Opinion ID: 1927801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: trial court's charge to the jury

Text: Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in three respects in its charge to the jury. She first avers that the court erred when, in instructing the jury regarding appellant's claimed defense of justification, [11] it stated that appellant's husband had a duty to retreat from deadly force. Conversely, appellant objects to the trial court's failure to include her requested point for charge that there is no duty to retreat from deadly force when an individual is in his or her own dwelling. The relevant portion of the court's charge states: Now, we're going to talk about the defense of justification.. . . And what, in effect, it means is that if the conduct of the defendant though otherwise criminal in nature would, by virtue of certain circumstances under the law be legally justified, then no offense has been committed. When there is evidence presented at trial that deadly force was used in self-defense, the burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in self-defense or defense of another. In this particular case there is no allegation of self-defense but the defense of another person. It is sufficient that the Commonwealth prove only that one of the elements required in the use of deadly force is lacking. If any element is disproved, then you may disregard the defense of justification. A person is justified in using deadly force in defense of another person when and only when the circumstances are such that the latter person would be justified or excused if he or she had used deadly force in his own defense. Let me clarify that. The principles and the rules applicable to the use of deadly force for the defense of another person are the same rules that would apply to that person's own self-defense. A person interfering in a difficulty in behalf of another simply steps into the latter's shoes. He, or in this case she, may lawfully do in another's defense what such other might lawfully do in his own defense, but no more. She stands on the same plane. I use she here because we are talking about the defendant. She stands on the same plane, is entitled to the same rights and is subject to the same conditions, limitations and responsibilities as the person defended, and her act must receive the same construction as the act that the person defended would receive if the deadly force was used by him. It is necessary and sufficient to justify or excuse the use of deadly force in defense of another where neither the person defended nor the defendant shall be at fault in provoking or continuing the difficulty; secondly, that the danger, real or apparent to the person defended, should be of death or great bodily harm; third, that the danger should be present, imminent, impending, and not a past danger. Now, remember, you consider the facts as I mention these things, the facts as testified to, because you are going to have to decide whether or not the conduct on the part of the defendant was justified to protect her husband from an imminent, present danger. According to her testimony, she said that it was imminent; that the gun was in her husband's chest or pointed at his chest or above, and that she felt that there was the effort to pull the trigger. Fourth, that either the person defended shall be in real danger of death or great bodily harm, or it shall be reasonably apparent to her, in this case to the defendant, that she honestly and reasonably believed that the person defended is in such danger and that it is necessary to use deadly force to save him therefrom. Fifth, that the person defended has the duty to retreat if he can do so without increasing his peril. And you consider, in a sense, this is a third person position. Was the [appellant] in a position to believe that there was the possibility that the person defended, her husband, could retreat from the peril without increasing the danger? N.T. December 15, 1983, at 446-448 (emphasis added). Appellant correctly states that while, generally, there is a duty to retreat if such retreat can be safely accomplished, one who is attacked in his dwelling need not retreat, but may stand his ground and meet deadly force with deadly force. Commonwealth v. Eberle, 474 Pa. 548, 379 A.2d 90 (1977). She contends the trial court's statement that appellant's husband had a duty to retreat was incorrect and that the court should have included her requested charge regarding no duty to retreat. We agree. It does not follow, however, that the court's error warrants reversal. It is axiomatic that, when an appellate court reviews a jury instruction, the charge must be read and considered as a whole. Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 343 Pa.Super. 486, 495 A.2d 569 (1985). In addition, the error is not reversible unless the defendant was prejudiced thereby. Commonwealth v. Morgan, 265 Pa.Super. 225, 401 A.2d 1182 (1979). We find that, reading the instruction as a whole, appellant suffered no prejudice. With but one respect, i.e., the duty to retreat, the court's charge correctly and thoroughly outlined the salient features of the defense of justification as it related to appellant's version of the events surrounding the shooting. [12] In addition, the court instructed the jury that, insofar as the duty to retreat was concerned, the Commonwealth would have to prove not only that appellant's husband had a duty to retreat, but also that appellant's perception of the circumstances was that he could have done so without increasing his peril. There was no possibility that the jury could have found the existence of the latter element since the evidence presented as to justification [13] unequivocally established that appellant's husband could not have safely retreated. That is, even with the trial court's error, the jury could not have found that the Commonwealth had established a violation of any duty to retreat. We accordingly conclude that the trial court's error in charging the jury that there is a duty to retreat (even when one is attacked in one's own home) could have had no prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations. The error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [14] Appellant also contends that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that (1) the porch of the house was part of appellant's dwelling, and (2) that a landlord does not have a right to remain on leased property against the wishes of the lessee. We find that the opinion of the court below, filed on April 4, 1985, adequately addresses and correctly disposes of both these allegations, and see no need for further comment in this regard. In her fifth claim on appeal, appellant challenges the constitutionality of the Firearms provision of the Mandatory Sentencing Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712, [15] in the following respects. She contends that section 9712 violates the equal protection clause; the due process clause, both in denying individualized sentencing and in allowing proof of possession of a firearm to be established by a preponderance of the evidence; the principle of separation of powers by granting the prosecutor complete discretion in deciding whether to invoke section 9712; and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The claim that section 9712 violates due process in allowing proof of possession of a firearm to be established by a preponderance of the evidence was explicitly rejected by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Wright, 508 Pa. 25, 494 A.2d 354 (1985), cert. granted sub nom, McMillan v. Pennsylvania, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 58, 88 L.Ed.2d 47 (1985). In Commonwealth v. Irving, 347 Pa.Super. 349, 500 A.2d 868 (1985), this court held that section 9712 does not violate equal protection, and in Commonwealth v. Cofoni, 349 Pa.Super. 407, 503 A.2d 431 (1986), we determined that it does not violate separation of powers by granting unbridled discretion to the prosecutor. Appellant's challenges to section 9712 on these grounds are accordingly without merit. We find that appellant's claim that section 9712 violates due process by impermissibly precluding individualized sentencing is also without merit. In considering such a claim in Commonwealth v. Cooke, 342 Pa.Super. 58, 492 A.2d 63 (1985), this court stated that while the judiciary imposes sentence upon conviction, the fixing of penalties for crimes is a task for the legislature, and, as one of its options, the legislature may prescribe a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. See Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 339 Pa.Super. 32, 488 A.2d 293 (1985). Due process of law is not violated when courts accede to the legislature's authority to frame a coherent statutory scheme for the administration of sentencing. . . . Commonwealth v. Cooke, supra 342 Pa.Super. at 69, 492 A.2d at 69, quoting Commonwealth v. Hernandez, supra, 339 Pa.Super. at 40, 488 A.2d at 298. Appellant's final challenge to the constitutionality of section 9712 alleges that it violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in that, by not allowing for consideration of a defendant's individual circumstances, it permits disproportionate sentences. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) (holding that the eighth amendment prohibits the imposition of significantly disproportionate sentences). Appellant claims that the five year minimum sentence was disproportionate in her case because she had no prior criminal convictions. Whether section 9712 is violative of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is one of first impression in this Commonwealth. We conclude that it does not. As stated above, while it is the judiciary's function to impose sentence upon conviction, it is for the legislature to fix the penalties for crimes. Commonwealth v. Cooke, supra . As decreed by the Supreme Court in Solem v. Helm, supra , in assessing a claim that a sentence is so disproportionate as to violate the eighth amendment, [r]eviewing courts . . . should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishment for crimes. . . . Solem v. Helm, Id. at 290, 103 S.Ct. at 3009. A punishment violates the eighth amendment only if it is so greatly disproportionate to an offense as to offend evolving standards of decency or a balanced sense of justice. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958). See Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937 (1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 970, 103 S.Ct. 2444, 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983). The legislature's enactment of section 9712 evinces a recognition of the seriousness of felonies committed with firearms, as well as a determination to protect the public from those armed with firearms, to deter violent crime and the illegal use of firearms, and to vindicate the legislature's interest in punishing those who commit serious crimes while visibly armed with a firearm. Commonwealth v. Wright, supra 508 Pa. at 40, 494 A.2d at 362. We find that section 9712's five year mandatory minimum sentence is not disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime appellant committed, and does not shock either a balanced sense of justice or offend evolving notions of decency. Appellant's claim that section 9712 violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is accordingly without merit. Appellant's final claim on appeal alleges that the trial court erred in refusing to order the Commonwealth to disclose to the defense the contents of certain notes which the victim had made at trial. [16] The record reveals that during the defense's cross-examination on rebuttal of Trooper Vieczorek, the trooper referred to several police reports which he had in his possession. Defense counsel asked to see these reports. The District Attorney assented, but asked the court's permission to first separate from the reports some handwritten notes which the victim had made earlier that day during the testimony of defense witnesses. Defense counsel responded that he should be allowed to see the notes on the basis that they were a written statement of an eyewitness, and, therefore, discoverable under rule 305. N.T. December 14, 1983, at 417. After reviewing the notes, the trial court denied defense counsel's request. We find that this action was correct. Before trial appellant requested, by motion to compel discovery, the disclosure by the Commonwealth of statements of the victim and interviews of eyewitnesses. Pa.R. Crim.P. 305(B)(2) provides for the disclosure of such materials as follows: Discretionary with the Court: In all court cases . . ., if the defendant files a motion for pretrial discovery, the court may order the Commonwealth to allow the defendant's attorney to inspect and copy or photograph any of the following requested items, upon a showing that they are material to the preparation of the defense, and that the request is reasonable: ..... (b) all written or recorded statements, and substantially verbatim oral statements, of eyewitnesses the Commonwealth intends to call at trial. The purpose of making prior statements of Commonwealth witnesses available to defense counsel is to assist the latter in preparing for subsequent cross-examination at trial of that witness. Commonwealth v. Grayson, 466 Pa. 427, 353 A.2d 428 (1976). That is, defense counsel may be able to uncover inconsistencies between a witness's pretrial statements and his trial testimony. Commonwealth v. Dalahan, 262 Pa.Super. 615, 624, 396 A.2d 1340, 1344 (1979) (emphasis added). The statements at issue herein were not pretrial statements. Not only were they made during trial, they were made after the victim has been cross-examined by defense counsel, and thus could have been of no possible assistance to defense counsel in preparing for that cross-examination. We accordingly find that the notes which the victim made during trial were not subject to discovery under Rule 305(B)(2). [17] We further note that our examination of Court Exhibit One reveals that, in any event, it contains very few statements. It consists primarily of questions posed by the victim regarding defense witnesses' testimony which, as the District Attorney informed the trial court, the victim wished covered during cross-examination of these witnesses. The few statements it does contain do not contradict the victim's testimony at trial. Finding all of appellant's claims on appeal meritless, we affirm the judgment of sentence. Judgment of sentence affirmed. KELLY, J., concurs in the result.