Opinion ID: 185433
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jurisdiction under FOGRSFA

Text: 17 Because we conclude that the Chevron framework is inapplicable to FOGRSFA's conferral of jurisdiction on the federal courts, we must decide, as an original matter, whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear Murphy's lawsuit. The outcome depends on what the meaning of the words any administrative proceeding is. More precisely, we must consider whether a refund request falls within the statute's definition of any administrative proceeding--in other words, whether FOGRSFA's 33-month deadline begins to run when a party files a request for a refund. We hold that it does. 18 As always, in interpreting a statute, we begin with the text of the statute itself. Carter v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2159, 2170 (2000) (In analyzing a statute, we begin by examining the text.). As noted above, 30 U.S.C. 1724(h)(1) obliges DOI's Secretary to issue a final decision in any administrative proceeding, including any administrative proceedings pending on August 13, 1996, within 33 months from the date such proceeding was commenced or 33 months from August 13, 1996, whichever is later. If she fails to do so, FOGRSFA establishes that she shall be deemed to have issued a final decision in favor of the Secretary ... and the appellant shall have a right to judicial review of such deemed final action in accordance with Title 5. Id. 1724(h)(2). The statute further defines administrative proceeding as any Department of the Interior agency process in which a demand, decision or order issued by the Secretary ... is subject to appeal or has been appealed. Id. 1702(18). 19 We conclude that Murphy's request that DOI refund its royalty overpayments triggered an administrative proceeding within the meaning of 1702(18). FOGRSFA makes clear that a private party's refund request is a type of demand. A demand is a separate written request by a lessee ... which asserts an obligation due the lessee ... that provides a reasonable basis to conclude that the obligation in the amount of the demand is due and owing. Id. 1702(23)(B). Because Murphy's refund request assert[ed] an obligation on the part of DOI to compensate it for past royalty overpayments, it was a demand for the purposes of FOGRSFA's 33-month deadline. And, because Murphy's demand set in motion an agency process that could culminate in a DOI order that would be subject to appeal, it triggered an administrative proceeding. 20 Moreover, FOGRSFA contemplates that both DOI and private parties are capable of making demands. See id. 1702(23)(A) (defining DOI-issued demands); id. 1702(23)(B) (defining private-party-issued demands). To be sure, the statute defines administrative proceeding to include a demand, decision or order issued by the Secretary. Id. 1702(18) (emphasis added). The placement of issued by the Secretary arguably implies that the italicized phrase modifies demand, decision, and order. On this interpretation, a private party's demand does not, simply by virtue of being a demand, set in motion an administrative proceeding. Rather, an administrative proceeding can be triggered only by a particular type of demand--viz., one that has been issued by the Secretary. 21 This strikes us as an implausible reading. If 1702(18)'s reference to demand is read to denote only that class of demands that have been issued by DOI's Secretary, then the term is entirely redundant. This is so because all DOIissued demands are also orders. Id. 1702(23)(A) (defining demand to include only a request by a lessee or an order to pay issued by the Secretary ... to a lessee). The fact that demand and order are separately enumerated suggests that Congress viewed them as separate categories. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995) (instructing courts to avoid a reading [of statutory language] which renders some words altogether redundant); Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (invoking the familiar principle that statutory language should be construed so as to avoid redundancy). We will not assume that Congress intended the definition of demand to be perfectly coextensive with order. Rather, we conclude that demand includes both orders to pay issued by DOI, and refund requests submitted by private parties. Either is sufficient to set in motion an administrative proceeding within the meaning of 1702(18)--and, hence, to trigger FOGRSFA's 33month deadline. 22 DOI's interpretation of administrative proceeding is an unconvincing one for the additional reason that it reads subject to appeal out of the statute. FOGRSFA expressly defines as an administrative proceeding a demand, decision, or order that either has been appealed or is subject to appeal. 30 U.S.C. 1702(18) (emphasis added). But as DOI sees it, administrative proceeding refers only to an order that has been appealed, not to an order that could be appealed. 64 Fed. Reg. 26,240, 26,240 (1999) (stating that DOI has 33 months from the date a proceeding is commenced to complete all levels of administrative review (emphasis added)). Of course, when construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). DOI's reading, under which subject to appeal lacks any force, contradicts the endlessly reiterated principle of statutory construction ... that all words in a statute are to be assigned meaning, and that nothing therein is to be construed as surplusage. Qi-Zhuo v. Meissner, 70 F.3d 136, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (invoking the familiar doctrine that the Congress cannot be presumed to do a futile thing). 23 Nor is it significant that 1724(h) is entitled appeals and final agency action. It is true, as DOI argues, that the title of a statute and the heading of a section are tools available for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (internal quotation and citation omitted). But as Almendarez-Torres makes plain, a section's title is a useful device only where its meaning is in doubt. For interpretative purposes, [it is] of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous word or phrase. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (citation omitted). When a statute is unambiguous, its title cannot be used to limit the plain meaning of the text. Id. And as we have explained, FOGRSFA's definition of administrative proceeding is plain: The category administrative proceeding includes a private party's demand, which in turn includes a refund request. 24 Even if we accept DOI's invitation to consult 1724(h)'s title, the fact that it speaks of appeals does not compel the conclusion that final agency action cannot obtain unless a party has filed an administrative appeal. For in addition to appeals, 1724(h)'s title also includes final agency action. The subsection performs two functions: It both states that DOI's orders are subject to administrative appeal, and defines when final agency action occurs. It does not imply that an appeal is a sine qua non without which final agency action cannot exist. 25 Nothing in our dissenting colleague's extended discussion of the canon of the last antecedent disturbs our conclusion that the statutory phrase issued by the Secretary does not modify demand. If anything, it supports that conclusion. Under that canon, as the dissent reminds us, a subsequent modifying phrase refer[s] solely to the last antecedent, which consists of the last word, phrase, or clause.... Dissent at 2 (quoting 2A Norman Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction 47:33 (6th ed. 2000)). But that same source confirms that a subsequent phrase may modify an antecedent phrase, clause, or word. Therefore, there is no reason to conclude that issued by the Secretary modifies the entire preceding phrase (demand, decision, or order), as opposed to the preceding word (order). Indeed, the rule as easily supports our conclusion that issued by the Secretary does not modify the comparatively remote word demand as the dissent's conclusion that issued by the Secretary modifies the phrase demand, decision, or order. The rule of the last antecedent may be sound grammar, Dissent at 1, 3, but it does not dispose of this case. 26 We conclude that Murphy's February 3, 1989 refund request set in motion an administrative proceeding within the meaning of FOGRSFA. Because Murphy's request was pending far longer than 33 months when the statute became effective on August 16, 1996, DOI's failure to resolve it is deemed a final decision that triggered a right to immediate judicial review. The district court therefore erred when it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Murphy's lawsuit.