Opinion ID: 1707689
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: failure to present a triable issue of fact regarding cause of death

Text: Assuming, arguendo, that Palmer's proffered experts are qualified to testify, examination of the record reveals no evidence  particularly testimonial evidence  of significant and probative value establishing her allegation that Wooten's negligence proximately caused Patricia's death. Therefore, the conclusion that Palmer failed to carry her burden of rebuttal as required under Rule 56 remains valid; no triable issue of fact exists. Palmer levelled numerous claims to support her negligence allegation. Palmer claimed that repair of Patricia's fractured jaw should have been delayed until her neurological condition improved, but the record reveals no evidentiary support. The decision to proceed with the surgery was not made by Wooten; it was made by Buckley, a neurosurgeon and Patricia's primary physician. Palmer's own expert, Lamphier, conceded that Buckley was the appropriate decision maker and that Wooten was correct to rely on Buckley's advice. [18] Palmer admits in her own brief that Buckley found ... Patty was sufficiently stable neurologically to sustain oral surgery. Admission aside, evidence produced by Wooten shows no complications were encountered during or after the surgery. Indeed, Palmer's own expert, Lamphier, testified during his deposition that, based on information provided him, he knows of no complications that resulted during or after the surgery. Palmer also claimed that the procedure employed to repair Patricia's jaw was improper. According to Palmer, Wooten should not, under the circumstances, have wired Patricia's mouth shut and that, having done so, should have provided post-operative instructions that she was not to receive anything by mouth. Lamphier adds that [Wooten] had a responsibility if he wired this girl's teeth together, that she be given nothing by mouth, because of the great danger of aspiration. [19] Palmer and her expert were obviously confused at this point. Evidence shows that Wooten did not wire Patricia's mouth shut; other than mere speculation, Palmer provides no evidence to the contrary. As described by Wooten, the procedure entailed placement of two loose elastics ... one on the right and one on the left [side of Patricia's mouth] to simply encourage the jaw to stay closed. She could easily open it anytime she [needed] to vomit, to speak or to lick her lips or whatever function she desired. But see Appellant's Main Brief at 11 (he wired[?] her mouth ... by placing rubber bands in her mouth). The two elastics did not inhibit opening of her mouth. The discharge summary, written by Buckley, notes that Patricia was conversive after the surgery and spoke in a rational way. In fact, Patricia did vomit on at least one occasion several days following the surgery, and she experienced no difficulty expelling the vomitus material. The point of Palmer's allegation regarding the procedure to repair the jaw is unclear. Is Palmer claiming that the procedure proximately caused Patricia's death because her mouth was allegedly wired shut and, consequently, she was unable to expel vomitus material? If so, then this claim was not specifically enunciated, and an evidentiary basis is nonexistent. On the contrary, the medical records, Buckley's discharge summary, the autopsy, and the death certificate do not indicate that aspiration of vomitus material caused or contributed to Patricia's death. In sum, Palmer's claim  that the procedure to repair Patricia's jaw was improper  is without merit. Indeed, Palmer does not even delineate an alternative procedure which allegedly should have been employed. In the pleadings, Palmer levelled another claim  that an ulcer was the cause of Patricia's death and that the defendants ... negligently failed to exercise ... the degree of care and skill exercised by physicians and surgeons in like cases by failing to properly diagnos [sic] and treat the stress ulcer. The autopsy report, however, contradicts Palmer's unsubstantiated determination that an ulcer caused Patricia's death: No clear cause of the cardiac arrest was determined. The report additionally concluded that  [n]o actual ulcerations [were] found  in the gastrointestinal tract. The death certificate did note that Patricia died of cardiopulmonary arrest due to a stress ulcer as a consequence of an automobile accident. This notation was written by an individual other than the pathologist who conducted the autopsy and is unsupported by the evidence presented in the record. But if Patricia did die of an ulcer, then Palmer's claim should nonetheless be rejected because she failed to present specific facts, as required under Rule 56, showing that Wooten breached the still undetermined standard of care and a relation between the breach of duty and the cause of Patricia's death. Fruchter, 522 So.2d at 199 (citing Matter of Lanius, 507 So.2d 27, 30 (Miss. 1987), and First Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n, 460 So.2d at 792). As stated, mere allegation or denial of material fact is insufficient to generate a triable issue of fact sufficient to avoid an adverse rendering of summary judgment. Sanders, 485 So.2d at 1054; Hill v. Consumer Nat'l Bank, 482 So.2d 1124, 1128 (Miss. 1986), cited in Fruchter, 522 So.2d at 198-99. Finally, in addition to her unsubstantiated claims that aspiration or an ulcer caused Patricia's death, Palmer levelled yet another claim: that Patricia fatally choked on a rubber band which Wooten used in repairing the fractured jaw. The record is devoid of supportive evidence. In sum, Palmer put forth numerous claims concerning the cause of Patricia's death, but failed to produce evidence of sufficient value to defeat Wooten's motion for summary judgment.