Opinion ID: 23590
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: retaliation under title vii and the tchra

Text: 22 The district court also granted summary judgment against Evans on her Title VII and TCHRA retaliation claims. The district court wrote that the McDonnell Douglas framework also applies in the retaliation context, holding that, to make out a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, Evans must show (1) that she engaged in an activity protected by the statute; (2) that she experienced an adverse employment action following the protected activity; and (3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 498, 507 (5th Cir. 1994). The district court acknowledged that Evans had engaged in a protected activity. She was compelled under subpoena to testify at a co-worker's grievance hearing for racial and age discrimination against her own supervisor, Abram. However, the district court held that a demotion, as a matter of law, could not rise to the level of an adverse employment action. The court cited Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir. 1997), for this proposition. 23 The district court found further that Evans failed to satisfy the third prong of the prima facie case, the causal link requirement, which it identified as a but for causation standard. The court concluded that the City's argument, that numerous disciplinary actions against Evans provided a nonretaliatory cause for the demotion, was compelling and that Evans could therefore not establish that her demotion would not have occurred but for her appearance at the grievance hearing. 24 Again, because the court found that Evans had failed to make out a prima facie case of retaliation, it went no further in the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
25 We believe that the district court erred in its analysis of Evans's retaliation claims. 6 Moreover, we find that Evans has created jury issues regarding her retaliation claim by demonstrating factual disputes as to a prima facie case of retaliation and as to pretext. As such, we conclude the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the City. 26 Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 1996), sets out the standard for evaluating a Title VII retaliation claim in a summary judgment context. A plaintiff must first prove by preponderance of the evidence (1) that she engaged in activity protected by Title VII, (2) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Id. at 304. 27 The district court found that Evans satisfied the first element of the prima facie case. This is supported by the summary judgment evidence from both sides. The City, in its admissions, states that Evans was subpoenaed to testify at Gentle's grievance hearing on January 3, 1995; that the hearing was set for January 6, 1995; and that the hearing was postponed until February 8, 1995, at which time Evans did appear and testify. The grievance hearing concerned Gentle's Title VII claims of racial discrimination against Abram. 7 If an employee has 'made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing' under Title VII, the employee has engaged in a protected activity. Long, 88 F.3d at 304 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(2) (1994)). The district court was therefore correct to find that Evans had satisfied the first element of the prima facie case. 28 The district court then considered whether Evans had also met the second prong of the prima facie test. The district court concluded that she had not. The court found that Evans could not show that she was subjected to an adverse employment action because she was merely demoted. The court erroneously relied on Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir. 1997), for the proposition that a demotion could not be an adverse employment action. Mattern contains no such language. Quite the contrary, this court has stated that a demotion can be an adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII if it meets the appropriate criteria. See Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d 923, 933 n.21 (5th Cir. 1999). 29 Under the facts of this case, Evans's demotion could very well be an adverse employment action if it meets certain criteria. See Sharp, 164 F.3d at 933 n.21; Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995) (Title VII was designed to address ultimate employment decisions, not to address every decision made by employers that arguably might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions.); cf. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.). As we mentioned above, there is a dispute between the parties regarding exactly when the demotion occurred. There are four dates on the demotion memorandum to Evans. The memorandum is dated February 15, 1995, and gives Evans notice that she was reclassified (demoted) on January 21, 1995. The date of January 21, 1995 is crossed out, and February 15, 1995 is written in by hand. That notation was apparently made on February 22, 1995. There is a stamp on the memorandum that indicates it was approved on February 20, 1995. Similarly, in the City's reassignment form, the date 1/25/95 is crossed out and 2/15/95 is typed in above it. 30 The City contends in its argument that due to the six-month probationary period, Evans did not have a property right to her new position[.] Evans asserts, however, that the date of her demotion was backdated so that the demotion would fall within the probationary period. The City does not address this allegation. We decline to make a bright-line rule regarding whether a demotion in the particular circumstance of a probationary period qualifies as an adverse employment action. As we stated above, a demotion is an adverse employment action if it meets certain criteria, and we simply note the contradictory dates on the memorandum may or may not affect this analysis. Because Evans raised a fact question as to this issue, summary judgment was improper. 31 To fully resolve whether Evans established a prima facie case of retaliation, we now turn to the final prong of the analysis and examine whether there is a causal link between Evans's engaging in the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Long, 88 F.3d at 304. The district court found that Evans had not satisfied this element. The district court based this finding on its belief that Evans had failed to show that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but for her testimony at Gentle's Title VII hearing. This is not the proper legal standard for this prima facie inquiry. This court has explicitly held that the causal link required in prong three of the prima facie case for retaliation is not as stringent as the but for standard. See Long, 88 F.3d at 305 n.4 (The standard for establishing the 'causal link' element of the plaintiff's prima facie case is much less stringent [than the but for test].) Accordingly, a plaintiff need not prove that her protected activity was the sole factor motivating the employer's challenged decision in order to establish the 'causal link' element of a prima facie case. Id. 32 Evans was subpoenaed to testify at Gentle's grievance hearing on January 3, 1995; appeared to testify on January 6, 1995; and did in fact testify on February 8, 1995. Evans was recommended for demotion on January 11, 1995. The time between her engaging in the protected activity of appearing to testify at a Title VII grievance hearing and her being recommended for demotion was five days. Close timing between an employee's protected activity and an adverse action against [her] may provide the 'causal connection' required to make out a prima facie case of retaliation. Swanson v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1188 (5th Cir. 1997) (emphasis omitted). We note that a time lapse of up to four months has been found sufficient to satisfy the causal connection for summary judgment purposes. Weeks v. NationsBank, N.A., No. CIV.A.3:98-CV-1352M, 2000 WL 341257, at  (N.D. Tex. 2000) (citing Garrett v. Constar, Inc., No. CIV.A.397-CV-2575, 1999 WL 354239 (N.D. Tex. 1999)). Accordingly, we find that a time lapse of five days in this case is sufficient to provide a causal connection that enables Evans to satisfy the third prong of the prima facie case of her retaliation claims against the City. The district court erred in holding otherwise. 33 Although not addressed by the district court, we also find that Evans has established a fact issue regarding pretext. Once the employer satisfies its burden of producing evidence of a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its decision, 8 the inference of discrimination introduced by the plaintiff's prima facie showing then drops from the case. See Russell, 235 F.3d at 222; Long, 88 F.3d at 308. Thus, we reach the ultimate question: has the City unlawfully retaliated against Evans? In contrast to the standard for the prima facie causal link factor, the question for the factfinder here is whether Evans has shown that the demotion would not have occurred but for her appearance at the Title VII grievance hearing. See Long, 88 F.3d at 308. Evans may establish the answer to this ultimate question indirectly, by showing that the legitimate, nonretaliatory justification offered by the City for Evans's demotion is pretextual. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). 34 Before evaluating Evans's summary judgment evidence, it must be noted that we have held that [m]erely disputing [an employer's] assessment of [a plaintiff's] work performance will not necessarily support an inference of pretext. Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 408 (5th Cir. 1999). Thus, Evans cannot survive summary judgment merely because she disagrees with the City's characterization of her disciplinary history; rather, [t]he issue is whether [the City's] perception of [Evans's] performance, accurate or not, was the real reason for her termination. Id. at 408-09 (emphasis omitted). Furthermore, [s]ince this case reached the pretext stage, the only question on summary judgment is whether the evidence of retaliation, in its totality, supports an inference of retaliation. Id. at 407. 35 In her deposition, Abram stated that she documented an outburst by Evans, detailed in note 5 supra, in a memorandum written by her, dated, and placed in Evans's file. No such document is in the record. Similarly, there is no document in the summary judgment record that describes the confrontation between Sterling and Evans. See supra note 5. Despite Abram's own assertion that I make notations on all verbal counseling, not a single such notation appears in the record. 36 The City relies on two memoranda to establish Evans's alleged checkered employment history and, therefore, to provide a legitimate justification for her demotion. At the outset, we note that both memoranda were written, the first on August 24, 1995, and the second on January 31, 1997, after Evans engaged in the protected activity and, indeed, after she was demoted. There is no contemporaneous evidence in the record of any disciplinary action taken against Evans at any time before she was demoted. All of the evidence of disciplinary problems comes from memoranda or depositions written or taken after Evans was demoted and, in some cases, after Evans filed suit. The second memorandum of January 31, 1997, can be of no consequence either, because it details only incidents that happened in 1996, one full year after Evans was demoted. This after-the-fact documentation cannot be evidence to justify a demotion because of disciplinary problems. 37 Evans, on the other hand, has also provided the court with a memorandum from Abram, dated May 23, 1994, recommending Evans for the promotion and describing her as qualified and willing to assume the new job. This stands in stark contrast to Abram's letter of January 11, 1995 (after Evans appeared to testify), which claims that Evans neither has the requisite skills nor is willing to acquire them. The record also contains a February 24, 1994 letter of commendation, written from Abram to Evans, praising Evans for demonstrating [her] abilities to supervise the staff and coordinating the Nursing activities[.] No mention is made of a history of disciplinary problems. 38 As we discussed above, Evans also claims that the City backdated her demotion to fall within the six-month probationary period, and the memorandum of demotion contains four separate dates. Needless to say, four dates on one demotion memorandum and two dates on the reassignment form is rather peculiar. The City did not address this issue in its briefing, and the district court did not address it in its summary judgment Order. We find that backdating the demotion notice could support a theory that the City was attempting to make it appear like Evans was demoted during her probationary period for the routine reason that her work was unsatisfactory. That would certainly support an argument of pretext. Thus, there is a fact question on whether the notice was backdated, and this fact question, along with the other evidence adduced by Evans, goes straight to the heart of the issue of pretext. 39 In Shackelford, we found that the combination of suspicious timing with other significant evidence of pretext, can be sufficient to survive summary judgment. 190 F.3d at 409. In this case, we believe that the close temporal proximity between Evans's appearance at her co-worker's grievance hearing and her demotion, coupled with the lack of any documentary evidence dated before her appearance or demotion that would tend to support a theory of disciplinary problems, plus Evans's evidence in the form of memoranda written by Abram that tend to refute Abram's own justifications for the demotion, all give rise to a conflict of substantial evidence on the ultimate issue whether the City wrongfully demoted Evans in retaliation for her appearance at a co-worker's grievance hearing. Thus, we conclude that the summary judgment evidence, in its entirety, supports an inference of retaliation. As such, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Evans's Title VII and TCHRA retaliation claims in favor of the City.