Opinion ID: 2514235
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right to Retained Legal Counsel Under Department of Corrections (DOC) Regulation

Text: The district court's order that Pierpoint had the option of retaining counsel to represent him at the disciplinary proceeding was based on DOC regulations. K.A.R. XX-XX-XXX provides, in part: (a) The principal administrator of each facility shall establish a disciplinary procedure in accordance with these regulations. (b) Prosecution by criminal justice agencies in the community is a separate process from this disciplinary procedure and both prosecution and disciplinary procedures may be conducted on matters relating to the same factual situations. .... (d) Subject to the limitations and guidelines set out in these regulations and subject to the control of the hearing officer exercised within the parameters of the law and these regulations, the inmate shall be entitled: (1) To receive advance written notice of the charge and a fair hearing by an impartial hearing officer; (2) to be present at the hearing; (3) to present documentary evidence; (4) to testify on the inmate's own behalf; (5) to have witnesses called to testify on the inmate's behalf; (6) to confront and cross examine witnesses against the inmate; and (7) to be represented by counsel or counsel substitute in certain serious cases. The issue of counsel is addressed by K.A.R. XX-XX-XXX, which provides: (a) If the hearing officer finds that the charged inmate is incapable of representing himself or herself at any stage of the disciplinary hearing, the hearing officer shall appoint a staff member from an approved list to act as counsel substitute to assist the inmate at the disciplinary hearing and to question relevant witnesses. The principal administrator shall make available to the hearing officer a list of staff members available to assist the inmate as counsel substitute. (b) Representation by Legal Services for Prisoners, Inc., or its designee, shall be permitted only in class I offense cases. Assistance in other cases shall be limited to counsel substitute, and shall be permitted only when the hearing officer finds that the inmate is not capable of effectively collecting and presenting evidence on the inmate's own behalf. If Legal Services for Prisoners, Inc., is not available, assistance by a counsel substitute shall be permitted in class I offense cases. If the inmate does not wish to be assisted by a counsel substitute when Legal Services for Prisoners, Inc., is not available, the hearing may proceed without legal counsel or counsel substitute unless the hearing officer finds the inmate incapable of proceeding on the inmate's own behalf. (c) Counsel shall be considered not available in cases in which counsel fails or is not expected to appeal within three days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, and authorized continuances. (d) Counsel substitute shall mean a correctional staff member. Counsel substitute shall also include Legal Services for Prisoners, Inc., in any case where the hearing officer determines that the inmate is incapable of proceeding on the inmate's own behalf, and Legal Services for Prisoners, Inc., is available and willing to represent the inmate. (e) Legal Services for Prisoners, Inc., may designate the University of Kansas law school defender project or Washburn university legal clinic by general designation for all members and participants of such programs on a continuing basis. When a bona fide conflict of interest exists, Legal Services for Prisoners, Inc., may designate a private attorney, on a case by case basis, with prior written approval by the secretary of corrections. (f) In a class I case, if the inmate is represented by legal counsel, the officer also shall be permitted to have representation by legal counsel. The counsel shall be provided by the staff attorney of the facility if one is on staff, or by a department staff attorney, if available. The district court found that the administrative regulations state that Pierpoint is entitled to counsel, and NCF should have allowed him to retain counsel. Pierpoint was charged with a class II violation and is entitled to counsel if his case falls within the class of certain serious cases. See K.A.R. XX-XX-XXX(d)(7). What constitutes certain serious cases is not defined in K.A.R. XX-XX-XXX. However, K.A.R. XX-XX-XXX states that class I offenses are serious cases requiring the option of counsel or counsel substitute. Where the offense is not a class I offense, counsel substitute is required if the hearing officer finds that the inmate is incapable of representing himself. Here, the district court made no such finding. Pierpoint acknowledges that the regulations do not create a right to retained counsel for an inmate charged with a class II violation. He points out, however, the regulations do not prohibit an inmate from retaining counsel of his choice. Pierpoint contends that NCF's denial of his request for retained counsel was arbitrary and the district court has a right to intercede where the institution has exercised discretion unlawfully, arbitrarily, or capriciously. To support this argument Pierpoint relies on Shepherd v. Davis, 14 Kan. App.2d 333, 789 P.2d 1190 (1990). In Shepherd, an inmate was found guilty of disciplinary charges in a hearing after he was not allowed to call material witnesses. The Court of Appeals found that administrative regulations provide that inmates accused of violations shall be entitled to call witnesses and such a request may be denied only where the testimony relates to something already disposed of, is repetitious, or is irrelevant. 14 Kan. App.2d at 336. Because the hearing officer made no record of the reasons for denying the inmate's request for the witness, the Court of Appeals held that the burden of proof was on the prison officials, who may not arbitrarily deny an inmate's request to present a witness. 14 Kan. App.2d at 337. The Shepherd case is distinguishable. Unlike the right to call witnesses, DOC regulations do not create an absolute right to counsel in disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, except under special circumstances, the denial of counsel in prison disciplinary proceedings need not be based on articulated reasons. Due process does not require that inmates be allowed to retain counsel in all disciplinary proceedings and the regulations do not create such right for all class II violations; therefore, the allowance of retained counsel is discretionary with the prison administration, not the courts. Reversed.