Opinion ID: 199884
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interest in reputation

Text: 50 Appellees assert another interest, which they claim serves as a valid basis for their due process claim: a liberty interest in their reputations. However, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976), held that damage to one's reputation alone does not trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 701, 96 S.Ct. 1155. Reputational harms must be attached to some other alteration in status in order to raise a valid due process claim. Id. at 711-12, 96 S.Ct. 1155. Appellees claim to satisfy this requirement by invoking the Puerto Rican Constitution. While the Puerto Rican Constitution does include a specific protection for reputation, see P.R. Const. art. II, § 8, we conclude that the Puerto Rican courts have not afforded greater protections to reputation than stateside jurisdictions. Furthermore, there is no indication that appellees have lost any legal rights because of the alleged defamation by government actors. Since appellees can point to no alteration in their legal status attached to any reputational injury, we hold that appellees have not asserted a constitutionally protected interest in their reputations. 51 Paul is very clear. There must be a legal alteration in plaintiff's position before the courts will recognize a procedural due process claim: 52 It is apparent from our decisions that there exists a variety of interests which are difficult of definition but are nevertheless comprehended within the meaning of either liberty or property as meant in the Due Process Clause. These interests attain this constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been initially recognized and protected by state law, and we have repeatedly ruled that the procedural guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment apply whenever the State seeks to remove or significantly alter that protected status. 53 Paul, 424 U.S. at 710-11, 96 S.Ct. 1155. The fact that a state accords protections to one's reputation by allowing one to bring a tort action does not create a legal status which is altered when the state is the alleged defamer. Id. at 711-12, 96 S.Ct. 1155. 54 The question presented here is whether the fact that Puerto Rico enshrines protection for reputation in its constitution creates a legal status which is altered when the Puerto Rican government allegedly defames one of its citizens. While this issue has arisen before, we have never had to decide it. See, e.g., Romero-Barceló, 75 F.3d at 33. 55 Based on the Supreme Court's decision in Paul, we have consistently held that the injury to reputation must be accompanied by a change in the injured person's status or rights (under substantive state or federal law). Beitzell v. Jeffrey, 643 F.2d 870, 878 (1st Cir.1981); see also Brennan v. Hendrigan, 888 F.2d 189, 195 (1st Cir. 1989) (reputational injury must coincide with some other `alteration of status' (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 709-10, 96 S.Ct. 1155)). We have termed this a defamation-plus test. Celia v. O'Malley, 918 F.2d 1017, 1021 (1st Cir.1990). One example of a successful defamation-plus claim is an allegation that a stigmatization has occurred in connection with a termination in employment. See Brennan, 888 F.2d at 196. Appellees have asserted nothing similar to this traditional plus factor. 56 Instead, they rely only on the assertion that Puerto Rico law creates a different regime. We have suggested that state law may broaden the liberty interests accorded due process protections. See Silva v. Worden, 130 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir.1997) (noting that Massachusetts may have a slightly broader conception of the liberty interests protected by due process). Therefore, it is conceivable that Puerto Rican law could accord a protected liberty interest in reputation without appellees needing to allege an additional deprivation. 57 The Puerto Rico Supreme Court has made clear that Puerto Rico's Constitution provides sweeping human rights protections: Our Constitution recognizes and grants some fundamental rights with a more global and protective vision than does the United States Constitution. López Vives v. Policia of P.R., 18 P.R. Offic. Trans. 264, 273, 1987 WL 448356 (1987). Furthermore, the Puerto Rico Constitution should be construed broadly in regard to these rights. Id. Despite these broad human rights protections, it does not necessarily follow that the Puerto Rican law protects reputation so broadly as to make it a protected liberty interest under the United States Constitution. To evaluate this question, it is necessary to look more closely at the protections Puerto Rico provides. 58 Puerto Rico law creates a right of action for defamation and libel in three separate sources. See Giménez Alvarez v. Silén Maldonado, 131 P.R. Dec. 91, 97-98, 1992 WL 754904 (1992). First, Article II, section 8 of the Puerto Rico Constitution provides, Every person has the right to the protection of law against abusive attacks on his honor, reputation and private or family life. This provision provides a right of action without enabling legislation. Porto v. Bentley P.R., Inc., 132 P.R. Dec. 331, 343, 1992 WL 754807 (1992). Second, the Libel and Slander Act of 1902 provides a right of action. 32 L.P.R.A. §§ 3141-49. This act draws from the common law tradition, Porto, 132 P.R. Dec. at 344 n. 8, and has been modified by pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court. See id. at 344-46. Third, there is a statutory right drawn from the Civil Code. 31 L.P.R.A. § 5141; see also Giménez Alvarez, 131 P.R. Dec. at 98. 59 In interpreting these various sources of law, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has explicitly said that Puerto Rico law on libel and slander follows the common law tradition. Villaneuva v. Hernández Class, 28 P.R. Offic. Trans. 618, 128 P.R. Dec. 618, 646, 1991 WL 735303 (1991) (Our libel and slander law — which follows the Anglo-Saxon common law....). Beyond this overt acknowledgment, the Puerto Rico courts frequently cite stateside jurisdictions when interpreting their laws protecting personal reputation. See, e.g., Porto, 132 P.R. Dec. at 349; Villaneuva, 128 P.R. Dec. at 647-48; González Martínez v. López, 18 P.R. Offic. Trans. 229, 236, 1987 WL 448359 (1987). Therefore, as currently developed by Puerto Rican courts, there is nothing that suggests that we should treat the protections accorded to reputation by Puerto Rico any more broadly than those granted in other United States jurisdictions. 60 Since the law in Puerto Rico appears to be no different, functionally, from the general common law protections for reputation, we cannot credit appellees' argument that reputation alone, in Puerto Rico, rises to a liberty interest accorded independent protection under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Therefore, appellees have failed to demonstrate a protected liberty interest in their reputation. 61