Opinion ID: 679513
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Constitutionality of Offense Statute

Text: 44 Williams challenges the constitutionality of one of the statutes pursuant to which he was convicted, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1), arguing that this statute is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous regarding its undefined use of the term cocaine base. We review challenges to the constitutionality of criminal statutes de novo. United States v. Harding, 971 F.2d 410, 412 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1025, 122 L.Ed.2d 170 (1993) (citation omitted). To prove that section 841(a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague, Williams must show that the statute (1) does not define the conduct it prohibits with sufficient definitiveness and (2) does not establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). Additionally, because Williams' vagueness challenge does not implicate any First Amendment interest, he must show that the statute is vague as it is applied in his case. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 1857-58, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). 45 We rejected an argument identical to Williams' in United States v. Shaw, 936 F.2d 412 (9th Cir.1991). In Shaw we found that, although it is not defined in either the statute itself or the relevant sentencing guideline, the term cocaine base is not unconstitutionally vague because the substances it denominates are distinguishable from cocaine hydrochloride, which is powder cocaine. Id. at 416. Reviewing the legislative history, we defined cocaine base as including crack. Id. at 415-16. Shaw is consistent with our prior decision, United States v. Van Hawkins, 899 F.2d 852 (9th Cir.1990), in which we stated that  'cocaine base' is cocaine that contains an active hydroxylion. As such, it is distinguished from cocaine salts. The term cocaine base encompasses 'crack.'  Id. at 854, n. 2. Based on this definition, we held in Van Hawkins that section 841(a)(1) was not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 854. 46 Despite the preclusive effect of Shaw and Van Hawkins, Williams argues that, because other circuits have defined cocaine base somewhat differently, see e.g. United States v. Jackson, 968 F.2d 158, 162-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 664, 121 L.Ed.2d 589 (1992); United States v. Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d 1124, 1135 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 484, 121 L.Ed.2d 388 (1992) (per curiam); United States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 956, 960 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 187 (1991); United States v. Avant, 907 F.2d 623, 625-27 (6th Cir.1990), our decisions actually support a conclusion that section 841(a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague. However, [j]ust because other courts of appeals differ in their definitions of a terms does not mean that the term is void for vagueness. Jackson, 968 F.2d at 163. Moreover, none of the other circuits define cocaine base in a substantially different manner than Shaw and Van Hawkins; these courts, while relying on different chemical terminology, all conclude that crack, the type of cocaine at issue in this case, is a cocaine base. Therefore, it is clear that section 841(a)(1), as it applies to Williams, adequately defines the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357, 103 S.Ct. at 1858 (citations omitted). Williams' constitutional challenge to section 841(a)(1) therefore fails.