Opinion ID: 2753606
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion under ER 404(b)

Text: ER 404(b) is a categorical bar to admission of evidence [of a prior bad act] for the purpose of proving a person's character and showing that the person acted in conformity with that character. State v. Gresham, 173 Wn.2d 405, 420, 269 P.3d 207 (2012) (citing State v. Saltarelli, 98 Wn.2d 358, 362, 655 P.2d 697 (1982)). But [t]he same evidence may, however, be admissible for any other purpose, depending on its relevance and the balancing of its probative value and danger ofunfair prejudice. Id. (emphasis omitted). For evidence of prior bad acts to be admissible, a trial judge must ( 1) find by a preponderance of the evidence that the misconduct occurred, (2) identify the purpose for which the evidence is sought to be introduced, (3) determine whether the evidence is relevant to prove an element of the crime charged, and (4) weigh the probative value against the prejudicial effect. Thang, 145 Wn.2d at 642 (citing Lough, 125 6 State v. Gunderson (Daniel Scott), No. 89297-1 Wn.2d at 853). This analysis must be conducted on the record. State v. Foxhoven, 161 Wn.2d 168, 175, 163 P.3d 786 (2007) (citing State v. Smith, 106 Wn.2d 772, 776, 725 P.2d 951 (1986)). The trial court must also give a limiting instruction to the jury if the evidence is admitted. Id. (citing Lough, 125 Wn.2d at 864). The trial court conducted the proper four-step analysis on the record and gave the jury an appropriate limiting instruction. Nonetheless, by not excluding the evidence, the trial court abused its discretion. Gunderson argues that the probative value of the evidence at issue here is outweighed by its significant prejudicial effect. Gunderson is correct. Essentially, he· challenges the trial court's conclusion under the fourth prong of the ER 404(b) analysis, which requires a court to weight the probative value against the prejudicial effect. This analysis, though done in the context of an ER 404(b) objection, implicates ER 403. See Saltarelli, 98 Wn.2d at 361 (ER 404(b) is only the starting point for an inquiry into the admissibility of evidence of other crimes; it should not be read in isolation, but in conjunction with other rules of evidence, in particular ER 402 and 403.). Here, we agree with Gunderson that the prejudice of admitting a prior domestic violence incident involving Gunderson and Christina outweighs its probative value. In State v. Magers, we took great care to specifically establish that evidence that [the defendant] had been arrested for domestic violence and fighting and that a no-contact order had been entered following his arrest was relevant to enable the jury 7 State v. Gunderson (Daniel Scott), No. 89297-1 to assess the credibility of [the complaining witness] who gave coriflicting statements about [the defendant's] conduct. 164 Wn.2d 174, 186, 189 P.3d 126 (2008) (emphasis added). 2 In the present case, Christina gave no conflicting statements about Gunderson's conduct. The State concedes that Christina's testimony was internally consistent but argues that the trial court's admission of Gunderson's prior bad acts was nonetheless proper because other evidence contradicted Christina's account. We decline to extend Magers to apply in such circumstances. That other evidence from a different source 2 We respectfully disagree with the dissent that Gunderson's criminal history is admissible under Magers. See dissent at 1-2. The facts in Magers were very different from those here. In Magers, Kha Magers entered the home of Carissa Ray, the alleged victim who had a no contact order against him, and threatened her with a sword. 164 Wn.2d at 178-79. When police arrived, she eventually told a responding officer that Magers was inside her house. Id. After this admission, Ray started crying and stated that Magers is 'violent. He's going to hurt me. Please don't tell him that I told you that he was in there.' !d. at 179 (quoting record). The responding officer testified that Ray looked traumatized. !d. After prosecutors charged Magers, Ray recanted the statement she gave the responding officer. !d. at 180. The underlying facts here are much different. Christina never spoke to officers or prosecutors and only gave one account of events on (or as far as we know, off) the stand. Also, unlike in Magers, the State in this case introduced no evidence of the witness's trauma. Nor do we find admission is appropriate under State v. Grant, 83 Wn. App. 98, 920 P.2d 609 (1996) or State v. Baker, 162 Wn. App. 468,259 P.3d 270 (2011). In Grant, the defendant testified and the State sought to admit his domestic violence criminal history to impeach his credibility under ER 609(a). Grant, 83 Wn. App. at 103. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the grounds that the prior bad acts were admissible to explain the victim's statements and conduct which might otherwise appear inconsistent with her testimony and to explain why the victim permitted the defendant to see her despite the nocontact order, and why she minimized the degree of violence. 83 Wn. App. at 106-08. Perhaps most importantly, [t]he State sought to admit evidence of these dynamics through testimony of [the victim]'s therapist. !d. at 108. No expert was offered here to help the jury understand these dynamics. While Baker in passing suggests prior acts of domestic violence might always be admissible, the evidence in that case was clearly admissible to explain why the victim did not report prior times the defendant attempted to strangle her and to rebut the defendant's theory that the strangulation was accidental. 162 Wn. App. at 4 72, 474-75. 8 State v. Gunderson (Daniel Scott), No. 89297-1 contradicted the witness's testimony does not, by itself, make the history of domestic violence especially probative of the witness's credibility. There are a variety of reasons why one witness's testimony may deviate from the other evidence in a given case. In other words, the mere fact that a witness has been the victim of domestic violence does not relieve the State of the burden of establishing why or how the witness's testimony is unreliable. 3 Much like in cases involving sexual crimes, courts must be careful and methodical in weighing the probative value against the prejudicial effect of prior acts in domestic violence cases because the risk of unfair prejudice is very high. See Saltarelli, 98 Wn.2d at 363 (finding that [a] careful and methodical consideration of relevance, and an intelligent weighing of potential prejudice against probative value is particularly important in sex cases, where the prejudicial potential of prior acts is at its highest). To guard against this heightened prejudicial effect, we confine the admissibility of prior acts of domestic violence to cases where the State has established their overriding probative value, such as to explain a witness's otherwise inexplicable recantation or conflicting account of events. See Magers, 164 Wn.2d at 186. Otherwise, the jury may well put too great a weight on a past conviction and use the evidence for an improper purpose. See State v. Brown, 113 Wn.2d 520, 531, 782 P.2d 1013 (1989) (Brachtenbach, J., lead opinion). Accordingly, we decline to extend 3 The blanket extension of Magers proposed by the dissent would create a domestic violence exception for prior bad acts that is untethered to the rules of evidence. 9 State v. Gunderson (Daniel Scott), No. 89297-1 Magers to cases where there is no evidence of injuries to the alleged victim and the witness neither recants nor contradicts prior statements. 4 It was manifestly unreasonable, and therefore an abuse of discretion, for the trial judge to admit evidence of Gunderson's past domestic violence on the record before us.