Opinion ID: 1723020
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence of Mental Anguish in Petrella and Simpson

Text: Before examining the testimony presented in these cases to determine whether the element of mental anguish was sufficiently established, it may be helpful to list the factors or type of evidence the Court of Appeals panels have considered in determining whether mental anguish has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We stress that each case must be decided on its own facts, and that no single factor listed below should be seen as necessary to a finding of mental anguish. These are some of the factors which the Court of Appeals has considered: (1) Testimony that the victim was upset, crying, sobbing, or hysterical during or after the assault. (2) The need by the victim for psychiatric or psychological care or treatment. (3) Some interference with the victim's ability to conduct a normal life, such as absence from the workplace. (4) Fear for the victim's life or safety, or that of those near to her. (5) Feelings of anger and humiliation by the victim. (6) Evidence that the victim was prescribed some sort of medication to treat her anxiety, insomnia, or other symptoms. (7) Evidence that the emotional or psychological effects of the assault were long-lasting. (8) A lingering fear, anxiety, or apprehension about being in vulnerable situations in which the victim may be subject to another attack. (9) The fact that the assailant was the victim's natural father. Keeping these factors in mind, we now turn to an examination of the evidence of mental anguish presented in Petrella and Simpson. The complainant in Petrella testified that she was fearful during the assault, and that afterwards she was very upset, frightened, and was crying. Her friend testified that when the complainant phoned her, she was screaming and her voice was hysterical, such that the friend did not initially recognize it. When her friend arrived at the complainant's apartment, the complainant was very upset and crying, and was frightened and uncomfortable when taken to the gas station to identify the defendant. The complainant's friend also testified that the complainant was not a person who cried easily. The complainant further testified that she had trouble sleeping after the incident, and continued to experience insomnia at the time of the trial. She missed three days from work immediately after the incident, and then periodically missed work from time to time due to the assault. She never again stayed in that apartment after the assault occurred. The officers who responded to complainant's call testified that she was wringing her hands, was very agitated, very upset, and very, very nervous. Keeping in mind both the definition of mental anguish we adopt today (extreme or excruciating pain, distress, or suffering of the mind) and the standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence (viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, could a rational trier of fact have found that the element of mental anguish was proven beyond a reasonable doubt), we think that the evidence presented in Petrella supported a finding of mental anguish. We are satisfied that the prosecution proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the victim suffered severe emotional and psychological consequences following the assault, resulting in a major disruption, or crisis, in her life. We agree with the prosecutor that, besides the evidence of crying, hysteria, fright, loss of sleep, and absence from the workplace, it is significant that the victim never stayed another night in the apartment in which she was raped. We conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that the element of mental anguish was proven beyond a reasonable doubt in Petrella. [23] In Simpson, the complainant testified that she was upset, screaming, and crying after the incident. She continued to be upset and crying when she arrived back at her apartment, where she took a couple of aspirins and went back to bed. She testified that she did not report the incident to the police because she just never really gave it too much thought. [24] On cross-examination, the complainant testified that she was probably crying all the way through during the incident as well. The complainant testified that she just kept repeating that she wanted to go home. The complainant's mother verified that the complainant was crying when she and her father arrived at the house, and that she was still crying when she got back to her apartment. The defendant testified, without objection, that he did not believe there was any great mental anguish or pain or anything else involved. He testified that afterward, when they got back into the car, she was crying a little bit, and that when she did not calm down, he offered to take her to the hospital. At another point, defendant testified that she might have been whimpering a trifle about it, just like so many childhood experiences. On cross-examination, defendant testified that when they first reached the field, the complainant was not crying or shook up at all. The courts below inferred that the emotional distress experienced by the victim was increased by the fact that she was raped by her father. For ease of reference, we repeat here the Court of Appeals discussion of this issue: While there was no evidence demonstrating that the victim required psychiatric care or that her normal activities have been disrupted, we find that, based on the testimony reflecting her emotional distress shortly after the incident, together with the fact that the victim's assailant was her natural father, the trier of fact could reasonably infer that the victim has suffered lasting emotional effects and mental anguish greater than that normally attendant to a forcible sexual penetration. Any forcible sexual assault is bound to cause some mental anguish to the victim, but where the assailant is the victim's own father, it can be reasonably inferred that even greater mental anguish is experienced by the victim, given the societal taboo on incest and also the victim's loss of a healthy relationship with her father. [132 Mich App 266. Emphasis supplied.] Viewing the evidence in the record in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we think that there was insufficient evidence of mental anguish presented in Simpson to justify the trier of fact's conclusion that mental anguish was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We have little doubt that the forcible rape of a twenty-year-old daughter by her natural father may ordinarily cause the victim to suffer extreme or excruciating pain, distress, or suffering of the mind, and indeed may have had that result in this case. The question before us, however, is not whether the victim in this case suffered such mental anguish; it is whether the prosecution produced sufficient evidence at trial to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that she did. We conclude, after a careful examination of the record, that the prosecution failed to produce evidence of that quality at trial, and thus we are unable to sustain the trial court's finding that the victim suffered mental anguish. Aside from the testimony that the complainant was crying and upset, the only other factor relied upon by the lower courts was the inference that the emotional distress experienced by the victim must have been aggravated by the fact that defendant is the complainant's natural father. The question to be decided is whether, on this record, such an inference was supportable. We have searched the record in vain for any evidence justifying such an inference. While the testimony clearly established the existence of the familial relationship of the defendant and the complainant, there was no testimony, by the complainant or anyone else, that this fact exacerbated the complainant's emotional distress. While it may be quite reasonable to expect that, in ordinary circumstances, a sexual assault by a father upon his daughter would, because of the familial relationship, intensify the mental suffering of the daughter, we are not free to assume such an effect in every case. The record must contain either direct evidence of intensified mental suffering, such as specific testimony on the point from the victim, or perhaps circumstantial evidence of such suffering, as an inference properly to be drawn from other facts in the record. While the trier of fact may draw reasonable inferences from facts of record, it may not indulge in inferences wholly unsupported by any evidence, based only upon assumption. People v Plautz, 28 Mich App 621, 623; 184 NW2d 761 (1970); People v Weyonen, 247 Mich 308, 311; 225 NW 552 (1929). We hold that the trial court's inference that the familial relationship between defendant and the complainant contributed to the complainant's emotional distress, so as to constitute mental anguish as we have defined it today, is unsupported by the evidence of record. The only remaining evidence of mental anguish was the testimony that the complainant was crying and upset. We do not think that this evidence, standing alone, rises to the level of extreme or excruciating pain, distress, or suffering of the mind. We hold that a rational trier of fact could not reasonably conclude, on the record before us, that the complainant suffered mental anguish in this case because the prosecutor failed to produce sufficient evidence on that element of the offense. Therefore, we reverse defendant's conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Since defendant concedes that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, see below, n 26, we remand for entry of a conviction of third-degree criminal sexual conduct and resentencing.