Opinion ID: 3052162
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: explanation of our request for

Text: CERTIFICATION We turn to the question that compels our certification order: Is Los Angeles International Airport a public forum under the Liberty of Speech Clause of the California Constitution? We certify this question because we conclude that there 6484 INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES is no clear controlling precedent on this issue, and because the answer given by the California Supreme Court will be determinative of the appeal pending before us. See Cal. Rules of Court 8.548(a). We also certify this question due to the unique procedural history of this case. “It is well-established that [federal] court[s] should avoid adjudication of federal constitutional claims when alternative state grounds are available . . . even when the alternative ground is one of state constitutional law.” Hewitt v. Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561, 1565 (9th Cir. 1991). When “the state constitutional provisions are co-extensive with related federal constitutional provisions, we may decide the federal constitutional claims because that analysis will also decide the state constitutional claims.” Vernon v. City of L.A., 27 F.3d 1385, 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1994). However, when the state provisions offer more expansive protection than the federal constitution, we should first address the state constitutional claim in order to avoid unnecessary consideration of the federal constitutional claim. Id. at 1392. Article I, section 2, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution provides: “Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.” Most state constitutions have similarly worded provisions, and courts frequently have observed that the language of those provisions is broader than that of the freedom of speech provision of the First Amendment.5 See, e.g., Alliance II, 993 P.2d at 342 & nn. 10-11 (citing cases). The California Supreme Court has likewise “indicated that the California Liberty of Speech Clause is generally broader and more protective than the free speech clause of the First Amendment.” Id.; see also Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 172 P.3d 742, 749 (Cal. 2007) (“It is beyond perad- 5 The First Amendment provides: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend I. INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 6485 venture that article I’s free speech clause enjoys existence and force independent of the First Amendment’s . . . [T]he California Constitution is now, and has always been, a document of independent force and effect particularly in the area of individual liberties. As a general rule, article I’s free speech clause and its right to freedom of speech are not only as broad and as great as the First Amendment’s, they are even broader and greater.”) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Since the California Supreme Court decided In re Hoffman, 434 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1967), California courts have developed an extensive body of case law addressing whether the government regulation of speech in certain locations violates the Liberty of Speech Clause. Under California law, if the location is a “public forum,” the regulation on speech must be reasonable in time, place, and manner. If the location is a “nonpublic forum,” the regulation on speech need only survive a more lenient inquiry. Although this “forum” terminology is derived from First Amendment law, the California courts have developed their own criteria for determining whether a location is a public forum under the California constitution. Nonetheless, there is still some confusion about how properly to articulate California’s public forum test. For example, in Carreras v. City of Anaheim, our court stated that “the test under California law is whether the communicative activity ‘is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.’ ” 768 F.2d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Prisoners Union v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 185 Cal. Rptr. 634, 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Kuba v. 1-A Agric. Ass’n, 387 F.3d 850, 857 n.8 (9th Cir. 2004)). More recently, the California Supreme Court explained that a shopping mall is a public forum because it is analogous to other spaces that have “immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts 6486 INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES between citizens, and discussing public questions.” Fashion Valley Mall, 172 P.3d at 745-46 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, other California cases focus more on the degree of access the public has to the property. See, e.g., Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 29 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001) (holding that a privately owned retail and residential apartment complex was “not the functional equivalent of a traditional public forum” because access to the complex was “carefully limit[ed]”). Thus, how to articulate California’s public forum test, and how that test differs from its federal counterpart, are not abundantly clear. But regardless of the test’s precise wording, it is undisputed that California courts tend to take a more expansive approach than federal courts in deciding whether a particular location qualifies as a public forum. See, e.g., Carreras, 768 F.2d at 1044, n.7 (citing several cases in which the California courts have interpreted the California Liberty of Speech Clause to provide greater protection for expressive activity than does the First Amendment). However, the California Supreme Court has never squarely addressed whether an airport’s terminals, sidewalks, or parking lots are public fora under the Liberty of Speech Clause of the California Constitution.6 By contrast, the United States Supreme Court has determined that an airport terminal is not a public forum under the First Amendment. See Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (holding that an airport terminal operated by a public authority is a non-public forum, and thus a ban on solicitation need only satisfy a reasonableness standard). Notably, Lee was decided over nine years before the events of 9/11 caused airports around the world to increase their security measures and to restrict general access to certain 6 In People v. Fogelson, 577 P.2d 677 (Cal. 1978), the California Supreme Court held that a licensing ordinance that regulated solicitation at LAX was facially unconstitutional on vagueness grounds. The court did not engage in a public forum analysis. INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 6487 areas of their terminals. Accordingly, we are not certain how the California Supreme Court would apply California’s public forum doctrine to the restrictions on solicitation at LAX. We conclude that the potential conflict between the application of the First Amendment and the California Constitution regarding freedom of speech at California’s airports is one that the California Supreme Court should have the opportunity to address and resolve. As the original panel noted, “[t]his case involves California plaintiffs and California defendants who disagree primarily over whether a California municipal ordinance violates the California Constitution.” Given the complexity of California’s public forum doctrine, the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Lee, and the changes made at LAX and other state airports following the events of 9/11, we agree with the original panel that this case is appropriate for certification. We further note that the parties operated on the assumption that this case would be certified when they engaged in extensive supplemental discovery from 2003 to 2006. Moreover, Judge Marshall operated on that assump- tion when she declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the California claim in case No. CV 03-00293 (No. 0656660 on appeal). For these reasons, we submit this request for certification.