Opinion ID: 71242
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Andrews litigation

Text: 4 Lamar Andrews filed Andrews v. AT & T, No. CV 191-175 (S.D. Ga. filed Sept. 12, 1991), individually and on behalf of a class of all other persons similarly situated, alleging that AT & T, Sprint, West-Interactive, and others knowingly participated in an enterprise operated in interstate commerce ... by which [people dialing applicable 900-numbers] ... place a bet or wager in the hope of winning a cash prize or some other award of great value. (R. 1-2 at 10 (First Am.Compl. at p 30).) Andrews contends that 900-number charges incurred by callers participating in programs involving games of chance, sweepstakes, or information on unclaimed funds equate to bets placed in hope of winning some jackpot or prize. Andrews's complaint alleges that this gambling activity is illegal under the laws of all of the fifty states, (id. at 18 (p 61)), and constitutes racketeering activity in violation of the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 to 1968 (1994), (id. at 19 (p 63)), the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 229 (1994), (id. at 26 (p 89)), and the federal common law of communications law, (id. at 24 (p 82)). 5 Andrews's complaint further alleges that the defendants committed mail and wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 & 1343 (1994), in furtherance of their RICO enterprise. It asserts that service bureaus like West Interactive committed mail fraud by promoting illegal games of chance with postcards mailed to solicit the placement of illegal wagers. (Id. at 19-20 (p 65).) The complaint alleges that AT & T and Sprint had actual or constructive knowledge that they [were] in the business of collecting gambling wagers and debts for gambling businesses, (id. at 9 (p 26)), by using both mailed collection notices and telephone contacts. In addition to the allegations concerning a national gambling enterprise, Andrews alleges that the defendants have violated Georgia statutes that prohibit the operation of a gambling business within that state. 6 After discovery was completed with respect both to the merits and to class issues, the district court conducted a class certification hearing, beginning on May 23, 1994. 2 Andrews, along with the other named plaintiffs in Harper, testified at the hearing. Andrews stated that he could not identify any particular 900-number call that he had placed, and he failed to show that he actually paid 900-number charges that appeared on his phone bill, although his phone service had been disconnected for failure to pay his bills in full. (R. 39-272 at 241-44.) With regard to the promotional postcards he had received in the mail, Andrews admitted that he could not point to any fraudulent statements on them on which he had relied to place 900-number calls. (Id. at 261.) 7 The defendants challenged Andrews's standing to bring suit, as well as his ability to represent the interests of unnamed class members. They also argued that class certification was neither feasible nor desirable, due to the number of possible claimants, the predominance of individual issues, and the unmanageability of the litigation. 8 The district court stated that it was not at all impressed with the standing of ... Andrews as a representative of unnamed class members. (R. 39-272 at 560.) The court recommended that the plaintiffs consider augmentation of the class representatives and recessed the hearing. (R. 39-272 at 560-61.) When the court resumed the certification hearing in September 1994, the plaintiffs moved to amend their complaints to add several new class representatives to both the Andrews and Harper groups of representatives. 9 The district court granted the motions to amend in November 1994, when it concluded that all Rule 23 class action requirements are met in this case. (R. 27-336 at 22; R. 38-210 at 22.) 3 The court rejected the defendants' challenge to Andrews's standing, concluding that, at the least, Andrews had allegedly been the target of efforts to collect an illegal gambling debt. The court also concluded that, with the addition of new named plaintiffs, the interests of the class would be adequately represented, as required by Rule 23(a). 10 The court rejected AT & T, Sprint and West-Interactive's arguments that individual issues predominate over common questions of law or fact and that class treatment of the plaintiffs' claims is inferior to other modes of litigation in resolving their claims. Applying the language of Rule 23(b)(3), the court stated that it was satisfied that common issues predominate, that individual issues can be adequately managed, and that class treatment is a superior method of adjudication (if not the only feasible method of adjudication, given the small size of each member's claims). (R. 27-336 at 30-31; R. 38-210 at 30-31.) As to manageability of the huge number of potential claims involved in these cases, the court stated that management problems and millions of claims are obstacles which can be overestimated by defense lawyers.... Counsel ... need have no fear for the management of this case. The Southern District of Georgia can and will assemble the resources that it requires. (R. 27-336 at 22; R. 38-210 at 22.) 11 The court certified a master class and a Georgia subclass. The master class includes: 12 All persons who paid for one or more 900-number telephone calls billed and collected by AT & T or Sprint, which calls were made in connection with programs offering sweepstakes, games of chance, awards, cash or other prizes, gifts, or information on unclaimed funds. 13 (R. 27-336 at 31.) The Georgia subclass was defined to include those members of the master class who paid for 900-number calls within Georgia. (Id.)