Opinion ID: 2089063
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Effect of Stipulations

Text: We must next consider the relevance of the in life photographs in this case in light of Respondent's contention that the parties stipulated to the identity of the victim. By definition, a stipulation is an agreement between counsel akin to a contract. See Burke v. Burke, 204 Md. 637, 645, 106 A.2d 59, 63 (1954). Like contracts, stipulations are based on mutual assent and interpreted to effectuate the intent of the parties. [9] Id., 106 A.2d at 63. Parties are generally held bound by their stipulations. Bloom v. Graff, 191 Md. 733, 736, 63 A.2d 313, 315 (1949). Although a stipulation by definition must be based on mutual assent, parties frequently dispute both the scope of the stipulation and the extent to which it precludes the parties from offering other evidence of the stipulated fact. [10] As Wigmore observed: A fact that is judicially admitted [stipulated] needs no evidence from the party benefiting by the admission. But his evidence, if he chooses to offer it, may even be excluded; first, because it is now ... immaterial to the issues ...; next, because it may be superfluous and merely cumber the trial ...; and furthermore, because the added dramatic force which may sometimes be gained from the examination of a witness to the fact (a force, indeed, which the admission is often designed especially to obviate) is not a thing which the party can be said to be always entitled to. Nevertheless, a colorless admission by the opponent may sometimes have the effect of depriving the party of the legitimate moral force of his evidence; furthermore, a judicial admission may be cleverly made with grudging limitations or evasions or insinuations (especially in criminal cases) so as to be technically but not practically a waiver of proof. 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2591, at 824-25 (Chadbourn rev. 1981 & 1990 Supp.) (citations omitted). In determining whether to admit evidence that is offered to prove a stipulated fact, courts must often balance the competing interests of the parties. State v. Gilmore, 332 So.2d 789, 795-96 (La.1976). The party who offers to stipulate is entitled to obtain the benefit of his bargain, i.e., preventing the use of inflammatory evidence. Id. The party benefiting from the stipulation, however, may also be entitled to the legitimate moral force of his evidence. WIGMORE, supra, § 2591, at 824. We believe, as Wigmore suggests, that because of these competing considerations, there should be no absolute rule on the subject ... [and] the trial court's discretion should determine whether a particular admission is so plenary as to render the first party's evidence wholly needless under the circumstances. Id. at 825, cited in Gilmore, 332 So.2d at 795. See also Burgess v. State, 339 So.2d 121, 123-24 (Ala. Crim.App.1976); Annot., Criminal Trial Proving Conceded Fact, 91 A.L.R. 1478 (1934). We therefore conclude that the trial judge should retain the discretion to determine whether evidence may be admitted to prove a stipulated fact. In exercising this discretion to determine whether extrinsic proof of a stipulated fact is admissible, trial courts should consider, inter alia: (1) the intent of the parties, if any, regarding presentation of the proffered evidence; (2) the incremental probative value of the evidence as compared to the stipulation, (i.e., where the evidence provides greater detail than the stipulation); and (3) the potential unfair prejudicial impact of the proffered evidence. We shall review the trial court's decision in this regard for abuse of discretion.