Opinion ID: 768725
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Continued Incarceration

Text: 37 Wilson contends that even if he was properly arrested in the first instance, he was kept in jail in violation of his rights because Russo learned of exculpatory facts after the arrest which should have motivated him to try to release Wilson. On February 7, Russo interviewed Wilson's friend George Richardson, who told Russo that Wilson had spent February 3 in his company. He told him that Wilson wore blue jeans, tan work boots, a beige sweatshirt and a brown jacket that day. He said that they had gone to the Towne Center, where Wilson went to get a lemonade at the pizza parlor while Richardson went to the bank. As evidence of his veracity, Richardson gave Russo a bank slip with 3:38 stamped on it. Russo testified that he visited the bank and looked at the films from the bank's surveillance camera to look for Richardson, but that he could not recall what he saw and could not recall if the employees remembered Richardson. 10 38 Wilson contends that Russo's post-arrest interview with Richardson provided exculpatory information that dissipated probable cause, and that Russo had a constitutional duty to inform the prosecutor of the interview and attempt to get Wilson released. The law in this area is not entirely settled. Compare Brady v. Dill, 187 F.3d 104, 112 (1st Cir. 1999) (concluding that police officers generally have no duty to try to release suspects when exculpatory information comes into their possession after a lawful arrest), with id. at 117-125 (Pollak, J., concurring) (proposing a rule by which [a]n affirmative duty to release arises . . . if an arresting or custodial officer ascertains beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspicion (probable cause) which forms the basis for the privilege of arrest is unfounded.). See also Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1162 (5th Cir. 1992) ([F]ailure to disclose . . . undeniably credible and patently exculpatory evidence to the prosecuting attorney's office plainly exposes[defendant police officer] to liability under S 1983.); BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 128 (7th Cir. 1986) (The continuation of even a lawful arrest violates the Fourth Amendment when the police discover additional facts dissipating their earlier probable cause.). 39 We do not, today, need to decide these difficult issues. Regardless of the existence and scope of an officer's duty to seek to release a suspect when probable cause no longer exists, or the level of knowledge that he or she must have in order to trigger that duty, the interview with Richardson clearly did not dispel the earlier probable cause. 11 A friend of Wilson gave Wilson a partial alibi, and his description of Wilson's clothing did not match the victims' descriptions, but he placed Wilson in the vicinity at the time of the robbery, and nothing he said overwhelmed the fact of Braverman's positive identification. In short, no reasonable jury could conclude that this evidence dispelled probable cause. 40 For the foregoing reasons, the grant of summary judgment will be affirmed as to the federal claims. The case will be remanded to the District Court for consideration of the state claims.