Opinion ID: 60808
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Brought on Hartford’s Behalf

Text: On its own behalf, Hartford claims that (1) Schneider provided a false statement (the fax to Roberts); (2) Hartford relied on the statement in its decision to issue the bond; and (3) the issuance of the bond allowed Schneider to receive his contingency fee relating to the personal injury action. Based on those allegations, Hartford argues that it should prevail on the following substantive theories: negligent misrepresentation, professional negligence, breach of contract and promissory estoppel. Hartford’s arguments, however, are meritless. 1. Negligent Misrepresentation and Professional Negligence We agree with the district court that Hartford has offered no evidence to establish that Schneider’s alleged negligence was the proximate cause of Hartford’s damages. There is no evidence that Schneider knew of Dize’s poor investments or that Schneider’s failure to advise Dize in the probate process resulted in poor investment choices. As the district court recognized, the only 5 evidence of causation that Hartford has offered is the speculation as to what Hartford might have done to protect the funds in Morgan’s estate if Schneider had known of Dize’s misconduct and reported it. That evidence, however, does not sufficiently connect Schneider’s alleged negligence to Hartford’s loss. Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriate on the negligent misrepresentation and professional negligence claims that Hartford brought on its own behalf. 2. Breach of Contract We also agree with the district court that no valid contract existed between Schneider and Hartford. Under Georgia law, a contract without consideration is invalid. O.C.G.A. § 13-3-40. Hartford has offered no evidence that Schneider received any consideration for his agreement to assist Dize in the probate process. Accordingly, no contract existed between Hartford and Schneider, and the district court correctly entered summary judgment in Schneider’s favor on this issue. 3. Promissory Estoppel Finally, we agree with the district court as to Hartford’s promissory estoppel claim as well. Under Georgia law, a plaintiff claiming promissory estoppel must establish that (1) the defendant made a promise; (2) the defendant should have reasonably expected the plaintiff to rely on the promise; (3) the plaintiff relied on 6 the promise to its detriment; and (4) an injustice can only be avoided by the enforcement of the promise. Rental Equip. Group v. MACI, 587 S.E.2d 364, 367 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). The reliance, however, must be reasonable. Gilmour v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 385 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). The Georgia Court of Appeals, moreover, has declared that “it defies logic to suggest that the intended obligee could reasonably rely on a promise to be bound without any compensation to the promisor.” Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. West Point Constr. Co., 344 S.E.2d 268, 270 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). Hartford has offered no evidence that it gave Schneider any compensation for any promise. Accordingly, any reliance on a promise from Schneider was unreasonable as a matter of law, and Hartford’s promissory estoppel argument fails.