Opinion ID: 1209844
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Coast Guard Report

Text: Plaintiffs next argue that the circuit court committed prejudicial error by allowing Kadlec to testify regarding the Coast Guard's conclusions and opinions in violation of Plaintiffs' motion in limine. We agree. Plaintiffs based their motion in limine on Huber v. United States, 838 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir.1988), which held that the conclusions and recommendations contained in Coast Guard investigative reports were inadmissible as evidence in a civil action arising out of an accident. The Ninth Circuit Court based its decision on the Coast Guard Rules, which provide that: [t]he investigations of marine casualties and accidents and the determinations made are for the purpose of taking appropriate measures for promoting safety of life and property at sea, and are not intended to fix civil or criminal responsibility.  Huber, 838 F.2d at 402 (quoting 46 C.F.R. § 4.07-1(b) (1986)) (emphasis in original). The Ninth Circuit Court reasoned that: the Coast Guard established a set of procedures to be followed by its personnel whenever a marine casualty or accident takes place, including a formal investigation of the incident.... The Coast Guard has also directed, consistent with its statutory mandate to promote marine safety, that reports of such investigations shall not be used as evidence to assign civil or criminal responsibility for accidents. The reason for this is obvious: were post-accident investigation reports admissible evidence in a later civil proceeding for damages, the investigators might well be reluctant to be completely open and candid in the report, a result which could have adverse consequences for public safety. Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the Huber court held that the Coast Guard reports were inadmissible as evidence in private litigation. Id. at 403. At the hearing on Plaintiffs' motion in limine, the circuit court ruled that it would allow Defendants to present the Coast Guard's finding that Auren did not violate any Coast Guard rules or regulations, but that it would not permit testimony regarding negligence. Contrary to the circuit court's ruling, Kadlec stated during trial that he reviewed the Coast Guard report and that the report found no equipment failure and no misconduct. Defendants concede that the court granted the motion in limine with respect to any reference to negligence or fault, but contend that the court also reserved the right to rule on other questions at trial. Enterprises further contends that the circuit court did not err because it simply allowed Kadlec to testify as to how he used the report to form the basis of his opinion. We disagree with Defendants. While it is true that Kadlec did not specifically use the words, negligence or fault with respect to the Coast Guard report, a statement that there was no misconduct or equipment failure impliedly addresses issues of negligence and fault. Thus, Kadlec's references to the Coast Guard report were in violation of the court's previous partial grant of the motion in limine. As stated by the Coast Guard Rules, its reports were not intended to fix civil liability and therefore should not have been presented to the jury. Moreover, it is clear from the record that Kadlec's references to the Coast Guard report were considered by the jury, as it requested to see the Coast Guard report during its deliberations. [7] We therefore hold that the circuit court committed reversible error when it allowed Kadlec to make several references to the Coast Guard's findings of no equipment failure or misconduct in violation of its motion in limine.