Opinion ID: 2714911
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Disbarment Is the Appropriate Sanction

Text: The American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991 & Supp. 1992) (ABA Standards) govern lawyer sanctions in Washington. Marshall, 160 Wn.2d at 342. Based upon the ABA Standards, we use a three. . step process to analyze a recommended sanction. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Preszler, 169 Wn.2d 1, 18, 232 P.3d 1118 (201 0). First, we determine the presumptive sanction by analyzing 'the ethical duties violated, ... the lawyer's mental state, and ... the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's conduct.' /d. (quoting Marshall, 160 Wn.2d at 342). Second, we determine whether any aggravating or mitigating circumstances call for a departure from the presumptive sanction. /d. Third, if raised by the attorney being disciplined, we evaluate the Board's recommended sanction based on '(1) [the] proportionality of the sanction to the misconduct and (2) the extent of agreement among the members of the Disciplinary Board.' /d. (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Schwimmer, 153 Wn.2d 752, 764, 108 P.3d 761 (2005)). Although we are not bound by the Board's recommendation, [w]e should not lightly depart from recommendations shaped by [the Board's] experience and perspective. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Noble, 100 Wn.2d 88, 94, 667 P.2d 608 (1983). Accordingly, we will adopt the sanction recommended by the Disciplinary Board unless we are able to articulate specific reasons for adopting a different sanction. /d. at 95. Here, the hearing officer concluded that the presumptive sanction was disbarment for 10 of the 14 counts. A unanimous board agreed. Jackson makes no 35 No. 201,017-2 compelling argument that would warrant our reversal of the sanction. We hold that the hearing officer correctly concluded that the presumptive sanction should be disbarment. A. The Presumptive Sanction Is Disbarment for 10 of the 14 Counts The hearing officer concluded, and the Board agreed, that disbarment was the presumptive sanction for 10 of the 14 counts, pursuant to standards 4.31, 6.61, 5.11, 6.11, 6.21, and 7.1. Although Jackson has assigned error to this conclusion, he does not set forth any argument to support the contention. 22 Jackson never argues that the hearing officer incorrectly applied the ABA Standards to determine the presumptive sanctions. Thus, we adopt the Board's decision in this regard. B. The Balance of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors Does Not Demand a Departure from the Presumptive Sanction of Disbarment Aggravating or mitigating factors can alter the presumptive sanction, but only if they are sufficiently compelling to justify a deviation. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cohen, 149 Wn.2d 323, 339, 67 P.3d 1086 (2003). In this case the hearing officer determined the applicable aggravating factors were dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of a disciplinary proceeding, submission of false evidence during a disciplinary proceeding, refusal to 22 Jackson argues that he was not Simonson's attorney during the bankruptcy proceeding and that Mr. Dainard did not suffer harm because he always controlled 115 Webster and the property was never actually sold to Kenneth North. Jackson's attack on these factual findings fails. The first finding is dealt with earlier in this opinion: there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Jackson was Simonson's attorney. Also, Jackson fails to allege facts or law to support his argument that the Dainards did not suffer any harm. Thus, we accept the hearing officer's finding that Jackson's misrepresentations injured the Dainards. 36 No. 201,017-2 acknowledge misconduct, and substantial legal experience. She found three mitigating factors: absence of prior discipline record, character or reputation, and imposition of other penalties with regard to count 4. Jackson challenges only standard 9.22(g): his refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. 23 This aggravating factor is appropriate where a lawyer admits that he engaged in the alleged conduct but denies that it was wrongful, or where he rationalizes the improper conduct as error. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Ferguson, 170 Wn.2d 916, 943-44, 246 P.3d 1236 (2011) (citing In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Holcomb, 162 Wn.2d 563, 588, 173 P.3d 898 (2007)). It is also appropriate where the lawyer is unrepentant and continues to justify his actions despite abundant contrary evidence and his own conflicting testimony or where the lawyer excuses the violation as merely 'technical' or 'unfortunate labeling.' /d. at 945. These were all present in the current case. As the hearing officer noted, throughout the proceedings, Jackson denied wrongdoing or attempted to justify his conduct. He refused to acknowledge the conflicts of interest that arose from his representation of Simonson, the Levenhagens, the Lanings, and the Laings. He sought to blame others, including the bankruptcy judge and other lawyers, for much of what occurred. Thus, we reject Jackson's contention that this aggravating factor does not apply. 23 Jackson also contends·that the vulnerable victim factor is questionable. But this was not one of the aggravating factors the hearing officer listed or relied on. 37 No. 201,017-2 We accept the hearing officer's finding that numerous and substantial aggravating factors outweighed mitigating factors. A balance of the enumerated factors does not justify a departure from the presumptive sanction of disbarment. C. Disbarment Is a Proportionate Sanction and the Board's Unanimous Sanction Recommendation Deserves Considerable Deference While we do not generally depart from a Board's recommendation, we will do so if we are persuaded that the sanction is inappropriate in light of the (1) disproportionality of the sanction to the misconduct or (2) the extent of disagreement among the members of the Board. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Kuvara, 149 Wn.2d 237, 259, 66 P.3d 1057 (2003). Here, Jackson cites three dissimilar cases in an attempt to illustrate that disbarment is a disproportionate sanction for his misconduct: Holcomb, 162 Wn.2d 563; In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Greenlee, 158 Wn.2d 259, 143 P.3d 807 (2006); In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against McKean, 148 Wn.2d 849, 64 P.3d 1226 (2003). We hold that these cases are not similarly situated to Jackson's. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Christopher, 153 Wn.2d 669, 686-87, 105 P.3d 976 (2005) (when evaluating proportionality, we analyze whether the recommended sanction is proper when compared to similarly situated cases). In Holcomb, we approved the Board's recommendation of a six-month suspension for two counts of misconduct where the presumptive sanction was suspension. In Greenlee, we approved the Board's recommendation of a six-month suspension for one violation of RPC 1.8(h) where the presumptive sanction was suspension. And in McKean, we approved the Board's six-month suspension recommendation for misconduct 38 No. 201,017-2 involving a business transaction with a client and loans of client funds, and where the presumptive sanction for two of the three counts was suspension. None of these cases is remotely similar to Jackson's. Here, we have fourteen counts of misconduct, 10 of which carry a presumptive sanction of disbarment. Notably, none of the above cases concerns fraud, deceit, and abuse of the legal process demonstrating a lawyer's unfitness to practice law. Given the pervasive misconduct in this case, we find that disbarment is a proportionate sanction. Moreover, the Board's unanimous sanction recommendation is entitled to great deference. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Day, 162 Wn.2d 527, 538, 542, 173 P.3d 915 (2007). Jackson has provided no reason for us to reject the sanction. Poole, 156 Wn.2d at 209-10 (we generally affirm the Board's recommended sanction unless there is specific reason to reject it).