Opinion ID: 168155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Upward D eparture

Text: After Booker, “[w]hen reviewing a district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines, we review legal questions de novo and we review any factual findings for clear error, giving due deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.” United States v. M artinez, 418 F.3d 1130, 1133 (10th Cir.) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 841 (2005). W hen review ing upward departures, we employ a four-part test: (1) w hether the factual circumstances supporting a departure are -6- permissible departure factors; (2) whether the departure factors relied upon by the district court remove the defendant from the applicable Guideline heartland thus warranting a departure; (3) whether the record sufficiently supports the factual basis underlying the departure; and (4) whether the degree of departure is reasonable. United States v. Wolfe, 435 F.3d 1289, 1295 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). All of these steps are subject to an abuse of discretion standard. Id. The degree of an upward departure is “reasonable” if the district court “precisely lay[s] out its reasoning and analysis as to why it is selecting a particular degree of departure” sufficient to “give us reasonable indicia that the sentence the district court pronounces is proportional to the crime committed.” United States v. Proffit, 304 F.3d 1001, 1012 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). Ordinarily, “[t]he district court accomplishes this task by using any reasonable methodology hitched to the Sentencing Guidelines to justify the reasonableness of the departure.” Id. (quotation omitted). Application Note 8 to §2K2.1 allows an upward departure where the defendant’s offense level “does not adequately capture the seriousness of the offense because of the type of destructive device involved, the risk to the public welfare, or the risk of death or serious bodily injury that the destructive device created.” Application Note 8 also cross-references USSG §5K2.2 which authorizes an upward departure “[i]f significant physical injury resulted” from the defendant’s conduct. In such a case, “[t]he extent of the increase ordinarily should depend on the extent of the injury, the degree to which it may prove -7- permanent, and the extent to which the injury was intended or knowingly risked.” Id. Relying on Application Note 8, the district court agreed to a departure based on “the risk of death or serious bodily injury to the [homeowner and his family] and to other families living on either side of the house had the fire spread to neighboring homes,” as well as the fact the homeow ner suffered smokeinhalation as a consequence of the fire started by Kostich. (R. Vol. VI. at 40.) It settled on two levels because “[m]ost analogous guidelines provide a two-level increase for this subject.” (Id.) The district court noted the departure “could be more, there’s no question,” but based on the offenses charged and Kostich’s lack of a criminal history decided to impose only two levels. (Id.) K ostich challenges the propriety of granting an upward departure at all. H e argues the unadjusted guideline range w as “adequate” and that “the only injury noted at sentencing and testified to at trial was minor smoke inhalation [suffered by the homeow ner, which] certainly [was] not life threatening or serious.” (Appellant’s Br. at 18.) Kostich also notes that no other members of the household received medical treatment. Thus, he argues, property damage was the main issue at sentencing and the application of Note 8 was “unnecessary, and is not justified for the small increase in the sentence imposed by the district court.” (Id. at 19.) W e disagree. Enhancement of a defendant’s offense level may be -8- warranted either where his conduct causes physical injury or poses the risk of causing injury. See USSG §2K2.1, comment. (n.8); §5K2.2. Here it is undisputed the owner of the home suffered smoke inhalation and had to receive medical treatment. As the district court correctly noted, “[h]is injury meets the guideline definition for bodily injury set forth in [the] sentencing guideline[s].” (R. Vol. VI at 40.); see USSG §1B1.1, comment. (n.1(B)). Even if such an injury did not warrant a two-level upward departure by itself, Application Note 8 of §2K2.1 allow s upw ard departures where the defendant’s conduct poses the “risk of death or serious bodily injury.” Despite his evident lack of concern for the health of the individuals reposed in the home to which he set fire, Kostich concedes “his conduct was reckless and could [have] caused personal harm and injury.” (Appellant’s Br. at 18.) Kostich notes that “[l]uckily, no one was seriously hurt.” (Id.) He is correct — it was fortunate for the victims and fortunate for himself. In any event, Kostich’s conduct clearly falls within the meaning of the applicable guideline provisions. Kostich provides no convincing reasons the district court’s imposition of a two level enhancement was an abuse of discretion.