Opinion ID: 1487492
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Variance Between Indictment and Proof

Text: Rubino contends that the grand jury indictment, which identified the dates of the proscribed contact as on or about April 15 and November 30, 1985, was insufficient to apprise him of the charges and to allow preparation of his defense. Rubino, however, never requested a bill of particulars. In this circumstance, the date of the unlawful sexual conduct is not an essential element of the offense except to the extent that the State must prove that the alleged act took place within the applicable statute of limitations and the prescribed age limits of the alleged victims. State v. Levasseur, 538 A.2d 764, 767 (Me.1988). See also State v. Greene, 512 A.2d 330, 333-34 (Me. 1986). The State put forth sufficient evidence that the alleged acts took place within the applicable time period, namely, before the girls' 14th birthday and October 13, 1981. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 8(2)(A) (1983) (6-year statute of limitations). The indictment was fully adequate to apprise Rubino of the charges against him. Rubino also contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to the necessary connection between the dates specified in the indictment and the proof offered at trial. Because Rubino failed to object to the instruction before the jury retired, we review for obvious error and find none. When read as a whole, the instructions are entirely correct and would not confuse or mislead the jury. See State v. Young, 560 A.2d 1095 (Me.1989); State v. Naoum, 548 A.2d 120 (Me.1988); M.R. Evid. 103(d); M.R.Crim.P. 52(b).