Opinion ID: 470998
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: larry peters

Text: 95 Larry Peters, Anthony Peters' brother, was convicted of participating in a conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846. Peters was sentenced to twelve years in prison. Larry Peters claims the district court erred by refusing to hold a pretrial hearing on the amount and effect of the case's publicity; by postponing decision upon and then subsequently denying the defendant's motion for change of venue; by failing to sequester the jury at the start of the trial; by admitting the testimony of prosecution witnesses who had agreements with the government; by denying the defendant's severance motion; by sentencing Peters to twelve years; and by refusing to apply the Young Adult Offender Statute. We affirm each of the district court's rulings.
96 Larry Peters claims that the district court erred by refusing to hold a pretrial hearing on the nature, amount, and effect of the publicity generated by the case. Peters sought a hearing to present examples of newspaper articles and of the radio and television coverage. Peters sought a hearing also to ensure a complete record of the publicity for the appellate record. 97 We find no support for Peters' contention that the district court's refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights. An evidentiary hearing was not necessary merely to ensure a complete record for an appellate review. The record contains newspaper articles attached to codefendant Sal Dacquisto's motion for a change of venue. The defendants could have attached more articles or submitted further affidavits detailing press coverage in support of the venue motion in order to flesh out the record on appeal. In addition, the defendant could have brought articles and other publicity to the trial court's attention during the trial to make a record. Due process does not require a trial court to automatically hold a hearing. It is a matter of the trial court's discretion depending on the circumstances. 98 Neither was the court obligated to hold a hearing simply to allow the defendant to bring newspaper articles and radio and television reports to the trial court's attention. The Fifth Amendment requires an impartial jury and a fair trial. The issue the trial court must consider when faced with pretrial publicity is whether an impartial jury can be seated. Accordingly, it was an appropriate exercise of the district court's discretion and ordinarily preferable to assess the impact of the pretrial publicity through an extensive voir dire of the prospective jurors, instead of in the vacuum of a hearing without reference to prospective jurors. After all, [i]f the [voir dire] ... examination satisfied the trial judge that the effects of the pretrial publicity were not prejudicial, there would be no necessity for his holding an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Gullion, 575 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir.1978). We find no due process violation in the district court's refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing on the effects of pretrial publicity in this case.B. POSTPONING AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE 99 Larry Peters challenges both the trial judge's initial decision to reserve the defendant's venue motion until after the voir dire and the judge's subsequent denial of the motion. 100 Peters asserts that the district court abused its discretion by reserving decision upon the venue motion until after the voir dire in April 1984. A court in its discretion may defer a determination of a pretrial venue motion until after the voir dire of the prospective jurors when the effects of pretrial publicity can be fully assessed. See United States v. Mandel, 415 F.Supp. 1033, 1052-53, 1067 (D.Md.1976); United States v. Balistrieri, 346 F.Supp. 336, 339-40 (E.D.Wis.1972). The ultimate question is whether it is possible to select a fair and impartial jury, and in most situations the voir dire examination adequately supplies the facts upon which to base that determination. United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119, 1126 (7th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 905, 91 S.Ct. 1366, 28 L.Ed.2d 645 (1971) (footnote omitted). This was such a situation, and the district court did not err in waiting until after the voir dire to decide the change of venue motion. 101 Larry Peters also challenges the trial court's subsequent denial of the venue motion. A motion for a change of venue under Fed.R.Crim.P. 21 28 rests within the trial court's discretion. 102 Due process, of course, requires that an accused be tried by an impartial jury free from outside influences.... Impartiality, however, does not mean complete juror ignorance of issues and events.... If a juror can put aside his impressions gained from pretrial publicity and render a fair verdict based upon the evidence, the impartiality requirement is satisfied.... Where juror exposure to pretrial publicity can be shown, defendants must still demonstrate that actual prejudice resulted. 103 United States v. Garza, 664 F.2d 135, 138 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 993, 102 S.Ct. 1620, 71 L.Ed.2d 854 (1982) (citations and footnote omitted). The record does not support a finding of actual prejudice from the publicity that would have necessitated a change of venue. Peters does not establish any actual prejudice. He relies upon statements by potential jurors at the voir dire who were later excused and upon unsubstantiated speculation. Peters' speculation, based upon an isolated comment by a sitting juror, is inconsistent with that juror's answers to other voir dire questions. Such speculation about the deliberations does not establish actual prejudice. 104 Nor was this one of the rare cases surrounded by such a carnival atmosphere, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1520, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966), that prejudice can be presumed from the pervasive and inflammatory pretrial publicity. United States v. Garza, 664 F.2d 135, 138 n. 1 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 993, 102 S.Ct. 1620, 71 L.Ed.2d 854 (1982). See United States v. Abrahams, 453 F.Supp. 749 (D.Mass.1978). The trial judge's comments about the amount of publicity reflect only the judge's awareness of the situation and are not evidence of the jurors' inability or unwillingness to be impartial. While some of the answers of some of the prospective jurors might seem in the record or out of context to indicate prejudice from the publicity, we are satisfied that the district court's carefully conducted voir dire resulted in the selection of unprejudiced jurors. See Garza, 664 F.2d at 139 & n. 2; United States v. Hueftle, 687 F.2d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir.1982). 105 The newspaper articles supporting the venue motion and cited as examples of the sensational press coverage are all dated from May through June of 1983. The voir dire of jurors did not begin, however, until April 1984, almost a year later. The trial judge was concerned about the amount of publicity and was in the best position to assess the effects of the publicity upon the potential jurors and upon the possibility of a fair trial. The trial judge was well aware of the possible influence of the publicity, and he took steps to ensure the jurors' impartiality and a fair trial. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358-363, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1519-23, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966) (trial court has a number of means at its disposal to protect the jury from outside influence). The judge excluded the press from the voir dire examination. The judge asked the potential jurors as a group if any of them had heard or read anything about the case. Those who indicated they had were individually and extensively questioned by the judge and each of the attorneys to determine the extent of that knowledge and to determine exactly what the potential juror had read or heard and what details the juror could recall. 106 Several potential jurors indicated having read approximately a dozen articles at various times, including a few articles which appeared in the weeks preceding the voir dire. Several jurors indicated that the articles they had read were not detailed. Most potential jurors, when asked to recite what information they had surrounding Anthony Peters' arrest, focused upon the seizure of property and drugs. 107 The judge impressed upon each potential juror the presumption of innocence and that the defendant need not present any evidence or any explanation. The judge then ascertained whether the prospective juror could be impartial and would make a decision in the case based only upon the evidence presented in the courtroom. Those who indicated they could not be impartial were excused. The judge on his own motion excused several more potential jurors whom he felt would be unable to approach the case with an open mind. The defendant does not point to any actual juror, as opposed to a prospective juror, who indicated an inability or unwillingness to follow the court's instructions to keep an open mind and to presume the defendants innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. When the actual jury had been chosen, the judge repeatedly instructed the jurors not to read or listen to any news reports of the case or talk to anyone about the case. We are not willing to speculate that the jurors disobeyed the judge's instructions. 108 Although asserting irreparable and pervasive prejudice from pretrial publicity, Larry Peters cites only two examples of comments by sitting jurors to support his contention. Although one of the jurors Peters cites did say that the initial news reports caused him to expect an explanation from Anthony Peters as to the source of his property, that same juror, upon further questioning, also said that knowing what I do now after it's been explained through the judge, I think I could ... blindly [follow the instruction of the court that you have no right to expect a defendant to offer an explanation] without looking back at what I had heard previous. This same juror also stated that he could separate what he heard in the courtroom from his preconceived views and that he would go with what I heard in the courtroom. He also understood and acknowledged that the defendant is presumed innocent. The juror stated that although he had initially formed an opinion from reading the newspaper, he did not have an opinion as to the defendant's guilt or innocence because of his presence at the voir dire proceedings. He indicated that from his basic knowledge of what's going on now, ... I think it would be only fair that everything be heard before I do form an opinion. 109 The second juror indicated that in conversations with co-workers he had said that Anthony Peters was in big trouble if he was guilty or, alternatively, that Anthony Peters was in big trouble. Peters also points out that this juror felt that you can't print a lie in the paper, so some of it must be true. This juror also indicated that he was envious of some of the defendants his own age being wealthy or having property. The juror further answered, however, that he would be able to put aside his envy and that it would not influence his decision on the defendants' guilt or innocence. He also indicated that although it probably would be hard to put aside his opinion, he thought he could render a decision based solely on the evidence presented in the courtroom. He also indicated that he would not expect Anthony Peters to explain his wealth because, based upon the judge's comments, he understood that he could not expect Peters to testify or to offer evidence. 110 These comments do not indicate that these jurors were not impartial. As the Supreme Court has stated, 111 an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case. This is particularly true in criminal cases. To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. 112 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642-43, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). Peters has not pointed out any actual prejudice from the publicity, and we find that the trial judge's voir dire examination adequately protected the defendant from any prejudice. See United States v. Hendrix, 752 F.2d 1226, 1231-32 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Merritt v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 2032, 85 L.Ed.2d 314 (1985). The district judge's conduct of the voir dire examination coupled with his repeated admonition to the selected jurors not to listen to or read any accounts of the trial or speak with anyone about the case satisfied due process requirements. We find no support for Peters' contention that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for change of venue. C. SEQUESTRATION 113 Larry Peters argues that the district court prejudiced the jury against Larry and Anthony Peters by abruptly sequestering the jury halfway through the four-week trial. Peters objects that both the timing and the manner in which the trial judge conducted the sequestration prevented Peters from receiving a fair trial. 114 Peters argues that the trial court should have sequestered the jury from the beginning of the trial because the jury would have understood and accepted the burden of sequestration better, but we see no examples of publicity in the record that would have warranted immediate sequestration. Sequestration in a trial of this length is a drastic and extremely burdensome measure that is not required simply because the case attracts media attention. Sequestration and control of news coverage are appropriate to control gross abuses of the news media in the guise of 'freedom of the press.'  Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727, 733 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833, 90 S.Ct. 89, 24 L.Ed.2d 84 (1969). 115 The trial judge was fully aware of the publicity surrounding the trial, but he was also aware of the substantial hardship that sequestering a jury for an estimated four to six weeks of trial could impose. The court was understandably reluctant to impose sequestration upon the jury unnecessarily. When the court learned that a story based upon information not in the public record was about to be released, the trial judge ordered the sequestration. 116 Peters reasons that the jury would have accepted four weeks of sequestration better than two weeks because the jurors would not have been subjected to the court's military-like commands at the mid-trial sequestration. As we discuss in greater detail subsequently, we do not find that the trial judge's actions were military-like nor did his actions prevent a fair trial. Had the trial judge not acted promptly as he did we expect the defendants would be here arguing that he did not protect the jury from the anticipated publicity. 117 Larry Peters also attacks the manner in which the trial judge effected the sequestration. The district court denied the defendants' pretrial motion for sequestration, which the defendants renewed at voir dire. Then, on Friday, May 4, 1984, the district court learned that on the following day an article was to be published in the Milwaukee Sentinel linking the case to drug deals allegedly involving several Milwaukee Brewers baseball players. The court ordered that each juror be read a written statement on Friday night stating that the jury was being sequestered, that the jury was to report to the court at 10:00 a.m. Saturday morning, and that the jury was still prohibited from listening to or reading press accounts. 118 Peters complains that the judge's military-like commands and failure to explain the sequestration made the jury antagonistic to the defendants. The record does not support Peters' contention that the jurors blamed the defendants for the sequestration. The district court specifically instructed the jurors that he had ordered the sequestration, not the defendants or the government. We are unwilling to say that the jurors disregarded the trial judge's statement and arbitrarily decided to seek revenge on the defendants. 119 We find that the district court handled the jury sequestration appropriately. The court responded to the exigencies of the moment upon learning of the imminent release of the newspaper article. There was no need for the trial court to explain the reason for the sequestration in its order on Friday night. The judge acted reasonably in seeking to sequester the jurors as quickly as possible in light of his knowledge of this particularly inflammatory article. In addition, the court's voir dire of the jury upon sequestration adequately protected the impartiality of the jury. 120 The court followed the procedure required in this circuit when prejudicial publicity is brought to the court's attention during the trial: 121 [T]he court must ascertain if any jurors who had been exposed to such publicity had read or heard the same. Such jurors who respond affirmatively must then be examined, individually and outside the presence of the other jurors, to determine the effect of the publicity. However, if no juror indicates, upon inquiry made to the jury collectively, that he has read or heard any of the publicity in question, the judge is not required to proceed further. 122 United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1214 (7th Cir.1985) (quoting Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727, 735 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833, 90 S.Ct. 89, 24 L.Ed.2d 84 (1969)). 123 The trial judge individually questioned each juror the morning the jurors arrived to be sequestered. Only one juror indicated hearing the case mentioned in connection with the Milwaukee Brewers. The juror had immediately turned the car radio off, and she told the court that this brief exposure would not influence her or affect her impartiality. Larry Peters suggests that this juror's minimal exposure to this news report necessarily adversely affected her view of the defendants. The record does not support this contention, and the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to replace this juror with an alternate. It was unnecessary for the trial judge at the time of sequestration to question the jurors, as Peters suggests, about the impact of sequestration. At the voir dire examination before the trial began the judge had ascertained the possible impact of sequestration and of a lengthy trial. 124 The court's actions in sequestering the jury only when the need arose were reasonable and adequately protected the defendants' due process rights. 125 D. ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES WITH AGREEMENTS WITH THE GOVERNMENT 126 Larry Peters next argues that the district court committed plain error in admitting the testimony of certain witnesses who had performance agreements with the government. Larry Peters claims that the plea agreements between George Gama, John Redford, John Gingras, and Michael Taylor were contingent upon performance at trial and constituted a per se violation of due process because the nature of the agreements placed a 'premium' on adverse testimony and motivated the witnesses to embellish upon or 'create' facts directly resulting in false testimony. 127 Neither Peters nor any other defendant objected on these grounds at trial. We therefore review the admission of this testimony under the plain error standard of Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). 29 Plain error is an error so egregious that it resulted in 'an actual miscarriage of justice, which implies the conviction of one who but for the error probably would have been acquitted.'  United States v. Sherwood, 770 F.2d 650, 653 (7th Cir.1985) (quoting United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338, 1349 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 792, 83 L.Ed.2d 785 (1985)). 128 George Gama was promised an income tax evasion charge, instead of the original conspiracy charge, and a recommendation of a maximum sentence of three years. John Redford agreed to testify in return for substitution of a single charge with a maximum four-year sentence for the original multiple charges carrying a maximum fifteen-year penalty. The government also agreed not to make any detrimental sentencing recommendation and to inform the court of Redford's cooperation. In return for truthful testimony, the government agreed to drop the original conspiracy and distribution of cocaine charges against John Gingras, carrying a possible sixty-year penalty, for a lesser charge with a five-year sentence, and no sentence recommendation. Similarly, Michael Taylor understood that if he testified truthfully he would receive immunity, but that if he lied he would be prosecuted for perjury as well as for his drug activity. At the time of trial Gama had not been sentenced, and Redford and Gingras were technically still defendants. 129 The agreements are traditional plea agreements where the government exercises its prosecutorial discretion in exchange for truthful testimony from a government witness about the witness' associates. Conditioning performance of the agreement upon truthful testimony at trial does not encourage exaggeration or lying, but rather serves as a necessary means to ensure truthful compliance with the plea agreement. See United States v. Kramer, 711 F.2d 789, 795 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 962, 104 S.Ct. 397, 78 L.Ed.2d 339 (1983); United States v. Kenney, 598 F.Supp. 874, 879-80 (D.Me.1984). Although they may not have been fully performed, these agreements nevertheless were not contingent upon the outcome at trial or upon further prosecutions. Cf. United States v. Baresh, 595 F.Supp. 1132 (S.D.Tex.1984) (extremely lenient treatment of informant conditioned upon successful prosecution of targeted defendants); United States v. Dailey, 589 F.Supp. 561, 562 (D.Mass.1984), vacated and remanded, 759 F.2d 192 (1st Cir.1985) (plea agreement dependent upon the success of the government's prosecutorial effort). 130 The details of each of the agreements in this case were fully revealed to the jury and were subject to cross-examination by each defendant's attorney. The jury, after being fully apprised of the various plea agreements, could adequately determine the reliability of this testimony. Each agreement was 131 made and binding upon the government before ... [the witness] testified; it was not contingent upon the government's satisfaction with the content of the testimony. [Each government witness] ... could testify truthfully and fully pursuant to the agreement without fear of reprisal. [Each witness'] ... testimony related to known facts; the agreement did not require the witness to seek out incriminating evidence against the appellant.... Further, the jury was fully apprised of the conditions under which [each witness] testified. 132 United States v. Librach, 536 F.2d 1228, 1230 (8th Cir.1976). These agreements did not put a premium upon adverse testimony nor create a risk of perjury so great that the admission of this testimony resulted in a miscarriage of justice. These agreements did not make the testimony unreliable as a matter of law and admission of this testimony plain error. 133 Larry Peters relies upon the original panel's opinion in United States v. Waterman, 732 F.2d 1527 (8th Cir.), vacated en banc by an equally divided court, 732 F.2d at 1533 (8th Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 2138, 85 L.Ed.2d 496 (1985), holding that the district court in that case erred in denying the defendant's motion to vacate his sentence based upon an agreement between the government and the main prosecution witness. The witness, before testifying at Waterman's trial, had been sentenced to twelve years pursuant to a government agreement to testify against others in the scheme for participating in arson and fraud. The allegedly improper agreement was that the government would recommend a two-year reduction in the witness' sentence if the witness' continued cooperation led to further indictments. The original appellate panel found that the government cannot consistent with due process offer favorable treatment to a prosecution witness contingent upon the success of the prosecution. Id. at 1532. The court also found that the jury could not legitimate that particular agreement by deciding upon the witness' credibility. The original panel therefore ordered the district court to release Waterman. An equally divided court sitting en banc reversed the appellate panel and affirmed the district court's refusal to vacate Waterman's sentence. 134 Peters' reliance upon Waterman is misplaced. The agreements at issue in this case differ substantially from the agreement in Waterman. In Waterman the prosecution's recommendation for the witness depended solely on whether the witness' testimony in front of the grand jury procured further indictments for the prosecution. The agreements in this case, however, were not linked to the outcome of the trial. The agreements in this case merely conditioned the sentencing recommendations upon truthful trial testimony. 135 The district court did not commit plain error by admitting the testimony of Gama, Redford, Gingras, and Taylor because the plea agreements negotiated with these witnesses do not offend due process. E. SEVERANCE MOTION 136 Larry Peters claims that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to sever Larry's trial from that of his brother Anthony Peters. Larry Peters asserts three bases for this claim: (1) the complexity of the case; (2) the disparity of the evidence; and (3) his fraternal relationship with codefendant Anthony Peters. We do not find any of these arguments to be meritorious. 137 A motion to sever a trial is addressed to the trial court's sound discretion, and the court's decision will be reversed only upon a clear showing of abuse of that discretion. United States v. Shue, 766 F.2d 1122, 1135 (7th Cir.1985). On appeal the defendant must show actual prejudice from the denial. United States v. Oglesby, 764 F.2d 1273, 1276 (7th Cir.1985). Establishing actual prejudice from a joint trial means showing that the defendant could not have a fair trial without severance, not merely that a separate trial would offer him a better chance of acquittal. United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 836 (7th Cir.1977). The general policy is that persons indicted together should be joined for trial, particularly where a conspiracy is charged which may be proved against all defendants by the same evidence and which results from the same or similar series of acts. United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892, 896 (7th Cir.1965). See also United States v. Percival, 756 F.2d 600, 610 (7th Cir.1985). The strong public interest in having joint conspiracy trials, however, does not override the need to ensure the defendants a fair trial. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 773, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1252, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). In complex cases or cases with a disparity in the evidence, the question of whether a joint trial infringes upon the defendant's rights to a fair trial depends on 'whether it is within the jury's capacity ... to follow admonitory instructions and to keep separate, collate and appraise the evidence relevant only to each defendant.'  United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1200 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965, 101 S.Ct. 1481, 67 L.Ed.2d 614 (1981) (quoting United States v. Kahn, 381 F.2d 824, 839 (7th Cir.1967)). See also United States v. Cavale, 688 F.2d 1098, 1107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 103 S.Ct. 380, 75 L.Ed.2d 441 (1982). We are satisfied that in this case the jury was able to follow the court's limiting instructions and assessed Peters' guilt on the basis of the evidence against him. 138 Peters first argues that severance was warranted under Fed.R.Crim.P. 14 30 because of the complex nature of the case. Four defendants were tried together on a fourteen-count indictment covering four years and numerous substantive acts. Larry Peters was charged in count one of conspiracy to distribute cocaine based upon a 1981 trip to Houston, Texas. The conspiracy charge encompassed twenty acts of various codefendants and other persons and acts referred to in the other thirteen counts of the indictment. Of the other thirteen counts, nine counts detail substantive acts of Anthony Peters only, two counts name Anthony Peters and another coconspirator, and one count was dismissed for lack of evidence. 139 In a related argument, Larry Peters claims that the disparity in evidence made it impossible for the jury to independently consider the evidence against him. Peters points to the relatively small amount of documentary evidence introduced against him and characterizes the testimonial evidence as showing that he was at most an errand boy for Anthony Peters, not part of a cocaine conspiracy. Larry Peters contrasts the evidence produced against him with the extensive evidence introduced against his brother Anthony Peters. This contrast, Peters asserts, inevitably led to a transference of guilt, with the evidence against Anthony Peters rubbing off on Larry Peters. 140 Peters' third argument is that the jury necessarily lumped the charges and evidence against Anthony Peters with those against Larry Peters because the two are brothers. Peters argues that his fraternal relationship with Anthony Peters made it impossible for the jury to follow the court's instructions and that his conviction thus resulted from suspicion and innuendo created by the evidence against Anthony Peters. 141 Peters has not, however, demonstrated any actual prejudice from the joint trial and the fact that the evidence against his codefendant[] might have been proportionally greater than the evidence against him is not itself grounds for a severance. United States v. Hendrix, 752 F.2d 1226, 1232 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Merritt v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 2032, 85 L.Ed.2d 314 (1985). At the trial, six witnesses testified they regularly bought or received delivery of cocaine from Larry Peters during the time period of the conspiracy. Although Larry Peters dismisses this evidence as highly suspect at best, credibility is an issue for the jury to determine. The testimony of these five witnesses provided ample evidence to support the jury's verdict against Larry Peters without the jury resorting to guilt by association. 142 Although the trial judge declined to instruct the jury each time evidence was admitted on count fourteen against Anthony Peters alone, the judge was willing to give an instruction during the trial in certain circumstances. For instance, defense counsel was particularly concerned about evidence relating to Anthony Peters' Chicago condominium decorating expenses, and, at defense counsel's request, the judge instructed the jury that these exhibits were received only as to Anthony Peters, not as to the other defendants. Furthermore, during the final jury instructions the trial judge reiterated several times in various contexts that the jurors must give separate personal consideration to the case of each individual Defendant; ... leaving out of consideration entirely any evidence admitted solely against the other Defendant or Defendants. Finally, in addition to these general instructions, the court also made several statements directly applicable to Larry and Anthony Peters. The trial judge specifically instructed that [a] conspiracy cannot be proven solely by a family relationship or other types of close association and that mere association with the alleged conspirators does not establish participation in the conspiracy. 143 The trial court's actions were sufficient to avoid any transference of guilt from the complexity of the case, the disparity of evidence, or the relationship between Larry and Anthony Peters. Although the trial judge declined to instruct the jury each time evidence was introduced only against Anthony Peters, he was willing to give such a clarifying instruction for items or exhibits which particularly concerned defense counsel. These occasional clarifying instructions during trial, coupled with the final jury instructions, were sufficient precaution against spill-over of evidence from Anthony Peters to Larry Peters. See United States v. Percival, 756 F.2d 600, 610 (7th Cir.1985); United States v. Cavale, 688 F.2d 1098, 1108 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 103 S.Ct. 380, 74 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982). Moreover, the acquittal of Thomas Pogodzinski on the conspiracy charge indicates the jury's understanding of and compliance with the trial court's limiting instructions. See United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1200 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965, 101 S.Ct. 1481, 67 L.Ed.2d 614 (1981); United States v. Shue, 766 F.2d 1122, 1135 (7th Cir.1985). 144 We believe that the jury was able to follow the court's instructions and to properly separate, collate and appraise the evidence relevant only to each defendant. United States v. Kahn, 381 F.2d 824, 839 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1015, 88 S.Ct. 592, 19 L.Ed.2d 661 (1967). Accordingly, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the severance motion. F. SENTENCING 145 Larry Peters' final argument is that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing him to twelve years in prison. Peters points to the disparity between his sentence and those of his codefendants and objects to the trial judge's refusal to sentence him under the Young Adult Offender Statute. 146 Peters argues that his sentence of twelve years evidences a gross abuse of discretion in light of codefendant Sal Dacquisto's sentence of eighteen months for his participation in the conspiracy and codefendant Anthony Peters' sentence of twenty-two years for operating a continuing criminal enterprise. Larry Peters asserts that in comparison his sentence was unduly harsh and inconsistent with his participation in and the severity of the respective crimes. 147 The trial court has broad discretion in sentencing, and  'a mere showing of disparity of sentences among codefendants does not constitute an abuse of discretion.'  United States v. Herrera, 757 F.2d 144, 150 (7th Cir.1985) (quoting United States v. Cardi, 519 F.2d 309, 315-16 (7th Cir.1975)). Moreover, [a] sentence which is within the limits established by the statute under which it is imposed will not be vacated upon review unless the sentencing judge relied upon improper considerations or unreliable information in exercising his discretion or failed to exercise any discretion at all in imposing the sentence. United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 402-03 (7th Cir.1985). Accord United States v. Noble, 754 F.2d 1324, 1332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 63, 88 L.Ed.2d 51 (1985). Peters' sentence was within the statutory limit, 31 and our review of his sentence is therefore extremely limited. 148 The trial court's comments in sentencing Peters indicate that the court based its decision upon Larry Peters' role as second-in-command of the conspiracy, upon the magnitude of the offense, and upon the need to deter others. The trial judge's remarks also indicate that he considered the need to protect society and the possibility of rehabilitation. All of these factors are proper considerations in determining an appropriate sentence. See United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1201 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965, 101 S.Ct. 1481, 67 L.Ed.2d 614 (1981). Although concluding that he would not be afraid to have Larry Peters circulating in society and that Peters was a good prospect for rehabilitation, the district court stressed the offense committed and the strong need for deterrence in imposing a twelve-year sentence. 149 Peters characterizes his role in the conspiracy as that of an errand boy. The judge, however, described Larry Peters as the executive officer, ... the lieutenant, the one who carried out the things that had to be done, that Tony [Peters] didn't see fit to take care of himself. Larry Peters' argument that his sentence is inconsistent with the sentences of Anthony Peters and Sal Dacquisto is further undermined by the judge's remark that he took a structured view of the dispositions that are made of all of the convicted defendants, taking into cognizance the roles in making the ... [conspiracy] succeed. 150 Focusing upon one of the trial court's comments at sentencing, 32 Larry Peters claims that the district court based its sentence upon a mistaken notion that Larry Peters shared in Anthony Peters' accumulation of wealth. Commenting upon the sentencing decision, this court has noted that [t]he task is not a simple one for the conscientious judge, indeed is an awesome responsibility, and it is easy with hindsight to seize out of context upon words, perhaps prompted by judicial soul-searching, to claim that the sentencing was somehow improperly influenced. United States v. Cardi, 519 F.2d 309, 313 (7th Cir.1975). 151 As discussed above, the record reveals that the court considered a number of factors, but focused primarily upon Larry Peters' integral role in this serious crime and upon the need for deterrence. In discussing the seriousness of the crime, the trial judge made the remarks to which Larry Peters objects. In the context of the trial judge's other remarks at sentencing, however, we do not believe that the trial judge based his sentencing decision upon an erroneous understanding of the facts. The trial court's remarks during the sentencing hearing reflect a thoughtful balancing of appropriate factors, and the record does not indicate any abuse of discretion in imposing a twelve-year sentence on Larry Peters. 152 Larry Peters also challenges the district court's refusal to apply the Young Adult Offender Statute (the Act), 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4216. 33 Peters describes himself as a prime candidate for treatment under the Act and argues that the court failed to consider the fact that Larry Peters was a follower and not a leader in the conspiracy. Addressing a similar situation the Supreme Court stated that [o]nce it is made clear that the sentencing judge has considered the option of treatment under the Act and rejected it, ... no appellate review is warranted. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 443, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 3053, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974). See also United States v. Ford, 627 F.2d 807, 813 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 923, 101 S.Ct. 324, 66 L.Ed.2d 151 (1980); United States v. Negron, 548 F.2d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 912, 97 S.Ct. 2981, 53 L.Ed.2d 1096 (1977). 153 The trial court made a specific finding of fact that as Larry Peters was twenty-four years old when convicted he was eligible for treatment under the Act. The court furthermore stated that he had considered using the Act, but decided on balance that the case was not appropriate for the Act because of the magnitude of the crime. In this case, it is clear that the court considered applying the Act and declined to do so. We will not disturb the court's decision.