Opinion ID: 1213794
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Elements of the offenses

Text: HRS § 701-114(1)(a) and (b) (1985) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offense, as well as the state of mind required to establish each element of the offense. State v. Pone, 78 Hawai`i 262, 265, 892 P.2d 455, 458 (1995) (quoting Kupau, 76 Hawai`i at 390, 879 P.2d at 495) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, pursuant to HRS § 702-205 (1985), the requisite state of mind applies to such conduct, attendant circumstances, and results of conduct as are specified by the definition of the offense. Id. (quoting Kupau, 76 Hawai`i at 390-91, 879 P.2d at 495-96) (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). A person commits the offense of attempted sexual assault in the second degree, in violation of HRS §§ 705-500(1)(b) and 707-731(1)(a), if the person intentionally engages in conduct, which, under the circumstances as the person believes them to be, constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known to be practically certain to subject another person to an act of sexual penetration that the person is aware is by compulsion. [14] Accordingly, there were two material elements of the offense of attempted sexual assault in the second degree as charged in Count I against Kinnane, each of which the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish guilt. These two elements were: (1) that Kinnane intentionally ( i.e., the requisite state of mind establishing attempt liability with respect to the actor's conduct) engaged in conduct; and (2) that the conduct, under the circumstances as Kinnane believed them to be: (a) constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct; (b) intended or known to be practically certain ( i.e., the requisite intentional or knowing state of mind with respect to the result of the actor's conduct); (c) to subject the complainant to an act of sexual penetration ( i.e., the result of the actor's prohibited conduct); (d) that Kinnane was aware ( i.e., the requisite knowing state of mind with respect to attendant circumstances); (e) was by compulsion ( i.e., the attendant circumstance of absence of the complainant's consent, see supra note 2). See supra note 14; HRS §§ 705-500(2), supra note 1, and 707-731(1)(a), supra note 2. On the other hand, a person commits the offense of sexual assault in the fourth degree, in violation of HRS § 707-733(1)(a), if the person knowingly subjects another person to sexual contact by compulsion or causes another person to have sexual contact with the actor by compulsion. Accordingly, had the jury been so instructed in connection with Count I, there were three material elements of the offense of sexual assault in the fourth degree, each of which the prosecution would have been required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish guilt. These three elements were: (1) that Kinnane subjected the complainant ( i.e., the prohibited conduct) to sexual contact ( i.e., the prohibited result of Kinnane's hand touching the complainant's sexual or other intimate parts under her panties and the attendant circumstance that the complainant was not married to Kinnane, see supra note 3); (2) that Kinnane did so by compulsion ( i.e., the attendant circumstance of absence of the complainant's consent, see supra note 2); and (3) that Kinnane did so knowingly ( i.e., the requisite state of mind). Finally, a person commits the offense of attempted sexual assault in the fourth degree, in violation of HRS §§ 705-500 and 707-733(1)(a), if the person intentionally engages in conduct, which, under the circumstances as the person believes them to be, constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known to be practically certain to subject another person to sexual contact that the person is aware is by compulsion. [15] Accordingly, had the jury been so instructed in connection with Count I, there were two material elements of the offense of attempted sexual assault in the fourth degree, each of which the prosecution would have been required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish guilt. These two elements were: (1) that Kinnane intentionally ( i.e., the requisite state of mind establishing attempt liability with respect to the actor's conduct) engaged in conduct; and (2) that the conduct, under the circumstances as Kinnane believed them to be: (a) constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct; (b) intended or known to be practically certain ( i.e., the requisite intentional or knowing state of mind with respect to the result of the actor's conduct); (c) to subject the complainant to sexual contact ( i.e., the result of the actor's prohibited conduct and the attendant circumstance that the complainant was not married to Kinnane, see supra note 3); (d) that Kinnane was aware ( i.e., the requisite knowing state of mind with respect to attendant circumstances); (e) was by compulsion ( i.e., the attendant circumstance of absence of the complainant's consent, see supra note 2). See supra note 14; HRS §§ 705-500, supra note 1, and 707-733(1)(a), supra note 3. As we have indicated, even if the jury had believed the complainant's testimony in its entirety, it could have acquitted Kinnane of attempted sexual assault in the second degree, as charged in Count I, on the basis of a reasonable doubt as to whether, despite having touched the complainant under her panties, Kinnane intended to insert his fingers into her vagina. The touching, however, clearly met the definition of sexual contact. See supra note 3. [16] We therefore hold that there was a rational basis in the evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Kinnane knowingly subjected the complainant to sexual contact by compulsion and thus to convict him of sexual assault in the fourth degree. Moreover, as we have indicated, the jury could have believed that Kinnane attempted, but failed, to subject the complainant to sexual contact. We therefore hold that there was a rational basis in the evidence for the jury to convict Kinnane of attempted sexual assault in the fourth degree.