Opinion ID: 3164647
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis of captain stevens’s claims

Text: Defendants argue that the district court erred in concluding that Stevens was subject to an adverse employment action. Defendants emphasize that, while she was initially terminated for not signing the Last Chance Agreement, Stevens was permitted later to resign. Because Stevens ultimately resigned, defendants argue, no adverse employment action was ever taken against her. 15 Case: 15-11265 Date Filed: 12/22/2015 Page: 16 of 24 We disagree. In the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Captain Stevens was effectively terminated and only resigned thereafter because she had no choice. Defendants admit they made her employment contingent on her signing the Last Chance Agreement. When she refused to sign the Agreement, defendants terminated her but then allowed her to resign on the day of her appeal hearing. At that point she was resigning to avoid a termination record. Given all events taken together, we cannot say that Stevens has not shown an adverse employment action for the purpose of making a prima facie case.
Plaintiff Captain Stevens argues that defendants’ proffered reasons for offering her the Last Chance Agreement and later terminating her were pretextual. Stevens asserts that (a) she did not violate any Department policy in the Olascoaga or GBI incidents; (b) similarly-situated employees were treated less harshly than Stevens; and (c) Major Matson demonstrated gender bias before and after the Olascoaga incident. We discuss each item separately.
The revised Last Chance Agreement chastised plaintiff Captain Stevens for exercising poor judgment and unprofessionalism inconsistent with Department standards for its captains and for violating Department policies, citing the Olascoaga incident along with three other incidents. Stevens has not shown that 16 Case: 15-11265 Date Filed: 12/22/2015 Page: 17 of 24 Chief Hobbs did not honestly believe that her conduct warranted a Last Chance Agreement and then termination. Captain Stevens argues that there was no explicit Department policy requiring that accident review panels receive and review complete accident review packets (including photographs). Stevens testified that panels frequently decided whether an accident was chargeable based solely on a verbal description of the accident. Neither she nor any officer she knew had been disciplined “for conducting an accident review panel without having the complete packet available.” The Department does have written policies stating that detailed photographs must be made of accidents involving city property or vehicles. Stevens stresses that these policies still do not specifically state that accident review panels must review the photos of the accident. Of course, defendants argue, that is the whole point of the photos and accident review packet. In any event, Captain Stevens emphasizes that the first review panel officers’ written statements and sworn testimony do not reflect them feeling threatened or intimidated by her. Stevens argues that she accurately described the accident to them. Stevens also points out that her non-chargeability finding was not “utterly unsupportable,” and Lieutenant Armstrong, although not a review panel member, admitted that it “could go either way.” 17 Case: 15-11265 Date Filed: 12/22/2015 Page: 18 of 24 The district court did not err in concluding that Captain Stevens failed to show pretext as to the Olascoaga incident. It is clear that photographs were supposed to be taken of Officer Olascoaga’s accident and that as a matter of best practices Stevens should have shared them with the original review panel as it considered whether the accident was chargeable. Stevens outranked each panel officer and advised each that the accident was non-chargeable. The Last Chance Agreement persuasively stated how this could have improperly influenced the panel: The significant difference between your rank and [the panel officers’] was at best a factor creating undue influence over their abilities to render independent judgments. At worst, the manner you used was intimidating, due largely to the strong opinion you voiced before they had an opportunity to form their own judgments about the facts, and the fact that you are a captain and they are merely sergeants. They understood that you expected them not to exercise their own independent judgment and discretion, but rather, to echo, or rubberstamp your conclusions. Thus, their review was a mere formality. From your experience as an investigator and as a manager, you should be keenly aware that this is not a competent, honest, nor a professional manner in which to conduct any investigation. Although Stevens disputes the Agreement’s description of her demeanor, she does not dispute approaching the original panel officers about what finding to make. The record indicates that Chief Hobbs saw the photographs and accident packet and reasonably concluded that Stevens’s “non-chargeable” finding was unsupportable and that her accident description had misled panel members. Further, a second review panel, upon reviewing the accident packet, unanimously 18 Case: 15-11265 Date Filed: 12/22/2015 Page: 19 of 24 found that the accident was chargeable. Importantly, it is irrelevant whether defendants’ decision to take adverse action against Stevens was imprudent or even unfair, so long as it was not discriminatory. See Flowers, 803 F.3d at 1338. Stevens’s evidence does not rebut the fact that Chief Hobbs disciplined Stevens because he honestly and reasonably believed that she acted improperly. There is no evidence of a discriminatory motive.
Plaintiff Captain Stevens also argues that back in February 2012 she did not violate any Department policy by telling a GBI officer that a former Forest Park officer had once attempted to grab her chest. As noted above, Stevens was disciplined for this incident (which was cited in the Last Chance Agreement). The February 2012 disciplinary report, that Stevens received, stated that she violated Chief Hobbs’s General Order #31 by providing undocumented information that could not be verified during a job reference. Order #31 states that (a) only the Chief of Police or persons to whom the Chief provides explicit written authority may provide any information or opinion about any Forest Park Police Department employee or former employee to any outside person or entity; and (b) it is the policy of the Forest Park Police Department to provide accurate and truthful information concerning its employees and former employees. 19 Case: 15-11265 Date Filed: 12/22/2015 Page: 20 of 24 Stevens does not dispute that she had not reported the groping behavior of the former officer before she told the GBI officer about it. In fact, when presented with the February 2012 disciplinary report stating that her disclosure of unverifiable information fell “outside the scope of General Order #31,” Stevens checked a box stating that she concurred with this statement (although she clarified that her intention was to be truthful). Even assuming arguendo that this GBI incident played a material role in Stevens’s ultimate termination, her evidence fails to create a triable issue concerning pretext.
Plaintiff Captain Stevens also argues that she was disciplined more harshly than similarly-situated peers, inviting an inference that her firing was discriminatory and that defendants’ proffered reasons for doing so were pretextual. In determining whether employees are similarly situated, we consider whether the employees are involved in or accused of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways. Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cty., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006). Where a plaintiff and a comparator are disciplined differently, the quantity and quality of a comparator’s misconduct must be “nearly identical” to that of the plaintiff for this to support the plaintiff’s discrimination claim. See id. Applying this standard, Stevens’s argument fails. 20 Case: 15-11265 Date Filed: 12/22/2015 Page: 21 of 24 Captain Stevens primarily points to Lieutenant Armstrong, an AfricanAmerican male who was subordinate to her. Lieutenant Armstrong concurred that Officer Olascoaga’s accident was non-chargeable and did not change his finding when urged by Major Matson. Armstrong was not disciplined, and was later promoted to plaintiff’s former position. However, Stevens’s argument ignores that Armstrong did not approach any of the three review panel members and advise them that Olascoaga’s accident was non-chargeable while failing to give them the review packet. Captain Stevens approached all three of them. Even setting aside Stevens’s prior disciplinary history, we find that Lieutenant Armstrong is a poor comparator. Stevens also argues that she is similarly situated to Captain Harris, a Caucasian male, who found a 2011 accident to be non-chargeable and was overruled by Major Matson. Stevens notes that, although Harris was on a Last Chance Agreement at the time, he only received verbal counseling. However, there is no record evidence that Harris gave his panel a misleading description of the accident in question, failed to provide them with evidence material to their determination or advised them the accident was non-chargeable (the panel unanimously found the accident was chargeable). Harris, too, is a poor comparator. 21 Case: 15-11265 Date Filed: 12/22/2015 Page: 22 of 24
Plaintiff Captain Stevens also argues that Major Matson had on several occasions demonstrated gender bias, and suggests that, due to his integral role in her termination, this casts suspicion on Chief Hobbs’s proffered bases for her termination. When denying Stevens’s request to transfer a female officer to her shift sometime in 2011, Matson allegedly commented that “there’s too much estrogen on your shift.” Stevens also points to a September 2011 email in which Matson said, “Lemme guess . . . your hat says ‘bitchy’?” in response to an email that Stevens had sent to several people that included a photograph depicting two female soldiers whose last names, “Moody” and “Kuntz,” were embroidered on the back of their hats. Additionally, Stevens alleges that Matson handed her the original proposed Last Chance Agreement on pink paper, and that he condescendingly stated that pink was her favorite color because she was a girl. In her reply brief, Stevens additionally cites Matson’s inappropriate interest in her romantic life and Matson’s pattern of attributing female officers’ work mistakes to problems in their personal lives. Stevens specifically asserts a “cat’s paw” theory of discrimination, suggesting that Chief Hobbs’s decision to offer her a Last Chance agreement was the product of Major Matson’s gender bias. A plaintiff may show that discriminatory animus caused an adverse employment action by proving that a 22 Case: 15-11265 Date Filed: 12/22/2015 Page: 23 of 24 biased party with no power to take the adverse action made a recommendation that directly resulted in the action. See Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999). Under this standard, a plaintiff may maintain a “cat’s paw” theory of discrimination by establishing that the decisionmaker followed a biased recommendation without independently investigating it. See id. at 1332. The problem for plaintiff Captain Stevens is that Chief Hobbs did not merely accept Matson’s assessment of Stevens without investigating and reaching his own conclusions. The record reflects that Hobbs personally reviewed Stevens’s disciplinary history, personally spoke with Stevens at length prior to her termination (thereby giving her the opportunity to tell her version of events), and personally revised the Last Chance Agreement. Notably, many critical facts that motivated Hobbs to discipline Stevens are not in dispute, namely that Stevens approached panel officers with the conclusion that the accident was nonchargeable without providing the officers with photographs of the accident.12 Given Chief Hobbs’s level of involvement in the process leading up to Stevens’s termination, Stevens fails to plausibly show that the adverse action she suffered was the product of Matson’s alleged bias. 12 Also, Matson’s initial recommendation was to fire Stevens, which Chief Hobbs rejected. This further suggests that Hobbs’s thinking was independent from that of Matson. 23 Case: 15-11265 Date Filed: 12/22/2015 Page: 24 of 24
Plaintiff Captain Stevens argues that facts surrounding her prior disciplinary incidents support her discrimination claim. Stevens specifically focuses on her 2012 dispute with Captain Harris and Lieutenant Hiers, arguing that she (a) did not behave erratically; (b) was needlessly pressured to meet with the Department’s therapist; (c) raised legitimate complaints about Lieutenant Hiers’s job performance that were never investigated; and (d) was unfairly disciplined while Lieutenant Hiers was not. Stevens stresses Matson’s role in this incident. Even granting that Stevens’s full disciplinary history played a role in her ultimate termination, the fact disputes she raises still fail to raise an inference of discrimination by Chief Hobbs, the decisionmaker here. The evidence shows that Chief Hobbs had a reasonable basis for his honest belief that Stevens’s performed improperly as a police captain, and more to the point, no reasonable juror could find that Stevens was the victim of discrimination by defendant Chief Hobbs.13