Opinion ID: 1179527
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: reasonable suspicion of criminal activities

Text: The State argues that the officer's opening the door constituted an extension of an investigative detention and that the officer's actions were lawful because defendants' activities gave rise to a reasonable suspicion either of criminal activities or of danger to the officer's personal safety. Therefore, the State asserts that the judge erroneously applied a probable cause standard instead of a reasonable and articulable suspicion standard in the hearing on the motion to suppress. As stated above, Officer Howard's action of opening the car door constituted a search, not an investigative detention, and therefore, the probable cause standard was correctly applied by the trial court. However, even if the State's premise were accepted that no search occurred, the facts do not support a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity which is necessary to support the State's position. See State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986); State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986); State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985). An investigative detention is justified if a police officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the automobile's occupants are involved in criminal activity. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226, 105 S.Ct. 675, 679, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985); Dorsey, 731 P.2d at 1087, 1090. Additionally, an officer may search a vehicle for weapons if he has a reasonable belief that the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons. Michigan v. Long, 464 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3481, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). In such instances, due weight must be given, not to [the officer's] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or `hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Here, Officer Howard had no warrant, no probable cause, and no articulable suspicion either that his safety was in danger or that the occupants were engaged in criminal activity. He cited no safety concerns as the basis for his actions; he sought only to investigate the possibility that defendants were engaged in illegal activity, and for that reason he opened the passenger door. Compare United States v. Pajari, 715 F.2d 1378, 1382 (8th Cir.1983) (driver's nervousness coupled with information from multiple informants and previous police observations provided reasonable, articulable suspicion for investigative stop) with Jones v. United States, 391 A.2d 1188, 1191 (D.C. 1978) (furtive gestures by a passenger and location of vehicle and time of stop did not rise to the level of articulable suspicion). Officer Howard's testimony does not support an articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Mere furtive gestures of an occupant of an automobile do not give rise to an articulable suspicion suggesting criminal activity. See People v. Superior Court of Yolo County, 3 Cal.3d at 821-24, 478 P.2d at 457-59, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 737-39 (passenger's actions of turning and putting her arm over the back of the seat, then facing forward, bending down towards floor, and then resuming normal position did not support probable cause to search); Spence v. State, 525 So.2d 442 (Fla.App. 1988) (leaning down as if putting something on floorboard did not justify officer's suspicion); People v. Mills, 115 Ill. App.3d 809, 71 Ill.Dec. 247, 450 N.E.2d 935 (1983) (defendant's fast movements and leaning forward as officer approached did not create reasonable suspicion). Cf. State v. Cyr, 501 A.2d 1303 (Me. 1985) (occupant of vehicle, in heavy crime area late at night, ducking down as if to avoid detection as officer drove by constituted basis for articulable suspicion). Schlosser's movements, turning to the left and to the right, appearing fidgety, bending forward, and turning to look at the officer, do not, without more, show a reasonable possibility that criminal conduct had occurred or was about to occur. Schlosser may have been attempting to locate a driver's license. He could have been preparing for conversation with the officer by turning down the volume on the radio or extinguishing a cigarette. He may also have been putting away food and beverages, changing a baby's diaper, putting on the parking brake or doing a host of other innocuous things. When confronted with a traffic stop, it is not uncommon for drivers and passengers alike to be nervous and excited and to turn to look at an approaching police officer. See State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 184 (Utah 1987). A search based on such common gestures and movements is a mere hunch, not an articulable suspicion that satisfies the Fourth Amendment. A driver's leaving the vehicle to talk to the officer, as Lowder did, is also reasonable behavior and not indicative of criminal conduct. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S.Ct. at 333, states that a driver's exiting his vehicle to talk with a police officer may actually be safer for the officer than for him to talk to the driver who remains inside the vehicle. See also People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.3d at 826-27, 478 P.2d at 462, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 742. Officer Howard did not point to anything which made Lowder's exiting the truck unusual or suspicious. Lowder had his driver's license and registration in hand, but that is neither unreasonable nor so suspicious as to give rise to an inference of illegal activity. In short, the trial court did not err in ruling that the facts do not support an articulable suspicion of criminal activity. [5]