Opinion ID: 2626220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the existence of triable issues of fact preclude the use of summary process to terminate this litigation

Text: ¶ 20 City also argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the evidentiary materials tendered below present no triable issues of fact. City contends the evidentiary materials support no other conclusion than that Officer McCoy's conduct conformed to the applicable standard of care. We disagree that the evidentiary materials are legally sufficient to warrant withholding this case from a jury's deliberations. ¶ 21 The threshold question in any negligence action is whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. [30] While the question of duty is usually presented in terms of the actor's obligation, the essential question [is] whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to protection against the defendant's conduct. [31] One of the most important considerations used in determining whether a duty exists is the foreseeability of injury to the plaintiff. [32] A defendant is generally said to owe a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct with respect to all risks that make the conduct unreasonably dangerous. [33] The outer limits beyond which the law will not find a foreseeable risk of harm to a particular plaintiff that entitles him (her) to protection are set by reason and good sense. [34] Because City does not dispute that it owed a duty of care to Alma, we will assume for purposes of this decision, without deciding, that a police officer owes a negligence-based duty of care to an arrestee to protect the arrestee from injury. [35] ¶ 22 The standard of care prescribes how a person must act or not act in order to satisfy the duty of care. [36] The parties disagree on the precise formulation of the standard of care applicable to a police officer making an arrest. That standard of care which is owed by a law enforcement officer in civil law to a suspect incident to arrest presents a question of first impression for this court. [37] ¶ 23 We begin by noting the obvious: a police officer does not stand in the same shoes as an ordinary citizen when it comes to using force against another person which exposes that person to a risk of injury. This much stands clearly recognized in the state's criminal law. In making a lawful arrest, a police officer in Oklahoma is statutorily relieved of criminal liability for assault and battery as long as the act of force is necessarily committed by the officer in the performance of a legal duty. [38] At the same time, an officer is subject to the criminal laws of this state to the same degree as any other citizen if excessive force is used. [39] Excessive force is statutorily defined as physical force which exceeds the degree of physical force permitted by law or the policies and guidelines of the law enforcement entity. [40] ¶ 24 The legislature has directed the state's police departments to adopt policies and guidelines that outline the outer limit of permissible use of force. [41] The Oklahoma City Police Department has adopted such policies, which are set out in its Operations Manual. The Manual instructs officers to use only such force as is reasonable and necessary under the circumstances, including such force as is reasonably necessary to effect a lawful arrest and prevent the escape of a person lawfully arrested. [42] The Manual defines reasonably necessary force as force used when all other reasonable means to accomplish the desired action have been exhausted or would clearly be ineffective under the circumstances. [43] The Manual also provides that constitutional violations by its officers in using force are to be assessed under a standard of objective reasonableness. [44] Although the Manual acknowledges that police officers are subject to the civil-law consequences of using excessive force, nothing in the Manual addresses the application of negligence principles to the force used during an arrest. ¶ 25 The traditional centuries-old common-law rule recognized in Oklahoma holds that whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to another, that, if he (she) did not use ordinary care and skill in his (her) own conduct, he (she) would cause danger of injury to the person or property of another, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger. [45] This basic formulation of the standard of care is not directly applicable to a police officer making an arrest where exposure of the suspect to injury is an inherent part of the activity. All arrests involve the use of some form of restraint, interference with the arrestee's liberty and the exercise of custodial control over another person. Each of these actions poses some risk of harm to the arrestee. Even when an arrest is accomplished with minimal force, an offensive contact takes place. If police officers were exposed to suit every time the risk of harm inherent in an arrest culminated in actual harm, law enforcement would grind to a halt. The standard of care must hence recognize that the use of force and a concomitant risk of injury are inherent in the performance of a law enforcement officer's duty to arrest those suspected of breaking the law. Ordinary citizens have no comparable leeway in their duty to avoid injury to others. ¶ 26 We therefore hold that a police officer has a special dispensation from the duty of ordinary care not to endanger others. A police officer's duty is very specific: it is to use only such force in making an arrest as a reasonably prudent police officer would use in light of the objective circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the arrest. In applying this standard, an officer's subjective mistake of fact or law is irrelevant, including whether he (she) is acting in good faith or bad. [46] The question is whether the objective facts support the degree of force employed. [47] ¶ 27 Among the factors that may be considered in evaluating the objective reasonableness of an officer's use of force in making an arrest are: (1) the severity of the crime of which the arrestee is suspected; (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest; (4) the known character of the arrestee; (5) the existence of alternative methods of accomplishing the arrest; (6) the physical size, strength and weaponry of the officers compared to those of the suspect; and (7) the exigency of the moment. [48] ¶ 28 City argues that the objective reasonableness standard applicable to police use of force creates a fixed standard of care that may be applied by the court without a jury. [49] A fixed standard of care is one that is firmly and precisely defined by law. [50] A variable standard is one that shifts with the circumstances. [51] Plaintiff's negligence claim in this case rests on the allegation of a breached obligation that is to be measured by a standard that has no fixed dimensions but shifts with the circumstances. [52] The fact that objective criteria are to be used to assess conformance with that standard does not make the standard fixed. [53] City's reference to federal law on the role of judge and jury in deciding the issue of qualified immunity in federal civil rights actions notwithstanding, where in a negligence action the parameters of duty are undefined as a matter of law and shift with the circumstances, a classic case for jury resolution stands presented. [54] ¶ 29 City next argues that summary judgment is its due as a matter of law because reasonable people could not draw different conclusions respecting the question of Officer McCoy's negligence. According to the applicable rule, where the evidence permits of no other conclusion than that a defendant has or has not met the standard of care imposed by law, the court may remove the issue from the jury and decide the question of negligence on its own. [55] We conclude that in this case triable issues are present and preclude summary judgment. [56] ¶ 30 It is undisputed that Officer McCoy removed Alma from a fight with another student. He accomplished this by grabbing Alma's neck with his right hand and, with his left hand holding her left hand, leading her about twelve feet to a wall. He then held her up against the wall with his body. Alma testified in her deposition that when Officer McCoy held her against the wall, he placed all of his force into her left side where her left hand got squished and was broken. Officer McCoy's deposition material tendered for the trial court's consideration does not include any estimation of the amount of force he used, but he repeatedly denied that the force he used would have caused Alma's broken wrist. Alma admits that she kept moving her left hand toward her neck, where Officer McCoy was holding her. Officer McCoy's deposition material contains a reading from his contemporaneous incident report, in which he stated that he perceived Alma's actions at the time as demonstrating her unwillingness to stop fighting. He testified that her actions were not sufficiently extreme to cause him to consider her to be resisting arrest, but she needed to be restrained. ¶ 31 Viewing the evidence as we must in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, [57] we conclude that a jury could find Officer McCoy used more force than was necessary or reasonable to subdue and arrest Alma. The only evidence in the record describing the amount of force used by Officer McCoy comes from Alma who claims the officer used all of his weight to hold her against a wall. The record shows that Officer McCoy weighed 275 lb. at the time of the incident in question and Alma weighted 110 lb. Whether such force, if used, was reasonably necessary cannot be resolved as a matter of law, given the evidence that Alma may not have been willing to submit to Officer McCoy's authority and was attempting instead to continue the fight. Moreover, the record is devoid of any testimony regarding restraint and arrest techniques under these circumstances, what alternatives were available to Officer McCoy to subdue Alma, and what the potential dangers might be to a struggling child had he used an alternative technique. Accordingly, we hold that City is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on its view that Officer McCoy's conduct should be accepted as objectively reasonable.