Opinion ID: 2346647
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retroactive Application of the 2001 Amendment

Text: [¶ 9] The interpretation of a statute is a matter of law that we review de novo. Hailu v. Simonds, 2001 ME 155, ¶ 8, 784 A.2d 1, 3; accord State v. Nastvogel, 2002 ME 97, ¶ 6, 798 A.2d 1114, 1117. As a preliminary matter, we must decide whether the 1999 or the 2001 version of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1202(1-B) applies to Shepley's probation. Absent clear and unequivocal language to the contrary, a statutory amendment does not affect any penalties that were incurred before the amendment took effect, nor does it apply to crimes committed prior to the time the amendment was enacted. 1 M.R.S.A. § 302 (1989); [6] Riley v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 639 A.2d 626, 628 (Me.1994). [7] [¶ 10] The 1999 version of section 1202(1-B) governs the termination of Shepley's probation because that version of the statute was in effect in 2000 when Shepley committed his crimes. State v. Hardy, 489 A.2d 508, 512 (Me.1985) (Punishment is incurred at the time of the wrongful act, as opposed to when ultimate liability for the act is imposed. Thus, the wrongdoer must be punished pursuant to the law in effect at the time of the offense.). To apply the 2001 amendment to Shepley would violate the United States Constitution, article I, section 10, and the Maine Constitution, article I, section 11, as an ex post facto application of a criminal law. See State v. Haskell, 2001 ME 154, ¶ 6, 784 A.2d 4, 8 (A criminal statute will violate these constitutional prohibitions of ex post facto legislation if ... [it] makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime after its commission ....).