Opinion ID: 1268943
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues relating to class certification

Text: Defendants argue the trial court erred in granting class certification. We agree. Proponents of class certification bear the burden of proving five prerequisites under South Carolina law. See Waller v. Seabrook Island Property Owners Ass'n, 300 S.C. 465, 388 S.E.2d 799 (1990); Rule 23(a), SCRCP. The prerequisites are: 1) the class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 2) there must be questions of law or fact common to the class; 3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties [must be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class; 4) the representative parties [must] fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class; and 5) the amount in controversy [must] exceed[] one hundred dollars for each member of the class. Rule 23(a), SCRCP. The first four criteria are often referred to as the requirements for numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation. In deciding whether class certification is proper, the court must apply a rigorous analysis to determine each prerequisite is satisfied. Waller v. Seabrook Island Property Owners Ass'n, supra . We generally defer to the trial court's discretion in granting class certification absent an error of law. [12] Id. Because failure to satisfy even one prerequisite is fatal to class certification we limit our discussion to the Named Plaintiffs' inability to prove commonality. [13] See id. (failure to satisfy all five prerequisites is fatal to class certification). To establish commonality, a party must show that there are questions of law or fact common to the class. Rule 23, SCRCP. In practical terms this means the party must articulate the existence of significant common, legal, or factual issues which bind the proposed class together. Boggs v. Divested Atomic Corp., 141 F.R.D. 58, 64 (S.D.Ohio 1991). Critically, [n]ot every issue in the case must be common to all class members. O'Connor v. Boeing North Amer., Inc., 184 F.R.D. at 311, 329 (C.D.Cal.1998). Commonality is met only where the class shares a determinative issue. See Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134, 145 (4th Cir.1990) (certification is proper only when a determinative critical issue overshadows all other issues; and question[s] [that are] in no way dispositive and [which] simply propel the action into a posture where judicial scrutiny is necessary for just adjudication are insufficient to establish commonality under Rule 23(a)(2), FRCP); see also Peoples v. Wendover Funding Inc., 179 F.R.D. 492, 498 (D.Md.1998) (a representative plaintiff cannot establish commonality ... if the court must investigate each plaintiffs individual claim.). Plaintiffs assert a common thread exists among its class members concerning whether Defendants' actions were proper in seizing income tax refunds without proper notice. We disagree. There are at least two common questions of law in this case relating to the 1995 Act: 1) whether the Defendants' notices pursuant to the 1995 Act were deficient and 2) whether Plaintiffs were prejudiced by the alleged deficiency. Even if the notices were deficient, Plaintiffs cannot prevail unless they establish they were prejudiced by the insufficiency. See Rose v. Beasley, supra ; Porter v. South Carolina Public Serv. Comm'n, supra ; Ballenger v. South Carolina Dep't of Health and Envtl. Control, supra . This is not a typical class action where minor factual differences exist among the individualized cases of class members. See, e.g., Monaco v. Stone, 187 F.R.D. 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1999. Instead, the factual differences (whether prejudice exists) are the crux of a predominant legal issue. A representative class cannot exist where the court must investigate each plaintiff's prejudice claim where it is one of the two predominate issues in the case. Requiring such individualized examination negates the benefits of a class action suit. See O'Quinn v. Beach Associates, 272 S.C. 95, 104, 249 S.E.2d 734, 738 (S.C.1978) (The very purpose of a class action is to avoid the necessity of requiring each member of the class to prove the elements of the cause of action.). Likewise, Named Plaintiffs cannot show that commonality exists for the defendant class. A court determines the existence of commonality among defendants by examining the plaintiffs' claims and the defendants' anticipated defenses. See Kline v. Coldwell Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226 (9th Cir.1974). As with Plaintiffs, Defendants' anticipated defenses center upon the predominant issue of whether Plaintiffs were prejudiced by the deficient notices. Such a defense necessitates forming legal arguments around the individual facts of each case to show whether prejudice may or may not exist. We conclude the trial judge erred by certifying both a plaintiff and a defendant class. [14]