Opinion ID: 2148470
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Level of Individualized Suspicion Required

Text: In light of these principles from Griffin and Knights, we apply the totality-of-the-circumstances test to the facts of this case to determine whether this search was reasonable at its inception and in its scope under the fourth amendment. When evaluating the propriety of this search pursuant to Bircher's search condition, we balance the level of intrusion on personal privacy against the degree of need for the search to promote legitimate government interests. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-19, 122 S.Ct. at 591, 151 L.Ed.2d at 505. The State of Illinois certainly has a legitimate interest in promoting its probation system effectively. Like Wisconsin in Griffin, we recognize that our probation system serves the purposes of rehabilitating probationers while punishing them and protecting the public from crime. People v. Meyer, 176 Ill.2d 372, 379, 223 Ill.Dec. 582, 680 N.E.2d 315 (1997); Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875, 107 S.Ct. at 3169, 97 L.Ed.2d at 718. We agree that supervising the administration of the probation system is a special need of the state beyond the typical needs of law enforcement that justifies a greater governmental intrusion on privacy than would be constitutional as to an ordinary citizen. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875, 107 S.Ct. at 3169, 97 L.Ed.2d at 718; Knights, 534 U.S. at 120-21, 122 S.Ct. at 592, 151 L.Ed.2d at 506. In addition, imposing the traditional warrant and probable-cause requirements would unduly interfere with the effective administration of the Illinois probation system. See Adams, 149 Ill.2d at 342, 173 Ill.Dec. 600, 597 N.E.2d 574, citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1414, 103 L.Ed.2d 639, 661 (1989). The probation officer, given his or her personal experience with the probationer, is better able to determine the level of supervision required than a neutral magistrate, and the process of obtaining a warrant would delay the officer's ability to respond to evidence of misconduct by the probationer. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876, 107 S.Ct. at 3170, 97 L.Ed.2d at 719. Similarly, requiring probable cause would facilitate the probationer's evasion of probation conditions through concealment of misconduct. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 878, 107 S.Ct. at 3171, 97 L.Ed.2d at 720. We acknowledge that the importance of the Illinois probation system may justify a warrantless search of a probationer upon a lesser degree of suspicion than probable cause. A probationer has a reduced expectation of privacy compared to ordinary citizens because he or she is a criminal offender. Adams, 149 Ill.2d at 348, 173 Ill.Dec. 600, 597 N.E.2d 574. Specifically, section 5-6-3 of the Code authorizes the imposition of reasonable probation conditions, which legitimately limit a probationer's liberty. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874, 107 S.Ct. at 3169, 97 L.Ed.2d at 718. The Court in Knights concluded that the defendant had a significantly diminished expectation of privacy because of his acceptance of the broad search condition of his probation order. Knights, 534 U.S. at 119-20, 122 S.Ct. at 591-92, 151 L.Ed.2d at 505. However, Knights' probation condition was broader than Bircher's condition in that it permitted a search by any probation officer or law enforcement officer instead of a search as directed by her Probation Officer and in that it lacked the limitation found in Bircher's condition that the search be to verify compliance with the conditions of this Probation Order. Knights, 534 U.S. at 114, 122 S.Ct. at 589, 151 L.Ed.2d at 502. The Court recognized a correlation between the terms of the probation search condition and the degree of the probationer's expectation of privacy, which in turn influences the level of individualized suspicion required to justify a search: We do not decide whether the probation condition so diminished, or completely eliminated, Knights' reasonable expectation of privacy    that a search by a law enforcement officer without any individualized suspicion would have satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Knights, 534 U.S. at 120 n. 6, 122 S.Ct. at 592 n. 6, 151 L.Ed.2d at 505 n. 6. Because Bircher agreed to a more limited probation search condition than Knights, her expectation of privacy was not as diminished, and more individualized suspicion was required by the fourth amendment than would have been required for Knights. The Court in Knights did not reach the issue of the minimum level of individualized suspicion that would have satisfied the fourth amendment. Knights, 534 U.S. at 120 n. 6, 122 S.Ct. at 592 n. 6, 151 L.Ed.2d at 505 n.6. However, we conclude that this comparison lends support to the assertion that a probation search of Bircher upon no individualized suspicion would be constitutionally unreasonable. In addition, although Bircher has a reduced expectation of privacy as a probationer subject to a search condition, the search of the motel room remains a significant intrusion on her privacy. United States v. Crawford, 323 F.3d 700, 715-16 (9th Cir.2003); see also Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657-60, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 2392-94, 132 L.Ed.2d 564, 577-79 (1995) (analyzing defendant's expectation of privacy separately from degree of intrusiveness of the search when evaluating the reasonableness of a warrantless search under the fourth amendment). Again, whether or not room 14 was Bircher's actual residence at the time of the search, we regard fourth amendment protection for guests in motel rooms the same as for residents in their private homes. Eichelberger, 91 Ill.2d at 364-65, 63 Ill.Dec. 402, 438 N.E.2d 140; Stoner, 376 U.S. at 490, 84 S.Ct. at 893, 11 L.Ed.2d at 861. The importance of fourth amendment protection in one's home has been stressed by the Court, The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's homea zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms: `The right of the people to be secure in their ... houses ... shall not be violated.' Payton, 445 U.S. at 589, 100 S.Ct. at 1381-82, 63 L.Ed.2d at 653, quoting U.S. Const., amend. IV. See White, 117 Ill.2d at 210, 111 Ill.Dec. 288, 512 N.E.2d 677. The primacy of fourth amendment protection against intrusions into a person's home further encourages us to require some level of individualized suspicion prior to a probation search of a probationer's residence. After balancing these privacy and government interest considerations under the circumstances of this case, we find that the officers were constitutionally authorized to search the motel room only if they had reasonable suspicion of a probation violation by Bircher. Even though neither Bircher's probation order nor Illinois regulations imposed a reasonable suspicion requirement, the search can be valid under the fourth amendment if the officers actually had reasonable suspicion of a probation violation supporting the probation search. See, e.g., United States v. Vincent, 167 F.3d 428, 431 (8th Cir.1999) (probation search is permissible, even if probation condition is overbroad, if the search authority is narrowly and properly exercised). Even though the Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed this issue, we note that the clear majority of federal courts of appeals also require reasonable suspicion to support a probation search. United States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 576 (1st Cir.1990); United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 790 n. 4 (4th Cir.1978); United States v. Scott, 678 F.2d 32, 35 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Payne, 181 F.3d 781, 787 (6th Cir.1999); Vincent, 167 F.3d at 431; Crawford, 323 F.3d at 714. The only case that has found that no individualized suspicion was required for a probation search was decided prior to the Griffin and Knights cases. Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1368 (11th Cir.1982). In addition, none of the cases in which the Court has permitted warrantless searches without individualized suspicion involved a search of the home. Crawford, 323 F.3d at 712; see, e.g., Acton, 515 U.S. at 650, 664-65, 115 S.Ct. at 2389, 2396, 132 L.Ed.2d at 572, 582 (permitting warrantless, suspicionless drug testing of interscholastic athletes); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 659-60, 677, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 1387, 1396-97, 103 L.Ed.2d 685, 698, 709 (1989) (allowing warrantless, suspicionless drug testing of U.S. Customs employees who have contact with illegal drugs, firearms or classified materials); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606, 624, 109 S.Ct. at 1407, 1417, 103 L.Ed.2d at 653, 664 (upholding warrantless, suspicionless mandated drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees involved in certain train accidents). The Court's conclusions in these cases were based, in part, on the fact that the urinalysis tests were conducted in such a manner that the invasion of privacy was not significant. Acton, 515 U.S. at 660, 115 S.Ct. at 2394, 132 L.Ed.2d at 579; see also Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. at 1394 n. 2, 103 L.Ed.2d at 706 n. 2; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624-25, 109 S.Ct. at 1417, 103 L.Ed.2d at 664-65. The Court explained, Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspicion are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated by a search are minimal and where `other safeguards' are available `to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to the discretion of the official in the field.' Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 [99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660] (1979) (citation omitted). New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n. 8, 105 S.Ct. 733, 743 n. 8, 83 L.Ed.2d 720, 735 n. 8 (1985). In contrast, a search of a person's home, whether consisting of one room or an entire house, cannot be characterized as a minor invasion of privacy. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 & n. 12, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2041-42 & n. 12, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 695-96 & n. 12 (1969). The clear trend in the federal courts of appeals and the rarity of the Court's allowance of warrantless, suspicionless searches provide additional support for our conclusion that a probation search of the residence of a probationer subject to a search condition like Bircher's complies with the fourth amendment reasonableness requirement only if the searching officers had reasonable suspicion of a probation violation.