Opinion ID: 182229
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ortiz’s Youthful Offender Convictions

Text: 2 At sentencing, Ortiz argued that his two cocaine trafficking offenses in 2000 were part of the same criminal episode and did not occur on different occasions. Ortiz’s appellate brief does not raise that issue with specificity, and we do not address it. See United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that to raise an issue on appeal, the party “must plainly and prominently” do so in the brief and that passing references are insufficient). We also do not address Ortiz’s argument, raised for the first time in his reply brief, that the district court failed to articulate a reason on the record for its finding that the two offenses occurred on different occasions. See United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1185-86 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that “an appellant may not raise an issue for the first time in a reply brief”). 10 Ortiz argues that the district court erred in using his cocaine trafficking convictions as predicate ACCA offenses because the state court sentenced him as a youthful offender, which lowered his maximum imprisonment term to six years.3 Under the ACCA, a “serious drug offense” is one “for which a term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Ortiz’s Florida cocaine trafficking offenses carried a statutory maximum fifteen-year sentence. See Fla. Stat. §§ 775.082(3)(c), 893.03(2)(a)(4), 893.13(1)(a)(1). In each instance, however, the Florida circuit court sentenced Ortiz as a youthful offender under the Florida Youthful Offender Act. See Fla. Stat. §§ 958.011-958.15. The Florida Youthful Offender Act vests the state court with discretion to sentence an eligible adult defendant (between 18 and 21) as a youthful offender. Fla. Stat. § 958.04(1). If the state court decides to sentence a defendant as a youthful offender, “[i]n lieu of other criminal penalties authorized by law,” the court is given an array of alternative sentencing options, including probation, placement in a community control program, incarceration in county facilities, restitution centers or public and private community residential facilities, and 3 We review de novo issues of statutory interpretation under the ACCA. United States v. Pope, 132 F.3d 684, 689 (11th Cir. 1998). 11 sentences split between these options. Id. § 958.04(2)(a)-(c). However, the state court may not commit a youthful offender to the custody of the Florida Department of Corrections for more than six years. Id. § 958.04(2)(d). This Court has concluded that a prior state conviction for which the defendant was sentenced as a youthful offender under state law may be counted as a predicate offense for ACCA purposes so long as the defendant received an adult conviction and a sentence of more than one year and one month. See United States v. Wilks, 464 F.3d 1240, 1242-43 (11th Cir. 2006) (involving prior convictions under Florida’s Youthful Offender Act); see also United States v. Pinion, 4 F.3d 941, 944-45 (11th Cir. 1993) (concluding prior state youthful offender convictions can support a career offender enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines). Ortiz argues that our precedent was abrogated by United States v. Rodriguez, 553 U.S. 377, 128 S. Ct. 1783 (2008).4 In Rodriguez, the district court refused to impose the ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence where the prior drug trafficking offenses carried only a five-year sentence for a first offense, but a maximum ten-year sentence for second or subsequent offenses. Id. at 381-82, 128 4 Ortiz argues only that we are no longer bound by our precedent after Rodriguez. Ortiz does not argue that, under our precedent, his prior youthful offender convictions were improperly counted. 12 S. Ct. at 1786-87. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the “maximum term” for purposes of the ACCA includes enhancements under a recidivist statute. Id. at 393, 128 S. Ct. 1793. Ortiz argues that, if a recidivist statute can increase the maximum sentence for ACCA purposes, then a mitigating statute such as Florida’s Youthful Offender Act can reduce the maximum sentence. However, the Supreme Court in Rodriguez specifically considered and rejected a similar argument. The defendant in Rodriguez argued that, if recidivist statutes increased the maximum sentence, then state mandatory sentencing guidelines reduced it. Id. at 390, 128 S. Ct. at 1792. The Supreme Court explained that, because even mandatory guidelines permit the sentencing court to depart upward under appropriate circumstances, the top of the guidelines range was not a maximum term for ACCA purposes. Id. at 390-91, 128 S. Ct. at 1792. Here, as the district court emphasized, Florida’s youthful offender sentencing is discretionary rather than mandatory. The state sentencing judge has discretion in whether to grant an eligible adult defendant youthful offender status and so lower the sentencing range. Because of this discretion, under Rodriguez’s reasoning, the youthful offender six-year limit on custody terms is not the “maximum term” for purposes of the ACCA. Rather, the statutory maximum term 13 for Ortiz’s prior cocaine trafficking offenses was fifteen years. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that Ortiz’s youthful offender convictions were for “serious drug offenses” within the meaning of the ACCA.