Opinion ID: 2611099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: were the landowners entitled to pursue their claim for inverse condemnation?

Text: As an alternative theory, the landowners assert a claim for inverse condemnation. In this claim they alleged that they were entitled to just compensation for the taking of their land. The trial court rejected this theory on the basis that the landowners did not exhaust their administrative remedy to obtain compensation under I.C. § 46-1012. We disagree with the trial court's ruling. The statute invoked by the trial court provides a means for obtaining compensation for property that was commandeered or otherwise used in coping with a disaster emergency and its use or destruction was ordered by the governor or his representative. I.C. § 46-1012(3). Claims for compensation must be filed with the bureau of disaster services. I.C. § 46-1012(4). The trial court ruled that the landowners could not pursue their inverse condemnation claim, because they did not exhaust the administrative remedy given to them in this statute. However, the statute does not provide for compensation unless the use or destruction of the property was ordered by the governor or his representative. The declaration of a state of emergency by the governor on June 14, 1984, did not refer to the use or destruction of the landowners' property. Neither IDWR nor any of the other governmental agencies is properly characterized as the representative of the governor in responding to the emergency. There is no evidence here that the governor designated any of the governmental agencies as his representative. Therefore, we hold that the landowners were not required to exhaust the remedy provided by I.C. § 46-1012, since that statute did not provide them with a remedy under the circumstances here. As an alternative grounds for upholding the trial court's decision rejecting the landowners' inverse condemnation claim, the governmental agencies invoke the doctrine of public necessity contained in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 196 (1965). The thrust of this doctrine is that [o]ne is privileged to enter land in the possession of another if it is, or if the actor reasonably believes it to be, necessary for the purpose of averting an imminent public disaster. Id. The governmental agencies point out that a comment to the Restatement states that the privilege carries with it the privilege to do any other acts on the premises reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose for which the privilege exists. Id. at comment (f). The governmental agencies acknowledge that this Court has not previously adopted the doctrine of public necessity. They cite decisions from our sister states of Washington and Colorado as demonstrating the application of the doctrine. Short v. Pierce County, 194 Wash. 421, 78 P.2d 610 (1938); Srb v. Board of County Commissioners, 43 Colo. App. 14, 601 P.2d 1082 (1979), cert. denied, 199 Colo. 496, 618 P.2d 1105 (1980). In Srb the court held that when property is taken by the state or one of its political subdivisions under circumstances of imminent necessity, the failure justly to compensate the owner does not violate the just compensation provision of the Colorado constitution. 601 P.2d at 1085. Since 1864 the statutes of Idaho, first as a territory and then as a state, have declared: The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the constitution or laws of the United States, in all cases not provided for in these compiled laws, is the rule of decision in all courts of this state.