Opinion ID: 2802105
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to consider all three penalty options

Text: Isom next contends the trial court also improperly failed to dismiss Jurors No. 57, 100, 105, 114, 168, 246, 391, and 398 because, according to Isom, these jurors “fail[ed] to give meaningful consideration to all three penalty options . . . .” Br. of Appellant at 17. In each instance the trial court explained that should the jury return a verdict of guilty of murder, the jury would be reconvened for the penalty phase of trial, and that the available options were death, life imprisonment without parole, or a term of years. See Tr. at 2014-15 (Juror No. 57); Tr. at 274951 (Juror No. 100); Tr. at 3527-28 (Juror No. 105); Tr. at 3801-02 (Juror No. 114); Tr. at 410204 (Juror No. 168); Tr. at 4751-52 (Juror No. 246); Tr. at 6015-16 (Juror No. 391); Tr. at 609192 (Juror No. 398). It is true that each of the challenged prospective jurors initially expressed an inclination towards one option over the other. However, the transcript of voir dire clearly reflects that each of these individuals stated that he/she would follow the court’s instructions and consider all of the testimony as well as the three penalty options. See, e.g., Tr. at 2063 (Juror No. 57 explaining, “[she] would be willing to change [her] opinion if [she] thought that maybe it was not quite as [she] originally thought”); Tr. at 2750 (Juror No. 100 affirming, “yes,” when asked if she would be “able to give full and fair consideration to all three of those as a potential penalty”); Tr. at 3528 (Juror No. 105 answering, “[y]es, I could,” when asked if he was “able to consider all three of those as a potential penalty”); Tr. at 3802 (Juror No. 114 affirming that he could “give meaningful consideration to all of those”); Tr. at 4103-04 (Juror No. 168 confirming that he “would [neither] automatically just dismiss” nor “just automatically impose” “any of those penalties”); Tr. at 4785 (Juror No. 246 responding, “I think I can” to defense counsel’s questioning as to whether he was “able to vote for any one of the three penalties”); Tr. at 6016 (Juror No. 391 testifying that he could “give fair, meaningful consideration to all three of those 6 potential penalties if called upon”); Tr. at 6092 (Juror No. 398 declaring that she “would [not] automatically impose or disregard” “any one of those potential penalties”). To accept Isom’s claim that the trial court erred in denying his for-cause challenges to these jurors on the basis the jurors refused to consider the potential penalty options would preclude the trial court from making a credibility determination as to whether the juror is sincere in “stat[ing] on oath that the juror feels able, notwithstanding the juror’s opinion, to render an impartial verdict upon the law and evidence.” I.C. § 35-37-1-5(b)(2). This is precisely what our statute proscribes and what the trial court did here. See Id. We repeat for emphasis, “a constitutionally impartial juror is one who is able and willing to lay aside his or her prior knowledge and opinions, follow the law as instructed by the trial judge, and render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in court.” Whiting, 969 N.E.2d at 28 (citing Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722-23). We find no error here. C. Failure to understand legal concepts applicable to the case Isom’s remaining challenges for cause involved the following prospective jurors: Juror No. 44, contending the juror failed to understand the defendant’s presumption of innocence; Juror No. 57, asserting the juror did not believe that the defendant had the right to remain silent; and Juror No. 398, positing that the juror had predetermined that the defendant was guilty and that the burden lied with the defense to prove his innocence. See Tr. at 2356, 2369-71, 2387-90, (Juror No. 44); Tr. at 2028-29 (Juror No. 57); Tr. at 6101-03, 6112-17 (Juror No. 398). As with Isom’s other challenges for cause, the trial court—along with counsel for the State and the defense—engaged in an extensive colloquy with each prospective juror. And although the record reflects an initial lack of understanding of the requisite legal standards governing the presumption of innocence and a defendant’s right to remain silent, without more, this is simply insufficient to hold that the jurors should have been dismissed for cause. Particularly where, as here, the trial court explained each legal principle that Isom now complains of and in each instance the prospective juror acknowledged that he/she understood and would be able to apply that standard to the evidence as presented at trial. Tr. at 2028, 2029 (explaining to Juror No. 57 that “Defendant never has to speak on his own behalf and he is presumed innocent throughout the entire trial” to which she declared, “if Mr. Isom does not testify, [she would not] somehow hold it against him”); Tr. at 2356 (Juror No. 44 responding, 7 “[y]es,” to the trial court’s question, “are you able to presume that he is innocent, ma’am?”); Tr. at 6102 (Juror No. 398 testifying that “if the State or the Prosecutor failed to provide [her] with enough evidence to convince [her] beyond a reasonable doubt” that Isom had committed the charged crimes she would vote “not guilty”). Again Isom’s argument to the contrary amounts to a request that we reject the trial court’s credibility determination which, again, we decline to do. See I.C. § 35-37-1-5; Oswalt, 19 N.E.3d at 245. There was no error here.