Opinion ID: 316137
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the federal assisting escape conviction

Text: 111 Since the sentence imposed for this federal conviction was consecutive to the sentence for the D.C. felony murder conviction, the court was unable to Hooperize it in order to avoid deciding the constitutionality of the D.C. burden of proof statute governing insanity as it applies to federal offenses. The court does find, however, that the D.C. 'charge of felony murder (while assisting an escape) includes every essential fact element of the (federal assisting escape) charge,' and concludes, therefore, that there has been a 'merger between the felony alleged as part of the felony murder,' and vacates the federal assisting escape conviction. (Court's opinion at 1158.) 112 The government itself pointed out in its petition for rehearing 41 that this merger was predicated on a wholly erroneous understanding of the felony murder doctrine. 42 At common law, homicides were divided into two categories, murder and manslaughter, with murder requiring a showing of 'malice.' Any homicide committed in the course of a felony was considered murder because malice could be implied from the commission of the felony. 43 When homicides were further subdivided by statute into first degree murder, second degree murder and manslaughter, 44 the doctrine of felony murder was preserved, and the underlying felony was viewed as providing the 'premeditation' and 'deliberation' otherwise required for first degree murder, as well as malice, where necessary. 45 113 Given this rationale for the felony murder doctrine, it strains credulity to hold that the underlying felony merges into the felony murder. 46 The statute proscribing the underlying felony-- robbery, for example-- is designed to protect a wholly different societal interest from the felony murder statute, which is intended to protect against homicide. 47 The underlying felony is an essential element of felony murder only because without it the homicide might be second degree murder or manslaughter. 48 Clearly, neither manslaughter nor second degree murder merges with any other felony like robbery or assisting a prisoner to escape. 49 114 This analysis undoubtedly accounts for the court's failure to cite a single case suggesting that a felony murder and the underlying felony merge. 50 Indeed, it explains why this court has affirmed both the underlying felony and the felony murder in countless cases. 51 115 In short, to avoid deciding whether the D.C.Code burden of proof statute governing the insanity plea can be applied to U.S.Code offenses, the court affirms appellant's D.C.Code felony murder conviction, and vacates his U.S.Code convictions for premeditated murder and assisting escape. Thus far, I have tried to show that well-settled judicial doctrine required the court to do the opposite of what it has done: namely, to vacate the D.C.Code felony murder conviction, and decide if the application of the D.C. burden of proof statute to appellant's federal offenses was proper. 116 The court's failure to adhere to established legal doctrine was by no means inconsequential. Even if the D.C.Code burden of proof provision was properly applied to appellant's federal offenses, the course taken by the court increased his minimum sentence by more than three years. 52 And, if the burden of proof could not be applied to his federal offenses, appellant is entitled to a new trial on the insanity phase of his convictions 53 under a more favorable burden of proof. 54 117 The court's tortured course was not only prejudicial to appellant, it was also of no avail. In the following section I will show that even if the court had been correct in taking each of the steps discussed so far, it was still required to decide whether the D.C. burden of proof statute could apply to federal offenses.