Opinion ID: 413381
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the welding workmen

Text: 15 Willson challenges the section 1926.28(a) citation by arguing that section 1926.28(a), a general construction industry regulation, is preempted by 29 C.F.R. 1926.750(b) (1981), a specific regulation imposing safety provisions on the structural steel erection industry. Accordingly, Willson asserts that section 1926.28(a) may not be used as the basis for a citation issued to Willson. Alternatively, Willson argues that the Commission erred in affirming the section 1926.28(a) citation because the Secretary did not demonstrate that a reasonably prudent employer familiar with the structural steel erection industry would have required its workers to use safety belts at the gymnasium-racquetball court construction site. 9 Although we conclude that the specific safety regulation, section 1926.750(b), does not preempt application of the general safety regulation, section 1926.28(a), to the structural steel erection industry under the circumstances presented by this case, we hold that the Commission's finding of a violation of section 1926.28(a) is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.A. Preemption 16 This Court recently considered Willson's preemption argument in a case involving two other OSHA citations issued to Willson. In L.R. Willson & Sons v. Donovan, 685 F.2d 664 (D.C.Cir.1982), we rejected Willson's claim that the mere presence of a specific safety regulation for an industry rendered inapplicable a general safety regulation that would, but for the specific regulation, apply to the industry under the circumstances. A general standard is not preempted unless a specific standard sets forth the measures that an employer must take to protect employees from a particular hazard. Id. at 670. 10 Thus, we must determine whether section 1926.750(b) sets forth, to the exclusion of the measures required under section 1926.28(a), all the measures that Willson was required to implement to protect its workers from the hazard of falling 24 feet from the steel beams on which they were working to the concrete floor below. We hold that it does not. 17 Section 1926.750(b) 11 provides that temporary floors must be provided within two stories or 30 feet, whichever is less, whenever steel erection work is being done. 12 If a building or structure is not adaptable to a temporary floor, then a scaffold must be provided. Should neither a floor nor scaffolding be practicable, a safety net must be provided whenever the potential fall distance exceeds two stories or 25 feet. We read section 1926.750(b) as establishing the measures required of employers engaged in the erection of structural steel to reduce the exposure of workers to falls of more than 30 feet. However, in our view section 1926.750(b) was not intended to relieve such employers of their general obligation, expressed in section 1926.28(a), to take appropriate measures to protect workers from hazardous falls of less than 30 feet. 13 18 The Fourth Circuit reached the same conclusion in an opinion by Judge Field, Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. OSHRC, 601 F.2d 717 (4th Cir.1979). Bristol was assembling a scaffolding preparatory to the erection of structural steel. Two employees were observed by an OSHA inspector on a wall, approximately 16 feet above some concrete stairs, without any fall protection. Accordingly, Bristol was cited for a violation of section 1926.28(a). Id. at 719. Bristol contested the citation, arguing that the specific structural steel safety regulation, section 1926.750(b), preempted application of section 1926.28(a) to its activities. Id. at 720-21. 19 The Fourth Circuit rejected Bristol's argument. Id. at 722. Recognizing that OSHA should be liberally construed to provide protection to workers, the court concluded that the general safety regulation was designed to fill those interstices necessarily remaining after the promulgation of specific safety standards. Id. at 721 (footnote omitted). 20 The specific standards relied upon by Bristol, while providing safety protection to employees engaged in steel erection, cannot achieve the goal of adequately protecting those employees in every conceivable situation. Infinite hypotheticals can be envisioned in which employees engaged in steel erection would be exposed to an unnecessary hazard not covered by a ... specific safety standard. The general safety standard dealing with personal protective equipment found in 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1926.28(a) complements the ... specific standards dealing with steel erection.... 21 Id. (emphasis added). 22 We find the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit persuasive. Willson, in essence, argues that the Secretary eliminated the general obligation of structural steel employers to protect their workers from the considerable hazard of falls less than 30 feet simply by specifying the measures required to protect such workers from the hazard of falls greater than 30 feet. Nothing in the Act requires the Secretary to establish specific safety regulations for all hazards in a particular industry, or to leave workers in that industry unprotected from such hazards, in order to specify measures required to protect workers from a particular hazard in the industry. See id. at 721 n. 11. The general obligation of an employer to protect his employees from a recognized hazard of the workplace 14 remains until the Secretary establishes specific safety requirements to protect workers from that hazard, or issues regulations which indicate that workers are to remain unprotected from that hazard. See L.R. Willson & Sons v. Donovan, supra, 685 F.2d at 670. 23 Section 1926.750(b) does not specify the measures required of employers to protect workers in the structural steel industry from hazardous falls of less than 30 feet and it is beyond question that falls of less than 30 feet can cause serious physical harm. Accordingly, the scheme of the regulations permitted the Secretary to cite Willson for a violation of section 1926.28(a) for failing to protect its workers from the risk of a hazardous fall of 24 feet. 15 It is therefore necessary to determine whether the Commission's order affirming the section 1926.28(a) citation issued to Willson is supported by substantial evidence in the record. We conclude that it is not. B. Substantial Evidence 24 Our review of the Commission's order affirming the section 1926.28(a) citation issued to Willson is limited to determining whether that order is supported by substantial evidence in the record. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 660(a) (1976). We are required to accept [the Commission's] findings of fact [if] supported by 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'  Whirlpool Corp. v. OSHRC, 207 U.S.App.D.C. 171, 176, 645 F.2d 1096, 1101 (1981). 25 To establish a violation of the general safety regulation, section 1926.28(a), the Secretary must prove 16 that a reasonably prudent employer familiar with the circumstances of the industry would have protected against the hazard in the manner specified by the Secretary's citation. Ray Evers Welding Co. v. OSHRC, 625 F.2d 726, 731 (6th Cir.1980). 17 Accordingly, in this case the Secretary was required to prove that a reasonably prudent employer familiar with the structural steel erection industry would have protected its workers from the hazard of falling 24 feet by requiring the use of safety belts. See Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. OSHRC, supra, 601 F.2d at 723. Courts require the Secretary to provide more than mere proof of the existence of a potential hazard to meet his burden. The Secretary must provide evidence from persons qualified to express such opinions 18 that, absent the specified protective equipment, the hazard was likely to occur; 19 that use of the specified protective equipment would not create new hazards for workers; 20 and that use of the specified protective equipment was feasible under the circumstances at issue. 21 Our review of the record in this case reveals that the Secretary failed to meet this burden of proof and that the order of the Commission affirming the section 1926.28(a) citation is not supported by substantial evidence. 26 The Secretary of Labor's only witness was Compliance Officer Browne. She testified that in her opinion it was feasible for the welding workmen to have used safety belts and to have tied those belts to the beams on which they were working. (JA 35, 89). The only evidence she offered to support her conclusion was her later observation that Willson employees were using safety belts while welding a scaffolding underneath the area where the alleged violation occurred. However, Browne was unable to identify what these workers' belts were tied to at that time. (JA 87-88). Browne did not inspect the work area, but rather viewed it from the ground, some 20 feet below. (JA 67). Furthermore, no evidence was provided as to the normal practice of the structural steel erection industry with respect to use of safety belts by welding workmen straddling beams. 22 27 Browne also testified that in her opinion there was a definite hazard to the welding workmen because they were holding tools in their hands and, therefore, could not hold themselves to the beams. (JA 31-32). Yet she offered no evidence, such as accident reports or statistics of the industry, to demonstrate the likelihood that the welding workmen would, in fact, lose their balance and fall from the beams on which they were sitting. Finally, the Secretary introduced no evidence with respect to any additional risks to the welding workmen that might be associated with their use of safety belts. 23 28 This sparse record simply does not provide sufficient evidentiary support for the Commission's conclusion that the Secretary had met his burden of proving a violation of section 1926.28(a) by Willson. We are particularly troubled by the total lack of evidence as to the normal practice with respect to the use of safety belts in the structural steel erection industry. Although we do not hold that such industry evidence would in all cases establish what was reasonable in the specific circumstances or that such evidence must be introduced in every case in order to find a violation of section 1926.28(a), 24 we suggest that evidence of industry use or non-use of safety devices is highly probative of the feasibility and safety of such devices. In the absence of such evidence, the Secretary must provide alternative, probative evidence of the feasibility and safety of protective devices in order to meet his burden of proof that a reasonably prudent employer would have so provided for the protection of his employees. 29 In this case, the only evidence presented by the Secretary with respect to the feasibility of the use of safety belts by the welding workmen was the unsupported conclusion of Compliance Officer Browne, who was relatively inexperienced in inspecting structural steel erection sites. 25 Browne did not closely inspect the work area where the alleged violation occurred, and her later observation of Willson's employees using safety belts when performing unrelated welding tasks is not probative of whether safety belts were feasible for use by the welding workmen at the site specified in the citation. Browne simply was not competent to testify as to the feasibility of the use of safety belts by the welding workmen at the gymnasium-racquetball court construction site 26 and the evidence she gave was insufficient to meet the Secretary's burden of proof. 30 It is clear that the evidence presented by the Secretary fails to demonstrate the feasibility of the use of safety belts under the circumstances set forth in the section 1926.28(a) citation issued to Willson. 27 Therefore, the Secretary did not meet his burden of proving all elements of Willson's violation of section 1926.28(a). Ray Evers Welding Co. v. OSHRC, supra, 625 F.2d at 733; Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. OSHRC, supra, 601 F.2d at 723; National Realty & Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 133, 144, 489 F.2d 1257, 1268 (1973). That being the case, the record necessarily lacks substantial evidence to support the Commission's affirmance of the section 1926.28(a) citation. National Realty & Construction Co. v. OSHRC, supra, 160 U.S.App.D.C. at 139, 489 F.2d at 1263. Accordingly, we reverse the Commission's order affirming the section 1926.28(a) citation. 31