Opinion ID: 1720308
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: mr hitchcock

Text: The judge stated he felt the people involved in the case knew more about it than he did. The judge stated the value of the business was its ability to support the parties well and as long as it served that purpose, that was how the parties should value it. It is true the judge urged the parties to settle but he did not give any impression of coercion. Judge Holliday overruled the motion to vacate and for new trial. He found the comment of the judge urging settlement was    without bias or prejudice toward either party. The comment was made in a desire to give counsel for the respective parties `an expression of the conclusions of the Judge up to the moment, in order that counsel may be advised what course to chart.' He concluded there was no error, irregularity or misconduct. He did not consider whether the economic provisions of the decree were equitable. In his conclusions of law Judge Holliday stated: Efforts on the part of the trial judge to expedite the proceedings and to encourage settlements out of Court are ordinarily to be commended, such efforts should never be so directed as to compell [sic] either litigant to make a forced settlement. The rule is well established that, within proper bounds, a trial judge should encourage the settlement of litigated cases. The question here is whether the judge's comments were within such bounds. A party or his counsel may always refuse to accede to a suggestion by the court. The trial court ought not to force a settlement on a party who wants a trial, but there is nothing wrong or irregular in the Court suggesting the advisability of settlement. A settlement procured under duress cannot be binding.    The record does not reveal any evidence of coercion, bias, or prejudgment on the part of the Court. On the contrary, the Court exercised a high degree of courtesy and patience, and at all times appeared to maintain an open and unprejudicial attitude. This Court concludes that the record does not present a situation which calls for a holding that the trial judge was guilty of misconduct which requires the granting of a new trial. I. The issue presented by Mrs. Hitchcock's appeal from the economic provisions of the final judgment and decree terminating the marital relationship existing between her and her husband is whether the award in those respects is justified and equitable. Section 598.21, The Code, as in force at the time material here, provided: Alimonycustody of childrenchanges. When a dissolution of marriage is decreed, the court may make such order in relation to the children, property, parties, and the maintenance of the parties as shall be justified. Subsequent changes may be made by the court in these respects when circumstances render them expedient. In Locke v. Locke, 246 N.W.2d 246, 251 (Iowa 1976), this court said: A distribution of the assets of the parties in a dissolution proceedings should be based on the guidelines set out in Schantz v. Schantz, 163 N.W.2d 398, 405 (Iowa 1968), excluding consideration of reward or punishment on the basis of fault. In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 169 (Iowa 1974). See In re Marriage of Cooper, 225 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Iowa 1975). Division of assets of parties in dissolution of marriage proceedings based on either a one-third share to wife or an equal division is not statutorily sanctioned; that which is determinative is that which would constitute an equitable and just award under the circumstances. See In re Marriage of Cooper, 225 N.W.2d at 919. As pointed out by Mrs. Hitchcock, the decree in this case is not the result of a trial on the merits or an independent decision of the court. There was no written stipulation of the parties which was incorporated in and made a part of the decree in this matter. Rather, the decree entered by the trial court was in the form submitted and approved by counsel for the parties. Within a few days after entry of the decree Mrs. Hitchcock filed a motion to vacate the decree and for a new trial. As a basis for the relief sought in the motion Mrs. Hitchcock alleged that her manifestation of assent to the settlement referred to in the decree was procured by undue duress and emotional stress induced by the trial judge's conduct in announcing his views as to what would be a just and equitable distribution of the assets of the parties under the circumstances. She further alleged she had no reasonable alternative to succumbing to the purported settlement. As we understand, Mrs. Hitchcock insists her manifestation of assent to the purported settlement was induced by the acts and conduct of the trial judge and consequently was not effective as an expression of mutual assent necessary for the formation of a valid contract of settlement. As stated, Judge Holliday in ruling on Mrs. Hitchcock's motion to vacate and for new trial concluded the record before him did not present a situation which called for a holding that the trial judge was guilty of misconduct which required the granting of a new trial. He specifically stated,    [T]his Court does not consider the matter of the equities of the decree before the Court. In our opinion, the question as to whether Judge Missildine's announcements relative to distribution of the assets of the parties constitutes misconduct requiring a new trial is not the issue for determination in Mrs. Hitchcock's appeal from the economic provisions of the decree. In view of the fact there was an actual expression of assent by Mrs. Hitchcock to the distribution of the assets of the parties as set forth in the decree, the problem before this court is whether the announcements and conduct of the trial judge were sufficient to actually induce assent on the part of Mrs. Hitchcock who claims to be the victim of duress thereby rendering it inequitable to permit enforcement of the distribution as provided in the decree. The test is subjective. Hence, threats that would suffice to induce assent by one person may not suffice to induce assent by another. All attendant circumstances must be considered, including such matters as the age, background and relationship of the parties.    Timid and inexperienced persons are particularly subject to threats,   . However,    circumstantial evidence may be useful in determining whether a threat did, in fact, induce assent. See Restatement, Second, Contracts, section 317, comment c (Tentative Draft No. 12). In our de novo review we are limited to a record of Mr. Hitchcock's testimony, the financial statements filed by the parties prior to trial (section 598.21) and the testimony of Mrs. Hitchcock, her counsel, Judge Missildine and Mr. Hitchcock relative to the events following the noon recess up until the purported settlement. Thus limited we find the announcements and conduct of the trial judge at the noon recess relative to what he considered to be a just distribution of the assets of the parties actually induced Mrs. Hitchcock's manifestation of assent to the purported settlement. In this connection we recognize duress may be exercised by one who is not a party to the contract as well as by one who is. See Introductory Note to Topic 2, Restatement, Second, Contracts (Tentative Draft No. 12). In section 317, comment b, id., it is stated that, A threat, even if improper, does not amount to duress if the victim has a reasonable alternative to succumbing and fails to take advantage of it. In the brief and argument filed on behalf of Mr. Hitchcock reference is made to the fact that while negotiations were in progress Judge Missildine told Mr. Neiman if they could not get the matter settled he was ready to continue to hear the evidence; at a later time Judge Missildine also told the parties to come back in and get on with the evidence. At this point Mrs. Hitchcock asked for another five minutes which the judge granted. Under the record a finding would be justified that during the noon recess Judge Missildine announced his views as to what would constitute a fair and just distribution of the assets of the parties. The alternative for Mrs. Hitchcock was to follow the judge's suggestion and settle the matter in accordance therewith or proceed to try her case on its merits before a tribunal which had apparently prejudged the issue to be determined by the court as mandated by section 598.21, The Code. In our opinion, this is a far cry from a reasonable alternative as contemplated by the Restatement. We agree with Mrs. Hitchcock she did not have a reasonable alternative to succumbing. Insofar as we are able to determine from the record the remarks attributed to Judge Missildine were made by the judge in the presence of both parties and their counsel. From our de novo review we conclude the purported settlement relative to the distribution of the assets of the parties as set forth in the decree is voidable by Mrs. Hitchcock. It cannot logically be maintained that she ratified the settlement agreement in any manner or to any extent, particularly in view of her promptness in filing the motion to vacate.    Ratification results if the party who executed the contract under duress accepts the benefits flowing from it or remains silent or acquiesces in the contract for any considerable length of time after opportunity is afforded to annul or void it.    [citing authorities]. Gallon v. Lloyd-Thomas Company, 264 F.2d 821, 826 (8 Cir. 1959), 77 A.L.R.2d 417, 424. We hold the distribution of the assets of the parties as set forth in the decree cannot be sustained. The legal concept of duress is dealt with in Galusha v. Sherman, 105 Wis. 263, 81 N.W. 495, where the history of the concept is traced in some detail. This court considered the matter briefly in Guttenfelder v. Iebsen, 222 Iowa 1116, 270 N.W. 900, and again in In re Estate of Dayton, 246 Iowa 1209, 71 N.W.2d 429. See also Joyce v. Year Investments, Inc., 45 Ill.App.2d 310, 196 N.E.2d 24; Tallmadge v. Robinson, 158 Ohio St. 333, 109 N.E.2d 496; 13 Williston on Contracts, (Jaeger, Third Ed.), sections 1601-1624; and Restatement, Second, Contracts, sections 316-319 (Tentative Draft No. 12). In the last two citations the modern day view of the concept is treated. II. Ordinarily, in equity matters, such as this, where our review is de novo it is our responsibility to review the facts as well as the law and determine from the credible evidence rights anew on those propositions properly presented, provided issue has been raised and error, if any, preserved in the trial proceedings. While weight will be given to findings of the trial court, this court will not abdicate its function as triers de novo on appeal. In re Marriage of Jennerjohn, 203 N.W.2d 237, 240 (Iowa 1972). In seeking to determine what distribution of the assets of the parties and what allowance for their maintenance would be justified as required by section 598.21, The Code, it would, of course, be necessary to ascertain the value of their property. At no point in the appendix, transcript or exhibits is there evidence which would justify a finding as to such value. This court was faced with a similar situation in Lessenger v. Lessenger, 258 Iowa 170, 175, 138 N.W.2d 58, 61, where the following statements were made: We have carefully read and searched the record.    The evidence is inadequate as to the essentials to be considered in determining what is `right' (section 598.14). We are convinced the questions of child support and property division or lump sum alimony cannot be properly adjudicated under the record before us. As argued by plaintiff's present counsel, who did not represent her at the trial, equity can only be done by remanding this controversy to the trial court for reopening and further evidence on these two vital issues. The general rule is where an equity case is not in a condition for a final decree, none will be made by this court, but the case will be remanded.    [citing authorities]. In Daugherty v. Daugherty, 260 Iowa 878, 882, 151 N.W.2d 569, 572, it was said:    Where the evidence is insufficient for the fair de novo determination of an important issue, we can and should return the case for more evidence on the subject.    . See also Locke v. Locke, 246 N.W.2d at 253. We conclude this case must be remanded for a retrial on the question of the division of the assets of the parties and the question of reasonable support and maintenance of Mrs. Hitchcock as directed in sections 598.17 and 598.21. The decree insofar as it dissolves the marital relationship existing between the parties is not affected by this remand. There is no merit to any suggestion that Mrs. Hitchcock's contentions relative to her appeal from the economic provisions of the decree were not properly preserved for review by this court. III. In view of the foregoing determination it is unnecessary to reach Mrs. Hitchcock's appeal from the order overruling her motion to vacate and for a new trial. IV. Mrs. Hitchcock has filed an application in this court for an allowance for fees for services rendered by her attorneys on this appeal. The application is supported by an itemized statement of the time expended by her attorneys, a paralegal and a law student clerk. It is apparent from an examination of this statement that counsel spent a great deal of time preparing this appeal. In this connection we direct attention to the fact that this is an appeal, not a proceeding for modification of a decree. Without in any way attempting to place a valuation on these services or what counsel should be paid, we simply determine what portion thereof should be paid by Mr. Hitchcock. Mrs. Hitchcock should be allowed the sum of $2,000 toward her attorney fees. Any amount due her attorneys above this allowance must be paid by her. Judgment shall be entered in the trial court for the amount allowed by this court. In reaching our conclusion in this matter we have considered every contention, assertion or argument advanced or urged by either of the parties and find none which persuade us that our decision should be otherwise. With directions to the trial court to set aside that portion of its decree dealing with the distribution of the assets of the parties and the maintenance of Mrs. Hitchcock and to proceed with a retrial on these issues the case isRemanded. MOORE, C. J., and RAWLINGS, UHLENHOPP and REYNOLDSON, JJ., concur. LeGRAND, REES and HARRIS, JJ., dissent. McCORMICK, J., takes no part.