Opinion ID: 1859817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Termination of Appellant's Parental Rights

Text: For her first point on appeal, Appellant argues that there was not sufficient evidence to terminate her parental rights. Appellant alleges that the chancery court's finding that she failed to complete any of the orders aimed at reunification was a blatant misstatement of the history of the case. Appellees DHS and the minor children, through their attorney ad litem, argue that there was clear and convincing evidence to prove that DHS put forth meaningful efforts to rehabilitate the conditions that led to the removal of the children, but that Appellant failed to avail herself of those services. We agree with Appellees. Section 9-27-341 requires that an order terminating parental rights must be based on clear and convincing evidence. Subsection (b)(2) sets forth the grounds for terminating parental rights, which include in part: (A) That a juvenile has been adjudicated by the court to be dependent-neglected and has continued out of the home for twelve (12) months, and, despite a meaningful effort by the Department of Human Services to rehabilitate the home and correct the conditions which caused removal, those conditions have not been remedied by the parent. This court has held that when the issue is one involving the termination of parental rights, there is a heavy burden placed upon the party seeking to terminate the relationship. J.T., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761; Anderson, 310 Ark. 633, 839 S.W.2d 196; Bush v. Dietz, 284 Ark. 191, 680 S.W.2d 704 (1984). Termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy and is in derogation of the natural rights of the parents. Wade v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 337 Ark. 353, 990 S.W.2d 509 (1999); J.T., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761; Anderson, 310 Ark. 633, 839 S.W.2d 196. This court recognized in J.T., however, that parental rights should not be allowed to continue to the detriment of the child's welfare and best interest. To illustrate that the best interest of the child is the primary consideration in these cases, this court in J.T. stated: While we agree that the rights of natural parents are not to be passed over lightly, these rights must give way to the best interest of the child when the natural parents seriously fail to provide reasonable care for their minor children. Parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and well-being of the child. Id. at 248, 947 S.W.2d at 763. Subsection (a) of section 9-27-341 sets forth in relevant part the intent behind the law governing termination of parental rights: The intent of this section is to provide permanency in a juvenile's life in all instances where the return of a juvenile to the family home is contrary to the juvenile's health, safety, or welfare, and it appears from the evidence that return to the family home cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time. Here, Appellant's repeated failure to comply with the chancery court's orders designed to remedy the problems that warranted removal in the first place is the exact type of situation this statute was designed to remedy. In her attempt to argue that the chancery court misstated the history of this case, Appellant sets forth examples of efforts she made to comply with the court's orders. What Appellant fails to realize, however, is that her mere attempts constituted nothing more than sporadic compliance at best. Appellant has failed to show any consistent improvements in terms of visitation, employment, or housing. In fact, her pattern of inconsistent visitation continued to harm her children even while they were not in her custody. In Crawford v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 330 Ark. 152, 951 S.W.2d 310 (1997), this court upheld the termination of parental rights in a case where the evidence indicated that the parent failed to maintain reasonable contact with his sons for almost a year while they were in protective custody. Likewise, Appellant has failed to maintain significant contact with her sons over the past year or to remedy the other problems that led to the removal of her children from her home. Appellant's attempts to place blame for lack of improvement with DHS is also unpersuasive. Appellant's testimony regarding her attempts to comply with the chancellor's orders conflicted with the testimony of therapists and caseworkers. This court has said that we will defer to the chancery court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses. Wade, 337 Ark. 353, 990 S.W.2d 509. Here, the chancellor found that the testimony of the therapists and caseworkers was more credible than the testimony of Appellant. A review of the record combined with the deference granted to the chancellor establishes that such a finding was not clearly erroneous. Appellant also argues that the chancery court did not find that she was an unfit parent, and thus, her rights should not be terminated. Her argument ignores this court's decision in J.T., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761, where we held that the court's finding that the appellant was unable to be the type of parent that her child needed and was unable to learn how to be that parent was a sufficient finding of her unfitness. Testimony throughout the hearings held in this case repeatedly indicated that Appellant's children needed consistency and supervision above all else. Appellant's actions, or lack thereof, evidenced the fact that she was unable to provide her children with either consistency or supervision. Again, a review of the record does not indicate that the chancellor erred in finding that Appellant was unable to provide the type of setting that her children required. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the chancellor's order terminating Appellant's parental rights.