Opinion ID: 2587254
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Intent to killโpresent murder

Text: Defendant contends the jury's finding on the felony-murder special circumstance must be set aside because there was insufficient evidence of intent to kill. As we discussed earlier, such evidence of intent to kill was required because the case arose following Carlos, supra, 35 Cal.3d 131, 153-154, 197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862, and prior to People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1138-1147, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306. According to defendant, the evidence establishes that Treto was drunk and bellicose, had a racial altercation with an African-American man on a bicycle, and attempted to provoke a fight with defendant shortly before the shooting. Defendant had consumed at least five drinks and was taking medication. Just prior to being shot, Treto lifted his hand, perhaps in a gesture of resistance. `In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence for a special circumstanceโas for a convictionโthe question we ask is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the allegation beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citations.] ( People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th 1, 39, 40 Cal. Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224.) The finding therefore must be supported by substantial evidence, `that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value....' ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1329, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) A review of the record discloses substantial evidence from which a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the intent to kill. The evidence was inconclusive as to how much defendant had to drink prior to the murder, but there was no testimony that he behaved as if intoxicated. Just prior to approaching the victims outside, defendant spent some time in the restroom of Ricky's Lounge, as if preparing himself for the robbery. Although Treto had had words with the African-American man on the bicycle, Treto had spoken about being friends and embraced him prior to the time defendant approached Treto as Treto prepared to depart in his automobile. When defendant commanded that Treto hand over the money, Treto raised his hand or hands but was not observed reaching for defendant's gun, and the absence of powder burns on his clothing established that the two men were a number of feet apart from each other at the time of the shooting. Having dispatched Treto with a shot to the chest, defendant then shot at Cebreros, who was running away and posed no threat. There clearly was sufficient evidence that defendant acted with the intent to kill Treto.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jurors that in order to find true the special circumstance allegation of murder committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery, they had to find that defendant possessed the intent to kill. At the guilt phase, the trial court declined defense counsel's request to give an instruction defining express malice, instead requiring the jury to make a special finding whether defendant possessed the intent to kill, at the same time the jury rendered a verdict on the murder itself. In addition, as discussed above, both the prosecution and the defense in closing argument addressed the issue of defendant's intent to kill. [11] In finding defendant guilty of first degree murder committed in the course of a robbery, the jury made the special finding that defendant possessed the intent to kill. As we have seen, this finding is supported by substantial evidence. Under these circumstances it is clear that the erroneous omission of the instruction requested by defendant, or of an instruction informing the jury it had to find defendant intended to kill in order to find the robbery-murder special circumstance true, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705; People v. Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th 470, 504, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869; cf. People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1099-1100, 255 Cal. Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619.)