Opinion ID: 215352
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Robinson's Obstruction Enhancement

Text: Robinson challenges the application of a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice imposed because he allegedly took retaliatory actions against officials investigating the scheme. Robinson argues that the facts underlying the enhancement were not presented at trial, he objected to the inclusion of these facts in the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), and the government did not adequately prove up the objected to facts at the sentencing hearing. See United States v. Hammer, 3 F.3d 266, 272-73 (8th Cir.1993) (holding that when a defendant challenges a PSR finding, the government must put on further evidence at the sentencing hearing to prove the basis for the finding). The government first responds that Robinson withdrew his objection to the PSR at the sentencing hearing by not renewing it. Further, the government argues that Robinson obstructed justice during and after trial by filing numerous pro se documents in violation of a district court order. Finally, the government contends that any error in imposing the enhancement was harmless, because the seventy-five-month sentence would still have been within the Guidelines range without the enhancement, and that the district court evinced an intent to impose this sentence, regardless of the base offense level. See, e.g., United States v. Staples, 410 F.3d 484, 492 (8th Cir.2005) (An error is harmless if it is clear from the record that the district court would have given the defendant the same sentence regardless of which guidelines range applied.). In the PSR, there were two factual bases given to support the obstruction enhancement: that some members of the sovereign citizen movement killed the pet of a law enforcement officer in an attempt to intimidate and retaliate against the officer for participation in this case; and that Robinson sent numerous pro se documents to officials prior to trial in an attempt to intimidate or retaliate against the officials. Robinson made a written objection to the factual assertions regarding the killed pet, arguing that there was no evidence that he took such actions. With regard to the filings, Robinson's written objection took issue with labeling the documents as pro se, and instead characterized the filings as follows: defendant, through his agent, submitted or attempted to submit certain documents to the U.S. Attorney's Office and the U.S. Marshal's Office in a misguided effort to put those entities on notice of certain actions and consequences that cannot legally be put into effect.  (emphasis in original). Robinson went on to challenge the legal application of the obstruction Guideline to those facts, arguing that submitting these documents was not the kind of conduct that is covered by U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. We agree with Robinson that the district court could not have based the obstruction enhancement on the conduct involving the law enforcement official's pet. Robinson objected to this PSR fact, and despite the government's arguments, we find that Robinson, having properly raised the objections in writing, did not waive them at the sentencing hearing. The government did not put on any evidence to support these factual allegations at the sentencing hearing, and therefore, the allegations were not a proper basis for the obstruction enhancement. United States v. Replogle, 628 F.3d 1026, 1029 (8th Cir. 2011). However, Robinson did not object to the factual allegations regarding the documents submitted to the United States Attorney and Marshal, and in fact admitted doing so. Robinson merely objected to the PSR's application of the guidelines to the facts. Id. Under those circumstances, the district court could properly consider those facts when applying the enhancement. And we agree that this pretrial conduct meets the requirement for application of the obstruction enhancement. See United States v. James, 328 F.3d 953, 956-57 (7th Cir.2003) (obstruction-of-justice enhancement authorized where defendant made unsuccessful attempt to intimidate judge, prosecutor, witnesses, and court personnel by mailing copies of contracts requiring them to pay $500,000 for use of his name); cf. United States v. Beale, 620 F.3d 856, 865 (8th Cir.2010) (holding there was sufficient evidence to support convictions on the substantive offense for obstruction of justice by improperly influencing an officer of the court under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 where defendants served subpoenas and arrest warrants on, and liens against, a federal district court judge involved in the defendant's tax evasion case), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1023, 178 L.Ed.2d 847 (2011). Furthermore, we agree with the government that even if the district court did commit a procedural error in applying the obstruction enhancement, such error was harmless in this case. That the district court wanted to get to a seventy-five-month sentence is fairly obvious from the transcript. Despite the advisory Guidelines range of 97 to 121 months, the government recommended a sentence of sixty months. The district court, after noting the Guidelines range, initially sentenced Robinson to seventy-five months on count I, concurrent with sixty-month sentences on all of the remaining counts. When advised by the government that the statutory maximum for each count was sixty months, the court decided to make two of the sixty-month sentences consecutive, for a total sentence of 120 months. When the defense objected to the substantial increase from the court's initial sentencing decision, the district court relented and sentenced Robinson to sixty months on Count 1, consecutive to a fifteen-month sentence on Count III. In other words, it appears from the record that regardless of the Guidelines range and the recommendations of the parties, seventy-five months was the sentence that the district court was going to impose. Under these circumstances, we find any procedural error committed by the district court to be harmless error. United States v. Ortiz, 636 F.3d 389, 395 (8th Cir.2011) (Under the circumstances of this case, there is no doubt the district court would have imposed the same sentence, and for the same reasons, regardless of any procedural error it may have made. . . .).