Opinion ID: 76259
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Commercial Purpose

Text: 8 The Tyne Plaintiffs first allege error in the district court's determination that Loft v. Fuller, 408 So.2d 619, 622 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App. 4th Dist.1981), controls this case and precludes the application of § 540.08 to the facts herein. 9 Section 540.08 of the Florida Statutes prohibits the unauthorized use of a person's 2 name or likeness for trade, commercial, or advertising purposes. See Valentine v. C.B.S., Inc., 698 F.2d 430, 433 (11th Cir.1983). In pertinent part, the statute reads as follows: 10 (1) No person shall publish, print, display or otherwise publicly use for purposes of trade or for any commercial or advertising purpose the name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness of any natural person without the express written or oral consent to such use given by: 11 (a) Such person; or 12 (b) Any other person, firm or corporation authorized in writing by such person to license the commercial use of her or his name or likeness; or 13 (c) If such person is deceased, any person, firm or corporation authorized in writing to license the commercial use of her or his name or likeness, or if no person, firm or corporation is so authorized, then by any one from among a class composed of her or his surviving spouse and surviving children. 14 (2) In the event the consent required in subsection (1) is not obtained, the person whose name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness is so used, or any person, firm, or corporation authorized by such person in writing to license the commercial use of her or his name or likeness, or, if the person whose likeness is used is deceased, any person, firm, or corporation having the right to give such consent, as provided hereinabove, may bring an action to enjoin such unauthorized publication, printing, display or other public use, and to recover damages for any loss or injury sustained by reason thereof, including an amount which would have been a reasonable royalty, and punitive or exemplary damages. 15 (3) The provisions of this section shall not apply to: (a) The publication, printing, display, or use of the name or likeness of any person in any newspaper, magazine, book, news broadcast or telecast, or other news medium or publication as part of any bona fide news report or presentation having a current and legitimate public interest and where such name or likeness is not used for advertising purposes; 16 (b) The use of such name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness in connection with the resale or other distribution of literary, musical, or artistic productions or other articles of merchandise or property where such person has consented to the use of her or his name, portrait, photograph, or likeness on or in connection with the initial sale or distribution thereof. 17 Fla. Stat. § 540.08. 18 The issue before this Court is whether the Picture's admittedly unauthorized use of the Tyne Plaintiffs', and their relatives', names and likenesses was for trade, commercial, or advertising purposes, as that phrase is used in § 540.08. Id. This is a similar issue to the one presented in Loft v. Fuller. See Loft, 408 So.2d at 622. In that case, the family of decedent Robert Loft sued the author of a non-fiction book entitled The Ghost of Flight 401. Id. Mr. Loft had been the captain of Eastern Airlines Flight 401 en route from New York to Miami when it crashed into the Florida Everglades on December 28, 1972. Id. In addition to the extensive coverage that the crash itself received, in the succeeding months numerous media outlets reported that people on several subsequent Eastern Airlines flights claimed to have seen apparitions of Flight 401 crewmembers, including Mr. Loft. Id. In 1976, author John Fuller published Flight 401, a nonfiction account of both the crash and the reported poltergeists. A motion picture under the same title was released in 1978. Id. Both portrayed Mr. Loft as a ghost in accordance with the newspaper accounts. The Lofts argued that the unauthorized use of the decedent's name (in the book and movie) and likeness (in the movie) violated Fla. Stat. § 540.08. Id. The Loft court disagreed and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the Lofts' complaint with prejudice. 19 In reaching its conclusion, the Loft court held that § 540.08 is designed to prevent the unauthorized use of a name to directly promote the product or service of the publisher. Id. at 622-23 (emphasis supplied). The court found that the term commercial, as employed in § 540.08, was [not] meant to be construed to bar the use of people's names in [any] sweeping fashion. Id. at 623. Rather, § 540.08 protects individuals from the unauthorized use of their names or likenesses solely in the context of an advertisement or promotion. See id. Thus, the publication [of a person's name or likeness] is harmful not simply because it is included in a publication that is sold for a profit, but rather because of the way it associates the individual's name or his personality with something else. Id. 20 The Tyne Plaintiffs argue that Loft is distinguishable because, in that case, the depiction accorded with the newspaper reports of Loft's reappearances on other flights, thereby clearly entitling it to First Amendment protection. In this case, however, the Tyne Plaintiffs assert that the Picture's depiction of the events at sea, and the relationships between the crew members and their children, had never been reported in the press and were intentionally fabricated. Thus, they argue, the Picture's representations were knowingly false and, therefore, not protected by the First Amendment. 21 The Tyne Plaintiffs also point out that applying Loft to this case presents several problems with regard to § 540.08. First, § 540.08(1) employs the phrase any commercial or advertising purpose. See Fla. Stat. § 540.08. The Tyne Plaintiffs note that if the statute covers only the promotion of a product or service, then the term any commercial ... purpose is rendered surplusage; there would be no need to state both advertising and commercial if the two terms had precisely the same meaning. This reading, they observe, would run counter to the well-known principle that a statute should be read to give effect to each of its provisions and to avoid rendering any terms mere surplusage. See Hawkins v. Ford Motor Co., 748 So.2d 993, 1000 (Fla.1999); See also Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins., 840 So.2d 993, 996 (Fla.2003) (It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.) (citation omitted). 22 The Tyne Plaintiffs also contend that if § 540.08 were read to solely prevent the unauthorized use of a name to directly promote the product or service of the publisher, it would conflict with language in the statute's two exception provisions. Specifically, § 540.08(3)(a) states that the statute does not apply to the use of a person's name or likeness in news or other media if the use implicates public interest and is not for an advertising purpose. See Fla. Stat. § 540.08(3)(a). Phrased positively, § 540.08(3)(a) asserts that the statute continues to apply to (i.e. consent is required for) the use of a person's name or likeness in news or public interest settings that involve advertising. But if § 540.08(1) applies only to advertising or promotional purposes in all cases, then there would be no reason for § 540.08(3)(a) to limit the statute's applicability to uses that involve news media for advertising purposes. Id. Subsection (3)(a)'s exemption provision would be unnecessary since all advertisements are covered by the main rule. 23 Similarly, there would be no need for the second, artistic works, exemption. See § 540.08(3)(b). This provision states that § 540.08 does not apply to the use of a person's name or likeness to resell/redistribute artistic works if the individual consented to the initial sale/distribution of the product. But it makes little sense for § 540.08(3)(b) to exempt the resale of artistic works if § 540.08(1) applies solely to advertisements. Thus, a narrow interpretation of § 540.08(1) as covering only uses that directly promote a product or service would render this second exemption superfluous. 24 Substantial doubt about a question of state law upon which a particular case turns should be resolved by certifying the question to the state supreme court. Jones v. Dillard's, Inc., 331 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir.2003). Because we are uncertain as to the scope of § 540.08 and the applicability of the Loft decision in the circumstances presented here, we certify the following question of law to the Supreme Court of Florida: 25 To what extent does Section 540.08 of the Florida Statutes apply to the facts of this case? 26 In order to assist the court's consideration of the case, the entire record, along with the briefs of the parties, shall be transmitted herewith to the Florida Supreme Court.