Opinion ID: 2622835
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Expression of Belief in Defendant's Guilt

Text: In his closing argument to the jury, defense counsel accused the prosecutor of making personal attacks on him as a tactical maneuver to deflect the jury's attention away from the weaknesses in the prosecution's case. A prosecutor who does not have the facts, he said, will attack the defense lawyer for being such a mean person and being not so bright, because I asked dumb questions. In her rebuttal, the prosecutor responded: One thing that I heard quite a bit was that I made a lot of nasty comments about [defense counsel] yesterday. That I said he was mean and I said he was stupid. And in fact I didn't say any of those things and I don't think those things are true. [¶] In fact I think [defense counsel's] style of thorough cross-examination was very helpful to my case because ... [i]t showed over and over again the witness's [sic ] demeanor, and their consistency from beginning to end. They weren't going to be confused by him.... They were going to listen to both of us and politely as best they could and as articulately as they are capable answer the questions. [¶] I don't think [counsel ] is mean or stupid. But I think his client is guilty. (Italics added.) The Court of Appeal viewed the latter comment as misconduct, explaining that it reflected a personal belief in defendant's guilt, under circumstances that would cause the jury to conclude that the belief was based on evidence not presented at trial. We disagree. A prosecutor may not express a personal opinion or belief in the guilt of the accused when there is a substantial danger that the jury will view the comments as based on information other than evidence adduced at trial. ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 447, 6 Cal. Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388; see also People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 207, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 593, 131 P.3d 995; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 975-976, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) The danger that the jury will view the prosecutor's expressed belief in the defendant's guilt as being based on outside sources is acute when the prosecutor offers his opinion and does not explicitly state that it is based solely on inferences from the evidence at trial. ( People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 848, 97 Cal.Rptr. 684, 489 P.2d 564.) Nevertheless, not all such comments are improper. Rather, [t]he prosecutor's comments must ... be evaluated in the context in which they were made, to ascertain if there was a substantial risk that the jury would consider the remarks to be based on information extraneous to the evidence presented at trial. ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 447-448, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388; see also People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1303, fn. 48, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 35-36, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.) Here, the prosecutor's comment did not imply that she based her belief in defendant's guilt on evidence not presented at trial. To the contrary: Because her statement that she believed defendant was guilty immediately followed her comment that, in her view, defense counsel's cross-examination of the victims demonstrated that they were credible, a reasonable juror would most likely infer that the prosecutor based her belief in defendant's guilt on the credibility of the victims' testimony at trial. Even if we were to assume, for argument's sake, that the prosecutor's comment was improper, defendant would still not be entitled to relief. As mentioned earlier, defense counsel did not object at trial to the comment, thus forfeiting on appeal a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Reversal of defendant's conviction would be warranted only if counsel's failure to object violated defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. But as we have pointed out, except in those rare instances where there is no conceivable tactical purpose for counsel's actions, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised on habeas corpus, not on direct appeal. ( People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 266-267, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134.) This is particularly true where, as here, the alleged incompetence stems from counsel's failure to object. [D]eciding whether to object is inherently tactical, and the failure to object will rarely establish ineffective assistance. ( People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 502, 117 Cal.Rptr 2d 45, 40 P.3d 754; see also People v. Dickey, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 914, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 647, 111 P.3d 921; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 433, 127 Gal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) Here, the record shows that defense counsel had good tactical reasons for not objecting to the prosecutor's argument or asking the trial court to tell the jury to disregard it. In his closing statement to the jury, defense counsel expressed his personal belief that defendant was innocent. Counsel said: I believe Father Lopez. Father Lopez has always said to me `Mr. Moore, I didn't do this.' Thus, one reason for defense counsel's failure to object when the prosecutor said that she believed in defendant's guilt may have been defense counsel's concern that the jury would find him a hypocrite for complaining about the prosecutor's argument (But I think his client is guilty) when defense counsel himself had used a similar tactic, by expressing a belief in defendant's assertion of innocence. And defense counsel may have been concerned that asking the trial court to admonish the jury not to consider the prosecutor's expressed belief in defendant's guilt could lead the trial court to tell the jury to disregard the personal beliefs expressed by both the prosecutor and defense counsel. Such an admonition, defense counsel may have concluded, could have done the defense more harm than good by having the jury disregard defense counsel's expressed belief in defendant's innocence. [2]