Opinion ID: 4266371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Any error in the jury instruction on Reese’s

Text: Fourth Amendment claim that authorized liability if “Defendant shot at and/or shot the plaintiff” was harmless. Defendants next contend the district court, over their objection, gave an erroneous jury instruction providing that a Fourth Amendment violation could be shown by proving that one of the Defendants “shot at and/or shot the plaintiff,” among other elements. Defendants argue “[t]his constituted prejudicial error by skewing the burden of proof at trial.” Defendants argue that merely shooting at someone is insufficient to constitute a seizure. The Court need not decide whether the instruction was erroneous because any error was rendered harmless by the jury’s verdict. In their answers to the special interrogatories, the jury found that the round fired from Deputy Brown’s rifle did not hit Reese but the round fired by Deputy Rose did. Correspondingly, the jury found a Fourth Amendment violation by Deputy Rose but not Deputy Brown. Thus, to the extent Deputy Brown could have been found liable under the Fourth Amendment for merely shooting at Reese rather than shooting and hitting him, the jury’s findings prevented any harm from the potentially erroneous instruction. Thus, even REESE V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 31 if the district court erred in giving that instruction, the error was harmless. D. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to exclude certain testimony by Reese’s expert, and certain testimony by Defendants’ expert elicited on cross-examination. Defendants next argue the district court abused its discretion by failing to exclude testimony by Reese’s expert that a particular set of circumstances represented a “don’t shoot scenario.” The district court overruled Defendants’ objection at trial that the question presented an incomplete hypothetical and invaded the province of the jury. Citing no legal authority, Defendants argue the evidence should have been excluded. “We review the district court’s evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion, and the appellant is . . . required to establish that the error was prejudicial.” Ambat v. City & County of San Francisco, 757 F.3d 1017, 1032 (9th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1110 (9th Cir. 2011)). As to the argument that the hypothetical was incomplete in that it referred to Reese being unarmed after he backed up into the apartment, the jury was not required to accept the described scenario as true and, in fact, made a finding that Deputy Rose did not see Reese’s hands when he shot him. As to the argument that the expert’s answer invaded the province of the jury in that it addressed the ultimate issue, Defendants have not shown prejudicial error. As a general rule, “[a]n opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an 32 REESE V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO ultimate issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 704(a). The district court’s ruling on this issue is therefore affirmed. Defendants also challenge the district judge’s failure to sustain objections to questions asked of Defendants’ expert by Reese’s counsel. The questions addressed scenarios pertaining to whether Deputy Rose saw Reese’s hands when he shot him. Again, given the jury’s finding on this issue, Defendants have failed to show prejudicial error, as the district court determined. The district court’s ruling is affirmed. E. The district court did not err in excluding the deposition testimony of a defense witness who did not appear in court to testify. Next, Defendants argue the district court erred in excluding from the trial deposition testimony of Brittany Shurtleff, a witness who Defendants claim was “unavailable” under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Defendants contend they successfully served a subpoena on the witness and made reasonable, good faith efforts to procure her presence. The district court determined that defense counsel, despite being aware the witness did not intend to appear in court, failed to make additional reasonable efforts in the time leading up to trial to ensure the witness’s appearance in court. The district court therefore concluded there was no basis “to justify finding her unavailable under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(5).” Likewise, Defendants here simply assert that counsel made reasonable, good faith efforts to procure the witness’s presence but they fail to explain what those efforts were. REESE V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 33 Absent any evidence of actual reasonable, good faith efforts to ensure the witness’s appearance, Defendants have not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion. The district court’s ruling is therefore affirmed. AFFIRMED IN PART, and REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART. Each party shall pay its own costs on appeal.