Opinion ID: 2239113
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Refusal to Give Comparative Fault Instruction

Text: The defendants' last assignment of error is the trial court's refusal to give their tendered instruction to the effect that the jury could find Ann Eskew contributorily negligent. A party to an action is entitled to an instruction on a proposition of law if there is evidence in the record to support it. Mullins v. Bunch (1981), Ind., 425 N.E.2d 164, 165. Valinet and NRC contend that their tendered comparative fault instruction was supported by evidence that Ann drove by the tree every day on her way to work and was just as capable of noticing it as Valinet, but continued to take that route regardless of the risks involved. At trial, Ann stated she never appreciated the danger involved with regard to the tree. Therefore, the only evidence that might support defendants' instruction was the fact that she frequently drove by the tree. This evidence does not support the tendered instruction. While, as we have held in Section I, a possessor of land in an urban area has a duty to exercise reasonable care in inspecting and maintaining trees on his land, a passing motorist has no such corresponding duty. Ann stated that she had never noticed this particular tree and that she never appreciated any danger associated with it. Therefore, there was no legal or factual basis for imposing any possible fault on her part. The trial court properly refused this instruction.