Opinion ID: 1751399
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Goodson's sentence to a term of 100 years imprisonment.

Text: Goodson claims that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing him to an indeterminate term of incarceration of 100 years for count I. See State v. Pappas, 337 N.W.2d 490, 493 (Iowa 1983). (Goodson does not challenge his sentences for counts II and III.) Goodson's claim is actually that the district court failed to exercise its discretion and consider the factors relevant to sentencing pursuant to Iowa Code section 901.5. The district court in fact stated on the record at Goodson's sentencing hearing that it would not exercise discretion in sentencing Goodson for his conviction of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance while in possession of a firearm, because the district court believed the legislature had substituted a statutorily mandated 100-year prison term for the court's discretion over sentencing. We agree with the district court. Goodson was found guilty of a violation of Iowa Code section 204.401(1), possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. The penalty portion of this statute states: a. Violation of this section, with respect to the following controlled substances, counterfeit substances, or simulated controlled substances is a class B felony, and notwithstanding section 902.9, subsection 1, shall be punished by confinement for no more than fifty years and a fine of not more than $1,000,000: . . . . (3) More than fifty grams of a mixture or substance described in subparagraph (2) which contains cocaine base. While the penalties described in our criminal statutes use mandatory language, these statutes must be read in pari materia with the Iowa Code general sentencing provisions which allow district court discretion in sentencing. See State v. Chana, 476 N.W.2d 38, 39 (Iowa 1991); State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Iowa 1979). In Hildebrand, this court in fact remanded the case for resentencing, finding that the trial court had failed to apply reasoned discretion. Id. at 396. We stated this rule: The trial court and we on review should weigh and consider all pertinent matters in determining proper sentence, including the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, defendant's age, character and propensities and chances of his reform. The courts owe a duty to the public as much as to defendant in determining a proper sentence. The punishment should fit both the crime and the individual. Id. (citing State v. Cupples, 260 Iowa 1192, 1197, 152 N.W.2d 277, 280 (1967)). Neither Goodson nor the State contend that Iowa Code section 204.401(1)(a) denies the district court the opportunity to exercise discretion in determining an appropriate sentence, including the options available under Iowa Code section 901.5. In the present case, however, the jury also found Goodson guilty of Iowa Code section 204.401(1)(e), which enhances the penalties under section 204.401 when the defendant is in the immediate possession or control of a firearm. This section states: e. A person in the immediate possession or control of a firearm while participating in a violation of this subsection shall be sentenced to two times the term otherwise imposed by law, and no such judgment, sentence, or part thereof shall be deferred or suspended. (Emphasis added.) Under section 204.401(1)(a), Goodson was found guilty of a class B felony for which he may be given an indeterminate sentence of confinement for no more than fifty years and a fine of not more than $1,000,000. Under subsection (e), the district court determined that when a firearm is involved the legislature intended to preempt the court's discretion and require an indeterminate sentence of 100 years incarceration that could not be deferred or suspended. We agree. In Chana, we held that Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)(a) (1989), which provided penalties for first-offense OWI, preserved district court discretion to determine an appropriate sentence under the attending circumstances. We noted that the legislature may clearly preempt the district court's sentencing discretion and eliminate sentencing options with the inclusion of express language to that effect in the penalty section of a criminal statute. Chana, 476 N.W.2d at 40. We then went on to list the penalty portions of several criminal statutes in which the legislature clearly eliminated the district court's sentencing discretion. Id. We find the preemption language required to have been used in the language of section 204.401(1)(e) (1991). The legislature's use of no such judgment, sentence, or part thereof shall be deferred or suspended instructs the district court that it must impose a term of incarceration which is twice the penalty otherwise imposed by law. Term in this subsection refers only to a term of incarceration; this subsection does not affect a court's sentencing discretion regarding the imposition of a fine. Id. (court distinguishes between imposition of a fine and a term of confinement and recognizes that the legislature may limit discretion for either penalty independently). While an individual found guilty of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance under Iowa Code section 204.401(1) may benefit from district court discretion in determining an appropriate judgment and sentence under that section alone, that discretion is removed when that individual is also found guilty of commission of the crime while in immediate possession or control of a firearm. The legislature clearly intended that the individual be subject to the penalty enhancement of two times the term of incarceration otherwise imposed in section 204.401 without the possibility of a deferred or suspended judgment or sentence.