Opinion ID: 6358387
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Counsel's failure to present Justin Akines-Harris as a witness

Text: Next, Brown asserts that trial counsel should have presented another witness, Akines-Harris, to impeach Anderson's credibility. Of relevance to this argument, Anderson testified at trial that he was wearing a blue jacket when the shooting occurred and when police first stopped and frisked him. N.T., 5/26/2005, at 52. The morning of the shooting, Anderson claimed that he loaned a red jacket to a high school student named Justice or Justin who lived near him. Id. at 51-52. He did not know the boy's full name. Shortly after the shooting, Anderson claimed that he saw this boy again, the boy returned the red jacket to him, and Anderson put it on. Id. at 52-53. Anderson testified that as a result, when he went to a nearby restaurant, where the police approached him again, he was then wearing the red jacket. Id. at 53-54. While wearing the red jacket, the police put him in a patrol car and took him to the police station for questioning. Id. at 54. Brown now claims that Justin Akines-Harris is the boy to whom Anderson claimed to have loaned his jacket, and that Akines-Harris would have testified that he never borrowed any jacket from Anderson. Brown's Brief at 31-32; PCRA Petition, Appendix, Akines-Harris Affidavit, 2/4/2013. This testimony, Brown asserts, would have undermined Anderson's explanation for changing his jacket, highlighting Anderson's guilt. Brown's Brief at 35-36. According to Brown, impeaching Anderson about changing his jacket would have significantly strengthened his defense, especially because trial counsel's strategy was to suggest that Anderson either killed Crawford or was protecting the person who killed Crawford. Id. at 36. Brown waived this claim at trial. The trial court conducted the following colloquy with Brown: The Court : Now, sir, are there any witnesses that you wanted to call or anything  that you discussed with [trial counsel] that is not going to happen at this trial? And I know that there's a few witnesses that are going to be called, and why don't we just state for the record who those are. [Trial Counsel]: Judge, I intend to call Police Officer Kevin Fant, F-A-N-T, and Detective Gregory Rodden, R-O-D-D-E-N, who was the assigned detective in this case. And we may call the crime scene detective who did the crime scene, Detective David Baker and Detective George Fetters. Detective Fetters has not yet arrived. We've only interviewed Detective Baker. The Court: Okay. So those are all the police witnesses. Were there any other names that you gave to [trial counsel] for the trial portion of this case, not the penalty phase, that you expected to testify and whose names just did not hear mentioned? [Brown]: Negative. The Court : All right. And are you satisfied with the representation that you have received from your counsel. [Brown]: Yes. N.T., 5/31/2005, at 14. In Commonwealth v. Mallory , 596 Pa. 172 , 941 A.2d 686 (2008), this Court held: [A]n on-the-record colloquy is a useful procedural tool whenever the waiver of any significant right is at issue, constitutional or otherwise, e.g., waiver of a trial, waiver of the right to counsel, waiver of the right to call witnesses , waiver of the right to cross-examine witnesses, waiver of rules-based speedy trial time limits, etc.) Id. at 697 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Paddy , 569 Pa. 47 , 800 A.2d 294 (2002), we recognized that a defendant who makes a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision concerning trial strategy will not later be heard to complain that trial counsel was ineffective on the basis of that decision. Id. at 316 . To do otherwise, the Court held, would allow a defendant to build into his case a ready-made ineffectiveness claim to be raised in the event of an adverse verdict. Id. at 316 . In Paddy , the defendant complained of trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to call alibi witnesses, in response to which we held that this ineffectiveness claim fails for the fundamental reason that Paddy agreed at trial to counsel's decision not to call the witnesses in question. Id. at 315 ; see also Commonwealth v. Rios , 591 Pa. 583 , 920 A.2d 790 , 803 (2007), overruled on other grounds , Tharp , 101 A.3d 736 . As the record reflects, Brown participated in a colloquy at which he was advised of all of the witnesses his trial counsel intended to call in his defense, and he expressly acknowledged that after consulting with trial counsel, there were no other witnesses he wanted to testify on his behalf. As Brown voluntarily agreed that he did not want to call any other witnesses, he cannot now complain about trial counsel's failure to call Akines-Harris to testify.