Opinion ID: 1389650
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether the Confrontation Right Was Violated by Admission of Coconspirator Statements

Text: Defendant's third contention is that the use of coconspirator statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers. The State argues that defendant failed to preserve this issue on appeal because the parties understood that the confrontation issue would be raised at trial, at the time the evidence was offered. Because a ruling was never requested on the confrontation issue, the coconspirator statements were admitted without objection at trial. [5] When the issue is one of constitutional magnitude, this court will review an error not raised before the trial court. State v. McCullum, 98 Wn.2d 484, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983); RAP 2.5(a). Admission of out-of-court declarations in a criminal trial, even when proper under the evidence rules, poses a potential constitutional issue that ordinarily justifies review. [6, 7] The constitutional right to confrontation does not invariably exclude inculpatory hearsay evidence at a defendant's trial. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (1980); State v. Parris, 98 Wn.2d 140, 654 P.2d 77 (1982). The crucial determination is whether the unavailability of the declarant for cross examination deprived the trier of fact of a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the out-of-court statements. United States v. Fleishman, supra ; State v. Parris, supra . Unless the declarant is legally unavailable, the defendant's right to confront accusers is paramount to the State's need for the hearsay testimony. Here, one of the coconspirator statements admitted at trial was made by Ramil, whose conviction for these killings is currently on appeal. One whose conviction is still pending has a continuing right to claim a Fifth Amendment privilege. State v. McElyea, 130 Ariz. 185, 635 P.2d 170 (1981); State v. Sutterfield, 45 Or. App. 145, 607 P.2d 789 (1980). A witness who invokes the privilege is unavailable for confrontation purposes. State v. Solomon, 5 Wn. App. 412, 487 P.2d 643 (1971). The other statement was made by coconspirator Boy Peli who could not be located during trial despite the State's repeated attempts to serve a subpoena. [2] Thus, we find that the prosecutor was unable to secure either declarants' testimony at trial. See Ohio v. Roberts, supra (prosecutor must demonstrate that a good faith effort was made to obtain the witness's presence at trial). The second inquiry is whether there is sufficient indicia of reliability to allow the jury to assess the truthfulness of the statements and guarantee trustworthiness. [3] The objectionable statements were made to Robert San Pablo, the Alaska cannery foreman. On May 31, Ramil told San Pablo that the new union dispatch officer was to be killed the next day. After the killings, in the middle of June, Boy Peli told San Pablo about his and Dictado's involvement in the killings. The trustworthiness of extrajudicial statements may be evaluated using such factors as the close proximity of the conversation to the crime, whether the statements were spontaneous and against declarant's penal interest, and whether there was apparent reason for declarant to lie. State v. Boast, 87 Wn.2d 447, 553 P.2d 1322 (1976); see also State v. Parris, supra . Federal cases have inquired whether there was incentive to provide truthful information, United States v. Nelson, 603 F.2d 42 (8th Cir.1979); whether the statements were corroborated by admissions of defendant, United States v. Weaver, 565 F.2d 129 (8th Cir.1977); whether other evidence at trial supported the statements, United States v. Vadino, 680 F.2d 1329 (11th Cir.1982). These factors are not exclusive; all circumstances that indicate whether the statements are reliable should be considered. State v. Parris, supra . The strongest argument for reliability is that the coconspirator statements were corroborated by defendant's own statements threatening the new dispatch officer and discussing getting rid of him with Tulisan members. Furthermore, Ramil's statement immediately followed a meeting between defendant, other Tulisan members, and San Pablo, in which defendant had again stated an intention to kill the victim. Ramil's statement strongly suggested his own complicity in the planned killing. The crime occurred the next day. Boy Peli's statement clearly implicated himself in the killings and served the purpose of convincing San Pablo that he must cooperate with defendant's demands regarding the gambling proceeds. Prior to Boy Peli's statement, San Pablo had already reported to a third party that defendant was the mastermind behind the killings. Taken as a whole, the evidence of the circumstances under which the statements were made, the motives of the various declarants, and the corroborating evidence provide a sufficient basis for the jury to assess the truth of the statements and support a finding of reliability.