Opinion ID: 202519
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unlawful or unprivileged entry

Text: 16 Bennett next contends that his conviction for breaking and entering a steel storage shed does not meet Taylor's definition because the statute under which he was convicted did not require an unlawful or unprivileged entry, and the record before the court did not indicate that his entry was unlawful or unprivileged. Bennett did not raise this issue below and therefore we review for plain error. United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir.2001). We have not addressed the contours of the unlawful or unprivileged element of generic burglary under Taylor, and there exists a circuit split on the issue. Compare United States v. Bowden, 975 F.2d 1080, 1084-85 (4th Cir.1992) (finding that the entry of a man who enters without breaking with intent to commit a felony or larceny is neither lawful nor privileged, so it must be within Taylor ), with United States v. Maness, 23 F.3d 1006, 1008-09 (6th Cir.1994) (finding that the same statute at issue in Bowden does not satisfy Taylor's definition of generic burglary because intent to commit a crime is a separate and distinct element[] from unlawful or unprivileged entry). In light of conflicting case law, any error that might have been committed by the district court was not obvious, and therefore not plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (At a minimum, court of appeals cannot correct an error pursuant to Rule 52(b) unless the error is clear under current law.).