Opinion ID: 1237709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: consent issue

Text: Defendants in Haines challenge their convictions on four other grounds; the first of which challenges Judge McMahon's ruling and jury instruction that they could be convicted if the jury found they had entered the clinic for a purpose inconsistent with the purpose for which the clinic was open to the public. Defendant's had moved for a directed verdict because they contended the State had failed to show they lacked consent to enter the facility. Judge McMahon denied the motion and refused to read an alternate jury instruction based on Defendants' theory. Rather, she instructed the jury on consent as follows: The general consent given to the public to enter a business premise is not for all things and all purposes, but is impliedly conditioned by the purpose of doing business in the area set aside for that purpose. [4] We conclude Judge McMahon did not err in either respect. Section 939.22(48), Stats., defines without consent as no consent in fact. Here, evidence was introduced which showed that Defendants had not been given consent to enter the facility. Thus they lacked consent in fact to enter the facility. Further, Judge McMahon's decision and instruction were based on Levesque v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 412, 217 N.W.2d 317 (1974). In Levesque, this court held that consent, as required in sec. 943.10, Stats. 1973-74 (burglary), [3] was impliedly conditioned by time, place and purpose to which the building was open. Id. 63 Wis. 2d at 415. This court further stated that the consent given to the public to enter is not for all things and all purposes. A hawker of baubles is a member of the public who does not have the consent of a jeweler to enter his store to sell baubles in the aisles. Id. 63 Wis. 2d at 416. We conclude the statute in Levesque and sec. 943.145 are substantially similar and that this definition of consent is applicable to sec. 943.145. Defendants rely on Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), for their contention that the ruling and instruction were erroneous. This reliance, however, is misplaced. The defendants in Bouie entered the establishment for the purpose for which the business was open to the public. Here, however, Defendants did not so enter; their purpose was quite the opposite.