Opinion ID: 1375473
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voluntary Separation Versus Discharge

Text: The Administrative Rules of the Unemployment Insurance Division of the DLIR regarding voluntary separation and suspension or discharge for misconduct provide in relevant part: § 12-5-47 Voluntary separation. (a) An individual shall be disqualified for benefits for voluntarily leaving work without good cause. (b) A separation is a voluntary leaving or quitting when the facts and circumstances demonstrate that a claimant is the moving party in the termination of an employment relationship. § 12-5-51 Suspension or discharge for misconduct. (a) A discharge occurs when an employer is the moving party in the termination of the employment relationship. (Emphases added.) As previously stated, the SAO found that claimant effectively abandoned her employment and that, as the moving party, her termination must be considered as a quit. The circuit court, however, observed that Hardin informed [United] of her leaving her place of employment early on June 11, 1994[,]... gave [United] a reason for leaving and returned to her employment within four days of leaving[,] and worked for approximately two weeks before receiving United's termination letter. The circuit court, therefore, disagreed with the SAO, finding instead that the moving party in the termination of [Hardin's] employment was [United] and not [Hardin]. In urging reversal of the circuit court's determination that Hardin is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits, United urges adoption of the constructive quit/provoked discharge doctrine. Under the constructive quit/provoked discharge doctrine, where an employee voluntarily engages in conduct which transgresses a legitimate known obligation and leaves the employer no choice but to discharge him [or her], Claim of Bookhard, 131 A.D.2d 912, 516 N.Y.S.2d 363, 364 (1987), the employee shall be considered to have voluntarily abandoned his or her employment. Id.
In James v. Levine, 34 N.Y.2d 491, 358 N.Y.S.2d 411, 315 N.E.2d 471 (1974), one of the cases relied upon by United, the New York Court of Appeals explained that the doctrine of provoked discharge was adopted by New York courts to fill what was perceived to be a gap in New York's unemployment insurance disqualification statute: [4] [T]he doctrine of provoked discharge, had its origin not in the [unemployment insurance] statute, but in Matter of Malaspina (Carsi), 309 N.Y. 413, 131 N.E.2d 709 [(1956),] and the special kind of discharge there involved. An employee was discharged by his employer because the employee had refused to join the union in an agency shop under a collective bargaining agreement. The act of the employee in refusing to join the union was therefore voluntary. The act of the employer was compelled by its obligation under the collective bargaining agreement. It was held that under such circumstances the employee, who had known of the requirement before employment and being fully aware of the inevitable consequences of his refusal, had voluntarily left his employment by provoking his discharge. Arguably, this was a legitimate and essential gloss on the statute to fill a gap. It did not purport to, nor might it, create a third and distinct category for determining temporary ineligibility for unemployment insurance benefits. Id. 358 N.Y.S.2d at 412-13, 315 N.E.2d at 472-73. In James, each of three claimants was denied unemployment insurance benefits on the purported ground that each had provoked her discharge [5] and had therefore terminated her employment voluntarily. Id. 358 N.Y.S.2d at 412, 315 N.E.2d at 472. Although the James court held that it was error for the doctrine of provoked discharge to have been applied to each of the claims for unemployment insurance benefits, the court ultimately held that each claimant was properly disqualified for unemployment insurance benefits on the ground that each had been discharged for misconduct in connection with their employment. In holding that the doctrine of provoked discharge was erroneously applied, the James court criticized the extension of the doctrine beyond the situation where the employee's voluntary acts result in the employer's `involuntary' discharge of the employee. Id. 358 N.Y.S.2d at 413, 315 N.E.2d at 473. The court explained: Among other jurisdictions, there has always been disagreement whether one who effects his [or her] own discharge by indirection may be deemed to abandon his [or her] employment voluntarily. The doctrine is a fiction in most cases, the real cause of discharge being misconduct. Some jurisdictions refuse to recognize the category of constructive voluntary leaving[.] It would seem that the doctrine arose largely within the context of union activities and collective bargaining agreements, where special policy considerations were at work.... For the large majority of cases, consideration of eligibility under the rubric of misconduct leads to more sensible analysis and resolution. More important, the statute requires it. Id. 358 N.Y.S.2d at 414, 315 N.E.2d at 473-74 (citations omitted) (emphases added). The court held that, where the employer may or may not choose to discharge the unsatisfactory employee, application of the doctrine of provoked discharge is inappropriate. Id. 358 N.Y.S.2d at 416, 315 N.E.2d at 475. [M]isconduct, the court explained, could always `provoke discharge' but that is not what the doctrine covers. Id. 358 N.Y.S.2d at 415, 315 N.E.2d at 474-75. In other words, the doctrine of provoked discharge should not be applied to cases where the employer retains discretion to discharge the employee but, instead, should be confined to the instance of the `involuntary' discharge by an employer for cause flowing from the `voluntary' act or acts of the employee. Id. 358 N.Y.S.2d at 416, 315 N.E.2d at 475. In the present case, United does not contend that Hardin's behavior compelled it to involuntarily dismiss her; rather, it appears that United retained the discretion to terminate Hardin or, as it had done for the several years prior to her termination, continue to work with Hardin to improve her dependability. Consequently, under the circumstances of this case, and assuming, without deciding, its general applicability in this jurisdiction, the doctrine of provoked discharge is not implicated.
In Ipsen, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) rejected the concept of constructive dischargea concept similar to the doctrine of provoked discharge. In that case, Jody Ipsen submitted a resignation letter to her employer, complaining that her supervisor had treated her in an abusive, insulting, and impetuous manner. 80 Hawai`i at 484, 911 P.2d at 119. Specifically, Ipsen complained that her supervisor had doubted the sincerity of an ankle injury, which had caused her to miss over two weeks of work. After resigning, Ipsen applied for unemployment benefits. The claims examiner denied Ipsen unemployment benefits, determining that Ipsen voluntarily terminated her employment for personal reasons and without good cause[.] Id. at 485, 911 P.2d at 120. The claims examiner's decision was subsequently affirmed by both the appeals officer and the circuit court. On appeal, the ICA preliminarily addressed whether Ipsen voluntarily quit her employment or was discharged. Ipsen argued that, notwithstanding the fact that she resigned from her employment, her employer was the moving party in the termination of the employment relationship because her supervisor's actions were coercive to the point of compelling an involuntary resignation from her. Id. at 486, 911 P.2d at 121. The ICA rejected Ipsen's argument, explaining: [T]he question of whether a leaving was voluntary or involuntary may often overlap with facts related to whether there was good cause to leave. Thus, a leaving may be determined to be involuntary, based on facts also establishing good cause to leave. We are aware of cases employing the concept of constructive discharge, but whether a person has been constructively discharged also rests on the determination of dual issues of voluntariness and cause. Hence, the concept of a constructive discharge is not necessarily helpful in isolating the issue of whether an employee's leaving was voluntary. We believe it more fruitful from an analytical perspective and in light of HAR § 12-5-47(b) ..., to evaluate the issues of voluntariness and good cause separately. Consequently, we agree generally with the following statement: The notion of voluntary quitting without good cause involves two levels of volition: (1) the immediate circumstances of leaving must reflect a subjective intent of the employee to terminate; and (2) the act of leaving must be an exercise of free will and not the product of other compelling reasons or pressures forcing him [or her] to leave. It is the second level of volition that concerns the ultimate issue of whether or not the employee has quit for good cause. ... Thus, in determining whether [Ipsen] voluntarily quit, we are concerned with whether the circumstances reflect an intent on the part of the employee to terminate employment. On the other hand, the question of whether there were compelling reasons which forced an employee to leave is properly analyzed under the good cause prong of the statutory standard. This approach is consistent with HAR § 12-5-47(b) which was adopted to implement the statute. HAR § 12-5-47(b) states that an employment separation is considered a voluntary leaving when the facts and circumstances demonstrate that a claimant is the `moving party' in the termination of an employment relationship. Voluntary separation is to be contrasted with a discharge. Under HAR § 12-5-51(a), [a] discharge occurs when [conversely] an employer is the `moving party' in the termination of the employment relationship. Moving is the present participle of the verb move. The definitions of move include to change position or posture, to take action. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 761 (10th ed. 1993). The word move from which moving is derived is very general and implies no more than the fact of changing position. Id. Id. (citations and footnotes omitted) (some brackets in original) (some brackets and emphasis added). Although Ipsen's decision to quit was motivated in part by what she believed to be harassment by her supervisor, the ICA noted that other factors contributed to Ipsen's decision to quit, e.g., the impending sale of the company, which caused Ipsen anxiety regarding her job security, and her ankle injury. Ultimately, the ICA determined that the circuit court's finding that Ipsen was the moving party in the termination of the employment relationship was not clearly erroneous, id. at 487, 911 P.2d at 122, and that Ipsen had not satisfied her burden of demonstrating that she left her employment for good cause. Id. at 489-90, 911 P.2d at 124-25. We agree with the ICA that whether a person has been constructively discharged... rests on the determination of dual issues of voluntariness and `cause'. Id. at 486, 911 P.2d at 121. We thus adopt the straightforward analysis applied by the ICA in Ipsen.
Under the administrative scheme adopted by the DLIR, the reasons underlying an employer's decision to discharge an employee are properly considered in making the determination whether the employee was discharged for misconduct. In the present case, the record definitively establishes that United was the moving party in the termination of the employment relationship. After leaving work early in order to care for an ill friend on June 11, 1994, Hardin herself became ill. Once she recovered from her illnesswhich was excused by a doctor in accordance with her employer's policyHardin returned to work on June 15, 1994. Thereafter, Hardin continued to work until June 28, 1994, when she received United's letter notifying her that her employment had been terminated. We therefore hold that the circuit court's finding that Hardin did not quit her employment but, rather, was discharged, is not clearly erroneous.