Opinion ID: 1577932
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Constitutionality of RCr 11.42(10)

Text: Finally, Carneal challenges the constitutionality of the limitations period of RCr 11.42(10), claiming it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. He argues that RCr 11.42(10) is a substantive law that restricts a petitioner's access to habeas corpus relief, in violation of Sections 16, 26 and 27 of the Kentucky Constitution. Section 16 states that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it. RCr 11.42 does not restrict a petitioner's access to habeas corpus relief pursuant to KRS 419.020 or Section 16 of the Kentucky Constitution. Rather, it exists simultaneously: [W]e recognize as the general rule that the RCr 11.42 procedure is adequate for a collateral attack by a prisoner in custody under a judgment which he believes to be defective for one reason or another. But we recognize as an exception that the prompt relief available by writ of habeas corpus remains for a prisoner who can establish in a summary procedure that the judgment by which he is detained is void ab initio. Commonwealth v. Marcum, 873 S.W.2d 207, 211-12 (Ky.1994). In cases where habeas corpus relief is appropriate, the existence of RCr 11.42 should not, and shall not, deprive the petitioner of his right to its use. Id. at 212. The argument that RCr 11.42 is unconstitutional on these grounds is without merit.