Opinion ID: 411938
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Definition of drug paraphernalia

Text: 20 M.C.A. Sec. 45-10-101 defines drug paraphernalia as any item used, intended for use, or designed for use in several activities related to the production or consumption of drugs. Appellant claims that this standard would allow a merchant's conviction based upon the transferred intent of a manufacturer or purchaser. Appellant also claims that the imprecise definition of drug paraphernalia admits of arbitrary enforcement against those stores or merchants that a community dislikes merely because of differing lifestyles. 21 The Supreme Court in Flipside specifically held that the language of the Hoffman Estates ordinance, requiring the licensing of any goods designed for use or marketed for use with drugs was not impermissible. The court found that the designed for use standard referred to objective criteria of an item that made it principally used with illegal drugs and thus there was no danger of a finding of guilt by transferred intent. The court also found that the marketed for use standard was clear because it relied upon the retailer's intent and actions in selling the item. The ordinance, so construed, gives adequate notice of that which it prohibits. 22 We first overcome the appellant's objections to our reliance upon Flipside. Even though the ordinance in Flipside may properly be characterized as an economic regulation, the Supreme Court undertook a more rigorous analysis than this fact alone would indicate. The Court explained that: 23 [T]he village concedes that the ordinance is quasi-criminal, and its prohibitory and stigmatizing effect may warrant a relatively strict test. Flipside's facial challenge fails because, under the test appropriate to either a quasi-criminal or a criminal law, the ordinance is sufficiently clear as applied to Flipside. 24 Flipside, 102 S.Ct. at 1194 (footnote omitted). Moreover, the Flipside ordinance and the criminal statute in the instant action regulate business activity of the same nature. The Court recognized that, businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action. Id. at 1193. 25 We feel free, in light of the strictness of the Supreme Court's analysis, to apply its interpretation of designed for use to the Montana Act. We are somewhat troubled, however, by the Act's use of the phrase intended for use rather than marketed for use, the language of the Hoffman Estates ordinance. The intended for use terminology less obviously refers to the acts of the defendant-merchant. Rather, it may permit some ambiguity in that it could refer to the intent of the manufacturer or of the purchaser. Flipside suggests that intended for use is a broader standard than marketed for use. The Court, referring to the latter standard, states, [t]he standard requires scienter, since a retailer could scarcely 'market' items 'for' a particular use without intending that use. Flipside, 102 S.Ct. at 1195. 26 The Seventh Circuit, in Record Head Corp. v. Sachen, 682 F.2d 672 (7th Cir.1982), was persuaded that the intended for use language, when combined with factors similar to those in M.C.A. Sec. 45-10-102 and absent any explicit state of mind requirement, is impermissibly vague. The ordinance in the Record Head case focuses on drug paraphernalia and minors and is not modeled closely after the MDPA. The Seventh Circuit, in another post-Flipside case, upheld a MDPA-style statute. Levas & Levas v. Village of Antioch, Illinois, et al., 684 F.2d 446 (7th Cir.1982). In Levas, the Seventh Circuit adopted the district court's construction of the definition of drug paraphernalia as an inartful, yet legitimate attempt to assign the appropriate scienter requirement to each type of offender. Thus, to be subject to prosecution, the user merely is required to possess an item used to produce or consume drugs (use), a manufacturer must design an item that objectively is for use with drugs (designed for use), and the retailer or distributor must sell or market an item with the intent that it be used with drugs (intended for use). Under this reading, there is no problem of transferred intent; that is, an innocent retailer may not be convicted for the state of mind of a manufacturer or a purchaser. This interpretation, with which we concur, minimizes the risk of arbitrary enforcement or of inadequate notice. The intent referred to in M.C.A. Sec. 45-10-101 is that of the person who has control of the prohibited drug paraphernalia. 27 The broad language of M.C.A. Sec. 45-10-101 does not disturb us because there are so many forms of drug paraphernalia. A definition which casts a wide net is necessary to accomplish the objectives of the Act. All that we must find to sustain the facial constitutionality of the Act is a single clear application of the Act to the appellant. In this case, the sale of a roach clip, an item specified in M.C.A. Sec. 45-10-101 and sold by appellant falls within the core conduct prohibited by the Act and obviates any facial vagueness challenge. 4 28 Thus, Amicus California Progressive Business Association's claim that the seller of a garden hose is subject to liability because the hose could be used to water a garden of marijuana plants not only contradicts our interpretation of the Act, but is legally irrelevant under the standard for facial vagueness review established by the Supreme Court in Flipside.