Opinion ID: 775222
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Delegation of Authority to Set Restitution Payment Schedule

Text: 76 I disagree with the majority's determination that it is permissible for the district court to delegate to the Bureau of Prisons and the defendant's probation officer the task of setting his restitution payment schedule. There is presently a split among the courts of appeals on this issue. 1 The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have held that it is impermissible to delegate the task of scheduling post-incarceration restitution payments to a probation officer. See United States v. Coates, 178 F.3d 681, 685 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that Constitution and applicable provision of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3664(f)(2), like its counterpart in the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663(f)(1) (1994), forbids district court to delegate authority to set payment schedule); United States v. Mohammad, 53 F.3d 1426, 1438-39 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 808-09 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that making decisions about the amount of restitution, the amount of installments, and their timing is a judicial function and therefore is non-delegable); United States v. Porter, 41 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Albro, 32 F.3d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Merric, 166 F.3d 406, 409 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that district court may not delegate to probation officer authority to set payment schedule for a fine). Likewise, the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have held that it is similarly impermissible to delegate the scheduling of restitution to the Federal Bureau of Prisons while the defendant is incarcerated. See United States v. Pandiello, 184 F.3d 682, 688 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that concerns about shifting responsibility from the Article III judge to another entity are the same whether the district court delegates its authority to a probation officer or the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program); United States v. Mortimer, 94 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Miller, 77 F.3d 71, 78 (4th Cir. 1996). Only the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted contrary rules with regard to delegation to a probation officer, see United States v. Fuentes, 107 F.3d 1515, 1529 n.25 (11th Cir. 1997) (circuit precedent permits district court to delegate setting of restitution schedule); United States v. Barany, 884 F.2d 1255, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1034 (1990) (holding, with respect to the now-repealed Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. 3651, that district court may leave restitution schedule to probation officer's discretion), and to the Bureau of Prisons, see Montano-Figueroa v. Crabtree, 162 F.3d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1998) (fine). 77 Upon consideration of the case law, I believe that the position adopted by the substantial majority of circuits is the better one. The applicable statutory language makes clear that it is the province of the court, and the court alone, to fix the amount of restitution, determine whether the restitution should be paid in a lump sum or in installments, and then, if the latter, establish the amount of each installment. See 18 U.S.C. 3663(f)(1) (1994) (stating that the the court may require that [the] defendant make restitution . . . within a specified period or in specified installments); 18 U.S.C. 3572(d) (1994) (noting, in relation to a defendant sentenced to pay a monetary penalty, that the court will provide for payment either on a date certain or in equal monthly installments over the period provided by the court, unless the court decides otherwise); see also 18 U.S.C.A. 3664(f) (2000) (current statute echoing language in former 3663(f)); 18 U.S.C.A. 3572(d)(1)-(2) (2000) (stating in current statute that, for defendant required to pay restitution, court will provide for payment on a date certain or in equal monthly installments unless the court establishes another schedule and that length of time over which scheduled payments will be made shall be set by the court). Only when the court has established the restitution amount and payment schedule may the Bureau of Prisons or a probation officer then enforce that order. 2 78 Sentencing a defendant is a core judicial act. As the statutory language makes clear, deciding whether to impose restitution and at what rate is a part of the sentencing process. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 3663(a)(1) (1994) (stating that when sentencing a defendant, court may order that the defendant make restitution to victim of offense). Given that the imposition of a restitution order is an element of sentencing, I agree with the Fourth Circuit that the applicable statutes must be read as conferring exclusive authority upon the courts with regard to their power to set the amount of restitution and the payment schedule. See Johnson, 48 F.3d at 808. Of course, courts may use nonjudicial officers to support judicial functions, as long as a judicial officer retains and exercises ultimate responsibility. Id. at 809. But they may not delegate their authority to set the timing of restitution payments to a non-Article III entity without running afoul of the Constitution. 79 While I appreciate the potentially difficult task that the district court may face in setting a reasonable restitution schedule at sentencing, particularly when, as Judge Cohn notes in his concurring opinion, the defendant faces a lengthy incarceration period and the court cannot anticipate when the defendant will likely be able to obtain employment so as to begin making restitution upon his release, I believe that the Constitution and the plain language of the applicable statutes will not admit of any other arrangement. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from Part III.D of the majority's opinion. Notes: 1 As the majority noted, this circuit has not yet commented upon the delegation question in a published opinion. The unpublished opinions which the majority finds persuasive are not binding on any court in this circuit. 2 I note that while 18 U.S.C. 3603(9) (1994) (currently codified at 18 U.S.C.A. 3603(10) (2000)) permits a probation officer to perform any other duty that the court may designate, this statutory grant of authority is implicitly cabined by the constitutional requirement that the judiciary exercise ultimate responsibility for resolving the case or controversy. See Johnson, 48 F.3d at 809. Therefore, the district court may not delegate the final authority to determine the restitution payment schedule, although the district court may, consistent with Article III, review and approve a payment plan initially conceived by a probation officer.