Opinion ID: 2807870
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Commonwealth’s legal rationales

Text: The Commonwealth did not initially rely on the Pennsylvania Constitution in seeking disqualification of the Federal Community Defender attorneys. Rather, the Commonwealth claimed it was seeking to disqualify the Federal Community Defender from appearing in state court because of an alleged misuse of federal funds. The district court in Mitchell, one of the cases that was consolidated for this appeal, accurately described the Commonwealth’s litigation theory as follows: The Commonwealth’s seven-page motion devoted almost two pages of citations to its allegation that the presence of federally-funded [Federal Community Defender] lawyers in Mitchell’s state case was unlawful under federal law. Mot. for Removal ¶ 6. It asserted no corollary state law cause of action, and it made no reference to an attorney disqualification proceeding or to any violation of the rules of professional conduct. The motion offered a single state law citation: it pled jurisdictional authority to pursue the matter under Section 10(c) of the state Constitution, the general provision endowing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court with the right to govern its courts. Id. ¶ 7. Even this citation, however, was secondary to its assertion, earlier in the paragraph, that it had 8 concurrent jurisdiction to enforce federal law. Id. In re Pennsylvania, No. 13-1871, 2013 WL 4193960, at  (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2013) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Mitchell]. As the Mitchell court noted, § 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution was only used to justify opposition to the Federal Community Defender’s representation of capital defendants after the Federal Community Defender removed this action to federal court. However, even then, § 10 was more of a passing reference than the foundation of the Commonwealth’s arguments in the district courts. Article V, § 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Constitution allows the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to make “general rules” to govern the state court system. PA. CONST., art. V § 10(c). However, §10(c) is not cited at all in the Commonwealth’s briefs to this Court. Instead, the Commonwealth stated generally that the disqualification motions were rooted in the “sovereign authority of Pennsylvania, including its power to supervise the practice of law under Article V, § 10 of the State constitution.” Com. First Step Br. 38. It later cited to Article V, § 10(a) of the Pennsylvania Constitution as the basis for the state’s sovereign power to “regulate[] the practice of law in Pennsylvania State courts.” Com. Third Step Br. 37; see also id. at 34. By contrast, the basis for the Commonwealth’s challenge to the Federal Community Defender at the beginning of this litigation was federal law. The rules articulated by the state Supreme Court in these consolidated cases differed slightly in their wording, but the main thrust of each was as follows: If federal funds were used to litigate the PCRA [proceeding] . . . the participation of the [Federal Community Defender] in the case may well be unauthorized by federal court order or federal law. Accordingly, on remand, the PCRA court is directed to determine whether to formally appoint appropriate post-conviction 9 counsel and to consider whether the [Federal Community Defender] may or should lawfully represent appellant in this state capital PCRA proceeding. Maj. Op. 11 (quoting Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 55 A.3d 1108, 1151 (Pa. 2012)). Not only was federal law the initial basis for these Orders, it was the only justification given in state court for disqualifying the Federal Community Defender. Thus, far from proceeding on a state law theory, the Commonwealth originally claimed that its opposition to the Federal Community Defender’s representation was based on the Commonwealth’s desire to enforce federal law. The Commonwealth concedes that it lacks a right of action under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A et. seq, and I agree with the Majority’s conclusion that the Commonwealth may therefore not “claim a direct violation of federal law.” Maj. Op. 31. Because the Commonwealth has no right of action to enforce federal law directly, it also does not have the authority to enforce compliance with federal law indirectly through a new state rule targeted at specific attorneys. See Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., 131 S. Ct. 1342, 1345 (2011) (noting that direct and indirect legal challenges are “one and the same” and must be treated as such, “[n]o matter the clothing in which [litigants] dress their claims” (quoting Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 8 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The post hoc nature of the Commonwealth’s assertion that the rules aimed at the Federal Community Defender were actually made pursuant to § 10(c), and the absence of supporting authority for this theory, seriously undermine the credibility of that assertion.