Opinion ID: 2088220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inadequate Preparation in Violation of DR 6-101(A)(2)

Text: The Hearing Committee concluded that Respondent had violated DR 6-101(A)(2) (inadequate preparation) because the complaints in three of the civil lawsuits were found to have been extremely poorly pleaded and legally deficient, even glaringly so in many respects, and because no competent lawyer could have filed such pleadings. . . without a lack of preparation. . . . While the Hearing Committee's conclusion is justified, the Board rests its determination of a violation of DR 6-101(A)(2) on a more focused evaluation of Respondent's conduct. In the Board's view, Respondent's inadequate preparation is established by clear and convincing evidence consisting of (1) the complaint filed in the MSPB case plus Respondent's explicit admission that in the MSPB case he attempted to file . . . a Bivens-type action, [9] (2) the testimony of Respondent's Office Manager that the complaint in the EEOC case was filed exactly as drafted by Respondent's client, [10] and (3) Respondent's testimony that he knew without any research that his client's claims in both the MSPB and EEOC complaints were improper. [11] A Bivens-type action is one based on the Supreme Court's opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). There, the Court held that the complaint stated a federal cause of action for damages based on allegations that federal narcotics agents had entered and ransacked Bivens' apartment, manacled him in front of his wife and children, and threatened to arrest the entire family, all without a warrant and in plain violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court, however, expressly noted that it was not deciding whether these federal officials had immunity from civil suit. Seven years later, in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), the Supreme Court addressed the immunity issue that had been left open in Bivens and expressly held (1) that administrative law judges and others exercising agency adjudiciatory functions are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for their judicial acts and that [t]hose who complain of error in such proceedings must seek agency or judicial review pursuant to authorized procedures for appeal, id. at 514, 98 S.Ct. at 2915; (2) that government officials who are responsible for the decision to initiate or continue a proceeding subject to agency adjudication are entitled to absolute immunity for damages liability for their parts in that decision, id. at 516, 98 S.Ct. at 2916; and (3) that an agency attorney who arranges for the presentation of evidence on the record in the course of an adjudication is absolutely immune from suits based on the introduction of such evidence. Id. at 517, 98 S.Ct. at 2916. The complaint filed by Respondent in Oliver v. Merit System Protection Board named as defendants the Board and all of its then current members, plus the former chairman of the U.S. Civil Service Commission; this complaint alleged in conclusory fashion that the defendants' final decision upholding Mr. Oliver's discharge was without due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment and unlawfully deprives plaintiff of liberty and the pursuit of happiness without due process, and denied plaintiff the right to a full due process adversarial hearing. As Judge Johnson observed in her opinion in the MSPB case, Respondent could have pursued his client's cause by seeking judicial review of the Board's decision, pursuant to authorized procedures for appeal, but Respondent did not do so. Instead, Respondent filed the MSPB lawsuit seeking inter alia $6 million in alleged damages, and it was summarily dismissed because the defendants had immunity from a Bivens-type complaint which Respondent was allegedly pursuing. Once again, Respondent argues that he cannot be guilty of inadequate preparation because the complaint in MSPB was prepared by his client, Mr. Oliver. Assuming arguendo that Mr. Oliver prepared the complaint and even insisted that it be filed exactly as Mr. Oliver typed it, Respondent cannot so easily escape his responsibility for observing the Disciplinary Rules. Respondent filed the MSPB complaint and then in argument before Judge Johnson expressly undertook to defend its substance as a Bivens-type complaint. A lawyer competent in a Bivens-type claim either knew, or with minimum preparation should have known, that all of the defendants in the MSPB case were performing judicial-type functions and had absolute immunity from any Bivens-type claims. Indeed, in his testimony at the disciplinary hearing, Respondent expressly acknowledged that he didn't have to do any research to know that what Mr. Oliver wanted with EEOC and suing Merit System Protection Board was improper. [12] Respondent's argument appears to be that he was aware of these legal deficiencies but was pursuing them at the insistence of his client in order to establish new law. The Hearing Committee rejected this argument on the ground that there was no evidence, e.g., no time records, legal memoranda, or even testimony, that would cast any doubt on the conclusion that Respondent gave little or no attention to the framing of Oliver's claims. Hearing Comm. Report at p. 18. The Board concurs in this assessment of Respondent's new law argument. The Board is of the further view that if Respondent had intended to pursue new law, he violated his obligation to inform the court expressly of the asserted new law basis for the civil lawsuits. Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as it existed when Respondent filed the four civil lawsuits here in question, the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading [and] that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it. Here, it is acknowledged that Respondent filed one or more of the complaints as drafted by Mr. Oliver, a non-lawyer, and Respondent may not have even read the MSPB or EEOC complaints before filing them. As the Hearing Committee found, Respondent did virtually nothing to assure the preparation of legally sufficient complaints. . . . Hearing Comm. Report at p. 19. Respondent's conduct is comparable to the violation of Rule 11 in Textor v. Bd. of Regents of North. Ill. University, 87 F.R.D. 751 (N.D.Ill.1980). There, the court imposed sanctions on the plaintiff's attorney for filing a complaint against non-resident defendants under circumstances where rudimentary principles made it clear that critical elements of the court's jurisdiction are totally lacking in this case. Id., at 753. At the very least, Respondent had an obligation to inform Judge Johnson of his new law concepts and to do so at the very outset of the litigation, rather than in the midst of oral argument on defendant's motion to dismiss. Compare, Allen v. Faragasso, 585 F.Supp. 1114, 1119 (N.D.Ca.1984) (attorney reprimanded for violating amended Rule 11 because the alleged claims were wholly without warrant in law or in any good faith argument for extension or modification of existing law.) Based on the combination of all of this evidence, the Board sustains the Hearing Committee's finding of inadequate preparation in violation of DR 6-101(A)(2). [13]