Opinion ID: 1341169
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Presentence Review by the Trial Court.

Text: The report required by Code § 19.2-264.5 was prepared and filed with the trial court by Probation and Parole Officer Bonville. This statute authorizes the trial court, after considering the report, to set aside the sentence of death and impose a sentence of life imprisonment. A hearing was conducted by the court on September 24, 1982, at which Bonville and two other witnesses testified in mitigation of punishment. Bonville stated that during the nine months Peterson spent in custody as a juvenile he progressed fairly well, and when he was released the detention authorities thought he was doing well. Bonville thought that Peterson needed vocational training and behavioral counselling. Ann D. Clark, a neighbor, testified that she had known Peterson since he was nine or ten. She had always found him to be friendly and courteous, had never seen him carrying a weapon, and had never observed any violent behavior on his part. She was not aware of his criminal record. Peterson's mother testified that Peterson was six when she and her husband separated and Peterson was somewhat of a disciplinary problem when he was growing up. Stating that her son's attitude improved after his detention as a juvenile, she asked the court to permit him to be rehabilitated rather than executed. Peterson says that his age, 21 years, was a mitigating circumstance requiring the trial court to set aside the death sentence. We agree with the Commonwealth that Peterson's age does not per se preclude imposition of the death sentence. Age was merely a fact to be weighed by the jury. Thus, in Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1066, 266 S.E.2d 94, 95 (1980), the defendant upon whom the death sentence was imposed was age 21 when he was indicted. Peterson's argument is without merit. At the same hearing, Peterson moved the court to set aside the death sentence because of certain after-discovered evidence upon which he had based a motion for a new trial on his Family Dollar conviction. On September 22, 1982, a hearing in that case was conducted on his motion and Peterson presented the testimony of two alibi witnesses. However, neither could say where Peterson was at the time of the Family Dollar robbery. The trial court, finding that the evidence would not have produced a different result, denied the motion. Nevertheless, Peterson argues that the jury in the present case should have had the benefit of the testimony of his alibi witnesses in the Family Dollar case. The trial court disagreed and overruled the motion. We hold that the court did not err in this ruling. The proffered evidence was irrelevant; it did not qualify as after-discovered evidence in the present case. Moreover, it was found by the trial court not even to qualify as after-discovered evidence justifying a new trial in the Family Dollar case. At the conclusion of the hearing on September 24, the trial court confirmed the jury verdict and sentenced Peterson to death. The trial judge stated, before imposing sentence, that the jury verdict was fully justified and supported by the evidence, that the punishment fixed by the jury was just and appropriate, and that it was not reached by the jury under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors. We hold that the trial court discharged its obligation under Code § 19.2-264.5 and did not abuse its discretion in imposing the death sentence in accordance with the jury verdict.