Opinion ID: 2602233
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: This appeal merits application of the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.

Text: We have held that we can choose to address certain issues if they fall under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. [12] There are three main factors that we consider in deciding whether to apply the public interest exception: (1) whether the disputed issues are capable of repetition, (2) whether the mootness doctrine, if applied, may cause review of the issues to be repeatedly circumvented, and (3) whether the issues presented are so important to the public interest as to justify overriding the mootness doctrine. [13] None of the individual factors is dispositive; rather, we use our discretion to determine whether the public interest dictates that immediate review of a moot issue is appropriate. [14] With regard to the first requirement, we have refused to apply the public interest exception to unusual factual circumstances that were unlikely to repeat themselves [15] or situations where the applicable statute or regulation was no longer in force and was unlikely to be reinstated. [16] Neither of those exceptions applies here. This issue is likely to repeat itself as questions of arbitrability are likely to arise with regard to other CBAs put before the ALRA in the future, and no statutory change has occurred. The second requirement for the public interest exception is that the issue will continually evade court review. This question is close. It is possible that this issue will arise again when it is not moot. In Legislative Council v. Knowles, [17] we were uncertain as to whether the issue would evade review in the future, but we were persuaded to apply the public interest exception because in that case the threatened harm resulted when a claim was brought, not when it was concluded. [18] This case presents a similar situation. Arbitrability is a threshold question; thus, the harm is caused by the means of resolution and not the resolution itself. Therefore, we find that this requirement is met. The third requirement is also satisfied. We have applied the public interest exception to situations, otherwise moot, where the legal power of public officials was in question. Specifically, in Knowles, we applied the exception to the issue whether the governor had the right to bring suit against the legislature. [19] Even though later enactments resolved the immediate conflict between the governor and legislature, we agreed to consider, under the public interest exception, the meaning of a constitutional prohibition of such suits. [20] Similarly, in Kodiak Seafood Processors Ass'n v. State, [21] we considered the issuance of a permit for fishing in waters that had been closed for over twenty-five years, despite the fact that the permit was revoked prior to trial, which rendered many of the issues moot. [22] We refused on mootness grounds to consider issues of procedural error that were admitted by the Department of Fish and Game, but we did consider whether the commissioner had exceeded his authority. [23] We ruled that the scope of the Commissioner's power is an issue of public interest. [24] The present case meets the important public interest requirement. As this case raises a question of the power of government officials, the issues are sufficiently important to the public interest to merit consideration. Therefore, the issue, though moot, has met the three-prong public policy exception test.