Opinion ID: 2136941
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony of J.C.'s Mother

Text: There are no findings in the record that the testimony of J.C.'s mother is relevant to any element enumerated in SDCL 19-12-5, or that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. As we said in State v. Eagle Hawk, supra, at 126, [i]f such a weighing was accomplished, we are certain the circuit court judge would have disallowed this evidence as its probative value is substantially overcome by its prejudicial effect. J.C.'s mother testified that some six weeks after defendant last babysat J.C., and after J.C.'s family had moved to a new community, she observed J.C. touching her vagina one day after a bath. When she asked J.C. why she was doing that, J.C. replied that defendant had both touched and licked her there, and that defendant had instructed J.C. not to tell her mother. J.C.'s mother also gave testimony about a spanking incident involving another daughter and defendant. Under SDCL 19-12-5, we fail to see how the testimony of J.C.'s mother, even if true, is relevant to any material issue against defendant. The testimony proves nothing about defendant's possible motives for abusing S.H. It proves nothing about what she intended with respect to S.H. It proves nothing about any preparation, plan or knowledge in the mind of defendant. It does not identify her as the abuser of S.H. It does not demonstrate that what happened to S.H. was no accident. In short, the testimony of J.C.'s mother has nothing to do with what happened to S.H. on August 5, 1989. The testimony was offered for the sole purpose of painting defendant as a bad person who was capable of abusing children and who therefore probably abused S.H. The testimony had no other purpose except to prove the character of [defendant] in order to show that [s]he acted in conformity therewith. That is precisely the kind of prior bad act evidence excluded by SDCL 19-12-5. To read the exceptions contained in SDCL 19-12-5 so elastically as to include the testimony of J.C.'s mother is to allow the exceptions to swallow the basic rule that prior bad act evidence going to character is inadmissible. See State v. Rufener, 392 N.W.2d 424, 429 (S.D.1986) ( Rufener I ) (Morgan, J. (concurring specially)). The court also failed to balance the probative value of such testimony against its prejudicial effect. This testimony was the only evidence presented which accused defendant of sexual abuse. It is highly inflammatory. Moreover, its probative value is questionable, in that it is based on the declarations of a four-year-old child six weeks after the alleged act in response to a question from her mother about why she was touching herself. J.C.'s mother also testified that she employed three other babysitters during this same time period. It would be difficult to conclude that the probative value of this testimony is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. In view of the minimal relevance of the testimony of J.C.'s mother, and because the court made no probative value/prejudicial effect balancing in the record, we find the court abused its discretion in admitting this prior bad act testimony. See State v. Eagle Hawk, supra, at 125-126. We also find the testimony inadmissible as hearsay, which we discuss below in issue 2b.