Opinion ID: 2254399
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consulting Fees

Text: The power of the Town to charge some amount associated with the consideration of a land-use application is not disputed in this case ( see Suffolk County Bldrs. Assn. v County of Suffolk, 46 NY2d 613, 619 [1979]). This Court has repeatedly observed that this power is limited by the requirement that the fees charged be reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of the regulatory program ( id. [citing Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue of N. Shore v Incorporated Vil. of Roslyn Harbor, 40 NY2d 158, 163 (1976)]). Plaintiff argues that its due process rights were violated by the requirement that it pay the consulting fees incurred in conjunction with its application, asserting that no opportunity existed to challenge the reasonableness of those fees. Section 26B-2 (A) (11) (a) of the Monroe Town Code requires an applicant to deposit an escrow with the Town Clerk to cover the costs being incurred by the town for all consultant services, including but not limited to engineering, planning and legal as well as clerical costs incurred in the processing and reviewing of such application. The Code further provides that [t]he Planning Board, in consultation with the applicant, shall compute the amount of the escrow to be posted with the town. Such amount shall be reasonably related to the costs attendant to the town's review of the application (§ 26B-2 [A] [11] [i] [1]). Thus, under the challenged provisions, the applicant is required only to reimburse the Town for fees actually expended. Plaintiff accurately observes that the consulting fee provisions do not include an express audit component providing an applicant with the opportunity to review the fee assessment but cites no authority for the proposition that such a mechanism must be contained within the fee provisions themselves as opposed to elsewhere in the statutory or regulatory scheme. The Code, however, expressly limits the fees that can be exacted to those that are reasonable ( see Monroe Town Code § 26B-2 [A] [11] [a], [i] [1]) and the Town interprets the fees as subject to the audit provisions of Town Law §§ 118 and 119. In addition, uncontradicted proof in the record establishes that (1) the Town pays the same rate for consulting services as it charges applicants; (2) the Planning Board audits vouchers submitted by consultants in the first instance and rejects any excessive or unnecessary charges; and, (3) applicants may inspect consultants' invoices upon request. Here, plaintiff apparently paid the fees under protest but the record contains no indication of the nature of that protest and plaintiff did not request an audit of the fees. Indeed, although plaintiff complains that it has been deprived of an opportunity to contest the consulting fees, it has not alleged that the fees were, in fact, unreasonable. Under these circumstances, plaintiff has failed to establish a due process violation. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs. Order affirmed, with costs.