Opinion ID: 612140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bill of Particulars; Jury Instructions

Text: 206 Murr further contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for a bill of particulars naming the five individuals whom he purportedly supervised in a continuing criminal enterprise. He asserts that, in the absence of such information, he was deprived of his ability to prepare a proper defense. 207 The grant or denial of a motion for a bill of particulars lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. United States v. Rey, 923 F.2d 1217, 1222 (6th Cir.1991). Proof of abuse of discretion 'requires a showing of actual surprise at trial and prejudice to the defendant's substantial rights by the denial.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 154 (1st Cir.1989)). 208 Absent such a showing, there is no requirement that an indictment or a bill of particulars identify the supervisees in a [case pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 848]. English, 925 F.2d at 159 (quoting United States v. Zanzucchi, 892 F.2d 56, 58 (9th Cir.1989)). The statute does not make the identity of the [persons managed] important; the government only has to prove that five or more individuals were, in fact, managed by the defendant. United States v. Beverly, 913 F.2d 337, 352-53 (7th Cir.1990). 209 Our task, therefore, is to determine whether Murr was legitimately surprised at the list of alleged supervisees first referred to by the government following the close of its proof. We think that he was not. Tommy McKeehan, Diane Whited, and Robert Phibbs, were co-defendants and were further referred to in pretrial discovery. Jerry Parks and Ernie Nicely, were known by Murr to be government witnesses, and were cross-examined by him at a hearing one month prior to trial. Jim Hurt's name was included in the government's supplemental bill of particulars, filed on September 11, 1991. Murr's ex-wife, Judy, lived with him at times during the life of the conspiracy, and was adverted to in Special Agent Merryman's grand jury testimony, which was provided to Murr as Jencks Act material. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500. As a result, Murr should have been put on notice that any or all of these individuals might be persons whom the government would allege were controlled by him. 210 Murr also claims that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury, as requested by the defense, as to which persons could not be considered one of the five predicate supervisees for a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 848. 211 When it became apparent that Murr's suggested list was unduly long, the court raised the possibility of furnishing the jury with the names of the seven individuals whom the government actually contended were managed by him. Murr's counsel, however, objected to Judy Murr's name being included in this fashion because we never had the opportunity to even deal with her. The court, feeling it was being whipsawed, then offered defendants a choice: it would either tell the jury to only consider the seven persons specified by the government, or it would give no other instructions on the matter. When Murr's counsel continued to protest, the court decided not to provide a narrowing instruction. 212 We have not adopted a pattern instruction for the offense of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise. Chalkias, 971 F.2d at 1215 n. 10. The district court stepped into this void by informing the jury, in part, that 213 [t]he terms organizer, supervisor, or manager are to given their usual and ordinary meanings as commonly understood by the public or business community. An organizer can be defined as a person who puts together a number of people engaged in separate activities and arranges them in their activity in one operation or enterprise. A supervisory position can be defined as meaning one who manages or directs or oversees the activities of others. In other words, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant Murr was more than just a fellow worker, but likewise Defendant Murr need not be the dominant organizer or manager as long as he was in a managerial position with respect to five other persons. 214 In United States v. Chalkias, we held that a less-detailed instruction than this one was not so deficient as to constitute plain error. Id. at 1215. There, we were invited to adhere to a ruling by the Ninth Circuit that 215 where the jury had a confusing array of persons presented, some of whom could be counted [as persons managed by a CCE defendant] and some of whom could not be counted, it was plain error to fail to instruct the jury as to who could not count towards [the defendant's] conviction of a continuing criminal enterprise. 216 Id. at 1214 (quoting United States v. Jerome, 924 F.2d 170, 173 (9th Cir.), opinion replaced, 942 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir.1991)). 217 Jerome involved a situation where the government had argued to the jury that the defendant could be viewed as the organizer of his suppliers and the suppliers of his suppliers. 924 F.2d at 172. The Ninth Circuit was of the opinion that this was incorrect as a matter of law, holding that an organizer within the sense of the statute [is more than] simply being a steady customer. Id. at 173. Accordingly, the district court's lack of an instruction in this regard was troublesome. 218 The circumstances were different in Chalkias; the government did not put before the jury an erroneous list of persons managed by [the defendant]. 971 F.2d at 1215. Consequently, we determined that the holding in Jerome was not applicable. We also declined to take the position that failure to give an instruction setting out the persons that could not be considered to have been managed by a CCE defendant is per se plain error. Id. 219 In the case at bar, as in Chalkias, the government did not mislead the jury concerning who, as a matter of law, could be deemed to be a supervisee of Murr's. 17 This leads us to reach the same conclusion as we did there--that the jury was not subjected to undue confusion in the context of the case as a whole. Id. 220 Murr further suggests that the district court should have instructed the jury that, in order to convict him of directing a continuing criminal enterprise, it had to unanimously determine the identities of the five individuals he supervised or organized. As the jury was under no duty to make such a finding, Murr's argument lacks merit. Id. at 1214 n. 7. See also English, 925 F.2d at 157-58. 221 Additionally, Murr asserts that the district court should have instructed the jury that a mere buyer-seller relationship does not establish one that is supervisory in nature. See Chalkias, 971 F.2d at 1214. However, the evidence adduced at trial indicated that none of the individuals the government contended he managed was in a buyer-seller relationship with him. Therefore, he was not entitled to the requested instruction. See United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 941 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1701, 118 L.Ed.2d 410 (1992). 222