Opinion ID: 2977807
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to reopen removal proceedings

Text: Hu first appeals the BIA’s decision affirming the IJ’s denial of his request to reopen his removal proceedings. We review the denial of a motion to reopen proceedings for abuse of discretion. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992); Alizoti v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 448, 451 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 96 (1988)). An abuse of discretion occurs when “the denial of [the] motion to reopen . . . was made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as invidious discrimination against a particular race or group.” Allabani v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 668, 675 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Balani v. INS, 669 F.2d 1157, 1161 (6th Cir. 1982)) (addition and omission in Allabani). When determining whether the BIA abused its discretion, we may look only at “the basis articulated in the decision and . . . may not assume that the [BIA] considered factors that it failed to mention in its opinion.” Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 626 (6th Cir. 2004). We review legal determinations made by the BIA de novo. Harchenko v. INS, 379 F.3d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 2004). Because it is undisputed that Hu’s motion was time-barred under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (giving an applicant for asylum ninety days from the “date of entry of a final administrative order of removal” to file a motion to reopen removal proceedings), to warrant reopening of his removal proceedings, Hu was required to establish materially changed country 4 Hu v. Holder, Case No. 08-4074 conditions in China occurring between the IJ’s 2004 ruling and his 2007 motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (no time limit to file a motion to reopen proceedings “based on changed country conditions arising in the country of nationality. . .”); accord 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). The BIA determined that the evidence Hu submitted to support his request to reopen contradicted his assertions that he did not know about China’s alleged sterilization policy until August 16, 2007. The BIA reasoned that Hu’s family would have informed him of local authorities’ reaction to Cindy’s birth following her 2002 trip to Shanghai. The BIA also concluded that Hu had failed to establish changed country conditions in China, explaining: [T]he birth of a child is a change in personal circumstances rather than a change in circumstances in the country of nationality. Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(34). Even if we accepted [Hu’s] assertion that circumstances have changed for him in China for the birth of a second child abroad, a male with two children failed to provide evidence that such sanctions in Fujian Province or Changle City would rise to the level of persecution. Matter of J-W-S, 24 I[.] & N[.] Dec. 185 (BIA 2007). (AR 3.) The BIA further noted that it had previously rejected some of the same reports submitted by Hu, deeming them insufficient to demonstrate that the Chinese Government has a national policy of requiring forced sterilization of a parent who returns with children born outside of China or that the sanctions and penalties described in the aforementioned evidence would rise to the level of persecution. . . . [and] insufficient to demonstrate that the respondent has an objective well-founded fear of sterilization or other harm that rises to the level of persecution upon his return to China. (AR 3) (internal citations omitted). A petitioner’s motion to reopen must be accompanied by “evidence [that] is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also Allabani, 402 F.3d at 675 (noting that an untimely motion to reopen 5 Hu v. Holder, Case No. 08-4074 proceedings “shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision. Cindy’s birth constitutes “changed personal circumstances,” insufficient to support an untimely motion to reopen. See Haddad v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 515, 517-18 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that divorce in the United States was a personal decision that did not constitute a changed country condition in Jordan); see also Bah v. Gonzalez, 230 F. App’x 547, 550 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that giving birth to a female child in this country who may be subjected to genital mutilation upon return to Guinea was a changed personal circumstance); Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 273 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that the birth of two United States citizen children was evidence of changed personal circumstances rather than changed conditions in China, and did not satisfy the exception under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii)). In addition, as the BIA explained, Cindy was born almost seven years before Hu’s March 24, 2004 removal hearing. Moreover, Hu’s claim that he did not know about China’s alleged sterilization policy until he received Fu Xin Huang’s letter is belied by his statement that his family told him that the Street and Resident Committee had accused him of “excessively giving” birth when Cindy visited Shanghai in 2002. Hu has also failed to demonstrate that the alleged changed country conditions have caused him an individualized threat of harm. See Harchenko, 379 F.3d at 410 (stating that an alien must provide “reasonably specific information showing a real threat of individual persecution”). Hu relies on numerous 2004 country reports to support his claim that because of the birth of his daughter in the United States, he will face sterilization and economic penalties upon his return to China. Hu’s 6 Hu v. Holder, Case No. 08-4074 evidence contravenes the May 2007 State Department document entitled China: Profile of Asylum Claims & Country Conditions, which states, “U.S. officials in China are not aware of the alleged official policy, at the national or provincial levels, mandating the sterilization of one partner of couples that have given birth to two children, at least one of whom was born abroad.” (AR 59.) The determination of current conditions in a particular country is within the purview of the BIA. INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-18 (2002). We will only overturn such a determination if a “rational adjudicator looking at the record as a whole would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We have previously adopted the BIA’s determination that “[t]he finding that children born outside of China are not counted for purposes of China’s population-control policies continues to be accepted by the BIA, as well as by other courts of appeals.” Fang Huang v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 640, 653 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing In re J-W-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 185, 192 (BIA 2007) (“We therefore find that the evidence of record does not demonstrate that the Chinese government has a national policy of requiring forced sterilization of parents who return with a second child born outside of China.”)); In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 255 (BIA 2007) (referring to evidence “indicat[ing] that ‘children born abroad, if not registered as permanent residents of China . . . are not counted against the number of children allowed by China’s family[- ]planning policy’”); see also Wu v. Mukasey, 273 F. App’x 12, 14 (2d Cir. 2008) (referring to 2004 State Department report on China and “finding that there is no evidence that returnees from the United States are being forced to undergo sterilization” and to the 2007 State Department profile, providing that “Chinese regulations stipulate that children born overseas are not counted for purposes of administering the family[-]planning policy”); Song Wang v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 615, 622-23 (7th 7 Hu v. Holder, Case No. 08-4074 Cir. 2007) (same); Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 152-54 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the BIA did not err in taking administrative notice of the 2007 State Department profile of China). Due to the contradictions between the reports submitted by Hu and the 2007 State Department profile, the BIA’s conclusion that children born abroad are not counted for purposes of China’s family-planning policies, and our previous rejection of claims similar to Hu’s, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s decision, and we affirm.