Opinion ID: 870930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: As this court has previously stated, a defense instruction must be requested by the defendant or prosecution.

Text: This court has previously stated that either the defendant or prosecution must request the defense instruction before the trial court is responsible to instruct as to the defense. In Pinero, 75 Haw. at 303-05, 859 P.2d at 1379-80, this court reviewed whether the defendant's right to a fair trial was prejudiced when the court, at the prosecution's request, instructed the jury concerning self-defense. At trial, the defendant objected to the instructions because self-defense was not part of his theory of the case. Id. at 303, 859 P.2d at 1379. In Pinero, this court acknowledged the trial court's duty to instruct the jury on every defense or theory of defense having any support in the evidence, but expressly limited its duty, stating that [t]he factual circumstances underlying our precedent, however, make clear that the court's `duty' is only prompted by a requested instruction.  Id. at 304-05, 859 P.2d at 1380 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Pinero, 70 Haw. 509, 525, 778 P.2d 704, 715 (1989); State v. O'Daniel, 62 Haw. 518, 527-28, 616 P.2d 1383, 1390-91 (1980) (ruling that [t]he trial court did not err in refusing to give the requested instruction on accidental death)). Finding that the prosecution met this requirement when it requested the self-defense instruction, it then proceeded to discuss whether the court was entitled to give the instruction without the consent of the defendant. Id. at 305, 859 P.2d at 1380. This court ruled that self-defense instructions requested by the prosecution should be given unless the defendant objects to the giving of the instructions on the basis that the record does not reflect any evidence on this issue and the trial court agrees with the defendant. Id. (emphasis added). A request from either party permits both parties to present arguments as to whether the evidence supports this issue and allows the trial court to decide, based on their arguments, whether to issue the instruction. There are several established rules that are pertinent to this issue: (1) a defendant is entitled to every defense ... having any support in the evidence ... (2) a trial court is required to instruct the jury properly, and (3) a trial court must sua sponte instruct as to any included offense having a rational basis in the evidence. Nevertheless, none of them can be logically construed to require the trial court to instruct the jury as to every defense, no matter how weak, sua sponte. I recognize the well-established precedent that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on every defense or theory of defense having any support in the evidence, provided such evidence would support the consideration of that issue by the jury, no matter how weak, inconclusive, or unsatisfactory the evidence may be. [2] State v. Hironaka, 99 Hawai`i 198, 204, 53 P.3d 806, 812 (2002) (quoting State v. Maelega, 80 Hawai`i 172, 178-79, 907 P.2d 758, 764-65 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). In addition, pursuant to the trial court's duty to instruct a jury properly, it is required to state to [the jury] fully the law applicable to the facts. State v. Feliciano, 62 Haw. 637, 643, 618 P.2d 306, 310 (1980) (citation omitted). I do not dispute that a defense, such as mistake of fact, is a (1) law that (2) may be applicable to the facts presented. See, e.g., Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 702-218 (1993) (providing that it is a defense that the accused engaged in the prohibited conduct under ignorance or mistake of fact if ... [t]he ignorance or mistake negatives the state of mind required to establish an element of the offense); State v. Locquiao, 100 Hawai`i 195, 208, 58 P.3d 1242, 1255 (2002) (holding that where a defendant has adduced evidence at trial supporting an instruction on the statutory defense of ignorance or mistake of fact, the trial court must, at the defendant's request, separately instruct as to the defense). However, whether the defense law is actually applicable to the facts, is contingent on whether it is requested because it is an optional instruction based on both the facts and each party's trial strategy. See supra. These rules do notand should not, see infra, burden the trial court to automatically instruct the jury as to every possible defense that may be inferred from the facts or supported by a scant amount of unsatisfactory evidence. Instead, as suggested by Pinero, the defendant's legal right to a defense instruction accrues when the defendant, or for certain defenses the defendant or prosecution, see supra, requests the instruction. An instruction as to a defense is not required if the defendant or prosecution, for strategic reasons, do not request it. See People v. Palladino, 47 A.D.3d 491, 492, 849 N.Y.S.2d 542, 543 (N.Y.App.Div.2008) (rejecting defendant's claim that the court should have instructed the jury, sua sponte, on the law of justification in defense of property because [s]uch action would have unlawfully interfered with defense strategy since `a defendant unquestionably has the right to chart his own defense' ..., and would, in any event, have been unsupported by a reasonable view of the evidence) (internal citations omitted); Schwindling v. State, 269 Ark. 388, 602 S.W.2d 639, 639 (1980) (Even assuming arguendo that the defense was sufficiently raised by the evidence, the court is not required to give a specific instruction when, as here, none was requested. (citing Ark.Code Ann. § 43-2134 (Repl.1977)); Tyler v. State, 265 Ark. 822, 581 S.W.2d 328 (1979); Roberts and Charles v. State, 254 Ark. 39, 491 S.W.2d 390 (1973)). I am also mindful that a trial court sua sponte must instruct juries as to any included offenses having a rational basis in the evidence without regard to whether the prosecution requests, or the defense objects to, such an instruction. [3] State v. Haanio, 94 Hawai`i 405, 407, 16 P.3d 246, 248 (2001) (emphasis added). In Haanio, this court rejected the view that the parties, as a matter of trial strategy or constitutional law, have any right to forego such an instruction as to any included offense having a rational basis in the evidence. Id. at 414-15, 16 P.3d at 255-56. Nevertheless, the question as to whether a trial court must instruct as to every defense, regardless of how weak though not requested, and thereby affect the defendant's defense strategy, is distinct from whether the defendant can prevent the jury from considering his or her guilt on included offenses. See Auld, 114 Hawai`i at 149, 157 P.3d at 588 (Nakamura, J., concurring and dissenting) (the question of whether the defendant should have a say in how to defend against the charges presented to the jury by forgoing a self-defense instruction is different from the question decided in Haanio of whether the defendant can prevent the jury from considering his or her guilt on lesser included offenses); People v. Barton, 12 Cal.4th 186, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531 (1995). In Barton, a case this court cited to in Haanio, the Supreme Court of California considered whether the trial court may instruct on included offenses sua sponte if (1) the evidence supporting the lesser included offense contradicts the defendant's theory of the case and (2) the defendant requests that the court not give the instruction, when it would not be obligated to instruct as to a defense under such circumstances. 12 Cal.4th at 196, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d at 574, 906 P.2d at 536. The court rejected the defendant's request that an instruction as to a defense and an included offense be treated the same, holding instead, that a trial court's duty sua sponte to instruct as to lesser included offenses differs from its duty to instruct as to defenses: [A] trial court must, sua sponte, or on its own initiative, instruct the jury on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present, but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that charged..... In contrast to lesser included offenses, a trial court's duty to instruct, sua sponte, or on its own initiative, on particular defenses is more limited, arising only if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case. 12 Cal.4th at 194-95, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d at 573, 906 P.2d at 535 (citations omitted). The court explained that [w]hen ... the question is whether the trial court must, on its own initiative, instruct the jury on defenses not asserted by the defendant, different considerations arise. Failure to so instruct will not deprive the jury of the opportunity to consider the full range of criminal offenses established by the evidence. Nor is the prosecution denied the opportunity to seek conviction on all offenses included within the crime charged. Moreover, to require trial courts to ferret out all defenses that might possibly be shown by the evidence, even when inconsistent with the defendant's theory at trial, would not only place an undue burden on the trial courts but would also create a potential of prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 197, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d at 574, 906 P.2d at 536. For the same reasons, even though this court has held that a trial court must instruct as to included offenses having a rational basis in the evidence, it does not follow that a trial court must sua sponte issue a defense instruction that is supported by weak evidence. As previously stated, in this jurisdiction, upon request, a defense instruction is required if it has any support in the evidence, regardless of how weak, inconclusive, or unsatisfactory the evidence may be. See, e.g., State v. Mainaaupo, 117 Hawai`i 235, 251, 178 P.3d 1, 17 (2008) (holding that, [h]owever weak [defendants'] testimony may have been, the circuit court erred in declining to give defendants' requested mistake of fact instructions). I cannot conclude that the failure to instruct a jury as to every defense that is supported by merely weak, inconclusive, or unsatisfactory evidence violates the court's duty to see to it that the case goes to the jury in a clear and intelligent manner, so that they may have a clear understanding of what it is they are to decide. Kupau, 76 Hawai`i at 395, 879 P.2d at 500 (citations omitted). As this court has also stated, `[t]he standard of review for a trial court's issuance or refusal of a jury instruction is whether, when read and considered as a whole, the instructions given are prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading.' Mainaaupo, 117 Hawai`i at 247, 178 P.3d at 13 (quoting State v. Balanza, 93 Hawai`i 279, 283, 1 P.3d 281, 285 (2000)). Aside from my broader view that this court should hold that a party must request a defense instruction, there is additional support that a trial court is not required to issue a mistake of fact defense sua sponte. The trial court's duty to issue a mistake of fact defense is contingent on, in part,  the defendant's request.  Locquiao, 100 Hawai`i at 208, 58 P.3d at 1255 (emphasis added). When determining whether a circuit court's error in refusing to instruct the jury on the mistake of fact defense was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, this court decided to adopt the rule set forth by certain jurisdictions that the mistake of fact instruction is required,  when properly raised, in order to draw the jury's attention to the defendant's theory of the case.  Id. at 206-07, 58 P.3d at 1253-54 (citations omitted) (emphases added). Finally, if the defendant's rights were prejudiced by the trial counsel's failure to create or implement a defense strategy (that included requesting a particular defense instruction), the defendant is not without remedy. The defendant is entitled to argue in a post-conviction proceeding, that his or her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to request a defense instruction. See State v. Uyesugi, 100 Hawai`i 442, 464, 60 P.3d 843, 865 (2002) (reviewing a defendant's claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for, among other things, failing to request an instruction on the law defining appreciate); Hawai`i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 40 (providing in relevant part that [w]here the petition alleges the ineffective assistance of counsel as a ground upon which the requested relief should be granted, the petitioner shall serve written notice of the hearing upon the counsel whose assistance is alleged to have been ineffective and said counsel shall have an opportunity to be heard[]). [4] As further discussed infra, it is not the trial court's responsibility to implement defense strategy with a defense instruction when the defense counsel fails to do so. Cf. State v. Fox, 70 Haw. 46, 55-56, 760 P.2d 670, 675 (1988) (stating that the adversary system presuppose[s]... that a party must look to his counsel to protect him and that he must bear the cost of the mistakes of his counsel (quoting 3A Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 856 (1982) (footnote omitted))). Nor should it be plain error on the part of the trial court if it fails to instruct the jury as to this defense sua sponte if the defense counsel chooses not to request that it be given. In light of the foregoing, I believe this court should hold that the trial court is not required to instruct the jury sua sponte as to every defense regardless of how weak, and that such failure is not an instructional error warranting appellate review under Nichols.