Opinion ID: 1127469
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Improper Master List

Text: Contrary to A.R.S. ง 21-301(B) (Supp. 1994), the original master jury list was composed only of licensed drivers and did not include registered voters. Several days before the trial was to start and after hearing testimony from the court clerk who serves as jury commissioner, A.R.S. ง 21-131(A) (Supp. 1994), the trial court ordered that a new jury list be created using both lists. The trial court continued the upcoming trial date one day. The jury commissioner advised the court that she could provide adequate potential jurors from the new list by then, although the forms mailed to the new jurors would place the outer deadline of returning the questionnaires a few days after the new trial date. The court's order requiring the jury venire to include registered voters as well as those licensed to drive resolved the statutory violation in the original jury pool. Defendants first argue that the short response time led to fewer venire persons from the more remote areas of the county. Second, they contend that, since the drivers' license list was one-and-one-half years old, it contained fewer young people than it would have had the list been more current. Since defendants are from a small rural area of Alabama and are young, they contend they were denied a jury of their peers. This speculation, however, is unsupported by the record. Defendants have not shown that they lacked a fair and impartial jury or that they were prejudiced by the procedure that was used. See State v. Mahoney, 106 Ariz. 297, 302, 475 P.2d 479, 484 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 917, 91 S.Ct. 898, 27 L.Ed.2d 818 (1971); State v. Miller, 135 Ariz. 8, 12, 658 P.2d 808, 812 (App. 1982). Even use of voter registration lists alone is not constitutionally infirm without showing that compiling lists in this manner systematically excluded a cognizable group of potential jurors and caused prejudice to the defendant. State v. Gretzler, 126 Ariz. 60, 77, 612 P.2d 1023, 1040 (1980); State v. Brierly, 109 Ariz. 310, 321, 509 P.2d 203, 214 (1973). Defendants have not shown they were denied their right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community. Defendants failed to show (1) the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community, (2) the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community, and (3) the underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979). Defendant has a high burden of showing a distinctive group. State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 622, 832 P.2d 593, 639 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1084, 113 S.Ct. 1058, 122 L.Ed.2d 364 (1993). Defendants failed to show that any one of the three prongs of Duren was satisfied. No cognizable group was excluded due to the procedure. See State v. Jordan, 171 Ariz. 62, 66, 828 P.2d 786, 790 (App. 1992) (defining cognizable group). No statistical evidence was presented to satisfy the second prong. Nor did defendants show that the exclusion was systematic. See Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 622, 832 P.2d at 639 (We hold ... that defendant's reliance on isolated, subjective observations of alleged underrepresentation is insufficient to support his [constitutional] claim.). The court's order requiring the jury venire to include registered voters as well as those licensed to drive resolved the statutory violation in the original jury pool. In any event, failure to follow statutory procedures is harmless, absent some separate showing of prejudice or discrimination. A judgment of conviction will not be reversed for disregarding formal provisions of the law regarding the manner and selection of juries if a fair and impartial jury was secured. State v. McGee, 91 Ariz. 101, 109, 370 P.2d 261, 266, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 844, 83 S.Ct. 75, 9 L.Ed.2d 79 (1962).