Opinion ID: 1967565
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Dr Byron Hurwitz

Text: Dr. Byron Hurwitz, Dr. Haidak's treating ophthalmologist, gave conflicting pretrial deposition testimony as to his opinion regarding whether there is any known effective treatment for ION. Dr. Hurwitz first stated that he was prepared to testify at trial that the treatment given Dr. Haidak by Drs. Burnley and Kolsky halted the progression of ION. In response to a subsequent question, however, Dr. Hurwitz stated that he did not know whether there was any known effective treatment for postoperative ION. On cross-examination at trial, Dr. Hurwitz stated that he was ready to change his testimony regarding the availability of effective treatment for ION. Three days later, after the testimony of Dr. Miller, Dr. Haidak requested that he be allowed to recall Dr. Hurwitz for the purpose of testifying to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that earlier treatment could have prevented damage to Dr. Haidak's vision. The trial court sustained an objection and forbade further testimony as to this. The court noted that Dr. Haidak had not informed the parties that Dr. Hurwitz would have an opinion on the treatment and prevention of ION in his Rule 26(b)(4) filing. Dr. Haidak claims the court erred and abused its discretion when it refused to allow him to recall Dr. Hurwitz to testify that he had reached an expert opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that earlier treatment would have reduced the extent of the injury to Dr. Haidak. In excluding the evidence, the trial court focused on the lack of notice to Dr. Corso and the Center: They didn't get notice and they had no reason to expect based on this deposition that he was going to enter into this area.... They didn't have a chance to prepare for it. They didn't have a chance to respond in other parts of their case to it, it's not fair. We note that Rule 26(f)(1)(B) imposes a duty on parties to supplement the subject matter and substance of expected testimony. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 26. See also Weiner v. Kneller, 557 A.2d 1306, 1309 (D.C.1989). Failure to supplement the statement may result in sanctions, including the exclusion of evidence, by the court. Id. The trial judge's determination whether the sanction imposed is a penalty too strict or unnecessary under the circumstances is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Henneke v. Sommer, 431 A.2d 6, 8 (D.C.1981) (citation omitted). The party seeking to introduce testimony improperly omitted from the 26(b)(4) statement must satisfy a standard based on the following five factors: (1) whether allowing the evidence would incurably surprise or prejudice the opposite party; (2) whether excluding the evidence would incurably prejudice the party seeking to introduce it; (3) whether the party seeking to introduce the testimony failed to comply with the evidentiary rules inadvertently or willfully; (4) the impact of allowing the proposed testimony on the orderliness and efficiency of the trial; and (5) the impact of excluding the proposed testimony on the completeness of information before the court or jury. Weiner, supra, 557 A.2d at 1311-12. Review of the record convinces us that the trial judge focused on his concern that the evidence would incurably surprise appellees. See id. at 1309, [t]he primary purpose of [the Rule] and the accompanying sanctions is to prevent unfair surprise.... Dr. Hurwitz was offered to testify as Dr. Haidak's ophthalmologist, not as an expert on ION. As the trial court noted, the deposition testimony of Dr. Hurwitz gave no indication that he was prepared to offer an opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, regarding whether ION is preventable. Moreover, Dr. Hurwitz stated he would defer to Dr. Miller, as a neuro-ophthalmologist, for an opinion on that subject. The court was also clearly concerned with the orderliness and efficiency of the trial. Dr. Hurwitz initially testified on July 23, and, on July 26, Dr. Haidak requested permission to recall him. Dr. Haidak suggested that the court allow further depositions to be taken over the weekend, thereby enabling Dr. Corso and the Center adequately to prepare for this new testimony. The court rejected this suggestion, noting, inter alia, that further testimony from Dr. Hurwitz as to causation could require Dr. Corso and the Center to make considerable revisions in their strategy and in the presentation of their defense. We defer to the trial judge's evaluation of the case at that point in time and find no abuse of discretion.