Opinion ID: 2353090
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unilateral Reduction of Child Support

Text: [¶ 18] While the appeal and cross-appeal of the June 28, 2006, order amending the divorce judgment were pending, the District Court ruled on the motion filed by Harvey seeking to reduce his child support payments. The court concluded that 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(8)(G), which the parties and the court had inadvertently failed to consider in the June 2006 order, changed the law reflected in our decision in Bartlett. In the interests of judicial economy and the need to narrow the issues on appeal, the court recalculated the arrearage it had previously determined Harvey owed, and concluded in the August 2006 order, contrary to its June 2006 order, that Harvey was entitled to unilaterally reduce child support upon the graduation of each of his daughters, because they were eighteen years old at the time, pursuant to the amended statute. [¶ 19] Kathleen contends that the August 2006 order is void ab initio because Harvey's motion was considered, and the order was issued, while the June 2006 order was on appeal to us. She further contends that her entitlement to child support arrearages, as previously found by the court, had vested prior to the enactment of section 2006(8)(G), on which the District Court relied in concluding that there were no arrearages, and the statute does not retroactively abrogate vested support obligations.
[¶ 20] Rule 3(b) of the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that [t]he trial court shall take no further action pending disposition of the appeal by the Law Court with limited, enumerated exceptions, none of which are applicable in the instant case. [5] There is no judicial economy exception to the limitation on the court's authority set out in M.R.App. P. 3 to allow the trial court to change a judgment or order while an appeal is still pending. The exceptions in Rule 3 focus on enforcement or contempt; in the absence of a clerical mistake in the judgment, see M.R.App. P. 3(b)(2), M.R. Civ. P. 60(a), a court has no authority to change a judgment while review of the judgment is pending appeal. The District Court erred in acting on Harvey's motion, which sought to substantially change the court's June 2006 order, while that order was on appeal. Nevertheless, because, as the District Court concluded, Harvey was entitled to unilaterally reduce his child support payments upon the graduation of each of his two older daughters, as discussed below, the District Court's error is harmless.
[¶ 21] We stated in Bartlett, that [t]here is no authorization for a unilateral change in court-ordered support, without court approval, in an order covering more than one child, except for the change contemplated by a court order pursuant to section 1653(13) [of title 19-A].  2005 ME 10, ¶ 17, 866 A.2d at 834 (emphasis added). Section 1653(13) provides that the court order may provide for automatic adjustments to child support payments when the child attains 12 or 18 years of age; or when the child graduates, withdraws or is expelled from secondary school, attains 19 years of age or is otherwise emancipated, whichever occurs first. 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(13) (2006). In Bartlett, we did not address whether the child support order provided automatic adjustments to child support upon any of the events specified in section 1653(13). 2005 ME 10, ¶¶ 3, 6, 866 A.2d at 831. In this case, the child support order, issued as part of the original divorce judgment, does provide for adjustments upon certain events: first, when the youngest daughter turned twelve, the amount of child support was automatically increased, and Harvey did increase his payments pursuant to the order; and, second, the order provides, unambiguously: The child support obligation shall continue for each child until that child reaches the age of 18; provided, however, that if the child has not graduated, withdrawn, or been expelled from secondary school as defined in Title 20-A, the child support shall continue until the child graduates or reaches the age of 19, whichever comes first. [¶ 22] The two child support worksheets attached to the divorce judgment provide that the total amount owed for each of the children, after the youngest child's twelfth birthday, is the same. Accordingly, by the terms of the child support order, Harvey was entitled to adjust his overall child support obligation upon the graduation of each of the two older daughters. Although by enacting 19-A M.R.S. § 2006(8)(G), the Legislature intended to change the law as expressed in Bartlett, the divorce judgment in this case is not affected by the law in Bartlett. Pursuant to the specific terms of the divorce judgment itself, Harvey was entitled to act unilaterally to reduce his support obligation. Accordingly, Kathleen did not have a vested interest in receiving child support for the two older daughters after they had graduated from high school, and the August 2006 order is affirmed, albeit on grounds different than those relied on by the District Court. The entry is: The June 28, 2006, order is affirmed, except as to that part of that order amended by the August 22, 2006, order. The August 22, 2006, order is affirmed.