Opinion ID: 2612288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: court's jurisdiction to address the unfair labor practice charge

Text: The Auditor's complaint was brought pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, RCW 7.24, specifically RCW 7.24.010: Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. The act is to be liberally construed and administered. RCW 7.24.120. PERC relies upon the Educational Employment Relations Act, RCW 41.59, in arguing: (1) PERC has exclusive jurisdiction in deciding unfair labor practice charges and the court's only function is to review PERC's actions; or (2) if the court does have jurisdiction, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires the court to defer the matter to PERC due to its expertise in the area. PERC specifically cites to RCW 41.59.150(1) which provides: The commission is empowered to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice as defined in RCW 41.59.140. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, equity or otherwise. [2] We do not agree with PERC's contention. Superior courts in Washington are courts of general jurisdiction in all cases and of all proceedings in which jurisdiction shall not have been by law vested exclusively in some other court. Const. art. 4, § 6. The Educational Employment Relations Act contains no language directly removing the jurisdiction of the superior courts over cases involving unfair labor practices or involving interpretation of RCW 41.59. The chapter in question merely establishes a system of collective bargaining, grants and defines certain rights of the parties in the collective bargaining agreements, and confers certain regulating and enforcement powers on PERC. In order to enforce its orders, PERC petitions the court. RCW 41.59.150(3). Naturally, PERC must define and interpret the language in RCW 41.59 in order to carry out its functions. Every administrative agency must interpret the law in order to enforce or to follow it. It is a quantum leap in logic, however, to jump from the fact that PERC is empowered to prevent unfair labor practices to the conclusion that PERC is the exclusive decider of public labor law questions. The declaration of legal rights and interpretation of legal questions is the province of the courts and not of administrative agencies. PERC's arguments amount to no less than a suggestion that the Legislature has by implication carved out an area of law and assigned a traditional judicial function to an administrative body. PERC further argues that the language of RCW 41.59.150 specifically and directly ousts the court of jurisdiction here. PERC cites several United States Supreme Court decisions wherein the Court held that under 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976) the state and various federal courts must defer to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). San Diego Bldg. Trades Coun. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245, 3 L.Ed.2d 775, 79 S.Ct. 773 (1959). Although RCW 41.59.150 is worded identically to 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976), we are by no means bound by the Court's interpretation of the latter statute. This is especially true since the primary concern of the Court in requiring courts to defer to the NLRB is to avert the danger of state interference with national policy. Garmon, at 245. See also Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 98 L.Ed. 228, 74 S.Ct. 161 (1953). Obviously, those are not concerns in our statutory scheme. Therefore, the federal cases cited by PERC are not persuasive in interpreting RCW 41.59.150. [3] The additional cases cited by PERC merely call for judicial restraint in reviewing matters within the expertise of an agency. This leads us to PERC's second argument that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires the court to defer this case to PERC. Primary jurisdiction, ... applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views. United States v. Western Pac. Ry., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64, 1 L.Ed.2d 126, 77 S.Ct. 161 (1956). See also Schmidt v. Old Union Stockyards Co., 58 Wn.2d 478, 364 P.2d 23 (1961); B. Schwartz, Administrative Law §§ 165-167 (1976). The deference called for in the rule of primary jurisdiction requires that: 1. The administrative agency has the authority to resolve the issues ... 2. The agency must have special competence over all or some part of the controversy which renders the agency better able than the court to resolve the issues ... and 3. The claim before the court must involve issues that fall within the scope of a pervasive regulatory scheme so that a danger exists that judicial action would conflict with the regulatory scheme. In re Real Estate Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 95 Wn.2d 297, 302-03, 622 P.2d 1185 (1980). There were no factual disputes in this matter since the testimony was essentially uncontroverted and nearly all facts and documents were stipulated into the record. Consequently, the only question is interpretation of the applicable statute in order to determine whether an unfair labor practice existed under the facts. Interpretation of a statute is solely a question of law and within the conventional competence of the court. Therefore, resort to PERC is not necessary since it has no special competence over the controversy. This conclusion reflects a well recognized exception to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. See Great N. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 66 L.Ed. 943, 42 S.Ct. 477 (1922). [4] Further, the application of primary jurisdiction is within the sound discretion of the trial court ( In re Real Estate Brokerage Antitrust Litig., at 305). We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply the doctrine. PERC contends that if we recognize the court's jurisdiction in deciding this issue, the entire statutory scheme will be upset. The bare fact that the court properly exercised its jurisdiction in this case does not necessarily mean that courts must accept jurisdiction over all actions involving unfair labor practices, no matter who brings them or under what circumstances. [5] PERC's final contention is that the Auditor is not a proper party to request relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. RCW 7.24. RCW 7.24.020 provides that a person interested under a ... written contract may bring a declaratory judgment action. In Washington Beauty College, Inc. v. Huse, 195 Wash. 160, 80 P.2d 403 (1938), we held that the interests of the person bringing the suit must be direct and substantial and substantial interest is not susceptible of a precise definition but must be a matter of judicial determination in each particular case. PERC's theory is that only the parties to the contract would have standing to bring this action. If that were so, the parties could bargain for and agree to any conditions with total impunity from outside perusal. This cannot be the case where public monies are involved. The Auditor clearly has sufficient interest in the school districts' contracts to bring this declaratory judgment action. This conclusion is based upon the Auditor's statutory duties to examine into all financial affairs of every public office and to inquire whether the Constitution and laws of the state ... have been properly complied with. RCW 43.09.260. This statute further provides the Attorney General shall institute necessary legal action if the Auditor's report discloses any malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance.