Opinion ID: 211763
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voluntary Retirement

Text: The Board’s jurisdiction in this case depends on whether McCollum was removed. See Staats v. United States Postal Serv., 99 F.3d 1120, 1123-24 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A decision to resign or retire is presumed to be voluntary, and an employee who voluntarily retires has no right to appeal to the Board . . . .”). Thus, we first consider whether the facts indicate that McCollum voluntarily retired. In his letter of September 7, 2000, McCollum declined the reassignment and requested discontinued service 05-3015 8 retirement. His letter was neither a resignation nor a request for voluntary retirement. It is important to note that discontinued service retirement cannot simply be requested. Under 5 U.S.C. § 8336(d)(1), discontinued service retirement requires an involuntary separation from service. McCollum’s letter merely acknowledged, as NCUA had twice warned McCollum, that NCUA would remove him if he failed to accept the directed reassignment. In fact, that was exactly NCUA’s response. Nineteen days later, on September 26, 2000, NCUA issued a notice of proposed removal. That letter states: “On September 7, 2000, you advised the Board that you would not accept this reassignment. Therefore, because you have declined this directed reassignment, removal is necessary for the efficiency of the service. This action is being taken under 5 CFR, part 752.” NCUA did not view McCollum as having resigned or voluntarily retired. McCollum responded by noting that he presumed the notice of removal was necessary to effect discontinued service retirement as he was previously told by NCUA. Nevertheless, he complains about the reference to “adverse action” under 5 C.F.R. part 752 and says that is not what is occurring. McCollum, however, misunderstood the law on this point because his removal was an adverse action. Moreover, McCollum’s response letter continues to seek “any means by which [he] can accept the ARDP position in Region VI.” Thus, McCollum’s use of such language makes clear that he did not resign or voluntarily retire. The Administrative Judge found that McCollum was removed. She stated, “In order for the appellant to receive a discontinued service retirement, which he died [sic], 05-3015 9 5 U.S.C. § 8336(d) requires an involuntary separation not for cause based on charges of delinquency or misconduct.” This finding is supported by substantial evidence.