Opinion ID: 1103334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: motion to suppressstatements

Text: Fitzpatrick claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements. This Court has explained the standard of review for orders on motions to suppress: [A]ppellate courts should continue to accord a presumption of correctness to the trial court's rulings on motions to suppress with regard to the trial court's determination of historical facts, but appellate courts must independently review mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately determine constitutional issues arising in the context of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment and, by extension, article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution. Nelson v. State, 850 So.2d 514, 521 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598, 608 (Fla.2001)). Specifically, Fitzpatrick asserts that the trial court erred in suppressing his statements made (1) during the initial September 20, 1996, interview with Detective Bousquet; (2) during a conversation on September 21, 1996, with Bousquet at the Pro Pizza parking lot; (3) during telephone conversations with Bousquet on September 23, 1996, and September 25, 1996; and (4) during his last interview with Bousquet on December 5, 1996. In the instant case, Fitzpatrick was initially questioned at the sheriff's office on September 20, having voluntarily complied with a detective's request for an interview. Fitzpatrick drove to the station where he was interviewed for approximately forty-five minutes to an hour. The record reveals that Fitzpatrick was specifically informed that he was not under arrest. When Fitzpatrick asked, Am I under arrest? Bousquet responded, No. You're not under arrest. I told you when you came out here you weren't under arrest. Moreover, when Fitzpatrick said, Maybe I need to talk to a lawyer, Bousquet responded, That's perfectly up to you ... I can't hold you.... I told you when you came in you weren't in custody; you're still not in custody. In fact, Fitzpatrick left the station after requesting an attorney. With regard to this initial interview, the trial court ruled that any statements Fitzpatrick made to the detective during the initial September 20 interview after he invoked his right to counsel would be inadmissible, but all other statements would be admitted. The trial court specifically found that Fitzpatrick was not in custody during the September 20 interview. We agree. The United States Supreme Court has held that Miranda [6] warnings are not required if the suspect is not placed under arrest, voluntarily comes to the police station, and is allowed to leave unhindered by police after a brief interview. See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1121-22, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983). The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that Miranda warnings are not required simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Id. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977)). In determining whether a suspect is in custody, the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Id. (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. 711). This Court has stated that under the dictates of Miranda a suspect involved in a custodial interrogation by law enforcement officials is entitled to the procedural safeguard of the Miranda warning, the key being that the suspect must be in custody. Correll v. State, 523 So.2d 562, 564 (Fla. 1988) (holding that the defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda where, after being asked to go to the sheriff's office, the defendant voluntarily went to the police station, was interviewed for approximately a half an hour to an hour, and the defendant left when the interview was over); see also Roman v. State, 475 So.2d 1228, 1231 (Fla.1985) (holding no requirement for Miranda warnings where suspect voluntarily accompanied investigators to the station house, was not handcuffed, and was interrogated approximately three and one half hours prior to his confession). This Court has determined that this inquiry is approached from the perspective of how a reasonable person would have perceived the situation. Id. at 1231. Here, Fitzpatrick was specifically told that he was not under arrest. This Court has specifically explained that a reasonable person might be more likely to think he is not in custody if specifically told he is not under arrest. Id. That Fitzpatrick's interview took place at a station house does not by itself transform an otherwise noncustodial interrogation into a custodial one. See id. Knowledge that he was free to leave, coupled with the fact that his request for a lawyer discontinued further questioning, and that he indeed left the station at that point, afforded a reasonable basis for Fitzpatrick to believe that he was free to leave. Fitzpatrick has demonstrated no basis for a reasonable belief that during this interview there was a restraint on his freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. This Court concludes that Fitzpatrick was not in custody for the purposes of Miranda, and therefore the police were not required to advise him of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Fitzpatrick's motion to suppress the statements he made to the detectives during the September 20 interview. Further, with regard to the September 20 interview, Fitzpatrick contends that the interview became coercive when Bousquet presented Fitzpatrick with false evidence suggesting that he had a satellite image of Fitzpatrick with Romines. However, this Court has held that police misrepresentations alone do not necessarily render a confession involuntary. See Escobar v. State, 699 So.2d 988, 994 (Fla.1997). The determination of voluntariness is based upon the totality of the circumstances. See id. (citing Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 964 (Fla.1992)). The record on appeal indicates that Bousquet stated to Fitzpatrick, We also place you with our female, picking her up at 7-Eleven. We also can placeand I'll show you the world wide net of an actual satellite systems. We were able to arrange a satellite system, candid satellite system to find out what we could find. Bousquet testified at the suppression hearing that he informed Fitzpatrick that they had satellite imagerywe could get satellite imagery, and I told him that I knew exactly where he was.... I never said that I hadputting him in that location. The detective testified that the satellite photograph was of the crime scene and that he did not show Fitzpatrick the photograph to make Fitzpatrick think that the detectives had a satellite photograph of him at the crime scene. Here, the police were not deceptive in a manner that would have rendered Fitzpatrick's statements involuntary. The detective never stated that he had in his possession a satellite picture of Fitzpatrick at the crime scene, but only that the detective was able to arrange a satellite system to find out what we could find. The fact that the detective informed Fitzpatrick that he knew exactly where [Fitzpatrick] was is not deceptive because the detective had the 7-Eleven video surveillance pictures placing Fitzpatrick at the 7-Eleven. Fitzpatrick's second allegation, that the trial court erred in admitting the statements Fitzpatrick made to Bousquet on September 21, 1996, at the Pro Pizza parking lot, is also meritless. The evidence indicates that on September 21 Bousquet visited the Pro Pizza parking lot to obtain measurements pertaining to the Romines investigation. The evidence indicates that Fitzpatrick approached Bousquet and initiated a conversation. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), the Supreme Court held that an accused having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.  Id. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (emphasis added); see also Francis v. State, 808 So.2d 110, 126 (Fla.2001) (The law is well-settled that once an accused has invoked his right to counsel any interrogation must immediately cease until counsel is made available, unless the accused himself initiates further communications with the police.). This Court has likewise held: Once a suspect has requested the help of a lawyer, no state agent can reinitiate interrogation on any offense throughout the period of custody unless the lawyer is present, although the suspect is free to volunteer a statement to police on his or her own initiative at any time on any subject in the absence of counsel. Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 966 (Fla. 1992) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see also Jennings v. State, 718 So.2d 144, 149 (Fla.1998). In the instant action, the trial court found that there was a sufficient interval between the discussion on September 20, when Fitzpatrick requested time to obtain a lawyer, and the discussion in the Pro Pizza parking lot, which the court found Fitzpatrick initiated. We agree with the trial court's finding. Here, Bousquet did not begin talking to Fitzpatrick on September 21 until Fitzpatrick approached him and initiated the conversation. Accordingly, this Court holds that these statements are admissible because, after asserting his right to counsel at the initial September 20 interview with Bousquet, it was Fitzpatrick who on his own subsequently and voluntarily initiated contact with the detective. In addition, the trial court found that the discussion between Fitzpatrick and his parole officer did not amount to sufficient pressure by the parole officer to overcome Fitzpatrick's freedom to resist any cooperation with the detectives. We agree. Contrary to Fitzpatrick's contention, the fact that Fitzpatrick's parole officer informed him that it was in his best interest to cooperate with the authorities does not rise to the level of coercion to render Fitzpatrick's statement involuntary. See Maqueira v. State, 588 So.2d 221, 223 (Fla.1991) (The fact that a police officer agrees to make one's cooperation known to prosecuting authorities and to the court does not render a confession involuntary.); see also State v. Williams, 358 So.2d 1094, 1094-95 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (determining that the officer informing the defendant that if contacted by the parole commission, the only thing the officer could do was tell the truth concerning the defendant's cooperation or lack of it in the investigation would not vitiate the defendant's otherwise voluntary confession). Accordingly, this Court holds that Fitzpatrick's parole officer's advising him to cooperate did not vitiate Fitzpatrick's voluntary statements. With regard to the statements Fitzpatrick made to Bousquet during their telephone conversations on September 23, 1996, and September 25, 1996, the trial court did not err in denying Fitzpatrick's motion to suppress. The evidence indicates that on September 23, it was Fitzpatrick who called Bousquet and left a message. The detective then returned Fitzpatrick's call and they had a brief conversation. Later that same day, Fitzpatrick left another message for Bousquet and the detective returned that call on September 25, resulting in another brief conversation. We hold that Fitzpatrick voluntarily initiated the communication with the police by calling Bousquet on these two occasions. Fitzpatrick's calling and leaving messages to speak with Bousquet was a voluntary initiation of contact within the meaning of Edwards. See Jones v. State, 748 So.2d 1012, 1018 (Fla. 1999) (holding that where a defendant invokes his right to counsel and subsequently reinitiates contact with law enforcement officials by asking to speak with a detective, who is unavailable, but later responds to the defendant's request, there is a voluntary initiation of contact within the meaning of Edwards ). Finally, Fitzpatrick's assertion that the statements he made during his last interview with the detective on December 5, 1996, are inadmissible because he was effectively in custody due to the police processing his vehicle also fails. The evidence surrounding this last interview reveals that Fitzpatrick arrived at the sheriff's office in his own car, was never restrained, and was free to leave at any time. This evidence supports our conclusion that Fitzpatrick voluntarily went to the station and was not in custody. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Fitzpatrick's motion to suppress.