Opinion ID: 2169494
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rhode Island Law

Text: The seminal opinion in Rhode Island from our Supreme Court on the issue of redistricting is Opinion to the Governor, 101 R.I. 203, 221 A.2d 799 (1966). There, the Court was presented with questions concerning the constitutionality of the redistricting legislation in light of the amendments to the Rhode Island Constitution requiring that electoral districts be as compact in territory as possible. Initially, the Court noted that the framers of the constitution, in providing that such districts be territorially compact, intended that it apply to any districts the legislature might from time to time have authority to establish. To hold to the contrary would be to deny vitality to the constitution. Id. at 801. Further, the amendments to the constitution confer[] no power on the legislature to establish electoral districts but is a limitation on the power to so act already possessed by the Legislature. Thus the Court recognized the inherent power of the legislature to create electoral districts: [S]tate legislatures possess plenary power in the legislative area except as the same may be limited by the Constitution of the United States or the constitution of this state. In other words, the legislature of this state would have plenary power to provide for election machinery, including the establishment of electoral districts, but for the restrictions thereon set out [the Rhode Island Constitution]. In short, we are concerned here with a determination of the extent to which the broad power of the legislature to structure electoral districts is circumscribed by that provision of [then] arts. XIII and XIX requiring that each such district territorially be `as compact in territory as possible.' Id. The framers of the constitution, in requiring territorial compactness, clearly intended to leave the legislature with a wide discretion as to the territorial structuring of the electoral districts. Id. at 803. The Court opined that this is so based on the language of the amendment requiring the districts to be as compact as possible. The phrasing of the constitutional limitation discloses a recognition of the legislative character of the determinations that must be made to establish the factors that govern the structuring of electoral districts so as to insure voting equality therein. Id. The Court noted the imprecise meaning of the term compact when referring to the constitutional mandate. While a division into tightly packed districts with regular lines might literally satisfy the constitutional requirement, our state with its irregular boundaries, its bays and its inlets, its islands, its rivers and lakes and its many other geographical features is obviously not susceptible to being divided into circular planes or squares. Opinion to the Governor, 221 A.2d at 802. The Court went on to further discuss compactness: The term `compact' then, as it is used in the constitution, has reference to a principle, rather than to a definition, and has meaning only within an appropriate factual context. Its origins as a constitutional requirement lie in an intention to provide an electorate with effective representation rather than with a design to establish an orderly and symmetrical geometric pattern of electoral districts. Undoubtedly a principal inducing factor for its adoption was the desire to avoid the political gerrymander. There was then, as there is now, a recognition that the structuring of electoral districts containing equal numbers of people or voters, standing alone, would not necessarily insure effective participation in representative government. Id. The Court recognized the necessity for effective representation as the ultimate goal in establishing, maintaining and creating legislative districts and reemphasized that a principal purpose of compactness was to prevent political gerrymandering. Limitations on a legislature's power, so as to avoid a political gerrymander, are necessary to the preservation of true representative government. . . . Id. (internal quotations omitted). Though our own constitution makes no explicit reference to contiguity, unlike many other state constitutions, the Court considered that factor an important consideration in determining compactness in a case with political gerrymandering. [A]ny deviation from contiguity and from natural, historical, geographical, and political lines for the purpose of achieving a political gerrymander is constitutionally prohibited by the mandate of compactness. Id. at 803. This is not to say that departures from those criteria in order to accomplish a racial or an ethnic gerrymander or to insure as far as possible the reelection of an incumbent, or to make inconvenient or impractical an exercise of the franchise, are not also prohibited. Id. [I]f the objective of compactness is to be attained, and a challenger shows redistricting based solely on political considerations, the deviations must be explainable by rational and legitimate considerations; they must be in good faith; and they must be justifiable upon grounds which . . . `are free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.' Opinion to the Governor, 221 A.2d at 803 (citations omitted). Territorial compactness, then, is peripheral in its thrust and is a legislative function to determine whether a district is as compact as possible. [W]hether there has been a complete departure from the requirement for compactness is a judicial question, but the determination of the territory that necessarily would have to be included in a district to provide that that district be as compact as possible is for legislative determination. Id. The Court conducted a fact-finding analysis in Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d 976 (R.I.1984). There, among other things, the Court was confronted with a political gerrymander challenge to the redistricting in the Rhode Island House of Representatives, with the plaintiffs alleging a violation of the constitutional compactness requirement. The plaintiffs' major assertion of the alleged violations of the compactness requirement focused on an excessive number of crossings of municipal boundaries in the statewide plan and the alignment of district 98 in the town of Jamestown with a portion of the city of Newport rather than with the town of North Kingstown. Id. at 985. The Court relied heavily upon Opinion to the Governor for the proposition that compactness, for purposes of our constitution, relates to effective representation, and not simple geographic formulae, particularly in light of the irregular shape of Rhode Island. Id. at 985-86. Indeed, a review of a compactness challenge is limited. Id. at 986. The phrasing of the constitutional limitation suggests this result in that it requires the districts to be as territorially compact as possible. Id. The Court's role is to ensure that the Legislature did not act `without a rational or legitimate basis.' Id. (citations omitted). The clause is violated . . . `only when a reapportionment plan creates districts solely for political considerations, without reference to other policies, in such a manner that the plan demonstrates a complete abandonment of any attempt to draw equal, compact and contiguous districts.' Holmes, 475 A.2d at 986 (citations omitted). The Court noted Opinion to the Governor's explanation that an electoral district violates the compactness requirement only when the legislature acts without a rational or legitimate basis. Id. Thus a court's limited role is to ensure that the legislature acted in a rational or legitimate manner. Id. The Court reviewed the trial justice's analysis of the pros and cons of placing Jamestown with either North Kingstown or Newport, as well as the General Assembly's proffered reasons for making its decisions. The trial justice's conclusions that neither tie was substantially stronger necessarily left the decision in the hands of the Legislature, which exercised its discretion in connecting Jamestown to a portion of Newport. The legislative decision to link Jamestown with Newport was based on legitimate factors and was clearly not irrational. Id. Rhode Island's unique geographic features make compliance with the compactness requirement difficult at times[,] nevertheless, the Court did not wish to lessen the importance of this constitutional mandate.. . . Id. at 987. The Court upheld the redistricting legislation as enacted by the General Assembly, finding no constitutional violation of the compactness requirement. However, a constitutional violation was found in Licht v. Quattrocchi, 449 A.2d 887 (R.I.1982). In Licht, the Court stated: The reapportionment plan enacted by the General Assembly, P.L.1982, ch. 20, violates the requirement of compactness contained in Article XIX of the amendments to the Constitution of Rhode Island pursuant to the findings of the trial justice that the redistricting of senatorial districts in the city of Providence unnecessarily and improperly crossed natural boundaries and violated the principle of contiguity for impermissible purposes. Licht, 449 A.2d at 887. The trial court's earlier decision found, inter alia, that the plan in that case violated the Rhode Island Constitution because the plaintiffs had proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the districts had been crafted to achieve a political gerrymander, and the challenged districts were either not compact, not contiguous, or both. See Licht v. Quattrocchi, 1982 R.I.Super. Lexis 61 (R.I. Super Ct.1982). Judge Bulman interpreted Opinion to the Governor for the proposition that compactness is a constitutional principle designed to eradicate political gerrymandering in any form or guise. Id. at . [D]eviations from natural, historical, geographical, and political lines must be explained by rational and legitimate considerations, in good faith, and free from any taint or arbitrariness or discrimination. Id. at  (citing Opinion to the Governor, 221 A.2d at 803). The Court found that the constitutional requirement for compactness was violated because the redistricting was done without a rational or legitimate basis, was not enacted in good faith, and was not free from the taint of arbitrariness or discrimination. Id. at 14-15. There, the senate districts violated the constitutional mandate of compactness because of deviations from natural, historical geographical and political boundaries for no rational or legitimate reason, but for the prohibited political purpose of protecting some incumbents while punishing others. Id. at . Compactness was further violated, according to the trial justice, because districts were connected in a totally non-contiguous way solely because of the political considerations of favoring some and punishing others. Id. Another noteworthy case that reviewed a Rhode Island compactness challenge is Farnum v. Burns, 561 F.Supp. 83 (D.R.I. 1983). The Federal District Court of Rhode Island found violations based upon population requirements in an earlier decision, Farnum v. Burns, 548 F.Supp. 769 (D.R.I.1982), and the parties appeared before the court on the defendants' motion to determine if their interim redistricting plans could be used. See Farnum, 561 F.Supp. at 87. The compactness requirement is intended `to provide an electorate with effective representation' and prevent `political gerrymander.' Id. at 90 (quoting Opinion to the Governor, 221 A.2d at 802). The federal court enunciated a two-part test. First, it must be determined whether district lines deviate from natural, historical, geographical and political lines. Id. at 91. If there is a deviation, it must be justified by rational and legitimate considerations, made in good faith, and free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination. Id. (citing Opinion to the Governor, 221 A.2d at 803). However, [t]he fact that the . . . districts deviate from geographical, historical and political lines does not in itself mean that they are constitutionally prohibited by the mandate of compactness. Id. Political gerrymandering  drawing districts purely for political reasons  is the additional element required. Farnum, 561 F.Supp. at 91. There, the court found both a political gerrymander and a deviation from geographic boundaries. Id. Therefore, the constitutional mandate of compactness was violated. Id. at 92. This Court notes that the Farnum decision is not binding and is merely instructive to the extent that it does not conflict with Rhode Island law. Subsequent to Farnum, the Rhode Island Supreme Court issued Holmes, initially questioning whether the federal court's decision was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Holmes, 475 A.2d at 978 n. 2. To the extent that there is a conflict between the holdings of Farnum and Holmes, Holmes controls; to the extent that the parties' respective burdens are different in the two cases, the appropriate burden of proof is found in Holmes. 475 A.2d at 985-86, supra.