Opinion ID: 727315
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Implications of Sostre v. McGinnis

Text: 2 This court first addressed the outlines of the Eighth Amendment right to exercise in Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.1971) (in banc), a case that remains this court's most detailed pronouncement on the nature of that right. The plaintiff in that case, Martin Sostre, was a prison inmate who brought a multi-faceted challenge to his conditions of confinement. An element of that challenge was directed at his prolonged detention in solitary confinement, as well as at the particular circumstances of that confinement, including his diet, his opportunity for exercise, [and] the hygienic conditions of his cell. Id. at 186. 3 Judge Kaufman, in his opinion for the majority of the in banc court, concluded that prolonged solitary confinement under the particular conditions experienced by Sostre did not violate the Eighth Amendment. His opinion stated that [i]n arriving at this conclusion, we have considered Sostre's diet, the availability in his cell of at least rudimentary implements of personal hygiene, the opportunity for exercise and for participation in group therapy, the availability of reading material (including law books), and the possibility of communicating with other prisoners in solitary confinement. Id. at 193-94 (footnotes omitted). In a footnote, Judge Kaufman noted that the availability of exercise distinguishes the instant case from Krist v. Smith, 309 F.Supp. 497, 501 (S.D.Ga.1970), where the court found no constitutionally acceptable justification for denying segregated prisoners a chance to exercise. Id. at 194 n. 25. 4 In our view, there are three relevant lessons to be drawn from Sostre. First, Sostre established that the availability of exercise is a key ingredient of a court's analysis whether an inmate's conditions of confinement pass muster under the Eighth Amendment. 4 We will not dwell on the question whether Sostre took the further step of deciding that the Eighth Amendment actually requires that prisoners receive some opportunity for exercise (although the above-quoted footnote strongly suggests that it did), because this court has since settled that question. In 1985, in Anderson v. Coughlin--six years before the formulation of the DOCS regime at issue in the present case, and eight years prior to the onset of Williams's confinement in medical keeplock--we described the right to exercise in unequivocal terms, stating that [c]ourts have recognized that some opportunity for exercise must be afforded to prisoners. 757 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir.1985) (emphasis added). 5 5 Second, Sostre implicitly established an important limitation on the Eighth Amendment's exercise guarantee, which we will term the safety exception. Judge Kaufman's recitation of facts in Sostre noted that all prisoners in solitary confinement were allowed an hour of exercise daily in a small, enclosed yard, open to the sky. 442 F.2d at 186. Judge Kaufman also observed, however, that 6 the record reveals that Sostre refused this privilege because he would not submit to a strip search. Officials testified that it was necessary to subject prisoners to such an examination each time they entered the exercise yard to prevent them from concealing on their bodies small bits of wire or other material suitable for use as a weapon. 7 Id. Despite this limitation on Sostre's exercise privileges, Judge Kaufman went on to state later in the opinion that Sostre had an opportunity for exercise, id. at 193--thus implicitly finding that safety rules like the strip search referred to above did not improperly burden Sostre's ability to exercise. 8 Two other courts of appeals have since agreed that restrictions on exercise must be limited to unusual circumstances, or circumstances in which exercise is impossible because of disciplinary needs. Mitchell v. Rice, 954 F.2d 187, 192 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 905, 113 S.Ct. 299, 121 L.Ed.2d 222 (1992); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 199 (9th Cir.1979). The courts found that the fact that an inmate is violent may justify segregating him or her from the general prison population, but does not necessarily justify a prison's failure to make other exercise arrangements; further, they agreed that prisons may not invoke cost considerations in denying prisoners the opportunity to exercise. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 192; Spain, 600 F.2d at 200. Mitchell also illustrates the skepticism with which restrictions on prisoners' ability to exercise are properly viewed: the Mitchell court specifically found that it would not be possible to grant summary judgment to prison officials on their claim of qualified immunity, even in the case of an inmate who had been denied exercise because of his incorrigibly assaultive nature, without [a] detailed review of the feasibility of alternatives ... such as solitary out-of-cell exercise periods, or the adequacy of in-cell exercise. Mitchell, 954 F.2d at 193. 9 The third important conclusion to be drawn from Sostre is that the court in no way endorsed the proposition that a prisoner who holds the keys to his cell may be subjected to treatment which would otherwise be impermissible under the Eighth Amendment. The appellees are therefore mistaken in contending (and the district court was mistaken in agreeing) that Sostre can be read to support this proposition. 10 The Sostre court did find that, in the particular circumstances addressed in that case, the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit the warden of Green Haven Prison from placing Martin Sostre in solitary confinement until such time as [Sostre] agrees to abide by prison rules. 442 F.2d at 193. 6 However, Judge Kaufman's majority opinion also made clear that such confinement was only permissible if the conditions of the inmate's solitary confinement met the minimum standards imposed by the Eighth Amendment. See 442 F.2d at 193 n. 23. 7 His opinion reviewed Sostre's conditions of confinement, including Sostre's opportunity for exercise, in some detail, and found them to be constitutionally permissible. See 442 F.2d at 193-94. One could say that Sostre held the keys to his cell in the sense that by agreeing to comply with prison rules he could have achieved release from segregation; but, as Judge Kaufman's opinion made clear, that fact in no way relaxed the court's inquiry into the adequacy of the conditions to which Sostre was subjected. 8 11