Opinion ID: 591208
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The exemptions from the permit requirements

Text: 37 Section 26-17 of the Douglasville sign code exempts five types of signs from permitting requirements and/or permit fees: 1) one wall sign per building side announcing the business and attached to the side of the building, 2) one real estate for sale sign per property frontage, 3) one bulletin board located on religious, public, charitable or educational premises, 4) one construction identification sign, and 5) directional traffic signs containing no advertisements. 4 Like the remainder of the ordinances discussed infra, this ordinance applies city wide. 38 Messer argues that the ordinance distinguishes between different noncommercial messages, and exempts certain noncommercial messages from permitting requirements based on their content, resulting in an unconstitutional content-based restriction on the noncommercial messages not so exempted. He argues that as the San Diego ordinance in Metromedia was struck for its system of exemptions favoring certain types of noncommercial speech over others, so should the Douglasville ordinance be struck. 39 The Metromedia plurality struck the San Diego ordinance because it had a system of exceptions to the general ban on non-commercial billboards which violated the First Amendment. 5 The court held that [w]ith respect to noncommercial speech, the city may not choose the appropriate subjects for public discourse.... Because some noncommercial messages may be conveyed on billboards throughout the commercial and industrial zones, San Diego must similarly allow billboards conveying other noncommercial messages throughout those zones. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 515, 101 S.Ct. at 2896. 40 Interpreting Metromedia to hold that an ordinance is invalid if it ... regulates non-commercial billboards based on their content, the Ninth Circuit struck an ordinance because of its system of exemptions from a city wide ban on off-site advertising billboards. National Advertising Co. v. Orange, 861 F.2d 246, 248 (9th Cir.1988). 6 41 We find that the exemptions in the Douglasville ordinance are distinguishable from the exemptions in the San Diego and Orange ordinances. First, [l]aws regulating the time, place or manner of speech stand on a different footing from laws prohibiting speech altogether. Linmark Assocs. Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 1618, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977). Unlike the San Diego and City of Orange requirements, the Douglasville exemptions are not exemptions from a general ban of all off-premise billboards, but from permitting requirements and permits fees. Messer has not challenged the permit process as an unconstitutional restriction on speech. Thus, the Douglasville sign ordinance stands on a different footing from the complete bans on speech in San Diego and the City of Orange. 42 Second, these exemptions are much more limited than those in the San Diego or City of Orange ordinances, and do not favor commercial over noncommercial messages, neither do they express a preference between different noncommercial messages. There are no specific exemptions for political, historical, religious, or special event signs. In fact, this ordinance favors noncommercial over commercial messages by expressly deregulating messages by non-commercial speakers. 43 Thus, we hold that the system of exemptions from the permitting process do not violate the First Amendment.