Opinion ID: 592092
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 7 We agree with the decision of the district court because we find the facts in the instant case indistinguishable from those in Strachan v. Union Oil Co. 3 Strachan involved employees who had been charged by company officials with clear violations of the CBA; had been temporarily suspended under the terms of the CBA; had been reinstated soon after the investigation; had not filed grievances under the CBA; and had later filed state law causes of action arising from the actions of the company. In Strachan, we affirmed the summary judgment of the district court, holding that when the charged violations are clearly within the terms of the CBA and no grievance had been filed, the state law claims are preempted by the LMRA. 8 One of the assertions of the plaintiffs, in Strachan as in the instant case, was that the suspension and investigation procedure of the defendant employer had defamed them by virtue of other employees' learning of the investigations. In Strachan we stated: To hold [a] company guilty of defamation for making such inquiries, even though they become known in the plant, would simply mean that the company could never undertake to investigate a possible disciplinary situation in routine and proper ways.... 4 The only fact that is different in Bagby's case is that he was escorted out of the plant by a security guard. Alone, the mere escorting of suspended workers out of the plant is not defamatory or indicative of malice. Here, there is no summary judgment evidence of unjustified or aggravating circumstances, such as handcuffing, drawing weapons, forcible ejection, or other factors that might elevate simple escorting to the level of defamation or malice. 9 In the instant case, Bagby asserts, as did the plaintiffs in Strachan, that the acts of management in causing Bagby to be suspended and to be escorted from the plant were acts of malice. But here, as in Strachan, [a] careful review of [the] depositions which were before the court reveals not the slightest hint of malice with respect to ... appellant. 5 10 Bagby also argues that summary judgment was improper because his pleadings set forth a series of acts towards Plaintiff of an outrageous nature [and] a finding of malice can and does involve a consideration of the totality of the relevant circumstances. In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 6 however, the Supreme Court stated that unsupported allegations in pleadings are insufficient to prevent the grant of summary judgment. In the instant case, discovery had closed and there was nothing outside of the four corners of Bagby's pleadings to substantiate his allegation of GM's malice. Thus, it was not error for the district court to grant GM's motion for summary judgment. 11 Bagby does not cite the Strachan decision, asserting instead that the analysis controlling the instant case is to be found in cases such as Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc. 7 Our analysis in Jones is inapplicable in the instant case. In Jones, we held that in light of the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 8 the adjudication of a claim for wrongful discharge under Texas law does not require an interpretation of the CBA and thus is not preempted by the LMRA. 9 Bagby, however, like the plaintiffs in Strachan, asserts that acts unquestionably taken in accordance with provisions of the CBA were nonetheless tortious. These claims will obviously require an interpretation of the CBA. Thus, the Lingle and Jones analyses cannot be invoked to bar summary judgment in this case.