Opinion ID: 1952364
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Privacy Act Claim

Text: We also believe that plaintiff stated a right-to-privacy claim under G.L.1956 § 9-1-28.1(a). [9] By disclosing plaintiff's confidential health-care records to an unauthorized person representing an adverse party in pending litigation, Rite Aid violated her right to be secure from unreasonable intrusion, § 9-1-28.1(a)(1), and her right to be secure from unreasonable publicity given to one's private life, § 9-1-28.1(a)(3). By unilaterally disclosing this information to the attorney who subpoenaed the records, Rite Aid committed an invasion of something that is entitled to be private or would be expected to be private, § 9-1-28.1(a)(1)(A)(i), to wit: plaintiff's prescription-drug records, which she rightly expected would be kept confidential by Rite Aid pursuant to the Confidentiality Act. Such invasion was or is offensive or objectionable to a reasonable [person]. See § 9-1-28.1(a)(1)(A)(ii). Further, when Rite Aid made its out-of-court disclosure of this information to the attorney for her estranged husband, there was some publication of a private fact    which would be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable [person] of ordinary sensibilities. Section 9-1-28.1(a)(3)(A)(i) and (ii). Although plaintiff's prescription-drug history may well have been subject to discovery in her divorce litigation and ultimate disclosure pursuant to compulsory legal process, Rite Aid's mere receipt of a subpoena did not give it carte blanche to publish the information willy-nilly to third parties like Higgins who have subpoenaed the records to court. Rather, to take advantage of the compulsory-legal-process exception to the privileged, confidential status of these records, Rite Aid was obliged to follow the directions on the subpoena and the law for complying with that legal process to the letter. The reason this is so is that as their confidential status indicates, plaintiff's prescription-drug records contain information that is presumptively private and confidential. They may also contain much information that is extraneous or irrelevant to whatever may be legitimately at issue in the divorce case. These records could also contain information that might be extremely embarrassing or damaging to plaintiff if it were to be disclosed to someone like her estranged husband or his attorney. They would then be in a position to use this information against her (for example, by further disclosure to other unauthorized parties or just by using it for improper leverage in any court case or settlement negotiations). Indeed, the Confidentiality Act presumes that each and every one of these records is confidential and should not be disclosed except pursuant to valid legal process. Moreover, mere receipt of a valid subpoena does not negate this privilege; much less does it justify publication of the records to the person subpoenaing them or to anyone else. This is where Rite Aid violated the plaintiff's statutory rights to privacy. To obtain the benefits of the protection afforded by compulsory legal process, it was required to bring such records to court, § 9-17-5, to request protective relief from the court, or to obtain the consent of the plaintiff or her attorney to the disclosure it proposed to make to the husband's attorney. But it failed to do so.