Opinion ID: 1466972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: improper influence of juror

Text: The next issue which we address is Sheeran's contention that his convictions should be set aside because of improper influence upon one of the jurors. The basis of this assertion is a letter written to the trial judge by a juror. (Appendix). The juror alleged that she had been pressured into making her decision and that she had been prevented from sending a note to the trial judge. Subsequently, two other jurors wrote to the Court denying that anyone had been coerced, threatened, or pressured. Sheeran filed a post-trial motion requesting that the jury be recalled and examined to ascertain the validity of the allegations. The trial judge concluded that relief was unavailable for two reasons. First, he ruled that the letter did not fall within the terms of admissibility set out in Delaware Rule of Evidence 606(b). Second, he ruled that the juror's failure to object to the verdict during the poll of the jury was a more persuasive indication of the absence of pressure than the post-verdict letter to the contrary. As a general rule, a juror may not impeach his own verdict once the jury has been discharged. [12] McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267, 35 S.Ct. 783, 784, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915). This rule promotes several public policies: 1) discouraging harrassment of jurors by losing parties eager to have the verdict set aside; 2) encouraging free and open discussion among jurors; 3) reducing incentives for jury tampering; 4) promoting verdict finality; and 5) maintaining the viability of the jury as a judicial decision-making body. Id. However, our criminal justice system is premised upon the theory that the conclusions which the jury reaches in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court and not by any outside influence. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462, 27 S.Ct. 556, 558, 51 L.Ed. 879 (1907). It has been recognized, therefore, that a flat prohibition against receiving post-verdict testimony from jurors would contravene another important public policy: that of redressing the injury of the private litigant where a verdict was reached by a jury that was not impartial. Id. Extrinsic influences upon a jury may violate various protections guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution  a defendant's right to confront witnesses, his right to assistance of counsel, and his right to an impartial jury. In an effort to accommodate the conflicting policies of preserving the sanctity of a jury's deliberations and the defendant's right to be convicted only by evidence and argument in open court, courts have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic influences upon a jury's verdict. Since the 19th Century, the established rule regarding a juror's competence to attack a verdict is that a juryman may testify to any facts bearing upon the question of the existence of any extraneous influence, although not as to how far that influence operated upon his mind. Mattox v. U.S., 146 U.S. 140, 149, 13 S.Ct. 50, 53, 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892). This standard has been codified by the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Delaware Rules of Evidence. (F.R.E. and D.R.E. 606.) [13] Extraneous influence has been construed to cover 1) exposure of jurors to news items about the matters pending before the jury, 2) consideration by the jury of extra record facts about the case, 3) communications between third parties and jurors relevant to the case to be decided and 4) pressures or partiality on the part of the court. Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 150 (3d Cir.1975), cert. den. Gereau v. Government of Virgin Islands, 424 U.S. 917, 96 S.Ct. 1119, 47 L.Ed.2d 323 (1976). Intrinsic influences have been construed to include discussions among jurors, intimidation or harrassment of one juror by another, and other intra-jury influences on the verdict. Id. at 150. [14] Jurors are competent to testify about extrinsic influences but not about intrinsic influences on the verdict. In support of his argument that his conviction should be reversed because a juror was improperly influenced, Sheeran cites this Court's decision in McCloskey v. State, Del.Supr., 457 A.2d 332 (1983). [15] However, our holding in McCloskey is a graphic acknowledgment of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic influences upon a juror during the course of deliberations. The facts in McCloskey show that late in the evening of the first day of jury deliberations, the Jury Forelady requested an in camera conference with the trial judge. The trial court, with counsel, met with the Forelady. She informed the Court that Juror No. 4 was non-communicative, refused to join in deliberations, and felt that the other jurors were antagonistic toward her. The Forelady also informed the Court that Juror No. 4 desired an interview with the Court. The trial judge, with counsel, the Prothonotary and a court reporter, met with Juror No. 4 the following day. [16] The McCloskey trial court advised Juror No. 4 to formulate any legal questions she might have, submit those to the Forelady, and the trial judge would address those questions in open court before the entire jury. Thereafter, the Court called in the jury to request any further questions. No questions were presented and the jury returned to continue with its deliberations. The following morning, the trial judge received another note from the Forelady requesting a second interview. The Court and counsel met with the Forelady for a second time. McCloskey's counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground that the apparent animosity among the jurors coupled with the trial judge's involvement with the individual jurors could result in juror intimidation and the denial of a fair trial. The trial judge in McCloskey denied that defense motion but expressed concern about the in camera and in court interviews and the possible detrimental effect of those interviews. We have reiterated the McCloskey facts in some detail because they clearly reveal that after the jury had begun its deliberations, the trial court, in the presence of counsel, met separately with two individual jurors, i.e. the Forelady and Juror No. 4. In reversing McCloskey's conviction, we found that the record established a reasonable probability of the unlawful intimidation of Juror No. 4. However, the intimidation which we addressed in McCloskey was not the animosity within the jury room, but the confrontations between the trial court and the jurors. [17] The holding in McCloskey is a recognition that pressures on a juror from the Court are improper extraneous influences. [18] In contrast to McCloskey, the juror's letter to the trial judge in this case describes the pressures that were felt by one juror from other jurors during the course of deliberations. The juror's letter alleges pressure by other jurors because of union affiliation. In addition, it alleges that the juror was prevented from sending a note to the trial judge. The pressure that the juror felt is inherent in the jury system. Those pressures and the juror's reaction to them are neither extraneous information nor outside influence. They are an inherent and intrinsic part of the deliberative process. (emphasis added). See Lovett v. State, Del.Supr., 516 A.2d 455, 475 (1986); Burke v. State, Del.Supr., 484 A.2d 490, 500-01 (1984). During the course of jury deliberations there are numerous pressures which are brought to bear upon the jurors, particularly those who find themselves in a minority position. It is unthinkable that such pressures would not exist, and they undoubtedly multiply as the size of the minority diminishes. [19] One would expect that those in the majority would argue forcefully in an attempt to persuade those in the minority to accept the views of the majority. [20] However, it is generally held that jurors may not impeach their verdict by testimony that it resulted from coercion or majority vote. See Jones, Evidence, Volume III, § 20:58, page 727 (Sixth Edition); 8 Wigmore, Evidence, §§ 2345-2356 (1961). The juror in this case does not suggest that anyone attempted or threatened to injure her. [21] The juror only states that she was not allowed to send a note to the judge. There is no explanation for the juror's subsequent failure to communicate with the court before the verdict was rendered or the juror's assent to the verdict when the jury was polled. In fact, that is the purpose of the poll. (Super.Ct.R.Crim. Pro. 31(d)). A trial judge has a very broad discretion in deciding whether a case must be retried or the juror summoned and investigated due to alleged exposure to prejudicial information or improper outside influence. Styler v. State, Del.Supr., 417 A.2d 948 (1980). (emphasis added). However, inquiry into a juror's mental process is not permitted. D.R.E. 606(b), Burke v. State, Del.Supr., 484 A.2d 490 (1984). In this case, the effect of the alleged actions of other jurors upon the mind or emotions of the juror who wrote to the trial court, is precisely the kind of intra-jury influence that the prohibition in D.R.E. 606(b) was designed to protect from inquiry. It is not open to consideration. We find the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing as to the allegations set forth in the juror's letter or in refusing to grant a new trial. Burke v. State, Del.Supr. 484 A.2d 490, 501 (1984). See also Lovett v. State, Del.Supr., 516 A.2d 455 (1986).