Opinion ID: 1817903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Harrison's Motion to Exclude

Text: The Kysers next argue that the trial court erred in granting Harrison's motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Scheuerman. The standard of review applicable to whether an expert should be permitted to testify is well settled. The matter is largely discretionary with the trial court, and that court's judgment will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Hannah v. Gregg, Bland & Berry, Inc., 840 So.2d 839, 850 (Ala.2002). We now refer to that standard as a trial court's exceeding its discretion. See, e.g., Vesta Fire Ins. Corp. v. Milam & Co. Constr., Inc., 901 So.2d 84, 106 (Ala.2004) (Our review of the record supports the conclusion that the trial court did not exceed its discretion in finding that Jones was properly qualified as an expert under Rule 702[, Ala. R. Evid.,] and in considering his testimony.). However, the standard itself has not changed.
The gist of Harrison's argument to the trial court in her motion to exclude was that, first, Dr. Scheuerman was not competent to testify as to the cause of death of an infant (from SIDS or some other cause), and second, even if he was, his conclusion, as set forth in his affidavit, was based on nothing more than speculation and conjecture. In ruling on Harrison's motion to exclude, the trial court stated: 1. That for the assigned reasons set forth in both [Harrison's motion to exclude] and her response to [the Kysers'] brief in opposition [to Harrison's motion for summary judgment], [the Kysers'] expert, E. Hunt Scheuerman, M.D., is not shown to be properly qualified and/or competent to render a rebutting expert opinion as to medical causation in this case, particularly considering that he does not possess the degree of specialty of [Harrison's] expert, J. Bruce Beckwith, M.D., a pediatric pathologist of international repute, and in view of findings of the State's Chief Medical Examiner, Dr. J.C. Upshaw Downs, as stated in his autopsy report, together with the strong presumption which attends the certificate of death under [§ 12-21-101, Ala.Code 1975]. 2. That there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [Harrison] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND DECREED as follows: 1. That [Harrison's motion to exclude] is granted. 2. That [Harrison's] motion for summary judgment is granted and summary judgment be and hereby is entered for . . . Harrison . . . . According to his curriculum vitae, Dr. Scheuerman received his medical degree from the University of Tennessee in 1973. He is licensed to practice medicine in Florida, Louisiana, and Alabama. He is board-certified in anatomic and forensic pathology. From 1985-1987, he served as a state medical examiner in Alabama, and he has served as a medical examiner in Florida at various times throughout his career. According to his affidavit, he has been certified as an expert witness in the fields of forensic sciences and death-scene investigation in Alabama, Louisiana, and Florida. While it may appear that Dr. Scheuerman has training and experience in the field of forensic pathology, neither his curriculum vitae nor his affidavit show that he has had any training or experience in the field of pediatric pathology, an area of expertise distinct from other disciplines. The highly specialized nature of pediatric pathology is shown by the numerous cases dealing with experts in that field. See, e.g., Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F.Supp.2d 805, 902 (D.Neb.2004) (Rebecca Baergen, M.D., is a board-certified clinical pathologist, professor of clinical pathology and laboratory medicine, attending pathologist, and chief of perinatal and pediatric pathology . . . . (emphasis added)); State v. McKnight, 352 S.C. 635, 643, 576 S.E.2d 168, 172 (2003) (Another pathologist, Dr. Woodward, who was qualified as an expert in pediatric pathology testified . . . . (emphasis added)); People v. Strawbridge, 299 A.D.2d 584, 588, 751 N.Y.S.2d 606, 610 (2002) (Donald Singer, a pediatric pathologist with a specialty in perinatal pathology who is board certified in anatomic, clinical and pediatric pathology, concluded that. . . . (emphasis added)); United States v. Gaskell, 985 F.2d 1056, 1059 (11th Cir. 1993) (Dr. Glenn Wagner, the Assistant Armed Forces Medical Examiner at the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and a specialist in pediatric pathology, testified for the defense. (emphasis added)); Charney v. Secretary of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., (No. 90-1125V, March 22, 1994), n. 13 (Fed.Cl.1994) (unpublished) ([I]n the last ten years, the 400 or so members of the Society for Pediatric Pathology working with the American Board of Pathology have brought into being a certified sub-specialty of pediatric pathology. (emphasis added)). The record does not reflect that Dr. Scheuerman had sufficient training or experience with the type of infant death that occurred in this case. As previously noted, the trial court concluded that E. Hunt Scheuerman, M.D., [was] not shown to be properly qualified and/or competent to render a rebutting expert opinion as to medical causation in this case, particularly considering that he does not possess the degree of specialty of [Harrison's] expert, J. Bruce Beckwith, M.D., a pediatric pathologist of international repute . . . . (emphasis added). [1] Because an expert may not testify to his opinion on matters outside of his field of training and experience, Central Aviation Co. v. Perkinson, 269 Ala. 197, 203, 112 So.2d 326, 331 (1959), the trial court acted within its discretion in disqualifying Dr. Scheuerman as an expert witness. Harrison also argued to the trial court that Dr. Scheuerman's conclusion that Steven died of asphyxiation was based on speculation and conjecture. With respect to the cause of Steven's death, Dr. Scheuerman's affidavit states: I have reviewed the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences autopsy report of Steven Alvie Kyser, . . . the autopsy photographs . . ., photographs of the death scene. . . . I have also reviewed medical records that were provided on Steven Alvie Kyser for care rendered May 10, 2002 . . . and medical records of pediatrician, Dr. Norma Sumuy. . . as well as the deposition testimony of Dr. J. Bruce Beckwith [Harrison's expert] and Dianne [sic] Harrison. Based upon my knowledge, training and years of experience as a forensic pathologist and having investigated many deaths to determine cause of death, I am of the opinion, based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the death of Steven Alvie Kyser was proximately caused by being placed in a prone sleeping position in a lethal sleep environment and the cause of death was positional asphyxia or in other words, suffocation. In interpreting the standard set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), for determining the admissibility of expert testimony, we have said, [A] person who offers an opinion as a scientific expert must prove that he relied on scientific principles, methods, or procedures that have gained general acceptance in the field in which the expert is testifying. Slay v. Keller Indus., Inc., 823 So.2d 623, 626 (Ala.2001). We also stated in Slay that [m]ere assertions of belief, without any supporting research, testing, or experiments, cannot qualify as proper expert scientific testimony under either the `general-acceptance' standard enunciated in Frye or the `scientifically reliable' standard of Daubert [v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)]. 823 So.2d at 626. In the instant case, Dr. Scheuerman's affidavit does not show that he relied on any scientific principles, methods, or procedures, much less ones that have gained general acceptance in the field [of pediatric pathology]. Slay, 823 So.2d at 626. His conclusion that Steven died of asphyxiation is nothing more than a [m]ere assertion[] of belief, without any supporting research, testing, or experiments, [and it] cannot qualify as proper expert scientific testimony. Slay, 823 So.2d at 626. See also Whatley v. Cardinal Pest Control, 388 So.2d 529, 532 (Ala.1980) (Evidence offered in response to [a motion for a summary judgment], in the form of affidavits or otherwise, must be more than a mere verification of the allegations contained in the pleadings. . . .); Townsend v. General Motors Corp., 642 So.2d 411, 423 (Ala. 1994) (A[n expert] witness's testimony cannot be based on mere speculation and conjecture.). Based on the foregoing, the trial court was justified in determining that Dr. Scheuerman was not qualified to testify as to Steven's death, or that, if he was qualified, his affidavit testimony was based simply on speculation and conjecture and was not adequately supported by research, testing, or experimentation. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not exceed its discretion in excluding Dr. Scheuerman's testimony.