Opinion ID: 1172635
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Shank

Text: (43) Defendant argues his death sentence must be reversed because the trial court erroneously allowed evidence of his conviction for possessing a weapon (specifically, a handmade shank) while he was in jail, as well as evidence respecting the circumstances surrounding that conviction, to be presented as a factor in aggravation at the penalty phase. Defendant does not dispute he was convicted of possessing the shank. He argues, rather, that his shank possession was not indicative of violence because, as he testified, he possessed it for defensive purposes, as he was jailed among rival gang members; hence evidence respecting it should not have been admitted under section 190.3, factor (b), as indicating an implied threat to use force or violence. Under section 190.3, factor (b), a penalty phase jury shall take into account ... if relevant the presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. We do not believe defendant's self-serving testimony about his motives rendered the shank evidence inadmissible. As we observed in People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158 [270 Cal. Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965], a case involving a Youth Authority inmate's possession of a knife, defendant was free to present any additional evidence of the circumstances of the incident that would be relevant to the jury's assessment of the incident's probative value with respect to defendant's propensity for violence. ( Id. at p. 1187.) The People correctly observe the jury was not bound to accept defendant's explanation, but could reasonably have concluded he possessed the shank for violent purposes. [T]hat defendant ... did not actually use [a weapon he possessed while incarcerated] in a threatening or violent manner when his possession of the weapon was discovered ... does not mean that he did not engage in criminal conduct involving the implied threat to use force or violence for the purposes of section 190.3, factor (b). (50 Cal.3d at p. 1186.) In Ramirez, we stated that possession of the type of `dirk' or `dagger' involved [in that case] [citation] is prohibited precisely because such an implement is a `classic instrument[] of violence' [citation] that is `normally used only for criminal purposes.' [Citation.] ( Id. at pp. 1186-1187.) Here, too, the shank defendant possessed would appear to have been a classic instrument of violence. Defendant next argues that, under factors (b) and (c) of section 190.3, only the existence of his conviction for possessing a weapon while in jail should have been admitted, and not the circumstances surrounding that conviction. He argues the facts underlying his conviction cannot, consistent with the statute's plain language, be considered in aggravation, because, unlike some other subdivisions of the statute, factors (b) and (c) refer to the presence or absence of the factors they discuss (i.e., criminal activity and any prior felony conviction, respectively), rather than to the circumstances of those factors. (Compare § 190.3, factors (b) and (c) with § 190.3, factors (a), (f) and (k).) Defendant concedes we have previously upheld introduction of similar evidence under section 190.3, factor (b). (See, e.g., People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 449 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135] [possession in jail of stolen wirecutters; circumstances of theft admitted].) In fact, we expressly have held that [w]hen dealing with violent conduct it is not the fact of conviction which is probative in the penalty phase, but rather the conduct of the defendant which gave rise to the offense. ( People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1203, original italics.) We further noted in Gates that [factor] (b) of section 190.3 ... permits the introduction of all evidence of violent crimes and does not require a conviction. ( Ibid., italics added, citing People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 202-203 [relitigation before penalty phase jury of facts underlying prior violent convictions consistent with due process].) Defendant asks us to reconsider our previous pronouncements regarding section 190.3, on the ground our holdings conflict with various decisions of the United States Supreme Court concerning the need for heightened reliability in capital sentencing procedures. Defendant acknowledges, however, that the federal courts have not decided the precise issue he raises. In People v. Balderas we acknowledged [a]t least two other jurisdictions have concluded that due process precludes a `guilt' jury from hearing `other crimes' evidence at the penalty phase. ( People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 204, citing State v. Bartholemew (1982) 98 Wn.2d 173 [654 P.2d 1170, 1184], remanded 463 U.S. 1203 [103 S.Ct. 3530, 77 L.Ed.2d 1383], opn. after remand 101 Wn.2d 631 [683 P.2d 1079]; State v. McCormick (1979) 272 Ind. 272 [397 N.E.2d 276, 279-281].) However, we declared, we find nothing in recent United States Supreme Court decisions to support such a conclusion. The court has often declared that states have the broadest possible range in deciding what negative aspects of the defendant's character and background are relevant to the sentencing determination. (41 Cal.3d at pp. 204-205, citing numerous high court decisions.) In recent years, we have reaffirmed that [e]vidence of the facts of criminal activity, whether or not accompanied by a conviction, is admissible under section 190.3, factor (b), but only if the activity involves force or violence. ( People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 776 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297].) We have also refused to overrule our decision in People v. Balderas that admission of such evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial is consistent with due process and a reliable death judgment. ( Id. at p. 777; see also People v. Avena, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 427.) Defendant offers no persuasive reason why we should rule differently in his case. Defendant contends, finally, that the trial court's failure to clarify CALJIC No. 8.84.1, tracking the language of section 190.3, improperly allowed the jury to consider his weapon-possession conviction under both factors (b) and (c) of the statute. Defendant more fully develops this contention in his general argument concerning penalty phase instructional errors. Accordingly, we address defendant's contentions regarding CALJIC No. 8.84.1 post, when reviewing that argument.