Opinion ID: 6335617
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenge to Reasonableness of the Sentence

Text: Fitzpatrick next challenges his thirty-six-year sentence as unreasonably high. “In reviewing sentences for substantive reasonableness, we do not substitute our judgment for that of a district judge, who is better situated to make individualized sentencing decisions.” United States v. Porraz, 943 F.3d 1099, 1104 (7th Cir. 2019). We review a sentence’s reasonableness for abuse of discretion, and we will “uphold a sentence so long as the judge offers an adequate statement of his reasons consistent with the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. Sentences within a properly calculated Sentencing Guidelines range are presumptively—although not conclusively—reasonable. United States v. Boscarino, 437 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2006). This presumption of reasonableness also extends to below-Guidelines sentences. United States v. Harris, 791 F.3d 772, 782 (7th Cir. 2015). As Fitzpatrick acknowledges in his brief, “the district court’s sentence was technically below the guidelines ‘range’ No. 21-1286 13 of life imprisonment,” so we begin our analysis from a presumption of reasonableness. See id. The first argument Fitzpatrick raises is that his 432-month term of incarceration is an “effective life sentence.” Fitzpatrick was twenty-nine years old when sentenced, and his life expectancy of 64.5 years, as calculated in part by his age and race, is less than his projected age upon release (after thirty-six years’ incarceration, Fitzpatrick would be sixty-five). Fitzpatrick notes that this sentence will “all but ensure[] that [he] will spend the remainder of his life incarcerated.” Fitzpatrick cites to United States v. Wurzinger, 467 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2006), for the proposition that “the probability that a convict will not live out his sentence should certainly give pause to a sentencing court.” Wurzinger, however, is factually distinguishable from the case before us. In taking a close look at Wurzinger and the cases it relies on, the abovecited rationale applies specifically to defendants who presented evidence at sentencing about extenuating medical conditions, rather than to defendants grappling with life expectancy calculations more generally. See id. at 651–52 (discussing the impact of diabetes on life expectancy); United States v. Gigante, 989 F. Supp. 436, 442 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (employing life expectancy predictions in the context of defendant’s history of cardiac surgery). Although not mentioned by either party, United States v. Patrick, 707 F.3d 815, 820 (7th Cir. 2013), is instructive: Most worrisome is our inability to discern whether the court appreciated the severity of the sentence it imposed, and in particular its equivalence to the life sentence that it had pur- portedly rejected. Perhaps a 360-month 14 No. 21-1286 sentence concurrent to [defendant’s] 20-year state sentence would not have been problem- atic, but a 360-month consecutive sentence in [defendant’s] case is effectively a life sentence. [Defendant’s] sentence runs until he is 86, and the average life expectancy for a male of [his] age and race is approximately 72 years. We have, however, subsequently stated that “Patrick does not stand for the proposition that, every time a district court imposes a sentence that exceeds the defendant’s life expectancy, the court must explicitly recognize that fact.” United States v. Cheek, 740 F.3d 440, 454 (7th Cir. 2014). If the district court never states that it wishes to give a defendant something less than a life sentence, the court’s failure to explicitly address life expectancy concerns is less problematic. See id. (“And Patrick is distinguishable from [this] case because here the district court never stated that he wished to give [defendant] something less than a life sentence.”). Although the parties went back and forth at sentencing about the appropriateness of a life sentence here, the district court did not explicitly articulate a wish to give Fitzpatrick something less than a life sentence. First, in talking about Fitzpatrick, the district court stated: I don’t believe you [Fitzpatrick] were the organ- izer. I don’t believe you at all played that role. Of course, the guidelines don’t reflect that, but it’s certainly worth pointing out. It does seem like you were kind of an add-on person into this scheme, but you did what you did, and it’s ex- tremely violent and very disturbing. No. 21-1286 15 Next, in talking about Nieto (who received a life sentence), the district court stated: Mr. Nieto received a life sentence, but this hom- icide, for which he was held accountable, be- cause he was kind of the ring leader who put this together, was really just one of many, many, many things that Mr. Nieto did in his role as a leader of the Latin Kings. Even if what we glean from the sentencing transcript hints at an intent by the district court to give less than a life sentence, Fitzpatrick’s sentence is nevertheless reasonable for two reasons. First, Fitzpatrick’s projected release date as calculated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons—July 30, 2048— comes just shy of his 57th birthday. See Find an Inmate, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, www.bop.gov/inmateloc (last visited April 12, 2022) (search for “Lajuan Fitzpatrick”). Although a slight variation from the calculations relied on in Cheek and Patrick, the projected release date calculations at play here assuage concerns “that the sentence amounted to a de facto life sentence.” Cheek, 740 F.3d at 454. Practically speaking, this sentence is not in excess of the projected life expectancy raised on appeal. Second, “even if we assume that [Fitzpatrick’s] sentence is effectively a life sentence, the district court adequately explained his sentence in a manner consistent with the § 3553(a) factors, which is all that was required.” United States v. McDonald, 981 F.3d 579, 581–82 (7th Cir. 2020). “[W]e have upheld a de facto life sentence where the sentencing court determined that the defendant showed a risk of recidivism and lack of respect for the law and the court appreciated the severity of the sentence.” Id. (citation and internal quotation 16 No. 21-1286 marks omitted). For either of these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing. The second argument Fitzpatrick raises under the umbrella of sentence reasonableness is that his sentence was unreasonable considering his co-conspirators’ sentences. The Sentencing Reform Act requires a judge to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Notably, “a sentencing difference is not a forbidden ‘disparity’ if it is justified by legitimate considerations, such as rewards for cooperation.” Boscarino, 437 F.3d at 637–38. Here, Hendry cooperated and cut a deal (although the government certainly could have revoked it), and Cherry cooperated. Those qualify as reasonable sentencing differences based on rewards for cooperation. Fitzpatrick also argues that his de facto life sentence was unreasonable because it was effectively the same as Nieto’s, yet Nieto had a far worse criminal history. Nieto, however, received a real life sentence, not a de facto one. And the record is far from clear that Fitzpatrick would never leave prison, as we can see from his projected release date. …There was thus no unwarranted sentencing disparity between the two. We uphold a sentence so long as the judge offers an ade- quate statement of his reasons consistent with the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In this instance, we hold the district judge fulfilled that duty and accordingly af- firm Fitzpatrick’s sentence.