Opinion ID: 1176477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: did the trial court's exclusion of psychiatric testimony on the question of pre-meditation deny defendant the right to present a defense in violation of the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the united states constitution?

Text: During defendant's offer of proof on the admissibility of the expert psychiatric testimony, Dr. Harrison Baker, a psychiatrist testified: Q. [ By Mr. Bair, defense counsel ]: Did you then form any opinions in this case as to whether or not this crime had been committed by Mr. Arnett with premeditation? A. [ By Dr. Baker ]: That's really a question I suppose I have to answer yes, but the following answer is going to be a yes but, type of thing. Q. That's all right. You did form an opinion? A. Right. Q. What was that opinion? A. My opinion was, taking into account the basic personality pattern of Mr. Arnett and taking into account the way he described the incident to me, I concluded that there was relatively little time devoted to consideration and contemplation before the actual commission of the act, and if that qualifies as making it unpremeditated, then that's what I came up with.       Q. [ By Mr. Crismon, prosecutor ]: But he can form an intent, he can premeditate and deliberate before he commits an act such as an act of killing; is that correct? A. [ By Dr. Baker ]: He is capable of that, yes. Q. And that is not inconsistent with your other determinations of his personality characteristics? A. No, it is not. We have held that an expert witness may testify as to a defendant's personality, but not as to defendant's state of mind at the time of the crime. Although personality traits may be established by expert opinion, we have held that the use of expert testimony to establish the trait of acting without reflection (e.g., panic reaction to stress) is limited. State v. Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32, 628 P.2d 580 (1981). In Christensen we ruled that [a]n expert witness may not testify specifically as to whether a defendant was or was not acting reflectively at the time of a killing. Id. at 35-36, 628 P.2d at 583-84 (emphasis added). Instead, an expert witness can only testify as to the general tendency of the defendant to act without reflection, allowing the jury to determine the defendant's intent at the time of the alleged crime. See State v. Hallman, 137 Ariz. 31, 35, 668 P.2d 874, 878 (1983); State v. Christensen, 129 Ariz. at 35-36, 628 P.2d 583-84;[4][ [2] ] State v. Dickey, 125 Ariz. 163, 169, 608 P.2d 302, 307-08 (1980). State v. Rivera, 152 Ariz. 507, 514, 733 P.2d 1090, 1097 (1987). Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying him an opportunity to present expert psychiatric testimony on the personality trait of impulsivity. Defendant claims that failing to admit such evidence denied him the fundamental right to present a defense in violation of the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and Ariz. Const. Art. 2, §§ (4) and (24), as to whether the murder was premeditated. We disagree. The admission of evidence is a matter for the trial court's discretion, which will not be overturned unless an abuse of that discretion is shown. State v. Williams, 132 Ariz. 153, 157, 644 P.2d 889, 893 (1982). In the instant case, the trial court found that the proposed testimony did not show a character trait of impulsivity, but instead was testimony of the defendant's probable state of mind at the time the offense occurred. The trial court properly excluded the proffered expert testimony. Rivera, 152 Ariz. at 514, 713 P.2d at 1097.