Opinion ID: 2996779
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reasonableness of the Detentions

Text: After being taken into custody, the plaintiffs waited for some time to be transported to PPS. They were then detained at PPS between three and fourteen and one-half hours. All but one of the plaintiffs was detained over four hours. Twelve of the fifteen were detained over six hours. Six were detained over eight hours. The plaintiffs complain that the length of these detentions was constitutionally unreasonable.
An excessive length of detention may be sufficient to violate the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court held in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), that an officer’s “on-the-scene assessment of probable cause” justifies an arrest and “a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps incident to arrest.” Id. at 113-14. The Court also held that individuals arrested without a warrant are entitled to a timely and judicial determination of probable cause prior to “extended restraint of liberty following arrest.” Id. at 114; see also id. at 126. The Court left unspecified in Gerstein just how “promptly” a probable cause determination had to be made, see id. at 125, but in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), the Court clarified that a determination of probable cause within forty-eight hours is presumptively reasonable, see id. at 56. In the case of detentions over forty10 No. 03-1329 eight hours, the government bears the burden of proving an emergency or other extraordinary circumstance which justifies the delay. Id. at 57. County of Riverside is generally invoked to evaluate cases involving extended detention because the forty-eight hour framework governs the length of time which may elapse before a probable cause hearing. See, e.g., Kyle v. Patterson, 196 F.3d 695, 696 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Sholola, 124 F.3d 803, 819-21 (7th Cir. 1997). Here, neither extended detention of the plaintiffs nor probable cause hearings were contemplated. Rather, police held the plaintiffs only while they completed their processing. County of Riverside is relevant to this discussion, nonetheless, because the Court noted in County of Riverside that unreasonable delays, even within the forty-eight hour period, may be constitutionally troublesome. See County of Riverside, 500 U.S. at 56. The Court specified: “Examples of unreasonable delay are delays for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay’s sake.” Id. Thus, under Gerstein and County of Riverside, the length of time taken to complete administrative steps incident to arrest must be reasonable. This court has addressed previously the reasonableness of the length of detention during administrative steps. In Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336 (7th Cir. 1985), we required defendants to explain why individuals spent more than four hours in jail after they were arrested in the middle of the night for a minor offense. See id. at 135051. Similarly, in Gramenos v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 797 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1986), an individual was arrested for shoplifting and detained for four hours in the middle of the night. See id. at 437. As to the length of detention, we noted: No. 03-1329 11 It is premature to say how long is too long under the fourth amendment. On remand the police should ex- plain what must be done after an arrest for shoplifting and why reasonably diligent officers need more than four hours to do it. The court also should determine whether four hours is an acceptable period for a nonviolent misdemeanor. Id. We also suggested that “[i]f the police choose to perform time-consuming tasks after an arrest, perhaps they must do so on their own time rather than the suspect’s, issuing a citation rather than keeping the suspect locked up in the interim.” Id. We later stated that the reasonableness of a length of detention typically “is a question best left open for juries to answer based on the facts presented in each case.” Lewis v. O’Grady, 853 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that an eleven-hour detention of individual waiting to be discharged presented a jury question). All but one of these plaintiffs was held for longer than four hours at PPS. Many were held substantially longer than four hours. Under Moore and Gramenos, we require an explanation for the length of the plaintiffs’ detentions. See also Arlotta v. Bradley Center, No. 03-1584, slip op. at 11 (7th Cir. Nov. 18, 2003) (evaluating government’s explanation of the length of detention of an individual arrested as part of the Bradley Center initiative). The defendants explain the length of the detention as a product of backlog. They note that PPS is the processing facility for the downtown area, that PPS is busiest in late evening to early morning and that the arrest of large groups can cause a backlog at PPS. The defendants also note that supervisors monitored the progress of the booking process and that arresting officers processed the paperwork as quickly as they could, given the number of arrestees for which each was responsible and the number of arrestees at 12 No. 03-1329 PPS. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, have not argued that the detention times were the result of “delay for delay’s sake,” County of Riverside, 500 U.S. at 56, or for any other 3 impermissible reason. They merely assert that the times were unreasonably long. The detention times of the plaintiffs, on average, were significantly longer than the four-hour periods which gave us pause in Moore and Gramenos and which another panel of this court evaluated in Arlotta. Nonetheless, in the absence of any evidence of improper purpose for the delay, we believe the government has provided a sufficient explanation. Cf. Gramenos, 797 F.2d at 436-37 (noting lack of evidence of time required to complete tasks and evidence of punitive intent); Moore, 754 F.2d at 1350-51 (noting absence of any evidence justifying length of detention). The Supreme Court cautioned in County of Riverside that, in evaluating the reasonableness of delay, “courts must allow a substantial degree of flexibility.” County of Riverside, 500 U.S. at 56. The Court warned: Courts cannot ignore the often unavoidable delays in transporting arrested persons from one facility to an- 3 We have reviewed the record carefully and have discovered no evidence that the plaintiffs were held for any improper purpose. See Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., Inc., 797 F.2d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting additional evidence that police held individual “out of spite—or perhaps to impose the real punishment for shoplifting”). Although Lieutenant Edman described the initiative as a “more affirmative action,” R.27, Ex.F at 38, that statement must be considered in the context of the perceived ineffectiveness of citations given on the scene. Alone, the comment does not provide evidence of improper purpose. Furthermore, the plaintiffs have not argued that police held them out of spite or with intent to punish. No. 03-1329 13 other, handling late-night bookings where no magistrate is readily available, obtaining the presence of an arresting officer who may be busy processing other suspects or securing the premises of an arrest, and other practical realities. Id. at 56-57. The Court issued this warning in reference to determinations about the reasonableness of delay in probable cause determinations, but the circumspection the Court advises applies to this situation as well. We must conclude, therefore, that the length of the plaintiffs’ detentions was not constitutionally unreasonable given the natural backlog in processing at PPS.
Even had the length of the detentions warranted a jury determination of reasonableness, the plaintiffs could not 4 succeed on their § 1983 claim against the City. The Supreme Court determined in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), that a government entity is only liable under § 1983 when execution of a government policy or custom “by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy” inflicts the injury of which the plaintiff complains. Id. at 694; see Henry 4 The plaintiffs also have sued Chief Jones but have not specified whether they are bringing their claims against him in his official capacity or his individual capacity. There is no evidence that Chief Jones was personally involved in the arrests of the plaintiffs or the development of the Bradley Center initiative. We consider the suit against him, therefore, to be in his official capacity. Claims against Chief Jones in his official capacity suit are effectively claims against the City. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). 14 No. 03-1329 v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1237 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that plaintiffs must prove that their injury “was caused by an official municipal policy or custom”); see also Arlotta, slip op. at 8 (“To state a § 1983 claim against a municipality, a complaint must allege that a constitutional deprivation was caused by an official policy or custom.”). We do not believe the plaintiffs can establish that the length of their detentions was caused by an “official policy or custom.” Our case law establishes that unconstitutional policies or customs take three forms: (1) an express policy that causes a constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread practice, that, although unauthorized, is so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a “custom or usage” with the force of law; or (3) an allegation that a person with final policymaking authority caused the injury. See Rasche v. Vill. of Beecher, 336 F.3d 588, 597 (7th Cir. 2003). The plaintiffs attempt to proceed under the first method by establishing an express policy. Only those individuals with the requisite policymaking authority are capable of establishing “official policy” as required by Monell. See Cornfield by Lewis v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1324-25 (7th Cir. 1993). The plaintiffs argue that the Bradley Center initiative constituted a policy upon which to predicate § 1983 liability. They contend that the decision to arrest summarily all offenders, combined with the standard processing procedures at PPS, led to constitutional injury. We cannot agree 5 with these contentions. 5 We note that, in Arlotta, another case involving claims of a plaintiff arrested as part of the Bradley Center initiative, another panel of this court determined that the plaintiff could not es- (continued...) No. 03-1329 15 The record indicates that Lieutenant Edman developed the Bradley Center initiative with the approval of Deputy 6 Chief Barber. The discretionary decisions of an employee without policymaking authority are insufficient to establish § 1983 liability. See McNabola v. Chi. Transit Auth., 10 F.3d 501, 510 (7th Cir. 1993); see also City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (plurality) (discussing insufficiency of decisions by subordinate municipal employees without 5 (...continued) tablish a § 1983 claim under Monell because causation between the alleged policy and the injury was lacking. Arlotta, slip op. at 10. Because our colleagues found causation to be absent, they did not specifically address whether the Bradley Center initiative qualified as an “official policy” under Monell. Our analysis does not disturb the reasoning in Arlotta. 6 It is true that a departmental policy permitted the arrest and detention of fine-only offenders, but our focus must be on the more particularized decision to arrest ticket scalpers and subject them to the routine at issue. That particular decision was the alleged source of injury and provides the appropriate level of meaningful specificity. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1984) (plurality) (“[S]ome limitation must be placed on establishing municipal liability through policies that are not themselves unconstitutional, or the test set out in Monell [v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978),] will become a dead letter. Obviously, if one retreats far enough from a constitutional violation some municipal policy can be identified behind almost any such harm inflicted by a municipal official . . . .”); see also Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481-82 (1986) (“The fact that a particular official—even a policymaking official—has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion.”). 16 No. 03-1329 final decisionmaking authority); Fiorenzo v. Nolan, 965 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[A] municipality is not liable merely because the official who inflicted the alleged constitutional injury had the discretion to act on its behalf; rather, the official in question must possess final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the challenged action.”). Whether the lieutenant or the deputy chief had the authority to set official policy is a question of state law. See Horwitz v. Bd. of Educ. of Avoca Sch. Dist. No. 37, 260 F.3d 602, 619 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124 (plurality). There is no indication that these officers had policymaking authority; rather, the police chief is charged with the command and rule-making responsibilities for the police department under Wisconsin law. See Wis. Stat. § 62.09(7)(c) & (13)(a); see also Monfils v. Taylor, 165 F.3d 511, 517-18 (7th Cir. 1998) (refusing to find municipal liability based on the acts of a Wisconsin deputy chief when evidence did not establish ratification by the police chief). There is no evidence that Chief Jones was involved in the 7 development of the Bradley Center initiative. Without the involvement of a policymaker, the decisions of subordinate employees do not suffice to establish municipal liability. Thus, the plaintiffs cannot succeed on their § 1983 claim against the City.