Opinion ID: 2583037
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Motion to continue the trial

Text: Higgs argues that the district court violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments when it denied his motion to continue the trial. He asserts that his defense expert did not have adequate time to evaluate the conclusions of the FBI's toxicology report that confirmed the presence of succinylcholine in Augustine's urine. Specifically, he asserts that FBI toxicologist Montgomery defied the court order instructing her to provide discovery. Without the full FBI report, Higgs argues that his expert witness, Chip Walls, could not testify as to the validity of the FBI report and the defense could not adequately cross-examine Montgomery. This court reviews the district court's decision regarding a motion for continuance for an abuse of discretion. Rose v. State, 123 Nev. 194, 206, 163 P.3d 408, 416 (2007). Each case turns on its own particular facts, and much weight is given to the reasons offered to the trial judge at the time the request for a continuance is made. Zessman v. State, 94 Nev. 28, 31, 573 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1978). This court has held that generally, a denial of a motion to continue is an abuse of discretion if it leaves the defense with inadequate time to prepare for trial. See id. In other instances, we have held that a denial of a motion to continue was an abuse of discretion if a defendant's request for a modest continuance to procure witnesses ... was not the defendant's fault. Rose, 123 Nev. at 206, 163 P.3d at 416. However, if a defendant fails to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the denial of the continuance, then the district court's decision to deny the continuance is not an abuse of discretion. Id. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Higgs' motion to continue the trial because Higgs has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the denial. By defense counsel's own admission, there was no explanation for the delay in asking for more information regarding the FBI's toxicology report. Higgs' expert witness, Chip Walls, had approximately six months to question, evaluate, and determine whether additional information about the toxicology report would be necessary for his consideration. During the hearing on the motion to continue, the State explained that Walls had received the toxicology report on December 7, 2006, yet Higgs failed to ask for additional information about the report until May 2007. In regard to the delay, defense counsel stated, The fault, unfortunately, really doesn't lie anywhere. Defense counsel, Walls, the State, and Montgomery all worked together to compile the list of materials, which constituted part of the discovery order signed by Judge Polaha. In addition, Montgomery spoke to Walls on the phone. Walls later testified that during that phone conversation, the two exchanged information and Montgomery answered his questions. Walls admitted that he could have asked Montgomery more specific questions and she would have answered them, but he chose not to ask additional questions. Walls confirmed that he and Montgomery exchanged information and all that was left was for him to complete [his] thoughts with her. The additional information that Montgomery compiled for Walls had to be cleared by the FBI's attorneys before it could be sent to Walls. Accordingly, we conclude that there is no evidence in the record supporting Higgs' contention that Montgomery violated the district court's discovery order. Rather, substantial evidence on the record shows that Montgomery was cooperative with the defense. We further observe that on the morning of June 18, 2007, before the beginning of the trial, Walls testified extensively during a motion-in-limine hearing regarding expert witness testimony. He testified about succinylcholine in general and the difficulties of testing the substance, as well as the problems with testing urine samples for succinylcholine. Walls' testimony was thoughtful and thorough; he explained the aspects of the FBI testing he agreed with and the aspects he questioned. Perhaps most importantly, Walls testified that while he had some reservations regarding the FBI's methodology, he agreed with the findings of Montgomery's toxicology report. Higgs does not offer any reason why Walls did not testify at trial as he did at the hearing on the motion in limine. However, Walls' testimony during the motion-in-limine hearing supplied to Higgs the discovery necessary to conduct an effective cross-examination of Montgomery. See Pantano v. State, 122 Nev. 782, 790, 138 P.3d 477, 482 (2006) (observing that `the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish' (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986))). Moreover, by defense counsel's own statements at the continuance hearing, Walls had known for weeks that the FBI lab machine that Montgomery had used had malfunctioned at one point. The evidence on the record shows that the discovery available to Higgs at the time of trial met constitutional guarantees of an opportunity to effectively cross-examine Montgomery, and therefore, we conclude that Higgs was not prejudiced by the district court's denial of the motion to continue. We also note that Higgs had a number of other opportunities before trial to seek a continuance because he needed more time to evaluate the toxicology report. The district court held several pretrial hearings on other motions during which Higgs could have again asked for more time. Specifically, the district court held a hearing on June 8, 2007, to confirm the trial date, during which Higgs' defense counsel expressly stated, We'll be ready on June 18th. We make a final observation with regard to the motion to continue. It was based on the defense's need for more time to investigate evidence relating to the cause of death. This court has held that cause of death can be shown by circumstantial evidence. West v. State, 119 Nev. 410, 416, 75 P.3d 808, 812 (2003). A denial of a motion to continue to allow the defense to investigate a report as to the cause of death is not prejudicial when the State could prove cause of death with other circumstantial evidence. Even if Higgs had more time to investigate the FBI toxicology report, it would not change the fact that the State had enough circumstantial evidence to prove Augustine's cause of death. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Higgs' motion to continue the trial because Higgs fails to demonstrate that any prejudice resulted from the denial.