Opinion ID: 1773692
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Omnibus Nursing Home Act Creates a Private Right of Action for Nursing Home District Employees Who Are Retaliated Against for Reporting Violations of the Act.

Text: Section 198.200 permits municipalities and counties to create nursing home districts. [W]hen a nursing home district is organized it shall be a body corporate and political subdivision of the state and shall be known as the `........Nursing Home District', and in that name may sue and be sued, levy and collect taxes.... Sec. 198.200.2. Section 198.200 further states, [f]or the purposes of sections 198.200 to 198.360, `nursing home' shall mean a residential care facility I, a residential care facility II, an intermediate care facility, or a skilled nursing facility as defined in section 198.006. Sec. 198.200.3. Section 198.012.1(2) expressly makes all the provisions of the Act applicable to nursing home districts, providing in pertinent part: The provisions of section 198.003 to 198.136 [the Act] shall not apply to any of the following entities: (1) ... (2) Any facility or other entity otherwise licensed by the state and operating exclusively under such license and within the limits of such license, unless the activities and services are or are held out as being activities or services normally provided by a licensed facility under section 198.003 to 198.186, 198.200 [nursing home districts], 208.030, and 208.159, RSMo, except hospitals licensed under the provision of chapter 197, RSMo. Id. (emphasis added). It is undisputed that the District, a body corporate and political subdivision of the State of Missouri, is a nursing home district, licensed under section 198.200, that it owns and operates the Miller County Nursing Home in which plaintiffs were employed, and that the activities and services provided by the District are those normally provided by a licensed facility under section 198.200. See sec. 198.012.1(2). The District acknowledges that it is subject to the provisions of the Act. None the less, it argues that it cannot be sued for firing plaintiffs for reporting violations of the Act, even though the Act specifically prohibits such retaliation, because the Act does not contain specific language stating that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is waived as to nursing home districts. In support, it cites cases holding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is the general rule and that any purported statutory waiver of sovereign immunity must be express and is to be strictly construed. See, e.g., McNeill Trucking Co., Inc. v. Missouri State Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 35 S.W.3d 846, 848 (Mo. banc 2001); State ex rel. New Liberty Hosp. Dist. v. Pratt, 687 S.W.2d 184 (Mo. banc 1985). This argument proves too much. Nothing in the statutes or case law requires that certain magic words must be used in order to waive sovereign immunity. The case law cited by the District merely requires that the intent of the legislature to waive sovereign immunity must be express rather than implied. While the most common way to express that intent may be to specifically state that sovereign immunity is waived, the legislature also expresses its intent through other language. For instance, H.S. v. Board of Regents, Southeast Mo. State Univ., 967 S.W.2d 665 (Mo.App. E.D.1998), recognized that in making the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) applicable to state employers, the legislature had expressly waived sovereign immunity even though the statute did not contain a provision specifically stating the defense of sovereign immunity is waived, because: The definition of employer in [s]ection 213.010(6) RSMo includes the state, or any political or civil subdivision thereof. Section 213.055 RSMo provides that it shall be unlawful employment practice: (1) for an employer, because of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age or handicap of an individual... to discriminate. Clearly [s]ection 213.055 RSMo was meant to apply to the state and its political subdivisions. Section 213.101 RSMo further provides that the provisions of this chapter shall be construed to accomplish the purposes thereof and any law inconsistent with any provision of this chapter shall not apply. Id. at 673. H.S. concluded that the express creation of a private right of action and the express provision that MHRA would apply to the State were sufficient to constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity for the State and its political subdivisions in those instances covered by the statute, stating [b]ecause the Missouri Human Rights Act treats the state and its subdivisions the same as it treats other employers, sovereign immunity does not preclude the trial court from awarding emotional distress damages pursuant to the Act. 967 S.W.2d at 673. Keeney v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 70 S.W.3d 597, 600 (Mo.App. S.D. 2002), reached the same conclusion, applying MHRA to the Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission and rejecting its contentions that sovereign immunity barred suits against public entities absent specific language stating that sovereign immunity was waived. The required specificity was contained in the express statement in MHRA that the act applied to the State. Similarly, the language of various taxing statutes allowing taxpayers to sue for refunds of improperly paid taxes, penalties or interest has been held to constitute an express waiver of sovereign immunity for that limited purpose, even though the statutes at issue do not use the specific words sovereign immunity is waived. See, e.g., Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. Dir. of Revenue, 64 S.W.3d 832, 835 (Mo. banc 2002) (applying section 144.190); Matteson v. Dir. of Revenue, 909 S.W.2d 356, 360 (Mo. banc 1995) (applying section 143.801). It is the express statement of the legislature's intent to allow itself to be sued, not the use of certain magic words, that is dispositive. This same analysis applies to suits brought by residents of nursing home districts. For instance, similarly to MHRA and the taxing statutes, the express statement of legislative intent to allow suits against the State is provided by the terms of sections 198.088 and 198.090 expressly giving residents who are retaliated against the right to sue nursing home facilities. In Stiffelman , this Court specifically held that these sections and section 198.093 create a private right of action for nursing home residents of facilities subject to the Act. 655 S.W.2d at 529. While the facility at issue in that case was private, section 198.012.1(2) expressly provides that nursing home districts are within the definition of a facility subject to the Act. But, under the District's argument, the courts would be required to hold that even nursing home residents were barred from suing under the specific authorizing provisions of the statute. Such a rule would render meaningless the provisions of the Act allowing suits by residents of homes operated by nursing home districts. The legislature is presumed not to have enacted a meaningless provision. It did not do so here. For, just as was the case in regard to private nursing homes, it would be illogical to say the legislature did not intend to allow private causes of action when it created a statute which compels an employee to report violations of the law, and protects her from retaliation or dismissal or conversely subject her to a penalty for failure to report a violation. Clark, 872 S.W.2d at 525. Clearly, residents of nursing home districts have a private cause of action for retaliation against them for reporting violations of the statute. The same is true as to nursing home employees such as the plaintiffs herein. As noted, a private right of action by employees who are fired or otherwise retaliated against in violation of the Act is also inherent in the provisions of the section 198.070 requiring employees to report such violations, imposing criminal penalties for failing to do so, and prohibiting retaliation against them for doing so. Id. The legislature has expressly made all of the provisions of the Act, including the anti-retaliation provisions, applicable both to private nursing home facilities and to nursing home districts by way of section 198.012.1(2). Since an employee of a private nursing home can sue under the provisions of the Act for retaliation, and as the provisions so permitting are expressly made applicable to nursing home districts, their language provides the express showing of legislative intent required to find a waiver of sovereign immunity. Any other reading of the statute would treat nursing home districts differently from private nursing homes, contrary to the express intent of the legislature that the Act should be fully applicable to nursing home districts.