Opinion ID: 2630026
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Supplemental Jury Instruction

Text: [¶ 28] Mr. Luedtke challenges the district court's decision to provide the jury with a supplemental jury instruction. We afford the trial court significant deference when reviewing claims of error involving jury instructions. Lapp v. State, 2004 WY 142, ¶ 7, 100 P.3d 862, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2004). We have previously noted: A trial court is given wide latitude in instructing the jury and, as long as the instructions correctly state the law and the entire charge covers the relevant issue, reversible error will not be found. Instructions must be considered as a whole, and individual instructions, or parts of them, should not be singled out and considered in isolation. Black v. State, 2002 WY 72, ¶ 5, 46 P.3d 298, ¶ 5 (Wyo.2002) (citing Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 8, 34 P.3d 271, ¶ 8 (Wyo.2001); Coburn v. State, 2001 WY 30, ¶ 9, 20 P.3d 518, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2001); Merchant v. State, 4 P.3d 184, 190 (Wyo.2000)). Prejudice will be determined to exist only where an appellant demonstrates that the instruction given confused or misled the jury with respect to the proper principles of law. Black v. State, at ¶ 16 (citing Lane v. State, 12 P.3d 1057, 1061 (Wyo.2000); Wilson v. State, 14 P.3d 912, 916 (Wyo.2000)). Giles v. State, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 14, 96 P.3d 1027, ¶ 14 (Wyo.2004). [¶ 29] During its deliberations, the jury sent a note to the district court which stated, [w]ith regard to instruction no. 11, what is a legal description of defraud with regard to item no. 4 as it applies to this case? [1] After conferring with counsel and noting defense counsel's objections, the district court provided a response to the jury in the form of supplemental instruction 21 which stated, `[w]ith intent to defraud' means to act willfully and deliberately and with the specific intent to deceive or cheat. The instruction was read to the jury in open court and the jury was provided a written copy of the instruction. The district court advised the jury: In response to your question, the Court has prepared a supplemental jury instruction. I'd ask the bailiff to distribute that. The supplemental jury instruction provides as follows: With intent to defraud means to act willfully and deliberately and [sic] the specific intent to deceive or cheat. That is what I can give you in response to your question. And I would ask you to review that as well as all other jury instructions and recall that you not put undue emphasis on any one particular instruction, that you need to review them. . . and consider all those instructions together as a whole. [¶ 30] Mr. Luedtke alleges that the supplemental instruction confused the jury. He relies upon our holding in Lapp to support his contention. His reliance is misplaced. [¶ 31] In Lapp, the defendant asserted that the district court committed plain error when it failed to provide a definition instruction of intent to defraud. We affirmed the conviction and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to provide the challenged jury instruction. We stated: In the context of the instructions as a whole, we conclude the term intent to defraud does not have a technical meaning so different from its ordinary meaning as to require an instruction defining it. Particularly in the context of the evidence presented here, the words intent and defraud are self-explanatory. Even if they were not, the instructions given, considered together, adequately informed the jurors what they needed to find to support a guilty verdict. We conclude no violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law was committed, and there was no plain error. Lapp, ¶ 16. [¶ 32] Mr. Luedtke urges us to extend this holding in Lapp to a finding of error in this case. We decline to do so. In Lapp, we also recognized that it is not error to provide a definition instruction in an appropriate case. Lapp, ¶ 15 (citing Henderson v. State, 976 P.2d 203, 208-209 (Wyo.1999); Broom v. State, 695 P.2d 640, 644-645 (Wyo.1985) (Rose, J., dissenting)). The language of the supplemental instruction challenged by Mr. Luedtke is identical to instructions provided in Cronin v. State, 678 P.2d 370, 371 (Wyo.1984) and Broom. We found no error relating to the instruction in those cases. [¶ 33] In Lapp, we reiterated that the decision to give or refuse an instruction on the definition of a term used in describing an element of an offense was within the latitude afforded to the district court to tailor the instructions to the circumstances of the case. Lapp, ¶ 11. In this case, the discussion regarding the need for a supplemental jury instruction was prompted by a question from the jury. The district court met with counsel to discuss the appropriate response. The district court considered several responses including defense counsel's suggestion that no additional instruction be provided. Ultimately, the district court chose an instruction identical to one given in Cronin. While the district court was not required to provide the supplemental instruction, it was not prohibited from doing so. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to respond to the jury's inquiry by giving the supplemental instruction. [¶ 34] Mr. Luedtke also contends that the supplemental instruction confused the jury because it overlapped other instructions or intruded upon the instructions previously agreed upon and given. Specifically, Mr. Luedtke claims that the supplemental instruction infringed upon the definition of intent provided by instruction 19. [2] We disagree. [¶ 35] The supplemental instruction provides a definition of intent to defraud that is not contained in instruction 19 or elsewhere in the jury instructions. The instruction does not conflict with any other instruction. The jury was specifically reminded by the district court that they must continue to review and apply the instructions together as a whole. Based upon the foregoing, we are unable to find any prejudicial error to Mr. Luedtke predicated upon the supplemental instruction provided to the jury.