Opinion ID: 948923
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conscience-Shocking Standard

Text: When Youngberg does not apply, the professional-judgment standard does not apply. Strutton, 668 F.3d at 557. In such a situation, a plaintiff may maintain a substantive due process claim only if the contested state action is so egregious or outrageous that it is conscience-shocking. Burton v. Richmond, 370 F.3d 723, 729 (8th Cir. 2004). Nothing about the policy at issue in Montin's case approaches this standard. Finally, it is well settled that the liberty interest at the heart of a due process claim may be a right created by state law, as is the case with Montin's second claim. See Ky. Dept. of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) ( Protected liberty interests may arise from . . . the laws of the States.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We employ the same conscience-shocking standard for such claims because [w]e remain cautious not to turn every alleged state law violation -5- into a constitutional claim. Strutton, 668 F.3d at 557. Here, even assuming Montin has articulated a liberty interest created by state law relating to his actual confinement and treatment, or relating to limitations upon medical professionals' treatment recommendations in light of security policies, nothing about the Center's actions is egregious, outrageous, or conscience-shocking. We refuse to dilute these concepts based upon the present allegations. We affirm the well-reasoned judgment of the district court. ______________________________ -6-