Opinion ID: 699646
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) and 403.

Text: 18 The admission of evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) is subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Rackstraw, 7 F.3d 1476, 1478 (10th Cir.1993). Under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), courts may not admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts ... to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. However, such evidence is admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Id. at 1478 n. 1. In this case, the district court concluded that Hill's prior cocaine base possessions were admissible to show Hill's knowledge or intent. [I]t tends to show that the defendant knew what crack was and what it looked like, the court reasoned, and to show that the defendant knew that the substance allegedly in his possession on March 24th, 1993, was crack. 19 To determine if this admission under 404(b) was proper, we apply a four-part test, which requires that: (1) the evidence was offered for a proper purpose; (2) the evidence was relevant; (3) the trial court determined under Fed.R.Evid. 403 that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice; and (4) the trial court gave the jury proper limiting instructions upon request. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1502, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988); Rackstraw, 7 F.3d at 1479. Because all four criteria have been met, we conclude that admitting the officers' testimony was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 20 The government offered this testimony for a proper and relevant purpose listed in 404(b)--namely, Hill's knowledge--which is clearly relevant, as it is an essential element of the charged offense. By standing on his not guilty plea, Hill put[ ] in issue every material ingredient of the crime charged, leaving the government its full burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt. In count one, Hill was charged with unlawfully, knowingly, and intentionally possessing cocaine base. The elements of this offense include not only that Hill knowingly and intentionally possessed the substance, but also that he knew that the substance was cocaine base at the time it was in his possession. Vol. VII at 202, Vol. I, Doc. 49, jury instr. 15, 19 (emphasis added). As the district court explained, evidence that Hill had been arrested in possession of cocaine base in clear plastic bags on two prior occasions is indeed probative that he knew what the two clear plastic bags at issue here contained. 21 The district court also properly determined that the probative force of these prior possessions was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. To dispel potential prejudice, the judge cautioned the jury about the very limited purpose for which the prior possessions were admitted every time they were mentioned at trial, and again in a final written instruction. Thus, we reject Hill's contention that the officers' testimony should have been excluded under Fed.R.Evid. 403. 22 Because the district court followed and properly applied the four-part test for admitting evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), we conclude that its application of that rule to the testimony in question was not an abuse of discretion. This conclusion, however, does not halt our inquiry. For Hill raises an alternative and more substantial argument for why evidence of the prior possessions should nevertheless have been excluded from trial. Hill argues that because this evidence was obtained through unlawful searches and seizures, it should have been excluded under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 23