Opinion ID: 111362
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal Common Law

Text: By the time of the Revolutionary War, several well-defined principles had been established governing the nature of a tribe's interest in its property and how those interests could be conveyed. It was accepted that Indian nations held aboriginal title to lands they had inhabited from time immemorial. See Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 28 (1947). The doctrine of discovery provided, however, that discovering nations held fee title to these lands, subject to the Indians' right of occupancy and use. As a consequence, no one could purchase Indian land or otherwise terminate aboriginal title without the consent of the sovereign. [3] Oneida I, 414 U. S., at 667. See Clinton & Hotopp, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Restraints on Alienation of Indian Land: The Origins of the Eastern Land Claims, 31 Me. L. Rev. 17, 19-49 (1979). With the adoption of the Constitution, Indian relations became the exclusive province of federal law. Oneida I, supra, at 670 (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 561 (1832)). [4] From the first Indian claims presented, this Court recognized the aboriginal rights of the Indians to their lands. The Court spoke of the unquestioned right of the Indians to the exclusive possession of their lands, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17 (1831), and stated that the Indians' right of occupancy is as sacred as the fee simple of the whites. Mitchel v. United States, 9 Pet. 711, 746 (1835). This principle has been reaffirmed consistently. See also Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 142-143 (1810); Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 543 (1823); Clark v. Smith, 13 Pet. 195, 201 (1839); Lattimer v. Poteet, 14 Pet. 4 (1840); Chouteau v. Molony, 16 How. 203 (1854); Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 211 (1872). Thus, as we concluded in Oneida I, the possessory right claimed [by the Oneidas] is a federal right to the lands at issue in this case. 414 U. S., at 671 (emphasis in original). Numerous decisions of this Court prior to Oneida I recognized at least implicitly that Indians have a federal commonlaw right to sue to enforce their aboriginal land rights. [5] In Johnson v. McIntosh, supra , the Court declared invalid two private purchases of Indian land that occurred in 1773 and 1775 without the Crown's consent. Subsequently in Marsh v. Brooks, 8 How. 223, 232 (1850), it was held: That an action of ejectment could be maintained on an Indian right to occupancy and use, is not open to question. This is the result of the decision in Johnson v. McIntosh. More recently, the Court held that Indians have a common-law right of action for an accounting of all rents, issues and profits against trespassers on their land. United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 314 U. S. 339 (1941). [6] Finally, the Court's opinion in Oneida I implicitly assumed that the Oneidas could bring a common-law action to vindicate their aboriginal rights. Citing United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., supra, at 347, we noted that the Indians' right of occupancy need not be based on treaty, statute, or other formal Government action. 414 U. S., at 668-669. We stated that absent federal statutory guidance, the governing rule of decision would be fashioned by the federal court in the mode of the common law. Id., at 674 (citing United States v. Forness, 125 F. 2d 928 (CA2), cert. denied sub nom. City of Salamanca v. United States, 316 U. S. 694 (1942)). In keeping with these well-established principles, we hold that the Oneidas can maintain this action for violation of their possessory rights based on federal common law.