Opinion ID: 783545
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionally-Protected Legal Mail

Text: 27 A prisoner's right to receive mail is protected by the First Amendment, but prison officials may impose restrictions that are reasonably related to security or other legitimate penological objectives. See Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1012 (6th Cir.1992). As we have noted, prison officials may open prisoners' incoming mail pursuant to a uniform and evenly applied policy with an eye to maintaining prison security. Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 607 (6th Cir.1993). However, prison officials who open and read incoming mail in an arbitrary and capricious fashion violate a prisoner's First Amendment rights. See Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir.1986). 28 Moreover, when the incoming mail is legal mail, we have heightened concern with allowing prison officials unfettered discretion to open and read an inmate's mail because a prison's security needs do not automatically trump a prisoner's First Amendment right to receive mail, especially correspondence that impacts upon or has import for the prisoner's legal rights, the attorney-client privilege, or the right of access to the courts. See Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172, 174 (6th Cir.1996) (The right of a prisoner to receive materials of a legal nature, which have impact upon or import with respect to that prisoner's legal rights and/or matters, is a basic right recognized and afforded protection by the courts....); see also Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir.2003) (In balancing the competing interests implicated in restrictions on prison mail, courts have consistently afforded greater protection to legal mail than to non-legal mail....). 29 In an attempt to accommodate both the prison's needs and the prisoner's rights, courts have approved prison policies that allow prison officials to open legal mail and inspect it for contraband in the presence of the prisoner. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (upholding such a policy against a Sixth Amendment attorney-client privilege claim and a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim based on access to the courts). In Knop, we addressed an opt-in system in which prison officials could open any mail sent to a prisoner unless the prisoner affirmatively requested that privileged mail, defined by the policy as mail sent by a court or by counsel, be opened in his presence. 977 F.2d at 1012. We found that the opt-in system was constitutionally sound as long as prisoners received written notice of the policy, did not have to renew the request upon transfer to another facility, and were not required to designate particular attorneys as their counsel. Id. 30 Not all mail that a prisoner receives from a legal source will implicate constitutionally protected legal mail rights. Indeed, even mail from a legal source may have little or nothing to do with protecting a prisoner's access to the courts and other governmental entities to redress grievances or with protecting an inmate's relationship with an attorney. When it does, however, we must balance the interest of prison security against the possibility of tampering that could unjustifiably chill the prisoner's right of access to the courts or impair the right to be represented by counsel. We also note in response to prison officials' security concerns that even constitutionally protected mail can be opened (although not read) and inspected for contraband. The only requirement is that such activity must take place in the presence of the recipient, if such a request has been made by the prisoner. 31 A. Claims A, B, C, D, and E: Items Allegedly Opened Before Plaintiff Filed the Written Request 32 On May 4, 1994, Sallier submitted a form to the mailroom supervisor indicating that it was a written request to be present when my legal mail is opened. The request was received by defendant Redmond on May 5, 1994. This written request was submitted in compliance with Michigan Administrative Code Rule 791.6605(4) and Michigan Department of Corrections policy directive PD 05.03.118 ¶ K, both of which state that upon a prisoner's written request, mail that is clearly identified as being from the prisoner's designated attorney, the legislative corrections ombudsman, or a state or federal court shall be opened and inspected for contraband in the prisoner's presence. 33 Sallier received all of the letters that he alleged were opened outside his presence in Claims A, B, C, D, and E on or before the date that his written request was accepted in the prison mailroom. Because this court and others have upheld opt-in systems that require an affirmative request to be present when legal mail is opened, Sallier had no constitutionally protected right to be present for the opening of any mail before the mailroom had received his request. Therefore, we need not reach the issue of whether the mail in Claims A, B, C, D, and E constituted legal mail. As a matter of law, the defendants cannot be liable for having opened mail, even if it is legal mail, prior to the time that Sallier made his written request to have such mail opened in his presence. As a result, Claims A, B, C, D, and E should not have been submitted to the jury and, accordingly, the jury verdict on these five claims must be set aside. 34 B. Claim F: Correspondence from the American Bar Association 35 Sallier alleged that on May 10, 1995, he received correspondence from the American Bar Association that was opened by the defendants outside his presence. Nothing on the envelope indicated that it contained confidential, personal, or privileged material, that it was sent from a specific attorney at the ABA, or that it related to a currently pending legal matter in which Sallier was involved. The ABA is a professional organization designed to support attorneys in a variety of ways; it is not an organization that has the authority to take action on behalf of an inmate. Compare Jensen v. Klecker, 648 F.2d 1179, 1183 (8th Cir.1981) (finding that a letter from the National Prison Project, bearing the name of an attorney and stamped Lawyer Client Mail Do Not Open Except In Presence of Prisoner appears to come well within the definition of protected attorney-client legal mail). Given that the ABA is not a direct-services legal organization and generally does not provide legal advice and that the envelope contained no marking to alert a prison employee that it was to be opened only in the presence of the prisoner, receipt of this correspondence did not implicate constitutionally protected legal mail rights. Cf. Boswell v. Mayer, 169 F.3d 384, 388-89 (6th Cir.1999) (upholding prison policy of treating mail from a state attorney general's office as protected legal mail only if (a) the envelope contains the return address of a licensed attorney and (b) the envelope has markings that warn of its privileged content); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 576, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (finding it entirely appropriate for a state to require any communication from an attorney to be specially marked as originating from an attorney, including the attorney's name and address, if the communication is to be given special treatment). 36 In general, when there is no specific indication to the contrary, an envelope from an organization such as the ABA may be opened pursuant to the regular mail policy without violating the First Amendment rights of a prisoner. As a matter of law, therefore, the defendants cannot be liable under Claim F, which should not have been submitted to the jury. Accordingly, the jury verdict on this claim must be set aside. 37 C. Claims G, J, L, and N: Correspondence From County Clerks 38 Sallier alleged that on May 19, 1995, June 27, 1995, August 15, 1995, September 6, 1995, and December 20, 1995, he received mail from various county clerks that was opened outside of his presence. The senders on these envelopes are: (1) Carmella Sabaugh, Macomb County Clerk and Register of Deeds; (2) Teola P. Hunter, Wayne County Clerk; and (3) Lynn D. Allen, Oakland County Clerk — Register of Deeds, County Clerk's Office. Nothing on any of the envelopes indicated that the envelope contained confidential, personal, or privileged material, that it was sent from an attorney, that it related to a currently pending legal matter in which Sallier was involved, or that it was to be opened only in the presence of the prisoner. In general, a county clerk or register of deeds is not someone who can provide legal advice about a prisoner's rights or direct legal services and is not someone with authority to take action on behalf of a prisoner. Mail from a county clerk simply does not implicate a prisoner's right of access to the courts, of petitioning the government to redress grievances, or of competent representation by counsel. The administrative matters about which one generally communicates with a county clerk or register of deeds, i.e., birth, marriage, or death certificates, tax and real estate services, automobile title and registration, etc., are not the types of legal matters that raise heightened concern or constitutional protection. 39 We find that as a general matter and as applied to Claims G, H, J, L, and N in this case, mail from a county clerk or register of deeds does not implicate constitutionally protected legal mail rights. Given the nature of a county clerk's office and given that there was no specific indication to the contrary marked on the envelope, the correspondence from the county clerks and registers of deeds in this case could be opened pursuant to the regular mail policy without violating Sallier's First Amendment rights. 40 As a matter of law, therefore, the defendants cannot be liable under Claims G, H, J, L, and N. These claims should not have been submitted to the jury and, accordingly, the jury verdict on these claims must be set aside. 41 D. Claims O through T: Correspondence from State and Federal Courts 42 In these claims, Sallier alleged that on various dates between December 22, 1995, and February 5, 1996, he received mail from state and federal courts that was opened outside of his presence. The status of such mail presents the most difficult question in this appeal, because it will frequently, but not necessarily, involve a currently pending legal matter affecting the prisoner's rights. See Bell-Bey v. Williams, 87 F.3d 832, 837-38 (6th Cir.1996); see also Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 475 (5th Cir.1976) (holding that an inmate's right of access to the courts requires that incoming prisoner mail from courts, attorneys, prosecuting attorneys, and probation or parole officers be opened only in the presence of the inmate). 43 We recognize that the Seventh Circuit has stated in dicta that mail from court personnel can be treated as general correspondence unless it is designated according to prison policy as Special Mail — Open only in the presence of the inmate, because mail from court personnel is generally a matter of public record. See Martin v. Brewer, 830 F.2d 76, 78-79 (7th Cir.1987); Castillo v. Cook County Mail Room Dept., 990 F.2d 304, 306-07 (7th Cir.1993) (calling the Martin decision non-binding as dicta on this point, and reversing a district court's dismissal of a prisoner complaint alleging two letters from a federal district court and one from the United States Department of Justice were opened outside his presence); but see Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir.1996)(citing Martin for the proposition that mail from the courts, as contrasted to mail from a prisoner's lawyer, is not legal mail). However, prior decisions from our court have used the term legal mail to include mail from the courts and have expressed disagreement with Martin 's rationale that mail from a court is automatically a matter of public record. See Bell-Bey, 87 F.3d 832 (referring throughout the opinion to mail from a prisoner to his designated attorney as well as to any state or federal court as legal mail); Boswell, 169 F.3d at 389-90 (Unlike mail from the ACLU, courts, defense attorneys, and so forth, mail from Prosecuting Attorneys and the Attorney General will almost always consist of documents in the public record.). 44 Indeed, we can imagine a situation in which a court corresponds with a prisoner before filing the prisoner's complaint because some administrative requirement, such as submitting an in forma pauperis affidavit, paying the filing fee, or signing the complaint, has not been met. In that situation, the complaint is not yet a public record, and prison officials have no legitimate penological interest in reading the correspondence before it is. See Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (prison officials must articulate some legitimate reason for interfering with prisoners' communications). In order to guard against the possibility of a chilling effect on a prisoner's exercise of his or her First Amendment rights and to protect the right of access to the courts, we hold that mail from a court constitutes legal mail and cannot be opened outside the presence of a prisoner who has specifically requested otherwise. 45 E. Claims I, K, and M: Correspondence from Attorneys 46 As to these three claims, Sallier alleged that on July 26, 1995, August 29, 1995, and November 7, 1995, he received mail from an attorney that was opened outside of his presence. Such correspondence is, of course, the very essence of legal mail. See Kensu, 87 F.3d at 174; Knop, 977 F.2d at 1012. Moreover, in Knop, we held that a prisoner may not be required to designate ahead of time the name of the attorney who will be sending the prisoner confidential legal mail. Id. In fact, we even implied in Muhammad v. Pitcher, 35 F.3d 1081 (1994), that a prison policy allowing inmates to be present when mail from their attorneys was opened was constitutionally required, and we held that mail from the Attorney General's office required similar protection because of the potentially confidential nature of such correspondence. Id. at 1083. 47 We are not alone in this conclusion. Although courts in other circuits have embraced varying definitions of legal mail, there is general agreement that mail from a prisoner's attorney is always included in such a definition. See, e.g., Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1094 (stating mail from a prisoner's lawyer is legal mail); Lemon v. Dugger, 931 F.2d 1465, 1466 (11th Cir.1991) (same); Jensen, 648 F.2d at 1182 (same). When the Supreme Court considered the question of incoming legal mail in Wolff, 418 U.S. at 576-77, 94 S.Ct. 2963, it concluded that a prison policy requiring an inmate to be present when mail from his attorney is opened adequately protects the inmate's constitutional rights. 48 We find that the prisoner's interest in unimpaired, confidential communication with an attorney is an integral component of the judicial process and, therefore, that as a matter of law, mail from an attorney implicates a prisoner's protected legal mail rights. See Kensu, 87 F.3d at 174 (referring to a prisoner's right to protect the contents of correspondence with an attorney as a fundamental right). There is no penological interest or security concern that justifies opening such mail outside of the prisoner's presence when the prisoner has specifically requested otherwise.