Opinion ID: 1637617
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: retroactive application of ring to death penalty cases

Text: The State argues that, even if Mr. Whitfield's right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, as recognized in Ring, was violated because the judge made the factual findings supporting a sentence of death, Ring cannot be applied to Mr. Whitfield's sentence, and this Court's mandate affirming that sentence should not be recalled. While this Court has never fully delineated the scope of an appellate court's power to recall its mandate, it is well-established that, although an appellate court divests itself of jurisdiction of a cause when the court transmits its mandate, jurisdiction may be reacquired by means of `the judicial power to recall a mandate for certain purposes.' State v. Thompson, 659 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Mo. banc 1983), quoting, Reimers v. Frank B. Connet Lumber Co., 273 S.W.2d 348, 349 (Mo. 1954). Thus, our courts have properly recognized that a mandate may be recalled in order to remedy a deprivation of the federal constitutional rights of a criminal defendant. Thompson, 659 S.W.2d at 768-769. Most commonly, this rule is applied to recall a mandate when defendant shows that appellate counsel was ineffective. This places the case in the procedural posture it was in at the time of the original appeal, and effective appellate counsel can raise the issues not properly raised on the initial appeal. See id. [10] As Thompson noted, however, another instance in which a mandate will be recalled is when the decision of a lower appellate court directly conflicts with a decision of the United States Supreme Court upholding the rights of the accused. Id., citing, State v. McReynolds, 581 S.W.2d 465 (Mo.App.1979); State v. Nevels, 581 S.W.2d 138 (Mo.App.1979). Cf. State v. Teter, 747 S.W.2d 307, 311 (Mo. App. W.D.1988) (overruling motion to recall mandate where the motion failed to demonstrate that the decision as rendered abridges any constitutional right of a criminal defendant as declared by the United States Supreme Court). McReynolds and Nevels are particularly illustrative of a court's power to recall its mandate when the mandate abridges constitutional rights that have been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the United States Supreme Court held that the systematic exclusion of women in a way that resulted in jury venires averaging less than 15% females violated the Constitution's fair cross-section requirement. Duren, 439 U.S. at 360, 99 S.Ct. 664. In both McReynolds and Nevels , the court of appeals recalled its mandates affirming defendants' convictions in trials in which voir dire had proceeded in a way not permitted under Duren, after the Supreme Court held in Lee v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 461, 99 S.Ct. 710, 58 L.Ed.2d 736 (1979), that Duren was retroactive. While the State recognizes that Thompson allows this Court to recall its mandate if its prior decision conflicts with a United States Supreme Court decision upholding the rights of the accused, the State denies that such a conflict exists, arguing that Ring does not apply to cases such as this one, that have become final. Indeed, the State goes so far as to argue that a decision announcing a new procedural right of the accused can never be applied to cases on collateral review, asserting: Since the [Missouri] Supreme Court decision in Thompson, the [United States] Supreme Court's jurisprudence on retroactivity has been greatly simplified by its decision in Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 413 [314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649] (1987). In Griffith, the Supreme Court held that a new rule for the conduct for criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively only to cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final. Id. at 328 [107 S.Ct. 708]. Since appellant's appeal was not pending on direct review and it was final in June 2002, Ring does not apply retroactively to appellant's case. The State's argument too narrowly construes both the law applicable in federal courts governing retroactive application of newly stated federal procedural rules and this Court's duty and authority to apply federal constitutional law retroactively. As to the first concern, Griffith did not set a limit, or ceiling, on when new procedural rules will be applied to other cases, but rather a floor. It set out when new procedural rules must be applied to other cases, stating, a new rule for conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final .... Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328, 107 S.Ct. 708 (emphasis added). Griffith at no point said that a state cannot apply new criminal procedural rules to cases on collateral reviewindeed, that issue was not before it, as Griffith was a direct appeal. After Griffith, the test for when a new constitutional procedural right would be applied to cases on collateral review at first continued to be the three-part analysis developed by the United States Supreme Court in two cases: Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). The Linkletter-Stovall analysis requires a court to evaluate three factors when determining whether retroactive application should be given to a new constitutional standard. Those factors are: (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 297, 87 S.Ct. 1967. The three-part test set forth in these cases is the analysis that this Court historically has applied in determining whether a decision should be applied retroactively. See e.g. Spidle v. State, 446 S.W.2d 793 (Mo. 1969); State v. Ussery, 452 S.W.2d 146 (Mo.1970); McCulley v. State, 486 S.W.2d 419 (Mo.1972). Two years after Griffith, the United States Supreme Court did adopt a new test for determining when federal courts will apply new constitutional rules to cases subject to federal habeas review. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Under Teague, federal courts may not apply a new constitutional rule retroactively unless the rule is a matter of substantive law or, if procedural, it falls within one of two exceptions: (1) it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe [11] for instance, proscribing the death penalty for those who were mentally retarded at the time of their crime, or (2) it establishes procedures that implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial, [12] without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. Id. at 313, 109 S.Ct. 1060. Teague narrowed the situations in which a federal court will apply a new procedural rule retroactively to cases on collateral review, setting forth a generally applicable test rather than permitting federal courts to continue to make a case-by-case determination based on the Linkletter-Stovall factors. There are numerous reasons it adopted this new rule. As the Supreme Court of Nevada noted in Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463 (Nev.2002): In Teague, the Supreme Court, instead of focusing on the purpose and impact of a new constitutional rule, looked to the function of federal habeas review, which is to ensure that state courts conscientiously follow federal constitutional standards. The Court determined that this function is met by testing state convictions against the constitutional law recognized at the time of trial and direct appellate review, ... Therefore, once a conviction has become final, federal habeas courts should generally not interfere with the state courts by applying new rules retroactively. Id. at 470. As Colwell also noted, however,  Teague is not controlling on this court, other than in the minimum constitutional protections established by its two exceptions. Id. This follows from the fact [s]tates are free to provide greater protections in their criminal justice system than the Federal Constitution requires. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1014, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983). For this reason, [t]he Supreme Court has recognized that states may apply new constitutional standards `in a broader range of cases than is required' by the Court's decision not to apply the standards retroactively. Colwell, 59 P.3d at 470-71, quoting, Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966); see also State v. Fair, 263 Or. 383, 502 P.2d 1150, 1152 (1972) ([W]e are free to choose the degree of retroactivity or prospectivity which we believe appropriate to the particular rule under consideration, so long as we give federal constitutional rights at least as broad a scope as the United States Supreme Court requires). It is up to each state to determine whether to apply the rule set out in Teague, to continue to apply the rule set out in Linkletter-Stovall, or to apply yet some other rule appropriate for determining retroactivity of a new constitutional rule to cases on collateral review. So long as the state's test is not narrower than that set forth in Teague, it will pass constitutional muster. While this Court has on occasion cited federal cases dealing with retroactivity that in turn relied on Teague, [13] this Court has never been presented with a case requiring it to decide between the Linkletter-Stovall and Teague tests. Neither has the State asked us to adopt the Teague test, nor even cited Teague to us in its brief. While Missouri shares many of the policy concerns Teague discusses concerning the finality of convictions, these concerns are well protected by the threefactor test set out in Linkletter-Stovall and traditionally applied by this Court. Further, the latter test permits this Court to consider the particular facts and legal issues relevant to the specific issue before the Courtfor instance, here, to consider that the right asserted is the fundamental right to trial by jury and that the stake is of the highest magnitudethe defendant's life. [14] Finally, this case involves a motion to recall mandate. As discussed above, Missouri has traditionally recognized that a motion to recall mandate may be used to obtain relief from convictions and sentences that are inconsistent with federal constitutional rules. Thompson, 659 S.W.2d at 768. For these reasons, as a matter of state law, this Court chooses not to adopt the Teague analysis but instead chooses to continue applying the Linkletter-Stovall approach to the issue of the retroactivity of Ring, an approach that comports better with Missouri's legal tradition. [15] Applying the analysis set out in Linkletter-Stovall here, this Court must consider (1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance by law enforcement on the old rule, and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new standards. [16] The purpose to be served by the rule set out in Ring is to ensure a jury of defendant's peers finds each of the factual elements necessary to his conviction and sentence of death. The Supreme Court and this Court have both held that the right to trial by jury is a fundamental right in serious criminal prosecutions. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969); Spidle v. State, 446 S.W.2d 793, 794-95 (Mo.1969). In a case not involving the death penalty, the Supreme Court held that this was not a sufficient basis in itself to require retroactive application of the rule requiring a jury trial in such cases. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633-34, 88 S.Ct. 2093, 20 L.Ed.2d 1308 (1968). It went on to consider the impact of its new rule on the administration of justice and the extent of reliance on the old rule and determined that the effect was so great that the new rule would not be applied retroactively. Id. By contrast, here, the second and third factors clearly favor retroactivity. Unlike new constitutional rules dealing with Fourth Amendment violations, the rule at issue here will not invalidate any searches or preclude the admission of any evidence. And, unlike in states such as Arizona in which the statutes required judges to determine whether to impose the death penalty, in Missouri juries have always made the decision whether to impose the death penalty except in those few cases in which the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Moreover, under Griffith, Ring must be applied to all future death penalty cases and to those not yet final or still on direct appeal. Thus, only those few Missouri death penalty cases that are no longer on direct appeal and in which the jury was unable to reach a verdict and the judge made the required factual determinations and imposed the death penalty will be affected by the retroactive application of Ring. As a result, the effect of application of Ring to cases on collateral review will not cause dislocation of the judicial or prosecutorial system. This Court's preliminary review of its records has identified only five potential such cases. [17] Even in those five cases, the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of Ring will be minimal, as is evident from application of the new rule to the instant case. Although the sentence imposed by the trial court is reversed, no new guilt or penalty phase trial need be held. [18] This is because section 565.030.4, for the reasons discussed above, does not permit the death penalty to be imposed unless the fact finder finds the first three factors set out in that subsection against defendant, and as noted, the record only shows that the judge made these findings. Under the principles set out in Ring, which apply retroactively to Mr. Whitfield on this motion to recall mandate, the court below violated his constitutional right in making the requisite findings itself and sentencing him to death. The only option was to impose a life sentence. [19] The State disagrees. It argues that, even if Ring applies retroactively, the remedy is to remand for a new penalty phase trial, not to impose a sentence of life imprisonment. In support, the State notes that on remand of Ring itself the Arizona Supreme Court held that new penalty phase trials are permissible. The State suggests that there is no reason why the result should be different under Missouri law. This argument ignores the fundamental distinction between the death penalty processes in Missouri and in Arizona. In Arizona, once a jury determined guilt, a judge determined punishment. Therefore, the defendant in Ring and in other Arizona death penalty cases never had the opportunity to have a jury consider penalty phase evidence and determine whether to impose a life sentence or death. It is therefore quite appropriate that the remedy the Arizona courts have ordered is that such a trial be held. In Missouri, by contrast, Mr. Whitfield and other defendants have always been entitled to jury sentencing under section 565.030.4. As set out in detail above, the jury must undertake four steps in determining defendant's sentence, the first three of which require factual findings. If the jury is unable to find each such fact favors death, then it must impose a life sentence. Here, the record fails to show that the jury made these findings, but does affirmatively show that the judge entered a judgment of death based on his own findings rather than those of the jury. As stated, under Ring and Missouri law, this was error that was not harmless. Therefore, the judge's only option was to impose a sentence of life. The separate opinion of Judge Price suggests that this is not the case, and that, at least until Missouri's jury instructions require jurors to specify at what point they have deadlocked, by making separate written findings as to each step set out in section 565.030.4, the remedy will be to order a new trial and give the State a second opportunity to convince a different jury to find the facts necessary for imposition of the death penalty. But, Missouri's statutes do not provide for this second bite at the apple. [20] The separate opinion seems to assume that the judgment is based on the jury's factual findings, and the issue is what presumptions can be indulged in about at what point the jury deadlocked. But, section 565.030.4 provides that a defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment unless the jury finds steps 1, 2, 3, and 4 against him or her. It also provides that, when the jury deadlocks, the jury's findings simply disappear from the case and the court is to make its own independent findings. That is what occurred here. Thus, any presumptions as to what the jury may have found are simply irrelevant. Here, the judgment of death, based on the court's findings, constituted constitutional error. For the reasons set out above, that error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [21] Therefore, had this case been tried after Ring, the proper course of action for the judge to follow would have been to sentence defendant to life imprisonment. The fact that the applicability of Ring was not determined until later does not change the remedy in the present case. It is still to enter the judgment the trial court should have entereda sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole. [22] This result is anticipated, and required, by section 565.040.2, which provides in pertinent part: In the event that any death sentence imposed pursuant to this chapter is held to be unconstitutional, the trial court which previously sentenced the defendant to death shall cause the defendant to be brought before the court and shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the governor.... Sec. 565.040.2 (emphasis added). Because the imposition of Mr. Whitfield's death sentence has been determined to be in violation of his right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a jury determination of the facts rendering him eligible for death, section 565.040.2 clearly applies. It expressly states that a defendant whose sentence is vacated on constitutional grounds shall be resentenced to life in prison. It does not, as the separate opinion suggests, state that a defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment only if his death sentence is held unconstitutional on the basis that the defendant was never really eligible for the death penalty in the first place, such as defendants who are mentally retarded or as to whom no statutory aggravator applies, and that defendants whose sentences are overturned on procedural grounds shall receive new trials. Rather, it states that [i]n the event that any death sentence imposed pursuant to this chapter is held to be unconstitutional, the trial court ... shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment. Id. (emphasis added). Mr. Whitfield's death sentence, imposed pursuant to chapter 565, is herein held to be unconstitutional because it violates his right to be sentenced on determinations made by a jury. [23] Section 565.040.2 states that in the event that a death sentence imposed pursuant to chapter 565 is held to be unconstitutional, the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment. Mr. Whitfield accordingly is entitled to be resentenced to a term of life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the governor.