Opinion ID: 2978826
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Late Endorsement of a State Witness

Text: Warlick argues that his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s late endorsement 1 Because we dispose of these three claims on other grounds, we do not consider the State’s waiver argument. 14 of State witness Don Dent (“Dent”)—the evidence technician that conducted the gunshot residue test on Warlick. Because the Michigan Court of Appeals only considered the merits of this claim on state law grounds, this court considers this issue de novo. Danner v. Motley, 448 F.3d 372, 376 (6th Cir. 2006). Dent was left off of the State’s original witness list—apparently inadvertently—but the judge nevertheless allowed him to testify at trial. Warlick contends that this decision violated his federal due process rights. The district court refused to consider this claim because it believed that Warlick had failed to put the Michigan courts on notice that a federal due process claim was being raised. Even if the district court erred in dismissing Warlick’s claim as unexhausted, his claim still fails on the merits. A decision regarding the endorsement of a witness generally constitutes a state law matter within the trial court's discretion, and Warlick has not presented a legitimate reason for disturbing the trial judge’s ruling, which has already been deemed proper under Michigan state law. See Warlick, 2004 WL 1699012, at  (Mich. Ct. App. Jul. 29, 2004); see also Daniels v. Romanowski, No. 07-CV-10462, 2009 WL 236543, at  (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2009). It is well-settled that there is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977). Thus, for an evidentiary ruling to violate due process and warrant habeas relief, it must be “so egregious that it results in a denial of fundamental fairness.” Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 512 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Coleman v. Mitchell, 244 F.3d 533, 542 (6th Cir. 2001), and Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 552 (6th Cir. 2000)). The trial court’s endorsement of Dent falls far below this high threshold, especially because Warlick should have reasonably anticipated that someone would present testimony about administering the gunshot residue test. Additionally, Warlick was not prejudiced by the decision to 15 allow Dent to testify because he had ample opportunity to cross-examine Dent and explain his testimony. See Mayes v. Gibson, 210 F.3d 1284, 1292 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the late endorsement of a prosecution witness did not prejudice the defendant because defense counsel conducted an adequate cross-examination and had a meaningful opportunity to explain the evidence offered).