Opinion ID: 2508401
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Teton Consented to Jurisdiction by Implication

Text: ¶ 36 The sentence at the heart of this jurisdictional dispute reads simply, [a]ll arbitration proceedings and litigation shall take place within Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Several cases across the nation have addressed whether similar contractual language operates as a consent to both venue and jurisdiction. While the parties have cited no controlling authority directly on point, there is an abundance of support for the proposition that language such as that at issue in this case should be read as including consent to both venue and jurisdiction. ¶ 37 For example, in Resource Ventures, Inc. v. Resources Management International, Inc., 42 F.Supp.2d 423, 432 (D.Del.1999), the court had to determine whether the contractual language, in the event of litigation, the case shall be tried by the appropriate courts in the State of Delaware, evidenced a consent to both venue and jurisdiction. The defendants in that case concede[d] that this is a forum selection clause but [argued] that it d [id] not subject [them] to the Court's jurisdiction because the clause contains no reference to jurisdiction. Id. The court concluded that the clause did contain a consent to jurisdiction, reasoning as follows: Since the parties have asserted that the purpose of the clause was to provide a forum in the event of litigation, then the parties must have also intended the clause to be an agreement as to personal jurisdiction so that any lawsuit could be maintained in the Delaware forum. Any other interpretation would render the clause senseless because no litigation could proceed without a court having personal jurisdiction over the parties. Id.; see also Citizen's Bank v. W. Shore Surgical Assocs. LLC, 15 Mass. L. Rep. 514, 514, 2002 WL 31973240 (Mass.Sup.Ct.2002) (In this case, venue is established by a provision in the finance lease. This provision, therefore, also determines jurisdiction because venue can only be established once jurisdiction is clear.). ¶ 38 In Kysar v. Lambert, 76 Wash.App. 470, 887 P.2d 431, 441 (1995), the court pointed out that [a]ccording to most courts, a choice-of-forum clause shows consent to personal jurisdiction, even though it refers only to venue. See also, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir.1990) (There would be no point to a clause that placed venue in Milwaukee County . . . but left the defendants free to object that they were outside the court's jurisdiction.); accord Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Dennehy, 739 F.Supp. 1303, 1306 (E.D.Wis.1990) (The court finds that when a party consents to venue in a particular court, it implicitly consents to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by that court.); Mut. Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Barry, 646 F.Supp. 831, 833-34 (E.D.Pa.1986) ([T]he courts have determined that venue selection clauses contain an implied consent to personal jurisdiction.). ¶ 39 We find the reasoning of the above-cited cases compelling and hold that forum selection clauses need not make specific mention of a consent to jurisdiction when the language of the clause makes the parties' intention to resolve disputes in a particular forum evident. As a result, we conclude that Teton consented to the jurisdiction of Utah via operation of the forum selection clause and therefore the district court was correct in applying the rational nexus test outlined in Phone Directories.