Opinion ID: 4275929
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Timeliness of Petitioners’ Appeal

Text: The central question is whether petitioners’ challenges to the height and construction of intervenor’s concrete wall were timely. The owner of a building or other structure or any person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final decision or order of the code official based in whole or in part upon the Construction Codes, may appeal to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The OAH appeal shall be filed within 10 business days after the date the person appealing the decision of the code official had notice or knowledge of the decision, or should have had notice or knowledge of the decision, whichever is earlier . . . . 12-A DCMR § 112.2.1 (2014). Petitioners argue that their challenges were timely because they appealed within 10 business days from the date DCRA issued the 2014 permit. They assert that the time for appeal did not begin to run in 2012 because intervenor’s first two applications (and the related building permits) “were 8 incomplete and misleading.”3 According to petitioners, the 2014 building permit was the first decision made by a code official that clearly revealed the height and character of the wall. We disagree and uphold the ALJ’s finding that petitioners “knew or should have known” of the basis for their claims well before DCRA issued the 2014 permit. Although petitioners may have had the requisite notice as early as 2012, substantial evidence in the record shows that they clearly knew of the code official’s decision to lift the stop work order in March of 2014. Petitioners did not attend the hearing on the stop work order, but DCRA Hearing Officer Ferdinand Gamboa personally let them know the outcome of that proceeding a few days later. 3 Petitioners rely on Sisson v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 805 A.2d 964 (D.C. 2002), when arguing that their time to appeal began with the issuance of the 2014 permit. The court in Sisson held that because petitioner’s project was developed in a “piecemeal manner” and his various permit applications were often incomplete and misleading, “the full extent of [the] construction project could not be discerned as each individual permit was issued and therefore they must be considered as a whole.” Id. at 969-70, 971. Thus, the aggrieved party “was not chargeable with notice of the entire scope of [the] work performed . . . until all of the permits were issued.” Id. at 970. We agree with Judge Handy’s determination that “the facts in Sisson differ significantly from those in this case.” Petitioners’ complaints focus on the size and location of the wall, matters of which they clearly had notice well before the 2014 permit was issued. 9 Petitioners and their attorney also met with Mr. Gamboa about a month after the hearing, but they did not appeal his decision to lift the SWO. If petitioners truly did not learn of the basis for their claims until March of 2014, they might have attempted to justify belated appeals of the 2012 building permits. However, a more logical recourse might have been to appeal the lifting of the stop work order. We now will address (1) petitioners’ argument that they did not have the right to appeal that order and (2) their claim that, in any event, the timely appeal of the 2014 building permit allowed them to challenge the height and location of intervenor’s wall. A. Appealability of the Decision to Lift the Stop Work Order To our knowledge, neither an administrative agency of the District of Columbia nor this court has addressed whether the lifting of a stop work order is a decision which may be appealed to OAH. Petitioners argue that they could not have appealed the lifting of the stop work order because “nothing in § 114.11 suggests that a neighbor” has this right of appeal. However, 12-A DCMR § 114.11 (2014) is not directly relevant to this question because it governs an appeal (such as that taken by intervenor) from the issuance of a stop work order. The following 10 section, § 114.11.1, applicable here, states that “[w]ithin 10 business days after the date of receipt of the appeals form [challenging a stop work order], the code official shall affirm, modify, or reverse the previous action or decision. The decision of the code official shall be the final decision of the Department . . . .” Appeals of final decisions made by code officials are governed by 12-A DCMR § 112.2.1 (2014). “[A]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final decision or order of the code official based in whole or in part upon the Construction Codes” may appeal to OAH. Mr. Gamboa’s lifting of the stop work order was a “final decision” that any aggrieved party, including a neighbor, could appeal. Thus, petitioners should have filed their appeal within 10 business days of learning of Mr. Gamboa’s decision. Petitioners protest that the issuance of a building permit, not the lifting of a stop work order, is the “relevant decision that triggers the right to appeal under § 112.” We agree that petitioners could have appealed from the issuance of the building permits in 2012. However, the regulations do not tie the time for appealing “to the issuance of a specified type of notice.” Basken v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 946 A.2d 356, 366 (D.C. 2008). Our case law specifically recognizes that decisions other than the issuance of a building permit 11 may start the time to appeal. See, e.g., id. at 365-66 (although revised building permit was ambiguous, subsequent letter from DCRA Director was not and “allowed the clock to begin running” on time to appeal). Although this court has not addressed whether the lifting of a stop work order is appealable, our neighboring state of Maryland has considered this exact question. See Montgomery County v. Longo, 975 A.2d 312, 330 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009). There, a neighbor did not timely challenge the issuance of a building permit, but, after construction began, complained of permit violations, and a stop work order was issued. The court reasoned that, when the administrative agency considered lifting the stop work order, it was “not merely reconsidering whether its initial decision to issue the building permit was correct.” Id. at 329. Rather, the agency assessed whether “the building, as constructed, met the requirements for an addition” and made a new decision in response to new facts revealed during the construction process. Id. at 329-30. Therefore, the court held “that the decision to lift the stop work order was an appealable decision or order.” Id.4 4 Section 8-23 (a) of the Montgomery County Code (2002) governed the right to appeal and stated that “[a]ny person aggrieved by the issuance, denial, renewal, or revocation of a permit or any other decision or order of the Department [of Permitting Services] under this Chapter may appeal to the County Board of Appeals within 30 days after the permit is issued, denied, renewed, or revoked, or the order or decision is issued.” Longo, 975 A.2d at 327. 12 Similarly, when intervenor appealed the issuance of the stop work order to DCRA, the code official held a hearing on the matter and assessed whether the fence/wall as constructed violated the Construction Code. The code official’s decision to allow work to resume was a new decision that considered new facts. Id. at 330; see also Basken, 946 A.2d at 366-67 (holding that issuance of a certificate of occupancy is “an appealable event” because it “may evidence a decision that is different from any that has come before with respect to a project”). The code official’s decision to lift the stop work order was a final decision appealable pursuant to § 112.2.1. Because petitioners failed to appeal within 10 business days after they had notice of that decision, their appeal was untimely. B. Petitioners’ Timely Appeal of the 2014 Permit Petitioners also argue that the ALJ erred in concluding that they could not challenge the “overall construction” of the wall through their timely appeal of the 2014 permit. They complain that “the ALJ cites no record evidence to support his conclusion that the only changes authorized by the 2014 Building Permit were the addition of stucco to the Wall and the lowering of slats on the fence.” Petitioners 13 assert that the CFA requested, and DCRA required, intervenor to file a new application “with complete detailed and dimensioned site plan, plans, elevations, and detail drawings with permit application for review by the [CFA].” According to petitioners, testimony would show that DCRA treated this as an “after the fact” permit, “giving it a full and complete structural review.” “Ordinarily, the building permit is the document that reflects a . . . decision about whether a proposed structure, and its intended use as described in the permit application, conform” to the regulations. Basken, 946 A.2d at 364. Thus, Judge Handy properly focused on the 2014 permit itself. It stated that “Permission Is Hereby Granted To [Intervenor]” to conduct work described as “lower existing fence” and “add stucco facing to exterior of already constructed wall.” Considered in context, this was quite understandable. As Judge Handy noted, the only reason intervenor was even required to obtain the 2014 building permit “was because HPO reversed its position on whether CFA approval was needed.” The 2014 permit addressed the two cosmetic recommendations made by CFA after it reviewed the existing fence/wall. Contrary to petitioners’ argument, it did not purport to grant retroactive approval for work not previously authorized but already completed. 14 “We defer to OAH findings of fact so long as they are supported by substantial evidence[,] [which] means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Rodriguez v. Filene’s Basement Inc., 905 A.2d 177, 181 (D.C. 2006). That test has been met here. The face of the 2014 permit supported the finding that it only authorized adding stucco to the concrete wall and lowering the wooden fence. Judge Handy’s decision that petitioners had acted too late to challenge the “overall construction” of the wall flowed rationally from the findings of fact. Although the 2014 permit had been timely appealed, it addressed specific aesthetic issues and “represented neither a new decision” authorizing the building of the fence/wall “nor [] petitioners’ earliest notice of” DCRA’s decision to approve the overall construction of the fence/wall. See Basken, 946 A.2d at 367-68 (although issuance of a certificate of occupancy was an appealable event, it did not “start another . . . appeal period as to any and all DCRA zoning decisions affecting a project that preceded issuance of the certificate”). 15