Opinion ID: 2521294
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Trial Judge's Recent Ties To The District Attorney's Office Might Cause A Reasonable Person To Question His Impartiality

Text: The question that this court must answer is whether Judge Schwartz's former association with the district attorney's office means that his impartiality might reasonably be questioned in this case, thus demonstrating that he should have disclosed this relationship and, if so requested, disqualified himself before Julien's trial had begun. This question, of how a reasonable person might respond to a particular situation, can only be answered through an examination of the specific facts and circumstances presented. The majority, without considering how a reasonable person might react to the particular facts of this case, concludes that Judge Schwartz's impartiality could not reasonably be questioned. Instead of engaging in a particularized factual analysis, the majority essentially creates a bright-line rule that a judge's impartiality can never reasonably be questioned as a result of her former employment at the prosecutor's office if the judge does not have personal knowledge about a case before her. I believe that a reasonable person would consider numerous factors when deciding whether the impartiality of a judge might be questioned as a result of the judge's employment at the D.A.'s office while the defendant's case was pending. These would include but not be limited to the length of the judge's service with the prosecutor's office, the length of time that has passed since the judge left the prosecutor's office, the size of the prosecutor's office, the level of involvement that the judge had with the particular case while employed by the prosecutor's office, and the supervisory authority granted to the judge while employed by the prosecutor's office. [4] Each of these facts pertains to either the likelihood that the judge would have come into contact with information about a particular case before taking the bench and/or the degree of loyalty that might be perceived to be felt towards the attorney currently prosecuting the case. Considerations such as these might lead a reasonable person to question whether a judge might, consciously or unconsciously, be biased. The majority considers only one of these factors: that Judge Schwartz states that he had no direct or supervisory involvement with, recollection of, or personal knowledge of Julien's case or its disputed evidentiary facts from his time at the prosecutor's office. While this fact is certainly important to determining both the actuality and the appearance of impropriety, it is by no means dispositive of the question of whether the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In adopting this approach, the majority condenses what should be a detailed analysis into a rule that fails to afford sufficient respect to our system's need to avoid the appearance of impropriety. The majority ignores the reality that a reasonable person might, depending on the circumstances, question the impartiality of a judge who was formerly employed by the prosecutor's office while a case that he now presides over was pending. In my view, Judge Schwartz's impartiality might reasonably be questioned in this case. Judge Schwartz, who had worked at the local district attorney's office for approximately seven years, had left the employ of that office only five weeks before he began presiding over Julien's trial. Julien's case was investigated and its prosecution was initiated during Judge Schwartz's tenure at the district attorney's office. Further, while employed by the district attorney's office, he had supervisory powers over numerous attorneys. Judge Schwartz stated that he had no recollection of Julien's case and did not work on it while he was a prosecutor; however, this fact is not dispositive. On balance, these facts tilt in favor of a finding that a reasonable person might question Judge Schwartz's ability to be neutral, detached, and impartial. I believe that Judge Schwartz should have confronted the issue of recusal before Julien's trial started. He should have disclosed the existence of his relationship with the district attorney's office to the defendant and his counsel. See, e.g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 6-1.6(a) cmt. (Whenever there could be an appearance of partiality caused by certain relationships or activities, full disclosure is the best policy.); see also id., 6-1.9(a) cmt. (Even in those cases where a prior prosecutorial role may not warrant recusal, the judge should disclose to the parties his or her former position.). At that point, the parties would have had the opportunity either to insist that Judge Schwartz recuse himself or to waive this requirement.