Opinion ID: 2605870
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the requirement of a statement of reasons

Text: The basis for the trial court's decision is that the Assembly did not articulate any reasons for disapproval of the plat. There is no statute or ordinance requiring the Assembly to explain its action in these circumstances. However, the trial court's conclusion is consistent with previous decisions of this court. Thus in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Local Boundary Commission, 518 P.2d 92, 97 n. 11 (Alaska 1974), we stated: We recognize that in the usual case findings of fact would be required even in the absence of a statutory duty in order to facilitate judicial review, insure careful administrative deliberation, assist the parties in preparing for review, and restrain agencies within the bounds of their instruction. See 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 1605 at 446-48 (1958). In Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 36-37 (Alaska 1976), at issue was a statute requiring the Director of the Division of Lands to find that the interests of the State would be best served by a proposed land disposition before making the disposition. We held that although the Director was not expressly obligated to make a formal written finding, at a minimum he was required to establish a record which reflected the basis for his decision. We noted that the purpose of this requirement would be to ensure that [the decision] was not arbitrary, capricious, or prompted by corruption. Ibid. n. 20. The administrative action taken in Moore was informal, not adjudicative. Here, by contrast, the proceeding was of a formal and adjudicative character. In such cases findings and reasons have with near uniformity been required in other jurisdictions, see K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 1605, 444 (1958), while in cases such as Moore involving informal administrative action, more varied results have been reached. See K. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies § 1600-9, 139-41 (1977 Cum. Supp.). We, therefore, have no hesitation in concluding that the superior court was correct in finding that the Assembly's action was defective because of the absence of a statement of reasons. With respect to the actions of the Commission there is a specific requirement. It is imposed by AS 29.33.160(a) which states in relevant part: The board shall state on its record and in writing to the applicant its reasons for disapproval of a plat. Section 20.16.170(a) of the Kenai Peninsula Borough Ordinances elaborates on this requirement: If the commission modifies or denies a final plat, the commission shall note in its motion those sections of this title with which the proposed final plat does not comply and the grounds for finding noncompliance. Where appropriate, the planning commission may adopt as its statement of findings justifying denial of a final plat the findings of the pertinent staff report transmitted to the planning commission by the planning director. In this case the planning commission complied with the statute, at least minimally. It delivered to Ryherd a form entitled Notice of Planning Commission Action referring to the meeting of February 23, 1976 which stated: The final or preliminary/final plat has been: ... disapproved for the reasons listed in the attached minutes. Attached to the form were the minutes of the meeting and included in the minutes were reasons given by two of the Planning Commissioners for their opposition to the plat as well as the statement of the Planning Director. [1] A similar practice was followed with respect to the March 15, 1976 Planning Commission meeting at which the plat was again disapproved. However, the Planning Commission did not comply with that portion of the ordinance which requires that the Commission note those sections of the subdivision ordinance on which the Commission is basing its action. Thus, the Planning Commission's conduct was also defective. In our view, the appropriate remedy in this case is to remand the case to the superior court with directions to remand the case to the Planning Commission. That is the course of action typically followed where an agency which has a duty to make written findings and conclusions has failed to do so. See, e.g., Public Service Commission v. Fort Wayne Union Railway Co., 232 Ind. 82, 111 N.E.2d 719 (1953); Society for Protection of New Hampshire Forests v. Site Evaluation Committee, 115 N.H. 163, 337 A.2d 778 (1975); Abbotts Dairies, Inc. v. Armstrong, 14 N.J. 319, 102 A.2d 372 (1954); State Board of Equalization v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 457 P.2d 963 (Wyo. 1969). In view of the considerable delay which has taken place since the Commission's last action, the Planning Commission should be instructed to hold an additional hearing, the proceedings of which should be recorded, on the request for final approval. If the Commission determines that denial is appropriate it should express its reasons and the underlying findings on which those reasons are based and, as required by the ordinance, it should cite the sections of the ordinance on which it relies. If the Commission determines that the plat should be approved, it should grant approval and express its reasons for that action. [2] REVERSED AND REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. COMPTON, J., not participating.