Opinion ID: 780364
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Polygraph Testing as a Condition of Supervised Release

Text: 42 With respect to the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing the polygraph condition, we have held that the sentencing court may order a condition of supervised release to the extent that it: (1) reasonably relates to the factors set forth in the statute containing the sentencing guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) & (2)(B)-(D); and (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the deterrence, public protection and/or correctional treatment for which it is imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1) & (2); United States v. Loy, 191 F.3d 360, 370 (3d Cir.1999). In imposing conditions, the court may consider: (a) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; and (b) the need for the condition to deter future criminal conduct, protect the public, and provide the defendant with necessary training, medical care, or other correctional treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) & (2); see also Loy, 191 F.3d at 370; United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251 (3d Cir.2001). 43 We find that the polygraph condition is reasonably related to the protection of the public, as well as the rehabilitation of the appellant. The polygraph testing could be beneficial in enhancing the supervision and treatment of Lee. See, e.g., Wilson, 1998 WL 939987, at  (stating that polygraphs are tools to help the probation officer monitor defendant's rehabilitation and compliance with release conditions); Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1370 (11th Cir.1982) (stating that the polygraph test may act to deter the probationer from violating the terms of his probation by instilling in him a fear of detection); Ebihara, 2002 WL 432378, at  (requiring defendant to submit to polygraph examinations in order to assist in treatment, planning, and case monitoring). Moreover, the polygraph condition does not involve greater deprivation of appellant's liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the purposes of protecting the public and rehabilitating the offender. Since appellant is already directed to report periodically to the probation officer and provide truthful answers after he is released from imprisonment, (Appendix at A-7), the additional requirement that Lee undergo polygraph testing does not place a significantly greater demand on him. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the polygraph condition.