Opinion ID: 1991264
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Voluntariness Instruction

Text: The defendant next argues that the trial justice gave an improper reinstruction to the jury regarding the voluntariness of defendant's statements while in custody at the Providence police station. It is worth recounting that defendant's verbal statements to Det. Johnson, as well as defendant's written confession, all uttered while in custody at the Providence police station, comprised a large part of the state's case against defendant. The defendant, however, never challenged the voluntariness of these statements in a pretrial motion to suppress, nor did he contest the admissibility of the statements at trial. The written statement was admitted into evidence and published to the jury and Det. Johnson was permitted to testify as to defendant's oral confession. Nevertheless, the trial justice gave a voluntariness instruction in her charge to the jury; [8] in fact, the state had requested such an instruction in its request to charge. In the morning of the second day of deliberations, the jury presented a single question to the trial justice: Does being handcuffed constitute constrained? The trial justice answered as follows: Well, the easy answer: Does `handcuff' mean you're restrained or constrained? Well, sure; sure, it does. But, the question here is in the context of whether or not a statement, admission, or confession is voluntarily given does constrain mean being handcuffed?    To answer the specific question: No, being handcuffed, in and of itself, does not preclude one from giving a statement voluntarily. The question is not whether or not a person giving the statement is free to leave the room or even free to get up and roam around the room. The question is whether he freely gave the statement or statements, whether he did so while restrained with handcuffs or not. When he spoke, when he wrote, was he compelled to do so by threat or coercion? Or, when he spoke and when he wrote, did he do so as his own free act and deed? So, the question you need to consider is not whether he was handcuffed when he gave his statement, but whether, when he spoke or wrote his statement or statements, he did so without threat, promises, or coercion. In other words, that he made the statement or statements as his own free act and of his own free will.    I do want to just reiterate to you, when you determine whether a statement is voluntarily given, you consider all of the evidence, every factor; but what you're trying to determine here, what you're trying to get at by considering all of the evidence, all of the circumstances and facts, is whether or not, when he spoke or wrote, he did so without promises or coercion. Did he do it of his own free act and deed? The defendant immediately took exception with the trial justice's reinstruction, arguing that the trial justice failed to adequately impress upon the jury that the fact of being handcuffed to a table was a legitimate consideration when determining the voluntariness of defendant's statements. The trial justice noted defendant's exception, but sent the jury back without incorporating defendant's proposed corrections. The defendant's only argument on appeal is that the trial justice's reinstruction constituted reversible error. [9] When this Court reviews jury instructions, we will `examine the instructions in their entirety to ascertain the manner in which a jury of ordinary intelligent lay people would have understood them,'    and we review challenged portions of jury instructions in the context in which they were rendered. State v. John, 881 A.2d 920, 929 (R.I.2005) (quoting State v. Hurteau, 810 A.2d 222, 225 (R.I. 2002)). In other words, we look to the charge as a whole, and do not examine a single portion in isolation. State v. Aponte, 800 A.2d 420, 428 (R.I.2002). When administering a jury instruction, a trial justice is duty bound to ensure that the jury charge sufficiently addresses the requested instructions and correctly states the applicable law. Id. at 427 (quoting State v. Mastracchio, 546 A.2d 165, 173 (R.I.1988)). [S]upplemental charges, like original charges, must be scrupulously fair to the defendant and to the state and must not infringe upon the factfinding province of the jury by coercion or improper suggestion. State v. Souza, 425 A.2d 893, 900 (R.I.1981). Furthermore, when issuing a supplemental instruction, there [is] no necessity for the trial justice to repeat that portion of the principal charge   ; his [or her] only responsibility in response to the requirements of due process [is] to answer the jury's specific questions. State v. Giordano, 413 A.2d 93, 94 (R.I.1980). Statements are voluntary when they are `the product of [a] free and rational choice.' State v. Leuthavone, 640 A.2d 515, 518 (R.I.1994) (quoting State v. Amado, 424 A.2d 1057, 1062 (R.I.1981)). Most important for the purposes of this discussion is the principle that [t]he definitive test of the voluntariness of a statement is whether, after taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, it was the product of the defendant's free will or was instead the result of coercion that overcame the defendant's free will at the time that it was made. State v. Perez, 882 A.2d 574, 589 (R.I.2005); accord Leuthavone, 640 A.2d at 518 (`all facts and circumstances surrounding the [statement] must be taken into account in determining whether, overall, [it] was freely and voluntarily made'). The defendant argues that the trial justice's charge was improper because it instructed that the handcuffing was really of no consequence. Apparently, defendant narrowly focuses on the trial justice's instruction that the question you need to consider is not whether he was handcuffed when he gave his statement, but whether    he spoke or wrote his statement    without threat, promises, or coercion. However, we cannot agree that this statement represents the sort of legal conclusion defendant suggests. Quite the contrary, the trial justice clearly was conveying to the jury that the fact of handcuffing alone does not render a custodial statement involuntary per se. Furthermore, the trial justice concluded her supplemental charge with the following: [W]hen you determine whether a statement is voluntarily given, you consider all of the evidence, every factor. Our review of the charge in its entiretyincluding the initial charge to the juryreveals that the trial justice took care to accurately convey to the jury that the voluntariness of defendant's statements must be determined by considering the totality of the circumstances. Therefore, we conclude that the supplemental jury instruction did not constitute reversible error.