Opinion ID: 719595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Hsus' Rights

Text: 40 A preliminary injunction is granted if the party seeking the relief establishes two elements: first, the party will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; second, either the moving party is likely to succeed on the merits, or there are sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships tip[s] decidedly its way. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Elman, 949 F.2d 624, 626 (2d Cir.1991). The district court ruled that the Hsus would carry their burden as to the first element if the School denied them their First Amendment rights: 41 If, as plaintiffs contend, they are being deprived of their First Amendment rights by defendants' nondiscrimination policy, they have and will continue to sustain irreparable harm. As the Supreme Court has stated: The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. Elrod v. Burns, [427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2690, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976)] . . . . Accordingly, this Court finds that plaintiffs have demonstrated that they will suffer irreparable harm. 42 876 F.Supp. at 451. The district court's finding of irreparable harm was thus conditioned on the conclusion (ultimately rejected by the district court) that the Hsus were being deprived of free speech rights. Since the irreparable harm inquiry depends on the merits of the claims, we turn to the merits, asking whether the Hsus are likely to succeed, and consider irreparable injury at the end of our opinion. 43 The Hsus make two statutory and several constitutional claims. Consistent with our practice of avoiding constitutional questions wherever possible, we begin with the Hsus' statutory claims. See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854, 105 S.Ct. 2992, 2996, 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985) (it is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint that [p]rior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision (internal quotations omitted)); Montilla v. INS, 926 F.2d 162, 168-69 (2d Cir.1991) (same).
44 Enacted in 1984, the Equal Access Act (Act), 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074, guarantees the right of public school students to form extracurricular groups that engage in religious, philosophical, or political discourse. Section 4071(a) creates this statutory free speech right 6 : 45 It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings. 46 There is no doubt that Roslyn High School is a public secondary school that has a limited open forum 7 and receives federal funds. Thus, the Hsus' claim turns on whether the School denied them equal access ... on the basis of the religious ... content of the speech that would have taken place at their meetings. 8 47 There is scant authority to guide us in our effort to interpret these statutory terms. The legislative history of the Act 9 indicates that its authors sought to end discrimination against religious extracurricular groups in public schools by mandating a policy of neutrality. See 130 Cong. Rec. 19,224 (1984) (statement of Sen. Hatfield). To the Act's authors, equal access meant that secondary school students engaging in religious speech have the same rights to associate together and to speak as do students who wish to meet to discuss chess, politics, or philosophy. Id. at 19,216 (Sen. Denton) (emphasis added). 48 Supporting and opposing members of Congress worried that this grant of protection for student speech was too broad and the intrusion on school autonomy too great; specifically, they expressed concern that a law intended to ensure that after-school prayer groups could meet would leave a school powerless to bar the Ku Klux Klan, cults, or intrusive proselytizers. 10 Though Senator Hatfield, the Senate's primary sponsor, thought this concern was overstated, arguing that the Act still allowed schools to outlaw groups that would be disruptive to the purpose of [the] school ... [, including a group like] the American Nazi Party ... that is dedicated to the purpose of dividing people, on grounds of race or religion, id. at 19,224, he admitted that we are [not] going to be able to anticipate every possible instance that will arise under this expansion of rights.... Id. at 19,225. 11 Indeed, the members of Congress do not appear to have anticipated the situation that confronts us: there is no discussion in the legislative history about whether equal access allows an after-school religious club to limit its leaders to those of a particular religious faith. Nor did members of Congress discuss whether the term speech at [the] meetings includes a leadership eligibility requirement that is intended to guarantee that the speech at the club meetings will have a particular content. 49 Though the Supreme Court interpreted the Equal Access Act in Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 110 S.Ct. 2356, 110 L.Ed.2d 191 (1990), that case also provides only limited guidance about how to interpret the statutory terms that concern us. In Mergens, students at a Nebraska public high school wanted to form an after-school Christian club, open to students of all religions, for prayer and Bible discussion. Id. at 232, 110 S.Ct. at 2362-63. The students sought the school's official recognition, which would have given the club access to the school newspaper, bulletin boards, the public address system, and the annual Club Fair. Id. at 247, 110 S.Ct. at 2370. The students' proposal contemplated that there would be no faculty adviser. Id. at 232, 110 S.Ct. at 2362-63. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071(c)(2) & 4072(2). The school denied recognition on the grounds that every recognized club needed a faculty sponsor, and that recognition of a religious club would violate the Establishment Clause. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 232-33, 110 S.Ct. at 2362-63. 50 The Supreme Court held that the Equal Access Act required recognition of the club, and that the Act on its face and as applied did not violate the Establishment Clause. (We address the Establishment Clause aspect of the Court's decision in section IV, infra.) In discussing whether the school's refusal to recognize the Bible club fell within the terms of the statute, the Court concerned itself almost exclusively with the meaning of the term noncurriculum related student groups, a concept not at issue in our case. 12 The final paragraph of the Court's statutory interpretation section briefly discussed the term equal access, holding simply that to deny the Bible Club official recognition (including denial of access to the school newspaper, bulletin boards, and public address system) was to deny it equal access. Id. at 247, 110 S.Ct. at 2370. 51 This Court has had no occasion to consider the Equal Access Act. Two other circuits have interpreted the Act, see Ceniceros v. Board of Trustees, 66 F.3d 1535 (9th Cir.1995); Garnett v. Renton School Dist. No. 403, 987 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 72, 126 L.Ed.2d 41 (1993); Pope v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 12 F.3d 1244 (3d Cir.1993); Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion School Dist., 776 F.2d 431 (3d Cir.1985), but none of these cases addresses the situation presented here or construes the wordings that concern us. In interpreting the Act, we therefore rely on the common meanings of the words themselves, the logic and architecture of the Act, the congressional purpose of providing religious clubs with the same rights as other clubs, the Supreme Court's direction in Mergens that the Act is to be interpreted broadly, 496 U.S. at 239, 110 S.Ct. at 2366, and Supreme Court cases from analogous areas of the law. 52
53 Did the School refuse to recognize the Hsus' club on the basis of the religious ... content of the speech at [the Club's] meetings? One might argue that there is no speech at issue here. After all, the School did not base its qualified recognition of the Club on what would be said at the Club meetings, but on what could be characterized as the Club's act of excluding non-Christians from leadership. The School has demonstrated that it would recognize the Walking on Water Club (or any other religious club) without regard to the content of the club's prayers or discussions, so long as no religious exclusions were made. 54 We are therefore confronted with difficult issues about the meaning of the statutory term speech. We conclude that, in light of the Supreme Court's command that we construe the Act broadly, the term speech includes the Walking on Water's Club leadership policy provision, to the extent that it is reasonably designed to assure that a certain type of religious speech will take place at the Club's meetings. 13 We take guidance from the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995). In that case, the Court recognized that the message a group imparts sometimes depends upon its ability to exclude certain people, and that this exclusion may be protected by the First Amendment. The veterans group that organized the annual St. Patrick's Day parade in Boston refused to let an Irish gay pride group march with a gay pride banner. The Massachusetts courts held that this exclusion ran afoul of the state's public accommodations law, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of, inter alia, sexual orientation. Id. at ---- - ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2341-43. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that this application of the state law violated the parade organizers' First Amendment free speech rights. Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2343. The Court noted that the parade did not exclude gay people in general, but rather excluded a group of gay people that wanted to communicate a particular message during the parade. By excluding that group, the parade organizers sought to tailor their own message by omitting a particular communication from the banners that constituted their speech, id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2347, and by select[ing] the expressive units of the parade from potential participants. 14 Id. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2348. The lesson we draw from Hurley is that the principle of speaker's autonomy gives a speaker the right, in some circumstances, to prevent certain groups from contributing to the speaker's speech, if the groups' contribution would alter the speaker's message. 55 Hurley does not control this case, because (first) it concerns speech rights under the Constitution, not a federal statute, and (second) the Club's proposed exclusion differs somewhat from the exclusion at issue in Hurley. Here, we are not faced with the exclusion of a discrete group that will definitely communicate a specific message if included. Rather, a broad cross-section of people is excluded from leadership in the Club because they lack a personal characteristic or belief, without any showing that they would desire to communicate any particular message. 56 Despite these two differences, Hurley remains instructive. First, since the Act creates an analog 15 to the First Amendment's default rule banning content-based speech discrimination, cases discussing the meaning of speech in First Amendment jurisprudence are also interpretive tools for understanding the Act. Second, the exclusions here and in Hurley are too similar to be meaningfully distinguished. As in Hurley, the Club's decision to exclude is based on its desire to preserve the content of its message. The Hsus claim that having Christian leaders necessarily shapes the content of the religious speech at their meetings, because the nature and quality of the speech at the meetings is dependent upon the religious commitment of the officers. We can accept this claim to the extent that there is an integral connection between the exclusionary leadership policy and the religious speech at their meetings. No party or amicus is challenging the idea that the activities of this Club will consist of religious speech. We accept--as the parties and the district court have apparently accepted--that the purpose of the Club is to organize participation in activities that will be in the nature of religious devotions. 57 However, as we review the Club's constitution, we see that some of the activities are not unambiguously religious. Although meetings will consist mostly of prayers, singspiration (a form of musical prayer), Bible readings, and testimonies about the impact of Jesus Christ in the students' lives, the Club's constitution also lists guest speakers, skits, and games as possible activities at the meetings. 16 There is no reason to limit the range of activities that may be undertaken by an after-school religious club that discriminates, so long as the activities are integral to a sectarian religious experience. But to the extent that such a group engages in social and community activities that are not integral to a sectarian religious experience, it is in danger of becoming merely a religious affinity group practicing social exclusion. The entire thrust of the Hsus' case, the School's resistance, and the amici's arguments assumes that the activities at the Club's meetings promote and express the Christian religious experience in an integral way, and we proceed on this assumption. 58 On the other hand, the constitution also lists picnics and volunteer community service as Club activities, events which would obviously take place outside of the Club's meetings at the schoolhouse. Taking an expansive view, one can say that religion suffuses all the conduct of a pious person, so that the worshipful contemplation of nature on a picnic, as well as acts of charity and service, may all be deemed to have a religious dimension. However, this is not religious speech within the meaning of the Equal Access Act, if only because it will not occur at a meeting. In addition, there is no reason to believe, based on the present record, that the planning of a picnic or a service project must be done by a Christian in order to make it meaningful for Christian students. In the Walking on Water Club, the planning of these non-school activities is the only responsibility of the Activities Coordinator, who, according to the Hsus, must ensure that the activities do not offend Christian sensibilities. But an agnostic with an understanding of Christian sensibilities might plan these activities as well as any other student. Similarly, it is very difficult to understand why the religious speech at the Walking on Water Club meetings would be affected by having a non-Christian Secretary, whose principal duties are to accurately record the minutes of meetings and be involved in the Club's financial accounting and reporting. 59 The Hsus claim that all officers, including the Secretary and Activities Coordinator, must be prepared to open or close a meeting with prayer ... or to lead a Bible study and that this duty justifies the exclusion of non-Christians from those posts. But this assertion has no limiting principle. Anyone in attendance at a religious meeting may be called upon for a benediction or to lead a Bible study. There is thus no difference between (a) the Hsus' desire to discriminate in the selection of numerous officers of a small club, each of whom may be called upon to officiate briefly, and (b) a religious test for membership or attendance, which is plainly insupportable. 17 60 The leadership provision is defensible, however, as to the President, Vice-President, and Music Coordinator of the Club, because their duties consist of leading Christian prayers and devotions and safeguarding the spiritual content of the meetings. Guaranteeing that these officers will be dedicated Christians assures that the Club's programs, in which any student is of course free to participate, will be imbued with certain qualities of commitment and spirituality. Thus, we conclude that the decision to allow only Christians to be President, Vice-President, or Music Coordinator is calculated to make a certain type of speech possible, and will affect the religious ... content of the speech at [the] meetings, within the meaning of the Equal Access Act. 18 From this point on, our reference to the Club's exclusionary leadership policy refers only to the exclusion of non-Christians from these three leadership positions. 61 In interpreting the term speech, we are also guided by a set of Supreme Court cases similar to Hurley, although analyzed under the Court's freedom of association jurisprudence. The right to free association for expressive purposes is implicit in the First Amendment free speech guarantee. See NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170-71, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 1798, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). That right is an instrumental one: expressive association is protected as an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3249, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). The right to associate also includes the right not to associate. Id. at 623, 104 S.Ct. at 3252-53. 62 The Supreme Court examined the scope of this right in Roberts and Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 107 S.Ct. 1940, 95 L.Ed.2d 474 (1987). In both cases, the Court upheld the application of state antidiscrimination laws to private civic clubs that wished to continue their exclusion of women as members. Although the Court determined that the statutes infringed on the expressive association rights of the private clubs, that infringement [was] justified because it serves the State's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women. Rotary, 481 U.S. at 549, 107 S.Ct. at 1948. See also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623, 104 S.Ct. at 3252-53; New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 11-12, 108 S.Ct. 2225, 2233-34, 101 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (rejecting a facial challenge to a nondiscrimination statute, on the ground that the freedom of expressive association was not infringed upon by all applications of the statute). 63 Roberts and Rotary (like Hurley ) are analytically distinct from this case, because they involve constitutional rights, not statutory ones. Nevertheless (like Hurley ) they assist our interpretation of the term speech in the Equal Access Act. The Act, which protects students only against the denial of equal access on the basis of their speech, does not expressly protect their right to associate. But since the grant of speech protection is to students who wish to conduct a meeting, the right to associate for the purpose of holding such a meeting is a necessary corollary. The Act's authors made it clear that the language of § 4071(a) was intended to protect both free speech and free association rights of certain student clubs. 130 Cong. Rec. 19,216 (1984) (statement of Sen. Denton); id. at 19,217 (Sen. Hatfield). Thus, the Act contains an implicit right of expressive association when the goal of that association is to meet for a purpose protected by the Act. 64 As in Roberts and Rotary, when the students' desire to hold a meeting covered by the Act involves a decision not to associate with other students, that decision, depending on its purpose, may constitute an exercise of the students' right of expressive association. On the one hand, an exclusion solely for reasons of hostility or cliquishness, with no direct bearing or effect on the group's speech, does not implicate the right to expressive association. But expressive association is implicated when the decision to exclude is made in order to foster the group's shared interest in particular speech. See William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 Nw. U.L.Rev. 68, 78-80, 90-91 (1986). As the Court said in Roberts, a regulation that prevents a group from excluding certain people may impair the ability of the original members to express only those views that brought them together. 468 U.S. at 623, 104 S.Ct. at 3252 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court in New York State Club Association stated that 65 an association might be able to show that it is organized for specific expressive purposes and that it will not be able to advocate its desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its membership to those who share the same sex, for example, or the same religion. 66 487 U.S. at 13, 108 S.Ct. at 2234 (emphasis added). 67 It is undisputed that the decision by the Walking on Water Club to impose a religious test for leadership positions has been made purely for expressive purposes--to guarantee that meetings include the desired worship and observance--rather than for the sake of exclusion itself. As we have explained, supra, this test serves this expressive purpose for three of the leadership positions. As in other instances in which a limitation on the right to associate for expressive purposes has been held to infringe on the right to free speech, the School's refusal to allow the Walking on Water Club to guarantee that Christians will lead its Christian prayers implicates free speech rights under the Act. This does not mean, however, that the students' Equal Access Act claim automatically prevails. On the constitutional level, the right to free association is not absolute. Roberts and Rotary make clear that a compelling governmental interest (such as eliminating discrimination against women) will override the right to expressive association. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623, 104 S.Ct. at 3252-53; Rotary, 481 U.S. at 549, 107 S.Ct. at 1947-48. And, since the students' right to expressive association here is based on a statute applicable to public schools--where free speech rights receive somewhat less protection generally--it is not at all apparent that a governmental interest need be compelling to override the expressive association rights at issue here. We ask in sections IV and V, infra, whether the School has a valid reason (under the Constitution or otherwise) for denying the Club the recognition it seeks. We can conclude at this point, however, that when an after-school religious club excludes people of other religions from conducting its meetings, and when that choice is made to protect the expressive content of the meetings, a school's decision to deny recognition to the club because of the exclusion is a decision based on the content of the speech at [the] meetings, within the meaning of the Equal Access Act. 68
69 The District argues that equal access has not been denied. It claims that it is applying its nondiscrimination policy neutrally to all after-school clubs, that this equal treatment amounts to equal access, and that recognition of the Walking on Water Club, with its discriminatory constitution, would afford the Club special treatment, a level of accommodation that the Act does not demand. 70 The District's focus on the even application of its nondiscrimination rule misses the point. The Act mandates that students be given equal access, not that the School's internal rules be administered uniformly. A rule against wearing hats in the school building, perfectly and consistently enforced, might deprive Jewish students of equal access to after-school facilities for shared religious observance. Similarly, a rule requiring students to wear appropriate footwear at all times, perfectly and consistently enforced, might effectively ban after-school meetings of the Yoga Club. The neutral application of the School's rules allows the School to say that it is treating all clubs equally. But exemptions from neutrally applicable rules that impede one or another club from expressing the beliefs that it was formed to express, may be required if a school is to provide equal access. 71 The District argues that allowing the Hsus to discriminate on the basis of religion would grant them special rights: since the Chess Club may not limit its officers to Muslims, even if its founding members trust only Muslims to lead them, then the Walking on Water Club may not limit its officers to Christians. We agree that the Hsus are only entitled to the same rights that other student clubs have. But the District's argument ignores the fact that the Walking on Water Club is a religious club and the Chess Club is not. Walking on Water Club meetings will include certain types of religious prayers and songs. The Club's leadership eligibility requirement on the basis of religion is therefore similar to a chess club's eligibility requirement based on chess. Though the District argues that only those exclusions based on ability and performance are appropriate, this ignores one of the principal ways in which many extracurricular clubs typically define themselves: by requiring that their leaders show a firm commitment to the club's cause. The record does not include the constitutions of other extracurricular clubs at Roslyn High School, 19 but it would be sensible--and unremarkable in light of the clubs' particular purposes--for the Students Protecting the Environment Against Contamination Club to require that officers have a demonstrated commitment to conservation or recycling; for Students Against Drunk Driving to require that officers have taken the pledge; or for Students for Social Responsibility to require that officers have a social conscience. Similarly, a hypothetical school scouting club could preserve its character and values by requiring that officers be exemplars of the scouting movement, just as a hypothetical Marxist discussion group could require that officers be dedicated to socialist values or be card-carriers. 72 All of these tests of an officer's commitment to the group's cause allow the group to ensure that its agenda will be advanced at its meetings. One can expect that students in favor of contaminating the environment will lead different meetings than those against contamination, for instance. Similarly, the Hsus may reasonably expect that the prayers at a Club meeting led by non-Christians would be different than the prayers led by Christians. Seen in this light, the discrimination practiced by the Walking on Water Club merely requires that its officers have a certain level of commitment to the program and purpose of the Club. Because that program and purpose are religious and sectarian, the requisite level of commitment and belief is quite naturally expressed in terms of religious belief. 20 Equal treatment should mean that the Walking on Water Club enjoys the same latitude that other clubs may have in determining who is qualified to lead the Club. Thus, just as a secular club may protect its character by restricting eligibility for leadership to those who show themselves committed to the cause, the Hsus may protect their ability to hold Christian Bible meetings by including the leadership provision in the club's constitution. 73 This type of commitment requirement may be especially important to religious clubs. The Equal Access Act provides that employees or agents of the school ... [may be] present at religious meetings only in a nonparticipatory capacity. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(3). Though the Act provides protection for political and philosophical clubs as well as religious clubs, this provision of the Act singles out religious clubs, denying only to them the opportunity to have faculty sponsors (presumably because of Establishment Clause concerns). Thus, while political clubs and chess clubs may have faculty sponsors to promote institutional stability, help guarantee that new leaders are committed to the club's cause, and ensure that the club remains true to its purpose, religious clubs do not have that protection. It is therefore particularly understandable that a religious group would seek to assure in other ways that its leadership is genuinely committed to its cause. 74 The District argues that its nondiscrimination policy does not in any way hamper the ability of Club members to express their religious beliefs. After all, says the District, the nondiscrimination policy does not require that a 'non-Christian' lead the club. [Club] members are free to elect whomever they believe will be the best leader and may cast their vote according to their conscience. The district court took a similar view, suggesting that the School's nondiscrimination policy did not actually prevent the Hsus from forming a club with Christian leaders, because the Club could rely on [e]lective forces to make sure that its desired leaders were chosen. 21 876 F.Supp. at 455. The Hsus' concern that the Club risk[ed] facing 'non-Christian leadership'  and might be taken over by students inimical to the Club's purpose was dismissed by the court as speculation. Id. at 456. But of course, it is also speculation at this point to conclude that there would be no hostility toward a Christian Bible Club at Roslyn High. We simply do not know. And considering that (i) the Club may not have a faculty sponsor and (ii) religious groups have historically been the object of hostility and persecution more often than, say, chess players or glee clubs, the Hsus' concern that their effort to pray and discuss the Bible after school might be disrupted, though speculative, is by no means unreasonable. In any event, it is not disputed that this concern has been enough to chill their speech. 75 More importantly, telling the Club to rely on elections to assure that its leaders are Christians contemplates that the Club will engage in the same type of religious discrimination embodied in the Club's constitution. The School cannot have it both ways. If it insists on outlawing all religious discrimination, including clubs with discriminatory constitutions, it can scarcely recognize clubs that elect officers on the basis of their religion. But since the whole purpose of the Club is to gather for sectarian praise and worship (as the School and district court have recognized), the need for the Hsus to realize that purpose justifies the imposition of a religious test for the leaders of the after-school meetings. Thus, the School's complete ban on religious discrimination, however it is enforced, also bans the Bible club envisioned by the Hsus. 76 We therefore reject the District's argument that the Hsus could abandon the leadership provision of the Club's constitution without suffering any tangible harm. Under the Equal Access Act, the Hsus may try to preserve the content of the religious speech at their meetings by discriminating in a way that ensures that the Club's leaders will be committed to both its cause and a particular type of expression. The School's recognition of the Club only on the condition that it abandon this effort therefore constitutes a failure to provide equal treatment, and denies the Walking on Water Club equal access. In short, the Hsus are likely to succeed on their claim that Roslyn High violated § 4071(a) of the Equal Access Act, to the extent that the Club's leadership provision applies to the President, Vice-President, and Music Coordinator of the Club. 22 77 By concluding that the School's non-recognition denies the Hsus equal access, we are giving the term equal access the broad construction that the Supreme Court requires. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 239, 110 S.Ct. at 2366. This does not mean, however, that all efforts by a student club to exclude other students are protected by the statute, even if the exclusion is based on a club's desire to realize its expressive purpose. The Equal Access Act is not a set of federal handcuffs fitted to school principals. Schools must have rules to control their students, and rules will always have the effect of suppressing someone's idea for a club. Though the School's effort to apply its nondiscrimination rule is trumped by the Equal Access Act, the Act's mandate of equal access can be trumped by the School's responsibility for upholding the Constitution, for protecting the rights of other students, and for maintaining appropriate discipline in the operation of the school. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509, 89 S.Ct. 733, 738, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) (internal quotations omitted). These are substantial limitations on the statute's intrusive power. We turn to them now and ask whether this application of the statute is both constitutional and consistent with a public school's mission.