Opinion ID: 2637028
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: It Was Error To Grant the Trust's Motion To Enforce the Settlement Agreement Without Conducting an Evidentiary Hearing.

Text: Whether it was error to grant the Gordon Family Trust's motion to enforce the settlement agreement without conducting an evidentiary hearing depends in part on our interpretation of the Alaska Historic Preservation Act. [6] The legislature enacted the AHPA in 1971 [7] to preserve and protect the historic, prehistoric, and archaeological resources of Alaska from loss, desecration, and destruction so that the scientific, historic, and cultural heritage embodied in these resources may pass undiminished to future generations. [8] To that end, AS 41.35.020 provides: The state reserves to itself title to all historic, prehistoric, and archeological resources situated on land owned or controlled by the state, including tideland and submerged land, and reserves to itself the exclusive right of field archeology on state-owned or controlled land. Alaska Statute 41.35.230(2) defines historic, prehistoric and archeological resources to include deposits, structures, ruins, sites, buildings, graves, artifacts, fossils, or other objects of antiquity which provide information pertaining to the historical or prehistorical culture of people in the state as well as to the natural history of the state. Alaska Statute 41.35.200(b) states that [a] person may not possess, sell, buy, or transport within the state, or offer to sell, buy, or transport within the state, historic, prehistoric, or archeological resources taken or acquired in violation of [the AHPA].... (Emphasis added.) Finally, AS 41.35.210 provides that a person who is convicted of violating a provision of the AHPA is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and AS 41.35.220 states that a person who violates a provision of the AHPA is subject to a maximum civil penalty of $100,000 for each violation. When are historic, prehistoric, and archeological resources situated on land owned or controlled by the state for purposes of AS 41.35.020(a)? WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE defines situated as placed as to site or position; located. [9] Thus, under a literal interpretation of the statute, the mere presence, even if temporary, of a historic, prehistoric, or archeological resource on land owned or controlled by the state would be sufficient to vest title to the item in the state, and to trigger the provisions of the AHPA. But where the literal interpretation of a statute would lead to absurd results, courts can interpret the words of the statute to agree with the intention of the legislature. [10] Here, a literal interpretation of the phrase situated on in AS 41.35.020(a) could lead to absurd results. For example, it seems unlikely that the legislature intended that title to personal property that qualifies as a historic, prehistoric, or archeological resource under AS 41.35.230(2) would pass to the state simply because its owner transported the property across state-owned or controlled land, and the property was only temporarily located on state land. We therefore interpret the AHPA to apply only to abandoned historic, prehistoric, or archeological resources situated on land owned or controlled by the state. Indeed, even BREXCO's brief states: BREXCO suspects . . . that when the Alaska Historic Preservation Act was adopted the Alaska legislature intended that the Act be construed in harmony with existing law, including the statutory and common law pertaining to abandoned property and escheat. Abandoned property is property whose owner has manifested an intention to relinquish all title, possession, or claim to the property. [11]
In deciding whether to enforce an alleged settlement agreement without conducting an evidentiary hearing, courts treat the motion to enforce as a summary judgment motion. [12] Thus, the question [on appeal] is whether the evidence presented to the trial court indicated that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that as a matter of law the parties had entered into a valid compromise agreement. [13] A party seeking summary judgment must demonstrate the absence of a genuine material factual dispute and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. [14] In support of its motion to enforce the settlement agreement, the trust submitted the affidavit of Wallace Gordon. In his affidavit, Gordon stated: I purchased most of the items [of mining equipment located on BREVCO's mining claims] and other items were loaned to me. Only a few of the items on the list were found by me and I found them on my own mining claims.  (Emphasis added.) Gordon also attached to his affidavit a handwritten document which listed all of the items and described the source of each item. Because Gordon's affidavit and his attached list indicated that he had found some of the items, [15] the trust did not meet its initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine factual dispute about whether transporting those items would violate the AHPA. As to the other items, Gordon's affidavit and list made out a prima facie showing that they were not subject to the AHPA. Even if a summary judgment movant has made out a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party may avoid summary judgment by producing competent evidence establishing that a genuine factual dispute exists. [16] BREXCO responded to Gordon's affidavit with the affidavit of Naomi Costello. Costello affied: When I first visited [BREVCO's mining operation], Gordon was living in an old cabin. I noticed that there were old mining tools, lanterns, utensils, pots, buckets, an anvil, and other items spread around the yard and leaning against the old cabin. The items were obviously very old. They were worn, weathered, and rusted, and many of them had old-fashioned wooden handles. Costello's affidavit also stated: Gordon told me that he had gathered the items from various drift mines in the area. . . . On occasion when I visited, [Gordon] would show me new items that he had gathered and he would tell me which old mining site he had collected them from.  (Emphasis added.) Costello's affidavit tended to support Gordon's statement that he had found some of the items he kept in and around his cabin. As to items Gordon said he had found, Costello's affidavit demonstrates that there is a genuine factual dispute about whether the found items fall within the AHPA. Costello's affidavit does not assert that Gordon actually found the items that he had described as having purchased or received. Costello's affidavit therefore creates a genuine, material factual dispute only as to items Gordon admitted he found or Costello expressly claimed Gordon found. Because Costello's affidavit did not create a genuine factual dispute about whether the AHPA applied to items Gordon claimed he received by gift, trade, or purchase, the court did not err in enforcing the transportation agreement as to those items. But because there was a genuine factual dispute about whether transporting the found items would violate the AHPA, it was error to enforce the transportation agreement without conducting an evidentiary hearing as to the found items. [17] The Gordon Family Trust argues that Costello's affidavit is irrelevant and thus inadmissible [18] because (1) there is nothing in her Affidavit to indicate that the items she describes are the same items BREXCO agreed to transport in the Settlement Agreement; (2) there is nothing in Ms. Costello's Affidavit to show that the pieces of mining equipment are items covered by the Alaska Historic Preservation Act. The trust also argues that the Court was free to disregard her opinion testimony because BREXCO presented no evidence that Ms. Costello is a mining expert or that she is competent to testify as to the age and ownership of these items. These arguments are not well taken. Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. [19] Costello's affidavit was relevant because it tended to establish that at least some of the disputed items were abandoned when Gordon found them. That proposition in turn was relevant to determining whether the items were protected by the AHPA. Costello's affidavit did not specifically indicate whether the items it listed were the same as the items contemplated by the settlement agreement; but her affidavit was nonetheless germane as to those items that Gordon conceded he found. Moreover, because Costello's affidavit did not rely on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge, [20] it did not require a foundation establishing Costello as a mining expert. Indeed, the most relevant portions of Costello's affidavit simply described Gordon's statements regarding the source of the old mining equipment. The trust argues that the language in paragraph five of the settlement agreement concerning the legality of transporting the mining equipment is a condition precedent which is unenforceable because the condition is simply not sufficiently unambiguous to be construed as a condition precedent. [21] We are unpersuaded by this argument. Paragraph five expressly states that BREXCO's performance is  contingent upon the transportation of [the mining] property not constituting a violation of any state, federal or local law, statute or ordinance. (Emphasis added.) This provision is not ambiguous in context of this case. We conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact about whether the AHPA prohibits transporting the found items. We therefore reverse the enforcement order with respect to the found items and remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether transporting those items would violate the AHPA. But because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the legality of transporting the rest of Gordon's items, we affirm the enforcement order with respect to the equipment Gordon did not find.