Opinion ID: 1922029
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Plaintiff's Claims Against Robinson

Text: The plaintiff asserted claims against Robinson for breach of contract; breach of warranty deed in violation of G.L.1956 §§ 34-11-15 and 34-11-16; failure to reveal a defective condition in the property in violation of G.L.1956 § 5-20.8-2, and common law fraud. The hearing justice granted Robinson's motion for summary judgment on these claims. She concluded that plaintiff failed to produce any evidence tending to show that Robinson acted fraudulently or that he breached the conditions of the warranty deed. The trial justice held that the deed refers to Bayberry Lane as the southern boundary of the parcel but does not purport to warrant any interest in the roadway. The trial justice concluded that plaintiff's claim of ownership to the centerline of the lane rested on a presumption, based on our holding in Newman, 73 R.I. at 392, 57 A.2d at 177, that absent special circumstances, the owner of land abutting on a highway owns the fee to the middle line of the highway. Id. (citing Healey v. Babbitt, 14 R.I. 533 (1884)). This presumption however, does not apply to the facts in this case because the trustees owned the entire tract and conveyed the lane in fee to the 1953 buyers. We agree with the trial justice that plaintiff cannot succeed on his claim of fraud against Robinson. To establish a prima facie damages claim in a fraud case, `the plaintiff must prove that the defendant made a false representation intending thereby to induce plaintiff to rely thereon and that the plaintiff justifiably relied thereon' to his or her damage. Bogosian v. Bederman, 823 A.2d 1117, 1120 (R.I.2003) (quoting Stebbins v. Wells, 766 A.2d 369, 372 (R.I.2001)). There is no evidence in this record demonstrating that Robinson made any false representations to plaintiff. The evidence shows that plaintiff was informed by Robinson's real estate agent that Bayberry Lane was a private road. There is no evidence in this record demonstrating that Robinson asserted an ownership interest in Bayberry Lane nor did Robinson purport to convey such rights to plaintiff. We decline to require Robinson to defend against an allegation of fraud based on a rebuttable presumption, in the absence of affirmative, intentional misrepresentations that plaintiff relied upon to his detriment. Bitting's breach of contract and breach of warranty claims rest on his contention that Robinson failed to convey good and clear title to the property. The plaintiff alleged that the property was not free from all encumbrances because of the defendants' claim to own Bayberry Lane and their alternative claim of adverse possession. Bitting also alleged that Robinson breached the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment and the covenant to defend against any claim of title asserted by others. The covenant of general warranty and the covenant of quiet enjoyment are considered to be substantially similar in their effect except when someone varies the language of either covenant. Lewicki v. Marszalkowski, 455 A.2d 307, 309 (R.I. 1983). By its enactment of §§ 34-11-15 and 34-11-16, the General Assembly delineated the obligations undertaken by a grantor who conveys real estate by either a `warranty deed' or a conveyance `with warrant[y] covenants.' Lewicki, 455 A.2d at 309. A seller who conveys real property with warranty covenants, warrants to the grantee inter alia, that he or she is lawfully seised in fee simple of the granted premises; that the devised property is free of all encumbrances; that the grantee shall at all times after the delivery of the deed peaceably and quietly have and enjoy the deeded premises; and that the seller shall defend against any claim against the premises. Id. at 310. [T]he covenants of quiet enjoyment and warranty of title are prospective in nature and come into play after the delivery of the deed. Id. Although Bitting failed to establish ownership to the centerline of Bayberry Lane, an examination of the deed from Robinson leads us to conclude that Robinson may be liable for breach of contract and breach of warranty covenants that the property is free from encumbrances, the covenant of quiet enjoyment and the duty to defend. Because Robinson conveyed the lot with reference to the 1952 plat, he impliedly conveyed the parcel with an easement over the road, and there may have been a duty to disclose any known impediments to that right-of-way. In the deed from Robinson to Bitting, the parcel is described as bounded by Bayberry Lane as follows: Southerly: On Bayberry Lane, so-called a road or a way forty feet in width, three hundred twenty-two and two-tenths (322.2) feet;    BEING Lot No. 1-B as shown on that certain plat entitled, `Plat Showing a Portion of Sachuest Golf Club Land, Lots No. 1 and No. 1B to be conveyed to Harold S. and Helen P. Barker, Scale 1 = 40' October 1952, Middletown, R.I.' drawn by Louis E. Murphy, R.P.E. and on file in Plat Book 3 at Page 48 of the Middletown Land Evidence Records. Just as the trustees conveyed the lot to Helen P. Barker with reference to the 1952 plat, thereby deeding a right-of-way in the roads in the plat, Robinson conveyed with reference to the same plat and thereby assigned his right-of-way over the lane to Bitting. The plaintiff acceded to the same rights in the lane as Robinson. To the extent that the defendants adversely possessed Bayberry Lane, a claim not yet determined, Robinson may have breached the warranty covenants. We do not reach the same conclusion however, with respect to Robinson's alleged failure to disclose a deficient condition as set forth in § 5-20.8-2. The plaintiff argues that pursuant to the disclosure requirements set forth in § 5-20.8-2(a), Robinson had an obligation to disclose to him in writing, all deficient conditions of which the seller has actual knowledge. A deficient condition is defined as any land restrictions, defect, malfunction, breakage, or unsound condition existing on, in, across or under the real estate of which the seller has knowledge. Section 5-20.8-1(5). Section 5-20.8-2(b)(2)(xxi) provides as follows: Easements and Encroachments  The seller of that real estate is required to provide the buyer with a copy of any previous surveys of the real estate that are in the seller's possession and notify the buyer of any known easements, encroachments, covenants or restrictions of the seller's real estate. A buyer may wish to have a boundary or other survey independently performed at his or her own expense. Although the statute imposes a duty on the part of sellers and their agents to disclose known defects, as that term broadly is defined, the Legislature did not create a private cause of action for buyers to seek damages for violations of its provisions. See Stebbins v. Wells, 818 A.2d 711, 716 (R.I.2003) (because the statute, chapter 20.8 of title 5, provides for a civil fine for each violation, the Supreme Court refuses to imply a private right of action for damages under the act). Therefore, Bitting does not have an independent claim for any alleged violations of the statute; however, evidence of a knowing violation is admissible to support other claims against the seller. Id.