Opinion ID: 532642
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preceding Procedure

Text: 15 Hudgins' complaint alleges that she had a legitimate expectation of continued employment as Ashburn city clerk and that she was deprived of this property interest without due process of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. 8 The individual defendants raised the immunity defense in their respective answers. Each council member-defendant states that he or she acted in good faith individually and as an elected official. 16 Following extensive discovery, including numerous depositions, defendants moved for summary judgment on two grounds. First, Hudgins had no property interest in her continued employment as city clerk under Georgia law and, consequently, she was not entitled to procedural due process when she was not re-elected. Second, the individual defendants warranted qualified immunity because they voted for the city clerk on January 2, 1986, pursuant to the Ashburn Code Sec. 4.1, which provides for the annual election of the city clerk. Plaintiff filed a cross motion for summary judgment and argued that defendants were precluded from qualified-immunity protection because they had acted in bad faith by terminating Hudgins' employment as city clerk without prior notice and a hearing in violation of her fundamental due-process rights under the 1982 Plan. 9 Defendants countered with a reply brief supporting their summary-judgment motion and opposing plaintiff's summary-judgment motion. They distilled the issue in this case to be whether or not Hudgins was covered by any laws or regulations that would create a property interest in her continued employment as city clerk. Defendants also reiterated their contention that they were entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacity because their not re-electing Hudgins as city clerk was in accordance with the Ashburn Code. 17 After considering the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, the district court found that summary judgment as to all issues was inappropriate because material, factual questions remained to be decided. 10 With respect to Hudgins' property interest in her continued employment as Ashburn city clerk, the district court enumerated two factual questions which required resolution: (1) whether the 1982 Personnel Management Plan or the Personnel Management System contained in the 1983 City Code is applicable to Plaintiff Hudgins' case; and, (2) if the 1982 Plan is applicable, then whether the office of city clerk should be categorized as a temporary or permanent position. 11 The district court concluded that [t]hese issues are factual and not legal in nature, and can only be determined after an evidentiary hearing or trial. 12 Accordingly, the district court denied plaintiff's summary-judgment motion, in which she contended that she had a property interest in her continued employment as Ashburn city clerk. While not specifically addressed, the district court apparently also denied defendants' summary-judgment motion as to its basis on the lack of plaintiff's property interest in her continued employment. This issue evidently remains for trial on the merits. 18 The district court, however, granted partial summary judgment on the qualified-immunity defense raised by defendants. Finding that council members-defendants Youngblood, Weston and Hayes did not participate personally in Hudgins' alleged constitutional deprivation, the district court granted summary judgment to these defendants in their individual and official capacities. Concluding that plaintiff Hudgins' complaints primarily were lodged against council members-defendants Barfield, Turner and Garner for their roles in not re-electing her as city clerk and that her allegations implicated these defendants in their individual and official roles, the district court denied summary judgment to them on the basis of qualified immunity. The district court found that the two unresolved and above-stated factual issues, which prevented adjudication of plaintiff Hudgins' property interest in her continued employment as Ashburn city clerk, would be relevant to determining whether or not the three remaining council members-defendants could be held liable in their individual and/or official capacities. Defendants-appellants Barfield, Turner and Garner have appealed to this court the district court's denial of summary judgment to them on their alternative ground of qualified immunity.