Opinion ID: 4459764
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: At-Will Employee

Text: To succeed on her claims, Correia must prove she was deprived of “‘a property right in continued employment’ without due process.” Floyd–Gimon v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Sci. ex rel. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ark., 716 F.3d 1141, 1146 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985)). “To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, 2 We grant Jones’s motion to supplement the record on appeal. -3- instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Correia’s property rights depend on state law. Floyd–Gimon, 716 F.3d at 1146. “In Arkansas, employment is ‘at-will’ unless the employment is for a fixed term or unless an employee handbook contains ‘an express provision against termination except for cause.’” Eddings v. City of Hot Springs, 323 F.3d 596, 601 (quoting Gladden v. Ark. Children’s Hosp., 728 S.W.2d 501, 505 (Ark. 1987)). The 2013 Henderson faculty handbook included no express provision for non-tenure-track personnel like Correia. Correia contends that, by passing a proposed budget including her name, title, and salary, the Henderson Board of Trustees created an employment contract with her for 2014–2015. The Seventh Circuit rejected a similar argument in Malcak v. Westchester Park District, and we do so as well. 754 F.2d 239, 244 (7th Cir. 1985) (“We hold that the automatic inclusion of the plaintiff’s salary in the annual budget did not create a contract for year-to-year employment.”) Because her contract ended on June 30, 2014, Correia was an at-will employee with only “a unilateral expectation of continued employment, insufficient to entitle [her] to due process protection.” Hogue v. Clinton, 791 F.2d 1318, 1324–25 (8th Cir. 1986); see Eddings, 323 F.3d at 601.