Opinion ID: 1405270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: unconstitutional special legislation

Text: The second major flaw in the majority opinion is its treatment of the absolute constitutional prohibition against special legislation: The legislature is prohibited from enacting any private or special laws in the following cases: . . . . 6. For granting corporate powers or privileges. Const. art. II, § 28. At the outset the majority finds an emergency in the need for an expeditious vote to precede the impending expiration date of Football Northwest's option to purchase the Seahawks team. Majority at 59. Yet the majority inconsistently justifies the legislation against the claim of special privilege to Football Northwest relying upon the statutory text's use of the generic term team affiliate. Majority at 52-53. Although in some parallel universe team affiliate might reference something other than Football Northwest not on this planet. But let us accept the challenge and test the claim of special privilege in the abstract. Turning our attention to that provision of the statute which gives the team affiliate the exclusive right to pay for (or buy) the election, and thereby determine if we are to have one, one must also consider whether this provision grants a special privilege to a corporation not available to others similarly situated. As perceived by appellant in his brief, [Const. art. II, § 28] is directed against legislation which favors one particular person, group or area to the exclusion of others (citing Municipality of Metro. Seattle v. City of Seattle, 57 Wash.2d 446, 357 P.2d 863 (1960)), whereas [s]ections of this provision tend to protect people of [the] state as a whole from legislative favoritism of individual or group (citing State ex rel. Collier v. Yelle, 9 Wash.2d 317, 115 P.2d 373 (1941)). Br. of Appellant at 27-28. It may be generally said that a special law is one which relates to particular persons or things while a general law is one which applies to all persons or things of a class. Spokane & Eastern Trust Co. v. Hart, 127 Wash. 541, 548, 221 P. 615 (1923) (citing Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Parish, 89 Wash. 495, 154 P. 785 (1916)). However, the true principle requires something more than a mere designation by such characteristics as will serve to classify, for the characteristics which thus serve as the basis of classification must be of such a nature as to mark the objects so designated as peculiarly requiring exclusive legislation.... The marks of distinction on which the classification is founded must be such, in the nature of things, as will, in some reasonable degree, at least, account for or justify the restriction of the legislation. Hart, 127 Wash. at 549, 221 P. 615 (quoting State ex rel. Richards v. Hammer, 42 N.J.L. 435, 440 (1880), aff'd, 44 N.J.L. 667 (1882)). So even if we engage in the fiction that team affiliate is not merely a pseudonym for Football Northwest, but rather by pure coincidence a lonely star in an otherwise empty universe, the question still remains whether there is a rational basis to allow the team affiliate the exclusive privilege to hold the election by agreeing to pay for it, as this exclusive privilege is certainly unavailable to any other person or private corporation who might want to assure the election is conducted. But if an election, bought and paid for by a team affiliate, is a good thing, why not make this a game anyone can play? The issue is exclusion. In pertinent part this legislation specially delivers the right to conduct this election to uniquely privileged corporate hands: Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, this act shall be null and void in its entirety unless the team affiliate as defined in section 101 of this act enters into an agreement with the secretary of state to reimburse the state and the counties for the full cost of the special election to be held on or before June 20, 1997. Laws of 1997, ch. 220, § 606. What the majority fails to explain is why it is only the team affiliate which is favored with the unique option to buy this election. If this election is for a public purpose, as says the majority, then why gamble the public interest by limiting the special power to hold it? Yes, I think by application of the criteria by which we measure special grants of corporate privilege, this is it. Even if we considered the team affiliate a class of corporations having but one member, it is still a special privilege to that class to the exclusion of those who are not in the class; whereas each excluded citizen has at least an equally rational basis to claim the right to pay for this election as does the privileged team affiliate. Compare CLEAN -I, 130 Wash.2d at 802, 928 P.2d 1054 (In order to `survive a challenge as special legislation, any exclusions from a statute's applicability, as well as the statute itself, must be rationally related to the purpose of the statute.') (quoting City of Seattle v. State, 103 Wash.2d 663, 675, 694 P.2d 641 (1985)).