Opinion ID: 1179776
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cross-examination of Defendant at Enhancement Trial.

Text: (35) Defendant claims that during the separate jury trial on the prior prison term enhancement alleged in the complaint (ง 667.5), the prosecutor committed deceptive and reprehensible conduct warranting a penalty reversal. The prosecutor, defendant insists, withdrew a meritorious objection to defendant's testimony on irrelevant issues, thus creating an opportunity to conduct a prejudicial cross-examination of defendant. We find no basis to overturn the penalty judgment. The relevant facts are as follows: Prior to commencement of the penalty phase, defendant received a jury trial (ง 1025) on the noncapital enhancement allegation that he had suffered a prior conviction and prison term (ง 667.5) for shooting at an inhabited dwelling (ง 246). Before the enhancement trial began, defendant moved to strike the prior conviction as constitutionally invalid. Defendant claimed his guilty plea in the prior case was not voluntary and intelligent because he was unaware it might have enhancement consequences in a future prosecution. The trial court denied the challenge. At the ensuing jury trial, the prosecution rested after presenting evidence on the truth of the enhancement allegation. Defense counsel then began an opening statement indicating that defendant would be called as a witness on the issue of the prior's validity. The prosecutor objected that validity was irrelevant. The court overruled the objection, stating that it could not prevent argument, though it might later exclude irrelevant evidence. At the conclusion of the defense statement, the court asked the prosecutor, outside the jury's presence, whether [y]ou were going to make some objection to ... [defendant's] testimony. The prosecutor responded that he withdr[e]w the objection [i]f [defendant] wants to testify. Defendant took the stand. On direct examination, he insisted that when he pled guilty to the charge of violating section 246, no one told him the conviction could be used against him in a later case. Defendant further stated he would not have pled guilty had he understood this consequence. The prosecutor then cross-examined defendant at length. Seeking to attack defendant's claim that he would not have pled guilty but for his ignorance of the consequences in a later case, the prosecutor asked sharp questions about defendant's experience with the juvenile and criminal justice systems, and about the facts underlying the charges to which defendant had entered a plea. On three occasions, defense objections to argumentative questions were sustained, but no admonition was sought or given. [31] Other objections by the defense, made on grounds that cross-examination was exceeding its permissible scope, were denied. In his argument, the prosecutor urged that neither the validity of the prior conviction nor the truth of the underlying charges was relevant. The defense had insisted on addressing those issues, said the prosecutor, but why it was necessary to go into that, I don't know. Later, when defense counsel tried to tell the jury it would be allowed to determine whether the prior conviction was valid, the prosecutor objected successfully, and the court admonished the jury it would be told to find only whether defendant suffered a conviction and a prison term as alleged. The instructions themselves made no reference to the issue of validity. After the jury retired, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. Counsel accused the prosecutor of withdrawing his initial objection to defendant's testimony so he could use that testimony as a vehicle for opening up new areas of criminal conduct behind the [prior prison term] allegation and conviction in the [section] 246 proceeding. Counsel further complained that after expressly waiving objection to evidence on the issue of validity, the prosecutor improperly sought to block the defense from arguing the relevance of that evidence. The prosecutor responded that whether or not he objected to testimony, the law is plain that the validity of a prior is not for the jury, but a question of law for the court. Counsel was put on notice, the prosecutor suggested, when an initial objection to counsel's argument was made, and defendant must take the consequences of counsel's decision to put defendant on the stand anyway. The motion for mistrial was denied. On appeal, defendant claims the prosecutor sandbagged the defense, thus violating his ethical duty to obtain a conviction only by fair means. We are not persuaded. The record leaves little doubt that the prosecutor took full advantage of an unexpected opportunity to subject defendant to vigorous cross-examination. However, the prosecutor engaged in no deceitful or unethical tactics to achieve that opportunity. On the contrary, the prosecutor made clear at the outset his correct belief that any testimony by defendant about the circumstances of his plea of guilty to the section 246 charge would be irrelevant. The defense, for its own purposes, nonetheless decided to present such evidence. [32] Even if the prosecutor ultimately failed to object, the consequences of the defense decision cannot be laid at the prosecutor's door. Moreover, once defendant testified that he had pled guilty in ignorance of the consequences, the prosecutor was entitled to assume this claim might affect the jury as the defense intended. Hence, he properly sought to rebut the claim by showing that defendant was somewhat experienced in the justice system, and that his plea was determined by the truth of the charge and the strength of the evidence. In any event, there was no prejudice warranting reversal of the penalty judgment. The prosecutor's sparring with defendant actually produced very little information not otherwise disclosed. For example, the penalty jury would have known in any event of defendant's conviction under section 246. That it also learned defendant's version of the circumstances of this violent crime could have had but a marginal effect. [33] During the cross-examination of defendant, there was some mention of a 1979 Youth Authority parole, and of your trial for robbery with the use of a knife out at juvenile hall. But these references appear to concern the Daniel Rypich robbery, the facts of which were presented in full at the penalty phase. Under the circumstances, and given the ample valid evidence of defendant's violent criminal career, there appears no reasonable possibility that the challenged cross-examination affected the penalty verdict. ( People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 446-448 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) [34]