Opinion ID: 4337
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Denial of Severance

Text: Russell argues that the District Court erred by denying his motion for severance under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14. Because the government sought the death penalty against McTier, but not Russell, Russell claims that he was subjected to undue prejudice when he was tried by a deathqualified jury. In addition, Russell maintains that he was subjected to undue prejudice when the jury heard evidence of violent crimes in which Russell took no part. Those factors, Russell argues, required the District Court to grant his Rule 14 motion for severance. “‘[A] district court should grant a severance under Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent a jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.’” United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 150 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993)). “There is a preference, in the federal system, for the joint trial of defendants indicted together, and thus, a district court order denying a Rule 14 motion is considered virtually unreviewable and will be overturned only if a defendant can show prejudice so severe that his conviction constituted a miscarriage of justice and that the denial of his motion constituted an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 149-50 (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted). The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance here. The mere fact that Russell was tried before a death-qualified jury was not, by itself, a sufficient ground for severance. See In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 93, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987)). To the extent that Russell claims that the jury heard evidence of crimes in which he did not directly participate, much of the evidence of those crimes was admissible against Russell because it established the nature and activities of the criminal enterprise—the Folk Nation gang—of which Russell was charged with being a member. Accordingly, the admission of such evidence was not grounds for severance. See United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 102-04 (2d Cir. 1999). 5 V. The Denial of a New Trial or Further Investigation Following Allegations of Jury Misconduct Stone argues that the District Court erred by denying Stone’s request for a new trial or further inquiry into the jury’s deliberations. Following the trial, Juror Eleven had a chance encounter with the attorney representing Russell in which Juror Eleven expressed his concerns that members of the jury had access to cell phones and newspapers in the jury deliberation room and had sent cell phone text messages to alternate jurors during deliberations. The District Court held a hearing and interviewed Juror Eleven. The hearing clarified that Juror Eleven, who was a court security officer in the state court system, was unnerved that “things were done here differently than what [he was] used to at [state] trials.” Although Juror Eleven had heard other jurors discussing cases that the attorneys had previously tried and that Judge Glasser had previously presided over, Juror Eleven had no other “personal knowledge of any juror seeking information about the case or the parties.” In particular, Juror Eleven had heard one juror suggest that a text message be sent to an alternate juror, but Juror Eleven had no knowledge of whether such a text message was, in fact, sent. Stone and Russell moved for a new trial—or, in the alternative, a broader investigation into the jury’s conduct—based on Juror Eleven’s statements. The District Court denied the motion after finding that Juror Eleven’s testimony was insufficient “to overcome the presumption of jury impartiality.” “We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 170 (2d Cir. 2002); cf. Sims, 534 F.3d at 132. “Although we cannot lightly brush aside allegations of juror misconduct, we recognize that the trial judge has broad discretion to decide questions involving such misconduct.” United States v. Carmona, 858 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1988). We conclude that the District Court’s denial of the motion for a new trial—and the District Court’s decision not to conduct further evidentiary hearings into the jury’s deliberations—was, in the circumstances presented here, well within the range of permissible decisions. VI. The Sufficiency of the Evidence for Stone’s Murder-in-Aid-of-Racketeering Conviction Stone argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient for the jury to convict him of murder and conspiracy to murder in aid of racketeering. See 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1), (5). Because “the task of choosing among competing, permissible inferences is for the [jury and] not for the reviewing court,” United States v. McDermott, 245 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2001), we are required to review the evidence “in the light most favorable to the government,” United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 459 (2d Cir. 2004), and to “resolve all issues of credibility in favor of the jury’s verdict,” United States v. Desena, 287 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). After a review of the trial record, we conclude that Stone has not met the “heavy burden” of demonstrating that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to convict him of murder in 6 aid of racketeering. United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 51 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). VII. The Convictions for Use of a Firearm Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) McTier and Stone argue that the District Court improperly sentenced them under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). McTier and Stone did not raise this argument before the District Court, and thus we review for plain error. “To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must show (1) error, (2) that is plain at the time of appellate review, and (3) that affects substantial rights. Where these conditions are met, we have the discretion to notice a forfeited error if (4) it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 316 (2d Cir. 2007). Subsection 924(c) provides in relevant part: Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime— (i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years; (ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and (iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). We have held that the “except” clause of this subsection “‘means what it literally says’—that the minimum sentences it requires do not apply where ‘a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by . . . any other provision of law.’” Williams, 558 F.3d at 169 (quoting Whitley, 529 F.3d at 153). Here, McTier and Stone were convicted on counts of murder in aid of racketeering and sentenced to life imprisonment—the statutory minimum—on those counts. Also, prior to our decisions in Williams and Whitley, the District Court sentenced McTier and Stone to additional “consecutive” terms of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The government now concedes that, under Williams and Whitley, some of the sentences the District Court imposed under § 924(c)(1)(A) were erroneous because another provision of law provided “‘a greater minimum sentence’”—life imprisonment—than the sentences called for in § 924(c)(1)(A). Williams, 558 F.3d at 169 (quoting Whitley, 529 F.3d at 153). 7 Nonetheless, even if some of the sentences imposed under § 924(c)(1)(A) were erroneous, the errors were harmless in the circumstances here and thus did not affect defendants’ substantial rights. Because each defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment, the “consecutive” sentences under § 924(c)(1)(A) are “irrelevant to the time [each defendant] will serve in prison, and we can think of no collateral consequences from such erroneous . . . sentences that would justify vacating them.” United States v. Rivera, 282 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 2000). Thus, even though the District Court erred in sentencing McTier and Stone under § 924(c)(1)(A), we need not vacate the sentences.