Opinion ID: 202583
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: USERRA Actions

Text: 10 We have not previously addressed the mechanism of proving discrimination claims under USERRA. Thus, we first turn to the statute and its history. USERRA provides, in relevant part, that: 11 (a) A person who is a member of, applies to be a member of, performs, has performed, applies to perform, or has an obligation to perform service in a uniformed service shall not be denied initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment by an employer on the basis of that membership, application for membership, performance of service, application for service, or obligation. 12 ... 13 (c) An employer shall be considered to have engaged in actions prohibited — (1) under subsection (a), if the person's membership, application for membership, service, application for service, or obligation for service in the uniformed services is a motivating factor in the employer's action, unless the employer can prove that the action would have been taken in the absence of such membership, application for membership, service, application for service, or obligation for service. 14 38 U.S.C. § 4311. 15 The statute was passed in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549, 101 S.Ct. 2510, 69 L.Ed.2d 226 (1981), in which the Court held under the predecessor of USERRA, the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act (VRRA), 6 that claims for anti-military employment discrimination would lie only if the employee could show that the discrimination was motived solely by reserve status. Id. at 559, 101 S.Ct. 2510 (emphasis added). This, in effect, kept the burden on the employee to show that any offered reason by the company was actually a pretext. In the House report accompanying passage of USERRA, Congress said that Monroe misinterpreted the original legislative intent, which was to place the burden of proof ... on the employer, once a prima facie case is established. H.R.Rep. No. 103-65, at 24 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449, 2457. The House report called instead for application of the burden shifting framework of NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983). Id. 16 Under Transportation Management, which addresses claims of unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act, the employee first has the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his or her protected status was `a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse [employment] action'; the employer may then avoid liability only by showing, as an affirmative defense, that the employer would have taken the same action without regard to the employee's protected status. Leisek v. Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898-99 (9th Cir.2002) (alterations in original) (quoting Transp. Mgmt., 462 U.S. at 401, 103 S.Ct. 2469). The circuit courts that have addressed the issue of burden-shifting under USERRA are unanimous in adopting this substantial or motivating factor test, rather than the sole motivating factor test of Monroe, and in putting the burden on the employer to show lack of pretext. See Coffman v. Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 411 F.3d 1231, 1238-39 (11th Cir.2005); Gagnon v. Sprint Corp., 284 F.3d 839, 853-54 (8th Cir.2002); Leisek, 278 F.3d at 899; Hill v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 252 F.3d 307, 312 (4th Cir.2001); Sheehan v. Dep't of Navy, 240 F.3d 1009, 1014 (Fed. Cir.2001); Gummo v. Vill. of Depew, N.Y., 75 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir.1996). 17 We agree. The language of the statute and the legislative history make clear that the employee need only show that military service was  a motivating factor in order to prove liability, unless the employer can prove that the [adverse employment] action would have been taken regardless of the employee's military service. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c) (emphasis added). Therefore, we hold that in USERRA actions there must be an initial showing by the employee that military status was at least a motivating or substantial factor in the [employer] action, upon which the [employer] must prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the action would have been taken despite the protected status. Sheehan, 240 F.3d at 1014. 18 This two-pronged burden-shifting analysis is markedly different from the three-pronged burden-shifting analysis in Title VII actions. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the burden of persuasion in Title VII actions always remains with the employee. Therefore, after the employee establishes a prima facie case of discriminatory animus, the employer only has the burden of producing some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's [termination]. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Then the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the employer's stated reason for terminating him was in fact a pretext. Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 161 (1st Cir.1998). By contrast, under USERRA, the employee does not have the burden of demonstrating that the employer's stated reason is a pretext. Instead, the employer must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the stated reason was not a pretext; that is, that the action would have been taken in the absence of [the employee's military] service. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c) (emphasis added).