Opinion ID: 2361405
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Necessity of Taking All of Pfeifer's Property

Text: In his first point on appeal, Pfeifer argues that the City never established the need to take all of his property for the creation of the presidential park, and that this lack of proof of necessity for taking his property for a public purpose leaves open a material question of fact to defeat summary judgment. Specifically, Pfeifer argues that a material issue of fact remains as to whether the City needed the southern one-third of his property south of Third Street. He argues that all of the documents and maps attached to the City's resolutions do not show that the presidential park extends south of Third Street into the south one-third of his property. Therefore, the City failed to show a need for the property, and whether such need exists is a material question of fact. The City responds by noting that Resolution 10,441 authorizing the eminent domain proceedings and the complaint in eminent domain specifically listed Pfeifer's entire property as that to be taken, and Pfeifer conceded that $400,000 was a fair-market price for his entire property. The City notes that the burden is on Pfeifer to show that the property at issue is unnecessary, and Pfeifer failed to meet proof with proof to rebut the City's contention that it needs the property for the presidential park. The City notes that, as a general rule, Pfeifer must show that there was fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion in the City's choice of property, and, again, Pfeifer fails to carry this burden. Rather, the City argues that although Pfeifer offers testimony from City planners that it appeared that his property would be cut in half, Resolution 10,441, the complaint, and offer of compensation indicate that the City sought to take his entire property, that prior to the condemnation lawsuit Pfeifer negotiated the sale of his entire tract of property, and that the ordinances and maps, while arguably could have been more carefully drawn, never indicated that the properties shown were the total needed for the project. The power of eminent domain is an attribute of, and inherent in, a sovereign state. Ark. Const. art. 2, § 23; City of Little Rock v. Raines, 241 Ark. 1071, 411 S.W.2d 486 (1967); Young v. City of Gurdon, 169 Ark. 399, 275 S.W. 890 (1925); City of Little Rock v. Sawyer, 228 Ark. 516, 309 S.W.2d 30 (1958). Article 2, section 22, of the Arkansas Constitution provides that [t]he right of property is before and higher than any constitutional sanction; and private property shall not be taken, appropriated or damaged for public use, without just compensation therefor. Statutes that relate to the power of eminent domain should be strictly construed in favor of the landowner, see Columbia County Rural Dev. Auth. v. Hudgens, 283 Ark. 415, 678 S.W.2d 324 (1984); Loyd v. Southwest Ark. Util. Corp., 264 Ark. 818, 580 S.W.2d 935 (1979), and no more property of a private individual, and no greater interest therein, can be condemned and set apart for public use than is absolutely necessary. See Selle v. City of Fayetteville, 207 Ark. 966, 184 S.W.2d 58 (1944). The authority for the taking of private property for public use should be clearly expressed. Sawyer, supra . Broad discretion is vested in those to whom the power of eminent domain is delegated. State Highway Comm'n v. Saline County, 205 Ark. 860, 171 S.W.2d 60 (1943). In Gray v. Ouachita Creek Watershed Dist., 234 Ark. 181, 351 S.W.2d 142 (1961), the supreme court explained: The State, by conferring on the District the power of eminent domain, necessarily left largely to the discretion of the District the location and area of the land to be taken. And one seeking to show that the taking has been arbitrary or excessive shoulders a heavy burden of proof in the attempt to persuade the Court to overrule the District's judgment. Burford v. Upton, 232 Ark. 456, 338 S.W.2d 929; Woolard v. [ Woollard ] State Hwy. Comm., 220 Ark. 731, 249 S.W.2d 564; State Game & Fish Comm. v. Hornaday, 219 Ark. 184, 242 S.W.2d 342; State Hwy. Comm. v. Saline County, 205 Ark. 860, 171 S.W.2d 60; and Patterson Orchard Co. v. Southwest Ark. Util. Corp., 179 Ark. 1029, 18 S.W.2d 1028. Gray, 234 Ark. at 183-85, 351 S.W.2d 142. This court stated in State Highway Com. v. Saline County, supra , that: A broad discretion is necessarily vested in those to whom the power of eminent domain is delegated, in determining what property is necessary for the public purpose, with respect to the particular route, line, or location of the proposed work or improvement; and the general rule is that the courts will not disturb their action in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion. The landowner may not object merely because some other location might have been made or some other property obtained which would have been suitable for the purpose. State Highway Com. v. Saline County, 205 Ark. at 863, 171 S.W.2d 60. In determining whether the taking of property is necessary for public use, not only the present demands of the public, but those which may be fairly anticipated in the future, may be considered. Woollard v. Ark. State Highway Comm'n, 220 Ark. 731, 249 S.W.2d 564 (1952) (citing Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 67 L.Ed. 1186 (1923)). The entry upon another's land is not a right to be assumed by anyoneprivate citizen or public agency. Robinson v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 263 Ark. 462, 565 S.W.2d 433 (1978). A public entity's right of eminent domain is a constitutional privilege granted with limitations. Id. First, there must be established the need for taking for public use or purpose. This is a judicial question which the owner has a right to have determined by the courts. Arkansas State Highway Comm. v. Alcott, 260 Ark. 225, 539 S.W.2d 432 (1976). Second, the condemnation of land must be according to the law. Robinson, supra . And, in reviewing the necessity of the taking for public use, the legislative determination is subject to review in cases of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion. Woollard, supra . Robinson v. Arkansas Game & Fish Commission was decided in 1978 after the court decided Woollard v. State Highway Commission in 1952. In Woollard , the court noted not only that the taking of property must be for a permissible purpose, but also that the judiciary may review in cases of fraud, bad faith, and gross abuse of discretion. However, in Robinson , the court only focused on the necessity and lawfulness of the taking, seemingly in conflict with the earlier Woollard decision. These cases, however, are harmonious in light of their facts. In Robinson , the court reviewed the Game and Fish Commission's restraining orders, which had since expired, allowing Commission employees to enter onto private property to survey for a lake. While no taking had yet occurred, this court addressed the issue to avoid future litigation and found that the statutory scheme required the Commission to obtain a temporary easement, which it had not done, prior to entering onto private land. This court did not conduct a review for fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion, but instead found that because the Commission had not complied with the statutory requirements to allow its employees to enter onto private property, such a taking could not be lawful until those conditions were met. That case was quite different from Woollard wherein the State Highway Department had already begun relocation of a twelve-mile segment of highway before landowners, whose property was being condemned, sought an injunction to enjoin the State Highway Department from relocating the highway. The Woollard court not only considered the necessity for the taking but also considered whether the decision to relocate the highway was fraudulent, in bad faith, or a gross abuse of discretion. This added consideration is proper where, as here, the eminent domain proceedings have lawfully begun according to statutory requirements. In order to prevail on this issue, Pfeifer had to meet proof with proof to show that the City did not need all of his property and that the City abused its discretion, committed fraud, or acted in bad faith in condemning his property for its anticipated purpose of creating a presidential park. Because the City is given broad discretion in deciding what property is necessary now and for the future, see Woollard, supra , we believe that the City's proposal and supporting documentation make it clear that Pfeifer's entire property was properly taken by the City for the presidential park. The proof provided by the City in its motion for summary judgment clearly shows that it needed all of Pfeifer's property for the park. While Pfeifer is correct in noting that some of the maps attached to various resolutions passed by the City do not appear to include the south one-third of his property south of Third Street as part of the general park outline, the City's additional documentation more than establishes that the City anticipated the need for all of Pfeifer's property in the park project. In looking at all of the maps provided with each resolution passed by the City, and in the other schematics provided by the parties, it appears that the City and the architects for the Foundation anticipated that this one-third portion of Pfeifer's property would be part of the park grounds. First, Pfeifer cites in his brief that the maps provided with Resolutions 10,125, 10,374, and 10,518 never show that proposed land condemnation would go further south than Third Street. However, in looking at the maps attached to these Resolutions, the City did two things. First, the City created the Clinton Presidential Park District in Resolution 10,125 described by certain boundaries as: South of the Arkansas River, east of Interstate 30, north of the mid-line between 6th Street and Capitol Avenue west of Pepper Street and north of Capitol Avenue east of Pepper Street, and west of Pepper Street south of Capitol Avenue and west of Bond Street north of Capitol Avenue. This map clearly encompasses Pfeifer's property in the building moratorium area. In the two later resolutions, the City continued the building moratorium in the district, and ultimately condensed the district area in Resolution 10,518 to the following area generally described as: South of the Arkansas River, east of Interstate 30, north of East 4th Street and west of John Street. While the district area definitely encompasses Pfeifer's property, the actual park area is not as clear. The City apparently mapped out a general boundary for the presidential park, which, as Pfeifer notes, appears not to extend south of Third Street. However, none of the resolutions state that this park area is set in stone, and, in fact, the resolutions clearly indicate that the area is a general area. In addition, in looking at the drawing created by the architects hired by the Foundation, all of Pfeifer's property is included in the park area. Because the City was clearly acquiring the property in hopes that the Foundation would lease the land, this drawing is particularly important in establishing what land is necessary to meet the Foundation's needs. In addition to the maps detailing the general area of the presidential park, the City passed Resolution 10,441 in which the City approved the commencement of eminent domain proceedings to acquire, among others, Pfeifer's property located at 115 East Second Street. While Pfeifer argued that this address only covered the north two-thirds of the property, his attorney admitted at oral arguments in this case that the May Supply Company building at that address rests not only on the north two-thirds of the property, but also on the south one-third of the property, making it difficult to split acquisition of the property into two parcels. In fact, this particular piece of information seriously undermines Pfeifer's contention that the City did not need all of his property because dividing the property according to Pfeifer's theory would cause the building to be split in half. Furthermore, Pfeifer negotiated with the City for sale of the entire tract of land prior to the City's filing of the complaint in eminent domain, which included all of the property for acquisition. Pfeifer also admitted in his answer and amended answer, and does not dispute now, that $400,000 is the fair-market value for the entire tract of land. Clearly, the City has consistently stated a need for Pfeifer's property. Whether Pfeifer thinks the property was necessary is not the issue. Rather, whether the City believes that the property is necessary to accomplish the purposes of creating a park area, which it may do, is the issue. Given the broad discretion provided to the City, Pfeifer failed to meet proof with proof that the City wrongfully condemned his property under eminent domain proceedings.