Opinion ID: 2975451
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The ERA and the ARB Decision

Text: Under the ERA, “[n]o employer may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee” engaged in an activity protected by the statute. 42 U.S.C. 5 § 5851(a)(1). In its Final Decision and Order, the ARB stated that once the complainant reaches the hearing stage of the ERA litigation process, he “must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he engaged in activity the Act protects, that [the employer] knew about the activity, that [the employer] discharged or otherwise discriminated against him, and that his protected activity was a contributing factor in the adverse action” taken by the employer. J.A. at 126 (Final Decision at 5). Later in the Final Decision and Order, the ARB stated that: A complainant seeking relief under § 5851 must prove that his employer took an unfavorable personnel action against him in retaliation for his involvement in protected safety activity. A personnel action pertains to the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. An unfavorable or adverse personnel action means a tangible adverse employment action such as a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. As we have already indicated, to prevail, McNeill must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Crane took a tangible adverse action against him. J.A. at 134 (Final Decision at 13) (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted). The ARB denied McNeill’s complaint because it determined that McNeill failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was “terminated” and that, even if he was “terminated,” this action was not materially adverse. J.A. at 139 (Final Decision at 18). Harmonizing the language in the statute with the ARB’s language in this case, we infer that the ARB interprets the language “discharged or otherwise discriminated against” as requiring that the complainant demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered a “tangible adverse employment action.”4 4 Although we have no occasion directly to address the issue today, we are puzzled by the ARB’s interpretation of the statute. The ERA prohibits employers from “discharg[ing] any employee or otherwise discriminat[ing] against any employee.” 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(1) (emphasis supplied). Based on the plain language of the statute, it appears that the materially adverse employment action inquiry is only relevant to whether an employer’s action was “otherwise discriminat[ing],” and that if one is “discharged,” the agency may not inquire further into whether the discharge constitutes a 6