Opinion ID: 2040373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stewart's State Law Claims

Text: Stewart's claims under state law essentially fall into two categories. First, she alleges the school system violated the teacher tenure law, as that law was interpreted in Watson v. Burnett (1939), 216 Ind. 216, 23 N.E.2d 420. Second, she alleges that the school board's decision was arbitrary and capricious and not based on the evidence before it. The teaching profession in this state has long enjoyed statutory protection. Since the enactment of the teacher tenure law in 1927, now codified at Ind. Code §§ 20-6.1-4-1 to -20 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990), the Indiana legislature has provided experienced teachers with a legal shield that protects them from unjustified dismissals. Under this law, teachers attain tenure status after their fifth year of teaching. Ind. Code § 20-6.1-4-9. Once tenured, a teacher may be discharged only for a limited number of statutorily enumerated reasons. Ind. Code § 20-6.1-4-10. One of these is a justifiable decrease in the number of teaching positions. Ind. Code § 20-6.1-4-10(a)(5). The law also prescribes procedures which must be followed before a tenured teacher can be discharged. Ind. Code § 20-6.1-4-11. Stewart does not claim that any procedural requirements were ignored by the board, but she does contend that the board's decision to discharge her as part of a reduction in force was illegal under the teacher tenure law and was not supported by the evidence. Although the teacher tenure law erects many safeguards for tenured teachers, the law does not prescribe the standard by which courts are to review a school board's decision to discharge tenured personnel. While errors of law are readily discerned and resolved by courts, this statutory silence has generated much confusion about the appropriate analysis applicable to evidentiary error by boards. For example, both petitioner and respondent have assumed that the standard was enunciated in Metropolitan School District of Martinsville v. Mason (1983), Ind. App., 451 N.E.2d 349. In that case, the Court of Appeals considered whether a school board's decision to withhold a school bus contract from the sole bidder on grounds the bid was too high was either arbitrary, capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence. Id. at 353. This two-pronged inquiry into the factual support for the decision was gleaned from Indiana's Administrative Adjudication Act. Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-14(d) (West Supp. 1990) (previously codified at Ind. Code § 4-22-1-18). [2] The Administrative Adjudication Act, however, does not control local school board decision-making. See, e.g., Ind. Code § 4-21.5-1-3 (West Supp. 1990) (act does not apply to agency of a political subdivision of the state); and Tippecanoe Valley School Corp. v. Leachman (1970), 147 Ind. App. 443, 261 N.E.2d 880 (local school board exempt from the act's requirements because it is not a state-wide agency). All in all, there seems to be little reason to ask both whether a school board's decision is arbitrary and capricious and whether it is unsupported by substantial evidence. Whatever differences exist between the two tests create more confusion than they are worth. [3] Instead, we hold that the substantial evidence standard should be applied when reviewing the evidentiary support behind a school board's decision. This standard is, perhaps, the oldest standard of review of administrative agency decisions and is today the most commonly utilized one. See 5 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 29:5 at 350-51 (2d ed. 1984) (substantial evidence test first applied to administrative agency decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1913 and subsequently adopted by Congress as the standard of review under the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act). The substantial evidence test was set out by this Court in the related cases of Stiver v. State ex rel. Kent (1936), 211 Ind. 370, 1 N.E.2d 592, and Stiver v. State ex rel. Kent (1936), 211 Ind. 380, 1 N.E.2d 1006. In the second Stiver opinion, we capsulized the standard as follows: If the procedural requirements are followed, including the assignment of a legal cause for cancellation [of the contract], and if there is substantial evidence presented which tends to support the legal cause, and if the hearing is, in fact, fair, the proceeding is lawful. 1 N.E.2d at 1007. Under the substantial evidence standard, the reviewing court must consider the record as a whole, not just the evidence that is favorable to the school board's decision. A court may vacate a school board's decision only if the evidence, when viewed as a whole, demonstrates that the conclusions reached by the school board are clearly erroneous. With this standard of review established, we turn to Stewart's state law claims: first, that the board's decision violated the tenure act, and second, that the board's decision was not supported by the evidence.
Arguing that the school board's actions were contrary to the teacher tenure law, Stewart relies on Watson v. Burnett (1939), 216 Ind. 216, 23 N.E.2d 420. That case presented an early opportunity to explore the reach of the teacher tenure law's protections. Julia Burnett was a tenured teacher licensed to teach only in grades one through four. She was fired as the result of a reduction in force. Although the law permitted a school to discharge a tenured teacher in that situation, Burnett complained that non-tenured teachers had been retained to teach classes she was also certified to teach. She argued that if the law's purpose were to be fully realized, tenured teachers had to be given priority over equally qualified non-tenured teachers during reductions in force. This Court agreed, and ordered the school board to reinstate her. Relying on the teacher tenure law and the Watson decision, Stewart argues that because both she and the two non-tenured teachers lacked a counselor's certificate (one of the two certificates required by state law for the guidance counselor position), she was as qualified as they were to hold the title acting psychometrist/counselor. As the only tenured teacher among these three equals, Stewart claims the teacher tenure law requires her to have been retained. Her argument is unpersuasive. Indiana Code § 20-6.1-4-10 and our decision in Watson protect Stewart from being fired before non-tenured teachers due to a reduction in force only as long as her qualifications make her eligible for the job she seeks. Watson emphasized that a tenured teacher must still be qualified to teach in the position for which the non-tenured teacher is retained. 216 Ind. at 221, 23 N.E.2d at 423. This prerequisite is reinforced by regulations of the Indiana Department of Education, which require that school personnel, including guidance counselors, be properly certified in their field. Ind. Admin. Code tit. 511, r. 4-1-3 (1988). Stewart's own brief to the Court of Appeals concedes that she was unqualified under state law to work as a counselor. Brief at 23-24. Our decision in Watson bestowed a powerful sword on tenured teachers, and Stewart naturally seeks to use it in her favor. That sword, however, was designed to enforce the teacher tenure law. It cuts only in favor of the primary legislative intent behind that act  the promotion of the public good through the creation of a competent cadre of teachers in the state. The law is primarily intended to promote ... the welfare of the state and of the school system by preventing the removal of capable and experienced teachers at the political or personal whim of changing officeholders. State ex rel. Anderson v. Brand (1937), 214 Ind. 347, 351, 5 N.E.2d 531, 532, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 58 S.Ct. 443, 82 L.Ed. 685 (1938); see also School City of Lafayette v. Highley (1938), 213 Ind. 369, 376-77, 12 N.E.2d 927, 930 (purpose of the act is to protect the educational interest of the state, not to grant special privileges to any class of teachers); accord Note, Dismissal or Removal of Public School Teachers Under Teachers' Tenure Laws, 21 Notre Dame L.Rev. 25, 26-27 (1945). The sword may not be used by a teacher to litigate her way into a position that she is unqualified to hold under state law. Cf. Switzerland County School Corp. v. Sartori (1982), Ind. App., 442 N.E.2d 702 (rejecting teacher's suit seeking enforcement of contract with school system on grounds that contract was void because teacher lacked certificate to teach in Indiana). Stewart does not qualify for relief under the rule of Watson v. Burnett , which rule requires the tenured teacher to be as well qualified as the non-tenured teacher who was retained. The trial court correctly held that Ind. Code § 20-6.1-4-10 had not been violated by the school system.
Stewart's second state law claim is that the school board's decision is not supported by the evidence before it. After reviewing the record, we hold that the board's decision in this case was not clearly erroneous. Facing a declining student population and dwindling financial resources, the school system was forced to reduce its teaching and administrative staff. These reductions were complicated by a variety of pressures. First, many of the teachers, like Stewart, had tenure rights that had to be accommodated. Second, the State of Indiana prescribed minimum educational standards that further limited the board's flexibility. Third, the private accreditation system prescribed additional minimum standards that had to be met if the school system was to retain its accreditation. The board decided that it could reduce its staff and still satisfy these pressures by combining the positions of psychometrist and guidance counselor. In combining these positions, however, the school board was forced to choose between Stewart and two non-tenured psychometrists. Both of the non-tenured employees already had classroom teaching certificates that enabled them to teach a class or two should the need arise. Stewart was not certified to teach in the classroom. Had she been retained, the board would have had to look elsewhere for a certified classroom teacher. Moreover, both of the non-tenured psychometrists were closer to being certified as guidance counselors, and they exhibited greater willingness to pursue the certification. Considering these factors along with the rest of the record, the school board's decision to retain the non-tenured psychometrists over Stewart was quite a reasonable choice. The board's decision survives the substantial evidence test.