Opinion ID: 1968444
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mutual Admissibility of the Crimes In Separate Trials

Text: While considering Bright's motion to sever under Rule 14 and the issue of admissibility of the murder evidence in the ammunition possession trial, the trial court asked the government whether it was seeking to try it, as mutually admissible evidence of each crime or as to this particular offense being separate and distinct. The trial court added its own view that [i]t would be difficult, I guess, to try it separate and distinct in light of the Court's previous ruling that you can use the ammunition to establish the means of  the Defendant's means of access to or possession of the .380-caliber pistol. Although the government expressed the view that both grounds could be relied on, in denying the motion for severance under Super. Ct.Crim. R. 14, the trial court stated: I believe that the evidence of the Defendant's possession of a .380-caliber weapon, which the government seeks to establish through its evidence of the murder and the carrying a pistol without a license charge, possession of a firearm during a crime of violence charge, would be probative on the issue of intent as to possessing the .380-caliber ammunition four days later on July 29. It would be mutually admissible at trial. Now, as to its probativeness, I think the Court maybe could weigh the effect  the prejudicial effect of it and the Court, within [its] discretion, could or may not allow it in, given the fact that evidence of the murder in a separate trial for possession of ammunition may be highly prejudicial; but I still think evidence that will come in on the murder charge establishing that he possessed a .380-caliber pistol would be probative to establish possession or intent, intent or knowledge of the ammunition recovered July 29. So I'm going to deny the motion for severance on Rule 14 grounds.[ [6] ] Thus, the trial court rested its determination of no prejudice on the mutual admissibility of the evidence in separate trials on the ammunition and murder charges, rather than on the ground that the evidence as to each offense [would be kept] separate and distinct, and thus [would be] unlikely to be amalgamated in the jury's mind into a single inculpatory mass.... Arnold, supra, 511 A.2d at 404. Under Johnson v. United States, 683 A.2d 1087 (D.C.1996), the ammunition evidence would have been admissible in a separate trial on the murder counts, as well as in a separate trial of the other crimes charged in the indictment against Bright, because it related to the means used to carry out the murders and was probative as to Payne's guilt. Given Johnson, the ammunition evidence would not have been excluded as other crimes evidence under Drew v. United States, supra . [7]  Drew does not apply where such evidence (1) is direct and substantial proof of the charged crime, (2) is closely intertwined with the evidence of the charged crime, or (3) is necessary to place the charged crime in an understandable context. Johnson, supra, 683 A.2d at 1098. The government relies on the first exception, arguing that Bright's possession of .38 caliber ammunition on July 29 was direct and substantial proof that five days earlier he was the gunman who had fired the .38 caliber bullets into the victims. Clearly, the ammunition evidence [bore] an immediate relationship to the [murders and other charges], both temporally and causally. Id. at 1098 n. 11. Contrary to Bright's contention, the murders and the ammunition possession were related temporally. The five-day period between the murders and the seizure of the .38 round of ammunition from Bright's sleeping quarters was insufficient to break the temporal relationship between the two. Moreover, the causal relationship is clear because the victims were killed with .38 caliber bullets. The fact that the casings on the ground contained a brand marking not found on the .38 round of ammunition seized from Bright's apartment is not dispositive. Indeed, when the court asked whether that round of ammunition could be fired from a .380-caliber gun, defense counsel responded Yes . . . This court has upheld the admission of similar evidence (there a gun) not clearly shown to have been used in the killing but nonetheless linked circumstantially to it, Ali v. United States, 581 A.2d 368, 374-77 (D.C.1990), in that it demonstrated, inter alia, that the defendant had the means to commit the charged crime. Powell v. United States, 684 A.2d 373, 382 (D.C. 1996). Thus, the ammunition evidence [bore] an immediate relationship to the [murders and other charges], both temporally and causally because .38 caliber bullets had been used to murder Peay and Ramsey, and five days later a .38 round of ammunition was found in Bright's sleeping quarters. Id. at 1098 n. 11. Consequently, it was direct and substantial proof of the murder charges, and could be admitted in a separate trial concerning the murders. Id. ; see also Powell, supra, 684 A.2d at 382; Ali, supra, 581 A.2d at 377. [8] However, whether evidence of the murders would have been admissible in a separate trial on the ammunition possession charge is a much more difficult issue. The critical inquiry is whether the probative value [of the murders would be] substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice in a separate trial on the ammunition charge. Johnson, supra, 683 A.2d at 1099. Significantly, as pointed out, the ammunition charge was not based on Bright's possession of the ammunition used in the shootings but upon his separate possession of similar ammunition five days later. The trial judge acknowledged that evidence of the murder[s] in a separate trial for possession of ammunition may be highly prejudicial. . . . Indeed, we conclude that introduction of the evidence of the murders in a separate trial on the ammunition offense would have created an extreme risk of prejudice no matter what instructions the judge gave regarding the limited use of the evidence. Parks v. United States, 656 A.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C.1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 198, 133 L.Ed.2d 133 (1995). The murders here were particularly heinous. Bright grabbed, held and hugged Peay while he shot her in the head. Then he relentlessly pursued Ramsey, who hobbled away as fast as he could on crutches with his leg immobilized by a cast, until he caught up with him and pumped bullets into his back and head. Clearly, the probative value [of evidence regarding the murders would be] substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Johnson, supra, 683 A.2d at 1099. Here the prejudice is `the most compelling prejudice' ... from which `the court would be unable to afford protection' if both the offenses were tried together. . . . Arnold, supra, 511 A.2d at 404. Thus, under the mutual admissibility test articulated in Arnold, evidence of the murders would be excluded in a separate trial on the ammunition charge.