Opinion ID: 169174
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Final Order of Removal

Text: 16 DHS contends that the IJ's grant of a § 212(c) waiver, or alternatively, the BIA's removal order, constitute a final order of removal. We conclude they do not. 17
18 DHS's first argument is that the IJ's § 212(c) waiver granted on October 12, 2004 (and its November 30, 2004 decision reaffirming the waiver) suffice as an order of removal since they necessarily conclud[e] that the alien is deportable under § 1101(a)(47)(A). Resp. Br. at 25. The gist of its argument is that the IJ would not grant a waiver of deportation unless he first concluded the alien was removable. 19 The problem with this contention is that nowhere, in either granting the waiver or reaffirming it, does the IJ make an express finding that Sosa-Valenzuela was deportable or order him deported. Instead, the IJ's orders merely approve a waiver of inadmissibility under § 212(c) of the INA. 7 While it is likely the IJ made or intended to make such a finding, the record we have discloses none. The BIA has not identified anywhere in the proceedings (nor do we have the transcript from the § 212 proceedings) where a finding of deportability was made, and neither order provides an express basis for our jurisdiction. 20 In sum, the IJ's § 212(c) waiver determination on this record is not — by itself — a substitute for a finding of deportability under § 1101(a)(47). Without a showing that the IJ in fact reached the question of deportability, we cannot assume such a finding and we lack jurisdiction. 21
22 Even without an express finding of deportability from the IJ, DHS also contends the BIA's removal order itself confers jurisdiction. 8 We disagree. 23 Statutory Scheme. As a threshold matter, the statutory scheme does not grant the BIA the independent authority to conduct removal proceedings. Removal proceedings are authorized by statute and in the first instance are conducted only by immigration judges. 24 Removal proceedings are governed by § 1229a. The plain language of the statute points to the primary role of the IJ in determining removability. First, it provides that [an IJ] shall conduct proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (emphasis added). It then adds [u]nless otherwise specified in this chapter, a proceeding under this section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United States or, if the alien has been admitted, removed from the United States. Id. § 1229a(a)(3) (emphasis added). Finally, and even more explicitly, § 1229a(c)(1)(A) provides that the [IJ] shall decide whether an alien is removable from the United States. The statute thus explicitly vests the power to conduct removal proceedings with the IJ in the first instance. The limited nature of the BIA's powers on the first question of removability naturally follows from its position as an appellate body with the attending limitations on its ability to engage in fact-finding, which under the statutory scheme has been left to the immigration judges. See Torres de la Cruz v. Maurer, 483 F.3d 1013, No. 06-9515, 2007 WL 970166 (10th Cir. April 3, 2007). 25 The only statutory mention of the BIA in the removal process is found in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47), which provides an order of removal becomes final only upon the earlier of (1) a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such order; or (2) the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47). The removal process thus contemplates a sequential proceeding where the determination of deportability is made by immigration judges and then reviewed by the BIA. See Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that the statutes and regulations do not allow the BIA to issue a final order of removal in the absence of such an order by the IJ). 26 In short, if Congress intended for the BIA to determine deportability in the first instance, it would have said so, and extended the authority to conduct removal proceedings to the BIA. The statute does not so provide. 27 Case Law and Regulations. Nor do the case law and regulations suggest a different interpretation of the plain meaning of the statutes. DHS contends the statutes should be read to extend plenary authority to the BIA based on (1) a series of immigration cases that predate the current statutory scheme; and (2) the BIA's delegated authority to act on behalf of the Attorney General in removal proceedings. Again, we disagree. 28 Turning first to the federal case law, nothing suggests § 1229a confers jurisdiction on the BIA to order deportation absent IJ findings of removability. DHS points to several Supreme Court and circuit cases it claims support the conclusion the BIA may issue an order of removal in the first instance absent an underlying IJ order. But in each of those cases a finding of deportability had already been expressly made by the IJ. For example, in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999), while the Supreme Court upheld a BIA decision ordering an alien deported after the BIA vacated an IJ decision, the alien had already conceded deportability before the IJ hearing. Id. at 422, 119 S.Ct. 1439. 29 The same is true of the circuit cases DHS relies on. In Solano-Chicas v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir.2006), for example, the Eighth Circuit held that where an IJ has already issued an order concluding that an alien is deportable in the course of waiver proceedings, the BIA's subsequent cancellation of the waiver leaves the IJ's original order of removal in place. Id. at 1054; see also Delgado-Reynua v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 596, 601 (5th Cir.2006) ([W]here the BIA reverses an IJ's grant of discretionary relief and gives effect to the IJ's original order of removability, the BIA has merely eliminated `impediments to removal' and effected the original removal order.); Lazo v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 53, 54-55 (2d Cir.2006); Del Pilar v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 326 F.3d 1154, 1156 (11th Cir.2003). And, even more recently, in Guevara v. Gonzales, 472 F.3d 972 (7th Cir.2007), the Seventh Circuit upheld the BIA's order of removal, but only in a case where the IJ already found the alien removable based upon several felony convictions. 9 30 These circuit cases stand for a proposition with which we agree. If the IJ makes a finding of removability, that finding satisfies § 1101(a)(47)'s definition of an order of deportation. In those circumstances, the BIA can order removal if it reverses the IJ's determination of waiver. 10 But — at least on this record — that did not happen in this case. 31 Finally, DHS's tertiary argument that agency regulations support the BIA's plenary power is equally unpersuasive. DHS argues that the Attorney General has delegated authority to the BIA to make initial findings of deportability. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2004). The regulation generally empowers the BIA in two ways: (1) it shall function as an appellate body charged with the review of those administrative adjudications under the Act that the Attorney General may by regulation assign to it, § 1003.1(d); and (2) a panel or Board member to whom a case is assigned may take any action consistent with their authorities under the Act and the regulations as is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of the case, § 1003.1(d)(ii). 32 The regulation is of little help. Nowhere does it expressly or impliedly grant the BIA any authority to act in the shoes of the IJ in conducting removal proceedings in the first instance. More importantly, the statutory removal proceedings laid out in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and the finality provisions laid out in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A) plainly place with the IJ the initial responsibility of ordering deportation or making a finding of deportation. 33 In sum, an order of removal by the IJ is required before the BIA may order removal. This may include an express order of removal or, more generally, a finding of deportability. Neither occurred in this case. Consequently, no final order of removal yet exists, and we lack appellate jurisdiction under § 1252(a). 34