Opinion ID: 2831471
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Commissioners’ Plea to the Jurisdiction

Text: Where a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, as the Commissioners did below, a reviewing court must determine whether the party asserting jurisdiction has alleged facts that 14 affirmatively demonstrate or negate the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). This determination is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id. AT&T alleged that the Commissioners acted ultra vires by their clear and extended refusal to accept responsibility for repayment of AT&T’s relocation costs and by directing the City to send the relocation notice. AT&T urges that such clear repudiation of the District’s statutory obligation is in violation of their duty and that declaratory relief is not barred by immunity even though it would compel prospective payment. We agree. The Commissioners argue that AT&T has not alleged that they have taken actions placing them within the ultra vires exception to immunity. But the Commissioners sidestepped AT&T’s attempts to work out an agreement for the District to bear the relocation costs of the facilities for a number of years by refusing to respond to correspondences requesting a written costs agreement. The District eventually responded by instructing the City to send a notice to AT&T directing it to relocate its facilities at its own expense. If AT&T relocated its facilities and then sought reimbursement from the District, its claim—whether styled as one for damages or declaratory relief—would run afoul of the District’s governmental immunity because AT&T would be seeking retrospective monetary relief. The Commissioners’ execution of the letter directing the City to send the relocation notice overtly evidenced their refusal to comply with Water Code § 49.223's requirement that the District pay the utilities’ costs by affirmatively acting in a manner that was intended to force AT&T to bear the relocation costs. The Commissioners’ actions unequivocally demonstrated their intent not to comply with the statute. AT&T’s only viable option for enforcement 15 of § 49.223 at that point was to bring suit seeking a declaratory judgment and prospective relief as to the District’s obligations under the statute. The next question is whether the Commissioners’ anticipatory refusal to comply with the statute qualifies as a ministerial act or was undertaken without legal authority, placing the conduct within the ultra vires exception to governmental immunity. Section 49.223 mandates that the District will bear the costs of relocation where exercise of the District’s power makes such relocation necessary: In the event that the district or water supply corporation, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain or power of relocation or any other power, makes necessary the relocation . . . of any road [or] bridge . . . all necessary relocations . . . shall be done at the sole expense of the district or water supply corporation unless otherwise agreed to in writing. TEX . WATER CODE § 49.223(a). The use of the word “shall” evidences the mandatory nature of the duty imposed, and the statue provides under what circumstances the District is to bear the expense. Cf. Downing v. Brown, 935 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. 1996) (concluding that an employee’s actions were not ministerial because a classroom discipline plan required deliberation and was discretionary where the mandate failed to instruct, among other things, which conduct required discipline and when and where to discipline the students). The statute also contains no indication that the District is to conduct any form of review, deliberation, or judgment in exercising its payment obligation. In other words, if the District’s exercise of power made necessary the utilities relocation, the statute requires the District to bear the relocation costs. See McLane Co. v. Strayhorn, 148 S.W.3d 644, 650 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied) (finding immunity barred suit because the statute granted discretion to the comptroller to determine the adequacy of collateral when it stated “similar types of 16 collateral acceptable to the comptroller.”); Tex. Racing Comm’n v. Marquez, No. 03-09-00635-CV, 2011 WL 3659092, at  (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 19, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that director did not have discretion to not docket an administrative appeal where relevant administrative code stated: “If after a reasonable time the proceeding cannot be settled through agreement, the executive secretary shall refer the matter to SOAH”). Thus, because § 49.223 imposes a purely ministerial duty upon the District, the Commissioners had no discretion in determining whether the District would pay the relocation expenses, and they failed to perform the ministerial task of authorizing payment. Under such circumstances their conduct in requesting the City to issue notices of relocation constituted ultra vires acts in contravention of their ministerial duty to cause the District to bear the costs of relocating AT&T’s facilities. Therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction over AT&T’s claims against the Commissioners and the trial court erred by granting the Commissioners’ plea to the jurisdiction. Further, AT&T is entitled to declaratory relief that payment of its relocation expenses by the District is required by § 49.223. Although that declaration essentially is a requirement for prospective relief against the District, the District’s immunity does not shield it from such relief. See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 368-69. 2. Marcotte’s No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment Where a no-evidence motion for summary judgement is granted, as Marcotte’s was, a reviewing court will sustain the summary judgment if “(a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than 17 a mere scintilla, or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact.” King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003). In his summary judgment motion, Marcotte contended that governmental immunity insulates him from this suit because, as AT&T’s pleadings alleged, he was acting in accordance with a City of Houston Ordinance when he sent the relocation notice and threatened to remove the facilities and assess the costs against AT&T. As stated earlier, the ultra vires exception to immunity only applies where a government actor fails to perform a ministerial task or acts without authority of law. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 370. Neither of these instances are present here. It is undisputed that Marcotte’s actions conformed with the Houston Ordinance. The undisputed facts establish that Marcotte acted with authority of law and that the ultra vires exception is inapplicable as to him. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of no-evidence summary judgment as to Marcotte.