Opinion ID: 2537152
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Banishment in general

Text: ¶ 13. This Court's previous decisions in Cobb v. State, 437 So.2d 1218 (Miss.1983), and McCreary v. State, 582 So.2d 425 (Miss.1991), provide the standards for properly banishing a person convicted of a crime. Specifically, Cobb requires trial courts to find, on the record, that: (1) the banishment provision bears a reasonable relationship to the purpose of probation; (2) the ends of justice and the best interest of the defendant and the public would be served by the banishment; (3) public policy is not violated and the rehabilitative purpose of probation is not defeated by the banishment; and (4) the defendant's rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution are not violated by the imposition of the banishment. Cobb, 437 So.2d at 1220-21. These considerations have come to be known as the Cobb factors. ¶ 14. We held in McCreary that banishments from the entire state violate public policy. Specifically, we explained that banishment from a large geographical area, especially outside of the State, struggles to serve any rehabilitative purpose, and implicates serious public policy questions against the dumping of convicts on another jurisdiction. McCreary, 582 So.2d at 427-28 (citing U.S. v. Abushaar, 761 F.2d 954, 959-60 (3d Cir.1985); Rutherford v. Blankenship, 468 F.Supp. 1357, 1360-61 (W.D.Va.1979)). See also, Simoneaux v. State, 29 So.3d 26, 39 (Miss.Ct. App.2009) (While banishing Simoneaux from Mississippi would perhaps provide a degree of protection to the citizens of our state, we certainly do not want our sister states repaying us for the favor.). ¶ 15. Cobb represents this Court's seminal decision on banishment. The criminal charge in Cobb stemmed from an incident in which Cobb's nephew had thrown rocks at Cobb's vehicle as he passed by. Cobb, 437 So.2d at 1220. Instead of notifying his brother (the boy's father) of the incident so that he could properly discipline the child, Cobb, who had a notoriously bad temper, shot the boy. Id. Thankfully, the boy recovered. Cobb pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. Yet the circuit judge suspended the sentence and put Cobb on probation for five years, provided he leave Stone County and stay 125 miles away from the county. Id. at 1219. On direct appeal, Cobb raised several arguments regarding the impropriety of the banishment. ¶ 16. In addressing Cobb's contentions, this Court first held that the banishment provision bore a reasonable relationship to the purpose of probation. We specifically pointed out that Mississippi Code Annotated § 47-7-35 (Supp. 1982) provides that courts shall determine the terms and conditions of probation and may order the probationer to `(g) Remain within a specified area[.]' Cobb, 437 So.2d at 1219 (quoting Miss.Code Ann. § 47-7-35(g) (Supp.1982)). And we explained that, [i]nstead of being a matter of right, it is by grace that probation is granted a defendant, and within his sound judicial discretion the trial judge may fix reasonable conditions of ... probation. Id. at 1221 (citing Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir.1982)). ¶ 17. We also found that the banishment did not violate public policy nor defeat the rehabilitative purpose of probation. Cobb, 437 So.2d at 1220-21. We noted that the judge recogniz[ed] that Cobb had an uncontrollable temper, [and] related this to the community, explaining that until Cobb learned to control his temper, it was not likely that he could live in harmony with his brother's family. Id. at 1220. The judge cautioned that, had the boy died, Cobb likely would have received a life sentence. Id. But the judge did not want to punish a man of [Cobb's] character so severely. Since Cobb's house was only three-eighths of a mile from his brother's house, the circuit judge thought the best interests of everyone required getting Cobb away from his brother and family[.] Id. at 1220-21. The circuit judge noted that compared to what I could have done, I think I have been relatively kind. Id. at 1221. We also recognized that some amount of punitive aspects of probation serve the public interest as well as the probationer's interest. Id. at 1221. So we agreed with the circuit judge that the ends of justice and the best interests of the public as well as the defendant would be served by the [banishment]. Id. at 1220. ¶ 18. Finally, we found that the trial court had not violated Cobb's constitutional rights by imposing the banishment condition. We noted that: Here the record shows that the trial judge carefully and meticulously explained to Cobb his rights which shows that Cobb understood that he could be sentenced to 20 years in the penitentiary upon the indictment to which he pled guilty. As found by the trial judge, Cobb voluntarily and knowingly pled guilty and specifically acknowledged his guilt. Then the court deferred sentence, so that the Mississippi Department of Corrections could conduct an investigation of this defendant and present a presentence report to the trial court, all of which presumably was done. The judgment of the court fixing the sentence and conditions here complained of shows that Cobb (while represented by counsel) signed the judgment underneath the following language: I accept the above probation in accordance with the terms thereof. Cobb, 437 So.2d at 1221. We thus found that Cobb's rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution had not been violated by imposition of the conditions of his probation, including the banishment. Id. ¶ 19. Based on the trial court's on-the-record adjudication of all those factors, this Court held on appeal, in pertinent part, that: Upon the record as made and presented, we find that the conditions imposed by the sentencing judge were reasonably related to Cobb's circumstances and his intended rehabilitation. [U]pon these facts, we are unable to say that removing him from the area was unreasonable or arbitrary ... or in any sense violated public policy or his authority under the pertinent statutes. Cobb, 437 So.2d at 1220, 1221 (emphasis added). Further, in McCreary, we explained why Cobb's banishment had been affirmed. We stated that: In Cobb, the Court satisfied itself from the record that the banishment provision bore a reasonable relationship to the purpose of probation; that the ends of justice and the best interest of the defendant and the public would be served; that public policy was not violated and the rehabilitative purpose of probation was not defeated; and that Cobb's rights under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were not violated. McCreary, 582 So.2d at 427 (citing Cobb, 437 So.2d at 1219-21) (emphasis added). So this Court affirmed Cobb's banishment because we were satisfied from the record as made and presented which included specific facts regarding Cobb's situation, character, and offensethat Cobb's banishment would achieve a rehabilitative purpose, serve the ends of justice, and protect the rights and interests of Cobb and the public. Cobb, 437 So.2d at 1219-21; McCreary, 582 So.2d at 427. ¶ 20. Our decisions in Cobb and McCreary do not necessarily place an affirmative duty on the trial judge to articulate the Cobb factors on the record. Cobb and McCreary simply indicate that we will affirm a banishment only if we are satisfied from the record as made and presented that the banishment is appropriate, taking the Cobb factors into consideration. Cobb, 437 So.2d at 1219-21; McCreary, 582 So.2d at 427. But we cannot be satisfied from the record that the banishment is proper if no record is made or presented that the banishment would achieve the goals outlined by Cobb and McCreary. So a trial judge who imposes banishment as a condition of probation or a suspended sentence, and wishes to have the banishment affirmed on appeal, will be best served by articulating, on the record, the reasons for and benefits of the banishment under the Cobb factors as they relate to the defendant. ¶ 21. To that end, this Court recently held that a trial judge's reasons for ordering banishment ... must be articulated and supported in the record by a factual basis, as required by Cobb and McCreary.  Mackey v. State, 37 So.3d 1161, 1167 (Miss.2010). Mackey thus imposes an affirmative duty on the trial court to articulate, on the record, the Cobb factors as they relate to the defendant to support the banishment. The Court of Appeals has recognized this affirmative duty for some time now. Put simply, [i]n order for banishment to be an appropriate form of punishment[,] an on the record analysis of the Cobb factors is required. Hamm v. State, 758 So.2d 1042, 1047 (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (deriding this outmoded form of punishment). ¶ 22. Today, we reaffirm the duty we announced in Mackey, and we provide more significant reasons for our imposition of it. It is evident from a reading of the Cobb decision that banishment is a unique and extraordinary form of punishment and should be seldom and cautiously imposed. Both Cobb and McCreary make clear that unreasonable, arbitrary, or unjustified banishment orders will not be upheld. See Mackey, 37 So.3d at 1166-67 (compelling reasons must be offered to justify allowing a defendant convicted of a serious criminal offense to leave the jurisdiction unsupervised, as opposed to incarceration or keeping the defendant in the jurisdiction of the court, with supervision). See also K.N.L. v. State, 803 So.2d 1245, 1249 (Miss.Ct. App.2002) (affirming banishment from shopping mall of teenager convicted of shoplifting from store in mall). ¶ 23. Sir William Blackstone says, personal liberty consists in the power of ... moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due process of law. Johnson v. Johnson, 189 Miss. 561, 580, 198 So. 308 (Miss. 1940) (Ethridge, J., dissenting) (citing Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., page 710; 1 Blackstone's Commentaries 134). This right of free movement is at stake when a court seeks to banish a person convicted of a crime, since banishment is a form of punishment which restricts the person's ability to live in and move to certain areas. So a person may be banished only by due process of law. [1] ¶ 24. The question, then, is what process is due? Nelson v. City of Horn Lake ex. rel. Bd. of Aldermen, 968 So.2d 938, 944 (Miss.2007). Generally, due process requires only notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard, before guilt of the charges may be found and punishment may be imposed. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 2648-49, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004); Estate of McCullough v. Yates, 32 So.3d 403 (Miss.2010). But this Court's decisions in Cobb and McCreary imposed heightened procedural due-process requirements on the trial court's discretion to order banishment as a condition of a suspended sentence or probation. Under Cobb and McCreary, as explained in Mackey, the trial court may not banish a person convicted of a crime without first explaining, on the record, the reasons for and benefits of the banishment under the Cobb factors as they relate to the defendant. See Willis v. State, 904 So.2d 200, 202 (Miss.Ct. App.2005); Weaver v. State, 764 So.2d 479, 480-81 (Miss.Ct.App.2000).