Opinion ID: 2479123
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Trial Court Properly Entered Summary Judgment

Text: We next consider whether the trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of the Bank. We reiterate that summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2000). DeFranco contends, for the first time in his brief to this court, that he is a surety and not a guarantor or, at the very least, a dispute remains over whether DeFranco stands as a surety or guarantor. The Bank contends that DeFranco forfeited this argument by judicial admission by repeatedly referring to himself as a guarantor in the trial court pleadings. This is not a true forfeiture argument. Forfeiture is the failure to comply timely with procedural requirements in preserving an issue for appeal. See Gallagher v. Lenart, 226 Ill.2d 208, 229, 314 Ill.Dec. 133, 874 N.E.2d 43 (2007). Likewise, we reject the judicial admission argument because the issue of whether DeFranco is a guarantor or a surety is a mixed question of law and fact. Judicial admissions are deliberate, clear, unequivocal statements by a party about a concrete fact within that party's knowledge. In re Estate of Rennick, 181 Ill.2d 395, 406, 229 Ill.Dec. 939, 692 N.E.2d 1150 (1998). A party is not bound by admissions regarding conclusions of law because the courts determine the legal effect of the facts adduced. People ex rel. Department of Public Health v. Wiley, 218 Ill.2d 207, 223, 300 Ill.Dec. 1, 843 N.E.2d 259 (2006) (holding a party not bound by a statement in a complaint that an installment agreement was a settlement agreement). Moreover, DeFranco has contended that a guarantor and a surety are the same under the Act, making his choice of label irrelevant to a determination of his true status. DeFranco contends that the circuit court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of the Bank because the contract language of the signed instrument made him a surety and, therefore, the Sureties Act is applicable, despite the use of the word guarantee in the instrument. We agree with DeFranco that the use of the terms guarantee or surety in an instrument does not necessarily determine whether the liability intended to be created was that of a guarantor or a surety. Vermont Marble Co., 356 Ill. at 131, 190 N.E. 291. Rather, when viewed as a whole along with any other evidence of the parties' intentions and the circumstances, a written instrument such as the one DeFranco signed may be construed to create a suretyship despite its use of the term guarantee. Indeed, this court has expressly recognized that parol evidence may be used to determine whether a suretyship exists, even when a party `insists upon a strict construction of the word guarantee, contained in its contract.' Vermont Marble Co., 356 Ill. at 133, 190 N.E. 291, quoting with approval Border Nat. Bank of Eagle Pass v. American Nat. Bank of San Francisco, 282 F. 73, 78 (5th Cir.1922). As this court explained, `to ignore the circumstances in which [the word guarantee] was used is to attach too much importance to it. It is a word which is frequently employed in business transactions which do not provide for securing the promise or debt of another, to express an original primary obligation. The promise in which the word appears is to be construed in the light of the evidence and as a whole. ' (Emphases added.) Vermont Marble Co., 356 Ill. at 133, 190 N.E. 291, quoting Border Nat. Bank, 282 F. at 78. Thus, [t]he question is one of [the parties'] intention[s] and depends upon the circumstances,  permitting the court to consider factual matters outside the language of the document to determine the true nature of the relationship intended between the parties. (Emphasis added.) Vermont Marble Co., 356 Ill. at 133, 190 N.E. 291. See also E. Spencer, The General Law of Suretyship § 92, at 123 (Where the language of a contract of guarantee or suretyship is ambiguous and susceptible of more than one interpretation, parol evidence will be freely admitted as in the case of other written contracts). In Tinker v. Catlin, 205 Ill. 108, 118-19, 68 N.E. 773 (1903), this court considered whether the appellants fell within the protections of a statute releasing sureties from liability if the creditors did not timely raise a debt. In analyzing that issue, this court comprehensively reviewed the relevant parol evidence, including the facts leading up to the creation of the documents that allegedly formed a suretyship with an appellant. Tinker, 205 Ill. at 121, 68 N.E. 773 ([n]or do we think appellant    has established, by the evidence, any such contract as would create the relation of principal maker and surety between him and [another party] (emphasis added)). Thus, the more general meaning of the word guarantee often used in business contexts may require courts to consider evidence outside the language used in the document to determine whether the parties intended to create a guaranty or surety. Here the case was decided on summary judgment, denying both the parties and trial court the benefit of the full development of DeFranco's argument about whether the parties intended him to be a surety even though the written agreement referred only to a guarantee. In the absence of the full development of DeFranco's current argument, the trial court never had the opportunity to rule on the merits of this position. Because genuine issues of material fact remain over whether the parties intended that DeFranco stand as a surety or guarantor under his agreement with the Bank, we hold that the circuit court erroneously entered summary judgment in favor of the Bank. We therefore affirm that part of the appellate court judgment holding that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of the Bank. We remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the intent of the parties from the language and circumstances of the agreement.