Opinion ID: 1057794
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Duty to Intervene

Text: The duty to intervene applies when a shipyard's judgment is obviously improvident, and the vessel owner both knew of 9 the defect [or hazard] and that [it] was continuing to [be] use[d], and should have realized the defect [or hazard] presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the longshoremen. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 175-76. In order to establish the duty to intervene, Minton needed to show that: the vessel owner ha[d] (1) actual knowledge that a dangerous condition exist[ed] and (2) actual knowledge that the stevedore or independent contractor, or its employees, [could not] be relied upon to remedy the condition, and that if unremedied it [would] pose a substantial risk of injury. Lormand v. Superior Oil Co., 845 F.2d at 542. Exxon claims that no evidence was presented to show that any Exxon employee had actual knowledge that Minton was working amid conditions that were obviously dangerous. Exxon argues that Minton proved only that Exxon should have known about the danger, but that this is not the standard to be applied to establish a duty to intervene.
The first step in establishing the presence of a duty to intervene requires an evaluation of whether Exxon had actual knowledge that a dangerous condition existed. James W. Hammond, Exxon's director of industrial hygiene, testified that the danger of pulmonary injury to humans from asbestos exposure was known by 1934. Dr. Neill Kendall Weaver, Exxon's associate medical director, stated in a deposition presented to the jury 10 that industrial hygienists were aware of the dangers of asbestos exposure as early as the 1930s. He indicated that, not only did Exxon know of the danger in the 1930s, but it also took precautionary measures in its refineries to protect workers from the harmful effect of asbestos. Dr. Weaver testified that in the 1950s he became aware that high exposures of asbestos were present in the shipbuilding industry. According to Dr. Weaver, during the 1950s, Exxon's industrial hygienists took voyages on Exxon vessels and reported their observations, including measurements of the amount of asbestos dust present on the vessels during the voyage. Dr. Weaver further testified that the scientific community was aware of the causal connection between asbestos and mesothelioma by 1964. Significantly, Dr. R.E. Eckhardt, Exxon's director of medical records, attended a three-day conference in October, 1964, on the Biological Effects of Asbestos, sponsored by the Section of Biological and Medical Sciences of the New York Academy of Sciences. The conference would later come to be known as the Selikoff asbestos conference. When he returned, Dr. Eckhardt wrote a summary of the conference for Exxon, which was presented to the jury as evidence of Exxon's knowledge. In this summary, after devoting five pages to the many presentations detailing the harmful 11 effects of asbestos exposure, Dr. Eckhart gives his own opinion: I would say that this three-day conference clearly suggests that exposure to asbestos is a most serious situation [and] it is very important to eliminate all unnecessary exposure to asbestos dust in the future. . . . Certainly this appears to be a problem that cannot be taken lightly, and certainly it would seem that very careful control of exposures to asbestos throughout refinery operations should be instituted. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In his summary, he also specifically recognized the danger asbestos posed to bystanders, such as Minton, stating that the foreman whose exposure is presumably quite light does not develop asbestosis but may in subsequent years go on to develop mesothelioma. Not only did Minton's evidence show that Exxon was aware that asbestos-containing products created dangerous working conditions, Minton's evidence as discussed in Part II.A.2.b., supra, also established that Exxon's vessels did contain asbestos throughout the period at issue, 1966-1977. b. Actual Knowledge That the Shipyard Would Not Act, and That the Condition, if Unremedied, Would Pose a Substantial Risk of Injury Minton also presented evidence of Exxon's actual knowledge that the Shipyard could not be relied on to protect Minton, thereby exposing him to the dangerous conditions present in an asbestos-containing environment without the protection of safety controls. A 1972 letter from T.J. McTaggart, Exxon's 12 head port engineer, to captains and chief engineers on Exxon vessels prohibits the use of asbestos-containing materials on vessels, mandating that [p]ersons packing the cartons . . . wear dust masks, and that supplies of asbestos insulating materials . . . be packed in . . . sealed [boxes] and marked 'Asbestos[:] Not To Be Used On This Vessel – Do Not Open Unless A Dust Mask Is Worn.'  Draper, the Shipyard's pipefitter foreman, testified that he did not, however, see any Exxon crew members use asbestos safety measures in the 1960s and 1970s, nor did he ever receive a warning from the Exxon crewmembers that asbestos was hazardous. Ware, the former estimating supervisor for the Shipyard, testified that at no time prior to the late 1970s did he see any signs warning against asbestos exposure or any effort by Exxon crew members to isolate areas so that the Shipyard workers would not be exposed to asbestos dust, to take air samples, or to employ wet-down methods to hold down the dust. Ware also testified that the Shipyard workers did not have showers or clean clothes provided to them when they worked around asbestos, nor did he see anyone, Exxon worker or Shipyard worker, wearing a respirator when working with or around asbestos products. Nor did he see any warnings or barriers to protect the Shipyard workers. The testimony of Dr. David Egilman, Minton's treating physician, emphasized the 13 extent of the danger created by these working conditions that existed without any warning to the Shipyard workers, analogizing the situation to a fire in a theatre to which no one speaks a word of warning. If accepted by the jury, the evidence of Exxon's knowledge regarding the dangers of asbestos both before and during Minton's employment at the Shipyard and the Shipyard's failure to warn its workers or protect individuals such as Minton in the presence of the danger was sufficient to establish Exxon's actual knowledge of the failure of the Shipyard to take the requisite steps to protect their employees. Thus, if Minton's evidence was accepted by the jury, it would have been sufficient for the jury to conclude that Exxon failed unreasonably to protect Minton when the Shipyard had failed to do so. B. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Show Proximate Cause Exxon's second challenge is to the sufficiency of the evidence presented to establish that Exxon's breach of its duty of care caused Minton's injury. The aforementioned standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury finding requires an examin[ation of] the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the prevailing party at trial that is not to be disturbed unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Nolte, 284 Va. at 14 90, 726 S.E.2d at 345 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Code § 8.01-680. In arguing that the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding of causation, Exxon claims that the inability of Minton's medical experts to testify that Minton's prior exposure to asbestos could not have, on its own, caused Minton's mesothelioma precluded a finding that Exxon caused Minton's injury. According to Exxon, because the experts testified that Minton's prior work in vessel construction was sufficient exposure to cause mesothelioma, any breach by Exxon could not be established as the cause of Minton's subsequentlydiagnosed mesothelioma. Exxon argues that any finding of causation would be based on mere conjecture. We disagree with Exxon's argument and find that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury, as instructed, to find that Exxon's actions were a substantial contributing factor in causing Minton's injury. Although Minton's experts did testify that Minton's prior exposure to asbestos could have been, on its own, enough to cause mesothelioma, it is established maritime law that an injured party [may] sue a tortfeasor for the full amount of damages for an indivisible injury that the tortfeasor's negligence was a substantial factor in causing. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 260 (1979). This is true even 15 if the concurrent negligence of others contributed to the incident. Id. Based on this principle, the jury was not precluded from finding that Minton's exposure to asbestos materials on Exxon's ships was a cause sufficient to establish liability for Minton's resulting indivisible harm. The question before the jury was therefore whether the evidence was sufficient to show that Minton's exposure to asbestos while on Exxon's vessels was a substantial contributing factor in the development of Minton's injury, mesothelioma. 1 To answer this question, the jury was given an instruction that defined substantial, not . . . by quantity but [by] quality[, meaning] that the exposure aboard Exxon's vessels was not an imaginary or possible factor or having only an insignificant connection with the harm. Based on this definition contained within an uncontested instruction, the evidence regarding the presence of 1 We have today rejected the substantial contributing factor analysis of proximate causation in cases tried under Virginia law when multiple sufficient causation is alleged. Ford Motor Co. v. Boomer, 285 Va. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (2013) (this day decided). In the case at bar, however, the appropriate theory of causation is not before us. At trial, the substantial contributing factor theory of causation was presented to the jury in a jury instruction without objection by either party to the case. In the absence of a contemporaneous objection, [r]ight or wrong, the instruction given [becomes] the law of the case on that point, and [is] binding upon both the parties and the jury. Hilton v. Fayen, 196 Va. 860, 867, 86 S.E.2d 40, 43 (1955). It cannot be questioned on appeal. Id. 16 uncontrolled asbestos aboard Exxon vessels and the testimony by Minton's medical experts regarding the effect of such levels of asbestos were sufficient to support a finding of causation. As noted in Part II.A.2.b., supra, the evidence made clear that asbestos, and repairs involving asbestos, were present on Exxon vessels in the 1960s and 1970s. There was also evidence that Minton visited the Exxon ships in the course of his employment with the Shipyard, spending approximately half of every day walking through the vessels. Exxon had seventeen vessels docked at the Shipyard during the eleven year period that Minton served as ship repair staff supervisor, when Minton spent over one thousand days walking through the asbestoscontaining area. The evidence shows that Minton was not protected from asbestos exposure through the use of safety controls on any of those days, nor that he was aware of the risk. The testimony also included the details of daily repairs, including a description of work on asbestos-containing areas of the engine rooms of a vessel, which would include asbestos insulation being thrown on the deck, after which cleaners would sweep the material, allowing the dust particles to repeatedly fly into the air. Evidence was also presented regarding the taking out of valves on the vessel, which would, on a case-by-case basis require the removal of 17 asbestos insulation to reach the valve. Based on this testimony and the extensive lists of asbestos-containing materials installed on the vessels, there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of significant asbestos exposure to Minton, who was frequently present on the ships while repairs were being completed. Dr. Egilman and Dr. John Coulter Maddox, a pathologist who has studied asbestos-related disease since the 1970s, testified as to the link between the prevalence of asbestos on Exxon's vessels and the injury to Minton. Both Dr. Egilman and Dr. Maddox opined that the exposure to asbestos on Exxon's vessels when work was performed on pumps insulated with asbestos materials was a substantial contributing factor in Minton's injury. Dr. Egilman opined that such work caused fibers of asbestos to circulate around the vessel, reaching bystanders at the time of repair. Dr. Egilman attributed Minton's injury, at least in part, to his exposure as a frequent bystander during the repair work. Based therefore on the evidence of asbestos-containing materials on the Exxon vessels in the 1960s and 1970s, Minton's daily exposure to the asbestos, and the danger present in such exposures, we agree with Minton that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Exxon's actions were a substantial contributing factor in Minton's injury. 18 C. Exclusion of Evidence on the Shipyard's Knowledge Exxon also assigns error to the circuit court's exclusion of evidence regarding the Shipyard's knowledge of the danger of asbestos exposure and its policies in place to protect the Shipyard workers from the hazard. Exxon contends that, due to the court's denial of its requests to introduce evidence about the Shipyard's knowledge and safety measures, the jury was given the false impression that Exxon had unique knowledge and was therefore the only actor with the ability to protect Minton from harm. Exxon argues that this error was highly prejudicial and therefore warrants reversal. Minton contends that the evidence is not relevant. He argues that the sole purpose for admitting evidence of the Shipyard's knowledge of the danger of exposure to asbestoscontaining materials was to direct blame at a statutorily immune employer. 2 Furthermore, even if attributing blame to the immune Shipyard was permitted, Minton claims that it would not be relevant to Exxon's duty of care. Minton argues that the two elements he needed to prove were that the Shipyard's conduct was obviously improvident and that Exxon did nothing to remedy it. As the Shipyard's knowledge was not relevant to 2 The Supreme Court has held, consistent with the Congressional intent underlying 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), that no attribution of liability may be made, either directly or indirectly, against a longshoreman's statutory employer. Edmonds, 443 U.S. at 263, 270 n.8. 19 either of these two elements of proof, Minton contends that it was properly excluded. We disagree. When reviewing the discretionary exclusion of evidence by a trial court, the decision will not be overturned on appeal absent evidence that the trial court abused [its] discretion. May v. Caruso, 264 Va. 358, 362, 568 S.E.2d 690, 692 (2002) (citation omitted). An abuse of discretion can occur when a relevant factor that should have been given significant weight [was] not considered. Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps., Inc., 282 Va. 346, 352, 717 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). As described in Part II.A., supra, the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Scindia established the standard of care owed by a vessel owner to an injured worker. The three duties are the aforementioned turnover duty, duty of active control, and duty to intervene. Howlett, 512 U.S. at 98; see also Scindia, 451 U.S. at 167-78. The turnover duty is violated by the actions of the vessel owner, applicable when the owner fails to turn the vessel over free of hidden dangers and without any warning of dangers that do exist. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 167. The second duty, the active control duty, is also based on the vessel owner's actions. It is violated if the vessel owner fails to exercise 20 reasonable care to prevent injuries to longshoremen in areas that remain under the active control of the vessel. Howlett, 512 U.S. at 98 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The duty to intervene, the third duty, requires that the vessel owner have actual knowledge that an unsafe condition exists and that the stevedore is allowing that condition to continue, leaving the vessel owner under a duty to intervene if the stevedore, or shipyard, is obviously improvident in failing to remedy the danger. Elberg v. Mobil Oil Corp., 967 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although all three duties are based in whole or in part on a vessel owner's acts or omissions, the duty to intervene stands alone in relying in part on the acts or omissions of the plaintiff's employer in improvidently allowing an unsafe condition to go unremedied. In order for a jury to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to show that the vessel owner unreasonably failed to intervene in the face of a shipyard's failure to act, evidence is admissible to show that there was a basis for the vessel owner not to rely on the shipyard to provide the necessary protective measures. This is a crucial consideration because the shipyard has the duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work and to take safeguards necessary to avoid injuries, and a vessel owner may rely upon 21 the shipyard's concomitant responsibility to avoid exposing its employees to unreasonable hazards. Howlett, 512 U.S. at 101 (citing Scindia, 451 U.S. at 170); see 33 U.S.C. § 941. The vessel owner can rely upon the shipyard's expertise and reasonableness, Duplantis v. Zigler Shipyards, Inc., 692 F.2d 372, 374 (5th Cir. 1982), as the shipyard is in the best position to avoid accidents during cargo operations. Howlett, 512 U.S. at 101 (internal quotation marks omitted). The shipowner has justifiable expectations that those duties will be performed by the repair company without the shipowner's supervision. Scindia, 451 U.S. at 176. In order to establish a vessel owner's duty to intervene, a jury must be able to consider evidence of the employer's knowledge of the danger and ability to protect the employee. Until it is shown that the employer, who is presumed to have a higher level of expertise than the vessel owner, lacked the knowledge, intent, or ability to protect the employee, no duty to intervene can be attributed to the vessel owner, who has no duty to anticipate inaction or carelessness of a ship repairer. Bergeron v. Main Iron Works, Inc., 563 So.2d 954, 957, 959 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (citation omitted). It is only if there is sufficient evidence that the vessel owner could not rely on the employer or its expertise that the vessel owner, if it has actual knowledge, is required to overrule the ship 22 repairer's judgment and correct the hazard. Id. (citation omitted). The circuit court found the Shipyard's knowledge of the danger of exposure to asbestos and its ability and intent to remedy that danger irrelevant. We hold, however, that evidence tending to show the Shipyard's knowledge of the danger and its ability and intent to remedy the danger is relevant in the determination of whether Exxon had a duty to intervene to protect Minton. Exxon's proffered evidence of the Shipyard's knowledge, intent, or ability to protect Minton through programs created by the Shipyard included: annual physicals for workers, the use of respirators when working with insulation projects, and the application of wet-down techniques to keep asbestos fibers from becoming airborne. Such evidence was relevant to the jury's determination of whether the existence of these programs supported Exxon's argument that it had no duty to intervene because Exxon would have been acting reasonably in relying upon the Shipyard to adequately protect the Shipyard's own workers. We therefore hold that the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence of the Shipyard's knowledge of the dangers of asbestos exposure and its procedures regarding precautions to be taken around asbestos, whether or not implemented. Although we have determined that the evidence that Minton presented, if 23 accepted by the jury, was sufficient to support a verdict for Minton based upon a violation of Exxon's duty to intervene, we cannot say that the jury would still have concluded that Exxon violated the duty if it was presented with the excluded evidence. Whether Exxon violated its duty to intervene was one of the two potential bases for the verdict in favor of Minton. Because we cannot determine from the record whether the jury found in favor of Minton based upon the duty to intervene without the opportunity to consider the excluded evidence, or because of Exxon's violation of the active control duty, we will reverse the judgment of the circuit court. D. Punitive Damages Finally, Exxon challenges the award of punitive damages, basing its argument on the language of 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), which it argues forecloses the remedy. Exxon contends that, by stating that the allowance under the LHWCA for recovery against a vessel owner for negligence is exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), the statute eliminates the ability of a court to supplement the statute's provided remedies. Minton argues that the award of punitive damages was not contrary to the statutory language of 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), which he claims does not address damages at all. Without any express language departing from the common law understanding, Minton 24 argues that the common law must be applied. As a result, Minton contends that punitive damages, which were available at common law and have been extended to federal maritime claims, should be affirmed in the case at hand. We recognize that a number of courts have allowed punitive damages in accordance with Minton's reading of the statute, holding that 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) is silent as to availability of punitive damages. See, e.g., Kahumoku v. Titan Mar., LLC, 486 F.Supp.2d 1144, 1151 (D. Haw. 2007) (finding the language of 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) silent as to punitive damages[,] indicat[ing] Congress' intent for the remedy to remain available under maritime law); Wheelings v. Seatrade Groningen, BV, 516 F.Supp.2d 488, 496 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (stating that [because] the LHWCA is silent on the availability of punitive damages, the court follows general maritime law). We reject this interpretation of 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) as contrary to the statute's plain language. In making this determination, we review this question of law de novo. David White Crane Serv. v. Howell, 282 Va. 323, 327, 714 S.E.2d 572, 575 (2011). The Supreme Court of the United States has established that the general rule that punitive damages were available at common law extended to claims arising under federal maritime law. Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 411 (2009). This remedy was applied with frequency 25 in lower federal courts for tortious actions of a particularly egregious nature, thereby establishing itself as a recognized and often-applied remedy. Id. at 411-12. Accordingly, the common law remedy of punitive damages in the context of federal maritime law claims can be denied only if Congress has enacted legislation departing from this common-law understanding. Id. at 415. The LHWCA constitutes legislation that explicitly departs from the general rule under common law that punitive damages are an available remedy in federal maritime law claims. The language of 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) states, in relevant part: In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the negligence of a vessel, then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title. . . . The remedy provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel except remedies available under this [Act]. (Emphasis added.) The plain language of the statute clearly limits the remedies available for a negligence action under the LHWCA to those included within the terms of the statute. We have previously held that [w]here the legislature has used words of plain and definite import the courts cannot put upon them a construction which amounts to holding the legislature did not mean what it has actually expressed. Barr v. Town & 26 Country Props., Inc., 240 Va. 292, 295, 396 S.E.2d 672, 674 (1990). Consequently, as punitive damages are not a remedy made available within the terms of the LHWCA, and the language plainly restricts the damages to those remedies explicitly made available, they are extinguished as a category of recovery in LHWCA claims. See Miller v. American President Lines, Ltd., 989 F.2d 1450, 1457 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that [t]his statute creates a worker's compensation scheme for certain maritime workers which is exclusive of other remedies and does not provide for punitive damages); McConville v. Reinauer Transp. Cos., 835 N.Y.S.2d 711, 713 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (indicating that [p]unitive damages are not available in an action brought pursuant to the LHWCA); Welsh v. Fugro Geosciences, Inc., 804 So.2d 710, 716-17 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (recognizing the trend in federal jurisprudential and statutory law to bar claims for nonpecuniary loss, including punitive damages) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we hold that the award of $12,500,000 in punitive damages was inappropriately granted because punitive damages are a remedy prohibited by the terms of LHWCA.