Opinion ID: 2031495
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the court's resentencing of garritsen as a habitual offender violated his constitutional rights

Text: Garritsen argues that the introduction of the constitutionally infirm Minnehaha County burglary conviction at the habitual offender trial was error of a constitutional magnitude requiring vacation of his habitual offender conviction. There is no doubt that a constitutionally infirm conviction cannot be used to enhance a sentence under South Dakota's habitual offender statutes. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967); State v. King, 383 N.W.2d 854 (S.D. 1986); Application of Garritsen, supra . However, error even of a constitutional dimension may be deemed harmless where the reviewing court finds that absent the error, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a conviction. High Elk v. State, 344 N.W.2d 497 (S.D.1984). We review Garritsen's habitual offender trial in light of the fact that the only issue in such a proceeding is whether the defendant is the same person as alleged in the habitual criminal information... SDCL 22-7-12. In the present case, the state's evidence consisted of: (1) certified copies of court records from Minnehaha County indicating Garritsen's conviction of third degree burglary, and from United States District Court for the Northwestern District of Iowa indicating Garritsen's conviction of interstate transportation of stolen property; (2) a certified transcript of Garritsen's testimony from the principal felony trial which contained admissions of the prior felony convictions; and (3) the testimony of the court reporter from the principal felony trial identifying Garritsen as the individual who made the admissions. Garritsen presented no evidence. The court instructed the jury that the state had the burden of proving Garritsen to be the same individual mentioned in each of the alleged prior convictions. The jury returned separate verdict forms finding Garritsen to be the same individual previously convicted of burglary and the same individual previously convicted of interstate transportation of stolen property. Given the nature of a habitual offender trial, the evidence presented, [3] the court's instructions, and the separate verdict forms, we find beyond a reasonable doubt that absent the introduction of the constitutionally infirm conviction the jury would have found Garritsen to be the same individual previously convicted of interstate transportation of stolen property. Because only one valid prior conviction was required under SDCL 22-7-7, the court below did not err in resentencing Garritsen as a habitual offender. By affirming the resentencing, we need not reach the issue of whether the double jeopardy clause of the state and the federal constitution would bar retrial of Garritsen on the habitual offender charge. Affirmed. MORGAN, Acting Chief Justice, and HENDERSON, SABERS, and MILLER, JJ., concur. TIMM, Circuit Judge, sitting for WUEST, C.J., disqualified.