Opinion ID: 159869
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The 9(a) – 8(f) Distinction

Text: The dispute between § 8(f) or § 9(a) governance finds its origins in the NLRA which made a distinction between the multiemployer bargaining relationships it recognizes. Section 9(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), provides that when a majority of employees in a unit appropriate for collective bargaining designates a labor union to represent it, the union becomes the exclusive representative for collective bargaining purposes. Under § 9(a) an employer may not unilaterally repudiate a contract and has a duty to bargain in good faith after the contract expires. See James Luterbach Constr. Co., 315 N.L.R.B. 976, 979 (1994). This is because the union that has attained the status of a 9(a) bargaining representative enjoys a presumption of majority status for the duration of a -7- contract or for a reasonable period. See Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 786 (1996). When a contract or reasonable period expires, the employer may rebut the presumption of majority status by showing either that the union does not in fact enjoy majority support or that the employer has a “good-faith reasonable” doubt of the union’s continued majority status. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 361 (1998). On the other hand, § 8(f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(f), allows employers engaged primarily in the building and construction industry to enter into pre-hire agreements containing union security clauses whether or not the union represents a majority of the employer’s employees. Under an 8(f) contract, the union enjoys no presumption of majority status and either party may repudiate the relationship upon the expiration of the contract. 1 See Luterbach, 315 N.L.R.B. at 978; see also Sheet Metal Workers’ Internat’l Ass’n Local 19 v. Herre Bros., Inc., 201 F.3d 231, 239 (3d Cir. 1999). 1 Prior to the Board’s decision in John Deklewa & Sons, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1987), enforced sub nom. International Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988), an 8(f) agreement could be repudiated by either party at any time for any reason. See id. at 1378. Likewise, an 8(f) relationship could be converted into a 9(a) relationship at any time when the union could show that it had obtained majority support. See id. When an 8(f) relationship converted into a 9(a) relationship, “an employer [was obligated] . . . ‘to recognize and bargain with the union as the employees’ exclusive representative.’” Id. at 1379 (quoting Davis Indus., 232 N.L.R.B. 946, 952 (1977)). -8- A relationship between a union and a construction industry employer is presumed to be governed by § 8(f), and “the party asserting the existence of a 9(a) relationship [has the burden] to prove it.” John Deklewa & Sons, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1385 n.41 (1987), enforced sub nom. International Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988); accord NLRB v. Viola Indus.-Elevator Div., Inc., 979 F.2d 1384, 1394-97 (10th Cir. 1992); see also Casale Indus., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 951, 952 (1993). A union can prove a 9(a) relationship and overcome the presumption of an 8(f) relationship in two ways: “(1) through a Board-certified election, or (2) through an employer’s voluntary grant of recognition of the union as the employees’ exclusive majority bargaining agent.” NLRB v. Goodless Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 322, 328 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1387 n.53. The Board has explained that a party attempting to satisfy the voluntary recognition option may overcome the 8(f) presumption by showing three things: (1) the union’s unequivocal demand for recognition as a 9(a) representative; (2) the employer’s unequivocal and voluntary grant of such recognition; and (3) a contemporaneous showing of majority support. See Goodless Elec. Co., 321 N.L.R.B. 64, 65-66 (1996); rev’d on other grounds, 124 F.3d at 328; Golden West Elec., 307 N.L.R.B. 1494, 1495 (1992); J & R Tile, Inc., 291 N.L.R.B. 1034, 1036 & n.11 (1988). -9- The threshold issue in this case is what kind of proof is necessary to satisfy the third prong of the voluntary recognition option. The Board and the Union assert that a contemporaneous showing of majority support may be established without extrinsic proof of majority status. Triple C argues that a 9(a) relationship was not established because the voluntary recognition was not based on actual objective proof of majority support. In fact, Triple C contends that a 9(a) relationship could not have been formed because, at the time it signed the contract with the Union in 1993, the company had only one employee who did not qualify as an employee for purposes of § 9(a), thus no majority support existed. We are not persuaded by Triple C’s arguments. Because an 8(f) agreement is available to the construction industry, a union’s demand to execute a collective bargaining agreement with an employer is inherently ambiguous. See J & R Tile, 291 N.L.R.B. at 1036 & n.11. As a result, instead of focusing on the third requirement of a contemporaneous showing of majority support, the Board seems to have given much attention to the first two requirements of the three prong standard for voluntary recognition, i.e., whether the union sought and the employer extended recognition under § 9(a). See, e.g., id. at 1037 (holding that “the evidence [was] insufficient to establish that the Employer . . . entered into a 9(a) . . . relationship with the Union” because “there [was] no evidence indicating that the Union sought, and thereafter was granted, -10- recognition as the 9(a) representative of the Employer’s employees”); see also Triple A Fire Protection, Inc., 312 N.L.R.B. 1088, 1088 (1993) (emphasizing importance of recognition form–signed by the employer–which “voluntarily and unequivocally granted recognition to the Union as [the] 9(a) representative” and which acknowledged proof of union’s majority status), enforced, 136 F.3d 727 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1067 (1999). The Board has held, for example, that “to establish voluntary recognition pursuant to Section 9(a) . . . there must be evidence that the union unequivocally demanded recognition as the employees’ 9(a) representative and that the employer unequivocally accepted it as such.” J & R Tile, 291 N.L.R.B. at 1036. “[T]he Board will require positive evidence that the union sought and the employer extended recognition to a union as the 9(a) representative of its employees before concluding that the relationship between the parties is 9(a) and not 8(f).” Id. It is clear from these principles that, in order to satisfy the voluntary recognition standard, the Board requires rigorous compliance with its first two prongs. The Board, however, has interpreted the contemporaneous showing requirement with greater latitude; it can be met in a number of ways. Board precedent indicates that majority support may be contemporaneously shown by actual objective proof, such as the presentation of employee authorization cards to an employer, see Hayman Elec., Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 879, 886 (1994), or an -11- “employer-conducted poll prior to initial recognition,” Precision Striping, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1112 n.6 (1987). At the same time, a contemporaneous showing of majority support occurs where, external to the contract, an employer admits or acknowledges that the union enjoyed majority support at the time that it demanded such recognition. See Golden West Elec., 307 N.L.R.B. at 1495 (holding as sufficient proof of a 9(a) relationship the terms of the voluntary recognition agreement signed by the employer and the employer’s testimony that it “knew at the time it signed the [recognition] agreement that . . . the Union was seeking recognition as the unit employees’ majority representative and that the Employer was granting the Union recognition as such”). Not all Board decisions rely on some sort of extrinsic evidence to satisfy the contemporaneous showing requirement and prove the existence of a 9(a) relationship. To the contrary, several Board decisions make clear that the contemporaneous showing requirement may be satisfied by contractual language indicating that a union has offered to show its majority status and that the employer acknowledges and is satisfied by that offer. For example, in Decorative Floors, Inc., 315 N.L.R.B. 188, 188 (1994), the employer signed a recognition agreement which unequivocally demanded and granted § 9(a) recognition, outlined the union’s offer to establish majority status by allowing the employer to examine authorizations cards, and explicitly stated that the employer was satisfied -12- that the union represented a majority of its employees. The Board held that “the contractual language, standing alone, [was] sufficient to establish that [a 9(a)] relationship existed.” Id. at 189. The Board again held that a 9(a) relationship was established where the employer executed a document in which it acknowledged that it had verified the union’s majority status “on the basis of objective and reliable information,” but where no other independent evidence of majority status existed in the record. MFP Fire Protection, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 840, 841-42 (1995), enforced on other grounds, 101 F.3d 1341, 1343 (10th Cir. 1996); cf. American Automatic Sprinkler Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 163 F.3d 209, 22122 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that Board incorrectly concluded that the union had attained 9(a) status because the language in contract did not evidence an unequivocal demand for or grant of voluntary recognition nor a contemporaneous showing of majority support), cert. denied, U.S. , 120 S. Ct. 65 (1999); 2 2 A close reading of American Automatic Sprinkler reveals that its holding does not contradict ours. The Fourth Circuit held that the employer’s voluntary recognition was not enough to establish a 9(a) relationship. The court requires explicit proof of actual majority status presented contemporaneously with the union’s demand and the employer’s voluntary recognition. See American Automatic Sprinkler, 163 F.3d at 221-22. There are two important differences between that case and this one. First, unlike the collective bargaining agreement in this case, the agreement in American Automatic Sprinkler did not recite that § 9(a) recognition was based on any showing of majority support. See id. at 221-22. Our decision today determines that an agreement containing some offer of proof or acknowledgment of a showing of majority status satisfies the contemporaneous showing -13- Goodless Elec., 124 F.3d at 329 (stating that Board precedent provides that “the union’s demand for and the employer’s grant of [§ 9(a)] recognition must be predicated on at least an unchallenged claim, if not an actual showing, of contemporaneous majority support”); James Julian, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1247, 1253-54 (1993) (holding that a 9(a) relationship was not established because, unlike prior Board decisions including Golden West Elec., the recognition agreements did not contain any acknowledgment of the union’s majority status and there was no evidence that the parties unequivocally intended the agreements to create a 9(a) relationship). Accordingly, in the cases in which the Board determined that a 9(a) relationship existed without independent proof of majority requirement. In other words, if the agreement represents that § 9(a) recognition is based on a showing of majority support, that acknowledgment satisfies the contemporaneous showing requirement sufficient to overcome the 8(f) presumption, so long as the other § 9(a) requirements are met. Nothing in the Fourth Circuit decision undermines that determination. Moreover, by requiring at least a recitation of an offer of proof of majority support or an acknowledgment of a showing of majority status, our decision today does not reduce the contemporaneous showing requirement to a “hollow form,” a concern expressed by the Fourth Circuit. Id. at 222. Second, American Automatic Sprinkler is also distinguishable based on the type of evidence presented to establish majority support. The union in that case attempted to use as proof of majority status the union membership count determined by the union security clause. Because Deklewa specifically rejected this type of evidence as proof of majority support, the Fourth Circuit correctly held that it could not count as a contemporaneous showing of majority support. See id. at 220. There is no contention in this case that majority support was unlawfully established by a union security clause. -14- support, the critical component is that the agreements either describe a contemporaneous showing of majority status or have the employer acknowledge the fact that majority status was shown. In accordance with Board precedent, the Third Circuit recently held that the recitations of a “collective bargaining agreement constitute[d] uncontroverted proof that the parties were governed by § 9(a).” Sheet Metal Workers’ Internat’l Ass’n Local 19 v. Herre Bros., Inc., 201 F.3d 231, 242 (3d Cir. 1999). The court determined that the “language conclusively establishes a 9(a) relationship” because it “unequivocally states that the employer recognizes the Union as the exclusive majority representative[,] . . . [and it] recites that the Union submitted proof and that the employer is satisfied that the union represents a majority of its employees based on that proof.” Id. We adopt the reasoning of the Third Circuit on precisely this point. We hold that the language of a bargaining agreement itself may satisfy the requirement of a contemporaneous showing of majority support and overcome the 8(f) presumption where it unequivocally demonstrates that the parties intended to be governed by § 9(a). The agreement must, at the very least, show that the union demands § 9(a) recognition, recite that the employer recognizes the union as the exclusive representative of an appropriate unit of employees based on some showing of majority support, and demonstrate that the employer acknowledges and accepts the showing of majority support for -15- the union. The collective bargaining agreements entered into by Triple C and the Union in 1993, 1994, and 1995 meet this standard. The initial bargaining agreement, as well as the subsequent agreements, unequivocally states that Triple C “recognize[s] [the Union] as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for . . . a unit [of employees] appropriate for bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a).” R., Vol. II, Ex. GC3 at 2. Significantly, the agreement also represents that “[t]he Employer agrees that this recognition is predicated on a clear showing of majority support for [the Union] indicated by bargaining unit employees.” Id. While the agreement does not state that the Union unequivocally demanded recognition, such a demand is clearly implied by the content of the entire recognition clause and by the fact that the Union presented Triple C with the collective bargaining agreement. See Sheet Metal Workers’, 201 F.3d at 242; cf. Stanford Realty Assoc., Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 1061, 1061 n.2 (1992) (determining, in non-construction industry context, that the union’s “requests [of employer] to sign a contract subsumed a demand for recognition”). In addition, although the above contract language “conclusively gives notice that a 9(a) relationship is intended” even without reciting § 9(a), Sheet Metal Workers’, 201 F.3d at 242, the reference to the statutory section is particularly helpful in this case -16- specifically and in these types of agreements generally. 3 In other words, because the agreement actually mentions § 9(a), Triple C’s argument that it did not have notice that § 9(a) governed its relationship with the Union rings rather hollow. Further, we see no analytical difference between the case where a contract states that the union offered authorization cards to the employer as proof of majority support but the employer waived the opportunity to see the cards and the case where the contract signed by the employer and the union recites both that there was a clear showing of majority support for the union and that the employer accepted that proof and acknowledged majority status. Cf. Decorative Floors, 315 N.L.R.B. at 188-89. The Board’s conclusion that the contract language satisfies all the requirements necessary to rebut the 8(f) presumption, including the requirement of a contemporaneous showing of majority support, is supported by substantial evidence. We hold that the language recited in the collective bargaining agreements in this case “constitutes uncontroverted proof that the parties were 3 Despite our view that the use of § 9(a) in recognition agreements is advisable and assists in carrying the burden of overcoming the 8(f) presumption, we do not disagree with the Third Circuit’s determination that reference to § 9(a) is not necessary so long as the remainder of the recognition language conclusively shows that the parties intended § 9(a) to apply. See Sheet Metal Workers’, 201 F.3d at 242. -17- governed by § 9(a).” 4 Sheet Metal Workers’, 201 F.3d at 842. That said, the question remains how § 10(b) affects the claims made by Triple C in this case.