Opinion ID: 2506803
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-Adjudicatory Improvement Period

Text: The next issue is whether the circuit court erred in granting physical custody of the four minor children to the Appellee Grandparents pursuant to a post-adjudicatory improvement period where conditions of neglect existed in the home. The Appellant DHHR argues that the circuit court erred in granting any post-adjudicatory improvement period because the Appellee Grandparents failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood that they can substantially correct the conditions of neglect in the near future. In contrast, the Appellee Grandparents argue that the circuit court did not err in granting them a post-dispositional improvement period because they were the psychological parents of the children. [11] As with all abuse and neglect proceedings, the best interests of the child is the polar star by which decisions must be made which affect children. Michael K.T. v. Tina L.T., 182 W.Va. 399, 405, 387 S.E.2d 866, 872 (1989) (citation omitted). This Court has repeatedly stated that the primary goal in cases involving abuse and neglect, as in all family law matters, must be the health and welfare of the children. Syl. Pt. 3, in part, In re Katie S., 198 W.Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996). Moreover, this Court recognized the concept of a psychological parent in In re Clifford K., 217 W.Va. 625, 619 S.E.2d 138 (2005). In Clifford K, the Court held in syllabus point three that [a] psychological parent is a person who, on a continuing day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills a child's psychological and physical needs for a parent and provides for the child's emotional and financial support. The psychological parent may be a biological, adoptive, or foster parent, or any other person. The resulting relationship between the psychological parent and the child must be of substantial, not temporary, duration and must have begun with the consent and encouragement of the child's legal parent or guardian. To the extent that this holding is inconsistent with our prior decision of In re Brandon L.E., 183 W.Va. 113, 394 S.E.2d 515 (1990), [12] that case is expressly modified. 217 W.Va. at 630, 619 S.E.2d at 143, Syl. Pt. 3 (Footnote added). Simply because a person is found to be a child's psychological parent, however, does not translate into the psychological parent getting custody of the child. Rather, this Court has only gone so far as to hold that the status of psychological parent entitles the individual to intervene in a custody proceeding, when such intervention is likely to serve the best interests of the child(ren) whose custody is under adjudication. Id. at Syl. Pt. 4, in part. Thus, custody determinations regarding a child or children are still controlled by what is in the best interests of the child(ren). In the case sub judice, the record is replete with the Appellee Grandparents' continued and repeated violations of orders entered by the circuit court regarding visitation by the children's mother with the subject children throughout the proceedings. Despite the circuit court's terminating the children's mother's rights, the Appellee Grandparents have continued to allow visitation between the children and their mother in direct violation of the circuit court's order that is the subject of the instant appeal. Further, there is also evidence in the record that the Appellee Grandparents have violated that order by not allowing the Appellant Father to visit his child and by failing to comply with psychological appointments scheduled for the children. Additionally, the record contains a failed home study of the Appellee Grandparents' home, as well as the psychologist's opinions after evaluating both of the Appellee Grandparents that their home was not a proper placement for the children. These documents were submitted to the circuit court prior to the entry of the May 21, 2010, order; however, the circuit court failed to address the documents in its order. Given this Court's continued adherence to the well-established precedent that placement of children with their grandparents must be in the best interests of the children, the circuit court completely overlooked this polar star in reaching its decision. The circuit court gave little consideration to the fact that an infant had died in the Appellee Grandparents' home with the Appellee Grandfather present and with no real explanation by him as to how the death occurred. Moreover, the children reported that the Appellee Grandfather whipped them with belts and broomsticks, with the only explanation offered by the Appellee Grandmother being that the children lie. The children were sharing a bed with their Appellee Grandfather, even though he had his own bedroom. Lastly, the Appellee Grandparents nonchalantly were being allowed by the circuit court to violate its orders, especially regarding visitation with the children's mother, with absolutely no explanation or consequences. The circuit court erred in granting a post-termination improvement period that allowed transfer of the physical custody of the children back to the Appellee Grandparents. When custody of children is changed, gradual transition periods should be used whenever possible. See Syl. Pt. 3, James M. v. Maynard, 185 W.Va. 648, 408 S.E.2d 400 (1991) (It is a traumatic experience for children to undergo sudden and dramatic changes in their permanent custodians. Lower courts in cases such as these should provide, whenever possible, for a gradual transition period, especially where young children are involved. Further, such gradual transition periods should be developed in a manner intended to foster the emotional adjustment of the children to this change and to maintain as much stability as possible in their lives.). In the instant case, such a gradual transition seems well-warranted. However, given the repeated wilful violation of the circuit court's orders by the Appellee Grandparents, as well as the fear that the guardian ad litem, the Appellant DHHR's workers, and the Appellant Father and his wife have of the Appellee Grandfather, as revealed to the Court during oral argument and as illustrated by the record, this may not be a case in which a gradual transition period is suitable in light of serious questions about the safety and welfare of the children involved. Upon remand, the lower court should set a hearing forthwith, bringing all the parties and their counsel in for a full hearing on the most effective means of transitioning the children while still protecting their safety. The lower court should make very clear that its orders will be followed without recalcitrance, interference, or hostility, and that if a transition period is established, the Appellee Grandfather and all other parties must work cooperatively or risk serious sanction. In addition, the circuit court, on remand, may consider whether the children should have continued visitation with their grandparents given the evidence that there is a strong psychological bond between the children and the Appellee Grandparents. See Syl. Pt. 11, In re Jonathan G., 198 W.Va. 716, 482 S.E.2d 893 (1996) (A child has a right to continued association with individuals with whom he has formed a close emotional bond, including foster parents, provided that a determination is made that such continued contact is in the best interests of the child.). It is imperative, however, that the circuit court focus on whether such continued contact is in the best interests of the children involved in light of the Appellee Grandparents' pattern and practice of violating court orders, as well as the Appellee Grandfather's apparent use of fear and intimidation. At a minimum, the circuit court, if examining any issues of visitation between the Appellee Grandparents and the children, should give due consideration to supervised visitation at a neutral location in the event that the circuit court determines that such visitation is warranted. Also, it is critical in this case for the Appellant DHHR to immediately develop permanency plans for all the children, I.A., N.A., and C.P. While there is some indication in the record that the children's last foster care parents may be a viable permanent placement as the foster care parents continued to visit with the children until the Appellee Grandparents stopped the visitation, counsel for the DHHR, during oral argument, was unable to state that that foster care home, indeed, was a permanent placement for the children. Recently in State ex rel. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources v. Pancake, 224 W.Va. 39, 680 S.E.2d 54 (2009), the Court reiterated the following fundament principle concerning the securing of a permanent placement for children: The early, most formative years of a child's life are crucial to his or her development. In re Carlita B., 185 W.Va. 613, 623, 408 S.E.2d 365, 375 (1991). We have repeatedly emphasized that children have a right to resolution of their life situations, to a basic level of nurturance, protection, and security, and to a permanent placement. State ex rel. Amy M. v. Kaufman, 196 W.Va. 251, 257, 470 S.E.2d 205, 211 (1996). Pancake, 224 W.Va. at 43, 680 S.E.2d at 58. The children should not be moved from place to place with no permanency plan and every effort should be made to ensure continued contact between the siblings. Further, the children should be provided with counseling services by the DHHR, and the circuit court should enter an order so directing. The lower court faces a Herculean task of requiring wisdom, compassion, and the strength to protect the children to the greatest degree possible from physical and emotional harm, and to create stability and safety.