Opinion ID: 210627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: History of the VCAA

Text: 14 At the center of Mr. Sanders's appeal are the notice requirements of the VCAA. The VCAA was enacted in November 2000 to ensure that the VA assisted veterans claiming VA benefits. The legislation was passed in response to concerns expressed by veterans, veterans service organizations, and Congress over a July 1999 decision of the Veterans Court, Morton v. West, 12 Vet.App. 477 (1999), which held that the VA did not have a duty to assist veterans in developing their claims unless the claims were well-grounded. Put another way, prior to the VCAA, the VA only had to assist in the full development of a veteran's claim if the veteran first provided enough information for the VA to determine that the claim was plausible. The VCAA eliminated this well-grounded-claim requirement. See 146 Cong. Rec. H9913-14 (Oct. 17, 2000) (Explanatory Statement by the House and Senate Committees on Veterans' Affairs). Instead, Congress noted that under the VA's claimant friendly and non-adversarial adjudicative system, the VA must provide a substantial amount of assistance to a [claimant] seeking benefits. 146 Cong. Rec. at H9913 (citations omitted). 15 Under the legal framework of the VCAA, there is generally no prerequisite to receiving VA assistance; the VA is simply required to assist a claimant at the time that claimant files a claim for benefits. See 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c) (2003). As part of this assistance, the VA is required to notify claimants of what they must do to substantiate their claims. 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a). If the VA denies a claim, it must provide the claimant with a statement of the reasons for the decision and a summary of the evidence considered. 38 U.S.C. § 5104(b). If a claimant files a notice of disagreement, the VA must issue a statement of the case summarizing the reasons for the VA's decision on each issue, the evidence considered, and the relevant statutes and regulations. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(1). All claimants are entitled to appear at their hearings for the purpose of presenting evidence, and VA personnel conducting hearings are instructed to suggest the submission of evidence which the claimant may have overlooked and which would be of advantage to the claimant's position. 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(c)(2). 16 As mentioned above, Mr. Sanders's appeal focuses on the notice requirements of the VCAA. These notice requirements are contained within 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a), which states: 17 Upon receipt of a complete or substantially complete application, the Secretary shall notify the claimant and the claimant's representative, if any, of any information, and any medical or lay evidence, not previously provided to the Secretary that is necessary to substantiate the claim. As part of that notice, the Secretary shall indicate which portion of that information and evidence, if any, is to be provided by the claimant and which portion, if any, the Secretary, in accordance with section 5103A of this title and any other applicable provisions of law, will attempt to obtain on behalf of the claimant. 18 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a). 19 The purpose of § 5103(a) notification is to ensure that the claimant's case is presented to the initial decisionmaker with whatever support is available, and to ensure that the claimant understands what evidence will be obtained by the VA and what evidence must be provided by the claimant prior to the initial adjudication of his claim. Mayfield v. Nicholson, 444 F.3d 1328, 1333-34 (Fed.Cir. 2006) ( Mayfield II ). Moreover, the VA's duty to notify cannot be satisfied by various post-decisional communications from which a claimant might have been able to infer what evidence the VA found lacking in the claimant's presentation, as such post-decisional notices do not contain the same content or serve the same purpose as § 5103(a) notification. Id.; see also Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet.App. 112, 120 (2004). 20 The statutory notice requirement of § 5103(a) is implemented in 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1), which provides, in pertinent part: 21 When VA receives a complete or substantially complete application for benefits, it will notify the claimant of any information and medical or lay evidence that is necessary to substantiate the claim. VA will inform the claimant which information and evidence, if any, that the claimant is to provide to VA and which information and evidence, if any, that VA will attempt to obtain on behalf of the claimant. VA will also request that the claimant provide any evidence in the claimant's possession that pertains to the claim. 22 Accordingly, the notice required by the VCAA can be divided into four separate elements: (1) notice of what information or evidence is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) notice of what subset of the necessary information or evidence, if any, that the claimant is to provide; (3) notice of what subset of the necessary information or evidence, if any, that the VA will attempt to obtain; and (4) a general notification that the claimant may submit any other evidence he or she has in his or her possession that may be relevant to the claim. Errors with regard to these elements are referred to as first-element, second-element, third-element, and fourth-element notice errors, respectively. 23 This court has previously held that such VCAA notice errors are reviewed under a prejudicial error rule. Conway v. Principi, 353 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed.Cir.2004). This is consistent with 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2), which states that the Veterans Court shall take due account of the rule of prejudicial error when reviewing the record of proceedings before the Secretary and the Board of Veterans' Appeals. The court in Conway, however, did not express an opinion as to what it means for the Veterans Court to take due account of the rule, nor did it define what constitutes prejudicial error. Conway, 353 F.3d at 1375. 24 Lacking specific guidance from this court, the Veterans Court took it upon itself to address how to apply the rule of prejudicial error in Mayfield v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.App. 103 (2005) ( Mayfield I ), rev'd on other grounds, 444 F.3d 1328 (Fed.Cir.2006). As an initial matter, the Veterans Court in Mayfield I held that an appellant asserting a VCAA notice error bears the burden of convincing the court that a notice error has, indeed, been committed, by referring to specific deficiencies in the documents in the record on appeal, including any documents that may have been relied on as satisfying the notice requirements of § 5103(a). Id. at 111. 25 Next, the court addressed what was meant by prejudicial error. Id. at 112-16. After analyzing Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent, as well as interpretations of the prejudicial error rule under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 1 the court concluded that an error is prejudicial if it affects the `substantial rights' of the parties in terms of `the essential fairness of the [adjudication].' Id. at 115 (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553-54, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984)). As stated by the court, this did not require an outcome to have been different to have been prejudicial. Id.; see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946) (The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error had substantial influence.). That said, a demonstration that the outcome would not have been different in the absence of the error would demonstrate that there was no prejudice. Mayfield I, 19 Vet.App. at 115. 26 According to Mayfield I, Congress, in § 7261(b)(2), provided the Veterans Court with considerable discretion in determining what burdens should be carried by the parties regarding [its] taking due account of the prejudicial-error rule. Id. at 117. After analyzing Supreme Court precedent in other contexts, see id. at 117-20, the court concluded that 27 in the section 5103(a) notice context an appellant generally must identify, with considerable specificity, how the notice was defective and what evidence the appellant would have provided or requested the Secretary to obtain (e.g., a nexus medical opinion) had the Secretary fulfilled his notice obligations; further, an appellant must also assert, again with considerable specificity, how the lack of that notice and evidence affected the essential fairness of the adjudication. 28 Id. at 121. However, if the asserted error is found to exist and to be of the type that has the natural effect of producing prejudice, an appellant need not have pled prejudice. Id. Instead, it is the Secretary's burden to demonstrate lack of prejudice in terms of the fairness of the adjudication. Id. To do this, the Secretary is required to persuade the court that the purpose of the notice was not frustrated— e.g., by demonstrating: (1) that any defect in notice was cured by actual knowledge on the part of the claimant, (2) that a reasonable person could be expected to understand from the notice provided what was needed, or (3) that a benefit could not possibly have been awarded as a matter of law. Id. With this in mind, the Veterans Court defined the roles of the claimant and the Secretary in connection with the court's taking due care of the prejudicial error rule in the context of the various types of notice element and timing errors. 29 With respect to the first notice element, i.e., notice regarding the information and evidence necessary to substantiate the claim, the court held that the natural effect of such an error would constitute a failure to provide a key element of what it takes to substantiate [the] claim, thereby precluding [the appellant] from participating effectively in the processing of her claim, defeating the very purpose of § 5103(a) notice. Id. at 122. Accordingly, the court held that such a first-element error was presumed prejudicial, and that the VA had the burden of demonstrating that the appellant was not prejudiced by the notice error. Id. 30 With respect to the second and third notice elements, i.e., notice regarding which portion of the information and evidence necessary to substantiate the claim, if any, is to be provided by the claimant and which portion, if any, the Secretary will attempt to obtain on behalf of the claimant, the court noted that the assertion of [such an] error, by itself, does not have the natural effect of producing prejudice because this asserted error did not preclude the appellant from effectively participating in the processing of [the] claim. Id. Instead, prejudice can arise from such an asserted error only if [the appellant] failed to submit evidence because [he or] she was not advised to do so, or if the Secretary failed to seek to obtain evidence that he should have obtained. Id. Accordingly, with respect to second and third notice elements, the Veterans Court placed the burden of establishing prejudice on the claimant, requiring the claimant to identify: (1) how the notice was defective; (2) what evidence the appellant would have provided or requested the Secretary to obtain had the Secretary fulfilled his notice obligations; and (3) how the lack of that evidence affected the essential fairness of the adjudication. Id. at 121. 31 With respect to the fourth notice element, i.e., that the notice request that the claimant provide any evidence in the claimant's possession that pertains to the claim, 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1), the court also placed the burden of showing prejudice on the claimant. Id. at 122-23. According to the court, [p]rejudice would exist only if the claimant had evidence in [his or] her possession, not previously submitted, that is, of the type that should be considered by the Secretary in assessing her claim. Id. at 122. Moreover, whether or not claimant had such evidence is a matter within [his or] her knowledge and certainly outside the Secretary's. Id. at 123. Accordingly, the court thought the burden to prove prejudice was properly placed on the claimant, rather than on the Secretary. This required the claimant to identify: (1) how the notice was defective, (2) what evidence the appellant would have provided had the Secretary fulfilled his notice obligations, and (3) how the lack of that evidence affected the essential fairness of the adjudication. Id. at 121. 32 Finally, with regard to timing errors, the court noted that such errors do[ ] not have the natural effect of producing prejudice and that, therefore, prejudice must be pled as to it. Id. at 123. 33