Opinion ID: 2325676
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the denial of valentine's motion to acquit

Text: On appeal, Valentine does not argue that the evidence presented by the State at trial was insufficient to allow a jury to conclude that it was Valentine's conduct which caused Tripp's death. Rather, Valentine relies upon expert medical testimony offered by the defense to contend that his motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted as a jury could not, as a matter of law, have found rationally the existence of the requisite culpable mental state. At trial a psychiatrist and two psychologists testified on Valentine's behalf. Their testimony related to Valentine's mental condition at the time he killed Tripp and the effect that condition had upon his conduct. Much of the medical testimony attempted to prove Valentine's inability to recognize the nature and consequences of his acts and his inability to control his behavior. One witness testified that Valentine's mental state and conduct resulting therefrom was similar to that of a man who spends all his money on a Christmas present for his child, becomes frustrated at his inability to assemble it and smashes the present. Such a person, he suggested, appreciates the significance of what he has done only after the fact. At the time of Valentine's trial 17-A M.R.S.A. § 58(1-A) (Supp.1980) provided [i]n a prosecution for a crime which may be committed intentionally, knowingly or recklessly, where such culpable state of mind is a necessary element, the existence of a reasonable doubt as to such state of mind may be established by evidence of an abnormal condition of mind. [2] Valentine contends that the expert medical testimony he offered at trial established a reasonable doubt that he intentionally or knowingly killed Tripp and, therefore, that the trial court was required to grant his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the murder charge. The defendant misapprehends both the specific functions of the two stage procedure of a bifurcated trial and the nature and effect of the medical testimony which he produced at trial. Stage one of a bifurcated trial determines only the issue of guilt or innocence. It is only after the fact-finder determines guilt that the issue of the insanity defense will arise in stage two of the proceedings. Lack of criminal responsibility resulting from mental disease or defect is not an issue in stage one of a bifurcated trial, and, indeed, our statutory framework precludes the admission of evidence on that issue in stage one of the proceedings. Evidence of an abnormal state of mind may be admissible in stage one of the proceeding when a culpable state of mind is an element of the crime charged. See State v. Mishne, Me., 427 A.2d 450, 454 (1981); State v. Sommer, Me., 409 A.2d 666, 668-70 (1979); State v. Burnham, Me., 406 A.2d 889, 894 (1978). To be admissible in stage one of a bifurcated trial, however, the evidence must be relevant to culpability. [E]vidence that a defendant may have been suffering from mental or emotional difficulties does not necessarily suggest that defendant's conduct was not intentional or knowing, as those terms are defined in the criminal code. Mishne, 427 A.2d at 454, citing Sommer, 409 A.2d 666. In the present case, little of the expert testimony was probative on the issue of guilt  the only issue in stage one of the trial. Much of the psychiatric testimony was to the effect that Valentine may have lacked the ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts or to control them. Although that evidence may be relevant as to criminal responsibility (stage two), the issue of the sufficiency of Valentine's insanity defense is not now before us. The medical evidence offered by Valentine certainly would not preclude the jury from rationally determining, in stage one of the trial, that Valentine acted with a culpable state of mind, viz., that he intentionally or knowingly caused Tripp's death. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 201 (Supp.1980). Accordingly, we conclude the Superior Court correctly refused to acquit Valentine of either murder or manslaughter. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 11(3) (Supp.1980). [3]