Opinion ID: 1326571
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: constitutional vagueness

Text: Freeman's vagueness arguments, mingled indiscriminately with his overbreadth charges, do not invoke any constitutional guarantee discretely. As we understand those arguments, he contends that certain words and phrases offend the Due Process Clause because they provide inadequate notice to the public of what conduct is prohibited. As Freeman's brief illustrates, due process vagueness and First Amendment overbreadth are sometimes functionally inter-related. If statutory language defining an offense is vague, those charged with enforcement may interpret and apply the language too broadly. By way of example, Freeman points to the word nudity as used in the definition of sexually explicit visual material. [N]udity alone is not enough to make material legally obscene. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161, 94 S.Ct. 2750, 2755, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). But the word nudity in subsection A does not exist in a statutory vacuum. The depiction of nudity is proscribed only if it is obscene for children. Moreover, Code § 18.2-390(2) defines nudity, in part, as a state of undress so as to expose the human male or female genitals. Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ... lewd exhibition of the genitals are among the plain examples of what a state statute could define for regulation. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2615, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). Such materials are not constitutionally protected if they depict or describe patently offensive `hard core' sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed. Id. at 27, 93 S.Ct. at 2616. As we construe our statutes, material depicting the lewd exhibition of a juvenile's genitals is hard core obscenity for children. Freeman does not consider the pictures obscene, and he says that there is no way for an adult citizen to predict what material is obscene for children. Hence, he finds that phrase constitutionally vague. In a prosecution under Code § 18.2-374.1, the inquiry is whether the material in issue is obscene for children. If the evidence shows that it is, the offense is complete, and how the defendant may have regarded it is irrelevant. See Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 41-42, 16 S.Ct. 434, 438, 40 L.Ed. 606 (1896). The scienter requirement is satisfied if the defendant was aware of the nature of the material in issue, even if he did not know it was illegal. It is constitutionally sufficient that the prosecution show that a defendant had knowledge of the contents of the materials... and that he knew the character and nature of the materials. To require proof of a defendant's knowledge of the legal status of the materials would permit the defendant to avoid prosecution by simply claiming that he had not brushed up on the law. Such a formulation of the scienter requirement is required neither by the language of [the statute] nor by the Constitution. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123-124, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2910-2911, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974). We find no merit in Freeman's argument that the obscene for children phrase is vague in that it requires the producer to consider the possible obscenity with regard to all children without regard to age, sex or other factors. It may be true that what is obscene for one child is not obscene for another. But obscenity may be defined with reference to a class more limited than the community at large. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 86 S.Ct. 958, 16 L.Ed.2d 56 (1966) (deviant sexual class). And there is no constitutional requirement that all members of a defined class have the same levels of maturity or sensitivity or hold the same views. Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 98 S.Ct. 1808, 56 L.Ed.2d 293 (1978). Indeed, it is the very diversity of viewpoint within the class which determines the average contemporary community standard. In a related argument, Freeman suggests that the juvenile class is vague because it includes not only juvenile models but any model who looks like a juvenile. He refers to subsection D of the statute which provides that a person who is depicted as or presents the appearance of being less than eighteen years of age ... is prima facie presumed to be less than eighteen years of age. We fail to see any due process implications in a rebuttable presumption which, by definition, does no more than shift the burden of going forward with the evidence. One of the guidelines for determining what material is obscene for adults is whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 24, 93 S.Ct. at 2614. Freeman believes that, while the Virginia statute includes the other Miller guidelines, it is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because the patently offensive guideline has no counterpart in § 18.2-374.1. [L]ack of precision [in defining obscenity] is not itself offensive to the requirements of due process. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. at 491, 77 S.Ct. at 1312. We see no real difference between sexual material which affronts contemporary standards, § 18.2-374.1(A)(2), and material which portrays sex in a patently offensive way. More to the point, we find nothing in the Constitution or case law which requires a child pornography statute to contain any particular counterpart of the judicial definition of adult obscenity. What is fit for adults is not necessarily fit for children. Child pornography which is not legally obscene for adults may be obscene for children. In the enactment of statutes to protect children exploited by adults in the production of pornography, legislatures are not constitutionally required to define obscenity by adult standards. We reject Freeman's constitutional challenges, and we turn to the errors he assigns to certain evidentiary rulings.