Opinion ID: 11919
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: After this case was fully briefed, Johnson filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Johnson contends that we have no jurisdiction over this appeal because there is no final judgment or final order, the order was not an appealable collateral order, and the district court did not fully adjudicate the rights and obligations of the parties. Before oral argument, we denied that motion, and upon reconsideration we have determined that our initial decision was correct. We make no 5 comment on Johnson’s specific arguments, instead concluding that we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 because the district court’s order granted an injunction.2 The district court’s order reads as follows: Defendant is ORDERED to modify or establish policies, practices, and procedures to ensure that disabled persons with guide dogs or other service animals have the broadest feasible access to the public tour of the Spoetzl Brewery consistent with the brewery’s safe operation. As Defendant establishes or modifies its policies, practices, or procedures, it is hereby ORDERED to seek guidance from the United States Department of Justice in the form of a letter opinion or, if necessary, a formal or informal rulemaking. In seeking guidance from the Justice Department, Defendant may request that the Justice Department consult with the United States Food and Drug Administration and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Defendant is further ORDERED to submit to the Court, as soon as practicable, a written policy governing support animal access to its public tour, incorporating whatever guidance the Justice Department provides. The Court shall maintain continuing jurisdiction over Defendant to ensure that this policy is carried out and that disabled persons with support animals are afforded the broadest feasible access consistent with the safe operation of the Spoetzl Brewery. The order, in effect, requires Gambrinus to make modifications to allow individuals with service animals the broadest feasible access to the tour, to consult with the Department of Justice in formulating these changes, and to submit a written policy to the 2 Section 1292 provides in pertinent part: (a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from: (1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions . . . . 6 district court as soon as practicable. This is very similar to the desegregation order in Board of Pub. Instruction v. Braxton, 326 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964). In Braxton, the lower court’s order listed five types of prohibited acts, for example, “[c]ontinuing to operate a compulsory biracial school system,” “[a]ssigning pupils to schools on the basis of race and color,” and “[a]ssigning . . . personnel to schools on the basis of . . . race and color.” Id. at 617 n.1. The order then indicated that the prohibitions would not go into effect immediately and required the defendants to submit “a detailed and comprehensive plan” to implement the prohibitions. Id. We held that the order was an appealable injunction, reasoning that “the ordering of the plan dealing expressly with these prohibited acts amounts to a mandatory injunction.” Id. at 619. The order in the case at bar is similar, given that it prohibits an act (banning all service animals from the brewery tour) and orders Gambrinus to consult the Department of Justice and submit a written policy incorporating that guidance. Thus, we conclude that the order in this case is an appealable injunction under § 1292(a)(1). See also Morales v. Turman, 535 F.2d 864, 867 n.6 (5th Cir. 1976) (“[T]he order requiring that the parties meet and negotiate a plan complying with the decision is itself a mandatory injunction which is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).” (citing Braxton)), rev’d on other grounds, 430 U.S. 322 (1977). 7 IV. STANDARDS OF PROOF UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT Title III of the ADA, which applies to public accommodations,3 establishes the general rule that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). The ADA then defines discrimination to include a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). The central issue for us to address in this case is the allocation of the burdens of proof in a “reasonable modifications” case under Title III. Because no Fifth Circuit case sets forth these burdens in the context of Title III, we will look to the more fully developed case law under Title I of the ADA, which prohibits disability discrimination in employment. See id. § 12112. In Riel v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. 1996), the plaintiff brought suit under the ADA after he was 3 The parties do not dispute that the public tour and hospitality room are places of public accommodation. 8 fired for repeatedly failing to meet milestone deadlines on projects. Id. at 681. He claimed that his failure to meet those deadlines was caused by his disability, which was fatigue attributed to renal failure and diabetes, and he requested accommodations. Id. at 680-81. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, in part by concluding that the plaintiff’s requested accommodations were not reasonable. Id. at 680. We reversed and remanded. Id. Title I of the ADA provides that discrimination includes “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The Riel court noted that the statutory language, by requiring a reasonable accommodation unless the employer “can demonstrate” undue hardship, clearly placed the burden of proof with respect to undue hardship on the employer. 99 F.3d at 682. As to the burden of proving the reasonableness of the accommodation, the court noted that “[i]n contrast, discrimination is defined to be a ‘failure to implement reasonable accommodations,’ suggesting that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on that issue.” Id. The court went on to describe the substance of these burdens: “[A] reasonable accommodation is ‘a method of accommodation that is reasonable in the run of cases, whereas the undue hardship inquiry focuses on the hardships imposed by the plaintiff’s 9 preferred accommodation in the context of the particular [employer’s] operations.’” Id. at 683 (quoting Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1538 (1994)) (alteration in original). Thus, a plaintiff meets the burden of proof on reasonableness by proposing and putting forth evidence of an accommodation that is generally reasonable, or reasonable “in the run of cases.” The employer can challenge the reasonableness of the accommodation only by evidence showing that the accommodation generally would not be reasonable. Moving on to the affirmative defense, if the employer introduces evidence that disputes the appropriateness of the accommodation in the specific circumstances, that constitutes evidence of undue hardship (on which the employer bears the burden of proof). The Riel court held that an employer’s only mechanism for challenging a requested accommodation (that is reasonable in the run of cases) on grounds that are specific to the circumstances is through the undue hardship defense. Id. at 683-84. The plaintiff in Riel requested that his employer accommodate him either by transferring him to a position without milestone deadlines or by adjusting the deadlines for him. Id. at 683. The employer argued that relaxing the milestone deadlines would disrupt its work structure. Id. The court concluded that there was a fact issue on that question and accordingly determined that summary judgment was inappropriate. Id. The employer also argued that its internal polices would not allow it to transfer the plaintiff because the plaintiff had 10 received ratings of “below average” as a result of missing milestone deadlines. Id. The court concluded that this evidence focused upon the plaintiff’s specific circumstances and thus could not be used to rebut the plaintiff’s showing of an accommodation reasonable in the run of cases, but instead was relevant only to meeting the employer’s burden of showing undue hardship. Id. at 683-84. The employer, however, did not plead undue hardship, which is an affirmative defense. Id. at 684. The employer’s evidence therefore was not sufficient to show that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that there were no genuine issues of material fact. Id. While Riel was a Title I reasonable accommodations case, its analysis is easily transferrable to the Title III reasonable modifications context. The language of both provisions is very similar: Title I defines discrimination to include “not making reasonable accommodations . . . unless [the defendant] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Title III defines discrimination to include “a failure to make reasonable modifications . . . unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of [the public accommodation].” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). In light of the statutes’ parallel language, we find no basis for distinguishing their respective burdens of proof. While Title I provides an undue hardship defense and Title III provides a fundamental alteration defense, fundamental alteration is merely 11 a particular type of undue hardship. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., § 1630.2(p). Consequently, while the scope of the affirmative defense under Title III is more narrow than that provided by Title I, the type of proof -- that is, proof focusing on the specific circumstances rather than on reasonableness in general -- is the same. Applying the Riel framework to the Title III reasonable modifications context yields the following allocation of burdens of proof. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that a modification was requested and that the requested modification is reasonable. The plaintiff meets this burden by introducing evidence that the requested modification is reasonable in the general sense, that is, reasonable in the run of cases. While the defendant may introduce evidence indicating that the plaintiff’s requested modification is not reasonable in the run of cases, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof on the issue. See also Staron v. McDonald’s Corp., 51 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1995) (reversing the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Title III suit based on district court’s determination that plaintiffs’ requested accommodations are not reasonable as a matter of law and remanding to give plaintiffs the opportunity to prove that the requested accommodations are reasonable).4 If the 4 The Rehabilitation Act is the predecessor to the ADA, and Rehabilitation Act precedent is to be used in interpreting the ADA. See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg. 35544, 35545 (1991). However, we have not been consistent in our interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act regarding the burden of proof on reasonableness. Compare McGregor v. Louisiana State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1993) (concluding that in a 12 plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant must make the requested modification unless the defendant pleads and meets its burden of proving that the requested modification would fundamentally alter the nature of the public accommodation. The type of evidence that satisfies this burden focuses on the specifics of the plaintiff’s or defendant’s circumstances and not on the general nature of the accommodation. Under the statutory framework, such evidence is relevant only to a fundamental alteration defense and not relevant to the plaintiff’s burden to show that the requested modification is reasonable in the run of cases. Service animals present potential concerns not encountered with other types of personal assistance mechanisms for individuals with disabilities. The Justice Department, which Congress directed to issue regulations to carry out the provisions of Title III, 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b), has promulgated a regulation and commentary discussing the use of service animals in places of public accommodation. The regulation states: “Generally, a public accommodation shall modify policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of a service animal by an individual with a disability.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(1). In Rehabilitation Act case concerning higher education, plaintiff had the burden to prove that his requested accommodations were reasonable), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1131 (1994), with Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. Unit A Nov. 5, 1981) (concluding in a Rehabilitation Act case involving employment discrimination that the employer has the burden of persuasion on the issue of reasonable accommodation). The analysis in Riel is much more similar to McGregor than Prewitt, and thus we will continue to follow that path. 13 its interpretive commentary, the Justice Department has stated as follows: Section 36.302(c)(1) of the final rule now provides that “[g]enerally, a public accommodation shall modify policies, practices, and procedures to permit the use of a service animal by an individual with a disability.” This formulation reflects the general intent of Congress that public accommodations take the necessary steps to accommodate service animals and to ensure that individuals with disabilities are not separated from their service animals. It is intended that the broadest feasible access be provided to service animals in all places of public accommodation, including movie theaters, restaurants, hotels, retail stores, hospitals, and nursing homes. The section also acknowledges, however, that, in rare circumstances, accommodation of service animals may not be required because a fundamental alteration would result in the nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations offered or provided, or the safe operation of the public accommodation would be jeopardized. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 app. B, at 623 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). This Justice Department interpretation fits well within the Riel framework. Under the Riel framework, the plaintiff must show a modification that is reasonable generally or in the run of cases. The regulation and commentary reflect an administrative determination that modifying a no animals policy to allow a service animal full access with its owner in a place of public accommodation is generally reasonable, or, in Riel language, reasonable in the run of cases. The commentary also mirrors the Riel framework by stating that a public accommodation must modify its animal restriction policy to allow a service animal to accompany its owner unless it can demonstrate that such modifications would cause a fundamental alteration or jeopardize the safety of the public accommodation. 14 Congress has specifically directed the Justice Department to issue regulations implementing Title III. See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b). In reviewing such regulations, we must first determine whether the statute has “directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). We agree with the district court in this case that Title III of the ADA does not explicitly address the issue of who bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of allowing service animals in places of public accommodation. Next “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. The agency’s construction does not have to be the only permissible reading of the statute. Id. at 843 n.11. “Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. at 844. We agree with the district court that the Justice Department’s interpretation is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. As previously discussed, the regulation corresponds with the ADA’s statutory framework as discussed in Riel. Furthermore, the legislative history of Title III makes clear that Congress concluded that it is a reasonable modification for places of public accommodation with animal restriction policies to allow individuals with disabilities full 15 use of service animals.5 We also defer to the Justice 5 The legislative history of the ADA contains many statements regarding the use of service animals in places of public accommodation. The Education and Labor Committee indicated that public accommodations should modify their operations to allow service dogs: A public accommodation which does not allow dogs must modify that rule for a blind person with a seeingeye dog, a deaf person with a hearing-ear dog, or a person with some other disability who uses a service dog. Refusal to admit the dog in these circumstances is tantamount to refusing to admit the person who is in need of the dog. Moreover, a public accommodation may not require the person with the disability to be separated from the service, guide, or seeing-eye dog once inside the facility. H.R. REP. No. 485(II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 389. Indeed, the Judiciary Committee specifically listed changing a “no pets” policy for the use of service animals as an example of a reasonable modification, stating that the refusal to modify such a policy is discriminatory: It is discriminatory to fail to make reasonable modifications in policies and practices when such modifications are necessary to provide goods or services, unless it can be demonstrated that the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods or services provided. For example, it is discriminatory to refuse to alter a “no pets” rule for a person with a disability who uses a guide or service dog. H.R. REP. No. 485(III), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 482. Similar sentiments were expressed in the Congressional Record. For example, Senator Simon stated as follows: One form of discrimination faced by thousands of people with disabilities in public accommodations is prohibiting entry by an assistive animal. Part of the problem lies in ignorance. . . . Regretfully, many people still don’t understand that these animals are well-trained and certified, and don’t create public disturbances nor pose any public health risk whatsoever. Generally speaking, any facility where it is safe for a person to go, it is safe for a trained assistive animal to go, including restaurants and other 16 Department’s commentary concerning service animals because it is not inconsistent with the plain language of the regulation. See WRT Energy Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, No. 9560326, 1997 WL 85280, at  (5th Cir. Feb. 28, 1997) (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994)) (giving deference to FERC’s interpretations of its regulations).6 public accommodations. . . . It should be further understood that a person with a disability using a guide, signal or service dog should not be separated from the dog. . . . A person with a disability and his or her assistive animal function as a unit and should never be involuntarily separated. Nor is there any need for this separation. To require it would be discriminatory under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 135 CONG. REC. S10,800 (1989). Representative Hoyer, when speaking of reasonable modifications under Title III, expressed that “it would be discriminatory for a restaurant to refuse to alter a ‘no pets’ rule for a person who uses a guide or a service dog, because such an alteration would not fundamentally alter the nature of the goods being provided.” 136 CONG. REC. E1919 (1990). 6 Gambrinus argues that the “broadest feasible access” language in the commentary is merely a goal, not a legal rule. Gambrinus insists that having a broadest feasible access standard is inconsistent with the wording of the statute because broadest feasible access is a “do or die” standard whereas the text of the statute mandates only reasonable modifications. Contrary to Gambrinus’s assertions, a broadest feasible access standard is not a do or die standard in contradiction to the reasonable modification requirement, but merely an explanation of what is reasonable in this context. Under the Riel framework, the plaintiff’s proposed modification must be reasonable in the run of cases. The administrative agency charged with interpreting the statute, aided by clear legislative history, has determined that allowing the broadest feasible access for service animals to accompany their owners in places of public accommodation is reasonable. This is not a do or die standard, for in the “rare circumstance[]” that allowing service animals would fundamentally alter the nature or jeopardize the safety of the public accommodation, the public accommodation would not be required to make the modification. However, even in such a rare circumstance, the public accommodation must designate the exact areas where exclusion is 17 Before discussing the application of the burdens of proof in this case, it is necessary to examine the relevant FDA regulations and the district court’s findings regarding those regulations.