Opinion ID: 1060398
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the proper standard to apply in change of custody cases

Text: Based on our prior case law interpreting Article I, section 8 in this context, and given the overwhelming authority from other jurisdictions on this issue, we conclude that our Constitution does not accord natural parents a presumption of superior rights to modify an existing and valid order of custody, even when that order results from the parent voluntarily agreeing to give custody to the non-parent. Though strong in many respects, no aspect of the fundamental right of parental privacy is absolute, and a parent who is given the opportunity to rely upon the presumption of superior rights in an initial custody determination may not again invoke that doctrine to modify a valid custody order. Absent proof of the custody order's invalidity or proof that the parental rights were not protected in the initial custody proceeding, the child's interest in a stable and secure environment is at least as important, and probably more so, than the parent's interest in having custody of the child returned. Accordingly, we hold that a natural parent is not generally entitled to invoke the doctrine of superior rights to modify a valid custody order awarding custody to a non-parent. Instead, in the absence of extraordinary circumstancesfor instance, the natural parent was not afforded an opportunity to assert superior parental rights in the initial custody proceeding; the custody order is invalid on its face; the order is the result of fraud or procedural illegality; or the order grants only temporary custody to the non-parentsa trial court should apply the standard typically applied in parent-vs-parent modification cases: that a material change in circumstances has occurred, which makes a change in custody in the child's best interests. See, e.g., Nichols v. Nichols, 792 S.W.2d 713, 715-16 (Tenn.1990). As in all other cases, the burden of establishing these factors rests upon the party seeking the change in custody. See Rogero v. Pitt, 759 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Tenn.1988). Citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) and Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979), the dissent in this case posits that we have failed to acknowledge the widely-accepted `presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children.' Notwithstanding the fact that these cases are wholly inappositethey address parental rights to limit grandparent visitation and to commit their children to civil institutionswe disagree that our decision today fails to acknowledge this important presumption in child custody cases. To the contrary, we have reaffirmed this presumption as an essential part of the superior rights doctrine. However, as we have gone to great lengths to demonstrate, this presumption shapes the initial decision of custody, and where a valid order exists transferring custody of a child away from a natural parent, the Constitution does not again compel that this presumption be given effect. The dissent also maintains that our holding today works to deny superior rights to a parent who voluntarily surrenders custody to a non-parent [and] will forever penalize parents whose decision to surrender custody was made with the best interests of the child as the paramount factor. Again, we must disagree. Nothing we have said today operates to punish or penalize natural parents, and in no way do we forever foreclose the possibility that a parent will be unable to regain custody of the child. However, our decision today does recognize that the parental rights given great weight in initial custody determinations must be balanced with other interests once a valid custody order is in place. In our view, the dissent gives too little weight to the interests of the child in a stable and secure environment, and it risks subjecting the child to `the whims and caprice of a parent.' Price, 484 S.E.2d at 535 (citation omitted). Indeed, if, as the dissent maintains, that a parent's voluntary decision to give custody to a non-parent is made with the best interests of the child as the paramount factor, can we not also suppose that the best interests of the child should again be the paramount factor when deciding whether custody should be returned to the natural parent? We see no compelling reason why the Constitution would command otherwise, provided that the rights of the parent were protected in the initial determination. [4] Moreover, generally applying the superior rights doctrine in custody modification proceedings as advocated by Mr. Blair would present practical problems for the administration of justice in this state. In giving effect to this doctrine in modification cases, Mr. Blair would essentially have us create a situation analogous to a show-cause process in which the custodial non-parent would have to show cause why the child should not be returned to the natural parent. In such a case, the natural parent would be entitled to have a child returnedeven in the face of a valid order transferring custody away from that parentunless the child's custodian can show that a change in custody would result in substantial harm to the child. We believe that such a process would effectively render existing orders of custody to non-parents practically worthless. As one court faced with a similar dilemma has recognized, If the court were to find that the custodians of [the child] were required to prove extraordinary circumstances in order to retain custody of this child, it would be concluding that final orders of custody are worthless and that the custodian of a child could have no confidence in the court process since, upon demand of the natural parent, the legal custodian would bear the burden of proving that extraordinary circumstances required their continuing to have custody of the infant child. Requiring such a burden of proof to be borne by the respondents in a proceeding to modify a custody order would practically render the initial custody determination a Pyrrhic victory for the non-parent. Darlene S. v. Justino L., 141 Misc.2d 303, 533 N.Y.S.2d 179, 182 (N.Y.Fam.Ct.1988). We must respect valid orders of custody, and we will not lightly embrace a rule that effectively renders such orders without effect or worth. [5]