Opinion ID: 853872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Assistance of Counsel at the Guilt Phase

Text: In challenging the assistance of his two trial counsel at the guilt phase, the defendant argues that trial counsel failed to develop or present any available defense. The defendant specifically alleges the following failures by counsel: (1) confusion over their respective roles; (2) belated, misguided, and inadequate investigation; (3) belated, random, and confused motion practice; (4) failure to appreciate the degree to which the defendant's mental health was at issue; (5) failure to develop a guilt phase theory; (6) failure to investigate and present available defenses, including voluntary manslaughter as to Counts I and II, factual disputes regarding Count III, and intoxication; and (7) failure to object to an allegedly prejudicial photographic array and in-court identification and the State's closing argument. The defendant also argues that the cumulative effect of these deficiencies deprived him of a fair trial. The record contains evidence that, at the time of his 1988 trial, one attorney had over ten years of experience in his criminal law practice. This same attorney had been involved in capital cases and had received training in capital defense. The other attorney had prosecuted murder cases and had either prosecuted or defended about twenty Class A and B felony cases. In preparing and presenting the defendant's defense, the two attorneys both undertook substantial work and consulted with each other regarding the case. Although one attorney was designated the lead attorney, the other attorney actually performed the bulk of the work on the case and assumed the lead role prior to trial. Defense counsel consulted with other attorneys, including counsel from the Indiana Public Defender's office. Defense counsel also had access to resources available from the Indiana Public Defender's office. One of the counsel testified that he believed he utilized all resources of which he was aware, and the other testified that he believed he had pursued every aspect of the defendant's case of which he was aware. Defense counsel arranged to have the defendant's mental condition examined, requested and received funds to hire an investigator, and hired an investigator who investigated the case. Both attorneys timely filed numerous relevant motions, including a motion to suppress the defendant's confession, one of the key pieces of evidence against him, and a motion to obtain funds for a psychiatrist, in addition to the two appointed by the court, to evaluate the defendant. The defendant has not identified any motion that was denied solely because it was not filed in a timely manner. Several weeks before trial, defense counsel indicated to the trial court that the defense would be ready for trial on October 3, 1988, and did not consider seeking a continuance because more time was needed for investigation. Defense counsel at trial challenged the State to prove the elements of the crimes alleged and attempted to create reasonable doubt, thereby seeking acquittal upon the failure of proof. Furthermore, defense counsel subjected the State's witnesses to cross-examination and objected to the admission of evidence at trial. Many of the alleged failings of defense counsel relate to strategic decisions that counsel would have made. Defense counsel could have reasonably decided not to include the defendant's mental health as a part of its defense, especially considering the fact that several of the psychiatric or mental health examinations performed on the defendant failed to provide substantive evidence suggesting that the defendant's mental health was a serious issue or any evidence that was favorable to the defendant's case. The results of at least three mental health examinations did not suggest that the defendant suffered from serious mental disability or disease. Counsel's strategic decision was reasonable. Defense counsel could have reasonably determined not to present certain potential defenses because they adopted an alternative strategy. As to Counts I and II regarding the murders of Steven Wentland and Tony Moore, defense counsel elected to challenge the State to prove fully its principal charges, seeking acquittal upon the State's failure to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, instead of presenting an affirmative defense or arguing for a lesser-included offense in the guilt phase. This strategic decision enabled counsel to concentrate on seeking potential inconsistencies in damaging witness testimony. As to the defendant's allegation that trial counsel failed to present factual disputes regarding Count III which involved the murder of Bruce Voge, we note that trial counsel filed a motion to suppress the defendant's confession, cross-examined State's witnesses, suggested during closing argument that another person was responsible for Voge's death, and identified discrepancies between the testimony offered by witnesses and the version of events provided by the defendant in his confession. Regarding the defendant's contention that defense counsel should have investigated and presented available evidence supporting an intoxication defense, counsel was not outside their bounds of discretion in deciding not to invoke an intoxication defense when, under the facts of this case and the law of Indiana, this defense was not likely to be effective. [3] See Montgomery v. State, 521 N.E.2d 1306, 1309 (Ind.1988). Such strategic decisions are reasonable and legitimate. By choosing not to object to the allegedly prejudicial photographic array and in-court identification and the State's closing argument, defense counsel avoided drawing attention to testimony or argument unfavorable to the defendant. This was a legitimate strategy. Applying our standard of review for appeals from negative judgments in post-conviction proceedings, we conclude that, as to the claims of deficient trial strategy and tactics, the evidence is not without conflict and does not, as a whole, lead unmistakably and unerringly to a result opposite that of the post-conviction court. The defendant also contends that, even if the individual failings of trial counsel do not constitute ineffective assistance, their cumulative effect does. The post-conviction court did not enter any findings or conclusions regarding this claim. The defendant cites to our holding in Williams v. State in which we reversed a conviction based upon an accumulation of defense attorney errors, finding that where those mistakes and oversights mount to do substantial damage to the defense, such a claim must prevail. 508 N.E.2d 1264, 1269 (Ind.1987). In Williams, counsel for the defendant clearly provided merely perfunctory representationcounsel failed to attend hearings, indicated to the trial court that he was unprepared to represent the defendant, attempted to withdraw on multiple occasions, including the first day of trial, did no additional investigation or preparation during the five days between the denial of a motion to withdraw and trial, and did not interview any of the State's witnesses prior to trial. His only contact with the alibi witnesses was by telephone, failing also to subpoena them, and he did not request funds to depose them until the morning of the trial. Under these unusual facts, this Court determined that [t]he undisputed facts, standing alone, clearly establish that Williams received ineffective assistance, id. at 1267, and that, [i]n addition to revealing substandard representation, the record graphically portrays a breakdown in the adversarial process which casts substantial doubt on the reliability of Williams' trial, as required by Strickland, id. at 1268. Such an unusual situation does not exist in this case. Here the two defense attorneys fully represented the defendant throughout the trial. Defense counsel had undertaken substantial work in investigating and preparing for trial. No breakdown in the adversarial process occurred that would cast substantial doubt on the reliability of the defendant's trial. (2). Assistance of Counsel at the Penalty and Sentencing Phases In challenging the assistance of counsel at the penalty and sentencing phases, the defendant contends that trial counsel failed to conduct a reasonable penalty phase investigation, to provide the jury with any meaningful explanation of the crimes, and to present available mitigating evidence of the defendant's childhood traumas, mental disabilities, and intoxication. The record indicates that in the penalty and sentencing phases defense counsel's strategy was to humanize the defendant, an appropriate strategic decision. Defense counsel presented opening and closing arguments and testimony from several witnesses in order to present evidence of the defendant's background, including alcohol, drug, and family problems, his relationships, his good qualities, his employment history, and his relatively minor criminal history. Defense counsel also conducted cross-examination, objected to the admission of evidence, and identified mitigating circumstances. Defense counsel requested funds and identified corrections for the pre-sentence report. We conclude that the evidence does not lead unerringly and unmistakably to a result contrary to that reached by the post-conviction court in rejecting the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty and sentencing stages. The defendant also contends that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when they argued that the death penalty should not be imposed so that the defendant could give back to society. During part of their summation in the penalty phase, the defense counsel argued that the defendant's life should be preserved so that experts could study him scientifically to discover how he worked and why people commit such crimes. The defendant cites two federal circuit court cases for the proposition that asking the jury to spare the defendant's life in order to study him constitutes ineffective assistance. Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1324 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1120, 115 S.Ct. 923, 130 L.Ed.2d 802 (1995); Waters v. Zant, 979 F.2d 1473, 1497 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated in part sub nom. Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir.1995), cert. denied sub nom Waters v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 856, 116 S.Ct. 160, 133 L.Ed.2d 103. Neither of these opinions supports the defendant's argument. [4] Arguing that the defendant's life should be spared in order to provide opportunities for study does not necessarily constitute ineffective assistance. Rather, such an argument could be a reasonable strategy in making the best argument in a hard case. We conclude that the evidence does not lead unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion contrary to the decision of the post-conviction court that the defendant's trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. Thus, the post-conviction court did not err in rejecting the defendant's claim that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at the trial, penalty, and sentencing phases.