Opinion ID: 865906
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Will Construction

Text: ¶15. In his petition for certiorari, Frank contends that Brill’s will created a testamentary trust for the benefit of Annie, and that the chancery court erred in finding that the will created a conditional bequest. In support of this contention, Frank cites several cases in which this Court has held that precatory language in a will may create a testamentary trust. See Yeates v. Box, 198 Miss. 602, 22 So. 2d 411 (1945); Whitaker v. Commercial Nat’l. Bank & Trust Co., 179 Miss. 167, 174 So. 890 (1937); McNeese, 170 So. 678. ¶16. We find that these cases are distinguishable from today’s case. The will in Yeates stated in part: I desire that my wife Mattie H. Box be cared for to the amount of Three Thousand Dollars per year that she have the use of home during her lifetime. She is also to have $5000.00 insurance O. R. C. Policy #1, Series E . . . I also want and desire that my old Uncle, L.W. Wofford be cared for until death & buried. Yeates, 22 So. 2d at 413. This Court in Yeates held that the specific provisions in the will directing the fiduciaries to pay the testator’s wife an annuity and care for the testator’s uncle until his death created a testamentary trust. Id. at 414. Because the will in Yeates provided specific details as to how the decedent’s wife and uncle were to be taken care of, Yeates is distinguishable from today’s case. No such details are present in Brill’s will. 8 ¶17. Similar to Yeates, the will in Whitaker provided enough details to support a finding that the will created a testamentary trust. Whitaker, 174 So. at 892. The will in Whitaker read, in part: That my sisters Irene, Lena and Junie C. Whitaker be allowed adequate funds for [their] support and maintenances, and each one to have equally as long as they are single, should any of them get married, then their share will be only half. Should all of them marry then all of their heirs my Brothers and Sisters shall share equally. Should any of my sisters mistood upon marry [sic] and be made widows for any cause then they shall be restored to their full share as long as widowes [sic]. If any of them should die leaving husband and child or children then their share or interest shall be held in trust for the benefit of the children. Id. at 891. Again, Brill’s will does not contain the same directives as the will in Whitaker. ¶18. In McNeese, the decedent’s will read, in part: Item II. I give devise and bequeath to my wife Bettie Finney all of my estate and property real and personal and mixed. Item III. It is my will and desire that at the death of my wife Bettie Finney the remaining property, real, personal or mixed shall go to my nephew, Frank Finney and his wife, I am doing this for the kindness and affection that they have shown me in my last year and for the kindness they have shown my wife, Bettie Finney, who’s [sic] health has been bad for several years, and that I believe Frank Finney and his wife Maudie Finney will take care of my wife in her declining years. McNeese, 170 So. at 678. In finding that the will created a testamentary trust benefitting the decedent’s wife, the Court, in McNeese, held that the testamentary instrument must be read as a whole. Id. at 679. The Court also found that the decedent’s wife’s mental incompetence was an important fact in determining that the instrument created a testamentary trust. Id. 9 Ultimately, McNeese found that, after the widow’s death, the nephew’s residuary estate should be charged with the cost of her care. Id. ¶19. Not only are the facts of McNeese distinguishable from today’s case, but the language of the two wills is as well. The McNeese will contains the clause “It is my will and desire that at the death of my wife Bettie Finney the remaining property, real, personal or mixed shall go to my nephew, Frank Finney and his wife.” Id. at 678. Brill’s will contained no provision directing how the residuary estate should be distributed upon Annie’s death. ¶20. McNeese gave some guidance for determining when a will creates a testamentary trust and when language in a will merely expresses a wish or desire. McNeese instructs that the language in the will, along with the surrounding circumstances, should be considered when determining if a testamentary trust is created. Id. at 679. But McNeese also warns that courts should be cautious when finding that a testamentary trust exists: It is true that when express words are absent, courts must exercise due caution that words asserted to be the equivalent thereof shall not be pressed too far; nevertheless, the holdings have been generally to the effect that such a testamentary trust will arise when the intention is reasonably manifest or well inferable from the entire language, viewed in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Id. ¶21. In Ryals v. McPhail, 154 Miss. 295, 122 So. 493 (1929), this Court held that the following language did not create a testamentary trust: I give, devise and bequeath unto my husband, Simon R. Robbins, all and singular my real and personal property where ever situated and of what ever kind or chattel that I may die possessed of, or any such property in expectancy or in which I may have any equitable interest, in fee simple to him, my said 10 husband, to do with as seemeth to him best, and if in the Providence of God, I should die before my said husband, I desire that he should remember and provide at his death for my children, Mansen Lafayette Rials, Mary E. McInnis, and Lucy E. Ham. Ryals, 122 So. at 493 (emphasis added). In finding that the will did not create a testamentary trust, the Court reasoned that the language was clear and unambiguous, that the will devised all of the testator’s property to her husband in fee simple, and that she “merely expressed the desire that [her husband] should, at his death, remember and make some provision for her children.” Id. at 493. This Court, in Ryals, reasoned that any provisions for the children were “clearly left to the choice and discretion of her husband.” Id. ¶22. More recently, in Estate of Dedeaux v. Dedeaux, 584 So. 2d 419 (1991), this Court interpreted a will that first devised all of the decedent’s “earthly possessions” to his wife, then in a subsequent paragraph directed that at his wife’s death, certain items were to be devised to other members of the family. The will read, in part: “It is my desire that if I should [precede] my wife Kay in death that all of my earthly possessions be received by her. Should she [precede] me in death; or should we die together; or at her death I would like to leave the following possessions as listed.” Id. at 420. This Court found that the phrase “at her death I would like to leave the following possessions as listed” was, at most, precatory. Id. at 421. In finding that the testator’s wife was the sole devisee under the will, the Court quoted Harvey v. Johnson, 111 Miss. 566, 71 So. 824 (1916), for the proposition that: Where an interest or estate is given in one clause of a will in clear and decisive terms, it cannot be taken away or cut down by raising a doubt upon the meaning and application of a subsequent clause, nor by inference therefrom, 11 nor by any subsequent words that are not as clear and decisive as the words giving the interest or the estate. Estate of Dedeaux, 584 So. 2d at 422. ¶23. With these cases in mind, we turn to the facts of today’s case. Frank asserts that the third sentence in Bobbye’s will – “The remainder of my estate I leave to my sister, Shirlee Phillips, with the understanding that she will take care of my mother, Annie Nichols” – devises Bobbye’s residuary estate to Annie either “outright or through trust.” The chancellor and the Court of Appeals found that this sentence created a “conditional bequest.” Nichols, 2010 WL 6200776 at , ¶23. After reviewing the entire will, we find that the sentence creates neither a testamentary trust nor a “conditional bequest.” Rather, the sentence devised Brill’s residuary estate to Shirlee in fee simple. We find that the language “with the understanding that she will take care of my mother” was a precatory expression of Brill’s wish or desire and was not imperative. ¶24. The will in Ryals clearly stated that the testator’s property was to pass to her husband in fee simple. Although Brill’s will does not include the same clear language as the Ryals will, nothing in the will demonstrates that Brill intended to create a trust to benefit her mother or to condition her bequest to Phillips.2 Unlike the testators in Yeates and Whitaker, Brill 2 See 97 C.J.S. Wills § 1381 (2001). Since conditions in a will are not favored, the courts will avoid a construction which would impose a condition, unless the intent to do so clearly appears. The words used in a will are not to be construed as importing a condition if they are fairly capable of different construction, especially when the latter course would carry out the intention of the testator. 12 gave no direction as to how Phillips should care for her mother. Without language that clearly evidences Brill’s intent, we cannot find that the will created a testamentary trust or a condition. Reading Brill’s will in its entirety, we find that Phillips is the devisee of Brill’s residuary estate in fee simple.