Opinion ID: 1192797
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Evidence Sustains Charges

Text: (1) Charges of unprofessional conduct on the part of an attorney should be sustained by convincing proof and to a reasonable certainty. ( Bodisco v. State Bar, 58 Cal.2d 495, 497 [24 Cal. Rptr. 835, 374 P.2d 803]; Black v. State Bar, 57 Cal.2d 219, 222 [18 Cal. Rptr. 518, 368 P.2d 118].) Any reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, and if equally reasonable inferences may be drawn from a fact, the inference which leads to a conclusion of innocence rather than one leading to a conclusion of guilt will be accepted. ( Vaughn v. State Bar. 6 Cal.3d 847, 852 [100 Cal. Rptr. 713, 494 P.2d 1257]; Himmel v. State Bar. 4 Cal.3d 786, 793-794 [94 Cal. Rptr. 825, 484 P.2d 993].) (2) The findings of the local committee and the board are, or course, not binding on this court, which will weigh the evidence and pass upon its sufficiency. ( Black v. State Bar, 7 Cal.3d 676, 683 [103 Cal. Rptr. 288, 499 P.2d 968]; Bodisco v. State Bar, supra, 58 Cal.2d 495, 497.) Since it is difficult to pass upon the weight to be given the testimony of a witness when only the written record is before a reviewing body, it is proper to give great weight to the action of the local administrative committee which heard the witnesses and which was in a better position than the Board ... or this court to pass upon the truthfulness of the testimony. ( Browne v. State Bar, ... 45 Cal.2d at p. 170 [287 P.2d 745]; Werner v. State Bar, 13 Cal.2d 666, 676-677 [91 P.2d 881].) ( Brawner v. State Bar, 48 Cal.2d 814, 818-819 [313 P.2d 1].) (3) Under the foregoing standards we are of the view that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the charges against petitioner. Insofar as the first three counts are concerned, petitioner admittedly gave Wolden approximately three-fourths of specified fees paid him by Glidden, General Foods, and American Home Products, but in our opinion it was not adequately proven that petitioner did so with the corrupt intent of influencing Wolden's action regarding assessments upon property in San Francisco to the benefit of those companies or that petitioner even knew at the time he was representing those companies that they had property in San Francisco that was subject to assessment by Wolden. The State Bar's evidence consists primarily of the prior testimony of Newstat and petitioner's own testimony. Although the evidence discloses a number of suspicious circumstances, petitioner's explanations, if believed, exonerate him of the charges. According to the prior testimony of Newstat, after consultations with Wolden, Glidden and General Foods received reduced assessments from Wolden's office commencing in 1960, [7] and Newstat would not have allowed the reductions had the decision been his to make. Petitioner admitted having a long and close relationship with Wolden before Wolden's conviction on bribery and conspiracy charges. Petitioner also admitted doing most of the work in the Glidden franchise tax matter and yet giving Wolden most of the fee paid by that company. As appears from the recited evidence, the amount of work Wolden did on the Alameda County personal property tax matters of General Foods and American Home Products is not clearly established, but even if the amount of work he performed did not justify the percentage of the fees he received, the foregoing would constitute merely further suspicious circumstances insofar as the present charges are concerned. [8] Petitioner explained that he had an informal agreement with Wolden under which they divided evenly the fees of the cases referred to him by Wolden, although in individual cases the split might differ depending upon the work performed and Wolden's need for money and that over a seven-year period petitioner received 52 percent of the fees of cases referred to him by Wolden. It may be inferred from the heretofore recited facts that petitioner agreed to the split in order to get the referrals and out of friendship for Wolden. [9] Petitioner further explained that at the time he represented the three companies concerning the franchise tax case in Sacramento and personal property tax matters in Alameda County he did not know that they were filing concerning property in San Francisco. Although the board found that he knew of those companies' property in San Francisco that was subject to assessment by Wolden, there is no direct evidence of such knowledge, and it does not appear from the recited facts that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence thereof to remove all reasonable doubts on that issue. A majority of the local committee, which heard the testimony and had an opportunity to observe petitioner while testifying, evidently believed his explanations, since that majority exonerated him of the charges. The district attorney's office reviewed petitioner's records and contacted the companies, and it may be inferred that office found insufficient proof to bring bribery and conspiracy charges against petitioner. The record of petitioner has heretofore been unblemished during his 39 years as a member of the State Bar, and his reputation for honesty and integrity is good. We conclude that the charges in the first three counts were not adequately proven. The charge in count four involving Standard Brands is also not sustained by the record as is conceded by the State Bar, and in our opinion the heretofore recited evidence is insufficient proof that petitioner conspired with Wolden to engage in the common plan alleged in count five. Since, as hereinabove indicated, it is the conclusion of this court that none of the charges in the notice to show cause is sufficiently supported by the evidence, this proceeding is dismissed. McCOMB, J. I dissent. As has been pointed out by this court on innumerable occasions (see, e.g., In re Plotner, 5 Cal.3d 714, 716 (1) [97 Cal. Rptr. 193, 488 P.2d 385]), the burden is on petitioner to show that the disciplinary board's recommendation is erroneous or unlawful. In my opinion, petitioner has not met this burden. The majority state: Insofar as the first three counts are concerned, petitioner admittedly gave Wolden approximately three-fourths of specified fees paid him by Glidden, General Foods, and American Home Products, but in our opinion it was not adequately proven that petitioner did so with the corrupt intent of influencing Wolden's action regarding assessments upon property in San Francisco to the benefit of those companies or that petitioner even knew at the time he was representing those companies that they had property in San Francisco that was subject to assessment by Wolden. The State Bar's evidence consists primarily of the prior testimony of Newstat and petitioner's own testimony. Although the evidence discloses a number of suspicious circumstances, petitioner's explanations, if believed, exonerate him of the charges. As I see it, additional suspicious circumstances, not pointed to by the majority, amply warrant the findings made by the disciplinary board, as a result of which the board's recommendation of disbarment should be followed. Petitioner testified that Wolden introduced him to the particular individuals from the corporations. In an exhibit to his answer to the original notice to show cause, petitioner lists the corporations' representatives with whom he dealt, as follows: