Opinion ID: 1107717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Demonstrating Reversible Error on Appeal

Text: The decision whether to excuse a juror for cause is a mixed question of fact and law that falls within the trial court's discretion. Busby v. State, 894 So.2d 88, 95 (Fla.2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1150, 125 S.Ct. 2976, 162 L.Ed.2d 906 (2005); Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7, 22 (Fla.1959). The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given to him by the court. Lusk v. State, 446 So.2d 1038, 1041 (Fla.1984) (citing Singer, 109 So.2d at 24). When a party seeks to strike a potential juror for cause, the trial court must allow the strike when there is basis for any reasonable doubt that the juror had that state of mind which w[ould] enable him to render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence submitted and the law announced at the trial. Singer, 109 So.2d at 23-24; see also Ault v. State, 866 So.2d 674, 683 (Fla.2003) (same). Courts have held that ambiguities or uncertainties about a juror's impartiality should be resolved in favor of excusing the juror. See Cottrell v. State, 930 So.2d 827, 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (quoting Huber v. State, 669 So.2d 1079, 1081 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (This court has held that it is error not to grant a challenge for cause when there is a basis for any reasonable doubt as to the juror's ability to render an impartial verdict, and that close cases should be resolved in favor of excusing the juror rather than leaving doubt.)); Smith v. State, 907 So.2d 582, 585 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (same). Under our cases, the preservation of a challenge to a potential juror requires more than one objection. When a trial court denies or grants a peremptory challenge, the objecting party must renew and reserve the objection before the jury is sworn. See Zack v. State, 911 So.2d 1190, 1204 (Fla.2005). By not renewing the objection prior to the jury being sworn, it is presumed that the objecting party abandoned any prior objection he or she may have had and was satisfied with the selected jury. Id. The rule is not a mere technicality designed to place onerous burdens on overstressed trial counsel. In Joiner v. State, 618 So.2d 174 (Fla.1993), we explained its purpose: We agree with the district court that counsel's action in accepting the jury led to a reasonable assumption that he had abandoned, for whatever reason, his earlier objection. It is reasonable to conclude that events occurring subsequent to his objection caused him to be satisfied with the jury about to be sworn. We therefore approve the district court to the extent that the court held that Joiner waived his Neil objection when he accepted the jury. Had Joiner renewed his objection or accepted the jury subject to his earlier Neil objection, we would rule otherwise. Such action would have apprised the trial judge that Joiner still believed reversible error had occurred. At that point the trial judge could have exercised discretion to either recall the challenged juror for service on the panel, strike the entire panel and begin anew, or stand by the earlier ruling. Id. at 176; see also Zack v. State, 911 So.2d at 1204 (reaffirming Joiner and holding that a Neil issue is not preserved for appellate review if the party objecting to the challenge fails to renew the objection before the jury is sworn). [3] In other words, renewing an objection before the jury is sworn gives the trial court one last chance to correct a potential error and avoid a possible reversal on appeal. It also allows counsel to reconsider the prior objection once a jury panel has been selected. Without such a requirement, the defendant could proceed to trial before a jury he unqualifiedly accepted, knowing that in the event of an unfavorable verdict, he would hold a trump card entitling him to a new trial. Joiner, 618 So.2d at 176 n. 2; see also Trotter v. State, 576 So.2d 691, 693 (Fla.1990) (noting that these requirements exist so that [t]he defendant cannot stand by silently while an objectionable juror is seated and then, if the verdict is adverse, obtain a new trial). If the issue has been preserved, courts review the trial court's discretionary decision for manifest error. The appellate court examines the record, keeping in mind that the trial court has a unique vantage point in the determination of juror bias that is unavailable to us in the record. Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 635-36 (Fla.1997). When a defendant preserves a cause challenge, he must demonstrate on appeal both that the trial court erred in determining the juror's competency and that the denial of the challenge caused prejudice. See Conde v. State, 860 So.2d 930, 941 (Fla.2003). Where the record demonstrates a reasonable doubt about a juror's ability to be impartial, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the cause challenge. See Busby, 894 So.2d at 95; see also Peters v. State, 874 So.2d 677, 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (While the decision to accept or dismiss a putative juror is considered an exercise in discretion, we view the seating of a juror as to whom there is a reasonable doubt concerning impartiality an abuse of discretion and thus `manifest error.'). Having demonstrated error, the defendant must then show that the error requires reversal. The expenditure of a peremptory challenge to cure the trial court's improper denial of a cause challenge constitutes reversible error if a defendant exhausts all remaining peremptory challenges and can show that an objectionable juror has served on the jury. Busby, 894 So.2d at 96-97. [4] The juror who served need not have been legally objectionable  that is, excusable for cause. Id. A defendant need only show the same type of harm [peremptory] challenges are intended to cure  the seating of a juror whom the defendant suspects, but cannot prove, is biased. Id. at 100-01. Even where the reviewing court concludes that a juror who actually served on the jury should have been stricken, however, the court will not reverse for a new trial if the error has not been preserved. See Singer, 109 So.2d at 19 (finding reasonable doubt as to one juror's impartiality, but refusing relief on this claim because it was not preserved for review).