Opinion ID: 2617561
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post Weinberg I Counterclaims

Text: The Mauchs first contend that the circuit court erred when it granted Weinberg's motions for summary judgment regarding the Mauchs' counterclaims. The Mauchs argue that the circuit court acted contrary to the law of the case when it granted Weinberg's motions for summary judgment as to the counterclaims in defiance of this court's mandate requiring a trial on all the claims.
The doctrine of the law of the case states that a determination of a question of law made by an appellate court in the course of an action becomes the law of the case and may not be disputed by a reopening of the question at a later stage of the litigation. Glover v. L.K. Fong, 42 Haw. 560, 578 (1958); Amfac v. Waikiki Beachcomber Inv. Co., 74 Haw. 85, 120-121, 839 P.2d 10, 29, reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 843 P.2d 144 (1992). This doctrine applies to issues that have been decided either expressly or by necessary implication. Doe v. New York City Dep't. of Social Servs., 709 F.2d 782 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864, 104 S.Ct. 195, 78 L.Ed.2d 171 (1983). Further, the law of the case concept applies to single proceedings, and operates to foreclose reexamination of decided issues either on remand or on a subsequent appeal ... [but] does not encompass issues presented for decision but left unanswered by the appellate court. Pegues v. Morehouse Parish School Bd., 706 F.2d 735, 736 (5th Cir.1983). In Weinberg I, this court found that the issue of the validity of the assignment of the Blackwells' equitable interest in Lot 1 was still unsettled. Summary adjudication was therefore improper. In Weinberg II, we focused on the same issue, the nature and validity of the assignment of the Blackwells' equitable interest in Lot 1, again concluded that summary disposition of the action was in error, and vacate[d] the judgments. The Mauchs argue that this court went beyond the purview of Weinberg I by using the word judgments. According to the Mauchs, this court's use of the plural of judgment indicated our intent to include the counterclaims in our order for trial. [6] This court, however, addressed only the issue of the Mauchs' equitable interest in Lot 1 in both Weinberg I and Weinberg II. The Mauchs' additional counterclaims were not addressed in Weinberg II. The only clear mandate in Weinberg II was that the subject property could not be foreclosed upon without an equity trial to determine the nature and validity of the assignment of the Blackwells' equitable interest in Lot 1 and the equities involved. Weinberg II, at 2. The doctrine of the law of the case is inapplicable to the present case. This court in Weinberg II did not make any legal determinations as to the counterclaims but left the issues presented by the counterclaims unanswered. Accordingly, the circuit court had the authority to rule upon these issues by means of a summary disposition.
We review the granting of summary judgment by the following standard: Summary judgment is proper where the moving party demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. S. Utsunomiya, 75 Haw. at 497, 866 P.2d at 961 (citations omitted).
According to the Mauchs, the circuit court erred by summarily disposing of the Mauchs' claims as to Weinberg's contractual or tortious breach of duty. However, the Mauchs fail to allege sufficient facts to create genuine issues of material fact. As to the breach of duty claim sounding in contract, the Mauchs again allege that Weinberg I stated that they, as assignees, are entitled to the same equitable protection from Weinberg as a buyer under an agreement of sale. Weinberg I, at 7. The Mauchs argue that because an assignee steps into the shoes of the assignor, Weinberg breached his contractual duty to disclose when he failed to inform the Mauchs of the details of the second Weinberg/Blackwell agreement. Specifically, the Mauchs allege that despite knowing about [the Mauchs'] right to cure and ... right to first refusal prior to the second Weinberg/Blackwell agreement[,] Weinberg entered into the second agreement with complete disregard for the Mauchs' rights and in breach of his duty to disclose. However, Weinberg never consented to the assignment of these rights and therefore they never were assigned to the Mauchs. Weinberg consented to only one element of the Blackwell/Mauch assignment  the Mauchs' one half interest in Lot 1. This interest was sufficiently protected when Weinberg and the Blackwells acknowledged in their second agreement that, with respect to Lot No. 1, [the Blackwells] ha[ve] assigned an undivided interest therein to [the Mauchs], by Assignment dated February 2, 1981[.] Weinberg, therefore, did not have a duty to disclose to the Mauchs the nature and extent of the second agreement because it did not pertain to the limited interest of the Mauchs. Alternatively, the Mauchs allege that they have a claim of negligence based on a breach of duty of care. Relying on W.P. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 93, at 667-668 (5th Ed.1984), the Mauchs note that by entering into a contract with A, the defendant may place himself in such a relation toward B that the law will impose upon him an obligation, sounding in tort and not in contract, to act in such a way that B will not be injured. The incidental fact of the existence of the contract with A does not negative the responsibility of the actor when he enters upon a course of affirmative conduct which may be expected to affect the interests of another person. (Emphasis added.) The Mauchs claim that by entering into the 1981 contract with the Blackwells, Weinberg was negligent because he knew of the 1980 Blackwell/Mauch agreement and nevertheless entered into a second agreement that detrimentally affected the Mauchs' interests. Further, the Mauchs cite Howell v. Fisher, 49 N.C.App. 488, 272 S.E.2d 19 (1980), review denied, 302 N.C. 218, 277 S.E.2d 69 (1981), in support of their negligence claim. In Howell, the North Carolina Court of Appeals established a duty in tort for misrepresentation where the injured party was not in privity of contract with the tortfeasor but detrimentally relied on the tortfeasor's misrepresentation. The instant case, however, easily differs from both the example in Prosser and Howell inasmuch as, in entering into the second agreement with the Blackwells, Weinberg did not affect the Mauchs' interest in any way. As discussed above, the Mauchs' only interest arising out of the 1981 Blackwell/Mauch assignment was a one half interest in Lot 1. This interest was not affected by the second Weinberg/Blackwell agreement. The Mauchs' rights to cure and to first refusal that the Mauchs claimed were destroyed by the second Weinberg/Blackwell agreement never existed because Weinberg never consented to the assignment of these rights. Because the Mauchs fail to present any genuine issues of material fact, summary judgment was proper.
The Mauchs further argue that because Weinberg and the Blackwells knew of the 1981 Blackwell/Mauch agreement when they entered into the second Weinberg/Blackwell agreement but acted in complete disregard of the Mauchs' rights, Weinberg, therefore, conspired with the Blackwells to destroy the Mauchs' interests. This court, in Ellis v. Crockett, 51 Haw. 45, 57, 451 P.2d 814, 822-23 (1969), recognized that the tort of `conspiracy' has not been clearly defined. Nevertheless, we went on to state that it is clear that there can be no civil claim based upon a conspiracy alone. Therefore, ... [if a plaintiff does] not set forth any actionable claim based upon deceit, there can be no claim against any alleged joint tortfeasor based solely upon conspiracy to deceive. Id. (citation omitted). In the instant case, the Mauchs assert that Weinberg and the Blackwells conspired to destroy the Mauchs' right to cure. However, as discussed above, the Mauchs did not have a right to cure because Weinberg did not consent to this element of the Blackwell/Mauch assignment. The Mauchs have failed to set forth any actionable claim based upon deceit, and, therefore, the claim for conspiracy must fail.
The Mauchs next contend that the circuit court erred in granting Weinberg's summary judgment motion regarding HRS Chapter 480. To appropriately appeal this issue, the Mauchs must satisfy Hawai`i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 28(b)(7) which states that the appellant's opening brief shall contain [t]he argument, exhibiting clearly the points of fact and of law being presented, citing the authorities relied upon. The argument may be preceded by a concise summary. HRAP Rule 28(b)(7) (1993). The Mauchs have failed to comply with HRAP Rule 28(b)(7) with respect to their claim for relief under HRS Chapter 480. Although in their opening brief they note the order granting Weinberg's motion for summary judgment as to HRS Chapter 480 in the points upon which Appellants rely[,] the Mauchs do not present an argument as to why the trial court erred by granting the motion. The Mauchs, therefore, have not properly presented this issue on appeal, and it is not subject to review by this court. [7]