Opinion ID: 361103
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the liability trial

Text: 24 Plaintiff originally sued under four different theories: 8 1) breach of the page twelve express warranties; 2) breach of the express warranty to repair or replace defective parts; 3) breach of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for particular purpose; and 4) negligence in the building and installation of the machine. These different causes of action were based on the same factual allegations despite repair efforts, the machine could not be made to forge axles as it was supposed to. The judge directed verdicts in favor of the defendant on the negligence and implied warranty claims. 9 He then submitted the remaining two claims to the jury: 1) whether defendant had breached any of the page twelve performance warranties in the contract; 2) whether defendant had breached the warranty 10 to repair or replace defective parts. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff on both causes of action. In reality, the two causes of action are synonymous; 11 but they must be separated for purposes of the following discussion. 25 Defendant Black Clawson does not seriously dispute the extensive record of the machine's defects. 12 Instead, it claims that Count I is barred by the statute of limitations and that Count II is barred because Standard Alliance failed to give proper notice as required by UCC § 2-607(3)(a). We agree that these arguments have merit.
26 Chronology is important to a precise understanding of the issues. The machine was delivered and assembled at Standard Alliance's plant in the fall of 1967. The machine proved defective, and Standard Alliance wrote Black Clawson on December 27, 1967, delineating exactly what was wrong with the machine and requesting that Black Clawson fix it. Black Clawson worked on the machine until June 21, 1968, when it abandoned repair efforts. This suit was filed on May 29, 1969. 27 The original contract contained a one-year limitations period; the minimum allowable under UCC § 2-725(1). 13 UCC § 2-725(1) also provides that the limitations period begins to run when the cause of action accrues. UCC § 2-725(2) 14 explains that a cause of action accrues when a breach occurs. A breach of warranty is deemed to occur upon tender of delivery except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered. UCC § 2-725(2). Black Clawson argues that the machine was tendered in the fall of 1967 and that, even granting that the warranty extends to future performance, the cause of action under Count I accrued no later than December 27, 1967, when Standard Alliance wrote its letter claiming that the machine was defective. Standard Alliance makes numerous arguments in reply. Primarily, we must consider the question of when breach occurred. This involves analysis of two separate issues: when tender of delivery was made; whether the warranty extended to future performance. In addition, we must consider various estoppel and policy arguments. 28 Standard Alliance first contends, with some support in the record, that novel machines like the one here often have long shake-down periods before they can be made to function properly. The import of its argument is that tender of a defective machine should not be deemed to take place until the machine is made to run properly. Since the machine in the instant case did not function properly when initially installed in October of 1967, Standard Alliance argues, tender of delivery was never really made until June 21, 1968, when Black Clawson halted its efforts to get the machine going. Thus, even assuming that the warranty did not extend to future performance, the earliest a breach could have occurred and a cause of action accrued, on Standard Alliance's theory was June 21, 1968. 29 This argument is plausible, but whithers upon proper examination of the Uniform Commercial Code. UCC § 2-503(1) defines tender of delivery as requiring . . . that the seller put and hold conforming goods at the buyer's disposition. . . . Comment 1 to UCC § 2-503 explains that at times tender means due tender meaning . . . an offer coupled with a present ability to fulfill all the conditions resting on the tendering party (which must be) followed by actual performance if the other party shows himself ready to proceed. At other times (tender) is used to refer to an offer of goods or documents under a contract as if in fulfillment of its conditions even though there is a defect when measured against the contract obligation. Id. We think that tender as used in UCC § 2-725(2) is the latter and not the former. A contrary interpretation would extend the statute of limitations indefinitely into the future since a defect at the time of delivery would prevent proper due tender from taking place until it was corrected. Under section 2-725, a cause of action accrues upon initial installation of the product regardless whether it functions properly or not so long as the warranty does not extend to future performance. See Val Decker Packing Co. v. Corn Products Sales Co., 411 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1969). 30 Secondly, Standard Alliance argues that the page twelve warranties did extend to future performance under section 2-725(2), and that the statute of limitations thus ran from the date of discovery of the defect. It particularly points to the phrase, Black Clawson warrants that the subject machinery Will perform the following mechanical functions. 15 Plaintiff's argument proves too much. Since all contracts contain future promises, words of futurity such as will are common. When the contract at issue here was signed, the machine was not yet built; the word will was necessarily used. The proper question is whether the statute of limitations is meant to run from the day of delivery or from the day when a defect is found sometime in the future. 31 Most courts have been very harsh in determining whether a warranty explicitly extends to future performance. Emphasizing the word explicitly, they have ruled that there must be specific reference to a future time in the warranty. As a result of this harsh construction, most express warranties cannot meet the test and no implied warranties can since, by their very nature, they never explicitly extend to future performance. See Holdridge v. Heyer-Schulte Corp. of Santa Barbara, 440 F.Supp. 1088 (N.D.N.Y.1977) (representation of product's condition at time of delivery); Raymond-Dravo-Langenfelder v. Microdot, Inc., 425 F.Supp. 614 (D.Del.1976) (specifications for pier construction); Binkley Co. v. Teledyne Mid-America Corp., 333 F.Supp. 1183 (E.D.Mo.1971), Aff'd, 460 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1972) (welder performance warranty did not make reference to future time); Centennial Ins. Co. v. General Electric Co., 74 Mich.App. 169, 253 N.W.2d 696 (1977) (one year warranty to repair or replace defective parts); Voth v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 218 Kan. 644, 545 P.2d 371 (1976) (one year auto warranty to repair/replace defective parts); Beckmire v. Ristokrat Clay Products Co., 36 Ill.App.3d 411, 343 N.E.2d 530 (1976) (implied warranty of merchantability of brick facing); General Motors Corp. v. Tate, 257 Ark. 347, 516 S.E.2d 602 (1974) (implied warranty of merchantability of automobile); Wilson v. Massey-Ferguson, 21 Ill.App.3d 867, 315 N.E.2d 580 (1974) (implied warranty of merchantability of tractor). 32 Two rare examples where express warranties were found to explicitly extend to future performance are Rempe v. General Electric Co., 28 Conn.Super. 160, 254 A.2d 577 (1969) (product was to work properly for a lifetime) and Mittasch v. Seal Lock Burial Vault, Inc., 42 A.D.2d 573, 344 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1973) (warranty that vault will give satisfactory service at all times). 33 It is clear that a buyer and a seller can freely negotiate to extend liability into the future; that is why specific allowance was made for warranties explicitly extending to future performance. See Raymond-Dravo-Langenfelder v. Microdot, Inc., supra at 618; 2 Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code, Section 2-725:5, 24 (1970). In the absence of explicit agreement, however, UCC § 725(2), reflecting the drafters' intention to establish a reasonable period of time, four years, 16 beyond which business persons need not worry about stale warranty claims is applicable. This policy consideration underlying § 2-725 makes it acceptable to bar implied warranty claims brought more than a specified number of years after the sale; otherwise merchants could be forever liable for breach of warranty on any goods which they sold. See Beckmire v. Ristokrat Clay Products Co., supra ; General Motors Corp. v. Tate, supra ; Wilson v. Massey-Ferguson, supra. Similarly, an express warranty which makes no reference at all to any future date should not be allowed to extend past the limitations period. Thus, where a manufacturer warrants that a welder will meet certain performance warranties, but makes no mention of how long the warranties are meant to last; the statute of limitations begins to run at delivery. See Binkley Co. v. Teledyne Mid-America Corp., supra. See also Holdridge v. Heyer-Shulte Corp. of Santa Barbara, supra; Raymond-Dravo-Langenfelder v. Microdot, Inc., supra. 34 Where, however, an express warranty is made which extends for a specific period of time, i. e. one year, the policy reasons behind strict application of the limitations period do not apply. If a seller expressly warrants a product for a specified number of years, it is clear that, by this action alone, he is explicitly warranting the future performance of the product or goods for that period of time. As J. White & R. Summers Uniform Commercial Code 342 (1972), points out, if an automobile is warranted to last for twenty-four thousand miles or four years, the warranty should extend to future performance. If the car fails within the warranty period, the limitations period should begin to run from the day the defect is or should have been discovered. 35 In the case at bar, Black Clawson expressly warranted the machine for a period of one year. Thus, we hold that the warranties explicitly extended to future performance for a period of one year. Therefore, under § 2-725(2) the cause of action accrued when Standard Alliance discovered or should have discovered that the machine was defective, so long as the defect arose within the warranty period. 17 36 Unfortunately, this holding does not assist the plaintiff. Under the contractual limitations period, Standard Alliance had one year from the date of discovery of defect to bring suit. Standard Alliance reported the machine's problems to Black Clawson by letter on December 27, 1967. At least as of this date, Standard Alliance had discovered the breach. Since suit was not brought until over a year later, on May 29, 1969, this action is barred by section 2-725(2) 18 . See Gemeni Typographers v. Mergenthaler Lino Co., 48 A.D.2d 637, 368 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1975). 37 Plaintiff thirdly argues that Black Clawson should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense because it promised to repair the defects and spent over five months attempting to do so. In effect, plaintiff contends that it reasonably relied on the repair efforts, to its detriment. Decisions in other jurisdictions are split. For cases where alleged reliance on a seller's repair efforts did not toll the statute of limitations, See Binkley Co. v. Teledyne Mid-America Corp., supra, (Missouri law); Bobo v. Page Engineering Co., 285 F.Supp. 664 (W.D.Pa.1967), Aff'd, 395 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1968) (Pennsylvania law); Zahler v. Star Steel Supply Co., 50 Mich.App. 386, 213 N.E.2d 269 (1973). For cases where the statute was tolled, See MidCity Finance Co. v. Coleman, 232 So.2d 918 (La.App.1970); Mack v. Hugh W. Comstock Assoc., Inc., 225 Cal.App.2d 583, 37 Cal.Rptr. 466 (1964); Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal.2d 573, 360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal.Rptr. 257 (1961); Nowell v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 250 N.C. 575, 108 S.E.2d 889 (1959). 38 We must determine what the Ohio courts would do if confronted with this issue. 19 Although we have been unable to find direct case authority, an examination of the statute is illuminative. UCC § 2-725(4), as promulgated by the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code, states: 39 This section does not alter The law on tolling of the statute of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before this Act becomes effective. (Emphasis added) 40 Ohio's version of UCC § 2-725(4) is codified at Ohio Rev.Code § 1302.98(D). That section provides:This section does not alter Sections 2305.15 and 2305.16 of the (Ohio) Revised Code on tolling of the statute of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before this Act becomes effective. (Emphasis added) 41 Thus, when the Ohio legislature adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, it substituted sections 2305.15 and 2305.16 of the (Ohio) Revised Code for the law in the text of UCC § 2-725(4). This significant change in the UCC's wording requires that we limit our analysis to the two Ohio statutes cited. 42 An examination of these statutes reveals that the limitation period is tolled if a defendant has removed himself from the state, Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.15, or if a plaintiff has suffered from some type of disability. Ohio Rev.Code § 2305.16. Neither is applicable here. 43 It is, of course, quite possible that the Ohio courts would apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel in a case where an innocent purchaser has relied to his detriment on a seller's promises to repair. The principle that '. . . no man may take advantage of his own wrong' prevents a defendant whose actions have induced a plaintiff to delay filing a suit until after the running of the limitation period from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to the action. Ott v. Midland Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367, 1370 (6th Cir. 1975). See Markese v. Ellis, 11 Ohio App.2d 160, 229 N.E.2d 70 (1967). Here, however, we have two corporate behemoths, well able to look out for themselves, and no evidence that one lulled the other into not suing on time. See Bowman v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 385 P.2d 440 (Okl.1963). 44 Standard Alliance's two remaining arguments, unsupported by any authority, merit only brief mention. Standard Alliance argues that this Court should toll the running of the limitations period or otherwise find timely filing because the limitations period was contractually reduced from four years to one year. It would also find significant that approximately one-half the one-year limitations period was spent in attempted repairs. 45 The one-year limitations period is specifically allowed by UCC § 2-725(1). We see nothing unfair about this provision in a negotiated contract between two parties of equal bargaining power. Similarly, we find no prejudice to plaintiff resulted from the lengthy repair time. Standard Alliance still had time to file suit on the original breach of warranty claim even after termination of the repair efforts; it also had a cause of action under Count II for failure to fulfill the repair or replacement warranty. 20
46 Standard Alliance's claim against Black Clawson is not ended by our decision on Count I. In Count II, Standard Alliance alleges a cause of action for breach of the express warranty to repair or replace defective parts. This cause of action, which is virtually identical to Count I, 21 was not barred by the statute of limitations. 22 Thus, even if Standard Alliance sued too late on its claim that the machine was defective, it did sue on time on its claim that Black Clawson failed to repair the machine. 47 Black Clawson concedes that suit on Count II was timely filed, but strongly argues that it had no knowledge that anything was wrong with the machine after it quit work on it and that plaintiff's failure to report the machine's defects barred the suit. 48 To recapitulate: The machine was installed in October of 1967, and plaintiff's employees attempted to make it operable. A letter was sent to Black Clawson on December 27, 1967, fully outlining the machine's defects. Black Clawson responded by sending a team of employees to try to fix the machine. These employees were at Standard Alliance's plant for over five months. On June 21, 1968, Black Clawson's repairmen left Standard Alliance's plant, never to return. Plaintiff claims that this action constituted knowing abandonment of the unrepaired machine. Black Clawson claims that it thought that the machine was satisfactorily repaired and that it knew nothing about any further problems. 49 The controlling statute is UCC § 2-607(3)(a) which provides: 50 The buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy. 51 Whether proper notice was given is a question of fact. Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 973 (5th Cir. 1976); Lynx Inc. v. Ordinance Products, Inc., 273 Md. 1, 327 A.2d 502, 512 (1974); L. A. Green Seed Co. of Arkansas v. Williams, 246 Ark. 463, 438 S.W.2d 717, 720 (1969). See E. C. Ernst v. General Motors Corp., 537 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying contract notice provision); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 298 (3d Cir. 1961) (applying Uniform Sales Act); Columbia Axle Co. v. America Automobile Ins. Co., 63 F.2d 206, 208 (6th Cir. 1933) (applying Uniform Sales Act). See also 2 Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-607:24 (1970). 52 Moreover, inasmuch as section 2-607 operates as a condition precedent to any recovery, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that notice was given within a reasonable time. Ehlers v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 226 N.W.2d 157, 159 (S.D.1975); Schnabl v. Ford Motor Co., 54 Wis.2d 354, 198 N.W.2d 161 (1972); L. A. Green Seed Co. of Arkansas v. Williams, supra, 438 S.W.2d at 719-20. 53 The district judge submitted the notice issue to the jury, which found for the plaintiff. The question presented here is whether the district judge erred when he refused to overrule the jury's decision and enter judgment N.O.V. for the defendant. 54 The standard which defendant must meet is a stiff one. To grant a directed verdict or J.N.O.V., 23 the evidence must be such that there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the proper verdict. Wolfel v. Sanborn, 555 F.2d 583, 593 (6th Cir. 1977). Ohio's standard is the same. 24 Ohio R.Civ.Pro. 50(A). See O'Day v. Webb, 29 Ohio St.2d 215, 280 N.E.2d 896 (1972). If the evidence is clear, however, a court can rule as a matter of law that a party failed to give proper notice. Clow Corp. v. Metro Pipeline Co., Inc., 442 F.Supp. 583, 588-91 (N.D.Ga.1977); Cotner v. Int'l Harvester Co., 260 Ark. 885, 545 S.W.2d 627 (1977). 55 The notice requirement of Section 2-607 is explained by Official Comment 4: 56 The time of notification is to be determined by applying commercial standards to a merchant buyer. 'A reasonable time' for notification from a retail consumer is to be judged by different standards so that in his case it will be extended, for the rule of requiring notification is designated to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good faith consumer of his remedy. 57 The content of the notification need merely be sufficient to let the seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be watched. There is no reason to require that the notification which saves the buyer's rights under this section must include a clear statement of all the objections that will be relied on by the buyer, as under the section covering statements of defect upon rejection (Section 2-605). Nor is there reason for requiring the notification to be a claim for damages or of any threatened litigation or other resort to a remedy. The notification which saves the buyer's rights under this Article need only be such as informs the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach, and thus opens the way for normal settlement through negotiation. 58 Some courts and commentators have taken the liberal view that almost any kind of notice of dissatisfaction is sufficient. Quite clearly the drafters (of the UCC) intended a loose test; a scribbled note on a bit of toilet paper will do. J. White & R. Summers Uniform Commercial Code 347 (1972). See e. g., Lewis v. Mobil Oil Corp., 438 F.2d 500, 509 (8th Cir. 1971); Metro Investment Corp. v. Portland Rd. Lumber Yard, Inc., 263 Or. 76, 501 P.2d 312 (1972). Other courts have required more than minimal notice where both parties were merchants engaged in on-going transactions. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 970-980 (1976); Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc. v. Island Lake Coal Co., 436 F.Supp. 91, 95-97 (E.D.Tenn.1977). See Cotner v. International Harvester Co., supra. See also Fischer v. Mead Johnson Laboratories, 41 A.D.2d 737, 341 N.Y.S.2d 257 (1973). 59 There is no dispute that Standard Alliance gave timely notice that the machine was not in compliance with the performance warranties and that Black Clawson then spent over five months trying to fix the machine. The dispute concerns whether defendant was properly notified that the repairs were inadequate. 60 Black Clawson's argument can be conveniently subdivided into two subparts. First, it contends that it understood the machine to be operating properly on June 21, 1968, and that it had no knowledge that the machine was defective after that date. Second, it contends that it had no notice that Standard Alliance considered it to be in breach of the warranty to repair or replace defective parts. 61 The jury's implicit finding 25 that Black Clawson had knowledge that the machine was defective and improperly repaired is supportable by the evidence. Black Clawson Vice-President Romagano did testify that he thought that the machine was repaired on June 21, 1968, and that he had no idea anything was wrong afterward. The jury, however, could have disbelieved this testimony, relying on a June 24, 1968, memo written by Mr. Romagano which reveals that the machine suffered repeated failures on both June 20, 1968, and June 21, 1968. In addition, the jury could have credited letters written in June, July and August of 1968 from Mr. Romagano to a Black Clawson subcontractor, Reliance Electric Co., complaining about the failings of the machine's electric drive, a critical component. Finally, the jury could have believed expert testimony that the machine was so poorly designed that it could not be made to operate in synchronization nor be repaired to meet any of the express warranties. If so, the jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant was aware that its attempts to repair were an utter failure. Thus, there exists evidence to support a jury finding that Black Clawson had knowledge that it was in breach of the repair or replace warranty. 26 62 The critical issue is whether Black Clawson had notice that it was considered to be in breach. Black Clawson emphatically argues that there is no evidence at all that it received notice of breach after it quit repair work on June 21, 1968. Standard Alliance directs us to none, and our independent examination of the record reveals none. Incredible as it may seem, Black Clawson quit repair work on June 21, 1968 and was never told anything was wrong until May 29, 1969, when suit was filed. 27 63 Standard Alliance argues that it fully informed Black Clawson of the machine's defects at the beginning and that Black Clawson abandoned the machine knowing that it was defective and unrepaired. Under these circumstances, the question presented is whether it was necessary to give additional notice of the failure of repair efforts. 64 We think that notice should have been given. Section 2-607 expressly requires notice of any breach. Comment 4 says that notice need only be such as informs the seller that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach. The express language of the statute and the official comment mandate notice regardless whether either or both parties had actual knowledge of breach. See Cotner v. International Harvester Co., supra. 65 We also note that this same result would take place under § 2-607's predecessor, section 49 of the Uniform Sales Act. 28 Judge Learned Hand's oft-quoted words applying section 49 are equally applicable here: 66 The plaintiff replies that the buyer is not required to give notice of what the seller already knows, but this confuses two quite different things. The notice 'of the breach' required is not of the facts, which the seller presumably knows quite as well as, if not better than, the buyer, but of buyer's claim that they constitute a breach. The purpose of the notice is to advise the seller that he must meet a claim for damages, as to which, rightly or wrongly, the law requires that he shall have early warning. 67 American Mfg. Co. v. United States Shipping Board E. F. Corp., 7 F.2d 565, 566 (2d Cir. 1925), Cited with approval in Columbia Axle Co. v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 63 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1933). See Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 971-972 (5th Cir. 1976); Bloch v. Eastern Mach. Screw Corp., 281 F. 777 (6th Cir. 1922); Champion Animal Food Co. v. L. B. Reich Distributing Co., 78 N.E.2d 180 (Ohio App.1947). 68 An examination of the policy reasons which underlie 2-607 further support our view. Notice of breach serves two distinct purposes. First, express notice opens the way for settlement through negotiation between the parties. Comment Four, Supra ; Eckstein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App.2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 897, 901 (1974). Second, proper notice minimizes the possibility of prejudice to the seller by giving him ample opportunity to cure the defect, inspect the goods, investigate the claim or do whatever may be necessary to properly defend himself or minimize his damages while the facts are fresh in the minds of the parties. Note, Notice of Breach and the Uniform Commercial Code, 25 U.Fla.L.Rev. 520, 522 (1973). See Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnel Douglas Corp., supra, at 972-73. Compare 3 Williston on Sales (4th Ed.), § 22-11 and J. White & R. Summers, Supra at 344 which identify three policy reasons behind the notice requirement: 1) To enable the seller to make adjustments or replacement or to suggest opportunities for cure; 2) To enable the seller to prepare for negotiation or litigation; and 3) To give the seller peace of mind from stale claims. See Steel & Wire Corp. v. Thyssen, Inc., 20 U.C.C.Rep. 892 (E.D.Mich.1976). See also Mattos, Inc. v. Hash, 279 Md. 371, 368 A.2d 993, 996 (1977) (protection against stale claims is the purpose of the statute of limitations, not the purpose of section 2-607(3)). 69 We do not know whether this lengthy, acrimonious lawsuit could have been settled beforehand. We do know that Standard Alliance's failure to give notice precluded the possibility of compromise. 70 More important, the record contains evidence suggesting the kind of prejudice which 2-607's notice requirement seeks to avoid. After Standard Alliance sold its Forgings Division to the Wiener Group on September 30, 1968, Wiener attempted to put the machine into operation. When that failed, the machine lay dormant. On May 28, 1969, the day before suit was filed, Standard Alliance, in cooperation with Wiener, started the machine and filmed its malfunctions. On July 14, 1969, a scant six weeks after suit was filed, Wiener began to dismantle the machine. Although Black Clawson was informed of the machine's sale, 29 it never inspected the machine after terminating repair efforts on June 21, 1968, nor was it aware that the machine was to be destroyed. 71 Standard Alliance contends that the destruction of the machine by a third party was proper and that Black Clawson was remiss in not seeking to inspect the machine during the six-week period after suit was filed, but before the machine was destroyed. This ignores the realities of the litigation process. Six weeks is an insignificant period of time in a case such as this which has dragged on for over nine years. In addition, it was pure chance that the machine was destroyed when it was; Wiener could have taken the machine apart whenever it wanted. Had Black Clawson gotten even minimal notice that it was being held in breach, it might very well have sought inspection and perhaps even made its own film of the machine. 72 Measuring the impact of potential prejudice here is, of course, difficult since Black Clawson was unable to have its own experts examine the machine. Standard Alliance emphasizes that Black Clawson designed and built the machine and worked on it for over five months. As the machine's creator, it arguably did not need to inspect it. Also, the evidence that the machine was defective was overwhelming. On the other hand, preparing for litigation is a Sui generis task. Black Clawson may have been able to put on a spirited defense, especially as to damages, had it gotten early notice and followed up by inspecting the machine. Whatever the degree of prejudice to Black Clawson, UCC § 2-607's notice requirement is designed to forestall the very difficulties which developed here. While we see no justification for the strong language in defendant's brief charging a conspiracy to hide the facts and destroy the machine, we think that this case demonstrates the wisdom of section 2-607's requirement of prompt notice. 73 Black Clawson also raises independent objections to the film and the circumstances of the machine's destruction, arguing that it should have had specific advance notice of both the film's production and of the machine's demolition. We need not decide these issues. We do note, however, that this Court has never sanctioned the sporting theory of justice. Adherents of the theory among the bar are reminded that a law suit is a serious matter; there is no room for games of hide and seek. Neither the federal rules nor statutory law can anticipate every twist and turn which can take place in litigation. Legal moves by ingenious litigants will not be countenanced where injustice would result. 74 These events further demonstrate the merit in those cases which hold merchants to higher standards of good faith than consumers. See Eastern Air Lines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra, at 977; Kopper Glo Fuel, Inc. v. Island Lake Coal Co., supra at 96. Black Clawson and Standard Alliance worked together at all times. Black Clawson responded promptly when informed that the machine was not working properly; commercial good faith mandated that it be told that repair efforts had failed and that it was being held in breach. A new car buyer can be excused for failing, in ignorance and exasperation, to notify a car dealer of an obvious breach after persistent repair efforts have ended in failure. A merchant like Standard Alliance cannot be so excused, it should have met section 2-607's non-rigorous notice requirements. 75 Standard Alliance points to two cases, Ernst v. General Motors Corp., 482 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1973), Appeal following remand, 537 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1976), and Metro Invest. Corp. v. Portland Rd. Lumber Yard, Inc., 263 Or. 76, 501 P.2d 312 (1972), for the proposition that proper notice, once given, is sufficient for all related breaches. Standard Alliance's position is that since it concededly gave proper notice that the machine was defective on December 27, 1967, it did not have to give notice later on that repair efforts to cure the defects had failed. 76 We reject this argument. In Ernst, supra, the court merely concluded that a letter complaining of delays in the start-up of a construction project could be reasonably construed to encompass problems caused by severe winter working conditions which would not have occurred but for the delay. Also, the court did not think that once initial complaint about delay was made, that additional notice of delay had to be given on a regular basis. In Metro Invest. Corp., supra, the buyer gave prompt notice of a defect. The parties met and agreed to wait and see if the defect improved. The Oregon Supreme Court found that the initial notice was sufficient, even though no complaint was made for two years thereafter. 77 In the instant case, the two warranties are distinct and notice serves different functions for each. When the machine was found to be in breach of the page twelve performance warranties, notice was necessary so that Black Clawson could come in and try to fix the machine. When repair efforts failed, and Black Clawson was allegedly in breach of its warranty to repair or replace defective parts, notice would alert Black Clawson that Standard Alliance thought that repairs were defective and that perhaps litigation was contemplated. At this point, the parties could have discussed settlement, and Black Clawson could have sought evidentiary support for its position that the machine was indeed repaired. Black Clawson was alerted that the machine was defective, but not alerted that its repair efforts were defective. We cannot allow notice of one breach to be carried over to create notice of a subsequent related, but distinct, breach. 78 We realize that our holding bars what is apparently a meritorious claim. Standard Alliance's inexplicable failure to give any notice whatsoever that Black Clawson was in breach of its repair/replace warranty is fatal; underlying standards of commercial good faith, codified in UCC § 2-607, mandate this result. 79 Our ruling makes it unnecessary to consider the numerous other issues raised concerning the liability or the damages trial.