Opinion ID: 1125205
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Louisiana's Ex Post Facto Law

Text: LA. CONST. art. I, § 23 prohibits the enactment of any ex post facto law. [21] Traditionally, Louisiana jurisprudence has addressed this issue by making a determination of whether a law passed after the commission of an offense which in relation to that offense or its punishment altered the situation of a party to his disadvantage. Under such an inquiry, suspect legislation qualified as an ex post facto law if: (1) it was passed after the date of the offense; (2) it related to the offense or its punishment; and (3) the legislation altered the situation of the accused to his disadvantage. See, State ex rel. Glover, 660 So.2d at 1200; Police Ass'n of New Orleans v. New Orleans, 94-1078 (La.1/17/95), 649 So.2d 951, 966 (holding that under LA. CONST. art. I, § 23, an ex post facto law is one passed after the commission of an offense which in relation to that offense or its consequences alters the situation of a party to its disadvantage.); State ex rel. Turner v. Maggio, 463 So.2d 1304, 1307 (La.1985) (Ex post facto changes in the substance of a criminal penalty cannot work to the disadvantage of the accused.); State ex rel. Bickman v. Dees, 367 So.2d 283, 291 (La.1978) (Any law passed after the commission of an offense which ... alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage is an ex post facto law.); State v. Sepulvado, 342 So.2d 630, 635 (La.1977) (An ex post facto law... is one passed after the ... commission of an act, which retroactively changes the legal consequences of such fact.); State v. Ferrie, 243 La. 416, 144 So.2d 380, 382 (1962) (An ex post facto law [is] one enacted after the offense has been committed and which in relation to it or its consequences alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage.) After viewing this jurisprudence, it is clear that in ex post facto analysis Louisiana courts have broadly focused on whether a law has disadvantaged an accused rather than determining the narrower question of whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which the crime is punishable. Collins, 497 U.S. at 41, 110 S.Ct. 2715. We must now determine whether the recent United States Supreme Court decisions which have narrowed the protection offered in the ex post facto clause should likewise be applicable to the interpretation of Louisiana's ex post facto clause. It has long been this State's tradition for Louisiana courts to look to federal case law for guidance in instances where our laws are patterned after or based upon federal law. See King v. Phelps Dunbar, L.L.P., 98-1805 (La.6/4/99), 743 So.2d 181, 187. [22] In the case sub judice, it is clear that not only is our constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto laws patterned after the United States constitution, our enactment is mandated by Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution. [23] Accordingly, we find that the Collins and Morales line of jurisprudence makes our jurisprudential interpretation of ex post facto no longer viable. Therefore, we adopt the Collins and Morales line of jurisprudence which significantly narrows the definition of an ex post facto law from the disadvantage line of jurisprudence to whether the change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty.