Opinion ID: 610593
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nullification

Text: 37 The TGX Defendants have found language in our cases in which this court states that the effect of a voluntary dismissal is to put the plaintiff in the same legal position in which he would have been had he never brought the first suit. Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 775 F.2d 617, 619 (5th Cir.1985). They would have us apply this language, irrespective of the reasons for and context in which we used it, to hold that Simmons's suit vanished upon voluntary dismissal, leaving nothing to reinstate by operation of § 27A(b). 38 But there is no rule that makes all voluntarily dismissed cases absolutely null for all purposes. The District of Columbia Circuit has permitted a district court to resurrect a voluntarily dismissed case under FED.R.CIV.P. 60. Boehm v. Office of Alien Property, 344 F.2d 194 (D.C.Cir.1965). And even if there were an absolute-nullity rule, we could not apply it in the face of contrary congressional intent unless we could articulate a constitutional basis for doing so. As we have explained, Congress intended broad relief from Lampf for any § 10(b) claim that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991. Simmons commenced his § 10(b) claims against the TGX Defendants on March 8, 1990, which places those claims within the ambit of § 27A(b).