Opinion ID: 749590
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Comment Cruz's Failure to Testify

Text: 14 It is undisputed that prosecutors are forbidden to comment on a defendant's decision not to testify. Such a comment would violate a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. United States v. Tarazon, 989 F.2d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir.1993). Cruz asserts that the prosecutor impermissibly made the following two statements regarding his failure to testify at trial: 15 And it sure doesn't make any sense that someone like Billy Can Cruz, this CRIP from California, would cry, sitting there in that interview room knowing he's about to be charged with murder. He would be so mad. He would tell the police: Yeah, I was there. Yeah, I was in that room. I was in that car, but I wasn't the shooter. And I'll tell you who was. And for you to believe that he would sit there silently and allow himself to be charged like that and not say a word is ridiculous. He was picked up again on December 17. And again he had the opportunity to think about it, that those guys--if you believe what the defense said--that they were framing him, and that he would sit there and not say a word 'til this very day. Ladies and gentlemen. It simply doesn't make sense. (Emphasis added) (RT Vol. XXVI, 6/14/95: 129-131. ER 38-39). 16 Do you think Billy would sit there while Henry Siquig was saying he was the shooter, if Billy knew the truth that Henry was the shooter, and he'd just sit there and never say a word. (RT Vol. XXVIII, 6/6/95: 30. ER 50). 17 While defense counsel made no objection to the prosecutor's second statement, he did object to the first of the prosecutor's commentaries arguing at side bar that the prosecutor impermissibly commented on Cruz's failure to testify. The transcript of the argument at side bar reveals that the trial judge believed the initial comments were about Cruz's behavior during his interrogation. However, the judge also recognized the possibility that the jury could interpret the comments as applying to Cruz's failure to testify at trial. Therefore, she instructed the jury: 18 Ladies and gentlemen, he sure that you don't misunderstand [the prosecutor's] remark, let me make it clear to you that a defendant has no obligation to testify during a trial; he need not present any evidence or testify. And you'll be given a formal instruction on that in my instructions. Please keep that in mind. 19 A prosecutor's comment impermissibly calls attention to the defendant's failure to testify if it is manifestly intended to call attention to the defendant's failure to testify or is of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a commert on the failure to testify. Tarazon, 989 F.2d at 1051-52. Cruz argues that the phrase,  'til this very day could be interpreted to mean his failure to testify at trial. Although not entirely free of ambiguity, when taken in context, the prosecutor's comments focused attention on Cruz's behavior and statements made to the police when he was interrogated, not on his failure to testify at trial. Moreover, the court's curative instruction eliminated any tendency of the jury to take the statement as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. See Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d 1424, 1431 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 317 (9th Cir.1987). 20 Cruz's argument that the curative instruction was inadequate because it did not specifically instruct the jury that it could not draw negative inferences from the defendant's decision not to testify is not persuasive. The trial judge's initial curative instruction advised the jury that they would receive a formal instruction later. The court's closing instructions included one which read: You must not draw any inference from the fact that a defendant does not testify. Further you must neither discuss this matter nor permit it to enter into your deliberations in any way. 21 Cruz also asserts that the prosecutor's second statement directed attention to the fact that he remained silent during Siquig's trial testimony. However, a review of the record reveals that when examined in context the statement does not suggest a manifest intent to call attention to the fact that Cruz did not testify. Rather, this statement, too, is directed at Cruz's behavior during the investigation. Certainly, the jury would not naturally and necessarily interpret the prosecutor's statements to focus on Cruz's failure to testify at the trial. 22 We are convinced that both of the comments were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.