Opinion ID: 1541042
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Private Interests of the Potential Committee

Text: The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has identified the prospective committee's paramount interest to be libertyfreedom from physical restraint. In re Ballay, supra, 157 U.S.App.D.C. at 60, 482 F.2d at 649. Deprivation of this `interest of transcending value,' In re Ballay, supra at 67, 482 F.2d at 656 quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958), inflicts a grievous loss upon the individual. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). And indeterminate commitment for mental illness most certainly constitutes a massive curtailment of liberty. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1972). Secondarily, potential commitees are concerned with the related liberty interest in avoiding unwarranted attachment of the mental illness label and its enduring social stigma. In re Ballay, supra, 157 U.S.App.D.C. at 79, 482 F.2d at 668. Finally, once the court has made a decision that an individual is committable, he or she has an interest elevated to a constitutional right to treatment. See Rouse v. Cameron, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 366, 373 F.2d 451 (1966). While the potential commitee's individual interests, therefore, are at least threefold, we join the Ballay courtand appellants herein acknowledging the primacy of the liberty interest. [11]