Opinion ID: 2253827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Collateral Consequences Exception

Text: Respondent's third established exception to the mootness doctrine is the collateral consequences exception. The collateral consequences exception to mootness allows for appellate review, even though a court order or incarceration has ceased, because a plaintiff has `suffered, or [is] threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.' Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct. 978, 983, 140 L.Ed.2d 43, 49-50 (1998), quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 1253, 108 L.Ed.2d 400, 410-11 (1990). Therefore, [s]ubsistence of the suit requires    that continuing `collateral consequences'    be either proved or presumed. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 8, 118 S.Ct. at 983, 140 L.Ed.2d at 50. [3] The appellate court rejected this exception stating, without support, that the collateral-legal-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine has no place in determining whether an issue is moot in a mental-health case. Regardless of whether a previous involuntary-admission order as to a particular respondent is upheld or reversed on appeal, that respondent's history of mental illness and involuntary treatment will continue to exist, and will be a factor that treating medical personnel may consider. It is that history that will possibly follow the respondent, not the fact of an adjudication. Accordingly, we hold that we will no longer adhere to    cases in which this court utilized the collateral-legal-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine in mental-health cases. 379 Ill.App.3d at 1029, 320 Ill.Dec. 260, 887 N.E.2d 40. Contrary to the holding of the appellate court, the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine is applicable in mental health cases and has been recognized by a host of Illinois court opinions, including opinions of this court. See In re Splett, 143 Ill.2d 225, 228, 157 Ill.Dec. 419, 572 N.E.2d 883 (1991) (Review is nonetheless appropriate, as the collateral consequences related to the stigma of an involuntary admission may confront respondent in the future); In re Hays, 102 Ill.2d 314, 317, 80 Ill.Dec. 307, 465 N.E.2d 98 (1984) (stating that review of the circuit court's action is appropriate, as the character of an involuntary commitment has been held to be of sufficient significance to permit the invoking of the `collateral consequence' exception to the mootness doctrine). See also Boyd, 41 Ill.App.3d 538, 353 N.E.2d 696; Alex T., 375 Ill.App.3d 758, 314 Ill.Dec. 85, 873 N.E.2d 1015; In re Wathan, 104 Ill.App.3d 64, 59 Ill.Dec. 884, 432 N.E.2d 670 (1982); Sciara, 21 Ill.App.3d 889, 316 N.E.2d 153. Though the appellate court is correct that the mere reversal of an adjudication will not, in itself, purge a respondent's mental health records of any mention of the admission or treatment, that is not the same as saying that there is no effect whatsoever. In fact, there are a host of potential legal benefits to such a reversal. For instance, a reversal could provide a basis for a motion in limine that would prohibit any mention of the hospitalization during the course of another proceeding. Likewise, the reversal could affect the ability of a respondent to seek employment in certain fields. See 225 ILCS 80/24(a)(16) (West 2006) (allowing for the refusal to issue a license or to revoke a license to practice optometry based on mental illness). However, despite the survival of the collateral consequences exception, its application is still decided on a case-by-case basis. Sciara, 21 Ill.App.3d at 894, 316 N.E.2d 153. When the facts of this specific case are considered, there are no collateral consequences that warrant an exception to the mootness doctrine. In this case, respondent has had multiple involuntary commitments prior to the present case. In addition, respondent is a felon who has served a sentence for murder. Simply stated, there is no collateral consequence that can be identified that could stem solely from the present adjudication. Every collateral consequence that can be identified already existed as a result of respondent's previous adjudications and felony conviction.