Opinion ID: 152917
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: DNA Sample

Text: Separate from the government's ongoing retention and matching of his DNA profile, Boroian challenges the retention of and use of his blood sample. In the district court, the government moved to dismiss this claim on the ground that Boroian points to no `search' of [his DNA sample] that is occurring or even imminent. Boroian responded in opposition that any future scientific analysis of his blood sample would constitute a separate Fourth Amendment search. In both its written motion to dismiss and at the hearing on the motion, the government conceded that a new scientific analysis of Boroian's stored blood sample would constitute a further Fourth Amendment search. At the hearing, counsel set forth the government's position: I'm saying that the CODIS search is done, and the CODIS information isn't a new search. If we go and do a new analysis of the DNA, your Honor, it absolutely implicates Fourth Amendment interests and it would need to be rebalanced, but there isn't such a search forthcoming. On appeal, the government neither repeats nor repudiates that concession. Instead, it emphasizes, as the district court found, that Boroian's complaint does not contain any factual allegations of a present or imminent new analysis of his DNA sample. The government further emphasizes that under the DNA Act, the use and disclosure of stored DNA samples are subject to the same strict limitations as DNA profiles: they may be used only for law enforcement identification  and other limited purposes, [9] and any unauthorized use or disclosure is subject to substantial criminal penalties. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14132(b)(3) (emphasis added), 14135e(c). In the absence of any factual allegations of abuse, we cannot presume that the government has acted contrary to law and subjected Boroian's sample to new scientific analyses or other unauthorized uses. On this record, Boroian has failed to state a claim that the government has subjected, or is about to subject, his blood sample to new analyses. See Johnson, 440 F.3d at 500 (affirming grant of motion to dismiss Fourth Amendment challenge to future use of DNA sample, reasoning that [n]othing in the record suggests such future testing is imminent, nor can we analyze its invasiveness until it appears). On appeal, Boroian argues that the government's retention of Boroian's DNA sample constitutes a continuing suspicionless seizure under the Fourth Amendment and that this seizure is separate and apart from the question of whether an additional search of the seized materials has occurred or will occur. However, Boroian did not present this continuing seizure theory in his opposition to the motion to dismiss in the district court, and he may not unveil it for the first time on appeal. [10] See Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Union, Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir.1992) (If any principle is settled in this circuit, it is that, absent the most extraordinary circumstances, legal theories not raised squarely in the lower court cannot be broached for the first time on appeal.). We see no reason to deviate from that well-established principle here. [11]