Opinion ID: 765749
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Virgin Islands Civil Rights Act

Text: 8 The District Court dismissed Figueroa's claim under Title 10 of the Virgin Islands Civil Rights Act based on its belief that Title 10 affords no private cause of action. The court did not distinguish between a claim brought under chapter 1 of Title 10 and one brought under chapter 5 of Title 10, ruling that, in either case, only the Commission can sue to recover damages [under the Act], not the individual claiming to be aggrieved. Dist. Ct. Op. at 4 (Feb. 19, 1998). Although the District Court relied upon Anderson v. Government, Civ. No. 96-118(N) (D.V.I. Nov. 21, 1997), for the proposition that there is no private cause of action under Title 10 of the Act, the parties at oral argument conceded that, as we discuss more fully below, the Anderson case is not on point, and the issue before the District Court has not previously been addressed by either the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands or the district court sitting in the Virgin Islands. 9 We will first provide the context for this issue by explicating the pertinent provisions of the Act. The Virgin Islands legislature enacted the Civil Rights Act in 1950 with the intent to prevent and prohibit discrimination in any form. The Act contains six chapters, only two of which -- chapter 1 and chapter 5 -- are relevant to this case. Chapter 1 of the Act, 10 V.I.C. 1-11, substantially amended and effective in 1961, contains a statement declaring the public policy of prohibiting and punishing discrimination based on race, creed, color, or national origin. 1. It recognizes the right to equal treatment with respect to employment and working conditions, and specifies those discriminatory acts prohibited under the chapter. 3. In section 7, the legislature provided civil and criminal penalties for violations of the chapter, including a specific provision for punitive damages. 7. 3 As an aid to its interpretation, it also includes a provision requiring courts to construe [it] liberally in furtherance of its intent as stated in section 1. 10. 10 In 1974, the Virgin Islands legislature enacted chapter 5 of Title 10, 61-75, and created the Virgin Islands Civil Rights Commission, granting it general jurisdiction and power to combat discrimination. 61. The Commission was empowered to investigate allegations of discrimination, collect information about the denial of equal protection of the law in the Virgin Islands, appraise the laws and policies of the Virgin Islands as to such discrimination, hold hearings and disseminate information regarding discrimination, and impose sanctions or provide other remedies in individual cases of discrimination. 63. Chapter 5 also contains a list of prohibited discriminatory practices, targeting discrimination based on race, color, religion, and national origin as in chapter 1, and also discrimination based on sex and political affiliation. 64. Chapter 5 provides a mechanism for those aggrieved by discrimination covered under the chapter to file a claim with the Commission, which will then investigate the claim and issue a cease and desist order, and such other orders that in the judgment of the Commission are consistent with enforcement of the chapter. 4 71-72. Finally, the Commission may bring a civil action in the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands by filing with it a complaint setting forth the facts of the discrimination and requesting such relief as it deems necessary to enforce the Act. 73. The 1974 amendments to the Act creating the Commission also affected chapter 1 of the Act, adding references to the Commission and deleting sections deemed unnecessary in light of the amendments. 5 The 1974 amendments did not, however, alter section 7 of chapter 1, which continued to provide the right of individuals to recover damages in a civil action, although it did increase the maximum possible imprisonment for a violation of chapter 1 from six months to one year. 11 Appellees proffer several arguments in support of their position that chapter 1 does not afford a private cause of action and that all grievances brought under the Act must be brought through the Commission. Primarily, they argue that all claims must be brought through the Commission and offer Anderson v. Government and Codrington v. Virgin Islands Port Authority, 33 V.I. 215, 911 F. Supp. 907 (D.V.I. 1996), in support of this reading of Title 10. Figueroa acknowledges that the Commission is given the authority to effectuate the Act's anti-discrimination policies in chapter 5, but urges that chapter 1 clearly creates a private cause of action and the grant of jurisdiction in the Commission to enforce the Act did not replace or eradicate this cause of action. She argues, alternatively, that, even if the Act were read to require a claimant to bring a claim through the Commission, such a requirement should be excused in her case where, due to a Commission member's animosity toward her counsel, the Commission would not have taken action in her behalf. 12 We agree with Figueroa. The language of section 7 of chapter 1 leaves us with little doubt that the Virgin Islands legislature not only intended to create, but did create, a private cause of action. It creates liability for a violation of the Act, states the type of damages available, states they are recoverable in a civil action by the person aggrieved, and even states that recovery under the Act does not preclude other remedies. 7. This language, present in the 1961 version of the Act, was the only remedial provision until the 1974 amendments created the Commission. If the language of section 7 of chapter 1 does not create a private cause of action, then, at least until 1974, the Virgin Islands Civil Rights Act was a toothless statement of policy and intent. We can conceive of no permissible reading of chapter 1 -- which states the Act's intent to combat discrimination, lists those acts constituting discrimination, and states the damages available in a civil action by the person aggrieved -- that would not include a private cause of action as clearly provided by section 7 of chapter 1 of the Act. 7 (emphasis added); see Government v. Puerto Rican Cars, Inc., 10 V.I. 9 (D.V.I. 1973) (case prior to the 1974 amendments recognizing private cause of action under chapter 1). 13 We must then consider whether the legislature revoked or replaced this existing cause of action when it amended the Act and created the Commission in 1974. Nothing in the language of chapter 5 itself, nor in any legislative history -- which is nonexistent -- so indicates. Nowhere in chapter 5, or anywhere else in the Act, did the legislature state an intent to detract from or alter the remedies that were available before the creation of the Commission in 1974. Further, nowhere does chapter 5 state or even imply that the Commission would have exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the Act. Finally, although the 1974 amendments did apply to the language of chapter 1, even amending section 7, they did not alter the critical language in section 7 giving persons aggrieved under the Act the right to bring a civil action for damages. The 1974 amendments merely created an agency with multiple enforcement responsibilities under the Act without expressing any intent to undo the previously granted cause of action. 14 Appellees argue that the later creation of the Commission, however, changed the statutory scheme such that all actions must proceed through the agency. Does the creation of additional remedies somehow incorporate, override, or annul the previously existing remedy? Although Virgin Islands law has not addressed this issue, we believe universal principles of statutory construction apply. 6 Where an additional statutory remedy is added to one previously created without expressly or impliedly supplanting or abrogating it, the new statutory remedy is generally not deemed to be exclusive. 1 Am. Jur. 2d Actions 63 (1994). This principle that the creation of one statutory remedy does not, in itself, abrogate a pre-existing remedy has been commonly recognized in case law. See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 627 (11th Cir. 1990) (The fact that Congress codified a preexisting remedy, however, does not, by itself, stand for the proposition that Congress also implicitly intended to circumscribe other available, preexisting statutory remedies.); Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 313 (2d Cir. 1980) (When as here Congress adds a new remedy . . . where other remedies had been clearly recognized, it would be expected to say so if it meant the new remedy to be exclusive.), aff'd sub nom., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 72 L. Ed. 2d 182, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982); Supreme Grand Lodge, Modern Free and Accepted Colored Masons of World v. Most Worshipful Prince Hall Grand Lodge, Free and Accepted Masons, 209 F.2d 156, 157 (5th Cir. 1954)(stating the creation of a new statutory remedy did not by necessary implication abrogate the pre-existing remedy); see also Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 524, 94 L. Ed. 2d 533, 107 S. Ct. 1391 (1987) (stating that there is a presumption against repeals by implication); Du Pont v. Ball, 11 Del. Ch. 430, 106 A. 39, 42 (Del. 1918) (holding that new statutory remedy did not abrogate pre-existing remedy). Thus, we cannot conclude from the enactment of chapter 5 alone that the Virgin Islands legislature intended to revoke the right of action that existed prior to the amendment. 15 We note that we do not find the District Court's reasoning as dictating a different result. The District Court's analysis was based upon a faulty premise -- that prior case law had held that no private cause of action existed under chapter 1 of Title 10 and that a claimant was relegated to proceeding before the Commission. However, the court's reliance on Anderson v. Government, Civ. No. 96-118(N) (D.V.I. Nov. 21, 1997), was misplaced. Anderson does not decide whether there is a private cause of action under Title 10. Rather, in Anderson, the court dismissed a private cause of action brought against the Virgin Islands government under Title 10 because chapter 1, by its terms, does not permit such an action against the government, and there is no private cause of action under chapter 5. Codrington v. V.I. Port Authority, cited by appellees, similarly does not decide whether a private cause of action exists under chapter 1. 33 V.I. 245, 911 F. Supp. 907 (D.V.I. 1996). Instead, Codrington involved a sexual harassment claim and is not relevant, since chapter 1, by its terms, does not include claims for sexual harassment. 16 Although there is no Virgin Islands authority on point, in Samuel v. Virgin Islands Telephone Corp., No. 75-6, 1975 WL 289, at  n.4 (D.V.I. July 8, 1975), Judge Christian noted in a footnote: 17 . . . The Legislature of the Virgin Islands did not use terms implying that the Commission was to have the exclusive original right to hear and make determinations concerning civil rights matters . . . . 18 For this Court to read the word exclusive into the statute would be to narrow it. Yet, in light of the ends it seeks to achieve, and the liberal treatment state courts have traditionally accorded statutes of this type, only a broad reading would be appropriate. It is therefore certainly arguable that parties whose rights have been violated under 64 of chapter 5 need not bring their claims in the first instance to the Commission, but may bring them directly to District Court. 19 Samuel, 1975 WL 289, at  n.4. 7 The District Court did not refer to this case in its decision. We see Judge Christian's observation as reinforcing the statutory construction principles we employ. 20 Other case law supports our view that the mere creation of an agency such as the Commission does not necessarily reflect legislative intent to exclude private enforcement of the Act and that an express indication of exclusivity of remedies is required. See, e.g., Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 424-25, 93 L. Ed. 2d 781, 107 S. Ct. 766 (1987) (concluding that a private cause of action existed where statute and its legislative history were devoid of an indication that exclusive enforcement authority was vested in HUD); Naegele Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Moulton, 773 F.2d 692, 699-700 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that the creation of the Kentucky Registry to investigate violations of campaign financing rules does not mean, without an express statement to the contrary, that the Registry has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate violations of these rules). 8 Here, there is no implication that chapter 5 was to constitute an exclusive remedy, let alone an express statement to that effect. The only logical interpretation of the 1974 amendments is that the legislature intended to augment the civil rights laws and remedies, not reduce or somehow limit them. 21 Appellees also argue that chapter 1 of the Act does not recognize claims of religious discrimination such as Figueroa's. This argument is also without merit. Chapter 1 of the Act applies to discrimination based on race, creed, color or national origin. 3 (emphasis added). According to the Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary (1984), creed is defined as a formal statement of religious belief or a confession of faith. Clearly then, chapter 1 encompasses discrimination based on religion. 22 Thus, we find that, contrary to the holding of the District Court, a Title 10 claimant is not required to bring a claim with or through the Commission because chapter 1 of Title 10 creates a private cause of action for discrimination based on religion. For this reason, we will reverse the decision of the District Court and will remand for proceedings consistent with this decision. 9 Due to our holding that Figueroa was not limited to bringing her claim through the Commission, we need not decide whether she was excused from doing so because of its alleged ineffectiveness.