Opinion ID: 4059120
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Conversion and Negligence Claims

Text: Dr. Poola next argues that the court erred in entering partial summary judgment for the University on her claims of conversion (Amended Complaint Count IV) and negligence (Count V). Specifically, she argues that the court erred in concluding that she “had no property interest in physical property deriving from her grant funds” and in concluding that her “research was „work for hire,‟” such that she was “precluded from asserting a property interest in the work.” 29
The following background is pertinent to Dr. Poola‟s argument. Dr. Poola attached to her Supplemental Opposition to the University‟s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment a list of property that she claims she was forced to abandon when she was denied access to her former laboratory and offices at the University. Dr. Poola listed the property under three category headings: (i) “Personal property”; (ii) “Property purchased with grants funded for Dr. Poola‟s research ideas and proposals that were awarded to Dr. Poola as the Principal Investigator” or “Property purchased with grants funds to Dr. Poola as the Principal Investigator for research ideas and proposals prepared by Dr. Poola”; and (iii) “Work Products” (a category in which Dr. Poola included, for example, “biomedical samples,” “gene clones,” genes and cells “in expression vector stored as freezes,” DNA and RNA from “breast cancer cell lines,” non-cancerous breast tissues and breast cancer tissues, antibody preparations, research data books, and unpublished research data). In a very abbreviated October 15, 2013, written order, Judge Ross granted the University‟s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to “any items derived from grant funds.” In an April 14, 2014, ruling from the bench, Judge Ross declared that “all that [wa]s left of the case” were Dr. Poola‟s claims that the University converted and negligently handled items of Dr. Poola‟s personal 30 property. He then issued an April 22, 2014, pre-trial order describing the matter for trial as “an action by Dr. Poola for any personal property she left at Howard University at the conclusion of her employment.” Thereafter, on October 7, 2014, Dr. Poola dismissed “with prejudice” her “claims set for trial” before Judge Ross, i.e., her claims pertaining to her personal property.
This court reviews a trial court‟s grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo. See Steele v. Salb, 93 A.3d 1277, 1281 (D.C. 2014). Summary judgment is proper where the record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Hubb v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 85 A.3d 836, 839 (D.C. 2014); Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56 (c). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.12 See Jaiyeola v. District of Columbia, 40 A.3d 356, 361 n.9 (D.C. 2012). 12 Here, in reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we accept Dr. Poola‟s categorization of the items she claims she was forced to leave behind. 31
1. Equipment and Supplies Purchased with Grant Funds In seeking summary judgment with respect to Dr. Poola‟s claims based on “items derived from grant funds,” the University cited (and its cites again in its brief to this court) Komen documents that identify the University as the “Grantee Institution” and Dr. Poola as the “Principal Investigator,” and which state that title to “equipment purchased during the term of a Komen-funded project,” while “intended for the use of the [Principal Investigator],” “shall be vested in the Grantee Institution[.]”13 The Komen documents further provide that “[u]pon completion of the project, all equipment purchased during the term of the Komenfunded project shall remain at the Grantee Institution” (although, with prior written approval from Komen, “in the event of [a Grantee Institution-] approved transfer of a Grant to another institution [upon the Principal Investigator‟s Change of 13 Dr. Poola averred that, to the best of her knowledge, the Komen documents, though not all from the time period of the grant under which she was working when she was expelled from the University, are “materially identical” to Komen documents that governed the grant (documents relating to which she asserts were among the possessions to which she was denied access). 32 Institution Request], the equipment necessary for the continuation and success of the project may be transferred to the new institution”). Addressing Dr. Poola‟s conversion claim as it pertains to equipment derived from DoD grant funds, the University cited Office of Management and Budget Circular A-110 (“Circular A-110”), which applies generally to all federal agency grants to non-profit organizations (such as the University). 14 Circular A-110 defines a recipient as “an organization receiving financial assistance directly from Federal awarding agencies to carry out a project or program” (italics added). It then states that “[t]itle to equipment acquired by a recipient with Federal funds shall vest in the recipient”15 and likewise that “[t]itle to supplies and other expendable property shall vest in the recipient upon acquisition.” “Supplies” is defined to include “all personal property excluding equipment, intangible property, 14 OFFICE MGMT. & BUDGET, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-110, UNIFORM OF ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR GRANTS AND AGREEMENTS WITH INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, HOSPITALS, AND OTHER NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (1999). The University‟s “Sponsored Program Equipment Management Policy,” which is included in the record, incorporates Circular A-110 by reference. 15 Circular A-110 defines “equipment” as “tangible nonexpendable personal property including exempt property charged directly to the award having a useful life of more than one year and an acquisition cost of $5000 or more per unit.” See also 32 C.F.R. § 32.2 (Westlaw, through Sept. 1, 2016) (DoD regulation defining “Equipment”). 33 and debt instruments” and certain “inventions of a contractor[.]” Circular A-110 states, however, that “[i]f any statute specifically prescribes policies or specific requirements that differ from the standards provided herein, the provisions of the statute shall govern.” Further, DoD regulations governing research grants provide that the DoD regulations shall control to the extent that they are inconsistent with Circular A-110. See 32 C.F.R. § 32.3 (Westlaw, through Sept. 1, 2016). Both Circular A-110 and DoD regulations allow the agency to make “deviations” from standard practice. See 32 C.F.R. § 32.4 (Westlaw, through Sept. 1, 2016). The court‟s comments from the bench during an October 1, 2013, hearing on the University‟s motion summary judgment reveal why the court entered partial summary judgment in favor of the University on Dr. Poola‟s conversion claim as it pertains to equipment and supplies purchased with grant funds. At the hearing, the court cited the Komen documents and Circular A-110 and reasoned that under both grant programs, the University, as a Komen “Grantee Institution” and as a DoD grant “recipient,” is the owner of any property purchased with Komen or DoD funds.16 To avoid summary judgment on her claims with respect to the equipment 16 The University asserts that the court‟s ruling was compelled by this court‟s decision in Trustees of the Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia v. Vossoughi, 963 A.2d 1162 (D.C. 2009), but we believe that Vossoughi cannot be read so broadly. We noted in Vossoughi that under (unspecified) federal regulations and National (continued…) 34 that she acknowledged was purchased with grant funds, Dr. Poola was obligated to come forward with documents or other evidence to prove, as to any equipment to which the University allegedly denied her access and that was purchased with Komen or DoD grant funds (or other grant funds), that she owned (or, arguably, at least had a superior possessory interest in) the equipment.17 She “was not entitled (…continued) Science Foundation (“NSF”) policy, the grants under which Dr. Vossoughi, a professor and researcher at the University of the District of Columbia (“UDC”), did research were “awarded to a recipient institution” and “title to grant-funded property vests in the institutional grantee.” Id. at 1167. We reasoned that because Dr. Vossoughi “admittedly utilized grant funds (or, conceivably, other university funds) to acquire the articles he purchased from commercial sources while he was at UDC[,]” “UDC would have been entitled to partial judgment as a matter of law [on Dr. Vossoughi‟s claim of conversion of that property and other related claims] with respect to those . . . purchased articles . . . had it specified them in its Rule 50 motion.” Id. at 1180. That premise does not, however, necessarily apply with respect to items purchased with Komen and DoD grant funds (as opposed to the unspecified government agency funds or NSF funds involved in Vossoughi). 17 The elements of the tort of conversion are “[1] an unlawful exercise, [2] of ownership, dominion, and control, [3] over the personalty of another, [4] in denial or repudiation of his right to such property.” Blanken v. Harris, Upham & Co., 359 A.2d 281, 283 (1976) (numerals added). Thus, to prevail on a claim of conversion with respect to items of property, a plaintiff must have a legal interest in the property. See Samm v. Martin, 940 A.2d 138, 141 (D.C. 2007). Some courts have held that a defendant commits the tort of conversion if he takes “wrongful control or dominion over another‟s personal property in denial of or inconsistent with that person‟s possessory right to the property.” Kendall/Hunt Pub. Co. v. Rowe, 424 N.W.2d 235, 247 (Iowa 1988). Dr. Poola argues that she applied for and was awarded the Komen and DoD grants, had contractual relationships with the granting agencies, was required to sign amendments to and financial reports about the grants, and had a right to use (continued…) 35 to wait until trial to develop” or present the necessary evidence that the equipment purchased with grant funds belonged to her. See Aziken v. District of Columbia, 70 A.3d 213, 223 (D.C. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). She did not meet her burden; as the University argues, she identified no statute, regulation, guideline or other authority to support her claim of an ownership interest in equipment purchased with Komen or DoD grant funds. She also has not shown that DOD made “deviations” from standard practice, 32 C.F.R. § 32.4. She refers in her brief to “mutually explicit understandings” between the University and herself regarding her entitlement to the grants, but has not identified or documented any purported mutual understanding regarding grant-funded equipment. We therefore cannot conclude that the court erred in ruling that Dr. Poola did not have an actionable (…continued) the grant-funded items to perform her research, but none of that is equivalent to a property interest in the equipment purchased with grant funds. That said, Dr. Poola‟s claim that she had an ownership interest in at least some of the equipment left in her laboratory and offices at the University is not patently frivolous. According to the Amended Complaint, she had grants from four funding entities in addition to Komen and DoD during her tenure at the University, including other research foundations — entities whose policies with respect to equipment purchased with grant funds are not disclosed in the record. However, in opposing the University‟s motion for partial summary judgment, Dr. Poola did not specifically assert that she was forced to leave behind equipment purchased with funds from such other foundation grants. 36 interest in any equipment purchased with Komen or DoD grant funds.18 We reach the same conclusion regarding “supplies and other expendable property” purchased with DoD grant funds given that Circular A-110 declares that title to the same “shall vest in the recipient upon acquisition.”19 18 Cf. Pemrick v. Stracher, No. 92-CV-959, 2007 WL 1876504, , 13 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007) (stating, in case in which former State University of New York (SUNY) research professor alleged conversion of laboratory equipment, that under applicable federal regulations, “it is clear that title to the equipment purchased with grant funds lies with the [SUNY] Research Foundation” and that “[a]lthough plaintiff argues that she is the owner of the equipment because it was purchased with funds from a [NIH] grant for which she was the Principal Investigator, she offers no legal authority to support her claim of title”); Abbs v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 1172, 1182 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (holding that “[a]s to the current grants, [plaintiff university professor] is not the grantee and can claim no property rights in the funding for these [Public Health Service] grants”; rather, “[p]ursuant to [federal regulations], the [university] Board of Regents is the grantee of the awards”), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 963 F.2d 918, 928 (7th Cir. 1992). As noted above, Komen policy documents contained in the record indicate that if the Principal Investigator transfers to another institution, equipment necessary for the project may be transferred to the new institution. This provision suggests that the University does not have an outright or irrevocable ownership interest in equipment purchased with Komen funds. It does not, however, establish that Dr. Poola, who has not shown that she transferred to a new institution, has a superior ownership or possessory claim adequate to support her claim of conversion. 19 See ThermoGen, Inc. v. Chou, No. 98-C-1230, 1998 WL 246395, -3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 1998) (citing HHS regulations that incorporate the provisions of Circular A-110 with respect to title to equipment and supplies and holding that, “[b]y virtue of these regulations and subject to express conditions, ThermoGen [the institutional applicant under a NIH grant] is the sole title holder to all equipment and supplies purchased with the federal grant funds” and that “[t]he terms and (continued…) 37 The Komen documents do not address title to supplies purchased with Komen grant funds, but do distinguish “equipment” from “supplies,” and thus indicate that not all items purchased with Komen grant funds constitute “equipment” (title to which “vest[s] in the Grantee Institution”). Further, Komen documents contained in the record that pertain specifically to grants for which Dr. Poola was the Principal Investigator indicate that Dr. Poola‟s budgeted expenditures for “supplies” for the years to which the documents relate far exceeded her budgeted expenditures for “equipment” (which are shown as zero on the documents included in Dr. Poola‟s Appendix), suggesting that the lion‟s share of items purchased with Komen grant funds were non-equipment items. As discussed above, the court relied on the Komen and OMB Circular A-110 policies when he broadly removed from the case Dr. Poola‟s claims with respect to “any items derived from grant funds.” It appears, however, that the Komen equipment policy was not an adequate basis for rejecting Dr. Poola‟s conversion claim insofar as it pertains to non-equipment items purchased with Komen grant funds. Also, while Dr. Taylor submitted an affidavit in support of the University‟s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in which he averred that, in his 30 years of experience (…continued) conditions . . . nowhere suggest that Chou, in her role as principal investigator, takes title to equipment or supplies purchased with federal funds”). 38 working as a Principal Investigator on grants at the University, it was University policy that “any items purchased with grant funds were the property of Howard University” rather than the property of the Principal Investigator, Dr. Poola disputes that bare statement. Thus, there exists a factual dispute about title to the supplies purchased with Komen funds, and we cannot say that the University was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Dr. Poola‟s conversion claim insofar as it is based on any such non-equipment items. 2. “Work Product” We also cannot uphold the partial summary judgment ruling with respect to the property that Dr. Poola identified as her “work product” (a category that appears to include items to which she sometimes refers to as her “intellectual property derived from grant funds”). Dr. Poola asserts that the court improperly “concluded that [her] research was „work for hire‟” and that she was “therefore precluded from asserting a property interest in the work.” 39 It actually is not clear on what basis the court excluded Dr. Poola‟s claims based on her claimed “work product.”20 The court‟s ruling came during the October 1, 2013 hearing, when the judge stated without explanation that “[w]ork product, . . . anything the professor does is the work product of the institution.” He repeated that unexplained ruling during an April 22, 2014, pre-trial conference; referring to what Dr. Poola‟s counsel called “things that [Dr. Poola] . . . worked on during the grant,” the judge said “[a]ll that stuff belongs to Howard University.” Dr. Poola asserts that it is implicit in the judge‟s ruling that he was persuaded by the University‟s argument, in its motion for summary judgment, that the items that Dr. Poola designated “work product” fell within the scope of the federal copyright-law doctrine known as the “work made for hire” doctrine.21 20 We observe that the record does not support an assumption that all of Dr. Poola‟s activity in her laboratory was paid for with grant funds. Possibly to the contrary, the Komen documents in the record indicate that Dr. Poola as Principal Investigator was to “provide a 10% minimal level of effort” to work under the grant. The record does not indicate what level of effort was required under the DoD grant. 21 See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-219) (“Works Made for Hire. In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”). Citations in the text to sections of the copyright statute are likewise to the Westlaw version, current through Pub. L. No. 114-219. 40 However, copyright principles apply only where there is an “original work[] of authorship.” 17 U.S.C. § 102. The “work product” items Dr. Poola describes include items such as “slides immunostained with various types of antibodies.” Such “„useful articles‟ [as distinguished from any design elements they may have] are not eligible for copyright protection,” Chosun Int’l v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324, 328 (2d Cir. 2005), and thus it is not clear why the judge would have relied on copyright law to dispose entirely of Dr. Poola‟s claims based on her work product. Dr. Poola‟s list of “work product” also includes items such as “research data books” and “unpublished research data.” Data compilations may be a “subject matter of copyright,” 17 U.S.C. § 103 (a), but only if they entail an organization of data reflecting the author‟s creative choices about what data to include or exclude and how to arrange them; there is no copyright protection for facts (including scientific facts), information, discoveries, raw data, or wholly factual information not accompanied by any original written expression. See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-60 (1991). It is not clear from the record, and the court (if indeed it meant to apply a copyright-law doctrine) did not attempt to sort out, whether Dr. Poola‟s research data books and unpublished research data constitute compilations that are subject to copyright law — and thus are possibly 41 subject to the “work made for hire doctrine” — or instead constitute mere raw data, that are not. And, in any event, “[o]wnership of a copyright . . . is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.” 17 U.S.C. § 202. As we read Dr. Poola‟s conversion claim, it is based, at least in part, on loss of the tangible, material objects — e.g., data books — in which her data are embodied; i.e., her claim does not appear to be about who may publish or control publication of the data. Thus, it is not apparent how the copyright work-for-hire doctrine would apply to resolve her claim. In addition, even if copyright-law doctrines are apposite in this case, the application of copyright law can, as the parties‟ briefs recognize, involve complicated questions about, and fact-intensive inquiries into, whether work product was generated at the “instance and expense of” the employer, SelfRealization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 206 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that for work to be “work made for hire,” “the motivating factor in producing the work [must have been] the employer who induced the creation” (internal quotation marks omitted)); and complicated questions about, and fact-intensive inquiries into, the nature and scope of the work relationship and the employer‟s right to control the manner in which the work is done. See, e.g., Law Enforcement Training & Research Assoc. v. San Francisco, 42 Nos. 90-15482 & 90-15638, 1991 WL 172416, -2 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 1991) (holding “[t]hat [a work] derived from the employment relationship is not sufficient to render the text a „work for hire,‟” and “[t]here is no presumption that a work was created within the scope of an employment relationship”). If the court concluded that Dr. Poola‟s claimed “work product” belongs to the University, and not to her, on the basis of the copyright “work made for hire” doctrine, it erred in doing so without addressing these complexities and resolving the issues they present. In the memorandum of points and authorities in support of its motion for partial summary judgment, the University cited the “Howard University Intellectual Property Policy” as another basis for judgment in its favor, asserting that under the policy purportedly set forth in that document, Dr. Poola “had no ownership of any research she may have conducted on [the University‟s] premises.” However, we see in the record no such policy document (and, in its brief to this court, the University has not re-asserted an argument about a “Howard University Intellectual Property Policy”).22 Dr. Poola asserted in her declaration 22 A University document in the record states that “[a]ll equipment at Howard University is managed in accordance with the Materials Management Department‟s Property and Equipment Management Policy,” but that document (continued…) 43 that the University “recognized that [her] research was [her] intellectual property[,]” thus creating an issue of fact that precluded summary judgment on the basis of the University‟s putative policy. Moreover, it is far from plain that everything Dr. Poola identifies as her “work product” (which, again, includes items such as biomedical samples, gene clones, genes and cells in expression vector stored as freezes, DNA and RNA from breast cancer cell lines, non-cancerous breast tissues and breast cancer tissues, and antibody preparations) constitutes “intellectual property.”23 It appears that the University may have a right to retain any of Dr. Poola‟s research data that were generated under the DoD grant if the data resulted in published research findings “that were used by the Federal Government in developing an agency action that has the force and effect of law[.]” Circular A- (…continued) also is not in the record, so we do not know what it says about management of “Property.” 23 Cf. Nadal-Ginard v. Children’s Hosp. Corp., No. 94-3782 E, 1995 WL 1146118,  (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 1999) (granting summary judgment for the defendant on plaintiff‟s conversion and negligence claims insofar as they applied to intellectual property, but denying summary judgment on those counts insofar as they were based on plaintiff‟s allegations that the defendant destroyed “physical property in the form of biological specimens [that were “being kept in a locked freezer”], the record-keeping system relevant to these specimens, and computer disks containing scholarly papers”). 44 110, § __.36 (d)(1). Circular A-110 provides that, as the grant recipient, the University “shall provide” such research data to the federal government if necessary for the government to respond to a Freedom of Information Act request. Circular A-110, § __.36 (d)(2)(i). However, under the Circular, “research data” does not include physical objects such as “laboratory samples.” Id. The court did not resolve whether and how these provisions apply to the “work product” Dr. Poola claims she was forced to leave behind. In short, the summary judgment record does not negate as a matter of law Dr. Poola‟s claim to ownership of the various items she refers to as her “work product.” In that regard, the summary judgment record in this case is similar to the trial record in Vossoughi, 963 A.2d 1162. Dr. Vossoughi sued UDC for conversion, negligence and trespass to chattels after UDC first directed him to vacate his laboratory because the space was needed for other university programs, and then, without his knowledge, cleaned out the laboratory, destroying property that included scientific instruments and other equipment, voluminous teaching materials developed by Dr. Vossoughi, his unpublished research data, and other items. Id. at 1167-72. As discussed supra in note 16, this court‟s opinion acknowledged that according to applicable federal regulations and the evidence presented at trial about the grants that funded Dr. Vossoughi‟s research at UDC, 45 “title to grant-funded property vest[ed] in the institutional grantee.” Id. at 1167. Importantly, however, we observed that “the evidence at trial did not establish that all the property acquired by Dr. Vossoughi at UDC,” such as “research data he collected or generated” there, “was derived from grant funds.” Id. at 1180. We thus recognized the possibility that data collected or generated by a professor in the course of his grant-funded work at a university are not necessarily — i.e., are not as a matter of law — data “derived” from grant funds. Consistent with our reasoning in Vossoughi, we conclude that the University did not establish that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Dr. Poola‟s claims regarding her “work product,” given that all the summary judgment record showed with respect to those items of property is that Dr. Poola collected or generated them while she was employed by the University. For that reason, and all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the court erred in granting judgment to the University on Dr. Poola‟s conversion claim insofar as it related to the property she identified as her “work product.” A remand and further proceedings are required for the trial court adequately to address Dr. Poola‟s conversion claim. 46
We reach a similar conclusion as to Dr. Poola‟s negligence claim. “[A] claim alleging the tort of negligence must show: (1) that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) injury to the plaintiff that was proximately caused by the breach.” Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d 789, 793 (D.C. 2011). To prevail on her negligence claim, Dr. Poola must prove that the University owed her a duty to safeguard the property she allegedly was forced to leave behind. According to a Komen document in the record, as Principal Investigator, Dr. Poola shared with the University “complete responsibility for all aspects of the research, investigation, funding and administration of or in connection with the grant award.” At least arguably, this included responsibility to assure that materials used in research under the grant were safeguarded, stored at proper temperatures, protected from tampering, etc., duties Dr. Poola could not fulfill while she (allegedly) was denied access to her laboratory. The court did not specifically consider whether the summary judgment record supported a judgment as a matter of law that the University had no duty to Dr. Poola with respect to property in her former laboratory or offices at the University even if she did not own the property (such as a duty not to interfere unreasonably with her carrying out of her responsibilities to the grant funders), or 47 that the University fulfilled any such duty. Accordingly, we also cannot uphold the court‟s ruling summarily dismissing the negligence claim.24