Opinion ID: 78555
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Access to Courts Claim

Text: Cunningham also argues that postconviction access to the biological evidence is necessary to vindicate his constitutional right of access to the courts, a claim that was not considered in Osborne. It is now established beyond a doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts under the Due Process Clause. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1494, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). That access must be adequate, effective, and meaningful. Id. at 822, 97 S.Ct. at 1495. In order to establish a violation of the right of access to the courts, however, a prisoner must show an actual injury. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2179, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). That requirement derives from the constitutional doctrine of standing. Id.; see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 2186-87, 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002) (recognizing that the right of access to the courts is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court). The injury requirement reflects the fact that the very point of recognizing any access claim is to provide some effective vindication for a separate and distinct right to seek judicial relief for some wrong. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 414-15, 122 S.Ct. at 2186. The injury requirement means that the plaintiff must have an underlying cause of action the vindication of which is prevented by the denial of access to the courts. See id. at 415, 122 S.Ct. at 2187 ([T]he underlying cause of action ... is an element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.). The allegations about the underlying cause of action must be specific enough to give fair notice to the defendants and must be described well enough to apply the `nonfrivolous' test and to show that the `arguable' nature of the underlying claim is more than hope. Id. at 416, 122 S.Ct. at 2187. Cunningham originally identified four possible causes of action that he alleged he was unable to pursue because of the defendants' actions: (1) a claim for a new trial in state court based on newly discovered evidence under Alabama's Rule 32; (2) a claim under Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993), that he is innocent and, therefore, is imprisoned in violation of due process; (3) a gateway claim under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995), that would allow him to use evidence of innocence to revive otherwise procedurally barred constitutional claims in a federal habeas action; and (4) an application for state clemency or pardon. Because the Supreme Court has made clear that Herrera is not a basis for obtaining DNA testing in a § 1983 action, see Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2321-22, and this Court's own precedent does not allow habeas relief on a freestanding innocence claim in non-capital cases, see Jordan v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 485 F.3d 1351, 1356 (11th Cir.2007), Herrera cannot support an access to courts claim. Because there is no constitutional right to state clemency proceedings, see Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2319, that cannot be a basis for an access to courts claim either. So, Cunningham's second and fourth posited causes of action will not support an access to courts claim. The other two posited causes of action do not fare any better. The first one of them is the claim that the asserted inadequacy of Alabama's procedures for postconviction relief and the refusal of the authorities to give him the evidence for testing have prevented him from seeking a new trial in Alabama state court. In other words, Alabama's Rule 32 creates the underlying cause of action for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, and the State is interfering with his right of access to its courts to obtain that new trial by impeding his access to the necessary evidence. As Cunningham recognizes, his argument here essentially mirrors his Osborne -based procedural due process claim. Because it does, the State responds that since Cunningham has not properly invoked Alabama's procedures, he cannot complain that Alabama has denied him access to its courts. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351, 116 S.Ct. at 2180 (litigant must demonstrate that shortcomings in the process hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim). This argument reflects Osborne 's holding that where a state's procedures are facially adequate, a claimant cannot challenge their application to his particular case on due process grounds until he has actually attempted to use those procedures. See 129 S.Ct. at 2321. Because we have concluded that Alabama's mechanism for postconviction relief is consistent with due process under Osborne 's fundamental fairness standard, it follows that it does not improperly interfere with Cunningham's right of access to the courts. Furthermore, the defendants' out-of-court refusal to release evidence for DNA testing in no way prevents Cunningham from asking a state court to order release of that evidence. In reaching this conclusion, we reiterate that we do not imply that Cunningham will ultimately succeed in obtaining access to the biological evidence through a Rule 32 petition. For reasons we have already discussed, a Rule 32 petition from him would face tough procedural hurdles. Whether Cunningham could clear those hurdles is a question we need not decide. If, for example, he is denied discovery because his request is untimely under Rule 32.2(c), or ifhaving already filed two previous petitions that never requested DNA testinghe cannot satisfy the successive petition requirements in Rule 32.2(b), it will be his own omissions and not the actions of the defendants that foreclosed his ability to seek a new trial in state court. That is not a violation of his right of access to the courts. Cunningham's only remaining attempt to satisfy the actual injury requirement by showing a potentially viable cause of action is his assertion that by refusing to turn over the evidence the defendants have prevented him from showing actual innocence as a gateway claim in a federal habeas action under Schlup, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808. Under Schlup a showing of actual innocence does not by itself provide a basis of relief. Id. at 315, 115 S.Ct. at 861. Instead, it is merely a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise [procedurally] barred constitutional claim considered on the merits. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Under Schlup, Cunningham may obtain review of his constitutional claims only if he falls within the `narrow class of cases ... implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice.' Id. at 314-15, 115 S.Ct. at 861 (citation omitted). To do that, he must establish that his conviction was the result of a constitutional violation and but for that constitutional violation, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence. Id. at 327, 115 S.Ct. at 867. One problem with Cunningham's reliance on Schlup as an underlying basis for an access to courts claim is that his complaint fails to specify any constitutional claimsviable or otherwisethat he could raise in federal court if he were able to overcome the procedural obstacles to filing a new habeas petition. Cunningham's assertion of actual innocence, by itself, is not enough. Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400, 113 S.Ct. at 860; see Mize v. Hall, 532 F.3d 1184, 1195 (11th Cir.2008); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1065 (11th Cir.2002). We have already concluded that Cunningham has suffered no violation of his due process rights in relation to his attempts to seek evidence for DNA testing. A Schlup claim would need to allege an arguably viable constitutional claim independent from the issue of access to DNA evidence, and Cunningham has not done so here. In order to satisfy the actual injury requirement for an access to courts claim, Cunningham's complaint must describe the underlying cause of action in specific enough terms to give the defendants fair notice and to satisfy the `nonfrivolous' test and to show that the `arguable' nature of the underlying claim is more than hope. See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416, 122 S.Ct. at 2187. The complaint in this case fails to identify a single constitutional claim that could be raised in conjunction with a Schlup gateway claim and, therefore, does not adequately plead an actual injury. Another reason why Cunningham's Schlup theory is not an adequate basis for an access to courts claim is that the state defendants in this case have not actually done anything to block Cunningham from bringing a Schlup -based federal habeas proceeding. [20] They have simply refused to do something that might help bolster his chances of success in a federal habeas action, and the doctrine of right of access to the courts imposes no such duty on them. Cf. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354, 116 S.Ct. at 2181 (disclaiming any suggestion that the state must enable a prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate effectively once in court). In Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir.2003), this Court found no violation of the right of access to the courts where defendants had concealed evidence that might have strengthened plaintiffs' claims in a wrongful death suit, since they had done nothing to prevent such a suit from being filed. Id. at 1283-84; see also Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 386 (4th Cir.2002) (King, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (concluding that Virginia's refusal to release evidence for DNA testing did not violate the claimant's right of access to the courts, because Lewis did not require the State to help [him] bolster any such future claims). Under Christopher, courts must apply the `nonfrivolous' test and determine whether the `arguable' nature of the underlying claim is more than hope. 536 U.S. at 416, 122 S.Ct. at 2187. We agree with the district court that Cunningham's Schlup claim does not satisfy the actual injury requirement, because there is only a hopeand not a well-grounded one that the DNA testing he seeks could provide sufficiently strong evidence of innocence to meet the demanding Schlup standard. Because none of Cunningham's four proffered causes of action meets the actual injury requirement, he cannot establish a violation of his right of access to the courts.