Opinion ID: 2520047
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecutor's Argument Regarding Motivations of Mitigating Witnesses

Text: Defendant first contends that the prosecutor's comments during closing argument relating to the motivation of his two sisters was improper because it mischaracterized the evidence and amounted to deliberate misrepresentation, thereby resulting in prejudicial misconduct. The prosecutor made the following argument: The most convincing testimony that this defendant should be sentenced to the death penalty came from both his sisters, Victoria and Graciela. They didn't shed a tear for him. They didn't beg for his life, for  for mercy for anyone, not even for themselves. They were somewhat lighthearted, noncommittal, and it didn't appear that they truly meant it when they said he was a good and nonviolent man. [¶] They're [ sic ] demeanor indicated, to the People at least, that they were supportive of their brother, but because they really, really know just how bad he, [ sic ] is because they lived with him and perhaps could not tell us the things that they really knew, that they testified out of family commitment. They testified for Mr. and Mrs. Valdez and not for him. [¶] They couldn't bring themselves to beg for his life because they know in their heart he doesn't deserve mercy. The two women said it all. They're not criminals. These are hard working people with children. [¶] ... [¶] But I'll tell you, these women know what Alfredo Valdez is, and they're not happy about it. To come to court and have to beg for somebody because their parents want them to, because he's your brother, you got to do it, Ladies and Gentlemen. I would expect nothing less from anybody else. [¶] You would want your brother to come. You would want your sister to come. But they're probably so sick, both of them, it probably doesn't cause either sister an inordinate amount of grief to think at all about one of their brothers, Alfredo, facing the death penalty. Their actions and demeanor tell us, and they tell you he deserves it. While counsel is accorded great latitude at argument to urge whatever conclusions counsel believes can properly be drawn from the evidence [citation], counsel may not assume or state facts not in evidence ( Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 732, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332) or mischaracterize the evidence ( People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673). `Whether the inferences the prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury to decide.' ( People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 169, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988, quoting Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 522, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035.) In this case, the prosecutor's comments did not mischaracterize or assume facts not in evidence, but merely commented on the evidence and made permissible inferences. ( People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 278, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897 [prosecutor's argument that the defendant's mother couldn't bring herself to tell [the jury] that he didn't deserve the death penalty ... [but only that] her religion says that there shouldn't be a death penalty amounted to fair comment on the evidence].) The prosecutor here did not misstate the witnesses' testimony or state that the witnesses did not ask the jury not to impose the death penalty. Rather, it is clear that the argument was based on the prosecutor's interpretation of the evidence  e.g., the witnesses' tepid testimony, their demeanor, and their relationship to defendant. (See, e.g., People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 964, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571 [no prosecutorial misconduct in prosecutor's comment that `[e]ven the most heinous person born, even Adolph [ sic ] Hitler, probably had a mother who loved him.' ... [Because a] reasonable juror would understand the comment as attempting to diminish the weight of defendant's evidence in mitigation, that is, the evidence of his mother's attachment to him. [Citation.]].) Moreover, there was no danger that the jurors believed the prosecutor was aware of facts to which they were not privy. (Cf. People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 829, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673 [improper argument because it raised the possibility the jury would assume [the prosecution] had some undisclosed knowledge].) Given this, there is no reasonable basis to conclude the prosecutor's argument skewed the jury's decision toward imposing the death sentence or diminished the jury's sense of responsibility. ( Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231.) In passing, defendant contends that counsel's failure to object amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Because we find that the argument was a permissible comment on the evidence, this claim also is without merit. Finally, we note that any possible prejudice was mitigated by the court's instruction to the jury that [s]tatements made by the attorneys during trial are not evidence. (See Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 734, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332.)