Opinion ID: 1133414
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Morgan's testimony about the $20 bribe

Text: As discussed earlier, the defense called Dennis Morgan as a witness at trial. Before Morgan took the stand, defense attorney Adrienne Dell sought to exclude any testimony by Morgan that defense attorney Bernstein had tried to bribe him with $20. Dell informed the court that Morgan would testify, at least according to his taped statement, that he was served with a subpoena by Mr. Bernstein [and] at the same time, he was passed under the table a 20-dollar bill. Dell added that both she and defendant had been present at the jail visit with Morgan, that no money was ever passed, and that it is physically impossible to pass money under the table at the county jail facility. Dell argued that allowing Morgan to give such testimony goes to the very heart of the credibility of defense counsel in this case. In support, she cited Evidence Code section 352. [6] In refusing to exclude Morgan's testimony about the $20 bill, the trial court noted that Morgan's testimony could be easily refuted by any member of the jail staff and would go to the credibility of the witness. The court added: An attorney, regardless of which side of the table he sits on, cannot pick and choose the testimony a witness is going to give if he chooses to call this witness.... You will take what this witness has to say completely. If he is a liar, he is a liar. Thereafter, Morgan testified on cross-examination that when defense counsel Bernstein came to see him in the Los Angeles County jail and Morgan entered the attorney-visitor room, there was a $20 bill on the table and Morgan assumed Bernstein had put it there. We do not decide whether, as defendant contends, this testimony by Morgan was far more prejudicial than probative and thus should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352. We do not reverse a judgment for erroneous admission of evidence unless the admitted evidence should have been excluded on the ground stated and... the error or errors complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Evid.Code,  353, subd. (b); see also People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243 [error is harmless under our state constitutional standard unless it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error].) Here, there was no miscarriage of justice. As explained in part IIID.2., ante, 85 Cal. Rptr.2d at page 887, 978 P.2d at page 45, where we concluded that defense counsel were not ineffective in calling Morgan as a witness, Morgan's story was inherently unbelievable. For the jury to accept the story as true, it would have to conclude that defense counsel Bernstein had placed the $20 bill on the table in violation of jail regulations and in full view not only of the deputy sheriff guarding the attorney-visitor room but also of other inmates and attorneys. Moreover, the evidence that defendant sexually assaulted and brutally murdered a helpless infant left in his care was substantial if not overwhelming. In light of this evidence, it is not reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a different verdict had it never heard Morgan's testimony about the $20 bill. Defendant also contends that admission of Morgan's testimony violated various federal and state constitutional provisions. Because defendant did not object to admission of the evidence on those grounds at trial, he has not preserved the claims for review. ( People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1170, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.)