Opinion ID: 1231899
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judicial Authority to Call and Question Witnesses

Text: ¶ 31. Wisconsin Stat. § 906.14 is titled Calling and interrogation of witnesses by judge. It reads: (1) Calling By Judge. The judge may, on the judge's own motion or at the suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus called. (2) Interrogation by Judge. The judge may interrogate witnesses, whether called by the judge or by a party. (3) Objections. Objections to the calling of witnesses by the judge or to interrogation by the judge may be made at the time or at the next available opportunity when the jury is not present. ¶ 32. In substance, this rule is identical to Rule 614 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 614. It is also based upon Wisconsin case law. Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, 59 Wis. 2d R, R200 (1973). ¶ 33. Under subsection (1), a judge may call witnesses on her own motion. There are no explicit limitations to this power, but limitations are implied by Wisconsin court decisions. The Judicial Council Committee's Note to subsection (1) reads in part: It is expected that this authority will be used only in the exceptional case. Id. ¶ 34. Subsection (3) of § 906.14 authorizes objections, and it defers the requirement of a timely objection. . . to the next available opportunity when the jury is not present. Id. R202. This subsection appears to focus more on situations where the judge questions witnesses in front of a jury than where a judge questions a witness in a bench trial or outside the presence of a jury. ¶ 35. Given the explicit authority to object to a judge's action, Carprue could have challenged Judge Schellinger's decision to call Kenneth Morrow to the stand. He did not. He could have objected to a particular line of inquiry. He did not. He could have offered a motion in limine to bar the State from calling Morrow as a rebuttal witness. He did not. Consequently, Carprue waived his right to object to the judge's actions. ¶ 36. There are several reasons why we are disinclined to overlook the defendant's failure to timely object. First, the general rule in Wisconsin is that issues not raised in the circuit court are deemed waived. State v. Polashek, 2002 WI 74, ¶ 25, 253 Wis. 2d 527, 646 N.W.2d 330; Apex Elec. Corp. v. Gee, 217 Wis. 2d 378, 384, 577 N.W.2d 23 (1998). This case is very different from State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80, 273 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 203, where the defendant was able to point to a somewhat ambiguous statute to support the proposition that he did not have to object at trial to challenge the sufficiency of the state's evidence. In this case, the relevant statute, § 906.14, specifically addresses a party's right to object. Hence, as the court of appeals said in State v. Wolter, [o]bjections to alleged judicial misconduct must be timely made. A failure to make a timely objection constitutes a waiver of objection. Wolter, 85 Wis. 2d 353, 373, 270 N.W.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1978). ¶ 37. Second, the policies underlying the waiver rule are especially well illustrated in this case. The waiver rule exists to cultivate timely objections. State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 766, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999). Timely objections promote efficient judicial administration by encouraging parties and courts to correct or avoid errors at trial. Id. (citing State v. Agnello, 226 Wis. 2d 164, 173, 593 N.W.2d 427 (1999)); see also Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990). They may eliminate the need for an appeal. In addition, the waiver rule diminishes any strategic incentive to induce error in order to gain access to appellate review. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 766; Vollmer, 156 Wis. 2d at 11. Even where a timely objection fails to correct error, it creates a record that facilitates appellate review. ¶ 38. Here, the judge acted outside the presence of the jury. The defendant would not have been embarrassed in front of the jury by launching an immediate objection to either of the judicial actions about which he now complains. Upon receiving objection, the court might have terminated questions and avoided any questionable conduct. ¶ 39. Finally, because appellate courts are sensitive to judicial intervention by a trial judge in the form of judicial witnesses and judicial questioning, circuit courts are likely to be very cautious when they are given fair notice that their conduct raises concerns. ¶ 40. This court has dealt with these concerns since at least 1881. Yanke v. State, 51 Wis. 464, 466-67, 8 N.W. 276 (1881). We have always recognized judicial authority to call and interrogate witnesses but simultaneously admonished caution against judicial abuse. The tension is seen in the 1906 case of Komp v. State, where the court stated: The right of a trial judge, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to examine or cross-examine a witness cannot be doubted. It is a right that is sometimes most valuable in the administration of justice, but it should be most carefully exercised, and the questions put should not betray bias or prejudice, nor carry to the jury the impression that the judge has made up his mind as to the facts. The questions should be framed to make clear that which is not clear. Within these limits there can be no just fault found with the fact that the trial judge asks some questions of a witness. 129 Wis. 20, 24, 108 N.W. 46 (1906) (citations omitted). ¶ 41. The struggle for balance appears again in State v. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d 527, 129 N.W.2d 155 (1964), overruled on other grounds by State v. Stevens, 26 Wis. 2d 451, 463, 132 N.W.2d 502 (1965). In Nutley, we addressed a claim that, when the trial judge cross-examined the defendants in front of the jury, he created the image of guilt in the jurors' eyes. Id. at 561. We noted that the judge questioned each defendant in relation to internal inconsistencies between his version of events and the version offered by the codefendants. We concluded that the court's conduct was justified in order to clarify a relevant and highly material line of inquiry. Id. at 562. In reaching this conclusion, we quoted Judge Learned Hand's insight that: It is permissible, though it is seldom very desirable, for a judge to call and examine a witness whom the parties do not wish to call. A judge is more than a moderator; he is charged to see that the law is properly administered, and it is a duty which he cannot discharge by remaining inert. Id. (quoting United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 925 (2d Cir. 1945)). In the conflicted manner typical of decisions in this area, we reasoned: While the court cannot function as a partisan, it may take necessary steps to aid in the discovery of truth. Id. ¶ 42. In State v. Asfoor, the tension between the competing interests was very apparent. 75 Wis. 2d 411, 435-37, 249 N.W.2d 529 (1977). In Asfoor, the defendant appealed on the ground that the judge presiding over his criminal trial was biased against him. Id. at 424. The defendant directed the court's attention to several instances on the record that suggested bias, including what this court characterized as the judge's somewhat active role in questioning witnesses. Id. at 437. The court stated: There is a fine line which divides a judge's proper interrogation of witnesses and interrogation which may appear to a jury as partisanship. A trial judge must be sensitive to this fine line. However, the trial judge is more than a mere referee. The judge does have a right to clarify questions and answers and make inquiries where obvious important evidentiary matters are ignored or inadequately covered on behalf of the defendant and the state. A judge does have some obligation to see to it that justice is done but must do so carefully and in an impartial manner. The questions asked here were appropriate and disclose no improper motive nor partiality. Id. The court concluded that the jury was not improperly influenced by any action of the court, and therefore rejected the defendant's bias claim. Id. ¶ 43. Over the years, this court has demonstrated particular concern about the impression that judicial questions might convey to a jury. There has been reluctance to hold that the trial court's involvement in the elicitation of testimony during a trial resulted in such prejudice as to require a new trial. Schultz v. State, 82 Wis. 2d 737, 742, 264 N.W.2d 245 (1978). But the court did order a new trial when the judge interrogated a witness about a conviction that was reversed on jurisdictional grounds, and, as a result, [t]he jury may very well have gained the impression that the defendant was guilty nevertheless. Benedict v. State, 190 Wis. 266, 272, 208 N.W. 934 (1926). In its opinion, the court commented that the practice of judicial interrogation is a dangerous one, and if the discretion of the [trial] court in the premises is abused a new trial will be granted. Id. at 273. ¶ 44. The opinions of our appellate courts are replete with precatory admonitions that trial judges must not function as partisans or advocates, State v. Garner, 54 Wis. 2d 100, 104, 194 N.W.2d 649 (1972), or betray bias or prejudice, State v. Driscoll, 263 Wis. 230, 238, 56 N.W.2d 788 (1953), or engage in excessive examination, Breunig v. American Family Insurance Co., 45 Wis. 2d 536, 548, 173 N.W.2d 619 (1970), particularly in front of juries. Last term, we reversed a conviction after a suppression hearing in which a circuit judge crossed the line of propriety. State v. Jiles, 2003 WI 66, ¶ 39, 262 Wis. 2d 457, 663 N.W.2d 798 (The court must not permit itself to become a witness or an advocate for one party. A defendant does not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing when the role of the prosecutor is played by the judge and the assistant district attorney is reduced to a bystander.). ¶ 45. In the present case, if Carprue had objected, Judge Schellinger would likely have altered her conduct or taken the opportunity to more fully explain her actions. In addition, the prosecution would have had an opportunity to explain whether it had planned to call Morrow as a rebuttal witness before Judge Schellinger intervened. Since Carprue did not object, any error by the court went unchecked, and the record is devoid of any contemporaneous explanation that would have been present if an objection had been lodged. ¶ 46. We presume that circuit judges try to be fair and impartial in their conduct of trials, and this presumption must be overcome by proof except in extreme cases of structural error. A defendant's failure to promptly raise concerns or object when he believes a judge is committing error constitutes waiver. ¶ 47. The absence of any objection warrants that we follow the normal procedure in criminal cases, which is to address waiver within the rubric of the ineffective assistance of counsel. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 766 (citing Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 380 n.6 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting); State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 273, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997); State v. Vinson, 183 Wis. 2d 297, 306-07, 515 N.W.2d 314 (Ct. App. 1994)).