Opinion ID: 6216788
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mootness of the Group-Prayer Claim

Text: We review questions of constitutional mootness de novo. See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1109 (10th Cir. 2010). But as is generally the case in matters of subject-matter jurisdiction, underlying findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s ruling. See Butler v. Kempthorne, 532 F.3d 1108, 1110 (10th Cir. 2008). “Federal courts only have jurisdiction to consider live, concrete cases or controversies.” Rezaq v. Nalley, 677 F.3d 1001, 1008 (10th Cir. 2012). The mootness doctrine thus “focuses upon whether a definite controversy exists throughout the litigation and whether conclusive relief may still be conferred by the court despite the lapse of time and any change of circumstances that may have occurred since the commencement of the action.” Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012, 1024 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A case is not moot when there is some possible remedy, even a partial remedy or one not requested by the plaintiff.” Rezaq, 677 F.3d at 1010. 10 Appellate Case: 19-1250 Document: 010110643021 Date Filed: 02/09/2022 Page: 11 After Mr. Ajaj was transferred from ADX to Terre Haute, the district court dismissed his group-prayer claim as moot because the LCP allowed group prayer. It explained: Mr. Ajaj no longer has standing to challenge BOP policies regarding communal prayer. Mr. Ajaj is apparently now able to pray communally at Terre Haute. The Life Connections Program allows him special access to religious activities including group prayer. Mr. Ajaj argues that the program only lasts 18 months, and therefore, his “short-term access to the unique opportunity” to participate in group prayer is not a reliable resolution of his claim. However, BOP represents that “inmates often remain in the program after their graduation, serving as a teacher or mentor to other inmates.” As such, there is not an imminent risk that Mr. Ajaj’s ability to participate in this program (and therefore group prayer) will end in the near future. The only concrete fact is that Mr. Ajaj is currently allowed to pray five times daily in a group setting at Terre Haute, and as such he suffers no injury-infact with regard to this policy or procedure. He therefore does not have standing to seek injunctive relief. J. App., Vol. 17 at 3359 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Mr. Ajaj makes three arguments against dismissal. First, as a threshold matter, he maintains that the district court erred by performing a standing, rather than mootness, analysis. We agree with Mr. Ajaj that standing and mootness are distinct concepts. It is true that they are quite similar. Indeed, mootness has often been characterized as “standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Prison Legal News v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 944 F.3d 868, 879 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). But that characterization is not totally accurate. As the Supreme Court has noted, (1) there is at least one exception to mootness (when the terminated action is capable of 11 Appellate Case: 19-1250 Document: 010110643021 Date Filed: 02/09/2022 Page: 12 repetition yet evading review) that has no counterpart in standing doctrine and (2) the defendant has the burden of proving mootness while the plaintiff must establish standing, and the likelihood of future action by the defendant may be too speculative for standing but not to overcome mootness. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189–90 (2000). We question whether the district court misconceived what it needed to determine in resolving mootness. We need not answer that question, however, because we must reverse the district court’s mootness ruling anyway on the ground that it was based on a misunderstanding of the facts. Mr. Ajaj argues that his claim was not rendered moot by his transfer to LCP because he still was not able to pray with others five times daily, and the court could therefore grant him meaningful relief. The district court rejected this argument below, stating that it was a “concrete fact” that Mr. Ajaj was “allowed to pray five times daily in a group setting.” J. App., Vol. 17 at 3359. But the record is to the contrary. First, the BOP never represented that Mr. Ajaj could pray with others five times daily in the LCP. It said only that his access to group prayer was significantly greater than it was at ADX. The thrust of the BOP’s motion to dismiss was that Terre Haute should be the proper subject of a new claim (that first needed to be administratively exhausted) for prospective relief after Mr. Ajaj’s transfer, and that the differences between the practices and circumstances at the two facilities were significant. Namely, whereas Mr. Ajaj alleged that he did not have access to any group prayer at all at ADX, the LCP “allowed [him] to pray in congregation with 12 Appellate Case: 19-1250 Document: 010110643021 Date Filed: 02/09/2022 Page: 13 other Muslim inmates multiple times a day, whenever he is outside his cell in his housing unit.” J. App., Vol. 13 at 2051 (emphasis added). The BOP cited an internal LCP memorandum stating that a designated classroom “may be used for group prayer during times when inmates are out of their cells,” including the five Islamic prayers “daily if possible” and Christian prayers from 8 to 9 PM “nightly.” J. App., Vol. 14 at 2431. In addition, the BOP said that even Mr. Ajaj himself acknowledged that he could pray with others in the LCP and that his grievances now focused on the fact that “he cannot pray as frequently as he wants.” J. App., Vol. 13 at 2052 (emphasis added). Opposing the BOP’s motion to dismiss, Mr. Ajaj submitted a declaration stating that LCP inmates were usually able to pray together only about three times per day because they could access the designated classroom only when it was not being used for classes or other group prayers. Mr. Ajaj’s ability to pray with others was further restricted by the limits on the hours that inmates were allowed outside their cells. See J. App., Vol. 14 at 2419 (declaration of Terre Haute chaplain stating that “[d]epending on schedules and the time of year, Muslim inmates can frequently pray four of the five daily prayers of the Islamic faith in a group.”). As additional support for Mr. Ajaj’s factual allegations, his motion for partial reconsideration— which argued that the district court’s finding that he could pray with others five times daily was “contrary to the record evidence presented by the parties,” J. App., Vol. 17 at 3366—included the following statement at the request of the BOP after the parties conferred about the motion: 13 Appellate Case: 19-1250 Document: 010110643021 Date Filed: 02/09/2022 Page: 14 The BOP opposes the motion for reconsideration because the Court correctly recognized that Mr. Ajaj now has access to significant group prayer opportunities in the Life Connections Program. As explained in the BOP’s briefing, Mr. Ajaj can pray with others when he is outside of his cell, up to five times per day depending on the time of year . . . . Mr. Ajaj may not be able to pray the first or last of the five daily prayers at those times of the year when the sun rises before inmates are released from their cells at approximately 6 a.m., or sets after the inmates are returned to their cells at approximately 9 p.m. J. App., Vol. 17 at 3365. 3 And the BOP’s brief on appeal suggests that Mr. Ajaj could pray with others at Terre Haute “typically for four of the five daily prayers of the Islamic faith.” Aplee. Br. at 23. Although missing one or two daily prayers might be considered a permissible burden on Mr. Ajaj’s religious beliefs, that goes to the merits of his RFRA claim, not its justiciability. Mr. Ajaj’s group-prayer claim has been founded on his belief that he must pray with others five times daily; and the record does not support that it was a “concrete fact” that he could do so in the LCP. District Ct. Order, J. App., Vol. 17 at 3359. We therefore must reverse the dismissal of Mr. Ajaj’s group-prayer claim as moot because it was based on a clearly erroneous finding that Mr. Ajaj could pray with others five times daily. Accordingly, we need not address Mr. Ajaj’s third argument regarding mootness, which claims an exception to mootness based on the alleged temporary 3 At a hearing during which Mr. Ajaj’s motion for partial reconsideration was addressed at some length, the district court appeared to accept that Mr. Ajaj was not always able to pray five times per day at Terre Haute; but neither at the hearing nor in the order denying the motion did the court explain why it nevertheless denied the motion. 14 Appellate Case: 19-1250 Document: 010110643021 Date Filed: 02/09/2022 Page: 15 nature of his placement in the LCP. Also, we deny as moot his related motion to supplement the record with evidence of interim events in support of his voluntarycessation arguments. 4