Opinion ID: 3049421
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Qualified Immunity for the Arrest

Text: [6] We must also determine, however, whether the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity for the arrest. As the Supreme Court explained in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims unless (1) their alleged conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) that right was clearly established. Id. at 201-02. In determining whether a right was clearly established, we do not consider the right as a “general proposition.” Id. at 201. Rather, “[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry . . . is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202. [7] Here, the Officers violated Edgerly’s constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment by arresting him without probable cause. The qualified immunity analysis therefore distills down to a single particularized inquiry: whether “a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed [for the] arrest” under the circumstances. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991). If so, the arresting officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Conversely, if a “reasonable officer could [not] have believed [the arrest] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officers possessed,” then the arresting officers are not entitled to immunity. Id. at 227 (final alteration in original). [8] We conclude that the Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity. At the time of the arrest, it was clear under established California law that Edgerly’s brief and otherwise unremarkable presence within the Cooperative’s gated, outside area did not violate any criminal statute. See id. at 22728. First, as we explained above with regard to then-section 602(l), it was clearly established well before Edgerly’s arrest that a person committed a trespass under that section only if 8630 EDGERLY v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO he or she had the specific intent to permanently dispossess the lawful owner of the property. Given Edgerly’s unremarkable presence on Cooperative property for a matter of minutes, no reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Edgerly under section 602(l). Similarly, no reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Edgerly under section 647(h), in light of its express specific intent requirement. As we explained above, a person violates section 647(h) only if he or she lingers on private property for the purpose of committing a crime. Here, Edgerly was simply standing at the Cooperative’s playground area for about five minutes, and the Officers had no additional information that Edgerly specifically intended to commit a crime at that time. Nor could a reasonable officer have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Edgerly under the applicable version of section 602.5, since none of the facts known to the Officers suggested that Edgerly had entered or was about to enter any of the Cooperative’s dwelling units. As we explained above, and the California courts had emphasized prior to Edgerly’s arrest, the section applied by its express terms only to actual places of habitation—dwelling houses or apartments—not playground areas. Finally, even assuming a reasonable officer could have believed that Edgerly had violated section 602.8(a), a reasonable officer could not have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Edgerly for the violation. As we explained in Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, “in evaluating a custodial arrest . . . federal courts must determine the reasonableness of the arrest in reference to state law governing the arrest.” 341 F.3d at 950 (alteration omitted). Thus, because California law “prohibits arresting someone solely for being an unlicensed driver,” we concluded in Bingham that “[a]rresting Bingham solely on that basis clearly is not an action that a reasonable officer could have believed lawful.” EDGERLY v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 8631 Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, too, no reasonable officer could have believed that it was lawful to place Edgerly under custodial arrest solely on the basis of section 602.8(a). As we explained above, California law prohibits custodial arrests for a first offense under the circumstances of the instant case. [9] In sum, we conclude that the Officers lacked probable cause to arrest Edgerly for any offense and, because no reasonable officer could have believed otherwise, that they are not entitled to qualified immunity for the arrest. We therefore reverse and remand for the district court to enter judgment in favor of Edgerly on the issues of probable cause and qualified immunity for the arrest, and for further proceedings on the issue of damages.