Opinion ID: 2014063
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Instruct the Jury Regarding Defendant's Potential for Rehabilitation

Text: Defendant also claims reversible error based on the circuit court's refusal, at the second stage of the sentencing proceedings, to instruct the jury that mitigating factors include that [t]he defendant may be rehabilitated or restored to useful citizenship. IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06 provides in relevant part: Mitigating factors include: First: [(Any or all of the following) (The following)] if supported by the evidence:    The defendant may be rehabilitated or restored to useful citizenship. Second: Any other reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to death. Where there is evidence of a mitigating factor, the fact that such mitigating factor is not a factor specifically listed in these instructions does not preclude your consideration of the evidence. The instructions proposed by the prosecution followed the language of IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06, except that no mitigating factors, such as defendant's potential for rehabilitation, were enumerated. The prosecution's instruction stated only that mitigating factors included any other reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to death. At the instruction conference, defense counsel objected to this omission but did not tender an alternative instruction. The circuit court overruled defendant's objection and gave the jury IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.06 in the form proposed by the State. Defendant now contends that the circuit court's failure to instruct the jury that defendant's potential for rehabilitation was a mitigating factor violated the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution, which provides that [a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. According to defendant, there was significant evidence of his potential for rehabilitation, including his charity, good behavior, and good work record in prison; his artistic talent, his interest in religion, his positive relationship with his girlfriend's daughter, and the availability of medication to treat the problems associated with his brain damage. Defendant asserts that the failure of the circuit court to instruct the jury to consider his potential for rehabilitation diminished, if not eliminated, the jury's consideration of that type of mitigation and handicapped counsel's ability to advocate the mitigation evidence in those terms. As a result, defendant argues, he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. It is well established that a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on the theory of his case. Gilliam, 172 Ill.2d at 519, 218 Ill.Dec. 884, 670 N.E.2d 606. If there is some basis for such an instruction in the evidence, it is an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to refuse the instruction. See, e.g., People v. Crane, 145 Ill.2d 520, 526, 165 Ill.Dec. 703, 585 N.E.2d 99 (1991). The State asserts that the circuit court properly refused to instruct the jury concerning defendant's potential for rehabilitation because the evidence at the aggravation-mitigation stage did not support such an instruction. However, [v]ery slight evidence upon a given theory of a case will justify the giving of an instruction. People v. Jones, 175 Ill.2d 126, 132, 221 Ill.Dec. 843, 676 N.E.2d 646 (1997). Defendant presented evidence that he was a good worker and had been involved in charitable activities both in and out of prison; he had been kind to other inmates and children; and he had sincere religious beliefs. In addition, Dr. Hess testified that the symptoms of defendant's brain damage could be treated with medication. Based on this evidence, we find that the circuit court erred in refusing defendant's request that the jury be instructed that mitigating factors included his potential for rehabilitation and useful citizenship. Nevertheless, we disagree with defendant that this error requires that he receive a new sentencing hearing. An error in a jury instruction is harmless if the result of the trial would not have been different if a proper instruction had been given. People v. Alvine, 173 Ill.2d 273, 290, 219 Ill.Dec. 546, 671 N.E.2d 713 (1996). In the case at bar, the circuit court's instructional error was harmless. This court has previously explained: It is well established that at the aggravation/mitigation stage of sentencing, the sentencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. [Citations.] The standard for determining whether jury instructions violate the protections of the eighth and fourteenth amendments is `whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.' Terrell, 185 Ill.2d at 517-18, 236 Ill.Dec. 723, 708 N.E.2d 309, quoting Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 276, 118 S.Ct. 757, 761, 139 L.Ed.2d 702, 710 (1998), quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1198, 108 L.Ed.2d 316, 329 (1990). In defendant's case, although the jury was not specifically instructed that defendant's potential for rehabilitation was a mitigating factor, it was instructed that mitigating factors included [a]ny other reason supported by the evidence why the defendant should not be sentenced to death. In addition, both the prosecution and the defense argued defendant's potential for rehabilitation to the jury. The State argued that the evidence did not indicate that defendant could be rehabilitated, while the defense contended that the evidence showed a real hope for defendant's rehabilitation. Thus, we find no reasonable likelihood that the jury believed it could not consider evidence of defendant's potential for rehabilitation and restoration to useful citizenship. In addition, this court has held that failing to instruct the jury at the second stage of a capital sentencing hearing to consider a defendant's potential for rehabilitation and restoration to useful citizenship does not violate article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, provided that the jury is instructed that it can consider any other reason why the defendant should not be sentenced to death. See People v. Free, 94 Ill.2d 378, 420-21, 69 Ill.Dec. 1, 447 N.E.2d 218 (1983). Further, defendant had a significant criminal history, involving bomb threats to schools, burglaries, threats of violence, and actual violence. He continued to commit criminal offenses, even after completing sentences of probation and imprisonment. Ultimately, he approached the Brewer household, apparently at random, seeking money to support his cocaine habit. In order to get the money he wanted, defendant brutally murdered an elderly couple with mobility problems and their daughter, who was recovering from surgery, in the middle of the night. He stabbed Charles Brewer, dragged him across the lawn of his house, and left him lying by the side of his house. He stabbed Doris Jean Brewer 16 times, fracturing her skull, and stabbed Bonnie Brewer 20 times. Given the strength of the aggravating evidence, as well as the arguments and instructions at the second stage of defendant's sentencing hearing, we believe that the jury's sentencing decision would have been the same, even if the circuit court had not failed to instruct the jury concerning defendant's potential for rehabilitation and restoration to useful citizenship. Accordingly, we hold that defendant is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing on this basis.