Opinion ID: 511054
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: prosecutorial comments and jury instructions

Text: 12 A jury convicted appellant, Vertulia Pierre, for importing cocaine into the United States from Haiti. In closing argument, the prosecutor made a reference to Haiti's status as a source country for cocaine. The prosecutor also stated that Pierre received payment for her role, a fact which was not in evidence. Pierre challenges the appropriateness of each remark and, in addition, challenges the district court's handling of jury instructions concerning deliberate ignorance and knowledge of substance. 13 Prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument does not require reversal unless the comments are both improper and prejudicial to a substantial right of the defendant. United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 1353 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017, 105 S.Ct. 3476, 87 L.Ed.2d 613 (1985). The prosecutor's comment that Haiti was a source country for cocaine came in response to an earlier statement by Pierre's lawyer to the effect that Haiti was a major drug trafficking source. Immediately, the court sustained an objection to the prosecutor's remark and the court instructed the jury not to consider the prosecutor's remarks as evidence. This comment did not prejudice Pierre's rights. Similarly, the prosecutor's comment regarding payment to Pierre did not constitute reversible error. The prosecutor made this comment in the context of a hypothetical which came in response to the remarks of Pierre's lawyer to the effect that Pierre did not dress like a drug dealer and could not afford a lawyer. The prosecutor stated that Pierre may not have been paid as much as a middle man, but the level of payment did not preclude her status as a drug dealer. We hold that this statement did not prejudice Pierre's substantial rights. 14 The district court gave the jury a deliberate ignorance instruction as follows: if you find from all the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant believed she possessed cocaine and deliberately and consciously tried to avoid learning that there was cocaine in the package she possessed ... you may treat such deliberate avoidance of positive knowledge as the equivalent of knowledge. Before the court gave this instruction, the prosecutor told the jury that [t]he court will also instruct you that you can determine that the defendant in this case possibly deliberately closed her eyes to what she had reason to believe was cocaine. Although Pierre did not object at trial, she now complains that the word possibly misled the jury. Due to the failure to object in the district court, we review this issue under the plain error standard. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). The prosecutor's comment merely suggested that the jury may possibly find that Pierre had reason to believe that cocaine was the substance which she imported. We hold that the prosecutor's comment did not constitute plain error. 15 Finally, Pierre challenges the district court's refusal to give an additional instruction on knowledge of substance. Specifically, Pierre requested an instruction which she argues was necessary to inform the jury that if she thought the packages she carried contained anything other than cocaine, such as marijuana, she must be found not guilty. The district court declined to give this instruction, finding that the instruction it intended to give adequately covered the law on knowledge of substance. The court indicated that the defense was free to make its more specific point in argument to the jury. Pierre argues that it was error to refuse the additional instruction. 16 The district court has broad discretion in formulating jury instructions so long as the charge accurately reflects the law and facts. See United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1395 (11th Cir.1984); United States v. Sorrells, 714 F.2d 1522, 1531 (11th Cir.1983). The trial judge is not obligated to give a requested instruction if the matter is adequately covered by other instructions, Sorrells, 714 F.2d at 1532, and the judge may refuse confusing or cumulative instructions. United States v. Gaines, 690 F.2d 849, 855-56 (11th Cir.1982). In this case, the court gave the following instruction: 17 [a]s to Count 1, Title 21, United States Code Section 952(a), makes it a Federal crime or offense for anyone to knowingly import any controlled substance into the United States. Cocaine is a controlled substance within the meaning of the law. 18 The defendant can be found guilty of that offense only if all of the following facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt: 19 First, that the defendant imported cocaine into the United States from a place outside thereof as charged, and second, that the defendant did so knowingly and willfully. 20 To import a substance means to bring or transport that substance into the United States from some place outside the United States. 21 As to Count 2, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1), makes it a Federal crime or offense for anyone to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute it. 22 Cocaine is a controlled substance within the meaning of the law. The defendant can be found guilty of that offense only if all of the following facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that the defendant knowingly and willfully possessed cocaine as charged; and, second, that she possessed the substance with the intent to distribute it. 23 (R3-188-89) This instruction, particularly when combined with the court's instruction regarding deliberate ignorance, accurately and completely stated the law. As such, the district court's refusal to provide an additional instruction was proper.