Opinion ID: 2981055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Florence Bank Robbery

Text: Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that a defendant’s prior bad acts may not be used as proof of propensity, though they may be offered for certain other permissible purposes. Admission under Rule 404(b) is limited by Rule 403, which requires the balancing of evidence’s probative value against its prejudicial impact. While I agree that Washam’s statement about his cocaine addiction was admissible to show motive, I cannot concur that the Florence 2 The majority fails to mention that the only employee to identify Washam at trial was not one of the tellers and was the employee with the worst vantage point to observe the robber. - 19 - No. 07-6179 United States v. Washam robbery was probative of identity under Rule 404(b). Additionally, the district court utterly failed to tailor the admission of the Florence robbery to any permissible purpose, in contravention of Rule 403. “Prior acts or crimes [may] be admitted to show identity, provided they are of ‘sufficient distinctive similarity’ with the charges in the indictment to ‘create a pattern or modus operandi.’” United States v. Allen, 619 F.3d 518, 524 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Perry, 438 F.3d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 2006), Mack, 258 F.3d at 554). This case falls far below that standard. Here, the commonalities, even if viewed cumulatively, were not sufficiently unique to constitute a signature or modus operandi that would be at all probative of identity. At best, the similarities were vague—a nondescript perpetrator committing a robbery in an unorganized and unsophisticated fashion. This level of generality cannot rise to the level of a common plan, a distinctive pattern, or a signature. See United States v. Clay, 667 F.3d 689, 695–96 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Phillips, 599 F.2d 134, 136 (6th Cir. 1979). Instead, the generalities of the prior crime only emphasized the impermissible inferences that (1) Washam was a “bad man” by virtue of his criminal history; and (2) that because he committed another robbery, be probably committed the ones charged. Phillips, 599 F.2d at 136; United States v. Johnson, 27 F.3d 1186, 1193 (6th Cir. 1994). If the parallels claimed here were truly “distinctive,” as the majority contends (Maj. Op. 7), then the exception swallows the rule, and the admission of propensity evidence becomes the standard of the day. Comparing this case to others where we have applied a totality-of-similarities approach reveals just how threadbare the alleged similarities are in this case. For instance, in Mack we found - 20 - No. 07-6179 United States v. Washam that Rule 404(b) evidence was properly admitted where, over a series of over nine robberies, the perpetrator wore a ski mask with a hooded sweatshirt, leapt over the teller counter to retrieve the monies, and leapt back over it in leaving. Mack, 258 F.3d at 553–54. In Perry, we found a series of robberies sufficiently unique, where the perpetrator’s signature involved seeking change for a $50 bill and asking to purchase money orders before pulling a gun out of a bookbag and demanding money. Perry, 438 F.3d at 648. Likewise, in United States v. Price, 516 F.3d 597, 603–04 (6th Cir. 2008), the robber forced an employee into the closed bank at gunpoint, turned off the alarm, accessed the vault, and forced the employee to lie on the ground until he escaped. By comparison, the alleged commonalities in this case are utterly unremarkable. By contrast, the dissimilarities among the robberies Bowling Green and Florence robberies were far more distinctive than were any of their purported similarities. For instance, the means of the robber’s escape was not consistent. In the Bowling Green robberies, the perpetrator wore a baseball cap and sunglasses, but the Florence robber did not take such efforts to conceal his identity. Perhaps the most unusual aspect of the Bowling Green robberies—the ruse of asking for change of smaller bills into larger ones and vice versa—was not used in the Florence robbery. Cf Perry, 438 F.3d at 648. Moreover, the robber’s friendly demeanor was not consistent, as the majority claims. In at least one of the Bowling Green robberies, the teller testified that the robber was immediately aggressive with her. (RE 179, Tr. at 112.) Finally, even if the Florence robbery was relevant for certain limited purposes under Rule 404(b), Rule 403 requires its exclusion “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the - 21 - No. 07-6179 United States v. Washam danger of unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. The district court failed to strike the proper balance here. As the majority admits, the probative value of the Florence robbery to Washam’s guilt of the charged crimes was quite limited. However, despite acknowledging its prejudice, the court made no effort to limit the admission of the Florence robbery to its permissible evidentiary purposes. Instead, the court allowed the prosecution to introduce the entire body of evidence one would expect if Washam had been on trial for the Florence robbery instead. The government presented three different officers who testified in detail about their investigation of the Florence robbery, Washam’s attempt to evade authorities, his arrest shortly after fleeing the bank, and the incriminating evidence discovered on his person and in his car thereafter. See United States v. Hemphill, 76 F. App’x 6, 15 (6th Cir. 2003) (describing similar evidence as extrinsic and prejudicial to the jury’s evaluation of the crimes charged). The jury also heard extensive testimony from the Florence bank teller, who described not only her limited interactions with the robber, but also details that were not probative of the Bowling Green robber’s identity. The most blatant example occurred when the Florence teller was asked to identify Washam in court. Only after the defense objected and the teller was unable to immediately make an in-court identification, did the government abandon its efforts and concede that the Florence teller’s identification was not probative of the Bowling Green robber’s identity.3 3 The government’s attempt to secure this irrelevant identification also likely prejudiced Washam before the jury, because he refused to stand and smile at the teller’s request, giving the jury the impression that he was evasive and uncooperative. - 22 - No. 07-6179 United States v. Washam Moreover, the court admitted extensive testimony regarding the gun used in the Florence robbery. During opening statements, the prosecutor admitted that the gun was of limited probative value, because none of the Bowling Green employees could identify the gun as the one used against them.4 (RE 178, Tr. 142–43.) Despite the weakness of this link, the court admitted the gun into evidence, allowed the prosecution to prominently display it throughout trial, and permitted the prosecutor’s to encourage multiple witnesses to physically examine the weapon. The lead FBI agent of the Bowling Green crimes also used the gun as a prop and presented a detailed explanation of its capabilities and characteristics. This concerted emphasis went far beyond any limited permissible purpose. The government argues that it was necessary to introduce the full background of the Florence robbery because Washam’s motive and his link to the Bowling Green getaway car could not have been presented in another manner. These arguments are baseless. Washam’s statement about his cocaine addiction could have been introduced without mentioning the Florence robbery at all. Likewise, Washam’s sale of his white sedan the day after the Bowling Green robbery, while assuredly probative of his guilt, was a fact that existed independently to the details of the Florence robbery. The testimony of the car’s purchasers and of the state vehicle registration officials could easily have been presented without introducing the entire Florence case to the jury. 4 In fact, the Bowling Green employees never consistently testified that the gun was even similar to the one used against them. All the employees could say was that the gun they saw was a handgun; the employees inconsistently described the gun as silver, black, dark grey, metal, and plastic. (See, e.g. RE 154, 104; RE 179, 8–9.) - 23 - No. 07-6179 United States v. Washam Moreover, even if the purported similarities among the robberies were probative of the robber’s identity, their parallels could have been introduced by a variety of less prejudicial means, including: by defense stipulation, by reading from Washam’s plea agreement in the Florence case, by calling only the lead investigator of the Florence robbery, or by calling only the Florence teller. Clay, 667 F.3d at 697 (citing United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 723 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Merriweather, 78 F.3d 1070, 1077 (6th Cir. 1996)) (“One factor in balancing unfair prejudice against probative value under Rule 403 is the availability of other means of proof.”) At the very least, the testimony could have been curtailed substantially to limit its prejudicial effects. Instead, the transcript shows that the prosecution spent roughly forty percent of its case-in-chief presenting evidence to the jury about the Florence robbery. That amount of time, of course, only rises sharply if we consider the amount of time the defense spent combating the improperly admitted evidence. The facts of this case bear close similarity to those that caused the Third Circuit to reverse the defendant’s conviction in United States v. Hans, 738 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1984). In Hans, the trial court admitted the testimony of an investigating FBI agent, who described the manner in which the defendant became the suspect of the charged robbery. Id. at 94. The agent testified that, after learning that one of the other suspects was originally from Michigan, he contacted Detroit FBI agents and presented them with the modus operandi and a description of the robbers and “asked them if they had anyone from the area who might logically fit as a suspect in this matter.” Id. Despite the far more distinctive similarities among the crimes in Hans—all involving three armed robbers - 24 - No. 07-6179 United States v. Washam wearing Halloween masks, windbreakers, dark gloves, and ranging in height from 5’5” to 5’9”—the Third Circuit held that the agent’s testimony was improperly admitted propensity evidence. Id. at 95. The court explained that “the only reasonable inference that a reasonable juror could draw from [the agent’s] testimony was that [the defendant] was well-known as a bank robber to the Detroit FBI.” Id. Similarly, the court reasoned that, even if admissible under 404(b), the testimony was “highly prejudicial” under Rule 403. The court found it “difficult to imagine testimony more prejudicial than [the FBI agent’s] implication” that the defendant was known to Detroit police to be a professional bank robber. Id. I share the Hans court’s concern that the other acts evidence here, along with the manner by which it was introduced, encouraged the jury to draw the very inferences forbidden by Rule 404(b). Merriweather, 78 F.3d at1079. Our review must take into account “what the error meant to [the jury], not singled out and standing alone, but in relation to all else that happened.” United States v. Cowart, 90 F.3d 154, 158 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946)). “While a limiting instruction can minimize the prejudicial impact of prior criminal acts, it is not a ‘sure-fire panacea for the prejudice resulting from needless admission of such evidence.’” Clay, 667 F.3d at 696 (quoting Haywood, 280 F.3d at 724)). In a case where well over half the evidence presented to the jury concerned a crime for which the defendant was not on trial, I cannot say with a “fair assurance that the jury’s verdict was not substantially swayed” by the improperly admitted evidence, regardless of the court’s brief limiting instructions. Merriweather, 78 F.3d at 1079 (internal quotations omitted). - 25 - No. 07-6179 United States v. Washam