Opinion ID: 4453185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Good‐faith Defense for AFSCME

Text: Although this is a new question for us, we note that every district court that has considered the precise question before us—whether there is a good‐faith defense to liability for pay‐ ments collected before Janus II—has answered it in the aﬃrm‐ ative.1 While those views are not binding on us, the unanimity of opinion is worth noting. 1 See Hamidi v. SEIU Local 1000, 2019 WL 5536324 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2019); LaSpina v. SEIU Pennsylvania State Council, 2019 WL 4750423 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2019); Casanova v. International Ass’n of Machinists, Local 701, No. 1:19‐cv‐00428, Dkt. #22 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2019); Allen v. Santa Clara Cty. Correctional Peace Officers Ass’n, 2019 WL 4302744 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2019); Ogle v. Ohio Civil Serv. Emp. Ass’n, 2019 WL 3227936 (S.D. Ohio July 17, 2019), appeal pending, No. 19‐3701 (6th Cir.); Diamond v. Pennsylvania State Educ. Ass’n, 2019 WL 2929875 (W.D. Pa. July 8, 2019), appeal pending, No. 19‐2812 (3d Cir.); Hernandez v. AFSCME California, 386 F. Supp. 3d 1300 (E.D. Cal. 2019); Doughty v. State Employee’s Ass’n, No. 1:19‐cv‐00053‐ PB (D.N.H. May 30, 2019), appeal pending, No. 19‐1636 (1st Cir.); Babb v. California Teachers Ass’n, 378 F. Supp. 3d 857 (C.D. Cal. 2019); Wholean v. CSEA SEIU Local 2001, 2019 WL 1873021 (D. Conn. Apr. 26, 2019), appeal pending, No. 19‐1563 (2d Cir.); Akers v. Maryland Educ. Ass’n, 376 F. Supp. 3d 563 (D. Md. 2019), appeal pending, No. 19‐1524 (4th Cir.); Bermudez v. 22 No. 19‐1553 The first task we have under Wyatt I is to identify the “most closely analogous tort” to which we should turn for guidance. 504 U.S. at 164 (citations and internal quotation marks omit‐ ted). Arguing in some tension with his statute‐of‐limitations position, Mr. Janus says that his claim lacks any common law analogue. His back‐up position is that good faith is pertinent only if the underlying oﬀense has a state‐of‐mind element, and he asserts that the most analogous tort in his case lacks such an element. Mr. Janus compares the First Amendment violation in his case to conversion. But that analogy does not work, at least with regard to the state’s deduction of fair‐share fees and its transfer of those fees to the union. Conversion requires an in‐ tentional and serious interference with “the right of another to control” a chattel. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A (1965). At the time AFSCME received Mr. Janus’s fair‐share fees, he had no “right to control” that money. Instead, under SEIU Local 521, 2019 WL 1615414 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2019); Lee v. Ohio Educ. Ass’n, 366 F. Supp. 3d 980 (N.D. Ohio 2019), appeal pending, No. 19‐3250 (6th Cir.); Hough v. SEIU Local 521, 2019 WL 1274528 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2019), amended, 2019 WL 1785414 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2019), appeal pend‐ ing, No. 19‐15792 (9th Cir.); Crockett v. NEA‐Alaska, 367 F. Supp. 3d 996 (D. Alaska 2019), appeal pending, No. 19‐35299 (9th Cir.); Carey v. Inslee, 364 F. Supp. 3d 1220 (W.D. Wash. 2019), appeal pending, No. 19‐35290 (9th Cir.); Cook v. Brown, 364 F. Supp. 3d 1184 (D. Or. 2019), appeal pending, No. 19‐35191 (9th Cir.); Danielson v. AFSCME, Council 28, 340 F. Supp. 3d 1083 (W.D. Wash. 2018), appeal pending, No. 18‐36087 (9th Cir.). See also Winner v. Rauner, 2016 WL 7374258 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2016) (post‐Harris claim for fee reimbursement); Hoffman v. Inslee, 2016 WL 6126016 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 20, 2016) (same). But see Lamberty v. Connecticut State Police Un‐ ion, 2018 WL 5115559 (D. Conn. Oct. 19, 2018) (dismissing for lack of stand‐ ing but implying plaintiffs were entitled to previously withheld fees, plus interest). No. 19‐1553 23 Illinois law and Abood, the union had a right to the fees under the collective bargaining agreement with CMS. This rules out conversion. As the Supreme Court said in Chicot Cnty. Drain‐ age Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940), “the actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an op‐ erative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.” Id. at 374. There are also at least two privileges that may be relevant to a conversion‐style claim: authority based upon public in‐ terest, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 265 (1965), and privi‐ lege to act pursuant to court order, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 266 (1965). Section 265 provides that “one is privileged to commit an act which would otherwise be a trespass to a chattel or a conversion if he is acting in discharge of a duty or authority created by law to preserve the public safety, health, peace, or other public interest, and his act is reasonably nec‐ essary to the performance of his duty or the exercise of his authority.” While the usual context for the assertion of this privilege is law enforcement, it is not too much of a stretch to apply it to the union’s conduct here. CMS and AFSCME acted pursuant to state law. That sounds like action in discharge of a duty imposed by law. Section 266, which provides a privi‐ lege when one acts pursuant to a court order, is not directly applicable because there was no court order directing AFSCME to receive fair‐share fees—Abood was permissive, not mandatory. Nevertheless, CMS and AFSCME did rely on the Supreme Court’s opinion upholding the legality of exactly this process. AFSCME contends that the better analogy is to the tort of abuse of process. Abuse of process occurs where a party “uses a legal process, whether criminal or civil, against another 24 No. 19‐1553 primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not de‐ signed.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 682 (1977). Alterna‐ tively, the most analogous tort might be interference with contract. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766A (1979). Un‐ der the agency‐fee arrangement, a certain portion of the salary CMS contracted to pay employees went instead to the union. This arguably made the contract less lucrative for objecting employees and violated their First Amendment rights. None of these torts is a perfect fit, but they need not be. We are directed to find the most analogous tort, not the exact‐match tort. This is inherently inexact. Although there are reasonable arguments for several diﬀerent torts, we are inclined to agree with AFSCME that abuse of process comes closest. But per‐ haps the search for the best analogy is a fool’s errand. As sev‐ eral district courts have commented, the Supreme Court in Wyatt I embarked on the search for the most analogous tort only for immunity purposes—the Court never said that the same methodology should be used for the good‐faith defense. See, e.g., Carey, 364 F. Supp. 3d at 1229–30; Babb, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 872–73; Diamond, 2019 WL 2929875 at –26. In the al‐ ternative, therefore, we leave common‐law analogies behind and consider the appropriateness of allowing a good‐faith de‐ fense on its own terms.