Opinion ID: 1206116
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: dual jury trial

Text: 1. The Georgia Civil Practice Act provides for joint trials and consolidation of actions. OCGA § 9-11-42(a) states: Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, if the parties consent, the court may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. Black's Law Dictionary defines consolidation as the act of uniting several actions into one trial and judgment ... where all the actions are between the same parties, pending in the same court, and involving substantially the same subject-matter, issues, and defenses. [4] A joint trial is defined as a trial of two or more persons ... conducted within the framework of one trial. [5] Although we conclude that the trial court in this case ordered neither a consolidated action nor a joint trial, it mandated a procedure that has attributes similar to both. Like a consolidated action, the Fords' actions were pending in the same court and involved substantially the same subject-matter, issues, and defenses. Like a joint trial, this case had two plaintiffs whose claims were tried within the framework of one trial. The primary disparity between the procedures specified in section 42(a) and the dual jury trial is that two juries, rather than one, rendered the verdicts. This distinction is insufficient to preclude section 42(a) from governing the procedure employed here. First, the trial court ordered the dual jury trial as an alternative to consolidation after the plaintiffs refused to consent to a joint trial. Second, the trial court employed the same rationaleefficient judicial administrationthat supports the consolidation of actions or issues. Third, both trial courts and litigants would be able to contravene legislative intent and the consent requirement of section 42(a) if we ruled that the section did not apply to the dual jury procedure. Instead, we hold that section 42(a) applies to the dual jury trial and other procedures that combine separate actions in joint court proceedings. [6] 2. Although patterned after the federal rule, the state provision differs from the federal rule in one way: it requires the parties' consent to either consolidation or a joint trial. Relying on the plain language of the statute, this court has consistently held that the parties must consent before a trial court may consolidate or join related actions for trial. [7] The legislative history of House Bill 6, which became the Civil Practice Act of 1966, shows that the General Assembly adopted the consent requirement despite opposition from the Senate. As originally introduced and approved by the House of Representatives, section 42(a) required the consent of the parties, but the Senate amended the bill by deleting the requirement. [8] The Committee of Conference recommended that the Senate recede from its amendment, and both houses approved section 42(a) with the language if the parties consent. [9] A year later the General Assembly rejected a state bar proposal to amend the section to remove the consent requirement. [10] Thus, the legislature intended to limit the trial court's discretion to decide how cases on its docket are to be tried by giving the litigants control over the decision to join actions that have common questions of law and fact. In this case, Uniroyal opposed the dual jury trial. Since the trial court ordered the procedure without the consent of all the parties, it violated OCGA § 9-11-42(a). When the statutory rights of a party are violated, the law presumes injury. [11] Requiring a party to show harm from a consolidation would eviscerate the consent requirement of section 42(a) and contravene the legislature's intent that the parties control the issue. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error in ordering a dual jury trial without the consent of the parties and reverse the Court of Appeals on this issue. [12] 3. In reversing, we note that the requirement of party consent in section 42(a) conflicts with the general intent of the consolidation rule. That objective is to give the court broad discretion to decide how cases on its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched with expedition and economy while providing justice to the parties. [13] One commentator concluded that the General Assembly emasculated the rule in Georgia by inserting the words if the parties consent. [14] As this case shows, giving the litigants control over the issue constricts the ability of trial courts to properly control their docket and order the merger of related actions when needed to avoid unnecessary costs and delay. [15] Until the legislature amends section 42(a) to remove the consent requirement, however, it applies when the trial court orders the consolidation or joinder, in whole or in part, of separate actions.