Opinion ID: 2507746
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Family and Medical Leave Act

Text: Under the FMLA, [6] an employee is entitled to 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period for childbirth or adoption; to care for a close relative with a serious health condition; or if the employee is unable to perform work-related duties due to a serious health condition. [7] The Act makes it unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right the Act provides. [8] The superior court found that Gregg was entitled to FMLA leave because she suffered from a serious health condition that made her unable to perform the functions of a police officer. Regulations implementing the Act define a serious health condition as a period of incapacity of at least four consecutive days that also involves continuing treatment by a health care provider. [9] They further define incapacity as an inability to work, attend school or perform other regular daily activities. [10] A plaintiff shows that he or she underwent continuing treatment by evidence that the plaintiff sought treatment two or more times from a health care provider. [11] In short, the federal regulation allows an employee to claim protection under the Act when she is able to show that she had a period of incapacity that lasted four or more days and involved at least two treatments from a health care provider. [12]
To claim the protection of the FMLA, Gregg had first to demonstrate that she was incapacitated for four or more days and unable to perform the essential functions of her employment. [13] It is evident from its decision that the court found Gregg was incapacitated by multiple health conditions from January until April 11, 1997. The superior court found that when Gregg requested leave without pay on April 11, she was clearly suffering from the cumulative effect of several health and mental conditions that constituted a serious health condition that made her unable to perform the functions of a police officer. These included the facts that [s]he was pregnant, she was recovering from injuries sustained in an automobile accident and she was going through significant mental stress. She was a victim of domestic violence and she needed time to deal with her personal issues. The court specifically found that testimony by Gregg's expert, Dr. Cynthia Dodge, who retroactively diagnosed that Gregg had suffered from post traumatic stress disorder from January to July 1997, had the strong ring of truth. Dr. Dodge based her conclusion on the traumatic event[s] of domestic violence that Gregg suffered in January of that year. Dr. Dodge explained that the symptoms of nightmare[s] ... intrusive memories... high levels of anxiety to the point of sleeplessness ... confusion, feeling overwhelmed and distressed, and a hypervigilance that Gregg reported were all consistent with a diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder. The doctor further concluded that Gregg's accident injuries and pregnancy contributed to this condition. [14] Dr. Dodge's testimony is the only medical evidence that Gregg suffered from an incapacitating health condition in April 1997. The parties stipulated that Gregg did not receive treatment from a health provider in April  for either her accident injuries or emotional distress  and Gregg presented no evidence at trial to show whether or not she received care related to her pregnancy at that time. It is undisputed that the health professionals that Gregg saw in January released her back to her duties. The Municipality disputes the court's conclusion on two levels. First, it argues that, as a matter of law, Gregg cannot establish that she was incapacitated in April, when she requested further leave, because she did not obtain a contemporaneous medical provider's diagnosis that she was unable to work. Secondly, it argues that Dr. Dodge's testimony is not credible, and that therefore the trial court's finding is without basis. Based upon its reading of federal precedent, the Municipality argues that the FMLA requires a contemporaneous diagnosis of the employee's incapacity by a health care provider. It notes that Gregg was, at the time of her request for leave, technically released back to work. And it points to the fact that Gregg saw no additional doctors in April to establish that she was not entitled to the Act's protection at that time. It is true that federal courts generally require that a plaintiff base proof of an FMLA claim on a health care provider's diagnosis, at some point, that the employee cannot work (or could not have worked) because of the illness. [15] But we do not read this precedent as substituting the opinion of on-the-scene medical professionals for the ultimate judgment of the fact-finder. For one thing, an employee could, as in this case, suffer from a condition, such as post traumatic stress disorder, which is not immediately capable of diagnosis by a non-specialist. When an employee is actually incapacitated by illness, the failure to get a correct diagnosis cannot disqualify an employee from the Act's protection. To hold that a doctor must agree, contemporaneously and at all times, that the employee is unable to work, places a burden on the employee that we find nowhere in the plain text of the Act, and ignores the reality of debilitating illness. Instead, the Act allows an employer to request a contemporary diagnosis at the time it grants FMLA leave; a safeguard that balances the rights of employer and employed. [16] The Municipality did not do so. [17] While this does not obviate the requirement that Gregg show that a medical professional considered her to be incapacitated, there was substantial evidence in the record in addition to Dr. Dodge's testimony that corroborates the conclusion that Gregg was incapacitated. [18] Once the trial court accepts evidence of a medical professional, in this case Dr. Dodge, that the plaintiff was incapacitated, that finding is protected by the clearly erroneous standard. [19] The Municipality also argues that the fact that health care providers she saw in January actually released Gregg back to work should bar her claims of incapacity in April. While the health care providers that Gregg saw in January 1997 released her back to work, the court found that  possibly due to the narrow focus of their examinations  they did not fully diagnose her combination of debilitating health conditions. In fact, they were unable to determine the extent of even her knee injuries because she could not be x-rayed while she was pregnant. The court found that Gregg continued to suffer pain from her accident injuries, and neither release adequately addressed her psychological stress. We conclude from these findings that in the course of Gregg's visits to health care providers in January, the extent of her incapacity was never fully diagnosed, and, therefore, the partial releases do not bar her claim. The Municipality also disputes the factual basis of the court's decision. It asserts that Dr. Dodge's testimony was not credible because her diagnosis was retroactive; because it did not definitely establish that Gregg was incapacitated for three or more days in April; and because Dr. Dodge did not know what the functions of the job of a police officer at APD were... [she] therefore could not and did not render an opinion of whether [Gregg's] alleged post traumatic stress disorder would have prevented her from performing the functions of her police officer job. The Municipality also notes that Dr. Dodge concurred that malingering should be suspected when a litigant seeks a post traumatic stress diagnosis. We address each of these concerns with Dr. Dodge's testimony in turn. While courts have rejected retroactive diagnoses, it is generally for other evidentiary reasons, such as when the diagnosis was also speculative or given without actually examining the patient. [20] The cases cited by the Municipality do not hold that retroactive medical diagnoses may never establish an FMLA claim. Here, the superior court was in the best position to weigh Dr. Dodge's retroactive diagnosis, subject to the rules of evidence, and concluded that her opinion was credible. We will not second guess the credibility of a witness on review. The Municipality also argues that Dr. Dodge's testimony did not establish that Gregg suffered from a period of incapacity in April because Dr. Dodge did not know when the post traumatic stress disorder began nor when it ended, and so could not have testified that a definite period of incapacity existed. The Municipality is correct that Dr. Dodge could not determine the exact date when Gregg's mental and emotional stress became incapacitating. But Dr. Dodge did state that it was her opinion that Gregg suffered the symptoms of a stress disorder from January to July 1997. In this bench trial, it was the court's role to determine if this broad diagnosis, together with the other facts of the record, reasonably established that in April Gregg was incapacitated for three or more days. Finally, the Municipality asserts that Dr. Dodge was not qualified to decide if Gregg was unable to perform the duties of a police officer. Dr. Dodge admitted that she did not know the basic qualifications of a police officer, but she also testified that, in her opinion, a person suffering from post traumatic stress disorder would not be competent for police work because of the high level of symptoms. What Dr. Dodge's testimony lacked in precision on this point is supplied by other non-medical evidence in the record. Beyond Dr. Dodge's diagnosis, the facts as found by the trial court support its conclusion that Gregg was incapacitated. Significantly, Woodward, Gregg's immediate supervisor and the only department officer reviewing her case, admitted in testimony that Gregg might have required a psych evaluation before she could return to work to see if her emotional stress was affecting her judgment. The Municipality as much as admits this in its brief when it states, Based on what he had seen of [Gregg's] behavior, Woodward believed that she should have been assessed for judgment issues. Judgment is a key concern for police officers. Gregg did testify that she continued to suffer from pain from her accident injuries and saw a specialist in October 1997, when she could be x-rayed after the birth of her child. And the fact that Gregg was in an abusive domestic relationship is relevant. A reasonable person could conclude that Gregg was effectively unable to work because she fled the state to leave an abusive husband who followed her, and that she was unable to perform daily activities because she was held in a hostage situation, where her behavior was dictated by the combination of fear for her children, a high level of emotional stress, her accident injuries, and her pregnancy. [21]
To earn the protection of the FMLA for a serious health condition, a plaintiff must also establish that her period of incapacity involved treatment two or more times by a health care provider. [22] The Eighth Circuit has observed that this reflects the [Department of Labor's] decision that `serious health condition' should be defined by an objective test that could be applied consistently based on the facts of each case. [23] The superior court found that Gregg had satisfied this requirement because she visited three medical providers for treatment of her accident injuries and pregnancy in January 1997. The Municipality maintains that the superior court erred in relying on this period of treatment because these providers released Gregg back to light duty at the end of January. It contends that Gregg would have to show that she received treatment in April when her request for further leave was denied, to qualify for further FMLA leave. The Municipality's first argument would read into the regulations a requirement that the length of an employee's leave should be determined by a medical professional, rather than decided as an accommodation between employer and employee. The purpose of the second regulatory factor is verification. It simply requires that the employee's serious health condition be serious enough to require two or more visits to a health care provider. [24] Such is the objective test. [25] The Act then entitles the employee to leave for any subsequent treatment or period of incapacity relating to the same condition. [26] The plain text of the regulation proves that it was unnecessary for Gregg to seek further treatment in April and yet still claim the Act's protection. Gregg saw three health providers in January. The court found that she was still suffering pain from the car accident after her visits, and that these trips to the doctors did not address the complete extent of her psychological stress. Gregg testified that she discussed the stress of her marriage with at least one of them, who prescribed Valium to Gregg according to his medical records. Thus, we may reasonably conclude that Gregg first qualified for FMLA leave in January, and since the trial court found that the same health conditions that caused her to seek treatment in January persisted through April, Gregg suffered through April a period of incapacity relating to the same conditions sufficient to satisfy the plain text of the regulation. [27]
To invoke the protection of the FMLA, an employee must notify his or her employer of her intention to take leave. [28] The requirements of this rule are flexible. If the employee's need for FMLA leave is based on foreseeable events or treatment, thirty days notice must be given to the employer. [29] Otherwise, the employee should give notice as soon as is practicable. [30] When the need for leave is unforeseeable, the employee need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA, but may only state that leave is needed. [31] Under this standard, whether an employee has given adequate notice will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. [32] The critical question is whether the information imparted to the employer is sufficient to reasonably apprise it of the employee's request to take time off for a serious health condition. [33] Accordingly, the test of whether or not an employee has given adequate notice is a factual one that we review for clear error. [34] The Municipality argues that Gregg failed to give sufficient notice because she stated only that she needed time to get her life back together on April 11 when she requested leave without pay. It asserts that Gregg, at a minimum, needed to alert Woodward of her need for medical treatment or another qualifying reason under the FMLA. The trial court found that Gregg gave proper notice, although she did not expressly invoke the FMLA. The record supports this conclusion. The Municipality placed Gregg on sick leave initially and, although her status changed to annual leave in March, the department never alerted her to her rights under the FMLA. Woodward was in weekly contact with Gregg and was aware of her injuries and domestic situation. The court found Gregg's testimony was credible that she informed Woodward on April 11 that she needed more time to deal with her injuries. It concluded that any reasonable person would have seen ... the significant mental stress [Gregg] was suffering from during the relevant times in this case. But neither Woodward nor the responsible department officer, Kinard, alerted Gregg to her rights under the FMLA or considered how the Act might grant her protected leave for her incapacity. The court reasonably determined that Gregg could not foresee her need for further leave on April 11. Gregg was in a stressful domestic situation, she had left Alaska, and Woodward presented her with an ultimatum on April 11 to either return to Alaska within three days or risk termination for abandoning her position. Therefore the Municipality cites incorrectly to the stricter standards of notice for foreseeable leave, 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c), rather than § 825.303, which governs unforeseeable leave. The Municipality's reliance on case law is similarly misplaced. [35] Instead, federal precedent supports a finding of proper notice where, as here, the plaintiff was initially placed on sick leave and mentioned an illness during her request for leave. [36]
Finally, the Municipality claims that even if Gregg established the elements of her FMLA claim, she did not qualify for further FMLA protection because by April 11, 1997, the Municipality had already given her the full extent of leave permitted under the Act. According to the Municipality's argument, Gregg took thirteen weeks of leave before she resigned, which is actually more than the Act guarantees, thus she suffered no prejudice from its refusal to grant her further leave. [37] The Municipality failed to raise this factual argument in the trial court, and it misstates the trial court's conclusion on appeal. The Municipality could be correct only if the court had found that it violated 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a), the failure to properly designate Gregg's leave. Section 825.700(a) provides in pertinent part that [i]f an employee takes paid or unpaid leave and the employer does not designate the leave as FMLA leave, the leave taken does not count against an employee's FMLA entitlement. For § 825.700(a) to be relevant, the Municipality would have had to establish that it had granted Gregg twelve weeks of FMLA leave concurrent with her regular department leave, and had simply failed to designate it as such. Instead the court found that Gregg was entitled to further FMLA leave in April, when she was forced to resign. [38] How much additional leave is a question of fact, which cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. [39]