Opinion ID: 4237534
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use of the word “bullied”

Text: ¶92 Hulsey also claims that the prosecution’s use of the word “bullied” in front of Juror 123 to describe the defense counsel’s rehabilitation of him was improper. This claim fails for multiple reasons: the trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection to use of the word; Juror 123 was ultimately and properly struck for cause; and the exchange took place outside of the presence of any other potential jurors. There is no likelihood of harm. 2. Guilt phase a. Cross-examination of Jaco Swanepoel ¶93 Hulsey claims that the prosecutor “talked over [a] witness and refused to let him answer the questions,” and insinuated that the witness was unethical. He claims that the prosecutor was yelling and screaming at the witnesses and flailing his arms. At trial, the court overruled defense counsel’s objections and stated that the prosecutor simply had a “very animated style.” We cannot conclude from the record that this assessment was incorrect. 29 STATE V. HULSEY Opinion of the Court ¶94 Hulsey also claims that throughout cross-examination, the prosecutor asked a series of questions designed to mislead the jury into believing a witness was testifying unethically, constituting improper burden shifting. In ruling on the objection, the court found that there was no evidence of unethical conduct and so instructed the jurors. ¶95 This Court gives great latitude to conclusions drawn by judges who observe trial behavior first hand. State v. Hansen, 156 Ariz. 291, 297 (1988) (“[W]e note that the trial court is in a better position to judge whether the prosecutor is unduly sarcastic, his tone of voice, facial expressions, and their effect on the jury, if any.”). Hulsey has given this Court no reason to overturn the trial court’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s tone had no effect on the verdict. Additionally, although “[i]t is improper . . . to imply unethical conduct on the part of an expert witness in the absence of evidentiary support,” State v. Velazquez, 216 Ariz. 300, 311 ¶ 48 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), any improper implication of unethical conduct or burden shifting was remedied when the trial court instructed the jurors that it “specifically found that this witness has not violated any code of ethics as set forth in any document.” b. Closing argument
¶96 Hulsey claims that the prosecutor insinuated in his closing argument that defense witness Paul Greene, who testified about the Shot Spotter, was untruthful. The prosecutor discussed Mr. Greene’s candor and encouraged the jurors to infer that his different styles of answering corresponded with the varying truthfulness of his statements. The prosecutor stated that Mr. Greene “is somebody that you really can’t trust.” ¶97 Counsel have wide latitude to argue reasonable inferences from the evidence, but cannot make insinuations that have no evidentiary support. See State v. Cornell, 179 Ariz. 314, 331 (1994). Here, the prosecutor’s conduct was close to crossing the line, but the record did contain facts on which he could fairly base his argument. See State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, 85–86 ¶ 59 (1998). The prosecutor highlighted his observations that Mr. 30 STATE V. HULSEY Opinion of the Court Greene was sometimes less vocal during cross-examination than in direct examination. From this, the prosecutor told the jurors that in order to assess Greene’s credibility, they should consider the way he answered questions. In context, the comments were not improper.
defense theory ¶98 Hulsey maintains that throughout the closing argument, the prosecutor continued to imply that defense counsel was a liar and made other personal attacks. During closing argument, the prosecution invoked the story of Don Quixote and compared the defense’s theory to tilting at windmills. He repeatedly analogized the defense’s evidence in the case to the imaginary monsters in that story. He stated that the defense wanted the jury to “[go] to Neverland” and enter the “Land of Oz.” Hulsey unsuccessfully moved for mistrial based on the “unethical behavior.” ¶99 While commentary about the defense’s theory is common, “[a]n argument that impugns the integrity or honesty of opposing counsel is . . . improper.” Id. at 86 ¶ 59; see also State v. Lynch (Lynch II), 238 Ariz. 84, 96–97 ¶¶ 28–29 (2015) (illustrating improper commentary towards counsel as suggesting defense counsel fabricated evidence), rev’d on other grounds, Lynch III, 136 S. Ct. 1818 (2016); cf. State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 171– 72 (1990) (no error where prosecutor referred to defense as “smoke screen”). The prosecutor’s comments equating defense counsel to Don Quixote were different from those discussing defense theories. The prosecution impugned defense counsel’s integrity by suggesting he was purposely leading the jury on a make-believe expedition. See Hughes, 193 Ariz. at 86 ¶ 59. These improper statements, however, were brief and on this record we cannot say that they affected the jury’s verdict, especially in light of the instruction to the jury that counsel’s arguments are not evidence. See Newell, 212 Ariz. at 403 ¶ 67. ¶100 Hulsey raises an additional unobjected-to-claim—that the prosecution personally attacked defense counsel regarding a rhetorical statement made by defense counsel about the attempted first degree murder instruction. The prosecutor pointed out the peculiarity of defense 31 STATE V. HULSEY Opinion of the Court counsel interjecting himself into his closing argument by stating that he did not know what the instruction meant. The prosecution questioned the relevance of such a statement. This exchange was not an improper attack on defense counsel constituting fundamental error.
¶101 Hulsey argues that the prosecution misstated the law by stating that “knowingly” was a lesser standard of proof than “intending.” This objection was sustained, and the trial judge stated, “Let’s not call it lesser. Let’s call it different.” Any misstatement was therefore cured. ¶102 Hulsey claims that the prosecutor misstated the evidence by arguing that the recording of Officer Goitia’s initial report stated that he ran into the middle of the street and began firing. There were three separate accounts at issue in this portion of the argument. Here, the prosecutor was “urg[ing] the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.” State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 602 (1993). The trial court correctly overruled the objection and stated that the “jury can decide who’s correct.” ¶103 Hulsey additionally argues that the prosecutor misstated evidence by arguing that the experts indicated that the .40-caliber bullet was not going to fragment. Hulsey is correct that the experts stated that both bullets could fragment, but testimony showed that the .40-caliber bullet was designed not to fragment, which differed specifically from the .357caliber bullet from Hulsey’s gun. Here, because the testimony showed that the chances of the .357-caliber bullet not fragmenting were “exceptions,” the prosecutor’s argument was not a misstatement of the evidence constituting misconduct. See id. (prosecutor can urge jury to draw reasonable inferences).
¶104 Hulsey argues that the prosecution presented “diametrically opposed theories of the same evidence.” Hulsey claims that the prosecutor first argued in the guilt phase that Officer Holly was shot at the back end of the car, and then in the aggravation phase he placed Officer Holly at the 32 STATE V. HULSEY Opinion of the Court front of the car so he could argue that Jones and Kostas were in the “zone of danger,” thus qualifying for an additional aggravator. See A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(3). ¶105 During the guilt phase, the prosecution argued that Jones testified that Officer Holly was standing near enough to the back-passenger side of the car for Jones to hand him the temporary registration; the prosecutor repeated that Officer Holly’s “body was found in the back of the [car] facing westbound.” In the aggravation phase, the prosecutor stated Officer Holly was “in the back of the [car],” and “[m]aybe [Officer Holly] took a step or two but he was standing in the back of the [car] and went down and fell face forward.” These are not diametrically opposed theories.
¶106 Hulsey argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched for Jones in his closing argument when he stated that she “told you how many [rounds were fired]. Four rounds. Do you think she sat down and read the police report? No, they don’t. She’s not privy to that. She didn’t make it up. She’s somebody who heard it.” Hulsey argues that this statement referred to matters outside the record and constituted improper vouching. ¶107 “Prosecutorial vouching occurs if, among other things, the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the evidence, testimony, or witness.” Payne, 233 Ariz. at 512 ¶ 109 (internal quotation marks omitted). The prosecutor stating that Jones was not privy to the police report was improper, but this comment gave at most de minimis support for her testimony. Hulsey cannot establish fundamental error because the trial court and counsel explained that the lawyers’ arguments were not evidence, see State v. Ramirez, 178 Ariz. 116, 127 (1994) (presuming jurors follow court’s instructions), and he has not identified how he was prejudiced by the improper vouching.
¶108 During his closing argument, the prosecutor stated that Officer Holly “was the first to answer the call. It was the call to his death.” Hulsey claims that this and the prosecutor’s recitation of the victim impact 33 STATE V. HULSEY Opinion of the Court statement including Officer Holly’s father’s statement during the penalty phase of visualizing his son’s “last agonizing moments” and his “[attempt] to breathe” improperly appealed to jurors’ passions. Both claims fail. ¶109 Statements are improper if they (1) “call to the attention of the jurors matters that they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict, and (2) [there is a high] probability that the jurors, under the circumstances of the particular case, were influenced by the remarks.” State v. Jones, 197 Ariz. 290, 305 ¶ 37 (2000) (citing Hansen, 156 Ariz. at 296–97). ¶110 Both claims were unobjected-to, and therefore to warrant reversal must present fundamental error. Here, the “call to his death” comment did not improperly appeal to the passions of the jury. The statements were not outside of the matters to be considered by the jurors, nor was there a high probability the jurors were influenced by the remarks. No error occurred. ¶111 In Burns, 237 Ariz. at 30 ¶¶ 141–42, this Court cautioned against piling up victim impact evidence for fear that it may cross the line. There, however, the state presented more than a dozen victim impact statements, some from people who never met the victim. Id. This Court noted that brief remarks about visualizing a victim’s final moments were not unduly prejudicial. Id. ¶ 141. Hulsey objects to statements from Officer Holly’s mother and father that briefly mentioned the last moments of their son’s life. Here the statements were not unduly prejudicial and no fundamental error occurred.
¶112 Hulsey claims that the following excerpt from the prosecutor’s closing improperly commented on his refusal to consent to the search. And so the police officer says you want me to search you -- I want to search you. We agree he says no. Clearly, he’s in control of the situation. He wasn’t scared, wasn’t going to say 34 STATE V. HULSEY Opinion of the Court no, didn’t have to say no. So it wasn’t a situation where he panicked or anything like that, no. When he asked may I search you, very calmly he said no, uh-huh. I am not going to let you do that. So that’s a calm individual. It’s not somebody who is so high on drugs, doesn’t know what’s going on. He knows what’s going on. ¶113 We need not decide whether the phrase “didn’t have to say no” was improper because it was not argued as evidence of guilt. This discussion solely addressed Hulsey’s demeanor at the traffic stop. The prosecutor made no comment on his invocation of his Fourth Amendment rights as evidence of guilt. Cf. State v. Stevens, 228 Ariz. 411, 414–15 ¶¶ 8–9 (App. 2012) (prosecutor referring to defendant’s refusal of search as a result of concern about being arrested and because defendant had something to hide). The prosecutor argued only that the refusal implied that Hulsey was “calm” and “in control of the situation,” and not “scared” or “panicked.” Hulsey was thus not prejudiced by the statement.
¶114 Hulsey also argues that the prosecutor committed error when he referred to evidence not admitted at trial by stating that Hulsey produced his brother’s driver’s license at the initial traffic stop. Attorneys “are not permitted to introduce or comment upon evidence [that] has not previously been offered and placed before the jury,” but the false identification was discussed in testimony and already in evidence. State v. Gonzales, 105 Ariz. 434, 437 (1970). To the extent that the reference to the real Bradley Hulsey in the courtroom was error, its brevity and inconsequential nature does not constitute fundamental error.