Opinion ID: 1945660
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Statements Made to Police Officer.

Text: As discussed above, error was not preserved with respect to the witnesses' testimony regarding Bergan's identification of Schaer as her assailant to the police officer. Therefore, we will analyze the defendant's claim that this testimony violated the defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him under an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel framework. The principles governing our consideration of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are well established: To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show: (1) trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty; and (2) prejudice resulted from this failure. Counsel has no duty to raise an issue or make an objection that has no merit. `Generally, ineffective-assistance claims are preserved for postconviction relief proceedings to afford the defendant an evidentiary hearing and thereby permit the development of a more complete record.' If the record on appeal shows, however, that the defendant cannot prevail on such a claim as a matter of law, we will `affirm the defendant's conviction without preserving the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.' Conversely, if the record on appeal establishes both elements of an ineffective-assistance claim and an evidentiary hearing would not alter this conclusion, we will reverse the defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial. Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 752-53 (quoting State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 869 (Iowa 2003)). We begin our discussion with the prejudice element of the defendant's ineffective-assistance claim, since [i]f sufficient prejudice is not shown, we need not address whether counsel breached an essential duty. State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Iowa 1995). Prejudice is shown when it is reasonably probable that the result of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Henderson, 537 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Iowa 1995). The probability of a different result must be `sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' State v. Reynolds, 746 N.W.2d 837, 845 (Iowa 2008) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698 (1984)). Even if the admission of Reckner's and Officer Blake's hearsay testimony violated the Confrontation Clause and counsel had a duty to object to its admission, we conclude there is no reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different if the jury had not heard the objectionable evidence. As we have previously discussed, there was admissible testimony from Reckner and the medical personnel that Bergan had identified Schaer as the perpetrator to them. Bergan's treating physician testified that Bergan had identified Schaer by name as her assailant. In addition, the emergency room nurse and Reckner testified to Bergan's indirect, yet clear, identification to them of Schaer as the person who had assaulted her. Thus, Reckner's and Officer Blake's testimony as to Bergan's statement to the officer was cumulative of other properly admitted testimony. See In re Moore, 133 Cal.App.4th 68, 34 Cal. Rptr.3d 605, 613 (2005) (holding counsel's failure to object to admission of 911 tape on confrontation grounds did not result in prejudice where evidence was cumulative of other testimony in record). In addition, the prosecution's case was strong. The circumstances surrounding the event pointed exclusively to the defendant as the perpetrator, since Bergan had been dropped off at the home she shared with Schaer just fifteen minutes before Reckner picked up Bergan a few blocks from her home, bloodied and beaten. Moreover, there was no credible alternative explanation for Bergan's injuries. See Haygood v. State, 289 Ga.App. 187, 656 S.E.2d 541, 546 (2008) (concluding in light of other evidence of guilt in the record, outcome of proceeding would likely not have been different had admission of DNA evidence been denied on confrontation grounds). We think any testimony regarding Bergan's identification of the defendant as her assailant to Officer Blake was merely cumulative, and its admission does not undermine our confidence in the outcome of the defendant's trial. Therefore, we conclude, as a matter of law, the defendant cannot establish the necessary prejudice to support an ineffective-assistance claim. Accordingly, we affirm his conviction without preserving this claim for a possible postconviction-relief action.