Opinion ID: 1578000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Enforceability of the Mediation Document.

Text: At the end of the parties' court-ordered mediation in March 2001, Arnie, Lucy, John, and Amie each signed a one-page, hand-written document drafted by the mediator, Bruce Buchanan, which stated the following: We the undersigned agree to the following: 1. At least 1 full weekend overnights every 6 weeks. 2. Other visitation at the discretion of all parties. 3. Bruce Buchanan is the binding arbitor [sic] on all matters not revocable regard[ing] Alexis + Robert. Arnie and Lucy argue that this document is an enforceable contract by which John guaranteed them limited visitation with Robert and Alexis. They point to several factors that they believe support this argument, including that mediation was undertaken at the direction of the district court, both parties later brought the document to their respective attorneys for additional action, and John agreed to the terms of the document and followed the terms for a period of time. John responds to this argument with a two-pronged attack. First, he argues that the document is unenforceable because it does not reflect a meeting of the minds among the parties. He claims that he signed the document believing it was an exercise in compromise that had no legal bearing. Furthermore, he asserts that, even if the document is a contract, he was insufficiently apprised of its meaning to have validly waived his constitutional rights as a parent. To support this argument, he again refers to his andhe believesothers' understanding that the document was generated solely as a method of helping the parties reach a compromise on visitation. The district court concluded that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties in relation to the document given its therapeutic use and the parties' understanding that it was, at least, in a state of flux as far as being a final compromise over visitation. Yet, even assuming the mediation document constitutes a contracta point which the district court did not accept and which we view with ample skepticismwe believe it is clear that John acted with insufficient understanding to have truly waived his constitutional rights by its signing. Thus, whatever the document's nature, it is unenforceable. See 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 247, at 250 (1991). We have previously recognized the concept of contractual waiver of constitutional rights in civil cases. Messina v. Iowa Dep't of Job Servs., 341 N.W.2d 52, 60 (Iowa 1983); see also Callender, 591 N.W.2d at 192. In so recognizing, we cited with approval a similar recognition by the United States Supreme Court, which applied the usual [criminal context] standards requiring the waiver to be voluntary, knowingly and intelligently made to determine whether a proper waiver had been accomplished. Messina, 341 N.W.2d at 60 (citing D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-86, 92 S.Ct. 775, 782, 31 L.Ed.2d 124, 134 (1972)). We believe these standards permit a proper analysis of a potential contractual waiver of constitutional rights and apply them to this case and our examination of the mediation document. As Santi, Howard, and our discussion in this case make clear, John held a constitutional parental caretaking interest when he entered into the mediation with Arnie and Lucy. Yet, the document ultimately generated made no mention of this constitutional interest and provides no evidence of a thoughtful relinquishment of it. In fact, the document itself and the testimony at trial reveal that the parties' approach to the document was relatively informal, with little if any discussion of the legal ramificationsmuch less the more specific constitutional ramificationsof its signing. Indeed, it was generated in a mediation session that was not attended by counsel for either party. The mediator, when asked whether there was any discussion about the facts that there may be underlying fundamental constitutional rights and issues involved, explained, A. You know what I think thatI don't remember if that was ever mentioned or not. ItI continue to try to stay away from any legal issues. I kept saying to both parties, remember I'm not an attorney, that's not my expertise. My expertise is kids and that's what I would be arbitrating. Although it is unnecessary to define the precise threshold at which John would have become sufficiently informed to have validly waived his constitutional parental rights, it is clear the threshold was not reached in this case. The document signed at the mediation is unenforceable.