Opinion ID: 321074
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 'Findings' Under Section 211(c)(2)(B) and (C) of the Clean Air Act

Text: 37 Section 211(c) of the Clean Air Act establishes a framework for 'informal rule-making,' an enterprise for which the usual scope of judicial review is prescribed by Section 10(e)(2)(A)-(D) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 21 and for which minimum procedural requisites are established by Section 4 of the APA. 22 Being silent on the scope of judicial review, 23 the Clean Air Act incorporates the APA's mandate that agency 'action, findings, and conclusions' be struck down if they are 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.' Section 10(e)(2)(A) of the APA. But, like many recent grants of rule-making authority, 24 the Clean Air Act itself prescribes certain novel procedural requisites. 25 Of these the most important for our purposes are the 'findings' requirements in Section 211(c)(2). Section 4(c) of the APA provides merely that 'the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.' To this duty Section 211(c)(2) adds a requirement that certain 'findings' be published in conjunction with promulgation of fuel regulations: 38 (B) No fuel or fuel additive may be controlled or prohibited by the Administrator pursuant to clause (B) of paragraph (1) except after consideration of available scientific and economic data, including a cost benefit analysis comparing emission control devices or systems which are or will be in general use and require the proposed control or prohibition with emission control devices or systems which are or will be in general use and do not require the proposed control or prohibition. On request of a manufacturer of motor vehicles, motor vehicle engines, fuels, or fuel additives submitted within 10 days of notice of proposed rulemaking, the Administrator shall hold a public hearing and publish findings with respect to any matter he is required to consider under this subparagraph. Such findings shall be published at the time of promulgation of final regulations. 39 Section 211(c)(2)(B). 40 (C) No fuel or fuel additive may be prohibited by the Administrator under paragraph (1) unless he finds, and publishes such finding, that in his judgment such prohibition will not cause the use of any other fuel or fuel additive which will produce emissions which will endanger the public health or welfare to the same or greater degree than the use of the fuel or fuel additive proposed to be prohibited. 41 Section 211(c)(2)(C). 42 Petitioners construe these provisions as requiring that the Administrator's Statement contain findings which are 'specific' in character and which are directed to each of the decisions and determinations embodied in the Fuel Regulations. A study of the language and history of the provisions has persuaded us that they cannot fairly be construed in this fashion. 43 We consider first the question of specificity. The two provisions speak only of 'findings,' not of 'specific findings.' The House version of the legislation required specificity; 26 the Senate version did not. 27 The Conference Committee on the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 adopted the Senate's preference for the unqualified noun. The Committee's decision was a deliberated one and was meant to have significance. Advocates of the House version had viewed the specificity requirement as a major limitation on EPA's regulatory power over fuels. 28 The Conference Committee's preference was for simplicity and workability. In reporting the Committee's decision to the Senate Senator Muskie stated: 44 While the conference substitute specifies procedures under section 211 which the Administrator will use in determining whether to prohibit or control fuels or fuel additives, the conference committee wishes to call the Administrator's attention to the relationship between his functions under this section and the emission deadlines stipulated in Section 202. It is not the intent of the Congress to create a cumbersome, time consuming administrative procedure which will delay necessary controls on fuels and fuel additives required to meet these deadlines. 45 Neither is it the intention of the Congress to lock the Administrator into a rigid economic interpretation of the cost benefit analysis specified in this section in making his determination to prohibit or control fuels or fuel additives. 46 Rather, the conference committee wishes to call the attention of the Administrator to the broad environmental, esthetic and health considerations underlying the enactment of this legislation which should be kept in mind in making these determinations. 29 47 Senator Muskie was a key legislator in drafting the Clean Air Act Amendments, and his uncontradicted views on the meaning of these provisions are entitled to significant weight. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 158 U.S.App.D.C. 308, 314-315, 486 F.2d 375, 381-382 (1973). We are satisfied that Congress wished the Administrator, and a fortiori the reviewing courts, to read the 'findings' requirements of Section 211(c)(2)(B) and (C) in light of that imperative need for administrative flexibility and expedition which we have already recognized as coloring EPA's statutory duty to state the 'basis and purpose' of its regulations. 30 Findings there must be, but they need not be 'specific' in the sense of being detailed or voluminous. 48 We next inquire into the subject matter of the 'findings' requirements in Section 211(c)(2)(B) and (C). What is it that EPA is required to find? Petitioners offer an expansive answer: The statute requires publication of distinct 'findings' with respect to every significant decision and determination made in the course of regulating fuels; every choice and judgment embodied in the regulations needs the support of stated findings. This being a matter of first impression, petitioners' thesis requires a rather lengthy exploration. 49 When-- as is the usual case-- findings are required in the context of an administrative adjudication, there is no need to ask what the requirement means. An adjudication typically involves a single, ultimate determination, the agency's sole task being to reason from raw evidence to a final conclusion of a mixed legalfactual character, usually framed in statutory language. For instance, an agency will be asked to determine whether the evidence available on a public utility's rate practices shows behavior that is 'unreasonable' or 'unduly discriminatory.' The agency's 'findings' are simply those 'basic' or 'intermediate' conclusions of fact by which it resolves evidentiary disputes and from which it moves, in a final step, to the ultimate statutory decision. See generally 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 16.06 (1958). 50 In rule-making, however, an agency's task is not to test raw evidence against a single, pre-established standard; rather the agency is to fashion a host of new legal standards-- regulations-- having prospective effect. A rule-making agency makes not one but dozens of 'ultimate' decisions-- not only because a set of regulations has many provisions, but also because adoption of any one provision constitutes a simultaneous rejection of many possible alternatives. Few if any of these 'ultimate' decisions will depend on factual conclusions of the sort conventional in adjudication. Looking to the future, and commanded by Congress to make policy, a rule-making agency necessarily deals less with 'evidentiary' disputes than with normative conflicts, projections from imperfect data, experiments and simulations, educated predictions, differing assessments of possible risks, and the like. The process is quasi-legislative in character, and one will search it in vain for those intermediate 'findings' of fact which mark the midway point in an adjudicator's linear march from raw evidence to single, ultimate conclusion. See generally Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 162 U.S.App.D.C. , - , 499 F.2d 467, 472-476, 488 (1974); Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 200, 205-207, 407 F.2d 330, 335-337 (1968). 51 For these reasons we think petitioners' expansive reading of the 'findings' requirements in Section 211(c)(2)(B) and (C) is inherently unrealistic. To require findings of a rule-making agency without specifying what factual predicates are to be found or which administrative decisions are to be supported by findings would be to invite endless confusion and great uncertainty, particularly at the stage of judicial review. Judge Friendly recently confronted a similar dilemma in Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Labor, 2 Cir., 487 F.2d 342 (1973), involving a statute, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, which subjected certain rule-making by the Secretary of Labor to judicial review under the 'substantial evidence' standard. After observing that the bearing of factual 'evidence' on rule-making is unclear at best, id. at 349-350, Judge Friendly warned: 52 Courts may well end up doing much less than Congress intended or, a more likely and graver threat in these days of judicial activism, much more than Congress had wished. 53 Id. at 354. 54 Fortunately, the findings requirements in Section 211(c)(2)(B) and (C) are capable of an alternative construction which avoids uncertainty and confusion. In our judgment Section 211(c)(2)(C) calls on EPA to answer a particular factual question, while Section 211(c)(2)(B) requires that particular factual determinations be made concerning the threshold necessity of embarking upon fuel regulation. Because these findings requirements are reasonably precise and comprehensible, they are compatible with the mechanics of rule-making and with the exigencies of judicial review. 55 Consider first Section 211(c)(2)(C). It provides that, before a fuel 'may be prohibited,' the Administrator must publish a 'finding, that in his judgment such prohibition will not cause the use of any other fuel or fuel additive which will produce emissions which will endanger the public health or welfare to the same or greater degree than the use of the fuel or fuel additive proposed to be prohibited.' The Administrator's Statement makes a finding to this effect. 31 Petitioners have presented us with no reason to think the finding arbitrary or capricious. 32 56 The 'findings' requirement in Section 211(c)(2)(B) calls for somewhat closer attention. It commands the Administrator to 'publish findings with respect to any matter he is required to consider under this subparagraph' (i.e. under 211(c)(2)(B)). The 'matter(s)' he must 'consider' are 57 available scientific and economic data, including a cost benefit analysis comparing emission control devices or systems which are or will be in general use and require the proposed control or prohibition with emission control devices or systems which are or will be in general use and do not require the proposed control or prohibition. 58 Thus in a literal sense the provision requires 'findings with respect to' the actual items of data which the Administrator must 'consider.' But we do not take this to mean that EPA is to produce an aimless commentary on the raw evidence presented to it. 33 There is an accepted distinction in the law between findings and a rambling discussion of evidence. See 2 K. Davis, supra, 16.06. Findings are generally required in order to illuminate the empirical bases of an agency's decision-making and this, we assume, is also the objective of the requirement in Section 211(c)(2)(B). 59 While the provision does not expressly specify the administrative decision in support of which findings are necessary, this emerges with reasonable clarity from the structure and legislative history of the provision. Section 211(c)(2) (B) is centrally concerned with EPA's threshold determination whether or not to regulate a particular fuel or additive. In effect, the provision establishes a rebuttable presumption that the Agency should maintain a laissez faire posture with regard to fuel regulation. 34 To rebut the presumption the Agency must determine, through consideration of 'available scientific and economic data, including a cost benefit analysis,' that the emission standards established under Section 202 of the Act cannot be achieved in acceptable fashion by relying on emission control devices in 'general use' which 'do not require the proposed control or prohibition.' The 'findings' arrived at in making this determination must be published. The findings are to show why regulation, as opposed to no regulation, is necessary or otherwise advisable. 35 These findings constitute a condition precedent to embarking upon the exercise of regulatory power. It does not follow that findings are also required to support the many subsequent and detailed decisions made during the exercise of that power. Section 211(c)(2)(B) involves a clear reference to the threshold question of whether or not to regulate, but implies no reference we can perceive to the myriad issues raised by the subsequent question of how to regulate. The findings requirement appears, therefore, to be an initial barrier which the Agency must scale, not a series of hurdles strung throughout the whole course of the rule-making process. 36 60 The legislative history of the provision supports this interpretation. In discussing the Conference Committee's bill, Senator Muskie spoke of 'procedures under section 211 which the Administrator will use in determining whether to prohibit or control fuels or fuel additives.' 37 The Senate committee explained its version of the legislation in similar terms. 61 The Committee believes that automobile and petroleum industries should be given the greatest possible latitude in developing an effective low emission technology. Therefore, before the Secretary made any decision to prohibit or limit the use of a fuel to facilitate emission control, he would be required to hold public hearings and make and publish a finding that such a prohibition is necessary.    38 While adverting to the later-rejected notion of 'specific findings,' the House committee also focused on the threshold determination whether or not to embark on fuel regulation. Before imposing such (fuel) limitations the Secretary is required to make certain specific findings as to the necessity of the imposition of such limitations. 39 62 In authorizing the Secretary to prescribe limitations for automotive fuel ingredients, the committee has conditioned the Secretary's authority by requiring specific findings based on specified evidence. The committee has done this for the purpose of assuring that such limitations will not be lightly imposed if other equally satisfactory alternatives are available. 40 63 Therefore, at the core of Section 211(c)(2)(B) we find a requirement that the Administrator state findings, drawn from a study of emission control devices in or near 'general use,' to the effect that fuel regulation is a necessary or otherwise advisable component in the Agency's overall strategy to meet the Section 202 emission standards. On this score the Statement accompanying the Fuel Regulations is candid and, we think, adequate. We quote relevant portions in the margin. 41 The Administrator expressly found that catalytic converters require a regulated fuel-- unleaded gasoline; that converters will be in general use in the 1975 model year; and that no other emission control device or system will then be in general use. Taken together, these findings negative any possibility of meeting the 1975 emission standards without fuel regulation. These findings are amply supported by the record. 64 Petitioners concede that leaded gasoline poisons converters. While petitioners argue that suspension of the 1975 standards will effectively restrict use of the converters to California, the evidence is otherwise, indicating 'general use' nationwide. The Administrator directly addressed this matter in his April 11 decision on the suspension. He concluded that fuel regulation remained necessary because California cars 'will undoubtedly travel to other parts of the country' and because converters would also be fitted 'on a significant number of vehicles sold in the other 49 States.' 42 These findings were reasonable on the record before him, and they have been dramatically vindicated by subsequent testimony of high officers of the Ford Motor Company and General Motors; these corporations plan to make extensive, nationwide use of converters in the 1975 model year. 43 The statute speaks of 'general use,' not of universal or invariable use. 65 Finally, petitioners contest the Administrator's finding that the catalytic converter is the only emission control device relevant, at this time, to the decision whether or not to regulate fuels. It is true that there are other devices and systems in the testing stage, that some of these may be able to operate on leaded gasoline, and that one or another of these systems may some day supplant converters for reasons of cost or efficiency. The Administrator examined these matters in his April 11 decision, and concluded that American automakers will have to rely on converters for another five years. 44 Section 211(c)(2)(B) requires a cost-benefit comparison only between those devices or systems which are in or near 'general use.' Until a device or system reaches that stage, it obviously cannot be a viable factor in deciding whether or not to regulate fuels in order to meet the Section 202 schedule for reduced emissions. Petitioners refer us to no evidence indicating that a non-converter device or system will be in or near general use in the 1975 or 1976 model years. When and if non-converter technology approaches general use, continuation of these Fuel Regulations will require that the Agency undertake the cost-benefit comparison among emission control systems outlined in Section 211(c)(2)(B). Until then, however, no such comparison is necessary. 45 66 In sum: By showing that fuel regulation is necessary to meet the Section 202 schedule for reduced emissions, and that the proposed regulation will not cause use of an equally harmful fuel or additive, the Administrator's statement has, in our judgment, met the 'findings' requirements in Section 211(c)(2)(B) and (C). Petitioners argue strenuously that Section 211(c)(2)(B) additionally requires 'findings' with respect to the Agency's detailed regulatory decisions, e.g. the decisions to set the lead content ceiling at 0.05 gram per gallon, to require marketing of unleaded gas, and to impose vicarious liability on refiners and end-point distributors. As earlier explained, this view depends on a broad construction of Section 211(c)(2)(B) which is rendered implausible by the verbal structure and legislative history of the provision, by Congress' rejection of the term 'specific findings,' by the legislative mandate for expeditious decision-making, and by the inherent nature of the rule-making process. 67 We acknowledge that Section 211(c)(2)(B) is awkwardly drafted, and that this very awkwardness may signal an unarticulated congressional intent that the Administrator publish those factual determinations which crucially affected the shape of his regulations. 46 But this possibility need not detain us, for so much would be required in any case by Sections 4 and 10 of the APA. 68 The 'basis and purpose' statement required by Section 4(c) of the APA must be sufficiently detailed and informative to allow a searching judicial scrutiny of how and why the regulations were actually adopted. Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, supra. In particular, the statement must advert to administrative determinations of a factual sort to the extent required for a reviewing court to satisfy itself that none of the regulatory provisions were framed in an 'arbitrary' or 'capricious' manner. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, supra, 158 U.S.App.D.C. at 323-334, 486 F.2d at 390-401; International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, supra, 155 U.S.App.D.C. at 425-443, 478 F.2d at 629-647; Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA,149 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 234-236, 462 F.2d 846, 849-851 (1972); City of Chicago v. FPC, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 312, 322-326, 458 F.2d 731, 741-745 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074, 92 S.Ct. 1495, 31 L.Ed.2d 808 (1972). In light of this jurisprudence, which has developed without the aid of a statutory requirement for 'findings,' we cannot perceive what would be added to the responsibilities of the Administrator, or of this court, by reading into Section 211(c)(2)(B) a diffuse and ambiguous congressional preference for fact-finding. 69 No matter how broadly we might read Section 211(c)(2)(B), the hard truth would remain that a great deal of EPA's rule-making could not, as a matter of simple logic, be 'supported' by 'findings.' This court, per Judge McGowan, recently addressed this precise problem in construing the requirement in the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) that the Secretary of Labor's rule-making be supported by 'substantial evidence.' Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, supra. We quote the opinion at some length, for it cogently explains the impracticality of the views advanced by petitioners in the present litigation. 70    In a statute like OSHA where the decision making vested in the Secretary is legislative in character, there are areas where explicit factual findings are not possible, and the act of decision is essentially a prediction based upon pure legislative judgment, as when a Congressman decides to vote for or against a particular bill. 71    Some of the questions involved in the promulgation of these standards are on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, and consequently as to them insufficient data is presently available to make a fully informed factual determination. Decision making must in that circumstance depend to a greater extent upon policy judgments and less upon purely factual analysis. Thus, in addition to currently unresolved factual issues, the formulation of standards involves choices that by their nature require basic policy determinations rather than resolution of factual controversies. Judicial review of inherently legislative decisions of this sort is obviously an undertaking of different dimensions. 72    (The Secretary's) decision to adopt, over strong employer objection, a relatively low limit (on allowable levels of asbestos dust in places of employment)    rests in the final analysis on an essentially legislative policy judgment, rather than a factual determination, concerning the relative risks of underprotection as compared to overprotection. 73 Regardless of the manner in which the task of judicial review is articulated, policy choices of this sort are not susceptible to the same type of verification or refutation by reference to the record as are some factual questions. Consequently, the court's approach must necessarily be different no matter how the standards of review are labeled.    74    (The 'substantial evidence' provision) is surely not to be taken as a direction by Congress that we treat the Secretary's decision making under OSHA as something different from what it is, namely, the exercise of delegated power to make within certain limits decisions that Congress normally makes itself, and by processes, as the courts have long recognized and accepted, peculiar to itself. A due respect for the boundaries between the legislative and the judicial function dictates that we approach our reviewing task with a flexibility informed and shaped by sensitivity to the diverse origins of the determinations that enter into a legislative judgment. 75 162 U.S.App.D.C. at - , 499 F.2d at 474-475. 76 Sharing these views, we read Section 211(c)(2)(B) as incorporating the commonsense approach which the courts have developed in applying Section 4(c) of the APA. Where EPA's regulations turn crucially on factual issues, we will demand sufficient attention to these in the statement to allow the fundamental rationality of the regulations to be ascertained. Where, by contrast, the regulations turn on choices of policy, on an assessment of risks, or on predictions dealing with matters on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, we will demand adequate reasons and explanations, but not 'findings' of the sort familiar from the world of adjudication. 77