Opinion ID: 2832467
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Response to Rubman’s FOIA Request

Text: Rubman has not alleged bad faith by CIS. The agency proved responsive throughout the process, especially in its quick creation of the second data table. See Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“[A]dditional releases suggest a stronger, rather than a weaker, basis for accepting the integrity of the search … .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore focus on the reasonableness of the search. The type and scope of CIS’s search was determined by its interpretation of Rubman’s FOIA request as one for statistics. In general, “an agency … has a duty to construe a FOIA request liberally.” Nation Magazine v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Furthermore, DHS regulations require its subsidiary agencies to clarify ambiguous FOIA requests: 3 We note that the D.C. Circuit now reviews all summary-judgment decisions in FOIA cases de novo. See, e.g., Petroleum Info. Corp. v. Dep’t of Interior, 976 F.2d 1429, 1433 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 14 No. 14-3733 If a component determines that your request does not reasonably describe records, it shall tell you either what additional information is needed or why your request is otherwise insuf- ficient. The component also shall give you an opportunity to discuss your request so that you may modify it to meet the requirements of this section. 6 C.F.R. § 5.3(b). CIS did not consult Rubman because it found his request to be, unambiguously, a request for summary statistics. FOIA states that “an agency shall provide [a] record in any form or format requested by the person if the record is readily reproducible by the agency in that form or format.”4 § 552(a)(3)(B); see also 6 C.F.R. § 5.11(b)(3) (“Components shall honor a requester’s specified preference of form or format of disclosure … .”); DeLorme Pub. Co. v. Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., 907 F. Supp. 10, 12 (D. Me. 1995) (“An agency’s duty is to disclose records, and records are formatted information. … Nothing in the FOIA excuses an agency from disclosing a particular record because it has disclosed the content elsewhere in a different format.”). This means that agencies must be attentive not only to the content of the records sought by a FOIA request but also to their form. In 4 This provision was added to FOIA in 1996 as part of the Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048, 3049 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2)). While it certainly indicates that a requester is entitled to electronic copies of documents if they’re “readily reproducible,” see Sample v. Bureau of Prisons, 466 F.3d 1086, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2006), the language of “form or format” clearly cuts more broadly than electronic documents alone. No. 14-3733 15 this case, unfortunately, CIS fixated on the former to the exclusion of the latter. Rubman’s initial request did not define the term “document,” but that’s hardly unusual. FOIA requesters often have no way to know exactly what type of records an agency has in its possession. But that doesn’t mean Rubman’s use of the word “document” could simply be ignored. A document may convey statistics, but it is not itself a statistic. Rubman’s FOIA request itself drew attention to this distinction when it asked for “documents reflecting statistics” and “documents that show the requested data.” (Emphases added.) See also Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 185 (1980) (“The Freedom of Information Act deals with ‘agency records,’ not information in the abstract.”). Furthermore, while the statistics that CIS assembled for Rubman were ultimately relayed to him in document form (first a four-page printout, then an e-mail attachment), we think that a FOIA request for “documents” is reasonably understood (at least presumptively) as one for preexisting internal agency records. “Records” for FOIA purposes are those that “the law requires the agency to prepare or which the agency has decided for its own reasons to create,” NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 162 (1975), and that “have come into the agency’s possession in the legitimate conduct of its official duties,” DOJ v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 145 (1989). The data table that CIS created in response to Rubman’s request was not produced or used in the course of CIS’s administration of the H-1B program. 5 5Additionally, “[t]he Act does not obligate agencies to create … documents.” Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 16 No. 14-3733 The idea that a FOIA request for “documents” refers (again, at least presumptively) to preexisting internal records is not only most consistent with the broad scope of the records that are subject to FOIA, it’s also most in line with FOIA’s purpose of showing requesters “what their government is up to.” DOJ v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989). A preexisting internal document enjoys marks of authenticity and accuracy that are absent from one generated by a FOIA officer. Genuine agency records also foster transparency by revealing—even if indirectly—something about the way the agency operates. The context-free data table of indeterminate origin released to Rubman furthered none of these policy goals. CIS also failed to give due weight to Rubman’s request for “documents”—plural—and more specifically for “all documents” about H-1B visa receipts. Even if the term “documents” were ambiguous, Rubman’s request plainly envisioned something more than a single data table. In LaCedra v. Executive Office for United States Attorneys, the D.C. Circuit held that a FOIA request that opened by asking for “all documents” on a particular subject but later said it was “specifically” seeking records on two narrower topics should have been liberally construed as one for all documents. 317 F.3d 345, 347–48 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Rubman’s case is much easier—his request never implied that he wanted anything 152 (1980). So FOIA would not have empowered Rubman to insist that CIS fulfill a request for a newly generated statistical table. This reinforces our conclusion that Rubman’s request for “documents” is best understood as one for preexisting internal documents rather than newly generated statistics. No. 14-3733 17 less than “all documents” reflecting statistics on the H-1B visa cap. It’s possible that Rubman’s request was too “non-specific and unwieldy” to permit an effective search, as the district judge thought, though we note that CIS has never specifical- ly lodged that objection, and the search was restricted to a four-year period. But if so, that’s the exact situation addressed by 6 C.F.R. § 5.3(b): If Rubman’s request did not “reasonably describe records,” CIS was required to “give [him] an opportunity to discuss [his] request” and clarify it. 6 We have no doubt that CIS believed in good faith that it was being helpful and efficient by generating a summary data table in response to Rubman’s FOIA request. We certainly don’t want to discourage agencies from providing raw data, database query results, or newly generated charts and tables when a FOIA request asks for them, when there are no other responsive records available, or when a requester consents to one of those formats. But when Rubman asked for “all documents reflecting statistics” and then objected to CIS’s decision to respond with a newly generated summary table, the agency was required to search for records in the form specified in the initial request. 6 If the scope of the search was the problem, CIS was also probably required to consult with Rubman under 6 C.F.R. § 5.11(e), which says that if an agency projects that a search will cost more than $25 (requesters are generally billed for the cost of the search), then it must both receive the requester’s permission before proceeding and “offer the requester an opportunity to discuss the matter with Department personnel in order to reformulate the request to meet the requester’s needs at a lower cost.” 18 No. 14-3733