Opinion ID: 373833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Indictment and Proof

Text: 7 Appellant first argues that the motions for dismissal and directed verdict should have been granted because the indictment and evidence failed to allege or establish any acts which would constitute a crime against the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 912. We disagree. 8 18 U.S.C. § 912 sets out two distinct crimes: the first, where one pretends to be an officer or employee acting under authority of the United States    And acts as such, and the second, where one in such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper, document, or thing of value   . We are dealing here with the first offense (hereinafter referred to as section 912(1)) which has as its two elements the impersonation of an officer And acting as such. An indictment under section 912(1) must allege, therefore, facts sufficient to constitute an act within the meaning of the statute. United States v. Harmon, 496 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Hamilton, 276 F.2d 96, 98 (7th Cir. 1960); Ekberg v. United States, 167 F.2d 380, 387 (1st Cir. 1948). The appellant claims that the acts as such element has neither been alleged sufficiently in the indictment, 2 nor proved. 9 One of the appellant's assignments of error is that the indictment failed to allege an intent to defraud. This approach is followed by the Fifth Circuit, and is based on that court's interpretation of a change in the language of the statute, which came about with the revision of the penal code in 1948. The offense of impersonating a federal officer prior to 1948 was contained in 18 U.S.C. § 76 (1946):Whoever, With intent to defraud either the United States or any person, shall falsely assume or pretend to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States, or any department, or any officer of the Government thereof, or under the authority of any corporation owned or controlled by the United States, and shall take upon himself to act as such   . 3 10 In United States v. Randolph, 460 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1972), the court found it unlikely that Congress would expand the scope of the statute so as to make more (sic) foolish bravado without any intent to deceive a federal felony. Id. at 370. Thus, the Fifth Circuit requires that intent to defraud still be alleged in the indictment, despite the fact that the language was dropped from the statute. 11 We question the wisdom of requiring that an indictment allege an intent to deceive when the reviser's note to the statutory change indicated that the words were rendered meaningless by a decision of the United States Supreme Court. Other courts which have considered the question follow the accepted canon of statutory construction that where Congress has advertently changed the legislative language the change must be given effect. United States v. Guthrie, 387 F.2d 569, 571 (4th Cir. 1967). See United States v. Rose, 500 F.2d 12, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Mitman, 459 F.2d 451, 453 (9th Cir.), Cert. denied, 409 U.S. 863, 93 S.Ct. 154, 34 L.Ed.2d 111 (1972). 12 While the weight of authority goes against the rationale of the Fifth Circuit in Randolph, supra, it remains unclear what properly should be contained in an allegation of a criminal offense under the second element of section 912(1). United States v. Rosser, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 79, 528 F.2d 652 (D.C.Cir.1976) represents a sound attempt to reconcile these two interpretations of the 1948 revision. Under the Rosser approach, the Fifth Circuit's concern that an expansion of the statute might elevate mere foolish bravado to criminal status could be relieved by using the language of United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 63 S.Ct. 914, 87 L.Ed. 1091 (1943) for the second element of the offense. 4 Thus, to act as such would be the equivalent of causing the deceived person to follow some course he would not have pursued but for the deceitful conduct. The Fourth, Ninth and Second Circuits would be accommodated by virtue of the elimination of the intent to defraud requirement. Rosser, supra, 174 U.S.App.D.C. at 83, 528 F.2d at 656. 13 The Rosser approach helps to explain the reviser's comment to the 1948 revision of the penal code, wherein it was stated that Lepowitch had rendered the intent to defraud requirement meaningless. More important, however, is the fact that the language in Lepowitch puts some substance into the acts as such element, requiring reliance on the impersonator's assertion of authority, without resorting to the language that Congress left out of the revised penal code. 14 The appellant asserts that our adoption of the Rosser approach would require us to reverse the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss and the motion for directed verdict. It is argued that Robbins impersonated an FBI agent but did not act as such by asserting the authority of an FBI agent. Thus, the indictment did not allege any assertion of an agent's authority and the prosecution failed to prove the same. We disagree with both conclusions. 15 In United States v. Hamilton, 276 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1960), the defendant was convicted under section 912(1) for impersonating an FBI agent. He rented a room in a boarding house, claiming he was an FBI agent, and on subsequent occasions, he wore a gun around the house. The court upheld his conviction, and quoted the comments of the district judge: 16 I don't think that any citizen of the type that Mrs. Martin was, and her husband, would ever have tolerated a citizen under the circumstances    that day in her home, this afternoon or the subsequent day, to be going through her house with a gun on his person and visible to other people.    I don't think that is exactly a case of idle boasting,    claiming he is an Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Here's a man that is carrying a gun, and he is a mature man. 17 276 F.2d at 98. In the present case, we have a more obvious scheme of impersonation of a federal officer and assertion of that officer's authority. The carrying of a pistol, handcuffs, identification card and a badge go beyond mere bravado. These actions are integral parts of the official routine of an FBI agent. Moreover, we are convinced that the evidence showed that the people who tolerated such acts and accorded some deference to Robbins, did so in reliance on the authority that an FBI agent possesses in order to carry out the duties of his profession. 18 While we are persuaded that the Rosser approach most accurately states the elements of a section 912(1) offense, we conclude that even under these standards the prosecution, by showing that Robbins carried a gun and handcuffs and did so in cashing a check and carrying on his business, alleged and proved acts sufficient to comply with the acts as such requirement of the statute. 5