Opinion ID: 1772082
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: firrea

Text: FIRREA's relevant section provides: (14) Statute of limitations for actions brought by conservator or receiver. (A) In general Notwithstanding any provision of any contract, the applicable statute of limitations with regard to any action brought by the Corporation as conservator or receiver shall be (i) In the case of any contract claim, the longer of (I) the 6-year period beginning on the date the claim accrues; or (II) the period applicable under State law; .... (B) Determination of the date on which a claim accrues For purposes of subparagraph (A), the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run on any claim described in such subparagraph shall be the later of (i) the date of the appointment of the Corporation as conservator or receiver; or (ii) the date on which the cause of action accrues. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14). FIRREA does not expressly extend the benefit of this expanded limitations period to the FDIC's successors in interest. However, most jurisdictions have recognized, based on different theories, that the FDIC's successors do enjoy the benefit of the six-year period in some circumstances. See, e.g., UMLIC-Nine Corp. v. Lipan Springs Dev. Corp., 168 F.3d 1173, 1177 n. 3 (10th Cir.1999); United States v. Thornburg, 82 F.3d 886, 891-92 (9th Cir.1996); FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d 805, 810 (5th Cir.1993); Tivoli Ventures, Inc. v. Bumann, 870 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Colo.1994); Cadle Co. II, Inc. v. Lewis, 254 Kan. 158, 864 P.2d 718, 724 (1993); N.S.Q. Assocs. v. Beychok, 659 So.2d 729, 734 (La.1995); Investment Co. of the Southwest v. Reese, 117 N.M. 655, 875 P.2d 1086, 1095 (1994); Union Recovery Ltd. P'ship v. Horton, 252 Va. 418, 477 S.E.2d 521, 524 (1996). And we so held in Jackson v. Thweatt , the case upon which Wolf relies. 883 S.W.2d at 178. The question we did not answer in Jackson, however, is the one presented herewhether the FDIC's successors enjoy the benefit of the six-year limitations period when a cause of action on the note has not accrued before the FDIC assigns the note to a subsequent holder. We agree with the Church that the policy justifications we cited for extending limitations in Jackson do not apply here. Thus, we join the two federal courts that have considered this issue and hold that the FDIC's successors do not receive the benefit of the FDIC's six-year limitations period if the cause of action does not accrue until after the note leaves the FDIC's hands.