Opinion ID: 2754415
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Quincy Jamal Williams

Text: Appellant similarly argues that an agreement existed between prosecutors and Williams, claiming Williams was facing first-degree murder charges, but was permitted to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter in exchange for his testimony in Appellant’s case. As proof of this alleged agreement, Appellant references Williams’ testimony from the PCRA hearing stating that he testified in Appellant’s case because the prosecutor promised him that he would be released on parole, and that his testimony was false and based on information fed to him by the prosecutor and detectives. Appellant also refers to a letter First Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) Daniel J. McDevitt wrote to the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole two years after Appellant’s trial acknowledging Williams’ cooperation in the case and a letter Williams wrote to ADA McDevitt in 2003 inquiring into their “deal” regarding his parole. In addressing Appellant’s Brady claim, the PCRA court concluded that no credible evidence established that prosecutors promised Williams parole in exchange for his testimony in Appellant’s case. PCRA Court Opinion, 9/4/12, at 58. Specifically, the PCRA court observed that, while Williams testified during the PCRA hearing regarding an alleged agreement he had with prosecutors in exchange for his testimony, credible evidence proved otherwise, as ADA McDevitt testified during the PCRA hearing that Williams’ cooperation in Appellant’s case had no influence on his office’s decision to allow Williams to plead guilty to involuntary manslaughter, and that prosecutors made no specific sentencing recommendations and did not ask for leniency on Williams’ behalf. The PCRA court further noted that ADA McDevitt explicitly stated in a 2003 letter to [J-46-2013] - 16 Williams that no deal existed between them, and that, although ADA McDevitt did, in fact, write a letter to the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole advising the Board of Williams’ cooperation in Appellant’s case, he did so at the request of Williams’ mother, and the letter did not represent that an agreement existed between Williams and law enforcement. Based on the foregoing, the PCRA court concluded that, “[w]hile Williams may have harbored the subjective hope that at some point his testimony would garner a benefit, there is no credible evidence supporting the conclusion that Mr. McDevitt, or anyone in law reinforcement [sic], promised him parole upon the service of his minimum sentence.” Id. at 59 (footnote omitted). We agree. While Appellant bases his claim on Williams’ testimony, the PCRA court specifically found the testimony was incredible. Appellant’s reliance on his earlier plea agreement and ADA McDevitt’s letter to the Parole Board is similarly unavailing. Indeed, Williams entered his open guilty plea and was sentenced in July 1998, months before Appellant’s trial began, and ADA McDevitt’s parole letter makes no reference to an agreement with Williams and, in fact, states that Williams’ cooperation with law enforcement was entirely voluntary. Further, although, as noted above, Williams referenced a deal in his letter to ADA McDevitt, ADA McDevitt’s letter in response explicitly rejected the existence of an agreement between Williams and the Commonwealth. Accordingly, because Appellant has failed to establish with credible evidence that an agreement existed between Williams and the Commonwealth, his claim fails.