Opinion ID: 1822610
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cases Interpreting Similar Language

Text: No Florida court has interpreted the precise language at issue. We have, however, considered similar language. In Container Corp., we noted that if an insurer had wished to limit an additional insured's coverage to vicarious liability it could have included language similar to that used in Consolidation Coal: Had Maryland wished to limit Container's coverage to vicarious liability, it could have done so by clear policy language. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 406 F.Supp. 1292 (W.D.Pa.1976) (construing coverage language as insuring the additional insured for vicarious liability). Container Corp., 707 So.2d at 736. In Consolidation Coal, a coal company hired a hauler to transport various coal products. As part of the contract, the hauler made the coal company an additional insured on its liability insurance policy. The endorsement covered the coal company, but only with respect to acts or omissions of the named insured. During the contract term, a coal company train nearly struck an employee of the hauler. The company settled the employee's subsequent claim and sought indemnification from the insurer. The insurer denied coverage, arguing that the endorsement limited coverage to the coal company's vicarious liability for the hauler's acts or omissions. A federal district court agreed, holding that [t]he most likely meaning of the subject phrase is that it attempts to limit coverage to those instances where the acts or omissions  the negligenceof [the named insured] leads to [the coal company's] liability. 406 F.Supp. at 1300. We approved this analysis in Container Corp. and confirm that view today. Courts from other jurisdictions have interpreted similar language to arrive at the same result. See Vulcan Materials Co. v. Casualty Ins. Co., 723 F.Supp. 1263, 1264-65 (N.D.Ill.1989) (holding that the phrase any other person or organization but only with respect to his or its liability because of acts or omissions of an insured is plainly a vicarious liability provision and nothing more); Sprouse v. Kall, 2004-Ohio-353, ¶¶ 3, 9, 2004 WL 170451 (Ohio Ct.App. Jan. 29, 2004) (an unreported Ohio opinion holding that the phrase but only with respect to [its] liability because of acts or omissions of an insured is intended to protect [the additional insured] from vicarious liability for the acts or omissions of . . . the primary insured); Transp. Ins. Co. v. George E. Failing Co., 691 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tex.App.1985) (holding that the clause any person or organization but only with respect to his or its liability because of acts or omissions of an insured only covers an additional insured's liability for negligence of a named insured). The additional insured provisions in Consolidation Coal, Vulcan, Sprouse, and George E. Failing, are nearly identical to the clause at issue. As Garcia and the Eleventh Circuit point out, however, the clause in each of these cases includes the words but only, while the policy here does not. Garcia argues that the absence of but only renders Federal's policy ambiguous. We disagree. Again, the phrase because of in the policy is relevant. As one court has explained, there is a more circumscribed meaning to because of than merely being a sequential link in the chain of events. . . . The phrase appears to include persons or organizations held in by way of vicarious liability for derelictions of [the named insured]. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 76 Misc.2d 832, 350 N.Y.S.2d 967, 972 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1973). [1] We agree with this assessment. The omission of the words but only in Federal's policy does not materially change the limitation of the additional insured provision to instances of vicarious liability.