Opinion ID: 663929
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Regrading Policy

Text: 12 Appellees suggest that Appellant's general claims regarding regrading are moot because the state changed the regrading policy independently of Appellant and no longer regrades. Generally, voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not ... make the case moot. County of L.A. v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (quotation attributions omitted). However, under Davis, such a case becomes moot if the state shows that (1) there is no reasonable expectation the alleged violation will recur, and (2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. Id. Appellees also claim this case is not capable of repetition yet evading review. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973). In response, Appellant argues only that the state should consent to a judgment if it actually will never implement this policy again. 13 The issue is not moot. No facts indicate that the effects of the alleged violation have been eradicated. No one has regraded Appellant's exam nor the exam of any applicant similarly situated; nor have Appellees shown that Appellant and similar persons have retaken or passed the bar since failing it. The burden of demonstrating mootness is a heavy one. Davis, 440 U.S. at 631 (internal quotations omitted). The state has not met that burden.
14 Appellant claims a factual dispute exists whether a legitimate purpose supports limiting regrading of essay exams to those with scores between 65% and 69.9%. Under Schware v. Board of Bar Exam., 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957), the government must show a rational basis. 1 Brown, 623 F.2d at 610. Appellant asserts that no rational basis is presently shown in the record. Appellant claims Judge Heely failed to explain any rational basis when asked. Taken in the light most favorable to Appellant, Appellant claims this failure is evidence there is no rational basis. Appellant also claims the rational basis asserted by the district court is contradicted by Judge Heely's deposition. The district court's opinion says regrading is meant to insure accuracy and the limitation is cost effective. Appellant claims regrading before an applicant's MBE score is known is in fact wasteful because at that point no one knows who needs the extra points. In his reply brief, Appellant cites Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), and United States Dep't of Agr. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 15 Under rational basis review, the regrading limitation must be upheld if there is any conceivable basis for it. Cash Inn of Dade, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade Cty., 938 F.2d 1239, 1241 (11th Cir.1991); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981); Potts v. Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Hawaii, 332 F.Supp. 1392, 1397 (D.Haw.1971). Appellees assert that regrading was to insure accuracy. Scores of 70 or above were not regraded because regrading would put them at risk of failing. Appellees cite Levanti v. Tippen, 585 F.Supp. 499, 507 (S.D.Cal.1984), in which time savings justified otherwise arbitrary cut-off points for regrading. Appellees note that regrading was of only marginal benefit; thus, no essays below a 65 average were regraded, and now none are. Appellees claim cut-off points for passing or reviewing bar exams have been upheld, at least when no MBE score is averaged in later. Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1101-03 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976); Bailey v. Board of Law Exam., 508 F.Supp. 106, 110 (W.D.Tex.1980). 2 16 We hold the regrading limitation has a rational basis. 3 The essays were regraded before the scores were sent off to be combined with MBE scores. Judge Heely's Deposition, ER 52, 46. This decision to regrade before sending the scores was justified by convenience and simplicity. Original grading was done all in one weekend during which graders would check into a hotel. Id. at 22-23. This procedure aimed to provide graders some quiet time for the purpose of being able to concentrate and grade the answers in one setting. Id. at 23. Though regrading was impossible in this one weekend, regrades were to be done as soon after original grading as possible. Id. at 23. This closeness in time could well promote continuity and consistency in the grading. 17 In this context, limiting regrades to essay exams with averages between 65% and 69.9% is rational. Scores in that range are more likely to fail than scores over 70 when the essay scores are combined with the MBE scores. Moreover, given positive correlation between essay scores and MBE scores, applicants scoring below 65% on the essay exam may well not score above 75% on the MBE (to reach a combined passing score), or so few might do so as to make regrading of essay exams below 65% inefficient. Id. at 53-54 (discussing the correlation between essays and the MBE that has developed over the years). Time constraints also provide a rational basis for the cut-off. Regrading prior to combination with MBE scores being justified here, we find persuasive the cases cited by Appellees in which no MBE component was involved. Tyler, 517 F.2d at 1101-03; Bailey, 508 F.Supp. at 110. 18 Appellant misinterprets Judge Heely's refusal to answer the question regarding rational basis. The witness refused to answer because the question required a legal conclusion. He did give reasons for the regrading and limitation policy. Plaintiff presents no affidavits suggesting Judge Heely's testimony is untrue. Thus, no issue of material fact is before the court. 19 Moreover, Boddie and Moreno are distinguishable; both involved policies dissimilar to that at issue here. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 371 (filing fee for divorce case); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 528 (exclusion of certain households from food stamp benefits). Moreover, those policies were unjustifiable, unlike the policies at issue here. 20 This court's job is not to determine the best policy but only to determine whether the policy at issue is rational. Even if the court is convinced that [Hawaii] has made an improvident, ill-advised, or unnecessary decision, it must uphold the [policy] if it bears a rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose. Cash Inn of Dade, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1241; Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 464-70. We believe it does.