Opinion ID: 1477474
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Leading Questions and Other Concerns

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to sanction the prosecutor for asking an abundance of leading questions on direct examination. He also offers what amounts to a detailed critique of the prosecutor's performance at trial. Included in this array of criticism is a suggestion that the trial court should have sanctioned the prosecutor for (1) failing to refresh a witness' recollection in the proper manner, (2) improperly injecting testimony while questioning a witness, (3) asking questions that provoked a hearsay response, and (4) inappropriately leaning against the jury box. Again, while some of the prosecutor's lapses could have been avoided, none of them, either individually or cumulatively, resulted in any significant prejudice to appellant. [23] Although not typical on direct examination, leading questions are sometimes permissible. See Bailey v. United States, 831 A.2d 973, 984 (D.C.2003) (trial court has fairly broad discretion to allow leading questions to be asked on direct examination); Arnold v. United States, 511 A.2d 399, 410 (D.C.1986) (the court in its discretion may allow counsel to probe and test a witness' recollection, even by asking leading questions); Jenkins v. United States, 500 A.2d 1019, 1021 (D.C.1985) (allowing prosecutor to ask leading questions on direct examination was not an abuse of discretion); Green v. United States, 121 U.S.App. D.C. 111, 112, 348 F.2d 340, 341 (1965) (leading questions on direct are permissible under certain circumstances). In this case, moreover, the trial court sustained each objection made by defense counsel after a leading question. On one such occasion, the court admonished the prosecutor to keep it non-leading, and after another such incident the court told the jury to disregard the prosecutor's question. Given these actions by the trial court, we are satisfied that if there was any potential prejudice, it was quickly cured, and appellant's right to a fair trial was protected. Here, as in Bailey, the record clearly and repeatedly demonstrates that the trial judge was alert to the possibility of prejudice and acted appropriately. 831 A.2d at 984. The remaining criticisms are not sufficiently significant to require extended discussion. Appellant has simply highlighted what were, at worst, minor mistakes by the prosecutor during the trial in the hope of showing that collectively they prejudiced the defense. He has failed to cite any supporting case law for the proposition that improperly injecting testimony while questioning a witness, asking questions that elicited a hearsay response, or momentarily leaning against the jury box should result in the sanctions he urges, let alone a reversal of his conviction. We are satisfied that these modest transgressions (if indeed they can even be called that) were too trivial to worry about. Scott v. United States, 619 A.2d 917, 929 (D.C. 1993).