Opinion ID: 203863
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Objectively Unreasonable Standard for Purposes of Habeas Review

Text: Although we have identified several gaps in the SJC's analysis, we are mindful that on habeas review under AEDPA we are not permitted to grant a writ if we merely disagree with the jury verdict or if we identify an error in the SJC's reasoning. The relevant inquiry is whether the SJC was objectively unreasonable in upholding the conviction. We once again acknowledge the extremely high bar that must be overcome on habeas review to overturn a state court decision; however, that bar is not insurmountable and on rare occasions we have held a state court decision to be objectively unreasonable. See, e.g., White, 399 F.3d at 25 (holding on habeas review that state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence where state court barred petitioner from cross examining complainants regarding prior accusations). This court has identified certain guidelines that it finds useful in analyzing sufficiency claims on habeas review. [22] In addition, we note that although we evaluate the state court decision in light of Supreme Court precedent, we are not precluded from looking at other federal court decisions that may help guide us in applying the Jackson standard. Indeed, `[d]ecisions from the lower federal courts may help inform the AEDPA analysis to the extent that they state the clearly established federal law determined by the Supreme Court.' Evans, 518 F.3d at 10 (alteration in original) (quoting Aspen v. Bissonnette, 480 F.3d 571, 574 n. 1 (1st Cir.2007)). This is especially true when `factually similar cases from the lower federal courts' can `provid[e] a valuable reference point' when considering the reasonableness of a state court's application of Supreme Court precedent to a particular set of facts. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Rashad v. Walsh, 300 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir.2002)). Under § 2254(d)(1), we are not constrained in our ability to draw from any legal source in determining whether the state court's decision rests on constitutional error or is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. [Section 2254(d)(1)] only limits the grounds on which habeas relief may be granted. Id. With this in mind, we look to a recent case, Newman v. Metrish , where the Sixth Circuit held a state court ruling to be objectively unreasonable on grounds that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to support a prosecution for murder of a known drug dealer. 543 F.3d at 797. In Newman, the prosecution presented evidence at trial that the petitioner planned to rob drug dealers for drugs or money; that the victim was a known drug dealer who kept drugs in his freezer; that the petitioner and the victim were known to engage in drug transactions in the past; that the victim's freezer was open and empty after he was killed; and that the petitioner had a motive for the killing because he had seen the victim make a pass at the petitioner's girlfriend. Id. at 794. Furthermore, the prosecution presented evidence supporting an inference that Newman had possessed and once purchased the murder weapon. Id. This evidence included forensic evidence and the fact that the petitioner's friend saw a gun similar to the murder weapon in the petitioner's home a few weeks prior to the murder. [23] Id. In analyzing the evidence under Jackson, the Newman court stated that even when consider[ing] all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there remains reasonable doubt because we are limited by what inferences reason will allow us to draw. Id. at 797. It remarked that these limitations included its ability to infer only that [the petitioner] intended to rob a drug dealer and knew that [the victim] was a drug dealer, that a gun previously owned by [the petitioner] was used to kill [the victim], and that a similar looking gun was seen in [the petitioner's] home approximately two weeks before the murder. Id. The Newman court added that even assuming that [the petitioner's] gun was indeed the one used in the homicide, there was no evidence of what happened to it between that date and the date of the homicide, and we need not speculate as to what might have happened. Id. The Newman court reasoned that while there was a wealth of information showing that [the petitioner] owned the gun, evidence placing [the petitioner] at the scene was conspicuously absent. Id. at 797. It pointed to the fact that there was no eyewitness testimony and the police did not recover any fingerprints from the crime scene. Id. The Newman court stated that [w]ithout additional evidence placing [him] at the scene of the crime, there is only a reasonable speculation that [the petitioner] himself was present. Id. It concluded that where the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution creates only a reasonable speculation that a defendant was present at the crime, there is insufficient evidence to satisfy the Jackson standard. Id. Accordingly, the Newman court declared the state court ruling an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Id. While Newman 's reasoning certainly does not control our analysis, it is significant that our sister court ruled a state court decision to be objectively unreasonable under Jackson on facts more probative of a petitioner's guilt than what we have here. For example, O'Laughlin, like the petitioner in Newman, was not connected to the crime scene by forensic evidence or eyewitness testimony; however, unlike the petitioner in Newman who had prior business dealings with the victim in that case, O'Laughlin had minimal contact with the victim apart from a few casual conversations and a maintenance call. Moreover, the petitioner's robbery motive in Newman was consistent with the evidence  as the victim's freezer, which was his storage place for drugs, was open and empty. [24] In the instant case, however, O'Laughlin's alleged motive of robbery to satisfy his need for crack cocaine does not align with the fact that nothing of value was taken from Mrs. Kotowski's apartment or with how savagely she was beaten at the hands of her assailant. Lastly, in Newman, the petitioner owned a gun whose spent cartridges and bullets matched those found in the victim's body. Here, the aluminum baseball bat that O'Laughlin owned was merely consistent with Mrs. Kotowski's injuries, in the same way a metal pipe or some other long, sturdy object would be consistent with her injuries. Another decision from a sister court also informs our analysis as to whether the SJC unreasonably applied the Jackson standard. In Juan H. v. Allen , the Ninth Circuit held that the state court decision was objectively unreasonable because there was insufficient evidence to conclude that a juvenile petitioner aided and abetted a principal in committing first-degree murder and first-degree attempted murder. 408 F.3d at 1278-79. In Juan H., the state court had concluded that the petitioner had manifested consciousness of guilt because he `fled from the crime scene; he attempted to leave his home with his family after the shooting; and he gave a false alibi to the police that he was in a trailer and not present during the shooting. Id. at 1277. Also, as motive evidence, the state court cited petitioner's gang gestures towards the victim and the fact that the petitioner had punched the victim on a prior occasion. Id. With respect to the evidence of flight, the Juan H. court reasoned that [n]o reasonable trier of fact could find evidence of criminal culpability in the decision of a teenager to run home from the scene of a shooting, regardless of whether the home was in the same general direction as the car of a fleeing suspect. Id. The Juan H. court added that [l]ikewise, any rational factfinder would find little or no evidence of guilt in the fact that [the petitioner] attempted, along with the rest of his family, to leave his home as it was being surrounded by an angry mob of neighbors. Id. Regarding the false alibi, the Juan H. court remarked that it was bare conjecture to regard the petitioner's untrue statements to the police as reflective of consciousness of guilt. Id. The court explained that the petitioner might have made a false statement to law enforcement for any number of reasons, especially given that any statements he made as a witness would likely be used to prosecute his older brother, a member of his immediate family. Id. The Juan H. court stressed: Although we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution, a `reasonable' inference is one that is supported by a chain of logic, rather than, as in this case, mere speculation dressed up in the guise of evidence. Id. Finally, the Juan H. court stated that the prosecution's motive evidence was mere conjecture, reasoning that the interpersonal tensions between the petitioner and the victim do not create a sufficiently strong inference of motive to allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that [the petitioner] had reason to aid and abet first-degree murder. Id. at 1278. The Juan H. court maintained that [s]peculation and conjecture cannot take the place of reasonable inferences and evidence  whether direct or circumstantial  that [the petitioner]  through both guilty mind and guilty act  acted in consort with [the principal]. Id. at 1279. Applying the Jackson standard to the state court decision, the Juan H. court ruled that only speculation ... supports a conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of aiding and abetting the first-degree murders. Id. It concluded that [s]uch a lack of evidence violates the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee that an accused must go free unless and until the prosecution presents evidence that proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-68, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). Admittedly, the facts in Juan H. do not line up precisely with those of the instant case. However, we find instructive the Juan H. court's treatment of its consciousness of guilt evidence. [25] The Juan H. court held that the petitioner's lies about his presence at the crime scene and the fact that he fled the area were insufficient to support an inference that he aided and abetted the murderer, reasoning that a conclusion regarding the petitioner's guilt from this evidence would be no more than bare conjecture. The evidence in Juan H. is far more reflective of consciousness of guilt than what we have here. Unlike the petitioner in Juan H., O'Laughlin was not caught in a lie about whether he was present at the crime scene and did not flee the scene of the crime. In fact, O'Laughlin approached the police just minutes after the attack. [26] Similar to the Juan H. court's reasoning, this consciousness of guilt evidence constituted bare conjecture regarding O'Laughlin's guilt and thus renders the SJC decision that relied primarily on this evidence, objectively unreasonable. We reiterate that Juan H. and Newman, while not controlling, powerfully illustrate how federal courts, acting under the AEDPA regime, can hold in appropriate circumstances state court decisions to be objectively unreasonable when applying Jackson. Our sister courts' reasoning in these cases underscore why we believe habeas relief should be granted in the instant case. Our holding is further bolstered by a post-AEDPA case of our own, Leftwich v. Maloney , where a petitioner claimed there to be insufficient evidence for a state court to correctly identify him as the perpetrator of the offense for which he was convicted. See Leftwich, 532 F.3d at 21. Although we held that habeas relief was not warranted in Leftwich, it is helpful to consider the factors we considered relevant. In Leftwich, the petitioner argued that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that he was a principal rather than an accessory to the murder of a bishop who had taken the petitioner in when he was released from prison. Id. In holding that there was sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict, the Leftwich court considered that the petitioner confessed to being in the same place, a ditch, within minutes of when the murder occurred; that the police recovered from the petitioner a Leatherman tool whose length and width were consistent with the victim's wounds; that he embarked on a wide-ranging cleaning spree shortly before his arrest; that forensic evidence included fingerprint evidence and the victim's blood on the petitioner's clothes and hands; that the petitioner lied about having any knowledge of the victim's death; that the petitioner's motive resulted from the victim's disapproval of the petitioner's use of company credit card to satisfy a gambling debt; and that the record [was] barren of any evidence as to who besides the petitioner could have inflicted the fatal stab wounds. Id. at 25-27. We note the many distinguishing features of the instant case as compared to Leftwich. Specifically, unlike the petitioner in Leftwich, there was no physical or forensic evidence linking O'Laughlin to the crime scene; O'Laughlin's financial motive was inconsistent with the evidence in Mrs. Kotowski's apartment; and O'Laughlin presented compelling third-party evidence that Mr. Kotowski was the actual assailant. We recognize that the stronger evidence supporting the petitioner's guilt in Leftwich, when compared to the present case, is not persuasive by itself to render the evidence insufficient here. However, the fact that the instant facts satisfy very few of the criteria the Leftwich court considered relevant in its Jackson analysis, provides additional support for our conclusion here that the SJC's decision to reinstate the conviction was objectively unreasonable. We acknowledge the many strands of circumstantial evidence the prosecution has presented in this case; however, when viewing this evidence in its totality, as we must do on habeas review, that evidence is far from sufficient to establish O'Laughlin's guilt under Jackson. Based on the record before us and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution, we hold that it would be overly speculative to conclude O'Laughlin to be the assailant beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we conclude that the SJC's decision to uphold O'Laughlin's conviction was objectively unreasonable.