Opinion ID: 2590262
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the inmates' statutory right to basic and special education

Text: When the relevant statutory provisions are properly read together and as a whole, it is clear the Legislature did not intend that the basic and special education acts apply to individuals incarcerated in DOC prisons. Consequently, we hold that the basic education act and the special education act do not apply to the inmate class.
The inmates first argue that the plain language of the basic education act clearly establishes an education system available to all students aged 5 through 21, and excluding none. Response Br. of Resp'ts at 14 (citing RCW 28A.150.220(5)) (footnote omitted). [3] Under the inmates' theory, because children incarcerated in adult prisons are not specifically exempted from the basic education act, they are covered by the act, and are thus entitled to the same education offered to all other children in Washington. We disagree. While the basic education act does not explicitly exclude youths incarcerated in adult facilities, the inquiry does not end there. A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court must interpret legislation consistently with its stated goals. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Tri, 117 Wash.2d 128, 140, 814 P.2d 629 (1991). Another well-established principle of statutory construction provides that apparently conflicting statutes must be reconciled to give effect to each of them. E.g., State v. Fagalde, 85 Wash.2d 730, 736, 539 P.2d 86 (1975); see also Fray v. Spokane County, 134 Wash.2d 637, 648, 952 P.2d 601 (1998) (courts avoid construing statutes in way that renders any statutory language superfluous) (citing case). To resolve apparent conflicts between statutes, courts generally give preference to the more specific and more recently enacted statute. See In re Estate of Little, 106 Wash.2d 269, 283, 721 P.2d 950 (1986) (more specific statute) (citing cases); Morris v. Blaker, 118 Wash.2d 133, 147, 821 P.2d 482 (1992). [4] Along these same lines, courts also consider the sequence of all statutes relating to the same subject matter. Department of Labor & Indus. v. Estate of MacMillan, 117 Wash.2d 222, 229, 814 P.2d 194 (1991) (citation omitted). Based on these principles of statutory interpretation, we examine the Legislature's statutory scheme regarding education to determine whether the basic education act applies to the inmate class. The basic education act, originally enacted in 1977, sets up a general program of education that does not specifically address the educational needs of DOC inmates. Chapter 28A.193 RCW, on the other hand, was enacted in 1998 with the intent to provide for the operation of education programs for the department of corrections' juvenile inmates.  RCW 28A.193.005 (emphasis added). Under chapter 28A.193 RCW, individuals up to, and potentially including, age 18 who are incarcerated in DOC facilities may participate in DOC education programs. RCW 28A.193.030(3)-(4); see also RCW 72.09.460(2). [5] Furthermore, the compulsory school attendance and admission law, chapter 28A.225 RCW, was amended in 1998 to specifically exempt individuals who are incarcerated in adult correctional facilities from mandatory school attendance. Laws of 1998, ch. 244, § 14; RCW 28A.225.010(1)(d). [6] Applying the previously discussed rules of interpretation, we hold that chapters 28A.193 and 72.09 RCW, not the basic education act, apply to the inmate class. First, applying the basic education act to DOC inmates would render chapter 28A.193 RCW and portions of chapter 72.09 RCW superfluous. See Fray, 134 Wash.2d at 648, 952 P.2d 601. Second, chapters 28A.193 and 72.09 are the more recent and far more specific statutes regarding inmate education, and thus should be given preference. See Little, 106 Wash.2d at 283, 721 P.2d 950; Blaker, 118 Wash.2d at 147, 821 P.2d 482. Finally, as stipulated to by the parties, the new mandatory declination provisions passed in 1997 were expected to significantly increase the number of juveniles under 18 incarcerated in DOC facilities. Relying upon the sequence in which these statutes were enacted, it is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended the more recent statutes and amendments to address an unmet need  the education of juvenile DOC inmates. See MacMillan, 117 Wash.2d at 229, 814 P.2d 194. In addition to their statutory construction arguments, the inmates contend that Tommy P., which held that the basic education act applies to children incarcerated in juvenile detention facilities, mandates application of the basic education act to the inmate class. Response Br. of Resp'ts at 14-15 (citing Tommy P. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 97 Wash.2d 385, 391-93, 645 P.2d 697 (1982)). [7] The inmates argue that Tommy P. stands for the proposition that children do not lose their rights to an education under the basic education act simply because they are incarcerated. Response Br. of Resp'ts at 14-15 (citing Tommy P., 97 Wash.2d at 391-93, 645 P.2d 697). We disagree, noting at least three major flaws in the inmates' arguments. First, contrary to inmates' assertions, the holding in Tommy P. does not rest on the basic education act ; rather, it is dependent upon the compulsory attendance law's applicability to juvenile detainees. RCW 28A.27 (recodified and amended by RCW 28A.225). This court specifically held: the compulsory education law requires the provision of a program of education in juvenile detention centers. Tommy P., 97 Wash.2d at 398, 645 P.2d 697 (emphasis added). [8] Second, as previously stated, the compulsory school attendance and admission law, upon which Tommy P. was based, was amended in 1998 to specifically exclude individuals incarcerated in an adult correctional facility. RCW 28A.225.010(1)(d); see also Tommy P., 97 Wash.2d at 394-98, 645 P.2d 697 (court held that, absent specific exemption, compulsory school attendance law applied to juveniles in detention facilities). Finally, Tommy P. involved offenders incarcerated in juvenile facilities, not youths who were declined to adult court or incarcerated in adult facilities. For these reasons we find Tommy P. distinguishable.
The analysis and arguments regarding whether the special education act, chapter 28A.155 RCW, applies to the inmate class parallels those regarding the basic education act above. Like the basic education act, the special education act is stated in broad terms and does not specifically address the education of juveniles in DOC facilities. The special education act's purpose is to ensure that all children with disabilities as defined in RCW 28A.155.020 shall have the opportunity for an appropriate education at public expense as guaranteed to them by the Constitution of this state. RCW 28A.155.010 (emphasis added). Children with disabilities includes individuals between the ages of 3 and 22 [9] who are: in school or out of school who are temporarily or permanently retarded in normal educational processes by reason of physical or mental disability, or by reason of emotional maladjustment, or by reason of other disability, and those children who have specific learning and language disabilities resulting from perceptual-motor disabilities, including problems in visual and auditory perception and integration. RCW 28A.155.020. In addition to not specifically including DOC inmates, the special education act is reasonably read as actually excluding them. The special education act's section titled Superintendent of public instruction's duty and authority states that the superintendent is, among other things, required to: Promulgate such rules as are necessary to implement the several provisions of [the basic and special education acts] and to ensure educational opportunities within the common school system for all children with disabilities who are not institutionalized. RCW 28A.155.090(7) (emphasis added). When reasonably read, this provision excludes from the special education act children with disabilities not within the common school system. If the superintendent is not responsible for ensuring the educational opportunities of a certain group of individuals, it is reasonable to conclude that the group is not covered by the act. Otherwise, we would have the anomalous situation where the special education act applies to a group of individuals, but instructs the superintendent, the individual in charge of implementing the act, that he or she is not responsible for educating these same individuals. Finding that the special education act creates an exception for individuals not within the common school system, we must now determine whether the inmates fall under that exception. The basic education act defines the common school system as that term is used in Title 28A RCW. See RCW 28A.150.020. As we have already held, individuals incarcerated in DOC facilities are not covered by the basic education act. Thus, by definition the inmate class is outside the common school system. Relying on the rule of statutory construction that when similar words are used in different parts of a statute the meaning is presumed to be the same throughout, we find that the special education act's common school system is the same as that in the basic education act. See State v. Akin, 77 Wash.App. 575, 580-81, 892 P.2d 774 (1995) (citing De Grief v. City of Seattle, 50 Wash.2d 1, 11, 297 P.2d 940 (1956)). Consequently, we are constrained to find that the inmates are not  within the common school system under the special education act, and thus fall under an exception to the act. Based on the special education act's silence regarding DOC inmates and its exclusion of students not within the common school system, we hold that the special education act does not apply to the inmate class. Because we do not favorably resolve the inmates' claims to basic or special education on statutory grounds, we next analyze the inmates' constitutional rights to basic and special education under article IX of the Washington Constitution. Within this next section we also determine whether chapter 28A.193 RCW is constitutional under article IX.