Opinion ID: 2061534
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Heading: Applicable Policy Provisions and Law

Text: The uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage portion of the business policy provides as follows: B. WHO IS AN INSURED 1. You. 2. If you are an individual, any family member. 3. Anyone else occupying a covered auto or a temporary substitute for a covered auto. The covered auto must be out of service because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction. 4. Anyone for damages he is entitled to recover because of bodily injury sustained by another insured. C. EXCLUSIONS This insurance does not apply to any of the following: . . . . 4. Bodily injury sustained by you while occupying or struck by any vehicle owned by you which is not a covered auto. The Joffers argue that via the temporary substitute clause found in paragraph B(3), they were covered under the business policy at the time of the accident, even though they were driving the Buick, arguably not a covered auto. LeMars contends that by the clear language of the policy, the temporary substitute clause does not apply to the Joffers, but rather applies to anyone else (other than the Joffers) driving a covered auto or a temporary substitute for a covered auto. Moreover, LeMars argues that the owned-but-not-insured exclusion found in C(4) clearly excludes the Joffers from coverage because they were driving the Buick at the time of accident, which they owned but which was not a covered auto under the policy. In response, the Joffers argue that the owned-but-not-insured exclusion renders the temporary substitute coverage illusory and that the doctrine of reasonable expectations supports a finding of coverage under the terms of the policy. The primary issues on appeal require us to interpret and construe several provisions of the business automobile policy issued to the Joffers by LeMars Mutual. Our rules of contract interpretation and construction peculiar to insurance policies apply. Ferguson v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 512 N.W.2d 296, 298 (Iowa 1994). Interpretation and construction are technically distinct exercises with regard to resolving insurance contract problems. Id. at 299 (citing Connie's Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 207, 210 (Iowa 1975)). Interpretation requires a court to determine the meaning of contractual words. Id. This is a question of law for the court unless the meaning of the language depends on extrinsic evidence or a choice among reasonable inferences to be drawn. Id.; see also A. Y. McDonald Indus., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607, 618 (Iowa 1991). Construction of an insurance policy requires the court to determine its legal effect. Ferguson, 512 N.W.2d at 299. The proper construction of an insurance contract is always an issue of law for the court. Id. The cardinal principle in the construction and interpretation of insurance policies is that the intent of the parties at the time the policy was sold must control. Id. ; A.Y. McDonald, 475 N.W.2d at 618. Except in cases of ambiguity, the intent of the parties is determined by the language of the policy. A.Y. McDonald, 475 N.W.2d at 618 (citing Cairns v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 398 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Iowa 1987); Iowa R.App. P. 14(f)(14)). An ambiguity exists if, after the application of pertinent rules of interpretation to the policy, a genuine uncertainty results as to which one of two or more meanings is the proper one. Id. Because of the adhesive nature of insurance policies, their provisions are construed in the light most favorable to the insured. Ferguson, 512 N.W.2d at 299; A.Y. McDonald, 475 N.W.2d at 619. Exclusions from coverage are construed strictly against the insurer. Ferguson, 512 N.W.2d at 299. We are mindful of the above-stated rules of interpretation and construction as we determine the issues before us.