Opinion ID: 886760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Application of the One-year Postconviction Time Bar

Text: ¶ 26 Section 46-21-102, MCA, provides that a petition for the relief referred to in XX-XX-XXX may be filed at anytime within 1 year of the date that the conviction becomes final. (Emphasis added.) Section 46-21-101, MCA, incorporated by reference within § 46-21-102, MCA, delineates the claims which may be brought by way of a postconviction proceeding: XX-XX-XXX. When validity of sentence may be challenged. (1) A person adjudged guilty of an offense in a court of record who has no adequate remedy of appeal and who claims that a sentence was imposed in violation of the constitution or the laws of this state or the constitution of the United States, that the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence, that a suspended or deferred sentence was improperly revoked, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law or is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error available under a writ of habeas corpus, writ of coram nobis, or other common law or statutory remedy may petition the court that imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence or revocation order. [Emphasis added.] All claims for relief listed herein, including, as highlighted above, challenges to a sentencing court's jurisdiction, are incorporated within the time limitation of § 46-21-201, MCA: [A] petition for the relief referred to in XX-XX-XXX may be filed at anytime within 1 year. . . . Thus, by operation of the statutes, all postconviction claims must be brought within the one-year time period, or they are time-barred. The only exception to this rule is the one provided by the postconviction statutes themselves. ¶ 27 A statutory exception to the postconviction time limit is provided for a claim which alleges the existence of newly discovered evidence that, if proved and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole would establish that the petitioner did not engage in the criminal conduct for which the petitioner was convicted[.] Section 46-21-102(2), MCA. A newly-discovered evidence claim may be raised in a petition filed within 1 year of the date on which the conviction becomes final or the date on which the petitioner discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the existence of the evidence, whichever is later. Section 46-21-102(2), MCA. We have explained that the time limit is waived pursuant to this exception in order to prevent a clear miscarriage of justice, which exists if a defendant provides the court with newly-discovered evidence that proves the defendant is actually innocent. State v. Redcrow, 1999 MT 95, ¶ 33, 294 Mont. 252, ¶ 33, 980 P.2d 622, ¶ 33. We have also interpreted the exception to allow waiver of the time limit for a petition alleging the defendant is legally innocent. See State v. Pope, 2003 MT 330, ¶¶ 68-69, 318 Mont. 383, ¶¶ 68-69, 80 P.3d 1232, ¶¶ 68-69. We have held that waiver of the time bar is only justified by a `clear miscarriage of justice, one so obvious that the judgment is rendered a complete nullity.' Redcrow, ¶ 34 (citing Petition of Gray (1995), 274 Mont. 1, 908 P.2d 1352). ¶ 28 The exception to the statutory time bar does not apply in this case. Peña has not asserted that newly-discovered evidence proves he is innocent. See Sanchez v. State, 2004 MT 9, ¶ 12, 319 Mont. 226, ¶ 12, 86 P.3d 1, ¶ 12; State v. Rosales, 2000 MT 89, ¶ 7, 299 Mont. 226, ¶ 7, 999 P.2d 313, ¶ 7; § 46-21-102(2), MCA. Peña makes no claim that he is actually or legally innocent of the deliberate homicide or aggravated burglary. Sanchez, ¶ 13; Rosales, ¶ 7. Therefore, no miscarriage of justice has occurred. Sanchez, ¶ 13; State v. Abe, 2002 MT 260, ¶ 15, 307 Mont. 233, ¶ 15, 37 P.3d 77, ¶ 15. ¶ 29 Thus, Peña's challenge to the sentencing court's jurisdiction is time-barred. Though Peña's claim is actually nonjurisdictional in nature, that determination does not affect the application of the postconviction time bar. According to the postconviction statutes, both jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional claims must be filed within the time period prescribed by § 46-21-102, MCA.