Opinion ID: 702975
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: molina

Text: 13
14 Molina appeals the district court's denial of his Fed. R. Crim. P. 17 motion to subpoena witnesses to either rebut testimony that the appellant's actions involved money laundering or to testify against Frasure's credibility. 15 Molina claims that the district court erred in excluding testimony that his purpose in dealing with Simpson and Frasure was to fund his food export business. We find no abuse of discretion in the court's holding that Molina's motive for entering into discussions of criminal enterprise with his coconspirators is irrelevant. Molina also challenges the district court's exclusion of taped conversations between him and Frasure, which the appellant sought to introduce to demonstrate his motivation for joining the conspiracy. Molina contends that although the government was permitted to introduce tape recorded conversations, the district court erred in not permitting the appellant to do so. We find no abuse of discretion in the court's exclusion of evidence on grounds of relevancy. 16 Molina also complains that he was not allowed to have witnesses testify as to the confidential informant Frasure's credibility. Specifically, Molina claims he sought to have Detective James Liggett (Liggett) testify about Frasure's bad check writing, lying, impersonating, reference falsifying, stealing, and securing goods and services falsely. Molina has not demonstrated that his right to produce witnesses in his defense was violated as in Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415 (9th Cir. 1994). Molina was allowed to cross-examine Frasure on all of the conduct mentioned; thus, the district court did not err in its denial of the appellant's motion. 17 Molina claims that the district court interfered with his right to cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. Specifically, Molina appeals the district court's refusal to permit testimony regarding the credibility of the government witness, Frasure. The appellant claims that his right to question the witnesses' motives and bias was curtailed. Molina was, however, able to cross-examine on all of these issues. We note that a defendant's undeniable right to confront witnesses is limited by the trial judge's wide discretion in determining the scope of cross-examination. United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1469 (9th Cir. 1991). We find no abuse of that discretion.
18 Molina argues that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on multiple conspiracies. Molina contends that the evidence supports the conclusion that multiple conspiracies existed, emphasizing that he was unaware of any conspiracy until December 1990, when he first met Frasure. The government argues that, while several individual transactions had been agreed upon, the general conspiracy was to obtain, transport, and sell cocaine. Finding multiple conspiracies requires some evidence of separate agreements and purposes. See United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1502 (9th Cir. 1987). No such finding is warranted here. The district court's ruling is affirmed. 19 Molina argues his conviction must be reversed because the district court failed to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense. He contends the jury should have been instructed on a conspiracy involving less than 5 kilos of cocaine. We have held that an instruction on a lesser included offense should be given under specific circumstances: 20 A trial court should give an instruction on a lesser included offense if the jury could rationally convict the defendant on the lesser included charge and acquit him of the greater. 21 United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 48 U.S. 968 (1988). Here, the record does not reflect that a jury could have rationally convicted the appellant of a lesser included offense and acquitted him of the greater. This conspiracy was not a one-shot deal where such an amount could be distinguished from another. We do not find any abuse of discretion in the court's refusal to give a lesser included offense instruction
22 Molina argues that he was prejudiced by the district court's refusal to sever the counts as well as defendants for trial. The appellant claims that the gun charges and drug charges were so dissimilar as to warrant severance of the counts; in fact, only his codefendant was charged with the use of a weapon. Molina also asserts that the government's introduction of prior bad acts against codefendant Simpson was so prejudicial to him as to warrant severance of the trials. 23 The government argues that Molina has not met the heavy burden required on this issue, quoting us in United States v. Kaplan, 895 F.2d 618, 621 (9th Cir. 1990): 24 A denial of severance will be upheld absent a showing that joinder was so manifestly prejudicial that it outweighed the dominant concern with judicial economy and compelled exercise of the court's discretion to sever. U.S. v. Whitworth, 856 F.2d 1269, 1277 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 109 S.Ct. 1541, 103 L.Ed.2d 846 (1989); U.S. v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1980). [J]oinder is the rule rather than the exception. Whitworth, 856 F.2d at 1277. 25 Id. We find no abuse of discretion in refusing to sever charges of drug dealing from the charge involving the weapon.
26 Molina argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion for mistrial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments. Specifically, Molina objects to a statement by the prosecutor: 27 These guys know what the score is. Though [sic] used to be cops until they sold their badges. So they knew what the possibilities were of other people listening in on the conversations. (Emphasis added). [RT, 10/23/91, p. 132] 28 Opening Brief of Appellant at 33. 29 We do not find that this statement amounts to asserting official misconduct by Appellant .... Id. at 35. Molina emphasizes that he had resigned from his government position three years earlier. The statement does not warrant a mistrial. We affirm the district court's ruling.
30 Molina claims, as did Simpson, that the district court used an incorrect quantity to calculate his offense level. Under the same analysis as discussed supra, we also affirm the district court's calculation of Molina's offense level.
31 Molina also claims, as did Simpson, that he is eligible for a downward departure for sentencing entrapment. As discussed supra, we also remand as to Molina's sentence for the district court to consider whether, in light of Staufer, a downward departure for sentencing entrapment is warranted.
32 Molina's other challenges to his sentence are without merit. The district court did not clearly err in concluding that Molina was not a minor or minimal participant or in concluding that he had failed to accept reponsibility. Aside from Molina's allegations regarding sentencing entrapment, there are no circumstances that would support a downward departure. 33
34 In this case, we have held in an order filed this date that proof of an overt act is not an element of the conspiracy charge. Therefore, we affirm the district court's denial of the appellant's motions for acquittal and new trial.