Opinion ID: 1437264
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: StandardReasonable likelihood of plaintiff's recovery of judgment

Text: Having determined that the approval of an attachment is an interlocutory order which, nevertheless, is immediately appealable to the Law Court, we must now address the issue, whether Rule 4A was properly applied in the instant case. Such, in turn, must preliminarily depend on the quality of showing the Rule compels the plaintiff to make in order to support its entitlement to the requested attachment. Hence, the immediate issue is, what standard of proof the trial court should apply, when hearing a motion for approval of attachment of real estate, before finding that there is a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff will recover judgment, including interest and costs, in an amount equal to or greater than the amount of the attachment over and above any liability insurance shown by the defendant to be available to satisfy the judgment. The defendant, Leisure Living, contends that the purpose underlying Rule 4A is to prevent a plaintiff from obtaining potentially onerous prejudgment security by way of attachment when there is a good faith dispute as to the merits [of a claim] and when the chances are equal or nearly equal that the plaintiff will not ultimately prevail. It opts for a standard pursuant to which the court could not make the prerequisite finding of reasonable likelihood of recovery of judgment if the court's mind is evenly balanced as to which party will ultimately prevail. Rule 4A was expanded to cover prejudgment real estate attachments for the purpose of fitting into a State policy of long standing due process safeguards of notice and hearing as an accommodation between the State interest in affording security to creditors and minimal protection to debtors against invalid claims and/or the abuse of excessive attachments. The likelihood of success standard will keep the process more in syntony with previous State policy than a preponderance of the evidence test. The term likelihood of success connotes mere probability of success or a favorable chance of success. See Verhelle v. Eveland, 1957, 347 Mich. 612, 81 N.W.2d 397. Clearly, the inquiry into the plaintiff's likelihood of success in the main action requisite to support approval of a prejudgment real estate attachment need not take the form of a full adjudication of the rights of the parties. Such adjudication better be left for determination at the time of trial rather than in the preliminary hearing contemplated by Rule 4A. The federal cases speak similarly of likelihood of success in terms of favorable chance of success. If a claim for which security by means of real estate attachment is requested is not of such insubstantial character that its invalidity so clearly appears as to foreclose a reasonable possibility of recovery, then, such a claim would be within the likelihood of success standard required by the Rule. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Company, 1974, 416 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 40 L.Ed. 2d 406, where it is stated: On the contrary, it seems apparent that the seller with his own interest in the disputed merchandise would need to establish in any event only the probability that his case will succeed . . . . (Emphasis ours) In Bell v. Burson, 1971, 402 U.S. 535, 540, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1590, 29 L.Ed.2d 90, 96, where factual analogy to the instant case appears, the Court said: Since the only purpose of the provisions before us is to obtain security from which to pay any judgments against the licensee resulting from the accident, we hold that procedural due process will be satisfied by an inquiry limited to the determination whether there is a reasonable possibility of judgments in the amounts claimed being rendered against the licensee. (Emphasis added) In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 1969, 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349, Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion viewed within due process requirements a pretrial hearing aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity, of the underlying claim against the alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his property or its unrestricted use. (First emphasis ours second in original)