Opinion ID: 4317843
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lewis’s Supervised Release

Text: Last, Lewis argues the district court committed procedural error because it “did not make the § 3553(a) ﬁndings required 6Shelton also argues the revocation sentence imposed related to the March 1999 conviction “remained beyond the 15-year time period” to be counted for criminal history points. This argument fails because for a term of imprisonment to be imposed due to revocation of probation, courts use “the date of last release from incarceration on such sentence.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k)(2)(A). Here, the date of release is within ﬁfteen years of “defendant’s commencement of the instant oﬀense.” See id. § 4A1.2(e)(1). 20 Nos. 17-3084, 17-3127, 17-3396, 17-3559 by § 3583(c) so as to properly justify the 3-year period of supervised release.” 7 We disagree. It is true that “in determining the length of the term … of supervised release,” the district court “shall consider” various § 3553(a) factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c). However, Lewis’s argument is misplaced because the district court did consider the § 3553(a) factors. “Although prison and supervised release are two diﬀerent forms of punishment, they are both part of a single sentence.” United States v. Oliver, 873 F.3d 601, 610 (7th Cir. 2017); see also e.g., United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 869 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Armour, 804 F.3d 859, 867–68 (7th Cir. 2015). For that reason, a district court is “not required to engage in a ‘separate comprehensive analysis’ of the § 3553(a) factors as they applied to [the defendant’s] term of supervised release after extensively discussing those same factors with respect to 7The government suggests Lewis waived this argument because he did not challenge the Guidelines range for supervised release in his sentencing memorandum and did not object at the sentencing hearing. At minimum, the government maintains the error was forfeited so we should review for plain error. “Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right,” while “forfeiture typically results from ‘an accidental or negligent omission.’” United States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 541 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 243 F.3d 411, 416 (7th Cir. 2001)). “The line between waiver and forfeiture is often blurry,” and “[t]he distinction is not always easy to make.” Id. Indeed, our cases are inconsistent as to whether a defendant’s failure to object to the PSR’s Guidelines calculation constitutes waiver or forfeiture. Compare United States v. Oliver, 873 F.3d 601, 610 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[W]hen [the defendant] stated that he had no objections to the PSR at the beginning of the sentencing hearing, he could not have known whether the district court would comply with procedural requirements during the rest of the proceeding.”), with United States v. Gumila, 879 F.3d 831, 837–38 (7th Cir. 2018) (ﬁnding waiver). We need not resolve this tension because the district court did not err. Nos. 17-3084, 17-3127, 17-3396, 17-3559 21 [the defendant’s] prison sentence.” Oliver, 873 F.3d at 611; see also Bloch, 825 F.3d at 869 (“[T]he district court was not required to provide two separate explanations, one for the term of imprisonment and one for the term of supervised release.”); Armour, 804 F.3d at 868 (“[T]he district court’s justiﬁcations for imposing [a prison term] also apply to the … term of supervised release.”). Instead, the court “need only provide one overarching explanation and justiﬁcation—tethered of course, to the § 3553(a) factors—for why it thinks a criminal sentence comprised of both terms of imprisonment and supervised release is appropriate.” Oliver, 873 F.3d at 611 (quoting Bloch, 825 F.3d at 870). Here, the court examined the § 3553(a) factors in detail in justifying its sentence, which included terms of imprisonment and supervised release. Moreover, it explicitly indicated that supervised release was appropriate “[g]iven the seriousness of this oﬀense and the long unabated history of criminal conduct by Mr. Lewis.” It also commented that the probation ofﬁcer would “provide support and guidance and mentoring and resources.” Thus, the court did not err.8 8 Lewis relies only on United States v. Henry, 813 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2016). In Henry, we noted that “[t]he government [was] right to concede sentencing error in regard to supervised release” because the “district judge had failed to make the ﬁndings required by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3583(d) to justify the length of a term of supervised release … that he imposed.” Id. at 683. Henry is distinct from this case for two reasons. First, the government conceded error. Second, the district court in Henry gave no explanation particular to why it imposed a term of supervised release. 22 Nos. 17-3084, 17-3127, 17-3396, 17-3559