Opinion ID: 2103784
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Content Requirements

Text: Several provisions of section 39-15-202(b) and (c), which require the attending physician to apprise a pregnant woman seeking an abortion of certain information, have been challenged as unconstitutional. These particular informational requirements are as follows: (b)(1) That according to the best judgment of her attending physician she is pregnant; (2) The number of weeks elapsed from the probable time of the conception of her unborn child, based upon the information provided by her as to the time of her last menstrual period or after a history, physical examination, and appropriate laboratory tests; (3) That if more than twenty-four (24) weeks have passed from the time of conception, her child may be viable, that is, capable of surviving outside of the womb, and that if such child is prematurely born alive in the course of an abortion her attending physician has a legal obligation to take steps to preserve the life and health of the child.... (4) That abortion in a considerable number of cases constitutes a major surgical procedure; (5) That numerous public and private agencies and services are available to assist her during her pregnancy and after the birth of her child, if she chooses not to have the abortion, whether she wishes to keep her child or place the child for adoption, and that her physician will provide her with a list of such agencies and the services available if she so requests; (6) Numerous benefits and risks are attendant either to continued pregnancy and childbirth or to abortion depending upon the circumstances in which the patient might find herself. The physician shall explain these benefits and risks to the best of such physician's ability and knowledge of the circumstances involved. (c) At the same time the attending physician provides the information required by subsection (b), such physician shall inform the pregnant woman of the particular risks associated with her pregnancy and childbirth and the abortion or child delivery technique to be employed, including providing her with at least a general description of the medical instructions to be followed subsequent to the abortion or childbirth in order to ensure her safe recovery. The State has a number of substantial interests that it may further by requiring that certain information be provided prior to an abortion. Of course, the State has an interest in the physical health of a woman, which it may further by requiring that the woman be told of the health risks of abortion and childbirth. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882, 112 S.Ct. 2791. The scope of information that can be required includes, but is not limited to, the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the `probable gestational age' of the fetus. Id. The State also has an interest in the psychological health of a woman. See id. Information concerning the impact of an abortion on a fetus furthers this interest by reducing the risk that a woman who obtains an abortion will suffer devastating psychological consequences. See id. Moreover, the State has an interest in protecting the life of the unborn, irrespective of whether the fetus is viable. See id. at 846, 883, 112 S.Ct. 2791. The State may pursue this interest by requiring that a woman be informed of the development of the fetus and assistance that would be available if she chose to carry the fetus to full term. See id. at 883, 112 S.Ct. 2791. It does not matter that the State's interest may be purely a preference for childbirth over abortion. Because such requirements cannot be considered substantial obstacles to obtaining abortions, they are not undue burdens and may be imposed. See id. In short, [i]f the information the State requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be permissible. Id. at 882, 112 S.Ct. 2791. In Casey , the United States Supreme Court examined content requirements of Pennsylvania's abortion statutes which, except for section -202(b)(6), are analogous to those that are challenged before this Court. The Casey Court upheld the constitutionality of each of the challenged provisions. Given the wide constitutional latitude within which a state may regulate abortion without violating either the Fourteenth Amendment of the Due Process Clause or the Law of the Land Clause, I find that none of the challenged provisions is suspect. Section -202(b)(1)-(3), -(5) and section -202(c) are clearly within the bounds of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Casey and are, without doubt, constitutional. Although the Casey Court did not examine a statute similar to section -202(b)(6), the general principles announced in Casey are sufficiently broad to encompass this provision as well. Section -202(b)(6) essentially complements section -202(c) by requiring a woman's physician to explain the benefits as well as risks of continuing with a pregnancy or aborting a fetus. The duty imposed on physicians by section -202(b)(6) is easily satisfied during the course of meeting the other informed consent requirements. Moreover, I would find this provision no more constitutionally offensive than I would a requirement that a physician performing any other medical procedure inform a patient of the benefits of that procedure. The information compelled by section -202(b)(6) is neither untruthful nor misleading, and I would therefore hold that it is constitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, by extension, the Law of the Land Clause of the Tennessee Constitution. As the majority notes, the State has conceded that section -202(b)(4) is unconstitutional. However, I do not find that this concession necessarily renders the remainder of the informed consent requirements unconstitutional. The fact that one provision of a statute is unconstitutional does not affect the validity of other independent provisions. State v. Murray, 480 S.W.2d 355, 356 (Tenn.1972). Under the doctrine of elision, a court may elide the unconstitutional provision of a statute while finding the remaining portions to be constitutional and effective. See Lowe's Cos., Inc. v. Cardwell, 813 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tenn.1991). Significantly, the General Assembly enacted the current abortion statutes as part of the 1989 Criminal Code revision, which did contain a general severability clause, see 1989 Tenn.Pub.Acts ch. 591, § 120, and the legislature has elsewhere expressed its general intention that unconstitutional provisions of a statute may be elided in order to give effect to the remainder of the statute, see Tenn.Code Ann. § 1-3-110 (1994). Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, section -202(b)(4) is not essential to the operation of the informed consent provisions, and its elision does not create an incomplete statute. Cf. Frost v. City of Chattanooga, 488 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Tenn.1972). As such, I disagree that the General Assembly believed section -202(b)(4) to be a necessary component of the informed consent requirements, and I therefore find that the remainder of section -202 could still be enforced despite the State's concession that section 202(b)(4) is unconstitutional.