Opinion ID: 1491821
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: DHS's appeal from the September 30, 1996 order.

Text: Intervenor suggests that DHS, as a non-party below, lacks the requisite standing to appeal from the September 30 order without having intervened below or initiated an original action in the trial court. Alternatively, intervenor argues that DHS's notice of appeal from the September 30 order was untimely under the timeliness provisions of Ark. R. Civ. P. 59 and 60 and Ark. R.App. P.Civ. 4. We reject these arguments and hold that DHS possesses the requisite standing to appeal, and that its notice of appeal was timely filed. The matter is resolved by Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Crunkleton, 303 Ark. 21, 791 S.W.2d 704 (1990), and Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Bailey, 318 Ark. 374, 885 S.W.2d 677 (1994), where this court laid down the path for DHS to take when appealing matters in similar circumstances. In Crunkleton DHS attempted to appeal from a judgment awarded against it for disbursements made to it for a child-support arrearage. While we suggested that the award violated principles of sovereign immunity, we dismissed the appeal since DHS was not a party to the litigation below. We held that DHS must first attempt to obtain relief in the trial court. But see In the Matter of Allen, 304 Ark. 222, 800 S.W.2d 715 (1990) (stating that the Crunkleton court failed to follow the long recognized exception that a person pecuniarily affected by a judgment but not a party may nonetheless bring a direct appeal where the action has been taken without notice to the one complaining). Crunkleton was followed by Bailey , where this court once again held that DHS was precluded from bringing a direct appeal from an order requiring it to pay for treatment in a FINS case which it had not initiated and was not a party to. While there DHS argued that the case was distinguishable from Crunkleton in that it had filed a Rule 60 motion to set aside, we noted that DHS has not appealed the denial of its motion to set aside the judgment which would have been the proper procedure. Bailey, supra . In the present case, DHS has followed the proper procedure prescribed by this court in Bailey . It first sought relief from the trial court by filing a motion to set aside following the September 30 order. While intervenor suggests that this motion should have otherwise been governed by the timeliness provisions of Rule 59 and 60, the fact remains that DHS was never a party to the underlying action for purposes of those rules. Pursuant to Bailey , it had no final judgment to appeal from until the trial court entered an order denying its motion to set aside. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that DHS has standing and has filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court's order denying its motion to set aside the September 30 order.
DHS first contends that the trial court's September 30 order did not comply with the juvenile code. It cites us to its policy V-C, and Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-303(17) (Repl.1993) [1] , which provides a list of instances in which family services may be provided: Family services means relevant services, including, but not limited to: child care; homemaker services; crisis counseling; cash assistance; transportation; family therapy; physical, psychiatric, or psychological evaluation; counseling; or treatment, provided to a juvenile or his family. Family services are provided in order to: (A) Prevent a juvenile from being removed from a parent, guardian, or custodian; (B) Reunite the juvenile with the parent, guardian, or custodian from whom the juvenile has been removed; or (C) Implement a permanent plan of adoption, guardianship, or rehabilitation of the juvenile. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-303(17) (Repl.1993). DHS contends that none of the three criteria for family services were met in this case. To the contrary, at the September 30 hearing, the trial court unequivocally stated that it was ordering services to prevent R.P. from being removed from her mother. Well, I think I'm going to order the Department to pay for having the water and electricity turned back on. The only alternative is to take R.P. into custody of the Department. This conclusion was supported by evidence of the detrimental effect of R.P.'s living conditions. The evidence to that point established that the P. family still had no water or electricity at the house. DHS did not dispute the trial court's finding that R.P. was a member of a family-in-need-of-services, and Cooper stated at the September 30 hearing that DHS would certainly put R.P. in a foster home if [the trial court] want[ed] to put her in a foster home. The prosecutor at one point suggested that R.P. was not able to bathe and present herself appropriately for school. In sum, the trial court's order did not exceed the statutory criteria for family services as set forth in Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-303(17) Repl.1993). An implicit facet of DHS's argument seems to be that the September 30 order was defective because the trial court failed to make written findings in accordance with Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-328(a) (Repl.1993), which requires that the court order family services appropriate to prevent removal of a FINS juvenile before removing the juvenile from the custody of her parent. It is clear that the statute requires specific findings only when the court orders actual removal from a custodial parent. Thus, we decline to hold that the trial court's order was defective under Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-328 (Repl. 1993). With regard to DHS's contention that the trial court's order did not comport with its policy, this court has previously held that the juvenile court's orders do not have to comply with DHS policy. See Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Clark, 304 Ark. 403, 802 S.W.2d 461 (1991) ( Clark I ) (there is nothing in the juvenile code that even arguably requires the juvenile court to fashion its orders within the policy guidelines of DHS.). Significantly, the record does not show that DHS could not have paid the bills at the time of the September 30 order. See Clark I, supra (trial court there did not order DHS to disburse a greater amount than the maximum allowable under its policy DHS did not claim that funds were not available and did not offer evidence of such). There were funds available to pay the bills, but it was DHS's position that paying the bills would be to the detriment of other families in need of the same money. Based on these circumstances, the trial court did not exceed its statutory authority in its September 30 order.

When DHS first moved to set aside the trial court's September 30 order, it argued that it was entitled to assert sovereign immunity and could not be made a defendant without waiving sovereign immunity. On appeal, DHS argues that the trial court's order coerced DHS into bearing a financial burden, which is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. While intervenor suggests that this argument was not made below, our review of the record shows that the issue was sufficiently developed for our review. Additionally, we decline to find, as intervenor suggests, that sovereign immunity has been waived simply because the prosecutor filed the FINS petition here. DHS was never the initial moving party in these proceedings. See Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481, 850 S.W.2d 847 (1993). However, we nonetheless find that there is a waiver of sovereign immunity under the circumstances presented. This court has recognized an exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity where an act of the legislature has created a specific waiver of immunity. See State of Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Mitchell, 330 Ark. 338, 954 S.W.2d 907 (1997); State v. Tedder, 326 Ark. 495, 932 S.W.2d 755 (1996). Unlike the statutes at issue in Arkansas Department of Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481, 850 S.W.2d 847 (1993), or Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Crunkleton, 303 Ark. 21, 791 S.W.2d 704 (1990), the Juvenile Code expressly empowers the court to order cash assistance in FINS cases. When a family is found to be in need of services, the court may order family services. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-332(1) (Repl.1993). The following are included within the definition of family services: Family services means relevant services, including, but not limited to: child care; homemaker services; crisis counseling; cash assistance; transportation; family therapy; physical, psychiatric, or psychological evaluation; counseling; or treatment, provided to a juvenile or his family. Family services are provided in order to: (A) Prevent a juvenile from being removed from a parent, guardian, or custodian; (B) Reunite the juvenile with the parent, guardian, or custodian from whom the juvenile has been removed; or (C) Implement a permanent plan of adoption, guardianship, or rehabilitation of the juvenile. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-303(17) (Repl.1993) (emphasis added). A FINS petition may be initiated by any adult. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-310(b)(3)(A) (Repl.1993). Before a juvenile may be removed from a parent, the court is required to order family services appropriate to prevent removal. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-328(a) (Repl.1993). Given that the trial court is empowered to order family services in FINS cases to prevent a juvenile from being removed from a parent, which by definition includes cash assistance, we conclude that the General Assembly has specifically waived sovereign immunity as to DHS in such instances. Any other interpretation would effectively eviscerate the court's power to order family services in FINS cases. This is especially true considering that a FINS case may be initiated by any adult, where DHS will not be the initial moving party. Such a consequence could not have been intended by the General Assembly in enacting the Juvenile Code.
DHS also argues that the September 30 order violated separation of powers, but we decline to reach the merits given that this theory was not sufficiently raised or developed below with respect to setting aside the September 30 order. See Stricklin v. Hays, 332 Ark. 270, 965 S.W.2d 103 (1998) ( supp. opinion on denial of reh'g, Ark. 1998). DHS concedes that its motion to set aside did not discuss the doctrine of separation of powers by name or at any length, but asserts that its separation of powers issue is preserved by the language in its motion and amended motion to set aside that both the State and its agencies may not be compelled to expend funds not appropriated by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas. However, our review of the record shows that DHS's separation of powers argument on appeal was not presented to the trial court. Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying DHS's motion to set aside the September 30 order.