Opinion ID: 1237820
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the jump constitute an inherent risk of skiing or a negligently created artificial condition?

Text: The superior court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the jump constituted an inherent risk of skiing, i.e. whether the jump was a non-negligently created or maintained variation in terrain. The City, in its crossappeal, is asking the court to hold, as a matter of law, that the jump constituted an inherent risk of skiing. [7] The City contends that the jump was a variation[] or steepness in terrain or a surface condition[]. The City also asserts that the jump was open and obvious and knowingly encountered, and argues that Hiibschman's alcohol consumption magnified any risk inherent in the jump. It claims the greater weight of authority would deem the jump an inherent risk of skiing. Hiibschman maintains that the jump was an artificial condition created by a neglected stack of brush cut and stacked by the City. Alternatively, she submits that it may have been built by children with shovels borrowed from the City employees, and intentionally groomed by the employees. Her theory of negligence is that this jump was inappropriate for a beginners' hill, particularly as no warning of its danger was given. We affirm the superior court's determination that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the jump constituted an inherent risk of skiing.
First, we note that the statute does not eliminate a ski area operator's liability for negligence. The legislative history of the statute makes this clear. Industry proponents of the bill stated repeatedly that they did not wish to avoid any responsibilities that were rightfully theirs, but they wanted to reduce nuisance claims. The statute was intended to bar recovery for those actions which only the skier could control and that were beyond the ski area operator's control. That the legislature intended to clarify the law and not change it, and that it sought to limit recovery for inherent risks, reinforces our conclusion that industry liability for negligence was maintained. [8] Therefore, the Ski Act preserved the common law duties of ski area operators at the time of the act's passage. In Webb v. City and Borough of Sitka, we said, The rule that we adopt is this: A landowner ... must act as a reasonable person in maintaining his property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden on the respective parties of avoiding the risk. [9] 561 P.2d 731, 733 (Alaska 1977). Further, at the relevant time the law on assumption of risk had been clarified, restricting it as an affirmative defense, but leaving intact the concept in its no duty form. We explained, The concept of assumption of risk was developed from the common law action of a servant against his master. The master was held to be not negligent if he provided a reasonably safe place to work, and the servant was said to have assumed the inherent risks that remained. In this sense assumption of risk was not an affirmative defense, but rather was another way of saying the master was not negligent; for the servant had the burden of proving that his injury resulted from a risk other than one inherent in a place that was a reasonably safe place to work. Leavitt v. Gillaspie, 443 P.2d 61, 67-8 (Alaska 1968). We continued, But where assumption of risk was a defense, the question was whether plaintiff had voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious danger, with knowledge of the danger, and without regard to whether he had acted in such a situation as a reasonably prudent man would have acted... . As a matter of policy we disapprove of a concept which could result in a situation where an accident victim, even though not contributorily at fault, could be barred from recovery because he knew or should have known of a negligently created risk. The just concept should be whether a reasonably prudent man in the exercise of due care would have incurred the risk despite that knowledge, and if so, whether he would have conducted himself in the manner in which the plaintiff acted in the light of all the circumstances, including the appreciated risk. Id. Consequently, only the person who voluntarily and unreasonably assumed a negligently created risk was contributorily negligent and barred from recovery. Hale v. O'Neill, 492 P.2d 101, 103 (Alaska 1971); Young v. State, 491 P.2d 122, 125 (Alaska 1971); Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 328-330 (Alaska 1970). [10] While we believe the statute codified this case law in the ski context, it also aids trial courts by listing those risks which are considered inherent in the sport: those risks which are obvious [11] and necessary [12] to it. Evidence of negligence on the part of the ski area operators, however, takes the case out of the inherent risk of skiing context. In the case at bar, it is not clear that the condition was an inherent risk of skiing, given that a jump is not specifically listed in the statute and its risk is not necessarily obvious or necessary. [13] Hiibschman stated she didn't think the jump was hazardous in the way it was designed or constructed before she went off of it. She said, I didn't think it would be there if it was. She knew that the ski hill staff allowed the children to take the jump and therefore assumed it was safe for beginners. Our review of the record persuades us that evidence of negligence also exists in the case at bar. For example, one witness stated that the jump should be torn down because it wasn't fit, suitable ... because it was built to where you got too much air, and it was a flat landing. Hiibschman's expert witness stated that there should not have been any jumps at all on a beginner's slope and that if the ski area were intended for more than beginner skiers, the jumps should have been clearly marked as being suitable only for expert skiers. Others also testified that the jump was not safe for beginner skiers. In fact, the ski area had rules prohibiting artificial jumps, unless authorized by ski area management. With all inferences drawn in Hiibschman's favor, we conclude that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the jump was an inherent risk of skiing.
Hiibschman makes much of this distinction in her brief; the City, however, contends it is irrelevant to the legal question of whether the jump was a variation[] or steepness in terrain, or a surface ... condition[]. The City maintains the origin of the jump is irrelevant, as it is an inherent risk of skiing even if it was an artificial condition. An artificial item can produce an inherent risk of skiing. The statute covers, for example, collisions with lift towers. AS 09.65.135(c)(1)(E). Other artificial items may also produce inherent risks assuming they are not negligently designed or maintained or assuming the risk is obvious and necessary (e.g. moguls on an expert trail). [14] See Rowett v. Kelly Canyon Ski Hill, Inc., 102 Idaho 708, 639 P.2d 6, 7 (1981) (no negligence by ski area operator when night skier injured by skiing into traffic control device which was adequately illuminated and discernible at a distance); see also Smith v. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 716 F.2d 1002, 1009 (3rd Cir.1983) (advanced intermediate skier voluntarily assumed the risk when he skied down a trail marked most difficult, aware of an icy headwall lined by an unprotected telephone-like pole). Therefore, we hold that the duty owed to a skier for a natural or an artificial condition is governed by Webb, 561 P.2d 731 (faulty sidewalk) and Moloso v. State, 644 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1982) (rock slide during state highway project). Primarily, the origin of the danger figures into the Webb calculus, as it affects the burden on the respective parties of avoiding the risk. It is also relevant to the issue of the ski resort's knowledge of the danger. We also hold, however, that an artificially created jump can not be, as matter of law, variations or steepness in terrain or surface ... conditions. AS 09.65.135(a)(1)(B) or (D). While the statute does not differentiate explicitly between a ski operator's responsibility for artificial versus natural conditions, the items it lists, as well as the intent to retain liability for negligence, indicate that ski area operator protection from liability for artificial conditions should be construed narrowly. The legislative history explained, The intent of this legislation is to clarify the law concerning the natural, inescapable risks that are a part of the sport of skiing and to specify that a ski area operator is not liable for injuries resulting from these inherent risks. (Emphasis added). We find particularly compelling the testimony provided by the National Ski Patrol System, Inc. during the bill's consideration: We agree with the concept of S.B. No. 470 which addresses the risks inherent in the sport of skiing. Ski area operators in the state definitely need protection from unjustified liability insurance claims associated with the natural risks of the sport. At the same time, we are concerned that skiers must also be adequately protected against any form of negligence caused by ski area operators. We believe with a few modifications, the proposed statute can achieve equitable protection for both ski area operators and the using public. Suggested revisions to sec. 09.10.320 definitions are: ... . 2. (D). Eliminate the word stumps. These are probably man induced obstacles that should be either eliminated, reduced, or marked as hazards by the ski area operator. (Emphasis added). The recommendation to eliminate the word stumps was adopted, indicating that altering natural conditions (e.g. cutting a tree) removes them from the category of inherent risks which are explicitly listed by the statute. Our conclusion is reinforced by the presence of the word stumps in the Utah ski statute, upon which the Alaska statute is modeled. UCA § 78-27-52(1). Similarly, the National Ski Patrol System, Inc. recommended the following, which was not adopted: 1. (C) Expand on snow or ice conditions to clarify that variations may occur because of weather factors and/or hill grooming. For instance, standard grooming practices could cause variable snow surface conditions which skiers should accept as normal inherent risks on a managed ski run. Negligent grooming practices could cause unsafe conditions, such as leaving dangerous berms or cutbanks on groomed runs. Ski area operators should not be absolved from such negligence. That the statute did not include snow variations from hill grooming as an inherent risk also reinforces the importance of this dichotomy. Case law from other jurisdictions also emphasizes the importance of natural conditions. What the challenged statute does is to recognize that there are certain risks inherent in the sport of skiing that neither the skier nor the ski area operator can reasonably control. Indeed, the risk and often-rugged natural setting provides both the greatest attractions of skiing as well as the greatest elements of danger. Natural conditions, such as vegetation, snow cover and weather conditions, make trail conditions highly variable and difficult to manage. Kelleher v. Big Sky of Montana, 642 F. Supp. 1128, 1130 (D.Mont. 1986) (emphasis added). Other cases identifying the inherent risks of skiing often speak generally of items such as grade, boundary, midtrail obstructions, corners and varied conditions of the snow. Wright v. Mt. Mansfield Lift, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 786, 790 (D.Vt. 1951). This includes things such as roots, rocks, brush, ruts, and worn spots. Id. In Leopold v. Okemo Mountain Inc., the court spoke of the apparent and necessary danger inhering in trees, rocks and adverse terrain which border every trail. 420 F. Supp. 781, 787 n. 2 (D.Vt. 1976). Here, conflicting evidence exists as to whether this jump was artificially made or naturally part of the terrain. This presents a factual question for jury resolution. The ski lift operator believed the jump was artificial because after it was removed, no dirt, alders or rocks were left. He saw just leveled snow, nice clean snow. Nor was there newly moved brush around to indicate that it was formed by brush. Also, he had observed the hill prior to the snowfall and others had told him that the jump was an artificial structure. Some operators called the jump Chet's jump, allegedly after the individual who built it. One witness testified that he saw Chet and another person build these jumps. Supposedly, each day, the employees would throw more snow on the jump to keep it built up, and would groom it or pack snow on it to change its characteristics. Testimony was presented that children made and groomed the jumps with the shovels given to them by employees at the hill. Yet, there was also evidence that it was not a jump, but rather a bump that was used as a jump. The person who removed the jump said it was created by alder. It remains for the jury to determine whether the jump is a natural variation in terrain or surface condition. Thus, we conclude that the superior court's denial of summary judgment in this respect was correct.