Opinion ID: 22215
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: and discretion’ exercised by

Text: Moore contends we should grant a COA on each juror.” the question whether Texas violates the Con- stitution by refusing to allow its appellate Colella [v. State], 915 S.W.2d [834,] courts to review the jury’s determination of 844 [(Tex. Crim. App. 1995)] (citing whether special mitigating factors exist to sen- Banda v. State, 890 S.W.2d 42, 54 tence a criminal otherwise fully qualified for (Tex. Crim. App.1994), cert. denied, death instead to life in prison. This, like the 515 U.S. 1105 . . . (1995)). “Mitigating issues of expert-provision, is a question of law. evidence” is defined as “evidence that a juror might regard as reducing the defen- The Court of Criminal Appeals explained dant’s moral blameworthiness.” TEX. that CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, § 2(f)(4) (emphasis added). Each juror [i]n Texas, mitigating evidence individually determines what evidence, if is admissible at the punishment any, mitigates against the just imposition phase of a capital murder trial. of the death sentence. Banda, 890 Once admitted, the jury may S.W.2d at 54. “Because the weighing of then give it weight, if in their ‘mitigating evidence’ is a subjective deindividual minds it is appropri- termination undertaken by each individate, when answering the ques- ual juror, we decline to review the evitions which determine sen- dence for sufficiency.” Colella, 915 tence. However, “[t]he a- S.W.2d at 845. Whether to give particmount of weight that the fact- ular evidence a mitigating effect is withfinder might give any particular in the prerogative of individual jurors; piece of mitigating evidence is thus, such a determination is unreviewleft to ‘the range of judgment able. Moore, 935 S.W.2d at 128. 5 (...continued) Moore, 935 S.W.2d at 129 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court requires that a jury’s Moore argues that this standard does not suffi- determination that a death sentence should isciently account for the exception to the rule that sue must be guided by standards and reviewed actual prejudice on the part of jury members must by appellate courts to determine its propriety be shown. and non-arbitrariness.6 Moore does not deny We agree that the Court of Criminal Appeals might have explained the standard of review more 6 plainly. We note, however, that the court explicitly See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. found that Moore’s “suggestion that the trial court 738, 749 (1990) (stating that “this Court has rewas prejudiced by community outrage is unsup- peatedly emphasized that meaningful appellate reported” because, largely, of evidence “that the pre- view of death sentences promotes reliability and trial publicity had not been inflammatory or even consistency”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 excessive.” Id. (emphasis added). Publicity that is U.S. 280, 302 (1976) (explaining that the Court neither inflammatory nor excessive cannot fit with- had rejected “unbridled jury discretion in the imin the rule of Rideau as understood in this circuit. (continued...) 9 that Texas provides for appellate review of the “the trier of fact must convict the defendant of jury’s determination that first-degree murder murder and find one ‘aggravating circumhas occurred and that a special aggravating stance’ (or its equivalent),” id. at 971-72, and factor exists, and of whether the proper proce- its “selection decision,” in which “the sentendures were followed in presenting to the jury cer determines whether a defendant eligible for all relevantly offered mitigation evidence in a the death penalty should in fact receive it.” Id. separate punishment-phase hearing. The Court recognized that “separate requirements” applied to each decision. Id. It ex- Neither can it be denied that the Court has plained that the selection decision has properly approved of state-court appellate review struc- been made “when the jury can consider reletures that analyze not only the jury’s guilt and vant mitigating evidence of the character and special-factor determinations, but its weighing record of the defendant and the circumstances of the mitigation evidence as well. See, e.g., of the crime.” Id. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 51-53 (1984). In fact, the Court has occasionally used lan- It is the eligibility decision that, according guage implying that states must review the to the Court, must be made with maximum jury’s consideration of demonstrated mitigat- transparency to “make rationally reviewable ing factors. the process for imposing a sentence of death.” Id. at 973. “The selection decision, on the It cannot be gainsaid that meaningful other hand, requires individualized sentencing appellate review requires that the appel- and must be expansive enough to accomlate court consider the defendant’s ac- modate relevant mitigating evidence so as to tual record. “What is important . . . is assure an assessment of the defendant’s culpaan individualized determination on the bility.” Id. basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime.” Because of this concern for expansiveness Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 . . . in the selection decision, the Court held that (1983). [o]nce the jury finds that the defendant Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321 (1991). falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death This passing phrase, however, lacks the penalty, the jury then is free to consider force to withstand the much more explicit di- a myriad of factors to determine whether rectives in Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. death is the appropriate punishment. In967 (1994), in which the Court distinguished deed, the sentencer may be given unbribetween a jury’s “eligibility decision,” in which dled discretion in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed af- ter it has found that the defendant is a 6 (...continued) member of the class made eligible for position of capital sentences” and requiring that that penalty. juries be provided standards to guide them in their “inevitable exercise of the power to determine Id. at 979-80 (quotation marks, ellipses, and which first-degree murderers shall live and which internal citation information omitted). It is just shall die”). 10 this narrowly cabined but unbridled discretion to consider any mitigating factors submitted by the defendants and weighed as the jury sees fit that Texas has bestowed upon the jury. In so doing, Texas followed Supreme Court instruc- tions to the letter. No court could find that Texas had acted contrary to federal law as explained by the Supreme Court, and no bene- fit will arise from further consideration of the obvious. The application for a COA is DENIED. 11