Opinion ID: 1356962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: children are people, too

Text: The majority, in the midst of its discussion of the potential conflict in the roles of a guardian ad litem and an attorney for the parent, states that [i]t is entirely appropriate in the case of a child to treat the two functions of counsel and guardian ad litem as being completely identical. The majority imparts the impression, to which I object most strenuously, that the adult litigant should have rights which exceed those of the child, suggesting to me that the child is considered a person with a lesser entitlement to rights than the adult. The majority hypothesizes that conflicts could emerge between the roles of guardian ad litem and counsel for the adult, yet deftly dismisses even the possibility that such conflicts could also occur in the roles of guardian ad litem and counsel for the child. If the majority believes an adult may be entitled to both appointed counsel and a guardian ad litem, how can they blithely presume that an individual can always operate in both capacities simultaneously for a child? We commented upon the general expectations of a guardian ad litem for a child in abuse and neglect proceedings in syllabus point five of In re Jeffrey R. L., 190 W.Va. 24, 435 S.E.2d 162 (1993): Each child in an abuse and neglect case is entitled to effective representation of counsel. To further that goal, W.Va.Code, 49-6-2(a) [1992] mandates that a child has a right to be represented by counsel in every stage of abuse and neglect proceedings. Furthermore, Rule XIII of the West Virginia Rules for Trial Courts of Record provides that a guardian ad litem shall make a full and independent investigation of the facts involved in the proceeding, and shall make his or her recommendations known to the court. Rules 1.1 and 1.3 of the West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct, respectively, require an attorney to provide competent representation to a client, and to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. We also summarized the guardian ad litem's role in syllabus point three of In re Scottie D., 185 W.Va. 191, 406 S.E.2d 214 (1991), as follows: In a proceeding to terminate parental rights pursuant to W.Va.Code, 49-6-1 to 49-6-10, as amended, a guardian ad litem, appointed pursuant to W.Va.Code, 49-6-2(a), as amended, must exercise reasonable diligence in carrying out the responsibility of protecting the rights of the children. This duty includes exercising the appellate rights of the children, if, in the reasonable judgment of the guardian ad litem, an appeal is necessary. We further elaborated in syllabus point five of James M. v. Maynard, 185 W.Va. 648, 408 S.E.2d 400 (1991), that [t]he guardian ad litem's role in abuse and neglect proceedings does not actually cease until such time as the child is placed in a permanent home. In syllabus point five of In re Christina, 194 W.Va. 446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995), we acknowledged that the wishes of the child regarding continued visitation or other contact with the parent should be considered, as follows: When parental rights are terminated due to neglect or abuse, the circuit court may nevertheless in appropriate cases consider whether continued visitation or other contact with the abusing parent is in the best interest of the child. Among other things, the circuit court should consider whether a close emotional bond has been established between parent and child and the child's wishes, if he or she is of appropriate maturity to make such request. The evidence must indicate that such visitation or continued contact would not be detrimental to the child's well being and would be in the child's best interest. Just as some circumstances may present conflict between the role of guardian ad litem and counsel for the parent, those roles may also conflict in the case of the child. Part I B-2 of the Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, adopted by the American Bar Association in February 1996, provides guidance on this issue and provides as follows: Conflict Situations. (1) If a lawyer appointed as guardian ad litem determines that there is a conflict caused by performing both roles of guardian ad litem and child's attorney, the lawyer should continue to perform as child's attorney and withdraw as guardian ad litem. The lawyer should request appointment of a guardian ad litem without revealing the basis for the request. (2) If a lawyer is appointed as a child's attorney for siblings, there may also be a conflict which could require that the lawyer decline representation or withdraw from representing all of the children. Comment The primary conflict that arises between the two roles is when the child's expressed preferences differ from what the lawyer deems to be in the child's best interests. As a practical matter, when the lawyer has established a trusting relationship with the child, most conflicts can be avoided. While the lawyer should be careful not to apply undue pressure to a child, the lawyer's advice and guidance can often persuade the child to change an imprudent position or to identify alternative choices if the child's first choice is denied by the court. The lawyer-client role involves a confidential relationship with privileged communications, while a guardian ad litem-client role may not be confidential. Compare Alaska Bar Assoc. Ethics Op. # 854 (1985) (lawyer-client privilege does not apply when the lawyer is appointed to be child's guardian ad litem) with Bentley v. Bentley, [86 A.D.2d 926] 448 N.Y.S.2d 559 (App.Div.1982) (communication between minor children and guardian ad litem in divorce custody case is entitled to lawyer-client privilege). Because the child has a right to confidentiality and advocacy of his or her position, the child's attorney can never abandon this role. Once a lawyer has a lawyer-client relationship with a minor, he or she cannot and should not assume any other role for the child, especially as guardian ad litem. When the roles cannot be reconciled, another person must assume the guardian ad litem role. See Arizona State Bar Committee on Rules of Professional Conduct, Opinion No. 86-13 (1986). The Ohio Supreme Court, in In re Baby Girl Baxter, 17 Ohio St.3d 229, 479 N.E.2d 257 (1985), resolved a situation of conflict in the two roles by holding: [W]hen an attorney is appointed to represent a person and is also appointed guardian ad litem for that person, his first and highest duty is to zealously represent his client within the bounds of the law and to champion his client's cause. If the attorney feels there is a conflict between his role as attorney and his role as guardian, he should petition the court for an order allowing him to withdraw as guardian. The court should not hesitate to grant such request. Id. at 232, 479 N.E.2d 257. As part of Ohio's reformation of temporary and permanent custody actions in 1988, R.C. 2151.281(H) was added to the Ohio Code. Closely tracking the language of Baby Girl Baxter, it provides, in pertinent part, as follows: If a person is serving as guardian ad litem and counsel for a child and either that person or the court finds that a conflict may exist between the person's roles as guardian ad litem and as counsel, the court shall relieve the person of his duties as guardian ad litem and appoint someone else as guardian ad litem for the child. See also In re Shaffer, 213 Mich.App. 429, 540 N.W.2d 706 (1995) (holding that while one person can simultaneously act as guardian ad litem and attorney for the children in an appropriate case, conflicts in those roles may require appointment of a guardian ad litem separate from the attorney). In Newman v. Newman, 235 Conn. 82, 663 A.2d 980 (1995), the Supreme Court of Connecticut expressed concern regarding the creation of conflict in the attorney's role by conflating the role of counsel for a child with the role of a guardian ad litem or next friend. 663 A.2d at 987. Typically, the child's attorney is an advocate for the child, while the guardian ad litem is the representative of the child's best interests. As an advocate, the attorney should honor the strongly articulated preference regarding taking an appeal of a child who is old enough to express a reasonable preference; as a guardian, the attorney might decide that, despite such a child's present wishes, the contrary course of action would be in the child's long term best interests, psychologically or financially. Id. at 987-88. The division of roles may be necessary to make sure that the attorney for the children will not be faced with the dilemma of reconciling such diverging interests while conforming to her role as advocate. Id. at 990. The reality is that abused and neglected children frequently want to be returned to their parents, for that is all they know, and despite the abuse, there usually still is an emotional bond. As we explained in Christina, as quoted above, the wishes of the child are not to be disregarded. Id. at 448, 460 S.E.2d at 694, syl. pt. 5. West Virginia Code § 49-6-5(a)(6), regarding the disposition of neglected or abused children, also requires a child's wishes to be considered in some instances. That statute, in pertinent part, emphasis added, provides as follows: (6) Upon a finding that there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected in the near future, and when necessary for the welfare of the child, terminate the parental or custodial rights and/or responsibilities of the abusing parent and commit the child to the permanent sole custody of the nonabusing parent, if there be one, or, if not, to either the permanent guardianship of the state department or a licensed child welfare agency. If the court shall so find, then in fixing its dispositional order, the court shall consider the following factors: (1) The child's need for continuity of care and caretakers; (2) the amount of time required for the child to be integrated into a stable and permanent home environment; and (3) other factors as the court considers necessary and proper. Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, the permanent parental rights shall not be terminated if a child fourteen years of age or older or otherwise of an age of discretion as determined by the court, objects to such termination. Dissimilarly, there is almost always a community of interest in the wishes of an allegedly abusive parent and the legal position adopted on his or her behalf by appointed counsel. Thus, there is far greater potential for a conflict in the representation of a child than in the representation of an adult in an abuse and neglect case. It is not so much the result in the present case with which I so vehemently disagree; it is the potential ramification of future interpretation and attempted application of this very rambling opinion, full of confusing ideas and standards, which disturbs me profoundly. Lastly, I must observe that the entire tenor of the majority opinion sounds in the rights of the Appellant. We recently observed in syllabus point seven of In re Brian D., 194 W.Va. 623, 461 S.E.2d 129 (1995) that [c]ases involving children must be decided not just in the context of competing sets of adults' rights, but also with a regard for the rights of the child(ren). It is not simply the rights of the parents with which we must be concerned in an abuse and neglect setting; rather, the rights of the children must be the foremost, preeminent responsibility. The rights of the children cannot be obfuscated under the guise of protection of the procedural rights of the parents. For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent.