Opinion ID: 2581073
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpretation of Collective Bargaining Agreement Requires Preemption Pursuant to Federal Policy

Text: Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) [9] (hereinafter Section 301) preempts an employee's state law claim if resolution of the claim hinges on the court's interpretation of a CBA. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988). Preemption in this context means the employee's claim is governed by the terms of the CBA and must be resolved by resorting to federal rules of law to interpret the CBA, which would generally occur under the CBA's arbitration procedures. Id. at 404, 411 & n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 1877. [10] In Lingle the plaintiff brought a retaliatory discharge claim based on Illinois law after the employer terminated her for allegedly filing a false workers' compensation claim. Id. at 401, 108 S.Ct. 1877. In addition to the state law remedy, the CBA which governed the plaintiff's employment provided a separate remedy for retaliatory discharge. Id. at 402, 108 S.Ct. 1877. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held the claim was preempted, but the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding the state law claim was not preempted even though it arose out of the same facts as her claim under the CBA. Id. at 402-03, 408-410, 108 S.Ct. 1877. The Court held: [I]f the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the application of state law (which might lead to inconsistent results since there could be as many state-law principles as there are States) is pre-empted and federal labor-law principles  necessarily uniform throughout the Nation  must be employed to resolve the dispute. Id. at 405-06., 108 S.Ct. 1877 In Commodore v. University Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 120 Wash.2d 120, 130-31, 839 P.2d 314 (1992), we first considered the scope of Lingle to hold interpretation of a CBA is not necessary, thereby preventing Section 301 preemption, if the Washington right allegedly violated is either a nonnegotiable right or an independent negotiable right. In so doing we reversed a trial court's dismissal of an employee's racial discrimination claim, reasoned the employee's claim based on his statutory right to be free from racial discrimination in the workplace [11] could have been brought in the absence of a CBA. Id. at 132, 839 P.2d 314. [12] The majority holds Hisle's MWA claims are not preempted because it involve[es] the nonnegotiable state right to overtime. Majority at 114. This conclusion oversimplifies the case. Certainly any employee is entitled to overtime compensation so long as he or she is not exempted from the overtime requirement. See RCW 49.46.130(2). But simply because a nonnegotiable right is involved does not displace the necessity to interpret the CBA at issue to resolve the claim. Lingle expressly recognized such a scenario: Petitioner points to the fact that the Illinois right to be free from retaliatory discharge is nonnegotiable and applies to unionized and nonunionized workers alike. While it may be true that most state laws that are not pre-empted by § 301 will grant nonnegotiable rights that are shared by all state workers, we note that neither condition ensures nonpre-emption. It is conceivable that a State could create a remedy that, although nonnegotiable, nonetheless turned on the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement for its application. Such a remedy would be pre-empted by § 301. Similarly, if a law applied to all state workers but required, at least in certain instances, collective-bargaining agreement interpretation, the application of the law in those instances would be pre-empted. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 408, 108 S.Ct. 1877 n. 7. [13] This case does not concern whether these employees are entitled to overtime benefits required under RCW 49.46.130(1), as the issue is not whether their employment exempts them from application of the statute's overtime requirements. See RCW 49.46.130(2). An example of such a case would involve an employee's MWA lawsuit that queried the court whether or not the employee was a [s]easonal employee[ ] who [is] employed at concessions and recreational establishments, RCW 49.46.130(2)(d), or was exempted pursuant to RCW 49.46.010(5), RCW 49.46.130(2)(a). Preemption would be completely inappropriate in those cases, as was true in both Lingle and Commodore. To the contrary Hisle's claim turns on the critical question of what the mutually negotiated wage was between Todd and Todd's employees. Determination of this wage turns on an interpretation of the CBA in question, which is illustrated by the majority's justification in addition to its hourly rate rationale to apply the MWA to this payment. The majority claims the payment is subject to the MWA overtime requirements because the 1997 CBA makes no indication that the payment is a ratification inducement [and] lists the hourly retroactive payment increases under the heading `Wage and Fringe Increase.' Majority at 113 (quoting Clerk's Papers (CP) at 232). This rationale assumes the parties' failure to include the precise nomenclature ratification inducement signals their intent to increase the regular rate at which [the employee] is employed. RCW 49.46.130(1). Moreover the majority assumes the specific location of the clause under the heading `Wage and Fringe Increase', CP at 232, implies contractual intent to alter the employees' regular rate, as if locating the clause under another heading would change the substantive effect of the contractual language. For example, if this clause had appeared under section 3.5, entitled Seniority, CP at 214, would this payment apply only to those employees with seniority despite clear language indicating payment should be made to  all non-Washington State Ferry Project employees that were actively employed on the execution date of the contract or had seniority rights as of the execution date of the contract, CP at 232 (emphasis added)? I doubt it. But regardless of how that question should be answered, the analysis to resolve the inquiry rests on interpreting the provision. This is precisely what Section 301 prohibits. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413, 108 S.Ct. 1877. Because this case does not involve an inquiry into whether Todd's employees are entitled to overtime  a proposition no one disputes  but instead whether a certain payment modified the determinative factor needed to calculate how much overtime is owed, i.e., regular rate at which [the employee] is employed, RCW 49.46.130(1), we are forced to examine and interpret the CBA. Federal law therefore preempts Hisle's claim.