Opinion ID: 1742561
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lack of a final order

Text: We confronted a similar situation in Ratzlaff v. Franz Foods of Ark., 255 Ark. 373, 500 S.W.2d 379 (1973), in which partial summary judgment was entered as to one count in each of the seven complaints. The plaintiffs then took a voluntary nonsuit on the two remaining counts. We said, The controlling question is whether a plaintiff, by taking a voluntary nonsuit with respect to two counts in his complaint, can thereby convert an adverse partial summary judgment with respect to a third count into an appealable order. We sustained a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of a final order. When the Ratzlaff case was decided, the law restricting appeals to those from final orders was found in Ark.Stat.Ann. § 27-2101. Today it is found in Ark.R.App.P. 2(a) which permits appeal of final orders and other categories constituting exceptions not applicable here. The order must be final for this Court to have jurisdiction, thus it is a matter we will consider even though the parties do not raise it. Wilburn v. Keenan Cos., 297 Ark. 74, 759 S.W.2d 554 (1988); Fratesi v. Bond, 282 Ark. 213, 666 S.W.2d 712 (1984). Discussing the statutory provision on the finality required for an appeal in the Ratzlaff case, we said: Here the appellants seek to circumvent the policy of the statute by holding two counts of their complaints in abeyance while they seek our opinion upon the validity of a third count. If that procedure is permissible, litigants may appeal from various interlocutory orders by taking a nonsuit with respect to the rest of the case. A voluntary nonsuit or dismissal leaves the plaintiff free to refile the claim, assuming there has been no previous dismissal. Ark. R.Civ.P. 41(a). No doubt the Hailes intend to pursue their negligence claim if the issues they seek to present in this appeal are decided in their favor, and perhaps even if they are not. Their counsel candidly stated during oral argument before us that he pursued this appeal because he was left with just a shell of a lawsuit because the issues he seeks to present to us were decided adversely to his clients. It is, therefore, clear that this is an interlocutory appeal which we have no authority to entertain under Rule 2(a). As we said in the Ratzlaf case, when we are convinced an appellant pursues an unauthorized interlocutory appeal, the appeal will be dismissed. See also Cowan v. Schmidle, 312 Ark. 256, 848 S.W.2d 421 (1993). Appeal dismissed.