Opinion ID: 4526973
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nurse Doe

Text: To “establish an Eighth Amendment claim arising out of inadequate medical care, a prisoner must prove deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.” Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Deliberate indifference has objective and subjective components: “First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, sufficiently serious. Second, the defendant must act with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To satisfy the subjective component, a plaintiff must establish “that the charged official act[ed] or fail[ed] to act while actually aware of a substantial risk that serious inmate harm will result.” Salahuddin v. Goord, 3 467 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir. 2006). “[W]hile ‘mere medical malpractice’ is not tantamount to deliberate indifference, certain instances of medical malpractice may rise to the level of deliberate indifference; namely, when the malpractice involves culpable recklessness, i.e., an act or a failure to act by the prison doctor that evinces ‘a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm.’” Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839 (1994)); see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.”). In cases where a prisoner alleges a delay in medical treatment, courts examine both the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical conditions and the harm caused by any unreasonable delay. See Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280 (“[I]f the prisoner is receiving on-going treatment and the offending conduct is an unreasonable delay or interruption in that treatment, the seriousness inquiry ‘focus[es] on the challenged delay or interruption in treatment rather than the prisoner’s underlying medical condition alone.’” (quoting Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2003))). Although the delay in Lombardo’s medical treatment was relatively brief (28 hours), he suffered from severe conditions (a partially collapsed lung and multiple rib fractures that required immediate treatment), and he alleged that one of his emergency room doctors told him it was “crazy” that the prison did not send him to the hospital for nearly 28 hours after he was injured. Lombardo also alleged that he experienced severe pain and trouble breathing during the 28-hour delay. Thus, taken together, Lombardo’s allegations regarding his severe medical conditions, the pain he experienced during the delay, and the doctor’s statement that the delay in treatment was “crazy” are sufficient to state a claim under the objective prong. See id. 4 However, Lombardo’s complaint fails because he did not adequately allege that Nurse Doe acted with a sufficiently culpable mental state, i.e., culpable recklessness as opposed to mere negligence. His minimal allegations do not indicate that the nurse was actually aware that his injuries were so severe as to require immediate medical treatment and that she consciously disregarded the risk of delaying such treatment. See id. He alleged only that Nurse Doe examined him and wiped blood from his face and body, that he told her he could not breathe, and that she sent him to his cell with a handful of ibuprofen. Additional details about his physical injuries, degree of respiratory difficulty, or his interactions with Nurse Doe would have helped Lombardo plausibly allege that Nurse Doe was aware he was suffering from serious injuries and deliberately denied treatment. Although Lombardo also alleged that he complained to a corrections officer during the night about his continued pain and difficulty breathing, he did not sue that officer or allege that these complaints were relayed to Nurse Doe. Moreover, in its decision and order, the district court pointed out what Lombardo needed to plead in order to state a claim, but Lombardo chose to appeal rather than amend. In sum, Lombardo failed to allege that Nurse Doe acted with a sufficiently culpable mental state under Eighth Amendment case law. See id.