Opinion ID: 2107127
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: The Cooperation Agreement of Elaine Thomas

Text: The defendant next argues that the trial justice committed reversible error when he admitted into evidence (as a full documentary exhibit and through the prosecutor's reading the document verbatim during his questioning of Elaine) the cooperation agreement that Elaine had entered into with the state. The defendant specifically argues that the document constituted inadmissible hearsay and that none of the exceptions to the rule against hearsay were applicable. [35] In addition, defendant argues that allowing the cooperation agreement to be admitted as a full exhibit for the jury to refer to during deliberations was also prejudicial to his defense. Accordingly, defendant argues, his conviction should for this reason be reversed. Rule 801(c) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence defines hearsay as, a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. On several occasions this Court has stated that [i]t is axiomatic that an out-of-court statement is not hearsay unless it is offered for the truth of the matter asserted. State v. Johnson, 667 A.2d 523, 530 (R.I.1995); see also State v. Crow, 871 A.2d 930, 936 (R.I. 2005) (holding that the testimony of a police detective concerning a conversation he had with a second detective was not hearsay and was admissible to demonstrate how the police detective had become involved in the continuing investigation); State v. Mann, 889 A.2d 164, 166 (R.I. 2005) (holding that the statement of an employee that a cable had been cut which previously secured a stolen compactor was not hearsay because it was offered for the limited purpose of showing what prompted the witness to conduct an equipment inventory); State v. Tatro, 659 A.2d 106, 110 (R.I.1995) (holding that an out-of-court statement made by a defendant that her registration was in the glove compartment was not hearsay because the statement served to show what prompted the officer to open the glove compartment); Wells v. Uvex Winter Optical, Inc., 635 A.2d 1188, 1193 (R.I.1994) (holding that a statement was not hearsay because it was offered not for its truth, but rather for the purpose of showing the effect that the statement had on a particular individual). An out-of-court statement not offered for the truth of the matter asserted may be admissible when offered for a limited purpose unless otherwise precluded by virtue of Rule 402 or 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Mann, 889 A.2d at 166-67 (Out-of-court statements not offered for the truth of the matter asserted may be admissible for the limited purpose for which counsel offers them, barring relevancy or prejudicial concerns under Rules 402 and 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, respectively.). It is clear from the record that Elaine's cooperation agreement was not offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Rule 801(c). The cooperation agreement was not offered as substantive proof that Elaine would be testifying truthfully. Rather, it was offered to establish the circumstances under which Elaine was testifying at defendant's trial  namely, that she had agreed to plead guilty to certain criminal charges and testify against defendant in exchange for, inter alia, a sentencing recommendation from the state. As such, the cooperation agreement did not constitute inadmissible hearsay. Accordingly, we perceive no error in the trial justice's decision to (1) admit the document into evidence as an exhibit and (2) to permit the prosecutor to read from the document verbatim during his direct examination of Elaine. Although the trial record does not indicate the trial justice's reasoning for overruling defendant's hearsay objection, it is clear from the record as a whole that the admission of Elaine's cooperation agreement was relevant. The defendant further argues that admitting the cooperation agreement into evidence was extremely prejudicial because that evidence constituted a form of improper vouching by the state with respect to the credibility of Elaine and therefore constitutes reversible error. In State v. Chakouian, 537 A.2d 409, 412 (R.I.1988), this Court stated that [o]ne means through which improper vouching may occur is by admission of plea agreements phrased in a manner that suggests that the government has special knowledge that its witness is speaking the truth. Improper vouching can also occur if the prosecution place[s] the prestige of the government behind the witness. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets in original); see also United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir.1980). However, we have expressly stated that the mere statement in a plea agreement that a witness promises to speak `truthfully' does not by itself constitute improper vouching. Chakouian, 537 A.2d at 412. [36] Additionally, improper vouching cannot be established solely on the basis of a statement in a plea agreement that perjury charges will be brought if the defendant makes any false statement under oath   . Id. The record indicates that Elaine testified that her cooperation agreement contained a statement that she agreed to testify truthfully and that, if she should fail to do so, such a failure would constitute a violation of the agreement that could be considered by the prosecution when formulating a sentencing recommendation. The cooperation agreement itself contains language indicating that, if Elaine should provide false information at any judicial proceeding, she could be charged with perjury and could be subject to further imprisonment. The just-summarized language in Elaine's cooperation agreement does not rise to the level of improper vouching as that concept has been described by this Court. In Chakouian, this Court quoted with approval the language of the Court of Appeals of Michigan concerning when reversible error would exist with respect to the admission of a plea agreement on the grounds of improper vouching. Chakouian, 537 A.2d at 412. The Michigan opinion from which this Court extensively quoted with approval in Chakouian was People v. Buschard, 109 Mich.App. 306, 311 N.W.2d 759 (1981), and we believe it appropriate once again to quote the same passage from that opinion that we quoted in Chakouian: Based upon the state and Federal decisions cited above, we cannot hold that any reference to a plea agreement containing a promise of truthfulness is in itself grounds for reversal. A more accurate statement of the law appears to be that, although such agreements should be admitted with great caution, admissibility of such an agreement is not necessarily error unless it is used by the prosecution to suggest that the government had some special knowledge, not known to the jury, that the witness was testifying truthfully. Buschard, 311 N.W.2d at 763-64. An instance of the special knowledge to which the court in Buschard made reference was discussed in Roberts, 618 F.2d at 533. In that case, improper vouching was held to have occurred because, in addition to admitting a plea agreement requiring a witness to testify truthfully, in closing argument the prosecutor stated that, if the witness were to testify falsely, then charges of first-degree murder would be reinstated, and he would stand a very good likelihood of going to the gas chamber. Id. The prosecutor in Roberts also directed the jury's attention to a police officer seated in the courtroom; the officer did not testify at the defendant's trial, but was present throughout the proceedings. The prosecutor in that case informed the jury that the police officer was on a mission    to sit and listen to the testimony of the chief prosecution witness. Id. Nothing in the record of the present case rises to the level of what occurred in Roberts. Accordingly, the mere statement in the cooperation agreement that Elaine would testify truthfully coupled with her acknowledgment that she could be charged with perjury if she failed to do so does not constitute impermissible vouching and certainly does not require reversal.