Opinion ID: 1613923
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Heading: Effect of Legislative Repeal.

Text: The statutory provision upon which petitioners base their entitlement to increased benefits was enacted by the legislature in 1979, as part of a two-year appropriation for DSS: It is the intent of the general assembly that the schedule of living costs and the payment for persons on the aid to dependent children program shall be increased for all family sizes by six percent commencing October 1, 1979 and by an additional six percent commencing October 1, 1980. 1979 Iowa Acts ch. 8, § 10(1). After petitioners sought judicial review, the legislature amended this provision as follows: It is the intent of the general assembly that the schedule of living costs and the payment for persons on the aid to dependent children program shall be increased for all family sizes by six percent commencing October 1, 1979 and by an additional six percent commencing October 1, 1980 and that the schedule of basic needs as provided in the Iowa administrative code 770-41.8(2) as published on June 25, 1980, shall remain in effect for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1981. 1981 Iowa Acts ch. 80, § 1. The amendment expressly was made retroactive to October 1, 1980, the date ADC payments would have increased. 1981 Iowa Acts ch. 80, §§ 5-6. [2] In district court respondents moved for summary judgment, claiming the 1981 amendment mooted the controversy. The court overruled the motion, but ultimately held on the merits that the 1981 amendment extinguished petitioners' claims. Cross-appealing, respondents renew their argument the case is moot, and allege district court erred in refusing to enter summary judgment. [3] Petitioners concede the 1981 amendment prospectively bars entitlement to increased ADC benefits. They narrow their claim to the increase payable from October 1, 1980, to the date the 1981 amendment was enacted, arguing they had initiated proceedings and accrued vested rights the amendment could not extinguish. Where, as here, an amending act rewrites a statute to read as follows, provisions of the original statute not carried forward into the new enactment are deemed repealed. State v. Garland, 250 Iowa 428, 431, 94 N.W.2d 122, 124 (1959); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 294, at 503 (1953). The general rule is that absent a savings clause, repeal of a statute renders the rescinded act as if it never existed. In re Estate of Hoover, 251 N.W.2d 529, 530 (Iowa 1977); Buchhop v. General Growth Properties and General Growth Management Corp., 235 N.W.2d 301, 304 (Iowa 1975); 1A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 23.33, at 279 (4th ed. 1972). This rule is subject to exception where a savings clause or general savings statute limiting the effect of a repeal is applicable. In re Estate of Hoover, 251 N.W.2d at 530; 1A C. Sands, supra, at § 23.37, at 286. Petitioners' argument their claim to increased benefits survived repeal is based on two sections of our statutory rules of construction. [4] Repealeffect of. The repeal of a statute, after it becomes effective, does not revive a statute previously repealed, nor affect any right which has accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, or any proceeding commenced, under or by virtue of the statute repealed. Iowa Code § 4.1(1) (1981). The re-enactment, revision, amendment, or repeal of a statute does not affect: 1. The prior operation of the statute or any prior action taken thereunder; 2. Any validation, cure, right, privilege, obligation, or liability previously acquired, accrued, accorded, or incurred thereunder; 3. Any violation thereof or penalty, forfeiture, or punishment incurred in respect thereto, prior to the amendment or repeal; or 4. Any investigation, proceeding, or remedy in respect of any privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment; and the investigation, proceeding, or remedy may be instituted, continued, or enforced, and the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment imposed, as if the statute had not been repealed or amended. If the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment for any offense is reduced by a re-enactment, revision, or amendment of a statute, the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment if not already imposed shall be imposed according to the statute as amended. Iowa Code § 4.13 (1981). We find these statutes are not controlling in this instance. Section 4.1(1) does not apply where invocation would be inconsistent with legislative intent or repugnant to the statutory context. Iowa Code § 4.1 (1981). Further, both these savings statutes merely declare a continuing legislative policy against release of accrued liabilities or extinguishment of accrued rights. They do not apply where a repealing statute expressly or by clear implication provides the contrary. People ex rel. Eitel v. Lindheimer, 371 Ill. 367, 376, 21 N.E.2d 318, 322, appeal dismissed sub nom. People ex rel. Eitel v. Toman, 308 U.S. 505, 60 S.Ct. 111, 84 L.Ed. 432 (1939); People v. Monteleone, 30 A.D.2d 158, 161, 290 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826 (1968); State v. Lewis, 91 R.I. 110, 114, 161 A.2d 209, 212-13 (1960); 1A C. Sands, supra, at § 23.37 n. 3; 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 386, at 507 (1974); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 440, at 1015; see State v. Bousman, 278 N.W.2d 15, 16-17 (Iowa 1979) (provisions in new criminal code governing its applicability control over section 4.13); In re Estate of Hoover, 251 N.W.2d at 531 (DSS claim against estate for old age assistance paid decedent was not saved where repealing statute expressly was retroactive). Here the legislature not only rendered its repeal of the original authorizing statute retroactive, 1981 Iowa Acts ch. 80, §§ 5-6, but expressly provided that the DSS schedule of needs published June 25, 1980, would remain in effect throughout the remainder of fiscal year 1981. 1981 Iowa Acts ch. 80, § 1. We hold the retroactive repeal bars petitioners' claims to the increase in benefits originally scheduled for implementation October 1, 1980.