Opinion ID: 222099
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Entrapment into Using Facility of Interstate Commerce

Text: Mandel was charged under the federal murder for hire statute, which in relevant part prohibits the use of a facility of interstate commerce with intent that a murder be committed in exchange for money or other things of value. § 1958(a). Counts Two, Three, Five, and Seven of the indictment charged that Mandel used his cell phone in furtherance of the scheme to have a hit man kill Antoniou (named in the indictment as Individual A). See United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir.2007) (telephones and cellular telephones are instrumentalities of interstate commerce) [2] ; United States v. Clayton, 108 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir.1997) (cellular telephones are instrumentalities of interstate commerce); United States v. Richeson, 338 F.3d 653, 660 (7th Cir.2003) (use of telephone lines constitutes use of facility of interstate commerce for purposes of section 1958(a), even when telephone calls themselves are intrastate). Counts One and Six charged that he used his automobile in furtherance of the scheme. See United States v. Cobb, 144 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir.1998) (automobiles qualify as instrumentalities of interstate commerce). Mandel challenges his conviction on three counts of the indictment (Counts Two, Three, and Seven) which were based on his use of a cellular telephone in furtherance of the murder for hire scheme. At this point, he no longer contests the sufficiency of the evidence establishing his intent to have Antoniou killed. But what section 1958 prohibits is the use of a facility of interstate commercein these counts, the cell phonewith the intent to commit a murder for hire. It is the use of a facility of interstate commerce which transforms what would otherwise be a state offense (murder for hire) into one that is within the federal government's authority under the Commerce Clause to proscribe and prosecute. See Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1631, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). Mandel contends that he was not predisposed to use a cell phone to discuss the details of the murder for hire scheme with Dwyer but rather was entrapped into doing so by Dwyer, who initiated the telephone calls underlying Counts Two, Three, and Seven by contacting Mandel on his cell phone. (With respect to the calls underlying Counts Two and Seven, Mandel answered his phone when Dwyer called. As for the call underlying Count Three, Mandel returned Dwyer's call.) In his attorney's words: At best, the government can argue that Mr. Mandel was predisposed to plot against Antoniou, a contention Mr. Mandel strenuously opposes. But even accepting the government's contention, there is no evidence that he was predisposed to pick up his cellular phone and call Dwyer in furtherance of that plot. The government cannot equate a predisposition to commit murder for hire with a predisposition to use a facility of interstate commerce in furtherance of that murder for hire. Not when that use of a facility of interstate commerce, on that particular occasion, constitutes a distinct crime. Even were Mr. Mandel predisposed to plot against Antoniou, it is pure conjecture that he would ever place a call to Dwyer in connection with that plot, much less that he would do so on three separate occasions. Mandel Brief 9. We note that Mandel does not challenge his conviction on Count Five, which was premised on the cell phone call that he himself initiated to a third party on November 25 to determine when Antoniou would be returning his son to his ex-wife. See Mandel Br. 5. Mandel concedes implicitly as to that count that neither his use of the cell phone to make the charged call nor his discussion of matters related to the murder for hire were induced by the government. As we have noted, the district court denied Mandel's motion for a judgment of acquittal, and we review that ruling de novo. E.g., United States v. Tavarez, 626 F.3d 902, 906 (7th Cir.2010), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1713, 179 L.Ed.2d 642 (2011). We consider, as the district court did, whether the record contained sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., United States v. Vallar, 635 F.3d 271, 286 (7th Cir.2011). In making that assessment, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, having in mind that it was the jury's job to gauge the credibility of the witnesses and to decide what inferences to draw from the evidence. Id.; Tavarez, 626 F.3d at 906. In order to prove a defendant guilty of violating section 1958(a) based on the use of a facility of interstate commerce, the government must show that (1) the defendant knowingly used or caused another to use a facility of interstate commerce, (2) the facility of interstate commerce was used with the intent that a murder be committed in violation of state law, and (3) something of pecuniary value was promised or agreed to be paid in consideration for the murder. United States v. Preacher, 631 F.3d 1201, 1203 (11th Cir.2011); United States v. Acierno, 579 F.3d 694, 699 (6th Cir.2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1567, 176 L.Ed.2d 151 (2010); United States v. Robertson, 473 F.3d 1289, 1292 (10th Cir.2007); R. 49 at 17 (district court's jury instruction). A defendant is entrapped when he (1) lacks the predisposition to commit a crime, and (2) is induced by the government to engage in the offense. See, e.g., United States v. King, 627 F.3d 641, 650 (7th Cir.2010). Whether the defendant is predisposed to commit the charged crime depends on a number of factors, see, e.g., United States v. Orr, 622 F.3d 864, 870 (7th Cir.2010), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2889, 179 L.Ed.2d 1200 (2011), the most important of which is `whether the defendant evidenced reluctance to engage in criminal activity which was overcome by repeated Government inducement.' King, 627 F.3d at 650 (quoting United States v. Blassingame, 197 F.3d 271, 281 (7th Cir.1999)). Inducement must be extraordinary to establish entrapment, the sort of promise that would blind the ordinary person to his legal duties. United States v. Haddad, 462 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Evans, 924 F.2d 714, 717 (7th Cir.1991)). If a person takes advantage of a simple, ordinary opportunity to commit a crime `not an extraordinary opportunity, the sort of thing that might entice an otherwise law-abiding person'then the person is not entrapped. Id. (quoting Evans, 924 F.2d at 717). One preliminary point bears noting before we address the merits of Mandel's challenge. The entrapment argument that Mandel is making now is different from the one he made below. At trial, Mandel's contention was that he had no predisposition to kill Antoniou and that Dwyer, on the government's behalf, induced him to join in a (fictitious) plot that Dwyer himself had concocted and repeatedly pressed on Mandel. See, e.g., R. 82 at 31, 35-36; R. 83 at 242; R. 85 at 438-39, 443-45, 452. Nowhere in the record below do we find a contention that Mandel was entrapped into using his cell phone in furtherance of that plot. However, because the government does not contend that Mandel forfeited the particular entrapment argument he is making now by not making the same argument below, we shall proceed to the merits. See United States v. Smith, 618 F.3d 657, 663 (7th Cir.2010); United States v. Leichtnam, 948 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir. 1991). The evidence presented to the jury was more than sufficient to dispel the notion that Mandel was entrapped into using his cell phone in furtherance of the scheme to murder Antoniou. Granted, Dwyer invited Mandel to use a facility of interstate commerce in connection with the murder plot by placing calls to Mandel's cell phone in order to discuss that subject. But, as is so often the case when entrapment is claimed, Dwyer, on the government's behalf, simply provided Mandel with an opportunity to commit a criminal act that Mandel accepted without any real inducement, let alone one strong enough to support an inference of entrapment. Mandel posits that he would not have discussed the murder scheme on a cell phone but for Dwyer taking the initiative in contacting him on his cell, but the evidence suggests otherwise. First, the cell phone was Mandel's own phone, and although use of such telephones was rare thirty years ago, it is commonplace todayin both law-abiding and criminal domains. Second, Mandel took Dwyer's calls (and, as the call underlying Count Three demonstrates, returned them) and readily discussed the scheme to kill Antoniou without any apparent reluctance or hesitation. Third, Mandel was not simply a passive recipient of the calls. The call underlying Count Five is one that Mandel himself placed to someone other than Dwyer in order to determine when Antoniou's visitation with his son would be ending and Antoniou would be returning to his usual abode, so that an appropriate date for the hit could be determined. Mandel's self-initiated use of his cell phone in that instance puts the lie to the notion that he would not have used the phone in furtherance of the scheme but for Dwyer's prompting. Finally, to the extent that Dwyer's calls to Mandel's cell phone could be characterized as inducement to use that phone to discuss the scheme, they were hardly the sort of extraordinary inducement that is necessary to show entrapment. See United States v. Podolsky, 798 F.2d 177, 179-80, 181 (7th Cir.1986); United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334, 344-45 (7th Cir.1975). All that Dwyer had to do to get Mandel to use a facility of interstate commerce in furtherance of the scheme was to invite that use by placing calls to Mandel's cell phone and raising the subject of Antoniou's demise. Mandel accepted the invitation without hesitation. The district court remarked that the evidence that Mandel was entrapped into plotting Antoniou's murder was scant at best, R. 62 at 1, and that is even more true of the assertion that he was entrapped into using a facility of interstate commerce in furtherance of the plot. Mandel is left to rely on the notion that the government improperly manufactured jurisdiction over his conduct by having Dwyer initiate calls to Mandel's cell phone in order to ensure Mandel's use of a facility of interstate commerce and thus to establish a key element of the federal offense. See United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir.1973). The Second Circuit in Archer reversed the defendants' convictions under the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, where the evidence disclosed that a federal agent had crossed state lines to place a telephone call to one of the defendants (which the defendant then returned) for the precise purpose of transforming a local bribery offense into a federal crime. 486 F.2d at 681. See also United States v. Coates, 949 F.2d 104 (4th Cir.1991). The Archer decision presupposes that it is improper for a government agent to initiate some action in interstate commerce for the sole purpose of ginning up federal jurisdiction over an offense, even if, as in Archer, the defendant himself willingly reciprocates the agent's interstate action. But as Mandel acknowledges, this Circuit has declined to embrace Archer 's broad proscription against manufactured jurisdiction. We have been skeptical of the contention that the government manufactures jurisdiction simply because its agent invites the defendant to take some action in or affecting interstate commerce and the defendant accepts that invitation. We pointed out in Podolsky that the defendant in Archer knew when he returned [the agent's] phone call he was making an interstate phone call and one related to the corrupt practices for which he and Archer were later prosecuted, so there could be no argument that [the defendant] lacked criminal knowledge or predisposition. 798 F.2d at 181. We added, thirteen years after the Archer decision, that no conviction has ever been set aside on the sole basis of the principle announced by it, even in the Second Circuit. Id. at 180. The same was still true more than thirty years after Archer was decided. United States v. Skoczen, 405 F.3d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 2005) (No case has ever turned on the principle set forth in Archer. ). Only where the actions of the government amount to entrapment have we been willing to recognize an Archer -like challenge to the conviction. See Gardner, 516 F.2d at 345 (construing Archer 's holding as one based on entrapment: The essence of [ Archer 's] holding is that the defendants were not merely taking advantage of an opportunity to complete their scheme provided by the Government, and that they were not predisposed to make the telephone calls.); Podolsky, 798 F.2d at 181 (noting that post- Archer cases cast doubt on any independent principle ... that forbids the `manufacture' of federal jurisdiction in circumstances not constituting entrapment and not canceling any element of the crime such as criminal intent); United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 453 F.3d 458, 462 (7th Cir.2006) (reading Podolsky as holding that  Archer has no force unless the agents' acts amount to entrapment). Mandel's resort to Archer consequently fails, because as we have already discussed, he was not entrapped into using a facility of interstate commerce to discuss the murder for hire. At most, the government, through Dwyer, merely presented Mandel with the opportunity to use his own cell phone to plan the murder, which Mandel readily did with no extraordinary inducement by Dwyer. [3]