Opinion ID: 7119198
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the policy in suit in force at the time the property covered thereby was destroyed f

Text: 2 ih-sukanoetuaicepoíicyao^1 io®1 delivery. It may be unnecessary to determine this proposition' on this appeal; but, the question being somewhat novel in its character, the writer feels justified in making answer, even in s0 doing, a private rule to reduce all opinions £0 ag few wor¿}s ag possible ÍS violated. This case is governed by Section 1759-m, Chapter 5 of Title IX of the Code Supplement, 1913, which has in contemplation the matter of cancellation of policies issued by mutual companies. Corey v. Sherman, 96 Iowa 114. The defendant company is a mutual fire insurance company, and not a stock company. Section 1745 is a part of Chapter 4 of Title IX of the Code, and governs stock companies. There is a very clear distinction in the law applicable to cases arising under the provisions of the foregoing chapters, respectively. It may be conceded that, when a statute provides for cancellation of a policy upon request, or the provisions of the policy not in contravention of the statute contain a similar provision, a policy may be canceled upon request. The following eases are in harmony with this proposition: Parsons v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 133 Iowa 532; Crown Point Iron Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 127 N. Y. 608 (14 L. R. A. 147); Gately-Haire Co. v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 221 N. Y. 162; Insurance Commissioner v. People’s F. Ins. Co., 68 N. H. 51 (44 Atl. 82); Roberta Mfg. Co. v. Royal Exch. Assur. Co., 161 N. C. 88 (76 S. E. 865); Ohio F. Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 38 Ind. App. 11 (77 N. E. 951). Section 1759-m, Code Supplement, 1913, provides: “Any policy of insurance issued by any association operating under the provisions of this chapter may be canceled by the association giving five days’ written notice thereof to the insured, or if the insured shall demand in writing or in person, of the association, the cancellation of his policy, the association shall immediately advise him, by letter to address named, the amount, if any, due, as his pro rata share of losses and expenses incurred since date of his policy. Upon surrender of his policy and payment of all sums due, his membership shall cease, provided, that during the months of June, July and August, hail insurance policies may be canceled only at the option of the officers of the association carrying the risk.” Article XI of the articles of incorporation of the defendant company provides: “Members may withdraw from the association by returning their policies or certificates of insurance, if there is no loss pending and all their assessments are paid. If a loss has occurred prior to the notice of withdrawal, he must pay his pro rata share of any assessment necessary to meet such loss before the withdrawal takes effect. Upon withdrawal of a member all liability to assessments or otherwise ceases.” A proper construction of the statute and article quoted requires a delivery of the policy to the company as a condition precedent to cancellation. Upon surrender of his policy and payment of all sums due, his membership shall cease. This was the thought that was in the mind of the secretary of the company when he wrote the insured the letter bearing the date of January 24th. The policy in question might have been returned by the plaintiff in person or by messenger. He did neither, but selected the United States mail as his agent. It was the means he adopted to secure his actual surrender of the policy, and the policy must necessarily be received by the' company through the agency adopted. See Crown Point Iron Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., supra. Had the plaintiff selected a messenger to go to Mason City to deliver the policy for the purpose of cancellation, it could not be said that the policy was surrendered until the messenger actually delivered it to the company. In Schroeder v. Farmers’ Mut. F. Ins. Co., 87 Mich. 310 (49 N. W. 536), the court held that the actual surrender of the policy was essential to a withdrawal from membership. See, also, Manitoba F. M. H. Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 14 Manitoba 157; Burmood v. Farmers Union Ins. Co., 42 Neb. 598 (60 N. W. 905); National Union Ins. Co. v. Akin, (Tex. Civ. App.) 160 S. W. 669. The contract of insurance in question is a mutual one, and cannot be rescinded or canceled at the pleasure or caprice of either party thereto. The terms of the contract must be complied with, in order to effect a cancellation. Were the conditions of the contract in any sense waived by the parties thereto by reason of the correspondence had between the parties prior to the fire loss? Conditions of a policy may be waived. Nelson v. Farm Prop. Mut. Ins. Assn., 127 Iowa 603. Tbe first letter written by plaintiff was a request for cancellation. Tbe answer thereto contained the statement, “On receipt of policies, will cancel.” The plaintiff attempted to comply, and sent the policies, as directed. An offer that expressly limits the time that a contract shall take effect, governs in the acceptance thereof. In this instance, it took effect from the time of the receipt of the policy, and not at the time of mailing. Lewis v. Browning, 130 Mass. 173; Haas v. Myers, 111 Ill. 421 (53 Am. Rep. 634). The offer of the defendant company was to cancel certain policies of insurance upon their receipt in its office. There is no dispute in the record as to the time of receipt of the policy. It was subsequent to the fire loss. The trial court instructed that it did not require any stamp, physical mutilation, or mark on the policy to effect its cancellation, but that it would, in law, be canceled when the envelope containing the policy was opened in the home office of the defendant. In other words, the policy must actually come into the hands of the company for the purpose of cancellation. This is a compliance with the statutory provision, with the provision of the article of incorporation, and with the agreement, if such there was, as shown by the correspondence of the parties. The defendant company, having prescribed a certain method of cancellation, in conformity to statutory rule, is in no position at this time to complain. The judgment entered by the trial court is — Affirmed. Evans, C. J., Weaver, Preston, and Arthur, JJ., concur.