Opinion ID: 734276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Feltner's Defenses Fail as a Matter of Law.

Text: 30 In his reply brief to this court, Feltner argues that, despite the apparent termination, there was nevertheless a triable issue of material fact concerning whether Columbia was precluded from terminating on the basis of estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, or an oral contract not to terminate. Feltner's evidence fails to raise a triable issue of fact as to any of these defenses. 31 A claim of promissory estoppel requires, among other things, a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms, and injury caused by the promisee's reasonable reliance on the promise. Laks v. Coast Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 60 Cal.App.3d 885, 131 Cal.Rptr. 836, 839 (1976). The only promise that could reasonably be inferred from Feltner's evidence was a promise by Columbia to work with Krypton. However, this is not a clear and unambiguous promise, for it clearly contemplated further negotiations to finalize the terms of the restructure. Id. Furthermore, to the extent it was an adequate promise, Feltner was not injured because Columbia performed the promise by negotiating extensively from March 1990 until December 1991. Thus, Feltner's promissory estoppel claim must fail. 32 Feltner's negligent misrepresentation claim is similarly defective. Negligent misrepresentation is a statement made for the guidance of others which is not warranted by the information of the person making it. Grenell v. City of Hermosa Beach, 103 Cal.App.3d 864, 163 Cal.Rptr. 315, 319 (1980); see Cal.Civ.Code § 1572(2). Although Feltner argued in the district court that Columbia had already restructured the license agreement with Krypton's predecessor and that Columbia's practice was not to undertake subsequent restructures of licenses that had already been restructured, Feltner has failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that this was in fact Columbia's practice. Thus, Feltner has failed to raise a triable issue of fact on his negligent misrepresentation claim. 33 Lastly, Feltner's breach of oral contract claim is properly dismissed on summary judgment. An agreement to make in the future such a contract as may be agreed upon at a later time amounts to nothing, is not binding, and cannot be made the basis of a cause of action. Forgeron Inc. v. Hansen, 149 Cal.App.2d 352, 308 P.2d 406, 411 (1957) (quoting 12 Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 111); accord Kruse v. Bank of America, 202 Cal.App.3d 38, 248 Cal.Rptr. 217, 229 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1043, 109 S.Ct. 869, 870, 102 L.Ed.2d 993 (1989). Because the facts presented by Feltner indicate, at best, an agreement to negotiate in the future, Feltner has failed to raise a triable issue of fact on his oral contract claim. 6 34 In sum, Feltner failed to raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether Columbia validly terminated the license agreements by October 17, 1991. Summary judgment against Feltner for copyright infringements occurring after that date was therefore proper.