Opinion ID: 1364765
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: DISCUSSION Jury Instruction Conference

Text: Thornton first argues that the district court erred by excluding him from the jury instruction conference in violation of Federal Criminal Rule 43(a)(2)'s requirement that a criminal defendant be present at every trial stage. The Government contends that a jury instruction conference falls within the exception of Rule 43(b)(3) for a conference or hearing on a question of law, and therefore Thornton's presence was not required. All circuits that have directly addressed this issue hold that jury instruction conferences do fall within the Rule 43(b)(3) exception. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 22 F.3d 430, 438 (2d Cir.1994) (The content of the instructions to be given to the jury is purely a legal matter.); United States v. Gregorio, 497 F.2d 1253, 1259 (4th Cir.1974), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Rhodes, 32 F.3d 867, 873 (4th Cir.1994) (Rule 43 does not confer on criminal defendants the right [to] attend a purely legal conference on jury instructions. . . .); United States v. Graves, 669 F.2d 964, 972 (5th Cir.1982) (A defendant does not have a federal constitutional or statutory right to attend a conference between the trial court and counsel concerned with the purely legal matter of determining what jury instructions the trial court will issue.); United States v. Sherman, 821 F.2d 1337, 1339 (9th Cir.1987) (We hold that a hearing outside the presence of the jury concerning the selection of jury instructions is a `conference or argument upon a question of law'. . . .). However, we need not reach the merits of this issue here because Thornton has presented no argument that the conference resulted in erroneous jury instructions, and we find no prejudice from his exclusion. The conference was held on the record, and Thornton's attorney was present to discuss factual and legal issues relating to the instructions. There is no indication that his attorney was not fully capable of representing Thornton's interests in this regard, or that his attorney could not consult with Thornton if needed. The jury was not present, thus Thornton could not have been prejudiced in that regard. Accordingly, even if exclusion of Thornton from the conference was error, such error was harmless. See United States v. Harris, 9 F.3d 493, 499 (6th Cir.1993) (recognizing in the context of ex parte communication with the jury that [T]he rule requiring a defendant's presence at every stage of the trial must be considered with [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure] 52(a) . . . providing that harmless error is to be disregarded.).