Opinion ID: 1807276
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reasonableness of the board's order.

Text: The Board found that respondent had participated in the firefighters' strike by absenting himself from his assigned hours of duty on the dates of the strike and concluded that in so doing he was guilty of violating sec. 111.70 (4) (1), Stats., and certain rules of the Madison fire department, and of contumacious conduct endangering the public safety. Respondent was ordered suspended for a period of one hundred eighty days. On review of the Board's order the circuit court held that the amnesty clause was valid, that the Board was bound by the clause, and that its order was therefore unreasonable. The circuit court, therefore, did not reach the question, [u]pon the evidence was the order of the board reasonable? Sec. 62.13 (5) (i), Stats. We conclude that the case must be remanded to the Board for further proceedings for the reason that the respondent was not afforded due process. Respondent had notice of and an opportunity to defend against charges that he was guilty of violating sec. 111.70 (4) (1), Stats., and of contumacious conduct endangering the public safety. The charges filed by the elector against the respondent did not allege that he had violated any rules of the fire department. It appears the respondent had no notice of these alleged rule violations until it was pronounced by the Board that he had so violated the three rules in its written decision filed after the hearing. Due process of law requires that an individual have notice of and an opportunity to defend against charges proffered against him. In General Electric Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (1958), 3 Wis. 2d 227, 241, 88 N. W. 2d 691, this court held: The principle of fair play is an important factor in a consideration of due process of law. Parties in a legal proceeding have a right to be apprised of the issues involved, and to be heard on such issues. A finding or order made in a proceeding in which there has not been a `full hearing' is a denial of due process and is void. ... No court of review has the means of determining whether the Board would have imposed the same penalty had it found the respondent in violation of only two of the violations charged in the complaint. On this appeal, the respondent contends that based upon the evidence before it, the order of the Board was arbitrary and discriminatory and also unreasonable. However, this issue was not passed upon by the circuit court; and also in view of our remand to the Board for further proceedings because of the lack of due process, it is not properly raised in this court. Nevertheless, we would observe that the Board does have the authority to dismiss the complaint after it has been processed if, in its judgment, it should determine such was a proper disposition of the charges filed by the elector. Also, should the Board decide further proceedings are necessary, on the basis of the record now before us, various factors should be taken into consideration by the Board in its ultimate decision. Among these are: (1) The amnesty clause in the agreement which unequivocally sets forth the position of the city council in its relation with the Union and its members; (2) the decision of the Board, as such, and its individual members, not to file charges against any fireman; and (3) the fact that the Board had knowledge of the fact that over 270 firemen participated in the strike and that no charges were filed against anyone except the respondent. We reach our conclusions as to the disposition of this case upon different grounds than those considered by the circuit court. However, the effect of our decision is that the judgment of the circuit court which reverses the order of the Board of Police & Fire Commissioners is affirmed. That part of the judgment ordering the Madison fire department to forthwith reinstate the respondent, and that he be paid as though he had been in continuous service, is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Board of Police & Fire Commissioners for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. By the Court. Affirmed in part; reversed in part, and cause remanded to the Board of Police & Fire Commissioners of the City of Madison. On this appeal, no costs are taxed by either party. HALLOWS, C. J. ( concurring ). I would reach the question of whether the amnesty clause was valid. In my view, sec. 111.70 (4) (1), Stats., expresses the public policy of this state that municipal employees cannot strike and such strikes are hereby expressly prohibited. A municipality cannot declare a contrary policy, circumvent, or override this public policy by granting amnesty to public employees who violate this law and endanger public safety. If the public policy expressed by this section is unjust or obsolete, then the legislature should be convinced to change the law. But until that is done, the amnesty clause is against public policy and void. I agree that the sentence of the Board cannot be sustained because it was based on charges which were not the subject of notice and, therefore, due process was violated. But I must disagree with that part of the majority opinion in which the court makes an observation which tells the Board of Police & Fire Commissioners what it already knows and suggests, in effect, to the Board that it should dismiss the complaint. Under any consideration, not one of these three items makes the illegal acts in disregard of public safety either legal or excusable. Because this court does not know how much of the discipline penalty given by the Board is referrable to the violation of Board rules and how much to the illegal acts, there is no reason to suggest to the Board what this court thinks the result should be. Such action by this court might well be considered by others to be an improper attempt to influence the Board in the performance of its duties and this should be avoided. ROBERT W. HANSEN, J. ( concurring ). The court majority sets forth facts and factors in this record that relate to reasonableness of penalty. This writer would go further to meet the issue raised on this appeal as to the penalty imposed by the commission being excessive. I would hold, on this record, that the penalty imposed, suspension for one hundred eighty days, was excessive and unreasonable. To the suggestion that listing mitigating factors tells the board what it knows and what it presumably took into consideration in fixing the penalty, the answer: if it did so, not sufficiently so. The rehearing, if rehearing there be, will, of course, be an entirely new ball game. But as to the record established, at the hearing held, on the issue raised, the writer would hold the outer limits of reasonableness of penalty would have been reached by a thirty or sixty day suspension.