Opinion ID: 889121
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Search and Seizure of the Laptop

Text: ¶ 43 As an initial matter, it is critical to note that the laptop was not searched based on Dozier's consent. Dozier gave consent to Officer Spaulding to seize the laptop, but the laptop was searched pursuant to a federal search warrant later obtained by Agent Vierthaler, and not upon Dozier's consent. This search warrant was granted two days after the laptop itself had been seized and was already in FBI custody. ¶ 44 In the application for the search warrant, Agent Vierthaler cited information gleaned during his interviews with Dozier and her minor daughter, the interview he and Detective Beckers conducted with Lacey, as well as evidence discovered in the search of the garage. As the State notes, the validity of this search warrant has not been challenged on appeal. A review of the application for the federal search warrant demonstrates that the interviews with Dozier, her minor daughter, and Lacey himself (wherein he admitted that he stored images of child pornography and images of himself committing sexual acts upon Dozier's minor daughter on the laptop), as well as evidence discovered in the garage search, provided the necessary probable cause for the search warrant with respect to the laptop. [1] Therefore, the pertinent inquiry with respect to the laptop is whether Dozier had sufficient authority to consent to its seizure by Officer Spaulding. ¶ 45 Both Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. There is a distinction between search and seizure as noted by the Illinois Court of Appeals in People v. Blair, 321 Ill.App.3d 373, 254 Ill.Dec. 872, 748 N.E.2d 318 (2001), a case relied upon by Lacey. In that case, police officers had arrested defendant Blair for disorderly conduct while he was videotaping children at a zoo in Rock Island County, Illinois. After Blair's arrest, officers went to his residence and were greeted by Blair's father, Howard Blair (Howard). Officers were allowed inside by Howard, and then asked if they could search some of Blair's belongings. Howard led the officers to the basement where Blair stored some of his belongings. In the basement officers came upon a computer owned by Blair. At the time, Howard stated that he had no ownership interest whatsoever in the computer. Nevertheless, the officers turned it on and began searching it. The officers later stated that they believed they had Howard's permission to turn on the computer. ¶ 46 In the course of their search, the officers discovered internet bookmarks with references to teenagers which they believed indicated the computer contained child pornography. They seized the computer. The officers later testified that Howard gave them permission to seize it, but Howard's recall of the events was not clear. Evidence later discovered on the computer led to Blair being charged with 16 counts of possessing child pornography. Prior to trial, Blair moved to suppress the evidence discovered on the computer. His motion was denied and he was later convicted in a bench trial, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. ¶ 47 The Illinois Court of Appeals reversed the denial of Blair's motion to suppress. First, citing to Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), the court noted that police officers must have probable cause to effect a seizure in the absence of either consent or a warrant. The court found probable cause was lacking because Blair's arrest for disorderly conduct and the internet bookmarks with references to teenagers were considered too ambiguous to give rise to probable cause. Blair, 254 Ill.Dec. 872, 748 N.E.2d at 323. ¶ 48 Additionally, the court rejected the argument that Howard could have given consent to the seizure of the computer. Because the court's treatment of this subject is instructive in the instant case, we quote it at some length: A third party may consent to a search if he has common authority over, or other sufficient relationship to, the premises or effects to be searched. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242. In the case at bar, however, we must decide, not whether a third party's common authority gives him the power to consent to a search, but whether that authority may permit government seizure of the property. This issue has received scant judicial attention. See United States v. Woodrum, 202 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2000) (third-party consent has been invoked only to validate warrantless searches of property, not seizures). Perhaps this is so because third-party consent is often superfluous where the incriminating character of an item is apparent, allowing it to be seized pursuant to the plain view doctrine without consent or a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 27 F.Supp.2d 1111 (C.D.Ill.1998) (police could seize computer pursuant to plain view doctrine where police discovered child pornography while conducting search authorized by third party); see also State v. Ready, 148 Or.App. 149, 939 P.2d 117 (1997) (police could seize videotapes labeled kid porn pursuant to plain view doctrine during valid third-party consent search). As noted previously, however, the police in the instant case lacked probable cause to believe that defendant's computer contained contraband or was otherwise connected with a crime. Accordingly, the question of third-party consent to seize is foursquarely before this court. . . . Measuring a third party's authority to consent by a suspect's expectation of privacy is consistent with the idea that the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches protects against unreasonable government intrusions upon privacy ( Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the Fourth Amendment not only guarantees freedom from unreasonable searches, but freedom from unreasonable seizures. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984). This latter guarantee protects against unreasonable government interference, not with privacy alone, but with possessory interests in property. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992). Moreover, the right to retain possession of property against unreasonable deprivation is not inferior to the right to maintain privacy. Soldal, 506 U.S. 56, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450. The rationale for third-party consent searches resting, as it does, upon the diminished expectation of privacy attending a third party's common authority over the premises or effects to be searched, does not provide a sufficient basis for a third party's consent to the seizure of another's personal effects. While one who permits a third party access or control over his property has a diminished expectation of privacy, the third party's access or control does not similarly diminish the owner's expectation that he will retain possession of his property. A third party having common authority over premises or effects may permit a search of the premises or effects in his own right. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242. In such a case, the third party is permitting others to do no more than the third party may do on his own, i.e., inspect the premises or effects. However, a third party may not in his own right consent to depriving the owner of possession of his property. The third party could not in his own right lawfully exclude the owner from possession of the property. Accordingly, the third party cannot permit others to do what he himself has no right to do. Blair, 254 Ill.Dec. 872, 748 N.E.2d at 324-25. ¶ 49 Based upon the foregoing authorities and analysis, we conclude that Dozier did not have the right or authority to consent to the seizure of Lacey's computer. Thus, we turn to the question of whether, absent the owner's consent, the officer had probable cause to seize the laptop. Arizona, 480 U.S. at 326-27, 107 S.Ct. at 1153. ¶ 50 Officer Spaulding did not herself see any pornographic images on Lacey's laptop. If Dozier had left one of the pornographic images on the computer screen when Officer Spaulding entered the room, then the plain view doctrine would arguably apply, supplying probable cause for the seizure. However, Officer Spaulding had only Dozier's statements that such contraband was on the computer, and did not personally see it herself. Thus, the question remains as to whether Dozier's statements, by themselves, were sufficient to establish the probable cause necessary to seize the laptop in the first place. ¶ 51 Probable cause to seize property exists when the facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe that another person has committed an offense. State v. Branam, 2006 MT 300, ¶ 22, 334 Mont. 457, 148 P.3d 635. In this case, the District Court did not make any findings as to whether Officer Spaulding had probable cause to seize the laptop. Instead, the District Court, in its verbatim adoption of the State's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, focused solely on whether Dozier had authority to consent to a search of the laptop. However, because officers did not search the laptop based upon Dozier's consent, but rather based upon the federal search warrant obtained by Agent Vierthaler, this analysis is misplaced. The question of whether Dozier could consent to a search of the laptop is immaterial to whether she could consent to its seizure. ¶ 52 Arguably, Dozier's statement to Officer Spaulding that she had observed images on the laptop showing Lacey sexually abusing her minor daughter was sufficient, by itself, to demonstrate probable cause to seize the laptop. However, even if Officer Spaulding lacked probable cause to seize the laptop, it is clear under the circumstances presented here that the evidence later discovered on the laptop pursuant to the federal search warrant is admissible under the inevitable discovery exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Thus, the District Court did not err in denying Lacey's motion to suppress this evidence. ¶ 53 As noted above, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine forbids the use of evidence which is discovered as a result of the exploitation of an initial illegal act by the police. Dasen, ¶ 19. Montana follows federal law in recognizing three exceptions to this doctrine, providing that evidence is admissible if it is: (1) attenuated from the constitutional violation so as to remove its primary taint; (2) obtained from an independent source; or (3) determined to be evidence which would have been inevitably discovered apart from the constitutional violation. Dasen, ¶ 19. We examine the exceptions in turn. ¶ 54 Exception one would be clearly inapplicable under the present circumstances due to the proximity of the laptop seizure and the search of the house and interviews of Dozier, her minor daughter, and Lacey the next day. See Therriault, ¶ 60. Exception two, the independent source, applies in those circumstances where law enforcement possessed an independent source of information which would have led to the evidence, or were engaged in an investigation which would have led to the evidence. Therriault, ¶ 60 (citing New, 276 Mont. at 537, 917 P.2d at 924). While independent source could feasibly apply, we noted in Dasen that genuine independence `may well be difficult to establish where the seized goods are kept in the police's possession.' Dasen, ¶ 20 (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 2535, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988)). ¶ 55 This leaves the third exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine known as inevitable discovery. Under this exception evidence initially obtained illegally by the State may nevertheless be used against a defendant in a criminal proceeding where it can be shown that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered despite a constitutional violation. State v. Notti, 2003 MT 170, ¶ 20, 316 Mont. 345, 71 P.3d 1233 (citing State v. Pearson, 217 Mont. 363, 704 P.2d 1056 (1985)). We apply the inevitable discovery exception sua sponte, provided there is a sufficient record before us to conclude that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered pursuant to the execution of a valid search warrant. State v. Dickinson, 2008 MT 159, ¶ 24, 343 Mont. 301, 184 P.3d 305. ¶ 56 Here, the record before us leaves no doubt that the evidence on the laptop would have been inevitably discovered even if Officer Spaulding had not initially seized the laptop after speaking with Dozier. If Officer Spaulding had left the laptop at Dozier's house, then the evidence discovered during the search of the garage the next day, as well as the statements made by Dozier, her minor daughter, and Lacey during their interviews with law enforcement, would have provided probable cause to seize the laptop. Even putting aside for the moment Lacey's admissions, Dozier identified some of the sex toys and sex devices found in the garage as those she had seen in the computer images of Lacey committing sexual acts on her minor daughter. Thus, we conclude that the evidence would have been lawfully discovered in any event; therefore, the District Court did not err in denying Lacey's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the seizure and search of the laptop. ¶ 57 Issue Two: Did the District Court err in denying Lacey's motion to suppress the testimonial evidence against him? ¶ 58 Lacey argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress the testimonial evidence against him because: (1) he was subject to custodial interrogation by Agent Vierthaler and Detective Beckers; (2) he invoked his right to counsel during the interrogation, and did not voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waive that right; and (3) his confession was coerced and not voluntarily given. Accordingly, Lacey argues that all the testimonial evidence taken from his custodial interrogation should be suppressed pursuant to his constitutional rights against self-incrimination under Article II, Section 25 of the Montana Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We disagree and affirm the District Court's denial of Lacey's motion to suppress. ¶ 59 The right against self-incrimination applies to bar the use of statements obtained from a custodial interrogation unless the defendant is warned, prior to questioning, that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney. State v. Olson, 2003 MT 61, ¶ 13, 314 Mont. 402, 66 P.3d 297 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). Persons are considered to be in custody and entitled to Miranda warnings if they have been deprived of their freedom of action in any significant way or their freedom of action has been curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest. State v. Munson, 2007 MT 222, ¶ 21, 339 Mont. 68, 169 P.3d 364 (quotation omitted). Whether a custodial interrogation has occurred is determined on a case-by-case basis and focuses on whether, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would feel free to leave. State v. Reavley, 2003 MT 298, ¶ 19, 318 Mont. 150, 79 P.3d 270. We examine the following factors to determine whether a custodial interrogation has occurred: (1) place of the interrogation; (2) time of the interrogation; (3) persons present during the interrogation; (4) whether Miranda warnings were gratuitously given; (5) the length and mood of the interrogation; and (6) whether or not the suspect was arrested following the interrogation. Reavley ¶ 19 (quoting Olson, ¶ 15). ¶ 60 If a custodial interrogation has taken place and a subject has been properly informed of his Miranda rights, an individual may waive those rights by a waiver which is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. State v. Gittens, 2008 MT 55, ¶ 14, 341 Mont. 450, 178 P.3d 91. The State has the burden of proving that the waiver of the right against self-incrimination has met this standard. Gittens, ¶ 14. ¶ 61 Finally, a defendant may move to suppress an admission or confession on the grounds that it was involuntary. Section 46-13-301, MCA; State v. Maestas, 2006 MT 101, ¶ 17, 332 Mont. 140, 136 P.3d 514. The determination of whether a confession is voluntary is a factual inquiry which takes into account the totality of the circumstances, focusing on whether the suspect's confession was the product of free choice or compulsion. State v. Scarborough, 2000 MT 301, ¶ 31, 302 Mont. 350, 14 P.3d 1202. When considering the totality circumstances, courts consider a number of factors including the defendant's age and level of education; the length and method of the interrogation; whether the defendant was advised of his or her Miranda rights; the defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system and police interrogation; the defendant's background and experience; and the defendant's demeanor, coherence, articulateness, and capacity to make full use of his or her faculties. Scarborough, ¶ 32. ¶ 62 In the State's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, it asserted that Lacey was not subject to custodial interrogation under the six Reavley factors. The State asserted that factor one weighed in its favor because while the questioning did occur at the Billings police station, Lacey voluntarily drove himself there and was not accompanied by an officer, or forced to go there in any way. The State argued that factor two also weighed in its favor because the questioning took place at 7:20 p.m., at a time when Lacey was lucid and articulate. Under factor three, the State argued that there were only two plain clothes officers present during the interrogation, they were polite and cordial during the questioning, and did not resort to a good cop/bad cop routine. Under factor four, the State asserted that because Lacey was given his Miranda rights, this factor weighed in its favor as well. Turning to factor five, the State noted that the interrogation lasted only 65 minutes and that the atmosphere was not coercive or threatening, given that the officers took steps to make sure Lacey was comfortable, did not handcuff or restrain him, and made him aware that he could exercise his Miranda rights and stop the interview at any time. Finally, while the State acknowledged under factor six that Lacey had been arrested, it suggested this factor should be accorded little weight because Lacey's arrest only occurred after he made incriminating statements and admitted molesting Dozier's minor daughter. ¶ 63 As noted above, the District Court adopted these proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim from the bench without entering a separate written order. As we have previously stated, we disapprove, heartily and stoutly of this practice. Sawyer-Adecor Intl., Inc. v. Anglin, 198 Mont. 440, 447, 646 P.2d 1194, 1198 (1982). More to the point, we conclude that the State's proposed conclusions of law on the issue of whether a custodial interrogation occurred here are incorrect. First, factor one focuses on the place of interrogation, not how the suspect got there. In this case, it took place at the Billings police station, and undoubtedly weighs in favor of a custodial interrogation. Under factor two, we agree with the State that the time of the interrogation, around 7 p.m., weighs against finding a custodial interrogation as it is a reasonable hour. Under factor three, the persons present in this case were two plain clothes police officers. Lacey was surprised by their presence, and commented that they seemed big. This factor, however, does not definitely weigh either for or against a finding of custodial interrogation. Factor four, however, clearly does weigh in favor of finding a custodial interrogation. Based on the transcript, it is patent that Detective Beckers did not give the Miranda warnings gratuitously, but out of necessity. As reflected in the transcript, Detective Beckers told Lacey that in order to give him a chance to tell them what was going on ... we need to advise you of your Rights, okay? Under factor five, however, we do agree with the State that the interrogation was not excessively long and that, based on the transcripts, it does not appear to have been confrontational or coercive in nature. Thus, this factor would weigh against finding a custodial interrogation. Factor six, on the other hand, weighs in favor of finding a custodial interrogation. This factor does not focus on whether there was justification for the arrest, but simply considers whether the suspect was in fact arrested after the interrogation. The fact of an arrest after questioning makes it likely that the questioning was custodial in nature to begin with. ¶ 64 In determining whether a custodial interrogation has occurred, the inquiry is ultimately an objective one to determine `whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.' Munson, ¶ 24 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 465, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995)). Here, there is little doubt that a reasonable person in Lacey's shoes would not have felt free to get up, terminate the encounter, and leave the Billings police station. Thus, the District Court erred in adopting the State's position that Lacey was not subject to custodial interrogation. ¶ 65 Because Lacey was subject to custodial interrogation, he must have been advised of his Miranda rights and knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived those rights for the State to use his statements against him. Here, we find that both conditions have been satisfied. As the waiver of rights form and transcript cited above make clear ( see ¶ 16), Lacey was advised of his rights, including his right to stop the questioning at any time and have an attorney present during his questioning. Nevertheless, he agreed to sign the waiver of rights form giving up those rights, and specifically stated that he would sign the form, that he would talk, and that he did not want to do anything to stop anything. These statements indicate that he understood those rights, knowingly and intelligently waived them, and agreed to make statements to the officers. ¶ 66 Lacey also argues that his waiver and subsequent confession were not voluntary and were in fact coerced. He maintains that Lieutenant Cady used his personal relationship to entice Lacey to come into the police department and then turned him over to Detective Beckers and Agent Vierthaler for questioning. He claims that both Lieutenant Cady and Agent Vierthaler made a false promise to Lacey, telling him that his opportunity to confess was a one-shot deal and that if he did not confess he would lose his opportunity to talk with the officers. He also claims that he was under substantial emotional distress at the time, and that Lieutenant Cady exploited his personal relationship with him to gain his confession. ¶ 67 The question of voluntariness depends on the totality of the circumstances, considering the characteristics of the defendant and what transpired during the interview. State v. Hill, 2000 MT 308, ¶ 39, 302 Mont. 415, 14 P.3d 1237. Here, we agree with the State that the totality of the circumstances show that the waiver and subsequent confession were a product of Lacey's own free will, and not the product of coercion. First, although Lieutenant Cady did use his personal relationship to bring Lacey to the police station, he never threatened or intimidated him into doing so. Lacey voluntarily drove himself to the Billings police station with full knowledge that officers were investigating the allegations that he sexually abused Dozier's minor daughter. Once there, he was informed that he had a one-shot deal to speak directly with the officers and tell his side of the story. Regardless of whether or not this would ultimately turn out to be the case, this type of statement, under these circumstances, does not constitute a threat, deception, or an attempt to overpower Lacey's will in an effort to get him to confess. Moreover, as noted above, the mood of the interrogation as reflected in the transcript was not overbearing or misleading; the officers were polite with Lacey and did not threaten him at any time. Finally, it is clear that Lacey is an intelligent individual, that he was not suffering from any mental impairments or mental health issues, and that he was not intoxicated at the time of the interrogation. While Lacey was likely in an intense emotional state at the time, there is no indication that officers took advantage of this state in order to manipulate him and coerce his confession. Thus, we conclude the waiver of rights and confession were voluntary. ¶ 68 While Lacey also argues that he made a clear request for counsel during his interrogation, we see no evidence of this in the record. Once a suspect waives his or her right to counsel, he may invoke that right and stop the questioning at any time. Maestas, ¶ 13. However, the request for counsel must be unequivocal and an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney does not require the police to cease questioning the suspect. Maestas, ¶ 15. [A] suspect `must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity... [the officer is not required to] stop questioning the suspect.' Maestas, ¶ 19 (quoting State v. Simmons, 2000 MT 329, ¶ 21, 303 Mont. 60, 15 P.3d 408). Such requests for counsel do not depend on the use of any particular words and are construed broadly. State v. Clark, 2008 MT 419, ¶ 30, 347 Mont. 354, 198 P.3d 809 (quotation omitted). For instance, statements such as Shit, I need a lawyer, man and I would like to talk to somebody are sufficient to meet this standard. Clark, ¶ 30. ¶ 69 Here, Lacey's references to an attorney did not meet the requisite level of clarity to invoke his right to counsel. Lacey did not express a desire to speak with an attorney or to consult with someone other than the officers during the interrogation. In fact, his most direct statement on this issue was the following: I talked to my parents' attorney and he says you should have an attorney present. I, I've never been through this before in my life. I mean I'm not trying to do anything to stop anything. These equivocal statements were not sufficient to invoke Lacey's right to counsel, thus requiring the officers to cease all further questioning. ¶ 70 While we have concluded that Lacey was subject to custodial interrogation, we nonetheless hold that the District Court did not err in denying Lacey's motion to suppress the testimonial evidence against him because the District Court did correctly conclude that Lacey was properly advised of his Miranda rights, knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, and that his waiver and subsequent confession were voluntary. ¶ 71 Issue Three: Was there judicial bias in this case and did it deprive Lacey of his right to due process and a fair and impartial trial? ¶ 72 Finally, Lacey argues that Judge Baugh demonstrated judicial bias during the suppression hearing, thus depriving him of his right to due process and a fair trial. Lacey notes that judges are to avoid officious interference in judicial proceedings, must maintain impartiality at all times in both their demeanor and their actions, and should not become advocates for any particular party. Lacey argues that Judge Baugh ran afoul of this principle due to what Lacey terms his excessive interruption of defense counsel and improper questioning of both defense counsel and Lacey. Lacey points to several instances in the suppression hearing transcript where Judge Baugh either directly questioned Lacey or challenged the feasibility of the explanations he gave for his conduct. In particular, Judge Baugh questioned Lacey about his initial discussion with Officer Spaulding in which he was told not to return to Dozier's house, about the fact that he did not raise an objection to the search of the house or seizure of his laptop, and about his subsequent decision to drive down to the Billings police station to meet with Lieutenant Cady and his expectations concerning whether he would be arrested there. Lacey also notes that his trial counsel had to object to Judge Baugh's questioning of Lacey on three occasions. Lacey argues that these actions show Judge Baugh's bias in favor of the State, and demonstrate that he was deprived of an impartial hearing. Further, Lacey argues that this bias was confirmed, and his constitutional rights further impaired, by Judge Baugh's verbatim adoption of the State's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. ¶ 73 We agree with Lacey that judges should not interfere in proceedings, must remain impartial, and should not become advocates for any particular party. State v. Skinner, 2007 MT 175, ¶ 36, 338 Mont. 197, 163 P.3d 399; State v. Stafford, 208 Mont. 324, 331, 678 P.2d 644, 648 (1984). Yet, as the State points out, judges may in fact question witnesses. M.R. Evid. 614(b); State v. Hibbs, 239 Mont. 308, 311, 780 P.2d 182, 184 (1989). Had these particular instances of conduct occurred in front of a jury, they may have raised significant concerns. However, this was a suppression hearing where Judge Baugh was the finder of fact. Moreover, while Lacey's trial counsel did object to Judge Baugh's questioning, she did not move to terminate the hearing or disqualify Judge Baugh. Further, a review of the transcripts of the suppression hearing in its entirety establishes that Judge Baugh did give Lacey a fair hearing and presented him with the opportunity to fully argue his motion to suppress. ¶ 74 In his reply brief, Lacey suggests this Court has the discretion to review his claimed errors of judicial bias under the plain error doctrine. See State v. English, 2006 MT 177, ¶ 66, 333 Mont. 23, 140 P.3d 454. We invoke the doctrine of plain error only sparingly and on a case-by-case basis, when failure to do so may result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, leave unsettled the fundamental fairness of the proceedings, or compromise the integrity of the judicial process. English, ¶ 66. None of these concerns are present here, and we decline to review Lacey's claimed errors under the plain error doctrine.