Opinion ID: 619103
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendants' Challenges to their Sentences

Text: We review sentences for procedural error and substantive reasonableness. See United States v. Scott, 654 F.3d 552, 554-55 (5th Cir.2011). Procedural error includes (1) failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the applicable Guidelines range; (2) treating the Guidelines as mandatory; (3) failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors; (4) determining a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts; or (5) failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence, including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range. Id. at 555. Review at this first step of the district court's interpretation or application of the Sentencing Guidelines is de novo, and factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id. If the district court's sentence is procedurally sound, we then consider whether the sentence is substantively reasonable, in light of the factors in § 3553(a). Id. Appellate review for substantive reasonableness is highly deferential, because the sentencing court is in a better position to find facts and judge their import under the § 3553(a) factors with respect to a particular defendant. Id. (citation omitted). This Court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Id.
Lance first argues that the district court erred in not retroactively applying the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA) to his sentence. See Pub.L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372. The FSA increased the quantities of crack that triggered various mandatory minimum sentences. This argument is foreclosed by this court's decision in United States v. Tickles, 661 F.3d 212 (5th Cir.2011), which held that the penalties prescribed by the FSA do not apply to federal criminal sentencing for illegal conduct that preceded the FSA's enactment. Id. at 215; see also United States v. Doggins, 633 F.3d 379, 384 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that the FSA does not apply retroactively to defendants who had already been sentenced and whose sentences were on appeal at the time the FSA was passed). Lance also argues that his life sentence was substantively unreasonable, and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. A review of Lance's sentencing hearing demonstrates that the district court took the § 3553(a) factors into account in determining Lance's sentence. Moreover, because the FSA does not apply retroactively, the district court correctly sentenced Lance to a mandatory life sentence on Count One under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Finally, as to Lance's constitutional claim, successful Eighth Amendment challenges to prison-term lengths will be rare, United States v. Harris, 566 F.3d 422, 436 (5th Cir.2009) (citations omitted), and this court has previously upheld mandatory life sentences imposed under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), see, e.g., Harris, 566 F.3d at 436; see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980) (Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.). The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Lance to life imprisonment.
Miller argues that the district court abused its discretion in running 60 months of the 210-month sentence for his conviction on Count Six (obstructing an official proceeding) consecutively to the 240-month sentence he received for his conviction on Count One (conspiring to possess with intent to distribute crack). Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Miller's total offense level was 32, his criminal history category was IV, and the advisory Guideline range was 168 to 210 months. His conviction on Count One and the Government's filing of a 21 U.S.C. § 851 prior felony information, however, increased his mandatory sentence to 240 months. By imposing a 300-month sentence, the district court departed not only from the Guidelines, but also from Probation's recommendation of 240 months. A district court has discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b) to run sentences consecutively or concurrently in accordance with the § 3553(a) factors. During Miller's sentencing hearing, the district court stated that one of the reasons for his departure was that Miller's two co-defendants each received life sentences. We are satisfied upon reviewing Miller's sentencing hearing that the district court took the § 3553(a) factors into account in determining his sentence. Moreover, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among co-defendants is a valid sentencing consideration. See United States v. McElwee, 646 F.3d 328, 345 (5th Cir.2011). Thus, Miller's sentence was not substantively unreasonable, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in running 60 months of Miller's sentence on Count Six consecutively to his 240-month sentence on Count One.