Opinion ID: 1775726
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Qualification of a Child Witness

Text: Prior to the 1985 legislation involved in this case, T.C.A. § 24-1-101 provided that every person of sufficient capacity to understand the obligation of an oath was competent to be a witness. The 1985 legislation added two additional sentences, however, as follows: Provided, however, where the witness being qualified is a child under the age of thirteen (13) and his or her testimony will be concerning a sexual offense allegedly committed against such child, such child is competent to be a witness. Before testifying, such witness shall be required to declare that he or she will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his or her mind with his or her duty to do so. During the course of the trial of the present case counsel for appellant objected to the use of the videotaped statement of the child because no oath had been administered. As previously stated, however, the child was not actually called as a witness to testify by either side, nor was the child's testimony taken pre-trial pursuant to court order. In either of those events, of course, the trial judge would have had to determine the competency of the child and would have had to use some form of oath or affirmation. No particular ritual or form is prescribed by the statute, but the trial judge must be satisfied that the child understands his or her duty to testify truthfully. In the present case the trial judge indicated that he had concluded that there were sufficient indicia of reliability within the purview of T.C.A. § 24-7-116(c)(1)(H). Necessarily this must involve some determination by the trial judge that the child was sufficiently mature to have credibility and to understand what was being asked of him. Further, failure to administer an oath to a witness is a matter which can be waived or which can amount to harmless error under various circumstances. See Hewlett v. State, 517 S.W.2d 760, 767 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974), cert. denied 422 U.S. 1011, 95 S.Ct. 2636, 45 L.Ed.2d 675 (1975). The State insists that the issue was waived in the present case, but we find no merit to that insistence. The objection for failure of the trial judge to administer an oath is not the kind of suppression motion required to be made prior to trial under Rule 12(b), Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Indeed in many cases such a motion could not be made pre-trial, unless the trial judge had ordered the testimony of the child to be taken under other provisions of the statute here in question and a sufficient oath had not been administered. The mere fact that the objection of counsel was made after the witness had testified does not constitute a waiver. We feel it important to mention this matter, because in some cases it has been indicated that failure of counsel to make a contemporaneous objection to evidence automatically constitutes a waiver. See, e.g., State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897, 903 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). This is true only if counsel also fails to make a timely motion to strike. A motion to strike testimony from the record is one form of objection. It may be made after evidence has already been introduced and the movant seeks to have that evidence stricken from the record or from consideration by the jury. It is a well established trial procedure, and that is all that occurred in the present case. The evidentiary record was still open when counsel's objection was made, and a motion to strike may properly be made at any time prior to the formal closing of the evidentiary record and the final resting of the case by all parties. This practice is firmly rooted in Tennessee trial procedure. In a leading criminal case, Moon v. State, 146 Tenn. 319, 368, 242 S.W. 39, 53 (1922) the court said: Objection to this testimony by Dr. Drake was not interposed until after he had answered the question, when counsel for the defendant asked the court to withdraw the evidence from the jury. It is contended by the state that the motion to have the evidence withdrawn came too late. To this we cannot assent. It is well settled by our decisions that a party adversely affected by the introduction of incompetent testimony may move to have same excluded any time before the jury retires to consider its verdict, provided, of course, he has not waived his right to have it withdrawn. See also Lee v. Lee, 719 S.W.2d 295, 296-97 (Tenn. App. 1986); Paine, Tennessee Law of Evidence § 183 (1974); Pivnick, Tennessee Circuit Court Practice § 24-14 (2d ed. 1986). Nothing in either the rules of civil or criminal procedure was ever intended to eliminate the trial motion to strike evidence from the record or to withdraw it from consideration by a jury. Sometimes it can serve as a late objection or a renewed objection, or it can serve to strike evidence which had previously been conditionally admitted when the condition has not later been met. The motion is expressly retained and recognized in the new rules of evidence, T.R.E. 103(a), as follows: Effect of erroneous ruling  Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of a party is affected, and (1) Objection.  In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection if the specific ground was not apparent from the context ... Although counsel did not characterize her objection in the present case as a motion to strike, it had the same effect, and the issue was not waived simply because the motion was made after the evidence had been introduced. We find no merit to the objection in the present case, and the trial judge properly overruled it because the child was never called as a witness for the purpose of giving evidence in the first place, and his competency, at least impliedly, had previously been determined by the trial judge. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed at the cost of appellant. The cause will be remanded to that court for any further proceedings which may be necessary. DROWOTA, C.J., FONES and COOPER, JJ., and CANTRELL, Special Justice.