Opinion ID: 1255540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Development Plan Under NRS Chapter 278A

Text: NRS 278A.400(1) provides that all provisions of a plan for a planned unit residential development run in favor of the development's residents and may be enforced by them at law or equity, but only to the extent expressly provided in the plan. NRS 278A.400(2) further provides: No provision of the plan exists in favor of residents on the planned unit residential development except as to those portions of the plan which have been finally approved and have been recorded. NRS 278A.060 defines plan as: The provisions for development of a planned unit development, including a plat of subdivision, all covenants relating to use, location and bulk of buildings and other structures, intensity of use or density of development, private streets, ways and parking facilities, common open space and public facilities. The phrase provisions of the plan means the written and graphic materials referred to in this section. The district court concluded that the plan for the development included an information report and master plan map (submitted by Glenbrook to regional and county agencies early in the process of seeking approval of the development), the final subdivision maps, the CCRs and their supplements, the Association's bylaws and articles of incorporation, and the physical features, structures and amenities within the area of the development when the above documents were recorded. It further concluded that an action based on NRS 278A is appropriate because of recorded maps, C,C,&R's, the physical features, structures and amenities existing within the area, and the verbal representations made by Glenbrook or its agents. Questions of law such as interpretation of statutory provisions are reviewed de novo by this court. SIIS v. United Exposition Services Co., 109 Nev. 28, 30, 846 P.2d 294, 295 (1993). The district court's inclusion of physical features, structures, and amenities as part of the plan was error. In reading NRS 278A.060, the district court apparently interpreted location and bulk of buildings and other structures, intensity of use or density of development, private streets, ways and parking facilities, common open space and public facilities as plan elements. However, when the statute is properly parsed, these items do not stand as independent elements of a plan, but as appropriate subjects for covenants which compose a plan. Moreover, the statute plainly states: The phrase `provisions of the plan' means the written and graphic materials referred to in this section. NRS 278A.060 (emphasis added). Thus, the court erred in considering physical features to be part of the development plan. The district court also erred by including the information report and master plan map in the plan because they were never recorded, as required by NRS 278A.400(2). The district judge apparently considered that filing the report and the map with regional and county authorities during the zoning approval process constituted recordation. NRS 278A.400(1) refers to provisions recorded by plat, covenant, easement or otherwise  these specified documents are all entered with a county recorder. Given this context, we conclude that as used in the statute, recorded has a specific meaning: entry in the county recorder's registry of real estate titles. However, inclusion of the unrecorded map and report was harmless error because Glenbrook has not shown that their inclusion led to a determination by the court which affected Glenbrook's substantial rights. NRCP 61. It appears that the rationale for limiting enforceable provisions of a development plan in this way is to promote flexibility in the development of PUDs and certainty as to what plans are enforceable commitments on the part of a developer as opposed to nonbinding proposals and ideas. A prime objective of NRS Chapter 278A is to promote flexibility of development. NRS 278A.110(3). A developer can maintain flexibility until it receives final approval for and records provisions of the plan. At that point, the features of a PUD enforceable under NRS 278A.400 are established. For example, in this case the TRPA approved zoning for preliminary plans which proposed higher density development than Glenbrook ultimately adopted in its final, recorded plan documents. The Association is not seeking enforcement of the denser development originally proposed by Glenbrook but does seek enforcement of proposals which Glenbrook made in regard to common areas. The statutory scheme established by the Legislature prevents either residents or a developer from picking and choosing in this way among the many features which may be proposed for a PUD but not ultimately adopted. [2] The Association contends that the district court properly considered non-plan documents and oral representations as parol evidence necessary to clarify ambiguities in the plan. Glenbrook counters that consideration of any oral statements violated the statute of frauds. In River Birch Assoc. v. City of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 100, 388 S.E.2d 538 (1990), a developer of a subdivision recorded a declaration of CCRs in which it covenanted to convey a common area to the homeowners association. Id. 388 S.E.2d at 552. The CCRs constituted a written contract to convey land, but the covenant created a latent ambiguity as to the identity and description of the common area. Id. at 551-52. Admitting parol evidence, both documentary and oral, to resolve the ambiguity did not violate the statute of frauds. Id. at 553. In accordance with the River Birch Assoc. case, parol evidence was admissible in this case to the extent that it was used to resolve ambiguities existing in the plan. The district court found the plan ambiguous in some way but did not elaborate. See infra note 3 regarding the ambiguity to which the court was likely referring. The court did not state that it considered evidence extraneous to the plan in order to resolve any ambiguity; it simply stated that since Glenbrook drew up the CCRs, Glenbrook will not now be allowed to use ambiguity in the document for its own benefit. It appears that the court did not resort to extraneous evidence to resolve any ambiguity of substance but simply construed the plan against its drafter, Glenbrook, as was proper. See Dickenson v. State, Dep't of Wildlife, 110 Nev. 934, 937, 877 P.2d 1059, 1061 (1994) (when a contract is ambiguous, it will be construed against the drafter). The district court also acted in its capacity as a court of equity, but this did not give it unqualified authority to consider non-plan documents and oral statements by Glenbrook. NRS 278A.400 permits enforcement of a development plan at law or equity, yet as already discussed, it also provides that provisions of the plan run in favor of the residents only if expressly provided in the plan and only as to portions of the plan which have been finally approved and have been recorded. NRS 278A.400(1) and (2). Therefore, it seems unlikely the Legislature intended to allow courts to enforce otherwise unenforceable provisions simply by invoking equity. See Longview Fibre Co. v. Cowlitz County, 114 Wash.2d 691, 790 P.2d 149, 153 (1990) (despite a harsh result, the court would not give relief on equitable grounds in contravention of a statutory requirement). Thus, we conclude that for the purposes of an action under NRS 278A.400, the district court improperly considered evidence extraneous to the recorded provisions of the plan.