Opinion ID: 1841072
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Viable Alternatives

Text: A finding of dependency alone will not allow a trial court to terminate a parent's rights to his or her child; the trial court also must find by clear and convincing evidence that there are no viable alternatives to the termination of parental rights. T.V. argues that the trial court's finding that there was no viable alternative to the termination of her parental rights was incorrect because DHR had failed to work to facilitate the reunification of T.V. and N.V. The Court of Civil Appeals has consistently noted that `[p]ursuant to the terms of a consent judgment in federal litigation, DHR has an affirmative duty to facilitate family reunification whenever that goal is possible.' D.O., 859 So.2d at 444 (quoting V.M. v. State Dep't of Human Res., 710 So.2d 915, 921 (Ala.Civ.App. 1998), citing in turn R.C. v. Nachman, 969 F.Supp. 682 (M.D.Ala.1997)). [4] The trial court concluded that DHR's past efforts to reunite T.V. and N.V. were reasonable and had failed. It is, however, not clear from our caselaw whether DHR had a duty to perform a home study when B.S. petitioned the trial court to terminate T.V.'s parental rights. The cases cited by T.V. generally do not involve petitions by individuals, but instead involve petitions by DHR itself to terminate the rights of a parent or parents. [5] It is also not clear from the record whether DHR intentionally ended its involvement with T.V.'s case or did so out of inadvertence. Neither party presented evidence explaining why DHR did not continue to supervise its placement of N.V. with B.S., even though the trial court, at the time the custody issue was initially decided, had explained to all parties that the custody decision was subject to being reopened by T.V. There is no indication that DHR has made any recent efforts to facilitate reunification; there has not been any examination of T.V.'s current ability or willingness to care for N.V. since B.S. received permanent legal and physical custody in 2000. The trial court did not order DHR to perform a home study nor did it hear any testimony by DHR social workers regarding T.V.'s current circumstances. Thus, it is not clear from the record what possible viable alternatives might have been found. Finally, the evidence at trial demonstrated that DHR had placed N.V. with B.S. under the mistaken belief that it was making a relative placement. However, there is no evidence in the record indicating that the trial court ever considered a relative placement after learning that B.S. was not related to either T.V. or N.V. See V.M., 710 So.2d at 921 (holding that the trial court had failed to consider all viable alternatives when it had not considered the possibility of placement with other family members). In deciding that there was no viable alternative to the termination of T.V.'s parental rights, the trial court in this case expressed its concern that N.V. has known B.S. and her family as his only family. The court noted the evidence that was not in the record: No expert was called to explain away the possibly devastating consequences to this five-year-old child upon finding out that his family was not really his family and he would have to go live with strangers who lived in the same town with him but didn't really try to develop a relationship with him for five years. This case is not about whether N.V. would have to leave B.S. and her family and live with strangers. The only issue in this case is whether there were grounds to terminate T.V.'s parental rights and whether there was a viable alternative to doing so. The trial court lauded the manner in which T.V. had turned her life around: While she has remained drug free since [N.V. was three years old], established a home with [the father of her older son] and her older son, has had sporadic employment, and is active in her church, she waited until [N.V.] was four-and-a-half years old to try to establish a relationship with him. The Court is aware that these accomplishments did not occur without a great deal of effort and time, but there has been no explanation why she ignored [N.V.] for so long and failed to forge a relationship with him while she continued to improve her life. The only expert testimony was that T.V. was making progress in establishing her relationship with N.V., that a bond appeared to be emerging between them, and that a strong relationship could grow if it were nurtured. Further, the child's guardian ad litem argued that she did not believe it to be in N.V.'s best interests to terminate T.V.'s parental rights. She pointed out that N.V. had, in effect, two families attempting to meet his needs and to give him affection. She also pointed out that an alternative to terminating T.V.'s parental rights was to maintain the status quo, by which she meant that visitation would continue while permanent legal and physical custody would remain in B.S. The record as it currently stands thus does not demonstrate that the trial court examined all the viable alternatives to the termination of T.V.'s parental rights. Justice Smith's dissent suggests that we have ignored the trial court's factual findings regarding T.V.'s past and present inability to care for her child. ___ So.2d at ___. In fact, it is these factual findings that form the basis of our holding that N.V. continues to be a dependent child. However, this Court must review not only whether N.V. remains dependent, but also whether the trial court considered and rejected, based on clear and convincing evidence, the possible viable alternatives before terminating T.V.'s parental rights. See Ex parte Ogle, 516 So.2d at 247 (holding that the party attempting to terminate a parent's parental rights has the burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that there are no viable alternatives); J.D. v. Tuscaloosa County Dep't of Human Res., 923 So.2d 303, 307 n. 1 (Ala.Civ.App. 2005) (When a nonparent such as DHR seeks to terminate parental rights, it must establish by clear and convincing evidence not only that the children are dependent but also that no viable alternative to termination of the parental rights exists.); D.O. v. Calhoun County Dep't of Human Res., 859 So.2d at 443 (A nonparent who seeks to terminate a parent's parental rights must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the children are dependent and that there are no viable alternatives to the termination of parental rights.); A.M. v. Lamar County Dep't of Human Res., 848 So.2d 258, 259 (Ala.Civ.App.2002) (same). The need to consider all viable alternatives is rooted, in part, in the recognition that the termination of parental rights is a drastic step that once taken cannot be withdrawn and that implicates due process. Thus, the Beasley two-pronged test is designed to protect the welfare of the child while also protecting the rights of parents. Beasley, 564 So.2d at 952. The requirement that clear and convincing evidence support the determination to terminate parental rights is based on the need to protect the due-process rights of the parents. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). The party seeking to terminate a person's parental rights thus has the burden of producing clear and convincing evidence that there are no viable alternatives to the termination of parental rights. Ex parte Ogle, 516 So.2d at 247; see also K.W. v. J.G., 856 So.2d 859, 874 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (holding that the party seeking to terminate the parental rights of another bears the burden of proving that termination of those rights is the appropriate remedy). Further, as noted above, the Court of Civil Appeals has consistently held that the existence of evidence of current conditions or conduct relating to a parent's inability or unwillingness to care for his or her children is implicit in the requirement that termination of parental rights is based on clear and convincing evidence. D.O., 859 So.2d at 444. It is because the termination of parental rights implicates [t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child, Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, that such an exacting level of certainty based on evidence of the parent's current situation is required. Thus, while we must presume under the ore tenus rule that the trial court's factual findings are correct, that rule does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to ensure that those facts clearly and convincingly warrant the termination of parental rights. `The appellate courts do not sit in judgment of the facts, and [they] review the factfinder's determination of facts only to the extent of determining whether it is sufficiently supported by the evidence, that question being one of law.' Hinds v. Hinds, 887 So.2d 267, 272-73 n. 2 (Ala.Civ. App.2003) (quoting Curtis White Constr. Co. v. Butts & Billingsley Constr. Co., 473 So.2d 1040, 1041 (Ala.1985)) (emphasis omitted). Justice Smith's dissent suggests that we are in the case before us reweigh[ing] the evidence. ___ So.2d at ___. We are not; we are required, however, to determine whether clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that there is no viable alternative to the termination of T.V.'s parental rights, and that is the issue we address. Borrowing from the statutory definition in § 6-11-20(b), Ala.Code 1975, relating to the award of punitive damages, the Court of Civil Appeals has defined what constitutes clear and convincing evidence in proceedings to terminate parental rights. In L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So.2d 171, 179 (Ala.Civ.App.2002), that court stated that `[c]lear and convincing evidence' is `[e]vidence that, when weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion.' We do not believe that the evidence in this case clearly and convincingly supports the factual finding that there are no viable alternatives to terminating T.V.'s parental rights. [6] The trial court's order includes a factual finding that T.V. has stopped using drugs, that she has reconciled with her family, that she participates in raising and supporting her other son, and that she regularly attends church. The only reason the trial court offered as justification for its finding that there is no viable alternative to the termination of T.V.'s parental rights was T.V.'s failure to visit N.V. and the child's corresponding inability to know her as his mother. However, the only evidence in the record regarding the effect of these absences on N.V. was the testimony that N.V. did not understand who T.V. was and the social worker's testimony that a bond between N.V. and T.V. was emerging. The trial court's concern that T.V. ultimately wanted to regain custody of N.V. does not, in itself, provide clear and convincing evidence that the current situation in which T.V. is allowed to visit with N.V. is untenable. Both B.S. and C.S. testified that they would eventually have to tell N.V. that he is not their natural son. The child still carries T.V.'s last name, and he uses that name at school. Thus, given that N.V. will one day have to learn that he is not B.S.'s natural son, visitation  which upon all accounts does not harm N.V. and which the guardian ad litem concluded is good for N.V.  would appear to be a viable alternative to the termination of T.V.'s parental rights. Therefore, the conclusion that there are no viable alternatives to terminating T.V.'s parental rights is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Because the trial court did not, after full consideration of all the viable alternatives to terminating T.V.'s parental rights, find clear and convincing evidence that none existed, the order terminating her rights must be reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court for a full consideration of viable alternatives to terminating of T.V.'s parental rights. See State Dep't of Human Res. v. A.J.T., 939 So.2d 46, 47-48 (Ala.Civ.App.2006) (A termination of parental rights . . . should occur only after consideration of all possible viable alternatives to termination, and must be in the child's best interest.).