Opinion ID: 1658129
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: was default judgment void?

Text: In considering whether a judgment should be set aside because it is a nullity, there is no discretion in the trial court. If a judgment is void it must be vacated. On the other hand, a judgment which is not a nullity cannot be set aside on this ground. A judgment cannot be set aside simply because it is erroneous. See: Gulf Coast Building & Supply Company v. Int'l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 480, 460 F.2d 105 (C.A. 5th 1972); Marshall v. Board of Education, Bergenfield, N.J., 575 F.2d 417, 422 (3rd Cir.N.J. 1978). A party seeking to set aside final judgment because it is void under Rule 60(b)(4) has the same burden as at common law when seeking to set aside a final judgment after adjournment of the term of court. We have held that if the judgment was void, it could be set aside, Burns v. Delta Loans, Inc., 354 So.2d 268 (Miss. 1974); Whiteway Finance Company v. Parker, 226 So.2d 903 (Miss. 1969). If merely erroneous, however, it could not. City of Starkville v. Thompson, 260 So.2d 191 (Miss. 1972); Bates v. Strickland, 139 Miss. 636, 103 So. 432 (1925). We have said that if a court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, and renders judgment during a term of court, it is without jurisdiction to set aside the judgment at a subsequent term. Strain v. Gayden, 197 Miss. 353, 20 So.2d 697 (1945). Federal courts interpreting this rule have stated that a judgment is void only if the court that rendered it lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law. See: Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 2862, pp. 199-200. [4] In this case clearly the Jones County Circuit Court had the authority to hear suits on open account and since personal service of process had been had upon Walters, it had the authority to proceed in this case against him. Analogous to the due process requirement of the Federal courts is our holding that no judgment can be rendered on a pleading which states no cause of action. See: Carrier Lumber & Mfg. Company v. Quitman County, 156 Miss. 396, 124 So. 437, 66 A.L.R. 614 (1929); Suggestion of Error Overruled, 156 Miss. 396, 125 So. 416 (1920); Smith v. Deas, 158 Miss. 111, 130 So. 105 (1930); U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company v. Plumbing Wholesale Co., 175 Miss. 675, 166 So. 529 (1936); Roberts v. James Mfg. Company, 197 So.2d 808 (Miss. 1967); Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. Crowder, 201 Miss. 92, 28 So.2d 654 (1947); Stevens v. Barbour, 193 Miss. 109, 8 So.2d 242 (1942). In this case Bryant's complaint clearly stated a cause of action. Its defect, if any, was the attachment of an incomplete itemized account. MCRP 10(d) states: (d) Copy Must be Attached. When any claim or defense is founded on an account or other written instrument, a copy thereof must be attached to or filed with the pleading unless sufficient justification for its omission is stated in the pleading. The comment to this rule states this subparagraph was added to continue the traditional Mississippi practice of annexing to pleadings copies of written documents upon which the claim or defense is founded. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-47 and § 13-1-141 (1972) have been construed, however, as rules of evidence, not a pleading. See: Enochs-Flowers, Ltd., et al. v. Bank of Forest, 172 Miss. 36, 157 So. 711 (1934); Britton v. Magnolia State Casket & Supply Company, 210 Miss. 264, 49 So.2d 404 (1950); Western Casualty & S. Company v. Fox-Everett, Inc., 78 So.2d 363 (Miss. 1955); Gulf & S.I.R. Company v. Kelly, 131 Miss. 133, 95 So. 131, (1923); Sanders & Alexander, Inc. v. Jones, 221 Miss. 143, 72 So.2d 240 (1954); Parker v. Thornton, 206 Miss. 662, 40 So.2d 538 (1949). With the liberal discovery statutes and rules in effect, and documents procurable on a simple motion to produce, there appears to be no compelling reason for rigid adherence to this rule. It makes even less sense to argue that literal compliance with this rule is necessary before any court has authority to enter a judgment against a defaulting defendant. The effect of these statutes and this rule have caused some difficulty. See: Motive Parts Warehouse, Inc. v. D & H Auto Parts Company Inc., 464 So.2d 1162 (Miss. 1985). We are not required in this case, however, to decide whether the failure to attach an account in literal compliance with cases years gone by was such that it was erroneous for the circuit judge to enter a default judgment thereon. Indeed, he may even have initially declined to enter a default judgment against the defendant because the account was incomplete. Granting a default judgment is discretionary with the court, and not a matter of absolute right. See Hanley v. Volpe, 48 F.R.D. 387 (E.D.Wisc. 1970); Bavouset v. Shaw's of San Francisco, 43 F.R.D. 296 (S.D.Tex. 1967); Flacks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702 (2nd Cir. N.Y. 1974); Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364 (10th Cir. N.M. 1970); Flaksa v. Little River Marine Const. Company, 389 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. Fla. 1968). Our inquiry is whether this attached account, admittedly incomplete, was so defective as to render the judgment which was rendered an absolute nullity. Even under our pre-rules pleading, a total failure to attach any account did not render a default judgment on a complaint void. See: Britton v. Magnolia State Casket & Supply Company, supra . Clearly, therefore, the complaint with exhibits attached stated a cause of action under our rules, and the court was authorized to enter a default judgment against Walters. Having duly entered a default judgment against Walters when the court had authority under the law to do so, it was error for the court to set it aside on the basis given, because it was not void.