Opinion ID: 221232
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Buckner's Girlfriend

Text: The regulations also provide that the ALJ will carefully consider any other information you may submit about your symptoms, including statements other persons provide about your pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). The regulation, however, does not define what is meant by careful consideration. When considering the issue, this court has not always insisted that the ALJ explicitly explain its reasons for discrediting a third-party's statements about the claimant's condition. In Robinson v. Sullivan, the ALJ explicitly discredited testimony from the claimant's wife but failed to discuss the reasons for doing so. 956 F.2d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 1992). We noted that it is clear that the ALJ specifically addressed [the wife's] testimony and found it not credible and that [t]his finding is supported by the same evidence that proved [the claimant's] claims not credible. Id. Ultimately, we affirmed the ALJ, explaining that [w]hile it is preferable that the ALJ delineate the specific credibility determinations for each witness, an arguable deficiency in opinion-writing technique does not require us to set aside an administrative finding when that deficiency had no bearing on the outcome. Id. (quotation and citation omitted). Three years later, in Lorenzen v. Chater, we again considered an argument that the ALJ erred by fail[ing] to list specific reasons for discrediting the testimony of a third party. 71 F.3d 316, 319 (8th Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, we affirmed the ALJ because it is evident that most of [the third party's] testimony concerning [the claimant's] capabilities was discredited by the same evidence that discredits [the claimant's] own testimony concerning his limitations. Id. Finally, in Willcockson, we considered an ALJ's failure to consider statements submitted by the claimant's mother, daughter, and sister. 540 F.3d at 880. We noted that we could not determine from the record whether the ALJ overlooked these statements, gave them some weight, or completely disregarded them. Id. Moreover, we question[ed] whether witness statements corroborating a claimant's subjective complaints can logically be treated as cumulative by assuming that they would have been rejected for the same reasons that the claimant statements were rejected. Id. at 881. This failure to address the third-party statementscombined with the ALJ's failure to explain the weight given to a nonexamining consultant's report and his insufficient assessment of the claimant's own statements compelled us to remand the case. Id. at 880-81. In the present case, although the ALJ did not expressly address the girlfriend's statement in his decision, the ALJ's error does not require remand. Unlike the statements in Robinson, the ALJ did not explicitly address the claims that Buckner's girlfriend made about Buckner's conditions. Rather, as in Willcockson, we cannot determine from the record whether the ALJ considered her statements at all. At the same time, much like the third-party statements Robinson and Lorenzen, the same evidence that the ALJ referred to in discrediting Buckner's claims also discredits the girlfriend's claims. Specifically, Buckner's girlfriend stated that Buckner cannot watch the children when she leaves the house. As noted above, the ALJ observed that Buckner, in his disability questionnaire and his hearing testimony, stated that he was able to care for his son. Buckner's girlfriend also claimed that Buckner could not work, would run out of breath easily, and had no energy. Although the ALJ did not address all of these specific claims, the ALJ did find that Buckner's own statements and hearing testimony show that he engages in a range of daily activities inconsistent with his allegation of disabling hypertension, headaches, back pain, hand cramps, shortness [of] breath, chest pains, depression and anxiety. Finally, the decision here did not suffer from the other deficiencies noted in Willcockson; most notably, as discussed supra, the ALJ here did sufficiently assess Buckner's credibility. Thus, we hold that the ALJ's arguable deficiency in opinion-writing technique, Robinson, 956 F.2d at 841 (quotation and citation omitted), had no bearing on the outcome of Buckner's case and does not require remand.