Opinion ID: 869748
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of Vacatur

Text: Having vacated Count 7, we address whether we must remand for resentencing de novo. Resentencing on all counts is warranted “when a multicount conviction produces an aggregate sentence or sentencing package.” United States v. Davis, 112 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Resentencing de novo is necessary when a defendant is found guilty on a multicount indictment, there is a strong likelihood that the district court will craft a disposition in which the sentences on the various counts form part of an overall plan. When a conviction on one or more of the component counts is vacated, common sense dictates that the judge should be free to review the efficacy of what remains in light of the original plan, and to reconstruct the sentencing architecture upon remand . . . if that appears necessary in order to ensure that the punishment still fits both crime and criminal. Id. (citing United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1989)). District courts should resentence de novo when an interdependent count of an aggregate sentence is vacated. Id. at 123. In United States v. Miller, the defendant‟s two child pornography counts were grouped, but when one of the 51 counts was vacated on appeal, the remaining count had a lower total offense level, and thus we held that de novo resentencing was appropriate. 594 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 2010). Similarly, in Davis, the defendant‟s counts for drug offenses and for use of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense were grouped. 112 F.3d at 119. After vacating the firearm offense, we recognized that those counts were interdependent because without the firearm offense, the total sentence would be calculated differently. Id. at 121. Here, the District Court combined the offenses into multiple groups, each of which received its own sentence that ran consecutive to the other groups‟ sentence. In the group containing Count 7, Counts 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, and 21 were also included because the offense level for those counts is determined largely based on loss amount. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d). Under the Sentencing Guidelines, when multiple counts are grouped, the court applies the Guideline for the count with the highest offense level. Id. § 3D1.3(a). In the relevant group, the money laundering conspiracy, Count 21, led to the highest offense level, and resulted in an adjusted offense level of 44. See id. §§ 2B1.1(b)(1)(J), 2C1.1(a)(1), (b), 2S1.1(a)(1), 3A1.1(b), 3C1.1. Because the remaining groups‟ offense levels are far lower, they did not affect Ciavarella‟s total offense level. Id. § 3D1.4(c). With the maximum offense level of 43 and a criminal history category of I, his advisory Guideline range is life imprisonment. Absent Count 7, Ciavarella‟s total offense level and advisory Guideline range is identical. Ultimately, however, the District Court sentenced Ciavarella to a below-Guidelines sentence of 336 months‟ imprisonment, which included a 240-month sentence for the group of offenses containing Count 7. Thus, because the vacated count did not affect Ciavarella‟s total 52 offense level, Guideline range, or sentence, we hold that resentencing de novo is not required. Davis, 112 F.3d at 12123. However, because Ciavarella was ordered to pay a special assessment of a hundred dollars for each count, including Count 7, totaling $1,200, we will vacate the imposition of the special assessment as to Count 7 and remand to the District Court to amend the judgment to reduce the special assessment consistent with this opinion.