Opinion ID: 184247
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Disability-Discrimination Claims

Text: The ADA provides that employers may not “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” and states that such discrimination includes “not making reasonable accommodations” for a disabled employee. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(5)(A). Michigan’s PWDCRA, Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1102(1)–(2), “substantially mirrors” the ADA, and claims under both statutes are generally analyzed identically, Cotter v. Ajilon Servs., Inc., 287 F.3d 593, 597 (6th Cir. 2002).8 To make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination, Steward must establish “(1) that she . . . is an individual with a disability[;] (2) who was otherwise qualified to perform [her] job’s requirements, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) who was discriminated against solely because of the disability.” Spees v. James Marin, Inc., --- F.3d ----, 2010 WL 3119969, at  Clay v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 501 F.3d 695, 706 (6th Cir. 2007), provided such harassment is “sufficiently severe or pervasive,” id. at 707 (quoting Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 560, 562 (6th Cir. 1999)); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67-68 (1986). However, Steward does not pursue that theory of discrimination in this action. 8 We note that the ADA was amended in 2008 to “broad[en the] scope of protection . . . available under the [statute].” Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554. These amendments “became effective on January 1, 2009,” but “do[] not apply retroactively to govern conduct occuring before the[y] became effective.” Milholland v. Sumner County Bd. of Educ., 569 F.3d 562, 565–67 (6th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, Steward’s claims must be analyzed under the pre-amendment version of the ADA (although, in this case, the version applied would make no difference). - 17 - No. 08-1282 Steward v. New Chrysler (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 1105 (6th Cir. 2008)). We assume arguendo that Steward is “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA and that she was placed on paid layoff solely because of her disability. Steward does not argue that she was capable of performing her job without accommodation. Rather, her complaint is that she could have performed her job with reasonable accommodation and that Chrysler refused to accommodate her. See Appellant’s Br. at 17, 29–31. Under the ADA, “[t]he plaintiff . . . ‘bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable.’” Johnson v. Cleveland City Sch. Dist., 344 F. App’x 104, 111 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 870 (6th Cir. 2007)). As part of this initial burden, the plaintiff must show “that the [proposed] accommodation is reasonable in the sense both of efficacious and of proportional to costs.” Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1183 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Vande Zande v. Wisc. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995)). The plaintiff must also “show that [s]he requested the specific accommodation; a plaintiff may not rely on accommodations that [s]he did not request.” Manigan v. Southwest Ohio Reg’l Transit Auth., 2010 WL 2776955, at  n.5 (6th Cir. July 12, 2010) (citing Virts v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 285 F.3d 508, 518 (6th Cir. 2002)); see also Burns v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 258 (6th Cir. 2000). The ADA provides that “reasonable accommodation” may include “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices . . . and other similar accommodations . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). However, while “job restructuring” is a reasonable accommodation, this term “only pertains to the - 18 - No. 08-1282 Steward v. New Chrysler restructuring of non-essential duties or marginal functions of a job.” Bratten v. SSI Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 625, 632 (6th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). Moreover, the duty of “reasonable accommodation” does not require an employer to “creat[e] a new job, mov[e] another employee, promot[e] the disabled employee, or violat[e] another employee’s rights under a collective bargaining agreement.” Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Burns, 222 F.3d at 257 (“Employers are not required to create new jobs, displace existing employees from their positions, or violate other employees’ rights under a collective bargaining agreement or other non-discriminatory [company] policy.”). Steward argues that she could have been accommodated by the continued assistance of a fulltime helper. However, as a matter of law, the duty of reasonable accommodation did not require Chrysler to provide a full-time assistant to help Steward perform essential tasks of her job installing windshield frames. “Courts have continuously found that employers are not required to assign existing employees or hire new employees to perform [essential] functions or duties of a disabled employee’s job which the employee cannot perform by virtue of his disability.” Bratten, 185 F.3d at 632 (holding that “allowing co-workers to perform as much as 20% of the essential automotive mechanic duties” for disabled employee was not reasonable accommodation); see also Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 644 (2d Cir. 1991) (having co-workers perform essential lifting tasks of disabled employee’s job not reasonable accommodation). Steward does not argue that her full-time helper was not performing any essential functions of her job; nor could a reasonable fact-finder conclude as much. - 19 - No. 08-1282 Steward v. New Chrysler Steward also argues that Chrysler could have accommodated her by giving her a clerical position or other position not involving physical labor. However, she has not come forward with evidence that she contemporaneously requested that Chrysler assign her to any specific position of this sort. See Manigan, 2010 WL 2776955, at  n.5 (“[A] plaintiff may not rely on accommodations that [s]he did not request.”). Moreover, the only two specific positions which she identifies in her appellate brief — a position involving “go[ing] out to different dealerships and show[ing] the vehicle” and one involving “answering phones and doing errands” — are both positions which Steward acknowledges are held by other employees; at the very least, she has adduced no affirmative evidence that these jobs were available at the time of her layoff or that they are available now. Appellant’s Br. at 29–30; see Cassidy, 138 F.3d at 634 (stating that employer is not required to “creat[e] a new job” or “mov[e] another employee”). Steward mentions a number of other employees whom she alleges Chrysler accommodated, but the bare fact that other employees were accommodated does not satisfy her evidentiary burden of pointing to a specific vacant position for which she was qualified, which she actually requested, and which was not provided to her. Chrysler, meanwhile, has submitted uncontested evidence that no such positions were available at the relevant time. See Aff. of Kief Clark, ROA 179, ¶ 8 (“From March 2005 to date, there has been and continues to be no job available within [Steward’s] seniority rights and work restrictions.”); see also ROA at 189.9 9 The closest thing the record contains to evidence pointing the other way is an email sent by human-resources employee Todd Taylor in August 2005, five months after Steward was placed on paid layoff. The email states that Chrysler “may have [had] a job [as of August 2005] that c[ould] accommodate [Steward’s] restrictions, but some new [physical requirements] might have just been - 20 - No. 08-1282 Steward v. New Chrysler Steward relies heavily on the deposition testimony of Moyna Moore, a former Chrysler human resources employee, who wrote an email in October 2004 stating that another position in which Steward could be accommodated was available at that time, and who testified in her deposition that she knew of other positions in which Steward could have been be accommodated as of November 11, 2004, when Moore left Chrysler’s employ. However, the availability of other jobs in October and November 2004 is irrelevant to our analysis. It is undisputed that at that time, instead of moving Steward to another position, Chrysler accommodated Steward in her existing position by means of an assistant. Steward does not argue that this choice was impermissible. Nor has she adduced any evidence that any particular position within her medical limitations was still available in March 2005, when Chrysler’s preferred accommodation became impracticable, or thereafter. Because Steward cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA or PWDCRA, the district court did not err by granting Chrysler summary judgment with respect to those claims.