Opinion ID: 1739694
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: exclusion of testimony regarding mitigating factors

Text: Irving asserts two errors here: the limitation of testimony allowed from a teenager and a Parchman chaplain regarding Irving's change in character since he had been imprisoned; and the refusal of the trial court to allow into evidence an affidavit of Keith Givhan, offered to refute the charge of recent fabrication of his confession that he actually shot Ray. As the State points out, these issues were not raised on direct appeal. However, based on the rationale of Carrier and Smith, the refusal to allow the testimony regarding Irving's prison activities will be discussed here in light of the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Skipper v. South Carolina, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). The specific testimony offered was as follows: a teenager who had received advice from Irving attempted to testify that she had received a letter of encouragement from him. When describing the contents of the letter, a hearsay objection was made. The trial judge ruled that I think the objection is well taken for the same reasons previously mentioned. Prior to this testimony, an objection had been interposed to the previous witness's testimony on the basis of relevance. Thus, it is somewhat unclear as to whether the objection was sustained on the grounds of hearsay or relevance. Later, the same teenager witness was asked whether she thought Irving should live. An objection was sustained on the basis of that being for the jury to decide. A Parchman chaplain also testified in mitigation. When he attempted to testify about the contents of a letter he received from Irving, a hearsay objection was sustained. Irving now argues that: 1) rules of evidence are relaxed to permit introduction of mitigating evidence; 2) the contents of the letters were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but to demonstrate his sincerity in helping others; and 3) the ultimate question objection is inappropriate in the context of mitigating evidence. The defendant in Skipper was sentenced to death for the crime of rape. The prosecution was allowed to argue that, if merely incarcerated, the defendant would pose a rape threat to other inmates. However, when the defendant sought to introduce opinion evidence from two jailers and a regular visitor to the jail that he had made a good adjustment to prison life, the trial judge ruled the evidence irrelevant. The Supreme Court reversed, Justice White writing for the majority that [A] defendant's disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life in prison is itself an aspect of his character that is by its nature relevant to the sentencing determination. ___ U.S. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 1672, 90 L.Ed.2d at 8. The prosecutor's arguments made this factor particularly relevant: The relevance of evidence of probable future conduct in prison as a factor in aggravation or mitigation of an offense is underscored in this particular case by the prosecutor's closing argument, which urged the jury to return a sentence of death in part because the petitioner could not be trusted to behave if he were simply returned to prison. Where the prosecution specifically relies on a prediction of future dangerousness in asking for the death penalty, it is not only the rule of Lockett [ v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973] and Eddings [ v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1] that requires that the defendant be afforded an opportunity to introduce evidence on this point; it is also the elemental due process requirement that a defendant not be sentenced to death on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 [97 S.Ct. 1197, 1207, 51 L.Ed.2d 393] (1977). ___ U.S. ___, n. 1, 106 S.Ct. at 1671, n. 1, 90 L.Ed.2d at 7, n. 1. The first hurdle to leap in applying Skipper to this case is the factual difference: the objection here was apparently sustained on hearsay, not relevance. That point was discussed, however, in this Court's opinion in Jordan v. State, 464 So.2d 475 (Miss. 1985), where the majority opinion held that evidence of an invention of Jordan's while in jail would have been hearsay and inadmissible. Id. at 485. The second issue here is whether the prosecutor's argument in this case rose to the level of that noted in Skipper. Here, the prosecutor referred to Marion Albert Pruett as an example of what can happen to a person serving a life sentence. He also referred to the defendant's prior lifestyle as an aggravating circumstance. These arguments do not appear as prejudicial as those in Skipper. The third issue here is that Irving, unlike the defendant in Skipper, was not completely precluded from submitting mitigating evidence about his character in prison. The record reflects that several witnesses were allowed to testify for Irving, including friends, acquaintances, family members, and prison officials. Therefore, no particular type of evidence was excluded, as in Skipper  the exclusion was more that of degree. All of these factors severely weaken any argument Irving can make under the Skipper rationale. As to the exclusion of Givhan's statement, in Stampley v. State, 284 So.2d 305 (Miss. 1973), this Court held that prior consistent statements of a witness are admissible when his credibility has been attacked by proof of prior inconsistent statements for the purpose of rebuttal [cites omitted] provided the witness denies having made the alleged inconsistent statement, or admits them, but explains them. Id. at 307. See also Smith v. State, 457 So.2d 327 (Miss. 1984). Irving's attorney attempted to have Givhan's statement admitted during his direct examination. Irving cites to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, which excludes from hearsay prior statements of a witness when it is consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. Since Givhan had not yet been cross-examined at the time the affidavit was offered, his credibility had not been attacked within the meaning of Stampley, nor had he been charged with recent fabrication.