Opinion ID: 1657126
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Excessive Speed

Text: The Easterwood decision holds that federal law and regulations preempt a common law claim of excessive train speed, which is defined as traveling too quickly given the `time and place.' Easterwood, ___ U.S. at ___ n. 15, 113 S.Ct. at 1743 n. 15. Easterwood did not address whether federal law preempts local speed limits. At trial, the evidence indicated that the train was violating the speed limit of 25 m.p.h. established by a Joplin ordinance. While the Railroad contests the validity of this ordinance, this Court does not need to decide its validity because the evidence does not support causation under any theory. The first potential theory of causation put forth by Barlett in this trial was the mere location rule. The mere location rule would permit finding causation from evidence that the train's speed at a remote point in time caused the train to be at the scene of the accident. See Mullis v. Thompson, 358 Mo. 230, 213 S.W.2d 941, 947 (1948). The mere location rule does not apply to other types of accidents (car and boat), where evidence of speed is only relevant to show the speed immediately before the collision. Hewitt v. City of Kansas City, 761 S.W.2d 679, 680 (Mo.App.1988). This case demonstrates why traditional causation is the better rule. The collision occurred at a relatively busy intersection. In fact, another car was immediately behind Barlett. Thus, if the train had been going slower at a remote point in time, it might well have missed Barlett, but hit the next car. The mere location rule also violates common sense, leaving causation open-ended. The mere location rule theoretically allows evidence of train speed over an infinite number of prior runs. While speed at a remote point in time may be a philosophical cause of a collision, it cannot be a legal cause. The mere location rule cannot be the basis for submitting a claim of violating the speed limit in this, or any future, case. Alternatively, Barlett contends that causation could be proved under the traditional theory of causation. At the ordinance speed limit of 25 m.p.h., a train would block the entire intersection in less than a second after the time it passed the end of the tree line. Thus, if the train were going the speed limit, a driver would have inadequate warning time to avoid an accident. Likewise, no evidence showed that a train could have stopped at that speed in time to avoid this collision. Thus, under the facts of this case, even though a violation of the Joplin speed limit could be shown, it would be impossible to prove causation.