Opinion ID: 2633305
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Because CCO 12.08.030 is unconstitutionally vague, we grant Silvar's petition

Text: The void-for-vagueness doctrine is predicated upon a statute's repugnancy to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [6] A statute is unconstitutionally vague and subject to facial attack if it (1) fails to provide notice sufficient to enable persons of ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct is prohibited and (2) lacks specific standards, thereby encouraging, authorizing, or even failing to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [7] The first prong is concerned with guiding those who may be subject to potentially vague statutes, while the second  and more important  prong is concerned with guiding the enforcers of statutes. By requiring notice of prohibited conduct in a statute, the first prong offers citizens the opportunity to conform their own conduct to that law. [8] However, the second prong is more important because absent adequate guidelines, a criminal statute may permit a standardless sweep, which would allow the police, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections. [9]
An ordinance may be struck under the vagueness doctrine's first prong if it does not provide adequate notice to the public of the prohibited conduct. Without adequate notice, citizens would be frustrated in their attempts to conform their conduct to the contours of the statute. Because CCO 12.08.030 violates the first prong by failing to provide adequate notice, Silvar argues that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. We agree. Two phrases in CCO 12.08.030 conspire to deprive the public of adequate notice of prohibited conduct. First, the phrase in a manner and under circumstances manifesting the purpose of inducing, enticing, soliciting for or procuring another to commit an act of prostitution is unduly open-ended. [10] A person of ordinary intelligence who carefully reads CCO 12.08.030 could not be sure what specific acts manifest illegal activity. [11] In Akron v. Rowland , the Supreme Court of Ohio found such wording unconstitutional because an average person who lives or works in a high-crime neighborhood could not be sure whether just standing on the street in front of his or her home or workplace might `manifest' something illegal. [12] Second, the phrase [a]mong the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such purpose is manifested is also unduly open-ended. As the Ohio Court of Appeals noted in Cleveland v. Mathis, [t]he word `among' indicates there were other circumstances to form the basis of an arrest and conviction. [13] Similarly, the word may has been construed as permissive rather than mandatory, which indicates that nonenumerated factors can be considered. [14] Based on these two phrases, we conclude that CCO 12.08.030 embodies a lack of specificity that is fatal to the ordinance. Because the ordinance does not provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct, which would enable persons of ordinary intelligence to conform their conduct to the law, CCO 12.08.030 is unconstitutionally vague under the first prong of the vagueness doctrine.
In many cases, courts have also struck down prostitution loitering ordinances under the vagueness doctrine's second  and more important  prong, which requires adequate guidelines to prevent arbitrary enforcement. Without these adequate guidelines, the ordinances risk arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Because CCO 12.08.030 lacks any guiding circumstances, Silvar argues that the ordinance has an even broader sweep than similar stricken ordinances, thus heightening its unconstitutionality. Using the same standard as previous courts, we agree with Silvar that CCO 12.08.030 is unconstitutionally vague. CCO 12.08.030 is unconstitutionally vague because it violates the second prong in two ways. First, the language of the ordinance does not specify the circumstances for which a person could be arrested for prostitution loitering. Second, although the ordinance provides a right to explain one's actions, the inadequate guidelines for evaluating these explanations render the right to explain inconsequential, and furthermore an officer could still disregard the explanation. Therefore, CCO 12.08.030 unconstitutionally risks arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
CCO 12.08.030 does not enumerate circumstances for which a person could be arrested for prostitution loitering. Thus, the enforcing officer has discretion over deciding whether a particular unenumerated circumstance supplies the necessary probable cause for arrest. This standard could shift from officer to officer or circumstance to circumstance because the ordinance lacks definitive guidelines. These inconsistent standards could lead to absurd results. For example, high school cheerleaders advertising a car-wash fundraiser from a sidewalk or a corner could be subject to arrest under the ordinance, as could effusive tourists celebrating a public holiday by strolling the streets and waving to cars and other passersby. Indeed, this amount of discretion proved fatal to similar ordinances in three other jurisdictions. First, for example, in Brown v. Municipality of Anchorage, [15] the Supreme Court of Alaska struck down a prostitution loitering ordinance in part because a formerly convicted prostitute could be convicted again simply based on (1) the act of loitering, and (2) his or her status as a known prostitute, without committing any other overt act demonstrating that he or she had induced, enticed, solicited, or procured another to commit prostitution. [16] The court concluded that, even though it suggests the purposes to engage in prostitution, this additional circumstance did not qualify as an adequate guideline  the ordinance's vagueness left too much discretion in the hands of the police, who could apply it arbitrarily. [17] Because CCO 12.08.030 does not have even the unconstitutionally vague known prostitute element of the Alaska ordinance, it leaves authorities with an even greater amount of discretion. Second, in Wyche v. State, [18] the Supreme Court of Florida broadened its focus beyond the known prostitute circumstances, concluding that the entire list of suggestive circumstances failed to qualify the word loiter sufficiently to satisfy due process concerns. [19] Many innocent people saunter on the streets and call to friends, the court reasoned. The list of circumstances guiding law enforcement officers is not exhaustive and leaves much to individual officers' discretion, which encourages the arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law. [20] The court thus concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutional. [21] As noted above, CCO 12.08.030 prohibits activity similar to the activity used by the Wyche court to justify striking the Florida ordinance. Therefore, following the Florida Supreme Court's logic, CCO 12.08.030 is unconstitutional. Third, in Coleman v. City of Richmond, [22] the Court of Appeals of Virginia noted that, because prostitution loitering ordinances do not require an overt act of solicitation or prostitution, an officer may arrest someone on a mere suspicion of future criminality. Because there are no standards to govern the application of the ordinance, people are permitted to wander or stand idly at the whim of whichever police officer is on the beat. [23] The court concluded that the ordinance vested too much discretion in the officers who enforce the ordinance and the ordinance allowed for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [24] CCO 12.08.030 presents these same problems (a court applying Coleman 's logic would most likely strike the ordinance). By failing to enumerate circumstances for which a person could be arrested for prostitution loitering, CCO 12.08.030 gives officers too much discretion in enforcing its provisions. Other courts have struck similar loitering ordinances for similar reasons. We have no reason to rule differently in this case. Therefore, we conclude that CCO 12.08.030 unconstitutionally risks arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
For two reasons, the right to explain one's actions provided in CCO 12.08.030 is inconsequential. First, any explanation could not be properly evaluated against the ordinance's inadequate guidelines. [25] The absence of any standards by which to evaluate such an explanation renders the right to explain inconsequential. Second, the enforcing authorities could simply disregard the explanation. Under CCO 12.08.030, only the opportunity to explain is required; once afforded, the person may be arrested regardless of his or her explanation. The enforcing authorities are not required to give the explanation any weight. [26] Thus, the right to explain one's actions provided in CCO 12.08.030 fails as an effective safeguard against the arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the ordinance. Consequently, the ordinance fails to provide adequate guidelines to officers, which renders it unconstitutionally vague under the second prong of the vagueness doctrine. Because we determine that CCO 12.08.030(1) fails to provide notice sufficient to enable persons of ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct was prohibited and (2) lacks specific standards, thus risking arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, we conclude that Clark County's prostitution loitering ordinance is unconstitutionally vague.