Opinion ID: 4528672
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Codefendant Statements

Text: We begin with the Defendants’ challenges to the district court’s admission of their codefendants’ out-of-court statements. Specifically, the Defendants challenge statements made to five witnesses: Douglas, Detective Kempf, Turner, Berry, and Rivera. This Court reviews evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion but legal conclusions concerning the Federal Rules of Evidence or Constitution de novo. United States v. Landersman, 886 F.3d 393, 413 (4th Cir. 2018). Even if an evidentiary error implicates a defendant’s constitutional rights, the Court reviews “that error for harmlessness.” United States v. Poole, 640 F.3d 114, 118 (4th Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Clarke, 2 F.3d 81, 85 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that the Court need not resolve an alleged Bruton violation when the alleged error is harmless). 5 In addition, following Benson’s closing argument, Brown’s counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the Government had used evidence outside the limiting instructions. The court denied the motion, noting it had given a cautionary instruction to the jury to disregard any potentially misstated evidence. 6 Wallace requested dismissal of the indictment or a new trial. Benson and Brown requested vacatur of their convictions and a new trial. 11 As noted, the Defendants challenge these codefendant statements on the basis that that the statements (1) violated the Confrontation Clause and/or (2) were generally inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The first type of challenge is governed by Bruton, which held that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when the facially incriminating testimonial statement 7 of a non-testifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only against the codefendant. 391 U.S. at 126; see id. at 135–37 (“[W]here the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant . . . are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial . . . we cannot accept limiting instructions as an adequate substitute for [the defendant’s] constitutional right of cross-examination.”). Richardson v. Marsh made clear that Bruton’s rule was a narrow one. 481 U.S. 200 (1987). If the statement of a non-testifying codefendant incriminates another only by virtue of linkage to other evidence at trial—that is, if it incriminates “inferential[ly]” rather than “facially”—then it does not implicate Bruton. Id. at 208–09. Nonetheless, a confession may still be facially incriminatory—and thus inadmissible even with a limiting instruction— where the inferences required to link the statement to the defendant are of the type “that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial.” Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 196 (1998). Ultimately, when Bruton 7 “The primary determinant of a statement’s testimonial quality is whether a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have expected his statements to be used at trial—that is, whether the declarant would have expected or intended to bear witness against another in a later proceeding.” United States v. Dargan, 738 F.3d 643, 650 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 12 is not implicated, the assumption is that jurors follow any limiting instructions, including considering an opposing party statement strictly against the party who made it. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208–09. In turn, as noted above, the district court concluded the challenged testimony (1) did not implicate Bruton and (2) was admissible either as an opposing party statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) or a statement against interest under Rule 804(b)(3). Rule 801(d)(2)(A) provides that a statement is not hearsay if “the statement is offered against an opposing party” and “was made by [that] party in an individual or representative capacity.” Thus, a defendant’s own statements constitute “admissions by a party-opponent and [are] admissible pursuant to” this Rule. United States v. Wills, 346 F.3d 476, 489 (4th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Jones, No. 19-4090, 2019 WL 6724464, at  (4th Cir. Dec. 11, 2019) (unpublished) (concluding defendant’s “out-of-court statement that he was involved in [the victim’s] murder” constituted a “statement made by a party and offered against that party”). Meanwhile, Rule 804(b)(3) provides for an exception to the hearsay rule for statements that (1) a “reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have made only if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so contrary to the declarant’s proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a tendency to invalidate the declarant’s claim against someone else or to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability” and (2) “is supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the declarant to criminal liability.” In sum, we conclude that none of the admitted statements presented a Bruton issue, and that they were all properly admitted under either Rule 801(d)(2)(A) or 804(b)(3). To 13 the extent such admission did constitute error, however, we conclude that any error was harmless given the scope of the properly admissible evidence against each Defendant. 8 A. Benson and Wallace’s Challenge to Douglas’s Testimony At trial, Douglas—Brown’s friend who had given him a ride a week after Joseph’s death—testified that Brown had complained to him that Wallace had taken over the robbery and brought in two “Boston dudes,” further describing how he had accompanied them to Joseph’s front door. J.A. 670. Following Douglas’s testimony, the court concluded that Brown’s statement was nontestimonial and therefore did not implicate Bruton. Further, the court instructed the jury that the testimony could only be considered against Brown as an opposing party statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), not against any other codefendant. 9 On appeal, Benson, one of the Defendants from Boston, argues that the testimony violated Bruton because it improperly implicated him. He also argues it constituted inadmissible hearsay. Further, both Benson and Wallace argue that Douglas’s testimony was so prejudicial that it violated their rights to a fair trial. We disagree. As an initial matter, Bruton does not apply here because the Confrontation Clause is only implicated in the context of testimonial statements. Dargan, 8 See Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27, 30 (1984) (“[W]e may affirm on any ground that the law and the record permit and that will not expand the relief granted below.”); United States v. Smith, 395 F.3d 516, 519 (4th Cir. 2005) (“We are not limited to evaluation of the grounds offered by the district court to support its decision, but may affirm on any grounds apparent from the record.”). 9 Specifically, the court instructed the jury that “you may only consider [Douglas’s] testimony about what Brown said against Brown. You may not consider any testimony he provided about what Brown said other co-defendants did against another co-defendant, only against Brown[.].” J.A. 718. 14 738 F.3d at 651 (“Bruton is simply irrelevant in the context of nontestimonial statements.”); see also Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2180 (2015). Brown’s statements to Douglas were non-testimonial. Douglas was a longtime personal friend of Brown, and their conversation occurred “maybe a week or more” after Joseph’s death, in Douglas’s car. J.A. 668. And because “testimonial evidence does not include statements made to friends in an informal setting,” United States v. Alvarado, 816 F.3d 242, 252 (4th Cir. 2016), any Bruton challenge presented by Benson is unavailing. Further, we conclude the testimony was properly admitted as an opposing party statement against Brown alone. And because Douglas’s testimony was admitted against only Brown, it was not part of the body of evidence that the jury could consider in assessing the guilt of Benson or Wallace. Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 190 (1987). 10 Thus, we can only reverse if there is some specific reason to doubt that the jury adhered to the district court’s limiting instruction. But we must presume the jury followed the district court’s Rule 10 The district court considered admitting Douglas’s testimony as a statement against interest under Rule 804(b)(3) “if there [was] sufficient corroborative evidence in the record with respect to what [Brown] says about Wallace.” J.A. 262. However, the court never ruled it was admitting the evidence under Rule 804(b)(3). To the extent Wallace and Benson challenge the admission of Douglas’s testimony under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) as insufficient to cure any prejudice against them, we conclude that the district court’s admission of Douglas’s testimony under Rule 804(b)(3) would have been sufficient to cure any evidentiary error given that, under Rule 804(b)(3), limiting instructions are unnecessary and there was sufficient corroborative evidence in the record regarding Wallace and Benson. Cf. United States v. Barbee, 524 F. App’x 15, 18–19 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting the requirements of Rule 804 need not be met where Rule 801 is satisfied). Ultimately, however, we conclude any evidentiary error, regardless of whether it sounds in Rule 801 or 804, was harmless given the extent of the Government’s other evidence against Wallace and Benson. See Thigpen, 468 U.S. at 30. 15 801 instruction. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 206–08 (observing courts apply an “almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions”). To overcome this presumption, Benson and Wallace would have to demonstrate not only that the jury was unable to follow the court’s instructions but also that the evidence was highly prejudicial. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987). But it is highly unlikely the jury would have been confused because the court offered (1) contemporaneous limiting instructions with respect to Douglas’s testimony and (2) three general limiting instructions in the final charge. Benson and Wallace have offered no reason to conclude the jury disregarded them. 11 Further, even if the admission of Douglas’s testimony somehow amounted to error, any abuse of discretion in admitting it was harmless given the abundance of other evidence presented against Benson and Wallace. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (harmless error review requires consideration of “what effect [the asserted constitutional error] had upon the guilty verdict”); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231 (1973) (finding Bruton error harmless where the erroneously-admitted evidence was “merely cumulative of other overwhelming and largely uncontroverted evidence properly before the jury”); United States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 327 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Erroneously admitted evidence is harmless if a reviewing court is able to say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 11 Kindell’s acquittal lends further support to the notion that the jury followed the court’s instructions. 16 Here, the Government’s case rested on the Defendants’ own admissions, reliably corroborated by other evidence, including forensic evidence in the form of DNA samples and phone and bus records. As to Benson, the jury heard about his statements to Berry before the crime asking for a gun and his statements after the crime discussing the robbery (in which he described a struggle inside Joseph’s residence and seeing a child). The jury also heard about his conversation with Rivera, in which he admitted to coming down to Virginia with somebody else from Boston. Further, the Government presented evidence of Benson’s DNA inside Joseph’s house; CSLI illustrating Benson’s travel from Boston to Virginia with Kindell; phone records showing communications with Wallace and Kindell around the time of Joseph’s death; and the abrupt change in his return ticket after Joseph’s death. And as to Wallace, the Government presented evidence of his cell phone communications with his codefendants, the CSLI showing his location, and his admissions to law enforcement that he was present for the robbery. In sum, we conclude the admission of Douglas’s testimony was harmless as to Benson and Wallace. B. Brown’s Challenge to Detective Kempf’s Testimony We turn next to Detective Kempf’s testimony recounting his conversation with Wallace, in which Wallace stated that “he and others . . . took Bryan Brown’s truck” to Joseph’s home. J.A. 622. Although Brown objected to this statement, the district court concluded it was “non-testimonial” and did not present a Bruton issue. J.A. 622. Brown’s counsel thereafter requested a limiting instruction, which the court deferred ruling on to “the end of the case if it’s necessary.” J.A. 624. Over the course of the rest of the trial, the court did not specifically mention Detective Kempf’s testimony. However, as noted earlier, 17 it gave a general limiting instruction that the jury consider the statements made by each Defendant as evidence only against that Defendant. Brown now argues that the statement amounted to a Bruton violation and an abuse of discretion. Although it is a close question, we agree that the statement did not present a Bruton issue because it was not facially incriminating as to Brown. To implicate Bruton, a statement cannot incriminate “inferentially”—that is, “only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial.” Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208. Although Brown asserts that the statement unambiguously named him as a participant in the crime, we agree with the Government that this characterization overstates the testimony. Wallace merely observed that “he and others . . . took Bryan Brown’s truck” to Joseph’s home. Left unsaid was whether Brown was physically present in the truck or at the house, or that Brown approved or even knew of Wallace’s use of his truck. At most, there was the possibility that the jury might infer that because Brown’s truck was involved, so was he. But the mere possibility of Brown’s involvement does not mean that Wallace’s statement was facially incriminating. To have been incriminating in a Bruton sense, the statement must have obviously referred to Brown’s direct participation in the offense. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208. For example, this Court has concluded that a co-conspirator’s post-arrest statement to a special agent—which generally discussed his use of his backyard shed as a contraband storage facility and noted that he had known the defendant, a next-door neighbor, his entire life—was not facially incriminating because it could not “be said to suggest that [the defendant] engaged in any crimes.” United States v. Locklear, 24 F.3d 641, 645–46 (4th Cir. 1994). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has concluded 18 that a codefendant’s testimony failed to facially incriminate because “when [the codefendant] did insert [the defendant] into his narrative, he never claimed [the defendant] seized, detained, threatened, injured, or demanded ransom for any of the victims,” as required for the offense of conspiracy to commit hostage taking. United States v. Mikhel, 889 F.3d 1003, 1045 (9th Cir. 2018) And the Fifth Circuit has declined to find a Bruton issue even where a non-testifying co-conspirator’s statements placed the defendant at the scene of the crime because the statement itself was “utterly silent as to [the defendant’s] whereabouts and activities” during the offense and would require several inferential jumps to arrive at the defendant’s participation in offense. United States v. Lage, 183 F.3d 374, 387 (5th Cir. 1999). Here, even if Wallace’s statements tended to corroborate that Brown had, at a minimum, given his truck to the codefendants and, at most, been present at the crime scene, it would not have been sufficient by itself to establish his participation in the offense because it would have required linkage to additional evidence. See also Mikhel, 889 F.3d at 1045 (rejecting the argument that codefendant testimony “corroborated the government’s evidence against” the defendant because none of the evidence “on its own, directly established that” the defendant had engaged in the offense). But even if we were to assume a Bruton error here, it would be harmless. Brown himself admitted to Douglas that he owned the truck used to transport the Defendants to Joseph’s house; that he helped to plan the crime; and that he was present when the other participants kicked the front door in (a description corroborated by crime scene investigators). Brown’s own statements thus subsumed Wallace’s passing reference to his truck by supplying far more incriminating information. And the Government presented 19 additional evidence that Brown armed and transported his codefendants—including his wiretap statement that he owned one of the firearms used to kill Joseph and his sale of the weapon—and his repeated communications with Wallace (the chief organizer) directly before and after the murder. 12 C. Brown and Wallace’s Challenge to Turner’s Testimony We turn next to the testimony of cooperating witness Turner, who was Benson’s cellmate at the Newport News City Jail. According to Turner’s trial testimony, Benson told him that he came down from Boston to conduct a robbery, and that Brown and Wallace “did the joint [Benson] was locked up for.” J.A. 753. Following Turner’s testimony, the court instructed the jury that it could “consider the witness’s testimony about what Mr. Benson said about himself” solely against Benson, and could not consider “what he said other co-defendants may or may not have done or said.” J.A. 761. On appeal, Brown and Wallace argue that the admission of Benson’s statements violated Bruton. We disagree, concluding that statements to a cellmate are plainly nontestimonial and thus do not implicate Bruton. Dargan, 738 F.3d at 650–51 (“[S]tatements from one prisoner to another are clearly nontestimonial.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In turn, the district court admitted the statements with a Rule 801 limiting instruction. And given that Brown and Wallace have offered no reason to conclude the jury 12 To the extent Brown asserts an evidentiary error, we disagree, concluding Wallace’s statement was admissible under Rule 801 on the basis of the district court’s general limiting instruction. Smith, 395 F.3d at 519 (affirming “on any grounds apparent from the record”). Further, even assuming an evidentiary error, it was harmless. 20 disregarded the instruction, we must assume that the jurors followed it. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 206, 211. Finally, even if the admission of this statement amounted to an evidentiary error, it would be harmless. Landersman, 886 F.3d at 413 (noting a non-constitutional evidentiary error is harmless if the “judgment was not substantially swayed by the error”). As discussed at length above, the Government presented substantial evidence of the involvement of both Brown and Wallace in the offense, including their own admissions. D. Wallace’s Challenge to Berry’s Testimony We next consider the admission of Berry’s testimony, which described his conversations with Benson and Kindell before and after their participation in the offense. Following Berry’s testimony, the district court stated it was “not issuing a limiting instruction on this witness” because his testimony “would clearly fall under [Rule] 804(b)(3)” and “this record is sufficiently full of independent corroboration.” J.A. 800. 13 Wallace challenges the admission of this testimony, claiming it was highly prejudicial. We reject Wallace’s challenge. As an initial matter, we conclude there was no Confrontation Clause issue because the statements to Berry were non-testimonial. Alvarado, 816 F.3d at 252 (concluding “testimonial evidence does not include statements made to friends in an informal setting”). Thus, to the extent Wallace can argue error, it can only be an evidentiary one. But we agree with the district court that the statements made 13 Specifically, the court observed “his testimony involved testimony directly about what two co-defendants said, and, to the extent he mentioned another co-defendant here, this record is sufficiently full of independent corroboration.” J.A. 800. 21 by Benson and Kindell were statements against interest under Rule 804(b)(3) and were sufficiently corroborated by the record. Further, any evidentiary error would have been harmless because of all of the other evidence, as noted, that was presented against Wallace. We therefore conclude the district court did not err in admitting Berry’s testimony. E. Wallace’s Challenge to the Tape of Rivera’s Visit to the Jail Finally, we conclude the district court did not err in admitting the tape recording of the conversation between Rivera and Benson, in which Benson admitted to being in Newport News at the time of the murder. During trial, Wallace requested a limiting instruction as to this tape. The district court declined, stating it did not believe a limiting instruction was “necessary in this case.” J.A. 767. Although the court did not specify the basis for declining to issue a limiting instruction, we agree that the tape of the conversation between Rivera and Benson constituted a statement against Benson’s interest under Rule 804(b)(3), which the court had generally considered earlier. This conversation was further corroborated by the evidence in the record. United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 809, 814 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting the Court may affirm an evidentiary record on any basis apparent in the record). And, for the reasons discussed previously, any error as to Wallace was harmless.