Opinion ID: 168357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Remand

Text: 6 On appeal Mr. Barkell contends that the state court's refusal to grant a limited remand to develop the record for his ineffectiveness claim violated his rights to due process and a meaningful appeal. The Wyoming Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that Mr. Barkell could not rely on mere allegations and speculation to justify a remand. Barkell, 55 P.3d at 1246.
7 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) provides that when a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court, a federal court will grant habeas relief only when the applicant establishes that the state court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). 8 Under the contrary to clause, we grant relief only if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the [Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the unreasonable application clause, relief is provided only if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Thus we may not issue a habeas writ simply because we conclude in our independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable. 9 Gipson v. Jordan, 376 F.3d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
10 Under AEDPA's standard of review, Mr. Barkell is not entitled to relief on this claim. Mr. Barkell has identified no United States Supreme Court precedent at the time of the Wyoming court's decision that clearly established his right to an evidentiary hearing. 11 Mr. Barkell argues that [w]hen the state provides an appeal of right, the defendant has a right to an appellate record that is adequate to present his claims on appeal. Aplt. Br. at 22. As authority for this proposition he cites Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 83 S.Ct. 774, 9 L.Ed.2d 899 (1963); and Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 92 S.Ct. 410, 30 L.Ed.2d 372 (1971). Griffin held that the Constitution requires states to provide trial transcripts to indigent defendants appealing their convictions. See 351 U.S. at 19, 76 S.Ct. 585. Draper held that a state cannot circumvent Griffin by allowing an indigent defendant a free transcript only if the trial judge decides that the defendant's claims on appeal are not frivolous. See 372 U.S. at 499-500, 83 S.Ct. 774. And Mayer held that an indigent defendant is entitled to a free transcript for purposes of appeal even if he has been convicted only of a misdemeanor and fined rather than incarcerated. See 404 U.S. at 195-98, 92 S.Ct. 410. Thus, these cases all deal with an indigent defendant's right to obtain for appeal a transcript of judicial proceedings that would be available to those who can afford to pay for one, not, as here, an attempt to add to the record of those proceedings by conducting supplemental proceedings. They do not provide clearly established precedent for Mr. Barkell's argument. 12 In addition, Mr. Barkell cites Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); and Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985), for the proposition that he was entitled to the effective assistance of counsel on his appeal. From that proposition he argues that an evidentiary hearing was necessary for his appellate counsel to provide adequate representation. But none of the cited cases addresses denial of an evidentiary hearing in the course of an appeal. Cuyler held that a defendant with a privately retained lawyer, like a defendant with appointed counsel, may raise a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance. See 446 U.S. at 344-45, 100 S.Ct. 1708. Cronic held that most claims of ineffective assistance require proof of deficient performance and that only rarely do the surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness. See 466 U.S. at 658-62, 104 S.Ct. 2039. Strickland addressed the meaning of the constitutional requirement of effective assistance, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, holding that to prove an ineffectiveness claim the defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense, see id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Evitts held that due process guarantees the effective assistance of counsel to a defendant pursuing a first appeal as of right. See 469 U.S. at 396, 105 S.Ct. 830. These cases simply do not consider the issue now before us. Attractive as Mr. Barkell's legal contention may be, he has not shown that the Wyoming Supreme Court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (state court's decision was not unreasonable or contrary to federal law when there were substantial differences between the case before the state court and the Supreme Court case relied on by the defendant). Nevertheless, as we shall see in addressing Mr. Barkell's allegations of pretrial ineffectiveness of counsel, the state court's decision to refuse an evidentiary hearing can affect our review of his other claims.