Opinion ID: 2827389
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: August 6 Search

Text: Long further claims the August 6 search of the OC Store and the seizure of Long’s property found there violated the Fourth Amendment. Although Officer La Mons searched the store without a warrant, the district court concluded this search was constitutional because Brouse, the property’s owner, consented to the search. “Consent to search, a valid exception to the [Fourth Amendment’s] warrant requirement, may be given either by the suspect or by some other person who has common authority over, or sufficient relationship to, the item to be searched.” United States v. James, 353 F.3d 606, 613 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). “‘Valid third party consent can arise either through the third party’s actual authority or the third party’s apparent authority.’” United States v. Chavez Loya, 528 F.3d 546, 554 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 716, modified, 499 -14- F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2007)). “[W]hether [Brouse] had actual authority to consent is a question of fact.” James, 353 F.3d at 613. The district court concluded because “Long apparently was no longer a tenant” when Brouse purchased the building on August 4, “Brouse as owner of the building had . . . actual . . . authority to permit Officer La Mons’s entry and search.” Cf. Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1132 (2014) (“It would be unreasonable—indeed, absurd—to require police officers to obtain a warrant when the sole owner or occupant of a house or apartment voluntarily consents to a search.”). The district court’s finding of actual authority to consent was not clearly erroneous. See Douglas, 744 F.3d at 1068. Long counters with a line of cases explaining officers cannot search a leased premises with only the consent of the landlord, not that of the tenant. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 617 (1961). But that line of cases does not help Long because, as noted by the district court, Long presented no evidence he had a lease or was otherwise entitled to occupy or use the premises on August 6. Long further contends even if the initial entry on August 6 was constitutional, the search and seizure of the shipping box violated the Fourth Amendment because “Officer La Mons had specific knowledge that the personal property being searched was inventory that belonged to Long.” Although Officer La Mons knew the box belonged to Long, Brouse and Raelynn told Officer La Mons the box was not in the store before the break-in, making the box possible evidence of the suspected burglary. Officer La Mons reasonably seized the box as evidence of a suspected burglary.7 7 Long also seeks to have post-Miranda statements he made to the police suppressed because they were the product of what he considers to be illegal searches. Because we find the July 28 and August 6 searches constitutionally permissible, Long’s subsequent statements “need not be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.” United States v. Webster, 625 F.3d 439, 446 (8th Cir. 2010). -15-