Opinion ID: 164103
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Mental Impairment and Listing 12.07

Text: Plaintiff was diagnosed by Dr. Royal as suffering from a chronic pain disorder. 3 See Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 251, 310. Plaintiff claims the ALJ erred at step two of the evaluation process by failing to find that her chronic pain disorder is a separate severe mental impairment. Plaintiff further claims the ALJ erred at step three by failing to conduct a proper step-three analysis and by failing to find that her chronic pain disorder meets or equals the 3 Dr. Royal diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from chronic pain “syndrome,” but we use the term “disorder” so as to be consistent with the terminology used in the mental disorder listings contained in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1, § 12.00. -12- mental disorder listing for Somatoform Disorders, listing 12.07. 4 See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.07 (2000). The ALJ’s findings on both of these points are supported by substantial evidence and therefore must be affirmed. See O’Dell , 44 F.3d at 858. First, contrary to plaintiff’s claims, the ALJ did consider her allegations of severe and disabling pain at steps two, four, and five of the evaluation process, and again as part of his analysis of the physical injuries to plaintiff’s back and neck. See Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 18. As a result, unless plaintiff can establish that the ALJ erred at step three by failing to find that she meets or equals the mental disorder listing for Somatoform Disorders, the ALJ’s failure to consider her chronic pain disorder as a separate mental impairment is not reversible error. This court must be able to conduct meaningful judicial review of an ALJ’s step-three determination, and ALJs are therefore required at step three to make 4 A Somatoform Disorder exists when there are “[p]hysical symptoms for which there are no demonstrable organic findings or known physiological mechanisms.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.07 (2000). The disorder causes a claimant to exaggerate her physical problems in her mind beyond what the medical data indicate. See Easter v. Bowen , 867 F.2d 1128, 1130 (8th Cir. 1989). There is also a subgroup disorder called Somatoform Pain Disorder, which is indicated where: (1) pain is the predominate complaint; (2) the pain causes clinically significant impairment; (3) psychological factors have an important role in triggering the pain; (4) the symptom or deficit is not intentionally produced or feigned; and (5) the pain is not better accounted for by a mood, anxiety, or psychotic disorder. See American Psychiatric Assoc.: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR), at 485, 503 (4th ed. 2000). -13- specific findings and set out their reasons for accepting or rejecting evidence. See Clifton v. Chater , 79 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 1996). Although the ALJ did not specifically refer to listing 12.07 in his decision, we nonetheless conclude that the ALJ’s decision contains sufficient findings regarding plaintiff’s mental status to constitute a proper step-three analysis. As noted above, Dr. Goodman examined plaintiff in December 1999. In his consultative report, Dr. Goodman stated that “[d]iagnostically, her symptoms would certainly fit the category of a somatozation disorder although in the alternative she has been diagnosed as having ‘chronic pain syndrome’ with myofacial pain and discogenic disease.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 243. As part of his “final psychiatric diagnosis,” Dr. Goodman then concluded that “[o]ne must consider somatoform disorder, somatozation type,” but he did not make an affirmative diagnosis. Id. In fact, Dr. Goodman did not render any opinion as to whether plaintiff’s pain disorder was the result of a psychiatric disorder or her underlying physical ailments, or a combination of both. 5 Instead, the only firm opinion set forth in his report is his conclusion that plaintiff had “no independent psychiatric difficulty that would interfere with her ability to work.” Id. 5 Similarly, in the Mental Status Form he completed in September 1999, Dr. Dubriwny diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from a “pain [disorder] associated [with] psychological and organic factors,” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 190, but he did not give an opinion as to whether plaintiff was suffering from a Somatoform Disorder. -14- In his decision, the ALJ specifically noted Dr. Goodman’s opinion that plaintiff did not suffer from a psychiatric disorder that would interfere with her ability to work. Id. at 17-18, 19. And, while the ALJ did not specifically cite listing 12.07, the ALJ did evaluate plaintiff’s mental status based on the subsection “B” criteria in listing 12.07, and he specifically found that plaintiff did not demonstrate the type of limitations with respect to her social functioning and daily living activities that are necessary to satisfy the listing. Id. at 19-20. The ALJ’s findings regarding the subsection “B” criteria are supported by substantial evidence in the record. We therefore conclude that the ALJ did not commit reversible error at step three of the evaluation process.