Opinion ID: 2622770
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: conclusion

Text: ¶ 63 We hold that § 760 is unconstitutional. We affirm the Court of Appeals in each case. C. JOHNSON, MADSEN, BRIDGE, CHAMBERS and OWENS, JJ., concur. SANDERS, J. (dissenting). ¶ 64 That to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical. [1] ¶ 65 The majority turns the First Amendment on its head. Unions have a statutory, not constitutional, right to cause employers not only to withhold and remit membership dues but also to withhold and remit fees from nonmembers in an equivalent amount. [2] Absent this statutory mechanism for the withholding and remission of agency fees (or membership fees for that matter), there is no right, constitutional or otherwise, for the union to require it. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 223, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 1793, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). ¶ 66 Many other states have markedly different statutory schemes: Some entirely bar union security agreements and outlaw agency shops as well. [3] ¶ 67 Should the legislature of the State of Washington choose to repeal the mandatory withholding provisions of RCW 41.59.060 and.100, there would be no constitutional impediment to doing so. And no party to this proceeding claims there is. ¶ 68 However the existence of these mandatory withholding statutes does raise a very definite constitutional problem insofar as the statute is used to compel the nonmember to support the political advocacy of the union without his consent. Nearly every case cited by the majority concerns precisely that eventuality. However that constitutional problem can no longer arise in the state of Washington by virtue of a further statute, RCW 42.17.760, which provides in its entirety: A labor organization may not use agency shop fees paid by an individual who is not a member of the organization to make contributions or expenditures to influence an election or to operate a political committee, unless affirmatively authorized by the individual. ¶ 69 There is nothing ambiguous about this statute. No labor organization may use agency fees for political purposes absent affirmative authoriz[ation] by the individual. Nonaction or acquiescence is not affirmative authoriz[ation]. ¶ 70 Given that the legislature could constitutionally repeal the whole statutory scheme allowing withholding in the first place, I find it nearly beyond comprehension to claim that the legislature, or the people acting through their sovereign right of initiative, could not qualify these statutes to ensure their constitutional application. ¶ 71 In short, the majority turns the First Amendment on its head to invalidate a state statute enacted to further protect the constitutional rights of nonunion members who are required to pay agency fees as the price of their employment. ¶ 72 While the First Amendment protects the right to organize and to express ideas on behalf of an organization, it does not impose any affirmative obligation on the government to listen, to respond, or ... to recognize the association and bargain with it. Smith v. Ark. State Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463, 465, 99 S.Ct. 1826, 1828, 60 L.Ed.2d 360 (1979). See also Brown v. Alexander, 718 F.2d 1417, 1421-22 (6th Cir.1983). Following from this basic premise, there is no constitutional right to have the government deduct union dues (and, by logical extension, agency fees) from paychecks. Ark. State Highway Employees v. Kell, 628 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1980). ¶ 73 Although the loss of payroll deductions may economically burden the [union] and thereby impair its effectiveness, such a burden is not constitutionally impermissible. S.C. Educ. Ass'n v. Campbell, 883 F.2d 1251, 1256 (4th Cir.1989). [T]he First Amendment does not impose an affirmative obligation on the state to assist the program of an association by providing payroll deduction services. Id. at 1257. The Fourth Circuit, examining whether payroll deductions were constitutionally required, quoted the United States Supreme Court, `[A] legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe that right.' Id. at 1256 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976)). The court concluded by stating, the state's failure to authorize payroll deductions for the [union] does not deny [union] members the right to associate, to speak, to publish, to recruit members, or to otherwise express and disseminate their views. Id. at 1257. ¶ 74 The Ohio legislature eliminated wage checkoffs for the support of any candidate, separate segregated fund, political action committee, legislative campaign, political party, or ballot issue. Ohio Rev.Code § 3599.031(H). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found this constitutional. Toledo Area AFL-CIO Council v. Pizza, 154 F.3d 307, 319-21 (6th Cir.1998). ¶ 75 Therefore, it would be perfectly constitutional if the State chose to eliminate the payroll deduction for collection of agency shop fees altogether. How then could merely placing a procedural condition on the collection of a small portion of such shop fees (those that would be used to influence an election or to operate a political committee) violate the constitution? ¶ 76 The majority chooses not to address this line of cases. Instead it distorts cases delineating the requirements protecting dissenting union members and nonmembers from having their dues used to support political activities with which they disagree to do the opposite: limit the State's ability to protect such dissenters. ¶ 77 Simply put, all of the cases cited by the majority involve claims by dissenters that certain steps were required to protect their constitutional right not to associate and not to have their money spent supporting political positions with which they disagreed. [4] I cannot improve upon Judge Hunt's dissent from the case below: [T]hese cases do not support the converse, advanced by the majority here, that an `opt-in' provision such as Washington's is constitutionally barred. State ex rel. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 117 Wash. App. 625, 642, 71 P.3d 244 (2003) (Hunt, J., dissenting). [5] Judge Hunt's learned dissent cogently analyzes each of the cases relied upon by the majority and reaches the correct conclusion. [6] ¶ 78 Our majority takes dissent is not to be presumed [7] out of the context in which it was writtenthe context of unions categorically violating the rights of dissenters. That language simply served to limit the actions a union must undertake in the absence of a statutory scheme. The holdings of all the cases cited by the majority amount to a simple proposition: the constitution requires at least an opt-out scheme to protect dissenters' rights. [8] None of these cases stand for the proposition that the constitution limits a different legislative approach to protecting dissenters' rights, including an opt-in scheme. ¶ 79 From the majority's misconstruction of the dissent is not to be presumed language a false balance requirement is invented. Other than general paeans to the right of association, the majority cites no other precedent for its holding that the balance between the associational rights of dissenters and nondissenters is upset by requiring one to register assent, rather than register dissent. [9] Again, if the elimination of a payroll deduction does not abridge the constitutional rights of union members and nonobjecting nonmembers to associate, it is inconceivable that requiring assent as a precondition to using funds generated by a payroll deduction abridges such rights. ¶ 80 In fact, an opt-in legislative scheme has explicitly been constitutionally upheld. In Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240 (6th Cir.1997), the Sixth Circuit upheld a statute that read: [A] labor organization may solicit or obtain contributions for a separate segregated fund . . . on an automatic basis, including but not limited to a payroll deduction plan, only if the individual who is contributing to the fund affirmatively consents to the contribution at least once in every calendar year. Id. at 1248-1249 (quoting Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 169.255(6) (West 1966)). ¶ 81 The statutory scheme in Michigan prohibited labor unions from making political contributions from general funds, requiring them to maintain a segregated fund for such contributions. Id. at 1244. Thus, in order to solicit or obtain funds that would be used for political purposeseven from its own members, let alone nonmembersthe union had to obtain affirmative consent for the deduction every calendar year. ¶ 82 This is a more restrictive scheme than the Washington statute at issue since it applies to all union members while the Washington statute applies only to nonmembers. [10] But the statute mirrors Washington's in requiring affirmative consentsubstantively identical to affirmative authorizationbefore using payroll deductions for political purposes. And even given the Michigan statute's broader effects in applying to union members, the Sixth Circuit stated: [T]he suggestion that asking people to check a box once a year unduly interferes with the speech rights of those contributors borders on the frivolous. Id. at 1253. ¶ 83 The majority's treatment of this case borders on the inexplicable. It claims that the primary issue in Miller was the equal application of the reverse checkoff to unions, corporations, non-profits, and other groups. Majority at 362 n. 6. It was nothing of the sort. The three sections of the opinion are labeled Facts ( id. at 1243), Intervention ( id. at 1245), and The First Amendment and § 169.255(6) ( id. at 1248). There are no sections involving equal protection challenges. [11] ¶ 84 As Miller recognized, the suggestion that a legislative choice to protect dissenting nonmembers by requiring affirmative authorization before using their agency shop fees to influence an election or to operate a political committee violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution borders on the frivolous. ¶ 85 The majority claims this statute violates the First Amendment associational rights of the union, citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L.Ed.2d 554 (2000). ¶ 86 This argument's flaw is at its foundation: association is a two way street requiring a mutual desire to associate by all concerned. But here nonunion employees have elected not to associate. This does not violate the associated rights of the union or its members since it had no constitutional right to compel membership much less monetary support from nonmembers in the first place. ¶ 87 Moreover, this argument for unconstitutionality was never advanced by the parties and is therefore not properly considered by the court. See RAP 9.12 (limiting review of summary judgment to evidence and issues called to the attention of the trial court); see also Nelson v. McGoldrick, 127 Wash.2d 124, 140, 896 P.2d 1258 (1995); Simpson Tacoma Kraft Co. v. Dep't of Ecology, 119 Wash.2d 640, 649, 835 P.2d 1030 (1992) (refusing consideration of issues not raised before trial court); cf. Tiffany Family Trust Corp. v. City of Kent, 155 Wash.2d 225, 240, 119 P.3d 325 (2005) (refusing consideration of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim raised only in reply brief). ¶ 88 However even if it is properly before the court, it is not meritorious since this statute does not apply to union members only nonmembers who must pay agency fees because of their refusal to join the union. The right of these nonunion employees to refuse to join the union is itself protected by the First Amendment right of association as `[f]reedom of association ... plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.' Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 648, 120 S.Ct. 2446; Good v. Associated Students of Univ. of Wash., 86 Wash.2d 94, 104, 542 P.2d 762 (1975). Boy Scouts protected the right of nonassociation. Were this statute to apply to union dues from voluntary union members, the analysis might be arguable. But it doesn't, and it isn't. ¶ 89 The majority confuses the analysis further by referring to the union's expressive association with agency fee payers, majority at 363, and its [union's] expressive association with nonobjecting agency fee payers. Id. at 364. But there is no association between the union and agency fee payers because by definition these individuals have refused to join (associate with) the union. The absence of membership defeats any claim that the regulation of statutorily required monetary support can possibly violate the right of union members to freely associate with one another for political advocacy. Rather it puts in jeopardy the First Amendment right of nonmembers to refuse to associate with a union which uses their money to advance a political agenda with which they might disagree. That is the concern of the First Amendment in this context, as it is the even more protective concern of RCW 42.17.760. Our Government has no more power to compel individuals to support union programs or union publications than it has to compel the support of political programs, employer programs or church programs. And the First Amendment, fairly construed, deprives the Government of all power to make any person pay out one single penny against his will to be used in any way to advocate doctrines or views he is against, whether economic, scientific, political, religious or any other. Good, 86 Wash.2d at 101, 542 P.2d 762 (quoting Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 791, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting)). ¶ 90 I dissent. ALEXANDER, C.J., and FAIRHURST, J., concur.