Opinion ID: 2276112
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voir dire: Mitigating circumstances.

Text: During individual voir dire, the trial judge inquired of the prospective jurors whether they could consider mitigating circumstances, such as alcohol and mental state, in fixing a penalty in this case. Appellant, however, asserts that the trial court should have permitted him to ask prospective jurors how they would weigh particular mitigating circumstances. For example, the Commonwealth's objections to each of the following lines of questioning were sustained: If you are in the process of kind of selecting between one of those punishments, would the fact that someone was under the influence ...; and In picking a penalty, if you heard something about someone's background and how they grew up, would that be something .... Appellant contends that KRS 532.025(2)(b) and the United States and Kentucky Constitutions afford him the right to conduct individual voir dire on specific mitigating circumstances. He is wrong. KRS 532.025(2)(b) is totally unrelated to voir dire. That statute only requires that the jury be instructed to consider mitigating circumstances supported by the evidence. Under federal law, this issue became moot when the death penalty was not imposed. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2702, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (referring to life without parole, We have drawn the line of required individualized sentencing at capital cases, and see no basis for extending it further.). Nevertheless, the constitutional bar against capital sentences imposed without an individualized determination that the punishment is appropriate, id. at 995, 111 S.Ct. at 2701, does not entitle the defendant to jurors who are bound to weigh mitigating evidence in his favor. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 475, 113 S.Ct. 892, 902, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993). See also Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 372, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 2671, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993) (rejecting petitioner's argument because [i]nstead of requiring that a jury be able to consider in some manner all of a defendant's relevant mitigating evidence, the rule would require that a jury be able to give effect to mitigating evidence in every conceivable manner in which the evidence might be relevant.). See also Soria v. Johnson, 207 F.3d 232, 243-44 (5th Cir.2000) (not error to preclude defendant from asking juror whether he would view certain evidence as mitigating rather than simply consider it); Sellers v. Ward, 135 F.3d 1333, 1341-42 (10th Cir.1998) (Constitution only guarantees jury that will not automatically impose death penalty and real inquiry is whether juror would refuse to consider mitigating evidence of any kind). All of the cases upon which Appellant relies involved scenarios where the sentencer was precluded from considering the mitigating evidence presented by the defendant. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319-28, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2947-52, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (invalidating sentencing procedure that permitted jury to consider only three special issues in deciding whether to impose death penalty, none of which left room for consideration of defendant's mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance), overruled on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-15, 102 S.Ct. 869, 876-77, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (invalidating death sentence where sentencing judge concluded as a matter of law that he was precluded from considering mitigating evidence); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2967, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (plurality) (invalidating statute that limited judge's consideration of mitigating circumstances); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality) (invalidating mandatory death penalty statute); Wright v. Walls, 288 F.3d 937, 943 n. 4 (7th Cir. 2002) (while not required to give weight to mitigating evidence, sentencer must consider it). Further, asking potential jurors how they would weigh specific mitigating circumstances would ignore well-settled precedent that it is impermissible to ask voir dire questions designed to commit jurors to certain theories. Furnish v. Commonwealth, Ky., 95 S.W.3d 34, 44 (2002); Woodall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 104, 116 (2001). The Constitution permits trial judges great leeway in addressing a defendant's request for more in-depth questioning of prospective jurors: The Constitution does not always entitle a defendant to have questions posed during Voir dire specifically directed to matters that conceivably might prejudice veniremen against him. Voir dire is conducted under the supervision of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion. This is so because the determination of impartiality, in which demeanor plays such an important part, is particularly within the province of the trial judge. Thus, the State's obligation to the defendant to impanel an impartial jury generally can be satisfied by less than an inquiry into a specific prejudice feared by the defendant. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594-95, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 1020-21, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976) (internal citations omitted). We note in passing that Appellant was permitted to ask the jury during group voir dire how they thought a person's upbringing and background might affect that person's propensity for crime. Additionally, the trial judge's inquiry into mitigating circumstances was more than sufficient. On at least two occasions, he questioned prospective jurors on personal background as a mitigator. He also asked prospective jurors whether they would consider mitigating evidence as mitigating if so instructed. The voir dire examination of jurors on the issue of mitigating circumstances was more than adequate.