Opinion ID: 1872182
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues relating to Twin County

Text: Gossett argues that the trial court erred in entering the summary judgment in favor of Twin County because, he argues, he presented sufficient evidence to create a jury question on the issue of Twin County's duty to provide a safe workplace and the issue of contributory negligence. We agree. First, Gossett contended in the trial court that the relationship between him and Twin County was that of servant and master, thereby charging Twin County with a duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace. We have stated: Under the common law the master is responsible for his own negligence and want of care and this may appear from his failure to furnish proper machinery and materials for the work, or from the employment of incompetent servants, or from a failure to make proper rules or establish a proper method for the conduct of his business. Chamberlain v. Southern Ry., 159 Ala. 171, 175, 48 So. 703 (1909). An employer/master has a duty to provide employees/servants with a reasonably safe work environment; this duty exists both by statute and under the common law. See, Bellew v. Sloan, 536 So.2d 917, 918 (Ala.1988). However, if one stands in the relationship of a subcontractor to a general contractor at a job site, the general contractor, as an invitor, has only a duty to protect the subcontractor invitee from defects or dangers that are hidden from the subcontractor and about which the general contractor either knows or ought to know. Secrist v. Mark IV Constructors, Inc., 472 So.2d 1015, 1019 (Ala.1985). Thus, it is necessary to determine whether Twin County and Gossett were general contractor and subcontractor or were master and servant before one can determine what duty Twin County owed to Gossett. Proof of a master and servant relationship is tested by the degree of control the alleged master retains over the alleged servant. Sufficient control to establish a master/servant relationship exists where the alleged master retains the right to control the manner in which the alleged servant conducts the work. Solmica of the Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Braggs, 285 Ala. 396, 232 So.2d 638 (1970). Where the alleged master retains merely the right to inspect the work as it progresses, in order to ascertain if it is completed according to plans or specifications, and the right to stop work improperly done, the master and servant relationship is not created. Pate v. United States Steel Corp., 393 So.2d 992, 995 (Ala.1981). In addition, [i]t is the reserved right of control rather than its actual exercise that furnishes the true test of whether the relation between the parties is that of an independent contractor or of employer and employeemaster and servant. Hodges & Co. v. Albrecht, 288 Ala. 281, 284, 259 So.2d 829 (Ala.1972). On the issue of the degree of Twin County's control over Gossett, it was disputed whether Twin County's representative, Garner, ordered Gossett to run the cable strand. Moreover, there existed discrepancies in the testimony of Gossett, Nunnelly, and Garner with respect to a payment made by Garner to Gossett on the day of the accident. Garner testified that he wrote Gossett a check for $100 prior to the accident so that Gossett would have gas money. Both Nunnelly and Gossett put the amount of the check at $250, or a week's wages. Gossett also testified that Garner had, on several occasions, given him direct instructions and orders. Garner testified that he merely assigned tasks to subcontractors and reviewed their progress. These discrepancies created genuine issues of material fact on the issue of whether Gossett was a servant of Twin County at the time of the accident. Moreover, viewing the evidence most favorably to Gossett, one could logically infer that Gossett was the servant of Twin County in running the cable strand and that Twin County breached a duty to provide Gossett with safe working conditions. Thus, the trial court erred in concluding that Gossett was an independent subcontractor in relation to Twin County as his general contractor at the time of the accident. This was a jury question. Therefore, the trial court's conclusion that Twin County breached no duty to Gossett, as based on the legal standards applicable to a general contractor and subcontractor relationship, is equally flawed. Finally, we also agree with Gossett that the trial court could not properly base the summary judgment for Twin County on a conclusion that Gossett was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. In Empiregas, Inc., of Belle Mina v. Suggs, 567 So.2d 271 (Ala.1990), we stated the following about contributory negligence: `In order to sustain a finding of contributory negligence as a matter of law, there must be a finding that the plaintiff put himself in danger's way, Mackintosh Co. v. Wells, 218 Ala. 260, 118 So. 276 (1928), and a finding that the plaintiff appreciated the danger confronted, Wilson v. Alabama Power Co., 495 So.2d 48 (Ala.1986); Marquis v. Marquis, 480 So.2d 1213 (Ala.1985); Baptist Medical Center v. Byars, 289 Ala. 713, 271 So.2d 847 (1972); Mackintosh v. Wells, supra. Moreover, it must be demonstrated that the plaintiff's appreciation of the danger was a conscious appreciation at the moment the incident occurred. Marquis v. Marquis, supra; Elba Wood Prod., Inc. v. Brackin, [356 So.2d 119 (Ala.1978)]. Mere `heedlessness' is insufficient to warrant a finding of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Decatur Light, Power & Fuel Co. v. Newsom, 179 Ala. 127, 59 So. 615 (1912).' 567 So.2d at 273 (quoting Central Alabama Elec. Coop. v. Tapley, 546 So.2d 371, 381 (Ala.1989)). In the present case, the evidence, taken in a light most favorable to Gossett, indicated that he was merely heedless in carrying the strand cable up before the pole was prepared or in failing to ensure that adequate traffic safety controls were in place. In addition, the record discloses conflicting evidence as to whether Gossett appreciated the danger of his actions at the moment the accident occurred. Gossett testified that it is safer to prepare the pole and then return to the ground to pick up the cable strand to be attached, rather than to do as he did, i.e., to carry the strand up on the trip to prepare the pole. However, he testified that he had seen cable technicians do it both ways and that he believed that it was acceptable practice to carry the cable strand up initially. The evidence was disputed as to what would have been reasonably acceptable practice. Further, the evidence indicated that at the time of the accident Gossett's attention was on preparing the pole, while Salter was on the ground attending to traffic control. From the evidence, one might logically infer that Gossett, at the moment of the accident, lacked an appreciation of any danger posed by his actions in relation to traffic control and traffic passing below him. Unless the evidence submitted on a summary judgment motion is wholly without adverse inferences or is free from any doubt, summary judgment must not be entered, but the issues must be submitted to the jury. Yates v. De Mo, 270 Ala. 343, 345, 118 So.2d 924 (1960). We find that the evidence respecting Twin County is neither free from doubt on the issue of contributory negligence nor without inferences adverse to Twin County. Therefore, the judgment in favor of defendant Nunnelly is affirmed, and the judgment in favor of defendant Twin County is reversed and the cause is remanded for trial as to that defendant. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. HORNSBY, C.J., and MADDOX, ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS, STEAGALL and INGRAM, JJ., concur. HOUSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.