Opinion ID: 2735150
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Witness Bolstering by the Government

Text: Barkus argues that the government improperly bolstered Helfgott’s testimony by introducing Helfgott’s plea agreement, supplemental information, and criminal judgment and using them as substantive evidence of Barkus’s guilt, ultimately prejudicing the outcome. Barkus argues that the prejudicial effect was exacerbated by the failure of the district court to give the jury a contemporaneous cautionary instruction during the direct examination of Helfgott. Where counsel fails to object to the government’s questioning, we review the government’s statements for plain error. Zidell, 323 F.3d at 425. Our “authority to correct a plain error is discretionary, and should be employed only if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)). Where counsel fails to request a limiting or curative instruction, we can only reverse for plain error affecting substantial rights. United States v. Benson, 591 F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir. 2010). Helfgott testified that he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud the United States and that the other charges against him were dismissed. He acknowledged that, as part of his plea agreement, the government agreed to a downward departure in his sentence if he cooperated and provided assistance in the defendants’ investigation. Helfgott testified that he was sentenced to - 20 - Case Nos. 12-4056; 4060 United States v. Lombardo and Barkus 18 months’ imprisonment, a sentence below the Guideline range that was contemplated in the plea agreement, over the government’s objection. In eliciting this information, the government published the plea agreement, the supplemental information, and the criminal judgment to the jury. The government questioned Helfgott about the objects of the conspiracy as set forth in his plea agreement. Helfgott testified that he did not dispute the facts to which he pleaded guilty, but also testified as to what he actually did. Then, the district court admonished the jury that “[t]he fact that Steven Helfgott has pleaded guilty to a crime is not evidence that the defendant is guilty, and you cannot consider this against the defendant in any way.” “[C]o-conspirator guilty pleas are not admissible as substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” Benson, 591 F.3d at 498. However, they may be introduced if the coconspirator testifies at trial for the limited purpose of assessing his credibility. Id. “[A] plea agreement could be interpreted as either bolstering or hurting a witness’ credibility, so [] introduction of the entire agreement is appropriate to permit the jury ‘to consider fully the possible conflicting motivations underlying the witness’ testimony.’” United States v. Thornton, 609 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 416 (6th Cir. 2000)). Further, the government may want to introduce the plea “so as to blunt defense efforts at impeachment and dispel the suggestion that the government or its witness has something to hide.” Id. (quoting United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203, 214 (6th Cir. 1986)). Even though a co-conspirator’s guilty plea can be especially prejudicial if it is introduced in connection with the conspiracy for which the defendant is charged, much of the potential for prejudice is negated when the co-conspirator testifies about the underlying facts. Id. at 378. For example, in Thornton, the court held that the potential prejudice of the plea was negated because the co-conspirator testified directly to the acts and his relationship with the defendant. Id. - 21 - Case Nos. 12-4056; 4060 United States v. Lombardo and Barkus When a guilty plea is offered to assess a co-conspirator’s credibility as a witness, “the district court must give a cautionary instruction to the jury informing them of the limited scope in which they may consider the evidence of a guilty plea.” Benson, 591 F.3d at 498. Evidence of Helfgott’s guilty plea was admissible for the purpose of assessing his credibility as a witness. It was within the government’s rights to ask Helfgott about his plea so as to blunt any defense efforts to impeach Helfgott’s credibility. It was also appropriate for the government to introduce the entire agreement so the jury could fully consider Helfgott’s motivations. Although Helfgott’s guilty plea could have been especially prejudicial since his plea involved the same conspiracy, the prejudice was negated because Helfgott testified as to the underlying facts relevant to his relationship with Barkus. Therefore, allowance of the government’s use of the plea agreement did not constitute plain error that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of Barkus’s trial. Zidell, 323 F.3d at 425. The limiting instruction given by the district court at the end of trial protected Barkus’s substantial rights because it adequately limited the scope in which the jury could consider Helfgott’s guilty plea. Benson, 591 F.3d at 499. Further, Barkus “has pointed to no authority requiring the limiting instruction to be given at the time [Helfgott] testified.” Id.