Opinion ID: 2638117
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Duty, Immunity, and Causation

Text: The State argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because it owed no duty to protect C.J. from Carter. It urges us to overrule our contrary holding in Neakok. [8] The State also argues that it is immune from suit under AS 09.50.250(1). The State raised similar arguments in Cowles, [9] a case that also involves a claim of negligence against the State based on crimes committed by a parolee under its supervision. Because these cases present related issues, we announce our decision in these two cases together. As we discuss in our opinion in Cowles, we decline to overrule our holding in Neakok that the State has a duty to exercise due care in supervising parolees. We also set forth in Cowles the boundaries of discretionary function immunity as it relates to decisions involving parole supervision. Our discussion in Cowles of when the State is immune from liability for a parole officer's failure to seek parole revocation is particularly relevant since C.J. alleges that Heyward should have pursued revocation when Carter failed to report on July 31 and failed to register as a sex offender. As we explained in Cowles, a parole officer's decision whether or not to pursue revocation in response to a known parole violation is immune from liability unless DOC policy explicitly requires the officer to seek revocation under these circumstances. [10] On remand, the superior court should determine whether each of DOC's allegedly negligent decisions is a discretionary function based on the principles outlined in Cowles and our other decisions concerning discretionary function immunity. [11] The State also argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because no reasonable jury could find that DOC's alleged negligence caused Carter's assault. Our decision requires the superior court to reexamine whether the State is entitled to discretionary function immunity for some of its allegedly negligent acts. That reexamination may affect the superior court's causation analysis, for C.J. may only rely on non-immune acts to establish causation. We decline to decide in the first instance whether the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of causation and remand the case to the superior court for a ruling on this question.