Opinion ID: 2977202
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). This prohibition encompasses two types of sexual harassment.4 First, it forbids quid pro quo harassment, which occurs when an employee’s submission to unwanted sexual advances becomes either a condition for the receipt of job benefits, or the means to avoid an adverse employment action. See Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 461 (6th Cir. 2000). Title VII also “affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,” and, to enforce this right, prohibits conduct that creates a “hostile environment.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). Plaintiff claims that Kirk’s conduct constituted quid pro quo harassment, and that Kirk’s actions created a hostile work environment. For the reasons that follow, summary judgment was improper, and both claims should proceed to trial.
When a sexual harassment plaintiff experiences a “tangible employment action,” a plaintiff may prevail in a claim against the employer upon proof of the following: 1) that the employee was a member of a protected class; 2) that the employee was subjected to unwelcomed sexual harassment in the form of sexual 4 Whether sexual harassment culminates in an adverse employment action determines whether a claim falls within the quid pro quo framework, or should be evaluated as a hostile environment claim. As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted from a refusal to submit to a supervisor’s sexual demands, he or she establishes that the employment decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions of employment that is actionable under Title VII.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753-54 (1998). In contrast, “[f]or any sexual harassment preceding the employment decision to be actionable, . . . the conduct must be severe or pervasive.” Id. at 754. 8 advances or requests for sexual favors; 3) that the harassment complained of was on the basis of sex; 4) that the employee’s submission to the unwelcomed advances was an express or implied condition for receiving job benefits or that the employee’s refusal to submit to the supervisor’s sexual demands resulted in a tangible job detriment; and 5) the existence of respondeat superior liability. Id. In this case, Plaintiff is part of a protected class because she is a woman, and Defendants do not contest that Kirk made unwelcomed advances. It is also uncontested that the harassment was based on Plaintiff’s sex. Thus, whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants depends on whether a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff has proven the final two elements of her claim.5
To prevail on a quid pro quo claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of respondeat superior liability. Id. “Under the theory of respondeat superior, employers are held strictly liable for conduct of supervisory personnel who have plenary authority to hire, fire, promote, and discipline employees.” Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir. 1992). Strict liability, however, is not limited to supervisors with such broad authority. Rather, “all that is required is that the employee have ‘significant control’ of those duties.” Id. In claiming that summary judgment was appropriate, Defendants emphasize that, as a very junior supervisor within QRC’s corporate structure, Kirk lacked the power to hire and fire employees. The record suggests, however, that even if QRC’s policy did not authorize Kirk to 5 Defendant claims that Plaintiff has waived her quid pro quo sexual harassment claim by failing to raise it on appeal. This argument lacks merit, as Plaintiff expressly argues in her brief that “Mr. Kirk was acting formally in his capacity as a supervisor in sending Ms. Howington home, and writing her up as he did. It was the act of a supervisor bringing the official power of the enterprise to bear on his subordinate, and therefore the employer should be strictly liable if the act was illegally motivated.” Pl.’s Br. 11–12 (citations omitted). 9 terminate employees, Kirk exercised “significant control” over personnel matters because of his apparent unilateral authority to discipline his subordinates. Defendants do not contest that, on two separate occasions, acting solely on his own authority, Kirk ordered Plaintiff to leave the restaurant. Further, after refusing to move her car, Plaintiff received a thirty-day suspension from her job, and the discipline form memorializing her suspension lists Kirk as the supervisor approving the disciplinary action. Thus, although Kirk might have lacked authority to fire Plaintiff, he imposed significant disciplinary measures of only slightly less severity than termination. We believe that such unilateral authority constitutes “significant control” over personnel matters, and is thus sufficient to render QRC vicariously liable for Kirk’s actions. See id.
Plaintiff also must demonstrate that her “submission to [Kirk’s] unwelcomed advances was an express or implied condition for receiving job benefits[,] or that [her] refusal to submit to [Kirk’s] sexual demands resulted in a tangible job detriment.” Bowman, 220 F.3d at 461. Thus, Plaintiff may 10 prevail if she demonstrates that she experienced an adverse employment action,6 and that this action occurred because of her refusal to have sex with Kirk.
While de minimis employment actions and “very temporary” actions are not materially adverse and, thus, not actionable under Title VII, Bowman, 220 F.3d at 462, those involving changes such as a termination or a suspension constitute adverse employment actions. Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 603 (6th Cir. 2008). We have also recognized that a “loss of pay or benefits” can constitute a tangible job detriment. See Thornton v. Fed. Express Corp., 530 F.3d 451, 454-55 (6th Cir. 2008). The record in this case is unclear as to whether Plaintiff lost any of her hourly wages when Kirk sent her home from work in either instance. Plaintiff, however, also earned wages through tips as a day-shift bartender. As a result, Plaintiff undoubtedly lost compensation in the form of unearned tips for the days she was not at work after Kirk sent her home. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff has satisfied this element of her prima facie case. 6 Defendants contend Plaintiff cannot, after arguing in district court that she was terminated, assert that the suspension constituted the adverse employment action. This argument is without merit. Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment effectively informed Defendants and the district court that Plaintiff believed she experienced a tangible job detriment when Kirk told her to leave work, and that she believes he did so because of her refusal to have sex with him. Arguments raised in a district court filing offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are preserved for appeal. See Vencor, Inc. v. Standard Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 317 F.3d 629, 642 n.11 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Swinney v. Gen. Motors Corp., 46 F.3d 512, 522 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that an issue presented to a district court is preserved for appeal as long as the issue was presented to the district court in a manner which “places the opposing party and the court on notice that a new issue is being raised”). Defendants further argue that, had they understood Plaintiff’s filings in the district court to encompass a claim that she experienced a tangible work detriment other than firing, they would have conducted additional discovery and argued to the district court that Kirk had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for disciplining Plaintiff, thus entitling them to relief. See Defs.’ Br. 21–22. This defense, however, is viable regardless of whether Plaintiff was terminated or merely suspended. See Bowman, 220 F.3d at 461. 11
The only remaining question is whether a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff was disciplined because of her refusal to have sex with Kirk. See Bowman, 220 F.3d at 461. According to Plaintiff’s deposition, Kirk propositioned her for sex “every day that [she] worked with him,” (J.A. 35) he became increasingly aggressive with her as she continued to refuse his advances, and he sent her text messages stating that “if [she] didn’t have sex with him [she] wasn’t going to be employed there anymore.” (J.A. 190.) These facts are sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to infer that Kirk disciplined Plaintiff because of her refusal to have sex with him. Cf. Idusuyi v. State of Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 30 F. App’x 398, 401 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding no causal relationship between refusal of sexual advances and the adverse employment action when alleged harasser did not participate in making the adverse decision). In addition, Defendants present no evidence to rebut Plaintiff’s claim that Kirk repeatedly propositioned her for sex. Defendants, however, contest Plaintiff’s claim that Kirk sent her text messages threatening to have her fired if she did not have sex with him. After Plaintiff introduced a copy of her cell phone records into evidence, Kirk stated in an affidavit that “[n]one of the numbers listed in [Plaintiff’s phone records] ever belonged to me.” Kirk’s affidavit, however, is only two paragraphs long, and does not at any point deny that he sent threatening text messages to Plaintiff, but denies only that he sent text messages to her from his own phone number. Thus, it remains unclear whether Plaintiff received text messages from Kirk, presenting a genuine issue of material fact relevant to determining whether a causal relationship existed between the adverse employment 12 action and Plaintiff’s refusals. As a result, we conclude that the district court improperly granted summary judgment to Defendants with respect to Plaintiff’s quid pro quo claim.7
Plaintiff claims that Kirk’s conduct throughout the course of her employment created a hostile environment. To prevail on her claim, Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case. See Clark v. UPS, 400 F.3d 341, 347 (6th Cir. 2005). Specifically, Plaintiff must show that: “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her sex; (4) the harassment created a hostile work environment; and that (5) the employer is vicariously liable.” Id. (formatting altered). “For any sexual harassment preceding [an] employment decision to be actionable, . . . the conduct must be severe or pervasive.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998). Except in cases of truly egregious conduct, a workplace does not become a hostile work environment on the basis of isolated incidents of harassment. Rather, Plaintiff must show that her workplace was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 7 Defendants also claim that Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) entitle them to an affirmative defense against Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim because QRC “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,” and Plaintiff “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. This affirmative defense, however, is not available “when the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.” Id. Because Kirk’s alleged harassment of Plaintiff culminated in her suspension from work, Defendants may not assert the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. 13 In addition, “[b]oth an objective and a subjective test must be met: the conduct must be severe or pervasive enough to create an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive and the victim must subjectively regard that environment as abusive.” Bowman, 220 F.3d at 463. This is not a “mathematically precise test,” and, thus, the question of whether a particular work environment was tainted by severe or pervasive harassment will necessarily depend on the facts of a particular case. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. Factors to consider in evaluating a hostile environment claim include “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Id. at 23. This Court considers “the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive.” Randolph v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 453 F.3d 724, 733 (6th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff alleges that Kirk’s conduct created a hostile work environment. Throughout her employment, Kirk asked Plaintiff to have sex with him “[p]retty much[] every day that [she] worked with him.” (J.A. 35.) Second, during an after-work outing, Kirk asked to perform oral sex on her, and he did so by using a vulgar term for Plaintiff’s genitals. Kirk also became increasingly angry with Plaintiff, and would sometimes yell at her in front of customers or slam a door in her face.8 Finally, Kirk sent multiple text messages to Plaintiff threatening to have her fired if she did not have sex with him, and disciplined Plaintiff on two separate occasions. 8 Although there is nothing inherently sexual about yelling or slamming doors, this Court has held that non-sexual behavior may comprise part of a sexual harassment claim when that behavior “could well be viewed as work-sabotaging behavior that creates a hostile work environment.” Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 564 (6th Cir. 1999). Thus, to the extent that Kirk’s angry outbursts were an attempt to sabotage Plaintiff because she refused to have sex with him, they may be considered in determining whether Plaintiff experienced a hostile work environment. 14 In Clark v. United Parcel Service, Inc., two UPS employees, Sandra Clark and Rhonda Knoop, brought hostile work environment claims against their employer, both claiming that Eli Brock, a supervisor, harassed them. 400 F.3d 351, 344 (6th Cir. 2005). Knoop alleged that, over a period of two-and-a-half years, Brock routinely told sexual jokes in front of her, twice placed his vibrating pager against her upper thigh and asked if it “felt good,” and once grabbed the back of her overalls and tried to look down them. Id. at 344-35. Nevertheless, the court found that, other than Brock’s sexually inappropriate jokes, Knoop had experienced only three incidents of harassment in over two years, and that such “isolated incidents” did not rise to the level of creating a hostile work environment. Id. at 352. Moreover, the Court held that Brock’s jokes were “not enough to elevate the isolated incidents to an ongoing and pervasive hostile environment.” Id. Although the court held that Knoop’s allegations were insufficient to sustain a hostile environment claim, it reached the opposite result with respect to Clark. As with Knoop, Brock used his vibrating pager to harass Clark by tossing it in between her legs when she was sitting and asking her if it “fe[lt] good.” Id. at 345. Clark, however, also described sixteen other incidents involving Brock, including a time when Brock placed a bag of potato chips on his crotch and encouraged Clark to reach her hand into the bag, and a time when he physically restrained Clark and scratched his finger against her palm. Id. Although the court believed that Clark’s allegations were “similar in kind to Knoop’s,” the court held that they were sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment because Clark presented “more of an ongoing pattern of unwanted conduct and attention by Brock.” Id. at 352. The court in Clark also cited Stacy v. Shoney’s, Inc., No. 97-5393, 1998 WL 165139 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 1998) to support its conclusion. In Stacy, a waitress’s supervisor began “harassing her with 15 sexually suggestive comments and leering looks.” Id. at . When they did not work the same shift, the supervisor would call her at home and say that he “missed her,” and when they did work together, he would comment, for example, that her “tan sure does look good” and that he “wish[ed] [he] could see more of it.” Id. The supervisor also told her that “if [he] had someone that looked like [her], [he]’d not let them leave the house.” Id. The waitress also reported an incident when the supervisor inappropriately touched her breast. Id. Despite the supervisor’s statements and actions, the court held that the supervisor’s conduct was not “sufficiently frequent, severe, physically threatening, or humiliating to unreasonably interfere with [the] [p]laintiff’s work performance to constitute actionable work place harassment.” Id. at . As a result, the court found the plaintiff’s hostile environment allegations insufficient to survive summary judgment. Id. In this case, Plaintiff has alleged harassment that occurred on an “ongoing” basis, similar to the pattern of unwanted conduct this Court found sufficient to survive summary judgment in Clark. Clark, 400 F.3d at 352. Kirk’s harassing behavior, in asking her to have sex with him, occurred every day that Plaintiff worked with him, and he frequently yelled at her while she was working. He also sent her, on more than one occasion, text messages threatening to fire her if she did not submit to his advances. Thus, Kirk’s behavior was continuous and “commonplace” in the work environment. See Abeita v. Transam. Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246, 252 (6th Cir. 1998). Although Plaintiff is unable to describe more than a few specific incidents of harassment, when a plaintiff claims ongoing harassment, the “inability to recount any more specific instances goes to the weight of her testimony, a matter for the finder of fact[].” Id. While each of the incidents Plaintiff describes, viewed separately, would not be sufficient to demonstrate Kirk created a hostile work environment, a reasonable person could find that all of Kirk’s actions, taken together, were 16 sufficiently severe or pervasive. See Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 562 (6th Cir. 1999). We conclude that Plaintiff has presented an issue for the fact finder as to whether Kirk’s actions were sufficiently severe or pervasive. As a result, summary judgment was inappropriate. II. Retaliation