Opinion ID: 1189525
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action

Text: It appears generally from plaintiffs' pleading and proofs that they purchased in March, 1945, the main body of their ranch holdings from one Frank Chambers. These lands embraced deeded property and leased lands also. The 400 acres of land concerning which the parties now present their respective contentions embrace the west half of Section 25 and the south half of the northeast quarter of Section 26, all in Township 36 North, Range 64 West of the sixth principal meridian; but subjected to all reservations in the original patents contained but specifically conveying to said Grantees (the plaintiffs) all claims for damages accrued to the surface of said lands to the date hereof and not heretofore compensated. The grantors in said conveyance are Frank W. Chambers and Leona B. Chambers, and the grantees are Henry B. Holbrook and Hattie B. Holbrook. This conveyance is dated the 25th day of January, 1947. The prayer of the second cause of action is for general damages in the sum of $25,000, for special damages for the death of a calf in the sum of $85, and for building a reservoir in the sum of $529 on account of plaintiffs' water supply being destroyed and rendered useless by defendants. Relative to this claim of the plaintiffs as to the reservoir construction and the cost thereof, defendants in their answer said: That the defendant oil companies have never used any water in their operations upon the lands described in paragraph 1 of each cause of action arising from any source upon said lands, or from any source upon lands owned by the plaintiffs, but have continuously throughout all their operations transported to the said lands described in paragraph 1 of each cause of action, water for their use from wells located about eight miles distant from the said lands, and in so doing have brought to the said lands a source of water supply not theretofore existing, and in addition the oil company defendants have used the tank battery installations on the said lands for the purpose of separating water from oil and a substantial amount of water has been and is being separated from the oil produced, and said water has been and is being discharged into the stream course known as Little Buck Creek, and that the said water is potable and usable for stock watering purposes, and that as the result of the transportation to the said lands of water by the defendant oil companies, and the discharge of water from the oil produced by said companies, there has been in the past several years and is now a larger supply of water in Little Buck Creek than existed prior to the commencement of operations by said oil companies, and as a result thereof, water has been made available and is available for stock watering purposes and for the growing of pasturage which did not exist prior to commencement of operations by the oil companies, and as a result thereof the value of said lands for stock-grazing purposes has been sustantially enhanced. (Italics supplied.) In this connection, it will be recalled that the trial court found as a matter of fact that the allegation of their answer was true. There is plenty of evidence in the record to support this finding. Nothing seems to be urged in appellants and plaintiffs' brief as to the damages as to the loss of the calf, and it is unnecessary to cite our decisions that under such circumstances the plaintiffs' claim on that account is waived. It is apparent that plaintiffs and appellants have adopted and pursued in both allegations and proofs an erroneous theory as to their right to recover damages. They have disregarded the rulings of the United States Supreme Court in the litigation which culminated in that court and which was commenced in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming in the case of Kinney-Coastal Oil Company v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488, 48 S.Ct. 580, 72 L.Ed. 961. In the absence of proof of negligent mining operations (and there is no evidence of that in the instant case record), the surface owners, the plaintiffs, can recover only for damages to agricultural improvements or agricultural crops. There are no proofs covering those matters herein. If there were any, the findings of the district court are against the plaintiffs; and under the rules mentioned above, the matter would be set at rest adversely to plaintiffs and appellants. The plaintiffs and appellants may not sue for damages to the land but only for injuries to agricultural improvements or agricultural crops. In Weddle v. Parrish, 135 Ore. 345, 295 P. 454, 456, the court said: The word `crop' in its more general signification is said to mean all products of the soil that are grown and raised and gathered annually during a single season. In this sense the term includes both fructus industriales, or annual crops, and fructus naturales, or natural crops. In some instances classification depends on the intention of the parties and on the nature of the transaction involved.' The Kieffer case, supra, was one where a homestead entryman and his vendees sought to establish and maintain a town site on land subjected to mineral lease under the Congressional Acts of February 25, 1920, and July 17, 1914. It was found by the United States District Court that the mineral lessees needed all the surface of the entry for their drilling operations. With this finding the court of last resort in the interpretation of Federal statutes did not interfere but said (48 S.Ct. 583): ... that use of `practically the entire surface' is necessary `for the full development' of the underlying oil and gas deposits and for `reasonably economical, efficient operations' under the lease; that the buildings constructed and intended to be constructed as part of the townsite venture will `take up space required by plaintiffs in their lawful operations' The findings of fact by the District Court before described have such support in the evidence that they should be accepted by us. Two were accepted by the Circuit Court of Appeals, as shown in the quotation before made from its opinion, and the others were not considered. Those not considered are equally well supported. The national Supreme Court also said: The acts of 1914 and 1920 are to be read together  each as the complement of the other. So read they disclose an intention to divide oil and gas lands into two estates for the purpose of disposal  one including the underlying oil and gas deposits and the other the surface  and to make the latter servient to the former, which naturally would be suggested by their physical relation and relative values. The act of 1914, in providing for the disposal of the surface, directs that there be a reservation of the oil and gas deposits, `together with the right to prospect for, mine, and remove the same,' meaning, of course, the right to use so much of the surface as may be necessary for such operations. And the act of 1920, in providing for the leasing of the oil and gas deposits, provides (section 29) for a reservation of the surface `in so far as said surface is not necessary for the use of the lessee in extracting and removing the deposits.' In effect therefore a servitude is laid on the surface estate for the benefit of the mineral estate to the end, as the acts otherwise show, that the United States may realize, through the separate leasing, a proper return from the extraction and removal of minerals. (Italics supplied.) The national Supreme Court further pointed out: The only compensation which he rightfully may demand is, as the act of 1914 says, for `damages caused' by the mining operations. The sentence next preceding that in which these words occur makes it fairly plain that they refer to damages to `crops and improvements,' and the title to the act, coupled with the reference to `crops' shows that `agricultural' improvements are the kind intended. Elaborating additionally as to the meaning of improvements and crops in the Act of Congress of 1914, the national Supreme Court also indicated (48 S.Ct. 584): So, while the provision on which the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals rests cannot be held to be an obstacle to the maintenance of this suit in a court of equity, we think it shows a need for modifying the decree of the District Court by providing therein for an ascertainment in this suit of any damages which the plaintiffs' entry and operations under the lease may have caused to the agricultural improvements or crops of the owner of the surface estates... . (Italics supplied.) In the case at bar there seem to be no agricultural improvements or agricultural crops established or maintained by the plaintiffs. At least, our attention is not called to any such. Besides, the trial court which saw and heard the parties' witnesses has found adversely in all plaintiffs and appellants' contentions relative to this matter. By these findings (they are well supported by evidence herein either uncontradicted or conflicting) the point is settled as far as this court is concerned under rules which we have already mentioned above. Of course, if the evidence was conflicting, the district court had the right to resolve the conflict in favor of the defendants. As to that rule, no authorities need be cited as it is so well settled by our own decisions heretofore announced. The theory of plaintiffs in this case appears clearly in subdivision IV of their second cause of action as follows: That the defendants have trodden down the grass crops upon the land, strewn oil and refuse and debris upon said lands and in said lands, polluted the water supply of plaintiffs, destroyed fences, left gates open which should be shut, killed livestock, usurped the water supply of the plaintiffs, lowered the water table in and on the land thereby drying up a spring, built roads, culverts, fills, dams upon the land to its detriment and damage, transported oil and gas, machinery, supplies and people upon and across said lands, and have stored and processed and handled oil and gas upon said lands produced from other lands, without right and have deprived plaintiffs of the full use and enjoyment of their said lands beyond any right which defendants may have had, and destroyed the ranch unit as above set forth, all to the plaintiffs' loss and damage in the sum of $25,000.00 In passing, we may note that in the Keiffer case, supra, the United States District Court said (1 F.2d 795, 797): The term `crops' clearly refers to agriculture, and the term `improvements,' in the connection in which it is found, can reasonably have no other significance than those of an agricultural nature. This view of the matter, as we have seen, was approved by the Supreme Court of the United States on final disposition of the case. We conclude there is no merit in plaintiffs' second cause of action.