Opinion ID: 201439
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Conditional New Trial

Text: 23 Having determined that the district court erred in granting Rivera's motion for a judgment of acquittal, we now consider whether it also erred in conditionally awarding Rivera a new trial. The district court granted a new trial based on its belief that the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to support Rivera's convictions and the government violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), by failing to turn over to Rivera impeachment evidence that was in its possession. 10 A district court may award a new trial pursuant to the government's failure to meet its disclosure obligations under Brady if the defendant demonstrates that 24 (1) the evidence at issue is material and favorable to the accused; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution; and (3)[he] was prejudiced by the suppression in that there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 25 United States v. Conley, 249 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review a district court's decision on a motion for a new trial ... for manifest abuse of discretion. Id. at 44 (citation omitted). 26 There are, however, definite limits upon a district court's right to upset a jury verdict. United States v. Rothrock, 806 F.2d 318, 322 (1st Cir.1986). A district court judge is not a thirteenth juror who may set aside a verdict merely because he would have reached a different result. Id. Thus, where the award of a new trial is predicated on the district court's evaluation of the weight of the evidence rather than its concern about the effect of prejudicial acts that may have resulted in an unfair trial, ... it [must be] quite clear that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 27 We first review the propriety of the district court's grant of a new trial pursuant to its belief that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. We have already determined that there was ample evidence to support the verdict. Therefore, because it is not clear that the jury ... reached a seriously erroneous result, id. (internal quotation marks omitted), we find that the district court manifestly abused its discretion in awarding Rivera a new trial. 28 We next address whether the district court was justified in awarding Rivera a new trial based on the government's alleged failure to meet its obligations under Brady, that is, its alleged failure to disclose that it had entered into a plea agreement with Ocasio. The grant of a new trial on this ground was unjustified. Even if there were no question as to the existence of the plea agreement (and there is, in fact, a serious question on that issue), 11 we think that it was a manifest abuse of discretion to find that there was a reasonable probability that Rivera would have been acquitted had the agreement been disclosed. See Conley, 249 F.3d at 45 (noting that where a defendant claims that ... evidence should have been produced under Brady [,] ... the defendant must establish that ... had the evidence been disclosed..., the result of the proceeding would have been different (internal quotation marks omitted)). This is because even if the jury had ignored all evidence pertaining to Ocasio, there was still ample evidence relating to Rivera's relationship with Ventura to convict. 29 Reversed and remanded with the instruction that the jury verdict be reinstated and for proceedings consistent with this opinion.