Opinion ID: 1745172
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A.R.E. 803 (25) (A) and the Confrontation Clause

Text: Testimony of witnesses as to what the boy had said about the appellant was admitted pursuant to A.R.E. 803 which provides: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: . . . . . (25) (A) A statement made by a child under ten (10) years of age concerning any act or offense against that child involving sexual offenses, child abuse or incest is admissible in any criminal proceeding in a court of this State, provided: 1. The Court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the statement offered possesses a reasonable likelihood of trustworthiness using the following criteria: a. the age of the child b. the maturity of the child c. the time of the statement d. the content of the statement e. the circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement f. the nature of the offense involved g. the duration of the offense involved h. the relationship of the child to the offender i. the reliability of the assertion j. the reliability-credibility of the child witness before the Judge k. the relationship or status of the child to the one offering the statement l. any other corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the statement m. any other factor which the Court at the time and under the circumstances deems relevant and appropriate 2. The proponent of the statement shall give the adverse party reasonable notice of his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement. 3. If a statement is admitted pursuant to this Section the Court shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury to determine the weight and credit to be given the statement and that, in making the determination, it shall consider the age and maturity of the child, the nature of the statement, the circumstances under which the statement was made, and any other relevant factors. 4. This Section shall not be construed to limit the admission of an offered statement under any other hearsay exception or applicable rule of Evidence.... The appellant's argument is that in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), the Supreme Court said the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment requires, as a prerequisite to making an exception to the hearsay rule, that the witness whose out-of-court statement is to be discussed, i.e., the declarant, be unavailable and that there be adequate indicia of reliability of the statement. The appellee points out that in this case the boy was not unavailable. In Ohio v. Roberts, supra , the question was whether the testimony taken at a preliminary hearing could be used at the trial in the absence of the witness. After a general discussion of the history of the hearsay rule exceptions in the context of the Confrontation Clause, in which it was noted that both unavailability of the witness and indicia of reliability of the statement are required, the court said: In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. In this case the witness was present at the trial. He was also available for the equivalent of cross-examination, as the court allowed the appellant to call him as a hostile witness even though his testimony was favorable to the appellant. If we were to terminate this portion of the opinion at this point, we might be interpreted as suggesting that in any case where the witness is present for the trial his prior out-of-court statements may be substituted for live testimony as long as there are indicia of reliability of the prior statement. We do not mean to do that. In United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986), the Supreme Court considered whether the hearsay rule exception permitting admissibility of out-of-court statements of co-conspirators made in the course and furtherance of the conspiracy could be admitted despite the availability of the witnesses in question. The claim there, as here, was that Ohio v. Roberts, supra , required unavailability of the witness as a prerequisite to any exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Court said that case was hardly to be interpreted as a wholesale revision of the law of evidence, and that the unavailability requirement did not apply with respect to every exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Court noted that the unavailability requirement applied in situations where the testimony of the witness at the trial was to be the same as it had been when given out of court. Obviously the better testimony would be that given live, and cross-examination could then be much more meaningful. However, where the testimony in court can be expected to be substantially different from that given out of court, as in the case of a co-conspirator whose out-of-court statement was surreptitiously obtained, the reason for the unavailability requirement disappears. The question then becomes solely whether there are sufficient indicia of reliability to make an exception to the hearsay rule. With a touch of understatement, the Supreme Court observed: When the Governmentas hereoffers the statement of one drug dealer to another in furtherance of an illegal conspiracy, the statement often will derive its significance from the circumstances in which it was made. Conspirators are likely to speak differently when talking to each other in furtherance of their illegal aims than when testifying on the witness stand. Even when the declarant takes the stand, his in-court testimony seldom will reproduce a significant portion of the evidentiary value of his statements during the course of the conspiracy. [106 S.Ct. at 1126] We find the same reasons apply to permit admissibility of the out-of-court statements of an alleged child abuse victim as applied to admit the statements of the alleged co-conspirators. One of the witnesses who testified as to the boy's out-of-court statements accusing the appellant was a psychologist. As abstracted by the appellant, his testimony included the following: It is not unusual for children who have been sexually abused to recant. Often children that have been abused, when they become aware of the implications, coming forward and talking about the sexual abuse, quite often they will recant. Some of the implications which they become aware of are going to court, changes that it causes in the family, and the pain they perceive they are causing other family members. The appellant has not argued that the boy's statements lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. We quote the psychologist's testimony solely for the purpose of showing it was his expert opinion that a child is likely to recant a statement about being abused sexually by a family member. Thus, in view of the common prospect, and here the known reality, of a great difference between trial testimony and out-of-court statements of the alleged victim, the unavailability requirement does not apply in this case any more than it did in United States v. Inadi, supra . Although the appellant's primary argument under this point is the one about unavailability, he also contends that the application of A.R.E. 803 (25) (A) in this case gave the prosecution an undue advantage not available in other cases as it permitted it to prove the crime by hearsay evidence and that that violated his rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. No authority is cited for this second proposition under this point, thus we will not address it. Dixon v. State, 260 Ark. 857, 545 S.W.2d 606 (1977). Should this become an issue upon retrial, we refer the parties and the court to Note, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1745 (1983); Note, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 806 (1985); and Note, 13 Pepperdine L. Rev. 157 (1985).