Opinion ID: 848858
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Liability of the City of Battle Creek

Text: The governmental tort liability act, M.C.L. § 691.1401 et seq., provides immunity from tort liability to governmental agencies [3] engaged in a governmental function. [4] M.C.L. 691.1407(1). The act provides immunity from tort liability to governmental employees if, inter alia, the employee's conduct does not amount to gross negligence. [5] The legislative immunity granted to governmental agencies and their employees is broad. This immunity, however, is subject to five narrowly drawn statutory exceptions. [6] Ross v. Consumers Power (On Rehearing), 420 Mich. 567, 593-595, 622, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984). Plaintiff asserts that he may recover from the city for his injuries suffered as a result of the negligent operation of the government-owned forklift under the motor vehicle exception. Thus, we must examine the language of the motor vehicle exception to determine whether a forklift is a motor vehicle as that term is used in the exception. Whether the Legislature intended that the term motor vehicle include a forklift is an issue of statutory interpretation. The primary rule of statutory interpretation is that we are to effect the intent of the Legislature. Wickens v. Oakwood Healthcare System, 465 Mich. 53, 60, 631 N.W.2d 686 (2001). To achieve this task, we must first examine the statute's language. Id. If the language is clear and unambiguous, we assume the Legislature intended its plain meaning, and the statute is enforced as written. People v. Stone, 463 Mich. 558, 562, 621 N.W.2d 702 (2001). The motor vehicle exception does not define motor vehicle. Further, contrary to the interpretation of the Court of Appeals, the governmental tort liability act does not refer to the Michigan Vehicle Code, M.C.L. § 257.1 et seq., for the definition. Section 1405, the motor vehicle exception, provides: Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner, as defined in [the Michigan Vehicle Code], as amended, being sections 257.1 to 257.923 of the Compiled Laws of 1948. The Court of Appeals erroneously assumed that the definitional phrase in § 1405 refers to the term motor vehicle. Grammatically, the final clause of § 1405 sends the reader to the Michigan Vehicle Code only for the definition of owner. The last antecedent rule of statutory construction provides that a modifying or restrictive word or clause contained in a statute is confined solely to the immediately preceding clause or last antecedent, unless something in the statute requires a different interpretation. Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward, 460 Mich. 230, 237, 596 N.W.2d 119 (1999). Applying this rule, the reference to §§ 257.1 to 257.923 in § 1405 defines owner, [7] not motor vehicle, and nothing in the statute demands a different interpretation. Haveman v. Kent Co. Rd. Comm'rs, 356 Mich. 11, 18-22, 96 N.W.2d 153 (1959). [8] Accordingly, because the motor vehicle exception does not provide a definition of motor vehicle, we are required to give the term its plain and ordinary meaning. M.C.L. 8.3a; People v. McIntire, 461 Mich. 147, 153, 599 N.W.2d 102 (1999). When determining the common, ordinary meaning of a word or phrase, consulting a dictionary is appropriate. Horace v. City of Pontiac, 456 Mich. 744, 756, 575 N.W.2d 762 (1998). It is possible to find varying dictionary definitions of the term motor vehicle. For example, the Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001) defines a motor vehicle as an automobile, truck, bus, or similar motor-driven conveyance, a definition that does not include a forklift. [9] In our view, this definition appropriately reflects the commonly understood meaning of the term. [10] The American Heritage Dictionary (2d College ed.), on the other hand, defines motor vehicle as self-propelled, wheeled conveyance that does not run on rails, a definition, which would arguably include a forklift. Given these divergent definitions, we must choose one that most closely effectuates the Legislature's intent. Fortunately, our jurisprudence under the governmental tort liability act provides an answer regarding which definition should be selected. As previously noted, it is a basic principle of our state's jurisprudence that the immunity conferred upon governmental agencies and subdivisions is to be construed broadly and that the statutory exceptions are to be narrowly construed. Nawrocki v. Macomb Co. Rd. Comm., 463 Mich. 143, 158, 615 N.W.2d 702 (2000). Thus, this Court must apply a narrow definition to the undefined term motor vehicle. The definition of a motor vehicle as an automobile, truck, bus, or similar motor-driven conveyance is the narrower of the two common dictionary definitions. Therefore, we apply it to the present case. A forklift-which is a piece of industrial construction equipment is not similar to an automobile, truck, or bus. Thus, the motor vehicle exception should not be construed to remove the broad veil of governmental immunity for the negligent operation of a forklift.