Opinion ID: 1130099
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Challenge to Second Confession.

Text: The record shows that, four months after he confessed to Leffel, defendant offered to discuss the Bakersfield crimes with Detective Vincent only if Vincent guaranteed that the death penalty would ultimately be imposed. (4a) Defendant now claims that Vincent granted this request, and that the second confession was involuntary because it was given in exchange for an official promise of a desired outcome or benefit. [12] The claim has been waived. As noted, defendant urged the trial court to suppress the second confession solely on grounds that Vincent's delay in advising defendant of his Miranda rights tainted the entire interview under the Fifth Amendment, including those statements made after a Miranda waiver was obtained. No question of a death penalty guarantee or other improper inducement was mentioned in defendant's suppression motion or argued at the hearing. As a result, the parties had no incentive to fully litigate this theory below, and the trial court had no opportunity to resolve material factual disputes and make necessary factual findings. Under such circumstances, a claim of involuntariness generally will not be addressed for the first time on appeal. ( People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 172 [19 Cal. Rptr.2d 836, 852 P.2d 331]; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 519 & fn. 5 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385]; cf. In re Cameron (1968) 68 Cal.2d 487, 503 [67 Cal. Rptr. 529, 439 P.2d 633].) Defendant insists that any failure by trial counsel to adequately preserve his current challenge to the second confession amounts to ineffective assistance in violation of his right to counsel under both the federal and state Constitutions. We disagree. So far as the record on appeal discloses and for reasons we explain, mention of the death penalty prior to the second confession was not coercive, and the suppression motion could not properly have been granted on this ground. We therefore cannot conclude that trial counsel was incompetent in failing to raise the issue. (See, e.g., People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 441-442 [48 Cal. Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373] [rejecting incompetence claim based on trial counsel's failure to argue that interrogating officers threatened defendant with the death penalty].) (5) In general, `any promise made by an officer or person in authority, express or implied, of leniency or advantage to the accused, if it is a motivating cause of the confession, is sufficient to invalidate the confession and to make it involuntary and inadmissible as a matter of law.' ( People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 838 [183 Cal. Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93], quoting People v. Brommel (1961) 56 Cal.2d 629, 632 [15 Cal. Rptr. 909, 364 P.2d 845].) In identifying the circumstances under which this rule applies, we have made clear that investigating officers are not precluded from discussing any advantage or other consequence that will naturally accrue in the event the accused speaks truthfully about the crime. ( People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 550 [58 Cal. Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908].) The courts have prohibited only those psychological ploys which, under all the circumstances, are so coercive that they tend to produce a statement that is both involuntary and unreliable. ( People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 166-167 [266 Cal. Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857]; People v. Hogan, supra, 31 Cal.3d 815, 841; People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595, 607 [147 Cal. Rptr. 172, 580 P.2d 672].) (4b) Contrary to what defendant implies, a confession will not be invalidated simply because the possibility of a death sentence was discussed beforehand. (E.g., People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 780-782 [276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330]; People v. Thompson, supra, 50 Cal.3d 134, 169-170; People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 773-774 [248 Cal. Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310].) We have found a constitutional violation in this context only where officers threaten a vulnerable or frightened suspect with the death penalty, promise leniency in exchange for the suspect's cooperation, and extract incriminating information as a direct result of such express or implied threats and promises. (E.g., People v. Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d 595, 609-613 [defendant admitted involvement in robbery murder after police indicated he could not otherwise avoid the death penalty or receive less severe punishment than a codefendant, even though police knew the codefendant was the actual killer]; People v. McClary (1977) 20 Cal.3d 218, 227-229 [142 Cal. Rptr. 163, 571 P.2d 620] [16-year-old girl admitted involvement in murder after police repeatedly denied her requests for an attorney, challenged her claim of innocence, falsely stated she was eligible for the death penalty, and offered leniency if she changed her story]; People v. Johnson (1969) 70 Cal.2d 469, 478-479 [74 Cal. Rptr. 889, 450 P.2d 265] [Black suspect under age 21 admitted involvement in robbery murder after police indicated the jury would otherwise disbelieve defendant's denial, assume he harbored hatred towards the White victim, and impose the death penalty].) Such coercion is lacking here. Detective Vincent initiated no discussion concerning the penal consequences of any statement defendant might make. Rather, defendant spontaneously requested a death sentence at the outset of the interview. He also indicated a willingness to tell the truth in order to ensure that justice was served and that no one else was falsely charged. These facts strongly suggest that defendant volunteered for the most severe penalty available under California law because he honestly believed such punishment was warranted given his involvement in the Barrel House crimes and several other violent robberies in Bakersfield. Moreover, Detective Vincent made no promises or threats of any kind. His one-sentence response about the death penalty merely alluded to what any person, including a convicted felon, would reasonably assume to be true  that authorities would be interested in pursuing a death sentence in any serious murder case in which it might apply. Vincent did not state or imply that the death penalty would necessarily be imposed, even assuming defendant desired such a result. On the other hand, no suggestion was made that defendant could avoid serious punishment by cooperating with police. Thus, under the circumstances presented here, defendant's second confession in Marquette was entirely the product of his free will. As with the earlier confession to Leffel, the motivating cause appears to be a sincere and reasoned desire on defendant's part to atone for his life of crime. ( People v. Brommel, supra, 56 Cal.2d 629, 632.) Unlike other cases in which official coercion has been found, there is no evidence that defendant was frightened by his contact with law enforcement officers or that he falsely confessed to ensure a particular outcome or to minimize the punishment he might otherwise receive. We therefore cannot conclude that trial counsel was incompetent in failing to claim that the second confession was induced by threats or promises concerning the death penalty.