Opinion ID: 1930886
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The Alleged Illegality of Malapportionment

Text: Because the standing of plaintiff Cohen in the first action and of the plurality of the plaintiffs in the third action authorizes a decision of the malapportionment question only as such decision is necessary to justify the preventive relief sought by plaintiffs, we find it unnecessary to reach the merits of the malapportionment issue in either of the actions. The reason is that hypothesizing, arguendo, that the Board were to be pronounced malapportioned, we must nevertheless deny plaintiffs the preventive relief they seek:an injunction against issuance of the school construction bonds (now approved by the voters of SAD No. 71). When a District Board determines to borrow funds for capital improvement purposes (as defined in 20 M.R.S.A. § 3457) it must, by warrant, call an election to achieve the approval of the voters in accordance with the steps specified in Section 225. By Section 304 voter approval of the Board decision to issue bonds or notes of the District is a prerequisite to such issuance (with exceptions not here material). The capital improvement project and accompanying bond issue initiated by the SAD No. 71 Board on December 30, 1974 and ratified by the District's voters on January 22, 1975 fulfilled these statutory preconditions. As to Board action yet necessary for completion of the issuance of the bonds, our opinion is that Section 304 shows that although discretionary decisions are involvedincluding determining the dates, denomination, interest rate, and method of sale as well as other particular features relating to the form of securities, minimum purchase price, and dates of maturity, these actions yet to be undertaken are truly the implementation of a capital construction commitment already in essence undertaken. As we have stressed ante, plaintiffs' standing before us precludes us from affording them any type of remedial relief. In no event, therefore, are plaintiffs entitled to have vacated and set aside the foundational commitment to the school construction project which has thus already come into existence. Blodgett v. School Administrative District 73, supra; LaFleur ex rel. Anderson v. Frost, supra . [6] Over and above the matter of the standing of plaintiffs, the unique nature of the malapportionment question itself has produced a general consensus that notwithstanding a judicial pronouncement that an elected body exercising governmental functions is malapportioned, actions of the body taken prior to the issuance of the malapportionment pronouncement are unaffected as to their legal validity and remain lawful. Some Courts have arrived at this view by analogizing the status of a malapportioned governmental body to that of a de facto officer acting under color of office. See, for example, Kidd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40 (1956); appeal dismissed 352 U.S. 920, 77 S.Ct. 223, 1 L. Ed.2d 157 (1956). The approach of other Courts is that the likelihood of the chaos resulting from the overturning, on malapportionment grounds, of legislative action already taken requires that such action be upheld as a pragmatic necessity. See, for example, State ex rel. Tayrien v. Doggett, Okl.Cr., 296 P.2d 185 (1956). [7] We believe that, regardless of differences in the subsidiary approaches adopted by individual courts, the ultimate principle on which they agree reflects an overriding policy concern that the law must afford protection when an elected governmental body has been proceeding under color of right because of the reliance justifiably placed by the public. Such policy has long been favored by this Court. Hooper v. Goodwin, 48 Me. 79 (1861); State v. Poulin, alias Pooler, 105 Me. 224, 74 A. 119 (1909). [8] In Poulin this Court expressly adverted to the practical necessities underlying the policy, saying: It would be unreasonable to require the public to inquire into the title of an officer, or compel him to show title, and these have become settled principles of law. (p. 229, 74 A. p. 121.) We, therefore, adhere to the general current of authority already developed and decide that the legal validity of the actions of a governmental body taken prior to a judicial pronouncement that the body is malapportioned are unaffected by such pronouncement. Beyond the foregoing general principle, a special feature of the instant case buttresses our conclusion that the past action of the Board in determining upon a school construction bond issue would continue legally valid despite an adjudication of malapportionment. Here, the commitment to a school construction capital outlay program was undertaken not only by representatives of the voters of SAD No. 71 but also by the voters themselves. Thus, the particular taint introduced when an elected body is malapportionedthat the Board's representational voting does not reflect equally the voting power of the peoplewas here purged when the people approved the project by their own direct vote. With our point of departure, then, that as to the malapportionment question, the action of the School Board on December 30, 1974 which determined upon the issuance of the school construction bonds was, and remains, legally validas also the approval of the electorate given in the election held on January 22, 1975,we proceed to evaluate whether the actions yet remaining to be taken by the Board would be properly enjoinable were we now to adjudicate the Board to be malapportioned. Our view is that since these prior occurring matters remain lawful, the substantive essence of the commitment which the bond issue would represent is already lawfully established with only finishing touches remaining to bring it to fruition. We regard the decision by the School Board to initiate the school construction capital improvement project through the issuance of securities under 20 M.R.S.A. §§ 225 and 304, and the subsequent required voter approval, as the two actions critical to issuance of the bonds. The judgments which are yet to be made by the School Board under Section 304 relate only to the manner in which they may issue securities once the Directors and people have determined that the securities shall issue. No further vote of either the Directors or the electorate is necessary to the existence of the basic commitment for capital outlay which the issuance of the bonds would impose. The form of warrant calling the voters to approve such a capital improvement plan, as prescribed by 20 M.R.S.A. § 225, requires that all details essential to the plan must appear in the warrant: namely, the maximum indebtedness sought to be authorized, the type of school to be constructed, and its location. Thus, the procedures specified by Section 225 include all essential elements of School District borrowing. Once they have been complied with, as here, only the executory steps outlined in Section 304 remain. In this regard, we find significant the following provision in Section 225(3) (A) regarding change in construction site after voter ratification: When a School Administrative District votes to change the site of its school construction project . . ., the date of authorization of the project shall be the original date whereby the voters authorized the directors to issue bonds or notes for the same project. We look upon this provision, requiring a relation back of amendments to capital improvement plans to the date of the original referendum, as significant indication of legislative intent that voter approval is the second and last of the two steps crucial to bring into existence the actual commitment to undertake the capital outlay obligation to be embodied in the school construction bonds ultimately issued. Beyond this conclusion that the heart of the bond commitment has already been validly settled and only incidents of implementation remain, a further factor unique to malapportionment considerations here supports a conclusion that a current pronouncement of malapportionment of the SAD No. 71 Board of Directors would not justify an injunction to prohibit the Board's undertaking of the further acts necessary to complete the school construction bond issue approved by the voters. In Section 301 of 20 M.R.S.A. the Legislature has commanded that [t]he directors of a School Administrative District during . . . reapportionment. . . shall serve until the reapportionment is completed and shall be legal representatives of the district until the reapportioned board is selected and qualified. (emphasis supplied) The Legislature has further mandated that, as such legal representatives of the district, pending reapportionment. [t]he directors shall carry out all business of the district including the borrowing of necessary funds which may be required during the period of board reapportionment. In Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 87 S.Ct. 446, 17 L.Ed.2d 330 (1966) the Supreme Court of the United States expressly permitted the Legislature of Georgia, previously adjudicated to be malapportioned, to continue to act with legal validity even to the extent of undertaking the momentous action of electing the Governor of the State. Overturning the District Court's order restraining such election, the Supreme Court said: In Toombs v. Fortson, 384 U.S. 210 [86 S.Ct. 1464, 16 L.Ed.2d 482], affirming [D.C.], 241 F.Supp. 65, we held that with certain exceptions, not here material, the Georgia Assembly could continue to function until May 1, 1968. Consequently the Georgia Assembly is not disqualified to elect a Governor as required by Article V of the State's Constitution. (p. 235, 87 S.Ct. p. 449.) We find the express commands of the Maine Legislature in Section 301that a malapportioned School Administrative District Board of Directors has the status of being the legal representatives of the district and has legal authority to carry out all business of the district (at least for a reasonable time after a pronouncement of malapportionment)as having legal effect here equivalent to that of the judicial recognition in Toombs v. Fortson, supra , of the continuing lawful authority of the malapportioned Georgia Assembly to act. In sum, then, even were we presently to hold the SAD No. 71 Board of Directors malapportioned, such adjudication would not justify an award of the preventive relief as to which alone plaintiffs have standing in the first and third actions before us, to-wit, an injunction prohibiting the Board from completing the issuance of the school construction bonds approved by the electorate on January 22, 1975. We, therefore, have no present occasion to decide the malapportionment question.