Opinion ID: 1159122
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: cambria

Text: Like the defendant in World-Wide Volkswagon, Cambria carries on no activity whatsoever in Idaho. It closes no sales and performs no services here. It avails itself of none of the privileges or benefits of Idaho law. It solicits no business here through advertising or otherwise. It does not attempt to sell helicopters here nor did it sell a helicopter to an Idaho resident. The record establishes that Cambria sold the helicopter in question not to decedent's employer, but to Limerick Aviation, another Pennsylvania corporation, which then in turn sold it to decedent's employer. Under the rule set forth in World-Wide Volkswagon, we cannot predicate jurisdiction on the fortuitous circumstance that a helicopter sold by a Pennsylvania corporation to a second Pennsylvania corporation would be later purchased by an Idaho corporation and ultimately kill an Idaho resident. In fact, there are fewer reasons compelling in personam jurisdiction as to Cambria than were present in World-Wide Volkswagon. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Cambria was even in the business of selling helicopters or otherwise engaged in the helicopter market unlike the wholesaler and retailer involved in World-Wide Volkswagon. Plaintiff argues that it was foreseeable that Cambria would be haled into an Idaho court. The Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagon stated as to foreseeability that: It is argued, however, that because an automobile is mobile by its very design and purpose it was `foreseeable' that the Robinsons' Audi would cause injury in Oklahoma. Yet `foreseeability' alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. ... . This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. But the foreseeability that is critical to the due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there... . The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the `orderly administration of the laws,' .. . gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit. 444 U.S. at 295, 297, 100 S.Ct. at 566-67. Cambria could not have reasonably anticipated being haled into an Idaho court. Cambria conducted no activities here and did not even conduct business with an Idaho corporation or resident. It could not have structured its activities in any different manner as to render itself immune from suit in Idaho. If this Court were to permit jurisdiction over Cambria merely because it, at one time, owned and sold the helicopter in question we would be finding that [e]very seller of chattels ... appoint[s] the chattel his agent for service of process. His amenability to suit... travel[s] with the chattel. Id. at 296, 100 S.Ct. at 566. The mere fact that a helicopter is by definition mobile and could foreseeably enter any state in the union is insufficient to award a state jurisdiction over the seller thereof. This type of rule was rejected by the Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagon and we will not adopt it in this case. Based on the foregoing analysis, we hold that Cambria did not maintain the minimum contacts with the State of Idaho necessary for our courts to exercise jurisdiction over it consistent with due process principles.