Opinion ID: 3023355
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Waretown Property

Text: 11 We shall first address the return of the Waretown property. Under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, for crimes involving property, a restitution order must command, if possible, that the ill-gotten property be returned to its rightful owner. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b); see also S. Rep. No. 104-179, at 18 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 931 (“It is essential that the criminal justice system recognize the impact that crime has on the victim, and, to the extent possible, ensure that offender be held accountable to repay these costs”). Russo contends that it is unfair to grant the Marshal’s Service a “windfall” by returning the property to it and effectively awarding it six years’ worth of appreciation value. He further argues that he should receive credit for improvements allegedly made to the property while it was under his control. We believe that both of these points of error can be addressed by reviewing the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, and adding to it our commonsense understanding of the purposes of restitution. United States Code Title 18, Section 3663A reads, in relevant part: “The order of restitution shall require that such defendant . . . in the case of an offense resulting in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense (A) return the property to the owner of the property or someone designated by the owner; or (B) if return of the property under subparagraph (A) is impossible, impracticable, or inadequate, pay an amount equal to (i) the greater of (I) the value of the property on the date of the damage, loss, or destruction; or (II) the value of the property on the date of sentencing, less (ii) the value (as of the date the property is returned) of any part of the property that is returned . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1). The statute plainly requires the return of any ill-gotten property which has been acquired by, inter alia, fraud on the victim. The statute does not provide 12 for an appreciation or improvement discount for the defendant. Russo has not presented a single case that supports his claim he should receive such credits, nor can we find one. Indeed, the value to be considered is the value on the date Russo acquired the property, or the value on the date of sentencing, whichever is greater. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(b)(1)(B). The plain language of the statute does not differentiate between an increase in value because of market appreciation and an increase in value due to improvements. Absent any support for Russo’s argument either in statutes or case law, we are disinclined to read into 18 U.S.C. § 3663A that which is not there. Moreover, we believe such an approach is in line with the clear purposes of restitution. While not intended to be primarily punitive, restitution “is separate and distinct from any punishment visited upon the wrongdoer and operates to ensure that a wrongdoer does not procure any benefit through his conduct at others’ expense.” United States v. Newman, 144 F.3d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing 1 George E. Palmer, The Law of Restitution § 1.1, at 5 (1978)) (emphasis added). We believe that forcing Russo to relinquish his property, together with the value of the appreciation and improvements, prevents him from benefitting from his wrongful conduct.11 Russo gambled when he added value to an ill-gotten property, and it must be a losing wager. See United States v. 11 Indeed, as the Government notes, had Russo swindled an elderly couple of their home, held it for several years, and improved the property in some manner, no reasonable person would expect the couple would have to pay Russo as a condition of getting their home back. Replacing the elderly couple with the Marshal’s Service should, logically, affect no change in this hypothetical. 13 Carrara, 49 F.3d 105, 108 (3d Cir. 1995) (“. . . restitution is also remonstrative, and, where indicated, will require that offenders disgorge their ill-gotten gains”). The District Court therefore did not abuse its discretion in ordering the transfer of the Waretown property back to the Government.