Opinion ID: 1188766
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Does Uppal's conviction under ง 268 of the Criminal Code of Canada constitute a crime involving moral turpitude?

Text: To determine whether a petitioner's conviction constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, the BIA looks first to the statute itself, and applies the categorical inquiry adopted by the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007). Matter of Cristoval Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 696 (BIA2008); see also Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 912. This inquiry requires categorical comparison of the elements of the statute of conviction to the generic definition of moral turpitude. Nicanor-Romero, 523 F.3d at 999 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If there is a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility that ง 268 would be applied to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime involving moral turpitude, then the offense is not a categorical crime involving moral turpitude. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 697-98. Here, in a one-panel-member unpublished decision, the BIA held that Uppal's offense under ง 268 of the Criminal Code of Canada constituted a categorical crime involving moral turpitude. We review the BIA's interpretation of the elements of ง 268 de novo. Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 907. The BIA has no special expertise or special administrative competence to interpret the petitioner's statute of conviction, thus we owe no deference to the BIA on this issue. Id. By contrast, when the BIA determines whether a specific offense constitutes a CIMT, it assesses the character, gravity, and moral significance of the conduct, drawing upon its expertise as the single body charged with adjudicating all federal immigration cases. Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 910. This is precisely the type of agency action entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). Id. Thus, our review of the BIA's determination that ง 268 constitutes a CIMT is governed by the same traditional principles of administrative deference we apply to the BIA's interpretation of other ambiguous terms in the INA. Id. at 911. Because the BIA's unpublished decision does not bind future parties, or rely on any published BIA decision interpreting ง 268, we accord Skidmore deference to the BIA's determination that ง 268 constitutes a categorical CIMT. Id.
With this framework in mind, we turn to our de novo review of the elements of ง 268. A person commits aggravated assault under ง 268 of the Canada Criminal Code if he wounds, maims, disfigures, or endangers the life of another. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46 ง 268(1) (1985). Uppal contends that ง 268 encompasses negligent and unintentional conduct, and thus cannot qualify as a categorical crime involving moral turpitude. To discern ง 268's mens rea requirement, we must read ง 268 together with ง 265, which establishes a base-level mens rea requirement for all assault offenses under the Criminal Code of Canada: A person commits an assault when (a) without the consent of another person, he applies force intentionally to that other person, directly or indirectly; (b) he attempts or threatens, by an act or a gesture, to apply force to another person, if he has, or causes that other person to believe on reasonable grounds that he has, present ability to effect his purpose; or (c) while openly wearing or carrying a weapon or an imitation thereof, he accosts or impedes another person or begs. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46 ง 265(1)-(2) (1985); R. v. Currier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371, ถถ 94-95. Read together, งง 265 and 268 establish that [t]he mens rea for aggravated assault is the mens rea for assault (intent to apply force intentionally or recklessly or being willfully blind to the fact that the victim does not consent) plus objective foresight of the risk of bodily harm[.] R. v. Williams, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 134, ถ 22. Thus, we agree with the BIA that an offense under ง 268 cannot be committed negligently or carelessly. We also agree with the BIA's conclusion that ง 268's actus reus requires inflict[ion] of significant injury. Section 268 only applies to acts which either endanger[] the life of the victim, or wound[ ], maim[ ], or disfigure[ ] the victim, as the BIA correctly stated. Section 268(1). Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, the BIA never concluded that all acts falling within ง 268 require proof of physical harm. Rather, the BIA stated that the statute requires willfulness of action which inflicts significant injury. Taken in context, this statement expresses the Board's conclusion that ง 268's actus reus involves some aggravating dimension that significantly increases the culpability of the offense. The Board explicitly recognized that the actus reus requires either wounding, maiming, disfiguring or endangering the life of the victim.  (emphasis added) Though the dissent may disagree with the Board's ultimate conclusion that ง 268 contains aggravating dimensions which significantly increase the culpability of the offense as compared to a simple assault or battery charge, it is clear that the Board correctly identified and interpreted ง 268's statutory elements.
Next, we turn to the BIA's decision. The BIA concluded that Uppal's offense plainly qualifies as a CIMT. As discussed above, this determination is entitled to Skidmore deference. Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 911. The measure of deference due to the BIA's decision under Skidmore varies depend[ing] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it the power to persuade, if lacking power to control. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161. Consistent with both BIA and our own precedent, the Board undertook a de novo review of the IJ's decision, and correctly applied the categorical analysis set forth in Duenas-Alvarez by comparing the statutory elements of Uppal's offense against a general definition of moral turpitude derived from BIA case law. [1] See, e.g., Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 696. To determine whether ง 268 was morally turpitudinous, the BIA examined the statute's mens rea and actus reus. Previous BIA and Ninth Circuit decisions identify these two elements as important factors to be considered when evaluating whether a crime rises to the level of a morally turpitudinous offense. In re Solon, 24 I. & N. Dec. 239, 242 (BIA 2007) ([I]n the context of assault crimes, a finding of moral turpitude involves an assessment of both the state of mind and the level of harm required to complete the offense.); see also Nicanor-Romero, 523 F.3d at 998 (identifying the mens rea and actus reus as important factors). Neither element, taken alone, is outcome determinative; rather, it is the combination of the two that determines whether a crime involves moral turpitude. Solon, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 242; see also Grageda v. INS, 12 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir.1993) ([I]t is the combination of the base or depraved act and the willfulness of the action that makes the crime one of moral turpitude.) (emphasis added). Neither the Attorney General nor the BIA has specified what degree of scienter is generally required for a CIMT. Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 924 (J. Berzon, dissenting). The BIA has, however, articulated a more specific standard to be applied in assault cases, a sliding scale that measures both the statute's mens rea and the harm inflicted: [I]ntentional conduct resulting in a meaningful level of harm, which must be more than mere offensive touching, may be considered morally turpitudinous. However, as the level of conscious behavior decreases, i.e., from intentional to reckless conduct, more serious resulting harm is required in order to find that the crime involves moral turpitude. Moreover, where no conscious behavior is required, there can be no finding of moral turpitude, regardless of the resulting harm. Solon, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 242. This sliding scale provides a workable and logical standard by which assault offenses can be measured on a case-by-case basis. Section 268 may only be applied to intentional conduct which wounds, maims, disfigures, or endangers the life of another. Section 268(1). Measured against Solon's sliding scale, ง 268 may be considered morally turpitudinous because it requires intentional conduct that results in a meaningful level of harm. Solon, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 242. Accordingly, the BIA's decision is consistent with prior BIA precedent on point. Though the BIA has at times found that assault offenses arising out of reckless conduct are crimes involving moral turpitude, we have held that only assault offenses arising from intentional acts may be termed morally turpitudinous. Compare Matter of Wojtkow, 18 I. & N. Dec. 111 (BIA 1981), and Matter of Medina, 15 I. & N. Dec. 611 (BIA 1976), with Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 1159, 1165-66 (9th Cir.2006). While it is difficult to draw generalizations about moral turpitude case law, we have also tended to recognize assault crimes as morally turpitudinous where the statutes have required proof of harm. See, e.g., Fernandez-Ruiz, 468 F.3d at 1167 (holding that an assault statute which contain[ed] absolutely no element of injury whatsoever was not a categorical crime involving moral turpitude); Galeana-Mendoza v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 1054, 1060 (9th Cir.2006); Guerrero de Nodahl v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 407 F.2d 1405, 1406-07 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that a statute requiring cruel and inhuman corporal punishment or injury resulting in a traumatic condition was a categorical CIMT); Grageda, 12 F.3d at 921 (holding that a statute requiring corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition was a categorical CIMT). Section 268 requires an intent to take an action which, viewed objectively, subjects another person to the risk of bodily harm. Williams, 2 S.C.R. at ถ 22. The statute also requires harm in fact: to convict an offender under ง 268, the Crown must show that the victim has either been wound[ed], maim[ed], [or] disfigur[ed], or that her life was endanger[ed]. Section 268(1). Thus, the BIA's determination that ง 268 constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude is also consistent with our moral turpitude case law. Uppal nonetheless contends that since ง 268 only requires the intent to act, not the intent to harm, offenses under this section lack the necessary evil or malicious intent required of crimes of moral turpitude. Yet the BIA has recognized that aggravated assault may involve moral turpitude even in the absence of an explicit element of evil intent. In re Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188, 1193 (BIA 1999). We have also questioned the value of the oft-cited evil intent requirement: If the crime is a serious one, the deliberate decision to commit it can certainly be regarded as the manifestation of an evil intent. Conversely, if the crime is trivial, even a deliberate intent to commit it will not demonstrate an intent so `evil' as to make the crime one of moral turpitude. Galeana-Mendoza, 465 F.3d at 1061 (quoting Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 741 (7th Cir.2004)). Intentional conduct can be morally turpitudinous if accompanied by a meaningful level of harm, regardless of whether the assault statute contains a general or a specific intent requirement. Solon, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 242. Nor does our decision in Grageda require a different result, as Uppal argues. In Grageda, we held that offenses under ง 273.5 of the California Penal Code (CPC) constituted categorical crimes involving moral turpitude, because the injurious act under [the statute] must be willful, meaning that the person intended to cause harm. Grageda, 12 F.3d at 922. Yet, as we later pointed out in Galeana-Mendoza, in Grageda we may have mischaracterized the California statute's mens rea requirement. Galeana-Mendoza, 465 F.3d at 1060 n. 10. California courts have interpreted CPC ง 273.5 to require only the mens rea of intending to do the assaultive act, not the specific intent to harm. Id. It appears, then, that CPC ง 273.5's mens rea requirement is very similar to the mens rea of the statute at issue here: both require an intent to act, but not an intent to harm. In fact, ง 268's mens rea requirement is slightly more robust, since it also requires the objective foresight of bodily harm. While some element of intent is a prerequisite to finding a crime involving moral turpitude, an intent to harm, per se, is not necessarily required. Solon, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 242. Section 268 requires an intent to take an action which, objectively viewed, would endanger another's life or result in serious bodily injury. The deliberate intent to take an action with such grave consequences can certainly be regarded as the manifestation of an evil intent. Galeana-Mendoza, 465 F.3d at 1061. The fact that the statute does not require a subjective intent to harm does not preclude a ง 268 offense from qualifying as a categorical CIMT. Nor does the possibility that a ง 268 offense may not result in actual physical harm to the victim preclude the offense from qualifying as a categorical CIMT, as the dissent argues. An offense which places a victim in mortal danger is still more analogous to the statutes at issue in Grageda and Guerrero de Nodahl than to those in Fernandez-Ruiz and Galeana-Mendoza. Measured on the Solon sliding scale, the harm caused by an intentional act which endangers the life of another is serious enough to render ง 268 a categorical CIMT. Solon, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 242 (holding that intentional conduct that results in a meaningful level of harm is a CIMT). Perhaps the grave nature of offenses falling under ง 268 is best illustrated by the cases themselves. The dissent mistakenly suggests that the term wounds in ง 268 could encompass minor injuries, such as a finger cut requiring only a band-aid. We disagree. To interpret the term wounds, the court should look to the Canadian court decisions applying the statute. See, e.g., Nicanor-Romero, 523 F.3d at 1000 (examining California case law to determine what conduct satisfied the actus reus requirement of ง 647.6(a)); Galeana-Mendoza, 465 F.3d at 1054 ([I]n determining the categorical reach of a state crime, we consider not only the language of the state statute, but also the interpretation of that language in judicial opinions.) (quoting Ortega-Mendez v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 2006)). The dissent's contention that ง 268 encompasses trivial injuries is graphically contradicted by the decisions interpreting and applying the statute. In one case, the offender shook her 31-day-old son so vigorously that he suffered subdural hematomas and a fractured ankle and knee. R. v. McCauley, [2007] 2007 CarswellOnt 2551. In another, an 18-year old shot a 12-year old boy, causing serious injury. R. v. Boachie, [2007] 2007 CarswellOnt 6897. In yet another, a man stabbed his co-worker repeatedly in the face and the head, ceasing only when another co-worker intervened, and broke a chair over his back. R. v. Sultan, [2007] 2007 CarswellBC 1351. The dissent has not cited a single case in which ง 268's actus reus requirement was satisfied by conduct which did not involve this sort of grievous bodily harm. Finally, we reject the dissent's contention that ง 268 cannot qualify as a categorical CIMT absent some additional aggravating factor, such as a trust relationship between the perpetrator and the victim. The BIA specifically found that ง 268 involved some aggravating dimension that significantly increase[d] the culpability of the offense โ namely, the wounding, maiming, disfiguring or endangering the life of the victim. The BIA concluded that this enhanced actus reus distinguished ง 268 from simple assault and battery offenses. As discussed extensively above, the BIA's conclusion is consistent with its prior precedent, and with our own case law. Furthermore, the BIA's decision is thorough, wellreasoned and persuasive. Accordingly, under Skidmore, we defer to the BIA's determination that an offense under ง 268 constitutes a categorical crime involving moral turpitude.