Opinion ID: 2756333
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment on Identity of Employer

Text: Parker next argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment, and on this issue we agree with him. As an initial matter, we reject Scheck Mechanical’s position, adopted by the district court, that Parker sued only Scheck Mechanical. The complaint includes multiple references to Scheck Industrial. Most significant, the complaint lists Scheck Industrial as a defendant in the caption, giving rise to the presumption that he made the company a party to the litigation. See Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551 (7th Cir. 2005) (to make someone a party-defendant, a plaintiff must identify him in the caption and arrange for service of process). Scheck Mechanical has not explained why it thought it was being sued if Parker worked for the other, “completely separate company” named in his complaint. As best we can tell, a “Scheck Industries” lawyer declared that Parker was suing only Scheck Mechanical. But that reading of Parker’s pro se complaint is both strained and unreasonable. Scheck Mechanical and Scheck Industrial shared the same registered agent, and there is no indication in the record that service of process on the latter was defective. See Mid-Continent Wood Products, Inc. v. Harris, 936 F.2d 297, 301–02 (7th Cir. 1991); Tremps v. Ascot Oils, Inc., 561 F.2d 41, 43–44 (7th Cir. 1977). True, the form Parker gave to the Marshals Service identified only Scheck Mechanical as a defend- 8 No. 13-3693 ant, but that form is only a “control document” designed by the Marshals Service. It is distinct from both the complaint and the summons. See Process Receipt and Return, U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, http://www.usmarshals.gov/process/ usm285.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2014). Even if there had been an issue with service, the appropriate remedy would have been to give Parker more time to cure any mistake. Service of process usually must be completed within 120 days, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), but that period must be extended on a showing of good cause, and may be extended even without a showing of good cause. United States v. Ligas, 549 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. McLaughlin, 470 F.3d 698, 700–01 (7th Cir. 2006). Parker demonstrated good cause by explaining his belief that the various Scheck entities were one and the same, headquartered—as their website says—at the address of Scheck Mechanical. Parker’s belief was not unreasonable. And even the EEOC apparently was led to believe that “Scheck Industries” was Parker’s employer. For completeness, we add that even if doubt remained whether Scheck Industrial was already a defendant, the district court would have abused its discretion by not allowing Parker to amend his complaint to add Scheck Industrial. Scheck Mechanical maintains that Parker never properly asked to amend because he never filed a separate motion requesting leave to amend and never submitted a proposed amended complaint. But Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), which governs pretrial amendments, does not require a stand-alone motion. See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F.3d 566, 603 (2d Cir. 2005); Elliott v. Foufas, 867 F.2d 877, 883 (5th Cir. 1989). No. 13-3693 9 We have often held that a district court may deny leave to amend when the plaintiff does not submit a proposed amended complaint, at least where the substance of the proposed amendment is not clear. See Arlin-Golf, LLC v. Village of Arlington Heights, 631 F.3d 818, 822–23 (7th Cir. 2011); Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 590–91 (7th Cir. 2009). A court need not decide in the abstract whether a proposed amendment would be sufficient or futile. In this case, however, the district court did not reject Parker’s request on that basis, and we do not see how a proposed amended complaint would have been needed to evaluate this particular request for leave to amend. The nature of the amendment was obvious: to include Scheck Industrial as a defendant and to retain Scheck Mechanical. A request for leave to amend “may be acceptable so long as it puts the opposing party on notice of the content of the amendment,” Moore v. Indiana, 999 F.2d 1125, 1131 (7th Cir. 1993), and there is no question that Scheck Mechanical had notice of the content of the amendment. Moreover, an amendment adding Scheck Industrial as a defendant would relate back to the date of Parker’s original filing. It is difficult to imagine that Scheck Industrial did not realize that Parker meant to sue his employer—whichever company that was—and Scheck Industrial would not be prejudiced by the proposed amendment. See Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538, 548–50 (2010); Joseph v. Elan Motorsports Technologies Racing Corp., 638 F.3d 555, 559–61 (7th Cir. 2011); Peterson v. Sealed Air Corp., 902 F.2d 1232, 1236–37 (7th Cir. 1990). What remains is Scheck Mechanical’s contention that it was entitled to summary judgment because it never em10 No. 13-3693 ployed Parker. We disagree, at least on the present summary judgment record. First, it may not matter which company employed Parker if, as Parker asserts, the line between the different Scheck companies is blurred. A defendant may be liable under Title VII if, by ignoring corporate formalities, its actions cannot be separated from an affiliate that employed the plaintiff. See Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 259–60 (7th Cir. 2001); Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 1999). Parker does not have overwhelming evidentiary support for the proposition that the line between the two companies is blurred. Scheck Mechanical moved for summary judgment before he had conducted discovery. But he does have some evidence, including the representation on Scheck Industries’ own website that the various Scheck entities are all one company with one “corporate headquarters.” See Contact Us, Scheck Industries, http://www.goscheck.com/ contact/index.php (last visited Dec. 1, 2014). Also, the purported lack of an employment relationship might not matter for Parker’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In some circumstances, a third party may be liable for interfering with a person’s equal opportunity to make and enforce contracts. See Shaikh v. City of Chicago, 341 F.3d 627, 630–31 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Painter’s Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350–51 (4th Cir. 2013); Harris v. Allstate Ins. Co., 300 F.3d 1183, 1197 (10th Cir. 2002). More fundamental, though, the evidence that Scheck Mechanical submitted to support its motion for summary judgment did not meet “the initial burden of proving there is no material question of fact with respect to an essential element of the non-moving party’s case.” See MMG Financial Corp. v. Midwest Amusements Park, LLC, 630 F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 2011). No. 13-3693 11 The declaration from Peach, Scheck Mechanical’s vice president of operations, also undermines the company’s claim that Scheck Mechanical and Scheck Industrial “are two separate and distinct legal entities.” Peach averred that Scheck Mechanical “has no involvement in the internal operations of Scheck Industrial.” As Parker points out, however, Peach’s assertion that the two companies’ operations are wholly separate is difficult to reconcile with his earlier declaration that his “review of the facts showed [that] Mr. Parker was terminated by Scheck Industrial … because he had made a threatening statement.” Peach has not explained how he had personal knowledge of any details of Parker’s discharge or, indeed, how he knew that Parker was employed by Scheck Industrial at all. Remember that Peach’s affidavit asserted direct personal knowledge of the facts; otherwise he could not offer admissible evidence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); Johnson v. Holder, 700 F.3d 979, 982 (7th Cir. 2012); Luster v. Illinois Dep’t of Corrs., 652 F.3d 726, 731 & n.2 (7th Cir. 2011). At the same time, Peach also asserted that he is employed by Scheck Mechanical, not Scheck Industrial. His apparent access to Scheck Industrial’s records requires at least some explanation in light of his assertion that there is no unity of interest between these two Scheck entities. Finally, we touch briefly on the timeliness of the Title VII claims. If, as Parker maintains, the clerk’s office gave him inaccurate information about the non-jurisdictional statute of limitations, he would have an argument for equitable tolling, which “is properly invoked in any case in which the court has led the plaintiff to believe that she had done everything required of her … or has misled a party regarding the steps 12 No. 13-3693 that the party needs to take to preserve a claim.” Prince v. Stewart, 580 F.3d 571, 575 (7th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (holding that district court’s mistaken advice about jurisdictional deadline for filing notice of appeal did not excuse appellant’s failure to meet deadline). But we need not decide whether these claims were timely because Scheck Mechanical has not raised this affirmative defense in this appeal. Accordingly, the judgment is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings. On remand the district court should revise the docket to add Scheck Industrial as a second defendant and direct that company to file an answer to Parker’s complaint without further delay.