Opinion ID: 1386274
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Evidence of Defendant's Conviction of the Felony of Assault With Intent to Commit Rape and the Underlying Facts

Text: Immediately before the commencement of the penalty phase, defendant moved in limine to bar the introduction of evidence that he had been convicted of the felony of assault with intent to commit rape against Lisa Cronin. The judgment in that case was entered after the commission of the capital and other offenses against Marcie D. (The attack on Cronin preceded the attack on Marcie by only hours.) At the time relevant here, the judgment in the Cronin case was on appeal. It was subsequently affirmed, and is now final. The existence vel non of prior felony convictions is an issue material to punishment under the 1978 death penalty law, specifically Penal Code section 190.3 (hereafter sometimes section 190.3). In support of his motion, defendant argued that a not-yet-final felony conviction is not a prior felony conviction within the meaning of section 190.3. The trial court denied the motion. In their case in aggravation, the People called Cronin to present evidence relevant to another of the issues material to punishment under section 190.3  the existence vel non of other violent criminal activity. Cronin testified to the facts briefly and without apparent emotion. Defendant objected to Cronin's testimony as it was being given and moved to strike it when it was completed. His ground was in substance that the issue of other violent criminal activity did not embrace such activity that resulted in a felony conviction. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion. At the close of their case in aggravation, the People moved into evidence an abstract of judgment showing defendant's conviction of the felony of assault with intent to commit rape. In response, defendant stated, No objection. The trial court granted the motion and admitted the evidence. (29) The law relevant here is as follows. The issue of other violent criminal activity covers all such activity  whether or not it results in a conviction. ( People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 201 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480].) The conduct, however, must violate a penal statute. ( People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782].) The presence of such activity suggests that the capital offense is the product more of the defendant's basic character than of the accidents of his situation, whereas its absence suggests the opposite. ( People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 208-209, fn. 1 [276 Cal. Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169] (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) The issue of prior felony convictions includes all such convictions  whether or not the offense was violent. ( People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 201.) The conviction, however, must be entered before the capital crime was committed. ( Id. at p. 203.) Like the presence or absence of other violent criminal activity, the existence or nonexistence of previous convictions reflects on the relative contributions of character and situation. Further, the existence of such convictions reveals that the defendant had been taught, through the application of formal sanction, that criminal conduct was unacceptable  but had failed or refused to learn his lesson. ( People v. Gallego, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 209, fn. 1 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.).) The issues of other violent criminal activity and prior felony convictions, of course, are not mutually exclusive. As stated above, other violent criminal activity covers activity even if it results in a conviction. And prior felony convictions include convictions even if the underlying criminal activity was violent. (See People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 787-788; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 640 [250 Cal. Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189]; People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 764.) (30a) Defendant now contends that the trial court erred by admitting the evidence of his conviction of the felony of assault with intent to commit rape. He argues that the evidence in question was inadmissible on the ground that a felony conviction entered after the capital offense  like that here  is not a prior felony conviction within the meaning of section 190.3. We reject the claim at the threshold. The rule of timely and specific objection was not satisfied: at trial, defendant did not object on the ground that underlies his point here. Moreover, no exception to the rule is applicable  nor does defendant maintain otherwise. We shall nevertheless address the merits. The determination crucial to the trial court's ruling is purely legal, dealing as it does with the coverage of section 190.3. As such, it is subject to the standard of independent review. ( People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969, 985 [232 Cal. Rptr. 110, 728 P.2d 180], following United States v. McConney (9th Cir.1984) 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (in bank).) Applying that test, we find error. As stated, prior felony convictions within the meaning of section 190.3 are such convictions entered before the capital crime was committed. ( People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 203.) The conviction here is not in this class. Having found error, we must then consider its consequences. (31) In People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d 432, we declared the following general rule: state-law error at the penalty phase of a capital trial ( id. at p. 448) is not automatically reversible, but is subject to harmless-error analysis under the reasonable possibility standard. (See id. at pp. 446-448.) The rule applies to the kind of error here. (See People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 567 [257 Cal. Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244] [recognizing the applicability of harmless-error analysis to this sort of error without expressly employing the reasonable-possibility test].) In conducting harmless-error analysis, we must ascertain how a hypothetical reasonable juror would have, or at least could have, been affected. (Cf. Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. ___, ___ [114 L.Ed.2d 432, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1893] [concluding that to say that an [erroneous] instruction was harmless under Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, is to make a judgment about the significance of the [instruction] to reasonable jurors].) (30b) The record here discloses the following. Evidence of defendant's conviction of the felony of burglary was properly admitted as relevant to the issue of prior felony convictions. More important  as we shall presently show  evidence of the facts underlying defendant's conviction of the felony of assault with intent to commit rape was properly admitted as relevant to the issue of other violent criminal activity. A reasonable juror could not have given defendant's conviction of the felony of assault with intent to commit rape any appreciable weight independent of its underlying facts. (32)(See fn. 14.) Accordingly, there is no reasonable possibility that the error here affected the outcome. (Compare People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 567 [finding a similar error harmless].) [14] (33) Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the facts underlying his conviction of the felony of assault with intent to commit rape. He argues that the issue of other violent criminal activity covers only the existence of such criminal activity and not the circumstances thereof. He then argues that even if the issue of other violent criminal activity does embrace the circumstances, such circumstances cannot include the result of the conduct  here, the fact that his attack caused a bruise and sprain to one of Cronin's arms. He then argues that the evidence that may be used to prove other violent criminal activity is limited and does not extend to testimony by a live witness. Again, we reject the claim at the threshold. The rule of timely and specific objection was not met, and no exception appears. Again, we shall nevertheless address the merits. The determination crucial to the trial court's ruling is purely legal, dealing as it does with the coverage of section 190.3 and the permissible manner of proof. As such, it is reviewed independently. So reviewed, it reveals itself to be proper. The issue of other violent criminal activity embraces not only the existence of such activity but also all the pertinent circumstances thereof. ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 788.) Such circumstances may include the result of the conduct  and certainly include the bruise and sprain Cronin suffered here. Also, the evidence that may be used to prove other violent criminal activity is subject to no special limitation. ( Ibid. ) Surely, testimony by a live witness is not barred. [15]