Opinion ID: 1882329
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the lower court erred in disallowing the hypothetical of expert dr. joseph eicke.

Text: ¶ 32. Prior to trial, the grandparents retained the services of Dr. Joseph Eicke, a psychologist, who counseled with Lori and the child. Lori testified that part of the reason she saw Dr. Eicke initially was to stop the Georgia visitation between Jeff and the child. The chancellor heard Dr. Eicke's lengthy testimony; however, Dr. Eicke did not testify as to what is in the best interest of the child in respect to placement in either the grandparents' home or Jeff's home. ¶ 33. The grandparents assert that Dr. Eicke's testimony was necessary because [t]he statute requires the testimony (affidavit) of a doctor, which was not submitted as evidence in this case. The grandparents are mistaken about the statutory requirements. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-17-3 (Supp.2000) states: The petition [for adoption] shall be accompanied by a doctor's or nurse practitioner's certificate showing the physical and mental condition of the child to be adopted.... Jeff complied with this element of the statute. ¶ 34. A doctor's testimony is not required by statute, as asserted by the grandparents. Nevertheless, Dr. Eicke's testimony was heard by the chancellor. It is a specific omission from this testimony that is apparently of concern to the grandparents and is the topic of this assignment of error. That is, Dr. Eicke did not testify as to what is in the best interest of the child in respect to placement in either the grandparents' home or Jeff's home. The grandparents address this issue as the chancellor's error, when, in fact, Dr. Eicke took the initiative in the matter by refusing to testify on this point since he had not evaluated all the parties involved. The following exchange took place between Dr. Eicke and the chancellor: Dr. Eicke: And the prevailing standard is that a person would evaluate the totalall the individuals involved, and I have not done that. I mean, I fullyI fully recognize that I have not had contact other than on one brief occasion The Court: And that's the prevailing so I understand, that's the prevailing standard to enable someone insituated as you are, qualified as you are, to express an opinion about custody issues. Is that what you're saying? Dr. Eicke: That's right. The Court: And you have not followed that standard yourself in this case because you have not talked to all of the parties. Is that what you're saying? Dr. Eicke: That's right. Later, Dr. Eicke testified as follows: Ms. Milner: And so that we can get the roles straight here, you are in a therapy position, meaning you have been seeing the child as a therapist; right? Dr. Eicke: Yes. Ms. Milner: Not a custody evaluator, not an adoption evaluator, not to determine what is in the best interest of this child with reference to a placement in either the [grandparents'] home or [Jeff's] home; right? Dr. Eicke: That's right. Ms. Milner: And, in fact, you are precluded by doing that if you're going to abide by the guidelines that are in your profession? Dr. Eicke: I think I have purposely avoided making any statements about [the adoptive father] without some reference to statements made to me or such.    Ms. Milner: And the person that is best ableat least according to the guidelines, is best able to determine when a custody change should occur or an adoption is a person who has seen all parties; correct? Dr. Eicke: That's what I've testified to, and that's what I adhere to. ¶ 35. The grandparents attempted to circumvent Dr. Eicke's inability to give an opinion on this issue by posing a hypothetical question which was inappropriately phrased and did not pass muster according to the chancellor. Counsel for the grandparents asked Dr. Eicke to base part of his opinion on his actual knowledge and experience with the parties he had evaluated and the remaining part on a hypothetical specific to Jeff, whom he had not evaluated. The chancellor sustained Jeff's objection and informed the grandparents' attorney that it's all or nothing when posing hypothetical questions. ¶ 36. The grandparents assert that the chancellor abused his discretion in not allowing a hypothetical. Such methods of eliciting expert testimony are permitted in this state. See, e.g., Gray v. State, 728 So.2d 36 (Miss.1998). However, we will not permit the use of ill-phrased hypothetical questions as a means of circumventing a chancellor's sound ruling disallowing inadmissible testimony. Such is what the grandparents attempted to do here. ¶ 37. Further, even if the chancellor did abuse his discretion in this matter, the error was harmless. Dr. Eicke was allowed to testify as follows: Mr. Buchanan: Okay. Just so we don't misunderstand each other, my question is your opinion as to whether or not [the grandparents] are suitable as adoptive parents for this child.    Dr. Eicke: I would restate my previous statement, that, in my opinion, the [grandparents] are more than adequate as parents for this young child and have done what I consider to be an admirable job to this date. Thus, though Dr. Eicke was unable to compare the grandparents' parenting capabilities to Jeff's, he was, nonetheless, allowed to give an opinion placing the grandparents in a favorable light. And, in fact, the chancellor granted adoptive rights to the grandmother and physical custody to the grandparents. This fact indicates that the chancellor gave considerable weight to Dr. Eicke's opinion. It also indicates that the purposes of the proposed but disallowed hypothetical were primarily accomplished in the end. That is, the grandparents were able to convince the chancellor that they were the better choice for placement of the child. They were unable to convince him, however, that they should be the sole parties to adopt the child. ¶ 38. For the foregoing reasons, any error committed by the chancellor was harmless. We find no merit to this assignment of error.