Opinion ID: 2520463
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Superior Court's Designation of Various Pieces of Property as Marital Property

Text: Ernest claims that the superior court erred in finding that various pieces of property were marital property. Ernest's principal argument is that he acquired all of the items relevant to this appeal before the parties were legally married. Ernest also argues that the superior court did not explain why it categorized the property as marital property. Because the decision to categorize the property as marital is sufficiently supported by the superior court's findings and by the record, we affirm the superior court's findings regarding the property. Property acquired by a couple prior to marriage may be considered marital property when the property was acquired during premarital cohabitation. [S]o long as the parties do marry, the trial court is free to consider the parties' entire relationship, including any period(s) of premarital cohabitation, in making its property division under AS 25.24.160(a)(4), so long as the court observes the distinction which AS 25.24.160(a)(4) draws between assets acquired prior to and during coverture. [20] With the exception of the home in Anvik, Ernest does not claim that he acquired any of the properties before the parties began cohabiting in 1986. Implicit in the superior court's reasoning is the conclusion that the coverture period commenced when Judy and Ernest began living together in 1986. [21] Under the rule articulated in Murray and Faulkner, the superior court appropriately deemed these properties marital by virtue of the fact that the parties lived together and later married. [22] We discuss the trial court's findings with respect to each of the properties below.
The trial court determined that the Anvik house and lot were part of the marital estate and awarded them to Ernest. In his initial disclosures, Ernest stated that he acquired the house in Anvik in 1983. At the trial, Ernest testified that he agreed to buy the house from his nephew around 1978. Judy testified that she and Ernest had bought the house together in 1989 or 1990. According to Judy's testimony, the couple used the Anvik house as their permanent home although they spent winters in Anchorage. Judy testified that she rented out the house in Anvik while Ernest was in prison, listing herself as the owner. The trial court did not make a determination about when the couple purchased the house; therefore, it is possible that Ernest purchased the house before the coverture period, which began when the couple began living together in 1986. But it does not matter whether Ernest purchased the house before the coverture period began, because the trial court noted that the couple remodeled the home and found that [t]he parties lived in the home as a family. In Cox v. Cox , we stated that [s]eparate property becomes marital ... upon a showing that the parties intended to treat the property as marital. [23] Factors to be considered by a trial court in making this determination include: (1) the use of the property as the parties' personal residence, (2) the ongoing maintenance and management of the property by both parties, (3) placing the title of the property in joint ownership, and (4) whether the non-titled owner's credit has been used to improve the property. [24] It is not necessary for all four factors to be present in order for the court to find that the property was marital property. [25] Under the standard set forth in Cox, evidence that the couple had improved the home and lived in it together was sufficient for the superior court to determine that the home was marital property, even accepting Ernest's contention that he acquired the home prior to the period of cohabitation.
The superior court determined that a cabin in Talkeetna used by the family for recreation was marital property and awarded it to Judy. Ernest claims that this home is not marital property because he began purchasing it in 1994 and had paid it off in full one month before he married Judy in 1996. Under the standard governing property acquired during premarital cohabitation that we articulated in Murray and Faulkner, the superior court did not err when it concluded that property acquired after the parties began living together in 1986 was marital property. This is true of the cabin in Talkeetna. Moreover, Judy claims that the couple bought the cabin together and used it for recreation. She presented evidence at trial that she had paid taxes on the cabin in 1998. The superior court found that the family had used the Talkeetna cabin for recreation. The superior court also found that Judy and Ernest originally put the cabin in Cody's name and that Ernest had acted on Cody's behalf to quitclaim the cabin back to himself without Judy's knowledge in 2002. The superior court concluded that [p]lacing [the cabin] in Cody's name was merely a convenience and a reflection that it was a family asset eventually to be passed on to the couple's children. These findings were supported by the record and were not clearly erroneous.
A number of pieces of equipment from the family's gold mining endeavors are also in dispute. The superior court found that the family's interest in the mine itself did not have any value at the time of the trial, but that some of the equipment left at the mine did have value. The superior court categorized these pieces of equipment as marital property and awarded them to Ernest. Ernest contests the trial court's categorization of the properties as marital. The superior court's determination that the mining equipment was marital property is supported by its finding that Judy raised the children while Ernest worked and that she sometimes assisted with the gold mine. The superior court wrote, Judy was a superb mother. She raised the children. She did not work outside the home, although she provided some assistance to the men working at the gold mine when she and the children were on the site. The superior court concluded that Ernest's interest in the mining operation itself was a marital asset. Although the trial court's findings regarding the mining equipment were succinct, the trial court's determination regarding the mine itself supports its conclusion that the mining equipment was a marital asset as well. More importantly, the superior court heard extensive and sometimes conflicting testimony about when and how the equipment was acquired, but Ernest does not claim that he bought any of the property prior to 1986. Therefore, the superior court properly deemed it marital under the pre-marital cohabitation standard set forth in Murray and Faulkner. Each piece of mining equipment is discussed briefly below.
Ernest claims that he purchased a Case 750 loader together with his brother in 1990 or 1991, before he married Judy. Ernest presented testimony from Judy's brother, who testified that he remembered seeing the loader at the mine in 1995 and 1996. Judy claims that the couple purchased the Case 750 in October 1996 and presented tax returns from 1996 indicating that the couple purchased it that year. Although the superior court did not determine when the Case 750 was purchased, it is clear that it was purchased sometime after the couple began living together in 1986.
Ernest claims that he purchased a D-8 Caterpillar in 1987. According to Ernest's testimony at trial, the Caterpillar was in poor condition when Ernest bought it and he rebuilt it. Judy testified that the couple bought the Caterpillar at a state auction in Grayling. Again, because the Caterpillar was purchased after 1986, the superior court properly deemed it marital property.
The Nodwell is a piece of equipment that the family used to haul fuel from the river. Ernest claims that he bought the Nodwell in Palmer in 1994. Judy testified that the couple bought it together and shipped it to the mine on a barge. As with the other pieces of mining equipment, there is no dispute that the Nodwell was purchased prior to 1986.
This piece of equipment was used to mine gold. Ernest testified that he purchased the trommel around 1988. [26] Judy claims that a photo of the trommel with their daughters in it when it was new indicates (because of the girls' ages) that the trommel was purchased after 1988. Because Ernest's own testimony indicated that he purchased the trommel sometime after 1986, the trial court properly categorized it as marital property.
Ernest testified that he purchased the Hough loader at a state auction in Umiat in 1987 or 1988 and that his brother paid to ship it to Nenana. The loader was used at the gold mine. Again, the trial court properly categorized the loader as marital property based on Ernest's own testimony that he bought it after 1986.
First Ernest testified that he bought the jet boat, but then testified that we bought this boat in 1993. Judy testified that they bought the jet boat in 1995 and that Ernest paid for it. Judy also testified that they improved the boat and used it for fishing as well as recreation. The superior court determined that the couple acquired the boat in 1993, well after the parties began cohabiting in 1986.
Ernest testified that he purchased the Cessna in 1989 using funds he obtained from the sale of another plane and money that his brother contributed. He testified that he painted the plane and used it in his business hauling salmon eggs. Judy testified that she thought Ernest bought the plane in 1992 or 1993. She testified that we all went and looked at it before buying it, and that the couple had used the plane during their marriage. In its findings of fact, the superior court concluded that Ernest bought the plane in 1981 and concluded that it was a marital asset because the parties used it for marital ventures. Judy claims that the finding regarding the year of purchase was a typographical error on the part of the superior court. We agree and conclude that the superior court's finding that Ernest bought the plane in 1981 was error because Ernest does not claim to have purchased the airplane before 1989. Because the Cessna was purchased after 1986 when the parties began living together, the superior court properly characterized the Cessna as marital property under either party's version of events. [27]
Ernest claims the Maule is non-marital property because he is the registered owner. Ernest testified that he acquired the plane in 1988 or 1989 when the previous owner told him he could have the plane if he would haul it away. Ernest testified that he did not pay anything for the airplane body but that his brother paid for the engine. Ernest also testified that he disassembled the plane to transport it on a boat, and then he rebuilt it. He testified that Judy helped him transport the plane. Judy testified that the couple used the Maule during the marriage. Judy argues that she cared for the children while Ernest repaired the plane. The trial court found that Ernest used marital funds to purchase the engine and repair the plane and deemed it a marital asset, a finding that Ernest disputes. Ernest does not claim that he purchased the Maule before 1986, when the cohabitation period began. Therefore, the superior court properly deemed the airplane marital property because it was purchased during the coverture period, commencing at the start of the parties' cohabitation.