Opinion ID: 173281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fleeting Possession Instruction

Text: To support a conviction under § 922(g)(1), the government must prove that the defendant possessed the firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Possession can be either actual or constructive; that is, the person must either have direct physical control over [the] firearm, or he must knowingly hold[ ] the power and ability to exercise dominion and control over [the] firearm. United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1046 (10th Cir. 2009). Mr. Washington does not appear to contest that he either actually or constructively possessed the two firearms at issue in this case. Instead, he argues that the district court should have provided the jury with a fleeting possession instruction. Specifically, Mr. Washington requested that the court provide the following instruction contained in Tenth Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.31: In addition, momentary or transitory control of an object is not possession. You should not find that the defendant possessed the object if he possessed it only momentarily, or did not know that he possessed it. See Tenth Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 1.31, ¶ 6. We review a district court's decision on whether to give a particular jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Turner, 553 F.3d 1337, 1347 (10th Cir.2009). A defendant is only entitled to an instruction on his theory of defense if it is supported by sufficient evidence and is a correct statement of the law. Id. Although this circuit has discussed a fleeting possession defense, we have never recognized one. See United States v. Baker, 508 F.3d 1321, 1326 n. 2 (10th Cir.2007); United States v. Al-Rekabi, 454 F.3d 1113, 1126 (10th Cir.2006). Furthermore, even if we were to adopt the defensewhich we do not do todayit only applies if the defendant (1) momentarily possessed contraband and (2) either lacked knowledge that he possessed contraband or had a legally justifiable reason to possess it temporarily. United States v. Adkins, 196 F.3d 1112, 1115 (10th Cir.1999), overruled on other grounds by Chambers v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 687, 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009). No possible interpretation of the evidence presented in this case could support acquittal under this theory. Mr. Washington has never contended that he did not know he was handling the guns or that he had a legally justifiable reason to do so. His defense at trial was that he handled them momentarily or not at all. Because the evidence, at best, would support a favorable finding as to only the first element of a fleeting possession defense, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to so instruct the jury.