Opinion ID: 1686118
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the youth court err in failing to inform i.g.'s mother and step-father of their right to counsel at the educational neglect hearing?

Text: This case involves the enforcement of the Mississippi compulsory attendance law, Mississippi Code Annotated § 37-13-91 (Supp. 1984). Under subsection 7(h) of that Act, when the attendance officer has exhausted all attempts to secure attendance of the child in school, the officer shall file an educational neglect petition with the youth court under Mississippi Code Annotated § 43-21-451 (1972). The youth court shall expedite a hearing to make an appropriate adjudication and disposition to insure compliance with the school attendance law. This occurred here. However, Mississippi Code Annotated § 43-21-451 (1972), which provides for the commencement of formal proceedings seeking an adjudication that a child is a neglected child, also contains under the same chapter the method of dealing with the adjudication process. § 43-21-557 provides: (1) At the beginning of each adjudicatory hearing, the youth court shall: ... . (d) explain to the parties the purpose of the hearing and the possible dispositional alternatives thereof; and (e) explain to the parties: (i) the right to counsel; (ii) the right to remain silent; (iii) the right to subpoena witnesses; (iv) the right to cross-examine witnesses testifying against him; and (v) the right to appeal. (2) The youth court should then ascertain whether the parties before the youth court are represented by counsel. If a party before the youth court is not represented by counsel, the youth court shall ascertain whether the party understands his right to counsel. If the party wishes to retain counsel, the youth court shall continue the hearing for a reasonable time to allow the party to obtain and consult with counsel of his choosing. If an indigent child does not have counsel, the youth court shall appoint counsel to represent the child and shall continue the hearing for a reasonable time to allow the child to consult with his appointed counsel. Among the provisions applicable to all youth court proceedings, Mississippi Code Annotated § 43-21-201 provides: (1) Each party shall have the right to be represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings. If the party is a child, the child shall be represented by counsel at all critical stages. If indigent, the child shall have the right to have counsel appointed for him by the youth court. (2) When a party first appears before the youth court, the judge shall ascertain whether he is represented by counsel and, if not, inform him of his rights, including his right to counsel. It is undisputed that nowhere in the record before us of the educational neglect hearing does the youth court judge explain to I.G.'s mother and step-father their rights under § 43-21-557, including the right to counsel and the right to appeal. This Court has held that where delinquency proceedings are brought under the Youth Court Act, the court should advise the minor and his parent that they are entitled to legal representation. In the interest of Long, 184 So.2d 861 (Miss. 1966); In interest of Ferguson, 317 So.2d 899 (Miss. 1975); In Interest of Way, 319 So.2d 651 (Miss. 1975). Ferguson and Way were reversed because the failure to advise the minor of his right to counsel rendered inadmissible the sole evidence against him, a confession. These cases acknowledge that the state and the court must advise the minor and his parents of their right to counsel. Both the statute covering youth court adjudicatory hearings [§ 43-21-557] and the statute governing youth court proceedings generally [§ 43-21-201], impose a mandatory duty upon the judge to ascertain whether each party is represented by counsel and, if not, to inform him of his right to counsel. These statutes do not, however, provide for the appointment of counsel for the parents. The youth court did not inform I.G.'s mother and step-father of their right to counsel, as mandated by our legislature, and for this reason the cause must be reversed. The effect of this omission becomes readily apparent at the contempt hearing, where I.G.'s mother and step-father testified that they came away from the educational neglect hearing with the understanding that the only valid excuse for keeping I.G. out of school was serious illness. The compulsory school attendance law, § 37-13-91 (4)(a)-(i), lists eight other valid excuses for temporary non-attendance, including a catch-all ground left to the principal's discretion. If the appellants had known of their right to counsel at the initial hearing and their right to appeal, they would likely have gone to Legal Services for representation, as they did for the second and third hearings. The state urges that the entire issue is barred because the appellants failed to perfect an appeal from the educational neglect hearing within 30 days, as required by Mississippi Supreme Court Rule 48. The state would have its cake and eat it too. Obviously, as the appellants were not informed of their right to counsel and their right to appeal at the educational neglect hearing, they had no way of knowing that they had a right of appeal, much less the time limits within which that right had to be exercised. Furthermore, the amended notice of appeal, filed 60 days after the first hearing, sought to consolidate all three hearings in one appeal. It would be manifestly unjust if this Court allowed the state to invoke Rule 48 to bar this appeal, based on the grounds that the appellants were not informed that they had a right to counsel and a right to appeal, when the statute clearly requires youth court judges to inform parties appearing before the youth court of these rights. While this case deals with parents who were parties before the court and not the minor, the record does not reflect that the appellants were informed of any of the other rights enumerated at § 43-21-557 (1)(e), including the right to remain silent, the right to subpoena witnesses, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to appeal. Our cases reversing youth court convictions for failure to inform the minor of his right to counsel generally turn on the inadmissibility of the confession. The youth court, in this case, interrogated the appellants without informing them of their right to assistance of counsel or their right to remain silent. The order upon which the subsequent citation of contempt was founded directly resulted from this interrogation. Therefore, in our view, the citation for contempt must also be reversed on the ground that it was based upon a court proceeding in which the appellants were denied statutory due process.