Opinion ID: 767510
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pump System Debris

Text: 43 After Avitech replaced the right pump, the left pump failed and was replaced a few days later. Four years later, during the fatal flight, the left pump failed again followed, allegedly, by the failure of the right pump. Additionally, the engine was cleaned at least four times after Avitech replaced the right pump. According to the evidence, all of the following can introduce contamination into the system: the negligent installation of a pump, the actual failure of a pump, engine cleaning, and even normal operation. In this case, debris was found after (1) four years of operation, (2) four engine cleanings, (3) three pump failures, (4) the installation of the left pump, and (5) the discovery of an oil leak near the left pump, which all agree was never fixed. 44 Given the variety of intervening events, the finding of debris alone cannot support any rational inference that Avitech's installation of the right pump was negligent, given that the plaintiff's experts wholly fail to address and rule out the numerous other potential causes. Had the expert's opinions undergone a Daubert analysis, they likely would not have been admissible, since an important factor under Daubert is the testability of an expert's conclusions and theory. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993). In this case, expert testimony was necessary to establish the likely cause of an aircraft disaster. A necessary ingredient of such theorizing, however, is the exclusion of alternative causes. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 757, 759 n.27 (3rd Cir. 1994). 45 Although the plaintiff's expert's theory that debris was evidence of negligence would likely have been inadmissible at trial under Daubert because it failed to exclude other causes, and although only admissible evidence should be considered at summary judgment, it is perhaps remiss to attempt a Daubert inquiry at the appellate level when the district court did not perform one. 2 See Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporacion Insular De Seguros, 111 F.3d 184, 189(1st Cir. 1997). However, in determining whether the plaintiff has sufficient and competent summary judgment evidence for a given issue, it would be equally remiss for us to ignore the fact that a plaintiff's expert evidence lacks any rational probative value. For if evidence gives rise to numerous inferences which are equally plausible, yet only one inference is consistent with the plaintiff's theory, the plaintiff has failed to offer evidence which is significantly probative, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986), absent at least some evidence that excludes the other potential causes. The reason for this is as follows: 46 Under Texas law, if a plaintiff has evidence that a defendant's negligence is a proximate cause of an accident, the plaintiff need not make any attempt to rule out other proximate causes of the accident because there can be more than one proximate cause of an injury, and all persons whose negligent conduct contributed to the injury are responsible for it. Coleman v. Equitable Real Estate Investment Management, Inc., 971 S.W.2d 611 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998). 47 However, if the plaintiff's only evidence of the defendant's negligence is an inference from the observation of a dangerous condition such as contaminated pump lines, then the plaintiff must at least make an attempt to rule out other likely sources of negligence because such an inference is essentially a form of res ipsa loquitur, even if the plaintiff does not label it as such. 48 Notwithstanding the fact that res ipsa is only applicable when the condition in question was under the exclusive control of the defendant - which was not thecase here - res ipsa also requires an exclusion of alternative causes. See, e.g., Harris v. National Passenger Railroad Corp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 673, 679 (E.D.Tex. 1999) (While res ipsa loquitur alleviates the plaintiff of the burden of directly proving causation, it is only applicable where the likelihood of causes other than the defendant are ruled out . . . .). 49 Because the plaintiff's expert made no attempt to rule out the numerous other sources of contamination of the alleged debris, the evidence was not significantly probative as to the issue of Avitech's negligence, and thus does not preclude summary judgment.