Opinion ID: 2971782
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mrs. Hawkins’s Consent

Text: It is well-settled that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject to a limited number of exceptions. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). One such exception is a search conducted pursuant to consent. Id. Consent may be given by “a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). Moreover, “[e]ven if a third party does not possess actual common authority over the area that was searched, the Fourth Amendment is not violated if the police relied in good faith on a third party’s apparent authority to consent to the search.” United States v. Gillis, 358 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2004). The test is whether the officer reasonably could have concluded, from the facts available at the time, that the third party had authority to consent. Id. at 39091. The facts relevant to Mrs. Hawkins’s consent were well-summarized by the district court: 5 . . . . She answered the door when the troopers knocked and did, in fact, live at the residence. She gave no indication that the garage was not hers until after it had been opened and marijuana spotted inside. She signed a consent form that expressly listed the detached garage as one of the areas to be searched, yet made no mention of her limitations with regard to that location. Furthermore, prior to the search, she discussed with her husband the troopers’ desire to look around, and he voiced no objection to searching the garage. Instead, he consented to the search, which the troopers heard through his wife’s comment “so it’s okay to let them look . . . okay.” . . . .