Opinion ID: 1160457
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence for Personal Use of a Deadly Weapon

Text: (31) Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that he personally used a deadly weapon in the robbery of Greta Slatten. The question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the underlying enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Dominguez (1995) 38 Cal. App.4th 410, 421 [45 Cal. Rptr.2d 153]; People v. Jacobs (1987) 193 Cal. App.3d 375, 380 [238 Cal. Rptr. 278].) The answer is yes. Contrary to defendant's claim, such a trier of fact could have determined to the requisite degree of certainty that whatever it was that he personally used in the crime was indeed a deadly weapon: it could have inferred from the nature and extent of the injuries that Slatten suffered  which required suturing with 20 stitches, prevented her from opening her mouth, and blackened the left side of her face from her hairline down through her neck  that it was a blunt instrument that caused them and that such instrument was in fact capable of inflicting death.
Defendant raises a single claim against his eligibility for the penalty of death. Substantially remounting the attack he made on his conviction for the murder of Allen Birkman in the first degree under the theory of felony-murder robbery or attempted robbery, defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of the felony-murder-robbery special circumstance, which includes both robbery and attempted robbery. (32) In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence for a special circumstance, the question we ask is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 678 [286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84], original italics.) [30] Substantially repeating the argument he made against his first degree murder conviction under the theory of felony-murder robbery or attempted robbery, defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the felony-murder-robbery special circumstance finding on the ground that it is inadequate to establish intent to steal  which, as stated, is an element of robbery and attempted robbery, which underlie this special circumstance (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i), as added by § 6 of Prop. 7, approved by initiative, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978); accord, Pen. Code, § 190.2, present subd. (a)(17)(A)). Defendant is wrong. We need not restate the reason. (See, ante, at pp. 224-225.) [31]
Defendant makes several claims going to the penalty of death. As will appear, none proves to be meritorious.
Defendant presents a number of contentions relating to an application he made to the superior court for authorization to incur expenses for a trip to Cuba in order to prepare and present a defense at the penalty phase. Properly to address his points, we must set out the pertinent proceedings at some length. Penal Code section 987.9 provides in pertinent part: In the trial of a capital case ... the indigent defendant, through the defendant's counsel, may request the court for funds for the specific payment of investigators, experts, and others for the preparation or presentation of the defense.... The fact that an application has been made shall be confidential and the contents of the application shall be confidential. Upon receipt of an application, a judge of the court, other than the trial judge presiding over the case in question, shall rule on the reasonableness of the request and shall disburse an appropriate amount of money to the defendant's attorney. The ruling on the reasonableness of the request shall be made at an in camera hearing.... Prior to trial, specifically on January 17, 1989, through appointed defense counsel W. Bradley Holmes and Hayes H. Gable III, defendant filed a confidential application in the superior court for authorization to incur expenses, in an amount not to exceed $9,726, for the payment of investigators to make a trip to Cuba in order to compile his social history in aid of a defense at the expected penalty phase. In a supporting declaration, Attorney Gable stated that he proposed to send to Cuba Rodrigo Mayorga, a Spanish-speaking attorney with many years of criminal law experience, and David Myers, a certified Spanish-English interpreter and investigator; he estimated that their trip would take about 14 days; he based his estimate upon the understanding that there will be a delay in Mexico City  there being no direct travel between the United States and Cuba  because the necessary visas would have to be obtained and air travel to Cuba is restricted to twice a week. The application was assigned to Judge Cecily Bond. Judge Darrel W. Lewis presided over defendant's case. On January 18, following a hearing in camera, Judge Bond granted the application for authorization to incur expenses for the trip to Cuba by Mayorga and Myers. She did so subject to the condition that expenses were not actually to be incurred before the cause was assigned to a courtroom, on the chance  which turned out not to eventuate  that the prosecutor, Patrick Marlette, might decline to seek the death penalty as part of a negotiated disposition. On June 13, Judge Lewis met with Prosecutor Marlette and Attorneys Holmes and Gable to schedule the commencement of the penalty phase. (The guilt phase had closed on June 9 when the jury rendered its verdicts and made its findings.) Attorney Holmes requested a date around July 3. Attorney Gable explained: Of major concern, your Honor, to us, is ascertaining whether or not we're going to be able to send Mayorga and Myers, who have already been [ sic ], funds have already been approved for this purpose some time ago, to Cuba. [¶] We've had numerous assurances from [the] Cuban government that we would be allowed to go there. [¶] We started our attempts to get down there to gather information regarding [defendant's] background at the time that we were first assigned to this courtroom, ... in February.... [W]e had thought we'd have this problem licked ... about a month ago. [¶] In fact, we got the people all the way to Mexico City before we found out that the Cuban government decided to throw a roadblock in our way again.... To accommodate his schedule, Judge Lewis suggested a date of July 10. Asked his position, Prosecutor Marlette stated, inter alia, that I have a general objection to a delay of that long, and I realize how much or how little weight that will carry in light of the defense concerns. Judge Lewis inquired: Let me ask, when do you expect to get some sort of a definitive answer on whether you're going to get into Cuba? Attorney Holmes responded: This thing has literally been going on for weeks now. [¶] I think Mr. Mayorga has been in almost daily phone contact with these people, at least the last two weeks, and at one point I thought I could have predicted the date they were going to say yes, yes you can have your special visa and away you go. [¶] At this point I really think they're doing everything they can do [to] discourage us from getting in at all. I can't really answer your question, and it could be tomorrow, could be three months from now. Attorney Gable added: Your Honor, ... we really can't offer the Court any kind of definitive deadline or time limit on when we might hear something from the Cuban government. [¶] We're kind of hoping since they know this really is a penalty phase of the trial, and it really is happening, that they might be moved to grant us access to records and individuals there in Cuba.... Thereupon, Judge Lewis set the date for July 10. In so doing, he offered: [I]f there's anything you feel I can do to assist the defense, maybe just by simply stating that the case will proceed on July the 10th, regardless of whether you are allowed to get into Cuba or not, may be the most beneficial thing the Court can do. Attorney Gable replied: If we could ever get some sort of response from the Cuban government to even know that they're alive down there, we would certainly come to the Court, and if that was something that they wanted, but as it is right now, it's just a question of going through, quote, diplomatic channels and see what we can do. On June 16, again meeting with Prosecutor Marlette and Attorneys Holmes and Gable, Judge Lewis rescheduled the commencement of the penalty phase to June 26 on his own motion, in large part because he believed that July 10 was too far away. In response to an invitation, Attorney Gable stated that he was prepared to make an offer of proof in camera regarding the necessity of continuing the start of the defense presentation of mitigating circumstances until the 10th or until at least ... the 6th or so. Asked subsequently whether he would be able to proceed on July 5, he answered that he believed he would. Judge Lewis then ordered the People's case to open on June 26 and defendant's to open on July 5. Attorney Gable stated for the record that, as a result of the roadblocks that have been placed in the way of us getting to Cuba, I don't want the Court to feel that I'm representing and guaranteeing right now that the [5th] is solid and we're going to be ready to go.... He reiterated that he was prepared to make an offer of proof in camera. Judge Lewis asked him to do so. In camera, Attorney Gable represented in substance that he and Attorney Holmes were continuing to experience difficulty securing passage to Cuba for Mayorga and Myers to gather relevant mitigating evidence, and were exploring alternative means to obtain such evidence. Judge Lewis asked, What type of evidence do you want to bring from Cuba? He answered, [T]he type of evidence that we would love to bring from Cuba is the actual testimony of family members and records from schools that [defendant] has attended, and any friends that he had back there. [¶] It's just the typical kind of evidence that we would be presented [ sic ] in any penalty phase of a capital case, the evidence of past good acts, of love and affection shown to parents, and also of the type of childhood that [defendant] had.... He added: We have no real hopes of being able to subpoena, if you will, people from Cuba to come and testify here, but what we had intended to do all along was send a team down to Cuba, armed with video recorders, and interview these people, and the hope was that we would conduct a sufficiently reliable interview that we would be able to present the interview at the penalty phase under the authority of Green v. Georgia (1979) 442 U.S. 95, 97 [60 L.Ed.2d 738, 741, 99 S.Ct. 2150]  which held in a per curiam opinion that, under the facts of [that] case, the exclusion of certain evidence constituted a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, even if it was barred by the state's hearsay rule, because it was highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase of the trial and substantial reasons existed to assume its reliability. Judge Lewis expressed his view that you'd have great difficulty having the Court deem reliable, just a statement by an ordinary person, particularly a family member or a relative who obviously has an interest in the case. On June 26, the penalty phase commenced. The People opened their case. Later that same day, having been granted leave to reopen to call a possible witness, they rested. At the close of the session, Judge Lewis asked: Does the defense feel any need to have any further discussions in camera regarding your case? Attorney Gable answered: Not at this time.... [¶] I think that the prosecutor is well aware that we're trying to gather information from [defendant's] homeland, and in fact, it appears that although we may not be able to send people down there ourselves, that we have made some contacts in Cuba, to where they can go and locate some of the family.... On July 5, with the People not seeking to reopen their case and stating again that they rested, defendant opened his case. At the close of the session, Attorney Gable informed Judge Lewis and Prosecutor Marlette that he and Attorney Holmes had an expert going to Cuba [r]ight around the 10th. Judge Lewis called for a more thorough offer [of] proof. Attorney Gable responded: The expert is an expert in the field of cultural anthropology with a specific expertise in the area of Cuba, having received a math or science degree at the University of Havana in cultural anthropology, and this individual has conducted extensive interviews with [defendant] already and has now the basis to obtain additional information in Cuba, regarding [defendant's] upbringing, and will be offering her opinions as an expert qualified in cultural anthropology. Judge Lewis commented: [A]t some point, we're gonna have to disclose a certain amount to the prosecution to make it so that I can make some predetermination as to whether or not it's even necessary to have this witness, because somewhat for cost, but more so for time and timing, it[']s useless to send somebody to Cuba and postpone this trial for an entire week and a half just to find out this person is not going to be able to testify.... Attorney Gable replied: I can just say that in the past I've used psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists to testify regarding the facets of the background of the defendant, and that's what it's being offered for. [¶] In other words, the expert can offer an opinion regarding the individual, based upon background information, of course, ... and that's the type of evidence that this witness would be offering. Judge Lewis inquired further in camera. Attorney Gable offered to make the expert available the next day for in camera examination. Judge Lewis accepted. On July 6, Judge Lewis conducted a hearing in camera. Taking the witness stand on voir dire was Gail McGarrity. McGarrity testified, inter alia, that she was a candidate for the degree of doctor of philosophy in anthropology at the University of California at Berkeley; she specialized generally in cultural anthropology and specifically in ethno medicine [ sic ], ethno psychiatry [ sic ], ... nutritional anthropology and medical anthropology in Latin America; she had lived and studied in Cuba, and was fluent in Spanish; she had undertaken to compile defendant's social history; to that end, she had interviewed defendant on a number of occasions; because he had memory gaps, she needed to communicate with persons who knew him as a child and youth in Cuba; moreover, she needed to do so in person because, given the fact that Cuba and the United States have such poor relations, it's not easy to telephone there or get letters back and forth; having lived and studied in Cuba, it's very easy for me to move around there and not have to go through officials channels, 'cause that's the most difficult way, especially for an American; she would attempt to leave for Cuba on July 10 or 12, and to return a week to 10 days later, but was uncertain of success; she would pose as a tourist, lest she arouse any suspicion on the part of the Cuban government that she was up to something political; she would travel[] with an investigator who would have a video camera. Attorney Gable requested to continue her appearance as a witness in defendant's case until July 24. Judge Lewis expressed concern about the delay. Attorney Gable stated that he and Attorney Holmes considered the Cuban trip important, and had been attempting to send investigators there for a long time. Judge Lewis asked, What's the cost involved? Attorney Gable answered, That's already been approved.... Judge Lewis told him to see what you can get done, and put off a decision on his request to continue McGarrity's appearance. Later on July 6, Judge Lewis met with Attorneys Holmes and Gable in the presence of Prosecutor Marlette. Attorney Gable stated that the expert  meaning McGarrity  had a confirmed flight to Mexico City on the 11th, the tour is set, ... the flight [is] to leave from Mexico City on the 15th, the return to Mexico City into the United States is on the 22nd.... Judge Lewis asked, Why is she going down to Mexico on the 11th, ... is she going to be paid this whole time, and if so, why is she going down five days or four days before? Attorney Gable answered, It's a tour package, that's how you have to do it. [¶] You have to get there three days in advance, you have to go to the Cuban Embassy and get your passports in order, that's just the way that they set it up. On July 10, Judge Bond conducted a hearing in camera with Attorneys Holmes and Gable to inquire into the trip to Cuba by Mayorga and Myers for which she had authorized defendant to incur expenses. Judge Bond acted on her own motion, in response to a communication by Judge Lewis, who she said was very unsatisfied with the need to go to Cuba: He ... wanted to know whether I had authorized any trip or not, and I told him that I had. But then he told me that this trip had been changed rather substantially since ... when I authorized it. Specifically, she had learned from him that an anthropologist, namely, McGarrity, was to go in place of Mayorga and Myers: I didn't approve that, and you didn't come in and ask for any change in approval. Attorney Gable attempted to explain: Mayorga and Myers got all the way to Mexico City and were turned back by the Cuban government for reasons that had to do, I think, primarily with the fact that ... they advised them what they were actually going down there for; since that time they have been trying to get back down there, ... and all to no avail; they were each now persona non grata; in the meantime, he and Attorney Holmes hired McGarrity to compile defendant's social history; they subsequently decided to send her to Cuba with an interpreter with the given name of Patricia  her surname was later identified as Santivanias  who had been recommended by Myers; apparently the [main] interpreter that we have for [defendant], Carmen Krewson, got in a snit over the fact that she couldn't go to Cuba, and went to Gladys Cook, who was the coordinator of Spanish-English interpreters in the interpreter's office, and told her some tale... that these people were just going down there to go on vacation; [t]he first thing I knew about it, I got a call from the newspapers, apparently Gladys Cook called all the newspapers, called the district attorney, and this is all supposed to be confidential, I might add, and apparently went and talked to Judge Lewis ex parte. Judge Bond commented: [W]hat was alarming, I think, to Judge Lewis, and the reason he called me just to have me handle the matter was, as I understand it, they were going to go to Mexico and they're going to be there for four or five days. Attorney Gable responded: No. And this is the thing that I think was prompted by interpreters Krewson and Cook. He went on to explain that you have to spend at least two days in Mexico City to acquire the visa from the Cuban Embassy. Judge Bond then asked, What connection is there with some kind of vacation tour ... [?] Attorney Gable responded, It's not exactly a vacation tour. It's a package put together to take people who are interested in going to Cuba.... He made plain that the tour in question was simply a cover[] under which McGarrity and Santivanias would be able to enter Cuba. He also made plain that they would be able to enter Cuba only under such a cover: That's the only way we can do it. Judge Bond stated: [W]hat you're really telling me is that they're going to go in under a subterfuge. I never authorized that. I did authorize, initially, Mr. Mayorga and Mr. Myers to go there aboveboard for the purpose for which they're being sent. I did not authorize anybody to create some sort of subterfuge to get into a country which we do not have any relations [with] on false pretenses and then go off and do investigations. I never authorized anyone to do any subterfuge to get into another country. I did not authorize anyone ever to join up with a tour for some purpose which is not in fact the true purpose in order to gain entrance to Cuba so they could then go off and do their own investigation. Judge Bond went on: Now the way you have this set up, it's a subterfuge, and I just don't think the Court or the state ought to be a party to that. You're talking about an international incident here. You're not talking about ... going into Georgia. You're talking about going into a foreign country, with which the United States does not have diplomatic relations, under a guise that's not true. And ... I just can't authorize that. I'm not going to do that. [W]hen I authorized this originally ... I was within that ambit of authority to give you authorization to do it straightforwardly, but I am not going to allow this Court or the state to be drawn into what is in effect a subterfuge in a foreign government. [¶] I mean, you're talking about an international incident, potentially, there. What if these people get arrested while they're there? What kind of protection are they going to have? It's not up to the Superior Court of Sacramento County to start making foreign policy decisions for the United States. Judge Bond reiterated, [Y]ou had an obligation to come to me and tell me this has changed because what I authorized is not what you were intending to do. I did not authorize you to go in in some surreptitious manner. Attorney Gable replied, I couldn't do that because I was going to be a little concerned about making the Court a party. Judge Bond stated, [T]his Court can't be party to some sort of subterfuge. Attorney Gable responded, I know that. And I wouldn't ask you to be party to some kind of subterfuge, either. Judge Bond proceeded to withdraw authorization to incur expenses for a trip to Cuba: I can't authorize you to do it the way you're going to do it.... In the wake of Judge Bond's ruling, defendant moved Judge Lewis to recuse the interpreter's office on the ground that it had committed misconduct by improperly disclosing information about the trip to Cuba by McGarrity and Santivanias. Defendant also moved Judge Lewis to declare a mistrial and, later, to preclude the People from seeking the death penalty and to sentence him to a term of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. For purposes of these motions, defendant moved Judge Lewis to order an evidentiary hearing, and also to recuse himself and Prosecutor Marlette, and to appoint new counsel for him in place of Attorneys Holmes and Gable, on the ground that each of the identified persons might be called to testify at such a hearing as a witness. For these same purposes, defendant assumed that Judge Bond's ruling withdrawing authorization to incur expenses for a trip to Cuba was not erroneous. After an evidentiary hearing at which he presided and in which Attorneys Holmes and Gable and Prosecutor Marlette participated, Judge Lewis denied all the motions. In the course thereof, he determined, inter alia, that neither he nor Judge Bond had committed judicial misconduct. He also determined that, even if the interpreter's office had committed misconduct through an improper disclosure, defendant was not entitled to the relief he sought. Moreover, he barred him from using the evidentiary hearing as an investigative tool to identify which interpreter or interpreters, if any, actually made any improper disclosure. Interpreter Krewson did not further assist defendant during the proceedings. McGarrity and Santivanias were unable to make a trip to Cuba. By means including a telephonic interview with defendant's father in Cuba, McGarrity compiled his social history. In the presence of the jury, she testified to her opinion, as a cultural anthropologist, on matters concerning his background and character in Cuba, and expressed the view that he suffered from conditions including profound emotional immaturity and extreme culture shock. In so doing, she stated that she had been unable to go to Cuba to conduct an investigation and hence had been unable to corroborate certain information on which she relied. Defendant now presents a number of contentions relating to his application for authorization to incur expenses for a trip to Cuba. (33) At the threshold, defendant claims that Judge Bond erred by withdrawing authorization to incur expenses for the trip to Cuba by McGarrity and Santivanias. An appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling on an application for authorization to incur expenses to prepare or present a defense for abuse of discretion. (See, e.g., People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 851 [277 Cal. Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906]; People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 847 [268 Cal. Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983].) We find no such abuse here. Judge Bond was not unreasonable in authorizing the aboveboard trip to Cuba by Mayorga and Myers, of which she had been informed, for the purpose of compiling defendant's social history: The end was proper and so were the means. But neither was she unreasonable in withdrawing authorization for the surreptitious trip to Cuba by McGarrity and Santivanias, of which she had not been informed: although the end remained proper, the means had become otherwise, threatening harm to international relations and also to the two travelers. Defendant argues in substance that, at least on the facts of a case like this, a judge may not withdraw authorization for improper means. Because he did not offer such an argument below  indeed, Attorney Gable agreed that a judge could do so  he may not offer any to that effect here. He also argues that Judge Bond did not in fact withdraw authorization for improper means, but did so for her own improper reasons. The record on appeal is otherwise. Even if error had occurred, it would not entail reversal. It is the general rule for error under California law bearing on the penalty of death  which includes the one asserted here  that reversal requires prejudice and prejudice in turn requires a reasonable possibility of an effect on the outcome under People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135]. ( People v. Ashmus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 983; People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1267.) No such possibility appears as a result of the withdrawal of authorization to incur expenses for a trip to Cuba. McGarrity herself stated that she was uncertain of success. Hence, it is merely conjectural whether McGarrity and Santivanias would have made it to Cuba, and if so, whether they would have discovered more favorable information than what McGarrity had already obtained, as through her telephonic interview with defendant's father in Cuba, and if so, whether they would have made it back to the United States in a timely fashion. [32] (34) Defendant also claims, in effect, that the interpreter's office committed misconduct by improperly disclosing information about the trip to Cuba by McGarrity and Santivanias. It is improper for an interpreter to disclose information reflecting privileged communications between counsel and client. (Cal. Standards Jud. Admin., § 18.3(c).) Judge Lewis impliedly assumed that at least one interpreter had indeed improperly disclosed information of this sort. We shall expressly do the same. We cannot conclude, however, that any improper disclosure would require reversal. We believe that a defect of this sort is subject to the general rule for error under California law that reversal requires prejudice. When, as here, it bears on the penalty of death, prejudice requires a reasonable possibility of an effect on the outcome. No such possibility appears. Attorneys Holmes and Gable had themselves disclosed to Judge Lewis and Prosecutor Marlette a significant part of the information concerning the trip to Cuba by McGarrity and Santivanias. Although revealing varied misconceptions and resentments, the interpreter who we assume made an improper disclosure disclosed nothing of substance other than the names of the travelers. That fact, however, was inconsequential. Indeed, while they were still pursuing the trip to Cuba by Mayorga and Myers, Attorneys Holmes and Gable had themselves disclosed their names. We do not ignore the fact that Judges Lewis and Bond initially looked with disfavor on Attorneys Holmes and Gable as a result of what we assume to be the improper disclosure by at least one interpreter of information about the trip to Cuba by McGarrity and Santivanias. We agree with defendant that the judges appear to have falsely believed that the attorneys were misusing court-approved funds. We also agree that they may consequently have doubted their credibility. For example, Judge Lewis admitted that he had thought that it seemed like this could be a boondoggle, and might have told Judge Bond something like this sounds like a county paid vacation. But the disfavor of Judges Lewis and Bond toward Attorneys Holmes and Gable passed as the judges learned of the difficulties the attorneys faced. Judge Lewis told them that he recognized that they found themselves in a very frustrating situation, and that he did not doubt[] the good faith of either of you. For his part, Judge Lewis stated: [F]rom now what I understand about the situation, I'm of the opinion that you have done nothing wrong.... Your credibility before this Court is just as high as it has ever been, which is high, I must say.... Neither do we ignore the fact that what we assume to be the improper disclosure by at least one interpreter of information about the trip to Cuba by McGarrity and Santivanias might have had a chilling effect ( Barber v. Municipal Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 742, 753 [157 Cal. Rptr. 658, 598 P.2d 818]) on communications between defendant and Attorneys Holmes and Gable, and indeed on their relationship. But even a reasonable possibility of an effect on attorney-client communications or even the attorney-client relationship  which we do not discern here  does not amount to a reasonable possibility of an effect on the outcome. [33] (35a) Defendant next claims that Judge Lewis erred by determining that neither he nor Judge Bond committed judicial misconduct by communicating between themselves about his application for authorization to incur expenses for a trip to Cuba. [34] Any such judicial misconduct would not entail reversal. A defect of this sort is subject to the general rule for error under California law that reversal requires prejudice. ( People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1133-1134 [240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].) When, as here, it bears on the penalty of death, prejudice requires a reasonable possibility of an effect on the outcome. No such possibility appears. The fundamental ... harm threatened in this situation is the disclosure of potentially significant information to the prosecution. ( Id. at p. 1134.) There was no disclosure of this kind. Even before Judges Lewis and Bond communicated between themselves about defendant's application for authorization to incur expenses for a trip to Cuba, Attorneys Holmes and Gable had themselves disclosed its existence and substance to Prosecutor Marlette. Defendant argues that the communications in question had a tendency ... to deprive [him] of the right to challenge `questionable facts or opinions'.... The tendency, however, did not result in a deprivation. Judges Lewis and Bond themselves brought the communications to light. Defendant then exercised his right, and mounted a successful challenge. It is true that the communications between Judges Lewis and Bond resulted in the withdrawal of authorization to incur expenses for a trip to Cuba. But, as explained above, such withdrawal of authorization did not affect the outcome within a reasonable possibility. [35] Defendant then claims that Judge Lewis erred by denying his motion to recuse himself from his other motions relating to his application for authorization to incur expenses for a trip to Cuba. (36) As a general matter, an appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling on a recusal motion for abuse of discretion. (Cf. 2 Childress & Davis, Federal Standards of Review, supra, § 12.05, pp. 12-35 to 12-40 [setting forth the standard of review under federal law].) (35b) No such abuse appears. Judge Lewis was not unreasonable in declining to recuse himself. Certainly, he was not required to do so. Defendant argues to the contrary. He asserts that Judge Lewis had personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, subd. (a)(1))  including whether he and Judge Bond communicated about his application for authorization to incur expenses for a trip to Cuba  and hence might, and indeed did, serve as a de facto witness. Judge Lewis cannot be deemed to have had personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts: he removed such facts from dispute by resolving them for present purposes in defendant's favor, as through his implicit concession that he and Judge Bond communicated about the application. [36] (37a) Defendant also claims that Judge Lewis erred by barring him from using the evidentiary hearing as an investigative tool to identify which interpreter or interpreters, if any, actually made any improper disclosure about the trip to Cuba by McGarrity and Santivanias. As a general matter, an appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling as to the conduct of a hearing for abuse of discretion. (See Erreca's v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal. App.4th 1475, 1494 [24 Cal. Rptr.2d 156]; cf. 1 Childress & Davis, Federal Standards of Review, supra, § 4.08, pp. 4-50 to 4-61 [setting forth the standard of review under federal law].) Again, no such abuse appears. Judge Lewis was not unreasonable in barring defendant from using the evidentiary hearing as an investigative tool to identify which interpreter or interpreters, if any, actually made any improper disclosure. Judge Lewis's concern was whether defendant was entitled to the relief he sought  not with whether any interpreter deserved discipline. Defendant argues that, had he been permitted to proceed as he wished, he might have been able to ensure against the possibility of a similar improper disclosure in the future. He may well be right. But he shows only that Judge Lewis might not have been unreasonable if he had made a different decision. He does not show that he was unreasonable in making the decision he did. This is especially true since Attorneys Holmes and Gable expressed a firm belief that it was interpreters Krewson and Cook who were to blame, and presumably took appropriate precautions against them for the future. Defendant then claims that Judge Lewis erred by failing to require Prosecutor Marlette to testify, sua sponte, as to his receipt of what we assume to be the improper disclosure by at least one interpreter of information about the trip to Cuba by McGarrity and Santivanias. We disagree. Defendant's premise is that Judge Lewis was under a duty to demand such testimony, even in the absence of a request. It is unsupported. [37] Underlying all the foregoing points urged by defendant is a broad and somewhat undefined claim of violation of the right to the assistance of counsel granted him by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (38) A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel includes a right to effective assistance. (E.g., People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 215.) For present purposes, counsel may embrace an attorney's agent, such as an interpreter. (See Chacon v. Wood (9th Cir.1994) 36 F.3d 1459, 1463-1465.) To establish ineffective assistance of counsel entitling him to relief, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel performed deficiently under an objective standard of professional reasonableness and thereby caused prejudice under a test of reasonable probability of an effect on the outcome. (E.g., People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 215-218.) (37b) Defendant expressly attempts to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. He fails. We shall assume for argument's sake that there was deficient performance on the part of at least one interpreter. (There would be no basis for a similar assumption about either Attorney Holmes or Attorney Gable.) We cannot, however, find prejudice. There is no reasonable probability of an effect on the outcome as a result of the withdrawal of authorization to incur expenses for a trip to Cuba. That is because, as explained above, there is no reasonable possibility: with McGarrity herself stating that she was uncertain of success, it is merely conjectural whether McGarrity and Santivanias would have made it to Cuba, and if so, whether they would have discovered substantially more favorable information than what McGarrity had already obtained, as through her telephonic interview with defendant's father in Cuba, and if so, whether they would have made it back to the United States in a timely fashion. Neither is there any reasonable probability of an effect on the outcome on any other basis. (39) A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel also includes a right to loyal assistance. (See, e.g., People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 834 [254 Cal. Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460] [holding that included in the right to counsel is `a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest ...'].) For these purposes too, counsel may embrace an attorney's agent, such as an interpreter. To establish disloyal assistance of counsel entitling him to relief, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel served an interest other than his (see Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980) 446 U.S. 335, 350 [64 L.Ed.2d 333, 347-348, 100 S.Ct. 1708] [considering the right to conflict-free counsel]; People v. Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 834-835 [same]), and that, in so doing, counsel `pulled his punches,' i.e., failed to represent [him] as vigorously as he might have otherwise ( People v. Easley (1988) 46 Cal.3d 712, 725 [250 Cal. Rptr. 855, 759 P.2d 490] [same]). (37c) Defendant does not expressly attempt to establish disloyal assistance of counsel. He speaks much about an invasion[] of the defense camp by the state ( Barber v. Municipal Court, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 760 (conc. and dis. opn. of Manuel, J.); accord, United States v. Mastroianni (1st Cir.1984) 749 F.2d 900, 906 [intrusion]; United States v. Seale (7th Cir.1972) 461 F.2d 345, 364 [same]), which assertedly requires automatic reversal or at least raises a presumption of prejudice. He does so inappropriately. There was no true invasion or intrusion into the defense camp. Rather, as he himself recognizes at times, there was simply a leak therefrom. Beneath his talk about invasion and intrusion, he impliedly attempts to establish disloyal assistance of counsel. Here, too, he fails. We shall assume for argument's sake that at least one interpreter served an interest other than his. (Here, too, there would be no basis for a similar assumption about either Attorney Holmes or Attorney Gable.) We cannot, however, find any pulling of punches. The record on appeal is simply barren of any indication thereof.
In his case, defendant called Gail McGarrity to the witness stand. As noted, she testified to her opinion, as a cultural anthropologist, on matters concerning his background and character in Cuba, and expressed the view that he suffered from conditions including profound emotional immaturity and extreme culture shock. In so doing, she stated that she had been unable to go to Cuba to conduct an investigation and hence had been unable to corroborate certain information on which she relied. As she was relating certain out-of-court statements on direct examination by Attorney Gable, Prosecutor Marlette made a hearsay objection and requested the superior court to instruct the jury that it could not consider any such statement for its truth. Attorney Gable declared that he was not offering statements of that sort for that purpose, but solely to reveal the basis of her opinion. He also declared that he did not object to the instruction requested. The superior court largely overruled the hearsay objection, and instructed the jury that it could not consider any out-of-court statement she related for its truth, but only as a basis for her opinion. Attorney Gable completed the direct examination. Prosecutor Marlette then subjected her to cross-examination. After she left the stand, he moved the superior court to withdraw the instruction it had given at his request, and to instruct the jury instead that it could consider any out-of-court statement she related for its truth. The superior court declared that it would do so only if defense counsel stipulated. They refused. It effectively denied the motion. (40) Complaining of defense counsel's refusal to stipulate to Prosecutor Marlette's motion, defendant contends that he was provided with ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. We disagree. Defendant does not demonstrate either deficient performance or prejudice. As to the absence of deficient performance: Evidently, Prosecutor Marlette made his motion in order to prevent the jury from drawing any inference favorable to defendant or adverse to the People based on McGarrity's inability to go to Cuba to conduct an investigation and her consequent inability to corroborate certain information on which she relied. Without offending any objective standard of professional reasonableness, defense counsel could have refused to stipulate, and apparently did refuse to stipulate, in order to allow the jury to draw precisely such an inference. Of course, they had to pay a price for their refusal: They had to give up an opportunity to use the out-of-court statements she related for their truth. The price, however, was not too high: the statements in question had little independent mitigating weight, coming as they did largely from defendant himself, who was affected by self-interest. As to the absence of prejudice: There is no reasonable probability of an effect on the outcome. By giving up an opportunity to use these statements for their truth, they gave up little. [38]
In the course of his summation, the prosecutor made comments characterizing defendant, including remarks to the effect that he was a creep, was worse than a predator[] because he enjoy[ed] ... unnecessary violence, was your worst nightmare, ... society's worst nightmare. Defendant objected to such comments as disparaging. Finding in substance that the remarks were not [i]nflaming the jury, the superior court overruled the objection. (41) Defendant contends in substance that the superior court erred by effectively determining that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct. As a general matter, an appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling on prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of discretion. There was no such abuse here. The superior court was not unreasonable in effectively determining that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct. For it was not unreasonable in impliedly finding that he did not use any method of persuasion that may be deemed deceptive or reprehensible, including inflammatory comments. Such remarks as those quoted above did indeed characterize defendant in negative terms. Although perhaps unnecessarily colorful, they were consistent with the evidence. Hence, they were not improper. (See, e.g., People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1076.) Defendant argues that the prosecutor in fact was testifying on behalf of his recommendation of death. The assertion is unsupported. It may be rejected out of hand.
In the course of the penalty phase, the superior court discharged two of the jurors who had sat on the jury when it rendered its verdicts and made its findings at the guilt phase, and put two alternates in their place. By stipulation of the People and defendant, it discharged one because of unavoidable scheduling conflicts. By necessity, it discharged the other because of death. Defendant moved the superior court to instruct the jury not to consider the guilt phase evidence. He relied on Penal Code section 190.4, subdivision (d), which provides that, [i]n any case in which the defendant may be subject to the death penalty, evidence presented at any prior phase of the trial ... shall be considered at any subsequent phase of the trial, if the trier of fact of the prior phase is the same trier of fact at the subsequent phase. The superior court refused. (42) Defendant contends that the superior court erred thereby. Against a claim of this kind, which involves the determination of applicable legal principles, an appellate court reviews a trial court's instruction independently. After such review, we find no error. Penal Code section 190.4, subdivision (d), declares in substance that, if the trier of fact at the penalty phase is the same as that at the guilt phase, it must consider the guilt phase evidence. Here, the trier of fact at the penalty phase was the same as that at the guilt phase. It was a jury. Indeed, it was the same jury: it was not rendered otherwise by the substitution of jurors with alternates. (See People v. Green (1971) 15 Cal. App.3d 524, 528 [93 Cal. Rptr. 84].) It therefore had to consider the guilt phase evidence. Had it been instructed not to, as requested by defendant, error would have been committed.
(43) Defendant contends that the superior court erred by delivering an instruction that he asserts was virtually identical to the no pity instruction held to be erroneous in People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 875-876 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813]: `As jurors, you must not be influenced by pity for a defendant....' Here too, against a claim that involves the determination of applicable legal principles, an appellate court reviews a trial court's instruction independently. Here too, we find no error. In accordance with the pattern instruction set out as CALJIC No. 8.84.1 (1989 new) (5th ed. pocket pt.), the superior court told the jury, in pertinent part, that [y]ou must neither be inf[l]uenced by bias or prejudice against the defendant.... This is the instruction that defendant challenges. It plainly survives his attack. For it plainly does not admonish against pity. It is true that the reporter's transcript originally presented the language in question as pity as or prejudice. But it was subsequently corrected to replace the meaningless pity as with bias.
In accordance with the pattern instruction set out as CALJIC No. 8.85 (5th ed. 1988)  and ultimately with Penal Code section 190.3  the superior court told the jury that, in choosing between the penalty of death and life imprisonment without possibility of parole, it should be guided by certain factors, if applicable, including [t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding.... Defendant contends that the superior court erred by delivering its instruction on the circumstances of the crime. Here too, against a claim that involves the determination of applicable legal principles, an appellate court reviews a trial court's instruction independently. Here too, we find no error. Penal Code section 190.3 impliedly requires a superior court to instruct on any factor that is applicable on the record of the individual case ( People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 932-933 [269 Cal. Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676], italics omitted)  which always and everywhere includes the circumstances of the crime. The superior court here complied. [39] Defendant argues that the superior court should have clarified its instruction on the circumstances of the crime (1) to specify that the crime referred to was the capital offense involving the murder of Allen Birkman, and (2) to state [40] that its circumstances did not embrace the rape of Sandra S., which was assertedly unrelated. Had he desired such a clarification, he should have requested it of the superior court. He made no request of this sort below. Hence, he may not raise a complaint here. [41]
Defendant made an application for modification of the verdict of death under Penal Code section 190.4, subdivision (e). After a hearing, the superior court denied the request. (44) Defendant contends that the superior court erred thereby. We review a superior court's ruling on a verdict-modification application independently. (E.g., People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1106.) After such review, we find no error. The superior court did all it was required to do. That is to say, it effectively review[ed] the evidence; consider[ed], [took] into account, and [was] guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances; ma[d]e a determination that the jury's findings and verdicts were not contrary to law or the evidence presented; state[d] on the record the reasons for [its] findings, and also set forth the reasons for [its] ruling and direct[ed] that they be entered on the Clerk's minutes (Pen. Code, § 190.4, subd. (e)). In arguing to the contrary, defendant makes a formal challenge. He attacks on four fronts. First, defendant asserts that, before making its ruling on his verdict-modification application, the superior court read a probation report, and thereby failed to anticipate our statement in People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 287 [266 Cal. Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892] that the preferable procedure is not to do so. But we presume that it was not improperly influenced by the report. (E.g., People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1106.) Our presumption is not rebutted by anything in the record on appeal. Second, defendant asserts that, in making its ruling on his verdict-modification application, the superior court undertook to independently determine whether the penalty of death was appropriate, and did in fact so determine, instead of simply proceeding to assess whether the jury's choice was contrary to the law or the evidence. He is right in stating that such an assessment is required and that an independent determination of this sort is not called for. (E.g., People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 1105-1106.) He is wrong, however, in implying that he has any cause for complaint. For if we assume, as he claims, that the superior court undertook to independently determine that the penalty of death was appropriate, and did in fact so determine, we must conclude that it necessarily found that the jury's choice was not contrary to the law or the evidence. Third, defendant asserts that, in making its ruling on his verdict-modification application, the superior court review[ed] the evidence (Pen. Code, § 190.4, subd. (e)) in an improper manner. He says that it was required to, but did not, employ the same type of analysis the jury would have done [ sic ] under the instructions. He fails to provide any support for the existence of such a requirement. We find none. To the extent that he maintains that it could not consider the evidence of the rape of Sandra S. or the robbery of Greta Slatten, he is incorrect. Indeed, in his verdict-modification application, he expressly conceded that it could. Correctly so. The Sandra S. rape and the Slatten robbery were each relevant to one or the other of two issues material to the question of penalty under Penal Code section 190.3, viz., the nature and circumstances of the present [capital] offense  if it was deemed related thereto  or the presence or absence of other criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or which involved the express or implied threat to use force or violence  if it was not so deemed. [42] Fourth, defendant asserts that, in making its ruling on his verdict-modification application, the superior court was not sufficiently specific in the reasons it state[d] and set forth (Pen. Code, § 190.4, subd. (e)). It was. The proof is apparent on the face of the record on appeal: the reporter's transcript contains six pages of reasons, and the clerk's transcript incorporates them by reference. In addition to his formal challenge, defendant makes a substantive challenge. He attacks on only a single front. Defendant asserts that the superior court's ruling on his verdict-modification application is unsound as a matter of law. He says that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of the felony-murder-robbery special circumstance, on which death eligibility rests. We have concluded to the contrary. (See, ante, at pp. 225-226.) [43]
(45) Defendant contends that each of the two so-called Three Strikes and You're Out laws exempts him from the death penalty and thereby renders unauthorized the sentence of death that the superior court imposed on him under the 1978 death penalty law. While this appeal was pending, section 667 of the Penal Code was amended by the Legislature to establish a sentencing scheme for fixing the term of imprisonment for any person convicted of a felony who had previously been convicted of one or more specified felonies (Stats. 1994, ch. 12, § 1), effective March 7, 1994 ( id., § 2). This is the first Three Strikes law. Subsequently, section 1170.12 was added to the Penal Code by the voters to establish a similar scheme (initiative measure Prop. 184, § 1, approved at Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994)), effective November 9, 1994 (Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a)). This is the second Three Strikes law. [44] Defendant's argument is as follows: Penal Code sections 667 and 1170.12 each establish a sentencing scheme for fixing the term of imprisonment for any person convicted of a felony who had previously been convicted of one or more specified felonies; each scheme is exclusive; as a result, each supersedes the 1978 death penalty law; each would have applied to him, inasmuch as he was convicted of five felonies in the present proceeding and had previously been convicted of the specified felony of voluntary manslaughter, if he had committed the five felonies on or after its effective date; each should be applied retroactively to his benefit as mitigatory. We are not persuaded. At least one crucial step in defendant's argument is unsound. It is true that Penal Code sections 667 and 1170.12 each establish a sentencing scheme for fixing the term of imprisonment for any person convicted of a felony who had previously been convicted of one or more specified felonies. It does not follow, however, that either supersedes the 1978 death penalty law. For, contrary to defendant's assertion, neither is exclusive: each declares itself to apply not exclusively, but rather in addition to any other ... punishment provisions which may apply (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (e), 1170.12, subd. (c), italics added)  including those of the 1978 death penalty law. (Cf. People v. Williams (1995) 40 Cal. App.4th 446, 457-458 [46 Cal. Rptr.2d 730] [rejecting a similar argument as to Penal Code section 667 for different reasons].) [45]
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that we must affirm the judgment. It is so ordered.