Opinion ID: 1214373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Declaratory Judgment for TSI

Text: Buyers argue that TSI's declaratory judgment claim that the Agreement expired on March 22, 1993, was moot, because at the time of trial: (1) buyers had withdrawn their claim for specific performance, (2) sellers had withdrawn their claim that buyers were interfering with the sellers' efforts to negotiate a transaction with CVC after March 22, 1993, and (3) the declaratory relief sought did not concern TSI's fraud claims. We do not agree. The standard of review on whether a declaratory judgment action rises to the level of an actual controversy is abuse of discretion. See Wichita Computer & Supply, Inc. v. Mulvane State Bank, 15 Kan. App.2d 258, 260-61, 805 P.2d 1255, rev. denied 248 Kan. 999 (1991). Buyers also contend that declaratory judgment is not a proper mode of determining the sufficiency of legal defenses, citing 22A Am. Jur.2d, Declaratory Judgments § 43. However, that authority says that declaratory judgment is not a proper mode of determining the sufficiency of legal defenses to a pending action. (Emphasis added). Here, TSI's declaratory judgment claim was asserted in the petition initiating this lawsuit. The pretrial order provided in part: 5. Theory of Defendants Jenkins' and Hood's Defenses Plaintiff TSI seeks a declaratory judgment that the contract between it and Jenkins and Hood was no longer in existence on March 25, 1993. Defendants Jenkins and Hood contend that the contract remained in force after TSI Holdings' purported termination of it on March 24, 1993, that TSI Holdings cannot force a termination of the contract by failing to fulfill its obligations under the contract and that TSI Holdings breached its contract with Jenkins and Hood. (Emphasis added.) While the parties dispute over the Agreement's expiration date remained unresolved, TSI's declaratory judgment claim was not moot. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on the declaratory judgment claim.