Opinion ID: 1199801
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct as to Penalty

Text: Defendant contends that on numerous occasions before the jury the prosecutor engaged in misconduct as to penalty. After review, we reject defendant's claim at the threshold. He failed to satisfy the general rule requiring assignment of misconduct and request for admonition as to any of the comments or questions by the prosecutor of which he now complains. No exception is applicable. We also reject defendant's claim on the merits. There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of comments or questions in an objectionable fashion. We do not overlook some apparent misstatements and other infelicities by the prosecutor. But when we consider each of the challenged remarks and queries in its context, we simply cannot conclude that the prosecutor used a method to persuade the jury that was deceptive or reprehensible. (26) Let us consider as representative examples the three complaints to which defendant devotes the greatest number of pages in his briefing. Defendant called his older brother Ronald Berryman as a witness in his case in mitigation. On direct examination, defense counsel Peterson elicited potentially mitigating testimony from Ronald relating to defendant's background and character. In its course, Ronald compared defendant to Casanova. Near its conclusion, counsel asked, Ronald, you've been convicted of a felony, haven't you? Ronald answered, Yes, I have. Counsel: As I understand it, it has something to do with marijuana, and a transaction that Rodney was involved in, too; is that right? Ronald: Correct. Counsel: And Rodney spent a little time in the county jail down in Los Angeles, right? Ronald: Yeah, but not that much. Counsel: You went to state prison, didn't you? Ronald: Yes, I did. On cross-examination, the prosecutor pursued the matter of Ronald's felony conviction. The following colloquy ensued. Q. And you were convicted of a felony. What felony specifically were you convicted of? A. Robbery, possession of dangerous weapons, firearms, drugs. Q. You? A. Me. Q. Now, were all those incidents in which your brother was involved? A. No, sir. Q. And the one that your brother was involved in, what one was that? A. That was narcotic  I think that might be when I was first arrested in the city of West Covina, when they had the biggest raid there, and we got caught up in a mix, Catch 22, and got busted. Q. Sales of marijuana, from an investigation coming from  A. The West Covina High School. Q. West Covina High School? A. Uh-huh, it was undercover in the West Covina High School. Q. Yeah, they thought you were selling to kids; is that correct? A. Well, not I, myself, but my brother, my brother was in high school at the time, so he was able to do that, because he was a high school kid himself. Q. You were supplying the stuff and he was actually doing the transaction, the transporting? .... .... .... .... .... .... .... . . A. No. Defendant claims to discern misconduct in the questioning of Ronald by the prosecutor. We do not. The prosecutor sought to impeach Ronald's credibility. His effort in this regard was not improper. Defendant's argument to the contrary is unpersuasive. His assertion to the effect that the prosecutor intentionally elicit[ed] inadmissible and prejudicial evidence, namely, evidence that he sold marijuana to kids (underscoring omitted), is without adequate support. Strictly speaking, the prosecutor did not elicit the evidence by his question. Rather, Ronald volunteered it in an answer beyond the question's scope. The prosecutor's query did not portray defendant  as he would have it  as a corrupter of the youth. Indeed, at the relevant time, defendant was a youth himself. (27) Next, in the course of his summation, the prosecutor referred to the penalty factor dealing with whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Any evidence of that? No, there was not.... No evidence that while this act was occurring that he was under any extreme mental or emotional disturbance. The prosecutor also referred to the penalty factor dealing with [w]hether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or the effects of intoxication. That's the old insanity defense. Did he know what he was doing was criminal? Did he have the ability to perform it, his behavior? No indication from anyone he had any sort of psychotic break or anything even approaching it that he didn't know what he was doing was criminal. Not a factor in mitigation. Defendant claims to discern misconduct in the comments by the prosecutor quoted above. We do not. Defendant is right that the prosecutor misstated the law in remarking that the penalty factor on impairment of capacity was the old insanity defense (see People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 720-721 [248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253])  although his mistake is readily understandable (cf. People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333, 336-337, 339-348 [149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 583 P.2d 1318] [adopting the standard proposed by the Am. Law Inst. in Model Pen. Code (Proposed Official Draft 1962) § 4.01, subd. (1): A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.], superseded by Pen. Code, § 25, subd. (b).) But as noted, misstatement is not enough. Defendant is wrong, however, in the rest of his complaints. Contrary to his assertion, the prosecutor did not lead the jury away from considering [potentially] mitigating evidence.... (Underscoring deleted.) Last, in the course of his summation, the prosecutor argued that the following penalty factors had not been factors in mitigation: [W]hether or not the victim was [a] participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act; did the defendant have a reasonable belief to be a moral justification or extenuation of his conduct?; and whether or not the defendant acted under extreme duress or under substantial domination of another person. Defendant claims to discern misconduct in the comments by the prosecutor quoted above. We do not. Defendant argues that the prosecutor's remarks implied that the absence of each of the cited circumstances in mitigation amounted to the presence of a corresponding circumstance in aggravation. There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury so construed or applied the words in question. A reasonable juror would have understood and employed the language to mean nothing more objectionable than the tautology that the absence of mitigation is the absence of mitigation. [20]