Opinion ID: 884679
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the District Court err in denying Belgarde's motion to dismiss for the State's failure to preserve exculpatory evidence in the form of a videotape made at the time of his arrest?

Text: ¶ 13 The District Court denied Belgarde's motion to dismiss his DUI charge holding that the State was under no duty to make a videotape in the booking room, and, further, that Belgarde failed to show what, if any, exculpatory evidence had been destroyed. A district court's grant or denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal case is a question of law which we review de novo. State v. Brander (1996), 280 Mont. 148, 151, 930 P.2d 31, 33. ¶ 14 Citing State v. Swanson (1986), 222 Mont. 357, 722 P.2d 1155, Belgarde argues that the District Court erred by denying his motion to dismiss his DUI charge. Belgarde concedes that the State had no duty to assist him in obtaining exculpatory evidence. Nonetheless, Belgarde asserts that, just as in State v. Halter (1989), 238 Mont. 408, 777 P.2d 1313, the court should have granted his motion because the State violated his due process rights by failing to preserve videotaped evidence of his demeanor during the booking process. ¶ 15 The State responds that the State had no duty to videotape Belgarde's booking process, and, therefore, the failure to do so did not violate Belgarde's due process rights. The State further responds that Belgarde does not assert and no evidence exists that the erasure of the videotape of Belgarde in the sally port of the Sheriff's Department was done deliberately; that the videotape was material; or that he was prejudiced by the erasure. Therefore, the State argues that the District Court properly denied Belgarde's motion to dismiss. We agree. ¶ 16 A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to obtain exculpatory evidence and denial of this right is a violation of due process. State v. Sadowski (1991), 247 Mont. 63, 79, 805 P.2d 537, 546. Nevertheless, this right is only a personal right, and, therefore, police officers are not required to take initiative or even assist the defendant with procuring evidence on his own behalf. Sadowski, 247 Mont. at 79, 805 P.2d at 546. However, while the police do not have an affirmative duty to gather exculpatory evidence, the police may not frustrate or hamper an accused's right to obtain exculpatory evidence. State v. Heth (1988), 230 Mont. 268, 272, 750 P.2d 103, 105. We further explained in Heth : Only a deliberate or intentional suppression of exculpatory evidence is a per se violation of due process. To amount to a denial of due process, negligently suppressed evidence must be vital to the defense. It must be more than a mere suppression, in that the defense must show the evidence was material and of substantial use. Finally, the evidence must be exculpatory meaning it [w]ould have tended to clear the accused of guilt, to vitiate a conviction. Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215; State v. Patterson (1983), 203 Mont. 509, 512-13, 662 P.2d 291, 293. Heth, 230 Mont. at 272, 750 P.2d at 105. ¶ 17 Here, the sally port videotape of Belgarde, which showed him exiting Officer Tuttle's patrol car and walking behind the car into the booking area, was erased except for a one or two-second recording of the patrol car in the sally port. Furthermore, the video camera in the booking area was never activated, and, consequently, Belgarde was not videotaped in the booking room. Therefore, the issue in the case at bar involves both the State's failure to preserve evidence as well as the State's failure to gather evidence. That is, police officers at the Sheriff's Department failed to preserve evidence when they erased the videotaped recording of Belgarde in the sally port, and, furthermore, they failed to gather evidence when they failed to activate the videotape camera in the booking room during Belgarde's booking process. We explained the significance of this distinction in Heth. ¶ 18 Heth was arrested for drunk driving. During his booking process, police officers activated a videotape camera but failed to turn on the volume. Heth, 230 Mont. at 269-70, 750 P.2d at 104. Relying on State v. Swanson (1986), 222 Mont. 357, 722 P.2d 1155, Heth argued that he was denied due process because the audio portion of the tape may have contained exculpatory evidence providing him with a valid defense to the charge of drunk driving, and, therefore, the District Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. Heth, 230 Mont. at 270, 750 P.2d at 104. In response, we explained that while Swanson stood for the proposition that an accused has a constitutional right to obtain exculpatory evidence, Swanson did not stand for the proposition that police officers had a duty to assist in gathering exculpatory evidence for an accused. Heth, 230 Mont. at 271, 750 P.2d at 104. ¶ 19 Pointing out that a difference existed between gathering and preserving exculpatory evidence, we explained that the police officers in Swanson failed to properly preserve the exculpatory evidence of Swanson's blood alcohol level that he had procured through an independent blood test after his DUI arrest and thereby denied Swanson due process. Heth, 230 Mont. at 271, 750 P.2d at 104-05. In contrast, we explained that the police officers' administration of video and audio testing in Heth constituted gathering evidence, and, therefore, because the police officers did not have a duty to gather exculpatory evidence on Heth's behalf, they did not violate Heth's right to due process by failing to turn on the volume. Heth, 230 Mont. at 272, 750 P.2d at 105. Just as in Heth, the police officers at the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department did not have a duty to gather exculpatory evidence for Belgarde. See Heth, 230 Mont. at 271, 750 P.2d at 104-05. Therefore, their failure to activate the video camera in the booking area to record Belgarde during his booking process did not violate Belgarde's due process rights. ¶ 20 Furthermore, Belgarde's due process rights were not violated when the police officers at the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department erased a videotaped recording of Belgarde in the sally port. In this regard, Belgarde's reliance on Halter to support his argument that the State violated his due process rights by failing to preserve exculpatory evidence is misplaced. In Halter, the District Court dismissed with prejudice charges against Halter of felony theft and illegal branding of a red Limousine bull due to the State's failure to preserve exculpatory evidence when the subject bull had been sold and slaughtered before Halter's expert witness could inspect its brands. Halter, 238 Mont. at 411-12, 777 P.2d at 1315. In an affidavit filed with Halter's motion to dismiss, Halter's expert witness stated that if he had inspected a skin sample from the subject bull prior to its destruction, he could have aged the brand and determined if the brand in question was placed on the bull during time periods when Halter was not in possession of the bull. Halter, 238 Mont. at 410-11, 777 P.2d at 1315. ¶ 21 On appeal, we explained: Whatever the duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve evidence, that duty must be limited to [evidence] that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense. To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, [ see United States v. Agurs (1976), 427 U.S. 97, 109-10, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2400, 49 L.Ed.2d 342], evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. Halter, 238 Mont. at 412, 777 P.2d at 1316 (quoting California v. Trombetta (1984), 467 U.S. 479, 488-89, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2534, 81 L.Ed.2d 413, 422). ¶ 22 We affirmed the District Court's grant of Halter's motion to dismiss, concluding that the evidence destroyed had exculpatory value which was apparent prior to destruction of the evidence; that Halter could not obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means; and that an expectation existed that the lost evidence would play a significant role in Halter's defense. Halter, 238 Mont. at 413, 777 P.2d at 1316. Additionally, we concluded that the slaughter of the bull was not the intentional or deliberate purpose of the State but that the State was negligent in preserving evidence. Furthermore, given that the bull was not on Halter's land for long periods of time and that the bull was finally discovered in another person's cow herd, we also determined that the preservation of the bull was as critical to the State's case to obtain a conviction as it was to the defendant to obtain an acquittal[,] and, therefore, we distinguished the case from other cases such as Heth. Halter, 238 Mont. at 413, 777 P.2d at 1316. ¶ 23 Unlike in Halter, Belgarde has failed to show that the sally port videotape erased by the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department was exculpatory. As the State explained during the hearing on this motion, the videotape would only have shown Belgarde exit Officer Tuttle's patrol car and walk to the booking area without incident. Furthermore, Belgarde could obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. That is, Officer Tuttle was available as a witness to testify concerning Belgarde's actions and demeanor in the sally port. Finally, Belgarde has failed to show that this videotaped evidence of his actions and demeanor in the sally port would play a significant role in his defense. Therefore, although the State was negligent in failing to preserve the videotaped evidence of Belgarde in the sally port, we conclude that Belgarde's due process rights were not violated. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's denial of Belgarde's motion to dismiss.