Opinion ID: 450662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of the Consent Judgment

Text: 13 The special master held that the Air Force violated the good faith provisions of the consent judgment. The Secretary contends that this finding was based on a construction of the consent judgment which is contrary to the intent of the parties. 14 As a preliminary matter, we must determine the appropriate standard of review. The district court indicated that The question whether defendants acted in good faith is a pure question of fact with the special master's determination respecting it subject to review under the ... clearly erroneous standard. The Secretary argues that the clearly erroneous standard is inapplicable because construction of a consent judgment is a question of law. He contends that the special master's finding of a violation was based on an interpretation of the legal duties placed on appellants by the term good faith. Hence, the Secretary urges review de novo by this Court as a legal question. 15 The Secretary's argument fails to distinguish between construction of a consent judgment, which is a question of law, and a finding that appellants' actions failed to comply with the standards established by the consent judgment, which is a factual inquiry. As the Supreme Court indicated in the recent case of Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2576, 2586, 81 L.Ed.2d 483 (1984) (citation omitted), the scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its four corners. Construction of a consent judgment is thus a question of law subject to de novo review. In the instant case, however, the scope of the consent judgment is not in issue. The consent judgment plainly requires that the Air Force make every good faith effort to fill [supervisory] positions in proportion to the percentage of blacks in the occupational category wherein the vacancy arises. Good faith effort is defined in the consent judgment to mean that every necessary and appropriate step will be taken to realize the specified objectives. The special master reviewed the specific actions of the Air Force in filling the supervisory vacancy and determined that those actions failed to meet the good faith standard established by the consent judgment. This is a factual determination which we review under the clearly erroneous standard. 16 The special master found that the good faith provisions had been violated on alternative grounds, as follows: 17 The Special Master determined that the good faith provisons of the Consent Judgment goals section were violated by the Defendants when the Defendants hired Mr. Kelly, a caucasian male, without ever notifying the selecting supervisor at any point in time that this was a Consent Judgment goal position. Notifying selecting supervisors, in some manner, that the position is subject to the Consent Judgment goals would be a minimal action necessary to meet the good faith requirement of the Consent Judgment. 18 The Special Master reaches the conclusion that the good faith requirement was not meet [sic] in this particular case on an alternative ground. The essence of the closing argument by the Defendants was that even if Mr. Little were qualified to fill the vacancy it was unreasonable to select anyone other than Mr. Kelly because Mr. Kelly was more qualified than Mr. Little.... Defendants' argument misses the mark. One would assume that in the absence of the Consent Judgment that whenever selecting officials have a number of qualified candidates from which to choose the officials would hire the best qualified applicant. If all that the good faith provision requires in this situation is the selection of the best qualified candidate then the provision is a nullity. The drafters of the Consent Judgment, by its express language, clearly intended that additional effort be exerted by the Defendants in meeting the goals. Thus, in this particular situation, assuming without deciding that Mr. Kelly was the best qualified candidate, the Defendants' argument that the good faith requirement was met because the supervisors selected the best qualified candidate from a group of qualified candidates is without merit. 19 These findings are amply supported by the record. The Secretary concedes that the selecting supervisors were not notified that the vacancy was one covered by a consent judgment goal. When the vacancy was filled originally on a temporary basis, the Air Force unilaterally decided that the goals did not apply to temporary positions. Later, the position was converted to permanent status noncompetitively. Thus, at no point were the selecting officials even notified that good faith efforts to meet the consent judgment goals were required. 20 Moreover, it is clear that good faith efforts were not made. As the special master found, the Air Force officials involved testified that they considered the good faith requirement to be met if they selected the best qualified candidate. The special master correctly found that such an interpretation would render the good faith requirement a nullity because discrimination is barred by Title VII and by Section II of the consent judgment. 21 Little was well qualified for the supervisory position. He had an Associate of Arts Degree, additional college courses, and specialized courses in air conditioning. He had 12 years experience as an air conditioning mechanic and extensive supervisory experience in the Army and Army reserve. Two of the three members of the all white selection committee testified that Little was less qualified than the individual selected because he had less supervisory experience. Yet both admitted that they were unaware of the full extent of Little's supervisory experience and had not reviewed his personnel file. Little testified that he was asked no questions about his prior supervisory experience and that his interview lasted approximately 15 minutes, while that of the selected individual may have lasted an hour. One of the committee members testified that education was one of three key factors in the selection, although he later testified it was less important than the other factors. The individual selected had only a GED high school diploma, while Little had an Associate of Arts Degree plus additional courses. One committee member testified that Little lacked the requisite mechanical skills, but this was contradicted by his own written performance appraisals of Little. 22 We need not decide what steps are sufficient to meet the good faith requirement of the consent judgment. Numerous opportunities for the Air Force to make good faith efforts are suggested by the facts in this case, however. The Air Force could have notified the supervisors that the consent judgment goals applied to the vacancy, it could have taken the time to interview Little thoroughly and to review his personnel file to learn of his supervisory experience, it could have included minority members in the selection committee, it could have evaluated carefully its selection criteria to determine if the extra years of experience of the individual selected really made him better qualified than Little with his better education and ample experience. We cannot find that the Air Force demonstrated that it made any effort to meet the consent judgment goal in filling this vacancy. Thus, the special master's finding that the Air Force failed to comply with the good faith requirements of the consent judgment is not clearly erroneous. 23 Before turning to the remaining issues in this case, we must mention one false issue raised by the Secretary. The Secretary repeatedly asserts in his briefs that the special master construed the good faith provisions to require the Secretary to hire or promote only class members until the 'goals' are met. There is simply no such holding in the special master's report. The special master held only that the steps taken in this case were insufficient to meet the good faith requirement and that the mere assertion that the best qualified candidate was chosen does not constitute a good faith effort. The Secretary builds on his erroneous interpretation of the special master's holding by arguing that a decree according an absolute promotion preference to class members violates both Title VII and the equal protection rights of innocent third parties. Because the special master's order does not require an absolute promotion preference for class members, we need not reach these arguments.