Opinion ID: 3168180
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Heading: The Requirement of a Final Decision from the

Text: Contracting Officer Under the Contract Disputes Act (“CDA”), a contractor has the option of appealing a contracting officer’s decision either to the appropriate board of contract appeals or the Court of Federal Claims. See 41 U.S.C. § 7104. Regardless of which forum a contractor elects, however, only final contracting officer decisions may be 6 GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US appealed. See M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (emphasizing that the Court of Federal Claims’ authority to adjudicate a CDA claim “requires both a valid claim and a contracting officer’s final decision on that claim”); James M. Ellett Constr. Co. v. United States, 93 F.3d 1537, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (explaining that the CDA extends to “actions brought on claims within twelve months of a contracting officer’s final decision”); Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“Board jurisdiction is grounded in the CDA which authorizes Board review only of a contracting officer’s final decision on a ‘claim.’”). Accordingly, although a termination for default is deemed to be a government, rather than a contractor, claim, see Malone v. United States, 849 F.2d 1441, 1443–44, modified on other grounds, 857 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the linchpin for the start of the statutory appeal period is a final decision by a contracting officer terminating a contract for cause. See Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903, 906 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“Generally, exhaustion of administrative remedies should occur before a case is ripe for judicial review.”); see also Pathman Constr. Co. v. United States, 817 F.2d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“Compelling the contractor to file suit at what may be a relatively early stage of its negotiations and discussions with the contracting officer is likely to impede the free exchange of vital information between the contractor and the contracting officer that is necessary for a settlement.”). Resolution of the present appeal turns on when the contracting officer issued a final decision terminating BPA 218 for default. The government argues that the contracting officer’s August 2012 default termination notice was a final decision, and that Guardian Angels’ claim is time-barred because it failed to file suit within twelve months of receiving that notice. See 41 U.S.C. § 7104(b)(3) (requiring a contractor to bring suit in the GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US 7 Court of Federal Claims “within 12 months from the date of receipt of a contracting officer’s decision”). The government does not dispute that Guardian Angels had the right to seek reconsideration of the contracting officer’s August 2012 default termination decision. See Tokyo Kikai Seisakusho, Ltd. v. United States, 529 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The power to reconsider is inherent in the power to decide. . . . For this reason, the courts have uniformly concluded that administrative agencies possess inherent authority to reconsider their decisions, subject to certain limitations, regardless of whether they possess explicit statutory authority to do so.”); Dayley v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 305, 308 (1965) (“[U]nless there is legislation to the contrary it is the inherent right of every tribunal to reconsider its own decisions within a short period after the making of the decision and before an appeal has been taken or other rights vested.”); see also Summit Contractors v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 806, 808 (1988) (explaining that although the CDA does not explicitly provide for reconsideration of a contracting officer’s decision, it is firmly established that “an administrative agency may reconsider its own decisions” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). It argues, however, that because the contracting officer “did not spend any time considering [Guardian Angels’] request for reconsideration,” that request did not abrogate the finality of the August 2012 default termination notice or suspend the running of the twelve-month limitations period. We disagree with the government. Under the facts of this case, we hold that whether the contracting officer “spends time” considering the request is not the proper standard. On February 28, 2013, Guardian Angels sent a letter to the contracting officer requesting reconsideration of her August 2012 default termination decision and asserting that BPA 218 should have been terminated for 8 GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US convenience rather than cause.  In response, the contracting officer, in a letter dated March 21, 2013, directed Guardian Angels to provide documentation supporting its claim at its “earliest convenience” and stated that she would then “proceed with a review of the material and provide a response as required by the [FAR].” J.A. 71. If the August 2012 termination for default had been a final and irrevocable decision, there would have been no reason for the contracting officer to request—or agree to evaluate—additional documentation supporting Guardian Angels’ claim that BPA 218 should have been terminated for the convenience of the government. See, e.g., Crippen & Graen Corp. v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 237, 240 (1989) (concluding that a government demand letter seeking the return of unliquidated progress payments was not a final contracting officer decision because “[t]he clear intent of the letter was to allow the contracting officer to gather and consider all relevant information concerning the dispute in rendering a final decision”); Summit Contractors, 15 Cl. Ct. at 807 (concluding that the finality of a decision was suspended where the contracting officer  Although we can imagine letters from a contractor to a contracting officer that would not provide sufficient information and therefore could not be properly characterized as a complete request for reconsideration, the government does not challenge the trial court’s determination that Guardian Angels’ February 2013 letter qualified as a valid request for reconsideration of the contracting officer’s August 2012 default termination decision. See Reconsideration Decision, 120 Fed. Cl. at 10 (“Because the Contracting Officer had to reverse the default termination to provide [Guardian Angels] its requested relief on reconsideration, [its] February 28, 2013 letter qualifies as a request for reconsideration.”). Nor does the government object to the timeliness of Guardian Angels’ request for reconsideration. GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US 9 “reviewed the record” in response to a contractor’s request for reconsideration, notwithstanding the fact that the contracting officer ultimately affirmed his original termination decision); Devi Plaza, LLC v. Dep’t of Agric., CBCA No. 1239, 09-1 BCA ¶ 34033 (2008) (concluding that there was no “final decision” and that the appeal period did not commence where a contracting officer “indicated that he was willing to continue a meaningful and productive dialogue” with the contractor after issuing the decision); Nachtmann Analytical Labs., ASBCA No. 35037, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20229 (1987) (explaining that where a contracting officer issues a default termination notice but, in response to a contractor’s request for reconsideration, undertakes a “review of the facts surrounding the default termination,” the finality of the original termination decision is vitiated); Johnson Controls, Inc., ASBCA No. 28340, 83-2 BCA ¶ 16,915 (1983) (concluding that a contracting officer’s initial decision was “not truly final” where he subsequently granted the contractor an audience to discuss the “merits” of that decision and did not “make it very clear” that the original appeal period was running). The situation here parallels that presented in RoscoeAjax Construction Co. v. United States, 458 F.2d 55 (Ct. Cl. 1972). There, a contracting officer issued a decision adverse to the contractor, but subsequently agreed to meet with the contractor to “discuss and consider the problem further.” Id. at 61. Although the contracting officer ultimately declined to modify his original decision, the United States Court of Claims, one of our predecessor courts, held that his willingness to meet with the contractor to discuss his original decision “served to keep the matter open and necessarily destroyed any finality [the original] decision theretofore had.” Id. at 63. The court explained that “[t]he Contracting Officer’s agreement to meet for further discussions of the disputed subject would have been meaningless unless the purpose was to give [the contractor] further opportunity to be heard, and if 10 GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US persuaded as to the correctness of [the contractor’s] position, to change his position.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A similar analysis applies here. The contracting officer’s decision, in March 2013, to obtain and review additional documentation on the question of whether BPA 218 should have been terminated for convenience rather than cause “served to keep the matter open,” id., and vitiated the finality of her original default termination notice. An agency decision will be deemed final only if it “mark[s] the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Because the contracting officer’s March 2013 letter evinced a clear willingness to consider additional evidence, it was reasonable for Guardian Angels to conclude that the VA had not yet made any definitive determination on whether to terminate BPA 218 for default and that the twelvemonth statutory appeal period therefore had not yet begun to run. See Zomord Co., ASBCA No. 59065, 14-1 BCA ¶ 35626 (2014) (explaining that the limitations period does not begin to run if a contractor “present[s] evidence showing that it reasonably could have concluded that the [contracting officer’s] decision was being reconsidered”); Royal Int’l Builders Co., ASBCA No. 42637, 92- 1 BCA ¶ 24684 (1992) (“While receipt by the contracting officer of a request for reconsideration of a decision in itself does not serve to vacate a decision or the period in which to appeal, reconsideration of a decision by the contracting officer or creation of a reasonable appearance that the decision is being reconsidered both serve to vacate the earlier decision along with the accompanying appeal period.” (emphasis added)). This is particularly true given that the August 2012 default termination notice did GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US 11 not explicitly state that the time period for appeal began to run on the date it was issued.  The fact that in May 2013 the contracting officer reversed course—sending a letter to Guardian Angels stating that she had not yet received the additional documentation she had requested and that she had not reconsidered and would not reconsider her original default termination decision—does not alter this result. In evaluating whether the August 2012 default termination notice qualified as a final contracting officer decision sufficient to trigger the twelve-month statutory appeal period, our focus must be on the contracting officer’s actions, not on her own after-the-fact characterization of those actions. See ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 281 (1987) (“Locomotive Eng’rs”) (explaining that it is an agency’s “action, rather than its discussion, that is dispositive”); VWP of Am., Inc. v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 2d 645, 655 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2001) (“Actions speak louder than words . . . . In the case of inconsistency, conduct controls.”). Although the contracting officer stated in May 2013 that she had not reconsidered her August 2012 default termination decision, this statement cannot override or erase the fact that in March 2013 she  The August 2012 default termination notice did inform Guardian Angels that it had the right to appeal as provided in the disputes clause of BPA 218. J.A. 67. This disputes clause incorporated by reference FAR 52.233-1, which provides that “[t]he Contracting Officer’s decision shall be final unless the Contractor appeals or files a suit as provided in 41 U.S.C. chapter 71.” Significantly, however, FAR 52.233-1 does not address the issue of whether a contractor’s timely request for reconsideration vitiates the finality of a contracting officer’s original decision or extends the time deadline for challenging that decision in the Court of Federal Claims. 12 GUARDIAN ANGELS MED. SERV. v. US agreed to review and respond to additional evidence on the question of whether BPA 218 should have been terminated for convenience. See Vepco of Sarasota, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 639, 645 (1992), aff’d without opinion, 6 F.3d 786 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (concluding that the fact that the contracting officer unequivocally stated that he did not reconsider his original decision was not determinative on the question of whether the finality of that decision was suspended); see also Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Reconsideration of Final Decisions: It’s Not Over Until It’s Over, 3 No. 2 Nash & Cibinic Rep. ¶ 13 (1989) (explaining that if a contracting officer wishes to avoid a determination that a decision has been reconsidered he or she “should refrain from any discussions, negotiations, review of documents or other actions which could be considered to be a de facto reconsideration”). The contracting officer’s March 2013 letter vitiated the finality of her August 2012 default termination notice and it was not until May 2013—when she unequivocally denied Guardian Angels’ request for reconsideration—that the VA issued a final decision terminating BPA 218 for cause. See Dayley, 169 Ct. Cl. at 309 (“The general rule is that the period for appeal or review does not begin to run until the disposition of a timely request for reconsideration, rehearing, or new trial, because such a request suspends the finality of the decision pending a ruling on the application.”); see also B.D. Click Co. v. United States, 225 Ct. Cl. 605, 607 (1980). Because Guardian Angels submitted its complaint to the Court of Federal Claims within twelve months of the VA’s May 2013 final decision, its suit was timely filed.