Opinion ID: 19774
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rebutting the Section 20 Presumption

Text: The circuit has recently clarified the burden imposed on an employer who seeks to rebut the Section 20 causation presumption. In Conoco, Inc. v. Director, O.W.C.P., 194 F.3d 684 (5th Cir. 1999), we reviewed a Benefits Review Board decision that held that an employer had failed to adduce specific and comprehensive evidence ruling out a causal relationship between claimant’s employment and her injuries, and, thus, had failed to meet its burden of proof on rebuttal. See id. at 690. We unequivocally rejected the “ruling out” standard applied by the Benefit Review Board in that case. See id. “‘To rebut this presumption of causation, the employer was required to present substantial evidence that the injury was not caused by the employment.’” Id. (quoting Noble Drilling v. Drake, 795 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1985)(emphasis in the original)). Because the Benefits Review Board here employed a standard far more stringent than the substantial evidence standard articulated in Conoco, we find that it erred. However, Conoco also teaches that such error is reviewed for harmlessness. See 194 F.3d at 690. In order resolve the question of harmlessness, we conduct an independent review of the record to see if the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, keeping in mind the deference due the ALJ’s findings. See id. The ALJ relied on the testimony 4 of two physicians and an inference drawn from the fact that Gilds did not mention the earlier knee pain during his doctor visit on January 11, 1995 when the tendon rupture was initially diagnosed. After a review of the record as a whole, we find that the Benefit Review Board’s use of an incorrect standard was harmless error. One of the physicians opined that while the work-hardening exercises did not “cause” the rupture, they probably caused a small tear in Gilds’s knee and that this tear subsequently became one of the causal factors in the later rupture. The other physician testified initially, based solely on medical records, that the most likely cause of the rupture was the a twisting when Gilds’s knee gave out just three weeks before his surgery. However, when given a hypothetical set of facts concerning Gilds’s October injury (which facts were established by other evidence and which were not included in the medical records the physician had previously reviewed) the physician reversed himself and related the rupture to the October injury. He explained that quadriceps ruptures are usually due to a degenerative condition, that stress contributes to a rupture and that the quadriceps machine put stress on the tendon. The ALJ’s reliance on this doctor’s preliminary testimony that did not take into consideration all the facts is misplaced. Further, Gilds’s failure to mention the October injury during his January diagnostic visit is not substantial evidence which would support the ALJ’s determination that Cooper rebutted the Section 20 causation presumption. We therefore conclude that there is no 5 substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s denial of Gilds’s claim for benefits.