Opinion ID: 440193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Award to Scotty

Text: 21 The district court awarded non-pecuniary damages of $5 million. Washington law entitles a plaintiff to damages for pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of capacity to lead a normal life, and characterizes such awards as compensatory. See, e.g., Parris v. Johnson, 3 Wash.App. 853, 860 n. 2, 479 P.2d 91, 95 n. 2 (1970). The government contends, however, that these damages are punitive because Scotty's injuries are adequately compensated by the large pecuniary award. 22 The principal case which supports this view is Flannery for Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2679, 81 L.Ed.2d 874 (1984). There a district judge, relying on West Virginia law, ordered the United States to pay plaintiff $1.3 million for loss of capacity to enjoy life. The court of appeals reversed, notwithstanding the state supreme court's characterization of such damages as compensatory. The court held that, as a matter of federal law, an award is punitive to the extent a claimant receives more than his actual loss. 718 F.2d at 111. Since this particular plaintiff was comatose, and therefore unaware of his diminished capacity, the additional money could not compensate him. Id. 23 The Ninth Circuit has squarely rejected this analysis, however. In Felder, supra, we recognized that such an expansive view of federal law would impinge seriously upon the architecture of the Act which provides for recovery according to the lex loci delictus. 543 F.2d at 675. The unique position of the United States as both defendant and tax-collector justified a rule requiring deduction of taxes from awards for lost compensation. But we also refused to prevent the plaintiffs from recovering a component of non-pecuniary damages already delimited as compensatory under state law. Id. The proper approach, we decided, is to hold the loss compensable and to reduce the award if a state court would find it excessive. Id. at 674. 6 The Sixth Circuit has also refused to adopt the view that any award of damages in excess of a plaintiff's direct or out-of-pocket loss is punitive. In Kalavity, supra, the court held that under Ohio law an award of damages to a widow in a wrongful death action could not be reduced on the ground that she had remarried and received support from her new husband. It found farfetched the government's argument that this award did not compensate the plaintiff for an actual loss. The court recognized that damages are punitive only when awarded separately for the sole purpose of punishing a tortfeasor who inflicted injuries 'maliciously or wantonly, and with circumstances of contumely or indignity.'  584 F.2d at 811 n. 1 (quoting Milwaukee R.R. v. Arms, 1 Otto 489, 493, 91 U.S. 489, 493, 23 L.Ed. 374 (1875)). 7 24 Under the law of Washington, awards are considered excessive only if the amount shocks the court's sense of justice or sound judgment. See Harvey v. Wright, 68 Wash.2d 205, 210, 412 P.2d 335, 337 (1966). The circumstances must indicate that the trial judge was swayed by passion or prejudice. We make this determination by comparing the sum to other awards in similar cases within the jurisdiction. See, e.g., Power v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 655 F.2d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir.1981) (diversity case based on Washington law). 25 Reviewing a non-pecuniary award presents a delicate and difficult question. Felder, 543 F.2d at 674. Each case stands on its own facts. This plaintiff's situation is most sympathetic. His injuries are multiple, grievous, and to a large extent, irreversible. Nevertheless, courts are required to maintain some degree of uniformity in cases involving similar losses. Id. 26 The highest reported verdict in a case of medical malpractice in Washington is $1.1 million. See Klink v. G.D. Searle & Co., 26 Wash.App. 951, 614 P.2d 701 (1980). In Klink, the doctor's negligence caused the plaintiff to suffer a massive bilateral stroke. Id. 614 P.2d at 703. Moreover, the decision did not specify how the award was allocated between pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. In Glover for Cobb v. Tacoma General Hosp., 98 Wash.2d 708, 658 P.2d 1230 (1983), the court found reasonable a settlement of $575,000 received by a patient who had been rendered comatose by improper administration of an anesthetic. Once again the amount for each component of damages was not reported. 27 These cases, while not directly on point, provide substantial guidance. Unlike the plaintiff in Glover, Scotty is not unconscious. There is evidence that he is capable of feeling, can perceive his environment, and is sensitive to auditory stimuli such as music. Based on a careful review of the facts, under the constraint of local law, we can only conclude that the size of Scotty's non-pecuniary award is excessive. We believe justice will be served by reducing this component of damages to $1 million. See, e.g., Felder, 543 F.2d at 676 (reducing non-pecuniary awards on appeal).