Opinion ID: 691683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cadena's Suppression Motion

Text: 2 Cadena contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress a gun and eighteen pounds of marijuana that police seized from his car during a traffic stop. The facts relevant to this claim are not disputed. At approximately midnight on December 19, 1990, Panola County, Texas Sheriff's Deputy Paul Beatty stopped Cadena's car for traffic infractions. The rural Texas highway on which the stop occurred is commonly used for the transportation of drugs. Cadena produced his driver's license and told Deputy Beatty that he was en route to a party in Ohio. When asked, Cadena told Deputy Beatty that he had a loaded pistol in the glove compartment; Deputy Beatty retrieved the gun. 1 Cadena presented a plastic identification card purporting to identify him as a Texas peace officer; he explained that he did not have a badge because he was no longer employed as a police officer. Upon presenting the identification card, Cadena's tone shifted from evasive and nervous to assertive and cocky. Cadena failed to produce registration papers or proof of insurance. 3 While Deputy Beatty conversed with Cadena, a man--later identified as Glen Flores--remained or pretended to remain asleep under a blanket in the car's back seat. Deputy Beatty eventually roused Flores. His answers to Deputy Beatty's questions conflicted with the answers Cadena had given. 4 Based upon his observations, Deputy Beatty suspected that Cadena and Flores were, in his words, up to something and therefore radioed for a dog trained to detect narcotics. Upon its arrival, the dog immediately indicated that the car's trunk contained drugs. Deputy Beatty opened the trunk and discovered approximately eighteen pounds of marijuana. According to Deputy Beatty's suppression hearing testimony, the entire roadside encounter lasted thirty-one minutes. 5 Cadena moved to suppress the marijuana and the gun. He contended that his roadside detention violated the Fourth Amendment and that the evidence seized during that detention should therefore be suppressed. After holding a hearing, the district court denied the motion. Cadena argues that the district court erred in its assessment of the legality of the roadside detention. We review de novo a district court's legal determination regarding the constitutionality of a police seizure of a person. United States v. Garza, 10 F.3d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir.1993). 6 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The stopping of a vehicle and the detention of its occupants constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). Since Deputy Beatty clearly seized Cadena and thereby triggered the protection of the Fourth Amendment, we must decide whether Cadena's detention was reasonable. 7 Traditionally, all police seizures of individuals were considered arrests and satisfied the Fourth Amendment only if they were supported by probable cause. 2 See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697 (1981). The Supreme Court, however, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), created a narrow exception to the probable cause requirement. After Terry, an officer may make a brief and limited seizure of a person if the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person to be seized has committed or is committing a crime. Id. at 19-21; Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980). 8 The Supreme Court has, since deciding Terry, described the types of circumstances that justify a police seizure founded on less than probable cause and has imposed limits on the permissible scope of a so-called Terry stop. We apply the standards established in Terry and its progeny to assess the reasonableness of the detention of motorists who have been stopped for violating traffic laws. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-11 (1977) (per curiam); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 435 (5th Cir.1993). To pass muster as a limited Terry stop, the detention must be justified at its inception, and its scope must be reasonably related to the circumstances that justified it. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20; Garza, 10 F.3d at 1245. 9 Our first inquiry is whether the stop was justified at its inception, i.e., whether Deputy Beatty had the type and degree of suspicion required to justify a Terry stop. For a brief investigatory detention to be valid, the officer must have an objectively reasonable suspicion that the person to be seized has committed or is committing a crime. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983). An officer's suspicion is reasonable only if it is based upon specific facts and observations. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). The Terry Court summarized, the facts available to the officer ... [must be such that they] would 'warrant the man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 10 Cadena does not argue that Deputy Beatty lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the car. Deputy Beatty witnessed several traffic violations, and the stop was therefore justified at its inception. But, absent reasonable suspicion that the driver is committing or has committed a crime, a police officer may not extend a traffic stop beyond the scope necessary to achieve the original purpose of the stop. United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir.1993); Cf. United States v. French, 974 F.2d 687, 692 (6th Cir.1992) (holding that marijuana odor emanating from automobile supplied officer with reasonable suspicion that justified extending the detention of the driver), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1012 (1993). Accordingly, our inquiry focuses upon whether it was reasonable for Beatty to extend the investigatory detention long enough to obtain a dog trained to detect narcotics. 11 Deputy Beatty, a well-trained and experienced law enforcement officer, testified that Cadena's suspicious conduct and the surrounding circumstances led him to summon the dog. A review of his testimony leads us to conclude that he harbored a reasonable suspicion that Cadena was transporting narcotics. Deputy Beatty articulated a number of factors that gave rise to his suspicion. The Texas highway on which the stop occurred was a pipeline for drugs entering and exiting Austin, Texas. When Deputy Beatty inquired as to Cadena's destination, Cadena responded implausibly that he was en route to an unspecified location in Ohio for a party. Cadena was unusually evasive and hesitant in answering Deputy Beatty's questions and conspicuously avoided eye contact with Deputy Beatty. According to Deputy Beatty, Cadena's reluctance was more pronounced than that which might be expected from an unhappy motorist receiving a traffic citation. Further, a companion, Flores, was asleep in the car's back seat; Deputy Beatty knew that such an arrangement is commonly employed by drug couriers who typically travel in pairs and alternate shifts of driving and sleeping. Flores' responses to Deputy Beatty's inquiries greatly differed from the responses given by Cadena. In fact, Cadena and Flores even differed as to how long they were going to stay in Ohio. Further arousing suspicion was the loaded handgun Deputy Beatty recovered from the car's glove compartment. Deputy Beatty also reported that Cadena displayed a Texas peace officer identification card of dubious validity; whereas Cadena had initially been evasive, he became cocky after displaying the card. 12 Deputy Beatty's observations, in our view, provide an articulable basis supporting a reasonable suspicion that Cadena was transporting drugs. We therefore conclude that the government has demonstrated that the stop did not exceed the permissible scope of a brief Terry -type investigatory detention. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Cadena's motion to suppress the evidence seized from his car.