Opinion ID: 855670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: claim construction and disclaimer

Text: The district court construed the claims of the Kimura patents based on a detailed review of the patents’ shared specification and prosecution history. The district court focused in particular on Kimura’s representations to the Patent Office during examination, including the Hope declaration. Based in part on Kimura’s representations, the district court determined that Kimura had “disclaimed applying insecticide without loopholes around a building, and applying insecticide without loopholes under a building, respectively.” BASF, 2011 WL 2607940, at . The district court rejected BASF’s attempts to qualify various statements in the Hope declaration and to introduce extrinsic evidence, in the form of expert testimony, that Kimura’s disclaimer was not intended to be so broad. Id. at . The district court concluded that the claimed method, properly construed, “(a) requires the deliberate creation of untreated locations (i.e., loopholes) through which the crawling insect can reach the building without being exposed to the insecticide and (b) disclaims applying insecticide without loopholes around a [future] building, under a [future] building, and both around a [future] building and under a [future] building.” Id. at . On appeal, BASF argues that the district court construed Kimura’s disclaimer too broadly. BASF concedes 12 BASF AGRO v. MAKHTESHIM AGAN that the Kimura patents teach a treatment “without barrier.” Nevertheless, BASF argues that the district court should have limited the disclaimed treatments to treatments “without loopholes both around and under a building.” According to BASF, the specification of the Kimura patents and the Hope declaration support its proposed construction. BASF argues further that the extrinsic evidence of record, including expert testimony, confirms that barrier treatments were understood as blocking all points of entry, both inside and outside a building’s boundary. Finally, BASF argues that the claims of the Kimura patents use the open-ended term “comprising.” In BASF’s view, this open-ended term warrants a finding of infringement even where the accused product combines a localized interior treatment with an exterior barrier treatment. BASF asks us to reverse the district court’s claim construction and summary judgment of non-infringement. Determining the proper meaning of a claim begins with the language of the claim. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[T]he claims are of primary importance, in the effort to ascertain precisely what it is that is patented.”). We presume that the terms in the claim mean what they say. Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002). We interpret the claim’s words “in light of the intrinsic evidence of record, including the written description, the drawings, and the prosecution history.” Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2002). If a claim term has a plain and ordinary meaning, our inquiry ends. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). If, however, the claim term does not have an ordinary meaning, and its meaning is not clear from a plain reading of the claim, “we turn to the remaining intrinsic evidence, including the written description, to aid in our construction of that term.” TelemBASF AGRO v. MAKHTESHIM AGAN 13 ac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We have held that “the specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. The construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and confirmed with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with the claim.”). During the process of obtaining a patent, a patentee may make statements to the Patent Office to distinguish her claimed invention from the prior art. Where such statements indicate a clear disavowal of subject matter, the patentee disclaims such subject matter and narrows the scope of her claims. Ekchian v. Home Depot, Inc., 104 F.3d 1299, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[S]ince, by distinguishing the claimed invention over the prior art, an applicant is indicating what the claims do not cover, he is by implication surrendering such protection.”). The public has a right to rely on representations a patentee has made in the course of obtaining her patent. See Spectrum Int'l, Inc. v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Southwall Techs. Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The prosecution history limits the interpretation of claim terms so as to exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution.”); Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that the prosecution history, which includes “all express representations made by or on behalf 14 BASF AGRO v. MAKHTESHIM AGAN of the applicant to the examiner to induce a patent grant,” limits the interpretation of the claims “so as to exclude any interpretation that may have been disclaimed or disavowed during prosecution in order to obtain claim allowance”); see also Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30 (1997) (noting “the public’s right to clear notice of the scope of the patent as embodied in the patent file.”). Generally, a patent’s intrinsic record does not warrant consideration of extrinsic evidence. Where a patent’s claims, written description, and prosecution history are complete and unambiguous, a court need not resort to extrinsic evidence such as treatises, technical references, or expert testimony. Where the intrinsic record leaves ambiguities and unresolved questions, however, a court may consider extrinsic evidence, including expert testimony. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317–18; Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Extrinsic evidence must be “given the appropriate weight by the trial court.” Amkor Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 692 F.3d 1250, 1259-60 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Spansion Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). To this end, we have been careful to distinguish between, on one hand, expert testimony on the state of the art, and on the other hand, expert testimony regarding the proper construction of a disputed claim term. See, e.g., Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1585. The latter should play a more limited role in a court’s analysis, especially where the intrinsic record is selfevident. In any event, extrinsic evidence cannot vary the terms of the claims or otherwise contradict the intrinsic record. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). Accordingly, expert testimony inconsistent with the intrinsic record has little if any probative value. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584–85. (“[E]ven if the judge permissibly decided to hear BASF AGRO v. MAKHTESHIM AGAN 15 all the possible evidence before construing the claim, the expert testimony, which was inconsistent with the specification and file history, should have been accorded no weight.”). We find here that the district court correctly construed the claims of the Kimura patents based on its determination that Kimura had disclaimed “barrier treatments” without loopholes. First, the language of the claims suggests exclusion of barrier treatments. Second, the specification clarifies and confirms a disclaimer. Third, Kimura relied on the disclaimer during prosecution. Fourth, the claims’ open-ended language does not moot Kimura’s disclaimer. And fifth, extrinsic evidence is not available to contradict such a clear and definite disavowal of subject matter. First, the language of the claims suggests exclusion of barrier treatments. The claims unambiguously require areas that are treated and untreated: “forming treated and untreated locations . . . by applying an effective amount . . . to discrete locations around or under said building.” The claims specify that “the untreated locations are the remaining portions of the perimeter where the solution or suspension was not applied.” In accordance with this language, the claims require portions of the perimeter to which insecticide has not been applied. In other words, the perimeter must have untreated “loopholes.” Thus, the claims exclude treatments that form a single unbroken barrier, or a barrier without such loopholes. Second, the shared specification of the Kimura patents disclaims barrier treatments. According to the specification the patented method provides an advantage over prior art methods which required “operators [to] apply the chemical around or under the building or houses to form a barrier against termites [sic] invasion.” A disadvantage of these prior art methods, the specification 16 BASF AGRO v. MAKHTESHIM AGAN explains, is that “loopholes in the treatment may cause failure of protection of the houses.” Thus, “an object of the instant invention is to provide a curative treatment which is effective even when attacked parts are untreated,” that is “to provide a termite treatment without barrier.” ’010 Patent col. 1 ll. 35–37, 43–45. According to the patented method, “the active ingredient is applied on discrete locus [sic],” id. at col. 3 ll. 41–42, not continuously to form a barrier free of loopholes. The specification thus confirms that the claims do not cover the prior art’s loophole-free barrier treatments. Third, the prosecution history indicates a clear disclaimer of barrier treatments. Kimura distinguished the Crosby and Mihealsick patents cited by the examiner as being “designed to provide a ‘barrier’ around the building to be protected” rather than forming both “treated and untreated locations” as in the claimed invention. Those patents, Kimura said, require “the formation of a barrier that has no untreated locations.” Kimura insisted that the prior art did not contain any “teachings or suggestions that would motivate an artisan of ordinary skill to deviate from the established practice of creating a continuous barrier around a building.” Kimura asked the examiner to allow the claims based on Kimura’s suggestion that no prior art reference “teaches the deliberate creation of untreated locations (i.e., loopholes) through which the crawling insect can reach the building without being exposed to the insecticide.” Kimura said, “all of the cited documents teach away from this approach because they endeavor to create a barrier between the crawling insects and the building so that the insect cannot reach the building without being exposed to the insecticide.” Thus, Kimura intended to disclaim all treatments that form a barrier to prevent insects from breaching a building’s perimeter without exposure to insecticide. BASF AGRO v. MAKHTESHIM AGAN 17 Kimura further relied during prosecution on the declaration of Dr. Joe Hope, who asserted that “the teaching of the common general knowledge and prior art as of [the filing of Kimura’s application] directs the skilled artisan to make a barrier treatment of chemical insecticide around a structure . . . i.e., [having] no untreated locations.” Hope Decl. 2. Dr. Hope distinguished the method of the Crosby patent, which teaches “discrete applications around a house,” as nevertheless being designed to “create a barrier to termite ingress.” Id. at 3. Finally, Dr. Hope distinguished the Mihealsick patent as teaching a method of applying insecticide “under a concrete slab and/or around a house” for the purpose of “creating or regenerating a barrier to termites.” Id. After reviewing the examiner’s cited prior art, Dr. Hope concluded that Kimura’s method was “unobvious and surprising.” Id. at 3–4. It is evident from Dr. Hope’s declaration that he considered Kimura’s method “surprising” because it did not require the creation of barriers around the perimeter of a building. Based on Dr. Hope’s analysis of the prior art and characterization of the claimed invention, the examiner allowed the claims of Kimura’s application. On issuance, Dr. Hope’s representations became part of the Kimura patents’ intrinsic record, and the public is entitled to rely on Dr. Hope’s representations in determining the claimed invention’s scope. Fourth, the claims’ use of the open-ended term “comprising” is not sufficient to overcome Kimura’s clear disavowal of certain subject matter. As we have said, “The open-ended transition ‘comprising’ does not free the claim from its own limitations.” Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Nor is “comprising” a talismanic incantation that counteracts a clear disclaimer. Spectrum, 164 F.3d at 1379–80 (“‘Comprising’ is not a weasel word with which to abrogate claim limitations . . . [or] restore [] excluded subject matter.”). We find Kimura’s use of the word 18 BASF AGRO v. MAKHTESHIM AGAN “comprising” insufficient to overcome the clear and definite disclaimer which is evident from the Kimura patents’ text and prosecution history. Fifth, the expert testimony offered by BASF regarding the state of the prior art is insufficient to change the scope of Kimura’s disclaimer. Extrinsic evidence cannot vary the terms of the claims or otherwise contradict the intrinsic record. Markman, 52 F.3d at 981. Even testimony from a qualified expert has little probative value if it is inconsistent with the intrinsic record. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 (“[E]ven if the judge permissibly decided to hear all the possible evidence before construing the claim, the expert testimony, which was inconsistent with the specification and file history, should have been accorded no weight.”). BASF presented testimony that at the time of Kimura’s invention an ordinarily skilled artisan would have understood barrier treatments to require formation of a complete barrier both around a building and underneath its foundation. Kimura’s argument that the prior art required treatment both around and under a building is contrary to the evidence intrinsic to Kimura’s patents. The specification of the patents suggests that the prior art did not require dual application both around and under a building. ’010 Patent col. 1 ll. 10–13 (referring to prior art methods in which “operators apply the chemical around or under the building or houses to form a barrier.”). Indeed, the prior art references cited by the examiner teach barrier treatments applied around but not under a building. See Crosby fig.1; Mihealsick fig.2. Moreover, Kimura’s and Dr. Hope’s representations to the Patent Office indicate a clear disclaimer of treatments that form a barrier either around or under a building. Kimura Resp. 11 (distinguishing the Crosby patent on the basis that “the method disclosed in the Crosby patent is designed to provide a ‘barrier’ around the building to be protected.” (emphasis added)); Hope Decl. 2 (distinguishing the Mihealsick BASF AGRO v. MAKHTESHIM AGAN 19 patent as teaching insecticide application “under a concrete slab and/or around a house” (emphasis added)). For the reasons above, we conclude that the district court correctly construed the claims of the Kimura patents to exclude treatments which require application of insecticide “without loopholes around a building, under a building, and both around a building and under a building.”