Opinion ID: 201474
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: TRPB's Other Arguments for a Protective Order

Text: 50 Evidentiary privileges formally recognized by state law are not the only relevant factors in the Rule 26 balancing act. Rule 26(c) is highly flexible, having been designed to accommodate all relevant interests as they arise.... [T]he `good cause' standard in the Rule is a flexible one that requires an individualized balancing of the many interests that may be present in a particular case. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 165 F.3d 952, 959-60 (D.C.Cir.1999). 51 In particular, considerations of the public interest, the need for confidentiality, and privacy interests are relevant factors to be balanced. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 n. 21, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984) (Although ... Rule [26(c)] contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language of the Rule.); In re Sealed Case (Medical Records), 381 F.3d at 1215 (interests in privacy should be taken into account in the Rule 26 analysis, even when the information sought is not privileged); Ellison v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 151 F.R.D. 8, 11 (D.N.H.1993) (balancing public interest in protecting the nation's blood supply against litigant's interest in discovering the identity of blood donors). 52 The district court has already recognized that Gill has some interest in discovering the identities of the informants, having accepted Gill's argument that the informants would likely have information relevant to whether defendants were reckless in their publication. Gill relied on Downing v. Monitor Publishing Co., 120 N.H. 383, 415 A.2d 683 (1980). The appellants reply that they were not agents of the defendants. 53 It is not our province to weigh Gill's interests (including ones he has argued for the first time on appeal), much less to balance these interests against the appellants' asserted interest, shared by the public, in protecting the integrity of racing and, as well, the privacy interests of the informants. It is enough that the law is clear that the latter two interests are recognized and must be weighed, in the first instance, by the district court. 54 In short, we think the district court should have a fresh opportunity to evaluate the competing interests, as contemplated by Rule 26. We recognize that the district court has the best vantage point from which to perform this balancing, and we intimate no view as to the outcome. We vacate its orders and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. No costs are awarded.