Opinion ID: 1192546
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: New York State Referendum Law

Text: Plaintiffs argued before the District Court that under Municipal Home Rule Law § 23(2)(b), (e) and (f), the substance of Local Law 51 could be enacted only by referendum. These subsections provide, in relevant part: Except as otherwise provided by or under authority of a state statute, a local law shall be subject to mandatory referendum if it: ... b. In the case of a city, town or village, changes the membership or composition of the legislative body or increases or decreases the number of votes which any member is entitled to cast. ... e. Abolishes an elective office, or changes the method of nominating, electing or removing an elective officer, or changes the term of an elective office, or reduces the salary of an elective officer during his term of office. f. Abolishes, transfers or curtails any power of an elective officer .... N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 23(2) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs advanced this challenge under the parallel provisions of the New York City Charter as well. [14] On appeal, however, appellants have abandoned their arguments with respect to subdivisions (e) and (f), as well as New York City Charter § 38, [15] and argue here only that Local Law 51 changes the membership... of the legislative body, as provided under Municipal Home Rule Law § 23(2)(b). [16] As noted at the outset, the New York Court of Appeals has made clear that local governments have broad power to enact local laws, and direct democracy in New York is the exception, not the rule. See McCabe v. Voorhis, 243 N.Y. 401, 413, 153 N.E. 849 (1926). Section 10 of the Municipal Home Rule Law provides that city governments shall have the power to adopt and amend local laws relating to [t]he powers, duties, qualifications, number, mode of selection and removal, terms of office, compensation, hours of work, protection, welfare and safety of its officers and employees. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10( l )(a)( l ). Indeed, the Second Department in Golden v. New York City Council, 305 A.D.2d 598, 762 N.Y.S.2d 410 (App.Div.2d Dep't), appeal denied, 100 N.Y.2d 504, 762 N.Y.S.2d 874, 793 N.E.2d 411 (2003) held that a referendum was not required to enact Local Law 27 (2002), which amended term limits and had the effect of allowing certain City Council Members to seek reelection who were ineligible under the previous term limit law and, in some instances, to serve two more consecutive years than previously allowed. The parties in that case did not, however, invoke subsection 23(2)(b) of the New York Municipal Home Rule Law. Thus, we are now faced with the question of whether plaintiffs' invocation of this subsection commands a different result than as in Golden. Appellants argue that Local Law 51 changes the membership of the City Council because it will inevitably result in the reelection of many incumbents in November 2009 who were ineligible to seek reelection under the previous term limit law. The parties do not dispute that the incumbent reelection rate in New York City is approximately 98%. Appellees offer two responses to this argument. First, they contend that the phrase membership refers to structural changes in the legislative body, not changes in the identity of the individuals who constitute it. For example, they claim that an increase or decrease in the number of seats in the City Council would constitute a change[] in membership. Second, they argue that the law in question must directly cause the change[] in membership to trigger section 23(2)(b). They contend that Local Law 51 merely permits certain incumbents to run for reelection who were term limited under the previous law, but it is the voters who will cause the change[] in membership by voting for particular candidates in the November 2009 election. New York State's jurisprudence in this area makes clear that appellees are correct in both respects. There is no case law interpreting Municipal Home Rule Law § 23(2)(b), which went into effect on January 1, 1964. There is case law, however, interpreting its predecessor, City Home Rule Law § 15(1), which provided, in relevant part, Except as otherwise provided by or under authority of an act of the legislature, a local law shall be subject to mandatory referendum if it ... [c]hanges the form or composition of the local legislative body.... N.Y. CITY HOME RULE LAW § 15(1) (repealed Jan. 1, 1964) (McKinney's 1952) (emphasis added). The only notable difference between City Home Rule Law § 15 and Municipal Home Rule Law § 23(2)(b) is that the former uses the word form where the latter uses membership. It is clear, however, that the New York State Legislature did not intend to make a substantive change in the meaning of the provision by virtue of this revision. The passage of New York Municipal Home Rule Law in 1964 consolidated several separate statutes that defined the powers of different types of municipalities. Specifically, it replaced the City Home Rule Law, the Village Home Rule Law, articles 6 and 6A of the County Law (containing general grants of local law powers to counties) and §§ 51-a though 51-f of the Town Law (containing general grants of local law powers to suburban towns). N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 58 (note). The New York Office for Local Government was assigned the task of drafting the Municipal Home Rule Law. Its stated purpose in drafting the law was to assure uniformity in governance among the various types of municipalities and to make it easier to effectuate future amendments and revisions of law ... since only one law would have to be amended rather than four. See Purpose and Scope of Mun. Home Rule Law, Memorandum of N.Y. Office for Local Gov't, reprinted in 35C McKinney's Consol. Laws of N.Y., at XI, XIII-XIV (1994); see also Analysis of the Mun. Home Rule Law, Memorandum of N.Y. Office for Local Gov't (enacted by L.1963, c. 843), reprinted in 35C McKinney's Consol. Laws of NY, at XV-XXIII (1994). Furthermore, the Municipal Home Rule Law states that it was not intended: to abolish or curtail any rights, privileges, powers or jurisdiction heretofore conferred upon or delegated to any local government or to any board, body or officer thereof, unless a contrary intention is clearly manifest from the express provisions of this chapter or by necessary intendment therefrom, or to restrict the powers of the legislature to pass laws regulating matters other than the property, affairs or government of local governments as distinguished from matters relating to their property, affairs or government. N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 50(3). With particular respect to section 23 of the Municipal Home Rule Law, New York's Office for Local Government stated: Section 23 is based on City Home Rule Law, section 15, with some clarification in the first subdivision.... With respect to matters subject to mandatory referendum, the subjects are as they appear in the City Home Rule Law provision, except that changes are made to adjust the section to the fact that it also applies to counties, towns and villages. Analysis of the Mun. Home Rule Law, 35C McKinney's Consol. Laws of N.Y., at XXI; see also Home Rule Handbook, N.Y. Office for Local Gov't, Memorandum, Constitutional Amendment Re Home Rule and Related Legislation, May 1963, at J.A. 813-15 (The procedure for adoption of local laws, the specification of types of local laws subject to referenda (mandatory or permissive), the restriction and prohibitions against the adoption of local laws would be substantially as they now are in the City Home Rule Law.). We conclude, therefore, that the New York State Legislature did not intend a substantive change by replacing the word form as used in section 15 of the City Home Rule Law with membership as used in section 23(2)(b) of the Municipal Home Rule Law. See, e.g., In re Estate of Horchler, 37 A.D.2d 28, 322 N.Y.S.2d 88, 90 (App. Div.2d Dep't 1971) ([N]o general or material change in the existing law is intended by a revision, unless the legislative design to accomplish a change is evident.) (internal citations omitted), aff'd on op. of App. Div., 30 N.Y.2d 725, 332 N.Y.S.2d 896, 283 N.E.2d 768 (1972). It necessarily follows that case law interpreting the former is persuasive as to the proper interpretation of the latter. These cases demonstrate that a law that has the effect of changing who constitutes a legislative body, as plaintiffs allege Local Law 51 will do, does not change[] the form or composition of the legislative body. In Neils v. City of Yonkers, 38 Misc.2d 691, 237 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup.Ct. 1962), the court addressed whether the changing of ward boundary lines constituted a change in the form or composition of the local legislative body under section 15(1) of the City Home Rule Law. See id. at 250-51. Even though the changing of boundary lines would appear to affect who would be elected to office, the court held that it did not come within section 15(1) of the City Home Rule Law and so did not require a referendum. See id. at 251. In Mehiel v. County Board of Legislators, 175 A.D.2d 109, 571 N.Y.S.2d 808 (App.Div.2d Dep't), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 855, 573 N.Y.S.2d 645, 578 N.E.2d 443 (1991), New York's Appellate Division addressed whether a local law passed by the Westchester County Legislature providing for the reapportionment of its legislative districts required a referendum under New York Municipal Home Rule Law § 34(4), which deals with permissive referenda in counties. Like section 15 of the City Home Rule Law, section 34(4) requires a referendum to enact any local law that changes the form or composition of the board of supervisors of such county. See id. at 809. The court held that [t]he redistricting plan under consideration merely changes the boundary lines of the legislative districts in Westchester County and does not constitute a change in the `form or composition' of the Westchester County Legislature. Id. (internal citations omitted). We find Neils and Mehiel especially instructive because redistricting has as much potential to change the individual members of a legislative body as does a change in term limits. Nevertheless, both courts decided that redistricting does not change[] the form or composition of the relevant body. This case law leads us to conclude that Municipal Home Rule Law § 23(2)(b) refers to structural changes, and not changes in the identity of the individual members who comprise the legislative body. We also find persuasive the District Court's discussion of the term membership as used in the Optional County Government Law, a New York State statute enacted around the same time as the Municipal Home Rule Law. This statute, enacted in 1961 but since repealed, provided in relevant part: If such city elects to withdraw from the jurisdiction of its civil service commission and adopt the county civil service administration, the membership of the county civil service commission shall, on the date on which such change of form of 7 administration by the city becomes effective, be increased to five members, all of whom shall be appointed by the county manager, and not more than three of whom shall at the same time be 10 adherents of the same political party. Chapter 565 (the Optional County Government Law § 1008) (1961), reprinted in LAWS OF N.Y., 184th Session, 1961, Vol. 2, at 1787 (emphasis added). As aptly noted by the District Court: It is unlikely that the legislature radically revised its understanding of the term membership between 1961 and 1963. Hence, the 1963 legislature, which passed the Municipal Home Rule Law, conceived of the term membership as referring to structural characteristics, including the number of persons in the legislative body. Molinari v. Bloomberg, 596 F.Supp.2d 546, 572 (E.D.N.Y.2009). We also find persuasive the relatively recent New York Court of Appeals decision in Mayor of City of New York v. Council of City of New York, 9 N.Y.3d 23, 842 N.Y.S.2d 742, 874 N.E.2d 706 (2007). In 2001, the City Council, over then-Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's veto, enacted Local Laws 18 and 19. Prior to the enactment of these local laws, the Mayor was required to engage in collective bargaining with City employees through one certified employee organization regarding certain matters. There was one exception: the Mayor had to bargain directly with unions representing uniformed employees, e.g., uniformed police, fire, sanitation and correction services. The 2001 local laws, however, expanded the definition of uniformed employees to include fire alarm dispatchers and emergency medical technicians. See id. at 707-09. The Mayor challenged the local laws on the ground that it was subject to a mandatory referendum under Municipal Home Rule Law § 23(2)(f), which provides: Except as otherwise provided by or under authority of a state statute, a local law shall be subject to mandatory referendum if it ... [a]bolishes, transfers or curtails any power of an elective officer. See id. at 710. The Court rejected the Mayor's challenge, reasoning: The requirement of a referendum for legislation that curtails any power of an elective officer must be read as applying only to legislation that impairs a power conferred on the officer as part of the framework of local government. For example, a local law limiting the power of New York City's Mayor to appoint commissioners, or to prepare a budget, or to create or abolish positions within his executive office would require a referendum (see N.Y. City Charter §§ 6, 8[f]; § 225[a]). But, as a general rule, a law that merely regulates the operations of city government, in collective bargaining or in some other area, is not a curtailment of an officer's power.... So here, the Mayor's power in the New York City governmental structure is unimpaired. A local law prescribing a procedural rule for collective bargaining is not an encroachment on the Mayor's role in City government. The limitation on his freedom to act is merely a consequence of legislative policymaking. By contrast, the cases the Mayor relies on all involved limitations on an elected officer's structural authority. Id. at 711 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, the New York Court of Appeal's analysis clearly emphasizes Municipal Home Rule Law § 23(2)'s concern with structural changes made by law, as opposed to an incidental consequence of a law. Based on these authorities, we agree with appellees that the term membership as used in Municipal Home Rule Law § 23(2)(b) refers to the structural characteristics of the legislative body. A structural change to the membership might occur, for example, where a law directly increases or decreases the number of seats in the legislative body. [17] Local Law 51, however, affects only an incumbent's eligibility to seek reelection. Even assuming, arguendo, that the term membership as used in the statute refers to the specific individuals constituting a legislative body, as appellants suggest, Local Law 51 does not trigger Municipal Home Rule Law § 22(2)(b) because it does not directly change the membership; rather, the election results in November 2009 will cause this change. See Lane v. Johnson, 283 N.Y. 244, 28 N.E.2d 705 (1940). In Lane, the Village of Peekskill, which was part of the Town of Cortlandt, decided to form its own city, the City of Peekskill. It drafted a charter with that effect, which provided, inter alia, for the election of two supervisors who were defined thereunder as City officers. See id. at 710-11. Under New York law at the time, [t]he supervisors of the cities ... in each county, when lawfully convened, [were also] the board of supervisors of the county. See id. at 711 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, when the two supervisors were elected as Peekskill City officers, they also became members of the Board of Supervisors of the county, thereby increasing the number of supervisors on the county Board. See id. The plaintiffs argued that the Peekskill charter violated New York law prohibiting any law which ... changes the form or composition of the elective body of such county ... without adoption by the electors of such county.... See id. The Court of Appeals rejected the argument, writing: [The City of Peeskill] has not by the special or local law ... changed in any manner any provision of law which fixes the form of county government of Westchester or the form or composition of any elective body. It has merely exercised its power to incorporate a city[;] and by force of the provisions of the general law which determines the form or composition of the Board of Supervisors, city officers become members of the Board of Supervisors and thus the number of members of the Board of Supervisors is increased. Id. at 712. As in Lane, Local Law 51 is not what works the change in the membership of the City Council. Rather, any effect caused by Local Law 51, although real, is indirect. The change will be caused by the November 2009 election results. Local Law 51 affects only certain candidates' eligibility to seek reelection. It is of no moment that a number of formerly term-limited Council members will likelyindeed, almost certainlywin reelection because of the opportunity afforded them by Local Law 51. The City's argument in this regard appears to us to be unassailable: If merely changing the likelihood that particular individuals will serve in the future constitutes `changing' the Council's membership or composition, then a host of other legislation with similar spillover effects campaign finance changes, for one examplewould also need voter approval. Brief for Defendants-Appellees Michael R. Bloomberg, et al. at 4. This conclusion is consistent not only with Lane but also with the redistricting decisions in Neils and Mehiel. Clearly redistricting is likely to have the ultimate effect of changing who will run and sit in a legislative body, but New York courts have held it does not require a referendum. For all the reasons discussed, we hold that section 23(2)(b) of New York Municipal Home Rule Law does not require a referendum to enact Local Law 51. We decline appellants' invitation to certify the interpretation of this provision to the New York Court of Appeals. Despite our discretionary authority to certify, certification is an exceptional procedure, to which we resort only in appropriate circumstances. McGrath v. Toys R Us, Inc., 356 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir.2004) (citing Krohn v. N.Y. City Police Dep't, 341 F.3d 177, 180 (2d Cir.2003)). In the past, we have certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals only where there is a split of authority on the issue, where the statute's plain language does not indicate the answer, or when presented with a complex question of New York common law for which no New York authority can be found. Riordan v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir.1992). These circumstances are not present here. We are confident as to how the New York Court of Appeals would rule on this issue in light of the presumption of representative democracy in New York, the plain meaning of the statute, its legislative history, the holdings in Neils and Mehiel, the meaning of the term membership as used in the Optional County Government Law § 1008 and the New York Court of Appeals decisions in Mayor of City of New York v. Council of City of New York and Lane v. Johnson . Conversely, there is a complete absence of authority suggesting that the New York Court of Appeals would hold that section 23(2)(b) is triggered by Local Law 51. [18] Accordingly, we perceive no benefit from certifying this question to the New York Court of Appeals because we are in a position to conclude with sufficient certainty what it would hold. That is, New York Municipal Home Rule Law § 23(2)(b) does not require a referendum to enact Local Law 51.