Opinion ID: 3013899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: subsection (D) as if it refers to “the latest

Text: We do not agree with the date on which the factual predicate of any 6 claim presented could have been IV. discovered through the exercise of due If we look beyond the words of the diligence.” But that is not what subsection statute, as we believe we must in this case, (D) says. we see two strong reasons for concluding Although neither Fielder nor the that the statute of limitations set out in § Walker Court explains the ground for their 2244(d)(1) should be applied on a claimimplicit conclusion that subsection (D) by-claim basis. requires a court to pick the latest date
when the factual predicate of a claim was reasonably discoverable, it is possible that First, this is the way that statutes of their analysis is based on the statement in limitations are generally applied, and there § 2244(d)(1) that the application runs from is no reason to suppose that Congress “the latest of” the four dates specified in intended to make a radical departure from subsections (A) through (D). However, this approach in § 2244(d)(1). In both this reference to “the latest” date does not civil and criminal cases, statutes of appear in subsection (D) and it does not limitations are applied on a claim-by-claim pertain to the issue at hand. The reference or count-by-count basis. When a statute of to “the latest” date in § 2244(d)(1) tells a limitations defense is raised in a case with court how to choose from among the four a multi-claim civil complaint or a multidates specified in subsections (A) through count criminal indictment, the court (D) once those dates are identified. This determines the date on which the statute language does not tell a court how to began to run for each of the claims or identify the date specified in subsection counts at issue, not just the latest date on (D) in a case in which the application which the statute began to run for any of contains multiple claims. Accordingly, the claims or counts. See, e.g., King v. there is nothing in § 2244(d) that suggests Otasco, Inc., 861 F.2d 438, 441 (5th Cir. that a court should follow the Walker 1988) (“When a suit alleges several interpretation and select the latest date on distinct causes of action, even if they arise which the factual predicate of any claim from a single event, the applicable presented in a multi-claim application limitations period must be determined by could have reasonably been discovered. It analyzing each cause of ac tion would be just as consistent with the separately.”); Home Indem. Co. v. Ball-Co statutory language to pick the earliest date. Contractors, Inc., 819 F.2d 1053, 1054 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that the District For these reasons, we believe that Court had erred in dismissing the the Walker interpretation fails on its own appellant’s separate but related claim on terms. It purports to be based on the statute of limitations grounds because it language of § 2244(d)(1) but actually was in fact governed by a different statute neglects to pay close attention to the of limitations); Barnebey v. E.F. Hutton & statutory language. 7 Co., 715 F. Supp. 1512, 1525 (M.D. Fla. § 2244(d)(1) forecloses a claim-by-claim 1989) (establishing different statute of approach because it refers to the period limitations for the different civil claims within which “an application,” rather than against the defendant); Weeks v. a “claim,” must be filed. But there is Remington Arms Co., 733 F.2d 1485, nothing unusual about the wording of § 1486 (11th Cir. 1984) (affirming the 2244(d)(1). It is common for statute of District Court’s dism issal of the limitations provisions to be framed using appellant’s strict liability claims but the model of a single-claim case. For reversing the District Court’s directed example, the general statute of limitations verdict on the appellant’s negligence for federal claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1658, claims); Contract Buyers League v. F & F prescribes the date by which “a civil Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210, 221 (N.D. Ill. action” must be commenced. State 1969) (applying antitrust statute of statutes often use similar wording. The limitations to the antitrust counts but New Jersey statutes speak of the time determining what limitation applied to the within “an action of law” must be other Civil Rights counts); United States v. commenced. N.J.S.A. § 2A:14-1 et seq. Spector, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12500, The Pennsylvania statutes generally refer 1994 WL 470554 (D.N.H. Aug. 31, 1994) to the time within which an “action” or (dismissing several counts of a multiple- “proceeding” must be begun. See 42 Pa. count indictment as time-barred but Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 5501, 5522 et seq. sustaining other counts of the indictment); Although these provisions are People v. Kelly, 299 Ill. App. 3d 222, 225 framed on the model of the one-claim (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (describing the seven- complaint, it is understood that they must count information under which the be applied separately to each claim when defendant was charged and the fact that more than one is asserted. To take 28 the defendant’s motion to dismiss three U.S.C. § 1658 as an example, one could counts because they charged crimes whose say of the wording of that provision statutes of limitations had run was precisely what the Walker Court said of granted); State v. Stansberry, 2001 Ohio the wording of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1): App. LEXIS 3014, 2001 WL 755898 (Ohio Ct. App. July 5, 2001) (denying The statute directs the court defendant’s argument that his felony to look at whether the [“civil murder conviction should have been action”] is timely, not barred by the statute of limitations because wh ether the individual the underlying felony, aggravated robbery, “claims” within the was time-barred). [complaint] are timely. The statute provides a single statute of limitations, with a The Walker interpreta tion, single filing date, to be recounted above, holds that the wording of applied to the [“civil 8 action”] as a whole. retroactively applicable constitutional Walker, 341 F.3d at 1243 (bracketed right regarding the conduct of police material added). Yet no one, we assume, interrogations, and it appears that this would argue that, in a civil case with right might have been violated in Doe’s multiple federal claims, the statute of case. Doe unsuccessfully pursues limitations must begin on the same date for collateral review in state court, but he does every claim. Rather, each claim must be not file a federal habeas petition, and analyzed separately. We believe that § another five years pass. At this point, ten 2244(d)(1) was not intended to be applied years after the conclusion of the direct in a similar fashion. review process, both the self-incrimination and unlawful interrogation claims are
Second, we believe that a claim-by- Suppose, however, that a short time later claim approach is necessary in order to Doe discovers the factual predicate for an avoid results that we are confident entirely different federal constitutional Congress did not want to produce. issue, namely, that the prosecution may Specifically, the Walker interpretation has have violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. the strange effect of permitting a late- 83 (1963), because it had in its possession accruing federal habeas claim to open the at the time of trial, but did not disclose, door for the assertion of other claims that certain arguably exculpatory evidence. had become time-barred years earlier. Doe promptly attempts to exhaust state An example illustrates this point. remedies with respect to this new claim, Suppose that on direct appeal a criminal and as soon as those efforts prove defendant in a state case (Doe) raises only unfruitful, he files a federal habeas one federal constitutional claim, say, that petition asserting both the Brady claim and his Fifth Amendment right to be free from the previously barred self-incrimination compelled self-incrimination was violated and unlawful interrogation claims. Under when the prosecutor made statements in the Walker interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § summation that Doe interprets as 2244(d)(1), the one-year statute begins to commenting on his failure to take the run on the date of the discovery of the stand. Doe is unsuccessful on direct factual predicate of the Brady claim, and appeal and chooses not to pursue state the fo rmerly barred claims are collateral relief. Doe then has one year miraculously revived. from the conclusion of direct review to We cannot think of any reason why file a federal habeas petition asserting this Congress would have wanted to produce claim, but he elects not to file a federal such a result. It makes sense to give Doe habeas petition, and five years pass. At time to petition for habeas review of the the end of that five-year period, the new Brady claim, but why should he be Supreme Court of the United States hands allowed to raise the self-incrimination down a decision that recognizes a new, claim, which had been time-barred for the 9 past nine years? Why should he be permitted to raise the unlawful interrogation claim, which had been time- in effect, the prisoner certainly should not barred for the past four years? Why wait before filing a petition raising the should the late discovery of the Brady direct review claims. Without knowing claim revive these unrelated, previously that he should subsequently have a ground barred claims? Neither Fielder nor the for the late accruing claim, he will file a Walker Court has explained why Congress petition raising the direct review claims might have wanted to produce such before the end of the one-year period and results, and we cannot think of any should later file a second petition under 28 plausible explanation.3 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) raising the late accruing claim. In the second situation, the prisoner 3 A treatise argues that the Walker learns that he has a basis for the late interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) accruing claim during the one-year period avoids unwarranted “piecemeal” habeas after the end of direct review, and he also litigation, 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. begins a state collateral proceeding raising LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS the late accruing claim during this period. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5.2b at 266- In this situation, the prisoner’s options will 67 & n.70 (4th ed. 2001), but we find this be the same no matter whether our argument unconvincing because the interpretation or the Walker interpretation circumstances in which the Walker of § 2244(d)(1) is in effect. In either interpretation would lead to fewer event, the prisoner will have two choices. successive petitions are quite limited. He will be able to file an initial federal The category of cases that must be petition raising the direct review claims considered are those in which a state and then seek to file a second petition prisoner exhausts some federal claims on raising the late accruing claim under 28 direct review (“the direct review claims”) U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). He will also have the and discovers another federal claim (“the option of waiting until the end of the state late accruing claim”) that cannot be raised collateral proceeding (which tolls the time on direct review and that falls within § for filing a federal petition raising the 2244(d)(1)(C) or (D). Within this category direct review claims) and then filing a of cases, there are three relevant single petition raising both the direct subcategories. review claims and the late accruing claim. In the first, the prisoner does not learn that he has any basis for asserting the In the third situation, the prisoner late accruing claim until more than one learns that he has a basis for the late year after the conclusion of direct review. accruing claim during the one-year period In this situation, no matter which after the end of direct review but he does interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) is not begin a state collateral proceeding 10
In support of his interpretation of obviously does not require us in this case 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d )(1), Fielder to adopt the Walker interpretation of 28 understandably relies on language in U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. Nor is there any logical 2002), but we are not persuaded by this inconsistency between the holding in argument. We note, first, that Sweger did Sweger and our holding here. The heart of not concern the issue presented here. our reasoning in Sweger was as follows: Sweger did not decide when the habeas Section 2244(d)(2) states, statute of limitations begins to run under “the time during which a 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Instead, Sweger properly filed application concerned the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. for State post-conviction or § 2244(d)(2), which provides for the other collateral review with tolling of the statute of limitations while a respect to the pertinent state post-conviction proceeding is judgment or claim is pending. The question in Sweger was pending shall not be counted whether under § 2244(d)(2) a state toward any period of proceeding tolls the statute with respect to l i m i ta t i o n u n d e r t h i s just the claims at issue in the state subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § proceeding or with respect to all the claims 2244(d)(2) (emphasis included in a subsequently filed federal added). Reading this petition. We held that the statute is tolled language to require that the for all of the claims in the federal petition. state post-conv iction proceeding raise the claims contained in the habeas during this period. In this situation, the petition ignores the use of choice between the Walker interpretation the word “judgment” in the and ours would make a difference, but we statute. See Carter [v. believe that very few cases will fall into Litscher, 275 F.3d 663, 665 this category. As a result, we do not think (7th Cir. 2001)] (“Austin [v. that our interpretation will lead to any Mitchell, 200 F.3d 391 (6th significant increase in the number of Cir. 1999)] reads the word successive federal habeas applications. In ‘ju dgm ent’ out o f § addition, the mild impact on judicial 2244(d)(2) and tolls the time economy of a few successive federal only while a particular habeas applications would be far less than ‘claim’ . . . is before the the impact on state courts of a rule that state court. That is just not allows all claims of error to be resuscitated what the statute says. Any through the happenstance of reviving a properly filed collateral single claim under Subsection (c) or (d). 11 challenge to the judgment Fielder filed his federal petition long after tolls the time to seek federal the date specified under subsection (A). c o l l at e r a l rev iew .”) Accordingly, Fielder’s claim of (emphasis in original). prosecutorial conduct is time-barred, and 294 F.3d at 516-17 (bracketed material it was properly dismissed by the District added ). We thus relied on a Court. straightforward applic ation o f the By contrast, Fielder’s afterparticular language of 28 U.S.C. § discovered evidence claim is timely under 2244(d)(2), and there is no tension § 2244(d)(1)(D). Nevertheless, we can b e tw e e n t h i s an a l ys i s a n d o ur affirm the decision of the District Court on interpretation in this case of 28 U.S.C. § the alternative ground that this claim is not 2244(d)(1). cognizable under the federal habeas statute As Fielder stresses, however, our because it rests on state, rather than opinion in Sweger does contain statements federal, law. It has long been recognized concerning 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) that that “[c]laims of actual innocence based on support his position here. In particular, newly discovered evidence” are never Sweger stated that the 28 U.S.C. § grounds for “federal habeas relief absent 2244(d)(1) must be applied to a habeas an independent constitutional violation.” petition as a whole and not on a claim-by- Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 claim basis. 294 F.3d at 514-15, 517. The (1993). Therefore, Fielder’s afterSweger Court used this interpretation of 28 discovered evidence claim was properly U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) as non-claim-specific dismissed by the District Court. to bolster its interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § IV. 2244(d)(2) as likewise non-claim-specific. For the reasons set out above, we Because these statements were dicta, affirm the District Court’s order. however, they do not bind us, and for the reasons explained above, we conclude that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), like other statute of limitations provisions, must be applied on a claim-by-claim basis.