Opinion ID: 3177408
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is “Hispanic” a “Race”?

Text: Defendants’ principal argument is that “Hispanics” do not constitute a distinct “race” as a matter of law. As a result, defendants argue, Barrella and Bermudez are both white in the estimation of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted), we need not consider Barrella’s § 1983 claims separately from his § 1981 claims. 9 federal antidiscrimination statutes, and Hardwick’s decision to promote one white candidate rather than another could not have constituted racial discrimination.9 Defendants raised this argument in 9 We express no opinion as to whether it is accurate, as defendants insist, that “if Bermudez was of the same race as . . . Barrella, there can be, as a matter of law, no inference of racial discrimination.” Hardwick Br. 54; cf. Village Br. 21 (“It is axiomatic[ ] that a Plaintiff attempting to establish [that] he is a member of a protected class . . . is required to demonstrate that he suffered racial discrimination as a result of an individual of a different race receiving a benefit to which the Plaintiff was denied.”). Neither defendant cites a published appellate decision supporting this notion. Of course, the fact that an employer favored someone outside of the relevant protected class “will ordinarily suffice” to sustain an inference of discrimination. See Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 313 (2d Cir. 2015). Conversely, a plaintiff who cannot show an employer’s “preference for a person not of the [plaintiff’s] protected class” will usually be unable to sustain a claim of disparate treatment. See James v. N.Y. Racing Ass’n, 233 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2000). But we have nonetheless suggested that a plaintiff may be able to plead a prima facie case under Title VII even without showing that the defendant favored someone outside of the plaintiff’s protected class. See Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 502 n.5 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1448 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[F]avorable treatment of one member of a protected class does not rule out the possibility that another member of the same class suffered discrimination.”), reheard en banc on other grounds, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). It would seem especially inappropriate to require such a showing in the instant case, “in which the [mayor’s] discretion [was] circumscribed by a promotion list limiting [him] to three choices.” Carroll v. City of Mount Vernon, 707 F. Supp. 2d 449, 454 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). If, as defendants maintain, Bermudez is white as a matter of law, then the results of the March 2010 promotional examination forced Hardwick to choose among three “white” candidates for chief: Barrella, Giglio, and Bermudez. Accordingly, Hardwick’s ultimate decision to appoint a “white” chief in those circumstances would hardly prove the absence of discriminatory intent. Cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (recognizing that white and Hispanic firefighters could bring a claim under Title VII after their 10 their motions for summary judgment, motions in limine, and at trial. They renew the same argument here in challenging the District Court’s denial of their Rule 50 motions for judgment as a matter of law.10 In addressing this argument, we need not answer the vexed question posed by the Village’s brief: “What is Race?”11 We do, however, need to resolve a narrower issue: whether “Hispanic” is a “race” for purposes of § 1981 and Title VII. municipal employer voided the results of their promotional examination due to race, even if the employer intended to offer a second promotional examination that might also have led to the promotion of white and Hispanic firefighters). Nonetheless, we need not address this argument, as we conclude below that Bermudez and Barrella belong to different races for purposes of § 1981 and Title VII. Defendants also raise this argument in challenging the District Court’s 10 denial of summary judgment. In general, we will not consider an appeal from a denial of summary judgment, which does not qualify as a “final decision” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180, 188 (2011), and which is in any case unappealable following a trial on the merits, id. at 183‐84. We have recognized an exception to this rule, however, “where the district court’s error was purely one of law.” Stampf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 761 F.3d 192, 201 n.2 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). But that exception does not apply here, because defendants raise both legal and fact‐based challenges to the denial of summary judgment. See, e.g., Village Br. 20‐23 (challenging the sufficiency of the evidence); see also Stampf, 761 F.3d at 201 n.2 (noting that purely legal questions do not “typically involve” disputes about “why an action was taken” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, to the extent that defendants’ summary judgment arguments do raise pure questions of law, we fully consider them in the context of defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law. 11 Village Br. 4. 11
The parties and the District Court experienced some confusion in unraveling the legal definitions of “race” and “Hispanic,” thanks partly to the federal government’s less‐than‐straightforward use of those terms.12 The Census Bureau, following standards issued by the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”), treats “Hispanic or Latino” as an ethnicity, the members of which may belong to any race.13 This bureaucratic definition, however, often fails to resonate with Hispanics themselves, who may hail from societies with quite different notions of racial identity.14 Nor is this definition entirely Such confusion has been enduring. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 12 316 n.39 (1987) (“[I]n our heterogeneous society the lower courts have found the boundaries of race and ethnicity increasingly difficult to determine.”). 13 See Hispanic Origin, U.S. Census Bureau (July 25, 2013), http://www.census.gov/topics/population/hispanic‐origin/about.html. The Census recognizes five races: “White,” “Black or African American,” “American Indian or Alaska Native,” “Asian,” and “Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander.” Race, U.S. Census Bureau (July 8, 2013), http://www.census.gov/topics/population /race/about.html. The government has differentiated “race” from “ethnicity” at least since Directive 15, issued by OMB in 1977. OMB’s 1997 race and ethnicity standards use the same distinction. See Karen Humes & Howard Hogan, Measurement of Race and Ethnicity in a Changing, Multicultural America, 1 Race & Soc. Probs. 111, 119 & n.5 (2009) (article by Census Bureau professionals). See Nat’l Research Council, Multiple Origins, Uncertain Destinies: 14 Hispanics and the American Future 41 (Marta Tienda & Faith Mitchell eds., 2006) (“Multiple Origins”). Puerto Rico provides one example of the potential absurdities generated by the imposition of North American racial taxonomies on Hispanic communities. After the United States acquired Puerto Rico in 1898, the percentage of Puerto Ricans classified as “white” grew with each decade of colonial rule, so that North American commentators hypothesized that the 12 intuitive to the mainstream media, which sometimes identifies “Latinos” with “blacks,”15 and at other times rounds “Hispanic” to “white.”16 In response to this enduring confusion, the Census Bureau island’s black population was disappearing (whereas Puerto Ricans were perhaps simply learning the hard consequences of being identified as non‐white in the United States). For sources, see José A. Cabranes, Citizenship and the American Empire 98 n.475 (1979) (“It is to be observed that while the census taken in 1887 shows a black population of 76,985, and that taken in 1897 reduces the figure to 75,824, the census of 1899 further reduces the figure to 59,390. If this decrease should continue for a number of years, the black race would eventually disappear from Porto Rico . . . . This is the only island in all the West Indies where the white population is so overwhelmingly in the majority. . . . In 1910 the colored population was 34.5 per cent of the whole; in 1920 it had declined to 27.0 per cent.” (quoting 22 Encyclopedia Americana 403 (1939))). In the 1950s, a growing recognition of the unreliability of Puerto Rico’s racial Census data, as well as the Puerto Rican government’s conviction that racial categorization was counterproductive, led the Census Bureau to stop collecting information about race in Puerto Rico altogether. (The practice resumed with the 2000 Census.) See Jorge Duany, The Puerto Rican Nation on the Move: Identities on the Island and in the United States 252‐53 (2002); Mara Loveman & Jeronimo O. Muniz, How Puerto Rico Became White: Boundary Dynamics and Intercensus Racial Reclassification, 72 Am. Soc. Rev. 915, 935 (2007). Debates about affirmative action, for instance, often merge “black” and 15 “Hispanic” into “minority.” See, e.g., Ford Fessenden & Josh Keller, How Minorities Have Fared in States with Affirmative Action Bans, N.Y. Times (June 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com /interactive/2013/06/24/us/affirmative‐action‐bans.html. 16 This tendency surfaced, for instance, in coverage of Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. at 557, in which the plaintiffs were eighteen firefighters, whom media reports often described as simply white, even though one of the plaintiff firefighters was Hispanic. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Justices Rule in Favor of White Firefighters in Racial‐Bias Case, Wash. Post (June 30, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2009/06/29 /AR2009062901608.html. Academic discussion of the case sometimes makes the 13 is now considering whether to abandon separate taxonomies of “race” and “ethnicity” altogether: the 2020 Census may instead ask respondents to select the “categories” to which they belong.17 Small wonder, then, that the parties in this case have struggled with whether, or in what sense, Bermudez might be both white and Hispanic. Compounding the confusion, the relevant terminology has changed substantially over time. In 1930, but neither before nor since, the Census counted the “Mexican” race.18 It was not until the 1950s, same elision. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 52 (2013). See D’Vera Cohn, Census Considers New Approach to Asking About Race— 17 By Not Using the Term at All, Pew Research Ctr. (June 18, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact‐tank/2015/06/18/census‐considers‐new‐ approach‐to‐asking‐about‐race‐by‐not‐using‐the‐term‐at‐all. 18 Until 1930, Mexicans had been presumed to be white. Enumerators for the 1930 Census, however, were instructed that “all Mexican laborers are of a racial mixture difficult to classify”; at the same time, Mexicans who were “definitely white, Negro, Indian, Chinese, or Japanese” were to be counted in those respective categories. After the 1930 Census, Mexican‐Americans—backed by the Mexican government—successfully lobbied to eliminate the “Mexican” category, largely because many civil rights, including the right to become an American citizen, depended on whiteness. See Humes & Hogan, ante note 13, at 117; cf. Morrison v. People of State of Cal., 291 U.S. 82, 85 (1934) (noting that “[t]he privilege of naturalization is confined to aliens who are ‘free white persons, and to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent,’” a definition that excluded people of Chinese, Japanese, Indian, American Indian, and Filipino descent (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 359)); id. at 95 n.5 (“There is a strain of Indian blood in many of the inhabitants of Mexico as well as in the peoples of Central and South America. . . . Whether persons of such descent may be naturalized in the United States is still an unsettled question.”). 14 however, that the federal government consistently started tracking other Spanish‐heritage groups, under the denomination of “persons of Spanish surname”19—a term that seems workable only if one ignores the possibility of intermarriage or the prevalence of “non‐ Spanish” surnames in Spanish‐speaking countries.20 As a result, many writers quickly adopted alternative terms that remain current today: “Hispanic” and “Latino.”21 The stakes of Mexican‐Americans’ “whiteness” were evident in a seminal Fourteenth Amendment case, Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954), which found that “persons of Mexican descent constitute[d] a separate class in Jackson County, [Texas,] distinct from ‘whites,’” whose systematic exclusion from juries was unconstitutional. For a summary of the Census Bureau’s protean efforts to classify 19 Hispanics, see the Appendix to this opinion. We note here that in the 1950 and 1960 Censuses, the federal government tracked only “white persons of Spanish surname.” In other words, when Title VII was enacted in 1964, “Hispanics” were presumptively white. 20 For example, the Chilean patriot Bernardo O’Higgins; the Dublin‐born governor of Spanish Louisiana, Alejandro O’Reilly (who also designed the fortifications of San Juan, Puerto Rico); Vicente Fox, the former President of Mexico; and any number of Argentine presidents, including Arturo Frondizi, Néstor Kirchner, and Mauricio Macri—not to mention the Catholic Church’s first Latin American pope, Jorge Bergoglio. The use of Spanish surnames for purposes of group identification was already under attack by the early 1950s. See Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 480‐81 (using “persons with Mexican or Latin American surnames” to draw demographic conclusions); id. at 480 n.12 (“The State challenges any reliance on names as showing the descent of persons in the County. However, just as persons of a different race are distinguished by color, these Spanish names provide ready identification of the members of this class.”). The choice between “Hispanic” and “Latino” occasionally provokes 21 anxiety. See Nate Cohn, Speaking of Identity: Choosing Between Latino and Hispanic, 15 N.Y. Times (May 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/24/upshot/speaking‐ of‐identity‐choosing‐between‐latino‐and‐hispanic.html. As we have previously observed, the terms reflect “nuanced differences of perspective” regarding personal or ethnic identity. Latino Officers Ass’n, N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York, 196 F.3d 458, 460 n.1 (2d Cir. 1999). “Hispanic” emphasizes links to the language, people, or culture of Spain. “Latino” avoids that connection to the “Mother Country” and points instead to “Latin” America, a geographic entity fostered, ironically enough, by French imperialists who hoped to gain influence over the region by emphasizing historical and linguistic ties between France and the former colonies of Spain and Portugal. Id. Despite occasional attempts to make one label more “correct” than the other—see, e.g., Henry Fuhrmann, Usage: ’Latino‘ Preferred over ’Hispanic‘, L.A. Times (July 28, 2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/readers/2011/07/latino‐ preferred‐over‐hispanic‐in‐most‐cases.html—both terms have respectable pedigrees. The Oxford English Dictionary records “Latino” as first appearing in English in 1946, but the word does not seem to have entered widespread use until the 1960s, see Multiple Origins, ante note 14, at 52 n.1. “Hispanic” began to be used in its modern ethnic sense in politics and public affairs at about the same time. See, e.g., Br. of Amicus Curiae Louis J. Lefkowitz, Att’y Gen. of State of N.Y., at 39, Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (Nos. 847, 877), 1966 WL 115487. (The word itself has a much longer history in other contexts, as suggested by institutions like the Hispanic‐American Historical Review (founded 1918) and the Hispanic Society of America (founded 1904).) The idea that Hispanics formed a recognizable political bloc apparently did not emerge until the 1960 presidential election, when the Associated Press ran a two‐sentence report that Senator John F. Kennedy had formed a national “Viva Kennedy” campaign to court “Spanish‐ speaking communities.” Kennedy Seeks Spanish Vote, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1960, at 22; see also Bonnie Angelo, Bob Kennedy Tells How His Brother Did It, Newsday, Nov. 10, 1960, at 5 (reporting the “new political development” of forming “clubs” to court voters “of Spanish extraction”); Peter Kihss, City Spanish Vote at a Record High, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1960, at 30 (reporting Kennedy’s predicted dominance among New York’s “Puerto Rican and Spanish‐speaking community”). Federal courts began using both “Hispanic” and “Latino” in the early 1970s. See Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Commʹn of City & Cty. of San Francisco, 371 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (first reported use of “Latino”); Moss v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 16
Despite societal confusion regarding Hispanic identity, the existence of a Hispanic “race” has long been settled with respect to § 1981.22 Although that statute never uses the word “race,” the Supreme Court has construed it as forbidding “racial” discrimination in public or private employment.23 The Court has further defined “racial discrimination,” for purposes of § 1981, as including discrimination based on “ancestry or ethnic characteristics.”24 As a result, two people who both appear to be “white” in the vernacular sense of the term, and who would both identify as “white” on Census forms and the like, may nonetheless belong to different “races” for purposes of § 1981. Similarly, someone may 350 F. Supp. 879 (D. Conn. 1972) (Jon O. Newman, J.) (first reported use of “Hispanic”). For the sake of consistency, we use “Hispanic,” which Hispanics themselves are more likely to choose (to the extent that they wish to adopt a pan‐ ethnic identity at all), and which, in any event, is entirely appropriate. See Cohn, ante. “Hispanic” also sidesteps the need for awkward neologisms, such as “Latin@” or “Latinx,” in the name of “gender‐neutral” language. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) provides in relevant part that “[a]ll persons within 22 the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 23 See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al‐Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609, 613 (1987). 24 Id. at 613. 17 belong to more than one “race” for purposes of that statute.25 For instance, in Saint Francis College v. Al‐Khazraji, the Supreme Court found that employment discrimination “based on the fact that [a plaintiff] was born an Arab” constitutes racial discrimination under § 1981, even though “under current racial classifications Arabs are Caucasians.”26 As defendants themselves insist, Hispanics clearly constitute an ethnic group.27 Defendants should hardly be surprised, then, that Consider a hypothetical white applicant whose ancestry is one‐half 25 Hispanic and one‐half Irish. That person could, in principle, bring a race‐ discrimination suit if an employer  refuses to hire him because he is Irish‐American, and instead hires a white Italian‐American;  refuses to hire him because he is Hispanic, and instead hires a non‐ Hispanic Irish‐American; or  refuses to hire him because he is white, and instead hires a black Hispanic. 481 U.S. at 607, 613; cf. Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 26 616‐17 (1987) (holding that Jews may bring a claim against non‐Jewish whites under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which forbids racially discriminatory interference with property rights). 27 The Supreme Court has treated “Latinos” as an ethnic group in, for example, Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991) (plurality). Hernandez involved a claim that a state prosecutor had “exercised peremptory challenges to exclude Latinos from the jury by reason of their ethnicity.” Id. Because Hernandez was part of the line of cases flowing from Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), it hinged on whether the prosecutor’s peremptory strikes “violate[d] the principle of race neutrality.” Id. at 362. Although the Hernandez plurality found that the prosecutor had “offered a race‐neutral basis for his exercise of peremptory 18 shortly after the Supreme Court decided Saint Francis College, our Court drew the obvious inference that discrimination against Hispanics—or “Latins” (sic), as Judge Winter’s opinion put it— constitutes “racial discrimination” under § 1981.28 Because § 1981 also forbids so‐called “reverse discrimination,”29 our 1988 holding in Albert necessarily implied that § 1981 also protects against discrimination based on lack of Hispanic ethnicity—something we had already assumed several years earlier.30 In short, despite defendants’ repeated attempts to confuse an already complicated, vexed issue, it has long been settled in this circuit that Hispanics comprise a distinct race for purposes of § 1981. challenges,” id. at 372—implicitly treating “Hispanic” as a race—the Court expressly declined to “resolve the more difficult question of the breadth with which the concept of race should be defined for equal protection purposes,” id. at 371. 28 Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 572 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc); see also Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 607 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that § 1981 “protect[s] against discrimination on the basis not only of race, but also of ancestry or ethnic characteristics” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1188 (2d Cir. 1987) (“There can be no question that [§ 1981’s ban on racial discrimination] includes persons . . . who are of Puerto Rican descent.”). 29 See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 286‐87 (1976). 30 See Krulik v. Bd. of Educ., 781 F.2d 15, 21 (2d Cir. 1986). 19
In contrast to our longstanding clarity with respect to § 1981, we have not yet resolved whether Hispanics constitute a race for purposes of Title VII. Title VII obviously affords a cause of action for discrimination based on Hispanic ethnicity—but why? Title VII provides, in relevant part, that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer” to take adverse action against an employee because of that employee’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”31 These categories—known as “protected characteristics” or “protected classes”—are not mutually exclusive. In particular, claims based on race and national origin “may substantially overlap or even be indistinguishable depending on the specific facts of a case.”32 As a result, courts and litigants alike have struggled with the proper characterization of claims based on Hispanicity. Most courts have assumed that Hispanics constitute a “protected class” but without saying whether that protection derives from race or national origin.33 Others have declared expressly that the underlying rationale 31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐2(a). 32 Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 2003). 33 See, e.g., De la Cruz v. N.Y. City Human Res. Admin. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 82 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1996). 20 is irrelevant.34 We have also recognized claims based on “Hispanic ethnicity,” a term not used in Title VII.35 Although we have avoided the question so far, the proper categorization of Hispanicity has important analytical implications. Section 1981 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race but not on the basis of national origin.36 Accordingly, if we were to treat Hispanicity as a national origin, but not as a race, for purposes of Title VII, plaintiffs in cases involving pro‐ or anti‐Hispanic discrimination might in some circumstances need to present two different factual arguments in order to invoke the distinct remedies of that statute along with those of § 1981.37 In the present case, the District Court decided at the summary judgment stage that Hispanic did not constitute a national origin as a See, e.g., Alonzo v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 25 F. Supp. 2d 455, 459 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Whether being Hispanic constitutes a race or a national origin category is a semantic distinction with historical implications not worthy of consideration here.”). Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 88 (2d Cir. 2015) 35 (emphasis supplied); see also Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 19 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing requirements for showing “an inference of ethnic discrimination” under Title VII). 36 Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 1998). Although Title VII and § 1981 overlap in many respects, there are 37 significant differences with respect to their statutes of limitations, employers’ respondeat superior liability, the cognizability of claims against individuals (as opposed to organizations), and whether a plaintiff must show that discrimination was intentional. See Patterson, 375 F.3d at 225‐27. 21 matter of law.38 At the same time, the District Court “assumed as a matter of law that Hispanic was a type of race.”39 Later, however, the Court reversed course and determined that the existence of a Hispanic “race” was a question of fact to be decided by the jury.40 We disagree with the District Court’s ultimate decision to treat the existence vel non of a Hispanic “race” as a question of fact. The meaning of the word “race” in Title VII is, like any other question of statutory interpretation, a question of law for the court.41 Here, however, the District Court’s error was harmless, because the jury reached the same conclusion as we do today: that discrimination based on ethnicity, including Hispanicity or lack thereof, constitutes racial discrimination under Title VII. We reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, we analyze claims of racial discrimination identically under Title VII and § 1981 in other respects, and we see no reason why we should not do the same with respect to how we define race with for purposes of those 38 See Barrella, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 145. 39 Id. 40 See id. at 170, 172. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133 (1976) (defining 41 “discrimination”), superseded by statute on other grounds, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95‐555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076; McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2001); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2000) (defining “sex” under Title VII). 22 statutes.42 Second, we have repeatedly assumed that claims of ethnicity‐based discrimination, including discrimination based on Hispanicity, are cognizable as claims of racial discrimination under Title VII, albeit without holding so explicitly. In Malave v. Potter (2003), for instance, we implicitly acknowledged the viability of a Title VII race‐discrimination claim based on Hispanic ethnicity.43 Similarly, in Krulik v. Board of Education (1986), we assumed the viability of a Title VII claim for intentional racial discrimination based on the plaintiff’s status as “white, Jewish, and/or not Hispanic.”44 The Supreme Court has similarly assumed that Title VII’s definition of race encompasses ethnicity.45 To be clear, a claim of discrimination based on Hispanic ethnicity or lack thereof may also be cognizable under the rubric of national‐origin discrimination, depending on the particular facts of See, e.g., Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 434 (2d Cir. 2015); Wiercinski v. 42 Mangia 57, Inc., 787 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2015); Choudhury v. Polytechnic Inst. of N.Y., 735 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1984). 43 320 F.3d 321, 324 (2d Cir. 2003). 44 781 F.2d at 21. See Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. E.E.O.C., 478 U.S. 421, 464 45 n.37 (1986) (plurality opinion) (discussing a potential Title VII claim of “preferential treatment to blacks and Hispanics based on race”); cf. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006) (“The antidiscrimination provision [of Title VII] seeks a workplace where individuals are not discriminated against because of their racial, ethnic, religious, or gender‐based status.” (emphasis supplied)). 23 each case.46 We hold only that for purposes of Title VII, “race” encompasses ethnicity, just as it does under § 1981.47 See, e.g., United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 134 (2d Cir. 2011) (treating 46 “Hispanic” as a national origin); Stern v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 313 (2d Cir. 1997) (same). We recognize that the Executive Branch may disagree with our 47 interpretation. As we noted above, the federal government generally treats “Hispanic” as a national origin, not as a race. For instance, OMB guidelines require the Census Bureau and other federal agencies to classify “Hispanic” as a national origin. See ante note 13 and accompanying text. Similarly, although the EEOC has not adopted a definition of race for purposes of Title VII, it generally follows OMB in treating “Hispanic” as a national‐origin category. See EEOC Compliance Manual § 15‐II. At the same time, the EEOC has recognized that discrimination based on ancestry can qualify as racial discrimination under Title VII; the EEOC has also noted the possibility of “considerable overlap” between “race” and “national origin” categories. Id. Moreover, the EEOC has suggested that discrimination complaints involving Hispanics may implicate race. See, e.g., id. (noting that “a discrimination complaint . . . by a dark‐skinned Latino” might “implicate race, color, and national origin”); id. § 15‐V (discussing a hypothetical “race/national origin” claim by a Hispanic); id. § 607.2 (noting that an employer might acknowledge, as part of an affirmative‐action plan, that “race and national origin played a part in” selecting a “Hispanic male” instead of an “Anglo male”). In any case, we need not grapple with these nuances of Executive Branch practice. No party has argued that the Government’s reading of Title VII is controlling; and the EEOC’s interpretation is entitled at most to so‐called Skidmore deference—i.e., “deference to the extent it has the power to persuade.” Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 53 (2d Cir. 2012); see Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013); Barrows v. Burwell, 777 F.3d 106, 109 n.6 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[U]nder so‐called ‘Skidmore deference,’ we give effect to an agency’s non‐legislative interpretation of a statute to the extent we find it persuasive.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944))). 24 4. Defendants’ Rule 50 Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law We now apply these conclusions to the present case. We review de novo a district court’s decision whether to grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.48 Where, as here, a jury has returned a verdict in favor of the non‐movant, a district court may grant a Rule 50 motion “only if the court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non‐movant, concludes that a reasonable juror would have been compelled to accept the view of the moving party.”49 That is not the case here. Defendants offer three arguments on appeal as to why the District Court erred in denying them judgment as a matter of law: (1) “Hispanic” is not a race as a matter of law; (2) even if “Hispanic” is a race as a theoretical matter, it was not shown at trial that Bermudez and Barrella are members of different races; and (3) Hardwick should in any case be protected by qualified immunity, because it was not clearly established in 2010 that Bermudez and Barrella belonged to different races as a matter of law. Each argument fails. As we have just established, Hispanics constitute a race as a matter of law, under both § 1981 and Title VII. And the evidence presented at trial unambiguously showed that Hardwick considered Bermudez, but not Barrella, to be Hispanic. Hardwick repeatedly identified Bermudez as Hispanic or Latino, and 48 Cash v. Cty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2011). 49 Id. at 333 (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted). 25 he frequently referred to him as the Village’s “first Hispanic police chief.”50 Furthermore, although Bermudez self‐identified as “white,” he also described himself as “Hispanic.”51 Barrella, for his part, described himself as “White of Italian descent,” and there is no indication that anyone ever considered him to be Hispanic.52 Accordingly, the jury had ample justification for concluding that Barrella and Bermudez belonged to different “races” for purposes of § 1981 and Title VII.53 Finally, we reject Hardwick’s qualified‐immunity argument, which contends—rather incredibly—that it was “objectively reasonable” for him to believe in 2010 that federal law did not forbid discrimination based on Hispanic ethnicity. As is well known, “[t]he doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate See Barrella Br. 9‐10, 12, 40; see also J.A. 3189 (recounting Hardwick’s 50 testimony that he “kn[e]w that [Bermudez] was Hispanic”); J.A. 3188 (noting Hardwick’s acknowledgment that Bermudez is “a White Latino male”); see also Hardwick Reply Br. 13‐14 (“Hardwick has never claimed that he was unaware that Bermudez was Hispanic.”). 51 Village Br. 41. 52 See, e.g., J.A. 3141. Defendants’ repeated insistence that Barrella “fail[ed] to establish his own race,” e.g., Village Reply Br. 25, is baseless. Because the parties agree that Bermudez is Hispanic—even if they 53 contest the significance of that designation—we need not decide whose definition of “Hispanic” matters. Cf. Jana‐Rock Constr., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Econ. Dev., 438 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that federal and New York law define “Hispanic” differently). 26 clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”54 The determination of qualified immunity depends both on the specific facts of an official’s actions—e.g., “what situation confronted [him], what acts he performed, and his motivation in performing those acts”—and on the clarity of the legal rules governing that particular conduct.55 This case presents many knotty legal and factual issues. For purposes of qualified immunity, however, the question is simple. The jury found that Hardwick appointed Bermudez rather than Barrella because the former was “a White person of Hispanic origin” and the latter was “a White person of Italian origin.”56 Would a reasonable official in Hardwick’s position have known that such intentional discrimination against non‐Hispanic whites violated Barrella’s rights under federal antidiscrimination law?57 Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (internal quotation marks 54 omitted). 55 Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 162 (2d Cir. 2012). 56 Hardwick Reply Br. 10; see J.A. 2379. Importantly, Hardwick does not argue that the law was not clearly 57 established with respect to when intentional racial discrimination might be permissible. For instance, he does not claim that he gave preference to a Hispanic as part of an arguably lawful affirmative‐action program, or that he was attempting to appeal to Hispanic voters. See Section II.B.2, post. Accordingly, we consider qualified immunity with respect to “unjustified” racial discrimination only. 27 The answer is plainly yes. As Hardwick acknowledges, a right is clearly established if “the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit has recognized the right.”58 Under that standard, it has been clear since the Reagan Administration that § 1981 bars employers from discriminating based on Hispanic ethnicity or lack thereof.59 Indeed, defendants manage to obscure the clarity of established law only by failing to cite Albert v. Carovano in any of the four briefs they collectively submitted, despite the District Court’s citation of that case in its opinions below.60 Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 255 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation 58 marks omitted). 59 See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al‐Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987); Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 572 (2d Cir. 1988) (en banc). That the District Court expressed some confusion about this issue does not alter the clarity of existing law. Cf. Mangino v. Incorporated Vill. of Patchogue, 808 F.3d 951, 959 n.9 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that multiple district‐court decisions may serve as evidence of an ambiguity in case law only where conflicting Second Circuit precedents created such ambiguity). Defendants point to no case suggesting that a plaintiff may not bring a claim of discrimination based on Hispanicity under § 1981 or Title VII. Nor did either defendant cite Saint Francis College in its principal brief. 60 We remind counsel that attorneys have an ethical obligation to “disclose to the tribunal controlling legal authority known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.” N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct 3.3(a)(2). That duty of candor extends to an appellant’s opening brief. See La Cucina Mary Ann, Inc. v. State Liquor Auth., 541 N.Y.S.2d 220, 220 (2d Dep’t 1989) (“[W]e remind counsel for the appellants of his affirmative obligation to advise the court of authorities adverse to his position . . . .”); cf. United States v. Gaines, 295 F.3d 293, 302 (2d Cir. 2002) (observing that “failure to cite controlling authority is at best inexcusably poor lawyering and at worst suggests counsel’s ignorance or violation of” the rules of professional conduct (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jorgenson v. Cty. of Volusia, 846 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1988) 28 The most charitable reading of Hardwick’s assertion of qualified immunity is that the law was unsettled with respect to Title VII. But Title VII is irrelevant to Hardwick’s personal liability, which stems solely from § 1981.61 And in any event, it has long been obvious under Title VII that employers may not discriminate based on Hispanic ethnicity, even if it has not hitherto been clearly established that such discrimination would constitute discrimination on the basis of race.62 In short, we conclude that the District Court correctly denied defendants’ pre‐ and post‐verdict motions for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50.63 (“The appellants are not redeemed by the fact that opposing counsel subsequently cited the controlling precedent. The appellants had a duty to refrain from affirmatively misleading the court as to the state of the law. They were not relieved of this duty by the possibility that opposing counsel might find and cite the controlling precedent . . . .” (emphasis in original)). 61 See Abrams v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 764 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Since Title VII imposes no liability on individuals, the doctrine of qualified immunity is irrelevant to plaintiffʹs Title VII claims.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 62 See, e.g., De la Cruz, 82 F.3d at 20. 63 Because § 1981 and Title VII provide sufficient bases for affirming the District Court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law, we need not consider whether NYSHRL likewise defines “Hispanic” as a race. Neither the District Court nor the parties have suggested that NYSHRL provides any remedy or substantive right at issue in this case distinct from those provided by § 1981 or Title VII. Cf. Lore, 670 F.3d at 169 (“[D]iscrimination claims under the [NYS]HRL are evaluated using the same analytical framework used in Title VII actions . . . .”). More important, defendants forfeited any claim regarding NYSHRL’s arguably different definition of race by failing to discuss the issue in their principal briefs. See Norton v. Samʹs Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117‐18 (2d Cir. 1998). 29