Opinion ID: 199507
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: presentence waivers of appellate rights

Text: 17 We divide this portion of our opinion into three segments. First, we discuss the validity in general of presentence waivers of appellate rights. Next, we explore the specific criteria and conditions that must be met in order for such waivers to be effective, as well as the general power of appellate courts to override such waivers in the interests of justice. Finally, we assay the waiver at issue here. 18
19 The basic argument against presentence waivers of appellate rights is that such waivers are anticipatory: at the time the defendant signs the plea agreement, she does not have a clue as to the nature and magnitude of the sentencing errors that may be visited upon her. Her waiver typically embraces all determinations later made by the sentencing court - some of which may never have occurred either to her or to the government, and some of which may be quite different than either thought possible. In a certain sense, then - though not in the usual criminal law sense - a waiver of the right to appeal cannot be knowing. In the appellant's view, this is a fundamental defect - and one that distinguishes presentence waivers of appellate rights from other waivers contained in a plea agreement. 20 We are not unsympathetic to this argument. Withal, three reasons counsel persuasively in favor of a rule that accords general validity to presentence waivers of appellate rights. 3 First, waivers are not inherently suspect in criminal cases any more than in civil cases. Criminal defendants typically may waive their rights, as long as they do so voluntarily and with knowledge of the general nature and consequences of the waiver. See Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942) (discussing waiver of right to jury trial); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-67 (1938) (discussing waiver of right to counsel). Indeed, guilty pleas are a staple of our criminal justice system - and a guilty plea inevitably entails a waiver of numerous rights. Although many of these waivers pertain to future events - a waiver of the right to trial by jury is a good example - their prospective nature has never been thought to place them off limits or to render the defendant's act unknowing. 21 Moreover, the idea of permitting presentence waivers of appellate rights seems relatively tame because the right to appeal in a criminal case is not of constitutional magnitude. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). Since the Supreme Court repeatedly has ruled that a defendant may waive constitutional rights as part of a plea agreement, e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 393 (1987); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752-53 (1970), it follows logically that a defendant ought to be able to waive rights that are purely creatures of statute. 22 The Criminal Rules themselves lend support to this conclusion. Effective December 1, 1999, the Supreme Court, with the approval of Congress, amended the Criminal Rules to provide specifically that, during a change-of-plea hearing, the presiding judge must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands . . . the terms of any provision in a plea agreement waiving the right to appeal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(6). While the advisory committee, in its explanatory note, made clear that it took no position on the underlying validity of such waivers, it recognized that they had become an accepted part of federal plea-agreement practice. See id., advisory committee notes. This widespread acceptance of the practice is itself a clear indication that those who deal most frequently with criminal cases have come to conclude that presentence waivers of appellate rights are not forbidden. 23 Considerations of public policy furnish a second pillar on which to rest a holding that breathes vitality into presentence waivers of appellate rights. Since criminal defendants are entitled to appeal convictions and sentences as a matter of statutory right, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, a defendant is unlikely to waive this right unless she believes that some feature of a proffered plea agreement makes it worth her while to do so. Allowing a criminal defendant to agree to a waiver of appeal gives her an additional bargaining chip in negotiations with the prosecution; she may, for example, be able to exchange this waiver for the government's assent to the dismissal of other charges. This benefit is very real; in some cases the government, without such a waiver, might not be willing to plea-bargain at all. 24 The benefit to the prosecution - conservation of resources -is obvious. 4 In the same vein, presentence waivers of appellate rights also husband judicial resources by discouraging groundless sentencing appeals. With court-appointed counsel freely available and nothing to lose by trying, a defendant, unfettered by a waiver agreement, is quite likely to appeal on a wing and a prayer. Reducing the number of baseless appeals promotes both efficiency and finality in the adjudication of criminal cases. 5 25 These policy considerations properly factor into our assessment of presentence waivers of appellate rights. Cf. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 117 (2000) (We allow waiver of numerous constitutional protections for criminal defendants that also serve broader social interests.). They indicate that the government, the defendant, and the judicial system all have something to gain from presentence waivers of appellate rights. This makes the device attractive: broadly speaking, plea agreements are in the best interests of the parties and the criminal justice system, United States v. Penta, 898 F.2d 815, 817 (1st Cir. 1990); Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1973), and the more options that both sides have, the more likely it is that they will reach an accord. 26 The third reason supporting a rule that accords validity to presentence waivers of appellate rights is the sheer weight of authority. On a close question, where no obviously right or wrong answer exists, courts of appeals should strive to avoid creating needless conflicts. In this instance, presentence waivers of appellate rights have been accepted by all nine of the circuit courts which have passed upon their validity. See United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761, 763-64 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Jemison, 237 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Nguyen, 235 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Cuevas-Andrade, 232 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Black, 201 F.3d 1296, 1300 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1168 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Michelsen, 141 F.3d 867, 871 (8th Cir. 1998). While these courts set varying boundaries, they all agree that, under ordinary circumstances, a knowing, voluntary waiver of the right to appeal from a sentence, contained in a plea agreement, ought to be enforced. 6 Absent some convincing countervailing argument - and we are aware of none - we are reluctant to brush aside this collective wisdom. Thus, this unanimity strongly suggests that such waivers, if appropriately drafted, asserted to, and explained, should be honored. 27 We will not paint the lily. Given the general availability of waivers in criminal cases, the public policy gains to be reaped by allowing plea-agreement waivers of appellate rights, and the impressive body of precedent sanctioning such waivers, we hold that presentence waivers of appellate rights are valid in theory. 28
29 We do not lend our imprimatur to such waivers indiscriminately. There are obvious dangers attendant to the practice. Sentences ultimately are imposed by the district courts, which must make sentencing determinations under controlling law. When a district court errs in sentencing, that error may be manifest on the record. Thus, in addition to concerns about fairness to the defendant, an institutional interest - public confidence in the judicial system - may be adversely affected if such errors go uncorrected. To ameliorate these risks, we deem it appropriate that such waivers meet stringent criteria. Even then, we think that limits must be set on the effect that can be given to them. It is to those criteria and conditions that we now turn. 30 The baseline for any waiver of rights is that the defendant enter into it knowingly and voluntarily. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 394. In the plea-bargain context, the text of the plea agreement and the content of the change-of-plea colloquy are critically important to a determination of knowledge and volition. See, e.g., United States v. Parrilla-Tirado, 22 F.3d 368, 373 (1st Cir. 1994) (examining both the text of the plea agreement and the change-of-plea colloquy to determine whether a guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily). Like other courts, e.g., Jemison, 237 F.3d at 916-18; Nguyen, 235 F.3d at 1182-83, we will consult those sources in determining the validity of a particular presentence waiver of appellate rights. 31 We look first to confirm that the written plea agreement signed by the defendant contains a clear statement elucidating the waiver and delineating its scope. E.g., Fleming, 239 F.3d at 762; Brown, 232 F.3d at 401. Mindful that Rule 11(c)(6), quoted supra at 22, specifically recognizes the importance of the change-of-plea hearing to any waiver of appellate rights, we next will examine the transcript of that hearing. The focus of this inquiry is to ascertain whether the court's interrogation suffices to ensure that the defendant freely and intelligently agreed to waive her right to appeal her forthcoming sentence. 32 In respect to presentence waivers of appellate rights, several courts had held, without reference to the neoteric provisions of Rule 11(c)(6), that the district judge must question the defendant specifically about her understanding of the waiver provision and adequately inform her of its ramifications. E.g., Jemison, 237 F.3d at 917-18; Brown, 232 F.3d at 401-02, 405-06. While some courts previously had held waivers of appellate rights to be valid despite the absence of specific questioning during the change-of-plea colloquy, e.g., Michelsen, 141 F.3d at 871-72; United States v. Wenger, 58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir. 1995), these decisions antedate the adoption of Rule 11(c)(6). That rule - which was in force when Teeter changed her plea - alters the decisional calculus. In explicating the rationale for adopting the rule, the advisory committee made it pellucid that such an inquiry, properly performed, offers considerable assurance of the defendant's knowledge and volition. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(6), advisory committee notes. Consequently, we hold that the district court must inquire specifically at the change-of-the-plea hearing into any waiver of appellate rights. 7 Neglecting this duty will constitute error and may serve to invalidate the waiver, depending upon what the record shows as to the defendants' knowledge (that is, whether the defendant, notwithstanding the absence of a particularized inquiry, understood the full significance of the waiver) and the existence vel non of prejudice. See United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 1993); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h). 33 Of course, courts ought to strive for consistency. While not necessarily a fatal error, a court can compromise an otherwise adequate change-of-plea colloquy by sending contradictory messages to the defendant. One potential source of confusion looms when the trial court, acting pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(5), 8 tells the defendant at sentencing about her right to appeal. If a presentence waiver of appellate rights is in place, the court should be especially careful in its choice of words, taking pains to explain to the defendant that her right to appeal is circumscribed by her pre-existing waiver. 34 One court has held that a blanket assurance about the right of appeal, delivered when sentence is pronounced, cancels a pre-existing waiver of appellate rights. United States v. Buchanan, 59 F.3d 914, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the sentencing court's statement created a reasonable expectation on the defendant's part that he could appeal his sentence, notwithstanding the pre-existing waiver). Other courts have disagreed, e.g., United States v. Atterberry, 144 F.3d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1998); Michelsen, 141 F.3d at 872, and so do we. While broad assurances to a defendant who has waived her appellate rights (e.g., you have a right to appeal your sentence) are to be avoided -they muddy the waters and tend to instill false hope - they do not effect a per se nullification of a plea-agreement waiver of appellate rights. Whether such assurances may constitute reversible error in particular cases, and if so when, are matters that may be left for another day. 35 We add a coda. We have endeavored to provide general guidance to the district courts and the bar concerning plea-agreement waivers of appellate rights. We caution, however, that because such waivers are made before any manifestation of sentencing error emerges, appellate courts must remain free to grant relief from them in egregious cases. When all is said and done, such waivers are meant to bring finality to proceedings conducted in the ordinary course, not to leave acquiescent defendants totally exposed to future vagaries (however harsh, unfair, or unforeseeable). Our basic premise, therefore, is that if denying a right of appeal would work a miscarriage of justice, the appellate court, in its sound discretion, may refuse to honor the waiver. 9 As a subset of this premise, we think that the same flexibility ought to pertain when the district court plainly errs in sentencing. 10 36 In sum, we conclude that plea-agreement waivers of the right to appeal from imposed sentences are presumptively valid (if knowing and voluntary), but are subject to a general exception under which the court of appeals retains inherent power to relieve the defendant of the waiver, albeit on terms that are just to the government, where a miscarriage of justice occurs. In charting this course, we recognize that the term miscarriage of justice is more a concept than a constant. Nevertheless, some of the considerations come readily to mind: the clarity of the error, its gravity, its character (e.g., whether it concerns a fact issue, a sentencing guideline, or a statutory maximum), the impact of the error on the defendant, the impact of correcting the error on the government, and the extent to which the defendant acquiesced in the result. Other considerations doubtless will suggest themselves in specific cases. 37 We recognize, too, that this general reservation will, at least at the outset, lessen what the government sees as the prime benefit of its bargain: the automatic cutoff of debate and the opportunity to get appeals dismissed on motion. Realistically, however, the outlook is not entirely bleak. While open-ended, the general reservation that we envision will be applied sparingly and without undue generosity. Motions to dismiss will still be entertained and, by appealing after promising not to do so, defendants will risk giving the government an option to disclaim a plea agreement, if it wishes to do so. 38 We acknowledge that this approach represents a break with precedent. Although several of our sister circuits have made clear, in approving presentence waivers, that there will be only narrowly circumscribed exceptions, e.g., Jemison, 237 F.3d at 911; Brown, 232 F.3d at 403; Michelsen, 141 F.3d at 872, we do not feel comfortable adopting any rigid taxonomy without more experience. Relief from waivers has traditionally occurred on a fact-specific basis. We believe that the general reservation which we adopt today is sufficiently broad to capture any truly deserving case but demanding enough to prevent defendants who have agreed to waive their right to appeal from successfully pursuing garden-variety claims of error. 39
40 Having constructed a framework for determining when waivers of appellate rights will be enforced, we ponder the waiver in this case. The following language appears in paragraph five of the plea agreement: 41 The Defendant is aware that 18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a) affords a defendant the right to appeal the sentence imposed. Knowing that, in exchange for the Government's concessions made herein, the Defendant waives to the full extent of the law any right to appeal . . . the conviction and sentence, or the manner in which it was determined . . . . 42 This explicit text is followed by a statement acknowledging the appellant's voluntary acceptance of the entire plea agreement and confirming that she has read and understood it. The appellant and her attorney signed the document immediately beneath this acknowledgment. These desiderata furnish prima facie evidence of the appellant's knowledge and volition. 43 What occurred next is somewhat more problematic. During the change-of-plea colloquy, the district court questioned the appellant concerning her overall understanding of, and acquiescence in, the terms of the plea agreement, but did not direct her attention to the waiver provision. As we have said, the validity of a waiver of appellate rights depends on whether the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily undertaken. Here, the court - hampered, no doubt, by the newness of Rule 11(c)(6) and the consequent lack of any precedential guidance -neither directed the appellant's attention to the waiver provision nor discussed it with her. Compounding that problem, the court, near the end of the Rule 11 colloquy, asked the appellant: [D]o you also understand that both you and the government will have a right to appeal any sentence I impose? This unqualified query - to which the prosecutor (not the same person who appears as counsel for the government in this court) inexplicably failed to take exception - drew an affirmative response from the appellant. The premise of this question directly contradicted the tenor of the waiver provision. 44 Given the court's failure to make inquiry into the waiver, its unfortunate contradiction of the waiver's terms, and the lack of any correction, then or thereafter, 11 we cannot say with the requisite assurance that the appellant's surrender of her appellate rights was sufficiently informed. Accordingly, we find that the district court transgressed Rule 11(c)(6). The government has not argued that this error was other than prejudicial. We think that the proper remedy, given the circumstances, is to sever the waiver of appellate rights from the remainder of the plea agreement, allowing the other provisions to remain in force. See Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1353-54. Thus, we permit Teeter's appeal to proceed.