Opinion ID: 2523559
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Attempted Possession of Cocaine Case

Text: The one count of attempted possession of cocaine in case No. 06CR395I was a severity level 4 drug crime. With Bonner's criminal history score of E, Bonner's conviction fell into a presumptive probation block on the sentencing guidelines drug grid. Because the crime was committed while Bonner was on felony bond, the district court had authority pursuant to K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4603d(f) to order imprisonment without implementing a departure. Nevertheless, a different circumstance identified in K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4603d(g) the fourth circumstance listed aboveapplies. Bonner's attempted possession of cocaine conviction was classified in the 4-E drug grid, and one of the circumstances listed in K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4603d(g) requires consideration of alternative nonprison sanctions prior to sentencing for a defendant whose offense is classified in grid blocks 4-E or 4-F . . . and whose offense does not meet the requirements of [K.S.A. 21-4729]. In turn, K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4729(a)(1) requires placement in a certified drug treatment program if the offense is classified in grid blocks 4-E, 4-F, 4-G, 4-H or 4-I of the sentencing guidelines grid for drug crimes and the defendant has no felony conviction of K.S.A. 65-4142, 65-4159, 65-4161, 65-4163 or 65-4164, and amendments thereto or any substantially similar offense from another jurisdiction. It is undisputed that Bonner had a prior felony conviction in Missouri for sale of a controlled substance, which is the statutory equivalent of 65-4161. Consequently, Bonner's offense did not meet the requirements of K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4729, and her offense was classified in grid block 4-E. As a result, the fourth circumstance listed in K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4603d(g) applies. The Court of Appeals recognized the applicability of this circumstance but concluded that because the sentence was not a dispositional departure, the alternative sentencing did not apply. In other words, the Court of Appeals failed to read the or in the statute as a disjunctive term and, therefore, erroneously held that alternative nonprison sanctions did not have to be considered by the district court if the firstthe dispositional departurecircumstance did not apply. This application of the statute is contrary to the clear language of the provision. See Bee, 288 Kan. at 741, 207 P.3d 244. The word or indicates the alternative nonprison sanctions must be considered if there is a dispositional departure or if the offense is classified in grid blocks 4-E or 4-F and does not meet the requirements of K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4729. Under the latter circumstance, there is no mention of the special rule under K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4603d(f) where a new felony is committed while the offender is on felony bond, and there is no requirement that the imposition of a prison sanction be a dispositional departure. Hence, we conclude the fourth circumstance listed in K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4603d(g)relating to drug treatmentrequires consideration of alternative nonprison sanctions, notwithstanding the fact that the crime was committed while the offender was on felony bond. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that K.S.A.2006 Supp. 21-4603d(f) does not mandate a prison sentence when a defendant commits a new crime while on felony bond; it merely gives the district court the discretion to impose a prison sentence. If incarceration were mandated, it would be inconsistent to conclude that the legislature intended the consideration of alternative nonprison sanctions. See Bee, 288 Kan. 733, Syl. ¶ 7, 207 P.3d 244 (An offender sentenced pursuant to K.S.A. 21-4729 who fails to participate in a drug treatment program is subject to immediate imposition of the underlying prison sentence once the district court has made the finding required by K.S.A. 21-4603d[n] of a pattern of intentional conduct demonstrating the offender's refusal to comply with or participate in treatment. Consideration of placement in [Labette] or other nonprison sanctions under K.S.A. 21-4603d[g] is not required.). The Court of Appeals erred in applying the identical rationale to both the forgery case and the attempted possession of cocaine case. The district court should have considered alternative nonprison sanctions with respect to Bonner's conviction for attempted possession of cocaine.