Opinion ID: 2976716
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fuelling’s reverse race discrimination claim

Text: Title VII prohibits employers from “fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, “the well-established McDonnell Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting framework applies to claims of discrimination brought under Title VII . . . and Ohio law.” McClain v. Nw. Cmty. Corr. Ctr. Judicial Corr. Bd., 440 F.3d 320, 332 (6th Cir. 2006) (articulating that framework and citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Tex. Dep’t Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)). Accordingly, a plaintiff claiming race-based discrimination supported only by circumstantial evidence must demonstrate that “(1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action, (3) she was qualified, and (4) she was treated differently than similarly-situated male and/or nonminority employees for the same or similar conduct.” Id. A plaintiff alleging discriminatory termination of employment must show under the fourth McDonnell Douglas prong that he or she was replaced by a person outside of the protected class. Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 567 (6th Cir. 2001). The original McDonnell Douglas standard required the plaintiff to show that “he belongs to a racial minority” because “[m]embership in a socially disfavored group was the assumption on 9 which the entire McDonnell Douglas analysis was predicated.” Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1016-17 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (modifying the McDonnell Douglas framework in a race discrimination case brought by a white plaintiff). But “Title VII, of course, prohibits racial discrimination against all groups.” Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985) (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 (1976)). Thus “[w]hites are also a protected group under Title VII.” Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017. Accordingly, this court has modified the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas standard to address claims of race-based discrimination brought by white plaintiffs. See Murray, 770 F.2d at 67 (“‘Reverse discrimination’ claims require application of a McDonnell Douglas standard modified to reflect this context as well as the factual situation of the claim.”). The first prong in establishing a prima facie case in such “reverse discrimination” cases does not require the plaintiff to show that he or she is a member of a racial minority. Instead, it requires the plaintiff to establish “background circumstances [to] support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 255-57 (6th Cir. 2002) (alteration in original; internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that a plaintiff may show that such background circumstances exist by presenting evidence that a defendant’s “unlawful consideration of race as a factor in hiring in the past justifies a suspicion that incidents of capricious discrimination against whites because of their race may be likely,” and concluding that the plaintiff had made such a showing where the person responsible for the company’s hiring was black (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Parker, 652 F.2d at 1018 (explaining that “evidence of a racially discriminatory environment serve[s] as a functional equivalent of the first McDonnell Douglas criterion, membership in a racial minority”). 10 Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See McClain, 440 F.3d at 332. “If [the defendant] successfully carries its burden, the burden returns to [the plaintiff] to produce evidence from which a jury could find that [the defendant’s] stated reason is merely pretextual.” Id. (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). The plaintiff may establish pretext by showing that the defendant’s alleged nondiscriminatory reason “(1) had no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate defendant’s conduct, or (3) was insufficient to warrant the challenged conduct.” Zambetti, 314 F.3d at 258. Although the defendants in the case before us concede that Fuelling experienced adverse employment actions (prong two) and was a qualified phlebotomist (prong three), they argue that she did not satisfy either the first or fourth prongs of the prima facie test. The defendants also argue that, even if Fuelling is found to have established a prima facie case, she failed to establish that New Vision’s legitimate reasons for firing her were only a pretext designed to hide discrimination. We need not decide whether Fuelling established the requisite “background circumstances” under the first prong of the prima facie analysis because we conclude that (1) her prima facie case fails under the fourth prong, and (2) even assuming that she had established a prima facie case, she has failed to show pretext. Each of these conclusions is discussed in turn.
Fuelling claims that the disciplinary actions taken against her and her eventual termination were discriminatory. The latter claim clearly fails because she was replaced by a white female. See Logan, 259 F.3d at 567. Her claim of discriminatory discipline also lacks merit because she failed 11 to assert any factual allegations whatsoever showing that she was similarly situated to the black employees who were purportedly not disciplined for the same conduct that Fuelling engaged in. This court has explained the showing that is required under the fourth prong of the prima facie test as follows: In order for two or more employees to be considered similarly-situated for purposes of creating an inference of disparate treatment in a reverse discrimination case, the plaintiff must prove that all of the relevant aspects of his employment situation are nearly identical to those of the [] employee who he alleges was treated more favorably. Leadbetter v. Gilley, 385 F.3d 683, 691 (6th Cir. 2004) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “The similarities between the plaintiff and the [other] employee must exist in all relevant aspects of their respective employment circumstances. Differences in job title, responsibilities, experience, and work record can be used to determine whether two employees are similarly situated.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Fuelling has identified only one black employee, Kim Napier, who allegedly called Fuelling a derogatory name and was not disciplined. But even then, Fuelling provided no information about Napier—such as her position, job responsibilities, years of experience, length of tenure at New Vision, or disciplinary history—that would indicate whether Napier and Fuelling were similarly situated in all relevant aspects of their employment. See id. Apart from the Napier incident, Fuelling fails to identify any other black employee who was not disciplined for similar behavior. Fuelling states that she was disciplined by Ward for calling a patient a “stupid nigger,” and that Ward did not discipline black employees for using the same language. But Fuelling does not identify any of those black employees, cite any specific instances 12 in which black employees other than Napier used such language, or assert any facts indicating that black employees who were not disciplined were “similarly situated” to her. Zachary alleges in her affidavit that Ward yelled at a white employee for using the term “the shits,” but did not reprimand a black employee who, a few minutes later, used the “F” word. Neither employee is ever identified. The same is true of her allegations about an employee who called someone a “spic.” Even assuming that the speakers were not disciplined for making these comments, Fuelling fails to demonstrate how they were similarly situated to her. Turning to Brown’s affidavit, she alleged that Ward chose a black woman to fill a phlebotomist position even though the woman had “no special qualifications” compared to any other phlebotomist, and that only a black employee “was allowed” to take a class required for a job in outpatient services. With regard to the former allegation, Brown provides no evidence to substantiate her conclusory assertion about the black woman’s qualifications. The latter allegation is also unsupported by specific factual allegations. Brown does not identify the “several phlebotomists” who were allegedly denied access to the class or claim that they were nonblack individuals. But even assuming that they were all white, Brown fails to allege any facts indicating that the black woman who was “allowed” to take the class was similarly situated to those unidentified persons who were allegedly not allowed to take the class. The party opposing a motion for summary judgment “must present some ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue [of fact] for trial,’” Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 699 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)), and affidavits submitted in support thereof “must be made on personal knowledge,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(1). Under this standard, Fuelling has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether she 13 was similarly situated to the black employees who were allegedly treated better than she was treated. See, e.g., Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998) (explaining that a plaintiff is “required to prove that all of the relevant aspects of his employment situation were nearly identical” to those of the employee who was allegedly treated more favorably in order to satisfy the fourth prong of the prima facie test (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)). That failure is fatal to her prima facie case.
Moreover, even if we were to assume that Fuelling had established a prima facie case of discrimination, her claim ultimately fails for another reason. The record contains ample evidence supporting the district court’s conclusion that Fuelling failed to show that the defendants’ legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for disciplining and later firing her was only a pretext designed to hide discrimination. According to the defendants, the primary reason that they disciplined and eventually terminated Fuelling was her filing of three false reports against other employees—one against Ward for purportedly broadcasting patients’ names over the hospital radio, a second against a fellow phlebotomist for supposedly sticking St. Rita’s patient Barbier five times in an attempt to draw blood, and a third against a coworker who had allegedly called another employee a “stupid f---ing Mexican wetback spic.” The defendants contend that these reports were investigated and proven to be false, thus providing legitimate grounds for disciplining and terminating Fuelling. Fuelling argues in response that the real reason for New Vision’s actions was Ward’s discriminatory animus. Specifically, she asserts that the investigations into Fuelling’s complaints were biased by Ward’s race-based prejudice. But Fuelling does not dispute that Hymer, not Ward, 14 made the decision to terminate her, and she does not allege that Hymer herself harbored any discriminatory animus toward Fuelling. She further concedes that Ward did not recommend that Fuelling be terminated and that Ward’s role in Fuelling’s termination was limited to printing out Fuelling’s disciplinary actions “so that [management] would have all the documents they needed.” The heart of Fuelling’s pretext argument is that Hymer “relied on what Ward told her and the information Ward provided her as part of the decision-making process.” Hymer’s reliance on the purportedly biased reports, Fuelling contends, tainted Hymer’s decision to terminate Fuelling. Fuelling’s argument, however, is without merit because she has failed to show either (1) that the investigations were biased, or (2) that Ward’s alleged bias can be imputed to Hymer. The district court explained that the “determinative question” in a situation where another employee, such as Ward, is alleged to have influenced the corporate decision-maker is “whether [the plaintiff] has submitted evidence that [a particular employee’s] racial animus was a cause for termination.” Noble v. Brinker Int’l, Inc., 391 F.3d 715, 723 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Fuelling has not shown any evidence that any racial animus held by Ward affected the investigations of the Barbier investigation or the alleged antihispanic comment, or that the findings of those investigations, as presented to Hymer, were biased. The assertion that Ruth [Ward] “falsely reported the outcome of [Ward’s] interview with Ms. Barbier” is conjectural and has no basis in the record cited by Fuelling. (first and second alteration in original); see also Noble, 391 F.3d at 724 (“Unless the statements or conduct of nondecisionmakers can be imputed to the ultimate decisionmaker, such statements or conduct [can not] suffice to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden . . . of demonstrating animus.” (alteration in original; internal quotation marks omitted)). To start with, Fuelling has failed to show that the investigations were biased. Her contention that Ward’s investigation into the Barbier incident was biased is disingenuous when Fuelling herself 15 admits that her accusations against the St. Rita’s phlebotomist were false. She thus concedes the very conclusion that Hymer reached based on Ward’s purportedly biased investigation. Regarding Fuelling’s HIPAA-related report against Ward, Hymer had the complaint investigated by having Ward’s radio broadcasts monitored for the next three days, but did not find any evidence of the type of conduct that Fuelling had alleged. Although Fuelling asserts that this investigation was also biased, the claim rings hollow because Ward obviously did not investigate the matter; rather, she was the subject of the investigation. Fuelling provides no explanation as to how Ward’s bias might have influenced the investigation when Ward was its target. Finally, Ward and two other managers investigated Fuelling’s complaint that a coworker had called another employee a “stupid f---ing Mexican wetback spic.” The five witnesses identified by Fuelling either denied that anyone had made that comment or heard only the word “spic.” As a result, Hymer concluded that Fuelling’s report of the incident was based on false information. Fuelling claims that this investigation was biased because of Ward’s discriminatory animus, but she fails to explain how Ward’s bias might have affected the other two managers, neither of whom are themselves alleged to be racially biased. Based on the foregoing, Fuelling has failed to show that the investigations into her complaints were biased because of Ward’s allegedly discriminatory animus, or that they served as a pretext for New Vision’s disciplinary actions against her. Even assuming, however, that Fuelling sufficiently alleged facts from which a reasonable jury could infer that the investigations were biased, Fuelling could prevail with respect to her discriminatory-discipline claim only by further showing that Hymer was a “conduit” of Ward’s purported bias. See Noble, 391 F.3d at 737. This she has failed to do. 16 In Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2001), this court found that a coworker’s racial animus against the plaintiff could be imputed to the supervisor who fired the plaintiff because the coworker’s negative report of an incident involving the plaintiff “was the exclusive and decisive factor” in the termination decision. Id. at 878 (explaining that the supervisor did not conduct his own investigation, but terminated the plaintiff based exclusively on the coworker’s allegations). Those facts, the court concluded, distinguished the case from Wilson v. Stroh Cos., 952 F.2d 942, 946 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding no “causal nexus” between the company’s decision to terminate the plaintiff and a supervisor’s racial animus because the decisionmaker had conducted an independent investigation into the plaintiff’s conduct), but were analogous to the facts of Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a supervisor’s age-based prejudice tainted a committee’s decision to fire the plaintiff because the supervisor’s portrayal of the plaintiff to the committee in the worst possible light “may well have been decisive” in light of the fact that the committee’s deliberations were “brief, perhaps perfunctory” and none of the committee members could remember having considered the issue of the plaintiff’s termination). Christian, 252 F.3d at 878. The Shager court explained that if a decisionmaker fires the plaintiff “for reasons untainted by any prejudice of” the other employee, then “the causal link between that prejudice and [the plaintiff’s] discharge is severed” and the plaintiff cannot maintain his or her claim. 913 F.2d at 405. Here, it is undisputed that the disciplinary reports that Ward provided to Hymer were considered in the decisionmaking process. But the record is replete with evidence showing that Hymer had nondiscriminatory grounds for terminating Fuelling that were independent of Ward’s alleged bias. Specifically, multiple disciplinary reports were filed against Fuelling by people other 17 than Ward, including Hymer, documenting various problems with Fuelling’s conduct. The complaints included Fuelling’s use of racial slurs and abusive language, her conflicts with other employees, complaints from law enforcement officers and St. Rita’s pharmacy staff, and Fuelling’s efforts to petition her coworkers for support. Hymer personally handled the complaints about Fuelling from the pharmacy staff, law enforcement officers, and the employees who were upset by Fuelling’s petition, and for the last few months before Fuelling’s termination personally handled everything involving Fuelling. She also explained that in her seven years as New Vision’s Executive Director, “the number of complaints [received] concerning Doreen Fuelling’s behavior far exceeded the number of complaints for any other employee,” and that “[i]n most of my investigations, [and based on] the things Doreen told me, she saw things very differently than everyone else.” In addition, New Vision’s employee manual sets forth grounds for disciplining and terminating an employee. It states that “disciplinary action, ranging from verbal warning to termination, may be taken for violations including but not limited to” a violation of hospital policy, discourteous treatment of patients, visitors, or other employees, interfering with the work of others, and making any false statement concerning any patient, visitor, or employee. The foregoing supports the district court’s conclusion that any bias on the part of Ward cannot be properly imputed to Hymer because Hymer fired Fuelling “for reasons untainted by any prejudice” of Ward, thus severing the causal link between Ward’s alleged bias and Fuelling’s discharge. See Shager, 913 F.2d at 405; Wilson, 952 F.2d at 946. Furthermore, Fuelling has failed to cite any evidence suggesting that Hymer did not hold an honest belief in her reasons for terminating Fuelling or that Hymer failed to make a “reasonably informed and considered decision.” 18 See Abdulnour v. Campbell Soup Supply Co., 502 F.3d 496, 503 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming the grant of summary judgment for the employer where the decisionmaker had before him complaints from various people about the plaintiff’s inadequate job performance and demeaning treatment of others, and where the decisionmaker personally observed that the plaintiff failed to address problems that were his responsibility). Fuelling has therefore failed to meet her burden of raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hymer’s stated reasons for terminating her were designed to hide Ward’s alleged discriminatory animus. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on Fuelling’s claim of discrimination based on disparate treatment.