Opinion ID: 2318487
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiently Final

Text: However, regarding the finality of Judge Terrell's decision, we have long held that the denial of a motion for summary judgment, as we are presented with here, is not sufficiently final to establish the law of the case. See, e.g., Guilford Transp. Indus., Inc. v. Wilner, 760 A.2d 580, 593 (D.C.2000) ([D]enial of a motion for summary judgment by one judge does not foreclose grant of summary judgment by another judge.) (citing 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4478 (1981 & Supp.2000)); Washington v. Government of D.C., 152 A.2d 191, 192 (D.C.App.1959) (We have held that an order denying a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment is an interlocutory and not a final order and that a final judgment is required to sustain the application of the law of the case rule.); McNeill v. Jamison, 116 A.2d 160, 161 (D.C.App.1955) (Long ago it was decided that interlocutory rulings do not settle the law of a case and are not conclusive or binding on the trial judge, who has the ultimate responsibility of deciding the case on the merits.); see also United States v. U.S. Smelting, Refining & Min. Co., 339 U.S. 186, 199, 70 S.Ct. 537, 94 L.Ed. 750 (1950) (noting that the law of the case doctrine is a discretionary rule of practice and is thus not necessarily controlling under all circumstances). [7] This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Judge Terrell did not set forth in her order her reasons for denying summary judgment, and, importantly, Judge Terrell herself acknowledged in other phases of the proceedings that she expected the trial judge to reconsider her rulings. [8] On this record, we do not find Judge Terrell's ruling to be sufficiently final to justify reliance on the law of the case doctrine.