Opinion ID: 879426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the trial court commit error by admitting inadmissible evidence?

Text: Defendants assert the trial judge heard three items of evidence that should have been ruled inadmissible. First, defendant Opsahl was allowed to testify that Springer worked for the partnership and not the corporation. Error is alleged because Opsahl also testified he knew little about the contract with Springer as well as the addendum to the partnership agreement. Defendants claim Opsahl should not have been allowed to give his opinion as to the ultimate issue of the trial when he admitted he knew little about the contract itself. A lay witness may give testimony in the form of an opinion if the testimony is rationally based on the perception of the witness and helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Rule 701, M.R. Evid. Opsahl was substantially involved with the affairs of the business and his statements were rationally based on his own perceptions. Further, his statements were helpful to the determination of a fact in issue. Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. Rule 704, M.R.Evid. Opsahl's testimony that he knew little about Springer's contract and the addendum to the partnership agreement goes to the weight of his testimony and not the admissibility. Therefore, the statements by Opsahl were admissible. Second, defendants claim a deed to property located in Dillon, Montana, was improperly admitted into evidence since title to the property was irrelevant. The deed was for the property acquired by the former partnership, Crosswinds Enterprises, to develop their first restaurant. Defendants contend the trial court erroneously used the deed to conclude that the partnership owned all of the restaurant facilities operated as Crosswinds restaurants. Even if it is assumed that the deed was irrelevant and should not have been admitted, defendants fail to adequately demonstrate that the District Court would have arrived at a different decision. Therefore, the admission of the deed was no more than harmless error. Finally, defendants assert that certain character evidence was improperly admitted. Counsel for Springer demonstrated that prior to the bankruptcy, the former Crosswinds restaurant in Dillon was transferred to a corporation controlled by defendant Alan Hart's mother. Defendants claim this was irrelevant character evidence which tended to imply a fraudulent transfer and resulted in prejudice. However, defendants fail to demonstrate the conclusions of the court would have been different if the allegedly inadmissible character evidence had not been admitted. Defendants state that evidence of the prejudicial effect can be seen in the District Court memorandum where it is stated, There was a considerable number of hours spent by the respective architects at a very reasonable fee which was much less than the accountant [defendant] Mr. Hart charged at the time. In view of the evidence presented in the transcript, we agree with this statement by the District Court. Further, we find no indication that the statements by Springer's counsel necessarily tainted the trial judge's decision.