Opinion ID: 553303
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of Tax Injunction Act

Text: 23 The Tax Injunction Act provides that [t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1341. The limitation imposed by the act is jurisdictional; it embodies the general principle that the jurisdiction of the federal courts to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of taxes must be drastically limited. Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 522, 101 S.Ct. 1221, 1233-34, 67 L.Ed.2d 464 (1981). Thus, absent a showing by a complainant that state law does not provide a sufficient remedy for his constitutional claims, a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to a state's scheme of taxation. See California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 407-11, 102 S.Ct. 2498, 2507-09, 73 L.Ed.2d 93 (1982) (applying Act to declarative relief); Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 512, 101 S.Ct. at 1228-29 (applying Act to injunctive relief); Moss v. Georgia, 655 F.2d 668, 669 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (applying Act to action for refund and damages). 24 Colonial, however, seeks to dodge the Act's jurisdictional bar on the grounds that it seek[s] no present interference with the assessment, levy or collection of taxes or violation of the integrity of the state treasury. Rather, it contends that the net effect of its requested items of relief--viewed separately or as a whole--would be to enhance and promote the assessment and collection of taxes through improved administration, expedited appeals, and federal judicial implementation of federal and state constitutional norms. Because such relief would enlarge tax revenues by increasing the valuation and assessment of currently undervalued properties, Colonial asserts that the Tax Injunction Act's jurisdictional bar is not applicable. See, e.g., Appling County v. Municipal Elec. Auth., 621 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015, 101 S.Ct. 574, 66 L.Ed.2d 474 (1980); Hargrave v. McKinney, 413 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.1969). 25 In making these overly literal and technical attempts to distinguish its claim from the scope of section 1341, Colonial ignores the basic fact that its requested relief, if granted, would require a massive federal judicial intervention into virtually all phases of Georgia's ad valorem tax system. Such an intrusion would clearly conflict with the principle underlying the Tax Injunction Act that the federal courts should generally avoid interfering with the sensitive and peculiarly local concerns surrounding state taxation schemes. See Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 527-28, 101 S.Ct. at 1236-37; A Bonding Co. v. Sunnuck, 629 F.2d 1127, 1133 (5th Cir.1980). As the Supreme Court has noted, the legislative history of the Tax Injunction Act demonstrates that Congress worried not so much about the form of relief available in the federal courts, as about divesting the federal courts of jurisdiction to interfere with state tax administration. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 409 n. 22, 102 S.Ct. at 2508 n. 22 (emphasis added). 26 In assessing whether a complainant's claim runs afoul of the Tax Injunction Act, we must look not only at whether the literal terms of the statute are implicated, but also at whether the requested relief requires such an exercise of federal judicial power as to collide with the broad purposes of the Act. In holding that a federal court was barred from granting declarative relief by section 1341, for example, the Supreme Court noted that that  'procedure may in every practical sense operate to suspend collection of the state taxes until the litigation has ended.'  Id. at 408, 102 S.Ct. at 2508 (quoting Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 299, 63 S.Ct. 1070, 1073, 87 L.Ed. 1407 (1943)). Colonial's various points of requested relief boil down to the basic proposition that the federal courts should oversee a redistribution of the ad valorem tax burden in Georgia between centrally-assessed and non-centrally assessed taxpayers through a campaign of systemic reform. 8 Although not dressed in the guise of an injunction, implementation of such relief would be at least as disruptive as the issuance of injunctive relief, and this court has held that such claims for redistribution clearly fall within the ambit of section 1341. See Williams v. City of Dothan, 745 F.2d 1406, 1411 (11th Cir.1984). Although we express no opinion at this stage about whether such judicial intervention is warranted, we conclude that the district court was correct in holding that Colonial's claims are subject to the jurisdictional bar of section 1341. 27 Although it did not specifically base its decision on this ground, we also note that general principles of comity may require the district court to abstain from granting Colonial's requested relief. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 102 S.Ct. 177, 70 L.Ed.2d 271 (1981); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 63 S.Ct. 1070, 87 L.Ed. 1407 (1943); In re Gillis, 836 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir.1988); Ayers v. Polk County, 697 F.2d 1375 (11th Cir.1983). This policy of equitable restraint, which predates the passage of section 1341 and now overlays that express jurisdictional bar, is also premised on the availability of a plain, adequate, and complete state remedy for asserted violations of federal rights. McNary, 454 U.S. at 116, 102 S.Ct. at 186. The question of whether this doctrine prevents the district court from adjudicating Colonial's claims, however, is not properly before us at this time because of our following conclusion that the district court erred in not allowing the parties to develop a fuller record on the adequacy of state remedies for Colonial's constitutional claims.