Opinion ID: 165954
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to modify sentence

Text: Pursuant to the modification statute under which Defendant proceeds: a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . may move the court [and] the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district court’s decision to deny a reduction in a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) is a discretionary one, which we review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Dorrough, 84 F.3d 1309, 1311 (10th Cir. 1996). We review the district court’s interpretation of the sentencing guidelines and other legal issues de novo. United States v. Smartt, 129 F.3d 539, 540 (10th Cir. 1997). Defendant was convicted of various drug-related offenses. At sentencing, the court found that Defendant had committed at least one drug offense within 1,000 feet of a school, and therefore enhanced Defendant’s sentence by two offense levels under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.2. In 2000, the Sentencing Commission amended the Application Note to § 2D1.2. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, -3- app. C at Amendment 591. This amendment limited § 2D1.2’s applicability to only cases in which the defendant was actually “convicted of a statutory violation of drug trafficking in a protected location” or “in a case in which the defendant stipulated to such a statutory violation.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.2, app. n.1. In the case at bar, Defendant claims he should retroactively be given the benefit of this limitation in § 2D1.2. The district court correctly concluded that Amendment 591 does apply retroactively, and therefore that a court may use it to reduce an existing sentence under § 3582(c)(2). See id. § 1B1.10(c) p.s. (Amendment 591 may be applied retroactively). However, the district court’s further analysis rejected Defendant’s § 3582(c)(2) motion because the court determined that Defendant had in fact been convicted of a “statutory violation of drug trafficking in a protected location.” Id. § 2D1.2, app. n.1. Specifically, the court relied on Defendant’s conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 860(a), an offense imposing enhanced penalties for drug offenses within 1,000 feet of a school. 1 Therefore, the court concluded, even under the 1 Section 860(a) is an offense that enhances the penalty for “[a]ny person who violates section 841(a)(1) or section 856 of [Title 21] by distributing, possessing with intent to distribute, or manufacturing a controlled substance in or on, or within one thousand feet of, the real property comprising a public or private elementary . . . school . . . .” 21 U.S.C. § 860(a). It is specifically referenced in § 2D1.2 as an offense for which the two-level enhancement is intended. We have held that the government does not need to prove as an essential (continued...) -4- amended version of § 2D1.2, the guidelines still provide for the same two-level enhancement in Defendant’s case, and as such no § 3582(c)(2) reduction is warranted here. We agree with the district court. The record confirms that Defendant was indicted for, among other charges, possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 860(a), and convicted of the same. United States v. Verners, 53 F.3d 291, 293 (10th Cir. 1995). Therefore, given this § 860(a) conviction, the § 2D1.2 enhancement would apply identically to Defendant’s sentence both before and after Amendment 591. As such, Defendant was not “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission,” and he is not entitled to a sentence reduction under this statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). On appeal, Defendant does argue that his conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) was invalid because both the indictment and the jury instructions were 1 (...continued) element of § 860(a) that the defendant intended to distribute drugs within 1,000 feet of a school. United States v. Harris, 313 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2002). Instead, the government need only prove that the defendant possessed illegal drugs within 1,000 feet of a school and intended to distribute them somewhere. Id. -5- defective as to the elements of § 860(a). 2 However, these issues go to the validity of Defendant’s § 860(a) conviction itself. A § 3582 motion is a continuation of the prior criminal proceeding, but it is limited to the narrow sentencing issues prescribed in § 3582 itself. United States v. Trujeque, 100 F.3d 869, 870 (10th Cir.1996). Therefore, it cannot be used to create a new vehicle for a collateral attack on a conviction. See Smartt, 129 F.3d at 542-43 (finding no jurisdiction under § 3582(c) to consider collateral sentencing issues including probation department errors, applicability of other statutory sentencing provisions, and ineffective assistance of counsel, and directing defendant to bring those arguments in a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255). In the case before us, because Defendant was convicted under § 860(a), and because Amendment 591 accordingly had no impact on the applicability of § 2D1.2 to his case, Verners was not entitled to any sentencing reduction under § 3582(c). We AFFIRM the district court. ENTERED FOR THE COURT David M. Ebel