Opinion ID: 718314
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Meaning of a System of Records

Text: 18 We start with the fundamental canon that statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute itself. Pennsylvania Dep't of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58, 110 S.Ct. 2126, 2130, 109 L.Ed.2d 588 (1990). In every case, however, we must recognize that the meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context, King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221, 112 S.Ct. 570, 574, 116 L.Ed.2d 578 (1991), a concern which is brought into high relief here by the fact that the determination that a system of records exists triggers virtually all of the other substantive provisions of the Privacy Act, such as an individual's right to receive copies and to request amendment of her records. 19 In this case, both Henke and the ATP argue that the statute's plain meaning supports their respective constructions. Henke argues that the Act's language clearly supports the district court's conclusion that an agency maintains a system of records where it has the capability to retrieve information about an individual which is indexed under her name. 10 The ATP argues the opposite, claiming that the Act's statement that a system exists if information keyed to an individual is retrieved by the agency means that unless an agency has an actual practice of retrieving information by an individual's name, there is no system of records. 20 Henke's textual argument is unconvincing, for it does not take account of Congress' definition of a system of records as a group of records ... from which information is retrieved by the name of the individual.... 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5) (emphasis added). Henke's argument would be stronger if Congress had used words which more clearly suggested that retrieval capability would be enough to create a system of records [317 U.S.App.D.C. 412] --something individual Members of Congress had in fact attempted to do in other bills introduced before the enactment of the Privacy Act. The Records Disclosure Privacy Act of 1974, for example, would have applied where an agency maintains records ... which may be retrieved by reference to, or are indexed under such person's name.... H.R. 12206, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (emphasis added). And another bill introduced later that year would have applied to information which was computer-accessible or manual-accessible, words clearly connoting retrieval capability. H.R. 13872, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (emphasis added). But in the Privacy Act itself, Congress used the words is retrieved, which suggest strongly that a group of records should generally not be considered a system of records unless there is actual retrieval of records keyed to individuals. 11 21 Not surprisingly, therefore, this court and others have previously concluded that retrieval capability is not sufficient to create a system of records. See, e.g., Bartel v. F.A.A., 725 F.2d at 1408 n. 10 (To be in a system of records, a record must ... in practice [be] retrieved by an individual's name or other personal identifier.) (emphasis added); Baker v. Dep't of Navy, 814 F.2d 1381, 1383 (9th Cir.) (deferring to a Navy Regulation stating that a  'system of records' is ... [a] group of records from which information 'is', as opposed to 'can be', retrieved by the name of the individual), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963, 108 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed.2d 390 (1987). While Bartel did not focus on the definition of a system of records, our statement there tends to deflate Henke's claim that under the plain language of the statute, retrieval capability is enough to transform a group of records into a system of records. 22 The ATP's construction, on the other hand, is more consistent not only with the language of the statute but with the policies underlying the Act. 12 As discussed above, the ATP's interpretation takes account of Congress' use of the words is retrieved in the statute. [317 U.S.App.D.C. 413] Moreover, as the ATP points out, under Henke's theory that mere retrieval capability creates a system of records, an agency faces the threat of being found retrospectively to be maintaining a system of records it did not even know existed, simply by dint of a potential use it neither engaged in nor contemplated. This in turn would create serious compliance problems for the agency, because if it had not recognized that it maintained a system of records and had therefore not published notice of its system in the Federal Register, then neither would it have followed the procedures necessary to invoke the exemptions in the Privacy Act which Congress intended to protect disclosure of national security information, confidential law enforcement information, or other information from confidential sources. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(j), (k). Indeed, were we to find that the ATP was maintaining a system of records here, the agency would not be entitled to invoke exemption (k)(5) of the Act, which protects the disclosure of investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining eligibility for ... Federal contracts, because not knowing that it has a system of records keyed to technical contacts, the ATP has never published the necessary rules to invoke this exemption. Cf. Henke v. Dep't of Commerce, 83 F.3d 1445 (D.C.Cir.1996) (NSF has acknowledged that it has a system of records and has promulgated the necessary rules to invoke the section (k)(5) exemption). 23 This is not to suggest that an agency may simply refuse to acknowledge that it maintains a system of records and thereby insulate itself from the reach of the Privacy Act. To the contrary, if there is evidence that an agency in practice retrieves information about individuals by reference to their names, the mere fact that the agency has not acknowledged that it operates a system of records will not protect it from the statutory consequences of its actions. On the other hand, there is no magic number of incidental or ad hoc retrievals by reference to an individual's name which will transform a group of records into a system of records keyed to individuals. 24 One factor in deciding whether such a system exists, obviously, is the purpose for which the information on individuals is being gathered, an approach which is consistent with Congress' distinction between a mere group of records and a system of records. 13 Thus, as in the case with the ATP program, where information about individuals is only being gathered as an administrative adjunct to a grant-making program which focuses on businesses and where the agency has presented evidence that it has no practice of retrieving information keyed to individuals, the agency should not be viewed as maintaining a system of records. On the other hand, where an agency--such as the FBI--is compiling information about individuals primarily for investigatory purposes, Privacy Act concerns are at their zenith, and if there is evidence of even a few retrievals of information keyed to individuals' names, it may well be the case that the agency is maintaining a system of records. We hold therefore that in determining whether an agency maintains a system of records keyed to individuals, the court should view the entirety of the situation, including the agency's function, the purpose for which the information was gathered, and the agency's actual retrieval practice and policies.