Opinion ID: 747239
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Unchallenged Convictions

Text: 15 Barron contends the district court lacks jurisdiction to vacate his two unchallenged convictions and corresponding sentence by rescinding his entire plea agreement because he challenged only his section 924(c) conviction and the corresponding 60-month portion of his sentence. He contends 28 U.S.C. § 2255 does not confer authority on district courts to set aside unchallenged counts and unchallenged portions of the sentence. 16 To determine whether section 2255 confers jurisdiction to vacate unchallenged convictions and sentences, we turn first to the statute itself. Section 2255 provides: 17 A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court ... may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 18 ... If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, ... the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate. 19 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994) (emphasis added). 20 Barron contends the language granting district courts the power to vacate and set the judgment aside, to resentence the prisoner, and to correct the sentence as may appear appropriate limits the court's remedial jurisdiction to the challenged count of conviction and that portion of the sentence directly associated with the challenged count. He contends that a prisoner may focus his attack on his sentence any way he likes, and because he seeks relief only from his section 924(c) sentence, the court has no jurisdiction to tamper with any other part of his sentence. 21 No federal court of appeals has construed section 2255 so narrowly. We and the seven other circuits that have considered the issue have unanimously concluded that section 2255 confers jurisdiction on district courts to resentence a defendant on unchallenged counts of conviction after vacating a challenged 924(c) count, at least where the aggregate sentence can be viewed as a package. 3 See United States v. Handa, 122 F.3d 690 (9th Cir.1997); United States v. Morris, 116 F.3d 501 (D.C.Cir.1997); Gardiner v. United States, 114 F.3d 734 (8th Cir.1997); United States v. Rodriguez, 114 F.3d 46 (5th Cir.1997); United States v. Harrison, 113 F.3d 135 (8th Cir.1997); United States v. Rodriguez, 112 F.3d 26 (1st Cir.1997); United States v. Davis, 112 F.3d 118 (3rd Cir.1997); United States v. Hillary, 106 F.3d 1170 (4th Cir.1997); United States v. Smith, 103 F.3d 531 (7th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1248, 117 S.Ct. 1861, 137 L.Ed.2d 1061 (1997). 22 As we explained in Handa, 23 The plain language of § 2255 does not support [the] argument that in all circumstances, the court is limited in its resentencing options to only the count challenged in the motion. Instead, the plain language does not restrict the word 'sentence' and authorizes the court to act 'as may appear appropriate.' Thus, it confers upon the district court broad and flexible power in its actions following a successful § 2255 motion.Handa, 122 F.3d at 691 (quoting Davis, 112 F.3d at 121). Thus, related consecutive sentences are viewed in the aggregate for purposes of determining the sentence to which the district court's flexible remedial power applies. See Hillary, 106 F.3d at 1172. 24 Just as section 2255's grant of authority to resentence the defendant and correct the sentence as may appear appropriate confers remedial jurisdiction over the aggregate sentence, the grant of authority to vacate and set the judgment aside and correct the sentence as may appear appropriate, confers remedial jurisdiction over the aggregate judgment. The district court may therefore abrogate an entire plea agreement under section 2255, even when that entails vacating unchallenged counts of conviction. 25 The sentence package concept we applied in Handa applies with equal force here. In Handa, we held that when a petitioner attacks one of several interdependent sentences, he in effect challenges the aggregate sentencing scheme. We explained that a district court 26 construes the multiple sentences given a defendant convicted of more than one count of a multiple count indictment as 'a package,' reflecting the likelihood that the sentencing judge will have attempted to impose an overall punishment taking into account the nature of the crimes and certain characteristics of the criminal. When part of the sentence is set aside as illegal, the package is 'unbundled.' After the unbundling the district court is free to put together a new package reflecting its considered judgment as to the punishment the defendant deserves for the crimes of which he is still convicted. 27 Handa, 122 F.3d at 692 (citing United States v. Binford, 108 F.3d 723, 728 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1128, 117 S.Ct. 2530, 138 L.Ed.2d 1029 (1997)). In United States v. Davis, the court explained: 28 The sentencing package doctrine suggests that when a defendant is found guilty on a multicount indictment, there is a strong likelihood that the district court will craft a disposition in which the sentences on the various counts form part of an overall plan. When a conviction on one or more of the component counts is vacated, common sense dictates that the judge should be free to review the efficacy of what remains in light of the original plan, and to reconstruct the sentencing architecture ... if that appears necessary in order to ensure that the punishment still fits both crime and criminal. 29 Davis, 112 F.3d at 122-23. 30 Until now, the sentence package concept has been primarily invoked to explain why courts may resentence on remaining counts of conviction after setting aside a section 924(c) conviction. The district court here, however, applied the sentence package concept to a plea agreement and determined that [b]y attacking a key component in the sentencing plan envisioned by the plea agreement, Barron is, in effect, attacking the plea agreement itself. Barron, 940 F.Supp. at 1493. 31 Given the realities of plea bargaining, it makes good sense to apply the sentence package concept when a petitioner challenges one of multiple convictions obtained under a plea agreement. A set of convictions and sentences entered pursuant to a plea agreement may be viewed as part of a package deal, considered and approved by the court. Because the government agreed to refrain from bringing other charges arising out of the same general facts in exchange for Barron's agreement to plead guilty to the charges in the indictment, it is possible, perhaps likely, that Barron would have faced other charges had he not pleaded guilty to the section 924(c) count. Because the district court cannot possibly know what convictions or sentences Barron would have received had he not pleaded guilty to the section 924(c) count or had the district court refused to accept his defective plea, an appropriate remedy is to put Barron in the position he was in before he entered into the plea agreement or before the district court accepted the plea based on conduct which did not constitute the crime charged. 4 See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(f). See also Hillary, 106 F.3d at 1172 (on correcting the error complained of in a section 2255 petition, the defendant may be 'placed in exactly the same position in which he would have been had there been no error in the first instance.' ) (quoting United States v. Silvers, 90 F.3d 95, 99 (4th Cir.1996)). 32 Of course, it is impossible to truly return Barron to the position he was in before he entered into his plea agreement because he has served time in prison as a result of his guilty pleas. This cannot be undone. Thus, the district court properly concluded that Barron is entitled to credit on any new sentence he may receive for the time he has already served on the counts to which he pleaded guilty under the agreement.