Opinion ID: 2548176
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of sections 801 and 1107

Text: The Attorney General contends that the expert testimony of Jeri Darr was admissible under both sections 801 and 1107. Defendant, however, argues the Attorney General cannot now rely on section 801 because it was not raised either at trial or in the Court of Appeal. If a judgment rests on admissible evidence it will not be reversed because the trial court admitted that evidence upon a different theory, a mistaken theory, or one not raised below. (See People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 944, 277 Cal.Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950; see People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 972, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171.) As we said in People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704: `No rule of decision is better or more firmly established by authority, nor one resting upon a sounder basis of reason and propriety, than that a ruling or decision, itself correct in laws, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for the wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion.' ( Id. at p. 976, 17 Cal. Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704, quoting D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 19, 112 Cal.Rptr. 786, 520 P.2d 10.) That principle does not apply, however, when the new theory was not supported by the record made at the first hearing and would have necessitated the taking of considerably more evidence, [or when] the defendant had no notice of the new theory and thus no opportunity to present evidence in opposition. ( Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 137-138 219 Cal.Rptr. 186, 707 P.2d 248 (lead opn. of Kaus, J.).) [7] That exception does not apply here because the evidence as to admissibility was fully developed in the trial court. (See Green, at p. 138, 219 Cal.Rptr. 186, 707 P.2d 248.) Defendant argues that the testimony of expert witness Jeri Darr, the prosecutor's closing argument to the jury, and the jury instructions were based on the premise that Darr's testimony was offered under section 1107; if the evidence had been offered under section 801, he says, he could have raised appropriate objections. With respect to expert witness Jeri Darr, neither she nor the prosecutor mentioned the term battered women's syndrome during the prosecutor's direct examination of her; the term was mentioned only in questions to Darr by defense counsel on cross-examination and by the trial court, and a brief reference to it occurred on the prosecutor's redirect examination of Darr in response to defense counsel's questions. [8] As to the prosecutor's closing argument, it was based on Darr's testimony that when domestic violence victims testify they tend to retract or minimize the violence that occurred. The prosecutor did not claim that defendant had beaten the victim before or that defendant fit the profile of a batterer. Thus, neither Darr's testimony nor the prosecutor's argument were premised on the admissibility of her testimony under section 1107. Defendant, of course, was free to raise at trial the asserted lack of admissibility under section 801. Moreover, in this court, defendant has had a chance to present his arguments on the testimony's admissibility under that section. Therefore, defendant cannot complain that the prosecutor's failure to mention section 801 as a basis for admitting the expert evidence deprived him of the opportunity to object to its admissibility. The instruction in question, CALJIC No. 9.35.1, advised the jury: Battered women's syndrome research ... begins with the assumption that physical abuse has occurred, and seeks to describe and explain the common reactions of women to that experience. As distinguished from that research approach, you are to presume the defendant innocent.... Defendant argues that by stating that research begins with the assumption that physical abuse has occurred, CALJIC No. 9.35.1 implicitly assumes the defendant is guilty. We disagree; the instruction expressly says that the jury is not to assume guilt, but to presume the defendant innocent. (See CALJIC No. 10.69 [instructions on rape trauma syndrome and child abuse accommodation syndrome]; People v. Gilbert (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1386-1387, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 660.)