Opinion ID: 499492
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant Mangum

Text: 44 Defendant Mangum raises two issues on appeal. The first is that Mangum's oral confession was obtained in violation of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In Connecticut v. Barrett, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 828, 831, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987) the Supreme Court held, The fundamental purpose of the Court's decision in Miranda was 'to assure that the individual's right to choose between speech and silence remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.'  (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469, 86 S.Ct. at 1625 (emphasis in original)). See also Colorado v. Spring, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 851, 856, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987). The Court also held that, Nothing in our decisions, ... or in the rationale of Miranda, requires authorities to ignore the tenor or sense of a defendant's response to [Miranda ] ... warnings. Barrett, 107 S.Ct. at 831. In Barrett, the defendant refused to give a written statement unless his attorney was present, even though he had no problem in talking about the incident. Id. at 830. The Supreme Court held that the defendant had not invoked his right to counsel for all purposes, and that he acquiesced to the oral interrogation. Id. at 832. 45 In the present case, FBI Agent Leuck asked Mangum if he could read, write and understand English. The defendant replied affirmatively. Mangum was given a Miranda Advice of Rights form to read. After Mangum read the form he was asked to sign it. The defendant replied, No, I never sign anything. Mangum Br. at 9. 46 Agent Leuck cautioned Mangum, We want to make sure you understand. Id. Leuck then went on to verbally explain all of Mangum's Miranda rights. Gov't Br. at 25. The defendant was then asked, Would you like to go ahead and talk with us without signing the form? Mangum admits he told Leuck, Sure, why not. Mangum Br. at 9. The defendant then gave an oral confession to his involvement in the robbery. 47 We rule Mangum confessed voluntarily. The interviewing agent was not required to ignore the sense of defendant's response to the Miranda warnings. Furthermore, we believe Mangum's waiver was made with full awareness of both the nature of his rights to be abandoned and the consequences of his decision to abandon them. 2 48 In Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) the Supreme Court held, Only if the 'totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2572, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)). Mangum was informed about his Miranda rights both verbally and in writing. Furthermore, there is no evidence that he was threatened, tricked or cajoled into this waiver. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. See also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. ----, ----, 107 S.Ct. 515, 523-24, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). Miranda gives a defendant a right to choose between speech and silence and Mangum chose to speak. See Barrett, 107 S.Ct. at 832. 49 In North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 370-71, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1756, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979), the Supreme Court held that when an FBI agent had fully advised a suspect of his Miranda rights, gave him an Advice of Rights form to read and sign and told the suspect he neither had to speak nor sign the form, the suspect's inculpatory remarks were admissible as evidence despite the suspect's statement, I will talk to you but I am not signing any form. Butler, 441 U.S. at 371, 99 S.Ct. at 1756. See also United States v. Boon San Chong, 829 F.2d 1572, 1574 (11th Cir.1987). We find a similar situation in the case at bar. Mangum's Miranda argument is without merit. 50 Defendant Mangum's final argument is that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior conviction as proof of his guilt to the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge. 3 The defendant relies upon Illinois case law which holds that the only proper manner to prove a prior conviction is through documents which, at minimum, contain the following: (1) a caption; (2) the entry showing the return of the indictment in open court by grand jury; (3) the indictment and record of arraignment; (4) the impaneling of the jury or waiver of the jury; (5) the jury verdict; and (6) the final judgment of the court. See People v. Novak, 343 Ill. 355, 175 N.E. 551 (1931); see also People v. Robbins, 88 Ill.App.2d 447, 232 N.E.2d 302 (1967). 51 Assuming arguendo that the defendant's checklist were to be adopted by this Court, each Certified Statement of Conviction form offered by the government to the trial court satisfies the checklist requirements. Each statement includes: (a) a caption identifying Mangum as the defendant; (2) an entry showing return of a grand jury indictment on November 21, 1975; (3) arraignment before Judge Joseph A. Power on December 12, 1975; (4) a plea of guilty to armed robbery (thereby negating the need for a jury or jury verdict); and (5) the final judgment of Judge Frank J. Wilson on July 7, 1976 and August 4, 1976, respectively. Furthermore, each Certified Statement of Conviction form was signed by a person authorized to make certification; the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Morgan M. Finley. Clerk Finley dated form numbers 75-7161 and 75-7162 on October 15, 1976. Mangum Br. appendix at 5-8. The signed forms were public records and pursuant to Fed.R. of Evid. 902(4) they were properly admitted by the trial court as evidence of Mangum's prior conviction. There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court's decision is 52 AFFIRMED.