Opinion ID: 884825
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Does the District Court's order violate Tammy's constitutional right to travel?

Text: ¶ 11 Tammy argues that, in conditioning her continued primary physical custody of D.M.G. and T.J.G. on the requirement that she relocate to Helena from her job, home and extended family in Salem, the trial court violated her constitutionally protected fundamental right of interstate travel. This right is recognized in a number of decisions of the United States Supreme Court and in a decision of this Court. On the other hand, Micheal maintains that, in the context of this custody dispute, Tammy's constitutional right of interstate travel is qualified by the special obligations of custody, the state's interest in protecting the best interests of the children and by the competing interests of the non-custodial parent. Though raised by Tammy in the proceedings below, the trial court did not address her constitutional argument in its decision. We conclude that the legal positions of both parties, summarized above, are correct. ¶ 12 The right of interstate travel has repeatedly been recognized as a basic constitutional freedom. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County (1974), 415 U.S. 250, 254, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 1080, 39 L.Ed.2d 306. This right is not mentioned in the federal constitution. Nevertheless, it is a right so fundamental and elementary that it was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. United States v. Guest (1966), 383 U.S. 745, 758, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 1178, 16 L.Ed.2d 239. As the Court described this right in Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), 394 U.S. 618, 629, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328, 22 L.Ed.2d 600, overruled on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan (1974), 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662, it is, among other things, the right to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a new life. And because the right of interstate travel is fundamental, a classification which operates to penalize those persons who exercise this right must be justified by a compelling state interest. Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S. at 258, 94 S.Ct. at 1082 (citing Shapiro and Dunn v. Blumstein (1972), 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274). The burden on the government to justify this compelling interest is a heavy one. Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S. at 269, 94 S.Ct. at 1088. ¶ 13 Memorial Hospital, Dunn, and Shapiro held that various state statutory durational residency requirements violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by creating invidious classifications that impinged upon the right of interstate travel. Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S. at 269, 94 S.Ct. at 1088; Dunn, 405 U.S. at 338, 92 S.Ct. at 1001; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627, 89 S.Ct. at 1327. Guest involved a conspiracy to deprive African-Americans of their right of interstate travel based upon racial considerations. Guest, 383 U.S. at 757, 86 S.Ct. at 1177. Those are not precisely the sorts of legal restrictions which are at issue here. Nonetheless, Tammy correctly points out that we have referred to this constitutional right of interstate travel and have cited Shapiro in our own case law involving an issue of child custody. That case, In re Marriage of Cole (1986), 224 Mont. 207, 729 P.2d 1276, involved a fact situation wherein we affirmed the trial court's refusal to restrict the right of the primary custodial parent to relocate the children out of state as part of a marital dissolution and joint custody determination. We will discuss this case in more detail later in this opinion. ¶ 14 In two other cases cited by Micheal, the change of residence issue was addressed but not vis-a-vis the constitutional right of interstate travel. In re Marriage of Bergner (1986), 222 Mont. 305, 310, 722 P.2d 1141, 1145, we ruled with no analysis whatsoever, that on the issue of whether a parent has the right to change residence subject to the best interests of the child, the answer is an unqualified `yes.' We cited § 40-6-231, MCA [1] , which provides: A parent entitled to the custody of a child has a right to change his residence, subject to the power of the proper court to restrain a removal which would prejudice the rights or welfare of the child. In Bergner, the father, who was a joint custodian, sought modification of the custody decree. He asked to be awarded physical custody on the basis that the children had been integrated into his home after having been placed with him for an extended period of time. Bergner, 722 P.2d at 1142. In addressing the change of residence issue, we noted simply that the father was awarded custody of the children, not because the wife moved to Texas, but because the girls' interest would best be served by allowing them to remain in the family, school and community they had enjoyed for several years. Bergner, 722 P.2d at 1145. ¶ 15 Micheal also cites In re Marriage of Elser (1995), 271 Mont. 265, 895 P.2d 619, overruled on other grounds by Porter v. Galarneau (1996), 275 Mont. 174, 911 P.2d 1143. In that case we affirmed the trial court's denial of the mother's motion for an order permitting her to remove the children to a permanent residence out of state and the court's granting the father's motion for an order designating him as the primary residential custodian. Elser, 895 P.2d at 623. Again, the constitutional right of interstate travel issue was not raised or addressed. We concluded simply that substantial evidence supported the District Court's finding that the proposed relocation out of state was not in the children's best interests, Elser, 895 P.2d at 623, again citing, among other authority, § 40-6-231, MCA. Elser, 895 P.2d at 621-22. ¶ 16 Finally, while not cited by either party, we also referred to this same statute in In re Marriage of Johnson (1989), 238 Mont. 153, 155, 777 P.2d 305, 307, and in In re Marriage of Paradis (1984), 213 Mont. 177, 181, 689 P.2d 1263, 1265. Again, however, we did not address the change of residence issue in the context of the constitutional right of interstate travel argument raised by Tammy here. ¶ 17 Since the constitutional issue was not raised in Bergner, Elser, Johnson or Paradis, our decisions in those cases are of only marginal assistance in our resolution of this issue. Furthermore, the case at bar presents a different factual twist from those in Bergner, Cole, Elser, Johnson and Paradis. In those cases the residence change issue was raised in the context of the court allowing or refusing to allow the custodial parent's relocation from the children's home in Montana to another state. In those cases either there was a previously existing custody decree for which modification was sought ( Bergner, Elser, Johnson and Paradis ) or the court's decision was made as part of a marriage dissolution action in which the parties' and children's home was in Montana at the time custody was first determined ( Cole ). ¶ 18 The case at bar, however, involves a situation where the court is effectively requiring that the children's primary residential custodian move to Montana from another state where the custodian had already established her home and the children's home prior to the initial custody determination and prior to the relocation issue being raised.As noted later in this opinion, we conclude that the instant fact situation may impact the constitutional right of interstate travel to an even greater extent than would the facts in our previously decided cases. ¶ 19 With those initial observations we turn to our decision in Cole, the one case decided by this Court which is most clearly on point to our discussion here. Cole involved the trial court's custody decision as part of a dissolution action. The parties had two children, one of whom (Robby) was diagnosed with Down's Syndrome which entailed learning and physical disabilities. Considerable testimony was presented at trial concerning the custody arrangement which best suited Robby's special needs. The child's teachers, therapist and trainer all testified in their particular areas of expertise and experience with Robby and the court received recommendations from two court-appointed investigators. The court awarded the mother custody of the children for roughly the school year, and awarded the father custody for roughly two months in the summer. Cole, 729 P.2d at 1278. ¶ 20 Among other things, the father challenged the trial court's refusal to restrict the mother from relocating to Tampa, Florida, claiming that he would be effectively removed from contact with his children for all but his two months of custody. The court considered the children's best interest, the mother's testimony that there were advanced employment opportunities in Tampa and testimony from Robby's counselors that Tampa would likely provide a more complete line of services to disabled children. We concluded that, on this evidence, the court's refusal was not an abuse of discretion. Cole, 729 P.2d at 1280. ¶ 21 We then went on to discuss the custody issue in the context of the constitutional right of interstate travel, citing Shapiro. We noted the delicate balancing required of courts in reconciling, on the one hand, the statutorily required best interests of the child, which are most appropriately served by consistent and continuing contact with both natural parents and, on the other hand, the custodial parent's fundamental right to travel. We observed that [t]he custodial parent who bears the burdens and responsibilities of raising the child is entitled, to the greatest possible extent, to the same freedom to seek a better life for herself or himself and the children as enjoyed by the noncustodial parent ... [but that] ... the custodial parent's freedom is qualified by the special obligations of custody, the state's interest in protecting the best interests of the child and the competing interests of the noncustodial parent. Cole, 729 P.2d at 1280 (citing Cooper v. Cooper (1984), 99 N.J. 42, 491 A.2d 606, 613). ¶ 22 Next, addressing the right to travel interstate and citing Shapiro for the rule that this, being a fundamental right, it can only be restricted in support of a compelling state interest, we stated: We believe that furtherance of the best interests of a child, by assuring the maximum opportunities for the love, guidance and support of both natural parents, may constitute a compelling state interest worthy of reasonable interference with the right to travel interstate. [Citation omitted.] We caution, however, that any interference with this fundamental right must be made cautiously, and may only be made in furtherance of the best interests of the child. To that end, we require the parent requesting the travel restriction to provide sufficient proof that a restriction is, in fact, in the best interests of the child. Cole, 729 P.2d at 1280-81. ¶ 23 Applying our rationale in Cole to the case at bar, we conclude that Micheal failed in his burden to provide legally sufficient proof that the best interests of the parties' children would be most appropriately served by effectively requiring Tammy to relocate to Helena from Salem or, failing to do so, that she would lose her status as the primary physical custodian of D.M.G. and T.J.G. for the next two years. ¶ 24 For the most part, the evidence pertaining to the children's best interest was presented through the testimony of Micheal's expert Dr. Levoti. As pointed out above, since she had not interviewed Tammy; since she had not evaluated either parent with the children; since she had not evaluated the children's home; and since she had not evaluated the children or their social and emotional development, her testimony was, necessarily, limited to a general discussion about the detrimental effects on some children who, by reason of separation or divorce, do not enjoy a good relationship and frequent, consistent contact with both parents. Dr. Levoti offered no testimony or opinion as to whether the children in this case, D.M.G. and T.J.G., have suffered or will likely suffer any of the detrimental effects to which she referred, nor did she have an opinion that Tammy was not acting in the children's best interests when she moved to Salem. ¶ 25 As regards the parties' testimony, neither Micheal nor Tammy disagreed with the general proposition that it would be a good thing for their children if they both lived in the same community so that the children could enjoy the sort of frequent, consistent contact with each parent that Dr. Levoti recommended as being ideal. Nevertheless, when it came to deciding which community that might be, each party tended to equate the children's best interest with his or her own perfectly legitimate desire to maintain his or her present life, home, community and career. Understandably, neither Tammy nor Micheal wants to relocate and lose the life each has established and each parent believes the best interests of the children will be better served if the other party is required to bear the burden of moving. ¶ 26 In truth, on this record and aside from the generalities and probabilities expressed by Dr. Levoti and each parties' own view of the children's best interest, there is virtually no evidence that would lead one to the firm conclusion that the best interests of these children would be most appropriately served by their living in Helena as opposed to Salem or in Salem as opposed to Helena. Both parties are fit and concerned parents; both have budding careers; each has the ability to make or has made a home for the children; there is extended family in each community; Micheal visits the children to the extent he is able and remains involved in their lives; and Tammy has not interfered in his efforts. To assert on this evidentiary record that D.M.G. and T.J.G. have been or will be in some way harmed or that their best interests will not be served because their parents happen to live in distant cities with the result that they may not have the sort of frequent, consistent contact with their father that may be the ideal, is pure speculation, unsupported by any case-specific evaluation, testimony or evidence to that effect. ¶ 27 Assuming that neither Tammy nor Micheal is willing to relocate (and that appears to be the situation facing the trial court), the bottom line is that the children are going to have to live primarily either in Helena or in Salem with one parent or the other. In this case, all things being, for the most part, equal, the question then becomes, can the court effectively require Tammy to relocate to Helena? In this respect, the court has given Tammy a true Hobson's choiceeither she gives up her home, career, life and residence in Salem and moves where she has chosen not to live, Helena, or she forfeits, for the next two years, her status as the children's primary residential custodian, and the children move to Helena, with the devastating impact attendant to their being removed from their mother. This, obviously, is not only a lose-lose situation for Tammy but also is an unacceptable alternative for the children as well. ¶ 28 Moreover, as mentioned above, § 40-6-231, MCA, allows the court to restrain a custodial parent's change of residence upon a showing that removal would prejudice the rights or welfare of the child. Our prior cases have been decided in that contexti.e., the custodial parent's desire to relocate the children's existing home from Montana to another state. Arguably, an even more difficult and serious problem is presented here. Instead of preserving the stability of the home and community to which the children are accustomed by restraining their relocation from their home state to another state, the court order at issue here effectively requires the custodial parent to disrupt the stability and continuity of the children's home in the state where they have lived for a substantial portion of their young lives and to instead relocate and start over again in Montana. Under these latter circumstances, and balanced against the children's best interests, Tammy's right to live and to make her home where she chooses is even more compelling than were she simply being restrained from starting a new life elsewhere. ¶ 29 While, as a general proposition, it may be preferable that separated or divorced parents both live in the same community and that their children have frequent and consistent contact with each parent, realistically that ideal cannot always be met. Our courts must deal with the facts that a substantial number of this country's marriages end in divorce; that a substantial percentage of our children are born out of wedlock; that ours is a mobile society; and that many custodial parents must move to seek or maintain employment, to avoid abusive relationships or to simply start a new life free from the burdens and reminders of the past. ¶ 30 As Tammy argues on appeal, if the best interests of the child standard, without more, always trumps the primary custodian's constitutional right to travel and to relocate in another state, then courts can effectively order that all primary custodial parents live in the same community as the child's non-custodial parent until the child reaches the age of majority. In short, if the judicial decision to restrain the custodial parent from relocating or, as here, to effectively require the custodial parent to return to Montana, is based upon legitimate, case-specific reasons and evidence pertaining to the particular childi.e., the sort of case-specific evidence and reasons that we referred to in Cole (which we held justified relocation) then the state's interference with the custodial parent's fundamental right of interstate travel may be justified in furtherance of the best interests of the child. Cole, 729 P.2d at 1280-81. Absent that sort of case-specific proof, however, there is no compelling state interest justifying a court ordering the custodial parent to live in a state other than in the one he or she freely chooses. ¶ 31 As we pointed out in Cole, the custodial parent who bears the burdens and responsibilities of raising the child is entitled, to the greatest possible extent, to the same freedom to seek a better life for herself or himself and the children as enjoyed by the noncustodial parent. In the context of this case and under our decision in Cole, Tammy has a fundamental, though qualified, constitutional right, in the words of Shapiro, to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a new life. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629, 89 S.Ct. at 1328. Moreover, given that Tammy enjoys this fundamental constitutional right, Micheal bears a heavy burden to demonstrate a compelling interest on the part of the state (here, the court) to interfere with this right. Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S. at 269, 94 S.Ct. at 1088. While the children's best interests are appropriately balanced against this fundamental constitutional right of interstate travel, Micheal was required to provide sufficient proof that the court's effectively forcing Tammy to relocate to Helena was, in fact, in D.M.G.'s and T.J.G.'s best interests. After carefully reviewing the record in this case, we conclude that the general, non-case-specific proof presented at trial on the best interests issue, as discussed above, was legally insufficient to demonstrate the sort of compelling state interest required as justification for interfering with Tammy's fundamental constitutional right of interstate travel. Micheal did not sustain the heavy burden of proof which the law imposed upon him. ¶ 32 Accordingly, we hold that the court abused its discretion in ordering that, for the next two years, Tammy must forfeit her status as the children's primary custodian absent her relocating to Helena with the children.