Opinion ID: 1979819
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion for civil contempt for failure to pay child support. [12]

Text: López contends that the trial court also abused its discretion by finding him in contempt absent sufficient evidence of his ability to pay. [13] It is settled that a court has discretion to adjudicate a person in contempt of court for wilful failure to obey an order of child support where the contemnor has the financial ability to comply. Desai, supra note 12, 711 A.2d at 825 (citations omitted); see also Hoffman v. Hoffman, 210 A.2d 549, 550 (D.C.1965) (court may enforce a father's obligation to support his minor children only commensurate with his financial ability to pay) (quotations and citation omitted). Ability to pay is not merely a function of actual earnings but is to be derived, more broadly, from earning capacity in the current job market, given one's educational background and work experience. Freeman v. Freeman, 397 A.2d 554, 556 (D.C.1979). When faced with a contempt motion for noncompliance with a support order, the defendant bears the burden of showing inability to pay. See Smith, supra note 12, 427 A.2d at 932 (citations omitted). We note first that the record before us on appeal is incomplete due to the fact that a portion of the official transcript of the March 1, 1996 hearing, containing the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, is unavailable, apparently through no fault of the parties. See supra note 1. Absent the complete transcript, we are unable to review the trial court's March 1, 1996 ruling granting appellee's motion for contempt. We, therefore, direct the parties' attention to D.C.App. R. 10(d) which outlines the conditions under which, by special leave of this court, a party may prepare and submit a statement of proceedings and evidence in lieu of an official transcript to enable appellate review. We further note, however, that should the parties and the trial court agree that the unofficial portion of the March 1, 1996 transcript, attached to appellee's brief on appeal, is an accurate statement of the proceedings, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to grant the contempt motion for the reasons that follow. The trial court explicitly found that López had the financial ability to make child support payments, but failed to do so. Assuming that the official transcript of the March 1, 1996 hearing is as presented in the attachment to Ysla's brief, this finding is supported by López's testimony which suggested that he actually earned more than his reported gross income, [14] as well as certain statements which indicated that, on months where he had few business expenses, he failed to pay child support. [15] In particular, the trial court questioned López's decisions to pay other debts rather than cover his child support obligations. [16] Although López complains that the trial court overestimated his limited net income during the relevant time period, the trial court's findings in the unofficial transcript, if verified, are supported by the record. See Smith, supra note 13, 427 A.2d at 932. Moreover, based on the unverified record, the trial court's determination that López was not a credible witness is not clearly erroneous. See Johnson v. United States, 616 A.2d 1216, 1234 (D.C.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 996, 113 S.Ct. 1611, 123 L.Ed.2d 172 (1993) (noting deference to the trial court's credibility determinations respecting witnesses who testify). Finally, the trial court determined that, whatever López's actual income might be, he had the ability to meet his fundamental obligation to go out and earn money and support these children. [17] We conclude, on the basis of the unofficial transcript, that there is clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court's finding that López violated a support order that he had the ability to pay. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding López in civil contempt for noncompliance with the support order, but staying execution of the order on the condition that López meet his payment obligations. See Smith, supra note 12, 427 A.2d at 932 (A court may order commitment for contempt but stay imprisonment on the condition of compliance with reasonable, specific requirements.) For the foregoing reasons, we remand to the trial court for a hearing on López's motion to reduce, at which time López may present evidence in support of his claim that he made consistent child support payments to Barbara Kolb between July 1994 and June 1995 and any other evidence necessary to justify his claim for a reduction in child support payments. Absent an official transcript of the trial court's March 1, 1996 ruling, we also remand on the contempt issue to give López, in conjunction with Ysla and the trial court, the opportunity to prepare a statement of the proceedings. Reversed and remanded.