Opinion ID: 1910245
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: NSS's Complaint

Text: [¶ 14] NSS argues that the language of the Third Beach easement is ambiguous, and that the proper construction of the easement is a genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, NSS contends, the trial court should have admitted and considered extrinsic evidence of Patten's intent in creating the easement, which it argues is a genuine issue of material fact. See Crispin v. Town of Scarborough, 1999 ME 112, ¶ 30, 736 A.2d 241, 250 (concluding that when the language of a deed is ambiguous, courts may admit extrinsic evidence to ascertain the objectively manifested intention of the parties). Accordingly, NSS argues that the trial court erred in granting the Trust's motion for a summary judgment on NSS's complaint. We disagree. [¶ 15] The trial court did not err in determining that the plain, unambiguous language of the Third Beach easement does not encompass the right to access the beach by boat. Rather, the plain language unambiguously limits the scope of the easement to swimming and sunbathing, which cannot be read to include a right to access the beach by boat. Nor can it be said, given the existence of a pathway that leads to the beach, that boat access is incidental or necessary to the proper enjoyment of the Third Beach easement. See Mill Pond Condo. Ass'n v. Manalio, 2006 ME 135, ¶ 6, 910 A.2d 392, 395 (providing that the holder of an easement can exercise only the rights granted therein, including those rights incidental or necessary to the proper enjoyment of the easement). Additionally, easement holders remain able to alternatively access the beach by anchoring the boat outside the swim area line and wading in. Because the meaning of the Third Beach easement is unambiguous, the trial court did not err by considering only the four corners of the deed and refusing to consider extrinsic evidence of Patten's intent in drafting the easement.