Opinion ID: 1190428
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction under the uniform child custody jurisdiction act and the federal parental kidnapping prevention act

Text: On appeal the custodians urge that the Oklahoma trial judge erred by refusing to recognize the Texas court's vested jurisdiction under the UCCJA. They argue that 10 O.S.Supp. 1982 § 1608(A) [14] bars an Oklahoma court from exercising jurisdiction if another custody proceeding was pending in a sister state's court when the petition was filed. The sister state must be exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with the UCCJA. [15] According to the custodians, the Oklahoma court's exercise of jurisdiction violates the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act [PKPA] [16] as well as state law. They contend the PKPA and UCCJA proscribe an Oklahoma court from proceeding under these circumstances absent a Texas-court stay of its proceedings. The mother urges (1) the custodians lacked standing to petition the Oklahoma court for habeas corpus, (2) the ex parte order for temporary custody could not be enforced because the mother had not been afforded due process and (3) Texas lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJA. [17] She argues her own domicile in Oklahoma gives this state exclusive jurisdiction to determine the child's custody. According to the mother, events that happened after the trial estop the custodians from claiming relief from this court. [18] We agree with the custodians that both the UCCJA's § 1608(A) [19] and the PKPA's § 1738A(g) [20] bar the Oklahoma trial court from exercising jurisdiction under the circumstances present here.
Oklahoma's UCCJA governs initial custody proceedings. [21] An Oklahoma court may enter a custody decree if one of four alternative jurisdictional prerequisites [22] are present: (1) if Oklahoma is the child's home state (or recently has been and a parent continues to live in the state), (2) if it is in the child's best interest for the state to assume jurisdiction because the child and his parents or the child and a contestant have a significant connection to the state and substantial evidence is available here concerning the child's present or future care, (3) if the child has no home state and it would be in the child's best interest for the state to assume jurisdiction, or (4) if the child is present in the state and has been abandoned or abused. [23] Oklahoma custody proceedings must be consistent with the PKPA. [24] Otherwise this state's custody orders would not be enforceable in other states. [25] The PKPA provides that although a state may meet one or more of the four prerequisites that we have described, that state may not proceed if another state is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the federal act's provisions. [26] A similar prohibition in the UCCJA proscribes an Oklahoma court's cognizance if a custody action is pending in another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with the Act. [27] These mechanical first-in-time rules are designed to prevent jurisdictional squabbles by limiting the court's jurisdiction to act in certain custody matters. [28] In G.S. v. Ewing [29] we recently considered an Oklahoma court's continuing jurisdiction under the UCCJA to modify a child custody decree. We noted there that under the UCCJA initial and modification cognizance differs. Initial jurisdiction ordinarily resides in the state with the closest connections to the child and to information about his present and future well-being. [30] We recognized in Ewing that § 1608(A) limits an Oklahoma court's authority to hear a custody dispute if there is a suit pending in another state's court. [31] The mother urges us to focus our jurisdictional inquiry on enforceability of the temporary ex parte order. She contends the Texas court was not exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with the Act when she filed the Oklahoma litigation because the Texas order was issued ex parte and was temporary. She urges she had no opportunity to appear and respond in Texas. A review of extant jurisprudence from other states reveals that not all courts agree on the meaning of the phrase, exercising jurisdiction consistently with the federal act or exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with the UCCJA. Some courts have held that unless proper notice has been given under the acts, no action is pending. [32] Others recognize that subject matter jurisdiction is not lost because the notice requirements have not yet been satisfied. [33] Before making a decree under the act, a court shall give the contestants reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard. 10 O.S. 1981 § 1606; [34] 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(e). [35] Neither the § 1738A(g) nor the § 1608(A) jurisdictional bars require that the first state shall have issued an enforceable order before the second state is barred from proceeding. [36] The better rule requires deference to Texas if the action was pending under Texas law when the Oklahoma proceedings were filed. Recognition of priority based upon the commencement of out-of-state forum litigation is consistent with prior Oklahoma cases and the purposes of the pertinent custody acts. [37] This principle prevents two or more states from exercising concurrent jurisdiction [38] and discourages an interstate race for a more favorable forum. An Oklahoma court must, when it learns an initial custody proceeding is pending in another state, make a critical two-part inquiry: (1) Was another state exercising home-state jurisdiction substantially in conformity with the UCCJA when the Oklahoma petition was filed? and (2) If so, did the other court stay its litigation? The answer to whether the Texas suit was pending lies in that state's Family Code at § 11.07 [39] and in its rules of civil procedure. The cited statute provides that a suit affecting the parent-child relationship shall be commenced by filing a petition. According to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a civil suit in the district or county court shall be commenced by a petition filed in the clerk's office. [40] Clearly, the petition's filing  rather than service of process  triggered the Texas litigation. [41] The Texas litigation was at its earliest stage when the Oklahoma actions were filed; hence the inquiry to determine whether the former proceeding substantially conformed to the Texas UCCJA must focus on its pleadings. Would the custodians' allegations  taken as true for purposes of this determination  give Texas home-state jurisdiction under the UCCJA? Home state means the state where the child was living with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as a parent, for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the time involved. [42] A person acting as a parent is one who has physical custody of a child and claims a right to custody. [43] Under Texas law a person who has possession and control of a child for at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition may bring a claim for custody. [44] The mother contends the Texas court lacked home-state jurisdiction because the custodians did not have physical custody of the child at the time the Oklahoma litigation was filed. The critical time for testing whether the custodians were acting as parents and claim a right to custody was the point in time when the Texas litigation was filed. The custodians allege that the mother voluntarily placed the child into their actual possession, care and control in September 1981 where he has remained  except for four very brief periods. In assessing whether the Texas court is exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with the UCCJA, the Oklahoma court may not test the truth of the custodians' allegations. [45] Rather the Oklahoma court must stay its own proceedings if the Texas litigation appears to be in substantial UCCJA conformity. The Oklahoma court attempted to avoid a jurisdictional dispute by conferring with the Texas judge, but it did not secure for the record an order staying the foreign litigation. Neither did it file in the custody registry a communication from the other state informing this state of a finding that Oklahoma is the more appropriate forum, as prescribed by 10 O.S. 1981 § 1609(I). [46] The Oklahoma court has no power to stay a Texas action; [47] discretion to decline jurisdiction in favor of a more appropriate forum rests with the Texas court. [48] Reliance solely upon oral communications between judges can cause confusion. The better rule of practice and the one we adopt today is that, without written notification that the sister-state court yields jurisdiction  filed in the cause  Oklahoma must defer to the pending first-commenced forum litigation. 10 O.S.Supp. 1982 § 1608(A); [49] 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(g). [50] The trial court's order denying the writ of habeas corpus and awarding custody of the child, C.A.D., to his mother and father is vacated. The trial court is ordered to stay all Oklahoma battles for his custody pending finality of the Texas litigation. Yet to be decided is whether any Texas orders for this child's custody are enforceable in Oklahoma within the parameters of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A. [51] LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, KAUGER, SUMMERS and WATT, JJ., concur. SIMMS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. HODGES, V.C.J., and ALMA WILSON, J., dissent. ALMA WILSON, dissenting: The majority opinion interprets where such court of that other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this section to make a custody determination, in the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, [1] to mean the state in which a request for a custody determination is first-in-time filed. I cannot accede to such an interpretation of a federal full faith and credit statute. [2] Implicit in the statutory words is exercising jurisdiction is congressional intent that the other state has the parties before it and has determined it is the most appropriate state to make a custody determination and, therefore, is exercising jurisdiction. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. Appellant, Jennie Roberts, claims her deceased son is the natural father of the twelve year old child, C.A.D. Appellant, David Roberts, is the present spouse of Jennie Roberts. In March, 1990, the minor child was residing with appellants and attending school in Texas, with the permission of appellee, Karen Nettie Draper, natural mother of the minor child. On March 2, 1990, appellants filed an action in Texas seeking appointment as conservators of the minor child. On March 5, 1990, a citation for personal service upon appellee was issued by the Texas court. Prior to personal service of the Texas summons, on March 13, 1990, appellee returned the minor to Oklahoma. On March 14, 1990, the Texas court issued an ex parte order placing temporary custody of the minor child with the appellants. On March 16, 1990, appellants filed an action for writ of habeas corpus in Oklahoma County district court, asserting right to custody of the minor child pursuant to the Texas ex parte order. Appellee filed a separate action requesting the Oklahoma County district court to assume jurisdiction and to make a custody determination of her minor child. Notice of the two Oklahoma actions were duly served upon the parties. Notwithstanding the absence of personal service of notice of the Texas conservatorship proceeding upon the appellee prior to determining its jurisdiction over the custody dispute, the Oklahoma County district court communicated by telephone with the Texas court. At the time of this telephone communication, the Texas court had not determined its jurisdiction over the custody dispute. [3] The two pending custody actions between the parties were consolidated and trial was had. Upon a full evidentiary hearing, [4] the Oklahoma district court determined that Oklahoma has jurisdiction over this child custody dispute; [5] ordered that custody of the minor child should be and is with the natural mother, appellee; and, denied appellants' application for a writ of habeas corpus. Appellants now seek reversal of that custody order, asserting the lack of jurisdiction of the Oklahoma County district court. Subsequent to the conclusion of the custody proceedings before the Oklahoma district court the following events occurred. The reputed natural father of the minor child (named as father on the birth certificate) removed the minor child from Oklahoma and delivered him to appellants in Texas. Appellee voluntarily accepted service of notice of the Texas conservatorship proceeding. Upon default of the appellee, the Texas court proceeded to determine its jurisdiction of the custody dispute, finding that Texas did not agree to allow Oklahoma to determine jurisdiction. The Texas court determined that Texas is the appropriate state to determine custody of the minor child. The Texas court refuses to give full faith and credit to the Oklahoma child custody order. The Appellants' apparent present position in the Texas court is that Oklahoma's fully litigated custody order is not entitled to full faith and credit, in Texas, while, in this Court, they assert that Oklahoma must give full faith and credit to the Texas ex parte order. In deciding this jurisdictional dispute between competing states, the majority opinion interprets the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act as requiring the Oklahoma district court to refrain from exercising jurisdiction in this child custody dispute in deference to the first-in-time [commencing of] out-of-state forum litigation. I disagree. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act does not establish a procedural race to the court house test to determine jurisdiction between competing states. Rather, it requires a state to refrain from exercising concurrent jurisdiction over a custody dispute where another state has determined that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the child custody dispute and the other state is exercising that jurisdiction; and, it requires all states to give full faith and credit to the first state's ensuing custody order. Because Oklahoma was the first state to determine that it had jurisdiction and to exercise that jurisdiction, Oklahoma's custody order entered below is the first state's ensuing custody order. Texas' ex parte order simply does not rise to the dignity of an exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1738A. The federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act provides: § 1738A. Full faith and credit given to child determinations (a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, any child custody determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State. (b) As used in this section, the term  (3) custody determination means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the custody or visitation of a child, and includes permanent and temporary orders, and initial orders and modifications; (e) Before a child custody determination is made, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the contestants, any person whose parental rights have not been previously terminated and any person who has physical custody of a child. (g) A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody determination commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in a court of another State where such court of that other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this section to make a custody determination. [Emphasis added.] Section 1738A does not require nor allow jurisdictional preference to a state for first-in-time filing nor for ex parte orders. It speaks to custody determinations made consistent with the section; reasonable notice; temporary and permanent orders; and exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the section. Fundamental in personam jurisdiction over the contestants is clearly a contemplated prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with § 1738A. The Texas court did not attain in personam jurisdiction over the natural mother herein nor had it determined its jurisdiction prior to the Oklahoma court's determination that it had jurisdiction of the child custody dispute and the Oklahoma court's exercise of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Texas court could not have been exercising jurisdiction over the parties and the child custody dispute consistent with § 1738A at the time the Oklahoma court first exercised jurisdiction over this dispute. Section 1738A does not establish jurisdiction of child custody disputes in the first instance, as if it were a venue statute. It establishes national standards for a competing court of one state to determine 1) its jurisdiction and 2) the effect to be given to decisions of sister states. [6] The United States Supreme Court has concluded that these statutory national standards prohibit a state, such as Texas in the instant dispute, from exercising concurrent jurisdiction once another state, such as Oklahoma, exercises jurisdiction consistent with § 1738A; and that all States must accord full faith and credit to the first State's ensuing custody decree. [7] Research has revealed no federal jurisprudence deciding whether a state is exercising jurisdiction consistent with § 1738A because it issues an ex parte order prior to service of process upon all contestants. However, in Arbogast v. Arbogast, [8] the West Virginia appellate court refused to give full faith and credit to another state's custody order, concluding that § 1738A requires that the decreeing state must have jurisdiction over the parties. And, in In re Custody of Thorensen, [9] the Washington appellate court refused to give full faith and credit to a Florida ex parte temporary order, even though custody was originally fixed in the Florida divorce. The parties in this matter have enjoyed de facto shared custody of the minor child, C.A.D., and during every year of his twelve year life, C.A.D. has been a de facto resident of both states, Texas and Oklahoma. When C.A.D.'s natural mother announced that she intended to terminate the de facto shared custody arrangements and become the sole custodian for her son in Oklahoma, the Texas custodians filed a conservatorship in Texas. Before service of process of the Texas conservatorship could be had upon her, the natural mother removed the child from Texas to Oklahoma. Again, before service of process in the Texas proceeding, the Texas custodians secured an ex parte temporary child custody order in the Texas conservatorship. Armed with this Texas ex parte order, the Texas custodians sought a writ of habeas corpus in the Oklahoma district court. The natural mother filed a separate custody proceeding in the Oklahoma district court. With all the parties before it and upon telephone consultation with the Texas court, the Oklahoma district court determined it had jurisdiction under the U.C.C.J.A. and § 1738A. Because § 1738A does not require a state to defer to the first-in-time out-of-state forum litigation and because Texas had not exercised jurisdiction over the parties and the child custody dispute consistent with § 1738A prior to exercise of jurisdiction by the Oklahoma district court, I would affirm the determination that the Oklahoma district court properly exercised jurisdiction below.