Opinion ID: 64707
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brady and Outrageous Government Conduct

Text: The record establishes that before Mauskar's first trial, the government knew Tonya Williams had forged Mauskar's signature on treatment charge sheets, progress notes, and other documents. Williams testified on cross examination during Mauskar's second trial that the government had been aware of the forgery for more than two years: Q: Who did you tell that you had been photocopying Dr. Mauskar's signature? A: Mr. Louis, Mr. McGregor. Q: And was this at a meeting you had at the U.S. Attorney's Office? A: Yes. Q: And it was before the trial began? A: Yes. Q: Is it while you were in prison or before you went to prison? A: Before I went to prison. Q: So, the government has known for at least for the last two years that you photocopied these signatures. A: (Nods head.) Q: Yes or no? A: Yes. The government concedes that at least some of these documents were relevant to some of the charges against Mauskar, and that it failed to disclose the forgeries until after Mauskar's second trial was underway. Following Williams's testimony, Mauskar moved for dismissal of the indictment due to outrageous government conduct and/or violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, alleging that the government committed an egregious Brady violation by failing to disclose the forgery. To make out a Brady violation, a defendant must show that (1) evidence was suppressed; (2) the suppressed evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) the suppressed evidence was material to either guilt or punishment. Miller, 520 F.3d at 514 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Evidence is material under Brady when there is a `reasonable probability' that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the suppressed evidence had been disclosed to the defendant. United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 245 (5th Cir.2002). Mauskar, however, fails on appeal to identify the forged documents with any specificity, or to explain to which charges the documents were relevant. In fact, Mauskar acknowledges that he was acquitted on some of those charges. Without this information, we cannot conduct the analysis necessary to determine whether the documents were material within the meaning of Brady. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) ([S]howing that the prosecution knew of an item of favorable evidence unknown to the defense does not amount to a Brady violation, without more.); see also Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 967 (5th Cir.1990) (observing that [t]he materiality of Brady material depends almost entirely on the value of the evidence relative to the other evidence mustered by the [government]), vacated, 503 U.S. 930, 112 S.Ct. 1463, 117 L.Ed.2d 609 (1992), abrogated on other grounds by Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992). Nor has Mauskar established the existence of outrageous government conduct that required dismissal of his indictment, a question we review de novo. United States v. Asibor, 109 F.3d 1023, 1039 (5th Cir. 1997). Government misconduct does not mandate dismissal of an indictment unless it is `so outrageous' that it violates the principle of `fundamental fairness' under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Johnson, 68 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir.1995) (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973)). Such a violation will only be found in the rarest circumstances. Id. (citing United States v. Yater, 756 F.2d 1058, 1066 (5th Cir.1985)); see also United States v. Childs, 447 F.3d 541, 545 (7th Cir.2006) (observing that dismissing criminal charges against a defendant because of government misconduct is an extreme step). We are deeply concerned by the government's failure to disclose Williams's forgery of Mauskar's signature on documents relating to the charges against him. [3] The duty of a prosecutor, as the representative of the sovereign in a criminal case, is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done. Dickson v. Quarterman, 462 F.3d 470, 479 (5th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Nonetheless, we cannot say on the record before us that the nondisclosure in the present case is so shocking to the universal sense of justice, Russell, 411 U.S. at 432, 93 S.Ct. 1637 (quoting Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246, 80 S.Ct. 297, 4 L.Ed.2d 268 (1960)), that the government should have been deprived for all time of the opportunity to prosecute Mauskar. In so concluding, we note that contrary to Mauskar's assertion, the government did not suborn perjured testimony from Tonya Williams regarding the authenticity of signatures on the forged documents. Williams testified during Mauskar's first trial that she had never written Dr. Mauskar's name on any Medicare application form that was submitted to Medicare. This testimony is not inconsistent with her subsequent testimony during Mauskar's second trial that she forged treatment sheets, progress notes, and other documents. Had the government suborned perjury regarding the authenticity of signatures on the forged documents relating to the charges against Mauskar, the outcome of this appeal may have been different.