Opinion ID: 204161
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Québec under the Law of Québec

Text: We turn, then, to the question of whether Kitchen International established that the Superior Court of Québec properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Evans. [12] In the district court, Kitchen International submitted the affidavit of a Canadian attorney and argued that the Québec court properly exercised jurisdiction under Article 3136 of the Québec Civil Code. That provision states: Even though a Québec authority has no jurisdiction to hear a dispute, it may hear it, if the dispute has a sufficient connection with Québec, where proceedings cannot possibly be instituted outside Québec or where the institution of such proceedings outside Québec cannot reasonably be required. Civil Code of Québec, R.S.Q., ch. 64, art. 3136. From an examination of the record in its entirety, it does not appear that Kitchen International relied upon any other particular provision of the Code. Moreover, the opinion of the district court appears to have interpreted Kitchen International's position as relying entirely on this provision. The district court took the view, albeit in conclusory fashion, that this provision applied because `the contract [at issue] was concluded in Quebec or [] the cause of action arose in Quebec.' Evans Cabinet, 584 F.Supp.2d at 415 (quoting Canadian Imperial Bank, 899 F.Supp. at 1253 (emphasis and first alteration in original)). There are two problems with this analysis. First, the Québec provision relied upon by Kitchen International, Article 3136, is clearly a provision that permits Québec courts to assume personal jurisdiction over parties in exceptional cases when there is no other available jurisdiction to which the parties may litigate their dispute. See GreCon Dimter, Inc. v. J.R. Normand, Inc., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 401 para 33. [13] Such a situation is clearly not the case here. The litigants are American corporations which are amenable to suit in the state of their corporate domicile and, with respect to particular transactions, in the states where they have the requisite minimum contacts with the other party and with the transaction at issue in the lawsuit. Because there obviously are other forums quite able to assume jurisdiction over the parties, we must conclude that Kitchen International has not carried its burden of establishing that this provision can serve as an adequate basis for jurisdiction over Evans in the courts of that province. Cf. Bouchard v. Ventes de Vehicules Mitsubishi du Canada Inc., [2008] Q.J. No. 13487, 2008 QCCS 6033 para. 22 (holding that the statute does not apply because all Respondents are domiciled in countries with sophisticated court systems which apply the rule of law). The second infirmity with the district court's reliance on Article 3136 is that Canadian Imperial Bank does not indicate that the parties in that case, or the district court in that case, were relying on this provision of Québec law. Nor does Canadian Imperial Bank identify what provision of Québec law the court believed supported an exercise of personal jurisdiction in that case. 899 F.Supp. at 1253. Thus, simply invoking Canadian Imperial Bank does not prove that the Superior Court of Québec properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Evans pursuant to Québec law. Under these circumstances, we normally would have little difficulty in concluding that Kitchen International had not met its burden of establishing that the Québec court had personal jurisdiction over Evans on the basis of Article 3136 and, moreover, that Kitchen International had waived reliance on any other provision of Québec law by its failure to raise any other provision in the district court. However, several considerations make a determination of waiver inappropriate under the circumstances of this case. First, although relying on the wrong section of the Code, the district court indicated to the parties that it believed Québec's Code authorized jurisdiction if the contract had been made in Québec or if the cause of action had arisen there. Additionally, Evans, far from relying on a waiver on the part of Kitchen International, explicitly admits in its brief before this court that the Québec court could have had jurisdiction if the contract had been concluded in Québec or if the cause of action arose in Québec. Appellant's Br. 16 (citing Canadian Imperial Bank ). [14] Under these circumstances, we must conclude that Kitchen International may be able to demonstrate that the Québec court was authorized to exercise jurisdiction if it can demonstrate that a contractual relationship was established with Evans in Québec or that there was a breach of that agreement in Québec or that one of the obligations arising from the contract was to be performed in the Province. A provision of the Civil Code of Québec authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction on these bases. See Civil Code of Québec, R.S.Q., ch. 64, art. 3148. [15] Under that provision, a Québec court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if, inter alia, a fault was committed in Québec, damage was suffered in Québec, an injurious act occurred in Québec or one of the obligations arising from a contract was to be performed in Québec. Id. Relying on the affidavit of Ms. Shiell, an officer and owner of Kitchen International, the district court took the view that the authority of Québec to exercise jurisdiction over Evans had been established because all of the `orders, communications, payments, correspondence and dealings' between the parties had taken place through Kitchen International's Montreal office. Evans Cabinet, 584 F.Supp.2d at 416 (quoting Shiell Aff. at 3). The district court also concluded that the parties had agreed to create a product showroom to display Evans's products to potential customers and sales agents from New England and Canada. Id. An examination of the record makes clear, however, that the district court's factual conclusions were not undisputed. Through the affidavit and supplemental affidavit of its CEO, Mark Trexler, Evans disputed that it had accepted in Québec any contractual obligation with Kitchen International or had engaged, through its representatives, in any business in Québec. Indeed, it denied the existence of any agreement with Kitchen International other than various agreements to sell the allegedly defective material. Evans denied, explicitly, any joint venture to establish a showroom in Montreal. Indeed, none of the affidavits make explicit the precise relationship between the alleged showroom and the specific sales of allegedly defective products by Evans. Under these circumstances, it is clear that genuine issues of fact remain to be resolved before the authority of Québec to exercise personal jurisdiction over Evans can be established.