Opinion ID: 853419
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Indiana Code section 10-1-9-8

Text: Finally, Smith claims that inclusion of his DNA profile in the Crime Lab database violated Indiana Code section 10-1-9-8. In 1996, that section authorized the Superintendent of the State Police to create an Indiana DNA database consisting of records for convicted criminals, crime scene specimens, unidentified missing persons, and close biological relatives of missing persons. Ind.Code § 10-1-9-8(a) (1998). Smith argues that Indiana Code section 10-1-9-8 authorizes retention of DNA samples only in the four limited categories. Because he is not a convicted criminal, his DNA profile falls in none of the four. He contends that the statutory categories are exhaustive. As he puts it, the section is restrictive legislation that under State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946), requires DNA to be destroyed unlike fingerprints or arrest records. [1] Section 10 of the same chapter provides that a person convicted of an offense against the person, burglary, or child solicitation is required to provide a DNA sample for the database. Section 20 provides that a person whose DNA has been included in the database may request its removal if the conviction on which the authority for inclusion in the Indiana DNA database has been reversed. It is clear that this statute was drafted with concern for widespread dissemination of the records. Section 22 refers to the privacy standards in the statute. Access to the database is limited to law enforcement agencies by section 21. Section 16 provides that unauthorized use of information in the database is a Class A misdemeanor. The statute provides for expungement of records on a showing of reversal of the conviction that authorized the inclusion of a profile. Ind.Code § 10-1-9-20 (1998). Use of the term authorized rather than required in describing the effect of a conviction suggests that the databank is to include only profiles of samples that fit within one of the four categories of (1) convicted criminals, (2) crime scene samples, (3) unidentified missing persons, or (4) close biological relatives of missing persons. The statute also includes some provisions that apply to any laboratory conducting forensic DNA analysis in Indiana. Id. § 10-1-9-14. Under section 14(c) they are required to forward relevant DNA database records to the state police laboratory. Their disclosure of DNA analysis is restricted by section 17 to law enforcement, defense counsel, and certain other limited circumstances. Smith contends that because he was acquitted in Case 1, the sample taken in that case falls into none of the four categories for which the database was created. From this, he reasons that the admission of his DNA profile would violate the database statute. We agree that he meets none of the criteria for inclusion in the database, but disagree that exclusion of the evidence of the DNA match is a consequence of that circumstance. As a preliminary matter, it is not clear whether the database statute is relevant at all. The DNA profile in question was initially created by the Crime Lab, a Marion County Agency. Apparently the Crime Lab was also the agency that performed the initial analysis that tentatively identified Smith as a match to V.O.'s assailant. At this point we can only speculate as to the application of the statute. None of the provisions applicable to any laboratory in this state appear to be implicated by Smith's motion, and we cannot divine the relationship between the Crime Lab and the database, either in general or in relation to this case. It is not clear from the record in this case whether the Indiana DNA Database authorized by the statute played any role in the identification of Smith's profile, whether the Crime Lab acted independently of the database, or whether the nature of the Crime Lab is such that its records should be deemed part of the database authorized by the statute. In any event, assuming the database is implicated, we agree with Smith that the statute seems to limit inclusion of profiles to the statutory categories. As noted, it refers to expungement of records authorized to be included by reason of a conviction. The implication seems strong that without the conviction, the inclusion is not authorized. And the inclusion of the statutory list of eligible profiles seems meaningless without construing it, as Smith urges, to limit the profiles that may be maintained in the database. Moreover, if profiles from arrest records as opposed to profiles of convicted criminalswere to be maintained, as they are with respect to fingerprints, it would have been easy enough for the statute to say so. We conclude that the statute was hammered out to balance concerns for potential misuse of a mass of profiling of the citizenry against the obvious and very significant contribution to law enforcement that the database can make. Accordingly, Smith's motion raises the question whether the exclusionary rule applicable to searches and seizures that violate the state or federal constitution should apply to profiles that are included in the database from sources not authorized by the statute. The rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the state constitution was adopted in Indiana in Callender v. State, 193 Ind. 91, 96, 138 N.E. 817, 818 (1922), long before Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), held that the exclusionary rule was a requirement of the federal constitution in state proceedings as to evidence seized in violation of Fourth Amendment standards. The rule is entirely a creation of judicial precedent. Nothing in the state or federal constitution explicitly requires it. Similarly, there is no statutory direction as to the admissibility of DNA profiles included or retained in the database without statutory authorization. Unlike the two constitutions, however, the database statute does include a number of explicit prohibitions and sanctions. As already noted, some misuse of the information is subject to criminal penalties. The Superintendent is given explicit direction to promulgate rules for the implementation of the statute. Section 22 provides that a laboratory's failure to meet quality and privacy standards described in this Chapter may result in denial of the privilege of exchanging records with other criminal justice agencies. Because of this range of other sanctions, we are not faced with the total absence of incentive to comply with the law that led both state and federal courts to adopt the exclusionary rule as to constitutional violations. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914); Callender, 193 Ind. at 91, 138 N.E. at 818. Exclusion of extremely valuable evidence in crimes that often leave little other trace is a major social cost. In the absence of a clear directive from the legislature on the need to exclude this evidence and in view of the very substantial law enforcement benefits from the database, we conclude that the potential for abuse in the future is not sufficiently clear to warrant adopting a rule excluding evidence from the database on the ground that it was obtained or retained beyond the authorized classifications. The statute is relatively recent. An exclusionary rule would prioritize the need for compliance by the authorities with the statute over the cost of exclusion of obviously critical evidence as to a serious crime. If experience with the database statute suggests that denial of admissibility of DNA profiles obtained in violation of the statute is the only practical means of securing compliance with the privacy standards described in [the database statute] we can revisit this issue. The General Assembly is free to reconsider it at any time.