Opinion ID: 848804
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act

Text: When the Michigan Legislature drafted our Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.2101 et seq., it relied heavily on the original federal title VII statutes banning workplace discrimination. Reviewing the text of each confirms this design. MCL 37.2202(1) of Michigan's Civil Rights Act provides: An employer shall not do any of the following: (a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status. (b) Limit, segregate, or classify an employee or applicant for employment in a way that deprives or tends to deprive the employee or applicant of an employment opportunity, or otherwise adversely affects the status of an employee or applicant because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status. Similarly, the federal statute provides: (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. [42 U.S.C. 2000e-2.] But for the addition of age, height, weight, and marital status as prohibited grounds of discrimination, as well as a few minor drafting variations, M.C.L. § 37.2202(1) and 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 would be identical. As with any statute subject to judicial review, our courts have developed rules that articulate the necessary elements of statutory claims. Because Michigan's employment-discrimination statute so closely mirrors federal law, we often rely on federal precedent for guidance. See Radtke v. Everett, 442 Mich. 368, 381-382, 501 N.W.2d 155 (1993), quoting Sumner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 427 Mich. 505, 525, 398 N.W.2d 368 (1986) (While this Court is not compelled to follow federal precedent or guidelines in interpreting Michigan law, this Court may, `as we have done in the past in discrimination cases, turn to federal precedent for guidance in reaching our decision.'). As a result, employment-discrimination actions under state law are nearly identical to federal actions. For example, our courts have recognized both disparate-treatment and disparate-impact actions identical to those articulated by the United States Supreme Court. [6] Regrettably, the majority now departs from this sound tradition and, in doing so, makes sweeping changes to our employment-discrimination jurisprudence. Hostile-work-environment actions, available on the basis of any ground articulated in the federal statute, will now be limited to claims of a sexual nature under our state Civil Rights Act. By dismissing plaintiff's allegedly nonsexual hostile-work-environment action, the majority necessarily confines hostile-work-environment claims to those authorized by M.C.L. § 37.2103(i)(iii) and rejects federal precedent that recognizes hostile-work-environment actions on the basis of statutory text nearly identical to our own, i.e., § 2202. Although the majority has not acknowledged the effect of its holding, it is important to emphasize that the Court would not dismiss plaintiff's sex-based claim if it recognized that hostile-work-environment actions could be brought under § 2202. Today's ruling is particularly significant because a hostile-work-environment claim is the only statutory remedy cognizable when an employee suffers pervasive and severe forms of discrimination, but experiences no tangible employment action. No longer will an employee subject to a sex-based (but not overtly sexual) hostile work environment find redress, even though an employer may fail to adequately respond.