Opinion ID: 1353320
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Heading: Application of the Double Jeopardy Bar to Transfers Under Section 707

Text: (1a) Section 707 provides that the juvenile court may transfer to the criminal court a minor who is accused of crime and who is found unfit for juvenile court treatment (cl. 1) At any time during a hearing upon a petition alleging that a minor is, by reason of violation of any criminal statute or ordinance, a person described in Section 602 or (cl. 2, under which the court acted in petitioner's case) if, at any time after such a hearing, a minor who was ... committed ... to the Youth Authority, is returned to the court by the Youth Authority pursuant to section 780 [3] or 1737.1.[ [4] ] (Italics added.) After the enactment of those provisions for transfer we decided in Richard M. v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 370 [93 Cal. Rptr. 752, 482 P.2d 664] that the constitutional bars against twice being placed in jeopardy for the same offense (U.S. Const., Amend. V; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13) apply to juveniles. (2) Therefore, we must now determine whether the statutory provisions for transfer are in accord with the protection of the guarantees against double jeopardy. A fundamental policy underlying those guarantees is that `the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.' ( Benton v. Maryland (1969) 395 U.S. 784, 795-796 [23 L.Ed.2d 707, 716-717, 89 S.Ct. 2056], quoting from Green v. United States (1957) 355 U.S. 184, 187-188 [2 L.Ed.2d 199, 204-205, 78 S.Ct. 221, 61 A.L.R.2d 1119].) (1b) The courts have traditionally recognized, however, that the double jeopardy bar does not protect a person charged under the criminal law from all harassment of repetitive proceedings. Thus the concept that jeopardy does not attach until the accused is placed on trial permits the vexation of repeated defective preliminary proceedings. ( United States v. Levy (1925) 268 U.S. 390, 393 [69 L.Ed. 1010, 1011, 45 S.Ct. 516]; Collins v. Loisel (1923) 262 U.S. 426, 431 [67 L.Ed. 1062, 1064, 43 S.Ct. 618]; Ex parte Fenton (1888) 77 Cal. 183 [19 P. 267].) Moreover, a concept of continuing jeopardy that has application where criminal proceedings against an accused have not run their full course permits retrial and exposure to the risk of a second conviction after a former conviction is set aside for error prejudicial to the accused. ( Price v. Georgia (1970) 398 U.S. 323, 326 [26 L.Ed.2d 300, 303, 90 S.Ct. 1757]; United States v. Ball (1896) 163 U.S. 662, 672 [41 L.Ed. 300, 303, 16 S.Ct. 1192].) A related concept of continuing jeopardy was invoked in In re Gary J. (1971) 17 Cal. App.3d 704 [95 Cal. Rptr. 185], upholding the constitutionality of the provision of our Juvenile Court Law (§ 707, first clause) which permits transfer for prosecution under the general criminal law [a]t any time during a hearing upon a petition alleging that a minor is, by reason of violation of any criminal statute ..., a person described in Section 602. [5] The transfer order in In re Gary J. was made at the dispositional stage of the hearing after the jurisdictional hearing resulted in a finding that the allegations of the section 602 petition were true. The Court of Appeal recognized that jeopardy attached when the jurisdictional hearing was entered upon. (See Richard M. v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 376.) It held, however, that no new jeopardy has arisen by the proceedings sending the case to the criminal court. The entire Juvenile Court Law contemplates a careful determination, on a case-by-case basis [footnote omitted], as to the type of procedure most likely to protect society and to rehabilitate the minor. Under some circumstances, a minor will go from the criminal court to the juvenile court; in other cases he will go from the juvenile court to the criminal court. But, until one court or the other reaches a final disposition of the case, only a single jeopardy is involved. (17 Cal. App.3d at p. 710.) [6] We agree with In re Gary J.'s application of the concept of continuing jeopardy and reject the view that once legal jeopardy has attached at the jurisdictional stage of the juvenile court proceedings, a transfer of the minor for criminal prosecution is constitutionally forbidden. [7] The transfer order in petitioner's case, however, was made at a later stage of the proceedings than the transfer order upheld in In re Gary J. In the matter before us the juvenile court first made a dispositional order committing petitioner to the Youth Authority and made its ensuing transfer order only after the authority refused to accept the commitment. Petitioner urges that his commitment to the Youth Authority was a final disposition of his case which, by virtue of the double jeopardy clause, precluded further prosecution for the same offense in the adult court. A dictum in In re Gary J. states that once the juvenile court has made a dispositional order, both section 606 [of the Juvenile Court Law] and the Constitution [the double jeopardy clause] would prohibit a renewal of the case in another court. (17 Cal. App.3d at p. 710.) [8] The dispositional order of commitment to the Youth Authority was final, however, only in the limited sense that it was appealable. (§ 800.) The court's determination that petitioner should be committed to the authority was necessarily tentative in nature under our statutory scheme since the authority is expressly empowered to refuse such a commitment. (§ 780, quoted ante, fn. 3; § 1737.1, quoted ante, fn. 4; cf. People v. Ralph (1944) 24 Cal.2d 575, 583 [150 P.2d 401]; In re Ralph (1946) 27 Cal.2d 866, 870 [168 P.2d 1].) Thus the jeopardy to which a minor is subjected in juvenile court proceedings which follow the course of those here under consideration is not terminated by the court's tentative decision to commit the minor to the Youth Authority. No new jeopardy attaches when the juvenile court, after the authority refuses to accept a minor, transfers him to the criminal court. This application of section 707 comports both with constitutional concepts and with the legislative intent that the Youth Authority, in light of its familiarity with its own facilities and programs, shall have power to balance the interests of the particular minor, of society, and of the overall operation of the authority, and determine that the minor should or should not be accepted by the authority. We point out also that to forbid transfer after the authority's rejection of a commitment would discourage the juvenile court from tentatively committing one such as petitioner to the authority for the benefits of possible treatment as a juvenile. If the juvenile court judge knew that commitment to and rejection by the authority of a juvenile would place the minor in a position where he could not be prosecuted as an adult, the judge might well be reluctant to resolve in favor of the minor any doubts as to the propriety of a tentative juvenile court commitment when to do so would risk the possibility that the minor, although he had committed a crime of violence, would be neither effectively treated as a juvenile nor punished as a criminal. [9] (See Review of Selected 1965 Code Legislation (Cont. Ed. Bar) p. 282, explaining that it was this possibility which led to the enactment of the 1965 amendment of section 707 empowering the juvenile court to transfer a minor rejected by the authority.) We conclude for the foregoing reasons that the double jeopardy bar does not preclude the prosecution of petitioner under the general criminal law.