Opinion ID: 1353141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Denial of interrogatories.

Text: Appellant's final argument is that she was denied her discovery rights in the administrative proceedings and was forced to proceed to trial without being completely prepared to present her defense. She does not contend that the division curtailed her statutory right to inspect documents or interview other employees (Gov. Code, § 19574.1) [4] for the division arranged for appellant's counsel to interview nine employees of the WCAB and supplied her with copies of all unprivileged documents in its possession relevant to the case. (5) Rather, appellant contends that she was prejudiced by the refusal of Roy J. Bell, administrative director, Division of Industrial Accidents, to answer 35 interrogatories served on March 27, 1969. The hearing officer denied appellant's request for an order requiring answers; [5] she then sought a writ of mandate in superior court to compel the division to answer the interrogatories. At the discovery hearing held on April 28, 1969, appellant contended that under Shively v. Stewart, 65 Cal.2d 475 [55 Cal. Rptr. 217, 421 P.2d 65], the discovery provisions of Government Code section 19574.1 are not exclusive, and that she is entitled to propound interrogatories pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure section 2030. The division urged that section 19574.1 is the exclusive discovery granted to a litigant before the State Personnel Board, and that Shively does not apply. Neither the order entered by the court in the discovery case nor the transcript of the proceedings are part of the record before us. The board now asserts that the trial court in its remarks from the bench, announcing that it was denying petitioner's Petition for Writ of Mandate, specifically stated that it was not basing its denial upon the appointing power's section 19574.1 argument; that accepting petitioner's argument that she had rights under Shively, still petitioner had made no showing of good cause for the answering of her interrogatories, as required by Shively at page 482, and on this basis it was holding that petitioner had failed to state cause of action. No appeal was taken from the judgment entered on April 30, 1969, which assertedly held that petitioner's petition had failed to state cause of action for mandate. The trial court herein held That in the administrative proceedings before the State Personnel Board petitioner failed to show good cause within the meaning of Shively v. Stewart, [ supra ], 65 Cal.2d 475 (1966) and Everett v. Gordon, 266 Cal. App.2d 667 (1968) for the issuance of any order compelling her appointing power to answer her interrogatories and that the matter of the interrogatories became res adjudicata after petitioner failed to appeal the adverse judgment against her on that subject matter in the aforesaid Case No. 951617 in the within court. Appellant contends that summary denial of a writ of mandate is not res judicata of the merits in a subsequent proceeding, citing McDonough v. Garrison, 68 Cal. App.2d 318, 327 [156 P.2d 983]. McDonough relied upon Funeral Dir. Assn. v. Bd. of Funeral Dirs., 22 Cal.2d 104 [136 P.2d 785], and State Bd. of Equalization v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal.2d 467 [127 P.2d 4], for the proposition that If there is any other possible ground other than the merits upon which the denial of the petition for a writ could have been based, such denial is not res judicata of the merits in a subsequent proceeding. But appellant does not challenge the board's representation of the basis for the superior court's decision in No. 951617. Consequently, she has failed to show that there was any other possible ground for the court's prior decision, and res judicata should apply. In any event, the board correctly points out that appellant's request for interrogatories failed to show good cause as required by Shively v. Stewart, supra, 65 Cal.2d 475, 482. Hence, we need not reach the question of whether the discovery procedures specified in the Civil Discovery Act are available in ordinary administrative proceedings. [6] It is evident, we conclude, that appellant had the benefit of the full range of discovery to which she was entitled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.