Opinion ID: 183646
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alternatives to Chevron deference

Text: Although an agency may not have formally interpreted a statute, the agency's construction may still merit some deference whatever its form, given the `specialized experience and broader investigations and information' available to the agency. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 234, 121 S.Ct. 2164 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)). We give such an agency interpretation respect proportional to its `power to persuade.' Id. at 235, 121 S.Ct. 2164 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161). Here, we conclude, however, that for the reasons set forth above, the FWS's three rules and the Handbook address the issue before us only tangentially. The rules and the Handbook, therefore, have no power to persuade us of any particular interpretation of areas under Federal jurisdiction. The United States also urges us to defer to the interpretation of the ESA set forth in its amicus brief, pursuant to Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997). This argument is without merit. In Auer, the Supreme Court gave weight to an agency interpretation advanced in an amicus brief of an ambiguous regulation promulgated by the same agency. Id.; see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256, 126 S.Ct. 904, 163 L.Ed.2d 748 (2006); Siskiyou Reg'l Educ. Project v. U.S. Forest Serv., 565 F.3d 545, 555 n. 9 (9th Cir.2009) (reviewing cases in which the Ninth Circuit has granted Auer deference). In this case, the amicus brief purports to interpret statutory, not regulatory, language. Moreover, in Gonzales, the Supreme Court refused to extend Auer deference to regulations that simply parroted a statute, holding that [a]n agency does not acquire special authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 257, 126 S.Ct. 904. Here, the three rules cited by the United States essentially parrot the statutory language. Because they give[] little or no instruction on a central issue in this case, the FWS's three rules and the Handbook cannot support the FWS's efforts to decide the meaning of areas under Federal jurisdiction in the amicus brief. See id.