Opinion ID: 2976330
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Andres’s Life Sentence

Text: 1. Constitutionality of the mandatory life sentence Andres argues that application of a mandatory life sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because it is grossly disproportionate to the offenses at issue here and would amount to retaliation for the exercise of a fundamental right to trial by jury. Andres emphasizes that he served a total of only 90 days’ imprisonment for his prior drug-related convictions, and that his prior felonies did not involve any personal injury or property damage. The Supreme Court’s decision in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), forecloses Andres’s argument. In Harmelin, the defendant was convicted in Michigan state courts for possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine, and was sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison without the possibility of parole. Id. at 961. A plurality of the Court rejected the defendant’s assertion that his statutorily required life term without parole was disproportionate because it was his first felony conviction. Id. at 994. The plurality concluded that the Eighth Amendment “does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” Id. at 1001 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983)). The plurality in Harmelin concluded that a life sentence for possession of 672 grams of cocaine did not violate the Eighth Amendment, even though it was the defendant’s first offense. “The Sixth Circuit has adopted the ‘narrow proportionality principle’ of Harmelin. Consequently, only an extreme disparity between crime and sentence offends the Eighth Amendment.” United States v. Marks, 209 F.3d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Recognizing that Andres’s sentence has been vacated on other grounds, we nonetheless reject the constitutional challenge to that sentence. In light of Harmelin, we cannot conclude that Andres’s sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime for which he was convicted. Andres was convicted of conspiracy, and therefore he was held accountable for all the drugs seized during the course of the conspiracy: over 6 kilograms of marijuana, another 60 pounds of marijuana that Andres packaged; 378.61 grams of cocaine base (crack); 48.5 grams of heroin; and 1088.7 grams of cocaine. Moreover, Andres was described as the co-organizer or co-leader of the conspiracy. See United States v. Hill, 30 F.3d 48, 50-51 (6th Cir. 1994) (rejecting a defendant’s argument that his life sentence for conspiracy to distribute 177.8 grams of crack cocaine was unconstitutional). In related constitutional arguments, Andres argues that his life sentence is disproportionate to the sentences received by his codefendants. This court has held that the Constitution does not require proportionality between defendants. United States v. Layne, 324 F.3d 464, 474 (6th Cir. 2003). Moreover, Andres had only one codefendant with two prior felony drug convictions; but that defendant played a minor role in the conspiracy, pleaded guilty, and cooperated with the government. Andres also argues that a statutory mandatory sentence violates the separation of powers doctrine because mandatory minimums unconstitutionally shift sentencing discretion away from the courts to prosecutors. We have flatly rejected this argument because “‘the scope of juridical discretion with respect to a sentence is subject to congressional control.’” United States v. Dumas, 934 F.2d 1387, 1389 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989)). See also id. (“Congress can constitutionally eliminate all discretion in sentencing judges by establishing mandatory sentences . . . .”) Finally, Andres claims that his sentence is unconstitutional because the judge was prohibited by the mandatory sentencing statute from considering Andres’s individual circumstances. We have held, however, that there is no constitutional right to individualized sentencing in non-capital cases. Nos. 06-5885/5915 United States v. Odeneal, et al. Page 6 United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1035 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gardner, 931 F.2d 1097, 1099 (6th Cir. 1991). 2. Prior-Conviction Enhancement To enhance Andres’s sentence based on his prior convictions, the government was required to comply with the notice provisions outlined in 21 U.S.C. § 851. That statute provides: No person who stands convicted of an offense under this part shall be sentenced to increased punishment by reason of one or more prior convictions, unless before trial . . . the United States attorney files an information with the court (and serves a copy of such information on the person or counsel for the person) stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon. . . . Clerical mistakes in the information may be amended at any time prior to the pronouncement of sentence. 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1). The requirements delineated in § 851 are mandatory, and a district court cannot enhance a defendant’s sentence based on a prior conviction unless the government satisfies the requirements. United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 1526, 1529 (6th Cir.1990) (citing United States v. Noland, 495 F.2d 529, 533 (5th Cir.1974)); see also United States v. Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“A prosecutor’s compliance with § 851(a)(1) is simply a necessary condition to a judge’s imposing an enhanced sentence on the basis of a defendant’s prior convictions.”). The sufficiency of a § 851 information is a question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556, 577 (6th Cir. 1999). On February 7, 2006, the government filed a Notice of Intent to Rely Upon Prior Convictions to Increase Sentence. Within the notice, the United States identified two previous convictions: (1) attempted possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine, entered on June 18, 2001, in Wayne Circuit Court, Wayne County, Michigan; and (2) possession of marijuana in an amount less than 50 pounds but more that 5 pounds, entered on March 22, 2004, in Hunt District Court, Hunt County, Texas. Andres objects to the use of his two prior felony convictions to enhance his sentence because (1) notice of the government’s intent to use the felony convictions was not filed in an information, (2) the prior felonies were not initiated by indictments, and (3) the prior felonies occurred during the time frame of the conspiracy and therefore do not constitute separate prior felonies. a. Sufficiency of the notice of intent to rely on prior convictions to increase sentence The “Notice” in this case was not titled an “information,” but that does not render the notice inadequate. United States v. Forest, 355 F.3d 942, 957 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that rendering a 851(a)(1) notice invalid because it was not titled an “information” would put form over substance). The notice fulfilled the requirements of § 851. b. Prosecution by indictment Further, 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(2) provides that “[a]n information may not be filed under this section . . . unless the person either waived or was afforded prosecution by indictment for the offense for which such increased punishment may be imposed.” Andres argues that because the notice did not indicate that he was charged by indictment for his prior offenses, those convictions could not be used to enhance his sentence. It is clear from the plain language of the statute, however, that the indictment requirement refers to the offense which is subject to an enhanced sentenced, i.e., the conspiracy charge at issue here, and not his prior convictions. Nos. 06-5885/5915 United States v. Odeneal, et al. Page 7 c. The prior felonies The conspiracy for which Andres was convicted began in August of 1999 and continued until November 8, 2005, the date that he was charged in a superceding indictment. Andres argues that because he committed the Texas felony during the course of the conspiracy, and the Michigan felony was finalized during the conspiracy, neither can be considered “prior” felonies. Whether the conduct constituted separate felonies or was part of one conspiracy is a legal question that we review de novo. United States v. Murphy, 107 F.3d 1199, 1208 (6th Cir. 1997). We rejected an identical argument in United States v. Hughes, 924 F.2d 1354 (6th Cir. 1991). There, the district court enhanced the defendant’s sentence for conspiracy to distribute and conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine because of a state felony conviction for possession of cocaine, which occurred during the time frame of the conspiracies. We found: Hughes had a prior felony drug conviction which arose from a separate criminal episode, an offense that was distinct in time. An episode is an incident that is part of a series, but forms a separate unit within the whole. Although related to the entire course of events, an episode is a punctuated occurrence with a limited duration. The criminal events that constitute the bases for Hughes’ conviction for possession of cocaine and his subsequent conviction for conspiracy do not represent a single criminal episode. Such events occurred at distinct times spanning a nine-month period. The initial drug raid, which precipitated the state conviction, occurred on March 4, 1988. The drug raid which gave rise to Hughes’ conspiracy conviction occurred on December 6, 1988. The conspiracy, alleged to have commenced on March 1, 1988, ceased more than nine months after the possession offense occurred and approximately three months after the conviction for possession of cocaine became final. The possession of cocaine constituted one episode which concluded with the first drug raid on March 4, 1988. In contrast, the conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine constituted another episode that did not conclude until December 6, 1988. While the raids occurred at the same residence and involved the same type of controlled substance, the intervening amount of time and the finality of the state felony drug conviction lead us to conclude that the twenty-year mandatory minimum was properly applied. Id. at 1361-62. The court also explained in Hughes that using the state conviction as a predicate offense under the federal conspiracy sentence furthered the purpose of the sentencing enhancement—to punish recidivists more severely. The factual circumstances underlying Andres’s Michigan conviction occurred before the conspiracy charged in this case; thus, we conclude that it was a separate criminal episode. The Texas conviction is more problematic because Andres committed the crime in 2002, during the time frame of the charged conspiracy. Specifically, on November 14, 2002, a police officer in Texas stopped a car that Andres had rented because it was speeding. After Andres consented to a search of the vehicle, the officer found 10 pounds of marijuana. Hughes makes clear that a separate criminal episode can consist of a crime involving the same type of controlled substance as charged in the conspiracy and occurring during the time frame of the charged conspiracy. In Hughes, a nine-month period of time between the allegedly distinct criminal episode and the conclusion of the conspiracy convinced the court that the prior conviction should be considered a separate criminal episode. Here, the events underlying the Texas conviction took place more than three years before the conclusion of the conspiracy, and the conviction was entered more than one year before the conclusion of the conspiracy. Andres had an opportunity after each conviction to cease his criminal activity, but he chose to continue. Nos. 06-5885/5915 United States v. Odeneal, et al. Page 8 For the reasons discussed, we reject Andres’s challenges to the constitutionality of a mandatory life sentence, to the § 851 notice of the intention to seek the enhancement, and the district court’s determination that his two previous convictions were prior convictions for purposes of the enhancement.