Opinion ID: 2623403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Bennett's cross-appeal: other claims

Text: Bennett raises many other claims in his petition. Because Bennett's petition is untimely filed and successive, he must demonstrate good cause to excuse his procedural defaults and prejudice with respect to these claims, or he must show that failure to consider these claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Although the district court stated in its order that Bennett's petition should be considered on the merits due to Brady violations, it failed to specifically address or expressly deny Bennett's additional claims. For our review, we assume that the district court denied those claims. [40] Bennett's petition below improperly raised claims previously addressed and rejected on direct appeal. The doctrine of the law of the case prevents relitigation of these claims. [41] This doctrine cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument upon reflection. [42] Bennett's claims in this respect are that the trial court improperly admitted Bennett's writings and music into evidence, the State improperly provided money and other inducements to a witness whose testimony was inherently incredible and prejudicial, the trial court improperly instructed the jury at sentencing, the death penalty as administered in Nevada does not satisfy constitutional standards, and the felony aggravators are unconstitutional. Bennett has failed to demonstrate that we should reconsider these issues. Bennett's petition below also raised a number of claims that should have been raised on direct appeal. These claims are waived pursuant to NRS 34.810(3) because Bennett failed to demonstrate good cause and prejudice for failing to raise them earlier. These claims include that the aggravating circumstance that Bennett knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person is invalid, that prosecutorial misconduct violated Bennett's right to a fair trial, that the prosecutor improperly delegated his charging discretion to the victim's family and police, that the district court erroneously failed to change the venue of the trial, that the jury instructions failed to properly delineate the elements of the capital offense and unconstitutionally minimized the State's burden of proof, that the jury instruction on reasonable doubt was unconstitutional, that the trial court failed to make a constitutionally reliable determination as to whether Bennett possessed the mental state of reckless indifference to human life necessary to impose a death sentence, that the trial court improperly admitted Beeson's writings into evidence, that the trial court improperly failed to remove jurors for cause and failed to prevent the removal of a juror for cause, that Bennett was deprived of an impartial trial tribunal, and that Bennett's conviction and sentence are invalid due to the inadequacy of the charging documents. Bennett also claims that this court's review on direct appeal and on appeal from his first petition for post-conviction relief was inadequate. We do not address these claims because Bennett has not demonstrated good cause and prejudice for failing to raise them earlier. [43] Bennett claims that his counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to raise the above-mentioned claims. Bennett should have raised this claim in his first post-conviction petition and has not demonstrated good cause or prejudice for his failure to do so. [44] Bennett claims that the district court prevented him from investigating his claims in the first habeas proceeding when it granted his motion to hire an investigator but then denied his habeas petition the next day. Bennett claims that the district court's actions amounted to an impediment external to the defense and prejudiced him because an investigator would have discovered additional mitigating evidence, namely, Bennett's neuropsychological impairments, a head injury he sustained, physical and mental abuse he suffered as a child from his parents and siblings, his attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, a family history of alcoholism, explosiveness, violence, depression, and substance abuse, that Bennett once saved a life, and other medical and psychological records of Bennett's family and of Beeson. Bennett claims that had this mitigating evidence been presented to the jury he would not have received a death sentence. Because Bennett's first post-conviction counsel waited over three years before making a motion for funds to hire an investigator, we conclude that the district court did not create an impediment external to the defense that would excuse the procedural bars. Moreover, we express no opinion on the materiality of this evidence because Bennett will have an opportunity to present relevant mitigating evidence at the new penalty hearing. Bennett claims that his first post-conviction counsel was ineffective for a multitude of reasons. Bennett was not statutorily entitled to post-conviction counsel at the time that he was convicted; [45] thus, he was not entitled to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. [46] Bennett claims that he was denied his right to be present at critical stages of his trial proceedings in violation of Gebers v. State. [47] First, Bennett claims that after his trial, several hearings were conducted in his absence concerning the State's potential failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence. In support of this claim, Bennett cites to a transcript of a hearing conducted in Beeson's case. Bennett did not have a constitutional right to be present at his accomplice's trial proceedings after the cases were severed. Second, Bennett claims that he was not allowed to be present during post-conviction proceedings where evidence was taken by the district court on whether his petition was procedurally barred. Bennett cites to two 1994 hearings. At neither hearing did the district court receive any evidence regarding the claims in Bennett's petition; thus, no Gebers violation occurred. Next, Bennett cites to the district court's written order dismissing his first petition in 1994. Again, Bennett fails to demonstrate that a Gebers violation occurred. Last, Bennett claims that this court has not applied its procedural bars consistently and that applying the bars to him would violate his equal protection and due process rights. Bennett did not make this argument in his opening brief, and the State did not raise the issue in its answering brief. Bennett is therefore barred from raising this claim in his reply brief, pursuant to NRAP 28(c), which requires reply briefs to be limited to new matters in the answering brief. Consequently, we will not consider this claim. [48]