Opinion ID: 2520945
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Watson and Ruiz

Text: Two Court of Appeal decisions, both relying on State Personnel Bd., concluded that a civil service employee may choose between the two administrative forums  the State Personnel Board or the Department. In Watson v. Department of Rehabilitation (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1271, 1284, 261 Cal.Rptr. 204 ( Watson ), the Court of Appeal stated, We fail to understand why the State continues to urge on appeal as it did in the trial court that Watson may not prevail because she has not exhausted her civil service administrative remedies. She need not have done so as the State well knows because Watson had a choice between her civil service remedies and those provided by the [FEHA]. (Gov.Code, § 12940 et seq.; [ State Personnel Bd., supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 429, 431, 217 Cal.Rptr. 16, 703 P.2d 354].) She chose to file her first charge with the DFEP [Department of Fair Employment Practices] and proceed accordingly. Watson complied with the procedures required under the act, received her `right to sue' letter and timely filed her suit. ( Watson, supra, at p. 1284, 261 Cal.Rptr. 204.) In Ruiz v. Department of Corrections (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 891, 900, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 139 ( Ruiz ), the Court of Appeal held that state employees may pursue their claims of employment discrimination with either the State Personnel Board or the Department, or both. Unlike Watson, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at page 1284, 261 Cal.Rptr. 204, Ruiz viewed State Personnel Bd., supra, 39 Cal.3d 422, 217 Cal.Rptr. 16, 703 P.2d 354, as authority only for the Department's and the State Personnel Board's concurrent jurisdiction over matters involving state employee discrimination claims. ( Ruiz, supra, at p. 897, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 139.) Ruiz, however, interpreted State Personnel Bd. and other cases as indicating a strong public policy supporting an employee's ability to challenge discriminatory employment practices in the forum of choice. ( Ruiz, supra, at p. 898, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 139.) The court concluded that State Personnel Bd. in particular, supports an expansive view of the avenues aggrieved state employees may pursue when filing their complaints. ( Ruiz, supra, at p. 897, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 139.) The court correctly noted that we took care to explain the differences between the two forums, emphasizing that the antidiscrimination provisions of the FEHA were more extensive than those in the Civil Service Act. ( Ibid. ) Ruiz further reasoned that our attention [in State Personnel Bd. ] on the different purposes of the two agencies suggests it would be proper for a potential claimant to consider which forum would be more appropriate for his or her cause of action. ( Ruiz, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 898, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 139.) We agree. In State Personnel Bd. we explained, The purpose of the Civil Service Act is to ensure that appointments to state office are made not on the basis of patronage, but on the basis of merit, in order to preserve the economy and efficiency of state service. (See § 18500.) The purpose of the FEHA is to provide effective remedies for the vindication of constitutionally recognized civil rights, and to eliminate discriminatory practices.... The Commission and Department have 25 years of administrative expertise solely in the prevention and remedying of civil rights discrimination, and thus have more specialized expertise in this area than does the [State Personnel] Board. ( State Personnel Bd., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 432, 217 Cal.Rptr. 16, 703 P.2d 354.) Thus, certain cases are more appropriate for the Department forum than for the State Personnel Board. For similar reasons, we find FEHA discrimination claims may be more appropriately heard by the Department than the City's Board of Civil Service Commissioners. Clearly, some plaintiffs would prefer the summary procedure of the Civil Service Act or comparable administrative remedies, while others with more serious discrimination claims would prefer to bypass the administrative procedures to seek a vindication of their civil rights, even if the ensuing litigation is expensive and protracted. The opportunity for all public and private employees to vindicate civil rights is the primary intent of the FEHA, and as Ruiz observed, this is why plaintiffs have a choice between their civil service remedies and those provided by the FEHA. ( Ruiz, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 891, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 139.) Ruiz also explored the practical considerations a state employee might face if we required employees to always exhaust their FEHA and state Civil Service Act remedies. As Ruiz explained, imposing this requirement would present a procedural minefield. Not only must the state employee, as well as the state employer, struggle to comply with the substantive and procedural requirements of each agency, but there arises a potential problem with the statute of limitations. Claimants who unsuccessfully appeal their termination with the [State Personnel] Board must file a writ in the trial court if they wish to challenge the findings of the Board. Otherwise, they are bound by the factual findings of the Board in future litigation. [Citations.] In the meantime, however, these same claimants must consider the strict statutory deadlines of the [Department] if they wish to file a subsequent or simultaneous complaint with that agency as well. According to the Department, claimants who receive their `right to sue' letters from the [Department] cannot initiate their lawsuits because they must [first exhaust the administrative remedies the State Personnel Board requires], a wait that could affect filing deadlines with the trial court. Moreover, to avoid [the effect of collateral estoppel on issues the Board decides], these same claimants must also wait until their writ to the trial court has been decided before initiating legal action. [Citation.] Though the doctrine of equitable tolling could possibly remedy the problem, the fact remains that the failure of state employees to meet statutory deadlines would be a potential argument by employers in future litigation, adding another obstacle for employees. ( Ruiz, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 899, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 139.) Ruiz emphasized that if the court were to require state employees to exhaust their administrative remedies at the State Personnel Board, regardless of their desire to pursue the same claims with other agencies, it would be imposing on them a burden that private employees do not share, raising potential equal protection issues. ( Ruiz, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 899, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 139.) The court also observed that affording state employees a choice between administrative remedies was in no way inconsistent with the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies, which, Ruiz concluded, requires only that a party comport with the chosen administrative forum's procedural requirements. ( Ibid. ) Even if we were to assume that former article IX, section 112 1/2, now article X, section 1017 of the City Charter is on equal footing with the Civil Service Act, we see no reason to distinguish the present action from Ruiz. As the Court of Appeal below acknowledged, the pursuit of separate administrative remedies may result in inconsistent administrative findings or adjudications. The court refused, however, to opine as to how to resolve the conflict should it occur, concluding instead that the possibility of conflict does not outweigh the benefits of requiring exhaustion of both administrative remedies. We find the Court of Appeal's reasoning unpersuasive, and conclude the approach we adopted in State Personnel Bd., and the Court of Appeal adopted in Ruiz and other cases is the better one. A city employee would indeed tread onto a procedural minefield if a claim was filed with the Department at the same time remedies were pursued under the City Charter. The benefits of judicial economy, agency expertise, and potential for swift resolution of grievances are better served by a rule that allows aggrieved public employees to seek redress in the forum that is most appropriate to their situation. We note an additional reason not to impose the internal exhaustion requirement in this case. As an employee of the City, Schifando is not governed by the Civil Service Act. Therefore, his principal statutory remedy (in addition to the general Unruh Civil Rights Act provisions (Civ.Code, § 51.7 et seq.) under California law to redress the asserted discrimination he suffered is to file an FEHA claim. As we have recognized, the FEHA was enacted to expand, not to limit employees' rights to remedy discrimination. ( Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 82, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373; State Personnel Bd., supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 431, 217 Cal.Rptr. 16, 703 P.2d 354.) It would be inconsistent with this legislative purpose to hold that aggrieved employees must exhaust their remedies under a city charter contemporaneous with or before filing a claim with the Department. [4] On a final note, we are not concerned that all public employees, and in particular those employees with a routine administrative claim for compensation or reinstatement will chose to bypass the summary and expeditious procedures and remedies the City Charter provides in order to proceed directly to a jury trial to seek an award of compensatory or punitive damages.