Opinion ID: 338429
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the meaning of repeatedly

Text: 13 Resolution of this case rests on the construction given the word repeatedly in § 666(a). This is a question of law, and our review is necessarily broad. As this court stated in Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. O. S. H. R. C., 519 F.2d 1200, 1206 (3d Cir. 1974): 8 14 (I)t is the duty of the courts to interpret the statute under which the agency functions and to determine whether the agency is acting within the congressional purpose. 15 Our starting point is with the word repeatedly itself, though the meaning of a word in a statute cannot be determined in isolation. Webster's Third Edition does not define repeatedly, but it states that the word is the adverbial form of the adjective repeated. That adjective is defined as follows: 16 1: renewed or recurring again and again: constant, frequent ( absences) ( mistakes) ( changes of plan) 17 2: said, done, or presented again (an often excuse) (an eloquently speech) (an easily pattern) 18 The usage examples given by the dictionary for the first definition can easily be converted to examples of the use of repeatedly while retaining the sense of the original phrase e. g., he is absent repeatedly. The usage examples given for the second definition cannot be so altered. This is illustrated by the following sentences: 19 It is a repeated speech. 20 It is an often repeated speech. 21 It is a speech made repeatedly. 22 The first sentence uses repeated in the sense of the dictionary's second definition the speech has been given before, perhaps only once before. Adding the adverb often to modify the adjective repeated makes the second sentence mean the speech is given many times. The third sentence shows that repeatedly is the equivalent of often repeated, or, in other words, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word repeatedly is constantly, frequently. 23 The Secretary contends that the statute facially permits a far broader interpretation of repeatedly than the one applied by the Commission in the instant case (that is, an employer must violate the identical standard of regulation more than once in order to be guilty of a repeated violation), and therefore the Commission's interpretation is a fortiori rational. The Secretary points out that § 666(a) provides in part that: 24 Any employer who . . . repeatedly violates the requirements of section 654 of this title . . . may be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation. Section 654 provides: 25 (a) Each employer 26 (1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees; 27 (2) shall comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this chapter. 28 The literal words of the statute, as understood by the Secretary, would permit the finding of a § 666(a) violation whenever the general duty to provide a work place free from serious, recognized hazards has been violated more than once, no matter how factually unrelated the two infractions may be. More strikingly, note that § 654 is violated each time any safety standard is violated, no matter how unserious the violation might be. Thus, the Secretary contends that the literal terms of § 666(a) would be applicable if two unrelated standards were violated in unrelated circumstances. The Secretary seems to recognize that this extremely harsh interpretation could not have been intended by Congress. 29 The Commission's interpretation of repeatedly as requiring that the same standard or regulation must be violated twice before § 666(a) applies certainly narrows the potential reach of § 666(a), but it reads out of the statute entirely the reference to § 654. Rather than being a fortiori correct, the Commission's interpretation requires plain statutory language to be ignored in order to prevent an absurd result. 30 Our court has interpreted § 666(a) previously, but the case dealt with the definition of willfully, rather than repeatedly. Nevertheless, much of the discussion in our previous case, Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. O. S. H. R. C., 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1974), 9 is helpful to the resolution of the instant case: 31 It is obvious from the size of the penalty which can be imposed for a 'willful' infraction ten times that of a 'serious' one that Congress meant to deal with a more flagrant type of conduct than that of a 'serious' violation. Willfulness connotes defiance or such reckless disregard of consequences as to be equivalent to a knowing, conscious, and deliberate flaunting of the Act. Willful means more than merely voluntary action or omission it involves an element of obstinate refusal to comply. 32 We believe that a restrictive definition is appropriate here since otherwise there would be no distinction between a 'serious' offense and a 'willful' one. The lack of demarcation would permit the agency to assess a higher penalty than that which is authorized for conduct defined as a 'serious' violation. A broad interpretation of 'willful' would disrupt the gradations of penalties and violations so carefully provided in the Act. 33 Id. at 1207. The Secretary points out that repeatedly is joined to willfully in the statute by the disjunctive or, and he contends that therefore repeatedly means something different from willfully. While there may be great merit in this contention, a broad interpretation of repeatedly would disrupt the gradations of penalties and violations so carefully provided in the Act just as much as a broad interpretation of willfully. 10 34 Though the legislative history is meager, it does provide some help in determining what Congress contemplated by the phrase willfully or repeatedly. The original Senate bill did not contain a civil penalty for willfully or repeatedly violating standards or regulations under the Act, but it did provide for a criminal penalty of not more than $10,000. and/or six months in jail for willful violations. 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News p. 5212. The House amendment provided a civil penalty of up to $10,000. for willful or repeated violations. These two provisions were compromised at conference the House's civil provision was retained and the Senate's criminal provision was modified to apply only to willful violations which result in the death of an employee. Id. at 5237-38. Thus, willfully first appeared in a criminal provision, and repeatedly was added when that criminal provision was changed to a civil provision. The genesis of willfully in a criminal provision strongly suggests that it was originally meant to require a strong showing of intent. To establish a civil violation, it is normally not necessary to show intent, and therefore it seems reasonable to conclude that the House added repeatedly to serve as an objective basis on which to attach liability. 35 The compelling logic of Frank Irey indicates that § 666(a) is directed at particularly flagrant conduct, and therefore the objective conduct which repeatedly encompasses must be similar to that which would raise an inference of willfulness. The following discussion of § 666(a) by the Commission in an earlier case sets forth what we believe to be an appropriate starting point for the development of a workable definition of repeatedly: 36 As a starting point, it should be observed that the size of a penalty that can be imposed for a 'repeated' violation is ten times that for a singular 'serious' violation. Hence, it is obvious that Congress intended to deal with a more flagrant type of conduct than just a single serious violation. Cf. Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. O. S. H. R. C., . . . which discusses 'willful' violations of the Act. These are grouped with 'repeated' violations as being the most severe in the hierarchy of civil penalties. The term 'repeated' is therefore read to mean happening more than once 11 in a manner which flaunts the requirements of the Act. With a test of whether the requirements of the Act are being flaunted it cannot be said abstractly just how many places of employment or conditions of employment should be considered. Each case must be decided upon its own merits and turn upon the nature and extent of the violations involved. 37 Secretary v. General Electric Co., 17 OSAHRC 49, 65-66 (No. 2739, 1975). 38 The mere occurrence of a violation of a standard or regulation more than twice does not constitute that flaunting necessary to be found before a penalty can be assessed under § 666(a). What acts constitute flaunting of the requirements of the Act must be determined, in the first instance, by the Secretary and the Commission, but they should be guided by our statements in Frank Irey quoted at page 161, supra. It should be noted that § 666(a) can be applicable even if the same standard is never violated twice, if the general or specific duty clauses of § 654(a) 12 are repeatedly violated in such a way as to demonstrate a flaunting disregard of the requirements of the Act. Among the factors the Commission should consider when determining whether a course of conduct is flaunting the requirements of the Act are the number, proximity in time, nature and extent of violations, their factual and legal relatedness, the degree of care of the employer in his efforts to prevent violations of the type involved, and the nature of the duties, standards, or regulations violated. 13