Opinion ID: 867456
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prospective Juror L. E.

Text: ¶ 41 Prospective juror L.E. stated that she did not believe she could vote for the death penalty under any circumstances. The judge asked L.E. if she would be able to follow the law, and she said no; she did not feel that she had the right to do that to somebody. Defense counsel explained the trial process to L.E., and she responded that she could not vote for death. She stated firmly that she would not follow the law because it was not up to her to decide if someone should die. The judge then dismissed L.E. for cause, without objection by either counsel. ¶ 42 All eleven of the dismissed prospective jurors were carefully questioned by the trial judge and defense counsel. Defense counsel did not object to any of the dismissals and thus this court reviews the dismissals only for fundamental error. See Moody, 208 Ariz. at 449-50, ¶ 85, 94 P.3d at 1144-45. ¶ 43 Roseberry claims that his death sentence cannot be upheld because the jury was chosen after excluding venire persons for cause solely because they voiced general objections to the death penalty. His premise is incorrect: Each dismissed juror expressed more than a general objection to the death penalty. As illustrated above, all admitted that they would not follow the judge's instruction on the law and thus it was appropriate for the judge to dismiss them. ¶ 44 The trial judge was exceptionally careful in questioning each juror who indicated disagreement with the death penalty, and defense counsel personally examined those jurors. Each dismissed juror clearly stated that he or she would not follow the law, if following the law meant that the defendant would be sentenced to death. Such statements meet the standards for dismissal set forth in Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 514, 88 S.Ct. 1770, and adopted by this court in Anderson, 197 Ariz. at 318, ¶¶ 6-7, 4 P.3d at 373, and thus there was no error, fundamental or otherwise.
¶ 45 Roseberry claims that the evidence that he committed the murder for pecuniary gain was insufficient to support the verdict. See A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5) (Supp.2004). [6] This court reviews a jury's finding for substantial evidence, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury verdict. [7] State v. Arredondo, 155 Ariz. 314, 316, 746 P.2d 484, 486 (1987). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is such proof that `reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 67, 796 P.2d 866, 869 (1990). ¶ 46 To prove that a defendant was motivated by a desire for pecuniary gain, the state must prove that pecuniary gain was a `motive, cause, or impetus for the murder and not merely the result.' State v. Cañez, 202 Ariz. 133, 159, ¶ 91, 42 P.3d 564, 590 (2002) (quoting State v. Kayer, 194 Ariz. 423, 433, ¶ 32, 984 P.2d 31, 41 (1999)). [P]ecuniary gain aggravation does not require a motive to kill [but may] be based upon a causal connection between the pecuniary gain objective and the killing. Id. ¶ 93. ¶ 47 At the aggravation phase of Roseberry's trial, neither the State nor the defense presented any new evidence because the aggravation jury was the same jury that heard the guilt-phase evidence. Instead, both counsel made closing arguments. ¶ 48 During his argument, the prosecutor reminded the jury that the evidence showed that Fottler was killed so that Roseberry could steal and sell the marijuana. He further reminded the jury that Roseberry had admitted during the trial that he started transporting marijuana for the Pembertons because he needed the money. Roseberry also told his wife and Dvoracek that he was going to make a lot of money by selling the marijuana himself after getting rid of Fottler. ¶ 49 The pecuniary gain motive is further illustrated by the evidence that Roseberry and his co-conspirators wasted no time in setting up a deal to sell some of the marijuana. Indeed, they called Bowman the very day Fottler was killed. Later, Roseberry and Dvoracek arranged to have Berkowitz transport marijuana to Ohio, and they split the proceeds of those sales. ¶ 50 The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Roseberry was motivated to kill Fottler by the desire for pecuniary gain, and that finding is well supported. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any other reason for Roseberry to kill Fottler. Roseberry admitted that he had met Fottler only once before the ill-fated drug run, and that meeting lasted just a few minutes. There was no evidence of animus toward Fottler and no evidence that hostility erupted between the two men during their motorhome trip. ¶ 51 Reasonable evidence clearly supports the jury's finding that the receipt of pecuniary gain served as a motive, cause, or impetus for the murder of Fottler, and thus we affirm the jury's finding of the (F)(5) aggravating factor.
¶ 52 Roseberry makes three claims of error regarding the jury instructions. ¶ 53 First, he argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jurors to consider mitigation evidence using a significant impairment standard. He did not, however, object to the instructions during the trial and actually included the same significant impairment language in the jury instructions he requested for the penalty phase. Roseberry therefore invited any error and waived his right to challenge the instruction on appeal. See State v. Logan, 200 Ariz. 564, 565-66, ¶ 9, 30 P.3d 631, 632-33 (2001) (stating that we will not find reversible error when the party complaining of it invited the error). ¶ 54 Second, Roseberry claims that the trial court gave the following instruction to the jury: Aggravating circumstances are those which increase the guilt or the enormity of the offense. That language, however, was not part of the court's instructions to the jury. Although the State included the instruction in its proposed jury instructions for the aggravation phase, the trial court declined to give the requested instruction. We therefore will not address the issue. ¶ 55 Third, Roseberry asserts that the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction violated his right to a fair trial and denied him due process. The instruction at issue is identical to the one set forth in State v. Portillo, 182 Ariz. 592, 596, 898 P.2d 970, 974 (1995), which we have upheld as constitutional several times. See State v. Lamar, 205 Ariz. 431, 441, ¶ 49, 72 P.3d 831, 841 (2003); State v. Prince, 204 Ariz. 156, 161, ¶ 25, 61 P.3d 450, 455 (2003); Cañez, 202 Ariz. at 156, ¶¶ 75-76, 42 P.3d at 587. Furthermore, Roseberry did not object to this instruction, and thus this court will only review for fundamental error. See State v. Gallegos, 178 Ariz. 1, 11, 870 P.2d 1097, 1107 (1994). Because the language of the instruction is required by our holding in Portillo, the trial court did not commit any error, much less fundamental error, in giving that instruction.
¶ 56 Roseberry claims that A.R.S. § 13-703.05 (Supp.2004), which requires review of death sentences for abuse of discretion, violates the separation of powers doctrine, as well as the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. However, by its own terms, the statute does not apply in Roseberry's case. Although the legislature stated clearly that A.R.S. § 13-703.05 applies to any sentencing or resentencing proceeding on any first degree murder case that is held after the effective date of this act, it applies to a capital case only if the offense was committed on or after the effective date of this act. 2002 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 1, § 7(C). The statute became effective August 1, 2002. Id. § 5. The murder in this case occurred in October, 2000. Section 13-703.05, A.R.S., is therefore inapplicable to this case.
¶ 57 Roseberry argues that the trial judge violated the double punishment prohibition in A.R.S. § 13-116 by imposing consecutive sentences for conspiracy to transport and actual transportation of marijuana. [8] The statute provides, in relevant part, that [ a ] n act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different sections of the laws may be punished under both, but in no event may sentences be other than concurrent. A.R.S. § 13-116 (2001) (emphasis added). ¶ 58 To determine whether conspiracy and transportation constitute separate acts, for which consecutive sentences are permissible, or only one act, for which sentences must be concurrent, we first apply the identical elements test. See State v. Gordon, 161 Ariz. 308, 312, 778 P.2d 1204, 1208 (1989) (citing State v. Tinghitella, 108 Ariz. 1, 3, 491 P.2d 834, 836 (1971)). The test requires that we identify the ultimate crime, discard the evidence that fulfills the elements of that crime, and then determine whether the remaining facts satisfy the elements of the other crimes. Id. (citing State v. Vaughn, 147 Ariz. 28, 30, 708 P.2d 453, 455 (1985)). If they do, then consecutive sentences are permissible unless, given the entire transaction, it was not possible to commit the ultimate crime without also committing the other offense. Id. at 315, 778 P.2d at 1211. Finally, if such a factual impossibility exists, we must ascertain whether Roseberry's conduct in committing the secondary crime subjected the victim to a different or additional risk of harm than that inherent in the ultimate offense. Id. at 314, 778 P.2d at 1210. ¶ 59 In this case, although Roseberry identifies the murder as the ultimate crime, he has not challenged the imposition of the sentences for the drug charges as consecutive to the sentence on the murder charge, but rather contests the order making the sentences for the conspiracy and transportation charges consecutive to each other. Because both conspiracy to transport more than two pounds of marijuana and transportation are class two felonies, see A.R.S. § 13-1003(D) (2001) (conspiracy takes on the same class as the offense that is the object of the conspiracy); id. § 13-3405(B)(11) (2001) (designating transportation of two pounds or more of marijuana a class two felony), neither is readily identifiable as the ultimate offense. Because Roseberry has not argued otherwise, we designate the conspiracy the ultimate crime for purposes of this analysis. ¶ 60 The evidence that fulfills the conspiracy was that Roseberry plotted with the Pembertons to use his motorhome to transport more than a thousand pounds of marijuana and drove to Phoenix. Discarding the evidence that supports that crime, we find that independent evidence establishes the transportation offense, which occurred when Roseberry had the drugs loaded into his motorhome in Phoenix and then drove the marijuana-filled vehicle to Nevada. Thus the evidence established two distinct crimes that were committed by two entirely different sets of acts. The facts do not show the commission of a single act that is made punishable in different ways by different sections of the laws so as to preclude the imposition of consecutive sentences. See A.R.S. § 13-116. ¶ 61 In satisfaction of Gordon's second step, the acts comprising the conspiracy and the transportation were such that Roseberry could have conspired to transport the drugs without ever actually transporting them. See Gordon, 161 Ariz. at 315, 778 P.2d at 1211. ¶ 62 The third Gordon requirement, whether the defendant's conduct in committing the lesser crime caused the victim to suffer an additional risk of harm beyond that inherent in the ultimate crime, also supports the imposition of consecutive sentences. Id. The transportation and conspiracy crimes subjected the victimsocietyto different risks. Conspiracy adds an element of concerted criminal activity that endangers society differently than individual acts do. Cf. United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975) (noting that the law of conspiracy serves ends different from, and complementary to, those served by criminal prohibitions of the substantive offense; conspiracy laws protect society from the dangers of concerted criminal activity); see also Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593, 81 S.Ct. 321, 5 L.Ed.2d 312 (1961) (observing that collective criminal agreementpartnership in crimepresents a greater potential threat to the public than individual delicts). Conspiracy to transport marijuana and the actual transportation of marijuana may thus be punished separately by our criminal laws. We therefore uphold the imposition of consecutive sentences for the drug-related convictions.
¶ 63 Roseberry argues that the dismissal of Juror Eight a week before the beginning of the penalty phase of the trial was an abuse of discretion and that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the reconstituted jury to begin sentencing deliberations anew, as is required by Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 18.5(h). We review a trial judge's decision to dismiss a juror for abuse of discretion. State v. Milke, 177 Ariz. 118, 122, 865 P.2d 779, 783 (1993). Because Roseberry did not object to the dismissal of the juror or the trial judge's failure to instruct the reconstituted jury to begin deliberations anew, we will review only for fundamental error. Moody, 208 Ariz. at 449-50, ¶ 85, 94 P.3d at 1144-45. ¶ 64 A jury convicted Roseberry on December 19, 2002; that same jury found the pecuniary gain aggravating factor the next day. After a stay to allow the defense to take a special action to the court of appeals, the trial court set the mitigation hearing for June 4, 2003. On May 27, 2003, however, Juror Eight handed the bailiff a letter from a doctor. The letter stated that the juror's wife was scheduled to undergo open-heart surgery on June 4th, the day the jury was supposed to reconvene for the mitigation or penalty phase of the trial. The judge held an impromptu hearing with counsel on May 28th to address the issue. ¶ 65 The prosecutor asked the judge to dismiss Juror Eight, and although both defense lawyers addressed Roseberry's absence from the hearing, [10] they did not clearly object to the dismissal of Juror Eight, nor did they raise any concerns about potential procedural problems based on Rule 18.5(h). The judge decided to dismiss Juror Eight and replace him with an alternate. ¶ 66 In addressing the reconstituted jury before the mitigation hearing began, the trial judge carefully questioned each juror to make sure each had followed the admonition not to discuss the case or read about it during the six-month break. He then gave explicit instructions that the jurors must consider all of the evidence from the trial, including the guilt, aggravation, and penalty phases. For example, he instructed the jury: The evidence you consider at the penalty phase is the evidence presented at the guilty-not guilty phase and the aggravation phase as well as any evidence presented at the penalty phase. He cautioned that the jurors must consider any evidence presented in the penalty phase, as well as any evidence [they] heard at the previous two phases that related to any mitigating circumstance to decide whether there are any mitigating circumstances and to assess what weight toto give to any mitigating circumstance. The judge also instructed the jurors to evaluate the weight to be given the pecuniary gain factor. ¶ 67 Furthermore, the trial judge took precautions to ensure that Juror Twelve, the alternate who replaced Juror Eight, was able to deliberate for the penalty phase. Juror Twelve affirmed that he had no problem serving as a juror and deliberating in the penalty phase. The prosecutor asked the juror about his comfort with the prior proceedings and the jury findings: Prosecutor: You understand that the jury has deliberated without you and now you're going to step in to deliberate? Juror: Yes, I do. Prosecutor: You understand that that jury has found Mr. Roseberry guilty of first-degree murder? Juror: Yes. Prosecutor: Do you understand that the jury has also found that the State has proven an aggravating circumstance? Juror: Yes. Prosecutor: Those have to be your verdicts as well. Do you have any difficulty with that concept? Juror: No, I don't. ¶ 68 Defense counsel asked the juror if he had any problems sitting as a juror only for the mitigation portion of the trial, to which Juror Twelve responded that he did not. At that point, the judge allowed the juror to return to the waiting room while the judge and counsel continued to voir dire the remaining jurors. ¶ 69 Although we recognize that it is preferable to complete a defendant's trial with the same jury that began it, our Rules of Criminal Procedure allow an alternate to be seated for the penalty phase of the criminal trial. See Ariz. R.Crim. P. 18.5(i) (In the event a deliberating juror is excused during either the aggravation or penalty phases due to inability or disqualification to perform required duties, the court may substitute an alternate juror ... to join in the deliberations.). We have held that a defendant is not constitutionally entitled to have the same jury that rendered a guilty verdict decide resentencing. Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 551, ¶ 39, 65 P.3d at 932. ¶ 70 The alternate juror was questioned extensively by the court and both counsel about his role as a replacement juror, and no one objected to his placement on the jury. Moreover, Roseberry makes no effective argument showing why the replacement juror should not have been seated. We find, therefore, that there was no fundamental error in the replacement of Juror Eight for the mitigation phase of Roseberry's trial. ¶ 71 Roseberry next complains of the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury, as Rule 18.5(h) requires, to begin deliberations anew. The failure was logical, however, because no penalty phase deliberations had begun before Juror Twelve was seated. Indeed, the newly constituted jury had not yet heard any evidence or argument on mitigation. ¶ 72 Roseberry does not address Rule 18.5(i), which instructs that a jury reconstituted to hear penalty deliberations shall not deliberate anew about a verdict already reached and entered, but shall only begin anew for the phase of the sentencing that [the juror is] currently deliberating. The trial judge carefully followed these rules: He instructed the jury that it was to consider all of the evidence presented in the case when it made its mitigation finding. He specifically instructed the jurors to consider the evidence presented at the guilt phase, as well as at the aggravation and penalty phases. The judge's instructions were sufficient to protect Roseberry's due process rights. We find no error.
¶ 73 Roseberry claims that his constitutional rights were violated because, although the jurors heard the mitigation evidence on five statutory and five non-statutory mitigating factors, they failed to find that mitigating factors existed, or if they did find the factors to exist, they failed to give them sufficient weight. [11] He contends that because the trial judge found the three mitigating factorslack of prior convictions, medical problems, and childhood difficultieswhen sentencing Roseberry for the drug offenses, the jury must have failed to consider these factors for the murder offense. ¶ 74 But other than noting that the trial judge found the mitigating factors in connection with the sentencing on the drug convictions, Roseberry does not say why he believes the jury did not consider any mitigating evidence. Because there is no special verdict on mitigation, [12] we cannot tell whether the jury failed to find the mitigating factors, or whether it did find some or all of them to exist, but concluded that they did not outweigh the aggravating factor of pecuniary gain. The finding and weighing of mitigating factors is for the jury. A.R.S. § 13-703.01(H). That the judge may have found certain mitigating factors does not mean that the jury had to find the same factors, as long as the jury's findings were supported by reasonable evidence. Roseberry has not shown that any jury finding was unsupported, nor has he shown any failure by the jury to perform its duty. Indeed, he has not shown that the jury did not find the same factors the trial judge found. ¶ 75 Nor does Roseberry argue that the jurors were improperly instructed. To the contrary, the record shows that they were comprehensively instructed to consider all of the evidence presented at the trial, including factors in fairness and mercy [that] may support a sentence other than death. We presume that the jury followed those instructions. See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234, 120 S.Ct. 727, 145 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000); see also State v. LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. 437, 439, 924 P.2d 441, 443 (1996). ¶ 76 Finally, the penalty verdict form, signed by the jury foreman and read in open court, states that the jury considered all the facts and circumstances of this case. Absent contrary evidence or effective argument, we must presume that this is true. See LeBlanc, 186 Ariz. at 439, 924 P.2d at 443. We find no merit in Roseberry's claim that the jury improperly weighed or failed to find mitigation evidence.