Opinion ID: 2831329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The MSA in This Case

Text: The MSA in this case contains a broad range of provisions governing conservatorship of the child, responsibility for health insurance and medical expenses for the child, child support, possession of and access to the child, and allocation of other parental rights and duties. Included among these is the protective provision enjoining Scott from being within five miles of the child at all times, requiring Stephanie to provide Benjamin with information on Scott’s whereabouts during 16 The mediator in the underlying case was Judge Leta Parks. Judge Parks was an associate judge in Harris County for eighteen years and is board-certified in family law. She is a former President of Gulf Coast Family Law Specialists and a former President of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, Texas Chapter. 20 her visits with the child, and allowing Benjamin to monitor compliance with the provision.17 Compliance with the MSA, then, means the child will have no contact with Scott. As is relevant to section 153.0071, the MSA is signed by the parties and their lawyers,18 and it displays in boldfaced, capitalized, and underlined letters that it is irrevocable; thus, it meets the statutory requirements described in that statute to make the agreement binding on Stephanie and Benjamin. See TEX . FAM . CODE § 153.0071(d). Additionally, the parties admit that Benjamin was not a victim of family violence, and thus the exception in subsection (e-1) does not apply. The trial court nevertheless denied the motion to enter judgment on the MSA and set the matter for trial based on the court’s conclusion that the MSA was not in the child’s best interest.19 Because section 153.0071 did not permit the court to do so, the court’s actions were an abuse of discretion. 17 The dissent expresses concern that the injunction provision is directed more at Scott, a nonparty, than at Stephanie. See ___ S.W .3d at ___. W e agree that the provision could have been more artfully worded, but the intent is clear: Stephanie may not allow the child to come within five miles of Scott. Further, in entering judgment on an MSA, trial courts may include “[t]erms necessary to effectuate and implement the parties’ agreement” so long as they do not substantively alter it. Haynes v. Haynes, 180 S.W .3d 927, 930 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). Thus, to the extent there is no dispute about the parties’ intent, the trial court has discretion to provide clarification of this or any other provision. In the unlikely event the parties disagree on the intent of this provision, that dispute may be resolved in accordance with the terms of the MSA. Milner v. Milner, 361 S.W .3d 615, 622 (Tex. 2012). 18 Benjamin’s argument that the M SA does not meet the statutory requirements because it is not signed by the Office of the Attorney General of Texas (the Office) misunderstands the signature requirement. He argues that the statute requires the signature of the Office because the Office is “a party to this litigation.” However, the statute only requires the signature of “each party to the agreement.” T EX . F AM . C O D E § 153.0071(d)(2) (emphasis added). Because the Office is not a party to the agreement, its signature is not required for the MSA to be binding. 19 The dissent characterizes the trial court's rejection of the MSA as being based on the trial court’s “clear[] determin[ation], based on Stephanie's own admissions, that Stephanie has little regard for court orders to protect children from her sex-offender husband, and that she has repeatedly made decisions against her daughter's best interest, which put her daughter at substantial risk.” ___ S.W .3d at ___. But the trial court made no such findings. As noted above, the trial court stated only that the MSA “is not in the best interest of the child[].” 21