Opinion ID: 1674429
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the trial court err in granting an instruction on aggravated d.u.i. where mayfield had been indicted and tried on a charge of manslaughter?

Text: Mayfield was tried on an indictment which charged the defendant with two counts of manslaughter by culpable negligence pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-47 (1972): COUNT I That GEORGE W. MAYFIELD, ... on or about the 29th day of April, 1989, ... did unlawfully and feloniously, without authority of law, kill and slay a human being, to-wit James H. Gilder, Jr., by his culpable negligence when he, the said GEORGE W. MAYFIELD, did cause the motor vehicle which he was driving or operating and in which the said James H. Gilder, Jr., was riding as a passenger to crash into a truck, in violation of the provisions of Section 97-3-47 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, Annotated, as amended; and, COUNT II That the aforesaid GEORGE W. MAYFIELD, on or about the 29th day of April, 1989, ... did unlawfully and feloniously, without authority of law, kill and slay a human being, to-wit Jo Ellen Powell, by his culpable negligence when he, the said GEORGE W. MAYFIELD, did cause the motor vehicle which he was driving or operating and in which the said Jo Ellen Powell was riding as a passenger to crash into a truck, in violation of the provisions of Section 97-3-47 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, Annotated, as amended; and all contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi. At the close of the trial, the court granted a lesser-included-offense instruction, quoted here in part: S-14 If you find that the State has failed to prove any one or more of the essential elements of the crime of manslaughter under either Count I or Count II you must find the defendant, GEORGE W. MAYFIELD, not guilty of manslaughter under Count I and Count II, and you will proceed with your deliberations to decide whether the State has proved from the evidence in this beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of the lesser crime of vehicular homicide under Count I and Count II. The crime of vehicular homicide as charged in this case is distinguished from the crime of manslaughter by the absence or failure of the State to prove culpable negligence. Instruction S-14 is based on Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30(4) (1988) which states: Every person who operates any motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of subsection 1 of this Section, and who in a negligent manner causes the death of another ... shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a felony, and shall be committed to the custody of the State Department of Corrections for a period of time not to exceed five (5) years. [2] The subsection 1 to which § 63-11-30(4) refers states: It is unlawful for any person to drive or otherwise operate a vehicle within this state who (a) is under the influence of intoxicating liquor; ... or (c) has ten one-hundredths percent (.10%) or more by weight volume of alcohol in the person's blood. The jury found Mayfield not guilty of manslaughter by culpable negligence but guilty of two counts of aggravated D.U.I. According to Mayfield, the crime of aggravated D.U.I. proscribed in § 63-11-30(4) is a crime separate and distinct from the crime of manslaughter by culpable negligence. Mayfield asserts that since the indictment did not assert a charge of aggravated D.U.I., he was denied his fifth amendment right to indictment by grand jury and his sixth amendment right to know the nature of the charges against him. This Court has often held that a criminal defendant may be convicted of a crime not expressly charged if the crime is logically and necessarily included in whatever crime the indictment sets out. See Hailey v. State, 537 So.2d 411 (Miss. 1988); Grayer v. State, 519 So.2d 438 (Miss. 1988); Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 (Miss. 1984). Mayfield argues that the crime of aggravated D.U.I. which § 63-11-30(4) describes is not included in the crime of manslaughter by culpable negligence since conviction of aggravated D.U.I. requires the State to prove intoxication  an element not included in the offense of manslaughter. In Craig v. State, 520 So.2d 487, 493 (Miss. 1988), the Court expressly found that the crime of aggravated D.U.I. set out in § 63-11-30(4) is a lesser included offense necessarily encompassed... under the more serious charge of manslaughter by culpable negligence. The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that position. See Evans v. State, 562 So.2d 91 (Miss. 1990); Whitehurst v. State, 540 So.2d 1319 (Miss. 1989); Childs v. State, 521 So.2d 882, 883 (Miss. 1988). Mayfield acknowledges that his argument runs contrary to Craig and its progeny, but he insists that this Court's position is defeated by the United States Supreme Court's holding in Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989). In Schmuck, a used-car distributor allegedly purchased used cars, rolled back their odometers, and sold the cars to retail dealers at inflated prices. Upon reselling the cars to customers at prices reflecting the distributor's fraud, the dealers mailed title application forms to the state transportation department. The distributor was indicted in federal court on twelve counts of mail fraud based on the theory that the dealers' submission of title applications furthered the distributor's fraudulent scheme. The distributor moved under Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for a jury instruction on the offense of tampering with a motor vehicle odometer. The trial court denied the motion, and the distributor was convicted on all twelve counts of mail fraud. The distributor appealed, arguing inter alia that the trial court should have instructed the jury concerning the offense of tampering. According to the distributor, tampering was a lesser included offense to the crime of mail fraud since an inherent relationship existed between the two acts. The United States Supreme Court rejected the distributor's argument and held that for purposes of Rule 31(c), the crime of tampering with automobile odometers does not constitute a lesser included offense to the crime of mail fraud. The Court in Schmuck compared the two recognized approaches for identifying a lesser included offense  the inherent relationship approach and the elements approach  and rejected the former in favor of the latter. In order for one crime to be an lesser included offense to another under the inherent relationship approach, the two crimes must relate to the protection of the same interests, and must be so related that in the general nature of these crimes, though not necessarily invariably, proof of the lesser offense is necessarily presented as part of the showing of the commission of the greater offense. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 716, 109 S.Ct. at 1450 (quoting United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 319 (D.C. Cir.1971)). Stated differently, the inherent relationship approach permits a lesser included offense instruction even if the proof of one offense does not invariably require proof of the other as long as the two offenses serve the same legislative goals. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 717, 109 S.Ct. at 1450. Under the elements approach, on the other hand, one crime cannot constitute a lesser included offense to another unless the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense. Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 716, 109 S.Ct. at 1450. According to Mayfield, Schmuck establishes the strict elements approach as a rule of constitutional dimensions and rejects the inherent relationship approach for all purposes. He further contends that the crime of aggravated D.U.I. cannot qualify as a lesser included offense to the crime of manslaughter by culpable negligence because the State is not required to prove intoxication in order to establish manslaughter by culpable negligence. Both arguments are weak. Mayfield reads Schmuck much too broadly. Schmuck limits its ruling to the context of Fed.R.Crim.Pro. Rule 31(c) and recognizes (without condemnation) that some state courts have employed the inherent relationship approach. This Court, therefore, is not bound by the Schmuck ruling. Clearly, an inherent relationship exists between the crime of aggravated D.U.I. and the crime of manslaughter by culpable negligence. The prohibition of both acts relates to the same interest  protecting lives; the nature of the two crimes is essentially the same  negligent killing. This Court has never considered itself bound to the objective elements approach. Aside from the several cases which expressly hold that aggravated D.U.I. is a lesser included offense to the crime of manslaughter by culpable negligence, the Court has found in other contexts that a lesser crime may be included in a greater one despite a lack of complete overlap in elements. In Grayer v. State, 519 So.2d 438 (Miss. 1988), we found that assault with intent to rape was a lesser included offense of forcible rape even though, at the time the defendant committed the acts in question, conviction of assault with intent to rape required a finding of previous chaste character on the part of the victim while conviction of forcible rape carried no such requirement. The Court ruled: The element of previous chaste character contemplated by Section 2361 is not inconsistent with forcible rape under Section 2358. That the jury may find the victim of previous chaste character would in no way preclude a conviction under Section 2358 if the other elements of forcible rape be proven. Grayer, 519 So.2d at 440. The Court went on to explain: By way of analogy, we consider heat of passion manslaughter a lesser included offense to the charge of murder, even though that particular form of manslaughter contemplates proof of a fact inconsistent with the principal charge of murder. See Isom v. State, 481 So.2d 820, 824-25 (Miss. 1985). Similarly, negligent homicide while intoxicated, Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-30 (Supp. 1987) is a lesser included offense to culpable negligence manslaughter, Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-47 (1972), even though driving while intoxicated is not a necessary element of the latter offense. Grayer, 519 So.2d at 400 n. 3. The Grayer rationale is instructive in the instant case. When comparing the elements of aggravated D.U.I. to the elements of manslaughter by culpable negligence, we find that the unmatched element, driving while intoxicated, is not inconsistent with the greater offense. In fact, the act of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is a factor a jury is permitted to consider in determining whether a defendant is guilty of culpable negligence. See Evans, 562 So.2d at 95. Mayfield is not entitled to prevail on his first assignment of error.