Opinion ID: 175980
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: DOL Report

Text: Plaintiff argues that the district court erred when it held that the DOL Report was inadmissible hearsay not exempted by Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), which provides: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: . . . . (8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth ... (C) in civil actions and proceedings ... factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. The disputed portion of the DOL Report states: Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., a covered employer, is considered a successor in interest to the covered employer Factory 2-U Stores, Inc. The circumstances of the transition that occurred between the two companies coincide with six out of eight factors that determine a successor in interest. These factors are: 1) the same retail business operation continued; 2) the same rental space was used; 3) most of the same personnel continued to work; 4) the store continued to employ retail salespeople who worked during regular hours; 5) the same supervisory personnel continued with the opening of the Dollar Tree store; and 6) the products continued to include clothing along with other personal, gift and household items (Exhibit E-6).
Some portions of the DOL Report, including the first sentence in particular, state legal conclusions. The district court ruled that, because Rule 803(8)(C) applies to factual findings, legal conclusions are inadmissible. This seemingly straightforward holding uncovers an open question of law in this circuit: Does Rule 803(8)(C) cover an investigative report's legal conclusions as well as its factual findings ? In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 109 S.Ct. 439, 102 L.Ed.2d 445 (1988), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the term factual findings in Rule 803(8)(C) encompassed only facts and not opinions and conclusions. The Court held that factually based conclusions or opinions are not on that account excluded from the scope of Rule 803(8)(C). Id. at 162, 109 S.Ct. 439. Particularly relevant here, the Court cabined its decision: We emphasize that the issue in this litigation is whether Rule 803(8)(C) recognizes any difference between statements of fact and opinion. There is no question here of any distinction between fact and law. We thus express no opinion on whether legal conclusions contained in an official report are admissible as findings of fact under Rule 803(8)(C). Id. at 170 n. 13, 109 S.Ct. 439. Only one circuit court has addressed that open question at any length. In Hines v. Brandon Steel Decks, Inc., 886 F.2d 299, 302 (11th Cir.1989), the Eleventh Circuit held that Rule 803(8)(C) does not provide for the admissibility of the legal conclusions contained within an otherwise admissible public report. Legal conclusions are inadmissible because the jury would have no way of knowing whether the preparer of the report was cognizant of the requirements underlying the legal conclusion and, if not, whether the preparer might have a higher or lower standard than the law requires. Id. at 303. That court caution[ed], however, that the amorphous line between `factual' and `legal' conclusions may obscure a practical analysis under this rubric. Id. The Fourth Circuit has agreed, albeit without analysis. See Zeus Enters., Inc. v. Alphin Aircraft, Inc., 190 F.3d 238, 243 (4th Cir.1999) (The NTSB order involved no factual determinations and was strictly a legal ruling. As such, the NTSB order was not admissible under Rule 803(8)(C).). We agree with the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits. Pure legal conclusions are not admissible as factual findings. In the context of a summary judgment motion, a conclusion of law by a third-party investigator does not, by itself, create a genuine issue of material fact for the obvious reason that a legal conclusion is not a factual statement and for the reasons explained by the Eleventh Circuit. Accordingly, the district court properly held that the DOL Report's legal conclusion that Dollar Tree is a successor in interest under the FMLA does not create a genuine issue of material fact.
The district court held that the remainder of the DOL Report, to the extent that it contains factual findings, is inadmissible as not trustworthy. [4] In Beech Aircraft, 488 U.S. at 167-68, 109 S.Ct. 439, the Supreme Court emphasized that, although a broad range of factual findings are potentially admissible under Rule 803(8)(C), the district court retains the discretion to exclude findings that are not trustworthy. See id. at 167, 109 S.Ct. 439 (Thus, a trial judge has the discretion, and indeed the obligation, to exclude an entire report or portions thereof ... that she determines to be untrustworthy.). Relevant factors include (1) the timeliness of the investigation; (2) the investigator's skill or experience; (3) whether a hearing was held; and (4) possible bias when reports are prepared with a view to possible litigation. Id. at 167 n. 11, 109 S.Ct. 439 (citation omitted). A party opposing the introduction of a public record bears the burden of coming forward with enough negative factors to persuade a court that a report should not be admitted. Johnson v. City of Pleasanton, 982 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir.1992). The district court acted within its discretion when it held that the DOL Report is not trustworthy. The report is incomplete because its exhibits are not attached. Its author is unidentified and unknown, making it impossible to assess the author's skill or experience. No hearing was held. The document does not appear even to be a final report, as distinct from an internal draft: It is recommended that this case be administratively closed as a partial agreement to pay. DOL Report at 8 (emphases added). The DOL did not issue the report or send it to either party at any time before this litigation; rather, it became available only because Plaintiff filed a request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. Accordingly, welike the district courtdo not consider the disputed portion of the DOL Report as evidence in our analysis of the successorship issue.