Opinion ID: 2995999
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grayson’s Retaliation Claim

Text: Grayson next argues that the trial judge erred in ruling that his retaliation claim was time-barred. The trial judge correctly observed that Grayson’s attorney received the right-to-sue letter on these claims on August 31, 1998, and that Grayson failed to file his complaint until December 9, 1998, a period in excess of the statutorily proscribed 90day filing period. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Threadgill v. Moore U.S.A., Inc., 269 F.3d 848, 849, 850 (7th Cir. 2001) (90-day statute of limitations begins to run on the date claimant or attorney representing him received the letter). Accordingly, the trial judge’s dismissal of Grayson’s retaliation claim was proper. Grayson seeks to breathe life into this claim by arguing for the first time on appeal that the Service retaliated against him not only because he protested the allegedly discriminatory treatment of Mapp, but also because he filed a discrimination claim with the EEOC on June 3, 1997. But this retaliation claim appears nowhere in Grayson’s complaint: Count I of his complaint alleges that the Service retaliated against him after he opposed “unlawful discrimination against Mapp and file[d] a charge with the EEOC on April 2, 1997.” It is well-established that a party waives the right to argue an issue on appeal if he fails to raise that issue before the trial court. Moulton v. 14 No. 01-3160 Vigo County, 150 F.3d 801, 803 (7th Cir. 1998); Stevens v. Umsted, 131 F.3d 697, 705 (7th Cir. 1997) (“It is axiomatic that arguments not raised below are waived on appeal.”). Although it is true that Grayson argued in opposition to summary judgment that the Service retaliated against him for filing EEOC complaints, “a plaintiff may not amend his complaint through arguments in his brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.” Shanahan v. City of Chicago, 82 F.3d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 1996). Because Grayson failed to present to the trial judge any claim that the Service retaliated against him because of his June 3, 1997 EEOC complaint, we shall not consider the merits of that claim on appeal.