Opinion ID: 186155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Time Limitation on Cross-Examination

Text: 34 Stanfield's next attack on the procedure used at the hearing focuses on the district court's limitation of the time allowed for the cross-examination of Shaw. The record does not indicate precisely how long the cross-examination continued beyond the initial twenty-two-minute limitation; it shows only that the limit was reached after twenty transcript pages of testimony and that testimony continued for thirteen more pages. See HOV Tr. at 32, 52, 65. Stanfield argues that even though the announced limit was ultimately exceeded, the court's exhortations to defense counsel to finish up, id. at 56, 63, caused counsel to be pressured and distracted, Appellant Br. at 17, and amounted to a denial of Stanfield's right to confront the witness against him. 35 A probationer facing revocation is entitled to an opportunity to ... question any adverse witness. FED.R.CRIM.P. 32.1(b)(2)(C); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2603-04, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (holding that a right to confrontation exists in parole revocation proceedings); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1759-60, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) (extending Morrissey to probation revocations). Although Morrissey states explicitly that a revocation hearing should not be equate[d] ... to a criminal prosecution in any sense, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. at 2604, we need not address the precise extent of the confrontation to which a probationer is entitled post- Morrissey because the cross-examination here was adequate. Cf. United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148, 1154 (D.C.Cir.1981) (right of cross-examination applies at a suppression hearing irrespective of whether it deriv[es] from the fundamental concepts embedded in the Due Process Clause or [is] implicit in the rules governing federal criminal proceedings). 36 In United States v. Slade, 627 F.2d 293 (D.C.Cir.1980), which arose from an adversary trial, the district court limited the defendant's cross-examination of a government witness to roughly forty-five minutes. Id. at 309. The court concluded: 37 [T]he time limitation may have placed a degree of pressure on [defendant]'s counsel, who then indicated that the schedule interfered with his preparation and concentration, [but] under the circumstances of these cases and the matters explored, the restriction of cross-examination was not an abuse of discretion.... 38 Id. In this case, defense counsel likewise indicated that she felt pressured by the time limitation. See, e.g., HOV Tr. at 58 (I'm sorry to be interrupting you, I am a little conscious of the time.). At the end of the cross-examination, however, counsel's objection was focused on the time allotted to review the Jencks material, not on the overall duration of the cross-examination. Id. at 65 (I have nothing further, Your Honor, although I would like briefly to restate for the record that I feel that without having had sufficient time to review all the papers ... my cross-examination was not as effective and [a]s wideranging as it should have been) (emphases added). Moreover, the transcript reflects a reasonably detailed discussion of the evidence relating to the alleged violations. See United States v. Anderson, 881 F.2d 1128, 1139 (D.C.Cir.1989) (court may limit cross-examination only after there has been permitted ... a certain threshold level of cross-examination which satisfies the constitutional requirement) (quoting United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203, 213 (6th Cir.1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Again, although we do not endorse excessive zeal in minimizing delay, we cannot conclude that the district court violated Stanfield's rights in limiting the cross-examination.