Opinion ID: 421083
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Including Trucks in the Product Market

Text: 21 First, Canadian National argues that the Commission improperly relied on truck competition to ameliorate the substantial lessening of rail competition caused by the merger. It would have the Commission focus exclusively on rail competition. In antitrust terms, the Commission, in effect, defined the relevant product market as transportation of freight, while Canadian National argues that [t]he product [market] is the transportation of goods by rail only. 7 We believe the Commission properly considered truck competition. 22 The Interstate Commerce Act broadly instructs the ICC to determine if a merger is consistent with the public interest. 49 U.S.C. § 11,344(c). Canadian National relies on Congress' instruction to the Commission to consider, in making that public interest determination, whether the proposed transaction would have an adverse effect among rail carriers in the affected region. Id. § 11,344(b)(1)(E) (emphasis added). 8 23 Section 11,344(b)(1) also, however, permits the Commission to consider factors other than those specifically listed; it provides that the Commission shall consider at least the following .... (Emphasis added.) The legislative history of § 11,344(b)(1)(E) confirms that the subsection merely codifies prior ICC practice and does not restrict the factors that the ICC may consider. As Congressman Panetta explained in introducing the provision as a floor amendment to the Staggers Rail Act of 1980: 24 My amendment is not intended to in any way tie the hands of the ICC on the question of mergers.... [C]ompetition plays an important role in the Commission's decisionmaking on railroad mergers. This is as it should be. My amendment would insure that this remains the case. 25 126 Cong.Rec. H8604 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1980). 26 Thus, the Commission may consider intermodal competition between truck and [229 U.S.App.D.C. 58] rail, so long as it also considers intramodal competition among rail carriers. Accord Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 115, 127, 83 S.Ct. 217, 224, 9 L.Ed.2d 177 (1962) (The statute entrusts the Commission with the duty to decide what considerations other than those specifically mentioned ... should be given weight.). 27 The only remaining question is whether the Commission has authority to give dominant weight to rail-truck competition, as it did when it concluded that reduction in competition among rail carriers is of little moment in light of vigorous rail-truck competition. We hold that the Commission has this power. 28 As a general rule, when a statute requires an agency to consider a factor, the agency must reach an 'express and considered conclusion' about the bearing of [the factor], but need not give 'any specific weight' to th[e] factor. Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 705 F.2d 506, 516 (D.C.Cir.1983) (Clean Air Act) (quoting Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1045 (D.C.Cir.1978) (Clean Water Act)). In this case, the ICC properly considered the relevance of competition among rail carriers, explaining that: 29 A change in the number of rail competitors is less significant where there is strong motor carrier competition which prevents carriers from obtaining and exploiting monopoly power. 30 Delaware & Hudson Merger, 366 I.C.C. at 407. 31 We think it appropriate to follow that general rule here. A major impetus behind the deregulation of railroads in the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 was Congress' recognition that railroads generally had to compete with other modes of transportation. See, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 1430 (Conf.Rep.), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 3978, 4110: 32 [H]istorically the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act was essential to prevent an abuse of monopoly power by railroads .... However, today, most transportation is competitive and many of the Government regulations affecting railroads have become unnecessary and inefficient. Nearly two-thirds of intercity freight is transported by modes of transportation other than railroads. 33 If Congress can rely on truck-rail competition to obviate the need for regulation, surely the ICC can do so as well. This is especially so in light of the congressional policy to minimize the need for Federal regulatory control over the rail transportation system. 49 U.S.C. § 10,101a(2). 34 Moreover, in considering truck-rail competition, the ICC was following the accepted antitrust definition of a product market: Two products belong in a single product market if they are regarded by consumers as ... close substitutes. 2 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law p 52a (1978). 9 If truck and rail transport are good substitutes for each other in the Montreal-to-New York corridor, it makes no sense in terms of antitrust policy to treat them, as Canadian National wants to, as if they were not. We will not lightly impute to Congress an intent to foreclose the ICC from following the antitrust principles incorporated in the antitrust laws. 10