Opinion ID: 1119446
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Void for Vagueness and Equal Protection

Text: The Defendant argues that the Persistent Offender Accountability Act is vague and violates equal protection guarantees because the prosecutors in the different counties in the state are affording different due process protections. The Defendant argues that this court must therefore declare the Act unconstitutional. We disagree. If a statute does not contain all of the process which is due, this court will impose the requirements necessary to satisfy due process. This court has inherent authority to supplement statutory provisions by requiring additional procedures to satisfy the requirements of procedural due process. In re Young, 122 Wash.2d 1, 46, 857 P.2d 989 (1993) (imposing additional procedures to ensure the sexually violent predator provisions of the Community Protection Act of 1990 are fairly enforced); In re Harris, 98 Wash.2d 276, 287, 654 P.2d 109 (1982) (this court has inherent power to require procedural due process). The real issue raised by the fact that different counties are applying different sentencing procedures under the new law is a due process challenge which is discussed more fully below and does not raise a viable equal protection or vagueness challenge. We conclude that the Persistent Offender Accountability Act is not unconstitutionally vague nor does it violate equal protection guarantees. A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the party challenging its constitutionality bears the burden of proving its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Myles, 127 Wash.2d 807, 812, 903 P.2d 979 (1995); State v. Ward, 123 Wash.2d 488, 496, 869 P.2d 1062 (1994). Unless a statute involves First Amendment rights, a vagueness challenge will be evaluated only in light of how the statute has been applied in a particular case. Myles, 127 Wash.2d at 811 n. 2, 903 P.2d 979. The Defendant does not engage in a Gunwall [8] analysis on this issue to show that more protections are available under the state constitution than are available under the federal constitution. Therefore, the due process vagueness challenge is decided under federal constitutional law. E.g., Myles, 127 Wash.2d at 811-12, 903 P.2d 979; State v. Maxfield, 125 Wash.2d 378, 394, 886 P.2d 123 (1994). Under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, a statute is void for vagueness if it does not define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is proscribed, or if it does not provide ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary enforcement. Myles, 127 Wash.2d at 812, 903 P.2d 979. A statute which fails to provide explicit standards to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is unconstitutionally vague. State v. Rhodes, 92 Wash.2d 755, 758, 600 P.2d 1264 (1979). The Persistent Offender Accountability Act defines what crimes will be considered to be most serious, defines the exact characteristics of a persistent offender, and mandates a sentence of life imprisonment for all persistent offenders. Ordinary people can understand what conduct will give rise to a finding that an offender is subject to sentencing under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act. In the Defendant's case, the plain meaning of the statute made him amenable to sentencing as a persistent offender. We conclude the Act survives the vagueness challenge. The Defendant also argues that the Persistent Offender Accountability Act violates constitutional principles of equal protection. Under the equal protection clause of the Washington State Constitution, Article I, Section 12, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law must receive like treatment. [9] In re Young, 122 Wash.2d at 44, 857 P.2d 989; State v. Coria, 120 Wash.2d 156, 169, 839 P.2d 890 (1992). One of three tests may be used to determine whether this clause has been violated. Strict scrutiny is applied when a classification affects a suspect class or a fundamental right. Intermediate scrutiny may apply in certain circumstances, such as when a classification affects both a liberty right and a semi-suspect class not accountable for its status. Westerman v. Cary, 125 Wash.2d 277, 294-95, 885 P.2d 827, 892 P.2d 1067 (1994). However, a statutory classification that implicates physical liberty is not subject to the intermediate level of scrutiny under the equal protection clause unless the classification also affects a semisuspect class. Coria, 120 Wash.2d at 171, 839 P.2d 890; Ward, 123 Wash.2d at 516, 869 P.2d 1062. Recidivist criminals are not a semisuspect class. Therefore the proper test to be applied in these cases, where only a liberty interest is asserted, is the rational basis test. Under this test, a legislative classification will be upheld unless it rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of legitimate state objectives. Coria, 120 Wash.2d at 171, 172 n. 4, 839 P.2d 890; State v. Shawn P., 122 Wash.2d 553, 561 n. 28, 859 P.2d 1220 (1993). The burden is on the party challenging the classification to show that it is purely arbitrary. Coria, 120 Wash.2d at 172, 839 P.2d 890. Here, the purpose of the law is to improve public safety by placing the most dangerous criminals in prison; reduce the number of serious, repeat offenders by tougher sentencing; set proper and simplified sentencing practices that both the victims and persistent offenders can understand; and restore public trust in our criminal justice system by directly involving the people in the process. RCW 9.94A.392. The rational basis test requires only that the statute's means are rationally related to its goal, not that the means are the best way of achieving the goal. Coria, 120 Wash.2d at 173, 839 P.2d 890. The legislating body has broad discretion to determine what the public interest demands and what measures are necessary to protect that interest. Ward, 123 Wash.2d at 516, 869 P.2d 1062. The classification of criminals as persistent offenders based on having committed three serious offenses is rationally related to the goals enunciated in the Act. A state is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely than it punishes a first offender. In re Grisby, 121 Wash.2d 419, 429, 853 P.2d 901 (1993) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3012, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983)). We find that the Persistent Offender Accountability Act passes the rational basis test of the equal protection guarantee.