Opinion ID: 1999277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions under Ind.R.Crim.P. 4. While the defendant was arrested on February 6, 1978, an information was not filed against him until February 14, 1978. Thus, the State had until February 14, 1979, to bring the defendant to trial. Ind.R.Crim.P. 4(C). In this case, the jury was not sworn until April 18, 1979. The extraordinary delay of sixty-three (63) days must therefore be accounted for. The defendant's argument is two-pronged: first, that the trial court erred in failing to order his release from jail when he was not brought to trial within six months of the date the charges were filed against him, see Ind.R.Crim.P. 4(A); and second, that the trial court erred in denying his motion for discharge because of the failure to bring him to trial within one year of the date the charges were filed against him, see Ind.R.Crim.P. 4(C). Both facets of the argument are without merit. As to the defendant's assignment relative to Ind.R.Crim.P. 4(A), it is well-settled that a violation of that section presents nothing on appeal. See, e.g., Fryback v. State, (1980) Ind., 400 N.E.2d 1128; Collins v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 430, 364 N.E.2d 750; Lewis v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 288, 342 N.E.2d 859. Proceeding to the defendant's assignment relative to his motion for discharge under Ind.R.Crim.P. 4(C), that section provides: Defendant discharged. No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge, whichever is later; except where a continuance was had on his motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such period because of congestion of the court calendar; provided, however, that in the last-mentioned circumstance, the prosecuting attorney shall file a timely motion for continuance as under subdivision (A) of this rule. Any defendant so held shall, on motion, be discharged. As mentioned hereinbefore, the defendant was not brought to trial for sixty-three days beyond the expiration of the one year period. However, a delay of at least seventy-one days was attributable to the defendant. First, on June 22, 1978, he filed a motion for a change of venue. The motion was granted and the case subsequently transferred to Hancock County, where the transcript was duly received and docketed on July 28, 1978: a delay of thirty-six days. See Nettles v. State, (1975) 164 Ind. App. 205, 327 N.E.2d 625. See also State ex rel. Garvin v. Dearborn Circuit Court, (1972) 257 Ind. 631, 277 N.E.2d 370; State v. Grow, (1970) 255 Ind. 183, 263 N.E.2d 277. Second, on August 31, 1978, the defendant filed a joint motion for continuance of the September 5, 1978 trial date. The motion was granted and trial was reset for October 10, 1978: a delay of thirty-five days. Because seventy-one days of the delay were attributable to the defendant, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for discharge.