Opinion ID: 1930254
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Detective Madore's Opinion as to the Victim's Veracity

Text: Defense trial counsel, in his opening remarks, stated to the jury that there's never been a policeman yet who follows up a complaint that didn't start out believing that it was true. Under direct examination by the prosecutor, Detective Madore testified, You always go into the case believing the victim unless it's proved otherwise; and I did believe [the victim], yes. Defendant argues that Detective Madore's testimony was an invasion of the jury's province to determine credibility and thus was improperly admitted. Although defendant made a general objection to the State's question to Detective Madore, he did not state the specific ground of objection as required by M.R.Evid. 103(a)(1), and thus we review the admission of Madore's testimony under the obvious error standard. See State v. McKenney, 459 A.2d 1093 (Me.1983). In the circumstances of this case, Detective Madore's testimony did not result in any manifest injustice. His testimony was his personal assessment of the victim's credibility at the time he was starting his investigation; it was not an assessment of her credibility at trial, a task that is within the exclusive province of the jury. Defense counsel apparently saw no prejudice to defendant in making the jury aware of Detective Madore's assessment of the victim's credibility at the time of the investigation since, when cross-examining the detective, counsel asked him, Were you satisfied that the information you were getting [from the victim] was at least on its surface reliable and accurate. Furthermore, Madore's testimony merely confirmed defense counsel's theory, as presented to the jury in his opening statement, that a policeman embarking on the investigation of a complaint proceeds on the initial premise that the complaint is true.