Opinion ID: 436288
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Barbara Waldo.

Text: 23 The defendant-appellant, Barbara Waldo, contends that she was not a willful and knowing member of the conspiracy but rather was merely present at the scene of the crime with knowledge that a crime was committed. As previously pointed out, it is a well-established rule that mere association, knowledge or approval of a conspiracy is not sufficient to prove a defendant's guilt. United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 989 (1983). However, the rule does not apply to the present case for the evidence demonstrates that Barbara Waldo was a far more active participant in the conspiracy than she would have us believe. 24 Significant evidence was presented concerning Barbara Waldo's membership in the conspiracy through the tape of the December 15, 1981, jewelry transaction at the Ronzone residence which resulted in Mrs. Ronzone's purchase of stolen jewelry with funds supplied by the FBI. We note that Mrs. Waldo initially told FBI agents that she had no knowledge of the jewelry theft, much less knowledge of or participation in the recent sale. In her initial explanation to the FBI agents, she simply stated that she was just along for the ride. Notwithstanding those denials, Barbara Waldo now concedes that she was present [at the December 15th jewelry transaction] and aware that the jewelry was stolen. The tape of the December 15th transaction demonstrates that Barbara Waldo was not just along for the ride and provides unequivocal evidence that she was knowingly involved in what she now admits was an illegal transaction. 25 Specifically, the record shows that she: (1) sat at the table during the negotiations concerning the sale of the stolen jewelry; (2) handled the jewelry she now admits she knew was stolen; (3) counted the stolen items about to be sold; (4) commented on the quality of the stolen jewelry; (5) asserted that Mrs. Ronzone would gain a ten-fold return on the jewelry; and (6) told Mrs. Ronzone she could have a 30-day money-back guarantee. After listening to the tape and reading the transcript thereof, the district court concluded that Barbara Waldoparticipated in the conversations that day with regard to quantity, quality, price, desirability, personal wants. She was not the ignorant onlooker that the cases speak of in some instances. 26 Our review of the record compels us to agree with the district court's conclusion and statements that her actions were not that of an ignorant onlooker. The totality of the circumstances surrounding the entire jewelry transaction amply supports the trial court's finding that Mrs. Waldo was a knowing and willing participant in the conspiracy rather than a person merely present who contributes nothing to its success. Xheka, 704 F.2d at 989. 27 The defendant argues that since Judge Marshall based his finding of guilt on the conspiracy count only upon the evidence relating to the December 15th jewelry transaction, and acquitted her on the other substantive possession offenses, we are collaterally estopped from considering any other evidence in connection with her guilt as to the conspiracy conviction. We hasten to point out that when we review a conviction we review the record as a whole and that a judge, as the trier of fact, is deemed only to have considered the relevant evidence before him. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Broad discretionary powers in determining the relevancy of evidence is vested with the trial court, and the court has the duty of balancing the probative value of any evidence against any prejudice when determining the issue of admissibility. United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1144 (7th Cir.1982). Therefore, if there is evidence in the record relevant to proving the offense charged, the court may consider it in its discretion. 28 The record does not support the defendant's argument that the court's ruling was based solely upon the tape of the December 15th transaction. Judge Marshall specifically stated that he based his ruling not only upon the tape of the December 15th transaction, but also upon other corroborating evidence. There is, in fact, separate and distinct corroborating evidence of Barbara Waldo's presence at the Ronzone home when stolen jewelry was sold on occasions other than the three dates for which she was acquitted of possessing the jewelry (the court found her not guilty of possessing the jewelry on August 17, 1981, October 5, 1981, and November 2, 1981). For example, with regard to the purchases made through June and July, 1981, Mrs. Ronzone stated that at least eighty to ninety percent of the time both husbands and wives [Jerry and Barbara Waldo, Robert and Marilyn Tuohey] accompanied Richard Neubeck when there was a payment [for jewelry] to be made. Mrs. Ronzone also testified that Barbara Waldo was present at her home on July 28, 1981 when a payment for stolen jewelry was made. Her memory was so clear that she noted on this date (July 28th) Barbara Waldo was wearing an evening gown as the Waldos and Tuoheys were going out partying. In addition, Mrs. Ronzone stated that as of July 28th, all of the parties involved in the transaction (including Barbara Waldo), knew that the jewelry involved was Goodman manufactur[ed] jewelry from Indianapolis, Indiana. She further testified that at least four or five times, the parties discussed, in Barbara Waldo's presence, the caveat that the jewelry not be sold in the Chicago or Indiana area. The placement of this condition on the location where the jewelry could not be sold is more than a mere indication that the jewelry was hot. Finally, Mrs. Ronzone testified that on another occasion in July 1981, Barbara Waldo was present when a jewelry sale was consummated, recalling that there were ten emerald necklaces offered for sale and that we women [Ronzone, Barbara Waldo, and Marilyn Tuohey] were trying them on and kind of playing with them. While Barbara Waldo was not indicted for possession for her participation in the sales of the stolen jewelry during June or July 1981, this evidence corroborates her involvement in the overall conspiratorial scheme. 3 29 There is no specific reference in the record to the trial court's reliance upon any evidence adduced at trial concerning the 8/17/81, 10/5/81, and 11/2/81 possession counts for which Barbara Waldo was acquitted. It is clear, however, that the court could have considered evidence of her prior acts, on dates other than those three, under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) if relevant. Rule 404(b) permits the use of evidence to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. For example, the evidence of Barbara Waldo's participation in the conspiracy and presence in the Ronzone home in June and July 1981, in the immediate area where the sales of the stolen jewelry were being transacted clearly provides proof of her knowledge of the existence of the overall plan to dispose of the stolen jewelry and proof of her opportunity and intent to be a member of the conspiracy from its earliest stages. This evidence contradicts her contention that she was just along for the ride on December 15th, as her prior acts were consistent with the modus operandi of the conspirators on December 15. Furthermore, the separate and distinct evidence establishing that she knew of the restrictions regarding where the jewelry could not be sold is proof of her knowledge that the jewelry was contraband. 4 30 In further support of Mrs. Ronzone's testimony, the tape of the December 15th transaction clearly reflects that Barbara Waldo was acquainted with Mrs. Ronzone prior to that date. Also received in evidence was a $600.00 check made out to cash that Mrs. Ronzone testified she gave to Jerry Waldo on October 27, 1981 in partial payment for jewelry she had just purchased from him. The check is endorsed by both Barbara Waldo and Jerry Waldo and provides additional corroborating evidence of Barbara Waldo's knowledge of and active participation in the on-going conspiracy. Finally, Mrs. Ronzone's husband testified concerning the jewelry purchases made by his wife and stated that Barbara Waldo and Marilyn Tuohey accompanied their husbands to the Ronzone home approximately 6, 7 times. The sum of this corroborating evidence clearly points to Barbara Waldo's participation in, and knowledge of, the conspiracy well before December 15, 1981. 31 Barbara Waldo's estoppel argument also appears to be based upon the premise that the court found the Ronzones' testimony incredible. As defined by the Supreme Court, collateral estoppel means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Castro, 629 F.2d 456 (7th Cir.1980). Clearly, in this case the government did not attempt to relitigate an issue of ultimate fact resolved in a prior proceeding in a separate future lawsuit, rather, the instant case merely presents an appeal of the district court's judgment. Thus, under the present facts the doctrine of collateral estoppel is simply inapplicable. However, were we to consider this appeal as the type of future lawsuit referred to in Ashe and Castro, the ultimate fact which Barbara Waldo contends was resolved in her favor is her presence at the Ronzones' home on the dates for which she was charged with possession. That fact, according to Barbara Waldo, is dependent on the credibility of the Ronzones. Contrary to what we discern is her (Barbara Waldo's) argument, the record reveals that the credibility issue was not resolved in her favor as the trial judge, while finding the Ronzones' evidence insufficient to convict her of possession on those three specific dates, emphatically refused to label their testimony as not truthful. Barbara Waldo's acquittal on the three possession counts does not bar this court from considering other separate and distinct corroborating evidence in the record concerning her involvement in and knowledge of the ongoing conspiracy. It is well-established that the commission of the substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct offenses, Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 1182, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946), and that [a]quittal on a substantive count does not bar conviction for conspiracy unless there is an identity of the proof necessary. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1152 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 3184, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974). We hold that in addition to the tape recordings the record contains further corroborating evidence of Barbara Waldo's involvement in the charged conspiracy and that we may consider that evidence in reviewing her conviction. We hold there is sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find Barbara Waldo guilty of the conspiracy as charged. 5 32 Barbara Waldo finally argues that the extent of her dominion and control over the jewelry on December 15, 1981, was insufficient to convict her of possessing stolen jewelry on that date. She contends that her husband and Robert Tuohey had control over the jewelry and that she was not present at O'Hare at the time of the jewelry theft nor did she have access to it because she was not employed at O'Hare. Her proximity to O'Hare at the specific time the jewelry disappeared is irrelevant to the question of whether she possessed any of that jewelry on December 15, 1981. The evidence of Barbara Waldo's participation in the conspiracy is overwhelming and the tape of the December 15, 1981 transaction reveals that Barbara Waldo actually handled and counted earrings and rings which she admits she knew were stolen at the time she handled them. 33 Defendant Barbara Waldo directs our attention to the following language from United States v. Parent, 484 F.2d 726 (7th Cir.1973), as authority for her argument that she did not possess the stolen jewelry: 34  'Generally, it is held that possession is dependent upon the extent of the defendant's dominion and control over the stolen property.' United States v. Nitti, 444 F.2d 1056, 1057 (7th Cir.1971). That dominion must not be 'a passing control, fleeting and shadowy in its nature,' but actual control. United States v. Wainer, 170 F.2d 603, 606 (7th Cir.1948). Actual possession may arise from proximity to the goods, but need not. 35 Id. at 732. 6 In Parent our court upheld a conviction based upon the constructive possession of stolen property. The court specifically distinguished United States v. Nitti, where dominion and control were found not to have existed, since in that case the court specifically noted that '[t]here [was] not a scintilla of proof that defendant ... touched or saw or had any knowledge of the stolen property ....'  United States v. Parent, 484 F.2d at 733 (quoting United States v. Nitti, 444 F.2d at 1059). Likewise, United States v. Wainer, 170 F.2d 603 (7th Cir.1948), fails to support her argument since in that case our court refused to uphold a conviction for receipt and possession of stolen goods because there was not a scintilla of evidence that the appellant had anything to do with the receiving, storing, possessing, handling, or disposing of any of the [stolen merchandise]. Id. at 605. It is clear from our examination of the record that Barbara Waldo had sufficient dominion and control over the jewelry on December 15, 1981, in that she: (1) sat at the table during the negotiations; (2) handled jewelry she now admits she knew was stolen; (3) counted the stolen items about to be sold; (4) commented on the quality of the stolen jewelry; (5) suggested that Mrs. Ronzone would gain a ten-fold return on the jewelry; and (6) told Mrs. Ronzone that she could have a 30-day money-back guarantee. We hold that there is substantial and convincing evidence in the record to support a finding that Barbara Waldo was guilty of possessing stolen jewelry on December 15, 1981 beyond a reasonable doubt.