Opinion ID: 743510
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 16 It is by now well settled that a defendant swims upstream in a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict. United States v. McKinney, 53 F.3d 664, 672 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 261, 133 L.Ed.2d 184 (1995). The evidence must support a finding that the jury could have found the Government proved each element of each crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 17
18 Count 1 of the indictment charged Polk with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction against the IRS building in Austin. The crime of attempt requires the Government to prove that the defendant (1) intended to commit the underlying offense, and (2) took a substantial step, beyond mere preparation, toward committing that crime. See United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1114, 95 S.Ct. 792, 42 L.Ed.2d 812 (1975). Liability for attempt attaches if the defendant's actions have proceeded to the point where, if not interrupted, would culminate in the commission of the underlying crime. Id. at 378. 19 The parties do not seriously dispute Polk's specific intent to blow up the IRS building in Austin. The parties do disagree, however, about whether Polk took the substantial steps necessary to support a conviction on Count 1. Polk argues that he did not take a substantial step toward destroying the Austin IRS building because he didn't have the money to purchase the weaponry necessary to do so. Polk asserts that even though he expressed outlandish ideas about blowing up the IRS building, he was never in any position to acquire the explosive materials because he had no money. 2 We reject these contentions because a reasonable jury could have concluded that Polk took substantial steps toward blowing up the IRS building in Austin. 20 We note at the outset that the record shows that throughout the investigation in this case, law enforcement officials became increasingly concerned that Polk was a dangerous person who would in fact carry out his plans unless he was prevented by law enforcement from doing so. The officers reached this conclusion based on Polk's alleged connection with persons unknown to law enforcement--individuals who the officers were led to believe had the resources to purchase explosives and other destructive weaponry. 21 With that said, there was more than enough evidence to support a finding that Polk was guilty of attempt. Polk sought the assistance of others to carry out his plans of destroying government property and killing and/or injuring federal employees; took or caused to be taken photographs of the IRS buildings; studied the IRS building to the point of indicating where bombs should be placed so that the building would be brought down; and initiated and participated in several meetings in which Polk ordered the materials necessary to carry out the planned bombing. 3 Just because Polk did not pony up the money to pay for the materials does not in any way alter the conclusion that a reasonable jury, under these facts, could have concluded that Polk is guilty of attempt. A reasonable jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Polk's sinister plan of destruction and violence was merely temporarily derailed by a shortage of cash, but as soon as he made his connection with the right compatriots, he would have carried out his plan to bomb the targeted building. 4 22
23 Under Counts 2 and 3, Polk was charged with solicitation to (1) damage or destroy the Austin IRS building by means of an explosive device (Count 2), and (2) kill or attempt to kill persons at the same location by means of an explosive device (Count 3). The indictment stated that the alleged offense continued from April 4, 1995 through July 28, 1995. To obtain a conviction on Counts 2 and 3, the Government was required to prove that the defendant intended that another person violate Title 18, and that the defendant induced or otherwise endeavor[ed] to persuade the other person or persons to commit the underlying crime. See United States v. Razo-Leora, 961 F.2d 1140, 1148 n. 6 (5th Cir.1992). The phrase otherwise endeavors to persuade should cover those cases in which a defendant seriously seeks to persuade another to engage in criminal conduct. S. REP. NO . 97-307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 183-84 (1982). 24 Polk argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction on Counts 2 and 3. According to Polk, [h]e never had money to hire anyone. He made no arrangements to hire anyone. Mr. Polk's discussions of this subject were just vague plans that changed constantly. We conclude that under the facts of this case, a reasonable jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Polk was guilty of the crimes charged. 25 Polk's suggestion that his conduct amounted to vague plans is another attempt to reweigh the same evidence the jury weighed in favor of the Government. The following evidence in the record supports the jury's findings of guilt: Polk instigated the process of obtaining weapons and explosives with Davidson; Polk provided Grier with a wish list of weaponry which was to be used to blow up the Austin IRS building and kill or injure persons within that building; Polk believed that undercover agent Frost had committed acts of terror in the past, discussed with Frost the plan to blow up the building and kill people, and stated that he (Polk) would conduct reconnaissance and determine the manpower needed; 5 and in Polk's second meeting with Frost, he (Polk) provided photos of the Austin IRS building, drew a diagram of it, and showed Frost the preferred locations of the explosive devices. 26
27 Federal law makes it a crime to carry a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (emphasis added). It is well settled that to prove a violation of § 924(c)(1), the Government must prove two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, the prosecution must demonstrate that the defendant ... 'carrie[d] a firearm.' Second, it must prove that the ... carrying was 'during and in relation to' a 'crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.'  Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2053, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993). We deal here with the meaning of in relation to. 28 In Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138, the Supreme Court broadly sketched the meaning of in relation to in § 924(c)(1). Recognizing that the phrase is expansive, the Court nonetheless distinguished between a firearm that has some purpose or effect with respect to the crime of violence--in which case § 924(c)(1) liability would be triggered--and those situations in which the presence of a firearm is the result of accident or coincidence--in which case § 924(c)(1) liability would not be triggered. Id. at 237-38, 113 S.Ct. at 2058-59. The Smith Court found that the firearm must facilitate or have the potential of facilitating a crime of violence before § 924(c)(1) liability attaches. Id. at 238, 113 S.Ct. at 2059 (internal quotations omitted). 29 Of course, the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), which defined use, does not affect Smith or alter our understanding of in relation to in § 924(c)(1). Accordingly, we recently applied the Smith Court's definition of in relation to in United States v. Tolliver, 116 F.3d 120 (5th Cir.1997) (on remand from the Supreme Court), where we found evidence sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that the defendant used a pistol in relation to a drug conspiracy. There, the evidence showed that at the time the defendant possessed the pistol (which was in his apartment), he was surrounded by drug records, a cache of assault weapons, and was in the presence of a co-conspirator. Id. at 126. Under these facts, we concluded that the defendant's use of the firearm was not accidental and that it was or could have been used to facilitate the drug conspiracy. Id. Similarly, in United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied sub nom., Castillo v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1466, 137 L.Ed.2d 681 (1997), and cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1467, 137 L.Ed.2d 681 (1997), we held that the in relation to prong of § 924(c)(1) was satisfied because the defendants' use of firearms was not accidental; it was part and parcel of the conspiracy to murder federal agents. Id. at 736. 30 Here, the Government in Count 4 charged Polk with knowingly carrying a pump shotgun in relation to the crimes of violence alleged in Counts 1-3. Proof on this count consisted of the presence of a shotgun in Polk's front seat during a meeting with Grier. At that meeting (which was tape recorded and played for the jury), Polk and Grier discussed the acquisition of plastic explosives and weaponry to be used to blow up IRS buildings across the country. However, because Counts 2 and 3 specify the Austin IRS building (and not IRS buildings around the country), the evidence at the Grier-Polk meeting provides evidentiary support only for the offense charged in Count 1. Indeed, there is no evidence suggesting that Polk discussed blowing up the Austin building at the meeting with Grier. Thus, the conviction on Count 4 sticks only if Polk carried the shotgun in relation to the crime of attempt charged in Count 1. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Polk carried the shotgun in relation to the crime of attempt. 31 Polk could not have carried a firearm in relation to the crime charged in Count 1 (attempt) because the Count 1 offense was not completed until after the date the Government claims Polk violated § 924(c)(1). Count 4 of the indictment charged Polk with carrying a pump shotgun during and relation to a crime of violence on or about April 6, 1995. However, consistent with the position taken by the Government, we have concluded that the evidence sufficient to support Polk's conviction for attempt consisted of actions and events which took place well after April 6, 1995. As such, a reasonable jury could not have concluded that Polk carried the shotgun in relation to the crime of attempt because (1) that crime was not completed until after April 6, 1995, and (2) the Government failed to produce any evidence that Polk carried the shotgun at each step of the Count 1 offense. 32
33 Polk next challenges the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o )(1), which criminalizes the possession of a machine gun, as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause. This argument, however, was dead on arrival, for after a spirited debate by our en banc court (which failed to produce a decisive ruling on the issue), 6 we have since declared § 922(o )(1) constitutional. See United States v. Knutson, 113 F.3d 27 (5th Cir.1997). Until the Supreme Court suggests otherwise, we are bound by Knutson. 34 E. Count 6--False Statement to a Licensee in the Acquisition of a Firearm, Aiding and Abetting 35 Count 6 of the indictment charged Polk with aiding and abetting the purchase of a firearm through a false and fictitious statement. In particular, the Government alleged that Polk purchased weapons from Liberty Sports through Davidson, a straw purchaser. Such purchases, argues the Government, violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) because they involve the buyer making a false statement about the true purchaser of the weapon(s). 36 Section 922(a)(6) provides in part as follows: 37
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