Opinion ID: 2633651
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's absence from in-chambers hearings regarding juror excusals

Text: Defendant claims his absence from several unreported in-chambers conferences regarding juror hardship excusals violated his rights under the confrontation and due process clauses of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as his rights under Penal Code sections 977 and 1043 and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. At the commencement of the trial, the court agreed to provide the jurors with a hardship questionnaire prepared by defense counsel, who suggested some jurors could be eliminated by agreement of the parties based upon their answers to the questionnaire. In response to a question from the trial court regarding section 190.9, [9] defense counsel explained his view that the statute's requirements would be satisfied if counsel and the court met informally off the record to discuss the questionnaires, but then put the results of their conference on the record. The prosecutor agreed. The court then asked defendant: Mr. Rogers, is that procedure all right with you? Defendant responded I don't have an opinion, sir. The court distributed the questionnaires to the first panel of jurors. After an in-chambers unreported conference which defendant did not attend, 10 prospective jurors were excused by stipulation of counsel. The court repeated this process with each panel of jurors, eventually excusing 133 jurors based upon their responses to the hardship questionnaires and counsel's stipulation. [10] Defendant now contends his absence from the in-chambers unreported conferences at which his counsel stipulated to the hardship excusals violated his state and federal rights to be present at all critical stages of his trial. The federal law governing a defendant's right to be present at trial is well established. `A criminal defendant's right to be personally present at trial is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution.... [Citations.] A defendant, however, does not have a right to be present at every hearing held in the course of a trial. [Citation.] A defendant's presence is required if it bears a reasonable and substantial relation to his full opportunity to defend against the charges. [Citation.]' ( People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 716-717, 97 Cal. Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248; see Kentucky v. Stincer (1987) 482 U.S. 730, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631; Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 105-106, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674.) The standard under sections 977 and 1043 is similar. `[T]he accused is not entitled to be personally present during proceedings which bear no reasonable, substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him.... [Citation.]' [Citation.] ( People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 74, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 742, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) We previously have rejected claims of error based upon a defendant's absence from discussions of juror hardship excusals. (E.g., People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 72-74, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 178, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781.) We do so again here. As in Ervin, [d]efendant's presence at counsel's jury screening discussions ... would have served little purpose ( People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 74, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506), and he accordingly had no state statutory or federal constitutional right to attend those discussions. (Accord, Cohen v. Senkowski (2d Cir.2002) 290 F.3d 485, 490 [no federal right to presence during discussion of hardship excuses].) Defendant contends the cases cited above do not govern here, because the juror questionnaires  and hence the in-chambers discussions  were not limited to the question of hardship. Although the discussions related to hardship were not reported, the questionnaires concerning this subject have been made part of the record. Of the 133 prospective jurors of whom defendant complains, 20 gave answers that extended beyond hardship to areas of potential bias such as exposure to pretrial publicity, acquaintance with the defendant or with Bakersfield law enforcement, or other matters. Defendant contends that, to the extent the prospective jurors' answers on the questionnaires regarding hardship extended beyond that subject to other matters involving potential bias, we may infer the in-chambers discussions concerning those jurors also extended beyond the routine matter of hardship. We decline to engage in such speculation. Rather, because the parties stated on the record that they would examine the questionnaires in chambers to determine whether there were any obvious hardship cases that can simply be excused by agreement of all parties, we presume that is what occurred. Defendant asserts his absence from the in-chambers discussions of hardship excuses prevented him from consulting with counsel, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. (See Geders v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 80, 88-91, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 [trial court's order prohibiting counsel from speaking with defendant during a 17-hour overnight recess during trial violated his Sixth Amendment rights].) Defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object in the trial court. Were we to reach the merits, we would find no Sixth Amendment violation, because the trial court did not prohibit defendant and his counsel from discussing hardship excuses or any other aspect of the trial.