Opinion ID: 195088
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Probation. The debate in which we are embroiled

Text: 1. Probation. today closely tracks an earlier debate over post-revocation probation. The relevant pre-guidelines statute empowered a court to revoke probation, and impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed. 18 U.S.C. 3653 (repealed).6 Under this law, five circuits viewed probation as a kind of sentence that could be imposed after revocation of probation. See Banks v. United States, 614 F.2d 95, 99 n.10 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rodgers, 588 F.2d 651, 654 (8th Cir. 1978); Nicholas v. United States, 527 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lancer, 508 F.2d 719, 730-32 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 989 (1975); Smith v. United States, 505 F.2d 893, 895 (5th Cir. 1974). The Tenth Circuit and a district court in the Fourth Circuit took the opposite view. See United States v. Martin, 786 F.2d 974, 976 (10th Cir. 1986) (declining to overrule Fox v. United States, 354 F.2d 752 (10th Cir. 1965)); United States v. Buchanan, 340 F. Supp. 1285, 1288- (explicating historical development). 6We consider it significant that no court, on either side of this debate, suggested that the statute's use of the word revoke might require a ban on the reimposition of a nondetentive term in sentencing defendants who had violated probation. Instead, the debate hinged on the word sentence specifically, on whether probation could be conceived as a kind of sentence. 17 89 (E.D.N.C. 1972). When the smoke cleared, the weight of authority heavily favor[ed] the conclusion that reimposition of probation is permissible upon revocation of probation. United States v. Urdaneta, 771 F. Supp. 28, 32 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (canvassing pre-guidelines case law). Under the new sentencing regime, the statute treating with post-revocation probation deals much more directly with the vexed question of reimposition. It empowers a court to revoke the sentence of probation and impose any other sentence that was available at the time of the initial sentencing. 18 U.S.C. 3565(a) (1988) (emphasis supplied). Although the question is not before us, and we, accordingly, do not rule definitively on it, it seems probable that Congress intended to depart from prevailing pre-guidelines practice and forbid reimposition of probation following the revocation of a term of probation.7 We draw this inference from the insertion of the word other, on the theory that a change in statutory language should be read, if possible, to have some effect. American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2475 (1992). It thus appears quite likely that the drafters of section 3565 were aware of the preguidelines case law and knew how to design a statute in such a 7Even if Congress intended to preclude reimposition of probation following revocation of a term of probation, that intention has no implications for supervised release. Under the Sentencing Reform Act, a term of probation may not be imposed when a defendant is sentenced to imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(3). Since a combined sentence is prohibited ab initio, it would make little sense to allow a combined form of sentencing upon revocation of probation. 18 way as to address its impact head-on.