Opinion ID: 1115407
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Disruption and Removal of Defendant From Courtroom

Text: Mr. DeWeese alleges that the trial court denied him a fair trial in removing him from the courtroom on the third day of trial. [12] The record shows Mr. DeWeese's removal from the courtroom followed a series of outbursts in which Mr. DeWeese interrupted the State's direct examination of witnesses and made prejudicial remarks in the presence of the jury regarding excluded evidence and his allegedly being forced to represent himself at trial without counsel. Prior to his removal, Mr. DeWeese was repeatedly warned that unless he controlled his behavior the court would be compelled to take action. Mr. DeWeese's initial removal from the courtroom was within the trial judge's discretion to maintain an orderly and fair proceeding. After that point, his continued absence was voluntary. The trial court acted properly in excluding Mr. DeWeese and maintaining an orderly trial and proceeded within the United States Supreme Court declaration that: It is essential to the proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country. The flagrant disregard in the courtroom of elementary standards of proper conduct should not and cannot be tolerated. We believe trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case. No one formula for maintaining the appropriate courtroom atmosphere will be best in all situations. We think there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant ... (1) bind and gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44, 25 L.Ed.2d 353, 90 S.Ct. 1057 (1970). The manner of maintaining order in the courtroom is within the trial judge's discretion; the least severe remedy to accomplish the result is preferable. Burgess v. Towne, 13 Wn. App. 954, 960, 538 P.2d 559 (1975). Furthermore, CrR 3.4(a) states in pertinent part: The defendant shall be present at ... every stage of the trial ... except as otherwise provided by these rules, or as excused or excluded by the court for good cause shown. (Italics ours.) The defendant was offered the opportunity to remain in court if he could adhere to the rules and cease his interruptions and disruptions intended to prejudice the jury. Mr. DeWeese did not take advantage of this opportunity. Once removed, the court placed Mr. DeWeese in a room with a video monitor which allowed him to follow the case so that he would be able to return to court to conduct cross examination of prosecution witnesses. Mr. DeWeese's absence from the remainder of proceedings after his removal the third day was entirely voluntary. CrR 3.4(b) states in pertinent part: In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's voluntary absence after the trial has commenced in his presence shall not prevent continuing the trial to and including the return of the verdict. Mr. DeWeese did not take advantage of his opportunity as a pro se defendant to present his own defense after the State rested, and he did not accept the court's invitation to him to present a closing argument. [13] We hold the defendant's right to be present at trial is not an absolute right. It is subject to either the defendant voluntarily absenting himself from proceedings or the removal of the defendant from the courtroom due to disruptive behavior. Such removal is within the discretion of the trial court. The defendant in this case received a fair trial.