Opinion ID: 1453555
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cuevas's Sixth Amendment and Guidelines-Related Objections

Text: In his initial appeal, Cuevas raised several Guidelines-related objections to his sentence. In his original brief, Cuevas challenged the District Court's offense level determinations, specifically its underlying findings as to drug quantity and his role in the organization, as clearly erroneous in light of the record developed at the Fatico hearing. Cuevas also argued that the District Court had committed error in denying his motion for a departure based on extraordinary family and medical circumstances. In his supplemental brief, filed a month after the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), Cuevas advanced the alternative position that the District Court should not have relied on its own findings at all, at least not to enhance the sentence. Since the time of the first appeal, the law governing federal sentencing has changed significantly. Six months after Blakely, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). In Booker, the Court clarified that to comply with the Sixth Amendment, [a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the [statutory] maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 738 (Stevens, J., opinion for the Court). To implement this holding, the Supreme Court excised the provision of the Guidelines that made its application mandatory. See id. at 245, 125 S.Ct. 738 (Breyer, J., opinion for the Court). Although  Booker removed the mandatory teeth of the . . . Guidelines . . . by rendering them advisory, it did not discard the Guidelines altogether. United States v. Cavera, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 1628799, at  (2d Cir. June 6, 2007). While a district court is no longer required to impose a Guidelines sentence, it still has a duty to consider the applicable Guidelines range, in addition to the other factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), in determining the appropriate sentence. See Crosby, 397 F.3d at 111-12. Furthermore, under the post- Booker regime, the sentencing judge is entitled to find all of the facts that the Guidelines make relevant to the determination of a Guidelines sentence and all of the facts relevant to the determination of a non-Guidelines sentence. Id. at 112. In short, district courts remain statutorily obliged to calculate Guidelines ranges in the same manner as before Booker and to find facts relevant to sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518, 526-27 (2d Cir.2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1060, 126 S.Ct. 1665, 164 L.Ed.2d 405 (2006); see also, e.g., United States v. Salazar, 489 F.3d 555, 557 (2d Cir. June 13, 2007). Cuevas pled guilty to a conspiracy involving more than five kilograms of cocaine, which carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), and to money laundering and conspiracy to launder money, each of which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years' imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1). Because the sentence imposed did not exceed these statutory maximums, the District Court did not violate Cuevas's Sixth Amendment rights by relying on its own factual findings in determining the appropriate Guidelines range. See United States v. Florez, 447 F.3d 145, 156 (2d Cir.2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 600, 166 L.Ed.2d 445 (2006); see also United States v. Ubiera, 486 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir.2007) ( Booker does require factfinding by a jury and beyond a reasonable doubt, but only where the fact `is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty.' (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 738)), petition for cert. filed (U.S. June 9, 2007) (No. 06-11887). Because the District Court sentenced Cuevas prior to Booker, however, it understandably but erroneously treated the Guidelines as mandatory. In United States v. Crosby , this Circuit's first decision applying Booker, we held that where a defendant raises a Sixth Amendment challenge to his sentence on appeal that he did not preserve below, Booker requires that we remand the case for the district court to consider whether it would have imposed a nontrivially different sentence had it appreciated that the Guidelines were advisory and considered all of the factors listed under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Crosby, 397 F.3d at 119-20. The purpose of a Crosby remand is to ascertain whether the district court's pre- Booker mandatory application of the Guidelines was plain error. The plain error analysis is satisfied if, on remand, the district judge determines that the original sentence would have differed in a nontrivial manner from that imposed. Id. at 118. If, on the other hand, the district judge decides, in full compliance with now applicable requirements, that under the post- Booker . . . regime the sentence would have been essentially the same as originally imposed, any Sixth Amendment error is harmless. Id. While the government acknowledges that Cuevas's original sentence predates Booker, it contends that a Crosby remand is unnecessary for two reasons  first, because the District Court chose a sentence at the bottom of the applicable Guidelines range and expressed its views on the appropriateness of the Guidelines sentence at the original sentencing; and second, because the District Court concluded on remand, after Booker and Crosby, that Cuevas's sentence should remain as originally imposed. Cuevas, 402 F.Supp.2d at 507. Neither rationale is persuasive. First, as we recognized in Crosby, while it may be possible for this Court to make an educated guess as to the likely outcome of a remand, it is still prudent to remand because that guess might be wrong, absent a clear indication at the original sentencing supporting the inference that the same sentence would have been imposed under the post- Booker . . . regime. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 118. No such clear indication exists here: Although the District Court noted that it was not uncomfortable with how high the [G]uidelines sentence was in Cuevas's particular case, we cannot say with certainty that the District Court would not have imposed a non-Guidelines sentence had it perceived this to be a possibility. Second, while the District Court stated in its December 2005 decision that Cuevas's sentence should remain as originally imposed, the body of the decision makes plain that the only matter considered by the District Court on remand was the extradition issue. Cuevas, 402 F.Supp.2d at 507; see also id. (The Dominican Republic's failure to object calls into question whether it ever intended the language in the decree to give rise to an agreement, and, in any case, suggests that affirming the Court's prior sentence will not offend principles of comity. Accordingly, Juan's sentence should remain as originally imposed. (citations omitted)). At oral argument, the government conceded that there was no mention of Booker at any point during the remand proceedings. We therefore conclude that a Crosby remand is necessary. Because the District Court has not yet had the opportunity to reconsider its sentence in light of Booker, our present task is not to review [Cuevas's] sentence[] for reasonableness, the new standard established by Booker. United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 222 (2d Cir.2005). We consider Cuevas's objections to the District Court's Guidelines calculations, however, because the district court, on remand, remains under an obligation to consider the Guidelines, and our resolution of [a] defendant['s] Guidelines objections `will assist the district court in fulfilling that obligation.' Id. (quoting United States v. Maloney, 406 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir.2005)); see also United States v. Carr, 424 F.3d 213, 230 (2d Cir.2005) (considering the defendant's objection to the district court's previous application of the Sentencing Guidelines before remanding, and explaining that [t]his is a question the district court will again be required to decide on remand because, post- Booker, it must still consider the appropriate Guidelines sentence along with the other section 3553(a) factors in arriving at the correct sentence), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1221 (2006). Cuevas contends that there was insufficient evidence for the District Court to find that the conspiracy involved more tan 150 kilograms of cocaine, or that he played a leadership role in criminal activity involving five or more participants, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). In reviewing a district court's sentencing decision on appeal, this Court `accept[s] the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous. . . .' United States v. Franklyn, 157 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir.1998); see United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 349 (2d Cir.2006) (stating that the clear error standard is appropriate where the district court's application of a sentencing guideline in a particular case presents an issue that is predominantly factual rather than legal), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 3001, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2007). A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. Hazut, 140 F.3d 187, 190 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Factual findings based on the testimony and observation of witnesses are entitled to particular deference, United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 52 (2d Cir.1998), since assessing the credibility of witnesses is distinctly the province of the district court, United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633, 642 (2d Cir.1993). Our examination of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that no error was committed here. At the Fatico hearing, Edward Vidal named more than five people who worked for Cuevas. He testified that between 1996 and 1997 alone, the organization arranged for more than 250 kilograms of cocaine to be shipped from Miami to New York. Vidal's job was to distribute the cocaine to customers in New York; when asked who provided the delivery instructions, Vidal stated that Cuevas told him how many kilos to deliver to each customer. Vidal further testified that between the end of 1997 and the time of his arrest in 1998, he picked up five or six shipments of cocaine, totaling more than 1300 kilograms. Vidal stated that he attended some meetings at which the final large shipment of cocaine was discussed, but that Cuevas was the one who actually negotiated the deal with the supplier. Although Vidal was not paid much for his work, at least not in cash, he testified that the one cash payment he did receive came from Cuevas. Rafael Duverge testified that he and Cuevas were partners in the drug importation business, although they ran separate organizations. Duverge stated that during the length of their partnership from 1995 to September 1998, Cuevas received approximately 1000 kilograms of cocaine from the supplier. Duverge also confirmed that Cuevas was the boss of his organization, which had multiple employees. Duverge described conversations that he had with Cuevas regarding the security of the locations where Cuevas stored the drug proceeds, and noted that on one occasion, Cuevas had money moved from one place to another to avoid apprehension. The above testimony, which the District Court found credible, provided more than enough evidence to support its findings that the conspiracy involved the distribution of more than 150 kilograms of cocaine, see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), (B), and that Cuevas was a leader of the conspiracy, which involved five or more participants, see United States v. Valdez, 16 F.3d 1324, 1335 (2d Cir.1994); see also U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n. 4. Cuevas also argues that the District Court erred in rejecting his application for downward departures on the bases of his family and medical circumstances. This argument is without merit. As was true when the Guidelines were mandatory, we have held in the post- Booker sentencing regime that `a refusal to downwardly depart is generally not appealable,' and that review of such a denial will be available only `when a sentencing court misapprehended the scope of its authority to depart or the sentence was otherwise illegal.' United States v. Stinson, 465 F.3d 113, 114 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Valdez, 426 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir.2005); citing United States v. Gonzalez, 281 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir.2002) (stating pre- Booker rule)). The District Court here clearly understood that it had the authority to grant the requested departures, but decided not to depart in consideration of the particular circumstances of Cuevas's case. Finally, Cuevas contends that the District Court unconstitutionally prevented him from testifying in his own defense by refusing to adjourn the sentencing until the related indictment pending in the Southern District of Florida could be transferred, so that he might enter a guilty plea in that matter. We are unpersuaded by this argument: Cuevas was afforded the opportunity to testify on his behalf at the sentencing hearing, but after weighing the advantage of the privilege against self-incrimination against the advantage of putting forward his version of the facts, he opted not to do so. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 155, 78 S.Ct. 622, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958). We find no constitutional error in the District Court's decision not to adjourn the proceedings. Cf. United States v. Maurer, 226 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam) (The procedures used at sentencing are within the discretion of the district court so long as the defendant is given an adequate opportunity to present his position as to matters in dispute.).