Opinion ID: 1730855
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: substantive due process claims

Text: The Scofields also contend that the district court erred in dismissing their claim that the DNR's decision violated their substantive due process rights under the federal and Nebraska Constitutions. [10] The federal and Nebraska Constitutions contain similar due process language, and both provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. [38] Because the due process requirements of Nebraska's Constitution are similar to those of the federal Constitution, we apply the same analysis to the Scofields' state and federal constitutional claims. [39] The Scofields first claim that their substantive due process rights have been violated because the regulations at issue go too far, thus destroying the value of their property to such an extent that the regulations have the same effect as a taking by eminent domain. In presenting this claim, the Scofields are apparently relying on language found in this court's decision in Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln. [40] In Whitehead Oil Co., we cited the 11th Circuit case of Eide v. Sarasota County, [41] which identified various types of challenges a landowner could bring against the State. The 11th Circuit in Eide characterized one of these challenges as a due process takings claim, [42] which apparently is what the Scofields are asserting here. The court in Eide explained that this type of claim can be brought by the plaintiff when the application of the regulation goes so far and destroys the value of his or her property to such an extent that it has the same effect as a taking by eminent domain. [43] However, after our decision in Whitehead Oil Co., and approximately 7 years after deciding Eide, the 11th Circuit, in Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon County, [44] concluded that two U.S. Supreme Court cases, First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County [45] and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, [46] refuted the notion of due process as an independent ground for a takings claim. The 11th Circuit concluded that those U.S. Supreme Court cases, when read together, firmly place all the constitutional constraints on regulatory takings recognized by this Court under the Takings Clause alone. [47] The court definitively stated, There is no independent `substantive due process taking' cause of action. The only substantive due process claim is for arbitrary and capricious conduct. [48] Stated differently, the court determined that the only available substantive due process claim in this context is one that alleges that the regulation is arbitrary and capricious. [11] We agree with the 11th Circuit's analysis and conclusion in this regard. Accordingly, we now conclude that when a party alleges that a regulation goes too far, as the Scofields have done here, such a claim should be analyzed under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and not under principles of substantive due process. To the extent Whitehead Oil Co. can be read as creating a due process takings claim, it is disapproved. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the Scofields' claim that their substantive due process rights were violated because the regulations go too far. [12,13] The Scofields also allege that their substantive due process rights have been violated because the regulations, insofar as they use the Canal to establish the boundary for the refuge, are arbitrary, capricious, and not based on any legitimate state interest. To establish a substantive due process violation, the government's land-use regulation must be `clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.' [49] Because the Scofields' substantive due process claim was dismissed for failure to state a claim, the key inquiry in our analysis is simply whether the facts, as pled in the Scofields' complaint, sufficiently allege an arbitrary and capricious act. The Scofields argue that they have met this standard. In particular, the Scofields point to their complaint wherein they allege that the regulations, to the extent they utilize the shoreline banks of the [Canal] to establish the boundaries of the ... Refuge, are arbitrary and capricious, are so egregious and irrational as to exceed standards of inadvertence and mere errors of law, and do not substantially advance a legitimate state purpose. [14] But this assertion by the Scofields is merely a legal conclusion, and we are free to ignore sweeping legal conclusions that are cast in the form of factual allegations. [50] More to the point, as already discussed above, the regulations using the Canal to establish the refuge boundary are consistent with the applicable statutory requirements. Because we have already determined that the regulations using the Canal to establish the refuge boundary are consistent with the applicable statutes, and because the Scofields do not take issue with the statutes themselves, the Scofields cannot prove a set of facts in support of their substantive due process claims that would entitle them to relief. Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing their substantive due process claim.