Opinion ID: 623171
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ostrovsky's Expert Testimony

Text: DEWPC argues that the district court erred in allowing Ostrovsky to testify as an expert witness on the issue of reasonable compensation because Ostrovsky was not competent to testify on that issue. Specifically, DEWPC asserts that Ostrovsky was not qualified, changed his opinion, relied on insufficient underlying facts, and used flawed methods in rendering his opinion. Ostrovsky is a certified business valuation analyst, but because compensation is only one component of business valuation, DEWPC deems Ostrovsky incompetent to testify as to compensation. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admission of expert testimony in this case. A witness may qualify as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. Fed.R.Evid. 702. Rule 702 does not rank academic training over demonstrated practical experience. Roach, 644 F.3d at 764. Here, the record reveals that Ostrovsky, as a general engineer for the IRS, spends about 40% of his time dealing with compensation issues and has worked on about 20 to 30 reasonable compensation cases. Therefore, even if Ostrovsky's education and training was not specifically tailored to compensation issues, he certainly has demonstrated practical experience qualifying him as an expert in the field. See id. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining Ostrovsky was qualified to render an expert opinion on Watson's compensation. In addition to challenging his qualifications, DEWPC asserts that Ostrovsky was not a competent expert witness because his opinion as to the value of Watson's services changed over the course of the proceedings. It is true that Ostrovsky's opinion changed as the proceedings progressed. Before Watson's deposition, Ostrovsky's initial assessment was that Watson's salary in the disputed years should have been no less than $184,876. After discovering errors in his initial assessment and learning additional facts through Watson's deposition, Ostrovsky eventually revised his report and arrived at his final estimate. The district court made a specific finding on this point and found Ostrovsky competent. DEWPC fails to cite any authority supporting its contention that Ostrovsky's revised opinion rendered his testimony incompetent. In fact, it appears Ostrovsky properly updated his expert report, giving DEWPC ample notice of his revised opinions. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(B), (e)(2). Under these circumstances, we see no reason why Ostrovsky's revised opinion would be incompetent. Thus, we see no abuse of discretion. DEWPC also argues that Ostrovsky failed to consider certain facts in rendering his opinion. Generally, the factual basis of an expert opinion goes to the credibility of the testimony, not the admissibility, and it is up to the opposing party to examine the factual basis for the opinion in cross-examination. Nebraska Plastics, Inc. v. Holland Colors Am., Inc., 408 F.3d 410, 416 (8th Cir.2005). However, if the expert's opinion is so fundamentally unsupported that it can offer no assistance to the [fact-finder], it must be excluded. Id. Previously, we have determined that when an expert fail[s] to take into account a plethora of specific facts his or her testimony is properly excluded. Id. at 417. Here, DEWPC cross-examined Ostrovsky and questioned the factual basis for his opinion. The district court could take this into account when assessing Ostrovsky's credibility. Based on the record, however, Ostrovsky did not fail to consider a plethora of facts rendering his opinion fundamentally unsupported. Id. at 416-17. To be sure, Ostrovsky even revised his opinion to reflect a lower salary after he considered new facts revealed at Watson's deposition. Therefore, after reviewing the factual basis for Ostrovsky's opinion, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony. Finally, according to DEWPC, the district court should have excluded Ostrovsky's testimony because his conclusions were the product of flawed methods. In determining whether expert testimony should be admitted, the district court must decide if the expert's methodology is reliable and can be reasonably applied to the facts of the case. Eckelkamp v. Beste, 315 F.3d 863, 868 (8th Cir.2002). Pursuant to Daubert, [4] the district court must conduct this initial inquiry as part of its gatekeeping function. Glastetter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 988 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). However, Daubert is meant to protect juries from being swayed by dubious scientific testimony. In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig. (In re Zurn), 644 F.3d 604, 613 (8th Cir.2011) (emphasis added). When the district court sits as the finder of fact, `[t]here is less need for the gatekeeper to keep the gate when the gatekeeper is keeping the gate only for himself.' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir.2005)). Thus, we relax Daubert 's application for bench trials. Id. In the present case, although DEWPC objected to Ostrovsky's qualifications, the record does not show that DEWPC ever raised an objection to the methods or underlying science Ostrovsky employed to arrive at his conclusions. See McKnight ex rel. Ludwig v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396, 1407 (8th Cir. 1994) (rejecting argument that district court must exercise gatekeeping function without an objection). Nevertheless, even if DEWPC did raise a proper Daubert challenge before the district court, we conclude the court acted within its discretion. At most, DEWPC has expressed a disagreement with the underlying assumptions Ostrovsky made in his calculations. This mere disagreement with the assumptions and methodology used does not warrant exclusion of expert testimony. Synergetics, Inc. v. Hurst, 477 F.3d 949, 956 (8th Cir.2007). Rather, if DEWPC thought other assumptions and methods were more appropriate, it had the opportunity to make this apparent through cross-examination and by presenting [its] own expert witness. Id. Finally, with a relaxed Daubert standard in this bench trial, see In re Zurn, 644 F.3d at 613, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Ostrovsky's expert testimony.