Opinion ID: 625403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Vacate Entry of Default

Text: Rule 55(c) permits a party to be relieved of default “for good cause,” whereas a default judgment may only be set aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). While Rule 55(c) does not define “good cause,” this Court has advised district courts to consider three criteria in deciding a Rule 55(c) motion: (1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether setting aside the default would prejudice the party for whom default was awarded; and (3) whether the moving party has presented a meritorious defense. Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1993). The same factors are applied in the context of a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside a default judgment, although they are applied more rigorously, and the district court must resolve any doubts in the defaulting party’s favor. Id. Here because the defendants moved for relief pursuant to Rule 55(c) prior to the entry of default judgment, their motion warranted consideration under the “good cause” standard. While 3 the district court’s decision did not explicitly state whether it applied the “good cause” standard under Rule 55(c) or the stricter standard of Rule 60(b) to evaluate the defendants’ motion, the district court ultimately concluded that relief was not warranted under either Rule. In the present case, we need not address the first criteria, whether the default was willful, because on balance the district court properly concluded that the other two criterion were met. There was nothing improper in the district court’s conclusion that Peterson would suffer prejudice due to the defendants’ actions. The fact that Peterson did not file a single discovery request during the entire discovery period may have mitigated any prejudice suffered by Peterson, but this fact does not render the district court’s finding of prejudice an abuse of discretion. Rather, as the district court noted, prejudice may be found where a plaintiff would suffer increased difficulty in conducting discovery, as Peterson would here due to his lack of knowledge of the defendants’ affirmative defenses with only a week remaining in the discovery period. See Davis, 713 F.2d at 916 (noting that substantial prejudice could be shown by “increased difficulties of discovery”). Nor did the district court improperly conclude that the defendants had not established a meritorious defense. While the district court may have overlooked a fact presented in the defendants’ memorandum of law stating that it was Peterson who became belligerent and began fighting with the officers, this error was harmless because unsworn statements in a memorandum of law are not evidence. See Kulhawik v. Holder, 571 F.3d 296, 298 (2d Cir. 2009). Moreover, even that memorandum did not traverse the claim that the defendants used excessive force. The defendants’ motion to vacate the entry of default was almost completely devoid of reference to any underlying facts regarding their defenses and contained no facts, which, if proven at trial, 4 would constitute a complete defense to Peterson’s excessive force claim. The district court did not err in concluding that Appellants had not established a meritorious defense.