Opinion ID: 1375796
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alternative methods

Text: The experts' testimony in the present case involved two types of evidence  scientific evidence on the procedures for determining a match between evidentiary DNA and opinion evidence concerning the experts' experience with random matches. The trial judge properly applied the Frye analysis and determined that evidence of a match is admissible. However, on the basis of the scientific evidence then available, the judge did not allow the experts to testify about the mathematical or statistical probability resulting from the match. Instead, the experts were allowed to offer evidence of their personal opinion. This testimony is governed not by the application of Frye but by Arizona Rules of Evidence 702 and 703. See State v. Roscoe, 145 Ariz. 212, 219, 700 P.2d 1312, 1319 (1984).  Frye -ing scientific evidence is necessary when application of a scientific technique is likely to have an enormous effect in resolving completely a matter in controversy. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 199, 644 P.2d 1266, 1285 (1982), quoting M. UDALL & J. LIVERMORE, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 102, at 212 (2d ed. 1982). However, when the expert gives testimony that only helps a trier to interpret the evidence ... it will be received on a lesser showing of scientific certainty. Id. As we stated in Roscoe, [t]he weight of the evidence did not hinge upon the validity or accuracy of some scientific principle; rather, it hinged on [the expert's] credibility, the accuracy of his past observation ... the extent of the training ... and the reliability of his interpretations.... Roscoe, 145 Ariz. at 220, 700 P.2d at 1320; McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 871, nn. 27 and 28 (J.W. Strong et al., eds., 4th ed. 1992). The experts in this case did not testify to conclusions based on the application of Cellmark's statistics and database but only to their own experience. Having made the DNA examination according to recognized scientific principles and finding a match at three loci, the experts claimed that because of the unique nature of each person's DNA, they had never before seen a three-loci match from unrelated individuals. On the basis of their own experience, they believed such a random match would be very uncommon. The trial judge did not err in admitting this evidence of the experts' own work and experience and the opinions reached on that basis. See Ariz. R.Evid. 702 and 703.