Opinion ID: 2360655
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the majority simply misses the point and misrepresents the law by quoting from an isolated case without looking at the context.

Text: ¶ 9 The majority does not attack the opinions relied upon herein regarding the history of the sanctity of stipulations and their place in the resolution of issues before the trial court, because it cannot. Rather, the majority takes issue with the statement that [t]he majority decides the cause on an issue which was never presented to the trial court and which it raises sua sponte.  In so doing, it again misses the point. The fact that the parties may have mentioned in closing arguments a statute which their stipulations make inapplicable will not justify the kind of judicial avarice represented by the majority's ignoring the specific stipulations made and presented to the trier of fact as governing the cause. ¶ 10 The majority's reference to the syllabus in First Nat'l Bank of Cordell v. City Guaranty Bank of Hobart, 1935 OK 1105, 174 Okla. 545, 51 P.2d 573 as standing for the proposition that parties may not affect the law applied to a cause by the Court through the utilization of stipulations is misplaced. In First Nat'l, the Court determined that the garnishee could not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court by stipulation. The holding in First Nat'l is consistent with case law which refused to allow parties' stipulations to confer jurisdiction where none existed. [12] ¶ 11 In a more recent decision, State ex rel. State Ins. Fund v. JOA, Inc., 2003 OK 82, 78 P.3d 534, we held that the State Insurance Fund would be bound by its stipulation during litigation that a specific attorney fee statute would apply to the action. In so doing, we recognized that the Court was being presented with a stipulation of law. We also acknowledged that limitations existed on stipulations involving the power and structure of government. ¶ 12 The JOA Court relied heavily on a cause authored by Justice Opala, Strelecki v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 1993 OK 122, 872 P.2d 910. In that case, we noted that the Tax Commission had entered a stipulation on an issue of law and taken inconsistent positions on issues of law. In addressing the extent to which the Tax Commission was bound by its counsel's argument in the litigation, the Strelecki Court stated the following: A party on appeal cannot take a position inconsistent with that maintained before a trial tribunal. While this court may decide a public-law case on dispositive issues, it will not relieve a party of a solemn commitment to a position argued both below and on appeal unless it is so contrary to the applicable law that it would amount to an ultra vires act.... The Commission will not be heardat this late hourto deny liability upon a changed interpretation of the state's remedial regime for refunds. The government stands before us on the footing of an ordinary appellee. It will not receive a more favorable treatment than that afforded other appellate litigants in a similar situation. [Footnotes omitted. Bold added for emphasis.] The above quotation is supported by authority recognizing that: neither party on appeal will be allowed to change the theory of the case from that on which it was presented to the trial court; [13] and, parties are bound in the appellate court by the theories on which a case was tried below. [14] Nevertheless, the majority here strips private parties of the protections granted by this Court's jurisprudence on stipulations where it would not do so to a State agency. There can be no justice in such a result.