Opinion ID: 1923339
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: admitting into evidence a statement made by scientific's agent

Text: Scientific contends that the trial court erred when it admitted a memo written by one of Scientific's employees to another employee. [3] Scientific objected to the memo, marked as defendant's exhibit G, on the basis that it was hearsay evidence and was prejudicial. The trial court at first refused to admit the memo into evidence. Subsequently, it determined that it was admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(iv) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence which is as follows: (d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: (2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is ... (iv) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, Scientific, in answer to requests for admissions, admitted as true that both Jim Young, the writer of the memo, and Gary Lappe, the addressee of the memo, were employees of Scientific at the time the memo was written. Scientific also admitted having the original of the memo in its files. We agree with the trial court's decision to admit the memo under Rule 801(d)(2)(iv), N.D.R.Ev. The memo was written by an agent or servant of Scientific, it concerned a matter within the scope of his employment, and it was made during the existence of that relationship. Rule 801(d)(2)(iv) states that such a statement is not hearsay. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R. Co., 615 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1980). In Kaiser Aluminum, an employee of the defendant carrier wrote a letter to the plaintiff indicating that it was highly likely that the contamination of an ore shipment originated in one or more of the carrier's railcars. The court determined that the letter fell under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) of the Federal Rules of Evidence which is similar to Rule 801(d)(2)(iv), N.D.R.Ev. Id. 615 F.2d at 476. Scientific also claims that even if the memo were admissible, it should have been excluded pursuant to Rule 403 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence because its probative value was essentially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We do not agree. The memo is relevant to the issues involved. Scientific had an opportunity to explain it. While the memo is damaging, it is not the type of evidence to be excluded under Rule 403. Scientific also asserts that the memo is a self-serving statement by Young to explain falling sales in his sales area. Declarations are admissible even though they are self-serving. Starr v. Morsette, 236 N.W.2d 183, 187-88 (N.D.1975). Scientific could have introduced evidence concerning the reliability of the memo. We agree with the trial court that the memo was properly admissible. Scientific also asserts that the trial court erred by allowing evidence to be admitted concerning the fact that Spraylock was, to a great extent, removed from the market after the present action was initiated. No objection, however, was made when Mr. Donat, a Minnesota Spraylock dealer, testified that he quit the Spraylock business and was refunded his money. Scientific's attorney did object to the following question directed to Jim McCormick, Scientific's plant manager, by Delkamp's attorney: Q. How many dealers are in the business? Well, the only question I want to know is: are you currently manufacturing and processing and selling this product that Mr. Delkamp was buying back in `78? A. Yes, sir. MR. ANDERSON [Scientific's attorney]: Objection. Irrelevant. THE COURT: Overruled. No further objection was entered by Scientific's attorney. On redirect examination, Scientific's attorney questioned McCormick as to application of Spraylock to buildings in Mount Pleasant, Scientific's headquarters, and as to problems in connection therewith. Delkamp's attorney objected on relevancy grounds and Scientific's attorney answered: It has the same relevancy as to his [Delkamp's] other dealers and the problems they may have experienced. Subsequently, Delkamp's attorney directed the following question to McCormick on recross examination: Q. [Mr. Peterson continuing] You do not market it as Spraylock anymore; do you? A. We still manufacture Spraylock. Q. Mr. McCormick, would you, please, answer my question. Listen to the question and then answer it. You do not market a product called Spraylock anymore; do you? A. No. Q. When did you quit marketing it as Spraylock? A. In approximately January of `79. Q. And isn't it a fact that one of the reasons you quit marketing it as Spraylock is that you were having significant problems with its application wherever it was being applied? A. I am not sure what all went into that decision. Q. That's one of them; isn't it? A. I am not sure. No objection was made by Scientific's attorney. Scientific now claims that the evidence should not have been admitted because it was precluded by Rule 407 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence concerning measures taken after an incident occurs to prevent a subsequent occurrence. Rule 103 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence requires an objection on a specific ground when it is not apparent from the context. In this case, the ground alleged was relevancy. Rule 407 was not argued. In Dobervich v. Cent. Cass Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 17, 283 N.W.2d 187, 191 (N.D.1979), we referred to State v. Haakenson, 213 N.W.2d 394, 399 (N.D.1973) and said: [T]he touchstones for an effective appeal on any proper issue should be that the matter has been appropriately raised in the trial court so that the trial court can intelligently rule on it, and that there be a valid appeal from the judgment. Scientific failed to object at the trial on the ground it now asserts for the first time on appeal. As the evidence did not affect a substantial right but was merely cumulative, it was not prejudicial error to receive it. Rule 103(a), N.D.R.Ev. [4]