Opinion ID: 1493723
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rights at Issue and Level of Scrutiny

Text: [¶ 12] It is well established that, pursuant to the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment, parents have a fundamental liberty interest in making decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. E.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); In re Scott S., 2001 ME 114, ¶ 20 n. 12, 775 A.2d 1144, 1151. It follows that a court order requiring grandparent visitation against the wishes of a parent constitutes an infringement of that fundamental right. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (plurality); Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 21, 761 A.2d at 300 (plurality). The Troxel plurality did not articulate the level of scrutiny by which such an infringement should be tested. See 530 U.S. at 65-75, 120 S.Ct. 2054. The Rideout plurality applied strict scrutiny. 2000 ME 198, ¶ 19, 761 A.2d at 300; see also id. ¶ 53, 761 A.2d at 309 (Alexander, J., dissenting). That approach followed the general principles set forth in previous Supreme Court decisions, see, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993), and in Justice Thomas's Troxel concurrence, 530 U.S. at 80, 120 S.Ct. 2054, and is consistent with more recent decisions of several other state courts, e.g., Harold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 836 N.E.2d 1165, 1171 (2005); Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1059 (2002); Roth v. Weston, 259 Conn. 202, 789 A.2d 431, 441 (2002). [¶ 13] The application of strict scrutiny in Rideout is not necessarily controlling here, however. To determine the proper level of scrutiny in this case, we must focus on the exact imposition on Patricia's rights that is at issue. Section 1803(1)(A) does not force Patricia to allow visitation. It forces her, rather, to litigate the question of visitation, which would then be decided by the trial court (presumably after a hearing) [7] applying the statutory criteria in section 1803(3). Whether we must apply strict scrutiny, therefore, depends on whether being forced to litigate a claim that may result in an infringement of a fundamental right itself constitutes an infringement of that right. In this context, considering the importance of the right, we believe that it does. This conclusion appears to be supported by the plurality opinions in Troxel and Rideout as well as decisions from courts in other states. [¶ 14] The Troxel plurality's conclusion that the Washington statute was unconstitutional as applied was based partially on the fact that the statute contained no limitation on who could file a third-party visitation petition. 530 U.S. at 67, 120 S.Ct. 2054. The plurality also noted that the burden of litigating a domestic relations proceeding can itself be `so disruptive of the parent-child relationship that the constitutional right of a custodial parent to make certain basic determinations for the child's welfare becomes implicated.' Id. at 75, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (quoting id. at 101, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). Similar concerns were voiced in Rideout. The plurality's conclusion that the Maine Act, as applied in that case, was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest depended in part on the fact that the grandparents there were required to convince the court of their statutory standing by an initial showing of a sufficient existing relationship with their grandchildren, thus providing the parents with some protection against the expense, stress, and pain of litigation. 2000 ME 198, ¶¶ 26, 30, 761 A.2d at 301-02. The grandparents' showing that they had functioned as parents to their grandchild gave the state a compelling interest in providing a forum in which the grandparents could litigate the visitation issue. Id. ¶¶ 26, 28, 761 A.2d at 301-02. [¶ 15] Other courts have also suggested that the mere commencement of third-party visitation litigation can infringe a parent's fundamental rights, and have adopted various threshold requirements for bringing such litigation when these were not provided by statute. The Connecticut Supreme Court stated that [w]here fundamental rights are implicated..., standing serves a function beyond a mere jurisdictional prerequisite. It also assures that the statutory scheme is narrowly tailored so that a person's personal affairs are not needlessly intruded upon and interrupted by the trauma of litigation. Roth, 789 A.2d at 442. To save the constitutionality of the Connecticut statute, which contained no limits on standing, the court added a requirement that any third party, including a grandparent . . ., seeking visitation must allege and establish a parent-like relationship as a jurisdictional threshold in order ... to pass constitutional muster . . . . Id. at 443 (emphasis added). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court similarly adopted a narrowing construction of the commonwealth's grandparent visitation statute in response to a constitutional challenge. See Blixt, 774 N.E.2d at 1060. The court held that, because the usual requirements of notice pleading do not sufficiently protect a parent's fundamental rights from the burden of potentially unwarranted litigation, a grandparent seeking visitation must make an initial showing of facts that would justify a visitation order by filing a complaint that is either detailed and verified or accompanied by a detailed affidavit. See id. at 1066; accord Daniels v. Daniels, 381 N.J.Super. 286, 885 A.2d 524, 530-31 (2005). The New Jersey Appellate Division shared the same concern that the litigation itself is a burden on the parent's substantive due process rights. One can easily imagine circumstances in which that burden would be grave indeed. Wilde v. Wilde, 341 N.J.Super. 381, 775 A.2d 535, 544 (2001). The court adopted a requirement that grandparents could not commence litigation until they had made substantial efforts to repair their relationship with the parent and their request for visitation had been denied with finality. See id. at 545. [¶ 16] Consistent with the analysis of the Troxel and Rideout pluralities, the decisions of these other courts, and the great importance of the rights at issue, we hold that forcing parents to defend against a claim for grandparent visitation is itself an infringement of their fundamental right to make decisions concerning the custody and control of their children. Such an infringement is subject to strict scrutiny, and must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Flores, 507 U.S. at 301-02, 113 S.Ct. 1439; Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 19, 761 A.2d at 299-300 (plurality). Accordingly, we must decide whether section 1803(1)(A), granting the grandparents in this case standing to petition for visitation with their granddaughter because her father had died, serves a compelling state interest, and if so whether it is narrowly tailored to that purpose.