Opinion ID: 2389823
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: right to counsel under article i, section 9 of the pennsylvania constitution

Text: Mr. Hess asserts that the application of the Pennsylvania forfeiture provision to legitimate fees paid to an attorney for criminal defense representation violates the right to counsel under Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. A state may provide through its constitution a basis for the rights and liberties of its citizens independent from that provided by the Federal Constitution. The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court are not dispositive of questions regarding the rights of citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under its own constitution. In Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (1991), we stated: Here in Pennsylvania, we have stated with increasing frequency that it is both important and necessary that we undertake an independent analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution each time a provision of that fundamental document is implicated. Although we may accord weight to federal decisions where they are found to be logically persuasive and well reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific constitutional guarantees,. . . we are free to reject the conclusion of the U.S. Supreme Court so long as we remain faithful to the minimum guarantees established by the U.S. Constitution. 526 Pa. at 389-390, 586 A.2d at 894-895 (citation omitted.) . . . [W]e are not bound to interpret the two provisions [of the state and federal constitutions] as if they were mirror images, even where the text is similar or identical. 526 Pa. at 391, 586 A.2d at 896. A defendant has the constitutionally guaranteed right to be represented by counsel of his own choosing under Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Commonwealth v. Szuchon, 506 Pa. 228, 484 A.2d 1365 (1984). The right to be represented by counsel of one's own choice is not absolute, however. The right to counsel may be impaired or eliminated by state regulation which is designed to provide for overriding state interests or individual constitutional guarantees which are in conflict with that right. Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896 (1975). In balancing these conflicting interests, four factors must be considered: (1) Whether the state interest sought to be achieved can be effectively accomplished in some manner which will not infringe upon interests protected by constitutional rights; (2) Whether the state interest is sufficiently compelling when compared with the interests affected, justifies any infringement of those interests; (3) Whether the state interest is sufficiently compelling to justify the degree of infringement that is necessary to effectuate that interest; (4) Whether the provision under challenge represents the narrowest possible infringement consistent with effectuating the state interest involved. Moore v. Jamieson, 451 Pa. 299, 310-311, 306 A.2d 283, 289 (1973). The state interests advanced by the forfeiture statute are in eliminating the economic incentives of drug related activity to prevent the profits of such activity from being used to support future activity and in deterring criminal activity. Quintessentially, it is a punitive measure. No conviction is required, however, to trigger the punitive measure. Thus, despite the appeal of forfeiture as a means of stripping drug activity of its profits, the punitive aspect of the statute requires exacting scrutiny. The purpose of seeking a restraining order to prohibit a defendant from disposing of assets that are subject to forfeiture is to prevent pre-conviction transfers to avoid forfeiture. This eliminates the possibility that criminal forfeiture sanctions could be avoided by transfers that were not arms length transactions. The state interest in preventing such transfers is not furthered, however, by depriving a defendant of assets prior to conviction that a defendant intends to use to obtain legal counsel. Furthermore, the interests of the state can be effectively accomplished without infringing upon a defendant's right to counsel. The Commonwealth's interests in forfeiture are not hindered by the exclusion of legitimate attorney's fees. The assets used to retain counsel will be unavailable to a defendant after trial, even when a defendant is acquitted. Should a defendant be convicted, the Commonwealth will have only lost a questionable opportunity to punish a defendant prior to his conviction. The forfeiture statute does not represent the narrowest possible infringement consistent with effectuating the state's interest to the extent that it permits forfeiture of a defendant's assets needed to retain an attorney prior to conviction. The right to counsel of one's own choosing is particularly significant because an individual facing criminal sanctions should have great confidence in his attorney. Moore, supra, 451 Pa. at 308, 306 A.2d at 288. (Citation omitted.) Although the right to counsel is subject to limitations, it may not be interfered with unnecessarily. As an intervenor and amicus curiae, the Attorney General argues that if attorney's fees may not be forfeited under the statute, a defendant will pay his attorney with drug profits and preserve any other assets that are nonforfeitable, such as inheritance. The Attorney General's concern is unnecessary, however, because the trial court has the authority to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a defendant has assets that are nonforfeitable and available for the payment of attorney's fees. The trial court may enter an order restraining a defendant from using assets that are subject to forfeiture for the payment of attorney's fees until the defendant's nonforfeitable assets have been exhausted. This procedure will eliminate the maneuvering anticipated by the Attorney General without infringing upon the defendant's constitutionally protected right to an attorney. Because an evidentiary hearing was not held in this case, the Commonwealth may request a hearing on remand to determine if there are nonforfeitable assets available to Mr. Hess. We hold that the state forfeiture statute violates Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution insofar as it applies to the payment of attorney's fees for legitimate criminal defense representation prior to conviction. This decision rests firmly on state constitutional grounds. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). In view of our holding, we need not address Mr. Hess's claim that the forfeiture statute violates his due process rights. The order of the Superior Court is reversed and the trial court's order is hereby reinstated. LARSEN and PAPADAKOS, JJ., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter. McDERMOTT, J., did not participate in the decision of this matter.