Opinion ID: 775760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 68 A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence must demonstrate that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, . . . no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Taylor, 92 F.3d at 1333 (internal quotation marks omitted). We must be especially deferential when reviewing a conspiracy conviction. Id. The existence of and participation in a conspiracy may be established through circumstantial evidence[, but] there must be some evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred that the person charged with conspiracy knew of the existence of the scheme alleged in the indictment and knowingly joined and participated in it. United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1121 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the government had the burden of proving each element of the charged conspiracy - that is, that the defendants agreed to extort money or property from contractors by means of the wrongful use of actual or threatened force or violence or by instilling fear of loss of property or physical injury in their victims and that the labor exception does not apply - beyond a reasonable doubt. 18 U.S.C. 371, 1951(b); Taylor, 92 F.3d at 1333. 69 The government's evidence met its burden of proof on each of the elements of the charged conduct. A brief outline of the testimony and pertinent exhibits -- viewed as we must in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the government - demonstrates that it included proof that the conspiracy to extort targeted at least seven different companies; at least some of those companies gave jobs to coalition members because they feared economic loss and/or physical injury; the defendants' activities did not fall within the labor exception; and each of the defendants knowingly joined and participated in the conspiracy.
70 Between 1995 and 1997, Defoe Corporation (Defoe) reconstructed the Gowanus Prospect Expressway in Brooklyn. The corporation obtained protection from the Gambino crime family in exchange for money and jobs. BFB also demanded jobs from Defoe, and the Gambino family ultimately agreed that BFB could have a coalition coordinator position and two laborer slots. Carnes acted as the coalition coordinator, received approximately $ 700 a week from Defoe, and did not come to the site unless Defoe called about a coalition problem. 71 This agreement among the Gambino family, Defoe, and BFB came about after a series of meetings during the spring and summer of 1995. John Amicucci, Defoe's owner, told Craig Depalma, a Gambino associate, in the presence of William Marshall, another Gambino family member and a cooperating witness, that BFB was pressuring Defoe to hire unnecessary workers. Later, Depalma, Marshall, Amicucci, and McCall met at Defoe's headquarters. Amicucci told McCall that he would have to go through Depalma with coalition business, and Depalma warned McCall that Depalma was with the son of the guy that's [in] the 22 hour lock up, which the government asserts was a reference to John Gotti, Jr. McCall responded that he had his own godfather and what he tells me is what I do. After McCall asked Amicucci to use his influence to get another individual to buy supplies from McCall, he left the meeting with Carnes. 72 Marshall had an opportunity to meet McCall's godfather, appellant Johnson, at a summer meeting at the Baychester Diner in the Bronx. Carnes also attended this meeting, along with Craig Depalma and his father Gregory Depalma. Gregory Depalma told Johnson that the Gambino crime family controlled Defoe and that Craig was attending the meeting directly on John Junior's behalf. After a private meeting between the Depalmas and Johnson, the Depalmas told Marshall that they had agreed to work with BFB but that Johnson could place only two laborers and one no-show paid coordinator at each site. 73 Some time thereafter, the Depalmas began to suspect that Carnes was pressuring Amicucci to hire more workers than their agreement allowed. At a second meeting, Johnson told the Depalmas that he would take care of the situation. Carnes and Craig Depalma subsequently worked together to control the flow of jobs to BFB. 74 According to the supervisor for all Defoe projects, Edward Schluter, Defoe hired coalition workers not because the company needed workers but because failure to hire them would result in having either a person hurt, having my equipment damaged[,] or having work stopped.
75 During their second meeting with Johnson and Carnes, the Depalmas told Johnson that Marshall, whom the Depalmas had placed at Halmar Builders as a coalition coordinator, was having trouble with rival coalitions. Carnes suggested that if Marshall got him a no-show pay job and put a couple of his men to work, Carnes would take care of the situation. Because Marshall left Halmar, he did not get Carnes the promised job although he did hire one of Carnes' men.
76 Johnson served as Tully Construction's coalition coordinator and referred to it as his bread and butter. In 1990, McCall came to Tully Construction's Brooklyn Resurfacing project with twenty to thirty people, encircled field supervisor James Tully, and began chanting we want jobs. Although Tully feared for his safety, he told McCall, who he did not realize was associated with Johnson, that he could not hire anyone without speaking to Johnson. Tully then called Johnson who asked to speak to McCall. After McCall and Johnson talked, McCall and his followers left the scene. Johnson later told Tully to hire one of McCall's workers, and Tully complied. 77 Tully also used McCall as coalition coordinator on a project he directed on Eastern Parkway and employed quite a few of McCall's men there. 78 Jan Szumanski, Tully Construction's superintendent at its Union Street, Queens, site, hired two workers at Johnson's direction, although he needed neither worker, because sometimes . . .they stop the job, they push the people around. Subsequently, he laid one of the workers off, and hired another laborer, believing that BFB had sent him to replace the worker he had fired. However, the fired worker actually came from a coalition headed by a man known as Love, and the replacement worker belonged to a coalition run by Robin Laborde, also known as Bodyguard. On May 21, 1996, Szumanski called Johnson and reported that Bodyguard had come to the site. Bodyguard indicated that he was willing to deal through Johnson but asked Johnson to do something for him. Johnson refused, saying, I gotta put my peeps, peeps there first. Later, Johnson told Szumanski that Love was not to put anyone on the job. When Szumanski expressed a fear of violence on the site, Johnson responded that if they want to act stupid, then . . . everybody can act stupid. The next day a general manager at Tully told Johnson that someone had come to the site and threatened the shit out of Szumanski. Johnson assured the general manager that he would take care of the situation. 79 On May 28, 1996, Johnson learned from Vernon Smith, a BFB leader, that Szumanski hired Bodyguard's man because he believed that he was the replacement for Love's fired worker. Johnson then called Bodyguard who blamed Love for threatening Szumanski. Johnson accused Bodyguard of secretly working with Love to pressure BFB but nevertheless allowed Bodyguard to place one man at the job and told Szumanski to lay off Love's man. Later that day, Johnson told Smith that he suspected Love and Bodyguard were working together, and Smith advised Johnson to knock everybody off the motherfucking job. 80 On June 3, 1996, Szumanski told Johnson that he had been forced to keep one of Love's workers after Love stopped the Union Street job for half an hour. Johnson told him to lay off Love's worker. Ten minutes later, Johnson warned Love, I'm gonna do what I gotta do, and Love responded in kind. On the same day, Johnson told McCall that Love claimed McCall had authorized the hiring of Love's worker. He later explained to Smith that he was trying to push [McCall] into the mix. Smith questioned the necessity of involving McCall because the twins would take care of it. Minutes later, Johnson spoke to Daniel Hunter, who has a twin brother named Rodney. The two agreed that it was useless to try to negotiate with Love, and Hunter said, I see that nigger tomorrow, I'm gonna bark on that nigger. Him and all of them. Whoever he with. Johnson told Hunter that he could replace the coalition workers at the site with his own workers. 81 The next day there was a shoot-out at the site. Police officers arrived too late to apprehend the perpetrators, but an hour later a detective heard Smith say into a pay telephone, knock both of them off and put Tyborne's [Daniel Hunter's] people in. After the shootout, there were no further problems at the Union Street site, and Johnson continued to act as coalition coordinator. 82 During spring 1997, Tully hired a man from a minority coalition in Red Hook. He was also pressured by Tyborne and Powerful (Rodney Hunter) to hire one of their men. Unaware that Tyborne and Powerful worked for Johnson, Tully asked Johnson to intercede. Johnson directed Tully to hire Tyborne's man. Later, Tully laid off the minority worker from Red Hook and hired another of Hunter's men. 83 The Hunter twins also stopped work at Tully's McGuinness construction project in 1998. As a result and after speaking to Johnson, Tully agreed to hire one of Hunter's coalition members. 84
85 McCall acted as the coalition coordinator for HHM Associates, Inc., in Brooklyn, and Eric Mulder occupied the same position in Queens. In addition, HHM contracted with a firm associated with Johnson's son and Vernon Smith for security guards. 86 Jesse Callender, a BFB leader, recruited Mulder to work for BFB after Mulder went into hiding to avoid the consequences of an incident in which he shot an organizer of his coalition in the face. In 1995, Mulder attended a series of meetings with BFB and other coalitions to seek approval to act as HHM's coalition coordinator in Queens. First, he met with McCall and Callender and told them he wanted to take responsibility for . . . Brooklyn Fight Back's interests for HHM in Queens. He then met with Carnes and Blacko, who was associated with a rival coalition controlled by Callie Harris. Carnes told Mulder that he would check with other members of BFB, and Blacko did not object to Mulder's request. At a third meeting, which Johnson, McCall, Smith, Callie Harris, Blacko, and Harvey Lyons, one of the owners of HHM, attended, McCall told Lyons that Mulder would be the new coalition coordinator in Queens. 87 A few weeks later, Mulder went to HHM's office. McCall, Callender, and Lyons were also present, and the next week, Lyons told Mulder to bring some workers with him to the job site. Mulder selected one or two workers for each of HHM's Queens work sites. Ordinarily, Mulder required those workers to pay him dues of approximately $ 100 per week. He also received a $ 1000 weekly salary from HHM. In order to protect the job site from rival coalitions, Mulder instructed one of his workers to bring a gun to the job site. 88 Harris' coalition caused problems for Mulder during his entire tenure in Queens. Mulder repeatedly told McCall, who he considered to be his supervisor, that Harris' men kept coming around and aggravating the job site, stopping the job. Harris' men also had caused problems for BFB in Brooklyn, and, on one occasion, Johnson left instructions for Carnes to go to an HHM construction site in Flatbush and take care of the problem. Mulder also reported his problems to Johnson. On May 16, 1996, Mulder told Johnson that Harris' coalition was coming around, seeking leverage, and Johnson directed Mulder to straighten out the rival coalition. A week later, Mulder reported to Johnson that these motherfuckers from fucking Cali [sic] . . . they come over there and stopped the job site today. Mulder added, I'm out there with my fucking machine gun early in the morning. And if I come kill a motherfucker I'm solving somebody else's problem. Shortly after this exchange, Johnson got off the phone. Johnson called Mulder back a week later and said, street shit is street shit. I don't want to get involved with . . . And when you talk to me on the phone some kind of way, I don't like it. In the interim between the two calls, Smith had instructed Mulder not to discuss violence on the phone because some coalition phones had been tapped. Mulder explained that the second phone call between him and Johnson had been staged to create the impression Johnson was not involved with violence. 89 On September 17, 1997, Mulder went to an HHM work site in Queens Village with BFB member David Pough and another man. There, Mulder learned that members of Harris' coalition including Erick Riddick, also known as Chaos, Blacko, and Biggie had been at the site and planned to return. When Riddick and Blacko returned with a crowd of people, they told Harvey Lyons that he should not deal with Mulder and began taking tools from the HHM workers. They also surrounded Mulder, and Blacko told Riddick to grab Mulder. Riddick put Mulder in a headlock, began punching him, and took some of his jewelry. Shots then rang out, and the crowd dispersed. Mulder saw Pough and Jamal Richardson, a BFB member who worked at the site, holding Riddick at gunpoint. Mulder took the gun, pointed it at Riddick, and shot him until he was unrecognizable. Mulder admitted that as he shot Riddick, he thought about making it possible [for him] not to be able to come back. 90 After the shooting, Mulder went back into hiding. While in hiding, he spoke to Callender who told him there was a fee for the murder and Mulder should contact Johnson.
91 Carnes and other BFB members planned a work stoppage at Frantellizzi because the company allegedly had laid off one of Carnes' employees.
92 Hunter controlled Felix Construction for BFB.
93 During the summer of 1997, Dennis McGrath, the president of Sullivan & McGrath Construction wanted to obtain protection for one of his Queens sites. A subcontractor recommended that McGrath speak to Tony Nestor. Nestor told McGrath that in return for $ 1500 per month, he would provide protection. McGrath also hired some of Nestor's coalition members. In late August, Nestor came to the site with Hunter, who had a gun in his pocket. 4 After being told McGrath was unavailable, Hunter told Frank Fallon, the job foreman at the site that he better get McGrath on the mother fucking phone right now or he would have a problem. McGrath spoke to Hunter, and the two agreed to a meeting. After consulting with the police, McGrath wore a recording device to the meeting, which Hunter, Nestor, Fallon, and several of Hunter's and Nestor's men also attended. When McGrath accused Hunter of bringing a gun to the work site the previous week, Hunter denied it and said to Fallon, wasn't [I] polite? Hunter also complained that he was due $ 4500 in payments, not just $ 1500. Police officers broke up the meeting shortly thereafter.
94 This evidence of defendants' activities at many work sites, the fear that contractors had of coalitions in general and BFB in particular, coalition members' use of violence, and conversations among the various defendants planning tactics against contractors and rival coalitions, coupled with expert and lay testimony indicating that coalition activities did not increase minority representation at job sites and that the coalition laborers hired were unnecessary, gave the jury an ample basis to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) each of the defendants conspired to extort money and jobs from various contractors by causing them to fear loss of income, damage to their property, and physical injury and (2) the defendants' activities did not fall within the labor exception to Hobbs Act liability. 95 Although defendants emphasize different evidence and attack the credibility of Mulder and Marshall, both of whom have long criminal records, and of Schluter, who obtained immunity from a perjury charge by testifying against the defendants, their arguments do not support reversal because, by making the inferences the government suggests and crediting the government's witnesses and other evidence, the jury could have found the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
96 In addition to attacking the sufficiency of the evidence in general terms, Carnes argues that it is impossible to tell whether the jury's verdict rested on sufficient evidence because (1) the jury's verdict acquitting him of extorting Defoe implies that the jury also found he did not conspire to extort Defoe; (2) there was insufficient evidence for the jury to convict Carnes of extorting certain contractors; and (3) without a special verdict sheet, it is unclear whether the jury found Carnes guilty of conspiring to extort a contractor with respect to whom the government offered sufficient evidence. 97 Carnes' argument is fallacious in several respects. First, the jury's decision to acquit Carnes on the substantive Defoe count does not indicate that it found he did not conspire to extort Defoe because the elements of the two crimes are different. Cf. United States v. Slocum, 695 F.2d 650, 656 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that because conspiracy to sell unregistered securities to the public employing fraudulent means and the parallel substantive offense had different elements, district court did not err by refusing to charge that acquittal on conspiracy count required acquittal on substantive counts). 98 Second, Carnes' contention that we must reverse because it is impossible to determine from the jury's verdict which contractors Carnes agreed to extort rests on an erroneous reading of Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 143 L. Ed. 2d 985, 119 S. Ct. 1707 (1999) and United States v. Garcia, 907 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1990). In Richardson, the Supreme Court found that each of the violations constituting a continuing series of violations necessary for conviction of a continuing criminal enterprise based on drug offenses was an element of the prohibited crime, id. 526 U.S. at 818-20, 119 S. Ct. 1707, and therefore held that the jury must unanimously agree on each of the predicate violations, id. at 824, 119 S. Ct. 1707. Because the identity of the targets of a Hobbs Act conspiracy is not an element of that conspiracy, see 18 U.S.C. 371, 1951; cf. United States v. Mucciante, 21 F.3d 1228, 1234-35 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that identity of victim is not an essential element of 18 U.S.C. 479, which forbids knowingly passing fraudulent government bonds), Richardson is inapposite. 99 Carnes' reliance on Garcia also is misplaced. The Hobbs Act indicates that extortion can be accomplished through the wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right. 18 U.S.C. 1951(b)(2). In Garcia, the government proceeded on two theories: that defendants attempted to create fear in their victim and that they extorted money under color of official right. At trial, defendants argued that there was insufficient proof that corporate officials feared an economic loss from the defendants and asked that this theory of guilt be withdrawn from the jury. Garcia, 907 F.2d at 381. We agreed with the defendants that there was no proof the victims feared economic loss, found that defendants preserved their right to appeal by their motion to withhold the fear theory from the jury's consideration, and vacated because we were unable to determine whether the jury based their conviction on a theory for which there was sufficient evidence. Id. at 382-85. Because the government did not argue that the jury could convict Carnes on one of two (or more) theories, Garcia has no application to Carnes' situation. Moreover, the Supreme Court effectively overruled Garcia in Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 57 n.2, 116 L. Ed. 2d 371, 112 S. Ct. 466 (1991). 100 Carnes also argues that his conviction must be reversed because it was the result of a compromise verdict. We reject this contention as contrary to the established law of this circuit. See United States v. Green, 523 F.2d 229, 235-36 (2d Cir. 1975).