Opinion ID: 2633509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct in Penalty Phase Argument

Text: Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct at five points in his penalty phase argument to the jury. [7] We conclude defendant forfeited some of his claims by failing to object and seek an admonition ( People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 432, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391; People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 841, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2) and that, in any event, none of the challenged prosecutorial remarks were improper. In penalty phase argument, the prosecutor maintained the evidence of hardships defendant had suffered when younger can never excuse or even explain his violent choices in life. He continued: And who hasn't suffered some hardship in their life? Who hasn't been disadvantaged in some way? All of us. There are no excuses for what he did to Mr. Miller or Mr. Wissel or the number of other victims. And should you choose life without parole for the defendant, based on this, then no human being would ever receive the death penalty because there is always some disadvantage or hardship that they may have suffered. Defendant contends this argument improperly suggested the jury could not legally consider his past hardships in deciding on penalty. He did not object or seek a jury admonition, which could have cured any prejudice, and has therefore forfeited his appellate claim. ( People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1239, 56 Cal. Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) [8] We also disagree on the merits. The prosecutor elsewhere acknowledged to the jurors that under the law the defense could present, and had presented, evidence of any aspect of defendant's character or record as a basis for a sentence less than death (see § 190.3, factor (k)). [9] In the challenged portion of his summation, the prosecutor argued not that the law prohibited consideration of the defense evidence, but that it was not worthy of consideration because it did not reflect any extraordinary hardships that could excuse or even explain defendant's violent criminality. The argument, a proper one, was that the evidence did not show defendant deserved sympathy, not that sympathy and mercy could not legally be entertained. ( Jackson, at p. 1241, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254; People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 917, 8 Cal. Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712; People v. Haskett (1990) 52 Cal.3d 210, 246, 276 Cal.Rptr. 80, 801 P.2d 323.) For the same reason, we cannot agree with defendant's claim the argument improperly disparaged our legal system. Defendant also contends the prosecutor misstated the law regarding mitigation and improperly impugned defense counsel's integrity by arguing that the defense, in its penalty phase evidence, continued to present or portray [defendant] as a victim, just as they had claimed self-defense in the guilt phase, that this constituted an attempt to distract the jury from the real victims of his violent life, and that the jury should [l]et that disingenuous attempt fall on deaf ears. [10] Again, we believe the argument was proper. An attorney, including a prosecutor, is entitled to point out that the opposing side is engaging in what the attorney believes to be an attempt to confuse the issues, and may urge the jury to ignore that attempt and focus on the relevant evidence. The prosecutor's admonition to the jury not to be distracted by the defense emphasis on defendant's hardships was neither a misstatement of the law, nor an attack on defense counsel's honesty and integrity, nor an improper appeal to passion. ( People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1166-1167, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 34 P.3d 937; People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 549-550, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420; People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1216-1218, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456, 892 P.2d 1199; People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1302 & fn. 47, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) Defendant reiterates his misconduct claims with regard to prosecutorial argument aimed at testimony from defendant's family members about the impact a death sentence for defendant would have on them. The prosecutor suggested the defense had applied guilt to the jury: And they tell you . . . this harms his children. This harms his family. This was done to prevent you from doing what is necessary; what is just. This was done to weaken your resolve. This was done to weaken your commitment to justice and the right thing. Whatever you choose, whatever penalty you choose, ensure that you follow the law and that you do justice. Whatever you choose, do not decide this case because someone tries to make you feel guilty. Defendant's appellate claim of misconduct in this regard is forfeited because he failed to object to the argument, but we disagree on the merits as well. We explained in [ People v. ] Ochoa [(1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442] that when considering mitigating evidence in determining the penalty, the relevant factor `is a defendant's background and characternot the distress of his or her family. A defendant may offer evidence that he or she is loved by family members or others, and that these individuals want him or her to live. But this evidence is relevant because it constitutes indirect evidence of the defendant's character.' ( People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1000, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171.) The evidence in the present case was admitted, and the prosecutor did not argue it could not be considered to the extent it reflected on defendant's character. The prosecutor did not improperly appeal to passion and prejudice, did not misstate the law of mitigation, and did not denigrate defense counsel in arguing that the jury should not decide penalty on the basis of guilt over the distress a death sentence would cause defendant's family, but should instead follow the law and do justice. After reviewing evidence of defendant's violent conduct in custody, the prosecutor argued it showed the danger of giving defendant a life sentence: We cannot put him in a cage somewhere and put him in a hole and never feed him and never have anyone come in contact with him.... He will be with other inmates. He will have contact with other jail deputies. He will have contact with doctors, nurses, all the types of people that live or work in the Department of Corrections.... Those people are all mothers and fathers and grandfathers and sons[ [11] ].... None of these people deserve the pain or suffering that the defendant is capable of inflicting. . . . Life without possibility of parole will afford him an opportunityan opportunityto harm others.... He'll be free to do whatever he wants in prison, to inflict whatever pain he so desires. As we know, this violence must end. It must stop.... And there is only one punishment that can accomplish that. `[W]e have never held that in closing argument a prosecutor may not comment on the possibility that if the defendant is not executed he or she will remain a danger to others. Rather, we have concluded that the prosecutor may make such comments when they are supported by the evidence.' ( People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 540-541, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032, quoting People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 940, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93; accord, People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 353, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846.) In the present case, there was ample evidence in aggravation showing defendant had committed violent assaults on jail personnel and fellow inmates alike. The prosecutor was entitled to urge the jury to extrapolate from that evidence to what defendant's behavior was likely to be in state prison if given a life sentence. [12] The argument neither went beyond the evidence nor improperly appealed to passion and prejudice. Finally, defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in arguing that he was less deserving of leniency because the evidence did not show he killed Miller while under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance (§ 190.3, factor (d)) or that Miller participated in or consented to the homicidal conduct ( id., factor (e)). [13] Again, we disagree. The prosecutor clearly explained that factors (d) and (e) were mitigating factors and that consequently their absence does not change to aggravating circumstances and does not aggravate this particular crime or aggravate towards the punishment of death, but merely shows the defendant is less deserving of leniency than if the factors were present. This was not, as defendant claims, a misstatement of the law. (See People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 148-149, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 788-789, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113.) With regard to emotional disturbance, the prosecutor argued the killing of Miller had nothing to do with extreme disturbance but was quite simply for robbery purposes. The prosecutor did not argue that a mental or emotional disturbance could not mitigate the crime unless it qualified as extreme. Indeed, shortly thereafter the prosecutor acknowledged that, under the law, [a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime could be considered in mitigation. (§ 190.3, factor (k).) The argument thus did not contravene factor (k)'s permission to consider any mitigating circumstance of the crime. For the reasons above, we conclude the prosecutor, in penalty phase argument, did not use deceptive or reprehensible methods in violation of California law, or by his remarks render the penalty trial unfair or unreliable in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (See People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.)