Opinion ID: 2758259
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Statements of an Unidentified Declarant

Text: Mr. Brinson also argues that the district court erroneously allowed introduction of hearsay statements to Officer Keith Osterdyk during his undercover investigation. At trial, Officer Osterdyk testified that during his investigation,  he had responded to an online advertisement for an escort, 12  an unidentified female had given him the price and told him to go to Room 123 at the Super 8 Motel, and  he and the girl in the motel room had stated that they did not have a condom. Mr. Brinson argues that the statements constituted inadmissible hearsay and that their introduction violated the right to confrontation. We disagree for two reasons: 1. The statements did not constitute hearsay. 2. Even if the statements constituted hearsay, they would not have been considered “testimonial.” Thus, the district court did not err by admitting the statements into evidence.
An out-of-court statement is considered “hearsay” if it is offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)(2). Thus, if the statement is not offered for its truth, the statement is not considered “hearsay.” See United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 974-75 (10th Cir. 1993). The statements to Officer Osterdyk did not constitute hearsay. The prosecution did not present the out-of-court statements to prove the truth of the statements about the location, price, or lack of a condom. Rather, the prosecution offered these statements to explain why Officer Osterdyk went to Room 123, how he knew the price, and why he agreed to pay for 13 oral sex. 4 Because these statements were not offered for their truth, they did not constitute “hearsay.” See United States v. Freeman, 816 F.2d 558, 563 (10th Cir. 1987) (stating that an officer’s discussion of an investigation “was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; rather, it was admitted to explain preparations and steps in the Government’s investigation”).
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of hearsay statements that are “testimonial” in nature. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-60 (2004). As discussed above, the statements did not constitute “hearsay.” We also conclude that the statements were not “testimonial.” A statement is considered “testimonial” if “a reasonable person in the position of the declarant would objectively foresee that his statement might be used in the investigation or prosecution of a crime.” United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 1302 (10th Cir. 2005). The resulting issue is whether the female on the telephone would reasonably have foreseen use of her statements in an investigation or prosecution. The district court properly concluded that this use would not have been foreseen. See, e.g., United States v. Mooneyham, 473 F.3d 280, 4 Officer Osterdyk testified that he had “understood that not having a condom meant that [he] was not going to be able to have regular sex with [the female] but that [he] could only receive oral sex.” III. App. at 481. 14 286-87 (6th Cir. 2007) (statements made to an undercover officer were not “testimonial”); Brown v. Epps, 686 F.3d 281, 287-88 (5th Cir. 2012) (same). Because the statements to Officer Osterdyk were not “hearsay” or “testimonial,” the evidentiary ruling did not violate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.