Opinion ID: 1860732
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Section 325.25, The Code (1975), includes no express requirement for notice of a hearing on a proposed transfer. Section 325.13, however, did require published notice upon the filing of an original application for a certificate of convenience and necessity. That section provided: Upon the filing of the application, the commission shall fix a date for hearing thereon and cause a notice addressed to the citizens of each county through or in which the proposed service will be rendered, to be published in some newspaper of general circulation in each county, once each week for two consecutive weeks. Churchill acknowledges this section applies to first-time permit issuances and is not by its own terms applicable to transfers of certificates. It contends, however, that the language of § 325.25 requiring that a proposed transferee possess all the qualifications of and meet all the requirements and assume all the obligations imposed upon an original applicant imposes the notice requirements of a new application upon these proceedings for a transfer of the certificate. No notice of the proposed transfer was published, but a courtesy notice of the pending joint application was sent by the board to all certified carriers in Iowa. This courtesy notice was sent to advise the carriers who might have interlining or tariff dealings with the present certificate holder. Churchill received such notice, filed a written resistance to the proposal, and appeared in opposition to it at the hearing. Churchill concedes it was not impaired in its ability to respond to the proposal and that it was not prejudiced in any manner by the failure to provide published notice; it contends only that the board was deprived of jurisdiction. The statutes, when read together, show that publication of notice is not required by the transfer section. Such notice for an original application must be provided by the boardit is not a requirement of the applicant. Although the practice has been for the applying carrier to provide the money and mechanics for such publication, the duty is that of the board under the statute to cause a publication; the applicant's involvement is mechanical only and partially a result of a desire to place on it the financial responsibility for publication costs. It is done pursuant to a board order for notice. The board has followed the practice of processing transfer applications without publication of notice as here urged by Churchill. The transfer section has been in existence since 1924 in substantially the same form as it was at the time of the board hearing on this proposal. The board has never interpreted the statute to require notice of a proposed transfer. Interpretations by an agency charged with implementation of a statute, particularly over a long period of time, and without legislative intervention, is evidence of compatibility of that agency's interpretation with legislative intent. See Iowa Nat. Ind. Loan Co. v. Iowa State Dept. Rev., 224 N.W.2d 437, 440 (Iowa 1974); section 4.6(6), The Code. Another matter which may be considered in construing the statute is the consequences of a particular construction. Section 4.6(5), The Code. To give the transfer statute the interpretation urged by Churchill, that all duties and responsibilities of a proposed transferee and the procedures under § 325.25, would be identical to those of an applicant for issuance of a new certificate under § 325.7 and 325.13, would make the transfer section meaningless; every proposed transfer would be, in effect, a cancellation of the existing certificate and issuance of a new one, with all of the additional matters to be considered regarding the need for the proposed service. This does not appear to be the intent of the legislature. The matter of necessity for the service had been previously determined on the original issuance. Public notice would be required to make that determination; it would not be required to make a determination of fitness of a transferee. Consideration of a proposed transferee could reasonably include financial ability under § 325.8, The Code; safety compliances under 325.18; payment of hearing expenses under § 325.19; and liability insurance coverage under § 325.26. These would bear on the qualifications, requirements and obligations of the carrier; whether the board had caused publication of notice would not bear on any of them. If all the requirements and procedures of a new application, including notice, were to be applicable in a transfer application, the legislature could easily have said so. It did not, and we conclude this was not the intent. This was also the conclusion of the South Dakota supreme court in Application of Transport, Inc., 75 S.D. 340, 64 N.W.2d 313, 315 (1954). In considering whether the convenience and necessity prerequisites, and the hearing requirements of a new application were also to be required on transfer of an existing certificate, the court said: The matter of the public need for the services was determined when the original certificates herein were issued. We think it would be contrary to the spirit and intent of the statute to require a hearing in each instance and impose the burden upon the transferee to show the existence of public convenience and necessity as a prerequisite to the authorization of a transfer. . . . That determination as above stated was had when the original certificates were issued and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the assumption is warranted that public convenience and necessity require continuation of the services previously authorized. We hold that published notice under § 325.13, The Code, applicable to new applications, is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction of the board to consider a proposed transfer under § 325.25, and that the board had jurisdiction in this matter.