Opinion ID: 1638451
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Claim of Mental Illness as a Bar to Execution

Text: Johnston argues, as he did in the postconviction court, that he is exempt from execution under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution because his severe mental illness places him in the same category as those whose executions are barred because they were under the age of eighteen at the time of the murder or are mentally retarded. The court below denied relief, finding Johnston's claim was procedurally barred for not having been raised on direct appeal or in prior postconviction proceedings and because, under this Court's precedents, mental illness is not a per se bar to execution. We agree with both these conclusions. Relying on the reasoning behind the United States Supreme Court's rulings in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional for defendants under age eighteen at the time of the crime) and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional for mentally retarded defendants), Johnston argues that it similarly constitutes cruel and unusual punishment to execute a defendant who is severely mentally ill. [7] He contends that his mental illness and neurological impairments, which have been documented in various proceedings in the record, cause him to experience the same deficits in reasoning, understanding and processing information, learning from experience, exercising good judgment, and controlling impulses as those experienced by mentally retarded individuals and by those who commit murder while under the age of eighteen. However, we agree with the postconviction court that the claim is procedurally barred because it could have been, but was not, raised on direct appeal or in any of the numerous prior postconviction motions. [8] Even if the claim were not procedurally barred, we would conclude that it is without merit. The same claim Johnston makes has been repeatedly rejected by the Court. In Nixon v. State, 2 So.3d 137 (Fla.2009), the Court held: Lastly, Nixon asserts that the trial court erroneously denied him a hearing on his claim that mental illness bars his execution. We rejected this argument in Lawrence v. State, 969 So.2d 294 (Fla. 2007), and Connor v. State, 979 So.2d 852 (Fla.2007). In Lawrence, we rejected the defendant's argument that the Equal Protection Clause requires this Court to extend Atkins to the mentally ill. See 969 So.2d at 300 n. 9. In Connor, we noted that [t]o the extent that Connor is arguing that he cannot be executed because of mental conditions that are not insanity or mental retardation, the issue has been resolved adversely to his position. Connor, 979 So.2d at 867 (citing Diaz v. State, 945 So.2d 1136, 1151 (Fla.) cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1103, 127 S.Ct. 850, 166 L.Ed.2d 679 (2006) (indicating that neither the United States Supreme Court nor this Court has recognized mental illness as a per se bar to execution)). Accordingly, Nixon is not entitled to relief on this claim. Id. at 146. In Lawrence v. State, 969 So.2d 294 (Fla.2007), we also rejected the claim Johnston makes herethat defendants with mental illness must be treated similarly to those with mental retardation because both conditions result in reduced culpability. Id. at 300 n. 9. We find no reason to depart from these precedents. For all these reasons, relief is denied on Johnston's claim that his mental illness is a bar to execution.