Opinion ID: 4543708
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: motion for judgment of acquittal on count 3

Text: Next, Caldwell contends that the district court erred in denying his motion 6 Namely, Caldwell challenges: (1) Crist’s less-than-one-minute opportunity to view the robber, who was masked and stood behind a tall counter; (2) Crist’s degree of attention to the robber’s face since she was also looking at the handgun and/or down at the register; (3) the details of Crist’s description, only some of which related to immutable characteristics; (4) the lack of certainty in Crist’s identification; and (5) Crist’s far distance from Caldwell at the showup. Defense counsel’s cross-examination of Crist revealed to the jury the majority of these “shortcomings.” 18 Case: 18-13426 Date Filed: 06/24/2020 Page: 19 of 28 for a judgment of acquittal as to Count 3 because the government failed to prove that the BOA branch was FDIC-insured at the time of the September 7, 2016 robbery.7 “To establish federal jurisdiction and to prove a violation of [§] 2113, the Government must show that the bank was insured by the FDIC at the time of the robbery.” United States v. Maner, 611 F.2d 107, 108 (5th Cir. 1980).8 Over the past fifty years, this Court has accepted “sparse” FDIC-insurance evidence from the government as sufficient. See United States v. Brown, 616 F.2d 844, 848 (5th Cir. 1980) (listing cases and explaining that, while, “[a]s in a number of cases decided by this Court, the government’s proof of federal insurance was sparse,” “[s]parse evidence . . . can be enough”). Ideally, the government would proffer proof of contemporaneously held FDIC insurance, or at least FDIC insurance held both before and after the time of the offense. United States v. Munksgard, 913 F.3d 1327, 1332-33 (11th Cir. 2019). However, “[i]n Cook v. United States, 320 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1963), we set a low threshold of proof of insurance for appellate review.” Maner, 611 F.2d at 7 This Court reviews de novo the denial of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Albury, 782 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2015). “When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, we view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and draw all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in the verdict’s favor.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 8 This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 19 Case: 18-13426 Date Filed: 06/24/2020 Page: 20 of 28 109. In each case after Cook, we have found the government’s evidence to be sufficient. Id. For example, in Maner, the government introduced: (1) a copy of the bank’s FDIC certificate issued five years before the offense; (2) a bank officer’s testimony that the certificate was a record maintained under his supervision in the bank’s regular course of business; and (3) another employee’s testimony that he had seen a 15-year-old certificate in the bank vault and copies of that certificate posted on each teller’s window. Id. at 108. The Fifth Circuit held that the government’s proof of FDIC insurance was “just barely” sufficient. Id. at 112. Soon thereafter, the Fifth Circuit determined that, “[i]n Maner, we reached the nadir of the acceptable level of proof.” United States v. Platenburg, 657 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir. 1981). In Platenburg, the government introduced solely a copy of the bank’s FDIC certificate issued seven years before the offense, nothing more. Id. The Fifth Circuit’s prior decisions upholding the adequacy of the evidence usually had the FDIC certificate—even if not always current—as well as the testimony of bank officials—even if “less than conclusive as to the insured status at the time of the illegal acts.” Id. at 799-800. Because the seven-year-old certificate was unaccompanied by any evidence that it was still current, the Fifth Circuit held that the government had finally crossed the line from sufficiency to insufficiency. Id. at 799. 20 Case: 18-13426 Date Filed: 06/24/2020 Page: 21 of 28 More recently, in Munksgard, the government introduced: (1) a copy of the bank’s FDIC certificate issued in 1990, over 20 years before the offenses; (2) a bank employee’s testimony that the bank was currently FDIC-insured at the time of trial in 2016; and (3) that same employee’s testimony that he worked at the small bank for 25 years and the bank was not required to renew its FDIC certificate “every so often.” 913 F.3d at 1330, 1333. This Court determined that, “given our precedent, what the government presented here was good enough” because it provided (1) “prior existence” of FDIC insurance in 1990, (2) “subsequent existence” of FDIC insurance in 2016, and (3) testimony about how the bank did not need interim renewals that provided additional evidence that the bank was insured at the time of the 2013 and 2014 offenses. Id. at 1333. Viewing this proof in the light most favorable to the verdict, “[c]oupled with the ‘universal presumption [from Cook] that all banks are federally insured,’” this Court concluded that a reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the bank was FDIC-insured on the dates of the offenses. Id. (quoting Maner, 611 F.2d at 110). Significantly, here, there was more evidence than in Munksgard and Maner. For sure, the government introduced a copy of BOA N.A.’s FDIC certificate issued in 1999, 17 years before the 2016 robbery. But the government also called two witnesses: (1) Anderson, who had been BOA’s Vice President of Corporate 21 Case: 18-13426 Date Filed: 06/24/2020 Page: 22 of 28 Security for ten years and was familiar with its administration and operations; and (2) Allen, who was Noa’s FDIC compliance manager and records custodian. Anderson testified that: (1) BOA N.A.’s FDIC certificate was a record maintained under his supervision in BOA’s regular course of business; (2) that FDIC certificate covered all BOA financial centers and branches, including this BOA branch; (3) there was no requirement for each branch to obtain separate FDIC insurance; (4) BOA was FDIC-insured at the time of the 2016 robbery; (5) BOA was current on its quarterly payments to maintain its insurance; (6) there was no indication that BOA’s insurance had ever lapsed; (7) BOA never received a cancellation notice; and (8) BOA was currently covered by its FDIC certificate at the time of trial in 2018. Similarly, Allen testified that, in general: (1) FDIC insurance is provided to the bank itself as a corporation and covers all the bank’s deposits; (2) FDIC certificates do not expire and do not need to be renewed once issued; and (3) FDIC certificates stay in effect unless and until revoked. Given all of this evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, “[c]oupled with the ‘universal presumption . . . that all banks are federally insured,’” a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the BOA branch was FDIC-insured at the time of the 2016 robbery. See Munksgard, 913 F.3d at 1330-33; Maner, 611 F.2d at 108, 110, 112. Contrary to Caldwell’s arguments, the bases of Anderson’s personal 22 Case: 18-13426 Date Filed: 06/24/2020 Page: 23 of 28 knowledge were fleshed out at trial, revealing his ten years as BOA’s Vice President of Corporate Security, his additional role as FDIC records custodian, and his institutional knowledge of BOA’s FDIC history and records. Defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined Anderson on the bases of his personal knowledge and even elicited Anderson’s concession that he did not bring to trial any other documents supporting the BOA branch’s coverage in 2016. Any discrepancies in Anderson’s testimony would be “for the jury to resolve.” See Maner, 611 F.2d at 110 (“Once the evidence was properly before them, the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence were for the jury to make.”). Both Anderson and Allen testified a bank’s FDIC certificate is provided to the bank/corporation itself and applies to all branches. Caldwell also ignores that there was more evidence in his case than in Munksgard. See 913 F.3d at 1330, 1333. In Munksgard, the government’s evidence—beyond prior and subsequent existence of FDIC insurance—was solely testimony that the bank did not need interim renewals of its FDIC certificate. See id. In contrast, here, the government’s evidence went much further than that in Munksgard. The government introduced Anderson’s and Allen’s testimonies that FDIC certificates generally do not expire and do not need to be renewed, BOA was current on its quarterly payments to maintain its FDIC insurance, and there was no indication of any cancellation of or lapse in BOA’s FDIC coverage. 23 Case: 18-13426 Date Filed: 06/24/2020 Page: 24 of 28 Anderson also expressly testified that BOA was FDIC-insured at the time of the 2016 robbery. 9 For all of these reasons, the district court did not err in denying Caldwell’s Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal on Count 3.