Opinion ID: 1749200
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Child Endangerment Resulting in Serious Injury

Text: The crime of child endangerment resulting in serious injury is set forth in Iowa Code section 726.6. The relevant portions of this statute state: 1. A person who is the parent, guardian, or person having custody or control over a child . . . commits child endangerment when the person does any of the following: . . . . a. Knowingly acts in a manner that creates a substantial risk to a child or minor's physical, mental or emotional health or safety. . . . . d. Willfully deprives a child or minor of necessary food, clothing, shelter, health care or supervision appropriate to the child or minor's age, when the person is reasonably able to make the necessary provisions and which deprivation substantially harms the child or minor's physical, mental or emotional health. Iowa Code § 726.6(1) (emphasis added). In order to sustain a conviction for child endangerment resulting in serious injury, the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, Mark had either control or custody of Travis. We discuss control and custody separately.
Iowa Code section 726.6(3) states a person has control for the purposes of child endangerment if he or she has: (1) accepted, undertaken, or assumed supervision of a child from the parent or guardian of the child; (2) undertaken or assumed temporary supervision of a child without explicit consent from the parent or guardian of the child; or (3) operated a motor vehicle with a child present in the vehicle. The district court did not instruct the jury on the third definition of control. Also, there was no evidence to prove Mark accepted, undertook, or assumed supervision of Travis with the consent of Travis's parents or guardians. Therefore, we must analyze whether Mark undertook or assumed the temporary supervision of Travis without the explicit consent of Travis's parents or guardians. Mark claims his mere presence as an adult in the vehicle does not mean he had control of Travis for even a brief period of time. We agree. Mark's role in this situation was peripheral. He did not decide to pick up the boys; he did not decide where to leave the boys. At best he acquiesced in his wife's decision to leave the boys at the Leckington home. His inactivity does not rise to the level of control.
As noted above, chapter 726, Protection of the Family and Dependent Persons, does not define the term custody. In Johnson, we equated the term custody in section 726.3 (neglect of a dependent child) with the term custody in section 726.6 (child endangerment resulting in serious injury). 528 N.W.2d at 641. Because we have already concluded Mark did not have custody of Travis for purposes of neglect or abandonment of a dependent person, we must also find he did not have custody for the purposes of the crime of child endangerment resulting in serious injury.