Opinion ID: 351538
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Affirmative Relief

Text: 20 The defendants contest the affirmative relief ordered by the district court. However, as this Court has noted, 21 (t)here can be little doubt that where a violation of Title VII is found, the court is vested with broad remedial power to remove the vestiges of past discrimination and eliminate present and assure the non-existence of future barriers to the full enjoyment of equal job opportunities by qualified black workers. 22 United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 553 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984, 92 S.Ct. 447, 30 L.Ed.2d 367 (1971) (citations omitted). We do not believe the court lacks equal power under § 1981 to order relief. Indeed, (i)n fashioning an appropriate remedy for employment discrimination, Congress has granted courts plenary equitable power under both Title VII . . . and section 1981. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 243 (5th Cir. 1974) (footnotes omitted). Although the decided cases have primarily involved either Title VII or § 1983, and not § 1981, we feel the extensive case law under both sections approving affirmative relief is directly applicable here. We see no reason to limit the relief available under § 1981 merely because in the past § 1981 and Title VII have been read in tandem. See, e. g., Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910, 95 S.Ct. 1561, 43 L.Ed.2d 775 (1975); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974) modified, 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974). Similarly, we note that Title VII and § 1983 cases frequently have been cited as involving analogous principles in fashioning equitable relief, see Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 628 (2d Cir. 1974); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 329 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950, 92 S.Ct. 2045, 32 L.Ed.2d 338 (1972), and cases involving one statute have been cited in support of the relief ordered in cases involving the other. 23 Eight Courts of Appeals, including this one, have considered and approved the use of accelerated hiring goals or quotas to eradicate the effects of past discrimination. See Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910, 95 S.Ct. 1561, 43 L.Ed.2d 775 (1975) (§§ 1981 & 1983, Title VII); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974) (Title VII); United States v. Masonry Contractors Ass'n of Memphis, Inc., 497 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1974) (Title VII); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974), modified, 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (Title VII); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895, 95 S.Ct. 173, 42 L.Ed.2d 139 (1974) (§ 1983); Vulcan Society v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973) (§ 1983); Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957, 94 S.Ct. 1971, 40 L.Ed.2d 307 (1974) (Title VII); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973) (§§ 1981, 1983); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973) (en banc) (§ 1983); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (§ 1983); United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973) (Title VII); United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939, 93 S.Ct. 2773, 37 L.Ed.2d 398 (1973) (Title VII); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972) (§ 1983); United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 211 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851, 93 S.Ct. 63, 34 L.Ed.2d 94 (1972) (Title VII); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950, 92 S.Ct. 2045, 32 L.Ed.2d 338 (1972) (§ 1983); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984, 92 S.Ct. 447, 30 L.Ed.2d 367 (1971) (Title VII); Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854, 92 S.Ct. 98, 30 L.Ed.2d 95 (1971) (Title VII); United States v. Local 38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943, 91 S.Ct. 245, 27 L.Ed.2d 248 (1970) (Title VII); Local 53, Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (Title VII). 18 While the defendants argue § 703(j) of Title VII forbids the imposition of racial quota hiring, even were this to be an order premised solely on Title VII, we note this view has been uniformly rejected by the many courts which have considered the question. 24 We believe the district court properly exercised its discretion in ordering affirmative action to be undertaken to erase the effects of past discrimination. We do not believe that such relief may be limited to the identifiable persons denied employment in the past for the presence of identified persons who have been discriminated against is not a necessary prerequisite to ordering affirmative relief in order to eliminate the present effects of past discrimination. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d at 330. 25 Nor are remedial goals limited to any specific or prescribed form. The precise method of remedying past misconduct is left largely to the broad discretion of the district court. Goals have been expressed in terms of specific numbers or ratios . . . or percentages . . . . 26 Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d at 631 (citations omitted). 27 While we remand because the district court expressly stated that the reason it ordered identical accelerated hiring of blacks and Mexican-Americans in equal ratios was because of the validity of the 5'7 height requirement, we do not necessarily believe a 1-1-3 ratio was incorrect. The court, however, should reconsider its order in light of our decision that the 5'7 height requirement is invalid and that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge defendants' use of the 1969 written examination. 28 The defendants finally argue that the imposition of an affirmative order to hire minority applicants is unnecessary. They argue in effect that they have already commenced and that they can be relied upon further to improve their hiring practices without the added impetus of a court order. The experience of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is useful in this regard protestations or repentance and reform aimed to anticipate or blunt the force of a lawsuit offer insufficient assurance that the practices sought to be enjoined will not be repeated. Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972); accord, United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 333, 72 S.Ct. 690, 96 L.Ed. 978 (1952). Here the record shows that the defendants had decided to use an unvalidated verbal aptitude test to hire new candidates in 1973 and that the only reason the test was not used was notice of this suit. The personnel director of the defendants testified at length at the trial and acknowledged that he was aware of the discriminatory impact such a test would have. Further, the trial judge found that defendants had failed and refused to take necessary affirmative steps to overcome the department's bad reputation in black and Mexican-American communities. We emphasize that this was not a close case in a community of 29.1% Minority population, only 3.3% Of the firemen employed by defendants were black or Mexican-American. These factors are hardly persuasive evidence of the defendants' good faith, even were such good faith relevant in fashioning relief. 19 We agree with the district court that an accelerated hiring order is the only way to overcome the presently existing effects of past discrimination within a reasonable period of time. 29 In sum, we believe the district court was wholly justified in deciding to impose affirmative hiring orders upon the defendants. 20 30 While it should be obvious to all, we nevertheless repeat the admonition that nothing said by this Court is to be taken as a requirement that the defendants hire any unqualified applicant for the performance of these essential jobs. 31 AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.