Opinion ID: 1270103
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Were the warrants supported by probable cause?

Text: The United States Supreme Court has consistently held after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate's `determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.' Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Gates established a totality of the circumstances test for determining whether there is probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is located in a particular place. Id. at 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317. [S]o long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more. Id. at 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (internal quotations omitted). Appellant correctly asserts that a warrant based solely on information provided by a confidential informant must contain information supporting the credibility of the informant and the basis of his knowledge. However, independent verification by law enforcement officers cures any defect. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 241, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (Our decisions applying the totality of circumstances analysis ... have consistently recognized the value of corroboration of details of an informant's tip by independent police work.); see also State v. Viard, 276 S.C. 147, 150, 276 S.E.2d 531, 532 (1981) (upholding a warrant based on the independent verification by the affiant of an informant's tip). Here, the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding a search would uncover illegal gambling machines. The information provided by the confidential informant was independently corroborated by undercover SLED agents. This verification established probable cause under the totality of the circumstances. As an additional ground for invalidating the seizure, appellant argues the information contained in the affidavit for the December warrants was stale, and therefore could not have been the basis of a finding of probable cause. We disagree. In order for an affidavit to support probable cause, it must state facts so closely related to the time of the issuance of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time. State v. Winborne, 273 S.C. 62, 64, 254 S.E.2d 297, 298 (1979) (internal quotation omitted). An affidavit which fails altogether to state the time of the occurrence of the facts alleged is insufficient. Id. Here, appellant argues the affidavit does not support a finding of probable cause because (1) it does not state the date the confidential informant saw the machines, only that he informed SLED agents sometime around November 1997, and (2) it does not state the date SLED agents corroborated the machines' presence. The date on which the informant saw the illegal machines is irrelevant because SLED's corroboration was the basis of the magistrate's probable cause finding, not the informant's tip. Furthermore, the lack of a date the SLED agents corroborated the tip does not defeat probable cause in this case. The affidavit does not fail altogether to state the time of the occurrence, as in Winborne. It merely fails to state when in the two-month period between November 1 and December 22, 1997, the agents corroborated the tip. The longest possible period between the corroboration and the issuance of the warrant is 52 days. We have never addressed what length of time is acceptable between the establishment of probable cause and the execution of a warrant. However, the Court of Appeals has held that a 60-day lapse did not create a staleness problem where the items sought were not such that one would expect to be removed or consumed in the interim: While the lapse of time involved is an important consideration and may in some cases be controlling, it is not necessarily so. There are other factors to be considered, including the nature of the criminal activity involved, and the kind of property for which authority to search is sought. State v. Corns, 310 S.C. 546, 550-51, 426 S.E.2d 324, 326 (Ct.App.1992) (quoting United States v. Steeves, 525 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.1975)). There was very little risk the property at issue here would be removed between the time the undercover agents visited the warehouses, which was at the very earliest sometime in November, and the time the agents obtained and executed the warrants on December 22 and 23. While it may have been preferable for the affiant to include the date of the undercover investigation in the affidavit, the United States Supreme Court has warned against the danger of hypertechnical, rather than ... commonsense interpretation of affidavits when reviewing for probable cause. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (internal citation omitted). The substantial basis for the magistrate's finding of probable cause was not defeated by the affiant's failure to state the precise date of the investigation.