Opinion ID: 865933
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the admission of hearsay testimony

Text: WAS PROPER UNDER THE TENDER-YEARS EXCEPTION. ¶13. Anderson argues that the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony of the victim’s statements in accordance with the tender-years exception. The standard of review for admission of evidence is abuse of discretion. Hobgood v. State, 926 So. 2d 847, 852 (Miss. 2006) (citations omitted). Mississippi Rule of Evidence 803(25) states in pertinent part: A statement made by a child of tender years describing any act of sexual contact performed with or on the child by another is admissible in evidence if: (a) the court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide substantial 6 indicia of reliability; and (b) the child either (1) testifies at the proceedings; or (2) is unavailable as a witness: provided, that when the child is unavailable as a witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence of the act. The comment to Rule 803(25) lists the following factors that the trial court should examine when determining sufficient indicia of reliability:4 (1) whether there is an apparent motive on declarant’s part to lie; (2) the general character of the declarant; (3) whether more than one person heard the statements; (4) whether the statements were made spontaneously; (5) the timing of the declarations; (6) the relationship between the declarant and the witness; (7) the possibility of the declarant’s faulty recollection is remote; (8) certainty that the statements were made; (9) the credibility of the person testifying about the statements; (10) the age or maturity of the declarant; (11) whether suggestive techniques were used in eliciting the statements; and (12) whether the declarant’s age, knowledge, and experience make it unlikely that the declarant fabricated. ¶14. A rebuttable presumption exists that a child under the age of twelve is of tender years. Veasley v. State, 735 So. 2d 432, 436 (Miss. 1999). Allison was eleven years old when she told her mother and aunt that Anderson had been having sexual intercourse with her, and she was twelve years of age when she made statements to Detective Clarite. At the time of trial, Allison was fourteen years old. When determining whether the tender-years exception applies, the court should consider the age of the child at the time the statements were made, not the age of the child at the time of trial. Elkins v. State, 918 So. 2d 828, 833 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). Therefore, a rebuttable presumption exists in this case that Allison was of tender years when the hearsay statements to her mother and aunt were made. 4 The introductory phrase under the comment states: “Some factors that the court should examine to determine if there is sufficient indicia of reliability are . . . .” (Emphasis added.) 7 ¶15. In addition to this rebuttable presumption, the trial court’s ruling also met the requirements of Rule 803(25). First, in accordance with section (a), a pretrial hearing was conducted to determine if Allison’s statements had substantial indicia of reliability. At the hearing, Allison’s aunt, Deborah Blevin, testified to what Allison had told her and the circumstances surrounding the statements. After Blevin had witnessed Anderson having sexual intercourse with Allison, Blevin told Allison that she knew what was happening. Allison then told her that it had been happening for a long time and that she had not told anyone because she did not want her father to get in trouble. Anderson also had told Allison not to tell anyone. Rachel Abbot, Allison’s mother, testified to the statements Allison had made to her. Abbot testified that Allison had told her that her father had been “sexually molesting” her and that it had happened on more than one occasion. Detective Clarite, who had conducted a forensic interview of Allison, testified about the statements that Allison had made to him and her demeanor during the interview. ¶16. After hearing the testimony and arguments from counsel, the trial court, in considering some of the factors set out in the comment to Rule 803(25), determined that the hearsay statements did have substantial indicia of reliability. The trial court found that: the statements were spontaneous and consistently repeated; Allison’s mental state seemed to be one of a person who would not fabricate; Allison used terminology consistent with a person of her age and she had a lack of motive to fabricate things; and Allison seemed to be of the character that “would be able to relate things reliably to those she’s speaking to.” Additionally, the trial court also considered that more than one person had heard the statements; that her relationships to the witnesses, especially her mother and aunt, showed 8 reliability; that the possibility of faulty recollection was remote; and that the people giving the statements seemed to be credible. The trial court also found that Allison seemed to be immature for her age and that suggestive techniques were not used. Finally, the trial court concluded that the factors weighed in favor of admitting the hearsay testimony. ¶17. From the record before us, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that these factors showed substantial indicia of reliability in Allison’s out-ofcourt statements. Lastly, section (b) of Rule 803(25) was satisfied, because Allison testified at trial. Accordingly, this Court finds no error on the part of the trial court in allowing Allison’s hearsay statements to be admitted under Rule 803(25).5 Thus, this issue is without merit. III. WHETHER THE STATE IMPERMISSIBLY ASKED A CHILD SEXUAL-ASSAULT VICTIM LEADING QUESTIONS. ¶18. Anderson argues that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the State to lead the victim concerning the dates of the alleged acts charged in Counts I and II of the indictment.6 Count I of the indictment charges Anderson with statutory rape “on or about 5 Likewise, since Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403 is the “ultimate filter through which otherwise admissible evidence must pass,” the record reveals that this evidence was relevant and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Givens v. State, 967 So. 2d 1, 9 (Miss. 2007) (citing Jones v. State, 920 So. 2d 465, 475 (Miss. 2006)). 6 Count I of the indictment charged Anderson with statutory rape in accordance with Mississippi Code Section 97-3-65(1)(b) and stated: David Paul Anderson in the First Judicial District of Harrison County, Mississippi, on or about November, 2006 did feloniously and unlawfully have sexual intercourse with [Allison], a child under the age of fourteen (14) years and twenty-four (24) or more months younger than the said David Paul Anderson and not the spouse of the said David Paul Anderson at the time in 9 November, 2006;” Count II of the indictment charges Anderson with statutory rape “on or about November 25, 2006.” Anderson objects to the following question asked of Allison by the prosecutor on redirect examination: State: Allison, did your dad have sex with you anytime before Thanksgiving in that month? And you don’t have to point to a day, just did he. I’m asking if he did. Allison: I think he did, but I’m not quite sure. During direct examination, however, Allison had testified that Anderson had intercourse with her during November 2006, both before and after Thanksgiving. ¶19. Anderson claims that, without the leading question on redirect examination, the State would not have been able to present sufficient evidence as to Counts I and II.7 However, we question, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi. (Emphasis added.) Count II of the indictment also charged Anderson with statutory rape in accordance with Mississippi Code Section 97-3-65(1)(b) and stated: As part of the same common scheme or plan that: David Paul Anderson in the First Judicial District of Harrison County, Mississippi, on or about November 25, 2006 did feloniously and unlawfully have sexual intercourse with [Allison], a child under the age of fourteen (14) years and twenty-four (24) or more months younger than the said David Paul Anderson and not the spouse of the said David Paul Anderson at the time in question, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi. (Emphasis added.) 7 Although Anderson argues that the State would not have been able to present sufficient evidence with regard to both Counts I and II, the testimony objected to refers only to the dates in Count I – “on or about November, 2006.” The record reveals that in 2006, Thanksgiving Day fell on November 23. The date of the alleged offense charged in Count 10 note that there was no objection to this question at trial. ¶20. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 611(c) generally prohibits leading questions and states: “[l]eading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop [the witness’s] testimony.” Rule 611's prohibition applies to redirect examination as well. See Parker v. State, 378 So. 2d 662, 663 (Miss. 1980). With regard to the exception in Rule 611(c), this Court has found that “the ‘classic example’ of a situation ripe for leading questions on direct is where the witness is a child.” Keyes v. State, 733 So. 2d 812, 814 (Miss. 1999) (citations omitted). In Keyes, the Court found that leading questions were appropriate for a ten-year-old sexual-assault victim. Id. ¶21. While leading questions generally are prohibited on direct examination, the facts of this case fit squarely within the exception in Rule 611(c). The witness is a young, sexualabuse victim, and the question was used to clarify her testimony regarding the dates alleged in the indictments. Accordingly, we find no merit in this assignment of error.