Opinion ID: 1685369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wisconsin's Law of Homicide

Text: ¶ 54. The law of homicide in Wisconsin was revised in 1988. 1987 Wis. Act 399. Prior to the revision, Chapter 940 listed nine homicide offenses, including first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and manslaughter. Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01, 940.02, 940.05 (1985-86). ¶ 55. Section 940.01(1), first-degree murder, read as follows: Whoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class A felony. Wis. Stat. § 940.01 (1985-86). Subsection (2) defined intent to kill to mean the mental purpose to take the life of another human being. Wis. Stat. § 940.02 (1985-86). This two-element offense was punishable by life imprisonment. Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(a) (1985-86). ¶ 56. Section 940.02, second-degree murder, prohibited the causing of death: (1) By conduct imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life; or (2) As a natural and probable consequence of the commission of or attempt to commit a felony. Wis. Stat. § 940.02 (1985-86). Second-degree murder was a Class B felony punishable by imprisonment not to exceed 20 years. Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(b) (1985-86). ¶ 57. Section 940.05, manslaughter, prohibited the causing of death: (1) Without intent to kill and while in the heat of passion; or (2) Unnecessarily, in the exercise of his privilege of self-defense or defense of others or the privilege to prevent or terminate the commission of a felony; or (3) Because such person is coerced by threats made by someone other than his coconspirator and which cause him reasonably to believe that his act is the only means of preventing imminent death to himself or another; or (4) Because the pressure of natural physical forces causes such person reasonably to believe that his act is the only means of preventing imminent public disaster or imminent death to himself or another. Wis. Stat. § 940.05 (1985-86). Manslaughter was a Class C felony punishable by imprisonment not to exceed 10 years. Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)(c) (1985-86). ¶ 58. The 1988 revision categorizes homicides based upon the degree of culpability involved, as reflected in the mental element required for each offense. Three of the framers of the revisionWalter Dickey, David Schultz, and James L. Fullin, Jr.describe four gradations of mental element as follows: (1) The mental element is intentional when the actor has the purpose to cause death or is aware that death is practically certain to be caused by the conduct [Wis. Stat. § 939.23]; (2) The mental element is aggravated recklessness when the actor is aware that the conduct creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to another under circumstances which show utter disregard for human life [Wis. Stat. §§ 939.24, 940.02]; (3) The mental element is simple recklessness when the actor is aware that the conduct creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to another [Wis. Stat. § 939.24]; (4) The mental element is negligence when the actor should realize that the conduct creates a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or great bodily harm to another [Wis. Stat. § 939.25]. Walter Dickey, David Schultz & James L. Fullin, Jr., The Importance of Clarity in the Law of Homicide: The Wisconsin Revision, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 1323, 1330 [hereinafter The Importance of Clarity ]. ¶ 59. These different mental elements are now embodied in different homicide statutes carrying different penalties. ¶ 60. This case concerns an alleged intentional homicide. Intentional homicides are divided into two categories, first-degree and second-degree. First-degree intentional homicide, Wis. Stat. § 940.01, replaced first-degree murder, Wis. Stat. § 940.01 (1985-86). It provides in relevant part: (1) OFFENSES. (a) Except as provided in sub. (2), whoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class A felony. .... (2) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES. The following are affirmative defenses to prosecution under this section which mitigate the offense to 2nd-degree intentional homicide under s. 940.05: (a) Adequate provocation. Death was caused under the influence of adequate provocation as defined in s. 939.44. (b) Unnecessary defensive force. Death was caused because the actor believed he or she or another was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that the force used was necessary to defend the endangered person, if either belief was unreasonable. (c) Prevention of felony. Death was caused because the actor believed that the force used was necessary in the exercise of the privilege to prevent or terminate the commission of a felony, if that belief was unreasonable. (d) Coercion; necessity. Death was caused in the exercise of a privilege under s. 939.45(1). (3) BURDEN OF PROOF. When the existence of an affirmative defense under sub. (2) has been placed in issue by the trial evidence, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts constituting the defense did not exist in order to sustain a finding of guilt under sub. (1). Wis. Stat. § 940.01 (emphasis added). ¶ 61. Second-degree intentional homicide, Wis. Stat. § 940.05, replaced manslaughter, Wis. Stat. § 940.05 (1985-86). It provides in relevant part: (1) Whoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class B felony if: (a) In prosecutions under s. 940.01, the state fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in s. 940.01(2) did not exist as required by s. 940.01(3); or (b) The state concedes that it is unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in s. 940.01(2) did not exist. By charging under this section, the state so concedes. (2) In prosecutions under sub. (1), it is sufficient to allege and prove that the defendant caused the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another. .... (3) The mitigating circumstances specified in s. 940.01(2) are not defenses to prosecution for this offense. Wis. Stat. § 940.05. ¶ 62. First-degree intentional homicide and second degree-intentional homicide have two elements in common: (1) the causing of death (2) with intent to kill. The difference between the two degrees of homicide is the presence or absence of mitigating circumstances. The presence of mitigating circumstances, when not disproved by the state, reduces the degree of culpability involved, and likewise reduces the potential punishment. First-degree intentional homicides are punished as Class A felonies. Wis. Stat. § 940.01(1). Second-degree intentional homicides are punished as Class B felonies. Wis. Stat. §§ 940.01(2), 940.05(1). ¶ 63. In this case, Debra Head attempted to raise the issue of self-defense as a complete defense to the charge of first-degree intentional homicide. She also attempted to raise unnecessary defensive force (imperfect self-defense) as a mitigating circumstance that would reduce the charge from first-degree intentional homicide to second-degree. ¶ 64. Wisconsin's self-defense statute, Wis. Stat. § 939.48, provides an affirmative defense to a person if the person reasonably believes that another is unlawfully interfering with her person, and if the person uses such force as the person reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the unlawful interference. Section 939.48(1) reads: Self-defense and defense of others. (1) A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with his or her person by such other person. The actor may intentionally use only such force or threat thereof as the actor reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. The actor may not intentionally use force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself. Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1) (emphasis added). ¶ 65. This key subsection in the self-defense statute has three sentences. The first sentence, stating general principles, is not adequate by itself to address perfect self-defense to a charge of intentional homicide. ¶ 66. Self-defense can be a complete affirmative defense to a variety of criminal charges, but the requirements for perfect self-defense are increased for an intentional homicide. Implicitly, the statute provides a perfect defense to a person charged with an intentional homicide when the person reasonably believed that an interference with her person involved the danger of imminent death or great bodily harm and reasonably believed that it was necessary to use force which was intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to prevent or terminate that interference. [10] ¶ 67. We are speaking here in the context of intentional killingsnot reckless killings, or negligent killings, or accidental killings. In these intentional homicides, a defendant is not privileged to use deadly forcethat is, force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harmunless the person reasonably believes that the level of unlawful interference is such that the force used is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. Hence, if a person reasonably believed that she was preventing or terminating an unlawful interference with her person and reasonably believed that the force used was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm, she is not guilty of either first- or second-degree intentional homicide. ¶ 68. Imperfect self-defense was a component of the pre-revision manslaughter statute, Wis. Stat. § 940.05. The former § 940.05 referenced imperfect self-defense as the causing of death unnecessarily, in the exercise of [the person's] privilege of self-defense. Wis. Stat. § 940.05(2) (1985-86). [11] ¶ 69. Unnecessary defensive force, codified in Wis. Stat. § 940.01(2)(b), is the current equivalent of imperfect self-defense. It applies to situations in which a person intentionally caused a death but did so because she had an actual belief that she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and an actual belief that the deadly force she used was necessary to defend her against this danger, if either of these beliefs was not reasonable. Under these circumstances, the crime of first-degree intentional homicide is mitigated to second-degree intentional homicide. [12] ¶ 70. To sum up, under the present statutes, to prove first-degree intentional homicide, the state must prove that the defendant caused the death of another with intent to kill. Wis. Stat. § 940.01(1). If perfect self-defense is placed in issue by the trial evidence, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that one of the defendant's beliefs was not reasonable. Wis. Stat. § 939.48(1). If unnecessary defensive force is been placed in issue by the trial evidence, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not actually believe she was preventing or terminating an unlawful interference with her person or did not actually believe that the force she used was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harmeven if those beliefs were unreasonableto sustain a conviction for first-degree intentional homicide. ¶ 71. This brings us to the standards and requirements for raising perfect and imperfect self-defense.