Opinion ID: 2637056
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Constitutionality of certain features of California's death penalty law

Text: Defendant asserts that several features of this state's capital sentencing scheme violate the federal Constitution, but we have repeatedly rejected similar contentions. Thus, contrary to defendant's argument, section 190.2 does not fail to perform the constitutionally required narrowing function by virtue of the number of special circumstances it provides ( People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1179, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384) or because of the breadth of the felony-murder special circumstance ( People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1265-1266, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475). Nor is defendant's death sentence invalid because of prosecutorial discretion in determining whether to seek the death penalty. ( People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1078, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68.) The death penalty law is not unconstitutional for failing to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravating factors, factors in support of a finding that aggravation outweighs mitigation, or that death is the appropriate penalty. ( Ibid. ) Nor is the law constitutionally infirm because it does not require intercase proportionality review. ( Ibid. ) [10] Section 190.3, factor (a) is not unconstitutionally vague. ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750.) Written findings concerning aggravating factors the jury has found to be true are not constitutionally required. ( People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1078, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68.) The jury's use during the penalty phase of unadjudicated criminal activity, as permitted by section 190.3, factor (b), does not render a sentence unreliable ( Kraft, supra, at p. 1078, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68); consistent with that general rule and our previous decisions, the presentation of evidence of the Wanda B. incident did not violate collateral estoppel principles or the double jeopardy provisions of the federal and state Constitutions, because dismissal of a charge, whether by plea bargain or otherwise, is not the equivalent of an acquittal within the meaning of section 190.3. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1375, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) Nor did the doctrine of laches, the applicability of which to a capital sentencing determination defendant fails to establish, preclude the prosecution from presenting that evidence. (See People v. Harvest, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 652, 101 Cal. Rptr.2d 135; People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 772, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2 [neither remoteness nor expiration of the limitations period is a bar to presentation of unadjudicated criminal activity pursuant to ง 190.3, factor (b)].) The inclusion in the section 190.3 list of potential mitigating factors of such adjectives as extreme (ง 190.3, factor (d)) neither acts as a barrier to the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence ( People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 479, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442), nor renders the factor unconstitutionally vague, arbitrary, or incapable of principled application ( People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1138, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450). Finally, section 190.3 and related jury instructions are not unconstitutional because they do not inform the jury that certain sentencing factors are relevant only in mitigation of penalty. ( People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 564, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420.)