Opinion ID: 1111566
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: imprisonment for debt

Text: (3) Tamara also contends that the prohibition of imprisonment for debt found in article I, section 10 of the California Constitution (hereafter article I, section 10) does not support application of the Todd holding to child support obligations. We agree. Article I, section 10 states in pertinent part: A person may not be imprisoned in a civil action for debt or tort, or in peacetime for a militia fine. It has long been settled that this provision does not apply to imprisonment for crime. Imprisonment for debt, as such imprisonment is defined in our constitutional guaranties, is necessarily imprisonment in a civil action for debt. As such imprisonment existed in the English common law, it was a provisional remedy strictly analogous to the present-day remedy of attachment of goods. It is against such attachments that the constitutional guaranties against imprisonment for debt are directed. They have no application whatever to imprisonment for crime, and legislative bodies are free to provide for punishment by imprisonment of offenders who commit acts denominated by the said legislative bodies as offenses against the public, provided, of course, that other constitutional limitations are not violated. ( In re Nowak (1921) 184 Cal. 701, 708-709 [195 P. 402].) More recently, in In re Trombley (1948) 31 Cal.2d 801 [193 P.2d 734] ( Trombley ), this court considered the application of the prohibition of imprisonment for debt in what was then section 15 of article I of the California Constitution to Labor Code section 216, subdivision (a), which makes it a crime for an employer who has the ability to pay wages to employees to willfully refuse to do so. The Constitution then provided: No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil action, on mesne or final process, unless in cases of fraud, nor in civil actions for torts, except in cases of willful injury to person or property.... (Cal. Const., art. I, former § 15.) We stated that while former section 15 expressly applied only to civil actions, we would examine any statute which makes nonpayment of an obligation a crime in light of the constitutional provision to ensure that the constitutional prohibition of imprisonment for debt is not circumvented by mere form. We then examined subdivision (a) of Labor Code section 216 to determine if the conduct it described came within the fraud exception. The word `wilfully' as used in criminal statutes implies a purpose or willingness to commit the act (Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 1), and although it does not require an evil intent, it implies that the person knows what he is doing[,] intends to do what he is doing and is a free agent. [Citations.] Subdivision (a), construed together with the Penal Code definition of the word `wilful,' makes it a crime for an employer having the ability to pay, knowingly and intentionally to refuse to pay wages which he knows are due. (31 Cal.2d at pp. 807-808.) We then considered whether this type of conduct could be punished by imprisonment and held that it could. The historical background of section 15 of article I and similar constitutional guaranties of other states clearly shows that the provisions were adopted to protect the poor but honest debtor who is unable to pay his debts, and were not intended to shield a dishonest man who takes an unconscionable advantage of another. (I Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, 1878-1879, 265-268; Code Civ. Proc., § 715; Gault v. Gault [(1932)] 112 N.J. Eq. 41 [163 A. 139]; see Clark v. State [(1908)] 171 Ind. 104 [84 N.E. 984, 16 Ann.Cas. 1229].) It has long been recognized that wages are not ordinary debts, that they may be preferred over other claims, and that, because of the economic position of the average worker and, in particular, his dependence on wages for the necessities of life for himself and his family, it is essential to the public welfare that he receive his pay when it is due. [Citations.] An employer who knows that wages are due, has [the] ability to pay them, and still refuses to pay them, acts against good morals and fair dealing, and necessarily intentionally does an act which prejudices the rights of his employee. Such conduct amounts to a `case of fraud' within the meaning of the exception to the constitutional prohibition and may be punished by statute. (31 Cal.2d at pp. 809-810.) Article I, section 10 no longer includes an express fraud exception to its prohibition of imprisonment for debt. That change has no substantive effect on the scope of the prohibition, however, and the fraud exception is still recognized. ( People v. Bell (1996) 45 Cal. App.4th 1030, 1043-1044 [53 Cal. Rptr.2d 156]; Central Delta Water Agency v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1993) 17 Cal. App.4th 621, 639 [21 Cal. Rptr.2d 453].) The obligation to pay child support, one which arises out of both statute and court order, is indistinguishable for purposes of the fraud exception to article I, section 10, from the obligation to pay wages. Family support obligations are not ordinary debts subject to the constitutional prohibition of imprisonment for debt. ( Bradley v. Superior Court (1957) 48 Cal.2d 509, 519 [310 P.2d 634] [[A] court may ... punish by imprisonment as a contempt the willful act of a spouse (or former spouse) who, having the ability and opportunity to comply, deliberately refuses to obey a valid order to pay alimony or an allowance for the support of the other spouse (or former other spouse). It is held that the obligation to make such payments is not a `debt' within the meaning of the constitutional guaranty against imprisonment for debt. ( Miller v. Superior Court (1937), supra, 9 Cal.2d 733, 737 [72 P.2d 868]; Ex parte Spencer (1890) 83 Cal. 460, 465....]; see also Ex parte Perkins (1861) 18 Cal. 60, 64 [The husband is bound to support the wife, yet this duty is an imperfect obligation which is not technically a debt.]; see also In re Fontana (1972) 24 Cal. App.3d 1008, 1010 [101 Cal. Rptr. 465]; In re Hendricks (1970) 5 Cal. App.3d 793, 796 [85 Cal. Rptr. 220].) Even were the obligation considered a debt, however, the Trombley rationale would be applicable. Children are dependent on their parents for the necessities of life and it is essential to the public welfare that parents provide support with which to care for their needs. To paraphrase the Trombley court, a parent who knows that support is due, has the ability to earn money to pay that support, and still willfully refuses to seek and accept available employment to enable the parent to meet the support obligation acts against fundamental societal norms and fair dealing, and necessarily intentionally does an act which prejudices the rights of his children. This conduct would fall within the fraud exception to the constitutional prohibition of imprisonment for debt. (See also People v. Neal C. Oester, Inc. (1957) 154 Cal. App.2d Supp. 888, 891-892 [316 P.2d 784] [person who is willfully financially unable to comply with statutory obligation to pay over withheld taxes is within fraud exception].) We conclude therefore, that neither the constitutional prohibition of involuntary servitude nor the bar to imprisonment for debt precludes imposition of a contempt or criminal sanction on a parent who, having the ability to do so, willfully fails to pay court-ordered child support, or when necessary to make payment possible willfully fails or refuses to seek and accept available employment for which the parent is suited by virtue of education, experience, and physical ability. To the extent that its application in the enforcement of child support obligations may be inconsistent with this conclusion, Todd, supra, 119 Cal. 57, is disapproved.