Opinion ID: 1058104
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Doctrine

Text: The Commonwealth argues that even if the affidavit is testimonial in nature, nonetheless, it is admissible under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. The Court of Appeals discussed what it referred to as the possibility, left open by the United States Supreme Court in Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 171 L.Ed.2d 488 (2008), that a defendant's intention to prevent testimony might be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, such as in a case of ongoing domestic violence. Crawford, 55 Va.App. at 473, 686 S.E.2d at 564. The United States Supreme Court specifically discussed this possibility in Giles: Where such an abusive [domestic] relationship culminates in murder, the evidence may support a finding that the crime expressed the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to the authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecutionrendering her prior statements admissible under the forfeiture doctrine. Giles, 554 U.S. at 377, 128 S.Ct. at 2693 (emphasis added). Ultimately, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court neither made the requisite factual findings showing Crawford's intent to prevent Sarah from testifying against him, nor did the court consider the specific domestic violence factors discussed in Giles which may evidence such an intent. Crawford, 55 Va.App. at 482, 686 S.E.2d at 569. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that, [b]y not considering Crawford's intent, the trial court incorrectly applied the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine, as it was defined in Giles. Thus, the trial court erred in its analysis for admitting the affidavit on that basis. Crawford, 55 Va.App. at 474, 686 S.E.2d at 565. We agree with the Court of Appeals.