Opinion ID: 4556289
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Green’s Contentions on Appeal

Text: On appeal, Green challenges the Superior Court’s determination that his ineffective-assistance of counsel claims were procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(3) and (4). Green also contends that the Superior Court erred to the extent that it rejected those claims on the merits. This time around Green presents his ineffective-assistance claims in a slightly different format, stating them as four separate claims. First, Green argues that the Superior Court erred in finding that his trial counsel’s failure to request a mistrial 34 2019 WL 6216247, at . 35 Id. at . 19 after the SANE nurse testified that she believed Sarah’s statements during the sexual assault examination did not amount to ineffective assistance. Second, Green contends that the Superior Court should have found his trial counsel ineffective because she did not effectively cross-examine Sarah about a prior inconsistent statement. Third, Green claims that the Superior Court erred by failing to find his trial counsel ineffective for failing to request a specific-unanimity instruction. And fourth, Green claims that the Superior Court erred by not finding that his trial counsel was ineffective “for failing to object to a myriad of impermissible testimony and evidence.”36 This, according to Green, exposed the jury to “[m]ultiple instances of hearsay, vouching, prior consistent statements, and evidence or argument designed to inflame the [jury’s] passions . . . .”37 Accordingly, Green asks us to reverse the judgment of the Superior Court.