Opinion ID: 407873
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Summary judgment on the due process claim.

Text: 51 The district court struck all of Nolan's jurisdictional allegations except Title VII because Title VII provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment. Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 835, 96 S.Ct. 1961, 1969, 48 L.Ed.2d 402 (1976). Nolan argued that her second cause of action was not a discrimination claim, but a due process claim. She argued that her involuntary resignation was caused by the VA's deceit, coercion, and duress which constituted a taking of a property interest. See Christie v. United States, 518 F.2d 584 (Ct.Cl.1975). 52 Nolan initiated her due process claim at the administrative level as an adverse action under FPM § 752. Nolan was advised that 5 CFR § 772.306(a)(2) prohibited an employee from concurrently pursuing a FPM § 713 appeal, which encompassed her EEO complaints, and a FPM § 752 appeal. In light of Nolan's three pending EEO complaints pursuant to FPM § 713, Nolan elected to proceed with her FPM § 713 appeal and was notified that her FPM § 752 adverse action was cancelled. However, 5 CFR § 772.306(a)(2) provided that the substance of the adverse action claim would be considered in the review of the EEO claims. 53 Therefore, although Nolan's action in the district court for a de novo review of the administrative determination may have properly placed Nolan's due process claim before the district court, we nevertheless agree with the district court's action in striking the due process claim. The holding of Brown, supra, is controlling on this issue and we feel that such holding cannot be circumvented where the factual predicate for Nolan's due process claim is the discrimination which is the basis of her Title VII claim. 18 The threshold question in Nolan's action is the constructive discharge claim and she would not be able to recover on the due process claim if she were successful on the constructive discharge claim due to the identical factual basis, and, therefore, the district court correctly dismissed the due process count and approached the action solely as a Title VII action pursuant to Brown, supra.