Opinion ID: 6333684
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Use of Perjured Testimony

Text: Wilson asserts that the probation officer provided perjured testimony regarding the fact that when he reviewed Wilson’s cell phone history, it showed calls to 23 Appellate Case: 21-1099 Document: 010110673884 Date Filed: 04/21/2022 Page: 24 MoneyGram, the company that facilitated McMillan’s wire transfers to Wilson. But Wilson provides no evidence to support this allegation. 6. Judicial Misconduct a. Delegation of the Judicial Function to the Probation Officer Wilson argues the district court improperly delegated its judicial function to a non-judicial officer in violation of Article III by soliciting the probation officer’s views and by imposing the punishment recommended by the probation officer. But “the probation officer serves as an investigative and supervisory arm of the court.” United States v. Davis, 151 F.3d 1304, 1306 (10th Cir. 1998) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). In that regard, “the probation officer serves as a liaison between the sentencing court, which has supervisory power over the defendant’s term of supervised release, and the defendant, who must comply with the conditions of his supervised release or run the risk of revocation.” Id. at 1306–07. Under this arrangement, “no improper delegation of judicial power occurs.” Id. at 1307. Thus, the district court did not err by considering and ultimately adopting the probation officer’s recommendation regarding punishment. b. Judicial Bias Wilson argues he did not receive a fair revocation hearing due to judicial bias. “To demonstrate a violation of due process because of judicial bias, a claimant must show either actual bias or an appearance of bias.” United States v. Scott, 529 F.3d 1290, 1297 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Judicial rulings alone are almost always insufficient to establish bias, as are mere speculation, 24 Appellate Case: 21-1099 Document: 010110673884 Date Filed: 04/21/2022 Page: 25 beliefs, conclusions, innuendo, suspicion, opinion, and similar non-factual matters.” Leatherwood v. Allbaugh, 861 F.3d 1034, 1050 (10th Cir. 2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Wilson largely bases his bias arguments on the trial judge’s rulings against him, which does not suffice. He also points to the judge’s use of the plural pronouns “we” and “us” in her rulings. Wilson speculates from these pronouns that the judge “was acting as a co-prosecutor.” Resp. at 73. Such speculation establishes neither actual judicial bias nor an appearance of bias.