Opinion ID: 1531299
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: the refusal to grant a new trial

Text: The circumstances of Doris' confession of perjury after the trial was concluded and when sentence was about to be pronounced have already been recounted. The defense urges her new testimony constituted newly discovered evidence and was sufficient to warrant a new trial. The court did not feel this evidence was newly discovered within the meaning of R.R. 3:7-11. The trial court was also of the opinion that the testimony would not change the result were a new trial to be granted. There is at least a possibility that Doris' credibility as a witness might be impaired to some degree by virtue of her recantation. Then, too, the credibility of her brother's testimony might also be reflected upon in view of the fact that her present version, instead of supporting his testimony, would in some respects be in conflict with it. These two witnesses played an important part in the State's presentation, but we deem it unnecessary to discuss the ruling in extenso in view of our conclusion already reached that a new trial is required. For the same reason we find it unnecessary to rule upon other errors assigned. The judgment below is reversed and the cause remanded for a trial de novo. HEHER, J. (concurring in reversal). At common law, the jurors in criminal cases were not permitted to separate, even with the consent of the accused; and in this country the dispersal of the jury in the exercise of judicial discretion came by statute, limited in most of our state jurisdictions to noncapital cases. 53 Am. Jur. 629 et seq.; 34 A.L.R. 1128, 1132, 1140, 1146; 79 A.L.R. 826; 21 A.L.R. 2 d 1100, 1105, 1107, 1109. The rule against separation is intended to secure an impartial and unbiased verdict by jury immune to extraneous and prejudicial influences. And, because of the gravity of the issue, seclusion of the jury has been deemed of the very substance of a fair trial in capital cases. In Peiffer v. Commonwealth, 15 Pa. 468 ( Sup. Ct. 1850), Gibson, C.J. said: Even the forms and usages of the law conduce to justice; but the common law, which forbids the separation of a jury in a capital case before they have been discharged of the prisoner, touches not matter of form, but matter of substance. It is not too much to say that if it were abolished, few influential culprits would be convicted, and that few friendless ones, pursued by powerful prosecutors, would escape conviction. Jurors are as open to prejudice from persuasion as other men, and neither convenience nor economy ought to be consulted, in order to guard them against it. Let them have every comfort compatible with their duties; but let them not be exposed to the converse of those who might pervert their judgment. In the words of Beasley, C.J., the sequestering of the jury in all capital cases was a basic requirement of ancient English law  an institute of law which is wholly beyond the control of the court, and which belongs to the citizen as of right; a requisition of absolute law which is not, in any measure, a matter resting in the discretion of the court. State v. Cucuel, 31 N.J.L. 249 ( Sup. Ct. 1865). The Chief Justice continued: No one acquainted with the subject will deny that this practice prevailed for many successive ages, and so far as is known to me, it has never been departed from by any English judicature. In this state, almost from the epoch of its settlement by our ancestors to the present moment, as we are informed by history, both printed and oral, the same formula has been observed. From these admitted incidents then, it would seem to be incontestably plain, that the formula itself is invested with every possible claim, to be considered a part of that legal system which this court is bound to sustain and administer. It is not a matter of unsubstantial form, but one of the means provided by the law, to reach the result of a verdict founded exclusively on the evidence delivered in open court in the presence of the parties. It is, therefore, as much a right of the defendant as is any other act which the law requires, by immemorial usage, to be performed at the trial. It is altogether impossible to admit the right of the court, at its pleasure, to waive the performance of this act. If the seclusion of the jury can be dispensed with before the charge of the court, why not dispense with it after such charge? And if the power to alter in one respect the admitted mode of ancient procedure is conceded to the court, what power to alter the forms of the trial can be denied?    It appears to be altogether illogical, admitting the great antiquity of the form of the separation of the jury from the mass of the community in capital cases, to maintain the right of the court to abolish such form, without at the same time admitting the right of the court to retain or set aside, at will, all the other essential circumstances which go to make up the proceedings of a trial at law. But it is enough for us to know that this court has heretofore laid claim to no such power; that it has ever conformed its practice, with implicit obedience, to the ancient usages, leaving to the legislative department of the government the task to modify the law, so as to place it in harmony with the ever shifting conditions of human life. In 1932, the old Court of Errors and Appeals unanimously reaffirmed the principle of jury seclusion as protective alike of society and the accused. State v. O'Leary, 110 N.J.L. 36 ( E. & A. 1933). This ancient usage of the common law continues in force until modified by constitutional authority. 1947 State Constitution, Art. XI, sec. 1, par. 3; 1844 Constitution, Art. X, par. 1. The sequestering of juries in capital cases is a peremptory rule of substantive law to serve the common right and individual justice. It was the judge who broached the subject of separation, not counsel for the accused. Immediately after being sworn, the jury were escorted from the courtroom for a short recess, and the judge thereupon inquired of the prosecutor as to whether it was his intention to ask for the death penalty, stating that the inquiry was put with the thought of possibly not sequestering the jury and both the prosecutor and the defense attorney ought to make statements as to their feelings about the sequestering of the jury. The prosecutor replied that the State would ask for a verdict of murder in the first degree, but would not demand the death penalty. The judge said that, there being no demand for the death penalty, it seems to me that it would not be necessary to sequester the jury, but he would like to hear from the defense attorney first on that question. Counsel responded that if the State does not seek the death penalty, he could see no reason why the jury should be sequestered. The prosecutor thought otherwise; the jury should be sequestered he suggested; and the judge said: All right. That will be the situation at your request. I certainly would not grant it otherwise. The judge had the notion that the question was one of discretion, but he would not direct the seclusion of the jury if either side thought otherwise. Counsel for the accused then indicated, as I read the record, that if it were a question of discretion, the accused would be satisfied either way. But the judge reiterated that in view of the prosecutor's attitude, the jury should be sequestered. At the close of the testimony on the following day, after a conference with counsel out of the presence of the jury, not incorporated in the appendix, the judge informed the jury that since the State was not asking for the death penalty, a capital offense was not involved, and so there was no need for the seclusion of the jury; that counsel for the accused and the prosecutor had both indicated they would have no objection if the judge permitted the separation of the jury, and such would be the order. Counsel for the accused should not have been subjected to this solicitation of consent, for such it was, even in the absence of the jury. What assurance could there be that the jury would not learn of counsel's refusal of consent to their separation, a fear that would deter insistence upon the right.