Opinion ID: 2499414
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Placement with extended family members

Text: Josh's main argument is that OCS failed to make active efforts because it did not actively investigate placement with his extended family members. He relies on our opinion in Jon S. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services, [21] and an opinion from the Minnesota Court of Appeals, In re Welfare of M.S.S. [22] We recently rejected this argument in David S. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services, [23] holding that ordinarily the question of whether a placement decision complies with ICWA's placement preferences will not be germane to the elements of termination because nothing in ICWA requires a consideration of the ICWA placement preferences in the decision whether to terminate parental rights. [24] We observed that the statutory scheme of ICWA supports this interpretation. [25] Section 1912(d) provides that any party seeking foster care placement or termination of parental rights regarding an Indian child shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful. [26] Section 1914 then provides that certain parties, including the parent, may challenge foster care placement or termination of parental rights by showing the action violated any provision of sections 1911, 1912, and 1913 of ICWA. [27] Absent from this list is section 1915, which provides that in any proceeding for adoption, foster care, or preadoptive placement, preference must be given to placing the child with a relative, another member of the child's tribe, or another Indian family, unless there is good cause to deviate from these preferences. [28] Under this statutory scheme, termination of parental rights may not be invalidated by showing a violation of ICWA preferences. [29] We recognize that the placement preferences under section 1915 are critical to ICWA's goal of promoting the stability and security of Indian tribes and families. Section 1915 has been described by the Supreme Court as the most important substantive requirement imposed on state courts under ICWA. [30] But as we held in David S., the issue of placement is generally distinct from the issue of providing remedial and rehabilitative services to reunify the child's family and prevent the termination of parental rights. In David S. we also recognize[d] the possibility that rare cases may exist in which OCS's early placement decisions may directly impact the ability of parents to fulfill the requirements of their case plans and thus may be part of OCS's active efforts `designed to prevent the break up of the Indian family,' observing that a child's placement might affect a parent's ability to participate in remedial efforts. [31] The dissent hinges its conclusion on this premise, arguing that this is exactly the kind of case in which OCS's placement efforts are relevant and OCS's independent duty to investigate ICWA-compliant placements overlays and at least informs, if not directs, its duty to make active efforts designed to prevent the breakup of an Indian family. The dissent explains that earlier holdings of this court indicated that incarceration alone could not constitute abandonment because it does not involve willful conduct; however, this holding was later overturned by the legislature, which determined that incarceration could constitute abandonment if certain factors are met, including that the incarcerated parent has failed to make adequate provisions for care of the child during the period of incarceration.... [32] The dissent then challenges the superior court's finding in this case that on a `clear and convincing' basis ... Josh had not `made adequate arrangements' for Eva in light of his unavailability because Josh contended that he `attempted to reach out to family members for assistance' in making adequate arrangements for Eva[, but] OCS failed to make active efforts to assist him. The dissent concludes that it is OCS's failure that led to Eva's continued status as a child in need of aid, not Josh's actions, because OCS has an active-efforts duty to consider, evaluate, and take action on an incarcerated parent's request for alternative placement under ICWA's standards. We disagree. As we identified in David S., there may be cases where a child's placement might affect a parent's ability to participate in remedial efforts, but these cases are rare and this is not such a case. [33] Given Josh's long-term incarceration, Eva's placement with one of his relatives would not have affected his ability to participate in remedial efforts or fulfill his case plan requirements. In October 2008, OCS developed a case plan for Josh; his objectives included completing assessments for mental health, anger management, and substance abuse, attending counseling to understand Eva's special needs, and engaging in Eva's therapy when she was ready. In November 2008, OCS filed a predisposition report, where the social worker proposed arranging calls through Josh's attorney. Additionally, Josh stipulated in January 2009 that there was good cause to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences and allow Eva to remain in her therapeutic foster home in Anchorage because of her special needs. By February 2009, the social worker had not heard from Josh, but was continuing to attempt to contact him. By the time of the October 2009 permanency hearing, the court found that Josh had still not made substantial progress to remedy his conduct. During this time period, Eva's placement with one of Josh's relatives would not have affected Josh's ability to work on his case plan objectives, such as obtaining an anger management or mental health assessment or attending parenting classes and engaging in Eva's therapy. Josh did not begin interacting with Eva until after this October 2009 hearing, and he did not submit his sisters as possible placements until October 2009. Moreover, according to his social worker, OCS had looked into placement with Josh's parents during this time, but they had concerns about their ability to meet Eva's special needs. Finally, Josh did nothing more than suggest placement with his sisters, without specifying a particular placement, and OCS found them all to be unsuitable as placements because they were known to have sex offenders in the home.... Thus, it was Josh's lack of action, not OCS's failure to investigate Josh's preferred placements, that led to Eva's continued status as a child in need of aid during this time. Under these circumstances, OCS was not required to actively pursue placement with Josh's relatives as part of its active efforts to prevent the termination of Josh's parental rights. [34]