Opinion ID: 1755365
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Least Restrictive Means and Overbreadth

Text: As to the second prong of the Winfield test, the courts must confront two closely related questions: whether the statute at issue here has used the least restrictive means available and, as a corollary, whether it is overbroad. Even if I assume that petitioners' activities have harmed the rights of others  such as by a public or intrusive display of allegedly obscene materials  I cannot conclude that the application of a criminal RICO statute constitutes the least intrusive means available to remedy this harm. The state just as readily could prevent such harm by way of reasonable time, place and manner restrictions contained in statutes imposing fines or other minor penalties. Similarly, laws or ordinances dealing with zoning or advertising displays also could be used to prevent such public displays. However, the extreme penalties established by the RICO statute sweep far too broadly into the right of personal inquiry and autonomy created by Florida constitutional law. By application of the RICO statute, the state in effect assumes power to shut down and confiscate establishments discreetly offering noninjurious entertainment or reading material for personal home use. It assumes the power to treat as racketeers people who merely have purchased such material on two or more occasions. This hardly constitutes a reasonable time, place or manner restriction under Florida law. See Keaton, 371 So.2d at 92. Closely related to the question of least intrusive means is that of overbreadth, an issue also raised by the parties. If a statute that impinges upon privacy is overbroad, then by definition it is not the least intrusive means. Initially, I believe that the interests protected by Florida's privacy amendment are directly analogous to, and in the context of this case overlap, interests protected by the free speech guarantees of the Florida and federal constitutions. Judicial weighing of both privacy and free speech interests requires a compelling state interest test. See Gardner v. Bradenton Herald, Inc., 413 So.2d 10, 11 (Fla.) (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101-02, 99 S.Ct. 2667, 2669-70, 61 L.Ed.2d 399 (1979), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 865, 103 S.Ct. 143, 74 L.Ed.2d 121 (1982). Moreover, the right of free speech itself is explicitly concerned at least with some kinds of privacy interests, particularly in the arena of obscenity law. E.g., Keaton, 371 So.2d at 91 (citing Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564-65, 89 S.Ct. at 1247-48). I thus rely on our own prior case law dealing with the overbreadth doctrine in the context of obscenity law. In Keaton, id. at 87-88, for example, this Court was confronted with an overbreadth challenge mounted against another obscenity statute that made it illegal to make a comment, request, suggestion, or proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent over the telephone. § 365.16(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1977). The decision in Keaton in turn was based on the earlier case of Spears v. State, 337 So.2d 977 (Fla. 1976), which confronted still another obscenity statute prohibiting public use of any indecent or obscene language. § 847.05, Fla. Stat. (1975). Also, this Court has addressed a similar obscenity problem in Brown v. State, 358 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1978), which dealt with a statute prohibiting open profanity. § 847.04, Fla. Stat. (1975). In Keaton, we began our analysis with the established principle that courts should construe a statute so as to render it constitutional, if at all possible. Keaton, 371 So.2d at 89. But Keaton also noted that this rule is qualified by the condition that courts may not engage in the essentially legislative act of varying actual intent or reading new elements into a statute, id., which would violate the separation of powers doctrine. [20] Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. Based on these rules, Keaton declined to judicially alter the actual language of the telephone obscenity statute, finding that it was bound by the manifest intent of the statutory wording. As we stated in Brown, [w]hen the subject statute in no way suggests a saving construction, we will not abandon judicial restraint and effectively rewrite the enactment. The Florida Constitution requires a certain precision defined by the legislature, not legislation articulated by the judiciary. Brown, 358 So.2d at 20 (citing art. II, § 3, Fla. Const.). On the question of the overbreadth doctrine itself, Keaton gave an extensive rationale. We noted that the danger of overbroad statutes comes from their tendency to have a chilling effect on activities protected by constitutional law, even if these activities are only before the Court on a hypothetical basis. Keaton, 371 So.2d at 91. On this point, the Court eschewed the possibility of a case-by-case analysis and concluded: [T]he mere existence of statutes and ordinances purporting to criminalize protected expression operates as a deterrent to the exercise of the rights of free expression, and deters most effectively the prudent, the cautious and the circumspect... . Keaton, 371 So.2d at 91-92 (quoting Spears, 337 So.2d at 980). Some constitutional rights are so important that even a hypothetical chilling effect must be avoided in the only way possible  by striking the overbroad statute on its face. Based on this rationale, Keaton then concluded that a statute purporting to criminalize indecent or obscene telephone conversations was unconstitutionally overbroad because it had the effect of outlawing even private, consensual discussions by two adults. The statute, for example, might have the effect of outlawing a hypothetical husband and wife's amorous conversations, or an off-color joke to a willing listener. Id. at 90, 92-93. This conclusion, in turn, rested on this Court's earlier holding in Spears that a statute forbidding public use of indecent language also was unconstitutionally overbroad. In Spears, we had found that the statute, if read literally, would have criminalized even some hypothetical forms of political speech that happened to employ vulgar or offensive language. Spears, 337 So.2d at 980-81. Accord The Ladoga Canning Corp. v. McKenzie, 370 So.2d 1137 (Fla. 1979). Similarly, in Brown the Court found that the statute outlawing open profanity swept too far into the realm of constitutionally protected speech and could even have the effect of making it unlawful for a hypothetical person to shout profanities alone in an open field. Brown, 358 So.2d at 20. The Court noted, however, that speech likely to cause harm  such as fighting words directed at other persons  could be regulated by the state. Id. at 19-20. In light of the holdings in Keaton, Spears and Brown, I can only conclude that the obscenity statutes at issue today also are unconstitutionally overbroad, sweeping too far into the realm of privacy and free speech rights protected by Florida law. Art. I, §§ 4, 23, Fla. Const. In effect, the statutes before us restrict the access individuals have to writings, forms of entertainment, or other similar materials. This result is accomplished in the total absence of evidence, at least upon this record, that these materials have harmed or will harm anyone. The only possible conclusion is that the government in this instance has undertaken to establish minimum standards of taste to which people must conform. The government has assumed authority to determine what is and is not art and to place under governmental regulation the ability of individuals to inquire into matters that may interest them. While not out-of-hand rejecting the right of privacy, this viewpoint nevertheless builds a governmental cordon around the places where such rights may be exercised. I agree with the Hawaii Supreme Court that privacy is an illusory right if all means of access to it are subject to governmental regulation. The majority in effect says that individuals may be arrested on their doorsteps for possessing reading and entertainment material that would be lawful a few steps away, inside the front door. The absurdity of this situation is plainly revealed by applying the same logic to the possession of contraceptives. The right to use contraceptives indeed would be utterly worthless if the government were authorized to arrest persons up until those contraceptives were safely inside the home. This same conclusion applies no less to the right of personal autonomy, which is an integral aspect of the right to be let alone. If the ability to inquire through reading and entertainment is restricted, so is the right to think freely and to judge for oneself. Individual thought thus becomes subservient to officially sanitized opinions imposed by decree of the state. The right of personal autonomy is impermissibly chilled. Privacy is not, as the majority erroneously suggests, concerned solely with objective manifestations of privacy. Majority op., at 261. If this were true, married couples would have a right only to use those contraceptives they somehow manufactured for themselves behind closed doors. But see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972). If this were true, a woman would never have a right to obtain an abortion anywhere but in her own home; and even then, the government presumably could prohibit medical professionals from entering her home to assist her. But see T.W. Contrary to the majority's suggestion, privacy is a right that protects both people and the aspects of their lives they have made private. It is a right that people can carry around with them, even when they are in public places and stores. People do not subject themselves to unlimited governmental scrutiny or intrusion into their lives simply because they walk out the front doors of their homes or enter a public place such as a store. I do not even believe the majority seriously would entertain the notion that government agents can, for example, take embarrassing photographs of law-abiding citizens in a public park and then publish those photographs in a newspaper. The constitutional right to be let alone protects citizens from such official scandalmongering as completely as common law privacy rights protect against similar intrusions by private persons. See Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts § 117, at 866 (5th ed. 1984) (lawyers' edition); Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So.2d 113, 120 (Fla. 1988) (Barkett, J., specially concurring). What the majority opinion fails to acknowledge is that, while the right to be let alone does in fact protect seclusion and other objective manifestations of privacy, it also protects other qualities of individual life as well. Among these are the right to be free from unwarranted governmental prying, id., a right to prohibit governmentally sponsored disclosures of some kinds of personal information, Rasmussen, and a right to self-autonomy. T.W. See Hawkins, Florida Constitutional Law: A Ten-Year Retrospective on the State Bill of Rights, 14 Nova L.Rev. 693, 831-55 (1990) (discussing categories of privacy rights). In order to reach its result, the majority erroneously analyzes this case as though it involved no interest other than objective manifestations of privacy such as seclusion. This is only little different from analyzing a free speech claim using nothing but fourth amendment doctrine. It prejudices the case in advance. Thus, while appearing to engage in a proper legal analysis, the majority is doing nothing of the kind. The present case clearly and unmistakably implicates self-autonomy interests that the majority simply ignores. In the process, the majority also ignores ten years of privacy jurisprudence developed by this Court and from which the majority obviously does not intend to recede. There are other serious flaws in the majority argument. The concluding paragraphs of the majority opinion, for example, argue that Eisenstadt is nothing but an equal protection case, thus suggesting that privacy was not at issue there. Majority op., at 262-263. This is not true. While Eisenstadt certainly dealt with equal protection issues, it also dealt with privacy. Indeed, the holding of Eisenstadt is unintelligible unless it is premised upon a privacy right involved in the purchase and sale of contraceptives. [21] Moreover, the majority completely overlooks the opinion in Griswold, which rests four-square on privacy and is the starting point from which Eisenstadt proceeds. Arguing that Eisenstadt and its predecessor, Griswold, have nothing to do with privacy is a gross misrepresentation of federal law. The majority also suggests that privacy is a right that may not be raised vicariously. The majority states: [I]t does not appear that the defense ... presented private individuals whose right to possess obscene materials at home had been violated by the instant action. Majority op., at 261. Although the majority stops short of actually holding that vicarious standing is not allowed, some persons may be misled by the majority's dictum. However, such a reading would render the majority opinion self-contradictory. We clearly have allowed vicarious standing without requiring the identification of the particular third parties whose rights are being asserted. State v. Saiez, 489 So.2d 1125 (Fla. 1986); Rasmussen. The majority itself clearly assumes this to be true. In fact, the majority could not reach the merits of this case or approve the opinion under review if it seriously believed defense counsel was required to locate individuals whose right to possess entertainment materials in the home had been chilled in the present case. If such a requirement really existed, the majority would be forced to dismiss this cause for lack of standing. This, they have not done. Indeed, under our precedents, we clearly are required to consider the chilling effect the obscenity and RICO statutes will have on other individuals as a result of this case, whether or not the defense has identified such persons. Keaton; Spears; Brown. Even a brief consideration of the majority opinion discloses how, in the real world beyond this courtroom, the chilling effect will be very severe indeed. Under the majority opinion, the possession or sale of offensive materials is equated with organized crime, drug smuggling, and murder-for-hire operations  all of which also may be racketeering offenses. And the penalty?  up to life in prison, heavy fines, and the possibility that the government may seek forfeiture of assets or property used to advance this racketeering activity. Compare § 895.02(1)(a)28, Fla. Stat. (1989) (making sale or possession of obscene materials a racketeering offense) with § 895.04(1), Fla. Stat. (1989) (making racketeering a first-degree felony) and § 895.05(2), Fla. Stat. (1989) (authorizing forfeitures of property). Even if we ignore the rights of free speech and privacy, these results are patently absurd and should not be permitted to stand. At a minimum, the draconian penalties endorsed by the majority are unconstitutionally excessive. Art. I, § 17, Fla. Const. They offend basic concepts of due process by establishing penalties out of all proportion to the harm that actually results in most instances from the activities involved. Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. The state clearly can achieve the result it wishes using less drastic measures. Moreover, under the majority opinion, the question of what is or is not obscene will be decided entirely by geographical happenstance. Material considered obscene in one part of Florida will merely be lawful entertainment elsewhere. Persons buying or selling such entertainment may be racketeers in one place and upstanding citizens in another. And all Floridians are subject to the concern that the compact discs, videos, recordings, or books they have obtained for use or resale might send them to state prison as racketeers. This is unacceptable in a free society.