Opinion ID: 2975823
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Severance Analysis

Text: Having determined both that portions of the sign regulations engage in unconstitutional content discrimination, and that the overall scheme constitutes a prior restraint, the regulations must next be examined to determine whether the unconstitutional provisions of the ordinance may be severed from the portions which do not violate the Constitution. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987); Regan v. Time, 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 282 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Usually the Court first declares unconstitutional a particular provision of law, and only then does it inquire whether the remainder of the statute can be saved.”).
As a general rule, the severability of a local ordinance is a question of state law. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 772 (1988). The Ohio Supreme Court has established a three-part test for determining whether an unconstitutional provision may be severed from a larger legislative scheme: (1) Are the constitutional and the unconstitutional parts capable of separation so that each may be read and may stand by itself? (2) Is the unconstitutional part so connected with the general scope of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the apparent intention of the Legislature if the clause or part is stricken out? (3) Is the insertion of words or terms necessary in order to separate the constitutional part from the unconstitutional part, and to give effect to the former only? State v. Hochhausler, 668 N.E.2d 457, 466-67 (Ohio 1996) (citations omitted). Applying this test reveals that much of the content-neutral portions of the sign regulations are severable from the content-based provisions. The sign regulations are structured largely by classifying different kinds of signs by names such as “bench billboard sign,” “free standing sign,” or “political sign.” (J.A. 119-24) Different rules are then applied to each of these classifications. While some of these categories, such as “political signs” are content-based, others, such as “free standing signs” are content-neutral. Most of the rules governing these content-neutral categories are likewise content-neutral. Section 321.2-2, for example, places content-neutral restrictions on No. 06-3828 Midwest Media Property, et al. v. Symmes Twp., Ohio Page 22 “[a]ll freestanding pole signs” in certain portions of Symmes Township. (J.A. 132) Under this section: 1. No freestanding pole sign shall be closer than ten (10) feet to any right of way line. 2. No freestanding pole sign shall be closer than twenty (20) feet to any adjacent property line. 3. No freestanding pole sign located three hundred (300) feet from the right of way of a federal interstate highway shall exceed forty-five (45) feet in height from the finished grade level and no sign within six hundred fifty (650) feet from the right of way of a federal interstate highway shall exceed twenty (20) feet in height from the finished grade level. 4. No freestanding pole sign shall contain more than one hundred twenty (120) square feet of sign area per side (maximum two sides) (J.A. 132) These provisions meet all three prongs of the Ohio severability test. These height, area and distance limits each may be read independent of the remainder of the sign regulations and still be given their full meaning. Furthermore, they give effect to an express purpose of the sign regulations, “to establish reasonable regulations governing the size, character, and location of signs within the Township.” (J.A. 119) Finally, no insertion of words or terms is necessary to separate them from other, content-based portions of the ordinance. Accordingly, were the sign regulations’ content discrimination their only constitutional flaw, it would be possible to sever the content-neutral provisions and give them their full effect.
The sign regulations, however, also constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint, and this alone is sufficient to declare them unconstitutional in their entirety. In Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville and Davidson County, we held a prior restraint affecting “sexually oriented” businesses unconstitutional for lack of sufficient judicial process. 274 F.3d at 402-03. Rather than allow some portions of the law to be severed, Deja Vu of Nashville held that when a prior restraint lacks the proper judicial safeguards, this “renders the entire statute facially unconstitutional.” Id. at 403. Under such circumstances, this Court has no choice but to “enjoin enforcement of the entire Ordinance.” Id.; see City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757-59 (1988) (holding that a licensing scheme containing a prior restraint is unconstitutional on its face and must be struck down in its entirety). Just like the ordinance in Deja Vu of Nashville, the instant sign regulations constitute a prior restraint lacking sufficient judicial safeguards. Accordingly, we are bound by Deja Vu of Nashville, and may not sever any portion of the Township’s ordinance, and must declare it unconstitutional in its entirety.