Opinion ID: 1798836
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Confessions Obtained Between First Court Appearance and the Time Counsel was Appointed.

Text: Goodchild, relying on Spano v. New York, [7] Massiah v. United States, [8] and Escobedo v. Illinois, [9] contends that any confessions made after his first appearance in municipal court on March 17th and before March 30th (when counsel was appointed) were inadmissible. Involved are three statements or confessions, all given on March 26th. Exhibit No. 23 is a tape recording of a statement made at the state crime laboratory and Exhibit No. 22 is a transcription of the recorded statement. Exhibit No. 26 is a confession he signed after he was returned to Manitowoc. The cases Goodchild cites are distinguishable. In Spano the accused, despite repeated pleas to see his attorney and after approximately eight hours of continual questioning, was tricked into confessing by the repeated urging and misrepresentations of a friend who was a policeman. Massiah involved the planting of a hidden microphone in the car of a coaccused who had become a cooperator with the police. The co-operator then deliberately elicited incriminating statements from Massiah who was out of jail on bail. Not only was the accused in Escobedo, despite attempts to do so, not allowed to consult his counsel during a lengthy interrogation by the police, but his attorney, who was at the police station, was not allowed to see his client. The opinions in the cases Goodchild relies on make it clear that the total circumstances must be considered when dealing with a particular situation. Unlike the defendants in these cases, Goodchild was in no way tricked or misled. No surreptitious or extended interrogations took place. He was not threatened or pressured. Goodchild admitted that he was well treated. There is no claim of brutality. He was never denied access to or the assistance of counsel; in fact, he refused counsel when he first appeared in municipal court on March 17th and there is nothing in the record indicating that he ever requested counsel until his arraignment in circuit court on March 30th. He was repeatedly advised of his right to counsel. A consideration of all the facts demonstrates a lack of extenuating circumstances such as were present in Spano, Massiah, and Escobedo, which would render any statement taken before counsel had been appointed inadmissible. This analysis is contrary to the holding and rationale adopted by the supreme court of California in the very recent case of People v. Dorado. [10] Dorado interprets Escobedo and Massiah as precluding the admission of a confession even when the defendant does not request counsel. The court held (in a four-three decision) that the confession had constitutional defects because: (1) the investigation was no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but had begun to focus on a particular suspect, (2) the suspect was in custody, (3) the authorities had carried out a process of interrogations that lent itself to eliciting incriminating statements, (4) the authorities had not effectively informed defendant of his right to counsel or of his absolute right to remain silent, and no evidence establishes that he had waived these rights. [11] However, Dorado is distinguishable. The California court recognized that Escobedo permits an accused to waive counsel, but emphasizes the point that a right which is not known cannot be waived. [12] The crucial fact difference is that Dorado was not advised of any rights in regard to counsel while Goodchild was and expressly waived his right to be represented. Thus point (4) of the holding is not pertinent to the present case. Not only has the decision in Dorado gone further than any pronouncement of the United States supreme court, but the Dorado rule is contrary to several very recent Wisconsin decisions. In Pulaski v. State [13] and State v. Brown [14] confessions were admitted even though obtained while the accused was unrepresented. It does not appear whether either Pulaski or Brown was advised of his right to counsel, but Pulaski maintained that his request for counsel had fallen on deaf ears. Although the opinions did not allude to Massiah or Escobedo, the holdings in Brown and Pulaski that the confessions were properly admitted are contrary to the ruling in Dorado. In Browne v. State [15] the defendant made certain admissions after his arrest. The court found that there was no error in introducing them in evidence. On rehearing, Browne urged that Escobedo (which had been decided by the United States supreme court since our original decision in Browne ) was controlling. After recognizing, as do the dissenters in Dorado, that Escobedo turned on particular circumstances, this court pointed out that the only common fact in Browne and Escobedo was a failure to advise the accuseds of their right to remain silent. The court said: He made no request to consult with an attorney nor did any attorney seek to confer with him. We deem that this fully distinguishes Escobedo and that it does not control the result here. With respect to the failure to advise defendant of his constitutional right to remain silent, Holt v. State (1962), 17 Wis. (2d) 468, 479, 117 N. W. (2d) 626, held that there is no hard-and-fast rule that an accused must be informed of his constitutional right not to incriminate himself as a condition precedent to admission into evidence of any admissions or confessions made to the police. The most that Escobedo holds in this respect is that the failure to so inform a criminal suspect under arrest, when coupled with other circumstances, may be sufficient to require exclusion of any admission made by him. We find here a total lack of any other circumstances which require exclusion of the instant admissions. [16] Thus, the express holding of Browne is contrary to that of Dorado. We believe that this court's interpretation of Escobedo in Browne is correct. [17] We reject the interpretation made by the California court in Dorado.