Opinion ID: 194914
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plain Language of Section 1253(h)(2)(B)

Text: 16 Mosquera contends that the phrase having been convicted ... of a particularly serious crime modifies the word alien and thus narrows the universe of aliens who may be determined a danger to the community. Mosquera further insists that a contextual comparison of section 1253(h) with the asylum provisions in section 1158(d) demonstrates that Congress well understood how to legislate a per se bar to eligibility for a withholding of deportation had it so intended. 6 We agree. But we think the statutory language is more ambiguous than Mosquera suggests. 17 Mosquera asks, with considerable logical force, why Congress would have included the danger to the community clause at all if it intended that an alien's conviction of a particularly serious crime be dispositive and that there be no separate determination that the alien poses a danger to the community. See Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1119 (1st Cir.1988) ( 'A familiar canon of statutory construction cautions the court to avoid interpreting a statute in such a way as to make part of it meaningless....' ) (quoting Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1054 (D.C.Cir.1986)); United States v. Ven-Fuel, Inc., 758 F.2d 741, 751 (1st Cir.1985) (All words and provisions of statutes are intended to have meaning and are to be given effect, and no construction should be adopted which would render statutory words or phrases meaningless, redundant or superfluous.). On the other hand, as the government argues, had Congress intended two separate determinations, surely it could have made its intention plain, simply by writing section 1253(h)(2)(B) with two coordinate clauses joined by a conjunction, viz., the alien has been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime and constitutes a danger to the community of the United States. Ramirez-Ramos v. INS, 814 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir.1987) (emphasis added); see Zardui-Quintana v. Richard, 768 F.2d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir.1985) (Vance, J. concurring in result) (same); see also Martins v. INS, 972 F.2d 657, 660-61 (5th Cir.1992); Arauz v. Rivkind, 845 F.2d 271, 275 (11th Cir.1988); Crespo-Gomez v. Richard, 780 F.2d 932, 934 (11th Cir.1986). Moreover, Mosquera's contextual argument is counterbalanced by the presence of 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1226(e)(2)-(3), governing parole for aliens convicted of aggravated felonies, which establishes various criteria for assessing recidivism to guide the Attorney General in determining whether aggravated felons will pose a danger to society. 7 Thus, in a closely analogous context, section 1226(e)(2)-(3) demonstrates congressional cognizance of its option to require a separate determination of dangerousness to the community in regard to aliens who apply for withholding of deportation following an aggravated felon conviction. As the statutory language does not clearly and unambiguously favor either interpretation of section 1253(h), we turn to the legislative history.