Opinion ID: 3008801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: N .P. seeks a new termination proceeding on the grounds that the closure of that portion of the proceedings violated article I, section 10 of the Washington State Constitution. He asserts that although his counsel declined to object to the closure, he may raise the issue for the first time on appeal because it is an issue of constitutional magnitude. The Court of Appeals found constitutional error but declined to consider it on appeal because N .P. did not preserve the error and did not show actual prejudice. In reAdoption ofMS.M-P., 181 Wn. App. at 312 (citing RAP 2.5(a)(3); O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d at 99). We affirm on different grounds. We find that N.P.'s attorney's decision to consent to the closure was a valid waiver ofN.P.'s rights under article I, section 10. We hold that in a parental termination proceeding, a statement from a litigant's attorney that there is no objection to a closure is a sufficient waiver of the litigant's rights under article I, section 10.3 N .P. argues that there was no valid waiver because N .P. was not advised on the record of the right to a public trial and was not present when the closure was ordered. In criminal proceedings a defendant must personally make an informed waiver of 3 Neither party sought our review of the Court of Appeals' decision that closing the termination portion of the proceedings without considering the Ishikawa factors on the record violated article I, section 1Q. Thus our opinion is limited to the specific question before us-whether N.P. waived his rights under article I, section 10. 4 In reAdoption of Jvf.S.NJ.-P., No. 90467-7 certain flmdamental constitutional rights. See, e.g., Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7- 8, 86 S. Ct. 1245, 16 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1966) (right to plead not guilty); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938) (right to counsel); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312, 50 S. Ct. 253, 74 L. Ed. 854 (1930) (right to trial by jury); United States v. Gordon, 264 U.S. App. D.C. 334, 829 F.2d 119, 123 (1987) (right to be present at trial). These rights are fundamental to ensure fair and constitutional criminal trials, and so such decisions have been deemed f''of such moment that they cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187, 125 S. Ct. 551, 160 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2004). But whether to exclude the public from all or a portion of a hearing on a civil parental termination petition is distinct from the highly consequential decisions in criminal cases that are reserved to criminal defendants alone. We find that the right of a litigant in a parental termination proceeding to an open hearing under article I, section 10 is more commensurate with other constitutional rights that may be waived through counsel. See, e.g., Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282, 287-88 (9th Cir. 1965) (right to confrontation may be waived by criminal defendant's counsel as a matter of trial tactics or strategy); State v. Valladares, 99 Wn.2d 663,671-72,664 P.2d 508 (1983) (withdrawal of pretrial motion to suppress evidence waived constitutional rights); Basil v. Pope, 165 Wash. 212, 218-19, 5 P.2d 329 (1931) (failure to challenge juror or move for mistrial waives litigant's right to claim deprivation of right to a fair trial because of biased juror); In 5 In reAdoption ofMS.M-P., No. 90467-7 re We(fare of Carpenter, 21 Wn. App. 814, 820, 587 P.2d 588 (1978) (in a parental terniination proceeding, failure to affidavit a potentially biased judge waives right to assert deprivation of fair trial on appeal). Following Basil, Carpenter, and Valladares, we hold that in a parental termination case, counsel can effectively waive a party's article I, section·l 0 rights by saying no objection on the record when the judge inquires about closing the court. We stress that this waiver is personal to that party and does not affect any other person's article I, section 10 rights.