Opinion ID: 1344706
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the remaining unlawfully provision

Text: The second question raised by this appeal is whether the court committed reversible error by instructing the jury that `[b]urglary' is defined as entering or remaining unlawfully in a dwelling ... with the intent to commit a felony, or theft or assault on any person. (Emphasis added.) Even though this instruction essentially quotes the language of the burglary statute, section 76-6-202(1), [3] Rudolph argues that it erroneously instructed the jury that he committed burglary if he formed the intent to commit a sexual assault at the time he entered or at any time thereafter while he remained unlawfully in the victim's home. He also asserts that the remaining unlawfully provision of the statute applies only where the initial entry was lawful. Since it was undisputed that he broke into the victim's home, he therefore maintains that the court erred by including the remaining unlawfully language in its jury instructions. The State correctly points out, however, that Rudolph raises this issue for the first time on appeal. As set forth above, we generally do not consider whether a jury instruction was erroneous absent an objection at trial. See Utah R.Crim. P. 19(c); Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1108-09. Nevertheless, we address this issue even though it was not properly preserved for appeal because it is necessary to our resolution of Rudolph's other assignments of error. This issue is one of first impression. Although we have previously held that the remaining unlawfully provision of section 76-6-202(1) applies where the initial entry was lawful, see State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985), we have never been asked to determine whether it also applies where the entry was unlawful. However, several of the jurisdictions that have decided this issue have held that the intent to commit the underlying crime may be formed after entry and while unlawfully remaining on the premises regardless of whether the entry was lawful. See Gratton v. State, 456 So.2d 865, 872 (Ala.Ct.App.1984) (holding defendant is guilty of burglary provided he formed intent to commit another crime when he entered or while he remained unlawfully); People v. Angell, 917 P.2d 312, 314 (Colo.Ct.App.1995) (unlawfully remaining provision applies even when entry was unlawful); Hewatt v. State, 216 Ga.App. 550, 455 S.E.2d 104, 106 (1995) (same); State v. Skelton, 247 Kan. 34, 795 P.2d 349, 359 (1990) (same); McCarthy v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Ky. 1993) (same); State v. Reams, 47 Or.App. 907, 616 P.2d 498, 504 (Or.Ct.App.1980) (child court correctly refused to give lesser included instruction on trespass where undisputed evidence showed that defendant had intent to commit assault when he unlawfully entered or remained in dwelling); State v. DeNoyer, 541 N.W.2d 725, 732 (S.D.1995) (requisite intent need not be formed at time of unlawful entry). Contra Arabie v. State, 699 P.2d 890, 894 (Alaska Ct.App.1985) (interpreting remaining unlawfully provision to apply only when entry is lawful); People v. Collins, 53 Ill.App.3d 114, 11 Ill.Dec. 134, 368 N.E.2d 685, 688 (1977) (intent to commit underlying crime must exist at time of unlawful entry); People v. Gaines, 74 N.Y.2d 358, 547 N.Y.S.2d 620, 546 N.E.2d 913, 915 (1989) (same). In sum, we agree with those cases holding that the remaining unlawfully provision applies regardless of whether the initial entry was lawful. The language of the burglary statute itself does not support Rudolph's contention that the remaining unlawfully provision applies only when the initial entry is lawful. In particular, the statute does not distinguish between lawful and unlawful entries. The general rule is that [w]hen faced with a question of statutory construction, we look first to the plain language of the statute. Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted). Moreover, courts are not to infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must be based on the language used, and the court has no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not expressed. Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994) (citations omitted). Thus, because the plain language of the statute does not distinguish between lawful and unlawful entries, we refuse to imply such a distinction. Rudolph nevertheless argues that our interpretation of the remaining unlawfully provision is incorrect because it was included in our burglary statute for the purpose of reaching those cases where the actor initially enters a building lawfully but then remains there after his or her right to do so has expired for purposes of committing a crime. While this may be true, it does not necessarily follow that the remaining unlawfully provision is confined to those situations where the initial entry was lawful. We believe that such an interpretation would create an anomalous result. For instance, under Rudolph's interpretation of the statute, one who enters lawfully but then remains unlawfully and forms the intent to commit another felony, theft, or assault is guilty of burglary while one who enters unlawfully and thereafter forms that same intent is guilty only of trespass. We are unable to see the distinction between the two scenarios. In our view, the actor in the second scenario is at least as dangerous and culpable as the actor in the first. Therefore, we are not satisfied that our legislature intended such a result when it enacted our current burglary statute. Rudolph further argues that applying the remaining unlawfully provision to all situations, regardless of the lawfulness of the entry, will lead to a slippery slope, making all crimes committed inside a building a burglary. The flaw in this argument, however, is that even under our interpretation, the actor must commit or form the intent to commit another crime at the time he enters or while he remains unlawfully in the building. In other words, if the actor commits a crime while lawfully inside a building, there is no burglary. Thus, contrary to Rudolph's argument, not all crimes committed in buildings will constitute burglary under our construction of the remaining unlawfully provision of the burglary statute. In conclusion, we hold that a person is guilty of burglary under section 76-6-202(1) if he forms the intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault at the time he unlawfully enters a building or at any time thereafter while he continues to remain there unlawfully. The trial court therefore correctly included the remaining unlawfully language in its instructions to the jury.