Opinion ID: 3013039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutorial Authority To Appeal

Text: It is axiomatic that a prosecutor has “no right to appeal an adverse criminal judgment unless expressly authorized by statute to do so.” Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 245 (1981); see also United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336 (1975) (“This Court early held that the Government could not take an appeal in a criminal case without express statutory authority.”); Gov’t of the V.I. v. Christensen, 673 F.2d 713, 715 (3d Cir. 1982). Thus, a legislature must “speak with a clear voice” in order to authorize a prosecutorial appeal in a criminal action. Manypenny, 451 U.S. at 247; see also id. at 246 (“[T]he presumption [is] that the prosecution lacks appellate authority absent express legislative authorization to the contrary.”). Here, the Government of the Virgin Islands asserts that its authority to appeal is supplied by 48 U.S.C. § 1493(c). The statute provides, “The prosecution in a territory . . . is authorized— unless precluded by local law—to seek review or other suitable relief in the appropriate . . . federal appellate court . . . from . . . an adverse decision, judgment, or order of an appellate court.” 48 U.S.C. § 1493(c). While 48 U.S.C. § 1493(c) appears to grant broad authority to the Government of the Virgin Islands to pursue an appeal, it is silent on whether an adverse decision, judgment, or order of the Appellate Division must be final in order for the government to perfect an appeal to this court.7 At issue is 7. The legislative history reflects that 48 U.S.C. § 1493(c) was enacted in response to Territory of Guam v. Okada, 694 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1982), 7 whether finality is required for appeals under 48 U.S.C. § 1493(c).
Generally, federal courts of appeals are limited to reviewing final decisions, judgments, and orders. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, courts of appeals “have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.” More specifically, finality is required by 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c), which provides jurisdiction for this court over appeals from the Appellate Division. 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c) (“The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district court on appeal from the courts established by local law.”); see also Ortiz, 126 F.3d at 547 (“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c), our jurisdiction is limited to ‘final decisions’ from the District Court of the Virgin Islands.”). Under this finality requirement, “a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered, in which claims of district court error at any stage of the litigation may be ventilated.” Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994). The requirement “descends from the Judiciary Act of 1789 where the First Congress established the principle that only final judgments and decrees of the federal district courts may be reviewed on appeal.” Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 203 (1999) (quotations omitted). It serves “several salutary purposes,” including “promoting efficient judicial administration” and avoiding “the amended by 715 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1983). 130 Cong. Rec. 23,792 (1984). Okada “held that the government of a territory[, namely Guam,] may not appeal to a federal court in a criminal case from a ruling—even that of [a district court sitting as] an appellate court—in the favor of the defendant, in the absence of a federal statutory authorization.” Id. Because there was no federal statutory authorization at the time of the decision, the Guam prosecutor could not appeal an adverse decision of the Appellate Division of the District Court of Guam to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The legislative history of 48 U.S.C. § 1493(c) is silent on whether an Appellate Division’s adverse decision must be final in order to be appealable. 8 harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals.” Id. at 203-04 (quotations omitted). We recognize that there are limited departures from the finality requirement. For example, Congress may “authorize[ ], through . . . statutory provisions, immediate appeals . . . in certain classes of cases.” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 310 (1995).8 But, “interlocutory appeals . . . are the exception, not the rule.” Id. at 309. One exception to the finality requirement is found in 18 U.S.C. § 3731. The statute authorizes prosecutorial appeals in criminal actions.9 Parts of 18 U.S.C. § 3731 specifically 8. In addition to statutory departures from the finality requirement, the collateral order doctrine is “a narrow exception to the normal application of the final judgment rule.” Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989). 9. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 provides: In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or information or granting a new trial after verdict or judgment, as to any one or more counts, or any part thereof, except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution. An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the return of seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after the defendant has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an indictment or information, if the United States attorney certifies to the district court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding. An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order, entered by a district court of the United States, granting the release of a person charged with or convicted of an offense, or denying a motion for revocation of, or modification of the conditions of, a decision or order granting release. . . . . The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes. 9 provide for appeals of certain non-final orders, including orders granting new trials and suppressing or excluding evidence. Thus, courts have heard appeals of certain interlocutory orders under this statute. See, e.g., Charleswell, 24 F.3d at 574 (“[O]ur jurisdiction over the [prosecutor’s] appeal is not dependent on 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Instead, we have jurisdiction . . . under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 . . . .”). But, we have held that “18 U.S.C. § 3731 does not authorize an appeal of a sentencing order.” Gov’t of the V.I. v. Douglas, 812 F.2d 822, 829 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus, the Government of the Virgin Islands concedes 18 U.S.C. § 3731 is not applicable here.10 Instead, the government contends 48 U.S.C. § 1493(c) authorizes its appeal. But unlike 18 U.S.C. § 3731, the text of 48 U.S.C. § 1493(c) does not expressly provide for appeals of non-final orders.11 As noted, 48 U.S.C. § 1493(c) is silent on finality. With no contrary authorization, we apply the general finality rule. Moreover, there is a “presumption that the prosecution lacks appellate authority absent express legislative authorization.” Manypenny, 451 U.S. at 246. Thus, absent Congressional authorization permitting the Government of the Virgin Islands to appeal non-final orders to this court, appeals under 48 U.S.C. § 1493(c) are limited to final decisions, judgments, and orders.
Requiring finality for appeals under 48 U.S.C. § 1493(c) accords with the role of the Appellate Division within the While the statute specifically refers to prosecutorial appeals “by the United States,” we have held that it also “applies to appeals taken by the Government of the Virgin Islands.” Gov’t of the V.I. v. Charleswell, 24 F.3d 571, 574 (3d Cir. 1994). Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 applies to appeals from the District Court of the Virgin Islands sitting both as a trial court and as an appellate court. Id. at 574-75. 10. We note that, aside from reiterating that 18 U.S.C. § 3731 does not authorize appeals of sentencing orders, our discussion of the statute takes no position on what types of non-final orders may be appealed under it. 11. Nor does the legislative history of 48 U.S.C. § 1493(c) indicate nonfinal orders may be appealed under the statute. 10 Virgin Islands court structure. As noted, we generally treat appeals from the Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin Islands the same as appeals from any other federal district court. See Ortiz, 126 F.3d at 548 (“[W]ith regard to the question of finality, we have treated appeals from the Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin Islands no differently than appeals taken from any other federal district court.”). In order to maintain consistency between appeals from the Appellate Division and other federal district courts, an appeal from the Appellate Division should either meet the finality requirement or satisfy a generally applicable finality exception. Allowing an exception to finality for appeals under 48 U.S.C. § 1493(c) would treat appeals from the Appellate Division differently than appeals from other federal district courts. Requiring finality also corresponds with another decision of this court. Recently, in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Marsham, we addressed a similar situation. 293 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2002). In Marsham, the defendant had appealed to the Appellate Division his sentence and restitution order imposed by the Territorial Court. The Appellate Division affirmed the sentence, but “remanded the case to the Territorial Court, ordering . . . that the restitution order be vacated.” Id. at 116. The Government of the Virgin Islands then appealed “the Appellate Division’s vacatur of the restitution order” to this court. Id. In addressing appellate jurisdiction over the government’s appeal, we held the Appellate Division’s decision must be final in order to be appealable. Id. at 117 (“The issue here is whether the Appellate Division’s decision is a final order.”).12 12. Notably, we did not specifically address 48 U.S.C. § 1493(c) in Marsham. Moreover, in Marsham, we concluded there was a “final [decision] for purposes of our appellate jurisdiction” because the Appellate Division judgment “conclusively and finally determined the issue of [the defendant’s] sentence and restitution, and sent the matter back simply for a ministerial entry” to vacate the restitution order. 293 F.3d at 117. But as we discuss infra Section II.C, there is no final decision here. 11 Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has read 48 U.S.C. § 1493(c) in conjunction with 48 U.S.C. § 1424-3(c), an analog of 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c) providing “jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the appellate division of the district court” of Guam. 48 U.S.C. § 1424-3(c). Under 48 U.S.C. § 1493(c), the territorial prosecutor in “Guam has the authority to appeal to [the Ninth Circuit] from an adverse final decision or order of the Guam Appellate Division.” Territory of Guam v. Borja, 983 F.2d 914, 916 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Territory of Guam v. Estrebor, 848 F.2d 1014, 1015 (9th Cir. 1988) (“48 U.S.C. § 1493(c), enacted after Okada, authorizes the prosecution in a territory to seek review of an adverse decision of an appellate court, and 48 U.S.C. § 1424-3(c) provides that this court has jurisdiction over appeals from all final decisions of the appellate division of the district court of Guam.”). In sum, there is no statutory authorization that would permit the prosecutor to appeal and to breach the traditional finality requirement. We hold that the Government of the Virgin Islands may only appeal final decisions, judgments, or orders under 48 U.S.C. § 1493(c).13