Opinion ID: 1797728
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The trial court erroneously allowed the introduction of a gang affiliation statement made involuntarily by defendant and procured in violation of his right against self-incrimination and his right to counsel.

Text: Defendant argues the trial court erroneously allowed the introduction of a document, signed by defendant upon his admission to the parish prison, which indicated he was a member of the Rollin' 60's. The form reads: I certify that by affixing my signature to this document, I am [circled] ... affiliated with any [sic] street gang. I fully understand that by making this statement, should it prove untrue, I could be placing myself in physical danger and that the Caddo Parish Sheriff's office will not assume any responsibility due to my actions. The document is signed by defendant, witnessed by a lieutenant, and, above a line marked gang affiliation, defendant has marked Rollin' 60's. The document was sought to be admitted in connection with the forensic document examiner's testimony in support of his conclusion that defendant had written certain letters to Charlene Henderson. Prior to trial, the examiner had requested a second exemplar of defendant's handwriting after determining defendant had attempted to disguise his handwriting in the first set. When the defendant refused, the state thereafter provided the expert with examples of defendant's handwriting which defendant had written while incarcerated. These included laundry requests, complaints against guards, and the gang affiliation sheet. In order to properly introduce these samples, the state called the jail records custodian and sought to introduce the gang affiliation sheet. Defendant objected to the admission of the gang affiliation sheet, arguing the document deal[s] with his character, and [defendant] has not put his character at issue because he has not taken the stand. The state argued defense counsel's objection was unfounded because counsel had questioned jurors during voir dire regarding defendant's gang affiliation and, further, that the sheet was admissible as evidence of specific intent and the matter of principles [sic]. The court, presumably noting that the state had countless records containing defendant's writing, asked, [t]o make sure, does this letteris this letter necessary for the state? [BY THE PROSECUTOR] Your Honor, that letter is another regularly conducteddocument that's used in the regular business practices of the jail. ... [BY THE COURT] I understand that; I am asking you: Is this letter necessary or... another one suffice? [BY THE PROSECUTOR] It's got his signature on it. It is something the handwriting expert will match up to other documents. Goes to the authenticity ofit's been admitted by defense counsel that he is a Rolling Sixties Crip. It goes to show that that is in fact him. I mean, he voir dired on this matter. I don't see how it could be prejudicial. [BY THE COURT] I understand that. What I am asking you is: Is this particular letter necessary for your case, or can you prove what you are attempting to prove with the other documents you have? [BY THE PROSECUTOR] I think it is not that we have other documents with his signature on it. It just goes to show the authenticity of all the jail records, that they are in fact him, you know. [BY THE COURT] All right ... The court will sustain the objection as to this document. Although the court initially sustained the objection, the court later withdrew that ruling after a bench conference held off the record. The court explained: My understanding [is that] the state will not attempt to introduce them in evidence at this time and in the presence of the jury. Even if they offered to introduce them in the presence of the jury, if defense counsel makes objection...if you offer to introduce them in evidence, the court will consider that, but any arguments to be made to the documents outside the presence of the jury. I will reserve the defense counsel's right to argue the introduction of each of the documents and whether or not they are to be published. Defense counsel thereafter did not object when the prosecutor elicited the following testimony from the jail records custodian: Q. State's exhibit 43, can you tell me what this document is? A. Yes, sir. This is a gang affiliation sheet. It's filled out by an arrestee ... Q.... And can you read the signature here? A. Yes, sir. Michael Cooks ... Q. What's the gang affiliation? A. Rolling Sixties. At the conclusion of the testimony, defense counsel made a motion for mistrial citing the erroneous admission of the gang affiliation sheet. The court denied the motion, noting that previous references to defendant as a gang member by numerous other witnesses dissipated any prejudice to defendant from the records custodian's testimony and that defense counsel had already informed the jurors that defendant was a gang member. In this assignment of error, defendant argues the document was erroneously admitted as it was obtained involuntarily and in violation of defendant's right to counsel and his right against self-incrimination. Defendant raises these arguments for the first time on appeal and consequently, they are not preserved for review. La.C.Cr.P. art. 841; State v. Taylor, supra; State v. Sims, 426 So.2d 148, 155 (La.1983) (a new basis for an objection may not be urged for the first time on appeal). Furthermore, defendant does not challenge the court's ruling that any prejudice to defendant resulting from admission of the gang affiliation sheet was minimal in light of other references to defendant's gang status. This assignment of error lacks merit.

Defendant complains of curtailment of his ability to present mitigation evidence. At the penalty phase, the prosecutor introduced evidence of an unadjudicated attempted second degree murder which occurred on August 22, 1995, during defendant's incarceration for the murder of Frazier. The prosecution called Deputy Ricky York who testified that defendant initiated a fight with another inmate, Jackie Sampson. Eight officers interceded and were able to separate the two inmates. Officers discovered that defendant was armed with a shank, a home-made knife, which he used to scratch Sampson's back and stab him in the face. Prosecutors introduced two sets of photographs depicting the injuries suffered by Sampson. On cross-examination, Deputy York denied any knowledge of prior altercations between defendant and Sampson, and the prosecutor's objection was sustained when defense counsel attempted to ask the witness whether he was familiar with Jackie Sampson's disciplinary records. Later, out of the presence of the jury, York again denied knowing of any other altercations involving Sampson but acknowledged that Sampson was held at times in another part of the jail where York had no guard duties. At the conclusion of the state's presentation of evidence at the penalty phase, the trial court denied defense counsel's request to introduce Jackie Sampson's jail records, including disciplinary records detailing fights Sampson was involved in and weapons seized from him. These records were proffered as was testimony by the jail records custodian that officers had discovered a shank in Sampson's possession on two occasions, one of which included the day the defendant and Sampson fought when officers discovered a razor blade under Sampson's bed. We have reviewed Sampson's disciplinary records which were offered as Defense Proffer 1. The records reflect Sampson and defendant may have fought once before and that Sampson bragged, I hit that nigger and I hope I broke his jaw ... that nigger is hurt and hurt bad. Further, the records reveal that after the stabbing, Sampson was seen opening the tray hatch of cell 17 to throw fecal matter on inmate Cooks. The records are replete with numerous disciplinary violations by Sampson and clearly indicate he was not a model prisoner. Defendant argues the exclusion of evidence of Sampson's conduct while in prison gave the jury a one-sided view of defendant's attack on him which led to the attempted second degree murder charge. He argues this was significant because during closing arguments, the state emphasized defendant would be a dangerous prisoner if he were sentenced to life imprisonment, using the Sampson altercation as proof: How much murder, destruction, and mayhem can one person give? When does it stop? That's what you have to ask yourself. Will a life in prison make it stop? You know the answer to that. Jackie Sampson knows the answer to that. During its rebuttal, the state again noted defendant would be a dangerous prisoner. Oh, give him life in prison; he won't hurt anybody while he's in there. Well, you know, there's passages in that Bible [5] that says an eye for an eye; and I'll bet Jackie Sampson and Carlos Bryant think that's the passage you ought to be reading. What has he been doing since he has been in prison? Well, he has been going to workshop and been making his tools. His tools of killing, mayhem, and destruction. You know, ladies and gentlemen, these don't only stab inmates. `Kicked a ride up last night, Nicky old girl. They locked me down. The guard got my face and I punched him. They think I'm crazy.' Ladies and gentlemen, are your twelve votes going to be the gunshots, as [defense counsel] says? ... Or are you going to wake up maybe next year, next month, tomorrow, twenty years from now and find out that somebody down at Angola got stabbed and killed and it just might not be another inmate, although they have every right to live, too. Just might be somebody's daddy, brother, son, who's trying to make a living as a guard. Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have repeatedly stressed a capital defendant has the right to introduce virtually any evidence in mitigation at the penalty phase of a capital trial. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605-606, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); State ex rel. Busby v. Butler, 538 So.2d 164 (La.1988). That evidence includes  any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2966 (emphasis added). See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (barring from capital sentencing hearing evidence on defendant's adjustment and good behavior while in prison violates his right to present all relevant evidence in mitigation) and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982)(refusal to consider family history and childhood abuse of 16-year-old facing the death penalty as mitigating factors violates the Eighth Amendment). Defendant argues that had he been able to present for the jury's consideration evidence of Sampson's violent character, the jury would have inferred that appellant only presented a threat to violent, frequently armed prisoners who had histories of assaulting him. In support of this assertion, defendant cites Lockett v. Ohio, supra , and State v. Bernard, 608 So.2d 966 (La.1992), and argues these decisions either allow the introduction of the evidence in question or could be extended to allow its admission. Defendant stretches the Lockett and Bernard rulings beyond their limits. He argues that evidence of Sampson's prior violent acts is relevant to explain his own record. However, Lockett focused on mitigating evidence as to the circumstances of the offense, and not as to other crimes introduced during the penalty phase. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2966. Defendant would have the penalty phase transformed into an inquiry into the worth, or lack thereof, of victims of  other crimes.  Neither Lockett nor Bernard contemplate the admission of such evidence. [6] Furthermore, had defense counsel presented evidence of Sampson's violent tendencies it seems reasonable to conclude that the state could rebut that evidence with evidence of defendant's disciplinary record which, offered as State Proffer 1, reveals defendant had been involved in many different fights while incarcerated. Further, the jury was already aware defendant had initiated a riot in the prison and would soon learn during gang expert Zimmerman's testimony that defendant intended to beat a member of a rival gang with whom he shared a room. Given this damaging evidence, it is unlikely the jury would conclude that defendant attacks only other violent inmates. [7] Defendant also relies on Skipper, supra, arguing the jury could have drawn favorable inferences from [the excluded] testimony regarding petitioner's character and his probable future conduct if sentenced to life in prison. Skipper, supra, 476, U.S. at 4, 106 S.Ct. at 1671. In Skipper, a capital defendant was barred from presenting the testimony of two jailers and one regular visitor to the effect that he had made a good adjustment during his time spent in jail. Skipper, supra, 476 U.S. at 3, 106 S.Ct. at 1670. Defendant and his wife had already testified defendant had conducted himself well while incarcerated; however, the Court concluded this evidence was the sort of evidence that a jury naturally would tend to discount as self-serving. The testimony of more disinterested witnessesand, in particular, of jailers who would have had no particular reason to be favorably predisposed toward one of their chargeswould quite naturally be given much greater weight by the jury. Id., 476 U.S. at 8, 106 S.Ct. at 1673. The Court held the exclusion of relevant mitigating evidence impeded the sentencing jury's ability to carry out its task of considering all relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender, and reversed defendant's death sentence accordingly. Id. The instant situation is distinguishable from that presented in Skipper, however. First, defendant was able to rebut the state's assertion he would be a dangerous addition to the prison population. Defendant called psychologist Dr. Mark Vigen who testified at the penalty phase that defendant would adjust to prison life and become a settled inmate and w[ould] live out his life there and w[ould] do well there. Second, the evidence defendant sought to admit did not mitigate defendant's attack on Sampson. Clearly, defendant and Sampson had an ongoing feud while they were incarcerated together. One fight precipitated another, with Sampson retaliating for being stabbed by dumping fecal matter on defendant. Defendant argues that without evidence of Sampson's violent character and the various altercations he and Sampson were involved in, the jury was presented with a one-sided version of events, a version which did not accurately depict the defendant's character. However, the evidence of a prior altercation between the two inmates would have established that defendant held a grudge against Sampson for an earlier attack and possibly armed himself with a shank so as to seek revenge at the earliest opportunity. Unlike in Skipper, supra, the jury most likely would have drawn negative inferences from this evidence. Nor was the evidence of Sampson's generally bad character admissible in mitigation. Absent any indication defendant was aware of Sampson's prior violent acts against others, the evidence did nothing to illuminate defendant's character for the jury. Defendant argues the jury was left with the impression that defendant attacked a peaceful, nonviolent prisoner. However, as the state correctly notes, the jury was aware that Sampson was awaiting trial for second degree murder when he was attacked by defendant. Evidence that guards had found shanks in Sampson's cell before and shortly after the fight between the two inmates arguably might have lent some support to defense counsel's insinuation that Sampson carried the shank to the fight and defendant wrestled it away from him before stabbing him. However, although Deputy York acknowledged on cross-examination he did not see the shank until it was pried from defendant's hand at the end of the fight, he testified on redirect that defendant threw the first blow which was an overhand stabbing motion, possibly an indication that defendant came to the fight armed with the shank. Consequently, assuming defendant was unaware of the shanks discovered in Sampson's cell, and nothing in the record indicates otherwise, the evidence was irrelevant and properly excluded. This assignment of error lacks merit.
Defendant argues testimony by a gang expert regarding his gang affiliation rendered his sentencing hearing fundamentally unfair. He asserts much of the evidence introduced was irrelevant and highly prejudicial and injected an arbitrary factor into the sentencing proceedings. Officer Chad Zimmerman was qualified as an expert in gang violence with no objection by defense counsel. Zimmerman discussed the history of gangs in Shreveport, the types of illegal conduct that gang members are generally involved in, and the types of conduct necessary for one to become the Original Gangster or O.G. [8] He also stated that a gangster in his mid-thirties would definitely be an O.G. After concluding this introduction, Zimmerman was asked to interpret the letters sent by defendant to Charlene Henderson. He noted the letters were written in gang script, a particular style used to alert other gang members that the writer is also a gang member. Zimmerman interpreted one letter to mean that defendant had started a riot in prison and was threatening to harm his cellmate. [9] Zimmerman then read from letters to Charlene Henderson in which defendant explains he has just learned his girlfriend, Tina Henderson, had lied when she told him she was pregnant and that she turned him into the police. He threatens the sisters in very violent and graphic terms throughout these letters. [10] On cross-examination, Zimmerman explained that an O.G. need not come from Los Angeles and that a baby born into a gang family is also an O.G. because it came from two gang members. Age was not necessarily the determining factor, Zimmerman continued, but instead, O.G. status is determined primarily based on what violent crimes a gangster has committed. For example, killing and jack[ing] a car would allow only entrance into a gang, but killing gangsters from a rival gang in front of witnesses would confer O.G. status. On redirect, Zimmerman indicated that if he knew an individual had entered a gang at the age of thirty-two, as defendant apparently did, he would find it so unusual that he would start an investigation and see where he came from, what he's into, and what he's trying to take over. Defendant argues the introduction of portions of the letters combined with Zimmerman's testimony and the earlier admission at the guilt phase of the gang affiliation sheet and testimony which revealed defendant was a member of a gang injected an arbitrary factor in his sentencing hearing and demands reversal of his death penalty. We first note defense counsel did not object to the expert's testimony, but only objected to the admission of certain portions of the letters written to Charlene. However, we held in State v. Taylor, supra , that we will review errors occurring during the sentencing phase, whether objected to or not, because of our duty under Rule 28 and La. C.Cr.P. art. 905.9 to review every death sentence for excessiveness by examining the record for passion, prejudice or arbitrary factors which may have contributed to the death penalty recommendation. We emphasize, however, that the goal of the contemporaneous objection rule of La.C.Cr.P. art. 841(A) and La.Code Evid. art. 103, to promote judicial efficiency by preventing a defendant from gambling for a favorable verdict and then, upon conviction, resorting to appeal on errors which either could have been avoided or corrected at the time or should have put an immediate halt to the proceedings, Taylor, 669 So.2d at 368, are just as valid in the penalty phase as in the guilt phase. In any event, we must review the gang expert testimony to consider whether it injected arbitrary factors or prejudice into the death penalty phase. Arbitrary factors are those which are entirely irrelevant or so marginally relevant to the jury's function in the determination of sentence that the jury should not be exposed to these factors; otherwise, the death penalty may be imposed `wantonly or freakishly' or for discriminatory reasons. State v. Comeaux, 93-2729 (La.7/1/97), 699 So.2d 16, 21-22, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1169, 140 L.Ed.2d 179 (1998) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)). If an arbitrary factor was introduced, we must determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the [sentence], and the court must be able to declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824,17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). In capital cases, the required focus of the penalty phase is on the circumstances of the offense, the character and propensities of the offender, and the aggravating and mitigating factors. Comeaux, supra at 26; La.C.Cr.P. arts. 905.2 A, 905.4 and 905.5. The character of the defendant is automatically at issue, whether the defendant has placed his character at issue or not. State v. Jackson, 608 So.2d 949, 953 (La. 1992); La.C.Cr.P. art. 905.2 The United State Supreme Court has held that evidence of a defendant's gang membership may be admissible at a capital sentencing hearing provided the evidence is relevant. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 165, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1097, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992), see also United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984). In Dawson, the Court concluded the trial court erroneously allowed the admission of evidence of defendant's membership in a prison gang because the evidence, as it was presented to the jury, was irrelevant to the sentencing proceedings. The state and the defense had agreed to a stipulation which provided that: The Aryan Brotherhood refers to a white racist prison gang that began in the 1960's in California in response to other gangs of racial minorities. Separate gangs calling themselves the Aryan Brotherhood now exist in many state prisons including Delaware. Dawson, supra, 503 U.S. at 162, 112 S.Ct. at 1096. The prosecution also informed the jury that defendant had tattooed Aryan Brotherhood on his hand and had introduced himself as Abaddon which he said meant one of satan's disciples. Id. The Court held that the narrowness of the stipulation left the Aryan Brotherhood evidence totally without relevance to Dawson's sentencing proceeding, because the evidence was not tied in any way to the murder for which defendant was being sentenced. Id., 503 U.S. at 165, 112 S.Ct. at 1097. Further, because the prosecution did not introduce evidence that the Aryan Brotherhood had committed any unlawful or violent acts, or had even endorsed such acts, the evidence was not relevant to prove any of the aggravating circumstances advanced by the state. Id., 503 U.S. at 166, 112 S.Ct. at 1098. Significantly, for our purposes, the Court noted the prosecution's expert witness, who was not called to testify, would have testified that the Aryan Brotherhood was associated with drugs and violent escape attempts at prisons, and advocates the murder of fellow inmates. The Court observed that if such evidence had been presented, the Court would have had a much different case. Id., 503 U.S. at 165, 112 S.Ct. at 1097. The Court further explained that [i]n many cases, for example, associational evidence might serve a legitimate purpose in showing that a defendant represents a future danger to society. Id., 503 U.S. at 166,112 S.Ct. 1093. The case at bar is the much different case the Supreme Court described. The gang expert's testimony described violent and drug-related conduct that is engaged in and endorsed by Rollin' 60's gang members and which, given defendant's membership in the gang, is highly relevant to defendant's character and his future dangerousness. His testimony was also necessary and relevant to interpret the letters written by defendant in which he threatens his cellmate, Tina, and Charlene. Thus, the prosecution in the instant case escaped the trap illustrated in Dawson by introducing strong evidence to establish a relevant link between the defendant's character, his sentencing, and evidence of his gang involvement. Furthermore, contrary to defendant's assertions, the evidence of gang drug involvement does not constitute the type of nonviolent unadjudicated other crimes evidence prohibited by State v. Jackson, 608 So.2d 949 (La.1992) because no specific crimes were associated with the defendant. In addition, it is common knowledge that gang members engage in drug-related and violent crimes; thus, the expert testimony can hardly be characterized as arbitrary, prejudicial, or even surprising to the jury. The threats of violence or death to the Henderson sisters and the confession that defendant started a riot in prison, which were contained in the letters, involve violence and thus are admissible under Jackson. Moreover, although the state introduced no independent evidence of the riot, this court recently held that although an accused cannot be convicted of a crime based solely on his own uncorroborated confession without some independent proof that a crime has been committed, the confession-corroboration requirement is not necessary before a confession may be admitted at the penalty phase of a capital trial. State v. Connolly, 96-1680, p. 15 (La.7/1/97), 700 So.2d 810, 820. [I]f the admitted confession is reliable and trustworthy, then it alone may be sufficient to satisfy the clear and convincing evidentiary standard established in State v. Brooks, 541 So.2d 801 (La.1989). Connolly, 96-1680, p. 15, 700 So.2d at 821 (emphasis in original). Here, as in Connolly, [t]here is no evidence in the record to suggest defendant's confession [to the riot] was anything other than voluntary and the product of defendant's uncoerced free will. Id. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Dawson left open the possibility that the wrongful admission of gang evidence at sentencing could be characterized as harmless error. Dawson, supra, 503 U.S. at 169, 112 S.Ct. at 1099. Thus, even assuming the admission of part of the gang expert's testimony was erroneous, it is harmless error under Chapman unless there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the [sentence], and the court [is] able to declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828,17 L.Ed.2d at 710-11. The state presented overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt in the instant case. Consequently, we conclude the conviction in the instant case surely was unattributable to the erroneous admission of evidence of defendant's gang affiliation during the guilt phase. Further, the gang expert's testimony at the penalty phase pales in comparison to the violence of the crime in question about which the jury had already heard in detail. It is also common knowledge that gang members are involved in violent activities. In addition, the content of the letters which Zimmerman read to the jury were so graphic and violent on their own that Zimmerman's interpretation of them did not add any arbitrary factor into the jury's deliberation. Thus, while we recognize that in the appropriate case the admission of gang expert testimony may constitute reversible error, we conclude that in this case, there is not a reasonable possibility that it contributed to the sentence, and its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.