Opinion ID: 1826799
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the circuit court judge erred in denying herring's motion for a speedy trial.

Text: Herring contends that the circuit court judge erred in denying his motion to dismiss for failure to provide Herring with a speedy trial. Herring asserts that both his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated. First, we will address the issue of the statutory right to a speedy trial.
Section 99-17-1 of the Miss. Code Ann. provides the defendant with a statutory right to a speedy trial. It reads as follows: Indictments to be tried within 270 days of arraignment. Unless good cause be shown, and a continuance duly granted by the court, all offenses for which indictments are presented to the court shall be tried no later than two hundred seventy (270) days after the accused has been arraigned. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (Rev. ed. 1994). Where the accused is not tried within 270 days of his arraignment, the State has the burden of establishing good cause for the delay since the accused is under no duty to bring himself to trial. Nations v. State, 481 So.2d 760 (Miss. 1985). Continuances for good cause toll the running of the 270-day period, unless the record is silent regarding the reason for the delay, and then the clock ticks against the Sate because the State bears the risk of non-persuasion on the good cause issue. Vickery v. State, 535 So.2d 1371, 1375 (Miss. 1988). This Court has held that a written order reciting that a motion for continuance is well taken and should be granted is the equivalent to judicial determination that good cause exists and has been shown for the continuance. Nations v. State, 481 So.2d 760 (Miss. 1985). However, we later said that a continuance which merely states that it has been granted for good cause is not sufficient to bear the burden of showing that the continuance was in fact granted for good cause. Vickery v. State, 535 So.2d 1371, 1375 (Miss. 1988). Thus, the Court should look to why the continuance was granted. This Court in the past has recognized congested dockets as good cause. Folk v. State, 576 So.2d 1243 (Miss. 1991) (bumping of defendant's trial occasioned by continuance of another criminal prosecution constituted good cause within the speedy trial statute, tolling ticking of the speedy trial time clock); and Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868 (Miss. 1987). Continuances that are attributed to the defendant stop the running of the clock and are deducted from the total number of days before trial. Vickery, 535 So.2d at 1376. Herring waived arraignment on November 28, 1990, and was tried October 4, 1993. This time period is a total of one thousand forty-three (1043) days between arraignment and trial. Seven hundred seventy-three (773) days must be accounted for in order to assure that Herring's statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated. The following is a list of pertinent dates and timetable. Statutory Speedy Trial Time Table Delay Following DATE EVENT the Event 11/28/90 Waiver of Arraignment. Order setting trial for April 1, 1991. 113 3/20/91 Notice to Court and Defendants  State Witness is unavailable. 12 4/1/91 No trial occurred; Herring was not cooperating with his attorney. Hearing took place; Mr. Scott, court-appointed counsel, said he had never even seen Herring, as he had not shown up for his appointments. Herring admitted that from 12/90 until 4/1/91 he made no effort to locate his lawyer or contact him in any way. 22 4/23/91 Order of Continuance entered. Herring says because State's material witness unavailable. State says because Herring needed time to consult with his attorney. Trial reset for 4/25/91. 2 4/25/91 No Trial Occurred. Wright (State's witness) was serving on active duty in the Persian Gulf conflict. Therefore, the case was set for the next term of court  10/14/91. Bond was also set. 4 4/29/91 Herring posted bond and went back to Tennessee. 168 10/14/91 No trial occurred. Herring failed to appear. Judgment Nisi was entered against him and his bondsman. 211 5/12/92 Order entered setting trial for 6/22/92. 41 6/22/92 No Trial occurred; the case was bumped so that State v. Versie Scott could be heard. 7 6/29/92 Order entered against the bondsman and notification was given to the police that Herring was a fugitive from justice. He was arrested in Memphis, TN, and then refused to sign waiver of extradition information along with the other documents which needed to be executed for extradition. 5 7/3/92 Order entered setting trial for 12/7/92 157 12/7/92 No trial occurred. Herring was not in court. 156 5/12/93 Governor Fordice executed a request for interstate rendition. Herring fought that extradition. On 6/26/93 Herring was returned to Mississippi. Next available date for trial was 10/4/93. 41 6/22/93 Order substituting Attorney David L. Walker for Attorney Paul R. Scott. 36 7/28/93 Order setting trial for 10/4/93 entered. 68 10/4/93 Trial began. 0 TOTAL NUMBER OF DAYS ELAPSED 1043 We must note that not one order of continuance or order to set the trial date is included in the Clerk's Papers. However, both parties seem to pretty much agree on the dates, and therefore, the timetable was taken from the briefs of the parties. In the present case, Herring seems to have caused the delay because he fled the jurisdiction and fought extradition. The one hundred twenty-five (125) days that elapsed between the date of arraignment and the first trial date may be said to count against the State. The twenty-two (22) days between the original trial date and the order setting a new date are counted against the defendant. He would not cooperate with his attorney. The two (2) days between the order and the second trial date also count against the defendant for the same reason. The next four (4) days should not count against the State because its material witness was serving in the Persian Gulf Conflict. On April 29, 1991, Herring posted bond and left the jurisdiction of Mississippi and went to Tennessee. From this point on, Herring fought extradition back to Mississippi and thus, the time should be counted against him and not the State. Seven hundred eighty-six (786) days elapse from the time Herring left the State until the time he returned to the jurisdiction of the court below. Trial was set immediately for October 4, 1993. The one hundred four (104) days from his return to trial cannot be counted against the State because thirty-six (36) were to allow his new attorney time to prepare and October 4, 1993, was the earliest trial date possible. Thus, the total amount of days that may be counted against the State is one hundred twenty-five (125), well within the two hundred seventy (270) day limit. A defendant should not be allowed to control the justice system to his advantage. Here is a prime example of a defendant who did not want to go to trial, but after causing as much a delay as possible requests his case be dismissed. Thus, Herring's statutory right to a speedy trial was not violated. Any delay over the one hundred twenty-five (125) days in the beginning is attributable to the defendant.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI. Herring asserts that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). With respect to the Constitutional right, the time began to run from the date of indictment versus the date of arraignment. Herring was indicted on October 1, 1990. This is fifty-eight (58) days prior to his arraignment. Adding that time onto the previous table, the time elapsed between the indictment and trial is one thousand one hundred one (1101) days and the amount that counts against the State for purposes of the Constitutional issue is one hundred eighty-three (183) days. The United States Supreme Court provided the standard of review for a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). We must look to the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, whether the defendant asserted his right, and whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay. We adhere to this Constitutional test as stated by the United States Supreme Court and will apply the Barker factors to the present case in order to determine if there has been a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The weighing of the Barker factors is not a mechanistic weighing. We must look at the totality of the circumstances. The familiar Barker factors in the analysis of a speedy trial as applied to the case sub judice are as follows.
The delay in the present case is a total of approximately three years. We have held that a delay of eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial. Spencer v. State, 592 So.2d 1382, 1387 (Miss. 1991); Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406 (Miss. 1989). Where there is an extensive delay prior to trial, that delay must be weighed heavily in favor of [the defendant] in the balancing test. Flores v. State, 574 So.2d 1314, 1322 (Miss. 1990). However, the delay should not [be] conclusively weighted against the State; the presumption of prejudicial delay may be rebutted when balanced by the remaining factors. Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008, 1012 (Miss. 1991). This factor weighs in favor of the defendant.
We have held that [o]nce we find the delay presumptively prejudicial, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to produce evidence justifying the delay and to persuade the trier of fact of the legitimacy of the reasons. State v. Ferguson, 576 So.2d 1252, 1254 (Miss. 1991). The State has shown and the lower court found that the overwhelming majority of the delay in the case sub judice is due to Herring himself. He fled the jurisdiction, fought extradition, and when he was present he was uncooperative with his attorney. This factor must weigh heavily in favor of the State.
In this third factor, the Barker Court held that [t]he defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right, then is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right. We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32, 92 S.Ct. at 2192-93. Herring never requested that his trial begin. In fact, he did everything but request a trial. As the United States Supreme Court noted, it is hard to claim denial of a speedy trial when the defendant does nothing to bring his case to trial, but, in fact, does everything to fight it. Thus, this factor weighs heavily against Herring.
In a delay as long as the one in the case at bar, the burden again shifts to the State to show that the defense suffered no prejudice by the delay. The United States Supreme Court has noted: Inordinate delay, wholly aside from possible prejudice to a defense on the merits, may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not and ... may disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family, and friends. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 463, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971); see also, Flores, 574 So.2d at 1323. However, Herring cannot show any prejudice. He was out on bond the majority of the time. At no point did Herring assert that he was prejudiced by failing to locate witnesses after such a long time, or in any other fashion. In fact, Herring admits that this factor does not weigh as heavily in favor of Appellant, it is not disposititve since all factors must be considered together. Herring suffered no prejudice in the delay before trial. Thus, this factor weighs against Herring and in favor of the State. Looking at the totality of the circumstances and the Barker factors, Herring's constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. Therefore, the lower court was correct in denying the motion to dismiss under both the statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial. This assignment of error is without merit and the lower court's decision to deny the motion to dismiss should be affirmed.