Opinion ID: 2373688
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct Closing Remarks[7]

Text: Appellant asserts that the prosecutor engaged in improper summations to the guilt jury and, furthermore, that the remarks infected the penalty phase of the proceedings by producing a sanction derived from passion, prejudice, or arbitrariness. While his brief includes a lengthy excerpt of those remarks, he emphasizes the crucial importance of the following statements: the victim lived the American dream and the jury should put [its] arms around the Gambrells and promise the individuals who did this will be held responsible; Mr. Gambrell cannot be brought back to his family; the co-defendants had voted on agreed unanimously. . . . that they voted he was to die and carried out the execution. . . . it is society's fault that (they) did it is an insult to myself, to Detective Nespoli, to Detective Graham, Sheriff Dade, all of us who grew up on the streets of Philadelphia; and what manner of man sits before you. (Brief, pp. 23-24.) At the guilt phase, we long have held that statements to the jury are not improper unless their unavoidable effect is to prejudice the jury so that a true verdict cannot be rendered because the existence of bias and hostility makes it impossible to weigh the evidence in a neutral manner. Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 511 Pa. 429, 515 A.2d 531 (1986), and cases collected therein. Within these broad limitations, however, the prosecutor is free to argue that the evidence leads to guilt, and the Commonwealth can press its case with logical force and vigor. Commonwealth v. Cronin, 464 Pa. 138, 346 A.2d 59 (1975), quoting ABA Standards. On the other hand, a prosecutor may not indulge in personal assertions of guilt of a defendant either by direct statement or indirectly by figure of speech. Cronin, 464 Pa. at 143; 346 A.2d at 62. At the penalty phase, however, where the presumption of innocence is no longer applicable, the prosecutor is entitled to present argument for or against the sentence of death, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(3), and may employ oratorical license and impassioned argument, including a statement that Appellant showed no sympathy or mercy to his victims. Commonwealth v. Banks, 513 Pa. 318, 521 A.2d 1 (1987), cert. den. 484 U.S. 873, 108 S.Ct. 211, 98 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987). Also, see the cases collected in Commonwealth v. Whitney, 511 Pa. 232, 512 A.2d 1152 (1986). According to these standards, we find nothing improper about the prosecutor's guilt phase statements. On the contrary, the Commonwealth's representative expressly told the jury that the case should not be decided on an emotional level, (T.T. October 4, 1984, p. 8.100), while the court itself instructed the jury that closing remarks are not evidence in the case. (T.T. October 3, 1984, pp. 7.189-7.190.) The presumption in our law is that the jury has followed instructions. Commonwealth v. Stoltzfus, 462 Pa. 43, 55, 337 A.2d 873, 879 (1975). We conclude that the closing remarks were designed to allow the verdict to flow from the evidence within the bounds of proper argumentation. Even if any of the remarks are considered improper, a new trial is not required for every improper remark. Commonwealth v. Perkins, 473 Pa. 116, 373 A.2d 1076 (1977). Only where the unavoidable effect of the remark creates such a bias and hostility that the jury could not render a true verdict will reversal be mandated in this Commonwealth. Stoltzfus, 462 Pa. at 61, 337 A.2d at 882. That is not the case under review.