Opinion ID: 1237351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim of Inconsistency in Procedural Provisions

Text: It is suggested that the Act is unenforcible because of a conflict between the provisions of §§ 13 and 14, on the one hand, and § 18 on the other. Where judicial review of an order of the examiner is sought by an aggrieved person, or where the examiner or an interested person petitions the Circuit Court for enforcement of such an order pursuant to §§ 13 and 14, the hearing in the Circuit Court is upon the transcript of the proceedings before the examiner. The court is authorized to enter its decree upon the pleadings, testimony and proceedings set forth in such transcript (§ 13). Further, No objection that has not  been urged before the examiner shall be considered by the court. The findings of the examiner with respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive. But § 18 empowers courts of competent jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of the Act and then provides: No relief under ORS 662.610 to 662.790 shall be given by any court except after hearing the testimony of witnesses in open court, with opportunity for cross examination, in support of the allegations of a complaint or petition made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered. ORS 662.610 to 662.790 in the foregoing sentence was substituted in the revision for the words this Act. If this prohibition were held to apply to proceedings taken under §§ 13 and 14 there would result a clear and irreconcilable conflict, for obviously, on that assumption, a court could not follow the procedure outlined in §§ 13 and 14 without violating the command of § 18. The legislative history is of interest. The measure was introduced as House Bill No. 663 on March 20, 1953. As passed by the House, the bill contained no provision for the creation of the office of labor examiner and no administrative provisions whatever except that the State Board of Conciliation was invested with authority to conduct elections for the purpose of determining a bargaining agent for employees. Section 7 of the bill provided that any person aggrieved by a violation of any of the terms of the Act should be entitled to injunctive relief and to recover damages resulting from such violation in any court of general jurisdiction. All the provisions for administrative proceedings to be conducted by a labor examiner and for judicial review and judicial enforcement of his orders, as well as the present § 18, came into the statute by Senate amendments which were adopted on April  20, 1953. On April 21 the bill was finally passed. On April 21 the legislature adjourned. In view of this history the following quotation from State v. Mulhern, 74 Oh St 363, 78 NE 507, is peculiarly pertinent:    We are therefore remitted to an ascertainment of the policy and intent of the Legislature by a construction of the entire act. This situation, which presents two irreconcilable provisions respecting the time when the commissioner will take office, probably arose from the undue haste which characterized much of the late work of the session, and appears, as was stated by counsel at the oral hearing, to be a case of too many cooks. Such legislation is sometimes held wholly inoperative, and were the subject-matter of minor interest we would be disposed to hold in this case that the number of cooks had spoiled the broth utterly. But it is not a matter of minor interest but of general interest reaching as it does to every county of the state, and affecting vitally the conduct of each county's business, and it undoubtedly is the duty of the court to endeavor to give effect to the act in one way or the other. Which construction, therefore, will more nearly effectuate the purpose intended, and which will be freest from objection in the practical working out of the law? 1. There is a rule that in case of irreconcilable conflict between various provisions the last provision in order of position or arrangement in the statute should prevail. The rule was recognized by this court in Upham v. Bramwell, 105 Or 597, 619, 620, 209 P 100, 210 P 706, 25 ALR 919, but was not applied because the court was able to harmonize two apparently repugnant provisions of the statute in question. In fact, although many courts recognize the existence of such a rule, an examination of the cases indicates that it is applied only as a last resort. As stated in 82 CJS 719, Statutes § 347.    However, this rule has been criticized as having no satisfactory basis and as not being  supported by any sound legislative practice. This is a purely arbitrary and artificial rule of construction to which there are exceptions. So, it is subject to the rule that the statute must be construed as a whole to find the legislative intent, and has no application where the prior section or provision is more in harmony with the general purpose or intent of the act, or is clearer and more explicit that the later one, or where the literal interpretation of the later section would nullify the whole act, and is to be resorted to only when there is clearly an irreconcilable conflict, when there are no other means of ascertaining the legislative intent, and all other means of interpretation have been exhausted, and in extremis. See, also, Black on Interpretation of Laws, pp. 326, 327. The rule is not applied when the earlier provision of a statute conforms to the obvious policy and intent of the legislature. Black, op. cit., supra; State v. Mulhern, supra; State v. Bates, 96 Minn 110, 104 NW 709; Valley National Bank of Phoenix v. Apache County, 57 Ariz 459, 114 P2d 883; Western Beverage Co. v. Hansen, 98 Utah 332, 96 P 2d 1105. As stated by Mr. Black, it is only when the subsequent clause combines equal clearness with the advantage of position that it will control the former. See, State ex rel v. Public Service Commission, 101 Wash 601, 172 P 890. 2, 3. We are not, however, compelled to resort to use of a rule, everywhere considered arbitrary and unsatisfactory, for the solution of the present question; for we think that while the provisions under consideration are apparently irreconcilable, they are not actually and necessarily so, and that under settled rules of statutory interpretation they may be harmonized. That it is the court's duty to harmonize them, if possible, there can be no doubt. Lommasson v. School Dist. No. 1, 201 Or 71, 267 P2d 1105. An author must be supposed to be consistent with himself; and, therefore, if in one  place he has expressed his mind clearly, it ought to be presumed that he is still of the same mind in another place, unless it clearly appears that he had changed it. Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, 250, § 182. And in a case of conflict between the provisions of a statute those susceptible of only one meaning will control those susceptible of two meanings if the statute can thereby be made harmonius. 82 CJS 720, Statutes § 347; People v. Monroney, 24 Cal2d 638, 150 P2d 888. The provisions of §§ 13 and 14 are clear, definite and explicit. They appear to have been modeled upon certain sections of the New York State Labor Act (McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Book 30, Art. 20, § 707)  in many particulars at least the language is identical with that of the New York Act  and they were obviously intended to create a typical modern scheme of judicial review and judicial enforcement of administrative orders. See, also, National Labor Relations Act, 29 USCA § 160 (e). There can be no doubt whatever about the object of these provisions nor the method adopted for the accomplishment of that object. Were it to be held that § 18, by reason of its local position, should prevail over the earlier sections, not only would these detailed, carefully drawn provisions be swept away, but the provisions for administrative hearings and orders would follow in their train, for it is not to be supposed that the legislature would have established these administrative procedures in the absence of appropriate methods for securing judicial review and enforcement. 4. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the legislature by § 18 has authorized proceedings in court for enforcing and obtaining relief under the Act quite apart from proceedings initiated by the examiner. This, it may be said, is an incongruous provision in such a statute. Nothing in the present case, however,  makes it either necessary or desirable to attempt to determine the appropriate occasions for invoking this initial jurisdiction of the courts rather than proceeding first through the examiner. It is enough to say that there is no necessary inconsistency in the law because it provides for alternative procedures; and, though it may be that the two procedures cannot coexist in entire peace and harmony, at least they can coexist. 5, 6. We come, therefore, to the effect to be given to the sentence in § 18 which declares that no relief shall be given by any court except after hearing the testimony of witnesses in open court, etc. The language is broad enough to include relief granted by a court pursuant to §§ 13 and 14. But its position in the same section which authorizes an original proceeding in the court is some indication that it was intended to apply only to such proceedings. While the words of the sentence are themselves free from ambiguity there is uncertainty, nevertheless, respecting their application. An intent plainly expressed by the words of a statute may be rendered dubious by the context. Endlich, op. cit., p. 7. Such is the case here. In that posture of affairs it is the court's duty to adopt the interpretation which will give effect to the entire statute rather than one which will wreck a substantial and important part of it, and to withhold controlling effect from a provision susceptible of two meanings over other provisions in apparent conflict with it which are susceptible of only one meaning. We hold, therefore, that § 18 does not affect proceedings taken pursuant to §§ 13 and 14.