Opinion ID: 1057780
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The Defendant next argues that the State did not prove all elements required for convictions of aggravated robbery and robbery. We simply disagree. Because, however, the Defendant is entitled to new trials on grounds that the trial court erred by refusing to grant severances, we will not recount the proof offered at trial in support of each conviction. In its appeal, the State argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by modifying the conviction for the July 11th incident from robbery to theft. We have decided to resolve this issue as a part of our remand. Initially, as we address the issue presented by the State, we keep certain well-established principles in mind. When considering a sufficiency of the evidence question on appeal, the State must be afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 521 (Tenn.2007). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and the reconciliation of conflicts in the proof are matters entrusted to the jury as the trier of fact. Id. When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant question is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Tenn. R.App. P. 13(e); State v. Williams, 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn.1983). The same standard applies even if the evidence is entirely circumstantial. State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Tenn.1977). Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt, the criminal defendant bears the burden on appeal of showing that the evidence was legally insufficient. State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn.1992). The Defendant was convicted of two counts of robbery, an offense defined as the intentional or knowing theft of property from the person of another by violence or putting the person in fear.  Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-401 (2003) (emphasis added). The fear referred to in the statute is a fear of `bodily danger or impending peril to the person,' which intimidates and promotes submission to the theft of the property. State v. Bowles, 52 S.W.3d 69, 80 (Tenn.2001) (quoting Britt v. State, 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 45 (1846)). The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the Defendant had fulfilled his burden by demonstrating that the State failed to establish the requisite element of fear on the part of the victim in the July 11th offense because Crain refused to so testify. The majority ruled that the victim had to explicitly acknowledge his fear before the State had met its burden of proof. As indicated, the elements of any crime may be established by circumstantial evidence. Stinson v. State, 181 Tenn. 172, 180 S.W.2d 883, 885 (1944). Indeed, Crain contended in this instance that he was not really afraid: I was still just mad that it was happening. When a victim denies fear under circumstances such as these, the determination of this element hinges on a question of witness credibility, which is an issue within the province of the jury. State v. Wilson, 924 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tenn.1996). The test may be properly described as objective rather than subjective in nature. Crain testified that he had not seen a weapon, but he had gleaned from the circumstances that there was a strong possibility that the Defendant was armed. He was aware that other drivers from his company had recently been robbed at gunpoint. According to Crain, the Defendant threatened to shoot and he reached for his pocket or belt. While Crain did not explicitly acknowledge that he was afraid, he did testify that he was more concerned  the fact that if something happened to me, my kids would be without a father. A reasonable inference is that the actions of the Defendant caused Crain to consider the possibility of his own death. He acquiesced only after the Defendant threatened to shoot him. When the robbery was over, Crain directed his co-worker to call the police. In our view, these are circumstances that the jury could have considered in determining that the victim was placed in fear during the course of the robbery. As aptly pointed out in the dissent to the Court of Criminal Appeals opinion, the victim's actions spoke louder than his words. State v. Dotson, No. W2005-01594-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 3438161, at  (Tenn.Crim.App. Nov.29, 2006) (Williams, J., dissenting); see also People v. Renteria, 61 Cal.2d 497, 39 Cal.Rptr. 213, 393 P.2d 413, 414 (1964) (finding that the circumstances surrounding a robbery supported the trial court's finding that the victim would not have given his employer's money to defendant unless he was in fear, in spite of his `bravado' answer in court). Fear could have been inferred from the circumstances. [14] In our assessment, the jury's task is to determine from all of the evidence whether the victim was placed in fear by the conduct of a defendant or should have been under the circumstances. A rational jury, weighing all the evidence presented at trial, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Crain was actually placed in fear. See Tenn. R.App. P. 13(e); Williams, 657 S.W.2d at 410. Thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by reducing Dotson's robbery conviction to theft based upon the content of Crain's testimony.