Opinion ID: 704024
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Requirement to Reweigh

Text: 24 Nevada is a weighing state, i.e., a state where the ultimate sentencing decision turns on weighing the statutory aggravating factors against the mitigating evidence. Jeffers v. Lewis, 5 F.3d 1199, 1203 (9th Cir.1992), rev'd on other grounds, 38 F.3d 411 (9th Cir.1994) (en banc). In a weighing state where the aggravating and mitigating factors are balanced against each other, it is constitutional error for the sentencer to give weight to an unconstitutionally vague aggravating factor, even if other valid aggravating factors remain. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 229-32, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1136-37, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992). 25 In the present case, the depravity of mind instruction was nearly identical to other instructions that this and other courts have found to be unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 433, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1764-65, 1767, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980); Deutscher v. Whitley, 946 F.2d 1443, 1447 (9th Cir.1991), vacated on other grounds, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 367, 121 L.Ed.2d 279 (1992); Jimenez v. State, 106 Nev. 769, 801 P.2d 1366, 1369 (1990); Robins v. State, 106 Nev. 611, 798 P.2d 558 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 970, 111 S.Ct. 1608, 113 L.Ed.2d 670 (1991); Moran v. State, 103 Nev. 138, 734 P.2d 712, 714 (1987), rev'd., Godinez v. Moran, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993); Rogers v. State, 101 Nev. 457, 705 P.2d 664, 671 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1130, 106 S.Ct. 1999, 90 L.Ed.2d 679 (1986) (demonstrating Nevada's recognition and application of Godfrey principals one week after McKenna's direct appeal and before his collateral appeals). 26 In McKenna's case, the trial court failed to provide the required limiting instruction that would distinguish the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 427, 100 S.Ct. at 1764. Thus, the jury's discretion was unchannelled by clear and objective standards providing specific, detailed guidance that makes rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death. Id. at 428, 100 S.Ct. at 1764-65. Nevertheless, the State argues that remand is unnecessary because another aggravating factor exists, and the jury specifically found no mitigating factors. We disagree. 27 The Supreme Court has held that invalidation of an aggravating circumstance does not automatically require the reviewing court to vacate a death sentence and remand for a new sentencing proceeding before a jury. Where at least one other aggravating factor exists, the state high court, instead, may either reweigh or conduct a harmless error analysis. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 748-49, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1448-49, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990); see also Jeffers, 38 F.3d at 414. 28 Even in a weighing state, however, invalidation of one of several aggravating factors may make no difference if there were no mitigating circumstances against which the state court could balance the remaining aggravating factors. See Neuschafer v. Whitley, 816 F.2d 1390, 1393 (9th Cir.1987). But where some mitigating factors exist, there must either be a new sentencing hearing before a jury or the state appellate court must reweigh or conduct harmless error review in order to give the defendant the individualized consideration required by the Constitution. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 746, 752, 110 S.Ct. at 1447, 1450. 29 In its published decision on McKenna's direct appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court stated [t]he jury further found there were no mitigating circumstances. McKenna, 705 P.2d at 622. The district court held that the record does not support the Nevada Supreme Court's conclusion. We agree. The special verdict form returned by the jury stated that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating factors. This is insufficient to conclude that the jury found no mitigating circumstances. Rather, the form indicates only that the mitigating evidence was insufficient to outweigh the two aggravating factors. The record demonstrates that McKenna did provide some mitigating evidence, including his difficult childhood, his argument that he was a product of the penal system and his value to society as a writer. Because we have found one of the aggravating factors to be unconstitutional, the question now becomes whether the mitigating evidence is sufficient to outweigh the sole remaining aggravating factor. Thus, under Clemons, McKenna must be resentenced in a proceeding where the remaining valid aggravating factor found by the jury is weighed against the mitigating evidence. 494 U.S. at 741, 110 S.Ct. at 1444; Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, ----, 113 S.Ct. 528, 535, 121 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992); Jeffers, 38 F.3d at 414. 30 The parties have suggested that this case be certified to the Nevada Supreme Court to resolve the question of the appropriate procedure for resentencing and how this procedure should be accomplished under Nevada law. We conclude that this is a question of Nevada law best resolved by the Nevada state courts in the context of a Nevada criminal case, rather than by a certification process in the context of a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Therefore, we express no opinion on the proper procedure Nevada should employ when resentencing McKenna.