Opinion ID: 4103125
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: October 2012 Calendar Call

Text: On October 3, 2012, Ammar moved to dismiss the September 17, 2012 superseding indictment pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act. He noted that unless the 9 Case: 13-12044 Date Filed: 11/29/2016 Page: 10 of 19 continuance granted by the court was excludable, the trial had not commenced within the 70 days required by the Act. Citing Zedner, he further noted that the fact that some defendants had agreed to the continuance was not sufficient, by itself, to comply with the Speedy Trial Act. Instead, the Act requires that, for all ends-of-justice continuances, the court make the appropriate findings set out in the statute. The government opposed the motion. The government acknowledged that the court had not used the phrase “ends of justice” in its order granting the continuance nor had it even mentioned the Speedy Trial Act, but it argued that the court had performed the balancing of interests required by § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, the government noted that, prior to ruling on the motion to dismiss, the court would be permitted to explicitly make the necessary ends-of-justice findings. The government requested that the court make those findings, which it contended were supported by the reasons for a continuance offered at the September 13, 2011 status conference. The district court addressed the matter at a calendar call on October 4, 2012. The court first stated that the trial date was “by agreement of everybody.” Ammar corrected the court, replying that he had requested that trial be set for December 2011. The court then stated that the delay “was caused by this death penalty statute and the law pertaining to setting trials.” Ammar explained that the district 10 Case: 13-12044 Date Filed: 11/29/2016 Page: 11 of 19 court’s order setting the trial date did not “set forth excludable time in the public [sic] best interest or in the interest of the defendant.” The court responded, “I asked each of you if you agreed to this, and everybody said yes,” and “[e]verybody knew they were waiving the Speedy Trial Act.” Although the government stated that it believed the court had engaged in the necessary balancing of factors and that the court was not required to “use some magic words, [like] the words ‘ends of justice,’” the government again requested that the court make an explicit ends-of-justice finding. Specifically, the government requested the court to hold “that when [it] issued that order it was in the ends of justice.” The court replied, “At the end of the day, if they all agree to [the trial date], that’s always been adequate.” The court disagreed that it had to say any words other than what date it was setting the trial. Further, the court opined that it had been Ammar’s duty to advise the court if the Speedy Trial Act was being violated and to request a trial. The court then asked the government, “What magic words are left out of the order that I entered? Should I put in there that [counsel for one of the codefendants] couldn’t go to trial on the September 15th calendar because he has a conflict, and somebody else couldn’t go later or before?” The government responded that it thought the court had earlier set out sufficiently the reasons for the continuance, but it once more urged the court to make an ends-of-justice 11 Case: 13-12044 Date Filed: 11/29/2016 Page: 12 of 19 finding on the record, to hold “that [the continuance] outweighs the public [sic] and the defendant’s interest in a speedy trial. That would make that time excludable.” The court inquired whether the government was arguing that the motion to dismiss should be denied. The government responded, “I think if your Honor feels it needs to be excluded and utter those magic words, you should.” The court responded that it did not “wish to go back and change an order that [it had already] entered, that [it] felt was perfectly acceptable, as a matter of fact agreeable with everybody.” Moreover, the court explained, “that’s the reason I entered the order.” The court continued, “It was in the interest of—both sides had an interest. The government had an interest in not having to try the case two or three times or whatever. The defendants had an interest, and we paid great sums of money to especially hire death penalty counsel. They had a big interest in seeing if they could persuade the [DOJ] not to seek the death penalty, which they did ultimately. That was a big advantage to them. . . . It was fair to everybody.” The government then stated that, “regardless of what the defendant says, the Court can make a finding that the ends of justice outweigh—a continuance in the interest of justice.” The court replied, “That’s why I’m overruling the defense [sic] request to move the case forward. When I’m granting a time that everybody wants, there’s no need for it. It’s pointless.” The court then denied Ammar’s 12 Case: 13-12044 Date Filed: 11/29/2016 Page: 13 of 19 motion, “in the interest of fair play in handling these cases and everything that is reasonable and decent, the effort I put into achieving a trial date that was agreeable to everybody and worked to everybody’s advantage.”