Opinion ID: 1057925
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: In his first assignment of error, E.C. asserts that a circuit court’s jurisdiction to consider a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is established at the time the petition is filed and because E.C. was under parole supervision at the time his petition was filed, the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider the petition. The DJJ does not dispute that the circuit court had the requisite jurisdiction to consider the case at the time the petition was filed, but contends that the circuit court’s jurisdiction was extinguished or ended when E.C. was released from parole supervision because, at that point, the court could no longer enter an order that would impact the duration of E.C.’s confinement. To consider the habeas corpus petition in this case, the circuit court had to have subject matter or “potential” jurisdiction as well as “active” jurisdiction. Ghameshlouy v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 379, 388-89, 689 S.E.2d 698, 702-03 (2010). Our jurisprudence has long held that a court’s jurisdiction is determined at the time the litigation is filed 4 and, once established, remains until the termination of the litigation. As we stated in Laing v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 511, 514, 137 S.E.2d 896, 899 (1964): [I]t is axiomatic that when a court acquires jurisdiction of the subject matter and the person, it retains jurisdiction until the matter before it has been fully adjudicated. See also Jones v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 425, 429, 317 S.E.2d 482, 484 (1984) (court acquired and retained jurisdiction until matter fully adjudicated); Rochelle v. Rochelle, 225 Va. 387, 391, 302 S.E.2d 59, 62 (1983) (same); 20 Am. Jur.2d, Courts §§ 98, 100, 101 (2011) (citing cases). While intervening events may affect the nature of the relief available, they do not end or extinguish the jurisdiction of the Court. The DJJ argues that a habeas corpus proceeding is not subject to this “axiomatic” principle relying primarily on language in the per curiam opinion issued in Blair v. Peyton, 210 Va. 416, 171 S.E.2d 690 (1970). Closer review of the record and history of Blair demonstrates that it is not dispositive of the issue in this case and has little, if any, precedential value. The petitioner in Blair filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging two convictions he had received from the Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk. At the time he filed his petition, the petitioner had already completed the 5 sentences imposed as a result of those convictions. He was, however, serving sentences imposed for convictions against him entered by the Circuit Court of Culpeper County. The relief sought was a credit for the time served on the alleged invalid Norfolk convictions against the time he had to serve for the Culpeper convictions. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss the habeas corpus petition arguing that the corporation court had no jurisdiction because the petitioner had already served the sentences imposed for the Norfolk convictions. The corporation court granted the motion to dismiss and the petitioner appealed. In an unpublished order, this Court reversed the corporation court’s judgment and remanded the case for a plenary hearing citing Peyton v. Christian, 208 Va. 105, 155 S.E.2d 335 (1967). Blair v. Peyton, Record No. 7046 (October 10, 1967). On remand, the respondent again urged dismissal of the petition on jurisdictional grounds and that Christian was not applicable to the jurisdictional issue in the case. The record indicates that the corporation court concluded that the mandate from this Court required it to conduct a plenary hearing. Following that hearing, the corporation court dismissed the petition on its merits and the petitioner again appealed to this Court. 6 In the second appeal to this Court, the respondent again argued that the corporation court was without jurisdiction because the petitioner had already fully served the challenged sentences at the time the petition was filed, citing Smyth v. Midgett, 199 Va. 727, 101 S.E.2d 575 (1958) and Smyth v. Holland, 199 Va. 92, 97 S.E.2d 745 (1957). This Court dismissed the appeal, however, stating that because the petitioner had completed his sentences for the Culpeper convictions prior to the appeal being heard in the Supreme Court, any opinion rendered would be an advisory opinion and the Court “therefore [was] without jurisdiction further to entertain the case.” Blair, 210 Va. at 417, 171 S.E.2d at 691. No citation to legal authority supporting this conclusion was provided. The Court did not address the jurisdictional question raised by the respondent in both appeals; yet, eight months later, in Moore v. Peyton, 211 Va. 119, 119-20, 176 S.E.2d 427, 427 (1970), the Court reaffirmed the principle that a court does not acquire jurisdiction to determine the validity of a sentence fully served before the proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus is instituted. The Court also stated that Christian was not applicable to such cases. Moore, 211 Va. at 120, 176 S.E.2d at 428. The Court did not refer to its previous decision in Blair. The DJJ relies on the language in the Blair per curiam opinion that the Court was “without jurisdiction further to 7 entertain the case” to support its position that habeas corpus jurisdiction can end or be extinguished by subsequent events. Blair has not been relied upon in any Virginia appellate case for that principle, nor has it been cited for any reason in any subsequent Virginia appellate case. For these reasons, the precedential value of Blair is suspect and we reject the DJJ’s argument that Blair is dispositive of the jurisdictional issue in this case. In summary, the habeas corpus statutes vested the circuit court with subject matter jurisdiction of the proceeding and active jurisdiction arose because the petitioner was detained for purposes of habeas corpus when the petition was filed. Ghameshlouy, 279 Va. at 388-89, 689 S.E.2d at 702-03. That jurisdiction did not end because E.C. was released from detention during the course of the proceeding. Laing, 205 Va. at 514, 137 S.E.2d at 899. Accordingly, the circuit court erred in determining that it did not have jurisdiction to consider E.C.’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.