Opinion ID: 2183205
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Juror impeachment of verdict.

Text: On June 2, 1972, more than three months after trial, defendant's motion for a new trial was heard. In an offer of proof by the defense, the jury forewoman testified as to her recollection of the content of the supplemental instruction. Her impression was that the instruction told the jurors that they had to make a decision, and that they would have to remain until they did, even if this meant staying the night. She also stated that it had the effect of changing some votes on the next ballot taken by the jury. There is no language in the supplemental instruction to support such an impression. The clear implication of the instruction is exactly the opposite. The record also reflects that at the conclusion of the trial the members of the jury were individually polled at the request of defendant's counsel. Each juror answered Yes when asked if the verdict they had returned was their verdict. The rule against a juror impeaching a jury verdict has been recognized in Wisconsin at least since 1855. Birchard v. Booth (1855), 4 Wis. 85 (). The public policy reasons for the existence of the rule have been stated many times. Any attempt to here comment on them would be repetitious and redundant. Kink v. Combs (1965), 28 Wis. 2d 65, 135 N. W. 2d 789; Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Amodt (1966), 29 Wis. 2d 441, 139 N. W. 2d 6; Boller v. Cofrances (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 170, 166 N. W. 2d 129. [4] Defendant urges that we seize this unique opportunity to carve out a narrow exception to the general rule against juror impeachment of a verdict. This exception would arise whenever (1) the supplemental instruction is given over timely objection; (2) surrounding circumstances suggest coercion; and (3) the juror comes forward voluntarily with the testimony. We decline the invitation to create such an exception to the established rule. The exception urged by the defendant runs contrary to the public policy considerations enunciated in our prior decisions. It would tend to unsettle verdicts, and to disclose for critical public scrutiny what is said in the private deliberations of the jury room. Although the defendant claims that his exception would operate only when a juror comes forward voluntarily, this would not prevent a party from creating the appearance of voluntariness. Lastly, this exception would encourage rather than prevent anxiety-ridden jurors from coming forward and claiming coercion. The exception requested by the defendant would allow evidence of the effect of an event [the giving of the supplementary instruction] upon the mind of a juror. Individual jurors would offer subjective testimony regarding the impact of this instruction on their minds, or would speculate about its influence upon the minds of other jurors. The crucial inquiry would necessarily relate to the state of mind of individual jurors, and whether this state of mind was coerced. This kind of testimony has been rejected in every modern formulation of a rule regarding impeachment of a jury verdict. It would be incompetent and inadmissible under the so-called Iowa rule, [5] the ABA Standard, [6] the Model Code of Evidence, [7] the Uniform Rules of Evidence, [8] and the new Wisconsin Rules of Evidence. [9] The defendant's reliance on Parker v. Gladden (1966), 385 U. S. 363, 87 Sup. Ct. 468, 17 L. Ed. 2d 420, and People v. De Lucia (1967), 20 N. Y. 2d 275, 229 N. E. 2d 211, is misplaced. We deem them to be not in point. By the Court. Judgment and order affirmed.