Opinion ID: 1952963
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The COA was incorrect in holding the State was allowed to question Hickson's wife concerning her refusal to speak to representatives of the prosecution.

Text: Hickson claims that the State improperly impeached his wife, who was called to establish Hickson's alibi defense, by questioning her about her silence concerning the alibi prior to being listed as a witness for Hickson. The State argued that the fact that Mrs. Hickson was contacted by the district attorney's office and refused to talk to anybody goes to her credibility. ... I think that it directly bears on her credibility as a witness  her truthfulness. [6] CROSS EXAMINATION BY THE STATE: Q. Mrs. Hickson, the attorney for your husband, Mr. Buckley, gave us notice on Friday that you were a possible witness in this case. Do you recall the investigator calling you on Friday? A. That's right. Q. That makes you an alibi witness; does it not? A. I suppose. Q. Now, I suppose you told law enforcement about this, did you not? A. No. Nobody has asked me. Q. You did not call and tell anyone that your husband was with you on the date he is charged with committing the crime? A. That's right. [7] This impeachment was the only cross-examination of this witness by the State. The Court of Appeals held that: The Statute [Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-5 (1972)] and relevant case law recognize a waiver of spousal incompetency where both spouses consent to waive the privilege. Jordan v. State, 513 So.2d 574, 581 (Miss. 1987)... . The Hicksons' waiver was effective when, on the day before trial, Ms. Hickson's name was submitted to the State on Hickson's witness list... . Further, once the Hicksons waived spousal incompetency, and Ms. Hickson delivered her testimony in support of her husband's alibi, the Hicksons could not claim spousal incompetency on cross-examination. COA op. at 5. The COA is correct that pursuant to Jordan v. State, 513 So.2d 574 (1987), spousal privilege is waived when a spouse agrees to testify at trial. The Spousal Competency Statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-5 states in pertinent part: But in all other instances where either of them is a party litigant, the other shall not be competent as a witness and shall not be required to answer interrogatories or to make discovery of any matters involved in any such other instances without the consent of both. However, spousal privilege or competency is not the issue before us. The issue is whether when a witness refuses to speak to counsel opposite, his/her refusal is admissible to show the witness's lack of veracity pursuant to Rule 611(b). The general rule enunciated by this Court is that when a witness refuses to speak to counsel opposite, his refusal is not admissible to show the witness's lack of veracity. This Court held in Alexander v. State, 610 So.2d 320 (Miss. 1992): Refusal to talk to an attorney prior to trial is not indicative of lack of veracity. Sayles, 552 So.2d at 1386-87. Such refusal is permissible, and the witness does not have to explain her silence. We do note that the questioning of a witness' refusal to cooperate with the defendant's attorney may be permissible under Rule 616 to show bias but such is not the controlling rule in this instance... . The questioning of Wheeler was not relevant to his credibility. Id. at 329. The State clearly argued to the lower court that they wished to cross-examine Ms. Hickson concerning her silence to impugn her veracity and credibility; and the lower court overruled Hickson's objection to this cross-examination based upon the State's argument. Pursuant to Alexander and Sayles, this ruling was erroneous. In Sayles v. State, 552 So.2d 1383, 1386-87 (Miss. 1989), we held: Lastly, Sayles tried to impeach Elbert by showing a lack of veracity because he refused to discuss the matter with defense counsel prior to trial... . The trial judge was correct in excluding this evidence as irrelevant. Elbert's refusal to talk to an attorney prior to trial is not indicative of lack of veracity. The criteria of relevancy to shed light on the credibility of the witness and his direct testimony is vague. However, Elbert's refusal to speak with defense counsel is not relevant to credibility. The trial court's ruling allowing the State to question Ms. Hickson on her silence was erroneous, and the Court of Appeals' analysis of this issue was also erroneous.