Opinion ID: 2515784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Batson/Wheeler Motions

Text: During jury selection, Richard Avila made a series of motions under People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 ( Wheeler ), challenging the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges against Black and Hispanic prospective jurors, and defendant joined in some but not all of them. [32] Spradlin also made one motion under Wheeler, in which defendant joined. The trial court denied each motion. The jury as seated included two Hispanic males, two Hispanic females, and one Black female. One of the three alternate jurors was a Black male. On appeal, defendant contends the court erroneously denied the Wheeler motions, violating his rights under the state and federal Constitutions. A prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors on the basis of group bias  that is, bias against members of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds  violates the right of a criminal defendant to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748; People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 553, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344.) Such a practice also violates the defendant's right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 88, 106 S.Ct. 1712; see also People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 732, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236, 86 P.3d 302.) The United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that Batson states the procedure and standard to be used by trial courts when motions challenging peremptory strikes are made. First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case `by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.' [Citations.] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the `burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion' by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, `[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.' [Citation.] ( Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 162 L.Ed.2d 129, fn. omitted [125 S.Ct. 2410, 2416].) We review the trial court's ruling on the question of purposeful racial discrimination for substantial evidence. ( People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 971, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874.) It is presumed that the prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner, and we give deference to the court's ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 864, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1.) As long as the court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal. ( Ibid. )
During jury selection, before the start of peremptory challenges, counsel for Richard Avila noted that, after challenges for cause and other hardship excusals were accounted for in the current jury panel, only a few Hispanic and Black individuals remained. On the basis of the small number of individuals representing minority groups, counsel stated she planned to make a Wheeler motion in response to any peremptory challenge exercised by the prosecution with which she did not agree. Counsel for Richard made her first Wheeler motion after the prosecutor exercised his third peremptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror S.A., who was Black. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that no prima facie showing had been made because there had been no pattern. [33] Counsel for Richard made her second and third Wheeler motions in response to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to two Hispanic prospective jurors, N.L. and C.R., and only counsel for Spradlin joined in the motions. At a hearing on these two motions, the trial court found a prima facie case as to N.L. and C.R., and asked the prosecutor to state his reasons for excusing the two. The prosecutor explained he was using peremptory challenges to excuse some prospective jurors who did not believe strongly in the death penalty, and that his decision was based on a mathematical system of scoring prospective jurors' answers on the questionnaires to certain death penalty-related questions. The court denied the Wheeler motions as to N.L. and C.R. Later, when the prosecutor peremptorily challenged a second Black prospective juror, V.J., the trial court conferred with counsel, asking them whether or not if it were to grant defendants' anticipated Wheeler motion, a possible remedy would be to keep V.J. seated on the jury. Counsel informed the court that decisional law required that the entire panel be discharged. Counsel for Richard argued that there was no legitimate basis for excusing V.J. because her questionnaire indicated she was strongly in favor of the death penalty and her answers during voir dire were extremely forthcoming and informative. Richard's counsel also noted that the prosecutor had earlier used a peremptory challenge to remove a Black prospective juror (S.A.). Defendant and Spradlin joined in counsel's arguments. The trial court found that, in view of the small number of African-Americans on the panel, two excusals constituted a prima facie showing under Wheeler. [34] The prosecutor responded that he challenged Prospective Juror V.J. because she believed that police lie, and because he felt she was not forthcoming about her knowledge of her husband's drug case. The court denied the motion. Next, during voir dire of the prospective alternate jurors, counsel for Spradlin made a Wheeler motion when the prosecutor peremptorily challenged G.B., who was Black, and defendant and Richard joined in the objection. The trial court found no prima facie case of group bias, stating, There's simply no pattern or circumstances that create that impression to the court that her race had anything to do with her being challenged or that there is any pattern on the part of the prosecutor to challenging people of the black race.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in accepting the prosecutor's justification for his peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror V.J. Preliminarily, we note defendant did not object below to the prosecutor's peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror V.J. But he did make arguments objecting to the challenge when codefendant Richard's motion was heard. We thus conclude the claim is preserved for review but that it lacks merit. Prospective Juror V.J. noted on her jury questionnaire that she served as the jury foreperson in a criminal trial, that her prior jury experience taught her things [were not] always like they seem, that someone close to her had been arrested and the experience was strange because she did not realize that everyone lies, and that her husband had been in prison and recently had been the victim of a carjacking. To the question asking whether she knew anyone whom she believed to be a drug addict, she wrote, personal. V.J. stated she strongly supported the death penalty. But her views were contradictory: she stated she would automatically vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole because she entertained conscientious opinions concerning the death penalty, but also stated she would automatically vote for the death penalty for the same reasons. Additionally, she wrote she had read about this case some time ago, that she would have to check the scrapbook her grandmother had made, and that she had no impressions about any of the defendants from what she had read. During voir dire by the trial court, Prospective Juror V.J. clarified that her prior jury service was not on a criminal case but on a civil case involving a crop duster who accidentally sprayed the wrong crop. When asked about her written comment that things were not always like they seemed, she said that accidents don't really mean a lot, referring to the fact that the crop duster was found liable even though it was an accident. Nevertheless, V.J. said she was satisfied with the outcome of that case. The trial court also asked several questions concerning Prospective Juror V.J.'s husband. V.J. explained that it was her husband who had been arrested, and that he was ultimately sentenced to prison. And when the court asked V.J. to whom she was referring when she wrote that she did not realize that everyone lies, she answered: Everybody. Policemen. I mean, everybody. But she added: Can't judge everybody else by what a few people done. [ Sic. ] She stated that if she were selected as a juror, she would be able to judge the case on its own merits. She also clarified that, if the defendants in this case were to be found guilty, nothing would cause her to automatically vote for one punishment over another. Later, counsel for Richard Avila questioned Prospective Juror V.J. The juror acknowledged she indicated on her questionnaire that she strongly supported the death penalty, but stated she had since changed her mind. She no longer had such strong convictions. Nevertheless, she would follow the law even if she personally disagreed with it. And when questioned about her conflicting answers about the death penalty, V.J. said she could keep an open mind and would follow the law. The court and counsel conducted further voir dire of Prospective Juror V.J. out of the presence of the other prospective jurors. In response to the court's questioning, V.J. said her brother was a drug addict, but that potential evidence about drug usage or alcohol abuse would not prevent her from being a fair and impartial juror in this case. In response to the prosecutor's questioning, V.J. also said that her husband had spent three and one-half years in prison on a drug case. Although she did not know what type of drug case it had been, her husband told her the police and attorneys treated him with respect during his court appearances. When the prosecutor asked V.J. about her statement in the questionnaire that everyone lies; she explained that in connection with her husband's drug case, the police had raided her house in her presence, and that, when the case went to trial, the police lied on the stand about how many times they had knocked on her door before entering. She stated: I just figured with them being policemen, they're supposed  they're supposed to uphold the law and they're supposed to always tell the truth. And sometimes  but they're human, they make mistakes just like anybody else. Maybe he didn't intend to tell that lie, but I knew it was a lie because I was there. Notwithstanding her experiences, she stated she could be fair to all the parties in the case. As stated, a Wheeler motion was made, and the trial court found a prima facie case of group bias. The prosecutor's principal reason for exercising a peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror V.J. was her view that the police lie. He explained that he did not want V.J. to infect the jury with her personal experience. The prosecutor was also concerned because, although V.J. said she did not know what type of a drug case her husband had been convicted of, he felt she knew more than she said about that case, considering that she had been present at the raid that eventually led to her husband's arrest and conviction. When counsel for defendant and Spradlin pointed out that M.Y., a White prospective juror who had been arrested and spent 22 days in jail as a result, remained in the jury box, the prosecutor replied that he intended to exercise a peremptory challenge against her for similar reasons. [35] The trial court ruled that the prosecutor had carried his burden of providing an explanation unrelated to group bias for exercising a peremptory challenge to V.J., noting the significance to all parties of the jurors' views of law enforcement personnel. The court explained that, although V.J. was very talkative and expressive during voir dire, she was the only prospective juror thus far who had a personal experience with police lying. The court expressly did not base its ruling on V.J.'s stated lack of knowledge about the type of drug case her husband had been involved in, explaining that the prosecutor's question on that point might have been ambiguous. Defendant argues that the prosecutor's challenge to Prospective Juror V.J. was based on group bias because members of racial minority groups are generally arrested more often and on less evidence than White individuals and thus tend to distrust police officers more than others. He further argues that the prosecutor made no attempt to show that V.J.'s belief would translate into some type of specific bias that would cause her to acquit an accused double murderer even if the prosecution proved he was guilty. We disagree and conclude the record does not establish that the prosecutor's justification for excusal was pretextual. [36] The prosecutor's challenge to V.J. was based on her personal experience that police officers lied, not on a theoretical perception that she, a member of a minority group, might view the police with distrust. It was apparent that the prosecutor was concerned about this circumstance, as he probed V.J. on her husband's criminal history involving drugs and specifically questioned her about her statement that everyone, including the police, lies. The trial court here made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the prosecutor's justifications for excusing V.J., and its ruling is supported by substantial evidence. Defendant further contends that the asserted pretextual nature of the prosecutor's excusal of Prospective Juror V.J. is demonstrated by a comparison of her voir dire answers with those of two nonchallenged and seated jurors, B.B. and D.W. Defendant did not engage in a comparative juror analysis of these particular jurors in the trial court. In earlier cases, we have declined to engage in comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal, stating that such an analysis was unreliable in evaluating the prosecutor's justifications for excusing minority prospective jurors. ( People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1190, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130; People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 76, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1220-1221, 255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047.) Defendant urges us to reconsider this position in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231 [125 S.Ct. 2317] ( Miller-El ), in which comparative juror analysis was employed, albeit not on direct appeal. In Miller-El, the United States Supreme Court held that, in the context of a challenge of a Black prospective juror, the defendant had established purposeful discrimination under Batson and was entitled to relief on that ground in federal habeas corpus proceedings (28 U.S.C. § 2254). ( Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2322].) In so holding, the high court observed: If a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson's third step. ( Id. at p. ___, [125 S.Ct. at p. 2325].) Preliminarily, defendant argues that comparative juror analysis was employed in the trial court because the prosecutor used a numerical scoring system, in which he compared jurors to each other. We disagree. The prosecutor's system of scoring to which defendant refers produced a numerical score for each prospective juror based on his or her own answers to certain death penalty-related questions on the questionnaire. Thus the scores attributed to particular prospective jurors were not dependent on the scores of others. [37] Moreover, irrespective of the prosecutor's use of a numerical scoring system, defendant did not argue at trial that White jurors who were scored as less acceptable than Black jurors were nevertheless retained, and he likewise fails to articulate such an argument on appeal. Assuming without deciding that comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal must be undertaken under the circumstances presented, we conclude defendant's proffered analysis fails to demonstrate purposeful discrimination. Defendant urges that the prosecutor's proffered reason for striking Prospective Juror V.J.  negative experience with law enforcement  applied equally to Prospective Juror B.B., who was White, but that the prosecutor nevertheless permitted B.B. to sit on the jury. Initially, we note that defendant's premise is incorrect: the prosecutor's proffered reason for striking V.J. was not simply because she had a general negative experience with law enforcement but because she had a personal experience with the police that led her question the veracity of police officers. In any event, a side-by-side comparison of Prospective Juror V.J. and Juror B.B. reveals that they were not similarly situated. ( Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2329].) B.B. revealed that her brother recently had been arrested on a traffic warrant, and that she believed the sheer number of officers involved in that incident  six police officers in three patrol cars  was unwarranted. B.B. did not witness her brother's arrest. B.B. also revealed that her brother-in-law, a convicted felon at the time she married her husband, was arrested for bank robbery a few years thereafter. B.B. was not involved in the prosecution of any of her brother-in-law's cases, and she had no opinion on how he was treated in the criminal court system. According to her brother-in-law, he had been treated well. Thus, B.B. herself did not have any negative experience with the police, much less an experience that caused her to form a negative opinion about their veracity. Defendant also argues that the prosecutor's justification for excusing Prospective Juror V.J. must have been pretextual because Juror D.W. was similarly situated to V.J. but nevertheless was allowed to serve on the jury. We disagree. Even if the prosecutor's justification for striking V.J. applied to D.W., that is not evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination, for D.W. was Black. (See Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2325].) In fact, review of D.W.'s voir dire provides further evidence that the prosecutor's justification for excusing V.J. was not based on racial bias. At the time of voir dire, Juror D.W. had an aunt who was employed by the sheriff's department, and D.W. herself was awaiting a response from the sheriff's department about her recent interview for an identification technician position. She also knew others who were in law enforcement or worked in the legal system. When D.W. was 15 years old, her uncle was arrested in her presence. Although her uncle was convicted in a Fresno court of an unidentified crime and sent to prison, he was later found to be innocent and released. D.W. believed her uncle had been treated unfairly but did not blame anyone for the situation. When the prosecutor asked D.W. whether she could be fair to the prosecution in this case, given her belief that her uncle had been treated unfairly in a Fresno case, the juror answered in the affirmative. Unlike Prospective Juror V.J., D.W. did not have an experience with police officers lying. And also unlike V.J., although the prosecutor was concerned about D.W.'s views concerning a relative's arrest and conviction, he was apparently satisfied with her answers. Accordingly, side-by-side comparisons of Jurors B.B. and D.W. with Prospective Juror V.J. support the trial court's ruling that no purposeful discrimination occurred.

Defendant contends that, once the trial court ruled he had made a prima facie showing of group bias regarding the prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror V.J., who was Black, it was required to seek the prosecutor's reasons for using a peremptory challenge against S.A., who was also Black, notwithstanding the court's earlier ruling that no prima facie showing of group bias had been made as to S.A. As stated, defendant did not object to S.A.'s excusal or otherwise join in codefendant Richard's objection to her excusal. We nevertheless reach the merits of the claim because defendant argues that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to reexamine S.A.'s excusal once it found a prima facie case of group bias as to V.J., and defendant effectively preserved the issue of V.J.'s excusal. This case raises the following question: once a trial court finds a prima facie case of group bias as to the excusal of one prospective juror, must it require the prosecutor to provide race-neutral explanations for all challenges made thus far to the members of the group in question, including those the court had ruled upon earlier? One Court of Appeal decision, People v. McGee (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 559, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 309 ( McGee ), addressed this question and answered in the affirmative. As we will explain, we disagree with the Court of Appeal and answer in the negative. A defendant may make out a prima facie case of group bias in jury selection by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. ( Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712.) The high court recently reaffirmed this principle, stating that a defendant makes out a prima facie case of group bias when he produces evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred. ( Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2417].) The defendant ultimately carries the `burden of persuasion' to `prove the existence of purposeful discrimination.' ( Ibid. ) In McGee, the Court of Appeal characterized Wheeler motions as challenging the selection of a jury, not the rejection of an individual juror; the issue is whether a pattern of systematic exclusion exists.  ( McGee, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 570, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 309, italics added.) Accordingly, it held that once the trial court has found a prima facie case of group bias in the excusal of one prospective juror, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to provide race-neutral explanations for all challenges to prospective jurors who are members of the same group. ( Ibid. ) The premise of the Court of Appeal's analysis in McGee, however, is incorrect. When a party makes a Wheeler motion, the issue is not whether there is a pattern of systematic exclusion; rather, the issue is whether a particular prospective juror has been challenged because of group bias. ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.) Although the McGee court relied on People v. Gore (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 692, 22 Cal. Rptr.2d 435, another Court of Appeal decision, the Gore decision did not frame the issue in this manner. Gore merely recognized, correctly, that a pattern of systematic exclusion of a particular cognizable group from the venire raises an inference of purposeful discrimination, and that when such systematic exclusion occurs, everyone (the defendant, the excluded jurors, and the community) is harmed because the public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice is undermined. [38] ( People v. Gore, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at pp. 705, 700, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 435; Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712 [Proof of systematic exclusion from the venire raises an inference of purposeful discrimination because the `result bespeaks discrimination.'].) Of course, a single discriminatory exclusion may also violate a defendant's right to a representative jury. ( People v. Fuentes (1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 716, fn. 4, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75; see also Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2417, fn. 5]; Batson, supra, at p. 95., 106 S.Ct. 1712) As will be discussed, we hold that, when a trial court determines that the defendant has made a prima facie showing that a particular prospective juror has been challenged because of such bias, it need not ask the prosecutor to justify his challenges to other prospective jurors of the same group for which the Batson/Wheeler motion has been denied. Accordingly, we disapprove of People v. McGee, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th 559, 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 309, to the extent it is inconsistent with this holding. People v. Gore, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th 692, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 435, provides little guidance on this issue. In Gore, during jury selection, the defendant did not make any Wheeler objections to the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges to four Hispanic prospective jurors, and the jury was sworn. Later, when the prosecutor used his first three peremptory challenges to the only three Hispanic prospective alternate jurors called to the jury box, the defendant finally made a Wheeler objection. The defendant argued that the prosecutor was systematically excluding Hispanic jurors, listing the seven Hispanic jurors who had been excused. The trial court limited the defendant's arguments to the three Hispanic prospective alternate jurors, finding the Wheeler objection untimely as to the first four Hispanic prospective jurors because the jury had been sworn. The court then found a prima facie case of group bias as to the three Hispanic prospective alternate jurors, although it ultimately concluded the prosecutor's reasons for their excusals were unrelated to group bias. ( Id. at pp. 697-699, 22 Cal. Rptr.2d 435.) The Court of Appeal held that the trial court should not have barred the defendant from objecting to the dismissal of the first four Hispanic jurors on a procedural finding of untimeliness, given that the pattern of challenging Hispanic prospective jurors permeated the selection of the 12 jurors and alternates and the Wheeler objection was brought before jury selection was complete. ( Id. at p. 705, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 435.) Gore has little application to McGee, where the trial court declined to inquire about the prosecutor's reasons based on a substantive finding that there was no prima facie showing. In other words, the issue raised in McGee  whether the prosecutor must explain earlier challenges that did not create a prima facie showing of group bias once the court finds a presumption of group bias as to a later challenge  was not before the Gore court. In People v. Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal.3d 707, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75, the defendant made several Wheeler motions in response to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to Black prospective jurors, the first after the prosecutor excused four Black prospective jurors. The trial court asked the prosecutor for an explanation, but the prosecutor was not prepared to give one. Accordingly, the court reserved its ruling on the motions and indicated it would note which prospective jurors were Black, and that it would have the prosecutor's reasons before trial commenced. After the prosecutor excused three more Black prospective jurors, the defendant objected, and the court stated it would `consider [counsel's objection] a continuing motion.' ( Id. at p. 712, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75.) In total, the prosecutor excused 14 Black prospective jurors, 10 during the selection of the trial jurors and four during the ensuing selection of alternates. At the conclusion of voir dire, the prosecutor made an attempt to explain his challenges. The court ruled that the defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing, but it nevertheless examined the prosecutor's purported reasons for excusing a total of 14 Black prospective jurors, ruling on the challenged jurors as a group. ( Id. at pp. 712-713, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75.) We concluded that the court made an implied finding of a prima facie showing of group bias, and that it violated the defendant's constitutional right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community (Cal. Const., art. I, § 16) by failing to carefully evaluate the prosecutor's explanations. ( People v. Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 710, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75.) In so concluding, we noted that every questioned peremptory challenge must be justified. ( Id. at p. 715, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75.) The McGee court cited our language in Fuentes that every questioned peremptory challenge must be justified ( People v. Fuentes, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 715, 286 Cal.Rptr. 792, 818 P.2d 75) in support of its holding. But the McGee court read our holding too broadly. Unlike in McGee, the Wheeler objection in Fuentes was a continuing one, and thus the court's implied finding of a prima facie showing of group bias applied to all the identified Black prospective jurors. Also unlike in McGee, the trial court in Fuentes did not initially deny the defendant's earlier Wheeler motions only to revisit its rulings at the end of voir dire. Accordingly, the point in McGee, that later excusals can undermine earlier findings of no prima facie showing of group bias, is unsupported. Admittedly, a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to several prospective jurors in a particular racial or ethnic group may appear more suspect than if he or she exercised merely one. Accordingly, even if a defendant's Batson/Wheeler motion pertaining to the first prospective juror of a particular cognizable group excused is denied for a lack of a prima facie showing, he is likely to make one or more subsequent Batson/Wheeler motions after a prosecutor peremptorily challenges several more prospective jurors of that same group. And if a trial court finds a prima facie showing of group bias at a later point in voir dire, the court need only ask the prosecutor to explain each suspect excusal. ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 135, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) Each suspect excusal includes the excusals to which the defendant is objecting and which the court has not yet reviewed. We addressed the converse situation in People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365 ( Alvarez ). There, the defendant made a Batson/Wheeler motion after the prosecutor challenged seven African-American and Latino prospective jurors. The trial court found a prima facie case of group bias, and the prosecutor satisfactorily explained his reasons. The defendant made a subsequent motion after the prosecutor challenged another African-American prospective juror, and the court denied the motion after determining that he had not made a prima facie showing of group bias. ( Id. at pp. 194-195, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) On appeal, the defendant argued that the court's determination he had made a prima facie showing of group bias as to his first Batson/Wheeler motion extended to his subsequent motion. We disagreed and explained that the presumption that a prosecutor uses his peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner is suspended when the defendant makes a prima facie showing of the presence of purposeful discrimination but reinstated . . . when the prosecutor makes a showing of its absence. ( Id. at p. 199, 58 Cal. Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) Thus, on a later motion, the defendant must make a prima facie showing anew. ( Id. at p. 199, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365; see also People v. Irvin (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1351, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 450 [Although Wheeler motions may be made seriatim, each Wheeler motion is itself separate and discrete and is resolved definitively and independently of each other.].) McGee, which fails to acknowledge our decision in Alvarez, is inconsistent with the premise that each Wheeler objection is a discrete event and should be resolved independently of each such motion. Applying these principles to the record before us, we conclude that the trial court was not required to ask the prosecutor to provide race-neutral explanations for excusing Prospective Juror S.A. because the only suspect excusal before the court was that of V.J. It is true that defendant noted V.J. was the second Black prospective juror peremptorily challenged and the court likewise noted that, in view of the small number of African-Americans on the panel, two excusals constituted a prima facie showing, both alluding to the earlier excusal of S.A. But the earlier excusal of S.A. was merely a part of the totality of the relevant facts to be considered in determining a prima facie case of group bias on the Wheeler objection, which was made as to V.J. only. Although we hold that the court has no sua sponte duty to revisit earlier Batson/Wheeler challenges that it had previously denied, upon request it may appropriately do so when the prosecutor's subsequent challenge to a juror of a protected class casts the prosecutor's earlier challenges of the jurors of that same protected class in a new light, such that it gives rise to a prima facie showing of group bias as to those earlier jurors. But the burden is on the party making the later motion to so clarify, for that party ultimately has the burden of proof. (See, e.g., People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 423, 25 Cal. Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790 [defendant bears the burden of establishing that denial of a continuance request was an abuse of discretion]; People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 484, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182 [defendant bears the burden of proof on his motion for a change of venue]; People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1030, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68 [the party seeking severance has the burden to clearly establish there is a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that charges be separately tried].) Defendant did not do so here.
Alternatively, defendant contends that, when the trial court addressed the Wheeler motion as to Prospective Juror S.A., it might have applied the wrong standard in assessing whether a prima facie showing of group bias had been made, and thus might have erred in denying the motion. As stated, Richard made a Wheeler motion when the prosecutor excused Prospective Juror S.A., and defendant did not join the motion. Accordingly, he failed to preserve this issue for appeal. (See People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 48, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) The issue is without merit in any event. Wheeler states that, to make a prima facie case of group bias, the objecting party must show a strong likelihood of bias ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748), and the trial court must determine whether a reasonable inference arises that peremptory challenges are being used on the ground of group bias alone ( id. at p. 281, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748). In People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1 Cal. Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d 270, we held that  Wheeler's terms `strong likelihood' and `reasonable inference' state the same standard ( id. at p. 1313, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d 270), and that Wheeler's standard, which has always been compatible with Batson, means that to state a prima facie case the objecting party must show that it is more likely than not the other party's peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias ( id. at p. 1318, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d 270). The high court recently held that our `more likely than not' standard is an inappropriate yardstick by which to measure the sufficiency of a prima facie case. ( Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2416].) Instead, the objecting party satisfies the requirements of Batson's first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred. ( Id. at p. ___, [125 S.Ct. at p. 2417].) Proof of a pattern or practice is not required because a single invidiously discriminatory governmental act is not immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions. ( Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 2417, fn. 5].) The trial court here did not articulate the standard it used in ruling that no prima facie case of group bias had been shown as to the excusal of Prospective Juror S.A. The court, however, noted that no pattern had been established, and when Richard asserted there need not be more than one excusal for the court to find a violation, it disagreed, stating case law indicated there must be a pattern or a prima facie case. Although there is no indication that the court applied a standard other than that articulated in Batson, because the court appeared to have been under the impression that only a pattern of discrimination, revealed in multiple excusals, would suffice to make a prima facie showing, we will assume, arguendo, that the court's decision is not entitled to deference. Instead, we are able to apply the high court's standard articulated in Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2410, and resolve the legal question whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on the basis of race. ( People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 73, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622.) As we will explain, the record does not support such an inference. At trial, Richard Avila relied on the following facts that he claimed raised an inference of group bias: Prospective Juror S.A. was the only individual out of her group of 24 called to the box who was Black; the prosecutor did not ask S.A. any questions; and S.A.'s answers to the questionnaire and the court's questioning were evenhanded. On her written questionnaire, S.A. wrote that she had served as a juror in a criminal case, and that the experience had left her with mixed feelings. This experience nevertheless gave S.A. an impression that the judicial system overall . . . runs well, but when asked whether she had any unpleasant memories of the trial in which she served as a juror, she answered, I just wonder sometimes if I made a difference. S.A. also wrote that she had a relative who had been arrested for manslaughter, and that the experience for her was devastating. She indicated she would consider the death penalty, although she had no opinion on whether the death penalty was used too often, not often enough, or too randomly. She had no opinion on life imprisonment without possibility of parole. During oral voir dire, when the trial court inquired about her mixed feelings about her previous jury duty experience, S.A. explained that she had learned that the defense counsel had wanted her as a juror because he believed that, as a member of a minority group, she would hold out longer than anybody else. Nevertheless, she did not believe her previous jury experience would carry over into her consideration of this case. S.A. also explained that it was her brother who had been arrested and convicted for manslaughter. But she also said she believed her brother had been fairly treated by the criminal justice system, and nothing about her brother's experience would affect her ability to be fair and impartial in this case. In sum, Prospective Juror S.A.'s written answers to the questionnaire and her responses during oral voir dire disclosed a number of reasons other than racial bias for any prosecutor to challenge her ( People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 70, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622), including but not limited to her personal experience as a trial juror and experience with her brother's involvement in the criminal justice system, notwithstanding S.A's assurances that her prior experiences would not carry over to this case if she were chosen as a juror. (See, e.g., People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 138, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988 [close relative's adversary contact with the criminal justice system is one ground upon which the prosecutor might reasonably have challenged prospective jurors].) Moreover, although S.A. may have been the only Black individual in her group of 24 called to the box, at the time S.A. was challenged, several Black prospective jurors remained on the panel. The record thus does not support an inference that the prosecutor excused S.A. on the basis of race.
Defendant contends the trial court either used an incorrect standard or abused its discretion in determining that a prima facie case of group bias had not been established as to the excusal of Prospective Juror G.B. Assuming without deciding that the court's decision is not entitled to deference (see ante, pt. II.C.3.b.), we are able to resolve the legal question whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused G.B. on the basis of group bias. We conclude the record does not support such an inference. Prospective Alternate Juror G.B., who identified herself as Black, indicated in the written questionnaire that she was a psychiatric nurse, had a degree in psychology, and valued the opinions of psychologists or psychiatrists most of the time, as she worked closely with them in her job as a nurse in a psychiatric ward. She had an unpleasant experience with a law enforcement officer. G.B. also did not strongly support the death penalty. On her written questionnaire, G.B. indicated she would consider the death penalty and wrote: [E]ach circumstance is individual to me. She had no opinion on whether the death penalty was used too often, not often enough, or too randomly. She [s]omewhat agreed with the statement that any person who intentionally kills another person, except in cases of self-defense or defense of another, deserved the death penalty, and she was neutral on whether convicted murders should be swiftly executed once they were convicted. She did not believe in the adage An eye for an eye. Although G.B. had given the issue of the death penalty much thought prior to being called as a prospective juror on this case, she did not answer the question on the questionnaire asking whether, regardless of the evidence and because of her conscientious objections to the death penalty, she would in every case automatically vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. [39] Some of G.B.'s answers on the questionnaire also were not fully and directly responsive to the questions. For example, although G.B. indicated that her opinion on the death penalty had changed over the years, when asked to explain how and why it changed, she answered in general terms, Its [ sic ] a moral issue and depends on where you are in your own life at the time you are thinking about it. Similarly, on the question asking about her general feelings regarding life imprisonment without parole, G.B. wrote, Is there rehabilitation would be my question. Thus, based on the questionnaire as a whole, there were many reasons other than racial bias for any prosecutor to challenge her, including but not limited to her negative experience with a law enforcement officer, her background as a nurse in a psychiatric ward where she worked closely with and valued the opinions of psychologists and psychiatrists, and her nonresponsive answers to some questions about penalty in this case. G.B.'s responses to oral voir dire further support this view. At one point, the prosecutor asked G.B. whether she could apply the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in the guilt phase of trial, regardless of her thoughts on penalty, and G.B. answered yes. When the prosecutor further asked, [I]s there a subjective side to that answer, G.B. answered, You're asking me to follow the law, and I said yes, I can follow the law. My  my answer would be yes. G.B. further stated that she did not have any subjective feelings as of that point but that, as human beings, everyone had a subjective side. The suggestion of tension between counsel and the juror is one good reason for any prosecutor to challenge her. Moreover, when G.B. was excused, W.H., who was Black, remained as a prospective alternate juror and eventually served as a juror for the guilt and penalty phases. (See People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 69-70, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622 [evidence that the prosecutor challenged one of two African-American prospective jurors is insufficient to establish a prima facie showing, particularly in view of the circumstance that the other African-American prospective juror ultimately sat on the jury].) After examining the totality of the relevant facts, we conclude that the record fails to support an inference that the prosecutor excused G.B. on the basis of race. Defendant argues, however, that because the trial court had found a prima facie showing in an earlier Wheeler motion responding to the prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror V.J., he was not required to make a prima facie showing in a subsequent motion objecting to the prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge to Prospective Juror G.B. We disagree. A prima facie showing at one point in the proceedings does not require a statement of reasons for excusal of all subsequent members of the same cognizable group. ( Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 198-199, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) In any case, as discussed, the record does not support an inference of discriminatory purpose.
The prosecutor also exercised peremptory challenges against Prospective Jurors A.R. and R.P. Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly excused these individuals, both Hispanic, solely on the ground of group bias, and that the trial court erred in failing to rule on his Wheeler motion pertaining to them. No one objected on Wheeler grounds to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges against A.R. and R.P. During the hearing on the Wheeler motion as to Prospective Juror G.B., however, counsel for defendant noted that A.R., a death penalty advocate, had been excused, and that there was some question about R.P. but that he indicated he could be fair and follow the law. He argued that G.B. exhibited no biases and concluded: Given the circumstances, I believe that a Wheeler motion is present and that a new jury should be impaneled. Defendant argues the above statements about A.R. and R.P. constituted a timely Wheeler motion objectioning to their excusal, and that the trial court erred in failing to address it. We disagree. Defense counsel's brief comments regarding their excusal came in the context of arguing that G.B. had been improperly excused based on group bias, and we do not construe counsel's comments as a Wheeler objection regarding the excusal of A.R. and R.P. Accordingly, he failed to preserve this claim for appeal. (See, e.g., People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 105, 270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23.)