Opinion ID: 6972211
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sierra Pacific’s Bight to Intervene

Text: Sierra Pacific appeals the district court’s decision not to allow it to intervene as of right on the merits of the underlying action. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) requires the applicant for intervention to claim an interest “relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action,” the protection of which may be impaired or impeded by the action if the applicant cannot participate in the litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 24(a). We apply a four-part test under this rule: “(1) the motion must be timely; (2) the applicant must claim a ‘significantly pro-tectable’ interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant’s interest must be inadequately represented by the parties to the action.” Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1493 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting Sierra Club v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 995 F.2d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir.1993)). The district court in this case held that Sierra Pacific did not meet the second element of this test-that Sierra Pacific did not have a “significantly protectable” interest in the underlying action that would entitle it to intervene during the merits phase. The district court relied on our rule that the federal government is the only proper defendant in an action to compel compliance with NEPA. See Forest Conservation Council, 66 F.3d at 1499 n. 11; Sierra Club, 995 F.2d at 1485; Portland Audubon Soc’y, 866 F.2d at 309. The rationale for our rule is that, because NEPA requires action only by the government, only the government can be liable under NEPA. A private party cannot “comply” with NEPA, and, therefore, a private party cannot be a defendant in a NEPA compliance action. See, e.g., Sierra Club, 995 F.2d at 1485. Sierra Pacific proffers two arguments in an attempt to circumvent our rule. First, it contends that the County and City are seeking more than mere compliance with NEPA in their action against the Secretary. Sierra Pacific argues that Plaintiffs’ suits “are more accurately characterized as attacks on the Settlement Act itself in an attempt to prevent its implementation.” This characterization must fail. As the district court recognized in its order, “Plaintiffs’ ease clearly arises under NEPA. [Sierra Pacific] urges us to find to the contrary, but such a finding, based on the alleged violations and the relief sought, is simply unsupportable.” Plaintiffs’ claims and request for injunctive relief are firmly grounded on claims of NEPA violation. Second, Sierra Pacific argues that the case of County of Fresno v. Andrus, 622 F.2d 436 (9th Cir.1980), represents an exception to our rule that only the federal government can be a defendant in a NEPA compliance action, and argues that Sierra Pacific falls within that exception. Whatever exception County of Fresno represents, however, has been limited by later decisions to the remedial phase of a trial. See Forest Conservation Council, 66 F.3d at 1499 n. 11; Sierra Club, 995 F.2d at 1485. Therefore, County of Fresno is unavailing to Sierra Pacific’s request to intervene in the merits phase. Sierra Pacific goes to great lengths in its briefs to show that it has a “significantly protectable” interest in the underlying action. These interests (e.g., its duty to protect the quality and quantity of water provided to its service and area, and its interest in the continuing construction of the Pinon Pine Power Plant) suffice only to grant them intervention in the remedial phase, as noted by the district court. Appellant does not have a “significantly protectable” interest in federal government complianee or noncompliance with NEPA. See Forest Conservation Council, 66 F.3d at 1499 n. 11; Sierra Club, 995 F.2d at 1485; Portland Audubon Soc’y, 866 F.2d at 309. Therefore, the district court did not err by limiting its intervention only to the remedial phase. 1