Opinion ID: 1265850
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was the Trial Court's Error Prejudicial?

Text: As already mentioned, the trial court's failure to instruct on the elements of a section 12022(b) enhancement was erroneous. (8) When state standards alone have been violated, the State is free ... to apply its own state harmless-error rule to such errors of state law. ( Cooper v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 58, 62 [17 L.Ed.2d 730, 734, 87 S.Ct. 788].) [T]he California Constitution, unlike its federal counterpart, contains an explicit provision that directly addresses the issue of reversible error  a section added by the electorate of this state for the specific purpose of abrogating the preexisting rule that had treated any substantial error as reversible per se. ( People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 501 [20 Cal. Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037], italics in original, citing Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) This state constitutional provision explicitly mentions `misdirection of the jury' as error which warrants reversal only if, `after examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court [concludes] ... that the error ... resulted in a miscarriage of justice.' The word `misdirection' logically includes every kind of instructional error. It seems manifest that incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly omitted instructions may equally `misdirect' the jury's deliberations. Nothing in the language or history of article VI, section 13, suggests that its requirement of actual prejudice, determined by reference to `the entire cause, including the evidence,' applies to some forms of `misdirection,' but not to others. ( Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 579 [34 Cal. Rptr.2d 607, 882 P.2d 298].) Thus, the trial court's failure to instruct on the elements of a section 12022(b) sentence enhancement is misdirection of the jury for which we are constitutionally forbidden to reverse absent a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) (9) The test for harmlessness we articulated in People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, which gives effect to the constitutional provision, is generally applicable under current California law. (See People v. Cahill, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 492.) Under Watson, the trial court's judgment may be overturned only if it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error. ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) In determining whether there was prejudice, the entire record should be examined, including the facts and the instructions, the arguments of counsel, any communications from the jury during deliberations, and the entire verdict. ( People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1130 [17 Cal. Rptr.2d 365, 847 P.2d 45].) Applying the Watson test, we conclude neither defendant Wims nor defendant Ford was actually prejudiced by the trial court's instructional error. (10) First, we consider the record as to defendant Wims. Three witnesses, McCoy, Gebhardt and codefendant Gipson, testified Wims displayed a knife during the robbery. Gebhardt described in detail the menacing manner in which he displayed it. She saw Wims, after beating her fiance with a crutch and then throwing it down, hold a knife up in the air above his shoulders. Wims possessed a knife (People's exhibit 5C) at the time of his arrest. His counsel, in arguing to the jury, did not deny Wims had possessed a knife; indeed, he implicitly conceded the point: Clearly he jumped into the assault. You know, Mr. Wims is no boyscout. What you see in evidence is definitely not a boyscout knife. In contrast, the evidence Wims did not personally use a knife was weak. Gebhardt acknowledged on cross-examination she had told officers immediately after the attack she was not certain whether anyone other than Gipson had used a knife, but she described herself as mostly concerned at that time about the knife with which Gipson had been threatening her. Likewise, McCoy acknowledged on cross-examination he had not told officers about a second knife, but redirect examination revealed he had not been asked. D'Agostino testified he did not see anything in Wims's hands other than a crutch, but he also testified he was not able to see Wims's hands after being struck in the face with the crutch. Wims, who argues the instructional error was prejudicial, contends the jury's requests for information during deliberations permit no other conclusion. As mentioned above, the jury asked for a copy of or reading of Mr. D'Agostino and Mr. McCoy's testimony regarding the presence, display or lack of presence of a knife during the incident by Mr. Wims, and for an answer to the question whether a crutch constitutes a deadly weapon. In view of these questions, Wims suggests, the most likely explanation for the jury's `true' finding is that it was based on the accomplice instructions given and the evidence that Ford held a knife on D'Agostino during the robbery. We cannot agree questions from the jury focusing on Wims 's conduct logically support the inference the jury found the 12022(b) allegation true as to him based on Ford's conduct. In view of the evidence Wims did personally use a knife during the robbery, his speculations about the jury's deliberative processes do not justify the conclusion further instructions on section 12022(b) would, to a reasonable probability ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836), have brought about a more favorable verdict. (11) Our examination of the record likewise reveals no reasonable probability of prejudice as to defendant Ford's section 12022(b) enhancement. Four witnesses testified Ford brandished a knife. Both victims testified Ford held the knife in D'Agostino's face and threatened to cut him. Ford was found with a knife shortly after the robbery, which the victims said resembled the one he used in the robbery. Ford argued only that he never participated in the robbery at all, not that D'Agostino's alleged attacker lacked a knife. The evidence did not permit a conclusion that Ford displayed a knife without menacing intent. We conclude that even had the court informed the jury of the elements of a section 12022(b) enhancement, it is not reasonably probable they would have found that allegation to be not true as to defendant Ford.