Opinion ID: 1160343
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: scope of permissible expert testimony

Text: Ray Renshaw, qualified as an expert, testified to his opinion that no pilot error occurred and that the sequence of events prior to the crash resulted in an accident caused by weather conditions. Renshaw's testimony is essentially an opinion concerning the issue of whether a duty of care was breached by Norvell. Renshaw was asked the following question: Q. You have heard the testimony, have you not, sir, of Mr. Bernhardt. Directing your attention to his testimony specifically to the effect that the last time that he observed the Beaver 70-Zulu, that it was still in a turn and that at that time, both aircraft were being operated within VFR minimums and that further south inside the snow squall visibility was below VFR minimums and that at the time the Beaver started its turn in the vicinity of Point Marsden clear weather with visibility all the way to Chichagof Island existed approximately twenty seconds flying time to the north, and that the sea was too rough to land at Point Marsden. Assuming these observations as facts, sir, and with your knowledge of the area, the weather, the aircraft and the capabilities of the pilot Richard Norvell, do you have an opinion as to why he turned the aircraft? (emphasis added) Over vigorous objection, Renshaw was permitted to testify to his opinion that, after completing his turn from the Admiralty side of the Chatham Strait, Norvell was in clear air; that he crossed the Strait in clear air; that he proceeded down a corridor on the Chichagof side in clear air; that he encountered a snow squall and attempted to land in False Bay when the craft was struck by an unexpected gust of wind and that the crash was not due to pilot error. Plaintiffs argue that Renshaw's testimony as to the flight pattern of the craft prior to the accident was speculative and that it was based on an impermissible assumption: that there had been no pilot error. On cross-examination, Renshaw admitted that his opinion was based in part on an assumption of no error: Q. I would like a direct answer, if you don't mind, sir. Part of your basic assumption is that the pilot did not commit error, is that not true? A. That's true.       Q. Your final observation on direct, as I recall, was that, If what I described happened, there was no pilot error. A. Right. If he was caught that way, there wouldn't be pilot error. Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Renshaw, that your real opinion is that since the pilot didn't commit error, this is what had to happen? A. Well, as I said before, you try to find some logical explanation for it.       Q. You stand with your former testimony, don't you, Mr. Renshaw, that the basis to your assumption is that the pilot did not commit error on the stick? A. Yes, that's correct. After Renshaw completed his testimony, plaintiffs moved to strike the part of the opinion based on a theory of no error. The motion was denied. [22] We have adopted a liberal position with respect to expert testimony. [23] Alaska law permits an expert, under proper circumstances, to testify on an ultimate issue. [24] The standard is whether a jury could receive appreciable assistance from the opinion of the witness. [25] The opinion, however, must be based on sufficient facts, [26] a matter normally a question for the jury. [27] In Maddocks v. Bennett , we stated: [I]f the trial judge felt that the jury could receive appreciable assistance from the opinion of the expert witness, this court would not interfere with his exercise of discretion in allowing the testimony to go to the jury, in the absence of an abuse. [28] Where, however, an opinion is based on facts not in evidence so that no jury could find sufficient facts to support the opinion, it is an abuse of discretion to permit the testimony. [29] Here, Renshaw testified that Norvell was an experienced pilot and was careful and competent. These characterizations were proper as opinions based on matters within Renshaw's personal expert knowledge, [30] and the jury could consider that opinion in determining whether Norvell was negligent on the day in question. Renshaw went further, however, and assumed no negligence on the part of the pilot as a basis for his conclusion that pilot error did not cause the crash. We find that Renshaw's testimony exceeded the range of permissible expert opinion and hold that the superior court erred in overruling plaintiffs' objections and denying their motion to strike, insofar as they related to expert opinion premised on an assumption of no pilot error. An expert may testify to his opinion regarding the capabilities of a pilot with whom he is familiar and may state his hypothesis as to how, under the circumstances, a careful and prudent pilot could have crashed his plane without negligence. An expert may not, however, assume the absence of negligence by a particular pilot on a particular occasion and then offer his opinion that, since there was no pilot error, the crash must have occurred in a particular manner. Even careful and prudent pilots are capable of acts of negligence, and an expert may not construct an opinion as to the cause of a particular crash based on the foreclosure of this possibility. To the extent that Renshaw's opinion was founded on an assumption that the pilot was not negligent, it was based on a fact not in evidence. Professor Wigmore notes a policy consideration regarding expert testimony: The jury are apt, especially where there are many expert witnesses and the evidence is voluminous, to remember and accept merely the net opinion of a witness, with little or no reference to the special premises on which it was based. [31] Professor Jones states: Nor should the opinion of an expert witness be invoked to supply a fact necessary to support his conclusion. [32] We do not find it necessary to determine whether, in light of plaintiffs' cross-examination, argument [33] and the jury instructions, [34] this error was harmless, [35] since reversal on other grounds is warranted in any event.