Opinion ID: 763265
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Testimony About Refusal to Consent to Search

Text: 19 Mr. Dozal also objects to the government's use of his refusal to allow officers to search property under his exclusive control to show that [he] had an interest in not having these areas searched. Aplt. Br. at 10. In his view, admission of such testimony erroneously allowed the jury to infer guilty knowledge based on the exercise of his constitutionally guaranteed rights. Id. 20 According to the government, Mr. Dozal failed to object to testimony he now contends allowed the impermissible inference that he knew areas under his exclusive control contained illegal drugs. We reject this characterization of the record. During Officer Crawford's testimony, defense counsel made several objections to evidence that Mr. Dozal limited the search. See 4 R. at 188, 234. 21 We nevertheless find the defendant's challenge without merit. Relying on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), Mr. Dozal argues that using evidence of his assertion of Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment rights to show that he had something to hide violates Due Process. See Aplt. Br. at 12. The Doyle Court held that a defendant may not be impeached with evidence of his silence at the time of his arrest and after his receipt of Miranda warnings. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240. To the extent that Mr. Dozal argues that he was penalized for invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, see Aplt. Br. at 12, we note that he was not in custody at the time he refused to consent to the search. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (distinguishing custodial interrogation from Fourth Amendment detentions, which are substantially less intrusive); United States v. Ritchie, 35 F.3d 1477, 1485-86 (10th Cir.1994) (holding that defendant was not in custody during search of his residence). Accordingly, his statements to the officers were not protected by Miranda safeguards. See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 110 L.Ed.2d 243 (1990) (stating that Miranda prohibits coercion arising from custodial interrogation). 22 Mr. Dozal also attempts to extend the Doyle strictures to the Fourth Amendment context. We recognize that [t]he failure to consent to a search cannot form any part of the basis for reasonable suspicion, United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 946 (10th Cir.1997), and we note that asking a jury to draw adverse inferences from such a refusal may be impermissible if the testimony is not admitted as a fair response to a claim by the defendant or for some other proper purpose. See United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200, 207 (3d Cir.1988); see also United States v. McNatt, 931 F.2d 251, 258 (4th Cir.1991) (defense that officer planted evidence in defendant's truck invited testimony about refusal to permit officer to search the truck at the time most important to this issue). 23 In this case, however, a careful review of the trial transcript convinces us that the contested statements were introduced, not to impute guilty knowledge to Mr. Dozal, but for the proper purpose of establishing dominion and control over the premises where a large part of the cocaine was found. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this testimony under these circumstances.