Opinion ID: 4578648
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prong one: Whether the district court erred

Text: To reiterate, Mr. Miller claims the district court’s imposition of the challenged drug-testing condition was error for three reasons. First, he argues that the delegation of authority to probation contravenes 18 U.S.C. § 3853(d). Second, he contends that the delegation of authority to probation contravenes Article III. Finally, he argues that the district court erred in failing to make findings on the record supporting the condition. We address each argument in turn.
Mr. Miller’s statutory theory of error is that the special condition violates 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). This provision provides, in relevant part: The court shall . . . order, as an explicit condition of supervised release, that the defendant refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance and submit to a drug test within 15 days of release on supervised release and at least 2 periodic drug tests thereafter (as determined by the court) for use of a controlled substance. The condition stated in the preceding sentence may be ameliorated or suspended by the court as provided in section 3563(a)(4). 18 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (emphasis added).3 Mr. Miller contends that the language “as determined by the court” contained in this provision “plainly evinces a congressional intent that the district court determine the number of drug tests to which defendants are subject following the initial test within 15 days of release.” Aplt. Br. at 12. A number of Courts of Appeals have agreed, interpreting the language “as determined by the court” in the statute (and corresponding guideline) to mean that a sentencing court may not allow the probation department to determine the maximum number of drug tests to which a defendant must submit during a term of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit considered this issue in United States v. Bonanno, holding that “18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) requires that the court determine the number of drug tests to which the defendants must submit.” 146 F.3d 502, 511 (7th Cir. 1998). The First Circuit agreed in United States v. Melendez-Santana, 353 F.3d 93 (1st Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 211 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc), reasoning that: [B]oth the statute and the Guidelines state that following the initial “drug test within 15 days of release,” there must be “at least 2 periodic drug tests 3 A corresponding Guidelines provision provides similarly: The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance and submit to one drug test within 15 days of release on supervised release and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter (as determined by the court) for use of a controlled substance, but the condition stated in this paragraph may be ameliorated or suspended by the court for any individual defendant if the defendant’s presentence report or other reliable information indicates a low risk of future substance abuse by the defendant (see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)). U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(a)(4) (emphasis added). 19 thereafter (as determined by the court) for use of a controlled substance.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2000); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(a)(4). If there is any ambiguity in this text, it does not relate to the responsibility of the court to make the determination referenced in the statute. That responsibility could not be more explicit. 353 F.3d at 103. See also United States v. Tulloch, 380 F.3d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 2004) (reversing and remanding for resentencing where supervised release condition allowed probation officer to set the maximum number of drug tests to which defendant was required to submit). Most recently, the Ninth Circuit joined the Seventh and First Circuits in holding that a special condition of supervised release that ordered the defendant to submit to “at least two periodic drug tests . . . as directed by the probation officer,” constituted an impermissible delegation of judicial authority, in contravention of § 3583(d). United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit explained: We agree with the First Circuit’s holdings in Melendez–Santana and Tulloch, that the statute, together with the guideline, clearly requires that the court, not the probation officer, set the maximum number of non-treatment-program drug tests to which a defendant may be subjected. Congress set the conditional minimum while assigning to the courts the responsibility of stating the maximum number of tests to be performed or to set a range for the permissible number of tests. The district court’s sentencing order . . . failed to abide by [the statute’s] final requirement that the court itself determine the maximum number of drug tests. It ordered that Stephens submit to the fifteen day drug test as well as “at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as directed by the probation officer.” Under the statute, it was for the district court to determine the maximum number, not for the probation officer to direct. Having determined that number, the court could have left it to the probation officer to direct the scheduling and other details of the test. But probation officers may not be vested with unlimited discretion to order drug tests given the very real consequences that may follow therefrom. Where, as here, a probation officer can of his own 20 accord order a test, he is subjecting the defendant to the possibility of further criminal punishment. While allowing the probation officer to determine the timing of tests is a permissible administrative task, it is for the court to determine how many times a defendant may be placed in jeopardy of being tested. Id. at 882–83. We agree with Mr. Miller and with our sibling circuits. “In construing a federal statute, we give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been expressed in reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., Inc. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 984 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the language provided in the statute, together with the corresponding guideline, is clear: the district court must set the maximum number of non-treatment-program drug tests to which a defendant may be subjected. The district court therefore erred in delegating this authority to Mr. Miller’s probation officer. The government responds to Mr. Miller’s statutory error argument by asserting that the statutory language “as determined by the court” in § 3583(d) “does not mean that Congress commanded that only a district court could ‘determine[]’ the number of drug tests.” Aple. Br. at 17–18. The government does not cite any cases that have adopted its proposed interpretation.4 Instead it (1) cites to the “background rule,” which states that “‘[a] probation officer shall . . . perform any other duty that the 4 Although the government does not cite to it, at least one federal court has adopted its preferred interpretation of § 3583(d)—United States v. Smith, 45 F.Supp.2d 914 (M.D. Ala. 1999). For the reasons discussed, however, we disagree. 21 court may designate,’” id. at 18 (ellipsis in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3603(10)); and (2) makes the policy argument that, because probation officers interact with defendants far more frequently than does the judge during the defendant’s term of supervised release, it “makes little sense” to restrict the district court’s authority to delegate to probation decisions about a defendant’s drug-testing during this period. Id.; see also id. (discussing the “common sense intuition” that the probation officer is “better positioned to determine rehabilitative needs”). The government asserts that if Congress intended to curtail the district court’s power to delegate to probation, “it would have done so with clearer language.” Id. The government’s arguments are unavailing. The government’s proposed interpretation of § 3583(d) to allow probation officers, as well as courts, to determine a defendant’s maximum number of drug tests contravenes the plain language of that provision. First, to read the language “as determined by the court” as not excluding probation from this decision-making authority would flout one of our “wellestablished canon[s] of statutory construction—the negative-implication canon (i.e., the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius),” which “provides that the ‘expressi[on] [of] one item of [an] associated group or series excludes another left unmentioned.’” Navajo Nation v. Dalley, 896 F.3d 1196, 1213 (10th Cir. 2018) (alterations in original) (quoting N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 940 (2017)). The “background rule” found in 18 U.S.C. § 3606(10) does not alter this conclusion, due to another construction canon. Specifically, it is a “well established canon of statutory interpretation . . . ‘that the specific governs the general.’” RadLAX 22 Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992)). The specific rule provided in § 3583(d) cannot give way to the background rule that district courts may generally delegate responsibilities to probation officers. We accordingly reject the government’s invitation to use the general language of 18 U.S.C. § 3606(10) as justification for ignoring § 3583(d)’s plain, specific text.5 The government’s policy arguments also fail. Even if this court agreed with the government’s policy arguments—i.e., that it would make more “common sense” to permit probation officers to make such drug-testing determinations—that would not give us license to interpret a statute contrary to its plain language. Moreover, if a district court wishes to delegate some authority to probation on this matter, then it may do so, consistently with the statute’s language, by specifying a range of drug tests to be performed by probation, or by specifying a maximum number of drug tests that probation may not exceed. See Melendez-Santana, 353 F.3d at 103 (interpreting § 3583(d) as authorizing courts to specify a range of substance abuse testing within which probation officers may exercise discretion); see also United States v. Guy, 174 F.3d 859, 862 (7th Cir.1999) (concluding that a condition requiring the defendant to 5 Mr. Miller argues the government’s interpretation of the statute should be rejected because it would render meaningless the “as determined by the court” language of § 3583(d). Aplt. Reply Br. at 5. He argues that “[i]t would not have been lost on Congress that district courts already had authority to order drug testing.” Id. Even if Mr. Miller’s superfluousness argument may have merit, the canons of statutory construction explained supra are more clearly applicable here, and they suffice to lay the government’s counterarguments to rest. 23 submit to “random drug tests as ordered by the Probation Office, not to exceed 104 tests per year[,]” did not constitute plain error). Thus, to the extent the government makes a fair policy point that probation officers are better positioned to decide the precise number of drug tests needed to meet a defendant’s rehabilitative needs, the authority of district courts to “set a range of drug tests to be performed pursuant to the statutory language meets this practical concern.” Melendez-Santana, 353 F.3d at 104. For these reasons, we join our sibling circuits in holding that under the terms of § 3583(d), district courts must determine the maximum number of non-treatmentprogram drug tests to which a defendant may be subjected during his term of supervised release. The district court therefore committed statutory error when it delegated this authority to Mr. Miller’s probation officer.
Mr. Miller also claims the district court’s delegation to probation was unconstitutional. Specifically, he argues that because the authority to impose punishment resides in the judiciary, the district court violated Article III when it delegated to probation the authority to determine the upper limit of his drug testing. “Article III of the United States Constitution confers the authority to impose punishment on the judiciary, and the judiciary may not delegate that authority to a nonjudicial officer.” United States v. Cabral, 926 F.3d 687, 697 (10th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted). 24 In an improper-delegation challenge to a supervised-release condition, we distinguish between permissible delegations that merely task the probation officer with performing ministerial or support services related to the punishment imposed and impermissible delegations that allow the officer to decide the nature or extent of the defendant’s punishment. This inquiry turns on the liberty interest affected by the probation officer’s discretion. Thus, allowing a probation officer to make the decision to restrict a defendant’s significant liberty interest constitutes an improper delegation of the judicial authority to determine the nature and extent of a defendant’s punishment. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The question here is therefore whether determining the number of drug tests to which Mr. Miller must submit constitutes “ministerial or support services related to the punishment imposed” or instead constitutes a decision as to the “nature or extent” of his punishment, thereby impacting a significant liberty interest. Id. (quotation marks omitted). For the reasons explained herein, we hold that the district court’s delegation did not amount to constitutional error. In so holding, we are guided by our precedent which, although not including caselaw directly on point, makes clear that the special drug-testing condition imposed in this case does not rise to the level of implicating a significant liberty interest. We are also swayed by the decision of the First Circuit when presented with a virtually identical issue. In United States v. Begay, we held that polygraph testing did not involve a significant restriction on the defendant’s liberty interests where, regardless of whether the restriction was in place, he would be required to undergo sex offender treatment and meet with his probation officer. 631 F.3d 1168, 1175–76 (10th Cir. 2011). We noted that although the burden imposed by the polygraph testing “may be 25 invasive and anxiety-provoking,” it did not rise to the level of “infring[ing] upon fundamental liberty interests, such as familial association.” Id. at 1175. Similarly, in United States v. Bear, we held that a delegation did not implicate the defendant’s significant liberty interests, and therefore was not unconstitutional, where probation could not require the defendant to submit to “residential treatment, penile plethysmograph testing, or the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs.” 769 F.3d 1221, 1230–31 (10th Cir. 2014); United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686, 696 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that “any condition that affects a significant liberty interest, such as one requiring the defendant to participate in residential treatment, or undergo penile plethysmographic testing,” may not be delegated to probation (citations omitted)). Cf. Cabral, 926 F.3d at 698–99 (holding a delegation of decision-making authority to probation unconstitutional where the decision could “infringe on a wide variety of liberty interests,” such as the defendant’s “fundamental right of familial association,” or could impose “occupational restrictions,” which we have “repeatedly held . . . implicate liberty interests”). Here, the decision delegated to Mr. Miller’s probation officer—i.e., to determine the number of drug tests to which he must submit—does not restrict a significant liberty interest. No occupational right or right to familial association is burdened, for example, nor does probation have authority to determine whether Mr. Miller submits to residential treatment, penile plethysmograph testing, or the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs. Further, even without the drugtesting special condition, Mr. Miller would be required (under those conditions of his 26 supervised release to which he does not object) to refrain from alcohol and drug use and to submit to alcohol testing. See ROA Vol. I, at 61 (listing as mandatory conditions of supervised release that Mr. Miller “must not commit another federal, state, or local crime” and “must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance”); id. at 63 (imposing as a special condition of supervised release that Mr. Miller “must not use or possess alcohol”); Aplt. Br. at 14 (stating that Mr. Miller “challenges the special condition authorizing substance abuse testing with respect to drug testing that may be required by the probation officer, but does not challenge it insofar as it requires him to submit to alcohol testing” (emphasis added)). Although Mr. Miller correctly notes that his failure to comply with the drugtesting condition would lead to an additional term of imprisonment, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(3) (“If the defendant . . . refuses to comply with drug testing imposed as a condition of supervised release . . . the court shall revoke the term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve a term of imprisonment not to exceed the maximum term of imprisonment authorized under subsection (e)(3).”), the ultimate revocation determination, and the decision as to the length of the resulting imprisonment term, are not delegated to probation and instead remain with the district court. Moreover, while actual imprisonment would of course restrict Mr. Miller’s significant liberty interests, the drug-testing condition itself does not create such a restriction; rather, imprisonment is contingent on Mr. Miller’s refusal to comply with the condition. See id. 27 The decision of the First Circuit in Padilla, when confronted with the same challenge, is also instructive. There, the court noted that the requirement in § 3583(d) that an Article III judge decide the maximum number of drug tests is not a constitutional requirement. 415 F.3d at 222. More specifically, the Padilla court held that [t]he placement of authority to set the maximum number of drug tests in the hands of the judge is a statutory choice; it is neither a matter of constitutional necessity nor a condition essential to the fair administration of justice. Thus, Article III is implicated only by way of the statutorily prohibited delegation[.] Id. (footnote omitted).6 Mr. Miller cites no authority supporting his contrary position. Because we are persuaded by the reasoning of the First Circuit in Padilla, we hold that the delegation of authority to probation to determine the number of drug tests to which Mr. Miller must submit was not an unconstitutional delegation of the district court’s judicial authority. Put another way, the district court did not commit constitutional error. 6 In United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 878–82 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit also considered a constitutional-delegation challenge to a drug-testing condition similar to the one at issue here. But conflicting statements in the decision make it unhelpful to the instant analysis. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit suggested that “how many times” a defendant will be subjected to drug testing was a decision implicating constitutional delegation concerns under Article III. Id. at 880. It then appears to hold that “there was no delegation of Article III judicial power regarding the primary decision of whether [the defendant] would undergo treatment,” which the court stated left only the “subordinate, statutory issue[]”of whether the district court erred in failing to specify the maximum number of non-treatment-program drug tests to which the defendant would be required to submit. Id. at 882 (emphasis added). This inconsistency in the Stephens opinion makes its holding unclear. 28
Mr. Miller argues that the district court further erred by failing to make findings supporting its imposition of the special condition. We agree. “When [] neither the Sentencing Commission nor Congress has required or recommended a condition, we expect the sentencing court to provide a reasoned basis for applying the condition to the specific defendant before the court.” MartinezTorres, 795 F.3d at 1237; see also United States v. Burns, 775 F.3d 1221, 1223 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Our precedents unambiguously require supporting findings when courts impose special conditions of supervised release.”); United States v. Hahn, 551 F.3d 977, 982 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the sentencing court “is required to give reasons on the record for the imposition of special conditions of supervised release” so that a reviewing court may consider the substantive reasonableness of the conditions). The district court must make an “individualized assessment” before imposing special conditions. Martinez-Torres, 795 F.3d at 1237–38. However, the “sentencing court need not provide reasons for each special condition that it imposes; rather, it must only provide a generalized statement of its reasoning.” Mike¸ 632 F.3d at 693 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court did not explain why it imposed a special condition authorizing Mr. Miller’s probation officer to require him to submit to non-treatmentprogram-based drug testing. The government concedes that the district court neither provided particular reasons for imposing this condition, nor made a generalized 29 statement of its reasoning. Because the district court did not make the requisite findings—a point which the government does not dispute—the district court erred.