Opinion ID: 2772304
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Invitation to Recede from Hamblen

Text: Next, Sparre urges us to recede from our holding in Hamblen, 527 So. 2d at 800. Sparre specifically argues that the following excerpt from Hamblen is problematic: - 30 - We find no error in the trial judge’s handling of this case. Hamblen had a constitutional right to represent himself, and he was clearly competent to do so. To permit counsel to take a position contrary to his wishes through the vehicle of guardian ad litem would violate the dictates of Faretta. In the field of criminal law, there is no doubt that “death is different,” but, in the final analysis, all competent defendants have a right to control their own destinies. This does not mean that courts of this state can administer the death penalty by default. The rights, responsibilities and procedures set forth in our constitution and statutes have not been suspended simply because the accused invites the possibility of a death sentence. A defendant cannot be executed unless his guilt and the propriety of his sentence have been established according to law. Id. at 804. According to Sparre, Hamblen and its progeny are based on two faulty premises. First, the appointment of special counsel would interfere with a defendant’s right to self-representation. Second, a case-by-case approach ensures that the death penalty is imposed fairly, reliably, and uniformly. We find that Sparre has not provided a good-faith basis for suggesting that we recede from controlling precedent comparable to that which we established in Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1992). In Haag, Justice Kogan writing for a unanimous Court stated: We recognize that our opinion today recedes from and overrules earlier precedent in this jurisdiction. The opinions of the district courts in Lindsay v. State, 579 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), Ruggirello v. State, 566 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 4th DCA), review dismissed, 569 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1990), Clifford v. State, 513 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), and Tucker v. Wainwright, 235 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970), contain results or analyses inconsistent with our views and accordingly are disapproved to the extent that they conflict - 31 - with this opinion. We also are receding from Walker v. Wainwright, 303 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1974), and State ex rel. Ervin v. Smith, 160 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 1964), to the extent they conflict with the views expressed above. While the doctrine of stare decisis normally would require a greater deference to this prior precedent, we find that the demands of justice and the principles of constitutional law recited above require an alteration in the precedent. As is self-evident, even the common law must bend before the dictates of the Florida Constitution. Not even the hoariest precedent is permitted to violate the guarantees of habeas relief, equal protection, and equal access to the courts, or any of the other fundamental rights set forth in the Declaration of Rights. Art. I, Fla. Const. .... It is a rule that precedent must be followed except when departure is necessary to vindicate other principles of law or to remedy continued injustice. McGregor v. Provident Trust Co., 119 Fla. 718, 162 So. 323 (1935). We find that the guarantees embodied in Florida’s Declaration of Rights are best vindicated by overruling the contrary precedent noted above. Id. at 617-18. Therefore, we reject Sparre’s suggestion and explain why we decline to recede from Hamblen. First, Sparre’s case-specific and self-serving arguments do not rise to the level of showing that “the demands of justice and the principles of constitutional law recited above require an alteration in the precedent” due to a recurring problem pertaining to this issue. Haag, 591 So. 2d at 618. Next, Sparre fails to point our attention to any specific way that Hamblen and its progeny, e.g., Muhammad, foster patent injustices, or otherwise stand contrary to constitutional imperatives in Florida’s death penalty cases. Next, we find that the State raises a legitimate concern that the rule change that Sparre advocates could foreseeably - 32 - result in violations of the United States Supreme Court’s longstanding holding in Faretta.14 Under Faretta, competent capital defendants have the right to decide the courses of their own defense. We find no compelling reason to alter the Hamblen policy. This policy subjects a trial court’s judgment about whether to call its own mitigation witnesses or appoint special mitigation counsel to an abuse of discretion standard on review. And, the present abuse of discretion review framework provides an adequate safeguard for capital defendants’ constitutionally protected rights. Accordingly, we reject Sparre’s second claim as lacking merit and deny him any relief concerning this issue.