Opinion ID: 2507169
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is there a Washington State special needs exception?

Text: ¶ 28 We have never adopted a special needs exception but have looked to federal special needs cases when dealing with similar issues. In cases concerning administrative searches, [18] border patrols, [19] and prisoners and probationers, [20] our courts have departed from the warrant requirement in similar, but not always identical, ways. ¶ 29 In Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121 Wash.2d 80, 847 P.2d 455, we held convicted sex offenders could be tested for HIV (human immunodeficiency virus). But because neither party briefed nor asked for an independent construction of the state constitution, we relied exclusively on federal cases when deciding Juveniles A, B, C, D, E. Id. at 91 n. 6, 847 P.2d 455. In Curran, 116 Wash.2d 174, 804 P.2d 558, we held taking blood pursuant to former RCW 46.20.308(3) (1987) did not violate article I, section 7 if there was a clear indication it would reveal evidence of intoxication and was performed in a reasonable manner. In Olivas, 122 Wash.2d 73, 856 P.2d 1076, after we analyzed the federal reasoning in Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct. 1402 and Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685, we held the State may conduct blood tests of violent sex offenders without a warrant, probable cause, or individualized suspicion under both the United States and Washington State Constitutions. ¶ 30 In Robinson, 102 Wash.App. at 827-28, 10 P.3d 452, the Court of Appeals held the city of Seattle could require a preemployment urinalysis test of police officers, firefighters, and any other city position where public safety is in jeopardy. In its analysis, the Court of Appeals claimed our court had accepted a variation of the federal special needs analysis: Although the special needs analysis appears to be an established part of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Washington Supreme Court has developed a different approach for article I, section 7 analysis of governmental searches outside the context of law enforcement. Id. at 816-17, 10 P.3d 452 (footnote omitted). The Robinson court examined several of our cases, including Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, and said: [The Washington State Supreme Court has] recognized two types of privacy: the right to nondisclosure of intimate personal information or confidentiality, and the right to autonomous decisionmaking. The former may be compromised when the State has a rational basis for doing so, while the latter may only be infringed when the State acts with a narrowly tailored compelling state interest. Id. at 817, 10 P.3d 452 (quoting Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121 Wash.2d at 96-97, 847 P.2d 455). But aside from what Robinson claims we did, we have not created a general special needs exception or adopted a strict scrutiny type analysis that would allow the State to depart from the warrant requirement whenever it could articulate a special need beyond the normal need for law enforcement. In the context of randomly drug testing student athletes, we see no reason to invent such a broad exception to the warrant requirement as such an alleged exception cannot be found in the common law. See Ladson, 138 Wash.2d at 350, 979 P.2d 833 (finding no common law exception for a pretextual warrantless traffic stop).