Opinion ID: 2178102
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: adequate time for discovery

Text: According to the scheduling order entered by the trial court on February 1, 2002, discovery was to be closed on April 1, 2002. The date by which dispositive motions were to be decided was May 16, 2002, but the court granted Alturas' motion for summary judgment on March 8, 2002. Appellants now argue that the court abused its discretion in rendering summary judgment before discovery was scheduled to be closed, and before the date set for dispositive motions to be decided. They assert that the trial court decided without warning ... that the assigned Track I calendar would be rescinded, and without opportunity ... to incorporate discovery responses into [the] opposition. Specifically, appellants argue (1) that they were unable to refute the amount of debt owed under the promissory note without first gaining information from Alturas (which was the only source of information on how that figure was calculated); (2) that they anticipated the opportunity to plug in evidence that elucidated the basis for their dispute with that figure as information became available through discovery; and (3) that filing a Rule 56(f) affidavit with their opposition would have been premature, since dispositive motions were not to be decided until May 16, 2002. We reject each of these arguments. [T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (emphasis added). The record here shows that appellants had adequate time for discovery to contest the amount they owed under the promissory note. The case was certified to the Civil Division on October 17, 2001, thus giving appellants the right, under L & T Rule 10(c), [5] to initiate the discovery process. Even if we focus on the later date of November 2, 2001, when Alturas filed its motion for summary judgment, appellants filed their opposition on December 4, 2001, more than a month later. Assuming that discovery was even necessary for the sort of information sought by appellants, either time frame ( i.e., from October 17 or from November 2) gave them ample opportunity to seek the relatively uncomplicated information which they now claim they needed, namely, how the figure of $2,184,809.79 was calculated. Appellants' argument is further weakened by the fact that they made no attempt at all to obtain discovery during the period in which they now say they needed it. They did not do so until March 1, 2002, nearly nine months after the complaint was filed and nearly three months after they filed their opposition to the summary judgment motion. Moreover, appellants cannot plausibly argue that they relied on the scheduling order, since it was not entered until almost two months after they filed their opposition. Since adequate time existed for discovery, the issue becomes whether the trial court may permissibly grant a motion for summary judgment before the date on which discovery is scheduled to close and the date by which dispositive motions are set to be decided. Alturas is correct that there is no rule or case law requiring the court to wait until the deadline for discovery before deciding a summary judgment motion. On the contrary, in Hollins v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 760 A.2d 563 (D.C.2000), summary judgment was rendered before the completion of discovery, a circumstance which suggests that no such rule exists. See id. at 572. Indeed, as a matter of logic, the very existence of the ability to seek Rule 56(f) protection (discussed infra ) strongly indicates that there is no need for such a rule. On a related point, we must also decide whether the trial court should have delayed its decision on the summary judgment motion to allow for further discovery under Rule 56(f). That rule affords protection against the premature or improvident grant of summary judgment by permitting a nonmovant to file an affidavit stating how discovery would enable him or her to effectively oppose the summary judgment motion. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 770 A.2d 978, 993 (D.C.2001) (citation omitted). To invoke the protection of Rule 56(f), a party must have been diligent in pursuing discovery before the summary judgment motion was made and must specify why additional discovery is needed. See id. at 994. Moreover, the trial court may deny a motion for summary judgment or grant a continuance to permit discovery if the party opposing the motion adequately explains why, at that time point, it cannot present by affidavit facts needed to defeat the motion. Strang v. United States Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, 275 U.S.App. D.C. 37, 39, 864 F.2d 859, 861 (1989) (quoted in Travelers, 770 A.2d at 994). Because appellants failed to file a Rule 56(f) affidavit with their opposition, the trial court committed no error in denying them protection under Rule 56(f). See Beegle v. Restaurant Management, Inc., 679 A.2d 480, 487 n. 8 (D.C.1996) (filing of the affidavit is required to preserve the Rule 56(f) contention that disposition of the motion [for summary judgment] should be delayed pending discovery (emphasis added)); McAllister v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 849, 853 (D.C.1995) (citing Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 780 n. 4 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215, 104 S.Ct. 2657, 81 L.Ed.2d 364 (1984) (Most courts which have considered the issue agree that filing an affidavit is necessary for the preservation of a Rule 56(f) contention that summary judgment should be delayed pending discovery)). Beegle and McAllister are therefore dispositive of this issue. See also D'Ambrosio v. Colonnade Council of Unit Owners, 717 A.2d 356, 359 n. 6 (D.C.1998) (noting that this court clarified in Beegle that filing a Rule 56(f) affidavit was required). It is true that in Travelers we purported to adopt a more flexible approach, focusing not only on the sufficiency of the Rule 56(f) affidavit but also on whether there were other factors present that sufficed to alert the trial court of the need for further discovery .... Travelers, 770 A.2d at 995-996 (citation omitted). In that case, however, a Rule 56(f) affidavit was actually filed, but was deemed insufficient on its face to invoke the protection of the rule because it stated only that additional information to fully develop facts was needed. Id. at 994. It was in this context  i.e., an insufficient affidavit rather than no affidavit at all  that Travelers was decided. [6] Thus, while we may have followed a somewhat more flexible approach in Travelers, that case cannot be viewed as relaxing or eliminating the requirement that a Rule 56(f) affidavit be filed. Indeed, we caution[ed] in Travelers that the specific basis and explanation for the need for discovery set forth in [the opposition to the summary judgment motion] should ordinarily be set forth in the Rule 56(f) affidavit itself. Id. at 996. Even if an affidavit were not required to invoke Rule 56(f) protection, appellants' argument would still fail. In the Travelers case, Travelers in its opposition fleshed out its need for formal discovery and noted that the other party had failed to respond to its discovery requests. Id. at 994-995. Here, by contrast, appellants' opposition in no way articulated what steps they had taken up to that point to discover the necessary information, nor did it spell out how they planned to obtain that information. They merely asserted that the balance owed for the subject property on the plaintiff's December 21, 2000, notice of foreclosure is at issue, stating that they reserved several facts  one of which was that the debt owed by the defendants under the Promissory Note and Deed of Trust was $2,184,809.79  because they had not yet had an opportunity for discovery. In First Chicago, supra note 6, the court concluded that the appellant was not at fault in failing to conduct discovery on the merits. 267 U.S.App. D.C. at 33, 836 F.2d at 1381. Here, however, through the fault of no one but these appellants, discovery requests were not even made until the very day the summary judgment motion was decided. Further, the Certificate Regarding Discovery filed by appellants made no mention of what was being sought or why it was needed to oppose summary judgment; instead, it merely informed the court that interrogatories and a request for documents had been sent to Alturas. Thus, even under the most flexible approach possible (as in First Chicago ), appellants failed to take the necessary steps to invoke the protection of Rule 56(f).