Opinion ID: 596133
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Denial of Pakhoed's Motion for Sanctions

Text: 33 In No. 91-6046, Pakhoed argues that Pease's Rule 60(b) motion was baseless and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings in the case. It urges that sanctions are merited under both Rule 11 and § 1927. We do not agree. 34 The Supreme Court has held, an appellate court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a district court's Rule 11 determination. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2461, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990). We review the district court's § 1927 determination under the same deferential standard. Browning v. Kramer, 931 F.2d 340, 344 (5th Cir.1991). 35 In essence, Pakhoed contends that Pease's counsel failed to make sufficient pre-filing inquiries to support the allegations contained within Pease's Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief. The motion, argues Pakhoed, was both factually and legally untenable and simply served to prop up a meritless claim. Although we agree with the district court that Pease's Rule 60(b) claims are unavailing, we conclude that his contentions are not so abusive or frivolous as to violate Rule 11. At the very least, Pease's arguments fall within the protective ambit of Rule 11's good faith argument provision, mentioned earlier in note 4. 36 We likewise refuse to usurp the district court's singular perspective and endorse sanctions under § 1927, a statute we have characterized as involving sanctions which are penal in nature. Monk v. Roadway Express, Inc., 599 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir.1979), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980). Under § 1927, the fees, expenses, and costs associated with the persistent prosecution of a meritless claim may be awarded. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 875 (5th Cir.1988) (en banc). We reject the arguments advanced by Pease's counsel as unpersuasive, but the arguments are not so untenable as to be vexatious or unreasonable. Under turbulent circumstances and difficult time pressures, Pease's new counsel came aboard and pursued Pease's claim in an earnest, albeit unsuccessful, fashion. As we have stated: Strict construction of this statute is necessary so that the legitimate zeal of an attorney in representing her [or his] client is not dampened. Browning, 931 F.2d at 344; see also H.R.CONF.REP.NO. 96-1234, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S.CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2716, 2781, 2782-83. 37 We conclude that the district court acted within its broad discretion in denying sanctions under both Rule 11 and § 1927. We perceive no compelling reason to disturb its decision. Pakhoed's request for legal fees and expenses related to the combined appeals is denied, as is Pease's request for costs against Pakhoed in appealing the district court's sanction decision.