Opinion ID: 2241940
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Likelihood of Prejudice to an Overriding Interest

Text: The essential first step is a sufficient trial record to establish a substantial probability of prejudice to an overriding interest in the event of open-court testimony. Clearly in buy-and-bust cases that requires more than conclusory assertions that the officer remains an active undercover and fears for his or her safety. Analysis begins with our decision in People v Martinez (82 N.Y.2d 436, supra ), where we addressed the requisite factual showing to satisfy the first prong of Waller in the context of undercover testimony in buy-and-bust cases. We refused in Martinez to sanction a rule of per se closure for all active undercover officer witnesses, reiterating that `unparticularized impressions of the vicissitudes of undercover narcotics work in general' did not suffice to overcome the presumptive right to an open trial ( id. , at 443; see also , People v Jones , 47 N.Y.2d 409, 415, cert denied 444 US 946). Nor did an officer's ongoing undercover operations in a borough of New York City  without greater specificity  satisfy the Waller standard ( People v Martinez , 82 NY2d at 443). Protecting the safety of law enforcement officers, as a general matter, unquestionably constitutes a compelling interest. What we recognized in Martinez was that the mere possibility that this safety interest might be compromised by open-court testimony does not justify abridgement of a defendant's constitutional right to a public trial. The Supreme Court has made clear that the proponent of closure must establish a substantial probability that the articulated interest will be prejudiced by an open courtroom ( see , Press-Enterprise Co. v Superior Ct. , 478 US 1, 14). Thus, a specific link must be made between the officer's safety concerns and open-court testimony in the particular buy-and-bust case ( see , People v Martinez , 82 NY2d at 443, supra ). The nexus might be established, for example, by references to associates of defendant or targets of investigation likely to be present in the courtroom, or to threats received ( id. ). We therefore held that the People's perfunctory showing in Martinez that the officer continued to operate undercover in the Bronx area failed to establish a sufficient likelihood of harm to satisfy the first prong of Waller . By contrast, the People's showing was adequate in People v Pearson , the companion case to Martinez . There, where the officer testified that she continued to function daily at the location of defendant's arrest, which was readily accessible from the courthouse, the trial court's conclusion that open-court testimony would endanger the witness' safety was not an abuse of discretion ( id. , habeas corpus denied sub nom. Pearson v James , No. 94 Civ 1499 [SD NY, Oct. 20, 1995], revd 105 F.3d 828, 830 [2d Cir 1997] [but concluding that the officer's testimony that her undercover activity was continuing in the same neighborhood where she purchased cocaine from the defendant sufficed to indicate the State's strong interest in concealing her identity], reh en banc granted No. 95-2801 [2d Cir May 19, 1997]). Applying these principles to the two cases now before us, the facts were sufficient to establish a substantial probability that the People's interests  protecting the undercover officers' safety and effectiveness  would be prejudiced by their testimony in open court. In Ramos , both officers had observed former buy subjects in and around the courthouse and had several other cases pending before the court. Indeed, officer number 27296 had cases pending in the very same courtroom ( cf. , People v Hinton , 31 N.Y.2d 71, supra [targets of undercover officer's other investigations were present in the courtroom]). Thus, in notable contrast to Martinez ( see , 82 NY2d at 443, supra ), the undercover officers specifically referred to the likelihood of encountering other investigative targets. Both officers, moreover, had recently worked undercover in the same precinct where defendant was arrested and expected to resume undercover operations there within a day. Finally, their efforts to conceal their identities upon entering the courthouse bolstered the claims that they feared being recognized as police officers ( compare , People v Cordero , 150 AD2d 258, affd 75 N.Y.2d 757 [closure improper, where undercover officer waited openly in common area of court's drug part]). Given all of this testimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that an overriding interest would likely be prejudiced by open-court testimony. [1] The factual showing in Ayala , however, presents a closer question. There, the undercover officer simply identified certain precincts in which he was recently active and expected to return imminently. These included the precinct where he purchased drugs from the defendant and the precinct within which the courthouse was located. The officer was thus unable to pinpoint his continued area of operations as particularly as the officer in Pearson , who had identified a specific Manhattan corner. Nevertheless, the officer's designation of certain police precincts was narrower than the geographically vague reference to the Bronx area deemed insufficient in Martinez . Police officers cannot be expected always to have advance notice of the precise street corner to which they will be assigned, and here the officer's specification of certain precincts was akin to identifying the particular neighborhoods in which he continued to be active. Since these included both the neighborhood of defendant's drug activity and the neighborhood of the courthouse, a sufficient link was made between testifying openly in defendant's case and being recognized by residents of those neighborhoods in which the officer worked undercover. That the officer used a private entrance to the courtroom further confirmed his claim that he feared being identified. On balance, then, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that open-court testimony would likely compromise the officer's safety and effectiveness. Having concluded that Waller 's first prong was satisfied, we turn to the obligation of trial courts to consider alternatives to excluding the public during the testimony of undercover officers.