Opinion ID: 1214616
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Juror X's comments were used as a circumstance against Gabalis

Text: Even were we to assume, arguendo, that Juror X's comments were improper, there is no indication that Juror X's comments were used as a circumstance against Gabalis. We recognize that the anonymous juror's letter  assuming the letter was indeed written by a juror in this case [7]  demonstrates that at least one juror arguably used Juror X's comments as a circumstance against Gabalis. Specifically, Juror X's comments caused the anonymous juror to speculate regarding the possibility of Gabalis's drug use during the period in question as a result of Gabalis's admission that he frequented the establishments that Juror X associated with drug use, coupled with the evidence regarding drugs and drug paraphernalia having been found in the stolen van. However, in considering whether Gabalis was entitled to a new trial premised upon alleged juror misconduct, we are required, pursuant to HRE 606(b), to disregard the anonymous juror's remarks regarding his or her subjective mental processes. HRE Rule 606(b) (1993) provides in pertinent part: Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict . . ., a juror may not testify concerning the effect of anything upon the juror's or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict ... or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith. The commentary to Rule 606(b) explains the values sought to be protected by the rule and the matters to which jurors may testify: Under traditional English common law, the general competency of a juror to testify as a witness had one limitation: he [or she] was barred from giving testimony to impeach his [or her] own verdict. See McCormick § 68; Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B.1785). The values sought to be promoted, according to the Advisory Committee's Note to the original proposal for federal Rule 606(b), include freedom of deliberation, stability and finality of verdicts, and protection of jurors against annoyance and embarrassment. However, the blanket prohibition also bars testimony relevant to misconduct, irregularities, and improper influences external to the process of deliberation. The intent of this subsection is to strike a proper balance by excluding testimony relating to the internal deliberative process and allowing testimony about objective misconduct and irregularities. No attempt is made to specify substantive grounds for setting aside verdicts. The Advisory Committee's Note to the original federal proposal, upon which subsection (b) is modeled, said: The trend has been to draw the dividing line between testimony as to mental processes, on the one hand, and as to the existence of conditions or occurrences of events calculated improperly to influence the verdict, on the other hand, without regard to whether the happening is within or without the jury room.... The jurors are the persons who know what really happened. Allowing them to testify as to matters other than their own reactions involves no particular hazard to the values sought to be protected. The rule is based upon this conclusion. For example, under this rule jurors would be competent to testify to the consumption of alcoholic beverages by deliberating jurors, a matter which under some circumstances may be cause for setting aside a verdict, see Kealoha v. Tanaka, 45 H. [Haw.] 457, 370 P.2d 468 (1962). HRE 606(b) Commentary (emphases added) (ellipses in original). Pursuant to Rule 606(b), neither the trial court nor this court on appeal may consider the anonymous juror's remarks regarding the effect that Juror X's statements had on his or her deliberative processes. Thus, implicit in Jackson is the proposition that the defendant must make a prima facie showing that improper juror comments during deliberations have been used as a circumstance against him or her based exclusively upon an objective evaluation of the juror's comment(s) at issue. For example, in Bibbins v. Dalsheim, 21 F.3d 13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 261, 130 L.Ed.2d 181 (1994), the defendant (Bibbins) sought to set aside his drug-related convictions on the basis of juror misconduct. A few minutes after a street sale of cocaine to an undercover agent, police spotted Bibbins across the street and arrested him because he fit the description of the seller. One juror told the others that she was a resident of the area in which the transaction and arrest took place and that there were no open places of business there. Bibbins offered proof that this statement influenced at least one other juror to render a guilty verdict on the theory that the absence of other people made the street identification of the defendant more compelling. Id. at 14. The proof offered by the defendant consisted of affidavits from two of the jurors from Bibbin's trial. Juror Eileen Krainak averred that, in discussing the accuracy of [the police officer's] identification of Bibbins, she had told the other jurors that she had lived in the... area [of the arrest] and that there were no open businesses in the vicinity of the spot where the drug transaction took place. In her affidavit, Krainak also gave her impression of what evidence had been adduced at trial on this issue, described the impression her statement made on the other jurors, and gave the tally of the jury's votes before and after she made it. The affidavit of juror John Urban confirmed Krainak's affidavit in all these respects, and described the effect that the extra-record information had on his vote. Id. at 15-16. Before addressing whether Krainak's observations were sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial, the court noted that, because the determination of prejudice is an objective one, Mr. Urban's affidavit is therefore inadmissible to the extent that it recounts how Ms. Krainak's disclosure affected the thinking and voting of individual jurors or the deliberations of the jury as a whole, including the tally of votes. Id. at 17. Likewise, in the present case, even assuming the authenticity and source of the letter, we must disregard the anonymous juror's remarks regarding how his or her mental process was affected by Juror X's comments. Thus, having assumed for purposes of this discussion that Juror X's comments were improper, the question narrows to whether an objective evaluation of the record indicates that Juror X's comments were used as a circumstance against Gabalis. The trial court concluded that little or no weight was accorded by the jurors concerning the nature of these locations. We agree. The individual voir dire of the jurors reveals that three of the jurors did not recall any discussion regarding Hawaiian Brian's, Sharkey's, or the Airport Hotel. Of the nine jurors who recalled discussions concerning the nature of those establishments, one juror recalled that the discussions occurred after the jury had reached a unanimous verdict. Of the remaining eight jurors, seven jurors testified that their discussions concerning these matters were brief, lasting fewer than five minutes out of the approximately three and one-half hours the jury spent during deliberations, and the remaining juror testified that the discussions lasted less than ten minutes. Specifically, following the individual voir dire of the jurors, the trial judge made the following findings: 38. Juror [No. 2] recalled another juror making general statements concerning Hawaiian Brian's, Sharkey's and the Airport Hotel. Juror No. 2 recalls all three places being discussed as places where there is drug activity and things of that nature. Juror No. 2 described the discussions concerning these statements as not brief but not lengthy and at least more than five minutes. Juror No. 2 recalls discussion concerning this matter twice. 39. Juror [No. 1] recalled hearing statements about Sharkey's as an undesirable place. However, Juror No. 1 recalls these statements being made only after the jurors had already reached a unanimous verdict and the verdict had been received by the court. Juror No. 1 recalled the statement as part of a very short discussion, lasting approximately five minutes. 40. Juror [No. 3] recalled hearing statements about Hawaiian Brian's and the Airport Hotel as places linked to drugs. Juror No. 3 recalls at least two jurors and possibly three jurors making these statements. Specifically, Juror No. 3 recalls that one juror made the statement and then other jurors chiming in, confirming that they had the same impression of those places. The statements were not very long, lasting only a couple of minutes in duration. Juror No. 3 recalls the statements being made during deliberations. 41. Juror [No. 4] did not recall any jurors making any statements about any of these places or any references to the defendant frequenting any drug user hangouts. 42. Juror [No. 5] recalled either one or two jurors making statements that Hawaiian Brian's, Sharkey's and the airport hotel were places frequented by drug users. Juror No. 5 recalls the three places being discussed separately with each discussion lasting less than ten minutes. Juror No. 5 recalls a juror making a statement about the particular location and then other jurors raising questions about the statements. 43. Juror [No. 6] recalls one or two jurors discussing both Hawaiian Brian's and Sharkey's being described as a place where alot [sic] of kids hang out and do alot [sic] of drugs. Juror No. 6 described these discussions as being separate but real short and made only once. Juror No. 6 did not recall any statements made about the airport hotel. 44. Juror [No. 7] testified that she made the following statement about Hawaiian Brian's[:] a place where alot [sic] of young people, adolescents, alot [sic] of the older people mainly dealing with drugs. Juror No. 7 also described Sharkey's as a pool hall, open twenty four hours ... where someone can hang out all night. Juror No. 7 also described the Airport Hotel as a place where people party. Juror No. 7 believes she made the statements two or three times and that they were short, brief. At the time Juror No. 7 made the statements, she is not sure if all twelve jurors heard her statements. Juror No. 7 believes that five individuals heard her directly. Juror No. 7 did not hear any other juror make similar statements. Juror No. 7 testified that she herself had been to Hawaiian Brian's on several occasions. 45. Juror [No. 8] recalled all three locations being discussed as a result of the drug paraphernalia being found in the van. However, Juror No. 8 did not recall any discussion relating to drug use. 46. Juror [No. 9] did not recall any discussions about Hawaiian Brian's, Sharkey's or the airport hotel, other than what was presented at trial. 47. Juror [No. 10] recalled one juror stating that Hawaiian Brian's was a twenty four hour place ... where alot [sic] of young people hang out ... something to do with drugs ... a twenty four hour place that people who were doing certain kinds of drugs might go to stay up all night. Juror No. 10 characterized these statements as brief. Juror No. 10 also recalls the same juror making a similar statement about Sharkey's which could have been made at the same time as the statement relating to Hawaiian Brian's and which was also brief. Juror No. 10 also recalls the same juror making a statement about the airport hotel as a place to maybe do drugs. This was also a brief statement. 48. Juror [No. 11] recalled one juror making a statement which lasted a minute and a half concerning Hawaiian Brian's to the effect that people who use drugs hang out there. Sharkey's was also discussed as being the same kind of place. Juror No. 11 also recalls the airport hotel being discussed as a place where reservations were not required in advance. 49. Juror [No. 12] recalls possibly two jurors discussing all three places at the same time as drug user hang outs. These statements were very brief and didn't mean much. Moreover, as previously stated, no evidence regarding drugs or drug use would have been adduced at trial but for defense counsel's cross-examination of Officer Beatty. Evidence of drug use was irrelevant because, even if the drugs could somehow be attributed to Gabalis, such evidence did not have any bearing on whether Gabalis stole the van or Aihara's wallet. Thus, even if we were to assume that Juror X's comments were improper, an objective evaluation of the record supports the trial court's conclusion that those statements were not used as a circumstance against Gabalis. Accordingly, we hold that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny Gabalis's motion for a new trial.