Opinion ID: 176472
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The 1987 Act and the 1994 Act

Text: Nisqually does not dispute that neither the 1987 Act nor the 1994 Act provides an explicit right of enforcement in the statutory text. Thus, our only inquiry is whether either act provides an implied right of action. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), the Supreme Court outlined a four-factor inquiry for determining whether a statute provides an implied right of action. These factors are: (1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there is any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create or to deny [a private right of action]; (3) whether it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply a private right of action; and (4) whether the cause of action [is] one traditionally relegated to state law. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). In the context of Indian tribes, we have previously interpreted the fourth factor to turn on determining whether federal remedies would interfere with matters traditionally relegated to the control of semisovereign Indian tribes. Solomon v. Interior Reg'l Hous. Auth., 313 F.3d 1194, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted). (1) Nisqually is not one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080 (citation and quotation marks omitted). In applying the first Cort factor, courts look to whether the plaintiffs that claim a cause of action exists are specifically mentioned as beneficiaries in the statute. Opera Plaza Residential Parcel Homeowners Ass'n v. Hoang, 376 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir.2004). Nisqually is not mentioned in the statute; the only reference to any Indian tribe is found in the 1994 Act's declaration that the Community is not subject to the jurisdiction of any federally recognized tribe. Indians: Technical Corrections, Pub.L. No. 103-435, § 8, 108 Stat. 4566, 4569-70 (1994). The 1987 Act and the 1994 Act recognize the status of the Community, defining and setting limitations on the Community's ability to self govern. If there is a class, for whose benefit the statute was enacted, that class is the Community alone. (2) Although Cort outlines a four-factor analysis, the Supreme Court has subsequently explained that the second of the four factors raises the dispositive question: whether Congress intended to create a private right of action. Transamerica Mortgage, 444 U.S. at 24, 100 S.Ct. 242 (emphasis added). The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text. Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004). Reviewing the text of the Acts, there is no evidence of legislative intent to create a private right of action. The Acts simply recognize and define the Community; nothing suggests an intent to create a private right of action to enforce any particular provision therein. Finding no evidence of such intent in the Acts, we review the legislative history. Such review does not indicate that a private right of action was even considered when drafting and enacting the Acts. The district court noted that one of the uncontroverted facts of this case was that Congress amended [the 1987 Act] in 1994 at the behest of [the Community], whose members feared unilateral annexation into the Nisqually Tribal Reservation. Nisqually Indian Tribe v. Gregoire, 649 F.Supp.2d 1203, 1205 (W.D.Wash.2009). At the time, Nisqually was considering an amendment to its constitution which would have annexed the Community. Id. If anything, this background militates against finding a private right of action allowing Nisqually to sue under the Acts. (3) A private right of action is also not consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080. The Acts create and define the Community, grant it certain rights as a self-governing dependent Indian community, and impose certain limitations (for example, no class III gaming) on its ability to self-govern. This scheme explicitly seeks to establish the Community as self-governing, not to subject it to outside control through private rights of action to enforce the provisions recognizing and empowering the Community. (4) Finally, the collection of state tobacco taxes in Indian country is a matter relegated to the states and tribes. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 159-60, 161-63, 100 S.Ct. 2069, 65 L.Ed.2d 10 (1980); Wash. Rev.Code § 43.06.450 (granting the governor power to enter into contracts with Indian tribes in Washington to govern tobacco tax collection). Confederated Tribes reaffirmed that states have the authority to impose taxes on tobacco sales to non-Indians by Indian retailers. 447 U.S. at 150-51, 100 S.Ct. 2069. The Supreme Court noted that the state may attempt to collect such taxes directly or to enter into agreements with tribesa decision at the discretion of the state. Id. at 155-56, 100 S.Ct. 2069. Thus, in matters relating to state taxes, the state's means of enforcementwhether through direct collection, special contracts with tribes, or simply allowing non-Indian purchasers to flout [their] legal obligation to pay the tax, id. is an issue of state law. We find nothing in the 1987 Act or the 1994 Act which suggests a federal right of action. After examining the four Cort factors, we hold that Nisqually has no private right of action to enforce either the 1987 Act or the 1994 Act.