Opinion ID: 2633286
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Asserted Instructional Error Regarding Evidence of Unadjudicated Criminal Activity

Text: Defendant contends the trial court committed numerous errors in instructing the jury regarding evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity introduced under section 190.3, factor (b).
The notice of aggravating evidence the prosecution filed before trial included the attempted rape of de Maderos in Guatemala. In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the trial court indicated to counsel that it did not intend to instruct the jury on any elements of this offense because the issue for the jury to decide was whether they're convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant either did or attempted to use force or violence in an illegal manner upon another person. Defense counsel, however, asked that the jury receive the instruction on attempted rape. The trial court informed counsel that if it gave an instruction on attempted rape, it also would instruct the jury on assault with a deadly weapon and attempted murder. It reasoned that if the jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt the alleged conduct was an attempted rape, it could nonetheless consider the conduct under section 190.3, factor (b), as either an assault with a deadly weapon or an attempted murder. Over counsel's objection that only the attempted rape instruction should be given, the trial court instructed the jury on attempted rape, assault with a deadly weapon, and attempted murder. The court then denied counsel's request for instructions defining battery and brandishing a weapon. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury on assault with a deadly weapon and attempted murder. He argues that he was entitled to rely on the particular offense alleged by the prosecutor in his notice of evidence in aggravation (e.g., attempted rape) in presenting his defense without having to defend against additional related offenses during trial. Not so. Evidence of prior violent conduct is admitted under section 190.3, factor (b), to enable the jury to make an individualized assessment of the character and history of the defendant to determine the nature of the punishment to be imposed. ( People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 544, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119.) The probative value of this evidence lies in the defendant's conduct that gave rise to the offense. ( Ibid. ) The prosecution's notice that evidence will be presented regarding a specific violent crime or crimes should alert counsel that evidence of all crimes committed during the same course of conduct may be offered, and, therefore, substantially complies with the notice requirement of section 190.3. ( People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 70, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388.) Here, defendant does not complain that he was unaware of the multiple offenses potentially arising out of the attack on de Maderos, nor could he. Defendant's investigator interviewed de Maderos more than a year before trial. She related that defendant pointed his machete at her throat and threatened to rape and kill her. Therefore, because the crimes of assault with a deadly weapon and attempted murder were also committed as part of the same course of conduct as the attempted rape, the prosecution substantially complied with the notice requirement under section 190.3. ( People v. Visciotti, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 70, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388.) Defendant, moreover, has not shown any prejudice. Generally, in the absence of any showing that a delay in the notice affected counsel's trial strategy, the appropriate remedy for a violation of the notice requirement would be to grant a continuance as needed to permit defendant to prepare a response. ( People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 956-958, 4 Cal. Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571.) Defendant did not request a continuance nor did he otherwise indicate he was unable to prepare a defense. ( Id. at p. 958, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571.) Accordingly, defendant's claim fails.
Defendant contends the trial court improperly refused his request for instructions on battery (§ 242) and brandishing a weapon (§ 417). Instructions on the elements of the offenses presented under section 190.3, factor (b) are not required in the absence of a request by counsel. ( People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 589, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; see also id., fn. 14 [rule that instruction on elements of prior violent crime is not required sua sponte is unaffected by Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348].) A trial court, however, may give such elements instructions on its own motion when they are vital to a proper consideration of the evidence. ( People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 72, 40 Cal. Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224.) Once defense counsel asked that the jury be instructed on attempted rape, the trial court informed counsel it would also instruct on assault with a deadly weapon and attempted murder. Based on de Maderos's testimony that defendant poked her throat with his machete and threatened to kill her, there was substantial evidence to support instructing the jury on assault with a deadly weapon and attempted murder. In addition, the court expressed concern that if only the attempted rape instruction were given, the jury might become confused and question whether the evidence could be considered under section 190.3, factor (b) if it believed defendant physically attacked de Maderos as she testified but still retained a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant intended to rape her. The court further reasoned that if the jury believes that the activities alleged were beyond a reasonable doubt committed by the defendant, and he threatened to kill her and attempted to kill her, that is evidence of prior act[s] involving force or violence, and it doesn't matter whether it's for the purpose of rape. On the other hand, the trial court specifically found instructions on simple assault or brandishing a weapon were not warranted based on the evidence: if you believe [de Maderos], it was either an [assault with a deadly weapon], it certainly wasn't a simple assault, or a brandishing of a weapon. That would involve conjecture. If it didn't happen the way she said it did, which amounts to at the very least an [assault with a deadly weapon], then it was nothing. We agree with the trial court's assessment of the facts and its conclusion that the instructions were not warranted under those facts. Accordingly, we need not decide whether a trial court is ever obligated to instruct on lesser offenses requested by trial counsel at a penalty phase. Moreover, any error in failing to give the requested instructions was harmless. As the People correctly point out, the issue before the jury was whether defendant used force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. (§ 190.3, factor (b).) Even if the requested lesser included offense instructions were given and found true by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the result would necessarily be the same: defendant used or threatened to use force or violence. As the trial court expressed, If [the jury] believe[s] [de Maderos] beyond a reasonable doubt, that somebody did these things, I don't think there's any question but what [ sic ] it involves the threat of or attempt to use force or violence on another person. Under these circumstances, there is no reasonable possibility of any error in failing to instruct the jury on simple assault or brandishing a weapon affected the verdict. ( People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 433, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000.)
Defendant contends, in essence, that when the trial court instructed the jury regarding the evidence that defendant had attacked de Maderos 10 to 12 years earlier, it repeatedly and improperly directed a verdict that defendant's conduct constituted an attempted rape, assault with a deadly weapon, and/or attempted murder. He asserts the erroneous instructions increased the aggravating effect of this evidence. We conclude the trial court properly instructed the jury that it was for them to determine whether the evidence of the attack on de Maderos amounted to an attempted rape, assault with a deadly weapon, or attempted murder. In assessing whether the jury instructions given were erroneous, the reviewing court must consider the instructions as a whole ... [and] assume that the jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given. ( People v. Martin (2000) 78 Cal. App.4th 1107, 1111, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 433; Cal. Const., art. IV, § 13; see also People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 675, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752 [claims of instructional error are evaluated in the context of the overall charge to the jury].) Here, in addition to the challenged instructions, the court instructed the jurors under former CALJIC Nos. 2.90 and 8.87 that when determining whether defendant committed an attack on de Maderos that constituted an attempted rape, assault with a deadly weapon, or attempted murder, they were to presume defendant was innocent until the evidence proved otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. The jurors were specifically instructed that they must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed such criminal activity before they could consider the evidence as an aggravating factor. In addition, the court told the jurors that if there was any reasonable doubt that the prosecution proved defendant committed the criminal activity, then the jurors must not consider the evidence for any purpose. Various other instructions informed the jurors that defendant was to receive the benefit of reasonable doubt: Former CALJIC No. 2.01 [sufficiency of circumstantial evidence], former CALJIC No. 2.72 [proof of corpus delicti], and former CALJIC No. 2.91 [burden of proving identity]. Therefore, in considering the overall charge to the jury, we conclude there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury misconstrued or misapplied the instructions under the belief that the trial court was directing them to find the conduct alleged constituted an attempted rape, assault with a deadly weapon, or attempted murder. ( People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705.)
Defense counsel requested the trial court instruct the jury on intoxication as part of its instructions on other crimes evidence. The trial court stated it would instruct on voluntary intoxication pursuant to former CALJIC Nos. 4.21.1 and 4.22, as it had in the guilt phase, but it failed to do so. Defendant contends the court erred. Although defendant failed to object to the trial court's failure to give the intoxication instructions, we find this issue cognizable because it involves a claim of instructional error affecting his substantial rights. ( People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 843, fn. 8, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673; People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 268, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123; § 1259.) As for the merits, there was insufficient evidence that defendant was intoxicated to warrant the requested instructions. As the People point out, de Maderos testified that defendant did not smell of alcohol. Ramirez testified he did not smell defendant's breath but only thought defendant was drunk because he was walking bent over.