Opinion ID: 2330170
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Preexisting back condition

Text: FGA argues that the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of Giglio's preexisting back condition. It claims that this evidence was relevant to its arguments regarding causation and damages. Specifically, FGA contends that it may attack Giglio's theory of causation without affirmatively proving an alternative. Giglio counters that the district court properly excluded evidence of her preexisting back condition because FGA's experts did not meet Nevada's certainty requirement for expert opinion testimony. A prior injury or preexisting condition may be relevant to the issues of causation and damages in a personal injury action. Voykin v. Estate of DeBoer, 192 Ill.2d 49, 248 Ill.Dec. 277, 733 N.E.2d 1275, 1279-80 (2000); see also Prichard v. Veterans Cab Company, 63 Cal.2d 727, 47 Cal.Rptr. 904, 408 P.2d 360, 364 (1965). In order for evidence of a prior injury or preexisting condition to be admissible, a defendant must present by competent evidence a causal connection between the prior injury and the injury at issue. McCormack v. Andres, 343 Mont. 424, 185 P.3d 973, 977 (2008) (The party seeking to introduce alternate causation evidence must demonstrate a causal connection between the present symptoms complained of and a prior accident.); Voykin, 248 Ill.Dec. 277, 733 N.E.2d at 1279-80 ([F]or a prior injury to be relevant to causation, the injury must make it less likely that the defendant's actions caused any of the plaintiff's injuries or an identifiable portion thereof.); Allendorf v. Kaiserman Enterprises, 266 N.J.Super. 662, 630 A.2d 402, 407 (N.J.Super.A.D.1993) (A party seeking to present evidence of a prior injury or condition relating to an issue of medical causation must show that the evidence has some logical relationship to the issue in the case.') Moreover, unless it is readily apparent to a layperson, a defendant seeking to introduce evidence of a prior injury generally must produce expert testimony demonstrating the relationship between the prior injury and the injury complained of, and why it is relevant to a fact of consequence. Voykin, 248 Ill.Dec. 277, 733 N.E.2d at 1280. The test for competency of medical expert testimony depends on the purpose for which the testimony is offered. Williams v. Dist. Ct., 127 Nev. ___, ___, 262 P.3d 360, 368 (2011). If medical expert testimony is offered to establish causation, it must be stated to a reasonable degree of medical probability. Id. However, if expert testimony is offered to contradict the party opponent's expert testimony, the offered testimony must only be competent and supported by relevant evidence or research. Id. However, for defense expert testimony to constitute a contradiction of the party opponent's expert testimony, the defense expert must include the plaintiffs causation theory in his analysis. Id. If the defense expert does not consider the plaintiffs theory of causation at all, then the defense expert must state any independent alternative causes to a reasonable degree of medical probability because he or she then bears the burden of establishing the causative fact for the trier of fact. Otherwise, the testimony would be incompetent not only because it lacks the degree of probability necessary for admissibility but also because it does nothing to controvert the evidence of appellants. Id. (quoting Stinson v. England, 69 Ohio St.3d 451, 633 N.E.2d 532, 538 (1994)). Here, the district court excluded all references to Giglio's preexisting back condition because it concluded that Giglio's prior injuries were remote in time and/or involved body parts that were unrelated to the injuries at issue. A review of the record shows that FGA proffered expert testimony that indicated that some or all of the treatment Giglio received after her fall could be attributed to her preexisting condition; however, none of the experts were able to testify to a reasonable degree of medical probability that her preexisting condition caused the injuries at hand. Because this testimony was proffered to establish causation, it failed to meet the appropriate standard. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of Giglio's prior back condition.