Opinion ID: 1163186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction over Bradley

Text: In the instant case, the prosecution has charged the appellees with conspiracy based in large part upon conduct occurring outside the boundaries of our state. HRS § 701-106 (1993), which delineates the scope of Hawai`i's criminal jurisdiction, State v. Meyers, 72 Haw. 591, 595, 825 P.2d 1062, 1064 (1992), specifically addresses two types of conspiracy charges, stating in pertinent part: Territorial applicability. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person may be convicted under the law of this State of an offense committed by the person's own conduct or the conduct of another for which the person is legally accountable if: . . . . (c) Conduct occurring outside the State is sufficient under the law of this State to constitute a conspiracy to commit an offense within the State and an overt act in furtherance of such conspiracy occurs within the State; or (d) Conduct occurring within the State establishes... [a] conspiracy to commit[] an offense in another jurisdiction which also is an offense under the law of this State[.] In order to determine which subsection applies to the instant case, we must examine the nature of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment. The conspiracy count of the indictment states in pertinent part: On or about the 19th day of November, 1989 to and including the 27th day of February, 1990, in the City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawaii[,] FRED DOUGLAS BRIDGES ... and TIMOTHY LAMAR BRADLEY, ... with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of crimes, to wit, Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the First Degree and Commercial Promotion of Marijuana in the Second Degree, did enter into a conspiracy ... by agreeing with each other and with [Detective Brown and Officers Laganse and Nishimura], and persons unknown, ... that they or one or more of them would engage in or solicit the conduct or would cause or solicit the result specified by the definitions of Promoting a Dangerous Drug in the First Degree and Commercial Promotion of Marijuana in the Second Degree in Sections 712-1241(1)(b)(ii)(A) [5] and 712-1249.5(1)(b) [6] of the Hawaii Revised Statutes. It was part of said conspiracy that Defendants BRIDGES and BRADLEY would knowingly distribute one or more preparations, compounds, mixtures, or substances of an aggregate weight of one-eighth ounce or more containing heroin or salts, isomers, and salts of isomers of heroin and marijuana having an aggregate weight of one pound or more to and with unindicted co-conspirators Brown, Laganse, Nishimura, and persons unknown. In addition, the indictment alleges eighteen separate overt acts that were allegedly committed [i]n furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof. Based on the language of the indictment and the evidence presented at the hearing on the appellees' motions to dismiss and to suppress evidence, it is clear that the conspiracy charges against the appellees allege that they conspired with each other and/or the HPD agents to distribute heroin and marijuana. See also Memorandum In Opposition To Motion To Dismiss Indictment For Lack Of Jurisdiction, at 5 (In the instant case both Defendants have been charged with conspiracy to distribute heroin and marijuana (Count II) during the time period from November 19, 1989 to and including February 27, 1990. The purpose or plan of the conspiracy was to distribute heroin and marijuana.). Although not argued by the appellees, we note that the appellees' receipt of heroin and marijuana from the HPD agents could not have amounted to distribution of heroin and marijuana. In State v. Aluli, 78 Hawai`i 317, 893 P.2d 168 (1995), this court held that `to distribute,' as that term is defined in HRS § 712-1240, does not include `to buy' or `to offer to buy.' 78 Hawai`i at 323, 893 P.2d at 174. In reaching our decision, we recognized that HRS § 712-1240 (1993) defines to distribute, inter alia, as to ... exchange with another, and expressly considered that aspect of the definition of to distribute. We explained that all of the other words the legislature used to define to distribute (sell, transfer, prescribe, give, deliver, etc.) clearly indicate that the legislature intended to proscribe the supplying or providing of dangerous drugs  to another. It would be incongruous, then, to construe the legislature's use of exchange with another as indicating its intention to proscribe the purchase or receipt of drugs from another. Aluli, 78 Hawai`i at 321, 893 P.2d at 172 (citation omitted; emphasis in original). [7] Accordingly, the appellees' receipt of heroin and marijuana from the HPD agents as part of an exchange of drugs could not constitute distribution of those drugs under HRS § 712-1240. Cf. State v. Rullman, 78 Hawai`i 488, 491, 896 P.2d 944, 947 (App.1995) (To sell a drug is to transfer it to another for any kind of consideration. To barter a drug is to transfer it to another for a kind of consideration other than money. Thus, bartering a drug is a type of sale; exchanging is similar.) Moreover, although the HPD agents clearly distributed heroin and marijuana to the appellees, see supra note 7, the appellees' agreement merely to receive the heroin and marijuana that was distributed by the HPD agents could not constitute an agreement to distribute heroin and marijuana. As explained in State v. Senteno, 69 Haw. 363, 742 P.2d 369 (1987), an agreement between providers and recipients of drugs is not the equivalent of an agreement between co-conspirators: The terms `offer or agree' contained in HRS § 712-1240 defining `to distribute' refer to offers or agreements made with respect to prospective buyers. In contrast, the conspiracy statute (HRS § 705-520) speaks in terms of agreements among co-conspirators.  69 Haw. at 367, 742 P.2d at 372 (emphases in original). Thus, any agreement by the appellees merely to receive heroin and marijuana from the HPD agents who were distributing the drugs could not constitute an agreement between co-conspirators to distribute heroin and marijuana. [8] On the other hand, the indictment can legitimately be construed as charging the appellees with conspiring with each other and/or the HPD agents to distribute heroin and marijuana to other unidentified persons on the mainland. The overt acts alleged in the indictment contain express references to further distribution of the drugs: 4. On February 6, 1990, an informant, Brown, and Laganse met with Defendant BRIDGES in California and discussed, among other things, the following: heroin and marijuana being delivered to the Defendant Bridges; Defendant BRIDGES' sending of heroin to Texas and Indianapolis for distribution; prices, quantities, and purity of heroin; Brown giving Defendant BRIDGES two pounds of marijuana as a sample; and future phone calls. . . . . 6. On February 17, 1990, Defendant BRIDGES met with Nishimura, Brown, and Laganse in Honolulu and discussed the price of heroin, distribution of heroin in various mainland cities, quantities of heroin to be delivered, and arrangements for the upcoming marijuana, heroin, and cocaine deal. (Emphasis added.) In addition, the amount of heroin (one pound) and marijuana (two pounds) involved is sufficient to support an inference that further distribution of the drugs was contemplated by the appellees. Thus, the question becomes whether the circuit court had jurisdiction over Bradley with respect to the charge that he conspired with Bridges and/or the HPD agents to distribute heroin and marijuana to unidentified persons on the mainland. HRS § 701-106(1)(c) only applies to conspirac[ies] to commit an offense within the State. A conspiracy to distribute drugs on the mainland is not a conspiracy to commit an offense within Hawai`i. Therefore, HRS § 701-106(1)(c) does not apply. HRS § 701-106(1)(d), on the other hand, applies to conspirac[ies] to commit an offense in another jurisdiction. This is the applicable subsection to determine whether the circuit court had jurisdiction over Bradley. Under this subsection, jurisdiction exists when [c]onduct occurring within [Hawai`i] establishes the conspiracy. HRS § 705-520 (1993) sets forth the conduct elements of a criminal conspiracy as follows: Criminal conspiracy. A person is guilty of criminal conspiracy if, with intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime: (1) He [or she] agrees with one or more persons that they or one or more of them will engage in or solicit the conduct or will cause or solicit the result specified by the definition of the offense; and (2) He [or she] or another person with whom he [or she] conspired commits an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy. Thus, in order for jurisdiction over Bradley to exist under HRS § 701-106(1)(d), an agreement (by Bradley) and an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy (committed by Bradley or another person with whom he conspired) must have occurred in Hawai`i. See State v. Merino, 81 Hawai`i 198, 213, 915 P.2d 672, 687 (1996).
There is nothing in the record to indicate when or where Bradley initially agreed with Bridges and/or the HPD agents that one or more of them would distribute the heroin and marijuana on the mainland. However, if Bradley committed an overt act in Hawai`i, that overt act would serve to renew his agreement in Hawai`i. See People v. Pascarella, 92 Ill.App.3d 413, 48 Ill.Dec. 1, 5, 415 N.E.2d 1285, 1289 (1981) (It is long established that every act in furtherance of a conspiracy is regarded, in law, as a renewal or continuance of the unlawful agreement. The conspiracy is renewed ... at the place where the overt act is done.). [9] Although Bradley was never physically in Hawai`i, he did place a telephone call that was received in Hawai`i. According to State v. Meyers, 72 Haw. 591, 595, 825 P.2d 1062, 1064-65 (1992), a telephone call constitutes conduct in the jurisdiction in which the call is received. The telephone conversation concerned the heroin and marijuana dealing. Thus, the telephone call constituted an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy that was committed in Hawai`i, thereby renewing Bradley's conspiratorial agreement in Hawai`i.
As discussed above, in order for jurisdiction to lie under HRS § 701-106(1)(d), both an agreement and the commission of an overt act must have occurred in Hawai`i. Moreover, although an overt act may serve to renew the agreement, the commission of a single overt act in Hawai`i cannot establish jurisdiction under HRS § 701-106(1)(d). See supra note 9. Thus, although Bradley's telephone call to the HPD agents in Hawai`i constituted an overt act in Hawai`i, because that overt act was used to establish the agreement, a separate overt act must have been committed in Hawai`i in order for jurisdiction to exist under HRS § 701-106(1)(d). Aside from the one collect call made to the HPD agents, Bradley placed no other telephone calls that were received in Hawai`i and, as noted above, he never set foot in Hawai`i during the time period that the conspiracy allegedly took place. Thus, as far as the record reveals, Bradley did not personally commit a second overt act in Hawai`i. HRS § 701-106(1)(d), however, does not require that the defendant personally commit an overt act in Hawai`i; it only requires that conduct establishing the conspiracy occur in Hawai`i. Moreover, pursuant to HRS § 701-106(1), criminal jurisdiction can be based on the defendant's own conduct or the conduct of another for which the person is legally accountable, and, under HRS § 705-520, a person is guilty of criminal conspiracy if [h]e [or she] or another person with whom he [or she] conspired commits an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy. Thus, an overt act committed in Hawai`i by a person with whom Bradley conspired would suffice to establish the overt act required for jurisdiction under HRS § 701-106(1)(d). The evidence in the record clearly demonstrates that Bridges was a person with whom Bradley had conspired and that Bridges committed at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy in Hawai`i when, while in Honolulu, he met with the undercover agents, discussed the drug transaction, and accepted a pre-payment for the cocaine. Therefore, the circuit court had jurisdiction over Bradley on the charge that he conspired with Bridges and/or the HPD agents to distribute heroin and marijuana to unidentified persons on the mainland. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred in granting Bradley's motion to dismiss with respect to the conspiracy charge.