Opinion ID: 2629622
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Walls

Text: ¶ 15 Duncan next assigns error to the trial court's decision to admit testimony that Duncan planned to live with Walls, a convicted sex offender, after release and by refusing to admit evidence that Walls had not reoffended after returning to the community. Duncan argues that evidence that Walls was a convicted sex offender was unfairly prejudicial on its own account and was compounded by the court's failure to allow rebuttal evidence. ¶ 16 As an initial matter, we note that a fact finder in an SVP civil commitment proceeding may consider conditions that would exist or that the court would have the authority to order in the absence of a finding that the person is a sexually violent predator. RCW 71.09.060(1). Evidence of who a defendant intends to live with upon release into the community is relevant information in an SVP commitment proceeding. The fact that Duncan intended to live with a former sex offender was properly presented to the jury. ¶ 17 However, the trial court's subsequent decision to deny Duncan the opportunity to elicit testimony showing that Walls had not reoffended since his release is troubling. Because the trial court determined that Walls's prior criminal history was relevant, fairness would seem to dictate that evidence of his current behavior would also be relevant on rebuttal. But when reviewing for an abuse of discretion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court and will affirm unless no reasonable person could have come to the same conclusion. State v. Lord, 161 Wash.2d 276, 295, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007). ¶ 18 The trial judge had been addressing issues regarding whether to allow evidence about Walls's case since well before the trial began. Prior to trial the State filed a motion in limine to exclude reference to Walls's own SVP case, which had been dismissed by the State prior to his trial. Duncan's defense counsel had suggested to the State that Walls's case was indistinguishable from Duncan's case. The State was concerned that Duncan would attempt to elicit testimony from Dr. Wollert that Mr. Duncan is no different than Mr. Walls. [5] RP (Oct. 24, 2005) at 3. During argument the judge expressed his concern with offering evidence on the Walls case saying, I don't see us getting into what somebody else did in some other similar case, because the problem with that is that it is too hard to ... correctly inform the jury about the Walls case. Id. at 12. The judge continued: because it's just too confusing. It's collateral really, and it's very collateral. You know, I could see that you can see that there's some logical connection to it, but we can't possibly try that whole case and bring this jury up to speed so that they compare it to this case. It would beit would just be a quagmire. Id. at 13. ¶ 19 At trial, when Duncan's counsel raised concerns about the State's question to Dr. Wollert regarding Walls's criminal history, those concerns were presented as reargument of the motion in limine. During a sidebar Duncan's counsel argued: I think the state in this line of questioning regarding Dion Walls has opened the doorsremember we had the motion in limine I wanted to get in let's talk about Dion Walls and how he is the same thing as Bryan and how he got released, and now the state is going into Dion Walls, which we were prevented from doing, and that apparently does not seem to apply to the state. If that is the case, we are entitled to bring in all of the information about Dion Walls. RP (Nov. 9, 2005) at 1812. Defense counsel continued, saying: The whole idea here is that the state strenuously objected to information [with] regards to Dion Walls. Information that leads to his success out in the community and whether he is being successful are the things that apparently we're not going to be able to get involved in because he has not reoffended, and he hasn't done anything wrong, and I'm going toand the question I have is this. These are the same factors. You know, in a lot of ways they are the same type of individual who didn't have controls, and yet they are being successful in the community. I should at least have the right to say, And not only that; Dion Walls hasn't reoffended. Dion Walls is being successful in the community, and he's exactly like Bryan Duncan. Id. at 1814-15. The judge responded by first noting that Duncan had not really made an objection to the State's question to Dr. Wollert. [6] He then reasoned, I see a big distinction between going into the legal aspects of Mr. Walls's case and the actual factual relationship between these two individuals. Id. at 1815. ¶ 20 Although Duncan now makes what is essentially an ER 403 objection to the court's ruling, that is not what was before the judge at the time. Instead, Duncan used the question posed to Dr. Wollert as an opportunity to reargue that he should be allowed to offer testimony regarding Walls's entire case to show a connection to Duncan. He did not argue that the testimony on the subject was prejudicial; only that it opened the door for him to make legal comparisons between his case and Walls's. ¶ 21 Generally, an ER 403 objection is not of constitutional magnitude and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Elmore, 139 Wash.2d 250, 283, 985 P.2d 289 (1999) (citing State v. Chase, 59 Wash.App. 501, 508, 799 P.2d 272 (1990)); RAP 2.5(a). Here there was no ER 403 objection before the court. While in hindsight, admission of evidence that Walls had not reoffended might seem appropriate, we reiterate that we are reviewing the record for an abuse of discretion and must consider what was actually before the judge. As a reviewing court, our role is to determine whether the judge's ruling was reasonable in light of the circumstances, not whether we would have come to the same conclusion if the decision had been ours to make. Here, even if the objection had been properly made, considering the argument before him, the judge made a reasonable decision to limit the amount of evidence that would be admitted regarding Walls. Duncan's counsel was clear that he did not want to limit evidence to the fact that Walls had not reoffended since his release, but rather he wished to compare the Walls case to Duncan's. On this record we conclude the court's decision to limit the testimony was reasonable and that there was no abuse of discretion.