Opinion ID: 2099262
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the safe place statute

Text: ¶ 26 In addition, Fox argues that the OSHA regulations in force pursuant to Wis. Admin. Code §§ Comm 32.15 and 32.50 and pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 101.055(3)(a) [18] articulate the standard under the safe place statute, Wis. Stat. § 101.11. [19] The statute adopting OSHA standards for public employees is therefore properly read, Fox asserts, in tandem with the safe place statute. Fox then points to case law that holds that the obligations the safe place law imposes on employers cannot be delegated. See, e.g., Dykstra v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 100 Wis.2d 120, 132, 301 N.W.2d 201 (1981) ([T]he person who has that duty cannot assert that another to whom he has allegedly delegated the duty is to be substituted as the primary defendant in his stead for a violation of safe place provisions.); Pitrowski v. Taylor, 55 Wis.2d 615, 627, 201 N.W.2d 52 (1972) ([T]he duty of complying with [the safe place statute] is on the employer[.] ... It cannot be delegated to or placed upon ... officers or employees.). ¶ 27 We are, of course, not dealing here with a claimed violation of the safe place statute at all. The complaint of the Umanskys makes it clear that the claim underlying the questions we address here as to immunity is one of common law negligence. We agree with the court of appeals that there is no logical connection between an employer's inability to shift its liability for a safe place violation to a third party and its ability to delegate to an employee the duty to comply with applicable safety regulations. Umansky, 313 Wis.2d 445, ¶ 31, 756 N.W.2d 601. This is not a safe-place statute case, and the rules concerning such claims do not govern here.