Opinion ID: 842331
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: substantial and compelling reasons for the guidelines departure

Text: The trial court's statement in support of its departure does not constitute a substantial and compelling reason to exceed the sentencing guidelines range. The phrase substantial and compelling reason has, in our judgment, acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law and, thus, it must be construed according to such meaning. That is, a substantial and compelling reason must be construed to mean an objective and verifiable reason that `keenly' or `irresistibly' grabs our attention; is of `considerable worth' in deciding the length of a sentence; and exists only in exceptional cases. [ People v. Babcock, 469 Mich. 247, 257-258, 666 N.W.2d 231 (2003), quoting People v. Fields, 448 Mich. 58, 62, 67-68, 528 N.W.2d 176 (1995).] Whether a reason for departure is objective and verifiable is a question of law subject to review de novo. Babcock, 469 Mich. at 265, 666 N.W.2d 231. In this case, the court relied solely on Burns's postprobation conduct to exceed the guidelines range. A sentencing court may consider postprobation conduct when determining whether substantial and compelling reasons exist to depart upward. But the fact that probation was violated does not automatically constitute a substantial and compelling reason. People v. Hendrick, 472 Mich. 555, 562-563, 697 N.W.2d 511 (2005). The trial court's statement on the departure evaluation form does not satisfy Hendrick 's requirement. By simply referring to Burns's violation behavior, the court did nothing more than repeat the fact that Burns had violated the terms of his probation. The statement did not explain why his behavior separated Burns from the typical probation violator. It did not explain why this particular departure was warranted, or why this is an exceptional case[] warranting a departure. Babcock, 469 Mich. at 258, 666 N.W.2d 231. And it said nothing about why this case should keenly or irresistibly seize our attention. Id. Without such detail, the stated reason for departure is insufficient. Id.; Hendrick, 472 Mich. at 563, 697 N.W.2d 511. And Burns must be remanded to the trial court for resentencing. MCL 769.34(11). The majority turns to the sentencing transcript to bolster the trial court's stated reason for departure. This is inappropriate. A reviewing court may not search the record to find its own substantial and compelling reason to depart. Instead, it must rely on the reasons stated by the trial court. If they are insufficient, the review must end there, and the case must be remanded for resentencing. Babcock, 469 Mich. at 273, 666 N.W.2d 231 (appendix to majority opinion). But even if we were to refer to the sentencing transcript, a substantial and compelling reason justifying the departure cannot be found. The only statement in the record that might constitute a reason for departure is the following statement by the court: I seldom ever exceed guidelines, in fact I can't recall a time that I have, but I'm going to in your case. The behavior that you exhibited here certainly is not or was not contemplated in arriving at your original guidelines. It was gross, it was abusive, and I believe there's a compelling reason to exceed guidelines. One could infer from this that the court intended to depart because Burns's behavior was gross and abusive. These are subjective words. Whether conduct is gross and abusive is a determination that changes depending on who is reviewing it. It could vary drastically according to a person's culture, upbringing, religion, and education. Because of its subjective nature, a finding that actions were gross and abusive cannot be a substantial and compelling reason to depart from the sentencing guidelines. Babcock, 469 Mich. at 257-258, 666 N.W.2d 231. Burns must be resentenced. MCL 769.34(11). [5] Therefore, no need exists to reach the Sixth Amendment question in this case. It is a well-accepted rule that an appellate court will not grapple with a constitutional issue if a case can be decided on other grounds. J & J Constr. Co. v. Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, Local 1, 468 Mich. 722, 734, 664 N.W.2d 728 (2003); Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. Univ. of Michigan Bd. of Regents, 444 Mich. 211, 234, 507 N.W.2d 422 (1993). The majority disregards this rule without providing its reason. At the very least, the majority should have addressed the Babcock issue before undertaking the application of Blakely v. Washington [6] here. If it had done so, the constitutional issue could have been avoided entirely. [7]