Opinion ID: 707337
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of Claims Against the State of Kansas

Text: 6 De Young's claims against the State of Kansas were properly dismissed by the district court. The Eleventh Amendment grants the states absolute immunity from suits brought by individuals in federal court. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). When the state itself is a named defendant, the Eleventh Amendment bar operates regardless of the legal or equitable nature of the relief sought. Hensel v. Office of Chief Administrative Hearing, 38 F.3d 505, 509 (10th Cir.1994). Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of De Young's claims against the State of Kansas. B. Dismissal of Claims Against Judge White 7 De Young alleged in his complaint that the State of Kansas was represented by Judge White. The district court thus assumed, as do we, that De Young is suing Judge White as a state official in both his official and individual capacities. However, because we agree with the district court that De Young's complaint does not state a claim for relief against Judge White in either capacity, we affirm the dismissal of the action. 8 First, although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against a state official for injunctive relief, see Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-160 (1908), it does bar official capacity suits against state officials for monetary relief, Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of the Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). Thus, De Young's claim for damages, if brought against Judge White as a representative of the State of Kansas, is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. 9 Second, even if De Young's claim is brought against Judge White in his individual capacity, we agree that this claim is barred by Judge White's common law judicial immunity. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). Under this doctrine, judicial officers are given immunity from civil damages liability for all acts performed in a judicial capacity. Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 107 (1994). Thus, we have held that a judge cannot be held liable for actions which are normally performed by a judge. Id. Here, De Young seeks civil damages from Judge White for the injury caused by the denial of De Young's constitutional challenge. Because there is no doubt that the act of deciding a constitutional challenge is at the core of the judicial function, the damages claim against Judge White in his individual capacity is barred by judicial immunity. 10 Finally, De Young's complaint does not state a claim for injunctive relief against Judge White. While it is true that neither the judicial immunity nor the Eleventh Amendment would bar a suit against a judicial officer for prospective injunctive relief, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984), it is clear that no injunctive relief is called for in this case. De Young alleges that the SCPA violates the Seventh Amendment by denying small claims litigants a jury trial and asks us to declare the statute unconstitutional. However, it is well-established that the right to jury trial in civil cases is not a fundamental aspect of due process and does not apply to state court proceedings. Minneapolis and St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916). Accordingly, De Young has not stated a claim upon which relief--injunctive or otherwise--can be granted.