Opinion ID: 1110800
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Shiv-Ram's financial position; the cost to Linda of litigation; criminal sanctions; and other civil sanctions.

Text: I agree with the conclusion reached in the main opinion that the factor of Shiv-Ram's financial position weighs  albeit modestly  against a remittitur because Shiv-Ram has liability insurance and there is no evidence indicating that Shiv-Ram would suffer any undue financial hardship as a result of the $500,000 punitive-damages award. [4] The next factor, the cost to Linda of litigation, does not support a substantial punitive-damages award, and Linda has conceded that this factor may be ignored. The criminal-sanctions factor supports a remittitur because the amount of a criminal fine assessed for like conduct is a measure of the penalty the Legislature considers appropriate, and it does not appear that Shiv-Ram's conduct subjects it to any criminal sanctions. Lance, Inc. v. Ramanauskas, 731 So.2d 1204, 1219 (Ala.1999). The other-civil-actions factor does not require a remittitur because there is no evidence indicating that Shiv-Ram has been subject to other civil actions for its conduct. A single dollar of punitive damages may not be assessed without a finding by clear and convincing evidence of willful and wanton conduct. See Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(a)(punitive damages are appropriate in a tort action where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard the plaintiff). Section 6-11-20(b)(3) defines wantonness as [c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. Lance, Inc. v. Ramanauskas, 731 So.2d at 1211. Merely reciting evidence that Shiv-Ram's conduct is willful, reckless or [in] conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others, therefore, does not alone support a punitive-damages award that is anything more than nominal. In this case, the jury awarded Linda $176,572.82 in compensatory damages and $500,000.00 in punitive damages; a ratio of approximately 2.83:1. Although this ratio is arguably within the constitutional limits of Gore, I do not believe that it is appropriate in this situation under a Hammond/Green Oil analysis. The degree of reprehensibility is the most important indicium in determining whether a punitive-damages award is excessive. In this case, I do not believe that Shiv-Ram's conduct was reprehensible enough to warrant a ratio of 2.83:1. Shiv-Ram did not actually know of the problem with the bed frames, and there is no evidence of any other serious injury caused by the condition of the bed frames. The second Hammond/Green Oil factor, the relationship of the punitive-damages award to the harm that actually occurred or is likely to occur, also militates in favor of reducing the punitive-damages award because, although there is a fairly high probability of a person's being injured by the bed frames, the risk that the injury will be serious is low. Again, there is no evidence indicating that anyone other than Linda required extensive medical treatment, and there is no evidence indicating why Linda required such extensive medical care for what she described as a goose egg and a speck of blood. The third factor, Shiv-Ram's profit from its misconduct, also militates in favor of reducing the punitive-damages award. There is no evidence indicating that Shiv-Ram profited from this misconduct. I believe that a ratio that approaches 3:1 is excessive and that a 1:1 ratio is at the outer bound of what is appropriate in this case. I would, therefore, reduce the ratio to 1:1 and award substantial punitive damages of $176,572.82. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.