Opinion ID: 1548631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Jury Instruction On Bribery

Text: Thomas argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on bribery because the court stated that a defendant's lack of actual authority to perform an act was not a defense to receiving or soliciting a bribe to commit that act. We disagree. An appellate court, reviewing jury instructions, will leave the judgment undisturbed so long as the instructions fairly cover the law. Smith v. State, 403 Md. 659, 663, 944 A.2d 505, 507 (2008). We will reverse a judgment and remand for a new trial, however, where the instructions are ambiguous, misleading, or confusing to jurors. See Battle v. State, 287 Md. 675, 684-85, 414 A.2d 1266, 1271 (1980). In this case, our determination as to whether the instruction on bribery fairly covered the law requires interpretation of Section 9-201(c) of the Criminal Law Article (C.L.), which reads as follows: A public employee may not demand or receive a bribe, fee, reward, or testimonial to: (1) influence the performance of the official duties of the public employee; or (2) neglect or fail to perform the official duties of the public employee. See Md.Code (2002, 2008 Supp.) § 9-201(c) of the Criminal Law Article. [5] The statute does not discuss the connection between an employee's actual authority and the act for which the employee was bribed. Instead, the statute refers only to the employee's official duties. In this case, therefore, we must determine if the act for which Thomas solicited a bribe, though outside of his actual authority, was sufficiently related to the performance of his official duties so as to be encompassed by the statute. Although this question is one of first impression for this Court, the Court of Special Appeals has twice before the present case held that a public employee need not have actual authority to act in a particular capacity in order to be guilty of soliciting a bribe in relation to that act. See Richardson v. State, 63 Md.App. 324, 331-33, 492 A.2d 932, 936-37 (1985); Kable v. State, 17 Md.App. 16, 22, 299 A.2d 493, 497 (1973). In Kable, for example, that court held that it was bribery for a public official [to accept money] to act corruptly in a matter to which he bears some official relation.... Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Likewise, several of our sister states, without explicit legislative commands on this issue, have consistently held that a public employee acting within her official capacity need not have authority to complete a specific act in order to be convicted of soliciting a bribe in connection with that act. [6] The Supreme Court of Arizona clearly stated the rationale for interpreting bribery statutes to encompass those activities within a broad definition of an employee's official duties: The reason for making it an offense to bribe a public officer is because of its tendency to pervert justice.... An officer's conduct need not be specifically prescribed by statute in order to constitute official action, and it is sufficient that the duty exists by reason of natural implication from the powers specifically granted by statute, or by reason of the lawful custom or regulation of a department of government.... Once the gist of the crime is apparent, a strict and technical interpretation of an officer's duty becomes as senseless to logic as it is legally deplored by the weight of authority. State v. Hendricks, 66 Ariz. 235, 186 P.2d 943, 947-48 (1947) (citations and quotation marks omitted). We view this line of authority as implicitly introducing an element of reasonableness into the determination of what are the bribed person's official duties. In our view, the reasonableness element involves both consideration of what an objective, outside observer would understand her duties to be, and what the public employee would expect the penal statute to proscribe, or common sense for that matter. Our sister states have permitted a lack of actual authority to stand as a defense only when the act that is the object of bribery is completely and utterly unrelated to a public employee's official duties. Those courts have correctly held that, under such circumstances, while it might be morally improper and may well involve some other crime to give or offer money to [induce] an officer to do an act totally unrelated to his job, it would not be bribery. Hendricks, 186 P.2d at 948. Thus, if a public employee accepts a payment for an act that could not reasonably be construed as related to her official duties, it cannot be considered a bribe. Thomas, in his brief, argues that we should apply this rationale in holding that his solicitation here was entirely outside of his official duties. We disagree. Thomas was a member of the proposal analysis group charged with evaluating bids for the security contract. Even if he lacked the actual authority to award the contract himself, he was intimately involved in the award process as a function of his official position, and it is therefore reasonable to view his solicitation as related to his official duties. Accepting Thomas's position on this issue would mean that only the most powerful public officials, those vested with the unilateral or ultimate power to act, could be convicted under the bribery statute. This is not consonant with the text or purpose of the statute. Thomas's case bears a particular resemblance to Raines v. State, 65 So.2d 558 (Fla.1953). In Raines, the Supreme Court of Florida held that a member of a state licensing board for barbers could be convicted of soliciting a bribe to issue a barber's license, in spite of the fact that he himself could never issue such a license without the acquiescence of other members of the licensing board. [7] Id. at 560. The court noted that it was well settled that an officer cannot be charged and convicted of an act that is entirely outside the scope of his legal duties. Id. Nonetheless, the court upheld the bribery conviction, applying the rationale that the defendant's acts could fairly be termed receiv[ing] anything of value to influence the receiver's official action.... Id. Similarly, Thomas himself was incapable of awarding the security contract, despite his blunt assertion to ISI that he possessed the power to ensure the award in exchange for illicit compensation. But with Thomas's position in the proposal analysis group, he could influence the award to be made by the Director of OCS. The combination of Thomas's official position and his statements to ISI make it reasonable to view this solicitation as related to his official duties. As such, his actions are included within our bribery statute. We hold that a public employee cannot claim as a defense to bribery the lack of actual authority to commit an act where the act is reasonably related to the employee's official duties. The trial court's jury instruction was thus a proper statement of Maryland law on bribery, and does not require a reversal of that court's judgment.