Opinion ID: 2674691
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process Challenge to Consultants’ Fee Law

Text: The District Court also properly dismissed Sherman’s claim that the Town’s imposition of its consultants’ fee law did not provide sufficient procedural due process. Town Code § 48‐3 provides that an applicant for approval of any land development proposal shall reimburse the Town’s reasonable fees. Pursuant to ‐40‐ SHERMAN V. TOWN OF CHESTER § 48‐5(A), “[a]n applicant may appeal, in writing, to the Town Board for a reduction in the required reimbursement amount.” The appeal must be filed within fifteen days from the delivery of the voucher itemizing the services performed and the amount charged for those services. §§ 48‐5(B); § 48‐3(K)‐(L). The itemized voucher is accompanied by a notice, informing the applicant of these requirements. § 48‐3(L). Sherman makes two arguments in support of his due process claim.4 First, he argues that “the Town did not provide Sherman with actual notice of what he was being asked to pay for . . . .” Appellant’s Brief 58. However, the complaint states that while he initially did not receive invoices for the required consultants’ fees, 4 Sherman’s arguments in support of the due process claim raised for the first time in his reply brief are waived. See JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d 418, 428 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A]rguments not made in an appellant’s opening brief are waived even if the appellant pursued those arguments in the district court or raised them in a reply brief.”). We also do not consider Sherman’s argument that the provisions in question violated New York law because the District Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that claim. ‐41‐ SHERMAN V. TOWN OF CHESTER “the Planning Board eventually provided Plaintiff with its consultants’ invoices . . . .” Sherman also argues that the Town did not “allow a pre‐ deprivation hearing when he complained . . . .” Appellant’s Brief 58‐ 59. However, Sherman did not object to the fees in the 15 days required by § 48‐5(A). He received the invoice for the $25,000 fee in February 2010. He paid the fee in March of that year. He did not did not appeal the fee until June 24, 2011 – over a year after the he received the invoices.5 In short, Sherman does not allege that he was not provided with an opportunity to be heard. Rather, he alleges that he did not take advantage of that opportunity. “[I]f reasonable notice and 5 The complaint also references a “timely filed” appeal in 2010. However, the complaint explicitly states that Sherman filed the appeal on June 24, 2011 and does not otherwise mention a 2010 appeal. “Although factual allegations of a complaint are normally accepted as true on a motion to dismiss, that principle does not apply to general allegations that are contradicted by more specific allegations in the [c]omplaint.” DPWN Holdings (USA), Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., ‐‐‐F.3d‐‐‐, 2014 WL 1244184, at  (2d Cir. Mar. 27, 2014) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the appeal’s timeliness is a legal conclusion that we need not accept as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). ‐42‐ SHERMAN V. TOWN OF CHESTER opportunity for a hearing are given, due process will be satisfied, regardless of . . . whether the owner takes advantage of the opportunity for a hearing.” Brody v. Vill. of Port Chester, 434 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Smiga v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 766 F.2d 698, 708‐09 (2d Cir. 1985) (rejecting procedural due process challenge to the imposition of costs and attorney’s fees because the party had an opportunity to be heard “but failed to take advantage of the opportunity”). The District Court therefore properly dismissed this claim.