Opinion ID: 867561
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The emerging trend and the new RESTATEMENT

Text: ¶ 10 We noted in DeLoach that the 1988 revisions to the RESTATEMENT were implemented to employ a type of interest analysis approach recognized by the drafters as the `emerging trend' among courts. DeLoach, 192 Ariz. at 29 ¶ 4, 960 P.2d at 629 ¶ 4. There was a recognition that in recent cases the courts select the state whose law will be applied to the issue of limitations by a process essentially similar to that used in the case of other issues of choice of law. RESTATEMENT § 142 cmt. e (1988). Thus, the new section 142 contained the two-step analysis we utilized in DeLoach and will employ here. ¶ 11 Before that analysis, however, it is instructive to look at two pre-revision cases that may well have been among the emerging trend discussed by the drafters of the RESTATEMENT. They are particularly relevant because both deal with Arizona automobile accidents and the interests served by the Arizona and California statutes of limitations.
¶ 12 This diversity action began when a van occupied by California residents was struck on an Arizona highway by a truck owned by an Oklahoma company and operated by an Arkansas driver. The district court dismissed, based on California's limitations period, and the Ninth Circuit reversed, saying, California has adopted a `governmental interest' approach to resolve choice-of-law problems. Ledesma v. Jack Stewart Produce, Inc., 816 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir.1987). In analyzing the interests of California and Arizona, the court reached several conclusions. California's interest in protecting its courts from stale claims is at least equally balanced by its interest in allowing its residents to recover for injuries sustained in a state that would recognize their claim as timely. Id. at 485. Further, because the Arizona legislature has set a two-year limitations period, Arizona's interest would be significantly impaired by a failure to apply its statute of limitations. Id. at 486. Quoting the Supreme Court of California, the Ninth Circuit held that one of the primary purposes of a state in creating a cause of action... is to deter the kind of conduct within its borders which wrongfully [causes injury]. Id. (quoting Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.3d 574, 114 Cal.Rptr. 106, 522 P.2d 666, 672 (1974)). ¶ 13 Before finally concluding that the Arizona statute of limitations should apply, the Ninth Circuit said, Insofar as drivers tend to be more careful when their chances of incurring liability are more substantial, Arizona does have an interest in ensuring that its statute of limitations is applied in any case that arises from accidents occurring within its state borders.  Id. (emphasis added). Further, the court noted that Arizona's legitimate government policy would be impaired by a failure to allow the cause of action that it has established for personal injury claims. Id. While in Ledesma, unlike the instant case, there were no California defendants, the court's holdings on deterrence of in-state conduct obtain no matter where the defendants reside.
¶ 14 An Arizona resident driving in Arizona on business for his Arizona employer drove his tractor-trailer into a car driven on business by a California resident. The California driver brought a negligence action in Arizona, and his workers' compensation carrier brought an action to recover the payments made to him. After the actions were consolidated, the superior court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss based on California's one-year statute of limitations. In reversing, our court of appeals applied a five-factor test on statute of limitations analysis: 1. Where the cause of action arose; 2. Amenability to suit in other states; 3. The substantial interest, if any, of the forum in the suit; 4. Which state's substantive law will apply; and 5. Whether the foreign state's statute of limitations has run. Brandler v. Manuel Trevizo Hay Co., 154 Ariz. 96, 99, 740 P.2d 958, 961 (App.1987) (citing Allen v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 F.2d 361, 362-63 (3d Cir.1977)). In conducting this analysis, the court applied a modified interest analysis rather than the mechanistic approach of the 1971 version of section 142 and found that only on the last factor did California's interest prevail over Arizona's interest in the same matter. [4] ¶ 15 Both Ledesma and Brandler dealt with automobile accidents in Arizona involving California plaintiffs, and in both cases, one federal and one state, the decision was that Arizona's statute of limitations should apply. Even though application of Arizona's statute was found in both cases, it is the pre-1988 analysis that presaged the change in the RESTATEMENT that is most interesting: careful identification of each state's interest was followed by a weighing of those interests. That, indeed, is the policy still followed in California on substantive issues. Even under a governmental interest analysis, it is likely that California would apply Arizona's statute of limitations in this case. Hurtado, 114 Cal.Rptr. 106, 522 P.2d at 670. The California Supreme Court recently relied on Hurtado, among other cases, when it restated the policy of using a governmental interest analysis in resolving conflicts of laws. Washington Mut. Bank v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.4th 906, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 320, 15 P.3d 1071, 1080-81 (2001). ¶ 16 However, as noted in DeLoach, Arizona has followed the RESTATEMENT tests, including the specific statute of limitations rule of the 1988 version of section 142, which states the general rule that the claim will be entertained if our statute of limitations has not run. We turn then to consider whether the government interest analysis exception to that rule applies.