Opinion ID: 171234
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: nmhra

Text: The City argues that Ms. Kelley did not engage in protected activity pursuant to the NMHRA both because the statute does not contemplate protection for a defense counsel's participation and because the term proceeding under § 28-1-7(I) of the NMHRA does not cover EEOC proceedings. We do not find the first argument convincing. In interpreting [the New Mexico] Human Rights Act, [the New Mexico Supreme Court has] previously indicated that it is appropriate to rely upon federal civil rights adjudication for guidance.... Gonzales v. N.M. Dep't of Health, 129 N.M. 586, 11 P.3d 550, 557 (2000). Similar to Title VII, the NMHRA covers participat[ion] in any proceeding under the NMHRA. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7(I)(2) (emphasis added). [13] Like § 2000e(f) of Title VII, the plain language of § 28-1-7 is broad enough to provide protection to a defense attorney participating in a mediation. For the same reasons offered in our analysis of Title VII, therefore, we conclude that NMHRA's retaliation provisions extend to Ms. Kelley under the facts of this case. We reject the City's second argument as well. Our review of the record reveals that the City failed to raise the argument to the district court. It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976); see also Wilburn v. Mid-S. Health Dev., Inc., 343 F.3d 1274, 1280 (10th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the argument is not properly before us, and we will not consider it.