Opinion ID: 1794090
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Against Penal Interest

Text: The next issue is the extent to which the declarant's statement must be against his penal interests, as defined by MRE 804(b)(3). That rule requires that the statement ... at the time of its making... so far tended to subject the declarant to... criminal liability, ... that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. (Emphasis added.) [8] After reviewing federal cases that have applied the actual language enacted by Congress, we believe that the phrase tended to subject includes a broad scope of inculpatory statements. See, e.g., United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687, 691 (C.A.9, 1978) (in enacting FRE 804(b)(3), Congress rejected a restrictive approach by choosing the phrase tended to subject). Federal case law has developed some general parameters that can guide our determination when a statement sufficiently tended to subject the declarant to criminal liability. First, the mere fact that the declarant invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to testify does not make the statement against penal interest. United States v. Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332, 1338 (C.A.11, 1995). On the other hand, statements against penal interest are not limited to direct confessions. United States v. Slaughter, 891 F.2d 691, 698 (C.A.9, 1989); Barrett, 539 F.2d at 251 (it is sufficient if the statement would be important evidence against the declarant). Moreover, it is well established that a particular piece of evidence need not by itself prove the declarant guilty. The proffered statement need only be a brick in the wall of proving the declarant's guilt. MRE 804(b)(3), like its federal counterpart, encompasses disserving statements by a declarant that would have probative value in a trial against the declarant. United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 288 (C.A.5, 1978). [9] By the same token, the statement would be against the declarant's penal interest if it intensified his culpability, such as by shifting criminal liability away from the accused and toward the declarant. United States v. Lopez, 777 F.2d 543, 554 (C.A.10, 1985). Furthermore, the statement need not have been incriminating on its face, as long as it was self-incriminating when viewed in context. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. ____, ___ _ ___, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 2436-2437, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994). However, in order to be probative of the declarant's guilt, the statement must be against the declarant's interest in a real and tangible way. Arthur, 949 F.2d at 216. It must actually assert the declarant's own culpability to some degreeit cannot be a statement merely exculpating the accused. United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d 316, 325 (C.A.9, 1977). Furthermore, as required by MRE 804(b)(3), a reasonable person in the declarant's shoes must have realized that the statement could implicate the declarant in a crime. Williamson, ___ U.S. at ____, 114 S.Ct. at 2437. This flows from the underlying rationale of the exception: the statement's reliability flows from the postulate that a reasonable person will not incriminate himself by admitting a damaging fact unless he believes that fact to be true. See 4 Weinstein & Berger, Evidence, ¶ 804(b)(3)[01], p 804-138. If the declarant faces no reasonable threat of punishment, the justification underlying the exception would not be met. United States v. Fowlie, 24 F.3d 1059, 1068 (C.A.9. 1994) (a statement made by a declarant while out of the country and facing no threat of punishment would not be against penal interest). In short, whether a declarant's statement was sufficiently against penal interest is whether the statement would be probative of an element of a crime in a trial against the declarant, and whether a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have realized the statement's incriminating element. If so, then the statement tended to subject the declarant to criminal liability.