Opinion ID: 1280959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: The Proper Standard of Review for a Directed Verdict

Text: In Gmeiner v. Yacte, 100 Idaho 1, 592 P.2d 57 (1979), this Court addressed the issue of whether the trial court had erroneously granted a directed verdict. This Court cited a federal circuit court as follows: If the court grants it [a motion for directed verdict] no findings of fact are necessary and upon review the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made... . We will therefore ... disregard the findings of fact of the trial court, reviewing the entire evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and giving him the benefit of all reasonable inferences which may be deduced from the evidence in his favor ... To adopt any other view in a jury case is to risk the deprivation of a plaintiff's right to trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment. O'Brien v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 293 F.2d 1, 9-10 (3d Cir.1961). We went on to state the following: The task of the appellate court remains the same, namely, to determine whether plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to survive defendant's motion for a directed verdict and to justify submitting the case to the jury, i.e., whether, as a matter of law, plaintiff produced sufficient evidence (not a mere scintilla) from which reasonable minds could conclude that a verdict in favor of the plaintiff was proper. Gmeiner, 100 Idaho at 4, 592 P.2d at 61. Additionally, in All v. Smith's Management Corp., 109 Idaho 479, 480, 708 P.2d 884, 885 (1985), this Court stated that [a] party who moves for a directed verdict pursuant to I.R.C.P. 50(a) necessarily admits the truth of the adverse evidence and every inference that may legitimately be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 252-53, 678 P.2d 41, 44-45; Owen v. Burcham, 100 Idaho 441, 447, 599 P.2d 1012, 1018 (1979). Justice Shepard authored the unanimous opinion in Owen. Justice Donaldson authored the unanimous opinion in Stephens, and also authored the Court's opinion in All. In the case at bar, plaintiffs did present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. The trial court failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs and to allow every inference that could be deduced from the facts and evidence to be appropriately weighed in plaintiffs' favor when it considered the motion. Plaintiffs directly examined both Dr. Tune and Dr. Boe. Dr. Boe was examined as to the standard of care in Pocatello in 1983-84 with respect to plaintiffs' factual situation. There are at least four instances in which defendant Dr. Boe testified to having breached the very standard about which he testified. First, Dr. Boe testified that the standard required him to read a nurse's notes about a patient. However, Dr. Boe never read the note, and even though Jake Gubler was his patient during this whole course of time, Dr. Boe never became aware of the nurses' note. Secondly, Dr. Boe testified that the standard required a doctor to be responsible for lab work ordered for a patient. However, Dr. Boe never saw the SMAC test results he ordered for Jake Gubler. Thirdly, Dr. Boe testified that the standard required a doctor to review the entire SMAC test results. However, Dr. Boe never discovered the entire results of the SMAC test ordered for Jake Gubler. Finally, Dr. Boe testified that the standard required lab work test results to be sent to a patient's chart. However, the SMAC test results ordered by Dr. Boe for plaintiff never made it to Jake Gubler's chart. Besides these readily apparent breaches of the applicable standard, plaintiffs attempted to further show at trial three other violations of the standard of care. The trial court disqualified Dr. Tune from testifying as to the standard of care, but initially allowed Dr. Tune's testimony to continue as to the issue of causation. This would have allowed Dr. Tune to testify as to his opinion about plaintiff's enlarged bladder, urinalysis and SMAC test results. However, the trial court then decided that Dr. Tune could not even testify as to causation. Dr. Tune was prevented from testifying altogether. The court required plaintiffs' counsel to make an offer of proof as to anything Dr. Tune or Dr. Brewer would have testified to with respect to issues other than the applicable standard of care. In plaintiffs' offer of proof counsel stated that he intended to use the testimony of Dr. Tune and Dr. Brewer to establish certain factual predicates which used in conjunction with Dr. Boe's testimony would establish a violation of the standard. First, Dr. Tune and Dr. Brewer would have testified to the fact that plaintiff's bladder was enlarged or palpable and that an observer could feel the bladder in October, 1983, as the nurse had, and that this combined with Dr. Boe's testimony that the standard of care would have required further investigation, is sufficient to show a violation of the standard of care in Pocatello in 1983. Second, Dr. Tune and Dr. Brewer would have testified that the urinalysis taken on October 25, 1983, was indicative or suggestive of a urinary tract infection, contrary to what Dr. Boe testified to, and combining this with Dr. Boe's testimony that suspicion of a urinary tract infection in a boy that age needed to be investigated and followed up in order to comply with the local standard of care in 1983 is sufficient to show a violation of the applicable standard in 1983. Third, Dr. Tune and Dr. Brewer would have testified that the SMAC test done on plaintiff showed abnormal results and that combining this with Dr. Boe's testimony, that the standard of care required these elevated results of the SMAC test to be followed up shows a violation of the standard in Pocatello at that time. With respect to the enlarged bladder, the trial court stated that Dr. Boe did not see the nurses' note about the enlarged bladder and that because of this there was no evidence of any violation of the standard. However, not only did Dr. Brydon, who is a doctor with defendant clinic, see the note, but, as has been stated previously, Dr. Boe had already testified that the standard required a doctor to read a nurses' notes about a patient. Dr. Boe also testified, as stated previously, that he never saw the nurses' note about plaintiff's enlarged bladder even though plaintiff was his continuing patient. Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital and Dr. Boe was his attending physician. Dr. Boe returned to hospital duty on October 30, 1983. Plaintiff was discharged the next day and saw Dr. Boe a week later on November 8, 1983. Dr. Boe never saw the nurses' note. This combined testimony shows a violation of the standard of care in Pocatello in 1983. With respect to the urinalysis, the trial court decided that absent testimony that Dr. Boe's conclusion that the urinalysis results were not abnormal was a violation, evidence of a violation was lacking. However, Dr. Tune and Dr. Brewer would have testified that the urinalysis results were abnormal and indicative of a urinary tract infection. Combining this testimony with Dr. Boe's testimony that indication of a urinary tract infection required further investigation shows evidence of a violation. It is enough of an issue of fact to get to the jury and let the jury decide which expert to believe. With respect to the SMAC test results, the trial court decided that absent testimony that Dr. Boe was responsible for seeing all the results, evidence of a violation was lacking. However, as stated previously, Dr. Boe had testified that a doctor was responsible for the lab work ordered for a patient and that the standard required a doctor to review the entire results of a SMAC test ordered. Dr. Boe also testified, as stated previously, that he never received the results of the SMAC test and that he never reviewed the results of the test, and never asked what all the results were. Therefore, this is evidence of a violation. Thus, even though plaintiffs' experts were prevented from testifying, there is still ample evidence of a violation of the applicable standard in 1983-84. The trial court should have let the jury weigh the evidence. Plaintiffs' counsel directly examined both Dr. Boe and Dr. Tune. Plaintiffs' counsel elicited direct expert testimony showing evidence of a violation of the applicable standard in 1983-84. In Gmeiner v. Yacte, 100 Idaho at 9, 592 P.2d at 65, this Court stated that although a trial court has power under I.R.C.P. 50(a) to grant a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's case, the preferred practice is to defer a ruling upon the motion until both sides have finally rested; moreover, even at the close of all the evidence, it may be desirable to refrain from directing a verdict though it would be possible to do so. In Fitzgerald v. Walker, 113 Idaho 730, 732-33, 747 P.2d 752, 754-55 (1987), this Court reversed a directed verdict because the plaintiffs were not given the opportunity to present all of their case. The trial court granted the directed verdict since plaintiffs were without an expert witness on the first day of trial. [9] In reversing the trial court and remanding for further proceedings, Justice Donaldson wrote: [T]he rules of civil procedure provide remedies. A court may impose sanctions where pleadings or motions have been interposed for delay or other improper purposes, I.C.R.P. 11(a)(1) (Supp. 1986), and sanctions for violations of discovery orders are provided for in I.R.C.P. 37(e). Violations of scheduling or pretrial orders are also subject to sanctions. I.R.C.P. 16(a). Finally, a failure to prosecute or a failure to comply with an order of the court or the rules of civil procedure may warrant dismissal under I.R.C.P. 41(b). These discretionary tools exist for the use of trial courts, but they must be used judiciously and for proper purposes. As has been said, the goal is not expediency for its own sake: Courts exist to serve the parties, and not to serve themselves, or to present a record with respect to dispatch of business. Complaints heard as to the law's delays arise because the delay has injured litigants, not the courts. For the court to consider expedition for its own sake regardless of the litigants is to emphasize secondary considerations over primary. Alamance Industries, Inc. v. Filene's, 291 F.2d 142, 146 (1st Cir.1961) (footnote omitted), cert. denied 368 U.S. 831, 82 S.Ct. 53, 7 L.Ed.2d 33 (1961). Also, though `burgeoning filings and crowded calendars have shorn courts of the luxury of tolerating procrastination,' Chira v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 634 F.2d 664, 668 (2nd Cir.1980), the `laudable objective [of reducing the congestion in court dockets] should not be sought in a way which undercuts the very purposes for which courts were created  that is, to try cases on their merits and render judgments in accordance with the substantial rights of the parties.' [ Link v. Wabash RR Co., 370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386 at 1398, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962) (Black, J. dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Warren.) Justices White and Frankfurter did not participate.] Lastly where dismissal with prejudice is contemplated, a court must exercise caution and make appropriate findings: Dismissals with prejudice are `reserved for the most egregious of cases usually where the requisite factors of clear delay and ineffective lesser sanctions are bolstered by the presence of at least one of the aggravating factors.' Rogers v. Kroger, 669 F.2d (317) at 320 (5th Cir.1982). Jones v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 704 F.2d 206 (5th Cir.1983). Those aggravating factors include (1) delay resulting from intentional conduct, (2) delay caused by the plaintiff personally, and (3) delay causing prejudice to the defendant. Morris v. Ocean Systems, Inc., 730 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1984). In addition to the foregoing, the court must consider lesser sanctions. That consideration, and the court's findings that lesser sanctions would be inadequate, must be spread upon the record for `such findings of fact are essential for our consideration of the inevitable argument that the dismissal was an abuse of its discretion.' Hornbuckle v. Arco Oil & Gas Co., 732 F.2d 1233, 1237 (5th Cir.1984). In Rogers, 669 F.2d at 321-22 we noted several such lesser sanctions which might be considered: `Assessments of fines, costs, or damages against the plaintiff or his counsel, attorney disciplinary measures, conditional dismissal, dismissal without prejudice, and explicit warnings are preliminary means or less severe sanctions that may be used to safeguard a court's undoubted right to control its docket.' Boudwin v. Graystone Ins. Co., Ltd., 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir.1985) (reviewing dismissal pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 41(b)). Fitzgerald, 113 Idaho at 732-33, 747 P.2d at 754-55. Clearly, this Court subscribed to the wisdom of Justice Black, and in relying on his opinion, adopted the language which this Court quoted. Attached as Appendix A to this opinion is a copy of the content of the trial court's order which this Court reversed in Fitzgerald. The Gublers' brief brings our attention to two cases where this Court over thirty-five years ago committed to the reversing of dismissals entered following a district court's refusal to grant a requested continuance, finding that in both instances the lower court did not properly guide its discretion. In Finch v. Wallberg Dredging Co., 76 Idaho 246, 281 P.2d 136 (1955), the Finches were seeking damages from Wallberg for deficiencies in a dredge which they had purchased. To the district court's apparent disapproval, at least three trial settings had been vacated by agreement of counsel. Four days before a final trial setting date, counsel for Wallberg withdrew. The Finches were able to obtain new counsel, a Mr. E.G. Elliott, who promptly moved for a continuance of the trial setting in order to become prepared for trial. The trial judge refused to grant any continuance, to which Mr. Elliott responded that he could not proceed to trial, being not informed or familiar with any of the facts, it would be a farce for me to attempt it and an imposition on the court. The court then granted defendant Wallberg's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court on appeal after stating the factual posture of the case, ruled that the lower court should not have permitted withdrawal of plaintiffs' counsel under those circumstances, and reversed, ordering that the Finch complaint be reinstated. The opinion authored by Justice Smith was unanimous. It pointedly stated that a motion for a continuance is within the discretion of the trial court, but that the discretion must not be exercised oppressively, arbitrarily, or capriciously, 17 C.J.S., Continuances, § 5, p. 193; Eckert v. Graham, 131 Cal. App. 718, 22 P.2d 44; Baker v. Jensen, 135 Or. 669, 295 P. 467; Elliott v. Lawson, 87 Or. 450, 170 P. 925. Finch, 76 Idaho at 250, 281 P.2d at 140. That language plainly conveyed the court's view that the motion for a continuance was denied oppressively, arbitrarily, or capriciously, and most likely all of the above, assuming that there are fine lines of distinction. In Pauley v. Salmon River Lumber Co., 74 Idaho 483, 264 P.2d 466 (1953), the scenario was much the same. Judge Koelsch denied a plaintiff's motion for a continuance and dismissed for lack of prosecution, after he first denied plaintiff Pauley a continuance based on his inability to go to trial without the deposition testimony of a Mr. Meisner who lived in California and who had been unable to attend a deposition to be taken in Stockton, California, all of which was supported by the affidavit Dr. Ben Boice, Meisner's attending California physician. After the district court entered judgment of dismissal for lack of prosecution, in due time it also denied and overruled plaintiff Pauley's motion to set aside the dismissal and to reinstate the cause. The Idaho Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Porter, unanimously found that the showing made by appellant (Pauley) on the motion to vacate the default judgment of dismissal reasonably meets all of the tests that have been applied to the adequacy of such a showing by this Court: We conclude that it clearly appears that this trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to vacate the default judgment of dismissal and to reinstate the cause. Against that backdrop, we are asked to measure the conduct of the trial judge in the instant case under the same circumstances. Here, as in Fitzgerald, Finch, and Pauley, the trial court ruled the plaintiffs' expert witness not qualified to testify whether or not the defendant doctor violated the applicable community standard of care in 1983. Plaintiffs moved the court for a continuance to allow plaintiffs to further qualify their expert witness. The trial court denied the continuance, stating over six months later in the Memorandum Decision and Order which was a denial of plaintiffs' motion for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment that: After considering the impact which this would have upon the jury and the fact that defense counsel would undoubtedly request an opportunity to redepose Dr. Tune based upon this change in circumstance, the Court denied plaintiffs' motion. R. 150. Nothing, however, serves to explain or even suggest how the jurors would have been impacted simply because a witness who had testified was recalled to the stand for further questioning. Moreover, the court's second assertion regarding a potential defense request for an opportunity to redepose Dr. Tune was nothing but speculation  sheer surmise. The trial court's denial of a continuance does not measure up to the likes of Fitzgerald, Finch, and Pauley. Unless this Court can say that those three decisions were incorrect, this Gubler case should be sent back for a new trial. The trial judge, in that same Memorandum Decision and Order of July 18, 1989, candidly conceded to being worried as to not giving the requested continuance: The court notes that the affidavit of Dr. Davis indicates that Dr. Tune could have been properly qualified to testify during this proceeding had he contacted Dr. Davis, rather than Dr. Groberg. This raises a concern that the plaintiffs in this matter were prevented from having their case submitted to a jury because of this oversight by counsel. To prevent a possible miscarriage of justice, the court has given serious consideration to granting a new trial, conditioned upon plaintiffs' counsel paying all attorney fees and costs incurred by the defendant immediately before and during the trial. While this would undoubtedly be a substantial sum, it would seem to be an appropriate method of preventing a possible injustice to the plaintiffs and an unjustified expense or inconvenience to the defendant. However, the court is unable to find any provision in Rule 59(a) or (e) which would allow the court to grant a new trial to avoid what may be a miscarriage of justice. R. 157-58. There is no doubting the sincerity of those remarks, nor that the district court agonized over the reality that his denial of what likely would have been a continuance of two hours at most was going to cause a miscarriage of justice. Whenever the judicial system malfunctions with the result that an eight-year old boy is not allowed to put his case in the hands of a jury, there is a denial of a constitutional right, and there is a miscarriage of justice. If that were not entertained as a firm belief then this one justice could have better spent the last seven working days at some other activity. Obviously, the district court was inclined to preclude a miscarriage of justice failing to understand that he would not be violating any rules. But it has never been doubted that these rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just determination of every action and proceeding. I.R.C.P. Rule 1(a) (emphasis added). This Court stated in Sines v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 435, 439, 566 P.2d 758, 762 (1977) that: Rule 1, I.R.C.P. is a constant reminder that the rules are to be liberally construed, and a just result is always the ultimate goal to be accomplished.  (Emphasis added.) Does anyone have a recollection of ever seeing an appellate decision which reversed a trial court for construing any rule of procedure liberally in attempting to accomplish a just result? In fact, I would go so far as to say that even without the benefit of Rule 1 and the Sines statement, courts have an inherent power to accomplish justice. It was so before Rule 1, and that rule in fact embodied the common law rule. Accomplishing justice is the fundamental reason for the existence of courts. Otherwise put, preventing miscarriages of justices is inherently within the province of a district court. In the instant case there may have been a mistake made by the attorneys in presenting Jake Gubler's severe permanent injury case, and the district court recognized it: because of this oversight by counsel. R. 158. However, that oversight was recognized after Dr. Boe had testified and when Dr. Tune was on the stand. Counsel's efforts to correct the oversight were, generally speaking, stonewalled by the district court. Those efforts consisted of placing Dr. Tune again in contact with Dr. Groberg for further discussion of the standard of care in the Pocatello community. The district court observed, six months after the trial, that Dr. Tune was precluded from testifying as an expert only because he had not asked Dr. Groberg if the standard of care in 1983 and 1984 was the same as in 1988, when the two doctors had their discussion. The district court ignored the statement to the effect that there had been no deviation in the standard of care in twenty years. More disturbing to the plaintiffs and their counsel than that, will be when they read the Court's opinion, in that there has seemingly been no reading of the briefs or the appeal record by those in the majority. A large share of the plaintiffs' brief explains why their ouster was erroneously given to defendants on a motion for directed verdict, but this Court writes of a dismissal with prejudice, which simply never happened.