Opinion ID: 1851471
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The statute reads:

Text: Provided, however, no member of any fire or police department within the terms of this act shall be removed, discharged, reduced in rank or pay, suspended or otherwise punished except for cause, and in no event until he shall have been furnished with a written statement of the charges and the reasons for such actions, and all charges shall be void unless filed within 90 days of the date of the violation, except in the case of a probationer, whose violations may accumulate for the probationary period. (Emphasis supplied.) [7] The circuit court construed this language as a statute of limitations prohibiting the bringing of charges for infractions more than 90 days old. The commission contends that earlier charges are void only to the extent that they cannot be used to prove present charges but are viable and relevant in determining [the] penalty that should be imposed for a proven violation. The purpose of the act is to provide job security for policemen and firemen. Discipline may not be imposed because of vague misgivings about performance. Discipline is justified only for cause. A written statement of charges and the reasons for the disciplinary action must be furnished. The appointing/removing authority bears the burden of justifying its action. Permitting consideration, for the purpose of assessing punishment, of charges not brought within 90 days would expose policemen and firemen to discharge for any infraction of any rule. Whenever there is an adjudicated violation  and almost everyone can be found guilty of violation of some rule or regulation  the appointing/removing authority could justify any discipline, including discharge, on the basis of the offender's whole file. The statutory language and legislative purpose renders the sentencing analogy inapposite. Permitting an appointing/removing authority to justify the imposition of discipline on the basis of the whole file  not charged and which could not be charged because antedating 90 days  would be to allow it to say one thing and do another; that is, to allow it to say that Konyha was discharged for missing the roll call but, since discharge is clearly excessive and cannot be justified, to allow it to in fact discharge him because of general dissatisfaction with his performance, in derogation of his legislatively granted job security.