Opinion ID: 3063680
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Red flags evidence

Text: Johnston argues that the district court erred by permitting the witnesses to testify about “red flag” profiling evidence and that admitting such evidence prejudiced the jury. Johnston alleges that “red flags” is a government-created standard for identifying drug abuse that has not been accepted by the medical community, and therefore is not relevant to the medical standard of care.9 Additionally, Johnston contends that the testimony about red flags was inadmissible under Daubert10 and the Federal Rules of Evidence because the government failed to establish that the testimony was reliable or relevant. Finally, Johnston argues that the district court improperly permitted experts to use the red flag testimony to reach legal, rather than medical, conclusions. 9 Johnston did not raise this argument before the district court and submits it for the first time in her brief. She argues that the term “red flags” originated from a 1999 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration publication entitled “Don’t be Scammed by a Drug Abuser.” 10 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (discussing use of expert testimony that has been determined to be reliable and relevant). 12 Johnston did not object to the admissibility of red flag testimony or the experts’ conclusions that they reached based on the red flags. Where a party fails to raise an evidentiary objection, we review only for plain error. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir. 2007). To demonstrate plain error, Johnston “must show that: (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; (3) it affected [her] substantial rights; and (4) it seriously affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Gresham, 325 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2003). An error is not plain unless it is contrary to precedent directly resolving a legal issue. United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003). We conclude that Johnston has failed to show that the district court committed plain error by admitting the testimony. The Supreme Court has held that an officer does not have reasonable suspicion that someone is engaged in criminal conduct solely on the basis that he fits a profile. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980) (per curiam) (discussing “the so-called ‘drug courier profile’”). This court does not permit the admission of evidence indicating that a defendant fit a particular criminal profile because such evidence is “inherently prejudicial because of the potential [it has] for including innocent citizens.” United States v. Hernandez-Cuartas, 717 F.2d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1983). The instant case, however, is distinguishable. First, the red flag statements were used to create a 13 profile about the patient, not Johnston. These statements were intended to give Johnston reason to believe that Schaible was an addict or was selling his medications. The red flags were introduced to show that Johnston failed to meet the required standard of care in dealing with her patients; not to show that Johnston somehow fit a specific criminal profile. Second, unlike in Reid, Johnston was not identified as a suspect because she fit a certain criminal profile. Instead, she was already a suspect prior to Schaible’s red flag statements. There was therefore no danger that an innocent person would be swept up in the investigation simply because she fit a certain profile. We further conclude that the experts’ testimony about the red flags was properly admitted pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. (“Rule”) 702. Under Rule 702, “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert . . . may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. In Daubert, the Supreme Court established a two-part test under Rule 702 for the admissibility of expert testimony: a trial judge must determine “whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.” 509 U.S. at 592. Some factors that should be considered in exercising this gate-keeping function 14 include “(1) whether the expert’s theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.” United States v. Douglas, 489 F.3d 1117, 1124-25 (11th Cir. 2007). “The same criteria that are used to assess the reliability of a scientific opinion may be used to evaluate the reliability of non-scientific, experience-based testimony.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). Johnston does not challenge the qualifications of the experts, but rather argues that “red flags” are not generally accepted scientific evidence of drugdealing and addiction. We note, however, that neither the government nor witnesses treated “red flags” as a term of art. The witnesses’ testimony treated “red flags” as synonymous with “warning signs.” The doctors testified that in light of the strange statements made by Johnston’s patients, had they confronted similar statements in their own practices, they would have sought further information from the patients before prescribing narcotics. They did not treat “red flags” as a medical standard and therefore Johnston’s argument that this evidence is inadmissible under Daubert fails. 15 We also reject Johnston’s argument that the experts improperly testified to legal conclusions. Although experts may not testify to legal conclusions, “testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” Fed. R. Evid. 704(a). Pinsley testified as to the appropriate standard of care in the medical field and gave her opinion that the prescriptions “were written without any legitimate medical purpose.” Criminal knowledge and intent are issues of fact, not law. See United States v. Greenfield, 554 F.2d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 1977)11 (“[D]efendant strenuously asserted that the prescriptions . . . were for a legitimate medical purpose and within the course of his professional practice. Necessarily, the issue of criminal intent or guilty knowledge was a factual issue for the jury to resolve.”). Pinsley’s testimony was therefore appropriate. In fact, Johnston questioned her own expert about whether he believed Johnston “acted in good faith in prescribing the substances” and “entered into . . . a legitimate therapeutic physician/patient relationship” with each undercover officer. We therefore conclude that the district court did not plainly err by admitting the red flag evidence and permitting the experts to give opinions based in part on 11 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this court held that all decisions handed down by the former Fifth Circuit before the close of business on September 30, 1981, are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. 16 such evidence.