Opinion ID: 2361734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The D.C. Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act

Text: Under this analysis, the majority need not have reached the issue whether the Merit Personnel Act preempts all work related common law claims, or the separate issue whether an exhaustion remedy nonetheless applies. Although the majority's conclusion on the preemption issue may be correct, it would be correct only because worker's compensation statutes have traditionally been limited to disabilities that have physical manifestations and that limit the ability to work. Thus, exhaustion should not be required for this reason, and because it would be more futile and less helpful than in the employment discrimination context. The Merit Personnel Act provides specified compensation for the disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of his [or her] duty. D.C.Code § 1-624.2 (1981 & 1986 Supp.). The salient issue is whether the phrase physical injury should be construed to include the intentional infliction of emotional distress. [4] The Personnel Act is similar in pertinent part to the Federal Employees Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1982) (FECA) and most other workers' compensation laws. See majority opinion, supra, at 13-14. In a directly analogous case, as the majority points out, this court has ruled that FECA does not cover claims for emotional distress. [5] Mason v. District of Columbia, 395 A.2d 399 (D.C.1978). The court wrote that mental suffering caused by humiliation and embarrassment would not be within the ambit of FECA and that the plaintiff need not have proceeded thereunder. Id. The court quoted with approval the following language: The type of injuries covered in 5 U.S.C. § 8101(5) includes injury by accident and disease; it does not appear to include such claims as are presented here for discrimination, mental distress, or loss of employment. Id. at 403, quoting Sullivan v. United States, 428 F.Supp. 79, 81 (E.D.Wis.1977). More recently, another court has written that FECA applies only to job-related physical injury [and not to] mental suffering, humiliation, embarrassment or loss of employment. Lawrence v. United States, 631 F.Supp. 631, 636-37 (E.D.Pa.1982). [6] The clear emphasis of workers' compensation laws is on protecting against physical disability. Compare Tredway v. District of Columbia, 403 A.2d 732, 734 (D.C.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867, 100 S.Ct. 141, 62 L.Ed.2d 92 (1979); Griffin v. United States, 703 F.2d 321, 322 n. 3 (8th Cir.1983); 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 65.14, at 12-9 (1982). For similar reasons, there would be little purpose served by requiring an exhaustion of administrative remedies. There are substantial issues of fact, such as intent and outrageousness, that would not be addressed in an administrative hearing under the Personnel Act. There is only a very small chance that damage claims would be satisfied by any workmen's compensation schedule. Finally, the agency would have little to offer in the way of expertise or legitimate policy emphasis. Accordingly, I would affirm the dismissal of both the common law and statutory causes of action for failure to exhaust the administrative remedies under § 1-2543 of the Human Rights Act.