Opinion ID: 775560
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Armour's Job

Text: 70 At least at one time--namely, during Schulte's 1995 campaign--Delores Armour's relationship with Bea Schulte could have been characterized as political in nature. It is less clear that Armour's position as secretary to Schulte required a shared political purpose. The question before this court is whether defendants have established, beyond factual dispute, that political agreement was an appropriate requirement for the position of secretary to a Beaver County Commissioner. 71 Adverse employment actions against government employees that are based on political affiliation are, as a general rule, prohibited. See O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996); Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). In Elrod, a plurality of the Court first announced this rule based on the recognition that political patronage dismissals run counter to the First Amendment rights of free speech and political association. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 359. At the same time, the Court delineated a narrowly drawn exception for particular positions for which political affiliation is found to be an appropriate requirement. Applying the intermediate exacting level of scrutiny, the Court explained: The interest advanced must be paramount, one of vital importance, and the burden is on the government to show the existence of such an interest. Id. at 362; see Boyle v. County of Allegheny Pennsylvania, 139 F.3d 386, 395 (3d Cir. 1998). The notion of what constitutes a position for which political affiliation may acceptably be required has developed over time. In Elrod, the Court adopted an approach that distinguished between policymaking and non-policymaking positions. Reiterating the rule in his concurrence, Justice Stewart advised that political affiliation could not provide a basis for adverse actions taken against a nonpolicymaking, non-confidential government employee. Id. at 375 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Court described the inquiry into the nature of the responsibilities and the function of a given position as particularly fact-specific. Id. at 367-68. 72 In Branti, the Court revised the Elrod test to lessen the emphasis on determinations of whether a position entails policymaking and confidentiality: the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label `policymaker' or `confidential' fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518. Justice Stevens, speaking for the Court, stated: Under some circumstances, a position may be appropriately considered political even though it is neither confidential nor policymaking in character. Id. at 518 (providing an example of a scenario in which a State's election laws require that precincts be supervised by two election judges of different parties). He continued: It is equally clear that party affiliation is not necessarily relevant to every policymaking or confidential position. Id. (giving the example of a football coach for a state university). 73 On the other hand, it is equally clear that the Governor of a State may appropriately believe that the official duties of various assistants who help him write speeches, explain his views to the press, or communicate with the legislature cannot be performed effectively unless those persons share his political beliefs and party commitments. 74 Id. The Branti Court also reiterated that in order for a patronage dismissal to pass constitutional muster, it must forward a governmental purpose: 75 The plurality [in Elrod] emphasized that patronage dismissals could be justified only if they advanced a governmental, rather than a partisan, interest. 427 U.S., at 362. That standard clearly was not met to the extent that employees were expected to perform extracurricular activities for the party, or were being rewarded for past services to the party. Government funds, which are collected from taxpayers of all parties on a nonpolitical basis, cannot be expended for the benefit of one political party simply because that party has control of the government. 76 Branti, 445 U.S. at 517 n.12. The requirement of a governmental purpose to support political patronage reflects the core holding of Elrod and Branti that a long tradition of political patronage cannot, in itself, immunize politically motivated dismissals from scrutiny. 77 We have had numerous occasions to apply these principles. In Boyle v. County of Allegheny Pennsylvania, 139 F.3d 386 (3d Cir. 1998), we charted the development of Third Circuit case law interpreting the Elrod /Branti test. The Boyle court canvassed Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 521 (3d Cir. 1981)(adopting a functional analysis under which a dismissal was permissible where a difference in party affiliation would be highly likely to cause an official to be ineffective in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the office), Brown v. Trench, 787 F.2d 167, 168 (3d Cir. 1986)(refining the Elrod/ Branti test by focusing the inquiry on whether the employee has meaningful input into decision making concerning the nature and scope of a major [governmental] program)(internal quotation marks omitted), and Zold, 935 F.2d at 636 (synthesizing prior decisions and holding that appellate courts are obligated to make an independent examination of the whole record with special scrutiny). 78 We noted in Boyle, 139 F.3d at 396, that because the Elrod/Branti test is flexible and entails an extremely fact-intensive inquiry, cases such as the case at bar resist easy generalizations. In the case at bar, we must determine whether the District Court's grant of summary judgment was correct as to the appellant--a nonpolicymaking, secretary-clerk serving in roughly equal parts an elective county executive (County Commissioner) and a non-elective county administrator (Chief Clerk). Unsurprisingly, none of our prior cases carries us effortlessly to a resolution; however, we find particular guidance in Brown and Zold. 79 Brown arose from the dismissal of a county assistant director of public information. In that case, we discussed the difficulty of determining the appropriateness of political-affiliation requirements for jobs that entail clerical tasks: 80 While Branti provides us with a test the Supreme Court has not specified the particular factors which indicate that a position falls within the Branti test. Factors suggested by other courts include whether the employee's duties are simply clerical or related to law enforcement, non-discretionary or technical. Courts have also considered whether the employee participates in Council discussions or other meetings, whether the employee prepares budgets, or has authority to hire or fire employees, the salary of the employee, and the employee's power to control others and to speak in the name of policymakers. In Crisp [v. Bond, 536 F.Supp. 137, 139 (W.D. Mo. 1982)], the Court held that the Assistant Director of the Division of Motor Vehicle and Drivers Licensing could not be fired because he had no confidential duties even though he supervised employees, prepared the budget, was liaison with the public, attended conferences, and analyzed administrative procedures and work standards. The key factor seems to be not whether the employee was a supervisor or had a great deal of responsibility but whether the employee has meaningful input into decision making concerning the nature and scope of a major township program. 81 Brown, 787 F.2d at 169-70 (citations omitted). In Brown, we concluded: While some of [Brown's] duties were only technical or clerical in nature, her principal duty was to act as spokesman for the Commissioners and help promote county projects. Brown could, therefore, be dismissed because of her political affiliation without any violation of her first amendment rights. Id. at 170. 82 In Zold, a deputy township clerk challenged her politically motivated dismissal. We reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the township and remanded the case for further proceedings. We observed that the district court appeared to rely on three job functions in finding that political affiliation was a proper job requirement for the deputy clerk position: (1) secretary of the Township Committee, in which capacity the deputy clerk could have access to confidential information during closed sessions; (2) liaison officer between government officials and taxpayers and between the executive and the general body of municipal personnel; and (3) public relations figure. See Zold, 935 F.2d at 637. We distinguished the public relations work performed by Zold from that conducted by the appellant in Brown based on the fact that Zold was not responsible for writing press releases and speeches of elected officials, or for promoting county projects, or for acting as spokesperson for the county commissioners before the press and public. See id. at 638. Instead, we reasoned: 83 Her contact with the press is generally limited to informing reporters about the agenda of upcoming meetings, and her contact with the public is, as the district court put it, receiving inquiries and complaints from the electorate and responding in kind, 737 F.Supp. at 317, rather than promoting policies. Therefore, Brown does not provide a basis to conclude that the deputy clerk's political affiliation is a job requirement. 84 Id. (citations omitted). 85 Additionally, we found that the deputy clerk's access to confidential material did not justify a political affiliation job requirement; however this holding was narrowly tailored to the circumstances of Zold: 86 Arguably, even though there is no evidence that the clerk or the deputy clerk acts as anything other than a functionary during the closed Committee meetings, the access to confidential information which may be discussed on these occasions might signify that political affiliation, translated in this case into loyalty to the majority party, is a job requirement. Nor do we deny that there is some sensitivity and discretion which must be exercised when the deputy clerk is acting as a liaison or as a spokesman. However, these factors cannot serve to demonstrate the need for party affiliation because virtually all of these functions are duties that the deputy assumes from the clerk. State law makes clear that political affiliation is not a factor in the municipal clerk's position. 87 Id. at 638. Hence, we stated that we cannot conclude that duties fulfilled by a tenured, nonpolitical appointee suddenly become confidential or political on those occasions when the deputy clerk is called to substitute for him. Id. Finally, we observed: 88 The defendants have expressed concern that an employee whose tasks include contact with the public could deliberately harm the government's (and thereby the dominant party's) image in the public eye; one who must provide information to government officials perhaps could deliberately undermine policy decisions or administrative efficacy. However, any government employee, including those with the most routine clerical tasks, could injure the employer's efficiency or public image. A receptionist could put callers on hold and neglect to answer or forward their inquiries; an office clerk could misfile forms, deliberately delay their processing, and treat visitors rudely. The obvious response is that employees who engage in such behavior can be discharged on the basis of their poor job performance. The potential that an employee may cause havoc is in itself no basis for holding the employee can be hired or discharged because of his or her political affiliation. 89 Id. at 639. 90 In the present case, the District Court found, at the close of discovery, that there were no remaining material issues of fact as to whether political affiliation was an appropriate requirement for Armour's position. As we explain in the paragraphs which follow, our review of the record yields a different conclusion. 91 We highlight certain factual disputes that we find unsusceptible to resolution at the summary judgment stage. First, we note that the District Court undertook to weigh the credibility and relative significance of Armour's March 11, 1998 written comments about her job description and her subsequent deposition testimony on the subject. Specifically, the District Court characterized Armour's deposition testimony as contradictory and her unbiased statement regarding her job duties as provided in March 1998 as more significant. We think such weighing should have been reserved for the fact-finder. 5 92 In the same vein, we do not agree with the District Court that Clarke's testimony that she represented Donatella supports summary judgment. The theme of representation was addressed in the testimony of a number of witnesses; however, the content of the testimony on the concept of representation of the commissioners is less than clear. Whereas Clarke testified that she represented Donatella at political events, a reasonable fact-finder might conclude that the representation of which she spoke entailed little more than her presence at certain events rather than active participation as a spokesperson (I go just to represent him, be present). For her part, Armour testified that it was not part of her job to represent Schulte at political events. Armour's role at the AFPN meetings--she attended in Schulte's stead but Schulte only became aware that Armour voted at the meetings after the fact--might also be interpreted to support more than one inference regarding the level of representation inherent in the position. 93 Further, Armour contends that the fact that the commissioners created a new administrative position above the secretaries, though they never filled that position, would lend support to a finding that the secretarial positions did not entail the level of confidentiality or require the type of representation of the commissioners that would make political affiliation a proper job requirement. Specifically, Schulte testified that the never-filled executive administrator position required a college degree because the person in that position would, indeed, be representing the three commissioners. Of course, the fact that the administrative position was created would not compel a fact-finder to conclude that the work of the secretaries and the work of the potential administrator would not have overlapped in any respect. However, the creation of the administrative position and the adoption of more demanding requirements for it than for a secretarial position might lead a fact-finder to doubt that a secretarial position was one for which political affiliation was a proper ingredient. 94 Finally, we note that the secretaries' contact with constituents, relied on by the District Court in its summary judgment ruling, also fails to bear the weight of the government's burden on the appropriateness of a political-affiliation requirement. It is undisputed that Armour and the other secretaries responded to constituent calls and, when possible, handled constituents' requests without involving the commissioners. We are, however, unpersuaded that the fact that the secretaries would attempt to handle constituents' requests on their own ineluctably leads to the conclusion that political affiliation was an appropriate requirement for the job. See Zold, 935 F.2d at 638 (employee's contact with the public limited to receiving and responding to inquiries and complaints rather than promoting policies did not support a political-affiliation requirement). 95 Neither the County nor Schulte contends that this case implicates the central question in most political patronage cases--whether an employee had meaningful input into decision making. Brown, 787 F.2d at 170. Instead, appellees rely on evidence that Armour was entrusted with access to confidential information as part of her job and that a lack of political loyalty would interfere with the performance of her duties. We have, indeed, acknowledged that access to confidential information may support a political-affiliation job requirement even in the absence of a decision-making function. See Zold, 935 F.2d at 638-39. However, we have also cautioned against an over reliance on the factors of confidentiality and loyalty: Although loyalty and confidentiality of sheriff's deputies are desirable attributes, those traits are needed for many working relationships. It has never been suggested that the need for loyalty and confidentiality alone supports politically motivated dismissals independent of the tasks which the employee must perform. Burns v. County of Cambria, 971 F.2d 1015, 1023 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1081 (1993). Here we are faced with the question whether being the personal secretary to a county commissioner is, without more, sufficient evidence to establish as a matter of law that political affiliation is an appropriate job requirement. There is case law that points in this direction. For example, in Faughender v. City of North Olmsted, 927 F.2d 909, 914 (6th Cir. 1991), the Sixth Circuit stated: Viewed in its functional aspect, a mayor's secretary is clearly the type of position that involves access to confidential and political material, and political loyalty, whether partisan or personal, is an essential attribute of the job. But the fact-specific approach embraced by this court in Brown and Zold and other cases is not in harmony with such a categorical rule. 96 Armour's access to confidential information... might signify that political affiliation... is a job requirement. Zold, 935 F.2d at 638. However, on the record before us, we are unable to so conclude without weighing the evidence--a task that we leave for the fact-finder. If a jury were to credit Armour's testimony, and indeed a good deal of the testimony of Donatella and Johnson, it could find that the job duties of the commissioner's secretary were more analogous to the most routine clerical tasks, id. at 639, than to tasks involving a high level of confidentiality. 97 Thus, based on our review of the record, we conclude that, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), genuine disputes regarding the nature of Armour's position remain. This conclusion is strengthened in that, as mentioned above, the substantial burden of proving that political affiliation is an appropriate job requirement remains at all times on the governmental entity or official seeking to justify the adverse employment action. See Burns, 971 F.2d at 1022. 6 98