Opinion ID: 778069
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Cumulative Effect of False Testimony

Text: 88 There is a reasonable likelihood that [Morgan's] false testimony ... affected the judgment of the jury. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392. As the district court noted, Morgan was one of two witnesses whose testimony specifically linked Jenkins to Reese's murder. He provided the only evidence of motive. The agreement implicates Morgan's credibility, a vital issue in a trial with only two substantive witnesses and no physical evidence linking the petitioner to the crime. The Napue Court observed that false evidence as to a witness's credibility can be determinative of guilt or innocence. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173; accord Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763; DuBose v. Lefevre, 619 F.2d 973, 979 (2d Cir.1980) ([U]nquestionably, agreements ... to reward testimony by consideration create an incentive on the witness'[s] part to testify favorably to the State and the existence of such an understanding is important for the purposes of impeachment.). Here, the remaining testimony was weak or problematic. A jury might well have doubted the testimony of Napoleon, the only eyewitness, in light of his limited prior knowledge of Jenkins and Reese, the difficulty of accurate observation at night, and the stark inconsistencies and contradictions in his testimony. 89 We have further noted the heightened opportunity for prejudice where the prosecutor, by action or inaction, is complicit in the untruthful testimony. See Mills, 826 F.2d at 1195 ([I]t is sufficient if [a] government attorney knows about the false testimony and no steps are taken to correct it.); DuBose, 619 F.2d at 978 (reversing denial of habeas writ because prosecutorial questioning fostered a misapprehension [in the jury] that the State had not offered [the witness] any kind of deal) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Pabisz, 936 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir.1991) (finding that the potential for misleading the jury was heightened by the prosecutor's summation); United States v. McElroy, 697 F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir.1982) (condemning potentially misleading characterization[s] by the prosecution that deceived defense counsel). 90 The respondent counters that Jenkins should be denied the writ because a defendant [is] compelled to raise the issue at trial or not at all. Forgoing a challenge to false testimony, notes the respondent, may be strategically advantageous by strengthening arguments in support of a subsequent habeas petition. The respondent contends that gaming the system in this manner should be discouraged. See Evans v. United States, 408 F.2d 369, 370 (7th Cir.1969) (holding that a challenge based on knowing use of perjured testimony must be raised at trial). 91 But the case at bar does not require that we determine when a challenge to a state court judgment under Napue or Giglio should be denied for this reason because it seems clear to us that this case did not involve strategic or tactical omission. In United States v. Helmsley, upon which the respondent relies, we concluded that the defendant was not only ... unable to establish a justifiable excuse for her failure to challenge ... testimony at trial, but it appear[ed] that her choice not to do so may have been deliberate. 985 F.2d 1202, 1209 (2d Cir.1993). We see nothing analogous here. Rather, Morgan's untrue testimony occurred during the course of defense counsel's attempt to draw out of him testimony establishing the existence of the plea agreement. This failed attempt belies any suggestion of strategic or tactical omission. The trial judge knew the testimony was false because the court had been alerted to the existence of the plea agreement at the start of the trial. Moreover, defense counsel's failure to continue questioning Morgan or stress Morgan's self-contradictory testimony in summation is explained by the prosecution's behavior. Even if defense counsel thought that he had adequately established the plea agreement's existence in the course of his cross-examination, or that he could do so later in the proceedings, he was thwarted by the prosecutor's misleading examination on redirect. ADA Lendino averred at the trial's commencement that she would likely elicit the plea agreement's details in her direct examination of Morgan. Jenkins's counsel could not have anticipated her reinforcement of Morgan's false implication that there was no such bargain. And while Lendino's redirect questions elicited technically correct answers, by having Morgan testify that he had never met her before and had made no deals with her, they left the jury with the mistaken impression that no plea agreement existed. We can think of no credible explanation for her conduct other than an attempt to reinforce Morgan's false testimony. 2 92 Finally, the prosecutor's actions cannot be overlooked on the ground that Jenkins's counsel did not continue to seek to gain an admission from Morgan as to the plea agreement. Further questioning by defense counsel could have prejudiced Jenkins. When a prosecutor throws his or her weight behind a falsely testifying witness, challenging the witness's statement... runs the risk of implicating the credibility of the prosecutor before the jury. Helmsley, 985 F.2d at 1207. Even prosecutorial silence harm[s] defendants, who are unable to respond effectively. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also United States ex rel Washington v. Vincent, 525 F.2d 262, 268 n. 9 (2d Cir.1975) (noting that a defendant is harmed by his or her inability to respond effectively in view of [the prosecutor's] silence).