Opinion ID: 859214
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reinitiation of Contact

Text: ¶8 Once a suspect invokes his Miranda right to counsel, police may not subject him to custodial interrogation without counsel for fourteen days following his release from custody “unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1219, 1223 (2010) (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485). The Edwards rule limiting police reinitiation of questioning following the invocation of rights is designed “to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.” Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990). It creates a presumption of involuntariness of any resulting waiver that occurs in response to “further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if [the defendant] has been advised of his rights.” Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1219-20 (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484). But, “[w]hen a defendant is not in custody, he is in control, and need only shut his door or walk away to avoid police badgering.” Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 795 (2009). Such noncustodial or “noninterrogative interactions with the State do not involve the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ that one might 4 reasonably fear could lead to involuntary waivers.” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)). ¶9 We assume, without deciding, that Yonkman effectively invoked his Miranda right to counsel when first questioned near his residence on March 27, 2010, and that he was in custody then and during the April 1, 2010 interview at the police station. Cf. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1223 (“In every case involving Edwards, the courts must determine whether the suspect was in custody when he requested counsel and when he later made the statements he seeks to suppress.”). Because Yonkman’s confession occurred within fourteen days of his initial invocation of his right to counsel, its admissibility turns on whether Yonkman or the police reinitiated the contact, whether Yonkman knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, and whether the confession itself was voluntarily given. See id. at 1219-22. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion. State v. Manuel, 229 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 11, 270 P.3d 828, 831 (2011). ¶10 A suspect may reinitiate questioning after terminating it by reopening a dialog with officers about the investigation. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485-86 & n.9. The United States Supreme Court has not addressed whether police can reinitiate interrogation through contact with third parties. Authority 5 from other jurisdictions is also sparse, but we are not aware of any court that has found an Edwards violation in circumstances like those presented here. ¶11 In assessing whether a suspect “initiate[d] a discussion with police through the communication of a third party,” the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found no distinction between direct communications and those from others, concluding that “what is important is [that] the impetus for discussion comes from the suspect himself.” Van Hook v. Anderson, 488 F.3d 411, 418, 422-23 (6th Cir. 2007). We agree with that court’s assessment that the Constitution provides no “protection against friends or family members who convince [a suspect] to talk with police” or “against third-party cajoling, pleading, or threatening.” Id. at 421. ¶12 Other courts have agreed with the reasoning in Van Hook. See, e.g., Ex parte Williams, 31 So. 3d 670, 682-83 (Ala. 2009) (noting that “an accused can initiate further interrogation through a third party”); cf. People v. Lucas, 548 N.E.2d 1003, 1009-11 (Ill. 1989) (finding no potential Edwards violation when suspect submitted to a polygraph after speaking with family members who were asked by officers to “find out . . . what actually happened”). ¶13 Several jurisdictions do not find that officers have reinitiated questioning unless the officers’ conduct rises to 6 the level of interrogation of the suspect under Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (holding that interrogation under Miranda is “words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response”). In Fox v. Ward, 200 F.3d 1286, 129798 (10th Cir. 2000), for example, the court held that the officers had not reinitiated questioning merely by handing their business cards to the suspect after he had requested a lawyer. Instead, the court concluded that the suspect reinitiated contact by indicating that he wanted to talk as the officers were walking away. Id.; see also Wayne R. LaFave et al., 2 Criminal Procedure § 6.9(f) (3d ed. 2012) (“One view, certainly subject to dispute, is that . . . police conduct is not relevant unless it actually amounted to interrogation or its functional equivalent under Innis.”). ¶14 Even those jurisdictions that might find police initiation based on officer conduct not amounting to full interrogation under Innis nonetheless find that incidental “police contacts . . . made for other legitimate purposes concerning the case do not constitute such initiation.” LaFave, supra ¶ 13, § 6.9(f); see also Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983) (plurality opinion) (noting that some inquiries “relating to routine incidents of the custodial 7 relationship,” whether made by the suspect or an officer, do not generally constitute reinitiation). ¶15 Here, the police did not reinitiate contact. Kelly contacted Detective Rivera to report her daughter’s recantation. Yonkman argues that Rivera sought to use Kelly to deliver a message to Yonkman that Rivera could not convey directly. He urges us to find this an improper reinitiation under Edwards. But Rivera did not call Kelly; he merely answered a telephone call from the person who initially reported the allegations of sexual misconduct. Such an action is far removed from the coercive conduct Edwards seeks to prevent. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986) (“The sole concern of the Fifth Amendment . . . is governmental coercion.”). Indeed, Rivera likely had a professional duty to speak with Kelly regarding the alleged recantation. During the conversation, Rivera advised Kelly of the status of the case, but neither asked to speak to Yonkman nor suggested that Kelly have Yonkman call him. The call was therefore not coercive. ¶16 The call Yonkman later initiated to Detective Rivera to set up an interview reopened the dialog between them. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485-86 & n.9. Moreover, the interview took place one to two days later, giving Yonkman time to reflect on his decision to speak with Rivera. 8 ¶17 Accordingly, the trial court properly found that Yonkman reinitiated the contact. Neither the purpose nor the policy rationales of Edwards would be advanced by suppressing Yonkman’s confession.