Opinion ID: 1213759
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Res judicata and the Dellarussiani plaintiffs' Prompt Pay Act claim in O'Brien

Text: We turn therefore to the other supplemental claims. With respect to the plaintiffs' third claim in O'Brien for liquidated damages under Ohio's Prompt Pay Act, O.R.C. § 4113.15(B): In Dellarussiani, this claim died on summary judgment, and above, we explain why we affirm the district court's disposition of count III. But the Dellarussiani plaintiffs still have a Prompt Pay Act claim in O'Brien. Mootness typically would not bar the Dellarussiani plaintiffs' § 4113.15(B) claim in O'Brien, in view of their loss at summary judgment on an identical claim in other litigation. Ordinarily, when a claim has already been resolved in a prior suit, mootness is invoked as a bar to subject-matter jurisdiction when full relief has been accorded by the prior tribunal. See, e.g., Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 606, 611 n. 4 (6th Cir.1998). Indeed, this is the case for counts I and II of Dellarussiani: plaintiffs have already won on these claims in Dellarussiani, and there is nothing more for them to win on a putative remand in O'Brien, particularly since we are remanding to the Dellarussiani district court the issue of what attorney fees can be recouped. That is why the Dellarussiani plaintiffs' are dismissed from the O'Brien appeal as to their FLSA and O.R.C. § 4111 claims. But with regard to the Prompt Pay Act claim for liquidated damages, the Dellarussiani plaintiffs in O'Brien are not, strictly speaking, barred by mootness but by claim preclusion. This fine distinction is worth discussing, because if mootness were to apply when a losing party received an adverse ruling but persisted in seeking relief in a subsequent suit, a federal court sitting in that subsequent suit would be required to sua sponte inquire into its own subject-matter jurisdiction over the previously losing party's claim. In other words, whether res judicata applied would be probative of whether the subsequent claim was moot and whether the claim was justiciable. But Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c) clearly frames res judicata as an affirmative defense, which means that it can be waived and that it does not go to subject-matter jurisdiction. See O'Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir.2005). Therefore, losing a claim on summary judgment in a previous suit does not moot such a claim in a subsequent lawsuit. Rather, the subsequent claim is barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion. See Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. U.S., 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990). Under Sixth Circuit Rule 27(d)(1), [m]otions to dismiss ordinarily may not be filed on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction. This rule favors denying the defendants' motion to dismiss as to the Dellarussiani plaintiffs' Prompt Pay Act claim in O'Brien, because claim preclusion, not mootness, is the obstacle that plaintiffs face on this claim. The individual Dellarussiani plaintiffs could then conceivably be recertified into a collective action along with the lead plaintiffs in O'Brien, given our conclusion, which we discuss later in Part IV.A.2, that the district court applied the wrong standard in decertifying the collective action in O'Brien. However, on remand, the defendants would surely raise res judicata and ask the district court to dismiss the extant Dellarussiani plaintiffs' claim once and for all. Res judicata in this instance is an insurmountable hurdle that has mootness-like effects. See Myer v. Americo Life, Inc., 469 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir.2006). Rather than grant the defendants' motion to dismiss the Dellarussiani plaintiffs' appeal in O'Brien as to their Prompt Pay Act claim, we instead choose to avoid transgressing the boundary between mootness and claim preclusion. The motion is denied as to the claim for § 4113.15(B) liquidated damages, but we find that under § 216(b) of the FLSA, the Dellarussiani plaintiffs are not similarly situated to the lead plaintiffs in O'Brien, given the inevitable preclusion of both the Prompt Pay Act claims and the common-law claims, as discussed next in Part III.D. Therefore, on the merits, we affirm the district court's decertification of these plaintiffs' Prompt Pay Act claim. Thus, the Dellarussiani plaintiffs are unable to rejoin the collective action. Technically, they could attempt to file individual actions, as we are affirming the district court's decertification and dismissal without prejudice of their claim. But such suits would be nipped in the bud by the affirmative defense of claim preclusion.