Opinion ID: 185976
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Other Acts Evidence

Text: 19 Next, Alexander argues that the district court erred in admitting prejudicial other acts evidence at trial, namely, Young's statement on the 911 call that Alexander [has] a gun on him now. Because Alexander did not raise a Rule 404(b) objection to the introduction of the 911 call below, 11 we review his other acts challenge for plain error. See United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1390 n. 12 (D.C.Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1128, 117 S.Ct. 1271, 137 L.Ed.2d 349 (1997). 12 However, we find no error—plain or otherwise—in the district court's admission of the 911 call because Young's statement that Alexander [has] a gun on him now does not constitute other acts evidence within the meaning of Rule 404(b). 20 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the admission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts ... to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. FED.R.EVID. 404(b). Such evidence may be admissible, however, if offered for purposes unrelated to the defendant's propensity to commit crime, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Id. If the government plans to introduce other acts evidence at trial, it must, upon request by the accused, ... provide reasonable notice in advance of trial ... of the general nature of any such evidence. Id. 21 [B]ecause Rule 404(b) applies only to evidence of a defendant's ` other crimes, wrongs, or acts,' several of our sister circuits have held that the rule creates a dichotomy between crimes or acts that constitute the charged crime and crimes or acts that do not. United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 927 (D.C.Cir.2000) (emphasis in original) (collecting cases). These courts have reasoned that Rule 404(b) applies only to extrinsic evidence of other crimes and not to intrinsic evidence of the same crime. Id. at 927-29; see, e.g., United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir.) (The continuous possession of the same gun does not amount to a series of crimes, but rather constitutes a single offense.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101, 109 S.Ct. 2456, 104 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1989). Although we have recently expressed our dissatisfaction with the extrinsic-intrinsic distinction, 13 see Bowie, 232 F.3d at 927-29, we have nonetheless recognized that at least in a narrow range of circumstances ... evidence can be `intrinsic to' the charged crime, id. at 929. For example, if evidence is offered as direct evidence of a fact in issue, not as circumstantial evidence requiring an inference regarding the character of the accused, it is properly considered intrinsic. Id. (citing United States v. Badru, 97 F.3d 1471, 1474-75 (D.C.Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1150, 117 S.Ct. 1327, 137 L.Ed.2d 488, and cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1213, 117 S.Ct. 1700, 137 L.Ed.2d 825 (1997)). 22 Here, Young's statement that Alexander [has] a gun on him now constituted intrinsic, admissible evidence on the felon-in-possession charge. 14 See United States v. Bradley, 145 F.3d 889, 891-94 (7th Cir. 1998) (declarant's excited utterance during 911 call that [h]e pulled a gun on me provided relevant, probative evidence of defendant's knowing possession of firearm and ammunition); Woodfolk, 656 A.2d at 1151 n. 17 (declarant's excited utterance during 911 call that her boyfriend had gun was directly relevant to the crime at issue, linking appellant to the gun). 15 Although Alexander contends that the 911 call established only that Young knew that Alexander possessed some gun at some point, Br. for Appellant at 20, and thereby invited the jury to make an impermissible propensity inference regarding Alexander's character, the record indicates otherwise. 23 After Young told the dispatcher that Alexander had a gun, the dispatcher asked: He got a gun on him now?, to which Young responded, Yeah. Thus, as the government correctly observes, Young's statement served not [as] evidence of a prior possession, or possession at some point, but instead as evidence of [Alexander's] current possession, the possession for which [Alexander] was arrested minutes later, and for which he was charged. Br. for Appellee at 31. In other words, Young's statement provided only intrinsic evidence of the crime charged, not extrinsic evidence inviting an inference regarding Alexander's bad character. 16 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in admitting Young's statement on the 911 call that Alexander [has] a gun on him now. 17