Opinion ID: 64044
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Against Doctors Bush and Holbrook

Text: Dr. Bush asserts three varieties of immunity and Dr. Holbrook two; they are discussed when relevant to particular claims. Both sides agree that Dr. Bush, a public hospital employee, is a state actor for purposes of Section 1983. Thus, it is not necessary to show that she was engaged in a conspiracy with others in order for her to commit a constitutional violation. Dr. Holbrook's status is less clear, but as the discussion will show, it is immaterial to the outcome here.
Mrs. Tebo's basis for asserting a violation of her due process rights to liberty is the so-called stigma-plus theory. While infliction of a stigma on a person's reputation by a state official, without more, does not infringe upon a protected liberty interest, a plaintiff may assert a constitutional violation by alleging a stigma plus an infringement of some other interest. Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 936 (5th Cir.1995). The necessary stigma consists of concrete, false factual assertions; infringement occurs if the state sought to remove or significantly alter a life, liberty, or property interest recognized and protected by state law or the federal constitution as incorporated against the states. Texas v. Thompson, 70 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir.1995). Mrs. Tebo must first show that statements by a state actor stigmatized her in some way. While the Defendants, especially Dr. Holbrook, argue that actual commitment to an institution is necessary for a stigma, the precedents they cite simply recognize that actually being committed is a stigma and thus requires heightened due process. The stigma portion of the analysis is concerned with speech from the government about an individual. See Garcia v. City of Albuquerque, 232 F.3d 760, 772 (10th Cir.2000) (a sufficient stigma is one involving serious mental illness). We do not find any inherent bar to the statements made in the doctors' report being considered for stigma purposes. However, Mrs. Tebo's argument fails to grapple with another aspect of the stigma requirementthe stigma must have been published by the government. See Bledsoe v. City of Horn Lake, 449 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir.2006) (an element of the stigma-plus infringement test is that the charges were made public). Placing a charge in a publicly available file has been held to satisfy the publication requirement, Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir.2001), although mere presence in a file not normally available to the public is insufficient. Hughes v. City of Garland, 204 F.3d 223, 228 (5th Cir.2000). Mrs. Tebo argues that one of our precedents held that a stigma claim can lie even when it was not shown that records of treatment are subject to public disclosure. See Coleman v. Dretke, 409 F.3d 665 (5th Cir.2005). The Coleman appeal, however, was a habeas challenge to the imposition of mandatory sex offender treatment at the conclusion of a prisoner's sentence. The court held that even if the state did not publicize the petitioner's status by placing him on the sex offender registry or disclosing records of his treatment, there were adverse social consequences that arose from requiring him to attend sex offender therapy; those effects required heightened due process. Id. at 668. Coleman was not applying the Section 1983 stigma-plus test, but rather interpreting the due process standards for commitment of prisoners to mental institutions. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980). Mrs. Tebo's only evidence of publication is an affidavit by one witness in the community that she heard that Thurman Tebo had tried to have Mrs. Tebo committed because she was mentally incompetent. There is no indication that this information came from the report signed by Doctors Bush and Holbrook, or from anyone else connected to the government. We find no basis to conclude that the publication element is met by evidence of this sort. Even if there were a stigma, it would not be enough. Mrs. Tebo must also establish that an independent constitutional interest was violated. She must show that she was deprived of a right previously existing under state law or the U.S. Constitution. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). Mrs. Tebo alleges that her right to liberty was violated by the threat of mental commitment. Even though she was not committed, she claims she went to Doctors Bush and Holbrook involuntarily. She asserts that Joan Sonnier told her she had to go see the two doctors on Monday, and she was scared the defendants would have her locked up ... if she did not obey their commands. Mrs. Tebo cites Dr. Holbrook's deposition testimony, in which he testified that Mrs. Tebo told him that someone else made her come and [s]he did not want to be there. Holbrook, in turn, cites Mrs. Tebo's deposition, in which she agreed that the sheriff did not force her to go, that her brother drove her to the doctor, and that her attorney did not tell her not to go. The cases cited by Mrs. Tebo did not find that a person's liberty interest was violated on facts consisting of nothing more than a sense of being pressured to receive this sort of medical examination. Moreover, Mrs. Tebo does not contest that Doctors Bush and Holbrook had no contact with or knowledge of her before she arrived at their offices for her appointment. Joan Sonnier, who Mrs. Tebo says told her she was required to attend the evaluations, is no longer a party. Mrs. Tebo does not explain how the doctors could have been involved in any such conspiracy. Thus, there is not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the doctors deprived Mrs. Tebo of a protected liberty interest. Summary judgment on this claim is affirmed.
The standard for an intentional infliction claim has previously been stated. This claim as it relates to the doctors arises from the statements in the report of the psychological evaluation that Mrs. Tebo was mentally ill and required inpatient psychiatric treatment. While those statements might constitute outrageousness if they were intentionally false, Mrs. Tebo presents no evidence of such intent. Her medical expert created a genuine issue as to whether the doctors' evaluation was negligently conducted and not in conformity with the relevant statutes. We address those claims later. But there is nothing in the record indicating that Bush or Holbrook had any reason to falsify their report or to harm Mrs. Tebo. Mrs. Tebo's speculation as to bad motives, without presenting some evidence that would allow a fact-finder to find intentional or reckless conduct, does not allow the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress by the doctors to withstand summary judgment. We affirm judgment on this claim.
The elements of this tort have already been explained. There is no evidence of malice in instituting or continuing the proceedings. Mrs. Tebo points to no motive or potential bad objective on the part of Doctors Bush and Holbrook. At most, she lays out a negligence claim. Summary judgment as to malicious prosecution is affirmed.

Mrs. Tebo argues that Dr. Bush violated various provisions of the civil commitment statutes. These violations are said to constitute negligence per se. Questions are also raised concerning whether Dr. Bush was negligent in his medical evaluation of Mrs. Tebo. However, because Dr. Bush is a public employee, issues of immunity control the outcome. A section of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act provides that no employee shall be held personally liable for acts or omissions occurring within the course and scope of the employee's duties. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-7. Excluded are fraud, malice, libel, slander or any criminal offense. Id. Mrs. Tebo argues that Dr. Bush is not entitled to this immunity because the doctor acted willfully and maliciously. As explained with respect to the intentional infliction and malicious prosecution claims, there is not sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact that Dr. Bush acted with malice. Moreover, Mrs. Tebo does not dispute that Dr. Bush is subject to this statutory immunity provision and does not explain how an exception for intentional torts could apply to a claim for per se negligence in violating a statute or negligently providing medical care. Dr. Bush is entitled to this statutory immunity.
Dr. Holbrook does not argue that he is entitled to the immunity for public employees. He cites us to another statute that immunizes actions taken under the civil commitment statutes that were in good faith in connection with the opinions of physicians and psychologists, among other things. Id. § 41-21-105(1). Mrs. Tebo claims that Dr. Holbrook has no immunity because there can be no good faith given her evidence that the statutory procedures were not followed and the medical standard of care was not upheld. Good faith is not defined by the statute. In other contexts, good faith has been defined as the absence of intent to defraud or seek unconscionable advantage. In re Estate of Wheeler, 958 So.2d 1266, 1273 (Miss.Ct.App.2007). It has been held that the immunity applies to charges of wrongful commitment, unlawful detention, battery (based on non-consensual treatment) and the like. It speaks to negligence only insofar as one might deviate from the appropriate standard of care in making the commitment decision. Carrington v. Methodist Med. Ctr., 740 So.2d 827, 829 (Miss.1999). It is precisely the making of the commitment decision that was at issue herenot, as in Carrington, the failure to prevent a suicide occurring after a commitment took place. Mrs. Tebo accuses Dr. Holbrook of two negligence-based claims; negligence is at the core of what the statute immunizes. Summary judgment is affirmed as to the negligence claims against the doctors.