Opinion ID: 2524517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Caenen's Motion to Suppress

Text: Next, Caenen contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress his three videotaped interviews. Caenen argues that the videos should have been suppressed because (1) his mental illness prevented him from making a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights, and (2) he had asserted his Fifth Amendment right to counsel under the United States Constitution. Caenen's contentions are not persuasive. Our standard of review inquires whether the district court's ruling was supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Minor, 268 Kan. 292, 297, 997 P.2d 648 (2000). At the suppression hearing, the district court heard the testimony of Detective Otis. In determining whether the accused's confession is voluntary, we look to the totality of the circumstances. State v. McCorkendale, 267 Kan. 263, 270, 979 P.2d 1239 (1999). See also State v. Lane, 262 Kan. 373, 383, 386, 940 P.2d 422 (1997) (applying the totality-of-circumstances analysis where a defendant's IQ was 77). First, Caenen contends that Kansas has erroneously carved out an exception in cases where it is alleged that a defendant's mental condition at the time of the confession rendered the confession involuntary. He relies on language in State v. Pursley, 238 Kan. 253, 258-59, 710 P.2d 1231 (1985), and State v. Boan, 235 Kan. 800, 804, 686 P.2d 160 (1984), superceded by statute as stated in State v. Hedges, 269 Kan. 895, 902, 8 P.3d 1259 (2000) (citing statutes applying the new mens rea approach to crimes committed on or after January 1, 1996). In Boan, we said: In State v. Pyle, 216 Kan. 423, 440, 532 P.2d 1309 (1975), it was held that the test for determining whether a suspect has the mental capacity to make a voluntary confession is the same as the test for determining his criminal responsibility for committing the crime. In absence of insanity meeting the M'Naghten test, the mental condition of a defendant at the time he makes a statement is relevant to the issue of voluntariness but is not necessarily conclusive; its weight is for the trier of fact. A trial court's finding, after a Jackson v. Denno hearing, that the defendant was sane and made his confessions knowingly and voluntarily is binding on appellate review if supported by substantial competent evidence. 235 Kan. at 804. Caenen argues that the Boan reasoning violates due process because it fails to distinguish between issues of incompetency and insanity. He contends that the Boan test places the burden of proof on the defendant to prove that his confession was involuntary. Caenen fails to note that the M'Naghten test is no longer applicable to crimes committed on or after January 1, 1996. Hedges, 269 Kan. at 902-03. We addressed and rejected his argument in State v. William, 248 Kan. 389, 406-09, 807 P.2d 1292, cert. denied 502 U.S. 837 (1991). (William had a life-long history of mental illness. He was convicted of first-degree murder.) As the State notes, we have endorsed the totality-of-circumstances analysis in other cases involving mental health and the question of voluntariness. See, e.g., State v. Mack, 255 Kan. 21, 32, 871 P.2d 1265 (1994); State v. Snodgrass, 252 Kan. 253, 259-62, 843 P.2d 720 (1992). The district court placed the burden of proof on the State and considered all of the evidence in determining the voluntariness of Caenen's statements. Caenen also reasons that under the totality of the circumstances, his incriminating statements were involuntary. He properly observes that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 162-63, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986). Factors to consider in determining whether a confession is voluntary are: (1) the accused's mental condition; (2) the manner and duration of the interrogation; (3) the ability of the accused on request to communicate with the outside world; (4) the accused's age, intellect and background; and (5) the fairness of the officers in conducting the investigation. McCorkendale, 267 Kan. at 270. Specifically, Caenen contends that the fact that he was diagnosed with a mental illness, paranoid schizophrenia, clearly shows that his statements were not a product of his free and independent will. However, he acknowledges that a mental disability does not, of itself, render a confession involuntary. Caenen observes that during interrogation, he consistently told officers that he was mind-altered. He argues that his mental illness caused an increased susceptibility to his interrogators' purportedly subtle, but coercive methods. He correctly asserts that coercion can be mental as well as physical. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207-08, 210-11, 4 L. Ed.2d 242, 80 S. Ct. 274 (1960) (finding that Blackburn was probably insane at the time of his confession, and evidence supported a finding that his confession was involuntary. Police tactics included eight-to nine-hour sustained interrogation in a tiny room which was upon occasion literally filled with police officers; the absence of Blackburn's friends, relatives, or legal counsel; [and] the composition of the confession by the Deputy Sheriff rather than by Blackburn.) Caenen points to no instances of coercion on the part of police officers. Although Detective Otis testified at the suppression hearing that Caenen talked to him several times about being mindaltered, Caenen's speech was clear. The detective said that several times, Caenen would begin to answer a question and then move into another story about his past or about his mind-alteredness. However, when Otis would direct him back to their current discussion, Caenen was able to follow. The first interview lasted 1 hour and 45 minutes, with two breaks of 5 or 10 minutes each. Caenen was interviewed by Otis and a second detective. Otis read Caenen his Miranda rights, and Caenen initialed each line of the Miranda form. Caenen said that he understood his rights. He told Otis that he had obtained a GED, served in the United States Navy, and received an honorable discharge. He also told the detective that he had several previous contacts with police. Otis said Caenen seemed a little edgy, moving around a little in his chair and tapping his fingers on the table. Otherwise, Caenen appeared to be fine. Otis testified that because Caenen made several references to having mental problems, it was decided that Otis would sit with Dr. Levine in a second interview the following day. Otis again read Caenen his Miranda rights. Caenen indicated that he remembered and understood his rights. He said he would talk. The interview conducted by Dr. Levine lasted just under 2 hours. During Dr. Levine's interview, Caenen had said that the detective might want to talk to him again. After Dr. Levine finished his interview, Caenen took a 10-to 15-minute break. Then, Detectives Otis and Ralph returned to the interview room to speak with Caenen again. This interview lasted about 1 hour and 15 minutes. Caenen had added some details to his story when talking to Dr. Levine, so Otis wanted to clarify the details. Caenen's demeanor remained the same. Caenen has shown neither coercive behavior nor unfairness on the part of the police. He points only to his mental illness as the deciding factor. Mental disability alone is not determinative of voluntariness. See Lane, 262 Kan. at 386. Substantial competent evidence supports the district court's finding that Caenen's statements were intelligent and voluntary. Caenen also argues that because of his mental illness, it cannot be concluded that he voluntarily, knowingly, or intelligently waived his Miranda rights. We disagree. Again, mental disability alone will not render such a waiver invalid. See Lane, 262 Kan. at 386.