Opinion ID: 4503539
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fourteenth Amendment Right To Bodily

Text: Integrity “Most cases that involve unwanted sexual contact or harassment by public officials have been analyzed under the substantive due process right to be free from violations of bodily integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 881–82 n.6. (9th Cir. 2001). 6 “Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process prong, we use the ‘shocks the conscience’ test.” Id. at 882 n.7 (citing Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)). “The threshold question is ‘whether the behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.’” Id. (quoting Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 848 n. 8). 6 Cases involving unwanted sexual contact or harassment by public officials during an arrest or custodial situation are evaluated under the Fourth Amendment. Fontana, 262 F.3d at 881–82 n.6. As Vazquez did not raise any Fourth Amendment arguments in her appellate briefing, we only address the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 VAZQUEZ V. COUNTY OF KERN Vazquez asserts that Anderson selected her for isolated work details so that he could groom her for sex. She alleges that Anderson referred to her as “babe,” told her she had a “big butt,” touched her face and shoulders without her consent, talked to her about her appearance in her shower gown, told her he had seen her in the shower, and told her that she should leave her boyfriend and “find someone better like him.” Moreover, she testified that during a work detail, Anderson told her to close the door and proceeded to tell her about a sexual dream he had about her. Vazquez testified that Anderson then told her “to get close to him . . . to the point where he had opened his knees and [she] was right in the middle of him, and he told [her] that he wanted his dream to come true.” As he did before the district court, Anderson continues to argue that even assuming Vazquez’s version of events is true, his alleged conduct was too insignificant to constitute a violation of Vazquez’s Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity. Thus, we must consider whether Anderson’s alleged conduct, if true, would violate Vazquez’s Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity. In Fontana, we considered whether similar conduct was sufficient to allege a section 1983 claim. 7 262 F.3d at 875– 76. There, the plaintiff was arrested for drunk driving, handcuffed, and placed in the back of a police vehicle as she was driven to jail. Id. at 875. The plaintiff alleged a police officer sexually harassed her during the drive to the station. 7 We analyzed Fontana under the Fourth Amendment because it involved an arrest but noted that if it had not involved an arrest, we would have analyzed the case under the Fourteenth Amendment. Fontana, 262 F.3d at 881–82 n.6. We ultimately said that even if we were to apply the Fourteenth Amendment analysis, using the “shocks the conscience” test, we would have reached the same result. Id. at 882 n.7. VAZQUEZ V. COUNTY OF KERN 15 Id. She alleged that an officer sat in the back seat next to her where he told her she had nice legs, put his arm around her, massaged her shoulders, told her he could be her “older man,” and made other sexual comments. Id. The defendant officer argued that his alleged behavior did not violate any of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights as a matter of law. Id. at 878. We disagreed, concluding that the allegations, if true, were “an abuse of power” and violations of the plaintiff’s bodily integrity. Id. at 881. Significantly, in our analysis, we also took note of the context of the allegations. See id. at 880–81 (noting the plaintiff alleged she was “helpless, handcuffed, and frightened and, thus, in a vulnerable position when [the defendant] began to prey upon her” because “[s]he had just been in a disorienting, high speed car accident at two o’clock in the morning”). Here, Vazquez’s assertions are sufficiently similar to those in Fontana for us to conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Anderson’s alleged conduct violated Vazquez’s Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity. Moreover, the context of Vazquez’s allegations demonstrate that she was at least as vulnerable as the Fontana plaintiff. At the time of the alleged events, Vazquez was a female ward at juvenile hall, whereas Anderson was 45 years old, was larger than Vazquez, wore a uniform, and had the power to discipline her if she refused to follow his instructions. Thus, a jury could find that Anderson’s alleged conduct “was egregious and outrageous and shocks the conscience as a matter of law.” Fontana, 262 F.3d at 882 n.7.