Opinion ID: 2570523
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence about the victim's mother in the penalty phase

Text: At the penalty hearing, Collman moved to admit all the evidence the district court had excluded from the guilt phase regarding Stach: specifically, her alleged interest in the occult, her prior abortion, and her alleged lack of remorse over Damian's death. Collman intended to refute the state's torture allegation by establishing that Stach had been the one who tortured Damian the last few months of his life and it was just fortuitous that [Collman] was the individual [who] inflicted the final abuse. The court denied the motion because the evidence was dubious, tenuous, and irrelevant to the penalty phase. Collman contends that the district court denied him his unfettered right to present mitigating evidence. NRS 175.552(3) provides in part: In the [penalty] hearing, evidence may be presented concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances relative to the offense, defendant or victim and on any other matter which the court deems relevant to sentence .... (Emphasis added.) The United States Supreme Court has also announced that the trier of fact in a penalty phase of a capital case must consider evidence about the defendant and his offense; the Court does not require considering evidence about a prosecution witness. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976). No case law or statute requires admission of witness character evidence in a penalty hearing. The hearing in the instant matter was about Collman, Damian, and Collman's crime, not about Stach. [Q]uestions concerning the admissibility of evidence during the penalty phase of a capital murder trial are generally left to the trial judge's discretion. Emil v. State, 105 Nev. 858, 864, 784 P.2d 956, 960 (1989). The district court here correctly concluded that the evidence was irrelevant to the penalty phase proceedings. That Stach allegedly had an interest in the occult, had an abortion, and allegedly lacked remorse remained irrelevant to the offense for which Collman was convicted. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Collman's motion to admit this evidence.