Opinion ID: 202439
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Commitment

Text: 17 In Maine, under the current statute (which was in effect when Holt was ordered admitted to a mental hospital), a person can be involuntarily admitted to a mental hospital on an emergency basis. Under Maine's emergency admission statute, to initiate such an admission, [a]ny health officer, law enforcement officer or other person, must make a written application which states his belief that the person [who would be admitted] is mentally ill and, because of his illness, poses a likelihood of serious harm. 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3863(1) (2004). This application must be accompanied by a certificate of examination signed by a licensed physician, physician's assistant, certified psychiatric clinical nurse specialist, nurse practitioner or a licensed clinical psychologist, stating that the person to be admitted is mentally ill and, as a result, poses a likelihood of serious harm. 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3863(2). A judicial officer then reviews the application and medical certificate. 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3863(3). If the judicial officer finds that the documents are regular and in accordance with the law, the judge ... shall endorse them, at which point the subject of the application may be transported to a hospital. Id. 18 After a person has been involuntarily admitted to a hospital under this process, he must be examined by a staff physician or licensed clinical psychologist within 24 hours. 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3863(7)(C). If an examination does not take place within 24 hours, or the examiner refuses to certify that the person is mentally ill and as a result poses a likelihood of serious harm, the person is immediately discharged. Id. If the examiner certifies that the person poses a likelihood of serious harm as a result of his mental illness, then the person may choose to be informally admitted, or the chief administrator of the hospital can seek involuntary commitment of the person within five days from the initial admission under 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3864. 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3863(5)(B). Thus, in contrast to the initial admission certification, which may be made by persons who are not licensed psychologists or physicians, the certification required after the 24-hour examination must be made by a licensed psychologist or physician. 19 In United States v. Chamberlain, 159 F.3d 656 (1st Cir.1998), this court considered whether a person involuntarily admitted to a hospital under 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3863 has been committed to a mental institution for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Under the Maine statute then in effect, a certification by a licensed psychologist or physician was required both for initial admission and after the 24-hour examination. Chamberlain, 159 F.3d at 666-67. In Chamberlain, an initial application for involuntary admission had been made, was certified by a licensed physician, and endorsed by a judge. Id. at 657. The defendant was then admitted to a hospital and was examined by a physician within 24 hours who certified that the defendant posed a likelihood of serious harm as result of a mental illness. Id. After the initial five-day emergency admission, the defendant voluntarily admitted himself to the hospital and, therefore, the chief administrator of the hospital did not seek an involuntary commitment order under 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3864. Id. The defendant argued that a person cannot be deemed committed until after the defendant has a full hearing. Essentially, the defendant argued that no commitment can occur unless a final involuntary commitment order is secured under 34-B M.R.S.A. § 3864. Id. at 661. 20 The court noted that Congress aimed broadly in the Gun Control Act and Congress believed that the mere risk or potential for violence was a sufficient reason to prohibit certain categories of persons from possessing firearms. Id. at 660. In light of these objectives, the court held that the five-day detention was a commitment, concluding that the substance of the mental institute admission procedures, rather than the label of the procedures as a commitment, is controlling for the federal statute. Id. at 663, 665. The court thus parted ways with the Fifth and Eighth circuits, which had allowed the state legislature's labeling of an emergency admission as a commitment to control for federal purposes. Id. at 662. 21 There have been no subsequent developments that would suggest that Chamberlain was wrongly decided, and we are obligated to follow it in any event. There are, however, two differences between this case and Chamberlain. First, there is a factual difference. In Chamberlain, the patient was admitted to a mental institute and examined within 24 hours, but here the record does not reveal whether a 24-hour examination occurred. We do not think that the existence of a 24-hour examination makes a difference in the outcome, nor did Chamberlain suggest that it should. As the Chamberlain court noted, at the time the judicial order was issued, and before the second examination had occurred, Chamberlain was ordered detained in a mental institution for five days based on a judicial order that this was in accordance with law. Id. at 663. This process meets the ordinary definition of commitment embraced in Chamberlain: to place in or send officially to confinement . . . to consign legally to a mental institution. . . . 1 Id. at 661 (quoting Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary (1971)). We conclude that the term committed in the statute refers to a judicial (or possibly an administrative) order of commitment and does not depend on the ultimate outcome of the commitment. See also United States v. Vertz, 40 Fed.Appx. 69, 73 (6th Cir.2002) (unpublished) (finding a defendant committed where a petition was filed by a psychiatrist in probate court but the required 24-hour follow-up psychiatrist examination did not occur). 2 22 Thus, a commitment under the Maine statute occurs when the court orders an involuntary hospitalization and not when the licensed psychologist or physician determines that the individual should remain in the institution after the 24-hour examination, and Chamberlain is not distinguishable based on the existence in that case of a 24-hour examination. 3 23 The second difference between this case and Chamberlain involves the amendment of the Maine statute to permit an initial commitment to be based on a certification of a physician's assistant, a certified psychiatric clinical nurse specialist, or a nurse practitioner in addition to a certification by a licensed psychologist or physician. 34-B. M.R.S.A. § 3863(2). We need not reach the question whether a judicial order for admission based, for example, on a certification by a physician's assistant would constitute a commitment under the federal statute or, indeed, whether such a court-ordered admission would satisfy due process requirements (a condition, we may assume, of a commitment under the federal statute). Here, as in Chamberlain, the initial order was based on a physicians's certificate. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979) (holding due process for commitment of a minor is satisfied if a physician evaluates the patient's medical and emotional condition); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) (Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either himself or others and is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists. (emphasis omitted)). 24 There is therefore no merit to appellant's arguments that the element of commitment was not properly charged to the jury and that he was not committed within the meaning of the federal statute.