Opinion ID: 196494
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Opinion Testimony.

Text: 16 At trial, DeAngelis, after chronicling his experience as a narcotics detective and his encyclopedic familiarity with the mores of the crack cocaine community, testified as to the approximate street value (all told, roughly $1,500) of the 148 straws of crack found during the search. He also explained that so large a quantity of crack was consistent with distribution as opposed to personal use. Finally, he listed the visible characteristics of the prototypical crack addict, and noted that the appellant manifested none of these symptoms. 3 17 The appellant labors to convince us that this testimony should not have been admitted for two reasons: first, it did not afford the jury appropriate assistance in determining his intent; and second, it comprised an impermissible opinion concerning his supposed mental state. We are not persuaded. 18 1. Rule 702. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, expert testimony is admissible if the witness qualifies as an expert and the proffered testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Fed.R.Evid. 702. The decision to admit or reject expert testimony is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and the court's determinations are reviewable only for abuse of that discretion. See United States v. Echeverri, 982 F.2d 675, 680 (1st Cir.1993); United States v. Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299, 1310 (1st Cir.1987). Typically, appellate courts give trial judges a wide berth in respect to these kinds of discretionary judgments. See Echeverri, 982 F.2d at 680. 19 Viewed through this lens, the district court's decision to admit DeAngelis's testimony appears to be properly focused. DeAngelis's qualifications as an expert were not challenged either below or in the appellant's brief, and we readily accept them as sufficient. 4 Turning to the testimony, DeAngelis explained the amount of crack that users normally carry, the effects of an individual dose, and the price of each packet. Matters involving dosages, prices, and other particulars endemic to the ingestion and distribution of crack cocaine are beyond the ken of the average juror. Consequently, expert testimony on these subjects is likely to help the jury and, hence, if sanctioned by the trial judge, is admissible in evidence. See United States v. Ladd, 885 F.2d 954, 959, 960 (1st Cir.1989) (approving admission of testimony that the quantity and packaging of certain heroin indicated its suitability for distribution). Other courts, apparently reaching the same conclusion, have regularly upheld the admissibility of such expert testimony based upon the trial judge's belief that it would help the jurors. See United States v. Tapia-Ortiz, 23 F.3d 738, 741 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 206, 286, 130 L.Ed.2d 136, 201 (1994); United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519, 1522 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 897, 112 S.Ct. 270, 116 L.Ed.2d 222 (1991); United States v. Safari, 849 F.2d 891, 895 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 945, 109 S.Ct. 374, 102 L.Ed.2d 363 (1988). 20 In this instance, the district court heard and overruled the appellant's objections to the proffered testimony. On this record, there is no principled way for us to second-guess that ruling. Nor will we strain to do so: we think that DeAngelis's testimony was likely welcomed by the jurors, who otherwise might not have understood the significance of such a large number of crack-filled straws. Seen from this perspective, the testimony provided a factual predicate for the jury, presumably inexperienced in the customs of the crack cocaine community, to draw the inference that the appellant possessed cocaine base for the purpose of retail distribution. 21 2. Rule 704(b). In a related vein, the appellant, citing Fed.R.Evid. 704(b), suggests that the trial court improvidently allowed DeAngelis to testify to the appellant's state of mind (intent to distribute). 5 We reject the suggestion. 22 Rule 704(b) is of fairly recent vintage. It emerged in 1984 as an offshoot of Congress's retooling of the insanity defense. See S.Rep.No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 230 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3412 (explaining the need to limit psychiatric testimony as to the ultimate issue of sanity under the law). Congress recommended that the new regime be applied broadly. To this end, the Senate Report stated: 23 [T]he rationale for precluding ultimate opinion psychiatric testimony extends beyond the insanity defense to any ultimate mental state of the defendant that is relevant to the legal conclusion sought to be proven. The Committee has fashioned its Rule 704 provision to reach all such ultimate issues, e.g., premeditation in a homicide case, or lack of predisposition in entrapment. 24 Id. at 3413. Thus, both the letter of Rule 704(b) and the spirit that animates it preclude psychiatrists or other mental health professionals from testifying directly to a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged (such as a criminal defendant's intent). See United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 728 (D.C.Cir.1995); United States v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1060 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 906 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011, 108 S.Ct. 710, 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988). 25 By like token, Rule 704(b) has not been restricted to testimony offered by psychiatrists and other mental health professionals. To the precise contrary, courts have consistently read the rule to apply to cases in which intent is an element of the offense and an expert--whether or not a psychiatrist or other mental health professional--seeks to testify to the defendant's actual intent. See, e.g., United States v. Buchanan, 70 F.3d 818, 824 (1995) (discussing narcotics officer's opinions in respect to defendant's specific intent to possess drugs); United States v. Thomas S. Orr, 68 F.3d 1247, 1252 (10th Cir.1995) (discussing opinion evidence of witness skilled in banking practices in respect to defendant's intent to commit bank fraud), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 747, 133 L.Ed.2d 695 (1996); United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 667, 670 (D.C.Cir.1995) (discussing police officer's opinions in respect to defendant's intent to distribute cocaine); United States v. Windfelder, 790 F.2d 576, 582 (7th Cir.1986) (discussing IRS agent's opinions in respect to defendant's intent to evade taxes). We, too, have indicated, albeit sub silentio, that Rule 704(b) potentially could apply to opinion testimony offered by a person other than a mental health professional. See United States v. Lamattina, 889 F.2d 1191, 1193-94 (1st Cir.1989) (discussing FBI agent's testimony in loan-sharking case). Given the unambiguous language of the rule and the weight of authority, 6 we hold that Rule 704(b) prohibits all direct expert testimony concerning a criminal defendant's intent, regardless of the witness's field of expertise, so long as intent is an element of the crime charged. 26 This conclusion does not end our inquiry. No matter how expansively Rule 704(b) is read, it is not limitless in its reach. Though Rule 704(b) bars experts from opining on the ultimate issue of a defendant's felonious intent, the rule does not prohibit experts from testifying to predicate facts from which a jury might infer such intent. See, e.g., Brown, 7 F.3d at 651 (explaining that Rule 704(b) does not preclude [ ] [an expert] from suggesting inferences to be drawn from the facts, including inferences that embrace an ultimate issue). 27 The case at hand fits neatly within this integument. Here, the witness offered no testimony that directly characterized the appellant's intent to distribute controlled substances. Instead, DeAngelis merely explained that the quantity of crack found at the search site was consistent with distribution, as opposed to personal use. Because this evidence does no more than supply suggested predicate facts, allowing the jury to draw its own conclusions as to intent from those facts if it chooses to credit the testimony, it does not transgress Rule 704(b). See United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1240 (7th Cir.1994) (upholding the introduction of opinion testimony suggesting that a particular amount of crack indicated intended distribution, and distinguishing such testimony from testimony that the defendant intended to distribute crack). 28 Discerning no error, we hold that the district court acted within the realm of its discretion in permitting the jury to hear and consider the contested opinion testimony. 29