Opinion ID: 2747992
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Amtrak Was Washington’s “Employer”

Text: As the District Court explained, Washington must show that Amtrak was his “employer” in order to prevail on his claims against it under most of the statutes at issue. See, e.g., Covington v. Int’l Ass’n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 2013) (Title VII). The District Court concluded that Washington did not allege that Amtrak was his employer and, in so doing, it noted several places in Washington’s dated December 9, 2008, in which the EEOC acknowledged receiving correspondence from Washington regarding discrimination by both CNSI and Amtrak and in which the EEOC requested additional information. (ECF No. 58 at 10.) We further note that the validity of an initial charge, and whether the EEOC treats it as a charge, are not necessarily determinative. See Holender v. Mut. Indus. N. Inc., 527 F.3d 352, 357 (3d Cir. 2008); Anjelino v. N.Y. Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 94 (3d Cir. 2000). 7 various filings where he alleged that he was employed by CNSI. Washington argues, as he did before the District Court, that Amtrak should be deemed his employer for these purposes as well. This issue too warrants further consideration. Neither the District Court nor Amtrak addressed the standard for determining whether a defendant is an employer for purposes of the anti-discrimination laws, and that standard embraces the concept of joint employment. See id. at 119-20; Graves v. Lowery, 117 F.3d 723, 727-29 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122-23 (3d Cir. 1982)). Whether Washington was employed by Amtrak as well as CNSI for these purposes turns on a number of factors, including Amtrak’s level of control over Washington, which entity hired and paid him, and which entity generally controlled his day-to-day activities. See Covington, 710 F.3d at 119 (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992)). Under this standard, “the precise contours of an employment relationship can only be established by a careful factual inquiry,” Graves, 117 F.3d at 729, and the issue thus “may generally require resolution at the summary judgment stage, rather than at the motion to dismiss stage,” Mariotti v. Mariotti Bldg. Prods., Inc., 714 F.3d 761, 768 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 437 (2013). Washington has alleged facts arguably suggesting that Amtrak could be deemed his employer under this standard. For example, in his original complaint, he alleged that his claimed workplace mistreatment occurred at “Amtrak” and that “Amtrak managers” 8 were involved in it. (ECF No. 3 at 3.) In his First Amended Complaint, he alleged that he worked in “the Amtrak engineering department.” (ECF No. 6 at 1.) In the resignation e-mail attached thereto, he states that he communicated with John Zachmann regarding when to return to work and other employment-related matters. (Id. at 6.) The e-mail reveals that, although Washington copied someone with an e-mail address “@cnsinc.com,” both he and Zachmann used e-mail addresses “@amtrak.com.” (Id.) The e- mail also refers to Washington having been issued “Amtrak equipment.” (Id.) See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323 (identifying as a relevant factor “the source of the instrumentalities and tools”) (quotation marks omitted). Washington’s Second Amended Complaint too states that he was “employed by the defendant(s)” at “Amtrak’s 30th Street facility” (ECF No. 37 at 12), refers to his “employment with CNSI and Amtrak” (id. at 15), and attaches an e-mail from Washington to the EEOC in which Washington states that “Amtrak Manager Michael Calderone, was my direct supervisor” (id. at 23). Neither the District Court nor Amtrak acknowledged these allegations, let alone applied the applicable standard to them, and we once again decline to do so in the first instance sua sponte because further consideration is warranted in the District Court. Washington made certain assertions relevant to this issue in his brief in opposition to defendants’ motions to dismiss,5 but the District Court denied leave to amend on this 5 For example, Washington referred to a conflict over who controlled his day-to-day activities, stated that his direct supervisor’s “boss” was an “Amtrak Technologies Regional Manager—Systems Engineering,” and asserted that he “expressed his concern 9 issue without explanation. Thus, we will vacate the District Court’s ruling in this regard. If the District Court concludes on remand that Washington has not adequately alleged that Amtrak was an “employer,” then it should exercise its discretion in the first instance in determining whether leave to further amend is appropriate. 6 C. Whether Washington Otherwise Stated a Claim for Relief Both CNSI and Amtrak argued below that Washington’s Second Amended Complaint otherwise fails to state a plausible claim for relief, but the District Court did not reach that issue. CNSI (though not Amtrak) repeats that alternative argument on appeal. We acknowledge that Washington’s voluminous filings are not models of clarity and that his allegations of discrimination are largely conclusory. If we viewed his about working in an environment where instructions were not clear.” (ECF No. 58 at 2.) 6 In the District Court, Amtrak submitted a copy of a contract between it and CNSI and argued that the contract shows that CNSI’s employees are independent contractors and not employees of Amtrak. (ECF No. 45-2 at 2-21.) Amtrak also argued that the District Court should consider the contract under Rule 12(b)(1) because whether Amtrak was Washington’s employer is not merely an element of Washington’s claims but goes to the District Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The District Court did not rely on the contract but, citing Kahn v. American Heritage Life Insurance Co., 324 F. Supp. 2d 652, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2004), it agreed that Amtrak’s status as an employer is a jurisdictional issue. We need not resolve whether that is so because the District Court did not rely on the contract, but we question that conclusion. Cf. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006) (holding that “the threshold number of employees for application of Title VII is an element of a plaintiff’s claim for relief, not a jurisdictional issue”); Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 83 (3d Cir. 2003) (same). We decline to rely on the contract at this stage as well, and we note that the existence of an independent contractor agreement may be “strong evidence” but is “not dispositive of the plaintiff’s employment status[.]” Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 181 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). 10 Second Amended Complaint in isolation, and if it represented an opportunity to remedy deficiencies previously raised by the defendants or the District Court, then we might agree that dismissal without leave to further amend was appropriate. After reviewing Washington’s filings in context, however, we believe that this issue warrants consideration by the District Court. Washington’s First Amended Complaint alleges in conclusory fashion that “I may have been passed over for . . . positions, promotions, training, subject to discriminatory treatment and conditions and a hostile work environment, harassment, reprisal and/or retaliation including the threat of physical violence which led to my involuntary resignation.” (ECF No. 6 at 1.) The First Amended Complaint also attached the abovereferenced 2008 affidavit, in which Washington referred to his CNSI manager making comments about “Negros” and “casting me in the role of a coloured [sic] buffoon.” (Id. at 5.) In addition, the First Amended Complaint appears to reproduce e-mails that Washington sent to the EEOC in which he claimed that an unspecified “mental handicap” made it difficult for him “to write a narrative document to show specific acts of discrimination” but in which he referred to pages in a 294-page document that he believes support his claims. (Id. at 2.) Washington’s Second Amended Complaint largely repeats the conclusory allegations from his First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 37 at 12-13), and again refers to his “mental handicap” and resultant difficulty in “writ[ing] a narrative document to show 11 specific acts of discrimination” (id. at 16). When Amtrak and CNSI moved to dismiss this complaint and argued for the first time that Washington failed to plead a plausible claim, however, he sought leave to amend and made several specific factual assertions in his supporting brief. For example, Washington referred to specific conversations he had with specific individuals notifying them of his mental disability and requesting accommodations that he asserts they did not provide. (ECF No. 58 at 2-4.) He also refers to specific instances in which his supervisor expressed skepticism that “someone who looks like you went to Princeton” (id. at 2) and in which others called him “boy” (id. at 3-4), and he asserts that his supervisor “Stevenson and others repeatedly made negative comments about [my] age, religion, race, handicaps and nationality” (id. at 8). In addition, he asserts that he was not provided with various office equipment that other employees received, including a laptop computer that was necessary to complete tasks required for promotional opportunities. (Id. at 3-5.) Washington further asserts that, when he complained that he thought these and other actions were discriminatory, his supervisor told him to “stop complaining if he wanted to keep his job.” (Id. at 3.) The sole reason the District Court gave for dismissing Washington’s claims against CNSI without leave to amend was that amendment would be futile in light of its ruling on exhaustion. The District Court did not reach the merits of Washington’s claims, and thus did not consider whether they warranted leave to amend on the merits in light of 12 the assertions contained in his brief or otherwise. We believe it best for the District Court, which is more familiar with the parties and this litigation, to exercise its discretion in that regard in the first instance.