Opinion ID: 200319
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence at First Trial

Text: 19 Julien argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction at the first trial. Although not argued as such, Julien's theory seems to be that if the evidence at the first trial is insufficient and the trial ends in a mistrial, a different double jeopardy argument is presented to bar the government from proceeding to retrial. Julien does not indicate a basis in law for him to present this issue. 20 The government replies that, because there was no conviction at the first trial, this claim is moot. The government correctly notes that the conspiracy count did not result in conviction at the second trial and has now been dismissed, and so there is no live controversy as to that count. That still leaves the possession with intent to distribute count. 21 We will assume dubitante, in Julien's favor, that he is in fact asserting a double jeopardy argument. Nonetheless, Julien does not present a viable issue. In Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984), the Supreme Court held: 22 the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause by its terms applies only if there has been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy. Since jeopardy attached here when the jury was sworn, petitioner's argument necessarily assumes that the judicial declaration of a mistrial was an event which terminated jeopardy in his case and which allowed him to assert a valid claim of double jeopardy. 23 ... [T]he failure of a jury to reach a verdict is not an event which terminates jeopardy. 24 Id. at 325, 104 S.Ct. 3081 (citations omitted); see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, ___ U.S. ____, 123 S.Ct. 732, 737-39, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (comparing different effects of mistrial and acquittal on double jeopardy protections). Because jeopardy does not terminate when the court declares a valid mistrial based on the inability of the jury to agree, defendant's claim of insufficiency of the evidence at the first trial presents no valid double jeopardy claim to prevent his retrial. Richardson, 468 U.S. at 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081; accord United States v. Willis, 102 F.3d 1078, 1081 (10th Cir.1996); United States v. Coleman, 862 F.2d 455 (3d Cir.1988). 25 To give Julien the benefit of all conceivable arguments, we consider whether there is a due process or non-constitutional claim, separate from the double jeopardy claim, that he is entitled to have the sufficiency of the evidence at the first trial determined at some point. Under Richardson, a denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence is an interlocutory order; it is not appealable after a mistrial and before a second trial except on double jeopardy grounds (grounds which the Supreme Court has rejected on the merits). The defense argument would be that there is a final appealable judgment after a conviction at the second trial, and Julien may then appeal otherwise non-final rulings when he appeals from that judgment of guilt. Although Richardson does not expressly foreclose this point, there is language in both Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion and Justice Stevens' dissent which tends to demonstrate that the Supreme Court's majority would be inhospitable to such a claim. See 468 U.S. at 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081; id. at 334-35, 104 S.Ct. 3081 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also 15B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3918.5, at 496-97 (2d ed.1992). That inhospitality governs our decision. We hold that defendant may not, on appeal from a judgment of guilt in a second trial following a mistrial, then raise a claim that he was wrongly denied his motion for acquittal on insufficiency of the evidence at the first trial. 26 This court has also applied Richardson in a related context to hold that a defendant may not argue that the vacating of his conviction for legal error on direct appeal from his first trial permits an evaluation of the sufficiency of the remaining evidence at the first trial. United States v. Porter, 807 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir.1986); see also United States v. Carrillo-Figueroa, 34 F.3d 33, 38-39 (1st Cir.1994) (double jeopardy claim concerning insufficiency of evidence at first trial waived by defendant's request for mistrial, but Richardson would foreclose claim even if preserved); United States v. Reis, 788 F.2d 54, 56-57 (1st Cir.1986) (no different standard applies to motion of acquittal after mistrial compared to other motions for acquittal). It is not open to Julien to make an argument based on insufficiency of the evidence at a trial which ended in a mistrial.