Opinion ID: 2626647
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Issue 2: Exclusion of the Release from evidence

Text: [¶ 21] As stated above, the Release was the subject of numerous disputes. At one point, the district court had before it PRC's motion for a protective order and Mr. Cramer's contrary motion to compel discovery of information relating to the punitive damages claim. The district court ruled that the Release does not amount to a declaration of policy on the part of Defendants or an admission that they do not maintain a safe mine site. Nor is it evidence of same. (Footnote omitted.) As the district court further explained: At best, the release form is a misguided effort to facially insulate Defendants from liability for damages to non-employee third parties. At worst, it is an undisguised attempt to forestall and even perhaps intimidate such individuals against filing suit for damages sustained on mine property. In either event, the release form does not bespeak a policy to maintain an unsafe mine site. Other language in the release form tends to this conclusion. (Emphasis added.) On this same basis, the district court later issued its Memorandum of Pretrial Conference, expressly limiting Mr. Cramer's use of the Release as evidence at trial: [T]he court determines the release form may not be used in Plaintiff's case-in-chief because it is of marginal relevance and has the potential to mislead and confuse the jury  even if otherwise admissible. See W.R.E. 403. However, Plaintiff may be entitled to use the release form in cross-examination. On this question the court RESERVES RULING. On appeal, Mr. Cramer challenges the district court's refusal to allow the Release into evidence in his case-in-chief. [¶ 22] We review a district court's decisions regarding evidence for abuse of discretion: Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and include determinations of the adequacy of foundation and relevancy, competency, materiality, and remoteness of the evidence. This Court will generally accede to the trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence unless that court clearly abused its discretion. We have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice. . . . In the absence of an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's determination. Teniente v. State, 2007 WY 165, ¶ 54, 169 P.3d 512, 529 (Wyo.2007) (internal citations and punctuation omitted). [¶ 23] We begin by considering the district court's conclusion that the Release was of marginal relevance. W.R.E. 401 defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Evenson v. State, 2008 WY 24, ¶ 26, 177 P.3d 819, 827 (Wyo.2008). Regardless of whether the Release reflected a company policy against maintaining a safe mine site, it was a statement made by PRC that, when considered by the jury, could tend to make it more likely that PRC had breached its duty of taking reasonable precautions to protect visitors from foreseeable hazards. On this basis, the Release does appear to have been relevant evidence. [¶ 24] But not all relevant evidence is admissible. W.R.E. 403 provides that, Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. The district court excluded the Release from evidence on the basis that it was potentially misleading and confusing to the jury. Like the issue of relevance, the balancing of prejudice against probative worth is ordinarily a discretionary matter for the trial court. Miller v. State, 784 P.2d 209, 211 (Wyo.1989). [¶ 25] We have reviewed the parties' numerous pretrial arguments about the Release, and observe that the arguments themselves suggest that the Release had the potential to confuse and mislead the jury. For example, Mr. Cramer often asserted that the Release was illegal. The jury could have been misled into speculation about whether PRC had been or should be subject to civil penalties, or even criminal sanctions. The jury might also have been confused about why Mr. Cramer was bringing a negligence claim against PRC when he had signed the Release with an explicit waiver and release of liability. In either example, the jury's attention would have been diverted from the negligence claim it was asked to decide. The district court might have tried to overcome the confusion with jury instructions, but given its conclusion that the Release was only marginally relevant, it was not unreasonable for the district court instead to exclude the Release from evidence pursuant to W.R.E. 403.