Opinion ID: 1147228
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Instruction on the Testimony of Immunized Witnesses

Text: (9) Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give requested cautionary instructions on the testimony of immunized witnesses. Three prosecution witnesses, Thomas Henkemeyer, Gary Sayers and Jefferson Schar, testified under a grant of immunity from prosecution. Each of the witnesses had been charged as an accessory after the fact in helping defendant flee to Mexico. Each testified as to admissions made by defendant before and after the killings. Defendant requested jury instructions stating that the testimony of immunized witnesses must be viewed with suspicion and examined with greater care and caution than the testimony of an ordinary witness. The trial court modified the requested instruction, directing the jury to determine whether an immunized witness's testimony has been affected by it [sic] or by his prejudice against the defendant, but to weigh the witness's credibility by the same standards by which you determine the credibility of other witnesses. The trial court also gave the standard instruction on witness credibility (CALJIC No. 2.20), which directed the jury to weigh, inter alia, the existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest or other motive. Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error in failing to give the requested instruction verbatim. The contention lacks merit. Evidence Code section 411 provides that [e]xcept where additional evidence is required by statute, the direct evidence of one witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient for proof of any fact. The Penal Code sets forth the exceptions in criminal cases, which include, inter alia, accomplice testimony. (See § 1111 [accomplice testimony insufficient for conviction if uncorroborated].) Thus, it is well settled that trial courts are required, under the appropriate circumstances, to give special cautionary instructions concerning accomplice testimony. ( People v. Terry (1970) 2 Cal.3d 362, 398 [85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 961].) Generally, however, as we observed in People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 623 [205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126], an interested witness' `entitle[ment] to full credit' under section 411 is a matter for the trier of fact. Accordingly, we rejected in Alcala the claim that an informant is analogous to an accomplice, observing: The exception for accomplice testimony ... arises from the accomplice's overwhelming motive to shift blame to defendant. He must do so, either to minimize his own liability at trial, or to convince the authorities it is worth immunizing him to obtain his testimony against the defendant. Whatever consideration a jailhouse informant may expect for testifying, the direct, compelling motive to lie is absent. ( Id., at p. 624, italics added; see also People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 565-566 [244 Cal. Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776].) No California authority supports defendant's contention that an immunized witness, unlike an informant, is so analogous to an accomplice that a trial court must, upon request, give cautionary instructions as to the trustworthiness of immunized witness testimony. In People v. Leach (1985) 41 Cal.3d 92, 106 [221 Cal. Rptr. 826, 710 P.2d 893], we held that a trial court was not required to give such cautionary instructions sua sponte, but did not address a court's duty to give such instructions upon request. Defendant relies on law developed by the federal courts holding that a defendant is entitled on request to an instruction that the testimony of informers, accomplices and immunized witnesses should be viewed with suspicion. (See United States v. Watson (7th Cir.1980) 623 F.2d 1198, 1205; United States v. Morgan (9th Cir.1977) 555 F.2d 238, 242-243.) No California decision has adopted or applied the federal rule, however, and the reason is not difficult to perceive. Under federal law the prosecutor cannot grant transactional immunity. (18 U.S.C. § 6002; United States v. Herman, supra, 589 F.2d at p. 1202; United States v. Leonard (D.C. Cir.1979) 494 F.2d 955, 961, fn. 11.) Thus, the government remains free to prosecute the witness after he testifies, as long as the prosecution is not based on the witness's testimony. The grant of immunity therefore does not totally eliminate the witness's incentive to testify falsely. ( United States v. Leonard, supra, 494 F.2d at p. 961, fn. 11.) California law, however, provides that a witness ordered to testify over a claim of self-incrimination shall be given transactional immunity. (§ 1324; Daly v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 132, 146 [137 Cal. Rptr. 14, 560 P.2d 1193]; People v. DeFreitas, supra, 140 Cal. App.3d at pp. 839-840.) The prosecution's leverage over the witness is thereby sharply diminished, as is the witness's motive to falsify. Thus, to paraphrase Alcala, whatever consideration [an immunized witness] may expect for testifying, the direct, compelling motive to lie is absent. (36 Cal.3d at p. 624.) We conclude, accordingly, that the trial court did not err in refusing to give verbatim the instruction requested by defendant. The general instruction on witness credibility, coupled with the modified instruction specifically directing the jury to determine whether the immunized witness's credibility had been affected by the grant of immunity, adequately informed the jury of the necessity to weigh the motives of the immunized witnesses.