Opinion ID: 1975713
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Judgment of Acquittal Motion

Text: Barrett contends that the trial justice should have granted his motion for a judgment of acquittal and that in failing to do so, he erred. He contends that the trial evidence was insufficient to enable the trial jury to be able to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time he shot and killed Silvia, he was capable of forming the specific mental state or intent necessary for conviction of either first or second-degree murder. He contends that because of his diminished capacity, the crime of murder charged in the indictment was reduced to the lesser included crime of manslaughter. [12] That contention appears flawed in two basic respects. First, it appears to overlook the fact that proof of the commission of a homicide without additional evidence is presumed to be murder, [but that] presumption ordinarily rises no higher than murder in the second degree. State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1106 (R.I.1992) (quoting Wharton's Criminal Law, § 140 at 182, 184-85 (Torcia 14th ed.1979)). To prove commission of second-degree murder by Barrett, the state was required only to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Barrett, with malice existing for less than of momentary duration, intended to unlawfully kill Silvia. The very fact that he used a gun was sufficient to prove his malice and that a reasonable inference may be drawn, directly and without speculation, that [Barrett] formed an intent to kill [Silvia]. Mattatall, 603 A.2d at 1106. We have also held that an intent to kill, however brief,    can satisfy the necessary element to establish malicious intent, Id. at 1106, and that Premeditation and deliberation are not elements of murder in the second degree. State v. Grabowski, 644 A.2d 1282, 1285 (R.I.1994) (quoting Mattatall, 603 A.2d at 1106); see also Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 7.7(e) at 648 (2d ed.1986 & 2001 Supp.). [13] Secondly, in challenging the trial justice's ruling denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, Barrett proceeds to undertake a discussion critical of the reliability and legal sufficiency of the expert opinion offered by the prosecution's witness, Dr. Robert Cserr, who had testified that Barrett, at the time he shot and killed Silvia, was then capable of having formed the intent and malice aforethought necessary for conviction in a murder trial. Barrett contends that the trial justice should have accepted and relied instead upon the medical opinions proffered by his medical experts, Drs. Paolino and Gutheil, whose opinions disagreed with Dr. Cserr's opinion. Consequently, Barrett, in his brief, asserts that the trial justice committed reversible error in not granting his motion for judgment of acquittal on the murder charge. Barrett appears to contend that the trial justice, when passing upon the motion for judgment of acquittal on the murder charge, erroneously evaluated the state's evidence to be sufficient to permit the trial jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he was capable of forming the specific malicious intent necessary to commit the crime of murder. It is, of course, both elementary, as well as long established that, when passing upon a defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial justice is not permitted to weigh or to evaluate the trial evidence, nor is he or she permitted to pass upon the credibility of the trial witnesses. State v. Smith, 662 A.2d 1171, 1176-77 (R.I.1995). The trial justice in this case was required only to view that trial evidence that the state claimed was capable of supporting Barrett's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, in a light most favorable to the state, and he was required to draw from that trial evidence all reasonable inferences favorable to, and consistent with Barrett's guilt. State v. Harrington, 689 A.2d 399, 402 (R.I.1997). If, in this case, the trial justice, after so viewing the trial evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, had determined that such could not have permitted the trial jury to conclude Barrett's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the murder charge, he would have been required to grant Barrett's motion as it pertained to the charge of murder. On the other hand, when, as here, the trial justice determined that the trial evidence, which included Dr. Cserr's testimony and opinion, when viewed in the light most favorable to the state, would enable the jury to reject Barrett's diminished capacity defense and to find Barrett guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he then was obligated to deny Barrett's motion. State v. Mastracchio, 612 A.2d 698, 706 (R.I.1992). On the basis of the testimony that had been given by Glynn, Richardson, Dinsmore and Dr. Cserr, the trial jury certainly could find beyond any reasonable doubt that Barrett was pissed off at Glynn  that he went to the Mobil station where Glynn was employed to hassle Glynn  that when Silvia later confronted him, Barrett got out of his car, as Richardson said, to escalate the argument  that Barrett, while angered by Silvia, instead of driving away, elected to chase down Silvia  to threaten to kill Silvia  and finally to shoot him three times at point blank range. Doctor Cserr testified that Barrett knew what he was doing and appreciated that it was unlawful. The sum of that evidence, when all viewed in a light most favorable to the state and in favor of Barrett's guilt, required the denial of Barrett's motion for judgment of acquittal. Barrett's claim of error, we conclude, is without merit.