Opinion ID: 3014466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: be designed carefully to achieve the

Text: State’s goal.” 447 U.S. at 564. This case is properly characterized Commercial speech is “expression as a compelled commercial speech case. related solely to the economic interests of See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 410; the speaker and its audience.” Id. at 561. Frame, 885 F.2d at 1146 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court, But the Court has left open the however, has left unresolved the standard question of whether Central Hudson’s for determining the validity of laws more relaxed First Amendment test compelling commercial speech, and the applies to cases involving compelled circuit courts are divided on the issue. commercial speech. In United Foods the There are at least four variations in the Court stepped back from addressing the judiciary’s cumulative experience. One issue in ipsis verbis, explaining: “the is the more lenient standard applied to Government itself does not rely upon commercial speech cases. See Central Central Hudson to challenge the Court of Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Appeals’ decision, . . . and we therefore Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). do not consider whether the Another is the “germaneness” test of Government’s interest could be compelled speech cases. See, e.g., considered substantial for purposes of the Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-236. Still Central Hudson test.” 533 U.S. at 410. another is an adaptation of the Nevertheless, in the earlier case of commercial speech standard. See Glickman, the Court questioned the Livestock Marketing, 335 F.3d at 722- application of the commercial speech test 723. And, in Frame, a pre-Glickman and to compelled speech cases: pre-United Foods case, this court applied The Court of Appeals fails to the stringent level of scrutiny for explain why the Central Hudson associational rights cases. 885 F.2d at test, which involved a restriction 1134. We now summarize the various on commercial speech, should standards. govern a case involving the
Given the fact that the Court of In Central Hudson, the Supreme Appeals relied on Abood for the Court held that to evaluate the proposition that the program constitutionality of regulatory restrictions implicates the First Amendment, it on commercial speech the Constitution is difficult to understand why the requires only intermediate scrutiny – Court of Appeals did not apply namely, that (1) the state must “assert a Abood’s “germaneness” test. substantial government interest”; (2) “the regulatory technique must be in 521 U.S. at 474 n. 18. proportion to that interest”; and (3) the Indeed, in United Foods, incursion on commercial speech “must 16 notwithstanding its specific disclaimer under the Dairy Act are germane to regarding Central Hudson, the Court nothing but the speech itself. “[A]lmost seemingly applied the “germaneness” all of the funds collected under the test: mandatory assessments are for one purpose: generic advertising.” Id. at 412. The only program the It would thus seem that the Dairy Act Government contends the would not survive Abood’s germaneness compelled contributions serve is test. the very advertising scheme in question. Were it sufficient to say Other courts have applied the speech is germane to itself, the germaneness test to cases involving limits observed in Abood and compelled assessments pursuant to Keller would be empty of promotional programs and have rejected meaning and significance. The the application of Central Hudson. See, cooperative marketing structure e.g., Michigan Pork, 348 F.3d at 163 relied upon by a majority of the (noting that “[e]ven assuming that the Court in Glickman to sustain an advertising funded by the [Pork] Act is ancillary assessment finds no indeed commercial speech, the more corollary here; the expression lenient standard of review applied to respondent is required to support limits on commercial speech has never is not germane to a purpose been applied to speech – commercial or related to an association otherwise – that is compelled”); In re independent from the speech Washington State Apple Adver. itself; and the rationale of Abood Comm’n, 257 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1287 extends to the party who objects (E.D. Wash. 2003) (concluding that to the compelled support for this “[b]ecause the Commission’s speech. For these and other assessments do not restrict speech, it is reasons we have set forth, the inappropriate to apply the Central assessments are not permitted Hudson test for restrictions on under the First Amendment. commercial speech”). 533 U.S. at 415-416 (emphasis added). In Livestock Marketing, however, the Eighth Circuit concluded that an As we previously explained, the adaptation of the Central Hudson test purpose of the Dairy Act is in all material applied, explaining that “Central Hudson respects the same as that of the and the case at bar both involve Mushroom Act at issue in United Foods, government interference with private and the Dairy Act is not ancillary to a speech in a commercial context.” 335 broader cooperative marketing regime F.3d at 722. All the same, the court like the fruit tree marketing orders at concluded that the Beef Act did not issue in Glickman. The compelled survive the intermediate scrutiny of assessments for generic dairy advertising 17 Central Hudson. Id. at 725-726. Relying Court in evaluating the on the reasoning set forth in United permissibility of regulation of Foods, the court determined that the beef commercial speech [in Central checkoff program is in all material Hudson] . . . . While the respects identical to the mushroom government has a general interest checkoff program, and concluded that in the health of the beef industry, “the government’s interest in protecting it does not follow that the the welfare of the beef industry by government has a substantial compelling all beef producers and interest in compelling the beef importers to pay for generic beef industry to make and support such advertising is not sufficiently substantial a promotion campaign. Instead, . . to justify the infringement on appellees’ . the messages represent the First Amendment free speech right.” Id. economic interests of one segment of the population . . . . Finally, in Frame, which was decided before the teachings of both Id. at 1146-1147 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) Glickman and United Foods, this court (citations and internal quotations applied the stringent associational rights omitted). standard but nevertheless upheld the As in Frame, the Government here constitutionality of the Beef Act, 7 argues that it has a sufficient interest in U.S.C. § 2901 et seq. Back in 1989, this increasing the demand for an agricultural court concluded that the government’s product. Moreover, the Government interest in “maintaining and expanding contends that it has an interest in beef markets proves . . . compelling[,]” decreasing its obligation to purchase and “[m]aintenance of the beef industry dairy products under the price support ensures preservation of the American program, 7 U.S.C § 1446. We previously cattlemen’s traditional way of life.” have emphasized, however, that the Frame, 885 F.2d at 1134-1135 (citations Court’s subsequent holding in United omitted). Foods that clarified and limited the Judge Sloviter, however, teachings of Glickman, cut away the dissented on this issue in Frame: underpinning of this court’s analysis in Frame. United Foods makes clear that I doubt that the type of compelled the government may not compel speech at issue here can be individuals to support an advertising justified on any basis. program for the sole purpose of Nonetheless, I do not reach the increasing demand for that product. 533 majority’s stringent associational U.S. at 415. In United Foods, the Court rights standard because I believe concluded that the Mushroom Act’s that no justification can be found, compelled subsidies would be even under the less exacting unconstitutional even under the lesser criteria adopted by the Supreme 18 scrutiny accorded to commercial speech. B. Id. at 410. In light of the reluctance of the Although the Government’s Supreme Court in United Foods to enter contention that it has a substantial the controversy over the applicable interest in decreasing its obligation under scrutiny for compelled commercial the dairy price support program is speech cases, however, we will follow somewhat unique from the government suit. “[W]e find no basis under either interest asserted in United Foods, this Glickman or our other precedents to interest is undermined by the fact that as sustain the compelled assessments sought a stand-alone statute, the Dairy Act does in this case.” 533 U.S. at 410.13 not operate in conjunction with the price The compelled assessments for support program. Indeed, producers of generic dairy advertising under the Dairy liquid milk such as the Cochrans are not Act relate to speech and only to speech. covered by the support program. Indeed, “almost all of the funds collected Moreover, reductions in the under the mandatory assessments are for government’s obligations under the price one purpose: generic advertising.” Id. at support program are insignificant to the 412. Dairy Promotion Program’s existence, as whether the compelled assessments Measured by any degree of continue is controlled by the dairy scrutiny set forth in the foregoing producers via the referendum process. 7 discussion, we conclude that this case U.S.C. § 4506(a). runs on all fours with the teachings and holding of United Foods, and We conclude, therefore, that the accordingly hold that the Dairy government’s interest in promoting the Promotion Stabilization Act of 1983 does dairy industry is not sufficiently not survive the First Amendment substantial to justify the infringement on challenge lodged by Appellants Joseph the Cochran’s First Amendment free and Brenda Cochran. The district court speech and association rights. As Judge erred in sustaining the constitutionality Sloviter suggested in her dissent in of the Dairy Act on the basis of Frame, promotional programs such as the Glickman. Dairy Act seem to really be special interest legislation on behalf of the  industry’s interest more so than the government’s. We believe that the 13 Supreme Court reached the same We reach this conclusion conclusion by ruling in United Foods that whether accepting the standard explicitly the compelled assessments pursuant to expressed in Frame or deciding that in the Mushroom Act are not permitted by view of the Court’s discussion in United the First Amendment. Foods, that standard is not longer controlling. 19 In sum, we conclude that the at Part VI-A. Twice – in both Glickman generic advertising pursuant to the Dairy and United Foods – the Supreme Court has Promotion Stabilization Act of 1983 does questioned the need for engaging in a not constitute government speech and is Central Hudson analysis.14 And, I think it therefore subject to First Amendment scrutiny. We hold that the Dairy Act 14 violates the Cochrans’ First Amendment The Court has not treated these free speech and associational rights. cases as involving a discrete commercial speech issue, instead indicating that “[t]he Although the dairy industry may be question is whether the government may subject to a labyrinth of federal underwrite and sponsor speech with a regulation, the Dairy Act is a stand-alone certain viewpoint using special subsidies law and the compelled assessments for exacted from a designated class of persons, generic dairy advertising are not germane some of whom object to the idea being to a larger regulatory purpose other than advanced.” United Foods, 533 U.S. at 410; the speech itself. see also id. (stating that, even if commercial speech is less protected than other speech, The judgment of the district court there is “no basis under either Glickman or sustaining the constitutionality of the our other precedents to sustain the Dairy Promotion Stabilization Act of compelled assessments,” but refusing to 1983 will be reversed and the proceedings consider “whether the Government’s interest remanded with a direction to enter a could be considered substantial for purposes decree in favor of Appellants in of the Central Hudson test”); Glickman, 521 accordance with the foregoing. U.S. at 474 & n.18 (noting that it was “error for the [Ninth Circuit] to rely on Central Hudson for the purpose of testing the