Opinion ID: 2025227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: plaintiff is a public official

Text: The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that erroneous statements are inevitable in free debate, and that such statements must be afforded some protection if freedoms of expression are to have the breathing space which they need to survive. ( New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), 376 U.S. 254, 272-73, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 701-02, 84 S.Ct. 710, 721-22.) To afford this breathing space to public debate, the United States Supreme Court has held that a public official seeking to recover for libel with respect to comments involving his official conduct must prove that the statements were made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that the statements were false or with reckless disregard of whether the statements were false. 376 U.S. at 279-80, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706, 84 S.Ct. at 726. Following the New York Times decision, the Supreme Court in Rosenblatt v. Baer (1966), 383 U.S. 75, 15 L.Ed.2d 597, 86 S.Ct. 669, had occasion to discuss the meaning of the term public official. The Court stated that the designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs. (383 U.S. at 85, 15 L.Ed.2d at 605, 86 S.Ct. at 676.) The Court further stated that the designation applies [w]here a position in government has such apparent importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees. 383 U.S. at 86, 15 L.Ed.2d at 606, 86 S.Ct. at 676. This court had occasion to apply the definition of public official in Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Publishing Corp. (1968), 40 Ill.2d 257, in which a police officer sought damages for allegedly libelous statements. We found that the officer was a public official, stating: Although as a patrolman he is `the lowest in rank of police officials' and would have slight voice in setting departmental policies, his duties are peculiarly `governmental' in character and highly charged with the public interest. It is indisputable that law enforcement is a primary function of local government and that the public has a far greater interest in the qualifications and conduct of law enforcement officers, even at, and perhaps especially at, an `on the street' level than in the qualifications and conduct of other comparably low-ranking government employees performing more proprietary functions. The abuse of a patrolman's office can have great potentiality for social harm; hence, public discussion and public criticism directed towards the performance of that office cannot constitutionally be inhibited by threat of prosecution under State libel laws. 40 Ill.2d at 265. Plaintiff has asked us to reconsider our decision in Coursey. He submits that this court erroneously applied the public official designation as that term has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. He argues that a police officer neither has nor appears to have substantial responsibility for or control over government affairs. He further indicates that the public does not take an interest in the qualifications and performance of a police officer except when he becomes involved in a particular controversy. Plaintiff also directs our attention to the comment in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), 418 U.S. 323, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, 94 S.Ct. 2997, that [p]ublic officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally do. (418 U.S. at 344, 41 L.Ed.2d at 808, 94 S.Ct. at 3009.) Plaintiff submits that a police officer does not have such access to the press and that therefore part of the rationale for designating an individual a public official is inapplicable here. Plaintiff also argues that the Supreme Court has not held that anyone as low ranking as a policeman or as a teacher is a public official, and suggests that the designation applies only to higher-ranking employees. The status of a teacher is not at issue here, and we do not comment on such status. As his argument applies to the status of a police officer, however, we agree with the observation in McLain v. Arnold (1980), 275 S.C. 287, 270 S.E.2d 124, where the court stated, [S]imply speaking, the status of a public official may be deemed sufficient to warrant application of the New York Times privilege, not because of the government employee's place on the totem pole, but because of the public interest in a government employee's activity in a particular context. 275 S.C. at ___, 270 S.E.2d at 125. We adhere to our conclusion in Coursey that a police officer is a public official. In this regard we initially disagree with plaintiff's conclusion that police officers lack greater access to the press than do members of the general public. Moreover, access to the press is not the test in determining whether a person is a public official, but is merely an advantage enjoyed by many public officials. As noted by Justice Powell in Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344, 41 L.Ed.2d at 807, 94 S.Ct. at 3009, it is often true that not all of the considerations which justify adoption of a given rule will obtain in each particular case decided under its authority. Further, it is significant that in the 20 years since the Coursey decision was rendered, countless decisions throughout the country have addressed the issue, and none to our knowledge has held to the contrary. (Several courts, however, have indicated that certain libelous statements were unrelated to an officer's official conduct and were therefore not qualifiedly privileged. See, e.g., Himango v. Prime Time Broadcasting, Inc. (1984), 37 Wash. App. 259, 680 P.2d 432; Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co. (1969), 70 Wash.2d 707, 459 P.2d 8.) The cases deeming a police officer a public official are based on sound reasoning. For example, we find particularly insightful Gray v. Udevitz (10th Cir.1981), 656 F.2d 588, 591, in which the court stated: The cop on the beat is the member of the department who is most visible to the public. He possesses both the authority and the ability to exercise force. Misuse of his authority can result in significant deprivation of constitutional rights and personal freedoms, not to mention bodily injury and financial loss. The strong public interest in ensuring open discussion and criticism of his qualifications and job performance warrant[s] the conclusion that he is a public official. In accord with Gray is Moriarty v. Lippe (1972), 162 Conn. 371, 378, 294 A.2d 326, 330-31, in which the court pointed out that [a]lthough a comparatively low-ranking government official, a patrolman's office, if abused, has great potential for social harm and thus invites independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds the position. Also on point is Smith v. Russell (Fla. 1984), 456 So.2d 462, 464, in which the court found that a police officer was a public official and stated: The plaintiff is a highly visible representative of government authority who has power over citizens and broad discretion in the exercise of that power. There are probably no public employees more recognizable than armed uniformed police officers. Most citizens are interested [in police officers' qualifications] beyond their general interest in the qualifications and performance of all government employees. We also find persuasive Roche v. Egan (Me. 1981), 433 A.2d 757, 762, in which the court observed: Law enforcement is a uniquely governmental affair. The police detective, as one charged with investigating crimes and arresting the criminal, is in fact, and also is generally known to be, vested with substantial responsibility for the safety and welfare of the citizenry in areas impinging most directly and intimately on daily living: the home, the place of work and of recreation, the sidewalks and streets. The nature and extent of the responsibility of a police detective is punctuated by the fact that a firearm, no less than a badge, comes with his office. Plaintiff submits that courts should determine that, for purposes of applying the public official designation, there are three groups of public employees. He submits that (1) employees in certain positions can as a matter of law be deemed public officials, (2) some are as a matter of law not public officials, and (3) others should be tested by a fact intensive analysis on a case-by-case basis as to whether they are public officials as a matter of fact. Arguing that he falls into the third category, he submits that there is no evidence in the record to indicate that he himself is a public official. In Rosenblatt v. Baer (1966), 383 U.S. 75, 88, 15 L.Ed.2d 597, 606, 86 S.Ct. 669, 677, the Court held that it is for the trial judge in the first instance to determine whether the proofs show respondent [a supervisor of a county recreation area] to be a `public official.' The Court noted that [s]uch a course will both lessen the possibility that a jury will use the cloak of a general verdict to punish unpopular ideas or speakers, and to assure an appellate court the record and findings required for review of constitutional decisions. 383 U.S. at 88 n. 15, 15 L.Ed.2d at 607 n. 15, 86 S.Ct. at 677 n. 15. Although we do not question that there may well be governmental employees whose positions require the extensive fact intensive analysis which plaintiff requests, the United States Supreme Court clearly has not required this with respect to those government positions the duties of which are widely recognized. Indeed, in the landmark decision of New York Times, the Court relied not on a detailed exposition of the plaintiff's duties but on the fact that his duties were generally the supervision of certain city departments. ( New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256, 11 L.Ed.2d at 692, 84 S.Ct. at 713.) We note also that the numerous decisions discussed above which have found a police officer to be a public official did so not on the basis of duties unique to that plaintiff but on the basis of duties of police officers generally. We further note that, as recognized in Belli v. Orlando Daily Newspapers, Inc. (5th Cir.1967), 389 F.2d 579, 588, [i]n most cases it is a relatively simple matter to determine whether the plaintiff is a public official and whether the defamatory comment is directed toward his official capacity. (Emphasis in original.) We note that plaintiff testified at trial regarding his job duties, and we hold that in the absence of any indication that plaintiff did not perform the ordinary and customary duties of a beat police officer, it was appropriate for the circuit court to conclude that he was a public official.