Opinion ID: 1255546
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Conviction for Possession of Wildlife

Text: RCW 77.16.040 provides that it is unlawful to bring into this state, offer for sale, sell, possess, exchange, buy, transport, or ship wildlife.... [13] RCW 77.08.010(16) defines wildlife as: all species of the animal kingdom whose members exist in Washington in a wild state. This includes but is not limited to mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, fish, and invertebrates. The term wildlife does not include, feral domestic mammals, [old world rats and mice], or ... food fish or shellfish.... Mierz argues that his domesticated coyotes were feral domestic mammals, and not wildlife, under this definition. This argument suggests that while RCW 77.16.040 bars possession of wild coyotes, there is an exception for Mierz's coyotes because he caught them and took them to his home. [14-16] Statutes are to be construed to effect their purposes, and to avoid an unlikely or strained consequence. Ski Acres, Inc. v. Kittitas County, 118 Wn.2d 852, 857, 827 P.2d 1000 (1992). A number of decisions broadly interpret various provisions of the wildlife laws so as to better protect wildlife. [14] Construing feral domestic mammals to include any animal reclaimed from the wild would defeat the purpose of the wildlife code to preserve, protect, and perpetuate wildlife. RCW 77.12.010; Judd v. Bernard, 49 Wn.2d 619, 622, 304 P.2d 1046 (1956). We think it more likely, as the Court of Appeals did, that feral domestic mammals refers to individual members of domestic species such as cats or dogs that have run away, species which the wildlife code is not intended to protect. [15] Mierz, 72 Wn. App. at 799. Mierz's interpretation would lead to insuperable difficulty in enforcing wildlife laws; individual domesticated members of a wild species would not be protected and could be possessed or taken with impunity. Wildlife agents would have to test the degree of domestication of a particular animal before concluding that the animal was wildlife. See Graves v. Dunlap, 87 Wash. 648, 657, 152 P. 532 (1915) (citing the difficulty of determining whether a fowl killed and possessed during the closed season had been a reclaimed or wild bird). This would be absurd. Wildlife agents must treat all members of wild species as wild. This is required to make the wildlife laws workable. Mierz also claims the prohibition upon possession of wildlife as applied to him is unconstitutionally vague under City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 178, 795 P.2d 693 (1990). We disagree. A person of ordinary intelligence would reasonably understand that taking coyotes from the wild and raising them at home with one's dogs violates a prohibition upon the possession of wildlife. This conclusion is bolstered by consideration of the context and history of our wildlife laws, practical difficulties of Mierz's alternative interpretation, and our history and common experience. Spokane, 115 Wn.2d at 180. Ordinary Washingtonians would not doubt that coyotes are wild animals. In sum, all members of a wild species are wildlife, even if tamed, and all members of a domestic species are not wildlife, even if running wild. Just as a leopard cannot change its spots ( Jeremiah 13:23), Mierz could not convert the coyotes from wild to domestic animals.