Opinion ID: 2376601
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Records held by the court

Text: ¶ 36 The Herald-Republic contends that the trial court erred by ruling that the PRA did not apply to court documents. The paper's central argument is that records related to defense costs are administrative records and that when the court acts in its administrative capacity, it should be considered an agency under the PRA. The newspaper urges this court to reconsider its decision in Nast v. Michels, 107 Wash.2d 300, 730 P.2d 54 (1986), which held to the contrary. The PRA applies only to the public records of an agency as defined by the act. RCW 42.56.070, .100. ¶ 37 We have already declined the Herald-Republic's invitation to revisit Nast in our recent decision in Koenig, which was decided after the parties' briefing but five months prior to oral argument, where we affirmed Nast. [8] In Koenig, David Koenig, an individual, made a public records request to the city of Federal Way for documents related to the resignation of a municipal court judge, as well as documents related to job-related exemptions for jury duty and appointment of pro tempore judges. The city of Federal Way provided more than 180 responsive documents, but did not provide court documents, such as correspondence with the presiding Federal Way municipal court judge, as they were not subject to the PRA. Id. at 344, 217 P.3d 1172. The city moved for injunctive relief, arguing that the municipal court was not subject to the PRA. Koenig filed a cross motion for summary judgment, requesting the court hold that the PRA applied to the court and that the city violated the PRA by withholding court documents. Id. at 343, 217 P.3d 1172. The trial court granted the city's motion and denied Koenig's. ¶ 38 In direct review, this court declined Koenig's invitation to overrule Nast: This court has already ruled on the issue of whether the judiciary is subject to the PRA, and Koenig has not demonstrated that the established rule is incorrect or harmful. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's holding that the PRA does not require the City to release the requested judicial records because the PRA does not apply to the judiciary. Koenig, 167 Wash.2d at 348, 217 P.3d 1172. The city was also not subject to the log requirement because the withheld documents were not public records under the PRA. Id. at 348 n. 3, 217 P.3d 1172. ¶ 39 In this case, as in Koenig, the documents requested from the Yakima County Superior Court, the Yakima County Clerk's Office, and the Yakima County Court Administrator's Office are judicial documents. These documents consist of (1) orders from the Yakima County Superior Court granting funds for the defense of Sanchez; (2) attorney invoices submitted to the superior court for reimbursement for attorney fees, experts and other associated costs of defense; and (3) worksheets or spreadsheets maintained by the Yakima Superior Court Administrator's Office to track these payments. All of these documents are held by the judiciary. Accordingly, the PRA does not govern these documents. ¶ 40 The Herald-Republic, however, contends that the use of a second judge, Judge Lust (a budget judge) in the criminal matter, changes the character of the documents from judicial documents to administrative documents, subject to the PRA. The paper claims that the only reason the requested documents are located within the judiciary is a result of Yakima County's curious decision to ask the local judges to perform the administrative function of approving the expenditure of taxpayer funds to defend outside lawyer billings. CP at 343 (emphasis added). ¶ 41 This contention is without merit. Judge Lust is a judge in the Yakima County Superior Court, acting in the context of a criminal case. Given the severity of the criminal charges, the superior court decided to use two judges. This practice is not uncommon. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1132-33, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987) (explaining that by statute in California, two judges must be used in capital cases involving indigent defendants, a judge of the court, other than the trial judge presiding over the capital case in question must decide the reasonableness of all applications for funding for experts requested by the criminal defendant's counsel (citations omitted)). ¶ 42 Moreover, having the judiciary make decisions on funding requests made by counsel for an indigent defendant's criminal defense is not a curious decisionthe requirement for defense funding is constitutionally mandated and the relevant rules expressly discuss ex parte hearings to approve such funding. See, e.g., CrR 3.1(f)(1)-(2) (providing in part that an indigent defendant's motion to the court to obtain investigative, expert or other services necessary to an adequate defense may be made ex parte to the court and such records may be sealed upon good cause); State v. Poulsen, 45 Wash.App. 706, 726 P.2d 1036 (1986) (explaining that CrR 3.1(f) incorporates the constitutional right of an indigent defendant to the assistance of expert witnesses; discussing key constitutional cases, including Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985)); Wash. State Bar Ass'n, STANDARDS FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, std. 4: Responsibility for Expert Witnesses (2007) (providing in part that [r]equests for expert witness fees should be made through an ex parte motion). The federal rules for indigent defendants in criminal cases are similar. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (providing in part that counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary for adequate representation may request them in an ex parte application). Thus, Judge Lust's actions in reviewing defense funding requests, part of Sanchez's criminal case, are squarely part of a judicial proceeding. The judge's role is not some curious action taken by Yakima County as alleged by the paper such that documents within the judiciary are no longer judicial documents. The trial court was correct in its analysis: Having a financial judge administer the costs of an aggravated first degree murder case is no less judicial just because the financial judge was not the actual trial judge. Every case bears its administrative aspects and the fact two judges were involved does not detract from the fact the judiciary administered these cases, not the legislative or executive branches of Yakima County or the State of Washington. In the end, quite simply it's a matter of separation of powers wherein the judiciary has the authority over the conduct and administration of criminal cases. CP at 19. And it is without question that the court has inherent authority to control its own documents. Id. (citing Nast, 107 Wash.2d at 305, 730 P.2d 54; Cowles Publishing Co. v. Murphy, 96 Wash.2d 584, 588, 637 P.2d 966 (1981)). The documents, like Judge Lust's role, are plainly part of judicial activity in a criminal case and are judicial documents governed by court rules regarding disclosure, not the PRA, which governs nonjudicial agencies. ¶ 43 The Herald-Republic asserts, though, that unless the PRA applies to these documents, a black hole of public access to court documents will result. Br. of Appellant at 35. The paper is incorrect. The trial court correctly pointed out that court documents are generally accessible to the public under the court rules and directed the paper to follow the rules outlined in GR 15(e) to unseal the court records. Moreover, the Herald-Republic received the court records regarding public financing of Mendez's defense costs in his criminal case initially requested with Sanchez's records, after following GR 15(e). See Appellant Yakima Herald-Republic's Reply to Resp. of Sanchez & Yakima County, Attach. A (attaching samples of Mendez's financial documents received by the paper after following the court process for unsealing); State v. Mendez, 157 Wash.App. 565, 238 P.3d 517 (2010) (releasing records after affirming trial court's order disclosing redacted copies of Mendez's records). ¶ 44 Next, the newspaper asserts that RCW 42.56.904, a statutory provision clarifying that attorney fee invoices are not to be withheld in their entirety under the PRA, will be rendered meaningless unless the PRA applies to these court records. The paper is mistaken. ¶ 45 As explained in West v. Thurston County, 144 Wash.App. 573, 183 P.3d 346 (2008), the legislature enacted RCW 42.56.904 following the trial court's dismissal of a public records request for attorney fee invoices in that case. The request in West related to attorney fee invoices to Thurston County from a private law firm hired by Thurston County to defend itself in an employment discrimination case. ¶ 46 In January 2002, several former Thurston County prosecutors brought a civil suit against Thurston County alleging hostile work environment and retaliation. Broyles v. Thurston, 147 Wash.App. 409, 421-22, 195 P.3d 985 (2008). In November 2006, after a three week jury trial, the jury found for the plaintiffs, awarding approximately $1.5 million in damages, and the trial court later awarded the plaintiffs approximately $1.3 million in attorney fees under the relevant statutory provisions. Id. at 423, 195 P.3d 985. The trial court's awards of damages and attorney fees were later affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ¶ 47 After trial, the plaintiffs in Broyles requested the attorney invoices from the law firm hired by Thurston County to support the plaintiffs' own posttrial motion for attorney fees. West, 144 Wash.App. at 583 n. 6, 183 P.3d 346. The trial court in Broyles denied the plaintiffs' request, finding that the attorney fee invoices (1) were not relevant (and hence not discoverable) at that time due to the plaintiff's narrow purpose of proving their requested fees and (2) contained privileged information. Id. The trial court stated that such invoices may become relevant (and hence discoverable) at a later time. Id. ¶ 48 In March 2007, the trial court in West dismissed West's public records request to Thurston County for the same attorney fee invoices requested by the plaintiffs in Broyles, relying on the trial court's denial in Broyles under the discovery rules for justification. [9] Shortly thereafter, the legislature enacted RCW 42.56.904 as a result of the West/Broyles litigation to clarify that discovery rules, as they applied to attorney fees paid by a public agency, do not exempt attorney fee invoices in their entirety under the PRA. West, 144 Wash.App. at 581-84, 183 P.3d 346 (citing extensive legislative history). ¶ 49 In May 2008, the Court of Appeals reversed the West trial court and remanded for disclosure of the attorney fee invoices not yet provided, relying in part on the legislature's enactment of RCW 42.56.904. Id. at 583, 183 P.3d 346 (We often apply statutory amendments retroactively if the legislature acted during a controversy regarding the meaning of the law because the legislature's timing reflects its intent to cure or clarify a statute.). ¶ 50 The paper fails to read RCW 42.56.904 in the context of this history. The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent and purpose. In re Parentage of J.M.K., 155 Wash.2d 374, 387, 119 P.3d 840 (2005); Am. Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Steen, 151 Wash.2d 512, 518, 91 P.3d 864 (2004). This is done by considering the statute as a whole, giving effect to all that the legislature has said, and by using related statutes to help identify the legislative intent embodied in the provision in question. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). RCW 42.56.904 is within the PRA and applies to public agencies as defined in the PRA. The provision does not alter or modify the definition of a public agency as defined in the PRA. Moreover, as the West case makes clear, this statutory provision remains effective and is not meaningless despite the fact that RCW 42.56.904 does not apply to judicial documents held by the judiciary. ¶ 51 Next, the Herald-Republic raises a number of concerns regarding the challenges it faced during its initial attempt to unseal the court records in front of Judge Lust pursuant to GR 15(e). Specifically, the paper faced arguments (1) regarding the trial court's jurisdiction to decide its GR 15(e) motion and (2) regarding the paper's standing to intervene. Additionally, the paper alleges that its GR 15(e) motion was complicated by the fact that the initial sealing orders were not in compliance with GR 15(c). We address each in turn. ¶ 52 First, as discussed above, in April 2008 Judge Lust held that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to decide the Herald-Republic's motion to unseal the court records without leave from the appellate court under RAP 7.2(e) because Sanchez's criminal case was on appeal in the Court of Appeals. This is a misreading of the rules. RAP 7.2(a) provides in relevant part that after an appellate court accepts review of a trial court decision, the trial court has authority to act in a case only to the extent provided in this rule. RAP 7.2(e) then explains that the trial court has authority to hear  actions to change or modify a decision that is subject to modification by the court that initially made the decision. (Emphasis added). Pursuant to GR 15(e), a trial court has authority to revisit a prior decision to seal court records and may unseal the records. ¶ 53 RAP 7.2(e) further provides that a trial court wishing to change or modify an earlier decision must obtain permission from the appellate court to do so, but only if the trial court determination will change a decision then being reviewed by the appellate court. In this case, the Court of Appeals was not asked to review the trial court's earlier decisions in Mr. Sanchez's case to seal the financial records related to defense costs. Thus, any decision by the trial court to modify its prior sealing orders would not relate to the decision on appeal (the conviction and sentencing). [10] Thus, in April 2008, Judge Lust did have jurisdiction to decide the Herald-Republic's motion to unseal the financial records and was not required under RAP 7.2(e) to seek permission from the Court of Appeals. ¶ 54 Second, the Herald-Republic was challenged by at least one of the parties as to its standing when it attempted to unseal the court records pursuant to GR 15(e). During the March and April 2008 hearings in front of Judge Lust, Mendez's counsel argued that the Herald-Republic had no standing to intervene in Sanchez's and Mendez's criminal cases given this court's holding in State v. Bianchi, 92 Wash.2d 91, 593 P.2d 1330 (1979). ¶ 55 Mendez's counsel continued to assert that the paper lacked standing after the Herald-Republic followed Judge Cooper's suggestion set forth in the trial orders and judgment of this case, CP at 7-20, and filed a second motion to intervene and to unseal the financial records in Mendez's closed criminal case. The trial court granted both of the paper's motions, and in August 2010, after oral argument in this case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order granting the Herald-Republic's limited intervention. Mendez, 157 Wash.App. 565, 238 P.3d 517. In affirming the trial court, the court in Mendez distinguished Bianchi, concluding that it did not apply to closed criminal cases. ¶ 56 In Bianchi, this court reversed a trial court's order permitting a newspaper to intervene in a criminal matter prior to trial to challenge a trial court's order sealing the affidavit of probable cause determination. Bianchi, 92 Wash.2d at 92, 593 P.2d 1330. Both the prosecution and defense moved to seal the document in the highly publicized matter to preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. This court concluded that a limited intervention in a criminal proceeding was improper given the lack of rule, statute or precedent that would allow a third party to intervene in a criminal manner. Id. We determined that the paper had no direct interest that would justify its intervention and the disruption of the pending criminal proceedings and discussed three out-of-state cases from the 1970s with similar holdings. Id. at 92-94, 593 P.2d 1330. We held that the newspaper's remedy lies instead in a separate action for declaratory judgment, mandamus, or prohibition. Id. at 93, 593 P.2d 1330. ¶ 57 As the Court of Appeals in Mendez reasoned, Bianchi is factually distinguishable. There the request to intervene was made pretrial while in Mendez the Herald-Republic moved to intervene after the defendant pleaded guilty. Additionally, as the court pointed out, many of the considerations supporting our decision in Bianchi are no longer true. First, after Bianchi was decided this court adopted GR 15 in order to create a uniform procedure for the destruction, sealing, and redaction of court records. GR 15(a). Although not explicit, subsection (e)(2) of the rule anticipates that nonparties may move to unseal records in a criminal case and provides for notice to affected parties. Second, both state and federal courts that have considered this issue since Bianchi generally favor limited intervention in such cases, despite the absence of express language permitting intervention in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the state procedural rules at issue. See, e.g., Stephens Media v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 221 P.3d 1240 (Nev.2009) (Nevada Supreme Court held that public and press have a right to seek limited intervention to assert public access regarding court proceedings); United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2008) (motion to intervene in criminal case appropriate procedural mechanism to assert public's First Amendment rights); In re Associated Press, 162 F.3d 503 (7th Cir.1998) (finding limited intervention proper). We also agree with the policy reasons cited in Mendez supporting limited interventionthe procedure allows the criminal defendant to be a necessary party and allows for counsel for indigent defendants. Finally, Bianchi 's concern with disrupting the pending criminal proceedings is not implicated once the trial has ended. ¶ 58 We hold that a limited intervention to revisit a prior sealing decision under GR 15(e) is a proper procedure for nonparties to use in a criminal case when a trial has been completed and we modify Bianchi to the extent it is contrary. [11] ¶ 59 Next, the newspaper points out a number of violations of the original sealing that complicated its initial proceeding under GR 15(e). We agree that there were violations of GR 15. For example, GR 15(c) requires a court (1) to conduct a hearing to determine if sealing is warranted [12] and (2) to make and enter written findings for its reasons for sealing a court document. Additionally, a court's order to seal documents and written findings supporting the order to seal documents must be made available to the public. GR 15(c)(5). In this case, the court failed to make and enter written findings giving its reasons for sealing these documents and failed to make public its relevant sealing orders and written findings. [13] ¶ 60 Finally, the paper urges that in addition to the requirements of GR 15, the trial court must apply the Ishikawa test when sealing and unsealing records. It argues that the budget judge failed to consider the Ishikawa factors when sealing the records and that Judge Cooper erred by failing to address the newspaper's constitutional right of access when the court relied on the budget judge's sealing order. In the interests of judicial economy the paper asks this court to direct the court on remand to consider its constitutional right to the records. ¶ 61 This court has recognized that the Ishikawa factors may have application in the context of sealing or unsealing records. See, e.g., Dreiling v. Jain, 151 Wash.2d 900, 909-10, 93 P.3d 861 (2004). However, we have also recognized that the constitutional right to an open court does not apply to all court records. Id. In Dreiling we held that mere discovery (as opposed to documents attached to dispositive motions) may be sealed for good cause shown and article I, section 10 does not speak to its disclosure. Id. ¶ 62 Moreover, it is necessary to distinguish between the common law right to inspect and copy court records, Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978) (recognizing common law right to access court case files), and the constitutional right to a public trial and open courts. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the First Amendment generally grants the press no right to information about a trial superior to that of the general public. Id. at 609., 98 S.Ct. 1306 The requirement of a public trial is satisfied by the opportunity of members of the public and press to attend the trial and to report what they have observed. Id. at 610, 98 S.Ct. 1306. ¶ 63 In Ishikawa, the issues were whether the courtroom should have been closed during a pretrial hearing to dismiss a criminal case and whether continued sealing of the hearing transcript was proper. As to the first, this court ruled no. As to the second, the court remanded for consideration of the sealing order under the heavy test set forth in First Amendment jurisprudence and adopted/modified by our court in Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wash.2d 51, 615 P.2d 440 (1980). In reaching its conclusion, the court considered the fact that the suppression motion clearly went to the merits of the criminal case. Further, the court attached significance to the fact that the public had a history of attending such pretrial hearings and there was a clear public benefit to such attendance. See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508-09, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984) (explaining in part why public presence during voir dire is necessary to ensure fairness and the appearance of fairness). ¶ 64 In contrast to Ishikawa and Press-Enterprise, in this case the orders and documents relate to defense funding, not an issue in the criminal trial. Further, there is no history of public attendance at a hearing to request public funds. Indeed, CrR 3.1(f) provides that motions for defense expenditures may be made ex parte. Finally, attendance at such a proceeding would hurt the overall process of providing the defendant an adequate defense given the need to keep defense strategies from the prosecution, maintain attorney-client confidences, and protect the right against self-incrimination. ¶ 65 As we recognized in Dreiling, there are distinctions to be drawn depending on the nature and use of court records. With respect to these court records we believe that the standards of GR 15 govern. ¶ 66 In the interest of judicial economy, we remand this case for the trial court to conduct a hearing under GR 15(e) to determine if sealing remains appropriate given the current posture of this case.