Opinion ID: 3135733
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The child either:

Text: (A) testifies at the proceeding; or (B) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the statement[.]” 725 ILCS 5/115–10 (West 2004). Section 115–10 allows for a child victim’s hearsay statement to be admitted under two scenarios: (1) the court deems the statement reliable and the child testifies at trial (subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2)(A)); or (2) the child does not testify, the statement is deemed reliable, and the allegations of sexual abuse are independently corroborated (subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2)(B)). Here, the circuit court admitted K.J.K.’s and M.J.B.’s hearsay statements under the first scenario, as both children testified at trial. Under Crawford, the confrontation clause poses no restrictions on the admission of hearsay testimony if the declarant testifies at trial and is present “to defend or explain” that testimony. “[W]e reiterate that, when the declarant appears for crossexamination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 162 (1970).  The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9. Accordingly, where K.J.K. and M.J.B. testified at trial and were present to defend or explain their testimony on cross-examination, the admission of their hearsay statements under section 115–10 does not violate the confrontation clause.
Defendant argues, however, that section 115–10 is facially unconstitutional because it incorporates the now-repudiated reliability standard set forth in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Under Roberts, the presentation of hearsay testimony of an unavailable witness comported with the confrontation clause if the statement fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or showed “particularized -11- guarantees of trustworthiness.” Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. The language of section 115–10 tracks the Roberts standard in part because it allows hearsay statements of a child witness to be admitted only if–among other things–the circuit court finds that “the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability” (725 ILCS 5/115–10(b)(1) (West 2004)). In Crawford, however, the Supreme Court repudiated the Roberts reliability test. Crawford held that the confrontation clause requires the reliability of testimony to be tested through cross-examination, and that no judicial assessment of “reliability” may be substituted for this form of credibility testing. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62. Now, under Crawford, testimonial statements of an unavailable witness may be admitted–regardless of their perceived “reliability”–only if the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. Section 115–10 satisfies Crawford in part. Under this statute, a child’s reliable hearsay statement, i.e., one which has been found reliable under subsection (b)(1), is admissible only if (1) the child testifies (subsection (b)(2)(A)), or (2) the child “is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the statement” (subsection (b)(2)(B)). Under the second scenario, which does not apply here, a statement deemed reliable by a judge could conceivably be admitted if the child were “unavailable” and the statement was supported by “corroborative evidence.” Crawford, however, requires something different: where the declarant is unavailable, the defendant must have had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. The situation is different under the first scenario–the one at issue in this case–because there the declarant is not absent, but testifies at trial and is present to defend or explain the testimony on cross-examination. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9. Admitting a hearsay statement under the first scenario thus comports with Crawford. See People v. Cookson, 215 Ill. 2d 194, 204 (2005). That a hearsay statement admitted under section 115–10 must meet the additional reliability requirement of subsection (b)(1) is not problematic. See People v. Reed, 361 Ill. App. 3d 995, 1002 (2005). Indeed, the requirement of “sufficient safeguards of reliability” provides defendants with additional protection, i.e., “protection over and above the confrontation clause.” Reed, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 1002; -12- accord People v. Cannon, 358 Ill. App. 3d 313, 320 (2005). This additional reliability requirement does not affect the constitutionality of section 115–10 because hearsay testimony still must satisfy Crawford’s constitutional requirements, in addition to the statutory requirement of reliability. See In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172, 179-80 (2006).
Defendant next contends that section 115–10 is unconstitutional because it does not incorporate the limitations on admissibility imposed by Crawford. Specifically, defendant argues the statute is unconstitutional because it “fails to incorporate a blanket prohibition of testimonial statements” where the declarant is absent from trial and the defense had no prior opportunity for cross-examination. However, hearsay exceptions such as section 115–10 need not be coextensive with the scope of the confrontation clause to pass constitutional muster. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970) (although “it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values,” the overlap need not be complete). Indeed, the evidentiary question of whether hearsay testimony satisfies a statutory exception (such as section 115–10) is separate from, and antecedent to, the issue of whether admitting the testimony satisfies the confrontation clause. See In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d at 179-80 (courts must engage in two-step analysis, first statutory and then constitutional, to determine admissibility of hearsay testimony). Because testimony is admissible only if it meets both evidentiary and constitutional requirements, the two standards need not be identical. In sum, we reject defendant’s argument that section 115–10 is facially unconstitutional in light of Crawford’s reinterpretation of the confrontation clause.