Opinion ID: 1907203
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Proportionality Review in New Jersey

Text: When the New Jersey Legislature reintroduced the death penalty in 1982, it too substantially incorporated the procedural safeguards in the Georgia law sustained by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg, including the provision for proportionality review. See State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 202-03, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987). The New Jersey Capital Punishment Act, L. 1982, c . 111 (codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3), like the Georgia statute, called for a determination by this Court on [e]very judgment of conviction which results in a sentence of death.... whether the sentence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3e. Later, the Senate Judiciary Committee explained that, at the time the Act was passed by the State Legislature, it was thought that the United States Supreme Court would not uphold a capital punishment law that did not contain such a `proportionality review' provision. Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to Senate Bill No. 950 ( L. 1985, c. 178). As enacted in 1982, the Capital Punishment Act required proportionality review, but did not describe the manner in which it was to be conducted or limit the universe of similar cases to be used for comparison purposes. In response to Pulley, however, the New Jersey Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3e to abolish mandatory proportionality review and to require instead that defendants request such review by this Court. L. 1985, c. 178. Then, in 1992, the proportionality review provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3e was amended yet again to define the universe of similar cases to be compared to defendant's case as those in which a sentence of death has been imposed. L. 1992, c. 5. This amendment became effective on May 12, 1992, L. 1992, c. 5, and will, if ultimately determined to be valid, limit the scope of proportionality review undertaken by this Court since Marshall II. In Ramseur, we explained that the development of a procedure of review ... [would] be an evolving process, requiring the advice of criminal justice experts ... [and] experts from disciplines outside the law. 106 N.J. at 328, 524 A. 2d 188. Our view of the fundamental purpose of proportionality review would guide this process: Proportionality review has a function entirely unique among the review proceedings in a capital proceeding. Proportionality review, in the context of a capital sentencing scheme, is not appellate review to ensure that the aggravating factors outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all the mitigating factors, L. 1985, c. 178, or to determine if the death sentence is disproportionate to the crime in violation of the ban against cruel and unusual punishment. That death is not disproportionate in the sense of being a cruel and unusual punishment is presumed by the nature of the review. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. at 43, 104 S.Ct. at 875, 79 L.Ed. 2d at 36. Rather, the purpose of review here is of a different sort.... It purports to inquire instead whether the penalty is nonetheless unacceptable in a particular case because disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime. [ Id. at 326, 524 A. 2d 188 (quoting Pulley, supra, 465 U.S. at 43, 104 S.Ct. at 875, 79 L.Ed. 2d at 36).] Therefore, when we conduct a proportionality review, we ask whether the punishment fits the criminal, Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 129, 613 A. 2d 1059, so as to ensure that the death penalty is being administered in a rational, non-arbitrary, and evenhanded manner, fairly and with reasonable consistency, id. at 131, 613 A. 2d 1059. Ramseur also explained that proportionality review provides a mechanism by which death sentences may be monitored, to prevent any impermissible discrimination in imposing the death penalty. 106 N.J. at 327, 524 A. 2d 188. In Marshall II, we spoke of the unique commitment of the people of New Jersey to the elimination of racial discrimination. 130 N.J. at 207, 613 A. 2d 1059. Today, as then, we believe that [t]o countenance racial discrimination in capital sentencing would mock that tradition and our own constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws under New Jersey Constitution Article I, paragraph 1. Ibid. Comparison of like cases presents an opportunity for the Court to monitor whether impermissible factors are present in the capital sentencing system. Marshall II describes in detail the creation of a database and the sorting processes we have used as a basis for comparison of similar cases. Id. at 141-45, 613 A. 2d 1059. We have substantially relied on the Final Report of our first Special Master, David C. Baldus, Death Penalty Proportionality Review Project, Final Report to the New Jersey Supreme Court (Sept. 24, 1991) ( Final Report ). As outlined in Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 152-59, 613 A. 2d 1059, and followed in our subsequent proportionality review cases, we conduct a frequency analysis using statistical methods and a precedent-seeking review consisting of case-by-case analyses of comparative culpability. State v. Bey, 137 N.J. 334, 350, 645 A. 2d 685 (1994) ( Bey IV ), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164, 115 S.Ct. 1131, 130 L.Ed. 2d 1093 (1995); State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 28, 651 A. 2d 949 (1994) ( Martini II ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed. 2d 137 (1995); State v. DiFrisco, 142 N.J. 148, 165-66, 662 A. 2d 442 (1995) ( DiFrisco III ), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129, 116 S.Ct. 949, 133 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1996). These methods compare the case at bar to other cases that have been found to have either similar fact patterns or similar levels of culpability and are used to determine whether the sentence imposed on the defendant in the case at bar is disproportionate to the sentences imposed in those similar cases. More specifically, frequency analysis is a statistical approach that determines in three ways which cases have similar levels of culpability: (1) the salient-factors test; (2) the numerical-preponderance-of-aggravating-and-mitigating-factors test; and (3) the index-of-outcomes test. Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 350-51, 645 A. 2d 685. The salient-factors test defines `similar cases in terms of factual comparability,' while the numerical-preponderance-of-aggravating-and-mitigating-factors test compares the raw number of those factors in each case. Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 146-47, 613 A. 2d 1059 (citations omitted). The index-of-outcomes test is a regression analysis that determines the culpability levels of defendants `as measured by the presence or absence in the cases of [statutory and non-statutory aggravating and mitigating] factors that appear to influence prosecutorial and jury decisionmaking.' Id. at 147-48, 613 A. 2d 1059 (citation omitted). Precedent-seeking review, on the other hand, compares all relevant statutory and nonstatutory aggravating and mitigating factors present in factually similar cases in order to determine defendant's criminal culpability, or relative degree of deathworthiness. See DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 184-85, 662 A. 2d 442. From the beginning, there has been extensive critical commentary by the Public Defender and Attorney General, along with alternative suggested approaches, on the frequency analysis methodologies accepted by the Court. We have considered that commentary and have chosen in each case to discuss the results of our frequency tests despite their acknowledged deficiencies, with the caveat that ultimately our judgments about the proportionality of death sentences are unquantifiable. Frequency review has always functioned as an adjunct to the detailed comparison of like cases that we undertake in precedent-seeking review and that, as judges, we are by training and experience best equipped to do. [3]