molotov cocktail incident, all the other evidence about which defendant complains was volunteered during cross-examination. Defendant fails to explain how the prosecutor was required to give notice of aggravating evidence about which she was either unaware or did not elicit. Ultimately, defense counsel made a reasonable strategic choice not to request that Joseph's testimony be stricken. He joined with the prosecutor in drafting a limiting instruction. Defense counsel's statement in the trial court indicates he believed a limiting instruction was more effective in this circumstance than asking jurors to disregard testimony. Defendant's tactical choice precludes a claim of error on review. ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 879 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1]; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1193 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1].)