Opinion ID: 1648991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: school district reorganization: appeal procedures

Text: One other provision of law that applies to petitions initiated by both voters and school boards is the right of appeal under § 79-413(4). That section provides, Any person adversely affected by the changes made by the state committee may appeal to the district court of any county in which the real estate or any part thereof involved in the dispute is located. In her supplemental brief, Nicholson contends that her collateral attack is a permissible means of challenging the constitutionality of the school districts' combination of the bond issues. Nicholson argues that § 79-413(4) is inapplicable because she is not disputing any changes made by the State Committee. She claims that the only changes made by the State Committee are to the boundaries of the school districts and the appointment of new school board members, neither of which she disputes, and that the State Committee does not authorize the issuance of bonds or the reallocation of indebtedness. In a related argument, she contends that if the State Committee authorized a transfer of debt from Twin Valley and Republican Valley to the reorganized district, her collateral attack is the proper remedy because the State Committee acted beyond its authority, rendering such action by the State Committee void. See School Dist. of Gering v. Stannard, 193 Neb. 624, 228 N.W.2d 600 (1975) (county superintendent proceedings may be attacked collaterally when such proceedings are void and county superintendent lacks jurisdiction). We reject Nicholson's arguments. Section 79-422(1) provides that bonded indebtedness approved prior to the change in school district boundaries shall remain the obligation of the school district voting such bonds unless otherwise specified in the petitions.  (Emphasis supplied.) The reorganization petition in this case did otherwise specify under § 79-422(1). Nicholson's objection to the reallocation of debt to the reorganized district was an objection to the terms of the petition. The State Committee's required approval of that petition, containing those terms, was a change within the State Committee's jurisdiction and subject to appeal pursuant to § 79-413(4). Nicholson next argues that she could not have appealed under § 79-413(4) because of our statements in Kosmicki v. Kowalski, 184 Neb. 639, 171 N.W.2d 172 (1969). She argues that the only function of the State Committee is to determine if the petition has been properly executed and that this is a ministerial and not a quasi-judicial function. Thus, citing Kosmicki, Nicholson concludes that the State Committee's exercise of a nonjudicial function is not appealable under § 79-413(4) and that her remedy is by collateral attack. See Kosmicki v. Kowalski, supra (when county superintendent does not act in judicial manner, then collateral attack offers adequate remedy). Prior to the enactment of the predecessor to § 79-413(4), the authority currently exercised by the State Committee was exercised by county superintendents. See 1999 Neb. Laws, L.B. 272 (transferring duties from county superintendents to State Committee). No specific provision for appeal of county superintendents' decisions existed until 1963. See 1963 Neb. Laws, ch. 473, § 1, p. 1519. Prior to 1963, judicial review of county superintendents' decisions was solely by petition in error. School Dist. of Wilbur, v. Pracheil, 180 Neb. 121, 141 N.W.2d 768 (1966). Allowing judicial review of county superintendents' decisions by petition in error clearly implied that county superintendents acted in a judicial manner. We have held that it is only when the inferior board or tribunal acts judicially that a review by error proceedings is allowed. Hawkins v. City of Omaha, 261 Neb. 943, 627 N.W.2d 118 (2001). Where an inferior board or tribunal decides no question of adjudicative fact and no statute requires the board or tribunal to act in a judicial manner, such orders are not reviewable by error proceedings. Id. Our cases from that earlier era also expressly held that county superintendents acted in a judicial manner. See, Longe v. County of Wayne, 175 Neb. 245, 121 N.W.2d 196 (1963) (under petition method, county superintendent acts judicially to certain extent in determining sufficiency of petition); Lindgren v. School Dist. of Bridgeport, 170 Neb. 279, 102 N.W.2d 599 (1960) (hearing before county superintendent is quasi-judicial in character); Dovel v. School Dist. No. 23, 166 Neb. 548, 552, 90 N.W.2d 58, 62 (1958) ([t]he hearing before the county superintendent of schools is a quasi-judicial hearing); School Dist. No. 49 v. Kreidler, 165 Neb. 761, 87 N.W.2d 429 (1958). We departed from that line of authority in Kosmicki v. Kowalski, supra . In Kosmicki, petitions were submitted to the county superintendent by the members of the boards of education of the respective school districts. The county superintendent held a hearing to consider the petitions and then approved the petitions. This court stated: The appellants contend that the district court for Sherman County has jurisdiction to review by proceedings in error the order of the county superintendent of schools. The issue raised by this contention is whether section 79-402, R.S. Supp., 1967 [codified today at § 79-413(4)], which provides that any person adversely affected by the changes made by the county superintendent may appeal to the district court of any county in which the real estate is located, requires the district court to review an administrative order which does not rest on any adjudicative fact. We hold that this provision for direct appeal is limited to an order which required the superintendent to act in a judicial manner. In School Dist. No. 23 v. School Dist. No. 11, 181 Neb. 305, 148 N.W.2d 301 (1967), this court reversed a district court's review of the superintendent's order in an error proceeding. The county superintendent had dissolved and attached one school district to another under section 79-408.01, R.R.S.1943. This court found that: In the present case the superintendent decided no dispute of adjudicative fact, and no statute required him to act in a judicial manner. Such orders are not reviewable by error proceedings, which are limited to orders made in the exercise of judicial functions. §§ 25-1901 and 25-1903, R.R.S.1943; Longe v. County of Wayne, 175 Neb. 245, 121 N.W.2d 196 [(1963)]. In such circumstances collateral attack offers an adequate remedy.... The county superintendent of Sherman County was required to determine only whether the signatures on the petition were valid under section 79-402, R.R.S.1943, and accordingly had no dispute of adjudicative fact before her. (Citations omitted.) Kosmicki v. Kowalski, 184 Neb. 639, 642-43, 171 N.W.2d 172, 174 (1969). Without citing Kosmicki, we returned to our pre- Kosmicki line of authority in School Dist. of Gering v. Stannard, 193 Neb. 624, 228 N.W.2d 600 (1975). There, a petition in error was brought against the determination by the county superintendent transferring real property from one district to another. We stated that this court had considered such proceedings on many occasions. It has held that the hearing by the county superintendent to determine the sufficiency of the petitions is judicial in nature ...; that if the petitions are legally sufficient, the county superintendent has the jurisdiction and the mandatory duty to order the requested change in boundaries ...; that judicial review of the county superintendent's action is by petition in error and that such proceedings may be attacked collaterally when such proceedings are void and the county superintendent lacks jurisdiction.... Id. at 628-29, 228 N.W.2d at 605. Obviously, Kosmicki is an anomaly in our school reorganization jurisprudence. Nicholson has cited to no other case but Kosmicki for the authority that the State Committee, in determining the sufficiency of a petition, does not act in a quasi-judicial manner. Kosmicki v. Kowalski, supra , is hereby disapproved. Our review of the statutes currently in effect supports our conclusion that the State Committee may consider the substance of a petition initiated by school boards, therefore acting in a quasi-judicial manner. Section 79-418 specifically subjects petitions initiated by school boards to approval by the State Committee. As we have noted, determining the sufficiency of signatures on a voter-initiated petition is a quasi-judicial function. Dovel v. School Dist. No. 23, 166 Neb. 548, 90 N.W.2d 58 (1958). In addition to determining the sufficiency of signatures, the State Committee must also evaluate a petition against the requirements of § 79-419. That statute prescribes the content of a petition, including, among other things, a summary of the terms on which reorganization is to be made between the reorganized districts. § 79-419(1)(b). With the present case in mind, such terms would include any reallocation of debt pursuant to the authority granted by § 79-422. Thus, the State Committee's evaluation of the reorganization petition presented the first opportunity for Nicholson to object to the school districts' reallocation of indebtedness. The State Committee's subsequent approval of the petition, including the terms Nicholson took exception to, adversely affected Nicholson within the meaning of § 79-413(4). She was thus required to challenge the State Committee's approval of the petition by an appeal pursuant to § 79-413(4), or, alternatively, a petition in error. See Moser v. Turner, 180 Neb. 635, 144 N.W.2d 192 (1966) (review of county superintendent's decision could be sought by appeal or petition in error). An action for declaratory judgment does not lie where another equally serviceable remedy is available. Galyen v. Balka, 253 Neb. 270, 570 N.W.2d 519 (1997). One who has failed to pursue a full, adequate, and exclusive statutory remedy is not afforded an additional remedy under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Id. Rather than seeking review by appeal or by petition in error, Nicholson filed this improper collateral attack, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, on May 2, 2003  1 week before the reorganization petition was approved by the State Committee. Because Nicholson filed an impermissible collateral action, we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction over Nicholson's appeal. APPEAL DISMISSED.