Opinion ID: 1489448
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Miscellaneous Allegations of Error

Text: Appellants also claim that (1) the trial court erred by finding that the Appellees were adverse parties and thereby granting them each three peremptory challenges; (2) the trial court improperly denied Appellants' claim of loss of consortium; (3) Appellees and/or their counsel engaged in misconduct; (4) the jury instructions erroneously directed the jury to consider Appellants' comparative negligence; (5) the jury instructions failed to properly instruct the jury as to the applicable law; (6) the jury's verdict as to Dr. Boyer's liability was not supported by the evidence; and (7) the jury engaged in misconduct. We address each of these issues in turn.
Appellants claim that it was error for the trial court to allow Dr. Eiseman and Dr. Boyer three peremptory challenges each during the jury selection process in violation of CR 47.03. The rule states, in relevant part: In civil cases each opposing side shall have three peremptory challenges, but co-parties having antagonistic interests shall have three peremptory challenges each. CR 47.03(1). The thrust of Appellants' argument is that Dr. Boyer and Dr. Eiseman were not sufficiently antagonistic to entitle them to separate peremptory challenges. The trial court must consider several factors in allocating the appropriate number of peremptory strikes under CR 47.03. In a recent unanimous opinion, we held: Generally, there are three elements to be considered in determining if coparties have antagonistic interests. They are 1) whether the coparties are charged with separate acts of negligence; 2) whether they share a common theory of the case; and 3) whether they have filed cross-claims. Additional important factors are whether the defendants are represented by separate counsel; whether the alleged acts of negligence occurred at different times; whether the defendants have individual theories of defense; and whether fault will be subject to apportionment. All of these factors are to be weighed by the trial court in determining if the defendants have antagonistic interests and thus are entitled to separate peremptory challenges. Sommerkamp v. Linton, 114 S.W.3d 811, 815 (Ky.2003) (internal citations omitted). We further stated: [I]nterests that are antagonistic at the time of jury selection or when the trial judge makes a determination regarding entitlement to separate peremptory challenges, do not necessarily have to remain antagonistic throughout the trial in order to support the allocation of separate challenges. There can be no certainty as to what the evidence will demonstrate or precisely what the claims or defenses will be during trial. Id. at 816. Appellants have provided no specific rationale for reversing the trial court on this issue and rely instead on a general objection that the Appellees pursued a common defense strategy throughout the trial. Appellees have each noted several instances during the trial which demonstrated their antagonistic interests. That being said, there is no need to recount each of those instances here. As noted above, a trial court's ruling under CR 47.03 is necessarily made prior to trial and a review of that decision need not focus on what actually occurred during the proceedings. In Roberts v. Taylor, 339 S.W.2d 653 (Ky.1960), a decision discussing an earlier version of the peremptory challenge rule, our predecessor court stated: Where the defendants in a personal injury action are charged with independent acts of negligence... the interests of the defendants are most always antagonistic, because each may escape liability or reduce his liability by convincing the jury that the other was solely or primarily responsible. Id. at 656. In this case, where two physicians were alleged to have committed entirely separate acts of negligence, that statement alone provides sufficient justification for the trial court's decision. This is particularly true given the jury's ability to consider the comparative negligence of the parties. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in granting separate peremptory challenges to the defending parties.
Appellants claim the trial court improperly refused to instruct the jury on their claim of loss of consortium. We first note that the only statutory support we can find for such a claim is limited to cases involving the wrongful death of a minor. See KRS 411.135 (In a wrongful death action in which the decedent was a minor child, the surviving parent, or parents, may recover for loss of affection and companionship that would have been derived from such child during its minority, in addition to all other elements of the damage usually recoverable in a wrongful death action.). It suffices to say that Michael Bayless was not killed. Appellants cite Department of Education v. Blevins, 707 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1986), for the general proposition that a parent may bring a claim for loss of consortium. But the cause of action in Blevins was premised on KRS 411.135 and loss of consortium damages were alleged after the death of a child. Nothing in Blevins supports the expansion of loss of consortium claims beyond the extreme case of a wrongful death lawsuit. Even if it did, we would point out that the holding in Blevins is limited to the context in which it arose, namely as an action against a state entity, and not an individual tortfeasor, pursuant to the Commonwealth's Board of Claims Act. [4] Furthermore, Blevins 's allowance for parental loss of consortium claims under the act was abrogated by statute as recognized in Williams v. Kentucky Department of Education, 113 S.W.3d 145, 156 (Ky.2003). Appellants provide no binding authority suggesting that Kentucky law recognizes a cause of action for loss of parental consortium in a personal injury case such as this. Instead Appellants cite an opinion of the Ohio Court of Appeals, Rouse v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 9 Ohio App.3d 206, 9 O.B.R. 355, 459 N.E.2d 593, 600 (1983), which they claim as proof that other courts have recognized and protected the right of a parent to be compensated for the interruption of parental rights. But Appellants' assertion about Rouse is clearly false. In fact, Rouse does not address the loss of consortium issue at all; rather it merely allow[s] a parent to recover from the wrongdoer the reasonable value of the care or attendance which he himself renders to his child as the result of a negligent injury. Id. at 600. Having cited no primary or secondary authority supporting their position, Appellants give us little reason to depart from the holding of the Court of Appeals in Humana of Kentucky, Inc. v. McKee, 834 S.W.2d 711 (Ky.App.1992). In that case, despite proof of serious and permanent injury to a child, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's denial of an instruction on the loss of [the child's] companionship, love and affection, that is, a claim for parental loss of consortium. Id. at 725. The Court of Appeals correctly noted that there is no Kentucky law which authorizes the giving of such an instruction. Id.
Appellants argue they are entitled to a new trial because of the [m]isconduct... of the prevailing party, or of his attorney. CR 59.01(b). Appellants' claim that after stipulating shortly before the trial that he had deviated from the requisite standard of care in examining Michael's x-ray, Dr. Eiseman testified and his attorney argued that this deviation was inconsequential and that he was sorry for the mistake. Appellants argue that Dr. Eiseman and his counsel should not have been permitted to make these and similar statements to the jury since they had admitted his liability for Michael's injuries. However, Appellants' argument reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of our tort law in that it assumes Dr. Eiseman's stipulation that he had violated the standard of care was equivalent to an admission of his liability for Michael's injuries, the ultimate issue in this case. In light of the foregoing, we have reviewed Dr. Eiseman's testimony and find no evidence of misconduct.
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in submitting an instruction to the jury which permitted a finding of comparative negligence on the part of the Appellants, Michael Bayless and/or his parents. Appellants' primary argument is that it was error to submit the question of Michael's negligence to the jury because of his relative youth and inexperience given that he was only 14 years old at the time of the accident. In support of their claim, Appellants cite Baldwin v. Hosley, 328 S.W.2d 426 (Ky.1959), which discusses the application of the long-overruled principle of contributory negligence [5] in cases where a party is a minor. They also claim that Boyer's allegedly inadequate discharge instructions relieved them of any duty they might have had to seek follow-up medical care. Appellants claim there was no factual basis for a jury instruction on the issue of comparative negligence and such an instruction was therefore impermissible. While it is true that an instruction must not be submitted on an issue that is entirely unsupported by evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom, West Virginia Tractor & Equip. Co. v. Cain, 487 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Ky.1972), Appellants have clearly ignored any and all such evidence in constructing this argument. Instead, Appellants present a litany of reasons that their liability should be excused or minimized. Such an argument, while appropriate for a jury at trial, does not address the fundamental error they have alleged here. There was sufficient evidence in this case to suggest that Appellants bore some responsibility for the injuries they claimed, not the least of which was the 66 day delay between Michael's treatment in the emergency room and his decision to seek follow-up treatment. Therefore the trial court's decision to instruct the jury on the issue of comparative negligence was not error.
This ground for appeal is, at best, a makeweight argument. Appellants' brief states that the instructions provided at trial essentially [gave] the jury no legal direction at all. Appellants cite no specific deficiencies or problems with the jury instructions and instead make only broad assertions of error. They ask that we overrule Cox v. Cooper, 510 S.W.2d 530 (Ky.1974), which held that jury instructions should provide only the bare bones, which can be fleshed out by counsel in their closing arguments if they so desire. Id. at 535 (emphasis added). Cox is not alone, however, and is buttressed by a long line of Kentucky cases which call for a substantially similar approach. See, e.g., Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., 840 S.W.2d 814 (Ky.1992); Rogers v. Kasdan, 612 S.W.2d 133 (Ky.1981); King v. Grecco, 111 S.W.3d 877 (Ky.App.2002). The instructions provided to the jury in this case were clearly adequate under Kentucky's established standard. Furthermore, Appellants' failure to cite any specific deficiency or to provide any more than a general objection to the practice of bare bones instructions gives us no reason to depart from our time-tested method of instructing juries.
Appellants claim that the jury's verdict in favor of Dr. Boyer was not supported by sufficient evidence and that it was error for the trial court to deny their motion for a new trial pursuant to CR 59.01(f). Appellants have identified three independent examples of what they claim was uncontroverted evidence of Dr. Boyer's negligence. These include his alleged failures (1) to perform the Anatomical Snuff-Box Test during Michael's emergency room examination, (2) to diagnose Michael's broken wrist through examination of the x-ray, and (3) to provide adequate discharge instructions upon Michael's release. At the outset, we would note that our role as a reviewing court is limited: The role of the appellate court when deciding negligence issues of this sort is limited to viewing the evidence from a standpoint most favorable to the prevailing party. In negligence cases such as this one the verdict of the jury resolves any conflicts in the testimony and also any conflicts in the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the testimony in favor of the prevailing party.... In short, an appellate court must not substitute its findings of fact for those of the jury if there is evidence to support them. Horton v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 690 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Ky.1985) (internal citations omitted). As stated above in our discussion of the zero verdict, appellate review of a trial court ruling on a motion brought pursuant to CR 59.01 is subject to the clearly erroneous standard, and requires a great deal of deference to the trial court. See Turfway Park Racing Ass'n v. Griffin, 834 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Ky.1992). Viewing the evidence in this case in the light most favorable to Dr. Boyer, it is clear that there was substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict in his favor. Appellants first contend that it was uncontroverted that Dr. Boyer did not perform an adequate physical examination of Michael's wrist, namely a palpation known as the Anatomic Snuff-Box Test. Significantly, Dr. Boyer did not remember the details of his meeting with Michael. However, he did testify that his notes taken during the examination included the comment no wrist pain, indicating to him that it was likely he performed the test because he would have thoroughly examined each of the bones in the wrist before making such an observation. Further, Michael admitted that Dr. Boyer had palpated different areas of his wrist, each time asking him if he experienced any acute pain. As for the x-rays, Dr. Boyer testified that because his physical examination revealed no acute pain in Michael's wrist, he did not believe that he would have ordered, much less examined, x-rays of the joint. Although Appellants contend that he did in fact examine the x-rays, such inconclusive testimony does not bar an inference by the jury in favor of the other party. Furthermore, the jury may have concluded that a failure by Dr. Boyer to properly interpret the x-rays was not a substantial factor in causing further injury to Michael due to Dr. Eiseman's subsequent admission that he had misread Michael's x-ray. Finally, Appellants argue that Dr. Boyer's discharge instructions to Michael were inappropriate. Although there was some disputed evidence regarding the verbal instructions given by Dr. Boyer, the discharge form clearly indicated that Michael should call his physician or return to the emergency room if his condition worsened or returned. Because Michael received such notice, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that Dr. Boyer's instructions were sufficient. In the end, Appellants' list of uncontroverted evidence, though it musters perhaps the strongest factual arguments from which a jury might infer that Dr. Boyer was liable, is incomplete in that it avoids any mention of evidence in the record that might lead a jury to the opposite conclusion. We, however, cannot ignore the existence of that evidence. Stated simply, Appellants ignored their obligation to show that the jury's verdict was not based on substantial evidence and instead endeavored to prove to this Court that they had the better case.
Finally, Appellants claim it was error to deny their motion for a new trial because CR 59.01(b) permits such relief when there has been misconduct of the jury. Specifically, Appellants claim that it was misconduct for one juror to vote against liability for Dr. Eiseman because the doctor had stipulated that his failure to recognize the fracture in the x-ray of Michael's wrist fell below the appropriate standard of care and the jury had been instructed as to that fact. Appellants state, [t]his illogical vote demonstrates a clear bias and prejudice which forecloses the ability to achieve a fair trial when a juror ignores stipulations and a court's directive. Appellants press this claim despite the fact that the jury concluded in their favor that Dr. Eiseman was partially liable for Michael's injuries, albeit by a vote of 11-1. As noted by the Court of Appeals, Appellants cite no legal authority supporting this claim. They confuse Dr. Eiseman's stipulation that his treatment fell below the standard of care with an admission that he is liable for Michael's injuries. In so doing, they ignore the possibility that a party might admit to a deviation from the standard of care but still avoid liability for an injury because the jury determines that the deviation was not the cause or proximate cause of the opposing party's injury. The trial court's instruction to the jury on this issue clearly contemplated just such a scenario. It read: The Defendant, Walter Eiseman, M.D., has stipulated that he did not meet his duty of care as a radiologist when he read Michael Bayless' x-ray of March 12, 1995. Given Walter Eiseman's failure to comply with this duty, if you believe from the evidence that such failure was a substantial factor in causing Michael Bayless' injuries, you will find for Michael Bayless against Walter Eiseman; otherwise, you will find for Walter Eiseman, M.D. Bayless et al. v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center et al., No. 96-CI-00438 (Kenton Cir. Ct. filed Jan. 25, 2001) (Jury Instructions, Instruction No. 4). In light of these facts, Appellants' statement in their brief that [t]he [trial court] so instructed the jury that they should find for plaintiffs on that issue, is clearly inaccurate. Likewise, their claim of juror misconduct is wholly without merit.