Opinion ID: 2248048
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Preclusion of Polygraph Evidence

Text: We turn now to the greater issue of whether defendant was denied a fair trial as a result of the trial court's preclusion of the polygraph evidence. During the course of trial, defense counsel moved the court to allow the introduction of evidence regarding the circumstances of defendant's confession, including evidence that defendant had taken a polygraph examination. The trial court, concerned with the prejudicial effect of the polygraph evidence, barred defendant from introducing it. We are aware that the term polygraph evidence, broadly construed, may include every aspect concerning polygraphy, including results. However, defendant's contention on appeal confines our review to a limited aspect of polygraph evidence, viz., the admissibility of the fact and the circumstances of the polygraph examination. It bears repeating that, in this case, defendant's polygraph examination yielded no results. We begin our analysis with a recitation of the basic principles regarding confessions. The circumstances surrounding the taking of a confession can be highly relevant to the legal question of voluntariness as well as the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence. ( Crane v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 683, 689, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 2146, 90 L.Ed.2d 636.) Thus, a defendant in a criminal case has a right at trial to present evidence concerning the circumstances of his confession. See Crane, 476 U.S. at 687-89, 106 S.Ct. at 2145-46, 90 L.Ed.2d at 643; see also People v. Burbank (1972), 53 Ill.2d 261, 269, 291 N.E.2d 161. A confession may be shown to be insufficiently corroborated or otherwise    unworthy of belief. ( Lego v. Twomey (1972), 404 U.S. 477, 485-86, 92 S.Ct. 619, 625, 30 L.Ed.2d 618, 625.) However, stripped of the power to describe to the jury the circumstances that prompted his confession, the defendant is effectively disabled from answering the one question every rational juror needs answered: If the defendant is innocent, why did he previously admit his guilt? ( Crane, 476 U.S. at 689, 106 S.Ct. at 2146, 90 L.Ed.2d at 644.) A defendant's case may stand or fall on his ability to persuade the jury that the manner in which the confession was obtained casts doubt on its credibility. Crane, 476 U.S. at 689, 106 S.Ct. at 2146, 90 L.Ed.2d at 644. We have consistently held that the results of a polygraph examination are inadmissible when offered in evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt or innocence of a defendant. ( People v. Zazzetta (1963), 27 Ill.2d 302, 189 N.E.2d 260.) In Illinois, this is the prevailing rule, regardless of which party seeks their introduction (see People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill.2d 329, 347, 24 Ill.Dec. 530, 385 N.E.2d 671; People v. Nicholls (1969), 42 Ill.2d 91, 97, 245 N.E.2d 771) and even if the parties have so stipulated ( People v. Baynes (1981), 88 Ill.2d 225, 58 Ill.Dec. 819, 430 N.E.2d 1070). However, we have not, prior to this case, had occasion to expressly address the propriety of the admissibility of the fact and the circumstances surrounding a polygraph examination when such evidence is offered on the issue of the reliability of a confession. While the majority of States continue to exclude evidence of the fact, details or the results of a polygraph examination (see Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1952)), some States have departed from a per se inadmissibility approach in special circumstances. In particular, in those jurisdictions where the question of the voluntariness of a confession is decided independently by both the judge, during pretrial, and the jury, during trial, the admissibility of polygraph evidence has not been completely barred. Since, in these instances, in addition to the trial court's pretrial determination, the jury must consider the totality of circumstances surrounding a confession in determining voluntariness, the fact that a defendant submitted to a polygraph examination is held admissible as relevant and necessary to a determination on that issue. (See Whalen v. State (Del.1981), 434 A.2d 1346 (Delaware Supreme Court held polygraph evidence offered by prosecution admissible as relevant factor to be considered in jury's assessment of voluntariness of defendant's confession). Accord Johnson v. State (1976), 31 Md.App. 303, 355 A.2d 504 (evidence offered by defendant); State v. Bowden (Me.1975), 342 A.2d 281 (evidence offered by prosecution); cf. State v. Green (1975), 271 Or. 153, 531 P.2d 245 (evidence offered by prosecution on issue of voluntariness held to be prejudicial; evidence only admissible when offered by defendant).) However, where improper inferences have been made to results ( State v. Melvin (1974), 65 N.J. 1, 319 A.2d 450 (evidence offered by prosecution)) or where the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value ( Johnson v. State (Fla. App.1964), 166 So.2d 798 (evidence offered by prosecution)), such evidence has been held inadmissible. Similarly, several Federal courts have reevaluated their stance on the general rule of inadmissibility of polygraph evidence and have taken a more liberal approach to the introduction of such evidence. In the leading case, Tyler v. United States (D.C.Cir.1951), 193 F.2d 24, the defendant contended that his confession resulted from police coercion. The police officer was permitted to testify that a lie detector examination showed that the defendant had been lying. Following this testimony, the trial court gave a limiting instruction to the jury admonishing it that the polygraph evidence was only admitted on the issue of the circumstances leading to the defendant's confession, and not as proof that the defendant was lying. The court of appeals affirmed, finding the evidence relevant to the vital question of voluntariness and holding that the limiting instruction obviated any prejudicial effect. United States v. Kampiles (7th Cir. 1979), 609 F.2d 1233, followed Tyler. In Kampiles, the court upheld a trial court's ruling that if the defendant sought to challenge, at trial, the voluntariness of his confession, then the prosecution would be permitted to introduce evidence that the defendant confessed after being told that he had failed a polygraph. The court held that there was no error, observing, It would have been unfair to allow defendant to present his account of his admissions,    without allowing the Government to demonstrate the extent to which failure of the polygraph precipitated the confession. ( Kampiles, 609 F.2d at 1244.) The court held that the limited use of the polygraph evidence was proper. See also United States v. Hall (10th Cir.1986), 805 F.2d 1410 (where defendant was warned in advance that if he sought to impugn the quality of government's investigation, government would be permitted to introduce evidence that defendant failed polygraph exam; court found admission of such evidence proper). Our appellate court, in People v. Jackson (1990), 198 Ill.App.3d 831, 145 Ill.Dec. 1, 556 N.E.2d 619, has also examined the limited admissibility of polygraph evidence. Defendant urges us to adopt the holding in Jackson. While the State maintains that defendant should not prevail on appeal, it, nonetheless, asserts that Jackson is good law, and urges affirmance. At trial in Jackson, the defendant testified that his confession was coerced by repeated threats of physical violence. In rebuttal, the State introduced testimony that the defendant confessed shortly after he was told that he had failed a polygraph examination. The trial court, relying on People v. Triplett (1967), 37 Ill.2d 234, 226 N.E.2d 30, instructed the jury that the polygraph evidence was not to be used as evidence of the defendant's credibility but, rather, to determine whether his confession had been voluntarily given. On appeal, the defendant, Jackson, contended that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear evidence that he had failed a polygraph examination. The defendant maintained, citing People v. Baynes (1981), 88 Ill.2d 225, 58 Ill.Dec. 819, 430 N.E.2d 1070, and People v. Yarbrough (1982), 93 Ill.2d 421, 67 Ill.Dec. 257, 444 N.E.2d 493, that this court has held polygraph evidence inadmissible for any purpose. The appellate court distinguished Baynes (polygraph results inadmissible even if admissibility stipulated to by parties) and Yarbrough (reliance upon polygraph results in ruling on post-trial motion wherein sufficiency of evidence is raised held impermissible), finding that neither case dealt with the admissibility of polygraph evidence for the limited purpose of determining the voluntariness of a confession. The court held that the evidence was admissible for the purpose of showing that it was the defendant's failure to pass the polygraph examination, rather than his alleged threats of violence, which induced his confession. Jackson relies for its holding upon Triplett, which we, therefore, consider. During a suppression hearing in Triplett, a deputy sheriff gave unsolicited testimony that the defendant had requested and submitted to a polygraph examination. At his jury trial, the defendant testified on cross-examination that he agreed to take the polygraph exam and that he was told that the test showed that he was lying. Defense counsel's motions for a mistrial and for the court to instruct the jury to disregard the testimony were denied. On appeal, the State argued that the polygraph evidence was admissible on the issue of the voluntariness of the confession. The court stated that while there is a strong aversion [to polygraph evidence], it can be argued that a different result should follow when the issue is the voluntariness of a confession. It can be said that the fact that the confession followed a polygraph examination is a relevant circumstance and that it is the fact of the examination, rather than its result, that is significant. ( Triplett, 37 Ill.2d at 239, 226 N.E.2d 30.) The court held that since there had been no limiting instruction to the jury on the use of the evidence, a new trial was required. In Illinois, the procedure for the determination of the admissibility of a confession requires that the preliminary inquiry into the voluntary nature of the confession is for the trial court. ( People v. Higgins (1972), 50 Ill.2d 221, 225, 278 N.E.2d 68.) Only the question of the credibility of a confession is submitted to the jury. (Ill. Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 114-11(f); see also People v. Pecoraro (1991), 144 Ill.2d 1, 11, 161 Ill.Dec. 296, 578 N.E.2d 942.) A defendant is not entitled to relitigate the issue of voluntariness before the jury after the trial court has determined its admissibility. See People v. DeSimone (1963), 27 Ill.2d 406, 409, 189 N.E.2d 329; 5 L. Pieczynski, Illinois Practice § 12.25 (1989). To follow the reasoning in Triplett and, therefore, Jackson, allowing submission of evidence to the jury on the issue of the voluntariness of a confession, would be contrary to the procedure in Illinois. Yet, we can agree with Jackson and Triplett on the value of limited admissibility of polygraph evidence in special circumstances. However, given the ordinarily prejudicial effect of polygraph evidence, the broader holding of Jackson, which would permit the State to offer polygraph evidence to rebut a defendant's assertion that his confession was coerced, gives us pause. (See State v. Green (1975), 271 Or. 153, 531 P.2d 245 (polygraph evidence only admissible when offered by defendant).) Nevertheless, since Jackson presents a different factual scenario, we need not determine the propriety of its broader holding. We believe that People v. Lettrich (1952), 413 Ill. 172, 108 N.E.2d 488, a case decided long before Jackson or Triplett, better supports our resolution of the issue here. In Lettrich, the State relied, for conviction, upon the repudiated confession of the defendant. The trial court ruled that the confession had been voluntarily given. At trial, the defendant attempted, on cross-examination, to elicit testimony from a witness, Walsh, concerning questions asked of him while the polygraph machine was being used. The witness stated that he could not do that without examining his records, which would take 15 minutes. The court refused to allow the witness to examine his records. Lettrich, 413 Ill. at 177-79, 108 N.E.2d 488. On review, the supreme court found that the trial court unduly restricted the defendant's cross-examination of the witness. Given that many of the statements in the confession, the only evidence connecting the defendant to the crime, did not conform to known facts about the crime, the court deemed liberal opportunity for cross-examination to be imperative. Lettrich, 413 Ill. at 178, 108 N.E.2d 488. The Lettrich court did not expressly rule on the propriety of the admissibility of the polygraph evidence. However, we believe that its approval of the admissibility of such evidence is implicit. Our belief is supported by the fact that the court stated that the defendant should have been permitted to show all of the circumstances surrounding his questioning by the witness, Walsh, including the nature and extent of the questioning. ( Lettrich, 413 Ill. at 178, 108 N.E.2d 488.) Additionally, the court stated that justice requires that the jury consider every circumstance which reflects upon the reliability of that confession. (Emphasis added.) ( Lettrich, 413 Ill. at 179, 108 N.E.2d 488.) One of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's questioning included the questioning while the polygraph machine was being used. Here, the State relied largely, for conviction, upon the defendant's confession, which similarly to the confession in Lettrich, fails at least in one respect to conform to a known fact. (Contrary to defendant's verbatim statement, that defendant had wiped the blood from the knife on a tissue and threw the tissue behind a television in the basement of his home, the blood-stained tissue was actually found behind a bookcase in the basement of the victim's home.) Other evidence of defendant's guilt consisted of an admission which he allegedly made to Susan Holloway. Of all of the physical evidence collected, the only evidence to connect this defendant to the crime scene were three glass fragments taken from defendant's shoes. These glass fragments, according to the State's forensic science witness, had similar refractive indexes to fragments taken from the shattered glass at the victim's home, but could not be absolutely identified as having come from that source. We believe that the exclusion of the polygraph evidence here deprived defendant of his fundamental right to a fair opportunity to present a defense. Fundamental justice requires that the defendant have every opportunity to controvert the State's proof. Defendant has a right, regardless of how substantial or infirm the evidence against him, to familiarize the jury with every circumstance attendant to the State's obtention of his confession. (See Lego v. Twomey (1972), 404 U.S. 477, 485-86, 92 S.Ct. 619, 625, 30 L.Ed.2d 618, 625.) Thus, we hold that the polygraph evidence should have been admitted for the limited purpose of determining the credibility and reliability of the confession. Cf. State v. Schaeffer (Minn.1990), 457 N.W.2d 194 (where the trial court admits the confession, the trial court must permit the jury to hear evidence on the circumstances surrounding the making of the confession for a determination of weight and credibility; thus, notwithstanding the general inadmissibility of polygraph evidence, the trial court did not err in permitting defense counsel to present such evidence).