Opinion ID: 267588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Radio Transcript

Text: 15 Sabena contends that the radio transcript, designated as exhibit 15, should have been excluded on the ground that it was hearsay and no foundation had been laid for its admission. The transcript is several stages removed from the conversation which is alleged to have taken place on February 13, 1955. The conversation was recorded at the time; a transcript was made from the recording as part of the Italian government's investigation of the crash and was included as an appendix to its report; exhibit 15 is a copy of that transcript. Analysis of its admissibility requires tracing back this chain: 16 First, if the appendix to the accident report would have been admissible, was exhibit 15 admissible? Second, if the original recording would have been admissible, would the appendix have been admissible? Third, would the original recording have been admissible? In addition, a further issue arises from the fact that Judge Murphy did not consider the exhibit's admissibility de novo but based his ruling on a pre-trial ruling by Judge Bonsal that it was admissible. 17 The first of these questions is the most easily answered. The only objection relevant to this link in the chain is that the exhibit was not certified as required by Rule 44(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But Sabena conceded that there is 'no discrepancy' between the exhibit and the appendix to the Itallian government's report. Certification could have done no more. Accordingly, exhibit 15 was admissible if the appendix would have been admissible. 18 Concessions by Sabena also go far toward answering the second question-- whether the appendix would have been admissible. Sabena's answers to pre-trial interrogatories establish that the transcript was indeed an appendix to an accident report and that the report was compiled by the Ministerio Difesa Aeronautica of the Italian government. 19 That a report has been prepared by a government official or agency does not always require its admissibility. But in most cases in which such reports have been excluded, there has been reason to suspect bias, Hoffman v. Palmer,129 F.2d 976, 991 (2 Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 109, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943), or the report has contained conclusions or hearsay, Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930), or, in the case of Civil Aeronautics Board accident reports, exclusion has been required by statute, 49 U.S.C. 1441(e). See generally 153 A.L.R. 163. 20 Whatever may be in the report as a whole, no conclusions are drawn in the appendix. Nor does Sabena claim that the Italian government was biased in this matter. To the extent that the transcript gives no information not obtainable from the recording, we therefore see no reason for excluding it if the recording itself would have been admissible. 21 Sabena argues that the transcript does go beyond the recording in certain respects. The most important of these are the notation of the times of transmission; the parenthetical notes, of which one appears at 1848 in the portion quoted above; and the identification of the parties who are transmitting. But the times could be obtained from the recording without difficulty, and the notations do little more than summarize the messages with which they are associated. It is of course possible that the method used to interpolate times was unreliable, but the speculative possibility of error or dishonesty on the part of the government agency in performing such a mechanical task is too minimal to give reason for excluding the document. See Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438, 446 (2 Cir. 1940). 2 22 The identity of the parties does present a problem but not one relevant to this second question, where we assume that the recording would have been admissible. It is sufficient here to say that the identity of the Sabena flight is explicit and that of the controller is implicit in the text of the messages. 23 With respect to the recording itself, we think that it was admissible in view of the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1732: 24 'In any court of the United States and in any court established by Act of Congress, any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event, shall be admissible as evidence of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event, if made in regular course of any business, and if it was the regular course of such business to make such memorandum or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence, or event or within a reasonable time thereafter. 25 'All other circumstances of the making of such writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but such circumstances shall not affect its admissibility. 26 'The term 'business,' as used in this section, includes business, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind.' 27 The archetype of the records to which 1732 was intended to apply is the typical business accounting record, a routine factual entry normally made without reference to anticipated litigation. Because such entries are likely to be accurate and. perhaps more important, because modern business organization makes it impractical to produce in court all the persons directly responsible for the entry, 1732 and similar state statutes were enacted. See Judge Frank's extensive discussion of such legislation in Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 F.2d at 983 et seq. 28 The statute's rationale is equally applicable to the recording here involved, which was a simultaneous recording made as part of a regular air control procedure. From the deposition and testimony of Captain Pierre Dils of Sabena and the undisputed testimony of the plaintiff's expert, Captain Richard Hettenbaugh, it appears that major airports were required to keep either a written or a recorded telecommunications log. The latter which automatically records transmissions to and from the controller, was in use in Italy in 1955. 29 The recording thus was at least the equivalent of a regular written journal kept by the Rome controller 3 and was a contemporaneous business record. That is all that 1732 purports to require. Despite the section's express reference to hearsay, however, courts have been cautious about allowing admissions of business records where the information was obtained only through hearsay. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 212 (9 Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975, 78 S.Ct. 1139, 2 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1958); United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863, 869 (2 Cir. 1948) (L. Hand, J.). 30 The leading case in thus limiting the admission of business records is Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930), 4 in which the report of a police officer was held inadmissible because it was based in large part on the volunteered statements of bystanders. But the statements involved in this case are not the gratuitous reports of persons not involved in the business. If the plane crews were not required to make such reports, it certainly was at least the regular business practice for them to do so. To such reports Johnson v. Lutz does not apply. See Pekelis v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 187 F.2d 122, 130-131, 23 A.L.R.2d 1349 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951, 71 S.Ct. 1020, 95 L.Ed. 1374 (1951); United States v. Grayson, supra (dicta); Note, 48 ColumL .Rev. 920, 926 (1948). Such reports should be as reliable as the typical business record, 5 and they surely are just the kind of hearsay which, in the words of the statute, 'may be shown to affect (the record's) weight, but    shall not affect its admissibility.' 31 Moreover, even if the principle of Johnson v. Lutz is assumed to apply here, the objection based on it can be met on its own terms. Since the objection applies only to 'multiple hearsay,' it does not apply to the 'rumore indefinible' or to the interpolation of times. Nor does it apply to the statements of the Rome controller, including the identification of their source that is implicit in them; the recording is at least as satisfactory as a written record kept by the controller, and his statements and identification should be no less admissible for having been tape recorded rather than written down. 32 The transmissions from the Swissair flight, on the other hand, are hearsay, but it is difficult to see how Sabena was prejudiced by their admission. They tend to establish, if anything, that the Viterbo beacon was operating. Since one of Sabena's principal contentions to the jury was that its plane could have picked up the Viterbo beacon at 1850, it could only have been to its advantage to establish that the beacon was operating. 33 The transmissions from the Sabena plane also are hearsay, but if we can assume that they did in fact come from that plane, they fall within the exception for admissions of an opposing party and therefore do not render the record inadmissible. Missouri Pacific RR v. Austin, 292 F.2d 415, 421 (5 Cir. 1961). There was a tentative identification by Captain Dils, who testified that he had listened to the recording and was 'practically sure' that he recognized the voice of the particular crew member. In addition, the context of the transmissions makes it highly unlikely, to say the least, that a transmission purportedly coming from the Sabena plane did not in fact do so. We think that the source of the transmissions was sufficiently identified. 34 The final issue with respect to admission of exhibit 15 arises from the fact that Judge Murphy appears to have admitted it solely on the basis of Judge Bonsal's pre-trial ruling. Whether that was a sound basis for admitting the exhibit is a nice question. It is of course customary for a district judge to follow an earlier ruling by one of his brothers in the same litigation, though he is not bound to do so. Dictograph Products Co. v. Sonotone Corp.,230 F.2d 131 (2 Cir.), rehearing denied, 231 F.2d 867, petition for cert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 883, 77 S.Ct. 104, 1 L.Ed.2d 82 (1956). But despite Professor Moore's flat statement that admissibility may be ruled on at pre-trial, 3 Moore, Federal Practice P16.16, at p. 1122 (1964), the efficacy of such rulings necessarily is limited by the first judge's inability to foresee the circumstances of the trial which may be relevant to admissibility. Cf. Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Frank, 227 F.Supp. 948 (D. Conn. 1964). 35 We need not resolve that issue here, however, for this is not a case in which admissibility was a matter within the district court's discretion. We conclude that in this case 1732 required admission of exhibit 15. 36 The district court's discretion with respect to 1732 is a discretion in judging whether the document offered 'has an inherent probability of trustworthiness.' Central RR v. Jules S. Sottnek Co., 258 F.2d 85, 88 (2 Cir. 1958). It is therefore a necessary premise for its exercise that the document's trustworthiness be in doubt. See Shenker v. United States, 322 F.2d 622, 627 (2 Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 907, 84 S.Ct. 659, 11 L.Ed.2d 606 (1964) (entry made by employee of party); Puggioni v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 286 F.2d 340 (2 Cir. 1961) (same); Central RR v. Jules S. Sottnek Co., supra (accident report based on bystanders' volunteered statements and containing conclusions as to the accident's cause). As we have attempted to demonstrate, however, nothing in the nature or content of exhibit 15 gives any reason to doubt its trustworthiness and Sabena in all of its argument has suggested no extrinsic circumstances which would raise such doubt. To exclude such a document as exhibit 15 on the mere speculative possibility of error of fraud would frustrate the evident purpose of the statute. 37 We therefore conclude that there was no error in receiving exhibit 15.