Opinion ID: 1128377
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The confession was taken in violation of Crawford's right to an attorney.

Text: ¶ 32. Crawford contends that law enforcement knew that he was represented by counsel and chose to interrogate him outside the presence of his attorney anyway. In his statement of issues, Crawford contends that admission of these confessional statements violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel. However, Crawford only addresses the Sixth Amendment claim in his brief. Assignments of error unsupported by any meaningful argument or relevant authority need not be addressed on appeal. Brown v. State, 690 So.2d 276, 297 (Miss. 1996). Therefore, as to the Fifth Amendment claim, Crawford is procedurally barred. ¶ 33. Crawford claims that the admission of his confession violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Determining whether a confession is admissible is a finding of fact which is usually not disturbed by this Court unless the trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard, committed manifest error, or made a decision contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Balfour, 598 So.2d at 742. However, as stated previously, the trial judge here did not make a specific finding of fact as to the admissibility of Crawford's confession. Therefore, while this Court may rely on necessarily implied findings, we are under no obligation to review under the manifest error standard. ¶ 34. Under the Mississippi Constitution, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel `attaches once the proceedings reach the accusatory stage.' Johnson v. State, 631 So.2d 185, 187-88 (Miss. 1994) (citation omitted). The right to counsel, both federal and state varieties, attaches at the point in time when the initial appearance under Rule 1.04 of the Uniform Rules ought to have been held. Morgan v. State, 681 So.2d 82, 90 (Miss. 1996). As is the case with the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are not violated by questioning in the absence of his attorney unless the defendant has asserted his right to an attorney. Wilcher v. State, 697 So.2d 1087, 1096 (Miss. 1997). ¶ 35. Though it is not particularly clear from the appellant's brief, Crawford could be making one of two arguments under the Sixth Amendment. First, Crawford may be arguing that because he was represented by Fortier in another proceeding, he was not to be questioned outside the presence of Fortier. At the time of the interrogation, Randy Fortier represented Crawford for a pending rape and assault trial, which was not connected with the disappearance of Kristy Ray. Fortier's representation did not yet extend to the offense of kidnaping. The Sixth Amendment right is offense-specific; it cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions. Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1316 (Miss. 1994); Balfour, 598 So.2d at 746. Therefore, Crawford cannot rely on the invocation of his right to counsel pursuant to previous charges of rape and assault. ¶ 36. It is more likely that Crawford is arguing that because he was arrested without a warrant, his proceedings had reached an accusatory stage and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached. Once the right to counsel has attached and been asserted, the State must of course honor it. Morgan, 681 So.2d at 90 (emphasis added). Although there is debate between the parties as to when the accusatory stage began so as to jumpstart Crawford's right to counsel, we feel that this determination is not germane to the disposition of the issue. As was addressed previously, there is a conflict of testimony as to whether Crawford invoked his right to counsel. Because the trial court made a general determination of admissibility rather than a specific finding of fact, we find that the trial court did not err in admitting the confessional statement. Accordingly, Crawford's argument regarding violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel is without merit.