Opinion ID: 888197
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scope of the Release and Sinclair's Manganese Poisoning Claims

Text: ¶41 In addition to determining that the release barred his alternative FELA claims, the District Court concluded that there were no genuine issues of material fact that the scope of the release covered Sinclair's manganese poisoning claims, and that it did not conflict with § 5 of FELA. According to the District Court, Sinclair knew of his symptoms at the time he signed the release, understood they were work-related, and also understood that the release covered those claims. Thus, the District Court granted BNSF summary judgment as a matter of law, concluding that the release precluded Sinclair from pursuing the manganese poisoning claims in Count I of his complaint. ¶42 Sinclair argues that the District Court erred. He maintains that the District Court's ruling runs afoul of § 5 of FELA. See ¶ 37. Sinclair argues that language in the release ( see ¶ 3) releasing all unknown claims, including an undiagnosed injury due to toxic fume exposures, violates § 5 of FELA, and that any release with respect to his manganese poisoning claims should be declared void. In support of his argument, Sinclair cites several cases including Babbit v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. , 104 F.3d 89 (6th Cir. 1997) and Wicker , in which courts have invalidated a release based on its conflict with § 5 of FELA. Citing to Bevacqua v. Union Pacific R.R. Co. , 1998 MT 120, ¶ 49, 289 Mont. 36, ¶ 49, 960 P.2d 273, ¶ 49, Sinclair asserts that the release should be liberally construed in his favor and allow his manganese poisoning claims to go forward. ¶43 Sinclair specifically argues that Babbit and Wicker cast doubt on the validity of boilerplate releases such as the one used in this case. First, quoting Babbit , Sinclair argues that [t]o be valid, a release must reflect a bargained-for settlement of a known claim for a specific injury, as contrasted with an attempt to extinguish potential future claims the employee might have arising from injuries known or unknown by him. Babbit , 104 F.3d at 93. Here, Sinclair argues that he never bargained for the release of the specific claims of manganese poisoning. Second, citing to Wicker , Sinclair argues that the fact that he was represented by counsel is irrelevant to the question of whether the release was valid. Finally, citing to both Babbit and Wicker , Sinclair maintains that the fact that he had some symptoms which might have been associated with his toxic exposure prior to executing the release does not mean that a general release would be valid with respect to those claims. ¶44 Additionally, Sinclair maintains that three experienced members of BNSF's claims department, including Jacobson, admitted under oath that they could not settle claims for undiagnosed injuries. Sinclair maintains that throughout the negotiation of the release, it was understood that this principle governed the settlement discussions. Sinclair argues that this evidence should have been sufficient to trigger a conclusion that there was a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Accordingly, Sinclair seeks the reversal of the District Court's grant of summary judgment and the reinstatement of his manganese poisoning claims. ¶45 BNSF responds that the terms of the release are not ambiguous, and that the general release should apply to Sinclair's manganese claims. BNSF asserts that Sinclair's own testimony establishes his awareness of the accrual of his manganese poisoning claims prior to signing the release. BNSF points to portions of his deposition testimony where he acknowledged that smoke from the welding fumes made him sick as early as 2001, and that he had symptoms such as mood swings, irritability, headaches, nosebleeds, and respiratory problems and shaking at that time. Further, BNSF points out that Sinclair had reason to suspect that these symptoms were due to the welding fumes based on some personal research he conducted. BNSF maintains that this knowledge triggered the accrual of his FELA cause of action, and that under federal law Sinclair had an affirmative duty to investigate his claims once he experienced and became aware of these symptoms. ¶46 BNSF further maintains that the District Court applied the correct legal standard in concluding that the scope of the release as it pertained to Sinclair's manganese poisoning claims did not run afoul of § 5 of FELA. In this regard, BNSF argues that its position in supported by Wicker as well as Brophy v. Cincinnati, New Orleans, & Texas Pacific Ry. Co. , 855 F. Supp. 213 (S.D. Ohio 1994), and Manis v. CSX Transp., Inc. , 806 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1992). Particularly, BNSF argues that under Brophy a release will be invalid under § 5, only if the employee is unaware of the injury at the time of the signing of the release and the employee's unawareness is reasonable. See Brophy , 855 F. Supp. at 217. Similarly, BNSF maintains that under Manis a release will be valid with respect to injuries which had already occurred and of which the employee was aware when he signed the release. See Manis , 806 F. Supp. at 179. Because Sinclair was aware of his symptoms prior to executing the release, and knew they were related to his welding work, he released this known risk when he signed the release, and it does not violate § 5 of FELA to enforce the release with respect to his manganese poisoning claims. ¶47 The District Court granted summary judgment to BNSF finding that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to the scope of the release in this case. Under de novo review, our task is to determine if this conclusion was correct as a matter of law. Stockman , ¶ 11; Lohmeier , ¶ 12. Although the District Court did not issue a written order, the transcript reveals that its decision was based on three major findings: (1) that Sinclair knew at the time he signed the release that he was experiencing symptoms related to welding that could be attributable to fumes and chemicals from his workplace; (2) that Sinclair was represented by counsel at the time and reviewed the release with him; and (3) that the release clearly set forth a release of the chemical claim, and indicatedin addition to the ankle accident and injury related to the FL-80 trucka release of any and all claims that could be made including exposure to chemical fumes. The District Court apparently concluded that a FELA release will cover those injuries of which a reasonable person would be aware at the time he entered into the release, and which he or she would attribute to work. The District Court placed weight upon all three factors noted above in concluding that the release entitled BNSF to summary judgment as a matter of law on Sinclair's manganese poisoning claims. ¶48 Our inquiry is two-fold: Did the District court err in concluding that the boilerplate release signed by Sinclair did not violate § 5 of FELA, and did the District Court err in concluding that there were no genuine issues of fact precluding summary judgment? To answer these questions, we turn to Wicker. ¶49 In Wicker , a case relied upon by both BNSF and Sinclair, the Third Circuit set forth a standard under which the validity of a FELA release should be evaluated in light of § 5 of that Act. In that case, five plaintiffs (collectively employees), were employees of Conrail who had suffered work-related injuries. All the employees had executed releases which appeared to settle all claims for past and future injuries. Wicker , 142 F.3d at 692-94. Each employee developed additional chemical-related symptoms after signing their releases which they believed were attributable to work-related conditions. The employees each claimed that their additional symptoms were not covered by their previous releases. For some of the employees, the new symptoms developed after the releases were signed, while others were aware of some of the symptoms before signing the releases but did not attribute them to work conditions. ¶50 The fundamental question for the Third Circuit in Wicker concerned the scope of § 5's application and whether it precluded the enforcement of the releases against the newly-filed claims. The court began its analysis by conducting a brief yet thorough review of the United State Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area. See Wicker , 142 F.3d at 696-97. The court concluded that releases were not per se unreasonably invalid under FELA, and that parties may settle `[w]here controversies exist as to whether there is liability, and if so for how much.'  Wicker , 142 F.3d at 697 (quoting Callen v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. , 332 U.S. 625, 631, 68 S. Ct. 296, 298-99 (1948)). At the same time, the Third Circuit noted that in Boyd v. Grand Trunk W.R. Co. , 338 U.S. 263, 70 S. Ct. 26 (1949), the United State Supreme Court cautioned that in light of § 5's language, it was necessary to distinguish appropriate compromises from  `a device which obstructs the right of the [FELA] plaintiff to secure the maximum recovery if he should elect judicial trial of his cause.'  Wicker , 142 F.3d at 697 (quoting Boyd , 338 U.S. at 266, 70 S. Ct. at 27-28). For this reason, the Wicker court noted that general, boilerplate releases were often viewed with suspicion and concluded that the proper reach and application of § 5 in this context remained unclear, possibly because the Court's decisions rejecting general releases as bars to subsequent claims have been fact-driven, and consequently do not provide a generally applicable rule of law. Wicker , 142 F.3d at 698. ¶51 From here, the court went on to examine some seminal cases in this area in order to determine the proper principles under which to evaluate the validity and scope of a FELA release in light of § 5. The court recognized that lower courts addressing the issue were split between those that ban the use of general releases in light of § 5, and those that allow them. See Wicker , 142 F.3d at 699 (collecting cases). The Wicker court took particular note of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Babbit . Babbit set forth a bright line rule to the effect that releases are valid only if they are part of a bargained-for settlement of a specific injury, as opposed to  `an attempt to extinguish potential future claims the employee might have arising from the injuries known or unknown by him.'  Wicker , 142 F.3d at 699 (quoting Babbit , 104 F.3d at 93). In light of the United States Supreme Court's expression in Callen that settlements apparently have some role to play under FELA, the Wicker court rejected the Babbit standard as overbroad, in part out of a concern that such a rigid, bright-line rule, would severely hamstring the ability of employers and employees to engage in the settlement process. As stated by the court, The question still remains whether a rule allowing parties to release claims related to known risks rather than known injuries reflects FELA's remedial goals. We believe it does. We hold that a release does not violate § 5 provided it is executed for valid consideration as part of a settlement, and the scope of the release is limited to those risks which are known to the parties at the time the release is signed. Claims relating to unknown risks do not constitute controversies, and may not be waived under § 5 of FELA. See Callen , 332 U.S. at 631, 68 S.Ct. at 298-99. For this reason, a release that spells out the quantity, location and duration of potential risks to which the employee has been exposedfor example toxic exposureallowing the employee to make a reasoned decision whether to release the employer from liability for future injuries of specifically known risks does not violate § 5 of FELA. Wicker , 142 F.3d at 701. ¶52 The court went on to explain that a release which chronicles the scope and duration of known risks . . . would supply strong evidence in support of the release defense, but also cautioned that boilerplate releases should be viewed with caution, and that trial courts should recognize that the validity of a release is a fact-intensive process. Wicker , 142 F.3d at 701. Instead, we conclude that a release may be strong, but not conclusive, evidence of the parties' intent. Where a specific known risk or malady is not mentioned in the release, it would seem difficult for the employer to show it was known to the employee and that he or she intended to release liability for it. Furthermore, where a release merely details a laundry list of diseases or hazards, the employee may attack that release as boiler plate, not reflecting his or her intent. We recognize that this is a different (and more difficult) standard for railroad employers than is typical in non-FELA situations, but given the Supreme Court's pro-employee construction of the FELA, see Kernan v. American Dredging Co. , 355 U.S. 426, 432, 78 S.Ct. 394, 398, 2 L.Ed.2d 382 (1958) (it is clear that the general congressional intent was to provide liberal recovery for injured workers); Boyd , 338 U.S. at 265, 70 S.Ct. at 27 (Congress wanted Section 5 to have the full effect that its comprehensive phraseology implies.) (internal quotation omitted), we adopt it. Wicker , 142 F.3d at 701. ¶53 The Wicker approach to the scope and validity of FELA releases in light of § 5 of FELA has been adopted approvingly by several courts. See Jaqua v. Canadian Nat. R.R., Inc. , 734 N.W.2d 228, 229 (Mich. App. 2007) (adopting the Wicker approach because [t]he rationale in Wicker allows the employer and the employee the freedom to negotiate and settle claims, but protects the employee from releasing the employer for unknown liability that was not considered and resolved in an informed manner.); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. McDaniel , 951 So.2d 523, 531-32 (Miss. 2006); Oliverio v. Consolidated Rail Corp. , 822 N.Y.S.2d 699, 702 (N.Y. Sup. 2006); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Sellan , 231 F.3d 848, 852 (11th Cir. 2000). We join these courts in adopting the standard set forth in Wicker to determine the validity and scope of a FELA release in light of § 5 of that act. ¶54 Applying Wicker in the instant case, we conclude that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to BNSF on Sinclair's manganese poisoning claims. While Sinclair might have arguably known of the risk of injury from toxic exposure to manganese, it is another thing to say that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether he and BNSF intended to release this claim when they entered into the release. Under Wicker , the language of the release in this case is not sufficient to show an absence of a genuine issue of material fact because it makes only a general mention of chemical exposure, and does not spell out the quantity, location and duration of the manganese exposure. Wicker , 142 F.3d at 701. For that matter, the release does not even specifically mention exposure to manganese poisoning at all. Additionally, it contains precisely the type of boilerplate termsthat is, a release of claims for injuries, illnesses or damages . . . which are unknown to me at the present time ( see ¶ 3)which are suspect given the language of § 5 and FELA's remedial purposes, and its pro-employee construction by the United States Supreme Court. See Wicker , 142 F.3d at 701. Thus, the language of the release should be viewed with caution, in spite of the fact that Sinclair himself may have suspected he had been poisoned by manganese exposure. Moreover, Sinclair and his attorney both stated that they did not believe that the release covered anything other than the back and ankle injuries, and there appears to be some evidence from BNSF's own representatives that they themselves did not believe the manganese poisoning claims were covered by the release in this case. ¶55 Because there are genuine issues of material fact as to the parties' intent in entering into the release and whether it covered Sinclair's manganese poisoning claims, we reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment on Sinclair's manganese poisoning claims. The intent of the parties to the release in this regard should be determined by a trier of fact.