Opinion ID: 2470930
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Strong Basis in Evidence

Text: The Brennan Plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case of disparate treatment under § 703(a) of Title VII, and we have rejected the first defense relied on by the City Defendants, that of affirmative action under Johnson and Weber. We next consider the City Defendants' second defense: that the retroactive seniority awards to the Offerees were intended as make-whole relief to victims of the City Defendants' previous testing and recruiting practices that had a disparate racial and gender impact. We hold that this defenseremedying disparate impactis governed by Ricci. [B]efore an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action. 129 S.Ct. at 2677. The City Defendants' action was race- and gender-conscious, and it was taken for the asserted purpose of remedying an unintentional disparate impact. It is therefore subject to Ricci. [46] Our reading of Ricci is that a strong basis in evidence that an employer will be subject to disparate-impact liability requires that, at the time it takes the race-conscious, discriminatory action, the employer be faced with both (1) a prima facie case of disparate impact against itself (or perhaps a strong basis in evidence of a prima facie case), and (2) a strong basis in evidence either (a) that the employment practice having the disparate impact was neither job-related nor consistent with business necessity, or (b) that there was an equally valid, less discriminatory alternative, that the employer had refused to adopt, that would have served the employer's needs. As detailed in Part V.A, infra, we hold that, under Ricci, a strong basis in evidence of non-job-relatedness or of a less discriminatory alternative requires more than speculation, more than a few scattered statements in the record, and more than a mere fear of litigation, but less than the preponderance of the evidence that would be necessary for actual liability. This is what it means when courts say that the employer must have an objectively reasonable fear of disparate-impact liability. The case before us also presents an additional problem not at issue in Ricci. Even if an employer has a strong basis in evidence that it faces liability for disparate impact, it may be unclear to whom the employer might face liability, or, if the disparate-impact case were brought by the Government, who might be entitled to court-ordered relief under § 706(g) and to what extent such individuals would receive relief. In the instant case, it was unclear at the time of the City Defendants' actions, and it remains unclear today, exactly who among the Offerees was a victim of any disparate-impact discrimination that might have occurred, and how much retroactive seniority was necessary to make such individuals whole. We hold that the strong-basis-in-evidence standard of Ricci applies to these questions too. Thus, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence not only that it will actually be found liable for disparate impact, but also that, at the remedial stage following such a finding of liability, a court might well impose (pursuant to § 706(g)) a make-whole remedy equivalent to or broader than what the employer has done voluntarily. Put differently, when an employer, instead of litigating and having a court impose an equitable remedy, undertakes unilaterally the process of recreating the past, Int'l Broth. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 372, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977), the employer must have a strong basis in evidence that its race- or gender-conscious action, as nearly as possible, `recreate[s] the conditions and relationships that would have been had there been no' unlawful discrimination, id. (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 769, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976)). As with the employer's fear of disparate-impact liability, the employer's reconstruction of the past must, that is, be objectively reasonable.
It is not immediately obvious from Ricci what constitutes a strong basis in evidence in the Title VII disparate-impact context. The standard is new in this context, and the Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to describe its operations in detail, for in Ricci the court held that the standard had manifestly not been satisfied. See 129 S.Ct. at 2681 ([T]here is no evidencelet alone the required strong basis in evidencethat the tests were flawed because they were not job-related or because other, equally valid and less discriminatory tests were available to the City.). Our task, therefore, is to provide, as best we can, some guidance for the district court in applying the Ricci strong-basis-in-evidence test to the facts of this case.
Some of the general contours of the strong-basis-in-evidence standard are evident from Ricci. First, the standard is objective, not subjective, and it therefore focuses on the strength of the evidence of liability, not the strength of the employer's fear of litigation. See id. at 2675 (stating that [a] mere good-faith fear of disparate-impact liability is inadequate); id. at 2677 (referring to an objective, strong basis in evidence); id. at 2681 (Fear of litigation alone cannot justify an employer's reliance on race....). Second, the strength of the evidence of disparate-impact liability is measured at the time the employer took the race- or gender-based action. In examining the evidence marshaled by New Haven, the Ricci Court considered only what the city knew at the time it made its decision, and not any further information that arose afterwards. See id. at 2678-81. Similarly, the Court generally referred to the absence of a strong basis in evidence in the past tense. E.g., id. at 2681 (On the record before us, there is no genuine dispute that the City lacked a strong basis in evidence to believe it would face disparate-impact liability if it certified the examination results.). The rationale underlying Ricci, moreover, confirms that the evidence is to be gauged at the time of the race- or sex-conscious employer action. The strong-basis-in-evidence standard is intended to strike[ ] a ... balance between the Title VII provisions concerning disparate treatment and disparate impact, so that employers make the right decisions in the first place. Id. at 2675. Thus, Ricci seeks to avoid both creating a legal framework under which employers likely would hesitate before taking voluntary action for fear of later being proven wrong in the course of litigation and then held to account for disparate treatment, and one under which employers would undertake race- [or gender-]based action at the slightest hint of disparate impact. See id. at 2674-75. If evidence from after the employer's race- or gender-based decision were taken into account, there would be false negatives and false positives. Some employers might take inappropriate race- or gender-based actions in the hope or expectation that a strong basis in evidence would later emerge; other employers who actually do have a strong basis in evidence might refuse to take voluntary action for fear that later evidence would undermine that basis. Moreover, still other employers would be held liable for disparate treatment or for disparate impact even though based on the evidence of disparate impact then before them, they acted correctly at the time they made their decisions. All such results are inimical to Ricci. [47] Third, either an actual prima facie case of disparate-impact liability is required, or a strong basis in evidence of a prima facie case is required. Ricci does not say which, as the City of New Haven was faced with an undisputed prima facie case of disparate impact. Id. at 2677-78. Nevertheless, because Ricci explicitly rejects the proposition that an employer in fact must be in violation of the disparate-impact provision before it can use compliance as a defense in a disparate-treatment suit, it seems likely that no more than a strong basis in evidence that a prima facie case exists would suffice. [48] Id. at 2674. If an actual prima facie case were required, then an employer who used an employment practice that was obviously not job-related and who was faced with a strong basis in evidence, but not an actual prima facie case, of disparate impact, likely would hesitate before taking voluntary action for fear of later being proven wrong in the course of litigation and then held to account for disparate treatment. Id. But we decline to decide this issue here, leaving it to be determined by the district court in the first instance, if it proves to be necessary to deciding the case. Fourth, because of the objective nature of the strong-basis-in-evidence test and its focus on the likelihood of actual liability, the test requires that the employer have a strong basis in evidence either (1) that its challenged employment procedures are not job-related, or (2) that there was a less discriminatory alternative procedure which the employer refused to adopt. These are, as the Ricci Court explained, the two conditions under which an employer can be liable for disparate impact after a plaintiff has shown a prima facie case of disparate impact. See Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2678. [49] A somewhat more difficult question is just how strong the evidence of non-job-relatedness or a less discriminatory alternative must be. Two boundaries are clear from the Ricci Court's opinion. The evidence of liability certainly must be stronger than the evidence New Haven presented in Ricci. Summary judgment against the city could not there be avoided with what was described as no evidence, 129 S.Ct. at 2681, or, at most, a few stray (and contradictory) statements in the record, id. at 2680. At the other end, a strong basis in evidence that an employer will be liable for disparate impact must be less than what is required to prove a disparate-impact violation (and hence than what is needed to prove non-job-relatedness or the existence of a less discriminatory alternative). The strong-basis-in-evidence standard, Ricci says, is not so restrictive that it allows employers to act only when there is a provable, actual violation. Id. at 2676. The strong-basis-in-evidence test does not, therefore, require that there be a preponderance of the evidence of an actual disparate impact violation. We think Ricci suggests that a strong basis in evidence is a balanced standard that falls somewhere in the middle between these upper and lower extremes. In borrowing the strong-basis-in-evidence standard from a line of Equal Protection cases, the Ricci Court stated that those cases recognized the tension between eliminating segregation and discrimination on the one hand and doing away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race on the other. Id. at 2675. Balancing those two goals requires evidentiary support for the conclusion that remedial action is warranted, id. (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277, 106 S.Ct. 1842, 90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986) (plurality opinion)) (modification omitted), and not just an amorphous claim that there has been past discrimination, id. (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499, 109 S.Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989)). Nevertheless, and notably, a strong basis in evidence for purposes of Ricci and Title VII is not necessarily the same as it is for Equal Protection Clause purposes. Id. at 2676. While in the equal protection context a strong basis in evidence has been described as sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that there has been prior discrimination, Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277, 106 S.Ct. 1842 (plurality opinion), Ricci, instead, explicitly does not require that an employer show that there has been a past disparate-impact violation of Title VII. Additionally, the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the government from taking actions which have an unintentional disparate impact, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), and the type of evidence that supports a disparate-impact claim is different from that which would support a disparate-treatment claim. [50] Finally, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, Title VII has repeatedly been construed so as not to undermine employers' ability to undertake voluntary compliance, which is the preferred means of achieving the objectives of Title VII, Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2674 (quoting Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 515, 106 S.Ct. 3063). In sum, a strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact liability is an objectively reasonable basis to fear such liability. It is evaluated at the time an employer takes a race-conscious action. It relies on real evidence, not just subjective fear or speculation. Because it focuses on liability rather than mere litigation, it requires both objectively strong evidence of a prima facie case (or perhaps actual proof of a prima facie case ) of disparate impact, and objectively strong evidence of non-job-relatedness or a less discriminatory alternative.
Even after an employer has shown a strong basis in evidence that it faces disparate-impact liability, the employer does not have carte blanche to take whatever race- or gender-conscious actions it pleases. Rather, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious [or gender-conscious], discriminatory action.  Id. at 2677 (emphasis added). That is to say, there must be a strong basis in evidence that the race- or gender-conscious action taken by the employer is necessary to avoid disparate-impact liability. This necessity issue was not squarely presented in Ricci, for two reasons. First, there was no strong basis in evidence that New Haven would have faced disparate-impact liability, so it was unnecessary to determine what New Haven was permitted to do to remedy the disparate impact. Second, if New Haven had had a strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact liability, then there would have been little question that refusal to certify the test results was precisely what was necessary to avoid liability. There was, therefore, no need in Ricci to undertake the difficult process of determining who might have been a victim of discrimination and what sort of relief might have been required to make such individuals whole. Cf. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 371-72, 97 S.Ct. 1843. It seems easier to say what would be necessary to avoid a disparate-impact violation that is about to occur but has not yet happened, than it is to say what is necessary to remedy such a violation years after it took place. We think it makes good sense to require that an employer's strong basis in evidence extend beyond the existence of disparate-impact liability, to the necessity of the employer's chosen race- or sex-conscious remedy for that disparate impact. As with the requirement of a strong basis in evidence of liability, a strong basis in evidence of necessity gives effect to both the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions, allowing violations of one in the name of compliance with the other only in certain, narrow circumstances. Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2676. In doing so, requiring a strong basis in evidence of necessity avoids extreme positions that would undermine the careful Ricci balancing of disparate treatment and disparate impact under Title VII. If a showing of actual necessity i.e., a showing that the race- or sex-conscious action's beneficiaries were actual victims who received make-whole relief were mandated, employers would likely refuse to settle disparate-impact cases for fear of disparate-treatment liability. See Part V.B, infra; Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2674. But if anything less than a strong basis in evidence of necessity were requiredfor example, if an employer's good-faith belief that its actions were necessary to comply with Title VII's disparate-impact provision were enough to justify race-conscious conduct, then employers might give out race-conscious benefits even where there is little if any evidence of disparate-impact discrimination against the recipients of those benefits. See id. at 2674-75. We therefore hold that the strong-basis-in-evidence standard of Ricci applies not only to the question of disparate-impact liability, but also to the further question of whether the employer's race- or gender-conscious action is necessary to remedy that disparate impact. Here too, the employer's belief that its action is necessary to remedy disparate impact, i.e., that the beneficiaries of the action were victims of disparate impact and the action puts them roughly where they would have been in the absence of discrimination, must be objectively reasonable in the above defined sense.
The Government and the Brennan Plaintiffs ask us to go beyond the explicit requirements of Ricci and holdeither in all cases or, alternatively, in those cases where an employer's race- or gender-conscious action may implicate contractual seniority rightsthat the employer can be liable even if its actions are supported by a strong basis in evidence that the actions are necessary to avoid or remedy a disparate-impact violation. According to them, a § 703(a) reverse-discrimination plaintiff can win by showing (a) that the employer's employment practices were not actually job-related and that there was not actually a less discriminatory alternative, or (b) that some or all recipients of race- or gender-conscious relief were not actual victims who received no more than make-whole relief. If the plaintiffs make this showing, they say, then the employer is liable to them for reverse discrimination. We disagree. The positions advocated by the Government and the Brennan Plaintiffs are irreconcilable with Ricci and rest on a confusion about the procedural posture of this case. Additionally, these parties' focus on contractual seniority rights is inappropriate because the remedy for an employer's unilateral and non-court-sanctioned breach of a collective bargaining agreement is to be sought (and obtained) by the union through the labor grievance and arbitration process, and not by means of a § 703(a) action brought by individual union members in federal court. As a result, the Ricci strong-basis-in-evidence standard is not altered in cases where the plaintiffs allege a breach of contract.
The first, and most significant, problem with the arguments of the Government and the Brennan Plaintiffs is that they ask us to do something that Ricci explicitly tells us not to do: Petitioners ... suggest that an employer must be in violation of the disparate-impact provision before it can use compliance as a defense in a disparate-treatment suit.... [T]his is overly simplistic and too restrictive of Title VII's purpose. The rule petitioners offer would run counter to what we have recognized as Congress's intent that voluntary compliance be the preferred means of achieving the objectives of Title VII. Forbidding employers to act unless they know, with certainty, that a practice violates the disparate-impact provision would bring compliance efforts to a near standstill. Even in the limited situations when this restricted standard could be met, employers likely would hesitate before taking voluntary action for fear of later being proven wrong in the course of litigation and then held to account for disparate treatment. Id. at 2674 (quoting Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 515, 106 S.Ct. 3063) (citations omitted). The Brennan Plaintiffs are asking us to give them the opportunity to prove, in the course of litigation, that the City Defendants were wrong when they deemed some Offerees likely victims of disparate-impact discrimination, and to hold the City Defendants liable for disparate treatment if any such error was made. But that is just what the Supreme Court has forbidden. The Brennan Plaintiffs are entitled to put those supporting the City Defendants to their proof that the City Defendants had a strong basis in evidence that the challenged testing and recruiting practices were not job-related or that there was a less discriminatory alternative to those practices, and that the City Defendants' actions were necessary to avoid the resulting disparate-impact liability as to particular Offereesbut that is all. [51] True, the Brennan Plaintiffs and the Government would put the burden of proof on the reverse-discrimination plaintiffs, and not on the employer, to show the absence of an actual Title VII violation against actual victims. But that shift of the burden of proof does nothing to avoid the dangers on which Ricci focused. Employers, acting from an ex ante perspective, would still view themselves as [f]orbidd[en]... to act unless they know, with certainty, that a practice violates the disparate-impact provision. Id. In order for the strong-basis-in-evidence standard to work the way the Supreme Court seems to have intended it, an employer who does have a strong basis in evidence that a race- or gender-conscious action is necessary to avoid or remedy a disparate-impact violation must be able to rely on its strong basis in evidence when a reverse-discrimination challenge occurs. Otherwise, employers likely would hesitate before taking voluntary action for fear of later being proven wrong in the course of litigation and then held to account for disparate treatment. Id. If employers who had the required strong basis in evidence that specific Offerees were past victims of disparate impact could be found liable anyway when the plaintiff shows that there was no actual disparate-impact violation or that the race- or gender-conscious action benefited people who were not actual victims (or benefited actual victims beyond the extent of their victimhood), it would be of little comfort to the employer that the burden of proof rested with the other side. The Brennan Plaintiffs and the Government also assert, in the alternative, that their actual violation approach applies only in those cases where the employer's voluntary action allegedly violates the contractual rights of those employees who are not the beneficiaries of the race- or gender-conscious action. But there is no basis for limiting Ricci in this way. Indeed, the Ricci Court stated, we adopt the strong-basis-in-evidence standard as a matter of statutory construction to resolve any conflict between the disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions of Title VII. Id. at 2676 (emphasis added). Ricci applies the strong-basis-in-evidence standard to all such conflicts, regardless of whether they involve contractual rights. Significantly, there were contractual rights in Ricci, and the Court never suggested that these would give rise to an exception to its careful balancing of disparate treatment and disparate impact. See id. at 2665 (describing the New Haven firefighters' CBA and its requirements concerning the promotional examinations, including a specific percentage weighting of the written and oral examinations); id. at 2679 (reviewing the job-relatedness of the percentage weighting under the strong-basis-in-evidence standard, not an actual job-relatedness standard).