Opinion ID: 1136017
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pending Exxon Valdez Tort Litigation Claims

Text: Though the issue was raised at trial, the superior court failed to address Michael's pending lawsuit against Exxon in its Memorandum of Decision, dated September 29, 1993. On November 15, 1993, forty-seven days after the court entered its decision, Bonita filed a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. [2] The superior court subsequently granted her motion and entered an Addendum to its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which states that any damages recovered by Michael in the Exxon litigation for wages lost prior to September 1993 are marital property and shall be equally divided between the parties. Michael argues that since time had expired for the filing of either a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal, and since the court's omission was easily recognizable by Bonita, her Rule 60(b) motion was improperly granted. [3] In this instance, there can be no doubt that Michael's pending litigation against Exxon was raised at trial. In fact, while examining a witness, Michael's attorney effectively conceded that a portion of the proceeds eventually received are a marital asset: [I]n fact, ... it's our position that Mrs. Hatten's entitled to 50% of the [Exxon] claims up to the present, which would represent damages which are reflected during the course of the marriage. Given the above, we conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in granting Bonita's Rule 60(b) motion. By all indications, the superior court's omission was an inadvertent factual mistake, not a mistake of law. [4] Similarly, insofar as Bonita's motion was seventeen days tardy, [5] Michael was not prejudiced since the superior court extended the time in which he could timely appeal, and he took advantage of this extension. [6] This court has held that Rule 60(b)(1) motions based on facts which are known to a party at a time when direct appeal is possible must be brought within thirty days. Kenai Peninsula Borough v. English Bay Village, 781 P.2d 6, 7 (Alaska 1989). However, we take this occasion to disapprove of our decision in Kenai Peninsula insofar as it would bar the Rule 60(b) motion in the case at bar. [7] In short, we conclude that only Rule 60(b) motions alleging a mistake of law need be filed within the time frame applicable to an appeal. We have also held that a motion was sufficiently timely under Civil Rule 60(b) if brought within six weeks of the date of the final order, a time-frame comparable with the instant case. [8] For all these reasons, we hold that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in granting Bonita's Rule 60(b) motion.
Michael also argues that even if Bonita's Rule 60(b) motion was properly granted, the superior court erred by using the September 14, 1993 date of trial rather than August 1990, the date of the parties' initial separation for purposes of dividing the proceeds from Michael's lost earnings claim against Exxon. In response, Bonita argues that Michael has waived this issue for purposes of appeal since, at trial, his counsel impliedly accepted the September 1993 trial date as the proper date of apportionment. She also argues that the superior court's adoption of the date of trial was not clearly unjust. [9] We have said that although the date for valuation of marital property should be as close as practical to the date of trial, the date for segregating marital from post-marital property is ordinarily the date of the functional termination of the marriage. Hanlon v. Hanlon, 871 P.2d 229, 231 (Alaska 1994). This date is when the marriage has terminated as a joint enterprise or when a married couple cease functioning economically as a single unit. Hanlon, 871 P.2d at 231 (citations omitted). Often the date of permanent separation is the date used for segregating marital from post-marital property. Gallant v. Gallant, 882 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Alaska 1994). In determining whether the superior court erred in using the September 1993 date of trial as the date for distinguishing marital from post-marital property and apportioning Michael's lost earning damage proceeds, four dates are potentially relevant: (1) August 1990, the date that the parties separated for the first time; (2) March 1992, the date Bonita testified as being the date of separation and the date Michael filed for divorce; [10] (3) December 1992, the date the decree of divorce was issued; and (4) September 1993, the date of trial. In Schanck v. Schanck, 717 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1986), we stated: As a general rule, we hold that property accumulated with income earned after separation that is intended to, and does in fact, lead to a divorce is excluded from the category of marital property, as long as it is obtained without the invasion of any preseparation marital asset. We decline to specify, as a matter of law, that the effective date when such earnings become severable from marital property is at separation or at filing for divorce. Each case must be judged on its facts to determine when the marriage has terminated as a joint enterprise. Here the marriage had terminated as a joint enterprise no later than March of 1992, the date when Michael filed for divorce and the date that Bonita testified was the time of separation. However, this court has also held that a spouse, based on statements made at trial, may waive an otherwise valid argument that the court improperly divided assets as of the date of trial: As noted above, the superior court found from the testimony of both parties, and the statements of their respective counsel, that the parties agreed Judy was entitled to one-half of the value of Raymond's accumulated pension. Study of the record shows that Raymond considered the entire pension accrued during the parties' cohabitation and marriage to be part of the marital estate. At trial, Raymond never differentiated the pension contributions he made before the parties' marriage or those made after the parties' separation. In light of the superior court's finding as to this issue, and its evidentiary support in the record, we conclude that Raymond waived any objection to the superior court's division of pension benefits as of the date of trial. Bays, 807 P.2d at 486. In the instant case, statements made by Michael's counsel during direct examination of Robert Cowan, Michael's attorney in the Exxon case, are of particular significance: Q: [W]hen the ... Alyeska and the Exxon claims become settled and the money is distributed, you'll be able to tell, will you not, what percentage of the claim is for future ... damages, using today's date as a reference point? September 13th, and what percentage was damages which accrued from the time of the Exxon spill to today's date? .... Q: [O]ur problem is, is the damages are going to be running from the Exxon spill, past the present date, in fact, and it's our position that Mrs. Hatten's entitled to 50% of the [Exxon] claims up to the present, which would represent damages which are reflected during the course of the marriage. .. . But the future damages would be solely Mr. Hatten's property. Given the above, we affirm the superior court's decision to apportion the prospective proceeds from the Exxon litigation as of the date of trial.