Opinion ID: 1116392
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Heading: ANALYSIS: Whether Papa Is Entitled to Receive Benefits Under Coverage C?

Text: The facts of this case are simple and virtually undisputed: Papa injured himself when he jumped off a bridge in order to avoid being struck by a vehicle being negligently driven by an uninsured motorist. The issue is whether Papa's insurance policies cover his injuries. Resolution of this issue requires construction of the following policy language: [An insured may recover medical benefits if he] sustains bodily injury, caused by automobile accident, while in or upon, entering or alighting from, or through being struck by any automobile. ... Both parties and the circuit court concluded that this language is clear and unambiguous and, thus, construction entailed application of the four corners doctrine. See Pursue Energy Corp. v. Perkins, 558 So.2d 349, 351 (Miss. 1990). That is, the parties and the court each examined the language within the policy's four corners  without considering extrinsic or parol evidence.
The dispute in the case sub judice essentially stems from a difference of opinion regarding construction of the word struck. The policy language clearly provides that an insured is entitled to medical benefits when his injuries occurred through being struck by any automobile. Farm Bureau cites for support of its contention the factually-similar case of Early Settlers Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 217 Va. 462, 229 S.E.2d 871 (1976). In Jordan, the insured sustained injuries when he swerved off the highway to avoid an accident with another vehicle and collided with a tree. Id., 229 S.E.2d at 872. The insured sought medical benefits under a policy which allowed recovery in cases in which injuries were sustained through being struck by an automobile. Id. The Virginia Supreme Court construed this language and concluded that the insured could not recover because neither he nor his automobile was struck by an automobile. The Court rationalized: There having been no impact between the vehicle in which [the insured] was riding and that of the unknown motorist who is alleged to have forced him off the highway, coverage under ... policy was never activated. Id., 229 S.E.2d at 874. Papa cites 42 Am.Jur.2d Insurance § 632 (1982), which provides a conclusion contrary to that reached by the Virginia Supreme Court: It has been held that the proper construction of the policy provision struck by an automobile does not necessitate physical contact of the body of the insured with the automobile as a prerequisite to recovery. Thus, such a policy provision was held to cover an injury to one who suffered an accident while attempting to avoid being struck by an oncoming automobile, and when in imminent danger of being struck, even though the moving car did not come in contact with his body.
Liberally construing the Farm Bureau policy provision, this Court concurs with Papa and Am.Jur.'s construction. Accord Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 507 So.2d 369, 372 (Miss. 1987) ([S]ince the provision of the policy was capable of two meanings, the meaning and construction most favorable to the insured should be applied.); State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 242 Miss. 38, 133 So.2d 288, 290 (1961) (In all cases the policy must be liberally construed in favor of the insured, in order to accomplish the purpose of the insurance. emphasis added)); Great American Ins. Co. v. Bass, 208 Miss. 436, 44 So.2d 532, 533 (1950) ([T]he policy must be construed in the light of its purpose and the hazards against which it was designed to protect.). The parties agree that the actions of a negligent automobile driver proximately caused Papa's injuries  a scenario to which the policy should purposefully apply. Moreover, no fraud is involved  which is generally a rationale for requiring physical contact. Accord Brewer, 507 So.2d at 372; Clark v. Regent Ins. Co., 270 N.W.2d 26 (S.D. 1978). Of course, fraud could be involved in any case  physical contact notwithstanding. Farm Bureau's construction inheres some absurdity: In order to activate the policy, one should wait until the automobile actually strikes him before he attempts to avert imminent danger. This logic would be inconsistent with this Court's view that one should take steps to mitigate damages. Cf. Barkley v. Miller Transporters, Inc., 450 So.2d 416, 420 (Miss. 1984) (It is [one's] duty ... to take reasonably proper steps to avoid an accident or injury ... after having knowledge of the danger.). Unquestionably, mitigation of damages would be consistent with insurers' interests. In sum, this Court construes the Farm Bureau policy as covering Papa's injuries which were proximately caused by the negligence of an automobile driver. The circuit court's decision is therefore reversed. Cf. Cossitt v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 551 So.2d 879 (Miss. 1989); Brewer, 507 So.2d at 372; State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 242 Miss. at 38, 133 So.2d at 288.