Opinion ID: 1443143
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deliberate Indifference to Grieveson's Medical Needs

Text: Grieveson alleges that he first told Officers Highbaugh, Cornell, and Duncan about his broken nose during the afternoon of December 1, 2000. He was told that they would let Medical know and one officer had Grieveson fill out a medical call card. On December 2, Grieveson claims that he again told Officer Duncan that he was in pain and that he needed to be seen by a doctor. Officer Duncan had him fill out a second medical call card. Grieveson was taken to the hospital on the morning of December 3. The total lapse of time between Grieveson's assault and when Grieveson ultimately received treatment is debated by the parties; Grieveson claims that the assault took place on November 30, and that it was almost two days after he first complained to a guard that he received treatment. Grieveson filed a grievance about the delayed medical treatment, and the jail's response supports the notion that the treatment was, in fact, delayed: [I]t is unforunant [sic] that it took that long to send you to [W]ishard.... In order to survive summary judgment on a claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, Grieveson must show that he had an objectively serious medical need, and that named guards were deliberately indifferent to it. Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir.2006); Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir.1996) ([A] prison official may evidence deliberate indifference by failing to treat or delaying the treatment of a serious medical need. However, for liability to exist the medical need must be objectively serious.). A delay in the provision of medical treatment for painful conditions  even non-life-threatening conditions  can support a deliberate-indifference claim, see Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1372 (7th Cir.1997), so long as the medical condition is `sufficiently serious or painful,' id. (quoting Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir.1996)). The defendants argue that Grieveson cannot survive summary judgment because he did not put forth evidence demonstrating an objectively serious medical condition  he did not `place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay in medical treatment.' Langston, 100 F.3d at 1240 (quoting Beyerbach v. Sears, 49 F.3d 1324, 1326 (8th Cir.1995)); see also Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d 710, 715 (7th Cir.2007) ([A] plaintiff must offer medical evidence that tends to confirm or corroborate a claim that the delay was detrimental.). We recently considered what qualifies as verifying medical evidence in Williams v. Liefer : Clearly, expert testimony that the plaintiff suffered because of a delay in treatment would satisfy the requirement. On the other hand, evidence of a plaintiff's diagnosis and treatment, standing alone, is insufficient if it does not assist the jury in determining whether a delay exacerbated the plaintiff's condition or otherwise harmed him. Id. at 715 (emphasis added). As in Williams, the evidence in this case falls somewhere in between a bare recitation of treatment received and expert testimony about the delay's effect. Id. Grieveson did not introduce expert testimony stating that his medical condition worsened because of the delay  but that does not mean Grieveson offered no verifying medical evidence. See id. Grieveson supplied medical records indicating that he had a nasal fracture, that he could experience further bleeding, and that he may need to see a specialist. Grieveson later underwent painful nose surgery. The evidence Grieveson provided would certainly help a jury determine whether the delay unnecessarily prolonged and exacerbated Grieveson's pain, id., and thus qualifies as verifying medical evidence that supports a genuine issue of material fact regarding the seriousness of Grieveson's medical condition. Based on the evidence provided by Grieveson, a jury could further infer that the delays of Officers Highbaugh, Cornell, and Duncan in arranging medical treatment caused Grieveson that many more hours of needless suffering for no reason. Id. According to Grieveson, these three guards knew that he was in pain, but they did not secure medical treatment for him until, at the earliest, one-and-a-half days after they knew about the injury. Grieveson's affidavits create a genuine issue of fact as to the officers' states of mind. Although a negligent or inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care is insufficient to state a deliberate indifference claim, it is enough to show that a defendant actually knew of a substantial risk of harm to the inmate and acted or failed to act in disregard to that risk. Gil v. Reed, 381 F.3d 649, 661 (7th Cir.2004); see also Williams, 491 F.3d at 716 ([A] jury could find that the defendants' delay caused [the inmate] six extra hours of pain and dangerously elevated blood pressure for no good reason.). Grieveson's claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs survives summary judgment as against Officers Highbaugh, Cornell, and Duncan to the extent that the claim relates to delays in treatment after Grieveson's first assault. Grieveson does not proffer sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment for any other delays in medical treatment because he does not show that the named defendants were personally involved in the other delays. See Alejo, 328 F.3d at 936.