Opinion ID: 1399686
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether prosecutorial misconduct deprived Two Elk of a fair trial.

Text: Trial judges have broad discretion in controlling closing arguments. Hyles, 521 F.3d at 958. They have similarly broad discretion in controlling the course of cross-examination. See Love, 521 F.3d at 1009 (We review a district court's evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion, including those regarding the scope of cross-examination. (quotation omitted)). Where Two Elk failed to object to an instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct, this court reviews for plain error. Hyles, 521 F.3d at 958.
To obtain a reversal for prosecutorial misconduct, [Two Elk] must show that (1) the prosecutor's remarks were improper, and (2) such remarks prejudiced the defendant's rights in obtaining a fair trial. Id. Three factors inform this court's analysis of the prejudice prong: (1) the cumulative effect of the misconduct; (2) the strength of the properly admitted evidence of the defendant's guilt; and (3) the curative actions, if any, taken by the district court. Eagle, 515 F.3d at 804-05. The first factor confirms that this court must consider each instance of alleged misconduct both by itself and in combination with the other alleged prosecutorial oversteps. Cf. United States v. Eizember, 485 F.3d 400, 405 (8th Cir.2007). Below, we review each of the allegedly improper prosecutorial acts individually and then turn to their cumulative effect.
Two Elk first contends that the prosecutor inappropriately appealed to the jurors' passion and sympathy with an allusion to a nursery rhyme: [Prosecutor]: ... All of the king's horses and all of the king's men, ladies and gentlemen, can't put A.R. back together again. MS. MINER [Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I would object. THE COURT: Overruled. MS. MINER: Sympathy is not to play a part in this. THE COURT: Overruled. [Prosecutor]: You can't put A.R. back together again, but your verdict can hold the person responsible.... It is well-settled that prosecutorial appeals to the passion, prejudice, or sympathy of jurors during closing argument are improper. Eagle, 515 F.3d at 805 (citing Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 247, 63 S.Ct. 561, 87 L.Ed. 734 (1943)); see also United States v. Mullins, 446 F.3d 750, 759 (8th Cir.2006). In Eagle, the prosecution made similarly strong statements regarding the impact of a crime on an eight-year-old victim of sexual assault. See Eagle, 515 F.3d at 805. The Eagle court noted that the prosecutor's arguments were reasonable inferences from the evidence and did not find reversible error. Id. And we have held that prosecutors may use colorful and forceful language in their arguments to the jury. Mullins, 446 F.3d at 759 (quotation omitted). Here, the prosecutor did not stray from the evidence and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it. Id. (quotation omitted). Moreover, the allusion to Humpty-Dumpty was no more egregious than the Eagle prosecutor's remarks. The statement, therefore, was not improper. Even if were to conclude otherwise, the statement did not deprive Two Elk of a fair trial. The jury had already listened to three doctors describe the awful details of A.R.'s injuries. Furthermore, as to the second factor, the admitted evidence of Two Elk's guilt was quite strong. The third factor also militates against reversal. The jury was instructed that they were to perform [their] duty without bias or prejudice, because the law does not permit jurors to be governed by sympathy, and that [s]tatements, arguments, questions and comments by lawyers ... are not evidence. In sum, the statement did not deprive Two Elk of a fair trial.
Two Elk posits that a second statement by the prosecutor also amounted to misconduct. The prosecutor remarked, [t]here's an old saying in the law, that if the standard of proof had to be met as articulated by defense attorneys, every crime would have to be witnessed by a bus load of nuns with video cameras. Two Elk's counsel objected and the judge overruled her. On appeal, Two Elk suggests that the prosecutor thereby directed a personal, unsubstantiated attack[] on the character and ethics of his defense counsel which may have induce[d] the jury to trust the Government rather than its own view of the evidence. We think this statement was arguably improper. It had the potential both to obfuscate the reasonable doubt standard and to impugn the defense counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 413 F.3d 770, 775 (8th Cir.2005) (reversing, on ground of prosecutorial misconduct, where prosecutor told jury that defense attorney was using smoke and mirrors to divert their attention and implied that the attorney had conspired with client to fabricate testimony). Again, even assuming it was improper, we do not believe that it deprived Two Elk of a fair trial. First, the statement's cumulative effect was likely negligible. Far from an ad hominem attack on the defense counsel, the statement seems more like an inopportune attempt at levity. Cf. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974) ([A] court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning....). More importantly, the statement was unlikely to alter the jury's understanding of the reasonable doubt standard. See United States v. Foley, 508 F.3d 627, 637-38 (11th Cir.2007). The judge instructed the jury on the proper standard and both the prosecution and defense discussed the standard during their closing arguments. As to the second factor, the statement pales in comparison to the government's evidence of Two Elk's guilt. And the final factor reinforces our belief that the statement had little cumulative effect: the jury instructions clarified the reasonable doubt standard, and the court labeled the statement as just argument on the record immediately after it was made. See Eagle, 515 F.3d at 806 (asserting district court's instruction that closing arguments are not evidence is a curative action that serves to alleviate any risk of prejudicial impact). The trial judge thereby dismissed the import of the statementand for good reason, it was too insubstantial to skew the trial's fundamental fairness.
Lastly, Two Elk sees reversible error in the prosecutor's questioning of Agent Ramirez, a defense witness. Specifically, the prosecutor asked, and Agent Ramirez answered, two questions that Two Elk regards as impermissible vouching: Q [Prosecutor]: Have any charges been brought against [Ben Murphy, Sr.] with respect to this matter that you are aware of? A [Agent Ramirez]: No, sir. Q [Prosecutor]: Is that a decision made by the U.S. Attorney's office? A [Agent Ramirez]: Yes, it is. Two Elk concedes that he failed to object to this line of questioning during the trial. Thus, we review for plain error. Hyles, 521 F.3d at 958. Two Elk asserts that this line of questioning amounted to misconduct because the prosecutor thereby (1) induce[d] the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of the evidence, and (2) implied that the prosecutor knew something that the jury did not about whether Ben Sr. was a possible perpetrator. Improper vouching may occur when the government ... refers to facts outside the record or implies that the veracity of a witness is supported by outside facts that are unavailable to the jury.... United States v. Santana, 150 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir.1998). Had this testimony been properly challenged, it may very well have been excluded. The prosecutor's questioning tacitly informed the jury that the U.S. Attorney's Office had opted not to charge Ben Sr., focusing instead on the defendant. Of course, the details of the government's investigation of Ben Sr. were not in evidence. The prosecutor thereby intimated that the government had access to knowledge about the case to which the jury was not privy. Nonetheless, Two Elk must still show[] prejudicethat is, ... a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different absent the alleged error. United States v. Abdullahi, 520 F.3d 890, 896 (8th Cir.2008) (quotation omitted). At the outset, we note that Two Elk's counsel actually asked Agent Mackey similar questions on cross-examination well before Agent Ramirez testified. Specifically, she queried whether anyone else [was] ever arrested for this crime? and whether anyone else [was] ever charged in any way for this crime? Agent Mackey responded, no. The defense thereby broached the topic and lessened the impact of Agent Ramirez's testimony. As we have explained above, the government had a strong case against Two Elk. The government adduced Two Elk's taped confession and other evidence that dovetailed with the details of Two Elk's confession. While Two Elk makes much of Ben Sr.'s checkered past, the prosecution's evidence against Two Elk was far more substantial than Two Elk's insinuations about Ben Sr. And Two Elk was able to introduce amplealbeit entirely speculativeevidence pinning Ben Sr. as a potential suspect. [16] Indeed, Two Elk had already confessed to the crime once and offered details about his conduct. Two Elk has not borne his burden of showing a reasonable probability that the court's error in allowing this line of questioning was prejudicial.
Prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal may result from the cumulative effect of repeated improper comments by the prosecutor. United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 768, 771 (8th Cir.1992). Taken together, however, the instances of alleged misconduct here did not prejudice Two Elk.