Opinion ID: 3026155
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judgment as to Compensatory Damages

Text: Our review of a grant of judgment as a matter of law is plenary. Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 2003). “[W]e apply the same standard as the District Court, that is, whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to verdict, a reasonable jury could have found for the prevailing party,” and we grant judgment as a matter of law “where ‘the record is critically deficient of the minimum quantum of evidence’ in support of the verdict.” Id. Kopacz argues that the District Court should not have granted the Delaware River and Bay Authority’s post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law because the Delaware River and Bay Authority did not make such a motion at the close of all the evidence. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). We find that a discussion amongst counsel and the District Court of post-trial motions during an in-chambers conference constituted a renewal of the Delaware 3 River and Bay Authority’s motion. As such, the Delaware River and Bay Authority was not foreclosed from renewing its motion post-verdict. With respect to the substance of the motion, an employee may recover consequential damages, including lost wages, pain and suffering, and attorneys’ fees and costs, “[if] the shipowner unreasonably refuses to pay a marine employee’s claim for maintenance and cure.” O’Connell v. Interocean Mgmt. Corp., 90 F.3d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 1996). No reasonable jury could have found that the Delaware River and Bay Authority unreasonably withheld maintenance and cure. The record shows that the Delaware River and Bay Authority did not believe that the car accident that formed the basis for Kopacz’s claim occurred. There were no witnesses to the alleged accident besides Kopacz. The jury in fact found that Kopacz had not been struck and injured by the car. Although there is evidence that Kopacz was taken to the hospital on the day of the alleged accident and was there declared unfit for duty, there is no evidence that any incident on board the ship other than the accident could have caused Kopacz injury. In addition, Kopacz had a history of health problems, of which the Delaware River and Bay Authority was aware, that could have accounted for his difficulties in the absence of an accident. We find that the jury’s conclusion that the Delaware River and Bay Authority unreasonably withheld maintenance and cure and that Kopacz was entitled to damages was not supported by the evidence. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of the Delaware River and Bay Authority’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.