Opinion ID: 185285
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sun-Diamond Decision

Text: 10 A district court may grant a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea if the defendant shows any fair and just reason. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e). Although presentence withdrawal motions should be liberally granted, they are not granted as a matter of right. United States v. Ford, 301 U.S. App. D.C. 210, 993 F.2d 249, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Loughery, 285 U.S. App. D.C. 255, 908 F.2d 1014, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 11 On appeal, a district court's denial of a motion to withdraw will be vacated only if the defendant can show an abuse of discretion. Ford, 993 F.2d at 251. In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court considers three factors: (1) whether the defendant asserted a viable claim of innocence; (2) whether the delay between the plea and the motion to withdraw substantially prejudiced the Government's ability to prosecute the case; and (3) whether the guilty plea was somehow tainted. Id. (internal quotes omitted). Because Ahn does not claim to be innocent and the Government has not argued that the delay would prejudice its ability to prosecute Ahn, we focus our attention on the third factor. 12 If a guilty plea is tainted--that is, if it is  'entered unconstitutionally or contrary to Rule 11 procedures' --a court's assessment of a motion to withdraw the plea is  'very lenient.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Barker, 168 U.S. App. D.C. 312, 514 F.2d 208, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc)). If the plea colloquy was not conducted in substantial compliance with Rule 11, then the defendant should  'almost always' be permitted to withdraw his plea. Id. (quoting United States v. Abreu, 296 U.S. App. D.C. 16, 964 F.2d 16, 18 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam)). 13 Ahn claims that his plea was tainted in two respects. First, he argues that the Government's proffer provided an insufficient factual basis for the illegal gratuity charge. Second, he contends that his plea was involuntary because he lacked an understanding of the nature of the charge against him. We reject both claims. 14 Each of Ahn's claims hinges on the meaning of the illegal gratuity statute. The statute makes it a crime for a public official to receive or accept anything of value personally for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such official.... 18 U.S.C. 201(c)(1)(B). An official act is defined as any decision or action on any ... matter ... which may at any time be pending ... in such official's official capacity, or in such official's place of trust.... Id. 201(a)(3). 15 Shortly after Ahn pleaded guilty, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 143 L. Ed. 2d 576, 119 S. Ct. 1402 (1999), which interpreted the illegal gratuity statute's for or because of any official act language. The Sun-Diamond Court held that an illegal gratuity could not be proved by merely demonstrating that a thing of value was given because of the recipient's official position. Id. at 400. Rather, the Government must establish a link between the gratuity and a specific 'official act' for or because of which it was given. Id. at 414; accord United States v. Schaffer, 337 U.S. App. D.C. 214, 183 F.3d 833, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In other words, a violation requires that some particular official act be identified and proved. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 406. Following Sun-Diamond, this Court held that an illegal gratuity can take one of three forms: (1) a reward for past action, (2) an enticement to maintain a position already taken, or (3) an inducement to take or refrain from some future official action. Schaffer, 183 F.3d at 841-42.
16 Ahn argues that the Government failed to proffer any facts that would demonstrate a link between the payments he received and any official act. He suggests that, instead, the Government's proffer only establishes that the massage parlors paid him solely because of his position as a police lieutenant. 17 According to Rule 11, when considering a plea, the trial court must make such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f). To establish a satisfactory factual basis, the Government must proffer  'evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the defendant was guilty as charged.'  In re Sealed Case, 332 U.S. App. D.C. 84, 153 F.3d 759, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Ford, 993 F.2d at 253). Accordingly, the trial court may draw reasonable inferences from the facts proffered by the Government. See United States v. Graves, 106 F.3d 342, 345 (10th Cir. 1997). 18 The Government's factual proffer established that Ahn went to the massage parlors to tell the cooperating witnesses that their parlors were not properly licensed. As a police officer, Lieutenant Ahn had a duty to report the licensing violations and to take such immediate and proper police action as the circumstances may demand. METROPOLITAN POLICE DEP'T GEN. ORDER 401.4, Part I, D(2). The proffer explicitly described how Ahn accepted payments from two cooperating witnesses associated with The Spas rather than reporting the violations. The proffer expressly defined The Spas as businesses whereby male customers purchase massages from female spa workers ... [and] may also purchase sexual acts. In the proffer, the Government identified five different payments from the cooperating witnesses, who were, as the proffer makes clear, associated with The Spas, which by the proffer's own unambiguous definition were engaged in illegal activity. Consequently, the only conclusion that can be drawn from the proffer is that while Lieutenant Ahn received payments from the cooperating witnesses, the massage parlors continued to engage in illegal conduct and Ahn failed to take any immediate and proper police action. 19 Although Appellant is correct that the proffer does not explicitly state a link between the payments and an official act, it does provide sufficient  'evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the defendant was guilty as charged.'  In re Sealed Case, 153 F.3d at 771 (emphasis added) (quoting Ford, 993 F.2d at 253). A reasonable juror could interpret the facts proffered by the Government as demonstrating that the cooperating witnesses paid Ahn as a reward for his not reporting the parlors' violations when he first notified them that they were not properly licensed, as an enticement to continue failing to report them, and as an inducement for not reporting them in the future. Under all of these reasonable inferences, the Government has proffered a sufficient factual basis to establish the link between the payments and an identified official act, or in Lieutenant Ahn's case, an official failure to act. See Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 414; Schaffer, 183 F.3d at 841-42. 20 We find instructive our recent decision in In re Sealed Case, 332 U.S. App. D.C. 84, 153 F.3d 759 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1), which establishes minimum sentences for anyone who uses or carries a firearm during or in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Before the defendant was sentenced, however, the Supreme Court held that to establish the use of a firearm the Government must prove that it was actively employed. See Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144, 133 L. Ed. 2d 472, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995). The Sealed Case defendant sought to withdraw his plea based on this holding, arguing that the Government's proffer had not established that he had used or carried a weapon. Nevertheless, the proffer did demonstrate that when police officers told the defendant to show his hands, he moved them away from his body and toward the corner, where the police found a gun moments later. In re Sealed Case, 153 F.3d at 772. We held that those facts were sufficient for a reasonable juror to find that the defendant had tossed away the gun and therefore was guilty of carrying. See id. Likewise, in Ahn's case, the Government did not explicitly state that Ahn received the payments for or because of an official act, but the facts it proffered were sufficient for a reasonable juror to infer such a link. 21 In contrast, in cases in which courts have held that there was an insufficient factual basis for a defendant's plea, the government has offered no evidence to support an element of the charge. For example, the defendant in United States v. Ford pleaded guilty to possessing a weapon while under indictment for a felony, see 18 U.S.C. 922(n), and the government omitted the fact that a gun was recovered from [the defendant's] bedroom--the key fact necessary to establish that he possessed a gun. Ford, 993 F.2d at 253. 22 Similarly, in United States v. Sawyer, 74 F. Supp. 2d 88 (D. Mass. 1999), on which Appellant relies, the government's proffer was insufficient to establish a factual basis for a violation of a Massachusetts illegal gratuity statute similar to the one at issue here. 1 In Sawyer, the government only demonstrated that the defendant gave free golf and other entertainment to Massachusetts legislators. Id. at 93 n.6. The court properly ruled that the government failed to allege any link between the entertainment and an identifiable, specific, official act. Id. at 103. More significantly, however, the government failed to identify any official act, instead wholly relying on the fact that gifts were given to state legislators. 23 Ahn argues that in his case, as in Sawyer, the Government believed that it could prosecute him based solely on his status as a police officer. Even if Ahn is correct, this belief is not fatal because the Government here, unlike the prosecution in Sawyer, proffered sufficient evidence linking the payments Ahn received to an official act. The record reveals that the district court substantially complied with the dictates of Rule 11(f), that the factual proffer provided sufficient evidence to establish a violation of the illegal gratuity statute, and, therefore, that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ahn's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
24 Ahn next contends that his plea was involuntary because he did not understand the nature of the charge against him. He suggests that, at the time of his plea, he understood that he was being charged with accepting payments because of his position as a police officer, not, as Sun-Diamond later required, because of any official act. 25 Before accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must engage in a colloquy with the defendant to determine that he understands the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1), and, therefore, that it is voluntary, see id. 11(d). For a plea to be voluntary under the Constitution, a defendant must receive  'real notice of the true nature of the charge against him.'  United States v. Dewalt, 320 U.S. App. D.C. 68, 92 F.3d 1209, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108, 96 S. Ct. 2253 (1976) (internal quotes omitted)). Real notice is that which is sufficient to give the defendant 'an understanding of the law in relation to the facts' of his case. 92 F.3d at 1212 (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418, 89 S. Ct. 1166 (1969)). In assessing whether the defendant has such an understanding, the record of the plea colloquy must, based on the totality of the circumstances,  'lead a reasonable person to believe that the defendant understood the nature of the charge.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Frye, 738 F.2d 196, 201 (7th Cir. 1984), and citing United States v. Musa, 946 F.2d 1297, 1304 (7th Cir. 1991)); see also Roberson v. United States, 901 F.2d 1475, 1477 (8th Cir. 1990) (explaining that a defendant is entitled to relief if the totality of the circumstances indicates that he did not understand the nature of the charges to which he entered a plea of guilty). 26 Ahn's contention rests solely on the following statements made by the Government during the plea hearing:I would further proffer to the Court that [defense counsel] and I have had a number of discussions about the illegal gratuity and bribery statute. And we have discussed that under certain interpretations, it is unnecessary to show the payments were earmarked for a particular purpose, but rather payments can be made to an individual because of his capacity or his particular status within the Government.... Certainly in this case the Government has discussed with counsel is not charging Mr. Ahn with a quid pro quo, but rather more of a theory of his job. 27 Transcript of Plea Hearing, Mar. 11, 1998, at 26. Appellant argues that these statements suggest that Ahn understood that the Government only needed to prove that he accepted payments as a public official. When viewed in isolation, his argument seems colorable. But when considered in light of the record of the plea hearing as a whole, it falls short. 28 Initially, in considering the Government's statement itself, it appears possible that the prosecutor and defense counsel agreed that the Government only needed to establish that Ahn received payments as a police officer. Yet, even the Government's statement is inconclusive. In the first part of its statement, the prosecution only said that under certain interpretations the Government did not need to show the payments were earmarked for a particular purpose. It never said that in this case the Government need not show such a purpose. In fact, as explained above, the Government proffered sufficient facts to reasonably demonstrate a particular purpose--that Ahn did nothing about the massage parlors' flagrant violations of the law. 29 The second half of the prosecution's statement is equally inconclusive. The Government correctly points out that it was not charging Mr. Ahn with a quid pro quo--if it had been, then it would have been charging him under the bribery statute, a charge to which Ahn already refused to plea guilty. Cf. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 405 (explaining that, in contrast with an illegal gratuity, only a bribe requires proof of a quid pro quo); Schaffer, 183 F.3d at 841 (noting that the bribery and illegal gratuity statutes differ because bribery requires a quid pro quo); United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1379 (5th Cir. 1995) (Under the bribery statutes, the government must prove a quid pro quo.). Although it is plausible to read the theory of the job statement to mean that the Government was charging Ahn with receiving a payment because of his position, such a reading ignores the contrast the prosecution seemed to be drawing between the illegal gratuity and bribe statute. In context, a reasonable person could have understood that the prosecution's reference to a theory of the job meant that the Government was charging Ahn for receiving payments that were linked to his failure to uphold the duties of his job--that is, his failure to report the licensing violations. 30 The critical inquiry is whether Ahn understood the nature of the charges against him. The record of the plea hearing reveals that a reasonable person would have believed that he did. Throughout the hearing, the court asked Ahn a series of questions focused on the nature of the crime. Significantly, at no point during this colloquy did the court or Ahn state that he was being charged merely for receiving payments because he was a police officer. 31 First, the district court asked whether Ahn did either seek, or receive, or accept, or agree to receive something of value from two witnesses, who are cooperating with the Government ... because of formal official acts performed by you. Transcript of Plea Hearing, Mar. 11, 1998, at 14 (emphasis added). Moments later, after giving Ahn a chance to compose himself, the Judge again asked if he understood the nature of the charge against [him], ... the receipt of illegal gratuities, something of value to perform an officialact or not. Id. at 15 (emphasis added). Ahn responded, I understand, Judge. Id. 32 Later in the colloquy, the Judge asked Ahn, You are charged ... with receipt of illegal gratuities in that either you received directly or indirectly or demanded and/or agreed to receive, accept cash from two individuals because of official acts to be performed or not performed by you; is that true, sir? Id. at 23 (emphasis added). Ahn answered, Yes, Your Honor. Id. at 24. 33 In each of these exchanges, the court spoke about Ahn's receiving payments for performing official acts, not for being a public actor, and in each exchange, Ahn replied that he understood. Based on this colloquy, a reasonable person could believe that Ahn understood the relationship between the law and the facts. 34 Cases in this Circuit that have held that a defendant did not understand the nature of the charges to which he pleaded guilty were based on substantially more compelling circumstances than the instant case. In Ford, the district court did not elaborate the charges beyond asking the defendant whether he had seen and read the indictment, discussed it with his attorney, and understood it. Ford, 993 F.2d at 253. In addition, the court referred to the wrong charge twice and neglected to inform[ ] the defendant of the material details of the charges against him. Id. at 254. In United States v. Dewalt, 320 U.S. App. D.C. 68, 92 F.3d 1209, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the court never mentioned that the defendant was pleading guilty to a charge concerning possession of a weapon. Furthermore, the court only asked whether the defendant had received a copy of and understood the indictment, not even asking whether he had read it. See id.; see also Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 642-43, 647, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108, 96 S. Ct. 2253 (1976) (holding that defendant's plea to second degree murder charges was involuntary when he was a nineteen-year-old man with substantially below average intelligence, the trial court had not discussed the elements of the crime, and the trial court had made no reference to the requirement that the defendant must have intended to cause the victim's death). 35 In light of the record before us, it reasonably appears that Ahn understood the nature of the charges against him and therefore that his plea was voluntary. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ahn's motion to withdraw his plea.