Opinion ID: 1799918
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did Board's action isolate defendant from individual liability?

Text: Because sec. 40.41 (2), Stats., [7] required majority action of the board of education in order to discharge plaintiff, and the board did on December 9, 1963, ratify its prior informal action of December 1st and the delivery of the letter, defendant contends that the letter was not his action, but constitutes the action of the board. Defendant relies upon Corrao v. Mortier , [8] Clausen v. Eckstein, [9] and Meyer v. Carman. [10] All three cited cases sought to hold a defendant public officer liable in damages for failure to perform a nonministerial duty and in each of these cases plaintiff was unsuccessful. The governing principle is stated in a quotation from 67 C. J. S., Officers, p. 418, sec. 125, set forth in Corrao v. Mortier [11] as follows: In the absence of statute expressly imposing such liability, a public officer who is a member of a corporate or governmental body on which a duty rests cannot be held liable for the neglect of duty of that body if he acts in good faith. If there is a refusal, neglect, or failure with respect to the exercise of the power or discharge of the duties of such body, it is the default of the body, and not of the individuals composing it. However, the black-letter wording of this same section of 67 C. J. S., Officers, states: Ordinarily a public officer is not liable in a private action for acts performed in good faith within the scope of his authority. He may, however, be held liable for injuries resulting from his torts. [12] In the body of the text of this same section, immediately after the quotation in Corrao v. Mortier , the following appears: However, it has been held that the illegal act or omission of a public board or corporation is the act of those members who actually participate in its consummation, and such members may be held personally liable for the resulting damage. [13] We are satisfied that a member of a public board who actively participates in the commission of a tort, such as publishing a libel, cannot escape liability therefor by claiming it was the result of board action for which he cannot be held individually liable. The problem is closely akin to that presented in the recent case of Purtell v. Tehan [14] wherein it was held that an agent who does an act which is otherwise a tort cannot escape liability therefor by the fact that he acted at the command of his principal.