Opinion ID: 835006
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the vacation of greene street

Text: We now address the Ninth Circuit's third certified question: Under [ORS] 271.120, is a City Council's purported vacation of a street ultra vires when the petition for vacation does not comply with the landowner consent provisions of [ORS 271.080]? [24] West Linn, 534 F.3d at 1105. That question arises because the city contended, in its counterclaim against plaintiff, that an ordinance that the city adopted vacating a portion of Greene Street abutting plaintiff's property is void and of no effect. As a condition of development, the city required that plaintiff seek vacation of the portion of Greene Street abutting plaintiff's property. Show Timber, an entity that owned and sought to develop land on the opposite side of Greene Street, also was subject to that same condition. As the Ninth Circuit explains in its certification order, Show Timber began the vacation process: In accordance with the City's demand, Show Timber    employed engineers to draw up a legal description of the proposed vacation of Greene Street. Thereafter, consent of area property owners was obtained based on the legal description,    The proposed vacation was then submitted to the City. However, City planner Eric Spir objected to the proposal, and the City ultimately demanded that Greene Street be vacated in its entirety. The consulting engineers objected to the City's demand because, they reasoned, through traffic on 13th Street would be blocked as a result. Show Timber and [plaintiff] acquiesced. A new legal description was prepared that included the disputed intersection. This second legal description was incorporated into public notices published for proposes [ sic ] of the vacation and the subsequent public hearing on the matter. Following the public hearing, the City Council approved the vacation of Greene Street in its entirety and passed City Ordinance No. 1439, which codified the vacation. [Plaintiff] contends that Ordinance No. 1439 had the full legal effect of vacating Greene Street, and by operation of law, a portion of the intersection vested in it free of any interest held by the City. The City maintains that the ordinance has no legal effect because it was adopted without the consent of all necessary landowners. West Linn, 534 F.3d at 1104-05. We understand Ninth Circuit to ask whether the procedural irregularity occasioned by the change in legal descriptions renders the vacation of Greene Street ultra vires. An act of a city or other governmental entity is ultra vires when that act falls outside the entity's corporate powers. Keeney v. City of Salem, 150 Or. 667, 669-71, 47 P.2d 852 (1935). When a governmental entity's power is conferred by statute, actions outside the scope of that power are extra statutory and therefore ultra vires. See, e.g., State v. United States F. & G. Co. et al., 125 Or. 13, 24-25, 265 P. 775 (1928) (so applying to the context of state highway commission). However, where a city has broad power to act, but is required to exercise that power in conformance with certain procedures or limitations, a failure to so conform does not necessarily render a given governmental action ultra vires. For example, in Kernin v. City of Coquille, 143 Or. 127, 135-36, 21 P.2d 1078 (1933), the city charter granted the city council authority to contract, but required that it do so through a competitive bidding procedure. When the city failed to follow that procedure, the court held that the doctrine of ultra vires was irrelevant: the city possessed ample power to enter into contracts. Id. To determine the extent of a city's power to vacate its streets, the parties direct us to Oregon statute, specifically the provisions of ORS 271.080 to 271.230, for a description of that authority. Those provisions grant cities authority to vacate streets and, relevant to this case, set forth two procedural mechanisms for doing so. [25] One mechanism allows any person to initiate a vacation proceeding (ORS 271.080); [26] the other allows a city governing body [27] to do so (ORS 271.130). [28] Both mechanisms call for notice and public hearing and, if the vacation is approved, for enactment of an ordinance vacating the street. ORS 271.110-271.130. Another statute expressly provides that the authority granted by those statutes is not exclusive. ORS 271.170. [29] Thus, we can say without hesitation that a city possesses broad power to vacate its streets and that its failure to exercise that power in accordance with specified procedures does not make its action ultra vires. Even if a city has broad power to act, however, its failure to follow required procedures may, in some instances, render its action void and of no effect. Thus, in Kernin, although the city's action in entering into a contract was not ultra vires, the city's failure to follow competitive bidding procedures required by its charter rendered the contract void. 143 Or. at 137, 21 P.2d 1078. We would not fully address the city's argument in this case if we limited our discussion to the city's broad power to vacate its streets, and we therefore reframe the Ninth Circuit's question as asking whether the city's failure to obtain the consent of affected landowners rendered the vacation ordinance void and of no effect. See Western Helicopter Services v. Rogerson Aircraft, 311 Or. 361, 370-71, 811 P.2d 627 (1991) (recognizing this court's discretion to reframe and restate certified questions). This court has not always been consistent or clear in defining the circumstances in which a government's procedural violation renders its action void. In Nyman v. City of Eugene, 286 Or. 47, 53, 593 P.2d 515 (1979), the court considered prior decisions that had used the concept of governmental jurisdiction to resolve the issue. In some of those cases, the court had deemed statutory requirements to be jurisdictional and decided that the failure to comply with those requirements rendered the governmental action void. In other cases, in which the court had concluded that statutory defects were not jurisdictional, the court had presumed that the governmental proceedings were regular despite alleged noncompliance. Id. at 52-53, 593 P.2d 515. After surveying those earlier cases, the court in Nyman concluded: It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine from these cases why certain statutory requirements are considered `jurisdictional' and others not.    We are now of the opinion that clear analysis in this area requires that we establish criteria for determining what statutory requirements are indispensable to the validity of the challenged action    and focus    on the specific statutory language that permits the government to affect the rights and obligations of its citizens. Id. at 53, 593 P.2d 515 (emphasis added). The parties in this case do not cite Nyman in their arguments. Nonetheless, the parties address the test used in Nyman  whether the consent procedure that the city failed to follow was indispensible to the vacation of Greene Street (as the city would have it) or merely a minor irregularity (in plaintiff's terms) not affecting the ultimate validity of the vacation. That analysis requires consideration of the statutory consent procedures and the role that they play in a city's decision to vacate a street. As noted, there are two relevant statutory mechanisms by which a city may vacate a city street. ORS 271.080(1) permits any person to initiate vacation proceedings. Under that provision, the person files a petition setting forth a description of the ground proposed to be vacated, the purpose for which the ground is proposed to be used and the reason for such vacation. (Emphasis added.) ORS 271.080(2) mandates that the person filing the petition append, as a part thereof and as a basis for granting the same, the consent of the owners of all abutting property and of not less than two-thirds in area of the real property affected thereby. After such a petition is filed, the city either may deny the petition or set a time for formal hearing. ORS 271.100. If the city decides to hold a hearing, it is required to publish notice of the hearing. The notice must include, among other things,  the ground covered by the petition. ORS 271.110(1) (emphasis added). ORS 271.130(1) [30] sets forth a second statutory mechanism by which a city governing body may initiate vacation proceedings. Using that mechanism, a city proceeds without the filing of a petition and attached legal description and without consent of affected landowners. The city gives notice of hearing that includes a description of the street to be vacated to abutting and affected landowners. After hearing, the city may vacate the street unless (1) the abutting landowners do not consent and the vacation will substantially affect the market value of such property, unless the city provides for payment of damages; or (2) a majority of the affected landowners object in writing. The city argues that, in this case, the city council proceeded according to the mechanism initiated by petition outlined in ORS 271.080(1) but did not consider the true `petition.'    Since the `ground proposed to be vacated' changed by the time of the City Council hearing, it is clear that the City Council considered a different `petition' than the one that was initially filed after obtaining consent. The consequence of that defect, the city maintains, is that the vacation is without legal effect, and to hold otherwise would be to eliminate the need for the consent of affected landowners in any vacation proceeding. Plaintiff argues, on the other hand, that that irregularity is inconsequential. Although the vacation proceedings were initiated by petition and the petition did not describe the disputed intersection, the city's notice of hearing provided the correct description and included the disputed intersection. The abutting landowners, plaintiff and Show Timber, acquiesced in that change, and the record does not disclose a written objection by any affected property owner. Thus, had the city begun the proceedings anew when it decided that vacation of the disputed intersection was warranted, and itself initiated vacation proceedings, the vacation could have been accomplished in accordance with the second mechanism for street vacation outlined in ORS 271.130. When the city revised the street description, it gave affected landowners the same opportunity to file objections to the vacation or to appear at the hearing and oppose the vacation that they would have had had the city used its authority to initiate vacation proceedings from the outset. Understanding that the consent of affected landowners is significant only when vacation proceedings are initiated by petition, we look to Nyman for guidance in assessing the arguments of the parties. Nyman involved the widening of a road. There was no affirmative showing that the widening of the road was a public necessity, that plaintiff's predecessor in interest had given written consent to the widening of the road, or that the city had given plaintiff's predecessor notice of the road widening proceeding. 286 Or. at 50, 593 P.2d 515. The court concluded that, in light of competing legislative goals to ensure that county actions establishing roads are final and unassailable and also that affected property owners receive notice of road proceedings, only the notice requirements were indispensable to the validity of the action. Id. at 57, 593 P.2d 515. Other statutory requirements that did not render the notice to the property owners ineffectual did not render the county's action void. Id. Similar competing goals are at play in street vacation proceedings. Street vacation affects title to real property, and stability and certainty in real property records is essential. Cf. Bitte v. St. Helens, 251 Or. 548, 551, 446 P.2d 978 (1968) (holding as untimely an appeal from city-initiated vacation ordinance because, where [t]itle to real property is involved,    orderliness and certainty of procedure are extremely important). By the same token, Oregon statute clearly makes a provision for notice to property owners affected by street vacation and gives them an opportunity to be heard and oppose vacation. If, after notice, a majority of affected property owners object in writing, the city is precluded from vacating the street. However, consent of property owners prior to notice and hearing is necessary only if vacation is initiated by petition. Oregon statute permits city initiation of vacation proceedings without the prehearing consent of affected landowners. Thus, that consent is not indispensible to city street vacation, and, in answer to the Ninth Circuit's third question, we hold that the absence of such consent does not render the vacation ordinance void and of no effect. [31] The certified questions are answered. KISTLER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which LINDER, J., joined. KISTLER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. West Linn Corporate Park (WLCP) filed this action in state court, claiming that the City of West Linn (the city) took its property in violation of the state and federal constitutions when it required WLCP, as a condition of development, to pay for off-site improvements. The city removed the case to federal court, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified three questions to this court. See ORS 28.200 (authorizing this court to accept certain certified questions). I agree with the majority's answer to the first and third questions but would answer the Ninth Circuit's second question differently. Specifically, I would decline to give an opinion whether requiring off-site improvements constitutes an exaction for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment. Not only does ORS 28.200 limit certified questions to issues of state law, but there is no need for this court to offer the Ninth Circuit our opinion on federal law. In Williamson Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985), the Court held that a federal takings claim will not be ripe in two instances. First, a federal regulatory takings claim will not [be] ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue. Id. at 186, 105 S.Ct. 3108; see MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986) (explaining that the resolution of a regulatory takings claim depends on first knowing the extent of permitted development on the property). Second, if a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the [Fifth Amendment] Just Compensation Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation. Id. at 195, 105 S.Ct. 3108. In its opinion certifying the three questions to us, the Ninth Circuit explained that, in this case, only the second prong noted in Williamson  whether Oregon provides an adequate procedure for seeking just compensation  is at issue. West Linn Corporate Park v. City of West Linn, 534 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir.2008). And the Ninth Circuit's opinion suggests that the first two questions that it has certified are, in its view, necessary to resolve that issue. Id. For the reasons explained below, I would give a different answer to the court's second question. The Ninth Circuit's second question asks whether requiring a property owner to pay for an off-site improvement as a condition of development constitutes an exaction. In explaining its question, the Ninth Circuit notes that the Oregon Court of Appeals held, in one decision, that such a requirement would constitute an exaction under the Fifth Amendment but, in a later decision, questioned that holding. See id. at 1102-04 (discussing Oregon Court of Appeals decisions). As both the majority and I understand the Ninth Circuit's second question, it invites us to explain whether, in our view, requiring a developer to pay for off-site improvements constitutes an exaction under the Fifth Amendment. The majority accepts that invitation. I would decline it. To the extent that the Ninth Circuit asks for our views on the Fifth Amendment, it asks for more than ORS 28.200 permits us to give. ORS 28.200 provides that we may answer certified questions submitted by other courts to resolve potentially determinative issues of Oregon law. See ORS 28.200 (authorizing the Oregon Supreme Court to accept certified questions regarding the law of this state); Western Helicopter Services v. Rogerson Aircraft, 311 Or. 361, 365, 811 P.2d 627 (1991) (explaining that the certified question must concern Oregon law, rather than the law of some other jurisdiction). As the terms of that statute make clear, we may answer only questions of Oregon, not federal, law. [1] Nor does Williamson require us to give the Ninth Circuit our opinion on federal law. The ripeness concern raised in Williamson entailed a more limited inquiry. The substantive issue in Williamson was whether a government regulation that temporarily prevented a property owner from using its property constituted a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 473 U.S. at 185, 105 S.Ct. 3108 (identifying that issue). The Court observed that the issue was an open one but declined to reach it because the issue was not ripe. Id. It explained that a state violated the Fifth Amendment only if it took property without providing an adequate procedure for obtaining just compensation. 473 U.S. at 194-95, 105 S.Ct. 3108. The Court noted that, under the applicable state law, a property owner claiming that restrictive zoning constituted a taking could bring an inverse condemnation claim in state court to recover just compensation. See id. at 196, 105 S.Ct. 3108 (discussing Tennessee law). Without some showing that the state's inverse condemnation procedure was unavailable or inadequate, the existence of that procedure was sufficient for the Court to hold that until [the property owner] has utilized that procedure, its taking claim [in federal court] is premature. Id. at 197, 105 S.Ct. 3108. In Williamson, the Court did not ask whether the Tennessee courts would recognize that a temporary deprivation constituted a taking before holding that the property owner's failure to bring its claim in the Tennessee courts meant that its claim in federal court was not ripe. Rather, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment claim that the property owner filed in federal court was not ripe, without regard to whether the property owner would win or lose on the merits of its Fifth Amendment claim in state court. Conversely, when the only remedy available in state court for a temporary taking was a declaratory judgment, and not damages, the Court held that the available state procedures were not adequate to provide just compensation. First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 312 and n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987); see Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194 n. 13, 105 S.Ct. 3108 (suggesting that conclusion). The Court accordingly proceeded to reach the substantive federal question in First Lutheran  whether regulations that temporarily deprive a property owner of the use of its property violate the Fifth Amendment  that it had declined to reach in Williamson. In my view, the only question raised by the second prong in Williamson is whether the procedures for obtaining just compensation in the Oregon courts are adequate. Williamson does not require a federal court to determine how the state court will rule on the merits of the landowner's federal takings claim. Were the rule otherwise, the United States Supreme Court would have asked in Williamson whether the Tennessee courts would have recognized a temporary taking before holding that the property owner's failure to bring its takings claim initially in the Tennessee courts meant that its federal takings claim was not ripe. The Court did not do so, and there is no need for us to tell the Ninth Circuit how we would rule on the substantive federal question in this case. It is or should be sufficient to say that a property owner who alleges that a local government requirement constitutes an exaction that violates the Fifth Amendment may bring that claim in the Oregon courts and receive all the compensation that the Fifth Amendment requires. Answering whether the property owner would win or lose on its substantive federal claim goes beyond what ORS 28.200 permits and Williamson requires. There is a suggestion in the Ninth Circuit's opinion that it views the scope of an inverse condemnation claim as presenting a question of state law, even when the source of law that gives rise to that claim is the Fifth Amendment. As a matter of Oregon law, however, there is no claim for inverse condemnation as such. Suess Builders v. City of Beaverton, 294 Or. 254, 258 n. 3, 656 P.2d 306 (1982). Rather, the phrase inverse condemnation is only `the popular description of a cause of action [which we would now refer to as a claim for relief] against a government defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken in fact by the government defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.' Id. (quoting Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 180 n. 1, 376 P.2d 100 (1962)); accord United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257, 100 S.Ct. 1127, 63 L.Ed.2d 373 (1980). As the court explained in Suess Builders, a claim for relief that a government action unconstitutionally took a person's property preceded the use of the phrase inverse condemnation as a popular description of that claim, 294 Or. at 258 n. 3, 656 P.2d 306, and the nature of the claim turns on the substantive law that gives rise to it, see First Lutheran, 482 U.S. at 315, 107 S.Ct. 2378 (explaining that form of relief d[oes] not change the essential nature of the claim). Describing a claim for relief as an inverse condemnation claim does not convert a claim that finds its source in the federal constitution into a state law claim on which we may offer an opinion pursuant to ORS 28.200. For that reason, I would not answer the Ninth Circuit's second question as the majority does. [2] The Ninth Circuit's first question, by contrast, asks our opinion on an issue of state law. It asks whether a property owner bringing a takings claim for an alleged exaction in state court would first have to exhaust its administrative remedies. Citing the reasons typically advanced for requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, the majority holds that exhaustion is required in state court as a prerequisite to bringing a takings claim. As the majority correctly clarifies, we would not require exhaustion for a Fifth Amendment takings claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1983. See Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982) (holding that courts may not require exhaustion for actions brought pursuant to section 1983). [3] We would, however, require exhaustion for other claims alleging that an exaction constituted an unconstitutional taking. [4] Some questions remain regarding how that state court exhaustion requirement would affect the issue whether WLCP's federal takings claims are ripe for the purposes of Article III. [5] However, those questions are issues of federal law for the Ninth Circuit. For the reasons stated above, I concur in part and dissent in part from the majority's answers to the certified questions. LINDER, J., joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.