Opinion ID: 176991
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence Arguments

Text: We review sufficiency of the evidence challenges by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and will reverse only if no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Morris, 576 F.3d 661, 666 (7th Cir.2009). We have frequently described a defendant posing this challenge as facing a nearly insurmountable hurdle. Id.; see United States v. Hach, 162 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir.1998) (Only if the record is devoid of evidence from which a jury could find guilt will we reverse.). Shamah was convicted of conspiring to violate the substantive RICO statute. The RICO conspiracy provision makes it unlawful to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of the RICO statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Shamah was charged with conspiring to violate subsection (c), which makes it unlawful for any person employed by or associated with [an] enterprise. . . to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity of collection of unlawful debt. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). To prove a violation of § 1962(c), the government must prove the following elements: (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern of racketeering activity. Brouwer v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 199 F.3d 961, 963 (7th Cir.2000). Shamah challenges the sufficiency of the government's proof on the conduct and pattern of racketeering activity elements.
To be liable under RICO, there must be operation of an enterprise. Shamah argues that the government failed to prove that he, a lowly police officer, played any role in directing the affairs of the Chicago Police Department, the charged enterprise. As an officer, he argues that he exercised no direction over the department because he had no authority to make command decisions, no supervisory powers over other officers, and no control over department-wide policies. He also argues that his actions could not rise to a level of criminal culpability because he was merely performing his assigned tasks as a police officer when he deployed his powers of arrest and seized contraband. The statutory language of § 1962(c) does not define what it means to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). In Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Supreme Court defined the meaning of participate and to conduct for § 1962(c), the substantive offense at issue here. 507 U.S. 170, 177-79, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993). The Court held that although liability was not limited to those in the upper management of an enterprise, it must be shown that the defendant participated in the operation or management of the enterprise's affairs. Id. at 184-85, 113 S.Ct. 1163; United States v. Cummings, 395 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir.2005). To show participation, the Court stated that the person charged must have had  some part in directing those affairs. Reves, 507 U.S. at 179, 113 S.Ct. 1163 (emphasis in original); see Goren v. New Vision Int'l, Inc., 156 F.3d 721, 727 (7th Cir.1998) (Mere participation in the activities of the enterprise is insufficient; the defendant must participate in the operation or management of the enterprise.). In arguing that a street officer cannot be an operator or manager of a police department, Shamah relies heavily on Cummings, where we reversed a RICO conspiracy conviction against a defendant who held a low-level position in the charged enterprise, the Illinois Department of Employment Security. 395 F.3d at 397-98. There, the defendant accepted bribes from an outsider to the enterprise and in return, provided the outsider with confidential information from an internal database. Shamah wrongly contends that Cummings turned on the rank of the employee. Instead, we based our conclusion on the lack of evidence that the defendant operated or managed any aspect of the enterprise, its database, or conspired with anyone who did. Id. at 398. The defendant's access to the enterprise's computer database was incidental to her role in the enterprise, she accessed it infrequently, and had no responsibility to maintain it. We also focused on the function of the enterprise, stating that it may have been a different case if the defendant was acting in a way that interfered with the agency's primary function of collecting premiums or paying benefits. Id. at 399. We did not rely on a job title or official role in the organization and indicated that evidence of some de facto control over the agency's affairs would have sufficed to show the defendant was an operator or manager. Id. at 398. We have previously stated that the prototypical RICO case is one where a person seizes control of an enterprise and uses it to commit criminal acts he could not do himself. Fitzgerald v. Chrysler, 116 F.3d 225, 227 (7th Cir.1997). Only a step away from the prototypical case is one where a criminal uses an enterprise to engage in criminal activities but is generally content to allow it to conduct its normal, lawful business. Id. That is the case we have here. And in a pre- Reves case, we rejected the argument that a police officer's lack of a supervisory position precluded his guilt under RICO. United States v. Ambrose, 740 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir.1984), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir.1989). Our sister circuits have similarly looked to the core-enterprise affairs and the actions of the charged defendant in determining whether the defendant is an operator or manager. In United States v. Urban, for example, the Third Circuit emphasized that the key to showing operation or management was a nexus between the person and the affairs of the enterprise. 404 F.3d 754, 769-70 (3d Cir.2005). The First Circuit has described the operator or manager as someone who is plainly integral to carrying out the enterprise's activities. United States v. Shifman, 124 F.3d 31, 36 (1st Cir.1997). Shamah and his co-defendant Doroniuk were operators for the purposes of RICO. The heart of a police department's function is to enforce the law, and not to manage other officers or implement policies. As an officer, even a lowly one, Shamah had the power to control the department's affairs and direct its force. With a substantial amount of discretion, Shamah chose who to stop on the street, which cars to pull over, and when to obtain arrest and search warrants. Furthermore, he acted as a representative for the larger police department and the city when he spoke to citizens, created public inventory records, and testified to facts that served as the basis for warrants and indictments. As the public face of the department, Shamah was given a great deal of responsibility and trust in operating and directing its affairs. His manipulation of this power transformed legitimate police functions into arms of his illegal endeavors. He usurped the department's identity, and turned it into a criminal enterprise hiding behind a facade of justice. The government presented ample evidence that Shamah and Doroniuk were not acting as mere law-abiding police officers when they forced civilians to part with money and drugs, performed illegal arrests and stops, and planted evidence on civilians. Given his discretion and authority as a police officer, and the way in which he chose to direct his powers, Shamah operated or managed the integral duties of the police department's daily affairs. And the government presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Shamah conducted the affairs of the enterprise. [1]
The government also needed to prove that Shamah agreed to participate in at least two predicate RICO acts to establish a pattern of racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); Brouwer, 199 F.3d at 966. The racketeering activity charged was multiple acts of robbery as defined by Illinois law. Under Illinois law, [a] person commits robbery when he . . . takes property . . . from the person or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force. 720 ILCS 5/18-1. Shamah argues that the evidence is insufficient to show that the crimes to which he agreed to participate were robberies, and not thefts. Specifically, Shamah claims that he and his partner agreed to a series of thefts, with the moment of theft occurring back at the police station when the co-defendants decided what amount of money to withhold from inventory. He further explains that any force used was to effectuate a lawful arrest, at which time police procedures were followed to seize money according to forfeiture laws. According to official policy, officers are given the discretion to either place property in their police vests for later inventory at the scene; or to leave property on a suspect for collection during the booking process. However, the evidence at trial was more than sufficient for the jury to conclude that the conspiracy was an ongoing agreement to commit robberies, not thefts. The distinction between a robbery and a theft can be subtletheft is a taking without the requirement of force. 720 ILCS 5/16-1. To sustain a charge of robbery, the robber must use force or the threat of force as the means to take the property from the person or presence of the victim. People v. Blake, 144 Ill.2d 314, 162 Ill.Dec. 47, 579 N.E.2d 861, 863 (1991). But the taking does not need to be contemporaneous with the force. Id., 162 Ill. Dec. 47, 579 N.E.2d at 865 (the use and threat of force and the defendant's removal of the property were essentially a related series of acts.). And, the taking of property does not need to directly follow the force or threat of force as there need only be some concurrence between the defendant's threat of force and the taking. People v. Aguilar, 286 Ill.App.3d 493, 221 Ill.Dec. 803, 676 N.E.2d 324, 327 (1997). Also, the force does not have to be exerted for the purpose of taking the property. Id. Shamah used force or the threat of force as the means to take property from his victims on many occasions. We provide only a few examples here: Love testified that Shamah and Doroniuk forced down his door and entered his home without a warrant. Doroniuk handcuffed and planted cocaine on Love, and money was taken from him. Additionally, Love testified that at least three times prior to the raid on his house, Shamah and Doroniuk would pull him over while he was driving, force him out of his car, search him, and take whatever money they found. On at least one of these stops they also had their guns drawn. On two different occasions, the two officers entered Lucas's garage, the place known as the Candy Store, and robbed him. On February 19, 2006, Shamah and Doroniuk went to the Candy Store, knocked on the door, and pushed their way in after someone answered their knock. They did not have a warrant, and they had their guns drawn. They searched Lucas and his store, taking money from him personally and from a back room. On March 26, 2006, Shamah and Doroniuk went to the Candy Store again. They kicked down the door with their guns drawn, handcuffed Lucas, and took money and jewelry from him. Finally, Shamah and Doroniuk used force to rob Bates. Cross, their informant and co-conspirator, told them that Bates was selling crack cocaine from a particular motel room. The two officers, along with 4-6 other officers, forced their way into Bates' room as he was opening the door. Doroniuk handcuffed Bates, searched him, and took cash and cocaine from his pockets. Clearly, the evidence showed that Shamah and Doroniuk used the force that came along with their police power as a way of subduing and preventing resistance from those they robbed. Drug dealers were their ideal targets because they tended to carry large amounts of money and would not likely be credible if they complained about the police officers' actions. The government also introduced evidence of Shamah and Doroniuk discussing ways they could get more money from someone they believed was a particularly profitable drug dealer, including a suggestion by Doroniuk that they take money off duty with a ski mask on if necessary. Given this evidence, a reasonable jury had more than enough evidence to conclude that Shamah and Doroniuk had an on-going agreement to rob drug dealers. We also easily dispose of Shamah's argument that he was just doing his job and that each arrest was preceded by probable cause. Shamah and Doroniuk created opportunities to engage with drug dealers for the purpose of robbing them, and some of the arrests or searches were blatantly unauthorized and illegal. Doroniuk testified that his standard practice was to keep property in his police vest when arresting suspects, unless another officer was nearby, and that he preferred to arrest the drug dealers on whom he planted evidence or robbed so that their complaints would seem even less legitimate. From this evidence, the jury could conclude that the arrests were made to effectuate the robberies and continue the conspiracy, and not to enforce the law. The jury was properly instructed on the elements of robbery, and there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that an agreement existed between the officers to rob whenever the opportunity arose for them to do so.