Opinion ID: 1615671
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Due Process Claim Based on Improper Resentencing in Reeves III

Text: Reeves had a life interest in connection with the imposition of the death penalty in Reeves III and was entitled to due process in the imposition of the sentence therein. See, Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, supra (holding that death penalty inmate's due process rights were not violated in clemency proceedings with majority of justices in their opinions basing due process analysis on life interest under 14th Amendment); Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. at 111 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 1723. (holding that sentencing process in capital case must satisfy requirements of due process clause of 14th Amendment which provides, `No State shall ... deprive any person of life ... without due process of law'); Gardner v. Florida, supra (holding that capital sentencing procedure must satisfy constitutional command that no person shall be deprived of life without due process of law). The underlying constitutional principle embodied in the Nebraska death penalty statutes on which Reeves relies, §§ 29-2519 to 29-2546, is that given the life interest at stake, the death penalty shall not be imposed without due process. Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, supra ; Lankford v. Idaho, supra ; Gardner v. Florida, supra . Thus, our evaluation of Reeves' claim is a due process analysis. Reeves argues, in effect, that he was denied due process when this court resentenced him to death in Reeves III. In particular, Reeves claims this court's resentencing in Reeves III denied him the trial level sentencing required by state law. Because of the life interest at stake, Reeves was denied due process if he was resentenced in violation of the sentencing procedures required by state law. Accordingly, we analyze this court's authority under state law to resentence Reeves in Reeves III. In Reeves III, this court asserted its authority under state law to resentence Reeves. The doctrine of stare decisis would ordinarily bind us to follow such decision. However, we have observed: `The doctrine of stare decisis is grounded on public policy and, as such, is entitled to great weight and must be adhered to, unless the reasons therefor have ceased to exist, are clearly erroneous, or are manifestly wrong and mischievous or unless more harm than good will result from doing so.' (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Burlison, 255 Neb. 190, 195, 583 N.W.2d 31, 36 (1998) (quoting Muller v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital, 160 Neb. 279, 70 N.W.2d 86 (1955), overruled in part, Myers v. Drozda, 180 Neb. 183, 141 N.W.2d 852 (1966)). As we further explain below, we conclude that this court's assertion of authority under state law to resentence in Reeves III was clearly erroneous. Because of the life interest and due process rights at stake, it would do more harm than good to adhere to this court's clearly erroneous decision in Reeves III. A review of the Nebraska statutory scheme regarding the state's Special Procedure in Cases of Homicide, §§ 29-2519 to 29-2546, shows that this court (1) lacked the necessary statutory authority under state law to resentence Reeves in Reeves III and (2) acted as an unreviewable sentencing panel in violation of state law, thus denying Reeves his right to due process. This court resentenced Reeves in Reeves III pursuant to the mandate of the U.S. Supreme Court in Reeves v. Nebraska, 498 U.S. 964, 111 S.Ct. 425, 112 L.Ed.2d 409 (1990), in which the U.S. Supreme Court stated, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further consideration in light of Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990). Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), made clear that when an aggravating circumstance has been found invalid, a state appellate court may reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances or undertake a harmless error analysis without offending federal constitutional principles. However, under Clemons there must be authority under state law for an appellate court to take such action. Some state appellate courts, including the Mississippi Supreme Court on remand from Clemons, have concluded that their respective state laws do not provide them with authority to carry out reweighing and resentencing. Under such circumstances, these courts have found they must remand to their state trial courts for resentencing. See, e.g., State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 858 P.2d 1152 (1993) (declining to reweigh and resentence with indication that to do so would be contrary to state law); People v. Shaw, 186 Ill.2d 301, 713 N.E.2d 1161, 239 Ill.Dec. 311 (1999) (state law does not allow for appellate resentencing without offending 14th Amendment due process rights); Stringer v. State, 638 So.2d 1285 (Miss.1994); Pinkney v. State, 602 So.2d 1177 (Miss.1992); Clemons v. State, 593 So.2d 1004 (Miss.1992) (holding that remand to trial court for jury determination for resentencing was necessary due to lack of authority for appellate court to resentence under state law; superseded by statute as stated in Cole v. State, 666 So.2d 767 (1995)). When this court resentenced Reeves to death in Reeves III, this court did not state the source of such authority under state law to do so. Rather, this court simply cited Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), as the basis of such authority and did not discuss the implications of state law. Although this court again stated in State v. Moore, 243 Neb. 679, 502 N.W.2d 227 (1993), and State v. Moore, 250 Neb. 805, 553 N.W.2d 120 (1996), that this court had authority to resentence, this court merely cited Reeves III and Clemons without analysis as to the source of such authority. That approach was clearly erroneous because it misinterpreted Clemons as providing the only authority necessary in order for a state appellate court to resentence. Clemons held that reweighing and resentencing would not offend federal constitutional principles. However, whether there was state statutory authority for a state appellate court to resentence was not analyzed by the U.S. Supreme Court because that determination was a matter of state law. As a general matter, this court, except in those cases wherein original jurisdiction is specially conferred by Neb. Const. art. V, § 2, exercises appellate jurisdiction, and such appellate jurisdiction can be conferred only in the manner provided by statute. Larson v. Wegner, 120 Neb. 449, 233 N.W. 253 (1930). Further, the Nebraska Constitution places original sentencing authority in the district courts and does not provide sentencing as one of this court's powers. Compare Neb. Const. art. V, §§ 2 and 9. The Nebraska statutory sections pertaining to the state's Special Procedure in Cases of Homicide provide specific instructions for the manner in which sentencing determinations are to be made in cases involving the possible imposition of a death sentence. These statutes create a two-tier sentencing process and differentiate between the role performed by the district court judge or a three-judge district court panel in sentencing as compared to the role of this court in reviewing that sentence. See §§ 29-2519 to 29-2546. The statutes are specific regarding the sentencing procedures, and nowhere do they give this court authority to resentence when we have found error on the part of the sentencing court that is not minor and not harmless. Section 29-2520 states that sentencing determinations following a conviction for first degree murder are to be made by the judge who presided over the trial or who accepted the guilty plea or by a three-judge panel that includes the trial judge. The decision of whether to convene a three-judge panel is left to the discretion of the district court trial judge. State v. Ryan, 233 Neb. 74, 444 N.W.2d 610 (1989), cert. denied 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 216, 112 L.Ed.2d 176 (1990). Section 29-2520(3) further provides that where the presiding judge is disabled or disqualified, the Chief Justice of the Nebraska Supreme Court shall name a panel of three district court judges to determine the sentence to be imposed. Section 29-2522 provides as follows: After hearing all of the evidence and arguments in the sentencing proceeding, the judge or judges shall fix the sentence at either death or life imprisonment, but such determination shall be based upon the following considerations: (1) Whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to justify imposition of a sentence of death; (2) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist which approach or exceed the weight given to the aggravating circumstances; or (3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. In each case in which the court imposes the death sentence, the determination of the court shall be in writing and shall be supported by written findings of fact based upon the records of the trial and the sentencing proceeding, and referring to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances involved in its determination. If an order is entered sentencing the defendant to death, a date for execution shall not be fixed until after the conclusion of the appeal provided for by section 29-2525. It should be noted that the statutory section pertaining to sentencing procedures in homicide cases utilizes the term judge or judges when referring to the sentencing judge or three-judge panel at the district court level and The Supreme Court when referring to this court. See §§ 29-2521.02 to 29-2521.04 and 29-2528 (regarding duties of the Supreme Court). Thus, the statutory sections regarding the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the determination of the sentence specifically place that role in the district court, with the judge who presided at trial included in the sentencing determination except where he or she is disabled or disqualified as provided for in § 29-2520(3), in which case a three-judge district court panel shall determine the sentence. There is no similar provision in the statutes authorizing sentencing by this court. The Nebraska Legislature did not authorize this court to perform the same function as the sentencing judge or sentencing panel. Further, the statutory sections pertaining to appellate review of death sentences provide this court with only the power to reduce a sentence of death to one of life imprisonment. See §§ 29-2521.03 and 29-2524. Thus, the powers of this court are limited. Section 29-2528 specifically provides that [i]n all cases when the death penalty has been imposed by the district court, the Supreme Court shall, after consideration of the appeal, order the prisoner to be discharged, a new trial to be had, or appoint a day certain for the execution of the sentence. Nothing in the Nebraska statutory scheme provides this court with the power to resentence a criminal defendant to death in a homicide case when we have found a reversible error in the sentencing proceedings conducted at the district court level. Rather, the only statute in which the Legislature has authorized any court to impose a death sentence is § 29-2520, which specifically states that the trial judge or a panel of district court judges makes such a determination. In Rust v. Hopkins, 984 F.2d 1486 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied 508 U.S. 967, 113 S.Ct. 2950, 124 L.Ed.2d 697, the district court sentencing panel found the existence of aggravating circumstances by a standard of proof of less than beyond a reasonable doubt. This court then reweighed the proof and determined that each circumstance was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, this court reinstated the death sentence in that case. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed on the basis that Rust had a statutory right to (1) have his trial judge or a three-judge panel consider whether aggravating facts were proved beyond a reasonable doubt and to be sentenced based on those findings and (2) have the determination of that sentencing judge or panel reviewed by the Nebraska Supreme Court. The Eighth Circuit stated that [w]hile created by state law, these are not `procedural right[s] of exclusively state concern,' they are liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1493. The Eighth Circuit further stated that [t]he whole point of the two-tier sentencing procedure is that the initial determination is reviewed by an independent appellate court. The two-tier process would be subverted if the Nebraska Supreme Court could step in and fully perform the work of the sentencing panel. Id. Following Rust, this court determined in State v. Moore, 243 Neb. 679, 502 N.W.2d 227 (1993), that this court would no longer engage in appellate reweighing, noting that any such reweighing would likely be reversible. See, also, State v. Ryan, 248 Neb. 405, 452, 534 N.W.2d 766, 796 (1995) (recognizing Eighth Circuit's holding that appellate reweighing violates a defendant's right to due process under Nebraska's death penalty sentencing statutes). Although factually different, we find the analysis in Rust v. Hopkins, supra , to be relevant to this case. In Rust, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted the importance of the two-tier sentencing scheme in Nebraska. In the instant case, significant error occurred at the first tier where Reeves' sentencing panel, inter alia, failed to consider intoxication as a mitigating factor in the deaths of both Lamm and Mesner. In ReevesIII, this court specifically stated: We are unable to determine that the weighing analysis in the minds of the three-judge panel would have been the same if [intoxication] had been factored into the balance. We do not know what weight the judges may have given this circumstance if they had found it to exist. 239 Neb. at 428, 476 N.W.2d at 837. Notwithstanding this observation, instead of remanding in order to allow the three-judge panel to consider the intoxication factor, this court made its own determination. Thus, this court was not acting in Reeves III in a manner that would merely cure a minor sentencing error; rather, as the comments in Reeves III illustrate, this court stepped into the sentencing panel's shoes by considering and weighing a factor that the panel had not considered. When this court determined in Reeves III that the error involved was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and then resentenced Reeves based on factors not considered by the sentencing panel, this court acted as an independent and unreviewable sentencing panel. This action deprived Reeves of a proper sentencing procedure before the district court, thus committing an error comparable to that which led to a reversal in Rust v. Hopkins, 984 F.2d 1486 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied 508 U.S. 967, 113 S.Ct. 2950, 124 L.Ed.2d 697. This court's action in Reeves III effectively deprived Reeves of the entire first tier of the sentencing procedures set forth by the Legislature in §§ 29-2520, 29-2521, and 29-2522, and further deprived him of the second tier of appellate review set forth in §§ 29-2521.02 and 29-2521.03. Not only is it contrary to the Nebraska statutory sentencing scheme for this court to resentence in homicide cases, it is the better rule that this court refrain from resentencing in homicide cases. As the Supreme Court of Arizona, en banc, has stated: In any capital case where additional evidence is to be received, remand is required. [W]e perform as an appellate court, not as a trial court.... Some cases will not require submission of additional evidence but only the reweighing and balancing of the evidence. Many of these cases will involve situations in which the trial judge erred with respect to aggravating or mitigating circumstances and in which there is mitigating evidence of some weight. In these cases too, remand for resentencing is the better rule. As the United States Supreme Court noted, we have an appellate task in reviewing death sentences and have placed the sentencing authority in all criminal cases, and especially capital cases, with the trial judge.... Law and policy would indicate that the trial judge should again make the [sentencing] determination.... There are important reasons for this procedural rule. First, this court's jurisdiction is appellate.... We have very limited original jurisdiction.... On appeal, in many cases it is simply impossible to determine how the trial judgewho heard the evidence and saw the witnessesevaluated and weighed that evidence and testimony. Without these imperative determinations, the aggravating and mitigating factors cannot be balanced.... Even if this court could somehow recreate the many valuable intangibles accompanying live testimony, the practicalities of our docket do not allow us to do so.... ... Other than the defendant and the attorneys, the trial judgethe one individual who received every single exhibit and heard every word uttered in court is by far a better tool of justice to determine the appropriate sentence.... .... Finally, as is often said, the death sentence is different from any other criminal penalty.... No system based on human judgment is infallible. Thus, with the death penalty, we have taken, and should continue to take, the extra stepindeed walk the extra mileto ensure fairness and accuracy in criminal cases. In light of the trial judge's unique familiarity with the facts of the case, remand is an extra step that should be taken.... State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 608-09, 858 P.2d 1152, 1211-12 (1993). Similar to the Arizona statutes, § 29-2520 provides for the trial judge to be involved in the sentencing process, whether alone or as part of a sentencing panel, as long as the trial judge is not disabled or disqualified. The Arizona Supreme Court noted that such a directive certainly reflects a legislative desire that, when possible, the same judge who personally saw and heard all of the evidence must evaluate and weigh that evidence for sentencing. 175 Ariz. at 608, 858 P.2d at 1211. As in the Arizona system, not only does this court lack statutory authority to engage in resentencing in cases involving a death sentence, we are also not the best equipped court to do so. Our state statutory scheme recognizes this. In summary, Reeves had a state statutory right to be sentenced by his trial judge or by a panel of three district judges and then had a right to have that sentence reviewed by this court. When this court resentenced Reeves in Reeves III, this court did so in contravention of state law. Given the life interest involved, such erroneous resentencing in Reeves III denied Reeves of due process. In Reeves III, this court acted as an unreviewable sentencing panel in violation of state law. Reeves III is therefore overruled to the extent it held that state law authorized this court to resentence a defendant in a homicide case, because such holding was clearly erroneous. To the extent State v. Moore, 250 Neb. 805, 553 N.W.2d 120 (1996), and State v. Moore, 243 Neb. 679, 502 N.W.2d 227 (1993), endorsed such conclusion found in Reeves III, they are disapproved. This court's resentencing in Reeves III denied Reeves of his due process right to the separate and distinct sentencing and review procedures set forth in the state statutes. Accordingly, the proper action of this court is to vacate Reeves' sentences and remand the cause to the proper sentencing authority, the district court, for resentencing.