Opinion ID: 789273
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Moorer's disability status under the regarded as definition

Text: 40 The first issue is whether the district court correctly found Moorer to be disabled within the meaning of the ADA. The district court found that Baptist regarded Moorer as having a physical or mental impairment — alcoholism 4 — that substantially limited his ability to work, and, therefore, Moorer satisfied the third definition of disability set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). According to the Supreme Court: 41 There are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall within this statutory definition: (1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. In both cases, it is necessary that a covered entity entertain misperceptions about the individual — it must believe either that one has a substantially limiting impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting. 42 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139. The district court reached its conclusion by breaking its analysis into two parts: first, whether Baptist regarded Moorer as having a physical or mental impairment, and second, whether Baptist mistakenly regarded that impairment as substantially limiting the major life activity of working, when it was not. Each part of the analysis is discussed below. 43 The district court did not commit clear error when it concluded that Baptist believed Moorer had the physical or mental impairment of alcoholism. After perceiving what she believed to be alcohol on Moorer's breath on July 22, 1997, Hill, Moorer's supervisor, told her superiors via an August 6, 1997 e-mail that Moore's apparent intoxication was a good indicator of [a] broader, lon[g] term issue, and she recommended a minimum 3-4 weeks of leave for him. After obtaining her superiors' approval, Hill demanded that Moorer undertake a fitness for duty examination or else face immediate termination. Later, Hill told Moorer that she thought he was an alcoholic and also called Moorer's wife and told her that alcoholism is an incurable, deadly disease and that Moorer would never be cured. When Hill fired Moorer, she told him that his work-related problems were caused by his disease of alcoholism. 44 This evidence was more than sufficient for the district court to conclude that Baptist, via Hill, perceived Moorer to be an alcoholic as early as July 22, 1997. It was within the province of the district court, as the finder of fact, to reject Hill's explanation that she relied solely on Moorer's poor work performance in requiring him to have treatment and then recommending his termination on the ground that her explanation was lacking in credibility and of no value. 45 The more significant issue is whether Baptist perceived Moorer's alcoholism as a substantial limitation on his ability to work, which, as noted above, requires a showing that Baptist perceived him as unable to work in a broad class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. Baptist argues that the district court erred in finding that Baptist regarded Moorer as significantly limited in his ability to perform even his particular job as a hospital administrator, let alone, his ability to perform a broad class or range of jobs. We disagree. 46 There was substantial evidence that Hill linked her perception of Moorer's alcoholism to his inability to perform his job as a hospital administrator. The August 19, 1997 memo that Hill sent to Moorer referred to his failure to meet the expectations normally associated with the hospital administrative responsibilities in BHCC. Hill further stated, While I find that you have made efforts to correct the noted deficiencies and have made some improvements in some areas, there is a lack of substantial progress toward elimination of root causes.... (emphasis added). Hill then listed several examples of these deficiencies and added, In an effort to utilize all available resources to evaluate these performance issues, I have made a management referral to Concern, EAP, for fitness assessment and any resulting plan of action. The implication of Hill's memo was that she believed that a root cause[ ] of Moorer's performance problems might be uncovered through his referral to CONCERN for his perceived alcohol problem. Consistently, Moorer testified that, at the time Hill informed him of the termination, she told him that she believed his performance problems were caused by his disease. 47 Based on this evidence, the court did not clearly err in finding that Hill acted in accord with her belief that Plaintiff's deficiencies were related to his alcoholism. Because Hill came to the conclusion that Moorer could not perform the duties of a hospital administrator, and because Hill linked his poor performance to his alcoholism, it was reasonable for the district court to conclude that Hill regarded Moorer as having an impairment that substantially limited his ability to perform his job. 48 Still, it does not follow from these findings that Moorer was entitled to a favorable judgment on his ADA claim. [T]o be regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working, one must be regarded as precluded from more than a particular job. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 523, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999). Moorer was required to show that Baptist regarded him as unable to work in a broad class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. This is no easy task. 49 In Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.2001), this Court recognized that [p]roving that an employee is regarded as disabled in the major life activity of working takes a plaintiff to the farthest reaches of the ADA and that this question is embedded almost entirely in the employer's subjective state of mind. Id. at 709. This task is extraordinarily difficult because it is safe to assume employers do not regularly consider the panoply of other jobs their employees could perform, and certainly do not often create direct evidence of such considerations. Id. The Court therefore held that where there is substantial evidence that an individual's medical status played a significant role in an employer's decision to fire that individual, combined with evidence that the employer concocted a pretextual justification for that firing, the need for more extensive factual inquiry — i.e., by a trier of fact — into whether the employer engaged in unlawful discrimination is especially acute. Id. Therefore, evidence that the company created a pretextual reason for [the plaintiff's] firing may tend to prove that it regarded [the plaintiff] as a disabled employee. Id. at 708. As discussed below, application of the Ross principles to the facts of this case tends to prove that Baptist regarded Moorer as disabled. 50
51 As noted above, there is substantial evidence that Moorer's medical status played a significant role in Baptist's decision to fire him. Prior to Hill's perception of alcohol on Moorer's breath, and her ensuing suspicion that he was an alcoholic, Moorer's termination was not imminent. Once Hill regarded Moorer as an alcoholic, however, she recommended, prior to any medical evaluation of Moorer, that he take an extended leave of absence for rehabilitation of his alcoholism. During that leave Hill purportedly uncovered additional performance deficiencies that led to Moorer's termination while he was still on leave. Hill told Moorer that his alcoholism was the cause of his performance problems. Accordingly, there is substantial evidence that Moorer's medical status played a significant role in Baptist's decision to fire him. Ross, 237 F.3d at 709. 52
53 The district court found substantial evidence in the record that Baptist concocted pretextual justifications for Moorer's termination. First, Hill testified that Moorer's termination was based, in part, on a written report from the state fire marshal's office purportedly stating that there was a fire hazard at BMH-Tipton. Hill claims that she reviewed this report prior to Moorer's termination. It was stipulated at trial, however, that following a search, the fire marshal's office was unable to find any record that such an inspection occurred. The only two written reports of fire safety inspections in the record indicate that the fire marshal conducted inspections on September 30, 1997 and December 4, 1997, after Moorer's termination. Baptist acknowledges the lack of a written report that pre-dates Moorer's termination, but explains that the record is replete with evidence that the fire hazards themselves existed prior to Moorer' termination. This explanation, however, does not explain away Hill's testimony that she relied on a written report of fire hazards. 54 Second, Hill testified that Moorer's termination was based, in part, on inspections of the BMH-Tipton facility conducted by the Tennessee Health Facilities Commission prior to the date of Moorer's termination, September 18, 1997. She claimed that [a]uthorized representatives of the Commission reported numerous issues concerning deficiencies at the facility. Hill testified that these reports were in writing and were on the corner of Moorer's desk and that she reviewed them prior to terminating him. Although the Commission did conduct a survey of BMH-Tipton, the survey was not conducted until September 30, 1997, after Moorer's termination. 55 Baptist has no persuasive response to this inconsistency, other than to point out that Hill had spoken with inspectors prior to Moorer's termination. This argument, however, does not explain away Hill's testimony that Moorer's termination was based in part on written reports from the Commission, reports she could not have received until after the termination decision was made. Baptist also argues that Hill unequivocally testified at trial that she spoke with surveyors from the Commission about deficiencies at the hospital prior to September 18[, 1997]. Baptist's Reply Br. at 21 (citing J.A. 594). However, the cited portion of the record does not support this assertion. Indeed, Hill admitted at trial that the survey itself was conducted on September 30, 1997, twelve days after Moorer's termination. (J.A. 585-87.) Thus, on this record, it is unclear how Hill could have had conversations with surveyors prior to Moorer's termination. 56 Third, Hill claimed that her termination recommendation was based, in part, on the August 21, 1997 letter from Dr. Cannon. However, Moorer's name is not mentioned in the body of the letter, and Dr. Cannon testified that the letter was not intended to be a criticism of Moorer's local administration of BMH-Tipton, but was directed at the system at large. Dr. Cannon further testified that Hill never spoke to him about this letter prior to the date of Moorer's discharge. 57 Baptist counters that the issues raised in Dr. Cannon's letter were not necessarily corporate issues, but involved the condition and maintenance of the hospital, issues that were Moorer's responsibilities. Baptist adds that Hill and others had a meeting with staff members of BMH-Tipton, including Dr. Cannon, a few days after receiving Dr. Cannon's August 21, 1997 letter. It was within the province of the district court, however, as the finder of fact, to credit Dr. Cannon's testimony over Baptist's explanation. 58 In addition to disputing several of the specific grounds Hill cited for his termination, Moorer argues that he was selected for termination before Hill discovered the depth of Moorer's performance problems while he was on medical leave. Moorer's wife testified that after she told Joe Swaim, a member of the BMH-Tipton board of directors, that Moorer's bosses had just visited him at the Talbot Recovery Center and fired him, Swaim responded, I know all about it. They told us all about it before they ever sent him. Swaim denied making this statement and stated that he was never told in advance that Moorer was going to be fired. Baptist explains that the statement Mrs. Moorer attributed to Swaim could have referred to the fact that he knew there was a problem and that Moorer would be away from the facility, rather than that Moorer would be terminated. Baptist's Reply Br. at 23 n. 20. Although Baptist's characterization of Swain's statement is plausible, it is not the only reasonable interpretation. The district court, as factfinder, was entitled to infer from this statement that Swaim knew that Moorer would be terminated prior to Moorer's admission to the Talbot Recovery Center. This inference tends to undermine Baptist's assertion that subsequently discovered problems with Moorer's performance led to his termination. 59 c. Regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs 60 The above-described evidence, which suggests that Moorer's alcoholism played a significant role in his discharge and that several of Baptist's reasons for terminating Moorer were pretextual, tended to prove that Baptist regarded him as disabled, Ross, 237 F.3d at 708; however, it was not sufficient in itself to prove that Baptist regarded him as substantially limited in his ability to work. Rather, Moorer still needed to proffer evidence showing that Baptist regarded him as unable to perform a broad range or class of jobs, meaning that Baptist perceived him as unable to perform the same general type of work in the same geographic area. See Henderson v. Ardco, Inc., 247 F.3d 645, 652, 653 n. 5, 654 (6th Cir.2001) (noting in ADA regarded as case that it would be plaintiff's burden at trial to prove that she was perceived as substantially impaired in her ability to perform other employment suitable to her age, education and experience and available in her geographic area); Burns v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 254 (6th Cir.2000) (looking to the EEOC regulations for guidance on the meaning of a substantial limitation on the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes, and noting that a court may consider `the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment (class of jobs)') (emphasis omitted; quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B)). 61 The Henderson case illustrates the type of evidence Moorer needed to submit. In Henderson, a welder on an assembly line injured her back and was restricted from stooping or bending and from lifting 25 pounds frequently or 40 pounds infrequently. Henderson, 247 F.3d at 647. Company policy prohibited an employee from returning to work unless he or she was 100% healed. Id. The company's plant manager testified that there would not be one job at the plant that the plaintiff's medical restrictions would not bump into. Id. at 651. 62 This Court found that one reasonable reading of the plant manager's view is that he considers someone with physical restrictions unable to `make it' doing factory work, even if it is within the technical requirements of the worker's restrictions, and/or that he considers it too risky or problematic to employ workers with whom he has to be cautious not to push much beyond the essential functions of their job. Id. The Court then held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer perceived the plaintiff to be substantially limited in her ability to perform a larger class of jobs because the 100% healed rule effectively treated her as incapable of work in a manufacturing operation. Id. at 651-52. In other words, the employer's perception about the plaintiff's ability to perform any work at that plant also constituted competent evidence of the employer's perception about the plaintiff's ability to perform the same broad class of work anywhere else. See id. at 654 (Plaintiff has brought forward evidence that the defendant perceived there was no job for her at the Ardco plant, and this gives an indication of the employer's perception about her suitability for a class of relevantly similar employment.). 63 We hold that, like the plaintiff in Henderson, Moorer presented evidence showing that Baptist perceived him as incapable of performing a broad class of work by virtue of Baptist's perception of Moorer's inability to perform managerial work for Baptist. The district court found that Moorer's job duties were diverse, requiring general skills that could be used in a broad range of fields. 5 The court noted that the skills required of Plaintiff as a hospital administrator are easily identified as necessary for most high-level management positions, regardless of field. According to the court, because Hill believed that Plaintiff's alcoholism substantially limited his ability to work at Baptist, she must also have recognized that such an impairment would have precluded him from performing a broad class of jobs. 64 Consistent with Henderson, the district court essentially found that Baptist perceived Moorer as unable to perform any job that would be appropriate for him given his training, knowledge, skills and abilities. The fact that Baptist believed that Moorer's alcoholism made him unable to perform his hospital administrator job, which required a broad range of managerial skills, permits the reasonable inference that Baptist believed that Moorer's alcoholism rendered him incapable of performing a substantial number of managerial jobs. This inference is buttressed by Hill's apparent belief, which she developed before she had any substantiation of Moorer's alcoholism, that Moorer had a drinking problem that in the short-term would preclude him from working at all for four weeks and that in the long-term would kill him. Indeed, Hill's belief that Moorer's incurable alcoholism would inevitably result in his death permitted the inference that Hill regarded Moorer as substantially limited in his ability to perform any life activity at all, let alone the major life activity of working. Cf. Heyman v. Queens Village Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Comm. Adolescent Program, Inc., 198 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir.1999) (reversing grant of summary judgment for employer because a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that defendants regarded the plaintiff as suffering from a physical impairment (lymphoma) that significantly restricted his ability to work; concluding that jury might find that defendants' experience of having allowed another employee with lymphoma to continue working and his resulting inability to perform all of his duties led defendants to conclude that the plaintiff, afflicted with the same disease, would likewise be unable to function fully and soon would become a workplace liability). Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not commit clear error when it found that Baptist regarded Moorer as disabled when it terminated him. 65