Opinion ID: 1433952
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Doe's negligence claims are based upon commercial activity

Text: Under the FSIA's commercial activity exception, it is not enough for the plaintiff to show that the defendant engaged in something that qualifies as a commercial activity under the Weltover test. The plaintiff must also show that his cause of action is related to that commercial activity in one of three ways, depending upon the geographical location where the activity occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). In Clause 1 of § 1605(a)(2), the FSIA requires that if the foreign state's commercial activity is carried on inside the United States, the plaintiff's cause of action must be based upon that activity itself. Alternatively, if the commercial activity is not carried on inside the United States, the plaintiff's cause of action must be [based] upon an act performed inside the United States in connection with the commercial activity elsewhere, id. [Clause 2], or else [based] upon an act performed outside the United States in connection with commercial activity elsewhere that causes a direct effect in the United States. Id. [Clause 3]. Doe asserts that his claims may go forward under either Clause 1 or Clause 3 of the commercial activity exception. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 113 S.Ct. 1471, 123 L.Ed.2d 47 (1993), provides the leading interpretation of the FSIA's based upon requirement. Nelson explained that [i]n denoting conduct that forms the `basis,' or `foundation,' for a claim, the phrase is read most naturally to mean those elements of a claim that, if proven, would entitle a plaintiff to relief under his theory of the case. Id. at 357, 113 S.Ct. 1471 (internal citations omitted). As the district court here correctly noted, [t]he commercial activity must do more than lead to the injuries plaintiff suffered; it must be involved in proving one of the elements of plaintiff's cause of action. Doe, 434 F.Supp.2d at 943 (quoting Sun v. Taiwan, 201 F.3d 1105, 1110 (9th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotations omitted). Applying this standard, I would hold that Doe's negligence claims were based upon the Holy See's employment of Ronan within the meaning of the statute. The existence of that employment relationship is a necessary element of at least the negligent retention and supervision claims. See Chesterman v. Barmon, 82 Or.App. 1, 4, 727 P.2d 130 (1986) (in assessing whether plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a negligent retention claim, requiring that the individual who caused the harm be an employee of defendant). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 (A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant.) [3] ; accord DiPietro v. Lighthouse Ministries, 159 Ohio App.3d 766, 772, 825 N.E.2d 630 (2005) (holding that [i]n order to prevail on a claim of negligent retention, plaintiff must establish ... the existence of an employment relationship) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because Ronan's activities pursuant to the employment relationship occurred inside the United States, it may be that Clause 1 of the FSIA's commercial activity provision is satisfied: Arguably, the Holy See's alleged negligent acts were based on an employment relationship that, at least in part, was carried on in the United States, as well as in Rome. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) [Clause 1]. Whether or not Clause 1 applies, however, I think it quite clear that jurisdiction arises under § 1605(a)(2)'s Clause 3, regarding acts performed outside U.S. territory in connection with a foreign state's commercial activity that have a direct effect inside the United States. Id. [Clause 3]. Doe alleges that the Holy See participated in the decision to retain and reassign Ronan rather than terminating his employment, an act that we can infer was taken outside the United States in connection with Ronan's employment, and that had a direct effect in the United States-Ronan's ability to carry out his molestation of Doe. Taking his allegations as true, Doe has satisfied Clause 3 as to his negligent supervision and retention claims. Determining whether Doe's failure to warn claim is based upon the alleged employment relationship requires looking to Oregon's failure to warn case law, of which there is relatively little. In general, under Oregon law, a defendant is not liable for a negligent omission that leads to a plaintiff being harmed by a third party unless the defendant has a special relationship either to the third party or to the plaintiff. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302 cmt. a. Such a special relationship may exist if, for example, the defendant has brought into contact or association with the other a person whom the actor knows or should know to be peculiarly likely to commit intentional misconduct. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302B cmt. e(D); cf. Brown v. Washington County, 163 Or.App. 362, 987 P.2d 1254 (1999) (holding that defendant could be held liable for failure to warn about the dangerousness of an inmate within its custody). According to Doe's complaint, it was the Holy See's continued employment of Ronan in a position of authority that led to Doe's contact with Ronan, and thus to the Holy See's duty to warn Doe and the other parishioners about Ronan's abusive past and potential future dangerousness. So Doe's negligent failure to warn claim is also based upon a commercial activity, in that it is the result of non-sovereign actions undertaken elsewhere  the decision not to warn about an employee's dangerousness  with a direct effect in the United States. § 1605(a)(2) [Clause 3]. I would therefore hold that the district court has jurisdiction to decide it.