Opinion ID: 1952548
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis i. whether the trial court erred in refusing to make a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of wilcher's alleged prior bad acts?

Text: Wilcher first argues that trial court erred by refusing to rule in limine on the admissibility of certain evidence of prior bad acts, thereby impairing his exercise of his right to testify. The evidence at issue consisted of statements made by Wilcher to journalist Sid Salter and prison records of Wilcher's bad behavior in the penitentiary. This Court finds that Wilcher is procedurally barred from raising this issue because he failed to proffer his testimony. Furthermore, even if this Court were to consider the merits of Wilcher's argument, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wilcher's motion. In support of his contention, Wilcher cites Settles v. State, 584 So.2d 1260, 1264 (Miss. 1991). The defendant in Settles had previously been convicted of other crimes. Settles sought and was denied a ruling that those prior convictions could not be introduced for impeachment purposes. Based on that ruling, Settles claimed that he did not take the stand to testify in his own defense. Settles, 584 So.2d at 1262. This Court reiterated its ruling in McInnis v. State, 527 So.2d 84, 87 (Miss. 1988) that the grant or denial of a hearing to determine in advance the admissibility of a prior criminal conviction for impeachment purposes is discretionary. Settles, 584 So.2d at 1265. Nonetheless, the court also admonished the bench and bar that there are sound reasons that dictate a serious consideration of applications for preliminary rulings. We strongly encourage that such rulings be made and that the trial courts defer ruling only in those rare circumstances where the delay is absolutely necessary to a fair presentation of the issue. In the instant case, there was an abuse of discretion. The trial court refused to consider the prior convictions in summary fashion stating only that it was not fair that the prosecutor be compelled to disclose whether he intended to use prior convictions. Settles, of course, was seeking no such disclosure. He sought only a determination whether the law as applied to the facts in his case would permit the use of certain facets of or all of his criminal history. The least to which he was entitled was exclusion of those convictions which are not permitted for impeachment under our rules. Id. Settles can be distinguished from the case at hand. Settles, as do most of the cases on this issue, involved a prior conviction being offered for impeachment purposes. See also Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 130-31 (Miss. 1991). Wilcher involves prior bad acts, for which he was not convicted. M.R.E. 404(b) provides that: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. However, when those other crimes, wrongs, or acts result in a conviction, additional rules of evidence apply. Specifically, M.R.E. 609 details the circumstances under which prior convictions may be used for impeachment purposes. [1] A review of Settles and its progeny reflects that, where the Rule 609 guidelines are clear, the trial judge is encouraged to make a pre-trial ruling on the admissibility of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes. See Settles, 584 So.2d at 1265; Johnson v. State, 666 So.2d 499, 502 (Miss. 1995); Hopkins v. State, 639 So.2d 1247, 1254 (Miss. 1993); Hansen, 592 So.2d at 131. However, there is no such clear set of guidelines for the admissibility of prior bad acts not resulting in a conviction. Furthermore, there is no such guideline for the introduction of either prior convictions or prior unconvicted bad acts for purposes other than impeachment: If [the defendant] had a valid legal objection to being cross-examined about a prior conviction, he was not denied the right to assert it, and presumably have it sustained if correct in his contention. The obviously appropriate time to assert it was if and when the State sought to cross-examine him on the subject. When a trial judge can know in advance of trial the circumstances under which evidence will be sought to be introduced, he can safely make a ruling. He should not be called upon, however, to anticipate which of several circumstances will occur. Evidence inadmissible for one purpose may be relevant and competent for another. And, a trial judge should not be faulted for refusing to rule in advance how he will rule when he does not, indeed cannot, know the context in which the evidence will be offered. Thorson v. State, 653 So.2d 876, 889 (Miss. 1994) (capital case) (citing Settles, 584 So.2d at 1265) (other citations omitted). The trial court has a great deal of discretion in declining to make a blanket ruling in limine on the admissibility of prior bad acts. This is particularly true in the light of Rule 404(b), which allows prior bad acts to be admitted to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. See M.R.E. 404(b). Moreover, even though this Court in Settles found that the trial court had abused its discretion by not making an in limine ruling on certain prior convictions, this Court also held that Settles was procedurally barred from raising the issue on appeal: This brings us to a consideration of whether Settles has properly preserved the issue. In Saucier v. State, 562 So.2d 1238, 1245 (Miss. 1990), we held that in order to preserve the issue whether a court erred in ruling on a motion to limit use of prior convictions the least that is required of the criminal defendant is that a proffer be made of the testimony that he would have offered but for the ruling. Id. at 1245. While, as we note above, the content of defendant's testimony may be of little assistance to the trial court in making a decision on admissibility, the requirement of a proffer serves two purposes. It provides a modicum of assurance that the requested ruling is not purely advisory and, most importantly, it provides a basis for this court's harmless error analysis. Of course, if a proffer is required in the face of an erroneous ruling, surely no less is required to preserve the issue where no ruling is made. Settles made no such proffer. Under the circumstances we need not reach the question urged upon us by the state, whether, the failure to actually testify is an absolute bar to the question of the availability of prior conviction evidence. Settles' conviction must be affirmed because he failed preserve the issue in the manner we have prescribed in Saucier, 562 So.2d 1238. Settles, 584 So.2d at 1265. Thus, Wilcher's argument on this point is procedurally barred. See Hansen, 592 So.2d at 131 (applying this procedural bar in a capital murder case). At the very least, a defendant wishing to present the point on appeal, absent having taken the witness stand himself, must preserve for the record substantial and detailed evidence of the testimony he would have given so that we may gauge its importance to his defense... . [i]f a defendant in fact has nothing of substance to say in his own defense, we are hardly likely to give the time of day to his suggestion that his right of allocution was chilled by the foreknowledge that the prosecution would present his prior conviction. Heidelberg v. State, 584 So.2d 393, 395 (Miss. 1991). Furthermore, even if Wilcher's argument were not procedurally barred, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by waiting to rule on the admissibility of Wilcher's prior bad acts until the State attempted to introduce them. Indeed, the introduction of these prior bad acts would have been proper if offered to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. See M.R.E. 404(b). Therefore, Wilcher's argument on this issue fails.