Opinion ID: 2745692
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure-to-Investigate Claim

Text: Frazier next claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to make “a full and adequate investigation into [his] background” prior to the penalty phase of his trial. Pet’r Br. at 58. In particular, Frazier objects to his counsel’s failure to interview his siblings and have them testify. Frazier asserts that his siblings would have “humanized him to the jury,” id. at 60, and his siblings submitted affidavits regarding Frazier’s upbringing, trouble in school, and general demeanor, see J.A. Vol. 2 at 793–98 (Affs.). The Ohio Court of Appeals denied this claim on the merits, holding that “the mitigation evidence proposed by [Frazier] is not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the decision not to ask [Frazier’s] siblings to testify at the mitigation hearing was anything other than a tactical trial strategy.” Frazier, 2008 WL 4408645, at . Because the state court adjudicated this claim on the merits, we again review Frazier’s assignment of error under AEDPA’s deferential standard. “The Eighth Amendment requires that the jury be able to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence offered by petitioner.” Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 377–78 (1990). Under the Sixth Amendment, “counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations” in an attempt to find such evidence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521–22 (2003). “[T]horough investigation[s] of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable,” but “a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91. After all, “reasonably No. 11-4262 Frazier v. Jenkins Page 21 diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think further investigation would be a waste.” Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005). Even if counsel’s failure to investigate was proven to be unreasonable, a prisoner must also “establish a reasonable probability that a competent attorney, aware of the available mitigating evidence, would have introduced it at sentencing, and that had the jury been confronted with this mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable probability that it would have returned with a different sentence.” Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 20 (2009) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and ellipses omitted). On this record, we cannot conclude that Frazier has offered proof demonstrating that the Ohio court’s application of this test was objectively unreasonable. First, Frazier’s counsel received the assistance of a court-appointed mitigation specialist that uncovered Frazier’s school records, juvenile records, health records, and records from the Social Security Administration. See J.A. Vol. 3 at 1103–1331 (various records). These records provide the basis for most of Frazier’s claims and cover a wide range of years and topics. Furthermore, Dr. Smalldon interviewed Frazier, in part, regarding his upbringing. See id. at 1075–87 (Smalldon Report). Despite this information, which was introduced at trial, Frazier argues that counsel should have also interviewed his siblings and called them to testify. The problem for Frazier is that two of his three siblings, who Frazier argues should have been interviewed, admitted to speaking with Frazier’s counsel. See J.A. Vol. 2 at 796 (Jean Frazier Aff.); id. at 797 (Nathaniel Frazier Aff.). Moreover, counsel has discretion over deciding which witnesses to call and how to examine them. Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 249 (2008). As a result, we cannot hold that the Ohio Court of Appeals was objectively unreasonable in concluding that counsel performed an adequate investigation. Second, even if counsel’s investigation was lacking, Frazier has failed to demonstrate that the Ohio Court of Appeals made an objectively unreasonable decision by holding that Frazier was not prejudiced by such deficient performance. The affidavits submitted by Frazier’s siblings state that they would have testified that Frazier grew up in poverty and that Frazier attended special-education classes. J.A. Vol. 2 at 793 (John Frazier Aff.); see also id. at 795–96 (Jean Frazier Aff.). Dr. Smalldon, however, testified to these facts. See, e.g., J.A. Vol. 8 at 3532:19– 22, 3539:1–3540:8, 3569:16–3570:19 (Smalldon Test.). Perhaps the jurors would have been No. 11-4262 Frazier v. Jenkins Page 22 more sympathetic to Frazier if his siblings testified to these facts directly, but as noted above, from whom a jury learns certain information is a decision for trial counsel. Gonzalez, 553 U.S. at 249. We agree with the Ohio Court of Appeals that the information to which Frazier’s siblings allude in the affidavits is cumulative, and therefore, Frazier was not prejudiced by counsel’s decisions. As a result, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Frazier’s petition on this issue. 4. Failure-to-Retain-Substance-Abuse-Expert Claim Finally, Frazier claims that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to retain a substance-abuse expert for the penalty phase of trial. Frazier argues that a substance-abuse expert would have explained to the jury how “Frazier’s limited cognitive functioning and drug abuse ha[d] a synergistic effect . . . [that each one] exacerbated the effects of the other, further impairing Frazier’s cognitive functioning.” Pet’r Br. at 62. For support, Frazier submits an affidavit from Dr. Robert Smith, testifying to the same. See J.A. Vol. 2 at 799–807 (Smith Aff.). The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, holding that Dr. Smalldon adequately testified to Frazier’s prior drug and alcohol abuse. Once again, we apply AEDPA deference, and we conclude that the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision was not objectively unreasonable. The record shows that Dr. Smalldon testified regarding Frazier’s drug and alcohol abuse, particularly his crack-cocaine use. See J.A. Vol. 8 at 3566:10–3569:3 (Smalldon Test.) He explained the behavioral effects of “acute crack cocaine intoxication.” Id. at 3567:3 (Smalldon Test.). Additionally, Dr. Smalldon hypothesized that Frazier’s drug use may have led to “hyperarousal, . . . extreme aggressiveness, irritability, . . . restlessness[,] and agitation.”11 Id. at 3567:18–20 (Smalldon Test.). As before, the jury might have been more receptive to a different messenger, but who testifies is generally a decision for counsel. Because Dr. Smalldon testified—at length and in detail—to the effects of crack-cocaine abuse, the Ohio Supreme Court was not unreasonable to conclude that counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to employ a substance-abuse expert and that Frazier was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to 11 Dr. Smalldon did state that discussing the “physiology of addiction . . . would take [him] beyond [his] expertise,” id. at 3568:1–2 (Smalldon Test.), but the state court would not be unreasonable in concluding that he had sufficient knowledge, based on his experience and the detailed testimony that he gave, to inform the jury adequately of the effects of drug abuse on individuals. No. 11-4262 Frazier v. Jenkins Page 23 introduce cumulative evidence. Therefore, we AFFIRM the denial of Frazier’s petition on this claim.