Opinion ID: 1974831
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: trial counsel and the misidentification defense

Text: Under the two-prong test enunciated by the Supreme Court, Webster must first demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance was deficientthat he made errors so serious that he was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65. If he is able to make this showing, then he must next establish that he was prejudiced. To do so, he must demonstrate that there exists a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The court may address the two Strickland prongs in any order, and need not consider the deficiency prong at all if the defendant has not made the requisite showing of prejudice. Id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. Assuming, without deciding, that Webster has demonstrated that his trial attorney's performance was constitutionally deficient, we agree with the government that his case falters on the prejudice prong. In order to prevail, Webster must show that there is a reasonable probability that a different outcome would have been reached if he had been represented at trial by a lawyer who was constitutionally adequate under the deferential Strickland standard. [12] Put another way, the question is whether the incremental skills of an attorney who passed constitutional muster would probably have changed the result in this case. In a close case, a showing of reasonable probability is not an unduly exacting one. [T]he result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; see also Byrd v. United States, 614 A.2d 25, 30 (D.C.1992). The concept of reasonable probability does require Webster to show, however, that there is a fair prospect that with a constitutionally adequate attorney, the result would have been different. In the present case, in our view, no such showing has been made. Given the match between the lookout broadcast by Officer Quander and Webster's appearance at the time of his apprehension, the notion that Quander misidentified Webster would have to rest on an improbable coincidence. If such a misidentification occurred, then someone with an array of similarities to Webster in appearance, clothing, and speech must have been selling cocaine only a block from the corner where Webster was walking a short time later. If the juggler was not Webster, he must have been Webster's virtual clone. Coincidences happen, but an alternative explanation not predicated on happenstance is often the one that has the ring of truth. Poulnot v. District of Columbia, 608 A.2d 134, 139 (D.C.1992). As noted in our narrative of the evidence, Officer Quander's description of the suspect who led him to the holder was quite detailed. The juggler, in other words, did not look like just about anybody else. Cf. Brown v. United States, 590 A.2d 1008, 1017 (D.C.1991). Where a description of a suspect is as distinctive as the one in this case, and where the arrested person matches that description in so many respects, the chances that someone other than the suspect committed the offense are necessarily somewhat remote. We begin with the suspect's speech. Officer Quander noted in his buy report that the individual in question talks with an accent. Webster is from Panama, and it is undisputed that he speaks with an accent. [13] Standing alone, the fact that both the suspect and Webster speak with an accent would not be conclusive, but one would have to attribute it at least to a mild coincidence. Officer Quander described the suspect as having a Jherri Curl style haircut. It is undisputed that Webster had such a haircut. If the suspect and Webster were not the same man, then by coincidence they shared both an accent and a hairstyle. Officer Quander described the suspect as wearing a black leather coat with fur around the collar. Webster acknowledged that he was wearing such a coat. Coats come in many styles and colors, and this match in dress further reduced the probability that the suspect and Webster were two different men. We now turn to Webster's distinctive trousers. Although there are some discrepancies between Officer Quander's description of the suspect's slacks and Webster's description of his own, [14] it is undisputed that both the suspect and Webster had dark slacks containing the color burgundy, as well as a stripe down the side. The odds against two different men with an accent, a distinctive hairstyle, a specific type of jacket, and dark striped pants containing the color burgundy walking about in the same immediate location are surely substantial, especially in the middle of the night when the streets are relatively empty. Moreover, these were not the only similarities between the suspect as described and Webster as apprehended. Officer Quander described the suspect as 5'7; Webster acknowledged that this is his height. Quander estimated the suspect's weight as about 170 pounds; Webster claimed to weigh 180 pounds. Quander observed facial hair; Webster had facial hair. Quander described the suspect as being in his late twenties; Webster was twenty-four. Finally, Officer Quander testified that he focused on the suspect's face because facial features do not change. Quander's job as an undercover officer was to remember the two suspects so that he could recognize them if they were apprehended. He positively identified Webster no more than half an hour after the sale. In the final analysis, given the positiveness of the identification by an undercover officer whose precise mission was to prepare to identify any suspects, the striking similarities between the detailed radio run description and Webster's actual appearance, and the weaknesses in the defense case, the likelihood of convincing a jury that a mistake in identity was made was surely slim. [15] Webster argues that Officer Quander's identification was uncorroborated, but that is true only in the narrowest sense of that word. The match between the detailed description of the suspect prepared by Quander prior to Webster's arrest [16] and Webster's actual appearance provides powerful reassurance that the officers arrested the right man. It is true, as Webster points out, that the twenty-dollar bill with the pre-recorded serial number was never recovered, and that the serial number was pre-recorded in the hope of recovering the money from the defendant and thus enhancing the prosecution's proof. Although, all other things being equal, the government's case is stronger if police find pre-recorded funds on the defendant's person than if they do not, the nature of the transaction in this case made recovery of the twenty dollar bill from Webster most unlikely. Webster was the runner or juggler; it was the other man who held the drugs and, presumably, got the money. In the final analysis, it is most unlikely that someone other than Webster (but who looked, dressed and talked like Webster) helped to sell Officer Quander cocaine a block from the corner where Webster was arrested half an hour later. Accordingly, Webster has not shown it to be reasonably probable that a constitutionally adequate attorney would have secured a more favorable result at trial.