Opinion ID: 774531
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 107 Lott argues that habeas relief is appropriate because the State of Ohio violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence to him concerning the following: (1) the absence of fingerprints on McGrath's car; (2) McGrath's description of his assailant and other eyewitnesses' descriptions of other possible suspects, which were at variance with his physical appearance; and (3) McGrath's ownership of an oil-burning lamp. 12 Respondent contends that all three pieces of this alleged Brady material are procedurally barred from review, and that two pieces were never raised in the state proceedings below, and as such, are unexhausted. Even if we were to set aside these procedural default and exhaustion questions, Respondent argues, Lott still would not be entitled to relief because he cannot demonstrate both that Respondent suppressed the evidence and that such evidence was material to the outcome of his case. 108
109
110 Lott contends that Respondent failed to disclose that police officers were unable to find any of Lott's fingerprints either on or inside McGrath's car, evidence that likely would have drawn into question the veracity of Deidra Coleman's testimony that Lott was the man she saw sitting in McGrath's car. Lott raised this claim on direct appeal (in the context of arguing that his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to raise this issue during the penalty phase at trial); as his sixteenth ground for relief in his state post-conviction petition; and as his second and twenty-first assignments of error in his Murnahan motion (in the context of arguing that his appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise Brady violations committed by the State). The question before us is whether Lott's direct appeal of this issue in the context of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is sufficient to save this issue from being deemed procedurally barred. As we have already noted, it does not. 111 Perhaps recognizing that this claim is procedurally barred, Lott argues that the Ohio Supreme Court's decision of Lott's fingerprints claim raised on direct appeal was a decision on the merits, which now precludes Respondent from arguing that the claim is procedurally barred. It is true that the Ohio Supreme Court, in reviewing Lott's claim, found that [t]his [fingerprint] evidence simply established that Lott's fingerprints were not found on McGrath's car. . . . [but the] mere absence of Lott's fingerprints does not refute evidence admitted at trial and is therefore not exculpatory, State v. Lott, 555 N.E.2d 293, 308 (Ohio 1990), suggesting that it reached the merits of Lott's claim. Because, however, the court's discussion was in the context of analyzing Lott's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim (and not the discrete claim Lott now raises), that discussion, without more, cannot resurrect Lott's claim. 13 Similarly, Lott's argument that his claim was revived by the Ohio Court of Appeals's decision of his Murnahan motion (and its discussion of the merits of Lott's fingerprints claim) also must fail. 112 Lott also raised this Brady claim in his petition for state post-conviction relief. He now contends that a state court reached the merits of this claim both when the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas granted Respondent's motion to dismiss, concluding that there were no substantive grounds for post-conviction relief, and when the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals found that Lott had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that there are substantive constitutional grounds for relief. Lott, 1994 WL 615012 at . 14 Lott, however, neglects the fact that the Court of Appeals, in the last reasoned decision on the subject, made an express finding that all of appellant's claims alleging pre-trial error [including the fingerprints claim] are barred by application of the doctrine of res judicata because Lott failed to raise them on direct appeal. Id. at . Accordingly, Lott's claim is without merit. 113
114 Lott argues that Respondent suppressed evidence from him concerning McGrath's description of his attacker, which Lott suggests differed significantly from his physical appearance (description-by-victim claim). Specifically, McGrath described his attacker to police, in a statement that was not introduced at trial, as a six-foot-tall, medium-build, very light-complexioned African-American man with long straight hair, who, at the time of the assault, was wearing a light-colored shirt, white-gray tennis shoes, and a cap without a bill. Lott is a medium-to-dark-complexioned African-American man, who is five feet, ten inches tall, 176 pounds, with short hair; at the time of Lott's arrest, police found light-colored tennis shoes in the trunk of his car. Lott also alleges, in what we will refer to as his other-suspects claim, that Respondent withheld from Lott: (1)other physical descriptions of McGrath's assailant that were consistent with McGrath's description; (2) evidence that a light-complexioned man informed police officers that he was wanted for questioning in connection with McGrath's death and several burglaries; (3) evidence that one of eyewitness Deidra Coleman's neighbors described the perpetrator as having a heavy build with a pot belly; and (4) evidence that McGrath told police in 1983 that he could identify the man who burglarized his home in 1983. 115 Lott failed to raise the description-by-victim claim at all in the state courts, and failed to raise the other-suspects claim either in the state courts or in his federal habeas petition, and thus, absent a showing of cause and prejudice for the defaults, is precluded from raising them now. He argued unsuccessfully before the district court that, because he raised his fingerprints claim on direct appeal (as part of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim), the instant Brady claims are not defaulted, reasoning that he fairly presented to the state courts the legal theory on which his claim was based, even if he failed to present all of the factual premises for that claim. 116 Citing Landano v. Rafferty, 897 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1990), the district court found that [p]resenting two claims under the same legal umbrella but with entirely different factual underpinnings, as here, does not constitute fair presentation to the state courts; Lott's description-by-victim claim was not the substantial equivalent of the fingerprints claim presented to the state courts, because he failed to present both the legal theory and the facts on which [his] federal claim rests. Landano, 897 F.2d at 669; see also Daye v. Attorney Gen. of New York, 696 F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 1982) (In order to have fairly presented his federal claim to the state courts the petitioner must have informed the state court of both the factual and the legal premises of the claim he asserts in federal court.). We agree with the district court that Lott's presentation of aBrady claim premised on the fingerprints issue does not permit him now to put forward other supposed Brady claims predicated on factually dissimilar premises. 117 Even if Lott's claim were not procedurally barred, he would, as the district court found, nevertheless have difficulty demonstrating that the information which forms the basis for this claim was outside, or dehors, the record at the time of his direct state court appeals, or that it became available to him only after state avenues to address it were no longer available to him. The district court rejected Lott's suggestion that the fingerprint evidence would have served to undermine the only identification of Lott at trial (Coleman's testimony) in a case that was built entirely of circumstantial evidence, reasoning that [w]hile a court could conclude that the lack of fingerprints might serve to weaken the force of Coleman's identification of Lott as the individual driving McGrath's car, the standard under the AEDPA is not whether the district court would come to the same conclusion, but whether the conclusion is debatable among reasonable jurists. Although we recognize that the applicable AEDPA standard has changed since the district court considered this issue, see Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 942-43 (6th Cir. 2000) (discussing the Supreme Court's rejection in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 408-13 (2000), of the debatable among reasonable jurists standard), we are nevertheless unpersuaded that the state court's conclusion on this point resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1). We thus reject Lott's argument. 118
119 Lott maintains that Respondent withheld evidence concerning McGrath's ownership of an oil-burning lamp, which, if presented at trial, would have called into doubt the Government's theory that McGrath did not own a lamp (and thus had no reason to own heating oil) and that Lott brought a bottle of heating oil into McGrath's house with the express purpose of using it to set McGrath on fire. Lott also argues that Respondent withheld information concerning a frayed telephone cord found near the location of McGrath's body, which McGrath's assailant allegedly used to bind and restrain him. The introduction of this evidence at trial, Lott argues, so infused the trial with unfairness as to deny [him] due process of law. Because the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court rejected this claim on the merits, he contends that it cannot be procedurally defaulted. Although Lott challenged on direct appeal the trial court's admission of this evidence on the basis that the State failed to establish its relevance, it appears that Lott never raised in state court the specific objection he raises today, and thus we are foreclosed from reviewing it. 120
121 As he has done with his other claims, Lott argues that his Brady claim may be unexhausted, but not procedurally barred, and if we do find a procedural bar, then he can demonstrate cause and prejudice to excuse that bar. Both arguments are without merit. Turning first to the cause and prejudice inquiry, we find that Lott cannot meet his burden. First, as the district court noted, Lott's counsel might reasonably have made a strategic decision not to raise this claim, particularly in light of the fact that the description provided by McGrath was not so materially different from Lott's actual appearance as to have affected the outcome of the trial. Second, the district court also observed that even if Lott's claim had been properly raised, it would have likely been rejected, both because McGrath's absence from trial made his prior description unnecessary for impeachment purposes, and because Lott's counsel successfully argued at trial that McGrath's statements were inadmissible hearsay. We agree and cannot conclude that the failure of Lott's counsel to assert this claim was an error of constitutional magnitude sufficient to establish cause for his default. 122 On the exhaustion question, as already discussed, where a habeas petitioner files a mixed petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims, a district court may deny the petition upon a finding that the petitioner has no available remedy in state court and to dismiss the petition would amount to nothing more than a futility. Such is the case here. Because Lott's claims are procedurally barred -- his attempt to argue the ineffectiveness of his counsel as cause for that bar is unavailing -- we are foreclosed from considering these claims, absent a showing that failure to do so would result in a manifest miscarriage of justice. 123
124 Even in the absence of cause and prejudice, a petitioner may overcome a procedurally defaulted claim upon a showing of actual innocence. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995); Herrerra v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993). Lott has long proclaimed his innocence in the killing of John McGrath, suggesting instead that the victim's own careless smoking was the cause of death. See State v. Lott, 555 N.E.2d 293, 302 (Ohio 1990). In affirming Lott's death sentence, the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed this explanation as an incredible hypothesis. Id. Yet the Ohio high court also acknowledged that [i]t is true that the trial court convicted Lott on circumstantial evidence. Id. Amid Lott's continued protestation of innocence, this is the most troubling aspect of the case. Although habeas review does not permit petitioners to re-try their cases in federal court, we must ensure that state convictions are supported by constitutionally adequate evidence. This safeguard is especially important when, as here, the petitioner argues that operation of procedural default rules would result in a miscarriage of justice because, according to Lott, he is actually innocent of the aggravated murder. 125 Although the parties have not argued the point, and we therefore reserve judgment on it, we should note that the evidence supporting Lott's conviction is reinforced by his interview with the Cuyahoga County Sheriff's Department on the afternoon of his arraignment. See Motion to Take Judicial Notice of State Court Proceedings, Exhibit H. The police report of the interview reads: 126 When questioned about the above incident with Mr. John McGrath he [Lott] started crying. He stated he never intended to hurt Mr. McGrath. He went over to Mr. McGrath['s] house at 7:00 A.M. sometime in the middle of July and went to the back of the house and broke out a basement window. He went into the house and found Mr. McGrath in a front bedroom on the main floor of the house. He stated that the next thing he knew Mr. McGrath was tied up. He remembers using either telephone cord or electrical wire to tie him up. McGrath wasn't in bed when this took place but doesn't remember or know why he wasn't. 127 After he was tied up he took his car keys which were on a dresser or table either in the bedroom or the room next to it and left the house and got into the car, which was in the driveway and drove off with it. He described McGrath['s] car as being a smaller model car, dark in color. 128 When asked about any type of flammable [sic] fluid or liquid being put on Mr. McGrath and then setting it on fire he stated that he didn't remember anything about that. He was asked about why he broke into Mr. McGrath's house and why did he tie him up he stated he didn't know why he broke into the house, he didn't want him to contact the police when he left the house with his car . . . . 129 When questioned about his intent in the McGrath incident he stated he didn't know. He stated he didn't intent [sic] to hurt anyone and that he didn't know what he was doing. He stated that he would do anything to keep from [going] to the [electric] chair. 130 Because Lott spoke to the interviewing detective without counsel present, defense counsel moved to suppress the statement during trial. At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor only summarized the contents of the statement to avoid biasing the trial panel. The panel then granted the motion to suppress on the authority of Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986) (We thus hold that, if police initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.). 131 Although the panel did not consider Lott's statement in convicting him, a habeas court may take it into account in evaluating his claim of miscarriage of justice due to actual innocence. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-28 (In assessing the adequacy of petitioner's showing, therefore, the district court is not bound by the rules of admissibility that would govern at trial. Instead, the emphasis on 'actual innocence' allows the reviewing tribunal also to consider the probative force of relevant evidence that was either excluded or unavailable at trial.); see also Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 320 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2577 (2001). 132 A more detailed review of the circumstances than appears in this record may show that Lott's inculpatory statement, although suppressed at trial, was voluntarily made and admits of no reason to doubt its reliability or truthfulness. Though Lott said he did not recall setting the fire that burned McGrath, the State introduced evidence of Lott's fingerprints in the victim's home, his possession of the victim's car, and a shoeprint in McGrath's bedroom that generally matched Lott's shoes. Since this issue may now be pending in state court and has not been fully briefed before us, we reach no final conclusion regarding the effect of the confession.