Opinion ID: 2604678
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Washington's Approach[7]

Text: Washington's temporary regulatory taking jurisprudence starts with the analysis of the state's police power. In Conger v. Pierce County, 116 Wash. 27, 198 P. 377, 18 ALR 393 (1921), we held the police power is an inherent attribute of government and, to the extent the police power is properly exercised in furtherance of safety, morals, health, or the general welfare of the public, an action cannot be a compensable taking, even if there is damage to property. [8] See also State v. Dexter, 32 Wash.2d 551, 202 P.2d 906, 13 ALR 2d 1081 (1949). Subsequent cases refined this approach by requiring a case-by-case analysis balancing of the public interest in regulating the use of private property against the interests of private landowners not to be encumbered by restrictions on the use of their property. Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. State, Department of Ecology, 88 Wash.2d 726, 731, 565 P.2d 1162 (1977). We cited in Maple Leaf to the well-known opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 S.Ct. 158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322, 28 ALR 1321 (1922), where Justice Holmes wrote: The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for such use without compensation. A similar assumption is made in the decisions upon the Fourteenth Amendment. Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 605, 28 Sup.Ct. 331 [334], 52 L.Ed. 637, 13 Ann. Cas. 1008. When this seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property disappears. But that cannot be accomplished in this way under the Constitution of the United States. The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent [without compensating the owner], if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. See also Kennedy v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash.2d 376, 617 P.2d 713 (1980); State ex rel. Randall v. Snohomish County, 79 Wash.2d 619, 623, 488 P.2d 511 (1971) (Unless the controls would deprive plaintiffs of a previously existing usage right, the burden is on plaintiffs to establish the unreasonableness of an otherwise permissible legislative zoning enactment.); Granat v. Keasler, 99 Wash.2d 564, 663 P.2d 830 (1983) (ordinance limiting right of landlord to evict houseboat tenants from moorage was deprivation of property without just compensation). The application of substantive due process principles to government regulation of land created even more doctrinal murkiness. The concept of substantive due process as a constitutional theory upon which to base challenges to governmental actions first appeared in our cases with little fanfare and even less authority in Norco Constr., Inc. v. King County, 97 Wash.2d 680, 649 P.2d 103 (1982), where we suggested due process was a limiting principle for zoning ordinances. In West Main Assocs. v. City of Bellevue, 106 Wash.2d 47, 52, 720 P.2d 782 (1986), we stated this court has often ruled that due process considerations limit how local governments use their police power, and then stated categorically: Thus a land use ordinance satisfies due process standards only if it (1) is aimed at achieving a legitimate public purpose, and (2) uses means to achieve that purpose that are reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Id.; Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594-95, 82 S.Ct. at 990; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137, 14 S.Ct. 499, 501, 38 L.Ed. 385 (1894). [9] In Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash.2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022, 108 S.Ct. 1996, 100 L.Ed.2d 227 (1988), this Court tried to harmonize the complex and conflicting Washington case law on takings rooted in the police power analysis and the balancing of interests. The Orion court adopted the three-part test for police power excess stated in Goldblatt for substantive due process violations in land use cases. Orion, 109 Wash.2d at 647-48, 747 P.2d 1062. The Orion court correctly pointed out that examining an allegedly excessive regulation either as a due process violation or as an excessive use of the police power asks the same question: Is the landowner being forced to shoulder an economic burden that, in justice and fairness, the public at large should bear? Id. at 648-49, 747 P.2d 1062. Nevertheless, Orion recognized two alternate remedies for excessive regulation: a violation of substantive due process, allowing invalidation of the regulation; or a taking, requiring just compensation. Id. at 649, 747 P.2d 1062. The Court's approach in not allowing damages for substantive due process claims was practical: If all excessive regulations require just compensation, rather than invalidation, land-use decision makers, who adopt regulations in a good faith attempt to prevent a public harm, will nevertheless be held strictly liable for regulations that result in a taking. Undoubtedly, the specter of financial liability will intimidate legislative bodies from making the difficult, but necessary choices presented by the most sensitive environmental land-use problems.... Strict liability would not result for all excessive regulations, however, under the approach developed in our own regulatory takings jurisprudence. Orion, 109 Wash.2d at 649, 747 P.2d 1062. See also Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash.2d 320, 787 P.2d 907, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 911, 111 S.Ct. 284, 112 L.Ed.2d 238 (1990). But all excessive land-use regulations do require just compensation. Merely labeling the cause of action as a violation of substantive due process rather than a regulatory taking does not change the nature of the wrong, or eliminate the constitutional imperative to provide a remedy. No matter how we describe the cause of action challenging a regulation, if a regulation goes too far, it is a taking requiring just compensation. [10] I have difficulty conceiving of a situation in the context of land-use regulation where a regulation is not a taking, but is constitutionally infirm as a denial of due process. Always, the challenged regulation places some restriction on the use of property, resulting in economic deprivation. If a regulation exceeds the permissible boundaries of the police power, and thereby causes a tangible economic diminution in the value of property, then the aggrieved landowner is entitled to just compensation. If a court holds a challenged regulation to be within the permissible boundaries of the police power, on the other hand, then even though some diminution in value might have occurred, compensation is not required. Always, the central inquiry must be: does the regulation go too far? We have adopted various tests for this central inquiry. For instance, in analyzing whether a taking has occurred, we first ask if the regulation substantially advances legitimate state interests. Presbytery, 114 Wash.2d at 333, 787 P.2d 907. If it does, then we consider whether a facial or an asapplied challenge is involved. For a facial challenge, the landowner must show that the regulation denies all economically viable use of any parcel of regulated property in order to constitute a taking. Id. at 333-34, 787 P.2d 907. For a challenge to the specific application of the regulation, the Court employs a three-part test: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the property; (2) the extent of the regulation's interference with investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the government action. Id. at 335-36, 787 P.2d 907. The standard of review for an alleged substantive due process violation also employs a three-part test: (1) whether the regulation is aimed at achieving a legitimate public purpose; (2) whether it uses means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose; and (3) whether it is unduly oppressive on the landowner. Id. at 330, 787 P.2d 907. As inspection shows, all of these tests can be reduced to the central inquirydoes the regulation go too far.