Opinion ID: 3026034
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The LJCC contests our jurisdiction of the appeal, however, on the grounds that LeBoon’s notice of appeal was untimely. We have jurisdiction to review our own jurisdiction when it is in doubt, see Constitution Bank v. Tubbs, 68 F.3d 685, 691 (3d Cir. 1995), and find that we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The LJCC argues that we lack jurisdiction of LeBoon’s appeal because LeBoon did not file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the Magistrate Judge’s February 17, 2005, order granting, for a second time, the LJCC’s motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4. LeBoon responds that her appeal is timely because her second motion for reconsideration, filed on February 25, 2005, tolled the 30-day limit to file an appeal; since the Magistrate Judge did not rule on that second motion until March 11, 2005, her April 4, 2005, notice of appeal was within the 30-day deadline. Although we question whether a litigant can toll the time for appeal by filing a second, essentially identical motion for reconsideration of a final order, we need not decide the issue. The reason for this is the Magistrate Judge’s failure to comply with the separate-order requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Under Rules 58(b) and 79(a), LeBoon had 180 (not 30) days to appeal from the order of February 17, 2005; thus her appeal, noticed on April 4, was timely. Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A), notices of appeal must generally be filed “within 30 days after the . . . order appealed from is entered.” However, “if Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a)(1) requires a separate document,” the judgment is considered entered “when the judgment or order is entered in the civil docket under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a) and when the earlier of these events occurs: [1] the judgment or order is set forth on a separate document, or [2] 6 150 days have run from entry of the judgment or order in the civil docket under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a).” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii). Thus, if a certain order is subject to the separate-document requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 and no separate document exists, an appellant has 180 days to file a notice of appeal – 150 for the judgment to be considered “entered,” plus the usual 30 days from the entry of judgment. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a)(1) requires every judgment and amended judgment to be set forth in a separate document unless it is “an order disposing of a motion . . . (D) for a new trial, or to alter or amend the judgment, under Rule 59; or (E) for relief under Rule 60.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a)(1). To summarize the convoluted procedural history again, the Magistrate Judge initially ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment on December 16, 2004. On December 23, LeBoon filed a motion for reconsideration, pointing out a factual error in the court’s opinion; in its response, the LJCC conceded that the decision had been based in part on a manifest error of fact. Consequently, on January 14, 2005, the Magistrate Judge entered an order vacating the order of December 16, “so that the Court may reconsider this matter.” On February 17, 2005, the Magistrate Judge issued an Opinion and Order that again denied LeBoon’s motion for summary judgment and granted the LJCC’s. Although at first blush the February 17 Order could be understood as merely ruling on LeBoon’s Rule 59 motion for reconsideration, it is clear that in fact its primary function was to dispose of the cross-motions for summary judgment, which were again pending because the earlier order ruling on them had been vacated. Thus the February 17 Order was subject to the separate-order rule. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 58 advisory committee notes (2002 amendment) (when the disposition of a post-judgment motion results in an amended judgment, the separate-document rule applies to the amended judgment); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Titan Int’l, Inc., 400 F.3d 486, 489 (7th Cir. 2005) (when a post-judgment motion is granted, and 7 therefore produces an amended judgment, the amended judgment must be set forth on a separate document).3 Since the February 17 Order was subject to the separateorder requirement of Rule 58, we next ask whether it complied with Rule 58. If it did not, LeBoon’s appeal is timely, because she filed a notice of appeal within 180 days from the docketing of the inadequate order. No magic words are necessary to satisfy the separate document rule; for instance, an “order’s denomination as an ‘order,’ rather than a ‘judgment,’ does not mean that it fails to satisfy the separate document requirement.” Local Union No. 1992, IBEW v. Okonite Co., 358 F.3d 278, 285 (3d Cir. 2004). Rather, an order is treated as a separate document if it satisfies three criteria: (1) it must be self-contained and separate from the opinion, (2) it must note the relief granted, and (3) it must omit (or at least substantially omit) the trial court’s reasons for disposing of the claims. Id.; In re Cendant Corp. Securities Litig., 454 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2006). The February 17 Order easily satisfies the second and third criteria. 4 Because it is not “self-contained and separate from the opinion,” however, it does not satisfy the first. In Cendant, we explained that although the separate-document requirement does not mean that the judgment must necessarily 3 The LJCC concedes this. LeBoon, inexplicably, contests it. 4 The February 17 Order reads: a. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED; b. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with regard to Plaintiff’s Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e); c. This case is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of federal jurisdiction. JUDGMENT IS ENTERED in this case in favor of Defendant. The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to close this case for statistical purposes. 8 be distinct from another document, it means “the judgment must be set forth in a document that is independent of the court’s opinion or decision, regardless whether that opinion takes written form.” Id. at 242. To be independent of the court’s opinion, an order must be separately titled and captioned, not paginated consecutively to the opinion or memorandum, not stapled or otherwise attached to the opinion, and must be docketed separately. See id. at 241; Local Union No. 1992, 358 F.3d at 284-85. The February 17 Order is set forth in a document titled “ORDER AND OPINION.” The document contains only one caption and one signature line and is consecutively paginated throughout. The judgment portion of it appears about three-quarters of the way down page 14 of the 15-page document and is separately headed “ORDER.” The entire document was docketed as “OPINION AND ORDER.” Thus the order does not satisfy the separate-document rule. Consequently the judgment set forth in it should be considered “entered” under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii) 150 days after February 17, 2005 (the day it was docketed), and LeBoon had 30 days after that to file her appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).5 The final question regarding the timeliness of LeBoon’s appeal is whether she was entitled to the additional 150 days to file an appeal or whether, as the LJCC argues, she lost the protections of the separate-document rule by clearly signaling that she understood the February 17 Order as a final judgment subject to appeal. The LJCC contends that LeBoon waived the application of the separate-document rule by filing a motion for 5 Although LeBoon’s appeal was filed before 150 days had elapsed (and thus before the formal entry of judgment), we are not prevented from entertaining it. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2) (“Filing Before Entry of Judgment. A notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision or order – but before the entry of the judgment of order – is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry”); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(B) (“A failure to set forth a judgment or order on a separate document when required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a)(1) does not affect the validity of an appeal from that judgment or order.”) 9 reconsideration of the February 17 Order, eventually appealing the order, and by stating at oral argument, through counsel, that she understood the February 17 Order to be the final judgment. We disagree. It is clear that a litigant can waive the application of the separate-document rule in the sense that she may file a valid appeal without waiting for the lapse of 150 days from the docketing of a faulty judgment, i.e., before the faulty judgment has been formalized by the passage of the time period contemplated by Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(7)(A). Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381 (1978) (per curiam). The LJCC’s position, however, is that when a litigant signals that she understands that a final judgment has been filed despite the order’s failure to comply with the separate-document rule, she must file an appeal within 30 days of the faulty judgment or lose her ability to appeal altogether. This is a dubious argument. See United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 221-22 (1973) (per curiam) (although the Government had clearly signaled its understanding that a stipulation for damages was the final judgment, the separate-document provision must be “mechanically applied in order to avoid new uncertainties as to the date on which a judgment is entered” and therefore the Government’s appeal was timely); Gregson & Assocs. Architects v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, 675 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (holding appeal was timely although the appellant admitted it had understood a faulty judgment to be final); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) advisory committee notes (2002 amendments) (“[i]n drafting new Rule 4(a)(7)(B) [which provides that appeals filed before the lapse of the 150 days that convert a faulty judgment into a final one are valid], the Committee has been careful to avoid phrases such as ‘otherwise timely appeal’ that might imply an endorsement” of the rule in a minority of the circuits that appellants who waive the separatedocument requirement must file an appeal within 30 days of the entry of the “faulty” judgment). Even if it were possible to waive the protections of the separate-document rule, LeBoon did not do so here. Waiver is “the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 10 right.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). It is all too obvious from LeBoon’s pleadings that she was unaware she could avail herself of an additional 150 days because of the formal inadequacy of the February 17 Order. At most, she could have forfeited her right, see id.; we decline to hold, however, that this court is deprived of jurisdiction over an appeal through a litigant’s unknowing forfeiture of the additional time granted her by the Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure, and find instead that LeBoon’s April 4 notice of appeal was timely.6