Opinion ID: 2635881
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Are the district court's findings of fact as to damages clearly erroneous?

Text: [¶ 22] In Snelling v. Roman, 2007 WY 49, ¶¶ 7-8, 154 P.3d 341, 345 (Wyo.2007), we reiterated our standard for reviewing the determinations of a district court after a bench trial: After a bench trial, we review the trial court's factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and its legal conclusions de novo. We do not substitute ourselves for the trial court as a finder of facts; instead, we defer to the trial court's findings unless they are unsupported by the record or erroneous as a matter of law. Although the factual findings of a trial court are not entitled to the limited review afforded a jury verdict, the findings are presumptively correct. This Court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record, but we do not reweigh the evidence. Due regard is given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses. We accept the prevailing party's evidence as true and give to that evidence every favorable inference which may fairly and reasonably be drawn from it. Findings may not be set aside because we would have reached a different result. A finding will only be set aside if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. (citations omitted). [¶ 23] The Garrisons' contention that the district court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous begins with the premise that expert testimony is required to prove matters outside the common ken, including customs, standards, and practices of the construction industry. In support of that proposition, the Garrisons cite three cases: Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108 (Wyo.1989); Logan v. Pacific Intermountain Express Company, 400 P.2d 488 (Wyo.1965); and Govin v. Hunter, 374 P.2d 421 (Wyo.1962). We note that Roybal and Govin are both medical malpractice cases wherein we held that, in professional negligence actions, proof of the standard of care requires expert testimony. Roybal, 778 P.2d at 112; Govin, 374 P.2d at 422. [4] Logan, another negligence case, does speak to the point of whether certain matters are of common knowledge, thereby obviating the need for expert testimony. Logan, 400 P.2d at 493. CC Builders does not contest the assertion that expert testimony is required to prove reasonable costs under a cost plus building contract, and cites no authority to the contrary. Consequently, we will accept the Garrisons' proposition and apply it in this case. [5] [¶ 24] The gravamen of the Garrisons' argument in regard to the district court's findings of fact as to damages is that the district court did not accept the uncontradicted and unimpeached opinion of their expert witness, Timothy Ciocarlin, that the reasonable cost to construct the house, excluding landscaping, was $3,000,000.00. To the contrary, the district court found the reasonable cost of construction was $3,783,448.00, which total included landscaping costs. See supra ¶ 11, n. 3. CC Builders responds, first, that a trier of fact is not obligated to accept an expert's opinion, where that expert's credibility has been impeached. See, e.g., Willis v. State, 2002 WY 79, ¶ 18, 46 P.3d 890, 896 (Wyo.2002) (impeachment by prior inconsistent statements shows witness capable of making errors in testimony); Rhoades v. K-Mart Corp., 863 P.2d 626, 633 (Wyo.1993) (inconsistencies between deposition testimony and trial testimony are fair game for impeachment purposes); Misner v. Newton, 448 P.2d 595, 599-600 (Wyo.1968) (trial judge may question credibility where conflicting statements have been made). Second, CC Builders contends that Ciocarlin's testimony was contradicted not only by his own earlier deposition testimony, but by the trial testimony of CC Builders' expert witnesses. [¶ 25] Having reviewed the entire record, and having examined the judgment entered by the district court, we conclude that CC Builders is correct. Ciocarlin's testimony was far from being uncontradicted and unimpeached. While there are too many instances to recite them all, a few examples may suffice: (1) during cross-examination at trial, numerous deficiencies were uncovered in Ciocarlin's estimation of the reasonable cost of construction, including unexplained variances in the amount of his different estimates and factually incorrect assumptions about building conditions and requirements; (2) there were differences between Ciocarlin's deposition testimony and his trial testimony; and (3) there was contradicting testimony from CC Builders' expert witnesses, especially in regard to reasonable labor costs. Under these circumstances, we conclude both that it was not unreasonable for the district court to disregard some or all of Ciocarlin's testimony, and that there was other sufficient evidence from which the district court could determine the reasonable cost of construction. [¶ 26] In its cross-appeal, CC Builders raises the same two issues that it raised in its motion to amend the district court's findings. First, it contends that the district court did not include all landscape and hardscape costs in its determination of the reasonable cost of construction, and second, it contends that the district court's finding as to the amount of unreasonable employee bonus and incentive costs billed to and paid by the Garrisons was not supported by the evidence. [¶ 27] In rendering its judgment, the district court added certain landscape and hardscape costs to the estimate CC Builders provided to the Garrisons on March 2, 2001. See supra ¶ 11. Those additions included $171,163.00 for additional masonry, and $244,409.00 for landscaping. CC Builders appeals that portion of the Judgment on the ground that, while the district court meant to include the cost of landscape and hardscape in the total reasonable cost of construction, it failed to include all such costs. Specifically, CC Builders contends that the district court overlooked the sum of $127,295.36 incurred by CC Builders for landscape and hardscape labor and materials prior to September 1, 2001. [¶ 28] The district court obtained the additional sums mentioned above from a Garrison exhibit (Plaintiff's Exhibit 60), which was a comparison of the March 2, 2001 estimate and actual expenditures as of September 6, 2001. See supra ¶ 27. CC Builders contends that this exhibit did not include other landscape and hardscape costs incurred prior to September 1, 2001, as shown on their exhibits 5N-5Q, which were CC Builders' invoices to the Garrisons dated June 5, 2001, July 9, 2001, August 10, 2001, and September 6, 2001. Those exhibits show the following expenses, which CC Builders claims are landscape or hardscape costs never included in the district court's calculation of the reasonable cost of construction, and therefore never credited to them in the damage equation: Yellow Iron Excavating $37,825.12 13,956.99 7,565.38 7,437.80 Four Corners Concrete 18,250.00 Taylor Quality Concrete 9,196.00 35,850.00 ___________ TOTAL $130,081.29 [¶ 29] It is unclear from the record or from the briefs why this amount is more than the $127,295.36 that CC Builders believes should be added to the total reasonable cost of construction. CC Builders refers in its brief to an affidavit of Clint Cook purportedly attached to its motion to amend the judgment, but that affidavit has not been included in the record on appeal. The transcript of the post-trial motion hearing also suggests that the $127,295.36 figure is explained in that affidavit, but the affidavit likewise is not attached to that transcript. [¶ 30] If we are to give meaning to the language of our standard of review, especially the idea that we accept the district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, we cannot in this case reverse the district court's damage award as it relates to the inclusion of landscape and hardscape costs in its computation of the amount of damages. What we are faced with is an assertion by counsel that $127,295.36 should be added to landscape and hardscape costs because amounts reflected in various invoices total that sum. However, the district court relied upon specific numbers from a different exhibit, which means that there was an underlying evidentiary basis for the district court's conclusion. In that situation, we cannot say the district court was wrong just because other exhibits may have suggested that other numbers were correct. CC Builders has not met its burden of proving that the district court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous. [¶ 31] The second issue raised in CC Builders' cross-appeal is the amount of employee bonus and incentive costs billed to the Garrisons that the district court found to be unreasonable. That amount$123,592.00 was added as an overcharge in determining the final judgment amount owed by CC Builders to the Garrisons. See supra ¶ 12. The actual finding of the district court was as follows: g) Overcharged: Bonuses/Incentives. The management incentives and bonuses were a portion of the pay packages for the CC Builders employees working the Garrison house. Experts Wilkinson, Ciocarlin and Chandler all testified that management incentives and bonuses are a cost of doing business, and it is appropriate to pass these costs on to the owner. The Court will give more weight to Ciocarlin's testimony that the bonuses and incentives charged by CC Builders of $123,592.00 were excessive and not in accordance with industry and custom. These charges, which include 33% labor bonuses and 12% overhead and profit, were not reasonable and proper. [CC Builders'] expert, Chandler, also expressed an opinion that the Lund bonus plus a month off seemed high. [The Garrisons] should not be responsible for this amount. [¶ 32] CC Builders contends that, although $110,350.00 in employee bonuses and incentives may have been attributable to the Garrisons' project, the Garrisons actually were only invoiced directly for $37,200.00 of that amount. [6] As explained by Lisa Cook, the process was this: CC Builders actually paid its employees $82,970.00 for bonuses and incentives attributable to the Garrisons' project. Of that amount, the Garrisons were invoiced directly only $37,200.00, with the balance paid out of the labor burden that was otherwise charged to the Garrisons. The 12% overhead and profit figure was added to the $37,200.00, but not to the balance that came out of the labor burden percentage. [¶ 33] Even considering Mrs. Cook's explanation of the method of payment, we cannot conclude that the district court's finding, that such amounts were unreasonable, was clearly erroneous. Timothy Ciocarlin testified, for instance, that these amounts far exceed[] any bonus that I've ever heard of and seen. In particular, he singled out the $54,000.00 bonus paid to Kurt Lund as being excessive because it's almost a year's pay for a good paid superintendent.