Opinion ID: 1276324
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Having satisfied ourselves that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting DiPiero's statement, we turn to PHA's contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury verdicts in favor of Marra and DiGravio on their retaliation claims under the PHRA. Our review of the District Court's denial of PHA's motion for judgment as a matter of law is plenary, and we apply the same standard as did the District Court. Springer v. Henry, 435 F.3d 268, 274 (3d Cir.2006) (citing Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 204 (3d Cir.2003)). Entry of judgment as a matter of law is a sparingly invoked remedy, CGB Occup. Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs. Inc., 357 F.3d 375, 383 (3d Cir.2004), granted only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability. Moyer v. United Dominion Indus., Inc., 473 F.3d 532, 545 n. 8 (3d Cir.2007) (quoting Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993)). In performing this narrow inquiry, we must refrain from weighing the evidence, determining the credibility of witnesses, or substituting our own version of the facts for that of the jury. Lightning Lube, 4 F.3d at 1166. Section 955(d) of the PHRA forbids an employer to discriminate against an employee because that individual has . . . testified or assisted, in any manner, in any investigation, proceeding or hearing under this act. 43 P.S. § 955(d). Plaintiffs' retaliation claims proceeded under a pretext theory of retaliation at trial, which is governed by the three-step burden shifting analysis set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 188 (3d Cir.2005) (noting that retaliation claims under . . . the PHRA typically proceed under the McDonnell Douglas framework) (citing Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp. Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567-68 (3d Cir.2002)); Woodson, 109 F.3d at 920 (The allocation of the burden of proof for both . . . federal and state retaliation claims [under the PHRA] follows the familiar Title VII standards) (citations omitted). Under the McDonnell Douglas paradigm, the employee bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation. Woodson, 109 F.3d at 920. He must show: (1) protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either after or contemporaneous with the employee's protected activity; and (3) a causal connection between the employee's protected activity and the employer's adverse action. Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 567-68 (3d Cir.2002) (quoting Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir.1997)). If the employee establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. Woodson, 109 F.3d at 920 n. 2 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-55, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir.1994)). If the employer meets its burden, the burden of production returns to the employee, who must now show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer's proffered explanation was false, and that retaliation was the real reason for the adverse employment action. Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Krouse, 126 F.3d at 500-01). [11] PHA does not dispute that Marra and DiGravio each presented sufficient evidence to establish two of the three elements of their prima facie cases: both engaged in a protected activity under the PHRA (giving sworn testimony at the Paladino trial) and PHA subsequently took adverse action against them (laying off Marra and transferring DiGravio to the Section 8 Department to perform inspections). [12] PHA instead contends that there is insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the requisite causal connection between the protected activity and adverse action in each case. Even if there is sufficient evidence of a causal link, PHA insists that it is still entitled to judgment as a matter of law because neither DiGravio nor Marra demonstrated that PHA's proffered non-retaliatory explanations for taking the adverse actions in question were pretextual in nature. We address each contention in turn. [13]