Opinion ID: 2815245
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: May’s Affidavit

Text: Chadwick argues the district court erred in considering May’s affidavit when it ruled on BANA’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Chadwick argues (1) May is a surprise witness; and (2) her testimony is based on inadmissible hearsay. We disagree with both arguments. 6 Case: 14-14555 Date Filed: 07/08/2015 Page: 7 of 12 First, although BANA did not explicitly identify May as a witness in its discovery disclosures, we agree with the district court May is not a surprise witness. Prior to the close of discovery, Chadwick had notice that May had information relevant to his claims. In particular, on February 20, 2014 May verified BANA’s responses to interrogatories about the foreclosure process on Chadwick’s Loan. As a result, May’s knowledge of the case should not have surprised Chadwick. Chadwick had ample opportunity to depose her, but simply chose not to. See Gutierrez v. AT&T Broadband, LLC, 382 F.3d 725, 732 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding no discovery violation, even though affiant was not listed in defendants’ discovery responses, because “plaintiffs were on notice prior to the close of discovery that [affiant] had information pertinent to this matter and was a potential witness” and thus “plaintiffs had a fair opportunity to seek discovery”); see also Advisory Committee’s Notes on 1993 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) (explaining a party has “no obligation to provide supplemental or corrective information that has been otherwise made known to the parties in writing or during the discovery process, as when a witness not previously disclosed is identified during the taking of a deposition”). Second, May’s affidavit is not based on inadmissible hearsay. As manager of BANA’s Mortgage Resolution Team and BANA’s authorized representative, May was competent to lay the foundation for the business records. See Rosenberg 7 Case: 14-14555 Date Filed: 07/08/2015 Page: 8 of 12 v. Collins, 624 F.2d 659, 665 (5th Cir. 1980)1 (“Any person in a position to attest to the authenticity of certain records is competent to lay the foundation for the admissibility of the records.”). While it is true, as Chadwick points out, May did not expatiate on her specific job experience or how exactly the records were maintained, we are mindful that “[t]he absence or extent of personal knowledge regarding preparation of a business record affects the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence.” United States v. Page, 544 F.2d 982, 987 (8th Cir. 1976). May’s testimony was sufficient to lay the foundation for the records. 2 1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981. 2 Chadwick also urges, even if the rest of May’s affidavit is admissible, paragraph 18 in particular constitutes inadmissible hearsay. Paragraph 18 of May’s affidavit states “[a]t no point did BANA reject Plaintiff’s tender or state that it would not accept Plaintiff’s tender.” The district court did not address Chadwick’s specific hearsay challenge to paragraph 18, presumably because Chadwick did not assert it until his reply brief in support of his motion to strike. As the argument was not properly presented before the district court, we need not address it here. Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 572 F.3d 1327, 1352 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Because the issue or argument was not properly presented to the district court, we will not decide it.”). In any event, though, we do not believe paragraph 18 of May’s affidavit contains inadmissible hearsay. “Testimony that conveys a witness’s personal knowledge about a matter is not hearsay.” United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 539 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). Though there is a fine line between hearsay—i.e., “testimony that recounts what was spoken by an out-of-courtdeclarant”—and testimony about matters within a witness’s personal knowledge, we are convinced paragraph 18 is the latter. See id. Paragraph 18 simply proffers May’s personal knowledge, acquired after reviewing BANA’s business records and files, that BANA did not reject Chadwick’s tender or tell him it would not accept tender. Such testimony is admissible, and the district court did not err in considering May’s affidavit in its entirety. 8 Case: 14-14555 Date Filed: 07/08/2015 Page: 9 of 12