Opinion ID: 2164973
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Kerry JacksonLesser-Included Offense

Text: We reject appellant Kerry Jackson's argument that reversal is required because he was convicted of the offense of assault to kill while armed, an offense not charged in the indictment. While recognizing the basic right protected by the rule against permitting a defendant to be tried on charges not returned by the grand jury, see Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217, 80 S.Ct. 270, 273, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960), we are persuaded that no plain error occurred. See Robinson v. United States, 649 A.2d 584 (D.C.1994); cf. Cash v. United States, 648 A.2d 964, 965 (D.C.1994) (per curiam) (reversible error where trial court erroneously instructed jury on misdemeanor offense of simple possession of controlled substance, instead of felony possession with intent to distribute controlled substance, and jury convicted defendant of felony offense). A brief review of the facts will facilitate an understanding of the conclusion reached. Appellant was indicted for second-degree murder while armed. He requested a lesser included offense instruction of simple assault on the theory that he had admitted to the police that he had a fist fight with the decedent earlier during the evening of the murder. Prior to closing argument, appellant's counsel accepted the court's proposal to instruct on assault with intent to kill while armed, acknowledging that she planned to argue appellant's case on that theory, inter alia. The jury found appellant not guilty of second-degree murder while armed, but returned a verdict of guilty of assault with intent to kill while armed. On appeal, appellant contends that reversal is required because assault with intent to kill is not a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder and because there was no evidentiary support for the instruction. These arguments must be rejected. It is a principle of long standing in this jurisdiction that a conviction will not be reversed because of an improper jury instruction, not objected to at trial, unless the instruction to the jury rises to the level of plain error. See Williams v. United States, 551 A.2d 1353, 1355 (D.C.1989); Deneal v. United States, 551 A.2d 1312, 1316-17 (D.C.1988); Green v. United States, 544 A.2d 714, 715 (D.C.1988); Shivers v. United States, 533 A.2d 258, 261 (D.C.1987); Allen v. United States, 495 A.2d 1145, 1151-54 (D.C. 1985) (en banc). If the decision not to object can be viewed as a tactical choice, it should not be considered plain error. Allen, supra, 495 A.2d at 1152 (citing Jones v. United States, 477 A.2d 231, 242 (D.C.1984)); Bennett v. United States, 375 A.2d 499, 504 (D.C. 1977). An appellant is bound by the position taken by trial counsel and should not be allowed to reverse a position taken at trial in order to disavow the implications that flow from it. See Parks v. United States, 627 A.2d 1, 10 (D.C.1993) (citing Mitchell v. United States, 569 A.2d 177, 180 (D.C.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 986 (1990)); Byrd v. United States, 502 A.2d 451, 452-53 (D.C.1985). After requesting a lesser-included instruction on the offense of simple assault, appellant accepted the trial court's proposed instructions on a number of other offenses, including assault with intent to kill while armed. This was not a hasty decision made in the heat of the trial, for the record reveals that trial counsel had at least an overnight recess to consider the proposed instructions. Having taken that tactical position in the trial court, it is questionable whether appellant can now impeach the jury's verdict. See Parks, supra, 627 A.2d at 10; Byrd, supra, 502 A.2d at 453; Allen, supra, 495 A.2d at 1151-52; Bennett, supra, 375 A.2d at 503-04. Assuming arguendo that despite his trial tactics, appellant has not waived his right to impeach the jury's verdict, no plain error rising to the level of a miscarriage of justice occurred here. Appellant's indictment for second-degree murder while armed provided him with ample advance notice that he had to defend against the government's evidence of malice aforethought, which, in this jurisdiction, denotes three types of murder, each accompanied by a distinct mental state. [6] See Comber v. United States, supra, note 6, 584 A.2d at 38. Malice has been defined by this court as (1) specific intent to kill, (2) specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury, or (3) wanton and willful disregard of an extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury. Id. at 38-39. Proving the intent sufficient for a conviction of assault to kill while armed requires the government to establish evidence of specific intent to kill. D.C.Code § 22-501 (1989); see Logan v. United States, 483 A.2d 664, 672 (D.C.1984). In proving malice, the government need not elect prior to trial one type of malicious conduct over the others. Thus, an indictment charging appellant with second-degree murder while armed provided appellant with ample notice of its intention to prove malice on any one of the theories, including specific intent to kill. At trial, the government sought to prove malice aforethought by introducing evidence tending to show that appellant committed the offense of second-degree murder while armed with the specific intent to kill. Thus, appellant had notice of the offense for which he was convicted. [7] In this case, no impermissible expansion of the indictment occurred. Compare United States v. Lawton, 301 U.S.App.D.C. 390, 995 F.2d 290 (1993). The element of specific intent, the critical one involved here, was within the charge in the indictment, and the government proceeded on this theory to prove this element of malice required for second-degree murder while armed. The evidence was clearly sufficient to support an instruction for assault with intent to kill. Under the circumstances, the rigorous standard for demonstrating plain error has not been met. For the foregoing reasons, appellants' convictions hereby are affirmed. So ordered. MACK, Senior Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: While I concur in the affirmance of the conviction of Sandra Jackson for the reasons stated by the majority, I would reverse the conviction of Kerry Jackson on the grounds that he has been deprived of a Fifth Amendment right to be answerable only to a charge levied by a grand jury. The issue posed by Mr. Jackson is not the simple one of instructional error or the implications flowing from defense counsel's failure to object thereto. The issue rather is whether any defendant can be convicted of a felony distinct from that charged by the grand jury. Once we admit (as did the government) that AWIKWA is not a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder while armed, we concede that there is error. With that concession, conceptually speaking, it is difficult to conceive how this specific error could be anything other than plain error. The lack of plain error in the traditional instructional context, other factors being equal, is based upon the failure of defense counsel to meet the duty of objecting. Under the circumstances here, however, it was the duty not only of defense counsel, but also of the prosecutor, to bring the error to the trial court's attention. Indeed, it could be argued that the prosecutor bore an even greater duty in this respect, since the government is closer to the grand jury process which results in indictments. See United States v. Lawton, 301 U.S.App.D.C. 390, 394, 995 F.2d 290, 294 (1993) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)) (errors that seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings normally qualify as plain error).