Opinion ID: 1676352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Finding of Unreasonable, Arbitrary, and Capricious Action by the Agency.

Text: The district court essentially resolved Barnes' petition for judicial review under the provisions of section 17A.19(8)(g) (1985) which provides that a court may grant appropriate relief from agency action when that action is [u]nreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. In Churchill Truck Lines v. Transportation Regulation Board, 274 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Iowa 1979), we concluded that the terms arbitrary and capricious, when applied to test the propriety of agency action, suggest action taken without regard to established rules or standards. These criteria are more fully developed in Frank v. Iowa Department of Transportation, (Iowa 1986). In challenging the district court's determination that its actions were arbitrary or capricious, the Department asserts that agency determinations which are required by controlling statutory law cannot be determined to be arbitrary or capricious. Where licenses have been revoked for refusal to submit to chemical testing, the Department views section 321B.13 as limiting eligibility for a temporary restricted license to only those persons subsequently pleading guilty to an OWI offense based on the circumstances which prompted a peace officer to request the test. We agree that the determination of whether the Department's action in the present case was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious turns on the interpretation of section 321B.13. The Department may only grant a temporary restricted license where allowed by statute. Janssen v. Sellers, 207 N.W.2d 746, 747 (Iowa 1973). If its denial of Barnes' application was mandatory under controlling statutory provisions, there was no room for arbitrary or capricious action. See Hensley v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 336 N.W.2d 448, 451 (Iowa 1983) (we find no basis upon which to conclude that the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously in acting upon those facts before it which indicated that disqualification was mandated by the appropriate statutes.). Our reading of section 321B.13 convinces us that the Department's interpretation of the statute is correct. In the field of statutory interpretation, legislative intent is expressed by omission as well as by inclusion. The express mention of certain conditions of entitlement implies the exclusion of others. In re Estate of Wilson, 202 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1972); North Iowa Steel Co. v. Staley, 253 Iowa 355, 357, 112 N.W.2d 364, 365 (1961). During license revocations for refusal of chemical testing, the legislature has tied the granting of temporary restricted licenses to specific circumstances. We find this linkage expresses an intention to deny such entitlement in the absence of such circumstances. Our conclusion is buttressed, we believe, when the prior legislation and administrative regulations on this subject are considered. Prior to July 1, 1984, there was no statutory authorization for a temporary restricted license for persons whose licenses were revoked based on refusal of chemical testing. Regulations of the Department expressly denied eligibility for a temporary license in those situations. 820 Iowa Admin.Code [07,C] 11.4(4)(g) (1982). This total denial of eligibility was upheld against due process and equal protection challenges in Veach v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 374 N.W.2d 248, 249-50 (Iowa 1985). The provision of section 321B.13 which is under consideration in the present case became effective July 1, 1984. It alters the denial of eligibility in the single circumstance mentioned, i.e., for persons pleading guilty to OWI. Had the legislature intended to further enlarge the area of entitlement, we believe it would have spelled that determination out in the statute. For all of the reasons we have indicated, the trial court erred in its determination that the Department's denial of Barnes' application was arbitrary and capricious.