Opinion ID: 716401
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 8 Evidence in a criminal trial is sufficient if any rational trier of fact, viewing it in the light most favorable to the government, could have found every element of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Bautista-Avila, 6 F.3d 1360, 1362 (9th Cir.1993). The credibility of the testimony presented at trial is not a matter for appellate review. United States v. Ramos, 558 F.2d 545, 546 (9th Cir.1977); Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 94, 50 S.Ct. 231, 233, 74 L.Ed. 720 (1930).
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10 Azzo argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly participated in the conspiracy. See Bautista-Avila, 6 F.3d at 1362 (knowledge required for drug conspiracies). Azzo's argument focuses on the evidence introduced by the government that he saw and/or received the buy money and that the package in his possession contained cocaine. Azzo argues that the government's evidence was insufficient to show that he knew he was receiving money and that he knew he was delivering cocaine. He notes that some of the evidence introduced at the trial was not incriminatory toward him. 11 Azzo's argument misses the point for two reasons. First, there is testimony that, if believed, is sufficient to support the conviction. Prosecution witness Robert Franchi testified that Azzo was present when Franchi showed the money to Tarek Halabi and to Charlie Tana at a restaurant. Franchi testified that Halabi was going to give the money to Azzo. Franchi testified that Azzo left the restaurant and later returned, showed him cocaine, and returned $4,500 to him because the amount purchased was less than expected. Franchi also testified that Azzo asked about receiving additional money for his work. Based on the record before this Court, the evidence was sufficient. 1 See, Bautista-Avila, 6 F.3d at 1362, quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 500 (1979). 12 Second, the government's evidence need not exclude all reasonable exculpatory theories. Thus, the fact that some evidence did not necessarily point toward guilt does not require a reversal. As this Court has noted in the past, the government's evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 663 (9th Cir.1982). 13
14 Halabi attacks only the sufficiency of the evidence offered to prove that a conspiratorial agreement existed, a required element of the offense. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 4 F.3d 757, 759 (9th Cir.1993). Halabi argues that the evidence only shows that he associated with members of the drug conspiracy and that the government failed to prove a single overarching conspiracy. Halabi admits that a drug conspiracy existed and he acknowledges that, once a conspiracy is shown, the evidence required to prove membership in that conspiracy need only be slight. Bautista-Avila, 6 F.3d at 1362. Halabi correctly asserts, however, that mere casual association with conspiring people is not enough to sustain a conspiracy conviction. Id. 15 In the present case, there is direct testimony that Halabi planned and executed the drug transaction. Franchi testified that he and Halabi discussed drug trafficking and that Halabi indicated that he could obtain a kilogram of cocaine. Franchi testified that he and Halabi discussed the price for the cocaine and that Halabi looked at the buy money. Franchi's testimony also shows that Halabi actually took the buy money and then gave it to Azzo. Franchi further testified that Halabi gave him a sample of higher quality cocaine as an example of the drugs he could produce for future transactions. Thus, the evidence shows that Halabi's activities went far beyond mere casual association with the conspirators. The evidence presented at trial was far greater than the slight evidence required to prove that Halabi was a member of the conspiracy. Hence, the evidence was sufficient. See Id. 16 Furthermore, as to Halabi's contention that there were separate conspiracies, the government's evidence does not have to exclude all possible inferences that distinct conspiracies could have existed. Rather, the evidence must be sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that a single conspiracy did exist. United States v. Bibbero, 749 F.2d 581, 586-87 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1103, 105 S.Ct. 2330, 85 L.Ed.2d 847 (1985). The government does not have to prove that all members of the conspiracy knew all the details or participated in all phases of a conspiracy. United States v. Vaughn, 797 F.2d 1485, 1492 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. Dicesare, 765 F.2d 890, 900, amended by, 777 F.2d 543 (9th Cir.1985). Moreover, a single conspiracy can be proven even if there are time lapses in the criminal activity of the conspiracy. United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1448 (9th Cir.1984). 17 Franchi testified that he discussed drug transactions with Halabi several times in February 1989 and that, during these conversations, Halabi offered to obtain cocaine. Franchi testified that, on March 3, 1989, Halabi actually arranged to obtain a kilogram of cocaine for Franchi and, later that day, cocaine was delivered to Franchi. Franchi also testified that many conversations and meetings took place in order to set up the deal that occurred on March 3. This testimony constitutes sufficient evidence to find that Halabi participated in a single drug conspiracy. Id. 18 Finally, Halabi contests the sufficiency of the evidence as to the aiding and abetting convictions. He offers no factual or legal argument on this point. The evidence offered at trial shows that Halabi made an offer to sell cocaine to Franchi, that he inspected the buy money, that he scheduled the actual transaction to occur, and that he took the buy money from Franchi and gave it to Azzo, who took the money and returned with cocaine. This evidence is clearly sufficient to support the convictions on the aiding and abetting counts. See United States v. Sanchez-Mata, 925 F.2d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir.1991).