Opinion ID: 1060657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: right to present evidence

Text: The majority erroneously concludes that [e]xcluding the proffered evidence essentially deprived Brown of an opportunity to present to the jury an alternative explanation for the complainant's hymenal injury. I disagree. The victim herself was present and available to testify. When the State made an issue of the hymenal tear, the defendant could have simply asked the victim whether she had previously engaged in sexual activity. The failure to pursue this line of questioning is essentially what deprived Brown of an opportunity to present an alternative theory explaining the hymenal tear. In response to counsel's failure, the majority fashions a rule which in effect permits a party who fails to comport with established evidentiary procedures to present inadmissible forms of the desired evidence. Moreover, the majority allows hearsay to be considered as substantive evidence even though the hearsay statement would have been admissible only for impeachment purposes had the defendant complied with the rules of evidence. This elevation of the statement to substantive evidence due merely to a failure to comply with evidentiary procedures is illogical. The troubling aspect of this elevation is that the proffered evidence was subject to multiple layers of reliability and evidentiary problems: (1) the victim may have been lying or boasting when she made the statement to third parties; and (2) it is entirely possible that the victim never made this statement to the third-party witnesses. Accordingly, such evidence should not be admissible as substantive evidence. The right to present relevant testimony is not without limitation. Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 149, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 54, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987); see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998). The right to present evidence may in appropriate cases bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. Lucas, 500 U.S. at 149, 111 S.Ct. 1743. Stated simply, [t]he accused does not have an unfettered right to offer [evidence] that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996). States are afforded broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 306, 118 S.Ct. 1261. States shall evaluate whether the interests served by evidentiary rules justify the limitations imposed on the defendant's constitutional right to testify. Rock, 483 U.S. at 55, 107 S.Ct. 2704. Rules of exclusion do not abridge an accused's right to present a defense so long as they are not `arbitrary' or `disproportionate' to the purposes they are designed to serve. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 306, 118 S.Ct. 1261, citing Rock, 483 U.S. at 55, 107 S.Ct. 2704. The rule against hearsay is predicated on the notion that untrustworthy evidence should not be presented to a trier of fact. See Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 42, 116 S.Ct. 2013 (Hearsay rules ... prohibit the introduction of testimony which, though unquestionably relevant, is deemed insufficiently reliable.). Out-of-court statements are traditionally excluded because those statements lack the conventional indicia of reliability: they are usually not made under oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker with the solemnity of his statements; the declarant's word is not subject to cross-examination; and he is not available in order that his demeanor and credibility may be assessed by the jury. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 299, 93 S.Ct. 1038. Accordingly, the Constitution should not be interpreted in a manner that relieves a defendant from compliance with rules of evidence and procedure that are designed to ensure both fairness and reliability. Id. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038.