Opinion ID: 1987249
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Crime of Second-Degree Theft.

Text: Rivers was convicted of theft by deception, a crime defined in Iowa Code section 714.1(3): A person commits theft when the person does any of the following: .... 3. Obtains the labor or services of another, or a transfer of possession, control, or ownership of the property of another, or the beneficial use of property of another, by deception. The word deception, as used in section 714.1(3), has been statutorily defined. In this case, we are concerned with only one alternative of the definition: knowingly...[p]romising payment, the delivery of goods, or other performance which the actor does not intend to perform or knows the actor will not be able to perform. Iowa Code § 702.9(5). Such intent or knowledge must exist at the time the defendant makes the promise of payment, delivery, or performance. See State v. Hogrefe, 557 N.W.2d 871, 879 (Iowa 1996). Rivers claims there was insufficient evidence that he did not intend to pay his hotel bill or perform the promised work for his customers, or that he knew he would be unable to pay or perform. In examining the evidence of intent in the record, we keep in mind some basic principles applicable to theft by deception. The mere fact of nonpayment or a failure to perform will not support a finding of intent. See Iowa Code § 702.9(5) (Failure to perform, standing alone, is not evidence that the actor did not intend to perform.); Hogrefe, 557 N.W.2d at 878. On the other hand, intent to deceive may be shown by circumstantial evidence. See State v. Comes, 245 Iowa 485, 491, 62 N.W.2d 753, 756-57 (1954).