Opinion ID: 3164641
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Claims against Covington and Parker

Text: Section 1983 actions in New York are subject to a three‐year statute of limitations, Murphy v. Lynn, 53 F.3d 547, 548 (2d Cir. 1995), running from the time a “plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury” giving rise to the claim, Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Covington’s involvement in the events giving rise to the suit ended in 2004, when Milan’s children were removed from her custody, and the final specific factual allegation against Parker is dated to 2009. The complaint makes clear that Milan knew of the alleged injuries when they occurred. Although Milan claims that Parker has been trying to sabotage her visits with one of her children since September 2009, this is the sort of conclusory, unsupported allegation that we need not accept when reviewing the dismissal of 6 No. 14‐3527‐cv the complaint. See Nielsen, 746 F.3d at 62. Because the properly alleged events giving rise to claims against Covington and Parker were completed more than three years before the complaint was filed in 2014, these claims are barred by the statute of limitations. II. The Claims against Costanza, Davis, and Wertheimer To avoid sua sponte dismissal of a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant was a state actor, i.e., acting under color of state law, when he committed the violation and (2) the defendant deprived the plaintiff of “rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 743‐44 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if Covington and Parker were state actors against whom a timely § 1983 action could be brought, the other defendants were not. Costanza and Wertheimer were law guardians, also known as “attorney[s] for the child,” appointed by New York’s family court to represent the interests of Milan’s children in the custody proceedings. N.Y. Ct. R. 7.2(a). As law guardians, Costanza and Wertheimer were required to “zealously advocate the child[ren]’s position” after consulting with them. Id. at 7.2(d). The question of whether law guardians so appointed are state actors has not previously been addressed by this Court. 7 No. 14‐3527‐cv Other circuits, in determining that law guardians are not state actors for the purpose of § 1983, have relied largely on Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). See, e.g., Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003); Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 155 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). In Polk County, the Supreme Court held that public defenders “do[] not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding,” notwithstanding the fact that the state pays for the services they provide. 454 U.S. at 325. We believe that the analogy of a law guardian to a public defender is apt. Although both are supplied and funded by the state, each acts according to the best interests of the client with “no ‘obligation to the mission of the state.’” Meeker, 782 F.2d at 155 (quoting Polk Cty., 454 U.S. at 320). Accordingly, we hold that law guardians who act as “attorney[s] for the child” are not state actors for the purposes of suits filed pursuant to § 1983. We thus agree with the district court that dismissal of the claims against law guardians Costanza and Wertheimer was appropriate. We also affirm the district court’s dismissal of the claims against Davis, Milan’s mother. The allegations in the complaint indicate that Davis was acting as a private individual and that she was in no sense a state actor. Accordingly, the claims against her were properly dismissed on that basis. 8 No. 14‐3527‐cv