Opinion ID: 147677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ground Three: State Strategy of Using Race to Inflame the Jury

Text: Jones argues that the lower courts have not, in [his] estimation, persuasively addressed [his] contention that the State utilized an explicit strategy of seeking to inflame the jury for the purpose of obtaining the death recommendation. Jones cites the testimony regarding his spider web tattoo and Detective Parker's testimony that Jones used a racial slur in a post-arrest interview. He does not, however, cite any legal authority in support of this argument. Jones's application for a certificate of appealability is unclear, but we construe this argument as referring to the claim in his petition that the state trial court should have excluded all evidence of his alleged racial bias. Jones does not explain how the introduction of this evidence violated his constitutional rights. No reasonable jurist could debate the decision of the district court to deny relief on this ground. In the district court, Jones argued that the United States Supreme Court has held that risk of racial prejudice affecting the outcome of a criminal justice process is unacceptable and must be guarded against and cited two decisions in support of that general proposition. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986). These authorities do not even hint that the decision of the Florida Supreme Court to deny Jones relief on this ground was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.