Opinion ID: 2179476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Division and valuation of property

Text: In a divorce proceeding, the disposition of property is governed by 19 M.R.S.A. § 722-A (1981 & Supp.1990). Section 722-A(3) provides a presumption that all property acquired after marriage, regardless of how title is held, is martial. That presumption, however, can be overcome by a number of methods, including a showing that the property was acquired in exchange for property acquired by one of the spouses by gift. See id. §§ 2(A) & 3. The party claiming that certain property acquired during the marriage is nonmarital bears the burden of overcoming the statutory presumption. See Cushman v. Cushman, 495 A.2d 330, 334 (Me.1985). Because the showing required to overcome the presumption is one of fact, `the decision of the divorce court whether the burden was successfully carried is reviewable only for clear error.' Id. (quoting Moulton v. Moulton, 485 A.2d 976, 978 (Me. 1984)). Wife contends that she satisfied her burden of showing that her interest in the trust established by her father was nonmarital and remained so throughout the conveyances that resulted in joint ownership of land in Maine at the time of the divorce hearing. The District Court, however, found that the transfer of land from the trust were gifts to husband and wife jointly and, thus, formed part of the marital estate. In Grant v. Grant, 424 A.2d 139 (Me. 1981), we affirmed, by an evenly divided court, a divorce judgment classifying as marital property certain real estate acquired by a couple during marriage through devise to them as joint tenants. One of the divergent opinions in Grant concluded that the court had erred in not excluding the property from the marital estate because it had been devised by a third party to the couple jointly and not acquired by  either spouse as specified in sections 722-A(2) & (3). Id. at 141-43. We adopt the contrary view that focuses on the intent of the statute to effectuate the concept of marriage as a partnership rather than on the technicalities of the statute's language. This intent is not furthered by excluding from marital property gifts acquired jointly, unless the transferor had a contrary intention. Smith v. Smith, 472 A.2d 943, 947 (Me.1984); see also Grant v. Grant, 424 A.2d at 144. Because the land from the trust was conveyed to the parties jointly and wife failed to establish that her father, the transferor, had a contrary intention when making the conveyances, the District Court did not err in finding that she failed to meet her burden of overcoming the presumption that the property is marital. Moreover, there is no merit in wife's contention that the court failed to consider her contributions as a homemaker in making its findings on property division or erred in its disposition and evaluation of the marital residence. It has long been the rule that a divorce court's decision regarding the disposition of marital property is reviewable only for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Cushman v. Cushman, 495 A.2d at 334. As a guide to the court, section 722-A orders a division of marital property in such proportions as the court deems just after considering such relevant factors as the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of marital property, including the contribution of a homemaker; the value of the property set apart to each; and the parties' economic circumstances at the time the division is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home to the spouse having custody of any children. The court may also consider any matters peculiar to an individual case in order to obtain a just result. See id. Here, the District Court determined the contributions of each spouse and their families before distributing the property. It found, based on the extensive amount of time wife had been spending in Massachusetts, that the marital residence in Maine should be sold, with the first $50,000 awarded to the wife and the remainder to be divided equally between the parties. The court awarded wife the right to possession of the home for 45 days from the date of the divorce judgment. Then, if the house had not been sold, the husband was awarded the right to take possession until the sale of the property. It based its evaluation of the property on the testimony of two real estate appraisers. On this record, we can find no abuse of discretion. The District Court clearly considered the contributions of each spouse to the acquisition of marital property, the value of the property set apart to each, including the revocable trust, the economic circumstances of each at the time of the division, and the desirability of awarding the family home for a limited period to wife, the spouse having custody of the daughter. See 19 M.R.S.A. 722-A(1). On appeal, wife has failed to demonstrate any failure to consider relevant factors in the court's distribution of property.