Opinion ID: 2313338
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fact Witness and Expert Witness

Text: Hudson's first contention is that the Superior Court abused its discretion by allowing Detective Skinner, the chief investigating officer, to testify both as a fact witness and as an expert. This Court reviews decisions to admit or to exclude expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. [1] We review questions of law de novo. [2] Hudson argues that, as a matter of law, the chief investigating officer in a criminal case should never testify at trial as an expert witness because such testimony will always present the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. [3] Hudson relies on Commonwealth v. Carter , [4] where the Superior Court of Pennsylvania found that testimony from an officer both as a fact witness and as an expert was highly prejudicial. Hudson's reliance on Carter is misplaced, however, because that case is distinguishable. In Carter, the officer first described to the jury the defendant's actions that he had observed and then opined that the defendant was engaged in a drug transaction. The Pennsylvania Superior Court found that the officer's expert opinion was cumulative of his testimony as a fact witness because it was based exclusively on information that the officer had already described to the jury. In Hudson's case, there is no such overlap. The Carter court expressly distinguished cases where, as here, an accused is found with a certain quantity of drugs [and] expert testimony may be offered by narcotics detectives concerning whether the facts surrounding the possession of the controlled substance were consistent with an intent to deliver rather than an intent to possess for personal use. [5] This Court also has held that allowing [an investigating officer] to provide expert testimony connecting the quantity and packaging of drugs with intent to deliver, in addition to testifying as a fact witness is appropriate. [6] Thus, Hudson's first argument is not only distinguishable from Carter but is directly contrary to settled Delaware law. Accordingly, we conclude that claim is without merit.