Opinion ID: 41149
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Equal Pay Claim

Text: On appeal, Revere argues that the government was not entitled to summary judgment where it refused to promote her and “paid her less money for the higher graded work that she performed.” She asserts that, even though she performed the same work, she was paid less than Pine McCollough, a male in a GS-12 position. She asserts that General Peter Madsen refused to promote her to the GS-12 level because of the investigations and assumed she was guilty. The EPA provides as follows: [n]o employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees . . . at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (I) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex. 9 29 U.S.C. 206(d)(1). An employee demonstrates a prima facie case of an EPA violation by showing that the employer paid employees of opposite genders different wages for equal work for jobs which require equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions. Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1077-78 (11th Cir. 2003). “Moreover, ‘[t]he prima facie case . . . focuses solely on the primary duties of each job, not duties that are incidental or insubstantial,’ and, although formal job titles or descriptions may be considered, the controlling factor in the court’s assessment of whether two jobs are substantially equal must be actual job content.” Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865, 876 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Similarly, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie equal-pay violation of Title VII by showing that she is female and her job was substantially similar to higher paying jobs occupied by males. Mulhall v. Advance Security, Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 598 (11th Cir. 1994). Because Revere did not establish that a similarly situated male comparator had received higher pay, the district court did not err in finding that Revere had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Equal Pay Act. Additionally, even if Revere had established a prima facie case, the difference 10 between Revere’s pay and a potential male comparator was based on a “factor other than sex,” and so did not violate the Equal Pay Act.