Opinion ID: 662420
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voluntariness of the Search

Text: 41 Appellant argues that his consent to be searched after being stopped was given involuntarily. First, appellant argues that the consent was obtained against a backdrop of unlawful searches and seizures routinely conducted by the police in the neighborhood in which Lawson was stopped. Next, appellant maintains that when requesting permission to search him the officers completely surrounded him, were in full uniform, aggressively questioned him as to what he was doing outside, searched his companion, and did not inform Lawson that he could refuse the search. The district court agreed that Lawson's consent to be searched was given in the context of highly questionable search and seizure practices by the police in that neighborhood. However, relying on United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294 (1990), the court focussed on the particular individual who consented to the search, i.e. Pernell Lawson, and concluded that the consent had been given voluntarily. Appellant now charges that the district court relied too closely on the factors enunciated as significant in Lewis, thereby failing to consider the totality of the circumstances in evaluating the likelihood that appellant's consent to the search was truly voluntary. 42 In examining whether Lawson had voluntarily consented to the search, the district court focussed on 43 whether there were any restrictions on the movement of the defendant, whether the defendant consented to the search without hesitation, whether the search exceeded the bounds of the defendant's consent and whether the testimony of the officer is challenged, and if so, whether it has been effectively rebutted. 44 Mem.Ord. at p. 6. It took these factors from our Lewis decision which, however, did not purport to lay out a general test for examining whether an individual consented to a search, but instead identified these factors as significant in determining whether the individual in Lewis had consented to the search. Ultimately, of course, Lewis examined the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether the consent in that case had been coerced. See Lewis, 921 F.2d at 1300. 45 Nonetheless, in the context of this case we are unable to detect any misconstruction of applicable law in the district court's ruling. We do not find that the court disregarded any significant circumstances under which Lawson expressed his consent. The district court explicitly considered the background of the allegedly coercive police practices in the neighborhood, the restriction of the defendant's movement when being questioned, and the search of Erky Berk in Lawson's presence. Mem.Ord. at pp. 3-7. We also remain unconvinced by appellant's argument that the trial court erred by considering whether the defendant presented evidence in support of his motion. Appellant contends that [a]lthough a trial court must make credibility determinations so that it may make factual findings, whether a witness' testimony is challenged or effectively rebutted is not itself a fact to be considered in the assessment of voluntariness. Contrary to appellant's assertion, the district court did not consider that the officers' testimony was unrebutted as a fact in itself weighing in favor of finding Lawson's consent to be voluntary. It merely made a credibility determination based in part on the fact that the officers' testimony was unrebutted, and decided to accept [the officers' testimony] as true and accurate on the issue of Lawson's consent to be searched. Mem.Ord. at p. 7. Indeed, in its oral ruling the district court was quite aware that the officers' testimony could have hurt them ... as much as helped them on the issue of consent, indicating that the court was willing to rely on the officers' testimony regardless of whether it undermined or supported a finding of voluntariness of the consent. [Transcript of District Court's Oral Ruling at p. 7.] Taking the district court's judgment as a whole, therefore, we can detect no error on the question of whether Lawson voluntarily consented to be searched. 46 Accordingly, in the event that the stop itself was lawful, we would affirm the district court's judgment on the issue of Lawson's subsequent consent to the search. However, if the officers did not have the articulable suspicion necessary for the stop, his subsequent consent cannot cure the unlawfulness of the stop, and the evidence that was seized must be suppressed. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 419-20 (D.C.Cir.) ([T]he [district] court apparently proceeded under the view that consent could cure an unlawful seizure. This is an erroneous statement of law. (citing Wong-Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963))), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 880 (1990).