Opinion ID: 3001556
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voluntary and Intelligent Plea

Text: Mr. Virsnieks asserts that the Wisconsin trial court’s determination that he knew that his plea involved the sexual assault was unreasonable.7 He further submits that the Wisconsin court’s decision was contrary to, and an 6 In Smith, the Supreme Court held that Alaska’s sexual offender statute was not punitive for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003). 7 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals adjudicated on the merits Mr. Virsnieks’ claim that his plea was involuntary and unintelligent, but it did so without reference to federal law. The Supreme Court has held that this is of no consequence. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (holding that, under AEDPA, a state court need not cite or even be aware of Supreme Court precedent, “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts” the Court’s precedents); see also Harrison v. McBride, 428 F.3d 652, 665-67 (7th Cir. 2005). 12 No. 06-3322 unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent because his plea had been neither voluntary nor intelligent. In support of this contention, Mr. Virsnieks points to the lack of any explicit statement, in either the information or the criminal complaint, at the preliminary hearing or at the plea hearing, that sexual assault was the predicate felony for the burglary charge.
The principles that govern our inquiry are well settled. A guilty plea8 must be voluntary and intelligent. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992). To enter a voluntary and intelligent plea, a defendant must have full awareness of the plea’s “direct consequences,” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970), “real notice of the true nature of the charge against him,” Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976), and understand “the law in relation to the facts,” McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). Whether a plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily is determined from “all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it.” Brady, 397 U.S. at 749. Guilty pleas “are accorded a great measure of finality” because they “are important components of this country’s criminal justice system.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977). As a result, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the plea he entered was involuntary and unintelligent. Marx v. United States, 930 F.2d 1246, 1250 (7th Cir. 1991). 8 We employ the same standard in determining whether a no contest plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. See, e.g., McGrath v. United States, 402 F.2d 466, 467 (7th Cir. 1968). No. 06-3322 13
Under AEDPA, we generally must accept a state court’s factual findings. Araujo v. Chandler, 435 F.3d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2); 2254(e)(1)). Therefore, as a threshold matter, Mr. Virsnieks must overcome the state court’s factual determination that he knew that the offense underlying the burglary charge was the sexual assault. Mr. Virsnieks has failed to show that the state court’s decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The Wisconsin trial court found “incredible” Mr. Virsnieks’ testimony that his trial counsel had told him that the predicate felony was “use of the facilities,” a non-felony in Wisconsin. R.8, Ex. S at 24. The court further discredited Mr. Virsnieks’ claim that he did not know that the sexual assault was the predicate felony for the burglary. Mr. Virsnieks points out that the information, criminal complaint, preliminary hearing and plea hearing did not state explicitly that sexual assault was the predicate felony. Nevertheless, the Wisconsin court made a credibility determination—which we generally are required to accept under AEDPA9—that, given the strong suggestions to that effect contained in the criminal complaint, information and Buechel’s preliminary hearing testimony, Mr. Virsnieks must have known that the sexual assault was the predicate offense for his plea. Although the information available in 9 See Murrell v. Frank, 332 F.3d 1102, 1112 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that we extend “great deference” to a state court’s credibility determinations); Ward v. Sterns, 334 F.3d 696, 710 (7th Cir. 2003). 14 No. 06-3322 the PSR and the statements made by the trial judge in his questioning of Dr. Nelson during the sentencing hearing post-dated Mr. Virsnieks’ plea hearing, his failure to object, or even inquire as to whether the sexual assault was the predicate felony for his guilty plea to burglary, buttresses the state court’s credibility determination.
Mr. Virsnieks’ claim that his plea cannot stand because he was not informed adequately about the potential that he would be ordered to register as a sex offender cannot succeed for an additional reason. The registration order was a collateral consequence about which the State was not required to inform him. The Supreme Court has held that a guilty plea is voluntary and intelligent if the defendant enters the plea with full awareness of its “direct consequences.” Brady, 397 U.S. at 755. Thus, although a defendant must be informed of the direct consequences flowing from a plea, he need not be informed of collateral consequences.10 Warren v. Richland County Circuit Court, 223 F.3d 454, 457 (7th Cir. 2000).11 10 We have defined direct consequences as the “immediate, and automatic consequences of the guilty plea.” United States v. Jordan, 870 F.2d 1310, 1317 (7th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006); Wilson v. McGinnis, 413 F.3d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 2005); Steele v. Murphy, 365 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004); George v. Black, 732 F.2d 108, 110 (8th Cir. 1984); Bryant v. Cherry, 687 F.2d 48, 49-50 (4th Cir. 1982). 11 See also Wilson, 413 F.3d at 199-200; Steele, 365 F.3d at 17; United (continued...) No. 06-3322 15 The Supreme Court has not delimited comprehensively the particular consequences that are direct or collateral for purposes of evaluating the voluntariness of a guilty plea. See Dalton v. Battaglia, 402 F.3d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 2005). Under its “contrary to” clause, AEDPA prohibits a federal court from granting habeas relief unless the state court’s decision contradicts “clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). As we have explained previously, “[t]here can be no Supreme Court precedent to be contradicted or unreasonably applied,” and therefore no habeas relief, when there is no Supreme Court precedent on point or where the Court has reserved the question. Lockhart v. Chandler, 446 F.3d 721, 724 (7th Cir. 2006); Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 585, 597 (7th Cir. 2006). To a very limited extent, reference to lower court holdings may be evidence of a rule mandated implicitly by the Supreme Court. For example, we held in Dalton that, for purposes of habeas review under AEDPA, the potential length of incarceration to which a prisoner exposed himself by pleading guilty was a direct consequence of a guilty plea. Dalton, 402 F.3d at 733. Unlike in Dalton, the issue here—whether being ordered to register as a sexual offender is a direct or collateral consequence—is not sufficiently clear cut to permit us to conclude that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Brady. Indeed, to the very 11 (...continued) States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc) (“We presume that the Supreme Court meant what it said when it used the word ‘direct’; by doing so, it excluded collateral consequences.” (emphasis in original)). 16 No. 06-3322 limited extent that the decisions of the courts of appeals can “guide us in determining what constitutes an unreasonable application” of clearly established Supreme Court precedent, see Wilson v. McGinnis, 413 F.3d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 2005), these decisions indicate that no clearly established federal law requires that defendants be informed of the possibility that they could be ordered to register as sexual offenders. See, e.g., Steele, 365 F.3d at 16-17 (holding that “the possibility of commitment for life as a sexually dangerous person is a collateral consequence of pleading guilty”); Warren, 223 F.3d at 456 (holding that the failure of a state court to inform a defendant prior to his Alford plea of the possibility that his probation could be revoked if he did not admit during counseling sessions that he had committed a sexual offense is a collateral consequence); George v. Black, 732 F.2d 108, 110 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that the possibility of confinement pursuant to civil commitment proceedings after the expiration of a criminal sentence is a collateral consequence); cf. United States v. Kikuyama, 109 F.3d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a “consequence is ‘collateral’ where it lies within the discretion of the court to impose it” and therefore that a defendant’s consecutive sentence was collateral); Wall v. United States, 500 F.2d 38, 39 (10th Cir. 1974) (same). No. 06-3322 17