Opinion ID: 1270170
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Informal confrontation.

Text: Jones claims the informal confrontation was unduly suggestive and tainted the in-court identification. In Stovall v. Denno (1967), 388 U. S. 293, 87 Sup. Ct. 1967, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199, the United States Supreme Court announced that, independent of any Wade-Gilbert claim, an accused might gain relief if he could establish that he had been subjected to a confrontation so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due process of law. Whether  a due-process violation occurred at a confrontation was to be determined by the totality of the circumstances surrounding it. This test is independent of whether or not counsel for the accused is present. In Simmons v. United States (1968), 390 U. S. 377, 88 Sup. Ct. 967, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247, the court ruled that an in-court identification, following an out-of-court identification, would be inadmissible if the out-of-court identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. In the very recent case of Neil v. Biggers (1972), 409 U. S. 188, 93 Sup. Ct. 375, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401, the court also adopted this standard as governing the admissibility of testimony concerning the out-of-court identification. Not every instance of suggestiveness in a confrontation procedure violates due process. See Neil v. Biggers (1972), 409 U. S. 188, 93 Sup. Ct. 375, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401. Law enforcement authorities are required to make reasonable efforts under the circumstances to conduct a fair presentation for identification so as to avoid the likelihood of misidentification which is a primary evil to be avoided. The police should avoid suggesting identification. Jones argues that the informal confrontation in the district attorney's outer lobby was unnecessarily suggestive because: (1) It was a one-to-one confrontation such as condemned in Stovall v. Denno, supra , because the accused did not mingle in the room with the other people but was escorted through the room to the district attorney's office in handcuffs by a detective; (2) the district attorney's office's lobby or outer office was suggestive of guilt and a more accusatorial setting than a formal lineup in a police department; (3) there was no compelling reason for this type of confrontation because a formal confrontation was available and in fact had been used earlier in the morning when the other cab  driver identified him; (4) there may have been other evidence indicating his guilt, such as the presence of the first cab driver in the room and the fact that he was a suspect; (5) the police were sure of his guilt; (6) the emotional state of the witness, Ellis, may have been such as to preclude objective identification; and (7) the limited observation of Jones by Ellis. Obviously, objections four, five and six are not based on the record but are merely speculation of what might have happened. This is not proof of the suggestiveness of the lineup. We do not consider this informal confrontation as a one-to-one confrontation, nor are the facts clear that Ellis saw the handcuffs upon Jones. Ellis testified he did not; but even if he did, that fact alone would not be sufficient suggestiveness. The identification of Jones by Ellis in the district attorney's outer office or lobby was not prompted by the police; Ellis was not told why he was taken to the district attorney's office; he did not expect a confrontation. So far as the record shows, Ellis, upon seeing Jones, spontaneously identified Jones. This was a natural reaction under the circumstances. Jones' third argument that there was no compelling reason for this confrontation does not necessarily make the confrontation suggestive. There is no evidence to show that the prior formal lineup had any influence on Ellis' unprompted identification; although, in the first lineup Ellis could not identify Jones because he did not have his glasseshe did have his glasses on in the district attorney's outer office. In respect to the reliability of Ellis' identification itself, Ellis had an opportunity to observe Jones twice, once when he put on the dome light prior to the robbery and again when Jones told him to look at the revolver. Jones was only two to three feet away at both times. In both instances, Ellis' degree of attention was high. A description of Jones given to the police immediately after  the robbery was accurate. It is true Ellis failed to notice a scar on Jones. But under the circumstances, this was at night and in the taxicab, such failure is not of great weight. An identifying witness need not notice every mark, feature or piece of clothing on a person. It is sufficient if what is observed as identifying marks actually identify the particular person. In this respect the overcoat was described in detail and found a few minutes later in the bedroom of the apartment where Jones was arrested. Besides, Ellis did not waver in his identification; it was positive; it was made without any prior viewing of photographs and was made less than twelve hours after the robbery. We think these facts fit the test laid down in Neil v. Biggers (1972), 409 U. S. 188, 199, 93 Sup. Ct. 375, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401. As indicated by our cases, the factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. See also United States ex rel. Phipps v. Follette (2d Cir. 1970), 428 Fed. 2d 912; Sobel, Eye-Witness Identification (1972), pp. 64, 69, sec. 37. The Biggers pronouncement has been accepted in Pate v. State (1973), 61 Wis. 2d 25, 30, and State v. Russell (1973), 60 Wis. 2d 712, 721, 211 N. W. 2d 637. We think the trial court committed no error in allowing the out-of-court identification in evidence and it follows that the in-court identification was likewise properly admitted. At the Wade hearing the trial court found the in-court identification was an independent recollection of his own based on his observations as he viewed the defendant at the time of the trial. This determination the trial court is competent to make. It  has been held that even an appellate court, given an adequate record, is entitled to resolve the issue of whether an in-court identification of an accused is based on the witness' observation other than that made at an unconstitutional viewing. See United States ex rel. Harris v. Illinois (7th Cir. 1972), 457 Fed. 2d 191, certiorari denied, 409 U. S. 860, 93 Sup. Ct. 147, 34 L. Ed. 2d 106. By the Court. Writ of error to review the judgment is dismissed; the order denying a new trial is affirmed.