Opinion ID: 2533803
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: NRS 41.133 civil liability

Text: Langon argues that, under NRS 41.133, Matamoros' conviction pursuant to a no contest plea and forfeiture of bail for failure to yield is admissible as conclusive evidence that she is liable for his injuries. Accordingly, Langon argues that the district court erred in denying his post-trial motions. Matamoros asserts that her plea of no contest did not result in a judgment of conviction of a crime for the purposes of NRS 41.133. We agree with Matamoros and hold that NRS 41.133 does not apply to misdemeanor traffic offenses. [3] We ascribe the plain meaning to a statute that is not ambiguous. [4] When `the statutory language ... fails to address [an] issue [impliedly affected by the statute],' legislative intent controls. [5] We look to reason and public policy to discern legislative intent. [6] Because the scope of NRS 41.133 is inherently unclear, particularly in relation with other statutory measures governing tort liability, and because a literal reading of the measure would result in consequences unintended by the Legislature, we must undertake an examination of the Legislature's intent with regard to its enactment. NRS 41.133 states: If an offender has been convicted of the crime which resulted in the injury to the victim, the judgment of conviction is conclusive evidence of all facts necessary to impose civil liability for the injury. The Legislature enacted NRS 41.133 from a group of victims' rights bills, which included a companion measure that prohibited a convicted offender from suing victims for injuries sustained during the commission of sexual assault, kidnapping, arson, robbery, burglary, sexual molestation and criminal homicide. [7] The bill was approved and signed by the Governor, and the companion provision became NRS 41.135. [8] The separation of the companion provision as NRS 41.135, from the text of the bill that eventually became NRS 41.133, resulted from an administrative act of revision not performed by the Legislature. The crimes of violence originally enumerated in the bill draft that became NRS 41.135 reflected malum in se offenses that legislators clearly intended NRS 41.133 to include; nothing in the legislative history indicates that legislators contemplated that malum in prohibitum offenses such as traffic violations would be considered crimes for the purposes of the overall measure. [9] We therefore conclude that NRS 41.133 does not apply to misdemeanor violations of state and local traffic codes. Moreover, the application of NRS 41.133 to misdemeanor traffic violations would directly conflict with NRS 41.141, Nevada's comparative negligence statute, thus thwarting a more specific legislative purpose. [10] First, NRS 41.141 insulates a defendant from liability in cases in which a plaintiff's comparative negligence exceeds that of the parties to the action against whom recovery is sought. [11] Second, NRS 41.141 reduces the extent of the defendant's liability when the comparative negligence of the plaintiff is found to be less than 51 percent of the total causal negligence. If NRS 41.133 were applied as Langon suggests, discretionary police decisions to issue traffic citations, regardless of potential evidence of comparative negligence, would serve to conclusively override the basic statutory construct governing the law of negligence. Such an approach would render the comparative negligence scheme of NRS 41.141 meaningless in this context.