Opinion ID: 1278599
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Auditor's Power to Comply With the Trial Court's Orders

Text: (8) Titsworth was apparently advised by county counsel that he could not disburse funds to cover court-ordered services unless there existed sufficient allocated monies in an appropriate account in the county budget. Reasoning that disbursement in excess of appropriated funds is prohibited and would subject him to personal liability (Gov. Code, §§ 29120, 29121), [17] and reasoning that only the county board of supervisors has the authority to appropriate funds or order a sufficient transfer from contingency funds ( id., § 29130) [18]  but had expressly refused to do so in this case  Titsworth apparently believed the court's order could not legally be paid ( id., § 29125). [19] As we shall explain, Titsworth's position ignores provisions of the Government Code that allow the auditor, on his own, to issue a warrant to cover the services ordered in this case. Furthermore, his argument is premised on an erroneous view of both the auditor's and the board of supervisors' role with respect to court-ordered defense services. As previously observed, both the statutes and the constitutional right to effective counsel authorize the court to appoint experts and order other defense services. In all such cases the court-ordered services are expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged with or convicted of crime and committed to the county jail ... and for other services in relation to criminal proceedings for which no specific compensation is prescribed by law. ... (Gov. Code, § 29602, italics added.) Expenses under Government Code section 29602 are county charges that shall be paid by the county auditor without regard to the existence of a specific appropriation to the same extent that the county board of supervisors may do so. (Gov. Code, § 29741, subd. (d).) [20] This raises the question of what role the board of supervisors, and hence the auditor, may play in regard to court-ordered defense services. Titsworth asserts that the separation of powers doctrine (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3) precludes a court order that might intrude into the county's power to weigh the best financial interests of the county against [the benefit to the defendant from] payments for ancillary defense services. However, although the separation of powers doctrine may preclude the court from directly ordering the board of supervisors to appropriate funds (cf. Mandel v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 531, 539 [174 Cal. Rptr. 841, 629 P.2d 935], and cases cited holding a court may not compel the Legislature to appropriate funds), the doctrine is of no assistance to Titsworth. The above-cited provisions of the Government Code demonstrate that the Legislature has itself imposed on both the auditor and the local legislative body  the board of supervisors  the duty to pay court-ordered county charges. The court transgresses no constitutional barrier when it orders a county auditor to proceed in accordance with those statutory provisions. Indeed, to accept Titsworth's view would result in violating the very constitutional principle he purports to champion. Pursuant to the separation of powers doctrine the trial court alone has authority to determine  in camera  whether reasonable need for defense services has been shown, and the county is powerless to review confidential defense requests or to modify or veto that determination. (Cf. Ex parte Widber (1891) 91 Cal. 367, 370 [27 P. 733] [The act of the board of supervisors in auditing such demands would be an idle thing, purely pro forma; for it would have no authority to reduce or increase the amount of the demand as certified by the judge]; Mandel, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 547 [Our Constitution assigns the resolution of such specific controversies to the judicial branch of government (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 1) and provides the Legislature with no authority to set itself above the judiciary by discarding the outcome or readjudicating the merits of particular judicial proceedings].) Although the county is free to challenge court orders in the courts, [21] it is impotent to review and reject such orders on its own. To hold otherwise would be to encourage and facilitate local government intrusion into exclusive powers of the judiciary. As stated above, it is solely a judicial question whether a given defendant shall be afforded requested defense services. Moreover, it is no answer to suggest, as does Titsworth, that if court-ordered defense services are not forthcoming the court can simply dismiss the charges; that solution would not only intrude into the court's power to require services authorized by statute and compelled by the constitutional right to effective counsel, it would also effectively vest the auditor and the board of supervisors with power to compel dismissal of a criminal case by unilateral veto of court-ordered defense services in that case. Under no theory would that serve the public interest. For similar reasons we reject Titsworth's contention that he lacked authority to disburse funds in excess of specific budget appropriations therefor, or that mandated compliance with such orders would violate the separation of powers doctrine. The cited statutes that prohibit disbursement in excess of appropriations expressly except their application to situations otherwise provided by law. As we have explained above, Government Code section 29741, subdivision (d), together with Government Code section 29602, otherwise provide. First, we note that Government Code section 29741, subdivision (d), contains no limitation on the auditor's authority to act independently of the board. (Fn. 20, ante. ) Moreover, we observe that Government Code section 29122 provides in relevant part: The board shall approve no claim and the auditor shall issue no warrant for any expenditure in excess of the budget appropriation therefor, except upon an order of a court of competent jurisdiction, for an emergency, or as otherwise provided by law. As we have explained above, neither the board of supervisors nor the auditor has authority to approve or disapprove court-ordered defense services. As section 29122 makes clear, a county auditor may not decline to disburse funds ordered by the county superior court to cover ordered services merely because such disbursement would be in excess of the budget appropriation therefor. Indeed, even if there is no specific appropriation to cover such orders, section 29122 authorizes the county auditor to immediately issue warrants against any appropriate budget fund  including the county general fund. Finally, compliance with the court order in this case  even if it requires disbursal of funds in excess of specific appropriations  does not violate, but sustains, the separation of powers doctrine. The right to such funds is established by statute and compelled by the Constitution; disbursal in such situations is authorized by statute. Again, a court transgresses no constitutional barrier when it orders a county auditor to proceed under the statutes. We thus must conclude that Titsworth possessed the power and the duty to comply with the court's order. (2b) Now that his role has been explicated, we have no reason to believe the county auditor will again fail to comply with such an order; we therefore deny Corenevsky's petition for a writ of mandate directing dismissal in L.A. 31723.