Opinion ID: 161326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jury instruction on intent

Text: 40 In a related issue, NESCO requested before trial that the jury be instructed as follows: [i]f the words and actions of the parties demonstrate the existence of an agreement, then a contract exists, even though one of the parties may harbor unexpressed reservations or objections to the existence of that contract. App., vol. I, at 85. The cited legal authority was one case from the Missouri court of appeals and one from Arizona. See Computer Network, Ltd. v. Purcell Tire & Rubber Co., 747 S.W.2d 669, 675 (Mo. App. 1988); Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 694 P.2d 267, 276 (Ariz. App.), vacated in part, 694 P.2d 198 (Ariz. 1984). Ronan objected that the requested instruction was not an accurate reflection of Oklahoma law. See App., vol. II, at 358. The court agreed the proposed instruction had no basis in Oklahoma law, App., vol. I, at 211, and ultimately rejected it. 41 Because the UCC is intended to be applied uniformly across the various states, courts routinely turn to decisions from other states when there is no case law on point within the relevant jurisdiction. For example, in Reynolds-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Peoples National Bank, 699 P.2d 146 (Okla. 1985), the Oklahoma Supreme Court observed with disapproval that one party did not attempt to distinguish [cases cited by the other], but instead simply brush[ed] them aside because they were decided in other jurisdictions. 699 P.2d at 149. Similarly, that court held a lower court was incorrect in refusing to consider the other decisions in its rulings. Id. In contrast, the state supreme court considered the cases persuasive . . . in the absence of any Oklahoma decisions on the point, and in view of the policy of the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code `to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.' Id. (quoting Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 1-102(2)(c) (1981)). The Oklahoma Supreme Court also used the UCC decisions of other states to inform its own holdings in Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870, 871 (Okla. 1979) and Mid-Continental Casualty Co. v. First National Bank and Trust Co. of Chickasha, 531 P.2d 1370 (Okla. 1975), explaining in the latter case that it found the decisions of the other states to be viable and persuasive. 531 P.2d at 1373. 42 Furthermore, as we explained above, the requested instruction was indeed a correct statement of law under the Oklahoma UCC. Nevertheless, we review a trial court's decisions regarding jury instructions for abuse of discretion. Hinds v. Gen. Motors Corp., 988 F.2d 1039, 1046 (10th Cir. 1993), and the exclusion of one correct statement of law does not necessarily constitute error. Rather, [t]he instructions as a whole need only convey a correct statement of the applicable law. Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404, 1411-12 (10th Cir. 1988). In considering the instructions on appeal, we take into account all the jury heard, and from the standpoint of the jury, decide not whether the charge was faultless in every particular, but whether the jury was misled in any way. Id. at 1411 (internal quotations omitted). Here, the jury was instructed as follows: 43 A contract for sale may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including language or conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract. 44 A contract for sale may be found to exist even though the moment of its making is undetermined. 45 Even though one or more terms are left open, a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy. 46 A contract may be express or implied. An express contract is set out in words, either spoken or written. An implied contract is created by the acts or conduct of the parties. No particular form is required for words or conduct to create either an express or implied contract. 47 App., vol. I, at 161-62 (emphasis added). The instructions were correct statements of law, taken from Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 2-204 and Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction 23.3, respectively. See App., vol. I, at 211. The court found these instructions made it clear that formation of a contract depends upon the parties' objective manifestations of agreement, rather than upon their subjective intent, id. at 212. We agree. 48 There was further support for the objective requirements in the definitions of offer and acceptance. The jury was told a party could manifest its intent to be bound by an agreement by words or by conduct from which a reasonable person could find that the party intended to be bound by the agreement and further that [c]onduct by both parties which recognized the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. Id. at 164, 166 (emphasis added). 49 There was one problematic instruction, however. The jury was told: 50 In this case, you must decide the meaning of the Ronan quotation to NESCO dated February 14, 1996. To do this you must decide what the intent of the parties was when Ronan made and NESCO received that quotation. 51 To decide what their intent was you should first examine the language of that quotation. You may also consider the circumstances under which Ronan made and NESCO received the quotation, and what the parties themselves believed the terms of the quotation meant as shown by the evidence. You may also consider the past dealings of the parties and the language of previous quotations. 52 Id. at 167 (emphasis added). The italicized language appears to allow consideration of subjective intent. NESCO never objected to this language during the preparation or communication of the jury instructions. It now argues that this language is particularly problematic given the trial testimony regarding Ronan's internal policy against nonstandard contracts. It contends its proffered instruction on disregarding subjective intent would have cured any potential for improper considerations by the jury. While that may be true, we believe the jury instructions as a whole conveyed an acceptable statement of Oklahoma contract law. The court's decision to exclude the proffered instruction is not reversible error.