Opinion ID: 171317
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disability: Driving as a Major Life Activity

Text: The first element of a discrimination claim under the ADA is proof that the plaintiff has a qualifying disability under the statute. The ADA defines disability as (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2). The term major life activities is not defined in the statute, but a regulation promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [1] defines it as functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). The categorization of an activity as a major life activity is crucial to the determination of disability. Oilind argues that the jury's verdict must be vacated because the jury was erroneously instructed that driving constitutes a major life activity under the ADA. The district court first expressed its view in an order partially granting and partially denying a motion for summary judgment by Oilind: This Court believes that there is no question that in Wyoming, where public transportation is virtually non-existent, distances between towns is measured by hours of driving, economic conditions often require residents to seek employment outside of their local community, and long winter conditions significantly limit foot or bicycle travel, driving is clearly a major life activity. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 19[7, [122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615]] (2002) (finding that major life activities refers to those activities that are of central importance to daily life). Aplt.App., Vol. I at 33. Oilind objected at trial to the instructions that included driving as a major life activity, but the objection was overruled. The interpretation of a federal statute is a question of law which this court reviews de novo.  Scanlon White, Inc. v. Comm'r, 472 F.3d 1173, 1175 (10th Cir.2006). Whether driving constitutes a major life activity under the ADA is a question of first impression in this circuit. The two courts of appeals that have published opinions on the question have concluded that it is not. See Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dept., 158 F.3d 635, 643 (2nd Cir.1998); Chenoweth v. Hillsborough County, 250 F.3d 1328, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2001). Although driving is not one of the listed activities in the EEOC regulation, that does not end the inquiry because the regulation does not purport to give an exhaustive list. It cannot be disputed that driving is an extremely important daily activity to many, even most, adults. Without the ability to drive, it may be very difficult to care for oneself or to work. Indeed, we have recognized that the activity of [c]aring for one's self encompasses normal activities of daily living; including . . . driving. . . . Holt v. Grand Lake Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 443 F.3d 762, 767 (10th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). But driving is, literally, a means to an end. The activities enumerated by the EEOCcaring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and workingare all profoundly more important in and of themselves than is driving. There are those who drive just for the pleasure of it (Hey, let's go for a ride), but that practice is declining and some would now consider it unpatriotic. Moreover, the importance of the enumerated activities is not dependent on where one lives; they are valued as much by the resident of a major metropolitan area as by an isolated rural resident. Driving, in contrast, may be a minor concern for one who is near convenient mass transit and can walk to work. To conclude, as did the district court, that driving is a major life activity because of its importance to the performance of other major life activities, such as caring for oneself or working, would shortcircuit the analysis in determining whether one of those major life activities has been substantially limited. For instance, to show a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working, the plaintiff must, under the EEOC regulations, establish a significant[] restrict[ion] in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Undoubtedly, an inability to drive will sometimes enable the plaintiff to meet this standard. See Best v. Shell Oil Co., 107 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 1997). Likewise, a restriction on driving could cause one to be substantially limited in the activity of caring for oneself. But a plaintiff should not be permitted to bypass having to prove substantial limitations in these major life activities by providing only evidence that she cannot drive. We hold that driving is not itself a major life activity. Because the jury was not required to indicate on the verdict form which major life activity or activities it found to be substantially limited, it is impossible to know whether the jury based its verdict on just the legally incorrect ground that Ms. Kellogg was unable to drive. When an appellate court cannot determine whether a jury reached its verdict on an incorrect legal theory presented in the instructions, it must set aside the verdict. See Farrell v. Klein Tools, Inc., 866 F.2d 1294, 1298-1301 (10th Cir.1989). We therefore vacate the verdict on Ms. Kellogg's ADA claim.