Opinion ID: 1873410
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: proper method of appeal and standard of review for district court

Text: The primary issue presented in this appeal is the proper procedure and standard of review for an appeal of a denial of a conditional use permit by a county board of commissioners. Olmer claims that the proper method of appeal and standard of review is set forth in § 25-1937, which requires the district court to conduct a trial de novo upon the issues made up by the pleadings in the district court. The Board contends, however, that because it acted in a judicial manner in denying Olmer's application, Olmer's exclusive mode of appeal was through the filing of a petition in error under § 25-1901. In Mogensen v. Board of Supervisors , [1] we were asked to determine the proper procedure for appealing a denial of a conditional use permit by a board of supervisors. In that case, the county board of supervisors denied an application for a conditional use permit. The applicant filed a petition in error in the district court. The district court affirmed the board of supervisors' decision. On appeal to this court, we concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the applicant's filing of a petition in error did not properly perfect the appeal. In reaching this conclusion, we noted that the Nebraska Court of Appeals, in Niewohner v. Antelope Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, [2] had addressed a similar issue and had concluded that under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 23-168.03 (Reissue 1997), an appeal of a denial of a conditional use permit by the county board of supervisors must be made to the board of adjustment. We agreed with the Court of Appeals and concluded that the appeal procedure in Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 23-168.01 to 23-168.04 (Reissue 1997) foreclosed the ability to appeal a decision of the board of supervisors to the district court through a petition in error under § 25-1901. [3] We explained that by adopting a specific method for appeal, the Legislature provided for an appeal specifically outside of the petition in error and that therefore, an appeal from a board of supervisors denying a conditional use permit is to be taken in accordance with §§ 23-168.01 to 23-168.04 and not by a petition in error. [4] And because the applicant did not file an appeal with the board of adjustment, the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear his appeal on a petition in error. In response to the circumstances presented in Mogensen and Niewohner, the Legislature, in 2004, amended Neb.Rev. Stat. § 23-114.01(5) (Reissue 1997) by adding the following language: An appeal of a decision by the county planning commission or county board of commissioners or supervisors regarding a conditional use or special exception shall be made to the district court. [5] With the addition of this language, the statute is now clear that contrary to the Court of Appeals' opinion in Niewohner and our decision in Mogensen, appeals from a planning commission, county board, or board of supervisors are not to be made to the board of adjustment. Instead, these appeals are now taken directly to the district court. At issue in this case is the effect that this language now has on Olmer's mode of appeal and the district court's standard of review. Olmer argues that by amending § 23-114.01(5), the Legislature has conferred a right to appeal, but has failed to prescribe the proper procedure for doing so. As a result, Olmer claims that the method of appeal and standard of review is determined by § 25-1937. This section provides in relevant part that [w]hen the Legislature enacts a law providing for an appeal without providing the procedure therefor, the procedure for appeal to the district court shall be the same as for appeals from the county court to the district court in civil actions. Trial in the district court shall be de novo upon the issues made up by the pleadings in the district court. The Board, however, argues that § 25-1937 does not apply when a board or tribunal appealed from is exercising judicial functions. The Board claims that when a board or tribunal exercises judicial functions, a petition in error is the exclusive remedy for those seeking review of the board's decision. And because the Board in the instant case acted judicially, Olmer's only method of review was by way of a petition in error. The procedures governing reviews on petitions in error are found in Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 25-1901 to 25-1908 (Reissue 1995 & Supp.2007). Section 25-1901 provides, in relevant part, that a judgment rendered or final order made by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions and inferior in jurisdiction to the district court may be reversed, vacated, or modified by the district court. And § 25-1903 states that [t]he proceedings to obtain such reversal, vacation or modification shall be by petition entitled petition in error, filed in a court having power to make such reversal, vacation or modification, setting forth the errors complained of.... In reviewing a decision based on a petition in error, an appellate court determines whether the inferior tribunal acted within its jurisdiction and whether the decision rendered is supported by sufficient relevant evidence. [6] When making this determination, an appellate court is restricted to the record created before the lower tribunal. [7] We agree with the Board that by receiving exhibits, hearing testimony, and reaching a decision based on that testimony, it exercised judicial functions. [8] We are not, however, persuaded by the Board's argument that because it exercised judicial functions, Olmer's sole method of appeal was through a petition in error. In a similar case, Moser v. Turner, [9] we addressed the question whether an appeal from a decision of the county superintendent must be made by a petition in error under § 25-1901, or whether an appeal could be had under § 25-1937. In that case, two petitions in error were filed in the district court seeking review of the decisions of two county superintendents regarding the dissolution and annexation of certain school districts. Separate trials were held in the district court, and the cases were combined for appeal. On appeal to this court, the appellants argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction because proceedings in error could not be taken from the decision of the county superintendent. The appellants claimed that the exclusive method of appeal was under § 25-1937. We explained that the right to appeal was set forth in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 79-402 (Reissue 1966), which provided that `any person adversely affected by the changes made by the county superintendent may appeal to the district court of any county in which the real estate, or any part thereof, involved in the dispute is located.' [10] We noted, however, that § 79-402 did not provide a method of appeal. We explained that under § 25-1937, where a statute provides for an appeal without setting forth the procedure therefor, the appeal shall be the same as appeals from county court to district court in civil actions. [11] We also acknowledged that [t]his court has repeatedly held that where the county superintendents of schools act in a quasijudicial capacity, their decisions may be reviewed under section 25-1901 ... by petition in error.... [12] We reconciled these two procedures for acquiring review by explaining: There is nothing in section 79-402 ... or in section 25-1937 ... which purports to take away the right to proceed in error under section 25-1901.... Any person adversely affected by the changes made by a county superintendent pursuant to section 79-402 ... may proceed by appeal or by error pursuant to section 25-1901.... [13] Thus, we concluded that although the county superintendents performed quasi-judicial acts, review of their decisions could be had by petition in error under § 25-1901 or by appeal under § 25-1937. [14] Like the county superintendents in Moser, the Board in the present case, in denying Olmer's application, was exercising judicial functions which decisions are generally reviewed through the filing of a petition in error. [15] But § 23-114.01(5) clearly provides for a right of appeal to the district court from the Board's decision, without setting forth any procedure for prosecuting the appeal. Therefore, the appeal procedure in § 25-1937 is also implicated. [16] And there is nothing in § 23-114.01(5), nor in § 25-1937, that purports to remove the right to proceed in error under § 25-1901. Thus, we conclude that under the circumstances presented here, Olmer had the option of filing either a petition in error under § 25-1901 or an appeal under § 25-1937. Olmer, in his Petition on Appeal filed in the district court, specifically references § 25-1937 as his chosen method of appeal. Accordingly, the district court erred in treating Olmer's appeal as if it were a petition in error.