Opinion ID: 6534454
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: 586C Stevens v. Czerniak

Text: Fifteen years later, in Stevens , this court confirmed what Oregon lawyers had long understood was the state of the law regarding expert discovery. In that mandamus proceeding, this court considered whether the trial court had impermissibly ordered the petitioner, who in the underlying case was seeking post-conviction relief, to provide pretrial disclosure of his expert witnesses'  names and anticipated testimony. 336 Or. at 394 , 84 P.3d 140 . The court in Stevens described, in general terms, ORCP 36 B(4) as the Council had promulgated it: The rule required the parties, upon request, to disclose their experts' names and addresses and the subject matter upon which the parties expected their experts to testify. 336 Or. at 403-04 , 84 P.3d 140 . The court described the highlights of testimony from two of the witnesses who testified before the Joint House-Senate Committee on the Judiciary, an attorney member of the Council who was in favor of subsection B(4) and another attorney who was opposed. Id. at 404 , 84 P.3d 140 . The court noted that, after both sides explored that debate over several hearings, a majority of the joint committee found the opponents' arguments persuasive. Id. The majority's opinion rests in large part on its view that  Stevens can be understood as recognizing a legislative intent to bar parties from discovering the identities of expert witnesses who fall into the three classes of expert witnesses addressed in the federal rule and the Merrill memorandum-expert witnesses who acquired or developed facts or opinions in anticipation of litigation or for trial-and the substance of their opinions. Ransom , 363 Or. at 565-68, 425 P.3d at 419-21. Yet that understanding of what the 1979 Legislative Assembly intended is unsupported by the Stevens opinion itself and is incorrect considering the legislative history of ORCP 36 B. The court in Stevens never concluded that the legislature had recognized a bar on discovery of only one class of expert witness, that is, retained experts or, similar to retained experts, in-house employee experts, as described in the federal discovery rule. Rather, the Stevens court recognized that Oregon practice barring expert discovery-not disapproval of expert discovery as framed in FRCP 26(b)(4),  as the majority assumes, see Ransom , 363 Or. at 565-68, 425 P.3d at 419-21-was the defining factor in the legislature's decision to take out ORCP 36 B(4) as promulgated by the Council on Court Procedures. 2 It bears emphasizing that this court's key conclusions in Stevens were that (1)  the legislature neither understood nor intended that ORCP 36 B(1) would authorize discovery of nonprivileged expert testimony -contrary to plaintiff's argument in this court and the majority's holding-and (2) the form of ORCP 36 B that was adopted reflected a legislative policy choice to continue the practice of not authorizing expert discovery in civil actions in state courts. Stevens , 336 Or. at 404 , 84 P.3d 140 (emphasis added). Indeed, the history of the Council's work on ORCP 36 B(4) illustrates how far the Council's rule was from FRCP 26(a)(4) when it was submitted to the legislature. A September 1978 tentative draft of ORCP 36 B(4) provided, in subsection (a): Subject to the provisions of Rule 44, upon request of any party, any other party shall deliver a written statement signed by the other party or the other party's attorney, giving the name of any person the other party reasonably expects to call as an expert witness at trial, and stating the areas in which it is claimed the witness is qualified to testify as an expert, the facts by reason of which it is claimed the witness is an expert, and the subject matter upon which the expert is expected to testify. The statement shall be accompanied by a written report prepared by the expert which shall set forth the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert will testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. If such expert witness relies in forming an opinion, in whole or in part, upon facts, data or opinions contained in a  document or made known to such  expert witness by or through another person, the party may also discover with respect thereto as provided in this subsection. The report and statement shall be delivered within a reasonable time after the request is made and not less than 30 days prior to the commencement of trial unless the identity of a person to be called as an expert witness at the trial is not determined until less than 30 days prior to trial, or unless the request is made less than 30 days prior to trial. 5 Legislative History Relating to Promulgation, Proposed Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, Tentative Draft (Sept. 15, 1978) 84-85. The Background Note to that subsection explained that ORCP 36 B(4) is a new provision drafted by the Council and deals only with experts to be called at trial and leaves regulation of discovery from experts employed, retained or consulted by an opponent but not to be called at trial to existing rules relating to privilege and fairness as developed by statute or cases. Id. at 88. That tentative draft was based on the rule that Professor Merrill had recommended to the Council on Court Procedures in his memorandum titled Discovery of Experts: Rule 26(b)(4) and the Bodyfelt Proposal in 2 Legislative History Relating to Promulgation of Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure (Merrill Memorandum). Merrill explained that his recommended rule was based on the Bodyfelt rule, with some modifications, and described it as the better approach to regulation of discovery of experts. Merrill Memorandum at 22. The heart of the Bodyfelt proposal was to have testifying experts provide written statements, and then, if necessary, the experts could be deposed. Merrill also opined that what he called the Graham proposal from Professor Michael H. Graham of the University of Illinois Law School was an improvement over FRCP 26(b)(4) ; the Graham proposal included authorization for discovery from testifying expert witnesses, not limited to any specific discovery device. Id. at 19-20, 22. In Merrill's view, Graham's work indicated that the expert discovery rule should avoid limiting the scope of discovery where there is a high and demonstrated need. Id. at 22. Merrill explained that [t]here is such a high need for discovery of experts to be called at trial, as opposed to non-trial expert witnesses. Id. He also  explained that the draft rule he recommended was in part based on Graham's proposal. Id. at 23. But the September 1978 tentative draft was not promulgated by the Council. As Merrill later explained in a summary of Rules 36 to 46 that he presented to the legislature in March 1979, once the Council received public comment on the draft of ORCP 36 B(4), the Council determined that this rule might create, rather than solve, problems and promulgated only a rule requiring a party to identify proposed expert witnesses. Any actual discovery from those witnesses would remain as it was before under existing case law defining the scope of discovery. Exhibit A, Joint House-Senate Committee on the Judiciary, HB 3131, Mar. 8, 1979 (Summary of Rules 36 - 46 ). Instead, in December 1978, the Council adopted a narrow version of ORCP 36 B(4). As promulgated, ORCP 36 B(4)(a) read: Upon request of any party, any other party shall deliver a written statement signed by the other party or the other party's attorney giving the name and address of any person the other party reasonably expects to call as an expert witness at trial and the subject matter upon which the expert is expected to testify. The statement shall be delivered within a reasonable time after the request is made and not less than 30 days prior to the commencement of trial unless the identity of a person to be called as an expert witness at the trial is not determined until less than 30 days prior to trial, or unless the request is made less than 30 days prior to trial. Council on Court Procedures, Amendments to ORCP 26 Promulgated by Council of Court Procedures 1980 to 2016: 1978 Original Promulgation, ORCP 36, http://counciloncourtprocedures.org/Content/Legislative_History_of_Rules/ORCP_36_promulgations_all_years.pdf (accessed Aug. 8, 2018). It is apparent that the legislature was not presented with a rule that looked like  FRCP 26(b)(4), which then permitted a party to require one who intends to use the expert to state the substance of the testimony that the expert is expected to give, but a court may order further discovery. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26, Notes of Advisory  Committee on Rules-1970 Amendment, https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_26 (accessed Aug. 8, 2018). But even as spare as it was, ORCP 36 B(4)'s identification requirement sparked controversy-and, as the Stevens decision indicates, much testimony and discussion before the Joint House-Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The committee heard repeatedly that discovery of testifying experts was not the practice in Oregon. A Portland lawyer explained that ORCP 36 B(4) as promulgated was a departure from present law, in that there is no duty to disclose the names of expert witnesses. Exhibit B, Joint House-Senate Committee on the Judiciary, HB 3131, Mar. 8, 1979, (Comments Concerning the Proposed Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure by Donald N. Atchison). Linn County Circuit Court Judge Wendell H. Tompkins, a member of the Council on Court Procedures, also testified before the committee. He explained that under Oregon procedure, the litigants are not entitled to depose the opposing expert with respect to his expert opinion. The proposed rule does not change that at all. Tape Recording, Joint House-Senate Committee on the Judiciary, HB 3131, Mar. 8, 1979, Tape 2, Side A (statement of Judge Wendell H. Tomkins). In response to a question by Senator Vernon Cook regarding potential gamesmanship as a result of the disclosure of experts, Judge Tompkins said that he did not see the question that Senator Cook had posed as being a substantial problem in state circuit courts because as a general proposition, you can't depose an expert anyway. Id. When Senator Cook later stated that he would think that, logically, if there were discovery, then a party should be able to pull in the other side's expert witnesses and find out what they are going to say, Judge Tompkins responded that, although that was the predominant practice in the country, it hasn't been the rule in Oregon for a long time. He added, It hasn't worked too badly. Id. (statements of Sen. Vernon Cook and Judge Wendell H. Tompkins). In sum, the major premise of the majority opinion-that the legislature intended to strike down what was essentially a federal rule that permitted discovery only of retained expert witnesses and to bar discovery of their  expert opinions, and not those of participating experts-is not supported by Stevens or the legislative history of ORCP 36 B(4). Instead, the Council put forward a narrow disclosure rule that was directed at all testifying experts, and the legislature rejected it. The fact that the legislature that reviewed ORCP 36 B was aware that Oregon courts generally did not permit discovery of expert witnesses and made a considered decision to uphold that practice by removing ORCP 36 B(4) as promulgated by the Council, in addition to this court's recognition of Oregon's no-expert-discovery practice in Stevens , should be matters of consequence in our consideration of the present question.