Opinion ID: 4108971
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: hunt’s c hallenges to the stay-away condition

Text: ARE MERITLESS. Although Hunt has not waived his claims about the stay-away condition, they lack merit.
plain procedural error. Hunt did not object at the sentencing hearing to the district court’s failure to substantiate the stay-away condition. Sent. Tr. 32-33 (Q: “Are there any other matters we need to take up, Counsel?” A: “I don’t believe so, sir.”). Accordingly, we review his procedural challenge for plain error only. United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (reviewing for plain error where defendant and his lawyer “sat in court while the judge pronounced the sentence, but they never voiced an objection on the ground that the District Court had failed to substantiate the conditions of release”); see United States v. Bigley, 786 F.3d 11, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“When a defendant fails to timely raise a procedural reasonableness objection at sentencing, this Court reviews for 12 plain error.”). 2 Under the plain-error standard, Hunt must demonstrate that the district court (1) “committed error”; (2) “that is plain” or obvious; (3) “that affects [his] substantial rights”; and (4) that “‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” United States v. Locke, 664 F.3d 353, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)) (second alteration in Johnson). Assuming without deciding that Hunt meets the first requirement, we conclude that he cannot satisfy the other three. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor our Court has squarely decided whether a district court must make express findings to substantiate a special condition of supervised release. 3 That alone dooms Hunt’s claim of plain 2 Hunt notes that he objected to the condition itself. Appellant’s Br. 15. That objection did not preserve his claim about the lack of explanation. United States v. Deatherage, 682 F.3d 755, 763 (8th Cir. 2012) (“A general objection at sentencing to the substantive restriction imposed by a special condition is not enough to preserve an allegation that the court did not adequately explain its specific reasons for imposing the special condition.”); United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 981 (9th Cir. 2009) (similar holding). 3 Our sister circuits are divided on the issue. Compare United States v. Falor, 800 F.3d 407, 411 (7th Cir. 2015) (express findings required); United States v. Martinez-Torres, 795 F.3d 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 2015) (same); United States v. Salazar, 743 F.3d 445, 451 (5th Cir. 2014) (same); United States v. Poitra, 648 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Miller, 594 F.3d 172, 184 (3d Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Brogdon, 503 F.3d 555, 563 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); and United States v. Brown, 653 F. App’x 50, 51 (2d Cir. 2016) (unpublished summary order) (same), with United States v. Garrasteguy, 559 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 2009) (express findings not required where reasons can be inferred from record); 13 procedural error. United States v. Terrell, 696 F.3d 1257, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (error ordinarily cannot be “plain” unless “a clear precedent in the Supreme Court or this circuit establishe[s] its erroneous character”). To cinch matters, we have held in an analogous case that a lack of findings, even if error, was not plain error. Sullivan, 451 F.3d at 896 (affirming sentence where defendant did not contemporaneously object to district court’s “fail[ure] to substantiate the conditions of release” and did not advance any “viable basis for ascribing plain error to” sentencing judge). We see no basis for a different conclusion here. Nor does the lack of explanation or findings affect Hunt’s substantial rights or call into question the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. The district court imposed the stay-away condition moments after the parties argued about its merits. The sequence and timing strongly suggest the court endorsed the government’s arguments that (1) Hunt’s many crimes at Potomac Gardens warranted the condition; and (2) the condition did not unduly restrict his liberty because “[h]e hasn’t lived” at the complex. Sent. Tr. 15-16. We discern no prejudice from the court’s failure to say out loud that it agreed with the government. See United States v. Balon, 384 F.3d 38, 41 n.1 (2d Cir. 2004) (defendant suffered no prejudice from any error in court’s failure “expressly [to] articulate on the record why it was imposing [certain] conditions of supervised release” because reason was “self-evident in the record”); cf. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007) (“Where a matter is . . . conceptually simple . . . and the record makes clear that the sentencing judge United States v. Betts, 511 F.3d 872, 876 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Ridgeway, 319 F.3d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003) (similar). 14 considered the evidence and arguments, we do not believe the law requires the judge to write more extensively.”).
under section 3583(d). The government concedes, and we agree, that Hunt preserved his substantive challenge to the stay-away condition by objecting to it at the sentencing hearing. Nonetheless, as with most sentencing matters, the standard of review is deferential. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), a district court may impose “any condition . . . it considers to be appropriate”—including “a discretionary condition” typically associated with probation under section 3563(b)—so long as the condition:
factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B),

than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); and
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a) . . . . The district judge has “wide discretion when imposing terms and conditions of supervised release” under section 3583(d) because he is in the best position to “measure[] the conditions imposed against the statutorily enumerated sentencing goals.” Sullivan, 451 F.3d at 895 (internal quotation omitted); see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (“The judge sees and hears the evidence, makes 15 credibility determinations, has full knowledge of the facts and gains insights not conveyed by the record.”) (internal quotation omitted). We therefore review the substantive validity of the stay-away condition under an abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Burroughs, 613 F.3d 233, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Sullivan, 451 F.3d at 895. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding, albeit implicitly, that the stay-away condition is tailored to Hunt’s criminal history, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), will deter him from criminal conduct, id. § 3553(a)(2)(B), and will protect the public from further crimes at his hands, id. § 3553(a)(2)(C). Hunt’s primary contention to the contrary is that the condition does not prevent him from dealing drugs anywhere outside Potomac Gardens. Appellant’s Br. 20-21 (“[D]rug dealing is hardly a crime that knows geographical boundaries. . . . If a defendant is inclined to continue his criminal behavior while on supervised release, he certainly will find a suitable locale for his activities.”). We do not agree that Hunt’s potential recidivism renders the condition unreasonable. As defense counsel noted at sentencing, another condition of Hunt’s supervised release prohibits him from “commit[ting] another federal, state, or local crime.” Sent. Tr. 30. And it is a federal offense to deal or conspire to deal illegal drugs. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a), 846. The stay-away condition dovetails with the general prohibition: the point is to make drug dealing more difficult for or less tempting to Hunt in case he decides to break the law again. The fact that he participated in so many deals at Potomac Gardens suggests he has established drug contacts there. If the stay-away condition does anything to dry up his sources of supply or his customer base, it can only help keep him out of trouble and thereby serve the purposes of sentencing. See United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 983 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Separating a convicted felon from negative influences in his 16 prior life is reasonably related to the permissible goals of deterrence and rehabilitation and is a common purpose of supervised release.”). Nor does the stay-away condition unduly restrict Hunt’s liberty. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). The Congress contemplated that a district court may require a defendant—as “a discretionary condition” of supervised release, id. § 3583(d)—to “refrain from frequenting specified kinds of places” and “from residing in a specified place or area,” id. § 3563(b)(6), (13). We reject Hunt’s contention that the district court went too far by “preclud[ing him] from entering a rather large section of the District of Columbia.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 6. For starters, “rather large” is a rather large overstatement. The condition keeps Hunt away from a single housing project, plus about an extra city block in each direction. Using a Google map to measure the metes and bounds the district court plotted, we take judicial notice that the restricted area covers about 50 acres. See United States v. Burroughs, 810 F.3d 833, 835 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (taking judicial notice of Google map whose “‘accuracy [could not] reasonably be questioned’” for relevant purpose) (quoting FED. R. EVID . 201(b)(2)). There are 640 acres in a square mile, see Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 686 n.23 (1979), which means the restricted area covers about 0.078 square miles. The District of Columbia encompasses about 68 square miles. See Jones v. D.C. Armory Bd., 438 F.2d 138, 141 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam). In other words, the restricted area comprises just over one one-thousandth of the District. That is a minimal imposition, especially when compared to the city- and county-wide restrictions that our sister circuits have upheld in analogous cases. See, e.g., Watson, 582 F.3d at 977-78, 983-85 (gang member prohibited from entering San Francisco); United States v. Garrasteguy, 559 F.3d 34, 40-44 (1st Cir. 2009) (drug dealers prohibited 17 from entering Suffolk County, Massachusetts) (plain-error review); United States v. Sicher, 239 F.3d 289, 289-93 (3d Cir. 2000) (drug dealer prohibited from entering two Pennsylvania counties) (plain-error review); United States v. Cothran, 855 F.2d 749, 750-53 (11th Cir. 1988) (drug dealer prohibited from entering Fulton County, Georgia). Furthermore, like the conditions in some of the cases cited above, the stay-away condition here is not absolute. It forbids Hunt to enter Potomac Gardens and the immediate vicinity “without the prior approval of the U.S. Probation Office.” Sent. Tr. 31. If he has any legitimate cause to enter the complex—e.g., to visit family—he can prevail upon his probation officer, who we presume will act reasonably under the circumstances. See United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Hunt does not even allege that he resides or has family at Potomac Gardens. The closest he comes is his assertion that he lived there “at one point,” Sent. Tr. 24, and “has been a member of the Potomac Gardens community for much of his adult life,” Appellant’s Br. 20. He claims no specific hardship, however, and it is hard to see how he could. His counsel acknowledged at oral argument that he did not live there at the time of the offense. Oral Arg. Recording 8:18-10:00. And to the extent he has friends there who are not involved in the drug trade, Sent. Tr. 24, he can meet them anywhere he chooses outside the restricted boundaries, which are unmistakably defined. The district court did not plainly err in failing to explain the stay-away condition and did not abuse its discretion in imposing it. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s judgment. So ordered.