Opinion ID: 1282340
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Habeas Corpus Appeal

Text: The habeas corpus appeal challenges the trial court's finding that the defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective. Our general rule in regard to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is contained in Syllabus Point 19 of State v. Thomas, 157 W.Va. 640, 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974), where we stated: In the determination of a claim that an accused was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel violative of Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, courts should measure and compare the questioned counsel's performance by whether he exhibited the normal and customary degree of skill possessed by attorneys who are reasonably knowledgeable of criminal law, except that proved counsel error which does not affect the outcome of the case, will be regarded as harmless error. See also Syllabus Point 4, State v. Key, W.Va., 275 S.E.2d 924 (1981); State v. Demastus, W.Va., 270 S.E.2d 649 (1980); Syllabus Point 2, Scott v. Mohn, W.Va., 268 S.E.2d 117 (1980); Syllabus Point 1, Carter v. Bordenkircher, W.Va., 226 S.E.2d 711 (1976). In Scott v. Mohn, supra , we elaborated on certain guidelines that had been formulated in our own and other jurisdictions relevant in determining the effectiveness of counsel: Distilling the principles taught by those cases we find that the Court should make the following inquiries as to whether: 1) counsel was promptly furnished to the accused; 2) counsel was afforded a reasonable time to prepare to defend the accused; 3) counsel promptly conferred and thoroughly discussed the facts and the law with the client, including but not limited to advising him of his rights, matters of defense, etc.; 4) counsel conducted any investigation of the facts and the law in preparation for trial; 5) counsel exhibited the normal and customary degree of skill possessed by attorneys who are reasonably knowledgeable of criminal law; and, 6) any prejudice resulted to the accused in the event any of the above guidelines were not followed. An omission or failure to abide by the above requirements may constitute a denial of effective assistance of counsel unless the state can establish lack of prejudice thereby. 268 S.E.2d at 119-20. [10] In State v. Thomas, supra , in Syllabus Points 21 and 22, we also recognized that defense counsel's performance at trial must also be judged in the light of the strategy, tactics and arguable courses of conduct open to counsel. As to those matters counsel will not be deemed ineffective unless no reasonably qualified defense attorney would have so acted. [11] Moreover, the burden is on the defendant to prove ineffective assistance by a preponderance of the evidence. [12] In determining effective representation, some consideration also has to be given to the quality of the State's case arrayed against the defendant and the strength of the defendant's case. Carter v. Bordenkircher, W.Va., 226 S.E.2d 711 (1976). See also Risher v. State, 523 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1974); State v. Stanley, 123 Ariz. 95, 597 P.2d 998 (1979); People v. Camden, 16 Cal.3d 808, 129 Cal.Rptr. 438, 548 P.2d 1110 (1976); Sutton v. State, 238 Ga. 336, 232 S.E.2d 569 (1977); People v. Turner, 74 Ill.App.3d 840, 30 Ill.Dec. 400, 393 N.E.2d 55 (1979); Commonwealth v. Domaingue, 8 Mass.App. 228, 392 N.E.2d 1207 (1979); Commonwealth v. Little, 468 Pa. 13, 359 A.2d 788 (1976); State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979). With one exception, the specific allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel relate to defense counsel's activity at trial. Defendant alleges that his trial attorney failed to move for a continuance when the defendant's wife was unable to attend the trial because of being hospitalized; that he failed to prepare for the impeachment of the defendant's brother, Francis Hatfield, who was called as a State's witness; that counsel failed to call Willie Hatfield and Ira Fletcher as witnesses for the defense; and that counsel failed to request defense instructions directed at a reduction in the verdict. The final claim is the failure to investigate the ownership of the gun found several days after the shooting under the porch of the victim's residence. We have discussed at some length in the criminal appeal section of the opinion the circumstances surrounding the ownership of the gun. The argument made in the habeas corpus case is simply that had defense counsel known that the ownership of the gun could be traced to an acquaintance of the defendant, a Mr. Carter, counsel would not have brought into evidence the finding of the gun. As we have earlier pointed out, however, the defendant's only defense to the shooting was self-defense. In order to buttress the defendant's story, who was the only one claiming that the victim had a gun, it is not unreasonable to believe that the defense attorney would have introduced the testimony relating to the gun regardless of its ownership. While counsel on appeal stressed that this enabled the State to show the owner of the gun was known by the defendant and to suggest to the jury that the gun was planted by the defendant, the defense counsel was also able in his closing argument to refer to the gun as being linked, however tenuously, to the victim. In view of the rather overwhelming nature of the State's case and the paucity of the defense evidence on self-defense, we cannot hold that defense counsel's strategy fell below that of no reasonably qualified counsel. Defense counsel's failure to move for a continuance based on the absence of the defendant's wife is not borne out by the record at the habeas corpus proceeding. It appears that prior to the empaneling of the jury, defense counsel met in chambers with the judge and prosecutor and orally moved for a continuance. The discussion that followed in regard to the nature of the wife's testimony revealed that her testimony was only corroborative of the arguments between the defendant and the victim's wife. She did not witness the shooting. Even the State's witnesses attested to the arguments. The trial court declined to allow a continuance. Defendant now claims that failure to record the motion for a continuance precluded this as a possible ground for appeal. The testimony at trial from the wife of the victim and other witnesses did not contradict the fact of the prior arguments. Therefore, even if this ground were preserved, we would decline to hold the trial court erred. A continuance cannot ordinarily be obtained for the absence of a nonmaterial witness. State v. Chaffin, 156 W.Va. 264, 192 S.E.2d 728 (1972); State v. Burdette, 135 W.Va. 312, 63 S.E.2d 69 (1951); State v. Currey, 133 W.Va. 676, 57 S.E.2d 718 (1950). Furthermore, defendant complains that the defense attorney had knowledge of two witnesses, Willie Hatfield (no relation) and Ira Fletcher, who were in the vicinity at the time of the shooting. Supposedly, these two men heard shots which they claimed sounded as if they came from different guns. Hatfield was not called at the habeas corpus hearing so we have no record of his testimony. Ira Fletcher's testimony was confusing at best. He was riding in a vehicle at the time and although he claimed it was on the street in the vicinity of the shooting, he saw none of the participants or witnesses. When asked how he knew the shots were from different guns, his only answer was [o]ne sounded loud and the other just a little. When asked on cross-examination how he knew they were shots, he responded: It's shots or backfire of a truck or something; all that noise. When further pressed if he actually knew that they were shots, his response was: I don't know that. Ain't nobody knowed it. The defendant's trial counsel acknowledged at the habeas corpus hearing that he did not use the witnesses because their testimony was weak and might do more harm than good. From a review of the testimony, we agree with the trial counsel. The defendant also claims that trial counsel did not prepare for proper impeachment of the State's witness, Francis Hatfield. Primarily, this complaint alleges that defense counsel had access to a statement given by Francis Hatfield to the State police which contained confirmation that the victim appeared to stoop over before the shooting (as if picking up a rock) and that the victim and the defendant had argued prior to the shooting. A reading of the trial transcript reveals these very points were made on cross-examination. Furthermore, the witness testified that he had begged the victim to leave during the argument and the victim went up the hill saying, `Shoot me. Shoot me.' Defense counsel was also able to expose some hostility on the part of Hatfield by reason of his refusal to be interviewed by defense counsel. The claim is also made by the defendant that defense counsel should not have attempted an independent impeachment of Francis Hatfield by suggesting that he was having an affair with the defendant's wife. The impeachment witness was an eight-year-old niece and while it was not entirely successful, we cannot conclude from the entire record that this caused any prejudice to the defendant's case. The final ground of the ineffective assistance claim is pointed at defense instructions which did not include instructions for lesser degrees of murder and manslaughter. These lesser offenses were included in the State's instructions. It is clear that defense counsel's primary argument was self-defense. There is no question that in defense counsel's closing argument he attempted to negate first and second degree murder and stated, I think this is a case of either not guilty because of self-defense or guilty of voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. We find no basis for holding that counsel's actions on this point fell below our standard of effective representation. Counsel did what could be reasonably expected in a difficult case. In view of the foregoing law, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Logan County. Affirmed.