Opinion ID: 774807
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the Board Violate INS Regulations?

Text: 43 Finally, Chong claims that the Board violated S 3.7 of the INS regulations. In this case, the IJ certified his decision to the Board. When an IJ knows at the time he issues a decision that he will certify the case to the Board, as is the case here, the INS regulations require the IJ to provide a Notice of Certification. 8 C.F.R. S 3.7 (2001). The regulations further require that the Notice of Certification inform the parties that they have the right to make representations before the Board, including the making of a request for oral argument and the submission of a brief. Id. In this case, the Notice of Certification did not inform Chong that she could make representations before the Board. Id. 44 [O]ur standard of review is even more deferential when an agency is interpreting a regulation rather than a statute that it administers. Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 552. An agency's interpretation of its own regulation is controlling... unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). The government, although acknowledging that the Notice of Certification did not provide Chong with the notice that S 3.7 requires, points out that the INS regulations state that the Board in its discretion may review any such case by certification without regard to the provisions of S 3.7 if it determines that the parties have already been given a fair opportunity to make representations before the Board regarding the case, including the opportunity [to] request oral argument and to submit a brief. 8 C.F.R. S 3.1(c). The government notes that Chong filed a memorandum with the IJ in which she argued that her convictions did not preclude her from qualifying for withholding of removal. This evidence was part of the administrative record before the Board when it decided Chong's appeal. Therefore, the government concludes, the Board could have determined, under S 3.1(c), that Chong already had been given a fair opportunity to make representations before the Board. We disagree. 45 The Board could not have determined that Chong had the opportunity to make representations before the Board because at the time the IJ certified his decision, Chong had not submitted any documents to the Board. The INA defines the Board as the Board of Immigration Appeals, and has a separate definition for immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. S 1.1(e) (2001); id. at S 1.1(l). Thus, we cannot consider documents Chong submitted to the IJ to be representations before the Board. Id. at S 3.7. Accordingly, the IJ violated S 3.7 by not informing Chong that she could make representations before the Board, including the making of a request for oral argument and the submission of a brief. Id. 46 However, we hold that to warrant reversal, the S 3.7 violation must have prejudiced Chong. [A]n agency's failure to afford an individual safeguard required under its own regulations may result in the invalidation of the ultimate administrative determination, even if the regulation is not constitutionally mandated. United States v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252, 266 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957) (While it is of course true that..., the Secretary was not obligated to impose upon himself these more rigorous substantive and procedural standards,... having done so he could not, so long as the Regulations remained unchanged, proceed without regard to them.). This principle is rooted in the doctrine originated in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), where the Supreme Court vacated a Board deportation order because the procedures leading to the order failed to comply with INS regulations. Id. at 267. Although the Accardi doctrine originally contemplated that an agency's failure to comply with its own rules automatically would nullify its actions, the Supreme Court since has required that claimants demonstrate prejudice resulting from the violation unless `[t]he rules were not intended primarily to confer important procedural benefits upon individuals in the face of otherwise unfettered discretion' or unless `an agency required by rule to exercise independent discretion has failed to do so.'  Morgan, 193 F.3d at 267 (quoting American Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1970)). 47 In Waldron v. INS, 17 F.3d 511 (2d Cir. 1994), the Second Circuit rejected the habeas petitioner's request to reverse the Board when the IJ did not provide the petitioner with a Notice of Certification under S 3.7. The court stated that 48 when a regulation is promulgated to protect a fundamental right derived from the Constitution or a federal statute, and the INS fails to adhere to it, the challenged deportation proceeding is invalid and a remand to the agency is required.... On the other hand, where an INS regulation does not affect fundamental rights derived from the Constitution or a federal statute, we believe it is best to invalidate a challenged proceeding only upon a showing of prejudice to the rights sought to be protected by the subject regulation. 49 17 F.3d at 518. 2 The court then turned to decide whether fundamental rights with constitutional or federal statutory origins are implicated by S 3.7's admonition that [i]f it is known at the time the initial decision is made that the case will be certified, the notice of such certification shall be included in such decision. 8 C.F.R. S 3.7. The Waldron Court held that S 3.7 does not implicate a fundamental constitutional or statutory right, as it primarily addresses the procedure for notifying an alien that the case is being certified to the Board. 17 F.3d at 518. 50 We agree with the Second Circuit that S 3.7 is not grounded in any underlying fundamental constitutional or statutory right. Id. As the Second Circuit noted, S 3.7 simply addresses the procedure for notifying an alien that the case is being certified to the [Board.] Id. Thus, the S 3.7 violation must have prejudiced Chong to warrant reversal. 51 Chong argues that the IJ's failure to provide her with notice that she could make representations before the Board prejudiced her because, had she been given the opportunity to present evidence to the Board, she would have submitted the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, which states that Chong was a minor participant in the heroin scheme. Additionally, Chong claims that she would have produced several witnesses who would have testified to the basis by which the prosecuting authorities found that she was a minor participant. But since Chong fails to address the Board's alternate holding that she does not have a valid claim for withholding of removal, we hold that the S 3.7 violation did not prejudice Chong. 52 Before the IJ, Chong conceded that her drug convictions constituted aggravated felonies. See 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(B) (2000) (defining aggravated felony, in part, as illicit trafficking in a controlled substance..., including a drug trafficking crime). Since the INA provides that an alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony is deportable, the IJ correctly found Chong subject to removeability. See id. at S 1227(a)(2)(iii). 53 Chong sought to avoid deportation by requesting withholding of removal. The INA prohibits the Attorney General from removing an alien if he decides that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Id. at S 1231(b)(3)(A). Chong claimed that the Malaysian government would threaten her freedom by prosecuting her for her American drug crimes because of her Chinese ethnicity. The Board rejected Chong's claim, holding that she does not have a valid claim for withholding of removal because she merely fears a subsequent prosecution in Malaysia due to her drug trafficking offense in the United States. [Chong] has not shown that any such prosecution would include elements of persecution because she is ethnic Chinese. Chong does not contest this holding on appeal. 54 Instead, Chong claims that the Board erred in holding that she committed a particularly serious crime. But by focusing on the Board's determination that she committed a particularly serious crime, rather than on the Board's holding that her freedom would not be threatened in Malaysia due to her Chinese ethnicity, Chong puts the cart before the horse. Chong must show that the Board erred in determining that her freedom would not be threatened in Malaysia due to her Chinese ethnicity before demonstrating that the exception for aliens who commit particularly serious crimes does not pertain to deny her withholding of removal. Thus, even though the IJ violated S 3.7, Chong's failure to contest the Board's finding that her freedom would not be threatened in Malaysia due to her Chinese ethnicity requires us to hold that this violation did not prejudice her. See In re Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 879 F.2d 987, 989-90 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (affirming because the appellant challenged only one of two alternate bases for the bankruptcy court's decision, for whatever we might decide about [one basis for the bankruptcy court's decision] could in no way affect the correctness of the bankruptcy court's denial of relief ); MacKay v. Pfeil, 827 F.2d 540, 542 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987).