Opinion ID: 2543612
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Additional Considerations of Prejudice and Aggravating Factors

Text: ¶ 26. While the Court of Appeals' finding of delay is correct, we respectfully find that the court erred when it continued in its analysis and found that the defendants were not prejudiced by the delay and that the absence of an aggravating factor warrants reversal of the trial court's judgment. Holder, 54 So.3d at 252, ¶¶ 38-41. After finding that an aggravating factor is not present in today's case, the Court of Appeals found that: When this fact is taken into consideration together with the fact that there is no clear record of actual prejudice caused to the defendant, or even that of presumptive prejudice, we find that the trial court erred in its decision to dismiss the plaintiffs' case with prejudice. Holder, 54 So.3d at 252, ¶ 41. ¶ 27. The trial court may consider prejudice or the presence of an aggravating factor, and these considerations may help to bolster or strengthen a defendant's case in support of dismissal. These considerations, however, are not a prerequisite to dismissal under Rule 41(b). The standard is whether there is delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff. . . . Cox, 976 So.2d at 875 (citing Am. Tel. & Tel., 720 So.2d at 181). Because [d]elay alone may suffice for a dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b), we disagree with the Court of Appeals' holding that the absence of both an aggravating factor and prejudicewhich we find is present in today's casewarrants reversal of the trial court's judgment. We discuss each separately below.
¶ 28. Actual prejudice is not a requirement for dismissal under Rule 41(b), however prejudice may be presumed from unreasonable delay. Cox, 976 So.2d at 876-79. ¶ 29. The Court of Appeals found that no presumptive prejudice existed in this case. The issue of whether actual prejudice did exist in this case is of no moment, because the result would be the same. The case had been stale for more than a year, and the plaintiffs had failed to meet multiple discovery and procedural deadlines. This dilatory conduct resulted in an unreasonable delay, and we have held that prejudice may be presumed from unreasonable delay. Id. at 879 (citing Rogers, 669 F.2d at 322). ¶ 30. Actual prejudice may arise when, because of the delay, witnesses become unavailable or the memories of witnesses fade. Id. at 877-79. The defendants agree that [i]t is completely reasonable to expect witnesses to have no independent recollection over three years after the October 2004 patient interaction and care. However, the defendants failed to present evidence showing that any of the witnesses could not recall the events. Despite the defendant's failure to present evidence of witnesses' fading memories, we find that the delay alone may result in presumed prejudice to the defendant. This presumed prejudice strengthens the defendants' case for dismissal under Rule 41(b).
¶ 31. The presence of an aggravating factor may serve to bolster or strengthen the case for a dismissal, but is not a requirement. Am. Tel. & Tel., 720 So.2d at 181. The aggravating factors include: (1) the extent to which the plaintiff, as distinguished from his counsel, was personally responsible for the delay; (2) the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant; and (3) whether the delay was the result of intentional conduct. Cox, 976 So.2d at 876 (citing Am. Tel. & Tel., 720 So.2d at 181). We do not find any aggravating factors in this case.