Opinion ID: 379233
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clause C

Text: 13 Clause C of Section 1985(2) is aimed at conspiracies designed to obstruct the due course of justice in any State or Territory. The conspiracy must be entered into with the intent to deny equal protection of the laws . . . . The district court held that plaintiffs failed to allege or show a conspiracy entered into with the intent to deny them equal protection of the law. We agree. 14 Exactly what evidence is required to establish that defendants entered into a conspiracy with the intent of denying plaintiffs equal protection of the law is not readily apparent. The starting point for this inquiry must be the Supreme Court's interpretation of similar language from Section 1985(3) in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971). Although the Supreme Court in Griffin was focusing on the language of Section 1985(3), this Court has held that, in light of its statutory roots, 8 clause C is to be interpreted in accordance with Griffin. Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1262, modified 583 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1978). 15 Griffin involved an assault on blacks traveling a Mississippi highway by white private citizens. The attack was racially motivated defendants acted on the mistaken belief that the plaintiffs were civil rights workers. The issue in Griffin was whether Section 1985(3) created a cause of action for damages against individuals acting in a purely private capacity. 16 The Court held that Section 1985(3) was designed to protect individuals from actions by private persons. The Court recognized, however, that Section 1985(3) was not intended to apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences (by private parties) with the rights of others. Id. 403 U.S. at 101, 102, 91 S.Ct. at 1798. The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, animus behind the conspiratorial actions. Id. at 102, 91 S.Ct. at 1798 (footnote omitted). Thus, since defendants in the case at bar are private parties, in determining whether plaintiffs have satisfied the requisites of clause C this Court must determine whether plaintiffs have established that defendants were motivated by the appropriate class-based, discriminatory animus. 17 We note from the start that not all classes of individuals fall within the protective cloak of clause C. See, e. g., McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (persons who have voluntarily filed a bankruptcy petition are not a protected class); Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930, 93 S.Ct. 1368, 35 L.Ed.2d 592 (1973) (doctors who have testified against their brethren in malpractice cases are not a protected class). The class that plaintiffs allege is the target of defendants' conspiracy is one that includes workers employed in the oil exploration industry who have pursued some type of personal injury claim. While personal injury claimants are undoubtedly a class for some purposes, the question in the case at bar is whether Congress intended to proscribe a conspiracy to obstruct the due course of justice aimed at personal injury claimants. A careful review of Congressional intent and the subsequent jurisprudence establishes that Section 1985(2), clause C was not designed to protect this class of plaintiffs. 18 There are two distinct genres of classes protected by clause C. The first category is defined by some courts as one where the class is characterized by some inherited or immutable characteristic. Perhaps the better definition is that recently endorsed by the Ninth Circuit in DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979). The Ninth Circuit held that in determining whether a group of individuals satisfies the class requirement of 1985(3), federal courts have remained faithful to the basis principle underlying the adoption of Section 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act: The governmental determination that some groups require and warrant special federal assistance in protecting their civil rights. Id. at 333. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1963) (Although the civil rights statutes were enacted in response to post-war conditions in the South, they are cast in general language and provide for flexibility). 19 The Supreme Court focused on the most obvious of this type of protected class in Griffin, when the Court held that conspirators who acted with a racially discriminatory animus could be found to be in violation of Section 1985(3). 9 Lower federal courts have extended this first category beyond race to encompass those who are victims of a conspiracy due to their sex, Life Insurance Company of North America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979); Curran v. Portland Superintending School Committee, 435 F.Supp. 1063 (D.Maine 1977); religion, Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973); or national origin, Id. 10 20 Plaintiffs are unable to establish that Congress or the judiciary has displayed a special solicitude towards their class because of its need for assistance in enforcing its civil rights. While this Court recognizes that the protective scope of the Act is not static, a class composed of personal injury claimants does not fall within this first category of classes protected by Section 1985(2), clause C. 21 There is a second category of classes encompassed by Sections 1985(2) and (3). This category includes individuals who are victims of a conspiracy because of their political beliefs or associations. 22 That Congress intended to protect individuals who are conspired against because of their political beliefs or associations is beyond doubt. Although the Ku Klux Klan is today thought of as a racist organization, in 1871 it was primarily a political organization. The Republicans, who controlled the 42d Congress, found Klan violence especially troublesome because they were convinced that it was politically motivated. Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(c) in Light of Its Original Purpose, 46 Univ.Chi.L.Rev. 402, 408 (1979). The majority report of the Senate Select Committee to Investigate Alleged Outrages in the Southern States reflected this concern: (I)t is clearly established . . . that the Ku Klux Organization does exist, has a political purpose, is composed of members of the democratic or conservative party, (and) has sought to carry out its purpose by murders, whippings, intimidations, and violence. H.R.Rep.No. 1, 42d Cong. 1st Sess. XXX-XXXI. The need to protect individuals being harassed because of their political associations rang throughout the Congressional debate. Senator George Edmunds of Vermont, who reported the bill out of committee, stated that: 23 We do not undertake in this bill to interfere with what might be called a private conspiracy growing out of a neighborhood feud of one man or set of men against another to prevent one getting an indictment in the State courts against men for burning down his barn; but, if in a case like this, it should appear that this conspiracy was formed against this man because he was a Democrat, if you please, or because he was a Catholic, or because he was a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter, (which is a pretty painful instance that I have in mind in the State of Florida within a few days where a man lost his life for that reason,) then this section could reach it. 24 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871), reprinted in A. Avins, The Reconstruction Amendments Debates 547 (1967) (emphasis added). Representative Ellis Roberts repeated this same concern when discussing, in the House, the need for legislation. 25 But one rule never fails: the victims whose property is destroyed, whose persons are mutilated, whose lives are sacrificed, are always Republicans. They may be black or white; they include those who wore the blue and those who wore the gray; new-comers and life-long residents, but only Republicans. Stain the door lintels with the mark of opposition to reconstruction and of hostility to the national Administration, and the destroying angel passes by. Omit that sign, and the torch may kindle the roof that covers women and children; the scourge may fall upon shoulders that stoop with weakness and with age; the bullet may pierce the breast without warning. Such uniformity of result can come only from design. Republicans only are beaten and mutilated and murdered, because the blows are aimed at Republicans only. 26 Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 412-413 (1871) (emphasis added). 27 Federal courts have recognized that those who are discriminated against because of political views or associations fall with the protective scope of Section 1985(2) and (3). Courts have found a class-based animus sufficient to support causes of action where the conspiracy is directed toward supporters of a particular political candidate, Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973) and Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958, 96 S.Ct. 1436, 47 L.Ed.2d 364 (1976); voters who were deceived about the actual effect of their vote, Smith v. Cherry, 489 F.2d 1098 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied 417 U.S. 910, 94 S.Ct. 2607, 41 L.Ed.2d 214 (1974); individuals critical of the President and his policies, Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 423 U.S. 930, 96 S.Ct. 280, 46 L.Ed.2d 258 (1975); members of a group advocating an unpopular position, Puentes v. Sullivan, 425 F.Supp. 249 (W.D.Tex.1977); laborers who are not members of a union, Scott v. Moore, 461 F.Supp. 224 (E.D.Tex.1978); members of the teaching profession who talk or associate with the CIA, Selzer v. Berkowitz, 459 F.Supp. 347 (E.D.N.Y.1978); and students who exercise their first amendment rights by joining certain organizations, Brown v. Villanova University, 378 F.Supp. 342 (E.D.Pa.1974). 28 Unfortunately for plaintiffs in the case at bar, this second category is of little assistance. Plaintiffs have provided no summary judgment evidence to establish that they are victims of a conspiracy because of their political views or associations. Rather, even assuming a conspiracy exists, the record indicates that the conspiracy is directed at plaintiffs because they filed personal injury claims. This is simply not the type class that is protected by the statute. 29 In summary, plaintiffs have not established the class-based, discriminatory animus that is required for a cause of action under Section 1985(2), clause C. The district court's grant of summary judgment on this portion of subsection (2) is affirmed. 11