Opinion ID: 2570346
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Direct Liability: Interpretation of Section 11383(c)(2)

Text: The People argue that section 11383(c)(2) criminalizes possession with intent that anyone manufacture methamphetamine, not just possession with the intent to personally manufacture methamphetamine; hence, Perez was properly convicted as a direct perpetrator because he possessed hydriodic acid precursors with the intent that someone else use them to manufacture methamphetamine. Preliminarily, we address Perez's contention that this argument has been forfeited. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29.1(b)(3).) While this precise statutory issue was not part of the People's petition for review, we may consider all issues fairly embraced in the petition. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(b)(1); People v. Braxton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 798, 809, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 46, 101 P.3d 994.) The issue whether aiding and abetting liability requires proof that the elements of the predicate offense were committed by another, as we have determined it does, necessarily includes the issue whether the court's error in instructing the jury on aiding and abetting in the absence of such evidence was harmless. The jury was instructed on the requirements of section 11383(c)(2). If that section criminalizes possession of precursors with the intent that someone else manufacture methamphetamine, i.e., if it directly criminalizes the conduct tried under an aiding and abetting theory, then the court's error in instructing the jury on aiding and abetting would be harmless. Turning to analysis of the statute, we begin with its language. Section 11383(c)(2) provides: Any person who, with intent to manufacture methamphetamine or any of its analogs ... possesses hydriodic acid or any product containing hydriodic acid is guilty of a felony.... (Italics added.) The subdivision is one of a series of provisions that criminalize possession of precursors with the intent to manufacture specified controlled substances. (See § 11383, subds. (a)-(h).) The statute defines a crime with two elements: (1) possession of specified chemicals, and (2) criminal intent. (See CALJIC No. 12.09.4.) Here, the first element is conceded, the second disputed. While the People argue that the intent that anyone manufacture methamphetamine should suffice, Perez argues that a defendant must intend to participate personally in manufacturing methamphetamine. We agree with Perez. First, the most sensible interpretation of the statute's plain language is that it requires intent to participate personally in manufacturing methamphetamine. The statute requires that a person have the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, not the intent that methamphetamine be manufactured. The use of an active, not passive, construction implies that the subject of the sentence, the defendant, must himself intend to participate in the manufacturing. Notably, when the Legislature has chosen to criminalize actions taken with the intent that someone else manufacture a controlled substance, it has used different language. Section 11104, subdivision (a) punishes [a]ny ... person ... [who] sells, transfers or otherwise furnishes any of the substances listed in subdivision (a) of Section 11100 with knowledge or the intent that the recipient will use the substance to unlawfully manufacture a controlled substance .... (Italics added; cf. 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(1), (2) [separately punishing possession of listed chemicals with intent to manufacture, and possession knowing ... that the listed chemical will be used to manufacture a controlled substance].) Second, we find the overall statutory context significant. (See Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 977, 90 Cal. Rptr.2d 260, 987 P.2d 727.) In the case where A supplies precursors to B, who manufactures methamphetamine, there are in essence four sequential steps: (1) A possesses the precursors, with the intent to sell or transfer them for manufacture; (2) A sells or transfers them to B, with the knowledge or intent that B will manufacture; (3) B possesses them with the intent to manufacture; and (4) B manufactures. The Legislature has enacted a series of statutes that separately address these steps in the manufacturing chain. Section 11378 makes step 1, possession for sale, a felony punishable by 16 months, two years, or three years. (See Pen.Code, § 18.) Section 11104 makes step 2, sale or transfer with the knowledge or intent that the recipient will manufacture, a felony punishable by 16 months, two years, or three years, or a misdemeanor, depending on the nature of the precursors. [4] Section 11383 makes step 3, possession with the intent to manufacture, a felony punishable by two, four, or six years. (§ 11383(c)(2).) Section 11379.6 makes step 4, manufacturing, a felony punishable by three, five, or seven years. (§ 11379.6, subd. (a).) These statutes generally reflect a legislative judgment that each successive step that moves closer to the actual manufacture of methamphetamine is a more serious crime meriting increased punishmentup to three years for step 1 or step 2, up to six years for step 3, and up to seven years for step 4. Indeed, the sale of methamphetamine and its manufacture originally were punished equally ( People v. Coria (1999) 21 Cal.4th 868, 878-879, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 650, 985 P.2d 970), but in 1985 the Legislature passed section 11379.6 in order to `increase the penalties for those who illegally manufacture controlled substances.' ( Coria, at p. 879, 89 Cal. Rptr.2d 650, 985 P.2d 970, italics omitted.) Notably, the statute that covers possession for sale of methamphetamine precursors, section 11378, covers only certain precursors and does not extend to the hydriodic acid precursors Perez possessed. [5] The People would cure this omission by arguing that even if Perez were guilty only of step 1, possession with the intent to sell, this would be enough to convict and punish him under section 11383(c)(2), which also penalizes step 3, possession with the intent to manufacture. But this interpretation would render possession with the intent to sell, the lesser included conduct, a more serious crime than the sale itself (step 2). (Compare § 11104, subd. (a) with § 11383(c)(2).) This is an anomalous result inconsistent with the overall statutory structure. Third, to the extent the legislative history underlying section 11383 sheds any light, it indicates that the statute was aimed at shutting down the actual manufacturing laboratories, not the manufacturers' suppliers. Section 11383 was enacted as part of the 1972 California Uniform Controlled Substances Act (Stats.1972, ch. 1407, § 3, p. 3024), and the original legislative history offers no insight into the section's intended scope. In 1987, the Legislature significantly expanded the range of precursor chemicals covered by adding subdivision (c) to the section. (Stats.1987, ch. 424, § 1, p. 1589.) Documents in support of the amendment explained that, as written, section 11383 impaired raids on drug laboratories because it did not cover new chemical combinations criminal chemists had devised for manufacturing methamphetamine; thus, unless manufacturing had begun, no arrests could be made. (See Youth and Adult Correctional Agency, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 2501 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) prepared for Governor Deukmejian (Sept. 1, 1987) p. 3; Attorney General John Van de Kamp, letter to Assemblywoman Lucy Killea [author of Assem. Bill No. 2501], Apr. 23, 1987.) The Attorney General sponsored the amendment to allow law enforcement once again to shut down illegal labs before the manufacturing process begins. Illegal labs are more dangerous once the chemical ingredients are reacting together. Shutting down labs before the drugs are manufactured helps to prevent injuries to law enforcement and interrupts the flow of dangerous drugs to the street. (Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 2501 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 20, 1987, pp. 1-2; accord, Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 2501 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 19, 1987, p. 3.) Discussion of the need for the bill focused exclusively on the need to shut down the operators of methamphetamine laboratories. In 1995, the Legislature amended section 11383 to add subdivision (c)(2), covering possession of hydriodic acid or its precursors. (Stats.1995, ch. 571, § 1, p. 4418.) The amendment was passed to close a loophole in section 11383 that had allowed illegal methamphetamine laboratory operators to purchase iodine and iodine crystals and manufacture hydriodic acid from them. (Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 419 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 28, 1995, pp. 2-3; People v. McCall, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 190-191, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 82 P.3d 351.) In contrast, hydriodic acid suppliers were understood as being regulated under section 11100, not section 11383. (Assem. Com. on Pub. Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 419 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 28, 1995, p. 1.) Thus, section 11383 was understood as applying to those who were themselves operating methamphetamine laboratories and who intended to participate in manufacturing methamphetamine, not to the laboratories' suppliers. The People argue that other similar statutes have been construed to criminalize possession with intent that someone else carry out a further prohibited act. For example, section 11351 criminalizes possess[ion] for sale of specified controlled substances. In People v. Consuegra (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1726, 1732, footnote 4, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 288, and People v. Parra, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pages 226-227, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 541, the Courts of Appeal interpreted that language as extending to those who possess controlled substances with the intent that someone else sell them. Here, the covered acts, statutory context, and grammar are quite different. Parra rested in part on the conclusion that there is no meaningful distinction in culpability between the defendant who actually sells the controlled substance and the defendant who transports it with the specific intent that someone else will sell it, as they both share in the specific intent to sell. ( People v. Parra, supra, 70 Cal. App.4th at p. 227, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 541; accord, People v. Consuegra, supra, 26 Cal. App.4th at p. 1732, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 288, fn. 4 [We see no meaningful distinction in culpability between the individual who holds drugs to sell personally and the one who holds them for others to sell].) The same cannot be said of the person who intends to sell precursor chemicals to a manufacturer and the person who intends to manufacture the final illegal substance. The statutory context discussed above reflects a legislative judgment that a person who intends to manufacture is more culpable than a person who sells the manufacturer the necessary chemicals; it follows that a person who intends to manufacture is also more culpable than a person who intends to sell, but has not yet sold, the necessary chemicals. [6] Finally, section 11351 criminalizes possess[ion] for sale, not possession with intent to sell. This passive construction, unlike the construction used in section 11383(c)(2), does not imply the possessor must also be the seller. Accordingly, Parra and Consuegra, which concerned possession for sale and not possession with intent to manufacture, are distinguishable. Consequently, absent proof of intent to personally participate in manufacturing, Perez could not be convicted as a direct violator of section 11383(c)(2). The People argue that this interpretation of section 11383(c)(2), combined with a determination that aiding and abetting liability requires a predicate offense committed by a direct perpetrator, will hamper law enforcement efforts to shut down drug trafficking by constraining officers to wait until drugs have been delivered. Not so. A host of statutes criminalize involvement at various stages of the drug manufacturing process. (See ante, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 430, 113 P.3d at pp. 106-107.) In addition, the law of attempt and conspiracy covers inchoate crimes and allows intervention before transfer, sale, or manufacturing has been completed. In any event, if gaps do exist, the answer lies with the Legislature, not with the judicial distortion of either a centuries-old common law doctrine or the plain language of a statute aimed at methamphetamine laboratories. Logically, possession of methamphetamine precursors with intent to sell them to a methamphetamine manufacturer should be punishable under section 11378, but the evolution of methamphetamine manufacturing methods appears to have outpaced the statutory response. While the Legislature has amended sections 11100, 11104 and 11107.1 to regulate the sale of the methamphetamine precursors here at issue, it has not yet updated section 11378 or the section it cross-references, section 11055, subdivision (f), to regulate their possession for sale. If the Legislature wishes to amend these provisions to address this gap, it may do so.