Opinion ID: 66068
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Seacor is Entitled to Summary Judgment

Text: Deprived of Dr. Prellop’s testimony, Seaman nevertheless urges that summary judgment was improper for two principal reasons: (1) Other sources provide sufficient causation evidence, and (2) the district court erred by granting summary judgment sua sponte on Seacor’s purported duty to detect Seaman’s cancer irrespective of causation by chemicals aboard Seacor’s vessels. In rejecting these arguments we hold that Seaman failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that would justify denial of summary judgment. Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 47 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating this rule and emphasizing that the Federal Rules of Evidence and the applicable standard of causation are “distinct issues and do not affect one another”) (quotation omitted); see also Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine Inc., 482 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying Daubert to an expert’s causation testimony in a Jones Act case). 42 Gray Law LLP v. Transcont. Ins. Co., 560 F.3d 361, 365 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 56(c)). 43 Id. 44 Aryain v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex. LP, 534 F.3d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 2008). 12 No. 08-30911
Seaman first contends that the deposition testimony of Seacor’s own expert, Dr. Richard Airhart, establishes both general and specific causation. Our review of Dr. Airhart’s deposition makes clear that his testimony does no such thing and instead fully supports his expert report, which emphasized that he was “unable to find any direct carcinogen for Mr. Seaman’s disease based on the evidence of his records.” The report focused on Seaman’s childhood secondhand exposure to cigarette smoke as a more significant risk factor than any demonstrated occupational risk. Dr. Airhart’s deposition testimony contains the following representative statements: (1) diesel exhaust has potential carcinogens in it but that “[w]hen you look at how much of a potential it is, especially for bladder cancer, it’s not proven”; (2) “I think [second-hand smoke] caused his cancer . . . . That’s a little stronger than more probable [than not]. . . . I feel very strongly that this is the most likely cause of [Seaman’s cancer]”; and (3) if Seaman worked around carcinogens, information about parts per million, length of exposure, and type of ventilation would all be relevant. In summary, the testimony and report of Seacor’s expert, Dr. Airhart, does not support Seaman’s position at all. Dr. Airhart’s deposition does not reveal the requisite causal link between Seaman’s cancer and either Ferox or diesel exhaust. And, without admissible expert evidence in this toxic-tort case, Seaman cannot prove causation.45 In an effort to establish his exposure to Ferox and diesel exhaust, Seaman points to the declarations of three of Seaman’s co-workers.46 Each co-worker 45 See, e.g., Allen, 102 F.3d at 199; Atkins v. Ferro Corp., 534 F. Supp. 2d 662, 666 (M.D. La. 2008), aff’d No. 08-30295, 2009 WL 605743 (5th Cir. Mar. 10, 2009) (per curiam) (unpublished). 46 We re-emphasize that Dr. Prellop relied on only the suggestion of Seaman’s counsel. The co-workers executed their declarations after the dates of Dr. Prellop’s report and deposition, so she could not have relied on them. 13 No. 08-30911 submitted a similar declaration that said: (1) Seacor’s vessel was supplied with Ferox; (2) Seaman applied Ferox “regularly,” “usually two or three times every week” using a brush or a pneumatic spray gun; (3) the crew never wore safety gear; (3) half of the time that the crew applied Ferox, it did so in enclosed spaces; (4) Seaman inhaled diesel exhaust fumes every day that he served aboard the vessel; (5) the smell of diesel exhaust was noticeable at all times; and (6) Seacor’s vessel routinely carried benzene and other chemicals. Without expert testimony to place these declarations in context, they do not demonstrate that Seaman was exposed to whatever may be the allegedly harmful level of Ferox or diesel exhaust.47 Seaman lacks competent summary judgment evidence that would create a genuine fact issue regarding the causation of his cancer.
The district court dismissed all of Seaman’s claims based on his failure to offer evidence that exposure to chemicals while aboard Seacor’s vessels caused his cancer. Seaman asserts, however, that Seacor never sought summary judgment on his independent cause of action related to Seacor’s alleged duty to discover Seaman’s symptoms irrespective of whether Ferox or diesel exhaust caused his cancer. According to Seaman, the district court erred in granting summary judgment sua sponte on this issue.48 We hold that to the extent that 47 In the absence of complementary expert evidence, we are skeptical that the declarations of lay co-workers might be of any assistance to Seaman’s case. See Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Absent some technical or professional expertise in detecting and quantifying toxic emissions, [the seaman’s] testimony was insufficient to establish dosage amount.”). 48 See Lozano v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 641 (5th Cir. 2007) (stating that generally a district court may not grant summary judgment sua sponte unless it gives the parties ten days notice). 14 No. 08-30911 an independent claim existed,49 the district court did not reversibly err in rejecting that claim. Seaman’s memorandum in opposition to Seacor’s motion for summary judgment described his theory related to Seacor’s alleged duties to detect his cancer and to provide him medical monitoring. By raising these issues in his opposition brief, Seaman, who makes no representation that he was deprived of an opportunity to present additional evidence, placed them at issue for summary judgment.50 According to Seaman, Seacor’s duty to detect his bladder cancer fell under Seacor’s fundamental Jones Act duty to provide a “reasonably safe place to work.”51 Even assuming arguendo that Seacor had a duty to provide medical monitoring to Seaman,52 he has offered no summary judgment evidence that would establish that Seacor’s alleged breach of that duty caused his cancer, i.e., 49 Seaman’s complaint offers almost no indication of this claim and merely alleges that Seacor failed to provide a safe place to work and to “investigate, remedy, and/or warn Mr. Seaman of all hazards.” 50 See O’Hara v. Gen. Motors Corp., 508 F.3d 753, 763–64 (5th Cir. 2007) (recognizing a harmless error exception to the ten-day notice rule when the non-movant had an adequate opportunity to brief the issue and to present its evidence, i.e., notice would have served no valid purpose); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 28 F.3d 1388, 1399 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Because the homeowners have not identified a material fact issue regarding their [claim], it would be a useless procedure to reverse the [d]istrict [c]ourt because it did not allow ten days to elapse before entering summary judgment.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 51 See Ober v. Penrod Drilling Co., 726 F.2d 1035, 1037 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (discussing this general duty). 52 Vessels that carry benzene of greater than 0.5% by volume as bulk cargo must provide medical monitoring to those employees expected to be exposed to a specific quantity of benzene in a given year. See 46 C.F.R. § 197.560(b)–(c) (detailing medical-examination requirements); see also id. § 197.501 (outlining to which vessels the requirement applies); § 197.505 (defining levels of benzene exposure). It is unclear whether Seaman would have been entitled to medical monitoring. Seaman submitted the report of John Edgar, who described relevant safety guidelines and regulations but who also conceded that he had no data on Seaman’s actual exposure. 15 No. 08-30911 that Seacor’s non-detection “played any part — however small — in the development of his” cancer.53 No one disputes that early diagnosis of bladder cancer is important. And, Seaman contends that Seacor was at fault for his not receiving treatment for bladder cancer until 2006. Seaman disregards the fact, however, that he did see a doctor for hematuria in 2003 and that the doctor recommended seeing a urologist if Seaman’s urine did not clear. Yet, it was not until 2006 that Seaman saw a urologist. Seaman offers no evidence that routine medical monitoring would have altered his prognosis any more than did seeing his doctor in 2003, particularly given that Seaman had been experiencing symptoms for seven to ten years before his 2005 visit to the infectious disease specialist. As Seaman has not established a genuine issue of material fact in support of this cause of action, Seacor is entitled to summary judgment on all of Seaman’s claims.54