Opinion ID: 1745281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: voluntariness of phelps' statements

Text: The admissibility of a defendant's custodial statements depends on all the circumstances under which the statement is made. [T]o be admissible, an accused's statement, admission, or confession must have been freely and voluntarily made, and must not have been extracted by any direct or implied promise or inducement, no matter how slight. State v. Robertson, 219 Neb. 782, 787, 366 N.W.2d 429, 433 (1985). See, also, State v. Dixon, supra ; State v. Bodtke, 219 Neb. 504, 363 N.W.2d 917 (1985). This court examined voluntariness of a defendant's statement in State v. McCurry, 228 Neb. 841, 846-47, 424 N.W.2d 364, 368 (1988), and stated: As we observed in State v. Bodtke, 219 Neb. 504, 510, 513, 363 N.W.2d 917, 922-23 (1985): As expressed by Justice Frankfurter in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860 [1879] 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961): `The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process.'... ... Use of an accused's involuntary statement ... so offends due process and fundamental fairness in a criminal prosecution, because one acting with coercion, duress, or improper inducement transports his volition to another who acts in response to external compulsion, not internal choice. With voluntariness as the ultimate test regarding an accused's statement, the focal point of inquiry into voluntariness is whether the statement is `the product of a rational intellect and a free will.' [Citations omitted.] .... ... To be admissible, a statement or confession must have been freely and voluntarily made. [Citations omitted.] In State v. Norfolk, 221 Neb. 810, 819, 381 N.W.2d 120, 127 (1986), we stated: The State bears the burden of proving that a defendant's statement was voluntarily made, before that statement is admissible as evidence against the defendant. See State v. Joy, 218 Neb. 310, 353 N.W.2d 23 (1984). In determining whether the State has satisfied its burden, a court examines the totality of the circumstances to ascertain whether the defendant's statement `is the product of a rational intellect and a free will.' [Citation omitted.] See, also, State v. Dixon, supra . A law enforcement officer's communication to a defendant which expresses the officer's intention to take a course of conduct permissible under the law is not, by itself, coercion preventing voluntariness of the defendant's statement in response to the officer's communicated intention. State v. McCurry, supra . However, under the circumstances surrounding the interrogation of Phelps, the trial court concluded that Cavanaugh's statements reasonably indicated a physical procedure which would subject Phelps to pain and trauma and that the imminent prospect of the procedure prevented Phelps' statements from being `the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice....' State v. McCurry, supra 228 Neb. at 846, 424 N.W.2d at 368. Although seeking to characterize sensation from a Q-tip inserted into the urethra as rather minor discomfort or slight pain, brief for appellant at 11, the State, nonetheless, stands on Cavanaugh's description of the penile swab and its consequent pain. The district court concluded that pain, to render a defendant's statement involuntary, need not be of such nature or degree that would have resulted in recoil by Tomás de Torquemada of the Spanish Inquisition. In view of the circumstances surrounding Phelps' statements in question, the State has failed to satisfy the burden of proving that Phelps' statements were voluntarily made, `the product of a rational intellect and a free will.' State v. Norfolk, 221 Neb. 810, 819, 381 N.W.2d 120, 127 (1986). The district court's findings and conclusions are not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the district court's suppression order is affirmed. AFFIRMED.