Opinion ID: 1159595
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mitigating Factors: Statutory

Text: ¶ 46 At sentencing, Martinez asserted that the statutory mitigating factors found in A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1) (significantly impaired capacity) and (G)(5)(age) existed at the time of the crime.
¶ 47 Although the trial court found that Martinez had a personality disorder which undoubtedly affected his conduct and behavior, it concluded that he did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1). On appeal, Martinez concedes his ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, but maintains that his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired on August 15, 1995. Martinez points to his violent childhood during which his father regularly beat his mother in the presence of the children. ¶ 48 The beatings were not limited to Martinez' mother. Martinez and his sister, Julia, both suffered physical abuse at the hands of their father. Martinez' father would often paddle or whip Martinez with a belt. After the beatings, Martinez would show Julia the big red welts on his legs and sometimes on his arms. Tr. July 9, 1998 at 150. To protect himself, Martinez began sleeping with a knife. This trauma adversely affected Martinez' development to such a degree that, at the age of fifteen, he was diagnosed as having characteristics of either borderline personality disorder or anti-social personality disorder. ¶ 49 At the aggravation/mitigation hearing, Martinez called Dr. Susan Parrish, Ph. D., to testify about his psychological condition. Dr. Parrish conducted a three hour psychological evaluation. She tested his intelligence and found that his IQ was well-above average (120 on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test; 100 is average). On the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, Dr. Parrish diagnosed Martinez as suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder [PTSD], and also Personality Disorder NOS, Not Otherwise Specified. Tr. July 22, 1998 at 16. She believed these disorders were due to Martinez' upbringing. ¶ 50 During her examination, Dr. Parrish discovered that Martinez displayed characteristics of impulsivity or failure to plan, irritability and aggressiveness, and reckless disregard for safety of self and others. She stated that these characteristics are commonly associated with someone who comes from an environment where there was a prolonged exposure to violence. Id. at 31. Martinez was a product of his environment and his nature.... [G]iven the environment that he had ... the decision that ... is the most salient is that he's going to survive. Id. at 51. Dr. Parrish explained that survival is the first thing that anyone with PTSD considers. A stressful event becomes a life-and-death situation. Id. She testified that when Officer Martin stopped Martinez on the Beeline Highway, Martinez probably thought, I'm not going back to prison. This man intends to put me in prison. It's me or him [sic]. Id. at 75. This led Dr. Parrish to conclude that Martinez was likely in a dissociative state at the time he shot Officer Martin. ¶ 51 The State retained Dr. Michael B. Bayless, Ph.D., to rebut Dr. Parrish's testimony. Dr. Bayless conducted his own examination of Martinez and found that Martinez scored 127 on the Shipley Institute of Living Scale intelligence test. A score of 127 is in the superior range. Dr. Bayless then reviewed Dr. Parrish's results on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory and diagnosed Martinez as having Anti-Social Personality Disorder. He strongly disagreed with Dr. Parrish's diagnosis of PTSD because Martinez' record lacked any evidence of PTSD symptoms. Dr. Bayless suggested that one would have seen symptoms of PTSD in his historical data and clinical data.... Tr. July 31, 1998 at 19-20. Dr. Bayless explained: When you have PTSD, this is pervasive anxiety. Anxiety at such a level that it does interfere with your social and occupational functioning. It is not something that happens and goes away, happens and goes away. It is something that is pervasive.... It doesn't get smaller. It doesn't go away instantaneously. There is no evidence in the file, whatsoever, that I could find, to substantiate a diagnosis of PTSD with Martinez. Id. at 21. This led Dr. Bayless to conclude that Martinez was not in a dissociative state when he murdered Officer Martin. ¶ 52 On appeal, Martinez argues that the trial court erroneously failed to find the existence of the A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1) mitigating factor because, although significant impairment usually requires the existence of a mental disease or defect, see State v. Stokley, 182 Ariz. 505, 521-22, 898 P.2d 454, 470-71 (1995), lack of mental disease or defect does not preclude a(G)(1) finding. To support this argument, Martinez cites State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 951 P.2d 869 (1997). ¶ 53 In Trostle, the defendant's mental health expert offered uncontroverted evidence of the defendant's mental impairment. Id. at 19, 951 P.2d at 884. But here, Dr. Parrish's findings were directly controverted by Dr. Bayless. Dr. Bayless strongly disagreed with Dr. Parrish's PTSD diagnosis. He believed that the only disorder Martinez may have had was Anti-Social Personality Disorder and that he was not in a dissociative state when he killed Officer Martin. The trial court heard both experts testify and chose one over the other. See State v. Doerr, 193 Ariz. 56, 69, 969 P.2d 1168, 1181 (1998) (stating that [t]he trial judge has broad discretion in determining the weight and credibility given to mental health evidence). We agree with this finding. ¶ 54 Martinez next argues that the trial court gave too much weight to Oscar Fryer's testimony and to Martinez' actions after the homicide. Martinez argues that taking Officer Martin's gun, robbing the Mini-Mart and shooting the clerk are consistent with the it's me or him line of thought. ¶ 55 But we think Martinez' actions speak louder than Fryer's words. Even if we were to disregard Fryer's testimony, Martinez still emptied his .38 caliber handgun into Officer Martin. Using his superior intellect and after recognizing that he had just murdered an Arizona police officer, Martinez stole Officer Martin's .9mm Sig Sauer and drove to Blythe, California where he robbed a Mini-Mart and shot the clerk. Although Martinez alleges that the clerk threatened him with a chair or weapon, this does not support Dr. Parrish's PTSD diagnosis. Martinez could not have reasonably felt that it was me or him. In fact, any threat Martinez may have feared was self-induced. He drove to Blythe and ran out of gas. He then called his aunt for money. After she failed to send the needed funds, he called her again. Losing his patience, he eventually robbed the Mini-Mart with Officer Martin's service weapon. The record does not suggest that the clerk randomly came up to Martinez in the parking lot, noticed the stolen car and threatened to call the police. Rather, Martinez' robbery and subsequent murder created any threat he may have felt. [9] ¶ 56 Martinez' actions in Indio also demonstrate his systematic thought processes and superior intelligence. At the first sight of the Indio police, Martinez didn't simply open fire even though he had two guns in his possession. Rather, he tried to flee after leaving the .38 caliber handgun with David and Anna. Once Martinez reached Johnny Acuna's trailer and the police surrounded the compound, Martinez did not come out shooting. He still had Officer Martin's .9mm Sig Sauer. This conflicts with Dr. Parrish's diagnosis. This was the ultimate me or him situation. ¶ 57 The trial court's finding that Martinez did not suffer from PTSD is supported by the evidence. His actions are not consistent with Dr. Parrish's diagnosis. He knew right from wrong. His IQ was well-above average. He consciously decided that he wasn't going back to jail and carried the .38 caliber handgun [f]or protection and if shit happens. Tr. Sept. 9, 1997 at 83, 85. Without more, we believe that Martinez' personality disorder does not qualify as a statutory mitigating circumstance. See State v. Kayer, 194 Ariz. 423, 437, 984 P.2d 31, 45 (1999) (stating that personality or character disorders usually are not sufficient to satisfy [the (G)(1)] statutory mitigator); State v. Brewer, 170 Ariz. 486, 505, 826 P.2d 783, 802 (1992) (Generally, a mere character or personality disorder alone is insufficient to constitute a mitigating circumstance.). But even if it did, there was simply no causal connection between Martinez' personality disorder and his actions on August 15, 1995. See State v. Clabourne, 194 Ariz. 379, 385, 983 P.2d 748, 754 (1999) (stating that [i]n every case in which we have found the (G)(1) factor, the mental illness was `not only a substantial mitigating factor ... but a major contributing cause of [the defendant's] conduct that was `sufficiently substantial' to outweigh the aggravating factors present....') (quoting State v. Jimenez, 165 Ariz. 444, 459, 799 P.2d 785, 800 (1990) (when voices told defendant to kill he could not control what he was doing) (emphasis added)), cert. denied by, Clabourne v. Arizona, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 1439, 146 L.Ed.2d 327 (2000); see also State v. Stuard, 176 Ariz. 589, 608 n. 12, 863 P.2d 881, 900 n. 12 (1993) ([E]vidence of causation is required before mental impairment can be considered a significant mitigating factor.). Martinez failed to establish the existence of the A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1) factor by a preponderance of the evidence.
¶ 58 Martinez was 19 years and 9 months old at the time of the murder. The trial court found that Martinez' age qualified under A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(5) as a mitigating factor but did not give it substantial weight because of Martinez' level of intelligence, and significant past experience with the criminal justice system. Both Dr. Parrish and Dr. Bayless diagnosed Martinez as having superior intelligence. He had multiple juvenile referrals and convictions, and three felony convictions during his relatively brief time in the adult system before he killed Officer Martin. We agree that Martinez' age was entitled to little or no weight as a mitigating factor. See State v. Jackson, 186 Ariz. 20, 30-31, 918 P.2d 1038, 1048-49 (1996) (finding that, in addition to chronological age, we must consider a defendant's: (1) level of intelligence, (2) maturity, (3) participation in the murder, and (4) criminal history and past experience with law enforcement).