Opinion ID: 1355168
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Protection Against Burglary Instruction

Text: It is well settled that a defendant is entitled to have his theory of the case submitted to the jury. [3] Appellant argues that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that McGowan was committing a burglary when he shot him, and accordingly, Appellant contends that he was entitled to a protection against burglary instruction. We agree and for this reason, we reverse Appellant's conviction. Historically, burglary was born into the common law as a separate substantive offense out of a desire to protect persons in the sanctity of the home. [4] Thus [a]t common law burglary [was] the breaking and entering at nighttime of another's dwelling with intent to commit a felony therein. [5] And from the earliest days of Kentucky's common law, a homicide was justifiable when committed to prevent a burglary. [6] It was thought that the commission of common law burglary contained an element of potential danger to the person against whom it was committed, and therefore, the prevention of burglary by killing the intruder was excusable. [7] Before the adoption of the Kentucky Penal Code [8] (Penal Code), Kentucky adopted numerous burglary statutes, but case law ... interpreted the statutes in accord with common law principles. [9] Additionally, Kentucky cases continued to recognize that homicide was justifiable to prevent a burglary, although Kentucky's most recent cases seemed to authorize the use of deadly force only to prevent entries designed to commit felonies or inflict violence upon dwellers. [10] But with the enactment of the Penal Code in 1974, [a] burglary is committed when someone unlawfully enters (or remains inside) a building with intent to commit a crime therein, [11] which is a more expansive concept of burglary than existed under the common law. The defense against burglary was also codified and broadened with the adoption of the Penal Code. KRS 503.080 provides: (1) The use of physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable when the defendant believes that such force is immediately necessary to prevent: (a) The commission of criminal trespass or burglary in a dwelling, building or upon real property in his possession or in the possession of another person for whose protection he acts; or .... (2) The use of deadly physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable under subsection (1) only when the defendant believes that the person against whom such force is used is: .... (b) Committing or attempting to commit a burglary of such dwelling.... Dwelling is defined as any building or structure, though movable or temporary which is for the time being either totally or partially the defendant's home or place of lodging. [12] Thus, with the Penal Code's broadening of burglary to include unlawful entry for any crime  rather than limiting it to felonies  and from a literal reading of KRS 503.080(2)(b), a dweller is privileged to use deadly force against unlawful entry for any criminal purpose (including petty theft and simple assault). [13] But is such a broad privilege to use deadly force what the General Assembly intended? A statute should be construed, if possible, so as to effectuate the plain meaning and unambiguous intent expressed in the law. [14] Where the words used in a statute are clear and unambiguous and express the legislative intent, there is no room for construction and the statute must be accepted as it is written. [15] We cannot ignore the plain meaning of a statute simply because we might consider another interpretation to state a better policy. [16] Thus, in construing a statute, [w]e have a duty to accord to words of a statute their literal meaning unless to do so would lead to an absurd or wholly unreasonable conclusion. [17] Additionally, [t]he original draft of KRS 503.080(2)(b) authorized the use of deadly force to prevent burglary only if a defender believed that a burglar intended `to use physical force against an occupant of his dwelling.' [18] The General Assembly, however, dropped this limitation, for undocumented reasons, and adopted the deadly force rule now in effect. [19] For that reason, and given that the protection against burglary defense was codified at the same time that the definition of burglary was broadened, we must hold that the General Assembly intended the literal meaning of the statute, even though in so doing it authorize[d] an incredibly generous use of deadly force, far beyond what one would expect under a policy that puts a high premium on the value of human life. [20] It is the province of this Court under the constitution to decide what the law is and not to declare what it should be. [21] If the statute is unwise or impolitic, the remedy rests with the Legislature; not with the courts. [22] As previously noted, Appellant tendered a protection against burglary instruction, which the trial court rejected. The Court of Appeals, despite recognizing that the evidence before the trial court is conflicting as to whether McGowan actually entered the Mondie residence and that Mondie claims that McGowan entered his home ... and then physically attacked him, affirmed this omission and stated that [t]he record does not indicate that McGowan was committing burglary or any other crime justifying the use of deadly force in protection of a dwelling. We must disagree. Based on Appellant's and Callinan's testimony, the jury could have reasonably believed that McGowan had entered or remained in Appellant's home with the intent to assault him, thereby committing a burglary, and that Appellant shot him, believing that it was necessary to prevent the burglary. Accordingly we hold that Appellant was entitled to a protection against burglary instruction and that the trial court erred in failing to give such an instruction. Moreover, because KRS 503.080(2)(b)'s privilege of protection against burglary is broader than the privilege to use deadly force in the protection of [one]self [under KRS 503.050], in that under [KRS 503.080(2)(b)] a defendant need not believe such force necessary to protect against death or serious physical injury, [23] we hold that the failure to give the protection against burglary instruction was reversible error. [24]