Opinion ID: 794577
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reginald Dinez Johnson

Text: 12 At trial, the government offered into evidence the identification card in the name of Cedric Miller, the loose pieces of paper, the cellular phone, and the pager. The district court admitted these items as having been lawfully obtained during a search and inventory incident to a lawful arrest. Johnson does not contest the lawfulness of his arrest, but argues that the warrantless search of his personal property violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We disagree. 13 We review the denial of a motion to suppress de novo. United States v. Adams, 401 F.3d 886, 893 (8th Cir.2005). `[We] review the underlying factual determinations for clear error, giving due weight to the inferences of the district court and law enforcement officials.' Id. (quoting United States v. Coleman, 349 F.3d 1077, 1083 (8th Cir.2003)). 14 Had the FBI retained Johnson's personal property throughout its investigation or had the report been transcribed on the date of investigation, there is little question that the evidence in question would have been admissible. The Supreme Court has noted that: [O]nce the accused is lawfully arrested and is in custody, the effects in his possession at the place of detention that were subject to search at the time and place of his arrest may lawfully be searched and seized without a warrant even though a substantial period of time has elapsed between the arrest and subsequent administrative processing, on the one hand, and the taking of property for use as evidence, on the other. This is true where the clothing or effects are immediately seized upon arrival at the jail, held under the defendant's name in the property room of the jail, and at a later time searched and taken for use at the subsequent criminal trial. 15 United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974). As stated above, Johnson's property was seized by the FBI, turned over to local authorities, returned to the FBI, and then searched. Although Johnson relies heavily on the date of transcription, December 16, Agent Vera testified that he investigated the items on December 11 or 12, 2001, after receiving them from the local authorities. Although a period of time elapsed between the arrest and the subsequent search of Johnson's property, we conclude that the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Lester, 647 F.2d 869, 874-75 (8th Cir.1981) (holding that the local authority's seizure of items shortly after the defendant was arrested and the FBI's search of those items the following day was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). See also United States v. Phillips, 607 F.2d 808, 809-10 (8th Cir.1979) (holding that a delayed search was reasonable); United States v. Swofford, 529 F.2d 119, 122-23 (8th Cir.1976) (same). 16 Johnson further argues that the district court erred in admitting FBI Agent George Roberts's testimony regarding the issuance date of the Illinois identification cards seized from Johnson and Diggs upon their arrests. Johnson carried an identification card in the name of Cedric Miller, and Diggs carried one in the name of Stephen Boyd. Agent Roberts testified that the Illinois Secretary of State's records reflected that the two cards had been issued on the same day. 17 Johnson argues that Agent Roberts's testimony was prejudicial and impermissible hearsay and that the admission of such testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Because defense counsel did not object at trial, we review for plain error. 2 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Under the plain error rule, an error may be corrected if it is plain, affects the substantial rights of a defendant, and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. Johnson, Diggs, and Anderson testified that Johnson and Diggs procured their false identification cards on the same day and with Anderson's help. Agent Roberts's testimony was thus merely cumulative and did not substantially affect Johnson's rights. Accordingly, Johnson is not entitled to plain error relief.