Opinion ID: 2072861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Scheme Underlying the Statute

Text: The legislative history not only manifests legislative intent to employ the term intoxicated to refer to persons inebriated by alcohol and to prevent them from driving, but also reveals a scheme by which the statute would reach that goal. This Court must determine the consistency of the Legislature's reaching its goal with the purposes underlying the legislative scheme  ( Sheehy, 73 NY2d at 634, quoting Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v Lindner, 59 NY2d 314, 325 [1983]). For, the Legislature has both the right and the authority to select the methods to be used in effectuating its goals, as well as to choose the goals themselves ( id. ). Sheehy and Burns Jackson addressed private rights of action. The same reasoning applies herethe implementation of an action should not be judicially sanctioned if it is incompatible with the enforcement mechanism chosen by the Legislature or with some other aspect of the over-all statutory scheme ( Sheehy, 73 NY2d at 635). In two respects, the People's construction of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3) is out of step with the statutory scheme. First, the scheme of section 1192 provides for different levels or kinds of proof to establish violations of the statute. Thus, a prosecutor must show impairment by alcohol to prove a violation of subdivision 1resulting in a traffic infraction. Subdivision 1 is a lesser-included offense of subdivisions 2 and 3. Subdivisions 2 and 2-a require a showing of a specific amount of blood alcohol content to result in a per se criminal violation, whereas subdivision 3in an intoxicated conditionallows for a circumstantial showing of inability to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Confirming this scheme, subdivision 9 explicitly permits a conviction under subdivision 1, 2 or 3 even when the charge alleges a violation of either subdivision 2 or 3. If subdivision 3 were now read, as the People urge, to allow for any drug to be included as part of the definition of intoxication, then one who has committed a misdemeanor under subdivision 3 could not, in contravention of the legislative plan, be found to have committed the lesser-included offense of driving while impaired by alcohol under subdivision 1. Second, while the legislative history from 1910 is unavailable, the history thereafter shows that the Legislature has consistently presumed that the initial statute was created to prevent drunk driving. Although, as the People argue, the goal of the Legislature may be advanced by including use of drugs in the definition of intoxication, the Legislature has repeatedly and definitively concentrated on precise mechanisms to prevent deathly accidents related to alcohol and drugs ( see Mark G. v Sabol, 93 NY2d 710, 722 [1999]). Including driving while under the influence of limitless drugs as a violation of driving while intoxicated has not been part of that mechanism. In 1960, the Legislature added section 1192 (1) to assure that not all drivers who were under the influence of alcohol would be criminally liable. This Court determined that this subdivision and subdivision 3 were not unconstitutionally vague ( see Cruz, 48 NY2d 419). The Court concluded that, as to subdivision 1, evident from the statutory language and scheme, the issue was whether, by voluntarily consuming alcohol, this particular defendant has actually impaired, to any extent, the physical and mental abilities which he is expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver ( id. at 427). Intoxication, the Court stated, is not an unfamiliar concept and is intelligible to the average person. The standard to determine intoxication is whether the individual's consumption of alcohol has rendered him incapable of employing the physical or mental abilities needed to, for instance, form a specific intent ( id. ). These terms, the Court continued, have an accepted meaning long recognized in law and life ( id. at 428). The Court thus upheld the Legislature's scheme. The addition in 1966 of subdivision 4 demonstrates the Legislature's desire to add the use of drugs to that of alcohol for further prevention of deaths on the highway. Were drugs included in the definition for intoxication under subdivision 3, the Legislature would have had no reason to add another misdemeanor. Rather, the Legislature, after careful study and debate, concluded that a driver could be convicted for impairment by drugsand then only by explicitly enumerated drugs. Moreover, the addition in 1970 of section 1196 (now section 1192 [9]) reaffirms that the term intoxication refers to the use of alcohol. In People v Farmer (36 NY2d 386, 390 [1975]), the Court held that, pursuant to section 1196, the defendant charged under subdivision 3 had notice that he could be convicted under subdivision 2. Although subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 proscribe separable offenses based upon the degree of impairment caused by alcohol ingestion, the provisions closely overlap and are species of the generic offense of `Operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol' ( id.; see also People v Bayer, 132 AD2d 920 [4th Dept 1987]; Grinberg, 4 Misc 3d at 677). Again, the Court upheld the legislative scheme and interpreted the legislative intent to be that driving while intoxicated under subdivision 3 addresses those who drink and drive. Only last year, focusing its attention on strengthening the statute, the Legislature added one provision to prohibit driving while using alcoholaggravated driving while intoxicated, subdivision 2-aand another provision to prohibit driving while using a combination of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugssubdivision 4-a. The Legislature unambiguously employed the term intoxicated for the level of alcohol, and the terms alcohol and drugs for the combination. If defendant did what the prosecution charges, then his conduct was reprehensiblehis voluntary inhalation of hydrocarbon while driving resulted in the death of a young woman and serious injuries to others. Perhaps gaps exist in the law and the prosecution should not have to rely on the 12 other counts charged. However, a determination by this Court that intoxication in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (3) includes the use of any substance would improperly override the legislative policy judgment. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. Order affirmed.