Opinion ID: 3133216
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: A. This Court will not review the district court’s denial of BRN’s motion for partial summary judgment. 6 BRN asks this Court to review the district court’s denial of its partial summary judgment motion concerning the applicability of the special relationship exception to the economic loss rule. BRN moved for summary judgment asking the district court “to rule as a matter of law that if Taylor provided the disputed advice concerning what was necessary to vest the PUD, the services involved in rendering such advice come within the special relationship exception to the economic loss rule.” “It is well settled in Idaho that ‘[a]n order denying a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory order from which no direct appeal may be taken.’ ” Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 542, 164 P.3d 819, 822 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Dominguez v. Evergreen Res., Inc., 142 Idaho 7, 13, 121 P.3d 938, 944 (2005)); see I.A.R. 11. “[A]n order denying a motion for summary judgment is not subject to review—even after the entry of an appealable final judgment.” Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 13, 121 P.3d at 944; see also Lewiston Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. City of Lewiston, 151 Idaho 800, 808, 264 P.3d 907, 915 (2011) (explaining that this Court does not review denials of summary judgment after judgment is rendered on the merits); Hunter v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 138 Idaho 44, 46, 57 P.3d 755, 757 (2002) (“An order denying a motion for summary judgment is not an appealable order itself, nor is it reviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”). We have consistently explained the rationale for this rule: [B]y entering an order denying summary judgment, the trial court merely indicates that the matter should proceed to trial on its merits. The final judgment in a case can be tested upon the record made at trial, not the record made at the time summary judgment was denied. Any legal rulings made by the trial court affecting that final judgment can be reviewed at that time in light of the full record. This will prevent a litigant who loses a case, after a full and fair trial, from having an appellate court go back to the time when the litigant had moved for summary judgment to view the relative strengths and weaknesses of the litigants at that earlier stage. Were we to hold otherwise, one who had sustained his position after a fair hearing of the whole case might nevertheless lose, because he had failed to prove his case fully on the interlocutory motion. Garcia, 144 Idaho at 542, 164 P.3d at 822 (alternation in original) (quoting Miller v. Estate of Prater, 141 Idaho 208, 211, 108 P.3d 355, 358 (2005)). We are not convinced that we should abandon this rule. To the contrary, we deem it prudent to continue to “strictly adhere” to our rule precluding appellate review of the denial of summary judgment when the case has subsequently gone to the finder of fact. Hennefer v. Blaine Cnty. Sch. Dist., 158 Idaho 242, 249, 346 P.3d 259, 7 266 (2015). We therefore decline to review the district court’s denial of BRN’s motion for partial summary judgment. B. The district court did not err by concluding that BRN failed to meet its burden of proving its claims against Taylor. The district court’s decision did not explicitly state that it found that Taylor had not breached its duty of care to BRN. However, a careful reading of that decision leads us to the inescapable conclusion that this is precisely what the district court found. In its decision, the district court stated: The evidence does not establish that Taylor entered into an oral agreement with BRN to perform land-use planning services on the project. This is demonstrated by a lack of a clear understanding between the parties regarding this responsibility. BRN may have been under the impression that land-use planning was part of Taylor’s role, however, such an impression does not give rise to an obligation under the contract. .... Taylor owed a duty of reasonable care in providing non engineering services in its work with BRN regardless of whether those services were provided under the contract or they were services assumed by Taylor. While it is clear that Taylor took on certain planning-related duties[,] it has not been established from the evidence that Taylor specifically advised BRN that a final plat had to be recorded to vest the PUD entitlement. The district court further explained that because BRN sought purely economic damages, Taylor would not be entitled to recover unless it proved the existence of an exception to the economic loss rule. BRN contends that the district court erred in these decisions. We find that substantial evidence supports the district court’s conclusion that Taylor did not breach its duty of care to BRN. As this is fatal to BRN’s claim, we do not reach BRN’s arguments regarding the special relationship exception to the economic loss rule. To establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage.” Nation v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 144 Idaho 177, 189, 158 P.3d 953, 965 (2007) (quoting O’Guin v. Bingham Cnty., 142 Idaho 49, 52, 122 P.3d 308, 311 (2005)). “Whether a duty exists is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.” Id. at 189, 158 P.3d at 965. Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc. v. Massey, 155 Idaho 942, 947–48, 318 P.3d 932, 937–38 (2014). “[O]ne owes the duty to every person in our society to use reasonable care to avoid injury to the other 8 person in any situation in which it could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care might result in injury.” Baccus v. Ameripride Servs. Inc., 145 Idaho 346, 349, 179 P.3d 309, 312 (2008) (alternation in original) (quoting Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399, 987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999)). This Court has explained that “a contract may create the circumstances for the commission of a tort.” Id. at 350, 179 P.3d at 313 (quoting Just’s Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 468, 583 P.2d 997, 1003 (1978)). However, “the mere negligent breach or non-performance of a contract will not sustain an action sounding in tort, in the absence of a liability imposed by law independent of that arising out of the contract itself.” Gagnon v. Western Bldg. Maint., Inc., 155 Idaho 112, 115, 306 P.3d 197, 200 (2013) (quoting Baccus, 145 Idaho at 350, 179 P.3d at 313). Although it is undisputed that Taylor undertook to perform a number of engineering tasks associated with the project, including utility design, boundary surveying, topographical surveying, construction staking, and construction observation, Taylor consistently maintained that it did not agree or undertake to provide land-use planning advice relating to the vesting of the PUD. BRN did not provide evidence that there was an express agreement, oral or written, that Taylor would provide land-use planning advice. The district court found that Taylor had voluntarily undertaken to perform certain landuse planning services. Taylor prepared some applications, attended hearings, and prepared minutes in the PUD approval process. Clearly, to the extent Taylor undertook to perform landuse services, it had a duty to perform those services in a non-negligent manner. However, Taylor’s duties were limited to those it actually assumed. There is substantial evidence to support the district court’s finding that Taylor did not provide land-use planning advice regarding the vesting of the PUD. Although Capps maintained that Taylor provided the erroneous advice regarding the necessity of recording a final plat at the 2008 meeting, Pace maintained that Capps and other individuals from BRN told him that a final plat was required. Pace explained that the statement in the demand letter from Taylor’s attorney to the effect that final plat approval was required by May 29, 2009, was based upon what Capps had told him. This is simply a matter of conflicting testimony. It is the district court’s role, not ours, to weigh conflicting evidence and judge witness credibility. State, Dep’t of Transp. v. Grathol, 158 Idaho 38, 45, 343 P.3d 480, 487 (2015). We will uphold the trial court’s factual findings if they 9 are based upon substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting. Big Wood Ranch, LLC v. Water Users’ Ass’n of Broadford Slough & Rockwell Bypass Lateral Ditches, Inc., 158 Idaho 225, 230, 345 P.3d 1015, 1020 (2015). Pace’s testimony constituted substantial evidence that Taylor was not the source of the erroneous information regarding the necessity of final plat approval. “[A] legal duty may arise if ‘one voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, having no prior duty to do so.’” Baccus, 145 Idaho at 350, 179 P.3d at 313 (quoting Coghlan, 133 Idaho at 400, 987 P.2d at 312). “In such a case, the acting party has a duty to perform that act in a nonnegligent manner.” Beers v. Corp. of President of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 155 Idaho 680, 688, 316 P.3d 92, 100 (2013). The district court found there was no evidence that Taylor undertook to provide advice regarding the necessity of securing final plat approval. We can find no error in this decision. C. Taylor is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Both parties request attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120. BRN also requests attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-121. As BRN has not prevailed in this appeal, its request for an award of attorney fees is denied. Taylor requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3), contending that its provision of engineering services to BRN constitutes a commercial transaction. “The term ‘commercial transaction’ is defined to mean all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes.” I.C. § 12-120(3). “[T]he commercial transaction must be integral to the claim and constitute a basis on which the party is attempting to recover.” Clayson v. Zebe, 153 Idaho 228, 236, 280 P.3d 731, 739 (2012) (quoting Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Nw. Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 471, 36 P.3d 218, 223 (2001)). Here, the parties’ claims against each other arose from Taylor’s provision of services in connection with the Black Rock North Development. These services were not for personal or household purposes. As Taylor has prevailed in this appeal, Taylor is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(3).