Opinion ID: 429505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the sentencing phase jury charge

Text: 27 Tucker claims that the trial court committed several errors of constitutional dimension during the sentencing phase of the trial. First, Tucker contends that the court's charge that the jury will recommend the death penalty ... or decline to recommend the death penalty, (emphasis supplied) was error because it misled the jurors as to their role in sentencing and led them to treat their decision too lightly. The petitioner points out that a Georgia jury's death sentence is no mere recommendation; the trial court is required to impose the sentence that the jury returns. O.C.G.A. Sec. 17-10-31. 28 The term recommend is borrowed from the Georgia death penalty statute, O.C.G.A. Sec. 17-10-30(c), which the Supreme Court has held constitutional on its face. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). Aside from the sanction that Gregg lends to use of the Georgia code's terminology, a review of the record convinces us that the jury must have understood its role in deciding punishment. At the beginning of the sentencing proceeding the court told the jurors, [t]he only issue for determination by the jury shall be the punishment to be imposed by you, the jury. During its charge the court instructed the jurors that their duty was to determine within the limits prescribed by law the penalty that shall be imposed. The tone of the charge that followed emphasized the jury's role as ultimate sentencer. For example, the court instructed the jurors that [i]f you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony ... you would be authorized but not required to impose the death penalty, and that if they found the presence of an aggravating circumstance it is entirely within your discretion to impose either the death penalty or life imprisonment. Viewing, as we must, the court's instruction as a whole, Antone v. Strickland, 706 F.2d 1534, 1537 (11th Cir.1983), in the context of the entire trial, Hance, supra, 696 F.2d at 953, we conclude that the trial court's reference to the jury's role as recommending punishment neither misled the jurors as to the effect of their choice nor diminished the jury's sense of responsibility for its sentence. Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549 at 557 (11th Cir.1983) (trial court's mention of mandatory appeal process not a due process violation). 29 Tucker also urges that the trial court did not adequately define mitigating factors and explain their function. In Spivey v. Zant, 661 F.2d 464, 467-72 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111, 102 S.Ct. 3495, 73 L.Ed.2d 1374 (1982), 9 the Fifth Circuit held that jurors must receive instructions that adequately guide their consideration of mitigating factors. 30 In most cases, this will mean that the judge must clearly and explicitly instruct the jury about mitigating circumstances and the option to recommend against death; in order to do so, the judge will normally tell the jury what a mitigating circumstance is and what its function is in the jury's sentencing deliberations. 31 Id. at 471 (footnote omitted). The Court stated that mitigating circumstances are those that do not justify or excuse the offense, but which, in fairness or mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability and punishment. Id. at 471 n. 8. In Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 798-803 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1798, 76 L.Ed.2d 364 (1983), this Court held that the instruction that jurors were to hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, or aggravation of punishment failed to meet Spivey's constitutional minimum because [n]owhere does the charge even slightly hint about the option to impose life imprisonment even though aggravating circumstances are found. Id. at 802. Most recently, this Court held that the Goodwin instruction is insufficient even when coupled with an instruction that makes clear the jurors' ability to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment if they find an aggravating circumstance. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1503 (11th Cir.1983). Although the charge authorized the jury to consider circumstances in extenuation or mitigation ... the court failed to explain what function such a consideration would play in sentencing deliberations. Id. at 1503. Taken together, these cases require the trial court to (1) instruct the jury that it must consider mitigating evidence, (2) define mitigating factors and explain their function in sentencing deliberations, and (3) inform the jurors that a finding of aggravating circumstances does not require them to return a death sentence. 32 In its charge to the jury at the sentencing phase of Tucker's trial, the court began with the following instruction: 33 You are authorized to consider all the facts and circumstances of the case. You will look to all the evidence in both phases of the trial, determine whether or not you find mitigating circumstances. If you do find them it will be your duty to consider them in arriving at your verdict. Now, mitigating circumstances are such as do not constitute a justification or excuse of the offense in question, but which in fairness and mercy may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability. 34 After describing aggravating circumstances, the court told the jurors that 35 [i]f you find such circumstances it is entirely within your discretion to impose either the death penalty or life imprisonment.... If you find that [an aggravating circumstance] exists, then it is your duty to consider all of the matters that I have called to your attention, and in your discretion to say whether or not the jury will recommend the death penalty. 36 Viewed as a whole, this charge clearly meets all the requirements of Spivey, Goodwin, and Westbrook. The trial court impressed upon the jury its duty to consider mitigating factors in fixing Tucker's sentence. The court defined and explained the function of mitigating factors in almost the exact words of Spivey. The court went further in explaining that the jury is to consider mitigating factors in exercising its discretion if it finds an aggravating factor exists. Finally, the court stated in the clearest terms the ability of the jury to recommend a life sentence even after it found the presence of aggravating circumstances. The instruction contained adequate guidelines to lead a reasonable juror to fully comprehend the duties and choices involved in the sentencing procedure. Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d at 562. 37 But Tucker argues further that the trial court should have pointed out the specific mitigating factors, such as age and lack of prior criminal record, that the jury might have found applicable to him. Nothing in any of our cases suggests that such explicit enumeration of possible mitigating factors is required. On the contrary, Spivey's indication that a judge must tell the jury what a mitigating circumstance is and what its function is, 661 F.2d at 471, contemplates a more general explanation. Moreover, a requirement that the trial court list specific mitigating factors would be inharmonious with the Supreme Court's admonitions that the sentencer be free to consider any relevant mitigating factor. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12, 102 S.Ct. 869, 873-875, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602-05, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2963-65, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). The sort of specificity Tucker requests would doubtless bring complaints from other petitioners that the trial court had unduly narrowed the focus of the jury's consideration. Defendant's counsel is, of course, free to direct the jury's attention to specific mitigating circumstances, but the Constitution does not oblige the trial court to do so. 38 Finally, Tucker points out that, when the jury foreperson asked about the possibility of parole from a life sentence, the trial court simply refused to answer the question. Tucker urges that the court, once it knew that the jury was considering the possibility of parole, was constitutionally required to instruct the jurors to disregard parole in their deliberations. The trial court's refusal to discuss parole was based on Georgia law, which prohibits the jury in any criminal case from being informed of the possibility of parole. O.C.G.A. Sec. 17-8-76(a). In California v. Ramos, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983), the Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not prohibit notifying a capital sentencing jury of the power of the governor to commute a sentence of life without parole. We must conclude, therefore, that defendants in the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial have no federal right to prevent jury consideration of the possibility that they will be paroled if sentenced to life imprisonment. Consequently, the trial court's failure to instruct Tucker's jury to disregard that possibility could not have violated the Constitution.