Opinion ID: 398311
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Age of Majority

Text: 26 The Berns secondly maintain that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to render an instruction regarding the pecuniary interest of children in their parents' assets and earnings after they reach the age of majority. Such an instruction would presumably authorize the jury to award damages for a time beyond the appellants' respective ages of majority. 3 The Berns compare their proffered instruction with one approved by the California Supreme Court in Redfield v. Oakland C.S.R. Co., 110 Cal. 277, 288, 42 P. 822 (1895), mod. and reh. denied, 42 P. 1063 (1896). 4 In contrast to the permissive language approved in Redfield, the Berns offered an instruction which referred to a child's right to enjoy parental benevolence after such child attained the age of majority. 5 The proffered instruction approaches a mandatory directive to award such damages whereas the instruction in Redfield permitted jurors to award damages past the age of majority if they found a basis to justify such an award. 27 Since the Berns' instruction was not synonymous with the instruction approved in Redfield, the court was not compelled to include it at the trial herein. Even in the absence of this discrepancy, the approval of the instruction in Redfield did not necessarily thereafter compel the rendering of a comparable instruction in all wrongful death actions. Finally, even if the failure to give such an instruction constituted error, the Berns have failed to demonstrate how its absence served to prejudice their interests. The general instruction regarding compensation for the value of all probable future benefits that each child would be reasonably certain to lose in the future adequately encompassed the scope of appellants' recoverable loss.