Opinion ID: 11168
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Response to Jury's Question

Text: 36 The appellant argues the trial court committed reversible error in responding to the jury's question during deliberations regarding the defense of duress. Our standard for evaluating responses to jury questions was set forth in United States v. Stevens, 38 F.3d 167 (5th Cir.1994): When evaluating the adequacy of supplemental jury instructions, we ask whether the court's answer was reasonably responsive to the jury's question and whether the original and supplemental instructions as a whole allowed the jury to understand the issue presented to it. Id. at 170 (citing United States v. Natale, 764 F.2d 1042, 1046 (5th Cir.1985)). 37 The trial judge had instructed the jury prior to deliberations as follows: 38 It is the theory of the defense in this case that although Gerald Harris may have committed the acts charged in the indictment, he did not do so voluntarily, but only because of force or cohesion in the form of intimidation and threats of bodily harm to himself or his family. 39 As you have already been instructed[,] intent is an essential element of the crime charged in the indictment, and acts done involuntarily because of cohesion are not done intentionally. In order to excuse an act that would otherwise be criminal, however, the intimidation or cohesion must be (1) present and immediate, and (2) must be of such a nature that it induces a reasonable and well-founded fear of death or serious bodily injury to one's self or someone else; and (3) there must be no reasonable opportunity to escape from cohesion without participating in the crime. 40 (R. 13 at 108-09). During deliberations, the jury submitted a note stating the following: 41 One of our group has brought up the consideration that the fear of death/serious bodily injury could have been perceived as lasting after the opportunity to escape. Therefore, that fear would be enough to excuse participation in the crime. After the escape--meaning fear of retaliation against self/family from Steven Thomas or any of his friends. 42 (R.14 at 3). 43 After consulting with counsel for all sides, the trial judge elected to simply refer the jury back to its original instruction. The appellant's counsel agreed with the trial court's decision. (R. 14 at 5). Thus the decision to refer the jury to the original instruction is reviewed only for plain error. United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1266, 131 L.Ed.2d 145 (1995). 44 To justify an instruction on duress, a defendant must show 1) he was under an unlawful, present, imminent and impending threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily injury; 2) he had not recklessly or negligently placed himself in such a situation; 3) he had no reasonable legal alternative to violating the law; and 4) there is a direct causal relationship between the criminal action taken and the avoidance of threatened harm. United States v. Harvey, 897 F.2d 1300, 1304-05 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1003, 111 S.Ct. 568, 112 L.Ed.2d 574 (1990), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Lambert, 984 F.2d 658 (5th Cir.1993). Applying these elements to the instant case, we find that the original instruction adequately stated the necessary elements of a duress defense. 9 45 The jury's question in this case focused on the temporal factor of a duress defense, i.e., whether a duress defense was justified if the defendant was under a threat of harm which could occur after the opportunity to escape. The original instruction that the threat must be present and immediate was a correct statement of Fifth Circuit law on the point of the jury's inquiry. Thus the trial court's response was reasonably responsive to the jury's question, and the instructions as a whole allowed the jury to understand the issue presented to it. United States v. Stevens, 38 F.3d at 170. There was no plain error.