Opinion ID: 1855318
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant Llewellyn Lemons

Text: Mr. Lemons was sentenced to one life term and two terms of 60 to 90 years. [30] In deciding to depart from the sentencing guidelines recommendation of 180 months or 360 months to life, Judge Best offered the following: I believe that this is the most heinous crime a parent can commit against a child. It doesn't rise to the level of murder but it's a killing of another kind. You've killed their trust ... their faith ... their family, you have destroyed a big part of their future and that was your choice; you didn't have to do it.       I believe that neither of you can be [rehabilitated]; that you will be a danger to society ... if ... released ... and I am concerned.       I think the guidelines are not adequate for this type of offense ... I believe that this type of situation was never and indeed could never be envisioned by the people... coming up with these guideline ranges. I can't imagine in their wildest dreams they anticipated a case like this ... those numbers are simply incorrect ... the conduct... was extraordinary in nature and beyond the anticipated range of behavior treated in the guidelines ... the special circumstances of the offense ... [and] offender require a significant departure.... [T]he guidelines ... are inadequate, ... inappropriate, ... [and] not sufficient....       I sat through this trial. I saw the children testify. I saw their emotion. You could feel the pain and the anger. For [Ms. Lemons' son] to say that if he could, he would pull the switch himself, I think is understandable. For [Mr. Lemons' younger daughter] to indicate that death is too good a punishment I think is understandable. And I think any court reviewing this trial or this sentence ought to understand that looking at a transcript is not sufficient to understand the emotion and the truth of what was conveyed by those children when they testified. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's sentence, and remanded Mr. Lemons' case for resentencing. It reasoned as follows: [W]e find the sentences proportionate and the departures from the guidelines justified. The heinousness of the crimes was not reflected in the guidelines.... The departures ... were also justified by the existence of other serious, uncharged offenses which were established at trial. However, although [Mr. Lemons'] sentences of 60 to 90 years may be proportionate to the offense, they are excessive with respect to the offender in light of his age of 45 years at the time of sentencing.... [He] would be more than 96 years old at the completion of his sentences.... Thus, we find it necessary to remand for resentencing... in accord with ... People v. Moore .... [Slip op at 2.] We agree with the Court of Appeals that the sentences were proportionate, but we reverse its finding that they were excessive under Moore because of the defendant's age at sentencing. Moore was decided before People v. Milbourn, 435 Mich. 630, 461 N.W.2d 1 (1990), and People v. Merriweather, 447 Mich. 799, 527 N.W.2d 460 (1994), which provide the standards for reviewing a sentence on appeal. These sentences are clearly governed by Milbourn and Merriweather. In Merriweather, the defendant committed unspeakably atrocious acts of torture and sexual abuse against an eighty-four-year-old woman in her home. Id. at 802-804, 527 N.W.2d 460. He was convicted of two counts of CSC I and sentenced to 60 to 120 years' imprisonment for those convictions. On appeal, the defendant argued that the indeterminate sentencing act requires that where the authorized maximum sentence is life or for any term of years, as is the case for CSC I, the judge must either impose a low sentence or else give `life,' which would make the defendant eligible for parole after a statutorily determined number of years. [31] Id. at 808-809, 527 N.W.2d 460. We rejected that argument and found no basis ... to conclude that the Legislature intended that all defendants ... must be eligible for parole. Id. at 809, 527 N.W.2d 460. Our decision in Merriweather makes clear that where a sentence falls within the permissible range of sentences for defendants convicted of [CSC I], which is for life or for any term of years, M.C.L. § 750.520b(2); M.S.A. § 28.788(2)(2), and is indeterminate, because the judge fixes both the minimum and the maximum, the sentence is lawful as long as it meets the requirements of proportionality under Milbourn. With regard to parole eligibility we observed: The fact that it is paradoxical that the defendant might be better off with a sentence of life, which would make him eligible for parole, has nothing to do with a legislative intention that every prisoner should be eligible for parole. The Legislature has not seen fit to interfere with the voters' directive that a defendant should not be parole eligible until the completion of the minimum term.       Assuming arguendo, the only possible rationale for sentencing the defendant ... was to effectively prevent the parole board from assuming jurisdiction, ..., that is the precise result the electorate sought and obtained in the passage of Proposal B. [ [ Merriweather, supra at 809-811, 527 N.W.2d 460.] In short, we find no basis in Milbourn for a requirement that the trial judge tailor every defendant's sentence in relationship to the defendant's age. Persons who are sixty years old are just as capable of committing grievous crimes as persons who are twenty years old. We find no principled reason to require that a judge treat similar offenses that are committed by similarly depraved persons differently solely on the basis of the age of the defendant at sentencing where the Legislature has authorized the judge to impose life or any term of years. A judge may, however, consider a defendant's age at sentencing in deciding whether the sentence about to be imposed is proper, just as the judge considers the recommended range under the guidelines and any other factors not expressly prohibited by law. [32] Because there is some ambiguity in the Court of Appeals opinion regarding whether it found the sentence proportionate to the offender, we briefly address that issue. Our review of the record reveals that both defendants laughed at trial when one of the victims testified that she, unlike her stepbrother who wished his parents were dead, wanted them to live and suffer like she suffered. The record further reveals that the defendants rejected plea bargains that would have spared their children the horror of reliving multiple acts of sexual abuse before strangers and the public, and that the defendants expressed no remorse whatsoever for the obvious pain and suffering they inflicted on their children. Contributing to our review of Mr. Lemons as an offender, the record also reveals that he committed multiple criminal acts that went uncharged. In the presentence investigation report, [t]he only positive factor the Court representative could find in Mr. Lemons background [was] that he has no prior adult felony convictions, remains married ..., and is in good physical health, denying ... [use of] illegal substances. All other factors operated in favor of lengthy incarceration and against the possibility of rehabilitation. Finally, the record reveals that the trial judge determined both defendants to be liars. Under Milbourn, the `key test' of proportionality is not whether the sentence departs from or adheres to the recommended range, but whether it reflects the seriousness of the matter. People v. Houston, 448 Mich. 312, 320, 532 N.W.2d 508 (1995). The sentences imposed were proportionate to the perversity of the acts and of the offender despite his age at sentencing. We conclude that the defendant's sentences were not excessive under Moore in light of his age at sentencing where the indeterminate sentences were authorized by the Legislature and were proportionate to the offense and the offender under Milbourn. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals with regard to Mr. Lemons' sentences, and we reinstate the sentences imposed by the trial court.