Opinion ID: 1401911
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Superior Court Properly Denied Sherbahn's Motion for a Directed Verdict.

Text: At the close of evidence, Sherbahn and SBS moved for a directed verdict on the issue of future damages. The superior court denied the motion. [5] On appeal, Sherbahn and SBS again argue that the evidence did not support the jury's award. They claim that Kerkove's submission of Dr. Ferris's report, which stated that Dr. Ferris would consider trigger-point injections if anti-inflammatory treatment did not work, was insufficient to allow the jury to award damages for future medical treatment. Kerkove responds that his own testimony, the testimony of his treating doctor, and Dr. Ferris's report are sufficient to support an award of future medical expenses. To establish a claim for future medical expenses, a plaintiff must prove two elements. First, the plaintiff must prove the fact of damages by a preponderance of the evidence. [6] To recover for future medical expenses one must prove to a reasonable probability that they will occur. [7] Second, the plaintiff must prove the amount of damages with a degree of certainty that allows the finder of fact to reasonably estimate the amount to be allowed for [the] item [of damages]. [8] Both the fact and the amount of damages can be proved by evidence of the type of treatment, the costs of treatment, the nature and duration of any hospitalization, resulting pain and suffering, and the length of any period of disability flowing from medical procedures. [9] Sherbahn and SBS rely on Blumenshine v. Baptiste [10] to support their argument that Kerkove's evidence was insufficient to support an award of future medical expenses. In Blumenshine, the trial court set aside the jury's award of future medical expenses after a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). [11] After he completed a pain management program, Baptiste's pain and rehabilitation center concluded that he did not need any further medical care. And although a different physician had suggested cortisone treatment, the plaintiff neither stated that he wished to undertake the treatment nor established what the treatment would cost. We concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove future medical expenses to a reasonable certainty and affirmed the trial court's grant of the JNOV. [12] In contrast, the evidence in this case supports the requested damages. Kerkove's chiropractor, Dr. Barrington, testified that he referred Kerkove to Dr. Ferris for an evaluation and possible trigger-point injection therapy. Although Dr. Barrington did not fully agree with Dr. Ferris's diagnosis and had doubts about the effectiveness of the proposed treatment, he recommended that Kerkove try the alternative treatment recommended by Dr. Ferris because traditional methods of treatment were no longer beneficial to Kerkove. Kerkove also testified that he would pursue the trigger-point injection treatment if he could afford it. Thus, Kerkove proved to a reasonable certainty that he would incur future medical expenses. Sherbahn and SBS also claim that Kerkove should have presented Dr. Ferris's expert testimony to support Kerkove's claim that he would need cortisone injections in the future. They rely on Houger v. Houger, [13] in which we noted that [i]f a question of the nature or character of appellee's injuries were involved, some special skill [is] needed, and expert testimony by someone qualified in medical science [is] required. [14] But Kerkove's chiropractor, an expert with special knowledge, did testify as to the character and nature of Kerkove's injuries and outlined the contents and recommendations of Dr. Ferris's report. Thus, Dr. Ferris's testimony was not necessary for the jury to determine the fact of future medical damages. Sherbahn and SBS next contend that Kerkove's statement that he believed that the injection treatment would cost $8,000 to $15,000 was insufficient to prove the amount of damages. They maintain that the statement is hearsay and that only Dr. Ferris or someone from the Alaska Spine Institute was qualified to testify as to the cost of the procedure. Even if the statement were hearsay, Sherbahn and SBS waived any objection to its admission as evidence. When Kerkove testified about the cost of the treatment at trial, Sherbahn and SBS did not object to it. If a party fails to object to the admission of evidence, the party has waived the objection. [15] Because Sherbahn and SBS waived any objection to Kerkove's statement about the cost of treatment, we will not consider this argument on appeal. Moreover, while the jury may not speculate or guess in making allowance for future medical expenses, [16] Kerkove only needed to provide some data ... upon which [the jury] might reasonably estimate the amount of his future medical costs. [17] And the jury, which is responsible for weighing the credibility of witnesses and the reliability of evidence, apparently accepted Kerkove's estimate. Thus, the jury had some data on which to base its award. After reviewing all of the evidence, we conclude that Kerkove presented sufficient evidence to support his claim for future economic damages. Accordingly, the superior court correctly denied the motion for a directed verdict.