Opinion ID: 2995418
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 49 U.S.C. sec. 40116 et seq. (The

Text: Anti-Head Tax Act) Likewise, Miller’s claim also fails to state a cognizable federal cause of action under 49 U.S.C. sec. 40116. Section 40116 is part of the Anti-Head Tax Act (AHTA). There is no explicit grant of a private right of action in the AHTA. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, Michigan, 510 U.S. 355, 365 (1994) (Supreme Court declined to consider whether AHTA contained an implied private right of action). A private right of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 1519 (2001). In Sandoval, the Supreme Court outlined the standards to be utilized by federal courts in evaluating whether a statute contains a private right of action, holding: The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy. Statutory intent on this latter point is determinative. Without it, a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute. Raising up causes of action where a statute has not created them may be a proper function for common-law courts, but not for federal tribunals. Sandoval, 121 S.Ct. at 1519-20 (citations omitted); see also National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 2001 WL 1158973, at  (7th Cir. October 2, 2001) (when interpreting the remedial provisions of a statute, this court’s inquiry will begin and end with the statute’s text, if the text is unambiguous). Miller contends that the County charged it unreasonable rental fees in violation of sec. 40016(e)(2). The AHTA does not, however, set standards for assessing the reasonableness of fees and charges established by state municipalities, and, more importantly, there is nothing in the text of sec. 40116 granting a private remedy for violations of the statute. Because Congress’ statutory intent is determinative on the question of whether a statute contains a private remedy, a private right of action cannot be implied with respect to the AHTA./16 The Tenth Circuit recently reached this same conclusion in Southwest Air Ambulance, Inc. v. City of Las Cruces, 2001 WL 1230611,  (10th Cir. October 16, 2001)./17 See also Air Transport Ass’n of America v. City of Los Angeles, 844 F. Supp. 555 (C.D. Cal. 1994). In addition to the absence of any statutory support for finding an implied private right of action in the AHTA, the Southwest Air Ambulance court noted that its conclusion was further supported by a provision in the Federal Aviation Act (FAA) permitting any person to file a complaint with the Secretary of Transportation for violations of the AHTA (which is encompassed within the FAA). Id. at . We agree with the Tenth Circuit that the fact that Congress provided a means by which violations of the AHTA are ’fully enforceable through a general regulatory scheme’/18 can be a relevant consideration in determining whether a statute provides for an implied private right of action. However, in doing so we note that while [l]anguage in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that Congress through statutory text created . . . it may not create a right that Congress has not. Sandoval, 121 S.Ct. at 1522. Because neither Wis. Stat. sec. 114.14 nor 49 U.S.C. sec. 40116 provide for a private right of action, the district court erred in failing to retain jurisdiction over this claim and dismissing it as a matter of law. While we could remand the claim to the district court for its consideration, such action is unnecessary because an outright dismissal of the claim, under either state or federal law, is clearly warranted. When a claim plainly lacks merit, it is better [for the Court of Appeals] to resolve it on the merits rather than remand for a determination by the district judge . . . . Korzen v. Local Union 705, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 75 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 1996). See also Martin-Trigona v. Champion Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 892 F.2d 575, 578 (7th Cir. 1989).