Opinion ID: 1149985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: false grand jury testimony

Text: Another point presented by McMahan's appeal is whether the indictment of first degree murder against him is defective because of false police testimony to the grand jury. Police Chief Bagron testified before the grand jury that he had gone to the scene of the shooting and that he had been present while the body was still there. He was asked by a grand juror if he had noticed whether there had been a knife on the counter of the apartment or anywhere near the body. Bagron answered, Yes I  I did. There were  there was no sign of a knife or sheath or any other weapon. Immediately afterward the following questioning occurred: Q. Did you go through the deceased's clothing? A. Yes, I did. Q. Was there a pocketknife? A. No, sir. At trial Bagron contradicted his grand jury testimony. He testified that, in removing the personal effects from Gribble's body, he found a folded jackknife [13] in one of Gribble's pockets. McMahan contends that Bagron's false grand jury testimony requires dismissal of the indictment. He argues that, if Bagron had testified accurately, the grand jury might have found the homicide legally justified as an act of self-defense and refused to return an indictment, or that the grand jury might have charged only second degree murder or manslaughter on the ground that the defendant's belief regarding harm to himself was reasonable. We considered the question of when false grand jury testimony requires dismissal of an indictment in Keith v. State, 612 P.2d 977 (Alaska 1980). We held that the standards for evaluating attacks on an indictment set forth in Taggard v. State, 500 P.2d 238 (Alaska 1972), were applicable: The indictment is the foundation underlying a criminal prosecution. If the indictment is seriously flawed, the conviction cannot stand. A mere formal defect does not require dismissal of an indictment after the guilt of the defendant has been established at a fair trial. But courts do not hesitate to dismiss an indictment, even after a conviction, when the defect in the indictment is substantial. The conviction must be overturned when an indictment is invalid and the error was properly preserved by a timely objection prior to trial. Taggard, 500 P.2d at 243 (footnotes omitted), quoted in Keith, 612 P.2d at 980-81. Assuming that the objection was properly preserved at trial, [14] we must determine whether the defect was substantial. In Keith this court noted that the giving of false grand jury testimony apparently had been unintentional. We held that if the unintentional misstatement goes to a nonmaterial fact that would not substantially affect the grand jury's conclusion, it would not be reversible error. Keith, 612 P.2d at 981. In this case it is not clear whether the giving of false testimony was unintentional. [15] Nevertheless, we believe that under Taggard the indictment stands, unless the misstatement would substantially affect the grand jury's conclusion. See Taggard v. State, 500 P.2d 238, 243 (Alaska 1972). The presence of a folded pocketknife in the deceased's pocket does not substantiate any theory of self-defense. Therefore, Bagron's misstatement is not so material as to require dismissal of the indictment. We have earlier held that the prosecutor has a duty to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury pursuant to Criminal Rule 6(q). Frink v. State, 597 P.2d 154, 164-66 (Alaska 1979). We need not decide whether the prosecutor is charged under Rule 6(q) with the police chief's knowledge [16] because the evidence of the pocketknife was not so material that it reasonably tended to negate McMahan's guilt. See Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d 737, 744 (Alaska 1980).