Opinion ID: 2829984
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Prosecutorial Vouching

Text: Emphasizing the jury was instructed at the penalty phase to consider all the facts adduced during the entire trial,14 defendant argues the prosecutor‘s closing argument in the penalty phase of trial improperly capitalized on her earlier, guilt phase, vouching for Iuli‘s and Palega‘s credibility. Defendant did not object to the prosecutor‘s penalty phase argument on this ground and thus forfeited the claim for appeal. In any event, we found no improper vouching at the guilt phase (ante, pt. I.B.3.f.), and the prosecutor‘s penalty phase argument merely emphasized the moral decision the jury was required to make. For example, the prosecutor asserted that ―[y]ou are charged with returning a moral and just verdict for this crime and for this sweet innocent life that was taken so brutally.‖ We previously have found similar arguments permissible. (See, e.g., People v. Rountree (2013) 56 Cal.4th 823, 859 [prosecutor could fairly argue ― ‗[c]apital punishment is merely society‘s expression of the moral outrage of particularly offensive conduct‘ ‖].) Aside from whether the prosecutor at trial affirmatively vouched for the credibility of her witnesses, defendant also suggests that simply by allowing Iuli and Palega to plead to lesser offenses carrying determinate terms, the prosecutor implicitly communicated to the jury that she personally viewed their roles in Pamintuan‘s murder as less serious than defendant‘s role, and that the death penalty was morally appropriate for the criminal actor who was not allowed to plead, i.e., defendant. To the extent this could have been an implied message of 14 See CALJIC Nos. 8.84.1 (―You must determine what the facts are from the evidence received during the entire trial . . . .‖), 8.85 (―In determining which penalty is to be imposed . . . you shall consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case‖). 73 Ms. Backers‘s exercise of prosecutorial discretion, such implications are faint and are present whenever a prosecutor draws distinctions between multiple criminal actors; as such, they do not rise to the level of improper vouching concerning the appropriate sentence for defendant. In any event, any possible prejudice was avoided by a special jury instruction, given at the request of the prosecution, informing the jury that the sentences of Iuli, Palega and Tautai had no bearing on what sentence was appropriate for defendant.15 We assume the jury followed this instruction. (People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 559.)