Opinion ID: 2779016
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review and Carter Analysis

Text: A trial court’s role in the immunity-determination process described in Carter is to explore the basis of the government’s refusal to grant immunity in order to protect the rights of the accused to due process and under the Sixth Amendment. See Butler v. United States, 890 A.2d 181, 189 (D.C. 2006). Whether the government’s refusal to grant immunity will result in “a distortion of the fact finding process,” such that sanctions are appropriate, is a discretionary call, which we review for abuse of discretion. Id.; Carter, supra, 684 A.2d at 345. We 10 determine whether the trial court’s rational act of decision-making was based on a firm factual foundation capable of supporting it, and indeed, whether its reasoning substantially supports its eventual decision. See Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 365 (D.C. 1979). If the trial court failed to consider or improperly relied upon a factor, or if the reasoning does not support the conclusion, we may determine that this error is of a magnitude requiring reversal. Id. at 366. We went en banc in Carter to develop a procedure for trial courts to follow when the Sixth Amendment right to call a witness collides with that witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Carter, supra, 684 A.2d at 335. Rather than creating a general requirement of judicially-imposed immunity in such situations, Carter’s process seeks to respect the government’s immunity-granting function, while assigning a reviewing role to the trial court to prevent prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 340. Under Carter, the trial court must first determine whether the proposed witness’s testimony is potentially incriminating and creates a possibility of prosecution in the future. Id. at 344. Thereafter, the defense bears the initial burden of showing that the witness possesses “material, exculpatory and non-cumulative evidence which is unobtainable from any other source.” Id. at 342–43. If the trial judge determines that the defense has carried its burden, the government may grant the witness limited immunity while it debriefs the witness 11 on the proposed testimony to make its immunity determination. Id. at 345. If the government offers a reasonable basis for declining to grant immunity, such as “considerations of potential future prosecution, an ongoing investigation, clear indications of potential perjury, or the excusable lack of information during the debriefing to make an informed immunity decision,” its refusal to do so “would hardly be prosecutorial misconduct . . . .” Id. at 342. When the government refuses to grant immunity, the trial court must review the basis of that refusal for abuse of discretion, considering whether there will be “a distortion of the fact finding process” in violation of due process. Id. at 342, 345 (citing United States v. Bustamante, 45 F.3d 933, 943 (5th Cir. 1995) for the proposition that using immunity to unfairly skew the facts presented to the jury is a violation of due process). The government may not use immunity to gain a tactical advantage, such as by “giv[ing] immunity to a prosecution witness while declining to grant immunity to a similarly situated defense witness,” nor may it intimidate a witness so that the witness feels compelled to invoke the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 340–41. Nor may the government usurp the jury’s function of determining credibility. Id. at 342. If the trial court determines, based on all the circumstances, that (1) the defendant will not receive a fair trial in the absence of the proposed material, exculpatory, non-cumulative, and otherwise unobtainable testimony, and 12 (2) the government has not provided a reasonable basis for refusing immunity, then the trial court may require the government to choose between granting immunity and having the court dismiss the indictment or impose some other commensurate remedy that the court fashions in accordance with the Sixth Amendment and due process. Id. at 342–43. Throughout this review process, the trial court must take care to avoid intruding into the exclusively executive function of granting immunity, particularly in light of the potential that immunity may provide opportunities to “undermin[e] the administration of justice by inviting cooperative perjury among law violators.” Id. at 339, 343.