Opinion ID: 1700799
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Damages to Reputation

Text: The defendants assert Lawrence has failed to preserve his challenge to the district court's grant of the defendants' motion for directed verdict for our review. The defendants contend that the law required Lawrence to file a motion for new trial following the grant of directed verdict in order to allow the trial court the opportunity to correct any error it might have made. The defendants' contention is in error. In order for a party to preserve error when challenging the grant of a motion for directed verdict, the party merely needs to challenge the motion and inform the trial court of the grounds for the challenge so that the trial court may pass on those grounds. Cf. 75A Am.Jur.2d Trial § 931, at 502-03 (1991); Henkel v. R & S Bottling Co., 323 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Iowa 1982). Our review is then limited to those grounds the challenger has raised. Cf. Spaur v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 510 N.W.2d 854, 858 (Iowa 1994); Federal Land Bank v. Woods, 480 N.W.2d 61, 65 (Iowa 1992); Bartels v. Cair-Dem, Inc., 255 Iowa 834, 845, 124 N.W.2d 514, 521 (1963); McClaine v. Alger, 150 Mich.App. 306, 388 N.W.2d 349, 352 (1986). The law requires a party to file a motion requesting the trial court to enlarge or amend its findings in order to preserve an issue for appeal only when the court fails to resolve an issue, claim, defense, or legal theory the parties have properly submitted to it for adjudication. Iowa R.Civ.P. 179(b); Fisher v. Keller Indus., Inc., 485 N.W.2d 626, 630 n. 2 (Iowa 1992); Farmers State Bank v. United Cent. Bank, 463 N.W.2d 69, 73 (Iowa 1990); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pflibsen, 350 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa 1984). In the case at hand, the defendants moved for directed verdict on the ground that Lawrence had failed to provide evidence which demonstrated he had experienced damage to his reputation. The record indicates Lawrence resisted this motion and raised the precise challenges to the motion he raises on appeal. The trial court therefore had the opportunity to consider the challenges Lawrence now requests us to consider. The record demonstrates no error preservation problem exists with regard to this issue. We review a trial court's grant of a motion for directed verdict for correction of errors of law. Iowa R.App.P. 4; cf. Spaur, 510 N.W.2d at 858; Beeman v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Fund, 496 N.W.2d 247, 254 (Iowa 1993). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and afford the nonmovant every legitimate inference that we can reasonably deduce from the evidence. Henkel, 323 N.W.2d at 187. We must determine whether reasonable minds could differ on the issue presented, and if such is the case, the grant of directed verdict was inappropriate and a jury question exists. Beeman, 496 N.W.2d at 254. B. Comparison to Libel and Slander Per Se Plaintiff posits error by the trial court in directing a defendants' verdict by reference to cases of libel or slander per se. See, e.g., Melton v. Bow, 241 Ga. 629, 247 S.E.2d 100, 101, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985, 99 S.Ct. 576, 58 L.Ed.2d 656 (1978); Marathon Oil Co. v. Salazar, 682 S.W.2d 624, 630 (Tex. Ct.App.1984). Libel in Iowa is a malicious publication, expressed either in printing or in writing, or by signs and pictures, tending to injure the reputation of another person, or to expose the person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule or to injure the person in the maintenance of the person's business. See Kelly v. Iowa State Educ. Ass'n, 372 N.W.2d 288, 295 (Iowa App.1985). Iowa has recognized that falsely accusing a person of a crime constitutes libel or slander per se. Rees v. O'Malley, 461 N.W.2d 833, 839 (Iowa 1990). From these sources, plaintiff claims that damage to his reputation can be assumed, similar to a libel case, without proof of actual damage. Plaintiff argues that when he was tried for the crime of bankruptcy fraud, a consequence that was generated by defendants' wrongful acts in his bankruptcy case, he was in effect libelled. He asserts that enough evidence for submission to a jury was provided by the testimony of himself and his wife. That evidence consisted of statements that he was well-known by the public in past years as a University of Iowa football player. No evidence was presented by other witnesses through testimony or documents of his reputation in the community prior to his indictment. Damages to one's reputation have been held to be recoverable in actions of libel, slander, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. Ordinarily, damages must be proved with reasonable certainty. There is authority, however, that specific proof of injury to one's reputation is not required for injury caused by remarks that are defamatory per se or by malicious prosecution, since this is considered a necessary result of the wrong. See 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 398, at 483 (1988). We have held that a statement that is slanderous per se is actionable without proof of damage. Vinson v. Linn-Mar Community Sch. Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108, 115-16 (Iowa 1984). However, recovery is limited to those damages which were a natural and probable consequence of the original slander or its repetition or republication. Brown v. First Nat'l Bank, 193 N.W.2d 547, 555 (Iowa 1972); see also Rees, 461 N.W.2d at 839. C. Recoverability of Reputation Damages in Negligence Action Lawrence's argument for damages to his reputation presupposes their recoverability in an action claiming remedies from acts of negligence. Even if Lawrence had provided legally sufficient evidence that his reputation had been damaged, the unstated legal issue inherently remaining is whether reputation damages are recoverable in a negligence action. Lawrence's argument that they are, pressing on from the law of libel and the law applicable to a criminal accusation, sidesteps a formidable legal hurdle. In asserting injury from an act of negligence, he makes no claim that defendants' conduct was malicious or done recklessly or wantonly, the gravamen of those actions cited for comparison. Only a few jurisdictions in the country allow recovery of such damages under the circumstances of this case. See Jorgensen v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 905 F.2d 515, 521 (1st Cir.1990) ([C]ourts recognizing such a claim are few in number. Moreover, those courts recognizing reputation damage claims have generally failed to address the foreseeability concerns that have been articulated by the courts rejecting such claims.). The Indiana Court of Appeals has succinctly stated the majority view on recovery of reputation damages: Damages for loss of reputation are only available in actions for libel, slander, abuse of process, malicious prosecution and third party contract interference. These intentional torts afford this remedy because the result is foreseeable. Foreseeability means that which it is objectively reasonable to expect, not merely what might conceivably occur.... The trial court did not err in summarily disposing of this issue as loss of reputation damages are not recoverable in a negligence action as a matter of law. Greives v. Greenwood, 550 N.E.2d 334, 338 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (citations omitted); see also Jorgensen, 905 F.2d at 521. The Georgia Court of Appeals has stated the rule as follows: We ... find a common thread running through the decisions in other jurisdictions: damages for injury to reputation... are generally not recoverable in an action premised on mere negligence where no physical injury is suffered by the plaintiff, unless the elements of willfulness or wantonness have entered into the case. Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 167 Ga.App. 411, 306 S.E.2d 340, 343 (1983), aff'd, 252 Ga. 149, 311 S.E.2d 818 (1984); see also Advanced Drainage Sys., Inc. v. Lowman, 210 Ga.App. 731, 437 S.E.2d 604, 606 (1993). Strikingly similar to the case at bar, in Hamilton, the plaintiff brought a legal malpractice action alleging his attorneys were negligent in that they provided erroneous securities law advice. That advice resulted in the plaintiff's arrest for securities fraud and injured the plaintiff's reputation. Hamilton, 306 S.E.2d at 340-41; see generally Jorgensen, 905 F.2d at 521. The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff could not recover reputation damages because there was no evidence in the record to demonstrate the attorneys had acted willfully or wantonly. Hamilton, 306 S.E.2d at 344; see also Jorgensen, 905 F.2d at 521. The refusal by the courts to allow recovery of reputation damages in mere negligence actions is motivated by policy considerations such as the need to prevent costly, meritless litigation, the desire to avoid disproportionality between liability and fault, and the goal of only allowing liability or damages when the prospect of injury was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. Jorgensen, 905 F.2d at 521. In Hamilton, the Georgia Court of Appeals stated: [Although a disallowance of reputation damages arising from negligence actions] is seemingly harsh, still [t]here is no right, capable of enforcement by process of law, to possess or maintain without disturbance any particular condition of feeling.... There are many moral obligations too delicate and subtle to be enforced in the rude way of giving money compensation for their violation .... The civil law is a practical business system, dealing with what is tangible, and does not undertake to redress psychological injuries... [T]here is no public policy to be subserved by giving damages for mental suffering as a general rule, and the law does not allow it. Hamilton, 306 S.E.2d at 344 (quoting Chapman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 88 Ga. 763, 15 S.E. 901 (1892)). In the case at bar, Lawrence is impermissibly trying to recover for [libel] without proving all the elements of [libel]. Jorgensen, 905 F.2d at 520. Lawrence has merely brought an action alleging a cause of action for negligence against his attorneys. There is a distinct difference between the level of fault associated with libel, which requires an intentional act, and a negligent act devoid of willfulness or wantonness. To sanction reputation damages in this case would be tantamount to holding that a negligent act which has resulted in reputation damages is equally as blameworthy as an intentional or wanton act designed to damage an individual's reputation. As a principle of law, such a result is unsupported by well-reasoned authority and is contrary to important policy considerations and guiding factors based on the foreseeability of such damages. We therefore hold that reputation damages are not a legal remedy available in a damage action premised on a defendant's negligent act.