Opinion ID: 775530
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Review of Clerical or Typographical Nature

Text: 56
57 Statutory interpretation is a matter of law and we thus review the district court's interpretation of 35 U.S.C. 255 without deference. Barton v. Adang, 162 F.3d 1140, 1144, 49 USPQ2d 1128, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Our task specifically concerns whether a mistake, the correction of which would broaden a claim, can be corrected under 255 and, if so, under what conditions. This is an issue of first impression. 58 In construing a statute . . . we begin by inspecting its language for plain meaning. If the words are unambiguous, no further inquiry is usually required. Camargo Correa Metais, S.A. v. United States, 200 F.3d 771, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). We also consider not only the bare meaning of the word[s] but also [their] placement and purpose in the statutory scheme. Fanning, Phillips & Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717, 721 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted); Tyler v. Cain, -- U.S. --, --, 121 S. Ct. 2478, 2482 (2001) (stating that we interpret the words in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme) (internal quotations omitted); Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1383, 49 USPQ2d 1144, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (statutory interpretation is a 'holistic endeavor' that requires consideration of a statutory scheme in its entirety). In appropriate cases, ambiguity may be resolved by considering the public notice function in interpreting the patent statutes. Vectra Fitness, 162 F.3d at 1384, 49 USPQ2d at 1148 (Moreover, an additional consideration also weighs against the interpretation of the statutory scheme[, involving 251 and 253,] for which Vectra argues. The public is entitled to rely upon the public record of a patent in determining the scope of the patent's claims.). We note that neither of the parties has directed us to any legislative history that we should consider. 59
60 The phrase clerical or typographical nature is not explicitly defined in 255, so we first look to the plain meaning and common understanding of the phrase. A standard dictionary defines clerical as relating to an office clerk or office work, and defines typographical as relating to the setting of type, printing with type, or the arrangement of matter printed from type. Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language 116, 646 (David B. Guralnik ed., Warner Books 1982). Thus, clerical or typographical mistakes are generallyunderstood to include simple mistakes such as obvious misspellings that are immediately apparent. Upon viewing such a misspelling, there is no doubt that a mistake, indeed a clerical or typographical mistake, has occurred. 61 The parties dispute whether a 255 clerical or typographical mistake may ever encompass a mistake that, upon correction, would broaden a claim. The common understanding of a clerical or typographical mistake certainly includes mistakes that, upon correction, would either broaden or narrow a claim. Majestic suggests, however, that a claim may only be broadened under the reissue provisions of 35 U.S.C. 251. We acknowledge that Congress dealt with broadening reissues in detail in 251 and that our interpretation of 255 must consider the entire statutory scheme, including 251. Tyler, -- U.S. at --, 121 S. Ct. at 2482 (we interpret the words in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme) (internal quotations omitted); Fanning, Phillips & Molnar, 160 F.3d at 721 (We also consider not only the bare meaning of the word[s] but also [their] placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.) (internal quotations omitted). Although 255, unlike 251, does not expressly deal with broadening corrections, the words of 255 do not preclude broadening corrections. We are hesitant to impose so great a limitation without express indication from the statute. Accordingly, we interpret 255 to allow broadening corrections of clerical or typographical mistakes. 62 The parties also dispute whether a 255 clerical or typographical mistake, the correction of which would broaden a claim, must be evident from the public record. This question arises from the observation that not all clerical or typographical mistakes are immediately apparent, and even where the mistake is apparent, it may not be clear how the mistake should be corrected. This leads to a classification of these typographical mistakes into three categories. Some mistakes are immediately apparent and leave no doubt as to what the mistake is. Examples of such errors include misspellings that leave no doubt as to the word which was intended; frane instead of frame, for example. In contrast, a second category includes those typographical mistakes not apparent to the reader at all; for example, a mistake resulting in another word that is spelled correctly and that reads logically in the context of the sentence. A third category of mistakes includes those where it is apparent that a mistake has been made, but it is unclear what the mistake is. Examples of such mistakes are those that create inconsistent terms, but leave unclear which of the conflicting terms is in error. It is not evident to the reader of the public record how to appropriately correct mistakes of the second and third categories. 63 To help resolve which, if any, of these three categories of mistakes may be corrected under 255, we again consider not only the bare meaning of the word[s] [of 255] but also [their] placement and purpose in the statutory scheme. Fanning, Phillips & Molnar, 160 F.3d at 721. The statutory scheme here encompasses 35 U.S.C. 251-256, which govern the amendment and correction of patents. We believe that 251 and 252 are of particular relevance in the statutory scheme, since they deal explicitly with post-issuance amendments that may broaden claim scope. We now address these provisions in more detail. 64 Section 251 addresses the correction of an error and it is understood that corrections under 251 can result in the broadening of a claim. 35 U.S.C. 251 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (allowing correction of an error in which the patentee claim[ed] . . . less than he had a right to claim). The patentee's right to broaden a claim is not absolute, however. First, 251 requires that the broadened claim be supported by the original specification. Id. (allowing a reissue only for the invention disclosed in the original patent). Second, 251 precludes a patentee from applying for a broadening reissue more than two years after a patent has issued. 35 U.S.C. 251 (1994) (No reissued patent shall be granted enlarging the scope of the claims of the original patent unless applied for within two years from the grant of the original patent.). Third, and most important for our analysis, Congress further protected the public by providing intervening rights for the public with respect to claims that were broadened under 251. 35 U.S.C. 252 (Supp. V 1999) (providing intervening rights); Seattle Box Co. v. Indus. Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 829-30, 221 USPQ 568, 576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (discussing the intervening rights of 252). 65 This statutory scheme reveals Congress' concern for public notice and for protecting the public from the unanticipated broadening of a claim. Section 251 itself provides only minimal notice for broadening reissues, requiring simply that the original specification support the broadened claim. Such a minimal requirement is also implicit in 255's requirement that reexamination not be required. But Congress displayed a greater concern for public notice in 251 and 252 by insulating the public from this lack of effective notice through the provision of, first, a two-year limit on broadening reissues and, second, intervening rights. We are mindful that our interpretation of 255 must not frustrate Congress' objectives in 251 and 252. See Vectra Fitness, 162 F.3d at 1384, 49 USPQ2d at 1148 (interpreting 253 in light of 251, so as to ensure that the notice function of 251 was not frustrated, stating that after the two-year window for broadening reissues, the public should be able to rely on the scope of non-disclaimed claims). 66 Having already determined that broadening corrections are encompassed in 255, at least in certain circumstances, it is here that we place the weight of 251 and 252. Sections 251 and 252 evince the clear intent of Congress to protect the public against the unanticipated broadening of a claim after the grant of the patent by the PTO. It would be inconsistent with that objective to interpret 255 to allow a patentee to broaden a claim due to the correction of a clerical or typographical mistake that the public could not discern from the public file and for which the public therefore had no effective notice. Such a broadening correction would leave the public without effective notice, without the constraint of a two-year time bar, and without the hope of intervening rights. 67 This court has previously noted the propriety of independently considering the public notice function in interpreting the patent statutes. Vectra Fitness, 162 F.3d at 1384, 49 USPQ2d at 1148 (Moreover, an additional consideration also weighs against the interpretation of the statutory scheme[, involving 251 and 253,] for which Vectra argues. The public is entitled to rely upon the public record of a patent in determining the scope of the patent's claims.). Both the Supreme Court and this court have highlighted the importance of the notice function of patent claims. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29, 41 USPQ2d 1865, 1871 (1997) (discussing the impact of the doctrine of equivalents on the definitional and public-notice functions of the statutory claiming requirement); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558, 575, 56 USPQ2d 1865, 1877 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating that the notice function of patent claims hasbecome paramount), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2519 (U.S. Jun. 18, 2001) (No. 00-1543).Placing due weight on the public notice function of patent claims suggests that we should interpret 255 to allow a broadening correction of a typographical error only where it is clearly evident from the specification, drawings, and prosecution history how the error should appropriately be corrected. Such an interpretation of 255 insures that the public is provided with notice as to the scope of the claims. Cf. Biotec Biologische Naturverpackungen GmbH & Co. KG v. Biocorp, Inc., 249 F.3d 1341, 1348, 58 USPQ2d 1737, 1741 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (applying a similar standard to the identification of mistakes in the prosecution history, the appropriate correction of which is both clear and affects claim scope, stating that [a]n error in the prosecution record must be viewed as are errors in documents in general; that is, would it have been apparent to the interested reader that an error was made, such that it would be unfair to enforce the error (emphasis added)). 68 Superior argues that 255 should not be held to require the appropriate correction of a clerical or typographical mistake to be evident from the intrinsic record even when that correction will broaden a claim. Superior notes that Congress explicitly required that a mistake be evident from the records of the PTO in 254, which deals with mistakes attributable to the PTO as opposed to the applicant, and that such an explicit requirement is not present in 255. Superior concludes therefrom that 255 should not be interpreted to require the correction of the mistake to be evident from the specification, drawings, and prosecution history. Section 254 is, of course, part of the statutory context we must consider in interpreting 255. Superior's observation on the textual difference between these two sections is correct and can be argued to support an inference that Congress did not intend to restrict 255. However, such an inference cannot override our obligation to interpret 255 to comport not only with 254, but with the overall statutory scheme-encompassing and embodied particularly in 251 and 252-protecting the public against the unanticipated broadening of a claim and giving proper credence to the public notice function. For these reasons, despite the fact that 255 does not explicitly reference the prosecution history, we deem it necessary to interpret this statutory section to contain this implicit, extra-textual requirement. 69 The cases cited by the parties are not controlling and one of them is not on point. In Arnott, the PTO expressed its view by stating that [a]bsent very unique and unusual circumstances, a clerical or typographical error should be manifest from the contents of the file of the patent sought to be corrected. 19 USPQ2d at 1053. We agree with the PTO, other than to note that we find no cause to provide for an exception for unique and unusual circumstances when a claim is broadened. In Eagle Iron Works, the Third Circuit stated that 255 does not authorize a broadening of the claims. 429 F.2d at 1383. The Third Circuit, thus, marked out an even brighter line than we have on providing notice to the public for possible broadening corrections-precluding such broadening altogether. However, decisions of the regional circuits on issues within our exclusive jurisdiction are not binding on this court. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370, 215 USPQ 657, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc). The parties also discuss Brandt, Inc. v. Crane, 558 F. Supp. 1339 (N.D. Ill. 1983). However, Brandt did not interpret 255 and is therefore not on point. Brandt decided that a claim was not invalid under 35 U.S.C. 112, but the district court was not called upon to address the validity of the 255 certificate correcting that claim or to interpret 255. Id. at 1341-42. 70 The dissent questions the need to construe 255 in this manner, citing our holding in Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin, Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 56 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In Southwest, we held that a certificate of correction issued under 254 is valid only for claims arising after the certificate issued. Id. at 1294, 56 USPQ2d at 1172. However, the holding in Southwest does not relieve us of our duty of interpreting 255 in its statutory context. Reissued patent claims that are not substantially identical to the original patent claims also are valid only for the trial of actions for causes arising after the issue of the reissued patent claims. 35 U.S.C. 252. Despite this, Congress provided a mechanism for protecting the public from unanticipated claim broadening via the two-year period and intervening rights of 35 U.S.C. 251 and 252. This indicates that simply making corrected claims applicable only to after-arising causes of action is in itself insufficient to provide the requisite public notice. 71 Furthermore, the Southwest court itself was concerned with placing the risk inherent in unanticipated broadening where it belongs: on the patentee that has availed himself of the patent system, not on the public that is entitled to rely upon the public record of the patent. [I]t does not seem to us to be asking too much to expect a patentee to check a patent when it is issued in order to determine whether it contains any errors that require the issuance of a certificate of correction. Southwest Software, 226 F.3d at 1296, 56 USPQ2d at 1173. 72 We have considered Superior's other arguments, but do not find them persuasive. Accordingly, we interpret 255 to require that a broadening correction of a clerical or typographical error be allowed only where it is clearly evident from the specification, drawings, and prosecution history how the error should appropriately be corrected. 73
74 We now review the district court's summary judgment decision that the alleged rear walls mistake was not of a clerical or typographical nature. Applying the clear and convincing evidence standard to this validity challenge, we must affirm the district court's holding if we find the absence of a genuine issue that the appropriate correction of the alleged rear walls mistake was not clearly evident from the intrinsic record. The intrinsic record, that is, the public record, consists of the original and corrected claims, the written description and drawings, and the prosecution history. We address these in turn. 75 The claim language in question recites a firebox within the housing comprising a top wall, rear walls and side walls. '534 patent, col. 5, ll. 44-45 (uncorrected claim 1). There is no grammatical error that suggests a mistake. The next limitation in the claim, however, refers to the rear wall of the firebox. '534 patent, col. 6, ll. 3-4 (uncorrected claim 1). Because that limitation refers to rear wall in the singular, with the definite article the, it does not agree with the earlier reference to rear walls in the plural. One of these limitations contains a mistake, but the claim does not indicate which is mistaken. To help resolve this question, we consider Figure 2 in conjunction with the written description. 76 The written description and drawings are consistent with either there being two rear walls or only one rear wall. The former interpretation, that there are two rear walls, is suggested most strongly by the commonality between sheet 11 and rear wall 15, which commonality suggeststhat sheet 11 should be considered to be a second rear wall. Sheet 11 and rear wall 15 are common in terms of size, placement, and function. Regarding size, sheet 11 has a height, shown in Figure 2, that is the same as rear wall 15 and a width that is substantially commensurate with a back of the heater casing 7. '534 patent, Figure 2 and col. 3, ll. 44-45. Regarding placement, sheet 11 is placed toward the rear of the firebox, being spaced rearwardly from the burner housing 2. '534 patent, Figure 2 and col. 3, ll. 50-51. Regarding function, sheet 11 and rear wall 15 operate together to provide three air pathways: one between burner housing 2 and sheet 11, a second between sheet 11 and rear wall 15, and a third between rear wall 15 and outer casing 17. '534 patent, col. 3, ll. 50-62 and col. 4, ll. 11-24. This interpretation is further reinforced by the fact that there is no limitation in the claims of the '534 patent which clearly corresponds to the sheet 11; the only possible corresponding limitation is the rear walls limitation of uncorrected claim 1. A reader of the patent might well conclude, given the structural similarity described above, that sheet 11 and rear wall 15 together correspond to the rear walls limitation. 77 The dissent notes that the specification contains a reference to the firebox rear wall 15 and characterizes this as strongly support[ing] its view that only a single rear wall is disclosed. We believe that the dissent reads too much into this use of the definite article the in this phrase. The phrase simply notes that the one wall numbered 15 is a firebox rear wall. Thus, even if one were to accept the proposition that use of the definite article the signals the presence of only a single firebox rear wall 15, there is nothing in that phrase that precludes sheet 11 from being characterized in a claim as an additional firebox rear wall. To the contrary, the written description and drawing, as noted above, support the characterization of sheet 11, placed as it is at the rear of the firebox, as a second firebox rear wall. 78 On the other hand, the interpretation that there is only one rear wall is suggested by the fact that the written description defines reference numeral 11 in Figure 2 as a reflective sheet and defines reference numeral 15 as a rear wall of the firebox. The use of separate names in the written description and the use of only one of those names, rear wall, in the claims, suggest that the sheet 11 is not a rear wall 15. 79 Looking to the prosecution history, we take note of two key facts. First, the examiner changed rear wall to rear walls in an examiner's amendment after a telephonic interview that was scheduled for the purpose of discussing prior art. The clear inference is that the examiner and the patentee agreed that such a change was necessary to overcome the prior art. That inference is buttressed by the fact that Superior did not object to the change, even though the examiner's amendment itself reminded Superior of its right to do so. Second, any suggestion that Superior simply did not review the patent as allowed and issued, thus explaining Superior's failure to object to the examiner's amendment, is negated by Superior's section 312 amendment and Make-of-Record Letter, as well as by the critical importance of reviewing claims. Cf. Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 1296, 56 USPQ2d 1161, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that it does not seem to us to be asking too much to expect a patentee to check a patent when it is issued in order to determine whether it contains any errors that require the issuance of a certificate of correction). These portions of the prosecution history appear to dispel the possibility that the change from rear wall to rear walls was a mistake. 80 In conclusion, the claim limitation in question is itself syntactically correct and on its face raises no question of a mistake. The rest of the claim, the other claims and the written description and drawings do not make it clearly evident that the rear walls limitation is a mistake and should have been rear wall. Furthermore, the prosecution history provides compelling evidence that rear walls was the correct phrase. Thus, the requested correction of the alleged mistake was not apparent from the specification, drawings, and prosecution history. The alleged mistake is, therefore, not a clerical or typographical mistake correctable under 255. Were we to apply the APA's standard of review, we would agree with the district court that the PTO's decision that the change to rear walls was of a clerical or typographical nature correctable under 255 was an abuse of discretion. 2 Opinion, 92 F.Supp.2d at 1009. 81