Opinion ID: 1985872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence Pertaining to Co-Defendant

Text: Moore's companion in the robbery, alleged to be James Stidd III, pled guilty to the offense. Stidd was unavailable to testify, as he had escaped and remained at large at the time of the trial. The State presented evidence of Stidd's conviction. The State also presented evidence that Stidd had stolen the car used in the robbery two weeks before the crime and that Stidd had sold a large quantity of ginseng to the Wilcox Drug Company the day after the robbery. Moore objected to the evidence of Stidd's car theft and later sale of the ginseng, but he did not object to the evidence of Stidd's conviction for the robbery in question. Moore now argues that the admission of Stidd's guilty plea to robbery was fundamental error. It is true that in many cases, evidence of a co-defendant's guilty plea has been considered irrelevant and inadmissible. Phelps v. State (1983), Ind. App., 453 N.E.2d 350 (evidence of co-defendant's guilty plea, which defendant offered as newly discovered evidence in his motion to correct error, was irrelevant and would have been inadmissible at trial); Jefferson v. State (1980), Ind. App., 399 N.E.2d 816 (refusal of defendant's proffered evidence of co-defendant's guilty plea not error because conviction or guilty plea of co-defendant is not substantive evidence of defendant's guilt and is generally inadmissible); Zarnik v. State (1977), 172 Ind. App. 593, 361 N.E.2d 202 (guilty pleas used to attack credibility of testifying co-defendants harmless error where prosecutor did not use evidence to argue defendant's guilt and court instructed jury to consider only evidence pertaining to defendant to determine guilt). Research reveals only one case in which use of a co-defendant's conviction was a basis for reversal. This Court found that [t]he fact that others indicted for the same offense had been found guilty was not evidence against the appellant, who was being tried separately, and should not have been considered by the jury... . Lincoln v. State (1921), 191 Ind. 426, 429, 133 N.E. 351, 352. The admission of the co-defendants' conviction rose to the level of reversible error only because the prosecutor made constant, improper reference to the co-defendants' conviction in arguing the defendant's guilt and because the judge refused to admonish the jury that only the evidence against the defendant should be considered. The question of whether the admission of a co-defendant's conviction requires reversal depends on the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. Zarnik, 172 Ind. App. at 206, 361 N.E.2d at 206. In this case, only a brief mention of Stidd's conviction was made in the testimony of the investigating officer. The prosecutor made few references to Stidd in final argument. He told the jury: What happened to Stidd? Those things aren't in your consideration. He did not use Stidd's conviction directly to argue Moore's guilt. The prejudice to Moore was insubstantial. Moreover, appellant did not object to the admission of Stidd's conviction. We agree with the State that this could be a tactical decision to shift blame to Stidd and away from Moore. Under these circumstances, the admission of Stidd's guilty plea does not require reversal. [1] Moore also argues that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence that Stidd stole the car used in the robbery and later sold the proceeds of the robbery. Defense counsel objected to this evidence as irrelevant. He argues that the evidence is relevant only to the unrelated acts of the co-defendant. Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove or disprove an issue material to the case. Ashley v. State (1986), Ind., 493 N.E.2d 768. The State argues that Stidd's car theft and sale of stolen property is admissible under the res gestae theory. Evidence of another and distinct crime is admissible where it was committed as part of the same transaction... . The res gestae is not confined to the act charged, but includes acts, statements, occurrences and circumstances which are substantially contemporaneous with the main fact. Kiefer v. State (1960), 241 Ind. 176, 178, 169 N.E.2d 723, 724. When used in this context, res gestae refers to necessary parts of the proof of an entire deed... . IA J. Wigmore, Evidence § 218 at 1888 (Tillers Rev. 1983). Res gestae does not render otherwise irrelevant evidence admissible. It merely illustrates that the scope of relevant evidence may exceed the limits of the charged act and include other acts which are an inseparable part of the whole crime. Id. at 1883. Of course, the theft here is not attributed to Moore, but to his co-defendant, Stidd. Evidence of acts of co-defendants has been held admissible when the act is directly related to the totality of circumstances surrounding a defendant's crime. Hudak v. State (1983), Ind. App., 446 N.E.2d 615. In Hudak, evidence of a roommate's inability to fill a drug order was relevant to show how the defendant became involved in a drug sale. Similarly, a co-defendant's conviction for prostitution was admissible to show that the defendant knowingly participated in promoting prostitution. Luginbuhl v. State (1987), Ind. App., 507 N.E.2d 620. Likewise, evidence that the check forged by the defendant was stolen by another individual was in essence so much a part of the totality of circumstances of the defendant's crime that it was relevant and therefore admissible... . Smith v. State (1972), 152 Ind. App. 654, 658, 284 N.E.2d 522, 525. Moore was never connected with the theft of the car two weeks before the robbery. There is no indication that Moore and Stidd conspired to steal the car as part of their plan to rob the Tuttles. The theft of the car was not substantially contemporaneous to the robbery. Moore's only connection to the car was as a passenger on the day of the robbery. The method by which Stidd acquired the car is unrelated. The final disposition of the stolen property is more closely related, but again there was no evidence before the jury that Moore participated in the sale or received any of the proceeds. We cannot say that these events were so much a part of the robbery as to be included in the totality of the circumstances. Stidd's car theft and sale of stolen property do not tend to prove that Moore knowingly took property from another person by force or threat of force and therefore were not relevant to the issues before the jury. Admission of evidence of unrelated criminal activity by a co-defendant may be harmless error. Smith v. State (1974), 160 Ind. App. 622, 312 N.E.2d 896. In this case, the unequivocal identification of the victim and his own admissions supported Moore's conviction. While the extraneous evidence of Stidd's acts was not relevant, it was not so prejudicial to warrant reversal.