Opinion ID: 706088
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Likely to be Deceived

Text: 16 [T]o state a claim under the [UBPA] one need not plead and prove the elements of a tort. Instead, one need only show that 'members of the public are likely to be deceived.'  Bank of the West, 2 Cal.4th at 1267, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538, 833 P.2d 545 (quoting Chern v. Bank of America, 15 Cal.3d 866, 876, 127 Cal.Rptr. 110, 544 P.2d 1310 (1976)). Freeman argues that to demonstrate that members of the public are likely to be deceived he need show only that some members of the public, such as the elderly, minors or the mentally disadvantaged, are likely to be deceived. Time argues that the court must consider whether a person of ordinary intelligence would be misled. 17 In a virtually identical case involving the same Time promotion, the district court rejected the plaintiff's proposed unwary consumer standard in favor of a reasonable person standard. Haskell v. Time. Inc., 857 F.Supp. 1392, 1398 (E.D.Cal.1994) (dismissing claims for false or misleading advertising and unfair competition); see also State Board of Funeral Directors, 271 Cal.App.2d at 642, 76 Cal.Rptr. 832 (applying standard of what a person of ordinary intelligence would conclude in false advertising case); Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. High Fidelity Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551, 557 (9th Cir.1960) (applying standard of the eye of the ordinary purchaser to the interpretation of unfair competition and misleading advertising under California law). 18 An ordinary person standard is not inconsistent with the standard of Bank of the West--to determine whether members of the public are likely to be deceived the court must apply some standard. Plaintiff admits that California courts have looked to interpretations of similar provisions in federal law under the Federal Trade Commission Act. AOB at 13. Haskell noted that [s]ince 1982 the FTC has interpreted 'deception' in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to require a showing of 'potential deception of consumers acting reasonably in the circumstances,' not just any consumers. 857 F.Supp. at 1399 (quoting Southwest Sunsites, Inc. v. FTC, 785 F.2d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir.1986)). Haskell further noted that 19 the reasonable person standard is well ensconced in the law in a variety of legal contexts in which a claim of deception is brought. It is the standard for false advertising and unfair competition under the Lanham Act, for securities fraud, for deceit and misrepresentation and for common law unfair competition. This list no doubt could be much expanded. 20 Id. at 1398 (citations omitted). [B]y explicitly imposing a 'reasonable care' standard on advertisers, Sec. 17500 implicitly adopts such a standard for consumers as well: unless particularly gullible consumers are targeted, a reasonable person may expect others to behave reasonably as well. Id. at 1399; Compare Committee on Children's Television, 35 Cal.3d 197, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660 (defendant's advertisements for sugar-filled cereals were targeted at children). In this case, the mailings were sent to millions of persons and there is no allegation that a particularly vulnerable group was targeted. [I]n view of the allegations here, the false or misleading advertising and unfair business practices claim must be evaluated from the vantage of a reasonable consumer. Haskell, 857 F.Supp. at 1399. 21 Freeman argues that his complaint adequately alleges that members of the public would be deceived, since it is likely that the reader will review the large print and ignore the qualifying language in small print. This argument is not persuasive. The promotions expressly and repeatedly state the conditions which must be met in order to win. None of the qualifying language is hidden or unreadably small. The qualifying language appears immediately next to the representations it qualifies and no reasonable reader could ignore it. Any persons who thought that they had won the sweepstakes would be put on notice that this was not guaranteed simply by doing sufficient reading to comply with the instructions for entering the sweepstakes. 22 Freeman further contends that the qualifying language in the promotion, even if read by the recipient, is ambiguous. He argues, for example, that the statement If you return the grand prize winning number we'll officially announce that [you have won] leaves room for the reader to draw an inference that he or she has the winning number. Such an inference is unreasonable in the context of the entire document. In dismissing the complaint against Time in Haskell, the court noted that such statements, in context, are not misleading. It is clear from the exemplar that no reasonable addressee could believe that the mailing announced that the addressee was already the winner.... 857 F.Supp. at 1403. We agree. Any ambiguity that Freeman would read into any particular statement is dispelled by the promotion as a whole. 23 Freeman argues that, although he did not plead it, his complaint states a claim for violation of provisions governing the operation of certain contests found in Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code Sec. 17539.1(a)(8). This section prohibits representing directly or by implication that the number of participants has been significantly limited, or that any particular person has been selected to win a prize unless such is the fact. This code section, however, clearly does not apply to the contest in question--the section is limited to a contest involving skill or any combination of chance and skill and which is, or in whole or part may be, conditioned upon the payment of consideration. Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code Sec. 17539.3(e). The entry here expressly notes that no payment or purchase is necessary to win. 24 Freeman failed to state a claim that the promotions violated the UBPA; therefore, the district court's dismissal of such claims is affirmed.