Opinion ID: 562709
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Preemption of the Emotional Distress Claims

Text: 17 Section 301(a) of the LMRA provides federal jurisdiction over [s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a)(1988). A suit for breach of a collective-bargaining agreement is governed exclusively by federal law under section 301. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 23, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2853, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). Consequently, if the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the application of state law ... is pre-empted and federal labor-law principles ... must be employed to resolve the dispute. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1881, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988). Thus, Perugini's emotional distress claims are preempted if they can be resolved only by referring to the terms of the CBA. See Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (9th Cir.1988). 2 Under California law: 18 [t]he elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. 19 Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 24 Cal.3d 579, 593, 595 P.2d 975, 983, 156 Cal.Rptr. 198, 206 (1979). To be outrageous, conduct must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. Id. 20 Safeway asserts that Perugini's emotional distress claims are based on Safeway's refusal to honor Perugini's request for light duty. Since Safeway's duty to reassign temporarily disabled employees to lighter work cannot be determined without reference to the CBA, Safeway argues that Perugini's emotional distress claims are preempted by section 301(a) of the LMRA. We disagree with Safeway's characterization of Perugini's claim. 21 Clearly, Perugini's emotional distress claim against Safeway is based in part on its refusal to honor her request for light work; however, Perugini also complains that Safeway harassed her at her job because she was female and pregnant. Perugini's complaint details a course of discriminatory conduct by Safeway unrelated to her request for light work. The allegations against Safeway include harassing and discriminatory remarks by Safeway employees, refusal to accept letters from her doctor, and assignment of extra, more difficult work. Specifically, upon learning of her pregnancy, Perugini's supervisor's remark about her pregnancy being bad news, and the assistant manager's questions regarding when she was going to take disability leave, demonstrate conduct independent of any response to Perugini's request for light work. Thus, Perugini's emotional distress claim against Safeway must fairly be considered in two segments for purposes of preemption. We must address claims for: (1) emotional distress caused by Safeway's refusal to assign Perugini light work, and (2) emotional distress caused by Safeway's on-the-job harassment of Perugini. 22 To the extent that Perugini's claim is based on Safeway's refusal to provide light duty, her claim is precluded by section 301(a). Safeway's handling of Perugini's request for light work was certainly no model for good labor-management relations. Nevertheless, if Safeway's managerial freedom is not constrained in any material way by the CBA, a rational jury could not find that Safeway's conduct in discharging Perugini from heavy work instead of reassigning her to light work was an action so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. Cervantez, 24 Cal.3d at 593, 595 P.2d at 983, 156 Cal.Rptr. at 206. We therefore must look to the CBA to judge the appropriateness of Safeway's behavior in regard to this allegation. No provision of the CBA specifically addresses light duty, but several provisions relate to the allegations in this case: Section 2.4.2 (discrimination in termination on the basis of sex); Section 3.3 (procedures for discharge); Section 5.14 (medical leave of absence); Section 9.5 (employment of workers with disabilities); and Section 18 (grievance and arbitration). We can determine whether Safeway was acting consistently with its duties under the CBA in refusing to reassign Perugini only by interpreting these provisions. Under Lingle, the district court properly ruled that the state claim against Safeway based on its failure to reassign Perugini is preempted. 23 In contrast, to the extent that Perugini's claims are based on allegations that Safeway's conduct and remarks constituted on-the-job harassment, reference to the CBA is not required to determine whether Safeway's conduct exceeded all bounds usually tolerated in a civilized community. The CBA does not govern the offending behavior. The resolution of these claims depends on a purely factual inquiry into the conduct and motivation of the employer. This case is similar to Tellez v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., Inc., 817 F.2d 536 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 908, 108 S.Ct. 251, 98 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987). In Tellez, the plaintiff brought a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress after his employer published a suspension letter charging him with purchasing drugs on the job. We held that this claim was not preempted because the CBA did not envision outrageous behavior of that type nor did it require or regulate suspension letters. See id. at 536-37, 539. 24 Here the CBA does not refer to on-the-job discriminatory and harassing conduct by management towards its employees. The only provision in the CBA relating to sexual discrimination is limited to discrimination in regard to hire and termination. See Section 2.4.2 (sex shall not be a basis for rejection or termination of an otherwise qualified employee and applicant for employment). Thus, under Lingle, Perugini's emotional distress claims based on Safeway's alleged harassment are not preempted by section 301(a). See Galvez v. Kuhn, 933 F.2d 773, 774, 778-80 (9th Cir.1991); Miller v. AT & T Network Systems, 850 F.2d 543, 550 n. 5 (9th Cir.1988). 25 The Union argues that Perugini's emotional distress claim against the Union is preempted by section 301 because the court must refer to the CBA to determine whether the Union failed to represent Perugini adequately as she sought light duty. Again, this argument is persuasive only to the extent that Perugini's claim is based on an allegation that the Union violated the CBA. As we discussed earlier, we do not believe this is an accurate characterization of Perugini's claim. In her complaint, Perugini detailed discriminatory remarks and conduct made by Union officials. 26 In reviewing whether the Union was obligated to represent Perugini and to pursue her claims, the court would necessarily refer to the Union's duties to Perugini as stated in the CBA. To the extent that Perugini's claims are based on the Union's failure to represent her, section 301 preempts her claims. Whether the Union's conduct in this regard was outrageous depends upon whether that conduct was appropriate under the circumstances. Because the tort requires inquiry into the appropriateness of the defendant's behavior, the terms of the CBA can become relevant in evaluating whether the defendant's behavior was reasonable. Miller, 850 F.2d at 550. The Union's failure to seek light duty for Perugini is not outrageous if the Union has no duty under the CBA to represent her in this matter. Consequently, regardless of whether the CBA actually obligates the Union to represent Perugini in her attempt to be assigned light duty, the appropriateness of the Union's conduct can be determined only by interpreting the CBA. Thus, the district court properly found that the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against the Union is preempted by section 301 to the extent that the claim is based on the Union's failure to represent Perugini. 27 In contrast, the CBA does not set forth standards to determine whether the Union acted outrageously in making discriminatory remarks to Perugini. Accordingly, Perugini's claim is not preempted to the extent that it is based on the Union's alleged harassment. 28 For the evaluation of claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress under California law, the relevant inquiry is whether the risk of harm to the plaintiff from the negligent act of the defendant was reasonably foreseeable; if so, the defendant owes that plaintiff a duty to exercise due care. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 27 Cal.3d 916, 923, 616 P.2d 813, 816-17, 167 Cal.Rptr. 831, 834-35 (1980). The provisions of the CBA are not relevant to the question whether the harm caused to Perugini by the defendants' harassment was foreseeable, because the CBA did not set forth standards governing on-the-job harassment and discriminatory conduct. However, the provisions of the CBA are relevant to the question whether the harm to Perugini caused by the defendants' failure to assign light work was foreseeable. Since Perugini had no explicit right to light duty under the CBA, it was not reasonably foreseeable that she would suffer emotional distress from being denied light duty by Safeway 3 or from the Union's delay in representing her in this matter. To the extent that resolution of the negligent infliction of emotional distress claims requires interpretation of the CBA, these claims are preempted by section 301. The district court incorrectly dismissed all of Perugini's state law claims against the defendants. 4 CONCLUSION 29 For the reasons stated above, we reverse the summary judgment for Safeway and the Union on all of Perugini's claims, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Perugini is entitled to her costs on this appeal. 30 AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.