Opinion ID: 1783351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Life to Life Imprisonment as Authorized Sentence for Class IB Felony.

Text: [4] On appeal, Moore argues that the life to life sentence imposed by the district court was not an authorized penalty under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2204(1)(a) (Reissue 2008), which provides in part that in imposing an indeterminate sentence upon an offender, the court shall (ii) Beginning July 1, 1998: (A) Fix the minimum and maximum limits of the sentence to be served within the limits provided by law for any class of felony other than a Class IV felony, except that when a maximum limit of life is imposed by the court for a Class IB felony, the minimum limit may be any term of years not less than the statutory mandatory minimum. If the criminal offense is a Class IV felony, the court shall fix the minimum and maximum limits of the sentence, but the minimum limit fixed by the court shall not be less than the minimum provided by law nor more than one-third of the maximum term and the maximum limit shall not be greater than the maximum provided by law[.] In State v. Marrs, [6] we rejected the argument now advanced by Moore, that life to life imprisonment was not an authorized sentence. This court concluded that there was no statutory requirement that the affirmatively stated minimum term for a Class IB felony sentence be less than the maximum term [and that a]lthough § 29-2204(1)(a)(ii) permits a sentencing judge imposing a maximum term of life imprisonment for a Class IB felony to impose a minimum term of years not less than the statutory mandatory minimum, it does not require the judge to do so. [7] We therefore held that a life to life sentence for second degree murder was a permissible sentence under § 29-2204. Moore acknowledges that Marrs is on point, but contends that we should revisit that decision. In support of this contention, Moore directs us to our opinion in Poindexter v. Houston. [8] Moore argues that in Poindexter, which was decided after Marrs, we concluded that a sentence with a minimum term of life is in effect a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Moore argues that under Neb.Rev. Stat. § 28-105 (Reissue 2008), which sets forth the range of penalties for felonies, such a sentence is only permissible for a Class IA felony. Because Moore was convicted of a Class IB felony, he argues, his life to life sentence was in violation of § 28-105. We decline Moore's invitation to reverse Marrs. As an initial matter, we disagree with Moore's characterization of our opinion in Poindexter. In Poindexter, we were presented with the question of whether Nebraska law required the commutation of a life sentence to a term of years before a defendant was eligible for parole; we concluded that in both 1969 and 2008, such was required. We made no finding that a life to life sentence was in effect a life sentence without parole. And to the extent that Moore argues that his life to life sentence was in violation of § 28-105, we also reject that contention. Though admittedly not expressly addressed in Marrs, it is clear from a review of the Marrs decision that in interpreting § 29-2204, this court was aware of and considered § 28-105. Moore's first assignment of error is without merit.