Opinion ID: 784482
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pervasiveness

Text: 36 The evidence presented permits a reasonable trier of fact to find that the comments were sufficiently pervasive to create a hostile environment. Professor Young allegedly uttered some form of Monica comment during many periods of instruction with Hayut and even, on occasion, outside the classroom. The classroom comments routinely occurred shortly after each period of instruction had begun and in front of a fully-assembled class. The evidence that Professor Young's conduct permeated the classroom atmosphere and set the tone for the whole class is sufficient to satisfy the pervasiveness requirement at the summary judgment stage. 37 We reject the district court's attempt to employ a mathematical equation of sorts to calculate the number of instances of misconduct in order to show that Professor Young's behavior did not pervade and color the classes throughout the entire semester. Hayut II, 217 F.Supp.2d at 287. The district court began, for example, by finding that during October 1998, Hayut missed approximately five classes in each of her courses with Professor Young (she took a two-week trip to Israel for her brother's bar mitzvah). Id. The court then calculated the remaining days in which Professor Young uttered a Monica comment in Hayut's presence, and deemed his remarks sporadic and infrequent, and, hence, non-actionable. We believe the court's approach to be erroneous for several reasons. 38 First, a rigid calculate and compare methodology ignores the proper role of courts which, at the summary judgment stage, is to construe all facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Weyant, 101 F.3d at 854. Also, such an approach, if strictly followed, disregards Supreme Court guidance that hostile environment analysis is not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct. 367. Because of the fact-specific and circumstance-driven nature of hostile environment claims, courts must be mindful that `the appalling conduct alleged in prior cases should not be taken to mark the boundary of what is actionable.' Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting Richardson v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 439 (2d Cir.1999)). And courts should not, themselves, attempt to establish an absolute baseline for actionable behavior. See id. 39 Additionally, as applied specifically to the facts in this case, we think the district court's approach to be flawed. The court did not adequately consider the fact that in just about half the periods of instruction taught by Professor Young which Hayut attended, Hayut was the target of Monica comments. These comments, moreover, were generally made at or near the beginning of the period, thereby setting the tone for the remainder of the class period. The court also ignored evidence that Professor Young continued the harassment by referring to Hayut, in her absence, as Monica. Professor Young's persistent mention of Monica when speaking of Hayut when she was not there can, of course, be relevant evidence in a discrimination claim. See Leibovitz v. New York City Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 190 (2d Cir.2001) (recognizing harassing remarks made outside a plaintiff's presence as germane to a hostile work environment claim). Whether a factfinder will, on balance, decide that the remarks reached the objective level of pervasiveness required by law is not for us to say. It is quite sufficient that there be enough evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could so conclude. And of that we have no doubt. 40