Opinion ID: 1028103
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of Claim Against Sergeant Harvey

Text: We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Sec’y of State for Defense v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff’s statement of his claim “need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and have “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965, 1974 (2007). “[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations 2 contained in the complaint.” Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2200 (citations omitted). In particular, a pro se complaint must be liberally construed and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. (citation omitted). The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials “to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (citation omitted). To establish a claim for failure to protect from violence, an inmate must show: (1) “that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” id. at 834, and (2) that the prison officials had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). “In prison-conditions cases that state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Id. (internal citations omitted). To be deliberately indifferent, a prison official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837. “Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, . . . and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Id. at 842. “While the obviousness of a risk is not conclusive and a prison official 3 may show that the obvious escaped him, . . . he would not escape liability if the evidence showed that he merely refused to verify underlying facts that he strongly suspected to be true, or declined to confirm inferences of risk that he strongly suspected to exist.” Id. at 843 n.8. A prison official also may not “escape liability for deliberate indifference by showing that, while he was aware of an obvious, substantial risk to inmate safety, he did not know that the complainant was especially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who eventually committed the assault.” Id. at 843. A plaintiff’s failure to personally notify prison officials of an alleged risk to his safety is not dispositive as to the issue of whether prison officials knew of the risk. Id. at 848-49. A showing of mere negligence does not qualify as deliberate indifference. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986); Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff must also show he suffered a serious or significant physical or mental injury as a result of the defendants’ conduct. Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1380-81 (4th Cir. 1993). Weatherholt claims that he suffered serious injuries at the hands of other inmates because Harvey directed that he identify inmates who allegedly robbed him in person, rather than through a photo identification process. Although Weatherholt does not explicitly allege that Harvey knew of, and disregarded, 4 the risk to his safety, his pro se pleading must be liberally construed and is sufficient to give notice of a plausible claim to relief under the Eighth Amendment. Weatherholt attached the response to an administrative grievance that he filed with prison officials concerning this incident, which indicates that Harvey did not follow proper procedure and that “appropriate action” was taken against her as a result. The resolution of Weatherholt’s grievance in his favor is not conclusive evidence that Harvey acted with deliberate indifference, but it constitutes some evidence that Harvey may have disregarded an obvious, general risk to inmate safety by failing to follow proper procedure in ordering Weatherholt to make his identifications in person. The attachment of the grievance resolution to the complaint also constitutes further notice of a plausible claim that Harvey was deliberately indifferent to a serious risk to Weatherholt’s safety. Accordingly, we vacate the order dismissing Weatherholt’s claim against Harvey.