Opinion ID: 2823788
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The CSP Conflicts with the Plain Language of Section 7

Text: Â¶27Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The Colorado Constitution features broad, unequivocal language forbidding the State from using public money to fund religious schools. Specifically, article IX,Â section 7âentitled âAid to private schools, churches, sectarian purpose, forbiddenââ includes the following proscriptive language: Neither the general assembly, nor any county, city, town, township, school district or other public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation, or pay from any public fund or moneys whatever,Â anything in aid of any church or sectarian society, or for any sectarianÂ purpose, or to help support or sustain any school, academy, seminary, college, university or other literary or scientific institution, controlled byÂ any church or sectarian denomination whatsoever . . . . (Emphasis added.) Although this provision uses the term âsectarianâ rather than âreligious,â the two words are synonymous. See Blackâs Law Dictionary 1557 (10th ed. 2014) (defining âsectarianâ as â[o]f, relating to, or involving a particular religious sect; esp., supporting a particular religious group and its beliefsâ). That section 7 twice equates the term âsectarianâ with the word âchurchâ only reinforces this point. Therefore, this stark constitutional provision makes one thing clear: A school district may not aid religious schools. Â¶28Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Yet aiding religious schools is exactly what the CSP does. The CSP essentially functions as a recruitment program, teaming with various religious schools (i.e., the Private School Partners) and encouraging students to attend those schools via the inducement of scholarships. To be sure, the CSP does not explicitly funnel money directly to religious schools, instead providing financial aid to students. But section 7âs prohibitions are not limited to direct funding. Rather, section 7 bars school districts from âpay[ing] from any public fund or moneys whatever, anything in aid of anyâ religious institution, and from âhelp[ing] support or sustain any school . . . controlled by any church or sectarian denomination whatsoeverâ (emphasis added). Given thatÂ private religious schools rely on studentsâ attendance (and their corresponding tuition payments) for their ongoing survival, the CSPâs facilitation of such attendance necessarily constitutes aid to âsupport or sustainâ those schools. Section 7 precludes school districts from providing such aid. Â¶29Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Respondents point out that the CSP does not require scholarship recipients to enroll in a religious school, nor does it force participating Private School Partners to be religious. Respondents thus suggest that the CSP features an element of private choice that severs the link between the Districtâs aid to the student and the studentâs ultimate attendance at a (potentially) religious school. It is true that the CSP does not only partner with religious schools; several Private School Partners are non-religious. The fact remains, however, that the CSP awards public money to students who may then use that money to pay for a religious education. In so doing, the CSP aids religious institutions. Thus, even ignoring the pragmatic realities that scholarship recipients faceâsuch as the trial courtâs finding that âvirtually all high school studentsâ can only use their scholarships to attend religious schoolsâthe CSP violates the clear constitutional command of section 7. 15 Â¶30Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The programâs lack of vital safeguards only bolsters our conclusion that it is constitutionally infirm. Most troubling is that the CSP does not forbid a Private School Partner from raising a scholarship recipientâs tuition (or reducing his financial aid) inÂ the amount of the scholarship awarded. Such conduct would pervert the programâs âoffsetâ approach and would instead result in the District channeling taxpayer money directly to a religious school. As the trial court found, one religious Private School Partner has already engaged in this very behavior. 16 Â¶31Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Respondents nevertheless contend that the plain language of section 7 is not plain at all, but that the term âsectarianâ is actually code for âCatholic.â In so doing, Respondents charge that section 7 is a so-called âBlaine Amendmentâ that is bigoted in origin. See Taxpayers for Pub. Educ., Â¶ 62 n.13 (describing Blaine Amendments as âstate laws and constitutional provisions which allegedly arose out of anti-Catholic school sentimentâ). They thus encourage us to wade into the history of section 7âs adoption and declare that the framers created section 7 in a vulgar display of anti-Catholic animus. Â¶32Â Â Â Â Â Â Â We need not perform such an exegesis to dispose of Respondentsâ argument. Instead, we need merely recall that âconstitutional provisions must be declared and enforced as writtenâ whenever their language is âplainâ and their meaning is âclear.â People v. Rodriguez, 112 P.3d 693, 696 (Colo. 2005). As discussed, the term âsectarianâ plainly means âreligious.â Therefore, we will enforce section 7 as it is written. 17 Â¶33Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Accordingly, we cannot square the CSPâs resultant aid of religious schools with the plain language of section 7. Respondents insist, however, that both state and federal case law compel the conclusion that the CSP in fact comports with section 7. We now review this case law, beginning with our decision in Americans United.