Opinion ID: 185433
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Chevron and the Standard of Review

Text: 11 The basic issue in this case is one of statutory construction. Does FOGRSFA's definition of any administrative proceeding, the commencement of which triggers the statute's 33month deadline, embrace the filing of a refund request? Or is any administrative proceeding limited to administrative appeals? Because our task is to measure DOI's regulations against FOGRSFA's text, this case might seem to be an appropriate one for analysis under the rubric of Chevron. Under Chevron, a court must first determine whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. 467 U.S. at 842. If so, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Id. at 842-43. If not--that is, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue--we will defer to a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency. Id. at 843, 844. 12 We conclude, however, that Chevron deference is inappropriate in this case. Chevron does not apply to statutes that, like 1724(h), confer jurisdiction on the federal courts. It is well established that [i]nterpreting statutes granting jurisdiction to Article III courts is exclusively the province of the courts. Ramey v. Bowsher, 9 F.3d 133, 136 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 926 (5th Cir. 1975) (The courts, however, have to make their own determination whether the district court has jurisdiction, rather than defer to the [agency] in the first instance.); cf. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that Chevron deference is inapplicable to criminal statutes, which are not administered by any agency but by the courts). As the Supreme Court has explained, when Congress has established an enforcement scheme that gives a party direct recourse to federal court, it is inappropriate to consult executive interpretations of [the jurisdiction-conferring statute] to resolve ambiguities surrounding the scope of [the party's] judicially enforceable remedy. Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 650 (1990). 13 A principal reason why courts pay agencies no deference on jurisdiction-conferring statutes is that such statutes do not grant powers to agencies. As the Supreme Court has explained, a congressional delegation of administrative authority is a precondition to deference under Chevron. Id. at 649. Unless the agency is the recipient of congressionally delegated power, there is no reason to defer to its interpretations of the statute that does the delegating. The typical Chevron case involves Congress extending an administrative power to an agency--for instance, an act that grants DOI the authority to administer federally owned lands, or a statute empowering the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate nitrogen-oxide emissions. A jurisdiction-conferring statute, by contrast, grants judicial power to the courts--namely the power to hear certain cases or controversies. Because jurisdiction-conferring statutes do not delegate authority to administrative agencies, courts do not extend Chevron deference to an agency's construction of them. 14 It is true that the statute before us contemplates a regulatory role for the agency. However, the implicit delegation of duties concerning the regulations for administrative appeals is limited to precisely that subject and does not extend by its terms or placement to any implication of authority to the agency to regulate the scope of the judicial power vested by the statute. Id. at 650. As Justice Marshall wrote in Adams Fruit, the fact that Congress envisioned ... a role for [an administrative agency] in administering [a] statute, by itself does not empower the Secretary to regulate the scope of the judicial power vested by the statute. Id. Just so here. The fact that an agency has made a determination such as the establishment of regulations governing administrative appeals, does not empower it to  'bootstrap itself in an area in which it has no jurisdiction,'  id. (quoting Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Three Train Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745 (1973) (specifically the grant of jurisdiction to the courts)). 15 Moreover, administrative agencies have no particular expertise in determining the scope of an Article III court's jurisdiction. Of course, practical agency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind Chevron deference. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651-52 (1990). Absent congressional delegation, if an agency has promulgated a regulation outside the scope of its specialized knowledge, courts will not defer to it. See, e.g., Professional Reactor Operator Soc'y v. NRC, 939 F.2d 1047, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (affording no Chevron deference to agency interpretations of statutes outside the agency's particular expertise and special charge to administer). It goes without saying that the jurisdiction of the federal courts is outside agencies' expertise. See, e.g., Florida Manufactured Hous. Ass'n, Inc. v. Cisneros, 53 F.3d 1565, 1574 n.2 (11th Cir. 1995); Ramey, 9 F.3d at 136 n.7 (explaining that agencies can bring no particular expertise to the subject). Our holding that DOI's interpretation of FOGRSFA's 33-month deadline is entitled to no deference thus is but a specific application of the general principle that an agency's regulations deserve no deference where they proceed neither from a congressional delegation nor from agency expertise. 16 The inapplicability of Chevron to jurisdiction-conferring statutes is also informed by a federal court's obligation to consider sua sponte its jurisdiction to hear a case. See, e.g., Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. v. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 917 F.2d 48, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ([I]t is well established that a court of appeals must first satisfy itself of its own jurisdiction, sua sponte if necessary, before proceeding to the merits.), aff'd, 501 U.S. 252 (1991). Courts have an obligation to examine the source of their own power. In the same way that a court must determine for itself that it has the jurisdiction to hear a dispute, even if the parties have so stipulated, a court must determine the scope of a congressional conferral of jurisdiction without consulting the views of an agency. Put another way, neither the parties to a private action nor an administrative agency may dictate the scope of an Article III court's jurisdiction.