Opinion ID: 1044043
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: disqualification of the court

Text: Mr. Hooker's motion contains multiple claims for relief. This Court cannot consider his requests for substantive relief without first considering his request that all of the members of the Court disqualify themselves from this case. We have previously considered Mr. Hooker's requests that we disqualify ourselves and have found these requests to be without merit. However, we will again address this issue.
Motions for recusal call into question the integrity of the judicial process and require serious and careful consideration. Persons appearing in Tennessee's courts have a fundamental right to have their cases heard and decided by fair and impartial judges. Bean v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d 798, 803 (Tenn.2009); Chumbley v. People's Bank & Trust Co., 165 Tenn. 655, 659, 57 S.W.2d 787, 788 (1933). This right guard[s] against the prejudgment of the rights of litigants and [assists in] avoid[ing] situations in which the litigants might have cause to conclude that the court ... reached a prejudiced conclusion because of interest, partiality, or favor. State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 470 (Tenn. 2002) (appendix). To protect this right, Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution of Tennessee states that judges should not preside over trials in which they may be interested. Likewise, Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 10, Canon 2(A) states that judges shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Accordingly, Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 10, Canon 3(E)(1) admonishes that [a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Disqualification decisions are discretionary ones. Bean v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d at 805; Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility v. Slavin, 145 S.W.3d 538, 546 (Tenn.2004). They do not, however, rest solely on a judge's own subjective perception of his or her ability to act fairly and impartially. Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998); Collier v. Griffith, No. 01A01-9109-CV-00339, 1992 WL 44893, at  (Tenn.Ct.App. Mar. 11, 1992) (No Tenn. R.App. P. 11 application filed). Rather, a more objective standard must be used. State v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d 287, 307 (Tenn.2008); Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 38 S.W.3d 560, 564-65 (Tenn. 2001). The objective standard consistently used by Tennessee's courts is that recusal is warranted only when a person of ordinary prudence in the judge's position, knowing all of the facts known to the judge, would find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge's impartiality. Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 38 S.W.3d at 564-65 (quoting Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 820 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994)); see also Bean v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d at 805; State v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d at 307.
We have again analyzed the basis for Mr. Hooker's disqualification claims in light of these principles and in light of the details of the extensive public record of all the proceedings involving Mr. Hooker. We again find these claims to be objectively without merit, and we have determined that no reasonable ground for the disqualification of any of the members of the Court has existed or currently exists. Our decision rests on four factors. First, as a matter of law, no member of this Court has a disqualifying interest in the case of Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility v. Hooker. This case involves only two issues. The first issue is whether the record contains substantial and material evidence supporting the hearing panel's and trial court's conclusion that Mr. Hooker violated Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 8, RPC 3.1, 8.2(a), and 8.4(d) in 2004 based on allegations in papers he filed in the Circuit Court for Davidson County regarding certain trial and appellate judges. None of the comments in these papers were directed at a member of this Court. The second issue is whether the special judge's decision to suspend Mr. Hooker's license to practice law is supported by substantial and material evidence. The ultimate disposition of these issues did not and does not require the Court to address the constitutional validity of the manner in which judges are elected and retained in Tennessee. No reasonable person familiar with the practice of law could conclude that the members of this Court have any personal interest in Mr. Hooker's law license. None of the members of this Court have personal knowledge of the facts of this case other than the facts appearing in the public records of the courts. Finally, no member of this Court has in the past exhibited or entertained personal bias or prejudice against Mr. Hooker in any of their personal or professional dealings with him. The Tennessee Court of the Judiciary reached the same conclusion when it dismissed Mr. Hooker's complaint challenging the Court's denial of his recusal motion in this case. Second, Mr. Hooker's refusal to follow the generally applicable rules for obtaining judicial review of the trial court's decision is the sole reason he has not obtained appellate review of the special judge's decision to suspend his license to practice law for thirty days. Despite being provided numerous opportunities to remedy his oversights, Mr. Hooker has declined and continues to decline to abide by the rules that all other litigants and lawyers must follow in order to obtain appellate review of a disciplinary order. Third, discussions between judges and legislators regarding the manner in which Tennessee's judges are chosen are encouraged and are not unethical. The Code of Judicial Conduct, Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 10, Canon 4(B) states that [a] judge may speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in other extra-judicial activities concerning the law, the legal system, the administration of justice, and non-legal subjects, subject to the requirements of this Code. In addition, Tenn. Sup.Ct. R. 10, Canon 4(C)(1) states that a judge shall not appear at a public hearing before, or otherwise consult with, an executive or legislative body or official except on matters concerning the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice or except when acting pro se in a matter involving the judge or the judge's interests. The Judicial Ethics Committee of the Tennessee Judicial Conference has concluded: In brief, this committee is asked whether judges are permitted to speak and write on the history, background, or interpretation of certain sections of the Tennessee Constitution; as to the power of the Tennessee General Assembly to prescribe the manner in which judges are selected and elected; and the pros and cons of different methods of selecting judges. It is clear that each of these topics is within the scope of Canon 4B and, as the Commentary to that section states, judges are, in fact, encouraged to speak and write on these and similar topics regarding the law. In this regard, the Code of Judicial Conduct does not limit the forums. Therefore, judges may speak and write on these topics for members of the legislature, the executive branch officials, bar groups, as well as other forums. The Court of the Judiciary has also received and reviewed the judges' invited communications with members of the General Assembly regarding the selection of judges and has reached the same conclusion as the Judicial Ethics Committee. Fourth, this is not the first case in which a lawyer's belief in the justness of the cause has resulted in the lawyer's refusal to heed the basic rules of civility and professionalism that are the hallmarks of the practice of law. [4] Despite the undoubted sincerity of Mr. Hooker's beliefs, a litigant's or lawyer's disagreement with the election of a judge has never been found to be an adequate basis for disqualifying a judge from a proceeding that does not directly involve the judge's own election. There is no precedent in Tennessee or elsewhere supporting the idea that otherwise qualified judges must be disqualified whenever a litigant or lawyer disagrees with the manner in which they were placed on the bench. Allowing litigants to challenge judges based on dissatisfaction with their election would hamstring the courts and disrupt our system of justice. In addition, recognizing such a ground of disqualification for judges will only prompt others to challenge or ignore acts of the Legislative or Executive Branches of government based on their disagreement with the manner in which these officials have been elected.
Based on these factors, the Court finds that no objective basis exists for requiring the disqualification of this Court, or any member of this Court, from hearing and deciding Mr. Hooker's case. Based on all the public facts, the Court concludes that a person of ordinary prudence, knowing all the facts, would not have a reasonable basis for questioning the impartiality of the members of the Court. Accordingly, as it has in the past, this Court respectfully denies Mr. Hooker's motion requesting the members of this Court to recuse ourselves from this case.