Opinion ID: 1976261
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: failure of court to conduct an inquiry into defendant's ability to stand trial.

Text: The defendant contends that the court erred in failing, on its own motion, to embark upon a collateral inquiry into Lucas' mental capacity to stand trial. A defendant whose mental condition is such that he is unable to comprehend his position, to consult intelligently with counsel and plan his defense, cannot be put to trial. State v. Peacock, 50 N.J.L. 34 ( Sup. Ct. 1887), reversed on other grounds, 50 N.J.L. 653 ( E. & A. 1888); State v. Noel, 102 N.J.L. 659 ( E. & A. 1926); State v. Auld, 2 N.J. 426 (1949); State v. Gibson, 15 N.J. 384 (1954); State v. Konigsberg, 44 N.J. Super. 281 ( App. Div. 1957). N.J.S. 2 A :163-2 authorizes the trial judge to conduct a hearing in advance of trial to determine the sanity of the accused at that time upon application by counsel. But our case law has also prescribed that such an inquiry may be made during the course of the trial on motion of either the court or counsel. In State v. Peacock, supra , Mr. Justice Reed held: It is undoubtedly the law that a person who by reason of insanity is unable to comprehend his position, and to make his defense, cannot be placed upon trial for a crime. If the court either before or during the progress of such a trial, either from observation or upon the suggestion of counsel, have facts brought to its attention which raises a doubt of the condition of defendant's mind in this respect, the question should be settled before another step is taken. The method of settling this preliminary question, where it is not the subject of statutory regulation, is within the discretion of the trial court. The court can itself enter upon the inquiry, or submit the question to another jury empaneled for that purpose. (50 N.J.L., at page 36) And in State v. Auld, supra , Mr. Justice Oliphant declared for this court: If the condition of a defendant's mind is brought into question in this respect at the time of pleading or at trial, either from observation or at the suggestion of counsel, the question should be immediately settled. The court can itself enter upon the inquiry or submit the question to another jury impaneled for that purpose. State v. Peacock, 50 N.J.L. 34 ( Sup. Ct. 1887), reversed on other grounds, 50 N.J.L. 653 ( E. & A. 1888); State v. Noel, 102 N.J.L. 659 ( E. & A. 1926). (2 N.J., at page 435) This language was quoted with approval in State v. Gibson, supra ; but cf. State v. Walker, 15 N.J. 485, 494 (1954). But while the court has the power to order an inquiry in the defendant's mental qualifications to stand trial, failure to exercise the powers will not be reviewed on appeal, unless it clearly and convincingly appears that the defendant was incapable of standing trial. It is to be ordinarily expected that defense counsel, who is in a far better position than the trial judge to assay the salient facts concerning the defendant's ability to stand trial and assist in his own defense, would originate the request that such an inquiry be conducted. In the instant case the trial judge did not err in failing to halt the trial and, on his own motion, engage in a collateral inquiry into the issue of the defendant's mental qualifications to stand trial. The only hint in the record on this score was the testimony of Dr. Ornsteen, who testified in response to a question on cross-examination during the inquiry as to the admissibility of the confession without the presence of the jury, as follows: Now, sir, do you think he is mentally competent at this time to consult with his attorneys in the preparation of his defense? A. Incompetent in preparation. He can confer with him but unreliably, because he doesn't have the depth of understanding. He doesn't have the insight of abstract values. Certainly, he can confer but not to his advantage. On the other hand, Dr. Larsen, a psychiatrist at the Trenton State Hospital testifying for the defense on inquiry as to the admissibility of the confession, stated that upon his release from the State Hospital on March 3, 1958 Lucas was free of psychosis. Dr. Bennett, testifying for the defense, confirmed this fact and further stated that Lucas at the time of his release:    appeared to have gone into a good state or remission, and we felt he was capable of consulting with his counsel in his own defense, and able to return to court and face the charge that had been lodged against him. From these proofs we cannot conclude that the trial court was under any duty to conduct a collateral inquiry into the defendant's ability to stand trial.