Opinion ID: 3154164
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: We address Teague first.

Text: As between exhaustion and Teague, we ordinarily consider exhaustion first, but we have discretion in some 10 JONES V. DAVIS circumstances to deny a claim on the ground that it is barred by Teague, without considering exhaustion. Two statutory provisions inform our analysis. First, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) provides that “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted unless” the petitioner has exhausted state-court remedies or has demonstrated an exception to the exhaustion requirement. (Emphasis added.) Nothing in the statute requires that we demand or analyze exhaustion if we deny the writ. Second, § 2254(b)(2) provides affirmatively that “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” We hold that Congress intended a “deni[al] on the merits” of “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus” to encompass the Teague inquiry. We acknowledge that, in the abstract, the phrase “on the merits” has many potential meanings, including a narrow meaning that requires adjudication of the substantive validity of the underlying claim itself. See, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501–02 (2001) (“The original connotation of an ‘on the merits’ adjudication [for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)] is one that actually passes directly on the substance of a particular claim before the court.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Indeed, Congress chose words in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to demonstrate precisely that meaning: “any claim that was adjudicated on the merits.” See Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2198 (2015) (“Section 2254(d) thus demands an inquiry into whether a prisoner’s ‘claim’ has been JONES V. DAVIS 11 ‘adjudicated on the merits’ in state court . . . .”); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) (contrasting state-court decisions on the claim’s substantive validity with state-court decisions on other grounds). In our view, Congress did not intend that narrow meaning in § 2254(b)(2). Unlike § 2254(d), which refers to adjudication on the merits of a claim—“any claim that was adjudicated on the merits”—§ 2254(b)(2) refers to the denial on the merits of the habeas application. That textual difference strongly suggests that Congress intended a broader meaning in § 2254(b)(2). We also find persuasive, by analogy, the Supreme Court’s holding that a civil judgment “on the merits” in federal courts connotes only that the plaintiff is barred “from returning later, to the same court, with the same underlying claim.” Semtek, 531 U.S. at 505. Accordingly, the phrase “judgment on the merits” encompasses rulings in which the court never reached the substantive validity of the claim. Id. at 504–06. Similarly, § 2254(b)(2) encompasses, at a minimum, the substance-like inquiry demanded by Teague. Unlike a purely procedural bar, such as a failure to meet the statute of limitations or a lack of personal jurisdiction, Teague requires an analysis of the underlying legal theory of the claim—albeit to determine its novelty rather than its ultimate persuasiveness. Moreover, in 1996, when Congress enacted AEDPA, Congress understood that a habeas application ordinarily encompassed the Teague inquiry because Teague was settled law. See, e.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994) (noting that Teague “prevents a federal court from granting habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner based on a rule announced after his conviction and sentence became final” (emphasis omitted)). Indeed, the 12 JONES V. DAVIS Supreme Court had emphasized that, so long as the state has not waived the defense, “the court must apply Teague.” Id.; see also Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 272 (2002) (per curiam) (summarizing, more recently, that “a federal court considering a habeas petition must conduct a threshold Teague analysis when the issue is properly raised by the state”). For those reasons, we conclude that—just as we have discretion to deny a claim on its underlying substantive validity without reaching the exhaustion issue, Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 777 n.10 (9th Cir. 2012)—we also have discretion to deny a claim as Teague-barred without reaching the exhaustion issue. This case warrants the exercise of our discretion to address Teague without considering the parties’ arguments concerning exhaustion.1 In the circumstances that we face here, analyzing the exhaustion issue would serve no useful purpose. If we agreed with Petitioner’s position that he has demonstrated an exception to exhaustion, we would next consider the Teague issue. Alternatively, if we agreed with the government’s position at oral argument that our recent opinion in Andrews v. Davis, 798 F.3d 759 (9th Cir. 2015), requires us to hold that Petitioner already has exhausted the claim, we also would next consider the Teague issue. Both paths lead to the same destination, so it is immaterial which fork in the road we choose. See Stokley v. Ryan, 659 F.3d 802, 807–11 (9th Cir. 2011) (declining to decide, among 1 As between Teague and the underlying Eighth Amendment claim, the Supreme Court has held that we “must apply Teague before” addressing the underlying substantive question. Caspari, 510 U.S. at 389. Not surprisingly, then, the applicable standard of review for considering the underlying claim also does not matter: We must address the Teague bar whether or not the heightened standards of § 2254(d) apply. Horn, 536 U.S. at 271–72. As noted, we review the Teague issue de novo. JONES V. DAVIS 13 other things, whether the petitioner exhausted state-court remedies because the petitioner was not entitled to relief in any event). Moreover, the very nature of Petitioner’s claim is that constitutional harm flows from the delay inherent in judicial proceedings. If we know that we must deny relief under Teague, we see nothing useful to be gained by imposing more delay unnecessarily. The recent decision of the California Supreme Court in People v. Seumanu, 355 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2015), also affects our decision. After the district court in the present case issued its opinion, the capital defendant in Seumanu filed a supplemental brief to the California Supreme Court “raising the same Eighth Amendment/delay issue [as Petitioner has raised here] and relying heavily on the federal [district] court’s reasoning.” Id. at 437–38. The California Supreme Court unanimously held: [A]ssuming for argument the facts before the court in Jones were before this court, and further assuming that evidence of systemic delay could implicate a capital defendant’s rights under the Eighth Amendment . . . , we conclude defendant has not on this record demonstrated that delays in implementing the death penalty under California law have rendered that penalty impermissibly arbitrary. Id. at 442–43 (citation truncated). In other words, even though Petitioner may not have formally exhausted his claim by raising it personally to the state courts, we have an unusual insight into the state court’s view of Petitioner’s claim. For 14 JONES V. DAVIS this reason, too, we decline to subject this federal case to further delay. We acknowledge that “[c]onstitutional issues are generally to be avoided, and . . . the Teague inquiry requires a detailed analysis of federal constitutional law.” Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 524 (1997). But judicial economy may outweigh constitutional-avoidance concerns. As the Supreme Court expressly held in Lambrix, “[j]udicial economy might counsel giving the Teague question priority, for example, if it were easily resolvable against the habeas petitioner, whereas [a non-constitutional issue] involved complicated issues of state law.” Id. at 525. Indeed, the Court there skipped a non-constitutional issue of state law to address Teague. Id. As in Lambrix, judicial economy favors deciding the Teague issue here. See also Lyons v. Stovall, 188 F.3d 327, 344 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that, “in the interest of judicial economy, we will excuse the lack of exhaustion because Petitioner’s evidentiary claim is barred under the doctrine of Teague v. Lane, and thus dispositive of this case”); Fisher v. Texas, 169 F.3d 295, 303 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that, because “Fisher’s claim is barred by Teague, judicial efficiency makes it appropriate to dispose of Fisher’s claim without requiring additional litigation”). Similar reasoning applies to the consideration of comity. “[T]he main purpose of exhaustion is to protect principles of comity between state and federal courts.” Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002). “Comity . . . dictates that when a prisoner alleges that his continued confinement for a state court conviction violates federal law, the state courts should have the first opportunity to review this claim and provide any necessary relief.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844 (1999). “This rule of comity reduces JONES V. DAVIS 15 friction between the state and federal court systems by avoiding the ‘unseemliness’ of a federal district court’s overturning a state court conviction without the state courts having had an opportunity to correct the constitutional violation in the first instance.” Id. at 845 (brackets omitted). Those concerns are reduced greatly when we deny the application for habeas relief—there is no risk of “unseemliness” because we do not disturb the state court’s judgment. Nevertheless, we have recognized that comity still plays a role in our discretionary determination to deny an unexhausted claim, at least when we deny that claim as unpersuasive: “[T]he principle of comity counsels in favor of a standard that limits a federal court’s ability to deny relief under § 2254(b)(2) to circumstances in which it is perfectly clear that the petitioner has no hope of prevailing. A contrary rule would deprive state courts of the opportunity to address a colorable federal claim in the first instance and grant relief if they believe it is warranted.” Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005). For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that it is “perfectly clear” that Petitioner cannot prevail.2 Id. 2 We emphasize that our ruling today in no way prejudices Petitioner’s ability to try to obtain relief from his capital sentence through means other than his amended claim 27 on federal habeas review. He remains free to seek relief through other means, including in the state courts. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 266 (2008) (holding that Teague does not “constrain[] the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure than is required by that opinion”). 16 JONES V. DAVIS