Opinion ID: 3161585
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Background on GR 15

Text: GR 15 provides a uniform procedure for sealing or redacting court records. GR 15(a). The rule applies to all court records, regardless of the physical form of the court record, the method of recording the court record, or the method of storage of the court record. /d. The General Rules define court record in equally broad terms, stating that a court record includes, but is not limited to . . . [a]ny document, information, exhibit, or other thing that is maintained by a court in connection with a judicial proceeding. GR 31(c)(4); GR 15(b)(2). GR 15 thus covers motions filed in parental termination cases and orders granting or denying those motions. If a party moves to seal a court record, GR 15(c) requires the court to hold a hearing; provide all parties with notice of that hearing; and, if it decides to grant the motion, issue written findings justifying the decision to seal: (1) In a civil case, the court or any party may request a hearing to seal or redact the court records. In a criminal case or juvenile proceeding, the court, any party, or any interested person may request a hearing to seal or redact the court records. Reasonable notice of a hearing to seal must be given to all parties in the case .... No such notice 8 In re the Dependency of M.H.P., No. 90468-5 is required for motions to seal documents entered pursuant to CrR 3. 1m or CrRLJ 3.1 (f). (2) After the hearing, the court may order the court files and records in the proceeding, or any part thereof, to be sealed or redacted if the court makes and enters written findings that the specific sealing or redaction is justified by identified compelling privacy or safety concerns that outweigh the public interest in access to the court record .... GR 15(c) (emphasis added). Subsection (c)(3) bars courts from sealing records when redaction will adequately resolve the issues before the court pursuant to subsection (2). GR 15(c)(1) provides that notice need not be given for motions to seal filed under two criminal rules that permit [a] lawyer for a defendant who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert or other services necessary to an adequate defense to file an ex parte motion to obtain such services at public expense. CrR 3.1 (f)(1 )-(2); CrRLJ 3.1 (f)(1 )-(2). Those criminal rules permit the court to grant and seal the motion upon a showing of good cause. CrR 3.1 (f)(1 )-(2); CrRLJ 3.1 (f)(1 )- (2). Neither GR 15 nor any other general, juvenile court, or civil rule includes any such exemption for indigent parents in parental termination cases. B. The trial court's sealing practice violates GR 15(c) Here, the trial court conducted the entire sealing procedure ex parte, which violates GR 15(c)(1 )'s requirement that the court provide notice and a hearing to the .opposing party before deciding whether to seal a court record. It also failed to comply with GR 15( c )(2) because it did not issue written findings justifying its decision to seal the disputed records at the time of sealing. If the CASA had not happened upon one of the court's sealing orders, neither the CASA, the State, the public, nor this court 9 In re the Dependency of M.H.P., No. 90468-5 would ever have known what documents the superior court had sealed and why it had sealed them. Consequently, the trial court's ex parte sealing practice and the sealing of the disputed documents violates GR 15(c)(1 ). The superior court's memorandum opinion justifying the sealing practice, which it issued only after the Department became aware of the disputed documents and filed its motion to show cause, also did not comply with GR 15. The opinion made no factual findings regarding the specific motions filed by M.H.P.'s parents, as required by GR 15(c)(2). Instead, the opinion discussed general matters of policy regarding parents' privacy interests in termination cases. The memorandum opinion also did not set forth substantial and compelling reasons, as required by GR 15(c)(2), for sealing the documents at issue rather than simply redacting portions of them. Finally, and as discussed in greater detail below, redaction would have adequately addressed the concerns underlying the court's decision to seal. The indiscriminate sealing of the disputed documents thus violated GR 15(c)(3) as well. For these reasons, we hold that the superior court's sealing orders violated GR 15. C. CrR 3. 1(f) does not apply in cases governed by the Superior Court Civil Rules Some of the superior court's sealing orders rely on CrR 3.1 (f). But, as noted above, that rule applies only to criminal cases and the civil and juvenile court rules contain no parallel provisions. Curiously, the superior court and Court of Appeals both assert that the superior court could look to the criminal rules for guidance precisely because the civil and juvenile court rules include no provisions paralleling CrR 3.1 (f) or CrRLJ 3.1 (f). But the omission of a provision that appears in the criminal rules from 10 In re the Dependency of M.H.P, No. 90468-5 the civil and juvenile court rules can hardly be construed as an invitation for courts to read the provision into rules where it does not appear. GR 15(c) governs motions to seal in civil, criminal, and juvenile court cases alike. The rule explicitly exempts motions filed under CrR 3.1 (f) from the usual notice requirements; it does not include any such exemption for any motions filed in civil or juvenile court cases. Under expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a canon of statutory construction, to express one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of the other. Omissions are deemed to be exclusions. In re Det. of Williams, 147 Wn.2d 476, 491, 55 P.3d 597 (2002) (citation omitted). Because GR 15( c) expressly includes an exemption for criminal cases but not for civil or juvenile court cases (or rather, juvenile court cases not involving a juvenile offense), 6 local courts cannot use CrR 3.1 as a basis for disregarding the notice requirements ofGR 15(c)(1) in parental termination cases. D. The work product doctrine does not supply a basis for disregarding GR 15 The superior court and Court of Appeals also rely on the parents' interest in protecting their work product as a basis for failing to provide notice to the Department and the CASA. See Parvin, 181 Wn. App. at 673-74. The work-product doctrine is, to be sure, a well-established principle that protects important interests. But it is not, as the superior court and Court of Appeals appear to assume, a fundamental right with 6 The result would likely be different if this were a juvenile offense case rather than a parental termination case, because the Superior Court Criminal Rules apply in juvenile offense cases unless they are inconsistent with the juvenile court rules and applicable statutes. JuCR 1.4(b ). Thus, CrR 3.1 (f) would apply in juvenile offense cases because no contrary rule appears in the juvenile court rules. By contrast, JuCR 1.4(a) makes the Superior Court Civil Rules applicable in parental termination cases in the absence of a contrary JuCR and, as explained supra, the civil rules contain no provisions paralleling CrR 3.1 (f). 11 In re the Dependency of M.H.P, No. 90468-5 constitutional moorings. It is a qualified privilege that provides protection from discovery. The metes and bounds of the work-product doctrine are established by rules of civil and criminal procedure, and they do not supply a basis for disregarding other applicable rules-particularly rules such as GR 15 that protect other important interests. The Supreme Court adopted the work-product doctrine in Hickman v. Taylor, which held that 'work product of the lawyer' is exempt from discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 329 U.S. 495, 511, 67 S. Ct. 385, 91 L. Ed. 451 ( 1947). Hickman examines work product solely as a principle of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not as a component of any constitutional right. Hickman does not mention due process, nor does it otherwise analyze the workproduct doctrine as a constitutional principle. In the seven decades since Hickman was decided, neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ever held that work-product protection is a constitutional right. Instead, this court has promulgated rules of civil and criminal procedure to define the extent to which parties' trial preparation materials are exempt from discovery. See CR 26(b)(4)-(5); CRLJ 26(f) (incorporating CR 26 for civil cases in courts of limited jurisdiction); CrR 4.7(f)(1 ); CrRLJ 4.7(f)(1 ). It is to those court rules, and not our constitutional jurisprudence, that courts and parties must look to determine whether work-product protection applies, and court rules do not become 12 In re the Dependency of M.H.P., No. 90468-5 a matter of fundamental due process simply because a litigant's fundamental substantive rights are involved. 7 E. Applying GR 15 in parental termination cases does not abridge parents' due process rights The Court of Appeals' opinion suggests that applying GR 15 in parental termination cases would violate parents' due process rights. We disagree. We determine whether a practice or procedure infringes on due process rights by using the three-part test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976). The three Mathews factors are the private interests at stake, the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions, and the countervailing government interests supporting the challenged procedure (in this case, GR 15's notice requirements). See In re Dependency of M.S.R., 174 Wn.2d 1, 14, 271 P.3d 234 (2012). In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the United States Supreme Court applied the Mathews test to parental termination cases and held that parents facing termination of their parental rights do not have a right to appointed counsel under the 14th Amendment's due process clause. 452 U.S. 18, 3234, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1981 ); see also id. at 26-27 ([T]he Court's precedents speak with one voice about what 'fundamental fairness' has meant when the Court has considered the right to appointed counsel, and we thus draw from them 7If that were the case, one might reasonably argue that the child has a due process right to see GR 15(c) enforced. After all, a child's fundamental right to health and safety is at stake in parental termination proceedings, just as parents' fundamental right to the care and custody of their children is at stake. E.g., In re Dependency of R.H., 129 Wn. App. 83, 88, 117 P.3d 1179 (2005). 13 In re the Dependency of M.H.P, No. 90468-5 the presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty. (emphasis added)). 8 In so holding, the Supreme Court overruled the federal constitutional component of our opinion in In re Welfare of Luscier, in which we held that indigent parents in termination proceedings have a due process right to counsel at public expense under both the state and federal constitutions. 84 Wn.2d 135, 139, 524 P.2d 906 (1974). We need not revisit the state constitutional component of Luscier today because the claimed right at issue in this case is not the basic right to appointed counsel, which Washington parents receive under RCW 13.34.090(2), but rather indigent parents' ability to request public funding for expert services without complying with the notice requirements of GR 15. Applying the Mathews factors, we conclude that due process does not require discarding GR 15 when parents seek such funding. While the interests at stake are significant for parents in termination proceedings, GR 15 does not infringe those interests, and compelling interests support the enforcement of GR 15. Crucially, the Superior Court Civil Rules, which courts must also apply in termination cases, both protect parents' trial preparation and reduce to the vanishing point the risk of erroneous deprivation of parents' rights. With respect to the first Mathews factor, parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their children. E.g., In re Dependency of K.D.S., 176 Wn.2d 644, 652, 294 P.3d 695 (2013). Terminating parental rights is, therefore, 8The Court of Appeals' opinion glossed over Lassiter, simply noting in a footnote that Lassiter overruled the federal constitutional component of our prior holding in In re Welfare of Luscier, 84 Wn.2d 135, 139, 524 P.2d 906 (1974). See Parvin, 181 Wn. App. at 671 n.5. 14 In re the Dependency of M.H.P., No. 90468-5 one of the severest of state actions. In re Welfare of J.M., 130 Wn. App. 912, 921, 125 P.3d 245 (2005). Consequently, no one disputes that parents are entitled to due process in termination proceedings. But the right to due process does not mean a right to unlimited process, and determining the scope of process due requires balancing the parents' strong interests in termination proceedings against the final two Mathews factors. Here, both of those factors cut strongly against discarding GR 15 in termination cases. As to the second Mathews factor, the risk of error, a complete examination of the relevant court rules demonstrates that GR 15 does not increase the risk that parents will have their rights erroneously terminated. While compliance with GR 15 discloses that an indigent parent is seeking funds to retain an expert, it would not meaningfully affect that parents' ability to defend against a termination claim because other court rules would, in any event, require disclosure of the reports of any experts who would appear during the trial itself while shielding work product. Under CR 26(b)(5)(A)(i), all parties must disclose upon request each person whom the ... party expects to call as an expert witness at trial and the substance of their anticipated testimony. 9 Because such disclosure would be required regardless of whether a parent requires public funds to retain an expert, the notice required by GR 15 does not give the State the right to access any more information about indigent parents' testifying experts than all parties may receive under the civil discovery rules. 9 The Court of Appeals apparently overlooked CR 26(b)(5)(B) when it incorrectly stated that revelation of the names or expertise of potential experts would be prejudicial to parents because, once potential experts are identified, they are available for questioning by the State. Parvin, 181 Wn. App. at 673-74. 15 In re the Dependency of M.H.P, No. 90468-5 The civil rules also establish that an adverse party can discover materials relating to a nontestifying expert only under two circumstances: first, under CR 35(a)(1) and (b), where one party's experts perform a physical or mental examination on another party or of a person in the custody or under the legal control of' another party. Thus, parents would have to provide the CASA with a report regarding any physical or mental examination conducted on the child by their experts and provide the report to the Department as well if the child is in the State's custody. Second, adverse parties may obtain nontestifying expert reports upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means. CR 26(b)(5)(B). 10 Outside these narrow exceptions, CR 26(b)(4) and (5) protect the work product of parents' attorneys and materials pertaining to parents' nontestifying experts; courts can redact documents containing such materials while leaving the remainder unsealed. CR 26(b)(5) and CR 35 thus effectively eliminate any prejudice that indigent parents might otherwise suffer as a result of complying with GR 15's notice requirements. The Court of Appeals asserted that the operation of GR 15(c) would likely chill defense use of experts by encouraging parents to forgo consultation with nontestifying experts out of fear that the required notice would reveal portions of their 10 In such a case, the party conducting the examination must provide the party or person being examined with a report of the examination's findings within 45 days of the examination and within 30 days before trial. See CR 35(b ). Thus, if one of the parents' experts wished to examine M.H.P., the parents would have to provide the CASA with a copy of the resulting report. See id. The parents do not claim that CR 26(b)(5) or CR 35 infringes on their due process rights. 16 In re the Dependency of M.H.P., No. 90468-5 trial strategy to the State. Parvin, 181 Wn. App. at 674. But this too ignores the impact of CR 26(b )(5) and CR 35(b ), which require disclosure of all testifying experts while protecting materials pertaining to nontestifying experts. As long as courts comply with those provisions of the Civil Rules, GR 15 should not deter indigent parents from consulting with experts, regardless of whether those experts ultimately testify at trial. Indeed, this chilling effect argument could just as easily be applied to experts. who are called at trial because disclosing the substance of such experts' anticipated testimony provides the Department and the CASA with insight into how the parents intend to attack the Department's case for termination. Despite this, neither the parents nor the Court of Appeals suggests that CR 26 violates due process or that its expert disclosure requirements chill parents' use of testifying experts. The second Mathews factor thus weighs strongly in favor of applying GR 15 in parental termination cases. The final Mathews factor-the countervailing interests that support the use of the challenged procedure-also weighs powerfully in favor of applying GR 15. The State has a compelling interest in protecting the welfare of children. E.g., In re Custody of Shields, 157 Wn.2d 126, 144, 136 P.3d 117 (2006). Indeed, we have ruled that a child's welfare is the court's primary consideration. Consequently, when the rights of parents and the welfare of their children are in conflict, the welfare of the minor children must prevail. In re Welfare of Sego, 82 Wn.2d 736, 738, 513 P.2d 831 (1973). It follows that the child has a strong interest in the speedy resolution of dependency and termination proceedings, see RCW 13.34.020, and the State has an interest in 17 In re the Dependency of M.H.P., No. 90468-5 ensuring such a speedy resolution to ensure that children do not remain in legal limbo-with the mental and emotional strain that entails-for any longer than is necessary. These interests are undermined when a court seals documents relevant to the proceedings or decides motions on an ex parte basis. If an expert added through a sealed motion is later added to the witness list, the CASA and the State might be forced to request a continuance so that the State or the CASA can retain and prepare experts of their own. That possibility is not merely hypothetical. According to the CASP\s superior court brief, in one of the other cases subject to the superior court's memorandum opinion, the parents disclosed an expert retained through an ex parte sealing order in a supplemental witness list submitted shortly before trial. The expert had not been mentioned on prior witness lists, but despite the prejudice this caused to the child, the CASA did not seek a continuance because of the significant delays already in getting the case to trial ... and the deteriorating mental health of the child due to the delays in the case. The proper functioning of the adversary system depends on both parties having an opportunity to be heard when the court makes decisions related to a case. Failing to apprise all parties of pending motions can result in the court's making errors, as occurred in M.H.P.'s case. The judge who signed the sealing orders apparently was never made aware of the discovery deadlines and thus permitted the parents to retain a new expert after the discovery deadline had passed. Plainly, the speedy and fair 18 In re the Dependency of M.H.P., No. 90468-5 resolution of parental termination cases can be significantly undermined by the ex parte sealing procedure that the superior court utilized. The State also has a strong interest in upholding the open administration of justice clause of Washington's constitution. WASH. CaNST. art. I, § 10. As discussed further below, that interest would be significantly impaired if courts were permitted to discard GR 15 in parental termination cases. Taking the factors as a whole, we conclude that applying GR 15's notice provisions in parental termination cases is, in concert with the other applicable court rules, fully consistent with protecting parents' due process rights. F. Applying GR 15 does not violate indigent parents' statutory right to effective legal representation Finally, Bramlett and Parvin also claim that applying GR 15 in parental termination cases would interfere with indigent parents' statutory right to effective legal representation under RCW 10.101.005. See Parvin, 181 Wn. App. at 673-75. But the statutory right to effective representation does not supply indigent litigants with workproduct protections beyond those set forth in the court rules, nor does it otherwise permit courts to grant exemptions from the General Rules and Civil Rules simply because compliance with those rules would place an indigent litigant at a disadvantage relative to some 11 litigants who can afford to retain their own counsel. The statute also does not provide a basis for disregarding the constitutional mandate 11 We say some because dividing litigants into the binary categories of indigent and wealthy is a gross oversimplification. Undoubtedly, many litigants who do not meet the requirements for establishing actual indigency may nevertheless lack the financial resources necessary to retain experts whom they have no intention of calling at trial. 19 In re the Dependency of M.H.P, No. 90468-5 for the open administration of justice, which we discuss in greater detail below. We therefore reject the parents' argument on this point. G. Conclusion on GR 15 In sum, the trial court erred in failing to adhere to GR 15's notice requirements. We reject the parents' argument that GR 15 can be disregarded in parental termination cases because it might lead to disclosure of the work product of the parents' attorneys and experts, both because work-product protection is not a constitutional right and because other court rules adequately protect parents' work product from disclosure. Other than interference with parents' work product, the parents, the superior court, and the Court of Appeals point to no basis on which applying GR 15's notice requirements implicate indigent parents' statutory right to effective legal representation or their constitutional right to due process. Because work-product protection does not supply a basis for indiscriminately sealing documents in violation of GR 15( c), we reject the parents' arguments on those points. Courts may not grant exemptions from court rules simply because compliance with those rules would place an indigent litigant at a disadvantage relative to litigants who can afford to retain their own counsel and experts. This is particularly true where, as here, leveling the playing field would require abridging other vital interests such as the open administration of justice, monitoring the expenditure of public funds, and the speedy resolution of termination proceedings. For these reasons, the trial court should have applied GR 15 when assessing the motions to seal and its failure to do so was error. 20 In re the Dependency of M.H.P., No. 90468-5 II. The trial court's sealing of the disputed documents violates article I, section 10 Even if it provides notice and a hearing and otherwise satisfies the requirements of GR 15, a court considering whether to seal a court record also must determine whether the sealing would violate Washington Constitution article I, section 10. To make this determination, a court must analyze the five factors set forth in Ishikawa. See, e.g., Allied Daily Newspapers of Wash. v. Eikenberry, 121 Wn.2d 205, 209-11, 848 P.2d 1258 (1993) (striking down a statute under article I, section 10 because the statute was not consistent with the Ishikawa factors). Ishikawa requires a showing that is more specific, concrete, certain, and definite than the compelling privacy or safety concerns required by GR 15(c)(2). State v. Waldon, 148 Wn. App. 952, 962-63, 202 P.3d 325 (2009). The five Ishikawa factors are: 1. The proponent of closure [and/]or sealing must make some showing of the need for doing so, and where that need is based on a right other than an accused's right to a fair trial, the proponent must show a 'serious and imminent threat' to that right. 2. Anyone present when the closure [and/or sealing] motion is made must be given an opportunity to object to the closure. 3. The proposed method for curtailing open access must be the least restrictive means available for protecting the threatened interests. 4. The court must weigh the competing interests of the proponent of closure and the public. 5. The order must be no broader in its application or duration than necessary to serve its purpose. Eikenberry, 121 Wn.2d at 210-11 (citing Ishikawa, 97 Wn.2d at 36-39). 12 12 The five Ishikawa factors are essentially identical to the five factors of the test adopted in State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d 254, 261, 906 P.2d 325 (1995) to assess the propriety of sealing and closures in criminal cases. 21 In re the Dependency of M.H.P., No. 90468-5 Here, the superior court's memorandum opinion did not analyze the sealing requests using the Ishikawa factors; in fact, the opinion does not even mention Ishikawa or its progeny. For the reasons stated below, applying the Ishikawa factors to this case leads to the conclusion that the trial court should not have indiscriminately sealed all of the disputed documents, although the factors may permit limited redaction of documents that otherwise would be subject to work-product protection under our discovery rules. The court should have made sealing and redaction determinations on a document-by-document basis, rather than presumptively sealing all motions and orders regarding expert funding in parental termination cases. A. Need for sealing The first Ishikawa requirement is that the party seeking to seal a record must make some showing of the need therefor. Ishikawa, 97 Wn .2d at 37. Because courts are presumptively open, the burden of justification should rest on the parties seeking to infringe the public's right. /d. at 37-38. The party should state the interests or rights which give rise to that need as specifically as possible without endangering those interests. /d. at 37. Where, as here, the interests at stake do not involve a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, the proponent of sealing must show a 'serious and imminent threat to some other important interest' to demonstrate necessity. /d. Here, this Ishikawa factor turns on whether the work-product doctrine suffices to establish a need for parents in parental termination cases to seal the motions and orders at issue. With respect to the court's orders-both the orders granting or denying the motions and the orders sealing the documents-the work-product doctrine 22 In re the Dependency of M.H.P., No. 90468-5 supplies no protection whatsoever. Work-product protection covers documents prepared by a party or a party's representative in anticipation of litigation. CR 26(b )( 4 ). The purpose of the doctrine is to keep parties' trial preparation materials away from adversaries. Umstrom v. Ladenburg, 110 Wn. App. 133, 142, 39 P.3d 351 (2002). Plainly, court orders are not trial preparation materials and thus cannot be deemed work product. If a court wishes to ensure that its orders do not compromise a party's trial strategy, it should draft the orders so that they make no reference to information that might reveal that strategy. Regardless, the work-product doctrine does not establish the necessity of sealing the court orders. As for the documents attached to the underlying motions for public funding, the parents can credibly assert a need to protect them from disclosure to opposing parties to the extent that they contain work product or other material protected by our court rules. The trial court's conclusory assertion that the documents contain work product does not satisfy Ishikawa, which requires a specific, concrete, certain, and definite showing of the need for sealing. Waldon, 148 Wn. App. at 962-63. To satisfy that requirement, the trial court could have redacted some portions of the disputed documents and, in the order explaining its decision to redact, could have stated that the redacted information consisted of opinions held by experts who are not expected to be called at trial, which are protected by CR 26(b)(5). Such an analysis could not, however, establish a need for the course of action that the trial court took in this caseindiscriminately sealing all documents submitted in connection with the parents' 23 In re the Dependency of M.H.P., No. 90468-5 motions. This factor thus weighs against the wholesale sealing of the disputed documents.