Opinion ID: 791939
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discretionary Denial of the Motion under the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine

Text: 43 Bhasin also contends that the Board abused its discretion when it denied her timely motion to reopen as a matter of discretion. In issuing its discretionary denial, the Board determined that denial of the motion was appropriate because she had failed to report in accordance with the removal order and that this operates as a serious adverse discretionary factor warranting denial of this motion. The Board cited to Matter of Barocio, 19 I & N Dec. 255 (BIA 1985), which holds that persons who choose to disregard the order of deportation against them by refusing to report on their appointed date of departure may have their motion to reopen[ ] denied as a matter of discretion. Bhasin contends that the Board repeatedly failed to properly serve her or her attorney with notice of the removal order and other critical documents, and that she should therefore not be penalized for her failure to report. 44 The fugitive disentitlement doctrine is a severe sanction that we do not lightly impose. Antonio-Martinez v. INS, 317 F.3d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir.2003) (internal quotations omitted). Where appropriate, the doctrine serves the legitimate policies of deterring the improper conduct of flight and preventing the issuance of unenforceable judicial orders. Id. at 1091-92 (citing Parretti v. United States, 143 F.3d 508, 511 (9th Cir.1998) and United States v. Gonzalez, 300 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir.2002)). 45 We conclude that the Board abused its discretion in denying the motion to reopen on the basis of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The record makes clear that on more that one occasion, critical documents were sent to wrong addresses by the agency. First, when Bhasin's original attorney in this matter filed his notice of appearance, he used an address on Blake Street in Berkeley, California. Though that attorney never filed a notice of change of address, the agency inexplicably began sending correspondence to an address on Sansome Street in San Francisco, California. When the Board issued its initial decision denying eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal, it mailed its decision to a second address on Sansome Street in San Francisco, California. During this period, Bhasin's original attorney consistently used his Berkeley address when corresponding with the agency. Bhasin asserts that this failure to mail the initial denial of her administrative appeal to the correct address resulted in her failure to file a timely petition for review of the Board's original decision. Similarly, the agency's notice to report for removal was sent to the second Sansome Street address, an incorrect address for Bhasin's first attorney. 46 Second, after Bhasin's current attorney had filed a notice of appearance in the matter, the agency mailed its opposition to the motion to reopen only to Bhasin, not to either of her counsel. Yet even this mailing was sent to an incorrect address. Bhasin's stated address throughout the proceedings was 1489 Fruitdale Avenue, Apartment 15, in San Jose, California. The opposition to the motion to reopen, which argued that Bhasin's case should be dismissed under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, was sent to 1498 Fruitdale Avenue, the last two digits of the numerical address transposed. For this reason, Bhasin claims that she was never given the opportunity to argue against the agency's assertion that she had become a fugitive from justice. 47 Under these extraordinary circumstances of failed notice procedures, we conclude that it was inappropriate for the Board to deny Bhasin's timely motion to reopen on the basis of the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. Not only are there serious questions as to whether Bhasin ever properly received the notice to appear for removal, this case is unlike the cases in which the Board and this court have labeled someone a fugitive from justice. For example, in Matter of Barocio, relied upon by the Board here, the agency presented to the Board return receipts signed by both the male respondent [Barocio] and the office of his prior attorney which verify that they received the notice to report. 19 I & N Dec. at 256. The agency also detailed its efforts to locate the respondents, including attempts to locate them at their last known address, the male respondent's last known place of employment, the postal service, the California Department of Motor Vehicles, and the local gas and telephone companies. Id.; see also Antonio-Martinez, 317 F.3d at 1091(applying fugitive disentitlement doctrine where immigrant had lost contact with counsel and the agency and all efforts to contact him had failed for over two years). We find no such deliberate flouting of the immigration laws in the present case.