Opinion ID: 1704647
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ineffectiveness as to voluntary intoxication

Text: In Davis's third claim, he argues that counsel Traina was deficient for failing to present an expert to support his voluntary intoxication defense. Davis states that the testimony of his expert, Dr. Smith, establishes that LSD prevented him from forming the specific intent that first-degree murder requires. Davis therefore argues that Traina was deficient for failing to call a witness to substantiate his voluntary intoxication defense. As stated above, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, Davis must show that counsel was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced him. The postconviction court denied this claim, stating: At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Smith repeatedly testified that Defendant's LSD ingestion would not negate his ability to plan or act purposefully. Dr. Smith testified that Defendant's actions would be based on distorted perceptions. However, Dr. Smith could not testify as to what the distortions would be or give any specific information about the distortions. Trial counsel's performance in presenting the voluntary intoxication defense was not deficient. Trial counsel's testimony at the evidentiary hearing establishes that given the problems with the plausibility of the defense, counsel presented the defense as best he could. Trial counsel questioned the State's witness about Defendant's LSD use on the night of the murder. Additionally, he argued voluntary intoxication during closing argument and even received a voluntary intoxication jury instruction.... Additionally, trial counsel testified that if he had retained an expert, he was concerned that the State would learn damaging information about [Davis] when the State deposed the expert.... The record supports the conclusion that trial counsel made a strategic decision not to call an expert to testify about the voluntary intoxication defense and that the decision was reasonable under the circumstances. Furthermore, Dr. Smith's testimony that [Davis's] LSD use would not affect [his] ability to plan and act purposefully would have negated the voluntary intoxication defense that trial counsel was able to present to the jury. Thus, it cannot be said that trial counsel's performance was deficient. Postconviction Order at 18 (record citations omitted). We affirm the denial of relief on this claim. First, competent, substantial evidence supports the postconviction court's finding that Traina made a strategic decision not to call an expert. The postconviction court noted that one of the reasons Traina did not call an expert was that Traina was afraid that the expert would learn things that incriminated Davis as a principal. Traina had good reason to fear Davis would make such comments to an expert, as Davis had made such comments to Traina. Traina stated that the defense's strategy was to portray Valessa as the murderer and Davis as just helping her after the fact. If Davis told an expert that he was involved in the crime itself and the State elicited such testimony at trial, it would directly contradict this defense strategy; in Traina's words, the expert would blow up in his face. Traina considered retaining an expert and chose not to based on his assessment of the situation. This evidence supports the postconviction court's conclusion that Traina's decision was strategic. Similarly, we find no error in the postconviction court's determination that Traina's strategic decision was reasonable. The strategy at trial was to portray Davis as involved only in the murder after the fact. Traina was concerned that the statements Davis had made to him would be the same statements that a retained expert would hear; those statements could incriminate Davis as a principal. Traina was concerned that the expert, when later deposed, would have to reveal the statements and thereby cripple their trial strategy. Accordingly, we agree that counsel's performance was not deficient. Additionally, we find no error in the postconviction court's conclusion that Davis has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by Traina's alleged deficiency. Dr. Smith's testimony would not have substantially helped Davis. Dr. Smith could not identify any particular hallucination or distortion that Davis had experienced when committing or planning the crime. He could only testify that it was a definite possibility that this crime would not have occurred but for Davis's LSD use. These statements about possibilities and unspecified distortions do not undermine our confidence in the outcome. See Maxwell, 490 So.2d at 932 ([T]he clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.). Further, Dr. Smith's testimony could have hurt Davis. Dr. Smith noted that LSD does not impair an individual's ability to make a plan, to act purposefully and would not prevent someone from form[ing] intent. These statements could have undermined the voluntary intoxication argument that Traina was able to make based on Whispel's testimony. Counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to present evidence that would be more harmful than helpful. Johnson v. State, 921 So.2d 490, 501 (Fla.2005) (Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to present evidence that would open the door to damaging cross-examination and rebuttal evidence that would counter any value that might be gained from the evidence.). We affirm the denial of relief on this claim.