Opinion ID: 2496
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Plugh Invoked His Fifth Amendment Rights

Text: A suspect cannot be required to incriminate himself. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Encapsulated in this protection are certain well-known rights: (1) the right to remain silent; and (2) the right to an attorney, either appointed or retained. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). More than forty years ago, the Miranda Court noted that the prosecution may not use statements made by a suspect under custodial interrogation unless: (1) the suspect has been apprised of his Fifth Amendment rights; and (2) the suspect knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights. Id. at 444-45, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The Supreme Court in the years following Miranda fleshed out the judicial mechanisms for ensuring the viability of these constitutional protections. Included among them is the principle that courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights, North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979), until the government proves otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence, Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). Put differently, unless the suspect validly waived his rights, we presume he retains them. Cases in this area of the law are fact intensive because of the number of combinations of: (1) the circumstances preceding a suspect's interrogation; (2) the method and manner by which a suspect is informed of his or her Miranda rights; and (3) the timing of the suspect's invocation  at the time he receives the warnings or later during the interrogation following an initial waiver. [6] To honor a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights, custodial officers must abide by several prophylactic rules designed to protect the Fifth Amendment rights that come into play once the suspect is in custody. Under Miranda's prophylactic protection of the right against compelled self-incrimination, any suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to have a lawyer present if he so requests, and to be advised of that right. Montejo v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 2089, 173 L.Ed.2d 955 (2009). There are additional layers of prophylactic protection. Once a suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment rights he is entitled to a second layer of prophylaxis that has its roots in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (1981). Under Edwards ' prophylactic protection of the Miranda right, once such a defendant has invoked his right to have counsel present, interrogation must stop. Montejo, 129 S.Ct. at 2098-90 (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, if the suspect initially decides after receiving the warnings that he wishes to remain silent, the custodial officers must scrupulously honor[] his right to cut off questioning. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). An exception to the rule occurs when it is not clear from a suspect's statements or conduct whether he is asserting his rights. In such cases, custodial officers may ask clarifying questions to determine if a suspect is exercising his rights. See Ramirez, 79 F.3d at 304. But because the default presumption is that a suspect retains his rights and the burden is on the government to prove otherwise, custodial officers who press on with questioning assuming that a suspect's statements or conduct are not indications of the suspect's desire to retain his Fifth Amendment rights do so at the risk of suppression of the suspect's subsequent statements.
In this case, the agents presented Plugh with a waiver form and no one disputes that Plugh refused to sign it. What then are the implications of Plugh's refusal? In United States v. Quiroz , this Court addressed whether refusal to sign a waiver form may constitute an invocation of a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights. 13 F.3d 505 (2d Cir.1993). There, the custodial officer asked [suspect] Quiroz to read the advice-of-rights forms, asked whether he understood the forms, and simply asked Quiroz to sign them. [7] 13 F.3d at 512. Quiroz declined to sign until he had spoken to an attorney. Id. at 509. Finding that the statement was a direct and complete response to the precise question Quiroz had been asked, the Court determined that the prophylactic requirement that custodial officers refrain from questioning was triggered at that moment. Id. at 512. The Quiroz Court had no doubt whatever that, had Quiroz signed, [the custodial officer] would have viewed that act as a complete waiver of Quiroz's rights. We can see no good reason not to treat Quiroz's refusal to sign forms in the absence of counsel as a refusal that was coextensive with the waiver [the custodial officer] sought. In sum, we do not view Quiroz's refusal to sign the forms as a limited request for counsel, any more than [the custodial officer's] request to sign the forms was a request for a limited waiver. Since we do not view Quiroz's statement as narrower than the [custodial officer's] request, we see no ambiguity. Id. Quiroz instructs us, therefore, that  absent a suspect's prior or simultaneous affirmative announcements of his willingness to speak, Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529, 107 S.Ct. 828, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987)  when a custodial officer specifically asks a suspect if he will waive his rights by signing a form and does so in such a way that the accused would interpret a refusal to sign as a negative answer, the suspect has taken sufficient action to trigger the Edwards prophylactic rule and the officers must refrain from questioning the suspect. [8]
Under Quiroz, the question is whether Plugh's actions-a refusal to sign the advice-of-rights form in light of the agent's question Is that true; are you willing to do that? following his statements I am not sure if I should be talking to you, and I don't know if I need a lawyer  were an invocation of his rights. While Plugh's statements, I am not sure if I should be talking to you and I don't know if I need a lawyer, appear ambiguous, Plugh's ultimate action  his refusal to sign  constituted an unequivocally negative answer to the question posed together by the waiver form and McArdle, namely, whether he was willing to waive his rights. McArdle's direction to Plugh that [i]f you agree with the statement you can sign the form, Plugh, 522 F.Supp.2d at 487, makes the meaning of Plugh's response less ambiguous than the defendant's refusal to sign in Quiroz, where the officer simply asked would you mind just signing these? Quiroz, 13 F.3d at 509. Plugh's answer in this context, under Quiroz, amounts to an invocation, and that is where the inquiry ends. [9] Because Plugh invoked his rights, the custodial officers should have refrained from reinitiating the interrogation, and all subsequent statements made by Plugh were properly suppressed. [10] See Part II., infra.
The government, looking to language in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), takes the view that an initial invocation of one's Fifth Amendment rights such as Plugh's must be unambiguous and that the ambiguity is resolved against Plugh. The government argues that Plugh did not unambiguously invoke his rights and that therefore, the agents were free to continue to question him. This view seriously misunderstands the sweep of Davis. [11] In Davis, the Supreme Court held that if a defendant validly waives his Fifth Amendment rights initially and then thereafter attempts to invoke those rights, the defendant bears the burden of showing that the invocation was unambiguous and unequivocal to trigger the prophylaxis rules. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460-62, 114 S.Ct. 2350; accord Diaz v. Senkowski, 76 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir.1996). Davis does not instruct courts how to analyze an initial invocation of one's Fifth Amendment rights following the Miranda warnings where no waiver occurred. In our view, Davis only provides guidance for circumstances in which a defendant makes a claim that he subsequently invoked previously waived Fifth Amendment rights. In order to use statements made by a suspect without counsel present while under custodial interrogation, the burden is on the government to prove the suspect waived his rights. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 169, 107 S.Ct. 515. Once the government has met its burden, the suspect has the burden of proving that he resurrected rights previously waived. The invocation must be unambiguous and unequivocal. To avoid difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations, this is an objective inquiry. Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-59, 114 S.Ct. 2350. The Court fashioned the rule to avoid transform[ing] the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity. Id. at 460, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (internal quotation marks omitted). The rule ensures that a suspect does not use the Fifth Amendment as a sword to excise unfavorable evidence after discarding it as a shield. The Davis Court was careful to note that only  after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney. [12] Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (emphasis added); see also id. at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (noting that an ambiguous reference to an attorney would not compel the  cessation of questioning) (emphasis added); id. (noting that a statement [that] fails to meet the requisite level of clarity ... does not require that the officers stop questioning the suspect) (emphasis added); id. (declining to extend Edwards to require officers to  cease questioning upon an equivocal statement by a suspect) (emphasis added). Clearly, Davis is not in play here.