Opinion ID: 2227985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Strict-Liability Claim.

Text: The plaintiff's strict-liability claim is based on section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which we adopted in Hawkeye-Security Insurance Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672, 684 (Iowa 1970). Under this rule, (1) [o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, at 347-48 (1965).
In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to its use. .... Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. j, at 353 (1965) (emphasis added). In this case, Goodyear had stamped a warning on the tire that stated: Serious Injury May Result From Tire Failure Due to Underinflation/Overloading/Misapplication Follow Tire Placard Instructions in Vehicle Check Inflation Pressure Frequently with Accurate Gauge Explosion of Tire/Rim Assembly Due to Improper MountingOnly Specifically Trained Persons Should Mount Tires When Mounting Tire, Use Safety Cage and Clip-On Extension Air Hose to Inflate. (Emphasis added.) Goodyear argues that its warning about using a safety cage would have avoided the injury if Leaf had heeded the warning. Apparently believing the comment j defense only applied in a failure-to-warn claim, the court submitted it under Leaf's negligence claim but refused to do so in connection with the strict-liability claim. See Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1994) (failure to warn may be submitted in negligence claim but not in both negligence and strict-liability claim). The issue is whether the court should have submitted Goodyear's comment j defense in connection with Leaf's strict-liability claim. Comment j has been held inapplicable in a defective-designas opposed to a failure-to-warnclaim. See Moulton v. Rival Co., 116 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir.1997). See generally, Annotation, Benjamin J. Jones, Presumption or Inference in Products Liability Action Based on Failure to Warn, That User of Product Would Have Heeded an Adequate Warning Had One Been Given, 38 A.L.R.5th 683, 701-11 (1996) (discussing comment j and comparable rules under state cases). The current status of comment j is uncertain. It has been deleted from the third Restatement of Torts, and it has been said that courts have overwhelmingly rejected Comment j because warnings are an imperfect means to remedy a product defect. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 336 (Tex.1998). A comment to the Restatement (Third) of Torts explains the rationale for rejecting comment j: We decline ... to adopt any rule that permits a manufacturer or designer to discharge its total responsibility to workers by simply warning of the dangers of a product. Whether or not adequate warnings are given is a factor to be considered on the issue of negligence, but warnings cannot absolve the manufacturer or designer of all responsibility for the safety of the product. Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability § 2 cmt. 1 (1998). A reporter's note to the third Restatement characterizes comment j as unfortunate language that has elicited heavy criticism from a host of commentators. Id. Rptr. Notes (citing Howard Latin, Good Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L.Rev. 1193, 1206-07 (1994)). While we have doubts that Goodyear's comment j argument would apply to Leaf's strict-liability claim, we do not decide the issue. Goodyear did not raise it in its motion for directed verdict, and the district court correctly ruled in its judgment NOV order that the issue had been waived. See Schlegel, 585 N.W.2d at 221. B. The claim of misuse. Goodyear argues that Leaf did not meet the requirements of section 402A because he failed to show that the product was expected to and did reach the plaintiff without substantial change in condition. See Fell v. Kewanee Farm Equip. Co., 457 N.W.2d 911, 918 (Iowa 1990); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(1)(b), at 348. Ordinarily, if mishandling or other alterations beyond the manufacturer's control render a product defective, the manufacturer is not liable. Fell, 457 N.W.2d at 918 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. g, at 351 (1965)). However, a manufacturer will remain liable for an altered product if it is reasonably foreseeable that the alteration would be made and the alteration does not unforeseeably render the product unsafe. Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 838 (Iowa 1978); see also Crow v. Manitex, Inc., 550 N.W.2d 175, 180 (Iowa App.1996); Smith v. Air Feeds, Inc., 519 N.W.2d 827, 831 (Iowa App. 1994); Hardy v. Britt-Tech Corp., 378 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Iowa App.1985). To support this argument Goodyear expressly raises one claim of abuse and suggests a second. We discuss both claims. 1. Alleged abuse of tire by prior owner. Goodyear claims the tire showed signs of having been run flat or underinflated, and this constitutes misuse. Leaf says the issue is not whether there was misuse by running it flat or underinflated but whether such misuse was reasonably foreseeable to Goodyear. This foreseeability inquiry should rarely be determined as a matter of law. Smith, 519 N.W.2d at 831. The court's instruction stated: The requirement that the tire be free from defects at the time it left Goodyear's control includes the requirement that necessary precautions be taken to keep the tire free from defects for a normal length of time when handled or used in a normal manner. However, Goodyear is not responsible if the tire was delivered free from defects and later mishandling, changes or other causes beyond its control make the product defective, unless that mishandling, change or other cause beyond Goodyear's control was reasonably foreseeable by it. This is a correct instruction on the law, and substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict. Goodyear's own expert testified it is foreseeable that this type of tire would be used when it is underinflated or flat, especially when run as an inside dual. 2. Leaf's claimed abuse. Goodyear also asserts that Leaf negligently left the air hose on the tire for up to three minutes after the bead was sealed and still outside the cage so that during the time period the full capacity of Whyte's' compressed air system was blasting into the tire while plaintiff rummaged around for a valve core. Goodyear makes this assertion in its statement of facts but did not include it in its written argument. In any event, the claim must be rejected. The evidence was unclear as to how long Leaf left the air hose attached to the tire before it ruptured; the testimony ranged from thirteen seconds to two or three minutes. Even accepting Goodyear's claim that Leaf left the air hose on the tire for two to three minutes, this does not necessarily mean Leaf overinflated the tire. Leaf's expert testified that, because Leaf had just used the bead blaster, the air pressure in the system would have been drawn down to the point where the air hose would have to be attached longer than normal to inflate the tire. In any event, the expert testified, the tire was not overpressurized at the time it ruptured. The jury was not compelled to find under these facts that Leaf's inflation procedure amounted to abuse. C. Admission of testimony of Leaf's expert. Goodyear claims error in the court's ruling allowing the testimony of Leaf's expert, Dick Baumgardner. Goodyear claims Baumgardner was not qualified to give an opinion on the alleged design defect, and his proffered testimony failed to satisfy the test of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Iowa Rule of Evidence 402 provides a broad scope of evidence in general: All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitutions of the United States or the State of Iowa, by statute, by these rules, or by other rules of the Iowa Supreme Court. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. Similarly, Iowa Rule of Evidence 702 provides an expansive scope of expert testimony: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. As we said in Mensink v. American Grain & Related Industries, 564 N.W.2d 376, 380 (Iowa 1997), [Iowa Rule of Evidence 702] and our cases decided both before and after the adoption of the rule make it clear that we are committed to a liberal view on the admissibility of expert testimony, and we have been quite deferential to the district court in the exercise of its discretion in that area. (citations omitted). And [w]e will not reverse the trial court's receipt absent a manifest abuse of that discretion to the prejudice of the complaining party. We are committed to a liberal rule on the admission of opinion testimony, and only in clear cases of abuse would the admission of such evidence be found to be prejudicial. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Black & Veatch, 497 N.W.2d 821, 827 (Iowa 1993) (citation omitted). 1. The Daubert analysis. Goodyear complains that Baumgardner's testimony should have been excluded by the court because Baumgardner was not shown to have the background, education[,] training or experience which would be necessary to qualify him as an expert in the field of radial truck tire design engineering under Daubert. The plaintiff's response is essentially threefold. The objection, which was not made prior to trial, was untimely; the admission of Baumgardner's testimony was proper under this court's liberal application of Iowa Rule of Evidence 702; and in any event, his testimony satisfied the test of Daubert. We affirm the court's ruling on the second ground. Under Daubert, the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule [of Evidence] 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93, 113 S.Ct. at 2796, 125 L.Ed.2d at 482 (footnotes omitted). Daubert also made general observations, appropriate in the exercise of the court's gatekeeping function, as we will discuss later. Even though Daubert is based on Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and is not binding on our court in the application of our own evidence rules, we have discussed the Daubert analysis in five cases: Johnson v. Knoxville Community Sch. Dist., 570 N.W.2d 633 (Iowa 1997); Mensink, 564 N.W.2d at 380-81; Williams v. Hedican, 561 N.W.2d 817 (Iowa 1997); Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882 (Iowa 1996); and Hutchison v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882 (Iowa 1994). In Mensink we considered the nature of the proffered evidence to determine whether it was of a scientific or merely technical nature. We concluded Daubert was inapplicable because the evidence was of a technical naturenot a highly complex matter of scientific evidence. Mensink, 564 N.W.2d at 381. The expert's testimony (regarding the properties and dangers of lightning) were so `close to the ken of the average layman' that a Daubert analysis would only complicate the court's decision regarding liability. Id. (quoting State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 86 (Iowa 1980)). Daubert itself suggests that it is limited to scientific, as opposed to technical or other specialized knowledge under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n. 8, 113 S.Ct. at 2795 n. 8, 125 L.Ed.2d at 481 n. 8 (Our discussion [of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, applying to technical or other specialized knowledge as well as scientific evidence,] is limited to the scientific context because that is the nature of the expertise offered here.). In Carolan we did not discuss the technical/scientific distinction but merely noted that Daubert reaffirmed the expansive scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Carolan, 553 N.W.2d at 888. Similarly, in Hutchison we referred to Daubert and quoted from it regarding a court's task in assessing whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and ... whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. Hutchison, 514 N.W.2d at 888 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93, 113 S.Ct. at 2796, 125 L.Ed.2d at 482). Despite our reference to Daubert in previous cases, we have neither adopted nor rejected it as a standard test for all expert-testimony cases. Our references to Daubert, in fact, have essentially just reinforced our broad interpretation of Iowa Rule of Evidence 702. See, e.g., Hutchison, 514 N.W.2d at 885 (noting Daubert reaffirmed Iowa's liberal rule on the admission of opinion testimony); and at 887 ([W]e refuse to impose barriers to expert testimony other than the basic requirements of Iowa Rule of Evidence 702 and those described ... in Daubert .). In Williams we applied the Daubert test without deciding if it was required because Daubert was the basis of the district court's analysis, and the plaintiff did not object at trial or on appeal. Williams, 561 N.W.2d at 827. As a concurring opinion in Williams noted, the majority opinion should not be interpreted as an acceptance of Daubert because our common-law interpretation of rule 702 has served us well and will continue to do so. Williams, 561 N.W.2d at 832 (Neuman, J., concurring). 2. Daubert not controlling. It is now time for us to decide what role we should give to Daubert in expert-testimony cases. Should we apply it only in cases of a scientificbut not technical nature? Should the Daubert analysis be applied to all cases involving expert testimony? Or should we adopt a variation of Daubert that will encourage, but not require, use of portions of Daubert's analysis? We elect the latter. One problem in limiting Daubert to scientific, but not technical, evidence, as we did in Mensink, is that it is not always clear how the evidence should be classified. In some cases, the evidence may have characteristics of both technical and scientific evidence. As we said in State v. Hall , distinguishing `scientific' evidence from other areas of expert testimony is a difficult determination in many cases. 297 N.W.2d at 85 (citing McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 203, at 490 (2d ed.1972)). On the other hand, subjecting all expert testimonytechnical as well as scientificto a Daubert analysis would unnecessarily complicate and confuse the court's analysis and unduly lengthen many cases. As we have noted, the Daubert analysis can be time-consuming and costly. Williams, 561 N.W.2d at 827. As already noted, Daubert itself suggests it does not apply in all cases. Rule 702 and our cases applying it have served us well, and we see no need to replace them in favor of a mandatory application of the Daubert test, whether the evidence is scientific or technical in nature. Nevertheless, we believe the observations in Daubert will be helpful to a court in assessing reliability of evidence in complex cases. As Daubert noted, [t]he inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one. Its overarching subject is the scientific validityand thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability of the principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate. 509 U.S. at 594-95, 113 S.Ct. at 2797, 125 L.Ed.2d at 483-84 (footnote omitted). And in Hall we said: Obviously the complexity of the subject matter will influence the foundational showing of reliability. For example, the foundation for neutron activation analysis, as in United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d [431,] 435-41 [(6th Cir.1970) ], or polygraph evidence as in State v. Conner, 241 N.W.2d [447,] at 459 [ (Iowa 1976)], would require greater input from the scientific community than, for example, blow-ups of handwriting exemplars, ballistic comparisons, or tire tracks. 297 N.W.2d at 85. We are not alone in adopting a limited application of Daubert. In McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 265 (Tenn.1997), the court said: Although we do not expressly adopt Daubert, the non-exclusive list of factors to determine reliability are useful in applying Rules 702 and 703. Some states flatly reject Daubert. For example, in Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum,  Nev. ___, 970 P.2d 98 (1998), the court stated: We have considered Dow Chemical's argument that this court should adopt the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc . . . . regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence. The interpretation of a federal counterpart to a Nevada rule of evidence may be persuasive, but is not controlling. We believe that the Daubert doctrine is a work in progress, and that we should observe the doctrine's further development in the federal courts before concluding that Daubert should be adopted as the law of this state. Above all, we do not presently perceive a need to adopt Daubert, based on our perception of developments in Nevada law, and we therefore decline to do so. Id. at 108 n. 3 (citations omitted). In Armstrong v. City of Wichita, 21 Kan.App.2d 750, 907 P.2d 923, 929 (1995), the court declined to adopt Daubert and stated: There are a number of reasons why we decline to apply the Daubert test. The most significant is that Daubert does not apply to Kansas cases. The Kansas court adhered to the general acceptance test of Frye. Id. In State v. Copeland, 130 Wash.2d 244, 922 P.2d 1304, 1315 (1996), the court declined to follow Daubert in favor of retaining the Frye test where novel scientific evidence is concerned. In State v. Carter , the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that Daubert, by its own terms, does not apply to state court proceedings and declined to adopt that test in favor of retaining the Frye test in determining the admissibility of DNA evidence. State v. Carter, 246 Neb. 953, 524 N.W.2d 763, 778 (1994) (clarified by State v. Freeman, 253 Neb. 385, 571 N.W.2d 276, 293 (1997)). In People v. Leahy, 8 Cal.4th 587, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663, 882 P.2d 321, 331 (1994), the court said that California's previous case law survived Daubert in this state, [and nothing cited] persuades us to reconsider or modify [the prior case law] at this time. We hold that trial courts are not required to apply the Daubert analysis in considering the admission of expert testimony. Nevertheless, trial courts may find it helpful, particularly in complex cases, to use one or more of the relevant Daubert considerations in assessing the reliability of expert testimony. See Hall, 297 N.W.2d at 85 (testimony must be reliable). Therefore, trial courts may, in their discretion, consider the following factors if deemed helpful in a particular case: (1) whether the theory or technique is scientific knowledge that can and has been tested, (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review or publication, (3) the known or potential rate of error, or (4) whether it is generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. If a trial court considers these factors, the court should focus solely on the principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. at 2797, 125 L.Ed.2d at 483.