Opinion ID: 471621
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: CPR Instruction

Text: 32 Maddox claims the district court erred when it instructed the jury that, any failure by the officers themselves to render cardial pulmonary resuscitation is not a violation of the decedent's constitutional rights. Maddox claims the fourteenth amendment due process clause requires officers to render CPR when a pretrial detainee in their custody is in need of CPR. 33 The due process clause requires responsible governments and their agents to secure medical care for persons who have been injured while in police custody. Revere, 463 U.S. at 244, 103 S.Ct. at 2983. We have found no authority suggesting that the due process clause establishes an affirmative duty on the part of police officers to render CPR in any and all circumstances. See Cartwright v. City of Concord, 618 F.Supp. 722, 729 (N.D.Cal.1985) (five to seven minute delay in starting CPR on prisoner found hanging in jail cell did not result in Sec. 1983 liability). But cf. Bass by Lewis v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir.1985) (prison doctor's delay in reacting to cardiac arrest was a basis for a Sec. 1983 claim). Due process requires that police officers seek the necessary medical attention for a detainee when he or she has been injured while being apprehended by either promptly summoning the necessary medical help or by taking the injured detainee to a hospital. Revere, 463 U.S. at 245, 103 S.Ct. at 2983. 34 The district court's CPR instruction must be read in the context of the court's entire instruction on the duty to secure medical care for the injured detainee. When read in conjunction with the court's instruction that, the concept of due process of law requires the officers to take reasonable steps to secure medical care which they recognize as necessary for the decedent, the instruction at issue set forth the constitutional obligation of the officers in this case. We find no error.