Opinion ID: 1981956
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dr Edelsohn's Testimony

Text: The first witness called by GMC was Dr. Lanny Edelsohn (Dr. Edelsohn), a neurologist who performed an independent medical examination (IME) on McLain on October 10, 1986, pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 35. At trial, Dr. Edelsohn was qualified as an expert in the area of neurology. He testified concerning the medical history that he took, his neurological examination, preliminary conclusions and familiarity with AVMs. Both parties agree that the aforementioned testimony was in consonance with his medical report and the interrogatory answers which were provided during discovery. Dr. Edelsohn also testified, with the aid of demonstrative exhibits, that in his opinion McLain had suffered a basilar fracture, which resulted in the AVM. McLain's attorney moved to strike this portion of Dr. Edelsohn's testimony, the day after he had cross-examined Dr. Edelsohn for three and one-half hours, on the ground that it was beyond the scope of what the pretrial discovery had disclosed as Dr. Edelsohn anticipated testimony. The motion to strike was denied. In response to an interrogatory posed by McLain which requested GMC to summarize the substance of each and every opinion to which each expert is expected to testify, GMC responded, in part: It is Dr. Edelsohn's opinion that plaintiff did suffer a depressed skull fracture and an epidural hematoma with a degree of pneumocephalus on December 28, 1983. Subsequently, she developed a traumatic middle meningeal artery fistula [same as AVM]. It is Dr. Edelsohn's further opinion that the fistula was successfully embolized at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania and that, except for a two to three month recovery period in 1984, plaintiff should not have any restrictions of the type presently imposed on her. Dr. Edelsohn is of the opinion that plaintiff's current headache symptoms are only partially related to the December 28, 1983 accident and that the major components of this condition are emotional and social issues which are unrelated to the December 28, 1983 accident. In addition to these interrogatory answers, prior to trial, GMC provided McLain's attorney, with Dr. Edelsohn's report of October 13, 1986. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 35(b)(2). McLain did not take Dr. Edelsohn's deposition, although she could have done so. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 35(b)(3). In denying McLain's motion to strike, the Superior Court stated: I think if you had made the objection yesterday, I would have ruled the same way I'm going to rule now, and that is that the information dealing with causation of the symptoms is a broad general term. It is, however, a term that would cover the testimony that the doctor gave yesterday. And my ruling yesterday would have been that if that was a major concern, it could have been followed up with depositions of the doctor, it could have been followed up with further interrogatories, a motion to compel a more definite answer to that. So I'm going to deny your motion to strike that testimony. I think it is within the answers that were given. And for that reason, it would be admissible. The report of Dr. Edelsohn's IME and GMC's discovery responses indicated that Dr. Edelsohn was going to testify regarding the 1983 accident and the development of the AVM. Those responses also revealed that Dr. Edelsohn was going to testify about McLain's current headache symptoms, which he partially attributed to the accident. [5] The Superior Court concluded that if McLain was surprised by Dr. Edelsohn's testimony, it was attributable to her failure to depose Dr. Edelsohn or to pursue other discovery options. Based upon the record in this case, we find that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying McLain's motion to strike those portions of Dr. Edelsohn's testimony in which he opined that a basilar fracture caused the AVM.