Opinion ID: 2219110
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Disallowance of Gray's Testimony During Hearing on Motion In Limine

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court improperly refused to allow Gray to testify at a pretrial competency hearing, despite the existence of medical testimony that Gray had been diagnosed and hospitalized with an acute schizophrenic reaction immediately after the killings. Defendant filed a pretrial motion styled Motion in Limine to Bar the Testimony of Paula Gray, on the basis of her alleged incompetency. Attached to the motion were copies of Gray's hospital records for May 22-24, 1978, written and signed by Dr. Watkins. Prior to hearing on the motion, the trial court ruled that Gray would not testify because the mere fact of defendant's challenge to her competency did not, by itself, justify a competency hearing. The trial court determined, however, that if defendant made a sufficient showing which would call Gray's competency into question, the court would then conduct a hearing as to competency and her testimony would be allowed. Defendant failed to make such a showing, however, and no competency hearing was held. Factors warranting a decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry as to competency must necessarily call into question the witness' ability to observe, recollect, and communicate. (See People v. Jones (1988), 123 Ill.2d 387, 405, 123 Ill.Dec. 944, 528 N.E.2d 648; see also People v. Porter (1981), 96 Ill.App.3d 976, 984, 52 Ill.Dec. 532, 422 N.E.2d 213 (defense denied the opportunity to voir dire witness with respect to competency on the basis of an arrest record indicating previous narcotics charges).) Even where a competency determination is to be made, due process does not require an examination of the witness by the challenging party. See People v. Seel (1979), 68 Ill.App.3d 996, 1002-03, 25 Ill.Dec. 99, 386 N.E.2d 370. In the present case, medical records produced by the defense in support of its motion and the testimony of Dr. Watkins failed to establish a connection between Gray's past mental problem and her ability to give competent testimony. Hospitalization itself does not reflect on Gray's competence to testify at trial; at most it established that she had once been treated for an acute schizophrenic reaction, albeit shortly after the killings, a fact the State conceded. In addition, there was no showing that Gray continued to suffer from such disability, or that she was thus disabled at the time of the killings. Consequently, we find that the trial court's denial of defendant's request to examine Gray was in the exercise of sound discretion. Defendant maintains, however, as a related matter, that the subsequent admission of Gray's testimony at trial was plain error because she was incompetent. A witness is competent to testify if he has the capacity to observe, recollect, and communicate, and his mental deficiency is considered only insofar as it affects credibility. ( People v. Jones (1988), 123 Ill.2d 387, 405, 123 Ill.Dec. 944, 528 N.E.2d 648; see People v. Dixon (1961), 22 Ill.2d 513, 515-16, 177 N.E.2d 224.) Thus, sanity is not the test of competency. ( People v. Seel, 68 Ill.App.3d at 1006, 25 Ill.Dec. 99, 386 N.E.2d 370.) Likewise, an individual suffering from mental retardation is legally competent to testify so long as he possesses the requisite capacities, and the burden to show otherwise is upon the party questioning competency. ( People v. Spencer (1983), 119 Ill.App.3d 971, 977, 75 Ill.Dec. 479, 457 N.E.2d 473.) The determination of whether a witness is competent to testify is within the sound discretion of the trial court and may be arrived at either through preliminary inquiry or by observing the witness' demeanor and ability to testify during trial. See People v. Spencer, 119 Ill.App.3d at 976, 75 Ill.Dec. 479, 457 N.E.2d 473; People v. Ford (1985), 139 Ill.App.3d 894, 901, 94 Ill.Dec. 574, 488 N.E.2d 573. Our review reveals that the trial court's subsequent admission of Gray's testimony at trial was proper. Gray's testimony in toto indicates that Gray was a competent witness. Any inconsistency regarding whether Gray had previously lied under oath obviously concerned her inability to understand the meaning of the term oath, rather than a failure to understand any moral duty to tell the truth. It is true that Gray displayed a marked tendency to remember events under direct examination, and to forget matters unrelated to the crime itself during cross-examination. Yet, this tendency appears somewhat justified given the fact that much of that cross-examination concerned whether she remembered making certain specific statements during any of several, previous separate hearings. In total, we believe that Gray's memory lapses, however, reflect more upon her credibility than her capacities. She even admitted that her memory improved a little bit upon redirect examination. In the final analysis, the trial court is in the best position to ascertain a witness' competence based upon her appearance and conduct at trial and we will not disturb that finding absent an abuse of discretion. (See People v. Garcia (1983), 97 Ill.2d 58, 78, 73 Ill.Dec. 414, 454 N.E.2d 274.) We find none here.