Opinion ID: 2528334
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Pick Off Exception to Wheatley

Text: As the dissenting justice below correctly observed, this exception to Wheatley has gradually evolved in our appellate court. 398 Ill.App.3d at 889, 339 Ill.Dec. 119, 925 N.E.2d 1240 (Cahill, P.J., dissenting). The exception's origin can be traced to Arriola, where, as in the case at bar, the defendant tendered relief to the named plaintiff, who never filed a motion for class certification. Arriola relied on Wheatley in holding that a class action cannot be sustained if the defendant tenders full damages to the named plaintiff before the plaintiff moves for class certification. Arriola, 323 Ill.App.3d at 151, 256 Ill.Dec. 168, 751 N.E.2d 221. The court then implied, in dicta, that if the named plaintiff had moved for class certification early in the litigation, the result could have been different. Arriola, 323 Ill.App.3d at 151-52, 256 Ill.Dec. 168, 751 N.E.2d 221. The court quoted Susman: `If the class action device is to work, the courts must have a reasonable opportunity to consider and decide a motion for certification.' Arriola, 323 Ill.App.3d at 152, 256 Ill.Dec. 168, 751 N.E.2d 221 (quoting Susman, 587 F.2d at 870). Arriola interpreted this language as implicitly holding that a class action plaintiff must be given a reasonable opportunity to move for class certification before the case can be dismissed. Arriola, 323 Ill.App.3d at 152, 256 Ill.Dec. 168, 751 N.E.2d 221. Arriola has since been cited for the proposition that a class action suit should not be dismissed where the defendant tendered full payment to the named plaintiff before the plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to move for certification of the class. See Gelb v. Air Con Refrigeration & Heating, Inc., 326 Ill. App.3d 809, 821, 260 Ill.Dec. 421, 761 N.E.2d 265 (2001); Bruemmer v. Compaq Computer Corp., 329 Ill.App.3d 755, 763-64, 263 Ill.Dec. 516, 768 N.E.2d 276 (2002); Cohen v. Compact Power Systems, LLC, 382 Ill.App.3d 104, 110-14, 320 Ill.Dec. 524, 887 N.E.2d 668 (2008); Akinyemi v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 391 Ill.App.3d 334, 340-42, 330 Ill.Dec. 311, 908 N.E.2d 163 (2009). We agree with the dissenting justice that the exception to Wheatley developed through this line of cases has no basis in the law. 398 Ill.App.3d at 889, 339 Ill. Dec. 119, 925 N.E.2d 1240 (Cahill, P.J., dissenting). Susman did not hold, as Arriola suggested, that a named plaintiff in a class action suit is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to move for class certification. The court in Susman was concerned with the trial court's opportunity to rule on class certification once a motion to dismiss has been filed. Susman, 587 F.2d at 870. The court's holding was limited to the fairly narrow situation where a motion for certification has been pursued with reasonable diligence and is pending when a tender is made.  (Emphasis added.) Susman, 587 F.2d at 871 n. 4. Plaintiff cites public policy concerns in allowing a defendant to prevent class action litigation by picking off the named plaintiff before there is an opportunity to protect the interests of absent class members by moving for certification. However, there is no prohibition against settlements with class members as long as the rights of nonsettling class members are not affected. Jankousky v. Jewel Cos., 182 Ill.App.3d 763, 767-68, 131 Ill.Dec. 314, 538 N.E.2d 689 (1989) (noting that public policy favors and encourages settlements). There is no indication here that defendant's refund to plaintiff affected the rights of others who did not receive similar refunds. Presumably, the remaining class members can either pursue class litigation or bring their claims individually. Indeed, this class action could have survived if one of the remaining class members had substituted himself as the named representative. See Wheatley, 99 Ill.2d at 487, 77 Ill.Dec. 115, 459 N.E.2d 1364. In sum, the pick off exception applied by the appellate court below directly contradicts Wheatley, which upheld a dismissal for mootness where the named plaintiffs were granted the relief requested but never moved for class certification. We hereby reject this pick off exception. [1] The circuit court below correctly dismissed plaintiff's class action claim as moot. See Wheatley, 99 Ill.2d at 485-86, 77 Ill.Dec. 115, 459 N.E.2d 1364. We reverse the judgment of the appellate court reversing that dismissal. We note, in addition, that Gelb, on which the appellate court relied, is the only Illinois appellate decision we are aware of, other than the decision below, which specifically holds that a plaintiff's claim is not moot when a tender is made before the filing of a motion for class certification. Gelb directly contradicts Wheatley, and Gelb is hereby overruled. While the ultimate holdings of Arriola, Bruemmer, Cohen, and Akinyemi are in conformity with Wheatley, each of these four appellate decisions contains language essentially acknowledging and recognizing the pick off exception expressly rejected above. This language is a clear departure from Wheatley and is therefore incorrect and should not be cited.