Opinion ID: 1641998
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Complaint and Information

Text: Olson argues that both the complaint and the information charging a violation of sec. 943.23 (1), Stats., failed to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court as neither the complaint nor the information alleged that he failed to abandon the vehicle without damage within a twenty-four-hour period. Olson contends that sec. 943.23 (2), creates an exception to the crime defined by sec. 943.23 (1), and that the failure to allege the nonexistence of this exception renders the complaint and information void ab initio. Sec. 943.23, prohibits the operation of a vehicle without the owner's consent in the following manner: 943.23 Operating vehicle without owner's consent. (1) Whoever intentionally takes and drives any vehicle without the consent of the owner is guilty of a Class E felony. (2) Whoever violates sub. (1) and abandons a vehicle without damage within 24 hours is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant in his brief relies on and argues that a complaint must recite the elements of a crime or it is jurisdictionally defective and void. A complaint which charges no offense is jurisdictionally defective and void and the defect cannot be waived by a guilty plea; the court does not have jurisdiction. State v. Lampe (1965), 26 Wis. 2d 646, 648, 133 N.W.2d 349; Burkhalter v. State (1971), 52 Wis. 2d 413, 424, 190 N.W.2d 502. Nor can a void charge sustain a verdict or a sentence based on it. Champlain v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 751, 754, 193 N.W.2d 868 (1972). The defendant acknowledges that the nonabandonment of a vehicle is but an exception to and not an element of the crime of operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent and argues that the rule that a complaint must allege the elements of a crime includes a requirement that the state negate the existence of a statutory exception to the crime. By a well-established rule of pleading in criminal actions, the complaint was insufficient to charge an offense under said sec. 4595, because it does not negative the exception in the statute, viz., that the selling of the intoxicating liquor, as stated in the complaint, was not `a work of necessity or charity.' Jensen v. State, 60 Wis. 577, 579, 19 N.W. 374 (1884). See also: State v. Williamson, 58 Wis. 2d 514, 524, 206 N.W.2d 613 (1973). The court of appeals recognized these general rules in its decision in the case at bar but held that assuming that sec. 943.23 (2), Stats., creates an exception to sec. 943.23 (1), the charging documents need not negate the existence of that exception because the facts relating to the exception are peculiarly and solely within the knowledge of the defendant. The court of appeals derived the rule that the charging document need not negate a statutory exception to a crime where the facts as to the exception are peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant from the following language in State v. Williamson, supra : The state counters that, while the general rule is that the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to prove that a defendant is not within an exception embodied in the enacting clause of a criminal statute, an exception exists where evidence of the exempting fact lies especially within the control of the defendant or peculiarly within his knowledge. We agree. Both the general rule, and the exception, are recognized in this state. This court has stated, `It is undoubtedly the general rule that the state must prove all the essential facts entering into the description of the offense. But it has been held in many cases that when a negation of a fact lies peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant it is incumbent on him to establish that fact. . . .' Id. at 524, citing Kreutzer v. Westfahl, 187 Wis. 463, 478, 204 N.W. 595 (1925). The state in its brief to this court characterizes the requirement of abandonment of a vehicle without damage within a twenty-four-hour period as an affirmative defense rather than an element of or exception to sec. 943.23 (1), Stats. Since they classify this issue of non-abandonment as an affirmative defense, the state argues that there is no obligation upon the district attorney to negate the existence of the affirmative defense in the charging document and, thus, the complaint and information were not jurisdictionally defective. From the preceding analysis of the constructions which the parties and the court of appeals placed upon the abandonment requirement and the rules applicable to each of these constructions, it is clear that the question of whether the complaint is jurisdictionally defective depends upon how this court characterizes the abandonment requirement. Sub. (2) of sec. 943.23, Stats., was added to the statute by chapter 173, Laws of 1977. Prior to that time, the statute read as follows: 943.23 Operating vehicle without owner's consent. Whoever intentionally takes and drives any vehicle without the consent of the owner may be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years or both. From the foregoing legislative history, it is clear that prior to the enactment of sec. 943.23 (2), Stats., the provisions of sec. 943.23 (1) described all the elements of the crime and that the addition of sub. (2) was intended only to give prosecutors flexibility in charging the offense and not to create another element of the crime. [3] Sub. (2) merely describes circumstances which would reduce the penalty from a felony to a misdemeanor. Under these circumstances, we deem it appropriate to characterize the abandonment as an affirmative defense to the felony charge which must be raised by the defendant. We reached a similar result in Blenski v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 685, 245 N.W.2d 906 (1976) in which we determined the effect to be given to the numerous statutory exceptions to sec. 440.31, Stats., which requires registration of persons soliciting charitable contributions. In that opinion we stated: We are of the opinion that the question of whether the defendant was within one of the exceptions is a matter of affirmative defense which must be raised by the defendant. In reaching the same conclusion, the trial judge correctly noted that the exceptions are numerous and complex and located in a separate subsection. This is a situation where the evidence of the exempting fact is especially within the knowledge or control of the defendant. Id. at 697. Like the statutory exceptions considered in Blenski, the abandonment of the stolen vehicle within twenty-four hours undamaged is solely within the knowledge and control of the defendant. As the court of appeals properly noted, generally the taking and abandonment of a vehicle are done stealthily and, thus, the times of taking and abandonment are peculiarly within the knowledge of the taker. Although the defendant argues that in this case there is no doubt as to the time of the taking and recovery of the automobile, we note that the knowledge of whether the defendant intended to abandon the vehicle remains solely with the defendant. Further, we point out that it takes little effort to visualize circumstances where the only available information concerning the condition of the vehicle and the time of abandonment resides in the person charged with the crime. In addition, we note that the mitigating circumstance of abandoning the automobile, undamaged, within twenty-four hours of the original taking is located in a separate subsection of the operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent statute. As in Blenski, supra, the fact that the mitigating circumstance is located in a separate subsection of the statute supports our determination that that mitigating circumstance should be regarded as an affirmative defense and not as an element of the crime. [1] We conclude that the complaint and information charging a violation of sec. 943.23 (1), Stats., need not allege the failure to abandon the vehicle undamaged within a twenty-four-hour period because it is an affirmative defense and, thus, we hold that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case at bar. While we have held that pleading the nonabandonment of the vehicle undamaged within twenty-four hours of the original taking is not necessary for the trial court to have subject matter jurisdiction of the case at bar, we consider it better practice for the state to plead the nonabandonment if a felony conviction is being sought. Pleading the nonabandonment of the vehicle undamaged within a twenty-four-hour period will serve the beneficial purpose of informing the defendant of all the facts underlying the charge and will allow the parties to narrow the issues to be contested at trial.