Opinion ID: 2521907
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issue 1. Denial of Motion to Suppress

Text: [ถ 8] On appeal, Mr. Hernandez does not dispute that the officers stopped him after he failed to signal a turn, which was a traffic violation. He concedes that a traffic stop initiated by a law enforcement officer after personally observing a traffic violation is supported by probable cause and does not violate Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, regardless of the officer's primary motivation. Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ถ 28, 146 P.3d 492, 501 (Wyo. 2006); see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). However, Mr. Hernandez relies on the point that the scope, duration, and intensity of the seizure, as well as any search made by the police subsequent to [a] stop, remain subject to the strictures of Article 1, Section 4, and judicial review. Fertig, ถ 28, 146 P.3d at 501. Any detention or search pursuant to a traffic stop must be reasonable under all the circumstances. O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, ถ 31, 117 P.3d 401, 410 (Wyo.2005). [ถ 9] Mr. Hernandez does not affirmatively contend that his detention and search were unreasonable. Rather, the thrust of his argument is that the prosecution presented absolutely no evidence about the scope, duration, or intensity of the detention and seizure, and thereby failed to meet its burden of showing that they were reasonable under all of the circumstances. The record reflects that the two officers at the hearing testified about the traffic stop and events leading to it, but neither testified about anything that occurred after the initial stop. Mr. Hernandez is correct that the prosecution presented no evidence about the scope, duration, or intensity of his detention and search. [ถ 10] But the record also shows why the prosecution did not present this evidence. Mr. Hernandez's motion to suppress challenged only the validity of his initial stop, not the reasonableness of his detention or search. The memorandum filed in support of his motion to suppress stated a single issue: that the officer lacked a valid basis to stop Mr. Hernandez. It asked the district court to decide a single question: if the initial stop conforms to the standards created for a warrantless investigatory detention. Both this memorandum and the Corrected memorandum filed later focused exclusively on the initial stop. [ถ 11] In reliance on these memoranda, the prosecutor announced at the beginning of the hearing on the motion to suppress that she was going to focus specifically on the stop, the traffic stop alone. The district court agreed that the issue that we're all going to address here is the pretextual nature of this stop. The prosecutor then said she had talked with defense counsel, and understood that the argument from [the defense] perspective is they were going to stop Mr. Hernandez regardless of whether there was probable cause or not, and so it didn't even matter whether or not there was a traffic violation. When the prosecutor invited defense counsel to Correct me if I'm wrong, defense counsel confirmed, That is correct. Later, defense counsel told the district court that the whole premise of this suppression hearing is that illegal turn or not. . . this vehicle was pulled over because Agent Ford told them to pull it over. Based on the evidence and arguments of counsel, the district court wrote in its decision letter that it had determined that Deputy Craig was justified in stopping Hernandez due to the traffic violation that Deputy Craig watched Hernandez commit. Hernandez makes no complaints beyond this initial stop. Accordingly, the Court need not proceed further with its analysis. [ถ 12] Both parties assert that, because Mr. Hernandez did not raise the issue of his detention and search with the district court, we should apply the plain error standard of review. But this is not a case in which the issue was simply not raised below. It is a case in which Mr. Hernandez, through his counsel, affirmatively represented to the district court and the prosecution that the reasonableness of his detention and search was not at issue. The doctrine of `invited error' embodies the principle that a party will not be heard to complain on appeal of errors which he himself induced or provoked the court or the opposite party to commit. Schott v. State, 864 P.2d 38, 39 (Wyo.1993). Generally, defense counsel must have solicited or otherwise acted affirmatively for the invited error doctrine to apply. James v. State, 998 P.2d 389, 393 (Wyo.2000). The record in this case leaves no doubt that Mr. Hernandez's counsel made affirmative statements that induced the prosecutor not to present evidence about the detention and search, and the district court not to consider the issue of their reasonableness. Applying the doctrine of invited error, we need not address this issue further. Callen v. State, 2008 WY 107, ถ 6 n. 5, 192 P.3d 137, 141 n. 5 (Wyo.2008).