Opinion ID: 2675603
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: DDR could nevertheless be found liable for

Text: negligently allowing Martínez's discriminatory acts to cause Velázquez's firing. Our conclusion that Martínez was not a supervisor does not necessarily absolve DDR of potential liability for Velázquez's discharge. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the precise question of whether employer liability premised on a finding of negligence can be limited to cases of hostile workplace discrimination, as opposed to discriminatory termination. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1194 n.4 (2011) (We express no view as to whether the employer would be liable if a co-worker, rather than a supervisor, committed a discriminatory act that influenced the ultimate employment decision.). The Court has cautioned, though, that the distinction between hostile workplace claims and quid pro quo claims is of limited utility. Burlington -16- Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998). And we see no basis for applying that distinction to permit a negligent employer to escape (or incur) liability on one type of claim but not the other. The same considerations of simplicity touted in Vance that counsel against heightening the potential for liability on quid pro quo claims counsel as well against lessening the potential for liability. Suppose, for example, that a white employee repeatedly taunts a black co-worker with vicious racial epithets and also lodges a series of false complaints about the victim to their supervisor in a racially-motivated attempt to have the victim fired. Certainly the employer could be held liable for negligently permitting the taunting. Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2439. So, too, the employer should be liable if it fires the victim based on complaints that it knew (or reasonably should have known) were the product of discriminatory animus. In either situation, the same elements are present: an act of discrimination is allowed to cause harm by an employer that knows or reasonably should know of the -17- discrimination. Other courts have reached the same conclusion, at least implicitly.7 In short, an employer can be held liable under Title VII if: the plaintiff's co-worker makes statements maligning the plaintiff, for discriminatory reasons and with the intent to cause the plaintiff's firing; the co-worker's discriminatory acts proximately cause the plaintiff to be fired; and the employer acts negligently by allowing the co-worker's acts to achieve their desired effect though it knows (or reasonably should know) of the discriminatory motivation. Here, a reasonable jury applying this test could find in favor of Velázquez. B. Hostile Workplace Claim As to Velázquez's more traditional hostile workplace claim, we agree with the district court that it offers no independent route to a judgment for Velázquez. To prevail on the claim, Velázquez would have to show that harassment was so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of [his] employment and 7 See, e.g., Flitton v. Primary Residential Mortgage, Inc., 238 F. App'x 410, 418 & n.5 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that a discriminatory termination claim could be supported by discriminatory comments by someone the plaintiff reported to, but who was not labeled a supervisor and did not make the decision to fire her); Oakstone v. Postmaster Gen., 332 F. Supp. 2d 261, 273 (D. Me. 2004) (holding that an employer could be held liable on a negligence theory for taking tangible employment actions based on a co-worker's discriminatory reports); see also Johnson v. Koppers, Inc., 726 F.3d 910, 915 (7th Cir. 2013) (assuming that a coworker’s discriminatory report could support a Title VII discriminatory termination claim, but rejecting the claim because the report was not the proximate cause of the termination). -18- create an abusive working environment. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Aiming to prevent Title VII from becoming a general civility code, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff must show that the sexually objectionable environment [was] both objectively and subjectively offensive, such that a reasonable person would find [it] hostile and abusive and the victim in fact did perceive to be so. Id. at 787-88. Elaborating this latter requirement, we have held that a plaintiff alleging that sexual advances created a hostile workplace cannot prevail unless the advances were unwelcome. O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 728 (1st Cir. 2001). Here, we must rely on Velázquez's deposition testimony, along with a series of emails between him and Martínez, to determine whether he could prevail.8 Reviewing this evidence, the district court ruled that Martínez's conduct was neither unwelcome nor severe or pervasive. On the first point, the district court found that the Plaintiffs and Martínez had the type of relationship where they . . . exchanged emails that were sometimes flirtatious, used vulgar language, had sexual content and were not work related. We disagree with the district court, but only in part: based on Velázquez's testimony, a reasonable jury 8 Velázquez also submitted an affidavit, but the district court struck it as tardy, and Velázquez does not appeal that ruling. -19- could conclude that Martínez's advances were unwelcome after their falling out, but not before. Velázquez has summarized his own testimony as stating that he had a good working relationship with Martínez until April 2008 but that Martínez, since the month of April 2008, up until [his] termination, started to harass, discriminate and retaliate against [him] . . . . Indeed, Velázquez testified at his deposition that he started feeling intimidated by Martínez only after the April incident at the hotel. Before that incident, their relationship was characterized by trust, a certain appreciation, and mutual flirtation, including the use of double intender [sic] words. The email evidence supports Velázquez's testimony, showing that he and Martínez once had a mutually flirtatious relationship that ended during their email exchange from April 10th to 12th following the first hotel incident. During that exchange, Velázquez harshly rebuffed Martínez9 and she reacted angrily.10 The talk was apparently cathartic, at least temporarily, as the final emails from both participants were calm and amicable.11 9 See footnote 3 above for specific examples. 10 For example, Martínez wrote: God made me see that you were an instrument of evil and that sooner or later you were going to destroy me. He rescued me and showed me what you really are, and He made me see that you were pure darkness. 11 For example, Velázquez wrote: I only want to tell you that you have a very special place in my heart. -20- Nevertheless, a reasonable jury could infer that any subsequent sexual advances by Martínez were unwelcome. As a result, we examine Martínez's conduct after April 12, 2008, to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could view it as severe or pervasive harassment. At his deposition, Velázquez gave only extremely vague answers when asked how and when Martínez harassed him. For example, he testified that Martínez tried a couple of times to transform a kiss on the cheek to a kiss on the mouth, but he failed to provide any sense of when this occurred or whether the behavior continued after April. He similarly offered no temporal detail regarding his claim that Martínez made comments about his clothing. Velázquez testified initially that very strong, strong sexual harassment commenced in April and that this harassment included requests to engage in sexual activity. But when asked for further specifics, Velázquez said, I would have to review the emails to be specific and I can't be specific, because I don't have the emails in front of me. Velázquez, though, has never been able to point to any email showing conduct of this type after April 12, nor do we see one in the record. Velázquez did also testify that during the one or two months after the April encounter, Martínez sent him an unspecified number of anonymous gifts such as chocolate, in at least one case including a note to my little rascal. Further, he testified that -21- shortly before he was fired, Martínez confessed her love to him in a hotel in August 2008 during a conversation he perceived as a renewed effort to establish a sexual relationship. The conversation ended promptly when Velázquez told Martínez he did not want to have a romantic relationship with her. Even viewing the record in the light most favorable to Velázquez, neither Martínez's gifts nor her comments at the hotel in August approach severe harassment under our precedent, particularly given the lack of physical touching, implicit physical coercion, extreme language, or obscene behavior. See Ponte v. Steelcase Inc., 741 F.3d 310, 314, 320-21 (1st Cir. 2014); Pomales v. Celulares Telefónica, Inc., 447 F.3d 79, 81, 83-84 (1st Cir. 2006). We doubt that a jury could even find these few post-April incidents hostile or abusive, in isolation or in aggregate. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787. See also Vega-Colón v. Wyeth Pharm., 625 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2010). And, even if a jury found Martínez's actions hostile or abusive, a handful of relatively mild incidents over a five month period could not be deemed pervasive harassment. See Lee-Crespo v. Schering-Plough Del Caribe Inc., 354 F.3d 34, 46 (1st Cir. 2003). Even further assuming that the factfinder could add into the equation Martínez's criticisms of Velázquez's work, which were not explicitly sexual but may have been motivated by sexual rejection, Velázquez still could not show that the harassment reached the required level of severity or -22- pervasiveness. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (noting that the sexual harassment standard filter[s] out complaints attacking the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language . . . . (internal quotation marks omitted)). Notably, Velázquez failed to offer any evidence that Martínez's behavior unreasonably interfere[d] with [his] work performance. Id. at 787-88. See also Pomales, 447 F.3d at 84 (finding no actionable harassment in part due to the lack of evidence that the alleged conduct negatively affected [the plaintiff's] ability to work as a . . . sales consultant). Indeed, there is no evidence that Velázquez was aware of the bulk of the criticisms Martínez was surreptitiously feeding to his supervisors. In sum, no unwelcome harassment occurred before the April falling out, and no severe or pervasive harassment occurred afterwards. If DDR's negligence allowed Martínez's retaliatory animus to play a causal role in its decision to terminate Velázquez, then he does indeed have a claim. But Velázquez has not shown that Martínez's conduct otherwise made his working environment objectively abusive before he was fired. We therefore hold that, if no discriminatory animus infected the termination decision, Velázquez could not prevail on a Title VII harassment claim with the evidence he has presented. -23- C. Retaliation In addition to claiming sex discrimination, Velázquez asserts that DDR retaliated against him by firing him for complaining of discrimination. We first discuss the threshold issue of timeliness, then turn to the substance of Velázquez's claim. Velázquez's retaliation claim arises from events in the spring and summer of 2008, culminating in his firing on August 25, 2008, the last act encompassed by his complaint. Velázquez filed his charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 185 days after he was fired, on February 26, 2009. As a general rule, Title VII requires plaintiffs to file a retaliation charge within 180 days of the alleged act of retaliation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). However, the limitations period expands to 300 days where the plaintiff has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice . . . . Id. Thus, the questions here are (1) whether Velázquez initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency, specifically the Puerto Rico Department of Labor and Human Resources, and (2) whether that state agency had authority to grant or seek relief from [the -24- challenged] practice. The company argues that Velázquez fails on both counts.12 As to the first question, Velázquez admits that he did not submit his charge directly to the state agency. He argues, however, that his filing at the EEOC automatically and simultaneously initiated proceeding at the Puerto Rico agency, pursuant to a worksharing agreement between the state agency and the EEOC. In particular, that agreement provides: In order to facilitate the assertion of employment rights, the EEOC and the [Puerto Rico Department of Labor and Human Resources] each designate the other as its agent for the purpose of receiving and drafting charges . . . . The EEOC's receipt of charges on the [Puerto Rico Department of Labor and Human Resources's] behalf will automatically initiate the proceedings of both the EEOC and the [Puerto Rico Department of Labor and Human Resources] for the purposes of [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) and (e)(1)]. The EEOC routinely uses worksharing agreements to facilitate “more streamlined and cooperative” relationships with state and local agencies, as it explained to this court in an amicus brief. Indeed, the Commission has used worksharing agreements for more than twenty-five years. See EEOC v. Commercial Office Products, Co., 486 U.S. 107, 112 (1988) (noting that the EEOC had entered worksharing agreements with “approximately three-quarters of the 109 state and local agencies authorized to enforce state and local 12 The first question, at least, would seem to apply equally to Velazquez's sexual harassment claim and retaliation claim, although the company has not presented any timeliness challenge to the sexual harassment claim. -25- employment discrimination laws”). The EEOC agrees that under the worksharing agreement applicable here, Velázquez's filing initially instituted proceedings with the Puerto Rico agency. The commission explains that, under the agreement, a plaintiff who files with the EEOC has also filed with the Puerto Rico agency, which has designated the EEOC as its agent for receiving charges, and that the plaintiff has initiated proceedings with the Puerto Rico agency. Many circuits have accepted that the EEOC may use worksharing agreements to achieve exactly this effect.13 We join those circuits, confirming our prior dictum that worksharing agreements can permit state proceedings to be automatically initiated when the EEOC receives the charge. E.E.O.C. v. Green, 76 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1996). DDR correctly observes that our opinion in Green noted that the governing worksharing agreement in that case did not make clear whether the EEOC and state agency intended a filing with the EEOC to initiate proceedings at the state agency. Id. The EEOC has since updated its standard worksharing agreement, and the agreement here clearly provides that 13 See Tewksbury v. Ottaway Newspapers, 192 F.3d 322, 327 (2d Cir. 1999); E.E.O.C. v. Techalloy Maryland, Inc., 894 F.2d 676, 679 (4th Cir. 1990); Griffin v. City of Dallas, 26 F.3d 610, 612 (5th Cir. 1994); Hong v. Children's Mem'l Hosp., 936 F.2d 967, 970 (7th Cir. 1991); E.E.O.C. v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1510 (9th Cir. 1989) overruled on other grounds by Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). -26- a filing with the EEOC will simultaneously initiate proceedings at the Puerto Rico Department of Labor and Human Resources.14 We also conclude that the Puerto Rico agency had authority to grant or seek relief from the retaliation alleged by Velázquez. Puerto Rico law prohibits employers from retaliating against individuals who have complained of sexual harassment, a prohibition established by Act 17 passed in 1988. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 155h. The Puerto Rico Department of Labor and Human Resources has statutory authority to enforce Act 17, see P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 308, and it established the Anti-Discrimination Unit to carry out that function. Under bylaws promulgated by the Department of Labor and Human Resources, the Anti-Discrimination Unit can investigate complaints of illegal discrimination or retaliation and can seek a remedy for such acts in court. DDR nevertheless points out that at the time of Velázquez's filing, an EEOC regulation omitted Puerto Rico from a list of jurisdictions in which a local or state agency had authority to enforce a prohibition on retaliation related to sexual harassment. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74(a) & n.5 (2008). The EEOC has acknowledged that the regulation became outdated when Puerto Rico passed Act 17 in 1988. Accordingly, the Commission has now amended the regulation to make clear that the Puerto Rico Department of 14 The company also claims that, even if Velázquez could have initiated proceedings at both agencies by filing with the EEOC, he chose not to. This claim is not supported by the evidence. -27- Labor has authority over charges alleging retaliation for having opposed unlawful sexual harassment. 29 C.F.R. 1601.74 n.6 (2014). There is no dispute that the Puerto Rico agency has had such authority since at least 1988.15 We owe no deference to the erroneous prior version of the regulation, which does not purport to interpret any ambiguous language bearing on this case. See, e.g., United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 392 (1999) (explaining that Chevron deference applies only to agency[] statutory interpretation that fills a gap or defines a term in a way that is reasonable in light of the legislature's revealed design (internal quotation marks omitted)). The language of Title VII clearly establishes the relevant requirement: the longer limitations period applies where a local or state agency had authority to grant or seek relief from [the challenged] practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Rather than attempting to fill any gap in the statute, the regulation provides a list, for public reference, of state and local agencies that have applied for and received formal recognition from the EEOC as having the authority to enforce anti-discrimination laws. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.70-1601.74 (2008). Moreover, the regulation itself explicitly provides that an agency lacking this formal designation 15 The company claimed at oral argument that the department had such authority even before Act 17 was passed. But what matters for our purposes is only that the agency had it when Velázquez filed. -28- may nevertheless meet the statutory criteria and may be treated accordingly by the EEOC. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.70(b) (2008) ([I]f the Commission is aware that an agency or authority meets the . . . criteria for . . . designation, the Commission shall defer charges to such agency or authority even though no request for . . . designation has been made.). Thus, even on its own terms, the regulation does not prevent Velázquez from utilizing the longer statute of limitations.16 The company in its brief argues that we should affirm the district court's decision on the alternative grounds that Velázquez's retaliation claim fails to survive summary judgment on its merits. Specifically, the company contends that Velázquez has not produced sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that his complaints of discrimination caused him to be fired. This but-for causation requirement for a Title VII retaliation case differs materially from the motivating factor test applicable to Velázquez's discrimination claim. See University of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2532-33 (2013). To prevail at trial, Velázquez must show that he would not have been fired had he not complained. 16 In so holding, we reject the conclusion of district court cases finding that the regulation precluded plaintiffs in Puerto Rico from utilizing the 300 day limitations period. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 240, 249 (D.P.R. 2004). -29- Velázquez files no reply brief responding to this argument. Nor does Velázquez's opening brief develop or even suggest any counter-argument. Our task is not to go through a record and see if a losing party may have developed an argument that it did not raise on appeal. See, e.g., Dialysis Access Ctr., LLC v. RMS Lifeline, Inc., 638 F.3d 367, 374 n.7 (1st Cir. 2011). Here, moreover, there is ample reason not to undertake such an inquiry. Velázquez's basic position, which we have accepted, is that a jury might find that Martínez sought his termination because he rebuffed her. His brief contains no argument that she was even aware that he had complained about her. Nor is there any evidence that González or Martínez first learned of any complaint by Velázquez during the period of time when González changed his mind from putting Velázquez on a performance plan for confirmed shortcomings in his performance to firing him instead. Accordingly, while we find that Velázquez had not run out of time to claim that his firing was in retaliation for having complained about Martínez's conduct, the claim is waived as unsupported by argument or fact on appeal.