Opinion ID: 2276759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Information in Lieu of Indictment (Strong's point 12)

Text: Strong claims the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte quashing the information in lieu of indictment for failure to comply with Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999). He argues that the state failed, in the indictment or in the information in lieu of indictment, to charge any statutory aggravating circumstance [5] as was necessary to render him eligible for the death sentence if convicted. Strong further contends that, because the information failed to plead any aggravating circumstances, the offense actually charged was unaggravated first degree murder, and the only authorized sentence is life imprisonment without probation or parole. Strong alleges these omissions by the state violated his constitutional rights to due process, a jury trial, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. This Court has repeatedly held that statutory aggravating circumstances need not be pleaded in the information or indictment. State v. Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496, 513 (Mo. banc 2004); State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 543-44 (Mo. banc 2003); State v. Gilbert, 103 S.W.3d 743, 747 (Mo. banc 2003); State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751, 766-67 (Mo. banc 2002); State v. Cole, 71 S.W.3d 163, 171 (Mo. banc 2002). Pursuant to section 565.005.1, the state is required to give to the defendant, [a]t a reasonable time before the commencement of the first stage of any trial of murder in the first degree, notice of the statutory aggravating circumstances it intends to submit in the event the defendant is convicted of first degree murder. Notice of statutory aggravating circumstances suffices in lieu of charging them in the information or indictment. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d at 543. The assertion that this Court's holding violates Ring, Apprendi, and Jones has also been denied previously. Glass, 136 S.W.3d at 513. Strong further attempts to rely on United States v. Allen, 357 F.3d 745 (8th Cir.2004). Allen offers no support, however, as it has been vacated and scheduled for rehearing en banc. The state filed its indictment on November 30, 2000, its notice of aggravating circumstances on March 20, 2001, and its information in lieu of indictment on April 30, 2002. Strong's guilt phase trial began February 26, 2003, and his penalty phase trial began on March 5, 2003. As such, he received nearly two years' notice that the state intended to prove the statutory aggravators in section 565.032.2(2) and (7), that the offense was committed while [Strong] was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of another unlawful homicide and that the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, or depravity of mind as to both Eva and Zandrea. This point is denied.