Opinion ID: 877111
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: domicile of the child as the basis of jurisdiction:

Text: Several courts have declared that they will not assume jurisdiction unless the Indian child is domiciled off the reservation. In Re Adoption of Buehl (1976), 87 Wash.2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334; Wakefield v. Little Light (1975), 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228, 238; Wisconsin Potowatomies v. Houston (W.D. Mich. 1973), 393 F. Supp. 719, 731. In Wakefield, the Court declared that the domicile theory insures that the Indian tribe is afforded significant protection from losing its essential rights of child-rearing and maintenance of tribal identity. 276 Md. at 350, 347 A.2d at 238. But we are not told how this protects the interest of the tribe if the child is living on the reservation but has domicile off the reservation. The logical upshot of such a holding is that if the Indian child is domiciled off the reservation, state jurisdiction is exclusive regardless of the family and social ties which the child has to the tribe. Note, 21 Ariz.L.Rev. 1123, 1134 (1979). Although the presence and domicile are handy jurisdictional rules, these tests largely ignore the ethnic identity of the child and cultural ties to the tribe. Indian tribes retain an inherent quasi-sovereignty which provides a safeguard against state interference in the internal tribal affairs. Thus, where the interests of an Indian tribe are involved in a custody dispute, a state court must consider the unique status which Indian tribes occupy under the law. Long ago the United States Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgia (1832), 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 8 L.Ed. 483, developed what is essentially a three-part analysis to determine the extent of tribal sovereignty: (1) Indian tribes originally possessed the inherent sovereignty of any independent nation; (2) the sovereignty of the Indian nations was necessarily lessened after conquest and had to yield to conflicting plenary federal authority; and (3) Indian tribes now possess the same measure of internal sovereignty they possessed before conquest except where Congress has expressly withdrawn such powers by Congressional treaty or statute. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559-561. At the same time, Indians who reside off the reservation, as a general rule have the same rights and responsibilities and are subject to the jurisdiction of state courts in the same manner as state citizens. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones (1973), 411 U.S. 145, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 36 L.Ed.2d 114. The problem is to decide what the dual status of the Indian as a state citizen, on the one hand, and as a quasi-independent sovereign, on the other, means in the context of a particular dispute between tribal and state jurisdiction. In Wisconsin Potowatomies, supra, the Court stated the essential query: If then, Indians are to be accorded such independence and sovereignty within the limits of their reservation, and if on the other hand, they subject themselves to the benefits and obligations of state law when without, the question becomes at what point the transformation from one to the other is accomplished. 393 F. Supp. at 730. We have found no law which strikes the balance in a factual situation sufficiently analogous to that presented here. Williams v. Lee, supra, held that states were permitted to act only where essential tribal relations were not involved and where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized. 358 U.S. at 219-20, 79 S.Ct. 269, 270, 3 L.Ed.2d 251. In Wakefield, supra, the Court held that child rearing is an essential tribal relation within the Williams test. 276 Md. at 343, 347 A.2d at 234. While jurisdiction over child custody matters arising on the reservation between reservation Indians is exclusive to the tribe, Fisher, supra, there appears to be significant developments here relating to custody which have occurred both off and on the reservation. Arguably, either the state or the tribe could assert jurisdiction. The question is to determine which forum is better able to determine the best welfare of the child  the controlling principle for determining jurisdiction. We do not believe a simple arithmetic tallying of off-reservation versus on-reservation contacts is sufficient to determine jurisdiction. Like the presence test and the domicile test, it is too mechanical and formalistic and by itself obscures the best interest of the child. This approach also ignores significant tribal interests in custody matters which cannot be translated into geographic terms. As the Court stated in Wisconsin Potowatomies v. Houston, supra: If tribal sovereignty is to have any meaning at all at this juncture of history, it must necessarily include the right, within its own boundaries and membership, to provide for the care and upbringing of its young, a sine qua-non to the preservation of its identity. 393 F. Supp. at 730. An assumption of state court jurisdiction over Indian child custody disputes poses a substantial risk of conflicting decisions which potentially threaten a decline in tribal authority. Different cultural views of parental responsibility are likely to be reflected by the ultimate custody determinations of tribal and state courts. To assume jurisdiction based solely on the location of the child or his parents or of various activities is to ignore the importance of ethnic heritage and customs. Presumably the tribal court is better equipped to consider the ethnic identity as a factor in determining the child's welfare than is a state court. We note in this respect, that the jurisdictional model of the Indian Child Welfare Act is not predicated on geographic factors, but rather on the ethnic identity and tribal ties of the child. 25 U.S.C. 1911. We conclude that to properly consider tribal interests in child custody that go beyond reservation boundaries, the best means to arrive at a considered decision as to whether a state court should accept or decline jurisdiction is to balance the state interests in taking jurisdiction against the tribal interest in assuming jurisdiction. The state may assert jurisdiction in an Indian child custody dispute of this sort if, upon balance, it appears that the state's contacts with and interest in the child and the parties are more substantial than those of the tribe. The state might, for example, appropriately take jurisdiction of a custody proceeding involving an Indian child whose parents have raised him off the reservation without appreciable contacts to tribal life. Presumably, such a child, while ethnically an Indian, would be culturally disassociated from the tribe by the free choice of his parents. A balancing of the state and tribal contacts might lead a state court to conclude that it is better able to determine the child's welfare. In such case, the child's best interests would probably be served by applying the concepts of parental fitness of the culture in which the child has been immersed. Upon rehearing of this case to determine whether or not it should assume jurisdiction, the trial court must inquire into the contacts of the child, and the parties to the state and to the tribe. It should consider the tribe's interest in deciding the custody of one of its members and must record such inquiries of fact and make appropriate conclusions of law directed at the question of which forum is better suited to determine the child's welfare. In balancing the state and tribal interests, the trial court should look to the statutory guidelines of sections 40-4-211, 40-4-102, 40-4-107 and 40-7-108, MCA. The choice of law principles  physical presence of the child, domicile and in personam jurisdiction over the parties  while not determinative in themselves, are also pertinent inquiries in determining the ultimate question of whether or not to assume jurisdiction. The trial court should also inquire into the following factual and legal matters which may affect a determination of which is the better forum to ascertain the best interest of the child: the existence of tribal law or tribal customs relating to child care and custody in cases of this sort; the nature of the child's personal relationship with her grandparents and with her mother; the child's assimilation into and adjustment to life in the tribe and on the reservation; the mother's ethnic and cultural background and membership in or ties to the Chippewa Cree Tribe or any other tribe; the length of the child's residence both on and off the reservation; the domicile and residence of the child's father and the child's personal relationship with her father. The focus of the evidentiary hearing should be to determine which forum is better equipped to make a determination on the merits, that is, to determine the child's best interests. Due consideration should be given to the child's ethnic and cultural identity. Upon reversal or vacation of a lower court order or judgment in a habeas corpus proceeding involving child custody, an appellate court may remand the cause for the determination of a particular issue by means of an evidentiary hearing. 39A C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 260 (1976); see, e.g., Elmore v. Elmore (1977), 46 Ill. App.3d 504, 5 Ill.Dec. 292, 294-295, 361 N.E.2d 615, 617-618; Slawek v. Covenant Children's Home (1972), 52 Ill.2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291, 292; Langenberg v. Steen (1958), 218 Or. 150, 322 P.2d 1087, 1088. A remand for further proceedings accords with the general nature of habeas corpus actions in the child custody context. In this state, habeas corpus proceedings involving child custody matters are essentially special proceedings of a civil nature to enforce private rights; the petitioner is considered the plaintiff and the adverse party, the defendant; and the disposition made by the lower court is a final judgment from which an appeal lies. In Re Thompson (1926), 77 Mont. 466, 470, 251 P. 163, 164-165. Because habeas corpus proceedings involving child custody are also considered as being equitable in nature, Conley v. Walden (1975), 166 Mont. 369, 375, 533 P.2d 955, 958, the child's welfare, rather than the technical legal rights of the parent, is the paramount consideration by which the court must be guided. Conley, supra, 166 Mont. at 375, 533 P.2d at 958; Burns v. Groshelle (1957), 131 Mont. 1, 6, 306 P.2d 675, 677-678; Wells v. Stranger (1949), 123 Mont. 26, 33, 207 P.2d 549, 552; Veach v. Veach (1948), 122 Mont. 47, 53, 195 P.2d 697, 700; In Re Thompson, supra, 77 Mont. at 475-476, 251 P. at 166. Thus, habeas corpus is merely a procedural device to bring custody matters before the court. Smart v. Cantor (1977), 117 Ariz. 539, 574 P.2d 27, 29. We vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand this case to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Our previous opinion in this case ( In the Matter of Bertelson, Cause No. 14885, decided June 4, 1980) is withdrawn. HASWELL, C.J., and DALY, HARRISON and SHEEHY, JJ., concur.