Opinion ID: 2977301
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Thompkins’s Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim

Text: Thompkins argues that various instances of prosecutorial misconduct violated his Due Process Clause right to a fair trial. Pet’r Br. at 23-34. Thompkins’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct centers upon the prosecution’s offering “evidence of Purifoy’s jury verdict and guilty plea conviction and of the aider and abettor charge against Purifoy.” J.A. at 459 (Order Granting Certificate of Appealability at 3). The warden argues that Thompkins has procedurally defaulted this claim because he failed to object contemporaneously to the instances of prosecutorial misconduct and the Michigan Court of Appeals reviewed this claim for plain error. Resp’t Br. at 25 (citing Gulertekin v. Tinnelman-Cooper, 340 F.3d 415, 423-34 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 557 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that “[c]ontrolling precedent in our circuit indicates that plain error review does not constitute a waiver of state procedural default rules”). The warden further notes that Thompkins’s appellate brief failed to argue for the existence of cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default. Resp’t Br. at 25. In his Reply Brief, Thompkins did include a brief section asserting that his arguments relating to his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim sufficiently demonstrated cause and prejudice for the failure to preserve his claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Pet’r Reply Br. at 2-3. In ruling on Thompkins’s prosecutorial-misconduct claim, the district court noted the warden’s argument that the claim was procedurally defaulted but elected to consider the merits “[g]iven that the cause and prejudice inquiry for the procedural default issue merges with an analysis of the merits of [Thompkins’s] ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” J.A. at 184 (Op. at 11 n.3). Although Thompkins’s failure to set forth an explicit argument regarding cause and prejudice until his Reply Brief is troubling in light of this clear notice that the warden had already asserted that his prosecutorial-misconduct claim was procedurally defaulted, we follow the district court in considering the merits of Thompkins’s prosecutorial-misconduct claim given the overlapping analysis. We also conclude that Thompkins is not entitled to relief on this claim. 1. Clearly Established Federal Law Regarding Prosecutorial Misconduct “On habeas review, [t]he relevant question is whether the prosecutor’s comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.” Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635, 640-41 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Therefore, “to obtain relief, [Thompkins] must demonstrate that the prosecution’s conduct was both improper and so flagrant as to warrant reversal.” Id. at 641. We consider four factors “in determining whether the challenged conduct is flagrant: (1) the likelihood that the remarks of the prosecutor tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) whether the remarks were deliberately or accidentally made; and (4) the total strength of the evidence against the defendant.” Id. Finally, “[c]laims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed deferentially on habeas review.” Millender v. Adams, 376 F.3d 520, 528 (6th Cir. 2004). 2. The State Court’s Adjudication of Thompkins’s Prosecutorial-Misconduct Claim The Michigan Court of Appeals applied plain-error review to Thompkins’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct because of his failure to lodge contemporaneous objections. J.A. at 164-65 No. 06-2435 Thompkins v. Berghuis Page 14 (Mich. Ct. App. Op. at 2-3). The state court recognized that it was “improper for the prosecution to introduce evidence of codefendant Purifoy’s conviction,” but it concluded that Thompkins’s “substantial rights were not affected because the defense asserted that Purifoy was the shooter and that the evidence of Purifoy’s conviction [on firearm charges] linked Purifoy to the gun.” J.A. at 164 (Op. at 2). As a result, the court of appeals apparently believed that the evidence that Purifoy had been convicted of possessing a firearm on that date would bolster Thompkins’s attempts to pin the murder on Purifoy, despite the evidence that Purifoy’s jury had acquitted him of the murder charges. The district court agreed with the state court that “[t]he testimony regarding the outcome of Purifoy’s trial was improper and should not have been admitted.” J.A. at 186 (Op. at 13). However, the district court noted that “if the defendant’s accomplice testifies at trial, evidence of the accomplice’s convictions may be introduced so the jury can assess his credibility,” so long as the trial court instructs the jury “that it may not consider the accomplice’s conviction as evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” J.A. at 186-87 (Op. at 13-14). Even though Purifoy testified and the trial court failed to give the jury such a cautionary instruction, the district court denied Thompkins’s prosecutorial-misconduct claim because it did not believe that the introduction of such evidence rendered the entire trial fundamentally unfair. Id. We agree with the district court’s analysis and affirm the denial of Thompkins’s prosecutorial-misconduct claim on this ground. The true cause for concern is not necessarily that the prosecutor elicited such evidence of an accomplice’s conviction—as the district court noted, evidence of an accomplice’s conviction is admissible to evaluate the witness’s credibility—but rather the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on the proper use of the evidence (and the failure of defense counsel to request such an instruction). It was not wholly illegitimate and improper for the prosecution to introduce evidence of Purifoy’s convictions, and the error that occurred from this introduction stemmed not from the prosecutor’s actions but instead from the failure of Thompkins’s counsel to request, and the trial court’s failure to give, a cautionary instruction to the jury. That is, although an error or misconduct occurred, the parties responsible for that error are Thompkins’s attorney and the trial judge, not the prosecutor. Accordingly, Thompkins’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct lacks merit. D. Thompkins’s Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claim Thompkins argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to request that the trial court instruct the jury that it could consider the evidence of Purifoy’s jury trial and guilty pleas only in assessing Purifoy’s credibility and not as substantive evidence of Thompkins’s guilt. Pet’r Br. at 36. We conclude that the district court erred in denying Thompkins’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim and that Thompkins is entitled to habeas relief on this ground as well. 1. Clearly Established Federal Law Regarding Ineffective Assistance of Counsel The standard for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel requires that a defendant (1) “show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) that a defendant show prejudice, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). Further, “[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. No. 06-2435 Thompkins v. Berghuis Page 15 2. The State Court’s Adjudication of Thompkins’s Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claim That Thompkins has satisfied the first prong of his ineffectiveness claim—deficient performance—is clear. Although the warden contends that “failure to ask for [a limiting] instruction was sound trial strategy,” Resp’t Br. at 30, the Michigan Court of Appeals appeared to accept that counsel’s failure to request a limiting instruction was error and simply denied Thompkins ineffectiveness claim because it found a lack of prejudice because “the record does not disclose an attempt to argue [Purifoy’s] conviction for an improper purpose,” that is, for a purpose other than an effect on Purifoy’s credibility. J.A. at 166 (Mich. Ct. App. Op. at 4). Likewise, the district court agreed with Thompkins “that effective counsel would have requested such [a limiting] instruction.” J.A. at 197 (Op. at 24). Indeed, the failure to request such a limiting instruction is particularly deficient in light of Thompkins’s primary defense at trial, which was “that Eric Purifoy was the shooter and that defendant was merely present.” Pet’r Br. at 7. The district court noted Thompkins’s argument that “he was extraordinarily prejudiced by the introduction of this testimony [relating to Purifoy’s trial and convictions] because his defense was that Purifoy was the shooter. As [Thompkins] raises: ‘[i]f Purifoy’s jury found him not guilty who did that leave as the shooter?’” J.A. at 185 (Op. at 12). We hold that Thompkins has satisfied the second prong of his ineffectiveness claim as well. Although the district court found that the performance of Thompkins’s counsel was deficient, the court denied Thompkins’s claim because “the Court [did] not believe that the introduction of evidence regarding Purifoy’s convictions rendered [Thompkins’s] trial fundamentally unfair.” J.A. at 197 (Op. at 24). Rendering the trial “fundamentally unfair,” however, is not the standard used to evaluate a claim of ineffective assistance; under Strickland, the required showing is prejudice, measured as “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. Given that Thompkins’s central strategy at trial involved pinning the blame on Purifoy, that his jury heard evidence—from multiple witnesses, J.A. at 345-47 (Trial Tr. 5/16/2002 at 85-87) (Helgert); J.A. at 289 (Trial Tr. 5/13/2002 at 237) (France); J.A. at 401 (Trial Tr. 5/16/2002 at 188) (Purifoy)—that Purifoy had been acquitted of murder likely exerted a powerful influence on the jury to convict Thompkins of murder. If the jury did not convict Thompkins, the jury knew that no one would be convicted for killing Morris and shooting France. Most importantly, in the absence of a limiting instruction, the jury could well have believed that it was entirely proper to weigh Purifoy’s acquittal as significant evidence that Thompkins must have been the shooter. In fact, the trial court’s jury instructions included the statement that “[y]ou may convict the defendant based only on the accomplice’s testimony, if you believe the testimony and it proves the Defendant’s guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” J.A. at 443 (Trial Tr. 5/17/2002 at 166) (emphasis added). The jury thus heard that it could convict Thompkins based solely on Purifoy’s testimony, which included not only his account of the shooting but also his statement that he had been acquitted of murder. Although we have concluded that the district court erred in denying Thompkins’s ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim, on habeas review Thompkins of course bears the additional burden of “show[ing] that the [Michigan] Court of Appeals applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699 (2002). We hold that Thompkins has satisfied this burden as well. The Michigan Court of Appeals applied Strickland in an objectively unreasonable manner in this case because its analysis of prejudice was fundamentally flawed. The Michigan Court of Appeals appeared to acknowledge that Thompkins’s counsel erred and was deficient in failing to request a limiting jury instruction regarding the evidence of Purifoy’s trial verdicts, but it rejected Thompkins’s claim because “the record does not disclose an attempt to argue [regarding Purifoy’s] No. 06-2435 Thompkins v. Berghuis Page 16 conviction for an improper purpose.” J.A. at 166 (Mich. Ct. App. Op. at 4). Questions of the prosecution’s purpose or intent are completely irrelevant in an analyzing whether an error resulted in prejudice, which by definition concerns the error’s effect upon the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 (“[A] court making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors.”) (emphasis added). Even if the prosecution intended that the evidence regarding Purifoy’s jury trial outcome be considered only as it pertained to Purifoy’s credibility, the prosecutor’s intent does not cure the problem that a reasonable probability exists that the jury understood Purifoy’s acquittal as powerful evidence that Thompkins, the only other individual in the front seat of the van, must have been the shooter. In denying Thompkins’s ineffective-assistance claim on the ground that the prosecution did not introduce evidence relating to Purifoy’s jury trial “for an improper purpose,” the Michigan Court of Appeals applied the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis in an objectively unreasonable manner. We therefore conclude that Thompkins is entitled to relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.