Opinion ID: 877465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: count iii: the charge of sexual intercourse without consent, the jury instructions and verdict

Text: Similar defects exist with the conviction for count III, sexual intercourse without consent. The prosecutor worded the charge as follows: That the defendant knowingly had sexual intercourse without consent, with a female not his wife, to wit: Peggy Lee Harstad, and inflicted bodily injury upon the said Peggy Lee Harstad in the course of committing sexual intercourse without consent. (Emphasis added.) The defect exists in the way the jury was instructed as to proving without consent, one of the essential elements of the crime. The jury was instructed that without consent could be proved alternatively. Instruction no. 33 defined without consent as follows: `Without consent' means: the victim is compelled to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, bodily injury, or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone. (Emphasis added.) This instruction is taken verbatim from section 45-5-501(1), MCA which defines the term without consent for all of the sexual offenses in the criminal code. By this instruction, the State could prove the woman's lack of consent by showing that Coleman compelled her by physical force to submit to him. Nank's accomplice testimony establishes that Coleman had intercourse with the woman by use of physical force  her hands were tied. However, there is no corroboration for this testimony. The negroid pubic hair found in the woman's car certainly does not corroborate that he used physical force. There is no assurance that the jury based its conviction on this definition of without consent. By instruction no. 33, the jury could also convict Coleman by finding that he had intercourse with the woman by threatening her or anyone else with imminent death, bodily injury, or kidnapping. But Nank's testimony negates the conclusion that Coleman accomplished intercourse by making any of threats. There is no evidence Coleman threatened her or anyone else with imminent death, bodily injury, or kidnapping. The lack of substantial evidence in the record to support this alternative theory of proving the essential element of without consent, requires that the conviction be reversed. Furthermore, substantial likelihood exists that the jury used a theory not supported by the evidence to convict Coleman of sexual intercourse without consent. The jury made an additional finding, later held by this Court in Coleman I to not be supported by substantial evidence (579 P.2d at 742-43), that Coleman had inflicted physical injury on her while accomplishing the act of intercourse. Because the jury made this finding, the likelihood is that it determined that Coleman threatened her with bodily injury and then carried it out by actually inflicting physical injury. There is, however, no substantial evidence to support that conclusion and this Court has already determined that the jury erred in finding that Coleman inflicted physical injuries upon her. Beyond the substantial evidence question, however, is still the fact that Coleman may have been deprived of a unanimous jury verdict on the issue of without consent. There is no assurance that the jury was unanimous on this issue. The jury was not instructed that it must reach a unanimous verdict on any without consent theory. Our standard of review is again governed by Chapman v. California, supra. Proper application of Chapman requires that the sexual intercourse without consent conviction be reversed and a new trial granted. See, United States v. Gipson, supra.