Opinion ID: 2104257
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Criminal Code Revision and its Effect on the Doctrine of Mutual Combat

Text: On November 1, 1989, Tennessee's revised criminal code went into effect. Enacted in 1989 Public Acts, Chapter 591, the revised code was a comprehensive modernization of the State's criminal law. In the new code, the statutory provisions relating to homicides were substantially revised. Under the revised code, second degree murder is now defined, in pertinent part, as a knowing killing of another. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-210(a) (1997). Likewise, voluntary manslaughter is now defined as the intentional or knowing killing of another in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner. Id. § 39-13-211(a). Because malice aforethought is no longer an element of second degree murder, it is now inaccurate to state that the element of malice is the essential distinction between second degree murder and manslaughter. Comparing the revised second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter statutes, the essential element that now distinguishes these two offenses (which are both knowing killings) is whether the killing was committed in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner. Id. It is in this context that we consider whether the doctrine of mutual combat remains viable and, if so, whether it applies to the facts of this case. There are few published Tennessee cases discussing the doctrine of mutual combat after the effective date of the revised criminal code. In State v. Johnson, the defendant was convicted by the jury of second degree murder. 909 S.W.2d 461 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995). He argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction because he and the victim were allegedly engaged in mutual combat at the time of the killing. In addressing this argument, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated: Mutual combat is not a statutory defense. The underlying facts may qualify, however, as adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner. Whether the acts constitute a knowing killing (second degree murder) or a killing due to adequate provocation (voluntary manslaughter) is a question for the jury. Id. at 464 (citations omitted). The intermediate court went on to conclude that the evidence in that case supported the conviction of second degree murder. As the court stated, [t]hat the jury chose to reject both the notion of provocation and the claim of self-defense was well within [its] prerogative. Id. Similarly, in State v. Summerall, the jury found the defendant guilty of second degree murder. 926 S.W.2d 272 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995). On appeal, the defendant argued, in pertinent part, that the trial court had erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter because there was evidence that he had acted with passion produced by adequate provocation after the victim shot at him. The intermediate court agreed, reversed the conviction, and remanded the cause for a new trial. Although the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the far greater weight of the evidence was otherwise, it concluded that there was evidence to provide at least some support to the defense theory that [the victim] had either provoked the defendant or that the two men were involved in mutual combat. Id. at 278. Accordingly, the intermediate court held that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter. [4] We agree with the reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Johnson and Summerall. Although the statutory elements of second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter changed with the adoption of the revised criminal code in 1989, the current definition of voluntary manslaughter preserves the common law concept of provocation. Even though the common law doctrine of mutual combat is directly related to the provocation element, we conclude that the revised code abrogated the mutual combat doctrine. The essence of the doctrine has been incorporated into the elements of the voluntary manslaughter statute. The facts and circumstances surrounding a killing occasioned by mutual combat may establish that the defendant was impassioned as a result of adequate provocation. Consequently, we hold that the trier of fact must consider all facts surrounding a killing, including the facts giving rise to an agreement to combat, to determine whether the killing resulted from a state of passion produced by adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner. In so holding, it is not necessary that we consider the State's contention that the doctrine of mutual combat is inconsistent with sound public policy. The consequence of our holding is simply that the defendant may contend that the particular facts concerning the homicide, including proof of mutual combat, warrant a finding that the killing was the result of adequate provocation, thereby constituting voluntary manslaughter.