Opinion ID: 804283
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: claim of unlawful racial discrimination

Text: Title VII prohibits discriminating against an employee on the basis of his race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Where, as here, the plaintiff lacks direct evidence of discriminatory intent, we employ the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 10 No. 11-5040 Davis v. City of Clarksville 792 (1973), to evaluate his claim.7 The plaintiff has the initial burden of presenting evidence from which a jury could conclude that the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination. Risch v. Royal Oak Police Dep’t, 581 F.3d 383, 391 (6th Cir. 2009). If the plaintiff meets this burden, the employer has the burden of producing admissible evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Id. The plaintiff must then identify evidence from which a jury could conclude that the employer’s stated reason is merely a pretext for racial discrimination. Id. At all times the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. Id. To make out a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must show “(1) that he is a member of a protected group; (2) that he was subject to an adverse employment action; (3) that he was qualified for the position from which he was fired; and (4) that he was treated differently than employees outside of the protected class for the same or similar conduct.” Singfield, 389 F.3d at 561. The parties agree that Davis has satisfied the first three elements—Davis is an 7 Davis’s brief discusses the differing legal frameworks for when a plaintiff has direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. See Appellant Br. at 14-16. However, Davis does not purport to have direct evidence of racial animus behind his termination, and he himself applies the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for circumstantial evidence to his own claims. We also note that despite consistently using the single-motive framework on appeal and before the district court, Davis occasionally states that race was “a motivating factor” in his termination. See Appellant Br. at 16; R. 27 (Pl.’s Opp. to Summ. J. at 8-9) (Page ID #597-98); but see R. 1 (Compl. at ¶ 18) (Page ID #3) (“Plaintiff’s termination was . . . motivated by his race.”); Appellant Br. at 25 (“Defendant’s race and prior prosecution . . . were the motivating factors in his treatment.”). Title VII mixed-motive claims are reviewed using a more plaintiff-friendly standard on summary judgment, not the McDonnell Douglas framework. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 400-02 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2380 (2009). However, in light of Davis’s own application of McDonnell Douglas to his claims, his inconsistent language suggesting either a single motive or a mixed motive, and his failure to challenge the district court’s treatment of his claims as single-motive, we do not treat his claim as one of mixed motive under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). 11 No. 11-5040 Davis v. City of Clarksville African American, his employment was terminated, and he was qualified for his position. The only issue is whether Davis has identified similarly situated employees not of the protected class who were treated differently. To be similarly situated in the disciplinary context, “the plaintiff and his proposed comparator must have engaged in acts of comparable seriousness.” Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 710 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). We consider “whether the individuals have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it.” Id. The plaintiff’s obligation is not to show an exact correlation with another employee, but instead that “the plaintiff and the employee with whom the plaintiff seeks to compare himself or herself [are] similar in all of the relevant aspects.” Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court held that Davis had failed to identify a non-protected individual “who was investigated for untruthfulness, was ultimately found untruthful, and subsequently retained his position.” R. 46 (D. Ct. Order at 15) (Page ID #924). We disagree that these were the correct parameters for identifying a similarly situated employee to Davis. Where, as here, the plaintiff disputes that he engaged in the conduct for which he was disciplined, the principles of summary judgment counsel against considering the truth of the alleged misconduct in identifying a similarly situated individual. As we did in Wright, a case where the plaintiff also disputed the underlying 12 No. 11-5040 Davis v. City of Clarksville facts, we must instead focus on the similarities of the alleged misconduct. See Wright, 455 F.3d at 710. We ultimately held that “Wright and Bradley [were] not similarly situated because their alleged acts of misconduct are of a very different nature, and there are legitimate reasons why [the employer] would” punish each differently if the alleged misconduct were found true. Id.; see also Martin v. Toledo Cardiology Consultants, Inc., 548 F.3d 405, 411-12 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding improper to rely on defendant’s version of facts when identifying similarly situated employees). Here, Moore and Davis were both accused of comparable misconduct—dishonesty to a superior—and their conduct and statements were evaluated by the exact same supervisor, Chief Ansley. We do not consider that the department ultimately found Moore to be merely confused and Davis untruthful because the validity of those findings is what Davis disputes. The plaintiff’s burden of establishing a prima facie case “is not onerous.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). And we “may not consider the employer’s alleged nondiscriminatory reason for taking an adverse employment action when analyzing the prima facie case,” because doing so would deprive Davis of the opportunity of demonstrating that the employer’s reason was merely pretext. Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 574 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Davis has met his burden of establishing a prima facie case because he identified a white officer, Officer Moore, who was also accused of untruthfulness but was not terminated following an investigation into his acts by Chief Ansley. The burden therefore shifts to the City to offer admissible evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Davis’s employment. Clay v. United Parcel Serv., 501 F.3d 13 No. 11-5040 Davis v. City of Clarksville 695, 705-06 (6th Cir. 2007). The City has satisfied its burden because it has identified the City’s policy against dishonesty, past instances of termination based on dishonesty, and a basis in the record for its belief that Davis was dishonest: the inconsistent reports he filed and the eyewitness testimony that conflicted with Davis’s version of events. The burden thus shifts back to Davis to offer evidence sufficient for a jury to find that the employer’s reason was pretext. A plaintiff may demonstrate pretext by showing “(1) that the proffered reasons had no basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate the employer’s action, or (3) that they were insufficient to motivate the employer’s action.” Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009). To survive summary judgment, Davis “must produce sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably reject” the City’s explanation why it fired him. Id. Here, Davis challenges the factual basis underlying his termination. He has testified under oath at his deposition that he was not dishonest; he did not draw a gun when pursuing the white van, and he was not at the same intersection as the eyewitness who saw an officer draw his weapon. Although the City has certainly presented ample evidence to counter Davis’s testimony—the independent eyewitness account and the alleged recording of Davis putting him at Jack Miller Boulevard—we will not question Davis’s credibility in reviewing summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Even when a plaintiff has demonstrated an issue of fact regarding the validity of the factual basis underlying his termination, an employer may still defeat an inference of pretext if it can demonstrate that it held an “honest belief” in its reasons for taking the adverse action. Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807-08 (6th Cir. 1998). “When an employer reasonably and honestly 14 No. 11-5040 Davis v. City of Clarksville relies on particularized facts in making an employment decision, it is entitled to summary judgment on pretext even if its conclusion is later shown to be mistaken, foolish, trivial, or baseless.” Chen, 580 F.3d at 401 (internal quotation marks omitted). The City’s investigation need not be perfect so long as the decision was “a reasonably informed and considered” one. Wright, 455 F.3d at 708. The employer bears the burden of identifying the particularized facts that it reasonably relied upon in order to rebut the inference of pretext. Clay, 501 F.3d at 714-15. Here, the City has offered evidence that it conducted a reasonable investigation and relied on particularized facts in terminating Davis for dishonesty. The City appointed Timothy Saunders, an officer with no past history of racial animus, to investigate the allegation of untruthfulness and interview Davis and the potential eyewitness. Numerous reports written by Davis himself, which he does not claim were doctored, present inconsistent information about the incident on December 17, 2008. There is a recording of Davis stating in his own voice that he was at a different location. Chief Ansley conducted a two-day pre-decision hearing during which Davis was allowed to fully explain his version of the events and his reasons for believing that the dispatch record of his call was altered. Chief Ansley also heard the recording of Sergeant Saunders’s call with Lisa Hendrickson, the third-party witness, who testified that she saw an officer in an unmarked vehicle attempt to pull over a white van by exiting his car with his weapon drawn. Davis did not dispute attempting to pull over a white van and at one point exiting his car and approaching the driver. Chief Ansley also had access to the call logs of both Davis and Hendrickson suggesting that the incidents were at or near 15 No. 11-5040 Davis v. City of Clarksville the same time. On the basis of this evidence, the City determined that Davis was untruthful about the events on December 17, 2008, and terminated his employment. The City is not required to be factually correct in its assessment of Davis’s behavior so long as the City has an “honestly held belief in a nondiscriminatory reason supported by particularized facts after a reasonably thorough investigation.” Wright, 455 F.3d at 709 (holding employer had honest belief based on thoroughness of investigation). Although Davis has consistently maintained that he was never dishonest, he has not challenged the sufficiency of Saunders’s or Ansley’s investigation or the process that he received leading up to his termination. Furthermore, Davis has “offered no evidence to indicate that [the City] made its decision on grounds other than those offered.” Id. at 709. The City has adequately identified particularized facts supporting the thoroughness of its investigation and its honestly held belief that Davis was untruthful and not merely mistaken. Because we review summary judgment de novo, we may affirm on any ground presented in the record. City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244, 251 (6th Cir. 1994). Therefore, although we disagree with the district court’s determination that Davis failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, we nonetheless affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City on Davis’s claims of racial discrimination under Title VII. His claims under the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) must therefore fail as well. Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 993 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding THRA claims apply same framework as Title VII). 16 No. 11-5040 Davis v. City of Clarksville