Opinion ID: 1374541
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Prosecutorial Comments on Appellant's Age

Text: (28a) CALJIC No. 8.84.1 advises the jury, in determining penalty, to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances listed in section 190.3, including [t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime. In his closing remarks, the prosecutor had said: [A]ppellant's age is a factor. He was 23 years old at the time of these offenses. He was old enough to know better. He was old enough to be a productive member of our society. He was old enough to know that he need not be a social anarchist, which I think the evidence shows him to be. He was old enough to kill. Appellant contends these comments were prejudicial misconduct, since they suggested that his age was an aggravating factor, though age can only be a circumstance in mitigation. We note at the outset that a misconduct claim is misplaced, because appellant failed to object to the prosecutor's argument, and an admonition to the jury would have cured any prejudice. ( People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 576 [180 Cal. Rptr. 266, 639 P.2d 908]; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) In any event, we are convinced the prosecutor's remarks were permissible argument which did not mislead the jury. In Davenport, supra, we indicated it is improper to instruct or argue that the absence of evidence of a statutory mitigating factor is itself aggravating on the issue of penalty. (29) As we explained, the purpose of aggravating and mitigating factors is to assess the seriousness of a capital crime in relation to others of the same general character. The mere absence of a mitigating element may weigh against a finding that the instant offense is less serious than normal, and thus especially deserving of mercy, but it does not suggest that the crime is more serious than normal, and thus especially deserving of death. Indeed, [s]everal of the statutory mitigating factors are particularly unlikely to be present in a given case.... To permit consideration of the absence of these factors as aggravating circumstances would make these aggravating circumstances automatically applicable to most murders. (41 Cal.3d at p. 289.) We agree, as appellant suggests, that mere chronological age, a factor over which one can exercise no control, should not of itself be deemed an aggravating factor. (28b) However, the sentencing jury is entitled to know that a defendant's crime lacks certain elements the state deems relevant to leniency in the choice of penalty. Thus, we see no impropriety in prosecutorial argument that a defendant is less deserving of leniency (as opposed to more deserving of death) than a younger, perhaps less sophisticated offender. The argument challenged here was thus within permissible bounds. It suggested only that appellant, like all adults, was fully responsible for his criminal acts and thus not deserving of the special deference to youthful impulsiveness. It did not declare affirmatively that appellant's chronological maturity weighed in favor of the death penalty, rather than life without parole. We conclude that the instant argument did not contravene Davenport.