Opinion ID: 420804
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the intent instructions

Text: 9 Mail fraud is a specific intent crime. The government is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to defraud. United States v. Martin-Trigona, 684 F.2d 485, 492 (7th Cir.1982). The district court gave the following instruction on deliberate ignorance as part of its charge on the type of knowledge which satisfies the requisite fraudulent intent: 10 However, the element of knowledge may be established by proof that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious to him. In other words, the requirement that the defendant has acted knowingly does not mean that the defendant needed to have positive knowledge. If the defendant failed to have positive knowledge only because he conscientiously avoided acquiring it, the requirement of knowledge is satisfied. 11 Rec., vol. VIII, at 673. On appeal, Glick contends that this instruction is an erroneous formulation of the law because it permitted the jury to convict upon proof of a lesser degree of knowledge than that required by the statute. 12 In recommending the use of a deliberate ignorance instruction, this court has pointed out that [w]hile negligence is not sufficient to charge a person with knowledge, one may not wilfully and intentionally remain ignorant of a fact, important and material to his conduct, and thereby escape punishment. The test is whether there was a conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment. Griego v. United States, 298 F.2d 845, 849 (10th Cir.1962) (footnotes omitted). Thus, the type of instruction at issue here may be given when the evidence points to deliberate ignorance and conscious avoidance of actual knowledge. See United States v. Garzon, 688 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632, 642-43 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956, 101 S.Ct. 365, 66 L.Ed.2d 221, 449 U.S. 1038, 101 S.Ct. 618, 66 L.Ed.2d 501 (1980); United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 312 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919, 100 S.Ct. 1854, 64 L.Ed.2d 273 (1980); United States v. Batencort, 592 F.2d 916, 918 (5th Cir.1979). 13 Glick argues that giving a deliberate ignorance instruction was inappropriate in light of the evidence presented at trial. This argument is apparently based on Glick's assertion that the record does not contain sufficient evidence of his willful ignorance in the face of facts known to him that would have made obvious the existence of the fraudulent scheme. 14 In denying Glick's motion for directed verdict, the trial judge determined that the instruction was proper because a reasonable juror could find that Glick had intentionally remained ignorant despite his subjective awareness of facts plainly indicating the fraudulent nature of Chisholm's business. The court specifically noted evidence of Glick's numerous blatant violations of accounting principles and auditing standards, his belief in 1975 that the mineral claim evaluations were unrealistic, his acknowledgment that no one would give a loan on the basis of the financial statements, his knowledge that fees were obtained for packaging loans which would likely not go through, and his knowledge of the nature of the corporate financial activities. This evidence is sufficient to enable a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Chisholm's loan packaging business was a fraudulent scheme from its inception, and that Glick either knew it or deliberately avoided acquiring positive knowledge. Accordingly, we conclude that an instruction on deliberate avoidance was appropriate. See Griego, 289 F.2d at 849. 15 Glick also argues that even if a deliberate ignorance instruction was warranted, the form of the instruction given in this case was inadequate because it failed to require the jury to find that the defendant was subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact whose knowledge is imputed, and that knowledge of that fact may not be imputed if the defendant actually believed that such fact did not exist. Brief of Appellant at 17. To insure that a defendant is only convicted if his ignorance is willful, rather than negligent, the preferable form of the instruction informs the jury, in addition to the charge given in this case, (1) that the required knowledge is established if the accused is aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in question, (2) unless he actually believes it does not exist. United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 704 n. 21 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 3173, 49 L.Ed.2d 1188 (1976); see also United States v. Aulet, 618 F.2d 182, 190-91 (2d Cir.1980). Glick urges that the court's failure to add this language to its charge is grounds for reversal. We disagree. 16 In response to counsel's general objection to the instruction, the district court repeatedly offered to modify the instruction if counsel wished to propose a language change. 3 Defense counsel responded that his objection was not to the language of the instruction, but to the propriety of such an instruction in any form. Because Glick failed to suggest to the trial court the language he now claims was erroneously omitted, we may reverse only if the omission constitutes plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). 17 The jury was instructed that Glick could not deliberately close his eyes to what would otherwise be obvious to him, that he could not be convicted for an act done because of mistake, accident, or innocent reason, and that he was innocent even if he prepared fraudulent financial statements if he did not intentionally and knowingly participate in the scheme or artifice to defraud. 4 Although inclusion of the omitted language would have been preferable, the omission in this case did not constitute plain error. See United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 243-44 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 347, 74 L.Ed.2d 387 (1982); United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069, 1074-75 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906, 98 S.Ct. 1453, 55 L.Ed.2d 497 (1978); Jewell, 532 F.2d at 704 n. 21.