Opinion ID: 735405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Enhancement for Discharge of Firearm

Text: 11 Under the Guidelines provision for robbery offenses, the base offense level is increased when a firearm is used during a robbery. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2). The amount of the enhancement depends on the manner in which the weapon is used: 12 (A) If a firearm was discharged, increase by 7 levels; (B) if a firearm was otherwise used, increase by 6 levels; (C) if a firearm was brandished, displayed, or possessed, increase by 5 levels.... 13 Id. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A)-(C). 1 It is undisputed that Serrano and Santiago discharged their firearms during the robbery attempt. The District Court nonetheless declined to impose a seven-level enhancement on Molina's base offense level. Instead, the Court imposed only a five-level enhancement based on the co-conspirators' brandish[ing], display[ ], or possess[ion] of their firearms, because it found that Serrano and Santiago's discharge of their weapons was an event not reasonably foreseeable by Molina. 14 On this sentencing appeal, we must accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and ... give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). This Circuit has held that [i]ncluded within the 'clearly erroneous' rubric is the question of reasonable foreseeability. United States v. Ekwunoh, 12 F.3d 368, 370 (2d Cir.1993); see United States v. Brumby, 23 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir.1994). But see Ekwunoh, 12 F.3d at 373 (Newman, J., concurring) (arguing that reasonable foreseeability is legal issue fully available for de novo review). A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (quotations and citation omitted). Upon reviewing the entire evidence in this case, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the District Court erred in finding that Molina could not have reasonably foreseen that Serrano and Santiago would discharge their weapons during the commission of a robbery of an armored car. 15 Under the relevant conduct principles of subsection 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the conspiracy may be taken into account to determine a defendant's sentence. See United States v. Medina, 74 F.3d 413, 415 (2d Cir.1996). Therefore, Molina's sentence can be enhanced under subsection 2B3.1(b)(2)(A), based on Serrano's and Santiago's discharge of their firearms, if (1) the [discharge] was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (2) the [discharge] was reasonably foreseeable [to Molina]. Brumby, 23 F.3d at 50. Because there is no dispute that the weapons were fired to further the aims of the conspiracy, the only question is whether their discharge was reasonably foreseeable to Molina. 16 The District Court credited Molina's contention that the conspirators' intended plan was not to fire their weapons during the robbery. Implicitly finding that the weapons were discharged only because the original plan went awry when Molina decided to move the double-parked getaway vehicle, the District Court concluded that only a five-level enhancement under subsection 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) was appropriate because it's not foreseeable that the people [he] associated [with would] act[ ] stupidly and discharge their firearms. 17 The District Court also found, however, that Molina knew that there was a machine gun supplied for the robbery and one of the co-conspirators was carrying that machine gun and it was loaded and that the co-conspirator was prepared to fire it. Indeed, the Court acknowledged that the conspirators knew that they were up against people carrying sidearms and that given the circumstances of the type of people going in with loaded guns one of them could be fired. Although Molina was unarmed and was not present at the scene when the shots were fired, he willingly participated in a conspiracy to rob an armored car guarded by armed men, and he supplied his co-conspirators with a fully loaded machine gun and a semi-automatic pistol. As the District Court itself noted, it was understood [between the conspirators] that the guards would be armed and an exchange of fire was therefore probable. 18 On the entire evidence presented in this case, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the District Court erred in finding that Molina could not have reasonably foreseen that Serrano and Santiago would discharge their firearms during the commission of the crime. Even if Molina hoped that the original plan would be carried out and that no shooting would occur, it was nonetheless reasonable for him to foresee that, in an encounter between armed robbers and armed guards protecting an armored car, a shooting was likely to occur.