Opinion ID: 1776549
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: did the court err in granting defendant's instruction d-23?

Text: Miles finally asserts reversible error because the trial court gave instruction number D-23 which reads as follows: The Court instructs the jury that the sole issue remaining for your determination on the question of liability is whether Dr. Robert Lewis gave Gertrude Miles, deceased, a warning concerning potential side effects of the drug Zyloprim. If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant Lewis did give a warning and you further find that such warning was acceptable for the standard of care of a minimally competent internal medicine specialist in the United States for one in like medical circumstances as Mrs. Gertrude Miles, deceased, then you must find for the Defendant, Dr. Robert Lewis. When this instruction was granted, Miles made the following objection: It's  the instruction is defective because there were two issues. One was whether there was an informed consent and another issue of liability is whether there was an informed consent given by Dr. Robert Lewis to Mrs. Miles. This instruction is further defective because it's in conflict with Plaintiff's instruction 4-A, which is an informed consent instruction, our instruction. And that 4-A tells the jury that there is an element in the case, and defendant's D-23 says it isn't an element in the case. It's prejudicial to tell the jury that there's only one issue in the case. The question whether Mrs. Miles gave informed consent revolves around whether she was adequately warned concerning the side effects of the drug. Instruction D-23 goes directly to that question. As such, it is not in conflict with Plaintiff's informed consent Instruction 4-A. Miles' objections are misplaced. First, Miles' own experts testified that Dr. Lewis' prescription of Zyloprim and the dosage met the applicable standard of care. For this reason, the court sustained part of Lewis and Catchings' motion for directed verdict. Inexplicably, no error was alleged by Miles concerning the court's ruling  post-trial or on appeal. On the basis of the record presented to us, Miles acquiesced in the court's ruling and wholly failed to preserve for appellate consideration any issue arising from the ruling. Apparently Miles realized that the testimony of her own experts had proved her out of court on this issue. If anything, Miles received more consideration than she was entitled to under the facts adduced and the court's ruling. We are also mindful of the repeated pronouncements of this Court, that so long as the instructions taken collectively adequately and properly instruct the jury on the issues, an individual instruction given the jury will not constitute reversible error. Detroit Marine Engineering v. McRae, 510 So.2d 462, 467 (Miss. 1987); Susan Garcia v. Coast Electric Power Association, 493 So.2d 380 (Miss. 1986); Mississippi Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. John W. Todd et al., 492 So.2d 919 (Miss. 1986). An error in one instruction is cured by another when the instructions are considered as a whole. Roberts v. State, 458 So.2d 719, 721 (Miss. 1984). For the reasons stated above, this cause is affirmed. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, PITTMAN and BANKS, JJ., concur.