Opinion ID: 4377578
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Promissory Estoppel and Negligence

Text: Doe argues the district court should not have dismissed his promissory estoppel and negligence claims against Dayton, NCHERM, and Swinton. Though these two claims have distinct elements, Doe’s allegations as to each suffer from the same flaw. The first element of a promissory estoppel claim is a “clear and unambiguous” promise. Cohen & Co. v. Messina, 492 N.E.2d 867, 872 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985). The first element of a negligence claim is “the existence of a duty.” Armstrong v. Best Buy Co., 788 N.E.2d 1088, 1090 (Ohio 2003). In this case, the promises made and duties owed are found in the terms of the Handbook and in Title IX itself. Claimed violations of Handbook terms have already been analyzed in their proper place, as potential breaches of contract. See O’Neill v. Kemper Ins. Cos., 497 F.3d 578, 583 (6th Cir. 2007) (“In Ohio, ‘where the parties have an enforceable contract and merely dispute its terms, scope, or effect, one party cannot recover for promissory estoppel.’” (alterations omitted) (quoting Terry Barr Sales Agency, Inc. v. All-Lock Co., 96 F.3d 174, 181 (6th Cir. 1996))); Bowman v. Goldsmith Bros. Co., 109 N.E.2d 556, 557 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952) (“[A]n action of tort for negligence cannot be maintained unless the defendant’s conduct constituted the breach of a duty imposed by law, apart from it being a breach of an obligation created by agreement of the parties, either express or implied.”). There is no dispute that the Handbook is a contract, so Doe’s response that these claims are pled in the alternative to his contract claims does not rescue them. Claimed violations of Title IX have likewise been analyzed in their proper place, under recognized Title IX rubrics—not as freestanding tort claims. See Horner ex rel. Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 206 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme Court rejected the use of agency or negligence principles to render the school district liable for monetary damages under Title IX.” (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 285 (1998))); see also Stiles -20- No. 18-3339, Doe v. Univ. of Dayton v. Grainger County, 819 F.3d 834, 849 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Title IX authorizes suit only against the school itself and not individual administrators . . . .”). The promissory estoppel and negligence claims were therefore properly dismissed.