Opinion ID: 2823809
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evolution of the Habitual Criminal Statute

Text: Â¶13Â Â Â Â Â When we decided Quintana, a defendant had a statutory right to have a jury decide habitual criminality as part of a single, bifurcated trial. See Â§ 16-13-103(4), C.R.S. (1973) (repealed by 2002 Colo. Sess. Laws 1428â29, ch. 318, sec. 3, Â§ 18-1.3-802). The governing statute provided: â[T]he jury impaneled to try the substantive offense shall determine by separate verdict whether the defendant has been convicted as alleged.â Id. Because both phases were conducted âbefore the same jury in one continuous proceeding,â we concluded that jeopardy attached when the jury swore an oath to determine the facts as to both the substantive and habitual counts. Quintana, 634 P.2d at 418. Â¶14Â Â Â Â Â We later addressed the statute in People v. Chavez, 621 P.2d 1362 (Colo. 1981) (plurality opinion). There, a plurality of the court concluded that even where a defendant testifies during the substantive phase of the trial and prior-convictions evidence is used to impeach his credibility, the prosecution must still prove those convictions beyond a reasonable doubt with evidence independent of the defendantâs testimony. Id. at 1367; see also People ex. rel. Faulk v. Dist. Court, 673 P.2d 998, 1001â02 (Colo. 1983) (discussing history of changes to the habitual criminal statute). A majority acknowledged the benefit of bifurcation with two justices emphasizing that âfundamental fairness requires no less than strict bifurcation.â Chavez, 621 P.2d at 1370(Quinn, J., concurring and specially concurring). In the wake of Chavez, that same year, the legislature amended section 16-13-103 to require a âseparate sentencing hearingâ in a bifurcated proceeding, as well as separate jury verdicts. See 1981 Colo. Sess. Laws 952â53, ch. 202, sec. 1, Â§ 16-13-103, C.R.S. (1978 Repl. Vol.). We later upheld the constitutionality of this bifurcated proceeding before the same jury. People ex. rel.Â Faulk, 673 P.2d at 1003. Â¶15Â Â Â Â Â In 1995, the legislature once again amended the habitual criminal statute to require that the trial court serve as the factfinder during the habitual phase. See 1995 Colo. Sess. Laws 467â68, ch. 129, sec. 14, Â§ 16-13-103, C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol.). Colorado law now states that âthe trial judge . . . shall determine by separate hearing and verdict whether the defendant has been convicted as alleged.â Â§ 18-1.3-803(4), C.R.S. (2014). We have not addressed the applicability of double jeopardy principles to the habitual phase of a bifurcated trial since this amendment.