Opinion ID: 1669608
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Negligence/Wantonness Claims

Text: The Turners next appeal the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Westhampton as to the Turners' claims asserting (1) negligent and/or wanton application of the EIFS; (2) negligent and/or wanton hiring, training, supervision, and retention of the independent contractors; and (3) negligent and/or wanton failure to warn. [1]
In its summary-judgment motion, Westhampton argued that it was not liable for the torts of the independent contractor who installed the EIFS. The Turners responded by arguing that regardless of how carefully or skillfully performed, installation of the EIFS would have likely resulted in the damage[ ] now experienced by the [Turners]. On appeal, however, the Turners argue that Westhampton owed them a nondelegable duty to apply the EIFS properly. Generally, a general contractor is not liable for the negligence of his independent contractor. Knight v. Burns, Kirkley & Williams Constr. Co., 331 So.2d 651, 655 (Ala.1976). There are two common exceptions to this rule: First, the principal remains liable for work that is of such kind or class that the doing of it, however carefully or skillfully performed, will probably result in damage, or is necessarily and intrinsically dangerous. Baker v. Atlanta, B. & A. Ry., 163 Ala. 101, 105, 49 So. 751, 752 (1909). Second, the principal is liable for the manner of the performance of his non-delegable duties. Dixie Stage Lines v. Anderson, 222 Ala. 673, 675, 134 So. 23, 24 (1931). The Turners' response to Westhampton's summary-judgment motion [2] argued only the application of the first exception (that application of the EIFS was abnormally dangerous). On appeal, however, the Turners argue only the application of the second exception (that the duty undertaken by Westhampton was nondelegable). Because the Turners failed to raise before the trial court the only argument that they raise on appeal, i.e., that Westhampton owed them a nondelegable duty, they have waived that argument, and we will not address it. Cain v. Howorth, 877 So.2d 566, 578 (Ala.2003) (`on an appeal from a summary judgment, this Court cannot hold the trial court in error on the basis of arguments made for the first time on appeal'). Therefore, the trial court did not err in entering a summary judgment for Westhampton on the Turners' negligent- and/or wanton-application claim.
The Turners also allege that Westhampton was negligent and/or wanton in its hiring, training, supervision, and retention of the independent contractors who applied the EIFS (the negligent-hiring claim). As mentioned in note 2, in their brief opposing Westhampton's summary-judgment motion, the Turners argued that the application of the EIFS was inherently or abnormally dangerous. On appeal, the Turners again argue that the application of the EIFS was abnormally dangerous. Additionally, in their brief on appeal, the Turners argue that a principal contractor can be liable for his negligence in selecting, instructing, or supervising the independent contractor. We cannot address this latter argument, because it has been raised for the first time on appeal. Cain v. Howorth, supra . We endeavor, however, to address the Turners' argument that application of the EIFS is an abnormally dangerous activity under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 (1977). The Turners contend that the abnormal danger presented by the EIFS is best illustrated by one of Westhampton's representatives, who stated: [A] lot of problems with EIFS houses is if there is any intrusion of water, it's such a tight envelope and there's no air exchange, there's no waylike in a brick veneer house, you're going to get water intruding in brick veneer because it's not a waterproof system. That's why you have a one-inch airspace behind the brick so that any moisture that may condensate [sic] or may find its way through the mortar joints or whatever is going to run down the back of the brick and eventually end up on the foundation and out [w]eep holes. But you have the ability for the moisture to escape or dissipate. Any intrusion on an EIFS house is trapped. It doesn't readily evaporate because it's a tight system. The Turners' argument, in essence, is that regardless of how carefully or skillfully performed, installation of the EIFS would have likely resulted in the damage[] now experienced. The above-quoted statement by Westhampton's representative, the Turners contend, demonstrates that intruding water will always be trapped in a house finished with EIFS and will always cause moisture damage. Therefore, they argue, application of EIFS is an activity that inherently causes damage to a house. This argument is questionable. However, we need not examine it in detail, because, however true the Turners' argument may be, their claim must fail. In Dickinson v. City of Huntsville, 822 So.2d 411, 417 n. 2 (Ala.2001), this Court noted: In Harper v. Regency Development Co., 399 So.2d 248, 253 (Ala.1981), this Court, citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 (1977), set forth the following factors to be considered in determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous: `(a) evidence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others; `(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; `(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; `(d) extent to which the activity is not a manner of common usage; `(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and `(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.' Based upon an analysis of all of the factors set out above, we conclude that the application of EIFS on a house is not an abnormally dangerous activity. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in entering a summary judgment as to the Turners' negligent-hiring claim.
The Turners next argue that Westhampton failed to warn them (1) that Westhampton had failed to ensure that the construction of their house complied with applicable building standards; (2) that EIFS requires a high degree of maintenance to avoid serious problems; (3) that Westhampton had specified that EIFS, an exterior cladding known to have serious inherent problems, be applied to the Turners' house; and (4) that Westhampton did not supervise the work of the independent contractors. The Turners cite only one case in support of their theory that Westhampton had a duty to warn them of the items listed above. In Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v. Providence Hospital, 454 So.2d 496, 505 (Ala.1984), we stated that `[a] duty to speak depends upon the relation of the parties, the value of the particular fact, the relative knowledge of the parties, and other circumstances.' (Quoting Jim Short Ford Sales, Inc. v. Washington, 384 So.2d 83, 86 (Ala.1980).) However, this quotation concerns one's duty to speak in the context of a fraudulent-suppression claim, not a claim alleging a failure to warn. Examining the question independently of the Turners' brief, we acknowledge that Alabama law recognizes a cause of action for failure to warn. A plaintiff has the option of alleging failure to warn as a matter of negligence, under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine (the AEMLD), or both. Central to both theories of a failure-to-warn claim is the absence of a warning accompanying the sale of a product. In Keck v. Dryvit Systems, Inc., 830 So.2d 1, 7 (Ala.2002), this Court clearly stated that EIFS cannot be considered a product. Although our holding in Keck concerned the definition of a product for purposes of the AEMLD, both that doctrine and negligence are creatures of the common law. No statute defines a product differently for purposes of the AEMLD, on the one hand, and for purposes of a common-law negligence action, on the other. Therefore, we see no reason to define a product differently for purposes of a failure-to-warn claim sounding in negligence. Consequently, we cannot hold that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment for Westhampton on the Turners' failure-to-warn claim.