Opinion ID: 211183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Pursuant to 38 U.S.C. §7292, the Federal Circuit is assigned jurisdiction of (1) issues concerning the validity of statutes or regulations on which the decision of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims depended; (2) issues of interpretation if the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims elaborated the meaning of a statute or regulation and the decision depended on that interpretation; (3) issues of validity or interpretation raised before the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims but not decided, if the decision would have been altered by adopting the position that was urged; and (4) other 'relevant' questions of law. Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc). Our authority to review decisions of the Veterans Court includes plenary review of that court's statutory interpretations, but does not extend to review of the court's application of law to fact, except to the extent an appeal presents a constitutional issue. Prenzler v. Derwinski, 928 F.2d 392, 393 (Fed. Cir. 1991). If a statutory interpretation of the Veterans Court is not in accordance with law, the Federal Circuit has the power to modify or reverse the decision of 05-7066 6 the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims or to remand the matter, as appropriate. 38 U.S.C. §7292(e)(1). The Secretary challenges the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction to receive this appeal, arguing that the basis of the Veterans Court's decision was its factual finding that Mr. Carpenter's work was not related to a claim or claims previously decided by the Board of Veterans' Appeals, the words of the fee agreement, and that findings of fact are excluded from our purview. Mr. Carpenter responds that the Veterans Court misconstrued the statutory provision first . . . final decision in the case, 38 U.S.C. §5904(c), when the court determined that the case in 1997, when the veteran obtained the claimed 100% disability retroactive to when the rating was initially reduced, was not the same case as that in which the Board rejected the claim in 1990. Mr. Carpenter argues that this was an incorrect interpretation of §5904(c). The Veterans Court's interpretation of the first . . . final decision in the case in §5904(c) is a statutory interpretation, and places this appeal within the Federal Circuit's appellate jurisdiction. Statutory Interpretation Formation of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in 1988 was accompanied by statutory authorization of reasonable attorney fees for work performed after the date on which the Board of Veterans' Appeals first makes a final decision in the case, 58 U.S.C. §5904(c)(1). The Senate Report on the Veterans' Judicial Review Act explained that the existing limit on attorney's fees is generally appropriate with respect to the initial claims stages in the sense that applying for VA benefits is a relatively uncomplicated procedure, with the VA generally securing the relevant military records as well as evaluating the merits of the claim. 05-7066 7 S. Rep. No. 100-418, at 63 (1988). The Report explained the statutory purpose of preserving the non-adversarial initial benefits process while providing the veteran with the assistance of an attorney when that process has failed and the veteran is faced with the complexities of appealing, reopening, and/or correcting prior adverse decisions: However, once the BVA renders a decision adverse to the claimant on the merits, the need for the assistance of an attorney is then markedly greater with respect to such issues as seeking a reopening and reconsideration and deciding whether to proceed to court. Thus, continuing to discourage attorney representation at the initial application, decision, and appeal stages would, the Committee believes, appropriately serve to protect claimant's benefits without prejudicing the claimant's ability to obtain effective legal representation at a later point. Id. at 64. In an interpretation of §5904(c), the Federal Circuit, in Stanley v. Principi, 283 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2002), explained that the reopening of a claim for new evidence or clear and unmistakable error is within the statutory entitlement to attorney fees: We conclude that the statute was designed to allow attorneys' fees, after the initial claims proceeding, in connection with proceedings to reopen a claim on the grounds of new and material evidence or clear and unmistakable error. Id. at 1352. This court referred to the congressional purpose to support attorney representation after the veteran has first presented his claim unsuccessfully, id. at 1356, and cited the VA's statement in the Federal Register that VA clearly concluded that the definition of final decision on an issue must be liberal enough to allow attorneys' fees in reopening proceedings. Id. at 1358 (citing 64 Fed. Reg. 2134 (Jan. 13, 1999)). The Veterans Court narrowly interpreted the phrase first . . . final decision in the case, as meaning the first decision by the Board after clear and unmistakable error has been raised, and required specificity of the fee agreement to every phase of prosecution of the claim. However, a veteran's claim based on a specified disability does not become a 05-7066 8 different case at each stage of the often lengthy and complex proceedings, including remands as well as reopening as in Stanley. [A] veteran's overall claim, or case, for benefits is comprised of separate issues. Barrera v. Gober, 122 F.3d 1030, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Clear and unmistakable error is a procedural burden, not a case. See Pierce v. Principi, 240 F.3d 1348, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (The party bringing a CUE challenge to a final RO decision bears the burden of proving that the decision was based on a clear and unmistakable error). In Barrera this court ruled that the issues of service connection and disability rating were both issues within the same case, explaining that a compensation claim contains five necessary elements: (1) veteran's status, (2) present disability, (3) service connection, (4) degree of disability, and (5) effective date. 122 F.3d at 1037; see Vargas-Gonzales v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 222, 226 (2001) (entitlement to a benefit is not complete without the date on which the award begins). The case encompasses all potential claims raised by the evidence, applying all relevant laws and regulations, regardless of whether the claim is specifically labeled, Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In the Bowyer proceedings the degree of disability and the effective date of disability were issues within the same case, for the claim for benefits includes the issues emanating from the disability or injury that led to the claim. Mr. Bowyer's claim for an earlier effective date for his 100% disability is part of the case for which he obtained Mr. Carpenter's legal services and entered into the fee agreements. It is an incorrect reading of the statute to hold that a claim for total disability and a claim challenging the effective date are not the same case. The Veterans Court erred in 05-7066 9 law, in holding that the fee agreements could not apply to any and all of these extensive proceedings, the court discussing the 1995 CUE claim and the 1990 Board decision, all of which were resolved in the veteran's favor upon prosecution by Mr. Carpenter. The statute was designed to authorize compensation for attorney services rendered after the initial proceedings, undertaken by the veteran, have failed. As reflected in congressional as well as precedential statutory interpretation, there may be and normally are various issues involved in a claim for veterans' benefits; these are not separate cases in terms of 38 U.S.C. §5904(c), and do not require separate fee agreements as to each aspect of the veteran's claim. The Veterans Court erred in construing case in §5904(c) to exclude the legal services rendered after the veteran's claim had been denied. The fee agreement applies to this case, in accordance with its terms. The dismissal is reversed; we remand for application of these statutory principles to the agreement between attorney Carpenter and veteran Bowyer. REVERSED AND REMANDED 05-7066 10 United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 05-7066 KENNETH M. CARPENTER, Claimant-Appellant, v. R. JAMES NICHOLSON, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee.