Opinion ID: 150366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Other Facts Suggesting the Public Might Expect the Prior Owner to Manufacture Both Products ( Lapp Factor Ten)

Text: In making this final determination under the Lapp test, courts should look at the nature of the products or the relevant market, the practices of other companies in the relevant fields, any other circumstances that bear on whether consumers might reasonably expect both products to have the same source. Kos, 369 F.3d at 724. The District Court made no findings not encompassed by the other factors, and neither party argues that any relevant evidence exists. Accordingly, this factor is neutral.
The most important factors, mark similarity and mark strength, favor Sabinsa. ForsLean and Forsthin are similar in appearance and meaning, and ForsLean is entitled to broad protection because it is a strong mark both conceptually and commercially. Moreover, ForsLean and Forsthin are physically identical, they are marketed to the same customers in the same ways, and the products' ultimate consumers do not exercise a particularly high level of care and sophistication when purchasing nutraceuticals. Accordingly, factors one, two, three, seven, eight, and nine favor Sabinsa as a matter of law. In contrast, since the District Court's findings regarding lack of actual confusion are supported by the record, factors four and six favor Creative Compounds. There is a factual dispute concerning Creative Compounds's intent in creating its mark. Even assuming that the District Court would completely discredit the evidence of bad intent, however, it would be clear error to allow the factors in favor of Creative Compounds to outweigh Sabinsa's strong showing on mark similarity and the remaining factors. We have repeatedly held that neither intent nor actual confusion are prerequisites to a finding of likelihood of confusion. See Checkpoint Sys., 269 F.3d at 286, 291. As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has observed, intent is largely irrelevant in determining if consumers likely will be confused as to source. The history of advertising suggests that consumer reactions usually are unrelated to manufacturer intentions. Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir.1986). Likewise, we have recognized that evidence of actual confusion is often difficult to find because many instances go unreported. Checkpoint Sys., 269 F.3d at 291. As we did in Kos, we have carefully considered whether to direct the District Court on remand to re-weigh the Lapp factors in light of the proper legal standards. We conclude once again that doing so would serve no useful purpose ... [and] waste judicial resources. See Kos, 369 F.3d at 725. The undisputed facts weigh heavily in favor of Sabinsa as a matter of law, and any reasonable factfinder weighing the Lapp factors in accordance with the correct legal standards would hold that Sabinsa had demonstrated a likelihood of confusion. See id. ; cf. Fisons, 30 F.3d at 482 (Garth concurring) (I can see no purpose in remanding for retrial of Fisons' Lanham Act claims when it is so evident that the marks at issue here are confusingly similar.). Accordingly, we see no reason to remand for further analysis on likelihood of confusion.
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the judgment in favor of Creative Compounds and remand this case for entry of judgment in favor of Sabinsa and for other proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.