Opinion ID: 1184865
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the legal sufficiency

Text: Protestants challenge the legal sufficiency of the petition on the following grounds: (1) It was circulated in violation of 34 O.S. 1981, § 9(D); (2) It is invalid because it is in defective form contrary to 34 O.S. 1981, § 2; (3) It was otherwise invalid because it is constitutionally vague and creates confusion; (4) It violates § 54, Art. 5, of the Oklahoma Constitution because it would have a retroactive effect on election proceedings already begun; (5) It violates Art. 1, § 2, of the United States Constitution and 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c), because it is a second congressional redistricting following the 1980 decennial census; (6) It violates Art. 1, § 4, of the United States Constitution and 2 U.S.C. § 7, because it would result in changing the time for holding a congressional election other than as provided for in 2 U.S.C. § 7. The circulation and filing of the signed petition while the application for approval of the ballot title was being processed is the basis for Protestants' first contention that the petition was circulated in violation of 34 O.S. 1981, § 9(D). [3] Protestants argue that when a copy of the proposed ballot title is filed with the Attorney General prior to circulation, under the clear language of § 9(D), supra, the ballot title must be fully processed and finally approved prior to circulation. Proponents contend that a petition may be circulated at the same time that ballot title proceedings are pending and is legally sufficient so long as the signed petitions are filed within the ninety (90) day period prescribed by § 8, supra. 34 O.S. 1981, § 9(A) [4] and 9(D), supra, are the only sections in our Initiative and Referendum statutes (Title 34) which relate to the time for submission of a proposed ballot title for approval. Neither section makes reference to the 90-day period prescribed by § 8 for filing of the signed copies of the petition with the Secretary of State. The language in § 9(D) was first adopted in 1965 (1965 Session Laws, Chapter 224, § 1). In 1967 this court decided In Re Initiative Petition No. 281, State Question No. 441, Okl., 434 P.2d 941, and held that the ninety (90) day period prescribed by § 8, supra, within which the signed copies of the petition must be filed with the Secretary of State commenced to run with the pre-circulation filing of the petition with the Secretary of State. No attempt was made in that proceeding to invoke the provisions of § 9(D) and we did not discuss it. Although the procedure for determining the sufficiency of an initiative petition has been changed since 434 P.2d 941 was decided in 1967, there has been no material change in the language in § 8, § 9(A) and § 9(D) that would affect these proceedings. Ballot title proceedings in 434 P.2d 941 were conducted pursuant to § 9(A) after the petition had been circulated and determined to be legally sufficient. This was proper because § 9(A) relates to when a measure is proposed ... by initiative petition and we have held a measure is proposed when it is found to be sufficient in form by the authority authorized by law to pass upon and determine the sufficiency thereof and such finding and determination has become final. [5] This court has also considered when initiative petitions could be circulated when ballot title proceedings were initiated under § 9(D). In In Re State Question No. 541, Initiative Petition No. 310, 601 P.2d 103 (Okl. 1979) we said: We are further of the opinion that the ninety (90) day period within which time electors must sign petition in support of initiative or referendum petitions shall begin to run when ballot title approved and accepted by this Court, as described aforesaid, is filed with the Secretary of State, 34 O.S. 1971, § 8, and 34 O.S. 1971, § 2 et seq, [6] Likewise, in In Re Initiative Petition No. 315, State Question No. 553, 649 P.2d 545, we stated that: ... The 90-day period for circulation does not begin until the proposed ballot has been reviewed by the Attorney General, the 10-day appeal period has expired, and any appeals timely filed, exhausted. Protestants cite the above two cases in support of their contention that the initiative petition here is invalid because it was circulated in violation of § 9(D). The above cases are not dispositive of the issue presented here. In 601 P.2d 103 the petition had not been circulated when the ballot title was finally accepted and approved and we held that the proponents of the initiative petition would be granted 90 days from date of filing the approved and accepted ballot title with the Secretary of State to circulate the petition. In 649 P.2d 545, the petition was circulated after the ballot title proceedings had become final. We declared such circulation was proper and the matter was referred to a referee to determine the sufficiency of the signatures on the petition. Our holding in the above cases did not establish that if the provisions of § 9(D) are invoked that such invocation precludes circulation of the petition until ballot title proceedings have been finally concluded. In our opinion § 9(D) provides an alternate time for a citizen desiring to circulate an initiative measure to commence and complete ballot title proceedings. Section 9(D) also permits such person the right to delay the running of the 90-day period prescribed by § 8, until the ballot title proceedings have been completed. [7] Section 9(D) is an alternative to § 9(A) because under 9(A), ballot title proceedings may not be commenced until the petition has been circulated, filed with the Secretary of State, and its legal sufficiency finally determined. Sections 8 and 9 must be construed together and a determination that the invocation of § 9(D) prohibits the circulation of a proposed initiative petition until the ballot title proceedings have been finally concluded would nullify the 90-day proviso in § 8 which provides for the filing of the signed copies of the petition with the Secretary of State within 90 days after its initial filing. We hold that when a person proposes to circulate an initiative petition and invokes the provisions of § 9(D) within ten (10) days after filing a true and exact copy of said petition in the office of the Secretary of State, the ninety (90) day period for circulating the petition may begin to run from the day it was filed in the office of the Secretary of State, or in the alternative, the 90-day period may begin to run after the proposed ballot title has been reviewed by the Attorney General, the 10-day appeal period has expired, and any appeals timely filed, exhausted. [8] The person proposing to circulate the initiative has the option to choose which one of the two times the 90-day period shall commence to run. We hold that initiative petition No. 317 was legally circulated and timely filed because the signed copies were filed with the Secretary of State within 90 days after the initial filing in the office of the Secretary of State. Proponents' invocation of § 9(D) did not render the circulation period inoperative and such circulation within the 90-day period was proper. Protestants' next contention relates to the legality of a second congressional redistricting enactment based on the 1980 federal decennial census. Protestants contend that the Legislature has already enacted one valid congressional redistricting act based on the 1980 census and that the United States Constitution (Art. 1, § 2) and federal statutory law, 2 U.S.C., § 2a(c), [9] implicitly prohibit a second enactment. Protestants argue that the Federal Constitution and the above statutory provision only allows one congressional redistricting to occur during a ten-year period covered by the decennial census. Preisler v. Secretary of State of Missouri, 279 F. Supp. 952, 1004 (W.D.Mo. 1967) and Grills v. Branigin, 284 F. Supp. 176 (S.D.Inc. 1968) cited by Protestants, do not appear to be controlling, for they deal primarily with the maxim one man, one vote. There is no express prohibition contained in the constitutional provision, nor in the statute, which would prohibit a second valid congressional redistricting within the ten-year period following a decennial census. The case of Exon v. Tiemann, 279 F. Supp. 603, 608 (D.C.Neb. 1967), [10] cited by the Proponents, contains language to the effect that there is no federal constitutional limitation on congressional redistricting occurring more than once in a ten-year period following a federal decennial census. The first power reserved to the people is the initiative, Art. 5, § 2, Okla.Const. Our Constitution in no way restricts the initiative against a legislative congressional enactment. Proponents point out that this is not the first time in Oklahoma that an initiative has been sought amending a legislative congressional redistricting act. In November, 1956, State Question No. 357, Initiative Petition No. 253, 268 P.2d 844, was submitted to the electorate of Oklahoma to amend a 1951 legislative congressional redistricting act based upon the 1950 federal census. Admittedly, such historic action is not controlling precedent but is persuasive. We hold that the electorate of Oklahoma are entitled to invoke the initiative against a legislative congressional redistricting act even though the initiative and the legislative enactment occur during the same ten (10) year period and are based upon the same federal census. Three of Protestants' contentions that the petition is invalid are based upon speculative facts that no special election will take place prior to the November 2, 1982, general election. [11] They argue that one may speculate that the drafters of the petition intended a second congressional election would somehow occur, sometime after the general election. Protestants then contend that if this be so it would violate 2 U.S.C., § 7 [12] which specifically provides when congressional elections must be held. Protestants also contend that § 5 of the Petition [13] renders the petition invalid because it would have an impermissible retroactive effect. Protestants argue that long before the petition is voted on at the general election, the laws require the filing for offices, the primaries, and run-off elections, and the party nominees would be elected the same day the petition will be voted on, and because the Petition would adversely and retroactively affect proceedings and candidates in the 1982 congressional elections, it is unconstitutional. The argument advanced by the Protestants in no way affects the validity of the Petition. However, Protestants' material contentions are considered and determined in a Concurring opinion of Justice Doolin, concurred in by five (5) other members of this court. That opinion holds that the 1982 Congressional Elections must be held under the 1981 Legislative Enactment, 14 O.S. 1981, § 5, and if the Petition is approved at either the 1982 General Election or at a prior Special Election its approval at either election would not affect the 1982 Elections conducted pursuant to the 1981 Legislative Enactment. Although that opinion is styled Concurring opinion, it has the same force and effect as any other opinion of the court which has a concurrence of the majority of its members as provided by Art. 7, § 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution. We hold that Initiative Petition No. 317, is legally sufficient.