Opinion ID: 2099262
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wisconsin statutes and administrative code

Text: ¶ 94 In order to determine if Fox had a ministerial duty in the case at hand, it is necessary to review the Wisconsin statutes as well as the administrative code, which has incorporated by reference a portion of the federal regulations. ¶ 95 [T]he purpose of statutory interpretation is to determine what the statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and intended effect. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 44, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. This court begins statutory interpretation with the language of the statute. Id., ¶ 45. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry and give the language its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning. Id. ¶ 96 Context and structure of a statute are important to the meaning of the statute. Id., ¶ 46. Therefore, statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. Id. Moreover, the [s]tatutory language is read where possible to give reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage. Id. A statute's purpose or scope may be readily apparent from its plain language or its relationship to surrounding or closely-related statutesthat is, from its context or the structure of the statute as a coherent whole. Id., ¶ 49. `If this process of analysis yields a plain, clear statutory meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the statute is applied according to this ascertainment of its meaning.' Id., ¶ 46 (citation omitted). If statutory language is unambiguous, we do not need to consult extrinsic sources of interpretation. Id. ¶ 97 Wisconsin Stat. § 101.055 (2001-02) [1] provides in relevant part: (1) INTENT. It is the intent of this section to give employees of the state, of any agency and of any political subdivision of this state rights and protections relating to occupational safety and health equivalent to those granted to employees in the private sector under the occupational safety and health act of 1970 (5 USC 5108, 5314, 5315 and 7902; 15 USC 633 and 636; 18 USC 1114; 29 USC 553 and 651 to 678; 42 USC 3142-1 and 49 USC 1421). .... (3) STANDARDS. (a) The department shall adopt, by administrative rule, standards to protect the safety and health of public employees. The standards shall provide protection at least equal to that provided to private sector employees under standards promulgated by the federal occupational safety and health administration.... ¶ 98 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 101.055, the Wisconsin Administrative Code, Ch. Comm 32, Public Employee Safety and Health, provides in relevant part: Comm 32.001 Purpose. This chapter establishes minimum occupational safety and health standards for public employees. Comm 32.002 Scope. The provisions of this chapter apply to all places of employment and public buildings of a public employer. .... Comm 32.01 Definitions.... .... (5) Public employee or employee, as defined in s. 101.055(2)(b), Stats., means any employee of the state, of any state agency or of any political subdivision of the state. .... Comm 32.15 OSHA Safety and health standards. Except as provided in s. Comm 32.16 and subch. IV, all places of employment and public buildings of a public employer shall comply with the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements adopted under s. Comm 32.50. ¶ 99 Wisconsin Admin. Code § Comm 32.50 incorporates by reference 29 C.F.R. Part 1910, which provides in relevant part at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1): Every open-sided floor or platform 4 feet or more above adjacent floor or ground level shall be guarded by a standard railing (or the equivalent as specified in paragraph (e)(3) of this section) on all open sides except where there is entrance to a ramp, stairway, or fixed ladder.... ¶ 100 When reading the text of the relevant Wisconsin statute and administrative code provision, it becomes clear that Fox did not have a ministerial duty to install a railing in this case for the following four reasons. ¶ 101 First, both Wis. Stat. § 101.055 and Wis. Admin. Code § Comm 32.001 plainly state that the standards adopted pursuant to these provisions are meant to protect the safety and health of public employees. Public employee or employee means any employee of the state, or any state agency or of any political subdivision of the state. Wis. Admin. Code § Comm 32.01(5). Thus, to the extent that a ministerial duty may arise out of these provisions, that ministerial duty is owed to public employees. Umansky, however, was a private employee of ABC, Inc. Because the relevant provisions address only a duty to public employees, any action Fox could have taken that would have benefitted Umansky was discretionary rather than ministerial. ¶ 102 Second, the legislature's decision to reference public employees only and thus limit the provision's applicability must be respected because the provisions could have been drafted more broadly. See C. Coakley Relocation Sys., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 WI 68, ¶ 24 n. 10, 310 Wis.2d 456, 750 N.W.2d 900 (stating that courts must presume that the legislature says what it means in a statute; the legislature's omissions must be respected; and it is generally not acceptable for courts to insert words into the statute). If the legislature meant for this statute to apply to more than just public employees, it could have included other verbiage, such as the word frequenters. For example, Wis. Stat. § 101.11(1), Employer's duty to furnish safe employment and place, provides that [e]very employer shall furnish employment which shall be safe for the employees therein and shall furnish a place of employment which shall be safe for employees therein and for frequenters thereof and shall furnish and use safety devices and safeguards.... (Emphasis added.) In contrast, the legislature used no such language to expand coverage beyond public employees in the provisions now at issue. The majority opinion today, however, makes the state a deep pocket for any frequenter of a state building despite the fact that the term frequenter is absent from the relevant statutes and codes. ¶ 103 Third, unlike in Lister, Kimps, Lodl, and Noffke where the controlling documents contained no restrictions as to whom a ministerial duty could be owed, the statute and code in this case do contain a restriction as to whom a ministerial duty may be oweda public employee. We must respect the legislature's decision. When the legislature enacted protective provisions, it limited that protection to public employees. This, however, does not provide a public employee with more protection than a private employee because 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.2 and 1910.23 on their face protect private employees. Therefore, private employees are not without protection; they are protected by the OSHA provisions and the duty that their employer owes them. ¶ 104 Fourth, the foregoing interpretation is consistent with the principle that an administrative rule may not be read so as to provide protection broader than that contemplated by its authorizing statute. Josam Mfg. Co. v. State Bd. of Health, 26 Wis.2d 587, 600-01, 133 N.W.2d 301 (1965). The authorizing statute, Wis. Stat. § 101.055, clearly sets forth that the protections belong specifically to public employees. If we conclude that the provisions at issue here could establish that Fox had a ministerial duty to Umansky, we would be reading the provisions well beyond the stated purpose of protecting public employees. ¶ 105 While I conclude there is no ministerial duty in this case, I further note that the majority does not completely address Fox's argument with regard to whether public employees worked on the platform in question. Majority op., ¶ 22 & n. 16. Though it is true that Fox argues that Umansky needed to prove that a public employee was working on the platform at the time Umansky fell, an argument which the majority does address, id., Fox argues in the alternative that it was at least necessary to show that public employees in the course of their employment had worked on the platform in question at some point in time. If no public employees ever worked on the platform, then it would not have been a regulated platform under 29 C.F.R. § 1910.21(a)(4) from the state's perspective, and Fox could have been under no obligation to have a railing in place. The court of appeals discussed this argument as follows, and expressly left the question open on remand for Fox to present evidence: Fox asserts that the regulation did not apply because there is no evidence this platform was ever used by a public employee as a workspace.... Fox points out that the definition of platform in 29 C.F.R. § 1910.21(a)(4) is A working space for persons, elevated above the surrounding floor or ground; such as a balcony or platform for the operation of machinery and equipment. As we understand Fox's position, because the purpose of Wis. Admin. Code ch. Comm 32 is to establish minimum occupational safety and health standards for public employes, Wis. Admin. Code § Comm 32.001 (Mar. 1999), 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1) does not apply to the platform from which Umansky fell unless it was the work space of a public employee. Apparently in Fox's view, ABC Inc. (and perhaps other commercial stations as well) was responsible for complying with the federal regulation regarding this particular platform and the University had no obligation to do so under Wis. Admin. Code ch. Comm 32.... ... [T]he factual record is not fully developed, as it likely would have been had Fox raised this argument in the circuit court. That is, while the evidence at present indicates no state employees used this platform, we do not know what the evidence would show had there been further exploration of the use of the platform.... Although we apply the waiver rule on this appeal, nothing in our opinion prevents the circuit court from permitting Fox to raise this argument on remand to the circuit court. So as not to suggest we are resolving this issue on this appeal, we phrase our rulings in the following paragraph with italicized caveats. Based on the undisputed facts and the developed arguments presented to us, we conclude: (1) Fox was responsible for compliance with state and federal safety regulations and this job responsibility is sufficient to impose on him the duty to comply with 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1) insofar as the regulation applies to his employer. (2) Given the height and structure of the platform (including the upper and lower platforms) and at least one open side, Fox had a ministerial duty to have a standard railing or an alternative as specified in 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1) on the open side or sides of the upper platform, if Fox's employer was required by state law to comply with this regulation as to this platform. Umansky v. ABC Ins. Co., 2008 WI App 101, ¶¶ 63-66, 313 Wis.2d 445, 756 N.W.2d 601 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original). The majority makes short shrift of this argument by conflating it with Fox's argument that a public employee needed to be on the platform at the same time Umansky fell, majority op., ¶ 22 & n. 16; however, it is an analytically distinct argument and necessitates that this factual question be left open on remand. ¶ 106 Under 29 C.F.R. § 1910.21(a)(4), a regulated platform is defined as [a] working space for persons, elevated above the surrounding floor or ground; such as a balcony or platform for the operation of machinery and equipment. Wisconsin Admin. Code Ch. Comm 32 establishes minimum occupational safety and health standards for public employees.  Wis. Admin. Code § Comm 32.001 (emphasis added). If no public employees ever worked on the platform in question, then it was not a regulated platform under § 1910.21(a)(4) from the perspective of the state administrative code, and therefore Fox was under no obligation to maintain a railing. Were that found to be the case, the only employer who would have had an obligation to maintain a railing would be ABC, Inc., Umansky's actual employer the only employer from whose perspective this platform was in fact a platform under OSHA. ¶ 107 However, as the court of appeals noted, the factual record is not fully developed with respect to this issue. Umansky, 313 Wis.2d 445, ¶ 64, 756 N.W.2d 601. At the very least, this court should follow the court of appeals' lead and leave this question open for further fact-finding on remand before concluding as a matter of law that Fox was required to maintain a railing on the platform in question. If no public employees ever worked on the platform, it was beyond the scope of Fox's obligations. ¶ 108 The problem with a contrary holding is obvious. The majority cannot seriously intend to suggest that the burden of maintaining a railing around every single architectural structure which might be used by third parties as a platform at Camp Randall Stadium should be placed on Fox. Certainly, there must be a limit on the scope of his duties, even under the majority's view. That limit is apparent from the language of Wis. Admin. Code § Comm 32.001, which requires state employers to conform to minimum occupational safety and health standards for public employees  (emphasis added). Private employers are responsible for their employees' safety under OSHA. Contrary to the majority's conclusions, Fox should not be expected to be everybody's keeper. ¶ 109 The Umanskys and the majority argue that the ministerial nature of Fox's duty cannot depend on the status of the person who is injured by Fox's negligence. The Umanskys assert that such a distinction is contrary to the text of the relevant provisions. Injury at a public place of employment, the Umanskys argue, is the determining factor in this case and, thus, the distinction between public and private employees is irrelevant under their theory. For the following three reasons, I disagree with the reliance on where the injury takes place and disregard for the employee's status as a public or private employee. ¶ 110 First, this argument ignores the full text of the Wisconsin Administrative Code. While Wis. Admin. Code § Comm 32.002 states that [t]he provisions of this chapter apply to all places of employment and public buildings of a public employer, the administrative code also states in § Comm 32.001 that [t]his chapter establishes minimum occupational safety and health standards for public employees. As a result, when read together, these provisions protect public employees in public places. The Umanskys' argument ignores the text of the relevant administrative code provisions. ¶ 111 Second, such an interpretation does not, as the Umanskys argue, lead to more protection for public employees than for private employees. Both private and public employees are equally protected when working on the platform at issue in this case. On their face, the OSHA regulations apply to protect a private employee. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.1, 1910.2, 1910.5. In this case, ABC, Inc. was fined $7,000 for failing to ensure that a railing guarded the front side of this platform. [2] The administrative code protects public employees through the incorporation by reference of OSHA provisions. See Wis. Admin. Code §§ Comm 32.15 and 32.50. Both the private employee and the public employee are protected under Wisconsin's Worker's Compensation provisions. See generally Wis. Stat. ch. 102; see Wis. Stat. § 102.03(2) (stating that the right to recovery under this chapter is the exclusive remedy against the employer). ¶ 112 Third, it is not that the ABC employee is without recourse, but rather, the proper recourse is not against Fox individually. A private employee has recourse against his employer. Under the Umanskys' logic, Umansky, unlike a state employee, is entitled to a windfall. Unlike a state employee, the ABC employee can obtain one recovery against his employer and one recovery against a public employee. However, a public employee would be limited to just one recovery. Wis. Stat. § 102.04(1) (The state is subject to worker's compensation.). ¶ 113 I conclude that a reading of the relevant authorities consistent with their plain language provides that Fox did not have a ministerial duty to install a railing for the benefit of Umansky. Accordingly, I would hold that Fox did not violate any ministerial duty imposed by law.