Opinion ID: 1914893
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: statement Obtained by Child Protective Investigator

Text: The defendant's first contention on appeal is that the introduction of a statement obtained by a child protective investigator with the DCYF violated his right against self-incrimination and right to counsel under the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions. Laurie Moriarty, a DCYF child protective investigator, was assigned to Phillip's case. Ms. Moriarty testified that her job involves receiving and investigating reports of child abuse and neglect and assessing risk and the danger that children are in. The DCYF has a statutory duty to investigate all reports of alleged child abuse or neglect. G.L.1956 § 40-11-7(a). The goals of a DCYF investigation are to determine the validity of reported allegations and to assure the safety and well-being of children. State law requires that DCYF have personal contact with the child named in the report. Id. It is DCYF policy, although not statutorily required, that investigators interview each involved adult, including alleged perpetrators. R.I.Code R. 03 005 001 § 500.0050. It is also DCYF protocol to work in conjunction with law enforcement personnel. According to a DCYF procedure and policy manual, [i]t is of utmost importance that investigative workers develop rapport with law enforcement personnel, as their assistance and support is essential in many parts of the investigative process, including: reporting[,] locating suspects[,] taking protective custody[, and] obtaining evidence. The Department must notify the police of all Priority 1 allegations received to request their cooperation and/or assistance. [10] If DCYF has reasonable cause to suspect child abuse or neglect, it is required by statute to forward any related information to the appropriate law enforcement agency. Section 40-11-7(f). On August 24, 2004, Ms. Moriarty went to the Child Advocacy Center (CAC), where she interviewed Phillip and his mother, and met with the detectives and prosecutor involved in this case. [11] At the CAC, Ms. Moriarty gave Det. McIlmail the names of other families and victims who might have been abused by Mr. Oliveira, and the detective gave her a copy of the police report concerning defendant. In her report, Ms. Moriarty stated that, based on the CAC interviews, [t]here appears to be enough evidence for the attorney general's office to press charges. The next day, August 25, 2004, Ms. Moriarty went to the Intake Center at the ACI to interview defendant. Before speaking with him, she neither ascertained whether he was being held with or without bail, nor whether he was represented by counsel. Ms. Moriarty testified that it is DCYF policy not to talk to attorneys because of confidentiality, nor is it DCYF policy to ask attorneys of record for permission to see their client. According to Ms. Moriarty, during the interview at the ACI, Mr. Oliveira admitted that he sexually molested his grandson. At trial, after refreshing her memory by reviewing her report, she told the jury that defendant stated that he spread [Phillip's] hole with his fingers to loosen him up and then he put his penis inside the child and rammed him, and the child asked him to stop because it hurt. Ms. Moriarty also testified that child protective investigators speak with alleged perpetrators [i]n case they have something further to say that can add to the evidence, and there have been incidences [sic] where I've learned new things when I talked to the perpetrator. On appeal, defendant argues that Ms. Moriarty was a government agent working in concert with law enforcement in this case. As such, he argues, she was required to Mirandize him and notify his attorney before she questioned him at the ACI. The state maintains that it is unnecessary for this Court to reach this issue because the admission of Mr. Oliveira's statement, even if erroneous, did not prejudice defendant. It argues, alternatively, that Miranda and right-to-counsel concerns were not implicated in this case because Ms. Moriarty's role in interviewing defendant was not prosecutorial in nature.
We begin our analysis with defendant's argument that the statement he gave to Ms. Moriarty violated his right to counsel, and thus was admitted erroneously by the trial justice. This Court undertakes a de novo review of questions of law, as well as mixed questions of law and fact, that involve issues of constitutional dimension. State v. Lead Industries Association, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 464 (R.I.2008); State v. Monteiro, 924 A.2d 784, 790 (R.I. 2007). Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution provide that the accused shall enjoy the right to the assistance of counsel for his defense in all criminal prosecutions. [12] The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at least when the defendant first appears before a judicial officer, United States v. Boskic, 545 F.3d 69, 81 (1st Cir. 2008)that time when the accused has been informed of a formal accusation against him and restrictions are imposed on his liberty. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Texas, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 128 S.Ct. 2578, 2581, 171 L.Ed.2d 366 (2008); see Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at that time when the government has committed itself to prosecute   . It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.). [13] A defendant then is entitled to the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of the prosecution. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 80-81, 124 S.Ct. 1379, 158 L.Ed.2d 209 (2004); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). A stage of the prosecution is critical when substantial rights of a criminal accused may be endangered by that proceeding or event. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 425, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). The United States Supreme Court has held that a post-formal-charge interrogation by police or an agent of the state is a critical stage of the prosecution in which the accused is entitled to counsel. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 169-70, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270-71, 274, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964); see also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469-70, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981). The accused has the right not to be confronted by an agent of the State regarding matters as to which the right to counsel has attached without counsel being present. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 178 n. 14, 106 S.Ct. 477. Any statement that a state agent deliberately elicits from the defendant in derogation of the right to counsel is inadmissible at his criminal trial. Id. at 174, 106 S.Ct. 477; accord State v. Mattatall, 525 A.2d 49, 52-53 (R.I.1987). In the present case, defendant's right to counsel clearly had attached by the time the state filed a complaint against him on August 13, 2004, and he was held without bail. Thereafter, any interrogation of defendant by an agent of the state constituted a critical stage of the prosecution, requiring the presence or notification of counsel. Thus, the determinative issue before us is whether Ms. Moriarty was an agent of the state for purposes of implicating defendant's right to counsel. We answer this question in the affirmative. Under the Sixth Amendment, an agent of the state is not limited to police and their express agents. We have observed that the Supreme Court of the United States has rejected arguments that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel can only be violated when the police arrange a confrontation with the accused after the right to counsel has attached. Mattatall, 525 A.2d at 51-52 (citing Moulton, 474 U.S. at 164, 106 S.Ct. 477 (the defendant arranged a meeting with a co-suspect, who cooperated with the police as a government informant); Henry, 447 U.S. at 269, 274, 100 S.Ct. 2183 (rejecting solicitor general's argument that a Sixth Amendment violation requires affirmative interrogation by the government); and Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202-03, 84 S.Ct. 1199 (information about who set up the meeting with the defendant not even mentioned in the opinion)). In Moulton, 474 U.S. at 174, 106 S.Ct. 477, the Court explained, the identity of the party who instigated the meeting at which the Government obtained incriminating statements was not decisive or even important to our decisions in Massiah or Henry.  The Court held in Estelle, that the Sixth Amendment required the exclusion of incriminating evidence obtained during a court-ordered psychiatric examination of the defendant in prison after the defendant's indictment and appointment of counsel. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 456-57, 470, 473, 101 S.Ct. 1866. The state trial court in that case ordered a psychiatric evaluation to determine the defendant's competency to stand trial. Id. at 456-57, 101 S.Ct. 1866. The psychiatrist, who concluded that the defendant was competent to stand trial, later was called by the prosecution to testify at the sentencing hearing on the defendant's future dangerousness. [14] Id. at 458-60, 101 S.Ct. 1866. The Supreme Court found that the psychiatrist was acting as an agent of the state when he testified at the hearing: That respondent was questioned by a psychiatrist designated by the trial court to conduct a neutral competency examination, rather than by a police officer, government informant, or prosecuting attorney, is immaterial. When [the psychiatrist] went beyond simply reporting to the court on the issue of competence and testified for the prosecution at the penalty phase    his role changed and became essentially like that of an agent of the State recounting unwarned statements made in a postarrest custodial setting. [15] Id. at 467, 101 S.Ct. 1866. Significantly, the question of whether a Sixth Amendment violation occurred did not turn on the purpose of the psychiatrist's interview. The Court recognized that the psychiatric examination was performed for the limited, neutral purpose of determining competency. Id. What mattered only was that the state proceeded to use the fruits of that evaluation adversely against the defendant. Id. at 465, 101 S.Ct. 1866. Because the interview proved to be a `critical stage' of the aggregate proceedings against [the defendant], the Court concluded the defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel before submitting to a pretrial psychiatric evaluation. [16] Id. at 469-70, 101 S.Ct. 1866. In the case at bar, defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached no later than his initial presentation in District Court when he was referred to the Public Defender's Office and held without bail. See Rothgery, 128 S.Ct. at 2585-86 (reiterating that the right to counsel attaches at the initial appearance, even if it comes before an indictment or formal arraignment). Although Ms. Moriarty did not interview defendant at the direct behest of the police or prosecution, she had met and exchanged information with them on the previous day as part of the CAC multidisciplinary team. Moreover, DCYF protocol required that she work cooperatively with law enforcement personnel. As Ms. Moriarty acknowledged at trial, one of her purposes in interviewing defendant was to add to the evidence. Significantly, she was statutorily required to forward any information she may obtain from defendant concerning child abuse to the police. Section 40-11-7(f). We recognize that Ms. Moriarty's role as a child protective investigator was not primarily prosecutorial; rather it was to protect children who might have been at risk due to defendant's suspected abuse. Typically, when a DCYF investigation supports an abuse allegation, the usual result is the filing by DCYF of child abuse and/or neglect petitions. These are civil proceedings in which Sixth Amendment guarantees do not apply. It is clear to us, however, that Ms. Moriarty deliberately intended to elicit incriminating evidence from defendant, which she knew she would then be required to turn over to the police, especially considering her awareness that a criminal prosecution had begun. We hold, therefore, that Mr. Oliveira was denied the basic protection of [the right to the assistance of counsel] when there was used against him at trial evidence of his own incriminating words. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 173, 106 S.Ct. 477 (quoting Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206, 84 S.Ct. 1199). [17] Our holding is not intended to stifle or limit the important work of the DCYF in protecting the safety of children. As stated by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals: The protection of the child does not necessarily include the prosecution of abusers. This Court is quite aware of the necessity of frank and open dialog between [DCYF] investigators, parents, victims and accused persons, so that the child protection goal can be achieved. We have no qualms with [DCYF] investigators getting statements related to child abuse; however, when these statements are used in a criminal proceeding, the constitutional rights of an accused must also be protected. Blanton v. State, 172 P.3d 207, 211 (Okla.Crim.App. 2007). If the state wishes to use such statements in a criminal trial, therefore, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to ensure that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel not be violated. We hasten to add that nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as prohibiting or restricting a child protective investigator or other official responsible for investigating allegations of abuse from interviewing an accused. The right to counsel is implicated, however, if the state chooses to use the information so obtained in its prosecution.
Notwithstanding the finding of a constitutional violation, this Court will not vacate a criminal conviction if the error was harmless to a defendant. The United States Supreme Court has defined `harmless error' as an error that `in the setting of a particular case [is] so unimportant and insignificant that [it] may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.' State v. Lopez, 943 A.2d 1035, 1043 (R.I.2008) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). [A]scertaining whether or not an error is harmless turns on whether it is reasonably possible that the error contributed to the conviction. Id. (citing State v. Lachapelle, 112 R.I. 105, 112-13, 308 A.2d 467, 471 (1973)). Erroneously admitted evidence which possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant cannot    be conceived of as harmless. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23-24, 87 S.Ct. 824. [B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824. An error is subject to harmless-error analysis if the error was merely a trial error that occurred during the course of the presentation of evidence to the jury and can be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine [the effect it had on the trial]. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). [M]ost constitutional errors can be harmless, and even the unconstitutional admission of an illegally obtained confession in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments is subject to harmless-error analysis. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246; State v. Feole, 797 A.2d 1059, 1067 n. 7 (R.I. 2002). See, e.g., Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) (confession obtained in violation of Sixth Amendment held to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Coker, 433 F.3d 39, 47, 49 (1st Cir.2005) (even if government violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by introducing a statement the defendant made at an interview without presence of an attorney, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt). [18] Although an admission or confession is subject to harmless-error analysis, we have recognized: A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, `the defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him   .    Certainly, confessions have profound impact on the jury, so much so that we may justifiably doubt its ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so.' State v. Bettencourt, 763 A.2d 636, 639 (R.I.2000) (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296, 111 S.Ct. 1246). Furthermore, this Court appreciates that the application of the harmless error rule must be used guardedly lest it destroy or dilute constitutional guarantees. Lachapelle, 112 R.I. at 113, 308 A.2d at 471 (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 50, 87 S.Ct. 824 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). In Bettencourt, 763 A.2d at 639, we held that the admission of an involuntary confession in a child-molestation prosecution was not harmless error, despite the fact that the other evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to support defendant's conviction. In that case, the admission of the confession may have bolstered the credibility of the victim and her mother. Id. Thus, we could not find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the admission of the defendant's confession did not affect the jury's evaluation of the evidence. See also State v. Vargus, 118 R.I. 113, 125, 373 A.2d 150, 156 (1977) (in which the defendant's admission served to corroborate the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution and had a persuasive impact on the ultimate fact to be determined at the trial, defendant's guilt or innocence, error was not harmless); Lachapelle, 112 R.I. at 113, 308 A.2d at 471 (the defendant's incriminating statement, with its corroborating impact on other evidence adduced through defendant himself, beyond a reasonable doubt contributed to the verdict of the jury and could not be considered harmless). Similarly, in the instant case, the improper admission of defendant's statements to Ms. Moriarty may well have affected the jury's evaluation of the evidence. Bettencourt, 763 A.2d at 638. In this case, the prosecution had a strong case against defendant without admission of these statements: the testimony of Phillip, his mother, the arresting officer, and the examining physician, defendant's earlier statement to the police, and compelling DNA evidence. This evidence alone might have supported a guilty verdict. Nonetheless, Ms. Moriarty's testimony was particularly prejudicial. It was the only testimony offered that mentioned penile, as opposed to digital, penetration of the young boy. Moreover, her testimony that he stated that he spread [Phillip's] hole with his fingers to loosen him up and then he put his penis inside the child and rammed him, was much more graphic and inflammatory than any other evidence offered. Indeed, it was so damaging and prejudicial that the prosecutor used it as the opening line of her closing argument. See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 260, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988) (evidence admitted in violation of the Sixth Amendment held not to be harmless error where prosecution highlighted the erroneously admitted evidence in closing argument to the jury). It is doubtful that this statement did not have a persuasive or corroborating impact on the determination of defendant's guilt or innocence. After reviewing all the evidence with the required degree of caution, we are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that admission of defendant's statements to Ms. Moriarty did not contribute to the jury's evaluation of the evidence and defendant's conviction. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case to the Superior Court for a new trial. Because our holding precludes the admission of defendant's statement to Ms. Moriarty at the ACI on Sixth Amendment grounds, we do not reach the Fifth Amendment issues raised in his appeal. We address defendant's hearsay argument, however, to provide guidance to the trial court because the same issue may arise at a new trial.