Opinion ID: 1745700
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the Trial Court Err in Overruling Mrs. May's Motion to Strike Testimony from Mrs. Phronie Hunt Concerning Other Remote Crimes?

Text: Here Mrs. May argues that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing Mrs. Phronie Hunt to testify that in 1983 she heard Mrs. May state she tried to poison her husband. As noted in Part I, Mr. May's death occurred October 30, 1984. Obviously, the testimony was admitted as going to show Mrs. May's intent to kill her husband. M.R.E. 404(b). See Steed v. State, 396 So.2d 625, 627 (Miss. 1981). The only authority Mrs. May cites for her proposition are two cases dealing with remote threats against defendants who many months later assaulted the persons voicing the threats. Stewart v. State, 226 So.2d 911, 912 (Miss. 1968); Myers v. State, 167 Miss. 76, 147 So. 308 (1933). In both cases the Court found the threats too remote. Obviously, a plea of self defense carries with it a requirement that the threat be contemporaneous with the act of defense, at least to the point that the actor had a reasonable belief of impending harm. No compelling contemporaneousness is required for intent. However, even if Mrs. Hunt's testimony involved an incident too remote to be relevant, several other persons testified to similar threats during the spring of 1984, at most 10 months before Mr. May's death. Any error in admitting Mrs. Hunt's testimony was surely harmless. Sensing the harmlessness of Mrs. Hunt's testimony, Mrs. May argues it was error to allow all the other testimony concerning her prior attempts to kill her husband. She cites no authority to support her additional claim of remoteness; however, some pre-Rules precedent might support her claim. Steed v. State, 396 So.2d 625, 627 (Miss. 1981), and Grooms v. State, 357 So.2d 292, 295-96 (Miss. 1978), both dealt with remoteness of threats made by a defendant about a victim, uncommunicated to the deceased. In both of those cases the Court intimated that threats made within two months of the killing were not too remote. In Parr v. State, 362 So.2d 634, 636 (Miss. 1978), the Court approved of admitting evidence of threats made as much as 13 months before the killing. However, in that case the Court noted, The record indicates that for a period before the threats were made up until the date of the homicide, there was hostility, bitterness, and ill will between appellant and his wife [the deceased]. Such a situation rendered the threats relevant and competent. Thus, this Court's pre-Rule precedent seems to hold that threats made within two months of the killing are not too remote, and threats more remote may be admissible where there are linking contemporaneous threats as in Parr. On the other hand, the Court noted in Steed, Grooms and Parr that whether a threat is too remote is a question addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Steed, 396 So.2d at 627. The analysis under the new Rules of Evidence may incorporate our pre-Rules precedent to some extent. Rule 404(b) states that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts will be admissible to show intent, knowledge, preparation, plan, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. If threats made to a deceased are considered other crimes, wrongs, or acts, then the focus should be on whether the trial judge abused his discretion under Rule 403, M.R.E., in admitting the evidence despite its prejudicial effect. If the threats do not fall under 404(b), the analysis is still essentially the same, since threats made to the accused not constituting another wrong could still be relevant under Rules 401 and 402 as showing intent or motive. See Jenkins v. State, 507 So.2d 89, 91-93 (Miss. 1987). Here the question of remoteness may re-enter the analysis as a question of relevancy. However, Rule 401 defines relevant evidence very broadly, and it would seem that evidence of threats made in early 1984, some 10 months before the murder, would have a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable, especially in a circumstantial evidence case. The Court would thus again be faced with the question of whether the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting the testimony under Rule 403. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony concerning prior murder threats made by Mrs. May against the deceased. The facts as detailed under Part I make clear that most of the objectionable testimony covered the time between January 1984 through May 1984. In addition, Mrs. Robinson also testified to a more contemporaneous threat made by Mrs. May less than a week before Mr. May's death. Mrs. Robinson testified that the Friday before Mr. May died, Mrs. May told her that Mr. May had to be dead by Thursday next, and at this time Mrs. May even asked her if she would kill him. Thus, even were we to follow Parr, there was some evidence of a contemporaneous threat. There is no error.