Opinion ID: 1781095
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: trial court erred in refusing to disqualify himself and to vacate the temporary injunction which he granted.

Text: Following the issuance of the temporary restraining order, appellants filed a motion to vacate the order, alleging that the chancellor owned land at least as near to the property of the appellants as some of the named appellees; further, that the chancellor was an incorporator of the Benton Speedbowl, a competitor of the appellants, it being thus asserted that he was disqualified to act in the case, and it was contended that the order should be set aside. As to the first contention, the principal reason for seeking the disqualification of the judge according to appellants, was that he might feel that the value of his property was affected. A hearing was set, at which time the chancellor stated, with respect to the proximity of his home to appellants' property, that he lived from a mile and a half to two miles as the crow flies from the racetrack property, and that he did not feel that the track would have any bearing upon the value of my property whatsoever. There was no showing by appellants, nor any effort to show, that the chancellor had been subjected to noise caused by the racing motorcycles and, of course, the burden was upon appellants to make such a showing. As to the second ground for disqualification, the chancellor stated that he had been an incorporator of the Benton Speedbowl, incorporated in 1958, but that he had disposed of his interest about five years before the present suit, did not even know who was operating the Benton Speedbowl, and had no connection or interest whatsoever in the mentioned Speedbowl. The chancellor declined to disqualify. When the case came on for trial, appellants served a subpoena on the judge, who refused to honor same, stating that he certainly was not going to testify in a case that he was trying. At that time, he also stated to counsel for appellants, I will tell you anything you want to know. We think there was no showing that the court was interested as that term has been defined in Article 7, Section 20 of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas and Ark.Stat.Ann. § 22-113 (Repl.1962). [2] See Foreman v. Marianna, 43 Ark. 324. Appellants admit that the trial court stated that it no longer had an interest in the Benton Speedbowl, but then propounds the question, Did he sell or give it to a relative or close friend? Of course, this information could have been obtained by subpoenaing the records of the corporation; moreover, as already pointed out, the court stated that it would tell you anything you want to know, but no questions were asked in this regard. We are of the view that the record falls short of reflecting facts that would warrant disqualification.