Opinion ID: 2521300
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Heading: Plaintiff's Common Law Tort Claim

Text: Plaintiff alleges that an employer's denial of educational assistance to an employee over the age of 40 because of the employee's age violates a fundamental public policy and thus constitutes a common law tort for which damages are recoverable under our decisions in Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d 167, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330, and Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d 65, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373. We disagree. Both Tameny and Rojo involved tortious discharge claims, and neither involved age discrimination. By contrast, plaintiffs suit does not allege wrongful discharge, but instead seeks to extend the FEHA prohibition against discrimination in employment benefits to the class of workers over 40. In Tameny, the plaintiff alleged that his employer had fired him for refusing to participate in an illegal price-fixing scheme. We held that an employer's obligation to refrain from discharging an employee who refuses to commit a criminal act ... reflects a duty imposed by law upon all employers in order to implement the fundamental public policies embodied in the state's penal statutes.  ( Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 176, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330, italics added.) We concluded that such a violation of public policy would support a common law cause of action in tort. ( Ibid. ) In Rojo, we held that the two plaintiffs had suffered tortious constructive discharge because their employer's sexual harassment forced them to leave their employment. ( Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 70-71, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373.) Our holding in Rojo was grounded in the determination that our state Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 8) declared a fundamental public policy against sex discrimination in employment ( Rojo, supra, at pp. 89-90, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373), and that this fundamental public policy `inure[d] to the benefit of the public at large' and was firmly established at the time of the plaintiffs' discharge ( id. at pp. 90-91, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373). Some two years after Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d 65, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373, this court refined the scope of the common law tortious discharge claim in Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680 ( Gantt ). There, the plaintiff was constructively discharged for resisting an employer's pressure to lie during the investigation of a coworker's sexual harassment claim. This court held that there was direct statutory support for the jury's express finding that the employer violated a fundamental public policy when it constructively discharged the plaintiff employee, in view of section 12975, which specifically prohibited any obstruction of an investigation by the DFEH. Distinguishing between matters genuinely involving public policy and those that concern merely ordinary disputes between employer and employee, we observed that [a] public policy exception carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions strikes the proper balance among the interests of employers, employees and the public. ( Gantt, supra, at p. 1095, 4 Cal. Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680.) As we later explained in Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 889, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157 ( Stevenson ), [i]n the context of a tort claim for wrongful discharge, tethering public policy to specific constitutional or statutory provisions serves not only to avoid judicial interference with the legislative domain, but also to ensure that employers have adequate notice of the conduct that will subject them to tort liability to the employees they discharge. (Italics added.) In Stevenson, an employee who had been discharged at the age of 60 after 30 years of employment alleged that her former employer wrongfully terminated her employment in violation of the public policy against age discrimination. ( Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 885-886, 66 Cal. Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157.) We recognized that the FEHA establishes a general public policy against age discrimination in employment, but we acknowledged the limitations of allowing common law tort claims based on public policy articulated in a statute. We said: [W]hen a plaintiff relies upon a statutory prohibition to support a common law cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, the common law claim is subject to statutory limitations affecting the nature and scope of the statutory prohibition, but the common law claim is not subject to statutory procedural limitations affecting only the availability and scope of nonexclusive statutory remedies. ( Stevenson, supra, at p. 904, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157, italics added.) Applying that reasoning here, a common law tort claim based on the public policy against age discrimination articulated in the FEHA is subject to the FEHA's limitations on the nature and scope of the statutory prohibition against age discrimination. ( Stevenson, supra, at p. 904, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157; see also Jennings v. Marralle (1994) 8 Cal.4th 121, 130, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 876 P.2d 1074 [public policy against employment discrimination does not apply to employers who are statutorily exempt under the FEHA because they do not regularly employ five or more persons].) If, as we have concluded, the FEHA does not prohibit employers from denying educational benefits on the basis of age, then plaintiff may not ground a common law claim for denial of the same benefits in the FEHA's prohibition against age discrimination. In Stevenson, we noted that a historical survey of tortious discharge decisions established four requirements that a policy must meet in order to support a claim: First, the policy must be supported by either constitutional or statutory provisions. Second, the policy must be `public' in the sense that it `inures to the benefit of the public' rather than serving merely the interests of the individual. Third, the policy must have been articulated at the time of the discharge. Fourth, the policy must be `fundamental' and `substantial.' ( Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 889-890, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157.) With respect to the first requirement, no constitutional or statutory provision supports a claim for a wrongful denial of educational benefits to workers over the age of 40. As we noted earlier, the plain language of sections 12940 and 12941 reveals that the FEHA does not prohibit an employer from denying educational benefits based on age. Here, plaintiff employee's interest in obtaining funding from defendant employer to pursue a postgraduate degree at company expense without regard to his age is not an interest tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions. ( Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1095, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680.) Failure to meet the first requirement of Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th 880, 66 Cal. Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157, is fatal to plaintiffs common law tort claim. Therefore, we need not discuss the other three requirements, and we reject plaintiffs common law tort claim.