Opinion ID: 2589798
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Hovey Voir Dire

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in not performing individualized voir dire concerning prospective jurors' views on capital punishment, in violation of his federal constitutional rights to effective representation, due process, an impartial jury, and a reliable death verdict, citing Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301. We recently held that Proposition 115 abrogated Hovey. ( People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 713, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) Defendant suggests no persuasive reason to revisit this conclusion. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining that group voir dire regarding death qualification was practicable in this case. (Code Civ. Proc, § 223; People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 713-714, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) Contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial court expressly stated on numerous occasions it had discretion to order sequestered voir dire if group voir dire was impracticable. In its view, individual voir dire with inquiry by counsel was appropriate when a juror made an affirmative response to a group inquiry involving a sensitive matter, such as a death- or life-qualifying question. This approach seems reasonable, and defendant fails to assert any persuasive reason why group voir dire was impractical in this case. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 223.) Defendant also contends that the format and questions used by the trial court prevented adequate life-qualifying inquiry in violation of Morgan v. Illinois, supra, 504 U.S. at pages 735-736, 112 S.Ct. 2222. We disagree. Rather, the trial court specifically asked the prospective jurors whether anyone would automatically vote for death on a particular set of findings or on any set of findings. Finally, defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution's challenge for cause of Prospective Juror Esther J. While in chambers, Esther J. volunteered, I couldn't vote for [the] death penalty. I justit's just something that I have never believed in it. A life, whether it's taken by legal means or otherwise, is just wrong; that's how I feel within me. In response to inquiry by the court, Esther J. stated, [O]ne thing that I think is so horrible is when a small child is mutilated and killed, but then I think the person who did it must be absolutely insane and theythey should be put away for life without a chance of getting out again, not that thisdeath, I can'teven for that I can't quite bring myself to feel that that's right. She further stated, I know that if I did vote for capital punishment, I would live with a sense of guilt for the rest of my life. While Esther J. indicated she would try to follow the law, she also agreed with the prosecutor that it was wrong for the state to execute people for any circumstance, and that she could think of no situation where [she] would be able to agree with the death penalty. A prospective juror may be challenged for cause based upon his or her views concerning capital punishment only if those views would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of the juror's duties as defined by the court's instructions and the juror's oath. ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 121, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887, quoting Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.) On appeal, if the prospective juror's responses are equivocal, i.e., capable of multiple inferences, or conflicting, the trial court's determination of that juror's state of mind is binding. { People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 809, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 456, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388.) If there is no inconsistency, and the only question is whether the prospective juror's responses in fact demonstrated an opposition to or bias in favor of the death penalty, we will not set aside the court's determination if it is supported by substantial evidence and hence not clearly erroneous. ( People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1047, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544.) We conclude this prospective juror was properly excused. To the extent Esther J.'s answers were equivocal or conflicting, we are bound by the trial court's determination. To the extent they were not so, substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial court's rejection of prosecution challenges for cause based on other prospective jurors' views on capital punishment has no bearing on the correctness of the trial court's decision to excuse Esther J.