Opinion ID: 1481540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: As to the Trade-Name.

Text: Though a descriptive word cannot (unless within the proviso of the statute as above noted) become the subject of a trade-mark, nevertheless, when a person has adopted and for a long time used a word or words, descriptive or otherwise, as a trade-name until it has acquired a new or secondary meaning, viz. a designation of a particular product or business as belonging to that person, the courts will protect him in his rights in relation to the trade-name. This is known as the doctrine of secondary meaning. Elgin, etc., Co. v. Ill., etc., Co., 179 U. S. 665, 673, 674, 21 S. Ct. 270, 45 L. Ed. 365; Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Co., supra; Pillsbury-Washburn Co. v. Eagle (C. C. A.) 86 F. 608, 41 L. R. A. 162; Computing Scale Co. v. Standard Co., supra; Vacuum Oil Co. v. Climax Refining Co. (C. C. A.) 120 F. 254; G. W. Cole Co. v. American Cement, etc., Co. (C. C. A.) 130 F. 703; G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield (C. C. A.) 190 F. 927; Rubber, etc., Co. v. F. W. Devoe, etc., Co. (D. C.) 233 F. 150; Industrial, etc., Corp. v. Community Fin. Co. (C. C. A.) 294 F. 870; Chas. Broadway Rouss, Inc., v. Winchester Co. (C. C. A.) 300 F. 706; Newport Sand Bank Co. v. Monarch Sand Mining Co., 144 Ky. 7, 137 S. W. 784, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1040; Reddaway v. Banham & Co., 65 L. J. Rep. (N. S.) Q. B. Div. 381. Hopkins in his work on Trade-Marks, Trade-Names, and Unfair Competition (4th Ed.) p. 13, suggests the following definition of a trade-name: A trade-name is a word or phrase by which a business enterprise or business location or specific articles of merchandise from a specific source are known to the public, and which when applied to merchandise is generic or descriptive and hence not susceptible of appropriation as a technical trade-mark. In Vacuum Oil Co. v. Climax Refining Co., supra, the court said: That a descriptive word or sign or symbol, descriptive from popular use in a descriptive sense, may acquire a secondary significance denoting origin or ownership, is true. But this secondary significance is not protected as a trade-mark, for a descriptive word is not the subject of a valid trade-mark; the only office of a trade-mark being to indicate origin or ownership. When a descriptive or geographical word or symbol comes by adoption to have a secondary meaning denoting origin, its use in this secondary sense may be restrained, if it amounts to unfair competition. In such case, if the use of it by another be for the purpose of palming off the goods of one as and for the goods of another, a court of equity will interfere for the purpose of preventing such a fraud. An unfair use of the trade-name may exist, though the exact name is not used, or though only part of the trade-name is used. If enough of the trade-name is used by the later comer, so that there is a likelihood that the public will be deceived, and no sufficient steps taken to prevent the deception, the earlier comer is entitled to protection. The rules and principles governing the rights of the owner of a trade-name are those governing unfair competition. The fundamental maxim is that a man may not palm off on the public his wares as being the wares of another. If the trade-name consists of a descriptive word, no monopoly of the right to use the same can be acquired. This is but a corollary of the proposition that a descriptive word cannot be the subject of a trademark. G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield (C. C. A.) 198 F. 369. Others may use the same or similar descriptive word in connection with their own wares, provided they take proper steps to prevent the public being deceived. Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Co., supra; Vacuum Oil Co. v. Climax Refining Co., supra; Allen B. Wrisley Co. v. Iowa Soap Co., 122 F. 796 (C. C. A. 8); Heide v. Wallace & Co. (C. C. A.) 135 F. 346; Trinidad Asphalt Co. v. Standard Paint Co., 163 F. 977 (C. C. A. 8); Walter Baker & Co. v. Gray, 192 F. 921, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 889 (C. C. A. 8); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield (C. C. A.) 198 F. 369; S. R. Feil Co. v. Jno. E. Robbins Co. (C. C. A.) 220 F. 650. In Trinidad Asphalt Co. v. Standard Paint Co., supra, this court said: But all must submit to the competition which comes alone from the fair and truthful employment of generic names and terms descriptive of the qualities and characteristics of articles of trade and commerce, unaccompanied by other acts designed to induce confusion and error in the mind of the public.    It would be a result unsustained by reason or authority if one, after vainly attempting through a trade-mark to secure a monopoly of a generic or descriptive word, should nevertheless be granted one by decree of a court, applying the doctrine of unfair competition to those who simply used the word in the appropriate naming or description of their goods, but in other respects plainly distinguished them from the goods of their competitor.    Unfair competition cannot arise from the mere use of words belonging to the public, accompanied by a fair and truthful statement of the ownership and source of manufacture.