Opinion ID: 4557156
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: When reviewing claims that the evidence at trial was insufficient, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 8 Though the federal cases discussing venue are not strictly analogous, they support the same proposition, as they focus on the conduct constituting the crime, rather than the defendant’s intentions. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. at 279 (emphasizing that “[a]s we confirmed just last Term, the ‘locus delicti of the charged offense must be determined from the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it.’ In performing this inquiry, a court must initially identify the conduct constituting the offense (the nature of the crime) and then discern the location of the commission of the criminal acts.”) (quoting Cabrales, 541 U.S. at 6–7) (emphasis added). 9 Our cases certainly mention the defendant’s “intent” at times. See, e.g., Ford, 616 A.2d at 1253 (noting that “Ford’s conduct was intended to interfere with the integrity of the judicial process in the District of Columbia”). However, the cases do so in the context of discussing what the integral components of particular offenses are and determining where those elements occurred. 14 of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The evidence need not compel a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or negate every possible inference of innocence. See Collins v. United States, 73 A.3d 974, 985 (D.C. 2013). “When two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.” Kruse v. District of Columbia, 171 A.2d 752, 753 (D.C. 1961). After reviewing the trial record, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction. Appellant first argues that the government did not prove that he “knowingly” communicated false information to the MPD. See Barrie v. United States, 887 A.2d 29, 32 (D.C. 2005) (“D.C. Code § 5-117.05 makes it a crime to give false information to the police knowing that information to be false.”) “Knowingly means that [appellant] acted voluntarily and on purpose, not by mistake or accident.” Jones v. United States, 813 A.2d 220, 224–25 (D.C. 2002). “[T]he law permits a court to find [appellant’s] knowledge of the falsity based on reasonable inferences from concrete facts in evidence.” Willgoos v. United States, 228 A.2d 635, 636 (D.C. 1967) (parentheses omitted). 15 The government presented concrete facts from which a reasonable fact finder could infer appellant knowingly made a false report to the MPD. First, surveillance video contradicted appellant’s claim that the youth struck him with a closed fist on the right side of the head. The video revealed that the youth touched appellant on the shoulder and that appellant then fell to the floor and lay there as if unconscious. Contrary to his report, appellant was never struck in the head. The trial court also noted that the video showed appellant holding the left side of his face, but he would not have been holding that side of his face had he been hit on the right side as he reported. Officer Tran and Detective Bank both testified that they stood close to appellant while he made his report. However, neither observed any physical injury or other indication that the youth hit appellant in the head. Though appellant claims his medical records prove he suffered a head injury and corroborate his testimony, the trial court noted that the records were not persuasive because they were general discharge instructions that did not include a medical professional’s analysis. 10 Thus, a reasonable fact finder could infer from the government’s evidence that appellant knowingly filed a false police report. 10 Appellant also argues that Officer Tran’s handwritten notes, which read “swelling,” corroborated appellant’s testimony that he was hit in the head. (continued…) 16 Appellant also complains that the trial court did not give “any weight” to his consistent testimony and the other evidence he offered at trial. However, the trial judge clearly considered appellant’s evidence and testimony but determined that she “did not find the report credible and the testimony credible from the defendant.” “It is the role of the trial court to assess the credibility of witnesses, and this court will not reverse a credibility finding unless it is clearly erroneous or lacking evidentiary support.” Bolanos v. United States, 938 A.2d 672, 685 (D.C. 2007). Appellant has not met this standard. Appellant next contends that the evidence showed he was indeed assaulted — that the youth committed either attempted-battery or intent-to-frighten assault when he touched appellant’s shoulder. See McGee v. United States, 533 A.2d 1268, 1270 (D.C. 1987) (explaining the two different types of assault). But, as the trial court noted, even if the touch on the shoulder technically was an assault, this was not the event reported by appellant. (…continued) However, at trial, Officer Tran testified that he did not remember why he wrote down the word “swelling.” 17 Appellant perhaps asserts that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the underlying assault was a “matter or occurrence” of which the MPD was “required to receive reports” or “conduct an investigation.” However, appellant has forfeited this argument for two reasons. First, he did not present it to the associate judge reviewing the magistrate judge’s decision. See Bradley v. District of Columbia, 107 A.3d 586, 593 (D.C. 2015) (noting that “absent extraordinary circumstances, a defendant ordinarily must present in his [motion for review] all the issues to be raised [on appeal] or else forego their consideration later by this court”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, this argument is presented too perfunctorily to warrant our consideration. See, e.g., McFarland v. George Washington Univ., 935 A.2d 337, 351 (D.C. 2007) (“Issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.”). Appellant mentions this argument within a single sentence on appeal. In addition, that sentence is located in appellant’s jurisdictional argument and never clearly presented as an argument contesting sufficiency of the evidence. Thus, appellant has forfeited this argument. 11 In sum, we hold that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction. 12 11 Appellant never urged the trial court to acquit him on this basis. However, the trier of fact was aware that attacks that occur on correctional officers in the District’s juvenile facilities are punishable under D.C. Code § 22-405, and the offense may be tried in the Superior Court, even if the assault did not occur at a (continued…) 18