Opinion ID: 1236953
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Article XI, Section 5 to the Facts of This Case

Text: Respondents and amici curiae on their behalf focus initially on subdivision (b)(4) of article XI, section 5. They assert charter section 313 is a regulation concerning the manner by which municipal officers are elected, and thus it is by definition a core municipal affair over which the city may exercise plenary authority to the exclusion of all general laws. Alternatively, they claim, charter section 313 is a municipal affair under subdivision (a) of article XI, section 5, as that provision was construed in CalFed, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1. Petitioners challenge both propositions. We address these points seriatim.
In Mackey v. Thiel (1968) 262 Cal. App.2d 362 [68 Cal. Rptr. 717] ( Mackey ), the court addressed article XI, former section 8 1/2, which, like its successor, article XI, section 5, subdivision (b)(4), granted charter cities plenary authority over the manner by which municipal officers are elected. At issue in Mackey was Elections Code, former section 10012.5 (presently § 10012), which provides that if a candidate for local office so requests, the county clerk shall send to voters, in the sample ballot package, a written statement of the candidate's qualifications, prepared by the candidate. The petitioner submitted his statement to the county clerk, but the clerk refused to comply with the statute, on the ground the statute does not apply to charter cities, and the city's election code made no provision for mailing of candidate qualification statements. The trial court eventually issued a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the clerk to comply with the statute. On review, the Court of Appeal reversed. The court noted that the city's election code established a comprehensive set of rules governing all phases of city elections and that it provides for certain information of a substantive nature respecting issues to be included with the mailing of sample ballots but not candidate qualification booklets as provided in [Elections Code, former] section 10012.5. ( Mackey, supra, 262 Cal. App.2d at p. 364, italics in original.) It also noted that article XI, former section 8 1/2 of the Constitution granted plenary authority to the city over the manner by which municipal officers are elected, and characterized the petitioner's argument as follows: Such `plenary authority' having been given to the City, ... it is contended that [City's] code ... should prevail over the provisions of [Election Code, former] section 10012.5.... ( Mackey, supra, 262 Cal. App.2d at p. 364.) The court proceeded to impliedly accept the petitioner's argument. In doing so, it acknowledged the respondent's assertion that Elections Code, former section 10012.5 reflected a concern for the creation of an informed and educated electorate on a statewide basis ( Mackey, supra, 262 Cal. App.2d at p. 365), and it conceded the plausibility of the respondent's claim that the statute reflected a statewide concern that the qualifications of elected officials be made known to voters. ( Ibid. ) Nevertheless, it concluded the state was precluded from enforcing the provision in charter city elections because California courts have already determined that the conduct of municipal elections is a municipal affair and subject to municipal control. ( Socialist Party v. Uhl [(1909)] 155 Cal. 776, 788 [103 P. 181].) [13] ( Mackey, supra, 262 Cal. App.2d at p. 365.) Petitioners assert Mackey and the cases on which it relies (e.g., Uhl, supra, 155 Cal. 776; City of Redwood City v. Moore (1965) 231 Cal. App.2d 563 [42 Cal. Rptr. 72] [disapproved on other grounds in Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56, 63, fn. 6 (81 Cal. Rptr. 465, 460 P.2d 137)]) are distinguishable because they involved local election procedures, and not the integrity of the political or electoral process itself. The latter matter, petitioners assert, is a statewide concern and hence the exclusive province of the state under the Political Reform Act of 1974, and the amendments thereto (§§ 81000-91015). [14] They further claim charter section 313 does in fact aim at regulating the integrity of the political or electoral process, not simply the manner of electing municipal officers, and hence the city's regulation is not a municipal affair under article XI, section 5, subdivision (b)(4). In essence, petitioners ask us to interpret narrowly the word manner, as used in the constitutional provision, to exclude all local election regulations except those that may be labeled procedural. But as the court in Mackey, supra, 262 Cal. App.2d 362, acknowledged, and as the respondent in that case argued, the conflict in Mackey could not fairly be described as procedural: the question was a substantive one, i.e., whether information about candidates' qualifications should be mailed to voters. It thus appears that the election provisions at issue in Mackey implicated concerns similar to what petitioners describe as the integrity of the political or electoral process, which is concededly an issue of statewide concern. Yet the Mackey court upheld a charter city's right to adopt a different course and decline to follow the state statute. This holding suggests that the constitutional provision granting charter cities plenary authority over the manner of electing municipal officers has a broader scope than envisioned by petitioners. We conclude petitioners offer no persuasive justification to question the reasoning or result in Mackey, and we are reluctant to endorse the narrow scope of the word manner advocated by petitioners. We are hesitant, however, to embrace the expansive view of article XI, section 5, subdivision (b)(4), advanced by respondents and their amici curiae. They assert, with some force, that partial public financing of municipal election campaigns is one way to elect municipal officials, although it is certainly... not the only `manner' in which to do so. They reason that under the plain words of article XI, section 5, subdivision (b)(4), partial public funding of local campaigns, being a manner of municipal elections, is a subject within the city's plenary regulatory authority that falls within the core definition of a municipal affair under that constitutional provision. [15] Although we believe charter section 313 clearly implicates a municipal affair (see CalFed, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1, 17), we need not, and do not, determine whether charter section 313 is by definition a core municipal affair under article XI, section 5, subdivision (b)(4), because we conclude that in any event, the charter section is enforceable as a municipal affair under article XI, section 5, subdivision (a), as that provision was recently construed in CalFed, supra.
(2) Under CalFed, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1, once we conclude, as above, that the matter implicates a `municipal affair' and poses a genuine conflict with state law ( id., at p. 17), our inquiry under article XI, section 5, subdivision (a) of the Constitution proceeds in two discrete steps. First, we focus on whether the conflicting state law  here, section 85300  qualifies as a matter of statewide concern. If the state statute does not qualify as a matter of statewide concern, the conflicting charter city measure (or practice) is a municipal affair and `beyond the reach of legislative enactment.' (54 Cal.3d at p. 17.) If the state statute qualifies as a statewide concern, we next consider whether it is both (i) reasonably related to the resolution of that concern, and (ii) narrowly tailored to limit incursion into legitimate municipal interests. If it meets this final test, then the conflicting charter city measure ceases to be a `municipal affair' pro tanto and the Legislature is not prohibited by article XI, section 5[, subdivision] (a), from addressing the statewide dimension by its own tailored enactments. ( Ibid. )
(3a) Petitioners assert four grounds (and various subpoints) on which to base their claim that section 85300 addresses a statewide concern. In the Court of Appeal, and to a lesser extent in this court, petitioners assert that because the drafters of Proposition 73 and those who voted for the measure intended to create a statewide rule barring public funding of all election campaigns, section 85300 addresses a matter of statewide concern. In support, they cite dictum in Bishop v. City of San Jose, supra, 1 Cal.3d 56, 61-62, which, when read in isolation, suggests that intent of drafters or voters to treat a matter as a statewide concern renders the matter a statewide concern. [16] This point need not detain us long. (4) The assertion that a legislative body may define what is, and is not, a matter of statewide concern was rejected in Bishop v. City of San Jose itself: [T]he fact, standing alone, that the Legislature has attempted to deal with a particular subject on a statewide basis is not determinative of the issue as between state and municipal affairs ...; stated otherwise, the Legislature is empowered neither to determine what constitutes a municipal affair nor to change such an affair into a matter of statewide concern. (1 Cal.3d at p. 63; see also id., at p. 63, fn. 6 [disapproving contrary cases]; Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma (1979) 23 Cal.3d 296, 317 [152 Cal. Rptr. 903, 591 P.2d 1].) As we explained in CalFed, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1, our inquiry regarding statewide concern focuses not on the legislative body's intent, but on the identification of a convincing basis for legislative action originating in extramunicipal concerns, one justifying legislative supersession based on sensible, pragmatic considerations. ( Id., at p. 18.) In other words, we must be satisfied that there are good reasons, grounded on statewide interests, to label a given matter a statewide concern. (3b) Petitioners next cite County of Sacramento v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1990) 222 Cal. App.3d 687 [271 Cal. Rptr. 802] ( County of Sacramento ) for the proposition that campaign financing, and public financing of political campaigns in particular, is a matter of statewide concern. In County of Sacramento, supra, the court addressed a conflict between section 85300 and a charter county's regulation that, like charter section 313, provided for partial public funding of county election campaigns, and for corresponding spending limits on such campaigns. After noting that the constitutional provisions relating to charter counties (art. XI, §§ 3, 4) are less expansive than those relating to charter cities (art. XI, § 5) the court expressed doubt that charter counties have any authority over financing of county election campaigns. It concluded, it is self-evident that campaign financing of election contests, both state and local, is a matter of statewide concern and thus beyond the proper purview of [charter] county regulation. (222 Cal. App.3d at p. 690.) County of Sacramento, supra, is plainly distinguishable. There, the court construed constitutional provisions (relating to charter counties) that, in contrast to article XI, section 5, contain no general reservation of local autonomy, and no grant of plenary authority over local election matters. [17] The court's quoted conclusion is also highly questionable. It offered no convincing basis for its determination that public financing of election campaigns, and partial public funding of local election campaigns in particular, is necessarily a matter of statewide concern. Instead, the court simply asserted that public funding might, for some unarticulated reason, adversely affect the integrity of election contests by contributing to corruption or undue influence caused by financial interests. (222 Cal. App.3d at p. 692.) (5)(See fn. 18.) As explained below, we discern no basis for the conclusion that partial public funding of election campaigns would exacerbate those problems; indeed, the available evidence, and logic, suggest the opposite. [18] In essence, the County of Sacramento decision appears to rest almost exclusively on the ground that the drafters and voters intended to establish a single body of law pertaining to the financing of election campaigns. (222 Cal. App.3d at p. 692, italics added.) As we explained above, however, the voters' intent that a matter be treated on a statewide basis does not make that matter a statewide concern. Furthermore, the bare interest of uniformity in the manner of electing officials is no justification for treating public funding of municipal elections as a statewide concern, because, standing alone, it reveals no convincing basis for legislative action originating in extramunicipal concerns. ( CalFed, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 18.) (3c) Accordingly, we decline to accept County of Sacramento's holding that campaign financing, and in particular, partial public funding of local election campaigns, is a statewide concern, because neither the County of Sacramento court, nor petitioners or their amicus curiae herein, have established any convincing reason, grounded on statewide interests, supporting Proposition 73's attempt to treat public funding of election campaigns as a statewide concern. In their effort to identify a statewide concern, petitioners advance various arguments relating to fiscal matters. First, they point to ballot arguments advising the voters that too much money is being spent on political campaigns today. From these and other ballot statements, petitioners conclude the electorate was clearly informed Proposition 73's aim was reducing the costs of political campaigns through a system of contribution limitations and prohibition on public funding. In other words, they identify as a statewide concern the protection of the public fisc. We do not doubt that conservation of the state's limited funds is a statewide concern. But petitioners, understandably, do not attempt to justify the public funding ban on the ground that it is designed to protect state revenues, because a local public funding law that draws its revenues exclusively from local taxes would obviously not implicate a concern for protecting the state fisc. Instead, petitioners suggest there is a legitimate statewide concern in how local tax proceeds are expended. On this point, we agree with the Court of Appeal below, which observed, [W]e can think of nothing that is of greater municipal concern than how a city's tax dollars will be spent; nor anything which could be of less interest to taxpayers of other jurisdictions. [Charter section 313, subdivision (C)4] expressly limit[s] the monies to be utilized for campaign financing to city funds. Thus, payments received by the city from state or federal governmental agencies may not be used. These are the city taxpayers' own dollars and those taxpayers, together with their city council, have voted to utilize those dollars to help finance political campaigns for city elective offices as a central if not critical part of major political campaign and ethics reform. That Proposition 73 expressly dealt with this subject and intended that its prohibition extend to campaigns and candidates for local office does not convert the decision of the City of Los Angeles, to follow a different path with its own money, into a matter of statewide concern. Petitioners also advance two variations on the fiscal concern described above in their attempt to establish a statewide concern. They focus on ballot arguments by the proponents of Proposition 73 to the effect that public funding might: (i) divert scarce tax funds from local needs such as police protection, fire protection, or schools; and (ii) be made available to extremist candidates such as communists or members of the Ku Klux Klan with whom many voters disagree. We reject the first claim because it is merely a variation on the argument presented and rejected above, i.e., that the manner in which local tax proceeds are expended is a legitimate statewide concern. Moreover, it proves too much, by effectively negating the authority of charter cities to regulate any municipal affair that involves expenditure of funds. The second claim was not raised in petitioners' briefs in the Court of Appeal, and in their briefs before this court they devote merely two undeveloped paragraphs to it. Their treatment of this issue consists of the following: In their opening brief they state, The federal experience in matching Presidential campaign funds amply supports the fears expressed in the ballot arguments that extremist candidates could receive state and local... taxpayers' dollars to press their political agenda. On September 27, 1989, the Federal Election Commission reported that Lyndon H. LaRouche received $825,576.99 for the 1988 election cycle. In their reply brief petitioners complain that Respondents offer no rebuttal to the statewide concern expressed by the voters that candidates expressing extremist messages should be required to raise their own campaign contributions and not rely on public financing. (Italics added.) In other words, petitioners appear to assert there is a legitimate statewide concern regarding the funding of political campaigns of candidates who are extremists  i.e., outside the mainstream of political thinking. They fail, however, to explain what legitimate interest the state might have in discriminating against non-mainstream candidates who otherwise qualify for matching funds under the objective eligibility criteria for receiving such funds. [19] Accordingly, we reject this ground of alleged statewide concern. [20] Finally, petitioners assert: (i) the integrity of the electoral process is itself a statewide concern; (ii) section 85300's ban on public funding of election campaigns is reasonably calculated to resolve that statewide concern; and (iii) therefore section 85300 addresses a statewide concern. We have no reason to doubt petitioners' major premise; the integrity of the electoral process, at both the state and local level, is undoubtedly a statewide concern. The basis for this conclusion was well stated in an Attorney General opinion in 1960, in support of a conclusion that a charter city candidate is obligated to comply with statewide campaign financial disclosure provisions: Purity of all elections is a matter of statewide concern, not just a municipal affair.... The Legislature ... has found that it is in the public interest that full and detailed disclosure be made of all contributions and expenditures in election campaigns. It was pointed out that such disclosure had a strong tendency to discourage excessive contributions and corrupt contributions.... [¶] So important is the independence and integrity of all elected officials that the reporting of campaign receipts and disbursements is the concern of the entire state as well as of the local communities [citations]. Elected officials of the various municipalities chartered and non-chartered throughout the state of California exercise a substantial amount of executive and legislative power over the people of the state of California, and this legislation aimed at obtaining the election of persons free from domination by self-seeking individuals or pressure groups is a matter of statewide concern. (35 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 230, 231-232 (1960).) Although we accept petitioners' major premise, we question their minor premise, that section 85300's ban on public financing of election campaigns is reasonably calculated to address the statewide concern regarding the integrity of the electoral process. We will consider that point in part IV, B,2b, below. In conclusion, we reject petitioners' attempt to establish a statewide concern by pointing to: (i) the drafters' and voters' intent to establish a uniform rule pertaining to the financing of election campaigns; (ii) the asserted statewide interest in how local tax proceeds are spent; and (iii) an asserted legitimate statewide concern regarding the funding of political campaigns of candidates who are outside the mainstream of political thinking. We agree with petitioners however, that Proposition 73 may be read to identify the integrity of the electoral process as a legitimate statewide concern. We now address whether section 85300 is reasonably related and narrowly tailored to resolution of that statewide concern.
Petitioners cite nothing to support the proposition that section 85300's ban on public funding of political campaigns advances in any way the goal of enhancing the integrity of the electoral process. In fact, the opposite appears to be true. As the high court observed in Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. 1, concerning the federal matching funds program for Presidential candidates, It cannot be gainsaid that public financing as a means of eliminating improper influence of large private contributions furthers a significant governmental interest. S. Rep. No. 93-689, pp. 4-5 (1974) [1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 5590-5591]. In addition, the limits on contributions necessarily increase the burden of fundraising, and Congress properly regarded public financing as an appropriate means of relieving major-party Presidential candidates from the rigors of soliciting private contributions. (424 U.S. at p. 96 [46 L.Ed.2d at p. 731-732]; see also Republican Nat. Committee v. Fed. Elec. Com'n (S.D.N.Y. 1980) 487 F. Supp. 280, 285-286, 289.) [21] The Court of Appeal below agreed: [T]he use of public funds for campaign financing will not, almost by definition, have a corrupting influence. [Instead] ... it seems obvious that public money reduces rather than increases the fund raising pressures on public office seekers and thereby reduces the undue influence of special interest groups.... [Moreover], the goals of campaign reform and reduction of election costs, including the reduction of the influence of special interest groups and large contributors, is in no way embarrassed by public financing. To the contrary, those goals can only be furthered.... To these observations we add the following. As explained above, the drafters of the Los Angeles charter amendment sought to create a measure that regulated not only campaign contributions (like Proposition 73), but that also imposed limits on spending by candidates. The drafters apparently realized that under Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S. 1, spending limitations may not be imposed unless public financing is offered to and accepted by a candidate. ( Id., at pp. 54-59 [46 L.Ed.2d at pp. 707-710]; see especially id., at p. 57, fn. 65 [46 L.Ed.2d at p. 709].) Accordingly, it appears the drafters provided for partial public financing of campaigns so that they could impose spending limitations consistently with Buckley v. Valeo, supra . It follows that, assuming spending limitations may enhance the integrity of the electoral process, a ban on public funding would actually frustrate achievement of that goal. For all of the above reasons, we conclude section 85300 is not reasonably related to the statewide concern of enhancing the integrity of the electoral process. Having reached this conclusion, we need not address whether the statute is also narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary incursion into legitimate areas of local concern.