Opinion ID: 178472
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of Pre-Termination and Termination Claims

Text: In dismissing Stiefel's pre-termination and termination claims, the district court ruled that he failed to timely file an administrative charge with the EEOC. The ADA adopts the procedures set forth in [42 U.S.C.] §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 (corresponding to sections 705, 706, 707, 709, and 710 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). Thus an ADA plaintiff is normally bound by the requirement that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency. . . such charge shall be filed [with the EEOC] by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see Walsh v. Nev. Dep't of Human Res., 471 F.3d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir.2006); 29 C.F.R. § 1626.7(a). Stiefel filed a complaint with the DFEH in April 2006 and received a right-to-sue letter from the California agency on May 8, 2006. The letter informed Stiefel that, if he desired a federal right-to-sue notice, he must file a complaint with the EEOC within 30 days of receiving the letter from DFEH. Stiefel did not file a complaint with EEOC until some 312 days later, on March 16, 2007. In dismissing the suit on this basis, the district court disregarded a right-to-sue letter that Stiefel received from the EEOC sometime within 180 days [2] of filing his March 16, 2007 charge. [3] Stiefel's claims should not have been dismissed on the ground that he failed to timely file a charge with the EEOC. Pursuant to Worksharing Agreements between the DFEH and the EEOC in effect when Stiefel filed his DFEH charges, the State agency was the agent of the EEOC for the purpose of receiving . . . charges. Worksharing Agreement Between California Department of Fair Employment and Housing and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for Fiscal Year 2006 (2006 Worksharing Agreement), at ii; see 2007 Worksharing Agreement, at ii (same). [4] Under such an agreement, a charge filed with the DFEH is deemed to have been received by the EEOC on the same day. Green v. Los Angeles County Superintendent of Schools, 883 F.2d 1472, 1476 (9th Cir.1989), quoted in Surrell, 518 F.3d at 1104; see 29 C.F.R. § 1626.10(c) (Charges received by one agency under the [worksharing] agreement shall be deemed received by the other agency for purposes of § 1626.7.). The EEOC's failure to issue a right-to-sue letter on a dual-filed charge is no bar to a suit under the ADA. We recently held in a Title VII case that where, as here, a plaintiff is entitled to receive a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, a plaintiff may proceed absent such a letter, provided []he has received a right-to-sue letter from the appropriate state agency. Surrell, 518 F.3d at 1105. The procedural analysis of Surrell applies to the instant suit under the ADA. See Walsh, 471 F.3d at 1038. As with the DFEH charge in Surrell, by filing a charge with the California department, Stiefel was entitled to a federal right-to-sue letter because of the Worksharing Agreement between the state agency and the EEOC. As in the present case, Surrell received a right-to-sue letter warning that [i]f a federal notice of Right-To-Sue is wanted, the [EEOC] must be visited to file a complaint within 30 days of this [notice] or within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act, whichever is earlier. Surrell, 518 F.3d at 1104. Surrell never filed a separate charge with the EEOC nor received a right-to-sue letter from that agency. Nevertheless, we held in Surrell that once a plaintiff is entitled to receive a right-to-sue letter (as Surrell was once the EEOC did not timely act on her properly filed charge), it makes no difference whether the plaintiff actually obtained it. Id. at 1105. The same is true for an ADA plaintiff. As such, we hold that when a plaintiff files a disability discrimination complaint with a state agency acting, with respect to ADA complaints, as an agent of the EEOC, and receives a right-to-sue letter from the state agency, thereby becoming entitled to an EEOC right-to-sue letter, the plaintiff need not file a separate complaint with the EEOC nor receive an EEOC right-to-sue letter in order to file suit. Stiefel became entitled to an EEOC letter once the EEOC did not timely act on [his] properly filed charge, Id. at 1105; that is, on November 4, 2006-180 days after his DFEH charge was deemed filed with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). After receiving an EEOC right-to-sue letter or becoming eligible for one by the Commission's inaction, a plaintiff generally has 90 days to file suit. Id. [T]he 90-day filing period is a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling in appropriate circumstances. Valenzuela v. Kraft, 801 F.2d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir.1986). Stiefel's 90-day window for filing the present suit was tolled pending his first suit, until the district court issued its final judgment on July 16, 2007. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 349-54, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983) (tolling the 90-day statute of limitations during the pendency of a related class action that gave the employer notice of the nature of the claim). Stiefel filed the current action on October 11, 2007, fewer than 90 days after that judgment. His suit was therefore timely, and it should not have been dismissed.