Opinion ID: 2350797
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Postconviction Motion for DNA Testing; Evidence

Text: ¶ 45 Relying on a single sentence in Riofta, the majority says that under RCW 10.73.170 the only evidence that can be considered is evidence that was admitted at trial and newly discovered evidence. This both misreads and misapplies Riofta. Quite simply, there was never any issue in Riofta about whether evidence that was not presented to the jury but available at the time of trial may be considered when deciding a postconviction motion for DNA testing. We never held that the evidence that can be considered is so unduly restricted. To the contrary, the primary emphasis in Riofta is on the requirement that a defendant show actual innocence. ¶ 46 We emphasized that the legislature used the word innocence to restrict the availability of postconviction DNA testing to a limited class of extraordinary cases where the results could exonerate a person who was wrongly convicted of a crime. Riofta, 166 Wash.2d at 369 n. 4, 209 P.3d 467. RCW 10.73.170 is not aimed at ensuring a defendant had a fair trial. Its purpose is to provide a remedy for those who were wrongly convicted despite receiving a fair trial. Id. RCW 10.73.170 asks a defendant to show a reasonable probability of his innocence before requiring State resources to be expended on a test. Id. at 370, 209 P.3d 467. Accordingly, the focus is on the defendant's innocence. Id. Innocent means that the State convicted the wrong person. Id. at 369 n. 4, 209 P.3d 467 (citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 340, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992)). ¶ 47 When reliable evidence available at the time of the motion shows that the State did not convict the wrong person, the purpose of the statute is not furthered by granting the motion. [7] On the contrary, the statutory goal is served by permitting a trial court to consider relevant, reliable evidence such as the defendant's statement here. In fact, if there is relevant, reliable evidence bearing on the issue of the defendant's actual innocence, the failure to consider it may result in a significantly distorted view of the defendant's innocence (or lack thereof). This is not what the legislature intended. ¶ 48 The majority says, though, that we must focus on the statutory requirements and not unduly expand the inquiry. Majority at 208. I completely agree, but am at a loss as to how considering reliable evidence directly bearing on the issue of actual innocence is an undue expansion of the inquiry into actual innocence. I also agree that the postconviction inquiry is not a retrial, see id.; indeed, this is why the standards and rules of admissibility applicable at a criminal trial should not strictly control. The statute's focus on actual innocence should guide us in deciding what evidence may properly be considered when deciding whether the defendant has made a sufficient showing of innocence. ¶ 49 Simply stated, a motion under RCW 10.73.170 does not occur in a criminal trial. Rather, RCW 10.73.170 provides a species of postconviction relief. Riofta, 166 Wash.2d at 370, 209 P.3d 467. A defendant seeking postconviction relief is in a significantly different situation than a person facing trial. Id. at 369, 209 P.3d 467. Available rights are limited. In District Attorney's Office for Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 129 S.Ct. 2308, 174 L.Ed.2d 38 (2009), the United States Supreme Court explained why different rights exist during postconviction proceedings than exist in a criminal trial: A criminal defendant proved guilty after a fair trial does not have the same liberty interests as a free man. At trial, the defendant is presumed innocent and may demand that the government prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. But [o]nce a defendant has been afforded a fair trial and convicted of the offense for which he was charged, the presumption of innocence disappears. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993). Given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty. [ Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. ] Dumschat, [452 U.S. 458,] 464, 101 S.Ct. 2460[, 69 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981)] (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The State accordingly has more flexibility in deciding what procedures are needed in the context of postconviction relief. [W]hen a State chooses to offer help to those seeking relief from convictions, due process does not dictat[e] the exact form such assistance must assume. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987).[The] right to due process is not parallel to a trial right, but rather must be analyzed in light of the fact that [the individual] has already been found guilty at a fair trial, and has only a limited interest in postconviction relief. Id. at 2320 (some alterations in original). ¶ 50 Thus, in Osborne, the Court held there is no free-standing substantive due process right to postconviction DNA testing. Id. at 2322-23. The Court said that a state may create a limited liberty interest in demonstrating innocence with new evidence, but this right has to be analyzed in light of the fact that the defendant has already been convicted. Id. at 2319-20. ¶ 51 The Court also held that there is no procedural due process right requiring the State, in postconviction proceedings where a defendant seeks DNA evidence, to disclose material exculpatory evidence; the obligation recognized in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), requiring a prosecutor to disclose material exculpatory evidence to the defendant before trial does not apply in postconviction proceedings. Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2319-20; Twillie v. Foulk, 360 Fed.Appx. 301, 304 (3d Cir.2010) (unpublished opinion). ¶ 52 This court, too, recognizes that different rights exist, and different analyses apply, depending upon whether the proceeding is the criminal trial itself or some other proceeding. In particular, admissibility of evidence at trial is not necessarily a prerequisite to its consideration in proceedings other than a criminal trial. For example, sentencing judges have traditionally had discretion in the sources and types of evidence that may be considered when determining a defendant's sentence. State v. Strauss, 119 Wash.2d 401, 418, 832 P.2d 78 (1992); State v. Herzog, 112 Wash.2d 419, 424, 771 P.2d 739 (1989). At sentencing, the rules of evidence do not strictly apply. Strauss, 119 Wash.2d at 418, 832 P.2d 78. Rather, evidence admitted at a sentencing hearing must meet due process requirements that the evidence be reliable and the defendant be given the opportunity to refute it. Id. at 418-19, 832 P.2d 78. ¶ 53 Reliability is also key to considering certain otherwise inadmissible evidence in postconviction proceedings where, although an individual is guaranteed some rights, they are not the same rights guaranteed in a criminal prosecution. State v. Abd-Rahmaan, 154 Wash.2d 280, 288-89, 111 P.3d 1157 (2005) (postconviction sentence modification hearings are not criminal prosecutions and therefore flexible due process requirements govern confrontation). State v. Dahl, 139 Wash.2d 678, 683, 990 P.2d 396 (1999), is instructive. There, the issue was whether hearsay evidence was properly admitted in a defendant's hearing on revocation of a special sentencing alternative sentence. Because the hearing was not a criminal proceeding and because the minimal due process rights that are required in order to confront and cross-examine witnesses are not absolute, we applied a balancing analysis, weighing reliability of the hearsay evidence against the difficulty that would be involved in procuring a live witness. Id. at 686, 990 P.2d 396. ¶ 54 Neither a trial court deciding a postconviction motion for DNA testing or an appellate court reviewing a trial court's decision on the motion is considering evidence for the purpose of determining whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. Instead, as stated, the issue is whether a claim of actual innocence is sufficient to justify the expenditure of costs, resources, and time necessary to provide DNA testing. [8] On this issue, relevant, reliable evidence should be considered in deciding the question of actual innocence. ¶ 55 Another court has faced the issue whether statements that were inadmissible or not admitted at trial can be considered in deciding whether to grant a postconviction request for DNA testing. The Texas Criminal Court of Appeals held that the defendant's statement and accomplices' statements were properly considered by the trial court ruling on a postconviction request for DNA testing. In Ex Parte Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d 883, 892 (Tex.Crim.App.2011), the defendant, who was denied postconviction DNA testing, argued that the trial court improperly considered both his own statement to police because it was purportedly taken in violation of his right to remain silent[and] his accomplices' statementsbecause they were neither admissible nor admitted at trial. (Footnote omitted.) The defendant claimed that the trial court therefore improperly denied his request for appointed counsel to assist in a motion for forensic DNA testing, as authorized by state law if a trial court determined that the defendant established reasonable grounds to file a motion for DNA testing. ¶ 56 The Texas appellate court rejected the argument. The court explained that [a]lthough evidence offered against a defendant at a criminal trial and challenged on constitutional grounds must be admissible to give adequate protection to the values that exclusionary rules are designed to serve, a postconviction proceeding addressing a person's request for DNA testing is not a `criminal trial' but is instead an independent, collateral inquiry where the exclusionary rule has no place. Id. at 892-93. The court observed that the state legislature ha[d] placed no barriers to the type of relevant and reliable information that the trial judge may consider and, while the information the court considers must be reliable, it need not be admissible or previously admitted at trial. Id. at 893. ¶ 57 The Texas court's analysis and its conclusion that reliability is the linchpin for consideration of the statements in Gutierrez are similar to our own postconviction decisions holding that constitutional protections and evidentiary standards are not the same as in the criminal trial and in certain circumstances reliable evidence may be considered even though not admissible at trial. ¶ 58 Moreover, just as was true of the Texas law at issue, our state legislature has placed no restrictions on the type of evidence that may be considered in deciding whether a defendant has established that DNA testing, along with other evidence, will show innocence on a more probable than not basis. Nothing in RCW 10.73.170 precludes consideration of relevant, reliable evidence that was available but not admitted at trial. This is entirely in keeping with the purpose of the statute to enable consideration of actual innocence when deciding whether to grant the motion for DNA testing. [9] ¶ 59 A trial court ruling on a postconviction motion for DNA testing is not determining whether the defendant was guilty of the crime. The individual has already been convicted. See RCW 10.73.170(1) (authorizing a person in prison after being convicted of a felony to move for DNA testing). Because the issue is whether the defendant has made a sufficient showing of actually innocence, here the defendant's statement to police is highly relevant. It affirmatively shows that he is not actually innocent. As the majority says, majority at 208, only one person had sexual intercourse with the victim the night she was raped and beaten. In his statement, the defendant voluntarily stated that he had sexual intercourse with J.S., although he claimed it was consensual. ¶ 60 The statement is also reliable. As mentioned, at trial the defendant stipulated to voluntariness and he does not now make any claims to the contrary. Critically, he also has never repudiated the truth of the factual statements contained in his sworn statement, including the fact that he had sexual intercourse with J.S. He had no need or obligation to do so at trial, of course, but on this postconviction motion for DNA testing, where he must make an affirmative showing of innocence, his failure to counter the veracity of his admittedly voluntary statement is pertinent on the matter of reliability. Finally, he has presented no evidence that contradicts his admission that he had sexual intercourse with J.S. ¶ 61 The trial court properly considered the defendant's statement made to police after his arrest. ¶ 62 Based on all of the evidence before it, and contrary to the majority's conclusion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defendant's postconviction motion for DNA testing. [10] ¶ 63 In addition to the evidence of the defendant's statement, the trial court [11] was also presented with the evidence pertaining to the defendant's failure to request DNA testing at trial. Although not a per se bar to postconviction DNA testing, a court may take into account a defendant's failure to seek DNA testing at trial. Riofta, 166 Wash.2d at 366 n. 1, 209 P.3d 467. RCW 10.73.170 does not allow defendants to adopt a `wait and see' approach. A defendant's failure to request DNA testing at trial of evidence he now claims to be exculpatory must be weighed against his claim of probable innocence unless circumstances exist to justify the failure. Riofta, 166 Wash.2d at 368 n. 3, 209 P.3d 467. ¶ 64 Here, when making his postconviction motion for DNA testing, the defendant claimed that he had sought a continuance at trial to permit DNA testing. The State submitted transcripts from the trial record showing that this claim is false. Rather, as explained, the defendant sought a continuance in order to try to obtain evidence that another person allegedly committed the crime, specifically, a copy of a driver's license that purportedly would show that its holder fit the description that the defense claimed J.S. had provided to the defense investigator. [12] ¶ 65 Given that at trial the defendant was willing to seek a continuance to obtain evidence that purportedly would have incriminated another individual, it is highly significant that the defendant did not seek a continuance for the purpose of DNA testing. If he believed that DNA testing would show that he was innocent, presumably he would have sought DNA tests that could have exonerated him or at least been exculpatory. [13] Yet, the defendant did not attempt to obtain DNA testing for trial. His failure to do so undercuts his claim that the evidence and DNA testing would establish a likelihood of innocence on a more probable than not basis. It strongly suggests that at trial he knew that DNA test results were unlikely, in fact, to have been favorable to his defense. ¶ 66 In light of the evidence, the trial court properly denied the postconviction motion for DNA testing. Not only is the failure to seek such testing at trial highly significant, Thompson's statement that he had sexual intercourse with J.S. is also extremely damaging to his motion because DNA testing could not differentiate between rape and consensual intercourse. [14] Thompson has not carried his burden under RCW 10.73.170(3) of showing that a DNA test would demonstrate innocence on a more probable than not basis.