Opinion ID: 2393195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The State as an Owner of Real Estate within the Meaning of Section 5-3-150(3)

Text: The circuit court found the phrase persons owning real estate, as used in the 100% petition method, is synonymous with the word freeholder in the 75% petition method. Freeholder is defined as: [A]ny person eighteen years of age, or older, and any firm or corporation, who or which owns legal title to a present possessory interest in real estate equal to a life estate or greater ... and who owns, at the date of the petition or of the referendum, at least an undivided one-tenth interest in a single tract and whose name appears on the county tax records as an owner of real estate. § 5-3-240. Because the State was not listed on the county tax rolls as an owner of the annexed property, the circuit court found the State was not a freeholder. Accordingly, the circuit court found the State's signature was not required for the 100% petition annexation. We reject this position. Where the State holds title to real property in the area to be annexed, it is a person[] owning real estate within the meaning of section 5-3-150(3) and its signature is required to accomplish an annexation by 100% petition. Section 5-3-150(3) provides in relevant part: [A]ny area or property which is contiguous to a municipality may be annexed to the municipality by filing with the municipal governing body a petition signed by all persons owning real estate in the area requesting annexation. (Emphasis added). By its plain language, section 5-3-150(3) requires the signatures of all persons owning real estate in the area requesting annexation. The term freeholder is not included in subsection (3), and we decline Respondents' invitation to read it in. The phrase all persons owning real estate, as it is commonly understood, does not carry with it the various requirements of freeholder status. See Bryant v. City of Charleston, 295 S.C. 408, 411, 368 S.E.2d 899, 900-01 (1988) ([I]n construing a statute its words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's operation.). We must respect the General Assembly's use of distinct terms to describe the signatories required for 100% petition versus 75% petition method annexations. See U.S. v. Barial, 31 F.3d 216, 218 (4th Cir.1994) (Where Congress has chosen different language in proximate subsections of the same statute, courts are obligated to give that choice effect.). For these reasons, we find the circuit court's interpretation of section 5-3-150(3) was an error of law. [5] Further, while section 5-3-150(3) does not explicitly require notice to each property owner, it is self-evident that each property owner who signs the petition has notice of the petition. See Kiriakides v. United Artists Commc'ns, Inc., 312 S.C. 271, 275, 440 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1994) (All rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that the legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and that language must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of the statute.). The petition itself provides notice. Thus, the Town was required to present the petition to the State for signature. This annexation did not comply with the requirements of the 100% petition method. The State was the presumptive owner of the annexed marshlands and the Town did not provide the State with prior notice of the annexation or obtain the State's signature on the petition. [6] Nevertheless, the State's challenge to the annexation is time-barred.