Opinion ID: 799597
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonable Accommodation for a Disability

Text: Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Michigan Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 37.1201-.1214, which mirrors the federal statute, Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1178 n. 3 (6th Cir. 1996), employers are prohibited from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability because of his or her disability in employment matters, such as hiring, advancement, and discharge. § 12101, et seq. Such discrimination includes not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an . . . employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Regan claims that Faurecia failed to provide her with a reasonable accommodation for her disability in violation of both the federal and state disabilities acts. The district court found that Regan's narcolepsy does not substantially limit . . . major life activities to the degree necessary to qualify her as disabled under [the disabilities acts]. The district court also found that, even if Regan is disabled, her request for an altered work schedule to minimize her commute time is not a required reasonable accommodation. Regan argues on appeal that the district court erred in making these two findings. Even assuming that Regan's narcolepsy qualifies her as disabled under the disabilities acts, she has not presented evidence demonstrating that her request for an altered work schedule is a required reasonable accommodation. Section 12111(9) of the Americans with Disabilities Act defines reasonable accommodation to include: (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. An employee has the burden of proposing an initial [reasonable] accommodation. Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d 195, 202 (6th Cir.2010); Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718, 725 (6th Cir. 2000) (The burden of establishing that the proposed accommodation is reasonable remains with the plaintiff.). [T]he inquiry into reasonableness requires[] a factual determination untethered to the defendant employer's particularized situation. Walsh, 201 F.3d at 726 n. 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). Regan proposed that Faurecia let her work an earlier schedule so that she could commute in what she believed to be lighter traffic; she did not present evidence or argument in the district court, or here, supporting the theory that her proposed schedule would provide a commute with lighter traffic. Though this Circuit has not yet decided this precise issue, many courts have found that the Americans with Disabilities Act does not require an employer to accommodate an employee's commute. Robinson v. Bodman, 333 Fed.Appx. 205, 208 (9th Cir. 2009) (The [employer] was not required to accommodate [the plaintiff's] inability to drive to work or use public transportation. Although an employer is required to make reasonable accommodations to eliminate barriers for a disabled employee in the workplace, the employer is not required to eliminate barriers outside the workplace that make it more difficult for the employee to get to and from work. . . .); LaResca v. Am. Telephone & Telegraph, 161 F.Supp.2d 323, 333 (D.N.J.2001) ([T]he change to day shift sought by Plaintiff is not an `accommodation,' that it is legally obligated to provide, but is simply a request for an easier, more convenient commute.); Salmon v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1163 (S.D.Fla.1998) (rejecting plaintiff's claims that employer failed to accommodate her disability by transferring her to a school which afforded her a shorter commute [because] plaintiff's commute to and from work is an activity that is unrelated to and outside of her job); Schneider v. Cont'l Cas. Co., No. 95 C 1820, 1996 WL 944721, at 9 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 16, 1996) (finding employer is not required to eliminate an employee's commute to accommodate the employee's back injury); see also Chandler v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 850 F.Supp. 728, 736 (N.D.Ill. 1994) (employee's inability to undertake a long commute because of back injury was not a disability for purposes of the employer's benefit plan but instead a limitation within the employee's control). While an employer is required to provide reasonable accommodations that eliminate barriers in the work environment, an employer is not required to eliminate those barriers which exist outside the work environment. Salmon, 4 F.Supp.2d at 1163. We find, similarly, that the Americans with Disabilities Act does not require Faurecia to accommodate Regan's request for a commute during more convenient hours. Under the facts present here, her proposal of a modified work schedule for purposes of commuting during hours with allegedly lighter traffic is not a reasonable accommodation. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment for Faurecia on Regan's disability discrimination claims.