Opinion ID: 1541378
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Glick's Remaining Arguments

Text: Glick raises several other arguments in support of his assertion that he is entitled to an order of specific performance. For instance, he asserts that the trial court erred in failing to find that Chocorua restructured its deal with Cabot as a partnership sale for the sole purpose of preventing him from exercising his first refusal. See, e.g., Quigley v. Capolongo, 53 A.D.2d 714, 383 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1976) (holding that a grantor of a first refusal breached the obligation of good faith and fair dealing by entering into a contract, denominated a lease in the hope of circumventing plaintiffs' rights). In addition, he asserts that the trial court's July 31, 2001 summary judgment order, when considered in light of the findings made in the final order, compels an order of specific performance. Having already determined that the Agreement gave Glick a thirty-day option to purchase the Masonian lots, and that he is therefore entitled to specific performance, we need not address these arguments. However, Glick also contends that the trial court erred in failing to find that Chocorua acted in bad faith in setting the purchase price for the Masonian lots. In support of his argument, Glick points to a letter submitted at trial in which Lloyd informed Seitz that the general manager of Chocorua believe[d] that he can place [a] high enough price on the right of first refusal property so that Mr. Glick will not exercise acquisition. Glick argues that, as demonstrated by this letter, Chocorua inflated the price in the P & S Agreement in bad faith in an effort to discourage [him] from exercising his rights of first refusal so as not to jeopardize the larger $10 [million] transaction that [Chocorua] was attempting to consummate with Cabot. While the trial court granted Chocorua's requested finding that Glick did not prove his allegations that [Chocorua] had acted in bad faith by purportedly inflating the purchase price of the [l]ots, or overestimating the amount of land contained within the lots, in its order the trial court expressly declined to make findings as to both the size and value of the Masonian lots. Because these facts are inextricably tied to Glick's bad faith argument, see Bank of Vermont v. Kelley, No. CIV 93-46-JD, 1994 WL 258680, at -7 (D.N.H. Feb. 4, 1994) (refusing to grant summary judgment on issue of bad faith in case involving a loan workout where disputed material facts remained regarding whether the bank had accepted the fair market value for the property at issue); see also Gleason v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 243 F.3d 130, 143 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining how allocations of price by interested parties to elements of a package [deal] may readily be manipulated to defeat contractual rights to substantially similar price terms); Gyurkey v. Babler, 103 Idaho 663, 651 P.2d 928, 934 (1982), and we are ill-suited to make such factual findings in the first instance, see Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780, 829 A.2d 1059 (2003) (explaining that the trial court is in the best position to resolv[e] conflicts in the testimony, measur[e] the credibility of witnesses, and determin[e] the weight to be given evidence), we are unable to assess the trial court's rejection of Glick's bad faith argument upon this record. For similar reasons, we are also unable to resolve Glick's contention that the purchase price in the P&S Agreement was premised upon an erroneous assessment of the size of the Masonian lots. See Pantry Pride Enterprises, Inc. v. Stop & Shop Co., 806 F.2d 1227, 1231 (4th Cir. 1986) (granting specific performance to the holder of a right of first refusal, but remanding for findings as to the value of the encumbered property where performance would result in a windfall). Therefore, upon remand, the trial court shall determine whether the purchase price in the P&S Agreement was inflated and, if it so finds, shall set a purchase price in accord with the fair market value of the property in November 1998, when Glick should have been permitted to exercise his right. If, however, the court finds that the price was not inflated, Glick shall be held to his contractual obligation to proffer the purchase price stated in the P&S Agreement.