Opinion ID: 2600500
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure To State a Viable Claim

Text: The department and Tomter alternatively claim that the superior court's judgment dismissing the complaint against both defendants was justified because J & S's complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to support any of the complaint's specifically alleged causes of action. This argument might have considerable merit if we strictly limited our consideration of this point to the facts set forth in J & S's complaint, as we ordinarily would in reviewing a dismissal under Civil Rule 12(b)(6). The complaint asserts claims against Tomter for misrepresentation, negligence, fraud, interference with prospective business advantage, breach of implied warranty, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. While the complaint on its face alleges facts that generally suggest the possibility of impropriety, such as Tomter's extensive contact with Toram during the proposal process and Tomter's failure to disclose to his superiors his close friendship with Toram's owner, it does not specifically describe any actions by Tomter that are patently improper, nor does it provide specific factual support for its conclusory allegations of bad faith misconduct. Even applying the charitable standard for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), which requires us to look at the complaint in the light most favorable to J & S and ask if there is any conceivable set of circumstances that, if proved, could support a viable claim, it seems difficult to glean facts from the complaint alone supporting a viable claim against Tomter for any intentional impropriety involving bad faith actions outside the scope of his official duties. But the circumstances in this case militate in favor of a somewhat broader perspective. As already indicated, the superior court did not dismiss J & S's complaint against either the department or Tomter on the ground that it failed to state facts capable of sustaining a viable claim. To the contrary, even though the court had allowed J & S an opportunity for discovery in order to develop additional evidence supporting its claim, and even though J & S had addressed some of this evidence in its arguments before the superior court, the court ultimately dismissed the case as to both defendants on the narrow legal theory that the procurement code's exclusive remedy provision categorically barred J & S from maintaining its suit. In spite of the parties' opportunity for discovery, then, this narrow ground for dismissal gave J & S no reason to move to amend its complaint to incorporate newly discovered facts to flesh out the original complaint's bare-boned allegations. Since it seems likely under these circumstances that J & S would have been entitled  and might still be entitled  to amend its complaint before a final dismissal for failure to state a claim, we think that basic fairness requires us to judge the sufficiency of the complaint on appeal by considering not just the facts recited in the original complaint, but all newly discovered facts in the superior court record that J & S might have included in an amended complaint. [25] Considering this slightly expanded universe of facts as if it were true and drawing all reasonable inferences arising from those facts in favor of J & S, we find it conceivable that the complaint sets forth allegations of fact consistent with and appropriate to some enforceable cause of action. [26] Or stating the proposition conversely, we cannot rule out the possibility of a viable claim. Specifically, J & S alleges facts tending to indicate that Tomter displayed animosity toward J & S, went out of his way to prevent the company from winning the lease, and actively helped its competitor, Toram, succeed. Both Janet Burts, the vice president of an aviation company that had supplied the department in the past, and her husband Doug Burts, a department employee who sat on the RFP review committee, stated that Tomter had openly disparaged J & S and had expressed reluctance to award the contract to it, describing it as a pain in the ass. Toram, in turn, was co-owned by a close personal friend of Tomter, Russ Torrison, who, after being contacted by Tomter, formed the company with another individual for the specific purpose of responding to the RFP. Neither Torrison nor his co-owner had any prior experience leasing aircraft. During the course of the bid evaluation process, Tomter repeatedly communicated with Torrison. Tomter never informed his superiors in the department of his friendship or communications with Torrison. More important, Doug Burts also provided deposition testimony suggesting that Tomter had made arrangements to receive kickback payments from Toram: According to Burts, Tomter had said that Burts could expect to receive money from Toram if Toram was awarded the contract. When viewed in totality and accepted as true, these allegations could reasonably suggest the existence of a scheme to favor Toram in return for personal payments to Tomter  a fraudulent arrangement that would fall well beyond the outer limits of Tomter's official duties. Bad faith actions of this kind could also potentially fall outside the protections afforded by qualified, or good-faith, official immunity. And the alleged misconduct could also conceivably fit into one or more of the specific causes of action alleged in J & S's complaint. For example, the complaint specifically alleges that Tomter's actions amounted to an intentional interference with J & S's prospective economic advantage. We have previously recognized this tort in Alaska, holding that a person who is pursuing reasonable and legitimate prospects of entering into an economic relationship with another is protected from a third person's wrongful conduct that aims to disrupt that relationship. [27] To make out a prima facie case for this tort, the plaintiff must show: (1) the existence of a prospective business relationship between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) knowledge by the defendant of the prospective relationship, and intent to prevent its fruition; (3) conduct by the defendant interfering with the relationship; (4) failure of the prospective relationship to culminate in pecuniary benefit to the plaintiff; (5) causation of the plaintiff's damages by the defendant's conduct; and (6) absence of privilege or justification for the defendant's action.[ [28] ] This cause of action provides a potentially viable theory to address J & S's chief complaint about Tomter: that Tomter, motivated by animosity against J & S and a desire for personal financial gain, abused his position as a participant in the procurement process to prevent J & S from forming a contract with the state. [29] Alternatively, the same allegations might fairly be characterized as fitting J & S's claim of an intentional misrepresentation  also alleged in the complaint. In ruling that J & S advances sufficient facts under these theories to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), we need not definitively endorse or approve either theory; rather, it suffices to conclude that neither the department nor Tomter has authoritatively ruled out the possibility that J & S might prevail under one or both. We thus decline to hold that dismissal for failure to state a claim provides an alternative basis for affirming the superior court's judgment against J & S as to Tomter.