Opinion ID: 1609293
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Invocation or Assertion of the Right to Counsel

Text: Unless the prophylactic rule set forth in Michigan v. Jackson applies, defendant can make a valid waiver of his right to counsel as long as it is knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Patterson v. Illinois , Michigan v. Harvey , Montoya v. Collins . In Michigan v. Jackson , the Court held the prophylactic rule was triggered only after a defendant's assertion... of his right to counsel. 475 U.S. at 636, 106 S.Ct. at 1411. Later, in Patterson v. Illinois , the Court pointed out the defendant in that case was not entitled to the additional protection provided by the bright-line rule of Michigan v. Jackson , because he had not retained, or accepted by appointment, a lawyer to represent him at the time he was questioned by authorities nor did he later request counsel during the interrogation itself. In the instant case, defendant does not allege, nor do we find, that he requested counsel during the interrogation itself. Therefore, the issue to be resolved is whether defendant had previously asserted or invoked his right to counsel at the initial appearance. The entire colloquy of the appearance is as follows: BY THE COURT: Oscar Carter, Forcible rape, two counts, one count of sexual battery, one count of oral sexual battery, can you afford a lawyer? BY THE DEFENDANT: No. BY THE COURT: Public defender. Record. BY MS. McMICHAELS: Three misdemeanor arrests. We have no convictions on our computer. The state recommends $300,000 on each charge of forcible rape, $300,000 on oral sexual battery and $70,000 on the second degree battery. BY THE COURT: $75,000 on each count of forcible rape, $3,000 on second degree battery and $10,000 on oral sexual battery. We do not believe the above constitutes an invocation or assertion of the right to counsel sufficient to trigger the application of Michigan v. Jackson . Something more than mere mute acquiescence in the appointment of counsel is necessary to show the defendant has asserted his right to counsel sufficiently to trigger the enhanced protection provided by Michigan v. Jackson 's prophylactic rule. The above colloquy does not show defendant in any way indicated he wanted to deal with the police only through counsel. Some affirmative assertion of the right to counsel is necessary in order to give rise to the per se presumption in Michigan v. Jackson that a waiver, later made in response to police-initiated interrogation, could not possibly have been voluntary because of the earlier assertion of the right to counsel. In Patterson, the Court looked at whether defendant had ever sought to exercise his right to have counsel present, whether defendant had indicated he wanted the assistance of counsel, and, citing the opinion in Michigan v. Jackson , whether the defendant ha[d] asked for the help of a lawyer in dealing with the police. 487 U.S. at 290-91, 108 S.Ct. at 2394. A handful of federal circuit courts have also addressed what constitutes an invocation or assertion of the right to counsel for purposes of triggering the prophylactic rule in Michigan v. Jackson . Most significantly, and directly on point, in Montoya v. Collins, supra, the Fifth Circuit was faced with a situation which is virtually identical to the one in this case. In Montoya, defendant was arrested and presented to the magistrate on the charge of murder. During this presentment, counsel was appointed to represent defendant. Later that day, he was questioned, waived his rights, and made a written statement. Defendant argued his subsequent conviction should be overturned because his right to counsel had been violated when the statement was taken from him without the presence of counsel. The court first noted that defendant's right to counsel attached upon his presentment before the magistrate. It then turned to the issue of whether the prophylactic rule of Michigan v. Jackson would apply to render his knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver otherwise invalid. Finding that the rule in Jackson is only invoked by the defendant's assertion... of the right to counsel, the court explained an assertion requires an actual, positive statement or affirmation of the right to counsel. 955 F.2d at 282. Because Montoya did not request counsel, answered negatively in response to the inquiry of whether he had or could afford an attorney, and then said nothing at all when the magistrate appointed counsel for him, he was found not to have asserted his right to counsel, and a subsequent waiver of his right to counsel in response to police-initiated interrogation could be valid. For purposes of Jackson, an assertion means some kind of positive statement or other action that informs a reasonable person of the defendant's desire to deal with the police only through counsel. This holding does not require a defendant to utter the magic words, I want a lawyer, in order to assert his right to counsel. As Montoya points out, the Supreme Court give[s] a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation, to a defendant's request for counsel. But interpretation, whether broad or narrow, is only required when there is a request or an assertion in the first place.... .... Patterson said that Jackson applies when a defendant has indicated he wanted the assistance of counsel, and Patterson characterized the essence of Jackson as [p]reserving the integrity of an accused's choice to communicate with police only through counsel. If the rule of Jackson is invoked by a defendant's indicating his choice, then it makes little sense to apply the rule to this case, where Montoya indicated nothing, expressed no choices, and made not the slightest response to the magistrate's intention to appoint a lawyer for him.... . . . . . The prosecutor has met his burden of establishing by evidence that Montoya did not assert his right to counsel within the meaning of Jackson. Montoya, 955 F.2d 279, 283, 285 (citations omitted). [16] As previously discussed, we have found the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and the right to counsel under La. Const. Art. I, Sec. 13 are coextensive in this area; therefore, we logically hold the same requirements respecting invocation or assertion of the right to counsel set forth in Michigan v. Jackson , Patterson v. Illinois , and Montoya v. Collins apply with equal force under La. Const. Art. I, Sec. 13. Under that provision, police are only prevented from interrogating defendant and obtaining a waiver from him in cases where defendant makes a request for or asserts his earlier-attaching right to counsel. If he does not make such an invocation of his right to counsel, then a waiver obtained pursuant to police-initiated interrogation can be found to be valid.