Opinion ID: 2624174
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Dispute About Milos's Clock Status at the Time of the Accident Is Material.

Text: The primary issue in this appeal is whether Milos's clock status is material to whether his injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment. The superior court held that the unforgivable misconduct of Quality by placing a stockpile below a power line and the foreseeability of the resulting injury to Milos established that the injury was sufficiently work-related to arise out of Milos's employment with Quality. The court stated that contrary factors such as the end of the shift, the lack of employer benefit, [and] the unauthorized use of the four wheel ATV for horseplay were overpower[ed] by Quality's misconduct. On appeal, the estate argues that Milos's activities cannot be work-related if they occurred after his shift ended. [11] Although it is not necessary to consider whether, as the estate contends, an employee must be on-shift when injured to be covered by workers' compensation, we do hold that in the circumstances of this case, Milos's off-shift status, if proved, may exclude him from the scope of workers' compensation. Alaska Statute 23.30.010(a) provides that workers' compensation extends to injuries that arose out of and in the course of the employment. According to AS 23.30.395(2), the phrase arising out of and in the course of employment includes employer-required or supplied travel to and from a remote job site; activities performed at the direction or under the control of the employer; and employer-sanctioned activities at employer-provided facilities; but excludes recreational league activities sponsored by the employer, unless participation is required as a condition of employment, and activities of a personal nature away from employer-provided facilities. Alaska Statute 23.30.010(a) requires payment of benefits if, in relation to other causes, the employment is the substantial cause of the disability or death or need for medical treatment. We have looked in our cases to whether the accidental injury or death is connected with any of the incidents of one's employment [12] and whether the employee's activity is reasonably contemplated and foreseeable by the employment situation. [13] Another important consideration is whether the activity benefits the employer in some way. [14] The statutory definition of arising out of and in the course of employment provides little guidance here. Quality argues that AS 23.30.395(2)'s exclusion of activities of a personal nature away from employer-provided facilities implies that personal activities on an employer's premises are included, even if they occur off-shift. But Quality's argument fails to recognize that Milos's actions also do not fall within the scope of activities identified by the statute as included in workers' compensation. Resolving all inferences in favor of Milos, his use of the ATV was not an employer-sanctioned activit[y] at employer-provided facilities [15] because he was not authorized by Quality to use the ATV. It is also difficult to see how Milos might be considered to have been acting under the control of Quality at the time of the accident if it is true that Milos was both off-shift and committing a fireable offense. [16] Hence, the most relevant examples of covered activities in the statute seem to exclude Milos's actions. Because the statutory definition neither clearly includes nor clearly excludes Milos's actions, we turn to our case law. Quality argues that Seville v. Holland America Line Westours [17] requires us to affirm the superior court. In that case, an employee leaving work slipped on an icy sidewalk that the employer was legally obligated to maintain. [18] We held that workers' compensation was applicable, reasoning that when an employer, in connection with the operation of its business, is charged with a legal duty to control or abate a specific hazard in the area adjacent to its premiseseven a common hazard to which the general public is exposedthe legal duty itself supplies the necessary element of work-relatedness. [19] Quality argues that if failure to abate a danger off-premises can create the necessary element of work-relatedness, then a failure to abate a danger on-premises must also create work-relatedness. The superior court agreed, noting that [t]his judge has great difficulty understanding why a tumble by an off-shift worker, off-premises, due to a hazard (icy sidewalk) not abated by the employer, should be compensable; but a post-shift on-site accident from a hazard affirmatively created by the employer should not be compensable. Seville is distinguishable from this case. Seville created an exception to the premises rule. The premises rule states that employees are covered by workers' compensation while coming and going from work for only as long as they are on the employer's premises. [20] The exception to this rule recognized in Seville, known as the special hazards exception, holds that an injury occurring due to special hazards on the normal route that employees must traverse to reach the employer's premises is covered by workers' compensation. [21] But neither the premises rule nor any of its exceptions is directly relevant here because Milos was not going to or coming from work at the time of the accident. Quality's argumentthat Seville's holding that an off-premises accident was compensable requires us to hold that Milos's on-premises accident is also compensableignores a crucial part of our holding in that case. We reasoned there that the special hazard exception is justified because if employees are forced to traverse a particular route to reach their worksite, the special hazards of that route become the hazards of the employment. [22] Leaving work for the day via an employer-maintained sidewalk is a hazard reasonably contemplated and foreseeable by the employment situation. [23] We are not convinced that Milos's unauthorized, post-shift activities were similarly reasonably contemplated by or incidental to Milos's employment, even if they might have been foreseeable. [24] Traveling to and from work is an unavoidable part of employment. Employees necessarily rely upon the employer to keep the paths into the workplace free from hazards. [25] In contrast, drawing all inferences in the estate's favor, Milos's actions were voluntary, unauthorized, and on his own time. He could not have necessarily relied upon Quality to protect him from the exposed power line because there was no employment-related reason for him to drive the ATV up the stockpile. In short, the hazards posed by the ATV and power line in the particular circumstances of this case were not necessarily the hazards of the employment. [26] Quality also points to Witmer v. Kellen to support its argument that workers' compensation is broad enough to cover Milos's actions. [27] But Witmer is also distinguishable from this case. Witmer, the president and sole shareholder of a company, was injured while accompanying a subordinate on a work-related errand. [28] Although Witmer claimed that his motives for taking the trip were personal, we noted that he would inevitably evaluate the performance of the subordinate and stood to benefit from the subordinate's successful completion of the errand. [29] Also, because Witmer was the president of the company, his actions, unlike Milos's, could not be considered unauthorized. [30] Hence, even if Witmer could be understood as being off-shift during the trip, there was a stronger nexus between Witmer's actions and his employment than is present in this case. Quality argues that the estate seeks to draw an arbitrary line in time, making all post-shift accidents noncompensable. We agree that an arbitrary line would be undesirable. But we are also unwilling to accept the contrary view that any employee injury occurring on the employer's premises is automatically compensable, no matter how far removed from the employee's working hours. The Larson treatise strikes a sensible compromise between these absolutist positions, suggesting that an employee injured during a reasonable period before or after working hours may be covered if she is engaged in activities necessary or reasonably incidental to her work, [31] but that an employee who merely loiters around the work place before or after hours may not be covered. [32] Under Larson's approach, arriving at work early to change clothes and have a cup of coffee, [33] or leaving late because of commuting arrangements, [34] might be within the scope of workers' compensation, but remaining at the workplace to drink beer and become intoxicated would not be. [35] Applying the Larson standard to this case, Milos's activities are outside the exception for employees injured during a reasonable interval after their shift ends. Drawing all inferences in favor of the estate, Milos's shift ended at 10:00 and he suffered his fatal injury within thirty minutes thereafter. We assume that thirty minutes can be a reasonable interval in some circumstances. But regardless of whether the interval was reasonable, Milos's unauthorized use of the ATV cannot be considered necessary or reasonably incidental to his work. If a factfinder believes the estate's evidence, Milos was loitering at the work site for purely personal reasons after his shift had ended. Quality presented no evidence to suggest that his loitering benefitted Quality in any way, or was otherwise connected to his work. The estate has therefore demonstrated that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Milos's actions were outside the scope of workers' compensation. We also note that Milos's post-shift diversion is distinguishable from that of an employee acting during a lull in his duties. Some jurisdictions have held that the scope of workers' compensation is broader if the injury results from horseplay during such a lull. [36] Quality presses us to apply the same principle in this case. [37] An employee in a lull has little choice but to find a way to pass the time as he waits for his duties to resume; an off-shift employee is free to leave the work site and pursue recreational activities on his own. If he chooses to stay on the employer's premises for reasons unconnected to his work and then injures himself, such an injury is generally too remote from the course of his employment to be covered by workers' compensation.