Opinion ID: 1891292
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Pretrial Ruling

Text: Nelson claims that the trial court erred by permitting Allstate to raise the issue of an offset for workers' compensation benefits on the morning of the trial even though it had failed to assert any such defense either in its answer or in the joint pretrial statement, which the court adopted as its pretrial order. In response, Allstate argues that the trial court merely held Nelson to his burden of proof to establish the amount of damages to which he was entitled under the terms of the contract. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 16 governs pretrial proceedings in civil cases, and subsection (g) of the rule, in particular, provides for the entry of a pretrial order and specifies in some detail what the order should contain. The rule contemplate[s] that fair disclosure will be made to remove cases from the realm of surprise, and both parties generally are bound by the pretrial order. Taylor v. Washington Hospital Center, 407 A.2d 585, 592 (D.C.1979). However, we have held that [w]hile [Rule 16] is intended to remove cases from the `realm of surprise,' it does not contemplate or require that rigid adherence to the pretrial order must always be exacted. Clarke v. District of Columbia, 311 A.2d 508, 511 (D.C.1973) (citations omitted). Hence the decision [w]hether to allow a party to go beyond the bounds of the pretrial order . . . is a matter left to the court's discretion, to be exercised in light of Rule 16's language authorizing modification in the proper case `to prevent manifest injustice.' Taylor, 407 A.2d at 592 (citations omitted); see Super. Ct. Civ. R. 16(g) (providing that a pretrial order may be modified at the discretion of the court for good cause shown and shall be modified if necessary to prevent manifest injustice). In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion under this rule, [t]he most important factor appears to be whether the opposing party was surprised or . . . prejudiced by the requested change. Daniels v. Beeks, 532 A.2d 125, 128 (D.C.1987); accord, Habtu v. Woldemichael, 694 A.2d 846, 849 (D.C.1997). In the case at bar, the trial court's reliance on the plain language of the contract did not subject Nelson to any unfair surprise or undue prejudice. The plaintiff in a breach of contract action always bears the burden of proving that he has been damaged and the amount of such damage. Rhodes v. Ritz Camera Centers, 151 A.2d 262, 263 (D.C.1959); see Romer v. District of Columbia, 449 A.2d 1097, 1100 (D.C. 1982). Thus the liability cap and the offset provision of the contract were central to the merits of the case. While Allstate probably should have stated its intention to rely on these clauses, as part of its defense, in its answer to Nelson's complaint and in the pretrial statement, Nelson was neither surprised nor unfairly prejudiced as a result of Allstate's failure to do so. As the trial court recognized, Nelson sued on the contract and therefore could not plausibly claim ignorance of its terms. [3] Furthermore, refusal to enforce these provisions would have had the unjust result of allowing Nelson to obtain more than he was entitled to receive under the contract. We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting Allstate belatedly to raise an issue not raised during the pretrial proceedings.