Opinion ID: 2600613
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the legal dispute

Text: ¶ 12 In Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 1989 OK 22, 770 P.2d 24, this Court recognized an actionable common-law tort for an at-will employee's discharge in contravention of a clear mandate of public policy. Darrow v. Integris Health, Inc., 2008 OK 1, ¶ 6 n. 8, 176 P.3d 1204, 1208 n. 8. Burk explained that the tightly circumscribed exception to the employment at will doctrine applies where an employee is discharged for refusing to act in violation of an established and well-defined public policy or for performing an act consistent with a clear and compelling public policy. 1989 OK 22, ¶ 19, 770 P.2d at 29. Only a specific Oklahoma court decision, state legislative or constitutional provision, or a provision in the federal constitution that prescribes a norm of conduct for the state can serve as a source of Oklahoma's public policy. Darrow, 2008 OK 1, ¶ 13, 176 P.3d at 1212 (emphasis omitted). ¶ 13 While a federal statute cannot by itself serve as a statement of Oklahoma policy, a federal statutory remedy may be as effective as an Oklahoma statutory remedy in dissuading employers from discharging employees for reasons that violate Oklahoma public policy. Clinton v. State ex rel. Logan County Election Bd., 2001 OK 52, ¶ 9, 29 P.3d 543, 546. In addition, to support a viable tort claim the public policy must truly be public, rather than merely private or proprietary. Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 1995 OK 108, ¶ 24, 905 P.2d 778, 787. Thus, to distinguish whistleblowing claims that would support a viable common-law tort claim from those that would not, the public policy breached must truly impact public rather than the employer's private or simply proprietary interests. Darrow, 2008 OK 1, ¶ 16, 176 P.3d at 1214 (footnote omitted). ¶ 14 The elements of a claim for wrongful discharge of an at-will employee articulated in Burk and its progeny can be summarized. A viable Burk claim must allege (1) an actual or constructive discharge (2) of an at-will employee (3) in significant part for a reason that violates an Oklahoma public policy goal (4) that is found in Oklahoma's constitutional, statutory, or decisional law or in a federal constitutional provision that prescribes a norm of conduct for Oklahoma and (5) no statutory remedy exists that is adequate to protect the Oklahoma policy goal. See McCrady v. Okla. Dept. of Pub. Safety, 2005 OK 67, ¶ 9, 122 P.3d 473, 475; See also Darrow, 2008 OK 1, ¶¶ 9-19, 176 P.3d at 1210-16. ¶ 15 In this matter, the trial court held Plaintiff's claim to be legally deficient on two bases, the at-will employee and the Oklahoma public policy goal elements. The trial court erred in its legal analysis of both elements. ¶ 16 In its order of summary judgment, the trial court held that Plaintiff's cause of action fails, as a matter of law, as the Plaintiff is not a contractual employee, but instead a statutory employee. The source of this contractual/statutory distinction appears to have been the argument of Employer's counsel. No such distinction is found in any appellate decision regarding wrongful discharge. It appears that Employer derived the term contractual employee from Burk's statement of the basic principal that an employment contract of indefinite duration may be terminated without cause at any time without incurring liability for breach of contract. 1989 OK 22, ¶ 5, 770 P.2d at 26. This is a statement of the employment-at-will rule for which Burk adopted a public policy exception. Therefore it appears that by counsel's use of the term contractual employee he was referring to an at-will employee. ¶ 17 Employer appears also to have reasoned that Plaintiff was a statutory employee because the appointment of deputy court clerks is authorized by section 162 of title 19 of the Oklahoma Statutes. Thus, under Employer's analysis, Plaintiff's employment status would have been that of a public officer. However, that analysis is flawed. Section 161(1) of title 19 provides that '[c]ounty officer' means the county clerk, county commissioner, county assessor, district court clerk, county treasurer and county sheriff. Section 161(2) provides that `[d]eputy' means one or more regular employees appointed to assist a county officer in the performance of the official duties of the county officer. ¶ 18 This matter was clearly brought by an employee, not a county officer. The fact that a statute authorized her employment makes her a public employee, but that does not alter her status as an at-will employee. For example, this Court has held that state employees who are classified, and thus under the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma Merit System of Personnel Administration, are not at-will employees and may not bring a Burk claim while unclassified employees serve at the pleasure of their employers and are considered at-will employees. McCrady, 2005 OK 67, ¶ 10, 122 P.3d at 475. Plaintiff served at the pleasure of the district court clerk and was an at-will employee. As such, she could be discharged for any reason or no reason without Employer incurring liability. Id. ¶ 6, 122 P.3d at 475. However, Employer cannot avoid a Burk claim, if her discharge was motivated in significant part by a reason that conflicts with an Oklahoma public policy goal. The trial court erred when it equated Plaintiff's employment status with that of a county officer. ¶ 19 Employer also challenged Plaintiff's claim on the public policy goal element. Employer argued successfully that Plaintiff's claim must fail because her asserted sources of an Oklahoma public policy goal did not apply to her and could not therefore provide the basis of her Burk claim. ¶ 20 [A]n employer's violation of a state-declared public policy is the fundamental predicate for a Burk tort. Darrow, 2008 OK 1, ¶ 10, 176 P.3d at 1210 (footnote omitted). The implication of a sufficiently discernable public policy presents a question of law to be resolved either [by the trial court] or ultimately by an appellate court. Id. ¶ 9, 176 P.3d at 1210 (footnote omitted). ¶ 21 In her response to Employer's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff asserted that [h]ere the public policy is quite clear-notification, removal and prevention of mold in a public courthouse. It is obviously important to have our State's public buildings free of possible health hazards. She argued that the Oklahoma Occupational Health and Safety Standards Act (OOHSSA), Okla. Stat. tit. 40, §§ 401-435 (2001 & Supp.2007), is one source of that policy. She also argued that she was entitled to the same protection from discharge for whistle-blowing activity that is provided to state employees by the Oklahoma Personnel Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 74, §§ 840-1.1 through 840-7.1 (2001 & Supp.2007). Together, she argued, the two acts express the policy of maintaining the health and safety of those who work in public buildings and the policy against discharging workers for reporting health and safety violations. The trial court rejected the asserted sources of an Oklahoma public policy goal [a]s the Plaintiff is not covered under either statutes [and thus] there is no basis for a Burk [sic] tort. This Court's recent decision in Darrow is instructive. ¶ 22 In Darrow, this Court noted that Oklahoma law protects both internal and external reporting of whistleblowers who rely on an employer's public-policy violation to support an actionable employment termination. 2008 OK 1, ¶ 19, 176 P.3d at 1215 (footnote omitted). Employees who report and complain of an employer's unlawful or unsafe practices and whose actions seek to further public good by unmasking these breaches should be protected from an employer's retaliation. Id. ¶ 19, 176 P.3d at 1216 (footnote omitted). ¶ 23 Plaintiff alleged she was discharged in retaliation for reporting unhealthy conditions in a public building that affected employees and the public. OOHSSA provides that [e]ach employer shall furnish to each of [its] employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to [its] employees, commensurate with [this Act]. Id. § 403(A). OOHSSA defines employer as the state and all its political subdivisions which has in its employ one or more individuals performing services for it in employment. Id. § 402(1). Employee is defined as a person permitted to work by an employer in employment. Id. § 402(2). The Commissioner of Labor administers and enforces the Act, Id. § 410, and the failure to comply with the Act is a misdemeanor. Id. § 412. ¶ 24 OOHSSA contains the following statement of public policy which applies specifically to the conduct that forms the basis of Plaintiff's Burk claim: No person shall discharge, discriminate or take adverse personnel action against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint, or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this act. Id. § 403(B). No statutory remedy is provided for an employer's violation of the provision. ¶ 25 It is difficult to imagine a statement of public policy more specific or more applicable to the conduct Plaintiff alleged. The whistleblower provision of OOHSSA mirrors the Whistleblower Act which provides internal and external whistleblower protection to classified and unclassified state employees. Okla. Stat. tit. 74, § 840-2.5 (Supp.2007). That protection includes the reporting of a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. Id. § 840-2.5(B)(2). Thus, the OOHSSA whistleblower provision extends similar protection to the employees of the state's political subdivisions and includes county employees such as Plaintiff. ¶ 26 Another argument was presented which the trial court did not rely upon in granting the Employer's motion for summary judgment. However, the transcript of counsels' argument indicates that the trial court believed that a Burk action might be unavailable to Plaintiff because she may have been able to bring a federal section 1983 action for abridgment of her First Amendment right of free speech. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's holding that Plaintiff's claim was legally insufficient based solely on that argument. However, Employer's claimed availability of a section 1983 action does not address or protect the Oklahoma public policy goal advanced by Plaintiff's whistleblowing. ¶ 27 The question is not, and never has been, merely whether a discharged at-will employee could possibly pursue a statutory remedy. The question is whether a statutory remedy exists that is sufficient to protect the Oklahoma public policy goal. McCrady, 2005 OK 67, ¶ 9, 122 P.3d at 475. Under Employer's view, every whistleblower Burk claim would be barred by the potential for a section 1983 remedy based on the whistleblower's right of free speech. Section 1983, however, is not a federal statutory remedy that sufficiently protects the Oklahoma policy goal of reporting unsafe or unhealthy conditions in public buildings. It is not an impediment to Plaintiff's claim of wrongful discharge. ¶ 28 Plaintiff has established that she was an at-will employee who was allegedly discharged in contravention of the statutorily stated Oklahoma public policy goal of protecting whistleblowers for reporting an unsafe or unhealthy condition in a public building and that there is no statutory remedy sufficient to protect that Oklahoma public policy goal. The remaining question is whether there are material facts in dispute which require a determination by the trier of fact.