Opinion ID: 1849100
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: former conflict in amendments harmonized.

Text: Where conflicts in constitutional provisions may be harmonized, the Court will so interpret the conflicting provisions [State ex rel. Collins v. Jackson, 119 Miss. 727, 81 So. 1 (1919)], but where they cannot be harmonized, the former must give way to the latter in time. The last must be deemed to have superseded the former. Wilson v. Crews, 160 Fla. 169, 34 So.2d 114 (1948); State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Macaluso, 235 La. 1019, 106 So.2d 455 (1958). In Johnston v. Hicks, 225 Ga. 576, 170 S.E.2d 410 (1969), the Georgia Supreme Court held that where an amendment to the constitution was in irreconcilable conflict with an existing provision of the constitution, the amendment being the last expression of the people must prevail. See also 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 68, at 246-47 (1964). It is apparent to a casual reader that two former sections of the Constitution  Section 145A [Appendix II] and Section 149A [Appendix III]  were in conflict at the time of their adoption as to the number of judges required to constitute a quorum. Section 145A [Appendix II] provided that in a six-judge court any four of whom when convened shall form a quorum. (Emphasis added). On the other hand, Section 149A provided that the Supreme Court may sit in two divisions of three judges each, two of whom when convened shall form a quorum. (Emphasis added). This conflict of quorum definitions obviously grew out of the fact that several resolutions for constitutional amendments were passed at the same time by the legislature with reference to the Supreme Court. On the same dates [March 7 and March 21 of 1914] the legislature resolved to submit to the people, in addition to Sections 145A and 149A, an amendment making the offices of supreme court judges elective by the people. [Appendix IV]. At the same time, the legislature offered a resolution to amend Section 165 which had previously contained the sentence: Where either party shall desire, the supreme court, for the trial of any cause, shall be composed of three judges. [Appendix V]. The new resolution deleted the last three lines of this section, leaving out the right of the parties to agree to a three-judge court. [Appendix VI]. The legislature also submitted to the people by joint resolution an amendment providing that in the event the people voted to increase the supreme court to six judges, the judges would be elected two each from the three supreme court districts. [Appendix VII]. The various amendments were submitted to the electors of the state who voted for the amendments, some of which were based upon the proposition that the court would be increased to six judges. The lawyers soon found the conflict between Section 145A and Section 149A. This issue was raised in Dean v. State, 173 Miss. 309, 162 So. 155, overruling suggestion of error in 173 Miss. 254, 160 So. 584 (1935), and in that case the Court said: When this court is sitting in banc, there must be at least four of its judges present; and no action can be taken by it unless a majority of the judges present concur therein. 173 Miss. at 309, 162 So. at 157. The Court went on to say that when there is an equally divided court, the case must be affirmed. Later in the case of Slush v. Patterson, 201 Miss. 131, 29 So.2d 311, overruling suggestion of error in 201 Miss. 113, 28 So.2d 738 (1947), the conflict between these constitutional amendments was again presented to this Court, and we said: It is too late now to consider that all those cases were decided without constitutional authority, because reversed by the vote of three instead of four Judges, and we hereby expressly bring forward and affirm what was said on the subject by Smith, C.J., in response to the suggestion of error in Dean v. State, 173 Miss. 254, at pages 309 and 310, 160 So. 584, 162 So. 155. 201 Miss. at 132, 29 So.2d at 312. It is obvious that the Court harmonized these two sections so that four judges were required to participate en banc, but that three judges constituted a quorum to reverse a case where at least four participated. However, this decision is based upon the proposition that the constitution had been interpreted so as to permit a reversal by three judges for more than a quarter of a century. 201 Miss. at 132, 29 So.2d at 312. There was nothing unusual about the decision of the Court to harmonize two conflicting constitutional sections, where such sections can be harmonized. In State ex rel. Collins v. Jackson, 119 Miss. 727, 81 So. 1 (1919), this Court said: In construing this amendment (section 33 of our Constitution), it is our duty to consider also section 75 of the Constitution, and, if possible, to harmonize and give effect to both sections. If this cannot be done, and it is clear that the amendment repeals section 75 by implication, then it is our duty to so hold. 119 Miss. at 739, 81 So. at 5. I submit that it is impossible for a nine-judge court to sit in two divisions of three judges each. Moreover, we have not been sitting in a three-judge panel for a quarter of a century since the people amended the Constitution so as to require us to have a quorum of five judges in order to transact business. In the case of Hays Finance Co. v. Bailey, 56 So.2d 806, overruling motion for hearing en banc, 56 So.2d 76 (Miss. 1952), overruling suggestion of error in 54 So.2d 727 (Miss. 1951), a motion was made in this Court requesting a hearing en banc. This Court stated: At the time this cause was decided and judgment entered, and at the time judgment was entered overruling the Suggestion of Error therein, this Court was composed of six Judges, who, under Section 149A of the Constitution of 1890, implemented by Rule 34 of this Court, sat in two divisions of three Judges each. This cause was decided finally by Division B without dissent.       It is immaterial that, since the decision of this case, the Legislature has ratified an amendment to our Constitution increasing the number of Judges to nine. All judgments entered herein antedated the adoption of such amendment.       We hold, therefore, that the decision and judgment herein is, insofar as this Court is concerned, a final judgment rendered `by the highest court of a State, in which a decision could be had.' However, this motion has been considered by the Court in banc since separate hearings by divisions have now been discontinued. 56 So.2d at 807. (Emphasis added). It is apparent from the foregoing authorities that this Court has heretofore interpreted the Constitution to require five judges to constitute a quorum.