Opinion ID: 2625366
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of Prior Murder Special Circumstance

Text: California Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2), allows a death sentence to be imposed if [t]he defendant was convicted previously of murder in the first or second degree.... [A]n offense committed in another jurisdiction, which if committed in California would be punishable as first or second degree murder, shall be deemed murder in the first or second degree. In the present case, the prosecution introduced evidence showing that in 1980 in Texas defendant pleaded guilty to unlawfully intentionally and knowingly causing the death of Antonio LeFosse, by shooting him with a gun. (See Tex. Pen. Code, § 19.02, subd. (b)(1).) Prior to trial, defendant contended his Texas offense, as defined by Texas law in 1980, did not include California's requisite element of express or implied malice, and therefore would not have qualified as punishable as ... murder in California. As noted, defendant prevailed in this argument before the trial court, but the Court of Appeal reached a contrary conclusion. ( Martinez, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d 197, 281 Cal.Rptr. 205.) Nonetheless, defendant reasserts the issue here. Before reaching the merits of defendant's claim, we first examine the Court of Appeal's decision and then address the Attorney General's contention that the claim is barred by the doctrine of law of the case.
The Martinez court noted that the trial court's decision was based on its conclusion that Texas law failed to recognize the doctrine of imperfect self-defense announced in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 674, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1, a doctrine that conceivably could have reduced defendant's crime to manslaughter. ( Martinez, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at pp. 200-201, 281 Cal.Rptr. 205.) In other words, the lower court relied on the possibility that defendant's Texas murder would not have been punished as murder at a trial held here. The Court of Appeal disagreed with that approach, finding Flannel irrelevant in determining whether the Texas offense was punishable as murder in California. (See People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 222-223, 260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285 ( Andrews )) As the Court of Appeal stated, [w]e conclude that the magistrate and trial court, by focusing on whether Texas recognized a Flannel defense, were, in effect, attempting to determine whether defendant would have been punished for murder had he committed his offense in California. In other words, both judges apparently interpreted the phrase `would be punishable' as requiring `certainty of punishment' rather than `the capacity therefor.' Under Andrews, the relevant inquiry is whether the offense of which the defendant was convicted in Texas includes the elements of first or second degree murder in California such that the Texas offense was one which had the capacity for punishment as first or second degree murder. ( Martinez, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at pp. 202-203, 281 Cal.Rptr. 205, italics added.) Turning to an analysis of the Texas and California elements of murder, the Court of Appeal believed that the Texas requirement that the defendant intentionally or knowingly causes ... death (Tex.Pen. Code, § 19.02, subd. (b)(1)), was the functional equivalent of California's requirement of an unlawful killing ... with malice aforethought. (Cal. Pen.Code, § 187; see Martinez, supra, 230 Cal. App.3d at p. 203, 281 Cal.Rptr. 205.) The Martinez court concluded that defendant's Texas murder conviction included the elements of second degree murder under California law. ( Martinez, supra, at p. 203, 281 Cal.Rptr. 205.) The court continued by observing that in 1974, a revision of the Texas murder statutes introduced the terms intentionally and knowingly to help simplify and clarify the various culpable mental states for various crimes. This revision suggested to the Martinez court that these terms do not create previously unknown mental states, but, rather, define the traditional mens rea concept of malice in more precise and comprehensible language. In other words, what distinguishes `murder' in California from `murder' in Texas is terminology, not substance. ( Martinez, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 204, 281 Cal.Rptr. 205, fn. omitted.) The court then examined the Texas statutes defining intentionally and knowingly, concluding that they respectively embodied the California concepts of express and implied malice. ( Martinez, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at pp. 204-205, 281 Cal.Rptr. 205.) Thus, under Texas Penal Code section 6.03, subdivision (a), A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. The Martinez court observed that an intentional murder under section 19.02, subdivision (a)(1), of the Texas Penal Code is one in which the defendant `intended to engage in the act that caused the death ... [and] ... also ... specifically intended that death result from that conduct.' ( Martinez, supra, at p. 204, 281 Cal.Rptr. 205; see Morrow v. State (Tex.Crim.App.1988) 753 S.W.2d 372, 375-376, fn. 3.) Thus, [i]n our view, the mental state which Texas law refers to as `intentionally,' when applied to the Texas crime of murder, is simply another way of defining the mental state which California refers to as `express malice,' that is, a deliberate intent to kill (§ 188). ( Martinez, supra, at pp. 204-205, 281 Cal.Rptr. 205.) Similarly, the Martinez court concluded that under Texas law, acting knowingly is equivalent to the California concept of acting with implied malice. Under Texas Penal Code section 6.03, subdivision (b), a person acts knowingly when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances [surrounding his conduct] exist, and is also aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. The Martinez court, finding no precise Texas case on point, opined that [t]he Texas mental state of `knowingly' and the California mental state of `implied malice' both focus on the subjective awareness, or knowledge, of the defendant. In Texas, a defendant knowingly causes the death of another, and thus commits murder, when the defendant is subjectively aware that death is `reasonably certain to result' from the defendant's conduct. In California, a defendant kills another human being with implied malice, and likewise commits murder, when the defendant is subjectively aware of the life-threatening risk involved in the defendant's conduct. (See People v. Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1221, 264 Cal.Rptr. 841, 783 P.2d 200.) Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude, as previously stated, that the Texas mental state of `knowingly' includes each of the concepts embodied in the mental state of `implied malice,' such that a `knowing' killing in Texas is equivalent to a killing with `implied malice' in California. ( Martinez, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at pp. 205-206, 281 Cal.Rptr. 205.) The Martinez court concluded that, given the equivalence of Texas and California law as pertains to the mental states needed for first and second degree murder, defendant's Texas murder conviction was properly deemed a prior offense, `which if committed in California would be punishable as second degree murder,' for purposes of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2). ( Martinez, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 206, 281 Cal.Rptr. 205.)
The Attorney General argues that, under the law of the case doctrine, defendant should not be allowed to reargue the issue. The Attorney General realizes, however, that the doctrine will not be adhered to where its application will result in an unjust decision, e.g., where there has been a `manifest misapplication of existing principles resulting in substantial injustice' [citation], or the controlling rules of law have been altered or clarified by a decision intervening between the first and second appellate determinations. [Citation.] ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 787, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.) Although the substantive issue presented here may be complex, and the elements of murder under Texas law in 1980 somewhat unclear, we cannot say that the Martinez court manifestly misapplied existing law, or that intervening decisions have clarified that law since Martinez was decided. Accordingly, we conclude that the law of the case doctrine applies here. Nonetheless, we will explore the substantive issue in some depth to demonstrate that no manifest misapplication of law occurred here.
Defendant argues the Martinez court erred in finding that his 1980 Texas plea to unlawfully intentionally and knowingly shooting and killing a person qualified as an offense, which if committed in California would be punishable as first or second degree murder. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(2).) He observes that in 1980 the Texas murder statute did not expressly require proof of malice, i.e., proof of either an unlawful intent to kill (required in California to show express malice) or an abandoned and malignant heart (required for implied malice). (See § 188.) Instead, defendant contends a Texas defendant could be convicted of murder if he merely intentionally or knowingly committed the act causing death, whether or not his act and intent were mitigated by his voluntary intoxication, unreasonable self defense, or other justification or excuse. As we will explain, defendant's Texas guilty plea to both intentionally and knowingly shooting his victim eliminated any uncertainty as to whether his act qualified, at the least, as an implied malice murder under California law. Contrary to defendant's argument, such mitigating factors as imperfect self defense or voluntary intoxication are not elements of the offense of murder in this state. We agree with the Martinez court that defendant's Texas murder conviction did indeed qualify as a prior murder for purposes of California's special circumstance provision.
In this state, malice is defined by statute as express if the defendant intended unlawfully to kill his victim, and implied if the killing was unprovoked or the circumstances showed an abandoned and malignant heart. (§ 188.) Defendant finds nothing in 1980 Texas law requiring such states of mind, an argument we explore below. But the quoted portion of the California statutory definition of implied malice has given way to a definition more meaningful to juries, so that malice is now deemed implied `when the killing results from an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.' ( People v. Dellinger, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1217, 264 Cal.Rptr. 841, 783 P.2d 200; see CALJIC No. 8.11 [defining implied malice killing]; see also People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 460, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 512, 2 P.3d 1066; People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 87-88, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675; People v. Whitfield (1994) 7 Cal.4th 437, 450, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 858, 868 P.2d 272.) Such conduct amounts to second degree murder, and for purposes of applying the Andrews elements test, these prerequisites are the sole elements of that offense. (See CALJIC No. 8.31.) As explained below, by pleading guilty to intentionally and knowingly causing death by shooting, defendant acknowledged at the least committing an act meeting the foregoing California definition of implied malice. Defendant observes that in California in 1980, unlike in Texas, the doctrine of imperfect self-defense allowed a defendant to negate malice by showing he was acting with an actual, though unreasonable, belief in the need to defend himself and thus did not intend to kill unlawfully or with an abandoned and malignant heart. (E.g., People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 674-680, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1.) Similarly, in California, unlike Texas, a defendant could present evidence of his voluntary intoxication to show he did not act with the requisite mental state for the offense of murder. (E.g., People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1115, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588; but see § 22, subdivision (b), as amended in 1995 [voluntary intoxication admissible solely to show whether defendant lacked specific intent or, in a murder case, whether defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice aforethought (italics added)].) Language in In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 779-780, and footnote 4, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574, suggests that a defendant may rely on the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, or voluntary intoxication, or on similar mitigating factors to defeat a claim that he acted with the unlawful intent required for either express or implied malice. But the unavailability of such mitigating theories under Texas law does not defeat application of the prior murder special circumstance in this case, for those mitigating factors are not elements of the offense of murder but are defensive matters, which may reduce murder to manslaughter by negating malice. We note that, if we were to adopt defendant's position and hold that, for purposes of applying the Andrews elements test, unlawfulness or unlawful intent is an additional California element of murder lacking in Texas law, our holding effectively could disqualify all out-of-state murders for the prior murder special circumstance. Although given the opportunity to file supplemental authorities, appellate counsel has cited no other state that makes unlawfulness an essential element of the crime of second degree murder. Thus, the absence of imperfect self-defense or voluntary intoxication is not an element of the offense of murder to be proved by the People. Instead, these doctrines are mitigating circumstances, which may reduce murder to manslaughter by negating malice. (E.g., People v. Rios, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 461, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 512, 2 P.3d 1066, and cases cited.) The defendant is obliged to proffer some showing on these issues sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt of murder. ( Id. at pp. 461-62, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 512, 2 P.3d 1066.) The problem with defendant's analysis is that it merely shows that it was conceivable he could have mounted a defense of voluntary intoxication, imperfect self-defense, or other mitigating circumstance, had he been tried in California rather than Texas, and had he chosen to defend rather than plead guilty. But because of his guilty plea, we have no way of knowing whether a successful defense to murder could have been raised. As we stated in Andrews, supra, 49 Cal.3d at page 222, 260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285, [defendant is attempting to characterize the words `would be punishable' as if they were synonymous with the term `would be punished.' `Punishable' has been defined as `[d]eserving of or capable or liable to punishment; capable of being punished by law or right.' (Black's Law Diet. (5th ed.1979) p. 1110, col. 1.) The word does not denote certainty of punishment, but only the capacity therefor.... [¶] To accept defendant's statutory construction would mean that every time the prosecution alleged a murder conviction from a foreign jurisdiction, the trial court must determine whether the guilt ascertainment procedures of that jurisdiction afforded the same procedural protections as those in California. We do not read such a requirement into the statute. We further stated in Andrews that the intent underlying section 190.2, subdivision (a)(2), was to limit the use of foreign convictions to those that include all the elements of the offense of murder in California.... ( Andrews, supra, at p. 223, 260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285; see also People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 242-244, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567, 27 P.3d 283.) We concluded in Andrews that because it would have been  possible for [the defendant] to have been convicted of murder in this state, the offense was punishable here. ( Andrews, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 223, 260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285, italics added.) As will appear, by pleading guilty to unlawfully, intentionally, and knowingly shooting and killing someone, defendant in the present case admitted committing an act that had the capacity of being punished as murder in this state. In Andrews's words, it was entirely possible to have convicted defendant of second degree murder in California. ( Ibid. )
Did defendant's Texas murder include all the elements of a California murder, as required by Andrews? According to the Attorney General, and supported by Martinez, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at pages 205-206, 281 Cal.Rptr. 205, in 1974, before defendant committed his Texas murder, Texas substantially adopted the Model Penal Code to simplify the criminal statutes without changing the substantive law, by discarding former references to mens rea and malice, and substituting language defining murder as intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] the death of an individual. (Tex.Pen.Code, § 19.02, subd. (b)(1); see Cal. Pen.Code, § 603, subds. (a), (b) [defining these mental states].) Indeed, the framers of the Model Penal Code stated that [m]urder is defined in Section 210.2 to include cases where a criminal homicide is committed purposely, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, and opined that these concepts provide a more satisfactory means of stating the culpability required for murder than did the older language of `malice aforethought' and its derivatives. (Model Pen.Code & Commentaries, com. to § 210, p. 2; see also id., pp. 13-19.) But we have found no decisions squarely equating the Texas murder statute's reference to intentionally or knowingly causing death with the (California concepts of express or implied malice. The Attorney General cites Texas cases supposedly so holding, but as defendant observes, they fail to go that far. (See Dowden v. State (Tex.Crim.App.1988) 758 S.W.2d 264, 276 [dissent noted equivalence of California's requirement of malice and Texas's requisite intent to kill]; Durrough v. State (Tex.Crim.App.1981) 620 S.W.2d 134, 138 [former Texas concept of malice necessarily includes intentional conduct required under 1974 amendment]; Luck v. State (Tex.Crim.App.1979) 588 S.W.2d 371, 374 [Texas court's post-1974 reference to concept of murder with malice].) On the other hand, defendant fails to cite Texas authorities holding that the 1974 adoption of the Model Penal Code definitions for the requisite mental states for murder necessarily abandoned the concepts of express or implied malice and created lesser standards in their place. Nor does he cite any Texas case in which a defendant was actually convicted of murder without requiring at least the equivalent of a conscious indifference to life. (See Cook v. State (Tex.Crim.App.1994) 884 S.W.2d 485, 489-491 [Texas murder statute must be interpreted as requiring either intent or knowledge that the act will or may cause death]; Morrow v. State (Tex.Crim.App.1988) 753 S.W.2d 372, 375-376, fn. 3 [intentional[ ] murder under the Texas murder statute is one in which the defendant both intended to engage in the act that caused the death and also specifically intended that death result from that conduct]; Beggs v. State (Tex.Crim. App.1980) 597 S.W.2d 375, 377 [Texas murder statute focuses on the result of one's conduct, not merely its nature]; cf. Holmes v. State (Tex.Ct.App.1992) 830 S.W.2d 263, 266 [intentional[ ] murder under Texas statute can include either an actual intent to kill or a conscious desire to commit the act causing death].) Because Texas case law does not definitively settle the point, we look to the bare language of the Texas statutes. As noted, defendant pleaded guilty to the Texas offense of unlawfully intentionally and knowingly causing the death of his victim by shooting him. Thus, by his plea he admitted that he had the conscious objective or desire either to shoot or to kill. (Tex. Pen.Code, § 6.03, subd. (a) [defining intentionally].) Similarly, by acknowledging that he knowingly caused a death, his plea admitted he was aware that his conduct [was] reasonably certain to cause death. (Tex.Pen.Code, § 6.03, subd. (b) [defining knowingly].) Consciously intending to shoot or kill someone, with knowledge that death is reasonably certain to occur, seems an even more culpable act than merely shooting someone with a conscious disregard for his life, an act that would be sufficient to constitute implied malice in California. ( People v. Rios, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 460, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 512, 2 P.3d 1066.) As noted, Texas Penal Code section 6.03, subdivision (b), states that a person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of his conduct or the surrounding circumstances when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances [surrounding his conduct] exist. The section continues, however, by stating that one acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. ( Ibid. ) Defendant claims that under Texas Penal Code section 6.03, subdivision (b), he could have been convicted of murder if he simply was aware of the nature or circumstances surrounding his conduct. But he cites no cases so holding, and the last sentence of the subdivision seemingly also requires knowledge that death is reasonably certain to result from defendant's conduct. In other words, by admitting he knowingly caused a death, he admitted he was aware death was reasonably certain to occur. In short, although Texas case law in 1980 may have been unclear as to whether a murder conviction could be based entirely on the defendant's intent to commit the act causing death, as opposed to an actual intent to kill, defendant's guilty plea included, and possibly exceeded, all the elements required by California law to constitute implied malice and second degree murder. That being so, the Martinez decision should be deemed law of the case, as that case involved no `manifest misapplication of existing principles,' and no post- Martinez decisions have intervened to cast doubt on its holding. ( People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 787, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.) Our conclusion makes it unnecessary to reach the Attorney General's alternative argument that we properly may consider the facts and circumstances underlying the offense to which defendant pleaded guilty, facts that in this case were elicited during the penalty phase. (See People v. Trevino, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 241, 109 Cal. Rptr.2d 567, 27 P.3d 283 [inquiring whether conduct of the offender satisfied all elements of California law]; Andrews, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 223, 260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285 [inquiring whether prior offense included all the elements of the offense of murder in California]; cf. People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 345, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150 [allowing reference to entire record in determining whether prior offense was serious felony for purposes of sentence enhancement].) Contrary to defendant's contention, our reliance on the wording of the Texas indictment to determine what crime defendant committed would not constitute improper consideration of extraneous facts and circumstances underlying the offense. In order to apply the elements test of Andrews, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pages 222-223, 260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285, we certainly must know, at the least, the crime to which defendant pleaded guilty.