Opinion ID: 1490004
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Doctor Tanguay

Text: At the time of Brown's trial, § 9-17-23, entitled Privileged communications to clergymen, provided: In the trial of every cause, both civil and criminal, no clergyman or priest shall be competent to testify concerning any confession made to him in his professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which he belongs, without the consent of the person making the confession. No duly ordained minister of the gospel, priest or rabbi of any denomination shall be allowed in giving testimony to disclose any confidential communication, properly entrusted to him in his professional capacity, and necessary and proper to enable him to discharge the functions of his office in the usual course of practice or discipline, without the consent of the person making such communication. Brown contends that any communications between him and Dr. Tanguay were confidential and thus privileged under the statute. Relying on In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374 (3d Cir.1990), he argues that even though portions of the discussion between Brown and Dr. Tanguay took place in Julie's presence, this should not defeat the privilege. In In re Grand Jury Investigation, the government appealed from the denial of a motion to compel a Lutheran clergyman to give federal grand jury testimony concerning subjects discussed during a family counseling session. Id. at 376. The family counseling session involved five people: the pastor, a husband and wife who were members of the pastor's church, the wife's adult son from a previous marriage, and the son's fiancée. Id. On appeal, the government contended that even if a clergy privilege existed under federal common law, the pastor should not be allowed to invoke the privilege because of the presence of the son's fiancée, who was not yet a member of the family. Id. at 377. The government argued that her presence was neither essential to nor in furtherance of any religiously motivated communications to the pastor on the part of the others present and therefore worked either to vitiate or to waive any privilege. Id. The court held that: [T]he privilege should apply to protect communications made (1) to a clergyperson (2) in his or her spiritual and professional capacity (3) with a reasonable expectation of confidentiality. As is the case with the attorney-client privilege, the presence of third parties, if essential to and in furtherance of the communication, should not void the privilege. Id. at 384. Brown maintains that because Julie was essential to and in furtherance of his communications with Dr. Tanguay, her presence should not obviate the privilege. Therefore, he argues, because the privilege was not destroyed by Julie's presence, John Brown was ineffective for failing to object to Dr. Tanguay's testimony. Yet, we need not decide this issue today to dispose of Brown's argument. We say this because whether or not the presence of third parties, in this case, Julie, destroyed the privilege, we believe that in this instance, Dr. Tanguay was not acting in the capacity of a pastor. Doctor Tanguay undeniably was a pastor, but any information he received from Brown was not properly entrusted to him in that capacity, nor was it necessary and proper to enable him to discharge the functions of his office in the usual course of practice or discipline. Section 9-17-23. Simply because one communicates with a clergyman does not mean that every communication is properly entrusted to the individual in that capacity. There is no indication that the meeting, which Dr. Tanguay described as a consult    to see if there was any interest in their getting into therapy for the alleged problem, was conducted with him in his capacity as a pastor of the Connecticut church. Indeed, Janikuak testified that she referred Brown and Julie to Dr. Tanguay because he possessed a greater level of expertise in therapeutic counseling than she could provide. Therefore, because we believe that Dr. Tanguay was not acting in his professional capacity as a pastor during his communications with Brown, and thus the privilege did not apply to these discussions, we do not, at this time, need to address the impact that the presence of third parties has on the privilege.