Opinion ID: 2541
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper Comments on Summation

Text: Spinelli contends he is entitled to a retrial because on summation the AUSA (1) without evidentiary basis asserted the government's ignorance of crimes committed by Gioia, (2) told the jury that the judge who sentenced Gioia had found his testimony truthful, and (3) vouched personally for the truthfulness of Spinelli and Gioia. As for the for the first contention, Spinelli protests the AUSA's statement, We didn't know the vast extent of his criminal background. Spinelli argues that this assertion was without support in the record. His contention is without merit. Gioia had testified that, to the best of his knowledge, the Government was not aware of his commission of his crimes until he revealed them. As for the second allegationabout the judge who sentenced GioiaSpinelli's argument mischaracterizes the AUSA's remark. The AUSA did not say to the jury that Gioia's sentencing judge found Gioia to be truthful in his testimony. In arguing to the jury that Gioia, having already testified against numerous other defendants and having already received his sentence, had no motive to fabricate accusations against Spinelli, the AUSA said that Gioia had received a light sentence of seven years imprisonment because he cooperated against numerous defendants. The evidence unquestionably showed that Gioia had testified against numerous defendants. This was not the same as telling the jury that Gioia's sentencing judge had found him to be truthful. Nonetheless, Spinelli is correct that the AUSA would have been better advised not to tell the jurors the sentencing judge's reasons for the sentence. The evidence before the jury did not reveal the sentencing judge's reasons. The judge's reasons, furthermore, were irrelevant to the argument being made, which was that Gioia's interest lay in telling the truth because, if he had lied, his cooperation agreement allowed the government to pursue additional charges against him. Although the judge's reasons would better have been left unsaid, this error had no significant consequence. Spinelli's third allegation raises a more serious problem. During the rebuttal summations, the AUSA said to the jury that not one of the cooperating witnesses ha[d] ever lied under oath or perjured themselves or falsely implicated anybody in a crime. It is improper for a government prosecutor to make such an assertion to the jury. [1] Such a statement, for starters, relies on matter outside the record of evidence presented to the jury. It says to the jury that the prosecutor, as a disinterested and objective officer of the government of the United States, has made a fair and thorough assessment of the witness's truthfulness (or alternatively possesses a special power to distinguish between truth and falsehood), and invites the jury to rely on an assurance furnished by the government of the United States of the witness's honesty. See United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (2d Cir.1981). By making these statements, the prosecutor put her own credibility at issue and implied the existence of extraneous proof which would support her assertion about the witnesses' credibility. See United States v. Drummond, 481 F.2d 62, 63-64 (2d Cir.1973); United States v. Rivera, 22 F.3d 430, 438 (2d Cir.1994). Even if the evidentiary record were reopened during summation to permit the receipt of new evidence, the prosecutor would not be competent to certify that a witness has testified honestly, much less that the witness has never falsely accused anyone. The prosecutor is of course entitled to argue forcefully and vigorously to the jury in support of her witness's credibility. But the argument must be based on evidence in the record. For example, as noted above, the AUSA was perfectly entitled to argue to the jury that Gioia's self-interest would lead him to testify truthfully because lies could expose him to further prosecution. The AUSA was undoubtedly entitled to rely on the fact that Gioia's testimony concerning Spinelli's admissions corroborated Basciano's description of what Spinelli did to further the attempt on Cappozalo, and vice versa; the AUSA was at liberty to argue that the testimony of each showed that the other was telling the truth. But the prosecutor is not entitled to tell the jurors that they may rely on her own assurances of the witness's truthfulness. Nor do we agree with the government's defense of the rebuttal summation in its brief to our court. Instead of relying on the harmlessness of the improper remark in the face of the powerful evidence of guilt, the government argues that a prosecutor may vouch personally for the honesty of government witnesses when the defense has the effrontery to argue to the jury that government witnesses have lied. See Gov't Brief at 63 (stating that where defense counsel engaged in persistent attacks on the credibility of the government's witnesses, it was proper for the AUSA to vouch for the honesty of the government witnesses). It is not misconduct for a defense attorney to argue on the basis of inferences drawn from the evidence (or the witness's demeanor) that a witness for the government has lied. When an accomplice in a criminal venture makes a cooperation agreement with the government and testifies against his prior criminal confederate, there is no impropriety in the defense attorney arguing to the jury that the cooperating witness has falsely accused the defendant in order to get a better deal for himself. Such arguments are made in virtually every case in which an accomplice testifies for the government under a cooperation agreement. They do not justify the prosecutor's telling the jury that the government's witnesses have never falsely implicated anyone in a crime [or] lied under oath or perjured themselves. [2] In support of the argument, the government cites United States v. LaSorsa, 480 F.2d 522 (2d Cir.1973), United States v. Rivera, 22 F.3d 430 (2d Cir.1994), and United States v. Myerson, 18 F.3d 153 (2d Cir.1994). These cases do not support the government's argument that a defendant's attack on a government witness's veracity justifies the government prosecutor in vouching for the witness's veracity. These cases deal with the very different circumstance of a defense attorney's gratuitous accusation, without basis in the evidence, that the government itself has suborned perjury and framed the defendant. In LaSorsa, 480 F.2d at 526, defense counsel had made open insinuations that the Government had without justification, staged a framed prosecution . . . because it needed to obtain convictions to respond to the public's outcry against narcotics pushers. In Rivera, 22 F.3d at 438, defense counsel repeatedly accused the government of having fabricated [the cooperating witness's] testimony; and in Myerson, 18 F.3d at 163 & n. 13, the defendant, summing up pro se, accused the prosecutor of having chosen to prosecute him because the defendant was too uppity . . . being a flamboyant, big, cigar smoking Jewish lawyer and because the prosecutor wanted a packed courtroom. In those circumstances, very different from a defendant's conventional evidence-based attack on the credibility of witnesses, we have allowed the government some latitude in defending because without it the government would have no way of responding. [3] Nothing in those cases, however, authorizes a prosecutor to give the jury a personal assurance of the truthfulness of the government's witnesses merely because the defense argued that the evidence supports an inference that the witnesses lied. [4] An inappropriate remark to the jury must be examined within the context of the trial to determine whether the prosecutor's behavior amounted to prejudicial error. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); United States v. Friedman, 909 F.2d 705, 709-10 (2d Cir.1990). Relevant factors are the severity of the misconduct, the measures adopted to cure the misconduct, and the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct. Friedman, 909 F.2d at 709-10; Modica, 663 F.2d at 1181. We conclude that the improper remarks do not justify disturbing the verdict. See Young, 470 U.S. at 12, 105 S.Ct. 1038. They did not play a significant role in the trial. The evidence of Spinelli's guilt was powerful and well corroborated. In the face of the evidence, there is no reason to doubt that the verdict would have been the same without the inappropriate remark. [5]