Opinion ID: 1183500
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Heading: damages for emotional distress under rcw 49.60

Text: Metro proposed the following instruction which sets out a tort standard for recovery of damages for emotional distress. To recover for mental anguish and emotional distress, plaintiff must prove that defendant intentionally engaged in outrageous and extreme conduct which resulted in severe emotional distress to plaintiff. The measure of damages for emotional distress has been based primarily on the intentional infliction of emotional distress giving rise to the tort of outrage. Browning v. Slenderella Sys., 54 Wn.2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wn.2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977). Neither of those cases arose under RCW 49.60. [4] RCW 49.60.030(2) provides for recovery of actual damages sustained by him ... In Glasgow v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 103 Wn.2d at 407, damages for emotional distress under RCW 49.60 were upheld, the court stating: [P]laintiffs have proved the requisite elements necessary to establish their claim of sexual discrimination. Accordingly, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover damages for physical, emotional and mental suffering as they did. See also Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wn.2d at 393. Ellingson v. Spokane Mortgage Co., 19 Wn. App. 48, 573 P.2d 389 (1978) had held that a person could recover damages for mental anguish under RCW 49.60. The decision noted that such recovery is distinguishable from common law recovery for emotional distress based on intentional discrimination or intentional tort because it is created by statute. Spokane Mortgage, at 57. The opinion recognized that the term actual damages included humiliation, mental anguish and suffering. Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974 (9th Cir.1981) affirmed emotional distress damages under RCW 49.60 in an action for age discrimination. There too the trial court refused an instruction requiring outrageous and extreme conduct. Kelly, 640 F.2d at 984 n. 16. Under RCW 49.60, proof of discrimination results in a finding of liability. The plaintiff, once having proved discrimination, is only required to offer proof of actual anguish or emotional distress in order to have those damages included in recoverable costs pursuant to RCW 49.60. The damages result from the injury, the discrimination. Andersen v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 89 N.J. 483, 446 A.2d 486 (1982); State Div. of Human Rights v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 46 A.D.2d 1001, 362 N.Y.S.2d 105 (1974); 121-129 Broadway Realty, Inc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 49 A.D.2d 422, 376 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1975). Dean testified that while pursuing another position within Metro he exhausted his financial resources. He was forced to sell furniture, clothing and jewelry to live. He moved to California and stayed with his mother. He borrowed money from his family and was forced to go on medical assistance. There was sufficient evidence introduced to warrant an instruction on emotional distress damages. The jury, after weighing the evidence, could have found that Dean suffered mental anguish as a result of the discrimination. However, since neither party requested a special verdict, it is impossible to determine the precise amount or indeed whether the jury awarded anything for mental anguish. Plaintiff, once having proved discrimination pursuant to RCW 49.60, need not prove outrageous and extreme conduct or severe emotional distress. The court instructed the jury, in part, as follows: If you find the plaintiff was discriminated against in his employment based on his physical handicap, you may award actual damages for the following: (1) Past, present and future emotional distress, mental anguish and humiliation; (2) The reasonable value of earnings lost with interest; and (3) Reimbursement for the reasonable value of lost fringe benefits. The burden of proving damages rests with the plaintiff and it is for you to determine whether any particular element has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Your award must be based upon evidence and not upon speculation, guess or conjecture. We hold that an instruction to the jury to consider emotional distress or mental anguish when determining actual damages sustained by the plaintiff is proper in a suit brought under RCW 49.60. The trial court is affirmed. The cause is remanded for a determination of reasonable attorney fees. DOLLIVER, C.J., and DORE, PEARSON, GOODLOE, and DURHAM, JJ., concur. BRACHTENBACH, J. (concurring) I concur in the result solely upon the basis that Metro did not except to the instruction that accommodation of a handicapped worker is an undue hardship if it is unreasonable in view of the size of the employer's business. WAC 162-22-080(3) provides: The cost of accommodating an able handicapped worker will be considered to be an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business only if it is unreasonably high in view of the size of the employer's business ... That standard may well be a valid and desirable criteria for determining the necessity of an employer's accommodation. However, it is not authorized by the statute, RCW 49.60.120(3) and .180(3). The regulation is beyond the authority granted the Commission. Its authority, RCW 49.60.110, is to adopt regulations to carry out the provisions of RCW 49.60. Nowhere is there a hint that the size of the employer's business is a relevant factor in determining whether there has been discrimination against a handicapped person. Such a criterion should be set by the Legislature, not the Commission. UTTER and ANDERSEN, JJ., concur with BRACHTENBACH, J.