Opinion ID: 1113193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Siegel testimony.

Text: (12) Defendant complains that his confrontation, due process, fair trial, and reliable-penalty rights were violated when Dr. Siegel, the prosecution drug expert, disclosed prejudicial hearsay information while explaining his conclusions on direct examination. Defendant accuses the prosecutor of using Dr. Siegel as an improper means of introducing hearsay for truth. Defendant blames the court and his trial counsel for failing to intervene. However, the trial court had no sua sponte duty to exclude evidence, remedy misconduct, or instruct the jury on specific evidentiary limitations. (See discussion, ante, pp. 914-915; see also People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 130-131 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561]; People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 64 [177 Cal. Rptr. 458, 634 P.2d 534, 23 A.L.R.4th 776].) Thus, counsel's failure to act waived direct claims of error. On the other hand, we find no incompetence warranting reversal. An expert may generally base his opinion on any matter known to him, including hearsay not otherwise admissible, which may reasonably ... be relied upon for that purpose. (Evid. Code, ง 801, subd. (b); In re Fields (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1063, 1070 [275 Cal. Rptr. 384, 800 P.2d 862].) (13) On direct examination, the expert may explain the reasons for his opinions, including the matters he considered in forming them. However, prejudice may arise if, `under the guise of reasons,' the expert's detailed explanation `[brings] before the jury incompetent hearsay evidence.' ( People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 583 [286 Cal. Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893], quoting People v. Coleman (1985) 38 Cal.3d 69, 92 [211 Cal. Rptr. 102, 695 P.2d 189].) Because an expert's need to consider extrajudicial matters, and a jury's need for information sufficient to evaluate an expert opinion, may conflict with an accused's interest in avoiding substantive use of unreliable hearsay, disputes in this area must generally be left to the trial court's sound judgment. ( Nicolaus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 582; see People v. Cole (1956) 47 Cal.2d 99, 105 [301 P.2d 854, 56 A.L.R.2d 1435].) Most often, hearsay problems will be cured by an instruction that matters admitted through an expert go only to the basis of his opinion and should not be considered for their truth. ( Coleman, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 92.) Sometimes a limiting instruction may not be enough. In such cases, Evidence Code section 352 authorizes the court to exclude from an expert's testimony any hearsay matter whose irrelevance, unreliability, or potential for prejudice outweighs its proper probative value. ( Coleman, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 91-93.) Here, the jury received CALJIC No. 2.07, which instructed that some evidence had been admitted for a limited purpose and must be considered accordingly. However, this instruction was never tied to particular evidence, and the jury's attention was never drawn to specific hearsay information disclosed by expert witnesses which should only be considered as a basis for evaluating their opinions. With this background in mind, we proceed to defendant's individual claims.