Opinion ID: 2051995
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the circuit court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder

Text: [15, 16] While the circuit court is given broad discretion with respect to the submission of jury instructions, when the issue is whether the evidence adduced at trial permits the giving of a lesser-included offense instruction, a question of law is presented. State v. Michels, 141 Wis. 2d 81, 95, 414 N.W.2d 311 (Ct. App. 1987). This court decides questions of law independently, without deference to the trial court or the court of appeals. Contempt in State v. Dewerth, 139 Wis. 2d 544, 552, 407 N.W.2d 862 (1987). [17-20] A circuit court has the duty to accurately give to the jury the law of whatever degree of felonious homicide the evidence tends to prove and no other. State v. Stortecky, 273 Wis. 362, 369, 77 N.W.2d 721 (1956). It is error for a court to refuse to instruct the jury on an issue which is raised by the evidence or to give an instruction on an issue which finds no support in the evidence. Lutz v. Shelby Mutual Ins. Co., 70 Wis. 2d 743, 750, 235 N.W.2d 426 (1975). The submission of a lesser-included offense is proper only when there are reasonable grounds in the evidence both for acquittal on the greater charge and conviction on the lesser offense. Hawthorne v. State, 99 Wis. 2d 673, 682, 299 N.W.2d 866 (1981). In applying this test, the evidence is to be reviewed in the light most favorable to the defendant. Id. at 683-84. We note, however, that: To give an instruction on a lesser included offense when the commission of that lesser included offense is not reasonably shown by the evidence is no favor to a defendant. The inclusion of a doubtful lesser included offense is likely to result in a jury's compromise to the detriment of the defendant. Numerous cases arise in which the proper alternative for the jury is either the conviction on the major crime or a complete acquittal. To superfluously add to the verdict a lesser included offense may well in some cases result in the defendant being found guilty of that offense when a verdict of not guilty should have been returned. Ross v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 160, 170, 211 N.W.2d 827 (1973). We conclude, after reviewing the record, that there is not a reasonable ground in the evidence for either acquittal on the greater charge of first-degree murder or for conviction on the lesser charge of second-degree murder. In regard to acquittal on the charge of first-degree murder, we find that the evidence, even when viewed most favorably to the defendant, leaves no reasonable doubt that, at the time the defendant shot the victim, the defendant had the requisite intent to kill to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder. The defendant shot the victim three times. Two of the bullets entered the victim's back, one approximately nine centimeters below the right shoulder blade, the other approximately seven centimeters below the right shoulder blade. One of the bullets that entered the victim's back hit his liver and diaphragm. The other bullet struck the victim's heart and lung. The third bullet entered the right top of the victim's head and traveled downward to the floor of the mouth, where it angled to the left and exited through the left jaw area. The cause of the victim's death was the gunshot wounds to his heart and his brain. [21, 22] As this court has previously noted, when one intentionally points a loaded gun at a vital part of the body of another and discharges it, it cannot be said that he did not intend the natural, usual, and ordinary consequences. Johnson v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 22, 33, 270 N.W.2d 153 (1978). Therefore, based on the nature of the injuries sustained by the victim as the direct result of the three shots fired by the defendant into the body of the victim, we conclude that there is no reasonable ground in the evidence for acquittal of the defendant on the charge of first-degree murder. In regard to reasonable grounds in the evidence to support a conviction on the charge of second-degree murder, the defendant argues that there was evidence supporting the view that the shooting was accidental and that the defendant only intended to scare the victim. The defendant contends that the evidence supporting the view that the shooting was accidental is the defendant's assertion in his statement to Officer Edge that the rifle went off accidentally and the testimony of Troy Oltrogge which indicated that prior to the shooting, the defendant told Oltrogge that he intended to scare the victim. We find that the defendant's assertions that the rifle went off accidentally and that he only intended to scare the victim are insufficient to support a conviction of the defendant on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. The defendant's assertions are not reasonable grounds for conviction of second-degree murder in light of the evidence adduced at trial concerning the nature of the weapon used by the defendant, the timing of the shots fired by the defendant, and the injuries sustained by the victim. More specifically, the weapon the defendant employed in shooting the victim was a .22-caliber semiautomatic rifle. By definition, a semiautomatic rifle requires that the trigger be pulled each time a bullet is fired. See Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 1052 (1977). In addition, a witness who heard the shots fired testified that the shots were spaced approximately one or two seconds apart. Finally, two of the bullets fired by the defendant at the victim entered the victim's back and traveled inward, while the third bullet entered the top of the victim's head and traveled downward, thereby indicating a passage of time between the shots fired at the victim's back and the shot fired at the victim's head. After reviewing the preceding evidence, we conclude that the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom are insufficient to support a conviction of the defendant on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. Consequently, we affirm the holding of the court of appeals that the circuit court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. In conclusion, we find that no seizure of the defendant occurred for fourth amendment purposes when the defendant went with the police officers to the police station for questioning, that the police did not violate the defendant's Miranda rights, and that the circuit court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. By the Court. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.