Opinion ID: 156860
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 97-1077--Claims against the City

Text: 29 Drake also appeals the grant of summary judgment for the City Defendants on his Title VII retaliation claim. An employee may bring a cause of action against a former employer under Title VII for retaliatory post-employment actions, see Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 117 S.Ct. 843, 848-49, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997), including providing negative job references. In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Drake must show that (1) he engaged in protected activity, (2) the DPD took adverse action subsequent to the protected activity, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. See Purrington, 996 F.2d at 1033-34. 30 Here, Drake failed to produce any evidence that would support an inference of a causal connection between the alleged retaliatory conduct and the claimed protected activity. Thus, we do not need to address the first two factors. Drake offers no direct evidence of a retaliatory causal connection, so he is forced to assert an inference of retaliatory motive that occasionally may be drawn from adverse action that closely follows protected conduct. See Candelaria v. EG & G Energy Measurements, Inc., 33 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir.1994). However, the 1989 telephone conversation the DPD had with CSU officials occurred several years after Drake filed his Title VII complaints. 8 Such a lapse in time is too long to provide the required causal connection. See id.; Burrus v. United Tel. Co. of Kansas, Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir.1982).
31 Drake brought his defamation claim against Potter under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court concluded that Drake did not offer sufficient evidence of a § 1983 violation. 9 We agree. 32 In order to succeed on his § 1983 defamation claim, Drake must show both that Potter's statements stigmatized or otherwise damaged his reputation and that the reputational damage  'was entangled with some other tangible interest such as employment. '  Ewers v. Board of County Comm'rs, 802 F.2d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir.1986) (quoting McGhee v. Draper, 639 F.2d 639, 643 (10th Cir.1981)) (further citation omitted); see also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-02, 711-12, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976) (constitutional due process deprivation under § 1983 requires showing of damage to property or liberty interest in addition to damage to reputation). Drake claims that he suffered damage to his liberty and property interests because his job prospects with CSU were impaired by the disclosure of inaccurate information from his personnel file, citing Corbitt v. Andersen, 778 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir.1985). In Corbitt, Corbitt, a psychologist, sued another psychologist who, acting as a state agent, allegedly made defamatory statements about Corbitt that caused two state agencies to cease referring clients to Corbitt. See id. at 1473. This court held that Corbitt alleged a sufficient deprivation of his constitutional rights because a stigma had been attached to him that  'foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.' ... The jury heard sufficient evidence regarding the initial health and worth of Corbitt's private practice and could reasonably conclude that [the defendant's] actions weakened and devaluated it. Id. at 1475 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972)). 33 However, subsequent Tenth Circuit opinions have limited the holding in Corbitt to the specific facts of that case, noting that Corbitt extended the concept of a liberty interest to its maximum permissible limit. Setliff v. Memorial Hosp. of Sheridan County, 850 F.2d 1384, 1397 n. 18 (10th Cir.1988); see also Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1269 (10th Cir.1989) (This court has made it clear since Corbitt that damage to 'prospective employment opportunities' is too intangible to constitute a deprivation of a liberty or property interest.) (quoting Setliff, 850 F.2d at 1397 n. 18). Specifically, the court in Setliff found that the holding in Corbitt was based on the fact that Corbitt showed losses to the tangible interest of his existing practice and not the more intangible loss of prospective employment possibilities. Setliff, 850 F.2d at 1397 n. 18. Although the Supreme Court in Paul, 424 U.S. at 701, recognized that injury to employment may constitute a cognizable constitutional deprivation: 34 [C]ircumstances which make an employee somewhat less attractive to employers would hardly establish the kind of foreclosure of opportunities amounting to a deprivation of liberty.... [A] liberty interest is not implicated merely by a reduction in an individual's attractiveness to potential employers.... A liberty interest is not implicated where the charges merely result in reduced economic returns and diminished prestige, but not permanent exclusion from or protracted interruption of employment. 35 Setliff, 850 F.2d at 1396-97 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Potter's negative recommendation did not cause any cognizable constitutional deprivation under § 1983. Because Drake has alleged nothing more than the loss of a potential employment opportunity, Drake cannot satisfy the constitutional deprivation prong of his § 1983 claim.