Opinion ID: 423909
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gelb Issue

Text: 8 Section 1102 of the Explosive Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 844 (1976) (Act), 2 makes it unlawful to maliciously damage or destroy a commercial premises by means of an explosive. Explosive is defined in the penal section of the Act to include: 9 [G]unpowders, powders used for blasting, all forms of high explosives, blasting materials, fuzes (other than electric circuit breakers), detonators, and other detonating agents, smokeless powders, other explosive or incendiary devices within the meaning of paragraph (5) of section 232 of this title, and any chemical compounds, mechanical mixture, or device that contains any oxidizing and combustible units, or other ingredients, in such proportions, quantities, or packing that ignition by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of the compound, mixture, or device or any part thereof may cause an explosion. 10 18 U.S.C. § 844(j) (1976) (emphasis added). An explosive is further defined as: 11 (5) The term explosive or incendiary device means (A) dynamite and all other forms of high explosives, (B) any explosive bomb, grenade, missile, or similar device, and (C) any incendiary bomb or grenade, fire bomb, or similar device, including any device which (i) consists of or includes a breakable container including a flammable liquid or compound, and a wick composed of any material which, when ignited, is capable of igniting such flammable liquid or compound, and (ii) can be carried or thrown by one individual acting alone. 12 18 U.S.C. § 232(5) (1976). Appellants claim that the substance used to set fire to the Kings Villa Diner--uncontained gasoline--is not an explosive within the meaning of the Act and cite as support for that proposition our recent decision in United States v. Gelb, 700 F.2d 875 (2d Cir.1983), which was decided after these convictions. 13 In Gelb, we decided that arson committed by use of uncontained gasoline is not punishable under the Explosive Control Act. We observed that the Act was intended to accomplish an important, albeit limited, purpose:The legislative history of the Act speaks of the dangers posed by subversive groups in the society. The perceived threat lay not so much in ideology or political objective, but rather focused on the alarming trend during the late 1960s when selective bombing emerged as a frequent vehicle for extreme social and political protest. 14 700 F.2d at 878. Accordingly, we reversed the judgment of conviction on the explosives counts, holding that uncontained gasoline was not an explosive within the meaning of section 844(j) because the legislative history of the Act: 15 strongly supports the view that the Act was envisaged as anti-bombing, not anti-arson, legislation. We find nothing in the language or legislative history of the Act to challenge this conclusion. Moreover, responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of crimes involving common law arson has traditionally been left to the states, and we are reminded that: [U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349, 92 S.Ct. 515, 523, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). 16 Id. at 878-79. 17 The government seeks to distinguish Gelb on the ground that proof at trial showed that an explosion actually occurred during the Kings Villa blaze. The government misunderstands our holding in Gelb; the fact that an explosion occurred is not determinative under the Act. The important question is whether an explosive, as defined by the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 844(j) (1976), has been used in the commission of the allegedly criminal act. The evidence is uncontroverted that the blaze at Kings Villa was caused by use of uncontained gasoline--a typical arson. Since there are no persuasive reasons for distinguishing this case from Gelb, the convictions obtained under the Explosive Control Act--Counts II and V in the indictment--are reversed. 18 Appellants urge that the conspiracy count must also fall in light of our decision in Gelb. We have consistently held, however, that if one criminal object of the conspiracy is proved by clear and convincing evidence, the conspiracy conviction will be upheld on appeal even if additional criminal objects of the conspiracy are reversed. See, e.g., United States v. Mowad, 641 F.2d 1067, 1073-74 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 817, 102 S.Ct. 94, 70 L.Ed.2d 86 (1981); United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1401-02 (2d Cir.1976). In this case, one object of the alleged conspiracy--mail fraud--was proved by clear and convincing evidence and accordingly we affirm the conspiracy conviction. 19 Appellants acknowledge the Mowad/Dixon precedent, but urge that since the explosives charge was the more serious crime, we should remand to the district court for reconsideration of their sentences. While in a different case remand might be appropriate, we will not do so here. The fact that uncontained gasoline is not an explosive for purposes of the Explosive Control Act does not detract from the serious nature of appellants' acts. The evidence remains clear and convincing that appellants conspired with Chrisanthou and Kynegos to burn the Great Neck Kings Villa with the intent to defraud their insurer. We see no justification for a remand for resentencing. 20 Because the conspiracy and mail fraud counts are based in part on evidence admitted by the district court and challenged on appeal, we proceed to consider appellants' remaining claims.