Opinion ID: 4427268
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: Before this Court can impose discipline, “[p]rofessional misconduct must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Farris, 472 S.W.3d 549, 557 (Mo. banc 2015). “The DHP’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are advisory.” In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Mo. banc 2016). In disciplinary proceedings, this Court “reviews the evidence de novo, independently determining all issues pertaining to credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence, and draws its own conclusions of law.” In re Snyder, 35 S.W.3d 380, 382 (Mo. banc 2000). 12 Ms. Dierdorf’s Conduct Rule 4-1.13 OCDC asserts Ms. Dierdorf should be disciplined because she violated Rule 4-1.13 by failing to report Ms. Worrell’s misconduct. Rule 4-1.13(b) provides in relevant part: If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee, or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act, or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. This rule applies to government agencies. Rule 4-1.13, cmt. [6]. Here, Ms. Dierdorf – a lawyer for OCA – knew another assistant circuit attorney – Ms. Worrell – had violated the law by filing false charges against a suspect to cover up a police officer’s brutal assault of the suspect. The failure to report such conduct was a violation of Ms. Dierdorf’s legal obligation to the circuit attorney’s organization and could have resulted in a civil rights violation or lawsuit against OCA. Accordingly, it was reasonably necessary in the best interest of OCA that Ms. Dierdorf report Ms. Worrell’s conduct. 3 Instead, Ms. Dierdorf chose to conceal her knowledge of Det. Carroll’s misconduct and Ms. Worrell’s filing of a false charge by lying to her supervisors, IAD, and the FBI. 3 Throughout her brief, Ms. Dierdorf contends she never knew the charges were falsified at the time Ms. Worrell filed them. In support of this assertion, she relies on the fact that Ms. Worrell has always disputed whether she filed a false charge. The record shows that, at the time she spoke with Ms. Collins and Ms. Schuessler on Thursday, Ms. Dierdorf knew the charge of felony fleeing custody was false and filed to cover up Det. Carroll’s assault of the suspect in custody. 13 Ms. Dierdorf’s statements to her supervisors and IAD gave the impression that both she and Ms. Worrell did not know about the assault until after charges were filed against the suspect. She further instructed another attorney, Ms. Schuessler, not to give any information to her supervisors. Ms. Dierdorf then lied again during her first FBI interview regarding when she initially learned about the assault carried out by Det. Carroll. It was not until her second FBI interview – over a month after the incidents occurred – that Ms. Dierdorf finally admitted Ms. Worrell had told her about the assault on Wednesday prior to the filing of the charges. As AUSA Goldsmith testified, Ms. Dierdorf “time shifted” to protect both herself and Ms. Worrell by making it appear they did not know about the assault until after Ms. Worrell filed charges. Furthermore, Ms. Dierdorf’s lies and omissions interfered with and prolonged the FBI’s investigation of Ms. Worrell. The record, therefore, reflects, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Ms. Dierdorf violated Rule 4-1.13 when she failed to report Ms. Worrell’s misconduct. Rule 4-8.4(c), (d) OCDC further asserts Ms. Dierdorf violated Rules 4-8.4(c) and 4-8.4(d) by repeatedly lying to federal and state investigators and instructing Ms. Schuessler to lie to her supervisors about the assault and Ms. Worrell’s misconduct. Rule 4-8.4(c) provides: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” Rule 4-8.4(d) provides: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” 14 Ms. Dierdorf exhibited a pattern of dishonesty over the course of the criminal investigations of Det. Carroll and Ms. Worrell. She admitted during her second FBI interview that she lied to her supervisors and IAD regarding when she discovered the assault occurred. Additionally, for over a month, she concealed from her supervisors, IAD, and the FBI that Ms. Worrell knew Wednesday morning, prior to the filing of the charges, not only that Det. Carroll assaulted the suspect but also the details of the severity of the assault. She further attempted to conceal her own knowledge of the assault and Ms. Worrell’s filing of a false charge by telling her supervisors she did not learn of the assault until Thursday and had not discussed the matter with anyone at the office. She also omitted facts regarding the Thursday evening telephone call between Ms. Worrell and Det. Carroll about the investigation. She even instructed Ms. Schuessler not to tell her supervisors anything and implied to both Ms. Schuessler and Ms. Collins that, by not saying anything, their knowledge of the incident prior to the charges being filed would not be discovered. Ms. Dierdorf’s dishonesty, therefore, not only interfered with criminal investigations but also concealed the professional misconduct of another attorney, Ms. Worrell. It follows that Ms. Dierdorf’s dishonesty and deceitfulness were prejudicial to the administration of justice. Accordingly, the record establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Ms. Dierdorf violated Rules 4-8.4(c) and 4-8.4(d). Appropriate Discipline In determining the appropriate discipline, “this Court considers the ethical duty violated, the attorney’s mental state, the extent of actual or potential injury caused by the 15 attorney's misconduct, and any aggravating or mitigating factors.” In re Ehler, 319 S.W.3d 442, 451 (Mo. banc 2010). When imposing discipline, this Court must be guided by the principle that the purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings “is not to punish the attorney, but to protect the public and maintain the integrity of the legal profession.” In re Gardner, 565 S.W.3d 670, 677 (Mo. banc 2019) (quoting In re Kazanas, 96 S.W.3d 803, 807-08 (Mo. banc 2003)). This Court also gleans guidance from the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (ABA Standards) and prior disciplinary precedent. Id. ABA Standard 5.22 provides: “Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer in an official or governmental position knowingly fails to follow proper procedures or rules, and causes injury or potential injury to a party or to the integrity of the legal process.” Furthermore, “[q]uestions of honesty go to the heart of fitness to practice law. Misconduct involving subterfuge, failing to keep promises, and untrustworthiness undermine public confidence in not only the individual but in the bar.” In re Disney, 922 S.W.2d 12, 15 (Mo. banc 1996) (internal citation omitted). Ms. Dierdorf, in her capacity as an assistant circuit attorney, knowingly failed to follow proper procedures when she discovered Det. Carroll’s assault of a suspect in custody and Ms. Worrell’s attempt to conceal that assault by filing false charges. When her supervisors discovered the incident, she lied to them to conceal both her and Ms. Worrell’s misconduct in the matter. Such conduct undermines the public’s confidence in not only OCA but also in Missouri prosecutors in general. Ms. Dierdorf’s active dishonesty and 16 concealment in the matter, therefore, goes to her fitness to practice law and justifies a suspension. Ms. Dierdorf argues a reprimand is appropriate because, while the case rests on the serious misconduct of police brutality and potentially false charges, Ms. Dierdorf was not the perpetrator of such misdeeds. She contends her misconduct is limited to two instances in which she failed to make full disclosures. But Ms. Dierdorf downplays the severity of her dishonesty over the course of the investigation into Ms. Worrell’s misconduct. A reprimand “is appropriate only where the attorney’s breach of discipline is an isolated act and does not involve dishonest, fraudulent, or deceitful conduct on the part of the attorney.” In re Littleton, 719 S.W.2d 772, 777 (Mo. banc 1986) (internal citation omitted). As previously discussed, Ms. Dierdorf engaged in a pattern of dishonest conduct by concealing when she and Ms. Worrell discovered Det. Carroll’s assault of the suspect. Her dishonest behavior was not limited to a single incident but, rather, continued for weeks. Furthermore, Ms. Dierdorf committed such acts while serving in her capacity as an assistant circuit attorney. This Court has recognized that “the responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate.” State v. Harrington, 534 S.W.2d 44, 50 (Mo. banc 1976). A prosecutor “is not an advocate in the ordinary sense of the word, but is the people’s representative, and [the prosecutor’s] primary duty is not to convict but to see that justice is done.” Id. at 49. “The prosecutor is an officer of the state who should have no private interest in the prosecution and who is charged with seeing that the criminal laws of the state are honestly and impartially administered, unprejudiced by any motives of private gain.” Id. A “prosecutor is under a duty to consider the public interest in the 17 fair administration of criminal justice.” State ex rel. Norwood v. Drumm, 691 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Mo. banc 1985). These principles are reflected in the OCA personnel manual, which Ms. Dierdorf signed and acknowledged she had read and understood. In pertinent part, the manual states circuit attorneys assume “two paramount obligations: to serve the public interest; and to perform public service with high personal integrity.” The manual further instructs, “Integrity requires . . . the fortitude to refuse to go along with something that you believe is ethically wrong.” The manual further states that “[b]eing a good public servant means knowing how to handle the demands of your work with character and discipline” and that “[t]he true public servant . . . does not succumb to peer or other pressure” and “[r]efuses to let official actions be influenced by personal relationships.” Ms. Dierdorf’s repeated dishonesty in her interviews with her supervisors and IAD shows a pattern of protecting herself and her friends over the duties she assumed when she became an assistant circuit attorney. Moreover, she encouraged other assistant circuit attorneys to keep quiet about the matter in a further attempt to conceal both her and Ms. Worrell’s misconduct. At the hearing, Ms. Dierdorf admitted she had no reason to be dishonest during the interviews. She further stated she did not correct her misstatement to her supervisors because she hoped she was not going to be further involved in the matter. Her misconduct and subsequent inaction, therefore, clearly violate the standards to which Missouri prosecutors and, in particular, St. Louis circuit attorneys are held. Ms. Dierdorf presents several mitigating factors, such as the absence of a prior disciplinary record, cooperation with the disciplinary board and proceedings, and a good 18 reputation in her current practice. But such mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the severity of her dishonesty, her selfish motive, the multiple offenses, and the vulnerability of the victim being assaulted. This Court has previously found a suspension is the appropriate discipline when an attorney makes false and misleading statements to the FBI during a criminal investigation. In re Zink, 278 S.W.3d 166, 169 (Mo. banc 2009). The attorney in Zink was suspended indefinitely with no leave to reapply for six months. Id. at 170. Such discipline, however, was imposed in light of the attorney’s voluntary abstention from the practice of law for one year prior to the institution of the state disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 169. Ms. Dierdorf made false and misleading statements to her supervisors at OCA and to law enforcement over the course of a criminal investigation. Importantly, her repeated dishonesty occurred while she was an assistant circuit attorney. As previously discussed, such attorneys are held to a higher standard given the nature of their work to protect the public. Additionally, unlike Mr. Zink, Ms. Dierdorf has not abstained from the practice of law. Accordingly, this Court concludes that an indefinite suspension with no leave to apply for reinstatement for three years is the appropriate discipline. Ms. Schuessler’s Conduct Rule 4-8.4(c) OCDC asserts Ms. Schuessler violated Rule 4-8.4(c) by repeatedly lying to and withholding information from criminal investigators about Det. Carroll’s assault of a detained suspect, thereby prejudicing the prosecution of Det. Carroll. Ms. Schuessler’s conduct following her discovery of the assault establishes a pattern of dishonest behavior. 19 Ms. Schuessler heard Det. Carroll describe, in detail, his assault of the suspect. Yet, in her interview with her supervisors and IAD, she did not reveal the speakerphone conversation. Instead, she told IAD she could hear only Ms. Worrell’s side of the conversation. It was not until over a month later, in her first FBI interview, that she admitted Det. Carroll was on speakerphone and she heard the details of the assault directly from him, including that he put a gun in the suspect’s mouth. But even then, she chose to lie by attributing her racist and homophobic comment to Det. Carroll. Again, such lies went uncorrected for nearly a month until her second FBI interview. Ms. Schuessler, therefore, engaged in dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of Rule 4-8.4(c) during the criminal investigation of Det. Carroll. Rule 4-8.4(g) OCDC further asserts Ms. Schuessler’s comment about the gun in the suspect’s mouth was racist and homophobic, thereby violating Rule 4-8.4(g). Rule 4-8.4(g) provides a lawyer engages in professional misconduct by “manifest[ing] by words or conduct, in representing a client, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, or sexual orientation.” “Whether a lawyer’s conduct constitutes professional misconduct in violation of Rule 4-8.4(g) can be determined only by a review of all of the circumstances.” Rule 4-8.4(g), cmt. [4]. Ms. Schuessler contends the comment cannot constitute a Rule 4-8.4(g) violation because it was not made in the context of “representing a client.” OCDC responds that, as a prosecuting attorney, Ms. Schuessler is always representing the people of Missouri. 20 Ms. Schuessler was in her office at OCA, during working hours, when she made the racist and homophobic comment. She was required, as an assistant circuit attorney, to act in the best interest of OCA and the citizens of the city of St. Louis. A prosecutor is not representing a client only when performing a specific act in a case. Ms. Schuessler’s conduct, therefore, violated Rule 4-8.4(g). The violation was particularly egregious given the circumstances in which the racist and homophobic comment was made. Rule 4-8.4(d) Finally, OCDC asserts Ms. Schuessler’s dishonesty during Det. Carroll’s criminal investigation violates Rule 4-8.4(d). Again, Rule 4-8.4(d) provides: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration