Opinion ID: 788340
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motions to suppress wiretap evidence and requests for an evidentiary hearing

Text: 96
97 Appellants argue that the district court erred in failing to suppress evidence gathered by the government through the wiretapping of the home phone lines of Fernandez (Line 6) and co-defendant Martinez (Line 7). Appellants claim that the wiretap applications contained false and misleading statements and omitted important information, so that probable cause would not have been established if the applications had been prepared properly. Appellants argue that, at a minimum, they made a sufficient showing of misrepresentations in the wiretap applications to require the district court to conduct a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). Appellants further claim that the wiretap applications for the relevant phone lines failed to establish the necessity requirement set out in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). 98 A district court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence is reviewed de novo and underlying factual issues are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Lynch, 367 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). We review de novo whether a full and complete statement of the facts was submitted in compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 2518( l ). United States v. Blackmon, 273 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The ultimate question of whether a false statement or omission is necessary to a finding of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact reviewed de novo. United States v. Tham, 960 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir.1991). If a full and complete statement of facts was submitted, the court reviews the issuing judge's decision that the wiretap was necessary for an abuse of discretion. Blackmon, 273 F.3d at 1207. 99 Appellants filed or joined a number of separate motions at the district court challenging the validity of the wiretap applications for Lines 6 and 7, and for a cell phone used by Detevis (Line 1) to the extent that it provided the basis for the applications for Lines 6 and 7. The district court denied all the motions. 100 The government applications for the three lines in question were supported by affidavits from FBI Special Agent David Olsen (Olsen affidavits). Although much of the language used in the Olsen affidavit for Line 1 is repeated verbatim in the later affidavits, the latter do build on the information developed through the earlier wiretaps.
101 The government argues that Appellants lack standing to challenge the validity of the wiretap as to Line 1 because none of them was targeted under that line. Even assuming this is the case, any meritorious challenges raised by Appellants would apply equally to the wiretap applications for Lines 6 and 7, and the government does not appear to challenge Appellants' standing regarding those lines. The government also argues that Contreras did not join in any of the motions to suppress the evidence gathered through wiretaps. The district court record, however, reflects that Contreras did join in co-defendants Mercado and Nieto's motion regarding Line 1 and Martinez's motion regarding Lines 6 and 7. We therefore consider the merits of the claims as to all appellants. 102
103 Appellants argue that the facts omitted from the Olsen affidavits, if considered with the rest of the information provided, would not establish probable cause for the wiretaps. In order to issue a wiretap order, the district court must find probable cause to believe (1) that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit specified offenses, ... (2) that communications relevant to that offense will be intercepted through the wiretap, and (3) that the individual who is the focus of the wiretap investigation will use the tapped phone. United States v. Meling, 47 F.3d 1546, 1552 (9th Cir.1995) (internal citations omitted). We conclude that none of the alleged omissions, if they existed at all, undermine the district court's finding of probable cause. 104 Appellants first claim that the Olsen affidavit for Line 6 failed to mention that Fernandez was a federal fugitive and that the government had never attempted to arrest him. The government appears to concede that this fact was omitted from the Olsen affidavits, but argues that the fact was not material because, if anything, it made it more likely that Fernandez was engaged in criminal behavior. The district court agreed, noting that Fernandez's fugitive status would have increased the showing of probable cause, not diminished it. We agree with the district court's determination as it relates to probable cause. However, the district court's analysis does not defeat Appellants' arguments that the omission was material to the necessity requirement. We address those arguments in the next section. 105 Appellants' second claim is that the Olsen affidavits failed to mention that the person Confidential Witness # 2 (CW # 2) claimed was Fernandez's associate was, in fact, CW # 2's associate. At the district court, Appellants claimed that the associate was an individual named Debra Wood Farris or Deb, and provided evidence that this person was in fact CW# 2's—rather than Fernandez's—associate. The government, however, submitted the affidavit of FBI Special Agent Franklin Davis, who stated that the individual referred to in the affidavit was co-defendant Robert Cervantes, who was in fact Fernandez's associate. Appellants provided no evidence to rebut this assertion, and the district court agreed with the government that the reference was to Cervantes. The Olsen affidavits were therefore neither false nor misleading on this point. Appellants have pointed to nothing in the record that would lead us to conclude that the district court's finding was clearly erroneous. 106 Finally, Appellants argue that the Olsen affidavits failed to mention that CW # 2 personally facilitated the purchase of drugs to be taken into the Los Angeles County Jail. 2002 WL 32302660 at . As the district court pointed out, however, the Olsen affidavits made specific reference to the fact that CW# 2 had facilitated such a drug deal. The record therefore fully supports the district court's finding that the Olsen affidavits contained no material misrepresentations or omissions with respect to CW# 2's drug use and drug dealing. 107 In sum, none of the omissions alleged by the appellants undermines the district court's finding that probable cause existed to approve the wiretaps.
108 Appellants claim that the wiretap applications failed to make the required showing of necessity. In order to obtain a court-approved wiretap, the government must submit an application that includes, among other things, a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). Our court has adopted 109 a `common sense approach' in which the reviewing court uses a standard of reasonableness to evaluate the government's good faith effort to use alternative investigative means or its failure to do so because of danger or low probability of success. Though the wiretap should not ordinarily be the initial step in the investigation, ... law enforcement officials need not exhaust every conceivable alternative before obtaining a wiretap. 110 United States v. Canales Gomez, 358 F.3d 1221, 1225-26 (9th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 111 Appellants' arguments regarding the necessity requirement lack merit. Appellants first claim that the government's use of two confidential informants, CW # 1— now known to be John Turscak—and CW # 2, obviated the need for a wiretap because they were able to provide significant information regarding the activities of the Eme. We have recently rejected similar arguments under virtually identical circumstances. In Shryock, 342 F.3d at 976, the government had access to seven cooperating individuals whom we described as providing a wealth of information and evidence in an investigation of the Eme. We found that even with access to these informants, the government had been able to meet the necessity requirement: 112 [T]he Mexican Mafia is a broad-based organization with several hundred members and an unknown number of associates. Several informants—including former members of the Mexican Mafia...—could not possibly reveal the full nature and extent of the enterprise and its countless, and at times disjointed, criminal tentacles. 113 Id. (citations omitted). Our holding in Shryock is controlling here and defeats Appellants' arguments regarding the informants. See also Canales Gomez, 358 F.3d at 1226 (The government need not show that informants would be useless in order to secure a court-authorized wiretap.); United States v. McGuire, 307 F.3d 1192, 1197 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that the government had established necessity for wiretaps despite its use of three cooperating witnesses because those witnesses were able to give agents only limited information, not including the names of all members of the conspiracy). 114 Appellants also argue that the fact that the Olsen affidavits failed to disclose Fernandez's status as a federal fugitive undermines the district court's finding of necessity. We conclude, however, that this omission was not material because the inclusion of the omitted information would not have affected the district court's determination of necessity. See Meling, 47 F.3d at 1553. The Olsen affidavits pointed out that interviews and grand jury investigations of Mexican Mafia members were risky investigative techniques because they would alert the targets of the ongoing investigation. The fact that the government had the authority to arrest Fernandez and question him about his activities did not mean that it would have been able to obtain the information it gathered through the wiretaps. See Canales Gomez, 358 F.3d at 1226 (This court [has] consistently upheld findings of necessity where traditional investigative techniques lead only to the apprehension and prosecution of the main conspirators, but not to the apprehension and prosecution of ... other satellite conspirators.) (quoting McGuire, 307 F.3d at 1198). While the information regarding Fernandez's fugitive status was relevant to the necessity inquiry, the district court could reasonably have found that the wiretaps were necessary even in the presence of that information. The omission was therefore not material to the necessity inquiry. 22 115 Appellants' most compelling argument is that the generalized averments made in the Olsen affidavits as to why normal investigative techniques would not work in this case were not sufficient to establish necessity. Some aspects of the Olsen affidavits are indeed problematic in this regard, especially in light of our precedent in Blackmon, 273 F.3d at 1210, where we concluded wiretap applications that included generalized statements as to why normal investigative techniques would be unsuccessful were insufficient. We noted that the boilerplate assertions made in the affidavits at issue in that case were unsupported by specific facts relevant to the particular circumstances of [the] case and would be true of most if not all narcotics investigations. Id. Portions of the Olsen affidavits suffer from the same flaws emphasized in Blackmon: they include statements that are nothing more than a description of the inherent limitations of particular investigative techniques. Id. 23 116 In the end, however, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in finding that the Olsen affidavits satisfied the necessity requirement set out in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). This case is distinguishable from Blackmon because our holding in that case was premised on a finding that the affidavits supporting the wiretap applications were plagued by material misrepresentations and omissions. See Blackmon, 273 F.3d at 1209-10; see also Canales Gomez, 358 F.3d at 1225 (declining to apply Blackmon because no material omissions or misstatements were alleged in that case). As we explained above, Appellants have not shown that the Olsen affidavits suffered from material misrepresentations or omissions. We therefore affirm the district court's decision not to suppress the wiretap evidence in this case. 117
118 Appellants argue that the district court erred in failing to conduct a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). We review the district court's denial of a Franks hearing de novo, but review the underlying factual findings of the district court regarding materiality under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Bennett, 219 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2000). 119 A defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing where he or she makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement was (1) deliberately or recklessly included in an affidavit submitted in support of a wiretap, and (2) material to the district court's finding of necessity. Shryock, 342 F.3d at 977 (citation omitted). As we have explained in the preceding sections, the district court properly rejected Appellants' arguments that the Olsen affidavits contained material misstatements or omissions. The district court therefore did not err in denying Appellants' request for a Franks hearing.