Opinion ID: 1598169
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Does Florida Need A Breach Of Peace/Disorderly Conduct Statute?

Text: If this writer's position had prevailed, the Legislature would be, of course, free to re-enact a new breach of the peace/disorderly conduct statute, within the foregoing constitutional limitations. In Franklin v. State, supra, this Court gave the Legislature precisely such a mandate: This statute and others ... need immediate legislative review and action. We urgently commend this important area of great social concern for appropriate remedial legislation. Legislative action is long past due in this and related fields... . The courts would much prefer appropriate legislative action, where proper conditions and restraints can be set forth. We strive to observe the delineation of our branches of government, but in the case before us here there is no doubt on its face that this statute as worded cannot withstand the constitutional onslaught and must fall. We are thoroughly in accord with upholding proper statutes, but a court must guard equally against those which offend constitutional standards and which constitute an infringement by the state upon the private rights of citizens... . We anticipate and recommend legislative study of the subject... . [18] In a similar situation, I note that less than eight months elapsed between the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Smith v. Florida, [19] and the Legislature's enactment of a constitutionally permissible substitute for the voided Florida vagrancy law. [20] Of course, the problem with any such statute, as this Court noted in City of St. Petersburg v. Calbeck, [21] is that: ... . The question as to whether a particular act is disorderly conduct depends on the facts in the particular case, and in the determination of such question not only the nature of the particular act should be considered but also the time and place of its occurrence as well as all the surrounding circumstances. It is not possible to define comprehensively `disorderly conduct' any more than it is possible to define comprehensively misdemeanors, nuisances, police power or insulting words; each case turns upon its facts, to be judicially determined. [22] The problem with this difficulty in definition is that, as a result of this and other Courts' evolving interpretations of the statute, breach of the peace/disorderly conduct has become, in effect, a necessarily included lesser offense to almost every crime in this State. That is, an examination of past Florida cases concerning this statute reveals that, in those cases in which breach of the peace/disorderly conduct convictions have been upheld, the facts of each case, coincidentally or not, encompassed precisely the elements of a violation of some specific criminal law; [23] in those cases where such convictions were overturned, coincidentally or not, the Courts were unable to find violation of any specific criminal law. [24] In his dissent in Smith v. State, [25] this writer discussed the reason for the existence of, and the need for, Florida's vagrancy law. The conclusions then drawn apply with equal vigor to the instant case: ... [These] statutes have been widely used by police authorities to hold people remotely suspected of crime while investigations were conducted. Modern interpretations of individual civil rights under state and federal constitutions clearly prohibit this now. If one is engaging in unlawful conduct the State should charge the person with violating a specific law. There is certainly no shortage of criminal laws.  [26] For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgments of the trial courts, but without prejudice, so that the prosecution could re-try any one or all three of the appellants under any other municipal ordinances or state statutes which their conduct may have violated. [27] I therefore dissent to the majority opinion. ERVIN, J., concurs.