Opinion ID: 1219182
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Evidence of Reformation

Text: The record in this proceeding contains evidence of applicant's reformation. Although applicant's initial service at the Center for Non-Profit Legal Services, Inc. was a condition of his criminal probation, supervisors who have known and worked with him attest to his good character and his dedication to his clients, and co-workers echo those sentiments. Applicant's continuing and effective work on behalf of the disadvantaged and afflicted has been verified. It also appears that applicant's public service activities have continued. The question, then, is whether that is sufficient evidence of rehabilitation to satisfy the demanding burden of proof of good character that applicant assumes in applying for admission to the Bar. I agree with the hearing panel and the Board that applicant's evidence of rehabilitation is not sufficient to outweigh his lack of truthfulness. None of the references applicant has offered knew him before 1986. In In re Rowell, supra, 305 Or. at 590, 754 P.2d 905, this court emphasized the importance of presenting testimony of present good moral character from witnesses who knew the applicant both before and after alleged rehabilitation. Applicant's rationalizations and excuses for his past misconduct differ substantially from the applicant's regret for past actions in In re Rowell, supra, 305 Or. at 591, 754 P.2d 905. Applicant's probation officer testified that applicant was not a model probationer, and he refused to support applicant's request for early termination of his probation. Moreover, he testified that, based on applicant's past criminal history, he would have reservations about his being admitted to the Bar. When the hearing panel's special investigator first suggested that applicant voluntarily take a drug test, applicant balked. His explanation at that time for not taking the test seems to me to be evasive and unconvincing. His expressed willingness in 1992 to take a drug test is not reassuring, because by that time he had time to clean up his act. In summary, applicant has the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is a person of good moral character. On de novo review, and viewing the totality of the evidence, I agree with the Board that applicant has failed to sustain his burden of proof. Applicant's untruthful statements about his prior conduct constitute evidence of a lack of present good moral character. Lawyers must be honest. Truth-speaking is requisite in this profession. In re Parker, 314 Or. 143, 154-55, 838 P.2d 54 (1992) cert. den. sub nom Parker v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2440, 124 L.Ed.2d 658 (1993) and Parker v. Oregon State Bar, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 929, 127 L.Ed.2d 222 (1994). Applicant has not been candid about his intentions in growing large quantities of marijuana. His testimony about the terms of his criminal probation is disingenuous. Applicant's course of conduct since 1975 would cause a reasonable person to have substantial doubts about his honesty and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of this state and nation. ORS 9.220(2)(a) and (b). One certainly must question the character of a middle-aged lawyer who threatens to kill a debtor, whom that person knows at that time is unable to pay the debt. The totality of the evidence in the record from 1975 to present does not persuade me that applicant should be admitted in Oregon. It follows, therefore, that applicant has not established by clear and convincing evidence that he possesses the requisite character and fitness for admission to practice law in Oregon. Because a significant doubt exists about his present moral character it follows that applicant has not established that it is highly probable that he has the requisite moral character and fitness to practice law. Consistent with this court's obligation to protect the public, In re Easton, supra, 298 Or. at 368, 692 P.2d 592, and notwithstanding evidence of applicant's rehabilitation, I would deny applicant's application. ORS 9.220(2)(a); In re Parker, supra ; In re Nash, supra ; In re Fine, supra . Accordingly, I dissent. UNIS, J., joins in this dissent.