Opinion ID: 2135771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Double Jeopardy and Sentencing

Text: The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment provides: nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. (U.S. Const., amend V.) Double jeopardy protections are similarly guaranteed by the Illinois constitution, which provides: No person shall be    twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 10.) The double jeopardy clause actually embraces three separate protections, which bar (1) retrial for the same offense after an acquittal, (2) retrial for the same offense after a conviction, and (3) multiple punishment for the same offense. ( North Carolina v. Pearce (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656; People v. Stefan (1992), 146 Ill.2d 324, 333, 166 Ill.Dec. 910, 586 N.E.2d 1239.) It is the first of these three protections upon which defendants seek to rely. Generally, double jeopardy principles have not been applied to sentencing. The imposition of a particular sentence usually is not regarded as an acquittal of any more severe sentence than could have been imposed. (See Bullington v. Missouri (1981), 451 U.S. 430, 438, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 1857, 68 L.Ed.2d 270, 278; see also United States v. DiFrancesco (1980), 449 U.S. 117, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328.) Thus, double jeopardy imposes no absolute prohibition against the imposition of a harsher sentence at retrial after a defendant has succeeded in having his original conviction set aside. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 719, 89 S.Ct. at 2077-78, 23 L.Ed.2d at 666. In Bullington v. Missouri (1981), 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270, however, the Court carved out an exception to the general rule regarding the propriety of imposing a harsher sentence at retrial. In Bullington, the Court found that Missouri's separate capital sentencing hearing resembled the defendant's trial on the issue of guilt. The Court's analogy of the sentencing hearing to trial was supported by the presence of three specific factors at sentencing: (1) the sentencer's determination was guided by substantive standards and based on evidence introduced in a separate proceeding that formally resembled a trial; (2) the prosecution had to prove certain statutorily defined facts beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the discretion of the sentencer was restricted to precisely two sentencing alternatives. ( Bullington, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270; Arizona v. Rumsey (1984), 467 U.S. 203, 209, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 2309, 81 L.Ed.2d 164, 170.) The formality of the separate proceeding, the standard of proof and the lack of sentencing discretion at the capital sentencing proceeding each paralleled the formality of the proceeding, the standard of proof and the lack of discretion in entering a verdict at the defendant's trial on the issue of guilt. Based upon the presence of these three trial-like factors, the Court characterized Missouri's capital sentencing proceeding as having the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 439, 101 S.Ct. at 1858, 68 L.Ed.2d at 279. By enacting a capital sentencing procedure that resembles a trial on the issue of guilt, Missouri requires the jury to determine whether the prosecution has `proved its case.' ( Bullington, 451 U.S. at 444, 101 S.Ct. at 1861, 68 L.Ed.2d at 282.) Thus, under the Missouri capital sentencing scheme, a jury sentence of life imprisonment served as an acquittal of `whatever was necessary to impose the death sentence.' ( Bullington, 451 U.S. at 445, 101 S.Ct. at 1861, 68 L.Ed.2d at 283, quoting State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason (Mo.1980), 594 S.W.2d 908, 922.) Accordingly, at resentencing, double jeopardy would bar the State's second attempt at obtaining the death penalty. Bullington's determination that insufficient evidence to support the imposition of the death penalty barred any subsequent attempt to seek the death penalty flows directly from those principles announced in Burks v. United States (1977), 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1. In Burks, the Court reasoned that reversal for insufficient evidence is tantamount to an implicit acquittal by the trial court. Thus, the Court held that the double jeopardy clause forbids retrial of a defendant whose conviction is overturned by a reviewing court because of insufficiency of the evidence at trial. Burks, 437 U.S. at 18, 98 S.Ct. at 2150-51, 57 L.Ed.2d at 14. Prior to Bullington, the Court had held, unequivocally, that if a defendant was convicted, sentenced to life imprisonment and then won reversal of his conviction, the State could seek the death penalty again upon retrial. (See Stroud v. United States (1919), 251 U.S. 15, 40 S.Ct. 50, 64 L.Ed. 103.) However, Stroud, as the Bullington Court distinguished, did not involve a separate sentencing proceeding and the sentencer had full discretion to choose the sentence, wholly unguided by legislative standards. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 439, 101 S.Ct. at 1858, 68 L.Ed.2d at 279. The Court in Bullington also distinguished United States v. DiFrancesco (1980), 449 U.S. 117, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328, the only case in which the Court had previously considered a bifurcated sentencing proceeding. DiFrancesco involved a government appeal of a sentence imposed under the Federal dangerous special offender statute. In Bullington, the Court compared each of the trial-like factors present under Missouri's capital sentencing procedure with those factors present under the dangerous-special-offender sentencing scheme. The Court initially focused on the nature of the resentencing proceeding. In that regard, the Court found DiFrancesco inapposite because the Federal procedures involved at resentencing included appellate review of a sentence `on the record of the sentencing court,' rather than a de novo fact finding. Further, the Court noted that in DiFrancesco the sentencer, a Federal judge, had a large amount of discretion in imposing sentence and the prosecution's burden was merely a preponderance of the evidence. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 440-41, 101 S.Ct. at 1858-59, 68 L.Ed.2d at 280. Before proceeding with our analysis, we note that this case does not represent this court's first opportunity to consider the reaches of Bullington. In People v. Davis (1986), 112 Ill.2d 78, 96 Ill.Dec. 703, 491 N.E.2d 1163, this court acknowledged that many of the characteristics of the Missouri capital sentencing proceeding which triggered the application of double jeopardy in Bullington are present in our capital sentencing proceeding. Thus, double jeopardy may be implicated in resentencing in capital cases in Illinois. (Accord People v. Page (1993), 155 Ill.2d 232, 185 Ill.Dec. 475, 614 N.E.2d 1160.) Neither the United States Supreme Court nor this court, however, has had occasion to decide whether the exception carved out in Bullington extends to noncapital sentencing procedures. But see Bohlen v. Caspari (8th Cir.1992), 979 F.2d 109, cert. granted (1993), ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2958, 125 L.Ed.2d 660 (Missouri case holding Bullington applicable to persistent-offender proceedings).