Opinion ID: 2408540
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Trial Court Failed To Exercise Independent Judgment In Adopting the Attorney's General's Proposed Findings Verbatim.

Text: I would also remand for new findings for an additional, independent reason. As the majority notes, this Court has in the past recognized that it has become commonplace for courts to adopt findings and conclusions proposed by the parties. While judges often make at least some changes or additions to these proposals, this is not necessarily required. Nonetheless, the Court has repeatedly expressed its dislike for the practice of adopting findings and conclusions without change. Thus, as the Court stated in State v. Griffin, 848 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. banc 1993), For obvious reasons, when a court adopts in its entirety the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law of one of the parties, there may be a problem with the appearance. The judiciary is not and should not be a rubber-stamp for anyone. Id. at 471-72. Similarly, in Massman Constr. Co. v. Missouri Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 914 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. banc 1996), the Court noted that: the trial judge followed the often troublesome practice of adopting, without modification, significant portions of a proposed order prepared by respondent's counsel. Advocates are prone to excesses of rhetoric and lengthy recitals of evidence favorable to their side but which ignore proper evidence or inferences from evidence favorable to the other party. Trial judges are well advised to approach a party's proposed order with the sharp eye of a skeptic and the sharp pencil of an editor. Id. at 804. Nonetheless, the fact that a trial court has adopted the findings offered by one party does not require reversal. Instead, as the Court stated in State v. White, 873 S.W.2d 590 (Mo. banc 1994): As long as the court thoughtfully and carefully considers the parties' proposed findings and agrees with the content, there is no constitutional problem with the court adopting in whole or in part the findings of fact and conclusions of law drafted by one of the parties. Once the trial court determines that it agrees with one of the parties' findings and signs the order, the court has in effect adopted that party's findings as its own. It is clear from the record that the prosecutor drafted some or all of the August 1, 1990, findings of fact and conclusions of law. We find no constitutional violation regarding this practice as long as the trial court is satisfied that its findings of fact and conclusions of law reflect its independent judgment. Because there was no evidence presented that the findings and conclusions did not reflect the court's own independent judgment, this point is denied. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, where, as here, the motion court has adopted the findings of the State verbatim, the issue becomes whether evidence has been presented that the findings and conclusions did not reflect the court's own independent judgment. Of course, it is difficult to develop such proof. One way proof of lack of independent judgment can be shown is by demonstrating that the findings and conclusions are not supported by the record, in that they include factually inaccurate findings or findings as to which there is no substantial evidence. This is the issue addressed by much of the majority's opinion. It reviews the findings signed by the court, and concludes that there was evidence in the record which supports each finding. For example, it finds that, based on the record, the trial court could have disbelieved a particular expert, or could have disbelieved evidence of Kenley's alleged alcohol and drug dependence, and so forth. I agree with the majority's analysis, as far as it goes. The amended judgment submitted by the State systematically summarizes all of the evidence favorable to the State in the form of findings of fact. Every time it mentions evidence favorable to Kenley, it systematically rejects it, each time leading off its analysis with the statement that it did not find that particular defense witness credible. Yet, as the majority notes in its excellent and thorough analysis of the record, there is evidence in the record which, if believed, supports each finding in the form of judgment submitted by the attorney general and adopted by the trial court. The majority ends its analysis here, however. It, in effect, concludes that because a judge exercising independent judgment could have adopted these findings and conclusions, the judge below must have exercised independent judgment. While I agree with the former proposition, I do not agree that this means that the court does not need to go on and consider whether this particular judge in fact exercised independent judgment. This is particularly true where, as here, the issue before us is whether to affirm the imposition of the death penalty. The Florida Supreme Court noted this principle in remanding for a new penalty phase hearing in a case in which the judge who heard the original penalty phase trial died before he could rule. Florida rules provide that in such circumstances another judge should review the record and then pass sentence. In holding that this rule, while normally adequate to protect a party's rights, is improper in a death penalty case, the Florida court stated: [I]n adopting this rule, we did not take into account death penalty cases and the very special and unique fact-finding responsibilities of the sentencing judge in death cases. The trial judge has the single most important responsibility in the death penalty process. Under this process, a trial judge may not impose the death penalty unless he or she articulates in writing his or her factual findings and reasons for imposing the death penalty. We have recognized the unique responsibilities of the sentencing judge in this regard and the necessity for independent evaluations and written factual findings concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances in imposing the death sentence. ... We conclude that fairness in this difficult area of death penalty proceedings dictates that the judge imposing the sentence should be the same judge who presided over the penalty phase proceeding. Corbett v. State, 602 So.2d 1240, 1243-1244 (Fla.1992). A similar approach has been espoused by the United States Supreme Court in reviewing procedures for imposition of the death penalty. The Court has upheld such procedures in numerous cases precisely because it has found that under the relevant state's law, for instance, [i]f a death sentence is imposed, the sentencing authority articulates in writing the statutory reasons that led to its decision. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2970, 49 L.Ed.2d 913, 926 (1976). This, the Court has noted, allows for meaningful review and ensures that the penalty is not imposed indiscriminately or arbitrarily. Id. In Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), however, application of these principles required the Court to reverse a death sentence imposed by a judge after the jury had recommended life imprisonment. The judge's order simply stated that the judge believed that mitigating factors were outweighed by aggravating ones, but did not identify what these factors were. The Court said that this was inadequate, rejecting the argument that trial judges can be trusted to exercise their discretion in a responsible manner, even though they may base their decisions on secret information. However acceptable that argument might have been before Furman v. Georgia [408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972)], it is now clearly foreclosed. 430 U.S. at 360, 97 S.Ct. at 1206, 51 L.Ed.2d at 403. Similarly here, because we deal with a death penalty case, I do not believe the Court can rely on the assumption that the motion court's findings must have reflected the judge's independent judgment, nor can we even assume that the judge's wholesale adoption of the State's proposed findings necessarily means that he agreed with each of them. I do not believe we can affirm simply by deciding that a reasonable judge could reach the findings and conclusions set out in the court's judgment. We must determine whether the judge below, the judge who actually heard the evidence, exercised his or her independent judgment in adopting the attorney general's findings. In order to do this, it is incumbent upon us to review the remainder of the record to see whether there is other evidence that the judge did not exercise independent judgment. In undertaking this analysis, we should be guided by the fact that proof of a lack of independent judgment will usually be circumstantial. Here, however, in addition to much circumstantial evidence, we have the exceptional presence of direct evidencetwo written judgments, the one prepared independently containing findings and conclusions unsupported by the record and inadequate to support the denial of post-conviction relief; the other prepared by an advocate without opportunity for response by the adverse party containing numerous factual propositions the court did not mention in its initial, independently-prepared judgment and omitting material contained in its initial judgment. That initial judgment was four paragraphs in length and showed little understanding of the complexities of the issues before the court. By contrast, the amended judgment was 29 pages, and the majority itself devotes the first 30 pages of its opinion to issues dealing with the facts, the findings in the amended judgment, and whether they were supported by the evidence. I also note that the initial judgment did not find any of the defendant's witnesses not to be credible, but instead seemed to credit defense testimony, but simply misconceived the issue as whether the proffered evidence demonstrated lack of guilt of the crime charged rather than whether there was ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase of the trial which followed the guilty verdict. For this reason, apparently, the court focused on whether Kenley was competent to be held guilty for murder despite his difficult childhood. That was not the issue before him, however. In any event, the initial judgment fails to accurately set out either the nature of the testimony which Kenley says should have been presented at his penalty phase trial, or the most basic facts of the murder. By contrast, the amended judgment is directed to the evidence that was presented and the issues before the court. It finds each defense expert not credible, and properly analyzes how their testimony fits with the defense and prosecution theories. The contrast between the two judgments necessarily creates doubt that the court exercised independent judgment while so fundamentally shifting the basis for its decision and reaching such different conclusions and such a broad reorientation of his understanding of the issues in the brief period after receipt of the attorney general's letter. These doubts might be allayed if the motion judge had kept and studied the State's proposed findings for a reasonable period of time, and either marked them up and adopted some while rejecting others, requested and considered proposed findings from Kenley, or waited for objections to the State's proposals, or at least notified Kenley's counsel that the court was considering amending its findings and adopting those proposed by the state. None of these events occurred, however. Instead, the court adopted the State's findings and conclusions four days after they were mailed, without notice to Kenley and without notice that it would amend its findings or an opportunity for Kenley to be heard, whether by submitting alternative findings and conclusions or by submitting objections to those proposed by the State. In fact, even if Kenley's counsel had prepared proposed findings or objections and mailed them the next day, they would not have reached the judge before he ruled. Finally, we must consider that the court adopted the State's proposed findings absolutely verbatim. This would not be surprising in a simple case involving a few simple issues, where most people might agree on what findings and conclusions were needed to reach a particular result. Here, however, the proposed findings covered 29 pages. They were extremely complex, going over detailed aspects of the record and the law. They also uniformly found every State's witness to be credible, and every defense expert not to be credible, findings absent from the initial, independently-prepared judgment and which, defense counsel suggests in this Court, the attorney general may have purposely included in the proposed findings so as to preclude later federal habeas corpus review of key issues raised below. This finding of lack of credibility also justified the motion court, and justifies this Court in reviewing the motion court's ruling, in ignoring or giving no weight to defense evidence. While I agree with the majority that a rational judge might have made each of these determinations, I find it exceedingly indicative of a lack of independent judgment that the motion court made all of them in exactly the terms suggested by the attorney general. A similar situation faced the Maine Supreme Court in a civil context in Clifford v. Klein, 463 A.2d 709 (Me.1983). The judge in Clifford solicited proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law only from defense counsel. He then adopted them verbatim without giving prior notice to the plaintiff's counsel of his intent to do so or of his request to defense counsel. The court first stated that, while it did not disapprove of adoption of findings proposed by a party, it would remand for new findings in those instances where this Court is uncertain whether the judicial function has been adequately performed. Id. at 712-13. It found it had such uncertainty in the case before it, stating: Not only did the trial justice solicit proposed findings from only one party, thereby depriving himself of the opportunity to weigh the views of counsel for both parties, but more importantly, in soliciting proposed findings from the prevailing party, the justice failed to give counsel for that party any indication of the rationale for his decision. This is not the type of case in which the basis for the justice's decision was readily apparent. The evidence adduced at trial was extensive and in part conflicting. The proposed judgement drafted by counsel for the prevailing party attempted to review this testimony at length and in the process rejected selected portions of it. We believe it highly unlikely that counsel=s perception and the portrayal of this testimony would have been identical to that of the presiding justice. The evidence adduced at trial was too extensive and too complex for counsel to have been able to divine the rationale supporting the decision of the court. Id. at 713 (emphasis added). See also, Ramey Constr. Co., Inc. v. Apache Tribe of Mescalero Reservation, 616 F.2d 464, 467 (10th Cir.1980) (noting that verbatim adoption of findings proposed by party mandates their review with a more critical eye and that here, [a]lthough the trial court may well have performed its judicial function in this case, viewing the findings and the record with a critical eye, we cannot be sure that it did so.). Nearly every doubt attending the judgment in Clifford is present here; only one party's views were considered; [1] that party prepared its proposed findings without receiving input from the judge as to the basis of his views; the evidence was so complex and the evidence so extensive that it is highly unlikely that counsel's perception and the portrayal of this testimony would have been identical to that of the presiding judge. Clifford, 463 A.2d at 713. For all of these reasons, as did Clifford , I believe that the facts necessarily raise considerable doubt (if not outright disbelief) that the motion court exercised independent judgment in adopting the State's proposed findings and conclusions. Whether or not such doubt that the amended judgment reflects independent judgment would be a sufficient basis to remand in a non-capital case, it certainly does provide a sufficient basis to remand in this capital case. As the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly noted: [T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of this qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961 (1976). Moreover, precisely because of the qualitative difference between death and other forms of punishment permitted under our laws: although not every imperfection in the deliberative process is sufficient, even in a capital case, to set aside a state-court judgment, the severity of the sentence mandates careful scrutiny in the review of any colorable claim of error. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884-85, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2747, 77 L.Ed.2d 235, 255 (1983) (citing Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305, 96 S.Ct. at 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d at 961). Applying such scrutiny to a death penalty case in which the trial court simply told the state's attorney that he believed the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and left it to the state's attorney to draft findings in accordance with that decision, the Florida Supreme Court remanded for a new sentencing hearing, stating the trial judge's action in delegating to the state attorney the responsibility to identify and explain the appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors raises a serious question concerning the weighing process that must be conducted before imposing a death penalty. Patterson v. State, 513 So.2d 1257, 1262 (Fla. 1987). Here, too, because the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the State's proposed findings raise not just colorable, but substantial, doubt as to the independence of the judgment exercised by the motion court, we should reverse and remand for a new 29.15 hearing and for independent findings of fact and conclusions of law. For these reasons, I dissent from the majority's decision to affirm the judgment below.