Opinion ID: 741729
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: General Retroactive Effect of the Act

Text: 39 The presumption against retroactive application of new laws is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1497, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (footnote omitted). It is an essential thread in the mantle of protection that the law affords the individual citizen. Lynce v. Mathis, --- U.S. ----, ----, 117 S.Ct. 891, 895, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997). 40 To be sure, Congress has the power to enact legislation with retroactive effect so long as it comports with due process by passing constitutional muster under rational basis scrutiny. Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564, 1570 (9th Cir.1993). Provided that the retroactive application of a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means, judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches[.] Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729, 104 S.Ct. 2709, 2717-18, 81 L.Ed.2d 601 (1984). However, because retroactive application of new laws disrupts settled expectations and actions taken in reliance on them, courts will not presume retroactive effect absent express statutory language. Words in a statute ought not to have a retrospective operation, unless they are so clear, strong, and imperative, that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot otherwise be satisfied. United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399, 413, 2 L.Ed. 479 (1806). 41 Landgraf altered the legal landscape so that prospective application has unquestionably become the default rule. 511 U.S. at 272, 114 S.Ct. at 1501. It established a three-stage analytical process for assessing the potential retroactive application of a statute. The first Landgraf question is whether Congress has prescribed the statute's proper reach. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. at 1505. To make this determination, we employ the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation. In doing so, we are informed, of course, by the presumption against retroactive application and the requirement that if Congress is to rebut the presumption it must state its intention in words clear, strong, and imperative such that no other meaning can be annexed to them. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 413. 42 If congressional intent cannot be divined from examination of the statute, the second Landgraf inquiry is whether the new statute would have retroactive effect (i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed). Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. at 1505. The third Landgraf stage is conclusory: if the new legislation would operate retroactively, then our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result. Id. Because we find Congress expressed its intent in the statutory language, we need only reach the first stage of the Landgraf analysis. 43 At issue is Title I of the Act, which reforms federal habeas corpus law in two significant ways. First, Title I amended existing statutory provisions contained in Chapter 153, Title 28 of the United States Code. Second, it added a new chapter, Chapter 154, to Title 28 which provided for new special habeas corpus procedures in capital cases. Jeffries' appeal involves the potential retroactive effect of the amendments to Chapter 153 contained in Title I. 44 The first stage of the Landgraf analysis is to determine whether Congress has expressed its intent. In statutory interpretation, the starting point is always the language of the statute itself. United States ex rel. Hyatt v. Northrop Corp., 91 F.3d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir.1996). In constructing Title I, Congress left little doubt as to the respective effective dates. Section 107(c) provides that Chapter 154 applies to all pending cases. 15 However, in describing the temporal reach of Title I, Congress did not apply the same language to the amendments to Chapter 153. Thus, a plain reading of section 107(c), coupled with the normal presumption of prospectivity, leads to the conclusion that the Chapter 153 amendments do not apply to pending cases. 45 The structure of Chapter 154 contains further evidence of congressional purpose. Chapter 154 incorporates by reference several provisions of Chapter 153, incorporation which would be completely superfluous if Congress intended both chapters to apply to pending cases. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2264(b). The absence of such a statutory interplay was a factor in Landgraf 's determination of whether Congress had made a purposeful decision as to an effective date for various provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 511 U.S. at 262-63, 114 S.Ct. at 1495-96. 46 The Act's direct legislative history also underscores the clarity of congressional design. Title I comprises what originally was separate and independent habeas corpus reform legislation, which passed the U.S. House of Representatives on February 8, 1995, as H.R. 729, 104th Cong. (1995). 141 Cong. Rec. H1434 (daily ed. February 8, 1995). After transmittal to the U.S. Senate, H.R. 729 was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee where it was inserted in its entirety into S. 735, 104th Cong. (1995), the pending antiterrorism legislation. As passed by the House, H.R. 729 did not provide for an effective date for either the Chapter 153 revisions or the new Chapter 154 procedures. When H.R. 729 was substituted into S. 735, the Senate Judiciary Committee made one substantive change: the addition of section 107(c) containing the effective date for Chapter 154. Compare original S. 735, 141 Cong. Rec. S5803 (daily ed. April 27, 1995), with S. 735 as revised by Amendment 1199, 141 Cong. Rec. S7857-77 (daily ed. June 7, 1995). As amended, S. 735 passed the Senate on June 7, 1995. 141 Cong. Rec. S7857 (daily ed. June 7, 1995). The habeas provisions were adopted without alteration by the Conference Committee on April 15, 1996. 142 Cong. Rec. H3305-33 (daily ed. April 15, 1996). Title I was signed into law along with the remainder of the Act on April 24, 1996. These affirmative congressional acts stand in contrast to the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 considered in Landgraf which led the Court to conclude that legislators agreed to disagree about whether and to what extent the Act would apply to preenactment conduct. 511 U.S. at 263, 114 S.Ct. at 1496. In Landgraf, the history revealed no evidence ... that an agreement had been tacitly struck and contained little to suggest that Congress understood or intended the interplay of the various provisions at issue. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 262-63, 114 S.Ct. at 1495-96 (emphasis omitted). 47 In statutory construction, we presume Congress legislated with awareness of relevant judicial decisions. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-704, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1957-61, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Congress's deliberate choice to include a specific retroactive application provision for Chapter 154 but none for Chapter 153 should be given effect. If Congress had intended that the amendments to Chapter 153 apply to pending cases, it would have stated so unequivocally. Congress did not do so, much less rebut the presumption against retroactive application of new laws with a clear statement to the contrary, and we are compelled to give force to that decision. Thus, we find congressional intent as to Title I's proper reach to be defined in section 107(c). 48 In so concluding, we respectfully differ with our colleagues in the Eleventh Circuit that Congress was silent on the subject of retroactivity, requiring examination under subsequent steps of the Landgraf analysis. Hunter, 101 F.3d at 1570; see Drinkard, 97 F.3d at 766. The explicit circumscription of an effective date for Title I in section 107(c), the interrelation of the amendments to Chapters 153 and 154 in the Act, and the distinct expression of Congressional intent through the direct legislative history, all indicate a deliberate congressional choice with which the courts should not interfere. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 184, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 1452, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994). 49 We also respectfully disagree with our colleagues on the Seventh Circuit who have rejected the idea that congressional intent as to the Act's retroactivity can be determined. Lindh, 96 F.3d at 861-62. They reason that direct statutory construction of Title I depends on application of a negative inference argument, a doctrine they maintain was repudiated by the Supreme Court. Id.; see Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 259-60, 114 S.Ct. at 1494. This principle of statutory construction is also known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius (an express declaration as to one item requires the exclusion of others). The argument for its application concerning Title I of the Act is that because section 107(c) specifically prescribes that Chapter 154 apply to pending cases and the Act is silent as to the effective date of the Chapter 153 amendments, there is a negative inference that the amendments to Chapter 153 do not apply to pending cases. 50 As we have demonstrated, one need not resort to negative inference to resolve this issue. Not only is the statutory language clear, but we find the direct legislative history persuasive--a factor not discussed in Lindh, Drinkard, or Hunter. However, the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius does add additional support to our conclusion. 16 In examining the potential application of negative inference, we are first constrained to note that Landgraf does not preclude the use of the analysis in a proper case. It merely rejected its application in the context of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Landgraf, of course, involved precisely the opposite circumstance to the one at bar. In Landgraf, the plaintiff was attempting to employ a negative inference argument from unrelated isolated sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to overcome the presumption against retroactive application--an argument appropriately rejected by the Court. In this instance, unlike Landgraf, a negative inference analysis reinforces the presumption. Thus, we are true to Landgraf 's holding that prospectivity remains the appropriate default rule. Id. at 272, 114 S.Ct. at 1501. 51 Wood, following Lindh 's lead, argues we should leap over statutory analysis and conduct a judicial examination of retroactive effect any time Congress does not provide an effective date for a section. This troubling interpretation of Landgraf would arrogate to the judiciary the privilege of determining effective dates of statutory sections by fact-intensive speculation as to a statute's potential impact on past conduct. We do not read Landgraf to command that an act's retroactive effect should always be decided by the courts unless Congress specifies the effective date in each section of a statute. Indeed, this construction would frustrate Landgraf 's philosophy which allocates to Congress responsibility for fundamental policy judgments concerning the proper temporal reach of statutes. Id. at 273, 114 S.Ct. at 1501. Although appropriate in construction of some statutes, judicial analysis of retrospective effect as a means of determining effective date should be the exception, not the default rule. Rather, the intent of Congress should remain the focal point for statutory construction. Only if the courts are unable to determine congressional intent from examination of the statute and its history, as informed by Landgraf 's default rule of prospectivity and the presumption against retroactive application, should they engage in the type of individualized examination required by the subsequent stages of the Landgraf analysis. 52 Wood correctly points out that there are a number of provisions in other titles of the Act which have differing effective dates. 17 Wood maintains that the existence of other dates undermines any possible significance of a negative inference analysis and that we ought not attach too much significance to section 107(c). This reasoning ignores the fact that Title I originated as separate, independent legislation unrelated to other portions of the Act. Landgraf examined this very situation and concluded that Congress's temporal prescription as to discrete sections of an act is not controlling as to other independent sections of the same statute. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 257-63, 114 S.Ct. at 1493-96. That aphorism is particularly apt here. The Act encompasses a wide variety of divergent subjects, from biological weapons to immigration reform. 18 Because of this, each title must be deconstructed separately. Title I is internally consistent, as would be expected of a title which originated as separate legislation, and its temporal reach discernible. Thus, the existence of other effective dates outside of Title I is of little significance. 53 Accordingly, we find the first stage of the Landgraf analysis conclusive and need not reach the subsequent stages of the examination. However, because Wood and some of our sister circuits have devoted substantial analysis to assessing the Act's potential retroactive effect, some scrutiny under the second Landgraf inquiry is warranted. 54 Landgraf's second analytic step is determining whether the statute would have retroactive effect. To answer this, we must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269-70, 114 S.Ct. at 1499. In this case, we have already determined that under pre-Act law, Jeffries must be resentenced. Wood argues that the Act would preclude this result. Thus, under Wood's theory, if the Act is applied to Jeffries, he will be executed; if it does not, he will be resentenced. Even applying only our sound instincts, as Landgraf suggests we should, execution would seem to be a new legal consequence. Id. (internal quotation omitted). Surely, our judicial instincts tell us, if imposing civil compensatory damages is a new legal consequence under Landgraf, death by lethal injection must fit the category. When we go beyond our instincts to examine the theoretical underpinnings of the Act, we can discern why retroactive application is not only counter-intuitive, but legally improper. Landgraf again provides the analytical framework. 55 Landgraf identified three examples of laws which generally do not have retroactive effect: (1) those which authorize or affect the propriety of prospective relief; (2) those which confer or oust jurisdiction and (3) those which make changes to procedural rules. 511 U.S. at 273-75, 114 S.Ct. at 1501-02. 56 Legislation which operates in futuro by definition generally does not have retroactive implications. The classic example is injunctive relief which proscribes present and future conduct. See, e.g., American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 42 S.Ct. 72, 66 L.Ed. 189 (1921) (holding that the Clayton Act's provisions on injunctive relief applied to pending cases). However, habeas corpus relief involves precisely the opposite circumstance. In a federal habeas proceeding, a state prisoner seeks to vitiate a prior state court decision. A federal court's habeas corpus power is to correct an invalid antecedent state conviction or sentence. Thus, federal habeas relief is inherently quintessentially backward looking under Landgraf. 511 U.S. at 282, 114 S.Ct. at 1506. 57 Similarly, Title I does not confer or oust federal jurisdiction. Jurisdictional statutes concern the power of the court, not the rights or obligations of the parties. 511 U.S. at 274, 114 S.Ct. at 1502. Section 440(a) of the Act, which removes federal jurisdiction over certain immigration matters, is a paradigmatic jurisdictional provision which we found applicable to pending cases in Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396, 399 (9th Cir.1996). By contrast, nothing in the amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) which are at issue here ousts federal courts of jurisdiction. Rather, Title I dictates how federal courts should exercise their jurisdiction. The Act does not prohibit federal courts from entertaining petitions for writs of habeas corpus; it instructs that the writ shall not be granted unless certain criteria are satisfied. 110 Stat. at 1219. Thus, the amendments to Chapter 153 are not jurisdictional as that term is contemplated by Landgraf. 58 Finally, the amendments to Chapter 153 are not procedural. Statutes implicating venue are illustrative of procedural changes which do not have retroactive effect. See, e.g., Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 69 S.Ct. 944, 93 L.Ed. 1207 (1949). As Landgraf notes, parties generally have a diminished reliance interest in procedural matters. 511 U.S. at 275, 114 S.Ct. at 1502. However, as Landgraf acknowledged, the mere fact that a new rule is procedural does not mean that it applies to every pending case. 511 U.S. at 275, 114 S.Ct. at 1502 n. 29. Courts must look to the nature and posture of an individual case. Id. 59 The amendments to Chapter 153 implicate substantive as well as procedural issues. The Act limits the ability of federal courts to reexamine questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact. Historically, federal habeas courts have reviewed all questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo. Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 299-304, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 2494-97, 120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Under the amendments to Chapter 153, federal courts must restrict their legal analysis to whether the state decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Act further restricts the scope of federal review of mixed questions of fact and law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). De novo review is no longer appropriate; deference to the state court factual findings is. These statutory alterations fall within the very genre of intertwined procedural and substantive issues which compelled the Landgraf court to conclude that altering the right to a jury trial was not purely a procedural question. 511 U.S. at 280-81, 114 S.Ct. at 1505. Similarly, because substance and procedure are inextricably impacted by Title I, the amendments cannot be viewed as having purely procedural implications. 60 Thus, the amendments to Chapter 153 cannot be classified under the general Landgraf denomination of statutes which have no retroactive effect. 61 Wood also contends that the amendments to Chapter 153 cannot create new legal consequences because Title I only impacts secondary rather than primary conduct. Under Wood's argument, the criminal act is the primary conduct. Wood reasons that a criminal would be unlikely to rely on the availability of federal habeas relief in committing a crime or making tactical litigation decisions. Therefore, Wood argues, prisoners could not have relied upon the availability of federal habeas relief to their detriment, no settled expectations have been disturbed and there are no new legal consequences to the underlying conduct. 62 Taken to its logical conclusion, Wood's argument means that no change in federal habeas law could ever have retroactive effect. Indeed, other than a true ex post facto law criminalizing a previously legal act, no change in criminal law could ever have retroactive effect under Wood's theory. The fallacy in this reasoning is that, with the exception of actual innocence cases, federal courts never adjudicate guilt in state prisoner habeas proceedings. The primary conduct described by Wood is never at issue. Rather, federal habeas relief is dependent upon an unconstitutional state court adjudication. A state prisoner's right to federal habeas relief is created by the entry of an unconstitutional state court judgment subjecting the prisoner to incarceration or death. Thus, the primary conduct implicated by federal habeas procedure is the state court proceeding, not the underlying criminal act. The prisoner's settled expectations are thus created when the state has placed him or her in custody in violation of the Constitution. Modifying the remedies available to the state prisoner to the point of transforming the legal outcome must necessarily constitute a new legal consequence under Landgraf. 63 These are generic considerations which caution against general retroactive application of the amendments to Chapter 153. Landgraf commands that if this analytical stage is reached, courts must evaluate each provision of the Act in light of ordinary judicial principles concerning the application of new rules to pending cases and preenactment conduct. 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. at 1505. Because we are satisfied as to congressional intent, we have not engaged in the specific inquiry required in the second Landgraf analytical stage. 64 Given the complexity of the procedural aspects of Title I, requiring universal subsequent stage analysis would have the highly undesirable effect of forcing courts to conduct a separate inquiry in each case as to its particular procedural posture. Besides being an unnecessary and considerable expenditure of judicial resources, such a practice would result in conflicting determinations of whether the Act applies, depending upon the case. This kind of applicability potpourri cannot be what Congress intended. As literally thousands of pending prisoner cases exist, such inquiry can only result in an unwieldy patchwork of decisions devoid of any overall coherence. Our sound judicial instincts and common sense dictate that justice and judicial economy are better served by applying the Act to cases filed after the enactment date. That result would avoid unnecessary judicial chaos, while fully implementing congressional will as to habeas petitions filed after the enactment date. 65 Because Congress has addressed the effective date of the relevant provisions of Title I, we conclude that the amendments to Chapter 153 of Title 28 of the United States Code contained in Title I of the Act do not apply to cases filed in the federal courts of this Circuit prior to the Act's effective date. Because Jeffries' habeas petition was filed prior to April 24, 1996, the Act does not apply to his case. 66