Opinion ID: 867532
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: present arizona affirmative defense statutes

Text: ¶ 25 Casey further relies on the following language of another statute, A.R.S. § 13-403, to support his position that lack of self-defense should be treated as an element of the crime: The use of physical force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal under any of the following circumstances. (Emphasis added.) Subsections one through five then list various circumstances under which certain persons may come within the statute's protection, including: a person in loco parentis, a jailer, a person in charge of a common motor carrier, and a physician. Id. These individuals all have a duty to maintain order in various circumstances. Even if the legislature, in essence, decriminalized actions taken to fulfill their duty, as Casey claims, [2] Casey does not fall within any of the subsections. ¶ 26 Subsection six, on which Casey relies, is not another in the list of circumstances which the legislature has selected for special treatment. It is a separate sentence that states: A person may otherwise use physical force upon another person as further provided in this chapter. Id. (6) (emphasis added). The language in the introductory portion of the statute can apply only to the circumstances contained in subsections one through five. Subsection six does not indicate that the legislature intended to decriminalize actions allegedly taken in self-defense in the myriad of other situations in which such a claim may arise. ¶ 27 Additionally, Casey's reading of subsection six renders a portion of section 13-205 meaningless. See State v. Pitts, 178 Ariz. 405, 407, 874 P.2d 962, 964 (1994) (we avoid interpretation of statute that renders it meaningless). Section 13-205 requires that the defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence, among other things, any justification defense in chapter four. Subsection six, on the other hand, according to Casey, makes the lack of the defenses in chapter four a quasi-element that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, rendering that portion of section 13-205 meaningless. On the other hand, applying the introductory paragraph only to the five listed circumstances avoids this direct and irreconcilable conflict. Accordingly, we reject as a matter of statutory interpretation Casey's attempt to, in effect, combine section 13-404, which defines self-defense, with the introductory language in section 13-403. ¶ 28 Finally, the actual statutes defining self-defense do not mention that the conduct permitted is not criminal. Section 13-404(A) states, in pertinent part, that a person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force. This section simply says the action is justified and makes self-defense a justification defense. See §§ 13-205, 13-401. It does not decriminalize the action, as section 13-403 may do with respect to those special circumstances described in subsections one through five. And section 13-401(B) states, in part, that justification, as defined in [Chapter 4], is a defense in any prosecution for an offense pursuant to this title. Taking the statutes as a whole and giving them a common sense reading, lack of self-defense is not an element of the crime of assault but an affirmative defense under section 13-205 that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. ¶ 29 Casey therefore has failed to show that either past Arizona cases or the current statutes mandate our declaring section 13-205 unconstitutional. Under section 13-205, self-defense remains a viable defense, like insanity and entrapment, despite the fact that the burden of proof is on the defendant. Because the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Casey committed each element of the crime of aggravated assault, the purposes of the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt have been satisfied. As we stated, in approving the shifting of the burden on insanity: As was stated in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, [209,] 97 S.Ct. 2319, [2326,] 53 L.Ed.2d 281, [291] (1977), [i]f the State... chooses to recognize a factor that mitigates the degree of criminality or punishment,... the State may assure itself that the fact has been established with reasonable certainty. To recognize ... a mitigating circumstance does not require the State to prove its nonexistence in each case ... if in [the State's] judgment [it] would be too cumbersome, too expensive, and too inaccurate. State v. Fletcher, 149 Ariz. 187, 192, 717 P.2d 866, 871 (1986) (alterations in Fletcher ). ¶ 30 We hold that the legislature has the constitutional authority to shift the burden of proof for self-defense to the defendant and therefore uphold section 13-205. [3] The decisions of the trial court and of the court of appeals are affirmed.