Opinion ID: 1057737
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence to Support Variances

Text: Noting that where the City Charter formerly required proof of a hardship approaching confiscation it was amended to require only a showing of a clearly demonstrable hardship, the Garners contend that the BZA may now authorize variances in instances that previously were not authorized. Their argument ignores, however, the fact that the amendment did not alter the remainder of Section 9.18(b) of the Charter, which requires a board of zoning appeals, prior to approving a variance, to make certain findings of fact, which we deemed 'crucial' in discussing the analogous statewide statutory provisions in Code 5 Code § 15.2-2309(2)'s three enumerated tests are the same, except that it does not require finding that the hardship is not created by the owner of such property. 6 Code § 15.2-2309(2) provides a similar limitation. 12 § 15.2-2309. Hendrix v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 222 Va. 57, 60, 278 S.E.2d 814, 816 (1981) (citing Packer, 221 Va. at 121, 267 S.E.2d at 142). Thus, notwithstanding that the BZA need not find a hardship approaching confiscation to grant a variance, the BZA still must find that (i) the strict application of the terms of the ordinance would effectively prohibit or unreasonably restrict the use of property, or the granting of such variance will alleviate a clearly demonstrable hardship, as distinguished from a special privilege or convenience; (ii) all variances [are] in harmony with the intended spirit and purpose of the ordinance; (iii) the strict application of the ordinance would produce an undue hardship; (iv) the hardship is not shared generally by other properties in the same zone and the same vicinity; and (v) the condition or situation of the property . . . is not of so general or recurring a nature as to make reasonably practicable the formulation of a general regulation to be adopted as an amendment to the ordinance. City Charter § 9.18(b). We review the Garners' four primary justifications for the variances and whether the BZA could properly have found them to satisfy all of the requirements of section 9.18(b) of the City Charter. 13 1. Condition of Lot Being Vacant in a District Where Most Surrounding Properties Are Already Developed The Garners first argue that they face a unique hardship because they seek to build a new home on a vacant lot subject to both the RM Zoning Ordinance and the Historic District Ordinance, where most of the surrounding properties are already developed. Contrary to the repeated assertions made by City staff that [t]he zoning regulations and requirements in the Old and Historic District are designed to apply to old buildings, the City's Zoning Ordinance was expressly intended to apply to new structures. Zoning Ordinance § 1-200(B) (All buildings and structures erected hereafter . . . shall be subject to all regulations of this ordinance.) In fact, granting a variance because a property owner is erecting a new structure would render the Zoning Ordinance meaningless. We have rejected interpretations of a statute that would render the entire statute meaningless. Stone v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 253 Va. 12, 20, 478 S.E.2d 883, 887 (1996). 7 Therefore, the decision of 7 Furthermore, since much of the City is already developed, any property owner could use this basis for requesting a variance. The use of variances to resolve such a problem is prohibited because the piecemeal granting of variances could 'ultimately nullify a zoning restriction throughout [a] zoning district.' Hendrix, 222 Va. at 61, 278 S.E.2d at 817 (quoting Packer, 221 Va. at 122-23, 267 S.E.2d at 143). 14 the BZA cannot be upheld on this ground. 2. Condition of Lot Being Shallow and Wide The Garners next argue that a variance is justified because their lot is exceptionally wide and shallow as compared to other lots on the 100 block of Prince Street. City staff reported that [o]n the 100 block of Prince Street, two-thirds of the lots are deeper than the [Garners'] property. The Garners' argument, therefore, is that they face a hardship because, when compared with other properties on the block, their relatively more shallow lot makes it difficult to build a home that satisfies the rear yard requirement. We rejected a similar argument in Packer where [t]he premise for the Board's decision was that the [applicants] should be entitled to build as close to the ocean as 'the average of the houses along this block.' 221 Va. at 122, 267 S.E.2d at 143. We held that [i]f, as the Board concluded, one owner of the property complying with a restriction should be allowed to conform his structure to neighboring nonconforming structures, then every such owner would be entitled to do so. A board of zoning appeals could, by granting variances piecemeal, ultimately nullify a zoning restriction throughout the zoning district. But the statute provides that all variances shall be in harmony with the intended spirit and purpose of the ordinance. Id. at 122-23, 267 S.E.2d at 143. Likewise, the Garners' argument, if accepted, would justify 15 variances for the one-third of the properties that are even more shallow than the Garners' property, yet still conform to the zoning ordinance, resulting in the granting [of] variances piecemeal that would ultimately nullify the zoning ordinance requiring a rear yard, thereby conflicting with the intended spirit and purpose of the ordinance. Id. Since the City Charter prohibited the BZA from issuing a variance not in harmony with the intended spirit and purpose of the ordinance, the BZA's decision cannot be upheld on this ground. City Charter § 9.18(b). 8 3. Condition of the Property as being Subject to Historic District Ordinance Finally, the Garners contend that their property is undevelopable because alternative designs would not comply with both the Historic District Ordinance and the Zoning Ordinance. 9 The BZA was presented with evidence that because the siding 8 The BZA was also presented with evidence that around half of existing homes on the block did not have a rear yard (i.e., did not currently comply with the rear yard requirements) and that therefore it would be a hardship to require the Garners to comply with the rear yard ordinance. For the same reason, a variance on this ground could not be upheld. 9 Because the Garners' third justification – the historic siding on the home adjacent to their property – relates to their claim of hardship resulting from being subject to both the Historic District Ordinance and Zoning Ordinance, we combine their third and fourth justifications for discussion. 16 of the home at 126 Prince Street is of historical value, the Garners' property is immediately adjacent to a property of extraordinary condition. The Garners argue that because the BAR considers the visibility of the neighboring wall in deciding whether to approve any home design the Garners might propose, they face a unique challenge in creating a design that both satisfies the BAR and conforms to the RM Zoning Ordinance. As the Garners admitted during the BZA hearing, they have the option of submitting to the BAR a conforming design that would not require variances, and they have not done so. Consequently, it is mere speculation that the BAR would not approve this design or any other design that conforms to the Zoning Ordinance. 10 Thus, there was no factual support for the Garners' claim that their property, by being located next to the historic wall, makes it uniquely more difficult to build a structure that both satisfies the BAR and conforms to the RM zoning regulations. Accordingly, the BZA's decision cannot be upheld on this ground. See Hopkins, 197 Va. at 205, 89 S.E.2d 10 At the BZA hearing, Cox expressed the BAR's interest in a home that would preserve a view of the neighboring wall stating, we feel pretty strongly, that's an important house and it's the only house that survived largely intact from the fire. . . . [W]e felt [the Garner home] should be as narrow as possible, as short as possible, as simple as possible. But Cox did not state that the BAR would reject a by-right design, instead only indicating a general preference for a better view of the historic wall. 17 at 3 (action that is unsupported by facts, [i]s an illegal action by a board of zoning appeals). Without support for that fundamental premise, the Garners' argument is instead simply that because it is difficult to both satisfy the BAR and comply with the RM zoning regulations, any design that the BAR approves should be granted the necessary variances. But all properties in the Old and Historic District are subject to both the RM zoning regulations and Historic District Ordinance. Under the Charter, the BZA may grant a variance only if it finds that the condition or situation of the property concerned or the intended use of the property is not of so general or recurring a nature as to make reasonably practicable the formulation of a general regulation to be adopted as an amendment to the ordinance. City Charter § 9.18(b); see also Hendrix, 222 Va. at 60-61, 278 S.E.2d at 816 (holding that a variance was improper where a zoning ordinance imposi[ng] . . . the off-street parking requirements was a problem shared by all property owners in that area); Packer, 221 Va. at 121-22, 267 S.E.2d at 142 (Proximity to the ocean is doubtless a 'privilege or convenience' coveted by every homeowner along the beach. But a zoning restriction upon that privilege does not constitute an 'unnecessary hardship' within the meaning of [the Code].) In passing upon requests for variances, a board of 18 zoning appeals exercises the limited function of insuring that a landowner does not suffer a severe hardship not generally shared by other property holders in the same district or vicinity. The power to resolve recurring zoning problems shared generally by those in the same district is vested in the legislative arm of the local governing body. Hendrix, 222 Va. at 61, 278 S.E.2d at 817. Because being subject to both sets of ordinances is a condition shared by every other property holder in the same zone, this condition was of so general or recurring a nature as to make reasonably practicable the formulation of a general regulation to be adopted as an amendment to the ordinance. City Charter § 9.18(b); see Code § 15.2-2309. Moreover, authorization of the variance upon this ground would amount to a policy judgment that structures built in the Old and Historic District should only be subject to approval of the BAR and need not comply with the RM Zoning Ordinance and would, therefore, constitute an 'administrative infringement upon the legislative prerogatives of the local governing body.' Hendrix, 222 Va. at 61, 278 S.E.2d at 817 (quoting Packer, 221 Va. at 123, 267 S.E.2d at 143). 11 11 The flaw in the Garners' argument is made apparent by their assertion that in order for the Garners to build the home that the BAR found appropriate, they required the side and yard variances from the BZA. Not only did the Garners fail to seek approval from the BAR for a by-right design, their argument improperly assumes that the BZA has the authority to authorize a 19