Opinion ID: 2640513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Impeachment of Tappan

Text: [¶ 12] The appellant subpoenaed Tappan to testify at trial, but Tappan's counsel informed the prosecutor and the appellant's trial counsel that Tappan would invoke the Fifth Amendment if he were called as a trial witness. The parties apparently then agreed that the appellant would simply elicit inculpatory statements attributed to Tappan from other trial witnesses. Accordingly, the appellant called Officer David Ferguson, who had been assigned to monitor Tappan and Huffman at the scene of the shooting, to testify during the appellant's case. Officer Ferguson testified that it was not unusual to see [Tappan] intoxicated and that Tappan's speech on the night of the shooting was very slurred. According to the officer, Tappan spontaneously volunteered the following information: 1. Tappan first stated that he was sleeping during the incident so he didn't know what happened; 2. Tappan then stated that he saw the appellant shoot the victim and that the appellant was being raped by the victim; 3. Tappan next stated that he shot the victim, that he could not let [the appellant] go down for something [Tappan] did, and indicated that the officer should handcuff him; and 4. After the officer advised Tappan of his Miranda rights and activated a tape recorder, Tappan reiterated that he saw the appellant shoot the victim with a .41 caliber Ruger handgun because the victim was going to go inside the house and retrieve another pistol and if somebody was going to get shot with that [pistol], they were going to go down. [¶ 13] The prosecutor proceeded briefly to cross-examine Officer Ferguson regarding a September 2002 encounter between the officer and Tappan in which the officer responded to a call that a very intoxicated man had collapsed at a local bar. When the officer asked Tappan how he happened to be down, Tappan first stated that he believed somebody hit him and then fell, but then stated that he had fallen off the barstool. Tappan began crying and indicated that he was very upset about some family problems. [¶ 14] The appellant's trial counsel objected to the prosecutor questioning Officer Ferguson about the September 2002 incident. After hearing argument from both parties, the district court concluded that if Tappan had testified at trial, his credibility would have been subject to attack by the prosecution, and that the September 2002 incident was a fair and relevant attack on Tappan's credibility. On appeal, the appellant contends that the testimony at issue was irrelevant, inadmissible under W.R.E. 404(b), and amounted to improper impeachment under W.R.E. 608(b). [9] [¶ 15] Even if we were to assume, for purposes of this appeal, that the district court erred in admitting the testimony at issue, the appellant must still demonstrate that such an error warrants a reversal of her conviction. See Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 52 (Wyo.1999). An error warrants reversal only when it is prejudicial and it affects an appellant's substantial rights, and it is the appellant's burden to establish that an error was prejudicial. Candelaria v. State, 895 P.2d 434, 439-40 (Wyo.1995), overruled on other grounds by Allen v. State, 2002 WY 48, ¶ 43, 43 P.3d 551, 566 (Wyo.2002). See also W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) (any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded) and W.R.A.P. 9.04 (any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded by the reviewing court). An error is harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant had the error never occurred. To demonstrate harmful error, the defendant must show prejudice under circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play. Law v. State, 2004 WY 111, ¶ 25, 98 P.3d 181, 190 (Wyo.2004) (internal quotation and citations omitted). [¶ 16] The appellant contends, in a single paragraph in her appellate brief, that Tappan's inculpatory statements were vital to the defense and impeachment of those statements was prejudicial because the evidence against her was not overwhelming and pointed more towards [Tappan's] guilt than her own guilt. In that regard, the appellant merely notes that Tappan made an incriminating statement to Officer Ferguson (although he also made exculpatory statements), Huffman testified that he overheard Tappan make an incriminating statement shortly after the shooting, and Tappan had a single particle on each hand that was consistent with gunpowder residue. [10] [¶ 17] Our review of the evidence received at trial reveals that Tappan's credibility did not hinge upon the fact that he, while intoxicated and emotionally unstable, previously gave Officer Ferguson two accounts of how he came to rest on a barroom floor. Very brief testimony to that effect (which testimony the prosecutor did not refer to either during his opening statement or his closing argument) was negligible compared to the other much more significant evidence that was available to the jury in evaluating Tappan's credibility, including: 1. Tappan's intoxication level the night of the shooting, and the intoxication levels of the appellant and Huffman; 2. The contents of Tappan's statement to Officer Ferguson, wherein he first claimed that he was asleep and did not know what happened, then claimed that he saw the appellant shoot the victim while the victim was raping her, then claimed that he shot the victim and should be handcuffed, and finally claimed (when advised of his Miranda rights and that his statement was going to be recorded) that he saw the appellant shoot the victim because the victim was going back to the house to retrieve a gun with which to shoot someone; 3. How Tappan's statement to Officer Ferguson compared with Huffman's testimony, the statements attributed to the appellant, and the testimony of other witnesses who observed what happened shortly after the shooting; 4. How Tappan's statement to Officer Ferguson compared with his statements to other law enforcement officers; 5. Tappan's potential motivations for giving inculpatory and/or exculpatory statements; and 6. The physical evidence. [¶ 18] That being the case, we cannot find that there was a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been more favorable to the appellant if the testimony at issue had been excluded. While the record contained some evidence to support the appellant's theory that Tappan shot the victim, the appellant does not endeavor on appeal meaningfully to analyze the weight of the totality of the evidence. Merely characterizing the state of the record and referring to a few pieces of evidence that support a particular theory does not persuade us that a reversal of appellant's conviction is warranted under the circumstances.