Opinion ID: 1801839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Self-representation in Capital Cases

Text: Defendant contends that in capital cases the Sixth Amendment right to represent oneself, recognized in Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525] ( Faretta ), must give way to the requirements of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the federal Constitution that the death penalty be imposed through a fair and reliable procedure. [7] He maintains the latter principle requires representation by counsel, even contrary to the defendant's choice, in all capital trials or, at a minimum, whenever the self-representing defendant's conduct of his or her trial renders it unfair. Defendant's inept conduct of his own defense, he further argues, made his trial fundamentally unfair. (3) We addressed and rejected much the same set of claims in People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 736-740 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145], and other cases. We have explained that the autonomy interest motivating the decision in Faretta the principle that for the state to force a lawyer on a defendant would impinge on `that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law' ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834)applies at a capital penalty trial as well as in a trial of guilt. ( Blair, at pp. 738-740.) This is true even when self-representation at the penalty phase permits the defendant to preclude any investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence. ( Id. at p. 737; see also People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1073-1074 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335]; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1364-1365 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259].) A defendant convicted of a capital crime may legitimately choose a strategy aimed at obtaining a sentence of death rather than one of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, for some individuals may rationally prefer the former to the latter. ( People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1222-1223 [259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698].) Moreover, a rule requiring reversal when a capital defendant chooses self-representation and presents no mitigating evidence could easily be misused by a knowledgeable defendant who wished to embed his trial with reversible error. ( Id. at pp. 1227-1228.) Nor does the likelihood or actuality of a poor performance by a defendant acting in propria persona defeat the federal self-representation right. The Faretta court explicitly recognized the probability defendants will be ill-served by waiving counsel and relying on their own unskilled efforts, but nonetheless held the defendant's choice must be honored. ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834.) The high court, however, has adhered to the principles of Faretta even with the understanding that self-representation more often than not results in detriment to the defendant, if not outright unfairness. [Citations.] Under these circumstances, we are not free to hold that the government's interest in ensuring the fairness and integrity of defendant's trial outweighed defendant's right to self-representation. ( People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 739-740, fn. omitted.) We conclude, therefore, that neither the fact defendant faced the death penalty nor the asserted ineptness of his defense efforts warranted denying or revoking his in propria persona status. We address in the next part the more difficult question of whether self-representation should have been denied or revoked on the ground defendant was mentally incompetent to represent himself.