Opinion ID: 1843185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Were Appellees In Fact Unable to Obtain Permits or Variances?

Text: Seymour argues that the subject conveyances do not fall within the scope of the ordinance. Thus, she maintains, the county should have granted the requested permits. Section 106.1 of the Jackson County subdivision ordinance provides in pertinent part: These regulations and development standards shall apply to the following forms of land subdivisions: a. The division of land into two or more tracts, lots, sites, or parcels, any part of which, when subdivided, shall contain less than three (3) acres in area. According to Seymour, the Colemans' parcel does not fall within the scope of § 106.1 since the Colemans' parcel contained three  not less than three  acres. This argument ignores the clear language of § 106.1(a). Subsection (a) does not exclude all parcels not containing less than three acres; rather, the subsection excludes subdivisions which contain no parcels of less than three acres. The parcels conveyed to the Evans and the Cruses, along with other previous conveyances to which the record refers, all contain less than three acres. Since the Colemans' tract is part of the same division out of which the Evans and the Cruses acquired their respective interests, subsection (a) applies to the Colemans' parcel. Seymour next argues that even if subsection (a) places her conveyances within the scope of the ordinance, § 106.1(f) takes them out. Subsection (f) provides: The provisions of this ordinance shall not apply to a sale or conveyance of a parcel of land constituting a part of a larger unplatted tract where such conveyance is made by a metes and bounds description, and no dedication, vacation, or reservation of any public or private street or easement is made within such larger unplatted tract subsequent to the effective date of this ordinance. The ordinance went into effect in 1970. It is unquestioned that the parcels conveyed to the appellees constitute parts of a larger unplatted tract retained by Seymour. It is also undisputed that the appellees have access to their tracts by way of an easement across the larger unplatted tract. The only real issue, then, is whether the easement was created subsequent to 1970. If so, then the conveyances will not fall under the § 106.1(f) exception. Seymour contends that the property contained within the easement was surveyed for the purpose of building a county road in 1966. The county, however, never acquired an interest in the property. All the relevant conveyances appearing in the record occurred subsequent to 1970. The chancellor did not err in finding that Seymour's conveyances to the appellees were governed by the Jackson County subdivision ordinances. It is thus clear that Seymour's conveyances conflicted with the Jackson County subdivision ordinances. It is not clear, however, that the appellees would have been unable to obtain hardship variances if they had sought them. If they had obtained variances, then the whole controversy now before the Court would have evaporated. The chancellor apparently assumed that the county would not have granted a variance, but the record does not provide a solid foundation for this assumption. Various county officials testified that the planning commission rarely grants variances and that the appellees probably could not have obtained one, but such testimony amounts to little more than mere speculation. Speculative evidence, standing alone, is generally insufficient to support a chancellor's finding of fact. See Thompson v. Thompson, 278 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss. 1973). On the other hand, we hesitate to require parties like the appellees to fight a losing battle to the bitter end just to prove what is already a foregone conclusion. In Knight v. McCain, 531 So.2d 590, 597 (Miss. 1988), we considered an analogous case and concluded: The [purchasers] did everything possible to secure a permit but actually apply; the only reason they did not actually apply for a permit was because they were told not to do so by the building permit office because it would not be issued. The law does not require the doing of a futile act. Whether the chancellor in the instant case could reasonably have concluded that the appellees did everything possible is a close question. It is also a question that we need not decide. Even if the county had conclusively refused to grant the appellees building permits, the chancellor would still have erred in ruling that Seymour's conveyances violated the § 89-1-33 seller's warranties. In order to best explain our conclusion, we shall separately discuss each warranty as follows: