Opinion ID: 2146063
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: essential elements of offense

Text: The burden of proof resting upon the State is satisfied only if the evidence shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, the following essential elements of the offense charged: 1. That on or about the 2nd day of September, 1995, in Griggs County, North Dakota, the Defendant Jamie Carlson, threatened to commit crimes of violence or acts dangerous to human life upon Paul Hendrickson or upon other members of his family with intent to place Paul Hendrickson in fear for his safety and in fear of the safety of his family; 2. That Defendant made such threats with intent to place Paul Hendrickson in fear for his safety or the safety of other members of his family. [¶ 23] The trial court's instruction advised the jury on the elements of terrorizing in the context of whether Carlson intended to place Hendrickson in fear for his or his family's safety. Under those instructions, Carlson was not precluded from arguing the effect of his transitory anger on the issue his intent. Moreover, Carlson's proposed instruction said that [t]ransitory anger expresses a threat [which] is `merely idle' with no intention of executing the same. However, the gist of terrorizing involves whether the defendant intended to place others in fear for their safety, and threats may constitute terrorizing regardless of whether the defendant intends to carry them out, or to inflict actual injury. Carlson's proposed instruction misstated that aspect of the law. The trial court's instructions correctly advised the jury on the law, and we conclude the court did not err in refusing to give Carlson's requested instruction on transitory anger.
[¶ 24] Carlson contends the trial court erred in refusing to allow Larry Hendricks, a licensed physician's assistant who treated Carlson in the emergency room at Mercy Hospital in Valley City on the night of the arrest, to testify as a medical expert. Carlson asserts the court's ruling prevented him from presenting medical evidence to support his claim of police misconduct and precluded the jury from hearing that his statements to Hendrickson were not made with the culpability required for terrorizing because they were made during his transitory anger. [¶ 25] Rule 702, N.D.R.Ev., provides [i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. See South v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819, 831 (N.D.1980). [¶ 26] Rule 702, N.D.R.Ev., envisions the generous allowance of expert testimony when a witness has some expertise in a relevant field. State v. Trosen, 547 N.W.2d 735, 739 (N.D.1996). To qualify as an expert, a witness need not be licensed in a given field. Oberlander v. Oberlander, 460 N.W.2d 400, 402 (N.D.1990). Rather, the witness must possess the requisite knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education in that field and must have information that is helpful to the trier-of-fact. Id. [¶ 27] Other courts have held that a physician's assistant may render an opinion within the area of the assistant's expertise. Jackson v. State, 516 So.2d 726, 749-50 (Ala. Crim.App.1985); Wal-Mart v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona, 183 Ariz. 145, 147, 901 P.2d 1175, 1177 (Ariz.Ct.App.1995); State v. Tibbetts, 572 A.2d 142, 143 (Me.1990); State v. Jones, 89 N.C.App. 584, 367 S.E.2d 139, 146-47 (1988). The qualifications of an expert witness, however, are primarily for the determination of the trial court, and its determination will not be reversed on appeal unless the court abused its discretion. Trosen, 547 N.W.2d at 739. [¶ 28] After eliciting testimony at trial about Hendricks's qualifications and experience as a licensed physician's assistant, Carlson made a broad offer of Hendricks as an expert qualified to testify to the medical aspects within this case. During extensive voir dire, Hendricks informed the court that he would testify his supervising physicians had advised him to testify that Carlson's x-rays were inconclusive about whether Carlson had refractured his shoulder. The court refused to let Hendricks testify about Carlson's x-rays. After additional voir dire, the court ruled that Hendricks could not testify as an expert witness on all medical issues in the case, but that he could testify about his examination and treatment of Carlson in the emergency room. Hendricks testified that he examined Carlson at the emergency room and that Carlson was complaining of pain in his left shoulder. Hendricks also testified he did not see any bruising, contusions, ecchymosis or skin excoriations on Carlson's head. The court sustained the State's objection to a question about whether Hendricks observed anything on Carlson's head or face that would indicate Carlson had been struck. Hendricks testified, however, he did not recall observing any outward signs of physical trauma on Carlson's head. [¶ 29] We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Carlson's broad offer for Hendricks to testify as an expert about all medical issues involved in the case. In view of Hendricks's statement about Carlson's x-rays, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in refusing to let Hendricks testify on that subject. Carlson has not specifically identified any other relevant expert opinions that Hendricks was precluded from testifying about. The court limited Hendricks's testimony to his examination and treatment of this defendant at the Valley City Mercy Hospital. Under the court's ruling, Hendricks was free to testify about his observations of Carlson's condition. We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion regarding the scope of Hendricks's testimony. [¶ 30] Carlson also asserts the court erred in allowing the State to read excerpts from Hendricks's emergency room report and then refusing to allow Carlson to read the entire report to the jury. [¶ 31] The record reflects that, during direct examination by Carlson and cross-examination by the State, Hendricks referred to his emergency room report. On redirect, Carlson asked to read the entire report to the jury. The court denied Carlson's request, ruling [t]he evidence sought to be included from the remainder of the statement[,] having once been subject to direct examination and now on redirect has been found limited to the scope of the cross-examination[,] will be excluded under Rule 403. The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Carlson's request. [¶ 32] Carlson also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to introduce Hendricks's deposition at trial. The court denied Carlson's request in a pretrial order; however, the court allowed Hendricks to be added to Carlson's witness list. Hendricks testified at trial, and the court's ruling did not preclude Carlson from using Hendricks's deposition at trial for any valid purpose. Carlson's argument about Hendricks's deposition is meritless.