Opinion ID: 2326772
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the opinion of the appellate court

Text: The opinion of the Appellate Court contains the following factual and procedural summary of the case. This [case] arises out of a criminal investigation into the police tactics used to make an arrest on February 14, 1997. At that time, the defendant was a member of the Hartford police department. The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On the evening of February 14, 1997, several officers from the Hartford police department, including the defendant, engaged in a high speed chase. Bloomfield police officers [including two rookie officers, Rebecca Michaud and Arthur Fredericks] joined the pursuit after being notified that the truck being chased, which was driven by James Wilson, had entered their town. The chase ended in Bloomfield police department removed Wilson from the vehicle. As Driscoll removed Wilson, the defendant, who was standing nearby, ducked and stepped back to avoid a blow from Wilson's hand. Several police officers, including the defendant [and Hugh O'Callaghan and Jacqueline Middleton, also of the Hartford police department], used force to subdue Wilson. An investigation into the police conduct followed. Reports and statements of seasoned police officers from both police departments conflicted with [those of] rookie police officers with regard to which officers were involved in subduing Wilson and the details concerning the amount of force used to subdue Wilson. Furthermore, testimony of the seasoned police officers about the incident conflicted with that of the rookie police officers.... The defendant was charged under two separate informations. The first information charged him with assault in the second degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60a [6] and assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60(a)(2). [7] The second information charged the defendant with fabricating physical evidence ... conspiracy to fabricate physical evidence ... and falsely reporting an incident.... The jury found the defendant not guilty of the assault counts in the first information [but] found the defendant guilty of all three counts of the second information.... [On appeal to the Appellate Court] [t]he defendant claim[ed] that the [state's attorney had] made numerous improper statements during closing and rebuttal arguments that were so egregious that he was deprived of his due process right to a fair trial.... Specifically, the defendant argue[d] that during the [state's attorney's] closing and rebuttal arguments, the [state's attorney] improperly (1) displayed blue tinted sunglasses that had not been admitted in evidence ... (2) introduced the concept of the `blue code' [of silence], (3) offered his opinion that the seasoned officers' testimony was unbelievable, (4) vouched for the credibility of the rookie [officers] ... (5) blamed the seasoned officers for failing to help [Wilson], (6) posed hypotheticals to the jurors to encourage them to relate to [Wilson], (7) displayed a badge that was not part of the evidence and (8) appealed to the jurors' emotions and inflamed the passions of the jurors. State v. Ancona, supra, 69 Conn.App. at 30-32, 797 A.2d 1138. The Appellate Court summarized the factual basis of the defendant's claims more particularly as follows. In closing argument, the [state's attorney] stated that he believed that there were a number of factors showing that there was criminal conduct in this case. He held up a pair of blue tinted sunglasses to demonstrate the concept of a `blue code' [of silence], whereby police officers `avoid ratting on a brother officer.' [8] He proceeded to credit the testimony of rookie officers and to discredit the testimony of the seasoned officers. The [state's attorney] next posed a hypothetical to illustrate his opinion that the officers would have seen everything if Wilson, rather than a fellow officer, had been the defendant in the case. [9] He accused the officers who hit Wilson of perverting the law and abusing their discretion. [10] ... He challenged the jury to `protect those officers that are attempting to properly use that discretion and ... to punish those officers who do not and who use their badge to commit a crime.' In the [state's attorney's] rebuttal, he discredited the statement and testimony of the defendant. He explained that the jury was to evaluate the totality of the evidence and that even if the state's witnesses were `liars,' there was still no reasonable doubt. After emphasizing witness testimony and stating his interpretation of the inferences that could be drawn, [11] the [state's attorney] blamed the seasoned officers for failing to prevent the assault on Wilson. [12] [The state's attorney] further posed a series of rhetorical questions to the jury about the police officers' conduct. [13] To close his rebuttal [argument], the [state's attorney] stated: `There's a monument in Washington that's set up that has about fourteen [thousand] or fifteen thousand plaques on it of officers who died in the line of duty. They died to protect us and they died to honor this, their badge. [14] What those officers did that night is a disgrace. It's a disgrace to their badge. Don't let them get away with it.' (Citation omitted.) Id., at 32-35, 797 A.2d 1138. With respect to the comments that the state's attorney had made during closing and rebuttal arguments, defense counsel objected only to the state's attorney act of displaying his badge after he had referred to the monument in Washington [15] and one other passage that is not relevant to the merits of this appeal. Before addressing the merits of the defendant's appeal, the Appellate Court noted that the defendant had failed to object to most of the comments of the state's attorney that the defendant had challenged on appeal. The Appellate Court further noted that the defendant had failed to seek review of his unpreserved claims under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), [16] in his principal brief; rather, the defendant sought review under Golding for the first time in his reply brief. State v. Ancona, supra, 69 Conn.App. at 36 n. 10, 797 A.2d 1138. Invoking the well established principle that our appellate courts generally will not review claims raised initially in a reply brief; e.g., State v. Russo, 259 Conn. 436, 440 n. 6, 790 A.2d 1132, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 879, 123 S.Ct. 79, 154 L.Ed.2d 134 (2002); the Appellate Court declined to address the merits of the defendant's unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct. See State v. Ancona, supra, at 36 n. 10, 797 A.2d 1138. The Appellate Court did state, however, that it would consider the defendant's unpreserved claims of prosecutorial impropriety in determining whether the actions challenged in the defendant's preserved claims were prejudicial in light of the whole trial. [17] Id., at 36 n. 11, 797 A.2d 1138. The Appellate Court then reviewed the two claims of prosecutorial impropriety that the defendant had preserved by way of timely objection at trial. With respect to the defendant's first preserved claim, the Appellate Court concluded that the state's attorney [had] failed to confine himself to the evidence in the record. During the [state's attorney's] rebuttal argument, he improperly displayed a badge that was not evidence in the case. He improperly made statements as to facts that had not been proven when he referred to a monument with the names of fourteen [thousand] to fifteen thousand police officers who died to `protect us and they died to honor this, their badge. What those officers did that night is a disgrace.' Furthermore, the [state's attorney] improperly asserted his personal opinion that what the police officers did was a disgrace. The use of the badge and reference to the monument were not subjects of proper closing argument. Id., at 38, 797 A.2d 1138. With respect to the defendant's second preserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the Appellate Court concluded that the state's attorney improperly [had] appealed to the emotions, passions and prejudices of the jurors, thereby attempting to divert their attention from deciding the case on the evidence against the defendant. The defendant was the only police officer on trial. The [state's attorney's] closing and rebuttal arguments, however, were not limited to comments about the defendant's actions. The [state's attorney's] arguments continually referred to, and focused on, other police officers involved in the incident and law enforcement in general.... The [state's attorney's] rebuttal statement regarding a monument and fourteen thousand or fifteen thousand officers who `died to protect us' and to honor their badge was a blatant attempt to divert the jurors' attention and appeal to their emotions, passions and prejudices by challenging the jurors not to `let them get away with it.' ... The [state's attorney] further attempted to distract the jury by using melodramatic language, by referring to a historical monument and by giving a hypothetical that had no basis in the evidence of the case. The [state's attorney] was attempting to color the jurors' minds with such emotion that they would consider it their duty to convict the defendant, regardless of the evidence. These comments could well have served to undermine the neutrality of the jury by distracting the jury's attention to either irrelevant factors or to matters of emotion and thereby divert the jury's attention from the issues in the case. (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Id., at 39-40, 797 A.2d 1138. The Appellate Court next considered whether the statements of the state's attorney were so prejudicial as to require a new trial. The Appellate Court concluded: Viewing the trial as a whole, including the [state's attorney's] remarks that were the subject of the defendant's unpreserved claims ... the [state's attorney's] ... arguments were so egregious that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. First, the record in this case discloses numerous instances of misconduct ... that were in no way invited by the conduct or argument of the defense. Next, the improper conduct was severe and frequent as demonstrated by the fact that the [state's attorney] displayed extraneous items, including the blue tinted sunglasses and a badge, and introduced the concept of the `blue code' [of silence] in his [closing and rebuttal] arguments. The [state's attorney] continued on this improper course by offering his opinion that the seasoned officers' testimony was unbelievable, that the rookie officers' testimony was believable and that the seasoned officers were responsible for failing to help [Wilson]. [The state's attorney] also posed hypotheticals involving extraneous facts and suggestions to the jurors to encourage them to relate to [Wilson]. Furthermore, the improper comments directly addressed the critical issue in this case, [namely] the credibility of the witnesses. The state's case relied primarily on the credibility of the witnesses. Moreover, the trial court failed to provide any additional curative measures beyond the general instruction regarding the fact that closing arguments are not evidence. Accordingly... the egregious prosecutorial misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Id., at 40-41, 797 A.2d 1138. In light of this conclusion, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.