Opinion ID: 4187625
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Federal Ex Post Facto Claim

Text: We lead with appellant’s federal claim in part because we recognize the General Assembly enacted SORNA in response to federal legislation. We also recognize the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Smith—which arose out of a federal ex post facto challenge—guides our analysis. The United States Constitution provides: “No State shall ... pass any … ex post facto Law. ...” U.S. CONST. art I §10. Our decision regarding violation of this clause depends on a determination of whether SORNA’s retroactive application to appellant constitutes punishment. Accordingly, we apply the two-part analysis employed in Smith and Williams II. We first consider whether the General Assembly’s “intent was to impose punishment, and, if not, whether the statutory scheme is nonetheless so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the legislature’s non-punitive intent.” Williams II, 832 A.2d at 971. If we find the General Assembly intended to enact a civil scheme, we then must determine whether the law is punitive in effect by considering the Mendoza-Martinez factors. Id. at 972. We recognize only the “clearest proof” may establish that a law is punitive in effect. Lee, [J-121B-2016] - 27 935 A.2d at 876-77. Furthermore, in determining whether a statute is civil or punitive, we must examine the law’s entire statutory scheme. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
Appellant contends although SORNA’s stated purpose is to protect the public, the real intent of the General Assembly is to punish offenders. Appellant’s Brief at 9. Appellant buttresses this argument by claiming SORNA’s statement of purpose implicates “sexual offenders” who are classified solely by their criminal record rather than the class of “sexually violent predators” to whom the former Megan’s Law statutes applied, and which required an individualized determination of SVP status. Id. at 11. Appellant also points out SORNA is entirely codified under the sentencing section of Pennsylvania’s Crimes Code. Id. at 12-13. Finally, appellant argues, SORNA vests administrative authority, not with a public safety department, but with the Pennsylvania State Police, a traditional enforcer of criminal laws, and failure to comply with SORNA results in arrest. Id. at 13-14. The Commonwealth concedes SORNA is broader in application than previous Megan’s Law statutes, but nevertheless insists the statutes do not differ in purpose, as SORNA explicitly provides the registration requirements shall not be construed as punitive. Commonwealth’s Brief at 15-16, citing 42 Pa.C.S. §9799.11(b)(2). The Commonwealth further contends since the statutory language regarding purpose is unambiguous further interpretation of legislative intent should be avoided. Id. at 16. “In applying the first element of this test, the sole question is whether the General Assembly’s intent was to punish.” Williams II, 823 A.2d at 971. This is a question of statutory construction and “[w]e must consider the statute’s text and its structure to determine the legislative objective.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 92, citing Flemming v. Nestor, [J-121B-2016] - 28 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960). Furthermore, “considerable deference must be afforded to the intent as the legislature has stated it.” Id. at 93. The General Assembly specifically stated SORNA “provides a mechanism for the Commonwealth to increase its regulation of sexual offenders in a manner which is nonpunitive but offers an increased measure of protection to the citizens of this Commonwealth.” 42 Pa.C.S §9799.11(a)(2). The statute further states “the exchange of relevant information about sexual offenders ... [is] a means of assuring public protection and shall not be construed as punitive.” 42 Pa.C.S. §9799.11(b)(2). Furthermore, the first listed purpose of SORNA is “[t]o bring the Commonwealth into substantial compliance with the [federal] Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006.” 42 Pa.C.S. §9799.10(1). Nothing in the expressed purpose, legislative findings, or declaration of policy of SORNA explicitly states the legislature intended the law to do anything other than create a remedial civil scheme to comply with federal legislation and protect the public. At the same time, we recognize the following aspects of SORNA are troubling and actually cast doubt on the stated legislative intent: the act encompasses a much broader class of offenders than Megan’s Law II, and includes relatively minor offenses within its net; the act is codified within the sentencing section of the Crimes Code; and the acts vests regulatory authority with the state police. However, we note the fact SORNA encompasses a broad class of offenders is a reflection of the legislature’s intent to comply with federal sex offender laws for funding purposes. Furthermore, Megan’s Law II was also codified completely within the Crimes Code and also vested regulatory authority in the state police. As such, we recognize the General Assembly’s intent in enacting SORNA apparently was twofold: to comply with federal law; and, as we stated in Williams II, “not to punish, but to promote public safety through a civil, regulatory scheme.” Williams II, 832 A.2d at 972. [J-121B-2016] - 29
As we have determined the intent of the General Assembly was to enact a civil scheme, we now conduct an analysis of the Mendoza-Martinez factors to determine whether SORNA is sufficiently punitive in effect to overcome the General Assembly’s stated nonpunitive purpose. Williams II, 832 A.2d at 971. i. Whether the Statute Involves an Affirmative Disability or Restraint Appellant argues this factor weighs in favor of finding SORNA punitive as SORNA differs from the Alaska statute upheld in Smith by requiring quarterly in-person appearances and in-person appearances for any updates to an offender’s information. Appellant contends even if he never changes his name, residence, employment, phone number, car, or e-mail address, or goes on vacation, he still must appear a minimum of 100 times over twenty-five years, and for the rest of his life. Appellant’s Brief at 18, citing 42 Pa.C.S. §9799.15. PACDL contends not only does SORNA impose major, direct disabilities and restraints such as in-person reporting and updating requirements that were not present in the statutes analyzed in Smith or Williams II, but it also imposes extraordinary secondary disabilities in finding and keeping housing, employment, and schooling, traveling out of state, and increases the likelihood the offender may be subject to violence and adverse social and psychological impacts. PACDL’s Brief at 4345. The Commonwealth responds by arguing although it is true the Alaska statute did not contain in-person reporting requirements, the Smith Court gave great weight to the fact Alaska’s statute did “not restrain activities sex offenders may pursue but leaves them free to change jobs or residences.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 19, quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 100. The Commonwealth further argues our Superior Court, in [J-121B-2016] - 30 Commonwealth v. Woodruff, 135 A.3d 1045 (Pa. Super. 2016), noted the Williams II Court found monthly counseling sessions, which seem more onerous than SORNA’s quarterly in-person reporting requirements, did not impose an affirmative disability or restraint under Megan’s Law II. Commonwealth’s Brief at 20, citing Woodruff, 135 A.3d at 1052-53. Although the Commonwealth acknowledges the Woodruff panel ultimately found this factor weighed in favor of finding SORNA’s scheme to be punitive, the Commonwealth nevertheless contends this Court, in light of its prior holding regarding monthly counseling sessions in Williams II, should find this factor to weigh in favor of determining SORNA is nonpunitive. Commonwealth’s Brief at 22. We are substantially aligned with appellant as to this factor. The Smith Court found the Alaska statute did not involve an affirmative disability or restraint partly due to the fact it does not require in-person updates. Smith, 538 U.S. at 102. We hold this distinction from SORNA is important. See, e.g., Perez, 97 A.3d at 753-54 (noting Alaska statute did not require in-person updates and distinguishing SORNA where Perez, a Tier II SORNA offender, was affirmatively required to report fifty times over twenty-five-year period). As stated, appellant, who was retroactively required to register as a Tier III offender under SORNA, is now required to appear in person at a registration site four times a year, a minimum of 100 times over the next twenty-five years, extending for the remainder of his life. See 42 Pa.C.S §9799.15(e)(3). In fact, this is the minimum number of times appellant will have to appear in person, and does not account for the times he must appear due to his “free” choices including “moving to a new address or changing his appearance[.]”18 See 42 Pa.C.S. §9799.15(g); Perez, 97 18 We are cognizant that restrictions on housing also arise from different statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. §13663(a), which prohibits Tier III offenders, like appellant, from residing in federally subsidized housing. [J-121B-2016] - 31 A.3d at 754. Furthermore, a homeless offender, referred to in the statute as a “transient,” is required to appear in person monthly, a minimum of 300 times over twenty-five years. See 42 Pa.C.S. §9799.15(h)(1). The Commonwealth’s argument the Williams II Court found more onerous monthly counseling sessions for sexually violent predators were not an affirmative disability or restraint is unpersuasive. The Williams II Court based its decision partly on the fact the counseling sessions requirement was designed to “assist the sexually violent predator, who is likely to be impulsive, irresponsible and burdened with poor behavioral controls, from relapsing into sexually predatory behavior.” Williams II, 832 A.2d at 975 (footnote omitted). Under SORNA, where there has been no finding that individuals subject to the in-person registration requirements are sexually violent predators, subject to needed counseling, the inperson appearances do not constitute counseling in any event. Thus, the reasoning on this point in Williams II simply does not apply. As such, we find the in-person reporting requirements, for both verification and changes to an offender’s registration, to be a direct restraint upon appellant and hold this factor weighs in favor of finding SORNA’s effect to be punitive. ii. Whether the Sanction Has Been Historically Regarded as Punishment Appellant also contends the requirements of SORNA closely parallel historical forms of punishment such as probation and parole since the in-person reporting requirements are similar to meeting with a probation officer, and sex offenders also have a reduced expectation of privacy under the statute. Appellant’s Brief at 19-20, citing 42 Pa.C.S. §9799.11(a)(5). Appellant notes this is a distinct difference from the Alaska statute at issue in Smith where the High Court rejected such an argument on the basis the Alaska statute contained no mandatory conditions comparable to probation. [J-121B-2016] - 32 Appellant’s Brief at 19, citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 101. PACDL posits the stated purpose of both probation and SORNA is to promote public safety, both rest on the assumption the individual requires supervision, both are imposed by the trial court at the time of sentencing and are part of the Sentencing Code, both require regular, in-person appearances, and both probationers and registrants must comply or face sanctions. PACDL’s Brief at 46-47.19 PACDL also contends SORNA is similar to shaming punishments and has been recognized as such by other jurisdictions. PACDL argues historical shaming punishments involved the public disclosure of similar information about offenders and SORNA’s declaration that all registrants are “sex offenders” and “high risk” is akin to a scarlet letter which the offender has no mechanism to dispute. Id. at 47-48. The Commonwealth contends although SORNA registration may be like some probationary terms, probation takes many forms and can be much more burdensome than SORNA’s requirements. Commonwealth’s Brief at 24. The Commonwealth also argues should the Court find this factor weighs in favor of finding SORNA punitive, the factor should be given little weight as probation is the least onerous and newest form of traditional punishment. Id. at 23-25, citing Woodruff, 135 A.3d at 1055. The Commonwealth also contends registration is not similar to shaming as the public display is not for the purpose of ridicule, but instead to inform the public for its own safety. Commonwealth’s Brief at 25-26, citing Kammerer v. State, 322 P.3d 827, 835-36 (Wyo. 2014). 19 PACDL also notes other jurisdictions have held sex offender registration laws are similar to probation. PACDL’s Brief at 46, citing Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Serv., 62 A.3d 123 (Md. 2013); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009); Doe, 189 P.3d 999. [J-121B-2016] - 33 The United States Supreme Court has distinguished colonial-era public shaming punishments from sex offender registration laws by noting public shaming “involved more than the dissemination of information” but also “held the person up before his fellow citizens for face-to-face shaming or expelled him from the community.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 98. The Smith Court found the sex offender information disseminated through the Alaska statute is accurate and, for the most part, already public. Id. The Court noted the publicity may cause embarrassment or ostracism for the convicted, but found “the publicity and resulting stigma [is not] an integral part of the objective of the regulatory scheme.” Id. at 99. The Court also stated the fact the information is posted on the internet did not alter its conclusion since the intent of the posting is to inform the public for its own safety, the website itself does not provide the public with a means to shame the offender, and members of the public must affirmatively seek out the information. Id. As stated above, we recognize the significance of the Smith Court’s decision with regard to its analysis of the Alaska statute. However, Smith was decided in an earlier