Opinion ID: 6971585
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Good Samaritan Liability

Text: Ohio Edison argues that maritime tort liability exists by virtue of the Good Samaritan Doctrine, “which makes one person liable to another for breach of a duty voluntarily assumed by affirmative conduct, even when that assumption of duty is gratuitous.” Patentas, 687 F.2d at 713-14 (citing Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955)). The Restatement (Second) of Torts 14 provides a more detailed statement of this rule: § 323. Negligent Performance of Undertaking to Render Services One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking. § 324A. Liability to Third Person for Negligent Performance of Undertaking One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 323, 324A (1965). Maritime tort law has been held to recognize the good Samaritan theory of liability. See Patentas, 687 F.2d at 714. The threshold issue is typically whether the Coast Guard undertook to render services with respect to the Aid to the plaintiffs or. for the benefit of plaintiffs. See Myers, 17 F.3d at 902. Ohio Edison must then show that the Coast Guard was negligent in carrying out that undertaking. See id. While the United States maintains that the responsibility for establishing, operating, and maintaining privately-owned aids to navigation lies not with the Coast Guard but with the private owner as illustrated by 33 C.F.R. §§ 66.01-3, 66.01-20, 15 the record is unclear as to whether the Coast Guard has undertaken to perform annual inspections of the Aid and to disseminate accurate and complete discrepancy information regarding this Aid through its Broadcast and Local Notices. For purposes of this opinion, however, we will assume arguendo that Ohio Edison has satisfied these first two elements in order to focus our discussion on the third element required for establishing Good Samaritan liability — proximate cause. Proximate cause can be demonstrated through a variety of ways. Ohio Edison asserts that proximate cause exists here both because the United States’ undertaking resulted in an increased risk of harm to plaintiffs and because plaintiffs detrimentally relied on the undertaking. Appellant’s Br. at 29. Ohio Edison’s first argument is that by disseminating inaccurate or incomplete information, the United States increased the risk of harm to plaintiffs. Appellant’s Br. at 30. This, however, is incorrect. In order to rely on this basis, Ohio Edison must show that the Coast Guard through affirmative actions caused “‘some physical change to the environment or some other material alteration of circumstances.’ ” Patentas, 687 F.2d at 717 (quoting the Restatement of torts § 324A cmt. c., illus. 1); see also Myers, 17 F.3d at 903. Thus, “[t]he test is not whether the risk was increased over what it would have been if the defendant had not been negligent,” but rather whether “the risk [wa]s increased over what it would have been had the defendant not engaged in the undertaking at all.” Myers, 17 F.3d at 903. The risk or hazard in this case was the unilluminated concrete/steel pier. Although the Coast Guard did nothing to diminish the risk posed by this hazard, it likewise did nothing to increase the risk that this hazard posed. In this respect, the situation presented by the instant case is no different from that in Myers where Mine Safety and Health Administration inspectors failed to detect and to protect miners from an explosion caused by a concentration of methane gas in the mines. Moreover, Ohio Edison is unable to show plaintiffs’ actual, detrimental reliance on the inaccurate/incomplete information disseminated by the United States. Appellant’s Br. at 29. In order to prevail on this basis, Ohio Edison must show that plaintiffs themselves actually and detrimentally relied on the Coast Guard’s dissemination of discrepancy information. In other words, plaintiffs must have been induced “ ‘to forgo other remedies or precautions against the risk.’” Myers, 17 F.3d at 903 (quoting the Restatement of Torts § 324A cmt. e. (1965)). Ohio Edison points to the testimonies of Anderson and Chaykosky to support this reliance theory. 16 Yet, while Chaykosky testified that “sometime in [his] past, [he] had a chance to consult a chart of [the] area [where the accident occurred]” and that he “knew the towers were [supposed to be] lit” and was “relying on what [he] knew about those towers to be lit to get [him] home,” this does not necessarily show that he relied on the Coast Guard’s dissemination of discrepancy information in navigating his boat. J.A. at 1732 (Chaykosky Dep. at 197). In fact, there is no evidence that Chaykosky was even aware of the existence of such Notices to Mariners. The chart provided the location of the Aid, but a mariner would have had to listen to the Broadcast Notices or read the Local Notices to know whether or not the Aid was actually illuminated at any given time. Anderson’s testimony that mariners generally rely on the Coast Guard’s dissemination of information is a'good starting point but does not address whether this particular accident involved detrimental reliance on incomplete Notice warnings. See Raymer v. United States, 660 F.2d 1136, 1143 (6th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944, 102 S.Ct. 2009, 72 L.Ed.2d 466 (1982). While some evidence not previously before the district court does suggest that Chaykosky relied on his knowledge of the Aid’s existence and his false assumption' that it would be illuminated, there is no assertion and no evidence that Chaykosky’s false assumption stemmed from his reliance on an incomplete/inaccurate Local Notice and that this reliance induced him to place undue faith in the accuracy of the charts he consulted. 17