Opinion ID: 197331
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Joinder and Prejudice

Text: 6 Jordan renews here his earlier objection to the court's decision to allow the government to join the outstanding charges from the first trial with the tax evasion counts. We note at the outset that instead of responding to the government's motion for joinder under Fed.R.Crim.P. 13, defendant used his response to argue prejudice under Fed.R.Crim.P. 14, most often utilized in a separate motion to sever. Although these may involve different standards of review, see United States v. Edgar, 82 F.3d 499, 503 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 184, 136 L.Ed.2d 123 (1996), and United States v. Alosa, 14 F.3d 693, 695 (1st Cir.1994), basically our issue is abuse of discretion with respect to prejudice. Jordan, correctly, does not dispute that, substantively, all offenses could have been joined in a single indictment under Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(a). See United States v. Clayton, 450 F.2d 16, 18 (1st Cir.1971). This said, we turn to the question whether the grant of joinder unduly prejudiced. 7 In order to prevail on this claim, Jordan must make a strong showing of prejudice. United States v. Gray, 958 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir.1992). In United States v. Scivola, 766 F.2d 37 (1st Cir.1985), we observed that there are three types of prejudice that can emerge from this type of situation: 8 (1) the defendant may become embarrassed or confounded in presenting separate defenses; (2) proof that defendant is guilty of one offense may be used to convict him of a second offense, even though such proof would be inadmissible in a separate trial for the second offense; and (3) a defendant may wish to testify in his own behalf on one of the offenses but not another, forcing him to choose the unwanted alternative of testifying as to both or testifying as to neither. 9 Id. at 41-42 (internal citations omitted). Jordan argues here that joinder subjected him to the latter two types of prejudice. 10 Jordan did not testify in either trial, and contends that by allowing the joinder of the fraud, money laundering and tax counts, he was deprived of his Fifth Amendment right to testify as to certain counts but not as to others. In support, he relies on our opinion in Alosa, ante, where we remarked that a defendant may deserve a severance of counts where [he] makes a convincing showing that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and strong need to refrain from testifying on the other. 14 F.3d at 695 (internal citations omitted). To make this showing, a defendant must timely offer enough information to the court to allow it to weigh the needs of judicial economy versus  'the defendant's freedom to choose whether to testify' as to a particular charge. Id. (quoting Scivola, 766 F.2d at 43). 11 In his objection to the government's motion to join indictments, Jordan argued his need to testify in order to produce a good faith defense to the tax charges. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 203-04, 111 S.Ct. 604, 611-12, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991) (holding that a defendant is entitled to present his subjective belief that he did not violate the law, even if such belief is objectively unreasonable). To bolster this assertion, he included an offer of proof reciting the testimony that would constitute his defense. 1 12 It is difficult to dismiss these grounds. The unique circumstances of this case distinguish it from Alosa where the defendant sought to sever a gun count from drug trafficking and conspiracy charges. There, the defendant wanted to testify on the gun charge simply to deny that he had used the guns for drug trafficking and that he owned the guns for fun. 14 F.3d at 695. We upheld the denial of Alosa's severance motion because that testimony was some distance from ... a credible alibi that only the defendant can supply showing him to have been elsewhere at the time of the crime. Id. Here, we believe that Jordan's subjective testimony on the tax charges is analogous to the credible alibi we found lacking in Alosa. Only he can supply testimony of his subjective belief as permitted by Cheek, forthrightly subjecting himself to cross-examination. We do not accept the government's contention that this belief was adequately before the jury in the form of Jordan's statement on his amended tax form that the income was not taxable. 13 Nor do we accept its contention that Jordan could have proffered the testimony of his bankruptcy attorney, from whom Jordan received legal advice, as an effective substitute for Jordan's own testimony. While it is likely that the attorney's testimony also would have been helpful in establishing a Cheek defense, Jordan contends in his proffer that he previously handled his own tax affairs and also relied on his own independent legal research. See supra note 1. On balance, therefore, we conclude that joinder likely had the effect of eviscerating Jordan's planned defense to the tax charges. 2 14 The surrender of this privilege was capped by the government's maneuvering that got before the mail fraud jury the allegedly fraudulent tax returns. The government had made substantial efforts at the original trial seeking to introduce the tax returns as proof of intent. The court twice ruled that possible prejudice from these forms outweighed their relevance under Fed.R.Evid. 403. We have here the type of prejudice outlined in Scivola, 766 F.2d at 41-42, that of evidence presented that would not have been admissible at a separate trial. By the joinder the government has circumvented the court's ruling. Jury-wise it could be thought better off with evidence that would point in an improper direction tied to an instruction not to so consider it, than not to have it at all. 15 We have an unusual situation. With the Fifth Amendment involved should either, both, or neither of the mail fraud, etc. convictions, and tax evasion convictions, be set aside? There are recognized benefits (to all, except, usually, the defendant) in having joint trials. Traditionally, defendants may, to an extent, have to stand the cost, the extent to be determined by the court's discretion. In the second mail fraud trial, by choosing not to take the stand defendant felt only one prejudice, the jury's knowledge of the tax cases. At the original trial the court, in excluding evidence of those charges, had described it as of minimum value to the government. While we agree with Jordan that it would have been happier for him not to have had that evidence now get in through the back door by the joinder, we believe it was within the court's discretion, in the absence of a Fifth Amendment problem (such as infected the tax counts), to subject him to the ordinary consequences of joinder of indictments. 16 This is not to say that Jordan did not endure some loss. There should be some limit to the harm the government should impose to meet the court's Rule 403 finding in the original action. By bringing the tax indictment, and joining it with the tax charges to get the tax forms before a mail fraud jury, it put Jordan in the proverbial bind--testify, to your loss in the mail fraud case, or do not testify, to your loss in the tax case. Jordan had valid Fifth Amendment reasons for disliking both alternatives, and we do not think the government should have it both ways. We allow one, but it should not complain that we hold it to its original decision of non-joinder. The convictions and sentences on the tax counts are vacated.