Opinion ID: 2519351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inherent Contempt Power of the Juvenile Court

Text: ¶ 14 Contempt of court is intentional: (a) Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding the court, tending to impair its authority, or to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceedings; (b) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, decree, order, or process of the court; (c) Refusal as a witness to appear, be sworn, or, without lawful authority, to answer a question; or (d) Refusal, without lawful authority, to produce a record, document, or other object. RCW 7.21.010(1). Contempt may be direct, occurring in the court's presence, or indirect, occurring outside of court. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827 n. 2, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994). A court's authority to impose sanctions for contempt is a question of law, which we review de novo. See M.B., 101 Wash.App. at 454, 3 P.3d 780. ¶ 15 Because contempt of court is disruptive of court proceedings and/or undermines the court's authority, courts are vested with an inherent contempt authority, as a power `necessary to the exercise of all others.' Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 831, 114 S.Ct. 2552 (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812)) (citations omitted). Inherent contempt power is separate from statutorily granted contempt power. State v. Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wash.2d 327, 335, 553 P.2d 442 (1976); Keller v. Keller, 52 Wash.2d 84, 86, 323 P.2d 231 (1958). It is created by the constitution, . . . comes into being upon the very creation of . . . a court and remains with it as long as the court exists. Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 423, 63 P.2d 397 (1936). The inherent contempt power is lodged permanently with [the court], and the legislature may not, by its enactments, deprive the court of that power or curtail its exercise. Id. at 424, 63 P.2d 397; see also Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354 v. Mead Educ. Ass'n, 85 Wash.2d 278, 287, 534 P.2d 561 (1975); State v. Estill, 55 Wash.2d 576, 579, 349 P.2d 210 (1960). The legislature may only regulate that power, and only as long as it does not diminish it so as to render it ineffectual. Mead Sch. Dist., 85 Wash.2d at 287, 534 P.2d 561 (citing Carter v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 791, 32 S.E. 780 (1899)). This inherent authority allows courts to impose sanctions upon the contemnor, after appropriate due process protections are provided. ¶ 16 Due process requirements vary depending on whether the contempt is direct or indirect and whether the sanctions imposed are remedial or punitive in nature. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 831, 114 S.Ct. 2552. A remedial sanction is one that is imposed for the purpose of coercing performance when the contempt consists of the omission or refusal to perform an act that is yet in the person's power to perform. RCW 7.21.010(3). It is considered civil, rather than criminal, in nature. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827, 114 S.Ct. 2552. A punitive sanction, on the other hand, is imposed to punish a past contempt of court for the purpose of upholding the authority of the court, RCW 7.21.010(2), and it is considered criminal in nature, Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828, 114 S.Ct. 2552. In determining whether sanctions are punitive or remedial, courts look not to the stated purposes of a contempt sanction, but to whether it has a coercive effect  whether the contemnor is able to purge the contempt and obtain his release by committing an affirmative act. Id. ¶ 17 Due process requirements do not prevent the use of inherent contempt power; they merely limit its exercise. In delineating the process required when exercising this authority, the United States Supreme Court has differentiated between three types of use: (1) imposition of remedial sanctions for direct contempt, (2) imposition of remedial sanctions for indirect contempt, and (3) imposition of punitive sanctions for direct or indirect contempt. Id. at 832-33, 114 S.Ct. 2552. Different procedural protections are required for each of these three types of cases, [4] but due process does not prevent the court from exercising its inherent contempt power in any of those three ways. See id. Contrary to petitioners' claim, a court may use its inherent power to impose punitive sanctions for indirect contempt without violating the due process clauses of the United States Constitution. ¶ 18 In the present case, a juvenile court commissioner exercised this power. The juvenile court is a division of the superior court. State v. Werner, 129 Wash.2d 485, 492, 918 P.2d 916 (1996); RCW 13.04.021(1). As such, it possesses the inherent power granted to the superior court under our constitution. See Const. art. IV, §§ 5-6; see also State v. Martin, 36 Wash. App. 1, 4, 670 P.2d 1082 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 102 Wash.2d 300, 684 P.2d 1290 (1984). Thus, the juvenile court, like other courts, possesses inherent power to sanction direct or indirect contempt by punitive or remedial sanctions. In Washington's court system, a juvenile court commissioner has the power, authority, and jurisdiction, concurrent with a juvenile court judge, to hear all cases under this chapter and to enter judgment and make orders with the same power, force, and effect as any judge of the juvenile court. RCW 13.04.021(1); see also Const. art. IV, § 23. Consequently, the court commissioner issuing the inherent contempt orders in this case had the inherent power that is possessed by a superior court judge.