Opinion ID: 3149551
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: History of Summary Judgment in Tennessee

Text: 1. Adoption of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56 The comprehensive history of summary judgment practice in Tennessee has been provided in prior decisions of this Court and in law review articles. See, e.g., Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993); Judy M. Cornett, Trick or Treat? Summary Judgment in Tennessee after Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 77 Tenn. L. Rev. 305 (2010) [hereinafter Cornett‘s Summary Judgment in Tennessee]. For purposes of this appeal, the following historical overview will suffice. Summary judgment in the modern sense first became available in Tennessee on January 1, 1971, with the adoption of Tennessee Rule 56. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 483 S.W.2d 719, 719 (Tenn. 1972); see also Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 210. At the time of its adoption, Tennessee Rule 56 was essentially identical to the corresponding Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (―Federal Rule 56‖) then in effect. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.01 advisory commission cmt.; Bowman v. Henard, 547 S.W.2d 527, 530 (Tenn. 1977). Tennessee Rule 56 was hailed as ―one of the most important and desirable additions to Tennessee procedure contained in the Rules of Civil Procedure‖ and described as ―a substantial step forward to the end that litigation may be accelerated, insubstantial issues removed, and trial confined only to genuine issues.‖ Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 210 (quoting Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory commission cmt.) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Donald W. Pemberton, Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 211, 215 (1974); Donald F. Paine, Recent Developments in Tennessee Procedure: The New Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, 37 Tenn. L. Rev. 501, 516 (1970). Early decisions construing Tennessee Rule 56 likewise emphasized the importance of summary judgment as a rapid and inexpensive means of resolving issues and cases where no genuine issues of material fact existed. See, e.g., Bowman, 547 S.W.2d at 529; Evco Corp. v. Ross, 528 S.W.2d 20, 24 (Tenn. 1975). 3 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). These three decisions are known collectively as “the trilogy.” Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 81, 82 (2006). We will refer to these decisions as the Celotex trilogy in this opinion. - 19 - 2. The Celotex Trilogy Tennessee Rule 56 remained essentially identical to its federal progenitor in 1986, when the United States Supreme Court issued the Celotex trilogy addressing summary judgment practice under Federal Rule 56. In Matsushita Electric Industrial Company v. Zenith Radio Corporation, decided first, the Supreme Court elaborated on the showing required for a plaintiff to survive a summary judgment motion. The Court observed that, when the moving party carries its ―burden under Rule 56(c),‖ then ―the nonmoving party must come forward with ‗specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.‘‖ 475 U.S. at 586 (quoting Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e)). To satisfy this burden, the nonmoving party must do ―something more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.‖ Id. Further, the Court explained that, ―where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‗genuine issue for trial.‘‖ Id. at 587 (quoting First Nat‘l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). In Anderson, the Court explained the role the burden of proof at trial plays in summary judgment practice and how the substantive law regarding a claim or defense affects the determination of which facts are ―material‖ and which factual disputes are ―genuine‖ for purposes of Rule 56. 477 U.S. at 247-48. The Court stated that ―the substantive law will identify which facts are material‖ and clarified that ―[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.‖ Id. at 248. Materiality, the Court explained, is ―only a criterion for categorizing factual disputes in their relation to the legal elements of the claim, and not a criterion for evaluating the evidentiary underpinnings of those disputes.‖ Id. The Court emphasized that disputes of material fact are ―genuine‖—and therefore preclude the entry of summary judgment—only if the evidence produced at the summary judgment stage ―is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.‖ Id. The Court held that this standard ―mirrors the standard for a directed verdict.‖ Id. at 250. Accordingly, ―[i]f the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil case moves for summary judgment . . . based on the lack of proof of a material fact, the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.‖ Id. at 252. Anderson instructed that summary judgment may be granted when the evidence supporting the plaintiff‘s claim ―is merely colorable or is not significantly probative.‖ Id. at 249-50 (citation omitted). The Court further explained: The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff‘s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. The judge‘s inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict—―whether there is - 20 - [evidence] upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.‖ Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall 442, 448 (1872)). In these first two cases of the Celotex trilogy, the Court assumed without deciding that the moving defendants had met their initial burdens under Federal Rule 56. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 n.4; Matsushita Elect. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586 n.10. In Celotex, decided the same day as Anderson, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the burden of production a moving party bears in summary judgment practice. Mrs. Catrett sued in September 1980, alleging that her husband‘s death had resulted from his exposure to products containing asbestos manufactured or distributed by Celotex and other named corporations. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 319. A year after the suit was filed, Celotex moved for summary judgment, contending that Mrs. Catrett had ―failed to produce evidence‖ showing that any Celotex product ―was the proximate cause‖ of her husband‘s wrongful death. Id. Celotex did not support its motion with affidavits but instead based its motion on Mrs. Catrett‘s failure to identify, when ―answering interrogatories specifically requesting such information, any witnesses who could testify about the decedent‘s exposure to [Celotex‘s] asbestos products.‖ Id. at 320. Mrs. Catrett responded to Celotex‘s summary judgment motion with three documents, including a transcript of her husband‘s deposition, a letter from an official of one of her husband‘s former employers whom Mrs. Catrett planned to call as a trial witness, and a letter from an insurance company to Celotex‘s attorney. Id. According to Mrs. Catrett, all of these documents suggested that her husband had been exposed in 1970 and 1971 to asbestos products that were manufactured by Celotex. Id. Celotex asked the federal district court not to consider Mrs. Catrett‘s response because the three documents she supplied amounted to inadmissible hearsay. Id. In July 1982, the federal district court granted Celotex‘s motion for summary judgment, and Mrs. Catrett appealed. Id. at 32122. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed and held that the summary judgment motion was fatally defective because Celotex had ―made no effort to adduce any evidence, in the form of affidavits or otherwise, to support its motion.‖ Id. at 321 (emphasis in original omitted). The Court of Appeals did not address whether Mrs. Catrett‘s response to the motion had been sufficient. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals‘ judgment and remanded to that court for further proceedings. Id. at 328. Although the Court was split five-to-four on the decision to reverse the Court of Appeals, eight of the nine justices agreed on how the burdens of production and persuasion should function in summary judgment practice. See Id. at 322-27 (Rehnquist, J., majority - 21 - opinion); Id. at 328 (White, J., concurring); Id. at 329, 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).4 The justices disagreed only as to the result that should pertain when the agreed upon standards were applied to the facts of the case. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated: We think that the position taken by the majority of the Court of Appeals is inconsistent with the standard for summary judgment set forth in Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper ―if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.‖ In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be ―no genuine issue as to any material fact,‖ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party‘s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is ―entitled to a judgment as a matter of law‖ because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof. .... Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ―the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,‖ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. But unlike the Court of Appeals, we find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent‘s claim. On the contrary, Rule 56(c), which refers to ―the affidavits, if any‖ (emphasis added), suggests the absence of such a requirement. And if there were any doubt about the meaning of Rule 56(c) in this regard, such doubt is clearly removed by Rules 56(a) and (b), which provide that claimants and defendants, respectively, may move for summary judgment ―with or 4