Opinion ID: 187075
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Critical Errors During Appellant's Trial

Text: Although the NPS regulations are not facially unconstitutional for want of a mens rea requirement, the Government proceeded with the prosecution of appellant on the erroneous premise that the regulations imposed strict liability. As noted above, the Magistrate Judge, in response to the prosecutor's objections, prevented appellant and her co-defendants from offering evidence of their intent and knowledge. In addition, when appellant's trial counsel moved for acquittal at the end of the Government's case, the prosecutor stated that [t]he issue of whether or not the Defendants were notified of the existence or nonexistence of a permit is not apposite. Trial Tr. (11/17/05) at 50. And in her closing rebuttal, the prosecutor reiterated that notice about the existence of the permit or lack of a permit is not an element and not a defense of this violation. Id. at 130; see also id. at 122. These arguments by the prosecutor were erroneous. Although a mistake of law on appellant's part may not have been a worthy defense, this did not relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove her mens rea, i.e., what appellant knew, heard, and intended on the day in question. The Government incorrectly proceeded on the basis that mens rea was not an element of the offense, and successfully objected to appellant's attempts to offer evidence of her knowledge and intent. It is also clear that the findings of the Magistrate Judge were premised on the erroneous view that the NPS regulations imposed strict liability. In his written opinion, the Magistrate Judge failed to mention any mens rea element when discussing the Government's burden of proof, stating instead that [i]n order to sustain a charge of protesting without a permit, the Government must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendants did not, in fact, have a permit to demonstrate on the sidewalk directly in front of the White House. Allen, Mag.Crim. No. 05-00649 at 4. The Magistrate Judge committed two legal errors. First, in allowing the Government to prosecute the case against Ms. Sheehan on the erroneous premise that the disputed regulations imposed strict liability, the Magistrate Judge eliminated the prosecutor's burden of proving mens rea. This was a serious constitutional error: The prosecution's burden of proving all elements of the offense charged and obligation to persuade the factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt of the facts necessary to establish each of those elements arise from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, in preventing appellant from presenting a defense on the mens rea issue, the Magistrate Judge denied her the right to procedural fairness. The Supreme Court has made it clear that [w]hether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. . . . [A]n essential component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Given these well-established constitutional protections, it cannot be doubted that the Magistrate Judge's rulings in this case were erroneous. During oral argument before this court, Government counsel did not contest that error was committed. Rather, the Government argued that the Magistrate Judge's errors should be excused as harmless. We disagree. The Government was allowed to prosecute appellant for a crime that does not exist, and appellant was denied a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. For the reasons set forth below, we cannot hold these errors harmless.