Opinion ID: 2787038
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Combination Order

Text: On April 4, 2011, the government applied for both a wiretap order and a PLI warrant in a joint application. The district court issued an “Order Authorizing -8- Interception of Wire Communications” (Combination Order).9 The Combination Order permitted the interception of wire communications from Corey Turner’s cell phone. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516. The wiretap portion of the Combination Order is not at issue on appeal. Instead, Corey Turner challenges the portion of the Combination Order that permitted the collection of PLI for his cell phone. It is helpful to focus, first, on what Corey Turner does not assert. He does not argue that a request for a wiretap order and a request for a traditional warrant cannot 9 The Combination Order also specified that [P]ursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, . . . [the relevant] communication service providers, as defined in Section 2510(15) of Title 18, United States Code, during the authorized period of the interception . . . shall . . . provid[e] all information, facilities and technical assistance needed to ascertain the physical location of [Corey Turner’s cell phone], including but not limited to data indicating the specific latitude and longitude of (or other precise location information concerning) [Corey Turner’s cell phone], . . . for a period of thirty (30) days. The court further ordered the disclosure of the Requested Location Information concerning [Corey Turner’s cell phone], and initiat[ation of] a signal to determine the location of [Corey Turner’s cell phone] on the service provider’s network or with such other reference points as may be reasonably available and at such intervals and times as directed by the law enforcement agent serving the proposed order, and shall furnish the technical assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with such services as that provider accords the user(s) of [Corey Turner’s cell phone], at any time of day or night, owing to the potential need to locate [Corey Turner’s cell phone] outside of daytime hours. -9- be included in the same application. We agree that such an argument would fail. See United States v. Barajas, 710 F.3d 1102, 1109 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[N]othing in the Fourth Amendment prevents us from considering whether certain facts in the affidavit support probable cause for the GPS data in addition to the wiretaps. Warrants frequently authorize a search of more than one place, and one set of facts may provide probable cause for both searches.”). Corey Turner also does not argue that the application in support of the request for PLI for his cell phone lacked probable cause.10 See United States v. Gabrio, 295 F.3d 880, 882 (8th Cir. 2002) (“The Fourth Amendment requires a showing of probable cause to support a search warrant.”). Corey Turner does argue that in the joint application the government requested a warrant to obtain PLI for his cell phone without obtaining a stand-alone warrant that meets the procedural requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41. He asserts that any evidence seized as a result of that PLI request for his cell phone should be suppressed. Corey Turner is correct that no separate warrant to obtain the PLI from his cell phone was issued pursuant to Rule 41. But the government counters that it nevertheless complied with all procedural requirements of Rule 41, albeit not in a traditional manner in all instances, and that suppression is not warranted. The issuance of a Combination Order granting both wiretap authorization and permission to seize PLI from a cell phone, without a stand-alone Rule 41 warrant, presents several challenging and relatively novel issues for our review. 10 The other constitutional requirements of a warrant were also met in this case: The Combination Order met the particularity requirement by identifying both the phone to be tracked and the type of information to be obtained, and no one disputes the Combination Order was issued by a neutral and disinterested magistrate. See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979) (describing constitutional requirements for warrants). -10- As an initial matter, Corey Turner asserts that law enforcement essentially converted his cell phone into a tracking device as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) and referenced in Rule 41. Neither party briefed this issue on appeal, and we are reluctant to resolve an issue like this without adversarial briefing. The government’s approach on appeal is to assume, without conceding, this fact for purposes of analyzing whether Rule 41 procedures were adhered to. We will do the same and assume, without deciding, that the cell phone in this case should be treated as a tracking device for purposes of the procedural requirements of Rule 41.11 Rule 41 requires that a warrant for a tracking device “must identify the person or property to be tracked, designate the magistrate judge to whom it must be returned, and specify a reasonable length of time that the device may be used.” Fed. R. Cr. P. 41(e)(2)(C). In this case, the Combination Order identified Corey Turner’s cell phone by phone number and by its International Mobile Subscriber Identity number and described it as a “prepaid account” being used by Corey Turner, Sr. This description sufficiently identified the property, and resulting person, to be tracked. Indeed, Corey Turner does not argue otherwise. The Combination Order does not “designate the magistrate judge to whom [the warrant] must be returned” as required in Rule 41(e)(2)(C). As the government points out, the Combination Order did require that reports be submitted to “this Court” regarding “what progress has been made toward achievement of the authorized objectives and the need for continued interception.” The Combination Order does not, however, discuss the return of the “warrant” providing for the gathering of PLI. With regard to the time limit in Rule 41, the Combination Order does expressly limit 11 Whether the requirements of a traditional warrant or a warrant for a tracking device are imposed on the Combination Order in this case is not likely to make a difference in the ultimate analysis and resolution of this issue because the alleged violations of Rule 41 are statutory in nature, not constitutional, regardless of which type of Rule 41 warrant the government was attempting to obtain. -11- the collection of PLI to a period of thirty days, which does not exceed Rule 41’s outer limit of 45 days. See Fed. R. Cr. P. 41(e)(2)(C). Rule 41 also requires that a warrant for a tracking device “command the officer to . . . complete any installation authorized by the warrant within a specified time no longer than 10 days.” Fed. R. Cr. P. 41(e)(2)(C)(i). What “installation” means in the context of a cell phone is not clear. Given our approach to this issue on appeal, however, we will give Corey Turner the benefit of the doubt: The Combination Order fails to address the issue of installation in any way and fails to identify the specified time within which such installation must take place.12 See id. Rule 41(f) addresses the requirements for executing and returning the warrant. For a tracking device, the officer executing the warrant must include “the exact date and time the device was installed and the period during which it was used.” Fed. R. Cr. P. 41(f)(2)(A). This was not done. The government argues the Sealing Application, filed after the electronic wiretap surveillance concluded, “functioned as a warrant return.” Yet, nowhere in the Sealing Application (or the district court’s order granting the Sealing Application) is the PLI, or the request to obtain PLI, ever mentioned. In fact, in the Sealing Application, the government expressly describes its April 4, 2011, application as one “for authorization to intercept communications over [Corey Turner’s] telephone,” making no reference to the PLI. (Emphasis added). 12 The government points out that the interception of wire communications shall continue “for a period of thirty days measured from the earlier of the day on which investigative or law enforcement officers first begin to conduct an interception under this Order or ten days after this Order is entered.” This, the government asserts, is how the Combination Order complies with the requirement that any installation occur within 10 days. The quoted language applies only to the wiretap communications, however. The Combination Order does not include similar language in connection with the 30-day limit on the collection of PLI. -12- Similarly, no separate document regarding the PLI was returned to the court. See Fed. R. Cr. P. 41(f)(2)(B) (“Within 10 days after the use of the tracking device has ended, the officer executing the warrant must return it to the judge designated in the warrant.”). Additionally, the government failed to provide notice, or seek permission for delayed notice, to Corey Turner that his phone had been tracked, as required under Rule 41(f)(2)(C) and (f)(3). The district court order granting the government’s Sealing Application specifies “[t]hat the notification requirements to Title 18, United States Code, Section 2518(8)(d), be postponed as to all parties intercepted during this subject wire surveillance until further order of this Court.” The notice delay was provided for the wiretap communications, under § 2518(8)(d), but it was never requested by the government or provided by the district court regarding the PLI obtained pursuant to Rule 41. In sum, a substantial number of Rule 41’s procedural requirements for preparing, executing, and returning a warrant for a tracking device were not followed with respect to the seizure of PLI from Corey Turner’s phone. The government failed to designate a judge to which the warrant must be returned, return the warrant, execute the warrant by installing the device, provide the requisite date and time information for installation of the device, and provide notice following execution of the warrant. See Fed. R. Cr. P. 41(e)(2)(C) and (f)(2). The government applied for both wiretap surveillance and PLI in a joint application and received a Combination Order; in so doing, it appears that the procedures for the wiretap order were scrupulously followed, but the procedures for issuing a Rule 41 warrant were not. The question remaining is what remedy results from these violations of the federal rules. -13- “We apply the exclusionary rule to violations of Rule 41 only if a defendant is prejudiced or reckless disregard of proper procedure is evident.” United States v. Bieri, 21 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 1994). “To determine prejudice, we ask whether the search would have occurred had the rule been followed. If so, there is no prejudice to the defendant.” United States v. Hyten, 5 F.3d 1154, 1157 (8th Cir. 1993). We recognize that this case does not present a single or minor violation of Rule 41. See, e.g., United States v. Sigillito, 759 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 2014) (concluding that a minor violation of Rule 41—the officers’ failure to leave a copy of the warrant at the location searched—did not justify exclusion). Here, a Rule 41 warrant was subsumed in a wiretap order, and a significant number of the procedural requirements in Rule 41 were overlooked or ignored. Despite these deficits, however, Corey Turner offers no argument that the search and ultimate seizure of the PLI associated with his cell phone would not have occurred had a stand-alone warrant issued and had Rule 41 been adhered to. See Bieri, 21 F.3d at 816. Corey Turner also does not suggest the government acted in reckless disregard of Rule 41 when it failed to seek a separate warrant or follow the execution and return requirements of Rule 41. See United States v. Berry, 113 F.3d 121, 123 (8th Cir. 1997) (analyzing the “reckless disregard” issue as akin to “bad faith”). And the government prepared a 70-page affidavit in support of its joint application, providing far more evidence in support of the request for the Combination Order than it likely would have presented for a PLI warrant alone. We are concerned about the number of Rule 41 violations in this case. The government requested both a wiretap order and a Rule 41 warrant, and the procedural requirements for both should have been followed. Without a showing of prejudice or a suggestion of reckless disregard, however, exclusion of the evidence is not the proper remedy. Id.; see also Hyten, 5 F.3d at 1157 (“Absent a constitutional -14- infirmity, the exclusionary rule is applied only to violations of Federal Rule 41 that prejudice a defendant or show reckless disregard of proper procedure.”). Corey Turner has made no attempt to show either. Thus, under the facts and circumstances of this particular case, suppression of the evidence seized is not warranted, and the district court properly denied the motion.