Opinion ID: 1449891
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Credibility of Vasquez's Symptom Reporting

Text: Vasquez argues that ALJ Rogers did not properly credit her symptom reporting when she found that Vasquez's allegations as to the intensity, persistence, and limits effects of [her] symptoms were not well supported by the probative evidence and [were] not wholly credible. In evaluating the credibility of a claimant's testimony regarding subjective pain, an ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir.2007). First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. Id. at 1036 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The claimant is not required to show that her impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom she has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom. Id. (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir.1996)). If the claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of the symptoms if she gives specific, clear and convincing reasons for the rejection. Id. Vasquez testified that she is in chronic pain. She stated that it hurts to sit in chairs and hurts walking. In the pain questionnaire she filled out as part of her benefits application, she specified that she feels a stabbing pain in her back, which spreads to her legs and toes, brought on by movement and seeming to worsen when she sits or walks, everyday throughout the day. Complaints of ongoing, unrelieved pain were also recorded by her physicians and incorporated in Vasquez's medical reports. After finding that Vasquez has a back disorder which is a severe impairment, the ALJ acknowledged that Vasquez's injuries could reasonably be expected to produce some of the pain and other symptoms alleged. (Emphasis added.) This satisfied the first prong of the ALJ's inquiry regarding the credibility of Vasquez's complaints. See Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035-36. The ALJ went on, however, to reject Vasquez's allegations, stating: after carefully considering all of the medical and documentary evidence, the undersigned finds that, in light of discrepancies between the claimant's assertions and information contained in the reports of the treating and examining physicians, the allegations by the claimant as to the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his [sic] symptoms were not well supported by the probative evidence and are not wholly credible. The claimant's complaints regarding the frequency, severity and duration of her back pain and lower extremity pain are not consistent with the objective medical evidence and are generally consistent [sic] with the limitations found. This statement does not comport with the requirements laid out by the Court in Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. The ALJ did not cite any evidence of malingering, and therefore, her adverse credibility findings may only be supported by specific, clear and convincing reasons. Id. However, the ALJ made no specific findings in support of her conclusion that Vasquez's claims were not credible, other than the vague allegation that they were not consistent with the objective medical evidence. [1] To support a lack of credibility finding, the ALJ was required to point to specific facts in the record which demonstrate that [Vasquez] is in less pain than she claims. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir.1993). The Commissioner's argument that the ALJ found that Claimant's complaints were inconsistent with the findings reported by Drs. Capen and Singh is not supported by the record. The cited portion of the ALJ's opinion does discuss the findings of Drs. Capen and Singh, but the ALJ did not discuss these findings, or any specific medical evidence when she rejected Vasquez's subjective complaints of pain. [2] The Commissioner's argument that the ALJ's findings were proper under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3) and 416.929(c)(3) [3] is similarly incorrect. Both regulations deal with evidence the Commissioner should consider in determining how a claimant's symptoms may affect her capacity to function under the guidelines; neither describe what findings are required before an ALJ can reject a claimant's allegations of disabling pain. [4] In any event, it does not appear that the ALJ complied either with the requirements laid out by this Court, see Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036; Dodrill 12 F.3d at 918, or its own regulations, see §§ 404.1529(c)(3) and 416.929(c)(3), in assessing Vasquez's subjective complaints of disabling pain. The appropriate judicial response in situations where the ALJ fails to give an adequate justification for rejecting a claimant's pain testimony was first discussed in Varney v. Secretary of Health and Human Services ( Varney II ), 859 F.2d 1396, 1398-99, 1401 (9th Cir.1988). There, we adopted the Eleventh Circuit's credit-as-true rule, holding that the Commissioner must accept, as a matter of law, a claimant's subjective pain testimony if the ALJ fails to articulate sufficient reasons for refusing to credit it. Id. However, the holding in Varney II was specifically limited to cases where there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a proper disability determination can be made, and where it is clear from the administrative record that the ALJ would be required to award benefits if the claimant's excess pain testimony were credited. Id. at 1401. Since Varney II, a split in authority has developed over whether the rule is mandatory or discretionary in this Circuit. Compare, e.g., Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that when an ALJ improperly rejects a claimant's testimony regarding his limitations, and the claimant would be disabled if his testimony were credited, the testimony must be credited as a matter of law); with Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir.2003) (discussing the Circuit's conflicting case law and holding that the doctrine is not mandatory because the court has some flexibility in applying the crediting as true theory (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is not necessary for us to resolve the conflict at this time, however, because, unlike Varney II or Lester, here there are outstanding issues that must be resolved before a proper disability determination can be made. [5] See Varney II at 859 F.2d 1401 (declining to address whether the credit-as-true rule should be adopted in cases where a remand for further proceedings is required before a disability determination can be made); Lester, 81 F.3d at 834 (holding that the credit-as-true rule is mandatory, but only where the claimant would be disabled if his testimony were credited). This Court has recognized that there are other factors which may justify application of the credit-as-true rule, even where application of the rule would not result in the immediate payment of benefits. In Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1989), we compared the limited application of the credit-as-true rule in Varney II with the rule in the Eleventh Circuit, which credits the claimant's pain testimony whenever the ALJ fails to articulate its reasons for doing so. Id. at 503 (citing Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1012 (11th Cir.1987)). Without adopting a general rule, we found that, because claimant was of advanced age and had already experienced a severe delay in her application, it was appropriate to apply the credit-as-true rule in that case. Id. at 503. We applied the rule even though we remanded for a further determination of whether benefits were due, and in doing so instructed the ALJ to credit the claimant's symptom testimony. Id. at 503-04. Similar facts are present in this case. Vasquez filed her application for benefits in October 2002. At present, she is 58 years old. Further, as we noted in Varney II, the purpose of the credit-as-true rule is to discourage ALJs from reaching a conclusion about a claimant's status first, and then attempting to justify it by ignoring any evidence in the record that suggests an opposite result. Varney II, 859 F.2d at 1398. By requiring the ALJ to specify any factors discrediting a claimant at the first opportunity, the rule ensures that pain testimony is carefully assessed, and helps prevent unnecessary duplication in the administrative process. Id. For all these reasons, we follow Hammock in applying the credit-as-true rule in this instance. On remand, the ALJ is instructed to accept Vasquez's symptom testimony as true in determining whether she is entitled to benefits.