Opinion ID: 1528391
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: the lease as a source of landlord control

Text: Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 118 Cal.Rptr. 741 (1975), is perhaps the most compelling case with respect to Petitioners' argument. In Uccello, an intermediate appellate court in California held that a duty of care arises when the landlord has actual knowledge of the presence of the dangerous animal and when he has the right to remove the animal by retaking possession of the premises. 118 Cal.Rptr. at 743. There, the landlord gave a month-to-month tenant permission to keep a dog on the premises. The plaintiff, a five-year-old child, was attacked by the dog while playing on the kitchen floor with the tenant's daughter in the tenant's apartment. The plaintiff sued the landlord. Uccello, 118 Cal.Rptr. at 743-44. Reversing a judgment of nonsuit, the court noted that the landlord in that case could have abated the harboring of the dog by terminating the month-to-month tenancy. Uccello, 118 Cal.Rptr. at 746-47. The court emphasized that the general rule preclude[s] a landlord's liability for injuries to his tenant or his tenant's invitees from a dangerous condition on the premises which comes into existence after the tenant has taken possession. Uccello, 118 Cal.Rptr. at 745. The court, however, noted that several exceptions had been carved out of this general rule, such as (1) where the landlord covenants to repair, (2) where the landlord has actual knowledge of a hidden defect and fails to disclose the defect, (3) where a nuisance exists when the landlord leases or renews a lease, (4) when a safety law has been violated, and (5) where the injury occurs in a common area. Uccello, 118 Cal.Rptr. at 746 (citations omitted). The court reasoned that these exceptions were premised on the landlord's retention of a recognizable degree of control over the dangerous condition with a concomitant right and power to obviate the condition and prevent the injury. Uccello, 118 Cal.Rptr. at 746. Based on what it called enlightened public policy, the court concluded that the landlord retains sufficient control where the landlord has the right to terminate a lease and thus obviate the presence of the vicious animal. Uccello, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 746-47. Thus, although the landlord had leased the entire premises to the tenant, the California intermediate appellate court found that the landlord gave express permission to keep the dog as well as retained control or power to eliminate the danger at issue in the case through the landlord's right to evict the tenant unless the tenant got rid of the dog. The opinions of some other courts suggest support for this view. See, e.g., Gallick v. Barto, 828 F.Supp. 1168, 1175 (M.D.Pa.1993) (concluding that No Pets clause in lease gave landlord control over premises and thus landlord  `stepped into the shoes' of the tenants concerning liability for injuries sustained as result of an attack by a pet ferret kept by tenant); McCullough v. Bozarth, 232 Neb. 714, 442 N.W.2d 201, 208 (1989) (affirming summary judgment for the landlord because plaintiff failed to allege that the landlord had sufficient control over the premises and no evidence was presented of the terms of the lease, but noting that a landlord may be liable if he knew of the dangerous propensities of the dog and where the landlord ..., by the terms of the lease, had the power to control the harboring of a dog by the tenant and neglected to exercise that power); Cronin v. Chrosniak, 145 A.D.2d 905, 536 N.Y.S.2d 287, 287-88 (1988) (reversing trial court's grant of summary judgment for the landlord and noting that while [a] landlord not in possession of the premises is usually not liable for injuries inflicted by an animal owned or harbored by a tenant, ... if during the term of the leasehold a landlord becomes aware of the fact that his tenant is harboring an animal with vicious propensities, he owes a duty to protect third persons from injury only if he `had control of the premises or other capability to remove or confine the animal' )(quoting Strunk v. Zoltanski, 62 N.Y.2d 572, 479 N.Y.S.2d 175, 177, 468 N.E.2d 13 (1984)); Palermo v. Nails, 334 Pa.Super. 544, 483 A.2d 871, 873 (1984) (specifically adopting the Uccello approach and holding landlord liable where landlord had ability to eject tenant who was landlord's nephew and whose tenancy was nothing more than a tenancy at sufferance). Many other courts, however, have rejected the Uccello approach. See, e.g., Feister, 497 N.W.2d at 525; Wright, 781 P.2d at 1143; Clemmons, 791 P.2d at 260; cf. Frobig v. Gordon, 124 Wash.2d 732, 881 P.2d 226, 227, 231 (1994) (refusing to impose a duty on landlord of commercial premises where third party was attacked by a tiger owned by tenant who ran a business providing wild and domestic animals for demonstrations, films, and videos; specifically rejecting Uccello 's framing of the issue as a question of morality). I am unpersuaded by the Uccello line of cases and agree with the courts that hold sound public policy dictates a rejection of the Uccello approach. [1] In Clemmons, the Court of Appeals of Washington specifically rejected the Uccello approach, noting that the rule rejecting Uccello promotes the salutary policy of placing responsibility where it belongs, rather than fostering a search for a defendant whose affluence is more apparent than his culpability. 791 P.2d at 260. The Supreme Court of Washington reiterated Washington's rejection of the Uccello approach in the analogous case of Frobig. In that case, the court held that the landlord had no duty to protect third parties from a tenant's lawfully owned but dangerous animals. Frobig, 881 P.2d at 231. The court specifically rejected the Uccello court's framing of the issue as a question of morality. Id. I would agree because as we have said [a] tort duty does not always coexist with a moral duty. Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank, 307 Md. 527, 534, 515 A.2d 756, 759 (1986). Also specifically rejecting the Uccello approach, a Michigan court, in Feister, 497 N.W.2d at 525, affirmed a grant of summary judgment for a landlord following the reasoning expressed by the Supreme Court of Nevada in Wright: [H]olding landlords liable for the actions of their tenants' vicious dogs by requiring them to evict tenants with dangerous dogs would merely result in the tenants' moving off to another location with their still dangerous animals.... [T]his approach [is like the case of] a `Typhoid Mary,' who was outcast from one place only to continue her deadly disease-spreading activity at another place. Wright, 781 P.2d at 1143. I believe that this reasoning is applicable here. In the instant case, the record indicates that Petitioners were close personal friends with Morton and that they had visited her at her previous residence. Thus, not only is it possible that if Morton were evicted others would have been exposed to the danger of Rampage, but it is also likely that Petitioners themselves would have been exposed to the same danger. In other words, even if the landlord had taken steps to terminate the tenancy, there is no reason to believe that this would have prevented Tevin's death. I would point out that in some cases where landlords were held liable it was because the leases contained a clause that prohibited tenants from keeping vicious dogs and annoying pets; the theory of recovery was that the landlords had undertaken a specific duty to protect others from tenants' vicious pets. See, e.g., Alaskan Village, Inc. v. Smalley, 720 P.2d 945, 948 (Alaska 1986). The rationale is that although generally, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a landlord does not have a duty to make repairs, once the landlord has undertaken to make the repairs, the landlord may be liable if he or she acts negligently in making those repairs. Miller, 206 Md. at 154-55, 110 A.2d at 685-86. In Alaskan Village, the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed a jury verdict against Alaskan Village, the owner of a trailer park, for injuries sustained by Monica Smalley, who was attacked by two dogs belonging to Henry Scepurek, one of the residents of the trailer park. 720 P.2d at 946. The lease between Alaskan Village and Scepurek contained a clause prohibiting tenants from keeping vicious dogs. Id. Scepurek had two small dogs for which he obtained permits from Alaskan Village to keep on the premises. Id. The permit, however, included a promise by Scepurek to remove the pets from the premises immediately upon notice that they annoyed other tenants. Id. Sometime before the attack on Smalley, Scepurek obtained two more dogs, both pit bulls. Alaskan Village, 720 P.2d at 947. These two pit bulls were the ones that eventually attacked Smalley. Id. Smalley argued that [Alaskan] Village had a duty to use reasonable care to enforce its rules, and a duty to exercise reasonable care under these circumstances. Id. Relying in part on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ง 323 (1965), [2] the court agreed. The court found that, by prohibiting tenants from keeping vicious dogs and further requiring Scepurek to promise to remove annoying pets, the landlord undertook the obligation to control vicious dogs in its trailer park, i.e., keep the premises free from vicious dogs. Alaskan Village, 720 P.2d at 948. Significantly, the court also noted that evidence that the undertaking is for the plaintiff's benefit is a prerequisite to liability; a plaintiff who does not produce such evidence is not entitled to a jury instruction on this theory. Alaskan Village, 720 P.2d at 947; see also Goddard by Goddard, 558 N.E.2d at 854-55 (holding landlord was not liable because landlord had relinquished control despite landlord's distribution of notices to residents telling them to keep their dogs tied or inside because evidence suggested that the reason for notice was that landlord had received complaints about barking and trash removal and not to protect others). The instant case, however, is distinguishable from Alaskan Village in that Respondents' lease with Morton prohibited all pets, not just vicious ones. It appears that Alaskan Village's agreements with its residents were intended to protect other tenants from being bothered physically or otherwise by the pets of other residents. No such conclusion can be made regarding Respondents' agreements with their residents. The Alaskan Village lease specified no vicious dogs, whereas in the present case, the lease prohibits all pets. This presumably could include even goldfish. Thus, the Alaskan Village lease could much more reasonably be found to be intended to keep tenants safe; whereas the lease in the present case could just as likely be intended to protect the landlord's property. Moreover, unlike in the instant case, the plaintiffs in Alaskan Village were tenants and, thus, more likely to be the intended beneficiaries of the lease provision. Finally, it is noted that the no pets clause in the instant case appeared in a laundry list of other prohibitions, many of which cannot be construed as being for the protection of other tenants. The lease included, among other things, a requirement that the tenant provide management with names, addresses, telephone numbers and relationships of persons to be notified in case of emergency. The lease also prohibits tenants from install[ing] carpeting in the apartment without written permission from management, using venetian blinds, shades, awnings, or window guards, except as permitted in writing by the owners and plac[ing], erect[ing] or expos[ing] any sign, advertisement, illumination, aerial or other projection on the window, roof or other part of the building. Thus, unlike the lease and agreement in Alaskan Village, the lease in the instant case cannot be the premise for finding that the landlord retained sufficient control over the premises to form the basis of liability.