Opinion ID: 2345844
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interlocutory Orders

Text: There are limited exceptions to the final judgment rule; in Salvagno v. Frew, 388 Md. 605, 615, 881 A.2d 660, 666 (2005), Judge Alan M. Wilner, writing for the Court, identified them as: [W]e have made clear that the right to seek appellate review of a trial court's ruling ordinarily must await the entry of a final judgment that disposes of all claims against all parties, and that there are only three exceptions to that final judgment requirement: appeals from interlocutory orders specifically allowed by statute; immediate appeals permitted under Maryland Rule 2-602; and appeals from interlocutory rulings allowed under the common law collateral order doctrine. Appeals from interlocutory orders specifically allowed by statute are those delineated in Section 12-303: A party may appeal from any of the following interlocutory orders entered by a circuit court in a civil case: (1) An order entered with regard to the possession of property with which the action is concerned or with reference to the receipt or charging of the income, interest, or dividends therefrom, or the refusal to modify, dissolve, or discharge such an order; (2) An order granting or denying a motion to quash a writ of attachment; and (3) An order: (i) Granting or dissolving an injunction, but if the appeal is from an order granting an injunction, only if the appellant has first filed his answer in the cause; (ii) Refusing to dissolve an injunction, but only if the appellant has first filed his answer in the cause; (iii) Refusing to grant an injunction; and the right of appeal is not prejudiced by the filing of an answer to the bill of complaint or petition for an injunction on behalf of any opposing party, nor by the taking of depositions in reference to the allegations of the bill of complaint to be read on the hearing of the application for an injunction; (iv) Appointing a receiver but only if the appellant has first filed his answer in the cause; (v) For the sale, conveyance, or delivery of real or personal property or the payment of money, or the refusal to rescind or discharge such an order, unless the delivery or payment is directed to be made to a receiver appointed by the court; (vi) Determining a question of right between the parties and directing an account to be stated on the principle of such determination; (vii) Requiring bond from a person to whom the distribution or delivery of property is directed, or withholding distribution or delivery and ordering the retention or accumulation of property by the fiduciary or its transfer to a trustee or receiver, or deferring the passage of the court's decree in an action under Title 10, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules; (viii) Deciding any question in an insolvency proceeding brought under Title 15, Subtitle 1 of the Commercial Law Article; (ix) Granting a petition to stay arbitration pursuant to § 3-208 of this article; (x) Depriving a parent, grandparent, or natural guardian of the care and custody of his child, or changing the terms of such an order; and (xi) Denying immunity asserted under § 5-525 or § 5-526 of this article. (Emphasis added). In interpreting Section 12-303 our goal is, as it always is in statutory interpretation, to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the Rules. Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 172, 935 A.2d 699, 708 (2007); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 352, 879 A.2d 1049, 1055 (2005). See also Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene v. Kelly, 397 Md. 399, 419-20, 918 A.2d 470, 482 (2007). We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that `no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.' Barbre, 402 Md. at 172, 935 A.2d at 708; Kelly, 397 Md. at 420, 918 A.2d at 482. See also Kane v. Bd. of Appeals of Prince George's County, 390 Md. 145, 167, 887 A.2d 1060, 1073 (2005). If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute's provisions and our analysis ends. Barbre, 402 Md. at 173, 935 A.2d at 708-09; Kelly, 397 Md. at 419, 918 A.2d at 482; City of Frederick v. Pickett, 392 Md. 411, 427, 897 A.2d 228, 237 (2006); Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604-05, 861 A.2d 78, 81 (2004). In construing a statute, [w]e neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute's meaning. Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 181, 776 A.2d 645, 654 (2001). See, e.g., Lamone v. Capozzi, 396 Md. 53, 72, 912 A.2d 674, 685 (2006) ([T]his Court ... first will look to the normal, plain meaning of the language, and, if the language is clear and unambiguous, it will not look past those terms.) (internal quotations omitted); Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 668, 911 A.2d 1245, 1254 (2006) (When interpreting a statute, the ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology.) (internal quotations omitted); Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 224, 909 A.2d 1020, 1026 (2006); Sears v. Gussin, 350 Md. 552, 562, 714 A.2d 188, 192 (1998) (The words of the statute should be given their ordinary and commonly understood meaning); In re Special Investigation No. 236, 295 Md. 573, 576, 458 A.2d 75, 76 (1983) ([T]he Court considers the language of an enactment in its natural and ordinary signification. A corollary to this rule is that if there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of a statute, there is usually no need to look elsewhere to ascertain the intent of the General Assembly.). Occasionally we see fit to examine extrinsic sources of legislative intent merely as a check of our reading of a statute's plain language. Robey v. State, 397 Md. 449, 454, 918 A.2d 499, 502 (2007), citing Stanley v. State, 390 Md. 175, 185, 887 A.2d 1078, 1084 (2005). In such instances, we may find useful the context of a statute, the overall statutory scheme, and archival legislative history of relevant enactments. Id. Both FutureCare and Ms. Addison argue that the language of Section 12-303(3)(ix) is unambiguous. FutureCare argues that the dictionary definitions of petition and stay demonstrate that Ms. Addison's opposition to FutureCare's Motion to Compel Arbitration was, in fact, a Petition to Stay Arbitration, and that the denial of FutureCare's Motion to Compel Arbitration was equivalent to the grant of a petition to stay arbitration. FutureCare further argues that the legislative history of the Section confirms its interpretation. Ms. Addison argues that an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is not an appealable interlocutory order because Section 12-303 explicitly identifies an order granting a petition to stay arbitration as an appealable interlocutory order, but excludes orders denying motions to compel arbitration. Ms. Addison explains that, [n]o ordinary or commonly understood meaning of `petition to stay arbitration' includes a `petition to stay litigation ' or to ` compel arbitration.' (emphasis in original). Section 12-303(3) includes eleven specific interlocutory orders from which an appeal may be taken, none of which identifies a motion to compel arbitration, while the grant of a stay of arbitration is explicitly identified in Section 12-303(3)(ix). When a statute expressly sets forth certain exceptions to the coverage of the enactment, this Court cannot disregard the mandate of the Legislature and insert an exception, where none has been made by the Legislature, Johnson v. Baltimore, 387 Md. 1, 15, 874 A.2d 439, 447-48 (2005) (holding that statutory language providing an exception for firefighters suffering from a particular occupational disease to collect dual workers compensation benefits was unambiguous and did not provide the same exception to the dependents of those individuals), quoting Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 186 Md. 371, 375, 46 A.2d 619, 621 (1946). See, e.g., Nasseri v. Geico, 390 Md. 188, 198, 888 A.2d 284, 290 (2005) (Where there are exceptions ... expressly authorized by the Legislature, this Court has consistently refused to recognize exceptions [to statutorily mandated insurance coverage] which were not authorized by the Legislature) (internal quotations omitted); Selig v. State Highway Admin., 383 Md. 655, 672, 861 A.2d 710, 720 (2004) (When the legislature has expressly enumerated certain exceptions to a principle, courts ... should be reluctant thereafter to create additional exceptions.); O'Connor v. Baltimore County, 382 Md. 102, 113, 854 A.2d 1191, 1198 (2004) (We will not ... insert language to impose exceptions ... not set forth by the legislature.) (internal quotations omitted); Salamon v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 379 Md. 301, 311-15, 841 A.2d 858, 864-67 (2004) (holding that a car insurance company did not have authority to add a pizza delivery exclusion to its insurance contracts when such an exclusion was neither expressly nor implicitly listed as an allowable statutory exclusion to mandatory insurance statutes); Lewis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 368 Md. 44, 48-51, 792 A.2d 272, 274-76 (2002) (holding an insurance policy provision which reduced the amount of uninsured motorist benefits, to which the insured is otherwise entitled, by the amount of money which the insurer had previously paid to the insured under a medical payments endorsement in the policy was not an exception expressly authorized by the Legislature). The explicit inclusion of a grant of a motion to stay arbitration with respect to appealability while the concomitant exclusion of appealability of a denial of a motion to compel arbitration is buttressed by the 1973 recodification of the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, [15] in which the General Assembly removed the denial of a motion to compel arbitration from the list of interlocutory orders from which an appeal could be taken. In 1973, the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act was situated in Sections 1 to 23 of Article 7, Maryland Code (1957, 1968 Repl.Vol.). Section 2 of Article 7 controlled judicial authority to order or stay arbitration upon application of a party for arbitration. Section 18 of Article 7 provided that an appeal could be taken from both an order denying an application to compel arbitration and an order granting an application to stay arbitration: (a) An appeal may be taken from: (1) An order denying an application to compel arbitration made under § 2; (2) An order granting an application to stay arbitration made under § 2(b); (3) An order confirming or denying confirmation of an award; (4) An order modifying or correcting an award; (5) An order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or (6) A judgment or decree entered pursuant to the provisions of this article. (b) The appeal shall be taken in the manner and to the same extent as from orders or judgments in a civil action. Included in the reports to the General Assembly from the Commission to Revise the Annotated Code, was a proposed recodification of the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act into a newly entitled Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, most specifically, for our purpose, are those sections then and now codified as Sections 3-207, 3-208, and 12-303. Section 3-207 controlled orders to arbitrate, was derived from former Article 7 Section 2(a), and was recodified and now provides: (a) Refusal to arbitrate. If a party to an arbitration agreement described in § 3-202 of this subtitle refuses to arbitrate, the other party may file a petition with a court to order arbitration. (b) Denial of existence of arbitration agreement. If the opposing party denies existence of an arbitration agreement, the court shall proceed expeditiously to determine if the agreement exists. (c) Determination by court. If the court determines that the agreement exists, it shall order arbitration. Otherwise it shall deny the petition. The Revisor's Note [16] to Section 3-207 stated: This section is new language derived from Art. 7, § 2(a). Provisions of subsection (a) are separated from other provisions of § 2 to emphasize the difference between the court's order with respect to an arbitration agreement and a stay of arbitration. (Emphasis added). Section 3-208 controlled stays of arbitration, was derived from former Article 7 Sections 2(b) and (c), and was recodified and now provides: (a) Petition to stay. If a party denies existence of the arbitration agreement, he may petition a court to stay commenced or threatened arbitration proceedings. (b) Filing of petition. (1) A petition to stay arbitration shall be filed with the court where a petition to order arbitration has been filed. (2) If a petition for order to arbitrate has not been filed, the petition to stay arbitration may be filed in any court subject to venue provisions of Title 6 of this article. (c) Determination of existence of arbitration agreement. If the court determines that existence of the arbitration agreement is in substantial and bona fide dispute, it shall try this issue promptly and order a stay if it finds for the petitioner. If the court finds for the adverse party, it shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration. The Revisor's Note to Section 3-208 provided: This section is new language derived from Art. 7, § 2(b) and (c). The term petition is substituted for application in accordance with Art. 7, § 15. The reorganization of provisions has been made to emphasize diversity. (Emphasis added). The list of appealable interlocutory orders, formerly located in Section 18 of Article 7, was recodified as Section 12-303. The only order explicitly mentioning arbitration was and continues to be in Section 12-303(3)(ix), which permits a party to appeal an order [g]ranting a petition to stay arbitration pursuant to § 3-208 of this article; its Revisor's Note stated: In addition, paragraph (9) [the section allowing an interlocutory appeal from an order [g]ranting an application to stay arbitration pursuant to § 3-207] picks up a provision of Art. 7, § 18. Sec. 18 deals with appeals with respect to arbitration and award. Most of its language deals with appeals from final judgments and is thus covered by § 12-301. The particular provision contained in paragraph (9) might authorize an appeal from an interlocutory judgment, and thus is included here. Art. 7, § 18 is proposed for repeal; see Maietta v. Greenfield, 267 Md. 287, 297 A.2d 244 (1972). On this record, FutureCare argues that no substantive change was intended by the recodification, and the grant of a petition to stay arbitration must be construed as identical to a motion to compel arbitration. FutureCare cites, in this regard, to numerous reports from the Commission to Revise the Annotated Code, [17] and to our holding in Welch v. Humphrey, 200 Md. 410, 90 A.2d 686 (1952), for our approach to construing statutes resulting from a code revision: [T]he principal function of a Code is to reorganize the statutes and state them in a simpler form. Consequently any changes made in them by a Code are presumed to be for the purpose of clarity rather than change of meaning. Therefore, even a change in the phraseology of a statute by a codification thereof will not ordinarily modify the law, unless the change is so radical and material that the intention of the Legislature to modify the law appears unmistakably from the language of the Code. Id. at 417, 90 A.2d at 689 (citation omitted). Ms. Addison argues, conversely, that when the Legislature recodified the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, the deletion of the earlier provision allowing for interlocutory appeals from orders denying an application to compel arbitration was an appropriate alteration, because it was the Legislature's prerogative to allow appeals from interlocutory orders granting a stay of arbitration pursuant to Section 3-208 rather than from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to Section 3-207. She urges that each State is free to choose its appellate procedures regarding arbitration, so long as those procedural rules do not undermine the objectives of arbitration, as we noted in Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, 363 Md. 232, 246, 768 A.2d 620, 627 (2001). [18] The fact that the panel of the Court of Special Appeals opined that, [t]here is little difference between the denial of a motion to arbitrate and a CJ § 12-303(3)(ix) order staying arbitration: both stop arbitration does not dispose of the matter, because the grant of a motion to stay arbitration and the denial of a motion to compel arbitration must be identical in order to support FutureCare's approach, which they are not. The grant of a stay of arbitration can be analogized to an order granting an injunction, which is appealable under Section 12-303(3)(i), because it defines the forum. A court's refusal to stay its own proceedings, intertwined with the denial of a motion to compel, on the other hand, is not equivalent to the denial of an injunction, because a forum is maintained. See e.g., Highfield Water Co. v. Washington County Sanitary Dist., 295 Md. 410, 416, 456 A.2d 371, 374 (1983) ([A] trial court's refusal to stay its own proceedings until the conclusion of another court case pending between the same parties ordinarily does not constitute the denial of an injunction.). [19] Rather, the denial of a motion to compel is often recognized as interlocutory and nonappealable, because it maintains the status quo and is reviewable at the conclusion of the case, after final judgment. See, e.g., Sigma Reproductive Health Ctr. v. State, 297 Md. 660, 667, 467 A.2d 483, 486 (1983) (listing numerous interlocutory and nonappealable orders). See also County Comm'rs for St. Mary's County v. Lacer, 393 Md. 415, 428, 903 A.2d 378, 386 (2006) (This Court has consistently held that discovery orders, being interlocutory in nature, are not ordinarily appealable prior to a final judgment terminating the case in the trial court.) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Brooks v. State, 320 Md. 516, 527-28, 578 A.2d 783, 787-88 (1990) (Denial of motion to compel disclosure of State's informer reviewable on appeal after conviction); Avery v. State, 15 Md.App. 520, 535-38, 292 A.2d 728, 740-42 (1972) (Denial of motion to compel State to produce records reviewable on appeal after conviction). Granting a stay of arbitration pursuant to Section 3-208an explicitly listed appealable interlocutory order under Section 12-303thus, would change the forum for dispute resolution from arbitration to the courts, and if filed in a separate action, could conceivably deny a forum altogether. The denial of a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to Section 3-207, however, keeps the parties in court, which may not preclude future arbitration. We note, in this regard, that the Legislature recognized the distinction by including the grant of a stay of arbitration in Section 12-303, but removing the denial of a motion to compel arbitration. The Revisor's Notes to Sections 3-207 and 3-208 explain that the changes pursuant to the recodification emphasize the difference between the court's order with respect to an arbitration agreement and a stay of arbitration, and that [t]he reorganization of provisions has been made to emphasize diversity.