Opinion ID: 1969802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 38

Heading: 231-66, e.16-18, f.9-14, f.17-21, g.6, h.12-14, h.16)

Text: In general, the claims asserted in this subsection primarily relate to the adequacy of the representation afforded defendant in the penalty phase of his capital-murder trial. We addressed aspects of this issue on direct appeal  specifically, counsel's failure to present additional mitigating evidence during the penalty phase and counsel's alleged abdication of the role of advocate in his penalty-phase summation  concluding on both those issues that counsel's performance was not demonstrably deficient and that if counsel's summation argument was deficient it did not materially affect the sentence imposed. Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 165-70, 586 A. 2d 85. Based on our disposition of those questions on direct appeal, the PCR court dismissed all but three of the claims of counsel's ineffectiveness relating to the penalty phase as procedurally barred. The PCR court held an extensive evidentiary hearing regarding the following two claims concerning counsel's alleged ineffectiveness: (1) failure to make reasonable inquiries of treating medical personnel regarding defendant's fitness to proceed with the penalty phase after fainting following the guilt-phase verdict; and (2) failure to inform the trial court that defendant was incapable of proceeding in the penalty phase. The PCR court dismissed those claims on the merits, concluding that the evidence adduced at the hearing had demonstrated that defendant had recovered from his fainting spell and was fully competent to proceed with the penalty phase. We agree with that disposition. The PCR evidentiary hearing revealed that defendant apparently fainted while being escorted after the guilty verdict from the courtroom to a holding cell. Sheriff's officers summoned the local Rescue Squad and squad members transported defendant by ambulance to a nearby hospital. The examining physician concluded that defendant's fainting spell was a reaction to the guilty verdict and that defendant was fully recovered and manifested no symptoms that warranted further observation. Defendant was then transported back to the Atlantic County courthouse. In the interim, the prosecutors and defendant's trial counsel had reached tentative agreement on the procedure to be followed in the penalty phase. The agreement contemplated that neither side would produce additional witnesses to support the aggravating or mitigating factors. The State agreed to withdraw aggravating factors c(4)(c) (murder involved aggravated assault of victim) and c(4)(d) (murder committed in expectation of pecuniary gain), and to rely only on aggravating factor c(4)(e) (commission of homicide procured by payment or promised payment of money). Defense counsel agreed to rely solely on the guilt-phase evidence to support two mitigating factors: c(5)(f) (no significant history of prior criminal activity), to which the State stipulated; and c(5)(h) (any other relevant material). Both sides agreed that they would each briefly address the jury, first defense counsel and then the prosecutor, to present argument in opposition to and in support of the death penalty. Defendant's trial counsel and defendant testified at the PCR evidentiary hearing and confirmed that the proposed penalty-phase procedure had been discussed with and approved by defendant. Defendant testified that he had told trial counsel that he had fainted, that counsel had inquired of defendant whether he wished to go ahead with the penalty phase, and that defendant had replied, [L]ets get it over with. Defendant testified that he and counsel had not previously discussed strategy concerning the conduct of a penalty-phase hearing. Trial counsel testified that he had discussed penalty-phase strategy with defendant on prior occasions, but acknowledged that the written notes he had maintained as a memorialization of his numerous conversations with defendant did not reflect their penalty-phase discussions. Counsel recalled specifically that he and defendant previously had discussed whether Marshall's sons would be called to testify in the penalty phase, and that Marshall had been opposed to their testifying. Counsel testified that he again had raised with Marshall the issue of his sons' testifying during their conversation between the guilt phase and the penalty phase, and stated that Marshall had reiterated his opposition, indicating that he wished to avoid the emotional ordeal to which such testimony could expose his sons. Relying on both testimony and affidavits contained in the PCR record, defendant asserts a multitude of both specific and generalized complaints of ineffectiveness of trial counsel concerning the preparation and conduct of the penalty-phase proceedings. The general complaints, broader in scope than those advanced on the direct appeal, allege that trial counsel did not adequately prepare for the penalty-phase hearing and that trial counsel had not developed any strategy in anticipation of the possible need for a penalty-phase hearing. The clear implication of the general complaints of ineffectiveness in the penalty phase is that trial counsel's decision to present no penalty-phase witnesses and to advance no forceful argument in summation against the death penalty was not the product of a strategic decision by trial counsel, but simply reflected counsel's utter lack of preparation for a penalty-phase proceeding. The primary record support for the general claims of ineffectiveness in the penalty phase consists of a certification from Joan O. Van Pelt, a Deputy Public Defender assigned to represent defendant on post-conviction relief, and an affidavit of Richard D. Ruffin, Jr., a psychologist who maintains a private practice as a mitigation specialist in capital cases. The Van Pelt certification states that she reviewed or supervised the review of the trial file and correspondence file maintained by trial counsel, including notes of interviews, and the file of counsel's investigator, Russ Kolins. She certified that the files include no materials concerning the penalty phase of the case, no legal research concerning aggravating and mitigating factors or requests to charge in the penalty phase of capital cases, no reports of investigations in preparation for a case in mitigation, no reports of consultations with experts in the presentation of mitigating evidence, and no notes of interviews with friends or family members in preparation for the presentation of mitigating evidence. The affidavit of Richard D. Ruffin, Jr. sets forth his experience as a mitigation specialist who assists counsel in preparing and presenting mitigating evidence in capital cases. Ruffin asserts that he reviewed the penalty-phase transcript and portions of the trial transcript, and that he also reviewed defendant's educational records from grade school through college, as well as various medical records, military records, and other investigative reports concerning defendant. His affidavit alleges that a proper mitigation investigation in a capital case should include extensive interviews with the client, family members, friends, teachers, employers, and physicians; examination of all school, medical, and employment records; and preparation of a comprehensive social history containing all of the information compiled that could be useful to trial counsel in presenting mitigating evidence. Ruffin's affidavit states that his review of trial counsel's file demonstrated that trial counsel failed to retain a mitigation specialist and failed to conduct a penalty-phase investigation that met the accepted standards of counsel experienced in the conduct of death-penalty trials. Ruffin's affidavit concludes with this statement: It is my opinion that information concerning Robert O. Marshall exists which could have served as a basis for a productive mitigation. However, defense counsel's failure to investigate properly resulted in this information being unavailable to the sentencing jury. Significantly, Ruffin's affidavit does not disclose the nature or content of the information about defendant that he concludes could have served as a basis for a productive mitigation. We address and resolve on the merits defendant's claims relating to the penalty phase of the trial. Although some claims are similar to contentions we addressed on direct appeal, we are persuaded that the claims in the PCR petition have a different context and broader scope than those we reviewed on direct appeal and that application of the Rule 3:22-4 and -5 procedural bars would be improper. See supra at 148-54, 690 A. 2d at 29-33. We have previously noted, supra at 158, 690 A. 2d at 35, that PCR courts ordinarily should grant evidentiary hearings ... if a defendant has presented a prima facie claim in support of post-conviction relief, which requires demonstration of a reasonable likelihood that the claim ultimately will succeed on the merits. Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 462-63, 609 A. 2d 1280. We also noted, supra at 156-57, 690 A. 2d at 34-35, that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are governed by the two-prong standard of Strickland, supra, requiring proof that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 698. We have previously rejected the contention that we should alter the Strickland/Fritz standard [for resolving ineffective assistance of counsel claims] for capital cases, and concluded that that standard will adequately fulfill the constitutional guarantee. State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 356-57, 561 A. 2d 1082 (1989). Except for a brief reference in State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 626, 577 A. 2d 455 (1990), this is the first case in which we have occasion comprehensively to discuss and apply the Strickland/Fritz standard to the penalty phase of a capital case. Accordingly, we deem it appropriate to elaborate on our understanding of the manner in which the prejudice prong of Strickland/Fritz should be adapted to the unique circumstances of a capital case penalty-phase proceeding. We recall that the Strickland court rejected as too severe a standard for prejudice a requirement that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 697-98. The Court instead adopted what it described as a somewhat lower standard, requiring a showing of a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different, and observing that [a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 698. The Court emphasized, however, that the standards it had adopted do not establish mechanical rules. Id. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 699. The Court stated: Although those principles should guide the process of decision, the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged. In every case the court should be concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results. [ Ibid. ] Commentators have noted that strict application of Strickland 's prejudice prong poses a high obstacle to the successful assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel claims concerning the penalty phase in capital cases. Because the decision to impose death or to grant mercy is inherently subjective, to prove a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different is daunting indeed. Faced with a horrific crime and overwhelming evidence of guilt, reviewing courts are often unable to imagine that a jury would have imposed any sentence but death. [Note, The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials, 107 Harv. L.Rev. 1923, 1931 (1994) (footnotes omitted).] Moreover, a literal application of Strickland 's prejudice prong mandates that appellate courts attempt to step into the shoes of death-penalty jurors, assessing the likelihood that if counsel had provided adequate representation the result of the penalty-phase proceeding would have been different. The difficulty inherent in that assessment derives from the unique function and responsibility of a capital jury: There are no standards to guide a capital jury in deciding whether to be merciful in sentencing. A capital case jury may have death-scrupled jurors, may constitutionally exercise mercy for any reason, and may consider any and all mitigating evidence, weighing and valuing it as it pleases. Consequently, short of substituting a verdict of its own, there is no way for a reviewing court to determine what effect unpresented mitigating evidence might have had on the sentencer's decision. A court which takes it upon itself to consider and weigh mitigating facts which were not presented to the sentencer at trial and to decide whether their presentation might have made a difference invades the province of the trier of fact and denies the capital defendant the right to a determination of sentence based on all relevant factors. [Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 299, 354 (1983) (footnote omitted).] In Caldwell v. Mississippi, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a prosecutor's argument to a death-penalty jury that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rested ultimately with the reviewing appellate court violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 472 U.S. 320, 328-29, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 2639-40, 86 L.Ed. 2d 231, 239 (1985). The Court's opinion focused specifically on the substantial difference between the role of a penalty-phase jury and the reviewing function of an appellate court: In the capital sentencing context there are specific reasons to fear substantial unreliability as well as bias in favor of death sentences when there are state-induced suggestions that the sentencing jury may shift its sense of responsibility to an appellate court. Bias against the defendant clearly stems from the institutional limits on what an appellate court can do  limits that jurors often might not understand. The delegation of sentencing responsibility that the prosecutor here encouraged would thus not simply postpone the defendant's right to a fair determination of the appropriateness of his death; rather it would deprive him of that right, for an appellate court, unlike a capital sentencing jury, is wholly ill-suited to evaluate the appropriateness of death in the first instance. Whatever intangibles a jury might consider in its sentencing determination, few can be gleaned from an appellate record. This inability to confront and examine the individuality of the defendant would be particularly devastating to any argument for consideration of what this Court has termed [those] compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. Woodson [ v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280], 304 [96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed. 2d 944, 961 (1976)]. When we held that a defendant has a constitutional right to the consideration of such factors, Eddings [ v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed. 2d 1 (1982)]; Lockett [ v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed. 2d 973 (1978) (plurality opinion)], we clearly envisioned that that consideration would occur among sentencers who were present to hear the evidence and arguments and see the witnesses. [ Id. at 330-31, 105 S.Ct. at 2640, 86 L.Ed. 2d at 240.] Our recognition of the profound distinction between our circumscribed appellate-review function and the capital jury's significantly less-restricted role in deciding between life and death informs our application of the prejudice prong of Strickland/Fritz to penalty-phase proceedings. That distinction demonstrates that a reviewing court strays from its traditional function if it attempts to predict the probability that a penalty-phase jury would have changed its verdict if counsel had not been deficient. In our view, an adaptation of the Strickland/Fritz prejudice test to capital-case penalty-phase proceedings that more faithfully reflects our appellate function would require courts to determine whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the jury's penalty-phase deliberations would have been affected substantially. That standard is, in our view, more consistent with the Strickland Court's admonition that a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 698. The reasonable probability that ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase of a capital case substantially affected the jury's penalty-phase deliberation equates with a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. We regard our understanding of the Strickland/Fritz prejudice prong for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in penalty-phase proceedings to be a necessary adaptation of the literal Strickland standard to the realistic limitations on appellate review of jury penalty-phase deliberations. Although an appellate court cannot predict the outcome of a penalty-phase jury's deliberations, it is entirely capable of assessing whether the production of additional mitigating evidence would have been likely to have a substantial effect on the jury's deliberations. We are satisfied that our adaptation of the Strickland prejudice prong to penalty-phase proceedings is faithful to the core meaning of the standard announced by the Strickland court. Concerning defendant's generalized claims of counsel's ineffectiveness in the penalty phase, we are convinced that defendant has failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that those claims ultimately will succeed on the merits. Defendant has offered documentation to support the allegation that trial counsel's preparation and performance in the penalty phase may not have been consistent with prevailing standards. The allegation that trial counsel's files reflect no investigation, research, or other preparation for the penalty phase is disturbing. Although Zeitz testified that he had conferred with defendant about the penalty phase on prior occasions, he acknowledged that his interview notes did not reflect those discussions. Similarly, the allegations in the Ruffin affidavit describing the scope of investigation in which mitigation specialists ordinarily engage suggests that trial counsel's penalty-phase preparation was less than that normally undertaken by experienced counsel, although we note that Ruffin is a mitigation specialist, not a lawyer experienced in capital cases. However, no documentation in the PCR record discloses information that an adequate investigation would have revealed and that would have been reasonably likely to affect substantially the jury's deliberations in the penalty phase. Ruffin's unsubstantiated allegation that such information exists is plainly inadequate. Even with the benefit of hindsight, PCR counsel does not allege the existence of facts, information, or specific evidence possessing a reasonable possibility of having had a substantial effect on the jury's deliberation in the penalty phase. The nature of the crime of which defendant was convicted diminishes the likelihood that the types of mitigation evidence commonly used in capital cases would have had a positive impact on the jury. For example, among the specific instances of ineffectiveness relied on by defendant are trial counsel's failure to adduce testimony of defendant's sister and son that his family loved him, and that his execution would harm the family. Notwithstanding trial counsel's testimony that defendant refused to have his sons testify in the penalty phase, the obvious risk of relying on harm to defendant's family as a mitigating factor is that the jury would have been offended by that contention because of its guilt-phase determination that defendant had already inflicted grievous harm on the family by hiring McKinnon to murder his wife and the mother of his three sons. Other specific claims of ineffectiveness, which we are about to address, either suffer from similar flaws or simply were unlikely to have affected substantially the jury's deliberations. The claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase can fairly be assessed only in the context of the entire trial record and of the grave offense of which defendant was convicted. We already have noted trial counsel's request to the trial court, concurred in by counsel for co-defendant Thompson, to limit death-qualification of the jury as a strategy designed to avoid a conviction-prone jury. See supra at 227, 690 A.2d 70. That strategy apparently assumed that a death-prone jury was preferable to a conviction-prone jury, an implied acknowledgement that the likelihood of acquittal was higher than the likelihood of avoiding the death sentence after conviction. Because trial counsel was privately retained and well-compensated, the inference is compelling that that strategic decision was not made without consultation with defendant. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the conclusion is inescapable that the task of mounting an effective mitigation strategy was formidable indeed. That conclusion is buttressed by the inability of PCR counsel to identify specific facts or information concerning defendant that, if offered as mitigating evidence, were likely to have affected substantially the jury's penalty-phase deliberations. In our direct appeal opinion we addressed specifically the contention that trial counsel's failure to produce additional mitigating evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We observed: It is self-evident that in view of the crime of which defendant was convicted, the selection of mitigating evidence on which to rely was a matter of some delicacy, requiring counsel to consider carefully the prospect of rebuttal evidence and rebuttal arguments, as well as the jury's anticipated reaction to any mitigation evidence that was offered. We are unwilling to second-guess counsel's strategic decision on this issue, particularly in view of the jury's determination that both mitigating factors offered had been established. [ Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 166, 586 A. 2d 85.] We also commented on the contention that counsel's closing argument in the penalty phase demonstrated ineffectiveness: We also infer from counsel's closing argument a strategic decision to avoid any emotional appeal to the jury, in favor of a low-key statement that emphasized that the life or death decision was the responsibility of each individual juror. In the context of this record and the grave offense of which defendant was convicted, a closing argument that focused each juror's attention on his or her moral responsibility for defendant's life or death cannot easily be discredited. [ Id. at 167, 586 A. 2d 85.] We entertain no doubt that even the most experienced capital counsel would have encountered considerable difficulty in preparing an effective case in mitigation for the penalty-phase of defendant's trial. Acknowledging that difficulty, we cannot ascertain on the record before us whether or not an evidentiary hearing might establish that trial counsel's preparation for the penalty phase was deficient. Nevertheless, following the admonition in Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 699, that disposition of the prejudice prong of an ineffectiveness claim may obviate resolution of whether counsel's performance was deficient, we hold that defendant has failed to demonstrate any likelihood that an evidentiary hearing would produce proof that would show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the jury's penalty-phase deliberations would have been affected substantially. In reaching that conclusion, we reiterate our observation on direct appeal that the jury found both mitigating factors relied on by defendant ... [and] that several defense witnesses at trial testified to defendant's good reputation in the community, and defendant testified extensively concerning his background, education, family life, and civic activities. Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 165, 586 A. 2d 85. In this case, the contention that proper investigation and preparation would have unearthed new mitigating evidence that probably would have affected substantially the penalty-phase deliberations is simply too speculative to warrant an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we reject on the merits defendant's generalized claims of ineffectiveness of counsel in the penalty phase. We now address defendant's specific claims of ineffectiveness in the penalty phase as well as defendant's other claims related to the penalty phase. We dismiss as meritless the contention that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to empanel a new penalty-phase jury or to conduct additional death-qualification voir dire prior to the penalty phase. Such motions properly would have been denied by the trial court. Defendant contends that counsel was ineffective in failing to request specific instructions by the trial court on the existence, meaning, purpose, and effect of mitigating factors, in failing to request that the court separately charge each catch-all mitigating factor and list them separately on the verdict sheet, and in failing to request a charge requiring that the jury again consider whether there was sufficient evidence to establish the existence of the aggravating factor for the purpose of the penalty phase. On direct appeal, we concluded that this jury understood clearly that the penalty proceedings were separate from the guilt phase of the case, and required the jury's fresh determination on the existence of aggravating and mitigating factors. Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 139, 586 A. 2d 85. Thus, any ineffectiveness of counsel in failing to request an instruction concerning the need to deliberate anew on the aggravating factor was harmless. Similarly, we comprehensively addressed on direct appeal the issue of the adequacy of the court's instructions on mitigating factors, id. at 141-48, 586 A. 2d 85, and concluded that the jury [understood] its function and the function and meaning of the mitigating circumstances, id. at 148, 586 A. 2d 85. Thus, any ineffectiveness arising from counsel's failure to request specific instructions concerning the mitigating factors or his failure to request that catch-all factors be listed separately on the verdict sheet did not possess any likelihood of affecting substantially the penalty-phase deliberations. Defendant alleges that counsel was ineffective in failing to present specific types of mitigating evidence, including testimony from defendant's sister, Oakleigh DeCarlo, about their relationship and childhood and the impact of defendant's execution on her and defendant's children; testimony of an unspecified nature from a psychologist or other mental health professional; testimony from a qualified social scientist about defendant's likelihood of recidivism; testimony from a qualified mental health professional regarding defendant's lack of future dangerousness; testimony from Dr. Atkins concerning defendant's depressive state and suicidal tendencies on the occasion of defendant's alleged suicide attempt at the Best Western Motel; evidence consisting of family photographs provided to trial counsel by defendant's sister; testimony from Henry Tamburin concerning defendant's philosophy of gambling; evidence consisting of a letter written in July 1985 by the victim's father in support of a motion for bail reduction; testimony from defendant's son, John, concerning defendant's mental state when he spoke to John from the Best Western Motel and concerning John's relationship with defendant and the likely impact of defendant's execution on their family; testimony from defendant's religious counsellors about the appropriateness of sentencing defendant to death; and testimony establishing as a specific mitigating factor that defendant's execution would cause hardship and emotional distress on defendant's family. Aside from the claims that are obviously frivolous, such as the claim relating to the gambling expert and that relating to trial counsel's failure to offer evidence consisting of family photographs, the allegations of trial counsel's ineffectiveness all involve clearly debatable issues of strategy. We are unpersuaded that trial counsel's failure to offer evidence of the type described in defendant's specific claims constitutes ineffectiveness of counsel, or that defendant has made the requisite showing suggesting that an evidentiary hearing would demonstrate a probability that the production of the omitted evidence would have affected substantially the jury's penalty-phase deliberations. Each of the specific allegations of ineffectiveness involves evidence that, although possibly beneficial to defendant, posed the clear risk of an adverse jury reaction. In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we reiterate that a defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that [j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693-94. None of defendant's claims of ineffectiveness based on the failure to offer specific mitigating evidence in the penalty phase satisfy the Strickland standards. Defendant also asserts claims of ineffectiveness based on counsel's failure to submit as mitigating factors the leniency of McKinnon's plea agreement, the disproportionality of a death sentence for defendant in comparison to McKinnon's sentence, and the disproportionality of sentencing defendant to death notwithstanding that the perpetrator of the murder had not yet been convicted. We specifically have held that accomplice sentencing is not to be considered as a mitigating factor in a penalty-phase proceeding. State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 554-57, 651 A. 2d 19 (1994); State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 502-05, 645 A. 2d 734 (1994) ( DiFrisco II ), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 949, 133 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1996); State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 101-05, 549 A. 2d 792 (1988). Accordingly, no claim of ineffectiveness can be predicated on counsel's failure to offer such mitigating evidence, nor is there any demonstration of a probability that such evidence, if offered, would have affected substantially the penalty-phase deliberations. Defendant also claims ineffectiveness based on counsel's failure to produce testimony concerning the nature of death by lethal injection. In State v. Rose, 120 N.J. 61, 65, 576 A. 2d 235 (1990), we specifically held that such testimony is inadmissible in the penalty phase. Accordingly, defendant's claim of ineffectiveness is without merit. Defendant also asserts generalized claims of penalty-phase error and ineffectiveness that he argues were inadequately presented on direct appeal. We reject those claims on the same basis that we reject defendant's other generalized claims of penalty-phase ineffectiveness. Defendant also asserts miscellaneous claims alleging that several of the trial court's penalty-phase jury instructions deprived defendant of constitutional rights. We reject those claims on the merits on the same basis that we reject the claims of penalty-phase ineffectiveness relating to trial counsel's failure to request specific instructions in the penalty phase. Supra at 254-55, 690 A. 2d at 83-84. Defendant also claims prosecutorial misconduct in the penalty phase, contending that the prosecutor improperly advanced his personal opinion in arguing that there was nothing more heinous than killing a family member such as one's wife, and in requesting the jury to consider as nonstatutory aggravating factors the heinousness of the killing and the fact that defendant's victim was his wife. Although related issues were raised on direct appeal, we address and dismiss those claims on their merits. In our view, the prosecutor's remarks were directly related to the aggravating factor alleged and found by the jury and did not constitute reliance on personal views or on nonstatutory aggravating factors. Finally, defendant alleges that the cumulative effect of all of the claims of ineffectiveness of counsel in the penalty phase combined to deprive defendant of his constitutional rights. We reject those claims on the merits. The assertion of a large number of related claims of ineffectiveness of counsel does not necessarily enhance their significance or capacity to affect substantially the penalty-phase deliberations. We reject the cumulative claims on the grounds that we rejected the individual claims. We are unpersuaded that the cumulative force of all the penalty-phase claims is measurably greater than that of the individual claims.