Opinion ID: 2402348
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Equitable Distribution, Rehabilitative Alimony, and Counsel Fees

Text: Rosemarie alleges other errors in her appeal to this Court. She contends that the general magistrate overlooked and misconceived material evidence and abused his discretion in determining that an 80/20 split of the marital estate was equitable. Because we already have determined that the Family Court used an improper valuation date to identify the parties' assets and distribute the marital estate, and consequently, a revaluation and new equitable distribution is imminent in this case, we need not address this assertion. We observe, however, that no abuse of discretion occurs when the trial justice has scrupulously considered all of the elements set forth in    § 15-5-16.1. Tarro, 485 A.2d at 560. We further note that, predicated upon the theory of marriage as a partnership and the factors enumerated in § 15-5-16.1, marital [a]ssets are to be divided equitably, though not necessarily equally. Perreault v. Perreault, 540 A.2d 27, 30 (R.I.1988). Ultimately, the intent of property division is to provide a fair and just assignment of the marital assets    on the basis of the joint contribution of the spouses to the marital enterprise. Stanzler v. Stanzler, 560 A.2d 342, 345 (R.I.1989). Although we are satisfied that the general magistrate did consider all the relevant factors and properly exercised his discretion in apportioning the marital estate, we recognize that a revaluation of marital assets may necessitate a different outcome. We therefore direct the Family Court, on remand, to once again scrupulously consider the above-referenced principles in light of our holdings today to make a fair and just distribution of the Ruffels' marital estate. In addition, we are not able to reach a conclusion at this time with respect to Rosemarie's argument that the general magistrate abused his discretion in failing to award her rehabilitative alimony and counsel fees. Section 15-5-16 allows the Family Court to fix the amount of alimony and attorney's fees, which this Court reviews under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Becker v. Perkins-Becker, 669 A.2d 524, 529 (R.I.1996). Here, however, the proper amount to award for alimony, if any, will depend on the ultimate distribution of the marital estate by the Family Court on remand, after which it will be in a position to determine the parties' relative needs. See, e.g., Berard v. Berard, 749 A.2d 577, 581 (R.I.2000); Fisk v. Fisk, 477 A.2d 956, 958 (R.I.1984). Furthermore, § 15-5-16.1(c) specifically states that [t]he assignment of property    shall precede the award of alimony. We therefore need not review the denial of alimony at this time. Similarly, the decision of whether to award counsel fees will depend on what portion of the marital estate each party is assigned on remand. Prior to awarding counsel fees the trial court must find that the party seeking counsel fees is unable to pay them. Alves v. Alves, 644 A.2d 1291, 1292 (R.I.1994). Also, in determining an award of alimony or counsel fees, § 15-5-16(b)(1)(iv) directs the Family Court to consider, among other factors, [t]he state and the liabilities and needs of each of the parties, considerations that cannot fairly be made until the entire marital estate is correctly valued and equitably distributed.