Opinion ID: 854693
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The BIA’s Decision is Persuasive

Text: The BIA cited four California Court of Appeal cases in reaching its conclusion that there is no “realistic probability” that California would apply § 243.4(e) to conduct falling outside the generic federal definition of moral turpitude. In each, the Court of Appeal applied § 243.4(e) to acts where the defendant had the specific intent to cause sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse, and actually inflicted harm through the unlawful touching of the victim’s intimate parts. See People v. Chavez, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); People v. Dayan, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 391 (Cal. Ct. 6 GONZALEZ-CERVANTES V . HOLDER App. 1995); People v. Rodriguez, No. B182215, 2006 WL 1903041 (Cal. Ct. App. July 12, 2006); People v. Jones, No. C045990, 2005 WL 2160425 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2005). For instance, in Chavez, the court held that misdemeanor sexual battery is a crime of moral turpitude because it is a specific intent crime, and “[u]nlike simple or even felony battery, sexual battery does not result from a simple push or offensive touch.” 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 682. Sexual battery, the court found, involved “the degrading use of another, against her will, for one’s own sexual arousal.” Id. at 682–83 (quotations and citations omitted). In Jones, the court upheld the defendant’s conviction for misdemeanor sexual battery where the victim testified she woke up naked from the waist down to find the defendant lying naked on top of her. 2005 WL 2160425, at . In Dayan, the court upheld the defendant’s conviction for misdemeanor sexual battery for intentionally and unlawfully groping women in his dental office. 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 392–95. And in Rodriguez, the court found the evidence that the defendant touched the victim’s breast against her will established the crime of misdemeanor sexual battery. 2006 WL 1903041, at –8. Since the sexual conduct in these cases actually harmed the victims through the non-consensual touching of their intimate parts, the acts fall within the generic federal definition of moral turpitude as applied in the context of sexGONZALEZ-CERVANTES V . HOLDER 7 related offenses.1 See Nunez, 594 F.3d at 1132; see also Mendoza, 623 F.3d at 1303 n.7.