Opinion ID: 3065405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Balancing of Equitable Criteria

Text: By necessity, the granting of injunctive relief requires adjustment of the parties’ rights without full adjudication of the facts. Yet here we benefit from the ALJ having created a substantial factual record to overlay against “the requirements of equity practice.” Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). When “determining whether interim relief under 10(j) is ‘just and proper,’ district courts should consider traditional equitable criteria . . . through the prism of the underlying purpose of § 10(j), which is to protect the integrity of the collective bargaining process and to preserve the Board’s remedial power while it processes the charge.” Miller, 19 F.3d at 45960. In Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court clarified the traditional equitable criteria, explaining a party seeking a preliminary injunction “must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008).5 5 In doing so it rejected our previous standard allowing injunctive relief on a showing of a “possibility” of irreparable injury. E.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 677 (9th Cir. 2008). I follow the majority in assuming without deciding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter alters our previous statements in Miller of the showing a party must make to obtain injunctive relief under section 10(j). I also see no reason why Winter disturbs our other statements in Miller instructing courts to consider the traditional equitable criteria against the backdrop of section 10(j)’s purpose. MCDERMOTT v. AMPERSAND PUBLISHING 1485 Rejecting Overstreet’s applicability in this case, I would find the district court abused its discretion in denying the injunction. Though the district court was conscientious in its analysis, finding the Director unlikely to prevail on the merits was grounded in the erroneous legal premise that employees’ attempts to negotiate aspects of the editorial process strip them of the NLRA’s protection. With the proper protection and deference to the Board in place, the ALJ’s findings show a clear likelihood of success on the merits, and the other equitable factors are met as well. When concluding Overstreet’s standard of review does not apply, courts view the Director’s probability of prevailing “in light of the fact that ultimately, the Board’s determination on the merits will be given considerable deference.” Miller, 19 F.3d at 460. Here, the ALJ’s extensive factual findings detail a variety of unfair labor practices orchestrated by the NewsPress and include reasonable findings that key testimony offered on the News-Press’s behalf was not credible and the justifications advanced for its actions were in large part pretextual. Under the facts here there are multiple irreparable injuries due to the terminations and subsequent rejection of the injunction. “To permit illegal employer conduct to go unaddressed while the Board’s corrective machinery grinds toward resolution would subvert the underlying purposes of section 10(j) and allow those who commit unfair labor practices to reap the benefits of that conduct.” Scott ex rel. NLRB v. Stephen Dunn & Assocs., 241 F.3d 652, 660 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, unlawful, unremedied discharges create adverse impacts on employees’ interests in union organizing, and the union’s ability to bargain irreparably deteriorates as this situation is allowed to continue. See Pye ex rel. NLRB v. Excel Case Ready, 238 F.3d 69, 74-75 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[T]he discharge of active and open union supporters . . . risks a serious adverse impact on employee interest in unionization and can create irreparable harm to the collective bargaining process.”) (internal quota1486 MCDERMOTT v. AMPERSAND PUBLISHING tion marks omitted); Electro-Voice, Inc., 83 F.3d at 1573 (“As time passes the likelihood of union formation diminishes, and the likelihood that the employees will be irreparably deprived of union representation increases.”). An unlawful discharge also causes the irreparable harm of removing union supporters from the workplace at the time when the union is in most need of support. See Electro-Voice, Inc., 83 F.3d at 1573. Here, the longer the complaint sits with the Board without action, the weaker the union appears to remaining employees and the less energy exists in support of unionization, injuries that are immeasurable and irreparable. The balance of hardships and the public interest also tip in favor of “ensur[ing] that an unfair labor practice will not succeed” because “declining to issue the injunction will permit the allegedly unfair labor practice to reach fruition and thereby render meaningless the Board’s remedial authority.” Miller, 19 F.3d at 460. The majority puts significant emphasis on the Board’s delay in filing an injunction, citing the passage of time as the only factor supporting its conclusion that denial of the injunction resulted in no irreparable harm. Maj. Op. 1473. Yet the majority’s entire discussion of the Board’s delay (and thus its entire discussion of irreparable harm) cites only one case, and in that case this court actually rejected the argument the majority recycles regarding the importance of the Board’s delay in filing the injunction. In Aguayo ex rel. NLRB v. Tomco Carburetor Co., 853 F.2d 744, 750 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Miller, 19 F.3d at 455-56, we dismissed an argument made pursuant to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., which, like the majority, found Board delay critical to denying an injunction, see 515 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir. 1975). We noted the delay argument was “not persuasive,” stating “[d]elay by itself is not a determinative MCDERMOTT v. AMPERSAND PUBLISHING 1487 factor in whether the grant of interim relief is just and proper.” Aguayo, 853 F.2d at 750. Yet the majority references Aguayo and then proceeds to reason from the premise Aguayo rejected, claiming the Board’s delay is so important here that it constitutes the entire irreparable harm analysis. Perhaps the majority cites no cases for this proposition because we have specifically rejected the reasoning underlying an approach attaching such importance to Board delay. We have previously noted that the view Boire and the majority advance “actually hinders rather than protects the collective bargaining process” because “ ‘the underlying purposes of section 10(j) are to protect the integrity of the collective bargaining process and to preserve the [Board]’s remedial power while the Board resolves the unfair labor practice charge.’ ” Scott, 241 F.3d at 660 (quoting Miller, 19 F.3d at 452). Other circuits, though recognizing the troublesome consequences of the Board’s delay in filing an injunction, have agreed, distinguishing Boire and declining to attach dispositive weight to Board delay. See, e.g., Muffley v. Spartan Mining Co., 570 F.3d 534, 544-45 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting the troubling nature of the Board’s 18-month delay in seeking an injunction, but finding the balance of harms, the likelihood of success on the merits, and the “strong public policy” favoring injunctive relief, supported an injunction); see also Levine v. C & W Mining Co., 610 F.2d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 1979) (noting approaches contrary to Boire are “more in accord with the purposes of the Act”).6 6 Significant delay in the 10(j) process is not unique to this case and is, in fact, a common criticism leveled at the Board. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems With its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 Duke L.J. 2013, 2028 (2009) (“One criticism frequently leveled at the NLRA is that the relative mildness of the remedies (reinstatement plus back pay) and the slowness of the administrative process (it can take years 1488 MCDERMOTT v. AMPERSAND PUBLISHING Though these cases show no excuse necessary, two related facts serve to justify the Board’s delay in this case. Generally, the Board argues it was waiting for the ALJ to develop the administrative record to prevent the district court and the ALJ from simultaneous review. This efficiency justification could in some instances be sufficient to justify delay. See Hirsch v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 147 F.3d 243, 248-49 (3d Cir. 1998). In addition, the Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a case to resolve whether adjudicative decisions made by only two of the NLRB’s five members are valid. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009) (No. 081457). Though the question in New Process Steel does not implicate the Board’s authority here in its prosecutorial role, see Muffley, 570 F.3d at 540, the uncertain legal status of the NLRB, as the Supreme Court has recognized, provides further, reasonable justification for delays in decision making. This justification is particularly salient because, here, the delay in filing the section 10(j) injunction, after the ALJ’s decision, occurred precisely when the cases questioning the Board’s ability to act without a quorum were moving through the NLRB and subsequently the courts of appeal. See, e.g., Laurel Baye Healthcare, LLC, 352 NLRB 179 (2008) (decided one week before injunction was filed in present case). Despite the passage of time, the union’s negotiations for its initial collective bargaining agreement with the News-Press are ongoing and the union’s position has been weakened by the absence of the key union-supporting employees who were discharged and by the remaining employees’ fears stemming from the filing of a complaint by an aggrieved employee to the issuance of an enforceable order) creates a huge incentive for employers to deliberately violate the statute knowing that they will reap the benefit of illegal conduct for a long time, if not permanently in the case of a successful defeat of an organizing campaign.”). MCDERMOTT v. AMPERSAND PUBLISHING 1489 from those discharges. Continued delay may cause the discharged employees to find other work, denying the union of the benefits of their active support and accumulated experience, and the passage of time thus does not obviate the need for injunctive relief. Nor does this subversion of the NLRA benefit the public interest. The majority also glosses over a significant district court error, conceding they “are not entirely confident that the district court gave appropriate weight to the rights of the discharged employees.” Maj. Op. at 1474. I agree. The district court erred in its acceptance of the News Press’s alleged harm relating to the replacement workers it has hired because “the predominant focus under section 10(j) is the harm to the bargaining process,” and the “rights of the employees who were discriminatorily discharged are superior to the rights of those whom the employer hired to take their places.” Aguayo, 853 F.2d at 750. In emphasizing the Board’s delay in seeking the injunction, rehashing its First Amendment arguments, and explaining away the district court’s misunderstanding of important precedent, Maj. Op. 1473-75, the majority neglects discussion of the irreparable harms that exist regardless of any delay: rights of wrongfully discharged employees, id. at 750, the firings’ damage to the organizing drive, Scott, 241 F.3d at 660, and potential weakening of the Board’s remedial authority, id., all of which are also relevant to the balance of the equities and the public interest. Finally, in evaluating the fired employees’ petition, the district court assumed the correctness of the ALJ’s thorough findings, reasoning that it “lack[ed] a basis to conclude” that “animus toward the Union and its demands was not the motive for the [News-Press’s] actions.” The majority also finds no basis, because one does not exist, for questioning these serious determinations that employees seeking to form a union were fired only after union organizing began. 1490 MCDERMOTT v. AMPERSAND PUBLISHING In short, the majority applied the incorrect legal standard, leading it to the incorrect result. “Instead of offering a credible explanation for its actions, the [News-Press] relied on a pretextual justification and contended that the First Amendment served as a shield that prevented the Board from challenging the decision and inquiring into its motives.” Passaic, 736 F.2d at 1553. Because the majority begins by accepting the notion that who a newspaper employs necessarily determines its content, it finds the News-Press exempt from the labor laws other employers must follow. Instead, I would recognize the scope of the injunction is limited to reinstatement only, and under the injunction the News-Press would still be able to publish its paper as it sees fit. In failing to make this distinction, the district court applied the incorrect standard and analysis, abusing its discretion. I would reverse and direct the district court to issue and enforce the injunction sought by the NLRB.