Opinion ID: 1983521
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Our Precedent and the Facts in This Case

Text: The majority (like the courts below) takes the position that our hands are tied by our precedent; that we must affirm because we decided in Matter of Taub v Altman (3 NY3d 30 [2004]) that there is no venue in this kind of case. The logic undergirding Taub and our earlier decisions in Matter of Steingut v Gold (42 NY2d 311 [1977]) and People v Fea (47 NY2d 70 [1979]) does not, however, mandate an affirmance here, where the facts are very different. Steingut, Fea and Taub were animated by an apprehension that particular effect jurisdictiona legislative exception to common-law conduct jurisdictionmight swallow up the common-law rule. Thus, in Taub we disclaimed the People['s] assert[ion] that ... the City [in this case, the State] may be deprived of its ability to prosecute within its borders certain crimes, of which it is undeniably the victim (3 NY3d at 38), because particular effect jurisdiction is an alternative ground for venue ... invoked only when jurisdiction does not lie on some other basissuch as the far more common scenario in which evidence exists that conduct establishing an element of the offense has occurred within another New York county ( id. at 38-39 [emphasis added]). We followed up this caveat with an even more explicit expression by stating that the criminal statute involved in Taub provided jurisdiction will lie in any county where the defendant executed or mailed the [tax] return ( id. at 39). Similarly, in both Fea and Steingut, venue would have been proper in the New York county where the allegedly criminal conduct took place. There would have been no venue gap at common law, and the remedial nature of CPL 20.40 (2) (c) did not come into play. In this case, however, county geographical jurisdiction could not lie in any New York county other than New York County; nor could geographical jurisdiction lie in any county under any theory of venue other than particular effect. Indeed, the majority appears to concede as much by suggesting that the Legislature might want to fill a perceived gap in the statute. Given that CPL 20.40 (2) (c) is remedial and that finding no jurisdiction in any county is contrary to legislative intent and objectionable as a matter of policy, there is no warrant for strictly construing this provision that, on its face, easily supports the grand jury's finding of particular effect jurisdiction in New York County ( see generally McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 141 [In construing a statute which is ambiguous the construction to be adopted is the one which will not cause objectionable results]). The majority has effectively rendered CPL 20.40 (2) (c) meaningless: on the one hand, it is an alternative ground for venue ... invoked only when jurisdiction does not lie on some other basis ( Taub, 3 NY3d at 38-39 [emphasis added]), but on the other hand (this case), it must be strictly construed and so may not be invoked in a situation where there is no alternative basis for geographical jurisdiction in any county despite the existence of geographical jurisdiction in the State ( see majority op at 426-427). [] Read together with CPL 20.10 (4), CPL 20.40 (2) (c) vests a county with jurisdiction over criminal conduct [that] had, or was likely to have, [consequences which, though not necessarily amounting to a result or element of such offense, have a materially harmful impact upon the governmental processes or community welfare of a particular jurisdiction, or result in the defrauding of persons in such jurisdiction] ..., and was performed with intent that it would, or with knowledge that it was likely to, have such [consequences] therein. The most direct effect of defendant's alleged perjury in this case would be to impede the Attorney General's investigation into anticompetitive practices in the tabletop market. The majority zeroes in on this, proclaiming that this is not an effect on the governmental processes of New York County. This analysis, however, misses the mark, particularly once the varnish of strict construction is stripped away from section 20.40 (2) (c) in light of the facts in this case. The Donnelly Act vests the Attorney General with authority to conduct investigations as a preliminary to bringing judicial or grand jury proceedings ( see General Business Law § 343). In this investigation, the Attorney General sent multiple subpoenaed interrogatories from New York County to Federated while defendant was CEO, several of which asked about certain principals' meetings in New York County. Federated and the Attorney General entered into a confidentiality agreement while defendant was CEO of Federated, which specified that any issues of confidentiality or otherwise would be adjudicated in Supreme Court, New York County. The Attorney General was taking testimony from witnesses in New York County, which was the situs for every interview of a Federated employee or representative save defendant, who was interviewed in Ohio as a negotiated courtesy. Thus, there was sufficient evidence from which the grand jury might fairly and reasonably infer that the particular effect of defendant's alleged perjuryto thwart or slow down the progress of an antitrust investigationwas likely to materially harm governmental processes in New York County, the probable venue for any eventual litigation. Any other result would reward a defendant whose perjury is successful, or would force the Attorney General to bring judicial or grand jury proceedings prematurely, without adequate preliminary inquiry. Moreover, a secondary, but wholly foreseeable, effect of impeding the Attorney General's investigation into anticompetitive behavior would be to undermine competition in the tabletop marketin other words, hindering an investigation fosters the underlying anticompetitive conduct sought to be deterred and/or punished. While the Attorney General might have a statewide focus generally, the conduct giving rise to his investigation was, among New York counties, particularly concentrated in New York Countywhere the tabletop industry's showrooms were located and its trade shows were held, the nerve center of Federated's New York operations, and the site of its flagship Macy's and Bloomingdale's stores. The community welfare of a county such as New York County includes not only its residents, but also its businesses. As a result, there was sufficient evidence from which the grand jury might fairly and reasonably infer that the particular effect of defendant's alleged perjuryto reduce competition in the tabletop industrywas likely to materially harm the community welfare of New York County, where the industry was centered. The final prerequisite for venue is defendant's intent or knowledge that his perjury would have a particular effect on New York County. Here, defendant corresponded with representatives from the Attorney General's office in New York County. As the longtime CEO of Federated, he had to have known that New York County was the focal point for the American tabletop industry and that Federated's nerve center in New York State is in Manhattan. Defendant, to whom the corporate law department reported, likely knew that Federated had signed a consent agreement dictating that any disputes would be litigated in Supreme Court in New York County. Finally, defendant likely knew that his former colleagues at Federated had been interviewed in New York County in connection with an antitrust investigation related to events during his tenure as CEO, that defendant was the only Federated representative interviewed outside New York County, and that defendant's own interview only took place in Ohio after requests to interview him in New York County had been rebuffed by his counsel. In light of these facts, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence for the grand jury to have reasonably inferred that, more likely than not, defendant knew his alleged perjury was likely to have a particular effect on New York County.