Opinion ID: 4510925
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Solitary Confinement Claims

Text: On appeal, J.H. challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of McMahan for the period of solitary confinement prior to December 9, and its grant of summary judgment in favor of Williamson County for the entire period of solitary confinement— November 17 to December 19. J.H. also argues that his procedural due process claim was properly pleaded. We address each argument in turn below. 1. Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Claim Against McMahan for Solitary Confinement from November 17 to December 8, 2013 The district court held that J.H. had sufficiently alleged McMahan’s personal involvement in J.H.’s solitary confinement, but disposed of J.H.’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against McMahan on grounds of qualified immunity. “Determinations of qualified immunity require us to answer two questions: first, whether the officer violated a constitutional right; and second, whether that right was clearly established in light of the specific context of the case.” Hayden v. Green, 640 F.3d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 2011). Because we can answer the qualified immunity questions in any order, see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009), we begin with the question of whether McMahan violated a constitutional right and then turn to whether that right was clearly established.
J.H. has alleged that JDC officials, acting at McMahan’s direction, kept him in solitary confinement as punishment for the November 17 incident, and that while in segregation he was fully isolated. Under the first prong of our qualified immunity analysis, we ask “whether [J.H.]’s No. 18-5874 J.H. v. Williamson Cty., Tenn., et al. Page 8 allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002) (emphasis added).1 The Supreme Court established in Bell v. Wolfish that, under the due process clause, “a detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt.” 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Under Bell, a pretrial detainee can demonstrate that he was subjected to unconstitutional punishment in either of two ways: (1) by showing “an expressed intent to punish on the part of the detention facility officials,” or (2) by showing that a restriction or condition is not rationally related to a legitimate government objective or is excessive in relation to that purpose. Id. at 538–39; see also Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015). The “expressed intent to punish” prong proscribes an intent to punish for the alleged crime causing incarceration prior to an adjudication of guilt. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535. It also prohibits officials from subjectively seeking to punish detainees simply because they are detainees, see id. at 539, or on the basis of vengeful or other illegitimate interests, see Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 375 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a substantive due process violation under the “expressed intent to punish” prong where placement of the plaintiff in solitary confinement was allegedly a vindictive response to a challenge brought by the plaintiff’s lawyer). This prong does not, however, categorically prohibit discipline imposed by jail officials for infractions committed while in pretrial detention. See, e.g., Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1002–03 (7th Cir. 1999); Kanu v. Lindsey, 739 F. App’x 111, 116 (3d Cir. 2018); Stamper v. Campbell Cnty., 415 F. App’x 678, 678–81 (6th Cir. 2011). Here, J.H. alleges that he was placed in solitary confinement in direct response to the November 17 disciplinary incident. This alleged action, without more, does not run afoul of the first prong of Bell. The relevant question is thus under Bell’s second prong: whether J.H.’s placement in segregation was “rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose and 1The district court held that there were genuine disputes of material fact as to these allegations by J.H., particularly “whether J.H. was placed in a single cell as punishment” and “how much social interaction J.H. had while housed in the single cell.” (Summ. J. Order, R. 384, PageID 13251–52.) In assessing the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, we do not disturb the district court’s determination on these factual points. Instead, we ask whether J.H. can show a constitutional violation if his allegations were true. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 736. No. 18-5874 J.H. v. Williamson Cty., Tenn., et al. Page 9 whether [it] appear[s] excessive in relation to that purpose.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 561; see also Collazo-Leon v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 51 F.3d 315, 318 (1st Cir. 1995). In answering the first part of this question, we agree that McMahan has put forth a legitimate governmental purpose: “maintain[ing] safety and security in the facility.” (McMahan Br. 42.) As the Supreme Court explained in Bell, “maintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and discipline are essential goals” of a detention facility. 441 U.S. at 546. Temporary placement of J.H. in solitary confinement, given his accused disciplinary infraction, appears rationally related to this purpose. Yet where McMahan’s argument falters is on the question of whether the discipline here was excessive. See Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 176 n.18 (4th Cir. 2018) (explaining “disciplinary measures based on a pretrial detainee’s misconduct in custody” must be “proportional thereto” in order to avoid qualifying as unconstitutional “‘punishment’ within the meaning of Bell”); see also Collazo-Leon, 51 F.3d at 318; Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 374. Jail administrators are afforded “wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 547. Yet this deference has its limits, and does not permit a detention facility to impose conditions that are excessively “harsh . . . to achieve objectives that could be accomplished [with] . . . alternative and less harsh methods.” Id. at 539 n.20. In considering whether the discipline imposed on J.H. was excessive, we are mindful of J.H.’s age; his known mental health issues; and the duration and nature of his confinement. We weigh these factors against the disciplinary infraction of which J.H. was accused and the governmental purpose for which the discipline was imposed. When considering “the totality of [these] circumstances,” we conclude that the discipline imposed was excessive relative to its purpose and thus violated J.H.’s Fourteenth Amendment rights as described in Bell. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 159–60 (3d Cir. 2005). First, we must consider that J.H. was a 14-year-old juvenile. As the Supreme Court has described, “youth is . . . a moment and ‘condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.’” Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 476 (2012) No. 18-5874 J.H. v. Williamson Cty., Tenn., et al. Page 10 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)). A growing chorus of courts have recognized the unique harms that are inflicted on juveniles when they are placed in solitary confinement. See, e.g., Doe by and through Frazier v. Hommrich, No. 3-16-0799, 2017 WL 1091864, at  (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 22, 2017) (granting a preliminary injunction preventing a detention facility from placing juveniles in solitary confinement as punishment or discipline and describing how “courts around the country have found increased protections for juveniles and persons with diminished capacities from inhumane treatment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments”); V.W. by and through Williams v. Conway, 236 F. Supp. 3d 554, 583, 590 (N.D.N.Y. 2017) (issuing a preliminary injunction to enjoin a county and its officials “from imposing 23-hour disciplinary isolation on juveniles” and recognizing “there is a broad consensus among the scientific and professional community that juveniles are psychologically more vulnerable than adults”); Turner v. Palmer, 84 F. Supp. 3d 880, 884 (S.D. Iowa 2015) (denying qualified immunity to officials who placed a juvenile with psychiatric issues in solitary confinement and noting that “[t]raditionally, juvenile detainees are afforded greater constitutional protection”). As a 14-year-old, J.H. was uniquely vulnerable to the harmful effects of solitary confinement, and thus his placement in segregation was a particularly harsh form of discipline. Second, it was well-known to McMahan before placing J.H. in solitary confinement that J.H. had been diagnosed with and required treatment for PANDAS, which is associated with several psychiatric symptoms. Placement of a mentally-ill detainee in solitary confinement “raises a genuine concern that the negative psychological effects of his segregation will drive him to self-harm.” Wallace v. Baldwin, 895 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 2018). As the Third Circuit has explained, confinement of a detainee should be assessed “in light of his mental illness,” recognizing the “growing consensus” that solitary confinement “can cause severe and traumatic psychological damage, including anxiety, panic, paranoia, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, psychosis, and even a disintegration of the basic sense of self identity.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 225 (3d Cir. 2017). Here, J.H.’s documented mental health issues made him particularly vulnerable to the effects of solitary confinement. No. 18-5874 J.H. v. Williamson Cty., Tenn., et al. Page 11 Third, we are mindful of the nature and duration of J.H.’s segregation. See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 180 (“[T]he Bell Court expressly considered, inter alia, the duration of the punitive conditions.”) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 543); Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 374 (considering the “nature of [the pretrial detainee’s] confinement” in determining whether the disciplinary segregation was excessive). J.H was in solitary confinement for several weeks—from November 17 to December 8, 2013—before Judge Guffee ruled on his placement in segregation. J.H. was housed in an eleven-by-seven-foot cell where he was not allowed to interact with any other juveniles. These 21 days of isolation are of noteworthy duration, as “[t]here is not a single study of solitary confinement wherein non-voluntary confinement that lasted for longer than 10 days failed to result in negative psychological effects.” Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., 848 F.3d 549, 566 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 477, 531 (1997)). The Third Circuit noted a study showing that “even a few days of solitary confinement will predictably shift the electroencephalogram (EEG) pattern toward an abnormal pattern characteristic of stupor and delirium.” Id. at 567 (quoting Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 325, 331 (2006)). And as Justice Kennedy has described, it has “long . . . been understood” that there is a “human toll wrought by extended terms of isolation.” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In sum, considering J.H.’s age, mental health, and the duration and nature of his confinement, we conclude that the punishment imposed on J.H. was excessive. When weighing the penalty imposed against his disciplinary infraction—in which he made verbal threats but did not physically injure another detainee—it is apparent that his punishment was disproportionate in light of the stated purpose of maintaining institutional security. See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 179–81 (holding a reasonable factfinder could conclude a detainee’s lengthy placement in solitary confinement “because of a single incident of unrealized and unrepeated threats” was excessive). Any momentary need to separate J.H. from the specific detainees whom he had threatened on November 17 does not justify the extended duration in which McMahan subjected J.H. to solitary confinement and completely isolated him from all contact with other juveniles. This discipline was excessive given the infraction that J.H. was accused of and the unique No. 18-5874 J.H. v. Williamson Cty., Tenn., et al. Page 12 vulnerabilities he possessed—namely his age and mental health status.2 We therefore hold that, assuming J.H.’s allegations to be true, his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights were violated when he was held in solitary confinement from November 17 to December 8, 2013.
The second question is whether the constitutional right in question was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. In order for the right to be clearly established, “[then-]existing precedent must have placed the . . . constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011); see also Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018). We cannot say that the right at issue was established with sufficient specificity as to hold it clearly established as of 2013, the time of these incidents. Many of the cases recognizing what a punishing experience placement in solitary confinement can be—especially for juveniles and those with mental health issues—have been issued after 2013. Thus, McMahan is entitled to qualified immunity, and we are obliged to affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this claim. 2. Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Claim against Williamson County for Solitary Confinement from November 17 to December 8, 2013 J.H. also sued Williamson County, arguing that its policies and customs were the “moving force” for the “constitutional violations perpetrated against” J.H. and that the county 2We do not mean to imply that each of these factors—that is, a detainee being a juvenile and mentally ill— must be present for the imposition of solitary confinement to be unconstitutionally excessive under Bell. See, e.g., Williamson, 912 F.3d at 181 (holding that simply the length of the plaintiff pretrial detainee’s solitary confinement could lead a “reasonable factfinder [to] conclude” that it was “excessive relative to his infractions”); Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 374 (concluding that given the “nature of [the plaintiff’s] confinement” it could be deemed excessive). However, where these factors are present, they must be relevant to our analysis. A court cannot consider the punishment of a child while ignoring the fact that he is a child, nor can a court pretend that the effects of solitary confinement are the same regardless of a detainee’s mental health status. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 474 (explaining that “imposition” of “penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children”); Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 225–26 (reversing a district court’s dismissal of an Eighth Amendment claim brought on behalf of a mentally ill 23-year-old who was placed in solitary confinement where plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged the “conditions there were inhumane for him in light of his mental illness”). No. 18-5874 J.H. v. Williamson Cty., Tenn., et al. Page 13 was deliberately indifferent “in the supervision and training of juvenile detention personnel.” (Compl., R. 1, PageID 3.) Although “[m]unicipalities are not vicariously liable for the actions of their employees” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Bible Believers v. Wayne County, 805 F.3d 228, 260 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc), a plaintiff can establish municipal liability under § 1983 by showing he was injured pursuant to a municipality’s custom or policy, Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). One basis for a Monell claim is a municipality or county’s failure to train its employees. As the Supreme Court concluded in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989): [I]t may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need. In that event, the failure to provide proper training may fairly be said to represent a policy for which the city is responsible, and for which the city may be held liable if it actually causes injury. Id. at 390. In Shadrick v. Hopkins County, 805 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2015), we held that plaintiffs can establish liability under a failure-to-train theory based on “‘a single violation of federal rights, accompanied by a showing that [the county] has failed to train its employees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential’ for a constitutional violation.” Id. at 738–39 (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)). “‘[O]bvious potential for such a violation’ has two elements: It must be obvious that the failure to train will lead to certain conduct, and it must be obvious (i.e., clearly established) that the conduct will violate constitutional rights.” Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford Heights, 858 F.3d 988, 995 (6th Cir. 2017). “The absence of a clearly established right spells the end of [a plaintiff’s] Monell claim.” Id. J.H. argues it was obvious that Williamson County’s failure to train its employees on the classification and housing of juveniles would lead to unconstitutional uses of “punitive solitary confinement for pre-trial detainee juveniles.” (Appellant Br. 41.) Furthermore, he argues it was obvious (or clearly established) that such punitive uses of solitary confinement would be unconstitutional. Having already concluded that J.H.’s substantive due process right was not No. 18-5874 J.H. v. Williamson Cty., Tenn., et al. Page 14 clearly established as of 2013, we must also conclude that J.H.’s Monell claim against Williamson County cannot succeed. See Arrington-Bey, 858 F.3d at 995. We thus affirm the district court on this claim. 3. Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Claim Against Williamson County for Solitary Confinement from December 9 to December 19, 2013 J.H. also appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Williamson County on the claim relating to his solitary confinement after Judge Guffee ordered on December 9 that J.H. remain in segregation. J.H. argues that neither Guffee’s judicial immunity nor McMahan’s quasi-judicial immunity extends to a municipality. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 701 (“[M]unicipal bodies sued under § 1983 cannot be entitled to an absolute immunity, lest our decision that such bodies are subject to suit under § 1983 ‘be drained of meaning.’”) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248 (1974)). Williamson County does not contend that it is eligible for judicial or quasi-judicial immunity—rather, it correctly argues that no basis for municipal liability remains after the court order on December 9, 2013, because Judge Guffee is not a policymaker whose decisions can create municipal liability. This conforms with our precedent. We have held that the “alleged unconstitutional actions taken by a juvenile court judge are not ‘policies’ of the county for which liability could attach under Monell”; instead, Judge Guffee’s order that J.H. remain in segregation was a “judicial decision[]” that was only “reviewable on appeal to the Tennessee appellate courts.” Johnson v. Turner, 125 F.3d 324, 335–36 (6th Cir. 1997). Nor could Adgent’s or McMahan’s adherence to that order create municipal liability because neither retained final policymaking authority regarding whether to segregate J.H. after the order was issued. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986). We therefore affirm the district court on this claim. No. 18-5874 J.H. v. Williamson Cty., Tenn., et al. Page 15 4. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Claim Against McMahan and Williamson County J.H. next argues that the district court erroneously dismissed his procedural due process claim against McMahan and Williamson County on the basis that it was not properly pleaded. The defendants argue that allowing J.H. to pursue a procedural due process claim not found in J.H.’s complaint would prejudice them because it would “subject [them] to unfair surprise.” (Williamson Cnty. Br. 40.) “The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . provide for liberal notice pleading at the outset of the litigation.” Tucker v. Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Emps., 407 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, even if a new claim appears during discovery, “liberal amendment of the complaint is provided for by Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that leave to amend the complaint ‘shall be freely given when justice so requires.’” Id. But “[o]nce a case has progressed to the summary judgment stage,” as is true here, “the liberal pleading standards under . . . [the Federal Rules] are inapplicable.” Id. (quoting Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004)). J.H.’s complaint alleges that the decision to put him in segregation “occurred in violation of [the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA)] and Tennessee Department of Corrections minimum requirements of confinement.” (Compl., R. 1, PageID 7–8.) It is unclear from the complaint, however, which portions of the PREA and the Tennessee Department of Corrections minimum requirements of confinement that J.H. alleges were violated. And even though J.H.’s complaint alleges violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, there are no specific allegations of procedural deficiencies. Thus, we affirm the district court’s holding that J.H. did not properly plead a procedural due process claim. C. Failure to Provide Medical and Mental Health Care Claims Against Adgent and McMahan J.H. also argues that Adgent and McMahan failed to provide adequate medical and mental health care and were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Specifically, No. 18-5874 J.H. v. Williamson Cty., Tenn., et al. Page 16 he alleges that “there was ample evidence to put Adgent and McMahan on notice of [the fact] that J.H. was suffering from serious mental health issues when he arrived at detention.” (Appellant Br. 52.) J.H. further alleges that “Adgent and McMahan ignored the needs of J.H. with ample evidence in front of them that he was a child suffering from mental deterioration” while in their care. (Id. at 53.)3 To prove deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, J.H. must “demonstrate both: (1) the existence of a ‘sufficiently serious’ medical need; and (2) that defendants ‘perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that [they] did in fact draw the inference, and that [they] then disregarded that risk.’” Hopper v. Plummer, 887 F.3d 744, 756 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702–03 (6th Cir. 2001)). The district court found that “it was reasonable for Adgent and McMahan to follow the instructions of medical providers concerning J.H.’s medication and to believe that any additional counseling or mental health treatment would be set up by J.H.’s parents or guardian ad litem or ordered by his medical providers.” (Summ. J. Order, R. 384, PageID 13262.) We agree. It is undisputed that J.H. met with and received medication from multiple medical professionals during his time at JDC, and that none of these officials requested that JDC make any accommodations for J.H.’s medical needs. Thus, the defendants’ actions were taken in reasonable “rel[iance] on medical judgments made by medical professionals responsible for prisoner care.” Graham ex rel. Estate of Graham v. Cnty. of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 384 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ronayne v. Ficano, No. 98–1135, 1999 WL 183479, at  (6th Cir. Mar. 15, 1999)). We therefore affirm the district court on this claim. 3We do not read J.H.’s brief on appeal as also raising a claim against Williamson County for failure to provide medical care, nor has he provided a basis for why there would be Monell liability here. Thus, we need not address the arguments raised in Williamson County’s brief averring that J.H. cannot succeed on such a claim against the county. No. 18-5874 J.H. v. Williamson Cty., Tenn., et al. Page 17 D. Failure to Train and Supervise Cruz Claim Against Williamson County Finally, J.H. alleges that Williamson County was deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk that Cruz would sexually assault him, and that it failed to supervise and train Cruz.4 In order to establish municipal liability under an “inaction” theory, as J.H. alleges, he must show: (1) “the existence of a clear and persistent pattern of sexual abuse by [JDC] employees; (2) notice or constructive notice on the part of [Williamson County]; (3) [Williamson County]’s tacit approval of the unconstitutional conduct, such that their deliberate indifference in their failure to act can be said to amount to an official policy of inaction; and (4) that [Williamson County] was the ‘moving force’ or direct causal link in the constitutional deprivation.” Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir. 1996). According to J.H., Williamson County was deliberately indifferent to the risk that Cruz would sexually assault J.H. when it failed to properly train him and properly conduct a background check, which would have revealed that Cruz is bisexual. While the details of Cruz’s alleged assault on J.H. are troubling, J.H. has not met his burden to establish municipal liability. We have held in unpublished cases that “opportunity alone, without reason to suspect that it will lead to a constitutional violation, does not establish deliberate indifference.” Mize v. Tedford, 375 F. App’x 497, 501 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Doe v. Magoffin Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 174 F. App’x 962, 970 (6th Cir. 2006). There was no clear pattern of sexual abuse at JDC, and Cruz had no history of misconduct at JDC. And there is no authority to support the offensive claim that a sexual assault is the obvious consequence of an official’s sexual orientation. J.H. argues that Mize and Magoffin are inapposite because, in those cases, the defendants were not charged with assuming responsibility of the plaintiffs in the way that Cruz’s job required. But that does not change the fact that “[t]he intentional, violent act that” Cruz is 4J.H.’s brief, in passing, also asks this court to hold that a reasonable jury could find Adgent and McMahan were “individually” deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk posed by Cruz. (See Appellant Br. 72.) We need not address the merits of this claim. The district court held that “there are no claims for failure to train and supervise against Adgent and McMahan individually,” as “Plaintiff has agreed” that these claims are only alleged against Adgent and McMahan in their official capacity. (Summ. J. Order, R. 384, PageID 13264.) The district court correctly dismissed these official capacity claims as superfluous of the claim against the county. See Foster v. Michigan, 573 F. App’x 377, 390 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Where the entity is named as a defendant, an official-capacity claim is redundant.”). J.H. cannot raise new individual-capacity claims, which he previously agreed he was not asserting, in his appellate brief. No. 18-5874 J.H. v. Williamson Cty., Tenn., et al. Page 18 alleged to have “performed far outside the scope of his duties” was not “something that was ‘obvious’ to occur.” Magoffin Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 174 F. App’x at 970. Furthermore, J.H. has not shown a “direct causal connection” between the failure to train Cruz and his alleged assault of J.H.—in other words, it is far from clear that any lack of training was the “moving force” behind Cruz’s decision to sexually assault a child. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d at 508–09. Thus, we affirm the district court on this claim.