Opinion ID: 2612406
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discovery in Connection With Habeas Corpus.

Text: Defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus with this court in 1984. We issued an order to show cause. Defendant filed a supplemental petition in 1986, which served also as a traverse to the return to the 1984 petition. We issued an amended order to show cause on the supplemental petition, but that order did not include the question whether Acker acted as a government agent in eliciting incriminating statements from defendant, rendering Acker's testimony inadmissible under Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201 [12 L.Ed.2d 246, 84 S.Ct. 1199] and United States v. Henry (1980) 447 U.S. 264 [65 L.Ed.2d 115, 100 S.Ct. 2183]. The majority therefore conclude that defendant cannot obtain discovery of Acker's file in connection with the habeas corpus proceeding pending here. In the amended habeas corpus petition he filed in 1986, defendant alleged that Acker was a state agent, rewarded by the law enforcement system for eliciting information from fellow inmates; that he had a history of informing prior to the time he informed on and testified against defendant; that he had prior relationships with law enforcement officials and that they encouraged him to elicit information; that he was ostensibly no more than a fellow inmate; that he may have been deliberately placed in a cell next to defendant; and that he was not merely a passive listening post but, as Acker admitted, deliberately initiated conversations with defendant. (Compare Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986) 477 U.S. 436 [91 L.Ed.2d 364, 364-365, 106 S.Ct. 2616]; People v. Whitt (1984) 36 Cal.3d 724 [205 Cal. Rptr. 810, 685 P.2d 1161].) The habeas corpus petition alleged that although Acker did not admit to being an informant when he testified in defendant's guilt phase trial, he had informed in at least three or four other cases before he testified against defendant. [10] By the time of defendant's first penalty trial some four months later, the petition alleged, Acker had given information in at least three more cases. [11] Additionally, the petition alleged, Acker sought, was promised and received numerous benefits for informing, despite his testimony at the guilt phase and first penalty phase trials that he had received no promises in exchange for his testimony and expected no consideration. Those benefits allegedly included, inter alia, immunity on murder, kidnapping, robbery and grand theft charges pending against him, removal of tattoos and possibly other plastic surgery to remove identifying marks, and protective transfer to a facility where he would be safe from inmates who might attack him for being a snitch. Finally, the petition alleged that Acker had testified falsely, and that representatives of the state were aware of the perjured character of Acker's testimony. To state a prima facie basis for relief under Massiah v. United States, supra, 377 U.S. 201, and United States v. Henry, supra, 447 U.S. 264, a petitioner must show that a government agent  a prisoner acting under state direction or inducement  deliberately elicited incriminating statements from the defendant, and that such statements were prejudicial. (See People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 559-561 [244 Cal. Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776] and cases there cited.) To state a prima facie case for relief based on the knowing use of perjured testimony, a petitioner must show that [f]alse evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (b)(1)) and that the perjury was prejudicial. [12] ( In re Wright (1978) 78 Cal. App.3d 788, 808 [144 Cal. Rptr. 535].) We could have found defendant's 1986 petition stated a prima facie case on both grounds, but were led astray by our ignorance of the practices of informers in the Los Angeles County jail, and by the manner in which the allegations were set out in the petition. The petition put the Massiah/Henry claim in terms of a failure of counsel to investigate, but the allegations showed no significant deficiency. In hindsight, it is now clear that the pattern of informer perjury in the jail system was clever enough to deceive even a competent investigator. The petition also alleged that Acker had informed on many inmates and received rewards, but it failed to allege specifically that any state representative had asked or directed Acker to elicit incriminating information from defendant, or that he had been promised or received a reward for his testimony in that case. Again in hindsight we see that such specific requests and promises are unnecessary; the state set up a system in which a savvy inmate knows that if he comes forward with a confession from a notorious prisoner, true or false, he will be rewarded. Finally, the petition's allegations of Acker's perjury concentrated not on the alleged false testimony describing defendant's confession  testimony that was clearly prejudicial  but on false statements concerning Acker's informing in other cases. But even if the 1984 and 1986 petitions were not sufficient to state a prima facie case for relief, I find incredible the majority statement that, even treating the allegations in the mandate proceeding as a supplement to the petition, no prima facie case is stated. Defendant's response to the mandate petition makes clear that defendant now asserts that Acker testified falsely as to matters material and probative on the issues of special circumstance and penalty, which is grounds for habeas corpus under Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (b)(1). Defendant has maintained from the initial trial that although he did converse with Acker, he did not share with Acker the details of his case, nor did he make the incriminating statements to which Acker testified. But the evidence to support his claim that Acker invented the confession is no longer limited to defendant's word. We have taken judicial notice of the report by the 1989-1990 Los Angeles County Grand Jury detailing how various inmates at the Los Angeles County jail successfully fabricated confessions by other inmates and how authorities encouraged or ignored the fabrications. It is true, as the majority point out, that nothing in that report names Acker as a participant in the fabrication scheme, and that there is no specific indication that the prosecution's files will yield information that will identify Acker as a participant. That, of course, is why defendant seeks discovery. But to characterize defendant's request as a attempt to fish through files to discover new grounds for relief, or to confirm mere speculation (maj. opn., ante, p. 1259) is grossly unfair; defendant states that he knows that Acker committed perjury and that Acker was a regular informant at a time when many informants regularly perjured themselves. His case is no more speculative than any case which must depend upon investigation and discovery to substantiate the allegations of specific fact. The majority are concerned that if we accept defendant's allegations as sufficient to permit discovery of law enforcement records, we will have to allow it in every case challenging the use of testimony from an informant housed at the Los Angeles County jail during the years 1979 through 1988. (See maj. opn., ante, p. 1260, fn. 56.) That, of course, is exactly what the district attorney proposed to the superior court, and what the superior court planned to do until this court granted review in the mandate action. However, the number of cases affected is relatively small. Although there are 8,600 persons confined in the jail at any one time, the grand jury report notes that the district attorney's jailhouse informant litigation team has identified just 153 cases in which jailhouse informants were called to testify in the 10 years prior to October 1988. (Rep. of the 1989-90 L.A. County Grand Jury, p. 4.) A list of jailhouse informant cases released by the Los Angeles County District Attorney's office and published in the Los Angeles Daily Journal on January 3, 1989, numbered 130; defendant's case was among them. Moreover, the majority gloss over a crucial fact alleged by defendant and supported by documentation: defendant was invited by the district attorney to make any appropriate motion concerning the possibility that Acker was involved in the confession fabrication scheme. [13] It is true that the district attorney did not specifically indicate that the prosecution's files would yield information that would undermine Acker's testimony, but neither did he deny that fact. What must defendant allege to state a prima facie case under Penal Code section 1473, and thus acquire the right to discovery? First, he must allege that when Acker described what petitioner supposedly told him about the crime, Acker committed perjury. This, I believe, he has done. Defendant, of course, was present when the conversation occurred, and his statement under penalty of perjury would be direct evidence of what he actually told Acker. We cannot, however, issue orders to show cause whenever a prisoner alleges that a prosecution witness has lied. The credibility of prosecution witnesses is generally resolved at trial, and a defendant's disagreement with the jury's assessment is not grounds for habeas corpus. Thus to state a prima facie case, defendant must also allege additional facts that have come to light subsequent to trial, which lend such additional weight to his claim that a new inquiry is warranted. Defendant here has met this burden, setting out both inconsistencies between that testimony and later discovered evidence and, more importantly, new evidence of a pattern of perjury by informers in the Los Angeles County jail at the time Acker was an informer in residence. The majority assert that habeas corpus is not a device for investigating possible claims, but a means for vindicating actual claims. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 1260.) Defendant has actually claimed that Acker testified falsely as to material and probative facts bearing upon the finding of special circumstances and penalty  which is grounds for relief under Penal Code section 1473  and has set forth facts showing this to be a credible claim, thus meeting the majority's criteria. Once an order to show cause issues, the issuing court should have discretion to grant discovery. Although there are apparently no California cases on point, the rule is clear in the federal courts. In the leading case, Harris v. Nelson (1969) 394 U.S. 286 [22 L.Ed.2d 281, 89 S.Ct. 1082], the United States Supreme Court upheld a federal district court order granting discovery in a habeas corpus proceeding, stating that where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is confined illegally and is therefore entitled to relief, it is the duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry. Obviously, in exercising this power, the court may utilize familiar procedures, as appropriate.... ( Id. at p. 300 [22 L.Ed.2d at p. 291].) The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice also endorse the use of discovery in habeas corpus proceedings (4 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, std. 22-4.5 (2d ed. 1988) p. 22.46-22.49); the commentary to this standard explains that One recurrent problem ... arises when a prisoner alleges in the application an apparently meritorious claim but the evidence that can be adduced to support the claim is unknown to the court.... Controlled use of discovery devices, if only on a limited scale, will demonstrate what applications are baseless while marshaling the evidentiary basis for applications with merit. I have no doubt that we should follow this guidance and permit limited discovery in habeas corpus proceedings. The majority, however, find no prima facie case. Their blithe perpetuation of the Catch-22 is particularly disturbing in a case in which it is clear that if defendant could gain access to the information he needs to satisfy the majority's stringent requirements for a prima facie showing that Acker's testimony was perjured, he could easily show prejudice. Acker's testimony, that defendant told him that he had been tipped to expect a police raid, that he wanted to bag a cop, and that he planned to claim, falsely, that he believed the officers were members of a street gang at war with his neighborhood, is the principal evidence to support the special circumstance allegation that defendant intentionally killed a police officer engaged in the performance of duty. In fact, the original trial judge in this case recalled that Acker's testimony was critical to the issue of whether or not the special circumstance which was alleged was involved. [14] The majority, however, declare that even though the state is withholding potentially exculpatory evidence, the limited scope and pleading requirements of habeas corpus prevent defendant from stating a prima facie case and discovering the concealed evidence. In light of their explanation of how the pleading requirements of habeas corpus can stifle discovery of critical evidence at every turn, it seems appropriate to quote a court with a different perspective on the scope of habeas corpus: The writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action.... The scope and flexibility of the writ  its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention  its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes  have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected.... [¶] ... And this Court has emphasized, taking into account the office of the writ and the fact that the petitioner, being in custody, is usually handicapped in developing the evidence needed to support in necessary detail the facts alleged in his petition, that a habeas corpus proceeding must not be allowed to founder in a `procedural morass.' ( Harris v. Nelson, supra, 394 U.S. 286, 290-292 [22 L.Ed.2d 281, 286], italics added.) It is plain that the majority are uncomfortable with the conclusion that defendant has no direct remedy, either here or in the trial court, to obtain discovery of the Acker file. They suggest that defendant try other, more circuitous, legal remedies, but without any confidence that he will succeed in getting discovery. [15] They note that defendant retains extrajudicial means of investigation, [16] although I know of none that would compel access to confidential law enforcement records. Finally, they express confidence that the People's lawyers will discharge their ethical obligation to disclose any material evidence they have. (Maj. opn., ante, pp. 1260-1261.) The confidence appears misplaced in light of the abrupt about-face witnessed here: the People's attorneys have moved to block discovery after inviting defendant to seek it, and continue to maintain that this is not a case in which they have any obligation of disclosure. All of this discussion of alternative remedies is smoke, not substance. The bottom line is that the majority affirm the conviction and deny all discovery or collateral relief. The State of California may now proceed to execute the defendant without revealing information it has concealed which may show that defendant's conviction and penalty were procured with perjured testimony. This is a miscarriage of justice which may return to haunt us. Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied February 27, 1991. Broussard, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.