Opinion ID: 1994384
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: equity excuses schlender's failure to intervene before the hearing

Text: Nanci contends that Schlender did not use the proper procedure for preserving the lien. She argues that to enforce his lien, Schlender had to file a petition to intervene. Nanci claims that by arguing his lien on May 1, 2006, and only later moving to intervene on May 23after the court declared the lien unenforceable Schlender put the proverbial cart before the horse. [13] The proper method of enforcing an attorney's lien in the original action is by intervention. [14] Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-328 (Cum.Supp.2006) provides that a person who has an interest in the matter may intervene before the trial commences. We have stated that to be filed as a matter of right, a petition in intervention under § 25-328 must be filed before the trial. [15] Here, the court held a hearing on the attorney's lien on May 1, 2006, and declared the lien unenforceable on May 15. Schlender did not move to intervene until May 23. Arguably, he did not follow the proper procedure to enforce his lien. Despite Schlender's failure to properly intervene before the hearing, this failure did not destroy any entitlement he may have had to the lien. We have stated that `[i]ntervention under [§ 25-328] is a matter of right, but does not prevent a court of equity in the interests of justice from allowing a proper party to intervene after the trial has begun.... ....' [16] We further stated: `Leave to intervene after the entry of a final decree is not allowable as a matter of right and should seldom be granted, but equity sometimes requires a departure from the general rule.... `Applications for leave to intervene after entry of a final decree are unusual, and generally have been denied. There are instances, however, where petitions for leave to intervene have been filed and granted after decree.' ... ...' [17] As noted above, the proper method for enforcing an attorney's charging lien under Nebraska law is by resort to equity. [18] In the present case, equity requires a departure from the general rule that intervention cannot occur after entry of a final decree. Or, stated another way, equity requires a finding that Schlender could intervene after the hearing, and his failure to intervene before the hearing did not destroy any right he may have had to the lien. Equity requires such a result because of the small window of time in which Schlender had to intervene before the hearing. John made his payment to the court on April 21, 2006, a Friday. The following Monday, April 24, the court ordered a show cause hearing for May 1. Recently, in Stover v. County of Lancaster, [19] we noted that once a judgment debtor paid funds to the court, the clerk should have notified the parties claiming an interest in the funds, and intervention by [the attorney] at that point ... would have been appropriate. Here, the court apparently gave Schlender notice of John's payment on April 24 when it ordered the hearing for May 1. This gave Schlender exactly 1 week-5 business daysto intervene before the hearing. Given this small window, equity permits Schlender to intervene after the court's disposition of the matter, which Schlender tried to do on May 23, 8 days after the court declared his lien unenforceable. Therefore, contrary to Nanci's argument, Schlender's failure to intervene before arguing his lien at the hearing did not destroy any entitlement he may have had to the lien.