Opinion ID: 1527587
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Psychiatric Expert Testimony.

Text: Consistently with these principles, this court has held that psychiatrists may offer opinions based on reports not in evidence if such reports are reasonably relied upon in the practice of their profession. Testimony similar to much of that at issue here has been held to be admissible. See In re Gahan, 531 A.2d 661, 666 n. 7 (D.C.1987) ([t]he court, as factfinder, was entitled to learn the factors underlying Dr. Carter's opinion that Gahan was likely to inflict harm on himself by ceasing to eat); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Nothstein, 300 Md. 667, 676-84, 480 A.2d 807, 812-16 (1984) (psychiatrist permitted to base his conclusion as to attorney's mental state on descriptions of attorney's behavior provided by the attorney's wife and by his partner). In the present case, the inquiry for Dr. Byrd and Dr. Cornet was whether Melton, if left to his own devices without supervision by the hospital, would be likely to pose a danger to himself or to others. In light of the wide latitude afforded to trial judges in relation to the admission or exclusion of expert testimony, the precise issue on appeal is whether the trial judge abused his discretion in rulingalbeit implicitly and without appreciable articulation [12] that in assessing Melton's dangerousness, a psychiatrist would reasonably rely on the reports and observations of family members and the records of Melton's past hospitalizations. We do not find this issue to be an especially troublesome one. The Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 703 recognize that a physician in his [or her] own practice bases his [or her] diagnosis on information from numerous sources and of considerable variety, including statements by patients and relatives, reports and opinions from nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital records, and X rays. Most of them are admissible in evidence, but only with the expenditure of substantial time in producing and examining various authenticating witnesses. The physician makes life-and-death decisions in reliance upon them. His [or her] validation, expertly performed and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for judicial purposes. (Emphasis added). The conclusion that a competent psychiatrist charged with assessing dangerousness would obtain information from the patient's relatives, as well as from his hospital records, is also dictated by what Justice Frankfurter has described as the saving grace of common sense. [13] Where else would the doctor go for such information? Indeed, as the United States points out in its brief as amicus curiae, a psychiatrist could be roundly criticized within and without the profession for not interviewing family members; by ignoring information which the profession views as vital, the psychiatrist would, at least, undercut the reliability of his or her opinion. See, e.g., People v. Britz, 123 Ill.2d 446, 460-63, 124 Ill.Dec. 15, 22-23, 528 N.E.2d 703, 710-11 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1044, 109 S.Ct. 1100, 103 L.Ed.2d 242 (1989). [14] This is not to say that everything a family member tells a psychiatrist is necessarily reliable or true. [F]riends or relatives of an outpatient may seek his return to the institution because they feel uncomfortable in his presence or are dissatisfied with the progress he is making towards rehabilitation. In re Richardson, 481 A.2d 473, 480 (D.C.1984). Psychiatrists are well aware that this may occur. See Bernard L. Diamond & David W. Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations, 63 MICH.L.REV. 1335, 1353 (1965). Indeed, they consider valuable for purposes of diagnosis any or all information provided by patients or relatives, whether the information is true or false. See 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 803(4)[01], at 803-150 (1990). In any event, a properly qualified expert is assumed to have the necessary skill to evaluate any second-hand information and to give it only such probative force as the circumstances warrant. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F.Supp. 1223, 1245 (E.D.N.Y.1985) (Weinstein, J.), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234, 108 S.Ct. 2898, 101 L.Ed.2d 932 (1988); see also State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1223 (Utah 1986). [15] Accordingly, the court should accord an expert wide latitude in choosing the sources on which to base his or her opinions. See Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 505 (5th Cir.1983). But the court may not abdicate its independent responsibilities to decide if the bases meet minimum standards of reliability as a condition of admissibility. See FED. R.EVID. 104(a). If the underlying data are so lacking in probative force and reliability that no reasonable expert could base an opinion on them, an opinion which rests entirely upon them must be excluded. FED.R.EVID. 401, 402. The jury will not be permitted to be misled by the glitter of an expert's accomplishments outside the courtroom. Agent Orange, supra, 611 F.Supp. at 1245. Because Rule 703 was intended to bring judicial practice into line with the practice of experts when they are not in court, see Advisory Committee's note quoted supra at page 902, the judge may not substitute his or her judgment for the expert's as to what data are sufficiently reliable, provided that such reliance falls within the broad bounds of reasonableness. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 277-79 (3d Cir.1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see also United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512, 514-16 (3d Cir.1981) (error to exclude psychiatric testimony as to criminal defendant's susceptibility to entrapment), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1039, 104 S.Ct. 699, 79 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984). The proper inquiry is not what the court deems reliable, but what experts in the relevant discipline [reasonably] deem it to be. Japanese Elec. Prods., supra, 723 F.2d at 276 (bracketed word added). The assumptions which form the basis for the expert's opinion, as well as the conclusions drawn therefrom, are subject to rigorous cross-examination. Id. at 277. Juries are intelligent enough, in light of the availability of such cross-examination, to ignore what is unreliable or unhelpful. Id. at 279. [16] In most cases, therefore, objections to the reliability of out-of-court material relied upon by a psychiatrist will be treated as affecting only the weight, and not the admissibility, of the evidence. Bertolotti v. Dugger, 883 F.2d 1503, 1517 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 3296, 111 L.Ed.2d 804 (1990).