Opinion ID: 2441011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Postcards and Evidence of Subsequent Offenses

Text: Skillicorn contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence of several crimes committed by Skillicorn and Nicklasson after Mr. Drummond's execution. After Nicklasson shot Mr. Drummond, Skillicorn, Nicklasson, and DeGraffenreid drove the stolen vehicle to a mutual friend's house in Blue Springs. Keri McEntee came to that house seeking DeGraffenreid. Upon her arrival, Skillicorn and Nicklasson came out of the house and Nicklasson accused McEntee of messing with their car. Both Skillicorn and Nicklasson obtained firearms from the trunk of Mr. Drummond's car and held them to McEntee's head. Nicklasson said he would not hesitate to kill her. The home owner then came out of his house, whereupon, Skillicorn and Nicklasson left. Skillicorn claims this evidence was improperly admitted because it was evidence of other crimes and because the probative value of this evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Criminal defendants have the right to be tried only for the offense for which they are charged. State v. Hornbuckle, 769 S.W.2d 89, 96 (Mo. banc 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 860, 110 S.Ct. 171, 107 L.Ed.2d 128 (1989). The general rule concerning the admission of evidence of uncharged crimes, wrongs, or acts is that evidence of prior uncharged misconduct is inadmissible for the purpose of showing the propensity of the defendant to commit such crimes. State v. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Mo. banc 1993). To be admissible, proof of the commission of another crime or other crimes must have some legitimate tendency to prove that the accused committed the crime for which he is being tried. State v. Buxton, 324 Mo. 78, 22 S.W.2d 635, 636 (1929). It is clearly not admissible on the theory that, if a person will commit one offense, he will commit another. Id., 22 S.W.2d at 637. The evidence must also be legally relevant, in that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. The balancing of the effect and value of evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Mo. banc 1993) (citations omitted). This Court in Buxton noted some particular cases and scenarios in which evidence of other crimes helped to prove that the accused committed the crime for which he was charged, and was, therefore, admissible. In a 1938 opinion, this Court cited to Buxton stating that it had delineated five recognized exceptions. State v. Garrison, 342 Mo. 453, 116 S.W.2d 23, 24 (1938). Those exceptions provide for the admission of evidence that tends to establish motive, intent, the absence of mistake or accident, or a common scheme or plan. Id. We have also permitted the admission of other crimes evidence to show the circumstances or the sequence of events surrounding the offense charged, State v. Wacaser, 794 S.W.2d 190, 194 (Mo. banc 1990); State v. Flenoid, 838 S.W.2d 462, 467 (Mo.Ct.App.1992); State v. Davis, 806 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Mo.Ct.App.1991), and to help present a complete and coherent picture of the events that transpired. Flenoid, supra, at 467. But these recognized exceptions were never meant to be an exclusive list within which evidence must necessarily fall in order to be admissible. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d at 13 (evidence of misconduct that does not fall within one of the five enumerated exceptions may nevertheless be admissible). Rather, the test has always been whether the evidence has some legitimate tendency to prove that the accused committed the crime for which he is being tried, Buxton, 22 S.W.2d at 636, and is more probative than prejudicial. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d at 13. [3] To prove Skillicorn guilty of first degree murder in this case, the state was required to show that, with the purpose of promoting or furthering the death of Richard Drummond, the defendant aided or encouraged Allen Nicklasson in causing the death of Richard Drummond and did so after deliberation. See MAI-CR3d 304.04. At trial, Skillicorn disputed the element of deliberation in the murder of Mr. Drummond. Skillicorn contended that he believed Nicklasson was going to take Mr. Drummond into the woods and somehow restrain him there and that Nicklasson's murder of Mr. Drummond was a complete surprise to him. The challenged evidence is a continuation of the sequence of events that presents a coherent picture of Skillicorn's crime. The events occurred only hours after Mr. Drummond's murder as Skillicorn and Nicklasson were making their escape west. Rather than an unrelated crime that might be used only to prejudice the jury, Skillicorn's participation in the threat to McEntee was particularly relevant and connected to the crime charged. It occurred only a few hours after the murder took place. Skillicorn and Nicklasson threatened McEntee's life with the same guns used in the perpetration of Mr. Drummond's murder. These actions were taken to protect the very object for which they had murdered Mr. Drummond, that is, his car. The jury could also infer from this evidence Skillicorn's murderous mental state during the period surrounding the charged murder and that he had no intention of distancing himself from Nicklasson's actions. If Skillicorn had not deliberately become involved with Mr. Drummond's murder, under the circumstances of this case, he likely could have distanced himself from, not overtly worked as a team with, one he knew to be the murderer. This evidence helped establish Skillicorn's deliberation on Mr. Drummond's murder, and that he aided Nicklasson in perpetrating the murder, both elements of the crime charged. We expressly recognized the use of other crimes evidence that was strongly connected to the charged crime to support the element of deliberation in State v. Kenley, 693 S.W.2d 79, 81-82 (Mo.1985); rev'd on other grounds, 937 F.2d 1298 (8th Cir.1991) (ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase for failure to present proper expert mitigating evidence). We stated: Mental state, in this case deliberation and premeditation, is rarely capable of direct proof, and that findings of deliberation and premeditation depend usually upon an inference reasonably drawn from the evidence and circumstances surrounding the act.... [The Defendant's] subsequent robberies and his statements that he had killed earlier and would kill again are also indicative of a deliberative state of mind.... Conduct before and after the commission of the charged crime is relevant where it relates to the elements of the charged crime. Id. Such mens rea evidence is admissible particularly where different inferences may fairly and reasonably be drawn regarding the intent with which the alleged criminal act was done or where the surrounding circumstances are such as to be susceptible of an interpretation indicating innocence. State v. Shilkett, 356 Mo. 1081, 204 S.W.2d 920, 923 (1947) (citing State v. Bersch, 276 Mo. 397, 207 S.W. 809 (1918) (where the evidence tending to show arson was entirely circumstantial and the fire was susceptible of explanation as accidental); State v. Fischer, 297 Mo. 164, 249 S.W. 46, 49 (1923) (embezzlement, where the act charged was susceptible of an innocent explanation); State v. Patterson, 271 Mo. 99, 196 S.W. 3, 6 (1917) (robbery by extortion, where the circumstances of the act were susceptible of an interpretation indicating innocence)); EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 5:01 (1996) ([T]he courts are most liberal in admitting evidence to prove mens rea.). The evidence was both logically and legally relevant to establish the crime for which Skillicorn was charged. Skillicorn also challenges the admission of evidence of subsequent burglaries and a robbery he and Nicklasson committed while on the run after the murder. The transcript contains no contemporaneous objection to the evidence of subsequent burglaries. The only somewhat contemporaneous objection challenged the procedure by which the state sought do admit the confession, and was made during the playback of several portions of Skillicorn's confession. No contemporaneous objection of any kind was made at the time the portion of the confession revealing such evidence was played for the jury. The defense made a continuing objection as to testimony regarding any statements Skillicorn made based on a motion... in limine regarding other crimes, before the relevant portions of the confession were played. However, the motion in limine challenges only evidence of other crimes alleged to have been committed by the defendant in Arizona and California. The transcript indicates that the portion of the confession Skillicorn here challenges referred to burglaries and a robbery committed before the pair arrived in Arizona and California. Thus, the alleged error was not preserved. [4] Under plain error review, Rule 30.20, Skillicorn has failed to show that admission of such evidence so violated his rights that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice resulted. Parker, 886 S.W.2d at 917. Skillicorn alleges the trial court also erred in admitting two postcards sent by Skillicorn and Nicklasson from Houck, Arizona, during their flight west. Both postcards depicted cowboys on horses. Both postcards bore the same postage cancellation date, time, and place. Nicklasson's postcard read: Outlaws on the run, love you much, still would love to have hot heavy sex. Say hi to everyone. Hope you enjoyed the meal. It was signed OutlawsLove R.I.P. Skillicorn's postcard read: from a friend you only met once getting from one place to another See if this card reminds you of any one you know. Both were addressed to Annie Wyatt in Blue Springs, Missouri. Evidence presented at trial showed that Wyatt was an acquaintance of Nicklasson and that Skillicorn and Nicklasson had taken her and some of her friends to the Blue Springs Country Kitchen the evening of Mr. Drummond's murder. Skillicorn claims these were hearsay and were inadmissible evidence of other crimes. The transcript shows that these postcards were not admitted for the truth of their contents. Rather, they were admitted to show that Skillicorn and Nicklasson were acting together, that they were a team. As such, they were not inadmissible hearsay and were probative of the issue for which they were presented. Points Seven and Eighteen are denied.