Opinion ID: 215188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether Plaintiffs' Claims Fall Within the Scope of the PVA

Text: A claim falls within the scope of the PVA if the claim comes within federal admiralty jurisdiction and if the damages were caused by a public vessel. Taghadomi, 401 F.3d at 1083. To come within federal admiralty jurisdiction, the tort must occur on or over navigable waters (locality requirement), and the actions giving rise to the tort claim must bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity (nexus requirement). Id. at 1084 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs' claims are that Coast Guard personnel committed a number of torts when the Coast Guard boarded their vessel on the high seas, inspected it, and towed it to mainland Ecuador.
[T]he situs of a tort for the purpose of determining admiralty jurisdiction is the place where the injury occurs. Id. at 1084. As in Taghadomi, Plaintiffs here do not claim that the injuries occurred anywhere but at sea. Thus, the locality requirement is satisfied. Id. at 1086. Even if one construed Plaintiffs' allegations as encompassing some negligent activity elsewhere, we have held that it is clear that this rule [that the place where the injury occurs controls] holds even when some of the negligent activity occurs on land. Id. at 1084.
There are two prongs to the nexus requirement. First, a court must assess the general features of the type of incident involved to determine whether the incident has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 130 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Second, a court must determine whether the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The incident in dispute did not merely have the potential to disrupt maritime commerce; it definitely disrupted maritime commerce. According to the operative complaint, the Coast Guard ruined Plaintiffs' commercial fishing trip and towed them and their boat hundreds of miles. Thus the first prong is easily met. See, e.g., Gruver v. Lesman Fisheries Inc., 489 F.3d 978, 982-83 (9th Cir.2007) (holding that an assault on a seaman by his former maritime employer aboard a vessel in navigable waters had the potential to disrupt maritime commerce because it rendered the seaman unable to fish); Taghadomi, 401 F.3d at 1086 (holding that this test was met where kayakers fell overboard and a rescue mission was attempted, because the efficacy of search-and-rescue operations has a direct effect on the health and lives of seamen). The second prong, which we have interpreted broadly, likewise is easily met. In Gruver, 489 F.3d at 984-86, for instance, a seaman was assaulted by a former maritime employer while the seaman slept in his ship, docked at a pier. The origin of the dispute lay in allegedly unpaid wages by the former employer. Id. We held that the lens through which to examine the relevant activity was the underlying wage dispute; because that dispute concerned maritime wages, the second prong was met. Id. ; see also Mission Bay Jet Sports, LLC v. Colombo (In re Mission Bay Jet Sports, LLC), 570 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir.2009) (holding that a jet-ski injury met the second prong because the activity in questionoperating a vessel in navigable watershas a maritime connection). The activity here, whether characterized as a fishing expedition or as a drug search on the high seas, meets the second prong, because the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc., 513 U.S. at 534, 115 S.Ct. 1043 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The PVA waives sovereign immunity for suits for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States. 46 U.S.C. § 31102(a)(1). A `public vessel' is one owned or operated by the United States and used in a public capacity. Taghadomi, 401 F.3d at 1083 n. 3. It is undisputed that the Coast Guard ship at issue here is a public vessel. But Plaintiffs argue that the PVA does not apply because the damages caused by the actions of the Coast Guard crew, especially those actions taken while aboard the Ecuadorian ship, are not damages caused by a public vessel. For decades, weand the Supreme Courthave interpreted that phrase broadly. Indeed, 60 years ago we interpreted the phrase damages caused by a public vessel to encompass all tort and contract claims aris[ing] out of the possession or operation of the ship. Thomason v. United States, 184 F.2d 105, 107 (9th Cir.1950). The phrase includes damages arising from those acts for which a private ship is held legally responsible as a juristic person under the customary legal terminology of the admiralty law. Id. at 107-08. We held, for instance, that unpaid compensation for seamen's services were damages caused by a public vessel. Id. at 108. Similarly, in American Stevedores, Inc. v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446, 448-54, 67 S.Ct. 847, 91 L.Ed. 1011 (1947), the Supreme Court held that a longshore-man's claim for personal injury resulting from the fall of a beam, negligently secured by a federal employee, constituted damages caused by a public vessel. See also id. at 453, 67 S.Ct. 847 (recognizing the growing feeling of Congress that the United States should put aside its sovereign armor in cases where federal employees have tortiously caused personal injury or property damage). In Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 224-25, 65 S.Ct. 639, 89 L.Ed. 901 (1945), the Court rejected a reading of the PVA that would have related only to collisions and held that the PVA extends to cases where the negligence of the personnel of a public vessel in the operation of the vessel causes damage to other ships, their cargoes, and personnel, regardless of physical contact between the two ships. More recently, we held that a claim alleging a negligent search by a Coast Guard ship fell within the scope of the PVA's damages caused by a public vessel requirement. Taghadomi, 401 F.3d at 1088. Given our broad interpretation of the phrase, [3] we conclude that Plaintiffs' claims here assert damages caused by a public vessel. Taking the allegations of the complaint as true, the crew of the public vessel stopped Plaintiffs' ship on the high seas, boarded it, damaged the cargo and other property, and towed the ship to Ecuador. Although the public vessel itself played a direct role only in some of the actions (stopping and towing Plaintiffs' ship), the public vessel's role in all of the actions of the crew is unmistakable. Even the actions of the crew members while aboard Plaintiffs' private ship ar[ose] out of the possession or operation of the ship. Thomason, 184 F.2d at 107. The PVA extends to cases where the negligence of the personnel of a public vessel in the operation of the vessel causes damage to other ships, their cargoes, and personnel, regardless of physical contact between the two ships. Canadian Aviator, 324 U.S. at 224-25, 65 S.Ct. 639. The relevant operation of the vessel here is not simply the movements of the public vessel itself; the relevant operation is the Coast Guard's search and seizure of Plaintiffs' vessel on the high seas. Thomason, 184 F.2d at 107-08. In conclusion, we agree with the district court that Plaintiffs' claims fall within the PVA's requirement of damages caused by a public vessel.