Opinion ID: 1932303
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other bases for departure

Text: We next consider whether the other factors identified by the lower courts would justify a departure, specifically the indiscriminate firing of multiple shots into a group. Appellant argues that a departure on these facts was an abuse of discretion as they are the predicate facts upon which the presumptive sentence for a drive-by shooting is based. See State v. Brusven, 327 N.W.2d 591, 594 (Minn.1982) (holding it was unfair for the trial court to rely upon factors already considered in the presumptive sentence as a basis for a durational departure). The definitions of the relevant crimes are key to this analysis. Murder in the second degree is defined as: (1) caus[ing] the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of that person or another, but without premeditation or (2) caus[ing] the death of a human being while committing or attempting to commit a drive-by shooting in violation of section 609.66, subdivision 1e, under circumstances other than those described in section 609.185, clause (3). Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1. Section 609.66, subd. 1e, defines drive-by shooting and provides varying levels of punishment depending on the target: (a) Whoever, while in or having just exited from a motor vehicle, recklessly discharges a firearm at or toward another motor vehicle or a building is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than three years or to payment of a fine of not more than $6,000, or both. (b) Any person who violates this subdivision by firing at or toward a person, or an occupied building or motor vehicle, may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both. Section 609.185 defines conduct constituting first-degree murder, a charge as to which appellant was acquitted, and includes: (3) caus[ing] the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of the person or another, while committing or attempting to commit    a drive-by shooting   . Appellant focuses on the language of section 609.66, subd. 1e, and argues that by definition a drive-by shooting involves recklessly discharg[ing] a firearm    toward a person [or group of people [4] ], and that this is essentially the conduct cited by the lower courts in support of the upward durational departure. Appellant cites legislative history suggesting that the risk to human life associated with drive-by shootings was exactly what the legislature had in mind when it enacted this statute. [5] Appellant asserts that the legislature sought to make the random discharge of a weapon from a motor vehicle at or toward a group of people a crime, and that because that is what appellant was convicted of here, the district court impermissibly relied on the statutory predicates of the crime to support the sentence departure. It is a close question whether the predicate conduct set forth in the statutory definition of drive-by shooting in section 609.66, subd. 1e, is so similar to the departure factors set forth by the district court, and relied upon by the court of appeals in affirming, that in effect appellant was treated differently than others convicted of this offense because his sentence was enhanced based on offense factors rather than aggravating factors. On balance however, we believe that he was. The words defining the crime are not strikingly different from those of the district court in its rationale for the departure:  The firing of the gun. The drive-by shooting crime relates to the reckless discharge of a firearm. The district court referred in its departure to firing eight shots toward people on the basketball courts but without a specific target. While the facts before the district court most certainly put the statutory definition in context, they did little more than that. Appellant clearly discharged the gun recklessly, but neither the statute nor the legislative history suggests that the random firing of eight shots was so significantly more serious than the statutory reference to a reckless discharge that an upward departure in sentencing is justified.  The target. The crime refers to the discharging of the firearm at or toward a person. The district court cited appellant's discharge of eight shots toward ten people, unknown to him, and without trying to shoot any particular person. Appellant discharged his firearm toward a personthe victim Zoobut the others, while certainly endangered by the shooting, are not dissimilar from those referred to in the legislative hearing as at risk because they are in or near the line of fire. The reliance by the trial court on the ten bystanders at risk, or that they were unknown to appellant, is not a distinguishing feature from the definition of the crime itself to justify a departure.  The setting. The district court also relied on the occurrence of the shooting at the playground near a school and park, and that the setting makes those using the facilities particularly vulnerable because they believed they were in a safe place. This reasoning is based on the same consideration relating to the zone of tranquility concept we rejected above and therefore it also fails as support for the sentencing departure. Appellant's crime was heinous by any standard, but appellant's conduct here was not so different than the offense described in section 609.66 that we can conclude it was significantly more serious than a typical drive-by shooting, as the trial court ruled and the court of appeals affirmed. We therefore remand for resentencing. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. MEYER, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.