Opinion ID: 215816
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clark's MHRA Claim

Text: On appeal, Clark argues that the district court erred when it granted Matthews's motion for summary judgment on his MHRA claim. We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Baker v. Silver Oak Senior Living Mgmt. Co., 581 F.3d 684, 687 (8th Cir.2009). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed most favorably to the nonmovant, shows no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Schultz v. Windstream Commc'ns, Inc., 600 F.3d 948, 951 (8th Cir.2010). A genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the party opposing the motion. Humphries v. Pulaski Cnty. Special Sch. Dist., 580 F.3d 688, 692 (8th Cir.2009). The MHRA and the ADEA are worded similarly. Both statutes generally prohibit employers from discriminating against their employees because of their age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 213.055(1). Under the ADEA, the United States Supreme Court has stated that the ordinary meaning of the ADEA's requirement that an employer took adverse action `because of' age is that age was the `reason' that the employer decided to act. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009). Under the ADEA, therefore, a plaintiff must prove that age was the `but for' cause of the employer's adverse decision. Id. In our prior opinion, we explained that this meant that Clark had to show that if it were not for his age, he would not have been terminated and he would have become a primary-packaging designer. Clark, 628 F.3d at 469. Under the MHRA, however, Clark is not required to prove that age was the but for cause of Matthews's adverse employment actions. According to the Supreme Court of Missouri, [n]othing in [the] statutory language of the MHRA requires a plaintiff to prove that discrimination was a substantial or determining factor in an employment decision; if consideration of age ... contributed to the unfair treatment, that is sufficient. Daugherty v. City of Md. Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 819 (Mo.2007). The Missouri Court of Appeals has defined a contributing factor in this context as one that contributed a share in anything or has a part in producing the effect. Williams v. Trans States Airlines, 281 S.W.3d 854, 867 (Mo.Ct.App.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Recent Supreme Court of Missouri case law supports this definition. Fleshner v. Pepose Vision Inst., 304 S.W.3d 81, 94 (Mo.2010) (noting that cases involving ... the MHRA ... turn on whether an illegal factor played a role in the decision to discharge the employee (emphasis added)). Essentially, as we noted in our prior opinion, the difference between the ADEA and the MHRA is that the former requires that age must have been `the reason' for the adverse employment action, while the latter merely requires that age was `a reason' for the action. Clark, 628 F.3d at 472; see also Baker, 581 F.3d at 689-90 (noting that the Supreme Court of Missouri has held that the MHRA is less demanding than the ADEA). In this case, Clark argues that he created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether his age was a contributing factor in Matthews's decisions to not promote him to a primary-packaging-design position and to ultimately terminate him. We agree. Generally, Matthews claims it made these decisions based upon Clark's skills, his performance reviews, and because of changes in the packaging-design market. However, there is evidence that Clark's skills as a corrugated-packaging designer were adequate, and there is evidence that other Matthews employees had performance reviews comparable to Clark's reviews yet were not terminated. Moreover, even though there is no evidence suggesting that Clark competently designed primary packaging, there is evidence that virtually every primary-packaging designer at Matthews was under the age of forty. Additionally, Clark has produced evidence that Matthews sent AARP mailings to its employees on their fifty-sixth birthday and that a Matthews official who made termination decisions made retirement-related comments and jokes. [5] Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Clark has produced evidence, as we noted in our prior opinion, that he was part of a RIF at Matthews that disproportionately affected older employees. Specifically, according to Clark's evidence, there were between forty-two and fifty-three workers subject to the RIF, and, after the RIF, the percentage of workers age forty and over in this pool dropped roughly 4-5%. Clark, 628 F.3d at 468. Clark's evidence, as we concluded in our prior opinion, does not create a triable issue of fact regarding whether Clark suffered adverse employment actions because of his age for purposes of the ADEA. It does not necessarily follow from this conclusion, however, that Clark's evidence does not create a triable issue of fact regarding whether Clark's age contributed to the adverse employment actions taken against him for purposes of the MHRA. Clark's MHRA claim survives summary judgment if there is a triable issue of fact regarding whether Clark's age played a part in producing his inability to become a primary-packaging designer or his ultimate termination, even if it is apparent that Clark's age was not a substantial, determining, or but-for cause of these employment decisions. On this record, we cannot say that it would be unreasonable for a jury to conclude that Clark's age played a part in producing the adverse employment actions he alleges. Therefore, the district court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of Matthews on Clark's MHRA claim.