Opinion ID: 586409
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: When was Santamaria seized?

Text: 8 The district court's ruling that seizure occurred at the time the border patrol car turned on its lights and siren was based on our precedent at the time. We so held in United States v. Morrison, 546 F.2d 319, 320 (9th Cir.1976), and stated that [t]he command [to halt] must be valid when given; its character is not changed by the motorist's response. Id. at 320. Thus, founded suspicion had to exist at the time the officers initiate the stop. United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1402 (9th Cir.1985); accord United States v. Robert L., 874 F.2d 701, 703 (9th Cir.1989). The district court, relying on Robert L., did not consider any of the post-siren events in determining whether or not the police had a founded suspicion for the stop. 9 The government does not dispute the district court's reading of our cases but argues that the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Hodari D. changes the point at which seizure must be deemed to occur. The government's argument is compelling. 10 Hodari D. involved some youths who ran away from two approaching police officers. One of the youths (Hodari) ended up running directly toward another police officer; Hodari did not see the officer until he was almost upon him, at which time he tossed away what appeared to be a small rock, which turned out to be crack cocaine. A moment later, the officer tackled and handcuffed Hodari. Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. at 1549. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the crack cocaine should have been suppressed because, at the time the cocaine was dropped, Hodari had been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 1 As the Supreme Court noted, this question was relevant to the existence of founded suspicion, because the officer's seeing Hodari disposing of the crack cocaine could provide founded suspicion for the subsequent tackling. Id. at 1549. 11 The Court ruled that a seizure does not occur if, in response to a show of authority, the subject does not yield; in that event, the seizure occurs only when the police physically subdue the subject. Id. at 1550. In sum, assuming that [the officer's] pursuit in the present case constituted a 'show of authority' enjoining Hodari to halt, since Hodari did not comply with that injunction he was not seized until he was tacked. Id. at 1552 (emphasis added). 12 Santamaria argues that Hodari D. should be limited to its facts, so that it would apply to this case only if Santamaria had tossed contraband or illegal aliens from his car. That argument ignores the main point of Hodari D.--that one who flees upon a show of authority is not seized until he or she is physically apprehended. It was the flight, not the discarding of the rock cocaine, that postponed the point of seizure in Hodari D. And it was flight that postponed the seizure of Santamaria. 13 Nor is there any reason to conclude that the reasoning of Hodari D. would not apply to automobile chases as well as foot chases. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Hodari D. relied in part on Brower v. Inyo County, 489 U.S. 593, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989), which involved a twenty-mile automobile chase ending in a fatal crash into a police barricade. The Hodari D. opinion noted that in Brower, the Court did not even consider the possibility that a seizure could have occurred during the course of the chase because ... that 'show of authority' did not produce his stop. Hodari D., 111 S.Ct. at 1552 (quoting Brower, 489 U.S. at 597, 109 S.Ct. at 1381). 14 It is clear, then, that Hodari D. governs this case if it is to be applied retroactively. In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 716, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), the Supreme Court stated that any new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases ... pending on direct review or not yet final. We have interpreted this directive to require the retroactive application of a Supreme Court decision broadening the permissible scope of automobile searches. United States v. Sanchez, 944 F.2d 497, 499 (9th Cir.1991). By the same token, we must apply Hodari D. retroactively here. 15 We conclude, then, that Santamaria was not seized for fourth amendment purposes until he was physically apprehended by the border patrol agents at the end of the chase. The determination whether agents have founded suspicion to justify a stop may take into account all of the events that occur up to the time of physical apprehension of a suspect who flees. 16