Opinion ID: 2607730
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: retroactivity of templeton

Text: In State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Templeton, 598 P.2d 77, 81 (Alaska 1979), we held that the Commission's interpretation of its regulations, which allowed it to deny income dependence points to persons who had fished as equal partners with gear license holders, was inconsistent with the purpose of the Limited Entry Act. In Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Byayuk, 684 P.2d 114 (Alaska 1984), we held that Templeton should be applied retroactively to persons who submitted timely applications for limited entry permits even if their applications had been denied. We expressed no opinion on the question of whether Templeton should be extended to persons who did not apply on time. Id. at 121. Although Cashen submitted a timely permit application in 1975, his application was rejected because he had not held a gear license in his own name prior to January 1, 1973. See Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Apokedak, 680 P.2d 486 (Alaska 1984). After our decision in Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359 (Alaska 1976), Cashen became eligible to apply for a limited entry permit, since he had held a gear license in 1973. He did not submit an application during the Isakson period. Thus, although Cashen's partnership claims are similar to Byayuk's, he is not situated entirely similarly to him, since he never filed a valid application with the Commission. We must therefore determine whether the reasons for retroactive application of Templeton set forth in Byayuk require that Templeton be applied to persons like Cashen. In Byayuk, we outlined four criteria to be considered in deciding whether, and how far, to apply decisions retroactively: 1) whether the holding either overrules prior law or decides an issue of first impression whose resolution was not foreshadowed; 2) whether the purpose and intended effect of the new rule of law is best accomplished by a retroactive or a prospective application; 3) the extent of reasonable reliance upon the old rule of law; and 4) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule of law. Byayuk, 684 P.2d at 117. We determined that the purpose of Templeton  to insure that the Commission avoid[s] unjust discrimination by judging all applicants by standards which accurately reflect their relative hardship, id. at 118  could only be effected through a retroactive application. Balancing the need to effect the purpose of Templeton against the potential administrative disruption caused by retroactive application, we determined that Templeton should be applied retroactively to allow Byayuk to claim points for partnership. We conclude that the same considerations require that Templeton be applied retroactively in Cashen's case. Cashen failed to submit an application when he was eligible to do so only after an agent of the Commission totalled the points available to him without including income dependence points for the years he fished as a partner. His actions in consulting with the Commission and having his points tallied by an agent of the Commission were sufficient, as a matter of law, to demonstrate that he failed to file an application in part because of the Commission's erroneous partnership policy. As we noted in Byayuk, the purpose of Templeton was to prevent the Commission from allocating points in a manner which caused unjust discrimination. Id. at 118. The Commission's previous partnership policy discriminated against persons who failed to submit applications because they could not receive partnership points, as well as those who were not awarded permits because they did not receive partnership points. The purpose of Templeton is best effected if both sets of applicants are allowed to have their points redetermined in accordance with Templeton. In Byayuk, we held that the need to effect the purpose of Templeton outweighed the burden imposed on the Commission in forcing it to reconsider the timely applications of persons with partnership claims. This burden will not be increased significantly if Templeton is applied retroactively in cases like Cashen's. Even though Cashen never filed an application at a time when he was eligible to do so, he did file an application in 1975, and consulted with the Commission about reapplying in 1977. He also received a notice entitling him to submit new evidence in 1978. His name, like Byayuk's, was thus in the Commission's files as a potential permit recipient, and, like Byayuk, he was part of a pool of applicants who might have received permits had they submitted sufficient new evidence in 1978. In requiring the Commission to accept new applications from persons in Cashen's position, we would not be forcing it to reopen the application period or to determine the eligibility of persons who have never before applied. The increased burden on the Commission is thus not sufficient to outweigh the need to effect the purpose of Templeton. [3] We therefore hold that Templeton should be applied retroactively to persons who applied for limited entry permits, and whose names are therefore in the Commission's records, and who have shown that they failed to submit valid applications when they were eligible to do so because of the Commission's erroneous partnership policy. Cashen has made such a showing. Accordingly, we remand his case to the Commission to allow him to submit a new application and to present evidence on his claim for income dependence points under Templeton. REVERSED.