Opinion ID: 1125042
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Circuit Court's Denial of the Liability Defendants' Motions to Realign the Parties

Text: The Liability Defendants contend that the circuit court denied the Liability Defendants a fair trial by denying the Liability Defendants' motions to realign the parties. We disagree. A circuit court has the discretion to realign the parties at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Cawthon v. Waco Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 259 Ga. 632, 386 S.E.2d 32, 33 (1989). A trial court's ruling on a motion for realignment is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Id. Although the Liability Defendants assert that the circuit court's failure to realign the parties resulted in manifest and severe prejudice to DuPont and the other Liability Defendants, the only form of prejudice to which the Liability Defendants specifically refer is the fact that the circuit court allocated two of the defense's eight total peremptory challenges to the Declaratory Defendants. In support of their argument, the Liability Defendants primarily rely on Cawthon, supra . In Cawthon, an automobile struck and killed the Cawthons' son while he was attempting to cross a three-lane highway to catch a school bus. Waco Fire and Casualty Insurance Co. (Waco) had issued an insurance policy to the board of education covering school bus accidents. While the Cawthons' wrongful death action was pending, Waco filed a declaratory action against the Cawthons and the board of education, seeking a determination that the insurance policy did not cover the accident. Before trial, the Cawthons moved the trial court to realign the board of education as a plaintiff, i.e., a co-plaintiff with Waco. In particular, the Cawthons were concerned that they would otherwise be forced to share half of their jury strikes, i.e., peremptory challenges, with the board of education, whose interests were clearly adverse to the Cawthons' interests. The trial court denied the motion to realign because it had no authority to realign parties. Id. 386 S.E.2d at 33. However, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did have the discretion to realign the parties in the interest of justice. The Cawthon court noted that multiple parties that are aligned on the same side of a case and have adverse interests are not entitled to additional peremptory strikes[.] Id. Thus, if the trial court had exercised its discretion and denied the Cawthons' motion to realign, the denial would have been an abuse of discretion under the circumstances of this case. Those circumstances include the fact that the denial would have given (as did the court's failure to exercise its discretion) the Cawthons only three jury strikes, but would have given the parties asserting contrary legal and factual contentions nine jury strikes. Id. However, the instant case is distinguishable from Cawthon in that, unlike the co-parties in Cawthon, the Liability Defendants did not have to split half of the defense's eight total peremptory challenges with their co-defendants, the Declaratory Defendants. The circuit court allocated only two of the defense's eight peremptory challenges to the declaratory defendants, and, thus, the Liability Defendants retained the remaining six peremptory challenges for themselves. Meanwhile Kawamata Farms and the Tomono Plaintiffs shared a total of eight peremptory challenges. Therefore, the effect of the circuit court's denying the motions to realign in the instant case was much less severe for the Liability Defendants than it was for the co-parties in Cawthon. Although the Liability Defendants had two less peremptory challenges than the Plaintiffs, [e]xact numerical equality between sides is not the purpose of equalization of peremptory challenges. Rather, the purpose is to equalize the positions of the parties to prevent one side, antagonistic among the parties on certain matters of fact with which they will be concerned, but primarily united in opposition to the other side, from selecting the jury. Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Wendt, 718 S.W.2d 766, 769 (Tex.Ct.App.1986) (citation omitted). Under HRS ง 635-29(b) (1993), a circuit court is authorized to require co-parties to share peremptory challenges: ง 635-29 Challenging peremptorily.... (b) In civil cases each party shall be allowed to challenge peremptorily three jurors, without assigning any reason therefor. Where there are two or more plaintiffs or two or more defendants, they may be considered as a single party for the purposes of making peremptory challenges, or the court may allow additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly. If additional peremptory challenges are allowed to the parties on one side, the opposing party or parties may be allowed additional peremptory challenges. .... (Emphasis added). The determination of whether the trial court erred in allocation [of peremptory challenges] is made at the time it makes its decision and not upon hindsight. American Cyanamid Co. v. Frankson, 732 S.W.2d 648, 653 (Tex.Ct.App.1987) (citation omitted). Moreover, a judgment will not be reversed unless the error in awarding peremptory challenges to a litigant, or to multiple litigants having the same interest, is shown to be prejudicial. In order to prove the existence of prejudice, the complaining party must show that it exhausted his peremptory challenges and that a prospective juror, who the challenging party would have otherwise stricken, served on the jury. Carter v. Tom's Truck Repair, Inc., 857 S.W.2d 172, 177-78 (Mo.1993) (citations omitted). The Liability Defendants have neither shown that they exhausted their peremptory challenges nor that a prospective juror, whom they would have otherwise challenged, served on the jury. Therefore, the Liability Defendants' argument, i.e., that the circuit court's denial of the motions for realignment adversely affected the number of peremptory challenges at their disposal, lacks merit. Under these circumstances, the circuit court did not clearly exceed the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of the Liability Defendants by denying their motions to realign the parties. Therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm the circuit court's orders denying these motions.