Opinion ID: 852584
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Battery of Krystall Simon

Text: This leaves us with the issue of whether either Holt or Houseworth had probable cause to arrest Row for the battery of Krystall Simon. Neither officer witnessed the alleged battery. The statute provides that an officer may use an affidavit to establish probable cause. In many cases an affidavit is sufficient to establish probable cause without more. But we agree with the Court of Appeals that an affidavit by a person claiming to have direct knowledge of the incident is not per se probable cause if there is other information known to the arresting officer at the time that would render it unreasonable to give unquestioning credence to the affidavit's facts or conclusion. Row, 834 N.E.2d at 1089. Specifically, because the alleged battery was not observed by the officer, under subsection (5) it must have been one inflicting bodily injury. Krystall's affidavit alleged bodily injury in conclusory terms but only because that term was contained in the fill-in-the-blanks affidavit Holt supplied to the Simons. Moreover, Holt had other information as well. First, she observed Krystall, the alleged victim, shortly after the incident. There was no evidence of any injury and no claim of pain or discomfort. Second, she knew of the animosity between Row and his accusers and the outstanding restraining orders which, by the Simons' own account, they had violated by approaching Row as he left Cox's house. As we explained in Ogle v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1146, 1148 (Ind.1998), [t]he determination of probable cause is not one of mathematical precision, but rather is grounded on the notions of common sense. Although an officer often may rely on an affidavit alone, where that reliance contradicts notions of common sense, the affidavit is insufficient to establish probable cause. Here, the information available to Holt did not support the reasonable conclusion that a felony battery of Krystall Simon had occurred. The Court of Appeals properly cited the affidavit of Row's expert, Officer Robert J. Snyder of the St. Matthews, Kentucky Police Department who has over thirty years of experience in law enforcement, and who, based on these facts, would not have arrested Row because in his opinion the record did not support probable cause. Snyder testified that any prudent law enforcement officer would have conducted more investigation than Holt and Houseworth did before making an arrest. This is a fact specific determination based on the information available to Holt at the time. The Court of Appeals concluded that this testimony raised an issue of fact whether Officer Holt had been presented with information that a reasonable person would question was sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest Row without a warrant. Row, 834 N.E.2d at 1085. We agree this is a sufficient basis to support the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that summary judgment was improperly granted as to Holt. We do not agree with all of the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in reaching its conclusion that Holt and Houseworth lacked probable cause to arrest Row. The Court of Appeals identified several pieces of evidence in support of this conclusion. We think that three of these are not relevant to the probable cause determination. First, Holt and Houseworth testified that they usually conducted a broader investigation before arresting based on an affidavit. But failure to follow usual procedure is not necessarily evidence of lack of probable cause. Second, the court noted that Holt had in the past been reprimanded for conduct unreasonable for a law enforcement officer. Holt's history, however, does not bear on probable cause in this case. Finally, the fact that the grand jury did not indict Row is a post-arrest event that does not suggest anything about the reasonableness of the arrest. Evidence discovered or events occurring after an arrest do not factor into the probable cause inquiry. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (finding that probable cause determinations depend on facts and circumstances present at the moment the arrest was made. (citations omitted)); Hirsch v. Burke, 40 F.3d 900, 904 (7th Cir.1994), ([P]ost-arrest evidence is irrelevant to whether [the arresting officer] had probable cause at the time of arrest.); Maltby v. Winston, 36 F.3d 548, 557 (7th Cir.1994) (Any evidence, therefore, that came to light after the arrest is not relevant to the probable cause inquiry.); Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 439 (7th Cir. 1986) ([I]t's what the police know, not whether they know the truth, that matters.).