Opinion ID: 1654370
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether There is an Identity of Issues

Text: Wal-Mart argues that Smitherman's claim for unemployment-compensation benefits and her retaliatory-discharge claim share one central issue: the reason for her termination. Under Alabama's Unemployment Compensation Act, a claimant has the burden of proving that he or she is eligible to receive benefits under Ala.Code 1975, § 25-4-77, and that he or she is not disqualified from receiving benefits by § 25-4-78. See Davenport v. State Dep't of Indus. Relations, 692 So.2d 851, 852 (Ala.Civ.App.1997). `The claimant assumes the risk of nonpersuasion.' State Dep't of Indus. Relations v. Downey, 380 So.2d 906, 908 (Ala.Civ.App.1980) (quoting Department of Indus. Relations v. Tomlinson, 251 Ala. 144, 145, 36 So.2d 496, 497 (1948)). To be eligible under § 25-4-77(a), a claimant must (1) file a claim for each week's benefits; (2) register for work at, and thereafter continue to report at, the state employment office; and (3) be able to work and be available for work. Under § 25-4-78(3)c., a claimant is partially disqualified from receiving unemployment-compensation benefits if he or she was discharged for misconduct committed in connection with work. In this case, Wal-Mart maintains that its reason for discharging Smitherman was misconduct connected with her work, i.e., a profane and derogatory remark she allegedly made about the district manager of the pharmacy departments. Smitherman thus had the burden of proving that she was not discharged from Wal-Mart for misconduct connected with her work, but was terminated solely because she sought to recover workers' compensation benefits. Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-11.1, provides: No employee shall be terminated by an employer solely because the employee has instituted or maintained any action against the employer to recover workers' compensation benefits under this chapter.... In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge [under § 25-5-11.1], the plaintiff must present substantial evidence that he was terminated solely for seeking workers' compensation benefits. Kent Corp. v. Hale, 699 So.2d 954, 958 (Ala.1997); see also Twilley v. Daubert Coated Prods., Inc., 536 So.2d 1364, 1369 (Ala.1988). Where a defendant makes a motion for summary judgment and properly supports the motion with evidence of a legitimate reason for terminating the plaintiff, the plaintiff must present substantial evidence not only establishing a prima facie case but also showing that the defendant's stated reason for termination was a pretext. See Richard v. Shoals Distrib., Inc., 645 So.2d 1378, 1382 (Ala. 1994). Thus, under § 25-5-11.1, Smitherman bears the burden of proving that Wal-Mart's proffered reason for terminating her employment is not, in fact, the true reason. Accordingly, the issue whether Wal-Mart discharged Smitherman for making a profane and derogatory remark about a superior is present in both the unemployment-compensation proceeding and the retaliatory-discharge action. Therefore, there is an identity as to at least one of the issues in the two proceedingsthat issue being the reason for Smitherman's discharge.