Opinion ID: 2206409
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Statements Produced Through Police Interrogation

Text: Crawford and Davis have begun to map out the contours of whose intent matters. Because both cases involved statements produced by police interrogations, the matter is clearer in that context. In Crawford, the Court stated that Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations are [] testimonial under even a narrow standard. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 124 S.Ct. at 1364, 158 L.Ed.2d at 193. This broad formulation is devoid of reference to the intent of the declarant, which implies that rather than the declarant's intent, the police intent to obtain information for prosecution is all that is relevant. In Davis, the Court explained that this was precisely its meaning: When we said in Crawford [citation] that `interrogations by law enforcement officers fall squarely within [the] class' of testimonial hearsay, we had immediately in mind (for that was the case before us) interrogations solely directed at establishing the facts of a past crime, in order to identify (or provide evidence to convict) the perpetrator. Davis, 547 U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 2276, 165 L.Ed.2d at 239-40. In Davis, the Court recognized that not all police interrogations were for the purposes of gathering information for prosecution, however, and modified the broad rule it announced in Crawford: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. Davis, 547 U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-74, 165 L.Ed.2d at 237. The Court also noted that police focus could potentially shift from emergency assistance to future prosecution, such that during the course of a given interrogation some statements in response to questioning could be testimonial and others not. Davis, 547 U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 2277, 165 L.Ed.2d at 241. See also In re T.T., 351 Ill.App.3d 976, 992-93, 287 Ill.Dec. 145, 815 N.E.2d 789 (2004) (holding that child's statements to doctor for the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment were nontestimonial, but identification of attacker in same interview was testimonial). It is clear, therefore, that when the statements under consideration are the product of questioning by the police (or those whose acts [are] acts of the police ( Davis, 547 U.S. at ___ n. 2, 126 S.Ct. at 2274 n. 2, 165 L.Ed.2d at 238 n. 2)), we must focus on the intent of the questioner in eliciting the statement. Moreover, our evaluation of that intent must rely on objective circumstances, not testimony from the officer as to his actual subjective intent. Davis, 547 U.S. at ___, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-74, 165 L.Ed.2d at 237.