Opinion ID: 794918
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Operable Unit 1

Text: 41 OU-1 consisted of the above-ground media, including the process vessels (e.g. the storage tanks, chemical reaction vessels) in the central process area. The ROD for OU-1 required that plant equipment be dismantled and salvaged to the extent possible and that all other nonsalvageable material be placed in an on-site landfill. Any hazardous material not suitable for the landfill was to be incinerated. Hercules implemented the remedy pursuant to Unilateral Administrative Order (UAO) issued by the EPA. 42 Hercules argues that the district court erred in holding it liable for the cleanup of OU-1, including the demolition, removal, and disposal of plant buildings and equipment, and their process waste contents. Hercules admits liability for part of the OU-1. 8 It contends that it established a reasonable basis of divisibility for further apportioning liability. Hercules argues that the district court erred in finding (1) that the plant buildings were demolished because they contained dioxin, (2) that Hercules was responsible for the contamination of the equipment, the shredded trash, and the pallets, and (3) that the EPA's response action was not arbitrary or capricious. 43 The district court found that [t]he buildings were demolished because the risk of collapse might cause release and human exposure to herbicide process contamination, including unacceptable levels of TCDD [dioxin]. We conclude that the record adequately supports this finding. Maud testified that the EPA was concerned about the buildings because they were falling into disrepair and because they contained large amounts of asbestos siding and roofing and asbestos interiors, some of which also contained dioxin dust. J.A. at 28265. The ROD states that in the event of a catastrophe, Based on the 2,3,7,8-TCDD (dioxin) concentrations found in [OU-1], human exposure to concentrations in excess of those considered acceptable . . . could occur. J.A. at 19811. 44 Hercules further contends that the district court clearly erred in finding that Hercules was responsible for the contamination of the plant equipment. In his expert testimony, Eugene Meyer, Ph.D., affirmed the statement from his 1998 affidavit that [t]he presence of 2,3,7,8-TCDD [dioxin] was established through samples in all of the following: surface and subsurface materials collected from the site sewers, distillation bottoms, waste activated carbons, leachate from on-site buildings, trash, shredded pallets, and the sludges generated during the treatment of waste waters. J.A. at 27928. Although Hercules's project manager for EPA compliance, Douglas Keilman, opined that Hercules did not cause the contamination, his opinion was based on the flushing theory. For the reasons stated above, we again conclude that the district court did not clearly err in rejecting that theory. 45 The district court found that Hercules cannot establish that it was not the source of the contamination on the shredded trash and pallets. Vertac XII, 364 F.Supp.2d at 955. The shredded trash included things like hard hats, broken tools, and tyvex suits, and the pallets were used to store drummed waste at the site. Although Keilman testified that the trash had been accumulating since 1980, there was no evidence to show that Vertac, and not Hercules, caused the contamination of the trash. The district court found that the pallets were contaminated by both leaking drums and contaminated soil. Because Hercules is responsible for the contaminated soil, the district court did not err in further holding it responsible for the pallets. 46 Finally, Hercules argues that the EPA's issuance of a UAO requiring Hercules to dismantle and to landfill the equipment and buildings at the site was arbitrary and capricious. We disagree. Section 113(j) of CERCLA allows a defendant to avoid paying response costs to the extent that it can show that the response action was arbitrary and capricious. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j). Hercules does not argue that the disposal of the building and equipment is arbitrary and capricious, but rather that the EPA was arbitrary and capricious in issuing a UAO. To support the issuance of a UAO, there must be evidence that there  may be an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (emphasis added). Because the record contains sufficient evidence to support the EPA's determination that the cautionary may be threat of imminent substantial endangerment had been established, its decision to issue the UAO was not arbitrary and capricious.