Opinion ID: 2329621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Count IV. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Text: The Restatement (Second) Torts, Sec. 436 provides: Sec. 436. Physical Harm Resulting from Emotional Disturbance (1) If the actor's conduct is negligent as violating a duty of care designed to protect another from a fright or other emotional disturbance which the actor should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, the fact that the harm results solely through the internal operation of the fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from liability. (2) If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to another otherwise than by subjecting him to fright, shock, or other similar and immediate emotional disturbance, the fact that such harm results solely from the internal operation of fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from liability. (3) The rule stated in Subsection (2) applies where the bodily harm to the other results from his shock or fright at harm or peril to a member of his immediate family occuring in his presence. Restatement (Second) Torts, Sec. 436A states: Sec. 436A. Negligence Resulting in Emotional Disturbance Alone If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance. Comment A to the Section explains that Under the rule stated in this Section, the negligent actor is not liable when his conduct results in the emotional disturbance alone, without the bodily harm or other compensable damage. Banyas v. Lower Bucks Hospital, 293 Pa.Super. 122, 437 A.2d 1236 (1981); see also, Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979). The facts set out by appellant do not suffice to uphold a cause of action in this instance. Appellant's list of grievances which make up count IV does not amount to a violation of any duties on the part of appellees. In addition, appellant did not sufficiently prove bodily injury as a result of any negligence by appellees. Without this proof, we are compelled to sustain the directed verdict. Sinn, supra ; Banyas, supra ; see also, Cathcart v. Keene Industrial Association, 324 Pa.Super. 123, 471 A.2d 493 (1984).