Opinion ID: 2633244
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prescriptive Easement case

Text: An easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner. Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 229, 76 P.3d at 973 (citing Abbott v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 548, 808 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1991)). The term prescription refers to the effect of lapse of time in creating or extinguishing property interests. 4 Powell on Real Property § 34.10(1) (Michael Allan Wolf ed., Matthew Bender) (2005). Because it is no trivial thing to take another's land without compensation, easements by prescription are not favored by the law. Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 143, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941). In order to establish an easement by prescription, a claimant must prove by clear and convincing evidence use of the subject property that is (1) open and notorious, (2) continuous and uninterrupted, (3) adverse and under a claim of right, (4) with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement (5) for the statutory period of five years. Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 229, 76 P.3d at 973; see I.C. § 5-203. A prescriptive right cannot be granted if the use of the servient tenement was by permission of its owner, because the use, by definition, was not adverse to the rights of the owner. Marshall, 130 Idaho at 680, 946 P.2d at 980. Indeed, the rule is well established that no use can be considered adverse or ripen into a prescriptive right unless it constitutes an actual invasion of or infringement on the rights of the owner. Simmons, 63 Idaho at 144, 118 P.2d at 744. In this case, the district court found Hughes had implied permission from Fisher to use the Path. Plaintiff Terry Whittier is the only plaintiff claiming to have used the Path before Fisher owned the property and the district court found him not credible due to inconsistencies in his testimony. It is well settled that, on review, this Court gives due regard to the district court's special opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses who personally appear before the court. Hodgins, 139 Idaho at 229, 76 P.3d at 973. All other plaintiffs began using the Path after Fisher purchased the property. Fisher testified he gave express permission to many individuals and his willingness to let his neighbors use the Path was common knowledge. Fisher worked in the ski industry and granted permission to promote business and good neighborliness. When Fisher moved off the property in 1992, he instructed his tenants to continue to allow others to use the Path. Fisher's testimony was not contradicted by Hughes. Instead, Hughes argues their use was not permissive because they did not ask for or receive permission to use the Path. Hughes' argument would have merit if the district court's finding of permission was based on express permission. However, the district court found Hughes had implied permission to use the Path, and Hughes has not shown that determination was clearly erroneous.
Even if there were some doubt about the evidence regarding Hughes' claim of open, notorious use of Fisher's property without permission, the district court also analyzed whether the public use exception applied. Generally, where a claimant establishes open, notorious, continuous and uninterrupted use under a claim of right for the statutory period, knowledge of the owner may be presumed. Hall v. Strawn, 108 Idaho 111, 112, 697 P.2d 451, 452 (Ct.App.1985). However, there are special considerations relating to notice to the owner when the claimant's use of the subject property is shared with the general public: Where, as here, the same degree of use upon which the adverse claim is based has been exercised indiscriminately by the general public, individual acquisition of a prescriptive easement has generally been held impossible. In such a case, the claimant must perform some act whereby the adverse nature of the claim is clearly indicated to the owner of the servient estate. Hall, 108 Idaho at 112-13, 697 P.2d at 452-53. In such situations, mere use of property alone is insufficient to establish a private prescriptive easement; rather, the claimant must perform some independent act signifying to the owner the adverse user's claim. Cardenas v. Kurpjuweit, 114 Idaho 79, 753 P.2d 290 (Ct.App.1988), vacated by 116 Idaho 739, 779 P.2d 414 (1989); Hall, 108 Idaho at 112, 697 P.2d at 452. This independent act requirement is merely a common sense way of ensuring the prescriptive easement elements have been satisfied. By definition, a use must be open and notorious, continuous and uninterrupted, and adverse and under a claim of right with the actual or imputed knowledge of the landowner for five years before it can ripen into a prescriptive easement. When the claimant is using the land along with members of the general public, it would simply be unfair to impute knowledge to the landowner that the claimant is making an adverse claim. The law in Idaho is clear that the general public may not obtain a private prescriptive easement. See State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 145, 594 P.2d 1093, 1098 (1979) ([T]his court is of the opinion that the `general public' or `the people of the state of Idaho' as distinguished from specific individuals cannot, absent specific statutory authorization, acquire prescriptive rights to private property.). Fairness demands the landowner receive some type of special notice so the landowner can differentiate between an adverse claimantwho can seek a private prescriptive easementand a member of the general publicwho cannotand take action to protect the landowner's property rights. Another rule which has developed over time flows from this Court's opinion in Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740 (1941), which created an exception to the general rule that the regular crossing of another's property is presumed to be adverse. In Simmons, we stated that where a landowner constructs a way over [the land] for his own use and convenience, the mere use thereof by others which in no way interferes with his use will be presumed to be by way of ... permission. Id. at 144, 118 P.2d at 744. In the instant case, there was much discussion below of the various presumptions, the shifting of burdens, and whether the exception even applied when the owner did not construct the way over the owner's land. Like the public use rule above, however, the rule from Simmons is merely another approach to analyzing whether the claimant has shown the basic prescriptive easement elements by clear and convincing evidence. To disentangle Idaho prescriptive easement law, we emphasize the need for courts to streamline their analysis by focusing simply on whether the five prescriptive easement elements have been satisfied based on the facts before them. In this case, the district court properly concluded Hughes used the Path along with the general public and performed no independent act that would have put Fisher on notice Hughes was claiming a prescriptive easement over his land. All of the plaintiffs themselves corroborated the public use of the Path by testifying that use of the Path was common knowledge, that everybody did it. It was something that was common practice, and that many people used the Path because it was regarded as the neighborhood access to the mountain. One plaintiff even testified he rented property in the neighborhood in part due to his realtor's suggestion that he could use the Path. Thus, the district court's finding that there was public use of the Path was based on substantial and competent evidence and will not be disturbed. Once such use by the public is established, the claimant is obligated to identify some independent act signifying the adverse claim to the landowner. There is simply nothing in the record indicating acts were committed that would have put Fisher on notice that Hughes' use was adverse. In fact, the district court found, Plaintiffs each admitted that there was nothing about their respective uses of the Path that would have imparted to Fisher or his predecessors that they were claiming a right to use the Path. Hughes has not shown this factual finding was clearly erroneous. In the absence of some independent act, Fisher cannot be deemed to have been on notice that the plaintiffs were each claiming an adverse right. Accordingly, Hughes has failed to establish all elements of a prescriptive easement and the district court's decision on this matter is affirmed.