Opinion ID: 513936
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: National and State Authority Under Article IX(4)

Text: 40 1. Evolution of Article IX(4). Examination of the evolution and contemporaneous understanding of clause 4 of Article IX confirms our conclusion that national authority to make treaties with the Indians derived from this clause and also sheds significant light on the respective powers of the national government and the states in Indian matters, particularly in regard to the purchase of Indian lands. The first draft of the Articles of Confederation, prepared by Benjamin Franklin in 1775, would have given Congress complete and exclusive authority over Indian affairs. Only Congress could purchase Indian land. 2 JCC 195-99 (July 21, 1775). Franklin's draft was not submitted to Congress. 41 The draft that served as the basis for amendment and ultimate adoption was prepared by John Dickinson. See 5 JCC 546-54 (July 12, 1776). The Dickinson draft submitted to Congress on July 12, 1776, gave Congress the sole and exclusive Right and Power of ... Regulating the Trade, and managing all Affairs with the Indians. Dickinson Draft of Articles of Confederation art. XVIII, 5 JCC 550 (July 12, 1776). This draft also dealt specifically with state authority to purchase Indian lands. In a provision more narrow than Franklin's draft, Dickinson's draft provided that no person or colony could purchase Indian land until state boundaries were determined, and Congress was given power to set such boundaries. Once the boundaries were determined, only Congress could purchase Indian land outside such boundaries. The plain implication was that after the boundaries were fixed, states could purchase Indian lands inside their boundaries. Id. art. XIV. 42 During the summer of 1776, a Committee of the Whole modified the Dickinson draft. The Committee's version, reported to Congress on August 20, 1776, deleted Article XIV from Dickinson's draft, eliminating even the prohibition on the authority of colonies to purchase Indian lands prior to ascertainment of state boundaries. The grant of exclusive power to Congress of regulating the trade, and managing all affairs with the Indians, contained in renumbered Article XIV, was now modified to apply only to Indians not members of any of the States. Committee Draft of Articles of Confederation art. XIV, 5 JCC 682 (Aug. 20, 1776). 43 Debate on the Articles languished until 1777 and did not resume on the clauses concerning Indian lands until October 1777. On October 27, two amendments were offered to the draft article granting Congress power over Indian affairs. The first, evidently offered by those interested in limiting national power, would have deleted the phrase not members of any of the states and substituted not residing within the limits of any of the United States. 9 JCC 844 (Oct. 27, 1777). This amendment would have narrowed national power to Indians living outside the territorial limits of the states. The second amendment, evidently offered by those interested in broadening national power, would have rewritten the entire grant of power to Congress to read: managing all affairs relative to war and peace with all Indians not members of any particular State, and regulating the trade with such nations and tribes as are not resident within such limits wherein a particular State claims, and actually exercises jurisdiction. Id. 44 Two aspects of this second amendment are significant. First, it showed that those endeavoring to broaden national power, the landless states, wanted national authority over trade with the Indians to apply even to Indians within a state's limits under circumstances where a state was not actually exercis[ing] jurisdiction. Second, it showed that even those seeking to broaden national power assumed that the phrase managing all affairs with the Indians included the power to deal with matters of war and peace with the Indians. The proponents of this amendment, in seeking broader national authority over Indian trade than over Indian war and peace matters, left the latter topic in what became Article IX(4); they did not bother to suggest any modification of the provisions that became Article IX(1) because they understood that the issues of war, peace, and treaties that were dealt with in those provisions concerned only relations with foreign countries. 45 The following day, October 28, the Congress, without explanation but evidently in a spirit of compromise, rejected both of the pending amendments and decided instead to leave the wording of the grant of national power respecting Indian affairs unchanged but to add the words of the Legislative Rights Proviso: provided, that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or violated. Id. at 845. 6 Thus, the somewhat ambiguous not members phrase was retained without either expansion or contraction, but a broad protection of state authority was expressly inserted, a protection of authority within a state's limits, not merely within areas over which it was actually exercis[ing] jurisdiction. 46 In two respects the evolution of Article IX(4) is especially pertinent to the pending controversy. First, the process that began with Franklin's draft and ended with the Articles as adopted represents a gradual victory for the landed states, which were seeking to curtail national power over Indian affairs. It would be inconsistent with this pattern of diminishing national power to find in the Articles an implicit prohibition barring the states from purchasing Indian land within their borders without the approval of Congress. Second, the contention that the exclusive Article IX(1) power of Congress to make treaties comprehends Indian treaties and thereby precludes state treaties to purchase Indian lands is refuted by the meticulous attention the Congress gave to Article IX(4). In the struggle between the states seeking to expand national power over Indian affairs and those seeking to narrow such power, all the attention was focused on the provisions that became Article IX(4). There was no controversy about the meaning of the national treaty power in Article IX(1). The entire debate over Article IX(4) would have to be ignored to conclude that while the landed states were winning their fight to refine Article IX(4) to their liking, there was always implicit in Article IX(1) a broad grant of exclusive national power that precluded by negative implication state purchases of Indian land within state borders. 47 Once it is understood that the allocation of power respecting all Indian affairs is governed solely by Article IX(4), there can be little doubt, as the preceding discussion has foreshadowed, that clause 4 confirmed the right of the states to purchase Indian lands within their borders without the consent of Congress, at least under circumstances that did not interfere with the war and peace powers of the Congress. Though the terms of clause 4 have properly been characterized as ambiguous, Worcester v. Georgia, supra, 6 Pet. at 559 (1832), and even obscure and contradictory, The Federalist No. 42, at 334 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961), the fundamental purpose and meaning of the Legislative Rights Proviso is clear in this respect. 48 In construing Article IX(4), we will assume without deciding that the District Court was correct in accepting appellants' contention that the not members phrase applied to Indians, such as those of the Six Nations, who were not assimilated into the body politic of any state, though located within its territorial limits. 649 F.Supp. at 431-32. Even if that is so, we agree with the District Court that the Legislative Rights Proviso confirmed the authority of the states to purchase Indian land within its borders without securing congressional consent. Id. at 433-35. Though the text of Article IX(4) does not settle the matter one way or the other, the contemporaneous materials examined by the District Court provide a firm basis for the Court's conclusion. 49 2. Contemporaneous Understanding of Article IX(4). Prominent among the contemporaneous materials surveyed by Judge McCurn is the correspondence between James Monroe and James Madison specifically discussing whether New York's claimed right to purchase Indian lands conflicted with the Articles of Confederation. In response to Monroe's query, Madison candidly recognized that Article IX(4) was ambiguous since the Legislative Rights Proviso, if taken in its full latitude, would destroy the authority of Congress. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Nov. 27, 1784), reprinted in II The Writings of James Madison 91 (Hunt ed. 1901). Endorsing an interpretation that endeavored to harmonize the Proviso with the grant of national regulatory power, Madison concluded that the Proviso guaranteed the states the right to purchase Indian land. 7 Specifically referring to the relationship between New York's proposed purchase and the national government's Treaty of Fort Stanwix, he said that as far as N.Y. may claim a right of treating with the Indians for the purchase of lands within her limits, she has the confederation on her side. 8 Id. 50 One somewhat equivocal indication of contemporaneous understanding is the resolution adopted by the Confederal Congress in 1783 in response to Pennsylvania's notification of its intention to make a treaty with the Indians for the purchase of land within the state's acknowledged borders. The Pennsylvania General Assembly had broached to Congress the topic of a land purchase in a carefully worded resolution that invited Congress to express its views but did not acknowledge the power of Congress to withhold consent. The resolution made clear Pennsylvania's view that the Articles of Confederation do not by any means explicitly restrict [the Pennsylvania General Assembly] from entering on this business [of a purchase of Indian land] independent of Congress, yet sought the sense of the Congress concerning the purchase being deeply impressed with the delicacy of touching any subject of federal relation, but with the most deliberate caution; and as the letter of a clause in the ninth section [Article IX(4) ] appears to involve a doubt.... 25 JCC 594 (Sept. 20, 1783). 51 The committee of Congress considering the matter recommended advising Pennsylvania that Congress had no objection provided no engagements relative to peace or war with the said Indians, be entered into by the said State, the power of holding treaties on this subject being vested by the Confederation solely in the United States in Congress assembled. Id. at 591. Though that view of national and state authority is consistent with our conclusions, the emphasis on national authority was evidently worded too strongly for the landed states, most of which joined together in defeating this version of the committee's resolution. After considerable attempts to find acceptable language, Congress ultimately adopted a far more innocuous resolution, stating only that the federal commissioners who were about to meet with the Indians to conclude a peace treaty should give notice to Pennsylvania of the time and place of holding the treaty to the end, that the persons to be appointed by [Pennsylvania], for purchasing lands within the limits thereof, at the expence of the said State, may attend for the sole purpose of making such purchase, at the time and place appointed for holding the said treaty. 25 JCC 767 (Oct. 30, 1783). Then, in lieu of the original language that had endeavored to describe the exclusive area of national authority, the resolution added that the United States commissioners are instructed to give every assistance in their power to the Pennsylvania negotiators towards promoting the interest of that State, as far as the same may consist with the general interest of the Union. Id. 52 Appellants draw from this episode the conclusion that Pennsylvania acknowledged the need to secure the approval of Congress for the land purchase. We think the episode lends greater support to the position of the appellees. Pennsylvania was careful to maintain its position that the Articles did not authorize Congress to bar the State's purchase. Significantly, Congress expressed no contrary view. Even the draft resolution emphasizing exclusive national power only over matters of war and peace was thought too strong and was rejected in favor of a more generally worded version that referred vaguely to the general interest of the Union. 53 More probative and strongly supportive of the appellees' position are the circumstances of Congress's reaction to New York's plans to undertake what ultimately became the first of the two purchases challenged in this litigation. During the course of congressional debate on resolutions of instruction to the federal commissioners who would negotiate the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, a resolution was offered concerning a then pending New York plan to distribute to its soldiers some of the land New York was endeavoring to appropriate from the Onondagas and the Cayugas, tribes that had sided with the British during the Revolution. The resolution would have instructed that if the planned distribution may so far irritate the Indians, as to expose these United States to the dangers and calamities of an Indian War, the federal commissioners were to report the difficulties to the New York legislature and in such case, it is earnestly recommended to the legislature of New York, to revise the laws by which such appropriations have been made.... 25 JCC 642 (Oct. 3, 1783). Even this mild proposal was too strongly worded for New York and other landed states, and it was defeated. But it is powerful evidence that even as to a land acquisition that might lead to war with the Indians, Congress believed it had only the power to recommend that a state desist, not the power to withhold a consent necessary for such acquisition. 54 Further indication of the absence of national power to disapprove state Indian land purchases under the Confederation are the pertinent views expressed concerning the changed circumstances under the Constitution. Among the most well-known statements is the December 29, 1790, reply of President Washington to Corn Planter, Chief of the Senecas, who had complained about state purchases of Indian lands. Washington pointed out that these purchases had occurred before the adoption of the Constitution and added, But the Case is now entirely altered. The General Government only has the Power to treat with the Indian Nations, ... No State, nor Person, can purchase your Lands, unless at a general Treaty, held under the Authority of the United States. Proceedings of the Commissioners of Indian Affairs 166 n. 1 (Hough ed. 1861). 55 Thomas Jefferson, writing an official opinion as Secretary of State, expressed a similar view on May 3, 1790: 56 There are but two means of acquiring the native title. First, war; for even war may, sometimes, give a just title. Second, contracts or treaty. 57 The States of America before their present union possessed completely, each within its own limits, the exclusive right to use these two means of acquiring the native title, and by their act of union, they have as completely ceded both to the general government. 58 3 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 19 (Lipscomb et al. eds. 1904). 9 59 In 1832, Chief Justice Marshall also recognized the significant change. In reviewing the evolution of national power over over Indian affairs, he noted the uncertainties created by the Legislative Rights Proviso in Article IX(4) and then observed that the correct exposition of this article is rendered unnecessary by the adoption of our existing constitution.... [The new government's powers over Indian affairs] are not limited by any restrictions on their free actions; the shackles imposed on this power, in the confederation, are discarded. Worcester v. Georgia, supra, 6 Pet. at 559. 60 In concluding as we do that during the confederal period the states had authority to purchase Indian land within their borders without the need of congressional consent, we accept an important proposition advanced by the appellees concerning the meaning of preemption during this period--namely, that this right of the states included the right to extinguish Indian title. After the Constitution, when the United States acquired plenary power over Indian affairs without the shackles of the Legislative Rights Proviso of Article IX(4), it is clear that the national government held the right of extinguishment of Indian title to all lands then owned by the Indians. But during the confederation, we are satisfied, after examination of the extensive materials presented to the trial court, that the historians who testified that the right of preemption enjoyed by the states then included the right of extinguishment have the better of the argument. 61 When Madison wrote his significant letter to Monroe on November 27, 1784, and set forth his reasons for construing the Legislative Rights Proviso to accord New York the right to purchase Indian land, he summarized the purport of the Proviso by saying that it was to save to the States their right of preemption of lands from the Indians. II The Writings of James Madison, supra, at 91. It would have made no sense to argue so carefully the case in support of New York's right to make the purchase if Madison had meant that New York could acquire only fee title, leaving the Indians with Indian title that only the United States could extinguish. Significantly, one of the reasons Madison advanced for his interpretation favoring New York was that the right of preemption had previously been asserted by New York and many other states. Clearly, these states had been asserting a right to obtain complete title to Indian lands within their borders, not a partial right that left them subject to the assent of the national government. 62 Jefferson's opinion of May 3, 1790, written when he was Secretary of State, also recognized that the rights of a state were broader before the Constitution. Advising with respect to Georgia's attempt to convey land obtained from Indians, he said: 63 Georgia, possessing the exclusive right to acquire the native title, but having relinquished the means of doing it to the national government, can only have put her grantee into her own condition. She could convey to them the exclusive right to acquire; but she could not convey what she had not herself, that is, the means of acquiring. 64 3 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, supra, at 20 (emphasis in original). 65 Marshall recognized the same point in Johnson v. McIntosh, supra. In recounting the development of the rights of discovering nations with respect to Indian lands, he observed: 66 It has never been doubted, that either the United States, or the several states, had a clear title to all the lands within the boundary lines described in the treaty [ending the war with Great Britain], subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and that the exclusive power to extinguish that right was vested in that government which might constitutionally exercise it. 67 8 Wheat. at 584-85 (emphasis added). It should be noted that Marshall was careful not to claim for the United States alone a right to extinguish Indian title, no doubt recognizing that the United States held such right as to Western lands but that the states held such right as to lands within their acknowledged borders. Marshall then considered the nature of Virginia's rights with respect to the particular parcels at issue in Johnson, land within the borders of Virginia that had been purchased by a private citizen from Indians in 1773 and 1775. After quoting Virginia's assertion in legislation passed in 1779 of the State's  'exclusive right of preemption from the Indians, of all the lands within the limits of her own chartered territory,'  the Chief Justice concluded, [I]t may safely be considered as an unequivocal affirmance, on the part of Virginia, of the broad principle which had always been maintained, that the exclusive right to purchase from the Indians resided in the government. Id. Having previously recognized that the right to extinguish Indian title was in that government which might constitutionally exercise it, Marshall (and Virginia) were necessarily using preemption to include the right of extinguishment. 68 We conclude that the Article IX(4) power of Congress to manage Indian Affairs, as limited by the Legislative Rights Proviso, did not preclude New York from making the 1785 and 1788 purchases of Oneida land within its borders.