Opinion ID: 2592090
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Present Proceedings

Text: Plaintiff Forti had been employed as an attorney within the State Department of Environmental Conservation until September of 1988, when he accepted employment with a private law firm as the head of the firm's newly created environmental law division. Following the announcement of Advisory Opinion 88-1, Forti commenced an action seeking a declaration that, contrary to that Opinion, Public Officers Law § 73 (8) applies only to those former executive branch employees who left State service on or after January 1, 1989 or, in the alternative, that the statute's two-year ban on all practice before the severed executive branch employee's former agency is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions (US Const 5th, 14th Amends; NY Const, art I, §§ 6, 11). Forti also sought a declaration that, as applied to attorneys and all other officers of the Courts of the State of New York, Public Officers Law § 73 (8), in its entirety, violates the separation of powers doctrine and, for that reason, is unconstitutional. On Forti's motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court, Albany County, concluded that Advisory Opinion 88-1 was correct as a matter of statutory construction, but that, as applied to individuals such as Forti who had left State service before its effective date, Public Officers Law § 73 (8) was unconstitutional. Specifically, after characterizing the statute as retroactive legislation impairing an admitted attorney's vested right to practice his or her profession, the court concluded that the distinctions drawn between former legislative and former executive branch employees were not supported by sufficiently persuasive reasons to satisfy the requirements of equal protection. On appeal, however, the Appellate Division reversed. In a lengthy and carefully reasoned opinion, the court concluded that plaintiff Forti had not demonstrated the statute to be unconstitutional ( see , 147 AD2d 269). Thereafter, Forti took an appeal as of right to this court pursuant to CPLR 5601 (b) (1), claiming the direct involvement of a substantial constitutional question. In Kuttner v Cuomo , the other action considered herein, the plaintiffs are all attorneys who were employed within State agencies but who left State service for private practice before January 1, 1989. Proceeding by order to show cause, the Kuttner plaintiffs sought declaratory relief similar to that sought in the Forti action. In addition to claiming that Public Officers Law § 73 (8) was not intended to be applied to them and was, as so applied, violative of their rights under the Due Process, Equal Protection and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions, the Kuttner plaintiffs complained that the statute constitutes an improper delegation of authority in that it fails to prohibit State agencies from adopting even more restrictive rules for its former employees. Further, they challenged the provisions of Public Officers Law § 73 (14), which give the Ethics Commission the discretion to determine which violations of the revolving door rules should be prosecuted as class A misdemeanors. On plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the new statute, the Supreme Court, Albany County, concluded that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the new restrictions in section 73 (8) were inapplicable to them, since, despite Advisory Opinion 88-1, there was no clear expression of a legislative intent to make [the statute] retroactive. Further, noting its view that the new law would be ex post facto if applied to plaintiffs, the court found that they would be irreparably harmed if preliminary injunctive relief were not granted, because the restrictions on their ability to practice would substantially diminish their value to their present private employers and they would be faced with the choice of either terminating their current professional activities or risking criminal prosecution. As in the Forti action, the Appellate Division concluded in the Kuttner appeal that section 73 (8) was properly deemed applicable to individuals in plaintiffs' position and did not violate the constitutional Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. The court further determined that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed either on their ex post facto claim or on their contention that the Legislature had improperly delegated rule-making authority. While it noted that plaintiffs might well succeed on their contention that the discretion afforded the Ethics Commission under section 73 (14) improperly infringed upon the authority vested in the State's prosecutors, it held that preliminary injunctive relief was nonetheless not warranted on that claim, since no criminal prosecutions were threatened and, consequently, there was no imminent irreparable harm ( see , 147 AD2d 215). Following the issuance of its order denying a preliminary injunction, the Appellate Division granted the Kuttner plaintiffs leave to appeal to this court, certifying the following question of law: Did this court err as a matter of law in reversing the order of Supreme Court granting plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction restraining defendants from enforcing Advisory Opinion 88-1 of the State Ethics Commission and in denying such motion?