Opinion ID: 155809
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Almegard’s Employer

Text: Plaintiff contends Florida Gulf and Mesa were separate entities; therefore, Florida Gulf was Almegard’s employer for workers’ compensation purposes. Under this theory, payment of workers’ compensation benefits by one entity, Florida Gulf, should not bar an action in tort against a separate entity, Mesa. In support of this argument, plaintiff cites two cases holding an employee of a wholly owned subsidiary who has obtained workers’ compensation benefits from the subsidiary may still bring an action in tort against the parent corporation. See Gulfstream Land & Dev. Corp. v. Wilkerson, 420 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1982); Gigax v. Ralston Purina Co., 136 Cal. App. 3d 591 (1982). Here, however, the district court found Mesa and Florida Gulf were “a single entity for purposes of the exclusive remedy analysis.” The record provides ample support for this conclusion. It is undisputed Mesa originally formed and operated Florida Gulf as a wholly owned subsidiary. It is also undisputed that, prior to the crash, Mesa and Florida Gulf merged leaving Mesa as the surviving corporation. The merger agreement between Mesa and Florida Gulf provides “the separate existence of Florida Gulf shall cease” upon the effective date of the merger. In addition, the agreement provides for the cancellation of all issued and outstanding shares of Florida Gulf stock. This clearly distinguishes the present case from Gigax and Gulfstream where two corporate entities were involved, -8- each with the attendant status as a separate legal entity. Here, Florida Gulf was no longer a corporation. While it may be a question of fact whether two corporations are separately controlled thus creating two potential defendants, in this case, there is only one corporation and, we conclude, only one employer -- Mesa.