Opinion ID: 2720490
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Asserted Instructional Errors

Text: Defendants mount numerous challenges to the trial court‘s guilt phase instructions. Assuming arguendo that all claims are cognizable (§ 1259), they are without merit. 1. Other Crimes Instructions Defendants challenge several instructions concerning evidence that defendants committed ―other crimes‖ besides the Wheeler Avenue murders. They first contend that the relevance of that evidence hinged on preliminary facts. Thus, under Evidence Code section 403, the court was obligated, on request, to instruct the jury to determine whether 113 the preliminary fact exists and to disregard the proffered evidence unless the jury finds that the preliminary fact does exist. Defendants‘ proposed instruction listed the other crimes and told the jury it was required to find that each defendant committed or ―request[ed], instigate[d] or hir[ed]‖ someone else to commit them. This challenge fails for two reasons. First, as the trial court pointed out, not all of the other crimes evidence depended for its relevance on the direct participation of a defendant. For example, the Gentry and Goldman shootings were relevant to establish Andre Armstrong‘s connection to the Bryant Family organization and his reasons for ―squeezing‖ the Family. Second, the trial court gave an instruction pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.50.1 (5th ed. 1988), which explained that the other crimes ―purportedly committed by a defendant or defendants must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. You must not consider such evidence for any purpose unless you are satisfied that a particular defendant committed such other crime or crimes. [¶] The prosecution has the burden of proving these facts by a preponderance of the evidence.‖ (See also People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 763 (Medina).) Defendants have not demonstrated that more specific instructions about other preliminary facts involved in particular crimes were proper or necessary. Additional instructions on other crimes evidence are not required when the foundational requirement is ―obvious‖ and the significance of the evidence, if any, is evident from ―simple logic.‖ (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 383 (Carpenter).) Next, defendants challenge the giving of an instruction pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.50 (1994 rev.) (5th ed. 1988), explaining how the jury could use the other crimes evidence. The trial court instructed: ―Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant committed crimes other than that for which he is on trial. [¶] Such evidence, if believed, was not received and may not be considered by you to prove that defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit crimes. [¶] Such evidence was received and may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show: [¶] A characteristic method, plan or scheme 114 in the commission of criminal acts similar to the method, plan or scheme used in the commission of the offense in this case which would further tend to show the existence of the intent which is a necessary element of the crime charged or the identity of the person who committed the crime, if any, of which the defendant is accused; [¶] The existence of the intent which is a necessary element of the crime charged; [¶] The identity of the person who committed the crime, if any, of which the defendant is accused; [¶] A motive for the commission of the crime charged; [¶] The defendant had knowledge of the nature of things found in his possession; [¶] The defendant had knowledge or possessed the means that might have been useful or necessary for the commission of the crime charged; [¶] That the crime charged is part of a larger, continuing plan or scheme. [¶] For the limited purpose for which you may consider such evidence, you must weigh it in the same manner as you do all other evidence in the case. [¶] You are not permitted to consider such evidence for any other purpose. [¶] However, prior criminal conduct resulting in a felony conviction may also be considered on the issue of the credibility of the person suffering the conviction.‖ Defendants complain that the court did not specifically identify which other crimes evidence could be considered for which purpose and against which defendant. The instruction was, in general, a correct statement of the law. (People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 328.)53 Defendants‘ claim of error is essentially that, in the absence of greater specificity, the jury might have considered some other crimes evidence for purposes that were not justified. A jury is generally permitted to consider all relevant evidence (Evid. Code, § 351), and to give that evidence the weight it deems appropriate (Evid. Code, § 312, subd. (b)). Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) and the 53 We previously found harmless, ante, in part III.A.4., any error in the trial court‘s having included establishing the ―identity‖ of the murderers as a permissible purpose for the other crimes evidence. 115 related jury instruction make clear that a jury may not consider other crimes evidence as proof of bad character. There is no reasonable likelihood the jury would have misused the evidence in that manner. If some of the other crimes evidence failed, logically, to establish a particular question as to any specific defendant, the jury would simply and properly conclude that evidence was not convincing and disregard it. (Nunez, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 49; see also People v. Linkenauger (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1603, 1615 [in some circumstances an instruction matching specific other crimes evidence to the issue to be proven would be improperly ―argumentative and repetitious of instructions already given‖].) In addition, the parties were free to argue whether specific other crimes evidence was probative of issues relating to the charges. Defendants fail to persuade that the court was required to augment the instruction as defendants now suggest. Finally, defendants contend CALJIC Nos. 2.50 and 2.50.1 as given unconstitutionally lessened the prosecution‘s burden of proof because the jury was told the other crimes need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. We have previously rejected the same contention, particularly in light of the complete charge to the jury, which, as here, included instructions specifically explaining the prosecution‘s burden to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 382-383; Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 763-764.) 2. Instructions Assertedly Undermining the Burden of Proof Defendants also contend that a number of other standard instructions undermined the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.54 These challenges have been rejected and are again. (Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 1278-1279; Solomon, supra, 54 They challenge CALJIC Nos. 1.00, 2.01, 2.02, 2.21.1, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27, 2.51, 2.90, and 8.20. 116 49 Cal.4th at p. 827; People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 506 (Hartsch); Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1294; People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1026.) 3. Motive Instruction Defendants raise an oft-repeated challenge to a standard jury instruction: that CALJIC No. 2.51 improperly instructed the jury that it could find sufficient proof of their guilt from evidence of motive alone, and shifted the burden of proof to the defense.55 This challenge has been repeatedly and properly rejected. (Watkins, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1029; Solomon, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 827.) 4. Consciousness of Guilt Instructions Similarly, defendants‘ claims that the consciousness of guilt instructions were unnecessary, improperly argumentative, and invited the jury to draw irrational inferences, are defeated by settled precedent.56 (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 921922 [CALJIC Nos. 2.04 and 2.05]; Hartsch, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 505 [CALJIC Nos. 2.03 and 2.06]; Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 152-154 [CALJIC No. 2.52].) 55 The trial court instructed the jury that ―[m]otive is not an element of the crimes charged and need not be shown. However, you may consider motive or lack of motive as a circumstance in this case. Presence of motive may tend to establish guilt. Absence of motive may tend to establish innocence. You will therefore give its presence or absence, as the case may be, the weight to which you find it to be entitled.‖ 56 Defendants challenge the giving of CALJIC Nos. 2.03 (Falsehoods), 2.04 (Efforts to Fabricate Evidence), 2.05 (Efforts of Others to Fabricate Evidence), 2.06 (Efforts to Suppress Evidence), 2.52 (Flight After Crime), and a special instruction (submitted by Bryant) regarding defendants‘ refusals to provide handwriting samples: ―If you find that before this trial any defendant willfully failed and refused to provide handwriting exemplars, then as to that defendant you may consider such failure as a circumstance tending to prove his consciousness of guilt as to the fact that his handwriting appears on some or all of the documents admitted into evidence.‖ 117 5. Prior Consistent and Inconsistent Statements Instructions Defendants challenge the giving of CALJIC No. 2.13 covering prior consistent and inconsistent statements, arguing that the instruction ―unfairly skewed the jury‘s credibility determination in favor of the prosecution,‖ because it referred to the truth but not also the falsity of the facts at issue.57 This claim, too, lacks merit. (People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 41; Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) J. Refusal to Limit the Jury’s Consideration of Evidence Against Smith Smith presented no defense. He argued that, because he planned to rely on the presumption of innocence and the prosecution‘s burden of proof, the jury should be limited to considering only the evidence presented up to the point he rested and not any evidence presented by the other defendants or by the prosecution in rebuttal. The court refused to so limit the jury‘s consideration of the evidence. The ruling was correct. As with defendants‘ challenge to the court‘s denials of their motions for separate trials, Smith‘s claim is based on the same fundamental misperception: that this trial should be viewed as the simultaneous separate trials of the four defendants, rather than a joint trial of all of them. As explained in part II.E., ante, when the charges and defendants in a case have been properly joined for trial, the circumstance that the evidence presented to the jury in the joint trial is different from the evidence that might have been presented in a separate trial does not make the joint trial fundamentally unfair, even when a particular defendant‘s chance of obtaining an acquittal might be reduced. (Zafiro, supra, 506 U.S. at p. 540; Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 781.) 57 The court instructed the jury, ―Evidence that on some former occasion, a witness made a statement or statements that were inconsistent or consistent with his or her testimony in this trial, may be considered by you not only for the purpose of testing the credibility of the witness, but also as evidence of the truth of the facts as stated by the witness on such former occasion.‖ 118 The paramount purpose of a trial is to provide a reliable process for determining the truth of the charges, not to provide the best possible opportunity for one party to obtain a particular result. The reliability of that truth-seeking process and the jury‘s ultimate verdict of guilt or acquittal cannot be enhanced by requiring that the jury ignore relevant evidence, whenever it is presented in the trial. (Cf. Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f)(2) [establishing a Right to Truth-in-Evidence, which generally prohibits the exclusion of relevant evidence from a criminal proceeding]; Evid. Code, § 351.) The jury‘s consideration of all the evidence in a joint trial, even if one defendant strategically elects to present none, does not relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove each defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, or otherwise result in fundamental unfairness. Indeed, if Smith‘s contention were supportable, there would be no logical reason to draw the line at the conclusion of the prosecution‘s case-in-chief: Each codefendant‘s cross-examination of the prosecution‘s witnesses (and the prosecutor‘s redirect examination) also creates an opportunity to introduce evidence that might not have been presented in a separate trial or that could benefit one defendant, but bolster the prosecution‘s case against another. Joint trials would cease to exist, except in a theoretical case in which each defendant promises to remain mute throughout. Moreover, there are recognized mechanisms for ensuring that the prosecution is not unfairly assisted by the defendants‘ efforts. These include the trial court‘s discretion to sever the trials of codefendants (see Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 574), and to dismiss the charges based on insufficiency of the evidence under section 1118.1.58 Finally, as the trial court 58 Contrary to Smith‘s arguments, there is a clear difference between a court‘s determination that the prosecution has presented insufficient evidence warranting a judgment of acquittal under section 1118.1, and the jury‘s determination if a defendant‘s guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Each decision is based on the state of the evidence when made. The existence of the remedy provided by section 1181.1 says nothing about the fundamental fairness of permitting the jury to consider all the evidence when it makes the ultimate finding whether the prosecution carried its burden of proof. 119 recognized, Smith would not be (and was not) precluded from later choosing to counter evidence he perceived as harmful, or to rely on helpful evidence, despite his decision not to present a defense on his own behalf. K. Discharge of Juror During Deliberations and Taking Partial Verdicts as to Bryant Bryant contends the trial court erred by accepting verdicts on two of the charges against him before excusing one juror and replacing him with an alternate. He raises three related challenges: (1) the verdicts were not final; (2) the excused Juror No. 77 (Number 77) was incapable of deliberating when the verdicts were reached; and (3) the reconstituted jury could not have truly deliberated anew on the remaining charges. To the extent Smith and Wheeler intended to join in this claim, the first two of the grounds Bryant asserts are inapplicable as to them because the challenged verdicts did not address their guilt. The trial court did not err. 1. Background The jury began guilt phase deliberations on May 11, 1995. It had deliberated for four court days when, on the morning of Wednesday, May 17, 1995, Number 77 sent the court a note, which read, ―Your Honor, on yesterday, I kept my appointment to see my doctor. She advised me to take a couple days off and stay off my feet. She says I have two things wrong: First, my blood pressure was very high, 184 over 120. And I have a very severe case of arthritis. She says if my knees don‘t respond to the medication, I will have to go to have knee replacement. She wants me to keep my feet elevated the whole time.‖ Bryant‘s counsel agreed with the court‘s suggestion that the juror should be questioned about the note, and expressed concern that the juror could be engaging in ―a subterfuge to bail out because of animosity that may have developed, and [counsel] would like to be assured that it‘s a genuine and legitimate medical problem.‖ The court questioned the juror in open court with the other jurors absent. Number 77 briefly recounted his chronic knee problems and high blood pressure. In response to 120 the court‘s questions, he explained that his knees would be ―hurting [him] pretty bad‖ ―after a full day,‖ and the pain ―seem[ed] to be progressively getting worse.‖ His blood pressure was also especially high. He agreed with the trial court‘s assessment that he was asking to be ―excused starting now for the rest of the week,‖ but that there was no ―guarantee that [he would] be back‖ thereafter. He also confirmed that the only reason for the request was his physical ailments, and not ―problems with the deliberation or what have you that causes you to want to be excused.‖ The attorneys declined the court‘s offer to ask any additional questions, and the juror returned to the jury room to continue deliberations. The prosecutor suggested it was problematic to hope the juror would return after only a short recess, and that, if the juror were to be excused, the court ought to inquire whether the jury had reached any verdicts ―so we can seal those before the juror is replaced.‖ Bryant‘s counsel ―strenuously‖ objected to taking partial verdicts.59 He argued that if the court was inclined to accept partial verdicts, the juror should not be excused. If there would be no receipt of partial verdicts, the juror could be excused. The other defense counsel joined in the objection. The court found good cause to excuse the juror based on his medical problems and the uncertainty as to his ability to return. It would ask whether the jury had reached any verdicts, and, if so, would entertain additional argument before going forward. Bryant‘s counsel continued to object, arguing that the inquiry would be improper, any verdicts should not be considered final in light of the upcoming participation of an alternate, and accepting the verdicts would conflict with the requirement that the newly constituted jury begin deliberating anew. The arguments were rejected. 59 The defendants (other than codefendant Settle) had made a general waiver of their right to be present for proceedings during the jury‘s deliberations. 121 All jurors were brought to the courtroom. The court said it would be excusing Number 77, and asked the foreman, ―Have there been final verdicts reached?‖ The foreman answered that the jury had reached verdicts as to ―one or more counts, [as to] one defendant,‖ but then added, ―as far as the degree, we haven‘t reached that yet.‖ In apparent conflict with that qualification, however, the foreman responded to the court‘s question whether ―these [are] tentative decisions or final verdicts filled out,‖ by saying the verdicts ―were filled out.‖ The court informed Number 77 that he was not yet excused, and directed the entire jury to return to the jury room. The court then expressed its view that the jury apparently had not reached a final guilty verdict as to any defendant, but there was a ―remote‖ possibility that, through a misunderstanding of the court‘s instructions, the jury might have acquitted a defendant of one or more charges. Over Bryant‘s counsel‘s continuing objections, the court decided it would review the verdict forms to determine if there was ―anything that might inure to the benefit of [a] defendant.‖ The jury then returned to the courtroom, and the court privately reviewed the verdict forms. Two of the forms were completely filled out, including the degree of the murder. The court then had the following exchange with the foreman: ―The Court: I have looked at the various forms that were given. There were a lot. Now, two of these forms are completely filled out, all the pages filled out. ―The Foreman: That‘s correct. ―The Court: And dated today‘s date, signed by a foreperson, et cetera. Just listen carefully to me now. Were these filled out before we had our discussion? ―The Foreman: Yes, they were. ―The Court: Completely as they are now? ―The Foreman: Yes, they are [sic]. I had forgotten about that because we were in deliberation on the next one. ―The Court: Okay. Are these, in fact, verdicts that have been arrived at? 122 ―The Foreman: Yes, they are. ―The Court: Tentative, or final? ―The Foreman: They are final. ―The Court: Any doubt about that? ―The Foreman: None. ―The Court: I don‘t want to, you know, push you or sway you one way or the other. But what I see is two forms. ―The Foreman: That‘s correct. ―The Court: If they reflect verdicts, I need to — ―The Foreman: That‘s correct. ―The Court: — discuss that with counsel. ―The Foreman: Sorry. ―The Court: That‘s okay. So when you were talking about whatever it was that you mentioned 10 minutes or so ago, that had to do with forms that had not yet been filled out at all? ―The Foreman: That‘s correct. When you asked the question, all I remembered was that we were deliberating on another charge as far as the degree, and I had forgotten about that. ―The Court: And previously, as to that charge[,] that had not been written on at all, since all the [other] ones are blank? ―The Foreman: That‘s correct. ―The Court: All right. Folks, again, if you would just go back to the jury room and stand by a couple minutes, okay? Stand by.‖ The trial court solicited views on how to proceed. The prosecution suggested the court accept the verdicts, poll the jury, and then replace Number 77 and instruct the jury to begin deliberating anew on the remaining counts. Bryant‘s counsel argued the court should excuse Number 77, seat an alternate, and direct the jury to begin deliberations 123 anew on all counts. The other defense attorneys concurred. The trial court postponed its decision until defendants could be brought to court and consult with counsel. The court told the parties that the jury had found Bryant guilty of the first degree murders of Armstrong and Brown. The court directed that readback of testimony previously requested take place while defendants were being brought to court. At subsequent proceedings outside the jury‘s presence, all defendants continued to object to acceptance of the verdicts, on the grounds that having different juries rendering verdicts would ―disrupt[] the continuity of the process.‖ The trial court acknowledged that it apparently had the authority to allow the soon-to-be newly constituted jury to deliberate anew on all the charges,60 but decided not to do so. The court believed there was no requirement that the same 12 jurors render verdicts as to all defendants and charges, and therefore the court did not want to ―waste for no good reason . . . four days of jury deliberation, when they have arrived at verdicts on two counts and have dated and signed those verdicts including the finding as to degree before we ever spoke to them.‖ Bryant objected that the verdicts should not be accepted because Number 77 had been aware of his medical concerns since the previous evening, and therefore the verdicts that morning had been reached without ―the full attention of this juror who wants to be excused.‖ The court overruled the objection, noting that the juror actually had not asked to be excused from serving, but only for a recess, and there was no indication the jury ―came up with a couple of verdicts to get out of here.‖ 60 Smith‘s counsel had pointed to People v. Hernandez (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 645 as supporting that position. (See id. at p. 658 [stating that when a jury has reported it has reached verdicts on some counts but is deadlocked on others, an ―acceptable option available to the trial court is not to receive any verdicts on decided counts from the jury until they have finished deliberations on all counts,‖ which would permit the jury to reconsider the verdicts it had already reached].) Hernandez is distinguishable. There is no indication that the jury was deadlocked at this point. We need express no view on the reasoning of Hernandez. 124 After the jury returned, the court again questioned the foreman regarding the two verdicts: ―The Court: I am looking at forms again. There are two, as I indicated this morning, two verdict forms filled out as to one defendant, and my question is, once again, are these tentative, or are these final verdicts of this jury? ―The Foreman: They were final verdicts of this jury. ―The Court: Are they still final verdicts of this jury? ―The Foreman: Yes, they are. ―The Court: And they were filled out prior to our meetings this morning, I take it, is that what you‘re saying? ―The Foreman: That is correct.‖ The court then explained that it would be accepting the verdicts and polling the jurors, meaning they would be ―asked in turn for the record . . . if these are, in fact, your verdicts.‖ The clerk then read the verdicts and the jury was asked collectively if these were the jury‘s verdicts. There was group assent. Each juror was then individually asked whether the verdicts were ―your verdicts.‖ Each juror confirmed that they were. The trial court thereafter directed the clerk to record the verdicts, excused Number 77, and seated an alternate juror. Finally, the court instructed the jury with a modified version of CALJIC No. 17.51: ―Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, one of your numbers has been excused for legal cause and replaced with an alternate juror. You must not consider that fact for any purpose. The People and the defendants have the right to a verdict reached only after full participation of the 12 jurors who returned the verdicts. This right may be assured only if you begin your deliberations again from the beginning. You must, therefore, set aside and disregard all past deliberations and tentative conclusions and begin deliberating anew as to the remaining charges. This means that each remaining original juror must set aside and disregard the earlier deliberations as if they had not taken place. You will now retire to begin anew your deliberations in accordance with all 125 the instructions previously given.‖ After the court confirmed that the jurors understood the instruction, it directed them to resume deliberating. One week later, another juror was replaced by an alternate due to a family medical emergency. In response to the court‘s inquiry, the foreman reported the jury had not as yet reached any other verdicts. The court again instructed the jury to begin anew their deliberations on the remaining counts. 2. Discussion The record repudiates Bryant‘s claim that the jury‘s verdicts were not final. He emphasizes that the trial court initially asked whether the jury had reached any verdicts, rather than the jury giving such notification. From this, he argues, it is possible that the jurors might not have intended to render final verdicts, and they did not comprehend the irrevocability of the verdicts once the court accepted them. Bryant cites no authority for the proposition that the court‘s questions improperly interfered with deliberations. The applicable statutes, sections 1147 and 1149, do not explicitly preclude the court‘s action.61 We stated in analogous circumstances that a court may inquire whether a deadlocked jury has reached any verdict eliminating a charged offense. (Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 519-520.) 61 Section 1147 provides: ―When the jury have agreed upon their verdict, they must be conducted into court by the officer having them in charge. Their names must then be called, and if all do not appear, the rest must be discharged without giving a verdict. In that case the action may be again tried.‖ Section 1149 provides: ―When the jury appear they must be asked by the Court, or Clerk, whether they have agreed upon their verdict, and if the foreman answers in the affirmative, they must, on being required, declare the same.‖ Neither provision delineates how, in the first instance, the court is to determine that the jury has ―agreed upon their verdict,‖ i.e., by waiting for the jury to say so, or by appropriate inquiry. 126 Bryant merely speculates that a juror might not have intended and appreciated the finality of the verdicts. The record demonstrates otherwise. The verdict forms for these two charges had been completely filled out, signed by the foreman and dated, and the jury had moved on to other charges involving a separate set of victims. In open court with all jurors present, the foreman unequivocally and repeatedly described these verdicts as final. He confirmed they had been reached before the court‘s initial inquiry. After the formal reading of the verdicts the jurors collectively and individually affirmed the verdicts. Nothing supports the notion that these verdicts did not constitute the jury‘s conclusive decisions as to those counts. Bryant‘s claim that the verdicts should not have been accepted because Number 77‘s medical problems rendered him unable to participate in the deliberations equally lacks support in the record. Contrary to Bryant‘s position, the trial court‘s finding of good cause to excuse Number 77 was not a determination that the juror had been or at that time was unable to perform his duties, but rather an acknowledgement that his continued service would have been an unacceptable hardship. Section 1089 provides in relevant part: ―If at any time, whether before or after the final submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or her duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears therefor, the court may order the juror to be discharged and draw the name of an alternate, who shall then take a place in the jury box, and be subject to the same rules and regulations as though the alternate juror had been selected as one of the original jurors.‖ In Lomax, supra, 49 Cal.4th at page 590, we repeated the rule that excusal of a juror during deliberations must be ― ‗manifestly supported by evidence on which the court actually relied.‘ ‖ These standards were satisfied. As to Number 77‘s ability to deliberate, his discussion with the court that morning clearly showed he was coherent and able to communicate. Although he told the court his knees would become painful ―after a full day,‖ and his blood pressure was elevated, there simply is no indication that these 127 problems precluded his meaningful participation in deliberations during the previous four days or that morning. During polling, Number 77 confirmed the verdicts as read were his own. Finally, defendants point to our statements in People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 693-694 that because a defendant‘s constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict ―is not met unless [the 12 jurors] reach their consensus through deliberations which are the common experience of all of them,‖ ―a proper construction of section 1089 requires that deliberations begin anew when a substitution is made after final submission to the jury.‖ They contend that accepting some guilty verdicts by one jury and others by a jury reconstituted with an alternate denied them unanimous verdicts on the later verdicts.62 This is so, they assert, because the existence of the prior guilty verdicts would preclude truly new and independent deliberations on the remaining charges. To the contrary, the requirements of section 1089 and Collins were satisfied. The procedures followed did not preclude new deliberations and unanimous verdicts by the reconstituted jury. Section 1089 explicitly permits the substitution of jurors after deliberations have begun: the substitution can be made ―any time, whether before or after the final submission of the case to the jury.‖ Long ago in People v. Rigney (1961) 55 Cal.2d 236, we approved the taking of partial verdicts in the general sense. ―There is no reason why the court should not have the jury‘s verdicts on each count returned separately.‖ (Id. at p. 246.) We have not directly resolved whether a court may accept partial verdicts, then excuse an original juror for good cause and permit a reconstituted jury to continue deliberations.63 62 Defendants present no argument that the record demonstrates the two reconstituted juries actually did not begin the deliberations anew on the remaining counts. 63 In People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1100-1101, we declined to address the merits of this issue because the defendant in that case had forfeited the claim. In People (footnote continued on next page) 128 Defendants note that other courts have expressed doubt regarding the ability of a reconstituted jury to set aside the deliberations and findings underlying already-recorded verdicts. For instance, in State v. Corsaro (N.J. 1987) 526 A.2d 1046, 1054, the court stated its view that ―where the deliberative process has progressed for such a length of time or to such a degree that it is strongly inferable that the jury has made actual factfindings or reached determinations of guilt or innocence, the new juror is likely to be confronted with closed or closing minds. In such a situation, it is unlikely that the new juror will have a fair opportunity to express his or her views and to persuade others. Similarly, the new juror may not have a realistic opportunity to understand and share completely in the deliberations that brought the other jurors to particular determinations, and may be forced to accept findings of fact upon which he or she has not fully deliberated.‖ Defendants also rely on the dissenting opinion in People v. Aikens (1988) 207 Cal.App.3d 209, which articulated a perceived distinction between the circumstances of a reconstituted jury asked to set aside prior unfinished deliberations as opposed to completed determinations. (Id. at p. 220 (dis. opn. of Johnson, J.).) Some states, by statute or rule, prohibit any substitution of jurors after the case has been submitted to them. (See, e.g., Cantrell v. State (Ark. 1979) 577 S.W.2d 605, 266; Claudio v. State (Del. 1991) 585 A.2d 1278, 1301; People v. Roberts (Ill. 2005) 824 N.E.2d 250, 258; Crossland v. Com. (Ky. 2009) 291 S.W.3d 223, 230.) We do not share the Corsaro court‘s pessimism regarding the capabilities of jurors. As we have consistently stated in numerous contexts we generally presume that (footnote continued from previous page) v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 351, we rejected a suggested routine procedure of substituting jurors at the conclusion of the guilt phase of capital trials, based on a concern that the penalty phase verdict might not result from deliberations that are the ― ‗common experience‘ ‖ of all the jurors. 129 jurors are capable of following, and do follow, the trial court‘s instructions. We have specifically applied this presumption to an instruction for a reconstituted jury to begin its deliberations anew. (Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 716.) For decades we have presumed that jurors follow a court‘s general instructions to consider each offense and defendant separately, ―as if it were the only accusation before them.‖ (People v. Kemp (1961) 55 Cal.2d 458, 477; People v. Dabb (1948) 32 Cal.2d 491, 499; see also CALJIC No. 17.00 and CALCRIM No. 203, CALJIC No. 17.02 and CALCRIM No. 3515.) The circumstances of a reconstituted jury‘s consideration of the remaining charges after the rendering of partial verdicts are not so different that the usual presumption should not apply. Several jurisdictions, including the federal courts, that had historically prohibited all substitutions of jurors after the start of deliberations, have now revised their statutes or rules to permit this practice. (See, e.g., Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., rule 24(c)(3), as amended Apr. 29, 1999, 28 U.S.C.; Conn. Gen. Stats. § 54-82h, subd. (c), as amended May 26, 2000; N.H. Rev. Stat. § 500-A:13, subd. V, as amended Aug. 14, 1993.) These changes reflect a developing confidence in the ability of jurors to follow a court‘s instructions to begin deliberations anew. Furthermore, this record reflects the jury did, indeed, deliberate anew. After Number 77 was excused, the jury met for more than three court days without reaching any other verdicts. Then there was another substitution. Immediately after the second substitution, a juror asked the court whether beginning deliberations anew required that the jury also rehear all previous readback, stating that he did not know ―whether that should be a consideration or not. Everything else, usually a new juror comes in we start 130 from scratch.‖64 The record shows the taking of partial verdicts in this case did not violate defendants‘ right to have the jury reach unanimous verdicts. L. Denial of Motion to Direct the Jury to Reopen Deliberations Defendants contend the court should have instructed the jury to reopen its deliberations after the verdicts against them had already been recorded. We will assume the issue is preserved as to Bryant and Wheeler despite their failure to explicitly join in Smith‘s motion. The court did not err. After the court had accepted and recorded verdicts as to all the counts against defendants here, the jury continued deliberating on the charges against codefendant Settle. The jury reported after a week of deliberations and several ballots that it was deadlocked 11 to one and could not reach any verdicts. The trial court asked the foreman whether there was ―anything that you personally can think of that . . . would assist the jury in ending the deadlock as to any count or counts,‖ such as ―further clarification of the law, [or] further [readback] of the testimony of any witness?‖ The foreman did not believe so, because in his view it was ―a matter of conviction on the part of the juror.‖ Another juror suggested clarification of the difference between proof beyond a reasonable doubt and beyond all possible doubt. The foreman then suggested clarification of ―the definition of an accomplice.‖ A third juror suggested further instruction on ―the full aspect of the corroboration of an accomplice and what that entails.‖ The court asked the jurors to return to the jury room and write out any questions so the court would not be explaining to the jurors ―things that you may not need.‖ 64 The court explained that it was up to the jury whether to request a readback, directing the jurors to ―go forward and begin new deliberations on those remaining counts.‖ Before reaching any subsequent verdicts, the jury received requested readback of several witnesses‘ testimony. 131 The jury sent the court several written questions, three of which concerned aiding and abetting and accomplices. 65 One question asked, ―If one is charged with the same crime, but not brought to trial, is he automatically an accomplice?‖ Another asked whether there can be ―aiding and abetting after the crime was committed?‖ The final question asked whether, as to the corroboration requirement for accomplice testimony, ―Doesn‘t this constitute reasonable doubt if there is no corroboration of same in your mind?‖ Smith expressed concern about the jury‘s ―apparent failure to understand the law of accomplice and corroboration.‖ The court recessed for the evening to consider how to respond to the questions. The next morning outside the presence of the jury, Smith asked the court to ―resubmit counts 1 to 5 to the jury for reconsideration in light of . . . the tenor of [the] questions [suggesting] a misunderstanding of the law by the jury.‖ The court denied the motion. The court then answered the jury‘s questions. It explained that a person who does not aid and abet a principal before the crime is committed is not an accomplice. A juror asked whether the court ―would . . . be interested in suggesting what [a person who assisted a principal only after the crime was completed] would be guilty of?‖ The court declined to give an answer, explaining that this ―would not be of any assistance to this jury.‖ A juror asked whether the jury ―has the final decision as to whether or not they consider someone to be an accomplice or an accessory?‖ The court explained that none of its instructions had referred to the term ―accessory,‖ and that was not an issue that the jury needed to decide. The court reiterated that it was up to the jurors to determine whether a witness was an accomplice. Another juror sought to clarify again that the corroboration requirement ―goes beyond reasonable doubt.‖ The court reiterated that this 65 The other questions were about the jury‘s consideration of inconsistent witness statements, its assessment of witness credibility, and the concept of reasonable doubt. 132 was a distinct rule of law. Finally, a third juror asked whether the accomplice determination required unanimity. The court explained that the jurors need not agree on whether a witness was an accomplice, but must be unanimous in the ultimate finding of whether the defendant‘s guilt had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.66 Outside the presence of the jury, Smith asserted that the jurors‘ in-court questions made it ―painfully clear‖ that the jury did not understand the law regarding accomplices, and ―perhaps did not understand it previously‖ when it rendered the verdicts as to defendants. He renewed his section 1161 motion to have the jury reconsider its verdicts ―based on misunderstanding of — apparent misunderstanding of that law.‖ The court denied the motion because it ―did not see a misunderstanding.‖ In the court‘s view, the questions indicated one juror was having difficulty determining whether there was sufficient corroboration of Williams‘s testimony incriminating Settle. The court stated, ―that in no way exists with any verdict [in Smith‘s] case, and does not evidence a confusion as to the law regarding accomplices whatsoever [so] as to render a verdict against your client mildly suspect.‖ Defendants‘ reliance on section 1161 is misplaced. The statute provides: ―When there is a verdict of conviction, in which it appears to the Court that the jury have mistaken the law, the Court may explain the reason for that opinion and direct the jury to reconsider their verdict, and if, after the reconsideration, they return the same verdict, it must be entered; but when there is a verdict of acquittal, the Court cannot require the jury to reconsider it. If the jury render a verdict which is neither general nor special, the Court may direct them to reconsider it, and it cannot be recorded until it is rendered in some form from which it can be clearly understood that the intent of the jury is either to render 66 As mentioned above, the jury ultimately was unable to reach verdicts as to codefendant Settle. 133 a general verdict or to find the facts specially and to leave the judgment to the Court.‖ (§ 1161.) Notably, this provision for reconsideration precedes the statutes regulating jury polling (§ 1163) and verdict recordation (§ 1164). By its own terms, section 1161 reflects an expectation that the trial court‘s actions would occur before the verdict is ―entered‖ or ―recorded.‖ As we recently stated in People v. Carbajal (2013) 56 Cal.4th 521, 531, the statutes create a ―mechanical, prescriptive . . . process for eliciting and receiving a jury verdict.‖ Section 1161 simply does not speak to a situation where verdicts have been formally entered and recorded, as in this case. Defendants cite no case in which a court has invoked section 1161 to direct reconsideration of recorded verdicts. The cases addressing section 1161, in fact, point to a second related flaw in the theory that the trial court had authority to direct reconsideration. It appears the relevant portion of section 1161 was meant to address errors made manifest by the verdict itself. Specifically, the statute refers to a verdict of conviction ―in which‖ there appears to have been a mistake of law on the jury‘s part. (§ 1161.) In People v. Bonillas (1989) 48 Cal.3d 757, at pages 769-770, we listed a number of instances when section 1161 had been properly applied. Each involved incomplete or inconsistent verdicts that rendered the jury‘s findings unintelligible. The problems were evident from examining the verdicts themselves. Here, defendants assert not that the verdicts were ambiguous because they were unfinished or conflicting, but that later events supposedly undermined confidence that the jury properly understood the law in rendering them. There is no authority reflecting that section 1161 was intended to reach such circumstances. To the contrary, Evidence Code section 1150 prohibits challenging the validity of a jury‘s verdict based on evidence ―concerning the mental processes by which it was determined.‖ 134