Opinion ID: 360492
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Validity of the Section 7203 Convictions

Text: 14 Buckley was convicted for attempted evasion of taxes (Section 7201) in 1970, 1973 and 1974. He was convicted for failure to file (Section 7203) in these same years, as well as in 1971 and 1972. As shown by the diagram below, upon the Section 7201 convictions for 1973 and 1974, concurrent one-year prison terms were imposed; for the Section 7203 convictions for 1970, 1971 and 1973, concurrent six-month prison terms were imposed to run consecutively to the one-year terms; finally, Buckley received concurrent suspended sentences for the Section 7201 count in 1970 and the Section 7203 counts in 1972 and 1974, but with concurrent one-year probation terms to be served upon release from prison. 15 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- Sec. 7201 suspended sentence one year one year with probation Sec. 7203 six months six months sentence six months sentence suspended suspended with with probation probation 16 Appellant argues, and we agree, that failure to file is a lesser offense included in a Section 7201 conviction based on the facts of this case. The government conceded as much at oral argument. 3 Where one of the affirmative acts of evasion relied upon by the government in proving attempted tax evasion under Section 7201 is the failure to file an income tax return, failure to file is a lesser included offense, and Congress did not intend for the defendant to be punished for both offenses. United States v. Newman,468 F.2d 791, 796 (5th Cir. 1972), Cert. denied, 411 U.S. 905, 93 S.Ct. 1527, 36 L.Ed.2d 194 (1973). 17 Although the government concedes that punishment may not be imposed under both statutes, it nonetheless argues that the Convictions for failure to file should stand for the years 1970, 1973 and 1974, reasoning that a conviction without a sentence imposed thereupon is harmless. 4 We disagree. Where one offense is included in another, it cannot support a separate conviction and sentence. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 97 S.Ct. 2207, 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977); United States v. York, 578 F.2d 1036, 1040 (5th Cir. 1978). Thus, in situations such as the present one, where a defendant is improperly convicted for a lesser included offense, the proper remedy is to vacate both the conviction And sentence on the included offense, leaving the conviction and sentence on the greater offense intact. United States v. Slutsky, 487 F.2d 832, 845-46 n.18 (2d Cir. 1973), Cert. denied,416 U.S. 937, 94 S.Ct. 1937, 40 L.Ed.2d 287 (1974); United States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.2d 1252, 1255-56 n.2 (2d Cir.), Cert. denied, 406 U.S. 931, 92 S.Ct. 1801, 32 L.Ed.2d 134 (1972); United States v. Newman, 468 F.2d 791, 796 (5th Cir. 1972), Cert. denied, 411 U.S. 905, 93 S.Ct. 1527, 36 L.Ed.2d 194 (1973). 18 The government emphasizes that in Jeffers the conviction on the lesser included offense was allowed to stand, 5 432 U.S. at 148, 97 S.Ct. 2207, and urges a similar result here. We find the government's reliance on Jeffers to be misplaced. In Jeffers the Court dealt with the contention by the defendant that 21 U.S.C. § 846, prohibiting conspiracies to commit drug-related offenses, was a lesser included offense of 21 U.S.C. § 848, which prohibits conducting a continuing criminal enterprise to violate the drug laws. Arguing that the two offenses were the same for double jeopardy purposes, Jeffers maintained that his trial and conviction for violating 21 U.S.C. § 848, occurring subsequent to his conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846, was invalid because it placed him twice in jeopardy for the same offense in contravention of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Assuming arguendo that Section 846 was a lesser included offense, the Court nonetheless concluded that Jeffers had Waived his double jeopardy rights by persuading the trial court to order separate trials and by failing to raise any double jeopardy objections at the time. Having concluded that Jeffers could not object to being separately tried and convicted for the two offenses, the Court then turned to the question of whether Congress had intended to allow Cumulative punishment for those defendants whose conduct violates both statutes. The Court concluded that Congress did not so intend, and accordingly reduced the fines given Jeffers to the maximum amount allowable under Section 848. 19 In contrast, we deal here with two offenses, one of which is admittedly included within the other, and a defendant who is neither responsible for his multiple convictions nor has exhibited any conduct resembling a waiver of his rights. Jeffers could not be heard to complain of successive prosecutions because he had in fact caused them; Buckley, on the other hand, has done nothing to estop him from complaining of his multiple convictions. Jeffers turned on a finding of waiver; we find no waiver in this case. 20 Therefore, we modify the judgment below by vacating the convictions and sentences for failure to file (counts two, six and eight) in the years 1970, 1973 and 1974. Because it is obvious that the convictions on the Section 7203 counts did not lead the trial court to impose a harsher sentence on the Section 7201 counts than he would have in the absence of such convictions, there is no need to remand for resentencing. See United States v. Slutsky,487 F.2d 832, 845-46 n.18 (2d Cir. 1973), Cert. denied, 416 U.S. 937, 94 S.Ct. 1937, 40 L.Ed.2d 287 (1974); United States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.2d 1252, 1256 (2d Cir.), Cert. denied 406 U.S. 931, 92 S.Ct. 1801, 32 L.Ed.2d 134 (1972).V. Disclosure of the F.B.I. Files 21 As a final point of error, Buckley argues that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to order discovery of the F.B.I. investigative files concerning him. Buckley contends that he is entitled to discovery by virtue of the Supreme Court's decision in Brady v. Maryland,373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), in which the Court held that the suppression of exculpatory evidence by the prosecution in response to the request of an accused violates due process whenever that evidence is material to either guilt or punishment. In response to Buckley's motion for the discovery of these materials, the trial judge ordered the F.B.I. to submit the files to the prosecution for review and to the court for an In camera inspection. Both the prosecution and the trial court concluded that the files contained no exculpatory materials within the meaning of Brady. Having examined these files, sealed by the district court for possible review on appeal, we agree. Requiring materials sought for discovery to be submitted to the court for an In camera inspection is a practice which is both reasonable and protective of the defendant's rights, and, we might add, one which has received a measure of approval by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). Moreover, in areas where, as in the present case, the request involves materials the disclosure of which is arguably not in the public interest, 6 this Court has sanctioned the use of In camera inspections to resolve the conflicting demands of the defendant and the government. United States v. Brown, 539 F.2d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 1976); See also United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1309-10 (5th Cir. 1978). Thus, we conclude that Buckley's rights were adequately protected by the procedure employed by the district court and we concur in its conclusion that the F.B.I. files contain no information that would have been helpful to Buckley's defense. 22 Buckley also contends that there are two independent statutory provisions which entitle him to the requested information as a matter of law. The first of these, Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(C), conditions the disclosure of information upon a showing by the defendant that the documents sought are  material to the preparation of his defense. Contrary to Buckley's assertion that Rule 16(a)(1)(C) mandate(s) the production of such documents upon request, it is incumbent upon a defendant to make a Prima facie showing of  materiality in order to obtain discovery: 23 Materiality means more than that the evidence in question bears some abstract logical relationship to the issues in the case. . . . There must be some indication that the pretrial disclosure of the disputed evidence would have enabled the defendant significantly to alter the quantum of proof in his favor. 24 United States v. Ross, 511 F.2d 757, 762-63 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836, 96 S.Ct. 62, 46 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). Buckley has made no such showing here. Alternatively, even if we were to assume that a showing of materiality had been made, the information sought, by Buckley's own admission, related only two his entrapment defense, which, as we have already decided, was not a defense in this case. 25 Similarly, Buckley's reliance on the disclosure provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a), 7 does not support his claim of entitlement to the files. Although the FOIA provides an independent basis for obtaining information potentially useful in a criminal trial, it was not intended as a device to delay ongoing litigation or to enlarge the scope of discovery beyond that already provided by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. United States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1977).VI. Conclusion 26 We affirm the judgment of the district court but modify it by vacating the convictions and sentences for failure to file in 1970, 1973 and 1974 (counts two, six and eight). 27 AFFIRMED in part; MODIFIED in part.