Opinion ID: 2338632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: proof of age

Text: Issues that implicate jurisdiction, statutory interpretation, and constitutional interpretation are subject to unlimited review by this court. State v. Bello, 289 Kan. 191, 195, 211 P.3d 139 (2009). We have previously determined that a defendant's age of 18 or older is an element of the off-grid Jessica's Law aggravated indecent liberties charged in this case. See, e.g., State v. Sellers, 292 Kan. 117, 132, 253 P.3d 20 (2011); State v. Gonzales, 289 Kan. 351, 370, 212 P.3d 215 (2009). Accordingly, if the defendant's age was not submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), the sentencing court is precluded from imposing the enhanced off-grid severity level sentence. Bello, 289 Kan. at 199-200, 211 P.3d 139. When the trial record shows evidence of age that was overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted, the failure to give the jury an instruction on the element of age in Jessica's Law cases may be harmless. See, e.g., State v. Huerta-Alvarez, 291 Kan. 247, Syl. ¶ 7, 243 P.3d 326 (2010); State v. Reyna, 290 Kan. 666, 682, 234 P.3d 761, cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 532, 178 L.Ed.2d 391 (2010). If the trial record does not include such evidence, we have held that the defendant can be exposed to punishment only for the on-grid form of the crime. See, e.g., Sellers, 292 Kan. at 133, 253 P.3d 20; Bello, 289 Kan. at 199-200, 211 P.3d 139; Gonzales, 289 Kan. at 371, 212 P.3d 215. In this case, the amended information did not allege that Hernandez was 18 or older at the time of the crimes, but it did list his year of birth as 1988, with the crime committed on December 16, 2007. At trial, an officer testified that a mother was calling stating there was an approximately 20-year-old Hispanic male in bed with their 12-year-old daughter. The victim testified that she was 11 years old at the time of trial. The victim's mother, B.F., testified that she had never met Hernandez before the night of the offense. She also testified that she had no idea what she said on the 911 call because she was upset and simply wanted an officer to arrive quickly. This testimony is weak because B.F. had no reason to know Hernandez' age and misstated the age of her own daughter. The victim's father, R.F., testified that Hernandez was friends with his son. The State argues this testimony suggests Hernandez was the same age as R.F.'s son. But according to R.F., Hernandez called several times wanting R.F., not his son, to come over and hang out. Hernandez eventually came to the house to visit with R.F., although neither the 19-year-old son nor the 14-year-old son was home that evening. Whether Hernandez was friends with R.F. or either of his sons, this evidence does not establish Hernandez' age at the time of these crimes. The trial record in this case does not show overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted evidence that Hernandez was 18 years old or older at the time of his crimes. Ordinarily, we would remand for resentencing for the on-grid form of the crime. See, e.g., Sellers, 292 Kan. at 133, 253 P.3d 20; Bello, 289 Kan. at 199-200, 211 P.3d 139; Gonzales, 289 Kan. at 371, 212 P.3d 215. But we are reversing Hernandez' convictions on other grounds and therefore we do not ordinarily address other claims of error. In this situation, we would address other claims of error for only two reasons: (1) to provide guidance to the trial court on issues likely to arise on remand; or (2) to determine a sufficiency of the evidence claim for double jeopardy purposes. See Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 671-72, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896) (double jeopardy does not apply to bar retrial where defendant appeals and obtains reversal based on error in the proceeding); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16-18, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (recognizing exception to Ball where conviction is reversed for evidentiary insufficiency; a reversal based on a determination the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict is akin to a determination the trial court should have entered a judgment of acquittal warranting the double jeopardy protection); State v. Dumars, 37 Kan.App.2d 600, 608, 154 P.3d 1120 (2007) (citing Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 39, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 [1988], and Burks, 437 U.S. at 18, 98 S.Ct. 2141). The question, then, is whether a violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), is a determination that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction within the meaning of the United States Supreme Court's double jeopardy jurisprudence. As noted below, double jeopardy does not apply to noncapital sentencing determinations. It is an open question whether the requirement of Apprendi that sentencing facts are the functional equivalent of elements of an offense for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, 530 U.S. at 494, n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348affects that double jeopardy principle. The Supreme Court has not resolved the question, we have never addressed it, and the parties have not raised and briefed it. Therefore, we find it is not appropriate to determine it sua sponte here and now. Under current Supreme Court precedent, double jeopardy principles do not apply in the sentencing context. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 724, 118 S.Ct. 2246, 141 L.Ed.2d 615 (1998). A narrow exception exists, however, for capital sentencing proceedings. Monge, 524 U.S. at 730, 118 S.Ct. 2246; Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 439, 445, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981) (double jeopardy applies to capital sentencing proceedings that have the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence[;] a jury's determination the prosecution did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt facts necessary to impose a sentence of death is an acquittal under double jeopardy and thus double jeopardy bars the State from seeking the death penalty on retrial). Monge was decided before Apprendi and was based on double jeopardy's distinction between facts that are elements of a criminal offense and facts that go only to the sentence [.] Monge, 524 U.S. at 738, 118 S.Ct. 2246 (Scalia, J., dissenting). At the time Monge was decided, that same distinction also delimit[ed] the boundaries of other important constitutional rights, like the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury and the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 524 U.S. at 738, 118 S.Ct. 2246 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Presaging the Apprendi decision, Justice Scalia argued for elimination of the distinction. Apprendi eliminated the distinction between certain sentencing facts and elements of an offense for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Nevertheless, an Apprendi violation is a sentencing error. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (Sixth Amendment right to jury trial is violated [w]hen [the] judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow). This frames the fundamental question for noncapital sentencing determinations: does Apprendi 's elimination of the distinction between sentencing facts and elements for purposes of the right to jury trial extend to other constitutional rights like double jeopardy? There is no clear answer. The Supreme Court has hinted that Monge, which relied on the distinction between sentencing facts and elements of the offense in holding that double jeopardy does not apply to noncapital sentencing determinations, may be subject to question in light of Apprendi. See Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 111-12, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (citing Monge, 524 U.S. at 738, 118 S.Ct. 2246 [Scalia, J., dissenting]) (`The fundamental distinction between facts that are elements of a criminal offense and facts that go only to the sentence ' not only `delimits the boundaries of... important constitutional rights, like the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury,' but also `provides the foundation for our entire double jeopardy jurisprudence.'). At this point, though, Monge remains good law; double jeopardy does not apply to noncapital sentencing determinations. Whether Apprendi would or should change that rule is the kind of question that should be resolved only after thorough consideration based on a full presentation of the question through briefing and argument. This is but one question that may be litigated upon remand. We have no doubt that skilled advocates would be able to identify others and present persuasive arguments elaborating on or countering the issues relating to potential retrial. By engaging in speculative conclusions without benefit of a district court ruling and the resulting briefs and arguments on appeal, the dissent has engaged in a pick-off play without realizing there are no runners on base. `The premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them.' National Aeronautics and Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 746, 757, n. 10, 178 L.Ed.2d 667 (2011) (quoting Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 [C.A.D.C. 1983] [opinion for the Court by Scalia, J.]); see also State v. Puckett, 230 Kan. 596, 600-01, 640 P.2d 1198 (1982) (When exceptional circumstances justify an appellate court's sua sponte consideration of an issue not raised on appeal, the parties must be given a fair opportunity to brief the new issue and to present their positions to the appellate court before the issue is finally determined.). Only after this issue has been briefed, argued, and decided at the trial court and consequently briefed and argued on appeal would this issue be ripe for decision by this court.