Opinion ID: 1207978
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mental Disorders

Text: While a patient at a Texas hospital in 1971, defendant was diagnosed with a passive-aggressive personality. In 1978, he was re-admitted to the same hospital for psychotic depression. Defendant reported feeling suicidal, along with a fear that he might harm someone else. The final diagnosis of the second hospitalization was that defendant suffered from a personality disorder with differential to include passive-aggressive personality, antisocial personality, and borderline personality. In a proceeding to determine defendant's competency to stand trial, a clinical psychologist found that defendant does not appear to be suffering from any psychotic disorder but he has a history of depression and other serious psychological problems, including a pattern of impulsivity. Defendant's Trial Exhibit 24. Defendant also claimed to have attempted suicide twice. The psychologist testified that defendant suffered from a borderline personality disorder and depression. He concluded that defendant is a seriously dysfunctional individual. Character or personality disorders alone are generally not sufficient to find that defendant was significantly impaired. Apelt, 176 Ariz. at 377, 861 P.2d at 662. A mental disease or psychological defect usually must exist before significant impairment is found. Id. Despite this evidence, [t]his case does not involve the same level of mental disease or psychological defects considered in other cases in which the § 13-703(G)(1) mitigating circumstance was found to exist. Brewer, 170 Ariz. at 505, 826 P.2d at 802. Defendant failed to show that his ability to control his actions was substantially impaired; his actions showed that he appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct. Evidence showed that defendant was familiar with the mine shaft and discussed killing the girls with Brazeal. Defendant sexually assaulted Mandy, choked her and stomped on her body, and agreed that Mary should also be killed. Defendant then attempted to cover up the crimes by dumping the bodies in the mine shaft and burning the girls' clothes. The record reveals that defendant made a conscious and knowing decision to murder the victim[s] and was fully aware of the wrongfulness of his actions. Id. at 506, 826 P.2d at 803. This evidence fails to meet the statutory burden by a preponderance of the evidence. B. Relatively Minor Participation Defendant raises this argument for the first time on appeal. According to A.R.S. 13-703(G)(3), mitigation exists where the defendant shows that he was legally accountable for the conduct of another ..., but his participation was relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution. The argument consists of one sentence in the brief: Given the overwhelming possibility that the jury's guilty verdict was based upon the felony murder theory, this factor should have been considered in mitigation. Opening Brief at 37. However, as we have previously noted, the trial court did not instruct the jury on felony murder. The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first degree premeditated murder. Defendant brutally killed Mandy and intended that Mary be killed. His actions were substantial; we therefore reject this argument. See Herrera, 176 Ariz. at 20, 859 P.2d at 130. C. No Reasonable Foreseeability that Conduct Would Create Grave Risk of Death to Another In an attempt to come within the ambit of A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(4), defendant argues for the first time on appeal that [a]t the time this episode first began, it does not appear that any plan existed to cause harm or fatal injury to the victims. Opening Brief at 38. He cites no facts or evidence to support this argument. After a review of the entire record, we also find no facts or evidence to support this statutory mitigating circumstance. See State v. Greenawalt, 128 Ariz. 150, 173, 624 P.2d 828, 851, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S.Ct. 364, 70 L.Ed.2d 191 (1981).