Opinion ID: 76484
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The alleged Caldwell violation

Text: 42 Carr contends that the state undermined the jury's sense of responsibility for sentencing by arguing that the jury would merely be making a recommendation for sentencing which would then be imposed by the trial judge. He maintains that his sentencing was rendered fundamentally unfair because no corrective action was taken by counsel or the trial judge.
43 During the sentencing phase, the prosecutor began his closing argument by explaining the jury's duties during sentencing. He explained that the decision to seek the death penalty is made by the district attorney, and that he had made that decision in this case. He elaborated that a jury should ultimately decide whether or not ... Carr would serve life in prison or be electrocuted in the Georgia electric chair, [and] not [the prosecutor], not a judge, but a jury. R2-10, Ex. Vol. 6, Ex. 13 at 1900-01. He explained, 44 Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, as I say, you're going to make the recommendation as to punishment. Now, don't misunderstand. You're not going to sentence this Defendant. The Judge is going to sentence him, and you should not feel that you are doing anything to Timothy Don Carr. It's your job to listen to the evidence, to evaluate the evidence, and to decide the appropriate punishment, and then you make a recommendation as a jury. 45 ... [I]t takes a[n] unanimous verdict before the death penalty can be imposed. If one of you doesn't vote for the death penalty, it's not a mistrial. We don't do this again. It's a life sentence. 46 ... We bring [the punishment] back to the people and let them decide these difficult questions [as to whether to impose a death sentence]. You've got to decide this question, not [the prosecutor], not [the defense attorney], not [the trial judge], but you twelve ladies and gentlemen. You need to know what the consequences of your acts are. If you can't become unanimous, then it's a life sentence. 47 R2-10, Ex. Vol. 6, Ex. 13 at 1904-05. He later continued, You've got two choices, life in prison, or recommend to [t]he Court to sentence him to death. Id. at 1919. Carr's attorney asked the jury to say by your verdict: We believe in fairness. We believe in the sacredness of a human life, and thou shalt not kill instead of vot[ing] to tell the Judge ... that it's all right to kill that twenty-three-year-old man child. Id. at 1933, 1925. 48 The judge began the charge by explaining to the jury that the determination of the punishment was our duty. Id. at 1935. He instructed the jury that, if they found Carr guilty of one or more statutory aggravating circumstances, they were authorized to authorize the imposition of a sentence of death. Id. at 1941. He advised that their verdict would thus read: We, the jury, find the following statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances, and ... fix the penalty at life imprisonment, or we recommend the death penalty, id. at 1941, and continued that if their verdict was the death penalty ... then the Defendant would be sentenced to be put to death in the manner provided by law. Id. at 1942. He advised them to disregard any hint, suggestion, or opinion by [t]he Court as to what penalty should be imposed in this case, and that [w]hatever penalty is to be imposed within the limits of the law as I have instructed you is a matter solely for you the jury to determine. Id. at 1942.
49 On direct appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held that it had considered [the prosecutor's remarks] in the context of the entire sentencing proceeding and held that: 50 (t)o establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law. [Cit.] Romano v. Oklahoma, [] 512 U.S. [1,] 9, 114 S.Ct. [2004,] 2010, 129 L.Ed.2d 1 [(1994)]. Viewed in context, the prosecutor's comments in this case do not contravene Caldwell, since the prosecutor's description of the jury's role was not an affirmative misstatement of the law and any confusion this isolated portion of argument may have engendered was alleviated by the repeated emphasis of the entire proceeding that the jury, and not the prosecutor or the court, was vested with the decision as to whether Carr should live or die. 51 ... 52 The jury's role as sole decision maker was reinforced throughout the entire sentencing phase proceeding. 53 ... 54 Any lingering confusion as to the jury's role would have been alleviated by Carr's closing argument and the trial court's charge. Carr made it clear that the jurors were the sole decision maker. The entire thrust of his argument was to impress on the jury its awesome responsibility in deciding punishment.... 55 Carr I, 480 S.E.2d at 593-94. 56 The district court found no decision contrary to or involving an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court and that the state court decisions were not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. R2-17 at 9. It concluded that Carr had pointed to no case and the Court has found no factually indistinguishable case from the United States Supreme Court that was applied incorrectly by the state courts in this case. Id. at 13-14. In its denial of a COA, the district court found that, following an exacting review of the state court's factual findings, the findings were presumed to be correct and [Carr] failed to prove otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. R2-23 at 2. The district court further found that the state court neither applied a rule of law that contradicted Supreme Court precedent or that resulted in a different opinion than that reached by the Supreme Court in materially indistinguishable facts nor based its decision on an unreasonable determination of the facts, established by the presented evidence. R2-23 at 2.
57 We review the closing arguments for impropriety under careful scrutiny, and will reverse only if the argument rendered the proceeding `fundamentally unfair.' Cargill v. Turpin, 120 F.3d 1366, 1379 (11th Cir.1997) (citation omitted). [I]t is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 2639, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). To establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law. Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407, 109 S.Ct. 1211, 1215, 103 L.Ed.2d 435 (1989). However, a Caldwell violation is not established where the jury was not affirmatively misled regarding its role in the sentencing process. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 2010, 129 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994). We have, therefore, held that references to and descriptions of the jury's sentencing verdict ... as an advisory one, as a recommendation to the judge, and of the judge as the final sentencing authority do not constitute Caldwell violations where they accurately characterize the jury's and judge's sentencing roles under [state] law. Davis v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 1471, 1482 (11th Cir.1997). 58 In Georgia, 59 [i]n all cases tried by a jury in which the death penalty... may be imposed, ... the jury shall retire to determine whether any mitigating or aggravating circumstances ... exist and whether to recommend mercy for the defendant. Upon the findings of the jury, the judge shall fix a sentence within the limits prescribed by law. 60 O.C.G.A. § 17-10-2(c) (2002). Once the jury has made its determination, the judge's role is mandated. Where a statutory aggravating circumstance is found and a recommendation of death is made, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-31 (2002).
61 The jury was informed that the trial court was required to impose a death sentence on their recommendation by both the district court's jury instructions and the prosecutor's argument as a whole. The prosecutor's comment accurately characterized the jury's role as recommending the sentence to the judge, and the parties arguments and judge's instructions informed the jury that they were the arbiters of the sentence imposed on Carr.