Opinion ID: 1360649
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Gross receipts obtained as a result of the offense

Text: Sandlin asserts a second reason why use of the gross receipts enhancement was improper. This reason has merit. He contends that he did not derive more than $1,000,000 as a result of the offense. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(13)(A). In adopting the PSR recommending a sentence under this provision, the district court implicitly found that the money Sandlin obtained was as a result of the offense. See United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 388 F.3d 466, 468 n. 8 (5th Cir.2004). A district court is entitled to accept the facts contained in a PSR when they constitute an adequate evidentiary basis and there is no rebuttal evidence from the defendant. United States v. Stalnaker, 571 F.3d 428, 441 (5th Cir.2009). Sandlin failed to present evidence on this issue and did not assert it as a defense until this appeal. Accordingly, we review for plain error. See United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 392 (5th Cir.2007). We have not previously interpreted the as a result of language from Section 2B1.1(b)(14)(A). Its simple language requires that the money be derived as a result of the violation of the statute. In contrast with our analysis under Sandlin's sufficiency of the evidence claim, this inquiry focuses on the actions of the bank. Specifically, we consider whether the bank extended credit because of Sandlin's false statements. The record is largely devoid of evidence relevant to this issue. The lack of evidence may stem from a pre-trial order granting a motion in limine in favor of the Government. That order excluded all evidence relating to whether Sandlin's false statements were material to the bank's decision, or whether the bank actually relied upon them in making the loans. Every indication is that the bank was not interested in checking behind Sandlin's application. Witnesses from the bank asserted that Sandlin's loans would have been permitted even if the Ricketts Loan had been listed. It is true that the bank's regional president also testified that it would concern him if it became apparent that the collateral for a loan included the proceeds of illegal activity. There is nothing to support, though, that Sandlin's identifying the Ricketts Loan would have made it apparent that illegal activity occurred. Our issue is whether the facts underlying the PSR on this point had such an inadequate evidentiary basis as to sink to the level of plain error. During oral argument, the Government suggested that the identification on the loan applications of this potentially illegal loan might have created suspicions that could have led to refusing the loan, not because of a lack of collateral but because of concerns created about Sandlin from the suspicious prior transaction. We find nothing beyond speculation to support this theory. To the contrary, the evidence was that Sandlin had been and remained a valued customer at Independent Bank. Had the motion in limine not been granted, there might have been more evidence on this. But the fact remains that the potentially toxic nature of the Ricketts Loan, whose fumes might even have caused a bank as customer-friendly as this one to feel faint, is pure speculation on this record. The onus is on Sandlin on plain error review to demonstrate the lack of an adequate evidentiary basis. United States v. Fernandez, 559 F.3d 303, 318 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that defendant bears the burden of persuasion on plain error review). We have examined the evidence available, looking for any to indicate a cause and effect relation between the omission of the information and the bank's decision to authorize the loan. There is none. As we have noted, plain error review requires satisfaction of three elements. First, there must be error and it must be plain. Peltier, 505 F.3d at 392. It is plain that an adequate evidentiary basis requires at least some evidence supporting the conclusions reached in the PSR. None exists on this record. The little evidence that does exist suggests that the funds were not obtained as a result of Sandlin's offense. There was error, and it is plain. Additionally, plain error must also affect a substantial right. Id. Sandlin's sentence was enhanced seventeen levels and increased from a potential zero to six month term to thirty-six months' imprisonment. An increase of this magnitude impacts Sandlin's substantial rights. See United States v. Gracia-Cantu, 302 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir.2002) (finding that a sixteen level enhancement affected defendant's substantial rights). Our final, overarching concern on plain error is whether the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Peltier, 505 F.3d at 392. We conclude that the dramatic increase in sentence satisfies the fourth prong by affecting the fairness of this proceeding. We therefore exercise our discretion to correct the unobjected-to error. Gracia-Cantu, 302 F.3d at 313. We therefore reverse and remand for resentencing. At a new sentencing hearing, the Government may offer evidence not presented previously to justify the sentence, and Sandlin may offer rebuttal. United States v. Kinder, 980 F.2d 961, 963 (5th Cir.1992). We have held that when a defendant succeeds in having a sentence vacated, on remand all new matter relevant to the issue appealed, reversed, and remanded, may be taken into consideration by the resentencing court. United States v. Marmolejo, 139 F.3d 528, 530 (5th Cir.1998). A district court should gather the relevant facts and evidence on the specific and particular issues heard by the appeals court and remanded for resentencing. Id.