Opinion ID: 2544894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: dessaure's penalty phase claims

Text: Dessaure claims that the trial court erred in finding that Dessaure's trial counsel was not ineffective for (1) failing to move for a competency determination after Dessaure waived the presentation of mitigation evidence to a penalty phase jury; and (2) failing to present the mitigation testimony of Dr. Michael Maher at his Spencer [5] hearing. Because Dessaure has failed to prove that his counsel's performance was deficient or that the deficient performance prejudiced him, we affirm the trial court's denial of relief. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Dessaure first claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing Dessaure to waive his right to a jury in the penalty phase without ordering a competency hearing. Dessaure particularly relies on language contained in the forms he signed in waiving a penalty phase jury, namely that Dessaure joined the State in seeking the death penalty. Dessaure claims that this language is extraordinary and proves that he should have been given a second competency hearing. We disagree. Florida law provides that a defendant must be given a competency examination only if the court or defense counsel has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is not mentally competent to proceed. Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.210(b). Once a defendant has been deemed competent, the presumption of competence continues throughout all subsequent proceedings. Boyd v. State, 910 So.2d 167, 187 (Fla. 2005) (citing Durocher v. Singletary, 623 So.2d 482, 484 (Fla.1993)). A subsequent competency hearing is only required if a bona fide question as to the defendant's competency has been raised. Id. (citing Hunter v. State, 660 So.2d 244, 248 (Fla. 1995)). If there is no reason to suspect that a defendant is incompetent, then it cannot be deficient performance if counsel does not request a competency examination. Nixon v. State, 932 So.2d 1009, 1020 (Fla.2006) ([T]rial counsel had no reason to request a competency determination [because defendant] had been examined by a mental health expert who did not give trial counsel any reason to delve further into competency.). Here, defense counsel was not ineffective for not requesting an additional competency hearing for Dessaure. Prior to the beginning of trial, Dr. Maher evaluated Dessaure for competency and concluded that Dessaure was competent to stand trial and to make penalty phase decisions, even in light of his posttraumatic stress disorder and history of suicide attempts. In addition, three of Dessaure's defense attorneys, Messrs. Cobb, Schwartzberg, and Watts, testified at an evidentiary hearing regarding their confidence in Dessaure's competency. Mr. Cobb testified that he could not recall anything about the results of that examination that suggested Dessaure was not competent to stand trial and assist counsel. Mr. Schwartzberg stated that he stood by Dessaure's decision to waive his right to a penalty phase jury because Dessaure gave a considerable amount of thought to the waiver and that all three talked to Dessaure about it. Mr. Watts testified that he consulted Dr. Maher about the penalty phase, and both believed Dessaure was competent to make waiver-type decisions. Mr. Watts further testified that he spent roughly thirty hours with Dessaure discussing the case, Dessaure's background, and the penalty phase, and that Dessaure consistently maintained that he did not want a penalty phase. The record also shows that the trial judge engaged in multiple colloquies with Dessaure to confirm that his waivers were knowing and voluntary, that Dessaure understood his right to present mitigation evidence, and that his decision not to present mitigation was against his attorneys' advice. In sum, nothing in the trial proceedings raised a bona fide question about Dessaure's competency. We also disagree that the language contained in the signed waiver was extraordinary or by itself draws Dessaure's competency into question. The record makes clear that Dessaure's lawyers explained to him on multiple occasions that he should reconsider his decision to waive mitigation. His attorney was prepared to present mitigation and also proffered the mitigating circumstances in court. Dessaure had many opportunities to change his mind regarding mitigation. Therefore, the waiver was nothing extraordinary, but rather a signed acknowledgement of the possible result of his actions. Accordingly, defense counsel cannot be rendered ineffective for not requesting additional competency testing when Dessaure waived his right to present mitigation.
Dessaure next claims that his counsel was ineffective for not presenting the testimony of Dr. Maher at the Spencer hearing. We disagree. The law is well-established that a competent defendant may control decisions pertaining to his defense, including the presentation of mitigation evidence, and that counsel will not be rendered ineffective for following a competent defendant's wishes. See Hamblen v. State, 527 So.2d 800, 804 (Fla.1988) ([I]n the final analysis, all competent defendants have a right to control their own destinies.). Here, Dessaure repeatedly made it clear that he did not want to present mitigation to a penalty phase jury. Yet, despite Dessaure's insistence that he did not want a penalty phase and despite his lack of cooperation, Dessaure's defense counsel investigated all possible mitigation in preparation for the penalty phase. Defense counsel then proffered the mitigation to the trial court, including that Dr. Maher diagnosed Dessaure with posttraumatic stress disorder arising from childhood trauma within his family and that as a result of that disorder, at the time he committed the crime, he would have had difficulty conforming his behavior to the requirements of the law and would have been under extreme emotional disturbance. After each proffer of mitigation testimony, the trial judge asked Dessaure if he understood that this testimony could be used to establish a mitigating factor for the court to consider, and also if he understood that by not allowing counsel to present any evidence to support this proffer, the court would not consider it in sentencing. To each question, Dessaure answered that he understood. Dessaure also reaffirmed his decision not to present any evidence to support the mitigation and not to present any legal argument against any aggravating circumstance. After each proffer of mitigation, Dessaure was asked whether he was continuing to exercise his right not to present evidence of mitigation; and he insisted that he was. Later, at his family's prompting, Dessaure decided that he did want to present some mitigation at his Spencer hearing. As a result, defense counsel presented the mitigation testimony of Mary Parent, the mother of Dessaure's child, and Louise Randal, Dessaure's grandmother. Dessaure also testified on his own behalf and asked the judge to impose a life sentence. Thereafter, defense counsel informed the court that Dessaure waived his right to present any additional testimony or evidence, and the following exchange took place: Court: What are you waiving now, Mr. Watts? Defense Counsel: Judge, further evidence. I have advised Mr. Dessaure that we've prepared a complete penalty phase and that we've proffered some and then we've presented some evidence. We could have asked this Court for more time to present Dr. Mayer or anybody else on the witness list. And that is the purpose of the waiver. Court: So, Mr. Dessaure, at this point you're waiving your right to present any additional testimony or evidence at this time; is that right? Dessaure: Yes, sir. Then, Dessaure signed a written waiver stating that (1) he was aware that additional mitigating evidence existed and could be presented to the trial court as evidence; (2) he understood that the mitigation that was proffered was not evidence that could be weighed by the trial court; (3) his attorneys had advised him that they would be glad to call additional witnesses and present additional evidence and that the court would likely allow the presentation of evidence; and (4) [h]aving been advised of the above, and understanding, I hereby waive presentation of additional mitigation and rely on the record as it stands, for the Court's consideration of my sentence. In sum, Dessaure's counsel was prepared and proffered all mitigation at a sentencing hearing, including the findings of Dr. Maher. When Dessaure changed his mind about presenting some mitigation at the Spencer hearing, defense counsel presented the testimony of Ms. Randal and Ms. Parent. Mr. Watts then informed the trial court that he could also present the testimony of Dr. Maher, but that Dessaure did not wish to present additional mitigation. And Dessaure signed a waiver acknowledging as much. Defense counsel cannot be ineffective for following Dessaure's direction under these circumstances. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of this claim.