Opinion ID: 1640733
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether howell's attorneys were ineffective concerning rice's identification of howell.

Text: ¶ 25. Howell asserts that his trial attorneys did not effectively represent him concerning Rice's identification and testimony. Howell was represented at trial by Duncan Lott and Jak Smith. Lott, who was Howell's primary attorney, sets out that he has been practicing criminal law in Mississippi since 1977 and that he had represented three capital-murder defendants before Howell. ¶ 26. Lott submitted an affidavit in which he claims that the State should have disclosed information about Rice's criminal record, incarceration record, and evidence of drug use. [1] As noted supra, there is no evidence that the State had any knowledge of Rice's criminal record and then suppressed that information. The assistant district attorney has sworn that no criminal background check of Rice was performed. Lott also states that exculpatory evidence concerning Mr. Rice's criminal background would have allowed me to impeach the only eyewitness to this crime. However, contrary to Lott's statement that Rice was the only eyewitness to this crime, the record reveals that Curtis Lipsey also was an eyewitness to the shooting, and Lipsey likewise identified Howell as the killer. ¶ 27. The standard for determining if a criminal defendant received constitutionally effective counsel is well-established. The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness [of counsel] must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A defendant must demonstrate that his attorney's actions were deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 477 (Miss.1984), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The focus of the inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. Id. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. (Citation omitted).... A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Stringer at 477; citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Defense counsel is presumed competent. Washington v. State, 620 So.2d 966 (Miss.1993). This Court has likewise stated: Then, to determine the second prong of prejudice to the defense, the standard is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss.1991). This means a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome. Id. . . . There is no constitutional right then to errorless counsel. Cabello v. State, 524 So.2d 313, 315 (Miss.1988); Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss.1991) (right to effective counsel does not entitle defendant to have an attorney who makes no mistakes at trial; defendant just has right to have competent counsel). If the post-conviction application fails on either of the Strickland prongs, the proceedings end. Neal v. State, 525 So.2d 1279, 1281 (Miss.1987); Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426 (Miss.1991). Davis v. State, 743 So.2d 326, 334 (Miss. 1999), citing Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1130 (Miss.1996). ¶ 28. Howell's attorneys did not specifically request information about Rice's criminal history. The attorneys did request general discovery and all Brady exculpatory information. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. The State's attorney maintains that all discoverable information was released to the defense and that the State had no duty to run a background check on Rice and then to turn over information not even requested by the defense. ¶ 29. As we have noted, Rice pleaded guilty to burglary in 1983. Pernell's murder and Rice's testimony against Howell occurred nearly seventeen years later. The impeachment value of Rice's 1983 conviction, even if admissible, would have been minor. Jones, 776 So.2d at 651-52. ¶ 30. Howell also asserts that his attorneys were ineffective in failing to discover that Rice knew him prior to the shooting. As already noted, Howell presents somewhat suspect affidavits that Rice must have known of Howell. Defense counsel argued during closing that Rice's identification was not reliable because he had never before seen Howell. We certainly cannot find that defense counsel's argument was illogical inasmuch as this argument could have been based upon a trial-strategy decision to argue to the jury that Rice's identification testimony was highly suspect because Rice did not know Howell. Strategic decisions of trial counsel are presumed to be reasonable. Cabello v. State, 524 So.2d 313, 319 (Miss.1988) ¶ 31. After a full review of the trial-court record, we are unable to find that Howell did not receive effective assistance of counsel on these issues. Rice was examined thoroughly and extensively about his identification of Howell. Counsel for Howell cross-examined Rice at length about the lighting and other visibility factors. We thus find that the actions of Howell's trial counsel were not deficient pursuant to Strickland.