Opinion ID: 4544635
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Alleged Intervening Act

Text: Muller next argues that his conviction for Count I should be set aside because the evidence established that an intervening act occurred that absolved him of criminal responsibility for Brundige’s death. Because Muller distributed the drugs that the jury found resulted in the death of Brundige, Muller would 19 Case: 19-11783 Date Filed: 06/26/2020 Page: 20 of 25 ordinarily be liable under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). That statute provides that it is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally distribute a controlled substance. Fentanyl is a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(6), 812(b)(6). And if any person who distributes a controlled substance “after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final,” where “death … results from the use of such substance shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). On appeal, Muller argues that an intervening act breaks the chain of causation between his sale of the drug and the death of Brundige. 5 Specifically, he argues that Hamilton’s conduct intervened and extinguished his criminal responsibility. He argues this is so because Hamilton failed to get help for Brundige, despite knowing the drugs were toxic, and did not summon help after Brundige passed out until it was too late. Muller faces a substantial hurdle because he did not request a jury instruction with respect to intervening cause. Nor did he assert intervening cause as a basis for his motions for judgment as a matter of law. Thus, we construe Muller’s intervening cause argument—raised for the first time on appeal—as an 5 We have never decided whether there is an intervening cause exception to the death results sentence enhancement of § 841(a)(1)(C). See United States v. Rodriguez, 279 F.3d 947, 951 n. 5 (11th Cir. 2002). In this case, we can assume arguendo, but we expressly do not decide, that the intervening cause doctrine can operate to extinguish criminal liability under § 841(a)(1)(C). 20 Case: 19-11783 Date Filed: 06/26/2020 Page: 21 of 25 argument that the district court should have sua sponte granted a judgment of acquittal on the ground that Hamilton should have intervened and saved Brundige from dying as a result of the drugs that Muller sold. We construe Muller’s new argument on appeal as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. We note that ordinarily we would review a sufficiency challenge de novo. However, when a defendant did not move for a judgment of acquittal on the ground relied upon for the first time on appeal, we no longer review de novo. See United States v. Hunerlach, 197 F.3d 1059, 1068 (11th Cir. 1999) (where the defendant asserted for the first time on appeal a ground not argued in the district court in support of his motion for judgment of acquittal, we review “the district court’s decision to deny the motion for judgment of acquittal on that basis only for ‘plain error’”). In any event, we cannot conclude that there is error, much less plain error. Without objection, the district court charged the jury: The Defendant can be found guilty of the crime charged in Count One only if all the following facts are proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) The Defendant distributed a mixture of substance containing a detectable amount of fentanyl; and (2) The Defendant did so knowingly and intentionally. . . . If you determine that the Defendant distributed the controlled substance as charged in Count One, you must also determine whether [Brundige’s] death resulted from the use of the controlled substance distributed by the Defendant. To establish that [Brundige’s] death 21 Case: 19-11783 Date Filed: 06/26/2020 Page: 22 of 25 resulted from the use of the mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of fentanyl distributed by the Defendant, the Government must prove that [Brundige’s] use of the fentanyl distributed by the Defendant was the “but for” cause of her death. “But for” causation is proven when you find beyond a reasonable doubt that had [Brundige] not taken the fentanyl distributed by the Defendant, then [Brundige] would not have died. Thus, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that had Brundige not taken the drugs distributed by Muller, she would not have died. Although Muller’s counsel did not request a jury charge that Hamilton’s failure to save Brundige was an intervening cause, he did assert in his closing argument to the jury that Hamilton had caused her death. The jury rejected Muller’s argument. We cannot conclude that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support that finding. And we certainly cannot conclude that there is plain error.