Opinion ID: 1190159
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The merits of Lockett's Eighth Amendment claims

Text: Lockett next argues that RUOs Irvine and Suardini used excessive force, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, when they restrained him following his July 21, 2004 hearing. MDOC does not dispute that the RUOs used force against Lockett, but instead challenges Lockett's claim that the force used was excessive. The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, including inflictions of pain that are totally without penological justification. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This court has held that in the prison context, good faith use of physical force may be necessary to maintain prison security and discipline. Williams v. Browman, 981 F.2d 901, 905 (6th Cir.1992). The Supreme Court has explained that [w]here a prison security measure is undertaken to resolve a disturbance ... that indisputably poses significant risks to the safety of inmates and prison staff, we think the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest `whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation, or instead evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as is tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur.' Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7, 10, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) (holding that the extent of the defendant's injuries, including bruises, swelling, loosened teeth, and a cracked dental plate, were sufficiently serious for his § 1983 claim to survive a motion to dismiss (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 106 S.Ct. 1078)). The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Id. at 9-10, 112 S.Ct. 995 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). An absence of serious injury is therefore relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end it. Id. at 7, 112 S.Ct. 995. This analysis must be carefully circumscribed to take into account the nature of the prison setting in which the conduct occurs and to prevent a prison official's conduct from being subjected to unreasonable post hoc judicial second-guessing. Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 605 (6th Cir.1986); see also Williams, 981 F.2d at 906 ([A]ll the facts and circumstances surrounding the application of force must be scrutinized and weighed.). Lockett does not dispute that he insulted the hearing officer, became very angered and upset during the hearing, bit RUO Suardini's hand while being escorted back to his cell, and resisted the RUOs in response to their allegedly excessive use of force. Nor does he challenge MDOC's contention that he verbally threatened the RUOs outside of the hearing room. Although his fellow prisoner attested that he did not see Lockett acting in an aggressive manner toward the RUOs, Lockett's undisputed conduct alone provided the RUOs with a good faith basis for using force to control Lockett, restore discipline and order, and transport him back to his cell. See Williams, 981 F.2d at 905-06. Lockett's own assertions indicate that a minimal amount of force was applied by the RUOs. He stated that Suardini attempted, unsuccessfully, to throw him down the stairs and choke him, and that both RUOs tried to push his face into the wall. In attempting to choke him, Lockett explained that Suardini missed my neck and throat, caught my mouth instead, at which point Lockett bit him extremely good. The RUOs, according to Lockett, were successful only in snatch[ing] him out of his chair in the hearing room, shov[ing] him out of the hearing room, grabb[ing] Lockett around the left jaw and throat, and bending back two of his fingers. The degree of force, he asserted, was great enough to almost break his eyeglasses. But the amount of force required to almost break a person's eyeglasses is minimal. Shoving, grabbing, and bending back two of Lockett's fingers also required only minimal force and was reasonably related to the need for forcibly bringing Lockett under control and returning him to his cell. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Lockett, by his own account, suffered at best only minor lacerations and cuts, and that undisputed evidence showed no dislocation or fracture in his hand. See Johnson v. Unknown Coolman, 102 Fed.Appx. 460, 461 (6th Cir. 2004) (denying a prisoner's excessive-force claim where the prison officers pushed him into his cell, pulled hard on his restraints, hurt his wrists, and tried to bend his thumb back, all in a legitimate attempt to return him to his cell); Williams v. Johnson, 55 Fed.Appx. 736, 736-37 (6th Cir. 2003) (denying a prisoner's excessive-force claim where the prisoner was being argumentative and the prison officer grabbed his arm and attempted to shove him into a closed door, which was determined to be a de minimis use of force that was reasonably related to a security need). Our dissenting colleague asserts that Johnson and Williams are distinguishable and that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the degree of force used by the RUOs. We remain persuaded, however, that these cases are on point and that the RUOs' minimal application of force, together with Lockett's admittedly minor injuries, did not rise to a level that is sufficient to sustain his Eighth Amendment claim.
Lockett's final claim is that Nurses Blackford and Galloway denied him medical treatment for his injuries, and that this denial constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that a denial of medical treatment violates the Eighth Amendment where two requirements are met. First, the medical need alleged must, objectively, be sufficiently serious that the plaintiff faces a substantial risk of harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The second requirement is that the prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical treatment, which is one of deliberate indifference. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A medical need is sufficiently serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention. Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 897 (6th Cir.2004) (emphasis in original) (explaining that the Sixth Circuit applies an obviousness standard to determine whether a medical need is sufficiently serious to satisfy the test set forth in Farmer as well as an effect of delay in treatment standard where the medical need is minor or nonobvious). Where the claimed injury is minor or nonobvious, the seriousness of a prisoner's medical needs may also be decided by the effect of a delay in treatment. Id. (emphases and internal quotation marks omitted). Verifying medical evidence is required in those cases to assess whether the delay caused a serious medical injury. Id. at 898. Under the deliberate indifference prong, the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970.
According to Lockett's own affidavit, he suffered minor lacerations and cuts and soreness in two of the fingers on his right hand. Nurse Galloway attested that when she twice checked on him within 24 hours after the altercation, he did not display any injuries. In addition, a subsequent examination of his hand revealed no fracture or dislocation in his fingers. Lockett's affidavit, submitted after Galloway's, does not dispute the foregoing factual assertions, and he did not submit any verifying medical evidence relating to the effect of not receiving treatment. Lockett's allegations of minor cuts and lacerations do not support his claim that his injuries were, objectively speaking, sufficiently serious to necessitate medical treatment. See Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 898 (citing cases involving nonobvious and minor injuries that did not support Eighth Amendment claims, including minor cuts and bruises resulting from a glass splinter that required neither stitches nor painkillers and a knee injury for which it was merely preferable that the prisoner receive treatment). The claimed seriousness of his injuries and any adverse effect from not receiving immediate medical attention is further undermined by the undisputed fact that Lockett failed to keep an appointment at the medical clinic five days after the incident. Thus, even accepting Lockett's own allegations of injury as true, he has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the severity of his injuries.
Lockett has also failed to satisfy the second requirement for his denial-of-medical-treatment claimdeliberate indifference on the part of either Blackford or Galloway. Lockett alleged in his verified complaint that Blackford refused to treat his injuries. Blackford, however, responded by attesting that she was not aware of his injuries because she never received a call about them and that she had no contact with him at all around the time of the July 21, 2004 incident. Lockett's affidavit, submitted after Blackford's, does not respond to Blackford's assertions and in fact does not address his denial-of-medical-treatment claim at all. For her part, Galloway stated that she saw Lockett twice within 24 hours of the incident, but observed no signs of injury. During her second visit to his cell, at 4 a.m. on the morning after the incident, she asked him if he was okay. He allegedly turned his back to her and replied no in a sarcastic tone. The undisputed fact that she checked on Lockett twice, gave him his medications, and asked him if he was okay defeats Lockett's claim that she disregarded his condition or was deliberately indifferent. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Lockett, Galloway's actions could at most be characterized as negligent for failing to ask follow-up questions after he sarcastically said that he was not okay, but not as evincing deliberate indifference. In light of the evidence in the record, no reasonable jury would find that Lockett's injuries were serious or that either nurse was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. We therefore conclude that his Eighth Amendment claim of a denial of medical treatment is without merit.