Opinion ID: 146638
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis of Pioneer Factors

Text: In this case, the time limit set forth in Rule 33 is unambiguous, and Bergmann's failure to timely file a motion was, in theory, entirely within his control. Given the Pioneer Court's admonition that clients must generally be saddled with the errors of counsel, it might appear at first glance that the reason-for-delay factor favors the government. However, in the first place, it is significant that Pioneer was a bankruptcy case; as the district court noted, Pioneer 's your lawyer, your fault principle should be applied less stringently in the criminal context, where our legal traditions reflect a certain solicitude for [a defendant's] rights, to which the important public interests in judicial efficiency and finality must occasionally be accommodated. Stutson, 516 U.S. at 196, 116 S.Ct. 600; see also United States v. Moses, No. CR 05 061 E BLW, 2006 WL 581191, at  (D.Idaho Mar. 8, 2006) (In the civil context, a client is bound by the acts and omissions of his or her attorney. . . . However, in determining what constitutes excusable neglect, the courts have generally been more solicitous of a criminal defendant's rights. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Secondly, we note that in the habeas context, courts have long made special procedural allowances for defendants who fail to timely raise ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims against lawyers who continue to represent them at the time those claims would properly have been raised. As the Supreme Court has noted, it is axiomatic that an attorney . . . is unlikely to raise an ineffective-assistance claim against himself. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003); see also Fautenberry v. Mitchell, 515 F.3d 614, 640 (6th Cir.2008) ([W]e conclude that it would be unreasonable to expect counsel to raise an ineffective assistance claim against himself.). Aside from the potential conflict of interest inherent in such a claimwhich we will address shortly[e]ven the scrupulous attorney searching the record in good faith would likely be blind to his [own] derelictions at . . . trial. . . . Billy-Eko v. United States, 8 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir.1993), abrogated on other grounds by Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504, 123 S.Ct. 1690. Additionally, as the district court noted, in cases involving late-filed notices of appeal, several courts have either held or suggested that ineffective assistance of counsel may justify a finding of excusable neglect. For example, in United States v. Clark, the Fifth Circuit found excusable neglect under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) where the defendant's attorney had failed to file a notice of appeal despite the defendant's explicit request that he do so. 193 F.3d 845, 846-47 (5th Cir.1999) ([W]e are faced with a clear case of ineffective assistance of counsel, which is sufficient to prove excusable neglect.); see also United States v. McKenzie, 99 F.3d 813, 816 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to find [defendant's] neglect excusable and to grant an extension of time to file his notice of appeal where defendant's attorney le[ft] town and bec[ame] totally inaccessible during relevant time period). Such a holding initially appears to clash with the Pioneer Court's admonition that clients must generally bear the consequences of their attorneys' inexcusable errors. However, in addition to the civil/criminal distinction already discussed, the Eleventh Circuit has provided a satisfying rationale, grounded in the Pioneer Court's attorney-as-agent paradigm, for distinguishing cases of ordinary attorney error, where clients will be bound by counsel's action, from cases of egregious acts and omissions: Respondents urge this Court to . . . hold[] that a client is always bound by the mistakes of his attorney, regardless how extreme or far afield from the client's directives those actions may be. . . . [This] your lawyer, your fault approach is consistent with the general principle [expounded in Pioneer] that lawyers are agents, and clients must be held accountable for the acts and omissions of their attorneys.    [However,] under fundamental tenets of agency law, a principal is not charged with an agent's actions or knowledge when the agent is acting adversely to the principal's interests. . . . [Thus,] when an attorney's actions extend beyond everyday mistakes into the realm of serious misconduct, . . . in some circumstances such malfeasance may be far enough outside the range of behavior that reasonably could be expected by a client . . . [that it would be inappropriate to] impute [such] attorney misconduct to [the] client. . . . Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1319-21 (11th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We note that the present case is not on all fours with prior cases where courts have found excusable neglect based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. In those cases, as the government notes, the [late-filing] party intended to comply with the applicable limitations period and, but for counsel's neglectful actions, would have done so. For example, in Clark, the defendant asked his counsel to timely file a notice of appeal, but counsel did not. 193 F.3d at 846-47. Here, by contrast, Munoz presumably had no intent to file a Rule 33 motion for ineffective assistance during the week when he could have timely done so; that intent only arose later, once he had acquired new counsel. Rule 45(b), however, does not require that the defendant have contemporaneously intended to comply with the relevant deadline. It merely requires that the party [have] failed to act because of excusable neglector, in the words of the Pioneer Court, that the party, for an excusable reason, le[ft the act] undone or unattended to. . . . 507 U.S. at 388, 113 S.Ct. 1489. Another distinction between the present case and the notice-of-appeal cases is that in those cases, the courts found that trial counsel's failure to timely file a notice of appeal was itself constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Here, by contrast, the allegedly ineffective assistance occurred during the underlying trial; Munoz does not specifically argue that Bergmann's failure to timely file a Rule 33 motion was, in itself, ineffective assistance. However, that concern should not control the outcome of this case. As the Eleventh Circuit explained in Downs, clients may be excused under the Pioneer standard for their agents' egregious acts or omissions not because those acts or omissions violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but because of the agency-law axiom that a principal is not bound by his agent's conduct where the agent is acting adversely to the principal's interests. Downs, 520 F.3d at 1320-21. A situation like the one alleged in the present casewhere an attorney refuses to fall on his own sword for his client, even though that is his client's last best hope is a paradigmatic case of adverse interests: [T]here [is] a clear conflict between [a client's] interest in presenting and prevailing in his ineffective assistance claim and [his attorney's] interest in protecting himself from the damage such an outcome would do to his professional reputation and from exposure to potential malpractice liability or bar discipline. That an attorney would have great incentives to prevent a client from prevailing in an ineffective assistance claim [against him] is both self-evident and well documented in the case law. . . . Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d 1129, 1134-35 (9th Cir.2000) (internal citations omitted) (holding, in habeas context, that client may assert as cause for his procedural default the actions of his attorney which, even though not constitutionally defective, were not attributable to him because they were tainted by a conflict of interest). Accordingly, we find that Bergmann's continuing representation of Munoz during the window for timely filing a Rule 33 motion was a valid reason for the delay, and that the delay was not fairly within Munoz's control. This factor therefore favors Munoz.
The government argues that it would be prejudiced in four ways by having to retry Munoz after an additional six months' delay. [6] However, two of thosethe fact that the government would have to prepare and present [its] case over again, and the fact that Munoz has now had the benefit of . . . hearing the government's case would be equally true had the motion been filed timely. Because these consequences cannot be attributed to Munoz's filing delay, they have no place in the Pioneer analysis. The government's third prejudice claimthat the passage of time compromises witnesses' memoriesis true as a general matter, but, at least on the facts of this case, six months is not a sufficient period of time to create significant prejudice on that score. The government's most substantial prejudice argument arises from the fact that, by the time Munoz filed his new-trial motion in May 2007, the testifying co-defendants, Tagaban and George, had already been sentenced (Tagaban in January 2007 and George in March 2007). In particular, both men had already received reduced sentences in exchange for their cooperation at Munoz's trial. Thus, the government argues, it now lacks leverage with which to assure their cooperation at Munoz's retrialas opposed to the situation that would have existed if Munoz had timely filed his new-trial motion in November 2006. However, Tagaban and George's plea agreements require them to testify truthfully whenever called by the government. If they do not testify truthfully at retrial, they would be in breach of those plea agreements, and, in theory, the government [would have] the option to . . . seek specific performance of the agreement[s].. . . United States v. Cimino, 381 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir.2004); see also LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 21.2(e) (3d ed.2007). Perhaps more practically, the government may still exert substantial leverage over Tagaban and George by virtue of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b), which allows a further sentence reduction for post-sentencing substantial assistance. Consequently, the prejudice factor does not clearly favor the government.
The government argues that even if ineffective assistance of counsel is, in theory, a proper excuse, Munoz failed to act with diligence once Hall took over his representation. Hall filed her notice of appearance on February 13, 2007, and the district court authorized her to appear on February 22, 2007. Munoz did not request leave to file an untimely new-trial motion until five days thereafter, and did not actually file the motion for another ten weeks. We have certainly found delays of this magnitude inexcusable in the past. See, e.g., Nafziger, 467 F.3d at 523 (37-day delay not excusable neglect under circumstances). However, we agree with the district court that Munoz's delay was not clearly inordinate here, given the sensitive posture in which Hall took over the case and the unique difficulties she presumably faced as a result. See Anne M. Voigts, Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: Procedural Default, Habeas Reform, and Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 99 Colum. L.Rev. 1103, 1131 (1999) (noting that, where successor counsel will be arguing former counsel's ineffective assistance, former counsel's incentives not to help the client . . . [may] affect cooperation with successor counsel); cf. Massaro, 538 U.S. at 506, 123 S.Ct. 1690 (noting that appellate counsel may be in an awkward position vis-à-vis trial counsel, as trial counsel will be unwilling to help appellate counsel familiarize himself with a record for the purpose of understanding how it reflects trial counsel's own incompetence). We believe that a district judge is in the best position to know how long a diligent successor counsel would require to research and prepare a new-trial motion under the circumstances presented by any given case. Thus, the delay factor does not clearly favor the government. [7]
The government does not contest the district court's finding that Munoz's delay involved no bad faith.