Opinion ID: 752932
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: count iii: the title vii retaliation claim

Text: 13 The plaintiffs allege that they were discharged by Blockbuster in retaliation for protesting Blockbuster's grooming policy. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) that he suffered adverse employment action; and (3) that the adverse employment action was causally related to the protected activity. See, e.g., Coutu v. Martin County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 47 F.3d 1068, 1074 (11th Cir.1995). A plaintiff engages in statutorily protected activity when he or she protests an employer's conduct which is actually lawful, so long as he or she demonstrates a good faith, reasonable belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices. Little v. United Technologies, Carrier Transicold Division, 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir.1997). However, it is insufficient for a plaintiff to allege his belief in this regard was honest and bona fide; the allegations and record must also indicate that the belief, though perhaps mistaken, was objectively reasonable. Id. 14 The reasonableness of the plaintiffs' belief in this case is belied by the unanimity with which the courts have declared grooming policies like Blockbuster's non-discriminatory. Every circuit to have considered the issue has reached the same conclusion reached by this Court in the Willingham decision. See Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir.1976); Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir.1976); Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir.1977); Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir.1975); Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir.1974); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1336 (D.C.Cir.1973). 2 The EEOC initially took a contrary position, but in the face of the unanimous position of the courts of appeal that have addressed the issue, it finally concluded that successful litigation of male hair length cases would be virtually impossible. EEOC Compliance Manual, § 619.1 (Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Inc.1996). Accordingly, the EEOC ran up a white flag on the issue, advising its field offices to administratively close all sex discrimination charges dealing with male hair length. See id. 15 Nonetheless, the plaintiffs contend that three decisions of the United States Supreme Court, decided after Willingham, made it reasonable to believe that Blockbuster's grooming policy violates the mandate of Title VII. However, as we will discuss below, none of the cases cited by the plaintiffs call into question the continuing validity of Willingham; therefore, the plaintiffs' belief that Blockbuster's grooming policy violated Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination was not reasonable. 16 The plaintiffs first point us to UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 113 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). In Johnson Controls, the Court held that a company's policy of prohibiting women capable of bearing children from working in battery manufacturing jobs was facially discriminatory. 3 Id. at 198, 111 S.Ct at 1203. That holding, however, is entirely consistent with the Willingham Court's holding, and thus, fails to advance plaintiffs' argument. See Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091-92 (holding that distinctions between men and women on the basis of fundamental rights such as the right to bear children constitute discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII). 17 The plaintiffs also rely on Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 103 S.Ct. 2622, 77 L.Ed.2d 89 (1983), and City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 55 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978), to support their position. In Manhart, the Court held that a policy requiring female employees to make larger contributions to an employee pension fund than their male counterparts was discriminatory. See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 711, 98 S.Ct. at 1377. The Court stated: Such a practice does not pass the simple test of whether the evidence shows treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person's sex would be different. Id. (internal quotation omitted). In Newport News, the Court applied the test from Manhart to an employer's policy of providing lesser health benefits to the spouses of male employees than to the spouses of female employees, and concluded that the policy was discriminatory. See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 683, 103 S.Ct. at 2631. The plaintiffs argue that the application of the but-for test in Manhart and Newport News, undermines the Willingham Court's analysis and conclusions. We disagree for two reasons. 18 First, the policies at issue in Newport News and Manhart related to employee health and pension benefits. The existence and extent of such benefits bear directly on employment opportunity. Because health and pension benefits frequently represent a crucial component of an employee's compensation, the practical effect of denying or reducing such benefits on the basis of sex is to deny the employee an employment opportunity on the basis of sex. In contrast, the grooming policy at issue in Willingham related more closely to the employer's choice of how to run his business than to equality of employment opportunity. 507 F.2d at 1091. Reasoning that Title VII was intended to guarantee equal job opportunity for males and females, we concluded in Willingham that the grooming policy did not constitute sex discrimination. Id. Therefore, the Supreme Court's holdings in both Newport News and Manhart are consistent with the reasoning and conclusions of the Willingham Court. See Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir.1996). 19 Second, the discrimination at issue in Newport News and Manhart was discrimination based on sex alone. The Newport News and Manhart plaintiffs could not avoid the effects of the discriminatory policies; they received lesser benefits simply because of their sex. Because the discriminatory policies in those cases were aimed at a single immutable characteristic--the plaintiffs' sex--a simple but for test effectively identified forbidden discrimination. In contrast, the alleged discrimination at issue in Willingham was between members of the same sex based on the neutral characteristic of hair length. The Willingham plaintiff was denied employment because he chose not to cut his hair; however, males in general were not prohibited from working for the defendant. Consequently, applying the but-for test from Newport News and Manhart to a Willingham-type situation does not effectively identify forbidden discrimination, i.e., discrimination that deprives members of a given sex of equal employment opportunity. The but-for test is appropriate only where alleged discrimination is based on sex alone. Therefore, the Supreme Court's use of that test in Newport News and Manhart does not affect the analysis or conclusions of the Willingham Court. 20 The plaintiffs chose to protest Blockbuster's grooming policy despite the existence of long-standing binding precedent holding that such a policy was not discriminatory. No decision cited by the plaintiffs has supplanted the reasoning or called into question the conclusions set forth in that binding precedent. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs could not have had an objectively reasonable belief that Blockbuster's grooming policy discriminated against them on the basis of their sex. Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed the plaintiffs' Title VII retaliation claim. 21