Opinion ID: 1780462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: potential errors in the instructions to be avoided upon a retrial

Text: There were no reversible errors in the instructions that were properly preserved by objection. Nevertheless, there were a number of questions raised on appeal which need to be addressed in order to avoid error in the giving of instructions at a subsequent trial. The primary theory of the defense at trial was that the victim was stabbed to death in her driveway and then transported to Martini Lane where the alleged sexual offenses occurred. Obviously, this theory does not square with the accused's pretrial statement indicating that the victim was alive when he put her out of the car. But it does square with some of the physical evidence suggesting that the victim was mortally wounded before her clothing was removed, and with so much of the accused's exculpatory statement as claimed that no sexual offenses had yet occurred at the point where he put the two brothers and the deceased out of the car because they were fighting. If the jury believed this theory, or if the jury concluded that the Commonwealth had failed to prove the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt, the defense theory negated conviction for kidnapping, rape, and sodomy, and foreclosed the aggravating circumstances necessary to inflict the death penalty. In closing argument the prosecutor understandably ridiculed this defense. However, at one point the prosecutor went too far, arguing that the appellant was just as guilty if he murdered the victim and then had sexual relations with her, and just as deserving in punishment. Obviously, a defense of this nature is a difficult one, hardly appealing to lay jurors' sense of justice. Defense counsel argued for an instruction on the crime of abuse of a corpse, as appropriate for submitting the defendant's theory. This was based on the Commentary (1974) to KRS Chapter 510, which states: This chapter does not penalize sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with [a] . . . dead human body . . . . If a prosecution for this sort of activity is necessary, it can be brought under abuse of a corpse . . . . See also Commentary (1974) to KRS 525.120. Counsel argued that the kidnapping, rape, and sodomy statutes all used the term person, which means a living, breathing, human being. Although the trial court refused to instruct on abuse of a corpse, the court did find sufficient merit in defense counsel's argument to insert the words a person after the victim's name in the instructions, and to define a person as a living, human being. The general rule is that the court is required to instruct on every state of the case reasonably deducible from the evidence. Ragland v. Commonwealth, Ky., 421 S.W.2d 79, 81 (1967). And, a defendant is entitled to have his theory of the case submitted to the jury. Davis v. Commonwealth, Ky., 252 S.W.2d 9, 10 (1952). Where the evidence is such that the jury could come to any of several conclusions, the trial court is required to submit the instructions on the various alternatives. Pace v. Commonwealth, Ky., 561 S.W.2d 664, 667 (1978). The right to instructions embodying an alternative offense, which is the defendant's theory of the case, is not accommodated by an instruction that the defendant will be found not guilty if the Commonwealth has failed to prove the offense charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. Sanborn could hardly expect the jury to exonerate him in the face of his criminal misconduct, and this was the reason why his counsel requested instructions on a crime that presented a middle ground between the offense more severely punished and acquittal. It is fundamental that in a criminal case it is the duty of the court by the instructions to give to the accused the opportunity for the jury to determine the merits of any lawful defense which he has. Curtis v. Commonwealth, 169 Ky. 727, 184 S.W. 1105, 1107 (1916). As stated in Brown v. Commonwealth, Ky., 555 S.W. 2d 252, 257 (1977): Whether one is referring to one of [the] affirmative `defenses' [in the criminal code] or to a lesser offense, the evidentiary situation and burden of proof are the same. Evidence suggesting that a defendant was guilty of a lesser offense is, in fact and in principle, a defense against the higher charge, though it is not a `defense' within the technical meaning of that term as used in the Kentucky Penal Code, cf., KRS 500.070. In one sense it may appear a misnomer to refer to the situation that exists when an accused admits to a state of facts that constitutes a criminal offense, while denying further facts that constitute a more serious offense, as a defense. But by doing so the accused defends against the principal charge. As stated in Palmore, Kentucky Instructions to Juries, § 1.06 (Supp.1979): Although the opinions usually speak in terms of `evidence' that is `sufficient' to call for an instruction on a lower degree, it should be clearly recognized that quite often the basis for such an instruction will be some deficiency in the proof pertaining to an essential element of the crime that differentiates the higher from the lower degree. This may result (a) from a mere weakness in the Commonwealth's evidence or (b) from countervailing evidence that is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt with respect to the element in question. The appellant's theory of the case was that the kidnapping, and in particular the sex offenses, were committed after the victim was already dead. If at the next trial there is any substantial evidence to support this theory, the appellant will be entitled upon request to instructions accordingly, rather than the jury being left with no alternative except to convict or acquit of the principal charges. Next, the appellant argues instructions should have been given on wanton murder, second-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide, premised upon his taperecorded statement to the effect that he did not commit the murder, but instead simply assisted the two men who did. No instructions were requested in this regard at the trial, and the error, if any, in failing to give such instructions is not preserved. Nevertheless, at the next trial, under the same hypotheses as premised above, if the appellant requests instructions on this theory, the giving of such instructions must be considered. The within case is reversed and remanded for a new trial in conformity with this opinion. STEPHENS, C.J., and LAMBERT and LEIBSON, JJ., concur. GANT and VANCE, JJ., concur in results only. WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents by separate opinion in which STEPHENSON, J., joins.