Opinion ID: 33414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Proceedings in the Present Action

Text: 8 Richard filed his Original Class Action Complaint in the Eastern District of Texas on January 10, 2000, on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated persons pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23. In his Second Amended Complaint, he defined the Class as follows: 9 All Texas citizens, residents and entities authorised [sic] to do business in Texas that own plumbing systems in structures in Texas and elsewhere, in which there is polybutylene plumbing and over which Tennessee and Alabama courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 10 All U.S. citizens and entities that were excluded from the settlement classes of Cox v. Shell Oil Co., No. 18,844, 1995 WL 775363 (Tenn. Chanc. Ct., Obion City) and Spencer v. Shell Oil Co., No. CV94-074 (Greene Cty., Ala.) because defects in their polybutylene plumbing systems were defined as non-qualifying. 11 All U.S. citizens and entities that own structures containing polybutylene plumbing systems and have never participated in a polybutylene class action in a court of competent personal and subject matter jurisdiction. 12 Richard claimed that the Appellees were liable for the damages that he and the class members sustained as a result of the leaks in their PB plumbing systems. The complaint cited theories of conspiracy, strict liability, negligence, and breach of implied warranties. Richard also asserted that the Appellees violated his due process rights, giving rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He based this assertion on his allegation that the Appellees and class counsel in Cox colluded in setting up procedural safeguards for class member certification. Richard also alleged that as an absent class member of the Cox and Spencer suits, he did not receive adequate notice, had no opportunity to opt-out, and did not receive adequate representation. Finally, Richard amended his complaint to include claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) of the RICO Act. 13 On May 25, 2001, Richard and DuPont reached an agreement and jointly moved for preliminary class certification as to DuPont only, and for preliminary approval of a settlement agreement. Shell and Hoechst opposed the motion. On March 30, 2002, the district court issued its memorandum and opinion, holding that: (1) the court did not have jurisdiction over Richard's § 1983 claim because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the federal RICO claims, but those claims failed to state a claim upon which the court could grant relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); and (3) Richard did not satisfy requirements for class certification. 14 Richard timely appeals the district court's dismissal of his claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).