Opinion ID: 793922
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hobbs Act as Applied

Text: 19 We review de novo constitutional challenges to federal statutes. United States v. Sheikh, 367 F.3d 756, 764 (8th Cir.2004). The Hobbs Act states in pertinent part: 20 Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned.... The term extortion means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right. 21 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), (b)(2). 22 Foster challenges the Hobbs Act as applied, arguing to allow satisfaction of the interstate commerce requirement of the Hobbs Act by showing a foreseeable impact on interstate commerce reads the limitations of the federal power under the Commerce Clause out of existence. Foster contends such overreaching is prohibited by United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). 23 In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down section 922(q) of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 as exceeding Congress's authority to regulate commerce. Id. at 551, 115 S.Ct. 1624. As the Court noted, section 922(q) did not contain a jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce. Id. at 561, 115 S.Ct. 1624. The Court concluded, `where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.' Id. at 558, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n. 27, 88 S.Ct. 2017, 20 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1968)). 2 24 Lopez does not support Foster's argument for several reasons. First, the Lopez Court challenged Congress's Commerce Clause authority to enact a portion of the Gun-Free School Zones Act. Here, Foster concedes Congress had the authority to enact the Hobbs Act. Second, in Lopez, the Court held the challenged section of the statute was fatally flawed, in part, because it lacked a jurisdictional element. The Hobbs Act, on the other hand, contains an express jurisdictional element: Whoever in any way or degree ... affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (emphasis added). Third, because the Hobbs Act contains a jurisdictional element, Foster's argument that the government has not shown the required nexus to interstate commerce is merely a challenge to the sufficiency of the government's proof of an element of the offense, and not a challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. The Court's holding in Lopez does not affect the interstate commerce requirements of the Hobbs Act, and therefore Lopez does not support Foster's as applied constitutional challenge. 3 See also United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836, 843-44 (8th Cir.1996) (holding the limitations to Congress's Commerce Clause authority, recognized in Lopez, have no effect on the establishment of the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act). 25 For the reasons stated, we conclude the Hobbs Act is constitutional as applied, and the district court properly denied Foster's motion to dismiss. 26