Opinion ID: 782567
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Admission of Crappa's Previous Trial Testimony

Text: 113 The district court rejected Alcala's claim that the admission of Crappa's previous testimony violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. In his cross-appeal, Alcala argues that Crappa's testimony was not sufficiently reliable to be deemed admissible as evidence. 114 The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that, In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895), the Supreme Court explained: 115 The primary object of the constitutional provision in question [is] to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits ... being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling [her] to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at [her], and judge by [her] demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which [she] gives [her] testimony whether [she] is worthy of belief. 116 Id. at 242-43, 15 S.Ct. 337. The admission of hearsay testimony, however, does not violate the Confrontation Clause, so long as the witness is unavailable and the testimony bears adequate indicia of reliability. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). Such indicia can be inferred if the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Id. at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531. 117 Crappa's demeanor during Alcala's first trial was odd, if not bizarre. Her conduct was so peculiar that it is next to impossible not to question the trustworthiness of her testimony. The record is replete with examples of Crappa behaving in a manner that calls into question her credibility, mental stability, psychiatric health, and veracity as a witness. 118 &#x2022; Crappa waited up to one minute or more before answering certain questions and, at times, did not answer questions unless they were repeated multiple times. Judge Schwab testified that, There were, at least in portions of her testimony, substantial delays between the question and an answer, sometimes running perhaps close to a minute, perhaps even longer. 119 &#x2022; At one point during her testimony, Crappa was rocking back and forth, her eyes closed.... for several minutes. According to Alcala's trial counsel, Crappa seem[ed] to be undergoing some kind of psychiatric or psychotic break. &#x2022; For one period lasting fifteen minutes, Crappa's only responsive utterance to the prosecutor's questions was to mutter repeatedly, It was a. 120 &#x2022; The prosecution asked Crappa to describe what she saw on the evening of June 25, 1979, multiple times. Crappa, however, either remained silent, muttered unresponsively to the questions, or would continue to rock her body back and forth without speaking. It was only after the trial court called for a recess and Crappa spoke with Robison, a police officer and trained hypnotist, during the break, that she was able to return to the witness stand and testify in a somewhat coherent fashion about having seen Samsoe's corpse on the evening of June 25. 121 &#x2022; Judge Schwab, a veteran California state trial judge with more than twenty years of experience on the bench, agreed that Crappa's behavior was unusual. In particular, the length of time it took for her to begin responding to a question after it was asked was not normal. Judge Schwab even called counsel into chambers to discuss whether it was appropriate for Crappa to continue testifying. Although he said this was not the only time he had considered terminating a witness's testimony, he could not recall any other specific cases where he had done so. 122 &#x2022; Judge Schwab advised Crappa of her constitutional right to assert her privilege against self-incrimination and consult an attorney, after it was suggested to him that Crappa was committing perjury. 123 Crappa's behavior as a witness was so extraordinarily odd that it strikes at the very core of her reliability as a witness. Moreover, reading the cold transcript of her testimony may have had the effect of transforming an incredibly bizarre performance into a credible presentation. 124 We are asked to determine whether, under these unusual circumstances, Crappa's past trial testimony nonetheless bears sufficient indicia of reliability to have been admissible. California argues that the reliability of prior trial testimony given under oath and subjected to cross-examination should be inferred without further inquiry because such testimony is recognized as a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. We do not opine on whether prior trial testimony is a firmly rooted hearsay exception, although we acknowledge some indications in the case law that it is. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 2531; Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722, 725-26, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968). In any event, the Supreme Court has noted that in extraordinary cases, further inquiry into the reliability of prior trial testimony may be required. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 73 n. 12, 100 S.Ct. 2531. 125 Although this may be such a case where further inquiry would be appropriate, we ultimately need not decide whether Crappa's testimony bears adequate indicia of reliability. The trial court's other constitutional errors, combined with the ineffectiveness of Alcala's trial counsel, are more than sufficient to warrant the denial of California's appeal and the granting of Alcala's petition. Accordingly, we decline to rule on this issue as it is unnecessary in our ultimate assessment of the merits of Alcala's petition.