Opinion ID: 1160510
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Heading: Intent of the Drafters of the Kansas Constitution

Text: The essential difference between a constitution and a statute is that a constitution usually states general principles or policies and establishes a foundation of law and government, whereas a statute must provide the details of the subject of the statute. A constitution, unlike a statute, is intended not merely to meet existing conditions but to govern future contingencies. State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 254 Kan. 632, Syl. ¶ 2, 867 P.2d 1034 (1993). The Constitution of the United States was framed in Philadelphia in 1787 by a Constitutional Convention. It was adopted and signed on September 17, 1787, by representatives of all of the original states except Rhode Island. The meeting of the representatives writing the proposed Constitution was closed, and official minutes were not published. The debates for ratification of the Constitution were held in each state and published in a series of articles known as the Federalist Papers. Eleven states ratified the Constitution by August 1788, and the Constitution became effective on that date. Since its ratification, the federal courts have been required to interpret the United States Constitution because of the vagueness of certain broad clauses and the lack of a historical record to indicate what its framers intended. The United States Supreme Court has decided few cases concerning the construction, scope, and interpretation of the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution. A majority of the cases dealt with civil liability of members of Congress, their staff, or employees of Congress, not immunity for criminal acts committed on the House or Senate floor. In its analysis, the majority in this case reviews four United States Supreme Court cases which address the Speech or Debate Clause: United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 61 L. Ed.2d 12, 99 S. Ct. 2432 (1979); Gravel, 408 U.S. 606; Brewster, 408 U.S. 501; Johnson, 383 U.S. 169. Some of the cases do not apply to immunity from criminal prosecution. Except for Johnson, where the Court discussed the Speech or Debate Clause immunity from criminal charges for crimes committed on the legislative floor, the discussion was mere dicta. In Johnson, a former Congressman was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland on seven counts of violating the federal conflict of interest statute, 18 U.S.C. § 281, and on one count of conspiring to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. At the trial, there was evidence, as well as argument by counsel, relating to the authorship, content, and motivation of a speech which the defendant allegedly made on the floor of the House of Representatives in pursuance of a conspiracy designed to give assistance, in return for compensation, to certain savings and loan associations indicted on mail fraud charges. The 4th Circuit Court of Appeals set aside the conspiracy count, holding the Government's conspiracy allegation was barred by Article I, § 6. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed, stating the prosecution on the conspiracy count, being dependent upon an intensive inquiry with respect to the speech on the floor of the House, violated the Speech or Debate Clause of Article 1, § 6 so as to warrant the granting of a new trial on the conspiracy count, with all elements offensive to the Speech or Debate Clause to be eliminated. 383 U.S. at 185. In applying the federal rationale of these cases to the Kansas Constitution, it is important to note that all four cases discussed in the majority opinion were decided subsequent to the adoption of the Kansas Constitution. The drafters of the proposed Kansas Constitution could not have been aware of or influenced by these later federal court decisions. We are interpreting the Kansas Constitution. This court not only has the authority, but also the duty, to construe the Kansas Constitution within the apparent intent of those who adopted it. State v. Durrant, 244 Kan. 522, 534, 769 P.2d 1174, cert. denied 492 U.S. 923 (1989). Although the Speech or Debate Clause of Article 2, § 22 of the Kansas Constitution has historic roots in English history and Article I, § 6 of the United States Constitution, it must be interpreted in light of the Wyandotte Constitutional Convention and in the context of the Kansas constitutional scheme of government. Our constitution is a written charter enacted by the direct action of the citizens of Kansas. It is a compilation of the fundamental laws of the state and embodies the principles upon which the state government was founded. The object of our constitution is to provide a government of laws and not of men, while insuring the protection of life, liberty, and property. Samsel v. Wheeler Transport Services, Inc., 246 Kan. at, 347-48. Unlike the United States Constitution, which was drafted in a closed convention without official minutes, the Wyandotte Constitutional Convention was open and the official minutes were published. The elected delegates assembled at Wyandotte on the first Tuesday of July 1859 to form a constitution and provide for the organization of a state government for the State of Kansas. Several standing committees were appointed to draft the several subdivisions of the constitution for consideration by the convention in adopting the Kansas Constitution. The various standing committees included committees for the executive department, the legislative department, and the judicial department. Minutes were kept of the committee report and published as The Wyandotte Constitutional Convention. At the afternoon session of Tuesday, July 12, 1859, on motion by Mr. Thacher, the general order of reports from standing committees was taken up. Mr. Thacher, from the committee on the legislative department, submitted the following report as to Article 2, § 22: For any speech or debate in either house the members shall not be questioned elsewhere. No member of the Legislature shall be subject to arrest, except for a felony or breach of the peace, in going to or returning from the place of meeting, or during the continuance of the session, neither shall he be subject to the service of any civil process during the session, nor for fifteen days previous to its commencement. Proceedings and Debates Embracing the Secretary's Journal of the Kansas Constitutional Convention, p. 114 (1920). In the afternoon session of Wednesday, July 13, 1859, on motion by Mr. Slough, the Convention resolved into a Committee of the WholeMr. Hipple in the Chairand resumed the consideration of the report of the committee on the legislative departmentthe question pending being on the adoption of Article 2, § 22. Mr. Brown offered the following as a substitute: For any speech or debate, in either house the members shall not be questioned elsewhere, nor shall any word or words spoken in debate in either house of the Legislature be the foundation of any action, complaint or prosecution. No member of the Legislature shall be subject to arrest, except for a felony or breach of the peace, in going to or returning from the place of meeting, or during the continuance of the session, nor for fifteen days previous to its commencement. Proceedings and Debates, p. 135. Ordinarily there is a presumption that a change or a refusal to change the language of the constitution results from the framers' purpose to change or the refusal to change its effect. Cf. In re Marriage of Schuhs, 20 Kan. App.2d 98, 99, 883 P.2d 1225 (1994), rev. denied 257 Kan. 1092 (1995) (Ordinarily, there is a presumption that a change in the language of a statute results from the legislative purpose to change its effect.). The substitute amendment, if adopted, would have granted legislators unlimited immunity and prohibited any word or words spoken in debate in either house of the legislature from being the foundation of any action, complaint, or prosecution. The proposed amendment offering unlimited immunity for any word or words spoken in either house of the legislature was rejected, and the section passed without the amendment. See Proceedings and Debates, p. 135. The defeat of Brown's substitute wording shows that the framers of the Kansas Constitution believed in a narrow and restrictive view of legislative immunity and certainly not the broad and expansive view which is taken by the majority.