Opinion ID: 152378
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Villanueva's Eligibility for Adjustment of Status

Text: On appeal, Villanueva maintains that an alien that is inadmissible under § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) [2] is eligible for adjustment of status pursuant to § 1255(i). Villanueva argues that § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) treats aliens, like himself, who entered without inspection differently than those who have been deported and are thus ineligible for adjustment of status. Villanueva maintains that the legislative history of the statute and proper statutory interpretation support his proposition. Villanueva argues that the Board's decisions in In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (BIA 2007), and In re Lemus-Losa, 24 I. & N. Dec. 373 (BIA 2007), are unreasonable and should not be followed. He also contends that we should recognize equitable tolling for the time that he was out of the country at the government's direction. We review the Board's conclusions of law de novo, with substantial deference to its interpretations of statutes and regulations administered by the agency. Ateka v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 954, 957 (8th Cir.2004). The Board's findings of fact will be disturbed only if unsupported by substantial evidence. Id. Harmonizing § 1255(i) and § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) has proven a tall order. The Board itself has wrestled with the ambiguity and resolved the conflict contrary to Villanueva's preferred reading in Briones and Lemus-Losa. Three circuits have deferred to the Board's interpretation that § 1255(i) does not exempt aliens who illegally enter the United States without being admitted following a prior period of unlawful presence in the United States totaling more than one year from § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)'s inadmissibility. Ramirez v. Holder, 609 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2010); Mora v. Mukasey, 550 F.3d 231 (2d Cir.2008); Ramirez-Canales v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 904 (6th Cir.2008). Villanueva relies on Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir.2006), and Acosta v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 550 (9th Cir.2006), for support, but both cases were decided before the Board addressed the statutory ambiguity and provide little aid to petitioner. In Briones, the Board considered the instant issue and held that aliens inadmissible under § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) are ineligible for adjustment of status pursuant § 1255(i). 24 I. & N. Dec. at 371; Lemus-Losa, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 377. In Mora, the second circuit stated that [b]ecause we conclude that the Briones decision interpreted ambiguous provisions of the immigration laws in a reasonable way, we must defer to it pursuant to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)[.] 550 F.3d at 232. Similarly, in Ramirez-Canales, the sixth circuit stated that  Briones is the type of case-by-case adjudication giving meaning to ambiguous statutes to which we owe deference. 517 F.3d at 908. We join the Fourth, Second, and Sixth circuits and hold that an alien that is inadmissible under § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) is not eligible for adjustment of status pursuant § 1255(i). Villanueva does not appear to contest his inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). [3] So, even if we agreed with Villanueva that an alien that is inadmissible under § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) is eligible for adjustment of status pursuant § 1255(i), Villanueva would remain ineligible to adjust status due to his § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) inadmissibility. Accordingly, we affirm the Board's decision denying adjustment of status.