Opinion ID: 1784508
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: purpose of discovery

Text: Importantly, this Court has consistently held that Florida's criminal discovery rules are designed to prevent surprise by either the prosecution or the defense. Their purpose is to facilitate a truthful fact-finding process. Kilpatrick v. State, 376 So.2d 386, 388 (Fla.1979). In Kilpatrick we explained: Florida's criminal discovery rules are designed to prevent surprise by either the prosecution or the defense. Their purpose is to facilitate a truthful fact-finding process. Discovery under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220 is commenced by service of a demand for discovery by the defense on the State. The rule imposes a continuing mandatory duty on the prosecution to disclose certain specifics, including the names of prospective witnesses. Once having invoked this procedure, the defense must also affirmatively respond by disclosing certain information to the prosecution including the names of prospective witnesses. Both sides are entitled to rely on full and fair compliance with the rule in preparing their cases for trial. Id. This Court has held that the chief purpose of our discovery rules is to assist the truth-finding function of our justice system and to avoid trial by surprise or ambush. See, e.g., Evans, 770 So.2d at 1182. Because full and fair discovery is essential to these important goals, we have repeatedly emphasized not only compliance with the technical provisions of the discovery rules, but also adherence to the purpose and spirit of those rules in both the criminal and civil context. See Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So.2d 1310, 1314 (Fla.1981). This Court has explained that the rules of discovery are intended to avoid surprise and trial by `ambush.' Binger, 401 So.2d at 1314. In Binger, we emphasized that the search for truth and justice can be accomplished only when all relevant facts are before the judicial tribunal. Those relevant facts should be the determining factor rather than gamesmanship, surprise, or superior trial tactics. Id. at 1313 (quoting Dodson v. Persell, 390 So.2d 704, 707 (Fla.1980)). Moreover, in Binger, this Court declared: The argument that the possibility of being ambushed by an unlisted impeachment witness encourages truthful testimony reflects an outdated methodology for ascertaining the truth at trials. It lacks the solid foundation on which courts should alone build exceptions to general discovery principles. Moreover, the logic of the proposition is fairly disputable. The listing of contradictory witnesses whose impeachment testimony can be discovered by interrogatory or deposition provides equal assurance that trial testimony will be accurate and truthful. Id. at 1314. Following our lead, the district courts of appeal have also interpreted Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.360(b), which requires disclosure of the reports of expert witnesses, to also require the disclosure of a substantial reversal of such an opinion. For example, even when no explicit duty to supplement discovery existed under the rules of civil procedure, this Court and the district courts have repeatedly emphasized that litigation should no longer proceed as a game of `blind man's bluff.' Jones v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 297 So.2d 861, 863 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). As the Second District noted in Jones: [I]t's now rudimentary that the primary purpose of pretrial discovery is twofold: (1) to discover evidence relevant and pertinent to the triable issues pending before the court, and (2) if in written form to serve, of itself, as evidence at trial if otherwise admissible. Jones, 297 So.2d at 863. Similarly, as this Court concluded in Evans, the Fourth District has pointed out, in finding error in a litigant's failure to disclose a change in an expert's opinion, [a] party can hardly prepare for an opinion that it doesn't know about, much less one that is a complete reversal of the opinion it has been provided. Office Depot, Inc. v. Miller, 584 So.2d 587, 590 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). The Fourth District concluded: While judicial economy may have been served by adhering to the decision made at trial to deal with the problem, justice is ultimately better served even if a new trial must be held to insure fairness to the litigants. The trial court's action here sends out a strong message to those who do not adhere to the code of fair play advanced by Binger. Serious violations of the pretrial disclosure rules may result in the exclusion of important evidence, and may, in extreme circumstances, lead to the grant of a new trial. Id. at 591. Moreover, the Fourth District in Office Depot emphasized, relying on Binger, [p]arties who fail to make such disclosure do so at their peril, depending on the circumstances of the particular case. Id. Of course, the policy of avoiding trial by ambush or surprise has even greater application in the criminal context, where the stakes are much higher and the obligation of the State to see that justice is done is much greater than that of the private litigants in a civil dispute. [3] Indeed, the United States Supreme Court long ago made clear: The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore . . . is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. . . . He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor  indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). These words seem especially appropriate to the circumstances before us today. Under our discovery rules and our case law, we conclude that the Fifth District was correct in its determination that the State committed a discovery violation when it failed to disclose to Scipio a material change in the State investigator's deposition statement. Further, the Fifth District's reliance on our decision in Evans is consistent with our case law stressing disapproval of trial by ambush. The State's calculated failure to inform the defense of the important and dramatic change in testimony of its medical examiner's investigator not only violated the prosecutor's duty not to strike foul blows, but undermined the very purpose of the discovery rules as set out by this Court in Kilpatrick and Evans, since the State was fully aware that the defense intended to rely heavily on the testimony of the State's investigator and would be completely surprised by the witness's changed testimony at trial.