Opinion ID: 1316209
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effective Representation Death Qualification

Text: Defendant contends various acts of ineffective assistance of counsel deprived him of a properly death-qualified jury, and violated his federal and state constitutional rights to due process and an impartial jury, and his right to a reliable penalty determination under the federal Constitution. We reject the claims. Defendant's primary complaint is that his trial attorneys, lead counsel C. Logan McKechnie and cocounsel Elizabeth Barranco, did not vigorously participate in sequestered voir dire, and that an insufficient number of prospective jurors were examined and challenged for cause as a result. (See Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80-81, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301 ( Hovey ).) [14] Counsel's nonparticipation was purportedly so egregious as to constitute a complete abdication of the duty of competent representation. Viewed in context, jury selection as a whole occurred over a 10-week period. Present in court throughout this process, including death qualification, was Dr. JoEllan Dimitrius, a jury expert assisting the defense. Our review discloses nothing perfunctory about Hovey voir dire in general, or about defense counsel's performance in particular. (Cf. People v. Lends (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 290-291, 266 Cal.Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892 [no incompetence based on counsel's participation in one-day voir dire in capital case].) Six and one-half weeks  or 65 percent  of the time spent selecting the jury was devoted to death qualification. Around 160 prospective jurors appeared during this phase and were not excused for hardship or by stipulation of the parties. Individual Hovey examinations  which consumed about 3,500 pages of the reporter's transcript  followed the same basic pattern. The trial court first asked questions, and then gave both defense counsel and the prosecutor the opportunity to do so. Sometimes follow-up inquiries were made. No restrictions appear to have been placed on the number or nature of questions that could be asked. (Cf. People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 586-587, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142 [approving Hovey voir dire limited to four questions with almost no follow-up inquiry by defense counsel].) Contrary to what defendant now claims, the record suggests his trial attorneys participated fully in the process, and did so intelligently. ( People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 485, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249 [rejecting ineffectiveness claim based on the nature and extent of counsel's questions about capital punishment].) Defense counsel questioned at least 86 prospective jurors, including a large number of actual jurors in the case. [15] Counsel also exercised at least 34 challenges for cause, and vigorously opposed several prosecutorial challenges based on the individual's views on capital punishment. Counsel's decision to forgo questioning in some instances seems tactically sound on this record. (E.g., People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th 450, 485, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249; see People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 986-987, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171 [stating general rule that ineffectiveness claims are rejected on appeal unless there could be no satisfactory explanation for counsel's performance].) Defendant's attorneys typically remained silent when the examination otherwise revealed that a prospective juror did not strongly favor capital punishment, or was amenable to life imprisonment without parole. By not probing deeper into the matter, defense counsel reduced the risk of antagonizing] the juror, or exposing pro-life scruples that might give the prosecution a reason to use a peremptory challenge or even grounds for a challenge for cause. ( People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 485, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249; see People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 657-659, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351.) At bottom, nothing shows counsel was incompetent for the reasons urged by defendant. Defendant also complains that the defense had exercised only two of its 26 peremptory challenges when it expressed satisfaction with the 12-member jury. The implication seems to be that counsel did not meaningfully participate in this phase of jury selection, and that defendant's jury was death prone as a result. We note, however, that defense counsel used two additional peremptories when the panel of six alternate jurors was chosen. The prosecution used a total of eight peremptory challenges in selecting all jurors, including alternates. Because the use of peremptory challenges is inherently subjective and intuitive, an appellate record will rarely disclose reversible incompetence in this process. ( People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 911, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277.) We have consistently rejected complaints about either the failure to excuse prospective jurors on an individual peremptory basis, or the decision to accept the jury as constituted before exhausting such challenges. (E.g., People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 448, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 480, 48 Cal. Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 62, 40 Cal. Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224; People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th 450, 486-487, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249; People v. Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 911, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277; People v. Lewis, supra, 50 Cal.3d 262, 290, 266 Cal.Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892.) No different result is warranted here. Peremptory challenges were exercised only after both Hovey and general voir dire were complete, and the pool of prospective jurors had been passed for cause by both sides. The defense thus had the benefit of both the protracted examination process and any advice received from its in-court jury consultant. We see no basis on which to conclude that peremptory challenges were used in an unsound or uninformed manner. One particular exchange reinforces this view. Over the prosecutor's objection, Defense Counsel McKechnie requested and received the court's permission to use a photograph of the victim's body during general voir dire. Counsel insisted he could not otherwise intelligently exercise my peremptory [challenges] without knowing how people are going to react to this very bloody scene at the Aztec Liquor Store. Counsel said he planned to rely on body language and eye contact generated by the photograph. Thus, contrary to what defendant suggests, it appears counsel placed special value on the peremptory challenge process, and viewed it as a nuanced means of selecting a suitable jury. Finally, defendant insists trial counsel viewed the death qualification process as merely a one-sided tool by which the prosecution eliminates potential jurors biased in favor of life imprisonment without parole: Due to this fallacious interpretation of the critical importance of sequestered voir dire, trial counsel performed below the standards to be expected of diligent counsel in a death penalty case. The record does not support the claim. The defense repeatedly made clear its intent to excuse individuals whose views in favor of capital punishment would `prevent or substantially impair' their performance as jurors. ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 121, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887, quoting Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.) Counsel expressed this understanding both orally and in writing when presenting the trial court with reasons underlying numerous challenges for cause during Hovey voir dire. No fundamental misunderstanding of counsel's role during this phase of trial has been demonstrated by defendant.