Opinion ID: 1173806
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Heading: comment on assertion of right against self-incrimination in a civil proceeding.

Text: The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. Article I, section 8 of the Hawaii Constitution is similarly worded. Neither the text nor the history of the great privilege  more properly designated as a right  afford any indication of the scope of its present application. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); see generally L. Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment, The Right Against Self-Incrimination (1968). The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the right applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and is further applicable to civil as well as criminal proceedings. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964) (applying the right to the states); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967) (state disbarment proceeding); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40, 45 S.Ct. 16, 69 L.Ed. 158 (1924) (bankruptcy proceeding). As decisions of the United States Supreme Court involving the Fifth Amendment have proliferated, the rationales underlying the right against self-incrimination have become the subject of close and often critical analysis. [1] In Wigmore's treatise on Evidence, twelve separate arguments have been advanced in justification of the right. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2251 at 310-318 (McNaughton rev. 1961). Yet we need not pick and choose among diverse and disputed rationales at this time. It suffices in this case to consider whether the prohibition of official comment on a defendant's invocation of the right against self-incrimination in a civil proceeding aligns itself with recognized policies and case law supporting the right embodied in our state and federal constitutions. While it is clear that United States Supreme Court decisions and Hawaii law prohibit prosecutorial comment on the accused's assertion of the right in a criminal proceeding, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965), HRS § 621-15, it is unsettled constitutional law whether the same rule holds true in a civil case where the defendant asserts his right. [2] Today we hold the no comment rule applicable to civil proceedings where the defendant asserts his right to remain silent, and base our decision on the United States and Hawaii Constitutions. In Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415-416, 86 S.Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453 (1966), Mr. Justice Stewart set out the policies which supported the no comment rule recognized in Griffin, while refusing to apply that rule retrospectively to convictions in which there had been similar comment. Speaking for the Court, he said: [T]he basic purposes that lie behind the privilege against self-incrimination do not relate to protecting the innocent from conviction, but rather to preserving the integrity of a judicial system in which even the guilty are not to be convicted unless the prosecution shoulder the entire load.    [I]nsofar as strict application of the federal privilege against self-incrimination reflects the Constitution's concern for the essential values represented by our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual `to a private enclave where he may lead a private life,' any impingement upon those values resulting from a State's application of a variant from the federal standard cannot now be remedied [footnote omitted].    [T]he Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth. That privilege, like the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, stands as a protection of quite different constitutional values  values reflecting the concern of our society for the right of each individual to be let alone. To recognize this is no more than to accord those values undiluted respect. Thus the policies to be considered in evaluating the no comment rule are (1) the preservation of official morality in which the state must independently prove its case, and (2) the preservation of individual privacy. They represent opposite sides of the scheme behind the Constitution and the Bill of Rights which operates to take government off the backs of people. Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 25, 88 S.Ct. 682, 19 L.Ed.2d 799 (1968). See McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Supreme Court Rev. 193, 206-14. From another point of view the United States Supreme Court teaches us that a person has a right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty    for such silence. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S.Ct. 1489 (1964) [emphasis added]. Further that Court said in Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515, 87 S.Ct. 625 (1967) that [i]n this context `penalty' is not restricted to fine or imprisonment. It means, as we said in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, the imposition of any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege `costly. [3] ' We find that the comment by the petitioner imposed a burden on the defendant's exercise of his right against self-incrimination. The petitioner's comment emphasized the defendant's invocation of his constitutionally guaranteed right, quite obviously to the defendant's detriment. Compare State v. Baxter, 51 Haw. 157, 454 P.2d 366 (1969). Further, were the defendant provoked to take the witness stand under the threat of comment, any testimony given by him would be admissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding as a party admission. Hale v. United States, 406 F.2d 476 (10th Cir.1969); see Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1967). Such a result would frustrate the recognized policy of maintaining an accusatorial system of criminal justice. The policy of providing the individual with a constitutionally protected aura of privacy is also promoted by disallowing any comment. If the defendant has a right to remain silent, this guarantee should be fully implemented. This is especially the situation when the party asserting his right is involuntarily in court at the behest of the petitioner. We therefore hold that in a civil proceeding the assertion of defendant's right against self-incrimination is protected by the state and federal constitutions and shall not be the subject of any comment or adverse inference by the opposing party. All other specifications of error are without merit. Reversed and remanded for a new trial.