Opinion ID: 884815
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Standard to Reeves' Claims

Text: ¶ 20 A. Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment as to Reeves' claim that she was terminated in violation of § 49-4-101, MCA? ¶ 21 To prevail on its motion for summary judgment, Dairy Queen has the burden of showing that no issues of material fact remain and that Reeves cannot prove a prima facie case of discrimination as a matter of law. Under the Act, [i]t is unlawful to discriminate, in hiring or employment, against a person because of the person's physical disability. There is no discrimination when the nature or extent of the disability reasonably precludes the performance of the particular employment or when the particular employment may subject the person with a disability or that person's fellow employees to physical harm. Section 49-4-101, MCA. Thus, to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Reeves must show: (1) she belonged to a protected class; (2) she was otherwise qualified for continued employment and her employment did not subject her or others to physical harm; and (3) Dairy Queen denied her continued employment because of her disability. See Hafner, 886 P.2d at 950; §§ 49-4-101 and 49-2-303(1)(a), MCA.
¶ 22 At the time of her discharge, Reeves suffered from high blood pressure and, as a result, experienced spells of dizziness, shortness of breath, bloodshot eyes, and flushing. To prove a prima facie case of discrimination, Reeves must show that because she suffers from high blood pressure, she is disabled and thus entitled to the protections of the Act. Hafner, 886 P.2d at 950. The District Court found that because Montana law has not established high blood pressure as a disability, Reeves is not entitled to protection under the Act. However, Reeves and the amici curiae argue that whether someone is disabled is an issue of fact that must be determined on a case-by-case basis. ¶ 23 Under the Act, a physical disability is defined as either a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of a person's major life activities or a condition regarded as such an impairment. Section 49-2-101(19)(a), MCA. Reeves argues that she is disabled under either definition. Because the Act is patterned after the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, this Court often looks to federal case law in interpreting its provisions. Hafner, 886 P.2d at 950-51; McCann v. Trustees, Dodson School Dist. (1991), 249 Mont. 362, 364, 816 P.2d 435, 437. Any physiological disorder or condition affecting the respiratory or cardiovascular systems is among the types of physical impairments included in federal disability discrimination laws. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). Neither party disputes that Reeves suffers from high blood pressure, a condition affecting her cardiovascular system, and that therefore she has a physical impairment under the Act. ¶ 24 A physical impairment is only considered a disability under the Act if the condition substantially limits one or more of a person's major life activities. Section 49-2-101(19)(a)(i), MCA. Federal regulation defines major life activities as functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working, and this list is not exhaustive. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). For example, sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching may also be considered major life activities. S.Rep. No. 116, at 21 (1989). ¶ 25 Under federal law, the determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity is one that must be made on a case-by-case basis. As noted in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Interpretive Guidelines: The ADA [Americans with Disabilities Act] and this part, like the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, do not attempt a laundry list of impairments that are disabilities. The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual. EEOC Interpretive Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j), App. at B-9 (1995). Because the same types of impairments often vary in severity and often restrict different people to different degrees or in different ways, consideration of factors such as the nature, severity, expected duration, and permanent or long-term impact of the impairment is required. EEOC Interpretive Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (1995); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). ¶ 26 We agree with Reeves that determining whether a person is disabled necessarily requires a factual determination about whether, and to what extent, a person is limited in his or her performance of a major life activity. The District Court held that because [n]o statute, administrative rule, or any precedent within Montana has previously established high blood pressure as a physical disability, Reeves is not disabled. However, a person is not disabled simply because the condition from which he or she suffers is found on a judicially or legislatively created list of disabilities. Medical advances, the discovery of new medical conditions and the improved understanding of old ones, renders the formation of such a list of disabilities impracticable, if not impossible. To require all diseases to be labeled as disabling or nondisabling would deny to persons with newly discovered or misunderstood diseases the protections provided by the Act until a court or legislature could reach the issue. ¶ 27 Further, a physical impairment that substantially limits one person's major life activities may not so limit another person suffering from the same impairment. For example, high blood pressure (hypertension) can be diagnosed as slightly, moderately, or seriously elevated. In some cases, high blood pressure can be controlled by medication; however, at its most severe, it can be a life-threatening disease. To include or exclude high blood pressure in the definition of disability as a matter of law, without consideration of its impact on the individual, either includes in the definition the very large number of people who suffer from only slightly elevated blood pressure or excludes persons who suffer from the disease in its most severe form. ¶ 28 Thus, we hold that whether a person is disabled under the Act cannot be decided as a matter of law, but rather requires a factual determination to be made on a case-by-case basis. In this case, there is ample evidence to create an issue of fact regarding whether Reeves is disabled. The record contains evidence that Reeves is limited in her ability to walk, perform manual tasks, breathe, and work. Co-workers have testified that Reeves nearly fainted in the kitchen while attempting to grasp an item out of her reach. Barber testified that Reeves could not do much work without becoming flushed and out-of-breath. Reeves suffers from dizziness, ear-ringing, and severe headaches. ¶ 29 Further, this Court has held that under the ADA, a person is substantially limited if he or she experiences difficulties in securing, retaining, or advancing in employment. Martinell v. Montana Power Co. (1994), 268 Mont. 292, 310, 886 P.2d 421, 432. Because of Reeves' high blood pressure, Dairy Queen felt that it was for her own well being that we let her go. Obviously, this is proof that Reeves' condition made it difficult for her to retain her 5+ year employment with Dairy Queen. ¶ 30 A person is entitled to the protections of the Act not only if he or she suffers from a substantially limiting impairment, but also if he or she suffers from a condition regarded as such an impairment. Section 49-2-101(19)(a)(iii), MCA. Congress added the regarded as provision to the ADA to recognize that individuals have historically suffered discrimination resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7). High blood pressure is an example of such a perceived disability: [S]uppose that an employee has controlled high blood pressure that is not substantially limiting. If an employer reassigns the individual to less strenuous work because of unsubstantiated fears that the individual will suffer a heart attack if he or she continues to perform strenuous work, the employer would be regarding the individual as disabled. EEOC Interpretive Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2( l ) (1995). ¶ 31 In his letter, Barber acknowledged that it was a combination of having high blood pressure and working in a position as a fast order cook working under conditions of pressure, stress and heat that caused Dairy Queen to fire Reeves. This letter alone is enough to create a fact issue as to whether Dairy Queen regarded Reeves as disabled. Thus, we determine that issues of fact exist regarding whether Reeves is disabled or was regarded as such by Dairy Queen. ¶ 32 2. Qualified for Continued Employment ¶ 33 To prove her prima facie case, Reeves must establish that she was otherwise qualified for continued employment. The District Court found that her symptoms of high blood pressure (not the fact of high blood pressure itself) affected [Reeves'] work performance and constituted a clear and present danger to herself and others. We first note that the distinction made by the District Court between the symptoms of high blood pressure and the disease itself is false. Symptoms are merely the outward and subjective signs of an impairment, Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1196 (9th ed.1986), and it is no more legal to discriminate against one who exhibits the symptoms of a disease than to discriminate against one who suffers from the disease itself. ¶ 34 The testimony in the record is that in her 5+ years at Dairy Queen, Reeves was regarded as an excellent employee. She was never reprimanded, and her co-workers testified that she was good at her job. Dairy Queen presented no evidence that Reeves could not perform any aspect of her job as kitchen manager. Thus, we determine that whether Reeves is otherwise qualified is still a disputed issue of fact. ¶ 35 Under the Act, a disabled employee may be discharged when the particular employment may subject the person with a disability or that person's fellow employees to physical harm. Section 49-4-101, MCA. Here, the finding that Reeves' continued employment with Dairy Queen increased the risk of harm to her and to others appears to be based primarily on one incident in which Reeves almost fainted and fell from a countertop. Barber never attempted to talk with Reeves or her doctor about the seriousness of her condition specifically or to learn the effects of high blood pressure generally. Rather, Dairy Queen apparently fired Reeves based on a misdirected and uninformed conclusion that it would be best for Donna. As amicus curiae MHRC noted, [t]he benign or well-intended violation of another's civil rights can be as successful in denying equal opportunities and full participation for the disabled ... as an act born of malice or prejudice. Misguided concern may explain why Reeves lost her job, but it does not provide a legal justification for the defendant's actions. We hold that Dairy Queen has not met its burden of showing that no material issues of fact remain regarding whether Reeves was otherwise qualified for continued employment. ¶ 36 3. Disability Caused Termination ¶ 37 Under § 49-2-303, MCA, it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to refuse employment to a person because of physical disability. Proof of this element includes proof that there is a causal connection between adverse action by the [employer] and the [employee's] membership in a protected class. Rule 24.9.610(2)(b)(v), ARM. The District Court found that Reeves offered no facts to suggest that Dairy Queen's motive was to discriminate against Reeves. As stated in section I, the parties do not dispute that Dairy Queen fired Reeves because of her high blood pressure. However, we hold that the District Court erred in holding, as a matter of law, that this action was not illegal discrimination. ¶ 38 Therefore, we hold that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment as to Reeves' claim that she was discriminated against in violation of § 49-4-101, MCA.