Opinion ID: 1727423
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Voice Mail Evidence

Text: Next, McDuffie contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it admitted testimony of the detailed contents of a threatening and vulgar message McDuffie left on the voice mail of attorney David Pederson on October 22, 2002. Pederson, an attorney whose father had previously rented a home to the McDuffies, had filed an eviction suit against McDuffie in which he claimed back rent and fees, including attorney's fees. The voice mail was left after McDuffie received the eviction suit. The actual voice mail was subsequently erased but Pederson was allowed to testify, over defense objection, as to the contents of the message: He said that he hoped myself and my father would go to Baltimore, Maryland, and get our asses shot off. At that time the sniper was there. Also, he said you can go suck your father's dick, fuck your mother, things along that nature. It's just  it was a nasty, hardcore message. The trial court admitted this detailed testimony based on the State's argument that it showed McDuffie's state of mind and desperation over his financial situation. We hold that admission of the contents of the voice mail message was error. The standard of review of a trial court's evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion. Fitzpatrick v. State, 900 So.2d 495, 514-15 (Fla.2005). The trial court's discretion is limited, however, by the rules of evidence, Johnston, 863 So.2d at 278, and by the principles of stare decisis. Cf. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1203 (Fla.1980) (Judges dealing with cases essentially alike should reach the same result.). A trial court also abuses its discretion if its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990). We will, therefore, examine the rules of evidence which govern and the assessment of the evidence presented in this case. Section 90.402, Florida Statutes (2005), a provision within the Florida Evidence Code, provides that all relevant evidence is admissible except as provided by law. Relevant evidence is defined as `evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact' [but] . . . `[r]elevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.' Sliney v. State, 944 So.2d 270, 286 (Fla.2006) (quoting §§ 90.401, 90.403, Fla. Stat.). [P]roper application of section 90.403 requires a balancing test by the trial judge. Only when the unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence must the evidence be excluded. Alston v. State, 723 So.2d 148, 156 (Fla.1998). Unfair prejudice has been described as an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one. Brown v. State, 719 So.2d 882, 885 (Fla.1998) (quoting Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997)). This rule of exclusion is directed at evidence which inflames the jury or appeals improperly to the jury's emotions. Steverson v. State, 695 So.2d 687, 688-89 (Fla.1997). In performing the balancing test to determine if the unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence, the trial court should consider the need for the evidence, the tendency of the evidence to suggest an emotional basis for the verdict, the chain of inference from the evidence necessary to establish the material fact, and the effectiveness of a limiting instruction. Taylor v. State, 855 So.2d 1, 22 (Fla.2003). The trial court is obligated to exclude evidence in which unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value in order to avoid the danger that a jury will convict a defendant based upon reasons other than evidence establishing his guilt. The Second District's decision in Coverdale v. State, 940 So.2d 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), is a case in point. Coverdale involved a prosecution for aggravated stalking, in which the trial court admitted evidence that Coverdale threatened a detective, saying he was going to hunt her down and would like to see her head blown off. Id. at 561. The prosecution argued the threatening statement was probative of Coverdale's state of mind concerning the crime of stalking the victim in the case. Id. The Second District reversed, explaining that [the detective's] testimony that Coverdale was acting irate do[es] address Coverdale's state of mind. But, the additional testimony about Coverdale's threat to hunt down the detective and that she would look good with a bullet in her head or that it would be nice to see her head blown off was unduly prejudicial. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the testimony. Id. at 562. In Davis v. State, 718 So.2d 874 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), in a prosecution for exploitation of the elderly, the trial court admitted a videotaped interview with the victim that was marginally relevant to show the victim's state of mind to corroborate her incompetence. Id. at 876. The district court reversed because the unfair prejudice to Davis outweighed the tape's probative value, noting that the tape's principal effect was to show the victim's loathing of the defendant and the attitude of the interviewer that the defendant was a threat. Id. at 877. The district court said that showing the marginally relevant tape lobbed the proverbial skunk into the jury box, and deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Id. Similar to Coverdale and Davis, in this case the details of the statement that McDuffie hoped Pederson and his father would go to Baltimore and get [their] asses shot off was unnecessary to prove what the State asserted was the relevant fact  that McDuffie was in a desperate state of mind. The vulgar portion of the voice mail only showed that he was extremely irate at having been served with a suit for eviction claiming attorney's fees he thought were unconscionable. Nor were the details of the voice mail, which occurred days before the murder and bore no relationship to the crimes, probative of whether McDuffie committed robbery and murder. On the other hand, those details tended to prove quite effectively several irrelevant, highly prejudicial facts  that McDuffie was vicious, nasty, and of questionable moral character. In addition, the reference to the sniper incidents, which involved random shootings by black men of primarily white victims, could only serve to inflame the jury's emotions. [3] We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the detailed contents of the threatening and obscene voice mail. Any purported probative value is marginal at best as it simply shows McDuffie was angry over being evicted, a fact that did not require the objectionable details of the voice mail to prove. Any marginal probative value relative to McDuffie's state of mind is substantially outweighed by the highly inflammatory contents of a voice mail depicting McDuffie as a person with a vicious temper who wishes on another individual a fate similar to that of the victims of the Washington, D.C./Baltimore area snipers. The trial court erred in admitting this evidence over McDuffie's objection. Improper admission of this evidence, over objection, is subject to a harmless error analysis as set forth in State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986); see also Floyd v. State, 913 So.2d 564, 573 (Fla. 2005). Because of the other errors that occurred, all of which were also preserved, we have determined that a cumulative harmless error analysis is appropriate.