Opinion ID: 2299913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Price Case

Text: In Price, Maryland parted ways with the Supreme Court's long-standing jurisprudence allowing inconsistent jury verdicts. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984). In Price, Baltimore City police officers, conducting surveillance of an apartment complex where drugs were known to be sold, observed Lawrence Price standing in a breezeway with approximately 15 other persons. Price, 405 Md. at 12-13, 949 A.2d at 621. The officers observed the people around Price, but not Price himself, receiving cash and, in return, dispensing small objects. Price, 405 Md. at 13, 949 A.2d at 621. After observing these perceived drug transactions, the officers called for back-up and approached the breezeway. Id. Everyone fled. Id. Price and another man ran to the third floor of an apartment building in the complex and locked themselves inside an apartment. Id. Because the man running with Price dropped along their route what the officers thought were drugs, they requested a key from the apartment manager in order to investigate further. Id. The officers entered the apartment and arrested Price, who threw to the floor a bag containing a handgun and cash. Id. Price was charged with 18 counts of drug and firearm charges. Id. Three of the charges were drug trafficking crimes, including possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. Price, 405 Md. at 14, 949 A.2d at 621. Nine of the charges charged conspiracies with intent to distribute or possess heroin, cocaine, or marijuana. Id. Price was charged also with possessing a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, possession of a regulated firearm after being convicted previously of a disqualifying crime, and unlawfully carrying or transporting a firearm. Price, 405 Md. at 14, 949 A.2d at 621-22. Rounding out the array were charges of simple possession of marijuana, cocaine, and heroin. Price, 405 Md. at 14, 949 A.2d at 622. Among the jury instructions given at trial, the judge instructed the jury that it could find Price guilty of possessing a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense only if it convicted him also of one of the drug trafficking offenses. Id. The jury acquitted Price of the drug trafficking charges and conspiracies. Price, 405 Md. at 15, 949 A.2d at 622. Price was acquitted also of the possession of a regulated firearm after conviction for a disqualifying felony and the unlawful wearing, carrying, or transporting of a firearm charges. Id. In spite of the trial judge's instruction, however, the jury convicted Price of possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Id. Price was convicted also of the simple drug possession charges. Id. Price moved to strike the guilty verdicts contending that they were inconsistent impermissibly. Id. The trial court, after receiving legal memoranda on the issue from both parties, denied Price's motion because prior cases from this Court and the federal courts allowed inconsistent verdicts generally. Id. Price appealed timely to the Court of Special Appeals, which upheld the inconsistent verdicts. Price, 405 Md. at 17, 949 A.2d at 623-24. We approached Price's appeal by accepting the premise that there was theretofore a general rule allowing inconsistent verdicts in Maryland. Price, 405 Md. at 18-21, 949 A.2d at 624-26. The Court noted the historic role of the jury in our judicial system and the various explanations for inconsistent verdicts, including juror lenity, mistake, or compromise. Price, 405 Md. at 18-19, 949 A.2d at 624. Judge Eldridge, writing for the Court in Price, noted several cases from this Court that upheld inconsistent verdicts. Price, 405 Md. at 18-19, 949 A.2d at 624 (citing, among others, State v. Williams, 397 Md. 172, 189, 916 A.2d 294, 305 (2007); Wright v. State, 307 Md. 552, 576, 515 A.2d 1157, 1169 (1986); Shell v. State, 307 Md. 46, 54, 512 A.2d 358, 362 (1986); Galloway v. State, 371 Md. 379, 408, 809 A.2d 653, 671 (2002)). The Court observed, however, that there also were recognized exceptions to the general rule when inconsistent verdicts were disallowed, including cases where inconsistent verdicts arose in the context of rulings in a bench trial or a trial where some counts were submitted to the trial judge and some to the jury. Price, 405 Md. at 19, 949 A.2d at 624-25 (citing Williams, 397 Md. at 189-90, 916 A.2d at 305; Shell, 307 Md. at 55, 512 A.2d at 363; Johnson v. State, 238 Md. 528, 541-43, 209 A.2d 765, 771-72 (1965)). In addition to cataloging the exceptions, Price critiqued that Maryland courts applied inconsistently the general rule, sometimes disallowing some inconsistent verdicts in some criminal trials. 405 Md. at 20, 949 A.2d at 625 (citing, among others, Shell, 307 Md. at 55, 512 A.2d at 362; Johnson, 238 Md. at 541, 209 A.2d at 771; Stuckey v. State, 141 Md.App. 143, 157 n. 3, 784 A.2d 652, 660 n. 3 (2001)). The discretionary power of the trial court to disallow inconsistent jury verdicts was delved into in Price, 405 Md. at 21, 949 A.2d at 626 (citing Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 599-600, 479 A.2d 1344, 1352 (1984)). Quoting from its opinion in Mack, the Court reiterated it is the duty of a jury to decide a criminal case according to established rules of law, however, the trial court is empowered to set aside the verdict when the jury misapplies the law. Id. Inconsistent jury verdicts are contrary to the law, contrary to the trial court's instructions, and granting of relief is within the discretion of the trial court. Id. The Court was concerned, however, that the holding in Mack did not supply criteria to trial judges as to how and when inconsistent verdicts may be accepted. Id. The Court noted also our prior expression of intolerance for inconsistent jury verdicts in civil actions, even though we left open there the question of whether the Court would prohibit inconsistent verdicts in a criminal context. Price, 405 Md. at 21, 949 A.2d at 626 (citing S. Mgmt. Corp. v. Taha, 378 Md. 461, 467, 836 A.2d 627, 630 (2003)). Of persuasive force to the Court seemed to be the reasoning supporting another state's common law prohibition of inconsistent jury verdicts in criminal trials, quoting DeSacia v. State, 469 P.2d 369, 377 (Alaska 1970), which explained that there is no basis to assume ... that inconsistent verdicts are the product of a jury's disposition toward treating the accused leniently; nor can we see a basis for assuming that, in allowing inconsistent jury verdicts in criminal trials to stand, we run only `the risk that an occasional conviction may have been the result of compromise.' The truth is simply that we do not know, nor do we have any way of telling how many inconsistent verdicts are attributable to feelings of leniency, to compromise, or, for that matter, to outright confusion on the part of the jury. Price, 405 Md. at 28, 949 A.2d at 630. Based on this reasoning, Maryland's exceptions to the general rule allowing inconsistent verdicts, and the holding in Taha that inconsistent verdicts in civil cases were prohibited, the Price Court concluded that inconsistent jury verdicts should no longer be permitted in criminal cases. Price, 405 Md. at 29, 949 A.2d at 630. Price's conviction for possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime was reversed. Price, 405 Md. at 34, 949 A.2d at 633. [9] The Price concurring opinion urged that the Court's opinion should be read as applying only to legally inconsistent verdicts, but not factually inconsistent verdicts. Price, 405 Md. at 35, 949 A.2d at 634 (Harrell, J., concurring). The concurring opinion observed that [t]he feature distinguishing a factually inconsistent verdict from a legally inconsistent verdict is that a factually inconsistent verdict is illogical merely. By contrast, a legally inconsistent verdict occurs where a jury acts contrary to a trial judge's proper instruction regarding the law. Id. Concluding that appellate courts are especially ill equipped to determine whether a jury's verdict is illogical factually, or merely `curious,' the concurring opinion urged that Maryland should join New York, Florida, Missouri, and Rhode Island which prohibit legally inconsistent verdicts, but allow factually inconsistent verdicts to stand. Price, 405 Md. at 36, 949 A.2d at 635 (Harrell, J., concurring) (citing People v. Tucker, 55 N.Y.2d 1, 447 N.Y.S.2d 132, 431 N.E.2d 617 (1981); Naumowicz v. State, 562 So.2d 710 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990); State v. Flemons, 144 S.W.3d 877 (Mo.Ct.App.2004); State v. Arroyo, 844 A.2d 163 (R.I.2004)). The Price concurring opinion cautioned also reviewing courts against engaging in an inquiry that may mistake a curious verdict for a legally inconsistent verdict. Price, 405 Md. at 36, 949 A.2d at 635 (Harrell, J., concurring). The concurring opinion explored also the procedure by which a defendant should challenge a legally inconsistent verdict. Price, 405 Md. at 40, 949 A.2d at 637 (Harrell, J., concurring). Id. Only a defendant, not the State, may object to an inconsistent verdict. Price, 405 Md. at 42 n. 10, 949 A.2d at 638 n. 10 (Harrell, J., concurring). The objection must be made prior to verdict finality and discharge of the jury (as McNeal did in the present case), thus preventing the defendant from accepting the inconsistent verdict and seeking thereafter a windfall reversal on appeal. Price, 405 Md. at 40, 949 A.2d at 637 (Harrell, J., concurring). Upon proper and timely objection by the defendant, the trial court must instruct the jury to resume deliberations and resolve the inconsistency either by returning verdict in the defendant's favor, convicting on the implicated counts, or deadlocking on a charge so that no inconsistent finding result. Price, 405 Md. at 42, 949 A.2d at 638 (Harrell, J., concurring).