Opinion ID: 23000
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inverse-Condemnation

Text: 6 The district court refused to exercise diversity jurisdiction over Vulcan's Texas law inverse-condemnation claim, reasoning that our decision in Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1991) prevents the exercise of diversity jurisdiction over state takings claims. In Samaad jurisdiction was based entirely on sections 1331 and 1367; no diversity jurisdiction was present or asserted. 7 The Samaad plaintiffs claimed that grand prix automobile racing in a public park owned by the City of Dallas was so disruptive that it effected a taking of their property without just compensation. Id. at 928. The Samaad district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the federal takings claim and dismissed the state law inverse-condemnation claim, asserted under section 1367, without prejudice. Id. The Samaad plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment order but apparently did not appeal the dismissal of the state takings claim. Id. We held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the federal takings claim because that claim was not ripe for adjudication. Id. at 934-35. 8 The Supreme Court established in Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3119 (1985), that a federal takings claim does not ripen until just compensation is denied. Therefore, for a federal takings claim to become ripe, the plaintiff is required to seek compensation through the procedures the state has provided unless those procedures are unavailable or inadequate. Id. at 3120-22. The Samaad plaintiffs argued that this requirement could be satisfied by simultaneously bringing federal and state law takings claims, with the district court resolving the state claim first. Samaad, 940 F.2d at 934. We held that: 1) Williamson County could not be satisfied by simultaneously bringing federal and state takings claims; and 2) there could be no section 1367 supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim since the federal claim that provided the sole basis of supplemental jurisdiction was not ripe. Id. 9 We do not think Samaad prevents district courts from exercising diversity jurisdiction over state takings claims. Samaad was not a diversity case. Samaad apparently involved an appeal only of the district court's disposition of the federal takings claim. In contrast, Vulcan appeals only the dismissal of its state law inverse-condemnation claim. Samaad only stands for the proposition that the Williamson County ripeness requirement for a federal takings claim is not satisfied by simultaneously bringing a state law takings claim. Vulcan's position on appeal is not that it is entitled to ripen a federal takings claim by simultaneously bringing a state law takings claim. It does not appeal the dismissal of the federal takings claim. Vulcan only asks that the same rules of diversity jurisdiction apply to its state law inverse-condemnation claim as apply to any other state law claim a plaintiff might bring in diversity. 2 If diversity is lacking, the second Samaad reason precludes the district court from hearing the state takings claim-but that is not the case here for diversity is present. We hold that a plaintiff may bring a state law takings claim in federal district court if the traditional requirements for diversity jurisdiction are fulfilled. 10 This holding is consistent with Searl v. School-Dist. No. 2, in Lake Co., Colorado, 8 S.Ct. 460 (1888), in which the defendant property owner was allowed to remove after a school district sued under Colorado law to condemn his property for public use. We also recognize our agreement with the Tenth Circuit, which has held that a plaintiff may bring a state law takings claim in diversity, though apparently may not use that claim to ripen a federal takings claim brought in the same proceeding. SK Finance SA v. La Plata County, Board of County Commissioners, 126 F.3d 1272, 1276 (10th Cir. 1997). In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit misconstrued our decision in Samaad as requiring that state law takings claims be brought only in state court. As we have explained, the first reason in Samaad only forbids a plaintiff from ripening a federal takings claim by simultaneously bringing a state takings claim. We so note only because the Tenth Circuit's misconstruction was relied upon by the district court in refusing to exercise jurisdiction over Vulcan's Texas law inverse-condemnation claim. 11 The City argues that to allow a district court to hear a state takings claim in diversity is to risk the danger of a district court reviewing its own decision regarding the state claim to determine if that decision denied the plaintiff just compensation. We think that this would almost never be a problem. Assume that, to prevent res judicata from impairing its rights, a plaintiff in diversity pleads both state and federal law takings claims. The district court, properly following Samaad, dismisses the federal takings claim. Then, following our holding today, proceeds to try the state law takings claim. If the plaintiff wins, no difficulty is presented because, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the issue of damages may not be relitigated. If the state remedy is inadequate, Williamson County and Samaad allow the plaintiff to bring the federal law takings claim without first bringing the state claim. If the plaintiff loses, the doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents relitigation of any issues determined in the first proceeding. It would only be in the rarest of cases wherein the denial of compensation was due to some issue peculiar to state law that there could ever be a second trial. 3 This faint possibility is not enough to justify departure from the normal rules governing federal diversity jurisdiction over state law claims. See supra note 2. 12 Finally, it appears that under Texas law Vulcan's inverse-condemnation claim is ripe for adjudication. Trail Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Houston, 957 S.W.2d 625, 631-32 (1997). 4 Accordingly, we find that the district court erred when it dismissed Vulcan's state law inverse-condemnation claim.