Opinion ID: 167625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Media Account Evidence

Text: 11 The District Court permitted Ms. Scheff to introduce the 48 Hours report, the Miami Herald article, and a Forbes magazine article in order to mitigate any damages attributable to her. In other words, the District Court allowed the news accounts for the limited purpose of demonstrating that World Wide's claims of damages in the form of lost profits could have been due to those sources rather than Ms. Scheff's statements. World Wide argues that this evidence constitutes specific instances of conduct and that such evidence is inadmissible in this case. 12 The admission of evidence is a matter within the discretion of the district court and this Court will not reverse the district court's decision except for an abuse of discretion. Praseuth v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 406 F.3d 1245, 1253 (10th Cir.2005). The District Court did not abuse its discretion here. The Federal Rules of Evidence permit the introduction of opinion evidence, reputation evidence, and specific instances of conduct when the character of a person is an element of the claim or defense or is otherwise at issue. See Fed. R.Evid. 405(b); Schafer v. Time, Inc., 142 F.3d 1361, 1372 n. 14 (11th Cir.1998) (The plain language of Rule 405(b) ... expressly permit[s] the admission of specific acts when character is an essential element of the case.). Although Utah has never so stated, it is well-established in other jurisdictions that the character of the plaintiff in a defamation case is at issue. See, e.g., Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Grant, 775 F.2d 508, 511 & n. 4 (3d Cir.1985); Longmire v. Ala. State Univ., 151 F.R.D. 414, 419 (M.D.Ala.1992); Daniels by Glass v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 634 So.2d 88, 93 (Miss. 1993). 13 Nevertheless, World Wide cites this Court's decision in Utah State Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Nat'l Farmers Union Serv. Corp., 198 F.2d 20, 24-25 (10th Cir.1952), as support for the proposition that specific instances of conduct are inadmissible for the purpose of mitigation of damages in a defamation per se case. 1 Utah State Farm Bureau, however, is distinguishable. In that case, the defendant publicly stated that the plaintiff was associated with communism. The statement was repeated by several news sources at the behest of the defendant, and the plaintiff filed suit for libel per se. At trial, the defendant sought to introduce the very news reports the defendant sought to be published in order to demonstrate that the plaintiff's reputation had been tarnished by the reports rather than by the defendant's statement. We upheld the exclusion of the evidence, holding that publication by others of the same libelous matters charged by the defendant is generally not admissible to mitigate damages for libel per se; in so doing, we adopted the reasoning of the trial court that it would be unfair to allow the [plaintiff] to avail [itself] of a publication which [its] agent had prepared and submitted for delivery to the public. 198 F.2d at 25. 14 In this case, however, World Wide does not argue that the media accounts are of a similar nature to the defamation it argues Ms. Scheff allegedly committed—indeed, it does not argue that the media accounts are defamatory at all. Moreover, there is no indication that Ms. Scheff was in any way involved in the publication of the disputed media evidence. Accordingly, the rationale underlying this Court's decision in Farm Bureau is not present here. We also note that Utah permits a jury to award only those damages which flow from the false and defamatory statement of the defendant and explicitly prohibits the jury from awarding damages that are the result of the plaintiff's own activities or any other person's activities. See Model Utah Jury Instructions 10.11. As such, we cannot conclude that the District Court abused its discretion on this basis. 15 Finally, World Wide argues that the media evidence should have been excluded because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. In performing the 403 balancing, the court should give the evidence its maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value. Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1274 (10th Cir.2000) (internal quotations omitted). [E]xclusion of evidence under Rule 403 that is otherwise admissible under the other rules is an extraordinary remedy and should be used sparingly. United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir.2001) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, absent a clear abuse of discretion, we defer to the trial judge on the issue of Rule 403 balancing because of his familiarity with the full array of evidence in the case. United States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 983, 987 (10th Cir.1990). 16 We find no abuse of discretion here. The District Court ruled that the evidence was relevant to show World Wide's damages. We also note that it was relevant to whether Ms. Scheff acted with actual malice because the reports, if relied on by Ms. Scheff, support a finding that she had a reasonable belief when making the statements. As to the question of whether the evidence was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403, the District Court observed that in the context of the entire trial, during which both parties offered media evidence (including a television program praising World Wide programs), the media evidence largely cancelled each other out. In addition, the court instructed the jury that the evidence was not to be considered for its truth, but was instead relevant only to the issue of determining the quantum of damages. We conclude that the potential for prejudice and confusion was not so substantial that the District Court abused its discretion in allowing these media accounts.