Opinion ID: 1119218
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Attorney General's Common Law Powers

Text: The duties of the Attorney General are statutorily set forth in AS 44.23.020(b). Among other things, that statute states that the Attorney General shall perform all other duties required by law or which usually pertain to the office of attorney general in a state. AS 44.23.020(b)(7). In Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, Third Judicial District, 534 P.2d 947, 950 (Alaska 1975), we stated that this language indicates that the office of the Attorney General is to function with those powers and duties normally ascribed to it at common law. We further noted: Under the common law, an attorney general is empowered to bring any action which he thinks necessary to protect the public interest, and he possesses the corollary power to make any disposition of the state's litigation which he thinks best. This discretionary control over the legal business of the state, both civil and criminal, includes the initiation, prosecution and disposition of cases. When an act is committed to executive discretion, the exercise of that discretion within constitutional bounds is not subject to the control or review of the courts. To interfere with that discretion would be a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Id. (Citations omitted). We believe that the above language forecloses any argument that the State is without authority to bring suit in the absence of express statutory authority. This view finds ample support in the decisions of other jurisdictions where the attorney general's common law powers are recognized. See, e.g., State v. Bristol-Myers Co., 470 F.2d 1276, 1278 (D.C. Cir.1972) (construing Illinois Law); D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal.3d 1, 112 Cal. Rptr. 786, 520 P.2d 10, 20 (Cal. 1974); State ex rel. Shevin v. Yarborough, 257 So.2d 891, 894-96 (Fla. 1972) (Ervin, J., concurring); Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney General, 377 Mass. 37, 385 N.E.2d 240, 247-48 (Mass. 1979); Michigan State Chiropractic Ass'n v. Kelly, 79 Mich. App. 789, 262 N.W.2d 676, 677 (Mich. 1977); Gandy v. Reserve Life Insurance Co., 279 So.2d 648, 649 (Miss. 1973); Hyland v. Kirkman, 157 N.J. Super. 565, 385 A.2d 284, 289-90 (N.J. Super. 1978); State ex rel. Derryberry v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 516 P.2d 813, 818 (Okl. 1973). This authority has been held to confer standing on the attorney general to seek redress for common law fraud. Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney General, 377 Mass. 37, 385 N.E.2d 240; 247-48 (Mass. 1979); Hyland v. Kirkman, 157 N.J. Super. 565, 385 A.2d 284, 289-90 (N.J. Super. 1978). We therefore hold that the State has the authority to bring suit in the public interest on the basis of common law fraud to obtain restitution for defrauded land purchasers. While it is not the court's function to pass upon the Attorney General's determination of what is or is not in the public interest, see Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, Third Judicial District, 534 P.2d 947, 950 (Alaska 1975), we do note that the trial court in this case found: The State has an interest in preventing unjust enrichment by land developers based on widespread misrepresentations and nondisclosure... . Here the defendants advertised the land sales in local newspapers, reaching about half the population of the state. The State also has an interest in protecting the economy of the State against developers who misrepresent the desirability of the land they sell.... The State also has a pecuniary interest in this particular case since its resources may be called upon to aid victims of a potential flood in the Windsong Subdivision.