Opinion ID: 2116540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 58

Heading: 5.7. Mitigating Circumstance (2)(d)

Text: Lotter also claims that mitigating circumstance (2)(d) existed, since it requires only that a capital defendant have an age. Lotter asserts that because he has an ascertainable age, the only question is the weight to be attributed to this mitigating circumstance. According to the plain language of subsection (2)(d), [t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime is a mitigating circumstance. However, in State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 250 N.W.2d 881 (1977), this court held that subsection (2)(d) refers only to a child of tender age, a juvenile, or a person of advanced years, where senility may be involved. Lotter acknowledges our holding in Simants, but points out that since Simants was decided, the Legislature absolutely prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on anyone under the age of 18 at the time the crime is committed. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-105.01 (Reissue 1995). Lotter argues that the adoption of § 28-105.01 indicates that the Simants court's interpretation of (2)(d) is no longer applicable. We disagree. Section 28-105.01 merely narrows the application of mitigating circumstance (2)(d) to persons of advanced years. Because Lotter is not such a person, he cannot receive the benefit of this statutory mitigating circumstance.