Opinion ID: 853689
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Heading: Legislative Power to Create and Abolish Courts

Text: Public Law No. 18-1995 is a statute purporting to abolish a court. Judge Monfort contends that if the Act is allowed to stand, it would violate Article III, § 1 of the Indiana Constitution, which provides for the separation of powers among the three branches of government. The State responds that the statute does not violate the separation of powers provision of the Indiana Constitution because under Article VII, § 1, the power to create courtsand implicitly the power to abolish themis a legislative function, not a judicial one. In construing the Indiana Constitution, we look to the language of the text in the context of the history surrounding its drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of our constitution, and case law interpreting the specific provisions. Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921, 929 (Ind.1998) (quoting Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ind.1996)).
The judicial power of the state is vested in the judicial branch by Article VII, § 1 of our current Constitution. This provision has been in the Indiana Constitution since its adoption in 1851 and was also found in the original Constitution of 1816. [2] The first line of inquiry in any constitutional case is the text of the constitution itself. Ajabu, 693 N.E.2d at 929. Article VII, § 1 states: The judicial power of the State shall be vested in one Supreme Court, one Court of Appeals, Circuit Courts, and such other courts as the General Assembly may establish. This Court has long held that this provision means what it says. See, e.g., Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 326, 328 (1855). It is beyond dispute that the Constitution gives the legislature the power to create superior courts. Included in the power to create is the power to abolish. See State ex rel. Yancey v. Hyde, 129 Ind. 296, 302, 28 N.E. 186, 188 (1891) (The power that creates can destroy.); Mullen v. State, 34 Ind. 540, 543 (1870) (upholding act repealing Jefferson Criminal Circuit Court because the act is not liable to any objection which would not with equal force apply to the act creating the court.). This power is limited by the text of the Constitution, with the result that the legislature cannot entirely abolish the courts whose existence is constitutionally mandated. [3] With that exception, we believe that Article VII, § 1 confers upon the legislature the power both to create and to abolish courts.
Reference to the history surrounding the drafting and ratification of the Constitution seems unnecessary in view of the clarity of the language of Article VII, § 1. In any event, if there were any doubt, the debates confirm that the issue of the legislature's power to create and destroy courts was specifically considered by the framers of the 1851 Constitution, and the conscious decision was made to give that authority to the General Assembly. Judge Borden, a Delegate for Allen, Adams, and Wells counties, expressed his concern that the proposed section, which later became Article VII, § 1, leaves the power in the General Assembly, to create and abolish Courts of Justice, at their pleasure. 2 Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the State of Indiana 1807 (Indiana Historical Collections Reprint, 1935). He further argued: [T]here should be three great departments of the government[.] I hope that this Convention will endeavor, as far as it possibly can, to make each department independent of the other two.... [I]n order to secure this, several things are necessary. In the first place, ... no new Court should ever be created, or old one abolished, by the legislative department of the government; and in the next place, sir, the judiciary should not owe its existence to either of the other two departments of the government.... If the report of the committee on the organization of Courts of Justice is adopted, the General Assembly will be empowered to create and abolish at their pleasure, such inferior Courts as they may deem proper.... [T]he greatest objection to investing the legislative department with the power to create courts is, that if they can create them, they must necessarily have the power to abolish them; and thus the power is placed in two of the departments of the government to legislate the third out of office. Id. at 1807-08. Despite Judge Borden's concerns, the convention passed Article VII, § 1 as proposed. In view of this history, it is clear that the language was intended to confer on the legislature the power to create and abolish courts.
Although the text and constitutional debates both support legislative power to abolish courts, that power is not without limitation. Constitutional provisions must be examined within the structure and purpose of the Constitution as a whole, and not in isolation. See Welsh v. Sells, 244 Ind. 423, 451, 193 N.E.2d 359, 361 (1963) (The Constitution has to be read as a whole and not as a part.); Beavers v. State, 236 Ind. 549, 557, 141 N.E.2d 118, 122 (1957) (If possible, the provisions of the constitution must be construed together, and not so as to create a conflict.). Judge Monfort argued, and the trial court agreed, that the separation of powers doctrine prohibits the legislature from abolishing Jasper Superior No. 2 altogether. The separation of powers provision of the Indiana Constitution, Article III, § 1, states, The powers of Government are divided into three separate departments; the Legislative, the Executive including the Administrative, and the Judicial; and no person, charged with official duties under one of these departments, shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in this Constitution expressly provided. The importance of this provision was elaborated in Book v. State Office Building Commission, 238 Ind. 120, 149 N.E.2d 273 (1958). Article 3, § 1, of the Constitution of Indiana is the keystone of our form of government and to maintain the division of powers as provided therein, its provisions will be strictly construed. Id. at 159, 149 N.E.2d at 293. The true interpretation of this [separation of powers] is, that any one department of the government may not be controlled or even embarrassed by another department, unless so ordained in the Constitution. In re Judicial Interpretation of 1975 Senate Enrolled Act No. 441, 263 Ind. 350, 352, 332 N.E.2d 97, 98 (1975) (quoting State v. Shumaker, 200 Ind. 716, 721, 164 N.E. 408, 409 (1928)). The separation of powers doctrine recognizes that each branch of the government has specific duties and powers that may not be usurped or infringed upon by the other branches of government. The judiciary is one of the three co-equal branches of government and its independence is essential to an effective running of the government. See Board of Comm'rs v. Stout, 136 Ind. 53, 58-59, 35 N.E. 683, 685 (1893) (Courts are an integral part of the government, and entirely independent; deriving their powers directly from the constitution, in so far as such powers are not inherent in the very nature of the judiciary.). In particular, it has been held in a variety of contexts that the legislature cannot interfere with the discharge of judicial duties, or attempt to control judicial functions, or otherwise dictate how the judiciary conducts its order of business. See In re Senate Act No. 441, 263 Ind. at 353, 332 N.E.2d at 98 (legislation prescribing qualifications for county judges is unconstitutional); Thorpe v. King, 248 Ind. 283, 287, 227 N.E.2d 169, 171 (1967) (legislature cannot set aside final judgment of a court); Noble County Council v. State ex rel. Fifer, 234 Ind. 172, 180, 125 N.E.2d 709, 713 (1955) (court has inherent authority to appoint and require payment of such personnel as the functions of the court may require); State ex rel. Kostas v. Johnson, 224 Ind. 540, 550, 69 N.E.2d 592, 596 (1946) (statute limiting time in which a court must rule on an issue is unconstitutional); Gray v. McLaughlin, 191 Ind. 190, 193, 131 N.E. 518, 519 (1921) (legislation attempting to set standards for briefs filed in Supreme Court is void); Roberts v. Donahoe, 191 Ind. 98, 104, 131 N.E. 33, 35 (1921) (same); Solimeto v. State, 188 Ind. 170, 171-72, 122 N.E. 578, 578 (1919) (same); Parkison v. Thompson, 164 Ind. 609, 626, 73 N.E. 109, 115 (1905) (legislature cannot dictate the manner and mode in which the courts shall discharge their judicial duties); State ex rel. Hovey v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350, 371, 21 N.E. 244, 252 (1889) (legislature cannot appoint ministers and assistants for the court). These principles apply equally to superior courts once they are created, even though there is no constitutional requirement that they be established in the first place. See Kostas, 224 Ind. at 550-51, 69 N.E.2d at 596 (Although the Superior Court of Marion County is not identified in the Constitution, that does not mean that it acquires its judicial power from the legislature. The legislature, under the Constitution, may create other courts than those named in the Constitution. But the Constitution alone bestows judicial power and all judicial power comes from the Constitution and is vested by it in courts and judges who can no more be interfered with by the legislature than a court or judge created by the Constitution itself.). [T]he courts possess the entire body of the intrinsic judicial power of the State, and ... the other departments are prohibited from assuming to exercise any part of that judicial power. Id. at 546, 69 N.E.2d at 594 (quoting Noble, 118 Ind. at 354, 21 N.E. at 246). Notwithstanding the general prohibition against interference by one branch in the functions allotted to another, some powers that arguably constitute that interference are expressly conferred by the Constitution. If so, the specific grant is, to use the phrase from In re Senate Act 441, 263 Ind. at 352, 332 N.E.2d at 98, ordained in the Constitution and is a constitutional exercise of power. Article VII, § 1 is an example of this. In view of the explicit language of this section, we conclude that the power to create and abolish courts is among the powers given to the legislative branch. The question remains whether Public Law 18-1995 nonetheless unconstitutionally interfered with the judiciary when it attempted to abolish Jasper Superior Court No. 2 in the middle of Judge Monfort's term. [4] We hold today that the legislature has the power to create and abolish superior courts, and indeed, within the limits of the Constitution, circuit courts as well. But, to do so in the middle of a judge's term violates the separation of powers provision of the Indiana Constitution. In order to preserve the very foundation on which our government was established, it is necessary to have absolute integrity and freedom of action of courts. Board of Comm'rs v. Albright, 168 Ind. 564, 578, 81 N.E. 578, 582-83 (1907) (quoting Stout, 136 Ind. at 59, 35 N.E. at 685). A court of general jurisdiction, whether named in the Constitution or established in pursuance of the provisions of the Constitution, cannot be directed, controlled, or impeded in its functions by any of the other departments of the government. Id. If the legislature can remove a sitting judge, it has the power to direct, control, or impede the judiciary by the threat of removing judges who make unpopular decisions, or by delivering on that threat. The resulting intimidation and potential disruption of courts entertaining issues that may be unpopular in legislative circles constitutes an impermissible intrusion into an independent judiciary. The separation of powers provision exists not only to protect the integrity of each branch of government, but also to permit each branch to serve as an effective check on the other two. Indeed, Black's Law Dictionary defines separation of powers as the constitutional doctrine of checks and balances by which the people are protected against tyranny. Black's Law Dictionary 1369-70 (7th ed.1999). See Book, 238 Ind. at 161, 149 N.E.2d at 294 ([T]he powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the others.) (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia). The concept of an independent judiciary lies at the bedrock of the separation of powers doctrine that shapes our form of government. It was one of the central principles underlying the thinking of the framers of the Indiana Constitution and also the Constitution of the United States. As Alexander Hamilton put it in the Federalist Papers: The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the Legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing. .... [T]he courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution, against Legislative encroachments.... This independence of the Judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals, from the effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjectures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the Government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.... But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only, that the independence of the Judges may be an essential safe-guard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the society. These sometimes extend no further than to the injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial laws. Here also the firmness of the Judicial magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating the severity and confining the operation of such laws. It not only serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it operates as a check upon the Legislative body in passing them; who, perceiving the obstacles to the success of an iniquitous intention are to be expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner compelled by the very motives of the injustice they mediate, to qualify their attempts. The Federalist No. 78, at 426, 428-29 (E.H. Scott ed., 1894) The same considerations undergird our state Constitution. We have long taken the view that: Our courts are the bulwark, the final authority which guarantees to every individual his right to breathe free, to prosper and be secure within the framework of a constitutional government. The arm which holds the scales of justice cannot be shackled or made impotent by either restraint, circumvention or denial by another branch of that government. State ex rel. Fifer, 234 Ind. at 181-82, 125 N.E.2d at 714. In sum, the legislature, as a co-equal branch of government, cannot be allowed to shackle the judiciary by, at its whim, removing judges from office during their term. This statute cannot stand as written in the face of Article III, § 1 of our Constitution.
The sparse case law addressing the role of the legislature in abolishing courts and judgeships in midterm points in the same direction. In State ex rel. Gibson v. Friedley, 135 Ind. 119, 129, 34 N.E. 872, 875 (1893), this Court addressed the constitutionality of an act abolishing a circuit court. There, we held that the act was unconstitutional because it infringed upon the judge's constitutional right to a six-year term as stated in Article VII, § 7 (formerly Rev. Stat. 1881, § 169). However, this Court also stated: To construe this section to mean that the Legislature can, at its own will, abolish the circuit, and thus legislate the judge ... out of office, in addition to being in direct conflict with the other provisions of our organic law, would also put the official life of every judge ... of the State at the mercy of the Legislature. It would subject the judiciary to the legislative power, and utterly destroy all judicial independence. Judges... would be at the whim or caprice of the Senators and Representatives in their tenure of office.... If the Legislature, by a special act, may remove one judge ..., it may remove any and all such officials in the State, and hence they would be at the mercy of any Legislature whose enmity or ill will they may have incurred. Id. at 128-29, 34 N.E. at 875. This reasoning applies equally to superior courts even though their judges' terms are not specified in the Constitution. If the legislature is allowed to remove a superior court judge in mid-term, it presents the same potential for abuse as the removal of a circuit court judge. The Indiana Court of Appeals addressed related issues in Corn v. City of Oakland City, 415 N.E.2d 129 (Ind.Ct.App.1981). In that case, the city council's attempt to abolish a city court at the end of the judge's term was upheld. In the accompanying discussion, the court acknowledged that the legislature cannot deprive a judge of his office before the expiration of his term by abolishing his office or the court served by the judge. Id. at 132. The court went on to note that this rule was established in cases involving constitutional courts, the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the circuit courts, and it suggested that the rule did not apply to a city court or judgeship because they are not constitutional offices. In Corn, any contention based on separation of powers was waived. Id. at 134. However, there is authority for the proposition that the separation of powers doctrine applies only to state government and its officers, not municipal or local governments. See Sarlls v. State ex rel. Trimble, 201 Ind. 88, 115, 166 N.E. 270, 280 (1929). Under this view the result stated in this dicta in Corn was correct, even if the rationale was not. As already explained, superior courts, as courts of general jurisdiction, enjoy the same immunity as circuit courts from interference that violates the separation of powers. In any event, in Corn, the city judge's court was abolished after his term expired and the issue presented in this case was not presented there. In sum, although Article VII, § 1 of the Indiana Constitution gives the legislature the power to create and abolish courts, that power is limited by Article III, § 1, which provides for the separation of powers among the three branches of Indiana government. Any attempt by the legislature to abolish a superior court in the middle of a judge's term interferes with the judicial power of the courts and is therefore unconstitutional. P.L. 18-1995 cannot stand as written.