Opinion ID: 170929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Request for Downward Variance

Text: Following United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), we review sentences for reasonableness. United States v. Jarrillo-Luna, 478 F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir.2007). Rojas asserts the district court's sentence is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable based on the court's failure to take into account factors warranting a downward variance. This court begins by ensur[ing] that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as... failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence. Gall v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). This court follows with an inquiry into whether the ultimate sentence is reasonable in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d at 1114.
Rojas argues the district court erred by failing to address the substance of his non-frivolous grounds raised to support a downward variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). A sentencing court is required to state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c); see also Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. This requirement is a component of procedural reasonableness. United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 1173, 1175-76 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 319, 169 L.Ed.2d 225 (2007). When a defendant makes a non-frivolous argument for a below-Guidelines sentence, but receives a within-Guidelines sentence, the district court must provide the appellate court with a record by which this court can discern whether the district court considered the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Traxler, 477 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 254, 169 L.Ed.2d 186 (2007); see also Rita v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (explaining when parties raise nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence, ... the judge will normally go further and explain why he has rejected those arguments). The sentencing court, however, is under no obligation to march through § 3553(a)'s sentencing factors. United States v. Rines, 419 F.3d 1104, 1107 (10th Cir.2005). Rojas claims the district court erred by failing to address his arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence based on co-defendant sentencing disparity and that the majority of Rojas's criminal history points arose from juvenile convictions. The record reveals, however, that the district court spent extensive time addressing Rojas's objections. The court then stated it was sentencing Rojas at the bottom of the Guidelines' range only after considering the factors set forth in Title 18 United States Code Section 3553, as well as under the Sentencing Reform Act and the sentence imposed here is the appropriate one. Our precedent does not require more. See United States v. Angel-Guzman, 506 F.3d 1007, 1016-17 (10th Cir. 2007).
Next, Rojas contends his sentence is substantively unreasonable because he is similarly situated to his co-defendants, both who received below-Guidelines sentences. Therefore, he argues, the district court erred by failing to sentence him below his advisory Guideline range. In reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness, we utiliz[e] the abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Munoz-Nava, 524 F.3d 1137, 1146 (10th Cir.2008). A district court abuses its discretion when it renders a judgment that is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable. Id. (quotation omitted). A sentence which falls within a properly calculated Guideline range is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054. The presumption of reasonableness is a deferential standard that either the defendant or the government may rebut by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when viewed against the other factors delineated in § 3553(a). Id. In this case, the district court sentenced Rojas within the Guideline range, and thus his sentence is presumptively reasonable. Rojas can not overcome the presumptive reasonableness. First, Rojas cannot show he is similarly situated to his co-defendants. His criminal history is more extensive than either Trujillo or Bermudez. Second, even if he was similarly situated, the district court did not err. In United States v. Davis, we held a criminal defendant alleging a disparity between his sentence and that of a codefendant is not entitled to relief from a sentence that is properly within the sentencing Guidelines and statutory requirements. 437 F.3d 989, 997 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1122, 126 S.Ct. 1935, 164 L.Ed.2d 682 (2006). Moreover, disparity among codefendants is not a consideration required by § 3553(a). See United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884, 899 (10th Cir.2008) (explaining § 3553(a)(6) requires a judge to take into account only disparities nationwide among defendants with similar records and Guideline[s] calculations). Although it is not improper to consider codefendant disparity, neither is it mandated. United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 804 (10th Cir.2008) (explaining post- Gall codefendant disparity is not a per se `improper' factor). We therefore hold Rojas's sentence is substantively reasonable.