Opinion ID: 1375296
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Franklin Statements

Text: Prior to trial, Appellant moved to introduce the confession of Joseph Paul Franklin, a convicted serial killer serving three life sentences at a federal penitentiary in Marion, Illinois. On March 1, 1984, Franklin told Special Agent Ernest V. Smith of the Wisconsin Department of Justice that he had killed two white females in West Virginia [8] and provided a hand drawn map depicting the location of the murders. He later repeated these statements to agents with the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. When he was interviewed by West Virginia State Police Trooper Debbie DeFalco, he initially denied involvement in the murders but then took responsibility for the killings. [9] Following these three instances, however, Franklin refused to talk further about his involvement in the murders. Appellant sought to introduce Franklin's confession, as well as a detailed map drawn by Franklin in the presence of Wisconsin officials, which allegedly corroborated his confession. [10] The trial court, applying Rule 804(b)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, refused to admit the confession on the grounds that it lacked the requisite guarantees of trustworthiness. Rule 804(b)(3) provides the following exception to the general prohibition against hearsay: Statement against Interest. ___ A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless he or she believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. W.Va.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) (emphasis supplied). We begin our analysis by noting that trial courts have broad discretion in making evidentiary rulings and this Court will not overturn those rulings unless there has been an abuse of discretion. State v. Bell, 189 W.Va. 448, 453, 432 S.E.2d 532, 537 (1993). An appellate court should find an abuse of discretion only when the trial court has acted arbitrarily or irrationally. State v. McGinnis, 193 W.Va. 147, 159, 455 S.E.2d 516, 528 (1994). In making its ruling, the trial court reasoned: I am not going to allow his statements because I don't think they have the degree of trustworthiness from a person who is incarcerated and makes one statement today and then won't talk to you after that about it, and then changes his mind when our own officers are there conducting the statement. That it lacks credibility. And when you couple that with and four-time loser [11] that has nothing to gain or lose with respect to what the statement is made. (footnote added) This ruling was made consistent with the recognition in United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103, 103 S.Ct. 726, 74 L.Ed.2d 951 (1983), that [i]t is to be recalled that Rule 804(b)(3) places upon the proponent of a statement against interest a formidable burden. The declaration offered to exculpate the accused must be supported by corroborating circumstances that `clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.'... As the Advisory Committee's Notes on this provision instruct, the risk of fabrication in this setting is significant. Consequently, rather than permitting only the jury to decide what weight to give the evidence, the initial responsibility is vested in the... [trial] [c]ourt. 688 F.2d at 233 (quoting, in part, Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) [12] ) (emphasis supplied); see also 2 Cleckley, supra, § 8-4(B)(3) at 283 (discussing Rule 804(b)(3)'s requirement of a finding that the circumstances clearly indicate that the statement was not fabricated). Appellant simply did not meet the formidable burden imposed by Rule 804(b)(3). MacDonald, 688 F.2d at 233. Like the circuit court below, the trial court in MacDonald was presented with declarations by an individual whose pattern of remarks in admitting and denying complicity rendered her hopelessly unreliable. Id. Franklin's refusal to speak further with any West Virginia authorities regarding his commission of the murders coupled with his vacillating statements provided the circuit court with convincing evidence of lack of trustworthiness. Quite simply, the absence of sufficient guarantees against the fabrication of the Franklin confession compel the conclusion that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the substance of Franklin's confession. [13] See MacDonald 688 F.2d at 233; Cleckley, supra, § 8-4(B)(3) at 283 (stating that standard governing the admission of statements under Rule 804(b)(3) is abuse of discretion).