Opinion ID: 1749345
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Special Needs Test

Text: Applying the special needs test, we first ask whether the search serves some need beyond the normal needs of law enforcement. If such a need exists, then that need must then be balanced against Appellants' privacy interests.
Appellants argue that DNA sampling is for law enforcement purposes, and thus does not fall within the special needs exception. As Appellants note, KRS 17.170 states that DNA shall be taken for law enforcement identification purposes and inclusion in law enforcement identification databases[,] and DNA database information is to be used for law enforcement purposes. KRS 17.175(4). Under the special needs test, law enforcement objectives violate the Fourth Amendment when the primary purpose is indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control. ... Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48, 121 S.Ct. 447. However, the phrase `general interest in crime control' does not refer to every law enforcement' objective. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424, 124 S.Ct. 885, 157 L.Ed.2d 843 (2004). While the DNA database is maintained for law enforcement purposes, the primary purpose is not a general interest in crime control. Instead, the primary purpose of the DNA database is to assist ... law enforcement agencies ... in the identification, detection, or exclusion of individuals who are subjects of the investigation or prosecution of sex-related crimes, violent crimes, or other crimes and the identification and location of missing and unidentified persons. KRS 17.175(2). It is an investigative tool designed to provide law enforcement with additional information. Its purpose is not to detect unknown crimes, but rather to assist police in solving crimes where the perpetrator left DNA evidence. See People v. Garvin, 219 Ill.2d 104, 301 Ill.Dec. 423, 847 N.E.2d 82, 91 (2006). In this respect, a DNA database differs significantly from the programs at issue in Edmond and Ferguson. In those cases, the programs were designed to obtain evidence of a crime. Unlike the urine samples in Ferguson, which contained evidence of the use of illegal drugs, a DNA sample is not by itself evidence of any crime. It merely provides identifying information that can be compared to physical evidence. See Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 669; Garvin, 301 Ill.Dec. 423, 847 N.E.2d at 91; State v. Steele, 155 Ohio App.3d 659, 802 N.E.2d 1127, 1136 (2003). As such, DJJ does not sample DNA for the immediate and sole purpose of collecting incriminating evidence. Williams v. Commonwealth, 213 S.W.3d 671, 676 (Ky.2006). Kentucky's DNA sampling program therefore fulfills a special need apart from ordinary law enforcement.
Having determined that DNA sampling serves a special need beyond a general interest in crime control, we must now evaluate Appellants' privacy interests against the state's interest in creating and maintaining a DNA database. The state's interest is obvious. It has an interest in assisting law enforcement in investigating and solving crimes where DNA evidence is present. See KRS 17.175(5). It also has an interest in locating and identifying missing and unidentified persons. Id. These legitimate interests must be balanced against Appellants' privacy interests. Generally, DNA sampling of convicted persons and adjudicated juveniles has been upheld as constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Appellants argue that those cases dealing with adult offenders are inapplicable because juveniles are different from adult felons for purposes of balancing their privacy interests. Further, Appellants argue that those cases dealing with juvenile offenders [14] either failed to take into account the unique status of juveniles, or are of little value because of the uniquely rehabilitative focus of Kentucky's juvenile code. Under the Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code, juvenile offenders are indeed treated differently than adult offenders. Juvenile offenders are not convicted, and they are not to be deemed criminals. KRS 635.040. Nor does a juvenile adjudication result in the civil disabilities that result from a criminal conviction. Id. The Juvenile Code also emphasizes rehabilitation to assist in making the child a productive citizen by advancing the principles of personal responsibility, accountability, and reformation. ... KRS 600.010(2)(e). Juvenile hearings are not open to the public, KRS 610.070(3), and juvenile court records are confidential. KRS 610.340. Given these considerations, we recognize that an adjudicated public offender's privacy interest is not diminished to the same degree as a convicted adult. The question is whether these special considerations tip the scales in the Fourth Amendment analysis. See In re Calvin S., 150 Cal.App.4th 443, 448, 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 559 (2007). Juvenile offenders are not afforded all the constitutional rights that adult offenders receive. They are afforded only the right to fair treatment. Carter, 795 S.W.2d at 61. Appellants argue that, because this Court has always subordinated the due process rights of juvenile offenders to the rehabilitative mission of the juvenile code, then it follows that juvenile offenders may not have their DNA sampled unless they are granted the same due process rights as adult offenders. However, the adjudication of a juvenile as a public offender must still be supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. KRS 610.080(2). In addition, DNA sampling does not significantly undermine a juvenile offender's interest in the confidentiality of his or her records. The 2002 version of KRS 17.175 mandates DNA records be used for law enforcement purposes, KRS 17.175(4), and punishes misuse of the database as a Class A misdemeanor. KRS 17.175(7). [15] Thus, because access to the database is carefully circumscribed, requiring public offenders to submit to DNA sampling is hardly a public announcement of the public offender's adjudication. Calvin S., 150 Cal.App.4th at 449, 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 559. Nor does collecting a DNA sample contravene the purposes of the juvenile code. The General Assembly has identified reducing recidivism and providing treatment while maintaining public safety as goals of the juvenile code. KRS 600.010(2)(e). The goal of reducing recidivism is served by the deterrent effect of having a juvenile offender's DNA sample stored in a database. Therefore, the ultimate goal of rehabilitation is served through DNA sampling's deterrent effect. See In re Lakisha M., 227 Ill.2d 259, 317 Ill.Dec. 690, 882 N.E.2d 570, 579 (2008). Further, the juvenile's interest does not outweigh the goal of maintaining public safety. Id. at 579-80. Appellants also argue that the uniquely rehabilitative focus of Kentucky's juvenile code distinguishes it from other states where DNA sampling of juveniles has been upheld. In In re Lakisha M ., the Illinois Supreme Court considered a similar argument in the context of the search and seizure provision of the Illinois Constitution. The juvenile noted that Illinois, as home to the nation's first juvenile court, had unique history and values when it comes to the treatment of juvenile offenders.... Id. at 581. The Court concluded that collection and storage of DNA pursuant to our indexing statute has a deterrent and rehabilitative effect that actually advances the goals of the juvenile code. Id. For the reasons stated above, we believe this statement applies to Kentucky's juvenile code as well. In short, the privacy interests of juveniles adjudicated public offenders, while greater than those of convicted adults, still do not outweigh the state's and DJJ's legitimate interests in establishing and maintaining a DNA database. Appellants' Fourth Amendment challenge must fail.