Opinion ID: 2978945
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Williamson County Defendants

Text: Many of the claims against the Williamson County defendants were dismissed on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This Court reviews de novo the district court ruling that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded subject matter jurisdiction. McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2006). A defendant can challenge this Court’s jurisdiction on its face through a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 516 (6th Cir. 2004). In that case, “all allegations of the plaintiff must be considered as true.” Id. 3 Plaintiffs do not assert a claim for excessive force against the arresting officers. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives its name from two Supreme Court cases that held that a federal court cannot exercise appellate review of a state court decision. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Rooker and Feldman exhibit the limited circumstances in which [the Supreme Court’s] appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, 28 U.S.C. § 1257, precludes a United States district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction in an action it would otherwise be empowered to adjudicate under a congressional grant of authority. In both cases, the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended, complaining of an injury caused by the statecourt judgment and seeking review and rejection of that judgment. Plaintiffs in both cases, alleging federal-question jurisdiction, called upon the District Court to overturn an injurious state-court judgment. Because § 1257, as long interpreted, vests authority to review a state court’s judgment solely in [the Supreme] Court, the District Courts in Rooker and Feldman lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291-92 (2005) (citations and quotations omitted). Rooker-Feldman applies “when a plaintiff asserts before a federal district court that a state court judgment itself was unconstitutional or in violation of federal law.” McCormick, 451 F.3d at 395. The key inquiry in deciding whether Rooker-Feldman applies is determining the source of the plaintiffs’ alleged injury. “If the source of the injury is the state court decision, then the RookerFeldman doctrine would prevent the district court from asserting jurisdiction. If there is some other source of injury, such as a third party’s actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent claim.” Id at 393. The majority of claims against the Williamson County defendants could be read as challenges to state court orders which are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Specifically, Count I alleges a violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional right of liberty and privacy based on five acts taken by Guffee that stemmed directly from her orders. Plaintiffs also allege that Guffee and other defendants “unlawfully conspired and orchestrated the ex parte deprivation of right as against the child,” but the only action alleged was again an order from Guffee. Plaintiffs’ other allegations of constitutional violations against Guffee also stem from court orders. For instance, in ¶ 77 of the amended complaint, Plaintiffs challenge the body attachment issued by Guffee.4 In ¶ 80, Plaintiffs challenge a settlement negotiated by the juvenile court that had the force of a court order. In ¶ 81, Plaintiffs challenge the incarceration of YKR. To the extent that Plaintiffs include the other Williamson County defendants acting in concert with Guffee, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should apply with equal force.5 The injury alleged by Plaintiffs in all of these allegations is a direct result of the judicial order and fails to assert an “independent claim” that would bring the case outside the ambit of Rooker-Feldman. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293 (finding that if a plaintiff “presents some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party, then there is jurisdiction . . .”) (citations and quotations omitted).6 4 The complaint against defendants Zollicoffer and Casillas, who arrested YKR, must be dismissed. Plaintiffs’ allegations are that Zollicoffer and Casillas violated YKR’s constitutional rights by incarcerating her on the basis of an “invalid” body attachment. The officers were merely enforcing a valid court order, and the fact that the order emanated from a supposedly unconstitutional statute has no impact on the liability of the individual officers. These officers are entitled to quasijudicial immunity. See Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994) (finding quasi-judicial immunity applied for defendant who carried out a court order because “enforcing or executing a court order is intrinsically associated with a judicial proceeding”). 5 In the alternative, the district court found that Guffee was protected by absolute judicial immunity, since “a referee has the same authority as the judge to issue any and all process. The referee in the conduct of the proceedings has the powers of a trial judge.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1- 107(c). Since Rooker-Feldman denies this Court jurisdiction, we need not reach this issue. 6 We emphasize that Rooker-Feldman will not always be applicable in suits against judicial officers, who are generally protected by judicial immunity. See Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 289 n.10 (7th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging the “tension between the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity and the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to suits for damages against state judicial officers”). “We stress that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not a panacea to be applied whenever state court decisions and federal court decisions potentially or actually overlap.” McCormick, 451 F.3d at 395. Nonetheless, McCormick clearly states that Rooker-Feldman applies “when a plaintiff asserts before a federal district court that a state court judgment itself was unconstitutional or in violation of federal law.” Id. Plaintiff’s allegations against Guffee undoubtedly constitute an Plaintiffs rely on a Seventh Circuit decision that is easily distinguishable. See Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2002). In Brokaw, the plaintiff brought suit against defendants in the child neglect office based on a conspiracy to take away her children. Crucially, Brokaw alleged that “the defendants conspired – prior to any judicial involvement – to cause false child neglect proceedings to be filed.” Id. at 665. The Seventh Circuit specifically held that the plaintiff “is not merely claiming that the decision of the state court was incorrect or that the decision violated her constitutional rights; rather, she is alleging that the people involved in the decision to forcibly remove her from her home and her parents and subject her to the custody of the IDCFS violated her constitutional rights, independently of the state court decision.” Id. Here, the orders issued by Guffee were the state court decisions themselves, and proceedings only began because Reguli herself charged her daughter as unruly. The reasoning of Brokaw does apply to other claims brought by the Plaintiffs against some of the Williamson County defendants. Various allegations in the complaint could be read to allege direct violations of Plaintiffs’ supposed constitutional rights, without the formal mechanisms of the court proceedings. These include allegations that defendant Martin deceived Reguli in a phone conversation about the purpose of an August 4, 2008 hearing. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that defendant Coffey conducted an unlawful search and seizure by removing minor child VRR from her public school class for an interrogation. As discussed below, these allegations fail because they are not constitutional violations, but we are not denied jurisdiction on those claims by the RookerFeldman doctrine. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that even if some of the court rulings are protected by RookerFeldman, all court orders entered after Plaintiff filed a state court appeal of the referee’s decision are attempt to have a federal court review the constitutionality of the juvenile court decisions. invalid. Plaintiffs allege that their appeal stripped the referee of jurisdiction, invalidating her orders. The main order Plaintiffs challenge after the notice of appeal was filed is the body attachment on YKR. The Tennessee Code clearly states that “an appeal does not suspend the order of the juvenile court, nor does it release the child from custody of that court.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159(b). The body attachment in this case was issued because YKR violated a previous order, which was still in force pending the appeal. The district court read the relevant statute to allow Guffee to issue the body attachment to “enforce” her prior order. We need not decide whether the juvenile court definitively had jurisdiction to issue the body attachment.7 Plaintiffs’ underlying claim is that the juvenile court order violated their constitutional rights. This Court cannot consider “whether a state court judgment itself was unconstitutional.” McCormick, 451 F.3d at 395. Even if issued without jurisdiction, the order was still issued by a state court, and Rooker-Feldman bars a federal court from reviewing the constitutionality of that order.8
Rooker-Feldman disposes of the majority of claims against the Williamson County defendants. Several miscellaneous allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint do not fit neatly under this 7 This argument actually goes to the heart of Guffee’s alternative defense, judicial immunity. Reguli attempts to import that framework into a Rooker-Feldman analysis. Plaintiffs are correct that a judicial officer can be found liable for damages if he has acted in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). However, “the scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge. A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Id. at 356. Even under judicial immunity, this challenge would likely fail, since Guffee did not act in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” 8 Plaintiffs also allege that the “Williamson County Juvenile Court” violated their constitutional rights by incarcerating YKR without an appearance bond on three occasions and twice denying YKR the right to visit or communicate with her parent “in violation of the Rules of the Juvenile Court.” (Amen. Compl. ¶ 83). Plaintiffs offer no support for the proposition that these acts are constitutional violations, nor do they even specify what constitutional right was violated. rubric and must be addressed separately. All of these claims were dismissed on Defendants’ motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings and must therefore be reviewed de novo. Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs make several allegations against defendant Martin, a youth services officer of the juvenile court. They allege that Martin “denied due process of the mother” by stating falsely in a phone call the purpose of the August 4th hearing and by presenting evidence “without regard for the due process of the Mother and YKR.” (Amen. Compl. ¶ 74). The phone call from Martin simply does not violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, inasmuch as conveying incorrect information about the purpose of the August 4, 2008 hearing did not rise to the level of a due process violation. Reguli eventually appeared and was given a further opportunity to bring YKR to court. She refused, and at that point, the body attachment on YKR was issued. Therefore, Plaintiffs have not asserted in their complaint how this alleged falsehood by Martin created a constitutional injury. The second allegation against Martin, presenting evidence before the referee, is shielded by the doctrine of absolute immunity, which covers “testimony or recommendations given in court.” Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 776 (6th Cir. 2000). This principle also covers the alleged conduct of defendants Bennett and Rounsavall. Those two employees had merely filed petitions in court proceedings, core prosecutorial functions and undoubtedly subject to absolute immunity. In Holloway, this Court held that “social workers are absolutely immune only when they are acting in their capacity as legal advocates – initiating court actions or testifying under oath.” Id. at 775. The allegations against Martin involve his testimony under oath, and the allegations against Bennett and Rounsavall involve their initiation of court proceedings. The final Williamson County defendant is Coffey who entered the school of VRR to investigate the abuse allegations. The claim is not cognizable because the daughter interrogated by Coffey at the school is not a plaintiff in this case. Therefore, Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge the questioning of this daughter as an illegal search and seizure. On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that “the Mother of a minor child has standing to bring this action as a violation of her (Mother’s) constitutional right of privacy and her right to parent.” (Pls. Br. at 31). The complaint, however, alleges an illegal search and seizure, and Plaintiffs cannot change their theory on appeal. On the merits, Plaintiffs cite no case law indicating that questioning a daughter in school where allegations of abuse have occurred constitutes a constitutional violation. See Williams v. Pollard, 44 F.3d 433, 435 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that two and one-half hour interview of minor child without notifying parent “did not violate a federally protected right”). II. Department of Children’s Services Defendants Defendants Schneider and Spann’s motion to dismiss was granted by the district court on the basis of absolute and qualified immunity. “Whether a defendant is entitled to absolute or qualified immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a legal question that this Court reviews de novo.” Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir. 2009). Schneider and Spann were employees of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. Agency officials who “perform functions analogous to a prosecutor are entitled to absolute immunity.” Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)). In Kurzawa, the Court granted absolute immunity to a psychologist and two psychiatrists whose findings following an examination of a minor child “are used by the Department of Social Services and the Michigan courts to determine what environment best serves the interests of the child.” Kurzawa, 732 F.2d at 1458. These actions contrast with the actions of social workers that were not entitled to immunity in Achterhof v. Selvaggio, 886 F.2d 826 (6th Cir. 1989). In that case, social workers were not granted absolute immunity where their actions were “only investigatory or administrative in nature, not prosecutorial, judicial or otherwise intimately related to the judicial process.” Id. at 830. Schneider and Spann emphasize that their actions were “intimately involved in the judicial process.” Id; Rippy v. Hattaway, 270 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2001). Undoubtedly, some of the accusations against the DCS employees were based on activities that were “intimately involved in the judicial process.” The complaint asserts that when Reguli failed to sign a safety plan, Spann called a judge to request emergency removal of the Reguli children. The complaint also challenges testimony by the DCS defendants before the referee and refers to an in-court interview with the children at the direction of the referee. These acts are entitled to absolute immunity, as is evident from the case relied on by Plaintiffs, Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2000). In Holloway, the Court found that a social worker was not entitled to absolute immunity where her actions were not “testimony or recommendations given in court concerning the children’s best interests as she saw the matter.” Id. at 776. The vast majority of the allegations against Schneider and Spann, however, deal with actions directly related to the court proceedings for which they should be entitled to absolute immunity. The district court found that all the allegations against Schneider and Spann were barred by absolute immunity. We believe that several claims are outside the ambit of actions intimately involved in the judicial process. First, Spann appeared at the home of the Mother to “investigate” YKR’s abuse allegations. Second, both Schneider and Spann threatened removal of the children if Reguli refused to participate in the interview process. These actions, however, are protected by qualified immunity. Plaintiffs cannot “simply identify a clearly established right in the abstract and allege that the defendant has violated it. Instead, the plaintiff must show a substantial correspondence between the conduct in question and prior law allegedly establishing the defendant’s actions were clearly prohibited.” Hughes v. City of North Olmsted, 93 F.3d 238, 241 (6th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs have made no such showing, and it is not clear what constitutional rights Schneider and Spann allegedly violated. Plaintiffs make an additional argument that the allegations of abuse by YKR, who was adjudged delinquent in part because she lied to her mother, were not sufficiently “reasonable” to trigger DCS involvement. Reguli’s argument invites us to take the position that a statement by a teenager of abuse is not “reasonable” grounds for starting an investigation merely because the teen has been known to lie about other matters. We do not accept the invitation. The alleged victim made the accusation, and it is preposterous to argue that the agency cannot begin an investigation based on a teenager’s accusations. DCS undoubtedly had a right to begin an investigation, and this Court has previously granted qualified immunity for much more intrusive actions taken by similar agencies. See, e.g., Williams v. Pollard, 44 F.3d 433, 435 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that “it is objectively reasonable for a social worker receiving an abuse referral from school officials to believe that interviewing the child . . . without notifying the parents did not violate a federally protected right”).