Opinion ID: 2144018
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Validating Legislation

Text: The defendants make an additional argument solely with respect to the lower courts' injunctions against the enforcement of the environmental impact fee law of Public Act 89-428. The defendants ask that we lift the injunctions against enforcement of this provision on the ground that the reenactment of the environmental impact fee law in Public Act 89-457 validated the imposition of the fees under Public Act 89-428. We agree that application of Public Act 89-457 requires that the injunctions be lifted to the extent that those injunctions proscribe the use, pursuant to Public Act 89-457, of environmental impact fees already collected under Public Act 89-428. This court has recognized the legislature's power to pass curative legislation. See Bates v. Board of Education, Allendale Community Consolidated School District No. 17, 136 Ill.2d 260, 268, 144 Ill.Dec. 104, 555 N.E.2d 1 (1990). The general rule is that the legislature may by a curative act validate any proceeding which it might have authorized in advance, provided the power be so exercised as not to infringe on or divest property rights and vested interests of the parties involved. Bates, 136 Ill.2d at 268, 144 Ill.Dec. 104, 555 N.E.2d 1; see also Worley v. Idleman, 285 Ill. 214, 219, 120 N.E. 472 (1918). The test is whether the legislature might have authorized the act which it attempts to validate before it took place. People ex rel. Shore v. Helmer, 410 Ill. 420, 427, 102 N.E.2d 96 (1951). Generally, where the legislature changes the law while an appeal is pending, the case must be disposed of by the reviewing court under the law as it then exists, not as it was when the decision was made by the lower court. Envirite Corp. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 158 Ill.2d 210, 215, 198 Ill.Dec. 424, 632 N.E.2d 1035 (1994). Accordingly, the fact that curative legislation is enacted during the pendency of an appeal does not preclude its application by the reviewing court. See Bates, 136 Ill.2d at 264, 144 Ill.Dec. 104, 555 N.E.2d 1; People ex rel. Bauer v. Elmhurst-Villa Park-Lombard Water Comm'n, 20 Ill.2d 139, 142, 169 N.E.2d 350 (1960); People ex rel. Patterson v. Woodruff, 280 Ill. 472, 475, 117 N.E. 791 (1917). In Bates, the plaintiffs challenged the defendant school district's issuance of bonds carrying an interest rate of 9.75%. The plaintiffs charged that the bonds were invalid because the applicable provision of the School Code set an interest rate ceiling of 7%. The defendant contended that the bonds were valid because the applicable provision of the Bond Authorization Act authorized an interest rate of 9.75%. The circuit court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim and the appellate court reversed. While the defendant's appeal was pending before this court, the legislature enacted new legislation that, inter alia, validated bonds which exceeded the authority granted by the provision under which they were issued, but were within the authority granted by the Bond Authorization Act. This court held that this legislation validated the bonds challenged by the plaintiffs. In so holding, this court noted that, at the time the bonds were issued, the legislature possessed the authority to authorize an interest rate above 7%. Therefore, because the legislature could have originally authorized the higher rate, it could validate the rate after the fact by means of curative legislation. Bates, 136 Ill.2d at 267-68, 144 Ill.Dec. 104, 555 N.E.2d 1. Similarly, in Woodruff, the plaintiffs brought a quo warranto action against a school district and its members charging that the district was organized pursuant to a statute which had been held unconstitutional by this court. While the case was pending before this court, the General Assembly enacted legislation that validated school districts, including the one challenged by the plaintiffs, which met certain requirements. This court determined that, because the legislature had the power to create the school districts in the first instance, the legislature could, by curative act, validate districts which had been organized under the unconstitutional act. Woodruff, 280 Ill. at 475-77, 117 N.E. 791; see also Bauer, 20 Ill.2d at 142-44, 169 N.E.2d 350 (curative legislation enacted during pendency. of appeal acted to validate water commission whose establishment had been challenged by the plaintiffs). Curative legislation has been held effective to validate tax levies which, when made, did not comply with statutory requirements. See Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill. Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981); People v. Holmstrom, 8 Ill.2d 401, 134 N.E.2d 246 (1956). In Schlenz, the plaintiffs challenged tax levies made by the defendants on the ground that they failed to publish the real estate assessment lists within the time frames set by section 103 of the Revenue Act. This court had previously held that the publication dates of section 103 were mandatory. While the plaintiffs' action was pending in the circuit court, the legislature enacted legislation that validated assessments that had not been timely published under section 103. This court held that, because there was no lack of power to make the assessments in the first instance, the subsequent legislation acted to validate the challenged assessments. Schlenz, 84 Ill.2d at 204-09, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336. In this case, the injunctions issued by the lower courts had the effect of prohibiting the defendants from collecting or disbursing environmental impact fees under Public Act 89-428. Prior to May 7, 1996, the date the first injunction was issued in Johnson, fees had already been collected under that law. According to the defendants, the injunctions issued in each of these cases prohibit the defendants from disbursing, in accordance with the terms of the statute, any of these collected fees to reimburse underground tank owners for corrective action. The defendants argue that Public Act 89-457 validated all fees collected and actions taken pursuant to the environmental impact fee law of Public Act 89-428. As a result, the defendants maintain, this court should lift the injunctions to the extent that they prohibit the disbursement of fees already collected under Public Act 89-428. For the reasons stated below, we agree. As noted, Public Act 89-457 recodified the environmental impact fee law contained in article 3 of Public Act 89-428. Public Act 89-457, like Public Act 89-428, imposed the fee beginning January 1, 1996. Public Act 89-457 also stated that the fee imposed under that law replaced the fee imposed under Public Act 89-428 and that fees paid under Public Act 89-428 shall satisfy the receiver's corresponding liability under Public Act 89-457. In addition, Public Act 89-457 contained the following provision: Validation. All actions taken in reliance on or pursuant to Article 3 of Public Act 89-428 by the Department of Revenue, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Pollution Control Board, or any other person or entity are hereby validated. Pub. Act 89-457, § 385. Public Act 89-457 thus expressly states the legislature's intention to validate fees collected and other actions taken under article 3 of Public Act 89-428. There is no contention made here that the legislature did not possess the authority, in the first instance, to impose the environmental impact fee. The defect we identified in Public Act 89-428 was in the structure of the Act, not in its substantive provisions. No argument has been made to this court that the environmental impact fee law of Public Act 89-428 is substantively invalid. Curative legislation is properly used to validate an irregular or defective exercise of authority. See Bates, 136 Ill.2d at 270, 144 Ill.Dec. 104, 555 N.E.2d 1. Consequently, because there is no contention that the legislature lacked the authority to impose the fees before the fact, the legislature could, by curative legislation, validate the fees already collected under the invalid act. See Bauer, 20 Ill.2d at 144, 169 N.E.2d 350. We note that no argument has been advanced here that the application of Public Act 89-457 to validate the fees collected under Public Act 89-428 interferes with vested rights or is otherwise unconstitutional. In fact, the party who would have been most interested in pursuing such an argument, the plaintiff in Langa, has declined to file a brief in this court. The Johnson plaintiffs, in their brief, have stated that they take no position as to the collection of fees under the Environmental Impact Fee Act. Legislative enactments are, of course, presumed to be constitutional. Bernier v. Burris, 113 Ill.2d 219, 227, 100 Ill.Dec. 585, 497 N.E.2d 763 (1986). Consequently, because we determine that Public Act 89-457 meets the test for curative legislation and because no party in this case has challenged the constitutionality of applying it as curative legislation, we find that Public Act 89-457 applies to validate the fees collected under the environmental impact fee law of Public Act 89-428. The lower courts' injunctions in these cases should therefore be lifted to the extent that they proscribe the use of fees already collected under Public Act 89-428. We caution, however, that by this holding we have not decided any issues regarding the constitutionality of Public Act 89-457, as no such constitutional challenge has been raised before us. This holding does not impact our decision above that Public Act 89-428, in its entirety, is unconstitutional and unenforceable. As the defendants concede, curative legislation may validate only actions taken in reliance on an unconstitutional statute. Curative legislation cannot validate or legalize the unconstitutional legislation itself. See People ex rel. Patterson v. Woodruff, 280 Ill. 472, 476, 117 N.E. 791 (1917).