Opinion ID: 4566580
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: Threshold Issue: Is Declaratory Judgment Action Proper? Much of Cain’s argument in this appeal is focused on his contention that our opinion in Cain II determined the actual value of his property for 2012 but the Assessor has incorrectly recorded that number as the taxable value. He contends that the district court could and should have remedied this problem by issuing an order declaring the correct meaning of Cain II. The district court, however, determined that before it could grant the relief Cain requested, it was required to determine whether it was proper to enter a declaratory judgment in this case. The district court was correct to begin with that question, and our analysis must begin there as well. Cain argues that the district court erred by finding that he was making an impermissible collateral attack on the TERC’s February 27, 2018, order and by finding that his “proper remedy” was to appeal that order. He argues that an appeal of the February 27 order would have been premature. According to Cain, up until the time that the Assessor made it clear that taxes would be levied based on a taxable value of $951,719.10, he was not aggrieved because, he claims, it was not clear until then that the Assessor would follow the TERC’s February 27 order rather than Cain’s understanding of our opinion in Cain II. Cain also argues that he could not have appealed because the TERC did not provide him or his counsel with a copy of the February 27 order. We find that is not necessary for us to decide whether Cain was making an impermissible collateral attack on the TERC’s February 27, 2018, order or whether he was precluded from seeking declaratory relief because he failed to take advantage of an available appeal. We reach this conclusion because even if we assume that Cain is correct that he was not making an impermissible collateral attack on the TERC order and that he could not have timely appealed it, we still find that the - 828 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports CAIN v. LYMBER Cite as 306 Neb. 820 district court correctly declined to enter a declaratory judgment. We explain our reasoning below. Another Serviceable Remedy: Application for Writ of Mandamus. This declaratory judgment action was initiated pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,150 (Reissue 2016), a provision within the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, which provides: Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. [4,5] Although declaratory judgment actions are permitted by statute, our cases have held that there are some circumstances in which a declaratory judgment is not available. We have said that the function of a declaratory judgment is to determine justiciable controversies which either are not yet ripe for adjudication by conventional forms of remedy or, for other reasons, are not conveniently amenable to the usual remedies. Ryder Truck Rental v. Rollins, 246 Neb. 250, 518 N.W.2d 124 (1994). Thus, we have noted that an action for declaratory judgment will not lie where another equally serv­iceable remedy is available. Galyen v. Balka, 253 Neb. 270, 570 N.W.2d 519 (1997). See, also, Sandoval v. Ricketts, 302 Neb. 138, 922 N.W.2d 222 (2019) (affirming dismissal of declaratory judgment action on ground that equally serviceable remedies were available for plaintiffs). We have also said that a court should enter a declaratory judgment only where such judgment would terminate or resolve the controversy between the parties. Hoiengs v. County of Adams, 245 Neb. 877, 516 N.W.2d 223 (1994). See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,154 (Reissue 2016). - 829 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports CAIN v. LYMBER Cite as 306 Neb. 820 Even assuming that Cain’s declaratory judgment action was not an impermissible collateral attack and that he could not have appealed the TERC’s February 27, 2018, order, we believe these principles would still preclude declaratory relief. As we will explain, Cain had another serviceable remedy: an application for a writ of mandamus. [6] Mandamus is a law action and is defined as an extraordinary remedy, not a writ of right, issued to compel the perform­ ance of a purely ministerial act or duty, imposed by law upon an inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, where (1) the relator has a clear right to the relief sought, (2) there is a corresponding clear duty existing on the part of the respondent to perform the act, and (3) there is no other plain and adequate remedy in the course of the law. See Huff v. Brown, 305 Neb. 648, 941 N.W.2d 515 (2020). While an extraordinary remedy, we believe that in this situation, a writ of mandamus issued to the TERC was not just equally serviceable, but a superior remedy to Cain’s action for declaratory judgment. [7-9] Cain alleges in his declaratory judgment complaint that the TERC did not adhere to our mandate in Cain II. Assuming Cain’s reading of Cain II is correct, the TERC had a ministerial duty to comply with that reading. The general rule is that an act or duty is ministerial only if there is an absolute duty to perform in a specified manner upon the existence of certain facts. State ex rel. Parks v. Council of City of Omaha, 277 Neb. 919, 766 N.W.2d 134 (2009). Compliance with an appellate mandate meets this test. Our cases hold that an inferior tribunal lacks any authority to take actions contrary to an appellate mandate. We have said that a lower court has an unqualified duty to follow the mandate issued by an appellate court and must enter judgment in conformity with the opinion and judgment of the appellate court. See State v. Payne, 298 Neb. 373, 904 N.W.2d 275 (2017). We have also said that no judgment or order different from, or in addition to, the appellate mandate can have any effect. Id. For essentially the same reasons, if Cain is right about our opinion in Cain II, he - 830 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports CAIN v. LYMBER Cite as 306 Neb. 820 would have a clear right to have the February 27, 2018, order of the TERC modified, and the TERC would have a clear duty to modify it. This leaves only the question of whether there is some other plain and adequate remedy in the course of the law. For the purposes of this analysis, we are already assuming that Cain could not have appealed the February 27, 2018, order, so we need not consider whether that is a plain and adequate remedy that would preclude mandamus relief. A question remains, however, as to whether the declaratory judgment action Cain filed is a plain and adequate remedy that would bar mandamus relief or if mandamus is an equally serviceable remedy that bars the declaratory judgment action. On this question, we acknowledge that some Nebraska cases have held in other contexts that parties could not seek mandamus relief because declaratory relief was available. See, e.g., State ex rel. PROUD v. Conley, 236 Neb. 122, 459 N.W.2d 222 (1990); Larson v. City of Omaha, 226 Neb. 751, 415 N.W.2d 115 (1987). But it has also been held in other circumstances that a writ of mandamus was available because declaratory relief was inferior to mandamus relief. See, e.g., Dozler v. Conrad, 3 Neb. App. 735, 532 N.W.2d 42 (1995). For multiple reasons, we believe mandamus is also a superior remedy to declaratory judgment in this situation. First, we are mindful of mandamus writs’ long history in this state as the remedy traditionally used to correct an inferior tribunal’s misconstruing of an appellate mandate in the absence of any other remedy. See, e.g., State v. Dickinson, 63 Neb. 869, 89 N.W. 431 (1902); State v. Norris, 61 Neb. 461, 85 N.W. 435 (1901); State v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 60 Neb. 232, 82 N.W. 850 (1900). We are aware of nothing in the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act suggesting actions for declaratory judgments supplanted mandamus as the traditional remedy in this situation. Indeed, we note that courts in several other states have concluded that statutes authorizing courts to enter declaratory - 831 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports CAIN v. LYMBER Cite as 306 Neb. 820 judgments did not supplant the traditional function of the writ of mandamus. For example, in State ex rel. Edmisten v. Tucker, 312 N.C. 326, 323 S.E.2d 294 (1984), the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of an action that essentially sought to obtain review of lower court decisions regarding the constitutionality of a statute through a declaratory judgment action. It explained that North Carolina’s declaratory judgment statute “may not be used to obtain review of lower court rulings” and that the “remedies for those rare instances of judicial abuse and derogation of duty, or for actions taken which are outside the authority of the judge, or for failure to perform a ministerial duty of the office remain the extraordinary writs of mandamus or prohibition.” Id. at 356, 323 S.E.2d at 313. See, also, State ex rel. King v. Lyons, 149 N.M. 330, 338, 248 P.3d 878, 886 (2011) (reading prior case to hold that “declaratory judgment actions are not intended to substitute for remedies such as mandamus”); Mitchell v. Hammond, 252 Ala. 81, 39 So. 2d 582 (1949) (concluding declaratory judgment could not be used as substitute for mandamus); Molnar v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm., 79 Ohio App. 3d 318, 320, 607 N.E.2d 112, 114 (1992) (“[a]n action for declaratory judgment is not a substitute for an action in mandamus”). Further, we believe a writ of mandamus to the TERC would be more effective at resolving the parties’ dispute than the declaratory judgment Cain sought. As we have noted, Cain requested an order from the district court declaring that in Cain II, we determined that $951,719.10 was the actual value of his property for the 2012 tax year and an order directing the Assessor to use that amount as the actual value in calculating the taxable value. Even if the district court granted the relief Cain sought, the Assessor might be uncertain about what should be done next. The Assessor would have a district court order declaring that our opinion in Cain II requires that $951,719.10 be recorded as the actual value, but the Assessor would also still have an order from the TERC ordering that $951,719.10 be recorded as the taxable value. Moreover, - 832 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports CAIN v. LYMBER Cite as 306 Neb. 820 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1311(3) (Reissue 2018), a provision within a statute setting forth the duties of county assessors, states that county assessors shall “[o]bey all . . . orders sent out by the [TERC].” Even a successful declaratory judgment action would thus run the risk of leading to uncertainty rather than resolving it. See Hoiengs v. County of Adams, 245 Neb. 877, 899, 516 N.W.2d 223, 239 (1994) (“a court should enter a declaratory judgment only where such judgment would terminate or resolve the controversy between the parties”); Dozler v. Conrad, 3 Neb. App. 735, 743, 532 N.W.2d 42, 49 (1995) (concluding mandamus was superior remedy to declaratory judgment because declaratory judgment “would only be the first step” to obtaining the relief sought). If, on the other hand, Cain obtained a writ of mandamus directing the TERC to modify its order to conform to his understanding of our opinion in Cain II, all would be clear. The TERC would be obligated to modify its order, and the Assessor would be obligated to follow the TERC’s modified order. For these reasons, we conclude that, even assuming Cain is correct that his declaratory judgment action was not an impermissible collateral attack on the February 27, 2018, TERC order and that he could not have appealed the TERC’s order, another serviceable remedy was available to him. The district court thus did not err in dismissing his declaratory judgment action. Dismissal of the TERC as Party. [10] Cain also assigned as error that the district court erred by dismissing the TERC from the declaratory judgment action. He makes clear, however, that this error was only assigned as a precautionary measure and argues only that the dismissal of the TERC should be reversed if we determine the presence of the TERC was necessary to grant Cain the relief requested. Because our disposition of this appeal does not depend on the district court’s dismissal of the TERC, it is not necessary for us - 833 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports CAIN v. LYMBER Cite as 306 Neb. 820 to decide whether that decision was correct. An appellate court is not obligated to engage in an analysis that is not necessary to adjudicate the case and controversy before it. Seldin v. Estate of Silverman, 305 Neb. 185, 939 N.W.2d 768 (2020).