Opinion ID: 2387732
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: scope of privilege created by krs 311.377(2).

Text: The majority has held that the privilege created in KRS 311.377(2) is limited to suits against peer review entities and has no application to medical malpractice suits. This statement exposes the flawed logic with which the majority reached its decision. The language in the statute is unambiguous. It simply states that peer review materials shall not be admissible in any civil action. The majority seems to think that this is the same as the statement in any civil action against a peer review entity. I cannot agree. KRS 311.377(1) creates a qualified privilege for the acts of all persons while involved in the peer review process. KRS 311.377(2) makes all records in the peer review process confidential. The majority believes that this confidentiality only extends to suits against the peer reviewers brought by a party aggrieved with the peer review process itself. Since peer reviewers already possess a qualified privilege against lawsuits, the majority today holds that the purpose of KRS 311.377(2) is to make peer review records confidential in those lawsuits which allege that the peer reviewers acted in bad faith. Accordingly, under the majority interpretation, peer review records are only protected when the peer review process itself is alleged to have been undertaken in bad faith. This result certainly defies common sense in that if a party is claiming that the peer reviewers acted in bad faith, isn't this the one circumstance under which peer review records would be highly probative? In fact, the peer review records would be the only documentary evidence of the peer reviewers' bad faith. I believe that the majority's strained logic is incorrect. The majority believes that because subsection 1 is limited to persons who apply for or receive staff privileges, the confidentiality requirements of subsection 2 only apply in cases involving this same class of persons. The only analysis offered to support this reading is that it is reasonable to conclude that the General Assembly intended that the subject matter of Subsection 2 should be no broader in scope than the subject of Subsection 1. Op. at 469. Exactly why it is reasonable to make this conclusion is noticeably absent from the majority opinion. There is no reason to think that the General Assembly did not intend the literal meaning of the words of the statute. By reading KRS 311.377, I reach the conclusion that subsection 1 provides a qualified privilege to the peer reviewers and subsection 2 makes the peer review records confidential in all civil actions. Under my reading, both sections of the law operate in a coherent and logical fashion. Under the majority reading, the only purpose of subsection 2 is to make the peer review records unavailable in the one proceeding in which they would be most relevant. I believe that the majority's opinion is also undercut by certain language within statute itself. The last sentence of subsection 2 states that [t]his subsection shall not apply to any proceedings or matters governed exclusively by federal law or federal regulation. This is an unusual qualifier to place upon a privilege which is limited to those who sought or received staff privileges as described by subsection 1. Under what circumstances would a physician be involved in a proceeding that was governed exclusively by federal law or federal regulation against a peer review committee? The answer is there are extremely few such proceedings. The only conclusion which I can draw from this sentence is that the General Assembly envisioned other types of actions than the one asserted by the majority and sought to avoid any federal pre-emption problems by the inclusion of this sentence. I find support for my view within the enactment of the statute as well. The statement of intent by the General Assembly makes clear that this law was passed to protect the public and to encourage open and candid peer review. Certainly an element of protecting the integrity of the peer review process is the qualified immunity which subsection 1 grants to those involved in the peer review process. As the language of the General Assembly clearly states, KRS 311.377 is designed to protect open and candid peer review. As any person who has ever been called upon to make a candid evaluation is aware, the degree of candor increases exponentially when anonymity is assured. Certainly protection from lawsuits is necessary to encourage the peer review process. However, no less necessary is the ability to speak in a forthright fashion about one's colleagues in a manner that might not be entirely favorable. It is precisely this speech which subsection 2 is designed to protect. Dangers come in forms besides lawsuits. Subsection 2 assures peer reviewers that their comments will be kept confidential within the committee making the relevant determination. The majority suggests that to provide an absolute privilege with respect to peer review documents would be unreasonable. Accordingly, the majority is permitted to modify the language of the law to the extent needed to make it reasonable. This is not the correct standard. This Court has a duty to accord to words of a statute their literal meaning unless to do so would lead to an absurd or wholly unreasonable conclusion. Reda Pump Co., A Division of TRW, Inc. v. Finck, Ky., 713 S.W.2d 818, 820 (1986) rev'd on other grounds Caterpillar, Inc. v. Brock, Ky., 915 S.W.2d 751 (1996), citing Dept. of Revenue v. Greyhound Corp., Ky., 321 S.W.2d 60, 61 (1959). I am not necessarily in disagreement with the majority's contention that KRS 311.377(2) creates an unreasonable protection for peer reviewers. However, the case law is clear that a law must be more than unreasonable before we may intervene and strike it. A law must be absurd or wholly unreasonable. Id. By accepting the majority's new-found and expansive interpretation of this doctrine, a virtual Pandora's box has been opened. Under this new test asserted by the majority, any law which is merely unreasonable in its perceived result can be stricken. By fashioning this review standard, the Court arrogates the power to wander through duly enacted legislation and strike that which leads to an unreasonable result. Op. at 470. To strike offensive legislation, this Court would only need to postulate a given set of facts under which the result obtained could be unreasonable. The majority states that an absolute privilege is unreasonable under the newly formulated test and as such must be modified to a reasonable result. What the majority fails to discuss is what makes the privilege unreasonable. The majority asserts that since the medical practitioners were not the intended beneficiaries of KRS 311.377, any benefit to them is unreasonable. Accordingly, under the majority perspective, a statute which benefits any party who is not the intended beneficiary is unreasonable and must be read to remove the benefit from that party. Whether the collateral effect of legislation benefits anyone other than the intended beneficiary is irrelevant. In this case the intended beneficiary is the peer review process. If as a result of protecting the peer review process, the collateral effect is that plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions are denied access to the proceedings and findings of a peer review committee, that is simply a legislative decision which we are bound to honor even if the result is not one with which we agree. Whether, as the majority asserts, KRS 311.377 tilts the legal playing field against those who would seek to discover peer review records is of no moment in discerning the meaning of this law. Op. at 470. Whether KRS 311.377 creates an unbalanced playing field is inappropriate for this Court to consider in construing a statute. [4] Rather, it is an appropriate issue for interested parties to argue before a legislative body. Perhaps the legislature sought to tilt the playing field against one side over the other. That would seem to me to be a political question that this Court should defer to the legislature. Yet, the majority apparently feels compelled to ignore the legislative intent expressed in the preamble to the enactment of this law and to replace it with the majority's own idea of that which is correct. As with any case involving statutory interpretation, our duty is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. We are not at liberty to add or subtract from the legislative enactment nor discover meaning not reasonably ascertainable from the language used. Beckham v. Board of Educ., Ky., 873 S.W.2d 575, 577 (1994), citing Gateway Construction Co. v. Wallbaum, Ky., 356 S.W.2d 247 (1962). While this body is charged with acting as a check on the two other co-equal branches of the government of the Commonwealth, we must not overstep our constitutional duties by replacing the General Assembly's judgment with our own. I would resolve the problem the majority opinion creates by giving the language of the statute its natural and normal meaning. The General Assembly wrote the words, in any civil action, and that is the meaning which I would give to the law. I fear that in this matter, we have been substituting our judgment for that of the legislature for far too long.