Opinion ID: 2431503
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: THE COMMONWEALTH WILL BE PERMITTED TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE REGARDING THE MAXIMUM EXPIRATION OF SENTENCE AS DETERMINED BY THE DIVISION OF PROBATION AND PAROLE FOR CURRENT AND PRIOR OFFENSES. KRS 532.055(2)(a)(4).

Text: As used in this proviso, the word current seemingly applies to the present offense for which the defendant stands convicted. Under this proviso, and the one discussed above in Section II (evidence of minimum parole eligibility), using the pretext of comity, we have abandoned a long line of cases recognizing that it is prejudicial error to inform the jury about the possibility of parole. See Payne v. Commonwealth, Ky., 623 S.W.2d 867 (1981); Broyles v. Commonwealth, Ky., 267 S.W.2d 73 (1954); Boyle v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 694 S.W.2d 711 (1985); and cases cited therein: . . . the subject of parole is not to be given any consideration by them [the jury] in determining innocence, guilt, or punishment. Boyle, supra at 712. Or, as stated in Payne: The consideration of future consequences such as . . . parole have no place in the jury's finding of fact and may serve to distort it. For that reason we now hold that neither the prosecutor, defense counsel, nor the court may make any comment about the consequences of a particular verdict at any time during a criminal trial. 623 S.W.2d at 870. We have substituted for this rule a new system in which consideration of the possibility of parole, uncertain as it is, will be central to imposing sentence. Although the time of release on parole is necessarily unknown and unknowable at the time of sentencing, we will introduce evidence that strongly suggests otherwise. With a single hastily conceived stroke of the pen we will discard our previous jurisprudence to invite speculation about the possibility of parole as a central factor in the jury's yardstick to use in deciding an appropriate punishment. The legal reasoning underlying our previous decisions holding such evidence irrelevant, inflammatory, and prejudicially erroneous, is overturned without suitable explanation, and largely without comment. In its place we substitute a new approach based on half-truths and speculation. As stated in 16 A.L.R.3d 1137, at p. 1141: As to the sentence, the prejudice [from information about the `possibility of parole'] operates by urging the jury to impose an excessive punishment in order to compensate for or protect against the action of the pardoning or paroling authority.