Opinion ID: 2977284
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Willie’s Sentence

Text: Finally, Willie challenges the reasonableness of his sentence. During the sentencing hearing, the district court noted that Willie’s PSR assigned him an offense level of 26 and a criminal history category of III, resulting in a Guidelines range from 78 months to 97 months. Neither the Government nor Willie objected to the PSR, either in writing or at the hearing. Although mentioning that it had the opportunity to pursue a higher sentence for prior convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 851, the Government requested a sentence of 97 months. Pointing out that one of Willie’s 1988 convictions involved his leadership in a conspiracy to distribute marijuana from Mexico, the Government reasoned that “any subsequent sentence . . . should be at minimum as much as what he received before, otherwise the deterrence and punishment and those ends would not be met.” Willie’s counsel disagreed and sought a 78-month sentence due to Willie’s “limited” role in the conspiracy. During colloquy, the court concluded: THE COURT: Well, I’m going to accept the report and the guideline application there, and I did sit through the trial. I know the facts of this case, and I know what the facts are in this report. What was it; 300 and some odd pounds that were— GOVERNMENT: Eighty-six your Honor. THE COURT: 386, which sounds reasonable and appropriate to me. You’re not being saddled with 1,000 and some odd pounds like some of the others, so I think a guideline range of 78 to 97 is appropriate and reasonable, especially considering your prior history. And I do have to agree with Mr. Kinnicutt that I think if you recommit an offense after engaging in a similar conduct, your sentence ought to be more than it was before, and before you got 78 months; right? I think that’s what it was, followed by a four-year term of supervised release. - 17 - Nos. 07-5543 and 07-5544 United States v. Estrada and Villasenor Observing that the PSR associated Willie with 386 pounds of marijuana, the court concluded that the Guidelines range was “appropriate and reasonable,” and in light of Willie’s prior history and the Government’s argument that Willie ought to receive a higher sentence after the 1988 incident, the court assigned him to 97 months in prison.1 Willie contends that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable on two grounds: (1) the court failed to explain sufficiently under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) its decision to sentence him to the high end of the Guidelines range, rather than accounting for his “subsidiary role in the alleged conspiracy”; and (2) the court did not indicate that it applied the Guidelines as advisory. In assessing the reasonableness of a sentence, we review the district court’s sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007); United States v. Jeross, 521 F.3d 562, 569 (6th Cir. 2008). In a two-part analysis, we ask first whether the court made procedural errors, including “treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, . . . or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. Only after resolving procedural questions do we examine substantive reasonableness. Id. We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Willie. 1 The court did not ask whether either party had any objections after pronouncing Willie’s sentence and before adjourning the sentencing hearing, as required under United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872 (6th Cir. 2004). The court’s failure to do so ensures that Willie did not forfeit any objection and is not required to prove plain error on appeal. Id. - 18 - Nos. 07-5543 and 07-5544 United States v. Estrada and Villasenor First, the court sufficiently explained under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) its decision to sentence him to the high end (97 months) of the Guidelines range. As a foundational matter, a sentence like Willie’s that falls within the Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007); United States v. Duane, 533 F.3d 441, 453 (6th Cir. 2008). Willie fails to rebut this presumption. Although he argued at the hearing for a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range due to a limited role in the conspiracy, the court adequately examined the § 3553(a) factors and explained more compelling reasons to assign the higher sentence.2 The court analyzed the “nature and circumstances of the offense,” § 3553(a)(1), and found that a Guidelines range of 78 to 97 months was “appropriate and reasonable” given responsibility for 386 pounds of marijuana. Likewise, the court reflected on the sentence’s ability to “afford adequate deterrence,” § 3553(a)(2), and after noting that the prior sentence was for 78 months, agreed with the Government’s reasoning that recommitting a past offense ought to result in a higher sentence. Although the court did not respond directly to Willie’s limited-role argument, the fact that Willie failed to object and seek a downward departure, and that the court discussed the relevant § 3553(a) factors, sufficiently explains the sentence. See Duane, 533 F.3d at 452 (not requiring a “ritualistic incantation” of each of the § 3553(a) factors) (quoting United States v. Trejo-Martinez, 481 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 2007)). 2 Willie’s argument is even less compelling because he failed to object to the probation officer’s calculation of his offense level, which included finding no adjustment for having a minor role in the offense. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). - 19 - Nos. 07-5543 and 07-5544 United States v. Estrada and Villasenor Second, although the court did not expressly describe the Guidelines as advisory, there is no indication that the court failed to treat them as such. As Willie himself notes, an explicit statement that the Guidelines are advisory is unnecessary. See United States v. Bailey, 488 F.3d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e refuse [the defendant’s] request to create an automatic-remand rule whenever the district court does not explicitly acknowledge that the Guidelines are advisory.”). In Bailey, a panel of this court required the appellant to “marshal evidence in support of the position that the district court actually failed to apply the Guidelines as advisory” in order to succeed on this type of appeal. Id. Here, Willie merely summarily states that “there was no demonstration that the district court applied the Guidelines as advisory.” Willie can point to no statement suggesting that the court treated the Guidelines as anything but advisory; finding no meaningful argument to the contrary, we affirm his sentence.