Opinion ID: 2106827
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Cause of Action Against William J. Egan

Text: [19] In his cause of action against Dr. William J. Egan, Mr. Candee alleges that Dr. Egan obtained a judgment against him entered in Milwaukee County; that Dr. Egan caused receiver Joseph G. Koll to be appointed; and that in so doing Dr. Egan acted in knowing and willful violation of sec. 273.04, causing the plaintiff to suffer damages in the amount of $500,000. Because the cause of action thus alleged is based solely on the violation of sec. 273.04, Stats., 1973, the complaint cannot be sustained on that ground alone. However, a complaint should be sustained as long as it expressly or by reasonable inference states any cause of action. De Bauche v. Knott, 69 Wis.2d 119, 230 N.W.2d 158 (1975). The plaintiff contends that, even if a violation of sec. 273.04 does  not create a cause of action against a judgment creditor, it supplies the element of willfulness necessary for a cause of action for wrongful procurement of a receiver. [20-22] The wrongful appointment of a receiver may render the litigant procuring such appointment liable in damages resulting from it. 75 C.J.S., Receivers, sec. 427-431 (1952). In Cullen v. Landwehr, 201 Wis. 247, 229 N.W. 68 (1930), this court stated that a litigant procuring the appointment of a receiver, where the appointment is unauthorized, may be held liable for his fees. However, as all of the cases cited by the plaintiff show, a cause of action for wrongful appointment of a receiver exists where a litigant obtains the appointment of a receiver when no grounds for the appointment existed. See, e.g., Wagoner Oil & Gas Co. v. Marlow, 137 Okla. 116, 278 P. 294 (1929) (receiver appointed pendente lite when there was no likelihood of recovery and no danger of irreparable loss); Stella v. Mosele, 305 Ill. App. 577, 27 N.E.2d 559 (1940) (receiver in a mortgage foreclosure improvidently appointed). Here the illegality of the appointment of Mr. Koll is not predicated on the fact that sufficient assets exist upon which the sheriff could have levied without the aid of the receiver. On the contrary, the plaintiff's claim against Dr. Egan presumes that a receiver of the nonexempt assets was needed to satisfy Dr. Egan's debt. The plaintiff's complaint is that the receiver who should have collected assets to be applied to the Egan judgment was the original receiver Mr. Edgarton, not Mr. Koll. Under these circumstances the plaintiff has no conceivable cause of action against Dr. Egan for wrongful procurement of a receiver, and the trial court properly sustained Dr. Egan's demurrer with prejudice.