Opinion ID: 1057584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Public Trial

Text: In a related issue, the defense contends that the trial court's strict application of Rule 615, such that his family members had to choose between attending his trial or testifying in mitigation in the event Defendant was convicted, compromised his right to a public trial because two family members were not able to attend the guilt/innocence phase in order to preserve their rights to testify during the penalty phase. See Cohen, supra, at § 615[10] (Since the accused in Tennessee is entitled to a `speedy and public trial,' the prosecution's use of Rule 615 to exclude a member of the public theoretically conflicts with the accused's right to a public trial.) (footnote omitted). On the facts of this case, we disagree. The right to a public trial is guaranteed by both our federal and state constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. The right is not absolute, however. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). As recognized by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, although rooted in the reaction to the abuses of the secret proceedings of the English Star Chamber, [the right to a public trial] is not usually viewed as imposing a rigid, inflexible straitjacket upon a trial justice's conduct of a trial. Rather has it generally been recognized as being subject to a court's inherent power to regulate admission to the courtroom and to restrict `attendance at the trial as conditions and circumstances may reasonably demand in order to preserve order and decorum, or to protect the rights of the parties and the witnesses, or generally to further the administration of justice.' State v. Mancini, 108 R.I. 261, 274 A.2d 742, 747 (1971). See also State v. Lawrence, 167 N.W.2d 912, 914 (Iowa 1969) (observing that the right to a public trial has generally been viewed as a right subject to the inherent power of the court to limit attendance as the conditions and circumstances reasonably require for the preservation of order and decorum in the courtroom, and to reasonably protect the rights of parties and witnesses). Our own Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that the right to a public trial serves as a guarantee that the accused will be fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned. The presence of citizens in the courtroom safeguards the accused against (a) the court being used as an instrument of persecution, (b) the abuse of judicial power and discretion, and (c) potentially perjurious and abusive testimony. In addition, the public's presence may induce unknown witnesses to come forward with evidence relevant to the issues in controversy or facts which can be used to impeach a witness, encourage the trial participants to perform their respective duties conscientiously, and afford the citizens in the community an opportunity to observe the criminal justice system in progress, determine whether the system is functioning adequately, and express these findings in the form of public opinion. State v. Sams, 802 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Tenn. Crim.App.1990) (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-39, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965)) (footnotes omitted). The sequestration of individual witnesses pursuant to the rule does not threaten any of these interests. Indeed, witnesses sequestered pursuant to the rule are no longer considered members of the general public for purposes of exclusion from the courtroom during criminal proceedings. Tharp v. State, 362 Md. 77, 763 A.2d 151, 160 (2000). Thus, it is clear that sequestration of witnesses in the ordinary case does not violate a right to a public trial. Cohen, supra, at § 6.15[10]. See also State v. Worthen, 124 Iowa 408, 100 N.W. 330, 331 (Iowa 1904) (holding that sequestration of criminal defendant's witnesses did not infringe upon his constitutional right to a public trial). In this case, the trial court excluded from Defendant's trial only those persons who would be witnesses. Although we have held that the trial court erred in its rigid application of Rule 615 to Defendant's sentencing hearing, the trial court's error did not violate Defendant's right to a public trial. Defendant has cited us to no case law standing for the proposition that a trial court who errs in applying a sequestration order thereby necessarily violates a defendant's right to a public trial, and we have found none. Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.