Opinion ID: 879899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the recantation

Text: The second specification of error concerns the District Court's failure to grant a new trial on the basis of Stillings' recantation. Perry does not attack the District Court's factual findings that Stillings was not credible; that Stillings' recantation could not be true because it conflicted with the testimony of other witnesses; that Stillings recanted out of fear for his life; that Perry lied on the stand; or that the testimony of Rande Branden is incredible. Rather, he contends that the District Court improperly applied the presumption of truthfulness to Stillings' 1971 testimony but not the subsequent recantation. As a result, Perry claims he was forced to shoulder the undue burden of proving the 1971 testimony was false. The District Court's reference to the presumption of truthfulness surrounding Stillings' 1971 testimony, in effect, adopts the prevailing judicial attitude that recanted testimony is to be viewed with great suspicion. State v. Tharp (Iowa App. 1985), 372 N.W.2d 280; State v. Norman (1982), 232 Kan. 102, 652 P.2d 683; In Re Weber (1974), 11 Cal.3d 703, 114 Cal. Rptr. 429, 523 P.2d 229; Thacker v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1970), 453 S.W.2d 566; People v. Nash (1967), 36 Ill.2d 275, 222 N.E.2d 473; State v. Wise (1966), 101 Ariz. 315, 419 P.2d 342. We believe the rule to be well reasoned. On its face, recanted testimony demonstrates the unreliability of a witness. In addition, it also raises other inquires: what motive would cause a person to subject himself to a potential perjury prosecution? In many cases, the answer is fear. See e.g., State v. Sena (1987), 105 N.M. 686, 736 P.2d 491 (defendant's family intimidated recanting witness with threats and acts of physical violence). Perry argues, however, that Stillings' recanted testimony is also entitled to a presumption of truthfulness and that the recantation per se mandates a new trial. Accord, State v. York (1985), 41 Wash. App. 538, 704 P.2d 1252. However, to grant a person of questionable credibility and motive carte blanche to overturn the determination of a jury operating within the bounds of our constitutional protections is not conducive to the sound administration of justice. People v. Shilitano (1916), 218 N.Y. 161, 112 N.E. 733; Accord, State v. Miller (Mont. 1988), 757 P.2d 1275; State v. Greeno (1959), 135 Mont. 580, 342 P.2d 1052. In light of the inherent suspicion surrounding recanted testimony and the public interest in swift and sure justice, we believe the better reasoned approach to be that adopted by the Supreme Court of Kansas: When a new trial is sought on the basis of recanting testimony of a prosecution witness, the weight to be given such testimony is for the trial judge passing on the motion for a new trial to determine. [Citations omitted.] The trial judge is required to grant a new trial only when he [or she] is satisfied the recantation of the witness is true. Norman, 652 P.2d at 689; see also, Thacker, 453 S.W.2d at 568; Nash, 222 N.E.2d at 478. We accordingly adopt the same. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, the decision of the District Court will be upheld. In the instant case, Stillings' recantation appears to be newly discovered perjury, not newly discovered evidence. As the District Court noted, the current versions of the night in question do not conform to the testimony of the other witnesses; the evidence presented at trial; Perry's prior statements; nor does it account for Perry's whereabouts at the time of the murder. It does strain the imagination, however. We conclude that Perry has failed to demonstrate the 1971 testimony was false.