Opinion ID: 2829377
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Misplaced Reliance on Steele

Text: The Court argues that the Stockwell – Lurie line of cases described above is no longer valid in light of Steele v. City of Houston , 603 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. 1980) . This exaggerates the scope of Steele . The Court cogently describes Steele ’s actual effect, which was to make clear that the Takings Clause is self-executing, thereby reversing the prior assumption that the State enjoyed sovereign immunity from takings claims. But the Court then extrapolates that Steele also precluded the Legislature from summarily abating nuisances in fact. The problem with that assumption is that Steele in no way modified or curtailed the State’s police power; instead, it merely removed the shield of sovereign immunity from the exercise of that power. See id. at 791 (“The Constitution itself is the authorization for compensation for the destruction of property and is a waiver of governmental immunity for the taking . . . of property for public use.”) ( emphasis added). In fact, Steele says very little about the question in this case—in Steele , there was no due process at all, because the Houston police summarily set fire to the plaintiff’s home in an attempt to flush out fugitives, id. at 789, nor was the city claiming to abate a nuisance, see generally id. Steele simply stands for the proposition that the Takings Clause is self-executing, and that sovereign immunity is waived for takings claims. See id. at 789. An important point, to be sure, but one that is not relevant where, as here, the Takings Clause is inapplicable because there was a proper nuisance abatement, rather than a taking. See Samuels , 267 U.S. at 196.