Opinion ID: 1725571
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sexual Advances

Text: The ODC also charged respondent in Count I of inform[ing] [Dade] that you wanted to have a sexual relationship with her in exchange for representing her relative to the non existent arrest warrant. The hearing committee found that Respondent attempted a sexual relationship with her in exchange for certain efforts he would exert on her behalf as her lawyer. After a full review of the record, we agree with these findings. The hearing committee found: From the cold, written record, one might conclude the evidence on both sides to be equally persuasive. However, we carefully observed the demeanor and body language of Dade and Respondent as they testified. We have no doubt that the evidence taken as a whole is clear and convincing that the encounters between Dade and Respondent happened exactly as she described them. Respondent attempted a sexual relationship with her in exchange for certain efforts he would exert on her behalf as her lawyer. Accordingly, based on our review of the record and the hearing committee's credibility determination based on the witnesses' demeanor, we find that the ODC proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent attempted a sexual relationship with Dade in exchange for certain efforts he would exert on her behalf as her lawyer. In light of this factual finding, the issue becomes whether respondent's actions violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. As the hearing committee recognized, such conduct is not specifically addressed by the Rules of Professional Conduct. However, for the reasons expressed below we find that such conduct violates Rules 1.7, 2.1 and 8.4. The American Bar Association has addressed the general issue of sexual relationships between attorneys and clients in Formal Ethics Opinion No. 92-364 and concluded as follows: A sexual relationship between lawyer and client may involve unfair exploitation of the lawyer's fiduciary position, and/or significantly impair a lawyer's ability to represent the client competently, and therefore may violate both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. While recognizing that the present rules did not specifically address the issue, the opinion found that the following existing rules were potentially implicated: First, because of the dependence that so often characterizes the attorney-client relationship, there is a significant possibility that the sexual relationship will have resulted from exploitation of the lawyer's dominant position and influence and, thus breached the lawyer's fiduciary obligations to the client. Second, a sexual relationship with a client may affect the independence of the lawyer's judgment. Third, the lawyer's engaging in a sexual relationship with a client may create a prohibited conflict between the interests of the lawyer and those of the client. Fourth, a non-professional yet emotionally charged, relationship between attorney and client may result in confidences being imparted in circumstances where the attorney-client privilege is not available, yet would have been absent the personal relationship. ABA Formal Ethics Opinion No. 92-364 (1992). The drafters of the opinion also noted that the criminal client may be particularly dependent on the lawyer. Id. at p. 1001:124. See also Oklahoma Bar Association Opinion No. 308 (12/9/94) (finding that [a] lawyer may not engage in a sexual relationship with a client, or a client's representative, during their lawyer-client relationship, except where the client is the lawyer's spouse and that [c]lients involved in domestic, child custody, criminal, and pro bono matters are particularly vulnerable to abuse of such [confidential client] information.). While this case does not involve a consensual sexual relationship, it involves conduct in which an attorney used his position to proposition his client in a sexual manner with the threat that he would not exert all his legal efforts in defending her case if she did not consent. This presents the intolerable situation envisioned by the drafters of the ABA opinion that the client may not feel free to rebuff unwanted sexual advances because of fear that such a rejection will either reduce the lawyer's ardor for the client's cause or, worse yet, require finding a new lawyer, ... ABA Formal Ethics Opinion No. 92-364 at p. 1001:123. This court has never addressed this situation. The only opinions from this court that involve sexual misconduct by an attorney are In re Redd, 95-1472 (La.9/15/95), 660 So.2d 839, In re Plaisance, 98-0345 (La.3/13/98), 706 So.2d 969, and In re Bonnie, 97-2729 (La.12/12/97), 704 So.2d 1179. In Redd, the attorney was the legal advisor to the Baton Rouge Police Department whose duty was to issue permits to exotic dancers. The attorney entered a guilty plea to a charge of simple battery involving the touching and taking photographs of a permit applicant's breasts. This court noted that the offense did not involve sexual misconduct with a client, but since part of Redd's job was the licensing of exotic dancers, his sexual misconduct towards the applicant revealed a serious flaw in respondent's fitness to practice law. 660 So.2d at 840. After noting several mitigating factors, we suspended Redd from the practice of law for one year and one day and ordered him to obtain one year of psychiatric treatment. Id. at 841. In Plaisance, we accepted the consent discipline of disbarment for an attorney who attempted to videotape female employees in his law firm's restroom without their knowledge. 706 So.2d 969. In Bonnie, we denied a proposed consent discipline of a public reprimand and twelve months probation for an attorney who, during a nine month period of representation, made improper sexual advances towards his client's wife, and offered her sums of money in exchange for sexual favors. 704 So.2d 1179. An examination of the jurisprudence of other states involving attorney disciplinary actions for sexual misconduct reveals a wide spectrum of factual situations, ranging from consensual sexual relations between attorney and client to sexual battery upon the client. Courts have concluded that such conduct rises to the level of a violation of the rules and have imposed sanctions ranging from public reprimand to disbarment. [9] Several state courts have been confronted with factual situations similar to the case at bar, wherein an attorney makes unwanted sexual advances to a client. In Matter of Piatt, 951 P.2d 889, 191 Ariz. 24 (1997), an Arizona attorney was disciplined for making sexual advances to two clients and threatening that they would have to pay more money for his legal services if they did not respond to his advances. Piatt argued that he should not be punished because his conduct was not clearly unethical at the time it was committed. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected his arguments as follows: A lawyer is a fiduciary with a duty of loyalty, care, and obedience to the client. The relationship is, and must be, one of utmost trust. It matters not that the words sexual harassment are not used in our Rules of Professional Conduct. ER 1.7(b) prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if that representation is going to be materially limited by the lawyer's own interests. Clearly, sexual harassment by a lawyer serves the lawyer's interest and not the client's. Asking wholly inappropriate questions and making obscene comments to a client undermines trust in the lawyer and the representation. Indeed, this case went beyond sexual harassment. Piatt told client A that unless she responded sexually to him he could no longer represent her unless she came up with a lot more money. Client A had already invested time and energy in Piatt as her lawyer. It is hard to imagine a more egregious case of putting one's interests ahead of the client's. ... We continue to believe the obvious that we do not need a specific rule against attempting to extort sexual conduct from a client. In spite of the strong language the court used in attacking the attorney's conduct, the attorney was sentenced to the relatively light punishment of a public censure with one year supervised probation. In Matter of Gilbert, the court determined that an attorney violated DR 1-102(A)(7) and 5-101(A) and should be suspended for one year for making unwanted and unsolicited sexual advances to two women clients during the course of his representation of them, as well as inappropriate comments of a sexual nature to two female secretaries in his office. 194 A.D.2d 262, 606 N.Y.S.2d 478 (N.Y.A.D. 4th Dept.1993). In People v. Crossman, an attorney was suspended for one year and one day for soliciting sexual favors in exchange for legal fees on three separate occasions with three prospective clients (including, in one case, kissing client's breast). 850 P.2d 708 (Colo.1993). The court found that the conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law) and DR 5-101(A) (lawyer shall not accept employment if lawyer's professional judgment will be or may be affected by his own interests). There, the court stated that [t]he lawyer stands in a fiduciary relationship with the client and by making unsolicited sexual advances to a client `perverts' the very essence of the lawyer-client relationship. Id. at 711 (citing Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gibson, 124 Wis.2d 466, 369 N.W.2d 695, 699-700 (1985), appeal dism'd sub nom., Gibson v. Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility of Wisconsin, 474 U.S. 976, 106 S.Ct. 375, 88 L.Ed.2d 330 (1985)). In Matter of Wood, an attorney, who had previously been disciplined for misconduct involving the exchange of legal services for sexual favors, was disbarred for engaging in the same type of conduct and for arranging for an underage girl to be employed in the making of pornographic movies. 489 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind.1986). See also People v. Bergner, 873 P.2d 726 (Colo.1994) (an attorney was publicly censured for making improper sexual statements to a divorce client which was found to be a violation of DR 1-102 (conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law)); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Sopher, 852 P.2d 707 (Okla. 1993) (attorney violated Rule 8.4 and was publicly reprimanded for looking down client and client's mother's blouses and making lewd comments); Matter of Adams, 428 N.E.2d 786 (Ind.1981) (attorney publically reprimanded for grabbing female client, kissing her and raising her blouse which constituted illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct which adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) and (6)). Although in the above cases the punishment varied with the specific facts of each case, in all instances the sexual misconduct resulted in a violation of the existing rules of attorney conduct, even though those states did not have a specific rule governing sexual relations or sexual misconduct with clients. Likewise, we find that even though sexual relations or sexual misconduct with a client is not specifically addressed in our present Rules of Professional Conduct, respondent's conduct violates several existing rules. First, respondent's conduct violates Rule 1.7(b) which states: A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by ... the lawyer's own interests, unless; (1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) The client consents after consultation. As stated in Piatt, such conduct violates Rule 1.7(b) because sexual harassment by a lawyer serves the lawyer's interest and not the client's. Asking wholly inappropriate questions and making obscene comments to a client undermines trust in the lawyer and the representation. Furthermore, as in Piatt, this case went beyond sexual harassment. Respondent told Dade that unless she responded sexually to him he would not put forth his best efforts to represent her. It is hard to imagine a more egregious case of putting one's interests ahead of the client's. Id., 191 Ariz. 24, 951 P.2d 889. Clearly, in this case, respondent could not have reasonably believed his representation of Dade would not be adversely affected by his conduct, nor did Dade consent after consultation. Respondent's conduct also violates Rule 2.1 which states that [i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. As the annotations to that rule provide: Emotional detachment, in the words of the ABA's Ethics Committee, is essential to the lawyer's ability to render competent legal services. A lawyer who engages in a sexual relationship with a client, the committee concluded, risks losing the objectivity and reasonableness that form the basis of the lawyer's independent professional judgment. Because of this threat to independent judgment, and because of the problems of confidentiality and conflicts of interest that lawyer-client sex presents, the committee concluded that a lawyer would be well advised to refrain from such a relationship. Annotations to Model Rule 2.1, p.271 (citing ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Opinion 92-364 (1992)). In this case, respondent promised to undertake special efforts on behalf of Dade only if she entered into a sexual relationship with him and not based on what efforts were necessary to her legal defense based on his independent professional judgment. Respondent's conduct also violates Rule 8.4 which provides that [i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct ...; (b) commit a criminal act especially one that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; ... Rule 8.4 also reaches instances of criminal sexual misconduct or sexual exploitation of a nature that indicates the lawyer is unworthy of the confidence reposed in him or her. Annotations to Model Rule 8.4, p. 563. We find that respondent's conduct here to be sexual exploitation of a nature that indicates he is unworthy of the confidence reposed in him. Having found a violation of several of the existing rules, we must now determine what level of sanction is appropriate. In fashioning the appropriate discipline, we must take into account the seriousness of the offense, any aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings. In re King, 94-0686 (La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 326. Although both the hearing committee and disciplinary board recommended a public reprimand, we find such a sanction to be too lenient based on the facts of this case. First we consider the seriousness of this offense. Dade stated that, as a result of his misrepresentations and threats, the following occurred: I said well I'll do what I have to do but I just don't want to get in trouble and he said that he wanted me to tell him that we will make love, he wanted me, he proceeded to touch my breast and my rear end and he put my hand on his crotch, he told me he wanted me to touch him. Ah he kissed me, he you know held me to him, he wouldn't let me pull away. The hearing committee footnoted this quote noting that respondent described this as a simple kiss. A client should come to an attorney with the confidence that the attorney will use his independent legal judgment in putting forth his best legal efforts to represent the client. An attorney who threatens to limit his efforts on his client's behalf if the client fails to engage in a sexual relationship with him has committed a very serious ethical offense. This undermines confidence in the legal system and is prejudicial to the administration of justice. We find no aggravating or mitigating circumstances that would justify a departure from the sanction to be imposed. Finally, we consider the primary purposes of lawyer disciplinary proceedings which is maintaining appropriate standards of professional conduct, preserving the integrity of the legal profession, and deterring other attorneys from engaging in ethical violations. Such proceedings are not designed solely to punish the attorney. In re Redd, supra at 840. In conclusion, we find that the conduct in this case is more egregious than the conduct in In re Redd. Further, in In re Redd, the attorney had no fiduciary relationship with the victim of the sexual misconduct as she was not a client. Therefore, we find that a suspension of two years, which is longer than the suspension imposed in In re Redd, is the appropriate sanction in this case.