Opinion ID: 707629
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adjustment for Restraint of Victim

Text: 17 Section 3A1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides: If a victim was physically restrained in the course of the offense, increase by 2 levels. Vought does not dispute the district court's factual finding that he physically restrained coconspirators Deanna Maurer and Charles Smith. He argues, however, that the district court erred by applying the two-level enhancement because a coconspirator is not a victim within the meaning of section 3A1.3. We review the district court's interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Buenrostro-Torres, 24 F.3d 1173, 1174 (9th Cir.1994). We review the court's factual findings for clear error. Id. 18 Neither the Guidelines nor case law definitively resolves the question of whether restraint of a coconspirator is conduct that can trigger application of section 3A1.3. The application notes following section 3A1.3 do not define victim, and no reported case has addressed this precise issue. For the following reasons, we conclude that section 3A1.3 does apply to the restraint of coconspirators, when the restraint occurs, as it did here, in furtherance of the conspiracy. 19 We agree with Vought that his coconspirators are not victims of the drug and money laundering offenses for which he was convicted. We do not believe, however, that this fact precludes application of section 3A1.3. We read that section as reflecting Congress' intent to punish an offense in the course of which the offender restrains someone more severely than a similar offense in which there is no such restraint. Cf. United States v. Tholl, 895 F.2d 1178, 1185 (7th Cir.1990). 1 The wording of the guideline, in the course of the offense, does not limit it to victims of the offense of conviction. Because the evil against which the enhancement is directed is physical restraint of a person, we interpret the word victim as referring to a victim of the restraint rather than a victim of the offense of conviction. The issue of whether the restraint was in furtherance of the conspiracy, in United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 265 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 362, 121 L.Ed.2d 275 (1992), arose because the individual sentenced was acquitted of having assaulted the victim, so the issue was whether he could be held liable for his coconspirators' confinement of the victim. The vicarious liability issue of Harris does not arise in the case at bar because Vought himself restrained his coconspirators. 20 We agree with the district court that Vought's restraint of Maurer and Smith was in furtherance of the drug conspiracy of which he was convicted. 2 We hold that the district court did not err by applying the two-level enhancement for restraint of a victim.