Opinion ID: 2648664
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Accrual of Mr. Benton’s Retaliation Claims

Text: “[E]ach retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable unlawful employment practice [and Mr. Benton] can only file a charge to cover discrete acts that occurred within [300 days of his filing].” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the employment context, a claim accrues when the disputed employment practice . . . is first announced to the plaintiff. Sometimes, of course, an adverse employment decision isn’t announced and the employee doesn’t learn of it until much later—and in those circumstances courts revert to asking when the plaintiff did or a reasonable employee would have known of the employer’s decision. But in all events, and consistent with the general federal rule, an employee who discovers, or should have discovered, the injury (the adverse employment decision) need not be aware of the unlawful discriminatory intent behind that act for the limitations clock to start ticking. Almond v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501, 665 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Here, defendants did not “announce” their decision to put false write-ups in Mr. Benton’s South Fork personnel file and provide that false information to prospective employers. He asserts that he had no knowledge of defendants’ - 17 - retaliation until he reviewed his personnel file on January 14, 2011. But his allegations show that he discovered or should have discovered his injury before that date. Mr. Benton’s allegations indicate that, before he took steps to review his South Fork personnel file on January 14, 2011, he had deduced that Chief Herrera was ruining his name and preventing him from obtaining employment. R., Vol. 1 at 62. He does not specify when he reached that conclusion. But he alleges that he applied for a job with the Town of Delta in the fall of 2009 and passed the testing for that position. He knew that Delta’s next step was a background check and that Delta had reviewed his South Fork personnel file. He learned in January 2010 that Delta would not hire him, and he specifically alleges a connection between his failure to get that job and Delta’s review of his personnel file. Arguably, Delta’s rejection letter should have alerted Mr. Benton to a problem with his personnel file. But additional allegations show that by April 30, 2010, Mr. Benton knew or should have known of his injury. On that date he learned that Officer Chavez had prepared a false write-up regarding the Elgin traffic stop. He alleges being surprised that this write-up existed because he had been threatened with false write-ups in September 2009, yet he had never seen this false write-up. R., Vol. 1 at 59-60. Based on these allegations, we conclude that Mr. Benton’s retaliation claims accrued no later than April 30, 2010. Therefore, he was required to file his EEOC charge within the next 300 days, by no later than February 24, 2011. Of course, if the false information was provided to - 18 - another potential employer at a future date, this would “constitut[e] a separate actionable unlawful employment practice,” see Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114, and the period for filing a claim would begin to run anew from the time the employee knew or should have known of it. b. Application of Equitable Tolling and Estoppel to Mr. Benton’s Retaliation Claims Because the district court did not address Mr. Benton’s Title VII and ADEA retaliation claims, it did not consider whether they were timely or whether to exercise its discretion to apply equitable tolling or estoppel to extend his deadline for filing his EEOC charge. As an appellate court, we are limited in our “authority to fashion [our] own rationale for a decision entrusted in the first instance to the discretion of the district court.” Ashby v. McKenna, 331 F.3d 1148, 1152 (10th Cir. 2003). Thus, we would ordinarily remand to allow the district court to make a determination on equitable tolling and estoppel in the first instance. See Beaird v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 145 F.3d 1159, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 1998). But we need not do so here because we can say, as a matter of law, that the district court would have abused its discretion by applying either equitable doctrine in this case. See Ashby, 331 F.3d at 1151. Mr. Benton argues that equitable tolling and estoppel apply because he had no knowledge of the false write-ups until he reviewed his South Fork personnel file.4 4 Mr. Benton now disclaims the assertion he made in his objections to the R&R (through his former counsel) that defendants delayed the filing of his EEOC charge by withholding his personnel file and releasing it only in scattered versions. He (continued) - 19 - He also maintains that in September 2009 defendants falsely led him to believe that his personnel file would not contain any false write-ups if he agreed to resign from his position with the Town. But for this promise, he claims that he would have filed his discrimination charge sooner than July 18, 2011. Mr. Benton’s allegations do not establish grounds for tolling the 300-day time period for filing his EEOC charge. After he learned of the false write-up prepared by Officer Chavez on April 30, 2010, he waited eight months to obtain a copy of his personnel file. He then delayed an additional six months to file his EEOC charge. He does not allege any acts by defendants during this time period that caused his delay, that lulled him into inaction, or that misled him about his claims. He says only that he did not realize how legally important the false write-ups were. R., Vol. 1 at 63. Mr. Benton’s allegations fail to demonstrate grounds for applying equitable tolling or equitable estoppel to extend the 300-day deadline for filing his EEOC charge on his retaliation claims. 5. District Court’s Denial of an Evidentiary Hearing on Equitable Tolling and Estoppel Issues We also reject Mr. Benton’s contention that the district was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether equitable tolling or estoppel apply in this case. In his objections to the R&R, Mr. Benton cited Beaird, 145 F.3d at 1174-75, for this proposition. We decline to read Beaird as requiring a district acknowledges that, upon his initial request, he obtained a complete copy of that file on January 14, 2011. - 20 - court to hold an evidentiary hearing in every case where equitable tolling or estoppel is asserted. In this case those issues arose in the context of motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, the district court made its determination based solely on the allegations in Mr. Benton’s amended complaint, as do we. He does not explain how an evidentiary hearing could alter the conclusion that he failed to allege any grounds for applying equitable tolling or estoppel. He simply has not “alleged enough facts to warrant . . . an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he is entitled to [that relief].” Fleming v. Evans, 481 F.3d 1249, 1256-57 (10th Cir. 2007).