Opinion ID: 786874
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Shapiros' Appeal

Text: 9 The IDEA provides that the district court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). The Shapiros contend that the district court erred in disallowing attorney's fees prior to the date that Walker was admitted to practice pro hac vice in Arizona. They argue that the administrative hearing officer had the authority to waive the pro hac vice requirements orally and that he did so by approving of Walker's representation of the Shapiros. 10 The district court relied on Z.A. v. San Bruno Park Sch. Dist., 165 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir.1999), in deciding that the Shapiros were not entitled to fees prior to February 2000. In Z.A., the issue was whether a party, represented by an attorney who is admitted to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California but is not admitted to the California State Bar, may be awarded attorneys' fees for a state administrative proceeding under the IDEA. Id. at 1274. Relying on California caselaw holding that no person may recover compensation for services as an attorney in California unless he or she was a member of the state bar at the time the services were rendered, Z.A. reasoned that [a] person is or is not licensed to practice law in a particular forum. There is no halfway. Id. at 1275-76 (citing Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.4th 119, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 304, 949 P.2d 1 (1998)). Because the attorney in Z.A. was not licensed to practice in California, he was not entitled to collect attorney's fees. Id. at 1276. 11 The Shapiros attempt to distinguish Z.A. on the basis that the right to practice law in California is a legislative decision, whereas, in Arizona, the court determines who is authorized to practice law. 4 They rely on Hunt v. Maricopa County Employees Merit Sys. Comm'n, 127 Ariz. 259, 619 P.2d 1036 (1980), in which the Arizona Supreme Court stated that the practice of law is a matter exclusively within the authority of the Judiciary. The determination of who shall practice law in Arizona and under what condition is a function placed by the state constitution in this court. Id. at 1038-39. 12 Hunt, however, does not advance the Shapiros' argument. The fact remains that no person is allowed to practice law in Arizona unless that person is an active member of the State Bar, Ariz. S.Ct. R. 31(b), or is authorized to appear pro hac vice, Ariz. S.Ct. R. 33(d). Under Rule 33(d), an attorney who is not a member of the Arizona State Bar may appear pro hac vice upon compliance with this rule, including an application to appear pro hac vice. The Shapiros do not argue that Walker complied with this rule at the first administrative hearing; instead, they rely solely on their argument that Merkow's and opposing counsel's consent authorized Walker to represent the Shapiros. 13 The general statement in Hunt that the determination of who shall practice law in Arizona is under the court's authority does not undermine the authority of the rules of the Arizona Supreme Court regarding the practice of law in Arizona. Hunt certainly cannot be construed as authorizing an administrative hearing officer to waive the requirements of Rule 33 for admission pro hac vice, particularly in light of the fact that Rule 31(d) lists a number of exceptions to the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, including various administrative proceedings, but there is no exception for IDEA due process hearings. See Ariz. S.Ct. R. 31(c). The Arizona Supreme Court's rules regulating the practice of law, including admission pro hac vice, are mandatory and must be followed. The district court's order awarding attorney's fees only from the date of Walker's admission to practice pro hac vice accordingly is affirmed.