Opinion ID: 2185892
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the trial court abused its discretion in restricting werner's expert's testimony.

Text: Werner argues that the trial court erred when it refused to allow his defense expert to testify to the jury as to the manner in which human memory functions. The admissibility of expert testimony is controlled by SDCL 19-15-2 (Fed. R.Evid. 702): If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. The trial court has broad discretion regarding the admissibility of expert testimony. State v. Hill, 463 N.W.2d 674 (S.D.1990); State v. Bachman, 446 N.W.2d 271 (S.D. 1989); United States v. Purham, 725 F.2d 450 (8th Cir.1984). Absent an abuse of discretion, this decision will not be reversed. State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D.1985). In order to admit psychological evidence, the testimony must be a proper subject for expert testimony. Hill, 463 N.W.2d at 677. This has been interpreted in two ways: (1) [T]he subject of the expert's testimony must lie beyond the knowledge and experience of the average lay person; State v. Swallow, 350 N.W.2d 606 (S.D.1984); Bachman, 446 N.W.2d at 275 and (2) the expert must not invade the province of the jury. Hill, 463 N.W.2d at 677. Under the first test, the determining factor is if the expert testimony would assist the jury in understanding matters normally outside of a lay person's breadth of knowledge. Id. Werner's expert would have testified as to the generalized theory of how memory works, which he claims would have been helpful to the jury in understanding the evidence. Specifically, Werner argues that the jury should have considered how the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) agent influenced the witnesses' testimony after hearing from the expert how such influence can change and affect memory. In response to Werner's argument, the trial court allowed the expert to testify regarding investigative techniques and also the effect improper techniques may have on the resulting answers in interviews. However, the trial court thought that it would be overly confusing and not helpful to the jury to hear testimony on the generalized theory of memory. We agree. Under the second test, we must analyze whether the expert is invading the province of the jury. Under South Dakota law, an expert may not testify if his testimony includes the expression of opinion regarding ultimate issues. Id.; Logue, supra . Werner's expert was allowed to testify at great length regarding interview techniques. He was not allowed to reach the ultimate issue, which in this case was whether the testifying witnesses had in fact been influenced by the DCI agent. This was a determination for the jury as trier of fact. McCafferty v. Solem, 449 N.W.2d 590 (S.D.1989). Finally, the trial court in its discretion must balance the probative value of this expert testimony against its prejudicial effects. In Hill, we said: Consequently, we hold that any small aid the expert testimony might have provided would be outweighed by the unfair prejudice which might have resulted because of the aura of reliability and trustworthiness surrounding scientific evidence. 463 N.W.2d at 678; Logue, 372 N.W.2d at 157. Likewise, the same rationale applies here. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding portions of the defense expert's testimony. Affirmed. WUEST, J., concurs. HENDERSON, J., concurs specially. AMUNDSON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. SABERS, J., dissents.