Opinion ID: 60402
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Remand is Unwarranted To Correct Any Alleged Error in the District Court's Denial of COA

Text: Haynes presents two independent arguments alleging error in the district court's sua sponte denial of COA. First, he contends the district court cannot sua sponte deny a COA, and second, he contends the district court did not provide a sufficient statement of reasons for its denial of COA. The first argument is without merit. We have clearly held that the district court's denial of COA sua sponte is perfectly lawful. Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir.2000). In Alexander, we also suggested that a district court's sua sponte denial of COA was proper, in part, because [the petitioner] points to no legal support for his contention that his rights were violated by the district court's sua sponte denial of COA without prior briefing and argument by counsel. Id. In his second argument, Haynes specifically contends that the district court's sua sponte denial violates the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 22(b)(1) because it does not supply adequate individualized reasons for its denial. Haynes contends that because of this violation, the district court's sua sponte denial is improper. Rule 22(b)(1) states, [i]f an applicant files a notice of appeal, the district judge who rendered the judgment must either issue a certificate of appealability or state why a certificate should not issue. (emphasis added). We have not explicitly ruled on what is required under Rule 22(b)(1), but other Circuit courts have rejected pro forma blanket denials. In Herrera v. Payne, 673 F.2d 307, 307 (10th Cir.1982), the Tenth Circuit vacated a blanket denial of a COA even though the denial referred to the extensive analysis in the court's decision to deny habeas relief. See also Brown v. Booker, 622 F.Supp. 993, 994 & n. 2 (E.D.Va.1985). In accordance with the Tenth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit has more recently held in Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir.2001), that even after setting forth reasons denying habeas relief, the district court must also give individualized consideration to each claim under Slack, 529 U.S. at 483, 120 S.Ct. 1595, in its denial of COA. Even assuming arguendo that we should follow these persuasive authorities, and find that the district court violated Rule 22(b)(1) by not stating individualized reasons in its denial of COA, [1] Rule 22 does not necessarily require us to remedy a violation by vacating the district court's defective issuance or denial of COA and remanding the case back to the district court. See 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3968.1 n.8 (2d ed. 2007) (Appellate Rule 22(b) does not provide any clear answer to the consequences of a district court's failure to provide an adequate statement of the reasons for denying a certificate of probable cause.). Other Circuit courts have indicated that an appellate court may choose to excuse a procedural violation with regards to an allegedly defective COA determination rather than remand the case and, thereby, delay appeals. See Davis v. Borgen, 349 F.3d 1027, 1028 (7th Cir.2003) (Only when the motion to vacate is made early enough to produce savings for the litigants  and even then only when issuance of the certificate was an obvious blunder, so that the court of appeals need not traverse the same ground twice ... does it make sense to entertain a motion to vacate a certificate.); Frazier v. Huffman, 343 F.3d 780, 788-89 (6th Cir. 2003). In this case, the district court's memorandum opinion comprehensively explains the district court's rationale for denying habeas relief, and the memorandum opinion supporting the denial of habeas relief provides the reasons for the district court's denial of COA. Moreover, the parties have fully briefed the important issues on appeal. Accordingly, circumstances do not warrant vacating the district court's decision denying a COA, so we decline to do so. See Frazier, 343 F.3d at 788-89. Such a remedy would only delay the judicial process and frustrate the legislative purpose, i.e., facilitating appellate review, underlying the COA mechanism. See Davis, 349 F.3d at 1028.