Opinion ID: 2174677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The jury instructions were in error.

Text: Oster claims that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on the law of the case because the instruction defining second degree burglary did not state that entry or remaining in the structure had to be unlawful. To answer this, we must revisit this case: In the Matter of T.J.E., 426 N.W.2d 23 (S.D.1988). T.J.E. was an eleven-year old girl who was in a retail store during business hours and, while in the store, ate a chocolate Easter egg, then left without paying for it. The State charged her under SDCL 22-32-3: Any person who enters or remains in an occupied structure with the intent to commit any crime therein under circumstances not amounting to first degree burglary, is guilty of second degree burglary... We interpreted remains to mean unlawfully remaining in an occupied structure. Therefore, we held that second degree burglary is not committed where T.J.E. entered an occupied structure and after entry, while lawfully remaining in the structure, formed the intent to commit an offense therein. Citing California authority, we acknowledged that burglary must be committed by a person who has no right to be in the building or structure burglarized. Matter of T.J.E. at 24; People v. Gauze, 15 Cal.3d 709, 125 Cal.Rptr. 773, 542 P.2d 1365 (1975); State v. Derby, 462 N.W.2d 512 (S.D.1990). In response, the legislature of South Dakota amended the second-degree burglary statute to read: Any person who enters an occupied structure with intent to commit any crime other than the act of shoplifting or retail theft as described in chapter 22-30A constituting a misdemeanor, or remains in an occupied structure after forming the intent to commit any crime other than shoplifting as described in chapter 22-30A constituting a misdemeanor under circumstances not amounting to first degree burglary, is guilty of second degree burglary. Second degree burglary is a Class 3 felony. The revised statute does incorporate some of the remedies as noted in Matter of T.J.E., 426 N.W.2d at 26 (Henderson, J., specially concurring). However, the statute still fails to remedy the problem that the commission of any crime indoors, no matter how severe, is subject to a felony burglary charge. Id. at 26. Furthermore, it does not state that the burglar must be one who has no right to be in the structure burglarized. Thus, we come to Instruction # 5, the subject of dispute. The trial court instructed the jury on the law as follows: The elements of the offense of second degree burglary, as charged in the Indictment, each of which the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt are: (1) That the defendant at the time and place alleged in the Indictment entered or remained in a structure described as a house. (2) That said structure was an occupied structure. (3) That the defendant entered with the intent to commit a crime or remained therein after having formed the intent to commit a crime. Although Oster did not object to this instruction, he did propose a substitute instruction. Failure of a court to correctly or fully instruct the jury is not reviewable unless an objection was made or a written instruction correctly stating the law was requested. Frey v. Kouf, 484 N.W.2d 864 (S.D.1992); Schmidt v. Wildcat Cave, Inc., 261 N.W.2d 114 (S.D.1977). Oster's proposed instruction was exactly the same except for inserting the term unlawfully where indicated: (1) That the defendant at the time and place alleged in the indictment entered or unlawfully remained in a structure described as a house. .... (3) That the defendant entered with the intent to commit a crime or unlawfully remained therein after having formed the intent to commit a crime. (Emphasis added.) Ordinarily, jury instructions are adequate, if when considered as a whole, they correctly state the law and inform the jury. State v. Gillespie, 445 N.W.2d 661 (S.D.1989). Although the trial court's instruction followed the wording of the statute, it did not incorporate applicable decisional law that was made known to the trial court by Oster. As this Court has held and indicated above, the accused must unlawfully remain. Matter of T.J.E., 426 N.W.2d at 25. Oster was bid to come into Vissia's home; after this peaceful and invited entry, he spontaneously took the money from the wallet on the cupboard. We stand by our previous holding in Matter of T.J.E., written by our former Chief Justice, Justice Wuest. We hold that because crucial wording was missing from the jury instruction, the trial court failed to accurately inform the jury of the law.