Opinion ID: 423679
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedural Defects in the Administrative Hearing

Text: 14 Defendants complain of the fact that the state review officer who reversed the August 11, 1980 decision of the local hearing officer and ordered MSC to fund plaintiffs' placement at Landmark was an employee of the state educational agency. The hearing there did not satisfy the requirement of the EAHCA that it not be conducted by an employee of [the local or state educational] agency ... involved in the education or care of the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2). 3 15 The district court rejected defendants' request that it remand the case for an impartial administrative review. Based on the legislative history of the statute, the court concluded that Congress intended the prohibition against review by employees of an agency involved to benefit only handicapped children and their parents and guardians. See Sen.Conf.Rep. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 49, reprinted in [1975] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 1425, 1502. MSC therefore was not within the protected class that Congress envisioned when it prohibited employees of the state educational agency from acting as review officers and could not challenge the alleged defect in the state review procedure. In this case, the court noted that it would not necessarily remand the under EAHCA for a new administrative review, because of its own mandate to assess the evidence independently, not simply to ensure that the administrative determination was supported by substantial evidence. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). Thus, the court concluded, even if the challenged procedural defect would render an educational agency a party aggrieved and entitle it to review in the district court, the remedy for that defect is de novo review by the court, not a second chance in the administrative process. See Kruelle v. New Castle County School District, 642 F.2d 687, 692 (3d Cir.1981); Grymes v. State Bd. of Educ., 3 EHLR 552:279, :281 (D.Del. Jan. 7, 1981). 16 Since the district court's decision, the Supreme Court has indicated that the court's review is to be something short of a complete de novo review of the state educational program, see Rowley, supra, --- U.S. at ----, 102 S.Ct. at 3051 (The fact that § 1414(e) requires that the reviewing court 'receive the records of the [state] administrative proceedings' carries with it the implied requirement that due weight shall be given to these proceedings), a decision that casts some doubt on the district court's conclusion that even if there were procedural error in the administrative process, no remand would be required. MSC also points out that at least one court has allowed a local educational agency to challenge the state educational agency's use of an employee as a review officer. See East Brunswick Bd. of Educ. v. New Jersey State Bd. of Educ., --- F.Supp. ----, Current EHLR Dec. 554:122 (D.N.J.1982). 17 We need not decide when a remand should be required to cure procedural defects in the administrative review or whether a local educational agency may ever challenge the designation of a state agency employee as review officer. MSC is foreclosed from challenging the procedural violation because through two hearings, numerous briefs, and two decisions by Review Officer O'Neil, MSC did not object to the fact that he was a Department of Education employee. The issue apparently was raised for the first time in a brief presented to the district court. Nor has MSC offered any excuse for its failure to raise the objection during the administrative proceeding, when the error might have been easily corrected. As the Supreme Court has instructed, orderly procedure and good administration require that objections to the proceedings of an administrative agency be made while it has opportunity for correction in order to raise issues reviewable by the courts. United States v. Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 37, 73 S.Ct. 67, 69, 97 L.Ed. 54 (1952).