Opinion ID: 2071130
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Merits of the Class Certification Order

Text: We now turn to the merits of the Circuit Court's decision to certify two classes of Maryland residents injured by or addicted to tobacco products. Maryland Rule 2-231 governs class certification and provides in pertinent parts as follows: (a) Prerequisites to a class action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. (b) Class actions maintainable . Unless justice requires otherwise, an action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of section (a) are satisfied, and in addition: (1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or (2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or (3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions, (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class, (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum, (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. (c) Certification . On motion of any party or on the court's own initiative, the court shall determine by order as soon as practicable after commencement of the action whether it is to be maintained as a class action. A hearing shall be granted if requested by any party. The order shall include the court's findings and reasons for certifying or refusing to certify the action as a class action. The order may be conditional and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits. (d) Partial class actions; subclasses . When appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class. There is a dearth of authority in Maryland analyzing the specific requirements of Maryland Rule 2-231. We need not consider the application of these requirements in a void, however, as there exists an abundance of cases from other jurisdictions, federal and state, that have analyzed class action rules either identical to or similar to Maryland's rule. See Jackson v. State, 340 Md. 705, 716, 668 A.2d 8, 13-14 (1995) (noting that when federal rule of evidence contains same language as Maryland rule of evidence, court may look to former when interpreting latter); Garay v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 355, 631 A.2d 429, 437 (1993) (reiterating that where Maryland rule essentially tracks federal rule, interpretations of that federal rule are persuasive as to meaning and proper applications of the Maryland rule); Beatty v. Trailmaster, 330 Md. 726, 738 n. 8, 625 A.2d 1005, 1011 n. 8 (1993). See also Pollokoff v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 44 Md.App. 188, 192, 407 A.2d 799, 801 (1979) (treating federal rule on class actions as persuasive authority in interpreting Maryland rule on class actions), aff'd, 288 Md. 485, 418 A.2d 1201 (1980). The United States Supreme Court has reviewed the federal class action rule, namely, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [hereinafter Federal Rule 23], [15] on a number of occasions, most recently in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). See also General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). Likewise, numerous federal appellate and trial courts have applied the federal class action rule in a variety of contexts, including that of mass tort tobacco litigation. See, e.g., Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127 (3rd Cir.1998); Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir.1996); In re American Medical Systems, Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir.1996); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.1995); Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 186 F.R.D. 535 (W.D.Wis.1998); Emig v. American Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 379 (D.Kan.1998). Finally, a small number of courts in other States and the District of Columbia has also interpreted the same or similar class action rules in contexts apposite to the present case. See, e.g., Reed v. Philip Morris Inc., Civil No. 96-5070, slip op. (D.C.Super.Ct. July 23, 1999) ( Reed II ); Reed v. Philip Morris Inc., Civil No. 96-5070, 1997 WL 538921 (D.C.Super.Ct. Aug. 18, 1997) ( Reed I ); Geiger v. American Tobacco Co., 181 Misc.2d 875, 696 N.Y.S.2d 345 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1999). [16] We shall look to these cases, and others, to aid our analysis in determining whether the Circuit Court abused its discretion in certifying this case for class action treatment and whether the court applied the correct legal standards in reaching its decision. See Washington v. CSC Credit Services, Inc., 199 F.3d 263, 265 (5th Cir.2000) (stating that [w]e review the district court's decision to certify the class for an abuse of discretion but that we review de novo whether the district court applied the correct legal standard to grant certification (citing Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 408 (5th Cir.1998))), petition for cert. filed , No. 99-1623 (Apr. 6, 2000). The plain language of Rule 2-231 sets forth several prerequisites that must be satisfied before a Circuit Court may certify a class. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161, 102 S.Ct. at 2372 (stating that, before certifying class, district court must conduct rigorous analysis of Federal Rule 23 prerequisites). The party moving for class certification bears the burden of proving that the requirements for certification have been met. See American Medical Systems, 75 F.3d at 1079. A court should accept the putative class representative plaintiffs' allegations as true in making its decision on class certification, see Emig, 184 F.R.D. at 385, and the determination may not be rested upon the merits of the underlying cause(s) of action, see Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177-78, 94 S.Ct. at 2152; Emig, 184 F.R.D. at 384. Nevertheless, the court can go beyond the pleadings to the extent necessary to `understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law in order to make a meaningful determination of the certification issues.' Emig, 184 F.R.D. at 384 (quoting Castano, 84 F.3d at 744 (in turn citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.11, at 214 (3d ed.1995))). See also Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160, 102 S.Ct. at 2372 (indicating that trial court may need to probe behind the pleadings to determine propriety of class certification). In accordance with the procedure outlined in Rule 2-231, for any case properly to be certified as a class action, four initial prerequisites must be satisfied: numerosity (the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable); commonality (there are questions of law or fact common to the class); typicality (the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class); and adequacy of representation (the representative parties and counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class). The prerequisites of Rule 2-231(a) are necessary but not sufficient conditions for a class action. See FED.R.CIV.P. 23, Advisory Committee Note to 1966 Amendments, reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 100 (1966) [hereinafter Federal Rule 23 Committee Note]. Besides meeting the four requirements thereunder, the proposed class or classes must also satisfy one of the three subsections of Rule 2-231(b). See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 614, 117 S.Ct. at 2245 (declaring that in addition to satisfying federal class action rule's threshold requirements, parties seeking class certification must show that the action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(1), (2), or (3)). The Circuit Court certified this class action under Rule 2-231(b)(3), with the exception of the medical monitoring claim, which the court certified under Rule 2-231(b)(2). [17] Under Rule 2-231(b)(3), a court must find predominance (questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members) and superiority (a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy), standards which also comprise prerequisites to certifying a class action under Federal Rule 23(b)(3). As the Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 amendments of the federal rule indicates, these standards jointly reflect a pragmatic goal: Subdivision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results. Federal Rule 23 Committee Note, supra, 39 F.R.D. at 102-103; see also Insolia, 186 F.R.D. at 545; Arch v. American Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 485 (E.D.Pa.1997). Accordingly, class action status should not be conferred upon cases that would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried, Federal Rule 23 Committee Note, supra, 39 F.R.D. at 103. Before we proceed to apply the specific requirements of Rule 2-231 to the case at hand, we think it important to address another oft-cited comment that seems to shed some doubt on the appropriateness of the class action vehicle for mass tort litigation, including, perhaps, the sort involved here: A mass accident resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried. Id. Although some courts have adhered strictly to this commentary and refused to certify mass tort class actions, many other courts have, when appropriate, certified classes in mass tort litigation. See Castano, 84 F.3d at 746 and 746-47 n. 23 (observing that historically, certification of mass tort litigation classes has been disfavored and comparing cases granting class certification in mass tort context with those denying such). For its part, the United States Supreme Court has placed some stock in the enduring vitality of the commentary, explaining that the Committee's warning ... continues to call for caution when individual stakes are high and disparities among class members great. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625, 117 S.Ct. at 2250. More or less independently of the debate over the 1966 Advisory Committee Note, the parties before this Court dispute the existence vel non of a recent trend, within the last decade or so, disfavoring class actions in mass tort cases. It is a dispute that we need not directly weigh in on, however, as we shall abide by the view that courts should decide whether to certify a class action in mass tort litigation on a case-by-case basis. See Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir.1996) (acknowledging that the 1966 Advisory Committee Note cast[s] doubt on the availability of class actions in mass tort cases, but also noting that courts have nevertheless generally proceeded on a case-by-case basis and considered the appropriateness of class action treatment under the particular circumstances presented); Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir.1986) (noting that courts have ordinarily avoided class actions in the mass tort setting, but observing that the courts are now being forced to rethink the alternatives and priorities by the current volume of litigation and more frequent mass disasters). See also 3 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 17.05 (3d ed.1992). Although we shall not decide the propriety of the lower court's class certification of the present action on the basis of some generalized or proposed approach to mass tort litigation, we are nonetheless cognizant of an irrefutable trend that is both more particular and more closely related to the instant case. A myriad of federal and state courts have shown a predominant, indeed almost unanimous reluctance to certify, or, in the case of appellate courts, to uphold the certification of class actions for mass tobacco litigation. Moreover, this aversion bears out regardless of (1) whether the plaintiffs represented a putative class membership that was nationwide or one that was restricted to a singular forum state, (2) whether the filed lawsuit presented multifaceted causes of action, more streamlined complaints, or even a single claim, and (3) whether the relief sought was comprised of compensatory damages, punitive damages, injunctive remedies, or a combination thereof. See Castano, 84 F.3d 734; Thompson v. American Tobacco Co., 189 F.R.D. 544 (D.Minn. 1999); Hansen v. American Tobacco Co., No. LR-C-96-881, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11277 (E.D.Ark. July 31, 1999); Clay v. American Tobacco Co., 188 F.R.D. 483 (S.D.Ill.1999); Chamberlain v. American Tobacco Co., 70 F.Supp.2d 788 (N.D.Ohio 1999); Insolia, 186 F.R.D. 535; Emig, 184 F.R.D. 379; Barreras Ruiz v. American Tobacco Co., 180 F.R.D. 194 (D.P.R.1998); Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 176 F.R.D. 479 (E.D.Pa.1997), aff'd, 161 F.3d 127 (3rd Cir.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1114, 119 S.Ct. 1760, 143 L.Ed.2d 791 (1999); Lyons v. American Tobacco Co., Case No. Civ. A. 96-0881-BH-S, 1997 WL 809677, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18365 (S.D.Ala. Sept. 30, 1997); Arch, 175 F.R.D. 469; [18] Walker v. Liggett Group, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 226 (S.D.W.Va.1997); Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90 (W.D.Mo.1997); In re Tobacco Cases II, No. JCCP-4042, slip op. (San Diego County, Cal.Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2000); Reed II, Civil No. 96-5070, slip op. (D.C.Super.Ct. July 23, 1999); Reed I, Civil No. 96-5070, 1997 WL 538921 (D.C.Super.Ct. Aug. 18, 1997); Taylor v. American Tobacco Co., No. 97 715975 NP, slip op. (Wayne County, Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 10, 2000); Cosentino v. Philip Morris Inc ., No. MID-L-5135-97, slip op. (N.J.Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1998, recon., Feb. 11, 1999); Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 252 A.D.2d 1, 679 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1998), aff'd, 94 N.Y.2d 43, 698 N.Y.S.2d 615, 720 N.E.2d 892 (1999); Geiger, 181 Misc.2d 875, 696 N.Y.S.2d 345. See also Note, Decertification of Statewide Tobacco Class Actions, 74 N.Y.U. L.REV. 1336, 1364-75 (1999) (arguing against certification of so-called son of Castano suits as class actions in state or federal courts); Comment, Forcing Round Classes Into Square Rules: Attempting Certification of Nicotine Addiction-As-Injury Class Actions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(B)3, 29 U. TOL. L.REV. 699, 718-26 (1998) (contending that products liability class actions based upon nicotine addiction-as-injury cannot qualify under Federal Rule 23(b)(3)). But see R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672 So.2d 39 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996), rev. denied, 682 So.2d 1100 (Fla.1996); Scott v. American Tobacco Co., 725 So.2d 10 (La. Ct.App.1998), writ denied, 731 So.2d 189 (La.1999); [19] Mark C. Weber, Thanks for Not Suing: The Prospects for State Court Class Action Litigation Over Tobacco Injuries, 33 GA. L. REV. 979, 990-1020 (1999) (generally asserting that carefully framed tobacco liability suits can properly be maintained as class actions in state courts and, with proper qualifications, should be). We shall now turn to the specific prerequisites for prosecuting a class action lawsuit in Maryland, for purposes of assessing the appropriateness of the Circuit Court's Class Certification Order in the present matter.
The first requirement of Maryland Rule 2-231 is that the class be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The purpose of the numerosity requirement is to ensure that there is a need for the class action; if joinder of the actions is practicable, then the class action device is unnecessary. See 1 HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 3.01, at 3-4 (3d ed.1992) [hereinafter 1 NEWBERG]. This requirement helps to promote the objectives of judicial economy and access to the legal system, particularly for persons with small individual claims. See id. at 3-12 to 3-13. Whether numerosity is met depends on a court's practical judgment, given the facts of a particular case. See General Telephone Co. of the Northwest v. E.E.O.C., 446 U.S. 318, 330, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1706, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (The numerosity requirement requires examination of the specific facts of each case and imposes no absolute limitations.); 1 NEWBERG, supra, § 3.05, at 3-26. Plaintiffs need not state a number with specificity; a good faith estimate is ordinarily sufficient. See id. at 3-18 to 3-19; 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1762, at 153 (2d ed.1986) [hereinafter 7A WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE]. Finally, a class consisting of hundreds, or thousands, of members is likely to satisfy this requirement. See 1 NEWBERG, supra, § 3.05, at 3-23 to 3-24. When the Circuit Court for Baltimore City consolidated the cases involved in the well-known asbestos litigation that inundated the City and State in the late 1980's and early 1990's, there were thousands of individual asbestos cases pending in that court, and thousands more pending in other Circuit Courts throughout the State. See ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin, 340 Md. 334, 341-43, 667 A.2d 116, 119-20 (1995). In the present litigation, Petitioners have opined that, at the time the motion for certification was filed, the four class representatives in this litigation represented the only pending tobacco litigation in Maryland. Nevertheless, Respondents have estimated that if this class action were to proceed, the number of people joining the litigation would far exceed the number of people involved in the asbestos litigation and have offered a good faith estimate of tens of thousands of Maryland citizens. (Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification at 35). Petitioners likewise have stated that the litigation will impact the claims of potentially hundreds of thousands of Maryland residents. (Defendants' Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Class Definition at 7). [20] Moreover, Petitioners did not contest numerosity before the Circuit Court, nor do they here. We consequently agree with the trial judge that the numerosity requirement of Rule 2-231(a) is satisfied in the present case.
We must next review the Circuit Court's determination as to whether there are questions of law or fact common to the classes. The lower court found that Respondents' case presents several common questions, including whether cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products are addictive; whether Petitioners have manipulated nicotine levels in their products; whether Petitioners intentionally conspired to conceal and distort the results of tobacco research; whether certain affirmative defenses are available to Petitioners; and whether the conduct of Petitioners supports the imposition of punitive damages under Maryland law. [21] The commonality requirement promotes [c]onvenience, uniformity of decision, and judicial economy, because common issues are litigated only once on behalf of all class members. 1 NEWBERG, supra, § 3.01, at 3-4. The threshold of commonality is not a high one and is easily met in most cases. See Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir.1986); 1 NEWBERG, supra, § 3.10, at 3-50. It does not require that all, or even most issues be common, nor that common issues predominate, but only that common issues exist. Central Wesleyan College v. W.R. Grace & Co., 143 F.R.D. 628, 636 (D.S.C.1992), aff'd, 6 F.3d 177 (4th Cir.1993); see also Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3rd Cir.1994) (requiring only that the named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class). Although the standard for commonality varies among jurisdictions, a common articulation requires that the lawsuit exhibit a common nucleus of operative facts. Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 186 F.R.D. 535, 542 (W.D.Wis.1998); Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir.1992); cf. 7A WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra, § 1778, at 528. We had occasion to analyze a commonality requirement similar to that of Rule 2-231(a)(2) during our review of the consolidated asbestos litigation. In ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin, 340 Md. 334, 667 A.2d 116, we affirmed the trial court's decision to hold a Phase I trial on common issues. Judge Rodowsky, writing for the Court, stated: The defendants submit that the 8,555 plaintiffs in the consolidation have different occupations, were exposed at different times, at different workplaces, have different diseases, and different medical histories. But none of these factors diminishes the commonality of the Phase I issues, and the Phase I determinations are the only determinations that will be applied against the defendants-appellants at mini-trials of the other plaintiffs' actions. Issues involving a plaintiff's burden on state of the art in an asbestos products liability failure to warn case are particularly appropriate for consolidation. Absent unusual circumstances, it is senseless to repeat the presentation of the same evidence against the same defendants in successive, individual trials or mini-consolidations. Id. at 395, 667 A.2d at 146. Although the instant lawsuit differs significantly from the asbestos litigation, we believe that the Godwin court's analysis of common issues is relevant here. The commonality requirement does not ask us to assess the common issues vis-à-vis individual issues, but only to ask whether common issues exist. Many of Respondents' allegations focus on fraudulent conduct and concealment, actions which vary little, if at all, from plaintiff to plaintiff. As in the asbestos litigation, the same medical studies, medical journal articles, workers' compensation claims, third-party suits, depositions of witnesses, transcripts of court testimony, minutes of meetings, correspondence, and other exhibits are produced against the same defendants in [lawsuit] after [lawsuit] throughout the nation. Id. at 395-96, 667 A.2d at 146. Indeed, as plaintiffs in any case alleging claims of fraudulent activity and misrepresentation on the part of tobacco manufacturers as well as charges regarding the harmfulness and addictiveness of tobacco usage, Respondents obviously have available for their arsenal of evidence any number of now widely disseminated and widely discussed documents and other materials. See Pls.' 4th Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 51-231; Appendix to Opp'n to Pet. § 7, at 1-85. See also, e.g., Insolia, 186 F.R.D. at 539-541 (relating the wealth of evidence against tobacco manufacturers and industry trade groups with respect to the potential harmful effects of tobacco usage and the addictive qualities of nicotine). Yet, despite the Circuit Court's confidence that such allegations suffice for purposes of the class action commonality requirement, and despite Respondents' conclusory argument before this Court (simply reciting the Circuit Court's listing of common issues, as outlined above in the first paragraph of this section), we agree with Petitioners, and the Insolia court, that an issue of law or fact should be deemed common only to the extent its resolution will advance the litigation of the entire case. See id. at 542. Putting aside any skepticism that resolution of the allegedly common issues would advance the litigation of the case at hand, see Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90, 96 (W.D.Mo.1997) (explaining that individual issues in tobacco litigation are so inextricably entwined with purportedly common issues that certifying a class in order to obtain a global resolution of these [common] issues will not advance the resolution of this case), [22] we shall not on this basis reverse the Circuit Court's judgment that a common nucleus of operative facts exists and that the commonality requirement has been satisfied. Underlying our rationale for this restraint is our mindfulness that the less demanding prerequisite of commonality in Rule 2-231(a) is necessarily subsumed in the more exacting requirement of predominance of common issues over individual questions, found in Rule 2-231(b)(3). See Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 609, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 2243, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997), (stating that Federal Rule 23(a)(2)'s `commonality' requirement is subsumed under, or superseded by, the more stringent Rule 23(b)(3) requirement that questions common to the class `predominate over' other questions).
The typicality requirement seeks to make certain that the representative part[ies] ... be `squarely aligned in interest' with the class members. 1 NEWBERG, supra, § 3.01, at 3-4 to 3-5 (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L.REV. 356, 387 n. 120 (1967)). It is also intended to ensure that class representatives will represent the best interests of class members who take a less active part in managing the litigation. S. BAICKER-MCKEE, W. JANSSEN, & J. CORR, FEDERAL CIVIL RULES HANDBOOK at 402 (Millennium edition 2000). Professor Newberg characterizes the typicality requirement as follows: [A] plaintiff's claim is typical if it arises from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members, and if his or her claims are based on the same legal theory. When it is alleged that the same unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both the named plaintiff and the class sought to be represented, the typicality requirement is usually met irrespective of varying fact patterns which underlie individual claims. 1 NEWBERG, supra, § 3.13, at 3-76 to 3-77 (citations omitted). This requirement demands a common-sense inquiry into whether the incentives of the plaintiffs are aligned with those of the class, and is meant to ensure that representative parties will adequately represent the class. See Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 55 (3rd Cir.1994); 7A WRIGHT, MILLER, & KANE, supra, § 1764, at 232-233. Representative claims need not be identical to those of the rest of the class; instead, there must be similar legal and remedial theories underlying the representative claims and the claims of the class. See Jenkins v. Raymark Industries, 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir.1986); see also Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 58 (stating that even relatively pronounced factual differences will generally not preclude a finding of typicality where there is a strong similarity of legal theories). Petitioners argue that where, as here, the crucial elements of each cause of action will require widely varying individual proof, it is impossible for a plaintiff to be typical of the class. Respondents counter that the representative claims were typical because [e]ach class member has suffered from injuries, medical conditions, and diseases caused by their addiction to or dependence upon nicotine contained in the cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products manufactured, promoted, distributed, and sold by the defendants. (Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification at 38-39). In order to make a determination regarding typicality, we will discuss each of the class plaintiffs.