Opinion ID: 586810
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Challenge

Text: 20 The government argues that, in light of the voluntariness finding, the district court wrongly suppressed Barone's statements. We disagree. 21 In Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975), the Supreme Court addressed an issue left unresolved by its landmark ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966): once a suspect in custody invokes his right to remain silent, under what circumstances may the police resume questioning for the purpose of obtaining statements admissible against the defendant at trial? In answering this question, the Court rejected the extreme possibilities that, on the one hand, interrogation is forever barred after a suspect chooses to remain silent, and, on the other hand, that interrogation may resume following a momentary cessation. 423 U.S. at 102, 96 S.Ct. at 326. 22 The critical safeguard identified in Miranda, the Mosley Court held, is a person's  'right to cut off questioning,'  423 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. at 326 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1627). By exercising that right, a suspect can control the time at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the interrogation, 423 U.S. at 103-04, 96 S.Ct. at 326-27. The requirement that law enforcement authorities respect the decision to terminate questioning counteracts the coercive pressures of the custodial setting. Id. at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 326. The Court concluded, therefore, that the admissibility of statements obtained after a person in custody has decided to remain silent depends on whether the government has scrupulously honored his right to cut off questioning. Id. 23 The government argues that Mosley sets up a dual standard, depending upon when police officers resume questioning. In its view, any statement obtained after only a momentary cessation in interrogation must be suppressed, whether or not a review of the surrounding circumstances would show that it was made voluntarily. In contrast, the government suggests, the admissibility of statements made after a sustained lapse in questioning--such as occurred in this case between Friday afternoon and Saturday night--turns on whether the totality of the circumstances demonstrates a voluntary waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege. 24 We are unable to subscribe to this view of the law. Nowhere in its opinion does the Mosley Court suggest that the threshold test of admissibility varies depending upon the amount of time that has passed since a suspect invoked the right to silence. Nor does the test focus on the voluntariness of the challenged statements. Both Justice White's concurring opinion and Justice Brennan's dissent noted the majority's implicit holding that, under Miranda, some confessions must be ruled inadmissible even if they result from informed and voluntary decisions to waive the previously asserted privilege. See 423 U.S. at 107-08, 96 S.Ct. at 328-29 (White, J., concurring); at 113, 96 S.Ct. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Indeed, arguing, as it does, that suppression is mandatory for statements made after a brief lapse in questioning, the government apparently concedes that the standard is not framed in terms of voluntariness. 25 In rejecting a voluntariness test, Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, simply carried forward the principles developed in Miranda. There, the justices recognized that in-custody interrogation imposes inherently compelling pressures on persons suspected or accused of crime, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624, and concluded that prophylactic rules governing police conduct are an effective means of neutralizing this setting, id. Thus, in determining the admissibility of a confession made in response to initial police questioning, Miranda directs courts to look at whether the law enforcement officers have followed specified procedures; if not, the suspect's confession is inadmissible, without inquiry into voluntariness. The presumption, of course, is that most confessions obtained without adherence to those procedures would be involuntary. 26 Mosley adopts the same approach for statements made later in the interrogation process. Based on the assumption that repeated rounds of questioning in the face of a decision to remain silent nearly always will undermine a suspect's will, see 423 U.S. at 102, 96 S.Ct. at 325, a Fifth Amendment violation is presumed unless the law enforcement officials have followed specified procedures. In this setting, the prophylactic requirement is that the police scrupulously honor the right to cut off questioning. 27 There is one significant distinction between the Miranda and Mosley inquiries, however, and it undoubtedly explains the government's misapprehension of Mosley. Unlike the clearcut, purely objective test in Miranda--did the police officers fully inform the suspect of his rights before he confessed?--the inquiry in Mosley involves a multiple factor review. In evaluating law enforcement conduct pursuant to Mosley, courts must consider, inter alia, the time that elapsed between interrogations, whether fresh warnings were provided, the scope of the second interrogation, and the intensity with which the officers pursued questioning after the suspect asserted the right to silence. 423 U.S. at 104-05, 96 S.Ct. at 326-27. 28 In determining whether Mosley's right to cut off questioning was fully respected, the Court noted that, after Mosley stated that he wanted no further discussion, Detective Cowie did not try either to resume the questioning or in any way to persuade Mosley to reconsider his position. Id. at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 327. Although there was subsequent questioning hours later, it did not undercut Mosley's previous decision not to answer, for the subsequent questioner focused exclusively on ... a crime different in nature and in time and place of occurrence from the robberies for which Mosley had been ... interrogated by Detective Cowie. Id. at 105, 96 S.Ct. at 327. 29 The government mistakenly equates this totality of the circumstances scrutiny with the traditional voluntariness test, which involves a similar process but a very different analysis. The traditional examination into whether a defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his or her Fifth Amendment rights occurs when a suspect, after receiving the Miranda warnings, makes a confession. The scrutiny in such instances is broad, encompassing not only the nature of the police conduct but also such factors as the suspect's age, education and past criminal experience, and whether the suspect had the capacity to understand both the warnings given him and the consequences of waiving his rights. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-27, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2571-73, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979); United States v. Melanson, 691 F.2d 579, 588 (1st Cir.1981). 30 While the suspect's state of mind is central to the voluntariness finding, the Mosley test focuses on what the police did, and when, after the suspect exercised his or her right to remain silent. Indeed, the Miranda- Mosley rules are designed to give law enforcement agencies and courts clear, objective standards that might be applied to avoid the vagaries of the traditional voluntariness test, Mosley, 423 U.S. at 113, 96 S.Ct. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Thus, under Miranda and Mosley, a court need determine specifically whether there has been a voluntary waiver only after the government has carried its burden of showing that it complied with the required procedures. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475-76, 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1628-29, 1630. See also, e.g., Kelly v. Lynaugh, 862 F.2d 1126, 1131 (5th Cir.1988). 31 The district court properly applied the Mosley standard. It carefully reviewed the police conduct following Barone's decision to remain silent about Limoli, finding that the officers repeatedly spoke to Barone for the purpose of changing his mind, failed to provide new Miranda warnings, applied pressure by emphasizing the danger he would face in Boston if he did not cooperate, and took advantage of a long delay in arraignment. See infra at 15-18. These circumstances led the court to conclude that the officers failed to respect his right to cut off questioning about Limoli. Under Mosley, this should have ended the court's inquiry. Its additional finding that the statements were voluntary did not, as the government urges, trump or undermine the prior conclusion; the voluntariness finding was unnecessary and, indeed, irrelevant. The district court impliedly recognized this by its order of suppression. We therefore reject the government's claim that the court misconstrued the law in suppressing Barone's statements. 7 32 Having disposed of the government's legal challenge to the suppression order, 8 we turn briefly to its contention that the district court erred factually in finding a Mosley violation.