Opinion ID: 1865975
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether a divorce judgment may preclude modification of maintenance

Text: The court of appeals, relying upon Dixon v. Dixon, 107 Wis. 2d 492, 319 N.W.2d 846 (1982); Fobes v. Fobes, 124 Wis. 2d 72, 368 N.W.2d 643 (1985); and secs. 767.32(1) and 767.08(2)(b), Stats., held that a divorce judgment can never preclude a court from subsequently modifying maintenance unless maintenance is waived. We disagree. [4] As a general rule, maintenance is always subject to modification upon a showing of the requisite change in circumstances. Sections 767.32(1) and 767.08(2)(b), Stats. However, in Rintelman, we recognized an exception to the general rule that maintenance is always subject to modification when we held that a party is estopped from seeking modification of the terms of a stipulation incorporated into a divorce judgment [5] if both parties entered into the stipulation freely and knowingly, . . . the overall settlement is fair and equitable and not illegal or against public policy, and . . . one party subsequently seeks to be released from the terms of the court order on the grounds that the court could not have entered the order it did without the parties' agreement. Rintelman, 118 Wis. 2d at 596. [6] The stipulation in Rintelman provided for nonmodifiable maintenance and met the criteria set forth above. Accordingly, we held that the payor spouse was estopped from seeking a modification in maintenance even though the payee spouse had remarried and sec. 767.32(3), Stats., provides that maintenance shall terminate upon motion of the payor spouse after the payee spouse has remarried. Id. at 596-98. [5] Thus, Rintelman stands for the proposition that the consent of the parties to nonmodifiable maintenance makes such a maintenance provision in a divorce judgment enforceable notwithstanding the provisions of secs. 767.32(1) and 767.08(2)(b) that maintenance is always subject to modification. The court of appeals held that Mitzi's consent to nonmodifiable maintenance is not enforceable because maintenance is always modifiable under the statutes. Nichols, 156 Wis. 2d at 507. Therefore, the holding of the court of appeals is directly contrary to our holding in Rintelman. Furthermore, neither Dixon nor Fobes supports the court of appeals' conclusion that maintenance is subject to modification where the parties freely and knowingly consented to nonmodifiable maintenance. Dixon, unlike Rintleman and the case at bar, did not involve a stipulation of the parties. See Fobes, 124 Wis. 2d at 78. Fobes did involve a stipulation of the parties; however, the parties in Fobes, unlike the parties in Rintelman and the parties in the case at bar, stipulated to a form of maintenance [7] the court had the power to order without the consent of the parties. Id. at 80. The doctrine of estoppel recognized in Rintelman only applies to terms a court does not have the power to order without the consent of the parties, such as nonodifiable or permanent maintenance. Rintelman, 118 Wis. 2d at 596. Similarly, none of the cases Mitzi cites [8] to support her position that stipulations do not bar modification of maintenance involved a stipulation providing for nonmodifiable maintenance. Accordingly, they do not apply to cases such as Rintelman and the case at bar which involve judgments that incorporated stipulations providing for nonmodifiable maintenance. Contrary to Mitzi's assertion, refusing to modify maintenance in this case does not nullify secs. 767.32(1) and 767.08(2)(b), Stats. If the legislature intended to prevent parties from entering into nonmodifiable maintenance agreements, it would have expressly prohibited such agreements. Historically, the legislature has explicitly stated when the terms of a statute may not be modified by contract. For example, the Fair Dealership Law provides that its terms may not be modified by agreement, sec. 135.025(3), Stats.; and the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Wisconsin prohibits sales contracts from substituting certain remedies for those provided by the code, secs. 402.719(2) and (3), Stats. [6] Nothing in sec. 767.32(1) or in sec. 767.08(2)(b) prohibits parties from entering stipulations which modify the statutory provisions. Moreover, we expressly approved of stipulations which provide that maintenance is not subject to modification in Rintelman. Therefore, we conclude that the court of appeals erred when it held that maintenance is always subject to modification unless maintenance is waived. A divorce judgment precludes subsequent modification of maintenance if the judgment incorporates a stipulation which fulfills the elements of estoppel set forth in Rintelman.