Opinion ID: 1377106
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The Bank argues that Bianco failed to make a submissible case on many of the elements of its fraudulent misrepresentation claim. The essential elements of such a claim are well-established: [i]t [is] essential ... to establish a representation; its falsity; its materiality; the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; his intent that it be acted on by the hearer and in the manner reasonably contemplated; the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; his reliance on its truth; his right to rely thereon; and his consequent and proximate injury. John T. Brown, Inc. v. Weber Implement & Auto. Co., 260 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Mo. 1953). Accord, State ex rel. PaineWebber, Inc. v. Voorhees, 891 S.W.2d 126, 128 (Mo. banc 1995). Bianco's fraudulent representation claim was submitted in Instruction No. 7: Your verdict must be for plaintiffs if you believe: First, defendant induced plaintiff into providing additional collateral to defendant based on the representations that defendant would: (a) not demand further additional collateral; and (b) allow the parties to meet with the manufacturers and the proposed buyer to complete the sale of the business; and (c) stop the replevin and taking of plaintiff Joel Bianco Kawasaki Plus, Inc.'s inventory if the meetings on October 7 and 8, 1997 occurred and the negotiations for the sale of the business proceeded in good faith; and (d) attend the meetings and make a substantial effort to resolve the sale of the business; and (e) not recommence the replevin and taking of the inventory without advising plaintiff Joel Bianco that a resolution cannot be achieved and the defendant was going to continue the replevin and taking; intending that plaintiffs rely upon such representations in providing the additional collateral, and Second, the representations were false, and Third, defendant knew that the representations were false at the time they were made, and Fourth, the representations were material to the plaintiffs, and Fifth, plaintiffs relied on the representations in providing the additional collateral, and Sixth, as a direct result of such representation the plaintiffs were damaged. unless you believe plaintiffs are not entitled to recover by reason of Instruction Number . The Bank argues that some of the five misrepresentations set out in Paragraph First were not even made, that those that were made were, at most, expressions of opinion or promises as to what the Bank hoped or wanted to do in the future, rather than statements of existing fact, and that in any event they were not false, were not material and Bianco could not reasonably have relied on them and did not suffer damages as a result of them. In so arguing, Bank cites to the substantial evidence it adduced below supporting its contentions. But, its argument fails to adequately take into account the standard of review. An appellate court will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, giving the prevailing party all reasonable inferences from the verdict and disregarding the unfavorable evidence. Nemani v. St. Louis University, 33 S.W.3d 184, 185 (Mo. banc 2000). While a court will not supply missing evidence or give a plaintiff the benefit of unreasonable, speculative, or forced inferences, Lewis v. FAG Bearings Corp., 5 S.W.3d 579, 584 (Mo.App. S.D. 1999), it will not overturn a verdict unless there is a complete absence of probative facts to support it. Id. So considered, the evidence submitted by Bianco, including Mr. Bianco's own testimony, that of the manufacturers with whom he tried to negotiate an agreement, and a document that the parties referred to below as the Standstill Agreement, supported the verdict. As to whether the representations were made as representations of existing fact, Bianco testified that the Bank promised that, in return for Bianco's October 6, 1997, agreement to provide it with a security interest in Bianco's boat, a deed of trust on his home, and $25,000 he borrowed from his mother as additional collateral, the Bank would not demand any more collateral and would allow the parties to meet with the manufacturers and the proposed buyer to complete the sale of the business on October 7 and 8. Lawyers who attended the October 7 and 8 meetings similarly testified that the purpose of the meetings was to arrange the sale of the business and use the proceeds towards the debt. Further, the Standstill Agreement stated that in exchange for providing this additional security, which Bianco agreed to and did provide on October 6, 1997, the Bank would permit the meeting with creditors and potential buyers. Several witnesses, including a manufacturer's attorney and a Bank vice-president, testified that the Standstill Agreement and other correspondence led them to believe that the Bank was willing to soften its demands and to make a substantial, concerted effort to resolve the matter, including accepting an amount less than the full debt, and that these were positive statements of the Bank as what the Bank was prepared to do, not vague future promises. The Standstill Agreement and the testimony of these witnesses also supported Paragraph First's submission that the Bank agreed that it would suspend the replevin and the taking of Bianco's inventory in the event the meetings on October 7 and 8 for the sale of the business proceeded in good faith. It also supported the jury's finding that all of Paragraph First's five representations were false and that the Bank knew they were false when it made them. [6] Specifically, participants in the October meetings testified that the Bank's only intention at the meeting on October 8 was to demand more money rather than to allow the parties to meet with the manufacturers and the proposed buyer in order to facilitate the sale of the business. Witnesses, including a deputy sheriff, testified that the Bank had trucks waiting outside during the meeting in order to continue with the replevin, that the Bank did continue with it before the negotiations broke up, and that the Bank's actions undermined the good faith negotiations between the several interested parties and were the reason the negotiations failed. Finally, there was evidence that the Bank later misrepresented that various manufacturers had agreed at the meeting that the Bank should get more money, a claim that some manufacturers' representatives who had attended the meeting said was absurd, we had not made any deal. At least one witness testified that she believed the Bank's actions were in bad faith, and another testified to the effect that he was shocked by the Bank's behavior. Several witnesses testified that the Bank was unyielding in its demands for additional collateral, despite having offered to make a substantial effort with all parties concerned to resolve this matter. The jury reasonably could have found from the Bank's actions and demands, which some participants at the October meetings found to be outrageous and ridiculous, that it never intended to fulfill its promise to make a substantial effort in resolving the matter, to cease the replevin, to allow the meetings to proceed in order to complete the sale of the business, and to not continue the replevin without notice, and that it knew its representations were false at the time it made them. This same evidence supports the jury's findings that the representations were material and that Bianco relied on them. The test for reliance is whether Bianco, under the circumstances, was justified in relying upon the representations. Oshia v. E.A. Strout Realty Agency, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Mo.1967). The jury was entitled to reject the Bank's apparent claim that Bianco just decided to pledge the deed on his home, his boat, and sums of money from his mother in return for vague and unenforceable promises by the Bank. It could well have concluded that, to the contrary, the Bank represented it would forestall the replevin and make substantial efforts to resolve Bianco's financial problems and that these representations were material and were reasonably relied on by Bianco in volunteering additional collateral. A misrepresentation is material if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent, or if the maker knows that it would be likely to induce the recipient to do so. Grossoehme v. Cordell, 904 S.W.2d 392, 397 (Mo.App. W.D.1995). Additionally, the testimony supported Bianco's claim that the close of the sale of Bianco's business, as well as paying off the manufacturers, would have occurred but for the actions of Bank. Bianco also testified as to the resulting loss of his business' good will and of his personal and professional reputation in the sports vehicle community.