Opinion ID: 2823809
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Barnum and Porter

Text: Â¶19Â Â Â Â Â When the court of appeals first addressed this issue in Barnum, it did not confront the import of Monge. Id. Instead, it understandably focused on Quintana and the legislatureâs changes to the habitual criminal statute since Quintana. Id. In Barnum, a jury found the defendant guilty of the substantive charges. Id. Before the trial courttook any witness testimony during the habitual phase, the defendant moved to dismiss those charges because they did not allege specific dates of the prior offenses. Id. The trial court granted the motion, and the prosecution moved for reconsideration. Id. After granting the motion for reconsideration, the trial court denied the defendantâs motion to dismiss the counts, recommenced the hearing, and adjudicated the defendant as a habitual criminal. Id. Â¶20Â Â Â Â Â On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court could not reinstate the habitual counts because jeopardy had already attached when the jury was sworn during his substantive trial. Id. The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that the defendantâs reliance on Quintana was misplaced. Id. It addressed the statutory change, distinguished Quintana, and held that jeopardy does not attach until the first prosecution witness is sworn in the habitual phase. Id. Because the trial court had dismissed the charges before any witnesses had been sworn in the habitual phase, the court of appeals concluded that âjeopardy had not yet attachedâ and the trial court could reinstate the habitual criminal charges against the defendant without violating his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Id.; accord Valencia, 169 P.3d at 222â23 (assuming jeopardy attached during habitual phase when the court âadmitted the one exhibit into evidence,â but ultimately holding that the trial court did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy because granting a âcontinuance did not effect a termination of the proceeding and thus expose defendant to double jeopardy upon the resumption of the proceedingâ). Â¶21Â Â Â Â Â In the case before us, the court of appeals was ânot persuaded by the Barnum divisionâs basis for distinguishing Quintana.â Porter, Â¶38. It found the procedures, both before and after the statutory change, âremarkably similar,â noting that â[t]he only real distinction is the designated fact finder.â Id. As a result, the division relied on Quintana and concluded that jeopardy attached when the first prosecution witness was sworn during Porterâs substantive bench trial. Â¶22Â Â Â Â Â We now resolve this split. We agree with the division in Porter that the statutory changes do not allow us to persuasively distinguish Quintana. Instead, we choose to overrule Quintana, based on the Supreme Courtâs subsequent decision in Monge and the many court decisions tracking Monge.