Opinion ID: 803214
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Reasonableness of Mr. Wright’s Sentence

Text: Before determining the sentence to be imposed after revocation of supervised release, a district court must consider both the policy statements contained in Chapter 7 of the Guidelines and the factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Steele, 603 F.3d 803, 808 (10th Cir. 2010). The § 3553(a) factors include the nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; pertinent guidelines; pertinent policy statements; the need to avoid unwanted sentence disparities; and the need to provide restitution. -8- United States v. Cordova, 461 F.3d 1184, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). In explaining the sentence imposed, the court “is not required to consider individually each factor listed in § 3553(a), nor is it required to recite any magic words to show us that it fulfilled its responsibility to be mindful of the factors that Congress has instructed it to consider.” Id. at 1189 (quotations omitted). Additionally, although the court must consider the Chapter 7 policy statements, which “recommend a range of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release,” the recommendation is “advisory rather than mandatory in nature.” United States v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1305 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted). “A sentence in excess of that recommended by the Chapter 7 policy statements will be upheld if it can be determined from the record to have been reasoned and reasonable.” Steele, 603 F.3d at 807 (quotations omitted). We have explained that “[t]his is the same analysis as the reasonableness standard of review under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).” Id. at 807. Our review “for reasonableness includes both a procedural component, . . . as well as a substantive component.” Id. at 807-08 (quotations omitted); see also McBride, 633 F.3d at 1232 (“Under our current nomenclature, a ‘reasoned’ sentence is one that is ‘procedurally reasonable’; and a ‘reasonable’ sentence is one that is ‘substantively reasonable.’”). Mr. Wright argues that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We first address the procedural reasonableness of Mr. Wright’s sentence and then consider substantive reasonableness. -9-
Procedural reasonableness “focuses on the manner in which the sentence was calculated.” United States v. Masek, 588 F.3d 1283, 1290 (10th Cir. 2009). “In reviewing a criminal defendant’s sentence for procedural reasonableness, we determine whether the district court committed any error in calculating or explaining the sentence.” United States v. Martinez, 610 F.3d 1216, 1223 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). We must “ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence— including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) We generally review the procedural reasonableness of a defendant’s “sentence under the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of review.” United States v. Halliday, 665 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted); see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 46. But when a defendant fails to preserve a procedural challenge before the district court, we review only for plain error. See Romero, 491 F.3d at 1178. As noted above, to demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that “there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Teague, 443 F.3d at 1314 (quotations omitted). -10- Mr. Wright contends that his “sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the [district] [c]ourt failed to adequately explain its upward departure from the . . . [G]uidelines range to the maximum statutory sentence.” Aplt. Br. at 12. Mr. Wright acknowledges that the district court stated that it had considered “the nature and circumstances of [his] violations, [his personal] characteristics, . . . the sentencing objectives required by [the] statute[,] . . . [and] the advisory nonbinding Chapter 7 policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. at 12-13 (quotations omitted). He argues, however, that the district court’s primary reason for its upward departure—“that the resources of the [P]robation [O]ffice] [would be] wasted on [him]—is not within the sentencing factors required under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)” and that the court’s reliance on this rationale rendered his sentence procedurally unreasonable. Id. at 8. Mr. Wright concedes that he did not preserve this argument for our review, and we therefore review his claim under the plain error standard. See Romero, 491 F.3d at 1177. Mr. Wright has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred by considering whether it would “waste” the Probation Office’s resources to allow him to remain on supervised release. Indeed, in his brief, Mr. Wright acknowledges that we rejected a similar argument in United States v. Tedford, 405 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2005).3 3 Mr. Wright argues that Tedford was “wrongly decided.” Aplt. Br. at 13. However, because “we are bound by the precedent of prior panels absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the Supreme Court,” United States v. Meyers, 200 F.3d 715, 720 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted), we decline Mr. Wright’s invitation to reconsider the correctness of our decision in Tedford. -11- In Tedford, the defendant’s supervised release was revoked after he violated several of the conditions of his release. “Based on a combination of [the] [d]efendant’s criminal history and the nature of the violations, the recommended sentence pursuant to the . . . Guidelines was between five and eleven months of incarceration.” Id. at 1160. “The district court imposed a sentence of forty-eight months.” Id. In so doing, the district court considered the Chapter 7 policy statements, the nature and circumstances of the defendant’s conduct, and the fact that “it would . . . be a waste of the limited resources of the probation office to have to continue supervision over [the] defendant.” Id. (quotations omitted). On appeal, the defendant argued that “the district court’s consideration of the Probation Office’s resources was an improper factor to rely on in imposing the sentence because it [was] not an enumerated factor in the Guidelines.” Id. at 1161. We rejected the defendant’s argument, stating: The Sentencing Guidelines set forth factors that must be considered, but that list is not all-inclusive. In addition, when read in context, the factor to which [the] [d]efendant objects, the resources of the Probation Office, does not reflect an impermissible analysis of federal penal resource allocation. . . . The district court merely recognized the futility of continued supervision, a consideration implicit in the Congressional grant of authority to revoke one’s supervised release. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Like the court in Tedford, the district court properly considered the Chapter 7 policy statements, the nature and circumstances of Mr. Wright’s conduct, and the -12- § 3553(a) factors, which implicitly permit a court to consider the futility of continued supervision. See id. Mr. Wright has failed to demonstrate any error in this analysis. We therefore reject Mr. Wright’s argument that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable.
“Substantive reasonableness addresses whether the length of [a] sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Damato, 672 F.3d 832, 838 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted). When a defendant challenges his sentence as substantively unreasonable, we review for an abuse of discretion “and give[] substantial deference to [the] district court[].” United States v. Sayad, 589 F.3d 1110, 1116 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted); see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 46. “A district court abuses its discretion when it renders a judgment that is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” Steele, 603 F.3d at 809 (quotations omitted). “This standard applies without regard to whether the district court imposes a sentence within or outside the advisory Guidelines range.” Id. Mr. Wright notes that “[t]he purpose of a supervised release sentence is to provide enough supervision to prevent recidivism.” Aplt. Br. at 11. He contends that his sentence conflicts with this purpose because his violations of supervised release were “relatively minor” and because he had only been on supervised release for a short time when the Government petitioned the court to terminate his supervised release. Id. at 10. -13- He argues that this conflict renders his sentence substantively unreasonable. We disagree. The Guidelines state that “at revocation the court should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.” U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, introductory cmt., A(3)(b). In considering the extent of Mr. Wright’s breach of trust, the district court appropriately focused on Mr. Wright’s disregard of several of the conditions of his supervised release. The court also noted that “Mr. Wright has historically failed to comply with his conditions of supervised release and [that he] is not amenable to supervision.” ROA (Case No. 12-3025), Vol. 2, at 16-17. Ultimately, Mr. Wright’s arguments are an invitation to reweigh the evidence, the § 3553(a) factors, and the district court’s “ultimate assessment of the balance between them.” United States v. Regan, 637 F.3d 1348, 1354-55 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). We decline to do so. Mr. Wright has failed to demonstrate, based on the totality of the circumstances, that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing him in excess of the range recommended by the Guidelines. And having reviewed the record, we cannot say that the district court’s decision to exceed the recommended sentencing range “exceeded the bounds of permissible choice, given the facts and the applicable law in the case at hand.” Id. at 1352 (quotations omitted). We therefore reject Mr. Wright’s claim that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. -14-