Opinion ID: 1394134
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: denial of city's motions for directed verdict and judgment n.o.v.

Text: The City finally contends that its motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted since there was no evidence from which the jury could find that it was negligent or that there was a causal link between the design of the accident site and the collision between Garcia and Lawton. The standard for granting motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is the same as that for motions for directed verdict set forth supra; the moving party asks the court to rule, as a matter of law, that there was insufficient evidence upon which a jury could find in the non-moving party's favor. In making such motions, the moving party admits the truth of all the non-moving party's evidence, as well as all legitimate inferences drawn therefrom. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986). Our standard of review on appeal is the same. Id. When viewed in a light most favorable to the Lawtons, we cannot say that the evidence in this case is such that reasonable minds could not differ concerning the issues of the City's negligence and causation. Evidence was presented from which the jury could find that the City was aware that the accident site presented safety concerns and that it made plans to implement design changes to remedy the problem. There was also evidence that such design changes would have prevented the maneuver attempted by Garcia and thereby prevented the accident. Accordingly, we hold that, based on the evidence in the record, the district court did not err in denying the City's motions for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.