Opinion ID: 2543849
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Meaning of Likely to Engage in Acts of Sexual Violence

Text: Under section 6601, subdivision (d), the Director shall request a petition for commitment or recommitment as an SVP if two designated evaluators concur that the person has a diagnosed mental disorder so that he or she is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence without appropriate treatment and custody. The majority properly rejects Ghilotti's contention that the term likely as used in this statute means highly likely, or at least more likely than not. I agree that the statutory phrase likely to engage in acts of sexual violence does not mean the risk of reoffense must be higher than 50 percent. (Maj. opn., ante, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 23, 44 P.3d at p. 968.) Rather, it is sufficient if the SVP presents a substantial danger  that is, a serious and well-founded risk of reoffending (ibid.) or, in other words, presents a high risk of reoffense. (Id. at p. 27, 44 P.3d at p. 971.) The risk of reoffense must be sufficiently high, however, to distinguish SVP's from the general population of convicted sex offenders. In Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501, the high court considered a Kansas SVP statute that required a showing that the person was `likely to engage in ... predatory acts of sexual violence' and stated: The statute thus requires proof of more than a mere predisposition to violence; rather, it requires evidence of past sexually violent behavior and a present mental condition that creates a likelihood of such conduct in the future if the person is not incapacitated. (Id. at p. 357, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) The high court recently returned to the Kansas SVP statute in Kansas v. Crane (2002) 534 U.S. 407, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 to examine the requirement established in Hendricks that the person be unable to control his behavior, stating: Hendricks underscored the constitutional importance of distinguishing a dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment `from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.' (Id. at p. 411, 122 S.Ct. at p. 870.) One requirement that helps make that distinction, the court noted, was that the person must manifest a special and serious lack of ability to control behavior. (Ibid.) Although `inability to control behavior' will not be demonstrable with mathematical precision, the court required that there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior. And this, when viewed in light of such features of the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case. (Ibid.) Sadly, there is a risk that any convicted sex offender will reoffend upon being released from prison. (U.S. Dept. Justice, Bur. J. Statistics, Sex Offenses and Offenders (Feb. 6, 1997) p. 26 [as of Apr. 25, 2002].) The Act, therefore, requires not just a risk of reoffense, but a high risk of reoffense. Thus, I embrace the majority's serious and well-founded risk standard with the understanding that it requires a heightened risk sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist. ( Kansas v. Crane, supra, 534 U.S. at p. 411, 122 S.Ct. at p. 870.) The risk of reoffense must be sufficiently high to distinguish the small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators, at which the Act is aimed (Stats. 1995, ch. 763, § 1), from the general population of convicted violent sex offenders, all of whom pose an elevated risk of recidivism. I also agree with the majority that, in assessing whether a person is likely to reoffend, the evaluators may consider whether the person will voluntarily accept community treatment. (Maj. opn., ante, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 31-34, 44 P.3d at pp. 974-77.) I note, however, that whether the person's refusal to cooperate in any phase of treatment, such as a period of supervised outpatient treatment in the community, indicates that the person is not prepared to control his untreated dangerousness by voluntary means if released unconditionally to the community (id. at p. 34, 44 P.3d at p. 977) will depend upon the totality of the circumstances. It may be, for example, that the person declined the conditional release program because it imposed onerous conditions to which the person reasonably objected, or that the person's expected release date was imminent, making conditional release unattractive.