Opinion ID: 2594892
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Confidential Marital Communication Privilege

Text: At the time of the crimes, Peterson and Veasley were married. Accordingly, Veasley asserted the confidential marital communication privilege of Evidence Code section 980, which provides, subject to exceptions not relevant here, that one spouse may prevent another spouse from disclosing a communication that was made in confidence between him and the other spouse while they were husband and wife. At trial, the court and parties were aware of this privilege, and the district attorney did not offer into evidence certain communications between Veasley and Peterson that came within it. The most important such communication, for example, was Veasley's statement to Peterson that he personally shot the victims. Because this statement was inadmissible against Veasley, the court bifurcated the penalty trial to permit Cleveland and Charan to present it in mitigation after the jury had reached its verdict as to Veasley. Nevertheless, Veasley contends the privilege was violated in three respects. First, Veasley objected to Peterson's testimony that when he returned to her home the evening of the murders she observed him wearing a watch and possessing cocaine. After consulting a prominent treatise, the court admitted the testimony. Veasley contends that Peterson's observations were, in effect, confidential communications between him and her. We disagree. As explained in the book the court consulted, the privilege applies only to oral or written verbal expression from one spouse to the other, and acts of the spouses committed in each other's presence do not constitute communications between them, within the meaning of the privilege for confidential marital communications. (2 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed. 1982) Privilege for Confidential Marital Communications, § 36.2, p. 1348; see also 2 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. Mar.2002 Supp.) § 36.21, p. 811; People v. Bradford (1969) 70 Cal.2d 333, 342, fn. 2, 74 Cal.Rptr. 726, 450 P.2d 46 [acts of placing cans in garage and giving wife the victim's jewelry are not `communications' within the meaning of the privilege]; People v. Dorsey (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 706, 717, 120 Cal.Rptr. 508[[T]he privilege encompasses only communications between husband and wife during marriage. It does not extend to physical facts which are observed, which do not constitute `communications'].) Veasley claims he showed or displayed the cocaine to Peterson in confidence, but she merely testified that she observed it in his possession. Substantial evidence supports the court's finding that the observations were not confidential marital communications. ( People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 654, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84.) Second, Peterson testified without objection on direct examination that a couple of weeks before the murders, Veasley told her that he was at the All Star Inn to meet Nelson. Later, in redirect examination, Veasley objected to similar testimony. After the prosecutor noted that it was already on the record, the court overruled the objection. Veasley now claims this testimony violated the confidential marital communication privilege. The issue is not cognizable on appeal because he did not object when she first testified about the statement. ( People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 187-188, 279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949.) Veasley claims counsel was ineffective for not objecting. However, the evidence appears to have been admissible. To make a communication `in confidence,' one must intend nondisclosure.... ( People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 654, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84.) While a communication between a husband and wife is presumed to be confidential, if the facts show that the communication was not intended to be kept in confidence, the communication is not privileged. ( People v. Gomez (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 874, 879, 185 Cal.Rptr. 155; see Evid.Code, § 917, subd. (a).) Here, the communication was innocuous when made, and no reason appears for Veasley to have wanted it kept in confidence. Later, he told others in Peterson's presence that he had previously dealt with Nelson at that motel, and he told Detective Moore that he had been at the All Star Inn. The facts show Veasley did not intend to keep this communication confidential. Third, during redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Peterson why she waited until December 1990 before talking with law enforcement officials. She responded, I didn't believe Mr. Veasley that the murder had been committed. Veasley objected to the statement. The court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the response. Later, Veasley moved for a mistrial because of the response. The court denied the motion, noting that there was ample evidence here for the jury to infer that her belief is not based on any statement by Mr. Veasley, but her belief ... came about through certain observations and through other statements that were received into evidence. Veasley contends Peterson's statement violated the confidential marital communication privilege. However, the court sustained his objection, so the statement was never admitted. To the extent Veasley claims the court should have granted a mistrial, we disagree. The court acted within its discretion in denying a mistrial. ( People v. Delgado (1993) 5 Cal.4th 312, 328, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 529, 851 P.2d 811.) Peterson did not specify what she had heard from Veasley. The jury properly heard evidence that before the murders, Veasley and the others talked about the crime in front of Peterson and implied that they intended to kill the victim. Later Peterson heard Veasley make comments to another person indicating his involvement in the crime. The court reasonably concluded it was unlikely the jury would assume Peterson's statement related to evidence it had never heard rather than the evidence it did hear.