Opinion ID: 2538465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Stewart's Felony Warrants A Suspension

Text: In determining the appropriate sanction in this case, it is necessary to review similar past cases, the disciplinary rules, and the applicable ABA standards. In Kazanas, it was noted that an attorney's conviction for a felony typically would merit disbarment. 96 S.W.3d at 808. And in In re Frick, it was stated that [s]ome acts committed in a non-professional capacity may indicate such a lack of respect for the law and for other members of society that disbarment may be warranted. 694 S.W.2d 473, 480 (Mo. banc 1985). But in In re Duncan, this Court found that a suspension was the presumptive sanction for an attorney who had been convicted of a felony. 844 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Mo. banc 1992) (involving an attorney who had failed to file or pay federal income taxes). Likewise, this Court's Rule 5.21, which details the procedures for suspending attorneys following criminal activities, reflects that the serious nature of a felony conviction justifies suspending an attorney from practice. See Rule 5.21(a) (providing that this Court shall cause to be served on a lawyer who has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to or been found guilty of... any felony an order to show cause why the lawyer should not be suspended from the practice of law pending the final disposition of any disciplinary proceedings based upon [the misconduct]); see also Rule 5.21(c) (allowing an attorney who commits certain criminal activities to be subject to discipline by this Court without the requirement of any proceeding). Under the ABA Standards, disbarment is warranted when criminal conduct is closely related to practice and poses an immediate threat to the public. See ABA Standard 5.11(a) (providing that disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct with an element of intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft). But a suspension is considered generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly [3] engages in criminal conduct which does not contain the elements listed in Standard 5.11 and that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice. ABA Standard 5.12. Moreover, aggravating and mitigating circumstances are considered in selecting an appropriate discipline. See ABA Standard 9.1 (providing that aggravating and mitigating factors may be considered in selecting an appropriate discipline); Madison, 282 S.W.3d at 361 (noting that sanctions can be increased based on the presence of aggravating factors); In re Belz, 258 S.W.3d 38, 39 (Mo. banc 2008) (noting that this Court always considers mitigating circumstances in determining the correct sanction). Appropriate discipline for an attorney who commits a felony and has substance abuse issues can be affected by mitigating factors, such as the attorney submitting to intensive substance abuse treatment. See Shunk, 847 S.W.2d at 792 (noting as mitigating circumstances the attorney's regular attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous meetings, his full compliance with his probation terms, and his proper handling of client affairs). Mitigating factors, however, do not necessarily justify a reduced sanction. See Kazanas, 96 S.W.3d at 809 ([E]ven when mitigating factors exist and where it is unlikely that the attorney will repeat the transgression, certain acts by attorneys so impugn the integrity of the legal system that disbarment is the only appropriate means to restore public confidence in it. (internal quotation marks omitted)). In Stewart's case, the aggravating factors are his four DWI convictions. It is also concerning that he failed to report his criminal conduct to OCDC when he was admonished for diligence and communication issues in 2009. On the other hand, mitigating factors include: his limited prior disciplinary history; his remorse; his ongoing struggle with the disease of alcoholism and his commitment to sobriety, shown by his participation in extensive inpatient and outpatient treatment and his attendance at numerous Alcoholics Anonymous meetings; and his full compliance with the terms of his criminal probation. But while this Court recognizes Stewart's commitment to recovery from substance abuse and notes his apparent ability to insulate his practice of law from the effects of his alcoholism, we cannot ignore the deleterious effect of his conduct on the reputation of the legal profession. See In re Coleman, 569 N.E.2d 631, 634 (Ind. 1991) (The image of a drunken lawyer driving down the highwaynot once, but four timesdoes little to serve the profession.). Considering this Court's precedent, the disciplinary rules, the ABA standards, and the facts in this case, suspension is the appropriate sanction for Stewart's conduct. His felony conviction represents an indifference to the law that merits a strong disciplinary response. His felony conviction reflects adversely on his fitness as a lawyer, and the repetitive nature of his behavior defeats any suggestion that he embarked on his course of conduct with less than full knowledge of the nature and consequences of his action.