Opinion ID: 1897450
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: legal claims

Text: A. Is the Evidence Mitigating?[1] The Public Defender asks us to set aside Martini's death sentence because the failure to present certain mitigating evidence at defendant's penalty-phase trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. This claim requires us to consider first whether the evidence is mitigating, a characterization vigorously contested both by the Bergen County Prosecutor and by Martini himself. Based on our review of the materials submitted by the Public Defender and the testimony at the hearing below, we conclude that the evidence presents a troubling picture that has some mitigation value mixed with a substantial downside potential. In effect, the usefulness of the evidence as mitigation is seriously undermined by its unfavorable aspects. We recognize, also, that the evidence if used would have opened the door to damaging rebuttal evidence by the State. In a penalty-phase trial, the State is entitled to impeach mitigation testimony with relevant evidence of a defendant's past conduct, subject to an instruction that the evidence is admissible only for the limited purpose of rebutting mitigating factors and cannot be used to add to the weight assigned by the jury to the aggravating factors. State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 503-08, 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988); see also State v. Bey, 129 N.J. 557, 610, 610 A. 2d 814 (1992) ( Bey III ), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164, 115 S.Ct. 1131, 130 L.Ed. 2d 1093 (1995); State v. McDougald, 120 N.J. 523, 574, 577 A. 2d 419 (1990). Even with a limiting instruction, in this case the presentation of evidence of limited mitigating value would have opened the door to powerful countervailing testimony that could have swayed the jury against defendant. See State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 431-33, 715 A. 2d 228 (1998) (recognizing defense counsel not ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence where evidence had potential to harm defendant's mitigation case); State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 256, 690 A. 2d 1 (1997) ( Marshall III ) (denying claim of ineffective assistance of counsel involving omission of evidence that, although possibly beneficial to defendant, posed the clear risk of an adverse jury reaction). In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful that the omitted evidence has been separated into two sets by the Public Defender who argues that only the first is admissible. Specifically, the Public Defender claims that she should not have been ordered by the PCR court to serve the second set of material on the prosecution. She maintains that this set contains inculpatory information that would not have been used at trial, and thus is not discoverable under the principles of State v. Williams, 80 N.J. 472, 404 A. 2d 34 (1979), and State v. Mingo, 77 N.J. 576, 392 A. 2d 590 (1978). We are convinced that the first set is sufficiently injurious to Martini such that it too has only marginal mitigating value. For this reason, we need not reach a decision on the admissibility of the second set. [2] In evaluating the nature of this evidence we have independently reviewed two expert reports submitted by the Public Defender for the purpose of showing how the evidence could have been used to construct a favorable social history of Martini at his penalty-phase trial. The trial judge refused to allow the experts to testify or to admit their reports at the PCR hearing. We find that the reports are cumulative and add little to the Public Defender's arguments. Because the reports reflect the experts' anticipated testimony, and because expert testimony is only admissible if it will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, N.J.R.E. 702; see also State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208, 478 A. 2d 364 (1984), we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the experts or the reports. In this case, there was ample testimony at the PCR hearing from Martini's prior counsel and others about the possible value of the proffered evidence in a penalty-phase trial. B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel In Lockett v. Ohio , the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant may not be precluded from presenting as a mitigating factor, any aspect of [his or her] character or record ... as a basis for a sentence less than death. 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964-65, 57 L.Ed. 2d 973, 990 (1978); see also State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 156, 548 A. 2d 887 (1988) ( Bey II ) ([A] state statute may not preclude the jury from considering any relevant mitigating evidence pertaining to any aspect of defendant's character.). Our concern for `a reliable penalty determination'  has persuaded us that a defendant in a capital case [may not] execute even a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. Koedatich II, supra, 112 N.J. at 330, 548 A. 2d 939 (quoting People v. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d 353, 222 Cal.Rptr. 13, 710 P. 2d 925, 931 (1985)). [3] In this case, however, the evidence put forward by the Public Defender contains at best some mitigation potential balanced by a concomitant and substantial damaging effect. We must ask then, whether defense counsel's failure to obtain [this] evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel or whether the omission of [this] evidence constituted a manifest injustice and a violation of defendant's constitutional rights, entitling defendant to post-conviction relief. Martini IV, supra, 148 N.J. at 454, 690 A. 2d 603. That the evidence has limited mitigating value coupled with a potential to harm, and that Martini has expressed his desire to maintain the confidentiality of the evidence, must factor in our analysis. 1. The Strickland/Marshall Test Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984), an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is made out upon proof that the representation is both deficient and prejudicial to the defendant. Counsel's representation is deficient if it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693; it is prejudicial if there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different, id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 698. The Strickland twoprong standard was adopted by this Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58, 519 A. 2d 336 (1987), as the appropriate measure of counsel's performance under Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution. Subsequently, in State v. Davis , we determined that the Strickland/Fritz standard would adequately fulfill the constitutional guarantee in capital cases. 116 N.J. 341, 357, 561 A. 2d 1082 (1989). In Marshall III, for the first time we had occasion to consider the Strickland/Fritz standard in the context of a penalty-phase proceeding. Our recognition of the profound distinction between our circumscribed appellate-review function and the capital jury's significantly less-restricted role in deciding between life and death, led us to modify the prejudice prong of the Strickland/Fritz standard to reflect this dichotomy. Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 250, 690 A. 2d 1. Under the reformulation, prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the jury's penalty-phase deliberations would have been affected substantially. Ibid. As we noted in Marshall III, supra, that modification was a necessary adaption of the literal Strickland standard to the realistic limitations on appellate review of jury penalty-phase deliberations. Ibid. We acknowledged that the reformulated standard essentially equates with the Strickland Court's understanding of reasonable probability ... [as] `a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,' ibid. (quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 698), and that it captures the core meaning of Strickland, id. at 251, 690 A.2d 1. 2. Deficiency Prong The Public Defender argues that Martini's representation was rendered ineffective by trial counsel's failure to conduct a timely and effective investigation that would have uncovered the omitted evidence, and, then, to use it at Martini's penalty-phase trial. We reject both claims. [C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 695. Whether this duty has been satisfied is measured by reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments. Ibid. Put differently, when counsel's decision to limit an investigation is supported by reasonable professional judgments, we will not find deficient performance. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3125, 97 L.Ed. 2d 638, 657; accord State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 624, 577 A. 2d 455 (1990). In some cases, whether counsel's conduct is reasonable may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2061, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695. Thus, when the defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable. Ibid., 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2061, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 696; see also Dooley v. Petsock, 816 F. 2d 885, 890-91 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 863, 108 S.Ct. 182, 98 L.Ed. 2d 135 (1987) (A trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise claims as to which his client has neglected to supply the essential underlying facts when those facts are within the client's possession....). Here, counsel's failure to discover the omitted evidence was significantly affected by Martini's conduct. Martini purposely hid information from his attorney and deflected questions put to him because he considered the information to be confidential. Martini's trial counsel testified at the PCR hearing that he had asked defendant about the possibility that additional evidence existed and that defendant had responded: it had no bearing on the case. When the information was discovered later Martini expressed his desire to keep it from being used in either the PCR hearing or in a new penalty-phase trial. Martini III, supra, 144 N.J. at 619-20, 677 A. 2d 1106 (Coleman, J., dissenting). That he did not want his attorneys to know about or use the information at his first penalty-phase trial is clear. In these circumstances, it was reasonable for his attorneys to conclude that further investigation would not yield anything useful. To the extent that Martini's lawyers had some idea that there was additional evidence, it also was reasonable for them to believe its discovery would result in more harm than good. On being informed about the nature of the evidence, trial counsel testified that, had he discovered it, he would most likely have kept it out because of its potentially damaging effect. Even Martini's original attorney, who had some limited knowledge of the evidence at the time, understood that it was both possibly good and not so hot. Because the evidence, although possibly beneficial to the defendant, posed the clear risk of an adverse jury reaction, Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 256, 690 A. 2d 1, the decision to forego further investigation is supported by reasonable professional judgment and does not constitute deficient performance. See Boyd v. Johnson, 167 F. 3d 907, 911 (5th Cir.1999) (declaring capital defendant's attorney did not perform deficiently in failing to investigate the issue further because the evidence may have influenced the jury negatively), petition for cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___, 1999 WL 412897 (June 11, 1999) (No. 98-9745). 3. Prejudice Prong We begin our analysis of the prejudice prong with the Marshall III reformulation. The Public Defender claims that there is a reasonable probability that the jury's deliberations would have been affected substantially if the omitted evidence had been presented during Martini's penalty-phase trial. In Marshall III, we reviewed a similar claim in connection with certain mitigating evidence not adduced at Marshall's penalty-phase trial, and concluded that the evidence was either flawed or not likely to have affected the jury. Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 252, 690 A. 2d 1. Marshall complained that his sister and son would have testified that his family loved him, and that his execution would harm the family. Ibid. Recognizing that Marshall had already inflicted grievous harm on [his] family by contracting for his wife's murder, and that the jurors would likely have been offended by such testimony, we rejected Marshall's claim. Ibid. Although State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 715 A. 2d 228 (1998), was a direct appeal, it also is instructive. In Morton, we rejected another ineffective assistance claim based on trial counsel's failure to call defendant's mother and daughter or to bring in a social worker to present a social history of defendant. Id. at 432, 715 A. 2d 228. There, we reasoned that the testimony could have portrayed defendant in a negative light or undermined counsel's attempts to portray defendant's mother as an inadequate parent. Id. at 431-32, 715 A. 2d 228. The evidence on which the Public Defender has based her ineffective assistance claim in this case is no different. Here, although there is some marginal mitigation value to the omitted material, its potentially harmful nature and the damaging rebuttal opportunity it provides, weigh heavily against presenting it to a jury. We hold that the absence of the evidence at Martini's penalty-phase trial was not prejudicial. C. Brady Claim In Brady v. Maryland , the United States Supreme Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed. 2d 215, 218 (1963). The Brady rule was later held to apply even where, as here, the defendant makes no formal request for Brady material. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 49 L.Ed. 2d 342, 351-52 (1976); State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233, 245, 678 A. 2d 642 (1996). In order to establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show that: (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence is favorable to the defense; and (3) the evidence is material. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 2568, 33 L.Ed. 2d 706, 713 (1972). Our discussion of the Strickland/Marshall test is directly pertinent to the question whether the proffered evidence in this case is material. In United States v. Bagley , the United States Supreme Court adopted a unitary materiality standard applicable in all Brady violation cases. 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed. 2d 481, 494 (1985); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1565, 131 L.Ed. 2d 490, 505 (1995). Under the unitary standard, as adopted by this Court in State v. Knight, [4] supra, evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383, 87 L.Ed. 2d at 494; accord Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at 433, 115 S.Ct. at 1565, 131 L.Ed. 2d at 505; Knight, supra, 145 N.J. at 246, 678 A. 2d 642. A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383, 87 L. Ed. 2d at 494. As we discussed supra at 261-63, 734 A. 2d at 264-66, we cannot say that it is reasonably probable that disclosure of the omitted evidence would have resulted in a different outcome because, although the evidence has some mitigating value, it poses a clear risk of an adverse jury reaction. Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 258, 690 A. 2d 1. We reach this conclusion for the reasons previously expressed. First, the evidence itself has the potential to negatively influence the jury. See supra at 261-62, 734 A. 2d at 265. Second, presentation of the evidence would afford the State the opportunity to present damaging rebuttal evidence, albeit subject to a limiting instruction. Bey III, supra, 129 N.J. at 610, 610 A. 2d 814; McDougald, supra, 120 N.J. at 574, 577 A. 2d 419; Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 503-08, 548 A. 2d 1058. We conclude that it is not reasonably probable the result would have been different such that our confidence in the outcome is undermined. [5]