Opinion ID: 173891
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fault in Allisions

Text: Two common presumptions are presumptions of fault, based on the rules articulated in THE OREGON, 158 U.S. 186, 15 S.Ct. 804, 39 L.Ed. 943 (1895) and THE LOUISIANA, 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) 164, 18 L.Ed. 85 (1865). The rule of THE OREGON creates a presumption of fault that shifts the burden of production and persuasion to a moving vessel who, under her own power, allides with a stationary object. THE OREGON, 158 U.S. at 192-93; James, 686 F.2d at 1132 n. 2. The rule of THE LOUISIANA creates the same presumption for a vessel who drifts into an allision with a stationary object. THE LOUSIANA, 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) at 173, 18 L.Ed. 85; James, 686 F.2d at 1131-32. Both of these presumptions are closely related to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor which creates a rebuttable presumption of fault on the part of the person controlling the instrumentality. SCHOENBAUM, supra, § 14-3. And, although the two presumptions apply to different types of vessels vessels under their own power and drifting vesselsthe courts treat them similarly, looking to law on one to inform decisions on the other. See S/Y NERAIDA, 508 F.3d at 593 (doctrines are the same except the vessels to which they apply); City of Chicago v. M/V MORGAN, 375 F.3d 563, 572 n. 11 (7th Cir.2004); Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. Nat'l Marine, Inc., 984 F.2d 880, 886 (7th Cir.1993) (Posner, J.); James, 686 F.2d at 1132 n. 2. These presumptions shift the burden of production and persuasion on the issue of fault. They are `[e]videntiary presumptions ... designed to fill a factual vacuum. Once evidence is presented... presumptions become superfluous because the parties have introduced evidence to dispel the mysteries that gave rise to the presumptions.' In re Mid-South Towing Co., 418 F.3d 526, 531 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Rodi Yachts, 984 F.2d at 887); see also In re Omega Protein, Inc., 548 F.3d 361, 368-69 (5th Cir.2008). But see Bunge Corp. v. M/V FURNESS BRIDGE, 558 F.2d 790, 795 n. 3 (5th Cir.1977) ([W]e reject the holding of the Third Circuit that when both sides had `fully presented testimony regarding their version as to what happened prior to the collision ... the presumption disappeared as a matter of law.' (quoting Pa. R.R. Co. v. S.S. Marie Leonhardt, 320 F.2d 262, 264 (3d Cir.1963))). And, they must be properly confined to the issue of breach only not causation (either in fact or legal cause) or the percentages of fault assigned to the parties adjudged negligent. Mid-South Towing, 418 F.3d at 532. Application of [one of these presumptions] does not supplant the general negligence determination which requires a plaintiff to prove the elements of duty, breach, causation and injury by a preponderance of the evidence. M/V MORGAN, 375 F.3d at 572-73 (citing Bunge Corp., 558 F.2d at 798; Brown & Root Marine Operators, Inc. v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 377 F.2d 724, 726 (5th Cir.1967)). In a recent case regarding damage to a dock from an allision with a pleasure yacht drifting during Hurricane Frances, the Eleventh Circuit outlined the three ways in which a defendant could rebut the presumptions established by both THE LOUISIANA and THE OREGON. S/Y NERAIDA, 508 F.3d at 593. The defendant can demonstrate: (1) that the allision was the fault of the stationary object; (2) that the moving vessel acted with reasonable care; or (3) that the allision was an unavoidable accident.... Each independent argument, if sustained, is sufficient to defeat liability. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Zerega Ave. Realty Corp. v. Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC, 571 F.3d 206, 211 (2d Cir.2009). The first route is essentially the contributory negligence route. S/Y NERAIDA, 508 F.3d at 593. For example, the drifting vessel may argue that the operator of the dock was also negligent in failing to moor the drifting vessel properly. Rodi Yachts, 984 F.2d at 889. Or, a vessel under its own steam may argue that its allision was caused by the improper placement of a navigational buoy. Inter-Cities Navigation Corp. v. United States, 608 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir.1979) (Brown, J.). The second route requires the defendant to negate negligence. S/Y NERAIDA, 508 F.3d at 593. Here, the moving vessel bears the burdens of production and persuasion, and the risk of non-persuasion. James, 686 F.2d at 1132. The appropriate standard of care in this regime is based upon `(1) general concepts of prudent seamanship and reasonable care; (2) statutory and regulatory rules...; and (3) recognized customs and usages.' S/Y NERAIDA, 508 F.3d at 594 (quoting SCHOENBAUM, supra, § 89); Bunge, 558 F.2d at 802. The third route places the most difficult burden on the defendant, because as a superceding causation argument it can free the moving vessel from all liability. S/Y NERAIDA, 508 F.3d at 596. If the drifting or moving vessel offers as a defense that the collision was an unavoidable accident or vis major, [t]he burden of proving inevitable accident or Act of God rests heavily upon the vessel asserting such defense. The vessel must show that the accident could not have been prevented by human skill and precaution and a proper display of nautical skills[.] James, 686 F.2d at 1132 (quoting Petition of United States, 425 F.2d 991, 995 (5th Cir.1970)). The case of THE LOUISIANA was an Act of God case. 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) at 173, 18 L.Ed. 85. There, the steamer LOUISIANA loosed her moorings in a stiff breeze and drifted into a collision with the steamer FLUSHING which was aground and out of the channel or course of passing vessels. Id. The Court found that although the wind and tide had risen considerably, [t]he drifting of this vessel was not caused by any sudden hurricane which nautical experience could not anticipate. Id. The Court concluded that the collision was caused by inadequate mooring and held the LOUISIANA liable for the collision damage. Id. Notably, though the Eleventh Circuit's drifting yacht case, S/Y Neraida, also involved a hurricane, the argument that prevailed there was not the Act of God argument, but rather the argument that the yacht's owner took reasonable precautions when securing the yacht in light of the impending storm. Arguably, the NERAIDA could have tried the Act of God route to exoneration had it failed to demonstrate reasonable care.