Opinion ID: 1959363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: GM's Appeal

Text: In its appeal from the trial court's denial of its motion for a judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, motion for a new trial following the entry of the judgment on the jury verdict and the award of attorney fees and expenses, GM sets out the following seven issues in its brief to this Court: I. Whether Serra's claim for damages from the continuing effects of alleged misconduct, which it has repeatedly conceded began and ended well over four years prior to the date Serra filed suit, is time-barred under the MVFA, Ala. Code § 8-20-12 (2001). II. Whether Serra failed to present substantial evidence demonstrating that GM violated the MVFA. III. Whether both the fact and amount of Serra's purported `lost profits' were speculative and uncertain. IV. Whether the testimony of Serra's expert should have been excluded as too unreliable to assist the triers of fact. V. Whether the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence of GM's prior dealings with Serra. VI. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that intent was irrelevant to a finding of liability under the MVFA. VII. Whether the trial court erred in awarding Serra statutory attorneys' fees of $2,500,000, even though Serra presented evidence that its actual reasonable fees, based on the number of hours its counsel worked multiplied by their normal hourly rates, were only about one-fifth of that sum$516,000; and whether the trial court erred in awarding Serra $330,000 in expert witness fees absent statutory authority for such an award. This Court has stated: When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a [judgment as a matter of law], this Court uses the same standard the trial court used initially in granting or denying the motion. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 689 So.2d 3 (Ala.1997). Regarding questions of fact, the ultimate issue is whether the nonmovant has presented sufficient evidence to allow the case or issue to be submitted to the jury for a factual resolution. Carter v. Henderson, 598 So.2d 1350 (Ala.1992). In an action filed after June 11, 1987, the nonmovant must present substantial evidence to withstand a motion for a [judgment as a matter of law]. See § 12-21-12, Ala.Code 1975; West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). A reviewing court must determine whether the party who bears the burden of proof has produced substantial evidence creating a factual dispute requiring resolution by the jury. Carter, 598 So.2d at 1353. In reviewing a ruling on a motion for a [judgment as a matter of law], this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and entertains such reasonable inferences as the jury would have been free to draw. Id. If the question is one of law, this Court indulges no presumption of correctness as to the trial court's ruling. Ricwil, Inc. v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 599 So.2d 1126 (Ala.1992). Ex parte Alfa Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 742 So.2d 1237, 1240 (Ala.1999). A. The MVFA's Statute of Limitations GM argues that Serra's claims against it under the MVFA are time-barred. Section 8-20-12, Ala.Code 1975, sets out the applicable limitations period for bringing a cause of action under the MVFA. That section provides: Except as otherwise provided in paragraph l. of subdivision (3) of Section 8-20-4, any civil action commenced under the provisions of this chapter must be brought within four years after the cause of action has accrued. The cause of action shall not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact or facts constituting a violation of the provisions of this chapter. GM has maintained throughout this litigation that the limitations period in the MVFA barred Serra's claims against it. It asserted that defense in its answer to Serra's amended complaint, in its motion for a summary judgment, in its motion for a judgment as a matter of law, and in its postjudgment motions. The trial court ruled on this issue as follows: 1. Before the testimony of Serra's expert witness, Dr. Michael Ileo, at trial, the following occurred: THE COURT: Let's talk about a couple of things. First, let's talk about statute of limitations. [GM's counsel]: All right, sir. THE COURT: Is Dr. Ileo coming next? [Serra's counsel]: Yes, sir. He's my next witness. THE COURT: Let's talk first about statute of limitations. [GM] filed a motion for summary judgment as to the statute of limitations. At that time, the motion was deferred because plaintiff, the plaintiff alleged under [§ ] 8-20-12, [GM] filed a motion for summary judgment as to all claims arising before April 8, 1994, pursuant to the four-year statute of limitations in [§ ] 8-20-12. The plaintiff said that and argued ... [that] the discovery provision of that code section saved the expiration of that statute. At this point now that we're at this point in the plaintiff's case, and I take it that there have been no otherit doesn't particularly matter what the other testimony is. At this point, I have the testimony of Mr. Serra who has testified that he knew of the problem, thought his SOP [standard of participation] was too high all the way back in the '80s. Then in '87 to '88 he was complaining about his AGSSA [Area of Geographic Sales and Service Advantage]. In the early `90s he was complaining about his problem that up through 1993 he was involved in distribution `through my managers' in his words. He talked earlier about how he would check the order banks and they would be full. He did say that he talked to Glenn Curlette [a former GM account manager]. He said, Glenn, my inventory is poor. And he would say, quote, `your order banks are not full and you have not earned them.' He did not say necessarily that he had legally relied on it. In fact, the contrary implication exists, but the determinative testimony was given on that subject by Mr. Gary Murphy [a former Serra general manager] who testified in reference to Mr. Curlette. Glenn would say, you were getting what you earned. Mr. Murphy answered him in reference to his 1993 comments, `but I never believed him.' In short, the discovery ... provision of [§ ] 8-20-12 simply does not affect this case because Mr. Serra and his managers were aware of the facts that constituted the violation, and further they did nothing, even though they did not believe that. They affirmatively testified they did not believe [GM]. So, the statute of limitations defense will be allowed as a matter of law. And I think rather than a judgment as a matter of law flowing to the jury there simply will be no charge to the jury except as to damages calculated after 1990, that date in 1994. And objection to any calculations prior to that date would be sustained. 2. At the close of Serra's case-in-chief the following occurred: [GM's counsel]: Your Honor, we are filing this motion for judgment as a matter of law.... .... [GM's counsel]: Your Honor, the undisputed evidence from the plaintiff is that the bad act or the wrongful act or the arbitrary act occurred in 1991. That act was the sole cause of the arbitrariness and the capriciousness or whatever the act uses as its standard. THE COURT: You're talking about the statute of limitations. You claim that the act in '91 causedwas the only thing that happened after that a stream of damage; is that correct? [GM's counsel]: That's correct. And the stream of damages, there is not any evidence of a series of additional bad acts that ... would support a claim for arbitrary distribution. All this case has been about is about what occurred in 1991. Now, this is not a continuing tort. It's a statutory action and there would have to be some showing of an arbitrary distribution or some sort of basis for liability, not damage[s]. There is a claim for damage[s] but there is not a basis for liability after 1995 or in 1995 and after. In fact, the contrary is true. The plaintiff's own expert, Dr. Ileo, testified that GM complied with its own distribution practices and that it did nothing wrong in 1995 and '96 and '97 and '98 and throughin other words, Dr. Ileo .... [GM's counsel]: Ileo was real clear that all of that occurred in 1991 and from thenceforth GM followed its distribution practices properly. That testimony alleviates any liability by GM after, in 1995 and after. .... THE COURT: ... Your statute of limitations argument is a very good one, a very persuasive one and a very close one. And I have been attentive to that since that came up. I am charged by law, however, at this stage with construing the evidence and the like most favorable to the plaintiff to get past your motion. In the testimony of Dr. Ileo, at some point after Exhibit 1395 came in, in paraphrase he saidwell actually it was earlier than that but that is where I wrote it on my book. In paraphrase, though he saidhe essentially quoted it accurately that after the events of 1991 and thereabouts, [GM] followed its own plan. And there was later testimony today on that subject. But he also testified in paraphrase that [GM] could have fixed it at any time. In construing the statute, it would be the Court's ruling that your motion is due to be overruled because that could be the implementation on a month-by-month basis of a plan that was arbitrary or unreasonably discriminatory. 3. In its September 25, 2001, order ruling on GM's postjudgment motions the trial court stated, in pertinent part: One of the fairly debatable issues which requires in part an analysis of the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act (`MVFA'), Ala.Code § 8-20-1, et seq., is the statute of limitations argument. Plaintiff wanted to claim continuing tort and also avail itself of the `discovery rule' provision of § 8-20-12. It lost those arguments and the court granted judgment as a matter of law as to ALL claims regarding damages or conduct occurring more than 4 years before the suit was filed. Further, all other claims for damages were dismissed except for those arising under § 8-20-4(2) which proscribes defendant from engaging in `any action with respect to a franchise which is arbitrary, in bad faith or unconscionable,' and those arising under § 8-20-4(3)(a) which make it actionable for defendant to `adopt, change, establish, or implement a plan or system for the allocation and distribution of ... vehicles ... which is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonably discriminatory.' Although the defendant continues to insist the ruling was that this was a `continuing tort' that was not and has never been the basis of the ruling. The defendant argues that Payton v. Monsanto, [801 So.2d 829, 835 (Ala.2001) ], and Moon v. Harco Drugs, 435 So.2d 218 (Ala.1983), determine the issue. Payton notes that `Alabama law does not recognize a continuing tort in instances where there has been a single act followed by multiple consequences.' Here, although GM undertakes to rely on a few out of context answers by one of Serra's witnesses, it was the conduct of GM each month during the period of limitations which the court allowed the jury to consider. GM's own trial representative testified adversely that the method of allocation was applied (`implemented,' carried out, accomplished) each month and could have been altered at any time, and in fact was altered during the applicable time. At no time has Serra conceded otherwise. Further, GM claimed throughout that part of Serra's failure to receive vehicles was a result of its failure to keep its order bank full, yet the proof was that plaintiff's competitors frequently ordered no vehicles, but continued to receive ample allocation. On this subject, GM's representative, Mr. Barrick, testified that GM did not follow its own rules and procedures. In addition, plaintiff complained it was unreasonably discriminated against in GM's use of the `pref' and `pref guide' categories of the allocation system. The evidence was ample and virtually undisputed that these categories were administered arbitrarily and with wide discretion granted to GM's managers, unbeknownst to its dealers. The GM representative also testified the distribution manuals were not followed, or were wrong. In short, the testimony of GM's own company representatives, employees and retirees provided ample evidence to sustain a plaintiff's verdict. Defendant also relies on Moon, supra . That case discusses the discovery rule in tort. Unlike Moon, however, there is a statutory discovery rule which applies in this case. There is no need for further discussion of that issue inasmuch as GM won that argument at trial and the discovery rule was not allowed to extend the statute. Interestingly, Moon also holds `repeated wrongs to the plaintiff can constitute a continuous tort such as ... (2) when there is a single sustained method pursued in executing one general scheme' (at 220). The jury could have found this is what happened here. No claim accruing outside the limitation period was allowed to go to the jury. As to the actions within the period, the jury had ample evidence from GM's own people, as well as plaintiff's witnesses, that defendant's conduct, inter alia, in violating its own procedures, in implementing its allocation system, in its application of the pref/pref guide categories, in its use of the order banks or ignoring of same was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonably discriminatory. Initially, we note that the trial court's ruling that Serra's cause of action accrued before April 8, 1994, has not been appealed to this Court. Further, this Court, when addressing the running of a limitations period when the occurrence of the injury, rather than the discovery of the injury, marked the accrual of a cause of action, has observed: In Garrett v. Raytheon Co., [368 So.2d 516 (Ala.1979)] the Court stated the principal rule of law thusly: `.... `We have held that the statute begins to run whether or not the full amount of damages is apparent at the time [the cause of action accrues]. In Kelly v. Shropshire, 199 Ala. 602, 75 So. 291, 292 (Ala.1917), the rule was stated as follows: `If the act of which the injury is the natural sequence is of itself a legal injury to plaintiff, a completed wrong, the cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run from the time the act is committed, be the actual damage (then apparent) however slight, and the statute will operate to bar a recovery not only for the present damages but for damages developing subsequently and not actionable at the time of the wrong done; for in such a case the subsequent increase in the damages resulting gives no new cause of action. ...' 368 So.2d at 518-19. Moon v. Harco Drugs, Inc., 435 So.2d 218, 220 (Ala.1983)(emphasis added). We conclude that this rationale applies here, where Serra did not appeal the trial court's ruling that the limitations period in the MVFA bars any claim by Serra based on acts by GM that occurred before April 8, 1994. Accordingly, claims for any damage sustained by Serra as a result of any violation of the MVFA by GM before April 8, 1994, and any subsequent damage resulting from such a pre-April 8 violation, would be barred by the MVFA's statute of limitations. [4] Thus, it is necessary that we consider whether there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that GM violated the MVFA after April 8, 1994, i.e., within the limitations period. B. Evidence of an MVFA Violation Within the Limitations Period Serra's claims against GM are based upon alleged violations of §§ 8-20-4(2) and 8-20-4(3)(a). Those sections provide: Notwithstanding the terms, provisions, or conditions of any dealer agreement or franchise or the terms or provisions of any waiver, prior to the termination, cancellation, or nonrenewal of any dealer agreement or franchise, the following acts or conduct shall constitute unfair and deceptive trade practices: .... (2) For any manufacturer, factory branch, factory representative, distributor, or wholesaler, distributor branch, distributor representative, or motor vehicle dealer to engage in any action with respect to a franchise which is arbitrary, in bad faith or unconscionable and which causes damage to any of the parties. (3) For any manufacturer, factory branch, factory representative, distributor, or wholesaler, distributor branch or distributor representative: a. To adopt, change, establish, or implement a plan or system for the allocation and distribution of new or used motor vehicles to motor vehicle dealers which is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonably discriminatory or to modify an existing plan so as to cause the same to be arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable discriminatory.... The gist of the testimony of Serra's expert witness, Dr. Michael Ileo, was that GM's vehicle allocation system, known as the turn and earn system, [5] resulted in a misallocation of vehicles between Serra and Edwards in 1991. During direct examination by Serra's counsel, Dr. Ileo testified, in pertinent part: Q. Let me ask you this right now, Dr. Ileo. Based on your years of involvement with the turn and earn system, do you have an opinion as to whether or not the turn and earn system conceptually is a fair system? A. Yes, it's a fair system. Q. And you have mentioned discretion several times. Is discretion an important component of that system? A. Yes. Q. Now, Doctor, based on all the information that's been produced in this case, irrespective of when it was produced, what, if anything, did you discover in your analysis of the 832 reports[ [6] ] in September of 1991? .... A. During the summer and fall of 1991, a dramatic change occurred in the new vehicle distribution practices of [GM]. Q. What change did you see as exhibited in the 832 reports? A. Despite the fact that Serra's sales were rising dramatically, GM lowered Serra's allocation and deliveries of new vehicles. Q. What, if anything, did you observe relative to Edwards Chevrolet as revealed by the 832 reports that have all been produced now? A. Despite the fact that Edwards's sales were declining, [GM] increased Edwards's new vehicle allocations and deliveries. .... Q. And I would ask your opinion as to the increase in Edwards's sales in the '91, '92 period. .... A. The rise in Edwards's sales follows a period of time in the summer and fall of 1991 when GM sharply changed its new vehicle distribution patterns with respect to what was then [termed] new Model Year N vehicles.[ [7] ] Those vehicles came out in the summer and fall of 1991, i.e., the new 1992 model years. In that period of time, [GM] delivered significantly more new Model Year N vehicles to Edwards and [a] relatively small number of new Model Year N vehicles to Serra. As a result, Edwards's Model Year N sales rose radically while Serra's Model Year N sales essentially were flat. .... Q. How can you account for the constant decrease in Serra's sales and the constant increase in Edwards's sales [from 1992 through 1995]? A. Edwards was earning more product and therefore was getting more product. Q. What, if any, effect did this event ... have on Edwards's earn as it built into the system? A. It was significant. .... Q. Doc, the event that occurred in `91 that you've testified to, how did that relate to Edwards's earn at that time and to carry out to the future? A. Edwards got more vehicles that Serra didn't get. He got a lot more of them despite the fact that Serra was outselling Edwards significantly. When those vehicles hit the lot, it's a new model year, those vehicles are going to get sold. They get rolled into the turn and earn system. The turn and earn system works on a computerized basis. You sell, you earn. And as you sell more, you earn more. So, it feeds on itself internally. So, as long as you're turning the product, you are going to earn more, you are going to sell more, you are going to be allocated more.... It's a never-ending process. The only way that process can stop is for GM to exercise discretion, that is, the discretionary component of the distribution system as distinguished from the earn component. .... Q. Now, Dr. Ileo, if I understand you correctly, once the additional allotment, however you want to characterize occurred in '91, is that effect still in Edwards's earn to this day? A. Yes. Q. And the lack of product which you've testified that Serra had orders in its order bank, did that have a negative impact to his earn which continues to this day? A. Yes. .... Q. Dr. Ileo, in doing your analysis, explain to the Court and ladies and gentlemen of the jury how you reached the determination of whether or not Serra lost any cars and trucks by virtue of the allocation as [GM] actually did it in '91 through the years? A. I looked at the sales patterns by model over the 1989, 1990, 1991 period and reached an opinion as to the assessment as an opinion regarding the impact of Gardendale that was opened in June of 1989. All the data in the 832 reports of GM show that salesthat Serra's sales took off significantly. That trend continued through most of 1991 except for the last month or so. Had Serra continued to receive an allocation of vehicles beginning with Model Year N [1992], a portion [sic] to his sales performance, sales, Serra's sales would have continued to grow as a result of Gardendale. And I use that as the basis for determining sales that by model that Serra would have made had it received a supply of Model Year N vehicles that was proportioned to his Model Year N sales performance. .... Q.... Now, Dr. Ileo, based on your analysis and research, what if any conclusions do you have regarding the allocation of motor vehicles relative to Serra and Edwards prior to 1991, prior to September of '91? A. Edwards and Serra received an appropriate level and mix of new vehicle supplies from [GM]. .... Q. Did you reach an opinion regarding the allocation of [GM's] product, the actual allocation and deliveries relative to Serra and Edwards beginning in September of 1991? A. Yes. Q. And what is your opinion? A. At that point in time [GM] radically changed its new vehicle supply practices such that Serra was denied the level and mix of new vehicle supplies to which it was entitled and where Edwards received a level and mix of new vehicle supplies to which it was not entitled. .... Q.... Now, once that event occurred that you have testified to, how is that accommodated within the turn and earn system throughout the years leading up to today? A. If a dealer does not have product, it does not make sales. If a dealer has an abundance of product, it makes an abundance of sales. Once those sales are made, they are rolled into the turn and earn system such that the dealer continually becomes entitled to an increasing amount of new product in the future. Q. And what is the effect of that event in '91 leading us up to today on Edwards's position in the marketplace and Serra's position in the marketplace in Birmingham, Alabama? A. Within 1991, the effect was comparatively small. Q. Yes, sir. A. But it started to build in 1992 and has built continually since that time. And today that preference that was built into the turn and earn system back in 1991 still resides in the number of vehicles being allocated to Serra and Edwards. Dr. Ileo's ensuing damage calculations were also based upon the effect of the turn and earn system after the 1991 misallocation. In regard to the methodology of his damage calculation, he testified, in pertinent part, as follows: Q. Can you briefly describe to the ladies and gentlemen and the Court the methodology you used in doing your computation to determine whether or not Serra Chevrolet suffered damage as a result of the [1991] allocation that you have described? A. Yes. I examined the 832 report data for Serra and Edwards such as that we have previously discussed. I reached the conclusion as a result of Gardendale's opening in June of 1989, Serra's sales were increasing very rapidly. And, indeed, the 832 report data show a continuing upward movement in Serra's sales. At the same time, that 832 report data showed that roughly beginning in the summer of 1991, a sharp change occurred in the way GM allocated and delivered vehicles. That is, despite the fact that Serra's sales were growing very rapidly, GM cut Serra's allocation in delivery of new vehicles. Consequently, Serra's sales fell rather dramatically while Edwards's sales rose sharply. My damage calculation is based on the premise that had GM provided Serra with the same level of vehicles that was [commensurate] with the sales that Serra had been making such as it did with respect to Model Year L [1990], Model Year M [1991], Serra's sales would have continued to grow. I projected that growth forward based on that prior experience, and I compared Serra's actual sales with ... the sales Serra would have made. During cross-examination by GM's counsel, Dr. Ileo testified, in pertinent part: Q.... According to your model and your damage calculation, you have said that these misallocation problems with Serra were in 1991? A. Yes. Q. When in 1991? A. Again, in May of 1991. Q. And when did it end? A. It has never ended. Q.... You are saying that in 1991, [GM] did not follow its own distribution policy; is that what your contention is? A. That's correct. Q. And isn't it true that you also testified in your deposition that GM did follow its own distribution policies after that? A. That's correct. Q.... So, GM did follow its own distribution policies beginning in 1995 as far as you know? A. After the damage had been done, yes. Q. But you have no evidence that GM did not follow its own distribution policies in 1995, do you? And that's what you have testified A. That's correct. Q. And you have no evidence that GM didn't follow its own distribution policy in 1996, and that's what you have testified? A. Yes. Q. And you have no evidence that GM didn't follow its distribution policies in [1997]? A. Yes. Q. And you have no evidence that GM didn't follow its own distribution policies in '98 and '99 and 2000? A. Yes. .... Q. Now, Dr. Ileo, you chose 1991 as a period for your baseline projection whereby you projected these millions of dollars in lost damages, did you not? A. I chose September and October of 1991. Q. I thought you told us you chose a six-month period in 1991 for the baseline projection for your damage calculation. A. I chose that period to determine the baseline projection, but the baseline projection was established as of October 1991. Q. All right, sir. Are you agreeing that it all happened in 1991? A. I am agreeing that the new vehicle supply problem began in 1991. During redirect examination by Serra's counsel, Dr. Ileo further testified: Q. Now, [GM's counsel] asked you a series of questions about '92, '93, '94, so forth and so on. And you testified to the questionand I believe he asked you or asked in substancewhether or not you found any evidence of misallocation, that's my term, by [GM] relative to Serra in '92. '93, and he took you through each year. Do [you] recall that? A. Yes. .... Q. And you recall your answer, what was it? A. I found no evidence of any maldistribution in the 832 reports for any of those years given the sales that were reported, the inventory that was reported in the 832 reports. Q. You did find it in the summer and fall of '91? A. That's correct. Q. Now, once that base of earn was established prior to September or the summer of '91, you had no criticism of it? A. That's correct. Q. After the fall of '91, is it your testimony that Edwards's base was raised unfairly? A. Yes. Q. Once that earn was raised based on vehicles that he did not earn, wasn't entitled to, did that base continue on through the years? A. Yes. Q. And did the fact that Serra received less vehicles in the summer and fall of '91 than he had earned, that base continued lower than it should have? A. That's correct. Q. And it continued in '92, '93, on out until today? A. That's correct. .... Q. Allocations in Model Year N, as in Nick, were greater for Edwards than Serra? A. About 60 cars, trucks and Geos, yes. Q. And once that happened, that was built into Edwards earned component of the system, of the computer? A. As long as Edwards sold them, yes. Q. And he gotthat built-in component that went out like an [inverted] pyramid today? A. That's correct. Based on the foregoing testimony of Dr. Ileo, we conclude that there was no evidence presented to the jury indicating that GM failed to follow its distribution system after 1991, which the jury could have reasonably inferred to be a violation of the MVFA. As Dr. Ileo testified, the misallocation by GM between Serra and Edwards in the summer and fall of 1991 was a radical or sharp change in its distribution system that did not occur again. What did occur thereafter, however, were less sales by Serra, because of the lower allocation flowing from proper and objective application of the turn-and-earn program, due to the initial drop in 1991 of new vehicle allocation. That event occurred before April 8, 1994, and any damage sought by Serra based upon that event through the application of the turn-and-earn system are barred by the MVFA's statute of limitations. Moon, supra . The record also contains evidence to support an inference that GM had failed to adhere strictly to policies stated in its distribution manual, which was provided to dealers, by providing vehicles to Edwards that Edwards had not ordered. On this point, Dr. Ileo testified, on direct examination by Serra's counsel, as follows: Q. Did you do an analysis of the 832 reports for Edwards in total to determine how many times something like this [receiving an allocation of vehicles that had not been ordered] happened? A. For the period September 1991 through I believe December 7, 1998, there were 192 instances wherethat is, 192 weeks where GM allocated vehicles, new Chevrolet vehicles, to Edwards while Edwards had placed no orders for such vehicle. Thereafter, Serra introduced as a trial exhibit a compilation by Dr. Ileo of instances where Edwards had received vehicles in excess of the number it had ordered. A review of that exhibit, not taking into account any allocations of vehicles before April 8, 1994, and using the subtotals calculated by Dr. Ileo, shows that during that periodApril 8, 1994, through October 19, 1998Edwards was allocated 210 vehicles from GM for which it had not placed orders. Serra's counsel also questioned Henry Barrick, an administrative manager in GM's distribution department and GM's designated corporate representative, about numerous instances where the 832 reports showed that GM had allocated vehicles to Edwards that Edwards had not ordered. When questioned about the apparent inconsistency between this practice and the terms included in the distribution manual, Barrick stated that the manual was not worded correctly. [8] The specific text of the distribution manual referred to by Serra to show the inconsistency appeared in a section captioned `CPG' [Chevrolet Preference Guide] and Preferencable Orders. It stated, in pertinent part, that if a dealer entered no orders for vehicles with GM, then there would be no orders preferenced, no preference guide (also referred to as pref guide in the 832 report, see footnote 6 to this opinion), and no carryover from one week to the next. Counsel for Serra questioned Barrick as to this aspect of the manual as follows: Q.... Now, to be certain we are all on the same page, [GM] tells its dealers if there are no orders that means zero in their totalwhat is it, total selectable order column? A. That is correct. Q. Then there are no orders preferenced, right? A. Right. Q. There's no orders are given, is that what A. You can't, yes. Can't do it. Q. Dealer missed out. And if that happens then there's no guide, that is, that column blank too? A. Which column is that? Q. Preference guide? A. No. Guide will haveit will still show the guide. Q. Well, that says no preference guide? A. Yeah, I'm not sure of the context in which it was written. I know I'm sitting here looking at it and the guide stays, okay. It's on all your 832 reports that you have. You'll see it. It's always stayed. I think what they're saying is no orders. We can't preference anything. You don't get any allocation. Q. Okay, so that is incorrect in the manual? A. It depends on what context you're looking at it, okay. If I was putting that in there I wouldn't say no guide, okay. You get the guide, but it doesn't mean anything. Barrick also stated that when a dealer was due an allotment and had not ordered any vehicles, GM agents would often telephone other dealers in an effort to move its product. [9] Barrick further testified, in pertinent part, as follows: Q. Now, here [Edwards] had ordered 9 and the system awarded him 23. Now, again, you're testifying that this figure had nothing to do with what was in the dealer order bank? A. The 23 has nothing to do with the order bank, no. Q. And he was given 20? A. Yes. Q. That he took even though he ordered nine; is that right? A. That is correct. Q. Would that be a phone call situation? A. I would have to assume that would be, yes. Q. That would be a phone call situation? A. Yes, we makeincidentally we make phone calls to an awful lot of dealers around the country. Serra has, I think, had their share of phone calls. Q. Yes, sir. A. So, we call a lot of dealers. Q. Mr. Barrick, I'm not implying that Serra did not receive preffed product, you know that? A. I just wanted to clear the air, that's all. .... Q. Now, we have looked at vehicles that Edwards received. You also did a study to look and see what Serra received; is that correct? A. Yes, I did. Q. An do you recall analyzing those records and determin[ing] that Serra received 1,799 motor vehicles in addition to what he generated under the normal turn and earn? A. Yes, I did. Q. That's not unusual, is it? A. I don't know how to answer that. I don't do this that often, you know. And I can't really give you an honest response on that, you know. It can happen. It depends on what you're looking at, what size dealership it is. Q. Have you ever seen any other dealers receive over a period of time 1,800 more product? A. Oh, yes. Not the same size dealer. (Emphasis added.) Thus, after Serra's counsel had set out the several instances in which Edwards had received additional vehicles, Barrick testified that after similarly conducting a study of Serra, he concluded that it had also received additional vehicles. Although this, and other, evidence arguably could provide the basis for an inference that GM had an opportunity to favor one dealer, such as Edwards, over another, such as Serra, in providing a dealership with vehicles the dealership had not ordered, no specifics sufficient to support an award of compensatory damages were ever developed to show the actual impact of any truly discriminatory allocations as between Edwards and Serra. Moreover, and more importantly, Dr. Ileo's damage calculations, as explained by him, relied solely on the allocation aberration that occurred in 1991 and the extrapolated subsequent fallout from that skewed allocation, because it served as base data in the otherwise objective and equitable turn-and-earn program. Thus, the $9,096,000 verdict cannot be upheld as attributable, in whole or part, to possibly discriminatory assignments to Edwards of vehicles not ordered by it. Based upon the evidence, limited to GM's conduct after April 8, 1994, we conclude there was no basis to support a verdict determining that GM's conduct was arbitrary, in bad faith, unconscionable, capricious, or unreasonably discriminatory, as is required for liability under the MVFA. Accordingly, because there was no evidence before the jury from which it could have reasonably inferred that GM violated the MVFA after April 8, 1994, GM was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In summary, we conclude that the trial court's summary judgment for Edwards is due to be affirmed and that the judgment against GM is due to be reversed and the cause remanded for the trial court to proceed in a manner consistent with this opinion. 1010340AFFIRMED. 1010341REVERSED AND REMANDED. HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur. MOORE, C.J., and JOHNSTONE, J., concur in part and dissent in part.