Opinion ID: 6351652
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutor’s Comments on Flight

Text: ¶19 In considering whether the prosecutor’s “flight” comments constituted error, we begin by outlining the appropriate standard of review. Then, we state 9 the test for determining prosecutorial misconduct and the relevant law concerning the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. We then apply the law to the facts of Vialpando’s case and conclude that the prosecutor’s statements, made during closing argument and concerning flight, were not error.
¶20 Because the prosecutor’s comments did not influence the framework of the trial and because Vialpando did not contemporaneously object, we review her prosecutorial misconduct claim for plain error. See Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1097 (Colo. 2010). Plain error is error that is “obvious and substantial.” Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 18, 288 P.3d 116, 120 (quoting People v. Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 750 (Colo. 2005)). B. Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Sixth Amendment Right to a Fair Trial by an Impartial Jury ¶21 Whether a prosecutor’s conduct was improper, and thus error, depends on the totality of the circumstances. Wend, 235 P.3d at 1096. “Factors to consider when determining the propriety of statements include the language used, the context in which the statements were made, and the strength of the evidence supporting the conviction.” Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1050 (Colo. 2005). Examples of context include “the nature of the alleged offenses and the asserted defenses, the issues to be determined, the evidence in the case, and the 10 point in the proceedings at which the remarks were made.” Id. (quoting Harris v. People, 888 P.2d 259, 266 (Colo. 1995)). ¶22 Vialpando claims that the prosecutor’s comments violated her Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. See U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, §§ 16, 23, 25. “A defendant’s exercise of the . . . [Sixth Amendment] right to a trial by jury may not be used by the prosecution to [imply] guilt.” Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054, 1080 (Colo. 2007); accord People v. Rodgers, 756 P.2d 980, 983 (Colo. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Miller, 113 P.3d at 748. This rule applies to both direct and indirect implications. See Martinez v. People, 425 P.2d 299, 302 (Colo. 1967). For example, in Rodgers, we held that the prosecutor violated the defendant’s right to a jury trial when the prosecutor claimed during closing, “[S]ome attorneys . . . [believe that] if you are guilty, you would want to request a jury because they just may not convict you and if you are innocent[,] you never want to request a jury because they just might convict you.” 756 P.2d at 982. ¶23 While a prosecutor may not tell the jury to infer guilt from a defendant’s exercise of their Sixth Amendment right, a prosecutor may highlight facts in evidence and draw reasonable inferences. Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1048. In doing so, a prosecutor is permitted to use “oratorical embellishment” and “metaphoric nuance.” Harris, 888 P.2d at 265–66. 11 C. Application ¶24 Our initial inquiry is whether the prosecutor’s statements, made during closing argument and concerning flight, were an improper comment on the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and, thus, error. To make this determination, we first consider the language used and the context in which the statements were made. See Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1050. ¶25 During opening statement, closing argument, and rebuttal closing, the prosecutor stated that the defendant fled from the police officers, both in the SUV and then later, on foot. In opening, he stated that “the defendant ran. The defendant opened the driver’s-side door and stepped out and fled. Fled the scene.” Again, in closing, he remarked that “Vialpando[] ran. A few moments before[,] she had crashed a stolen [SUV] . . . . She opened the driver’s-side door and ran . . . . Before that[,] she had run . . . from the officers . . . . The defendant ran.” Critically, he said during closing that “although she is seated now, that flight continues to this moment. But it ends today.” Additionally, during rebuttal, the prosecutor told the jurors that Vialpando’s “flight has continued up and to this point” and that they should “end her flight by signing ‘guilty.’” ¶26 We conclude that the prosecutor did not impermissibly imply that Vialpando was guilty because she requested a jury trial. Our determination is guided by the context in which these statements were made, which includes the 12 evidence in the case and the nature of the alleged offenses. See Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1050. ¶27 Here, the prosecution presented evidence that Vialpando drove the stolen SUV, fled from the police in the motel parking lot, and, after crashing the car, ran away from the scene on foot. These facts demonstrate movement and flight. In addition, Vialpando was charged with vehicular eluding, which required the prosecution to prove that she knowingly eluded a peace officer while being pursued by said officer. See § 18-9-116.5, C.R.S. (2021). That is, the vehicular eluding charge implicated her evasion, escape, or flight. Thus, the prosecutor’s comments were contextually related to the evidence in the case. See Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1048 (“Final argument may properly include the facts in evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.”). ¶28 In holding otherwise, the division majority relied on two cases—United States v. Hardy, 37 F.3d 753, 757 (1st Cir. 1994), and Howard-Walker, ¶ 44, 443 P.3d at 1014–15—which both held that the prosecution improperly commented on the defendant’s right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment. We find both cases inapposite. ¶29 In Hardy, two defendants were arrested after a foot chase with police officers and later charged with various firearm-related offenses. 37 F.3d at 755–56. During closing argument, the prosecutor stated that the defendants were running and 13 hiding on the night of the crime and “still running and hiding today.” Id. at 757. Neither defendant testified. Id. at 758. The First Circuit reasoned that the prosecutor’s statements “improperly called attention to the failure of [the defendants] to take the stand and testify at trial.” Id. at 757. On those facts, the prosecutor’s improper reference to the defendants’ Fifth Amendment right to silence was unmistakable because it drew direct attention to their absence from the witness stand. That is, the link between the defendants “running and hiding” and exercising their Fifth Amendment right to silence was obvious. Comparatively, any link here between “flight” and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is less apparent. Moreover, Vialpando testified, and the prosecutor’s remarks—that Vialpando’s “flight continue[d]”—did not draw a direct line to her constitutional right to a jury trial. ¶30 Howard-Walker is also distinguishable. There, the defendant (who was accused of burglary) did not testify, and the prosecutor told the jury, “[T]here is only one person in this room that could tell you where all of those items are now and he won’t.” Howard-Walker, ¶ 38, 443 P.3d at 1013. We held that this comment clearly implied the defendant’s guilt because he exercised his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Id. at ¶ 44, 443 P.3d at 1014–15. But in the case before us, the prosecutor made no such pronounced insinuations. In context, his statements did not bring Vialpando’s right to a jury trial to the forefront; rather, they drew on 14 the overall theme of flight and were connected to the facts of the case. Contra Rodgers, 756 P.2d at 982, 985 (holding that the prosecutor improperly referenced the defendant’s right to a jury trial when the prosecutor claimed during closing, “[S]ome attorneys . . . [believe that] if you are guilty, you would want to request a jury because they just may not convict you and if you are innocent[,] you never want to request a jury because they just might convict you”). ¶31 We recognize that, as the division majority pointed out, thematic arguments concerning flight are fraught with peril. But here, based on the vehicular eluding charge and the flight evidence pervading this case, the prosecutor’s closing statements about Vialpando’s continued flight at trial are better considered “oratorical embellishment” and “metaphoric nuance.” See Harris, 888 P.2d at 265–66. Absent this factual context, however, the result might well be different. Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecutor’s flight comments were not error.