Opinion ID: 2048220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Presentencing Incarceration Credit

Text: We turn first to the appellate court's ruling that defendant's presentencing incarceration entitled him to a $604 credit against the $4 Criminal/Traffic Conviction Surcharge, the $500 Assessment Controlled Substance, and the $100 Trauma Fund charge. The statute establishing the presentencing credit is section 110-14(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides: Any person incarcerated on a bailable offense who does not supply bail and against whom a fine is levied on conviction of such offense shall be allowed a credit of $5 for each day so incarcerated upon application of the defendant. However, in no case shall the amount so allowed or credited exceed the amount of the fine. 725 ILCS 5/110-14(a) (West 2004). The parties do not dispute that defendant was incarcerated on a bailable offense for 274 days before sentencing, and accordingly is entitled to a credit of up to $1,370. The parties also agree that the credit under section 110-14 operates to offset only fines, not fees. See 725 ILCS 5/110-14 (a) (West 2004). Accordingly, whether defendant was entitled to the credit against any charge imposed on him turns solely on whether that charge constituted a fine or a fee. This is a matter of statutory interpretation. The construction of a statute is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill.2d 326, 330, 246 Ill.Dec. 636, 730 N.E.2d 1101 (2000). The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill.2d 493, 503-04, 247 Ill.Dec. 473, 732 N.E.2d 528 (2000). Accordingly, courts should consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the legislature's apparent objective in enacting it. People v. Davis, 199 Ill.2d 130, 135, 262 Ill.Dec. 721, 766 N.E.2d 641 (2002). The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill.2d 469, 479, 203 Ill.Dec. 463, 639 N.E.2d 1282 (1994). Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute without resort to further aids of statutory construction. Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill.2d 181, 184-85, 237 Ill.Dec. 769, 710 N.E.2d 399 (1999). We construe statutes as a whole, so that no part is rendered meaningless or superfluous. People v. Jones, 214 Ill.2d 187, 193, 291 Ill.Dec. 663, 824 N.E.2d 239 (2005); Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill.2d 391, 397, 199 Ill.Dec. 659, 634 N.E.2d 712 (1994). When construing criminal statutes, the rule of lenity requires that any ambiguity must be resolved in that manner which favors the accused. People v. Davis, 199 Ill.2d 130, 140, 262 Ill.Dec. 721, 766 N.E.2d 641 (2002), citing People ex rel. Gibson v. Cannon, 65 Ill.2d 366, 370-71, 2 Ill.Dec. 737, 357 N.E.2d 1180 (1976). However, this rule must not be stretched so far as to defeat the legislature's intent. In re Detention of Powell, 217 Ill.2d 123, 142, 298 Ill.Dec. 361, 839 N.E.2d 1008 (2005) (citing People v. Brooks, 158 Ill.2d 260, 264, 198 Ill.Dec. 851, 633 N.E.2d 692 (1994), and People v. Washington, 343 Ill.App.3d 889, 903, 279 Ill.Dec. 368, 800 N.E.2d 436 (2003)). Our appellate court has had cause to consider the distinguishing characteristics of a fee and a fine, and explained them as follows: A `fine' is a pecuniary punishment imposed as part of a sentence on a person convicted of a criminal offense. People v. Despenza, 318 Ill.App.3d 1155, 1157 [253 Ill.Dec. 179, 744 N.E.2d 912] (2001). A `cost' is a charge or fee taxed by a court such as a filing fee, jury fee, courthouse fee, or reporter fee. Despenza, 318 Ill.App.3d at 1157 [253 Ill. Dec. 179, 744 N.E.2d 912]. Unlike a fine, which is punitive in nature, a cost does not punish a defendant in addition to the sentence he received, but instead is a collateral consequence of the defendant's conviction that is compensatory in nature. People v. Terneus, 239 Ill. App.3d 669, 672 [180 Ill.Dec. 499, 607 N.E.2d 568] (1992). A `fee' is a charge for labor or services, especially professional services. Black's Law Dictionary 629 (7th ed.1999). (Emphasis added.) People v. White, 333 Ill.App.3d 777, 781, 267 Ill.Dec. 464, 776 N.E.2d 836 (2002). We agree with this characterization. See also Black's Law Dictionary 647, 664 (8th ed.2004) (a fee is a charge for labor or services, especially professional services, whereas a fine is a pecuniary criminal punishment or civil penalty payable to the public treasury). Broadly speaking, a fine is a part of the punishment for a conviction, whereas a fee or cost seeks to recoup expenses incurred by the Stateto compensat[e] the State for some expenditure incurred in prosecuting the defendant. [1] With these rules in mind, we turn to the specific provisions at issue in this case.
We first consider the $4 Criminal/Traffic Conviction Surcharge. This charge was imposed pursuant to section 5-9-1(c-9) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c-9) (West 2004)). At the time of defendant's conviction this statute provided as follows: There shall be added to every fine imposed in sentencing for a criminal or traffic offense, except an offense relating to parking or registration, or offense by a pedestrian, an additional penalty of $4 imposed. The additional penalty of $4 shall also be added to every fine imposed upon a plea of guilty, stipulation of facts or findings of guilty, resulting in a judgment of conviction, or order of supervision in criminal, traffic, local ordinance, county ordinance, or conservation cases (except parking, registration, or pedestrian violations), or upon a sentence of probation without entry of judgment under Section 10 of the Cannabis Control Act or Section 410 of the Controlled Substances Act. Such additional penalty of $4 shall be assessed by the court imposing the fine and shall be collected by the circuit clerk in addition to any other fine, costs, fees, and penalties in the case. Each such additional penalty of $4 shall be remitted to the State Treasurer by the circuit clerk within one month after receipt. The State Treasurer shall deposit the additional penalty of $4 into the Traffic and Criminal Conviction Surcharge Fund. The additional penalty of $4 shall be in addition to any other fine, costs, fees, and penalties and shall not reduce or affect the distribution of any other fine, costs, fees, and penalties. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c-9) (West 2004). As defendant notes, the plain language of section 5-9-1(c-9) strongly suggests that the charge ought to be considered to be in the nature of a fine, not a fee. The statute repeatedly refers to the charge as a penalty, which connotes a fine, not a fee. See White, 333 Ill.App.3d at 781, 267 Ill.Dec. 464, 776 N.E.2d 836. Moreover, the statute states that the penalty is to be added to the fine. This statutory language strongly suggests that the legislature intended the surcharge in section 5-9-1(c-9) to constitute a fine. As the State notes, the label used by the legislature is not necessarily definitive. See Crocker v. Finley, 99 Ill.2d 444, 452, 77 Ill.Dec. 97, 459 N.E.2d 1346 (1984) (holding that although a $5 charge was consistently labeled a fee within the statute imposing it, it was in reality a tax); People v. Elizalde, 344 Ill.App.3d 678, 682, 279 Ill. Dec. 571, 800 N.E.2d 859 (2003) (both legislature's characterization of charge and charge's substantive character are relevant to determination of whether charge is subject to offset under section 110-14(a)). However, the label is strong evidence of the legislature's intent, especially because the legislature not only referred to the charge in a consistent fashion as a penalty to be added to the fine but also used other labelsother fine, costs, fees, and penalties (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c-9) (West 2004))within the same statute, buttressing the conclusion that the terms used were intentional. Nevertheless, the State argues that the charge is actually in the nature of a fee, not a fine. The State calls our attention to the statute creating the traffic and criminal conviction surcharge fund, section 9 of the Illinois Police Training Act (50 ILCS 705/9 (West 2004)). The State notes that the fund is to be used to train governmental employees in law enforcement techniques (see 50 ILCS 705/9(2), (4), (5) (West 2004)), and argues that this makes the charge a fee, according to the definition that a fee is intended to compensate the State for the costs of prosecuting the defendant. See White, 333 Ill.App.3d at 781, 267 Ill.Dec. 464, 776 N.E.2d 836. Defendant responds that the State's argument sweeps far too broadly, and we agree. The fact that the proceeds of this charge may be used for general police training does not mean that the charge reimburses the State for the cost of prosecuting the defendant and is therefore a fee. As defendant and our appellate court have noted, section 27.6(a) of the Clerks of Courts Act directs that with limited exceptions, some portion [2] of all fees, fines, costs, additional penalties, bail balances assessed or forfeited, and any other amount paid by a person to the circuit clerk equalling an amount of $55 or more are to be deposited into the Traffic and Criminal Conviction Surcharge Fund. 705 ILCS 105/27.6(a) (West 2004). This does not mean that every charge is a fee. The State also argues that the charge should be considered a fee based on the precedent of Ali v. Danaher, 47 Ill.2d 231, 265 N.E.2d 103 (1970). There, we considered the constitutionality of a $1 library fee imposed on all litigants filing civil actions, which fee was intended to help finance the construction or upkeep of county law libraries. Several arguments were raised against the fee: the plaintiff contended that the fee violated separation of powers principles, that it constituted an improper litigation tax, and that it was not assessed equally to all litigants. Ali, 47 Ill.2d at 234, 265 N.E.2d 103. We upheld the fee. In so holding, we stated that funding a county law library is a proper purpose for a fee, because such a library is conducive to a proper and even improved administration of justice. Ali, 47 Ill.2d at 237, 265 N.E.2d 103. The State argues that training government employees in law enforcement techniques is similarly conducive to an improved administration of justice and therefore the charge at issue in this case ought be construed as a fee. The case is clearly distinguishable, for the fundamental reason that Ali did not involve any attempt to distinguish between a fee and a fine. Indeed, the statute imposing the fee at issue in Ali specified that the fee was to be assessed only in civil litigation and `shall not be charged in any criminal or quasi-criminal case.' Ali, 47 Ill.2d at 234, 265 N.E.2d 103, quoting Ill. Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 81, par. 81. The statement to which the State directs our attention is taken entirely out of context and is not sufficient to support the State's argument that we should override the statutory language indicating that the charge is a penalty. Moreover, as a final note, we later clarified that the charge imposed in Ali was in fact not a fee but a tax, because the charge was not imposed to defray costs specific to the litigation in which it was imposed. Crocker, 99 Ill.2d at 452, 77 Ill.Dec. 97, 459 N.E.2d 1346 (court charges imposed on a litigant are fees if assessed to defray the expenses of his litigation (emphasis added)). See also Arangold, 204 Ill.2d at 148-49, 272 Ill.Dec. 600, 787 N.E.2d 786 (reaffirming that the charge at issue in Ali, although labeled a fee, in reality, was a tax). Although the State need not demonstrate that a fee represents the exact cost incurred in defendant's litigation (see, e.g., White, 333 Ill.App.3d at 782, 267 Ill.Dec. 464, 776 N.E.2d 836 (finding probation and lab analysis fees are fees, not fines, even though State did not show that they reflected actual costs the state incurred in prosecuting the defendant's case)), a fee must at least relate to charges incurred in the defendant's case. The State also argues that the legislature cannot have intended to allow this charge to be offset, because everyone who is arrested spends at least part of one day in jail and would thus be entitled to at least a $5 credit for time served. Because this charge is only $4, a $5 credit would wipe out this charge in all cases. However, as was observed at oral argument, this fails to consider the fact that the charge could survive any case where this was not the only fine imposed against defendant. Our ruling here does not have the practical effect of extinguishing this charge in all cases, as the State suggests. Finally, the State notes that in 2005, subsequent to defendant's conviction, the legislature repealed subsection (c-9) and added the $4 surcharge previously imposed in this section to a similar $5 surcharge imposed in subsection (c). Noting that subsection (c) expressly provides that the charge is not subject to offset for presentencing incarceration, the State contends that the legislature must have intended the same to be true of subsection (c-9) all along. We do not find this argument convincing. We faced a similar argument in People v. Hare, 119 Ill.2d 441, 450-51, 116 Ill.Dec. 664, 519 N.E.2d 879 (1988). There, as here, at the time of the defendant's conviction the statute imposing the fine at issue lacked any provision excluding the fine from offset for presentencing incarceration credit. In Hare, the statute imposing the fine was subsequently amended to so provide. We acknowledged the rule of construction that an amendment to a statute may be a legislative attempt to clarify the meaning of the statute, but we also noted a countervailing rule that an amendment gives rise to the presumption that the new legislation was intended to effect a change in the law as it formerly existed. Hare, 119 Ill.2d at 450-51, 116 Ill.Dec. 664, 519 N.E.2d 879. We stated that which of the two rules should apply depends on the circumstances involved, specifically, whether the statute was unclear prior to the amendment. We concluded in Hare that the statute was not unclear before the amendment adding the provision excluding the fine from offset and, accordingly, concluded that the amendment constituted a change. The same reasoning applies here. Indeed, as defendant notes, this case would be an even less likely candidate than Hare for interpreting an amendment as a clarification of prior legislative intent, because the legislature did not amend subsection (c-9); it repealed that subsection. Finally, we note that although subsection (c) has existed for a number of years, subsection (c-9) enjoyed a comparatively brief existence, enacted in 2003 and repealed in 2005. For the entire time that subsections (c) and (c-9) coexisted, subsection (c) contained the provision that the charge imposed therein was not subject to offset, while subsection (c-9) contained no such provision. This fact, that the legislature enacted subsection (c-9) without the exclusion when subsection (c) of the same statute did contain such a provision, further strengthens our conclusion that the penalty imposed pursuant to subsection (c-9) was not intended to be exempted from offset. Accordingly, we conclude that the charge imposed by section 5-9-1(c-9) is subject to offset.
We next address the $500 Assessment Controlled Substance. This charge, imposed pursuant to section 411.2(a) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/411.2(a) (West 2004)), is commonly referred to as a drug assessment. Section 411.2 provides in relevant part as follows: (a) Every person convicted of a violation of this Act, and every person placed on probation, conditional discharge, supervision or probation under Section 410 of this Act, shall be assessed for each offense a sum fixed at:    (4) $500 for a Class 3 or Class 4 felony;    (e) A defendant who has been ordered to pay an assessment may petition the court to convert all or part of the assessment into court-approved public or community service. One hour of public or community service shall be equivalent to $4 of assessment. The performance of this public or community service shall be a condition of the probation, conditional discharge or supervision and shall be in addition to the performance of any other period of public or community service ordered by the court or required by law. (f) The court may suspend the collection of the assessment imposed under this Section; provided the defendant agrees to enter a substance abuse intervention or treatment program approved by the court   .    Upon successful completion of the program, the defendant may apply to the court to reduce the assessment imposed under this Section by any amount actually paid by the defendant for his participation in the program. The court shall not reduce the penalty under this subsection unless the defendant establishes to the satisfaction of the court that he has successfully completed the intervention or treatment program   . (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 570/411.2(a), (e), (f) (West 2004). Our appellate court has consistently concluded that a section 411.2 drug assessment is a fine, not a fee, and thus is subject to offset by presentencing incarceration credit. See, e.g., People v. Youngblood, 365 Ill.App.3d 210, 214-15, 302 Ill. Dec. 631, 849 N.E.2d 423 (2006); People v. McNeal, 364 Ill.App.3d 867, 873-74, 301 Ill.Dec. 832, 847 N.E.2d 842 (2006); Fort, 362 Ill.App.3d at 5-8, 298 Ill.Dec. 417, 839 N.E.2d 1064 (and cases cited therein); People v. Gathing, 334 Ill.App.3d 617, 620, 268 Ill.Dec. 229, 778 N.E.2d 215 (2002); People v. Brown, 242 Ill.App.3d 465, 466, 182 Ill.Dec. 907, 610 N.E.2d 776 (1993). We agree with these decisions. Fort is instructive on this point. There, the appellate court noted that by labeling the charge an assessment, the legislature did not clearly indicate whether the charge was in the nature of a fine, subject to offset, or in the nature of a fee. However, the legislature did refer to the charge as a penalty in subsection (f), a term which denotes a fine, not a fee. Fort, 362 Ill.App.3d at 7, 298 Ill.Dec. 417, 839 N.E.2d 1064. Moreover, assuming that the statute was ambiguous, Fort noted that the legislative history characterized the charge as a fine: Referring to the proposed section 411.2, Senator Cullerton asked: `I'm just curious, though, ifdoes this reallocate money which is now being sent somewhere, or does it purport to increase the fines for people who are charged with drug offenses?' (Emphasis added.) Senator Barkhausen, a sponsor of the bill, answered: `Yes, it's an increase. It's a new fine; although, we had amended the bill a second time through, and I believe the provisions are here againI was just looking for themto give the court some discretion to require community service work for those who can't pay fines. But this is new money. It's not a reallocation of any old money.' (Emphases added.) Fort, 362 Ill. App.3d at 7, 298 Ill.Dec. 417, 839 N.E.2d 1064, quoting 87th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, July 18, 1991, at 186-87 (statements of Senators Cullerton and Barkhausen). Finally, Fort noted that although the drug assessment had been construed as a fine for several years, and the legislature had numerous times amended section 411.2, the legislature had never taken action to override the unanimous conclusion that the drug assessment was subject to offset. This fact lends support to the conclusion that the legislature acquiesced in the earlier decisions, and constitutes a strong reason to adhere to the prior decisions. Fort, 362 Ill.App.3d at 8, 298 Ill.Dec. 417, 839 N.E.2d 1064 (quoting Agnew, 105 Ill.2d at 280, 85 Ill.Dec. 514, 473 N.E.2d 1319, and citing People ex rel. Department of Labor v. Tri State Tours, Inc., 342 Ill.App.3d 842, 847, 277 Ill.Dec. 322, 795 N.E.2d 990 (2003)). The State acknowledges the above authority. Indeed, the State admits in its brief to this court that the assessment is punitive in nature and its purpose is not related to compensating the state for the costs of criminal investigation and prosecution. However, the State argues that the legislature has the authority to exempt specific charges from the $5 credit allowed by section 110-14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and contends that the legislature did implicitly exempt the section 411.2 drug assessment by providing that the assessment could be reduced or removed if the defendant performed community service or participated in a substance abuse intervention or treatment program. See 720 ILCS 570/411.2(e), (f) (West 2004). The State argues that permitting a defendant to receive presentencing incarceration credit would violate the legislative intent to promote community service and drug treatment by providing that community service and drug treatment would be the only ways to reduce the drug assessment. We reject this argument. Nothing in the statute indicates that the legislature intended that community service and drug treatment would be the exclusive means to reduce a drug assessment. The notion that the legislature intended to preempt presentencing credit is dealt a severe blow by the fact that the presentencing credit is mandatory, whereas the reductions provided for in subsections (e) and (f) are discretionary. Compare 725 ILCS 5/110-14(a) (West 2004) (Any person    shall be allowed a credit of $ 5 for each day    (emphasis added)) with 720 ILCS 570/411.2(e) (West 2004) ([a] defendant    may petition the court to convert all or part of the assessment into court-approved public or community service (emphasis added)) and 720 ILCS 570/411.2(f) (West 2004) (The court may suspend the collection of the assessment imposed under this Section; provided the defendant agrees to enter a substance abuse intervention or treatment program approved by the court   .    Upon successful completion of the program, the defendant may apply to the court to reduce the assessment imposed under this Section by any amount actually paid by the defendant for his participation in the program (emphases added)). Moreover, the State provides no explanation why the legislature would have taken such a circuitous route of implicit preemption when it could simply have spelled out that the assessment was not subject to reduction for presentencing incarceration credit, as the legislature has done in numerous other statutes. See, e.g., 705 ILCS 105/27.6(b) (West 2004) (This additional fee of $100 shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing); 705 ILCS 105/27.6(b-1) (West 2004) (This additional fee of $5 shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing); 705 ILCS 105/27.6(c) (West 2004) (This additional fee of $100 shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing); 705 ILCS 105/27.6(c-1) (West 2004) (This additional fee of $5 shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing); 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c) (West 2004) (Such additional penalty shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing); 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c-5) (West 2004) (This additional fee of $100 shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing); 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1(c-7) (West 2004) (This additional fee of $5 shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing); 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(c) (West 2004) (This additional fee of $5 shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing); 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.6 (West 2004) (Such additional penalty shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing); 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.10 (West 2004) (This additional fee of $100 shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing); 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.11(a) (West 2004) (The additional penalty shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing). Clearly the legislature knows how to provide that a particular charge is not to be subject to reduction by credit for presentencing (or postsentencing) incarceration, and the legislature did not do so with respect to the drug assessment. Further, the State's argument ignores the fact observed in Fort that the drug assessment has consistently been construed as a fine subject to reduction for presentencing incarceration, and the legislature has never amended the statute in any way so as to repudiate those holdings. This indicates legislative acquiescence in the construction accorded to the statute by the previous decisions. Agnew, 105 Ill.2d at 280, 85 Ill.Dec. 514, 473 N.E.2d 1319; Tri State Tours, Inc., 342 Ill.App.3d at 847, 277 Ill.Dec. 322, 795 N.E.2d 990. Accordingly, we agree with the appellate court that the drug assessment is subject to reduction by credit for presentencing incarceration pursuant to section 110-14(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/110-14(a) (West 2004)).
The final charge which the appellate court determined was subject to the presentencing incarceration credit is the $100 Trauma Fund charge. The statutory authority for this charge is found in section 5-9-1.1(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(b) (West 2004)), which provides as follows: (b) In addition to any penalty imposed under subsection (a) of this Section [which mandates imposition of a fine at least equivalent to the street value of the drugs seized], a fine of $100 shall be levied by the court, the proceeds of which shall be collected by the Circuit Clerk and remitted to the State Treasurer under Section 27.6 of the Clerks of Courts Act for deposit into the Trauma Center Fund for distribution as provided under Section 3.225 of the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act. 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(b) (West 2004). There is no question that the $100 Trauma Fund charge is a fine. Not only is it called a fine, it is also referred to as an addition to a penalty, and it is clearly not intended to reimburse the state for any expense of prosecution or investigation. Moreover, section 5-9-1.1(b) does not contain any provision to the effect that the Trauma Fund charge is not subject to setoff. The State concedes all of these points. Nevertheless, the State contends that the legislature did not intend for this fine to be subject to reduction for time served prior to sentencing. The State bases its argument on the reference to section 27.6 of the Clerks of Courts Act. That section provides in pertinent part as follows: (c) In addition to any other fines and court costs assessed by the courts, any person convicted for a violation of [ inter alia, the Illinois Controlled Substances Act] shall pay an additional fee of $100 to the clerk of the circuit court. This amount, less 2½% that shall be used to defray administrative costs incurred by the clerk, shall be remitted by the clerk to the Treasurer within 60 days after receipt for deposit into the Trauma Center Fund. This additional fee of $100 shall not be considered a part of the fine for purposes of any reduction in the fine for time served either before or after sentencing. (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 105/27.6(c) (West 2004). The State contends that section 27.6(c) of the Clerk of Courts Act, along with its explicit direction that the $100 charge is not subject to reduction for presentencing incarceration, is incorporated by reference into section 5-9-1.1(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections. In two recently published decisions the appellate court has agreed with this argument, and concluded that the $100 Trauma Center Fund charge is not subject to offset for presentencing incarceration. See People v. Jones, 366 Ill. App.3d 666, 304 Ill.Dec. 114, 852 N.E.2d 364 (2006); People v. Squire, 365 Ill. App.3d 842, 303 Ill.Dec. 189, 851 N.E.2d 87 (2006). Defendant raises a compelling response to this analysis, however. Defendant notes that sections 5-9-1.1(c) and 5-9-1.10 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1(c), 5-9-1.10 (West 2004)) not only refer to section 27.6 of the Clerks of Courts Act but also expressly state that the charges assessed therein are exempt from presentencing credit offset. Defendant argues that to conclude that the reference to section 27.6 of the Clerks of Courts Act is sufficient to preclude offset would render the anti-offset language in these other statutes redundant and superfluous. The State responds, essentially, that these other statutes are irrelevant because the legislature's intent is perfectly clear. We find defendant's argument convincing. Sections 5-9-1.1(c) and 5-9-1.10 not only provide that the charges assessed therein are to be remitted pursuant to section 27.6 of the Clerks of Courts Act but also explicitly state that the charges are not subject to offset. If the legislature intended the mere reference to the Clerks of Courts Act to suffice to exempt the charges from offset, as the State argues, then the anti-offset language contained in sections 5-9-1.1(c) and 5-9-1.10 would be entirely redundant and superfluous. We reject the State's contention that we should ignore this fact; our rule that we construe statutes as a whole is intended to avoid just such a situation as the defendant brings to our attention, where one possible construction would render another statutory provision meaningless or superfluous. See Jones, 214 Ill.2d at 193, 291 Ill.Dec. 663, 824 N.E.2d 239; Bonaguro, 158 Ill.2d at 397, 199 Ill.Dec. 659, 634 N.E.2d 712. This is not to say that defendant's construction is clearly correct; his argument that the Trauma Fund charge imposed by section 5-9-1.1(b) is subject to offset would seem to render meaningless the anti-offset language in the Clerks of Courts Act. Neither construction is perfect, and it is not clear which construction the legislature would prefer. In such circumstances, we are guided by the rule that ambiguity in criminal statutes must be resolved in that manner which favors the accused. Davis, 199 Ill.2d at 140, 262 Ill.Dec. 721, 766 N.E.2d 641; Brooks, 158 Ill.2d at 264, 198 Ill.Dec. 851, 633 N.E.2d 692. Accordingly, we conclude that the Trauma Fund charge is subject to setoff. We invite the legislature to clarify this ambiguity. Unless and until it does so, however, we must agree with the appellate court that the Trauma Fund charge is subject to setoff. To the extent that the decisions in Jones, 366 Ill.App.3d 666, 304 Ill.Dec. 114, 852 N.E.2d 364, and Squire, 365 Ill.App.3d 842, 303 Ill.Dec. 189, 851 N.E.2d 87, conflict with our holding, they are overruled.