Opinion ID: 183816
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Temporal Limitations on Lay Witness Testimony

Text: In a pretrial order, the district court ruled that Goodman could call his father, his divorce lawyer, and his minister as witnesses, but limited their testimony to Goodman's behavior during the days immediately surrounding the robberies. Goodman contends the district court erred in temporally limiting the lay testimony, and he further argues the limitations prevented him from showing other manifestations of his mental diseases and from contrasting his pre- and post-combat behavior. Goodman asserts his insanity defense suffered as a result. We agree. We first turn to the standard of review. The government contends Goodman failed to preserve the issue for appeal and that we should therefore review for plain error only. United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir.2005). We have ruled that a motion in limine may preserve an objection when the issue (1) is fairly presented to the district court, (2) is the type of issue that can be finally decided in a pretrial hearing, and (3) is ruled upon without equivocation by the trial judge. United States v. Mejia-Alarcon, 995 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir.1993). Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve the claim of error for appeal. FED.R.EVID. 103(a). In his pretrial brief, Goodman notified the district court that his father, pastor, and divorce attorney would testify about the deterioration of his personality, mental stability, and emotional state during the months leading up to the robberies. Goodman's counsel again notified the court at the pretrial conference the people he expected to call as witnesses. He also provided the district court the content of some of their testimony, including among other things, Goodman's living in a filthy apartment surrounded by dog feces, his fleeing the crowd at a college football game for fear that someone might be a suicide bomber, and his experiencing a flashback and diving to the ground at the sound of an incoming call on a policeman's hand radio. Specifically, Goodman's parents would testify about their observations of him before he went to Iraq and after he returned home, despite his treatment: how he overslept, behaved robotically, and lost touch with reality. The pastor would testify about how different Goodman behaved and looked in 2008 compared with his behavior in years prior. Goodman thus fully proffered the essence of the proposed lay testimony prior to trial. The district court ruled unequivocally in a written order, and Goodman's counsel obviously was restricted in what testimony he could elicit from these witnesses at trial. We are therefore satisfied Goodman properly preserved his objections for appeal. Consequently, our review on admission and exclusion of evidence [is] for abuse of discretion. United States v. Allen, 449 F.3d 1121, 1125 (10th Cir.2006). Although the abuse of discretion standard is deferential, abuse is shown where the decision was made based upon a mistaken view of the law. Id. Our cases have been generous in extending broad latitude to lay testimony in insanity trials. The leading precedent is United States v. Austin, 933 F.2d 833 (10th Cir.1991), where we concluded that when insanity is an issue all evidence of mental difficulties, either before, after, or on the date of the alleged offense is admissible.  Id. at 842 (emphasis added). In Austin, we considered the exclusion of a defendant's eight-year-old medical reports, which the defense hoped would help show the defendant's insanity. The district court excluded them as too old to be relevant. We reversed, clarifying that we have never placed a temporal limit on relevant proof of mental illness. Id. Instead, mental health evidence can retain its relevance in view of its frequently long duration, its possible chronicity as suggested by the tendered exhibits and its recurrent manifestations within the common knowledge of lay witnesses. Id.; see also Davis v. United States, 364 F.2d 572, 574-75 (10th Cir.1966) (The instruction . . . is. . . too restrictive in that it limits the accused's evidence as to her mental condition to the time of the commission of the crimes. . . . Such evidence may instead relate to conditions existing both before and after the crime.). While we offer no general rule concerning the point at which evidence of insanity becomes too stale to be relevant, the excluded evidence in this case did not cross the line. Unlike the eight years of behavior at issue in Austin, Goodman's excluded evidence at most would have been only three years old, and part of a continuous pattern that developed from the beginning of his psychiatric treatment up to the time of the robberies. The proffered evidence was based on the direct observations of close family and friends, and is the type of evidence that can bolster expert mental health testimony. Based on our reading of Austin, the district court erred by limiting the temporal scope of Goodman's lay witnesses. The government urges us to nonetheless affirm on the grounds the district court's error was harmless. We cannot do so. First, by not allowing Goodman to show a number of manifestations of his insanity, some of which occurred just a few weeks and months prior to the robberies, the district court compromised Goodman's ability to persuade the jury he was legally insane at the time he committed the crimes. Secondly, the temporal limitation did not simply prevent Goodman from introducing a few anecdotal facts. It also likely affected how Goodman's counsel crafted his entire defense theme and strategy, prepared his witnesses, and questioned them at trial. Here, the exclusion handicapped defense counsel from the outset of the case. We therefore agree with Goodman the exclusion deprived [him] of important evidence relevant to a sharply controverted question going to the heart of [his] defense, and that therefore his substantial rights were affected and he is entitled to a new trial. See United States v. Yarbrough, 527 F.3d 1092, 1103 (10th Cir.2008). In sum, the district court should have allowed Goodman's witnesses to testify about their observations of his behavior in the three years leading up to the crimes.