Opinion ID: 867532
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Anderson and Hunter analysis

Text: ¶ 19 Casey relies on Anderson v. Territory, 9 Ariz. 50, 76 P. 636 (1904), a murder case, as authority for the proposition that due process requires the state to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. But Anderson predates the Arizona Constitution and interpreted now repealed provisions of Arizona's Penal Code that allocated the burden of proof. In that case, the jury was instructed, in accordance with Penal Code 1901, § 933, that if the act was unlawful, the law presumed the criminal intent and the defendant was required to prove a justification defense. The court was troubled by the potential for conflict between the element of malice and the defendant's claim that he had acted in self-defense, just as the dissenters in Martin were. See Anderson, 9 Ariz. at 56, 76 P. at 638 (Malice is as much an essential element in the crime of homicide as is the killing.). But the court in Anderson did not decide the case on constitutional grounds and specifically limited its holding to one of statutory construction, stating: It seems ... more reasonable to hold that the statute means.... 9 Ariz. at 55, 76 P. at 638. See also Rosser v. State, 45 Ariz. 264, 267, 42 P.2d 613, 614 (1935) (instruction reflecting § 933 did not improperly place[] the burden upon defendant to prove self-defense). Accordingly, Anderson held that the statute, rather than the due process clause of Arizona's Constitution, required the state disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 20 Casey also relies on State v. Hunter, 142 Ariz. 88, 688 P.2d 980 (1984), another murder case. The court there found that the trial court had committed fundamental error by instructing the jury: If you decide the defendant's conduct was justified, you must find the defendant not guilty. Id. at 89-90, 688 P.2d at 981-82. Despite the fact that Winship had been decided fourteen years earlier, Hunter did not mention it or its constitutional underpinnings. As this court later commented: Hunter does not mention any constitutional provision and is remarkable for its silence on the question of whether the fundamental error had its origins in the constitution.... However, Hunter does not involve the state's due process obligation to prove the elements of the crime but, rather, the burden-shifting of the state's obligation to prove the absence of justification for defendant's actions. State v. Slemmer, 170 Ariz. 174 n. 8, 823 P.2d 41 n. 8 (1991). ¶ 21 Hunter relied on two authorities for the proposition that the state must prove every element of the crime, including disproving self-defense, beyond a reasonable doubt. One authority was section 13-115(A), the statute which establishes the requirement for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Invoking the statute does not implicate the due process clause. ¶ 22 The second authority was Everett v. State, 88 Ariz. 293, 356 P.2d 394 (1960). Everett was an assault case interpreting a then existing assault statute mentioned previously, section 13-246, which stated, in relevant part: Violence used to the person does not amount to assault or battery in ... self-defense, or defense of another against unlawful violence to his person or property. Everett, 88 Ariz. at 296, 356 P.2d at 396. Accordingly, the Everett court concluded, as a matter of statutory construction, that the statute made lack of self-defense an element of the crime. Again, in this decision the court did not invoke the due process clause to justify its result. ¶ 23 Finally, the current assault statutes are completely different from those considered in Everett and do not make lack of self-defense an element of the crime. See, e.g., § 13-1204. In fact, section 13-205 specifically states that self-defense is an affirmative defense. Therefore, even if Everett had established that lack of self-defense was an element of the crime under the former statute, it has no application to the current statute. Accordingly, neither the holding nor the rationale of Hunter compels a finding that section 13-205 is unconstitutional. ¶ 24 Our decision in State v. Cannon, 157 Ariz. 107, 755 P.2d 412 (1988), further supports our conclusion. In Cannon, although we refused to overturn Hunter based on Martin as the state had urged, again we did not indicate that the requirement that self-defense be disproved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt was constitutionally based. In discussing the state's argument that, by removing the word unlawful from the definition of assault and murder in revisions to the new criminal code, the legislature had intended to relieve the state of its burden to disprove self-defense, we stated: This argument, while clever, is unconvincing. First, the legislature gave no express indication of such an intent, nor, if the burden was to be shifted to the defendant, what the burden was to be. When it does so intend, as in the case of the insanity defense, ... it has made its intent and the nature of the burden clear. Second, the method by which the state seeks to infer an intent depends upon a body of constitutional law that did not exist at the time the criminal code was being drafted by a special commission or first passed by the legislature. Third, when a change is to be made of a principle of law that has existed since territorial days, we require that legislative intent be clear and not inferred from a labored analysis as likely to mask legislative intent as to explicate it. Finally, the fact that the purported legislative intent was not discovered by the state for over ten years is a fair indication it never existed. Cannon, 157 Ariz. at 108, 755 P.2d at 413 (citation omitted). If the requirement that the state disprove self-defense were constitutionally based, legislative intent would have been immaterial. And the legislature has now given an express indication of its intent and has specified the burden. Further, the legislature has acted pursuant to a body of constitutional law allowing the change. Finally, the legislature's intent was discovered as soon as section 13-205 was enacted. The legislature has therefore fulfilled the requirements set forth in Cannon.