Opinion ID: 1349849
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Majority's Decision

Text: The majority has drawn a different conclusion in the instant case, reasoning that an ordinary person would understand the § 32's directive to enforce § 29 as giving the Court the duty and authority to enforce § 29 in the way that would most effectuate the balances struck by the people in the Headlee Amendment. Op., at p. 285. I disagree with this basic point because it is unclear what the majority's interpretation of enforce means. Through this vague understanding of enforce, the majority has created a license to fashion any remedy that it deems fit. I am convinced that the ordinary person would understand § 32 to only confer authority on the courts to provide declaratory relief for a violation of § 29. The people ratifying these amendments, in my opinion, likely believed that it would be easy to identify when the state either (1) enacted a new program but failed to provide for the funding or (2) reduced funding for an existing state-mandated service, and that the courts would then expeditiously order the end of the violation. Hence, with this understanding, there would be no reason to provide for monetary damages because there would not be a situation in which the state had failed to comply in past years. The drafters of the Headlee Amendment, and the people ratifying it, did not likely anticipate that it would take seventeen years for this Court to issue a definitive ruling on the amendment's application. In reaching its conclusion, the majority has not attempted to root its pragmatic decision in the amendment. The majority has limited the relief to three years, 1991-92, 1992-93, and 1993-94. The Court awards a money judgment to the school districts to use for refunds to the taxpayers, tax relief, or other public purposes. This effectively gives the school districts complete discretion in deciding how to use the funds. [1] This Court has not been empowered, in my opinion, to create this novel solution. By virtue of the fact that the majority apparently only intends to apply this ruling to plaintiffs in this controversy, the majority reveals the idiosyncratic nature of its decision. The majority has improperly arrogated to itself the power to fashion what it believes to be a fair remedy. Moreover, I am not persuaded that the result is consistent with the basic point of the Headlee Amendment, which is to provide relief for taxpayers. See Durant, supra at 378, 381 N.W.2d 662. The majority has indicated that it anticipates that this monetary relief typically will not be necessary in future § 29 cases. See Op., at p. 284. In other words, these eighty-four school districts will receive the benefit of a monetary damage award for the underfunding for these three years but no other school districts will. This relief will come from the state, and, thereby, it will come from all the taxpayers of the state. In other words, the practical effect of this relief is to give these school districts relief at the expense of the taxpayers of the rest of the state. The majority's decision to only give tax relief to these taxpayers suggests to me that the majority is really punishing the State of Michigan for its dereliction in failing to meet its obligations. See Op., at p. 284. [2] Although I believe that the state must meet its constitutional duties, if there is a fear that the state may fail to comply in the future because we are only able to give declaratory relief, I believe that the appropriate response is political, not judicial. The sad irony of this final chapter in the Durant saga is that the result of the taxpayers revoltthe 1978 Headlee Amendmentis an award of damages against the taxpayers of Michigan. Whether the Court awards damages to the school districts, local taxpayers, or both, state taxpayers will ultimately foot the bill. The magnitude of the Court's judgment is staggering. The Court awards $211 million to the plaintiff school districts. And yet, not even a single child has claimed to have been denied special education services during the pendency of this lawsuit. Although I acknowledge the state's prolonged recalcitrance in resolving this matter, it hardly justifies foisting what may be the largest damage award in state history upon the very partiestaxpayersthat the Headlee Amendment was intended to protect. The Court's award of damages rests uneasily on the following two arguments. The first is that [t]he harm suffered by the local taxpayers here rendered anything short of taxpayer relief a refusal to enforce their rights. To deny taxpayers relief would be to deny the reality that they have suffered real dollar losses throughout this protracted litigation. [Op., at p. 286 (emphasis added).] With the best of intentions, the Court aspires to give relief to taxpayers for their real dollar losses. However, this justification overlooks one simple fact: local taxpayers are state taxpayers. A damage award against the state is a damage award against the state taxpayer. Contrary to the majority's apparent belief, taxpayers cannot be compensated by making them pay money to themselves. The same principle that explains why a damage award against the state cannot give taxpayer relieflocal taxpayers are state taxpayersalso suggests another fact. State taxpayers benefited from the state's ability to shift special education expenses to the local level. In other words, even though a taxpayer's local millage may have risen, that taxpayer was also enjoying the benefits of reduced state spending, which resulted in a lower state tax burden. Thus, as the local tax burden rose, the corresponding state tax burden fell. Therefore, it would appear that the net effect of declining state special education funding on taxpayers was neutral. Accordingly, the majority's reliance on the real dollar losses of local taxpayers is misplaced. The majority's second reason for requiring the taxpayers to, in effect, pay for special education twice is that [t]o deny monetary relief here might also provide incentive for protracted litigation in the future. [Op., at p. 287.] This argument assumes that it is the Court's role to remove incentives for protracted litigation on the part of the state. The Court's place is to interpret the law, not to guide, control, or direct the activities of the other branches of government. We must presume that the other branches of government, once informed of their constitutional duties, will execute them to the letter and spirit of the law. In the unfortunate event that they choose to diverge from their explicit constitutional obligations, the remedy must be political, not judicial. Further, in its attempt to exact a penalty from the state for its transgressions, the Court inadvertently punishes the taxpayer, the party who will ultimately pay the bill in this case. The school districts' claim to damages is unconvincing because the school districts exist in a representative capacity, acting on behalf of local taxpayers and students. Because a school district stands in relation to the state as does a subsidiary to its parent corporation, it does not have an inherent right to damages. Its claim to damages can only be as worthy as that of whom it represents, the students and the taxpayers. For divergent reasons, neither of these groups warrants financial relief. The students can be organized into two groups on the basis of the educational services they receivedspecial education and general education. Special education students were not affected by reduced state funding because each of the school districts made accommodations in other areas to ensure that special education programs met state requirements. For example, the school districts may have increased local millages or cut other programs. General education programs, on the other hand, may have suffered cutbacks resulting from the shifting of resources from general education to special education. In such cases, however, it is impossible to unring the bell, given the passage of time. Those general education students who were affected have moved ahead to the next grade, and many have been graduated. Indeed, many of these new graduates will be helping to pay for the state's prolonged recalcitrance. Notwithstanding the folly of trying to estimate the value of such damages, retroactive damages simply cannot replace a missed educational opportunity. Thus, the school districts can have no claim to damages through the taxpayers they represent. Although taxpayers may have had their millages increased at a local level, all Michigan taxpayers benefited from lower state taxes made possible, in part, by the state's declining responsibility for special education costs. Consequently, as discussed above, taxpayers did not necessarily suffer real dollar losses. Michigan voters, through their elected representatives, have chosen to maintain a system of special education that is a model for the rest of the country. By deciding to have such an exemplary program, the citizens of this state also agreed to pay for it. That the money for special education came from the average citizen's property tax pocket, as opposed to his state income tax pocket, makes little difference to his net worth. The reality is that the programs were paid for once, albeit not at the constitutionally prescribed level of government. It is undisputed that those programs were maintained during the pendency of this lawsuit. Local taxpayers paid for them, either through higher local taxes or reduced regular education programs. Awarding damages to the school districts asks the taxpayers to pay for those programs a second time. Even though local taxpayers may receive token payments from their school districts, everyone knows where the funds for those payments come from: the State Treasury, which is funded by tax dollars. The state taxpayer will also be funding the administrative costs to distribute this relief. In my view, the taxpayer can do without this kind of relief. Most likely, the local taxpayer would not want this kind of relief, especially when that relief comes out of his own pocketdeducting, of course, administrative expenses. The sure, simple, and most direct way in which to give the taxpayers relief is to award a declaratory judgment. This acknowledges the state's future obligations under the Headlee Amendment. It also recognizes that this lawsuit is simply not susceptible to damages. And, it avoids a misguided, cumbersome award of damages that confers no net benefit on the taxpayers. Instead, the majority's remedy will punish the Michigan taxpayers whom the Headlee Amendment was intended to protect, by requiring an increase in state taxes, cuts in state programs, or both. Accordingly, this Court should limit the scope of its relief to a declaratory judgment for the plaintiffs. [3]