Opinion ID: 1159431
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Appeal on the Merits

Text: (1) Defendant cites as prejudicial misconduct requiring reversal a statement by plaintiff's counsel during argument referring to a favorable verdict he had received in a previous case in the same court. Assuming that this isolated aside was misconduct, although it was neither emphasized nor repeated and was terminated by defendant's timely objection, it could not have been prejudicial. In addition to the seemingly innocuous nature of the remark, any possible prejudice was surely removed by the trial court's immediate and proper admonition to the jury that they must disregard any reference to any other case. (See Sabella v. Southern Pac. Co. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 311, 318 [74 Cal. Rptr. 534, 449 P.2d 750], and cases cited therein.) (2) One Davey, an electrical contractor called as an expert witness by plaintiff, was asked several hypothetical questions framed in terms of who should pay  the general contractor or the subcontractor  for certain types of work. The trial court properly sustained defendant's objections to this approach and limited the questions to the existence of a custom and usage in the electrical contracting business. (3) Defendant asserts that custom or usage is inadmissible to vary the terms of a written contract (see C.J. Wood, Inc. v. Sequoia Union High School Dist. (1962) 199 Cal. App.2d 433, 436 [18 Cal. Rptr. 647]); but it refers us to no specific provisions in the voluminous general contract  incorporated by reference in the subcontract  which are purportedly varied by the testimony of the witness. If there was a custom or usage which was admissible in evidence, Davey, as an unchallenged expert witness, could properly testify to its existence, even if his testimony thereby embrace[d] the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. (Evid. Code, § 805.) (4) Finally, defendant complains that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that Any loss arising from errors and ambiguity in the plans and specifications occasioned by the acts of the owner's architect shall fall upon the general contractor and not upon the subcontractor, as between the general contractor and the subcontractor. This is said to be too broad a generalization, as the general contractor would not be liable if, for example, the extra work was due to the subcontractor's negligence in assessing the plans, and in any event it would not be liable unless it had ordered, directed, or authorized the subcontractor to do the extra work. Although the instruction complained of, if isolated, might be erroneous, a reading of the entire charge to the jury reveals that this broad statement was qualified substantially. The jury was instructed, inter alia, that the subcontractor could not recover for work included under the contract; that it could not recover for extras occasioned by incomplete or confusing plans if reasonable care would have put it on notice of the error or confusion; and that recovery could be had only for extra work ordered by the general contractor in writing, unless this requirement had been waived. Viewing the questioned instruction in context, we perceive no error.