Opinion ID: 482450
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: failure to enjoin further acts of discrimination

Text: 30 Johnson also claims that the district court erred in refusing to enjoin the DOL from further acts of discrimination. She argues that upon a finding of discriminatory conduct such an injunction is mandatory. As with the determination of appropriate affirmative relief, the determination of whether to enjoin an employer from further discriminatory acts is left to the discretion of the trial court. The trial court's discretion, however, must be exercised in light of the purposes of Title VII. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 417, 95 S.Ct. at 2371. Thus, the district court has a duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future. Id. at 418, 95 S.Ct. at 2372 (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154, 85 S.Ct. 817, 822, 13 L.Ed.2d 709 (1965)). Although enjoining a defendant from further acts of discrimination is a typical remedy in Title VII cases, this court has never held that it is a mandatory remedy; nor have we held that the burden is on the defendant to disprove the need for such an injunction by clear and convincing evidence. 31 Johnson places great reliance on our decision in Bundy. She argues that absent a reasonable expectation that the discriminatory conduct will not recur the district court must enjoin the DOL from further acts of discrimination. See Bundy, 641 F.2d at 946 n. 13. In Bundy, however, we did not hold that an injunction is mandatory in all cases. We merely held that under the particular facts of that case there was reason to believe that the discriminatory conduct could recur. Id. Consequently, we suggested that the district court issue an injunction which, inter alia, enjoined the defendant from further acts of discrimination. Id. at 948 n. 15. 32 As Johnson has pointed out, the facts in Bundy are similar to the facts in this case. As in Bundy, the same persons who committed the discriminatory acts remain in supervisory positions at DOL and ETA and are capable of further discriminatory acts. This fact alone, however, is not sufficient for us to conclude that the district court's refusal to issue an injunction constitutes an abuse of discretion. Unlike the discriminatory acts committed in Bundy, the acts complained of here were not directed at Johnson. The district court expressly found that there was no specific intent to discriminate against Johnson. Where no such intent was present it is not reasonable to conclude that discriminatory acts will continue in the future. The result of this action has no doubt impressed upon the agency its need to exercise greater care in determining its employment policies. Its past practices do not suggest the callous disregard for the goals of Title VII which necessitate injunctive relief. The district court has a keener appreciation of [the] facts and circumstances peculiar to [this] particular [case]. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 421-22, 95 S.Ct. at 2373. Based upon our review of the record, we cannot say the district court's refusal to enjoin DOL from further acts of discrimination amounted to an abuse of discretion.