Opinion ID: 2587730
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: On remand, the superior court should determine if clear and convincing evidence exists to support overriding the parental preference only if Naomi is currently unable to care for her children.

Text: The shared physical custody arrangement between Elton and Arletta was intended to be temporary. On remand, the superior court should first address whether the conditions of Naomi's life in Florida have improved so that she may assume physical custody. The superior court need not address whether clear and convincing evidence exists to override Elton's parental preference unless Naomi remains unable to care for Julian and Carmen. [29] If Naomi is not currently able to care for Julian and Carmen, the superior court should determine whether clear and convincing evidence exists indicating that Elton is unfit to assume sole physical custody. A finding of clear and convincing evidence that Elton is not fit to be the sole care-giver for his children, if supported by the record, would permit an award splitting physical custody between Elton and Naomi. [30] If clear and convincing evidence does not exist that Elton is unfit to be the children's sole care-giver, the superior court should examine whether clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that the welfare of the children requires them to remain, at least part of the time, in Arletta's custody. In making this determination, the court should remain cognizant that this finding requires more than the conclusion that the best interests of the children would be served by remaining with Arletta. [31] The court must determine that it would be detrimental to the child[ren] to permit Elton to have custody. [32]
Elton maintains that the superior court abused its discretion by awarding legal custody to Naomi. We disagree. The problem facing the superior court fundamentally required a comparison between Naomi and Elton. Given the evidence presented at trial and the court's findings, we cannot conclude that the superior court abused its discretion by selecting to grant legal custody to Naomi. [33] Elton advances two reasons why the superior court abused its discretion by awarding legal custody to Naomi rather than Elton. First, Elton contends that it was an abuse of discretion to award legal custody to Naomi because the superior court had found her unable to meet the children's needs because she is jobless, effectively homeless and her job skill-set is marginal. Second, Elton argues that no evidence was proffered at trial showing that he was not able to care for his children. [34] Neither argument is persuasive.
Granting legal custody to a parent who is not currently able to care for the child is not a per se abuse of discretion. On several occasions, we have upheld awards of legal custody or joint legal custody to parents considered presently unable to care for their children. [35] This position is conceptually coherent because of the different requirements of legal and physical custody. A parent who temporarily lacks the financial or personal resources to physically care for her child may still be the best person to make major decisions regarding how the child is raised in the long term. [36] Trial judges are well situated to determine if awarding legal custody to a parent facing temporary economic or personal hardships serves the best interests of a child. Awarding legal custody to Naomi in this particular case was not an abuse of discretion. Elton appears to argue that the superior court did not properly ascertain his fitness to parent, maintaining that once it concluded that Naomi was presently unable to meet the children's needs, it should have awarded him custody. However, the superior court considered at length the comparative parenting abilities of Naomi and Elton. The superior court noted that in terms of the capability and desire of each of these parents to meet the children's needs, they're both in kind of tough shape at the moment. Nonetheless, the superior court concluded that Naomi's present inability to parent resulted from temporary problems with work and housing, while Elton's inability was permanent.
Contrary to Elton's assertions on appeal, the superior court reviewed ample evidence of Elton's shortcomings as a parent. The superior court found particularly relevant Elton's history of abandoning his responsibilities, his marginal judgment, his unemployment, and the fact that dealing with his own personal problems would make it difficult for him to be a primary caregiver to the children. Elton's brother Ralph testified that Elton has always been a man that seems to run away from everything. I mean, constant. That has been his role; run away, run away, run away. Denise Hudson, the custody investigator in this case, testified that Julian and Carmen told her that there was no food in Elton's house, that they were left unattended during visitation, and that Elton often spent all day sleeping. By Elton's own account, he has been unemployed since July 2003 and lives on $700 a month in public assistance. Based on these facts, we cannot conclude that the superior court abused its discretion by awarding sole legal custody to Naomi.
Elton argues that it was improper to award shared physical custody to Arletta because she was not a party to the litigation. Though we have already reversed the order regarding physical custody, we address the propriety of granting custody to a non-party because (a) Elton has briefed the issue and (b) if the superior court finds on remand that Evans has been satisfied, the issue will be fully ripe for decision. Arletta, who had sought custody in her answer to Elton's complaint, was dismissed as a defendant by stipulation at the beginning of trial. Nonetheless, the superior court awarded her shared physical custody of Julian and Carmen after she consented to the arrangement. In the past, this court has upheld custody orders in which a parent was awarded legal custody and physical custody was granted to the child's grandparents or other family members who had intervened in the custody action. [37] Whether a superior court may award physical custody of a child to a non-party grandparent is an issue of first impression for this court. We first note that relevant Alaska Statutes do not address the propriety of non-party custody awards. [38] We have long recognized that trial courts have broad discretion to fashion appropriate child custody orders. [39] This discretion is dictated by statute [40] and the complex, fact-intensive nature of custody disputes. As a general matter, we do not wish to preclude trial courts from fashioning custody awards that will better serve the interests of children by establishing overly broad prohibitions. [41] We hold that it is within the discretion of a trial court to grant custody to a person who was not a party at the initiation of the litigation as long as four conditions are met. First, the non-party must consent to entry of the custody order and to becoming a party to the litigation. Elton argues that granting custody to non-parties is inappropriate because a court may not adjudicate the rights of a person or entity that is not a party to the action before it. [42] As Elton points out, courts in other jurisdictions have reversed awards to non-parties because the courts in question could not bind the non-parties by the custody order. [43] We agree that a court lacks the power to require a non-party to assume custody of a child. However, we are not persuaded that this general rule should prevent courts from awarding custody to a non-party when the non-party consents to the arrangement. In this case, Arletta consented in court to the shared custody arrangement. If, upon remand, the court determines that custody should be placed with Arletta, she must consent to becoming a party to the case. Second, the award must comply with Evans. [44] It is not within the unfettered discretion of a trial court to override the parental preference. A court may grant custody to a non-parent only if the parents agree to the arrangement, or if clear and convincing evidence shows that one or both of the parents are unfit, or that the welfare of the child requires custody to be with the particular non-party non-parent. Third, a court may award custody only to a non-party who would have been entitled by right to intervene as a party in the custody proceedings pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 24(a). We have previously allowed psychological parents [45] and grandparents [46] to intervene as parties in custody disputes. Limiting possible non-parties to those individuals who have standing to intervene as a matter of right accomplishes two important goals. First, it eliminates any temptation to award a child of disadvantaged background to an individual or institution unknown to the child based on the non-party's resources and capacity to care for the child. [47] Second, because parents will almost certainly know all possible intervenors, parents will be in a better position to oppose or agree to a non-party award. Lastly, non-party awards must comply with due process. Awarding custody to a non-party may implicate due process concerns when a party lacks notice that such an award is being considered. In Anonymous v. Anonymous, [48] the Alabama Supreme Court reversed an award granting custody to a child's paternal grandparents, who were not parties to the case, because the mother had not received adequate notice or an opportunity to be heard on the issue of whether the grandparents should obtain custody. [49] The court reasoned that the process followed by the trial court deprived the mother of due process. [50] Alabama's experience is instructive. Consequently, we hold that a party to a custody dispute must receive fair notice of the possibility that custody could be awarded to a particular non-party. Fair notice must include a reasonable opportunity to marshal evidence and present arguments against a particular non-party obtaining custody. If the superior court considers awarding some amount of physical custody to Arletta, Elton deserves an opportunity to develop and present evidence against such an award. Prior to trial, Elton had some notice that a custody award to Arletta was a possibility. Arletta and Naomi submitted a joint answer to his complaint, asking that Arletta be awarded the care, custody and control of the minor children. Arletta appears to have dropped this claim, however, during a March 3, 2004 hearing before the superior court. Additionally, since Arletta was dismissed as a party at the beginning of the trial, Elton had no reason to present evidence against Arletta. Elton, therefore, did not have sufficient notice at the time of trial that Arletta might obtain custody and was not able to develop and present evidence against such an award. Consequently, if the superior court contemplates awarding physical custody to Arletta on remand, it must hold an evidentiary hearing to allow Elton to voice his objections. In sum, a trial court has discretion to grant custody to a non-party if (1) the non-party consents, (2) the award complies with the requirements in Evans for overriding the parental preference, (3) the non-party could have intervened in the custody dispute, and (4) the parties to the custody dispute have sufficient notice of the possibility that a non-party will receive custody to satisfy due process.
Because the superior court did not award de facto legal custody to Arletta, a non-parent, in violation of Evans, and because the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding legal custody to Naomi, we AFFIRM the superior court's order awarding legal custody. But because the court awarded physical custody to a non-parent over the objections of a parent, and failed to make findings by clear and convincing evidence either that the parent was unfit or that the welfare of the children required the children to remain with the non-parent, the order awarding shared physical custody violated Evans. Consequently, we REVERSE the order concerning physical custody and REMAND the matter to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.