Opinion ID: 212020
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Availability of Damages for the '611 Patent

Text: 36 Before considering the '611 patent marking issue on the merits, we first dispose of Eagle's claim that Sentry waived its arguments. First, Eagle contends that Sentry waived its arguments by failing to present marking evidence in response to Eagle's summary judgment motion. (Eagle notes that Sentry did not present this evidence with its own summary judgment motion, either.) Eagle, however, cites no binding authority that would lead us to find waiver in this case, given that the district court considered the marking evidence when Sentry submitted it with its motion to alter or amend the judgment. Eagle's primary case, Hinsdale v. City of Liberal, Kansas , is an unpublished Tenth Circuit decision. 19 Fed.Appx. 749 (10th Cir.2001). Its other authority, United States v. Haynie , is a Seventh Circuit criminal case that is inapposite for the additional reason that the waiving party did not raise his argument at all during trial, even in a post-judgment motion. 179 F.3d 1048, 1050-51 (7th Cir.1999). 37 Second, Eagle argues that Sentry's failure to plead compliance with the marking statute also constituted a waiver. Eagle cites Maxwell v. Baker for the proposition that a patent plaintiff is required to plead constructive notice. See 86 F.3d 1098, 1111 (Fed.Cir.1996). That case, however, only makes the bare statement that the plaintiff had the burden of pleading and proving at trial that she complied with the statutory requirements. Id. The Maxwell court ultimately found that the plaintiff not only pleaded but proved such compliance. More relevant to the present case is the Supreme Court's statement, in reference to both actual notice and marking, that the duty of alleging and the burden of proving either of these facts is upon the plaintiff. Dunlap v. Schofield, 152 U.S. 244, 248, 14 S.Ct. 576, 38 L.Ed. 426 (1894). Under the rule announced in Dunlap, Sentry's pleading that the infringements have been willful and with full knowledge of the '611, and '781 patents was sufficient. See id. at 249, 14 S.Ct. 576 (requiring a pleading equivalent to with a knowledge of the patent and of his infringement [] and holding the patentee to allege ... notice to the public or to the defendant, from which such knowledge must necessarily be inferred (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, Sentry did not waive its marking argument by failing to plead notice. 38 Turning to the merits of the issue, the district court misapplied the constructive notice rule with respect to the '611 patent. In cases where a patent owner sells a product embodying the invention, a patent owner may seek damages for infringement occurring during a period in which the accused infringer had actual or constructive notice of the asserted patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a); Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1536 (Fed.Cir.1993). It is undisputed in this appeal that Eagle did not infringe the '611 patent once it had actual notice of that patent. However, constructive notice is disputed. Constructive notice is provided when the patentee consistently mark[s] substantially all of its patented products [.] Am. Med., 6 F.3d at 1538. Sentry produced evidence of such marking during the period of Eagle's alleged infringement. Specifically, Sentry came forth with an affidavit stating that its products were marked, together with documents showing sales in that period. Our review of this evidence indicates that it is not so conclusory or lacking in factual support as to allow us to affirm the grant of summary judgment. See Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1112 (Fed.Cir.2000). Accordingly, the district court erred by holding that Sentry's marking evidence did not preclude summary judgment. Sentry is entitled to an opportunity to prove constructive notice and corresponding entitlement to damages for infringement of the '611 patent. Our holding, naturally, renders the issue of infringement of this patent not moot.