Opinion ID: 1700466
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether There is Clear Intent for Retroactive Application

Text: In respect to Amendment 7, while the statements of purpose and the amendment stated that, if enacted, it would change the current law that protected these statements and reports, neither the amendment, its declared purpose, nor the summary explicitly addressed retroactivity. The Legislature reviewed the constitutional provision, including the lack of any specific provisions or words addressing retroactivity, and determined that the revision was not retroactive. See § 381.028(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). Since there is no contrary intent set forth in the amendment, in accord with abundant precedent, this Court should presume that the Legislature acted constitutionally in adopting this statute. See, e.g., State v. Giorgetti, 868 So.2d 512, 518 (Fla.2004) (quoting this Court's prior case of Gray v. Central Fla. Lumber Co., 104 Fla. 446, 140 So. 320, 323 (1932), for its holding that [o]n its face every act of the Legislature is presumed to be constitutional [and] every doubt as to its constitutionality must be resolved in its favor); N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Servs., Inc. v. State, 866 So.2d 612, 625-26 (Fla. 2003) ([I]n the absence of an impingement upon constitutional rights . . . an act of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional.) (quoting State v. Bussey, 463 So.2d 1141, 1144 (Fla.1985)); Bunnell v. State, 453 So.2d 808, 809 (Fla.1984) (stating in review of single subject challenge that legislative acts are presumed to be constitutional and that courts should resolve every reasonable doubt in favor of constitutionality). This presumption affords proper deference to the legislative branch of our government. As the Fifth District points out, the amendment stated that it was to become effective on the date it was approved, which clearly states a present effectiveness, not a retroactive effectiveness. See Fla. Hosp. Waterman, 932 So.2d at 354. The majority reaches the contrary conclusion that the constitutional amendment was intended to apply retroactively, asserting that the purpose of amendment 7 plainly contemplates that its application would provide access to existing records by overriding and supplanting existing statutory provisions. However, this Court has explicitly rejected the theory that simply because applying a statute retroactively would vindicate its purpose more fully is a sufficient reason to rebut the presumption against retroactivity. See Arrow Air, 645 So.2d at 425; Metropolitan Dade County v. Chase Fed. Housing Corp., 737 So.2d 494 (Fla.1999); see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 285-86, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (holding that the rationale that retroactive application of a new statute would vindicate its purpose more fully . . . is not [a] sufficient [justification] to rebut the presumption against retroactivity). The First District and the majority define the word patient as one who had previously undergone treatment and then treat this phrase as an expression of a clear intent that the records subject to disclosure include those created prior to the effective date of the amendment. Notami Hospital, 927 So.2d at 145; majority op. at 487. I do not agree. It is important to point out that the word previously is not found anywhere in the text of the amendment or the ballot summary. This language comes from the First District's opinion in Notami, which the majority then adopted. Likewise, the majority relies on the term any, but this term is also not in the ballot summary that was before the voters. The ballot summary and ballot title use only the present tense or future tense in describing the impact of the initiative. [8] Because this constitutional amendment was passed by initiative, in determining the intent behind the constitutional amendment, this Court must look to the information before the voters and whether the voters of the constitutional amendment meant for this amendment to apply retroactively. However, the only information immediately available to the voters when casting their ballots is the ballot title or summary. Cf. Advisory Op. to the Att'y Gen. re Additional Homestead Tax Exemption, 880 So.2d 646, 653-54 (Fla.2004) (Voters deciding whether to approve a proposed amendment to our constitution never see the actual text of the proposed amendment. They vote based only on the ballot title and the summary.). This becomes very important when viewed in light of this Court's precedent, which emphasizes that whether a drafter intended a certain effect does not matter nearly as much as the probable intent of the voters as evidenced by the materials they had available. See Myers v. Hawkins, 362 So.2d 926, 930 (Fla.1978) (We have already held that the intent of the framer of a constitutional provision adopted by initiative petition will be given less weight in discerning the meaning of an ambiguous constitutional term that [sic] the probable intent of the people who reviewed the literature and the proposal submitted for their consideration.); Williams v. Smith, 360 So.2d 417, 420 n. 5 (Fla.1978) (In analyzing a constitutional amendment adopted by initiative rather than by legislative or constitution revision commission vote, the intent of the framers should be accorded less significance than the intent of the voters as evidenced by materials they had available as predicate for their collective decision.). In applying those principles to this case, this Court must recognize that the ballot summary and ballot title have none of the ambiguous terms which allegedly show an intent for retroactive applicationinstead, these materials show a clear intent that the constitutional provision will only apply prospectively. In looking to the amendment itself, the amendment provides that a patient is an individual who, in the present or in the past, has sought or undergone treatment and by this amendment the patient is provided a right to records made by a health care facility or provider relating to any adverse medical incident. As this Court held in Advisory Opinion to Attorney General re Patients' Right to Know, 880 So.2d 617, 618 (Fla.2004), and as set forth in the majority opinion at page 488, the purpose of the amendment was to create a constitutional right to access the records. It logically follows that the past treatment to which the amendment extends is to the date of the creation of the right, which is the effective date of the amendment. The majority in its footnote 4 cites to State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. University of Akron, 64 Ohio St.2d 392, 415 N.E.2d 310 (1980). The majority, however, omits the part of the Ohio decision that is essential in analyzing the question of retroactivity here. That part states: Any interests in confidentiality that may have been affected by reliance upon prior law in compiling these reports by the university are adequately safeguarded by R.C. 149.43 itself. These interests are dealt with extensively in R.C. 149.43(A)(2) and (4) which define confidential law enforcement investigatory records and trial preparation records which are exempted from public availability. Id. at 314 (emphasis added). This part of the decision from the Ohio Supreme Court demonstrates another reason why the present amendment cannot be properly applied retroactively because the amendment, unlike the Ohio provision, does not have a provision that the records made upon the reliance of the existing statutory privilege are safeguarded so that the State's promise of nonavailability is kept. Similarly, State of Hawai'i Organization of Police Officers v. Society of Professional Journalists, 83 Hawai'i 378, 927 P.2d 386, 397 (1996), affects only an agency's prospective duty of disclosure and impairs no existing rights.