Opinion ID: 2070061
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the balancing process described

Text: The standard for free exercise claims is a balancing test which countenances shifting burdens of persuasion in proportion to proofs admitted at trial. For example, once a plaintiff has established that a regulation burdens the exercise of religion, the state must establish that a compelling state interest is at issue and that the interest cannot otherwise be served. If the plaintiff sets forth alternative means which rebut the government's claim of necessity, then the state is required to show with more particularity that no lesser restrictive alternative is available. Compare Wisconsin v Yoder, supra, 234-236. The balancing process which is required has been diversely described by the United States Supreme Court. [20] In Sherbert v Verner, supra, 403, the Court applied traditional strict scrutiny review and required that a governmental regulation which burdens the free exercise of religion be justified by a compelling state interest. [21] In Wisconsin v Yoder, supra, 214, the Court required a showing of a sufficient state interest to override the burdened religious interest. See also United States v Lee, 455 US 252, 257-258; 102 S Ct 1051; 71 L Ed 2d 127 (1982). One commentator has observed that the Court's failure to use the compelling state interest language suggest[s] the use of a more open balancing test. Nowak, Rotunda & Young, Constitutional Law (2d ed), p 1060. At least one member of the United States Supreme Court has posited that the majority of decisions has placed an almost insurmountable burden on any individual who objects to a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes [or prescribes] conduct that his religion prescribes [or proscribes].... [22] Although this is the pronounced view of only one justice, we cannot ignore the conclusion that even the Supreme Court has acknowledged that certain government interests are so compelling that the state need not show that the means chosen is absolutely essential to further that interest, and that no lesser restrictive alternative could be substituted. It thus appears that the degree of importance attached to the governmental interest can well dictate the extent the government is required to diminish the effectiveness of the regulation by granting an exemption. [23] Those cases in which the state has failed in its burden are the exceptions, not the rule. [24] They have occurred where the effect of a law on religious practices is severe and, as in Yoder, supra, where a lesser restrictive alternative has been clearly and convincingly established by the plaintiffs challenging the regulation, [25] or where the interest of the state in refusing to extend a legislative exemption has been found subordinate to the free exercise rights of those who were deprived by that interest and has suggested a discriminatory intent. [26] Sherbert v Verner, supra ; Thomas v Review Bd of Indiana Employment Security, supra. Those exceptions are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar.
In Wisconsin v Yoder, supra, 215, the balancing test was based on the quality of the claims of the respondents concerning the alleged encroachment of Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance statute on their rights and the rights of their children to the free exercise of the religious beliefs they and their forebears have adhered to for almost three centuries. In that case the Amish persuasively established almost three hundred years of consistent practice which pervaded and regulated the respondents' entire mode of life. This evidence supported their claim that enforcement of the State's requirement of compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of their religious beliefs. Id., 219. The Yoder Court accepted the proposition that some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence. Id., 221. It also recognized that education prepares citizens to become self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society. The Court then found that the Amish had carried the burden of demonstrating the sufficiency of their alternative mode of continuing informal vocational education in the same terms of those interests advanced by the state in support of its compulsory high school education. Id., 235. It was then, the Court concluded, that in light of this convincing showing, and considering the minimal difference between what the state required and the Amish accepted, the state must show with more particularity how the admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish. Id., 235-236. The most recent case applying the balancing test we believe appropriate where a paramount government interest is demonstrated is Goldman v Weinberger, supra . In Goldman, a case decided this year, the petitioner contended that the Free Exercise Clause permitted him to wear a yarmulke while in uniform despite a United States Air Force regulation mandating uniform dress for Air Force personnel. The ultimate governmental interest at stake was congressional authority to raise and support armies and to regulate their performance. The intermediate goals or interests asserted were discipline, uniformity, the need to inculcate the virtue of obedience, and the subordination of the interests of the individual to the needs of the service. In order to achieve these objectives, the military promulgated dress regulations. Such regulations, as interpreted, prohibited the wearing of the yarmulke. The petitioner asserted that his religious beliefs required him to wear the yarmulke and that, under Sherbert v Verner, supra , and Wisconsin v Yoder, supra , the regulation as applied to him burdened his free exercise of religion. A majority held that the governmental interest in the military is so important that any regulation which reasonably relates to achievement of any of the asserted intermediate interests was permissible even though the effect of the regulation was to cause a person to violate his religious beliefs. Whereas the opinion for reversal in this case argues that it is inescapable that Sherbert v Verner, supra , sets the standard for all claims of violation of free exercise of religion, in Goldman only two justices agreed. Justices O'Connor and Marshall applied that standard and, in dissent, held that the granting of an exemption should be required. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, would have required an exemption as well, but he declined to apply Sherbert because the military was involved. Seven of nine justices agreed that the granting of an exemption would create no danger of impairment of the military mission of the Air Force. Three justices, in a separate concurring opinion, noted that where a regulation is neutral regarding religion, is based on an objective standard, is not motivated by hostility against, or any special respect for, any religious faith, to require an exemption simply because the governmental interest would not be impaired, thereby would invite nonuniform treatment for members of different religious faiths. [27] The issue in the conflict between religiously motivated conduct and the military interest in uniformity of dress was resolved as it was because a majority recognized the paramount importance of the military interest. Although a majority of justices applied a rational basis test, a standard clearly not applicable here, Goldman nonetheless refutes any mechanistic and simplistic application of Sherbert to all free exercise claims. The point is that the congressional power to raise and regulate armies, including the requiring of uniform dress, is so important that the most important of personal rights, the free exercise of religion, even where directly burdened, must give way to the governmental regulation even where the relationship between the governmental interest and the means to achieve it is not only not essential or necessary, but the logical nexus is far from clear. Goldman suggests that the higher in rank the governmental interest, the less the need for necessity to support the means chosen to achieve it even where paramount personal rights are directly burdened.
The opinion for reversal sharply criticizes both the opinion of Chief Justice WILLIAMS and this opinion for articulation and application of the standard of review in this case. Post, pp 566-578. In summary, the opinion for reversal states that the standard for review in free exercise claims is clear. Once the claimant has asserted that a governmental regulation burdens the free exercise of religion, the government is obligated to articulate and prove that it has a compelling interest, that the means selected to achieve that end is essential for that purpose, that no means less burdensome to free exercise exists to achieve such purpose, and that the granting of the exemption would effectively destroy the government's ability to achieve its purpose. Our colleague implies, further, that the claim of religious practice as well as the burden thereon is defined by the claimant and that scrutiny of the claim is perhaps beyond the competence of the judiciary. While the test used by Chief Justice WILLIAMS' opinion and in this opinion is articulated somewhat differently, we have applied the test articulated by the opinion for reversal in this case. Whether Supreme Court precedent requires this standard remains unclear. From the case law, however, the following factors do emerge as required considerations. One obvious factor is the governmental interest. As Yoder and Goldman teach, questions regarding the importance of the interest are inescapable. As a practical matter, the level of abstraction employed by a court in recognizing the interest can often be controlling. The higher the level of generality, in general, the better the government will fare in the contest. The more concrete or fact-specific the interest recognized, the worse the government will fare in the balancing. A second and third factor involve the means chosen by government to achieve its interest and the logical nexus between the end and the means. Evaluation of the latter relationship involves concepts such as necessity, essentiality, broadness versus narrowness, objective versus subjective, whether the regulation is one of general application, and whether the regulation is one of several different ways to accomplish the objective or is the only way of doing so. In short, the stronger and more direct the logical nexus, the better the government will fare in the balancing. A fourth factor is the private right asserted as affected. The rank given to such a right is also an inescapable consideration. Whether the right is explicit in the constitution, whether a court is asked to recognize such a right as a matter of first impression, or whether the right is claimed to exist by extension of, or analogy to, other explicit rights, some definition of the scope and nature of the right asserted is necessary. A fifth apparent factor is the nature of the conflict between the private right and the means chosen by the government to achieve its objective. Among other formulations of the concept employed here are direct versus indirect, belief versus conduct, purpose versus effect, and least restrictive alternative. A sixth factor is the extent of the conflict. At this point in the analysis the amount of the burden or restraint is relevant, as well as to what extent the state's effectiveness in achieving its goal would be diminished if required to relieve the burden. A final factor is the role of the individual exemption. Whether it is required to be offered depends upon analysis of the above six factors. If the governmental objective is compelling, if the means to achieve it is closely and narrowly drawn, and if the effect on religious exercise is indirect, unintended, and marginal, then an exemption as an alternative to avoid the claimed conflict is not necessary. In summary it appears that the higher the rank of the governmental interest, the stronger the logical nexus between such interest and the means selected to accomplish it, the less important the private right, the less direct the conflict between the exercise of the right and the regulation in question, and the lower the amount of the burden, the less likely the claimant will win in the balancing process. A mathematically certain formula cannot be created which accounts for the internal evaluation of each factor and its relative weight with respect to each other factor. The essential judicial task is to evaluate asserted conflicts between private rights and public interests to ensure that neither is compromised or destroyed.