Opinion ID: 2304836
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Principles to this Statute

Text: Looking at the statute, as interpreted above, we are obliged to determine if it withstands a constitutional vagueness challenge. We reiterate that there is a strong presumption against declaring a statute unconstitutional. See Gueory, supra, 376 A.2d at 836. The first element of the statute that narrows its application is the intent requirement. An individual must engage in the described conduct willfully and maliciously in order to be prosecuted under this statute. The [Supreme] Court, indeed, has recognized that the requirement of a specific intent to do a prohibited act may avoid those consequences to the accused which may otherwise render a vague or indefinite statute invalid. The constitutional vice in such a statute is the essential injustice to the accused of placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which the statute does not define and hence of which it gives not warning ... But where the punishment imposed is only for an act knowingly done with the purpose of doing that which the statute prohibits, the accused cannot be said to suffer from lack of warning or knowledge that the act which he does is a violation of law. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-02, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1035-36, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945). The additional requirement of repeatedly also narrows the statute, as explained by the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals in its discussion of its stalking statute: The word repeatedly adds to the specific intent required to commit the offense as well as the restraint law enforcement officers and prosecutors must follow. Not until a perpetrator follows or harasses a victim more than once does the conduct rise to a criminal level. Additionally, by using the words, willfully and maliciously, the legislature has provided that it is the perpetrator's intent which triggers this statute. This construction is consistent with the decisions in other jurisdictions. See Pallas v. State, 636 So.2d 1358 (Fla. App. 3 Dist.1994); People v. Heilman, 25 Cal.App.4th 391, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 422 (1994). Saunders, supra note 7, 886 P.2d at 497; see also Randall, supra, 669 So.2d at 227. Therefore, the requirements that the conduct must be done willfully, maliciously and repeatedly help define the offense so ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited, and also discourage arbitrary enforcement of the statute. Moreover, the existence of an objective standard by which to measure the victim's reaction to the perpetrator's activities can also help to eliminate any vagueness problems. See, e.g., Culbreath, supra, 667 So.2d at 162; Johnson, supra note 5, 648 N.E.2d at 670; State v. Lee, 82 Wash.App. 298, 917 P.2d 159, 167-68 (Div.1, 1996); see also M. Katherine Boychuk, Comment, Are Stalking Laws Unconstitutionally Vague or Overbroad?, 88 Nw. U.L.REV. 769, 788-89 (1994). For example, the Court of Appeals of Indiana stated that under its stalking statute: [t]he actions must not only cause the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened but must be such that would cause a reasonable person to feel so, as well. The reasonableness standards contained in the statutes provide a constraining and intelligible enforcement standard for those charged with enforcing the statute. Johnson, supra, 648 N.E.2d at 670. The Supreme Court of Kansas struck down its stalking statute because it used words such as alarms, annoys and harasses without providing definitions or an objective standard with which to measure the proscribed conduct. State v. Bryan, 259 Kan. 143, 910 P.2d 212 (1996). Some state courts have upheld their stalking statutes by reading an objective standard into the language of the statute. See Bouters, supra note 5, 659 So.2d at 238; State v. Martel, 273 Mont. 143, 902 P.2d 14, 19 (1995). The District of Columbia stalking statute provides an objective standard in its theories of liability in which a perpetrator places another person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury. While the other theories of liability, where defendant engages in conduct with the intent to cause emotional distress, do not necessarily contain such an objective requirement, we look to the definition of harassing to find a reasonable person standard: harassing means engaging in a course of conduct either in person, by telephone, or in writing, directed at a specific person, which seriously alarms, annoys, frightens, or torments the person, or engaging in a course of conduct either in person, by telephone, or in writing, which would cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed, frightened, or tormented. D.C.Code § 22-504(e). We are mindful that there is concern that this section may be read to allow prosecutions in situations where harassing seriously alarms, annoys, frightens, or torments the person, even though the victim's reaction is not reasonable. The Supreme Court in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) declared a law making it a criminal offense for three or more persons to assemble ... on any of the sidewalks . . . and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by . . . unconstitutionally void for vagueness: Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus, the ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all. As a result, men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 [46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322] (1926). Id. at 614, 91 S.Ct. at 1688. We must interpret the statute to support its constitutionality. Therefore, to avoid this potential vagueness problem, we emphasize that the definition of harassing requires that the victim be seriously alarmed, annoyed, frightened, or tormented, and that the conduct would cause a reasonable person to have such a reaction. We recognize that the statutory prohibition against causing emotional distress by following another person, does not appear to contain an objective standard: [9] Proving that the accused on more than one occasion engaged in conduct with the intent to cause emotional distress to the complainant by willfully, maliciously and repeatedly following the complainant. However, the intent requirements and the repeatedly term help to mitigate any potential vagueness problems. We also find that the term following is easily understood and is not vague. Although the issue may be a close one, we conclude that this theory of liability is not unconstitutionally vague. Construing the statute in this way, we find that ordinary people can understand what conduct is criminalized. We also conclude that the statute sufficiently limits the discretion of those who are responsible for enforcing it. Therefore, the stalking statute as interpreted here is not unconstitutionally vague.