Opinion ID: 1938113
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the meaning of misrepresentation

Text: The meaning of misrepresentation, as used in the PUPs, cannot be determined in isolation or out of context. See Amica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Streicker, 583 A.2d 550, 552 (R.I. 1990). Accord Hughes, 423 A.2d at 1173; McGowan v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 110 R.I. 17, 19, 289 A.2d 428, 429 (1972). Rather, the contested terms of an insurance policy must be defined contextually. See McGowan, 110 R.I. at 20-21, 289 A.2d at 429-30; Nagy, 100 R.I. at 738-39, 219 A.2d at 399. This principle, known as noscitur a sociis (literally, from the Latin, it is known by its associates), provides that the meaning of a word in a written instrument must be determined by reference to the terms accompanying the word and, more specifically, `that general and specific words are associated with and take color from each other.' Industrial National Bank v. Sefsick, 92 R.I. 93, 100, 166 A.2d 417, 421 (1961). Noscitur a sociis and its related, narrower Latin maxim  ejusdem generis (of the same kind)  have been applied in this jurisdiction to interpret terms of contracts, statutes, and wills. See Berthiaume v. School Committee of Woonsocket, 121 R.I. 243, 248, 397 A.2d 889, 893 (1979); Shulton, Inc. v. Apex, Inc., 103 R.I. 131, 135, 235 A.2d 88, 91 (1967); Sefsick, 92 R.I. at 100, 166 A.2d at 420-21; Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Babbitt, 22 R.I. 113, 115, 46 A. 403, 404 (1900); Railton v. Taylor, 20 R.I. 279, 283, 38 A. 980, 982 (1897). Standing alone, misrepresentation is a very broad term, and  as the District Court noted in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Russo  has been merged to such an extent with other kinds of misconduct that neither the courts nor legal writers have found any basis to regard it as a separate basis of liability.  829 F. Supp. at 28 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 105 at 726 (5th ed. 1984)). Instead, misrepresentation is regarded as a method of accomplishing various types of tortious conduct. 9 Stuart M. Speiser et al., The American Law of Torts § 32:2 at 209 n. 2 (1992). The term is defined formally as [a]ny manifestation by words or other conduct by one person to another that, under the circumstances, amounts to an assertion not in accordance with the facts. Black's Law Dictionary 1001 (6th ed. 1990). As used in subpart C of the definition of personal injury, however, the term misrepresentation is surrounded by the more specific terms libel, slander, humiliation, defamation of character, and invasion of rights of privacy. The interpretation of misrepresentation, for purposes of the PUPs, can only be ascertained, then, from its contextual meaning. We note that the other terms in subpart C have meanings more specific than that of misrepresentation. Defamation, for example, is an attack on the reputation of another, that is to say, the unprivileged publication of false statements which    result in injury to another. 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 2 at 25 (1987). Libel and slander are methods of defamation of one's reputation and character by the publication of false statements. Id. §§ 2, 5 at 25, 32. Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the meaning of the general term misrepresentation is qualified and restricted, inter alia, by its association with the terms libel, slander, and defamation. The listing of these terms together within the definition of personal injury demonstrates the intent to insure against liability for injury arising from false statements injurious to a person's reputation. Use of the terms humiliation and invasion of rights of privacy also manifests the intent to cover invasions of personal interests. Mental suffering that results from humiliation constitutes a compensable element of damages for personal injuries, Arlan v. Cervini, 478 A.2d 976, 979-80 (R.I. 1984), and may be the basis of recovery in an action for defamation. 50 Am.Jur.2d Libel And Slander § 356 at 878-79 (1970). An action for invasion of the right of privacy can ensure an individual's right to mental comfort and peace. Id. § 6 at 518. Use of the term misrepresentation within this context clearly restricts the coverage in the PUPs to liability for personal injury that arises from false statements injurious to another's reputation or otherwise invasive of his or her personal interests. Accordingly, the term cannot be interpreted as extending the coverage of the PUPs to the master complaint's allegations that Russo and DiNapoli misrepresented the solvency of CCU. [2] For the foregoing reasons, this court holds that the term misrepresentation as used in the Personal Umbrella Policies held by Russo and DiNapoli does not extend coverage for the claims of negligent and intentional misrepresentation made against them in the master complaint. Because we answer the first certified question in the negative, we refrain from addressing the second question. The papers in this case are remanded to the United States District Court for the District Court of Rhode Island.