Opinion ID: 2211835
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: distinct nature of plea proceedings

Text: Appeals from plea-based convictions and appeals from convictions obtained following trials, like those appeals at issue in Douglas and Ross, are fundamentally different. Foremost, a defendant who tenders a plea has admitted guilt of the offense in open court. [A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 16.02, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). Further, the state has a fundamental interest in the finality of guilty pleas.... Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). A guilty plea evidences a defendant's desire to terminate the prosecution. Thus, a defendant who concedes his guilt has acceded to the state's fundamental interest in finality. Plea proceedings are also shorter, simpler, and more routine than trials; the record most often consists of the factual basis for the plea that is provided to the trial court. In contrast with trials, less danger exists in plea cases that the record will be so unclear, or the errors so hidden, that the defendant's appeal will be reduced to a meaningless ritual. Also, a concession of guilt limits considerably the potential issues that can be raised on appeal. See 1A Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law and Procedure (2d ed.), ง 16:30, pp. 94-104 (discussing the effect of a plea on the availability of various appellate claims). [7] These are all reasoned distinctions that are relevant to determining whether Michigan provides meaningful access to the appellate courts.