Opinion ID: 2980499
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Woods’s Exhaustion of State-Court Remedies

Text: Federal courts use state-court records to determine whether the petitioner raised the same issue in state court that is now presented in the habeas proceeding. Picard, 404 U.S. at 276. Woods’s merits brief before the Michigan Court of Appeals raised the following, general issue for that court’s consideration: “Whether the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel.” R. 15-2 at 1. The merits brief listed the following reasons that defense counsel was ineffective: “(a) Failure to request an instruction on the issue of flight”; “(b) Failure to object to the trial court’s refusal to re-instruct the jury after their request”; and “(c) Failure to argue missing evidence.” R. 15-2 at 2–4. None of these reasons raised the specific objection that Woods raised before the district court, that is, that counsel failed to discover Brewington’s criminal history or effectively cross-examine Brewington on that issue. In a motion to remand for a new trial, which was filed after the merits brief but before the state appellate court heard oral argument, Woods further elaborated that “counsel failed to conduct an investigation of the principal witnesses against the defendant,” R. 15-3 at 17, and that he “failed to explore whether or not there was an agreement between a key prosecution witness and the prosecutor in exchange for his testimony (an agreement to reduce his sentence).” R. 15-3 at 18. That motion was held in abeyance until oral argument, and was ultimately denied as to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Woods contends that the - 14 - No. 09-1071 Darryl Woods v. Raymond Booker, Warden combination of his general ineffective assistance claim in the merits brief and his more specific contention in the motion to remand amount to exhaustion of his claim. As a preliminary matter, Woods’s umbrella ineffective-assistance claim was insufficient to properly raise the failure-to-investigate issue before the Michigan Court of Appeals on direct appeal. See Picard, 404 U.S. at 276. This general claim was coupled with a series of more specific claims, providing a list of ways in which trial counsel was allegedly ineffective. Woods’s merits brief did not give the Michigan Court of Appeals any reason to suspect that a failure to investigate issue was waiting in the wings. Therefore, Woods’s general claim did not provide the state appellate court a “fair opportunity” to apply controlling legal standards to the facts of this claim. See id. at 276–77. Woods’s claim that his motion to remand exhausted the failure-to-investigate claim ignores the procedural norms of the Michigan Court of Appeals. As that court has made clear, it will review only those claims “stated in the questions presented section of [a] defendant’s brief [or] suggested by the stated issues.” People v. Ewing, 2005 WL 658835 at  (Mich. Ct. App. 2005); see also Haytham v. Bell, 2008 WL 3875399, at  (W.D. Mich. 2008). In order to fairly present his claim of failure to investigate before the Michigan Court of Appeals, Woods needed to include it within his questions presented on direct appeal. It follows that, as a general matter, a motion to remand would not fairly present an issue before the Michigan Court of Appeals. See Black v. Ashley, 87 F.3d 1315 (6th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision) (No. 95-6184, available at 1996 WL 266421) (“The fair presentation requirement is not satisfied when a claim is presented in state court in a procedurally inappropriate manner that renders consideration of the merits unlikely.”). In support of his reliance on the motion to remand, Woods points to Elmore v. Foltz, 768 F.2d - 15 - No. 09-1071 Darryl Woods v. Raymond Booker, Warden 773 (6th Cir. 1985). There, we found a petitioner had fairly presented his claims, including ineffective assistance of counsel, through a motion to remand that was filed before the merits of the appeal were briefed or argued. Id. at 775. Woods asks us to extend the ruling in Elmore to his case, where the motion to remand was filed after the brief on the merits. We made a comparable extension in the context of a pro se litigant in Cottenham v. Jamrog, 248 Fed. App’x 625 (6th Cir. 2007), while noting that pro se petitioners receive “less stringent standards” in determining fair presentation. Id. at 633 (quoting Caver v. Straub, 349 F.3d 340, 347 (6th Cir. 2003)). In Jamrog, the petitioner “repeatedly raised the issue of his problems with [his counsel] before the Michigan Court of Appeals, by motions and by letters to the court.” Jamrog, 248 Fed. App’x at 633. In both cases, we concluded that the claims were exhausted because the petitioners’ motions were procedurally required and sufficiently detailed to “fairly present” the petitioners’ claims to the Michigan Court of Appeals. Id. at 634; Elmore, 768 F.2d at 775. With regard to procedure, our decision in Elmore hinged on the fact that, under the Michigan General Court Rule that was in force at the time of Elmore’s direct appeal, a motion to remand was the proper way to handle his claim. Elmore, 768 F.2d at 775. Elmore could not raise his issues in subsequent briefs after the motion to remand had been denied because there would have been an inadequate record for subsequent decisions. Id. Under the modified Michigan Rule that applied to Woods, a motion to remand is permitted where the factual record is insufficient for appellate consideration. M.C.R 7.211(C)(1). However, Woods failed to make a timely request for a Ginther hearing—the process for developing facts to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, People v. Ginther, 212 N.W.2d 922 (Mich. 1973). Because of this failure, appellate review of - 16 - No. 09-1071 Darryl Woods v. Raymond Booker, Warden Woods’s ineffective assistance claims was limited to the record. See id.; People v. Woods, No. 136731, at 3 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). Therefore, unlike the petitioner in Elmore, Woods’s motion to remand was not procedurally viable. Besides, Woods’s claim on remand was not sufficiently detailed to fairly present the claim he now offers. In Elmore, we noted that “given the length and detail of that motion, and given the denial of the motion for ‘lack of merit,’ we cannot say that Elmore failed to fairly present his constitutional claims to the Michigan Court of Appeals.” Elmore, 768 F.2d at 775. By contrast, Woods’s cursory statement in the motion to remand, without further explanation, did not put the Michigan Court of Appeals on notice of Woods’s claim that counsel should have discovered Brewington’s bond status and cross-examined him on his potential bias. Moreover, the motion to remand was considered by the Michigan Court of Appeals only in the context of its tardiness—not for its merit, as in Elmore. See id. Instead, Woods’s motion to remand was summarily denied because the Ginther motion was not timely filed in the trial court. Woods, No. 136731, at 3 (citing People v. Armendarez, 468 N.W.2d 893, 901 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)). Based on these important differences between the motion discussed in Elmore and the motion to remand that Woods seeks to rely on, it would not be appropriate to extend Elmore’s holding in this case. This is supported by the fact that the motion to remand in Elmore was submitted before the merits brief, securing more meaningful review. Id. at 775. Moreover, the ruling in Jamrog must be considered in light of its application to a pro se petitioner. Jamrog, 248 Fed. App’x at 632. Because Woods was represented by counsel in his direct appeal, we cannot extend the same leniency here. It follows that Woods’s present claim was not exhausted through his motion to remand. - 17 - No. 09-1071 Darryl Woods v. Raymond Booker, Warden