Opinion ID: 1387817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Motion to Dismiss the Indictments

Text: The first charge of error is that the court denied the motion to dismiss which urged that the indictments were fatally defective. Incidentally, it is suggested here that defendant was charged under the wrong name; but any criticism by her for that reason could be given little weight since as above noted the record shows that her counsel moved for the change of name at the time of her arraignment and was allowed to do so. Moreover, the change of name being only one of form and not of substance was permissible without the request. Dye v. Sacks, 6 Cir., 279 F.2d 834, 837; United States v. Owens, D.Minn., 334 F. Supp. 1030, 1031. The burden of defendant's motion to dismiss seemed to be that the offense was not sufficiently charged to enable her to prepare a defense and avoid possible double jeopardy in subsequent proceedings as well as to substantiate that charging her on both indictments constituted double jeopardy. It is notable that the defense filed numerous motions, including those to discover. In all fairness it could not be said that there was any doubt about the crime with which defendant was charged, and certainly she could have ascertained by discovery had there been any question regarding this matter. Moreover, where the charge follows the statutory language and such language contains all that is essential to constitute the crime, the indictment is sufficient. State v. Callaway, 72 Wyo. 509, 267 P.2d 970, 971; State v. Hickenbottom, 63 Wyo. 41, 178 P.2d 119, 125. We held in Crouse v. State, Wyo., 384 P.2d 321, 325, that it was only necessary to allege sufficient to allow the accused to understand the charge and prepare his defense. The court exercised its proper discretion in overruling the motion.