Opinion ID: 393989
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Finding of Impropriety.

Text: 41 Appellants are correct in asserting that the plaintiffs supplied no authority for the court to conclude that the four factors discussed earlier created ethical problems and infringed upon the integrity of the court. This, however, is not controlling. If the situation does endanger the integrity of the court, it is immaterial that the same circumstances have never been considered before. The crucial question is whether the concerns expressed are indeed present or merely anticipatory and speculative. In other words, did the court have a basis for finding apparent improprieties that were serious enough to outweigh the parties' interests in being represented by counsel of their choice? 42 In light of Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981), which was decided after the district court entered its order, we are satisfied that the district court would have ruled the other way if Upjohn had been decided before the district court had to act. 43 Upjohn undercuts factor No. 3, relied upon by the district court. The plaintiffs' attorneys may not discover what transpired in the orientation session whether or not the defense attorneys act as counsel for the witnesses at the deposition. 7 Without factor No. 3, the other factors are insufficient to support the disqualification order. Factor No. 1 the solicitation factor is a problem more properly addressed to the organized bar than to the court. The solicitation alleged, even if it could be substantiated, does not cut to the heart of the integrity of the system so as to require the court to take drastic steps to safeguard the image of the judicial process in the eyes of the public. Moreover, we note that in light of Upjohn, the definition of solicitation in the corporate-counsel context is altered. Factor No. 2 the pre-deposition insulation is an inconvenience, admittedly, and a frustration. But mere inconvenience and frustration do not warrant interference with the right to counsel. 44 Nor can factor No. 4 the instructions not to answer support the order. Assuming, without deciding, that the attorney represents two different clients, the employee and the company, this problem can be dealt with by the judicious use of sanctions. The trial judge in this particular case is obviously sensitive to potential abuses. He may instruct the attorneys on how to conduct the depositions; for example, that they may interrupt the proceedings only on behalf of their witness-clients. They may be called upon to explain why an interruption was made. Costs can be assessed against counsel for vexatious delays. In addition to the sanction of costs, the court, after a warning, has contempt power. Finally, the court could always suggest to the plaintiffs that they renew their motion to disqualify should specific behavior problems occur. 45