Opinion ID: 2590389
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: What guidelines are appropriate to determine if a proposed ordinance is legislative or administrative in character?

Text: The Kansas Initiative and Referendum statute, K.S.A. 12-3013, allows city electors to submit a proposed ordinance to a city's governing body by petition if it is signed by a minimum percentage of qualified electors. The percentage varies depending on the city's class size. For example, Fairway is a city of the second class, so a petition there must carry signatures at least equal in number to 40 percent of the electors who voted at the last preceding regular city election. K.S.A. 12-3013(a). Once a petition is submitted with the required minimum signatures and assuming the subject matter is authorized, the city must either pass the ordinance without alteration within 20 days or call a special election allowing the city's electors to vote on it. K.S.A. 12-3013(a). But a city is not required to act on a petition if its subject matter applies to: (1) An administrative ordinance; (2) an ordinance related to a public improvement to be paid wholly or in part by the levy of a special assessment; or (3) an ordinance subject to referendum or election under another statute. K.S.A. 12-3013(e). Here, the City refused the City Hall and Commercial Development Petitions after concluding both were administrative, which would satisfy the first exclusion if that determination is correct. Whether a proposed ordinance is legislative or administrative is often a difficult question to answer. Lewis v. City of South Hutchinson, 162 Kan. 104, 124, 174 P.2d 51 (1946). Across the country, courts frequently struggle to classify ordinances as either legislative or administrative. A principal reason for the inconsistency is that some courts give a more liberal application to their particular initiative and referendum process than others. As this court previously commented: An examination of the cases and legal authorities will disclose that the determination of whether a municipality has acted in its legislative or administrative capacity is indeed difficult and by no means consistent. Each case must be determined on its particular facts and even then there is no unanimity of opinion. Action based on one set of facts will be considered legislative in one jurisdiction while the same or similar action may be considered administrative in a different jurisdiction. Rauh, 223 Kan. at 522, 575 P.2d 517. In Kansas, the initiative and referendum process under K.S.A. 12-3013 has long been judged on a more demanding basis than in some other locales. See McArdle, 214 Kan. at 870, 522 P.2d 420 ([W]e have never adopted a `liberal' view of the matters which should be subject to initiative and referendum, but quite the contrary.); State, ex rel., v. City of Kingman, 123 Kan. 207, 209, 254 P. 397 (1927) (The tendency seems to be to confine the operation of similar referendum statutes with a considerable degree of strictness to measures which are quite clearly and fully legislative and not principally executive or administrative.). One challenge arising from our stricter doctrine occurs when applying the guidelines for judging whether a particular initiative and referendum petition is legislative or administrative in nature. As we have said previously, no single act of a governing body is ever likely to be solely legislative or solely administrative. Kansas Taxpayers Network, 255 Kan. at 540, 874 P.2d 667. Accordingly, courts must determine when a proposed ordinance's administrative characteristics predominate enough to exclude it from the initiative and referendum process. This court repeatedly has stated the initiative and referendum statute is only appropriate for measures that are 'quite clearly and fully legislative and not principally executive or administrative.' 255 Kan. at 540, 874 P.2d 667; McArdle, 214 Kan. at 867, 522 P.2d 420. Making this determination calls for a weighing of the characteristics recited in our case law to decide when an initiative is legislative or administrative. But if the doctrine is applied too strictly by our courts, it can render the statutory initiative and referendum process meaningless and deny our citizens an electoral option reserved to them by the legislature. Courts should be on guard against this danger. A statute should not be interpreted in such a manner as to make it meaningless. See In re Adoption of G.L.V., 286 Kan. 1034, 1041, 190 P.3d 245 (2008) (courts presume the legislature did not intend to enact meaningless legislation). This difficulty is exemplified by the way in which the district court condensed our strictness doctrine and declared it would strike the proposed ordinances if they were not clearly and fully legislative. In so stating, the district court dropped the qualifying phrase from our cases that adds and not principally executive or administrative to the analysis. We believe this additional qualifying phrase is critical. In other words, the phrase quite clearly and fully legislative should not be read so strictly as to mean solely legislative. Instead, courts must determine the essential character of a proposed ordinance from the facts found in each case and then confine the operation of the initiative and referendum statute with a considerable degree of strictness to those measures that are quite clearly and fully legislative and not principally executive or administrative. City of Kingman, 123 Kan. at 209, 254 P. 397; see City of Lawrence v. McArdle, 214 Kan. 862, 867, 522 P.2d 420 (1974). To be sure, our case law in this area fails to give courts a more precise demarcation in the legislative versus administrative tug-of-war. But this does not mean the initiative and referendum statute may be limited to only those circumstances in which cities are acting purely in a legislative capacity, as argued by the League of Kansas Municipalities in its amicus curiae brief and suggested by the district court's ruling. With this admonition, we move to the guidelines. In McArdle this court reviewed the prior case law and then identified specific rationales to determine under the facts of each case whether the essential character of a proposed ordinance is legislative or administrative. Those McArdle guidelines are: 1. An ordinance that makes new law is legislative; while an ordinance that executes an existing law is administrative. Permanency and generality are key features of a legislative ordinance. 214 Kan. 862, Syl. 2, 522 P.2d 420. 2. Acts that declare public purpose and provide ways and means to accomplish that purpose generally may be classified as legislative. Acts that deal with a small segment of an overall policy question generally are administrative. 214 Kan. 862, Syl. 3, 522 P.2d 420. 3. Decisions which require specialized training and experience in municipal government and intimate knowledge of the fiscal and other affairs of a city in order to make a rational choice may properly be characterized as administrative, even though they may also be said to involve the establishment of policy. 214 Kan. 862, Syl. 4, 522 P.2d 420. In City of Wichita v. Kansas Taxpayers Network, Inc., 255 Kan. 534, 874 P.2d 667 (1994), the court enumerated as a fourth guideline the strict application philosophy. This provided that the initiative and referendum statute should be restricted to measures 'quite clearly and fully legislative and not principally executive or administrative.' 255 Kan. at 540, 874 P.2d 667 (quoting McArdle, 214 Kan. 862, Syl. ¶ 1, 522 P.2d 420). This fourth guideline was also referenced in Fitzgerald, 22 Kan.App.2d at 431, 916 P.2d 1301. But we believe this principle is more useful as a recitation of the strict construction doctrine discussed above and less helpful as a guideline for determining under the facts in each case whether a proposed ordinance is legislative or administrative. In its brief, the City recognized this same concern and commented that this was less a fourth measuring stick than a statement of State judicial policy. We agree. It should not continue to be enumerated as a fourth guideline for analyzing the facts in these types of cases. In Rauh v. City of Hutchinson, 223 Kan. 514, 519-20, 575 P.2d 517 (1978), this court added to the legislative versus administrative analysis, stating: `[I]f the subject is one of statewide concern in which the legislature has delegated decision-making power, not to the local electors, but to the local council or board as the state's designated agent for local implementation of state policy, the action receives an administrative characterization, [and] hence is outside the scope of the initiative and referendum.' [Citation omitted.] See 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 16.54, pp. 404-05 (3d ed. Rev.2004). The City argues this language from Rauh constitutes a separate test from the McArdle guidelines, and it urges even further that the first step in this court's analysis should be to determine whether the proposed ordinances are administrative under Rauh. The City contends that if we find the proposed ordinances are matters of statewide concern as articulated in Rauh, then we are not required to consider the McArdle guidelines. We disagree. The City's argument ignores this court's actual holding in Rauh, which explains that the decision was based on the broad general policy and the comprehensive nature of the industrial revenue bond act and applying the criteria set forth in City of Lawrence v. McArdle .  (Emphasis added.) Rauh, 223 Kan. at 522, 575 P.2d 517. We believe the City is wrong in offering that Rauh is a separate test for deciding whether a proposed ordinance is administrative under the initiative and referendum statute. Instead, we see Rauh as providing another guideline to be used in conjunction with the three other McArdle guidelines. Therefore, in analyzing the facts regarding the two proposed ordinances disputed here, we will employ the three McArdle guidelines and add the language from Rauh as a fourth guideline, replacing the fourth guideline previously identified in Kansas Taxpayers Network and Fitzgerald. Finally, we believe it is important to point out that we will not view any one guideline as necessarily controlling over the others. We will give consideration to each guideline before reaching a final decision. But in doing so, we acknowledge it is possible the weight given to any one guideline may be enough under a particular factual situation to decide that a proposed ordinance intrudes too far into a city's administrative arena. That is a matter best determined in each case. See generally State v. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. 157, 161, 194 P.3d 1195 (2008) (holding one consideration may weigh so heavily that it directs the final conclusion when applying the three-prong test for determining whether a sentence violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment); State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, 97, 91 P.3d 1204 (2004) (holding the third factor in the three-factor test for prosecutorial misconduct may override the first two factors if certain conditions are satisfied). In the end, if the weight of all the guidelines taken together indicates a proposed ordinance is clearly and fully legislative and not principally executive or administrative, it is appropriate subject matter under the initiative and referendum statute. Next, we consider each proposed ordinance separately using the legal standards and four guidelines articulated above.