Opinion ID: 2827843
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count One (wire fraud): insufficient evidence

Text: Deason claims that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for the conduct charged in Count One because: (1) Count One charges a wire from a bank in Iowa, and (2) there is insufficient evidence to support the interstate-commerce nexus. Deason preserved his objection to the sufficiency of the evidence by filing motions for a judgment of acquittal, so we review that objection de novo. 3 The standard for such a claim is high: “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict, and we determine whether a rational jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 4 3United States v. Harris, 740 F.3d 956, 962 (5th Cir. 2014). 4 United States v. Brown, 553 F.3d 768, 780 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 484 F.3d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 Case: 14-10461 Document: 00513157744 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/17/2015 No. 14-10461 The elements of wire fraud, as set out in 18 U.S.C. § 1343, are: (1) a scheme to defraud, (2) the use of wire communications, and (3) a specific intent to defraud. 5 Deason’s challenge relates to the second element, the use of wire communications. Claiming that Count One of the indictment charges a wire from a bank located in Iowa, he contends that the evidence presented at trial showed a wire to his Wells Fargo account from a bank located in New York, and insists that the evidence is thus insufficient to convict him for the conduct charged. Count One charges: On or about April 5, 2012, in the Fort Worth Division of the Northern District of Texas and elsewhere, the defendant, Caleb Deason, . . . caused to be transmitted, by means of wire and radio communications in interstate commerce . . . a wire transfer of approximately $1,004,028.41 from HSBC Bank USA on behalf of Transamerica Life Insurance Company, located in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, to the defendant’s Wells Fargo Bank account, located in the state of Texas. We are unpersuaded by Deason’s deliberate misreading of this charge. Count One does not list the location of HSBC Bank USA as Iowa; rather, it states that Transamerica is located in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. 6 Relying on the same misreading of Count One, Deason contends that, because the United States did not adduce evidence that the charged wire was transmitted from Iowa into another state, his conviction for wire fraud must be reversed for lack of evidence regarding a nexus to interstate commerce. For substantially the same reasons expressed in the prior paragraph, we reject 5 United States v. Benns, 740 F.3d 370, 375 (5th Cir. 2014). 6 The jury heard testimony that Transamerica is located in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. 5 Case: 14-10461 Document: 00513157744 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/17/2015 No. 14-10461 Deason’s claim that there is insufficient evidence of the wire’s nexus to interstate commerce because Count One charged an “Iowa bank wire.” 7 2. Count Two (money laundering): insufficient evidence Deason also attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for the conduct charged in Count Two, claiming that: (1) a cashier’s check is not expressly defined as a “monetary instrument” in § 1956(c)(5) so his purchase of the cashier’s check does not support his conviction under § 1957(a); (2) there is insufficient evidence to show that he “knew” the property with which he purchased the cashier’s check was criminally-derived; and, (3) there is no evidentiary support for concluding that his purchase of the cashier’s check implicated interstate commerce. Deason preserved his sufficiency of the evidence challenge, so we review these claims de novo. 8 To repeat, our review is highly deferential to the jury’s verdict. 9 We consider first Deason’s contention that his purchase of the cashier’s check does not constitute a “monetary transaction” under § 1957(a) because a cashier’s check is not defined as a “monetary instrument” in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(5). The statutory language of §§ 1956 and 1957, and our precedent, foreclose his theory. First, a “monetary transaction” is defined in § 1957(f)(1) as “the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, of funds or a monetary instrument . . . by, through, or to a financial institution . . ., including any transaction that would be a financial transaction under section 1956(c)(4)(B) of this title.” 10 A “financial transaction” is defined under § 1956(c)(4)(B) as a “transaction involving the 7 To the contrary, the record is replete with evidence concerning the charged wire’s nexus to interstate commerce. 8 Harris, 740 F.3d at 962. 9 See id. 10 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (emphasis supplied). 6 Case: 14-10461 Document: 00513157744 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/17/2015 No. 14-10461 use of a financial institution which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree.” 11 Deason’s purchase of a cashier’s check constitutes a “monetary transaction” for the purpose of § 1957(a) in two ways: (1) It constitutes a “transfer, or exchange . . . of funds . . . by, through, and to a financial institution,” and (2) it constitutes a “transaction involving the use of a financial institution . . . which affect[s] interstate . . . commerce.” 12 We are satisfied that his conduct falls within § 1957(a) even though cashier’s checks are not expressly included on the list of “monetary instruments” in § 1956(c)(5). Deason next claims that the trial record lacks the “necessary direct or circumstantial evidence” to support the jury’s conclusion that he knew the $67,133.00 he withdrew to purchase the cashier’s check was criminallyderived. Although he offers no countervailing evidence, claiming that he is “unable to cite record pages from which requisite evidence is absent,” he ignores the fact that the jury was free to disregard his testimony as not credible. He testified that he assumed that the $1,004,028.41 which appeared in his Wells Fargo account was the result of an unrelated large deal that he had been working on for some time. But, the jury also heard testimony from a Transamerica representative that Deason did not have any commissions in the pipeline that would amount to approximately a million dollars, and that his total earnings from Transamerica totalled less than $30,000.00 since he had enrolled as an independent producer for the company in 2006. “The jury is the final arbiter of the weight of the evidence, and of the credibility of witnesses,” 1118 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4)(B). 12See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, Nos. 97-50353, 97-50234, 97-50235, 1998 WL 895380, at  (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1998) (per curiam) (“The purchase of the cashier’s check did have an effect on interstate commerce because the cashier’s check was purchased at a bank engaged in interstate commerce.”). 7 Case: 14-10461 Document: 00513157744 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/17/2015 No. 14-10461 so we will not disturb its finding on appeal. 13 The record is replete with evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Deason knew that the money in question was criminally-derived. Finally, Deason claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the conclusion that his purchase of the cashier’s check had even a “minimal nexus” to interstate commerce. Our precedent, and that of other circuits, forecloses his challenge. Like § 1956, the money laundering statute, § 1957 regulates conduct that, in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. And, we have held that the link to interstate commerce need only be slight in such cases. 14 The evidence adduced at Deason’s trial meets this threshold. The jury heard testimony that Deason purchased the cashier’s check from a Wells Fargo branch and that Wells Fargo is a bank that is insured by the FDIC with branches across the United States. “Proof that a savings institution’s accounts are federally insured is certainly sufficient to prove that the transaction involved a financial institution the activities of which affect interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4)(B).” 15 The evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that Deason’s purchase of the cashier’s check had at least a “minimal nexus” to interstate commerce. 13 United States v. Restrepo, 994 F.2d 173, 182 (5th Cir. 1993). We accept “all credibility choices and reasonable inferences made by the trier of fact that tend to support the verdict.” United States v. Moreno-Gonzalez, 662 F.3d 369, 372 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Asibor, 109 F.3d 1023, 1030 (5th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 14 See United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 572 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176, 1191 (5th Cir. 1997)) (overruled on other grounds by United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002)). Section 1957 requires only that these transactions have a “de minimis effect” or “minimal impact” on interstate commerce. See United States v. Benjamin, 252 F.3d 1, 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2001). 15 United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093, 1103 (2d Cir. 1997). 8 Case: 14-10461 Document: 00513157744 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/17/2015 No. 14-10461 3. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 enhancement Deason claims that the court erred in applying U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 to his sentence because his trial testimony did not support the application of that section’s enhancement. Deason preserved his objection, so we review the court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. 16 Section 3C1.1 provides for a two-level increase to a defendant’s offense level if he (1) “willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the . . . prosecution . . . of the instant offense of conviction,” and (2) “the obstructive conduct related to . . . the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct . . . .” 17 For the purpose of this enhancement, a defendant obstructs justice when he perjures himself. 18 A witness perjures himself when he gives “[1] false testimony concerning [2] a material matter with [3] the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” 19 When a defendant objects to a sentence enhancement that results from his trial testimony, the district court “must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice.” 20 In doing so, however, the court need not expressly find that false testimony concerned a material matter when materiality is obvious. 21 In 16 United States v. Perez-Solis, 709 F.3d 453, 469 (5th Cir. 2013) (footnote omitted); United States v. Miller, 607 F.3d 144, 148 (5th Cir. 2010) (“For an obstruction of justice enhancement, we likewise review the district court’s factual findings for clear error.”). 17 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. 18 Perez-Solis, 709 F.3d at 469 (footnote omitted). 19 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 20 Id. (quoting Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 95). 21 Id. at 470. 9 Case: 14-10461 Document: 00513157744 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/17/2015 No. 14-10461 making its factual findings in support of the application of § 3C1.1, the court may adopt adequate findings in a PSR. 22 As noted, Deason filed a written objection to the § 3C1.1 enhancement, and he renewed his objection during the sentencing hearing. The district court explained why it thought the enhancement was proper: I heard the defendant’s testimony, and I didn’t hear too much truthfulness come from the stand while the defendant was on the stand. If you were to go through and take up each answer that was a false answer, you would – you would spend a lot of time doing it. [Cites examples of false testimony] . . . . I’m not going to take the time to go through all of the false answers he gave. Every one he gave – and the probation officer has correctly indicated in paragraph 19 of the presentence report the different place in the record where he gave false testimony . . . . In each instance, it was material to the issues that were being decided by the jury . . . . We agree with the district court’s summation. Apart from Deason’s contention that his own juried testimony, in context, does not support the enhancement, he offers no evidence to refute the factual findings contained in the PSR which laid out the multiple instances in which he perjured himself during trial. We therefore affirm the district court’s application of § 3C1.1 to his sentence. 4. Substantive reasonableness Deason also challenges the above-guidelines sentence imposed by the court as substantively unreasonable, claiming that the court: (1) failed properly to consider and weigh the § 3553(a) factors, and (2) improperly relied on uncharged conduct recounted in the PSR. Deason objected to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence following its imposition, so we review the “substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an 22 Id. 10 Case: 14-10461 Document: 00513157744 Page: 11 Date Filed: 08/17/2015 No. 14-10461 abuse-of-discretion standard.” 23 When reviewing an above-guidelines sentence for substantive unreasonableness, (1) we consider “the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range,” and (2) we accord deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors support the sentence. 24 On appeal, Deason contends that the trial court erred in failing to consider mitigating factors, e.g., the letters of support submitted by his friends and family, and that, as his counsel put it, “he’s not really different than most of the white-collar fraud defendants . . . across the nation.” To the contrary, the district court thoroughly considered the § 3553(a) factors and acknowledged the letters of support: One of the factors are the nature and circumstances of the offense. And, of course, the nature and circumstances of the offense is that he tried to steal a million dollars from a widow, by way of her insurance benefits that were due to her through her purchase of an insurance policy through the services of the defendant . . . . Well, from what I heard, he’s amoral, period . . . . He’s a good flimflam man, as evidenced by all these letters I’ve received from people that say he’s – he is a good person, and I suppose that’s typical of a good con man . . . . When I consider all of the factors the Court should consider in sentencing, to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, he simply doesn’t know how to function without swindling somebody, at least the indication so far is, and I don’t know that there’s any cure for that, other than confinement. 23 United States v. Rodriguez, 660 F.3d 231, 233 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 24 United States v. Brantley, 537 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 11 Case: 14-10461 Document: 00513157744 Page: 12 Date Filed: 08/17/2015 No. 14-10461 We are satisfied that the sentence imposed is substantively reasonable. Despite Deason’s contention that the trial court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors thoroughly, the record compels the opposite conclusion. That court explained at length its reasons for imposing an above-guidelines sentence. Deason’s claim on appeal amounts to nothing more than a disagreement with the court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors, so we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion. Our precedent makes clear that we do not reweigh factors or reexamine their relative import; neither do we reverse a sentencing court on the basis that, in our estimation, a different sentence would be proper. 25 Further, Deason’s contention that the sentencing court improperly relied on uncharged conduct is without any basis in the law. Our precedent holds that, at sentencing, the court is not precluded from considering uncharged conduct incorporated into the PSR and its guidelines calculation. 26 And, although Deason does not clearly articulate the extent of the variance as a basis for reversal, we note sua sponte that the instant variance is not significant when compared to much greater variances we have affirmed. 27