Opinion ID: 1928842
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: constitutionality of the delegation

Text: We now proceed to inquire into the constitutionality of the delegation of power, since our reflections upon this subject will illuminate the consideration as to whether or not the Commissioner acted within his assigned powers in ordering overtime rates to be based upon the regular hourly wage, as opposed to the basic minimum fair wage. Appellants insist that assuming the Commissioner has the authority to promulgate overtime rates and to designate the maximum number of hours after which they are to take effect, his discretion is not adequately guided by standards sufficient to avoid the imputation of an unconstitutional delegation. The Commissioner is commanded to supplement the report of the wage board and to safeguard the minimum fair wage standards established. The words supplement and safeguard, as used in the statute, are not sufficiently definitive, say the appellants. But obviously these words refer to safeguarding the purposes of the Minimum Wage Act which in turn properly delimit the Commissioner's powers. The context of the act and its imbedded objectives may be considered in determining whether or not the administrator's discretion is constitutionally circumscribed. Schierstead v. City of Brigantine, 20 N.J. 164 (1955); Ward v. Scott, 11 N.J. 117 (1952); American Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm., 329 U.S. 90, 67 S.Ct. 133, 91 L.Ed. 103 (1946). The Minimum Wage Act has a twofold purpose. It is to aid oppressed employees in the achievement of a wage sufficient to meet the minimum cost of living necessary for health and to insure the employee receives a wage fairly and reasonably commensurate with the value of the service or class of service rendered. See R.S. 34:11-34. Appellants urge that provisions for premium pay on an overtime basis have no relation to carrying out the legislative intent. The basis for this hypothesis is the fallacious assumption that the proclamation of a minimum rate alone fulfills the purposes of the act. Despite assurance of a minimal hourly return, however, it is quite clear a living wage cannot be achieved unless the employee is engaged for more than a few hours per week. The requirement of an hourly rate only becomes meaningful as related to the minimum cost of living necessary for health when it is applied to the employee's opportunity to labor an average number of hours each week. Mary Lincoln Candies, Inc., v. Department of Labor, 289 N.Y. 262, 45 N.E. 2 d 434, 143 A.L.R. 1078 ( Ct. App. 1942). A minimum rate of 85 cents per hour for a non-clerical employee will not prove adequate to maintain health and well-being if he has only the limited opportunity of working four or five hours a week. By acting as a financial deterrent to the employment of certain workers for long hours to the detriment of their fellows' opportunity to labor, regulations placing a premium upon overtime assist in promoting the obtainment of a weekly recompense sufficient to maintain health. They encourage a more even distribution of available work among existing employees. Furthermore, appellants concede illness and accident occur in greater measure during overtime hours. Disabilities prohibit the steady employment which produces a minimum living wage on a long-term basis. Therefore, to the extent that overtime rates discourage the employer from prevailing upon his employees to spend excessive hours in the factory, they operate to secure the minimum cost of living necessary for health. Appellants deny that another and independent purpose of the Minimum Wage Act is to secure for employees a wage fairly and reasonably commensurate with the value of the service or class of service rendered. R.S. 34:11-36 declares employment at an oppressive and unreasonable wage to be contrary to public policy. R.S. 34:11-34 defines an oppressive and unreasonable wage as a wage which is both less than the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered and less than sufficient to meet the minimum cost of living necessary for health. (Emphasis supplied) In precis, the argument runs that the act is directed exclusively toward eliminating oppressive and unreasonable wages where they prevail and that whether a wage rate falls into this objectionable category ultimately depends upon its sufficiency to maintain health. Thus, say appellants, the fair and reasonable value of services, considered in isolation, cannot serve as a standard. It is important to realize, however, that the existence of a substantial number of women or minors receiving oppressive and unreasonable wages from any occupation is only the stimulus which impels the Commissioner to set in motion the administrative processes leading to rectification. The remedy for the imposition upon these vulnerable classes of employees is not merely establishment of a minimum wage tending to produce the minimum cost of living but the promulgation of a minimum fair wage which is defined in R.S. 34:11-34 as a wage fairly and reasonably commensurate with the value of the service or class of service rendered. (Emphasis supplied) If doubt exists as to the proper construction of a statute, resort may be had to the preamble for clarification. Grobart v. Grobart, 5 N.J. 161 (1950); Blackman v. Iles, 4 N.J. 82 (1950); Magierowski v. Buckley, 39 N.J. Super. 534 ( App. Div. 1956). The original preamble to the act in question states: The employment of women and minors in trade and industry in the State of New Jersey at wages unreasonably low and not fairly commensurate with the value of the services rendered is a matter of grave and vital public concern.    Judged by any reasonable standard, wages are in many cases fixed by chance and caprice and the wages accepted are often found to bear no relation to the fair value of the service rendered. The Legislature was obviously concerned with trying to insure payment commensurate with the value of the work performed. Does the fixing of maximum hours beyond which premium overtime rates shall be paid aid in securing the subject employees a fair return for their services? It is common knowledge that in almost every occupation overtime wages are today paid. Among the 64 petitioners to the Appellate Division, 63 voluntarily paid one and one-half times the regular hourly wage rate. Concededly, requiring payment of special rates for overtime labor serves objects other than insuring a fair return to the employee, but overtime may also logically be deemed a class of service rendered which is to be rewarded by a wage fairly and reasonably commensurate with its distinctive value. It was in part this point of view which led Congress to enact the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq., embodying a provision for overtime compensation at one and one-half times the regular rate of pay. Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 68 S.Ct. 1186, 92 L.Ed. 1502 (1948); Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419, 65 S.Ct. 1242, 89 L.Ed. 1705 (1945); Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 65 S.Ct. 11, 89 L.Ed. 29 (1944); Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 62 S.Ct. 1216, 86 L.Ed. 1682 (1942). Thus, we find the Commissioner's discretion to establish overtime rates to take effect after a maximum number of hours is limited by whether its exercise reasonably tends to procure, on behalf of the employees covered by his regulations, a subsistence wage fairly commensurate with the special service rendered. We are satisfied that the authority to proclaim premium rates is one of many elements in the enactment designed to foster its purposes. Whether such authority has been abused can be tested by reference to those purposes. Are these standards adequate? Since the question has never before been raised under the Minimum Wage Act, we may prudently turn to the examination of statutes in other fields which have been supported against a similar challenge. Without meticulous exposition of the cases on this subject, it seems safe to say, taking into account the nature of the subject matter regulated in each instance, that standards of a more general nature than those involved here have consistently been sustained as adequate to avoid the imputation of unconstitutionality. Thus, the Municipal Finance Commission is controlled by the simple standard of providing for the payment of existing obligations in such a way as to cause the least embarrassment to property owners as taxpayers in determining whether to permit an insolvent municipality to sell lands not needed for public use. R.S. 52:27-65. Schierstead v. City of Brigantine, supra . In awarding franchises for bus service, the Board of Public Utility Commissioners is guided by the general consideration of whether such franchise is necessary and proper for the public convenience and properly conserves the public interests. R.S. 48:2-14. In re Greenville Bus Co., 17 N.J. 131 (1954). See also R.S. 48:11-1 (public convenience and necessity) and R.S. 48:2-21 (just and reasonable). The discretion of the Commissioner of Alcoholic Beverage Control, with respect to fixing prices and issuing regulations, is limited by the general direction to administer the statute in such a manner as to promote temperance and eliminate the racketeer and bootlegger. R.S. 33:1-3, 39. Gaine v. Burnett, 122 N.J.L. 39 ( Sup. Ct. 1939), affirmed 123 N.J.L. 317 ( E. & A. 1939). And R.S. 4:12 A -21 empowers the Director of the Milk Control Board to take such measures as may be necessary to control or prevent unfair, unjust, destructive or demoralizing practices which are likely to result in the demoralization of agricultural interests in this State engaged in the production of milk or interfere with the maintenance of a fresh, wholesome supply of sanitary milk for the consumers of this State. See State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N.J. Eq. 504, 521 ( E. & A. 1935); Como Farms, Inc. v. Foran, 6 N.J. Super. 306, 312 ( App. Div. 1950). Standards sustained as adequate by the Supreme Court of the United States have been equally if not more broad, as is indicated by the analysis in Lichter v. U.S., 334 U.S. 742, 786, 68 S.Ct. 1294, 92 L.Ed. 1694 (1948).