Opinion ID: 2600337
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Strict compliance with the filing deadline is required.

Text: The judges also argue that, even if we hold that the June 8 and July 15 communications did not satisfy the statutory requirements, we should affirm the superior court on the alternative ground that judicial retention candidates need only substantially comply with election filing deadlines. The judges argue that strict compliance is only appropriate with regard to non-judicial candidates because they have to supply much more information than their judicial counterparts, presumably because information about judges is already available in the public records. They also point out that strict compliance is justified in the political arena because it prevents potential gamesmanship, by which a candidate could otherwise wait until the last minute to decide to run after first seeing who else filed. This concern does not carry over to judicial retention elections because judicial candidates are unopposed. The judges substantially complied with the August 1 deadline, they argue, when they filed their declaration of candidacy forms with the division in mid-August. The judges argue that those filings substantially complied with the deadline because the division was not hampered in its preparations for the election since the council had previously provided the necessary information. Further, they contend that although their mid-August filings were after the deadline, they were filed comfortably before the Division's deadlines for printing ballots and election pamphlets. [W]here the election statutes fix a date for filing petitions or certificates of candidacy, such documents must be filed before the expiration of the time fixed, and [the] election officials may not exercise any discretion in the matter. [29] In Falke v. State we stated that it is well established, both in Alaska and in other jurisdictions, that election law filing deadlines are to be strictly enforced. Strict compliance is the rule, and substantial compliance the rare exception. [30] Because filing dates are mandatory, substantial compliance is not sufficient, absent substantial confusion or `impossibility.' [31] Thus far we have permitted substantial compliance with an election filing deadline in only one case. In Silides v. Thomas , the candidate did not strictly comply with the deadline for filing his financial disclosure statement. [32] We held that the election statutes that required Silides to simultaneously file his financial disclosure statement in Anchorage and his declaration of candidacy in Juneau were inherently unclear and impossible to comply with. [33] Because of the lack of clarity inherent in the statute and the impossibility of compliance, we departed from the normally salutary doctrine that election deadlines must be strictly construed and strictly enforced and held that substantial compliance was sufficient. [34] In Division of Elections v. Johnstone, we did not rely on a substantial compliance theory, but we allowed Judge Johnstone to remain on the bench even though he failed to file his declaration of candidacy by the deadline. [35] We excused Judge Johnstone's failure to timely file his declaration of candidacy because we concluded that the Alaska Constitution was ambiguous with regard to when he was required to stand for retention. [36] Judge Johnstone was not given any special treatment, however, because of his status as a judge. He was effectively given the same treatment as Silides, a non-judge. In both Silides and Johnstone, we did not require strict compliance. But in both cases we held that statutory or constitutional ambiguity, and not a candidate's oversight, justified departure from the strict compliance standard. [37] Because the August 1 declaration deadlines cannot reasonably be considered ambiguous or impossible to comply with, there is no justification for departing from the strict compliance standard here. The dissent may reason that the statutory retention process was confusing or that the statutes were somehow ambiguous. [38] There is no ambiguity in the clear language of AS 15.35.070 or AS 15.35.110 or in any of the procedures. There is no basis for importing a substantial compliance factor into their text. As confirmation of that proposition, it is clear that no one was confused in June or July, or before August 19, 2004, or had any doubt about what the declaration statutes required. On June 9 the division sent the two judges letters stating you have not yet filed for judicial retention . . . . August 1 is the deadline to file for judicial retention. In comparison, the division sent different letters to those judges who had filed a declaration; those letters stated you have filed for retention. On July 15, the same day the council sent its July 15 e-mail to the division, the council also sent a memo to the ten judges, explaining both the duty to file a timely declaration and the consequences of failing to file on time: In order to continue as a judge past next January, state statutes require you to file with the Director [of Elections] a declaration of candidacy . . . no later than August 1. . . . If you do not file this declaration of candidacy with the Director of Elections on or before August 1, your name will not appear on the ballot this fall and your term as judge will end ninety days after the election. This message unambiguously conveyed the clear statutory requirements and consequences. Given this message from the council to the judges, neither the council nor the judges could have thought any communication between the council and the division could satisfy the declaration statutes. And on August 16, 2004, when Judge Jeffery submitted his declaration of candidacy to the division, he stated in his accompanying letter I realize these documents are late. On August 19, 2004, when Judge Nolan submitted her declaration of candidacy, she stated in her letter [t]oday it came to my attention that I failed to timely file the Declaration of Candidacy. These communications are inconsistent with any notion that the statutes or the procedures were ambiguous or confusing or that the council or reasonable persons could have thought that communication by the council with the division would relieve or had relieved the judges of their statutory duty to file declarations of candidacy with the division. Furthermore, the declaration statutes effectively require a candidate to communicate to the division the candidate's current intention to stand for retention. The August 1 deadline chosen by the legislature is late enough in the election sequence that it provides an accurate declaration of each candidate's current intentions, unlike anything that might be inferred from whatever the judge may have told the council the prior November, before the evaluation process began. [39] Likewise, the August 1 declaration deadline allows jurists previously interested in retention to silently drop out before publication of any adverse evaluation by the council or adverse information from the Judicial Conduct Commission. [40] This might explain why the legislature adopted the August 1 deadline for declaring candidacy for retention [41] and the August 7 deadline for submitting information for inclusion in the election pamphlet. [42] A substantial compliance standard is thus inconsistent with both the text of the controlling declaration statutes and with the way the division, the council, and even the judges interpreted the declaration statutes on or before August 19, 2004. [43]