Opinion ID: 852394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Revision of Sentences

Text: I agree with the majority that the British background at the time is therefore significant but I draw a different conclusion from that background. Although a 1907 English statute explicitly authorized an upward or downward revision, as the majority notes, by the time Indiana considered this issue in the 1960s, the British courts had virtually abandoned upward revisions. It seems reasonable to infer that the working assumption of the proponents of the ABA Model was that American judges would come to the same conclusion, and would undertake appellate review of sentencing but largely, if not completely, abandon upward revisions. As we have noted before, a principal concern leading to the recommendation favoring appellate review of sentences was the perception that sentences were not evenly imposed across the state. Rather than adopt a mechanical approach along the lines of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, it was thought that appellate review could address the major inequities. The initial response of the Indiana Supreme Court was to adopt a rule that prescribed no procedures, but adopted a substantive standard of review that virtually precluded appellate revision. In 1972 the predecessor of Appellate Rule 7 was adopted calling for affirming a sentence unless it was manifestly unreasonable, thus requiring an appellate declaration that the trial court had lost its bearings altogether before the appellate court would act. As might be expected, few sentences were disturbed under this regime. But increased concern for disparity in sentencing led to the amendment of the rule in 2000 to provide for revision of a sentence that was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Under that provision the appellate courts of Indiana have engaged in more frequent revision of sentences, but to date have never increased a sentence. I acknowledge, as the Court of Appeals noted in this case, that this Court has increased sentences on individual counts in the process of reducing the sentence in aggregate. Monroe v. State, 886 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. 2008) (revising five consecutive twenty-year sentences to five concurrent fifty-year sentences). But we have held that [u]ltimately the length of the aggregate sentence and how it is to be served are the issues that matter, Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind.2008), and neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals has increased an aggregate sentence. In my view that is the proper result and the result anticipated by those who proposed leaving this issue to resolution by Supreme Court rules. It would seem that the Constitution contemplates rules fleshing out the appellate review of sentences, but Indiana and most other jurisdictions have addressed the issue, if at all, in case law. I have no objection to proceeding by case law, but I do not join in the holding that appellate upward revision is dependent on the defendant's challenging his sentence. As we confirm today, the State can neither appeal nor cross-appeal a sentence. The majority would permit the State to argue for an increased sentence if the defendant challenges the sentence. I assume this means that no argument for an increased sentence is to be presented in the State's appellate briefing unless the defendant has sought to invoke the appellate court's review and revise power. This scheme seems impractical to me. First, I assume the appellate court could exercise its review and revise power whether or not the State requested it. It would not take Louis Brandeis to figure out how to smuggle an argument for an increased sentence into a brief ostensibly addressing other issues. More importantly, even if the appellate court would not address the sentence unless one or more parties requests it, upward sentence revision would be at risk only if the defendant initiates the debate over the sentence. This puts the defendant's counsel in a very awkward position if upward revision by an appellate court is a realistic prospect. Often the sentence is the only viable issue in the appeal that Article 7, Section 6 of the Indiana Constitution guarantees. We should not force counsel to choose among raising the issue and obtaining an increased sentence, or foregoing the issue and either waiving appeal or raising frivolous issues. It seems highly unlikely that in practice Indiana's appellate courts will frequently exercise their power to increase a sentence. Although I agree we have had that power for thirty-six years, neither this Court nor the Court of Appeals has ever exercised it. We have tacitly, and without awareness of the British legacy Justice Dickson has outlined, followed our British cousins in foregoing upward revision of sentences. In my view we should forthrightly state that although we have that power, we have never exercised it and do not expect to exercise it in the future except in the most unusual case. This will leave defendants free to exercise their constitutional right to appeal without great concern for retribution, eliminate concern for ineffective assistance claims based on taking an appeal that backfired, and avoid the temptation for the State to disguise a sentencing argument in some other garb. RUCKER, J., concurs in Part II.