Opinion ID: 2394901
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Application of Art. 41, ง 122(b)(1)

Text: At the time the offense in the case at bar was committed Code (1957, 1978 Repl.Vol.) Art. 41, ง 122(b) provided that a person sentenced to life imprisonment was not [to be] eligible for parole consideration until he ha[d] served 15 years or the equal of 15 years when considering the allowance for diminution of period of confinement provided for in Article 27, ง 700 and Article 27, ง 638C .... The General Assembly amended this section by Ch. 298 of the Acts of 1983, effective July 1, 1983, providing that such a person should not be eligible until he had served twenty-five years. The Attorney General advised the Governor relative to the statute that the new 25 year minimum will apply only to inmates sentenced to life imprisonment for crimes occurring on or after July 1, 1983. Any other application would violate the ex post facto clauses of the United States Constitution.... (Emphasis his.) Bowers asserts that under Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) an accused may make an intelligent and knowing waiver of fundamental constitutional protections. Thus, he says he may waive the ex post facto protection here. He contends that his willingness to serve twenty-five years before consideration for parole is a mitigating factor which the jury might take into consideration. We do not see it that way at all. What Bowers attempts to do is to bargain with the sentencing authority. That authority would not have the ultimate right to determine whether or when Bowers should be paroled. We do not believe this is permitted under our death sentence statute.