Opinion ID: 2453029
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Luther Sutter's Responses

Text: Pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(a) a non-resident of the state has thirty days after service of the summons and complaint to file an answer. It is undisputed that Joshua Sutter, a Georgia resident, filed his answer well beyond this time period. In reply, Joshua Sutter contends that he can benefit from Luther Sutter's timely filed response under the common-defense doctrine. We agree. Arkansas has long recognized the common-defense doctrine, which provides that an answer that is timely filed by a co-defendant inures to the benefit of a defaulting co-defendant. Richardson v. Rodgers, 334 Ark. 606, 976 S.W.2d 941 (1998); Arnold Fireworks Display, Inc. v. Schmidt, 307 Ark. 316, 820 S.W.2d 444 (1991); Southland Mobile Home Corp. v. Winders, 262 Ark. 693, 561 S.W.2d 280 (1978). The test for determining whether the common-defense doctrine applies is whether the answer of the nondefaulting defendant states a defense that is common to both defendants, because then a successful plea ... operates as a discharge to all the defendants, but it is otherwise where the plea goes to the personal discharge of the party interposing it. Richardson, supra ; Southland Mobile Home Corp., supra . In this respect, we have held that a general denial of each and every material allegation contained in the complaint is the assertion of a common defense. See Southland Mobile Home Corp., supra . Likewise, we have held that a defense on the merits that equally applies to the other defendant is the assertion of a common defense. See Richardson, supra (containing a general denial of all material allegations in the complaint, and an assertion that the plaintiffs suffered no damages). Finally, in Richardson , we recently held that a defaulting defendant does not have to demonstrate the criteria listed in Ark. R. Civ. P. 55(c) for setting aside a default judgment if the defaulting defendant was entitled to the benefit of a timely filed answer under the common-defense doctrine. Id. In the case before us today, Joshua Sutter does not clarify whether he is relying upon Luther Sutter's January 16, 1997 motion to dismiss, or his June 26, 1997 answer to the amended petition. Both pleadings, however, include defenses such as the lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and other defenses that are equally applicable to both co-defendants and are not peculiar to Luther Sutter. Furthermore, Luther Sutter included in his answer a general denial of each and every material allegation contained in the original and amended petition. Hence, it appears that the common-defense doctrine applies, and thus Joshua Sutter can benefit from Luther Sutter's timely filed answer. This case, however, raises the novel issue of whether Joshua Sutter can continue to rely upon Luther Sutter's timely filed responses after they have been voluntarily withdrawn. Although we have never dealt with this precise issue, we have held in several cases that the common-defense doctrine applies even if the defaulting defendant makes his or her first appearance after the answering defendant is no longer in the case because the plaintiff has nonsuited or dismissed its complaint against the answering defendant. See, e.g., Richardson, supra ; Schueck Steel, Inc. v. McCarthy Bros. Co., 289 Ark. 436, 717 S.W.2d 816 (1986) (supplemental opinion granting rehearing); Rogers v. Watkins, 258 Ark. 394, 525 S.W.2d 665 (1975). In Schueck Steel, for example, Schueck Steel filed a complaint against Missouri Pacific Railroad Company and McCarthy Brothers Company. Schueck Steel, Inc., supra . Missouri Pacific timely filed an answer that included a general denial of the material allegations of the complaint. Id. In contrast, McCarthy Brothers failed to answer the complaint. Schueck Steel nonsuited its complaint against Missouri Pacific and then obtained a $91,000 default judgment against McCarthy Brothers. Id. In a supplemental opinion, we held that pursuant to the common-defense doctrine Missouri Pacific's timely filed answer inured to the benefit of McCarthy Brothers even after the plaintiff had voluntarily nonsuited its claim against Missouri Pacific. Id. In particular, we said that the answer of the common defendant, Missouri Pacific, was not erased by the later dismissal. Id. Relying upon our holding in Schueck Steel, Inc., supra , the Court of Appeals held in National Sec. Fire & Cas. v. Barnes, 65 Ark.App. 13, 984 S.W.2d 80 (1999), that even when an answering defendant is no longer in the case at the time a default judgment is requested, its answer continues to inure to the benefit of the party against whom the default judgment is sought. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals declared that: Once an answer inures to a defendant's benefit, it would be illogical to retract that benefit upon dismissal of the answering defendant. If such a retraction were allowed, plaintiffs could subvert the rule by nonsuiting or settling with an answering defendant. Id. From these cases, it is clear that the common-defense doctrine applies even if the defaulting defendant makes his or her first appearance after the answering defendant is no longer in the case. In other words, a defaulting defendant can rely upon the answer of a co-defendant who is no longer in the case, and the subsequent dismissal does not erase the answer. This holding is consistent with the well-settled precedent that default judgments are not favorites of the law and should be avoided when possible. See Southeast Foods, Inc. v. Keener, 335 Ark. 209, 979 S.W.2d 885 (1998); B & F Eng'g, Inc. v. Cotroneo, 309 Ark. 175, 830 S.W.2d 835 (1992). Granted, the case before us today is somewhat different from the above-cited authorities because Luther Sutter, the answering defendant, withdrew his answer instead of the plaintiffs nonsuiting or dismissing their claims against him. In support of this distinction, Luther Sutter cites several cases that he claims stand for the proposition that a defendant cannot rely upon an answer that has been withdrawn. See Tri-State Transit Co. Inc. v. Miller, 188 Ark. 149, 65 S.W.2d 9 (1933); Little Rock & Ft. Smith Ry. Co. v. Clark, 58 Ark. 490, 25 S.W. 504 (1894). In these cases, however, we merely held that a withdrawn answer could not be introduced at trial as a party admission. We did not render any holding as to whether a withdrawn answer could inure to the benefit of a defaulting defendant under the common-defense doctrine. Tri-State Transit Co., Inc., supra ; Little Rock & Ft. Smith Ry. Co., supra . Likewise, the cases Luther Sutter cites from other jurisdictions are inapposite because they do not deal with the common-defense doctrine. See Blazina v. Blazina, 42 Ill.App.3d 159, 1 Ill.Dec. 164, 356 N.E.2d 164 (1976); Mathis v. Clary, 142 Ind.App. 154, 231 N.E.2d 157 (1967); Heeter v. Fleming, 116 Ind.App. 644, 67 N.E.2d 317 (1946); Conduitt v. Trenton Gas & Elec. Co., 326 Mo. 133, 31 S.W.2d 21 (1930); Bongardt v. Frink, 265 N.C. 130, 143 S.E.2d 286 (1965). Finally, as to withdrawn pleadings, 61A AM.JUR.2D, Pleadings, § 354 (1981), provides that: While an answer is subject to withdrawal, the fact that it has been once filed, and that it may have been held insufficient on a demurrer, remains a matter of record, and is within the judicial notice of the court, acting on a motion in reference to the same pleading. The withdrawal does not eradicate the fact that the litigant did file the pleading, assuming, of course, that it was filed by him or under his authority. In some cases, however, it is held that an answer, after it is withdrawn, ceases to be part of the record. This is true where an answer is filed for a particular purpose and contains an admission merely to serve that purpose. Thus, we find no support for Luther Sutter's contention that a defendant may never rely upon a withdrawn answer. In light of our displeasure with default judgments and our holdings in Richardson , Schueck Steel, Inc ., and McCarthy Bros., Co ., we question whether a party may defeat the common-defense doctrine by voluntarily withdrawing his or her answer at any point in the litigation. We, however, do not decide that issue today because it is clear that Joshua Sutter answered the petition on December 22, 1997, which was several days before Luther Sutter withdrew his answer. Because Luther Sutter's answer was still viable at the time that Joshua Sutter answered the petition, we hold that the trial court erred when it ruled that the common-defense doctrine did not apply in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order striking Joshua Sutter's answer, and its order of declaratory judgment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.