Opinion ID: 221476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Acme's Insured Status

Text: In a prosecution under the federal bank robbery statute, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim financial institution falls within the coverage of the law. If the victim is a state-chartered credit union, the government must prove that its accounts were insured by the National Credit Union Administration at the time of the robbery. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) & (g); United States v. Taylor, 728 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir.1984). To meet that burden, the government presented the testimony of Acme's vice president/comptroller, who identified two government exhibits as insurance certificates showing that Acme was insured by the NCUA. According to the vice president, Acme had been insured by the NCUA since November 13, 1972, and was insured in the amount of $100,000 per member account on the day it was robbed. On cross-examination, and again on redirect examination, the vice president reaffirmed that Acme was insured by the NCUA on the date of the robbery. This insurance was in addition to Acme's insurance against robbery and protected Acme's customers' accounts against any losses they might incur if Acme went out of business. This evidence was sufficient to meet the government's burden. See Taylor, 728 F.2d at 933 (finding sufficient bank vice president's testimony that clearly indicated to the jury that the bank was federally insured on the date of the offense). Even if we assume for the sake of argument that the 30-year-old insurance certificates on their own were not sufficient to show that Acme was insured when it was robbed in 2006, see United States v. Platenburg, 657 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir.1981) (vacating conviction where the only evidence of bank's insurance status was a certificate that antedate[d] the charged events by seven years), the vice president explained that those certificates remained effective at the time of the robbery. More extensive testimony on this issue was unnecessary, particularly since the vice president's testimony was uncontroverted by any evidence offered by the defendant. Taylor, 728 F.2d at 933 (rejecting defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence against him); see United States v. Knop, 701 F.2d 670, 672-73 (7th Cir.1983) (deeming evidence of bank's insured status sufficient where defendant never contested the sufficiency of that evidence at trial).