Opinion ID: 1318727
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: need for expert opinion testimony

Text: We now consider the defendant's contention that the plaintiff was not entitled to the benefit of the rule of res ipsa loquitur for want of opinion evidence by an expert that the defendant's conduct fell below the standard of care for delivery of gasoline. The defendant argues that the testimony of an expert was necessary because only with such testimony can a juror conclude that a reasonable delivery person would have anticipated that a diesel truck so positioned would be affected by vapors leading to a fire. The defendant cites for this argument Hall v. State, 290 Or. 19, 619 P.2d 256 (1980); Lynd v. Rockwell Manufacturing, 276 Or. 341, 554 P.2d 1000; and Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Or. 174, 489 P.2d 953 (1971). In Hall v. State, supra , the defendant had contended on appeal that expert testimony [5] was necessary for the plaintiff to establish what would be a reasonable time for the removal of sand from a highway and on review had contended that expert opinion was required to prove that the sand should have been removed earlier than the plaintiff's accident. We said that the rule was otherwise: Expert testimony is an indispensable part of plaintiff's case only when the average juror cannot be expected to understand the issues without that kind of assistance. It is not required simply because the circumstances are outside the average juror's experience if the other evidence is such as to present the issue in terms which the jury can be expected to understand. Lynd v. Rockwell Manufacturing, 276 Or 341, 349, 554 P2d 1000 (1976); Simpson v. Sisters of Charity of Providence, 284 Or 547, 557, 588 P2d 4 (1978). 290 Or. at 27, 619 P.2d 256. We held that expert testimony was not essential to the plaintiff's case. In Lynd v. Rockwell Manufacturing, supra , a product liability design defect case concerning a saw, the defendant contended that an expert's opinion would be necessary to establish that the design was defective. The opinion states: Admittedly, design defect cases sometimes involve technical, scientific issues which cannot be fully understood by the average juror without some expert assistance. In such cases, expert testimony as to the defective nature of defendant's design will be an indispensable element of plaintiff's case. However, when the issues presented relate to matters which require only common knowledge and experience to understand them, the testimony of experts is not essential. See generally VII Wigmore 453, § 2090 (3d ed 1940) and cases cited therein. This is the same rule which is applied in other cases which frequently involve technical, scientific issues such as medical malpractice cases. See, e.g., Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Or 174, 489 P2d 953 (1971); Nation v. Gueffroy, 172 Or 673, 142 P2d 688, 144 P2d 296 (1943); Annot., 40 ALR3d 515 (1971); Annot., 81 ALR2d 597 (1962). 276 Or. at 341, 554 P.2d 1000. The opinion held that from the evidence as to the working of the saw and its components the jury could understand the issue without the opinion evidence of an expert. In Getchell v. Mansfield, supra , a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff had suffered injuries when wires used in surgery to join separated parts of her shoulder had broken. The plaintiff alleged negligence in failing to advise her of the risk of breakage and that therefore she did not give informed consent. The opinion held that the jurors could not comprehend the issue without help from experts and therefore expert opinion evidence that the defendants' conduct fell below the standard of care in the community was necessary. We have no reason to question that decision, but we do not perceive it as helping this defendant. [6] Just as in Hall v. State, supra , and Lynd v. Rockwell Manufacturing, supra , we find that there was evidence from which the jury in the case at bar could understand the issues of negligence and causation without the assistance of opinion evidence. We agree with the statement by the Court of Appeals: The average juror does not need an expert to explain that it is more likely than not negligence to overfill an underground tank and cause gasoline to spill on the surface. A juror can understand, without expert testimony, that a reasonably prudent person would not park a delivery truck with the engine running where it is reasonably foreseeable that gasoline vapors will be present and that the truck would be affected by, or ignite, those vapors. 70 Or.App. at 5, 688 P.2d 1360.