Opinion ID: 2550767
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Majority Errs by Deferring to the DSM-IV[1] Definition of Mental Illness

Text: ¶ 62 The majority correctly recognizes that an insanity acquittee petitioning for release must be discharged if it is demonstrated that he or she no longer suffers from a `mental disease or defect.' Majority at 650. And it correctly recognizes that we must not conflate the factual determination of polysubstance dependence and personality disorder with the legal conclusion of mental disease or defect under the statute. Majority at 650 n. 7. But unaccountably, it does just that. ¶ 63 Despite protestations to the contrary, the majority effectively assumes that polysubstance dependence is a mental disease or defect simply because it appears in the DSM-IV. See majority at 651. It concedes that some disorders defined in the DSM-IV will not rise to the status of `disease or defect' under our statutes. Majority at 651. But it concludes that polysubstance dependence qualifies, without explanation. Essentially, its legal conclusion relies entirely on the trial court's finding that Klein suffers from a mental disease or defect. But unfortunately, the majority fails to examine the substance of that finding. ¶ 64 Whether or not Klein continues to suffer from a mental disease or defect is indeed a question of fact. See majority at 650. But it is a question of fact the trial court neither asked nor answered. The trial court purported to find the legal fact that Klein continues to suffer from mental disease or defect. CP at 40. But it actually found only the fact that Klein suffers from polysubstance dependence. CP at 40, 22. [2] And it simply assumed that because polysubstance dependence is a disorder listed in the DSM-IV, it is a mental disease or defect under RCW 10.77.200. [3] But it was wrong.