Opinion ID: 1734759
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Revisions to Criminal Code

Text: Nebraska, like many other states, made significant revisions to its criminal code beginning in the early 1970's. In 1972, L.B. 8, a proposed complete revision of the Nebraska Criminal Code, first came before the Judiciary Committee. In 1977, after much study and debate, the Legislature passed 1977 Neb. Laws, L.B. 38, the framework for what is now the Nebraska Criminal Code. The only change effected by the 1977 criminal code revision on our homicide statutes was to remove from our former second degree murder statute the requirement that second degree murder is a killing done purposely and maliciously, but without deliberation and premeditation, replacing it with the requirement that murder in the second degree is causing the death of another person intentionally, but without premeditation. Compare Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-402 (Reissue 1975) with § 28-304. In contrast, the 1977 revision of the criminal code left undisturbed the requirement that malice is an element of first degree murder. Compare Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-401 (Reissue 1975) with Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-303 (Reissue 1989). In addition, the revised manslaughter statute continued to specifically require that manslaughter is a killing done without malice. Compare Neb. Rev.Stat. § 28-403 (Reissue 1975) with Neb. Rev.Stat. § 28-305 (Reissue 1989). Thus, it is clear that the Legislature, in the 1977 revision of the criminal code, contrary to the majority's assertion, was not silent as to whether malice remained an element of second degree murder. By removing malice from the statutory text of only the second degree murder statute, the Legislature acted affirmatively with the intention of changing only the second degree murder statute and eliminating malice as an element of that particular crime. The effect of this change can only be examined within the context of the entire criminal code. In 1969, the Legislature enacted Nebraska's first justification statute, the Nebraska Self-Defense Act, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-114 (Cum.Supp.1969). State v. Goodseal, 186 Neb. 359, 365, 183 N.W.2d 258, 262 (1971). Prior to that time, self-defense and other justification defenses in homicide cases were defined by the common law in this state. This court declared § 29-114 unconstitutional in State v. Goodseal, supra . In response, the Legislature immediately drafted what was then the justification statutes from the Model Penal Code into 1971 Neb. Laws, L.B. 895. Judiciary Committee Hearing, L.B. 895, 82d Leg., 1st Sess. 1-6 (April 13, 1971). This bill became law in 1972 and is currently codified at §§ 28-1406 through 28-1416. The effect of this legislation was to change self-defense and other justifications or excuses for the use of deadly force from common-law defenses to statutorily defined affirmative defenses. See § 28-1416(1). The nature of an affirmative defense is such that the defendant has the initial burden of going forward with evidence of the defense. When the defendant has produced sufficient evidence to raise the defense, the issue is then one which the State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt. See, State v. Thompson, 244 Neb. 375, 507 N.W.2d 253 (1993); State v. Connely, 243 Neb. 319, 499 N.W.2d 65 (1993). As a practical matter, the evidence necessary to raise an affirmative defense may be adduced either by the defendant's witnesses or in the State's case in chief without the necessity of the defendant presenting evidence. A defendant is not required to plead and give notice of an affirmative defense of justification or self-defense. State v. Clayburn, 223 Neb. 333, 389 N.W.2d 314 (1986). The defendant need only adduce more than a scintilla of evidence to satisfy this initial burden. State v. Stahl, 240 Neb. 501, 482 N.W.2d 829 (1992). In this context, the effect of the legislative act, which affirmatively removed malice as an element of second degree murder within a short time after the Legislature statutorily defined justification defenses, was to relieve the prosecution of an unnecessary burden in those cases where justification or self-defense was not at issue. In other words, Nebraska law intended to treat an accused who intentionally, but without premeditation, killed another as one guilty of second degree murder unless and until the accused raised the issue of just cause or excuse. Once the accused raises the issue of justification, then the burden is on the State to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of justification for the use of deadly force. Instructive on this issue is State v. McCullum, 98 Wash.2d 484, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983). The State of Washington adopted revisions to its criminal code and, in particular, its homicide statutes in 1975. In McCullum, the defendant claimed the trial court's jury instruction unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof concerning his claim of self-defense. In analyzing the statutory allocation of burden of proof as to self-defense, the Washington Supreme Court first found that under their former criminal code, the state had the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, the absence of self-defense in a murder prosecution. Washington's former first degree murder statute included the provision that a killing was murder unless it was justifiable or excusable. This language was removed by the Washington Legislature in 1975. In addition, the legislature made self-defense an affirmative defense to homicide in the 1975 revisions to Washington's criminal code. The court in McCullum reasoned that when the legislature removed the language, unless it was `excusable or justifiable' from Washington's former murder statute, it did not relieve the state of its burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a killing was without justification or excuse, when at the same time the legislature made self-defense an affirmative defense without allocating a burden of proof to the defendant. Id. at 491, 656 P.2d at 1069. As a matter of statutory construction, the Washington court presumed that the legislature did not engage in a meaningless act by removing the language of justification or excuse from the former murder statute. Thus, the court concluded that with these changes in the criminal code, the legislature intended to relieve the prosecution of the necessity of pleading the absence of self-defense. [T]he Legislature merely relieved the State of the time-consuming and unnecessary task of alleging and proving negative propositions which may not be involved in each case. Once the issue of self-defense is properly raised, however, the absence of self-defense becomes another element of the offense which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 493-94, 656 P.2d at 1070. I find the reasoning of the Washington Supreme Court to be persuasive in the instant case. It seems clear that the Nebraska Legislature, in amending our second degree murder statute, intended to remove the words purposely and maliciously and, instead, define second degree murder as intentionally (as that word must be understood within the context of the criminal code) causing the death of another, without premeditation. Moreover, the Legislature, by making justification or excuse for the use of force a statutory defense, intended to treat any intentional killing as unlawful unless the defendant, by any means possible, raised the issue of justification or excuse. If any effect is to be given the legislative act of removing malice from Nebraska's second degree murder statute, it must be that, as in Washington, the Legislature intended to relieve the prosecution of the burden of pleading and proving the lack of justification or excuse when the defendant has not first raised the issue.