Opinion ID: 771584
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiff's Claim Under the FOTETA

Text: 27 On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the district court erred when it concluded that Plaintiff did not have an implied private cause of action pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 40.25, a regulation promulgated under FOTETA. This Court holds that the district court properly analyzed Plaintiff's claim and properly concluded that an impliedprivate cause of action does not exist under 49 C.F.R. § 40.25 or FOTETA. 28 The regulation upon which Plaintiff relies reads in pertinent part: 29 The employee may not be required to waive liability with respect to negligence on the part of any person participating in the collection, handling or analysis of the specimen or to indemnify any person for the negligence of others. 30 49 C.F.R. § 40.25 (f)(22)(ii). The statute under which the regulation was promulgated, FOTETA, provides that the Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe regulations to establish drug testing programs [i]n the interest of commercial motor vehicle safety. 49 U.S.C. § 31306. In addition, the regulations provide that [t]he purpose . . . is to establish programs designed to help prevent accidents and injuries resulting from the misuse of alcohol or use of controlled substances by drivers of commercial motor vehicles. 49 C.F.R. § 382.101. 31 In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), the Supreme Court articulated a four-part test to determine whether an implied right of action exists in a federal statute. The four-part test established in Cort requires that the court consider: (1)whether plaintiffs are among the class of persons intended to benefit from the enactment of the statute; (2) whether there is any evidence of legislative intent to provide or deny a private remedy; (3) whether a private remedy would be consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; and (4) whether the action is one traditionally delegated to state law so it would be inappropriate to imply a federal remedy. 422 U.S. at 78. Since the issuance of Cort, however, the Supreme Court has refined this inquiry and the focal point is whether Congress, expressly or by implication, intended to create a private cause of action. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979); see also Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ([W]e effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash analysis in Touche Ross . . . and Transamerica . . ., converting one of its four factors (congressional intent) into the determinative factor.). The other Cort factors are relevant insofar as they assist in determining congressional intent. See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575-76. 32 Defendants rely upon Salomon v. Roche Compuchem Laboratories, Inc., 909 F.Supp 126 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) in support of their claim that § 40.25(f)(22)(ii) does not provide for a private cause of action. In Salomon, the plaintiff was a flight attendant for American Airlines and brought suit alleging that the defendant violated 49 C.F.R. § 40.37, the regulation governing employee access to drug testing records. The district court concluded that the statute was framed as a general mandate to the Federal Aviation Administration to establish drug testing regulations, not to address the concerns of a specific class of persons. See id. at 128. Other courts have similarly concluded that the regulations promulgated under 49 C.F.R. Part 40 do not provide for a private cause of action. See, e.g., Drake v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 147 F.3d 169, 170-71 (2d Cir. 1998) ( affirming district court's conclusion that plaintiff did not have a private cause of action under 49 C.F.R. Part 40); Schmeling v. NORDAM, 97 F.3d 1336, 1343-44 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding that 49 C.F.R. § 40.35 did not provide for a private cause of action); Abate v. S. Pacific Transp. Co., 928 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1991) (concluding that Federal Railroad Safety Act provides no private cause of action to enforce regulations implementing federally mandated drug-testing programs set forth in 49 C.F.R. Part 40). 33 This Court similarly concludes that the FOTETA is framed as a general mandateto the Department of Transportation as the regulations promulgated under part 40 are applicable to the Federal Highway Administration, Federal Railroad Administration, Federal Transit Administration and Federal Aviation Administration. See 49 C.F.R. § 40.25 (f)(10)(B). This regulatory scheme does not evince a concern for the protection of drivers who believe that they have been aggrieved through the drug testing process. Cf. Drake, 147 F.3d at 170-71; Schmeling, 97 F.3d at 1343-44. Furthermore, federal regulations in and of themselves cannot create a private cause of action unless the action is at least implied from the applicable statute. See Smith v. Dearborn Fin. Servs., Inc., 982 F.2d 976, 979 (6th Cir. 1993). Therefore, this Court holds that the district court properly concluded that the FOTETA or the regulations promulgated thereunder do not imply a private cause of action and properly granted summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim.