Opinion ID: 740526
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The due process claim considered

Text: 21 Even if we were to suppose that Moffat had not waived the due process argument, Moffat's claim would fail. We agree with Moffat I that, without a showing of something else--something possibly sinister--there is nothing suspicious about the son of the trier of fact, who is an assistant State's Attorney, conversing with the prosecutor, defense counsel, and his father. Moffat I, 148 Ill.Dec. at 59, 560 N.E.2d at 361. True, the son, Francis Mahon, Jr., was a prosecutor, but that is a far cry from his necessarily being a party (as in ex parte). Assigned to the arson unit, the son had nothing to do with Moffat's prosecution. The son was visiting the sex crimes trial of a Chicago high school principal, formerly deputy head for all Chicago public schools. Media attention was intense. His father was the presiding judge. His ex-boss was the defense counsel. Under these circumstances, we find no hint that the courtroom to-and-fro of Francis, Jr. raises due process concerns. And where we find no such hint of a constitutional delict, it does not matter which § 2254 standard we employ, be it old or new. 22 The matter of the nighttime chat is less readily resolved. Moffat II ruled that [n]o evidence suggests that during the conversation with his son, the trial judge spoke about the merits of defendant's pending post-trial motion, Moffat II, 201 Ill.Dec. at 879, 637 N.E.2d at 468, and the district court agreed. We cannot follow their appraisal. On our understanding of what the merits means, the trial judge did touch upon the merits with his son. We take Moffat II and the district court as suggesting that the trial judge did not ask his son how to rule on the motion. We presume this to be true. But the merits of an issue should not be so narrowly defined. Moffat had challenged Francis, Jr.'s conduct and what it implied; Judge Mahon asked his son what his conduct had been. This impromptu inquiry into the validity of Moffat's claims necessarily enmeshed the merits of the pending motion. What else would have been the point of the nighttime chat? (Judge Plunkett recognized as much when he wrote that the judge's initiative in speaking to his son concerning his activities in the courtroom was not the best way to go about this investigation.) 23 Yet we agree with the district court and with Moffat II that nothing in the evidence suggests that the trial judge was somehow influenced by the ex parte communication. Moffat II, 201 Ill.Dec. at 879, 637 N.E.2d at 468. Moffat's motion for a new trial had alleged that Francis, Jr.'s presence revealed prosecutorial and even judicial misconduct. So Judge Mahon asked his son about it, and his son said he'd talked more to Moffat's own lawyer (and his former boss) than to the prosecution. Both the district court and Moffat II found no prejudice. An innocuous story, we concur, from what we know. 24 Moffat says this is circular reasoning. Of course these reviewing courts found no prejudice, because they had to rely solely on what the trial judge said from the bench. Moffat has a point here, at least in logic. Francis, Jr., was never put on the stand; nor was his father, who settled the matter by dismissing the motion. Moffat hence at no time examined either of the nighttime conversants. 25 Yet he never sought to. This omission is important, because we think it was the defense counsel's obligation to inquire further. This must be so, at least in the absence of a genuine reason to suspect that the trial judge was biased against the defendant. At oral argument before this court, Moffat's counsel was asked whether Moffat's trial attorney had made any effort to develop the facts of the nighttime talk, perhaps through an evidentiary hearing. The answer was no. But that should not matter, counsel said, for Moffat should not bear the burden of showing that the allegedly ex parte communications were to his prejudice. 26 We cannot agree. If not the defendant's burden, whose would it be? The prosecution's? Certainly not. The trial judge's? We think not as well. We do not suppose that the Constitution--and that must be the source of Moffat's argument, if he has one-requires the trial judge to investigate sua sponte and at length a challenge to his integrity. As a practical matter, such a requirement would make little sense. Suppose some evidence of judicial mischief did exist. Would a defense lawyer leave the investigation to the very judge tainted with suspicion? Surely the defense counsel would seek to take hold of the investigation herself. 27 We find no violation under either the pre- or post-amended § 2254. Even if Moffat had not waived his federal due process claim, we conclude under the old § 2254 standard that he had no viable claim to begin with. It follows that he fails under the more stringent standards of the 1996 amendments.