Opinion ID: 1242865
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Daily affairs and unsound mind

Text: ¶ 43 While Florez raised the argument of repressed memory, our decision did not address memory repression but only the question of tolling because of unsound mind. Id. at 528, 917 P.2d at 257. A majority of this court found that the plaintiffs failed to assert sufficient facts to withstand summary judgment and that the facts presented in the record actually supported the opposite proposition. In Florez, the plaintiffs were able to maintain employment, take care of financial affairs (Gomez), attend school part-time and work full-time (Moonshadow), manage all their daily affairs, and take care of themselves. Gomez knew what had happened, and was able to talk about it and deal with it. He had consulted a lawyer and had been investigating the statute of limitations issue. Id. at 526, 917 P.2d at 255. The majority rejected as conclusory the only assertions in the affidavits that supported tollingthe experts' allegations that the plaintiffs suffered from unsound mind or post-traumatic stress disorder. The majority reasoned that simply attaching the post-traumatic stress disorder label to a person's symptoms is insufficient to satisfy the Allen definition of unsound mind. Id. at 525-26, 917 P.2d at 254-55. ¶ 44 In the present case, the court of appeals has misread Florez for the harsh proposition that as a matter of law the disabling psychological effects of child abuse do not constitute an `unsound mind' under section 12-502(A) where the victims were able to function on a day-to-day basis and manage their ordinary affairs. Doe, 187 Ariz. at 608, 931 P.2d at 1118. The court of appeals then listed evidence presented in the affidavits demonstrating Plaintiff's ability to manage her daily affairs as grounds for granting summary judgment. But Florez does not stand for the proposition that summary judgment is appropriate just because there is evidence that an alleged victim is able to manage any of her daily affairs. That reading of Florez improperly shifts the focus of inquiry from whether the plaintiff has submitted evidence of her inability to manage her affairs to whether she has disproven her ability to manage any of them. A motion for summary judgment is decided on the basis of whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. In the context of determining unsound mind as evidenced by an inability to manage daily affairs, the question is whether there is credible evidence of the plaintiff's inability to manage daily affairs. The plaintiff is not required to discredit all evidence of ability to manage her affairs such controverting evidence merely establishes that there is a jury question on an issue of material fact. ¶ 45 Thus, the court of appeals' interpretation of Florez gives the court the inappropriate role of factfinder. It is not the court's role to weigh conflicting evidence to determine whether the plaintiff was capable of functioning on a day-to-day basis. That role would encroach upon the jury's function. Florez goes no further than to require factual rather than conclusory substantiation of unsound mind. The Florez discussion of facts demonstrating the plaintiffs' ability to manage their daily affairs was illustrative, but the critical inquiry of the majority opinion focused on the absence of facts supporting the plaintiffs' claim. When the plaintiff has alleged facts indicating inability to manage daily affairs, it is the court's duty to deny summary judgment. We do not permit the court to substitute itself for the factfinder. ¶ 46 Applying this to the present case, we conclude that the trial judge erred in granting summary judgment for Defendants. The record contains evidence from which one could conclude that for a considerable period of time Plaintiff was unable to function in day-to-day affairs. She experienced suicidal ideation, was in denial of the abuse she suffered, and required psychological and psychiatric therapy and treatment as well as institutionalization for her mental condition; because she was unable to function at work, she had to quit her job and was unable to seek other employment. Because of her denial and inability to articulate or discuss the abusive acts, a jury could find that Plaintiff, unlike the Florez plaintiffs, was disabled and thus unable to seek or address the issues with legal counsel for approximately two years. Also, unlike the Florez plaintiffs, Plaintiff was not ready to talk about it; nor was she ready to deal with it. Cf. Florez, 185 Ariz. at 526, 917 P.2d at 255. Unlike the affidavit in Florez, the affidavits in this case present facts, not mere conclusory opinions of post-traumatic stress disorder or unsound mind. ¶ 47 As the court of appeals correctly recognized, there are facts in the record that detract from Plaintiff's claim of inability to manage daily affairs; those findings would preclude summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff if she moved for summary judgment on the unsound mind issue. In that case, the issue would be whether there were any facts indicating Plaintiff was of sound mind, thus precluding summary judgment. However, it was Defendant who moved for summary judgment; the facts offered in opposition to that motion are more than sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on whether Plaintiff was unable to carry on the day-to-day affairs of life.