Opinion ID: 2452851
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Burden on Right of Association

Text: To secure an order preventing the disclosure of its donor lists, BACALA bears the initial burden to make a prima facie showing that the trial court's orders will burden First Amendment rights. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74, 96 S.Ct. 612; New York State Nat'l Org. for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1355 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947, 110 S.Ct. 2206, 109 L.Ed.2d 532 (1990); Brock v. Local 375, Plumbers Int'l Union, 860 F.2d 346, 349-50 (9th Cir.1988). Many courts have grappled with the question of what constitutes a sufficient showing of harm to First Amendment rights. Brock, 860 F.2d at 350 n. 1 (listing cases). In order to guarantee protection of a party's First Amendment rights, however, the burden must be light. Terry, 886 F.2d at 1355 ([I]n making out a prima facie case of harm the burden is light.). The Supreme Court has recognized that unduly strict requirements of proof could impose a heavy burden and that a party must be allowed sufficient flexibility in the proof of injury to assure a fair consideration of [its] claim. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74, 96 S.Ct. 612. The evidence offered need show only a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties. Id. The proof may include specific evidence of past or present harassment of members due to their associational ties, or of harassment directed against the organization itself. Id. At the hearing on the taxpayers' motion to compel and BACALA's motion for protective order, BACALA submitted several letters as evidence that its supporters had been subject to boycott threats. The first letter was a law firm's resignation from the Chamber because of the Chamber's position concerning tort reform. A second letter prevailed upon local lawyers to urge their clients not to do business with BACALA supporters, listing Chamber members who voted to support BACALA and major contributors to BACALA. This letter stated that BACALA is basically about limiting and destroying our right to trial by jury. Another letter, from a lawyer to a local district judge, explained that the lawyer would not be contributing to a judicial conference because the conference would be held at a barbecue restaurant owned by a BACALA supporter. This letter referred to BACALA as an organization which has degradated [sic] our judiciary, our judicial system and the citizens who spend their valuable time serving so faithfully on our juries and asserted that the author simply will not knowingly do business with anyone who so attacks our judicial system or the good people who run and participate in it. A final letter, from a lawyer to the president of the U.S. Lexington Museum on the Bay, stated that the lawyer would not support the association because its deputy executive director was BACALA's treasurer. BACALA also offered testimonial evidence that many contributors donate money on an anonymous basis and that some fear an adverse impact on their businesses if they are identified as BACALA supporters. The taxpayers respond that they introduced evidence to show that disclosure would result in no such reprisals. For example, one of the taxpayers' lawyers, the author of the letter concerning the barbecue restaurant, testified that he had recently eaten at the barbecue restaurant and that he and the restaurant owner were long-time friends. The taxpayers do not dispute, however, that the threats were made or that they were intended when made; they merely claim that the threats should no longer be taken seriously. The taxpayers further argue that BACALA's evidence of retaliation is too speculative to satisfy its burden of proof. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 70, 96 S.Ct. 612. In Buckley , the Court concluded that the appellants' evidence of retaliation was highly speculative and therefore NAACP v. Alabama was inapposite. Id. at 69-73, 96 S.Ct. 612. The Buckley appellants relied primarily on the clearly articulated fears of individuals, well experienced in the political process and testimonial evidence that one or two persons refused to make contributions because of the possibility of disclosure. Id. at 71-72, 96 S.Ct. 612. The appellants offered no stronger evidence of threats or harassment. Id. at 72 n. 88, 96 S.Ct. 612. BACALA's evidence is stronger than that offered by the appellants in Buckley . As opposed to mere subjective fears and testimony that some donors would refuse to donate, BACALA's evidence demonstrates that individuals opposed to BACALA's agenda had boycotted the business establishments of persons affiliated with BACALA and encouraged others to do the same. This is the type of specific evidence of past or present harassment of members due to their associational ties and harassment directed against the organization recognized by the Court in Buckley . Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74, 96 S.Ct. 612. The evidence shows actual, non-speculative hostility and demonstrates a reasonable probability of economic reprisals against contributors that may burden First Amendment rights. Cf. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462, 78 S.Ct. 1163. Under such circumstances, compelled disclosure of BACALA's contributor lists may dissuade contributors and hinder BACALA's and its contributors' ability to pursue collective advocacy of their beliefs. See id. at 462-63, 78 S.Ct. 1163. The taxpayers also argue that the alleged harm falls short of the type of retaliation shown by parties in other cases such as Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 99, 103 S.Ct. 416, 74 L.Ed.2d 250 (1982), and NAACP v. Alabama , in which courts protected associations from disclosing supporters' names. In Brown , for example, the campaign committee introduced evidence of harassment including threatening phone calls, hate mail, destruction of property, and physical violence. We agree with the taxpayers that the threat to BACALA is not as severe as that demonstrated in cases such as Brown or NAACP . However, such a factual record of violent past harassment is not the only situation in which courts have recognized a potential infringement on an association's First Amendment rights. Local 1814, Int'l Longshoremen's Assoc. v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 667 F.2d 267, 271 (2d Cir.1981); see also Community-Service Broadcasting of Mid-America, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 593 F.2d 1102, 1118 (D.C.Cir.1978) (The absence of such concrete evidence [of harassment], however, does not mandate dismissal of the claim out of hand; rather it is the task of the court to evaluate the likelihood of any chilling effect....). In Local 1814, the court found it sufficient that longshoremen contributors would perceive a connection between contributing to a political fund and being called before the Waterfront Commission and would therefore discontinue their contributions. Local 1814, 667 F.2d at 272; see also Tilton, 869 S.W.2d at 956 (holding trial court's order of production of ministry's contributor lists unconstitutional when requests were aimed at persons sharing particular beliefs and the harm alleged was that contributors could be subpoenaed for questioning). And in Pollard v. Roberts , the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's recognition of the potential infringement on First Amendment rights that could result from political and economic reprisals, even though no factual showing of such reprisals had been made: While there is no evidence of record in this case that any individuals have as yet been subjected to reprisals on account of the contributions in question, it would be naive not to recognize that the disclosure of the identities of contributors ... would subject at least some of them to potential economic or political reprisals of greater or lesser severity.... ... Disclosure or threat of disclosure well may tend to discourage both membership and contributions thus producing financial and political injury to the party affected. Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F.Supp. 248, 258 (E.D.Ark.), aff'd. per curiam, 393 U.S. 14, 89 S.Ct. 47, 21 L.Ed.2d 14 (1968) (emphasis added). In sum, BACALA has offered factual, nonspeculative evidence of economic and political reprisals against itself and its contributors. This evidence is sufficient to satisfy its burden of proof. C