Opinion ID: 179425
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Career Offender Enhancement

Text: The district court categorized Curb as a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, which imposes higher Guidelines offense levels for certain repeat offenders. For a defendant to qualify for the enhancement, a court must find: (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). Curb argues that he did not satisfy the third prong of two prior felony convictions. At first blush, Curb's argument might seem like a fool's errand. He has undeniably been convicted for one felony charge of aggravated assault and one felony charge of cocaine possession. These would seem to sufficiently satisfy the third prong. However, additional sections of the Guidelines inform us that whether Curb has as least two prior felony convictions actually depends on whether he has previously received separate sentences. The Guidelines do not make this conclusion readily apparent, nor does the facially unambiguous section 4B1.1(a) direct us to look at other sections for a deeper meaning. Nevertheless, whether Curb satisfied the third prong depends on whether he had multiple, prior, separate sentences. We will attempt to explain this rule. For a defendant to qualify for the third prong of section 4B1.1(a), at least two of the sentences for the defendant's prior convictions must be counted separately pursuant to section 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c). U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(c). These sections do not reference convictions at all. Instead they reference prior sentence, which is defined by section 4A1.2(a). Furthermore, hidden among the comment notes of section 4B1.2, the Guidelines expressly make the definitions listed in section 4A1.2 applicable to section 4B1.1 for purposes of determining whether prior convictions are counted separately. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n. 3. Therefore, to determine whether Curb had qualifying prior convictions, we look to the definition of prior sentence in section 4A1.2(a). Although we have made it this far through the Guidelines labyrinth, we are now faced with another quandary. At the time Curb was sentenced, an earlier definition of prior sentence from section 4A1.2(a)(1) was in effect that has since been amended by Amendment 709. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 709 (2007). Curb argues that he does not have multiple prior sentences based on the language of Amendment 709. For his argument to succeed, we would have to find that Amendment 709 is clarifying and, thus, retroactive for his sentence. If a Guidelines amendment is clarifying, it may be applied retroactively to discern the Sentencing Commission's intent regarding the application of a pre-amendment Guideline. United States v. Geerken, 506 F.3d 461, 465 (6th Cir.2007) (citing United States v. DeCarlo, 434 F.3d 447, 458-459 (6th Cir.2006)). Several of our sister circuits have decided this issue and held that Amendment 709 is substantive rather than clarifying. See United States v. Alexander, 553 F.3d 591, 592-93 (7th Cir.2009); United States v. Marler, 527 F.3d 874, 877 n. 1 (9th Cir.2008); United States v. Wood, 526 F.3d 82, 87-88 (3d Cir.2008); United States v. Godin, 522 F.3d 133, 136 (1st Cir.2008) (per curiam). Nevertheless, we need not decide whether Amendment 709 is clarifying or substantive if Curb would still qualify as a career offender even if Amendment 709 applied to his sentence. Under the current language of section 4A1.2(a)(1), as revised by Amendment 709, prior sentence is defined as any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere, for conduct not part of the instant offense. The Guideline elaborates further: If the defendant has multiple prior sentences, determine whether those sentences are counted separately or as a single sentence. Prior sentences always are counted separately if the sentences were imposed for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first offense prior to committing the second offense). If there is no intervening arrest, prior sentences are counted separately unless (A) the sentences resulted from offenses contained in the same charging instrument; or (B) the sentences were imposed on the same day. Count any prior sentence covered by (A) or (B) as a single sentence. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) (emphasis added). The first question necessary to conclude whether Curb had multiple prior sentences, therefore, is whether he had an intervening arrest separating the offenses. If he did, our analysis ends here. The Guidelines do not provide a definition for arrest. Curb argues that we should rely upon Tennessee's definition of arrest, which precludes juveniles from being arrested. Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-1-113 (West 2010) (A child may be taken into custody ... [p]ursuant to the laws of arrest, but [t]he taking of a child into custody is not an arrest, except for the purpose of determining its validity under the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.). However, unless Congress plainly instructs us otherwise, we will not look to state law in interpreting the federal Guidelines. United States v. Jackson, 401 F.3d 747, 749 (6th Cir.2005). Curb also argues that changes to federal law require us to find that he could not have been arrested as a juvenile. He points to the 1974 revisions to The Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5033, 5035, that replaced the phrase [w]henever a juvenile is arrested with [w]henever a juvenile is taken into custody as proof that federal law follows the same thesis as Tennessee law. Nevertheless, we have encountered the specific language of these sections before, and treated custody of a juvenile as an arrest. United States v. Doe, 226 F.3d 672, 679 (6th Cir.2000) (addressing federal custody, i.e., a federal arrest on a federal charge (emphasis removed)). Therefore, for purposes of interpreting the Guidelines, Curb was arrested when he was taken into custody as a minor. Because he was arrested once on March 15, 1997 and again on April 7, 1997, the first arrest was intervening. We need not reach the remaining questions of section 4A1.2(a)(2). Even pursuant to the language of Amendment 709, Curb would still qualify as a career offender under section 4B1.1. We, therefore, do not reach the question of whether it applied to him retroactively. Additionally, Curb does not argue that the district court erred in its interpretation of the previous language of section 4A1.2. Accordingly, his appeal regarding his career offender status fails.