Opinion ID: 2160235
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: denial of motion to sever the charges

Text: On the Tuesday before the Thursday trial date, Dixon's counsel indicated to the trial court by telephone that he desired to make a motion to sever. The trial court was unable to hold a hearing on the record at that time. On the morning of the trial Dixon's counsel made a motion to sever the multiple counts in the indictment. Initially, the trial court stated that it did not believe that the motion was timely. The motion was made orally to the court and then denied by the trial court. SDCL 23A-8-3 states: Any defense, objection or request which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion. Motions may be written or oral at the discretion of the judge. The following must be raised prior to trial: . . . . (6) Requests for a severance of charges or defendants under § 23A-11-2. The language of the statute is broad. Dixon did alert the trial court of his desire to move for severance two days before trial. The court allowed Dixon to make the motion pretrial and orally. It would appear that the motion was timely made, or that its untimeliness was excused. The standard for review on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for severance. State v. Closs, 366 N.W.2d 138 (S.D.1985); State v. Van Beek, 88 S.D. 154, 216 N.W. 2d 561 (1974), overruled on other grounds, 273 N.W.2d 716, 722 (S.D.1978). Dixon cites to SDCL 23A-6-23 (Rule 8(a)) in support of his contention that severance should have been granted. SDCL 23A-6-23 provides: Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in separate counts for each offense, if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. SDCL 23A-6-23 sets out three grounds upon which joinder of offenses against a single defendant may be allowed. If none of the tests are met, SDCL 23A-11-2 (Rule 14) provides relief from prejudicial joinder by allowing the severance of offenses. The first test allows joinder if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character. Dixon was charged with burglary, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, petty theft, and intentional damage to property. Although this test has been broadly construed, all of these offenses do not appear to be of the same or similar character. The second test allows joinder if the offenses are based on the same act or transaction, and the third test allows it if based upon two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. All the charges relating to the burglaries committed on October 1 and October 15 would pass the second and third test but it is difficult to see how the intentional damages charges, allegedly committed on October 19th, have any connection to the other charges. Other than the facts that the October 19th charges occurred in the same community within the same month as the other offenses, and that the juvenile was to be a State's witness on all the charges, there is no connection between these charges. Nevertheless, a trend is developing that the most important consideration is whether evidence of one offense would have been admissible at a trial of the other offense, ... 1 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Joinder of Offenses & Defendants § 143 (1982); State v. Hoffman, 106 Wis.2d 185, 316 N.W.2d 143 (1982); State v. Hall, 103 Wis.2d 125, 307 N.W.2d 289 (1981); State v. McGuire, 218 Neb. 511, 357 N.W.2d 192 (1984). It seems unlikely that evidence relating to the intentional damage to property charges would have been admissible at a separate trial for the other offenses or vice versa. Regardless of the tests utilized in other jurisdictions, we have interpreted the statutes to mean that the decision not to sever is firmly within the discretion of the trial court and absent a clear showing of prejudice to substantial rights of the defendant, there is no abuse of that discretion. Van Beek, supra ; Closs, supra ; State v. Layton, 337 N.W.2d 809 (S.D. 1983); State v. Maves, 358 N.W.2d 805 (S.D.1984). In discussing the amount of prejudice sufficient to require severance of offenses, the court in Hoffman, supra noted: `Any joinder of offenses is apt to involve some element of prejudice to the defendant, since a jury is likely to feel that a [defendant] charged with several crimes must be a bad individual who has done something wrong. However, if the notion of involuntary joinder is to retain any validity, a higher degree of prejudice, or certainty of prejudice, must be shown before relief will be in order.' [citation omitted] 316 N.W.2d at 157. Dixon argues that the reading and trial of all seven counts to the jury resulted in reversible prejudice. As mentioned above, some prejudice to the defendant is likely to occur when he is charged with multiple crimes. However, this must be balanced with judicial efficiency which is the purpose of the joinder statute. Layton, supra ; Closs, supra . Dixon also argues that he was unable to adequately prepare a defense to all of these charges at the same time. The certainty of prejudice here is that Dixon essentially admitted counts I through V and denied any involvement in counts VI and VII. Additional prejudice against Dixon and in favor of the juvenile's testimony would exist on counts VI and VII when charged jointly with the other five counts. The chance of getting a fair trial on these counts is slim under these circumstances. We do not overlook the fact of acquittal on Count VII but are not persuaded by it either. The testimony of the two prosecution witnesses on Count VII was extremely inconsistent. The evidence was so poor even an otherwise unfair trial could produce a fair result of acquittal. This does not eliminate the prejudice with respect to Count VI. In this case, we are convinced that the original joinder of charges was improper under SDCL 23A-6-23 and that the denial of the motion to sever prejudiced Dixon's substantial rights. We have reviewed Dixon's final claim concerning improper indictment and conclude that it is without merit. We reverse and remand for retrials on severed charges on the second issue. MORGAN, J., concurs. HENDERSON, J., concurs with writing. MILLER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. WUEST, C.J., dissents.