Opinion ID: 2971805
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Testimony of Coconspirators

Text: The district court admitted at trial the testimony of several indicted and unindicted coconspirators, including Robert Thompson, Tony Phillips, Elizabeth Sexton, Roger Pilgrim, Eugene Jones, Darlene Estill and Karen Slutton, ruling that the statements were made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy and are therefore exceptions to the hearsay rules. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) (admitting statements if the “statement is offered against a party and is . . . a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy”). The trial court may conditionally admit coconspirator statements, as it did here, subject to subsequent demonstration of their admissibility. Fed. R. Evid. 104(b); United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 153 (6th Cir. 1979). For such statements to be conditionally admitted, the government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the conspiracy existed, (2) the defendant against whom the statement is offered was a member of the conspiracy, and (3) the statement was made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987); United States v. Smith, 320 F.3d 647, 654 (6th Cir. 2003).1 1 A 1997 amendment to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) codifies the holding in Bourjaily by stating expressly that a court shall consider the contents of a coconspirator’s statement in determining “the existence of the conspiracy and the participation therein of the declarant and the party against whom the statement is offered.” According to Bourjaily, Rule 104(a) necessitates these preliminary requirements to be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Second, the amendment provides that the contents of the declarant’s statement do not alone suffice to establish a conspiracy in which the declarant and the defendant participated. The court must consider in addition the circumstances surrounding the statement, such as the identity of the speaker, the context in which the statement was -3- Nos. 02-5781/6292/6322 United States v. Sexton Defendants argue both that the government failed to show that a conspiracy existed and that statements were made “in furtherance” of the conspiracy. We disagree. In addition to the statements of the coconspirators themselves, the district court heard extensive other evidence from law enforcement and other witnesses indicating the existence of a conspiracy. The district court therefore conditionally admitted the statements and then made extensive findings later to support their admission. (J.A. at 3392-3407, 3466-86) The evidence of a conspiracy relied upon by the district court to conditionally admit the statements includes Officer Bryant’s undercover activities and controlled buys from Legg, recorded conversations between and among informants, coconspirators and Legg and Romans, observations by officers of meetings between and among coconspirators during and after drug transactions and the actual seizure of drugs on Legg’s property. For example, the court cited the testimony of Darlene Estill, who was Legg’s girlfriend and lived with him off and on for four years, including during the existence of the conspiracy. She was involved in Legg’s drug activities and testified that he supplied cocaine to Romans and Sarah Moss. Estill testified that Legg told her that defendant Tim Sexton was Legg’s supplier. While she lived with Legg she knew of more than a dozen customers of Legg’s, including Romans and Moss, who then resold cocaine to others. She testified made, or evidence corroborating the contents of the statement in making its determination as to each preliminary question. See United States v. Clark, 18 F.3d 1337, 1341-42 (6th Cir. 1994). The statements may be admitted subject to a later ruling that the government has met its burden. Id. The district court may rely on a coconspirator’s statement to determine whether a conspiracy has been established as long as there is some independent corroborating evidence that serves to rebut the presumption of unreliability of out-of-court statements. Id. -4- Nos. 02-5781/6292/6322 United States v. Sexton that Legg would take money from drug transactions to Sexton’s house and would sometimes return from those visits with more drugs to sell. Estill recorded a conversation with Sarah Moss that indicated that Sexton sometimes provided drugs to Romans, Legg and Moss for resale and Moss joked about competition between Romans and her for cocaine customers. The court cited numerous other items of testimony to indicate that Legg, Romans, Sexton and Moss, along with others, engaged in a drug conspiracy during the time in question. Trial Trans. at 3060-66, J.A. at 33953401. In addition to challenging the existence of a conspiracy, defendants also challenge whether the admitted coconspirator statements were made “in furtherance of the conspiracy.” A statement is “in furtherance” of a conspiracy if it is intended to promote the objectives of the conspiracy – here to sell cocaine. United States v. Clark, 18 F.3d 1337, 1342 (6th Cir. 1994). Many of the admitted statements were made by coconspirators during the course of an actual drug transaction. Some of the statements informed other conspiracy members or customers about the source of the cocaine, and the hierarchy or the roles of various persons in the conspiracy. Trial Trans. at 3070-72; J.A. at 340507. Defendants further contend that the court is required to review each offering by the government separately to determine if a particular statement is one in furtherance of the conspiracy. Before making a determination as to whether the statement was admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the court reviewed each conversation in colloquy with counsel. The district court reviewed the specific evidence particular to each coconspirator to establish the existence of a conspiracy and that person’s role in the conspiracy before admitting the statement made by that person. The court -5- Nos. 02-5781/6292/6322 United States v. Sexton correctly found that the statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Accordingly, there was no error in admitting the coconspirator statements.