Opinion ID: 1218510
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether dhec has jurisdiction to assess, decree, and collect damages against the city, a governmental entity

Text: In denying the City's motion for summary judgment, the trial judge also rejected the City's argument that the Tort Claims Act controls jurisdiction where damages resulting from permit violations can be collected. The City now argues on appeal that the trial judge erred and that even if DHEC can assess and collect damages for its fish-kill, the exclusive remedy for the negligent discharge of pollutants by a governmental entity is under the Tort Claims Act. The City argues that the exclusivity of the Tort Claims Act is illustrated by the language contained in Section 15-78-70(a) which states, [t]his chapter constitutes the exclusive remedy for any tort committed by an employee of a governmental entity. We disagree with the City and find the trial judge correctly determined that the Tort Claims Act does not control jurisdiction under the facts of this case for the reasons discussed below. First, we note that liability under the Pollution Control Act is strict and although such a violation may involve a tort including nuisance or negligence, there is no requirement for such a finding for the City to be liable for a violation of the Pollution Control Act. See, Carolina Chemicals, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control , 290 S.C. 498, 351 S.E. (2d) 575 (Ct. App. 1986) (under the Pollution Control Act, the legislature intended that strict liability be imposed for pollution of the environment). Secondly, if we were to hold the Tort Claims Act to be the exclusive remedy in this case, certain provisions of the Pollution Control Act would be repealed by implication. Repeals by implication are not favored by courts and to repeal a statute on account of an asserted conflict or repugnancy with another, the repugnancy must not only be plain, but the provisions of the two statutes must be incapable of any reasonable reconcilement; for if they can be construed so that both can stand, the Court will so construe them. Pearson v. Mills Manufacturing Co. , 82 S.C. 506, 509, 64 S.E. 407, 409 (1909). Further, the general rule is that statutes of a specific nature, such as those contained in the Pollution Control Act are not to be considered as repealed in whole or in part by later general statutes such as those included in Tort Claims Act, unless there is a direct reference to the former statute or the intent of the legislature to repeal is explicitly implied therein. See, Sharpe v. South Carolina Department of Mental Health , 281 S.C. 242, 315 S.E. (2d) 112 (1984). Here, we find that the Pollution Control Act and the Tort Claims Act are not repugnant and can be easily reconciled. The purpose of the Pollution Control Act is obvious: that of establishing a comprehensive regulatory scheme to control pollution of the environment. To hold that the Tort Claims Act supersedes provisions of the Pollution Control Act would seriously disturb the Pollution Control Act's comprehensive regulatory scheme. This could not have been the intention of the legislature. Although the Tort Claims Act was enacted subsequent to the Pollution Control Act, we find that under the facts of this case, the latter is the more specific statute and should take precedence over the more general statute, the Tort Claims Act. Further, there is no language in the Tort Claims Act which either expressly or implicitly negates any of the provisions of the Pollution Control Act.