Opinion ID: 543684
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Farmer's Violent Tendencies

Text: 21 Sellers contends that the district court improperly permitted the Government to introduce evidence of Farmer's general reputation in the community for being hot-tempered and violent. Sellers also objects to evidence of a specific past incident of violent behavior by Farmer, of which Roach was informed the day after it happened, and evidence that Roach was made aware on two other specific occasions of Farmer's proclivity for violence. Federal Rule of Evidence 404, of course, bars the admission of general character evidence and evidence of specific acts for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith. The disputed evidence in this case clearly had some potential for unfair prejudice under Rule 404, in that it suggested that Farmer's beating of Hill would have been in character, thus supporting Hill's account of the interrogation. Because Roach and Sellers conceded that they permitted Farmer to talk with Hill in their custody, evidence that Farmer in fact beat Hill tends to support their guilt by a route improper under Rule 404. 10 The Government proffered the evidence, however, as relevant to intent and knowledge on the defendants' part. The evidence supported the Government's theory that the defendants, especially Roach, knew about Farmer's violent proclivities in advance and deliberately planned and intended to use him to beat a confession out of Hill. We note that this evidence was especially crucial as to the conspiracy count on which the defendants were ultimately acquitted. 22 This Court has outlined the proper analysis for admitting extrinsic-act evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403: 23 The court must first determine whether the [evidence] is relevant to an issue other than ... character. If such relevancy is established, it must then determine whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the prejudice arising from it, and whether the proffered evidence is otherwise admissible under rule 403. 24 United States v. Butler, 792 F.2d 1528, 1535 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 933, 107 S.Ct. 407, 93 L.Ed.2d 359 (1986). The evidence of Farmer's violent tendencies in this case satisfies this standard. 11 The district court had discretion to conclude that its probative value, as discussed above, was not substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudicial impact. 25 Sellers makes a related argument on this issue that the district court erred by not giving the jury a limiting instruction that this evidence should be considered only against Roach. 12 There was sufficient evidence, however, relating to Sellers's knowledge of the community as a law enforcement officer and his close working relationship with Roach, from which the jury could properly conclude that Sellers was aware of Farmer's proclivity for violence. While much of this evidence implicated Roach most directly, the district court properly instructed the jury to consider the case against each defendant on each count separately. 26 Sellers also moved for severance because of the admission of this evidence. The district court's denial of this motion was well within its discretion. See United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 1447, 1464 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189, 1216, 105 S.Ct. 957, 1192, 83 L.Ed.2d 964, 84 L.Ed.2d 338 (1985) (Severance will be granted only if a defendant can demonstrate that a joint trial will result in specific and compelling prejudice to the conduct of his defense.... A defendant does not suffer compelling prejudice simply because much of the evidence at trial is applicable only to his codefendants.); United States v. Harrell, 737 F.2d 971, 976 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1164, 105 S.Ct. 923, 83 L.Ed.2d 935, 470 U.S. 1027, 105 S.Ct. 1392, 84 L.Ed.2d 781 (1985) (disparity in the quantum of proof ... justifies severance only in the most extreme cases).