Opinion ID: 2602138
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutionality of the operation of the JOA and the LRA

Text: ¶ 21 In general `[A] constitutional question is not to be reached if the merits of the case in hand may be fairly determined on other than constitutional issues.' State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, n. 8, 32 P.3d 976 (quoting Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1980)). Because this case has not been resolved on other grounds, we address the constitutional question presented by Peterson. ¶ 22 As mentioned above, in Nelson we held that the release clause of the Joint Obligations Act applies to releases dealing with vicariously liable parties, while the release clause of the Liability Reform Act applies to all other co-defendants. See Nelson, 935 P.2d at 514 n. 3. Under the JOA, there must be an express reservation of rights by plaintiffs or the release operates to release all joint obligors. See Krukiewicz, 725 P.2d at 1350. Under the LRA, the release must name the defendant or identify the defendant with some degree of specificity for there to be a release. See Child, 892 P.2d at 12. Peterson argues that applying the JOA to vicariously liable parties and the LRA to regular co-defendants is a violation of Article I, Section 24, of the Utah Constitution's uniform operation of laws clause, because doing so affects similarly situated parties differently. ¶ 23 Article I, Section 24 provides that: All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. Utah Const. art. I, § 24. Under the uniform operation of laws clause, we utilize a lower standard of review unless the statute infringes a fundamental or critical right . . . [or creates] classifications considered impermissible or suspect in the abstract. Ryan v. Gold Cross Services, Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1995). Peterson has not argued that a constitutional right has been implicated, nor do we find one. Therefore a low threshold applies in balancing (1) whether the classification is reasonable, (2) whether the legislative objectives are legitimate, and (3) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the two. See Ryan, 903 P.2d at 426 (citing Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 1989)); see also Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670-71 (Utah 1984). A statute has a strong presumption of constitutionality, with doubts resolved in favor of its constitutionality. See Warren v. Melville, 937 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (citations omitted). ¶ 24 The first question is whether there is anything inherently unreasonable in the legislature's decision to treat vicariously liable defendants differently than other co-defendants. See Ryan, 903 P.2d at 427. We have often noted that vicarious liability does not arise because of actual negligence or fault. See Nelson, 935 P.2d at 513-14; Krukiewicz, 725 P.2d at 1350-51. Treating vicariously liable defendants as different in kind from defendants with some form of fault does not result in an inherently irrational classification, and is not based on any impermissible or suspect grouping. See Ryan, 903 P.2d at 427. ¶ 25 The second issue is whether the legislative purpose in separating vicariously liable defendants from regular co-defendants is legitimate. [T]he court will sustain legislative action if it can reasonably conceive of facts which would justify the classifications made by the legislation. Ryan, 903 P.2d at 427 (citing Blue Cross, 779 P.2d at 641). In the present case, imputing a legitimate purpose to the legislature is not necessary because the legislature has itself referred to its purposes. One of the primary purposes of the legislature in enacting the LRA was `basic fairness.' Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993) (quoting Tape of Utah Senate Floor Debates, 46th Leg.1986, Gen. Sess. (Feb. 12, 1986)). The legislature intended to promote fairness by abolishing joint and several liability for co-defendants liable on fault grounds because no party should be liable for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributed to that defendant. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1999). The same rationale does not logically extend to co-defendants to whom no fault can be apportioned, but who are instead subject to vicarious liability. ¶ 26 The LRA was intended only to abolish the joint and several liability of `defendants'. . . but that does not affect an employer, who being only vicariously liable is not a `defendant.' [2] Nelson, 935 P.2d at 515 (Howe, J., concurring). As noted above, vicarious liability does not arise because of actual negligence or fault. See Nelson, 935 P.2d at 513-14; Krukiewicz, 725 P.2d at 1350-51. Therefore, it is legitimate for the legislature to draw a distinction between co-defendants who are at-fault and vicariously liable parties who are not. It is also legitimate for the legislature to promote fairness through abolition of joint and several liability for at fault co-defendants. ¶ 27 The last issue is whether there is a reasonable relationship between the statutory classification and the legislative purpose. We conclude that the classification is not an unreasonable means of achieving fairness in the apportionment of damages between different kinds of defendants. [3] Even though the legislative distinction between at-fault co-defendants and vicariously liable co-defendants requires two separate standards for the creation and interpretation of releases, it is not the court's place to defend the merits, desirability, or rationality of legislative action. Ryan, 903 P.2d at 426. It is enough that distinguishing between at-fault co-defendants and vicariously liable ones is reasonable in light of the legislative objectives. See id. ¶ 28 Peterson extends his uniform operation of laws argument to plaintiffs who are disparately affected in their ability to collect damages by virtue of different standards governing releases under the JOA and the LRA. We disagree with the argument that the disparity is unconstitutional. In reality, both the JOA and the LRA provide a plaintiff with equal opportunity to pursue all liable parties. Neither the JOA nor the LRA will release either an at fault co-defendant or a vicariously liable one where the release expressly reserves the plaintiff's rights to pursue those parties. See Nelson, 935 P.2d at 514. Plaintiffs will only be treated differently where they do not carefully draft their releases or do not adequately investigate the possibility of other liable parties. The burden is on plaintiffs to understand the distinction between the JOA and the LRA. The JOA applies to vicariously liable co-defendants and the LRA applies to co-defendants who are at fault within the meaning of the act. See Nelson, 935 P.2d at 514 n. 3. The public policy arguments advanced by Peterson on behalf of plaintiffs should be addressed to the legislative process. So long as the distinctions made by the statute are reasonable, we may not invalidate them on constitutional grounds where no other factors such as fundamental rights are at issue.