Opinion ID: 539161
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 2 In transferring the case to this court, the Ninth Circuit properly recognized the Federal Circuit's exclusive appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1295(a) (1982) over a final judgment on the merits and rebuked Kennecott's contention that the Federal Circuit would not review the order by citing recent cases in which the Federal Circuit had reviewed orders granting and orders denying a motion to disqualify counsel. The decision to transfer was not only plausible, but correct. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 819, 7 USPQ2d 1109, 1117 (1988) (directing that if the transferee court can find the transfer decision plausible, its jurisdictional inquiry is at an end). 3 Because Kennecott's petition for mandamus to the Ninth Circuit was filed within 10 days from the entry of the order and the district court certified that the order involved a controlling question of law and that an immediate appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, we may treat Kennecott's petition as an appeal under section 1292(c)(1) (Supp. III 1985). Cf. Sun Studs, Inc. v. Applied Theory Assocs., Inc., 772 F.2d 1557, 1566, 227 USPQ 81, 87 (Fed.Cir.1985) (accepting an appeal under section 1292(c)(1) over an order granting cross-motions to disqualify both parties' counsel). The Ninth Circuit considers a challenge to the denial of a disqualification motion under the mandamus statute and not under either section 1291 or 1292(b). See Unified Sewerage Agency, Etc. v. Jelco Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1344 (9th Cir.1981). Nonetheless, we have accepted jurisdiction over such certified denials in cases where we would have jurisdiction under section 1295. See, e.g., Telectronics Proprietary, Ltd. v. Medtronic, Inc., 836 F.2d 1332, 1335, 5 USPQ2d 1424, 1427 (Fed.Cir.1988).