Opinion ID: 2010977
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Loss on the sale of equipment.

Text: Plaintiff recovered $1,000 for loss upon sale of Chem Tech's office and manufacturing equipment. If supported by adequate evidence of causation, damages of this nature are recoverable. Adams v. National Auto. Ins. Co. 56 Cal.App.2d 905, 133 P.2d 657. Since this loss was occasioned by the decision to go out of business, plaintiff was required to prove a two-link chain of causation: (1) That the decision to go out of business was proximately caused by the suspension of Chem Tech's operations, and (2) that the restraining order was the proximate cause of the suspension of operations. Defendants argue that plaintiff failed to establish either of these links, thereby precluding his right to recover not only this loss but also his claims for rental expense and loss of earnings of his assignors for the 10-week period operations were suspended. Plaintiff testified that Chem Tech went out of business because of accumulated indebtedness (largely for back salaries), inadequate capital, and the loss of customer goodwillall due to the cessation in operations necessitated by the restraining order. Defendants contend that the evidence conclusively shows that the decision to liquidate the businessmade shortly after the temporary injunction was issuedwas due solely to its provisions properly prohibiting the use of any of Fremont's formulas and requiring Chem Tech to keep detailed records of all formulas used in the manufacture and sale of products similar to Fremont's which restrictions would not have prevented a resumption of operations were it not that defendant's formulas were in fact being used. Upon this record, the cause of liquidation was a question of fact for the jury, and since the evidence would support a decision either for or against the plaintiff, the jury's conclusion must be sustained. Similarly, the jury's implicit finding that suspension of operations was caused by the comprehensive restrictions of the restraining order has sufficient evidentiary support. Plaintiff testified that this order made it impossible for Chem Tech to do business since the parties restrained had been advised by counsel that they would face contempt penalties if they sold products, even inadvertently, to Fremont's customers. One who is enjoined is required to obey an injunction implicitly both in letter and in spirit. Hatch v. National Surety Corp., 105 Mont. 245, 72 P.2d 107. If an injunction is ambiguous or imprecise, leaving the party enjoined in doubt as to his obligations, it is up to the party who procured the injunction to have it clarified. Webb v. Laird, 62 Vt. 448, 20 A. 599. If he fails to do so, he exposes himself to liability for damages caused by any reasonable interpretation of the injunction. See, Hatch v. National Surety Corp., supra; Webb v. Laird, supra. The terms of the restraining order in this case were broad and imprecise enough to permit the jury to conclude that the parties restrained could reasonably have interpreted it as requiring them to suspend all operations. In spite of the fact that the order by its terms did not expressly require suspending operations, and in spite of testimony from which defendants argue that the business could have been continued by the simple expedient of securing a list of Fremont's customers, the jury's conclusion, implicit in the verdict returned, that this loss upon sale of the equipment was proximately caused by the wrongful restriction imposed by the order is neither unreasonable nor lacking in evidentiary support. Nor do we agree, as defendants argue, that the award of $1,000 was based on pure speculation. Without objection from defendants, the trial court instructed the jury that this item of claimed loss was to be measured by the difference in the equipment's fair market value at the time the wrongful restraint was imposed compared to the value at the time of sale. See, Kolin v. Leitch, 351 Ill.App. 66, 113 N.E.2d 806. With respect to this, plaintiff testified that the equipment cost about $2,600 when acquired in the fall of 1961, was used for some 6 weeks, and was sold for $900 after plaintiff had made every effort to secure the highest price under the conditions of the market prevailing in the early part of 1962. Making due allowances for the depreciation of the equipment during its use and while the operations were suspended, the award made is within the permissible limits of the inferences which may be drawn from the testimony.