Opinion ID: 1980772
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Appellate Court Order

Text: In the appellate court, Sexton had challenged both the grant of Blair's motion to dismiss the counterclaim and the grant of XL Disposal's motion for summary judgment on its complaint. The appellate court did not separately consider the two rulings. Presumably, that was because the motions involved like bases, and an appeal of a section 2-619(a)(9) dismissal involves the same concerns as an appeal of a grant of summary judgment (see Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge (1993), 156 Ill.2d 112, 116-17, 189 Ill.Dec. 31, 619 N.E.2d 732 (stating the standard of review)). But the motions were of different parties, were directed at or involved different pleadings, and sought different relief. In directing that Sexton could be awarded fees found to be excessive, the appellate court effectively granted summary judgment for Sexton. Notwithstanding that Supreme Court Rule 366 would allow for entry of any judgment    that ought to have been    made or the grant of any relief, the appellate court's ruling exceeded the scope of the appeal. (134 Ill.2d R. 366.) Sexton did not move for summary judgment against either Blair on its counterclaim or XL Disposal in a cross-motion for summary judgment. Certainly, Sexton's argument that it was not obligated to continue to pay Blair presented a legal question the court could decide. But no evidence whatsoever had been presented as to Blair's services by which any determination could be made about the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the compensation. Blair alone has contested the appellate court's order and only the viability of Sexton's counterclaim against Blair is at issue. The disposition here is limited accordingly.