Opinion ID: 1589244
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Court's Failure to Advise of the Right to Self-Representation

Text: Blake next argues the trial court erred in failing to advise him of his right to self-representation. We reject this claim as well. Blake filed two pro se motions to dismiss counsel and appoint new counsel. He withdrew the first motion. The second motion alleged that counsel ignored his requests to interview witnesses and sound advice, that counsel was unwilling to pursue an adversarial role, and that Blake lacked confidence in counsel. At a hearing on the motion, the judge asked Blake and defense counsel about the grounds alleged. He took the motion under advisement, indicating a written order would follow. The issue of self-representation did not arise. The next day, the court denied the motion without prejudice to re-file the motion if new grounds become available. Blake does not challenge the trial court's denial of the motion. Instead, he argues that Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d 256, 259 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), cited with approval in Hardwick v. State, 521 So.2d 1071, 1074-75 (Fla.1988), required the trial court, after denying the motion, to inform the defendant of his right to self-representation. We reject this claim. A motion to discharge counsel does not automatically require a Faretta [5] inquiry or notice of the right to self-representation. State. v. Craft., 685 So.2d 1292, 1295 (Fla. 1996) (holding that Nelson and Hardwick do not require the trial court to inform a defendant of the right to self-representation after the denial of a motion to discharge counsel based on incompetence). A Faretta inquiry is triggered only by an unequivocal assertion of the right to self-representation. Craft, 685 So.2d at 1295; see also Gamble v. Sec y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 450 F.3d 1245, 1249 (11th Cir. 2006) (Tin order for there to be a Faretta violation, the defendant must have indicated that he wishes to conduct his own defense.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 510, 166 L.Ed.2d 381 (2006). Blake did not at any time indicate a desire to represent himself. Therefore, the trial court was not required to inform Blake of his right to self-representation or to conduct a Faretta inquiry. Blake's claim that the trial judge erred in failing to make his findings on the record is likewise without merit. Blake apparently interprets the phrase [i]f no reasonable basis appears for a finding of ineffective representation, the trial court should so state on the record, Nelson, 274 So.2d at 259 (emphasis added), as requiring an oral pronouncement from the bench. Here, the trial court took the motion under advisement and the next day entered a written order denying the motion. A written order is a ruling on the record. Blake has not cited any cases requiring an oral ruling from the bench. For these reasons, we affirm.