Opinion ID: 2211374
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Law Relating to Stops

Text: Automobile stops, which constitute seizures for Fourth Amendment [2] purposes, historically have been founded upon an officer's reasonable suspicion of illegal activity ( People v Sobotker, 43 NY2d 559 [1978]). Suspicionless stops, however, may be upheld where reasonable, determined by balancing the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers ( Brown v Texas, 443 US 47, 50 [1979] [internal citations and quotation marks omitted]). For evaluating the validity of a particular stop, Brown offers a three-part balancing test: the gravity of the public concerns served by seizure of the vehicle, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest and the severity of interference with individual liberty ( id. at 50-51). That test has been applied by the Supreme Court and this Court to review suspicionless automobile stops, including by roving patrols ( Michigan Dept. of State Police v Sitz, 496 US 444 [1990]; Delaware v Prouse, 440 US 648 [1979]; United States v Brignoni-Ponce, 422 US 873 [1975]; Muhammad F., 94 NY2d 136; People v Spencer, 84 NY2d 749, cert denied 516 US 905 [1995]). Most relevantly, in Muhammad F. this Court, applying the Brown balancing analysis, concluded that random, suspicionless stops of livery cabs pursuant to the New York City Police Department program predating TRIP were unreasonable and thus unconstitutional. Under that predecessor program, the New York City Taxi-Livery Task Force made suspicionless stops of livery cabs in targeted neighborhoods to provide the drivers with pamphlets containing safety information, inquire as to their safety and simultaneously observe the passengers' reactions. The police routinely asked passengers to step out of the vehicles and searched cab interiors. Stops were wholly within the officers' discretion, with no written guidelines or records of stops made. While not doubting the gravity of the public concern served by the program, we concluded that the stops pursuant to this program were invalid, noting the failure of proof that less intrusive or discretionary means were unavailable to achieve the stated objective. Moreover, we found the stops excessively intrusive, measured both objectively (passengers routinely were directed to step out of the cab while the officers searched it) and subjectively (the stops were of a type that could well frighten lawful travelers). Finally, no attempt was made to satisfy the constitutional requirement that the stops be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers ( Muhammad F., 94 NY2d at 146-148; see also United States v Santiago, 950 F Supp 590 [SD NY 1996]). TRIP, by contrast, properly balances the competing interests under Brown. In that the acute public interest in preventing crime against livery cab drivers remains unchallenged Brown 's first factorwe begin our analysis by considering the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest (the effectiveness factor). In Muhammad F., we were troubled by the lack of evidence of the effectiveness of conducting random, suspicionless patrol stops, as opposed to less intrusive methods, particularly given the elevated potential intrusiveness and    greater opportunities for the unlimited exercise of discretion by police implicated by such stops ( Muhammad F., 94 NY2d at 146). Under TRIP, however, the officers' discretion in the field is significantly constrained by the limitation of the program to participating vehicles. Stops, in that sense, are not truly random. Only livery cab owners and drivers who feel vulnerable will elect to participate, as opposed to programs that subject all vehicles to random, suspicionless stops at the unchecked discretion of an individual officer ( see Prouse, 440 US at 659-660; Spencer, 84 NY2d at 758-759). Moreover, to the extent that an enrolled vehicle owner decides the program's intrusiveness outweighs its intended benefits, or that potential passengers are discouraged from entering the cab, the owner can opt out of the program. In this case, the testimony demonstrates that, for Escano, TRIP was effective. In his words, at times you wish to be stopped. The structure of the program and the restrictions imposed on police officers by the Operations Order also significantly reduce the intrusiveness of stops, both objectively and subjectively ( Brown 's third factor). Only participating vehicles may be stopped. Vehicle occupants may not be removed or questioned during stops; absent independent reason to detain them, they are free to leave without being asked to provide identification. Additionally, by contrast to the New York City police program reviewed in Muhammad F., TRIP requires the police to complete a detailed activity log for every stop made, which affords the possibility of post-stop judicial review to the extent questions are raised as to the actual operation of the program ( United States v Martinez-Fuerte, 428 US 543, 559 [1976]). The police also maintain a registration log of all vehicles participating in the program. Subjective concerns, such as the potential for fear on the part of passengers, are mitigated by the consent of the driver and the display of decals that notify passengers that the vehicle might at any time be stopped and visually inspected by the police. In other contexts, including the search of a vehicle, consent alone may satisfy Fourth Amendment concerns ( see e.g. Florida v Jimeno, 500 US 248 [1991]; Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US 218 [1973]; Kamins, New York Search & Seizure, at 429-436 [12th ed]; cf. People v Battaglia, 86 NY2d 755 [1995]). Under TRIP, a passenger unwilling to assume the risk of a stop can simply pass up a car participating in the program. In United States v Woodrum (202 F3d 1 [1st Cir], reh and reh en banc denied 208 F3d 8 [1st Cir], cert denied 531 US 1035 [2000]), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the stop of a taxicab pursuant to a 1996 Boston Police Department program, TIPS, strongly resembling TRIP. [3] In that case, the court applied the third-party consent doctrine, subject to a requirement that the actions taken pursuant to that consent had to be reasonable. The court went on to find that stops made pursuant to TIPS withstood a weighing of the public interest against passenger rights, given the obvious public interest in preventing crime against taxicab drivers, the limitations on police discretion in making TIPS stops, and the relatively modest intrusion on passengers' liberty in light of the brevity of the stops and the notice of the program. In this case, defendant contends that because a taxicab passenger has an independent expectation of privacy, the stop cannot be justified under third-party consent principles ( cf. United States v Matlock, 415 US 164 [1974]; see also People v Gonzalez, 88 NY2d 289 [1996]; People v Cosme, 48 NY2d 286 [1979]). Because we conclude that this stop was reasonable under a Brown analysis, we need not separately determine whether the third-party consent doctrine alone would validate the stop. [4] Finally, defendant's challenge to the legality of the stop based on the location of the TRIP decals on Escano's car is unpersuasive. Given that the decals primarily serve to mitigate the subjective intrusiveness of a TRIP stop, the passenger's constructive, rather than actual, notice of the TRIP program is sufficient. In this case, we need not contemplate the implications of the omission of a TRIP decal in the passenger compartment interior. Defendant's notice of the TRIP program can be imputed as a matter of law from the facts of this case even in the absence of the decal in the passenger compartment. Defendant's remaining arguments, which involve mixed questions of fact and law, are beyond further review by this Court inasmuch as the lower court determinations are supported by evidence in the record. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. Order affirmed.