Opinion ID: 42951
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cumulative Impacts Analysis Under NEPA

Text: 19 We first address Petitioners' contention that the Secretary failed to adequately consider the cumulative impact of the Gulf Landing deepwater port with three other ports for which applications were filed. Under the Deepwater Port Act, organizations wishing to construct the type of facility contemplated here must apply to the Secretary of Transportation for a license. 33 U.S.C. § 1503(a). As part of the approval process, the Act requires the Secretary to prepare an EIS pursuant to NEPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1504(f). In accord with NEPA, the Secretary must include a detailed statement of the environmental impacts of the proposed actions. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i). Impacts include ecological . . . aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic, social, or health, whether direct, indirect, or cumulative. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8. Cumulative impact is the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions  and can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (emphasis added). 20 When analyzing cumulative impacts of a proposed action, we have held that an agency should consider: 21 (1) the area in which the effects of the proposed project will be felt; 22 (2) the impacts that are expected in that area from the proposed project; 23 (3) other actions — past, proposed, and reasonably foreseeable — that have had or are expected to have impacts in the same area; 24 (4) the impacts or expected impacts from these other actions; and; 25 (5) the overall impact that can be expected if the individual impacts are allowed to accumulate. 26 Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir.1985)(citing Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 683-84 (D.C.Cir.1982)), overruled on other grounds, Sabine River Authority v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 951 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1992). Furthermore, this court has held that [a]n impact is `reasonably foreseeable' if it is `sufficiently likely to occur that a person of ordinary prudence would take it into account in reaching a decision.' City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth, 420 F.3d 440, 453 (5th Cir.2005) (citing Sierra Club v. Marsh, 976 F.2d 763, 767 (1st Cir.1992)). 27 In issuing the FEIS for the Gulf Landing project, the Secretary limited his analysis of cumulative impacts to the two ports for which an approved public Draft NEPA document [was] available for review at the time of the Draft EIS for Gulf Landing. The Secretary therefore did not consider the impact of the three facilities for which applications had been filed but the consideration of the application had not progressed to the draft EIS stage. 9 He reasoned that [i]t would not be reasonable to speculate on the quantitative or qualitative configurations of an application until an approved public draft evaluation was available for review. He also excluded two of those three ports on the independent rationale that they were too geographically distant from the Gulf Landing port, finding that [t]he Mississippi River discharge plume is approximately 210 miles east of the [proposed Gulf Landing port] and, in this case, represents a reasonable biological boundary for assessment of cumulative impacts. 28 The Petitioners argue that the Secretary's decision to exclude consideration of the three ports for which applications had been filed was arbitrary and capricious. They contend that the effects of the proposed projects are not speculative because the details required in an application give the Secretary ample information to evaluate the effects of the projects. 10 29 Appellants also argue that the dire need for natural gas, the sums expended by the applicants, 11 the expense entailed in preparing such applications, and the financial stability of the applicants make the projects sufficiently likely to occur that a person of ordinary prudence would take [them] into account in reaching a decision. City of Shoreacres, 420 F.3d at 453. 30 The Secretary argues that he was not arbitrary or capricious in declining to consider the effects of the three projects for which draft EISs were not available. The Secretary acknowledges that absolute certainty that a project will come to fruition is not required in order to include it in the cumulative impact analysis. He argues, however, that a line must be drawn somewhere, and he has drawn the line such that projects without a final license are to be considered, but only after a draft EIS is available. Specifically, the Secretary contends that the Deepwater Port Act requires so many steps after the filing of an application that until a draft EIS is available, there is insufficient certainty about the project's future construction and environmental consequences to include it in the cumulative impact calculus. He argues that accepting Petitioners' argument would require the Secretary to engage in four layers of speculation. 31 First, the Secretary would have to presume that information provided by the applicant is sufficient for consideration, without the independent analysis by the Secretary mandated by the Act. He points out that this analysis is not superficial or perfunctory; for example the Act requires expertise from a number of different agencies. 12 Second, the Secretary may decide to deny the license or impose conditions on it that alter the project's environmental effects. He argues that one of the conditions may even be a change from open loop to closed loop technology, or vice-versa, a change with significant environmental effects. 13 Third, the Act imposes requirements beyond the Secretary's control that may require him to deny or impose conditions on a license. For example, the license cannot issue if the EPA informs the Secretary that the project does not comply with environmental statutes or if the Governor of the adjacent state timely indicates disapproval. 33 U.S.C. § 1503(c)(8). Fourth, even if a license issues, the facility may never be built, because of the cost of the project, a volatile market or because of unanticipated conditions the Secretary imposes on construction. 14 The Secretary argues that while he could have cast his net wider, it was not arbitrary or capricious for him to cast it where he did because of the above uncertainties. 32 Finally, intervenor, ConocoPhillips points to the continued monitoring requirements, imposed by the Secretary requiring the operator to mitigate undue environmental damage. Pointing to the short, 356-day window given to the Secretary to act on an application, it also argues that with these time constraints the Secretary could not have taken into account the three speculative ports, and that the Secretary cannot be expected to consider applications filed up until the date it completes its EIS. 33 We agree that the Secretary did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when he included only two of the five ports for which applications were filed. We recognize the high demand for natural gas and these LNG ports, thereby increasing the possibility that the ports will be built. We also recognize that the companies which have filed the applications certainly have the resources to build the ports. 34 However, the Secretary was entitled to conclude that the occurrence of any one of a number of contingencies could cause the plans to build the ports to be cancelled or drastically altered. 15 For example, one or more of the applicants may decide for a number of reasons to withdraw its application before the Secretary's approval, such as ExxonMobil did with its application for the Pearl Crossing GBS platform. 16 The Secretary, after receiving input from other agencies, may deny an application or make changes to the application's construction specifications such as demanding that the port be closed loop rather than open loop. The technology in this area is also advancing rapidly and may change the effects of the planned ports. Finally, based on public statements and correspondence from Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco, the Secretary was aware that she might well decide to veto any open loop port approved by the Secretary. 17 35 Under the facts presented to us and under the deferential standard which we review the agency's determination, we find that the Secretary did not abuse his discretion or act arbitrarily or capriciously in concluding that the three ports were not reasonably foreseeable future actions, or, as this court has put it, actions that a person of ordinary prudence would take [] into account in reaching a decision. City of Shoreacres, 420 F.3d at 453. 18