Opinion ID: 1685770
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Availability of Interlocutory Review Where Trial Court Determines Defendant is Mentally Retarded

Text: As a preliminary matter, the Defendant challenges the propriety of interlocutory review of the trial court's determination that he is mentally retarded. [6] He asserts that the language of Tennessee Code Annotated subsections 39-13-203(c) and (f), when read together, indicate that this is a decision that lies solely with the trial court. [7] After reviewing the plain language of section 39-13-203, along with the provisions of Rules 3 and 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we conclude that interlocutory review is appropriate. In 1990, the Tennessee General Assembly, following the lead of the Georgia and Maryland state legislatures, made the policy decision to prohibit the execution of any defendant with mental retardation at the time of committing first degree murder. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-203(b) (2003). This statutory prohibition was followed by this Court's decision in Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn.2001), in which we held that execution of mentally retarded persons was constitutionally prohibited as well. Id. at 809 (holding execution of mentally retarded individuals fails to achieve legitimate penalogical objectives for punishment as required by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution). Noting that a national consensus prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded had developed in the state legislatures over the previous decade, the United States Supreme Court adopted the same position in the year following Van Tran. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) (concluding that in light of evolving standards of decency, execution of mentally retarded offenders is excessive under the Eighth Amendment). The statute prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded provides that the burden of production and persuasion to demonstrate mental retardation is upon the defendant, who must prove his condition by a preponderance of the evidence. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-203(c) (2003). If a trial court makes a pretrial determination that the defendant is not mentally retarded and the defendant is thereafter convicted of first degree murder, the defendant is still permitted to offer evidence of diminished intellectual capacity as a mitigating circumstance during the sentencing phase of the capital trial under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(j)(8). Id. § 39-13-203(e) (2003). If the defendant is sentenced by the jury to death, the issue may still be raised on direct appeal. Id. at (f). Subsection (f) of the statute provides that [t]he determination by the trier of fact that the defendant is not mentally retarded shall not be appealable by interlocutory appeal, but may be a basis of appeal by either the state or defendant following the sentencing stage of the trial. Id. (emphasis added). The statute does not address the propriety of interlocutory appeal where the trial court determines that a defendant is mentally retarded. Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed by appellate courts de novo with no presumption of correctness given to the courts below. State v. Collins, 166 S.W.3d 721, 725 (Tenn.2005) (citing State v. Wilson, 132 S.W.3d 340, 341 (Tenn.2004)). This Court's role when construing a statute is `to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute's coverage beyond its intended scope.' Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn.2002) (quoting Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995)). Legislative intent is determined `from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language within the context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction that would extend or limit the statute's meaning.' Osborn v. Marr, 127 S.W.3d 737, 740 (Tenn.2004) (quoting State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 197 (Tenn.2000)). When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we apply the plain language in its normal and accepted use. Boarman v. Jaynes, 109 S.W.3d 286, 291 (Tenn.2003) (citing State v. Nelson, 23 S.W.3d 270, 271 (Tenn.2000)). Under such circumstances, there is no need for recourse to the broader statutory scheme, legislative history, historical background, or other external sources of the Legislature's purpose. Calaway ex rel. Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509, 516 (Tenn.2005) (citing In re Conservatorship of Clayton, 914 S.W.2d 84, 90 (Tenn.Ct. App.1995)). Notably, the plain language of the statute, while prohibiting interlocutory appeals from a trial court's determination that a defendant is not mentally retarded, does not prohibit interlocutory appeals from a trial court's determination that a defendant is mentally retarded. We apply the statutory construction canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius (to mention one thing is to exclude others) to conclude that the legislature did not intend to prevent interlocutory appeals in cases where the trial court finds that the defendant is mentally retarded. See Calaway, 193 S.W.3d at 516-17. The next question is whether the issue in this case meets the criteria for interlocutory review under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 which governs interlocutory appeals by permission. The language of Rule 9 provides for the consideration of the following criteria when determining whether to grant interlocutory appeal: (1) the need to prevent irreparable injury, giving consideration to the severity of the potential injury, the probability of its occurrence, and the probability that review upon entry of final judgment will be ineffective; (2) the need to prevent needless, expensive, and protracted litigation, giving consideration to whether the challenged order would be a basis for reversal upon entry of a final judgment, the probability of reversal, and whether an interlocutory appeal will result in a net reduction in the duration and expense of the litigation if the challenged order is reversed; and (3) the need to develop a uniform body of law, giving consideration to the existence of inconsistent orders of other courts and whether the question presented by the challenged order will not otherwise be reviewable upon entry of final judgment. Tenn. R.App. P. 9(a). As applied to criminal actions, the Rule specifically provides that [p]ermission to appeal under this rule may be sought by the state and defendant in criminal actions. Tenn. R.App. P. 9(g). As a practical matter, the effect of a trial court's finding that a defendant is mentally retarded is that the State loses the option to pursue the death penalty. Once a defendant is tried and judgment is entered, the State has no appeal as of right under the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Tenn. R.App. P. 3(c) (providing for State's appeal as of right in limited circumstances, not including a trial court's finding that a defendant is mentally retarded). Furthermore, even if a defendant were to appeal on other grounds and successfully obtain a retrial, the State would arguably be barred by principles of double jeopardy from seeking the death penalty in subsequent sentencing proceedings. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984) (holding that if a trial court has rejected death as a possible sentence, double jeopardy bars the state from seeking the death penalty at re-sentencing, even where rejection of the death sentence was based on a legal error). [8] Accordingly, denying the State an interlocutory appeal when a trial court precludes the death penalty by finding a defendant mentally retarded leaves no appellate recourse at all. We conclude that the question raised in this case is one appropriately raised under Rule 9(a)(1). Cf. People v. Super. Ct., 40 Cal.4th 999, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 851, 155 P.3d 259, 264-65 (Cal.2007) (holding that although the California Legislature did not expressly provide for appeal from a trial court's determination that a defendant was mentally retarded, allowing such an appeal was consistent with California Penal Code section 1238 which provides for interlocutory review of orders or judgments dismissing or otherwise terminating all or any portion of the action). The Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion that this matter was appropriate for interlocutory appeal under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 is affirmed.