Opinion ID: 1135212
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Gagging

Text: England next argues that the trial judge violated his constitutional right to a fair sentencing hearing by gagging him in view of the jury without providing a cautionary instruction. The facts relevant to this claim are set out below. Beginning early in the trial, England's courtroom behavior was inappropriate. He repeatedly made improper comments in the presence of the jury. For example, when his girlfriend and witness, Karen Duggins, entered the courtroom, England said, Karen, I love you loud enough for both the judge and clerk to hear. England also waved his hand and smiled when the prosecutor asked Duggins to identify him. The trial judge advised England he should not say anything to the witnesses and should talk to his attorneys before he made gestures. During Investigator McGuire's testimony, England blurted out: THE DEFENDANT: Will you tell the Court where I was getting that information from, that I was being framed for murder? DEFENSE COUNSEL KEATING: Stop it. Your Honor, can we have a recess? THE DEFENDANT: I was being framed for murder. KEATING: Stop it. Your Honor, can we have a recess, please. THE COURT: Sit down. Folks, need you to step out. THE DEFENDANT: Let them know where I was getting the information from. (Jury out.) The trial judge then advised England: Mr. England, can't have it, doesn't work that way. Got to try and play by the rules here. You may not like what's said. I'm sure you won't on some matters, and some matters you'll like what was said, but you can't blurt out like that. The trial judge warned England that if you do that again, I'm going to gag you and put you in your seat. You cannot blurt out like that or I will gag you. This warning did not dissuade England. He engaged in at least four more outbursts by inappropriately addressing the jury and the judge, by accusing the prosecutor of lying, and by admonishing witnesses. Each time, he was warned that if he did not behave properly, he would be gagged. Finally, the judge ordered England to be gagged during the penalty phase closing arguments. After the security officer gagged England, he reported to the judge that England told him that the outbursts were an intentional attempt to get a mistrial. Closing arguments concluded without incident. After the jury was instructed and retired, the trial judge told defense counsel that if England would assure the court there would be no further outbursts, the gag would be removed. Upon receipt of such assurance, the judge ordered the tape removed from England's mouth. We review this claim for fundamental error because it was not preserved for appeal. It was not preserved because trial counsel did not meet the requirements of section 924.051, Florida Statutes (2005), by appris(ing) the trial court of the relief sought and the grounds therefor. § 924.051(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005). In response to the trial judge's order to gag England during the closing arguments in the penalty phase, defense counsel stated only, Please don't gag him. This statement did not apprise the judge of the relief sought or the grounds therefor. Therefore, this issue is not properly preserved and must be reviewed for fundamental error. Fundamental error at the penalty phase must be so prejudicial as to taint the jury's recommended sentence. Peterka v. State, 890 So.2d 219, 243 (Fla. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1118, 125 S.Ct. 2911, 162 L.Ed.2d 301 (2005). No fundamental error occurred. This Court has long held that the use of restraints, such as a gag, is within the trial court's sound discretion. Elledge v. State, 408 So.2d 1021, 1022-23 (Fla.1981). Therefore, a decision to use restraints will be reversed only on a showing of abuse. Id. at 1023. This standard is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's most recent ruling on the issue of restraint in a death penalty case. According to that Court, while routine restraint of defendants during the penalty phase of a criminal trial is unconstitutional, restraint itself is not wholly prohibited. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 2008-09, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005). Specifically, according to the Court in Deck, the constitution permits a judge, in the exercise of his or her discretion, to take account of special circumstances, including security concerns, that may call for shackling. . . . [A]ny such determination must be case specific; that is to say, it should reflect particular concerns, say special security needs or escape risks, related to the defendant on trial. Id. at 2015. The decision to gag England was not a matter of routine practice. It reflected the particular and appropriate concerns of this trial judge who was, at the end of the trial, confronted with an obstreperous defendant intent on manufacturing a mistrial. Certainly, a judge must use care when ordering a defendant gagged, as it is possible that the sight of shackles and gags might have a significant effect on the jury's feelings about the defendant, [and] the use of this technique is itself something of an affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold. Jackson v. State, 698 So.2d 1299, 1302 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970)). Therefore, such a confinement should be used only as a last resort in extreme situations. Id. However, when such restraint is necessary, there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways for a trial judge to handle an obstreperous defendant such as England: (1) bind or gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt; or (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly. Allen, 397 U.S. at 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057. The trial judge in this case certainly did not commit fundamental error by gagging England at this late stage of the trial. England was warned approximately seven times that he was going to be gagged if he continued to disrupt the trial proceedings. The trial judge provided England numerous opportunities to curb his outbursts prior to the gag order. Once England had been gagged, the trial judge specifically ordered that England's hand be free to write notes to his attorneys. He also limited the time period of the restraint. Under the circumstances, it is not reasonable to assume that the threat of contempt would have dissuaded England. Though a cautionary instruction from the judge to the jury is certainly preferable in such circumstance (particularly if requested by counsel), the absence of such an instruction does not make this restraint improper.