Opinion ID: 1899037
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Adverse-Action Procedures.

Text: In an official letter, Deputy Fire Chief Philip Matthews, the administrator of the Communications Division, proposed that Hutchinson be removed for inefficiency, specifically, the [f]ailure to satisfactorily perform one or more major duties of his ... position. See D.C.Code § 1-617.1(d)(3) (1992) (inefficiency is cause for removal); D.C. Personnel Regs. § 1603.1(c), 34 D.C.Reg. 1845, 1850 (1987) (same). In the parlance of the D.C. Personnel Regulations, Matthews acted as the proposing official and his recommendation of a removal was the proposed penalty. See D.C. Personnel Regs. §§ 1609.1, 1609.5, 34 D.C.Reg. at 1854. This was Hutchinson's third instance of inefficiency; [1] removal was therefore an appropriate penalty in the Table of Appropriate Penalties, D.C. Personnel Regs. § 1618.1, 34 D.C.Reg. at 1863. The Department appointed a disinterested designee, Deputy Fire Chief Joseph Quander, Jr., to review the proposed action before making a recommendation to the deciding official, Fire Chief R. Alfred. See D.C. Personnel Regs. §§ 1613.1-1613.3, 34 D.C.Reg. at 1857. Quander recommended a ninety-day suspension. Pursuant to D.C. Personnel Regs. § 1614.1, 34 D.C.Reg. at 1858, Alfred evaluated Quander's report and issued his final decision: that the proposed penalty of removal was appropriate and Hutchinson should be removed.
Hutchinson exercised his right under D.C.Code § 1-606.3(a) to appeal this adverse action to the OEA. See also OEA R. 604.1(b), 39 D.C.Reg. 7404, 7406 (1992). In the first stage of OEA review, an administrative judge, Blanca E. Torres, held a de novo evidentiary hearing at which various witnesses testified. See OEA R. 628.1, 628.2, 39 D.C.Reg. at 7421. In her initial decision, the administrative judge found that the Department had proven that Hutchinson's inefficiency, and not a computer malfunction, was the reason the call was lost. The administrative judge also determined that removal was an appropriate penalty. On January 25, 1994, Hutchinson initiated the second stage of OEA proceedings by filing a petition for review with the full OEA. [2] See OEA R. 636.2, 39 D.C.Reg. at 7425 ([t]he initial decision shall not become final if any party files a petition for review); see also OEA R. 637, 39 D.C.Reg. at 7426-27 (governing review procedures). Specifically, Hutchinson asked that the administrative judge's initial decision be reconsidered in light of the decision of another administrative judge concerning another Fire Department employee. The OEA denied the petition in a twelve-page opinion and the administrative judge's initial order became the OEA's final order. See OEA R. 636.3, 39 D.C.Reg. at 7425.
From this final order, on August 22, 1994, Hutchinson appealed to the Superior Court, alleging errors at both stages of the OEA proceedings. See D.C.Code § 1-606.1(d) (A final decision of the full Office [of Employee Appeals], relating to an appeal brought to it from a hearing examiner, shall be appealable to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.); [3] OEA R. 637.10, 39 D.C.Reg. at 7427 (Any employee or agency may appeal a final decision of the Office to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.). The Superior Court denied the petition for review and affirmed the final decision of the OEA. From these rulings, Hutchinson appeals to this court.