Opinion ID: 1168333
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did Bayless Reasonably Rely on Garcia's Opinion?

Text: The court of appeals believed the trial court found that Bayless, by the time of trial, had relied on Garcia's opinions at least to some degree. Lundstrom, 157 Ariz. at 490, 759 P.2d at 636. The question of whether an expert relied on out-of-court material and if that reliance is reasonable is one within the trial court's discretion. Rule 104; Rule 703, Comment; J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence § 703[03], at 703-16 (1988) (hereafter Weinstein). That Bayless's reliance on Garcia's opinion was reasonable cannot seriously be disputed. See Hernandez, 137 Ariz. at 454, 671 P.2d at 432 (testifying expert may reasonably rely on medical opinions of a non-testifying doctor); M. Udall & J. Livermore, Arizona Practice  Law of Evidence § 23, at 12 (2d ed. Supp. 1989) (hereafter Udall) (It is hard to say ... that it is not reasonable [for experts] to rely on ... shared opinions). One doctor's reliance on the report or opinion of another qualified doctor is practically the paradigm of reasonable reliance. See Rule 703, Fed.R. Evid., Advisory Committee Note. The state, however, challenges whether Bayless actually relied on Garcia's opinion. See Sharman v. Skaggs Co., 124 Ariz. 165, 169, 602 P.2d 833, 837 (Ct.App. 1979) (hearsay opinions not considered by testifying expert are inadmissible). Bayless's testimony unequivocally indicates his normal practice when performing psychological evaluations is to consult with other experts. For Bayless not to have considered information from Garcia after their accidental encounter would be surprising indeed. Garcia was, after all, the first psychiatrist to examine Lundstrom after the crime. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that Bayless reasonably relied on Garcia's substantiating opinion as part of the foundation for his trial testimony, if not for his pre trial written report. Moreover, defense counsel at in-chambers argument drew this clear distinction between what Bayless relied on in preparation for his written report and what he relied on for his trial testimony. The distinction is proper: Rule 703 allows an expert to utilize facts or data made known to him at or before the trial; the text does not confine the expert to those facts made known to him and relied on by him for the preparation of a report. We realize this interpretation of Rule 703 creates the potential for unfair surprise at trial. For instance, in this case the record suggests that Bayless's reference to his reliance on Garcia's opinion was completely impromptu and unforeshadowed by any pretrial disclosure. Such disclosure may have been required by Rules 15.2(c)(2) and 15.6, Ariz.R.Crim.P., 17 A.R.S. If the state was in fact surprised, [6] ordinarily the proper remedy would include a sufficient recess to allow the state to reinterview Bayless, interview Garcia, and perhaps, if the prosecutor wished, call Garcia as a rebuttal witness. See Weinstein, § 703[03], at 703-33 (suggesting Rules 611(b) and (c) allow an opposing party to call the authors of opinions relied on by testifying experts and examine them by cross-examination). The record does not disclose that the state made such a request. Bayless relied on Garcia's medical opinion for his trial testimony. That reliance was reasonable. Thus, if another doctor's concurring opinion is a fact or datum within the meaning of the expert opinion rules, the trial court erred by limiting Bayless's testimony to the bare fact of his consultation with Garcia. 2. Is a Non-Testifying Expert's Concurring Opinion a Disclosable Fact or Datum within the Meaning of the Evidentiary Rules? The history of the rules is silent on this issue. See Udall, § 23, at 11 (2d ed.Supp. 1989). The original Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 703, Fed.R.Evid., states that a testifying expert may base his opinion on `reports and opinions from ... other doctors....' Weinstein, § 703[03], at 703-3 (quoting Advisory Committee Note) (emphasis added). A testifying expert may rely on the opinions of other experts if such reliance is the kind of material on which experts in the field base their opinions. Lewis v. Rego, 757 F.2d 66, 74 (3d Cir.1985); Hernandez, 137 Ariz. at 453-54, 671 P.2d at 431-32; see also United States v. Phillips, 515 F. Supp. 758, 762-63 (E.D.Ky. 1981); Weinstein, § 703[03], at 703-25 n. 23; Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring Adequate Assurances of Trustworthiness, 1986 U.Ill.L.Rev. 43, 64. The question becomes whether the substance of the other expert's opinion may be disclosed to the trier of fact. In Lewis, the plaintiff's expert testified on direct that in forming his professional opinions he normally relied in part on conversations with colleagues possessing similar technical backgrounds. He indicated he did so in this case and identified the other non-testifying expert by name. On the basis of that conversation and his own expertise, he rendered an opinion. When plaintiff's counsel asked the expert if there was any agreement between him and the non-testifying expert, the court sustained the defendant's objection. 757 F.2d at 73-74. On appeal, the court of appeals held the trial court erred in precluding, without apparent reason, the full development of the bases of the testifying expert's opinion, including the substance of the testifying expert's conversation with the non-testifying expert. Id. at 74. In Hernandez, the court overruled the hearsay objection and allowed the expert to testify about certain conclusions found in another expert's report. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that a conclusion of a non-testifying expert was a fact within the meaning of Rule 703 and could be disclosed to the factfinder. 137 Ariz. at 453-54, 671 P.2d at 431-32. See also Graham, supra, 1986 U.Ill.L.Rev. at 65 (underlying facts and opinions may be disclosed to factfinder). In Phillips, the court permitted the expert to testify to the contents of a non-testifying expert's report on which he relied. 515 F. Supp. at 762-63. This is analogous to Bayless's reliance on Garcia's verbal report and then relaying the substance of that report to the jury for the limited purpose of revealing the basis for his opinion. One objective of the expert opinion rules is to conform court practice to reality. See Rule 703, Fed.R.Evid., Advisory Committee Note. Experts in all professions sometimes rely on the opinions of other experts. See id. In the real world, the surgeon at the operating table may rely on the nurse's report of the pathologist's opinion of the frozen section of tissue before deciding on the type of procedure necessary to complete the surgery. Surely, then, the doctor in the courtroom may rely on his colleagues' opinions in completing his trial testimony. Triers of fact must have foundational information to assess adequately the weight to be given an expert opinion. See Udall, § 23, at 37 (2d ed. 1982). We agree that under most circumstances an expert may testify as to the substance of another expert's opinion if the testifying expert reasonably relied on that other opinion in forming his own opinion. The fact that Garcia's diagnosis either paralleled or diverged from Bayless's is crucial. Garcia saw, observed, and evaluated Lundstrom at the county jail the day after the shooting and assigned him to a psychiatric ward. Bayless, retained as an expert long after the event, was subject to attack on the retrospective nature of his opinion. Thus, on cross-examination, when the prosecutor challenged Bayless's high degree of certainty about his diagnosis, Bayless properly invoked Garcia's concurrence as support for that certainty. Moreover, to reveal the substance of Garcia's opinion is not to reveal hearsay. Facts or data underlying the testifying expert's opinion are admissible for the limited purpose of showing the bases of that opinion, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Lynn, 144 Ariz. at 568, 698 P.2d at 1287. Thus Bayless's testimony that Garcia concurred in his diagnosis was not evidence that Lundstrom was insane, but only a partial basis for Bayless's opinion. See Jefferis v. Marzano, 298 Or. 782, 791-95, 696 P.2d 1087, 1093-95 (1985) (expert's enumeration of specific doctors and institutions practicing medical procedure at issue was admissible as a basis for expert's opinion and was not impermissible hearsay); Graham, supra, 1986 U.Ill.L.Rev. at 66. Pursuant to Rule 105, the state could have sought a limiting instruction to this effect but did not do so. Readenour v. Marion Power Shovel, 149 Ariz. 442, 450, 719 P.2d 1058, 1066 (1986) (once evidence is admitted for a limited purpose it is error for the court to fail to give the requested limiting instructions). We note the dangers lurking in our interpretation of Rule 703 and we add, therefore, that the right to disclose the bases of an expert opinion on direct examination is not absolute. Under Rule 403, a trial court may weigh the value of admitting the facts or data sought to be disclosed as a basis of an expert opinion against the dangers of unfair prejudice arising from such disclosure. Weinstein, § 703[03], at 703-31. The record does not indicate the trial judge precluded Bayless's references pursuant to the balancing test found in Rule 403. Nor apparently was he asked to do so. Instead, the trial judge appears to have enunciated an unyielding rule of law. We caution also that if the testifying expert merely acts as a conduit for another non-testifying expert's opinion, the expert opinion is hearsay and is inadmissible, Rule 703 notwithstanding. Id. at 703-25 n. 23; see also United States v. Williams, 431 F.2d 1168, 1172 (5th Cir.1970) (applying pre-Rule 703 law, an expert who consults and merely summarizes the content of a hearsay source without applying his own expertise is merely a hearsay witness). [7]