Opinion ID: 2551468
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Denying Several Motions for Mistrial

Text: At least six times during trial, defendant moved for a mistrial. In each case the trial court denied his motion. He claims that five of the rulings violated his right to due process, which is secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. (He also refers, without elaboration, to the Sixth and Eighth Amendments to the federal charter.) The claims' essence is that the trial court erred in denying motions for mistrial following what defendant perceived to be prosecutorial misconduct or other trial defects for which the government was responsible. As stated, we review a ruling on a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion, and such a motion should be granted only when a party's chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged. In turn, `[t]he applicable federal and state standards regarding prosecutorial misconduct are well established. `A prosecutor's ... intemperate behavior violates the federal Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct so egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.' [Citation.] Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves `the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.' [Citation.] As a general rule a defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion and on the same groundthe defendant [requested] an assignment of misconduct and [also] requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety. [Citation.] Additionally, when the claim focuses upon comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion.' ( People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th 353, 427, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442.) We will explain that the trial court did not abuse its discretion on any occasion. First, defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly asked Eduardo Lalo Sanchez Galdan in front of the jury whether he had been threatened. After he asked the question, Sanchez explained outside the jury's presence that an investigator for Hector Ayala, not defendant himself, had threatened him to tell the truth or suffer possible physical consequences, and that another investigator named Eric Hart was present. The prosecutor explained that he believed Hart (apparently an investigator for defendant) was present at the time the threat was made, that in one version of the descriptions of the threat the need to tell the truth was not mentioned, and that Sanchez's demeanor in court suggested that he was afraid to testify fully. The trial court ruled that the prosecutor had asked the question in good faith and denied the motion for mistrial, which defendant made on state law grounds. It did not abuse its discretion. The record, described above, supports its conclusion that the prosecutor asked the question in good faith. Because there was no prosecutorial misconduct as defined in state law, there was no basis for a finding of mistrial. Next, defendant contends that sheriffs deputies acted improperly by barring two members of the public from the courtroom. Counsel asserted that jurors had seen the deputies' intervention and that it would prejudice defendant's right to a fair trial. The trial court inquired of two deputies, who stated that the district attorney's office had asked them to watch for suspicious looking attendees, particularly gang members, and that they had asked two people for identification on leaving the courtroom (an order to which one of the two loudly objected). They told them not to go back in and informed the prosecution, which told them to let them enter. The court instructed the deputies not to engage in such actions again. Counsel then argued that a mistrial was justified because the deputies' actions had enhanced an atmosphere of fear that the prosecution had been trying to create during the trial. The trial court disagreed, ruling that [t]here's no basis for a mistrial. We find no abuse of discretion. The trial court was able to gauge the extent of the disruption of the proceedings and the effect on the jury, and found that nothing justified a mistrial. On this record, we agree. The question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the incident prejudiced the jurors against defendant. (See In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 296, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 975 P.2d 600.) We discern no such likelihood. As part of this subclaim, defendant contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it permitted Juan Manuel Meza, testifying before the jury, to suggest that defendant had served time in prison. The record belies the assertion. Meza was referring to events that occurred when he, Meza, was in prison. Even if Meza's initial volunteered and non-responsive commentI'd hear a lot about [defendant] in prisonwas ambiguous, the prosecutor, at the court's instruction following its denial of defendant's mistrial motion, erased any ambiguity before the jury by asking Meza a question that made clear he was discussing events during his own confinement in prison. He made no suggestion that defendant was also in prison. The claim is without merit, and the motion for mistrial was properly denied. Defendant also renews the mistrial argument that he has already made, without success, ante, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d at page 720, 1 P.3d at page 38. Next, defendant claims that the trial court erroneously denied a motion for mistrial he made after he learned the jury would hear Rafael Mendoza Lopez's recantation during the prosecution's rebuttal case. His counsel argued in essence that the jury would inevitably, in the course of the parties' examination of Mendoza on rebuttal, have to hear prejudicial evidence of his involvement with the Mexican Mafia. Counsel also argued that defense counsel might be required to testify, and that some of Mendoza's taped assertions impugned her integrity, so that counsel might have a conflict of interest in continuing to represent defendant. But as we have explained, ante, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d at page 714, 1 P.3d at page 32, no references to the Mexican Mafia resulted. With regard to a possible conflict of interest, the motion was prematureMendoza's taped statement did not inevitably require testimony that might create a conflict of interest. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. In sum, the motions for mistrial all were properly denied. At no time was defendant's chance of receiving a fair trial irreparably harmed. To the extent he claims that prosecutorial misconduct occurred in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, or claims a violation of any other constitutional provision, we perceive none, and therefore no basis, constitutional or otherwise, on which a motion for mistrial should have been granted.