Opinion ID: 397401
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evans and Hood

Text: 108 Both appellants Evans and Hood claim that the evidence was insufficient to convict them on Count Ten. They do not deny that they helped Thevis after his escape from jail and are therefore guilty of harboring a fugitive; rather, they emphatically deny that they knew Thevis was planning to silence Underhill. Without this knowledge, they argue, they cannot be found guilty of the Count Ten conspiracy. 109 We reject appellants' contentions. For a defendant to be convicted of a conspiracy, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed, that the accused knew of it, and that he intended to join or associate himself with the objectives of it. United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379, 1381 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962, 99 S.Ct. 1508, 59 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979). See United States v. Bland, 653 F.2d 989, 996 (5th Cir. 1981). Participation in a conspiracy, however, need not be shown by direct evidence; a jury may infer a common purpose or plan from a development and a collection of circumstances. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). See United States v. Marx, 635 F.2d 436, 439 (5th Cir. 1981) (Defendant's assent to a conspiracy may be inferred from acts which furthered the conspiracy.); United States v. Malatesta, supra, at 1381. 110 The role of an appellate court in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is strictly limited. Whether for conspiracy or other crimes and whether the evidence is circumstantial or direct, see United States v. Fox, 613 F.2d 99, 101 (5th Cir. 1980), the test for reviewing sufficiency is that a jury verdict must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the government, to support it. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 124, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2911, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (quoting Glasser, supra, 315 U.S. at 80, 62 S.Ct. at 469). See Malatesta, supra, at 1381-82. This court has interpreted the substantial evidence test as evidence which would permit a reasonable jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, United States v. Fox, supra, at 101, or, alternatively, evidence such that a reasonable jury could conclude was inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. United States v. Garcia, 655 F.2d 59, 62 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Berry, 644 F.2d 1034, 1039 (5th Cir. 1981). 111 We find that the evidence against Evans and Hood met this standard. The record showed that Evans and Hood not only harbored Thevis but took a number of other actions which, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, indicated they were aware of the conspiratorial purpose to silence Underhill. Both Evans and Hood contacted a cousin about silencers for a .38 pistol and a 30.06 rifle. The day before the murder Evans visited a former associate real estate broker to inquire about the Underhill property, despite earlier having told the associate not to have anything to do with this property because of Underhill's involvement with Thevis. Later that same day Hood ran a license check on the car Underhill was driving. The jury could reasonably conclude that these actions and the other activities of Evans and Hood related in part I of this opinion were inconsistent with any hypothesis of innocence, including the mere harboring of Thevis.