Opinion ID: 2506435
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: South Carolina Historical Perspective and Other Authorities

Text: Although there is no South Carolina case specifically addressing whether reckless, willful, and wanton conduct can be compared to ordinary or simple negligence after the adoption of comparative negligence in this state, there is a trio of cases from our appellate courts that are instructive in this regard. In Stockman v. Marlowe, 271 S.C. 334, 247 S.E.2d 340 (1978), this Court considered whether reckless, willful, and wanton conduct could be compared to ordinary negligence in a case interpreting former section 15-1-300 of the South Carolina Code. [2] This statute created an exception applying comparative negligence in cases involving motor vehicle accidents, although contributory negligence was then still the general rule in tort cases. The appellant argued that, since the statute refers only to negligence, conduct that was reckless, willful, and wanton could not be compared to ordinary negligence. We rejected that contention, holding although recklessness, willfulness, and wantonness are technically distinct from ordinary negligence, they are so inextricably connected and interwoven to the extent that `negligence' in its broadest sense is often said to encompass conduct of the former variety. Id. at 338, 247 S.E.2d at 342. We observed that recklessness, willfulness, and wantonness are extensions of the law of negligence and that the term negligence necessarily embodies all of these kindred concepts. Id. We found the legislative purpose of the comparative negligence scheme for automobile cases could not be achieved unless the broad spectrum of conduct was considered so that a jury could evaluate the overall culpability of each party and bar the plaintiff's recovery only if the plaintiff's fault is greater than that of the defendant. Id. Section 15-1-300 was later declared unconstitutional in Marley v. Kirby, 271 S.C. 122, 245 S.E.2d 604 (1978) for violating equal protection since it applied comparative negligence only to individuals involved in automobile accidents. However, the discussion in Stockman regarding the broad spectrum of conduct that is embodied under comparative negligence and its reasoning regarding the function of comparative negligence is instructive now that comparative negligence is the general rule in tort cases. In a later case arising after South Carolina's adoption of a general comparative negligence scheme, Weaver v. Lentz, 348 S.C. 672, 561 S.E.2d 360 (Ct.App.2002), the Court of Appeals found no error where the trial court reduced the plaintiff's award for actual damages in a wrongful death action based on the decedent's percentage of negligence, even though the plaintiff had been awarded punitive damages. Id. at 684, 561 S.E.2d at 366. The plaintiff argued the award of punitive damages necessarily meant the jury had found the defendant had acted recklessly; therefore, the decedent's ordinary negligence should not have been compared to the defendant's recklessness under our system of comparative negligence. Id. The Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff's argument, holding the award for actual damages was properly reduced by 50% for the amount of the decedent's negligence. Id. at 684-85, 561 S.E.2d at 367. The court reasoned that the rule that the plaintiff's ordinary negligence could not be compared to a defendant's reckless conduct served a valid purpose under the very different contributory negligence scheme; however, the validity of this rationale is undercut by the offset inherent in the comparative negligence framework. Id. at 684, 561 S.E.2d at 367. These comments must be viewed as dicta, however, because there was no objection to the jury charge at issue and, therefore, no issue was preserved in this regard. In another case, Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 529 S.E.2d 528 (2000), this Court considered whether punitive damages should be reduced based on a plaintiff's negligence. The Court held the award of punitive damages should not be proportionally reduced because to do so would nullify the punishment and deterrence goals underlying punitive damages. Id. at 379-80, 529 S.E.2d at 534. Reduction of the actual damages, however, was deemed appropriate. Id. at 381, 529 S.E.2d at 534. We observed that the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions considering this issue have concluded that an award of punitive damages is not reduced under comparative negligence. Id. at 380, 529 S.E.2d at 534. Thus, in Clark, the plaintiff's ordinary negligence was compared to a defendant's reckless conduct in assessing actual damages. However, in Clark we noted: The parties agree that Nelson [ Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991)] requires the reduction of [the] plaintiff's actual damages. Id. at 378, 529 S.E.2d at 533. Thus, we were not asked to specifically address the issue presented in the current appealwhether a plaintiff's ordinary negligence may be compared to a defendant's recklessness under our comparative negligence scheme. However, we now expressly answer this question in the affirmative. Since the ruling in Nelson, the trial courts of this state have, as a matter of course, permitted juries to compare the conduct of the parties to determine each party's culpability and, where the defendant's conduct was found to be reckless, willful, or wanton, the plaintiff has been additionally deemed entitled to punitive damages for this heightened level of misconduct. See, e.g., Fairchild v. South Carolina Dep't of Transp., 385 S.C. 344, 683 S.E.2d 818 (Ct.App.2009). In the current appeal, Berberich argues a question arises whether South Carolina's version of comparative negligence is a comparative negligence doctrine or a comparative fault scheme and argues ordinary negligence and recklessness differ in kind and should not be compared. In contrast, Jack asserts Berberich expressly consented to the case going to the jury on actual damages alone. Consequently, there was no need to instruct the jury on legal terms relevant only to an award of punitive damages. A review of cases from other jurisdictions, as well as South Carolina, indicates the terms comparative negligence and comparative fault are frequently used interchangeably, with no discernable difference in application. In one case a court made an interesting distinction in these terms based on which party was at fault, but this did not fundamentally alter the general concepts as suggested by Berberich. See Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Assocs., 650 So.2d 712, 715 (La.1994) (These provisions of the comparative fault law all share a common characteristic; `[they all] use the term `fault' when referring to tortfeasor conduct and `negligence' when referring to victim conduct.' (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Prosser and Keeton have noted that the use of the terms negligence and fault can cause confusion. See W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 65, at 453 (5th ed. 1984) (It is perhaps unfortunate that contributory negligence is called negligence at all. `Contributory fault' would be a more descriptive term. Negligence as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others. Contributory negligence is conduct which involves an undue risk of harm to the actor himself. Negligence requires a duty, an obligation of conduct to another person. Contributory negligence involves no duty, unless we are to so ingenious as to say that the plaintiff is under an obligation to protect the defendant against liability for the consequences of the plaintiff's own negligence. (footnotes omitted)). South Carolina's system is essentially a comparative fault system, but comparative negligence is the term most often used in this state, and we recognize the terms as equivalent. Further, although there is a divergence of opinion in courts that have considered the question, we hold the sounder reasoning supports the determination that comparative negligence encompasses the comparison of ordinary negligence with heightened forms of misconduct such as recklessness, willfulness, and wantonness. See Annotation, Application of Comparative Negligence in Action Based on Gross Negligence, Recklessness, or the Like, 10 A.L.R.4th 946 (1981 & Supp.2010); 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 243 (2004) (stating reckless, willful, or wanton conduct constitute merely a higher level of negligence and, although the concepts are technically distinct, they can be thought of as extensions of the law of negligence) (citing Stockman v. Marlowe, 271 S.C. 334, 247 S.E.2d 340 (1978)); see also Rickner v. Haller, 124 Ind.App. 369, 116 N.E.2d 525, 530 (1954) (stating `negligence' is generally, if loosely, used to describe numerous kinds of misconduct, including wil[l]fulness and wantonness and observing in common parlance, `wil[l]ful and wanton misconduct' are considered a kind of `negligence' and are so treated under the title of `Negligence' in our most reputable texts (citing American Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris Secundum )). In a case that is the subject of the American Law Reports annotation cited above, the California Court of Appeal held the doctrine of comparative negligence should apply even when one party's conduct is willful and wanton: [W]e conclude that no defensible reason exists for categorizing willful and wanton misconduct as a different kind of negligence not suitable for comparison with any other kind of negligence. The adoption of comparative negligence in Li [ Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975)] rendered such a separate category unnecessary since contributory negligence on the part of a plaintiff was no longer a total bar to recovery for a tortious injury. We apply an old axiom, when the need for a rule ceases the rule ceases. Sorensen v. Allred, 112 Cal.App.3d 717, 169 Cal.Rptr. 441, 446 (1980). In Martel v. Montana Power Co., 231 Mont. 96, 752 P.2d 140 (1988), the Supreme Court of Montana overruled a prior decision that held willful and wanton conduct was distinguishable from mere negligence and that comparative negligence was not applicable when the defendant's conduct was willful and wanton. The court stated this distinction was based on faulty reasoning as it was applicable only under the prior rule that contributory negligence by the plaintiff constituted a total bar to tort recovery as the distinction served to ameliorate the harshness of the contributory negligence rule. Id. at 142-43. The court observed, Fortunately, we now operate under a scheme of comparative negligence where there is no danger of a plaintiff's slight negligence barring all recovery against a willful and wanton or grossly negligent defendant. Id. at 143. Consequently, [t]he rationale for the rule . . . no longer exists and all forms of conduct amounting to negligence in any form . . . are to be compared with any conduct that falls short of conduct intended to cause injury or damage. Id. We agree that the former rule that a plaintiff's ordinary negligence is not a defense to reckless conduct was meant to ameliorate the harshness of the all or nothing result under contributory negligence. Since the abandonment of contributory negligence in this state and the adoption of comparative negligence, the need for this concept has been eliminated. We hold that, under our comparative negligence system, all forms of conduct amounting to negligence in any form, including, but not limited to, ordinary negligence, gross negligence, and reckless, willful, or wanton conduct, may be compared to and offset by any conduct that falls short of conduct intended to cause injury or damage. [3] By this method, each party's relative fault in causing the plaintiff's injury will be given due consideration. A trial court should instruct the jury on the definitions of these various terms, in addition to ordinary negligence, when so requested by a party, even if punitive damages are not at issue. In the case now before us, the trial court declined Berberich's request to define the concepts of ordinary negligence versus recklessness, willfulness, and wantonness, but did instruct the jury on assumption of the risk [4] and other concepts. We find this had the potential to confuse the jury and skew the apportionment of fault in a manner that favored the defendant. For this reason, we reverse and remand for a new trial. We reject, however, Berberich's contention that the jury should have been instructed that any negligence on his part could not be a defense to reckless conduct. For the reasons outlined above, a jury may compare all forms of negligence as part of its assessment of fault. We likewise reject Berberich's alternative argument that the jury should have been instructed that heightened degrees of wrongdoing should be accorded greater weight than ordinary negligence. [5] The relative significance of each party's conduct and its overall contribution to the plaintiff's injury are accounted for in the offsets inherent in our comparative negligence system.
Berberich contends the trial court erred in denying his new trial motion based on (1) the jury charge and verdict form and (2) his claim of juror bias. Due to our reversal and remand on other grounds, we need not address Berberich's remaining issues.