Opinion ID: 1667037
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: New Trial Upon Newly Discovered Evidence

Text: Antone contends that he is entitled to a new trial because of the discovery subsequent to trial that the FDCLE had paid an attorney $11,500 to represent Haskew. Antone argues that the failure to disclose this information prior to trial violates both Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220 and the dictates of Brady v. Maryland and United States v. Agurs . We remanded this cause to the trial court, Antone v. State, 355 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1978), for an evidentiary hearing to determine if a new trial should be granted. The trial court denied a new trial, and we agree. The resolution of this issue is controlled by the guidelines established in Agurs. There the majority opinion outlined three situations in which a Brady violation might occur. The first situation occurs when undisclosed evidence demonstrates that the prosecution's case included perjured testimony. If the prosecution knew or should have known of the perjury and there is a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have altered the jury's judgment, then fundamental fairness mandates that a new trial be granted. Antone contends that Haskew's testimony concerning the plea bargain arrangement was false, that the prosecution should have known it was false, and that it could have affected the judgment of the jury. We cannot agree. As the trial court reasoned in its detailed order, questions asked of Haskew both in deposition and at trial were directed solely to the plea bargain agreement. Taken in context, Haskew's answers can fairly be characterized as truthful. The second situation occurs when a pretrial request for specific evidence is made. If the requested evidence is withheld by the prosecution following a specific request and the evidence is material  meaning that it might have affected the outcome of the trial  then a new trial must be ordered. The Agurs court succinctly stated: When the prosecutor receives a specific and relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable. 427 U.S. at 106, 96 S.Ct. at 2398. In the instant case defense counsel made only general demands for material or information within the State's possession or control which tends to negate the guilt of the Defendant... . Antone's attorneys also filed a motion seeking disclosure of all evidence favorable to the defendant. We therefore find this second situation not applicable because no specific request was ever made. The third situation occurs when a general request for Brady information has been made and a failure to disclose has followed. In this situation, the standard of materiality which Agurs states must be applied is as follows: The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt. Such a finding is permissible only if supported by evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It necessarily follows that if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed. This means that the omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. 427 U.S. at 112-13, 96 S.Ct. at 2402 [footnotes omitted]. Applying this test to the undisclosed evidence of FDCLE's payment of Haskew's attorney's fees, we find that Antone's conviction must stand. The evidence in no way detracts from the testimony presented by the state which established Antone's guilt beyond and to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt. At best, the evidence was useful for impeachment of Haskew, but it is not germane to Antone's guilt or innocence. Further, and even more significant, evidence tending to impeach Haskew was already before the jury, and this evidence would have added little to defense efforts to show Haskew as a witness unworthy of the jury's belief. In addition, Haskew would have been entitled to counsel in any event, and there is no showing of any conspiracy between his counsel and the state. Upon our remand, the trial court found no evidence of deliberate prosecutorial misconduct. We agree. We find the undisclosed evidence clearly fails to meet the Agurs test of materiality, and a new trial is therefore not required. [5]