Opinion ID: 844248
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Jury Selection Process

Text: Defendant maintains the trial court erred by excusing, for cause, a prospective juror who expressed pro-life views, and by rejecting his claims that the prosecutor's peremptory excusals of three female prospective jurors were improperly motivated by gender bias. All such contentions lack merit.
We summarize the process used to select the trial jury in this casecontext that defendant fails to provide in challenging such procedures on appeal. The process began with 160 prospective jurors. After a preliminary screening, which resulted in numerous excusals on hardship grounds, a pool of 75 prospective jurors remained. All 75 persons completed an 18-page questionnaire, which they were required to sign under penalty of perjury. The written questions were the product of substantial collaboration between the court and counsel. About 25 percent of the questions concerned the death penalty. Voir dire began with 18 prospective jurors inside the jury box, representing the 12 persons needed for the actual jury and the six persons needed as alternate jurors. The court examined each panelist at length. Counsel on both sides asked followup questions. Except for sensitive personal matters, voir dire occurred in open court. [20] At the bench, the parties exercised challenges for cause, followed by peremptory challenges. [21] When only 11 people were left in the jury box, the court called more names to create a new 18-person panel. This process occurred a total of seven times to select the 12-person jury. A similar procedure involving four panels of five persons each was used to choose the six alternate jurors.
Defendant claims the trial court erred in granting the prosecution's challenge for cause to D.G., who was one of the first 18 persons to undergo voir dire. He argues here, much as he did below, that the ruling violated Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844] ( Witt ), and thereby deprived him of due process, an impartial jury, and a fair and reliable penalty determination under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution, and under parallel provisions of the state Constitution. We disagree. The record discloses that D.G. expressed personal opposition to capital punishment on her questionnaire. She indicated that she strongly agree[d] with the statement that [a]nyone who commits murder, attempted murder and sexual assaults should never get the death penalty. She explained her answer to this and other questionsincluding one soliciting her general views on the death penaltyby writing, I do not believe in the Death Penalty. She also wrote that no one should die at the hands of the Death Penalty, and that her preferred outcome in cases involving violent crimes was jail for life. When asked to identify cases in which the death penalty was not appropriate, she wrote, all cases. Consistent with this view, she listed no case, and left the answer blank, when asked to identify circumstances in which the death penalty was appropriate. [22] On voir dire, the trial court first inquired whether D.G. held strong views on punishment. Echoing her questionnaire, D.G. said, Right. I just don't believe in the death penalty. When the court noted that D.G. had circled NO in response to written questions about rejecting death or life imprisonment without parole in appropriate cases, she exclaimed, Oh, I can vote for life. The court next asked whether there were any circumstances you can imagine that you think death might be appropriate. D.G. repliedagain, tracking her questionnaireno. An exchange then occurred in which the trial court explored possible exceptions to D.G.'s apparent refusal to impose death in any case. When the trial court mentioned Charlie Manson, serial killer, D.G. acknowledged hearing about the case on television, but twice said, I don't know in response to the court's question about the appropriate punishment. D.G. was also asked whether she could vote to impose the death penalty on Jeffrey Dahmer, another notorious serial killer who sexually assaulted and tortured his victims, among other things. D.G. indicated that she was familiar with the Dahmer case, but replied No, I couldn't [impose death]. I am just one that don't [ sic ] believe in the death penalty. The court then posed its final inquiry along these lines, asking whether it was possible to reject life imprisonment without parole and vote for death if the aggravating evidence substantially outweighed the mitigating evidence. D.G. essentially answered in the negative, as follows: It would be hard for me to, you know, vote that way. But again, I just don't believe in the death penalty. That is just my belief. I believe that we are put here on this earth to remain here unless otherwise, you know, from an illness or some other act we are taken away from here. I just can't see it. I just don't believe in it. Defense counsel's followup examination consisted of a series of yes or no questions. At the outset, D.G. answered affirmatively when asked if she understood that defendant was entitled to jurors who held a diversity of views, that the law did not require any juror to vote for death in a given case, and that jurors must set aside their personal views and apply the law consistent with the court's instructions. Thereafter, D.G. continued to say yes when counsel asked whether she could follow the court's instructions to set aside her personal opinions and render an impartial verdict under the law, and whether she could consider the death penalty and follow the law if instructed to do so in certain cases. However, midway through this exchange, D.G. interjected the following remark: I would follow the law, although I still woulddon't believe in the death penalty. The prosecutor posed only a few questions. All of them confirmed D.G.'s personal feelings that she could not vote for the death penalty regardless of the circumstances of the case. At a sidebar conference, the prosecutor challenged D.G. for cause. Defense counsel objected on the ground D.G. gave appropriate answers to, i.e., walked through, counsel's questions about following the law and instructions, and considering the death penalty. The trial court disagreed, saying I don't think she walked through it. She was carried through it. . . . Even [so], she slipped out a little burst of independent thought there that she was not in favor of the death penalty. [¶] I think her feelings are clearly strong enough to interfere with following the court's instruction. The challenge for cause to D.G. was granted as a result. Based on the foregoing developments, defendant contends that D.G. showed no disqualifying bias, and should not have been excused for cause, because her personal opposition to the death penalty would not have prevented her from imposing death under any circumstances. Defendant relies heavily here, as below, on defense counsel's examination of D.G. (9) In Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770], the high court held that a death sentence cannot constitutionally be imposed by a tribunal organized to return a verdict of death ( id. at p. 521), that is, by a jury that excluded veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction ( id. at p. 522 & fn. 21 [suggesting it must be unmistakably clear the person would  automatically  reject death]). In Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 424, the court clarif[ied] Witherspoon, and held that a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because his views on capital punishment would either `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of his duties under the instructions and the oath. Thus, under Witt, persons opposed to the death penalty may serve as jurors only if they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs and follow the law. ( People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 529 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076], citing Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176 [90 L.Ed.2d 137, 106 S.Ct. 1758].) In other words, such persons must persuasively demonstrate an ability to put aside personal reservations, properly weigh and consider the aggravating and mitigating evidence, and make that very difficult determination concerning the appropriateness of a death sentence. ( People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 447 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271].) In a related vein, trial court findings regarding a prospective juror's views on capital punishment are entitled to substantial deference on appeal. ( People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th 491, 529.) Hence, where answers given on voir dire are equivocal or conflicting, the trial court's evaluation of the person's state of mind is generally binding on the reviewing court. ( People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 21 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 896, 163 P.3d 896], and cases cited.) The trial court is in the unique position of assessing demeanor, tone, and credibility firsthandfactors of `critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.' ( Ibid., quoting Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9 [167 L.Ed.2d 1014, 127 S.Ct. 2218].) As noted in Witt itself, the trial judge may be left with the definite impression that the person cannot faithfully and impartially apply the law even though he has not expressed his views with absolute clarity. ( Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 425-426.) Applying this deferential standard here, we find ample evidence to support the trial court's determination that D.G.'s opposition to the death penalty would, at the very least, `substantially impair' the performance of her duties as a juror. ( Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 424.) At every phase of voir dire, whether her answers were given orally or in writing, and whether they were solicited by the court or counsel, D.G. repeatedly stated, in almost talismanic form, that she did not believe in the death penalty. She also communicated with remarkable clarity in her questionnaire and during voir dire that the death penalty was inappropriate in all cases, and that she could conceive of no case in which she could or would reach a different result. The latter principle evidently held true no matter how vile the circumstances of the crime or how strong the evidence in aggravation. Contrary to what defendant implies, D.G. never state[d] clearly, in her own words, that she was willing or able to set aside these personal views and reject a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. ( People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th 491, 529.) Nor does the record otherwise persuasively demonstrate an ability to follow the law and consider imposing a death sentence. ( People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th 425, 447.) Rather, after counsel led her through a series of yes or no questions on sentencing, and she seemed to accept the notion of following the law and instructions, D.G. lapsed into her repeated refrain, I still . . . don't believe in the death penalty. Upon hearing D.G.'s voice and seeing her demeanor, the trial court found this view to be sincere, strong, and unyielding. As in prior cases, where the prospective jurors' answers arguably seemed more equivocal and less absolute than those at issue here, we decline to second-guess the trial court's finding on appeal. (See, e.g., People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 831 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 244, 234 P.3d 501] [upholding excusal for cause based on prospective juror's statements that though she `[t]heoretically' opposed the death penalty, she could `probably' vote for death in some cases, but would find it `extremely difficult' to do so]; People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 61 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 211 P.3d 520] [same result where one prospective juror admitted being `slightly schizophrenic' and unsure about voting for death, while another prospective juror apologized for `vacillating' on penalty and likewise did not know whether she could impose death].) Accordingly, in our view, no error in excusing D.G. for cause occurred.
Defendant insists the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor allegedly displayed gender bias by using her first three peremptory challenges against female prospective jurors. He argues here, as below, that such conduct violated the state constitutional right to a representative jury ( People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748] ( Wheeler )), and the federal constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws. ( Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106 S.Ct. 1712] ( Batson ); see J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B. (1994) 511 U.S. 127, 129 [128 L.Ed.2d 89, 114 S.Ct. 1419]; People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 104 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 131 P.3d 400].) As noted, after the 75 members of the jury pool completed their questionnaires, the court called 18 of them into the jury box. During the ensuing voir dire, the parties stipulated to excuse one woman, K.M., based on her past experience with violent crime and the court system. The prosecutor also dismissed another woman for cause, D.G., as discussed above. The parties then took turns exercising peremptory challenges against the 16 prospective jurors left on the panel. Critical here is the prosecution's use, at that time, of peremptory challenges against M.E., T.B., and N.F.all three of whom were women. Defense counsel, in turn, struck one male and one female prospective juror. Seven more people were called into the box. The court and counsel questioned one of them, G.C., who answered mostly at the bench, outside the hearing of other jurors. Immediately after G.C. returned to the jury box, and shortly before the court session ended for the day, defendant moved for a mistrial. Citing Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, defense counsel simply said, The three peremptories that were exercised by [the prosecutor] were all women. However, as urged by the prosecutor, the trial court denied the motion because no prima facie showing had been made. The court noted that while it usually invite[d] the People to state their reasons for the record in such cases, no action was appropriate on this occasion, apparently because the time to adjourn for the day had arrived. The court then dismissed the prospective jurors and ordered them back in the morning. When voir dire resumed the next day, the court and counsel continued questioning the panelists who had been newly seated in the jury box near the end of the prior session, including G.C. During this process, the parties stipulated to the excusal of one female prospective juror, and a female replacement was called and questioned in the box. The court also acted on several challenges for cause. Once peremptory challenges against the remaining panelists began, defendant excused a woman. The prosecutor exercised the next peremptory challengeher fourth overallagainst M.D., who was a man. Defense counsel responded by renewing his Wheeler motion from the previous day, and by also invoking Batson, supra, 476 U.S. 79. When the court noted the gender difference between M.D. and the three women who were the subject of the prior strikes, counsel replied that M.D., like one of those women, was Hispanic, i.e., belonged to a cognizable group[ ]. As before, the trial court found no Wheeler/Batson violation because there clearly [was] no prima facie case. However, consistent with its prior comments about handling such motions, the court invited the prosecutor to list [her] reasons for the disputed strikes anyway. As discussed further below, the prosecutor complied with this request as to two of the women, M.E. and N.F., and as to the Hispanic male, M.D. However, regarding the third woman in the excused group, T.B., no reasons were given for her peremptory challenge. The prosecutor explained that she left her notes from the previous day upstairs, and that she could not independently recall why she had excused T.B. The court denied defendant's motion for lack of a prima facie case. Defendant renews his Wheeler/Batson claim on appeal. He maintains that by using all of her early peremptory challenges against women, the prosecutor created a statistical scenario amounting to a prima facie Wheeler/Batson case. Because the trial court reached a contrary conclusion, and found no grounds for soliciting or analyzing the prosecutor's reasons for all of the disputed strikes, defendant insists we must either reverse the judgment outright, or remand the case to the trial court to conduct such further proceedings. However, no error occurred, and no remedial step of any kind is warranted. [23] (10) At issue are the requirements for establishing a prima facie case of group bias in the use of peremptory challenges. In this first stage of any Wheeler/Batson inquiry, the defendant must show that `the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.' ( Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168 [162 L.Ed.2d 129, 125 S.Ct. 2410], quoting Batson, supra, 476 U.S. 79, 96; accord, Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 280-281.) To clarify, this is not a case in which, after a prima facie violation is found, the prosecution must offer permissible nondiscriminatory reasons for the strikes (i.e., the second stage of a Wheeler/Batson challenge). Nor must the trial court decide whether the defendant has carried his burden of showing the discriminatory use of such strikes (i.e., the third Wheeler/Batson stage). (See Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 168.) Rather, as the trial court correctly assumed below, the prosecutor was not required to disclose reasons for the excusals, and the court was not required to evaluate them, until a prima facie case was made. ( People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1292 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 190 P.3d 616]; People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1104-1105 & fn. 3 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 297, 163 P.3d 4].) Other core principles guide the manner in which we review a finding that no prima facie case arose under Wheeler/Batson. First, in Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. 162, the United States Supreme Court reversed People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d 270], in which we confirmed that the relevant California standardeven if it sometimes had been expressed as a `reasonable inference' ( People v. Johnson, at pp. 1312-1313)was to show that it was more likely than not that purposeful discrimination had occurred. ( Id. at p. 1318.) The high court disapproved this exacting standard for federal constitutional purposes, and said that a prima facie burden simply involves producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference of discrimination. ( Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 170.) Where, as here, it is not clear which standard the trial court used, we independently decide whether the record permits an inference that the prosecutor excused jurors on prohibited discriminatory grounds. ( People v. Carasi, supra, 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1293; People v. Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1105.) Second, in conducting this independent review and determining whether such an impermissible inference exists, we have the benefit of the entire record created on voir dire. ( People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 116 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166].) Under settled law, several interrelated circumstances are relevant in this regard, as follows. (11) Contrary to what defendant contends, no prima facie case arose based on the sheer number of peremptory challenges underlying the present Wheeler/Batson claim. Here, as elsewhere, the `absolute size of th[e] sample' undergoing such scrutiny is `small.' ( People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 342-343 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 160 P.3d 84] ( Bonilla ), quoting People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 597-598 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 453, 151 P.3d 292].) While no prospective juror may be struck on improper grounds, we have found it `impossible,' as a practical matter, to draw the requisite inference where only a few members of a cognizable group have been excused and no indelible pattern of discrimination appears. ( Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 342-343 [upholding finding of no prima facie case where prosecutor excused two African-Americans, leaving none in the 78-person pool], quoting Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 597-598 [same result where prosecutor excused two of three African-American women in the 47-person pool].) Similar concerns prevent us from rejecting the instant ruling simply because the prosecutor excused three women at the start of jury selection. A broader statistical view also undermines the present Wheeler/Batson claim. We recently declined to disturb a ruling that no prima facie case arose where our review of the entire record showed that the percentage of prosecutorial strikes in issue did not exceed the percentage by which the relevant group was represented either in the jury pool or on the actual jury that was impaneled. (See Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th 313, 344 [finding no basis at all to infer discrimination against Hispanics, in general, or Hispanic women, in particular, where prosecutor excused all three Hispanic women from jury pool, and where Hispanics comprised approximately 10 percent of the pool (eight of 78), the prosecution used 10 percent of its challenges on Hispanics (three of 30), and the final jury was roughly 10 percent Hispanic (one of 12)].) Indeed, ultimate inclusion on the jury of members of the group allegedly targeted by discrimination indicates `good faith' in the use of peremptory challenges, and may show under all the circumstances that no Wheeler/Batson violation occurred. ( People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 203 [30 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717] [reaching similar conclusion as to numerous prosecutorial strikes against African-American women where five out of the-12 sitting jurors were African-Americans, and four out of those five jurors were women]; accord, People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 168 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521] [same, where prosecutor used four of six peremptories against African-Americans, but accepted a jury that, as ultimately impaneled, included five African-Americans].) Here, the prosecution's approach to the cognizable group (females) seems even more favorable than in the foregoing cases. Women comprised 56 percent of the jury pool (42 of 75). They also represented 72 percent of the first panel called into the jury box (13 of 18), and 68 percent of the same panel after challenges for cause occurred (11 of 16). [24] By comparison, the prosecutor used a substantially smaller percentage of peremptory challenges against women when choosing the actual juryseven of 14, or 50 percent. Most telling, however, is that the vast majority of the final jury was female, to wit, 10 of 12, or 83 percent. This figure exceeds female representation at any other stage in the process. Thus, the ultimate composition of the predominantly female jury, along with the relatively modest number of prosecution strikes used against women throughout jury selection, makes it difficult to infer purposeful discrimination under Wheeler/Batson. [25] Finally, the record contains gender-neutral reasons supporting each of the three peremptory challenges contested on appeal. In explaining her dismissal of M.E., a young Hispanic woman, the prosecutor noted that M.E. disclosed, both orally and in writing, that numerous friends had been killed in violent gang activities; that other friends were confined at the time on serious charges stemming from drive-by shootings, including attempted murder; that her ex-boyfriend was jailed on pending drug charges; and that her brother had been falsely accused by the police of drug possession and was eventually acquitted by a jury of the crime. Such potentially negative contacts with the criminal justice system gave the prosecutor ample reason to excuse M.E. without regard to her gender. (See People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1010-1011 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775] [prosecutor expressed race-neutral grounds for dismissing African-American male whose half brother had been incarcerated, and who reported being stopped by police on false pretenses].) We likewise see nothing discriminatory in the prosecutor's stated reasons for excusing N.F., a 57-year-old Caucasian woman. This prospective juror stated on voir dire, consistent with her questionnaire, that she had previously served on a jury that deadlocked over intent in a felony case. She acknowledged that she was one of the persons responsible for the hung jury, that she felt harassed by other jurors during deliberations, and that she learned from that experience to avoid being swayed by the views of others. When asked by the trial court about imposing the death penalty, N.F. indicated that intent could again play a key role in her decision. N.F. further indicated that it might be easier to vote for life imprisonment than for death even where aggravating evidence outweighed mitigating evidence. In short, we see no gender bias in the prosecutor's express concern about N.F.'s possible closemindedness and reluctance to impose the death penalty. (See, e.g., Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th 313, 349 [upholding dismissal of female prospective juror who previously served on deadlocked jury, who said she would adhere to her views if faced with the same situation again, and who was generally unsure when a death sentence should be imposed].) We reach a similar conclusion as to T.B., the prospective juror whose peremptory challenge the prosecutor had no chance to explain. (See Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th 313, 346-349 [finding gender-neutral reasons in the record for the excusal of numerous female prospective jurors where prosecutor explained only one such strike and trial court found no prima facie Wheeler/Batson case]; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 439-442 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790] [same].) On her questionnaire, T.B. identified herself as a young Caucasian woman with a high school diploma who worked in a nonmanagerial job in a bank. She wrote that she was neither totally for or against the death penalty, and that she was not sure what punishment was appropriate for defendants who hurt people. T.B. told the trial court that despite any uncertainty reflected in her written answers, she was okay with deciding the appropriate penalty in a capital case. However, when the court asked what factors might affect that decision, T.B. said she couldn't say. When the prosecutor asked whether she could ever impose the death penalty, T.B. replied, Well, I'm notI wouldn't say that I would never say no. So, I would leave it open that I could say yes to that. We have found no group bias where the person's views on penalty were as mixed and vague as T.B.'s. The prosecutor could readily have seen her as a wild card, and used a peremptory challenge for reasons unconnected to [her] sex. ( Bonilla, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 348.) In light of all these factors, including the nondiscriminatory reasons elicited on voir dire, the trial court properly denied the Wheeler/Batson motion linked to the peremptory challenges exercised against M.E., T.B., and N.F. As framed both at trial and on appeal, such claim is particularly weak as it consist[s] of little more than an assertion that a number of prospective jurors from a cognizable group had been excused. Such a bare claim falls far short of what the law requires to establish a prima facie case. ( People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th 395, 442.)