Opinion ID: 1281444
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Contentions

Text: Defendant first contends that the provisions of Penal Code section 270 (hereafter section 270) provide a complete defense to any prosecution based on her treatment of Shauntay's illness with prayer rather than medical care. Section 270 enumerates certain necessities that parents must furnish their children and imposes misdemeanor liability for the failure to do so. As enacted in 1872, the statute provided that Every parent of any child who willfully omits, without lawful excuse, to perform any duty imposed upon him by law, to furnish necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical attendance for such child, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (Pen. Code (1st ed. 1872) ง 270.) The Legislature amended the provision in 1925 by inserting the phrase or other remedial care after medical attendance. (Stats. 1925, ch. 325, ง 1, p. 544.) The statute was again amended in 1976 to specify that treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone constitutes other remedial care. (Stats. 1976, ch. 673, ง 1, p. 1661.) [3]
(1a) As a threshold consideration we must ascertain whether prayer treatment constitutes an acceptable substitute for medical care under the terms of section 270, as defendant contends. If it does not, then a fortiori the statute provides no defense to prosecutions under separate manslaughter and child endangerment provisions for the use of prayer in lieu of medicine. This determination hinges on whether other remedial care, defined in section 270 to include prayer, represents an alternative to medical attendance or rather identifies a distinct and additional necessity that parents must provide their children. In People v. Arnold (1967) 66 Cal.2d 438, 452 [58 Cal. Rptr. 115, 426 P.2d 515], we considered the contention that section 270 allows parents to provide children with an accepted alternative to medical attendance: `other remedial care,' namely enemas, compresses, and prayer. The case involved the appeal of a mother convicted of misdemeanor-manslaughter after unsuccessfully treating her child's illness with prayer. Although reversing on unrelated grounds, the Arnold court summarily rejected in dictum the defendant's interpretation of section 270, reasoning that The phrase `other remedial care' ... does not sanction unorthodox substitutes for `medical attendance'; it indicates one of the multiple necessities which the parent must provide. ( Ibid. ) While the Arnold decision predates the 1976 amendment specifying that other remedial care includes prayer, the court's reasoning remains fatal to a defense based on treatment by spiritual means: regardless of its content, other remedial care constitutes one of the multiple necessities under Arnold, thus operating in addition to rather than in lieu of the responsibility to furnish medical attendance. Because the 1976 amendment did not address the contention [in Arnold ] that other remedial care could not act as a substitute to standard medical treatment, the Court of Appeal in the case at bar concluded that defendant's provision of prayer did not supplant her separate responsibility to furnish medical care under section 270. Well-settled principles guide our review of the statutory analysis set forth in Arnold and embraced by the decision below. (2) `The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.]' In determining such intent, the court turns first to the words of the statute. `[W]here ... the language is clear, there can be no room for interpretation.' ( Regents of University of California v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 601, 607 [224 Cal. Rptr. 631, 715 P.2d 590], citations omitted.) (1b) Section 270 requires that parents furnish necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care.... In our view, this language is sufficiently clear to reject the dictum in Arnold and conclude that the Legislature intended other remedial care to constitute a substitute for medical attendance. We begin by noting the repetition of or to introduce both medical attendance and other remedial care. The first use of the word, preceding medical attendance, denotes that clothing, food, shelter, and medical attendance represent distinct necessities each of which must be provided a child; it would be superfluous if the succeeding phrase, or other remedial care, introduced yet another necessity into the statutory scheme. (3) We have often observed that courts should give significance to every word, phrase, and sentence of an act, and that any construction rendering certain words surplusage should be avoided. ( Palos Verdes Faculty Assn. v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified School Dist. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 650, 659 [147 Cal. Rptr. 359, 580 P.2d 1155].) (1c) To give significance to the initial use of the word or, its second use must be taken to mean that other remedial care operates as an alternative to the immediately preceding phrase rather than as an additional necessity appended to the entire sentence in the manner of an afterthought. The definition of certain pivotal words in the statute bolsters this interpretation. Remedial is defined as affording a remedy: intended for a remedy or for the removal or abatement of a disease or of an evil. (Webster's New Internat. Dict. (3d ed. 1961) p. 1920.) Remedy, in turn, is defined as something that relieves or cures a disease: a medicine or application that serves or helps to terminate disease and restore health. ( Ibid. ) Finally, other is defined as not the same: different. ( Id. at p. 1598.) When these definitions are substituted for the words of the statute, the provision penalizes parents who fail to provide clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or [different] care [intended to relieve or cure a disease]. It thus is apparent that the Legislature intended other remedial care to represent an alternative to medical attendance under the terms of section 270. Any doubt regarding this interpretation cannot survive examination of the legislative history of the 1976 amendment defining other remedial care to include prayer. When the members of the Assembly considered the amendment, contained in Assembly Bill No. 3843, 1975-1976 Regular Session, they had before them the third reading analysis of the legislation prepared by the Assembly Office of Research. The analysis stated: Under this bill, the parents may not be liable for failing to provide for the health of the child because they choose treatment by prayer rather than common medical treatment.... (Assem. Office of Research, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3843 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.).) Similarly, the members of the Senate received an analysis of the legislation prepared by either the Republican or Democratic Caucus. Both caucus analyses stated that the amendment would shield from liability those parents who provide prayer in lieu of medical care for their children. (Sen. Democratic Caucus, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3843 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.); Sen. Republican Caucus, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3843 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.).) While these materials are not dispositive evidence of legislative intent ( Shippen v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1984) 161 Cal. App.3d 1119, 1126 [208 Cal. Rptr. 13]), they are significant insofar as their contents do not contradict the plain language of the statute. ( Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 219 [185 Cal. Rptr. 270, 649 P.2d 912].) We accordingly conclude that section 270 exempts parents who utilize prayer treatment from the statutory requirement to furnish medical care, and overrule People v. Arnold, supra, 66 Cal.2d 438, 452, to the extent it concludes to the contrary.
(4a) We next consider whether section 270 bars the prosecution of defendant under the manslaughter and child endangerment statutes. (งง 192(b), 273a(1).) Again we turn to its plain language for initial guidance. Citing the statutory provision that treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone... shall constitute `other remedial care', as used in this section  (italics added), the Court of Appeal concluded that section 270 expressly precludes any extension of its religious exemption to other statutes. This analysis confuses the statutory limitation on the definition of other remedial care with a limitation on possible defenses implied by that definition. Following the rule of the last antecedent, the phrase as used in this section must modify other remedial care. (See People v. Baker (1968) 69 Cal.2d 44, 46 [69 Cal. Rptr. 595, 442 P.2d 675].) The language therefore either (1) qualifies the five earlier references to other remedial care in the statute, none of which mentions treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone, or (2) distinguishes the definition of the phrase in section 270 from its use in numerous other statutes, most of which make no reference to treatment by spiritual means. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., ง 1209.5; Welf. & Inst. Code, งง 305, subd. (c), 369, subds. (a)-(g), 625, subd. (c), 739, subds. (a)-(g), 11452, subd. (6), 14059; see also Stats. 1987, chs. 1353, 1485.) Neither of these qualifications on the statutory language bears on whether the defense implied by the definition of other remedial care, as used in section 270, should apply to the charges against defendant under sections 192(b) an 273a(1). Defendant conversely asserts that the plain language of section 270 requires the extension of its religious exemption to her prosecution. She focuses on the reference in the statute to the provision of  necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance, or other remedial care.... (Italics added.) Observing that necessary is defined, inter alia, as absolutely required: essential, indispensable (Webster's New Internat. Dict. (3d ed. 1961) p. 1511), she contends that there can be no circumstance involving the illness of a child in which the use of prayer in lieu of medicine is unlawful. It is true that the statute recognizes other remedial care as an acceptable substitute for medical attendance when care is necessary; however, this conclusion does not address the question whether compliance with the terms of section 270 absolves defendant of liability under all other provisions of the Penal Code. (5) When used in a statute words must be construed in context, keeping in mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear.... ( People v. Black (1982) 32 Cal.3d 1, 5 [184 Cal. Rptr. 454, 648 P.2d 104]; People v. Alday (1973) 10 Cal.3d 392, 395 [110 Cal. Rptr. 617, 515 P.2d 1169].) Conduct that is legal in one statutory context thus may be actionable under separate statutes created for different legislative purposes. (4b) It follows that the legality of defendant's conduct under the terms of section 270 cannot be read to create a parallel exemption from prosecution under sections 192(b) and 273a(1) unless the statutes reflect some shared legislative objective. [4] ( Milligan v. City of Laguna Beach (1983) 34 Cal.3d 829, 835 [196 Cal. Rptr. 38, 670 P.2d 1121]; see also People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562, 585 [146 Cal. Rptr. 859, 580 P.2d 274]; Pen. Code, ง 4.) We turn to the purpose of section 270. Rather than punishment of the neglectful parents, the principal statutory objectives [of section 270] are to secure support of the child and to protect the public from the burden of supporting a child who has a parent able to support him. ( People v. Sorensen (1968) 68 Cal.2d 280, 287 [66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 437 P.2d 495, 25 A.L.R.3d 1093].) The provision is designed to supplement civil statutes for effective enforcement of child support obligations. (Note, Criminal Nonsupport and a Proposal for an Effective Felony-Misdemeanor Distinction (1986) 37 Hastings L.J. 1075, 1079; County of Ventura v. George (1983) 149 Cal. App.3d 1012, 1015 [197 Cal. Rptr. 245].) A parent thus may comply with the requirements of the statute simply by providing financial assistance to another individual with physical custody of the child. ( Lyons v. Municipal Court (1977) 75 Cal. App.3d 829, 843 [142 Cal. Rptr. 449].) A parent who is financially incapable of furnishing support, without fault, is likewise excused from compliance. ( People v. Sorensen, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 287.) Indeed, the dispositional section of the statutory scheme explicitly contemplates protection of the fisc by stipulating that If the children are receiving public assistance, all fines, penalties or forfeitures imposed and all funds collected from the defendant [for violations of section 270 or section 270a] shall be paid to the county department. Money so paid shall be applied first to support ... and any balance remaining shall be applied to future needs, or be treated as reimbursement for past support furnished from public assistance funds. (Pen. Code, ง 270d; see People v. Sorensen, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 287.) Disputing this settled understanding of section 270 as a fiscal support provision, defendant asserts that the objective of the statute is to protect children from serious injury rather than to secure certain routine necessities at parental expense. [5] She argues that her interpretation is supported by the notes of the Code Commission of 1870-1872. (6) We will consider the code commissioners' notes when they do not conflict with other persuasive evidence of legislative intent and particularly `where the commission's comment is brief, because in such a situation there is ordinarily strong reason to believe that the legislators' votes were based in large measure upon the explanation of the commission proposing the bill.' ( Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 630 [87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617, 40 A.L.R.3d 420], quoting Van Arsdale v. Hollinger (1968) 68 Cal.2d 245, 249-250 [66 Cal. Rptr. 20, 437 P.2d 508].) The explanatory note for section 270 reads: Consult the Civil Code for the provisions reported defining the duty of parental support. As to the criminality of a willful omission to perform this duty. โ See Reg. vs. Chandler [(1855) 6 Cox Crim. Cas. 519], Reg. vs. Gray [(1857) 7 Cox Crim. Cas. 326], Reg. vs. S---- [(1851) 5 Cox Crim. Cas. 279], Reg. vs. Philpot[t] [(1853) 6 Cox Crim. Cas. 140]. (Code comrs. note, Pen. Code (1st ed. 1872) p. 117.) Because the note says nothing regarding the purpose of the statute, any construction of legislative intent resting on its contents requires the implausible assumption that the legislators sought out and read the four English common law cases cited therein and then conformed their understanding of the statute to the reasoning of those opinions. Yet even if we were to so assume, the cases fail to substantiate defendant's interpretation. She emphasizes that each involved allegations of a child suffering physical injury as a result of a parent's failure to provide basic necessities, and asserts that child endangerment was thus the harm to be averted by imposition of criminal liability. To the contrary, the first case cited in the code commission note held that a mother could not be found guilty of neglecting to feed her child when she had lacked the financial means to do so, even though public assistance had been available to otherwise provide for the starving child. It is admitted in the case that there was no evidence of her having the means; that being admitted, it is no answer to say that she might have procured the means by applying to the relieving officer. ( Reg. v. Chandler, supra, 6 Cox Crim. Cas. at p. 520.) This disposition suggests that failure to provide financial support, rather than injury per se, was the gravamen of the common law crime. Indeed, the continued existence under section 270 of a complete defense for parents who lack without fault the means of support significantly distinguishes the misdemeanor provision from sections 192(b) and 273a(1), which recognize no insolvency exception to felony charges stemming from severe neglect. (4c) We thus reaffirm our determination in Sorensen, supra, 68 Cal.2d 280, that section 270 requires able parents to furnish certain routine necessities for their children so that the public need not unnecessarily assume that obligation. (See also Davis v. Stroud (1942) 52 Cal. App.2d 308, 315 [126 P.2d 409].) While certainly reflecting concern for the general welfare of children, the fiscal objectives of this support provision are so manifestly distinguishable from the specific purposes of the involuntary manslaughter and felony child-endangerment statutes โ designed to protect citizens from immediate and grievous bodily harm โ that section 270 cannot be read to create express exemptions from prosecution under those separate provisions as a matter of parallel construction. The Legislature has determined that the provision of prayer is sufficient to avert misdemeanor liability for neglecting one's financial responsibility to furnish routine child support. This hardly compels the conclusion that in so doing the Legislature intended to create an unqualified defense to felony manslaughter and child endangerment charges for those parents who continue to furnish prayer alone in the rare instance when a gravely ill child lies dying for want of medical attention. [6] In the absence of support from the plain language and purpose of section 270, defendant points to the legislative history of certain amendments to the statute as evidence of an intent to exempt prayer treatment from the reach of sections 192(b) and 273a(1). She specifically contends that the 1925 and 1976 amendments to section 270 were enacted to bar manslaughter prosecutions against Christian Scientists. With respect to the 1925 amendment, which added the phrase or other remedial care to the statute, defendant rests her account of its legislative history on certain descriptive passages contained in the 1920 and 1925 annual reports of the Christian Science Committee on Publication for Southern California. She is not well served by these materials. First, the documents are so removed from the legislative process that any construction of the statute based on their contents would be patently unreliable. Second, even if we were to consider the reports, they provide virtually no support for her contention. [7] Defendant next contends that the 1976 amendment identifying prayer treatment as a form of other remedial care was similarly intended to shield Christian Scientists from manslaughter prosecutions. She observes that the amendment was sponsored by the Church in response to our dictum in Arnold, a case involving a misdemeanor-manslaughter prosecution. While legislative materials demonstrate that the amendment was indeed sponsored by the Church in response to Arnold, there is no evidence that the Legislature intended the modification to affect manslaughter, as opposed to misdemeanor, liability. (See Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3843 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.); Sen. Republican Caucus, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3843, supra. ) The portion of the Arnold opinion cited in the legislative materials as inspiring the amendment focused exclusively on the underlying misdemeanor liability of the parent; none of the documents mentions the relationship between the discussion of section 270 in Arnold and the manslaughter charge elsewhere involved in the case. ( Ibid. ) While the ensuing amendment necessarily precluded misdemeanor-manslaughter prosecutions based on violations of section 270 by eliminating misdemeanor liability under that statute, the Legislature left untouched the possibility of an involuntary manslaughter prosecution based as here on allegations of criminal negligence in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner.... (ง 192 (b).) [8] The historical materials documenting the enactment of Assembly Bill No. 3843 demonstrate that the members of the Legislature were well aware the legislation left open the possibility of manslaughter and child endangerment prosecutions, but simply declined to extend their amendatory efforts beyond section 270. A staff analysis prepared for the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice observed that The bill appears unclear in two respects. First, Section 273a makes it a wobbler (10 year top) for any person to permit a minor under his care or custody to suffer any physical harm or injury. Thus, though the parents may not be liable for failing to provide for the health of the child because they choose treatment by prayer rather than common medical treatment, they would be liable if the child suffered any physiological harm. Second, no exception is made under the manslaughter statutes for parental liability should the child die. If treatment by prayer is to be recognized in part, the parents should not be liable for the results of using a permitted mode of healing. (Assem. Com. on Criminal Justice, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3843 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.).) Despite the opinion offered in the final sentence of the staff analysis, no amendments were made to eliminate potential liability under sections 192(b) and 273a(1). The committee passed the bill on April 29, 1976. When the full Assembly considered the legislation on May 6, 1976, its members had before them the third reading analysis of the bill prepared by the Assembly Office of Research. This analysis incorporated, nearly verbatim, the observations regarding manslaughter and child endangerment liability contained in the earlier analysis prepared for the Criminal Justice Committee. (Assem. Office of Research, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3843, supra. ) Again, no amendments were offered in response to the observations. The bill passed and moved to the Senate. The Senate Committee on Judiciary received a four-page analysis of the legislation. Under the heading Comment and entirely capitalized, unlike any other portion of the document, were the following questions: Do the provisions of this bill conflict with section 273a of the Penal Code which makes it a crime for any person to willfully cause or permit a minor under his care or custody to suffer any physical harm or injury? [ถ] Might a parent be immune from liability for failure to provide for the health of the child because they [ sic ] choose treatment by prayer rather than common medical treatment, but incur liability if the child suffers any harm? (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3843, supra, capitalization omitted.) As in the Assembly, the Senate committee members chose to disregard the issues raised so prominently in their staff analysis and passed the measure to the full Senate without addressing manslaughter and child endangerment liability. No other reference to sections 192(b) and 273a(1) appears in the historical materials documenting the enactment of Assembly Bill No. 3843. The ineluctable conclusion we must draw from these materials is that the members of the Legislature were fully conscious of the potential liability remaining under sections 192(b) and 273a(1) for conduct they had legalized with respect to section 270, but simply chose to leave the matter unaddressed. Needless to say, considered silence is an insufficient basis to infer that the Legislature, by amending a misdemeanor support provision, actually exempted from felony liability all parents who offer prayer alone to a dying child. (7) The failure of the Legislature to change the law in a particular respect when the subject is generally before it and changes in other respects are made is indicative of an intent to leave the law as it stands in the aspects not amended. ( Cole v. Rush (1955) 45 Cal.2d 345, 355 [289 P.2d 450, 54 A.L.R.2d 1137], disapproved on another point in Vesely v. Sager (1971) 5 Cal.3d 153, 167 [95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 486 P.2d 151].) The plain language, purpose, and legislative history of section 270 thus fail to establish a discernible legislative intent to exempt prayer treatment, as a matter of law, from the reach of the manslaughter and felony child-endangerment statutes. (Accord, Note, California's Prayer Healing Dilemma (1987) 14 Hastings Const.L.Q. 395, 401-404.)
(8) Defendant next contends that an intent to exempt prayer treatment from conduct within the reach of sections 192(b) and 273a(1) is implied by a number of other civil and criminal measures relating to the provision of prayer in lieu of medical care to children. She first cites a plethora of statutes exempting prayer practitioners and their facilities from medical licensure requirements [9] or variously accommodating individuals who choose to rely on such treatment for their own care. [10] These accommodative provisions, however, evince no legislative sanction of prayer for the treatment of children in life-threatening circumstances. (9a) More useful are statutes dealing with the definition of neglected or abused children for purposes of the state's child welfare services program (Welf. & Inst. Code, ง 16500 et seq.), the activities of the Office of Child Abuse Prevention ( id. ง 18950 et seq.), and a criminal provision requiring certain individuals to report instances of suspected child abuse (Pen. Code, ง 11165 et seq.). Utilizing substantially similar language, each of these three statutes provides that children receiving treatment by prayer shall not for that reason alone be considered abused or neglected for its purposes. (Welf. & Inst. Code, งง 16509.1 (hereafter W&I section 16509.1) and 18950.5 (hereafter W&I section 18950.5); Pen. Code, ง 11165.2 (hereafter section 11165.2).) Defendant cites these provisions as evidence that the Legislature does not consider prayer treatment to be a threat to the health of children, and thus that the imposition of criminal liability for the results of its use is inconsistent with legislative intent. The Attorney General urges a different construction of the statutory language. He contends that the phrase for that reason alone  (italics added) denotes that a child receiving prayer treatment can still fall within the reach of the statutory definitions if the provision of such treatment, coupled with a grave medical condition, combine to pose a serious threat to the physical well-being of the child. [11] While defendant contends the phrase merely indicates that a child receiving prayer treatment can come within the purview of the statutes for other reasons, her construction renders the use of the word alone surplusage and thus must be rejected under the rule that `[e]very word, phrase and provision employed in a statute is intended to have meaning and to perform a useful function....' ( White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 681 [183 Cal. Rptr. 520, 646 P.2d 191], quoting Clements v. T.R. Bechtel Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 227, 233 [273 P.2d 5].) The code section immediately preceding W&I section 16509.1 in the child welfare services chapter strongly corroborates the interpretation offered by the Attorney General. That section reads: Cultural and religious child-rearing practices and beliefs which differ from general community standards shall not in themselves create a need for child welfare services unless the practices present a specific danger to the physical or emotional safety of the child. (Welf. & Inst. Code, ง 16509 (hereafter W&I section 16509).) (10) It is fundamental that the language of a particular code section must be construed in light of and with reference to the language of other sections accompanying it and related to it with a view to harmonizing the several provisions and giving effect to all of them. ( Johnson v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal. App.3d 573, 582 [205 Cal. Rptr. 605].) The provision of prayer treatment in lieu of medical care to a gravely ill child doubtless constitutes a religious child-rearing practice which differ[s] from general community standards.... Nor is there any question that W&I sections 16509 and 16509.1 are related and intended to express a unified statutory objective. To harmonize their provisions accordingly, the use of the word alone in W&I section 16509.1 must be construed to signify that treatment by prayer will not constitute neglect for purposes of the child welfare services chapter except in those instances when such treatment, coupled with a sufficiently grave health condition, presents a specific danger to the physical ... safety of the child. [12] While section 11165.2 and W&I section 18950.5 lack similar companion provisions, there are persuasive reasons why we should interpret them in the same manner. First, each employs the words for that reason alone in a context identical to the use of the phrase in W&I section 16509.1. Identical language appearing in separate provisions dealing with the same subject matter should be accorded the same interpretation. ( Ford Dealers Assn. v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1982) 32 Cal.3d 347, 359 [185 Cal. Rptr. 453, 650 P.2d 328].) Because each statute deals with the relationship of prayer treatment to the definition of child neglect or abuse, we are obliged to construe their shared language in a consistent fashion. ( Dieckmann v. Superior Court (1985) 175 Cal. App.3d 345, 356 [220 Cal. Rptr. 602].) Second, both section 11165.2 and W&I section 18950.5 explicitly refer to the language of W&I section 16509.1 to define the conduct excepted from their definitions of neglect and abuse. [13] This fact further suggests that the Legislature intended the several statutes to share a common meaning. Finally, the most telling indication that the statutes should be construed together in the manner urged by the Attorney General is their mutual interrelation with the child dependency provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 (hereafter W&I section 300). Furnishing the state with its most powerful tool to intercede on behalf of children threatened at the hands of their parents, W&I section 300 delineates the circumstances under which a child can be removed from parental custody and declared a dependent of the court. Section 11165.2 and W&I sections 16509.1 and 18950.5 are each components of separate acts connected in some significant fashion to the child dependency proceedings outlined in W&I section 300. In sum, the three acts (1) require that suspected instances of child abuse or neglect be reported to the agency responsible for initiating child dependency proceedings under W&I section 300 (Pen. Code, ง 11166, subds. (a), (b), & (g)); (2) provide services to neglected or abused children identified through dependency proceedings (Welf. & Inst. Code, งง 16506, subd. (a), 16507, 16508, subd. (a)); and (3) fund child-abuse prevention projects in cooperation with local welfare agencies responsible for supervising dependency proceedings (Welf. & Inst. Code, ง 18964, subd. (f)(3)). This intimate interrelation of statutory objectives, revolving around the identification and enforcement provisions of W&I section 300, counsels us to interpret the language of the related acts with reference to the provisions of the dependency statute to achieve a uniform and consistent legislative purpose. ( Isobe v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Bd. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 584, 591 [116 Cal. Rptr. 376, 526 P.2d 528]; People v. Caudillo, supra, 21 Cal.3d 562, 585.) On September 30, 1987, the Governor signed into law Senate Bill No. 243, 1987-1988 Regular Session, which revised W&I section 300 in its entirety. (Stats. 1987, ch. 1485, ง 4 [No. 5 Deering's Adv. Legis. Service, pp. 5779-5780].) Although the legislation will not take effect until January 1, 1989, its provisions dealing with the relationship of prayer treatment to dependency proceedings are critically significant to our interpretive task insofar as they represent the Legislature's most recent and detailed articulation of the protection to be assured seriously ill children receiving such care. Newly amended W&I section 300 provides in pertinent part: Any minor who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the court.... [ถ] (b) The minor has suffered, or there is substantial risk that the minor will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, ... by the willful or negligent failure of the parent ... to provide the minor with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment.... Whenever it is alleged that a minor comes within the jurisdiction of the court on the basis of the parent's ... willful failure to provide adequate medical treatment or specific decision to provide spiritual treatment through prayer, the court shall give deference to the parent's ... medical treatment, nontreatment, or spiritual treatment through prayer alone in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination by an accredited practitioner thereof and shall not assume jurisdiction unless necessary to protect the minor from suffering serious physical harm or illness.  (Italics added.) (9b) Thus in any circumstance involving the threat of serious physical harm or illness, the Legislature has empowered the juvenile court to intercede and assume custody for the express purpose of assuring medical care for a child whose parent is furnishing spiritual treatment by prayer alone. The expression of legislative intent is clear: when a child's health is seriously jeopardized, the right of a parent to rely exclusively on prayer must yield. This intent is implicit in the enumeration of necessities a parent must furnish to avert a dependency proceeding under W&I section 300; conspicuously absent from the list is any substitute for adequate medical treatment. It follows that the only tenable construction of the related provisions defining the relationship of prayer treatment to child neglect or abuse is the analysis offered by the Attorney General. While dependency proceedings are civil rather than criminal, their relevance to our inquiry is plain. Parents possess a profound interest in the custody of their children. ( In re Carmaleta B. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 482, 489 [146 Cal. Rptr. 623, 579 P.2d 514]; Holt v. Superior Court (1960) 186 Cal. App.2d 524, 526-527 [9 Cal. Rptr. 353].) Custody embraces the sum of parental rights with respect to the rearing of a child, including its care. It includes ... the right to direct his activities and make decisions regarding his care and control, education, health, and religion. ( Burge v. City & County of San Francisco (1953) 41 Cal.2d 608, 617 [262 P.2d 6].) The United States Supreme Court has termed this constellation of parental interests essential ( Meyers v. Nebraska (1923) 262 U.S. 390, 399 [67 L.Ed. 1042, 1045, 43 S.Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446]), among the basic civil rights of man ( Skinner v. Oklahoma (1942) 316 U.S. 535, 541 [86 L.Ed. 1655, 1660, 62 S.Ct. 1110]), and [r]ights far more precious ... than property rights ( May v. Anderson (1953) 345 U.S. 528, 533 [97 L.Ed. 1221, 1226, 73 S.Ct. 840]). Consistent with the gravity of the prerogative at stake, parents involved in W&I section 300 proceedings are assured notice and a due process hearing ( In re Robert P. (1976) 61 Cal. App.3d 310, 318 [132 Cal. Rptr. 5]) while those who are indigent receive appointed counsel ( In re Christina H. (1986) 182 Cal. App.3d 47, 49 [227 Cal. Rptr. 41]; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 1334(c), 1363(c)). The Legislature's willingness to intrude on a parental interest of such magnitude to assure that children receiving prayer treatment are spared serious physical harm certainly evinces no contrary intent with respect to the application of the penal laws, which in significant respects constitute a less intrusive method of advancing the state's paramount interest in the protection of its children. Defendant's argument by analogy to civil neglect and dependency provisions therefore corroborates rather than refutes our previous determination that the Legislature has created no exemption under sections 192(b) and 273a(1) for parents who are charged with having killed or endangered the lives of their seriously ill children by providing prayer alone in lieu of medical care. The legislative design appears consistent: prayer treatment will be accommodated as an acceptable means of attending to the needs of a child only insofar as serious physical harm or illness is not at risk. When a child's life is placed in danger, we discern no intent to shield parents from the chastening prospect of felony liability.
Taking a wholly different tack, defendant next contends that she cannot be convicted under either the manslaughter or felony child-endangerment statutes regardless of the availability of a religious exemption. She rests this contention on a claim that the People will be unable to prove the degree of culpability necessary to convict her under either provision, both of which require criminal negligence in the commission of an offending act. ( People v. Penny (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 879 [285 P.2d 926]; People v. Peabody (1975) 46 Cal. App.3d 43, 47 [119 Cal. Rptr. 780].) (11) We have defined criminal negligence as `aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless, that is, the conduct of the accused must be such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent or careful man under the same circumstances as to be incompatible with a proper regard for human life, or, in other words, a disregard of human life or an indifference to consequences.... [Such negligence] is ordinarily to be determined pursuant to the general principles of negligence, the fundamental of which is knowledge, actual or imputed, that the act of the slayer tended to endanger life.' ( People v. Penny, supra, 44 Cal.2d at pp. 879-880.) Defendant makes two arguments for the claim that her conduct cannot, as a matter of law, constitute such negligence. She first contends that the defenses recognized at English common law are available to her under Civil Code section 22.2, which reads: The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this State, is the rule of decision in all the courts of this State. She cites two English cases from the 19th century in support of the proposition that the common law recognized treatment by prayer in lieu of medicine as legally insufficient to constitute criminal negligence. [14] (12) While we note that common law defenses, with limited exceptions, are unavailable in California ( Keeler v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 631-632), we need look no further than the cases themselves to dispose of defendant's contention. The opinion of the court in Regina v. Wagstaffe (Cen.Crim.Ct. 1868) 10 Cox. Crim. Cas. 530, consists of a vaguely worded jury charge. The court instructed the jury that criminal negligence was a very wide question.... At different times people had come to different conclusions as to what might be done with a sick person.... [A] man might be convicted of manslaughter because he lived in a place where all the community was of a contrary opinion, and in another he might be acquitted because they were all of his opinion.... ( Id. at p. 532.) The court asked rhetorically whether it was intended by God Almighty that persons should content themselves by praying for His assistance, without helping themselves, or resorting to such means as were within their reach for that purpose? ( ibid. ), and concluded with the observation that the defendants appeared sincere and affectionate. Although the defendants were subsequently acquitted, the fact that the jury itself resolved the question of criminal negligence negates the claim that the court in Wagstaffe recognized a legal defense to the charge. Furthermore, its jury instructions merely restated the principle that criminal negligence is a question of fact to be determined in light of contemporary community standards, which at the time made the particular question a close one. The second case cited by defendant makes this point quite clearly. In Regina v. Hines (1874) 80 Cent. Crim. Ct. 309, the court dismissed an indictment for manslaughter against a parent who had exclusively prayed for an ill child. [15] Although the court ruled that the conduct was not criminally negligent as a matter of law, to state the holding is to refute its application 114 years later: the court considered and rejected the proposition that a parent who treated a child by spiritual care instead of calling in a doctor to apply blisters, leeches, and calomel, was guilty of criminal negligence. ( Id. at p. 312.) Were blisters, leeches and calomel the medical alternative to prayer today, quite likely defendant's reliance on Hines would more fully resonate with this court. Medical science has advanced dramatically, however, and we may fairly presume that the community standard for criminal negligence has changed accordingly. Nineteenth-century English common law thus fails to establish a defense, as a matter of law, to charges arising today for criminal negligence in the death of a child treated by prayer alone. [16] (13) Defendant next contends that her actions are legally insufficient to constitute criminal negligence under the definition of that conduct established in the decisions of this court. Emphasizing her sincere concern and good faith in treating Shauntay with prayer, she claims that her conduct is incompatible with the required degree of culpability. Defendant does not dispute, however, that criminal negligence must be evaluated objectively. ( People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 296-297 [17 Cal. Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279]; People v. Penny, supra, 44 Cal.2d 861, 880.) The question is whether a reasonable person in defendant's position would have been aware of the risk involved.... ( People v. Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 296.) If so, defendant is presumed to have had such an awareness. ( Ibid. ) The significance of this principle was well illustrated in People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d 824 [201 Cal. Rptr. 319, 678 P.2d 894], a case involving a self-styled `healer' who provided `deep' abdominal massages to a leukemic who thereafter died of a massive abdominal hemorrhage. ( Id. at pp. 826, 828.) We observed that There is no allegation made, nor was there any evidence adduced at trial, that [the defendant] at any time harbored any intent even to harm [the victim] in the slightest fashion. ( Id. at p. 834.) Indeed, nowhere is it claimed that defendant attempted to perform any action with respect to [the victim] other than to heal him.... ( Id. at p. 833.) Nonetheless, we determined that the defendant could be charged with criminally negligent involuntary manslaughter. ( Id. at p. 836.) The relevant inquiry, then, turns not on defendant's subjective intent to heal her daughter but on the objective reasonableness of her course of conduct. [17] In view of this standard, we must reject defendant's assertion that no reasonable jury could characterize her conduct as criminally negligent for purposes of sections 192(b) and 273a(1). As the court in People v. Atkins (1975) 53 Cal. App.3d 348 [125 Cal. Rptr. 855], observed in affirming the involuntary manslaughter and felony child-endangerment conviction of a parent whose child died for want of medical care, criminal negligence could have been found to have consisted of the [mother's] failure to seek prompt medical attention for [her son], rather than waiting several days. There is evidence she knew, or should have known, that [her son] was seriously injured.... Viewing [the evidence] in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there is substantial evidence here of involuntary manslaughter based on the lack of due caution and circumspection in omitting to take the child to a doctor. ( Id. at p. 360.) When divorced of her subjective intent, the alleged conduct of defendant here is essentially indistinguishable. Defendant's arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. She first asserts that the various statutory exemptions enacted for Christian Scientists demonstrate a legislative acceptance of the reasonableness of their spiritual care that is incompatible with a finding of gross, culpable, or reckless negligence. As discussed at length above, however, California's statutory scheme reflects not an endorsement of the efficacy or reasonableness of prayer treatment for children battling life-threatening diseases but rather a willingness to accommodate religious practice when children do not face serious physical harm. Indeed, the relevant statute suggest that prayer treatment for gravely ill children is sufficiently unreasonable to justify the state in taking the draconian step of depriving parents of their rights of custody. ( Ante, at pp. 132-134.) The two cases cited by defendant in support of her claim are clearly distinguishable. In People v. Rodriguez (1960) 186 Cal. App.2d 433 [8 Cal. Rptr. 863], the court reversed the involuntary manslaughter conviction of a mother who had left her children alone at home where one died in a fire. The court ruled that the mother's conduct did not reflect a course of conduct sufficiently reckless to justify a finding of criminal negligence. ( Id. at pp. 440-441.) In terms of unreasonableness, however, the failure of defendant to seek medical attention for a child who sickened and died over a 17-day period is plainly more egregious than the decision of Mrs. Rodriguez to leave her children alone at home for an afternoon. In Somers v. Superior Court (1973) 32 Cal. App.3d 961 [108 Cal. Rptr. 630], the court granted a writ of prohibition barring the manslaughter prosecution of a police officer who had shot a fleeing youth whom the officer mistook for a felon. The court observed that the situation was tense and menacing because of earlier reports of robberies in the vicinity, that the victim matched the description of a suspect and appeared to be carrying a shotgun, and that the victim continued to flee after the officer had shouted Stop, police. ( Id. at pp. 965, 968-970.) Again, the objective unreasonableness of defendant's course of conduct, compared with the officer's actions in Somers, is of an evidently greater magnitude. In sum, we reject the proposition that the provision of prayer alone to a seriously ill child cannot constitute criminal negligence as a matter of law. Whether this defendant's particular conduct was sufficiently culpable to justify conviction of involuntary manslaughter and felony child endangerment remains a question in the exclusive province of the jury.