Opinion ID: 2766201
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The scope of the challenged condition.

Text: The district court clearly stated its intention to restrict Gnirke’s access to what it referred to as “pornography.” This was consistent with the Sex Offender Treatment Program psychologists’ recommendation. But the condition as written restricts Gnirke’s access to depictions of adult sexual conduct using a statutory definition of “sexually explicit conduct” that Congress has applied only to depictions of children. This definition encompasses much more than what is commonly understood as pornography in the context of adult sexual activity. Under the condition imposed by the district court, Gnirke may not possess any materials depicting “sexually explicit conduct,” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2), or patronize places where such materials are available. This definition comes from a statutory chapter specifically addressing the sexual exploitation and abuse of children. Under the provision: “sexually explicit conduct” means actual or simulated— (i) sexual intercourse, including genital- genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; (ii) bestiality; 12 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE (iii) masturbation; (iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person[.] 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2). Because the special condition incorporates this particular statutory definition of “sexually explicit conduct,” it prevents Gnirke from possessing any materials depicting real or simulated sexual acts or “lascivious” full-frontal nudity,2 and from going places where he knows such materials are available. Such places might include movie theaters, book stores, libraries, theaters, and large retailers and grocery stores that sell magazines or R- rated movies. The condition appropriately prevents Gnirke from entering strip clubs and X-rated video stores—but it also prevents him from setting foot inside his local Walmart, a library that loans R-rated movies, or a movie theater showing an R-rated film with a simulated sex scene (even if Gnirke enters the theater to see a different film). We are aware that conditions of supervised release are read to “require an element of mens rea,” and that this mitigates to some extent the danger that Gnirke’s ability to patronize certain businesses will be limited. See United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010). But applying the standard literally, the average person will likely have actual knowledge that most places selling or renting DVDs—including local libraries—will stock materials containing depictions of adult sexual acts or lascivious 2 Lascivious is defined as “tending to excite lust; lewd; indecent; obscene.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 13 displays of nudity. The breadth of the condition poses a problem both for probation officers, who must decide what constitutes a violation, and for Gnirke, who should not be left guessing where he permissibly may go. B. The district court’s intention to restrict Gnirke’s access to “pornography” was reasonably related to the goals of supervised release. Gnirke argues that the special condition was not reasonably related to the goals of supervised release. He claims that “no evidence was presented that access to sexually explicit material involving adults” would negatively affect his rehabilitation or render him more likely to reoffend. Gnirke does not challenge the restriction on his access to materials depicting children. In United States v. Bee, 162 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 1998), we affirmed a condition of supervised release that was similar—though not identical—to the condition that Gnirke challenges. Bee was convicted of sexually molesting a six-year-old girl, and, upon his release from custody, the district court imposed a condition that he “not possess any sexually stimulating or sexually oriented material as deemed inappropriate by [his] probation officer and/or treatment staff, or patronize any place where such material or entertainment is available.” Id. at 1234 (alteration in original). We held that this condition was reasonably related to the goals of supervised release because “[t]he probation officer believed and the district court agreed that this condition was necessary to address Bee’s problems with deviant sexual behavior . . . [and it was] therefore sufficiently related to the goal of ‘protect[ing] the public from further crimes of the 14 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE defendant.’” Id. at 1235 (third alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C)). The district court’s rationale for restricting Gnirke’s access to “pornography” is similarly reasonable in this case. Gnirke was convicted of a sexual offense involving a young child. While incarcerated for this crime, Gnirke refused to participate in sex offender treatment and was found in possession of pornography, among other infractions. He admitted to using hard drugs and alcohol while in prison, a factor that elevates his risk for sexual recidivism according to the discharge evaluation. Accounting for this history, the prison psychologists “place[d] [Gnirke] in the Moderate-High (between the 81st and 90th percentile) risk category [to reoffend] relative to other male sexual offenders.” Given Gnirke’s egregious offense, his failure to participate in sex offender treatment, and the psychologists’ recommendation, we conclude the district court’s intention to restrict Gnirke’s access to sexually explicit materials was reasonably related to the protection of the public. C. The condition as written deprives Gnirke of more liberty than is reasonably necessary. Gnirke also argues that the condition the court actually imposed “infringes more on [his] liberty than is reasonably necessary” to accomplish the goals of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(d)(2). He suggests that, in light of the significant First Amendment interests at issue, the district court should not have prohibited all depictions of adult sexual conduct, or prohibited him from “patroniz[ing] any place where such materials or entertainment are available.” For the reasons explained below, we agree. UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 15 First, we acknowledge that the condition imposed on Gnirke unquestionably implicates his First Amendment right to access protected speech. See United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935, 956, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.”). We have said there is also no doubt that “a defendant’s [First Amendment rights] may be abridged to effectively address [his] sexual deviance problem.” Rearden, 349 F.3d at 619 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because a condition may not restrict more liberty than is reasonably necessary under § 3582(d)(2), the scope of the challenged condition is the focus of our analysis. We have previously considered restrictions on sexually explicit materials as a condition of supervised release. In Bee, our court approved a condition that prohibited possession of “sexually oriented material as deemed inappropriate by [Bee’s] probation officer.” 162 F.3d at 1234. In United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002), our court held that a condition restricting access to “pornography” was impermissibly vague. Id. at 872. In Gnirke’s case, the district court tied the definition of adult “sexually explicit conduct” to the statutory language in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2), thereby encompassing virtually all materials containing depictions of adult sexual conduct. Images of adult sexual activity are ubiquitous in advertisements and a variety of mainstream media. By employing the language from a statute intended to apply only to child pornography, the plain language of Gnirke’s condition includes any depiction of actual or simulated adult sexual intercourse, however fleeting or veiled, and regardless 16 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE of how insignificant it may be to the overall content of an art exhibit, play, or movie. Because the condition also prevents Gnirke from patronizing establishments where any depictions of simulated adult sexual activity are available, he could easily violate it by simply carrying on everyday activities like shopping, seeing a mainstream movie, reading a mainstream magazine, or watching television. The government cites our decisions in United States v. Rearden and United States v. Daniels. Neither is inconsistent with the result we reach here. In Rearden, reviewing for plain error, we upheld “a special condition that Rearden not possess any materials depicting sexually explicit conduct as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)” where Rearden’s offense consisted of transmitting pornographic images involving sexual acts between “adult men and infant, prepubescent, and pubescent boys, as well as the display of the genitalia of boys.” 349 F.3d at 612. Rearden had collaborated with “a dangerous pedophile,” and the offense resulted from Rearden’s “interest in extremely vile and graphic depictions of child rape and murder.” Id. at 620. The district court determined that “limiting Rearden’s possession of materials depicting sexually explicit conduct . . . furthered the goals of rehabilitating him and protecting the public.” Id. Because we have held that the phrase “sexually explicit conduct” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) is neither unconstitutionally “vague nor overbroad,” and given the facts of Rearden, we found no plain error in the restriction preventing Rearden from possessing legal adult pornography and pornographic stories. Id. As we have explained, Gnirke may similarly be prevented from possessing legal adult pornography. Daniels concerned a prohibition on “possess[ing] any materials, including pictures, photographs, books, writings, UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 17 drawings, videos, or video games, depicting and/or describing ‘sexually explicit conduct’ as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2).” 541 F.3d at 927. Daniels was convicted of possession of child pornography, and he argued on appeal that the condition involved a greater deprivation of his liberty than was reasonably necessary. Id. Citing Rearden, we held that the condition was not plainly erroneous, even though Daniels was not involved with a dangerous co-defendant and his pornographic interests were less extreme than Rearden’s. Id. at 927–28. There are at least two important distinctions between Gnirke’s case, on the one hand, and Rearden and Daniels, on the other. First, in both Rearden and Daniels, we reviewed the district court’s rulings for plain error. “Under the plain error standard of review, the appellant must show that: (1) there was error; (2) the error committed was plain; (3) the error affected substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Gonzalez-Aparicio, 663 F.3d 419, 428 (9th Cir. 2011). An error “cannot be plain where there is no controlling authority on point and where the most closely analogous precedent leads to conflicting results.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because of the lack of controlling authority on point, any error regarding the scope of the condition in Daniels and Rearden would not have been “plain” at the time those cases were decided. Second, neither Rearden nor Daniels involved the additional restriction found here: that Gnirke may “not patronize any place where such [sexually explicit] materials or entertainment are available.” This part of Gnirke’s condition vastly expands its scope. Not only may he not possess “any materials such as videos, magazines, 18 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE photographs, computer images or other matter that depicts ‘sexually explicit conduct’ involving children and/or adults,” he is also severely restricted in where he may shop, acquire information, and view art or entertainment. Unlike Rearden and Daniels, Gnirke did object to the portion of the condition imposed by the district court that restricts his access to depictions of conduct involving only adults. Our view is that it was within the scope of the district court’s discretion to limit his access to child and adult pornography—which the district court’s written order termed “sexually explicit conduct”—but the condition actually imposed sweeps too broadly by limiting Gnirke’s access to non-pornographic depictions of “sexually explicit conduct” involving only adults, and by prohibiting him from going places where these materials or entertainment may be found.3 As written, the condition’s burden on Gnirke’s constitutional rights is potentially great. The Supreme Court recognizes that “[t]he portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press.” Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957). “[I]t is one of the vital problems of human interest and public concern.” Id. Applied literally, the language of the condition would prevent Gnirke from viewing Oscar-winning films like American Beauty and Brokeback Mountain, television shows 3 Contrary to the concurrence’s suggestion, we do not conclude that the condition sweeps to broadly because we “equat[e] the district court’s use of ‘sexually explicit conduct’ with ‘pornography.’” Rather, as we have explained, we conclude the condition sweeps too broadly because it defines “sexually explicit conduct” with reference to 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) and prohibits Gnirke from patronizing places where materials depicting such conduct may be found. UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 19 like The Wire, or sexually explicit works of art that appear in museums; yet such non-pornographic materials receive full protection under the First Amendment. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997). Because the condition also prevents Gnirke from patronizing places where such materials are available, the burden it imposes extends well beyond possession of what is commonly understood as “pornography” and makes it much more likely that Gnirke will unwittingly violate the condition. The government has not made any specific showing why Gnirke’s access to nonpornographic depictions of adults must be restricted in order to serve the purposes of supervised release, and it is not apparent from the record; therefore, we conclude that the condition as written deprives Gnirke of more liberty than is reasonably necessary. Our conclusion is consistent with the reasoning of our earlier cases, and with decisions from other circuits. In United States v. Simons, the Eighth Circuit recognized that special conditions that prohibit possession of pornographic materials “have often withstood First Amendment challenges” but nonetheless held that a condition prohibiting the defendant “from possessing any material that depicts nudity” involved a “greater deprivation of liberty than [was] reasonably necessary.” 614 F.3d 475, 483, 485 (8th Cir. 2010). And the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Siegel, citing Simons, remanded for a district court to reconsider a similar condition restricting the possession of materials containing nudity. 753 F.3d 705, 712–13 (7th Cir. 2014).4 4 The special condition here is both broader and narrower than the conditions in Simons and Siegel. It is broader because it prohibits patronage as well as possession. But its definition of “sexually explicit conduct” is narrower than the blanket definition of “nudity” in those cases. 20 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE The Seventh Circuit suggested that the prohibition be rephrased to encompass only “material that depicts nudity in a prurient or sexually arousing manner,” which accords with the commonly understood definition of pornography. Id. at 713.5 D. Limitation on the special condition. The district court intended to restrict Gnirke’s access to “child and adult pornography,” but by applying the definition in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) to depictions of adult sexual activity, 5 The concurrence incorrectly suggests that our conclusion conflicts with United States v. Mefford, 711 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2013), United States v. Deatherage, 682 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 2012), and United States v. Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2009). As in Daniels and Rearden, the conditions in Deatherage and Thielemann did not involve the restriction that the probationer not patronize any place where sexually explicit materials are available. See Deatherage, 682 F.3d at 762; Thielemann, 575 F.3d at 270. As we have explained, this part of Gnirke’s condition vastly expands its scope. In Mefford, the district court imposed the following two special conditions: (1) “Defendant shall not access, view, possess, or have under his control any pornography, including any material that depicts or alludes to sexual activity, or sexually explicit conduct as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)”; and (2) “Defendant shall not enter any location where pornography, erotica, or adult entertainment can be obtained or viewed.” Mefford, 711 F.3d at 926. In upholding these conditions, the Eighth Circuit explained: “The district court intended that Mefford only be prohibited from possessing or obtaining pornography . . . . The district court explained that these ‘are limited restrictions that serve the purpose of [§] 3553(a) while preserving the Defendant’s right to view and/or possess non-obscene material that may contain nudity.’” Id. at 927. In other words, the court upheld the condition because it understood it to be limited to what is commonly understood as pornography. See id. at 928. Here, we similarly uphold Gnirke’s condition as substantively reasonable when construed as the district court intended. UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 21 the condition deprives Gnirke of more liberty than is reasonably necessary. We therefore construe the condition to apply: (1) to any materials with depictions of “sexually explicit conduct” involving children, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2), and (2) to any materials with depictions of “sexually explicit conduct” involving adults, defined as explicit sexually stimulating depictions of adult sexual conduct that are deemed inappropriate by Gnirke’s probation officer. Gnirke may not possess such materials, nor may he patronize any place where such materials or entertainment are available. See United States v. Goddard, 537 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008) (construing a facially broad condition more narrowly to avoid a greater deprivation of defendant’s liberty than was reasonably necessary). Contrary to the concurrence’s suggestion, we believe Gnirke’s condition is “readily susceptible” to this limiting construction because it brings the condition in line with what the district court clearly intended. The concurrence argues that we should remand for the district court to craft a new condition, rather than narrowing the condition on appeal. But both this court and the district court have struggled to describe a special condition of release prohibiting access to sexually explicit materials that is sufficiently clear and not overbroad. We believe it is appropriate to provide the district court with a workable alternative rather than yet another directive to “try again.” With respect to the construed condition, we recognize that, as in Bee and every other case involving special conditions of release, Gnirke’s probation officer and the district court will have some degree of discretion to decide which materials the condition restricts. Cf. Bee, 162 F.3d at 1234–35 (upholding condition preventing Bee from 22 UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE possessing “sexually stimulating or sexually oriented material deemed inappropriate by his probation officer and/or treatment staff” and from patronizing places where such material is available). The difficulty of defining “pornography” with any degree of precision is inherent in the nature of this condition of supervised release. Other courts have had occasion to consider how to define the terms “pornography” or “pornographic,” with varying degrees of success.6 And we have suggested that “[t]he term 6 The Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. California concerned obscenity but recognized that “[t]he material we are discussing in this case is more accurately defined as ‘pornography’ or ‘pornographic material’” because that case concerned sex-related obscenity. 413 U.S. 15, 18 n.2 (1973). The Court’s legal definition of sex-related obscenity was narrower than the dictionary definition it quoted for pornography: “a depiction (as in writing or painting) of licentiousness or lewdness: a portrayal of erotic behavior designed to cause sexual excitement.” Id. Pornography is therefore a broader category than sex-related obscenity. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002) (“As a general rule, pornography can be banned only if obscene.”). Others have tried to frame more focused legal definitions of adult pornography. One influential strand of legal thought ties “pornography” to “the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women,” but this definition has not found favor with courts. See Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324–25 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1 (1985)), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). Another scholar has required depictions of actual “physical abuse” with “the purpose and effect of producing sexual arousal.” Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 Duke L.J. 589, 592 (1986). These are attempts at a definition of legally “regulable pornography,” see id. at 592–93, that is, pornography that lacks protection under the First Amendment. Here, we are concerned not with defining the scope of the First Amendment, but with the more prosaic and functional question of how to avert the potentially negative effects of pornography on an individual who has committed sexual abuse on a child. UNITED STATES V. GNIRKE 23 [‘pornography’] itself is entirely subjective; unlike ‘obscenity,’ for example, it lacks any recognized legal definition.” Guagliardo, 278 F.3d at 872. But this does not mean that pornography lacks a recognized definition in society at large, however fuzzy its edges may be. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “pornography” as: “Material (such as writings, photographs, or movies) depicting sexual activity or erotic behavior in a way that is designed to arouse sexual excitement.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009); see also Oxford English Reference Dictionary 1128 (Rev. 2d ed. 2006) (defining pornography as “the explicit description or exhibition of sexual subjects or activity in literature, films, etc., intended to stimulate erotic rather than aesthetic or emotional feelings”). This seems to coincide with the common understanding of the term. There may be various additions and qualifications one may wish to make, but it is evident that, at a minimum, pornography is explicit material intended to stimulate, arouse, or the like. We have little doubt that this ordinary definition is generally what the district judge had in mind when he paraphrased the special condition as: “[t]o not possess child or adult pornography.” And we note that the exercise of discretion by Gnirke’s probation officer and the district court in applying the revised condition will be subject to judicial review to the same extent as other conditions of supervised release.