Opinion ID: 796977
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffectiveness of Counsel for Failure to Appeal

Text: 45 Shedrick's second contention is that his then-counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely appeal in this case. In resolving this claim, we are guided by the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000). There, the Court addressed whether counsel may be found deficient for failing to file a notice of appeal absent specific instruction from the defendant not to do so. Because the question concerned whether counsel's representation was constitutionally defective, the Court held that the two-part Strickland test governed its inquiry. Id. at 476-77, 120 S.Ct. 1029. Applying that standard to the particular facts before it, the Court held that counsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either (1) that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing. Id. at 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029. The Court further explained that it employ[ed] the term `consult' to convey a specific meaning— advising the defendant about the advantages and disadvantages of taking an appeal, and making a reasonable effort to discover the defendant's wishes. Id. at 478, 120 S.Ct. 1029. Additionally, the Court instructed that courts undertaking this inquiry, as with all ineffective assistance claims, take into account all the information counsel knew or should have known. Id. at 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052). 46 With respect to Strickland's prejudice prong, the Court held that the harmless error inquiry applied and that relief could not be granted unless the defendant demonstrate[s] that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he would have timely appealed. Id. at 484, 120 S.Ct. 1029. The Court did not identify any determinative factors in this regard, but did stress that evidence that there were non-frivolous grounds for appeal or that the defendant at issue promptly expressed a desire to appeal will often be highly relevant. Id. at 485, 120 S.Ct. 1029. 47 A review of the record reveals that Shedrick reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing by vehemently contesting the factual issues that led to his enhancement and upward departure throughout the District Court proceedings. See Gov't Br. at 18 (acknowledging that Shedrick hotly contested the factual issues leading to his enhancement and upward departure both prior to and during his sentencing proceedings); see also Appellant's App. at 78-79 (demonstrating that Shedrick, during his plea colloquy and prior to pleading guilty, specifically ensured that he was not conceding any involvement in the van shooting incident or any attempt to fire the weapon at police). In this context, Shedrick's counsel had a constitutionally-imposed duty to consult with him concerning a possible appeal. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480, 120 S.Ct. 1029; see id. at 481, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (We expect that courts evaluating the reasonableness of counsel's performance using the inquiry we have described will find, in the vast majority of cases, that counsel had a duty to consult with the defendant about an appeal.). 48 The Government argues that Shedrick makes no allegation that he ever directed counsel to [file an appeal]. Gov't Br. at 58. Indeed, Shedrick's habeas counsel wrote in his brief to our Court that [t]he record does not indicate that [trial] counsel had any discussion with [Shedrick] regarding an appeal. It is also unclear whether [Shedrick] specifically asked [his trial counsel] to file an appeal. Appellant's Br. at 17. We are uncertain why such comments were made in light of Shedrick's explicit statement in a letter to the District Court, dated February 26, 2003 ( before the appeal deadline had passed), that he had asked his trial counsel to file an appeal on his behalf. In this context, Shedrick's trial counsel knew at least one of three things— Shedrick asked that an appeal be filed, he likely would want to appeal, or he was interested in appealing—and yet did not file an appeal. 49 There is no indication in the record that Shedrick's attorney consulted with him post-sentencing. Indeed, Shedrick expressly stated in letters submitted to the District Court both during and after that period that his trial counsel failed to consult with him during the appeal period. Even if counsel did so, there is little question he was deficient for failing to file an appeal because Shedrick stated on the record that he wished to appeal while that option was available. If counsel did not consult with Shedrick during the appeal period, then he was deficient under Roe-Ortega for not doing so. Under these circumstances, it is not necessary for us to remand this case to the District Court for a factual finding that counsel either did or did not consult with Shedrick because counsel was deficient either way. 50 As it was ineffective assistance of counsel that prevented Shedrick from timely appealing the upward departure—a challenge permitted by his plea waiver—we hold that he is entitled to a direct appeal challenging that departure. Because it has been thoroughly briefed by counsel, we deem it unnecessary to call for further briefing, and thus we turn our attention to the merits of the sentencing. 8