Opinion ID: 1250937
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Sixth Amendment and Equal Protection

Text: In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court observed that in order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community, (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community, and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that in equal protection challenges the burden is on a defendant to `prove the existence of purposeful discrimination.' Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1721, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Purposeful discrimination may be established by proof of a disproportionate impact, which is demonstrated by showing that the defendant's cognizable racial group has not been summoned for jury service over an extended period of time; or that his group is substantially underrepresented on his venire and that the venire was chosen under a practice providing the opportunity for discrimination. U.S. v. Garcia, 836 F.2d 385, 388 (8th Cir.1987). See State v. Perez, 235 Neb. 796, 457 N.W.2d 448 (1990). In reliance upon those rules, the defendant in State v. Perez, supra , argued that the State had unconstitutionally engaged in the systematic and unconstitutional exclusion of persons of Spanish descent in the jury selection. Id. at 803, 457 N.W.2d at 454. In support of his argument, the defendant proffered two affidavits. The first cited a 1980 census report which disclosed a total of 38,344 people in Scotts Bluff County, including 4,714 persons of Hispanic descent. The second affidavit was from an official who reviewed the process by which the court compiled the venire list for the defendant's trial. The Perez court, in concluding that the defendant had failed to show discrimination, recited the standards set by the U.S. Supreme Court in cases involving jury selection challenges under the Sixth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause, stating: On appeal, defendant merely argues that an underrepresentation exists. He completely fails to address the issues of systematic exclusion and purposeful discrimination. On this basis his argument on appeal must be rejected. Id. at 806-07, 457 N.W.2d at 456. We have consistently held that a defendant has no right to a petit jury composed in whole or in part of members of his or her race, State v. Pratt, 234 Neb. 596, 452 N.W.2d 54 (1990); State v. Venable, 233 Neb. 309, 444 N.W.2d 907 (1989); State v. Kitt, 231 Neb. 52, 434 N.W.2d 543 (1989), and that the absence of members of the defendant's race in the jury, standing alone, does not support a claim of improper racial composition, State v. Falkner, 224 Neb. 490, 398 N.W.2d 708 (1987). A defendant cannot, under either a Sixth Amendment or an equal protection challenge, simply allege that no minorities are on the jury, but has the burden of establishing systematic exclusion and purposeful discrimination. Like the defendant in Perez, Garza has not met the threshold obligation of establishing a prima facie case and thereby shifting the burden to the State. Garza's sole evidence is the fact that two members of the venire had Hispanic surnames and neither was placed on the jury. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated that for purposes of determining whether the defendant has been denied a cross-section of the community, [s]tereotypical ethnic or religious characterizations of surnames are unreliable and only tenuous indicia of a jury's makeup. U.S. v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1161-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 493 U.S. 994, 110 S.Ct. 544, 107 L.Ed.2d 541 (1989). Certainly, evidence that two potential jurors had Hispanic surnames, by itself, is not convincing. Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 25-1627 and 25-1628 (Reissue 1989) require that the jury commissioner, in the presence of a judge, select a key number, which is then used to select a jury panel from voter registration and licensed driver lists. The proposed juror list shall be derived by selecting from the master list the name of the person whose numerical order on such list corresponds with the key number and each successive tenth name thereafter. § 25-1628. Once the names are chosen, the proposed jurors are mailed a juror qualification form, and at some point they are summoned to appear for jury duty. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1629 (Reissue 1989). This process has been repeatedly found valid and racially neutral under the Nebraska Constitution. State v. Fallis, 205 Neb. 465, 288 N.W.2d 281 (1980); State v. Addison, 198 Neb. 442, 253 N.W.2d 165 (1977); State v. Wright, 196 Neb. 377, 243 N.W.2d 66 (1976); State v. Casados, 188 Neb. 91, 195 N.W.2d 210 (1972). As written in State v. Gutierrez, 187 Neb. 383, 385, 191 N.W.2d 164, 166 (1971): It is difficult to conceive of a fairer or more practical method of selecting jurors than that used in Nebraska. The names are drawn by lot from lists of voters or registrants. The system is clearly within constitutional limits and renders impossible an intentional exclusion of any element of the population in a state or county where the privilege of voting is open to all who have attained the age required of an elector. Moreover, the use of voter registration lists as a means of selecting jurors has been approved by courts throughout the country. See, e.g., United States v. Daly, 573 F.Supp. 788 (N.D.Tex.1983); State v. Pittman, 569 S.W.2d 277 (Mo.App.1978); U.S. v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431 (4th Cir.1988); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987); State v. Sellers, 39 Wash.App. 799, 695 P.2d 1014 (1985). Garza offers no statistical evidence of racial makeup in the community or of substantial underrepresentation of any cognizable racial group, nor does he suggest in any fashion how the State systematically discriminated against an identifiable group. Furthermore, Garza's claim that the juror questionnaire forms require race identification is wrong. As has been articulated, the absence of diverse racial representation on a jury, without evidence of intentional discrimination, is insufficient to uphold a constitutional challenge.