Opinion ID: 2790067
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: introduction of x-ray

Text: Tomkins next argues that the government violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a) through its delay in turning over the x-ray that Officer McGuire took of the Chicago device before it had been rendered safe, and that the district court should have granted a mistrial on that basis. He emphasizes that the government admits that it received the x-ray the day before the final pretrial conference and yet did not mention it during the conference or turn it over at the start of the trial. 2 2In moving for a mistrial, Tomkins argued that the delayed production of the x-ray also ran afoul of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The district court determined, however, that Brady does not apply because 16 No. 13-2234 Under Rule 16, the government must permit the defendant to inspect or copy items within the government’s control that (1) are material to preparing the defense, (2) the government intends to use in its case-in-chief, or (3) were obtained from or belong to the defendant. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E); see United States v. Baker, 453 F.3d 419, 424 (7th Cir. 2006). The government offers a meager defense of its compliance with this rule, contending that the record does not establish whether Officer McGuire was a member of the prosecution team and that Rule 16 does not impose a duty on federal prosecutors to obtain documents in possession of state police. See United States v. Hamilton, 107 F.3d 499, 509 n.5 (7th Cir. 1997). But as Tomkins notes, even if McGuire was not part of the prosecution team, that does not excuse the government’s failure to provide the x-ray at the pretrial conference or start of trial. But even if the government did not comply with Rule 16, that does not mean that the district court erred in admitting the x-ray as rebuttal evidence. Trial courts have “discretion to fashion a remedy for the government’s noncompliance with Rule 16, and this court will not disturb the district court’s decision absent a showing of abuse of discretion and prejudice.” United States v. Warren, 454 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); see United States v. Breland, 356 F.3d 787, 797 (7th Cir. 2004). Tomkins has not made that showing here. Even though Tomkins was pro se, the court’s refusal to allow the x-ray during the government’s case-in-chief and clear warning that the x-ray could come in as rebuttal evidence provided a reasonable remedy for any Rule 16 violathe x-ray is not exculpatory, and Tomkins does not challenge that ruling on appeal. No. 13-2234 17 tion. The court’s rulings allowed Tomkins adequate opportunity to adjust his defense, especially since Tomkins must have known how the contents of the device had been arranged. Although Tomkins sought a new trial, that remedy is appropriate “only when ‘all other, less drastic remedies are inadequate.’” Warren, 454 F.3d at 760 (quoting United States v. De La Rosa, 196 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 1999)). Tomkins has failed to convince us that the less drastic remedy adopted by the district court was unreasonable. Moreover, the district court’s exercise of discretion in regard to Rule 16 is reviewed for harmless error, see United States v. Hurt, 574 F.3d 439, 442 (7th Cir. 2009), and we are not persuaded that the alleged error here affected the outcome of trial. In particular, as the district court noted, the government introduced photographic evidence showing that the relative sizes of the lead pellets and gunpowder would have made it highly unlikely that they did not mix together and contact the igniter. Further, explosive experts confirmed that Tomkins’s devices had all the elements of explosive bombs, and expert Winslow maintained that the devices could have exploded if mishandled during shipping. In light of this testimony, we are not convinced that the x-ray made a critical difference in the jury’s decision.