Opinion ID: 836040
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: applicability of constitutionally required safeguards for criminal prosecutions

Text: Defendant contends that, although ORS 30.866 creates a civil action for entry of an SPO, that statute in fact is criminal in nature, giving rise to various state and federal constitutional safeguards, including the right to a jury trial. In particular, defendant cites Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, which provides, in part: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to public trial by an impartial jury in the county in which the offense shall have been committed; to be heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor   . (Emphasis added.) [7] The state responds that ORS 30.866 is civil in nature and that, in any event, the procedure for entering an SPO under that statute is not the type of proceeding to which Article I, section 11, was intended to apply. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the state's latter contention. At the outset, we note that the parties' disagreement about whether ORS 30.866 is a civil or criminal statute is based upon their respective applications of the criteria that this court identified in Brown v. Multnomah County Dist. Ct., 280 Or. 95, 570 P.2d 52 (1977). [8] However, this court's case law demonstrates that, even if an ostensibly civil proceeding can be characterized as a criminal prosecution under Brown, an applicable historical exception to Article I, section 11, can exempt such a proceeding from the safeguards set out in that provision. For example, in State ex rel Dwyer v. Dwyer, 299 Or. 108, 698 P.2d 957 (1985), this court addressed the question whether a criminal contempt proceeding for violation of a child-support order implicated Article I, section 11. After determining that, under Brown, such a proceeding might be characterized as a criminal prosecution, the court reviewed the history of criminal contempt proceedings and concluded that, when the Oregon Constitution was adopted, it already was well established that such proceedings took place without jury trials. Id. at 112-14, 698 P.2d 957. The court, therefore, concluded that a statutorily required court finding on a criminal contempt charge is wholly confined within an historical exception that was well-established when the Oregon constitutional guarantee of a jury trial in all criminal prosecutions was adopted, and the jury trial guarantee in Article I, section 11, demonstrably was not intended to reach punishment for indirect criminal contempt for violation of court orders to pay child support. Id. at 114-15, 698 P.2d 957. Similarly, in State ex rel Hathaway v. Hart, 300 Or. 231, 708 P.2d 1137 (1985), this court concluded that criminal contempt proceedings for restraining order violations under the Abuse Prevention Act fell within a historical exception to Article I, section 11. In so concluding, the court acknowledged that the framers of the Oregon Constitution could not have been aware of restraining orders under the Act, which was enacted in 1977. Id. at 240, 708 P.2d 1137. However, the court determined that it could review the historical record for analogies to restraining orders under the Act. Id. Based upon a historical exception for injunctions preventing spousal harassment, as well as the exception for criminal contempt proceedings discussed in Dwyer, the court in Hathaway concluded that the framers would have viewed restraining order proceedings under the Act as an exception to Article I, section 11, and, consequently, that no right to a jury trial applied. Id. at 241-42, 708 P.2d 1137. Consistent with Dwyer and Hathaway, we shall review the historical record to determine whether an SPO entered under ORS 30.866 falls within a historical exception to Article I, section 11. As in Hathaway, the framers of the Oregon Constitution cannot be said to have contemplated specifically the entry of an SPO, as the legislature did not enact the anti-stalking statutes as a whole until 1993. Here, however, the purpose of our inquiry is not to try to match historical facts; rather, our goal is to identify relevant principles that illuminate the matter at hand. See generally State v. Delgado, 298 Or. 395, 692 P.2d 610 (1984) (examining historical record to determine scope of framers' intent respecting types of weapons encompassed within constitutional right to bear arms). To that end, we think it significant that, before statehood, the Statutes of Oregon provided for proceedings to prevent the commission of crimes. Under those statutes, upon receipt of a complaint of a threat to commit an offense against another person or another person's property, a magistrate could examine both the complainant and the accused person, as well as any potential witnesses. The accused person, in turn, had a statutory right to be assisted by counsel. Statutes of Oregon, Act to Define Crimes and Misdemeanors, and Regulate Criminal Proceedings, ch. XVI, §§ 2, 4, 5 (1855). The magistrate further could compel the appearance of the accused person, id. at § 3, and, upon a finding of just cause to fear that any such offence will be committed by the accused person, could require the accused person to enter into recognizance [9] with sufficient sureties, id. at § 6. However, the magistrate had no authority to order the accused person to appear before the district court, unless that person was charged with an offense within that court's jurisdiction. Id. The statutory procedure set out in ORS 30.866 for entering an SPO mirrors the historical procedure for preventing the commission of a crime: A plaintiff files a petition in circuit court; the court compels the appearance of the defendant (and may issue a warrant if the defendant fails to appear); the court hears testimony from both sides; and, upon a finding of probable cause (for a temporary SPO) or preponderance of the evidence (for a more permanent SPO), the court may enter an SPO against the defendant and also may award damages to the plaintiff. Further, as with the prevention of commission of a crime, ORS 30.866 as a whole sets out a preventive procedure, that is, the entry of an SPO ostensibly would serve to prevent the defendant from harming the plaintiff in some way. In sum, it is significant to our analysis here that the right to a jury trial did not attach to the procedures in place in 1855 for preventing the commission of a crime. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the procedures set out in ORS 30.866 for obtaining an SPO fall within a historical exception to Article I, section 11, and, therefore, cannot be characterized as a criminal prosecution[ ] within the meaning of that provision. Accordingly, defendant was not entitled to the constitutional safeguards set out in that provision, such as the right to a jury trial. Defendant also contends that, as applied to him, the procedures set out in ORS 30.866 amounted to a criminal prosecution under Article I, section 11. Defendant specifically contends that, on the date that plaintiff filed her complaint, an OSP officer subjected him to a full custody arrest, including being frisked and handcuffed. In defendant's view, [h]e was treated in the same fashion as a person arrested for a crime. The evidence reflects, as defendant contends, that a police officer frisked and handcuffed him, and transported him by police vehicle, on the date that plaintiff filed her complaint. However, ORS 30.866 does not contemplate such police action. Rather, the statute itself provides for issuance of an arrest warrant only if a defendant fails to appear upon being served with the petition and temporary SPO. ORS 30.866(3)(b). Stated differently, the police actions that defendant cites as demonstrating that ORS 30.866 is criminal in nature as applied to his case are not part of the statute that he challenges. We therefore reject defendant's as applied argument.