Opinion ID: 1427135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Evidence of forcible kidnaping.

Text: (1) All parties concede that, at the time of Robin's disappearance, force or fear was a necessary element of kidnaping unless asportation was from outside the state, or done for slavery, robbery, or extortion. (§ 209; former § 207; People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 64; People v. Camden (1976) 16 Cal.3d 808, 813-814 [129 Cal. Rptr. 438, 548 P.2d 1110].) [8] (2a) Defendant vigorously contends that proof of force or fear was lacking. We think a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that force or fear was used to transport Robin. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578 [162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, 16 A.L.R.4th 1255].) (3) Even if the victim's initial cooperation is obtained without force or the threat of force, kidnaping occurs if the accused `subsequently restrains his victim's liberty by force and compels the victim to accompany him further.' ( People v. Camden, supra, 16 Cal.3d 808, 814, quoting People v. Gallagher (1958) 164 Cal. App.2d 414, 420 [330 P.2d 464]; Parnell v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal. App.3d 392, 402 [173 Cal. Rptr. 906].) The force used against the victim `need not be physical. The movement is forcible where it is accomplished through the giving of orders which the victim feels compelled to obey because he or she fears harm or injury from the accused and such apprehension is not unreasonable under the circumstances.' ( Parnell, supra, quoting People v. Stephenson (1974) 10 Cal.3d 652, 660 [111 Cal. Rptr. 556, 517 P.2d 820].) (4) Imprisonment for any substantial distance in a moving vehicle is forcible asportation. Thus, where the victim expresses the desire to leave the car, or not to accompany the defendant in the direction he is going, but the defendant ignores the plea and continues to drive so fast that the victim cannot escape, force or fear is established. ( People v. Camden, supra, 16 Cal.3d 808, 811-812; People v. La Salle (1980) 103 Cal. App.3d 139, 146-147 [162 Cal. Rptr. 816].) Such a situation is particularly threatening to a child. ( Parnell v. Superior Court, supra, 119 Cal. App.3d 392, 402.) (2b) Here, there is both direct and circumstantial support for the charge of forcible kidnaping. The People introduced evidence that Robin was a responsible child, highly motivated to meet her late-afternoon ballet appointment. Yet she never arrived for that appointment, and Dana Crappa claimed to have seen her in defendant's company at the scheduled time, some 40 miles distant from both her home and the dance studio. Defendant was a virtual stranger, and Jackye Young testified that Robin had found him strange. The jury could reasonably infer that she had not accompanied him voluntarily. Moreover, inmate Herrera testified to defendant's statement that he had lured Robin into his automobile with a ruse about magazine photos, then locked the car's only passenger-side door. Under the circumstances, the jury could conclude that the door was locked to prevent Robin's escape. Thereafter, defendant told Herrera, he drove toward Pacific Coast Highway. During this period, Robin said she wanted to get out of the car and asked to be let out at the next corner. Defendant failed to comply. The death scene was far from Pacific Coast Highway, suggesting that Robin was kept in the car for a substantial period and distance after she asked for her freedom. The jury was not required to assume that she gave new consent to the asportation by voicing no further protest. Her motivation to be elsewhere, and the coercive atmosphere created when defendant ignored her original plea, make the possibility of new consent remote. We need not be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant kidnaped Robin by force. We must merely determine whether  any rational trier of fact at all could be so persuaded. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, 576, quoting Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573-574, 99 S.Ct. 2781], rehg. den., 444 U.S. 890 [62 L.Ed.2d 126, 100 S.Ct. 195, italics in original.) (5) The factfinder may weigh the credibility of witnesses and draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence. ( People v. Reilly (1970) 3 Cal.3d 421, 425 [90 Cal. Rptr. 417, 475 P.2d 649].) (2c) Herrera's testimony, supported by circumstantial evidence suggesting Robin would not have gone voluntarily to Sierra Madre, furnish an ample basis for a finding of forcible kidnaping. (6a) Defendant asserts, however, that Herrera's testimony about what actually happened in the car must be disregarded, since it is not directly corroborated. Because of a jailhouse informant's motive to lie, defendant suggests the informant's uncorroborated testimony is unworthy of full credit as a matter of law. [9] The contention lacks merit. (7a) Evidence Code section 411 provides that  [e]xcept where additional evidence is required by statute, the direct evidence of one witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient for proof of any fact. (Italics added.) The Penal Code sets forth the exceptions applicable in criminal cases. They include treason (§ 1103; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 18 [court confession or two witnesses]), perjury (§ 1103a [contradiction of testimony by single other person insufficient]), abortion or enticing away for prostitution (§ 1108 [uncorroborated testimony of prosecutrix insufficient]), theft by pretense without false token (§ 1110 [false writing or two witnesses required]), and accomplice testimony (§ 1111 [insufficient for conviction if uncorroborated]). (8a) Moreover, the corpus delicti of a crime may not be proved solely by the accused's admissions. ( People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 455 [99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1]; see discussion, post. ) (7b) But for these exceptions, an interested witness' entitle[ment] to full credit under section 411 is a matter for the trier of fact. (E.g., Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 904, 918-919, and fn. 6 [109 Cal. Rptr. 473, 513 P.2d 353].) Thus, for example, there is no bar to conviction of a sex crime solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness. (E.g., People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 296 [145 Cal. Rptr. 876, 578 P.2d 123]; People v. Sylvia (1960) 54 Cal.2d 115, 122 [4 Cal. Rptr. 509, 351 P.2d 781], disapproved on other grounds, People v. Kelley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 232, 242 [57 Cal. Rptr. 363, 424 P.2d 947].) (6b) The exception for accomplice testimony, which defendant deems most analogous, arises from the accomplice's overwhelming motive to shift blame to defendant. He must do so, either to minimize his own liability at trial, or to convince the authorities it is worth immunizing him to obtain his testimony against the defendant. Whatever consideration a jailhouse informant may expect for testifying, the direct, compelling motive to lie is absent. Here, the jury was fully apprised of the possible selfish motives for Herrera's testimony, and it was labeled false by another inmate. (9) (See fn. 10.) No basis appears for a judicial exception to the clear policy of section 411. [10] (8b) Though defendant does not address the point, we note that the corpus delicti of a crime must be proved independent of the accused's extrajudicial admissions. ( People v. Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d 441, 455; see 1 Witkin, Cal. Crimes (1963) § 89, p. 85.) (10a) Thus, before the jury could find that defendant kidnaped Robin, a case of force or fear must appear from evidence other than Herrera's account of his conversation with defendant. The jury was so instructed. (CALJIC No. 2.72, as modified.) (8c) The independent proof may be by circumstantial evidence ( People v. Manson (1977) 71 Cal. App.3d 1, 25 [139 Cal. Rptr. 275]), and it need not be beyond a reasonable doubt. A slight or prima facie showing, permitting the reasonable inference that a crime was committed, is sufficient. ( People v. Towler (1982) 31 Cal.3d 105, 115 [181 Cal. Rptr. 391, 641 P.2d 1253]; People v. Mehaffey (1948) 32 Cal.2d 535, 545 [197 P.2d 12], cert. den., 335 U.S. 900 [93 L.Ed. 435, 69 S.Ct. 399].) If the independent proof meets this threshold requirement, the accused's admissions may then be considered to strengthen the case on all issues. ( People v. McMonigle (1947) 29 Cal.2d 730, 738 [177 P.2d 745].) (10b) Measured by this standard, there was adequate preliminary evidence, aside from defendant's admissions, to suggest that Robin was abducted by force or fear. As we have seen, the circumstantial evidence presented made it highly unlikely that Robin had accompanied defendant willingly to the death scene. An inference of force or fear on this basis is not speculative, conjectural, or fantastic in the context of establishing the corpus delicti. (Compare, e.g., Jones v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal. App.3d 390, 395-396 [157 Cal. Rptr. 809]; People v. Schuber (1945) 71 Cal. App.2d 773, 776-777 [163 P.2d 498].) The corpus delicti rule was satisfied, and there was sufficient evidence of forcible kidnaping.