Opinion ID: 792205
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable Level of Constitutional Scrutiny

Text: 35 Because the level of judicial scrutiny that must be applied to state actions inhibiting speech varies with the nature of the forum in which the speech occurs, we must first consider what sort of forum had been created for the environmental poster assignment. See Make the Rd. by Walking, 378 F.3d at 142. Following the lead of the Supreme Court, we have tended to classify fora for expression in four categories that, correspondingly, fall along a spectrum of constitutional protection. The first, and most speech-protective forum is the traditional public forum. This category is comprised of those places — streets, parks, and the like — which have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In these fora, [c]ontent-based restrictions will be upheld only if they are necessary to serve a compelling state interest and are narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 36 The designated public forum, and its subset, the limited public forum, fall next along the spectrum. Id. at 142-43. A designated public forum is a place not traditionally open to public assembly and debate — a public school, for example — that the government has taken affirmative steps to open for general public discourse. Id. Speech in a designated public forum is entitled to the same constitutional protection as that extended to expression in a traditional public forum, so long as the state continues to designate the forum for such use. Id. at 143. A limited public forum, instead, is created when the State opens a non-public forum but limits the expressive activity to certain kinds of speakers or to the discussion of certain subjects. Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union Local 100 v. City of New York Dep't of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 545 (2d Cir.2002). In limited public fora, the government may make reasonable, viewpoint-neutral rules governing the content of speech allowed. Id. at 545-46; see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 150 L.Ed.2d 151 (2001). 37 Garnering the lowest level of scrutiny along the forum analysis spectrum is the non-public forum, 5 which is neither traditionally open to public expression nor designated for such expression by the State. Restrictions on speech in a nonpublic forum need only be reasonable and viewpoint neutral. Make the Rd. by Walking, 378 F.3d at 143; see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985) (Although a speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the forum, or if he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose especial benefit the forum was created, the government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject. (internal citations omitted)). 38 The parties apparently agree that neither Antonio's classroom, nor the school cafeteria, nor any other aspect of the Catherine McNamara Elementary School, was a traditional public forum. They also agree that none of these was a forum that had been designated for public expression, and the record clearly supports this position. No evidence points to any affirmative steps taken by The District, in the context of the events pertaining to this case, to open these facilities to public use and expression. Cf. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267, 108 S.Ct. 562 ([S]chool facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have by policy or practice opened those facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public or by some segment of the public. . . . If the facilities have instead been reserved for other intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, then no public forum has been created . . . .). Hence, there is no dispute that The District was entitled, in the non-public fora at issue in this case, at least to regulate the content of Antonio's poster in a reasonable manner. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806, 105 S.Ct. 3439. 39 The parties do, however, contest the nature of — and level of constitutional protection to be accorded to — the student expression represented by Antonio's poster. The Supreme Court has recognized that, while [s]tudents in the public schools do not `shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,' Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266, 108 S.Ct. 562 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 89 S.Ct. 733), nevertheless the First Amendment rights of students in the public schools `are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,' and must be `applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.' Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986), and Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 89 S.Ct. 733). These special characteristics have led the Supreme Court to identify, broadly, two categories of student expression in the school environment, each of which merits a different degree of judicial scrutiny in connection with school-imposed speech restrictions. 40 The first category, encompassing students' personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises, was explored by the Court in Tinker, a case that considered a school district's punishment of junior high and high school students who wore black armbands to school in opposition to the Vietnam War. In holding that the First Amendment did not permit such silencing of student opinion, the Court stated: 41 The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication among the students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is also an important part of the educational process. . . . When [a student] is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without materially and substantially interfering with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school and without colliding with the rights of others. 42 Id. at 512-13, 89 S.Ct. 733 (internal footnote, quotation marks, and alteration omitted and emphasis added). 43 Almost twenty years later, the Court in Hazelwood considered the relevance of Tinker 's material and substantial interference test for school censorship of student expression in the context of a class assignment. The speech at issue consisted of two articles that were written by students in a high school journalism class and that were to appear in a school newspaper published as part of the class's curriculum. The articles addressed pregnancy in the high school and the impact of divorce on the school's students. The school principal objected to their publication on the grounds that a) the pregnancy articles contained insufficient protections for the sources' anonymity and addressed subject matter that was too sensitive for the school's younger students, and b) that the author of the divorce article had not given the parents of some students profiled in the piece the opportunity to respond to some of the students' allegations. 6 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262-64, 108 S.Ct. 562. 44 In assessing the Hazelwood School District's actions, the Court deemed Tinker inapposite to the context of student expression that the court characterized as curricular and, hence, school-sponsored: 45 The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student speech — the question that we addressed in Tinker — is different from the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech. The former question addresses educators' ability to silence a student's personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises. The latter question concerns educators' authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school. These activities may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences. 46 Id. at 270-71, 108 S.Ct. 562 (emphasis added). Tinker 's material and substantial interference standard was, in the Court's view, insufficiently deferential to the prerogative of educators to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school. Id. at 271, 108 S.Ct. 562. Accordingly, Hazelwood held, educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.  Id. at 273, 108 S.Ct. 562 (emphasis added and footnote omitted). 47 Contrary to the Pecks' contention that [i]t is difficult to see how the Plaintiff's poster is any different than the armbands worn in the Tinker case, we think it clear that the facts in the record bring Antonio's poster, the vehicle of his censored expression, within Hazelwood's framework. It is undisputed that the poster was prepared by Antonio pursuant to a class assignment, and one that was given under highly specific parameters: to depict[] ways to save our environment and to reflect what had been taught in the kindergarten environmental unit. 7 Additionally, the posters were to be displayed at a school-sponsored assembly, to take place in the school cafeteria, to which parents of the kindergartners were invited. Aside from the students' posters, the environmental assembly included songs and other presentations that were prepared as part of the kindergarten curriculum. 48 These undisputed facts demonstrate that the poster assignment and the environmental assembly at which the posters were hung — perhaps even more starkly than in the context of the newspaper articles at issue in Hazelwood — were indisputably part of the school curriculum . . . . supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences. Id. at 271, 108 S.Ct. 562. See also Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289 (10th Cir.2004) (Few activities bear a school's `imprimatur' and `involve pedagogical interests' more significantly than speech that occurs within a classroom setting as part of a school's curriculum. (quoting Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 924 (10th Cir.2002)); Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208, 1214 (11th Cir.2004) (finding that a student's murals constituted school-sponsored expression because they were located in prominent school locations where members of the public might reasonably believe that they bore the imprimatur of the school); Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155-56 (6th Cir.1995) (Where learning is the focus, as in the classroom, student speech may be even more circumscribed than in the school newspaper or other open forum.). 49 Accordingly, we find the case before us to fall within the core of Hazelwood 's framework. And, the district court correctly concluded that the Hazelwood reasonable relation to legitimate pedagogical concerns test provides the appropriate lens through which to examine The District's censorship of Antonio's poster.