Opinion ID: 1846461
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Plaintiffs Failed to Establish Any Duty on the Part of Coho and Cockrell to Perform Soil Test or Site Preparation Work.

Text: ¶ 34. Coho and Cockrell next argue that there was no basis in the record for finding a duty to perform a soil test or any additional site preparation; no evidence of a dangerous soil condition; and no evidence of a causal connection between any alleged failure and the accident. ¶ 35. According to Coho, all witnesses who offered testimony on the issue of site preparation testified that, whether by custom of the industry, or by the course of performance of the parties, Smith Brothers had the responsibility to decide what, if any, additional site work was needed in order to perform its work safely. If such site preparation was necessary, Smith Brothers would request Coho to perform such work before Smith Brothers would rig up its equipment. Further, both tool pushers testified that the site at issue was sufficiently prepared to perform their work safely without any additional site preparation and there was no evidence of any dangerous condition. ¶ 36. However, as McCarthy points out, every witness who testified concerning this issue stated that Coho was responsible for the well site preparation. Further, it is undisputed that Coho did nothing to inspect or prepare the well site before Smith Brothers began performing the workover. Cockrell agreed that it was absolutely necessary that the pipe rack be supported by a suitable foundation. ¶ 37. When Coho's district production manager was being cross-examined at trial, the following exchange took place: Q. Well, would you agree with me that at least one of the safety factors that you would look at would be the condition of the soil underneath the racking board? That would be at least one factor that could have caused this rig to fall over, could it not? A. That could be at least one factor but not the sole factor. Q. All, right. And if that were a factor and if it's your duty as Coho to provide a safe place to work, would one of those duties in providing a safe place to work be site preparation work? A. Yes, one of those duties would be site preparation work. Q. And there's no duty whatsoever upon Smith Brothers or any of their employees to do any site preparation work, is it? A. There is a duty upon everyone when it comes to safety. Q. That wasn't my question. My question was whether or not they had any duty with reference to site preparation work? A. They have no duty to my knowledge towardtoward site preparation work. . . . Q. Well, did Coho hire a soil expert before they rigged up on this location? A. Not to my knowledge. Q. Did Coho prep this site like it would have been prepped a site where they were drilling a new well, did they do that? A. Not to my knowledge. ¶ 38. Clearly there was a jury question as to whether Coho and Cockrell were negligent in not performing soil tests or site preparation. This issue is without merit. ¶ 39. In conclusion as to Issue I, Coho and Cockrell assert several reasons why the trial court's denial of motions for JNOV and directed verdict was improper. However, we conclude there is substantial evidence in support of the verdict when we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to McCarthy and the Stroos, giving them the benefit of all favorable inference that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. Even though reasonable and fair-minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions, pursuant to our standard of review we must affirm.
¶ 40. Dr. George Hammitt was offered as an expert in the field of soil mechanics as a civil engineer who was able to give an opinion as to why the rig overturned. The court accepted Dr. Hammitt as an expert witness, with Coho and Cockrell waiving voir dire on his qualifications, yet objecting to his offering an opinion as to the soil conditions. ¶ 41. Dr. Hammitt obtained a Ph.D. in geotechnical and soils engineering from Texas A & M University. He was chief of the airfields and pavement division of the U.S. Army Waterways Experiment Station in Vicksburg, the largest research and development facility within the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. He provided soils analysis for the recommendation of proper foundations to support roads and landing fields. He is extensively published, has taught on the university level, and has served as a consultant within his field. Moreover, he has been qualified as an expert in courts of this state and other jurisdictions in the area of soil mechanics. ¶ 42. Coho and Cockrell argue that Dr. Hammitt had no experience in oilfield work and no knowledge of the duties and responsibilities of the various parties involved in oilfield work, and thus could not be an expert in that specific field. Additionally they argue that Dr. Hammitt's opinion failed to address the physical forces acting on the rig at the time of the accident and that he sampled the soil from 50 to 100 feet from the well, not at the well site where the accident occurred. ¶ 43. According to the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, where scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, the qualified witness may testify. Miss. R. Evid. 702. As this Court stated in Roberts v. Grafe Auto Co., 701 So.2d 1093, 1098 (Miss.1997): The admission of expert testimony is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Unless we conclude that the discretion was arbitrary and clearly erroneous, amounting to an abuse of discretion, that decision will stand. Id. ¶ 44. Dr. Hammitt testified that his soil sampling complied with good engineering practices. He testified that if crushed stone or gravel had been added to the site prior to commencing the workover, the soil would have been sufficiently strong to support the weight of the pipes and the accident would not have occurred. ¶ 45. Clearly Dr. Hammitt's testimony would assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine whether Coho was negligent in failing to conduct soil tests or any further site preparation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Dr. Hammitt was qualified as an expert, and it properly allowed Dr. Hammitt's testimony as to soil conditions and the cause of the rig's overturning. This issue is without merit.
¶ 46. Coho and Cockrell argue that they were denied an opportunity to put on evidence of subsequent remedial measures which proved that after the accident, Smith Brothers provided a substantially larger, stronger and more stable mat to be used for racking the pipes. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 407 provides: When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment. Miss. R. Evid. 407 (emphasis added). Coho and Cockrell argue that it was reversible error for the trial judge not to allow further questioning, after initially letting them ask a few questions on this topic. They argue they were introducing evidence of subsequent remedial measures to establish control, not to prove negligence. At trial, the following exchange transpired: Q. Now, has Smith Brothers changed anything about the way they rack pipe as a result of this accident? MR. SIMS: We object, if the Court Please. That's subsequent remedial measures. MR. ELLINGBURG: Your Honor, Smith Brothers isn't being sued. There's no claim of negligence against Smith Brothers. THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection on that basis. A. Yes, sir. Wechange from racking on loose boards, you know, boards stacked on top of each other to a formed mat which is three layer of two-inch boards bolted together, and they have a cable running through each end. Q. And is it a somewhat bigger mat? A. Oh. Yes, sir. Q. Has Smith Brothers started requiring or have they ever requested that Coho run soil tests at workover sites before they rig up to do their work? ¶ 47. During recess, the court advised counsel that it had reconsidered its initial ruling and decided not to allow further questioning on subsequent remedial measures. Coho and Cockrell claim this premature termination of this line of questioning was prejudicial error. However, as the Stroos point out, the jury did hear about the subsequent remedial measure concerning changing the type and size of the mat. Then, the attorney voluntarily moved on to other issues and began questioning about soil tests. It was not until recess that the judge decided that it would not allow any further questioning in this area. As previous stated, we review evidentiary rulings by the trial court on an abuse of discretion standard. While it may have been error to not allow any further questioning on this topic, we fail to see how it was prejudicial. Coho and Cockrell were clearly able to get before the jury the fact that Smith Brothers had changed the type and size of the racking mat after the accident. This issue is without merit.
¶ 48. Coho and Cockrell next argue that opposing counsel carried on a course of conduct throughout the trial, through questioning, comments, and innuendo that was calculated to mislead and inflame the jury and prevent the jury from impartially considering the facts and instructions given by the court. Specific instances cited included questioning about an alleged agreement between Coho and Smith Brothers to falsely place the blame on Smith Brothers so Coho could escape liability; questioning concerning whether Smith Brothers had given each of the employees $100 after the accident and instructed them to tell no one about what happened; and implying that Smith Brothers was represented by Coho's attorney at the trial. McCarthy and the Stroos respond that Coho and Cockrell often failed to timely object at trial. And when they did timely object, the trial court offered to admonish the jury to disregard the remarks. ¶ 49. The first time that a motion for mistrial was made regarding the questioned course of conduct was after the plaintiffs had rested. Coho and Cockrell did not move to strike, nor for a curative instruction. ¶ 50. Our standard of review of the trial court's decision whether to grant a mistrial is abuse of discretion: Case law unequivocally holds that the trial judge is in the best position for determining the prejudicial effect of an objectionable remark. The judge is provided considerable discretion to determine whether the remark is so prejudicial that a mistrial should be declared. Where serious and irreparable damage has not resulted, the judge should admonish the jury then and there to disregard the impropriety. Roundtree v. State, 568 So.2d 1173, 1177-78 (Miss.1990)(internal citations omitted). Further, the aggrieved party must make a timely objection. In Meena v. Wilburn, 603 So.2d 866 (Miss.1992), this Court stated: Of utmost importance, a judge can only make a determination of prejudice if the defendant makes a timely objection and motion for mistrial .... [t]imeliness means the objection and motion must be made contemporaneously with the alleged improper utterance. This is well-known as the contemporaneous objection rule. ... Contemporaneousness is critical because it allows the judge to avert a mistrial, if possible, by admonishing the jury to disregard the utterance. Id. at 874. ¶ 51. In his denial of Coho and Cockrell's motion for JNOV or new trial, the trial judge found there were no errors, which were the subject of objections and motions for mistrial, that affected the outcome of the case in any material way or affected the defendants' right to a fair trial. After review of the alleged infractions, keeping in mind our standard or review, we conclude that any prejudice was minimal and that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying a mistrial. This issue is without merit.
¶ 52. At trial, Coho and Cockrell requested that the trial judge allow them to counter opposing counsel's assertion that [P]laintiffs were going home with nothing by putting on evidence of their recovery of workers' compensation and social security benefits. Coho and Cockrell claim that they also needed to put on evidence of these other benefits to counter opposing counsel's assertion that the plaintiffs were poor and that the trial court's denial of this request was reversible error. ¶ 53. The trial court considered the plaintiffs' motion to exclude this information in limine, at which time Coho and Cockrell assured the court they would not attempt to violate the collateral source rule by offering evidence of such payments. McCarthy and the Stroos argue that their statement about going home with nothing did not intimate they were poor, and was instead intended to show the potential bias of a witness. As we stated in Central Bank of Mississippi v. Butler, 517 So.2d 507 (Miss.1987): Mississippi has adopted and follows the collateral source rule. Under this rule, a defendant tortfeasor is not entitled to have damages for which he is liable reduced by reason of the fact that the plaintiff has received compensation for his injury by and through a totally independent source, separate and apart from the defendant tortfeasor. Id. at 511-12. Further, in McCary v. Caperton, 601 So.2d 866, 868-69 (Miss.1992), the defendant argued that the evidence was not offered to the jury for the purpose of reducing the amount of the award that the jury would return, if any, but was instead offered for the express purpose of showing that McCary was engaged in a scam; that she was trying to collect for injuries she never suffered. We held, [W]e have never recognized such an exception to the collateral source rule, and we refrain from doing so here. McCary, 601 So.2d at 869. ¶ 54. Coho and Cockrell are essentially arguing for an exception to the collateral source rule, to rebut an averment of poverty by the plaintiff, yet they cite no authority for this exception. We have never recognized such an exception and decline to do so here. ¶ 55. On the other hand, it could be argued that McCarthy and Stroo opened the door by their statement that the plaintiffs would leave with nothing and that fairness requires the court to allow Coho and Cockrell to put on evidence to counter that assertion. Under that scenario, it was error for the trial court not to allow the evidence of the other benefits that they had already received. However, this error does not rise to the level of reversible error, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing Coho and Cockrell to put forth such evidence.
¶ 56. After the judgment, McCarthy and the Stroos filed a motion for prejudgment interest. At the hearing on the motion, the trial judge stated: THE COURT: Okay. We'll do the prejudgment interest first, I guess, and I have a shortcut method of doing that. And y'all can tell me if its wrong, but I look at the complaint, and if the complaint asked for prejudgment interest, my policy has been to grant it. ¶ 57. And he did. Coho and Cockrell argue that the decision was arbitrary on its face because the judge did not even consider any of the specific circumstances under which Mississippi law recognizes a party's right to prejudgment interest, and thus the trial judge abused his discretion. We agree. Moreover, even if the judge had not abused his discretion, the statute, as interpreted by this Court, warrants determination that prejudgment interest was not proper. Pursuant to statute: All judgments or decrees founded on any sale or contract shall bear interest at the same rate as the contract evidencing the debt on which the judgment or decree was rendered. All other judgments or decrees shall bear interest at a per annum rate set by the judge hearing the complaint from a date determined by such judge to be fair but in no event prior to the filing of the complaint. Miss.Code Ann. § 75-17-7 (2000). This Court has interpreted the statute as follows: An award of prejudgment interest rests in the discretion of the awarding judge. Under Mississippi law, prejudgment interest may be allowed in cases where the amount due is liquidated when the claim is originally made or where the denial of a claim is frivolous or in bad faith. No award of prejudgment interest may rationally be made where the principal amount has not been fixed prior to judgment. Warwick v. Matheney, 603 So.2d 330, 342 (Miss.1992)(internal citation omitted)(emphasis added). ¶ 58. In the case sub judice, the principal amount was not fixed prior to judgment; therefore no award of prejudgment interest could rationally be made and it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to do so. We reverse and render the award of pre-judgment interest.
¶ 59. A married woman shall have a cause of action for loss of consortium through negligent injury of her husband. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-3-1 (1994). This Court has interpreted this statute as follows: The interest sought to be protected is personal to the wife and arises out of the marriage relation. She is entitled to society, companionship, love, affection, aid, services, support, sexual relations and the comfort of her husband as special rights and duties growing out of the marriage covenant. To these may be added the right to live together in the same house, to eat at the same table, and to participate together in the activities, duties and responsibilities necessary to make a home. All of these are included in the broad term, conjugal rights. The loss of consortium is the loss of any or all of these rights, but damages recoverable by a wife in an action for loss of consortium under the statute must be limited to avoid double recovery for the same damages by both husband and wife.... Consortium does not consist alone of intangible mental and emotional elements, but may include services performed by the husband for the wife which have a monetary value. Tribble v. Gregory, 288 So.2d 13, 16-17 (Miss.1974)(internal citations omitted). ¶ 60. Coho and Cockrell argue that none of the elements of recovery for any type of loss of consortium were proven at trial, and to allow Patti Stroo to recover $10,000 for same would allow for double recovery. Further, they argue that Patti Stroo never testified at trial concerning her personal losses. The Stroos respond that Bobby Stroo adequately testified concerning the loss of his ability to aid and provide services and to participate in activities and duties related to making a home. The Stroos also claim that this Court has never required that a plaintiff testify in her own behalf regarding loss of consortium, if the case is properly proven by other witnesses. Coho and Cockrell agree that Patti was not required to testify in her behalf, but argue that there was no evidence from any witness as to loss of consortium. (emphasis in original). ¶ 61. In fact, that argument is supported by Dr. Alan Freeland, Bobby Stroo's treating physician, who testified as follows: Q. It wouldokay. To come back to my question, in view of the fact he can take his own time, would you expect him to be able to do routine household things that men usually do around the house when they are at home helping their wife? A. I think so. There might be some specific things that he couldn't do or have more trouble with, but I think he would be doing most things probably at his own pace. . . . Q. Is there any reason he can't have a normal sex life? A. None that I know of. ¶ 62. We recognize the difficulty of proving loss of consortium and placing a value on elements of a consortium claim. Patti Stroo's claim was based upon the loss of aid and services and the loss of participation with activities and duties related to making a home. Bobby Stroo testified as to what he has not been able to do physically at work or home as a result of his broken wrist and the surgery for his injury. His entire testimony regarding matters which might be construed to fall within the scope of the conjugal rights enumerated in Tribble, is found in the direct examination of Bobby Stroo regarding the broken bones in his wrist, as follows: Q. Does the pain cause you any problems sleeping at night? A. I wake up constantly. I mean, if I turnif I turn wrong or if I roll over on it, it will wake me up. . . . Q. Has the injury that you received caused any limitation on the activities that you could do before you had this injury? A. Yes, sir. I'm an avid hunter or I was. I used to go all the time fishing. Mowing. I got two boys growing up. I played football. Before I had the surgery from Dr. Freeland, I couldn't do none of it. Now, I do have a little bit I can do with the boys. I may go out and throw a football five, six times and that's it, and it goes to hurting and back in the house I go. Q. With reference to your household working chores, are there any limitations on what you can do after the injury as opposed to what you could do before the injury? A. Yes, sir. I'mI'm a yard fanatic. I like to cut yard. I do all the lawn mowing or did until the accident, and I always told my wife she wouldn't never have to do no yard work. Well, I lied. She had to get out there. My boys and my daughter had to get out there and do the work. And right now I can do some, but mostly the boys take care of the yard, the flower beds, anything else that's got to be done, garden. They don't like it, but they do it. The direct examination then returned to limitations on Bobby Stroo's ability to work in the oil field. Nowhere else in the record is there further evidence which could even arguably be construed as pertaining to Patti Stroo's loss of consortium claim. ¶ 63. Bobby Stroo's testimony regarding his own physical limitations for which he recovered an award cannot prove his wife's damages for the same physical limitations in a loss of consortium claim. ¶ 64. Justice Diaz's separate opinion cites Alldread v. Bailey, 626 So.2d 99 (Miss.1993), for his contention that there was sufficient evidence to support Patti's loss of consortium award. In Alldread, the wife was injured in an automobile accident and received a judgment on her negligence claim. Id. However, the jury found against her husband on his derivative loss of consortium claim, even though the following evidence was introduced: Mrs. Alldread testified her family was just a normal family prior to the accident. She stated that they would go to the park together or go fishing, and she and her husband played racquetball and walked. She testified she did the majority of the household duties. After the accident, she was able to do housework, but normally did not do anything that required a lot of stooping and bending. She stated that after the accident her husband and children did most of the housework. In discussing her sexual relations, Mrs. Alldread stated that prior to the accident, she and her husband had relations two or three times a week; however, since the accident, they had sexual relations once a month or less. She stated she no longer plays racquetball. Id. at 100. The jury concluded that the husband had suffered no loss, and this Court unanimously affirmed. ¶ 65. Justice Diaz cites the following evidence, elicited from Bobby Stroo's testimony, as proof of Patti's loss of consortium: (1) because of pain, Bobby wakes up constantly at night; (2) Bobby cannot play with his children as he used to; and (3) Bobby can no longer do the yard work. With all due respect, Bobby waking up at night, not being able to play with his children, and not being able to do the yard work, without more, is not sufficient to draw inferences of damages personal to Patti. Further, Bobby has already been awarded $1,500,000 (reduced to $840,000 by the judge) for his injuries. One can only assume that an award of that size included his loss for not being able to do the these previously mentioned activities. To award Patti damages for the same loss would result in impermissible double payment for the same injury. See Tribble, 288 So.2d at 16-17 (damages recoverable by a wife in an action for loss of consortium under the statute must be limited to avoid double recovery for the same damages by both husband and wife). ¶ 66. As we stated in Alldread: A cause of action accruing to a party for loss of consortium is separate and distinct from that party's spouse suffering personal injury. The spouse seeking compensation for loss of consortium must show that he or she suffered damages arising out of the other's injuries Alldread, 626 So.2d at 102 (emphasis added). ¶ 67. In Purdon v. Locke, 807 So.2d 373 (Miss.2001), this Court recently affirmed an award of loss of consortium. However, there was substantially more testimonial evidence presented as to the wife's loss, from both the husband and the wife, as follows: testimony and evidence were properly introduced and evince a serious decline in the Lockes' relationship subsequent to the injury. Larry Locke testified that he was very sore and had to sleep a few nights in a recliner. When he was discharged, the doctor told him not to lift anything and to take it easy; he continues to have problems with lifting anything heavy. He testified that he has bad nightmares and could not control his emotions. Because of his mood swings, he had to take nerve pills and sleeping pills. Mr. Locke testified that he suffers emotional instability and this has affected his relationship with his wife. From this testimony, it is reasonable for the jury to infer loss of spousal assistance and affection. Rita Locke testified that before his surgery, her husband was outgoing, friendly, caring, and enjoyable to be around. After the surgery, she testified that for a long period of time he would get upset with her and the kids and frustrated because he could not do the things he could before. According to Mrs. Locke, her husband complained about pain and had trouble sleeping. He would sleep in the chair a lot and he did not care to be around her as much. This emotional and physical change in behavior, she testified, adversely affected her relationship with her husband. From the testimony given by Mrs. Locke, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that her relationship with her husband was adversely affected. Id. at 379 (emphasis added). In contrast, in the case sub judice, there is no testimony from either Bobby or Patti, as to how Bobby's injury has adversely affected his relationship with Patti. In Alldread, in which the injured spouse testified to her limitations and how they affected her husband and children, we affirmed the finding of no loss of consortium and said that the spouse seeking compensation for loss of consortium must show that he or she suffered damages arising out of the other's injuries. 626 So.2d at 102 (emphasis added). Subsequently, in Purdon, where both the injured husband and his wife testified, we said that it was reasonable for the jury to infer loss of spousal assistance and affection. 807 So.2d at 379. It is speculative and contrary to precedent to allow the jury to infer that Bobby's limitations, as shown generally by the evidence before the jury, affected his relationship with Patti such that she has suffered a compensable injury. ¶ 68. Because the evidence offered was insufficient to even draw inferences to support Patti Stroo's personal claim for loss of consortium, the trial court's judgment of $10,000 for loss of consortium is reversed and rendered.
¶ 69. Coho and Cockrell next argue that the jury was not properly instructed as to the applicable law, even if the jury instructions are read as a whole. As we have said, on appellate review, we do not isolate the individual instruction attacked, but rather we read all of the instructions as a whole. Payne v. Rain Forest Nurseries, Inc., 540 So.2d 35, 40-41 (1989). Defects in specific instructions do not require reversal where all instructions taken as a whole fairlyalthough not perfectlyannounce the applicable primary rules of law. Id. at 40-41. Further, [t]he trial court enjoys considerable discretion regarding the form and substance of jury instructions. Higgins v. State, 725 So.2d 220, 223 (Miss.1998). Mississippi's law on jury instructions has been summarized as follows: Jury instructions are to be read together and taken as a whole with no one instruction taken out of context. A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case; however, this entitlement is limited in that the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is fairly covered elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. We have also held a court's jury instructions will not warrant reversal if the jury was fully and fairly instructed by other instructions. Id. at 223. ¶ 70. Coho and Cockrell assert numerous errors in charging the jury. However, because loss of consortium and premises liability are discussed more fully in other sections of this opinion, we will not address alleged errors in those instructions here. However, we will discuss the allegation that the instructions were deficient in that they failed to allow the jury to apportion fault, between Coho and Cockrell, and among other parties. We will also discuss the jury instruction that dealt with loss of enjoyment of life.
¶ 71. Coho and Cockrell object to instructions P-15 and S-P-14 because the instructions did not allow the jury to apportion fault between the defendants, or consider the fault, if any, of other persons or entities. Coho and Cockrell claim that instruction D-23, which was refused, would have correctly allowed the jury to apportion fault. They quote Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7(7)(1999) as follows: In actions involving joint tort-feasors, the trier of fact shall determine the percentage of fault for each party alleged to be at fault. However, they fail to cite any authority that states that a jury instruction, so deficient, is reversible error. ¶ 72. The Stroos correctly respond that the statute does not permit apportionment of liability between an employer and employee, because they shall be considered one (1) defendant when the liability has been caused by the employee. Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7(3)(1999). The Stroos further argue that even though it is true that instruction P-15 did not contain a sufficient form for the defendants, instruction D-9 sufficiently instructed the jury as to the form, if the jury found in their favor. Thus, taking P-15 and D-9 together, the jury had ample opportunity to find for the defendants if it was so inclined. After a close examination of the jury instructions at issue, we agree.
¶ 73. Coho and Cockrell further argue that the trial court should have instructed the jury to take into consideration the fault of a party not present in the lawsuit, as well as the fault of the parties to the suit. This means that any negligence attributable to Smith Brothers, its employees, Ainsworth or any other participants to the well workover should have been taken into account. ¶ 74. The Stroos respond that the law at the time of the trial was McBride v. Chevron U.S.A., 673 So.2d 372, 381 (Miss. 1996), which made it permissible, but not mandatory, to permit juries to consider the fault of settling defendants. [2] While jury instructions were being discussed in chambers, the trial judge said: THE COURT: I agree. The statute seems to say you can [have the jury consider the fault attributable to a non-party]. Up until recently I would put in unnamed tortfeasors or unsued tortfeasors and I've been convinced since McBride that was probably wrong. So I stopped doing that. ¶ 75. The Stroos further argue that an interrogatory question was posed to Coho and Cockrell during discovery seeking the identity of any other parties that they would contend had caused the accident. They did not identify any other party in their answer, nor did they supplement that response to name Smith Brothers. As such, they waived any right they may have had to apportion fault to Smith Brothers.
¶ 76. Instruction P-13 allowed the jury to consider awarding damages to McCarthy's estate for any or all the following elements: mental anguish; net present cash value of future earnings; loss of enjoyment of life; loss of love, society and companionship with their father, if any, which each of McCarthy's children would have enjoyed; loss of nurture, training and guidance each child would have received, and the cost of the funeral and burial. There was no instruction which defined any of these six elements. Instruction P-15 provided for a general verdict, directing that if the jury found for the Plaintiff, they should simply fill in the blank with the one total amount. ¶ 77. McCarthy's certified financial analyst did not present to the jury any testimony regarding the value of loss of enjoyment of life. There was minimal testimony from family members about what Kelvin McCarthy enjoyed doing and would be unable to enjoy due to his untimely death. In closing argument, the McCarthy's attorney mentioned specific dollar figures only for net present value of lost earnings ($327,977) mental anguish ($100,000) and loss of enjoyment of life ($817,823) but then ended his argument requesting that the jury return a verdict for $3,500,000. No further testimony was before the jury regarding loss of enjoyment of life, and no instruction gave any specific dollar amount for any of the six elements mentioned above. Because the record does not reveal whether any amount of the damages awarded by the jury was for loss of enjoyment of life, and because the question of the applicability of damages for the loss of enjoyment of life in cases where death is instantaneous is yet unanswered, we cannot say that the trial court was in error on this issue. ¶ 78. In conclusion, although there may have been some defects in specific instructions, where all instructions taken as a whole fairlyalthough not perfectlyannounce the applicable primary rules of law, reversal is not warranted. This issue is without merit.
¶ 79. Coho and Cockrell next assert that the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial after attorney for plaintiffs elicited testimony concerning insurance as follows: Q. Tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what lawyers represented you in that matter when you first got sued? A. When I first got sued? Q. Yes, sir. Up until last week? A. The lawyersthe Smith Brothers insurance lawyers. (emphasis added). ¶ 80. In Jackson v. Daley, 739 So.2d 1031, 1039 (Miss.1999), we stated: It is well established in this state that evidence of insurance or lack thereof may not be presented at a trial to show who would have to pay the judgment. However, in Meena v. Wilburn, 603 So.2d 866 (Miss. 1992), we said: The general rule that insurance should not be mentioned before a jury has long been adhered to by this Court because it was thought to prejudice a defendant. However, [t]he likelihood of the [defendant] being prejudiced by the mention of insurance has been diminished in recent years because most jurors, and other citizens, ... share the common knowledge [regarding coverage of] liability insurance. Such awareness has meant that the mere mentioning of insurance in a trial is not cause for mistrial in all cases. The trial judge is in the most advantageous position to correctly rule whether prejudice, or the lack of it, has emanated from the comment of a witness. Therefore, a large discretion has been [vested in] the trial [judge] in ruling upon comments concerning insurance arising during a trial. Meena, 603 So.2d at 873-74 (internal citations omitted). ¶ 81. In the case sub judice, Ainsworth's response that mentioned insurance was spontaneous, unsolicited, and non-responsive. Coho and Cockrell did not make a contemporaneous objection that would have allowed the trial judge to instruct the jury to disregard the remark. Instead, they asked to approach the bench and were advised to make a record on that point at a later time. ¶ 82. We find that the mere spontaneous, unsolicited and non-responsive mention of insurance does not rise to the level of reversible error, and the trial court did not abuse his discretion in not declaring a mistrial on this issue.
¶ 83. Finally, Coho and Cockrell argue that the trial court should have continued the trial rather than severing Ainsworth only days before the trial began. The trial court severed him because close to the time of the trial, counsel for Coho, Cockrell and Ainsworth discovered a potential conflict with representing Ainsworth and filed a motion to withdraw and for substitution of counsel. Coho and Cockrell cite Kiddy v. Lipscomb, 628 So.2d 1355, 1357-58 (Miss.1993), for the proposition that it is improper to sever joint tortfeasors where the actions involve the same nucleus of common facts and arise from the same transaction or occurrence. ¶ 84. McCarthy responds that Ainsworth was not a joint tortfeasor with Coho and Cockrell. Instead, Ainsworth was a hired consultant who was acting within the course and scope of his agency. As such, § 85-5-7(3) would prevent an apportionment of fault between Ainsworth, Cockrell or Coho. ¶ 85. The Stroos argue that Kiddy is factually inapposite to the case at bar because it involved two defendant doctors in a medical malpractice case. In Kiddy, one of the defendant doctors did not want to be joined at trial with the other defendant doctor because the latter had been indicted in a highly-publicized child pornography case. Kiddy, 628 So.2d at 1357. This Court held that the plaintiff had a right to have the two doctors joined in the same suit because to do otherwise would have allowed the doctors to divide and conquer, thus allowing each doctor to point at the empty chair and prevent the jury from hearing the entire case. Id. at 1358. The Stroos correctly argue that Kiddy does not stand for the proposition that multiple defendants have the right to always be joined in the same action. Regardless, even if Ainsworth had not been severed, he would not have separate liability apart from his employer. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in severing Ainsworth prior to the trial.