Opinion ID: 1140648
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: chancellor was jurisdictionally correct in retaining cause

Text: My major problem with the majority has been stated. Ordinarily, I would not discuss the minor premise in this case that the chancellor was absolutely correct, in the first place, in retaining the cause. The majority's reasoning here also is so bolixed, however, that it is tantalizing. As I have stated, under the well-pleaded allegations, which were all the chancellor was required to consider, Johnson & Knight v. Hinds County, supra , the chancellor was manifestly correct. The majority, to support it decision, has gone beyond the pleadings. There is also this additional reason, completely ignored by the majority, which the chancellor gave for keeping this case. The complaint asked for punitive damages. The chancellor cited Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, supra , which constitutes clear support, because in that case this Court held that a claim for punitive damages in and of itself was sufficient to give a chancery court jurisdiction. The majority tells us that a good reason for this Court to transfer the cause to circuit court is that the defendant demanded a trial by jury, which will be denied him in chancery court. (Pp. 214-215, Majority Opinion) It neglects to tell us that in Tideway the same majority held that a chancellor was superior to a jury in determining whether to assess punitive damages. Let us briefly review the history of punitive damages in chancery court. In repeated cases this Court held the chancery court was without power to award punitive damages. Subscribers Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Totaro, 370 So.2d 1342 (Miss. 1979); Gulf Steamship Companies v. Polk, 370 So.2d 1348 (Miss. 1979); Carl v. Craft, 258 So.2d 237, 241 (Miss. 1972); Avant v. Whitten, 253 So.2d 394, 396 (Miss. 1971); Monsanto Co. v. Cochran, 254 Miss. 399, 180 So.2d 624, 626 (1965); Wilborn v. Balfour, 218 Miss. 791, 806, 67 So.2d 857, 864 (1953). This line of decisions culminated in Thompson v. First Mississippi Nat. Bank, 427 So.2d 973 (Miss. 1983), where we emphatically held that the chancery court was without power to award punitive damages. One month later the same majority in Tideway Oil, supra, held that indeed the chancery court did have power to award punitive damages, and overruled all previous decisions to the contrary, including the fresh, ink-wet [4] Thompson v. First Mississippi Nat. Bank, supra . Tideway Oil made such statements as: [I]t is difficult to image a more appropriate forum for the litigation of such volatile and sensitive matters [punitive damages] than the chancery court. 431 So.2d at 461. Our chancellors are charged with granting that relief which equity and good conscience require. There will be rare cases where the conduct of the defendant is so outrageous that an assessment of punitive damages ought to be made. It would be peculiarly [in]appropriate that a judge charged to act in accordance with equity and good conscience may not hear and adjudicate such claims. This is particularly so in this day when many feel that more than an occasional plaintiff recklessly demands punitive damages at law, hoping that he can move a jury to give him that windfall which in equity and good conscience he ought not to have. [Brackets ours]       We hold that claims for punitive damages lie within the subject matter jurisdiction of the chancery courts of this state. We rely in no part upon notions of pendent jurisdiction en route. [Emphasis added] 431 So.2d at 646. Even with these observations, the majority in Tideway Oil was not through with the matter. Recognizing the country lawyer's philosophy of draftsmanship that it don't hurt to say the same thing more than once, the majority did indeed want to say the same thing again. The majority quoted from Shaw v. Owen Gin Co., 229 Miss. 126, 133, 90 So.2d 179, 181 (1965), as authority for the proposition that when the chancery court has jurisdiction to hear one of the disputed issues, it can take jurisdiction to hear all issues in the case, known as pendent jurisdiction. Then we said it again that a chancery court did not have to have pendent jurisdiction to hear punitive damages. [W]e go the further step, however, and hold that notions of pendent jurisdiction are unnecessary to our decision. We hold that our chancery courts have actual, not just pendent, subject matter jurisdiction over claims for punitive damages. [Emphasis added] 431 So.2d at 464. How anyone can read Tideway Oil, supra, and not conclude this Court has held that if you have a bona fide case entitling you to punitive damages you are entitled to file your suit in chancery court escapes me. The late Justice Broom in a cogent, brief and gentlemanly dissent warned us that in so doing we were depriving parties of a right to a trial by jury guaranteed by § 31. He concluded: Serious procedural problems can be foreseen which make the majority action fraught with peril in future cases. Due to the very nature of chancery practice, chancellors may be flooded with an avalanche of claims for punitive damages which will obscure the main thrust of chancery litigation. My view is that such changes should not be wrought by judicial fiat of this Court without allowing the bench, bar and citizenry of the state to present their views by some manner or means. Action which results in abridgement of the sacred right to jury trial is more suitably accomplished by our lawmakers: the members of the Mississippi Legislature. 431 So.2d at 468. The majority in Tideway Oil, supra, is authority for a circuit judge, when there has been a claim for punitive damages, transferring the action to chancery court. In this case the plaintiff demanded $500,000 actual and $8,000,000 in punitive damages. If he prevails in his suit that the defendant acted recklessly or maliciously, or both, clearly he is entitled to have the trier of fact consider punitive damages as well as actual damages. In Tideway the majority held that a chancellor was superior to a jury in considering whether punitive damages should be assessed, and if so the amount, than a jury. Now, this same majority tells us that the defendants should have a jury on damages, citing Article 3, § 31 of our Constitution. Of course, if the majority in Tideway had heeded Justice Broom, who also cited § 31, we would not be faced with this problem. Instead, the majority then ignored § 31 because it suited its purposes to do so, just as it is now emasculating § 147. Had the law remained as it was for at least two centuries prior to Tideway, the plaintiff would not have filed suit in chancery court, because in doing so it would have meant he could never recover a penny in punitive damages, regardless of his entitlement. Decisions from this Court should be hallmarks of caution, clarity and consistency.