Opinion ID: 1228357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the scope of the director's regulatory powers

Text: The Director of Fisheries' regulatory powers are set forth principally in three statutes, RCW 75.08.012; .020; .080. These statutes are clearly designed to allow the director to enact regulations to conserve the state fishery in order to preserve and enhance the industry's economic viability. The director's duties in this regard are set forth in mandatory terms in RCW 75.08.012. It shall be the duty and purpose of the department of fisheries to preserve, protect, perpetuate and manage the food fish and shellfish in the waters of the state and the offshore waters thereof to the end that such food fish and shellfish shall not be taken, possessed, sold or disposed of at such times and in such manner as will impair the supply thereof. For the purpose of conservation, and in a manner consistent therewith, the department shall seek to maintain the economic well-being and stability of the commercial fishing industry in the state of Washington. The more specific provisions of RCW 75.08.020 and .080 [9] are consistent with this general mandate. In order to effectively exercise the mandatory duties imposed upon him by statute, it is essential that this court recognize the power of the director to enact regulations which he finds necessary to preserve and promote the fisheries resource in light of the new demands placed upon it by virtue of federal court decisions which are binding upon the state. As pointed out by Justice Horowitz in his dissent in Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wn.2d 677, 693-94, 565 P.2d 1151 (1977): United States v. Washington, supra at 389-93, 399-412, 413-20, and particularly at page 416, held that the Department of Fisheries and its director had the authority and were indeed obligated under the supremacy clause to refrain from violating the District Court injunction. Indeed, the defendants, including the Department of Fisheries and its director, are specifically ordered to fully observe and to the best of their ability carry out the provisions and purposes of the treaties cited in paragraph 1 of the Findings of Fact, and conform their regulatory action and enforcement to each and all of the standards set forth in Final Decision #1. United States v. Washington, supra at 414. This provision is now final in the federal court system and the Department of Fisheries and its director are bound by the injunction. Moreover, as United States v. Washington, supra at 402 states: Because the right of each treaty tribe to take anadromous fish arises from a treaty with the United States, that right is reserved and protected under the supreme law of the land, does not depend on state law, is distinct from rights or privileges held by others, and may not be qualified by any actions of the state. To fail to recognize this binding ruling at this point will only further imperil the resource itself and insure that the State will lose a substantial amount of control over this vital resource to the federal government and those agencies which ultimately are vested with control of the treaty fishery. Such a result is certainly counterproductive. The refusal of our state courts to accept as binding the pronouncements of federal courts with regard to the federal rights of treaty fishermen has already contributed to a substantial loss of state control over the state fisheries resource. The federal government has now entirely preempted the power of the states to manage the offshore fishery beyond the territorial limits of the state. See Northwest Trollers Ass'n v. Moos, 89 Wn.2d 1, 568 P.2d 793 (1977). Federal enforcement officers also patrol our inland waters, utilizing the federal contempt power to enforce federal rights which our state courts have chosen in many instances to ignore. The state fisheries director has himself been placed in personal jeopardy by the federal court for alleged refusal to comply with its orders. The state fisheries resource has suffered considerably from the absence of a consistent comprehensive management policy throughout this lengthy legal entanglement. More importantly, this controversy has escalated to the point at which the lives and property of individual citizens are in peril. It would be painfully naive to assert that this court's reluctance to recognize the validity of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts with regard to the treaty fishery is not at least in part responsible for this situation. In Gillnetters the majority recognized that the director possesses the power to allocate fish between competing claimants for the purpose of conservation. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, supra at 683. It held, however, that this power did not include authority to allocate fish between competing claimants of the same class. As the previous discussion shows, treaty and nontreaty fishermen are not of the same class and the Gillnetters decision is therefore not controlling. Gillnetters also mistakenly rests upon the proposition that the United States Supreme Court has not construed the treaty provision in a manner which is binding upon the State. This is also incorrect. Puyallup II expressly holds that the treaty clause entitles its beneficiaries to take a fair portion of the harvestable fish. The subsequent decision in United States v. Washington, supra , is expressly based upon the controlling rule of law enunciated in Puyallup II. This court is, of course, not free to interpret the treaty clause in a manner inconsistent with Puyallup II. The allocation ordered against the State by the District Court in United States v. Washington, supra , has been held to be within the trial court's discretion under the fair portion rule by the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court has denied certiorari, making that judgment final and binding upon the State as a party to that action. Given all this, the simple fact is that, if the director is not allowed to promulgate regulations for the conservation of the fishery which reflect the competing rights of treaty and nontreaty fishermen, someone else will. The regulations promulgated by the department under these statutes have for many years resulted in allocation of fish between competing classes of user groups such as commercial and noncommercial, seiners and gillnetters, etc. A new class now exists which it is both logical and necessary that the director take into account. To hold that he is without power to do so is both inconsistent with established law and will but assure that the legislative purpose set forth in RCW 75.08.012 will be entirely frustrated. The words conservation and management in the applicable statutes are broad enough to encompass the principles of allocation embodied in the challenged regulations. Allocation is an important factor in the conservation of fish runs. Where a resource is not presently plentiful enough to satisfy all needs, a restriction on withdrawal must be instituted in order to conserve the renewable resource and insure its availability in the future. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 87 Wn.2d 417, 423-24, 553 P.2d 113 (1976) (Utter, J., dissenting). The majority opinion misconstrues cases and ignores binding precedent. It reaches a result which can only make a poor situation much worse for all citizens of our state. I dissent. HOROWITZ, J., concurs with UTTER, J.