Opinion ID: 849062
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the jtc's deference to the master's findings

Text: We do not believe that the JTC disputed the factual findings of the master concerning respondent's statements to the police. [12] Rather, the JTC and the master agreed that respondent had initially indicated that her relationship with Fletcher started in February 1999 and ended one month afterward, when in fact, as respondent later acknowledged, this relationship lasted from January 1998 to August 1999. Further, both the master and the JTC agreed that respondent had initially indicated that she did not speak with Fletcher on August 17, 1999, following his wife's death, when in fact, as respondent later acknowledged, she did speak with him. Nonetheless, respondent questions the JTC's conclusions of fact concerning these statements. Specifically, respondent challenges the JTC's conclusions that the statements were false in light of the master's conclusion that, because the statements were taken from a narrative of the police interview, rather than from a direct transcript of respondent's statements, the substance if not the detail of respondent's statements was accurate. [13] Respondent therefore contends that the JTC exceeded its authority in determining that the statements were false. In response to this argument, the JTC asserts that it reviews the findings and conclusions of law of the master de novo, and that the JTC is not compelled to defer to the master's findings of fact. We agree. The JTC is established by the Michigan Constitution and vested with the responsibility of determining whether to recommend to this Court that a judge be disciplined for misconduct in office ... or conduct that is clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice. Const. 1963, art. 6, § 30. Section 30(2) further provides that on recommendation of the JTC, the supreme court may censure, suspend with or without salary, retire or remove a judge for conviction of a felony, physical or mental disability which prevents the performance of judicial duties, misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform his duties, habitual intemperance or conduct that is clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice. The supreme court shall make rules implementing this section and providing for confidentiality and privilege of proceedings. Thus, pursuant to this provision, it is the JTC's, not the master's conclusions and recommendations that are ultimately subject to review by this Court. Additionally, § 30 provides that the Supreme Court shall make rules implementing the JTC's authority and procedures. Subchapter 9.200 of the Michigan Court Rules was promulgated for this purpose. As to the actual procedures in decision making, the court rules clearly indicate that the JTC has authority to review the master's findings de novo. MCR 9.221 governs the final decision of the JTC. In subsection (A) it provides in relevant part: The affirmative vote of 5[JTC] members who have considered the report of the master and objections and who were present at an oral hearing provided for in MCR 9.217... is required for a recommendation.... [Emphasis supplied.] Accordingly, all that is needed for the JTC to make a valid recommendation is that it consider the report of the master and objections, and that a five-member majority agree on the facts and the recommended discipline. Further, subsection (B) of that court rule outlines procedures with regard to the JTC's recommendation itself: The commission must make written findings of fact and conclusions of law along with its recommendation for action with respect to the issues of fact and law in the proceedings, but may adopt the findings of the master, in whole or in part, by reference. [Emphasis added.] Although this provision addresses creation of the record, its language provides further explication of the JTC's reviewing authority. The provision distinguishes between what the JTC must do, to wit, make written findings of fact and conclusions of law, and what the JTC may do, to wit, adopt the findings of the master... Court rules, like statutes, are to be interpreted in accordance with their plain meaning. Kelley v. Mich. Public Serv. Comm., 392 Mich. 660, 668, 221 N.W.2d 299 (1974); see also Neal v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 226 Mich.App. 701, 722, 575 N.W.2d 68 (1997). Giving this court rule its plain meaning, we conclude that the JTC is not compelled to defer to the master's findings of fact, but rather may review the findings of fact, and the conclusions of the master, de novo. [14] In so concluding, we agree with the JTC that respondent's statements were false and deliberately made, and with a full understanding of their implication, and we disagree with the master that such statements were inaccuracies, which did not rise to the level of judicial misconduct.