Opinion ID: 688748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiff's Principal Argument

Text: 18 Plaintiff claims that male employees similarly situated to her were promoted to an SG 11, while she, equally or better qualified, was not. She characterizes the state directors/lobbyists reporting to her own supervisor as appropriate comparative employees. Since, she argues, the flex plan of her SGA department applied to regional attorneys as well as to state directors, and since she had been identified for promotion by senior management more often than the male state directors had been, failure to invoke the flex plan to promote her constituted discrimination on the basis of sex. 19 Plaintiff's faces a formidable hurdle in arguing that she was similarly situated to the state directors/lobbyists. In a McDonnell situation, where one's application for an existing vacancy is rejected, the basis for comparability is simply that the applicant met the job qualifications. When the universe for comparability broadens to employment decisions such as promotions or discharges, not restricted to particular vacancies, there must, it seems to us, be an objectively identifiable basis for comparability. 20 One example might be an automatic system for promotion dependent upon time in service and the acquisition of credits based on additional education or training; a plaintiff denied promotion would meet the McDonnell standard by showing that others of the opposite sex or race who possess no greater credentials were promoted, even though the jobs involved might be different ones. Another example would be where the basis for comparability lies in a policy addressed to or aimed against the members of a protected class, regardless of the job being done. Such was the situation in McNabola v. Chicago Transit Authority, 10 F.3d 501 (7th Cir.1993), cited to us by plaintiff. In that case a white medical examiner, terminated by the Chicago Transit Authority, was the only per diem medical examiner. He contended that the Authority was following a practice or custom of terminating all whites hired on a per diem basis, introducing evidence of sharply disproportionate terminations of white per diem attorneys. The parties themselves put the issue to the jury in special interrogatories whether the Authority had a custom or policy of terminating white per diems. Id. at 509. The court, in holding that McNabola was similarly situated to the per diem attorneys, observed that the basis of comparison was not the precise task of attorneys and physicians but their common status as independent contractors used for their expertise. Id. at 514. 21 In this case, however, the flex plan lacks the element of a company-wide policy targeting all members of a protected group like that in McNabola. That is, there is no contention that it has been withheld from regional attorneys because all of them are women. Instead, we confront what plaintiff alleges is a department-wide plan covering both regional attorneys and lobbyists, which is highly discretionary, aiming to single out those most deserving of promotion. Plaintiff's claim is that, but for her sex, defendants would have concluded, taking all of the facets of her work into account and weighing them against the demands placed on state lobbyists, that she was equally deserving of promotion. 22 Defendants assert that this would be tantamount to adopting a comparative worth analysis, an approach we have always rejected. E.g., Davidson v. Bd. of Governors of State Colleges and Univs. for Western Illinois Univ., 920 F.2d 441, 446 (7th Cir.1990). We do not reach this question, except to say that when, as here, a plaintiff is alleging the discriminatory application of a highly discretionary program--and as evidence compares herself to employees who perform quite different functions--she faces an uphill road. Because we do not reject plaintiff's theory outright, we must inquire whether she had adduced sufficient evidence to permit a rational jury to find that regional attorneys were eligible for the SGA flex plan, and to raise an inference that the true reason defendants failed to promote her under this plan was her gender.