Opinion ID: 2261164
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Permanent Protection Order

Text: ¶ 14 Washington's Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) defines domestic violence as [p]hysical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault, between family or household members.... RCW 26.50.010(1). The legislature has articulated a clear public policy to protect domestic violence victims. See ch. 26.50 RCW; see also ch. 10.99 RCW (domestic violence official response act); RCW 10.99.010 (The purpose of this chapter is to recognize the importance of domestic violence as a serious crime against society and to assure the victim of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse which the law and those who enforce the law can provide.). ¶ 15 The legislature has authorized courts to make protection orders permanent in some circumstances: [I]f ... the court finds that the respondent is likely to resume acts of domestic violence against the petitioner or the petitioner's family or household members or minor children when the order expires, the court may either grant relief for a fixed period or enter a permanent order of protection. RCW 26.50.060(2). Such permanent protection orders, however, can be modified or terminated. Upon application with notice to all parties and after a hearing, the court may modify the terms of an existing order for protection. RCW 26.50.130(1). ¶ 16 The modification statute fails to spell out grounds, factors, or standards authorizing modification of a permanent protection order. See id. It also fails to mention which party bears the burden of modifying or maintaining the permanent protection order. Id. In this vacuum, we read the DVPA as a whole. ¶ 17 Most instructively, the statute authorizing renewal of a temporary order of protection provides: The court shall grant the petition for renewal unless the respondent proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent will not resume acts of domestic violence against the petitioner or the petitioner's children or family or household members when the order expires. RCW 26.50.060(3) (emphasis added). Both (1) blocking a renewal motion and (2) modifying a permanent order are sufficiently similar to warrant the same standard, particularly when the legislature has shown a preference for it. It certainly does not make sense to apply a standard to modify a permanent order that is lower than the standard required to renew a temporary order. As much as it is possible to prove a negative, Rob (the moving party) bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence (i.e., more likely than not) that he will not resume acts of domestic violence against Robin or her children. ¶ 18 In this matter of first impression it is not necessary to reinvent the wheel. In Carfagno v. Carfagno, 288 N.J.Super. 424, 672 A.2d 751 (1995), a New Jersey court embraced 11 factors guiding termination of a permanent protection order: (1) whether the victim has consented to lift the order, (2) the victim's fear of the restrained party, [4] (3) present nature of the relationship between parties, (4) whether the restrained party has any contempt convictions for violating the order, (5) restrained party's alcohol and drug involvement, if any, (6) other violent acts on the part of the restrained party, (7) whether the restrained party has engaged in domestic violence counseling, (8) age and health of the restrained party, (9) whether the victim is acting in good faith to oppose the motion, (10) whether other jurisdictions have entered any protection orders against the restrained party, and (11) other factors deemed relevant by the court. Id. at 435, 672 A.2d 751. We believe New Jersey's guidelines provide a sensible framework for analyzing whether the preponderance of the evidence suggests a restrained party will commit a future act of domestic violence. ¶ 19 Robin asserts the permanent restraining order in this case should remain just thatpermanent. Robin alleges the Court of Appeals improperly shifted the burden of proof from Rob to her, requiring her to overcome a presumption that her present fear is unreasonable if not assuaged by the passage of time and distance. Pet. for Review at 7. Robin claims that [u]nder the court's ruling, a perpetrator may have a permanent order terminated if he proves he has complied with the order over a period of time, no longer lives in the vicinity, and claims a need for the order to be terminated. Id. at 6. ¶ 20 Robin's characterization oversimplifies the analysis. The relevant analysis, instead, includes whether Rob proved an unlikelihood of committing future acts of domestic violence and whether the facts support a current reasonable fear of imminent harm. While Rob bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he will not commit future acts of domestic violence, the facts must also support a finding that Robin's current fear of imminent harm is reasonable. We can only determine if the commissioner abused her discretion when denying a request to modify a permanent protection order if the facts of the matter are placed before us on review. This should not be confused with compelling Robin to prove her case again by overcoming a presumption. ¶ 21 Again, RCW 26.50.010(1) defines domestic violence as [p]hysical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault, between family or household members. The facts supporting a protection order must reasonably relate to physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the fear of imminent harm. It is not enough that the facts may have justified the order in the past. Reasonable likelihood of imminent harm must be in the present. This notion dovetails with the legislature's authorization for courts to modify existing permanent protection orders. See RCW 26.50.130. While permanent protection orders are contemplated to be permanent when the facts require it, the legislature's grant of modification clearly authorizes the court to rescind some if the petitioner meets its burden. Id. ¶ 22 Robin cites two Court of Appeals cases, Barber v. Barber, 136 Wash.App. 512, 150 P.3d 124 (2007), and Spence v. Kaminski, 103 Wash.App. 325, 12 P.3d 1030 (2000), for the proposition that permanent protection orders can be permanent based on past abuse and present fear alone. Pet. for Review at 7. Robin's reliance on these cases is misplaced. These cases stand for the proposition that to renew or make permanent a protection order, the victim does not need to prove a new act of domestic violence if the present likelihood of a recurrence is reasonable. See Spence, 103 Wash.App. at 333, 12 P.3d 1030; Barber, 136 Wash.App. at 513, 516, 150 P.3d 124. Unlike Robin, the victims in both Spence and Barber showed a reasonable present likelihood of violence, in addition to past abuse. Id. Notably, the victims had ongoing relationships with their abusers. In Spence the couple's relationship continued after a divorce as they bickered over child custody. [T]he continuing relationship of the parties, who still struggled over custody issues, presented ongoing opportunities for conflict. Spence, 103 Wash.App. at 333, 12 P.3d 1030. In Barber the couple also interacted after their divorce. 136 Wash.App. at 513, 150 P.3d 124. Robin, on the other hand, shows past abuse but the facts show recurrence of domestic violence is unlikely. ¶ 23 Here, to permit the permanent protection order to continue forever would hold Rob hostage to his decade-old imprudence. There is scant evidence that Rob would subject his former wife and her children to future domestic violence. Through his testimony, deeds, relocation, career ambitions, and now 10-year compliance with the permanent protection order, Rob has met his burden to prove that he will more likely than not refrain from future acts of domestic violence against Robin or her children. ¶ 24 The New Jersey factors weigh in favor of Rob. Namely, (factor 2) Robin's fear of Rob is objectively unreasonable; [5] (factor 3) they have had no contact for ten years; (factor 4) Rob has not violated the permanent protection order, so no contempt orders exist; (factor 5) Rob has no known problems with alcohol or drugs; (factor 6) Rob has no criminal record and has committed no other violent acts; (factor 8) Rob's health has suffered as a result of his war injury and amputation; (factor 10) the record does not reflect any other protection orders against Rob; and (factor 11) other relevant considerations include Rob's career ambitions. ¶ 25 In contrast, the factors favoring Robin include the fact that (factor 1) Robin has not consented to lift the order and (factor 7) Rob has presumably not engaged in domestic abuse counseling. Robin's (factor 9) good faith is unknown. As Rob noted, he has clearly moved on with his life and ha[s] not done anything to support Robin's continued fear of harm from him. Resp. Br. of Appellant at 9. ¶ 26 As much as it is possible to prove a negative, Rob has done so here. [6] The likelihood that Rob will commit future acts of domestic violence on these facts is low. Hand in hand with that determination, the facts do not suggest Robin's fear of Rob is based on a reasonable threat of imminent harm. Accordingly, the commissioner abused her discretion; she based her denial of Rob's motion to modify or terminate the permanent protection order on untenable grounds. State ex rel. Carroll, 79 Wash.2d at 26, 482 P.2d 775. We affirm the Court of Appeals termination of the order. [7]