Opinion ID: 705166
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Human Rights Law

Text: 96 The HRL defines employer in terms of the number of persons employed and provides no clue to whether individual employees of a corporate employer may be sued under its provisions. Patrowich v. Chemical Bank, 63 N.Y.2d 541, 542, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659, 473 N.E.2d 11 (1984) (citing N.Y.Exec.Law Sec. 292(5)). In Patrowich, the New York Court of Appeals held that an employee is not individually subject to suit under Sec. 296 of the HRL as an employer if he is not shown to have any ownership interest or any power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others. Id. at 542, 483 N.Y.S.2d 659, 473 N.E.2d 11. None of the three individual defendants has an ownership interest in Seiler, and plaintiff has not alleged that either Polonsky or Conroy had the power to hire or fire her. As to Lucey, no evidence has been presented to indicate that he could hire or fire Tomka, or any other Seiler employee. Although Lucey's position as district manager gave him supervisory control over Tomka's worksite and would presumably enable him to review and comment on her performance in Rochester, it was Ray Taylor, the director of the Starts and Surveys team, who had assigned Tomka to Rochester and who apparently had the authority to make personnel decisions about Starts and Surveys team members. 97 However, Sec. 296(6) of the HRL states that it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this article, or attempt to do so. N.Y.Exec.Law Sec. 296(6) (emphasis added). Based on this language, several courts have distinguished Patrowich by holding that a defendant who actually participates in the conduct giving rise to a discrimination claim may be held personally liable under the HRL. See, e.g., Poulsen v. City of North Tonawanda, N.Y., 811 F.Supp. 884, 900 (W.D.N.Y.1993); Bridges, 800 F.Supp. at 1180-81; Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 740 F.Supp. 127, 135-36 (N.D.N.Y.1990); but see Falbaum v. Pomerantz, 891 F.Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y.1995). In the present case, Tomka has alleged that each of the individual defendants assaulted her and thereby created a hostile working environment. This allegation is sufficient to satisfy Sec. 296(6), and the district court thus incorrectly dismissed Tomka's sexual harassment claims against the individual defendants in their personal capacities under the HRL.