Opinion ID: 2333091
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was there error in denying the defendants' motion for a change of venue?

Text: Neither the defendants' argument nor brief correctly outlines the procedural steps taken and the rulings made on the application for a change of venue. Counsel in his brief, amongst other things, claims: The published circumstances surrounding the crimes were repulsive to the community's conscience, and Reports of the murder and subsequent apprehension of the defendants appeared daily in bold headlines in the press. An editorial in the newspaper with the largest circulation in the county deplored the crime and assumed the guilt of the defendants. Grand jury resolutions and resolutions of the Township of Union praising those responsible for the apprehension of the defendants and assuming their guilt were published in the press. Special precautions had to be taken by the county sheriff to handle the spectators at the trial   . The Bond murder had become a household term in Union County. These are some of the facts and circumstances impelling counsel to place their cause within the pronouncement made in Shepherd v. State of Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 51, 71 S.Ct. 549, 95 L.Ed. 740 (1951), where it was held the trial procedure was but a legal gesture to register a verdict already dictated by the press and the public opinion which it generated. The record, however, reveals the following: on April 2, 1954 an application was made before the assignment judge under R.R. 3:6-2( a ) and ( b ) for proofs to be taken for a change in venue. That rule specifically states: All applications for change of venue or trial by foreign jury in criminal trials shall be made to the Assignment Judge of the county in which the indictment was found.    And: Whenever, in the opinion of the court, a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county in which the indictment was found    the court shall order a change of venue. Finally: The proofs shall be made in such form as the court may direct. Counsel inquired of the court what form the proofs shall take upon our application. The court directed: I am going to set a date for the hearing of the taking of proofs, which will be oral evidence taken by testimony in open court before me Tuesday, April 6, 10 o'clock A.M. This date was subsequently changed to Wednesday, April 7, at the same hour. Dissatisfied with the dispatch evidenced by the lower court, counsel appealed to the Appellate Division, seeking further time. The motion was denied, the court in effect saying it was a matter of discretion for the assignment judge. Counsel thereupon appeared again before the assignment judge on April 7, 1954 and bluntly advised the court that under the circumstances we are not prepared this morning to move unless your Honor in your discretion will give us at least two weeks to put our proof  to put in our proof. We are not prepared to move this morning. Whereupon the court announced: No proof being offered, the motion to change the venue is denied. Despite the denial, however, the court then advised counsel: I will be available  I will make myself available for the period of two days, if necessary three days, during the Easter vacation period in the event counsel wish to offer proofs at that time.    If, however, they wish now to say that even that would be too short a time, I would then make my ruling definite and deny the motion for change of venue. Mr. Mantel: On behalf of the three defendants, we say that the time is too short. The court then ruled: The record will also show the court's offer and availability during the Easter recess the days of the 12th, 13th and 14th of April and counsel's attitude and the statement that even that time would be too short and therefore no proof will be offered. Under those circumstances, I think it is just and I so order that the motion for change of venue is denied. A formal order to this effect was entered. The defendants never availed themselves of the opportunity given by the court to be heard further in the matter. On May 17, 1954, on a motion for an adjournment or postponement before the trial court, counsel called the court's attention to and marked in evidence a number of resolutions passed by the grand jury of Union County highly laudatory and lavishly praising the officials active in the apprehension and arrest of the defendants and informed the court there were a number of articles in the various newspapers constituting widespread publicity from the date of the murder on February 12 up to the present time. There were also offered two resolutions adopted by the Township of Union. This was the sum and substance of what counsel relied upon for a change of venue as well as a postponement of trial. The principal objection, as stressed by counsel, to the resolutions and newspaper articles was their constant assumption of the guilt of the defendants. It was urged: This publicity endangers the right of a fair trial. It encourages a trial by publicity instead of a trial by jury. Counsel then adroitly renewed their application for a change of venue, coupling it with the other relief being sought. The court, in denying the motion for delay, said: It seems to me that every case involving alleged murder is an important news item and of necessity receives widespread publicity. Everything done in open court is naturally a matter of public concern and will receive widespread publicity in connection with a case of this type. The resolutions of the Grand Jury will not be admissible in evidence during any trial of this case and cannot even be commented upon, and the same is true of the other resolutions that might have been passed. The resolutions, true, have been published but also other news items involving this particular case. Each prospective juror may be questioned as to whether or not he has formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendants. If he states that he has formed an opinion as to the guilt and that he will not decide the case on the evidence, or that his opinion is based on malice or ill-will, that prospective juror may be challenged for cause. Furthermore, the jury will be instructed to be guided solely by the evidence and the charge of the Court, which will include instructions that the defendants are presumed to be innocent until the State proves them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury will be further instructed, as are jurors in other cases of this type, that they are to be guided only by the evidence and not to be influenced by what they may have heard or read with reference to this case. I have seen no evidence of any inflamed public sentiment against these defendants. We quote the court in extenso because subsequent developments proved the wisdom of its observations. There is nothing in the record as we search it giving the slightest justification for counsel's charge in his brief that the defense was never given an opportunity to demonstrate to the court the full frenzy to which the population of Union County had been whipped up by the crime and the publicity given to it. We freely subscribe to the basic concepts of fairness as dedicated in Shepherd v. State of Florida, supra , holding newspapers, in the enjoyment of their constitutional right, may not deprive the accused of his right to a fair trial, and requiring the due process clause to be realistically and honestly interpreted and observed. But we find nothing in the proofs submitted in the instant case bringing it within the prohibited orbit. Our courts, too, in the same spirit of fundamental fairness, have decreed that motions for a change of venue are addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The discretion employed must be neither arbitrary, vague nor fanciful but must be guided by and in consonance with well established principles of law. In re Longo, 124 N.J.L. 176, 181 ( E. & A. 1940); La Bell v. Quasdorf, 116 N.J.L. 368, 372 ( Sup. Ct. 1936). The test is whether an impartial jury could be obtained from among the citizens of the county or whether they are so aroused that they would not be qualified to sit as a jury to try the case. The evidence submitted, to be controlling, must be clear and convincing proof that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had before a jury of the county in which the indictment was found. State v. Overton, 85 N.J.L. 287 ( E. & A. 1913); State v. Lynch, 103 N.J.L. 64 ( E. & A. 1926); In re Kelsey, 127 N.J.L. 568 ( Sup. Ct. 1942); State v. Collins, 2 N.J. 406 (1949); State v. Cooper, 10 N.J. 532 (1952). Applying the rule firmly established by many adjudications to the facts before us, we reflect again upon the comments of the trial court in which it prophesied that the extent of the influence, if any, of the publications and the documents complained of would be clearly evidenced when the prospective jurors were inquired of as to their qualifications to sit at the trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. Although the defendants, under R.R. 3:7-2( c ), were entitled to exercise 30 peremptory challenges, they actually, by the record, exercised only 17 of such challenges: Albert Wise, 5; Harry Wise and Alfred Stokes 6 each. In addition to their peremptory challenges, they presented 14 challenges for cause, of which 9 were granted. This, in substance, meant that the 14 jurors finally selected had not been challenged in any manner whatsoever, nor was there an objection made to any one of them as being a trier of the facts in the case to be submitted to them. The general panel of prospective jurors was not exhausted when the defense expressed their complete satisfaction with the jury as it was finally selected. Their conclusion in this regard was again admitted on oral argument. Under these circumstances, we see no error, nor do we find a failure to comply with the true concept of essential fairness as we conceive it in denying the motion for a change of venue. Although we find no error in this regard for the reasons already expressed, we must comment with considerable vigor, so there will be no repetition of it, upon the resolutions returned by the grand jury referred to in the motion addressed to the court. There is absolutely no authority in the grand jury to issue or publish such resolutions. The grand jury is limited to returning indictments or presentments, and when this occurs, they should be returned and controlled as provided for by our rules. Indictments are to be handed up directly to the court, pursuant to R.R. 3:3-8, and presentments are returned to the court under R.R. 3:3-9. The assignment judge may receive the presentment in whole or in part or decline it in toto. In re Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23 (1952).