Opinion ID: 1226896
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claim of Error Concerning Sympathy Instruction

Text: (56) Defendant claims that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on sympathy in accordance with his own request: You may consider pity, sympathy or mercy in deciding the appropriate punishment; however, you should not be governed by mere conjecture, prejudice or public opinion. He argues that the instruction allowed the jurors to take into account any sympathy they might have had for Hanson and/or Blount, and that in this respect it was violative of the cruel and unusual punishments and due process clauses of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the analogous provisions of article I, sections 17 and 7 and 15, of the California Constitution. We find no error. Defendant's primary, and factual, premise is unsupported. The instruction does not carry the meaning he asserts. A reasonable juror would have understood the language in question to allow consideration of sympathy for defendant. That meaning is practically declared by the words themselves. It is also confirmed by their context: immediately following is the instruction, Factors in mitigation may include, but are not limited to, Douglas Scott Mic[k]ey's character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition. In addition, that meaning was anticipated by the prosecutor and defense counsel in their summations: they agreed that the jurors could consider sympathy for defendant  but did not even suggest that they could consider sympathy for the victims. In our view, a reasonable juror could not have understood the challenged instruction as defendant claims. [18]