Opinion ID: 4541297
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Use of discipline

Text: Ordinarily, adequacy of an IEP is determined by consideration of the four “indicators of whether an IEP is reasonably calculated to provide a meaningful educational benefit under the IDEA,” which were set forth in CypressFairbanks Independent School District v. Michael F. ex rel. Barry F., 118 F.3d 14 The district court, in a footnote, noted that the escalating discipline at Ridgecrest was a result of either a failure to implement the IEP or an “inappropriate” IEP. However, the district court’s opinion also noted that neither party was challenging the adequacy of the IEP itself. Because the opinion includes no analysis of the relevant factors, it does not appear the district court intended to hold the IEP was inadequate. 20 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 21 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274 245, 253 (5th Cir. 1997). However, when a plaintiff brings a claim based on a failure to implement an IEP, the first factor (whether the program is individualized) and second factor (whether the program is administered in the least restrictive environment) are generally “not at issue.” Bobby R., 200 F.3d at 348. Rather, a court must decide whether a FAPE was denied by considering, under the third factor, whether there was a “substantial or significant” failure to implement an IEP; 15 and under the fourth factor, whether “there have been demonstrable academic and non-academic benefits from the IEP.” Id. at 349.
The district court found the use of Take 5 and Take 10 violated the IEP because under Texas law, “[t]he use of time-outs must be limited on a student’s IEP if they are to be used,” and because the procedures were time-outs as they “were mandatory isolations for O.W. away from his regular setting and other students.” The district court also found the use of the take-discipline inconsistent with the IEP’s general requirement that staff use a calm interaction area, redirect O.W., and remind him of his ability to access a cooling off area. Texas law provides a “[t]ime-out may only be used in conjunction with an array of positive behavior intervention strategies and techniques and must be included in the student’s IEP and/or BIP if it is utilized on a recurrent basis to increase or decrease a targeted behavior.” 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.1053(g). Thus, an IEP or BIP which does not authorize the recurrent use of time-outs effectively prohibits such use. The parties do not dispute that O.W.’s IEP did 15 Bobby R. defined the inquiry as whether a district “failed to implement substantial or significant provisions of the IEP.” 200 F.3d at 349. However, the panel focused the substance of its inquiry on whether the violation of the IEP (rather than the provision) was de minimis. Id. at 348. 21 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 22 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274 not authorize the use of time-outs, 16 or that the take-discipline was utilized on a recurrent basis to increase or decrease a targeted behavior. However, the School District contends the Take 5 and Take 10 disciplines were not time-outs under Texas law because the desk was in O.W.’s classroom and was not separated from other students and because O.W. was given an opportunity to pursue preferred activities during the discipline. The code defines a time-out as “a behavior management technique in which . . . the student is separated from other students for a limited period in a setting: (A) that is not locked; and (B) from which the exit is not physically blocked by furniture, a closed door held shut from the outside, or another inanimate object.” Id. § 89.1053(b)(3). While the School District is correct the desk was in O.W.’s classroom and that O.W. was allowed to partake in preferred activities, nothing in the administrative definition of “time out” suggests the definition is limited to placement in a separate room or is inapplicable when the student is provided certain activities. Section 89.1053(b) only requires a “separat[ion] from other students for a limited period . . . .” Although the parties cite no specific evidence as to the location of the desk, references by school employees to the procedure as an “isolation” or “time-out,” while not dispositive, support the district court’s finding that the desk was separated from other students. Thus, we conclude the district court did not err in finding the take-disciplines to be timeouts. Because O.W.’s IEP prohibited time-outs, the recurrent use of the take-discipline amounted to a substantial or significant departure from the IEP. Regarding the fourth factor, the district court found the failure to 16 The School District does not argue the IEP’s authorization to “[d]irect [O.W.] to the cool-down area” amounted to an authorization to use time-outs under Texas law. We deem this argument forfeited. See United States v. Zuniga, 860 F.3d 276, 284 n.9 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[A]ny issue not raised in an . . . opening brief is forfeited.”). 22 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 23 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274 implement the IEP “denied O.W. the educational benefits sought under the IEP, and that such failure denied O.W. a FAPE.” We agree. It is undisputed that after the IEP was implemented, O.W.’s grades dropped 17 and his behavior deteriorated to the point where school officials determined his school day should be shortened to three hours. This regression shows neither an educational nor a behavioral benefit. See generally Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. V.P. ex rel. Juan P., 582 F.3d 576, 583 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n IEP must be likely to produce progress, not regression . . . .”) (emphasis added). In sum, the use of the take-discipline was a significant or substantial departure from O.W.’s IEP. During the time period this departure occurred, O.W. regressed both educationally and behaviorally. Under these circumstances, we conclude the district court did not err in finding an actionable failure to implement O.W.’s IEP as to take discipline.
The district court and the hearing officer found the use of physical restraints violated the IEP’s framework for behavioral interventions, which required that staff use a calm style, minimize verbal interactions, avoid power struggles, and provide access to a cooling off period. The School District argues it was entitled under Texas law to use physical restraints and it was not required to include such use in the IEP. There is no question the use of physical restraints is neither positive reinforcement nor consistent with avoiding confrontations or power struggles. However, Texas law expressly authorizes a local education agency (LEA) to use 17 In arguing O.W.’s grades improved under the IEP, the School District compares O.W.’s scores from the first term (when he started at Nottingham) to his fourth term (when he was mostly at Ridgecrest). When compared in this fashion, the School District is correct that all but one of O.W.’s grades improved. However, when compared to the third term, which ended approximately two weeks before O.W. began at Ridgecrest, the grades dropped in most subjects. 23 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 24 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274 physical restraints in an “Emergency” situation, which is defined as a “situation in which a student’s behavior poses a threat of . . . imminent, serious physical harm to the student or others; or . . . imminent, serious property destruction.” 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.1053(b), (c). Unlike the use of time-outs, the law contains no provision requiring that the use of physical restraints be expressly authorized by a student’s IEP. O.W.’s IEP listed positive reinforcement and avoidance of power struggles as two of seven “Specific strategies/supports to prevent or decrease . . . problem behavior.” In addition, the IEP listed five “Strategies/interventions to use when [physical aggression] behavior is occurring:” (1) “Us[ing] a calm interaction style and minimize[ing] verbal interactions;” (2) “Remind[ing O.W.] to use taught coping strategies;” (3) “Direct[ing O.W.] to the cool-down area;” (4) “Provid[ing] more physical space;” and (5) “Remov[ing] extraneous objects so [O.W.] is not tempted to throw them.” Nothing in the IEP suggests the LEA was required to follow every strategy in every instance. More important, nothing in the listed strategies suggests the techniques were intended to apply in the specific situation governed by the emergency restraint provision—when there is an imminent threat of serious harm. Therefore, so long as the School District’s use of physical restraints complied with state law, the use of restraints did not violate the IEP. O.W.’s disciplinary records show that he was physically restrained eight times and that each instance of restraint was preceded by violent behavior by O.W. and attempts by district staff to utilize at least some of the strategies enumerated in the IEP. In each instance, the school determined the restraint was necessary to prevent serious physical harm to O.W. or to another. O.W. does not dispute the uses of restraints were necessary to prevent harm and were thus appropriate under Texas law. Accordingly, the district court erred in concluding these eight instances of physical restraints violated O.W.’s IEP. 24 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 25 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274
As with the physical restraints, the district court and the hearing officer determined the request for police intervention violated the IEP, and thus denied O.W. a FAPE, because calls to police were inconsistent with the IEP’s expressly authorized strategies of using a calm interaction style, minimizing verbal interactions, providing access to a cooling off period, and avoiding power struggles. We disagree. As mentioned above, the IEP listed specific strategies to be used to address O.W.’s aggressive behavior. These strategies are not necessarily violated by a mere request for police presence, particularly to deal with a violent and escalating situation such as a student repeatedly striking a teacher and charging at her, as was the case here. O.W. interacted with police officers on one occasion, and only after school officials provided him an opportunity to cool down, offered verbal redirections, provided praise, attempted to reduce verbal interactions, and applied calming techniques. Once the officers arrived, the interaction was limited to a handful of questions which may best be characterized as implicit threats of arrest if O.W. continued to assault his teachers. There is no indication Ridgecrest staff directed or encouraged the police officers to act in a manner inconsistent with the IEP. Because the School District took steps to avoid police interaction and O.W.’s behavior posed a substantial risk of serious injury to himself and others, we do not believe the calls to police were inconsistent with O.W.’s IEP. Accordingly, the single instance of police involvement did not rise to the level of an actionable violation.