Opinion ID: 1521791
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: ruffin: written statement

Text: We conclude the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in ruling that Ruffin was not in custody at the time he gave his written statement and thus erred in concluding that he gave the statement voluntarily.
There is no dispute that Ruffin gave his oral statement virtually as soon as he arrived at the homicide office, sometime after noon (Detective Muse imagined Ruffin arrived between 1:00 and 2:00). Then, as soon as Ruffin had given his oral statement, Detective Muse was called in to the interrogation room to take a written statement, which he recorded between 2:39 and 3:48 p.m. When Ruffin had been ushered into the interrogation room, Detective Dyson had told him he was not under arrest. At no time thereafter, however, did a police officer tell him he was free to leave. Muse initially testified that Ruffin was not handcuffed, but, on cross-examination, he admitted he was unable to recall whether Ruffin was handcuffed to the desk in the interview room (as Ruffin himself had alleged), stating that he could have been because it was a policy, not always followed, to handcuff suspects. Advised of his Miranda rights, Ruffin asked Muse if he thought he (Ruffin) needed a lawyer. Muse replied, [W]ell, if it is self-defense, you can answer questions, ... it would only clarify your part. Ruffin then signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights, after which he gave the written statement. Under these circumstances, whatever inferences should be drawn from the record as to Ruffin's initial appearance at the homicide office, we must conclude that a reasonable person in Ruffin's position could not have believed he or she was free to leave, see Calaway, supra, 408 A.2d at 1224, once he had given the inculpatory oral statement and Detective Muse was called in to take a written statement. The period of time which had elapsed, the virtually continuous interrogation, the inherently coercive atmosphere, the eliciting of a signed waiver of Miranda rights despite Ruffin's announced concern that he might need a lawyer, and the lack of any indication to Ruffin that he was entitled to leave the stationhouse whenever he wished lead to a conclusion that Ruffin was in custody as the time he gave the written statement to Detective Muse.
We next consider the alleged violation of Ruffin's fifth amendment right to counsel. See United States v. Alexander, 428 A.2d 42, 47 (D.C.1981). We conclude the trial court erred in ruling in the alternative that, even if Ruffin was in custody, he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The written statement, therefore, should have been suppressed. Before taking the written statement, Muse advised Ruffin of his Miranda rights. According to Muse's own testimony, Ruffin then asked if I [Muse] thought he [Ruffin] needed a lawyer. Muse responded, [W]hy? Ruffin replied, [B]ecause of what [Muse] read to him, i.e., his right to counsel. According to Muse, he then explained to Ruffin why counsel was not necessary: [Y]ou said that ... it was self-defense [and you] didn't have any reason not to answer questions because it was self-defense. And I said, well, if it is self-defense, you can answer questions, ... it would only clarify your part, what your statement is [in] reference to what took place. Although he did not initial the written waiver of counsel found on the police department form, Ruffin did dictate a three-page statement following this colloquy with Muse, initialing each page and signing it. The interchange between Ruffin and Muse presents an issue left unresolved by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95-96 & n. 3, 105 S.Ct. 490, 492-93 & n. 3, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (per curiam): what is the effect of an ambiguous or equivocal request for counsel? In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), the Court fashioned a per se rule that an accused who has invoked the Fifth Amendment right to assistance of counsel cannot be subjected to additional custodial interrogation until either (1) counsel is furnished or (2) the accused, with knowledge of the right, knowingly and intelligently relinquishes it. 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85. Although we have held that initiation by the accused of substantive discussion following an assertion of Miranda rights is a compelling factor in determining the existence of a valid waiver, Rogers v. United States, 483 A.2d 277, 285 (D.C. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227, 105 S.Ct. 1223, 84 L.Ed.2d 363 (1985), the mere response by a suspect to additional questioning following an assertion of the right to counsel does not effect a waiver of the right, Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484, 101 S.Ct. at 1884. [18] At issue here is whether, and to what extent, the Edwards rule applies in a case such as this, in which the request for counsel appears to be equivocal. As in every waiver case, the government has the burden of showing an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of the right, and we must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); Turner v. United States, 443 A.2d 542, 554 (D.C. 1982); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 486 n. 55, 86 S.Ct. at 1634 n. 55 (the standard for waiver is necessarily high). As the Court noted in Smith, 469 U.S. at 96, n. 3, 105 S.Ct. at 493, n. 3, some courts have held that the Edwards' per se rule requires that interrogation cease following any indication at all from the accused, however equivocal, that he or she might want counsel before continuing to answer questions. These courts have held that resolution of any ambiguity against the defendant would subvert the prophylactic intent of Miranda. [19] For example, in People v. Superior Court of Mono County, 15 Cal.3d 729, 735-36, 125 Cal.Rptr. 798, 802-03, 542 P.2d 1390, 1394-95 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816, 97 S.Ct. 58, 50 L.Ed.2d 76 (1976), the accused's question to his interrogating officer, Do you think we need an attorney, was held to have required the cessation of questioning and the suppression of the statement that resulted from the continued interrogation of the accused. A similar result obtained in People v. Alexander, 79 Mich.App. 495, 261 N.W.2d 63, 64 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 958, 98 S.Ct. 3073, 57 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1978), where the defendant asked the interrogating officer whether he thought that she needed an attorney, and the officer responded that she should just tell the officer what had happened. See People v. Fish, 660 P.2d 505, 509 (Colo.1983) (An ambiguous indication of an interest in having counsel requires cessation of police interrogation.); Ochoa v. Texas, 573 S.W.2d 796, 800-801 (Tex.Crim.App.1978) (statement by accused that he probably ought to talk to a lawyer required cessation of questioning); People v. Lewis, 47 Mich.App. 450, 209 N.W.2d 450, 451 (1973) (inquiry by defendant as to whether an attorney was available at the late hour of the interrogation was a sufficient request); cf. United States v. Prestigiacomo, 504 F.Supp. 681, 683 (E.D.N.Y.1981) (statement by foreigner not fluent in English that maybe it would be good to have a lawyer was a sufficient request for counsel and required that interrogation cease). Most courts have held, however, that there is also another permissible response to an equivocal request for counsel: a question, or series of questions, designed to clarify only whether the suspect does or does not want to consult with an attorney before continuing the interrogation. See, e.g., United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124, 1130 (5th Cir.1984); United States v. Riggs, 537 F.2d 1219, 1222 (4th Cir.1976); United States v. Chansriharaj, 446 F.Supp. 107, 109-110 (S.D.N.Y.1978); Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218, 222 (Alaska 1981); State v. Acquin, 187 Conn. 647, 448 A.2d 163, 177 (1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229, 103 S.Ct. 3570, 77 L.Ed.2d 1411 (1983); State v. Moulds, 105 Idaho 880, 888, 673 P.2d 1074, 1082 (App.1983); State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113, 477 A.2d 1265, 1268 (1984); State v. Cody, 293 N.W.2d 440, 446 (S.D.1980); State v. Robtoy, 98 Wash.2d 30, 653 P.2d 284, 290 (1982); Daniel v. State, 644 P.2d 172, 177 (Wyo.1982); State v. Smith, 588 S.W.2d 27, 31 (Mo.App.1979); State v. Smith, 34 Wash.App. 405, 661 P.2d 1001, 1002-03 (1983). We believe that this latter, majority approach comports with the spirit of Edwards without unduly restricting the government's investigative authority. Accordingly, we conclude that the appropriate response to an ambiguous or equivocal assertion of the right to counsel by an accused  typically, an indirect expression of interest in counsel  is a request by police interrogators for clarification. For example, in a case such as this, an appropiate response to the question, Do you think I need a lawyer, would be to inform the suspect that the decision is one for him or her to make, Smith, 661 P.2d at 1002-03, and to then ask for the decision. Although this is one permissible response, it is not the only one possible; for, as the Court pointed out in Miranda, the investigating officer has discretion to determine whether the accused waives the right to counsel. 384 U.S. at 486 n. 55, 86 S.Ct. at 1634 n. 55. Nevertheless, a permissible response must seek clarification without persuasion or inducement, Moulds, 105 Idaho at 888, 673 P.2d at 1082, and may not take the form of an argument between interrogators and suspect about whether having counsel would be in the suspect's best interests. Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 772 (5th Cir. 1979). Nor may the limited inquiry permissible after an equivocal request incorporate a presumption by the interrogator to tell the suspect what counsel's advice to him [or her] would be if [counsel] were present. Such measures are foreign to the purpose of clarification, which is not to persuade but to discern. Id. Detective Muse's response to Ruffin's equivocal expression of interest in counsel was insufficient to protect Ruffin's right to counsel under Edwards. Muse sought not to clarify whether Ruffin wanted an attorney but to persuade him that he did not need one. Muse presumed to give Ruffin legal advice: that no lawyer was necessary as long as it was self-defense. He implied that all Ruffin had to do was to tell his side of the story to clear up any misunderstanding, and that since he had acted in self-defense the events of the evening were not serious enough to warrant counsel. The right to advice of counsel surely is the right to advice from counsel, not from the interrogator, Thompson, 601 F.2d at 772. Accordingly, we hold that on the facts of this case Ruffin was deprived of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, and that the statement he subsequently gave in response to further interrogation, reduced to writing by Detective Muse, was therefore inadmissible at trial.