Opinion ID: 2494456
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Validity of Rigterink's Miranda Warnings

Text: After examining the requirements of Miranda and its progeny, along with the decision in Powell II, we determine that the Miranda warning the police issued to Rigterink was sufficient. The warning was sufficient and not materially deficient under Miranda and its progeny because it reasonably conveyed to Rigterink that he had the right to counsel both before and during his custodial interrogation. This right to counsel emanates from the right against self-incrimination encompassed in both the Federal and Florida Constitutions. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution both provide a right against self-incrimination. See U.S. Const. amend. V (stating that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself); art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. (No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against oneself.). This Court has clearly outlined and delineated the historical and independent Florida right against self-incrimination as it exists under the Florida Constitution, and determined police must advise citizens that they have the right to counsel both before and during a custodial interrogation. See Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 965-66 (Fla.1992). However, this Court has interpreted the parameters of the manner in which that right is explained conterminously with the decision in Miranda and its progeny, and, as with the requirements under Miranda, we require that police reasonably convey to a suspect that he or she has the right to counsel both before and during a custodial interrogation. See, e.g., Miller, 42 So.3d at 221 (Based on this Court's analysis of Florida law and the `experience under Miranda and its progeny,' we outlined the [] rights that police officers must convey to a Florida suspect prior to a custodial interrogation to ensure the voluntariness of a confession. . . . (quoting Traylor, 596 So.2d at 966)). The warnings in this case reasonably conveyed to Rigterink his right to counsel because, given the context in which the police administered the Miranda warnings, the warnings provided a clear, understandable instruction that Rigterink had the right to counsel both before and during a custodial interrogation. This is in accord with the decision in Powell II because, there, the United States Supreme Court deemed a Miranda warning proper and sufficient that conveyed the right to counsel in language with no greater clarity than the language used in the warnings administered to Rigterink. Thus, because the warning in Powell II satisfied the parameters of Miranda and its progeny by reasonably conveying knowledge of the right to counsel both before and during a custodial interrogation, we conclude that, logically, the clearer and more descriptive warning administered to Rigterink in this case also complies with the requirements of Miranda and its progeny.