Opinion ID: 1794090
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: People v. Barrera

Text: In Barrera's statement to the police, he indicated that he was the driver that night. He also stated that he had kicked the victim in the head: I kicked her in the head before Matt stabbed her because she was on her knees when I kicked her and she was yelling and screaming[.] [T]hat's why I kicked her in her head.[ [18] ] He denied that there was any plan to rob or rape the woman. He admitted that a cassette tape that was found at the scene was his. He also admitted that he ripped up the victim's jacket. Barrera was tried for first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree felony murder. With respect to the first count, the prosecution's theory was that Barrera aided and abetted in the killing, in particular by driving the car and by kicking the victim down before her throat was cut. The prosecutor repeatedly argued that this was a [f]our against one, planned gang attack. Further, he argued that Barrera was in control of the car and drove to a remote, secluded spot to accomplish the rape, robbery, and murder. With respect to felony murder, the prosecutor argued that Barrera helped create the situation with knowledge that death or great bodily harm would occur. He argued that this was the requisite malice. [19] The prosecutor also argued that even if the crime was spontaneous, Barrera was guilty of second-degree murder because he helped destroy her clothes and left her to die behind a secluded building. In contrast, Barrera's defense was that there was no premeditation because there was no plan to rob, rape, or kill the victim. He only thought that they had hired a prostitute, and that they would have sex and then leave. He thought that they were there to party. He did not know that Copeland had a knife with him. He further argued that kicking the victim, an assault and battery, did not amount to an intent to create a high risk of death by multiple stab wounds. In his statement, Barrera described his version of the stabbing: We all got out of the car and we went behind the bathrooms. I can't remember exactly who made the first move but Matt and Fred grabbed the hooker and ripped her shirts and pants off. They grabbed her and pulled her shirt off and she fell on the ground and that's when they, Matt and Fred tore her pants off. Matt made her suck his dick and after she was done he slapped her and then Mike stepped up and made her suck his dick. Q. What were you and Fred doing at this time? A. We were drinking Labatts Beer watching and talking to each other. Fred was saying how sick it was what Matt and Mike was doing. Then while she was sucking Mike's dick, Mike stepped back and Matt started [to] beat the girl with his fist. He kicked her and then he pulled out this big Rambo knife. I think he had it in the back of his pants. He pulled the knife out and stabbed her. Fred said Oh my God. I couldn't believe this was happening. I turned around and went to the car. Barrera was convicted of first-degree felony murder. Under People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980), the jury was required to find that Barrera himself had malice. [20] In this case, Barrera's intent was the critical issue. Barrera's jury was told through Barrera's statement that Copeland did the stabbing. However, by excluding Copeland's statement, the trial court did not permit the jury to hear why Copeland killed the victim. [21] We find that this explanation of the stabbing was evidence crucial to Barrera's defense that he had no reason to expect that someone would kill the victim and that Copeland acted spontaneously and without warning. There was no evidence suggesting that Barrera could have anticipated that the prostitute resembled Copeland's former girlfriend, or that Copeland would hallucinate and believe that she was his old girlfriend, or that Copeland would pull out a knife and stab her to death. Because the explanation for the stabbing was evidence crucial to Barrera's theory of defense, his constitutional right to present this evidence limited the threshold of corroborating circumstances that the court could require of Copeland's statement. We find that the trial court improperly focused on minor inconsistencies in the statement. Those inconsistencies go to the weight of the evidencenot to its admissibility. Garcia, 986 F.2d at 1140-1141. The primary statement in the confession was corroborated by the statements of all three codefendants: Copeland spontaneously acted alone in the stabbing. Additionally, we find the following factors further corroborated the trustworthiness of Copeland's statement. Applying the three-factor inquiry set out above, we find that there was not a close relationship between Copeland and Barrera that would induce Copeland to take the rap for Barrera. [22] Further, Copeland made a voluntary statement after being advised of his Miranda rights. Moreover, there was no evidence that Copeland did so in order to curry favor with the authorities: he said that he was not promised anything for giving the statement, [23] and, more importantly, he was later sentenced to life without parole on the basis of his statement. [24] Under the Poole factors, we note that although the statement was made to law enforcement officers, instead of shifting blame to the other three participants, Copeland directed blame to himself by explaining his personal motive for the killing, and by expressly stating that to his knowledge no one else stabbed the victim. However, [h]is incentive, one might think, was to inculpate as many other persons as possible and minimize his own involvement. Rivera, 915 F.2d at 283. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Copeland's statement and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [25] This preserved constitutional error is not harmless because we cannot declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the exclusion of this evidence did not contribute to the jury verdict by undermining Barrera's defense. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, vacate Barrera's conviction, and remand the case for a new trial consistent with this opinion.