Opinion ID: 46147
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: tributable to his actions. Second, the court

Text: Lahood was named in three counts of a selected the wrong date on which to calculate 118-count indictment: one count of conspiracy the amount. Finally, even if the correct date to commit bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. was used, based on the testimony at sentencing § 371 and two counts of bank fraud in viola- the amount should be $23,000. tion of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 2. He pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge. We review de novo the application of the sentencing guidelines, but we review factual findings for clear error. United States v. Haas, 171 F.3d 259, 268 (5th Cir. 1999). A finding 1 “Check kiting is a systematic scheme to de- of fact is not clearly erroneous “[a]s long as it fraud, whereby nonsufficient checks are traded or is plausible in light of the record read as a cross deposited between two or more checking ac- counts in order to artificially inflate the bank ac- 2 count balances. This is accomplished by using the Whether the loss amount is $52,000 or float time in the bank system. Once bank accounts $33,000 is immaterial to Lahood’s sentence, beare artificially inflated, checks that would normally cause the guidelines impart an offense level inbe returned for nonsufficient funds are, in fact, crease of six points if the loss is between $30,000 paid or honored by the issuing banks.” United and $70,000. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (b)(1)(D). Thus, States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554, 563 n.1 (6th Cir. the increase in offense level is the same for each 2006). amount. 2 whole.” United States v. Betancourt, 422 was to defraud banks with a check kiting F.3d 240, 245 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting United scheme. The scheme succeeded, and check States v. Morris, 46 F.3d 410, 419 (5th Cir. kiting by conspiracy members resulted in a loss 1995)). to Cottonport Bank. Even if the particular loss was entirely on account of the actions of In calculating the loss caused by fraud, the Samara or other conspiracy members, it can sentencing court “need only make a reasonable properly be used to sentence Lahood because estimate.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 comment. the conductSScheck kitingSS was both reason- (n.3(C)).3 We give the district court wide lati- ably foreseeable and in furtherance of the tude to determine the amount of loss, United conspiracy. States v. Cothran, 302 F.3d 279, 287 (5th Cir. 2002), because “the sentencing judge is in a B. unique position to assess the evidence and es- Lahood argues that the loss amount must timate the loss based upon that evidence.” be calculated on the date he withdrew from the U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 comment. (n.3(C)). The de- conspiracy, which he claims is January 30, termination of the loss amount is a factual 2003. This argument is unavailing. finding and thus is shielded by the clearly er- roneous rule on appeal. United States v. Glin- The amount of loss resulting from a check sey, 209 F.3d 386, 393 (5th Cir. 2000).4 kiting scheme is measured at the time the scheme is discovered. United States v. Fry- A. denlund, 990 F.2d 822, 825-26 (5th Cir. Lahood contends that of the loss amount in 1993). Restitution following the scheme’s disthe PSR, only $16,000 is directly attributable covery does not warrant a decrease in the loss to his actions. We disagree. amount. Id. at 826. Lahood pleaded guilty of conspiracy to Deaton, who investigated the case for the commit bank fraud. Under the sentencing FBI, testified that at the time of the scheme’s guidelines the conduct of others can be used to discovery the overdraft on Sarama’s account determine the sentencing range if such conduct was approximately $52,000, which was paris reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of tially recovered from other accounts. The rejointly undertaken criminal activity. U.S.S.G. maining overage was paid with a $10,000 cash § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). The goal of the conspiracy deposit and a loan for “20,000 and change.” Pucheu testified that the check kite was dis- covered at the end of January 2003 and that on 3 “[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that January 28 Samara’s account had a shortfall of interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative $33,000 based on the check-kiting scheme. unless it violates the Constitution or a federal The shortfall was repaid with a $10,000 cash statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly errone- deposit and $23,000 loan. Lahood did not ous reading of, that guideline.” Stinson v. United present testimonycontradicting these facts, but States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993). on cross-examination he elicited responses 4 showing that the amount of overdraft on Janu- Glinsey dealt with a loss amount resulting ary 30 was never measured. from fraudulent conduct under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1. That section, however, was consolidated with § 2B1.1 in November 2001. The correct time to measure the loss is not 3 the date on which Lahood withdrew from the D. conspiracy, but the date when the kite is dis- The government asks us to hold that the covered. Also, we have never held that the loss amount for sentencing purposes is the loss must be calculated as of the exact date of float at its highest point during the course of the discovery.5 Viewing the record as a the check kite.7 Because it is not squarely bewhole, one will conclude that it is plausible fore us in this case, we need not, and do not, that a reasonable estimate of the loss at the decide that question. time of the scheme’s discovery was $33,000, so there is no clear error. The judgment of sentence is AFFIRMED.8 C. Lahood argues that even if the district court calculated the loss as of the proper date, the loss amount should be $23,000, because Pu- cheu testified that “it is fair to say that the bank was only out $23,000.” This attempt to alter the meaning of the testimony by removing it from context fails: Pucheu maintained throughout her testimony that the loss amount was $33,000, which was recovered after the scheme’s discovery by Samara’s $10,000 cash deposit and $23,000 loan.6 5 See United States v. Akbani, 151 F.3d 774, 778 (8th Cir. 1998) (“It would make little sense, therefore, to fashion a rule that requires a sentencing court to look only at the exact date on which the scheme is discovered.”). 6 The full testimony is as follows: Q: So I guess it would be fair to say that on that date, in using the government’s snapshot, the bank was out $23,000. 7 “Float” is the amount of money in checks that have not cleared because of the time delay between A: That would be fair, yes. when a check is written and when funds to cover it are deducted from an account. Q: Be a fair statement, right? 8 Lahood also appeals the denial of his motion A: Well, other than the only other thing is the to remain on bond during appeal. Because we af- $10,000 that he deposited. firm, this claim is denied as moot. 4