Opinion ID: 1435222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the toyota search

Text: Another codefendant of Cleaver, David Hilliard, was arrested in the residence of Bertha Allen at 1226 28th Street, which was adjacent to the house in which Cleaver and Hutton took shelter during the shootout. After Hilliard's arrest, Ms. Allen found two keys on a black leather strap on the dresser in the bedroom where he had been hiding, and gave them to a police officer who noted they appeared to be for a Toyota automobile. The police then asked the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to identify all cars registered to any of the eight arrestees taken into custody that night; the DMV check revealed that Cleaver's codefendant Wendell Wade was registered as the coowner of a Toyota. Wade's Toyota was located during the early hours of April 7 on an Oakland public street approximately 37 blocks from the scene of the initial shooting on Union Street. The vehicle was towed to the Oakland Police Department parking lot. At 8 a.m. that morning the keys Ms. Allen had found were used to open the trunk of Wade's automobile and several weapons as well as some ammunition were seized as evidence. This search, like those described above, was conducted without first obtaining a search warrant or the consent of defendant or the owner of the vehicle. (4a) Defendant contends that the automobile search was illegal not only because of the failure to obtain a warrant but, more fundamentally, because a warrant could not have been obtained for want of probable cause. (5) It is axiomatic that the search of an automobile  whether pursuant to a warrant or not  must be supported by probable cause. ( People v. Dumas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 871, 884 [109 Cal. Rptr. 304, 512 P.2d 1208]; Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co. (1968) 391 U.S. 216, 221 [20 L.Ed.2d 538, 543, 88 S.Ct. 1472].) We recently noted that probable cause exists to conduct a warrantless automobile search where an officer is aware of facts that would lead a man of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and conscientiously to entertain, a strong suspicion that the object of the search is in the particular place to be searched. [Citations.] ( People v. Dumas, supra, at p. 885.) Was that standard met? (4b) The recital of the foregoing facts fails to suggest the presence of any strong suspicion that the automobile towed from the street contained any specific property lawfully subject to seizure. The People assert that the circumstances under which the police obtained the keys indicated that Hilliard had tried to dissociate himself from them and had thus demonstrated his fear that the car which the keys fit would link him to the crimes with which he was charged. The argument is unpersuasive. Wade's automobile was seized before it was known that the keys found at the place of Hilliard's arrest fit that particular Toyota. Furthermore, the automobile was not found in the vicinity of Hilliard's arrest, or even reasonably nearby  it was located a substantial distance away in a wholly different part of the city. We conclude, accordingly, that the trial court correctly ruled illegal the automobile search here in issue, and suppressed the evidence resulting therefrom. In S.F. 23758, the alternative writ is discharged and the peremptory writ is denied. In S.F. 23759, let a peremptory writ of mandate issue in accordance with this opinion.