Opinion ID: 2581010
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Denial of defendant's motion for a new guilt and special circumstance phase trial, based upon asserted juror misconduct

Text: In support of a motion for new trial filed after the jury returned its penalty verdict, defendant submitted an affidavit sworn and signed by defendant's former girlfriend Jacqueline Coghlan, as follows: My testimony as a witness was interrupted by a break for lunch. While in the restroom, Juror No. 2 made the following statement to me: [¶] `We're not supposed to have any contact but I just wanted to tell you that you're a very beautiful woman.' [¶] I replied, `I don't feel so beautiful right now.' The People filed a response to the motion in which the prosecution addressed the misconduct allegation and appended a declaration from the juror who had spoken to Jacqueline Coghlan. (As defendant acknowledges, the juror in question was actually Juror No. 5, who was a woman, not Juror No. 2, who was a man.) In that declaration, Juror 5 first stated that she was a juror in the number five position in the case and then asserted: 2. During a break in the testimony of witness Jackie Coghlan, I saw Ms. Coghlan in the ladies restroom; [¶] 3. While in the restroom, I said to Ms. Coghlan something to the effect of [¶] `I know we're not suppose[d] to have any contact but I just wanted to tell you're a very nice looking (or attractive) lady.' [¶] 4. I have no idea what she said after that because I walked out the door. I know she said something back but I didn't hear it because I went out the door. [¶] 5. This brief contact did not in any way affect my ability to be fair and impartial in this case. The trial court concluded that assuming there was misconduct, it was clearly of a trifling nature and [did] not warrant the granting of a new trial. We agree with defendant that Juror No. 5 committed misconduct. ( People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 310, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890; Pen.Code, § 1122, subds. (a) & (b) [forbidding conversations between jurors and anyone else on any subject connected with the trial].) In speaking to Coghlan, Juror No. 5 violated the trial court's repeated and explicit admonitions to avoid contact with all other persons  including witnesses  associated with the case. As we observed in another capital case, however, when misconduct is `of such a trifling nature that it could not in the nature of things have been prejudicial to the moving party and where it appears that the fairness of the trial has been in no way affected by such impropriety, the verdict will not be disturbed.' ( People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 117-118, 241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127.) The trifling misconduct at issue in Miranda, which we found to be nonprejudicial, consisted of a juror approaching the defendant's girlfriend (who attended the trial as a spectator) and thereafter, while the trial continued, engaging in extensive conversations with her, displaying an obvious romantic interest. Manifestly, the facts set out in the declarations in this case demonstrate a lesser degree of misconduct than that at issue in Miranda, and do not appear to have involved anything of substance concerning the merits of the case. The trial court did not err in denying a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct. As we have explained, [a]ny presumption of prejudice is rebutted, and the verdict will not be disturbed, if the entire record in the particular case, including the nature of the misconduct or other event, and the surrounding circumstances, indicates there is no reasonable probability of prejudice, i.e., no substantial likelihood that one or more jurors were actually biased against the defendant. (E.g., [ People v. ] Carpenter [(1995)] 9 Cal.4th 634, 653, [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985].... ( In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 296, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 975 P.2d 600.) Disregarding, under Evidence Code section 1150, Juror No. 5's assertion that the event did not affect her ability to be fair and impartial in the case, the remaining aspects of the declarations, viewed together with the entire record in this case, do not establish any substantial likelihood that Juror No. 5 actually was biased against defendant. Nor was the interaction inherently and substantially likely to have influenced the juror. ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 653, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985.)