Opinion ID: 2371995
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Back-Pay/Front-Pay

Text: Ottenberg's argues that Robinson's rejection of its unconditional offer of the position of Regional Manager eliminates its liability for front-pay and back-pay from the date of his refusal. Robinson responds that there is evidence that his rejection of the job offer was reasonable, and therefore, Ottenberg's remains liable for back-pay and front-pay damages. The Supreme Court has held that an employer charged with unlawful discrimination under Title VII can toll the accrual of back-pay liability by unconditionally offering the claimant the job that he had been denied. Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 458 U.S. 219, 231-32, 102 S.Ct. 3057, 73 L.Ed.2d 721 (1982). The rule is grounded in ancient law principles and the claimant's statutory obligation to minimize damages under Title VII, § 706(g). Id. at 231, 102 S.Ct. 3057 (citations omitted). This rule governs the availability of front-pay as well as back-pay. [19] See Dominic v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. 822 F.2d 1249, 1258 (2d Cir.1987) (noting that proof of a discrimination claimant's failure to mitigate damages would have foreclosed any front-pay award and cut off back-pay as of the time of failure to mitigate) (citing Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 233-34, 102 S.Ct. 3057). There are exceptions to the rule where special circumstances justify rejection of the offer of employment. Ford Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 238-39 & n. 27, 102 S.Ct. 3057; Lewis v. Federal Prison Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir.1992) (noting that although the law encourages claimants to accept offers of reinstatement, it does not, in every circumstance, require them to do so). Only the claimant's unreasonable rejection of an unconditional offer of the job will cut off back-pay and front-pay liability. Smith v. World Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1456, 1463-64 (8th Cir.1994) (holding that reasonable rejection of an employment offer is a special circumstance under the Ford rule that permits recovery of back-pay damages); Toledo v. Nobel-Sysco, Inc., 892 F.2d 1481, 1493 (10th Cir.1989) (noting that rejection of reinstatement offer, if reasonable under the circumstances, does not cut off back-pay liability). Whether rejection of the job offer is reasonable depends upon the circumstances surrounding the offer and its rejection. Toledo, 892 F.2d at 1493. (holding that offer of reinstatement was reasonably rejected where conditioned on claimant dismissing discrimination claim and passing polygraph and physical examinations); Giandonato v. Sybron Corp., 804 F.2d 120, 124-25 (10th Cir.1986) (holding that circumstances surrounding claimant's rejection of reinstatement offer eliminated any claim for back-pay). The reasonableness of the claimant's decision to reject the offer is determined applying an objective standard, i.e., whether a reasonable person, in similar circumstances, would have rejected the offer. Morris v. American Nat'l Can Corp., 952 F.2d 200, 203 (8th Cir.1991) (citing Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 808 (8th Cir.1982)). The burden is on the employer to prove that the claimant failed to mitigate damages, i.e., that rejection of its unconditional job offer was objectively unreasonable. Smith, supra, 38 F.3d at 1465 (citing Muldrew v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 728 F.2d 989, 992 (8th Cir.1984)) (other citation omitted) (holding that while a claimant has a duty to mitigate damages, employer has the burden of proving failure to mitigate). When there are exceptional circumstances, the trier of fact, in its discretion, can give weight to them in determining whether back-pay damages accrued following rejection of an unconditional offer of the job the claimant was denied wrongfully. Ford Motor Co., supra, 458 U.S. at 238 n. 27, 102 S.Ct. 3057. In Ford, as an example of such a special circumstance, the Supreme Court cited the high cost of relocation for a replacement job as one the court might consider in determining whether back-pay damages should be awarded in spite of the claimant's rejection of the job. Id. Accepting the job may not be practicable where there is extreme hostility between the employer and the claimant. Lewis, supra, 953 F.2d at 1280-81 (citations omitted) (holding that offer of reinstatement was not viable where medical evidence showed that claimant's return to the job would cause the same symptoms that disabled him due to the discrimination he had endured); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 728-29 (2d Cir.1984) (holding that reinstatement offer would not foreclose front-pay award where employer-employee relationship was irreparably damaged by the lawsuit). While pervasive and intense hostility might be sufficient to constitute a special circumstance justifying rejection of the unconditional job offer, Lewis, 953 F.2d at 1280, the mere recitation of hostility . . . is insufficient, because `antagonism between parties occurs as the natural bi-product [sic] of any litigation.' Saladin v. Turner, 936 F.Supp. 1571, 1582 (N.D.Okla.1996) (quoting Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 648 F.2d 1129, 1139 (8th Cir.1981)). If reinstatement were foreclosed because of such litigation hostility, it would frustrate the make-whole purpose of discrimination laws. See Taylor, 648 F.2d at 1138-39. To avoid operation of the rule, it is also insufficient for the claimant to cite personal reasons for rejecting the offer. Albert v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 356 F.3d 1242, 1253 (10th Cir.2004); Giandonato, supra, 804 F.2d 120 at 124 (discrimination victim's refusal of offer of reinstatement because of his wife's illness, among other reasons, was insufficient to allow back-pay claim). Applying these general principles, we consider whether Robinson was justified in rejecting the employer's offer of employment. The Commission concluded that Robinson was justified in rejecting the job offer because of his concerns about returning to work with individuals who had continually discriminated against him. It considered that although Robinson had given examples of how he was mistreated at the meeting with Lee Ottenberg and Walker when they made him the offer, neither had attempted to alleviate his fears. [20] Therefore, the Commission determined that Robinson's back-pay award should not be tolled nor the award of front-pay affected. Ottenberg's argues that rejection of the employment offer was unreasonable under any objective standard, and therefore both back-pay and front-pay damages should be cut off as of the date that Robinson rejected the job offer. Under the objective standard, the question is whether a reasonable person in Robinson's position would have refused the job offer. Morris, supra, 952 F.2d at 203. Consideration is given to the terms of the offer and the reason for the former employer's refusal. Claiborne v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 583 F.2d 143, 153 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934, 99 S.Ct. 2869, 61 L.Ed.2d 303 (1979). Here, the employer made the unconditional job offer almost immediately after denying Robinson the position and being informed that Robinson attributed the action to discrimination. The promptness of the unconditional offer is one factor tending to support the good faith of the employer's attempt to remedy the situation. Given that the offer came before litigation, hostilities engendered by litigation would not be a factor here. Cf. Whittlesey, supra, 742 F.2d at 728-29 (recognizing that deterioration of parties' relationship caused by litigation might make reinstatement unrealistic). That Robinson simply doubted that his employer would treat him fairly in the future is not sufficient in itself to avoid Ford's mitigation rule. The mere recitation of hostility . . . is insufficient because `[a]ntagonism between parties occurs as a natural bi-product of any litigation.' Saladin, supra, 936 F.Supp. at 1582 (quoting Taylor, supra, 648 F.2d at 1139); cf. Morris, supra, 952 F.2d at 203 (upholding tolling of back-pay although the complainant, who had been subjected to sexually hostile work environment, did not believe the employer's assurances that it would protect her in the future). Robinson argues that he made an effort to discuss his apprehension of future discrimination if he accepted the offer, but the employer did not adequately reassure him. He contends, therefore, that his refusal of the employment offer was reasonable, applying the reasoning of Saladin, supra . [21] Robinson overstates his own efforts and understates the employer's assurances, both as determined by the Commission. While Robinson told the employer that he feared retaliation if he returned to work, he did not elaborate on his concerns. Aside from the complaint related to his termination, which the employer was seeking to remedy, Robinson made no complaints that he had been subjected to other acts of discrimination or had some other reason for his apprehension. Under the circumstances, the employer's response that the grievance process would be available to address any such issues was reasonable. It is undisputed that Robinson had received favorable evaluations, promotions and pay increases during his employment with the company. Under the totality of the circumstances, a finding that Robinson's rejection was objectively reasonable is not supported by the evidence. Therefore, we hold that Robinson's rejection of the employer's unconditional offer of the position of Regional Manager eliminated any claim for back-pay or front-pay on or after March 22, 1995, the date he rejected the employer's offer. [22]