Opinion ID: 1444288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Bolin's Case

Text: Bolin argued that the district court erred in finding that his sentencing in two separate cases on the same day did not constitute a single multiple conviction case under K.S.A. 21-4720(b). The Bolin panel reasoned that the legislature changed the statute to limit the application of the double rule to multiple counts within an (the same) information, complaint, or indictment. 24 Kan. App. 2d at 885. The Court of Appeals in Bolin held that all subsections of K.S.A. 21-4720(b) must be construed together. Under the rationale of Roderick, the Bolin panel concluded: K.S.A. 21-4720(b)(5) is held to apply to nonbase sentences included in the same charging document as the base sentence. 24 Kan App.2d 882, Syl. ¶ 3. We agree. The panel in Bolin then noted: We are not unmindful of the decision of a panel of this court in State v. Christensen, 23 Kan. App.2d 910, 937 P.2d 1239 (1997). Suffice it to say, we do not agree with that decision as it pertains to the issue of whether and how K.S.A. 21-4720(b)(5) should be applied when sentencing a defendant for multiple crimes arising from several charging documents all on the same day. 24 Kan. App.2d at 886. The interpretation of the KSGA is a question of law, and thus, our review is unlimited. State v. Donlay, 253 Kan. 132, 133-34, 853 P.2d 680 (1993). Under the fundamental rule of statutory construction, the intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be ascertained from the statute. The general rule is that a criminal statute must be strictly construed in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt about the meaning is decided in favor of anyone subjected to the criminal statute. The strict construction rule, however, is subordinate to the rule that judicial interpretation must be reasonable and sensible to effect legislative design and intent. State v. Cox, 258 Kan. 557, Syl. ¶ 7, 908 P.2d 603 (1995). Although the Bolin-Christensen conflict is not easily resolved, the rationale of the Bolin panel in extending Roderick is persuasive. The legislature changed K.S.A. 21-4720(b) (effective July 1, 1994) to limit the application of the double rule to cases involving multiple convictions arising from the same charging document. As the panel in Bolin pointed out, [a]ll sections of a statute must be construed together. 24 Kan. App.2d at 885. The legislature eliminated all references to conviction events and used the language an information in subsection (b)(4) to implement the limitation of the reach of K.S.A. 21-4720(b). (Emphasis added.) In construing statutes and determining legislative intent, several provisions of an act, in pari materia, must be construed together with a view of reconciling and bringing them into workable harmony if possible. [Citation omitted.] State v. Vega-Fuentes, 264 Kan. 10, 14, 955 P.2d 1235 (1998). The provisions of K.S.A. 21-4720(b) should be construed consistently. The district court properly sentenced Bolin. Bolin argues that even if Roderick is extended, he must be given the benefit of K.S.A. 21-4720 under State v. Riley, 259 Kan. 774, 778, 915 P.2d 774 (1996), because his forgery crimes were committed before July 1, 1994. We disagree. Riley's multiple crimes arising from multiple charging documents were committed before the legislative changes relied upon in Roderick. We held Riley should have been sentenced under K.S.A. 21-4720(b). As a result, Riley's criminal history was improperly computed, and his nonbase crimes should have had a criminal history of I under K.S.A. 21-4720(b)(5). 259 Kan. at 778. Riley does not affect Bolin's sentence. The Riley rule is applicable only to: (1) crimes committed before July 1, 1994, the date K.S.A. 21-4720(b) was amended; and (2) sentencing on convictions for pre-July 1, 1994 crimes, whether they arise from a single or multiple charging documents. Only Bolin's forgery counts occurred before July 1, 1994 (94 CRM 622). The crimes in Bolin's second case (94 CRM 938) were committed after July 1, 1994, and therefore do not come under the Riley rule. Bolin's sentences on the forgery counts and on the burglary/ obstruction counts would each be multiple conviction cases and subject to the limitation in K.S.A. 21-4720(b)(5). Subsection (b)(5) would shorten Bolin's nonbase sentences. However, Bolin's two 14-month sentences in the forgery cases were ordered served concurrently. The same is true with the burglary/obstruction sentences. Bolin's base sentence was 10 months on the burglary charge. He received 10 months on the felony obstruction charge, the nonbase sentence. The sentences Bolin serves will not change even if K.S.A. 21-4720(b)(5) is applied to his nonbase sentences because he is serving the nonbase sentences concurrent with his base sentences. The base sentences are not affected by the application of K.S.A. 21-4720(b)(5).