Opinion ID: 2402179
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Admission of Jerry Coleman's Statement

Text: The defendant's first argument on appeal is that the trial justice erred, and thereby violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under article 1, sections 2 and 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution, when she allowed the written statement of Jerry Coleman to be read to the jury by Detective Johnson of the Warwick Police Department. It will be recalled that, during defendant's trial, Detective Johnson was permitted to read to the jury the written statement that Mr. Coleman, whose case had been severed prior to defendant's trial, had provided to the police while he was being interrogated regarding the break-in at the Lavens' home. [6] In addition, shortly after Detective Johnson finished reading the statement to the jury, the following colloquy took place: Q Detective, what was your next what did you do next, with regard to Mr. Alston, in your investigation? A After interviewing Mr. Coleman? Q Yes. A I completed an arrest warrant affidavit for Jeffrey Alston. Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds both to the introduction of Mr. Coleman's statement and to the subsequent questioning of Detective Johnson as to what he did    next with regard to Mr. Alston, in [his] investigation[.] [7] After careful consideration of the record and after reviewing the pertinent authorities, we are in agreement with defendant's argument that the trial justice erred in allowing Detective Johnson to read Mr. Coleman's written statement to the jury. We conclude that the admission of Mr. Coleman's statement in this case cannot be reconciled with the principles articulated by the United States Supreme Court in its seminal opinion in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). [8] In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held that the trial court committed reversible error when, during a joint trial, it admitted the codefendant's confession, which implicated defendant Bruton. 391 U.S. at 124, 126, 88 S.Ct. 1620. The Court held that the admission of the codefendant's confession constituted a violation of the defendant's right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 126, 88 S.Ct. 1620. In that case, the confession of Bruton's codefendant was admitted into evidence through the testimony of a third party to whom the codefendant had orally confessed. Id. at 124, 88 S.Ct. 1620. The Supreme Court noted that the codefendant's confession added substantial, perhaps even critical, weight to the Government's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, since [the codefendant] did not take the stand. Id. at 128, 88 S.Ct. 1620. In view of this scenario, the Court held that the defendant was denied his constitutional right of confrontation. Id. In the present case, the Superior Court had granted defendant's motion to sever Mr. Coleman's case from defendant's case before defendant's trial began. The defendant's memorandum in support of his motion to sever had explicitly referenced Bruton. It is our opinion that, once a Bruton -based decision to sever trials is made, then it is presumptively prejudicial to allow into evidence a confession made by the person whose case has been severed. Accordingly, given the granting of the motion to sever and given the principles set forth in Bruton, it was error to then allow Detective Johnson to read to the jury Mr. Coleman's statement to the police. [9] In our judgment, the admission of Mr. Coleman's statement in the instant case cannot be reconciled with the constitutional principles articulated in Bruton. See 391 U.S. at 126, 88 S.Ct. 1620. Similar to the confession of the codefendant at issue in Bruton, the statement of Mr. Coleman, which Detective Johnson read to the jury, added substantial weight to the prosecution's case in a form that was not subject to cross-examination by defendant. Accordingly, applying the principles set forth in Bruton, it is our opinion that defendant was denied his constitutional right to confrontation in this case. It is further our opinion that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [10] The trial justice's error in admitting the Coleman statement was magnified in this case by the subsequent questioning of Detective Johnson as to what he did next with regard to Mr. Alston, which questioning occurred shortly after the detective had read Mr. Coleman's statement to the jury. This questioning of Detective Johnson, along with the elicited testimony which revealed that what he did next was to complete an arrest warrant affidavit for Jeffrey Alston, demonstrates how potentially prejudicial to defendant was the admission of Mr. Coleman's statement. The shift from the reading of Mr. Coleman's statement about his own involvement in the break-in to the testimony of Detective Johnson that what he did next was to prepare for the arrest of defendant had the highly probable effect of further inculpating defendant in the eyes of the jury without his having the chance to cross-examine Mr. Coleman. In effect, the jury was told that Mr. Coleman's statement was the basis for defendant's arrest. For this reason, we vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this case to the Superior Court for retrial. Although we are reversing and remanding for a new trial on Bruton grounds, we will nevertheless proceed to address one of defendant's other appellate contentions because it involves an issue that may well present itself once again upon the retrial of this case. However, we choose not to comment upon defendant's third contention (namely, that the trial justice erred in not granting the jury's request to review the statements that the Lavens made to the police with respect to the physical description of the two men whom they encountered at their home), because there is no reasonable likelihood that the same scenario will be repeated upon retrial.