Opinion ID: 748851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Act in General and as Applied by the District Court

Text: 13 Pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, a defendant must be brought to trial within seventy days of the filing date of the indictment, or from the date of his appearance before a judicial officer, whichever is later. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). The Act sets forth several types of excludable delay, which do not count toward the seventy-day limit. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(1)-(8). For example, the district court may exclude delays caused by a continuance if the continuance is based on findings that the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). 14 In this case, Shetty made his initial appearance on December 7, 1994; was arraigned on December 12, 1994; and his trial was set for January 31, 1995. From December 7, 1994, until January 9, 1995, at which time the district court held a status conference, thirty-three days elapsed under the Speedy Trial Act. Thereafter, there were eight continuances of the trial. Shetty on his own or in conjunction with the Government requested six of these continuances. As of the hearing on Shetty's motion to dismiss, which was heard the day before his case went to trial, the Government submitted that 61 days ... [had] passed on the speedy trial clock [and that] ... nine days remain[ed]. Tr. at 47 (June 10, 1996). 15 On June 12, 1996, the district court filed a twelve-page order detailing its reasons for denying Shetty's motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act, which read in part: 16 [Shetty] stipulated to the findings required by this Court in determining excludable time [under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) ]. Based upon the parties [sic] representations, the Court made findings that this time should be excluded under the Act. 17 Order Den. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Indictment, at 9 (June 12, 1996) (footnote omitted). 18 It is important to note that while eighteen months have elapsed from [Shetty's] arraignment to his trial date, approximately 283 days of this period are directly attributable to [Shetty's] requests. Therefore, over half of the delay involved in this matter is neither at issue, nor disputed by [Shetty] in his motion. 19 Id. at 10 n. 9. 20 As mentioned before, [a defendant] cannot waive the right to a speedy trial. However, at the same time, [a defendant] may not stipulate to certain findings and then later seek to attack a court's findings concerning excludable time based upon such stipulations. [Shetty] always stipulated to the continuances, never once challenging the Government's position or the Court's reasoning. 21 Id. at 12 (citations and footnote omitted).