Opinion ID: 4553695
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Consequences for Good-Faith Objectors

Text: Ours is an adversary system of justice. When defendants and class counsel seek to settle a class action, “the clash of the adversaries” on which our system depends is lost. Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 720 (7th Cir. 2014). The district judge must act as “a ﬁduciary of the class” in deciding whether to approve a proposed settlement. E.g., Pearson I, 772 F.3d at 780. Yet even the most faithful exercise of this duty cannot in itself make up for the absence of adversary presentation. The judge must still rely on the now-allied adversaries “to generate the information that the judge needs to decide the case” faith- fully. Eubank, 753 F.3d at 720. Genuine adversary presentation is supplied, if at all, only by objecting class members. See id.; see also Devlin, 536 U.S. at 9 (“once the named parties reach a settlement that is approved over petitioner’s objections, petitioner’s interests by deﬁnition diverge from those of the class representative”). It is therefore critical that class members not be deterred from raising reasonable and good-faith objections to a class settlement. See, e.g., Pearson I. We do not expect reasonable and good-faith objections to be deterred or chilled by our holding here, particularly in light of the 2018 amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 addressing the problem of objector side deals. Rule 23(e)(5)(A) now requires that an objection “state whether it applies only to the objector, to a speciﬁc subset of the class, or to the entire class, and also state with speciﬁcity the grounds for the objection.” New Rule 23(e)(5)(B)(ii) requires district court approval speciﬁcally for “forgoing, dismissing, or abandoning an appeal” of denial in exchange for “payment or other consideration.” If the appeal has already been docketed, No. 19-3095 21 under new Rule 23(e)(5)(C) the district court is to issue an indicative ruling under Rule 62.1. Good-faith objectors should be able to say speciﬁcally why the class or a part of it has been deprived of the fair, reasonable, and adequate settlement to which it is entitled. By deﬁnition, such objectors expect to be able to improve the class’s position, whether by compromise or favorable judgment, for which equitable compensation is available. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(5)(B) advisory committee’s note (“Good-faith objections can assist the court . . . . It is legitimate for an objector to seek payment for providing such assistance under Rule 23(h).”). We do not expect any good-faith objector will fail to bring her objection because she is prohibited from selling out the class in exchange for private payment, where she may choose instead not to sell out the class and still receive payment if she brings the class a real beneﬁt. And we trust no district court will be misled by the facile expedient of dressing a class-based objection in individual clothing to avoid scrutiny under Young and our decision here.