Opinion ID: 2452276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of in-custodial statements

Text: Appellant Griffin's first allegation of error is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his four in-custodial statements to police, as well as a statement given to Willie Smith. While the record does not contain a written motion to suppress these statements, the trial court was evidently aware of Griffin's objection to the admission of the statements, as it held an evidentiary Denno hearing on this issue in accordance with Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), after which it declined to suppress Griffin's statements. At the hearing, Detective Marty Watson of the Clarksville, Tennessee Police Department testified that he was investigating Griffin on forgery charges and learned on June 14, 1993, that Griffin was in jail and wanted to talk to someone about the forgery case. At approximately 11:45 a.m. that day, Detective Watson went to the jail, read Griffin his rights, and had him sign a waiver-of-rights form. According to Detective Watson, Griffin told him that he would tell him everything he wanted to know, and stuff that he did not know, if Detective Watson would permit him to smoke a cigarette. Detective Watson advised Griffin of the building's no smoking policy, but Griffin would not talk to him without the cigarette, Detective Watson, for the purposes of his own notes, then wrote refused on the rights form. It was Detective Watson's testimony that Griffin specifically told him that he was not refusing it; rather, Griffin stated he just want[ed] a cigarette. The officer returned to his office and related the situation to his sergeant, who advised him to check Griffin out of the jail and allow him to smoke a cigarette outside on the way to the interview room. At approximately 2:00 p.m., while proceeding under the original waiver-of-rights form, Detective Watson interviewed Griffin, who gave him information about the forgeries as well as other crimes he had committed. During this interrogation, Detective Watson scratched out the refused notation on the rights form and signed his name beside the scratch-out. When Detective Watson asked Griffin if there was anything else he wanted to tell him, Griffin replied, I don't know how to tell you this, but I killed a man in West Memphis, Arkansas. Griffin offered to draw a map to the victim's house, and while doing so, Detective Watson left the room to get Detective Erin Kellett and to have someone contact West Memphis authorities to confirm Griffin's story. Detective Kellett testified that he entered the interview room and witnessed and signed the original rights form, noting that the time was 2:00 p.m. rather than 11:45 a.m. He also witnessed and signed a second rights form before taking both a written and a taped statement from Griffin. In each statement, Griffin confessed to committing the murder. Detective R.W. Brockwell of the Crittenden County Sheriff's Office testified that he arrived the next day, June 15, 1993, and interviewed Griffin at the Clarksville Police Department. After Brockwell read Griffin his rights, Griffin signed and initialed a waiver-of-rights form. Griffin then made both taped and written statements, in which he again confessed to the murder. Detective Brockwell, as well as Detectives Watson and Kellett, denied using any threats, force, or coercion to obtain the statements from Griffin. Willie Smith testified that on June 15, 1993, Griffin's sister, Mary Garrard, came by his place of business to tell him that Griffin wanted to talk to him. Later that afternoon, Mr. Smith went by Griffin's mother's residence, where he talked to Griffin on the telephone. According to Mr. Smith, Griffin confessed to him that he had committed the murder. Griffin testified at the Denno hearing and denied that he had made any statements to police on June 14. According to Griffin, he told the Tennessee officers that he wanted to talk to someone about a murder that happened in Arkansas, but refused to make a statement until the Arkansas detectives arrived the next day. Griffin stated that on June 15, before his rights were read to him, Detectives Brockwell and Watkins took him outside to the top of the building so that the three could smoke cigarettes. According to Griffin, Detective Brockwell handed him a cigarette, then hit him in the head with a pistol. Griffin testified that Detective Brockwell threatened that if he did not say what he was told to say, he would push him off the side of the roof, then give his family's address to the victim's family to come and kill them. Griffin stated that he was then carried back downstairs where he was forced to give both a written and a taped statement. It was Griffin's testimony that during his taped statement, Detective Brockwell hit him on at least two occasions, which explained [a] whole bunch of pauses in the tape. Griffin claimed that, after giving statements to the officers, he was carried back down to the drunk tank, where he told either Jailer Anderson or Jailer Monzella, neither of whom was present during his statements to police, that his head was bleeding and that he needed to go to the hospital. According to Griffin, one of the jailers brought him an ice pack. Griffin also denied telling Willie Smith that he had committed the murder; rather, he contended that he merely told Mr. Smith that officers had me for a murder case. Griffin's counsel proffered this testimony at the hearing. However, when asked by the trial court if the jailers could testify as to the nature and extent of the injuries Griffin had allegedly received, counsel replied that he was not sure. After oral arguments, the trial court denied the motion to suppress the five statements, finding that, by a preponderance of the evidence and under the totality of the circumstances, the statements were voluntarily, knowingly, understandably and intelligently given, and that Griffin had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his 5th and 6th Amendment Rights. In Smith v. State, 254 Ark. 538, 494 S.W.2d 489 (1973), we adopted the rule that, whenever an accused offers testimony that his confession was induced by violence, threats, coercion or offers of reward, the State has the burden to produce all material witnesses who were connected with the controverted confession or give an adequate explanation of their absence. [1] (Emphasis added.) As we recently recognized in Foreman v. State, 321 Ark. 167, 901 S.W.2d 802 (1995), we have repeated this rule many times. Remeta v. State, 300 Ark. 92, 777 S.W.2d 833 (1989); Williams v. State, 278 Ark. 9, 642 S.W.2d 887 (1982); Earl v. State, 272 Ark. 5, 612 S.W.2d 98 (1981); Bushong v. State, 267 Ark. 113, 589 S.W.2d 559 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938, 100 S.Ct. 2157, 64 L.Ed.2d 791 (1980); Gammel & Spann v. State, 259 Ark. 96, 531 S.W.2d 474 (1976); Russey v. State, 257 Ark. 570, 519 S.W.2d 751 (1975); Northern v. State, 257 Ark. 549, 518 S.W.2d 482 (1975); Smith v. State, 256 Ark. 67, 505 S.W.2d 504 (1974). In Bushong v. State, supra , we held that a constable who was present at the scene of Bushong's arrest was not a material witness. In so holding, we stated as follows: If we decide that he was a material witness, then we might as well say all witnesses who could possibly have witnessed anything must be called by the State. That is an unreasonable burden to place upon the State. There must be some connection between the alleged acts of coercion or an opportunity to observe the alleged coercion. This record gives no indication that [the constable] would have been a material witness in any regard except he happened to be present on the scene and might have observed something. 267 Ark. at 121, 589 S.W.2d 559. (Emphasis added.) We cannot conclude that the State was required to produce the jailers. There was no connection between them and the alleged acts of coercion and they were not in a position to observe the alleged coercion. While the record indicates that Griffin was given notice of his April 11, 1994, trial date on March 17, 1994, it is significant that Griffin did not enlist the aid of the prosecutor to obtain the presence of Anderson and Monzella until Friday, April 8, 1994, at approximately 4:00 p.m. Upon receiving the faxed subpoenas, the jailers' supervisor related that he could not release them from work on such short notice. While the State never subpoenaed the jailers, the prosecutor explained at the Denno hearing that he ha[d] no idea who the officers are, or anything. In deciding the issue of voluntariness in the absence of testimony from Anderson and Monzella, who were not present during the alleged coercive acts, the trial court was permitted to consider both Griffin's eleventh-hour attempt to subpoena these witnesses, and counsel for Griffin's concession at the hearing that he was not sure whether either officer could testify as to the nature and extent of injuries Griffin had allegedly received. Moreover, in making his decision, the trial judge, who was in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, Weger v. State, 315 Ark. 555, 869 S.W.2d 688 (1994), apparently concluded that the State's witnesses were more credible than Griffin's. In short, in examining the record before us, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to require the State to produce the two jailers, nor did it err in refusing to suppress Griffin's statements. Griffin also asserts that he was only read his Miranda rights in relation to the forgery charges against him in Tennessee, and was not Mirandized with respect to the homicide. We have previously addressed this issue in Whitmore v. State, 296 Ark. 308, 756 S.W.2d 890 (1988), as follows: It is not a violation of the rather rigid Miranda rules for the police to give one valid warning and then question the suspect about two or more different crimes. Hall v. State, 242 Ark. 201, 412 S.W.2d 603 (1967). Further, and distinguished from the argued police violation of the Miranda rules, a suspect's awareness of all of the different charges in advance of interrogation is not relevant to determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment privilege. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987). In contrast, the case cited by Griffin on this point, Shelton v. State, 287 Ark. 322, 699 S.W.2d 728 (1985), involved the issue of whether the statement Shelton gave an officer in his police car was the result of custodial interrogation, and, thus, required Miranda warnings. Here, the Tennessee officers gave Griffin a valid Miranda warning prior to questioning him about the forgery charges. The subject of the homicide arose after Detective Watson asked Griffin if there was anything else Griffin wanted to tell him. Under these circumstances, there was no violation.