Opinion ID: 2621092
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim of Jury Misconduct

Text: Defendant moved to set aside the penalty verdict based on allegations that religious beliefs improperly influenced several jurors. Alternatively, he requested a hearing to investigate possible jury misconduct. ( People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 272 Cal.Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260.) The trial court denied both motions, along with defendant's subsequent oral motion for reconsideration. Defendant asserts error based on the trial court's denial. Defendant submitted a declaration from Juror Jeffrey E. stating that all 12 jurors held hands and prayed at the start of deliberations during both the guilt and penalty phases. During penalty deliberations, Jury Foreperson Paul W. questioned the jurors why they could not reach a verdict. According to Jeffrey E., Juror Sally B. `said she needed some time to make the right decision, knew what was right, but was having difficulty in voting.' Paul W. responded that `he did not know if it would help her, but what had helped him make his decision was that [defendant] had been exposed to Jesus Christ and if that was in fact true [defendant] would have `everlasting life' regardless of what happened to him.' Jeffrey E. concluded, Sometime after that we reach[ed] a verdict. Defendant did not submit a declaration from either Sally B. or Paul W., but intended to subpoena them to appear and testify at the Hedgecock hearing. In addition, a few days after the trial, Paul W. sent Defense Counsel Neal Pedowitz a letter requesting to meet and talk with defendant. Less than two months later, he sent a second letter and the book Born Again. Paul W. wrote that Pedowitz will have real inner peace and purpose by having a personal relationship with God and by accepting Jesus Christ, and urged that both Pedowitz and defendant read Born Again, which is not about religion but relationship. The trial court denied defendant's motion. Relying on Hedgecock, the trial court found that Jeffrey E.'s declaration describing the conversation between Sally B. and Paul W. was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a). This provision may be violated not only by the admission of jurors' testimony describing their own mental processes, but also by permitting testimony concerning statements made by jurors in the course of their deliberations. ( People v. Hedgecock, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 418-419, 272 Cal.Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260.) The court also determined that Paul W.'s letters and book sent to defense counsel after the trial was over were irrelevant. Defendant argues that Paul W.'s statement did not relate to his mental processes during deliberations, evidence of which is proscribed by Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a). Rather, his statement constituted evidence that Paul W. prejudicially influenced Sally W. with an entirely illegitimate basis for imposing a death sentence. Defendant maintains that the jurors were improperly exposed to an extraneous source outside the record, i.e., an extra-judicial code of conduct. ( Jones v. Kemp (N.D.Ga.1989) 706 F.Supp. 1534, 1559; see also People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 193-194, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862.) Also, Paul W.'s statement that if defendant had been exposed to Jesus Christ he would have everlasting life whatever happened to him, sharp[ly] contrasted with the jury instruction that life means life and death means death. [9] Thus, the trial court should have set aside the penalty verdict, or at a minimum, held a healing to investigate the allegations of jury misconduct. For reasons that follow, we reject all points, which we discuss in turn. In Hedgecock, we held that a trial court may conduct a hearing to determine the truth of jury misconduct allegations, when the court in its discretion, concludes that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve material, disputed issues of fact. ( People v. Hedgecock, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 415, 272 Cal.Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260.) We emphasized, however, the limitations of Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a). { People v. Hedgecock, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 418-419, 272 Cal.Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260.) Although Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a) permits a court to receive otherwise admissible evidence about matters that may have influenced a verdict improperly, it limits the evidence as follows: No evidence is admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined. Thus, when a juror in the course of deliberations gives the reasons for his or her vote, the words are simply a verbal reflection of the juror's mental processes. Consideration of such a statement as evidence of those processes is barred by Evidence Code section 1150. ( People v. Hedgecock, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 419, 272 Cal.Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260.) The trial court correctly determined that defendant's proffered evidence was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a). The exchange between Sally B. and Paul W. clearly involved their decisionmaking processes. ( People v. Hedgecock, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 419, 272 Cal.Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260.) Sally B.'s statement evinced her struggle and difficulty when deciding whether to sentence defendant to death. Likewise, Paul W.'s statement described how he came to reconcile his decision to vote for the death penalty. As an exception, Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a) does not prohibit admitting a statement that reflects a juror's reasoning processes if the statement itself amounts to juror misconduct, comparable to an objective fact such as reading a novel during trial, or consulting an outside attorney for advice on law relevant to the case. ( In re Stankewitz (1985) 40 Cal.3d 391, 398, 220 Cal.Rptr. 382, 708 P.2d 1260.) However, we disagree that Paul W.'s statement itself constituted misconduct. Contrary to defendant's contention, by referring to Jesus Christ and defendant's possible everlasting life, Paul W. did not improperly refer to an extraneous sourcehis personal religious beliefs or a code that mandated a particular course of conductto influence Sally B.'s vote. (Cf. People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 465-467, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388 [jurors improperly read Bible passages during deliberations].) `The introduction of much of what might strictly be labeled extraneous law cannot be deemed misconduct. The jury system is an institution that is legally fundamental but also fundamentally human. Jurors bring to their deliberations knowledge and beliefs about general matters of law and fact that find their source in everyday life and experience. That they do so is one of the strengths of the jury system. It is also one of its weaknesses: it has the potential to undermine determinations that should be made exclusively on the evidence introduced by the parties and the instructions given by the court. Such a weakness, however, must be tolerated.' ( People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1219, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) That jurors may consider their religious beliefs during penalty deliberations is also to be expected. The court in no way means to suggest that jurors cannot rely on their personal faith and deeply-held beliefs when facing the awesome decision of whether to impose the sentence of death on a fellow citizen. ( Jones v. Kemp, supra, 706 F.Supp. at p. 1560; cf. People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 515, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249.) Given the collective nature of jury deliberations, we do not find it unusual, much less improper, that jurors here may have shared their beliefs with other jurors either through conversations or prayers. We find nothing in the record, moreover, that suggests the jurors disregarded the law or the court's instructions, and instead imposed a higher or different law. ( People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 193, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862.) The fact that some jurors expressed their religious beliefs or held hands and prayed during deliberations may have reflected their need to reconcile the difficult decisionpossibly sentencing a person to deathwith their religious beliefs and personal views. (See Jones v. Kemp, supra, 706 F.Supp. at p. 1560.) But it does not show that jurors supplanted the law or instructions with their own religious views and beliefs. (See People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 194, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862 [We do not mean to rule out all reference to religion or religious figures so long as the reference does not purport to be a religious law or commandment.].) We will not presume greater misconduct than the evidence shows. ( In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 657, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985.) Contrary to defendant's contention, we disagree that Paul W.'s statement that defendant may have everlasting life contradicts the jury instruction that states, in defendant's words, life means life and death means death. Everlasting life obviously does not exist in the physical world. In that regard, Paul W. did not dispute that death does not mean death, but instead was referring to spiritual everlasting life, a commonly understood expression of religious belief and faith. We assume that Sally B. perceived the difference between physical and spiritual everlasting life in light of the jury instruction. Jurors are presumed to be intelligent, capable of understanding instructions and applying them to the facts of the case. ( Conservatorship of Early (1983) 35 Cal.3d 244, 253, 197 Cal.Rptr. 539, 673 P.2d 209.) The cases upon which defendant relies are inapposite. Unlike in People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pages 193-194, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862, the prosecutor here did not make the religious references to Jesus Christ and everlasting life. Reference by either party to religious doctrine, commandments or biblical passages tending to undermine that principle [that the jury should base their penalty determinations on evidence and legal instructions before it] is improper. ( People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 194, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862.) A juror, Paul W., made the references in the course of deliberations. Unlike in People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pages 465-467, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388, and Jones v. Kemp, supra, 706 F.Supp. at page 1559, the jurors did not consult material extraneous to the record, like the Bible. Rather, Paul W. merely shared with Sally B. his personal religious view and how he reconciled his vote for the death penalty. Finally, unlike in In re Stankewitz, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pages 399-400, 220 Cal.Rptr. 382, 708 P.2d 1260, Paul W. did not disregard a court's instruction, consult his own outside experience, and share his erroneous legal advice with other jurors. Again, he merely shared his personal view and did not purport to validate it as truth or impose his view on others. These distinctions underscore the privacy and sanctity of jury deliberations, i.e., `the subjective reasoning processes of the individual juror, which can be neither corroborated nor disproved.' ( In re Stankewitz, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 400, 220 Cal.Rptr. 382, 708 P.2d 1260; In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 294, fn. 17, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 975 P.2d 600.) Accordingly, we reject defendant's federal constitutional challenge based on his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and trial by jury. We also reject defendant's argument that the jurors had a diminished sense of responsibility when they sentenced defendant to death, in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 328-330, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231, and defendant's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a reliable, individualized capital sentencing determination. (See People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 258-261, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107.)