Opinion ID: 2556516
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Decision To Change The Children's Permanency Plans

Text: Ms. B. also challenges the juvenile court's ultimate decision to change the Children's permanency plans from reunification to adoption. We have already discredited her primary contention that the trial court necessarily abused its discretion in making the threshold determination that the Department had made reasonable efforts towards reunification. Moreover, the record makes clear that, while in Ms. B.'s care, the Children had been exposed to physical and sexual violence and neglect, and Ms. B. does not present any evidence that such conduct would be unlikely to continue. [10] See FL § 9-101(b) (Unless the court specifically finds that there is no likelihood of further child abuse or neglect by [the parent], the court shall deny custody or visitation rights to that party[.]). Indeed, there was some testimony that Ms. B. continued to allow unsupervised contact between Mr. T. and Shirley, a dangerous gamble in direct violation of an earlier court order. Finally, Ms. B.'s inability to improve her situation, arguably through no fault of her own, left the Children languishing in foster care drift for 28 months, with no end in sight. Cf. Rashawn H., 402 Md. at 500, 937 A.2d at 192. (The State is not required to allow children to . . . grow up in permanent chaos and instability, bouncing from one foster home to another . . . because their parents, even with reasonable assistance from [the Department], continue to exhibit an inability . . . to provide minimally acceptable shelter, sustenance, and support for them.). While we acknowledge that Ms. B. had been largely cooperative with the Department, we must balance her interests with the Children's health and safety. See FL § 5-525(f)(1) (listing the child's ability to be safe and healthy in the home of the child's parent as an integral factor in determining the permanency plan). Thus, from the sum of these factors, we see no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court's decision to change the Children's permanency plans from reunification to adoption. We hasten to note that placing a child in an adoptive home does not necessarily sever all ties between child and biological parent. Open adoption is an adoption in which it is the explicit intent of all parties to the adoption that the child maintain contact, including the possibility of visitation, with the birth parents[.] COMAR 07.02.12.02(B)(29) (2011). The Department is directed to explore open adoption when [o]lder children who are placed in out-of-home care know who their birth parents are and have already formed significant emotional attachments to them; and . . . [i]t is otherwise appropriate and in the child's best interest not to sever all ties with the child's birth parents[.] COMAR 07.02.12.12-1(A) (2011). See also COMAR 07.05.03.19(A)(2) (2011) (A child may be considered for open adoption when . . . [t]he child's age and level of contact with, or commitment to, the parent make it emotionally difficult for the child to sever all ties with the parent[.]). Indeed, here, the juvenile court found that it's going to be in the best interest of these children if at all possible that there would be continued visitationthat there be a continued contact with mother. Accordingly, the court ordered that the standing visitation orders permitting contact between Ms. B. and her children remain unchanged.