Opinion ID: 1189746
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Count 3: Violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act

Text: The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 et seq., prohibits: [t]he act, use, or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate, or with the subsequent performance of such person as aforesaid, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived, or damaged thereby.... N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. The term merchandise generally includes services. N.J.S.A. 56:8-1(c). However, the New Jersey courts have consistently held that professionals are not covered by the Consumer Fraud Act. [A]lthough the literal language may be construed to include professional services, it would be ludicrous to construe the legislation with that broad a sweep in view of the fact that the nature of the services does not fall into the category of consumerism. Neveroski v. Blair, 141 N.J.Super. 365, 379, 358 A.2d 473 (App.Div. 1976). While the holding of Neveroski, that real estate brokers are not covered by the Consumer Fraud Act, is no longer good law due to the subsequent amendment of the Act to include sales of real estate, the New Jersey Supreme Court recently cited this dictum approvingly. Macedo v. Dello Russo, 178 N.J. 340, 344, 840 A.2d 238 (2004). The court in Macedo went on to say, Thus, forty years after the [Consumer Fraud Act] was enacted, our jurisprudence continues to identify learned professionals as beyond the reach of the Act so long as they are operating in their professional capacities. Id. at 345, 840 A.2d 238. Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Defendants' activities as not related to the provision of treatment, and thus not in any professional capacity, on the basis of Blatterfein v. Larken Associates, 323 N.J.Super. 167, 732 A.2d 555 (App.Div.1999), which held that an architect who misrepresented building materials to a house purchaser was acting as a sales agent rather than as a professional architect, and could therefore be liable under the Consumer Fraud Act. Id. at 183, 732 A.2d 555. Macedo, however, held that a doctor's advertising was in his professional capacity, Macedo, 178 N.J. at 346, 840 A.2d 238, and overcharging for professional services has been held to be outside the scope of the Consumer Fraud Act in the attorney context. Vort v. Hollander, 257 N.J.Super. 56, 62, 607 A.2d 1339 (App.Div.1992). Plaintiff's citations to Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management Corp. of America, 289 N.J.Super. 489, 674 A.2d 582 (App.Div. 1996), aff'd, 150 N.J. 255, 696 A.2d 546 (1997), do not relate to this case, since the question in Lemelledo was whether application of the Consumer Fraud Act was pre-empted by regulations of the Department of Banking and Insurance, not whether the Act applied to professionals. See Macedo, 178 N.J. at 345. 840 A.2d 238. In light of these cases, the contention that Defendants' billing practices are covered by the Consumer Fraud Act is unsupportable, and this Count will be dismissed.