Opinion ID: 2513985
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The risk of wrongful deprivation of the right to raise one's children due to reliance on telephonic testimony and the probable value added by in-person testimony

Text: The value of live testimony was attested to at length in our opinion in Whitesides. [83] As we recognized, the trial court is in a unique position to judge the credibility of a party or witness who testifies before it. [84] In situations where one's credibility is at issue, denying an in-person hearing denies a party an opportunity to present evidence in the most effective way possible. [85] In this case, Richard argues that his telephonic testimony was inadequate. He contends that he had difficulty communicating basic information to the court, and adds that the forum did not provide [him] with an adequate opportunity to convey his credibility to the court. He claims that he offered testimony designed to demonstrate that he has taken steps to eliminate sexual abuse, alcoholism, and domestic violence from his life, and that he was committed to maintaining those changes in the future. He argues, [t]he most compelling evidence [Richard] had to offer was his testimony. [Richard's] credibility was essential to his defense against the petition to terminate his parental rights.... The trial court's denial of his motion to transport to Bethel deprived [Richard] of the most effective weapon in his arsenal, the ability of the trier of fact to personally witness his demeanor as he testified. In response, the state contends that Richard's credibility was not an issue on any material matter. First, the state maintains that Judge Curda had ample opportunity to observe Richard's credibility and demeanor during the course of his CINA case, as well as on his domestic violence assault and attempted sexual assault of a minor charges. Next, the state argues that Richard never specifically requested to be transported because his credibility was at issue. Finally, the state asserts that while Richard denied the conduct underlying his conviction for sexual abuse of a minor, whether or not [Richard] attempted to sexually abuse [Cynthia] was not a material issue in the case. The state concludes that because [Richard] did not contest that he had been charged with sexual abuse of a minor, that he had pled no contest to one count of attempted sexual abuse of a minor, and that he was incarcerated at the time of trial on that conviction[,]... no issue of credibility was presented. The state's argument is convincing. Throughout his testimony, Richard did not dispute, but instead corroborated his history of domestic violence, substance abuse, and related criminal charges and convictions (except the sexual abuse charge). While other facts formed additional bases on which to terminate his parental rights, Richard's testimony alone established sufficient facts to support the charges of domestic violence, other criminal charges, and substance abuse against him. Whether the court found Richard's testimony on these issues credible was irrelevant, because he largely admitted the state's case and the state presented other evidence to support that case. Further, Richard would ordinarily have been precluded by his conviction from denying the conduct on which it was based. [86] Because Richard was challenging his conviction through an application for post-conviction relief when the issue arose, however, it is not necessary to rely on this point. Accordingly, we find that Richard's credibility was not at issue on any material matter and therefore that any value added by in-person testimony in this case would have been negligible. c. The interests of the government and the financial and administrative burdens the government would incur as a result of requiring transport of prisoners for the purpose of in-person testimony The primary government interests involved here are those of avoiding the cost, administrative burden, and potential dangers of transporting prisoners. In support of its position that the cost of transporting Richard to the termination hearing would be prohibitive, the state argued that Richard's transport would require an officer to bring [Richard] from Spring Creek by road to Anchorage, fly him to Bethel, house him at the crowded Bethel correctional center, YKCC, for a number of days and then bring him back down to Seward, all at great expense to the state. Additionally, the state maintained that transporting Richard would potentially lead to illegal overcrowding and would create `ripple' effects throughout the system and require significant planning and coordination. Adding to the state's burden in this situation is Richard's untimely request for transport. As discussed earlier, with trial scheduled to being on October 16, Richard moved on September 28 to be relocated to the Bethel correctional facility no later than October 4. This provided the state with less than a week to arrange for the personnel, travel accommodations, and jail space necessary to facilitate Richard's presence at the termination trial. The high administrative and financial costs of transporting Richard to trial, coupled with the untimeliness of his motion, weigh heavily against a finding that due process required his transport. d. The circumstances of Richard's case do not require his in-person participation. Richard maintains that given the importance of the interest at stake, the demonstrated benefits of in-person testimony, and the merely generalized assertions of expense and inconvenience articulated by the state, due process requires that we read AS 33.30.081(f) as guaranteeing him the opportunity to testify in person. He concludes that when a fundamental right is at stake, due process requires that the costs to the state take a lesser priority, to insure that an individual is not wrongly deprived of a fundamental right. Richard oversimplifies our analysis. In every case we must weigh not only the interests at stake but the benefits and burdens that would result from implementing the proposed rule. Richard looks only to his interestwhich assuredly is fundamental and the state'swhich is important but not fundamentaland concludes that he must by definition prevail. But he has failed to consider the extent to which his proposed rule would advance his interest and the extent to which it would burden the state's interest. When this analysis is considered, the balance tips decidedly in the state's favor. We turn first to the extent to which Richard's interest in his parental rights would be furthered by a rule that he must be allowed to participate in person in the termination proceeding. In Whitesides we held that where a tribunal must make a judgment regarding credibility, the individual must be given the opportunity to appear in person before the hearing officer. Here, however, as we have seen, Richard's credibility was not central to the court's decisionmaking process. [87] Conversely, the burden on the state's interests of a rule requiring prisoner transports in all termination proceedings would be substantial. Financial costs to the state of moving prisoners would be high, and the administrative burden on the Department of Corrections would be increased by the frequent need to transfer prisoners out to make room for incoming prisoners or face legal action for overcrowding. [88] And as previously noted, significant planning and coordination will often be necessary to accomplish such transfers, and in this case Richard gave little notice to the Department of Corrections of his request to attend the trial in person. [89] Our holding today is limited and tied closely to the facts of this case. We hold that due process does not in all cases require the transport of an incarcerated parent to a trial to decide the termination of parental rights. The trial court must consider all relevant factors, including the disputed issues, whether a parent plans to testify, the relevance of a parent's testimony to the disputed issues, the costs to the statefinancial, administrative, and legaland any threat to public safety, in deciding whether to grant a motion by a parent to be transported to a termination hearing. On the facts of this case, Richard has not established that his due process rights were violated by Judge Curda's decision not to order the Department of Corrections to transport Richard to the hearing but to allow him to participate telephonically.