Opinion ID: 2610178
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the principal action

Text: The questions on appeal are: 1. Whether the evidence supports the trial court's finding that Yuma was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the earlier Phillips-to-Allen trust deed; 2. Whether it was shown that Webb is only the nominal title holder to the property, and as such, he is not a proper party in interest as per NRCP 17(a); [1] 3. Whether the trial court's findings of fact are incomplete and conflicting, and as such, are inadequate under NRCP 52(a); [2] and 4. Whether hearsay exhibits were improperly admitted. This issue will not be entertained. For failure to press the question with citations of authorities it is deemed abandoned. 1. The trial court found that Yuma from whence Webb's title is derived purchased the Overton ranch in good faith, paid value therefor, and had no notice of the earlier unrecorded trust deed to the Allens. This finding is supported by the evidence and will not be disturbed. Mel Decker, Yuma's President, was previously acquainted with Phillips in some limited degree. No evidence of collusion, however, appears from the record  only that Phillips had considered himself entitled to a sales fee or commission for another and different transaction involving Yuma which Decker paid by giving Phillips an interest in other property, certain apartment lots, owned by Yuma, called Anderson Lake. The Allens' multifarious attack on the Yuma-Phillips dealings do not overcome the basic principle that where there is substantial evidence in the record to support the lower court's findings they will not be disturbed despite suspicions and doubts based upon conflicting evidence. Brandon v. Travitsky, 86 Nev. 613, 472 P.2d 353 (1970); Le Mon v. Landers, 81 Nev. 329, 402 P.2d 648 (1965). Webb's burden of showing that Yuma had no notice of the trust deed was met. Bailey v. Butner, 64 Nev. 1, 176 P.2d 226 (1947). 2. The Allens seek to take advantage of a remark made by Webb's counsel that Webb was a mere nominal holder for Hughes Tool Company and invoke NRCP 17(a). The remark was made during opening argument. As such, it is not a judicial admission and not enough to counter the presumption that the ownership of real estate is where the title says it is. Picetti v. Orcio, 57 Nev. 52, 57, 58 P.2d 1046 (1936). We do not deem counsel's statement to be a binding admission. Cf. Gottwals v. Rencher, 60 Nev. 35, 51, 98 P.2d 481 (1940); Edmonds v. Perry, 62 Nev. 41, 71, 140 P.2d 566 (1943); IX Whitmore on Evidence, § 2594A (1940); but cf. Laird v. Air Carrier Engine Service, 263 F.2d 948, 953 (5th Cir.1959). Furthermore, Webb's description of the details of the transaction indicates he is the owner and the Allens provide no contrary evidence. The finding of fact on this point was clearly supported by the evidence and will be upheld. Brandon v. Travitsky, supra. 3. We cannot agree that the findings of fact are incomplete because they fail to recite what consideration Yuma paid for the ranch. A specific finding of what the consideration was may be implied from the record. Pease v. Taylor, 86 Nev. 195, 467 P.2d 109 (1970). Equity in 180 homes, as here, worth about $150,000 net above incumbrance, reasonably can be assumed as the consideration. Nor is there substance to appellants' contention that the findings are obscure simply because the transaction is sometimes referred to as a purchase, other times as a trade. In essence they are one and the same here. Black's Law Dictionary, Purchase, 4th ed. (1951); 35A Words and Phrases, Purchaser (1963); cf. Murphy v. State, 65 Ariz. 338, 181 P.2d 336, 354 (1947); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Kircher, 47 Ohio App. 140, 191 N.E. 374 (1934).