Opinion ID: 2598222
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: As an initial matter, Bickford contends that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to hear her administrative appeal. First, she argues that the superior court's jurisdiction was defective because the Department of Education impermissibly removed her complaint from its primary jurisdiction by assigning it to an assistant attorney general, Dahl, who was not under the supervision, direction, or control of the Commissioner of Education, but the Attorney General. Second, Bickford also argues that the superior court's jurisdiction was defective because she never exhausted her administrative remedies and because no complaint investigator ever issued a final decision on the merits of her complaint. We disagree. First, there is no merit to Bickford's primary jurisdiction argument. At base, Bickford appears to be arguing that the Department of Education should not have been allowed to involve lawyers from the attorney general's office in the resolution of her complaint; that assertion is plainly incorrect. Second, Bickford's exhaustion argument is also unpersuasive. Bickford appealed a final agency determination to the superior court. Once the Department of Education had completed its investigation of Bickford's administrative complaint, no additional administrative procedures were available to her. The superior court was therefore properly positioned to hear her appeal. [25]