Opinion ID: 2331431
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: The prosecutor misstated the definition of killing in the heat of passion

Text: As her last point to the prosecutorial misconduct arguments, McCullough claims the prosecutor misstated the definition of heat of passion while discussing the voluntary manslaughter count. This count was one of the lesser included offenses available for the jury's consideration. The district court instruction was from PIK Crim.3d 56.05, which indicates that voluntary manslaughter occurs if the defendant intentionally killed the victim during a sudden quarrel, in the heat of passion, or upon an unreasonable but honest belief that circumstances existed that justify deadly force in defense of self. But the jury was not instructed on the definition of heat of passion, and neither party argues this omission was clear error. PIK Crim.3d 56.04(e) defines heat of passion as: [A]ny intense or vehement emotional excitement which was spontaneously provoked from circumstances. Such emotional state of mind must be of such degree as would cause an ordinary person to act on impulse without reflection. This court has frequently described heat of passion as meaning `any intense or vehement emotional excitement of the kind prompting violent and aggressive action, such as rage, anger, hatred, furious resentment, fright, or terror,' based `on impulse without reflection.' (Emphasis added.) State v. Foster, 290 Kan. 696, 711-12, 233 P.3d 265 (2010) (quoting State v. Guebara, 236 Kan. 791, 796, 696 P.2d 381 [1985]); see also State v. Coop, 223 Kan. 302, Syl. ¶ 1, 573 P.2d 1017 (1978); State v. Jones, 185 Kan. 235, Syl. ¶ 2, 341 P.2d 1042 (1959); State v. Linville, 148 Kan. 142, Syl. ¶ 2, 79 P.2d 869 (1938). In other words, this court often refers to anger as an example of what might be considered heat of passion, along with the other descriptors of the actor's emotional state. But during closing argument the prosecutor made the following comments about heat of passion voluntary manslaughter. She stated, Was it heat of passion? You know, heat of passion, we think of the case where, you know a woman finds her husband in bed with another woman. McCullough's counsel objected, arguing the prosecutor was trying to define heat of passion based on other types of cases. After the court overruled the objection and admonished the jury that a lawyer's arguments are not evidence, the following exchanged occurred. [Prosecutor]: So that's what we think of heat of passion, you know, finding your spouse in bed with another person. But you know what, in this case anger isn't passion.  [McCullough's counsel]: Objection ... the Court has defined what heat of passion is, heat of passion defines itself. Arguing that anger is not passion is objectionable. THE COURT: Well, its argument. Please continue. [Prosecutor]: Anger is not the heat of passion, anger is a motive to kill.  (Emphasis added.) McCullough argues the emphasized language misstates Kansas law, citing this court's repeated definition of heat of passion. We agree. The prosecutor's statement was more than a simple fumble. It oversimplified the required analysis and denied that anger could even be an example of heat of passion under any circumstances, despite our caselaw to the contrary. For these reasons, the statement was misleading. Accordingly, we must determine whether this error was harmless under the standard adopted in Inkelaar and Ward.