Opinion ID: 164068
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of Detention

Text: 47 Cline next argues that, even assuming the initial stop was valid, the detention which followed exceeded the permissible scope of a routine traffic stop. He argues that several minutes elapsed prior to the time when Trooper Grassl actually contacted dispatch and transmitted Cline's driver's license information, during which time Agent Aldine was discussing with other DEA agents what course of action to pursue in their investigation of Cline, all of which was unrelated to the traffic violation. 48 [T]he Fourth Amendment reasonableness of a traffic stop based on probable cause must be judged by examining both the length of the detention and the manner in which it is carried out. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1230 (10th Cir.2001) (en banc). The Supreme Court has stated that, in determining whether a detention is too long, we should examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). Other than the fact that some five minutes elapsed prior to Trooper Grassl's submission of Cline's driver's license to dispatch, nothing else about the detention was unusual or intrusive. Trooper Grassl testified that most traffic stops last between five and ten minutes. Cline's stop lasted approximately eight minutes. While Agent Aldine did, for a few minutes, discuss with DEA agents what course of action to pursue with respect to Cline, a person they suspected was involved in a methamphetamine drug organization they were investigating, those few minutes did not extend the length of the stop beyond that of a normal traffic stop. We accordingly agree with the district court that the detention was reasonable in scope and duration.