Opinion ID: 1239288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Deceit and lies argument

Text: George contends the statement in argument that: [T]hey have sewed (sic) deceit, deception, lies and misconception. They are the ones trying to trick you.... should not have been considered by the Court of Appeals because it was not raised in Dial's post-trial motion. We agree. In Toyota, we found reversible error despite the lack of a contemporaneous objection where the issue of inflammatory argument was raised for the first time in post-trial motions. Toyota cites the rule that even in the absence of a contemporaneous objection, a new trial motion should be granted in flagrant cases where a vicious inflammatory argument results in clear prejudice. 314 S.C. at 263, 442 S.E.2d at 615 (citing South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Nasim, 255 S.C. 406, 179 S.E.2d 211 (1971)). Toyota sets forth a narrow exception to the general rule that a party must make a contemporaneous objection to improper argument or the objection is waived. See Varnadore v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 289 S.C. 155, 345 S.E.2d 711 (1986). Under Toyota, the issue of inflammatory argument must be raised to the trial judge by way of post-trial motion to preserve the issue for appeal. In this case, the record indicates the allegation of racial prejudice was the only complaint Dial raised in her post-trial motion regarding counsel's argument. This allegation does not encompass counsel's deceit and lies remark. In addressing this issue, the Court of Appeals went beyond Toyota and improperly considered an issue not preserved by post-trial motion. [2] In any event, on the merits, the deceit and lies statement does not rise to the level of a Toyota argument when considered in context. This statement was in response to accusatory remarks by Dial's counsel insisting George's failure to testify was a deceptive tactic. For instance, Dial's counsel stated: But if they want to hide something or if they want to do it that way, why didn't they put their man up? I'll tell you why, but you can infer it in your own way. They didn't want you to know the truth. They didn't want you to know why George turned the way he did. They didn't want you to see George. They didn't want you to judge him. . . . Why didn't they put him on? They didn't put him on for one reason. They didn't put him on because they didn't want me or Jim to cross examine him, to learn the truth that you are here to get today, the truth. Dial's counsel also referred to the use of a defense witness's deposition testimony rather than having the witness testify: Do you think that's the reason Sease didn't testify and come up here from the company? The one man from the company they put up was Mr. Swift who doesn't know anything about it. He conveniently for his company, not for him, was off sick at that time. Don't you think if they want the truth they'd put somebody up here? . . . If they wanted the truth, where is George, where is Sease, where is (sic) the company people? Not here. We have held argument of counsel is not so inflammatory as to constitute a ground for reversal where counsel responds in kind to previous argument of opposing counsel. State v. Singleton, 284 S.C. 388, 326 S.E.2d 153 (1985). In this case, counsel's deceit and lies remark was in response to opposing counsel's repeated accusation of deception. In context, this remark was not so inflammatory as to come within the ambit of our decision in Toyota. In conclusion, the Court of Appeals should not have considered counsel's deceit and lies argument in reversing the denial of Dial's post-trial motion. We take this opportunity to reiterate that the exception in Toyota excusing the failure to make a contemporaneous objection is limited to instances where the issue is raised to the trial judge by post-trial motion.