Opinion ID: 2615597
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Matthews and Dunlap

Text: Matthews was the first published California decision to consider admission of computer printouts of criminal history information as evidence that a defendant suffered prior felony convictions and served prior prison terms. In Matthews, to prove that defendant Terrance Matthews was sentenced on May 22, 1984, for a robbery conviction, the prosecution offered a certified copy of a superior court record showing a robbery conviction for an individual named Carl Matthews. ( Matthews, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 934, 280 Cal.Rptr. 134.) To establish that Terrance Matthews and Carl Matthews were the same person, the prosecution offered: (1) a computer printout labeled `San Francisco Police Department Criminal History Record' for `Terry Matthews,' showing sentencing on May 22, 1984, for a robbery conviction; and (2) an unlabeled computer printout for Terry Matthews, who used Carl T. Matthews as an alias. ( Id. at p. 934, fn. 2, 280 Cal.Rptr. 134, and accompanying text.) After admitting these printouts over objections based on hearsay and lack of foundation, the trial court found Matthews had suffered the prior robbery conviction. The First District Court of Appeal, Division One, reversed the trial court, finding that the evidence was inadmissible hearsay. For two reasons, it rejected the argument that the records were admissible under either the business records or the official records exceptions to the hearsay rule. First, the court reasoned the prosecution had failed to establish the foundational requirements for either exception because no testimony was adduced about how [the records] were prepared or the sources of information used for the entries made. ( Matthews, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 940, 280 Cal.Rptr. 134.) Second, citing our decision in People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150 ( Guerrero ), the court asserted: [I]n any event, without the necessary certification to admit the [documents] as prison records under section 969b, we cannot depart from the rule that, other than certified prison records, only the `record of conviction' is admissible to prove a prior conviction. [Citations.] Consequently, if the [documents] cannot be admitted as certified prison records under section 969b, and they are not part of the `record of conviction' within the meaning of Guerrero, they are not admissible as business records or under any other exception to the hearsay rule to prove [Matthews's] prior conviction. ( Matthews, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at pp. 940-941, 280 Cal.Rptr. 134.) A few years after Matthews, the Fifth District Court of Appeal took up the issue in Dunlap, which involved enhancement allegations against defendant Randle Dunlap under section 667.5, subdivision (b). The prosecution offered abstracts of judgment for two prior convictions and a CLETS computer printout of criminal history information to show [Dunlap's] aliases (in order to link [him], through various spellings of his name, to the abstracts of judgment from the prior convictions), and to demonstrate that [he] had served a separate prison term for each of the prior convictions and had not stayed free of prison custody for a five-year period [citation]. ( Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal. App.4th at p. 1472, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 204.) The first page of the CLETS printout bore a stamp from the Kern County District Attorney's Office with the following statement: `This is to certify that the above is a true and original document received from the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, by the District Attorney's Discovery Unit.' ( Ibid. ) Directly under [this statement] were spaces for the date and a clerk's name; hand-written into these spaces was the date `8-18-92' and an illegible name or set of initials. ( Ibid. ) The trial court admitted the CLETS printout, overruling Dunlap's objections based on Matthews, hearsay, and lack of foundation. ( Ibid. ) The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling. As a threshold issue, it rejected Matthews 's assertion that a prior conviction may be proved only through the `record of conviction' or certified prison records under section 969b. ( Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 1474, 23 Cal. Rptr.2d 204, original italics.) The court first explained that this assertion in Matthews was dictum, because the [Matthews ] court had already concluded that the [documents] were inadmissible under any recognized exception to the hearsay rule.... ( Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 1474, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 204.) More fundamentally, the Dunlap court concluded that the cases Matthews cited, including Guerrero, did not govern because they considered the scope of evidence admissible to prove that a conviction was for conduct of a particular type, not that the defendant had been convicted.... ( Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 1474, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 204.) The court explained: We see a substantial distinction between cases ... where the question is the substance of the prior conviction (i.e., the nature of the conduct giving rise to it), and cases ... in which the question is the fact of the prior conviction or the additional fact that the defendant served a prison term within the meaning of section 667.5. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Guerrero, going beyond the record of conviction to prove its substance `threaten[s] the defendant with harm akin to double jeopardy and denial of speedy trial.' [Citation.] But no such danger is present when evidence other than court or prison records is used only to establish the fact of conviction and/or service of a prison term. ( Id. at p. 1476, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 204, original italics.) The court concluded: Provided that other types of evidence (e.g., other official records) satisfy applicable rules for admissibility, they may be relied on to establish a prior conviction. [Citation.] ( Ibid. ) The Dunlap court then held that the CLETS printout was admissible under the official records exception to the hearsay rule (Evid.Code, § 1280). Although the prosecution presented no foundational evidence independent of the printout, the court nevertheless found the hearsay exception applicable based on statutes (which the court judicially noticed) establishing a duty of public employees to record and report a person's criminal history, and the presumption under Evidence Code section 664 that an official duty has been regularly performed. ( Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1477-1480, 23 Cal. Rptr.2d 204.) The court also again refused to follow Matthews, finding it factually distinguishable because the printout Matthews discussed was `an unlabeled computer printout' and there was no indication [it] was generated by the CLETS system or any other statutorily authorized program. ( Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 1481, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 204.) The court also questioned Matthews 's reasoning, noting that the court there (1) apparently overlook[ed] the fact that the official records exception, unlike the business records exception, does not require foundational testimony by the custodian or other qualified witness as to the record's identity and mode of preparation, and (2) did not discuss, and apparently did not consider, either judicial notice or the presumption that official duty was regularly performed, as those concepts might bear on the foundational issue. ( Dunlap, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 1481, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 204.)