Opinion ID: 2351039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court Erred in Admitting Evidence of the Defendant's Prior Conviction.

Text: Under the Kansas Rules of Evidence, established by statute, whether evidence may be presented that a person committed some earlier crime or civil wrong is governed by K.S.A. 60-455. This statute recognizes the danger that the evidence [of a defendant's specific past action] will be considered to prove the defendant's mere propensity to commit the charged crime. State v. Wells, 289 Kan. 1219, 1227, 221 P.3d 561 (2009). Accordingly, the statute places limits on when such evidence may be presented. We must determine whether evidence was properly admitted at Torres' April 2008 trial by applying the version of this statute, K.S.A. 60-455, that was in effect at the time of the trial and also when Torres allegedly committed these crimes. It provides that evidence of prior crimes and civil wrongs may not be admitted to prove a person's general disposition to commit the charged crime, but it may be admitted for limited purposes, such as to show the defendant's plan: Subject to K.S.A. 60-447 evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion[] is inadmissible to prove his or her disposition to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference that the person committed another crime or civil wrong on another specified occasion but, subject to K.S.A. 60-455 and 60-488 such evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact including motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. K.S.A. 60-455. K.S.A. 60-455 allows the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence when the district court determines that its evidentiary value outweighs the potential for undue prejudice. See State v. Richmond, 289 Kan. 419, 435-36, 212 P.3d 165 (2009). We have established a three-part test for the district court to use in determining whether evidence about a person's prior crimes or civil wrongs may be admitted under K.S.A. 60-455, and for an appellate court to apply when reviewing these matters on appeal. These steps were recently summarized in State v. Inkelaar, 293 Kan. 414, 424, 264 P.3d 81 (2011):  First, the district court must determine whether the fact to be proven is material, meaning that this fact has some real bearing on the decision in the case. The appellate court reviews this determination independently, without any required deference to the district court.  Second, the district court must determine whether the material fact is disputed and, if so, whether the evidence is relevant to prove the disputed material fact. In making this determination, the district court considers whether the evidence has any tendency in reason to prove the disputed material fact. The appellate court reviews this determination only for abuse of discretion.  Third, if the fact to be proven was material and the evidence was relevant to prove a disputed material fact, then the district court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the potential for undue prejudice against the defendant. The appellate court also reviews this determination only for abuse of discretion. If the evidence meets all of these requirements, it is admitted, but in a jury trial the district court must give the jury a limiting instruction telling the jury the specific purpose for which the evidence has been admitted (and reminding them that it may only be considered for that purpose). 293 Kan. at 424, 264 P.3d 81. The district court ruled that Torres' past conduct was relevant to prove plan and preparation, and it gave the jury a limiting instruction that the evidence of Torres' earlier conduct could be considered solely for the purpose of proving the defendant's preparation and plan. In its appellate brief, the State offers no suggestion that the evidence could be admitted to show preparation. And a claim not briefed is deemed abandoned. State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 709, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011). We therefore examine only whether the evidence was properly admitted to show Torres' plan. Plan evidence may be admitted under either of two theories. In one, there is some direct or causal connection between the earlier conduct and the crimes charged. Jones, 277 Kan. 413, Syl. ¶ 2, 85 P.3d 1226. In such a case, since the two events are causally connected, proving the defendant's involvement in the earlier incident logically tends to establish the defendant's involvement in the charged crime as well. But there is no direct or causal connection here between Torres' 1988 relationship with Billie T. and his alleged rape of V.H. in 2007, so we must look to the second theory. Under the second theory, the two events do not have to be directly or causally connected, but the method of committing the prior act must be so similar to the method used in the charged crime that it is reasonable to conclude that the same individual committed both acts. Jones, 277 Kan. 413, Syl. ¶ 2, 85 P.3d 1226. In such a case, the method of committing the act is so distinctive that even without a direct connection between the events, the evidence logically tends to establish the defendant's involvement in the charged crime. In Prine, 287 Kan. 713, 200 P.3d 1, we carefully reviewed our cases under this second theory with recognition that we had not always consistently stated how similar the methods must be to meet admissibility standards. 287 Kan. at 730-35, 200 P.3d 1. We concluded that the best way to state the standard was to require that the methods in the earlier and present cases be so strikingly similar in pattern or so distinct in method of operation as to be a signature: [T]his standard governs examination of whether particular evidence has probative value.... If a defendant's prior bad act is so strikingly similar in pattern or so distinct in method of operation as to be a signature, then it is probative of defendant's plan in the case at bar. If it is not, then the evidence has no probative value on plan and the evidence is irrelevant if offered for that purpose. On appeal, we will review a district judge's decision under the `signature' standard for an abuse of discretion. (Citation omitted.) 287 Kan. at 735, 200 P.3d 1. Even under the deferential standard for abuse-of-discretion review, see State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 3, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), it was error to admit evidence of the 1988 events involving Billie T. because those events simply are not sufficiently similar to the 2007 events alleged to have occurred involving V.H. The conduct in common between the old events and the charged crime must be something more than the similarities common to nearly all sexual-abuse cases. Prine, 287 Kan. at 731, 200 P.3d 1 (citing Jones, 277 Kan. at 422-23, 85 P.3d 1226, and State v. Davidson, 31 Kan.App.2d 372, 384, 65 P.3d 1078, rev. denied 276 Kan. 971 [2003]). Here, there are not enough similarities to make the two events strikingly similar in pattern or so distinct in method of operation as to make the method of committing these acts the signature of the defendant, Torres. See Prine, 287 Kan. at 735, 200 P.3d 1. There are, of course, some similarities. Both girls were 14 or under; Torres had sexual relations with Billie T. and is alleged to have done so with V.H., and the State notes that Torres provided some financial support to both girls' mothers. But there are far too many differences to meet the test for plan evidence:  Torres' relationship with the victims began in different ways. He was merely a neighbor to Billie T., but he started a committed relationship with V.H.'s mother and V.H. called him Dad.  Billie T. testified that she was a young teenage girl looking for attention, which she got from Torres, then a man in his forties. While such a relationship is inherently coercive, it was significantly different than Torres' alleged relationship with V.H. She testified that his actions were unwelcome and caused her pain.  V.H. was 11 when Torres allegedly began to abuse her, while Billie T. was 14 when Torres began sexual activity with her and nearly 15 when that ended.  The relationship between Torres and Billie T. ended only because authorities spotted them together at a hotel, while V.H. reported Torres to authorities.  Torres' financial support to the girls' mothers arose in significantly different ways. Billie T.'s unemployed mother was Torres' neighbor, and she welcomed some financial help after her husband left the country. V.H.'s mother worked and supported her family before leaving Mexico, but testified that Torres did not let her work in Wichita. The State suggests that we should ignore the rule we stated for plan evidence in Prine because that decision was rendered after Torres' trial. But the Prine decision interpreted the same version of K.S.A. 60-455 that was in place when Torres was tried and when he allegedly committed his crimes; the trial in Prine occurred before Torres' trial; and Prine reconciled our prior cases: it did not create a new rule that had never before been applied. We therefore apply the Prine rule hereeven though, as in Jones, the evidence wasn't sufficient to establish similarity under any of the tests we had applied before Prine under K.S.A. 60-455. See Jones, 277 Kan. at 423, 85 P.3d 1226 (noting that evidence was insufficient whether standard was `signature' or `strikingly similar' or even `similar enough' for K.S.A. 60-455 purposes). In sum, we have carefully reviewed the evidence regarding these two events. The evidence of similarity is less here than in cases in which we have upheld the admission of such evidence. See State v. Overton, 279 Kan. 547, 554, 112 P.3d 244 (2005) (finding sufficient similarity where both victims were 14 years old, defendant met both at school, discussed family problems with each, kissed and fondled each, hired each as babysitters to provide opportunity to be alone, and raped each boy in similar locations in his house); State v. Moore, 274 Kan. 639, 648, 55 P.3d 903 (2002) (finding sufficient similarity where victims were of comparable age, defendant videotaped victims before fondling their genital areas and exposing his penis, and both crimes occurred privately where defendant had control of the environment); State v. Rucker, 267 Kan. 816, 826, 987 P.2d 1080 (1999) (finding sufficient similarity where victims were similar in age and relationship to the defendant, sex acts were very similar, and defendant threatened to kill pets of both victims if they disclosed the abuse); State v. Damewood, 245 Kan. 676, 678-83, 783 P.2d 1249 (1989) (finding sufficient similarity given same pattern of conduct that involved arranging time alone with young teenage boys, meeting them for beekeeping activities, and performing similar sexual acts on each). We find the present case much closer to those in which we have held the admission of plan evidence was improper. See Prine, 287 Kan. at 735-36, 200 P.3d 1 (finding similarity insufficient to admit plan evidence when defendant performed different sex acts with each victim, even though the victims were roughly the same age); Jones, 277 Kan. at 421-23, 85 P.3d 1226 (finding similarity insufficient to admit plan evidence when the sexual relationship started differently with each victim, different sexual acts were performed, and the frequency of sexual events varied even though victims had similar relationship to defendant). The district court abused its discretion by admitting Billie T.'s testimony. Even if evidence has been wrongly admitted under K.S.A. 60-455, that doesn't automatically require setting aside a jury's verdict: the error still may be harmless. Prine, 287 Kan. at 736, 200 P.3d 1. So we must also determine whether the wrongful admission of this evidence was harmless error. In accordance with K.S.A. 60-261, before we can declare an error harmless, we must determine that it didn't affect a party's substantial rightsmeaning that it didn't affect the trial's outcome. Ward, 292 Kan. at 565, 256 P.3d 801. Because the wrongful admission of evidence here doesn't implicate any of the defendant's constitutional rights, to declare this error harmless we must be persuaded by the State (as the party benefitting here from the wrongly admitted evidence) that there is no reasonable probability that the error affected the trial's outcome. See State v. McCullough, 293 Kan. 970, Syl. ¶ 9, 270 P.3d 1142 (2012); Ward, 292 Kan. at 565, 256 P.3d 801. Notably, the State made no argument in its brief that the admission of this evidence would have been harmless if we rejected the State's position that it was properly admitted. The failure to make that argument waives it. See McCaslin, 291 Kan. at 709, 245 P.3d 1030. Even if the State had briefed the issue, however, we could not find this error harmless. There were substantial credibility issues in this case: V.H. admitted that her trial testimony was different than what she had told police officers on two key points. First, she told the police that Torres had touched her only five or six times, but she said at trial that he'd done so almost daily. Second, she admitted having told police that the last such event was in February 2007, while at trial she said that the last time was the day before she spoke to a teacher in October 2007. In addition, there was no physical evidence to corroborate her testimony. We are unable to make the finding required to conclude that the error was harmless, i.e., that there is no reasonable probability that the wrongful admission of the evidence about Billie T. affected the trial's outcome. The State also argues in a letter submitted under Supreme Court Rule 6.09 (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 49) that we should find the error harmless by applying a new version of K.S.A. 60-455 that was enacted and became effective in 2009, after Torres was tried, convicted, and sentenced, and after Torres had filed his appeal. We decline to do so here. The State made no mention of the 2009 amendment to K.S.A. 60-455 in the brief it filed in October 2009, 5 months after the statutory amendment took effect. There are serious constitutional questions that would arise were we to apply a statutory change in evidence law made after a criminal trial had been held so that crucial evidenceinadmissible under the rules in place when the defendant was triedmagically became admissible while the case was on appeal. In its most famous case interpreting the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court said that the provision applied to [e]very law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798); see also Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987) (quoting Calder ). The State's Rule 6.09 letter provides no legal argument regarding whether retroactive application of the amended statute would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Because the State's letter was not submitted until the last business day before oral argument, the defendant's response, which argues that retroactive application of K.S.A. 60-455 would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, came after oral argument. We therefore conclude that the State's claim that the 2009 statute should be applied when considering whether evidence was admitted in error in Torres' 2008 trial is inadequately briefed and therefore not properly before us in this case. See State v. Raskie, 293 Kan. 906, Syl. ¶ 5, 269 P.3d 1268 (2012) (failing to adequately brief issue waives it); Cooke v. Gillespie, 285 Kan. 748, 758, 176 P.3d 144 (2008) (same). Under the evidentiary rules in place when Torres was tried, important testimony was admitted in error and that error cannot be ignored as harmless. Torres is therefore entitled to a new trial.