Opinion ID: 2029423
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: PSC Appeals After 2000

Text: The landscape changed with the enactment of 2000 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1285, which became effective on April 7, 2000. Section 75-136 (Cum. Supp. 2002) provided, as amended: (1) Except as otherwise provided by law, if a party to any proceeding is not satisfied with the order entered by the commission, such party may appeal to the Court of Appeals as provided in section 75-137 to reverse, vacate, or modify the order. (2) In the case of an order assessing a civil penalty entered under subdivision (1)(b) of section 75-156, the party may seek judicial review in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. In the case of any other order entered under sections 75-156 to 75-158, the party may (a) seek the review of the Court of Appeals as provided in section 75-137 or (b) seek judicial review of the order under section 75-136.01. Subdivisions (a) and (b) of this subsection are mutually exclusive and the choice of either section 75-136.01 or 75-137 shall govern the appeal process. L.B. 1285 also created Neb. Rev. Stat. § 75-132.01(2) (Cum. Supp. 2000), which vested the PSC with exclusive jurisdiction over telecommunications appeals and provided that [a]fter all administrative remedies before the commission have been ex-hausted, any interested party to an action may appeal in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.  (Emphasis supplied.) See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 86-811 (Cum. Supp. 2000) (appeals from actions against telecommunications companies to follow procedures of § 75-132.01). Consequently, effective April 7, 2000, the statutes provided two distinct means of appealing from the PSC. Generally, appeals were taken from the PSC to the Court of Appeals, as before, pursuant to § 75-136. However, telecommunications appeals were subject to the APA, pursuant to § 75-132.01. The appellees contend that the instant case is such a telecommunications appeal, and Qwest does not contest that contention. In addition, 2002 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1105, amended and recodified several sections in the process of creating the Nebraska Telecommunications Regulation Act (NTRA), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 86-101 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 2002). Section 86-158, an amendment and recodification of § 86-811, provided that operative January 1, 2003: (1) Except as otherwise provided in section 86-123, any order of the commission entered pursuant to authority granted in the Nebraska Telecommunications Regulation Act may be appealed by any party to the proceeding. The appeal shall be in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act. (2) An original action or appeal concerning a violation of the Nebraska Telecommunications Regulation Act by a telecommunications company shall follow the procedures set forth in section 75-132.01. (Emphasis supplied.) Section 86-123 provided that appeals from the PSC specifically relating to subscriber service complaints were to be brought pursuant to the APA. Consequently, the NTRA explicitly provided that telecommunications appeals would be brought under the APA. In short, at the time Qwest filed its notice of appeal in this telecommunications case, it was required to proceed pursuant to the APA by the plain language of two separate statutory provisions: §§ 75-132.01 (any interested party to an action may appeal in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act) and 86-158 ([t]he appeal shall be in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act). Because Qwest failed to proceed under the APA, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. See, § 84-919; Nebraska Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 256 Neb. 479, 590 N.W.2d 840 (1999) (APA is exclusive means of judicial review of final decision of any agency in contested case). Qwest, however, argues that the word may in § 75-132.01 was permissive, and not directory. See, e.g., Spaghetti Ltd. Partnership v. Wolfe, 264 Neb. 365, 647 N.W.2d 615 (2002). Thus, according to Qwest, while it could have appealed under the APA, it could also choose to proceed under § 75-136. Qwest reads § 75-132.01 as having provided parties in telecommunications cases with a choice of appellate procedure, as did § 75-136 for other cases in more explicit terms. Qwest's purported rationale is that depending on the situation, parties might want to expedite appellate review, or might want to go to district court in order to obtain more immediate relief in the form of a stay or injunction. The appellees reply that while the word may is generally permissive, in § 75-132.01, it meant only that a party may or may not choose to appealbut if an appeal is filed, use of the APA is not discretionary. [4] Qwest's proposed interpretation is not persuasive, for a number of reasons. First, §§ 75-132.01 and 86-158, as the specific statutes governing telecommunications appeals, were controlling in those specific circumstances over the general provisions of § 75-136. To the extent that there is conflict between two statutes on the same subject, the specific statute controls over the general statute. Brown v. Harbor Fin. Mortgage Corp., 267 Neb. 218, 673 N.W.2d 35 (2004). [5,6] Second, in construing a statute, an appellate court should consider the statute's plain meaning in pari materia and from its language as a whole to determine the intent of the Legislature. Premium Farms v. County of Holt, 263 Neb. 415, 640 N.W.2d 633 (2002). All subordinate rules are mere aids in reaching this fundamental determination. Alegent Health Bergan Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Haworth, 260 Neb. 63, 615 N.W.2d 460 (2000). Qwest's argument regarding the purportedly permissive language of § 75-132.01 does not account for § 86-158, which stated that telecommunications appeals shall be in accordance with the APA and then specifically incorporated the appellate procedure set forth in § 75-132.01. In order to ascertain the proper meaning of a statute, reference may be had to later as well as earlier legislation upon the same subject. Unisys Corp. v. Nebraska Life & Health Ins. Guar. Assn., 267 Neb. 158, 673 N.W.2d 15 (2004). Plainly, §§ 75-132.01 and 86-158 were in pari materia, and established the Legislature's intent that telecommunications appeals be perfected under the APA. Qwest also notes that in the midst of these statutory changes, this court decided two telecommunications appeals that were filed after April 7, 2000, but were not brought under the APA. See, In re Application of Lincoln Electric System, 265 Neb. 70, 655 N.W.2d 363 (2003), cert. denied 539 U.S. 943, 123 S. Ct. 2620, 156 L. Ed. 2d 630, and 539 U.S. 954, 123 S. Ct. 2620, 156 L. Ed. 2d 648; In re Application No. C-1889, 264 Neb. 167, 647 N.W.2d 45 (2002). Qwest contends that because jurisdictional questions can be raised by an appellate court sua sponte, see State ex rel. NSBA v. Krepela, 259 Neb. 395, 610 N.W.2d 1 (2000), by reaching the merits of those appeals, this court impliedly adopted Qwest's interpretation of § 75-132.01. However, neither In re Application of Lincoln Electric System nor In re Application No. C-1889 expressly addresses any issue of appellate jurisdiction, and those opinions are not authority for any point not specifically raised as an issue addressed by this court. See Farmers Union Co-op Ins. Co. v. Allied Prop. & Cas., 253 Neb. 177, 569 N.W.2d 436 (1997). Furthermore, as the appellees noted at oral argument, we rejected an argument functionally identical to Qwest's in Ulbrick v. City of Nebraska City, 180 Neb. 229, 141 N.W.2d 849 (1966), in which it was argued that the plaintiffs had failed to perfect their appeal by not following the statutory procedures for taking an appeal from a municipal annexation ordinance. We stated: Previous appeals under this statute have been before this court in two cases. Shields v. City of Kearney, 179 Neb. 49, 136 N.W.2d 174 [(1965)]; Read v. City of Scottsbluff, 179 Neb. 410, 138 N.W.2d 471 [(1965)]. In neither of these cases was the procedure on appeal questioned. The opinions in those cases are authority only for the holdings therein made. Since the district court had jurisdiction of the subject matter, any failure to comply with procedural rules is deemed to have been waived and do not in any way affect the validity of those decisions. It is argued, however, that it is a rule of this court, many times applied, that the court may on its own motion raise questions of jurisdiction and, not having done so in the two previous cases before the court, the procedures followed in those cases constitute a conclusive construction of the sta-tute. No authority has been cited, and we have found none, that sustains this contention. Jurisdiction of the subject matter cannot be waived, but procedural requirements may. This court may on its own motion take notice of them. The fact that this court did not take notice of procedural defects in the Shields and Read cases can give no aid to the plaintiffs in the instant case when procedural defects were timely raised. Ulbrick, 180 Neb. at 231-32, 141 N.W.2d at 851-52. For the foregoing reasons, we reject Qwest's proposed interpretation of § 75-132.01. Read in pari materia, §§ 75-132.01 and 86-158 clearly stated that at the time Qwest filed its notice of appeal, telecommunications appeals were subject to the APA. By failing to proceed pursuant to the exclusive means for ap-pealing a PSC decision in a telecommunications case, Qwest failed to perfect its appeal. See, § 84-919; Nebraska Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 256 Neb. 479, 590 N.W.2d 840 (1999). However, none of the parties' arguments have addressed the effect, if any, of statutory changes that were made subsequent to the filing of Qwest's appeal. For the sake of completeness, we consider those amendments.