Opinion ID: 168445
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Shaw's Sentence

Text: 21 As noted above, Shaw does not challenge the guideline calculation, arguing only that a 34-month increase in his sentence above the applicable guideline range is unreasonable. While conceding that perhaps an additional 6 months or so might be reasonable, Aplt. Br. at 10, Shaw challenges the district court's decision to sentence at the same level as his codefendant, who had a different criminal history and was therefore eligible for a higher guideline range. 22 Under § 3553(a) a district court must consider whether the sentence will create unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. § 3553(a)(6). While similar offenders engaged in similar conduct should be sentenced equivalently, disparate sentences are allowed where the disparity is explicable by the facts on the record. United States v. Goddard, 929 F.2d 546, 550 (10th Cir.1991) (citation omitted). Ordinarily, the disparity between co-defendants' sentences is not grounds for relief. United States v. Davis, 437 F.3d 989, 997 (10th Cir.2006). But where the court concludes that the Guidelines inadequately reflect a defendant's criminal history or the seriousness of the offense, a deviation may be appropriate. According to Shaw, by applying the guideline range for his criminal history, he would be eligible for a sentence of only 57 to 71 months, and not the higher range, 84 to 105 months, for which his codefendant was eligible. 23 Consistent with Shaw's claim, the district court recognized that the guideline calculation of Shaw's and Patterson's respective criminal history categories suggested they had different records. However, while the Guidelines suggested dissimilar records, the court concluded that, as a matter of fact, their records were quite similar and that the Guidelines had not adequately accounted for that similarity. The court noted the difference in the guideline calculation was based on the fact that Patterson had committed the bank robbery while he was on parole or within two years of his release from incarceration, Vol III, 8, whereas Shaw missed this benchmark by only ten days. The court concluded, there is virtually no significant difference at all in terms of the background of the criminal history. Id. Given this substantial similarity, the court concluded that the advisory guideline range did not properly account for all of the § 3553(a) factors relevant to his sentencing decision. 3 Despite this substantial similarity, Shaw nonetheless argues that the district court should have imposed a lower sentence. We disagree. 24 The district court concluded that Shaw's conduct reflected a prompt reentry into criminal activity after release from [his] prior incarceration or supervision, that appears to occur fairly quickly fairly consistently. Id. This observation implicated objectives of sentencing relating to protection of the public and achieving an appropriate deterrent effect with respect to this defendant, id., 9, as additional rationales for a nonguideline sentence. See § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C). 25 Secondly, the district court concluded that Shaw's conduct was more serious than his codefendant's because Shaw was the one who actually assaulted the bank manager. See § 3553(a)(1) (the nature and circumstances of the offense). The Guidelines do not explicitly distinguish between principals and accessories for purposes of the serious bodily injury enhancement at issue here. USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). But § 3553(a)(2)(A) does authorize a sentencing court to impose a nonguideline sentence if the court concludes the guideline range does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offense. While an adjustment based on a factor that was already built into the guideline calculation may challenge the overall uniformity of sentences under § 3553(a)(6), any tension between subsection (a)(2)(A) and subsection (a)(6) can be resolved by the district court in light of all the facts before it, as long as it does so reasonably. See Cage, 451 F.3d at 595 (The problem with the sentencing decision, however, is not in the consideration of these factors; it is in the weight the district court placed on them.). 26 Here, the question is whether the district court's upward deviation from the Guidelines was reasonable. The Guidelines recognize the usual calculation may be inadequate if reliable information indicates that the defendant's criminal history substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history. USSG § 4A1.3. Moreover, the criminal history score is unlikely to take into account all the variation in the seriousness of criminal history that may occur. Id., cmt., Background. Given the district court's careful explanation of its reasoning as to why Shaw's initial guideline calculation underestimated his culpability — including his primary involvement in the bank manager's injuries and his prompt reentry into crime after ending probation — we conclude that there was substantial justification for the court's divergence from the . . . guideline range. Cage, 451 F.3d at 595. 27 We therefore conclude Shaw's sentence was reasonable under § 3553(a).