Opinion ID: 4644880
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tim Cole Act

Text: Under the Tim Cole Act, formerly known as the Texas Wrongful Imprisonment Act, “a wrongfully imprisoned person may seek compensation from the state for the period of wrongful imprisonment.”12 The Act provides three distinct methods of establishing eligibility for compensation, all of which require a determination of innocence in some form or fashion.13 Brown seeks compensation solely under Section 103.001(a)(2)(C), which requires that (1) he “has served in whole or in part a sentence in prison under the laws of this state”; (2) he “has been granted relief in accordance with a writ of habeas corpus”; (3) “the state district court in which the charge against [him] was pending has entered an order dismissing the charge”; and 10 Id. § 103.051(e) (authorizing an applicant to challenge the Comptroller’s denial of compensation by bringing an action for mandamus relief); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.002(c) (providing that only the Supreme Court has authority to issue writs of mandamus against state executive officers); In re Smith, 333 S.W.3d 582, 585 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding) (“The Comptroller’s decision is not appealable, but a claimant may seek review through an original mandamus proceeding.”). 11 Amicus curiae briefs have been submitted by Former Governor Rick Perry; Professor Ron Beal; The Cato Institute; Harris County Commissioner Rodney Ellis; Tim Cole’s brother, Cory Session; The Innocence Project of Texas; Innocence Project, Inc.; The Actual Innocence Clinic of The University Of Texas Law School; Harris County Special Prosecutor John Wesley Raley; Right Reverend C. Andrew Doyle, Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Texas; Reverend Erik Gronberg, Bishop of the Northern Texas-Northern Louisiana Mission Area of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America; Bishop Joel N. Martinez (Retired), former Resident Bishop of the San Antonio Area of the United Methodist Church; Senior Rabbi Brian Strauss, on behalf of Congregation Beth Yeshurun; Texas Impact, an interfaith advocacy network; The Anti-Defamation League, a nationally leading anti-hate organization, represented by former National Board Chair Marvin D. Nathan; Bishop Scott J. Jones, resident Bishop of the Texas Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church; Bishop Ann B. Sherer, Retired Bishop of the United Methodist Church; Cardinal Daniel DiNardo, Archbishop of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Galveston-Houston; and Edmund Heimlich. 12 Allen, 366 S.W.3d at 699. 13 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 103.001(a). 5 (4) “the district court’s dismissal order is based on a motion to dismiss in which the state’s attorney states that [i] no credible evidence exists that inculpates [Brown] and . . . [ii] the state’s attorney believes that [he] is actually innocent of the crime for which [he] was sentenced.”14 To make a claim for compensation under the Act, Brown had to timely file an application for compensation with the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts and submit the following:  “a verified copy of the . . . court order, motion to dismiss, and affidavit, as applicable, justifying the application for compensation”; and  “a statement provided by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and any county or municipality that incarcerated the person on whose imprisonment the claim is based in connection with the relevant sentence verifying the length of incarceration.”15 On receipt of an application for compensation, the statute charges the Comptroller with determining (1) “the eligibility of the claimant” from the face of the verified documents and (2) “the amount of compensation owed to an eligible claimant.”16 The Comptroller must make both determinations within 45 days and, if the claim is denied, state the reason for the denial.17 This mandamus proceeding concerns the Comptroller’s determination that Brown is not eligible for compensation. As to that matter, the Comptroller does not dispute that Brown timely filed the required documents, including the State attorney’s and convicting court’s affirmative declarations that Brown is actually innocent of the capital-murder charge for which he was sentenced. Nor is 14 Id. § 103.001(a)(1), (2)(C). 15 Id. § 103.051(a)(1)–(3). Other required documents are not applicable to the circumstances of Brown’s conviction and incarceration. See id. § 103.051(a)(4)–(6). 16 Id. § 103.051(b), (b-1). 17 Id. § 103.051(c), (d). 6 Brown’s satisfaction of the actual-innocence standard at issue. Rather, the focus of dissension is the Comptroller’s authority to reject the district court’s determination that it had jurisdiction to amend the dismissal order to include a declaration that Brown is actually innocent. Whether or not the Comptroller is empowered to do so turns on the proper construction of the Tim Cole Act and its application to the undisputed facts. These are questions of law we review de novo,18 starting with Section 103.051(b-1) of the Tim Cole Act, which articulates the Comptroller’s authority with respect to eligibility determinations: In determining the eligibility of a claimant, the comptroller shall consider only the verified copies of documents filed under [Section 103.051(a)(2)]. If the filed documents do not clearly indicate on their face that the person is entitled to compensation under Section 103.001(a)(2), the comptroller shall deny the claim. The comptroller’s duty to determine the eligibility of a claimant under this section is purely ministerial.19 Given the express statutory constraints on the Comptroller’s eligibility determinations, the parties primarily join issue on his authority to look behind the verified documents to revisit the district court’s jurisdictional findings. Secondarily, Brown argues that the Comptroller substantively erred in concluding the district court lacked jurisdiction to amend the dismissal order when the actual-innocence determination became legally and factually supportable.