Opinion ID: 713036
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Restoration of Civil Rights: Individualized Acts Only?

Text: 13 We approach the task of statutory interpretation with the following guideline foremost in mind:So long as the statutory language is reasonably definite, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive (at least in the absence of an unmistakable legislative intent to the contrary). 14 United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 823 F.2d 685, 688 (1st Cir.1987) (citations omitted). 15 The key words of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) are expunged, set aside, pardoned, and civil rights restored. All of the words signify a result: strike out, efface, eliminate (expunge); dismiss, discard, annul (set aside); excuse an offense without punishment, release an offender from punishment (pardon); bring back to an original state or condition (restore). 2 They do not address the means by which the results may be accomplished or, consequently, indicate preference for any particular means. 16 In Ramos, our panel assumed that pardons, expungements and restorations of rights all involved individualized official judgments and procedures. 961 F.2d at 1010. But the wide variety of practices adopted by states has since been pointed out. In United States v. Glaser, 14 F.3d 1213, 1218 (7th Cir.1994), the court noted that [n]either pardons nor expungements are necessarily individualized, citing mass pardons by both Presidents Jefferson and Carter, and federal and state laws providing for routine expungement of convictions for juvenile offenses. 17 In McGrath v. United States, 60 F.3d 1005, 1008 (2d Cir.1995), the court recognized that many states restore civil rights to convicted felons by means of a general law stating that all rights shall be reinstated upon the service of a sentence. It also noted that other states authorize officials to issue certificates of restoration after a given period of time following sentence or parole, while a minority of states restore rights in piecemeal fashion, and twelve states apparently have no provision regarding restoration of civil rights. 18 Perhaps even more significantly, in Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 103 S.Ct. 986, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983), the Supreme Court recognized the diversity of state post-conviction actions such as expungement. It noted that over half the states had enacted such statutes and that they varied in almost every particular, ranging from applicability only to young offenders or certain offenses to automatic expunction, and amounted to nothing less than a national patchwork. Id. at 121-22, 103 S.Ct. at 996. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the federal firearms statute would be frustrated by a ruling that gave effect to state expunctions, id. at 119, 103 S.Ct. at 995, and reversed a lower court ruling that had given full effect to a state expungement following a successfully served period of probation. 3 19 Congressional reaction to Dickerson in large part accounted for the crafting of § 921(a)(20), which expressly allowed state law to define a predicate conviction for purposes of the federal firearms laws. 4 See McGrath, 60 F.3d at 1009. In interpreting § 921(a)(20), therefore, we take into account not only the diversity of state approaches to the restoration of civil rights of convicted felons but also the clearly manifested purpose of Congress to defer to state laws, in this context, in determining predicate convictions and the removal of firearm disqualifications. As the Court stated in Dickerson, [a]s in all cases of statutory construction, our task is to interpret the words of [the statute] in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve. 460 U.S. at 118, 103 S.Ct. at 995 (quoting Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 1911, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979)). 20 In light of this background, we discern no basis for reading into the words at issue any gloss based on assumed frequency of use or primacy of meaning. And, we hesitate to impose a qualification upon these words absent some textual indication that such limitation is warranted. 5 Accordingly, we conclude that the plain language of § 921(a)(20) makes clear that the restoration of civil rights need not be focused or individualized. 21 From our present perspective, therefore, we see no need to look into legislative history. 6 See Summit Inv. and Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 610 (1st Cir.1995) (Plain statutory language does not prompt recourse to countervailing legislative history.). Nonetheless, given that we initially reached a contrary conclusion, and to ensure that there is not a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 110, 103 S.Ct. at 990 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), we take a brief foray into the legislative history of § 921(a)(20). 22 Our review leads us to the conclusion that the legislative history of the provision  'is more conflicting than the [statutory] text is ambiguous.'  United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493, 499 n. 8 (1st Cir.1993) (en banc ) (quoting Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49, 70 S.Ct. 445, 454, 94 L.Ed. 616 (1950)). We begin with the statutory predecessors of § 922(g)(1), 18 U.S.C.App. §§ 1201-1203, which proscribed, inter alia, the possession of firearms by a convicted felon, id. § 1202(a)(1), but exempted a person who had expressly been authorized by the President or such chief executive [of a state] to ... possess ... a firearm. Id. § 1203(2). There was no comparable pardon provision applicable to the shipping or receipt of firearms under former §§ 922(g)(1) and (h)(1). 23 In 1981, S. 1030 was introduced, which, as revised, contained essentially the language of the last sentence of § 921(a)(20). See Cassidy, 899 F.2d at 547. A Senate Judiciary Committee Report explained that the bill would repair the above described inconsistency between §§ 922 and 1202 by expanding the pardon provision to encompass § 922. See S.Rep. No. 476, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1982). In addition, the explicit reference to chief executives was dropped and the exemption was expanded to include expungements and restorations of civil rights. See id. 24 While such expansion might indicate a movement away from individualized action, other excerpts provide a contrary thrust. For instance, to demonstrate the need for the bill, the report expressly cited to Thrall v. Wolfe, 503 F.2d 313 (7th Cir.1974), where the court held that a state pardon still did not permit one to receive or purchase a firearm. See S.Rep. No. 476, at 18. Although the report made no mention of the kind of pardon in Thrall, it was an individualized one. The report also used the following language to describe the last clause of § 921(a)(20): In the event that the official granting the pardon, restoration of rights or expungement of record does not desire it to restore the right to firearm ownership, this provision is rendered inapplicable where the order or pardon expressly provides that the person may not possess firearms. Id. (emphasis added). And it referred to this last clause as providing flexibility should such a pardon or restoration be based upon considerations not relating to fitness to own a firearm. Id. at 12. Taken together, these extracts might indicate that individualized actions were intended. 25 Nonetheless, we note that S. 49, the successor to S. 1030, was explained by Senator Hatch as addressing the problem created by imposing federal sanctions on persons who have had their full civil rights restored pursuant to State law. He added: 26 This [bill] will accommodate State reforms enacted since 1968 which permit dismissal of charges after a plea and successful completion of a probationary period. Since the Federal prohibition is triggered by the States' conviction, the States' law as to what disqualifies an individual from firearms use should govern. 27 131 Cong.Rec. S8,689 (daily ed. June 24, 1985). Both the reference to reforms and the linking of state power to define both the triggering conviction and the conditions of disqualification tilt toward the inclusion of generic restorations of rights. 28 It could be and has been argued that Congress, which has held itself out as endeavoring to tighten laws against firearms abusers, would not lightly turn over final decision power to the states, allowing them in effect to nullify federal sanctions. But, as the Second Circuit observed, 29 The very decision to have restoration triggered by events governed by state law insured anomalous results.... They are the inevitable consequence of making access to the exemption depend on the differing laws and policies of the several states. 30 McGrath, 60 F.3d at 1009. 31 In summary, we discern no such clear and compelling evidence of Congressional intent to limit restoration of civil rights to individualized procedures and judgments as to change our interpretation of what we deem to be unambiguous language. Ramos' holding regarding the need for individualized action is overruled.