Opinion ID: 1351466
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Errors in Admitting the Circumstances of the Lee's Liquor Store Robbery

Text: In his opening argument at the penalty phase the prosecutor referred to the fact that defendant's conviction of armed robbery was the result of a plea bargain in which he pleaded guilty to one count of armed robbery and had two counts of attempted armed robbery (against liquor store patrons) dismissed. The prosecutor defined the meaning of the term plea bargain as what I think the public refers to as a deal. (41) Defendant now contends that the prosecutor improperly raised the matter of the plea bargain, and that his comments on the bargain constituted prejudicial error. These claims are meritless. First, it is proper under section 190.3, factor (b), to introduce evidence of violent criminal activity, including alleged violent acts of which the defendant was not convicted because of a plea bargain. ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 755.) Only alleged violent criminal activity of which the defendant was acquitted is barred from admission under section 190.3. It was therefore proper to bring to the jury's attention all the circumstances of the liquor store robbery, including acts for which he was charged but was neither convicted nor acquitted. Second, the prosecutor did not comment adversely on the plea bargain. Although the term deal, in the context of the criminal justice system, may have a somewhat pejorative connotation, the prosecutor otherwise used fairly neutral descriptive language in discussing the bargain. (Cf. People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 755, fn. 16 [prosecutor referred to plea bargain as a break which [the defendant] did not deserve].) We therefore conclude that the prosecutor's reference to defendant's plea bargain in the Lee's Liquor Store robbery was not improper.