Opinion ID: 1058446
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instruction R

Text: In ruling on the respondent's motion to dismiss Ahmer's habeas petition, the circuit court held that trial counsel was entitled to rely on the court's statement at trial that Instruction R was a part of the record, and that the petitioner had not established deficient performance on counsel's part that would satisfy the first part of the Strickland test. Ahmer cites Woods v. R.D. Hunt & Son, Inc., 207 Va. 281, 287, 148 S.E.2d 779, 783 (1966), for the proposition that the onus is upon the appellant to provide [the appellate court] with a sufficient record from which [it] can decide whether the trial court erred as alleged. A failure to furnish a sufficient record will result in an affirmance of the judgment appealed from. Thus, Ahmer contends, it was the duty of his counsel to take such steps as might be necessary to ensure that the record was complete in order to protect his appellate rights. [5] The question whether counsel's performance fell below the standard with respect to Instruction R is subject to the subsidiary question whether, as the circuit court found, counsel was entitled to rely on the court's statement at trial that Instruction R was a part of the record. The question is further complicated by the rapid succession of three attorneys who assumed responsibility for the defense during the crucial period between sentencing and appeal, when the record was being assembled in the clerk's office. Ahmer's arguments are correct as abstract statements of the law. Applying them to the peculiar circumstances of this case, however, brings us to consideration of the Supreme Court's observation in Strickland: The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel's performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed. Courts should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result. 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052. That admonition is particularly appropriate to the present case. However complex the question of counsel's performance may have been in the circumstances, Ahmer's failure to establish the prejudice prong of the Strickland test is clear. The jury was fully and fairly instructed. All instructions except that relating to concert of action were agreed upon by the parties. We agree with the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals in its holding that the trial court's use of the model jury instruction had left no vital issue unaddressed. Ahmer argues that the essential content of Instruction R can be determined from its apparent quotation by counsel in oral argument. Assuming that to be true, we think its language would have been more confusing than enlightening. The terms planned, arranged, adjusted, agreed on or settled are stated in the disjunctive, so as to give the jury the apparent choice of any single one of them as the definition of concert of action. In that context, adjusted and settled are themselves in need of definition. There is no limitation of the time within which these actions must have occurred in order to be significant. Ahmer asserts that the terms he advocates were taken from the explanatory language contained in an appellate decision. We have frequently cautioned against the danger of the indiscriminate use of language from appellate opinions in a jury instruction. Clohessy v. Weiler, 250 Va. 249, 255, 462 S.E.2d 94, 98 (1995) (quoting Blondel v. Hayes, 241 Va. 467, 474, 403 S.E.2d 340, 344 (1991)). Appellate language used to explain a ruling or illustrate a point must necessarily be tailored to the facts and circumstances of the case then before the court on appeal. Unless clearly intended for use as a jury instruction, such language is inappropriate for that purpose. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Bruce, 208 Va. 595, 601, 159 S.E.2d 815, 820 (1968). The burden is on the proponent of a jury instruction to satisfy the trial court that the proposed language is a correct statement of the law, applicable to the facts of the case on trial, and expressed in appropriate language. If Instruction R was phrased as Ahmer contends, his trial counsel could not have met that burden. Consequently, the trial court did not err in refusing the proposed instruction and its refusal would have been unavailing as a ground for reversal even if it had been contained in the record on appeal. Accordingly, we conclude that Ahmer suffered no prejudice because of the omission of Instruction R from the record and we do not reach the performance prong of Strickland in deciding Ahmer's assignments of error concerning Instruction R.