Opinion ID: 1969802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 47

Heading: claims involving the fairness of the post-conviction relief proceedings

Text: In Section IV, we discussed the arguments raised in defendant's PCR petition concerning whether a reversal of his convictions and sentence is warranted. In this Section, we address defendant's claims concerning the fairness of his PCR proceedings.
At the commencement of the PCR proceedings, defendant moved to inspect the State's entire file, arguing that he was entitled to such broad discovery because the Defendant has demonstrated that the State did not comply with its obligation to provide [pretrial] discovery and because a post conviction proceeding in a capital sentenced case is a special situation which requires the broadest of all discovery. As noted, see supra at 139, 690 A. 2d at 25, the PCR court denied that motion, ruling that such a broad discovery right is contemplated by neither the discovery provisions in our Court Rules, see R. 3:13-2 to -4, nor by our decisional law. The PCR court ruled, however, that defendant was entitled to make an application to inspect specific documents that he believed to be in the State's possession. Following that procedure, defendant requested and received from the State approximately one hundred documents. Defendant now contends that the PCR court's decision not to order the State to allow him to inspect the State's entire file denied him his right to a full and fair PCR hearing. As defendant concedes, our Court Rules concerning petitions for PCR, see R. 3:22-1 to -12, do not contain any provision authorizing discovery in PCR proceedings. Moreover, the general discovery obligations contained in the Rules Governing Criminal Practice, see R. 3:13-2 to -4, do not extend to post-conviction proceedings. Defendant relies on Rule 3:13-3(g), which refers to parties' [c]ontinuing [d]uty to [d]isclose discoverable materials. However, that obligation continues only during trial. Thus, our Court Rules do not explicitly authorize the discovery requested by defendant in this case. Similarly, defendant cannot demonstrate a constitutional basis for his asserted right to inspect the State's file. Although the Due Process Clause requires that the State provide criminal defendants with any exculpatory, material evidence in the State's possession, see Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97, 10 L.Ed. 2d at 218, that Clause does not require the prosecutor to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at 675, 105 S.Ct. at 3380, 87 L.Ed. 2d at 489; see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 845-46, 51 L.Ed. 2d 30, 42 (1977) (There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one....); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 2212, 37 L.Ed. 2d 82, 87 (1973) ([T]he Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded....). Nonetheless, our cases have recognized that, even in the absence of authorization in the form of a Court Rule or constitutional mandate, New Jersey courts have the inherent power to order discovery when justice so requires. State ex rel. W.C., 85 N.J. 218, 221, 426 A. 2d 50 (1981); see, e.g., State v. Cook, 43 N.J. 560, 569, 206 A. 2d 359 (1965) (permitting defendant to view State's psychiatric reports on defendant); State v. Moffa, 36 N.J. 219, 222, 176 A. 2d 1 (1961) (permitting defendant to inspect witness's grand jury testimony); State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 605, 143 A. 2d 530 (1958) (compelling witness to submit to psychiatric examination by defendant's expert). Courts in other jurisdictions have concluded that a court's inherent discovery power applies in post-conviction proceedings, and we agree fully with that determination. See, e.g., Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 22 L.Ed. 2d 281 (1969) (holding that federal court may authorize taking of interrogatories in support of habeas corpus petition); Gibson v. United States, 566 A. 2d 473, 478 (D.C. 1989) ([C]ourts ... may fashion post-conviction discovery procedures as may be required to give meaning and substance to the objectives of the law.); State v. Lewis, 656 So. 2d 1248, 1249 (Fla. 1994) ([I]t is within the trial judge's inherent authority, rather than any express authority found in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, to allow limited discovery [when a party is pursuing a post-conviction claim].); People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill. 2d 175, 121 Ill.Dec. 937, 941, 526 N.E. 2d 131, 135 (1988) (holding that courts have inherent authority to authorize taking of depositions in post-conviction proceedings). We anticipate that only in the unusual case will a PCR court invoke its inherent right to compel discovery. In most cases, a post-conviction petitioner will be fully informed of the documentary source of the errors that he brings to the PCR court's attention. Moreover, we note that PCR is not a device for investigating possible claims, but a means for vindicating actual claims. People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 275 Cal. Rptr. 729, 776, 800 P. 2d 1159, 1206 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835, 112 S.Ct. 117, 116 L.Ed. 2d 85 (1991). The filing of a petition for PCR is not a license to obtain unlimited information from the State, but a means through which a defendant may demonstrate to a reviewing court that he was convicted or sentenced in violation of his rights. See R. 3:22-2. Moreover, consistent with our prior discovery jurisprudence, any PCR discovery order should be appropriately narrow and limited. See, e.g., State v. D.R.H., 127 N.J. 249, 256, 604 A. 2d 89 (1992); State v. R.W., 104 N.J. 14, 28, 514 A. 2d 1287 (1986). [T]here is no postconviction right to `fish' through official files for belated grounds of attack on the judgment, or to confirm mere speculation or hope that a basis for collateral relief may exist. Gonzalez, supra, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 775, 800 P. 2d at 1205; see Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F. 3d 1485, 1493 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1230, 114 S.Ct. 2730, 129 L.Ed. 2d 853 (1994); State v. Thomas, 236 Neb. 553, 462 N.W. 2d 862, 867-68 (1990). However, where a defendant presents the PCR court with good cause to order the State to supply the defendant with discovery that is relevant to the defendant's case and not privileged, the court has the discretionary authority to grant relief. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 Rule 6(a); Lewis, supra, 656 So. 2d at 1250; Fitzgerald, supra, 121 Ill.Dec. at 941, 526 N.E. 2d at 135 (noting that good cause standard guards against potential abuse of PCR discovery process). Courts may reason by analogy to existing discovery rules, see R. 3:13-2 to -4, in designing an appropriate PCR discovery order. In the document-production context, barring exceptional circumstances, a defendant seeking to inspect State files should identify the specific documents sought for production. The PCR court may choose to view the documents in camera before determining whether to issue the requested discovery order. We have thoroughly reviewed the PCR record and exhibits in this case and conclude that the PCR court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on defendant's discovery motions. While finding that defendant was not entitled to inspect the State's entire file, the PCR court permitted him to make requests for specific items and ordered the State to turn over those items that were relevant and not work product. We endorse the use of that procedure. We are not unmindful of the State's failure to comply fully with its pretrial discovery obligations in this case. Our review of the record and defendant's PCR claims leads us to conclude that there were indeed some discoverable documents that the State did not provide to defendant before or during defendant's trial. If the PCR court had concluded that the State's nondisclosures had been willful, it would have been within that court's authority to grant defendant's motion to inspect the entirety of the State's file. Under appropriate circumstances, a PCR court may properly conclude that review of the State's file by either the defendant or the court itself is the only means to guarantee that the defendant has received all the discovery materials to which he is entitled. In this case, however, defendant has not demonstrated that those circumstances exist. The overwhelming majority of defendant's PCR discovery claims refer to documents that were either protected by the work-product privilege, largely irrelevant to the issue of defendant's guilt or innocence, or simply nonexistent. Although it appears that the State was not as meticulous as it should have been in abiding by our court rules governing discovery, there has been no showing that the State acted willfully, with malice, or with the intent to conceal discoverable evidence from defense counsel. The PCR court reached a similar conclusion. Finding defendant's motion to inspect the State's file to be overly broad, the court explained: There's no showing of any reasonable likelihood of discoverable material in the motion as constituted, and therefore, I will deny the motion without prejudice to the right of the Defendant to pursue any application for specific items. Based on the PCR court's familiarity with the practices and conduct of the parties, that court's informed sense of whether any discoverable documents remain unseen by defendant, and our own independent review of the record, we decline to disturb the PCR court's determination of the type and amount of discovery justice ... requires in this case. W.C., supra, 85 N.J. at 221, 426 A. 2d 50; cf. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161, 199 A. 2d 809 (1964) (discussing trial court's opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the `feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy). We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that this is not one of the rare cases in which a blanket inspection of the State's file is appropriate. Defendant also argues that the Right-to-Know Law, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -4, and the common-law right to inspect public documents entitle him to the discovery requested in this case. We find those arguments to be without merit. Under the Right-to-Know Law, New Jersey citizens have an absolute right to inspect, copy, or purchase records `required by law to be made, maintained or kept on file' by public officials. Home News v. State, Department of Health, 144 N.J. 446, 453, 677 A. 2d 195 (1996) (quoting N.J.S.A. 47:1A-2) (emphasis added). The Right-to-Know Law does not provide defendant with the right to inspect the law-enforcement files sought in this case because no law or regulation requires that such files be made, maintained or kept. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-2; see River Edge Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hyland, 165 N.J. Super. 540, 545, 398 A. 2d 912 (App.Div.) (holding that no law required that results of law-enforcement official's investigation into alleged criminal offense be maintained or kept, and thus such results were not subject to Right-to-Know Law), certif. denied, 81 N.J. 58, 404 A. 2d 1157 (1979); Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Borough of Seaside Heights, 246 N.J. Super. 62, 67, 586 A. 2d 870 (Law Div. 1990) (holding that no law required that police reports be maintained or kept and thus reports were not subject to Right-to-Know Law). The common-law right to inspect extends to any document `made by public officers in the exercise of public functions' and thus encompasses a far broader range of documents than the Right-to-Know Law. Board of Educ. v. Department of the Treasury, 145 N.J. 269, 279, 678 A. 2d 660 (1996) (quoting Nero v. Hyland, 76 N.J. 213, 222, 386 A. 2d 846 (1978)). However, although the common-law right to inspect documents extends to a wider pool of public records than does the Right-to-Know Law, ... the right itself is a qualified one. Home News, supra, 144 N.J. at 453, 677 A. 2d 195. Specifically, before a claimant is granted access to the document in question, the claimant's common-law right of access must be balanced against the State's interest in preventing disclosure. Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex, 141 N.J. 35, 46, 660 A. 2d 1163 (1995). That interest in nondisclosure consists primarily of the need to maintain the confidentiality of the information sought, id. at 48, 660 A. 2d 1163, a concern that is especially important in the context of a pending criminal proceeding. As the Appellate Division has explained: The receipt by appropriate law enforcement officials of information concerning the existence or occurrence of criminal activities is critical to the uncovering and the prosecution of criminal offenses, and is thus crucial to effective law enforcement. In order that the flow of such information be not impeded or cut off, the law has long treated the information as confidential and privileged against disclosure, thereby protecting witness security, the State's relationship with its informants and witnesses, and other confidential relationships, among other things. [ River Edge Sav. & Loan Ass'n, supra, 165 N.J. Super. at 543-44, 398 A. 2d 912.] See also Loigman v. Kimmelman, 102 N.J. 98, 107, 505 A. 2d 958 (1986) (discussing government's need to conduct [investigative] affairs with skill, with sensitivity to the privacy interests involved, and in an atmosphere of confidentiality that encourages the utmost candor); Nero, supra, 76 N.J. at 225, 386 A. 2d 846 (Confidentiality is vital not only because it serves to protect government sources of information, but also because it enhances the effectiveness of investigative techniques and procedures. (citations omitted)). In our view, the policies that inspire the common-law right of inspection of public documents are different from the considerations that govern discovery in criminal proceedings. The interests at stake in criminal proceedings require a different analysis and a balancing of different interests. The appropriate analysis and balancing of interests is reflected in our criminal discovery rules. See R. 3:13-2 to -4. Moreover, we note that no court in this State has relied on the common-law right to inspect in granting a criminal defendant discovery beyond that authorized by the Rules Governing Criminal Practice. We endorse that result and hold that the common-law right to inspect public documents may not be invoked in a pending criminal case by a defendant seeking discovery rights beyond those granted by Rule 3:13-2 to -4. See State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 70 Ohio St. 3d 420, 639 N.E. 2d 83, 89, 92 (1994) (reversing prior interpretation of state records law that allowed criminal defendants to use records law to obtain discovery in addition to that provided by criminal procedure rules, because prior practice brought about interminable delay and chaos in criminal trials and state's discovery rules had virtually been rendered meaningless). Defendant attempts to differentiate this case from pending criminal proceedings on the ground that, on this appeal, defendant is seeking collateral, post-conviction review. Defendant suggests that his case is closed because it is no longer at trial or on direct appeal, and that he is therefore entitled to invoke the common-law right to inspect. However, the fact that defendant seeks a new trial on this appeal belies the claim that his case is in any sense closed. Moreover, the fact that there is no Court Rule explicitly governing post-conviction discovery does not render the common-law right to inspect an alternative basis for obtaining discovery materials in this pending PCR case. The proper approach is for courts to reason by analogy to existing discovery rules in fashioning appropriate discovery orders in PCR cases. We thus conclude that the post-conviction nature of these proceedings does not entitle defendant to the discovery he seeks. Whether a criminal defendant's case is at trial, on direct appeal, or on PCR review does not alter the defendant's inability to invoke the common-law right to inspect in an effort to obtain additional discovery. See also Nero, supra, 76 N.J. at 225, 386 A. 2d 846 (`[E]ven inactive investigatory files may have to be kept confidential in order to convince citizens that they may safely confide in law enforcement officials.' (quoting Koch v. Department of Justice, 376 F. Supp. 313, 315 (D.D.C. 1974))).
Following the usual practice in this state, the same judge that presided over defendant's trial also heard his PCR petition. During the PCR proceeding, defendant moved to disqualify the judge for bias. Defendant claimed that bias had been demonstrated by prior rulings adverse to the defense and by extra-judicial remarks made by the judge. Under our rules, the judge of any court shall be disqualified if the judge has given an opinion on the matter before the court, R. 1:12-1(d), if the judge is interested in the outcome of the matter, R. 1:12-1(e), or if there is any other reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so. R. 1:12-1(f). The disqualification decision is initially left to the discretion of the trial court. Hundred East Credit Corp. v. Eric Schuster Corp., 212 N.J. Super. 350, 358, 515 A. 2d 246 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 60, 526 A. 2d 146 (1986); State v. Flowers, 109 N.J. Super. 309, 311-12, 263 A. 2d 167 (App.Div. 1970). Moreover, judges are not free to err on the side of caution; it is improper for a court to recuse itself unless the factual bases for its disqualification are shown by the movant to be true or are already known by the court. Hundred East Credit, supra, 212 N.J. Super. at 358, 515 A. 2d 246; Clawans v. Schakat, 49 N.J. Super. 415, 420-21, 140 A. 2d 234 (App.Div. 1958) (citing State v. De Maio, 70 N.J.L. 220, 222, 58 A. 173 (E. & A. 1904)). Fundamental to any consideration of possible judicial disqualification is a showing of prejudice or potential bias. Flowers, supra, 109 N.J. Super. at 312, 263 A. 2d 167; see also State v. Walker, 33 N.J. 580, 592, 166 A. 2d 567 (1960) (holding judicial disqualification inappropriate where [t]here is no showing that the trial judge had any personal or private interest apart from the fulfillment of his judicial duties), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 850, 83 S.Ct. 89, 9 L.Ed. 2d 86 (1962). An adverse ruling in prior proceedings does not warrant disqualification. See Walker, supra, 33 N.J. at 591, 166 A. 2d 567 (Absent a showing of bias or prejudice, the participation of a judge in previous proceedings in the case before him is not a ground for disqualification.). An error by the court in the previous proceeding does not necessarily justify an inference of bias and will not, by itself, furnish a ground for disqualification. See ibid. (holding that reversal of judgment in previous proceedings in insufficient ground for disqualification on remand); Hundred East Credit, supra, 212 N.J. Super. at 358, 515 A. 2d 246 (upholding denial of disqualification motion on remand following reversal of trial court's earlier rulings). Of course, an error might be sufficiently blatant, and so lacking in an alternative, good faith explanation that the error would support a charge of bias. In the ordinary case, however, the fact that a court is overruled or overrules its own prior ruling is entitled to no weight in deciding whether that court is biased against the party harmed by the error. Defendant claims that evidence of bias exists in two erroneous discovery rulings by the trial court. The rulings concerned two documents, a memorandum by Investigator Edward Murphy to Assistant Prosecutor Kelly concerning an interview of witnesses and a memorandum by Lieutenant James Churchill concerning alibi witnesses for Thompson. The documents are also the subject of discovery claims discussed elsewhere in this opinion. The trial court reviewed those documents in camera and ruled that they were work product, withholding from defendant the entire Murphy memorandum and turning over only a redacted version of the Churchill memorandum. The trial court acknowledged its error in the PCR proceedings and the unedited documents were released. Defendant claims that those rulings reveal the trial court's bias against him. Defendant emphasizes his assertion that the court's ruling on the Murphy memorandum prevented the discovery of evidence contrary to the court's factual basis for denying the suppression motion, and that those factual findings were made soon after the court's in camera review of the document. Redacting the Churchill memorandum, it is claimed, prevented defendant from interviewing key witnesses. We are unpersuaded that those discovery rulings constitute evidence of bias. The trial court itself acknowledged that the documents were withheld in error. We note, however, that the documents are within the literal terms of the rule exempting from discovery internal reports, memoranda or documents made by that party or the party's attorney or agents, in connection with the investigation, prosecution or defense of the matter. R. 3:13-3(e). Moreover, the information contained in the Murphy memorandum is not directly contrary to the trial court's findings at the suppression hearing, and we have sustained the PCR court's determination that releasing that document to the defense would not have had the capacity to change the outcome of the proceedings. Likewise, as we find elsewhere in this opinion, the Churchill memorandum contained no material information. Therefore, the nature of those two documents will not serve to elevate the trial court's discovery rulings from mere error to something more sinister. Defendant also alleges that several statements by the trial court warrant its disqualification. A court's prior statement of opinion concerning a matter before it may indicate that the court has prejudged the matter and must be disqualified under Rule 1:12-1(d). The Rule contains an important qualification, however. A judicial statement of opinion in the course of the proceedings in the case at bar, or in another case in which the same issue is presented, will not require disqualification. R. 1:12-1 ([Paragraph (d)] shall not prevent a judge from sitting because of having given an opinion in another action in which the same matter in controversy came in question or given an opinion on any question in controversy in the pending action in the course of previous proceedings therein....); Hundred East Credit, supra, 212 N.J. Super. at 358, 515 A. 2d 246. A judge's statement of opinion in the course of proceedings might reveal such prejudice that disqualification is required under the Rule 's catch-all paragraph (f). However, the effect of paragraph (d) is directed primarily at statements made outside of the declarant's role as a judge. Defendant raises the fact that the trial court presided over the trial in the unrelated case of State v. Acceturo, in which the issue of the Ocean County Prosecutor's compliance with its discovery obligations was in dispute. Defendant claims that a statement by the court in relation to that issue warrants disqualification. However, that is obviously a statement of opinion in another action expressly exempted from 1:12-1(d). Defendant also claims that testimony by the trial judge in a civil matter in Louisiana titled Thompson v. McKinnon requires disqualification. Defendant contends that the testimony reveals that the judge prejudged whether the prosecution was conducted fairly and whether defense counsel had committed gross negligence. Concerning whether the prosecution was fair, the judge testified that he had no reason to believe otherwise. That statement does not support the inference that the judge had prejudged the fairness of the prosecution. With regard to negligence of defense counsel, the judge's Louisiana testimony merely recounted a statement the court had made in defendant's trial. Defendant's remaining allegations concern a speech to a high school class about defendant's case and a fragment of a conversation in chambers that was caught on videotape. However, defendant does not claim to know the substance of the court's remarks to the high school class, and only a fragment of the conversation in chambers was recorded. Contrary to defendant's claim, the sentence attributed to the court does not necessarily reveal that it had prejudged defendant's credibility. The sentence appears out of context, and is subject to a variety of interpretations. Thus, none of the supposed examples of bias or prejudice raised by defendant warranted disqualification of the PCR court. Nor do those examples taken together show the pattern of bias defendant alleges. We recognize that litigants are fierce in their determination and view an adverse decision as prejudice of the judge. Matthews v. Deane, 196 N.J. Super. 441, 447, 483 A. 2d 232 (Ch.Div. 1984), appeal dismissed, 206 N.J. Super. 608, 503 A. 2d 376 (App.Div. 1986). We also acknowledge that it is not necessary to prove actual prejudice on the part of the court, and that the mere appearance of bias may require disqualification. R. 1:12-1(f). However, before the court may be disqualified on the ground of an appearance of bias, the belief that the proceedings were unfair must be objectively reasonable. Ibid. We do not believe that the court's conduct in this case approaches such a standard, and we thus affirm the denial of the disqualification motion.
Defendant claims that the PCR court's denial of his request to interview the trial jurors was in error. Defendant further claims that our rule precluding post-trial contact with jurors without leave of the court, R. 1:16-1, violates his constitutional rights under the First Amendment. Defendant acknowledges the long-standing common-law rule against inquiring into jurors' motives to impeach their verdict. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 2745, 97 L.Ed. 2d 90, 104 (1987). For sound reasons of policy, including the prevention of juror harassment and the avoidance of chilling jury deliberations, courts typically require some showing of extraneous influence before permitting a party to interview jurors. See, e.g., State v. LaFera, 42 N.J. 97, 110, 199 A. 2d 630 (1964); see also United States v. Console, 13 F. 3d 641, 669 (3d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1076, 114 S.Ct. 1660, 128 L.Ed. 2d 377, and cert. denied, 513 U.S. 812, 115 S.Ct. 64, 130 L.Ed. 2d 21 (1994); United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F. 2d 1210, 1234 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971, 104 S.Ct. 2344, 80 L.Ed. 2d 818 (1984). That practice is particularly appropriate when the jury has already been discharged. See Tanner, supra, 483 U.S. at 120-21, 107 S.Ct. at 2747-48, 97 L.Ed. 2d at 106. Before the PCR court, defendant sought permission to contact jurors some seven years after their discharge, but he made no showing that would justify such an extraordinary measure. Defendant's allegations of extraneous influence lack any factual basis and rely on purest speculation. This Court has found that the trial court's conduct of the voir dire was without error. Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 93-94, 586 A. 2d 85. Therefore, we reject defendant's claim that the PCR proceeding was unfair because of the court's denial of his request to interview jurors. We also are unpersuaded by defendant's First Amendment challenge to Rule 1:16-1. The compelling public interest in protecting jurors and their deliberations amply justifies the restriction on contacting them without good cause.
Before the PCR court, defendant moved to expand the record and to hold a hearing to reconstruct the record concerning evidence of the service of the notice of aggravating factors on the defense, off-the-record discussions concerning jury selection, withdrawal of two of the three aggravating factors, and off-the-record discussions of penalty-phase procedures and jury selection. The PCR court denied this request, and defendant seeks to reverse that determination and to have the case remanded to complete the record. Defendant bases his claim on the proposition that due-process rights require that a record be made of the proceedings. Obviously, however, there is no mandate to memorialize every inconsequential event in the course of a major trial. Defendant claims that the missing material would be relevant to defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, with regard to a number of issues, but defendant does not state specifically what that relevance is or that the omitted material would affect the outcome of the PCR proceeding. Moreover, we find significant the fact that defendant failed to move to reconstruct the record before the PCR proceeding began, years after the conversations at issue took place. The fact that neither counsel who participated in the conversations, nor defendant's counsel on direct appeal, found it worthwhile earlier to attempt to reconstruct the record is strong evidence that the conversations were considered unimportant by those in the best position to know their substance. In addition, we note that the information defendant seeks to reconstruct seems redundant. Defendant cannot reasonably argue that he lacked notice that the State would present aggravating factors. The fact that two of the aggravating factors were withdrawn is certainly of record. Moreover, it is not clear how off-the-record discussions concerning the withdrawn aggravating factors could establish an ineffectiveness claim. Likewise, unrecorded discussions concerning jury selection would appear to be of limited usefulness, in view of the fact that we have found that counsel's performance in the jury selection process was not deficient. We note that defendant's trial counsel testified at the PCR hearing concerning the circumstances of the State's withdrawal of the aggravating factors and his discussions with his client concerning the penalty phase. Finally, we concur with the PCR court's observation that PCR counsel remained free to interview trial counsel without judicial assistance and to present any evidence indicating that the missing portions of the record are indeed material. That defendant has made no such showing further supports the inference that the omissions are inconsequential. Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim that the PCR court interfered with his right to appeal, and we affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to reconstruct the record.