Opinion ID: 2444445
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: TPR Statute

Text: FL Section 5-323 is the Maryland statute governing termination of parental rights. In Subsection (b) thereof, a juvenile court is granted the right, not present under common law, to terminate parental rights and grant guardianship of the child: (b) Authority.  If, after consideration of factors as required in this section, a juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a parent is unfit to remain in a parental relationship with the child or that exceptional circumstances exist that would make a continuation of the parental relationship detrimental to the best interests of the child such that terminating the rights of the parent is in a child's best interests, the juvenile court may grant guardianship of the child without consent otherwise required under this subtitle and over the child's objection. The balance of FL Section 5-323 sets forth certain factors to be considered and procedures that must be followed. [8] Petitioner Ta'Niya C. argues that the juvenile court erred when it interpreted Rashawn H. as changing the law governing TPR cases to a standard favoring parental interest over the child's best interest, and consequently refused to terminate the parental rights of Ms. L, Ta'Niya's mother. Ms. L, Respondent, contends that the record, when viewed as a whole, demonstrates that the trial court applied the correct legal standard[.] At the time of the hearing, subsection (b) of that statute provided that in order for a juvenile court to grant DSS guardianship of a child without a parent's consent, the court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that terminating the rights of a parent is in the child's best interests[.] As the statute requires and as we have recently expounded in Rashawn, in making those determinations, a juvenile court must consider and make specific findings with respect to the relevant statutory factors under FL Section 5-323(d), and, mindful of the presumption favoring a continuation of the parental relationship, determine expressly whether those findings suffice either to show an unfitness ... or to constitute an exceptional circumstance that would make a continuation of the parental relationship detrimental to the best interest of the child[.] Rashawn, 402 Md. at 501, 937 A.2d at 192. At the time we decided Rashawn, the TPR statute [9] did not expressly require that a juvenile court find parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances that would make continuation of a legal relationship with the parent detrimental to the child's best interest. See id. at 489-91, 937 A.2d at 185. Rather, it required only a finding that terminating parental rights was in the child's best interest. See id. Thus, in Rashawn, a mother, whose parental rights had been terminated, argued that Maryland's TPR statute was unconstitutional because it did not take into consideration the parent's Constitutionally-based right to raise his or her children. Id. at 494-95, 937 A.2d at 187-88. In considering the mother's claim, we recognized the presumption that it is in the best interest of children to remain in the custody of their parents. Id. at 495, 937 A.2d at 188. We emphasized, however, that the parents' right is not absolute and must be balanced against the fundamental right and responsibility of the State to protect children, who cannot protect themselves, from abuse and neglect. Id. at 497, 937 A.2d at 189. Therefore, this parental presumption may be rebutted upon a showing either that the parent is `unfit' or that `exceptional circumstances' exist which would make continued custody with the parent detrimental to the best interest of the child. Id. at 495, 937 A.2d at 188. Even though at that time our TPR statute did not call for the finding of either parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances, we nevertheless found that this necessary finding was implicit from the statutory scheme. Rashawn, 402 Md. at 498, 937 A.2d at 190. Accordingly, in order to protect parental rights, we pointed out that in applying the statutory provisions, juvenile courts must keep in mind three critical elements. Id. First, the court must focus on the continued parental relationship and require that facts ... demonstrate an unfitness to have a continued parental relationship with the child, or exceptional circumstances that would make a continued parental relationship detrimental to the best interest of the child. Id. at 499, 937 A.2d at 190. Second, the State must show parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. [10] Id. Third, the trial court must consider the statutory factors listed in subsection (d) to determine whether exceptional circumstances [11] warranting termination of parental rights exist. [12] Id. What has proved to be elusive in this equation is defining exceptional circumstances, and determining its interaction with the child's best interests standard.