Opinion ID: 698438
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Judgment on the ADEA Claim

Text: 8 Standards of proof in ADEA discrimination suits parallel those in Title VII suits. We combine the Title VII and ADEA claims for analysis because the burdens of proof and persuasion are the same. Wallis v. J.R. Simplot, Co., 26 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir.1994). The allocation of the burdens of proof and order of analysis follow a three step pattern: 9 [A] plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. Then, in order to prevail, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer's alleged reason for the adverse employment decision is a pretext for another motive which is discriminatory. 10 Id. at 889 (quoting Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1420 (9th Cir.1990)). 11 Ritter was 51 years old at the time of his termination, and he raised a material issue of fact as to whether he was qualified for the position of Senior Project Engineer and other positions he sought. In his Amended Complaint, Ritter alleged that after his discharge, work originally performed by him was taken by another Hughes' employee, Ernie Lau (Lau), who was substantially younger ... and less qualified. But, in his opposition to summary judgment, Ritter argued not that Lau took his position, but that Lau had hired some other unnamed person outside the protected age group. Yet, in support of this claim, Ritter presented no specific evidence establishing the identity, age, or inferior qualifications of this employee. In view of the inconsistency of Ritter's claims and the vagueness of the evidence offered in support of them, we conclude, as did the district court, that Ritter failed to present sufficient evidence to raise any genuine material issue of fact as to whether he had been replaced by a person outside the protected class. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). 12 Ritter, however, could also prove age discrimination through circumstantial, statistical or direct evidence that the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of age discrimination. Wallis, 26 F.3d at 891 (quoting Rose, 902 F.2d at 1421). Ritter contends that because he worked in a number of projects and positions which were eventually subject to cutbacks and layoffs, there exists an inference of subterfuge based on age discrimination. 13 We find Ritter's argument meritless. In Nesbit v. Pepsico, Inc., 994 F.2d 703 (9th Cir.1993), an employee claimed that his employer had violated the California Fair Employment and Housing Act by discriminating against him because of his age. The plaintiff relied on the following evidence: 14 (1) statistical evidence that some older workers were terminated while some younger workers were retained and that employees hired after the RIF were generally younger than those terminated; (2) a comment by [the employee's] direct superior to [the employee] that '[w]e don't necessarily like grey hair'; and (3) an interview of [the employer's] Senior Vice President of Personnel in which he stated, We don't want unpromotable fifty-year olds around. 15 Id. at 705. Observing that California courts have adopted the analysis applicable to ADEA claims, we concluded that [v]iewing the evidence cumulatively, and in a light most favorable to the appellants, it falls short of creating an inference of age discrimination. Id. at 704-05. Ritter presented less evidence than that offered by the unsuccessful plaintiff in Nesbit. His employment history does not give rise to an inference of age discrimination. 16 We hold that the district did not err in concluding that Ritter failed to present a prima facie case of age discrimination and properly granted summary judgment.