Opinion ID: 2644627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appeal of the Five-Level Upward Adjustment

Text: On appeal, McGeoch argues that the District Court erred in adding five offense levels to his guidelines range pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b), based on “a pattern of activity involving prohibited sexual conduct,” because the record does not establish that “‘on at least two separate occasions, the defendant engaged in prohibited sexual conduct with a minor.’” Appellant Br. at 12 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5 cmt. 4(B)(i)). We review a district court’s legal interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, and its related factual findings for clear error. United States v. Mi Sun Cho, 713 F.3d 716, 722 (2d Cir. 2013). Application Note 4 of Guidelines section 4B1.5 provides that “[a]n occasion of prohibited sexual conduct may be considered for purposes of subsection (b) without regard to whether the occasion (I) occurred during the course of the instant offense; or (II) resulted in a conviction for the conduct that occurred on that occasion.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5 cmt. 4(B)(ii). “Prohibited sexual conduct” includes, inter alia, an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)―McGeoch’s statute of conviction―and an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2551 which addresses production and attempted production of child pornography. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5 cmt. 4(A). Trafficking in, or mere receipt or possession of, child pornography does not constitute prohibited sexual conduct for purposes of § 4B1.5(b). See id. Upon review of the record, we agree with the District Court that McGeoch engaged in “prohibited sexual conduct” on “at least two separate occasions.” The offense of conviction may 1In the sentencing transcript, this condition is noted as Special Condition No. 2, but in the Judgment it is referenced as “No. 1” and we refer to it as such here. 3 provide proof of one of the requisite two separate occasions of “prohibited sexual conduct.” United States v. Broxmeyer, 616 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2010). As additional occasions, the District Court cited the contact with the purported 13-year-old victim (as distinct from the 15-year-old) and the fact that McGeoch “used internet accounts [over a period of four to five years] to get [approximately ten] young boys between ages of 11 to 14 to send him pictures of their erect penises.” McGeoch argues that his conduct with respect to the ten boys does not establish that he engaged in production, as opposed to mere receipt of child pornography, because there is no evidence that the pictures were created at McGeoch’s request. To the contrary, we think the District Court had ample basis for finding that McGeoch caused or attempted to cause the production of child pornography. McGeoch conceded that he “convinced around 10 minors to send him pictures of their erect penises.” App’x 108 (stating no objection to the facts in the PSR). It is implausible that ten minor boys took and transmitted photos of their erect penises to McGeoch without his solicitation, particularly in light of the substance of McGeoch’s chats with V-1 and V-2.2 Consequently, the District Court did not err in applying an increase of five offense levels pursuant to § 4B1.5(b).3 B. Appeal of Special Condition No. 1 of Supervised Release McGeoch has two sons who, at the time of his projected release, will be 14 and 12 years old, respectively. On appeal, McGeoch argues that Special Condition No. 1, which prohibits him from having direct or indirect contact with anyone under the age of 18 unless supervised by an individual approved by his probation officer unreasonably infringes upon his rights as a parent, and was imposed without a specific finding that such measures were necessary. Appellant Br. at 17. The Government argues that McGeoch waived his right to appeal Special Condition No. 1 because, after McGeoch had the opportunity to review (for the first time) the conditions of supervised release, the District Court stated: “Mr. McGeoch, is that right, you’ve seen those special conditions there and you understand that you’re going to have to abide by them as part of your term of supervised release . . . ?” App’x 129. McGeoch responded in the affirmative. Id. While McGeoch’s response may be interpreted as registering consent to the conditions of supervised release, we cannot conclude that it constituted a knowing and voluntary waiver of any right to challenge a specific condition, as opposed to a mere oversight, such that McGeoch should be 2 These facts are even stronger than those in Broxmeyer, which involved defendant’s solicitation of sexually explicit images from a 17-year-old. Yet in that case we concluded that “Broxmeyer's procurement of a sexually suggestive, albeit not sexually explicit, image of K.T. sufficed to prove him guilty of attempt[ed production].” Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d at 282. 3 Because we are satisfied that the uncharged conduct with respect to the ten minors meets the requirements for a pattern of prohibited sexual conduct, we need not address whether McGeoch’s solicitation of the 13-year-old (V-2) constitutes a separate act of prohibited sexual conduct from the solicitation of the 15-year-old such that the charged conduct alone would satisfy the requirements of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b). 4 foreclosed from raising the issue on appeal. McGeoch’s counsel did not affirmatively state that there was no objection to Special Condition No. 1; McGeoch simply acknowledged that he was bound by the terms of supervised release generally, after reviewing them briefly and having just received a 12-year prison sentence. Cf. United States v. Wellington, 417 F.3d 284, 289-90 (2d Cir. 2005) (claim waived where, for tactical reasons, defendant made no objection in the district court and his counsel affirmatively represented that he would forego those rights). We therefore conclude that McGeoch did not waive his right to challenge Special Condition No. 1. We review the sentencing court’s exercise of its broad discretion in setting conditions of supervised release for abuse of that discretion. United States v. Bello, 310 F.3d 56, 59 (2d Cir. 2002). “An erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence” constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See also United States v. Batista, 684 F.3d 333, 341 (2d Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1458 (2013) (“An argument forfeited by the defendant may still be reviewed according to a plain error standard”). A condition of supervised release that prevents a father from seeing his children outside the presence of an approved monitor is a severe one subject to careful scrutiny. See Bello, 310 F.3d at 59 (“we carefully scrutinize unusual and severe conditions” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Reeves, 591 F.3d 77, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Where a condition of supervised release impairs a protected associational interest, our application of § 3583(d) requirements must reflect the heightened constitutional concerns involved”).4 The District Court failed to acknowledge the effect Special Condition No. 1 would have on McGeoch’s relationship with his own children much less articulate why such a severe intrusion on the fundamental right to familial association was necessary under the circumstances. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (noting that an individual’s “interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the due process clause”). Here, there is evidence in the record indicating that oversight of McGeoch’s relationship with his sons is warranted. The District Court specifically explained that an “aggravating factor” at sentencing was that McGeoch had planned to bring his then 4-year-old son on the camping trip at which he had arranged to meet V1 and V2, “as a cover or excuse for [the] liaison.” App’x 124. Moreover, at the time of McGeoch’s release, his sons will be in exactly the age range that he has admitted being attracted to. Absent an individualized inquiry into whether McGeoch’s sexual proclivities pose a threat to his sons, however, the imposition of a harsh condition of supervised release that either prohibits interaction with his children or makes such interaction subject to supervision by a person approved of by the probation officer violates McGeoch’s due process rights. See United States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that application of special condition prohibiting contact with minors to 4Section 3583 states that “release conditions must, among other things, be reasonably related to certain prescribed sentencing factors and involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing.” Reeves, 591 F.3d at 80 (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted). 5 defendants’ immediate family without an individualized inquiry infringed on defendant’s due process rights). While we take no position on whether this harsh application of Special Condition No. 1 is warranted under the circumstances, if the District Court intends this result, it must, after providing McGeoch with an opportunity to be heard, make specific findings to justify such a condition. Accordingly, we remand the case to the District Court for resentencing only with respect to Special Condition No. 1.