Opinion ID: 1172711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Ease in the Determination and Application of the Law to be Applied

Text: These principles are considered important in resolving issues under section 258. Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Law § 258, cmt. b. These factors also particularly support adopting the presumption stated in comment c that, when the spouses have separate domiciles at the time of the acquisition of the moveable, the law of state where the spouse who acquired the movable was domiciled at the time will usually be applied. This is the simplest rule to apply and yields uniformity of result. It is also, of course, easier for Washington courts to apply Washington, rather than Texas, law. We find the principles of section 6 support the application of Washington law to this case and support the presumption stated in comment c. We adopt the presumption stated in comment c of the Restatement to apply in choice of law cases under section 258, and we hold Washington law applies to this case. This, however, does not end our inquiry. We must now decide whether RCW 26.16.140 applies as a matter of law to bar Rosalie's community property claim. RCW 26.16.140 states: When a husband and wife are living separate and apart, their respective earnings and accumulations shall be the separate property of each. [2] Seizer asks this court not to apply the separate and apart statute in this case. Washington's community property laws are based on the existence of a viable marital community. A community encompasses more than mere satisfaction of the legal requirements of marriage. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 110 Wash.2d at 372, 754 P.2d 993. The theory underlying community property is that it is obtained by the efforts of either the husband or wife, or both, for the benefit of the community. Togliatti v. Robertson, 29 Wash.2d 844, 852, 190 P.2d 575 (1948). Therefore, when a marital community no longer exists, there can be no community property because there is no longer any common enterprise to which each spouse is contributing. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 110 Wash.2d at 372, 754 P.2d 993. The statute distinguishes between a marital and a community relationship. Mere physical separation does not dissolve the community, Kerr v. Cochran, 65 Wash.2d 211, 396 P.2d 642 (1964), but it is not necessary for purposes of RCW 26.16.140 that a dissolution action be final or even pending. Togliatti, 29 Wash.2d at 851-52, 190 P.2d 575. The statute applies, as we have previously noted, to marriages that are defunct. Rustad v. Rustad, 61 Wash.2d 176, 180, 377 P.2d 414 (1963). We have found a marriage defunct under RCW 26.16.140 only when the facts involved situations where both parties demonstrated the marriage was over. For instance, in Togliatti, the wife obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce from her husband, but no final decree was ever entered. The parties, however, lived separately and never resumed marital relations. Togliatti, 29 Wash.2d at 845, 190 P.2d 575. After the husband's death, the wife claimed an interest in the ownership of bonds the husband had acquired subsequent to their separation. We found the bonds were the husband's separate property because the wife had obtained an interlocutory decree of divorce, the spouses lived separate and apart, neither contributed to the support of the other, neither asserted a claim to property accumulated by the other, each managed business and affairs separately, and the wife had married another man. Togliatti, 29 Wash.2d at 852, 190 P.2d 575. Although no formal decree of divorce nor any formal agreement regarding property was entered into, the conduct of the parties recognized the separate ownership of all property acquired subsequent to their separation. Togliatti, 29 Wash.2d at 852, 190 P.2d 575. Our subsequent cases follow this approach, all requiring some conduct on the part of both spouses before we will apply the separate and apart statute and characterize property acquired by one spouse as his or her separate property. MacKenzie v. Sellner, 58 Wash.2d 101, 361 P.2d 165 (1961); Aetna Life Ins. Co., 110 Wash.2d 368, 754 P.2d 993; In re Marriage of Short, 125 Wash.2d 865, 890 P.2d 12 (1995). In a particularly pertinent case, we held that acquisitions by the husband during a long separation from his wife, due to his wife's confinement in a mental institution, were not separate property, but community property. Rustad, 61 Wash.2d at 179-80, 377 P.2d 414. We have noted: A marriage is considered defunct when both parties to the marriage no longer have the will to continue the marital relationship. In other words, when the deserted spouse accepts the futility of hope for restoration of a normal marital relationship, or just acquiesces in the separation, the marriage is considered defunct so that the living separate and apart statute applies. In re Marriage of Short, 125 Wash.2d at 871, 890 P.2d 12 (citing Cross, supra, at 34-35) (emphasis added). The facts of this case are extreme. Given the length of separation and two competent spouses, we might be able to find that because both parties no longer had the will to continue the marital relationship, the marriage is defunct. Our test for whether the statute applies requires, at the least, an acquiescence in the separation. Here, however, the conduct tending to show a defunct marriage is Elmer's conduct only. Elmer moved away, established a common law marriage, divorced, and then married Barbara. Rosalie, on the other hand, has been mentally ill and was declared incompetent. It is unclear whether her mental state was such that she was able to conduct herself in such a way as to display conduct exhibiting a lack of will to continue the marital relationship. An incompetent person's silence cannot be enough to trigger the separate and apart statute because mere separation is not enough to trigger the statute. A deserted spouse who desires that the relationship continue despite desertion or abandonment of the othera frustration of the deserted spouse's community expectations should remain protected by the community property rules and should be able to assert an interest in the deserting spouse's after-acquired property. Cross, supra, at 34. Further, our holding in Rustad that a marriage was not defunct when the spouses were separated due to the wife's confinement in a mental institution supports a conclusion that the conduct of both spouses must demonstrate that the marital community is defunct. We hold that RCW 26.16.140 requires some mutuality on the part of the spouses. Because it requires mutuality, the statute does not apply in situations where an abandoned spouse is mentally ill or incompetent during the separation. In this case, the marriage may be defunct if Rosalie was not incompetent or mentally ill at some time after separation, such that she could accept the futility of hope for restoration of a normal marital relationship or acquiesce in the separation, which is the test we established in In re Marriage of Short, 125 Wash.2d 865, 890 P.2d 12. Further, the fact a marriage is defunct should be established by the deserting spouse. See Cross, supra, at 35, n. 114. In this case, Barbara must establish that the marriage between Rosalie and Elmer was defunct. We reverse the Court of Appeals and hold Washington law applies to this case. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. If the trial court determines Rosalie has an interest in the lottery proceeds under Washington law, the court must also determine whether the lottery ticket was purchased with separate or community property and how this fact affects Rosalie's interest in the proceeds. DURHAM, C.J., and DOLLIVER, SMITH, GUY, MADSEN, ALEXANDER, TALMADGE and SANDERS, JJ., concur.