Opinion ID: 1372628
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury's Entitlement to Consider Sympathy.

Text: (21) Defendant contends that the jury was improperly instructed, via the guilt phase instruction, that it could not consider sympathy for him in weighing his fate  an error that violated state law and his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He maintains that the error was compounded by the prosecutor's statement during closing argument that as the judge indicated to you earlier in the original instructions that he gave you, any decision that you make [in] this case must be based on a conscientious and objective consideration of both the facts and the law, and you should not make your decision based on any sympathies or passions or prejudices or emotions, either for the defendant or against him. We do not find it reasonably likely ( People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th 629, 663) that the jurors were misled about the scope of their discretion in determining penalty. We thus reject the contention. We have reasoned that a jury will understand such an instruction does not foreclose compassionate evaluation of the mitigating evidence, but warns only against untethered emotion, bias, or outside pressure. ( People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1225 [275 Cal. Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159].) The facts are similar to those we confronted in People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1 [252 Cal. Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249]. Malone's jury also was told at the guilt phase not to consider sympathy in reaching a verdict, and then was told at the penalty phase to consider guilt phase instructions it found relevant. We held that, given the penalty trial's focus on the defendant's background and character, the jury would not have misunderstood that it could not consider sympathy in deciding punishment. ( Id. at pp. 39-42.) We so conclude in this case. Sympathy was obviously at issue during the penalty trial. The court instructed the jury that it could consider (1) whether the offenses were committed while defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, (2) whether the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law's requirements was impaired by mental disease or defect or by intoxication, and (3) any other circumstances that might extenuate the crimes' gravity, even though they might not be legal excuses for the crimes. Indeed, in an abundance of caution the court instructed the jurors, in a significant and appropriate modification of former CALJIC No. 8.84.2 (4th ed. 1979 bound vol.), that If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstance [ sic ], you may impose a sentence of death. However, if you determine that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole. (Italics added.) The instructions as a whole adequately signaled the jury that it could consider sympathy, a signal buttressed by the use of may in the modified instruction quoted immediately above  a device that further emphasized to the jurors the normative nature of the decision they were to make. To be sure, in People v. Malone, supra , the prosecutor stated that the jury could consider sympathy (47 Cal.3d at p. 41); here the prosecutor incorrectly stated the opposite. The prosecutor's comment, viewed in isolation, misstated the law and we cannot endorse it. We have held that each juror may assign whatever sympathetic value he or she will to each relevant factor, including those in mitigation. ( People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 541 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440], revd. on other grounds sub nom. California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837].) But we have already explained that we presume the jury understands the court's instructions to be statements of the law by a judge, and the prosecution's argument to be an advocate's attempt to persuade. (Pt. II.D., ante. ) Moreover, the nature of the penalty trial itself vitiated the comment's effect, for, as we have stated, the defense at the penalty phase was designed to elicit sympathy for defendant in light of his background and medical history. In fact the prosecutor's argument, taken as a whole, did not urge the jury to disregard sympathy. He reviewed the relevant statutory aggravating and mitigating factors seriatim. He argued that the circumstances of the crime should be considered in aggravation, as should be defendant's relevant prior criminal activity. He argued there was no extreme mental or emotional disturbance, but did not say the absence thereof was a factor in aggravation. He conceded that the absence of prior felony convictions and defendant's age were basically factors in mitigation, though the latter was not unequivocally so. He said that defendant's ability to appreciate the nature of his conduct and conform to the law's requirements might have been impaired by mental difficulties  though the prosecutor disagreed that the evidence led to any such conclusion. And he acknowledged the evidence of extenuation of the gravity of the crimes presented by Dr. Rath, evidence showing possibly some extenuating circumstances, although he argued, to use his prefatory expression, that evidence of that factor really is not present. There was nothing inherently improper in the prosecutor's approach. (See People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 152-154 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559] (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.), vacated and remanded sub nom. Bacigalupo v. California (1992) 506 U.S. ___ [121 L.Ed.2d 5, 113 S.Ct. 32].) Moreover, each of the mitigating factors to which the prosecutor referred naturally touched on sympathy. And the prosecutor did not object when defense counsel stated at closing argument, So you are not in a rigid situation. You don't have to count up these factors and you don't have to say, `Well, I would like to give him life; I have the power to do that. But the law prevents me from doing it.' [¶] The law does not prevent you from doing it. Given the record described above, we conclude that the proceedings did not mislead the jury about its role. We find no reasonable likelihood that the jurors understood they could not consider sympathy for defendant's background, in particular his medical difficulties.