Opinion ID: 2350495
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Invalidation of the 70% Voluntary Agreement

Text: By statute, landlords are permitted to adjust the rent ceiling for all rental units of a housing accommodation by a specified percentage if 70% of the tenants sign an agreement to that effect. D.C.Code § 45-1526 (1981). On October 25, 1984, Temple filed a 70% voluntary agreement with RACD. Temple argues that the agency's invalidation of the agreement was error and that the rent ceilings of all the units should have been set at the figures listed in the agreement. We disagree. On the form prescribed for the voluntary agreement, Temple listed as the rent ceiling the current rent of each unit, although, at that time, the agency had not determined the rent ceilings. The agreement, however, included the following typed-in statement: [W]hile we [the tenants] are aware that the reported ceilings in Column C are in dispute, we wish to certify that the current rents are fair and reasonable and that they should become the ceilings for the respective apartments. The agreement was signed by three tenants. [20] Lobsenz and Kirkendall did not sign. Prior to the date of the agreement, a fire in Kirkendall's unit rendered the unit uninhabitable and thus Kirkendall no longer occupied it. Hearing examiner Blaher determined that Kirkendall's absence from the apartment building disqualified him as a tenant for purposes of determining the number of tenants needed to constitute 70%. Blaher, however, invalidated the agreement on the basis of the inaccuracy of the rent ceiling on the form. The RHC affirmed Blaher's invalidation based on the inaccurate rent ceilings. The agency also determined that Kirkendall should have been included in the total number of tenants for purposes of determining whether 70% had signed. Since we agree that Kirkendall was still a tenant for purposes of the voluntary agreement, and since his inclusion as a tenant means that only 60% of the tenants signed the agreement, we need not address the RHC's other basis for invalidating the agreement. Under the rental housing laws, a tenant is a person entitled to the possession, occupancy, or the benefits thereof of any rental unit owned by another person. Id. § 45-1503(30). To determine whether Kirkendall was a tenant at 216 Third St., S.E., after he was displaced by a fire not caused by him, we turn to two sources. First, D.C.Code § 45-1561(f) (1981) provides: (1) A landlord may recover possession of a rental unit for the immediate purpose of making alterations or renovations to the rental unit which cannot safely or reasonably be accomplished while the rental unit is occupied.... (2) Immediately upon completion of the proposed alterations or renovations, such tenant shall have the absolute right to re-rent the rental unit. While this provision does not directly address the rights of tenants displaced by fires not caused by them, it generates the inference that if fire damage necessitates the removal of a tenant in order to rehabilitate a unit, the displaced tenant shall have the absolute right to re-rent the unit upon its rehabilitation. A contrary interpretation might sanction a landlord's use of fire as a mode of evicting tenants. Second, Kirkendall's lease was still in effect when the fire broke out. One provision of the lease stated: That if the premises become uninhabitable by reason of fire not due to the negligence of Tenant, his family, agents or employees, the rent herein provided shall be suspended until the premises shall have been restored to a habitable condition. Landlord shall not be obligated to rebuild or restore said premises. Since there is no evidence that Kirkendall caused or occasioned the fire, we concur in the RHC's interpretation of this provision. Under the agency's interpretation, Kirkendall's tenancy continued, but his obligation to pay rent was suspended. Thus, under both D.C.Code § 45-1561(f) (1981) and Kirkendall's lease, Kirkendall was still a tenant in Temple's building unless and until such time as Temple rehabilitated the unit and Kirkendall rejected the opportunity to return. Because only 60% of the tenants signed the voluntary agreement, the agency's decision to invalidate it was in accordance with law. [21] Id. § 1-1510(a)(3)(A).