Opinion ID: 2615125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: antitrust laws

Text: Brewers argue that the Act requires them to engage in price discrimination and to establish interstate price-fixing in violation of federal antitrust laws, specifically the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections 1 through 7 (1976), and the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 13 (1976). We disagree. The United States Supreme Court in Seagram specifically found no concerted anticompetitive conduct required for violation of federal antitrust laws. The Court stated: The bare compilation, without more, of price information on sales to wholesalers and retailers to support the affirmations filed with the State Liquor Authority would not of itself violate the Sherman Act     Section 9 imposes no irresistable economic pressure on the appellants to violate the Sherman Act in order to comply with the requirements of § 9. On the contrary, § 9 appears firmly anchored to the assumption that the Sherman Act will deter any attempts by the appellants to preserve their New York price level by conspiring to raise the prices at which liquor is sold elsewhere in the country. Although it is possible to envision circumstances under which price discriminations proscribed by the Robinson-Patman Act might be compelled by § 9, the existence of such potential conflicts is entirely too speculative in the present posture of this case     Id. 384 U.S. at 45-46, 86 S.Ct. at 1261 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). More recently, the United States Supreme Court again reviewed whether an alcoholic beverage control law violated federal antitrust laws and relied heavily on the Seagram case as authority in deciding Rice v. Norman Williams Co., ___ U.S. ___, 102 S.Ct. 3294, 73 L.Ed.2d 1042 (1982). In Rice, the Court stated that: In determining whether the Sherman Act preempts a state statute, we apply principles similar to those which we employ in considering whether any state statute is preempted by a federal statute pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. As in the typical preemption case, the inquiry is whether there exists an irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state regulatory schemes. The existence of a hypothetical or potential conflict is insufficient to warrant the preemption of the state statute. A state regulatory scheme is not preempted by the federal antitrust laws simply because in a hypothetical situation a private party's compliance with the statute might cause him to violate the antitrust laws. A state statute is not preempted by the federal antitrust laws simply because the state scheme might have an anticompetitive effect     A party may successfully enjoin the enforcement of a state statute only if the statute on its face irreconcilably conflicts with federal antitrust policy. Id. at ___, 102 S.Ct. at 3299, 73 L.Ed.2d at 1049-1050 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Court thereafter held that: Our decisions in this area instruct us, therefore, that a state statute, when considered in the abstract, may be condemned under the antitrust laws only if it mandates or authorizes conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws in all cases, or if it places irresistible pressure on a private party to violate the antitrust laws in order to comply with the statute. Such condemnation will follow under § 1 of the Sherman Act when the conduct contemplated by the statute is in all cases a per se violation. If the activity addressed by the statute does not fall into that category, and therefore must be analyzed under the rule of reason, the statute cannot be condemned in the abstract. Analysis under the rule of reason requires an examination of the circumstances underlying a particular economic practice, and therefore does not lend itself to a conclusion that a statute is facially inconsistent with federal antitrust laws. Rice, ___ U.S. at ___, 102 S.Ct. at 3300, 73 L.Ed.2d at 1051. Inasmuch as no material distinction exists between New York's Section 9 and the Act, we determine that the holdings in Seagram and Rice are controlling and that it is unnecessary for us to engage in the hypotheticals presented by Brewers on this point. A statute dealing with the regulation of alcoholic beverages, such as the price affirmation law presented in this case, cannot be constitutionally condemned in the abstract. If legislation is not a  per se violation of federal antitrust laws, we will not engage in constitutional analysis unless and until a concrete case is engendered from a specific application of the legislation. In other words, if legislation is constitutional on its face, then it will remain constitutional until such time as there is specific enforcement experience that will give us a body of historical facts upon which we can base a proper judgment, as opposed to an inappropriate decision based on hypotheticals, assumed facts or potential conflicts. Rice v. Norman Williams, Co .; California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc .; Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, Chairman New York State Liquor Authority .