Opinion ID: 1433827
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether NRS 616D.030 applies retroactively.

Text: In 1995, the Nevada Legislature made significant changes to the state's workers' compensation laws. One of those changes is embodied in NRS 616D.030, a measure which took effect while the cases on appeal were pending at the district court level. NRS 616D.030 provides: 1. No cause of action may be brought or maintained against an insurer or third party administrator who violates any provision of [Nevada's industrial insurance statutes]. 2. The administrative fines provided for in NRS 616B.318 and 616D.120 are the exclusive remedies for any violation of this chapter or chapter 616A, 616B, 616C or. 617 of NRS committed by an insurer or a third party administrator. NRS 616D.030 was enacted in response to our ruling in Falline v. GNLV Corp., 107 Nev. 1004, 823 P.2d 888 (1991). In Falline, we recognized limited tort actions against workers' compensation insurers for bad faith and negligence in the processing of workers' compensation claims. This was based on our conclusion that the then existing statutory fines were insufficient to compensate injured workers and their families. Although noting decisions of other courts to the contrary, we held that, [i]f the Legislature sees fit to declare the statutory scheme of fines an exclusive remedy to aggrieved workmen whose claims are denied or delayed as a result of negligence or bad faith, the Legislature may enact legislation to that end. Id. at 1011, 823 P.2d at 893. With the enactment of NRS 616D.030, the legislature accepted this court's invitation to limit the potential liability of workers' compensation insurers by narrowing the remedies available to an aggrieved party. Appellants, having commenced their actions prior to its effective date, argue that NRS 616D.030 does not apply because it is not, by its terms, retroactive. We disagree. Review in this court from a district court's interpretation of a statute is de novo. State, Dep't of Mtr. Vehicles v. Frangul, 110 Nev. 46, 48, 867 P.2d 397, 398 (1994). It is well-settled that: Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and its meaning clear and unmistakable, there is no room for construction, and the courts are not permitted to search for its meaning beyond the statute itself. Erwin v. State of Nevada, 111 Nev. 1535, 1538-39, 908 P.2d 1367, 1369 (1995) (quoting Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Boulder City, 106 Nev. 497, 503, 797 P.2d 946, 949 (1990)). However, where language is ambiguous, a court should consult other sources such as legislative history, legislative intent, and analogous statutory provisions. See Moody v. Manny's Auto Repair, 110 Nev. 320, 871 P.2d 935 (1994). As a general matter, statutes are presumptively prospective. See McKellar v. McKellar, 110 Nev. 200, 203, 871 P.2d 296, 298 (1994) (holding that [t]here is a general presumption in favor of prospective application of statutes unless the legislature clearly manifests a contrary intent or unless the intent of the legislature cannot otherwise be satisfied). It is also well settled that the presumption of prospective application applies only to vested rights or to penalties. The presumption does not obtain when the new statute affects only remedies. See T.R.G.E. Co. v. Durham, 38 Nev. 311, 316, 149 P. 61, 62 (1915), in which we held that the general rule against retrospective construction of a statute does not apply to statutes relating merely to remedies and modes of procedure; and Friel v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 751 F.2d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir.1985) (when a statute is addressed to remedies or procedures and does not otherwise alter substantive rights, it will be applied to pending cases). Nevada's approach mirrors the general rule. Here, NRS 616D.030 is limited in its effect to remedies available against a third-party administrator or insurer, i.e., it supplants the common-law tort remedy under Falline, leaving in its place the administrative remedy. See also, Torre v. J. C. Penney Co., Inc., 916 F.Supp. 1029 (D.Nev.1996) (federal court concluding in diversity action that the Nevada Supreme Court would apply NRS 616D.030 to pending cases). Because we conclude that NRS 616D.030 is restricted in its effect to remedies available and does not abridge vested rights, we hold that its proscriptions are not presumptively prospective in their application. We further conclude that application to pending matters is consistent with the clear intent of the legislature. See Convention Properties v. Washoe Co. Assessor, 106 Nev. 400, 402, 793 P.2d 1332, 1333 (1990) (general presumption in favor of prospective application in absence of legislative intent clearly manifested to the contrary). Because NRS 616D.030, effective July 1, 1995, provides that an action against an insurer for violation of the industrial insurance statutes may not be brought or maintained, we conclude that the legislature intended application to actions filed but not resolved, prior to the effective date of the statute. Maintain is defined as follows: To maintain an action is to uphold, continue on foot, and keep from collapse a suit already begun, or to prosecute a suit with effect. George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, Ga., 289 U.S. 373, 53 S.Ct. 620, 77 L.Ed. 1265. To maintain an action or suit may mean to commence or institute it; the term imports the existence of a cause of action. Maintain, however, is applied to actions already brought, but not yet reduced to judgment. Smallwood v. Gallardo, 275 U.S. 56, 48 S.Ct. 23, 72 L.Ed. 152. Black's Law Dictionary 859 (5th ed.1979). Nevada law is in accord with the dictionary definition of maintain. In National Mines Co. v. District Court, 34 Nev. 67, 116 P. 996 (1911), this court interpreted the phrase institute and maintain as it was used in a legislative act. Maintain was defined as follows: The word maintain, as used frequently in statutes in reference to actions, comprehends the institution as well as the support of the action, and the statutes of this state contain many instances where it is used in this broader sense. It is used in other instances to express a meaning corresponding to its more restricted and more proper definition, as in the cases of Carson-Rand v. Stern, 129 Mo. 381, 31 S.W. 772, 32 L.R.A. 420, and Cal. Savings Co. v. Harris, 111 Cal. 133, 43 Pac. 525, cited in petitioner's brief, where it was construed not to comprehend the institution of an action, but merely the support thereof. In section 1 [of the statute] the two words are used together, institute and maintain; and hence both are used in their restricted sense. Id. at 77-78, 116 P. at 1000. We conclude that the use of brought and maintained in NRS 616D.030 parallels the use of institute and maintain as used in the statute in National Mines. Accordingly, we hold that the language of the statute is a manifestation of the legislature's intent that NRS 616D.030 should have retroactive effect. [3]