Opinion ID: 2211835
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: indigent guilty plea defendants in michigan have meaningful access to the appellate system

Text: Given the obvious differences between trial-based and guilty plea convictions, it is clear that our current guilty plea procedures provide sufficient methods of assistance to meet the Ross meaningful access requirement. To preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant must move to withdraw his plea before the trial court. MCR 6.311(C). MCR 6.005(H)(4) states that unless an appellate lawyer has been appointed, [appointed trial counsel is responsible for the] filing of postconviction motions the lawyer deems appropriate, including motions ... to withdraw plea, or for resentencing.  (Emphasis added.) Thus, our court rules require trial counsel to assist the defendant in organizing and presenting to the trial court any potential appellate issues that warrant preservation. Accordingly, a pro se defendant seeking discretionary review will have the benefit of a transcript, trial counsel's framing of the issues in the motion to withdraw, and the trial court's ruling on the motion. As in Ross, these factors will aid the defendant in identifying and asserting claims. Further, prison inmates filing discretionary applications will have the same access to law libraries, paralegal assistance, and staff attorneys that Michigan provides to them in other postconviction proceedings. While trial counsel cannot be relied on to advise the defendant of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, those claims that have merit likely will be apparent on the record. [8] We acknowledge that the tools available to indigent defendants seeking leave to appeal from their guilty pleas are not equivalent to those present in Douglas and Ross. However, Douglas and Ross both involved appeals from convictions following trial. Neither Douglas nor Ross addressed the issue before us, namely, whether a defendant is entitled under the federal constitution to appointed counsel in a first discretionary appeal from a plea-based conviction. As stated, the differences between trial- and plea-based convictions are undeniable. Thus, any statements in Douglas and Ross suggesting the necessity of a reasoned lower court decision and a brief prepared by an attorney in the lower court must be considered in the context in which those cases were decided. Finally, we acknowledge that the Court has, since Ross, continued to expand its meaningful access line of cases in the context of filing fees and transcripts. See, e.g., MLB, supra . However, we note that none of those decisions have expanded on the right to counsel recognized in Douglas. Thus, we conclude that the free transcript and counsel cases are really on separate trajectories. Indeed, compare the Court's expansive jurisprudence in the free transcript/filing fees cases against its contracting jurisprudence regarding the right to counsel in identical settings. See, e.g., 3 LaFave, Israel and King, Criminal Procedure (2d ed.), งง 11.2(c) and (d). The Court has extended the right to transcripts at state expense in collateral attack cases and habeas corpus proceedings. In the analogous postconviction setting, the Court has never voted to expand the Douglas right to counsel. Since Douglas itself, the Supreme Court has never, not once, even in the case of inmates on death row, ordered counsel appointed for individual petitioners as a component of the right of meaningful access. [9]