Opinion ID: 204040
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Misstatement in Closing Argument

Text: García and Vázquez both argue that the district court abused its discretion when it declined to grant them a new trial based on an alleged misstatement made during the prosecution's closing argument. As we noted earlier, during the strike in 2004, the Union paid each of its members $300 every two weeks. In its rebuttal closing argument, the prosecution argued that (1) this money came from the Union Account; (2) the Union Account contained Health Plan funds; and (3) the Plan thus helped pay for the strike, even though its funds were not meant for that purpose. The prosecutor further stated: I did my math. And it's approximately $5.8 million that the [U]nion dished out for those picketing workers on the lines, the striking people, the people that were out. And I'm not saying that those people don't deserve to get monies. I'm saying not from health care funds. Where did the [U]nion get $5.8 million during the strike? Where did the [U]nion get the money to pay Héctor René Lugo and all these people? None of the defendants contemporaneously objected to this line of argument during the closing itself, but they all objected at a sidebar afterward. They claimed that the argument was false because, according to them, the money for the picketing workers came from a Union strike fund, not from Health Plan funds. The district court overruled the objection. As García and Vázquez preserved their claim, we review de novo whether the prosecution's remarks were improper. United States v. Nelson-Rodríguez, 319 F.3d 12, 38 (1st Cir.2003); see also United States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 387, 393 (1st Cir.2007) (We review de novo whether a challenged statement by the prosecutor during closing argument was improper.) However, we review for manifest abuse of discretion a district court's refusal to grant a new trial. United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9, 22 (1st Cir.2006). Even if the remarks are improper, we affirm unless they prejudiced the defendant. United States v. Joyner, 191 F.3d 47, 53 (1st Cir.1999). We consider the following factors in considering prejudice: (1) the severity of the prosecutor's misconduct, including whether it was deliberate or accidental; (2) the context in which the misconduct occurred; (3) whether the judge gave curative instructions and the likely effect of such instructions; and (4) the strength of the evidence against the defendants. Nelson-Rodríguez, 319 F.3d at 38 (quotation omitted). García and Vázquez contend that the government's remarks at closing were improper, claiming that (1) the Union paid the striking workers from Banco Santander [Account] No. XXXXXXXXXX; (2) that the account belonged to the Union, not the Health Plan; and (3) the Plan thus did not help pay for the strike, and the prosecution, in arguing to the contrary, had misstate[d] evidence and misl[e]d the jury. In response, the government contends that Banco Santander No. 1310003987 was the Union Account, as defined in the indictment, and, since the Plan funds were diverted to that Account, the government's remarks were factually accurate. Even if improper, the remarks had no effect on the trial outcome, as the case concerned not how the striking workers were paid, but whether the Defendants paid themselves with money they knew did not belong to them. At best, this is a stray remark that is too inconsequential to warrant reversal. See United States v. Martínez-Medina, 279 F.3d 105, 119 (1st Cir.2002). Finally, as correctly noted by the government, the district court instructed the jury that closing statements are not evidence. Accordingly, we see no reversible error.