Opinion ID: 1211333
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Text of the Predicate Exception

Text: The plainness or ambiguity of statutory [text] is determined by reference to the [text] itself, the specific context in which that [text] is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 843. Here, the statutory text states that a predicate statute is a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of [firearms]. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii). There is no dispute that the California tort laws, which are codified in the California Civil Code, are state statutes. The issue is whether those statutes are applicable to the sale or marketing of firearms within the meaning of the PLCAA. As discussed below, Plaintiffs and Defendants present competing definitions of the term applicable. Like most terms, applicable does not have only one meaning when viewed in isolation. Not surprisingly then, courts have struggled to determine the meaning of applicable as used in a variety of statutes. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (statute governing medical devices); McGee v. Peake, 511 F.3d 1352 (Fed.Cir.2008) (statute governing the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims); Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 471 F.3d 1350 (D.C.Cir.2006) (statute governing the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration). One everyday meaning, and a dictionary definition, of the term applicable is capable of being applied. Black's Law Dictionary 98 (6th ed.1990). Plaintiffs urge us to conclude that this expansive definition is the only possible meaning of the term applicable in the PLCAA's predicate exception. Under that definition, Plaintiffs would prevail: Because we held in Ileto I that Plaintiffs' claims concerning the sale and marketing of firearms are cognizable, the California tort laws are [capable of being applied to] the sale or marketing of [firearms]. By contrast, Defendants argue that Congress intended a very narrow use of the term applicable, which can mean relevant or applicable specifically. Defendants argue that, under that narrow meaning of the term, the requirements of the predicate exception would be met only if a plaintiff alleged a knowing violation of a statute that pertained exclusively to the sale or marketing of firearms. The dictionary captures this narrower definition, see Black's Law Dictionary at 98 (defining applicable as relevant), and so does everyday usage. [4] We are convinced at the outset, then, that the term applicable has a spectrum of meanings, including the two poles identified by the parties. To determine Congress' intended meaning in the PLCAA, we must examine the specific context in which [the term `applicable'] is used[ ] and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 843. Congress listed examples of predicate statutes in the PLCAA: (I) any case in which the manufacturer or seller knowingly made any false entry in, or failed to make appropriate entry in, any record required to be kept under Federal or State law with respect to the qualified product, or aided, abetted, or conspired with any person in making any false or fictitious oral or written statement with respect to any fact material to the lawfulness of the sale or other disposition of a qualified product; or (II) any case in which the manufacturer or seller aided, abetted, or conspired with any other person to sell or otherwise dispose of a qualified product, knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the actual buyer of the qualified product was prohibited from possessing or receiving a firearm or ammunition under subsection (g) or (n) of section 922 of Title 18[.] 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii). We conclude from those illustrations that Plaintiffs' asserted meaning of applicable appears too broad, but that Defendants' proposed restrictive meaning appears too narrow. See Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961) (noting that a word is known by the company it keeps); Cal. State Legislative Bd. v. Dep't of Transp., 400 F.3d 760, 763 (9th Cir.2005) ([T]he general term should be defined in light of the specific examples provided.). The illustrative predicate statutes pertain specifically to sales and manufacturing activities, and most also target the firearms industry specifically. Those examples suggest that Plaintiffs' proposed all-encompassing meaning of the term applicable is incorrect, because each of the examples hasat the very leasta direct connection with sales or manufacturing. Indeed, if any statute that could be applied to the sales and manufacturing of firearms qualified as a predicate statute, there would be no need to list examples at all. Similarly, the examples suggest that Defendants' asserted narrow meaning is incorrect, because some of the examples do not pertain exclusively to the firearms industry. In conclusion, we hold that, viewed in isolation, the term applicable has a range of meanings. The context in which the term appears in the PLCAA suggests that neither Plaintiffs' nor Defendants' asserted meaning is wholly correct. In any event, we conclude, as did the Second Circuit, City of New York, 524 F.3d at 401, that the text of the statute alone is inconclusive as to Congress' intent. [5] We thus are left to examine the additional indicators of congressional intent. Jonah R., 446 F.3d at 1005.