Opinion ID: 2973181
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Conduct Annual Review

Text: First, Diamond argues that MRS violated the Act’s procedures when it did not conduct an annual review of her IPE as required by § 722(b)(2)(E)(i) of the Act. The district court did not determine whether MRS and Diamond reviewed the May, 2000, IPE within the requisite ninety day time period. It found, however, that even if MRS violated the Act’s requirement for annual review, Diamond could not demonstrate any substantive harm from any such procedural violation. Indeed, instead of harm, the district court found that Diamond “experienced a windfall at public expense, as excess benefits continued unabated.” An initial and dispositive question is whether the IPE on which Diamond bases her claim had expired by its own terms on November, 2000. The May, 2000, IPE signed by Diamond and MRS stated that its expected end date was November, 2000. The state hearing officer concluded that the May, 2000, IPE expired by its own terms on November, 2000. The district court found that MRS did not violate the procedures of the Act because the May, 2000, IPE had expired and was no longer in effect. Under 34 C.F.R.§ 361.50(d)(2) a state agency may under the Act place an expected end date on an eligible individual’s IPE. This regulation provides that the State unit may not establish absolute time limits on the provision of specific services or on the provision of services to an individual. The duration of each service needed by an individual must be determined on an individual basis and reflected in that individual's individualized plan for employment. 34 C.F.R. § 361.50(d)(2). Thus, the expected end date placed on Diamond’s May, 2000, IPE by MRS was not improper and, accordingly, her IPE expired on its expected end date of November, 2000. Although Diamond’s IPE expired on November, 2000, she continued to receive an abundance of services both listed and not listed in her expired IPE. Thus, the district court was correct in finding Diamond benefitted from, rather than was harmed by, any failure of MRS to undertake a periodic review of her IPE. Accordingly, Diamond cannot demonstrate any substantive harm from the possible failure of MRS to conduct an annual review. Because Diamond cannot review under § 722(c)(5) of the Rehabilitation Act, given that the text and structure of the statutes are virtually identical.”). No. 04-2327 Diamond v. State of Michigan Page 6 demonstrate any substantive harm, she is not entitled to any relief under the Act for a possible procedural violation. Therefore, we find the district court correctly rejected this contention.