Opinion ID: 307719
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court's Stated Reasons

Text: 8 The District Judge's ruling seems to consist of three parallel strands of thought. The first, which is infused most frequently throughout his colloquy with counsel, was expressed as In this case, wholly aside from the strict interpretation of Jencks, as a pure matter of fairness, Mrs. Middleton's testimony was so rambling on the stand here, and so inconsistent and some of her statements so inherently outrageous that as a matter of fairness alone I think perhaps we can't have the testimony. 10 Shortly thereafter he reverted to this theme: I am not talking just about the photographic information. I am talking about her testimony generally . . . . That is absurd testimony, absolutely absurd. And then there were other inconsistencies in her testimony . . . . 11 9 He then adverted to the second strand of his thought: But normally that would be a matter for the jury, not for me. But Jencks says you must have this material. . . . They say you have got to have them and I think you have to have them if you're going to put the witness on. 12 He then amplified this in discussing Lee v. United States: 13 [L]ikewise here there is no indication but that the reports were destroyed not in the ordinary course of business, but destroyed or lost not by the U. S. Attorney, but by the reporting firm employed by the United States; and that, of course, there is no indication whatever that there was any conscious purpose on behalf of the defendant [sic], and the defense counsel has agreed that was not so . . . . 14 In referring to our court's holding in Lee, . . . the fact, without making any general and sweeping holding, that in all cases the loss of Jencks Act statements will bar the witness. They say that in the context of that case and the delay in trial they cannot permit failure to produce the Jencks Act statement to go by without reversing. 15 10 The third strand of the trial judge's thoughts were not that the Jencks Act was an absolute bar, but that the law should be evaluated with reference to the importance of the testimony and the possible prejudice to the defendant. He referred to the statement made by an inter-office prosecution memorandum, 'The fact that many of the witnesses, especially Mrs. Middleton, opened up in the grand jury,' . . . Now surely that indicates the importance of the grand jury testimony from the Government's point of view. If it is important from the Government's point of view, surely it is no less important from the defendant's point of view. 16 11 In concluding his rationale, the trial judge interwove his first thought, the inherent contradictions and absurdity of the witness' testimony, with his third, the importance of it to the Government and to the defense: 12 In the context of this case, in the context of the many interviews had by Mrs. Middleton, in the context of her testimony on the stand in this case and the cross-examination, and except for the evidence that she has given on the stand here, there is no written word-for-word question and answer testimony anywhere available or would be available except this testimony in the grand jury which the U. S. Attorney and the grand jury thought was so terribly important. 13 It appears to this court that the absence of that question and answer testimony before the grand jury would, therefore, under the circumstances of this case and the circumstances and evidence we have as to the many statements made by this witness and her testimony on the stand, would be very prejudicial to the defendant. 17 14