Opinion ID: 2222259
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: evaluation of ameritrade's evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment

Text: This court has stated that the primary purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the allegations made in the pleadings and show conclusively that the controlling facts are other than as pled, and thus resolve, without the expense and delay of trial, those cases where there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences to be drawn therefrom, and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, Hogan v. Garden County, 264 Neb. 115, 646 N.W.2d 257 (2002); City State Bank v. Holstine, 260 Neb. 578, 618 N.W.2d 704 (2000). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing that no genuine issue as to any material fact exists. That party must therefore produce enough evidence to demonstrate his or her entitlement to a judgment if the evidence remains uncontroverted, after which the burden of producing contrary evidence shifts to the party opposing the motion. Newman v. Thomas, 264 Neb. 801, 652 N.W.2d 565 (2002). From the evidence properly before both the district court and this court, we conclude that Ameritrade failed to demonstrate its entitlement to a judgment. Exhibit 6 is a document apparently prepared by the Securities and Exchange Commission, describing the best execution rule, which rule, discussed in greater detail below, requires a broker-dealer to use reasonable efforts to maximize the economic benefit to the client in each transaction. See Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 135 F.3d 266, 270 (3d Cir.1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 811, 119 S.Ct. 44, 142 L.Ed.2d 34. The document can best be characterized as informational and does not contribute substantively to establishing Ameritrade's entitlement to a judgment. Exhibit 7 is the affidavit of Wood, dated October 10, 2000. Wood is identified as the executive vice president of Ameritrade, Inc. Wood's affidavit addresses the execution time of three orders which were alleged in paragraph 45 of the petition to have been placed by appellants. Exhibit 7 also refers to two orders alleged to have been placed by appellants which were not executed. Although Zannini complains about three trades in paragraph 45 of the petition, the Wood affidavit refers only to the execution of two. Although Sigler complains about the delay and difficulty in placing an order, the Wood affidavit speaks only to the time of execution after the order was placed. Although Parents complains about the delay in placing a stop-order, the Wood affidavit speaks only to the time Ameritrade took to route the order to the market. Although Pitcher complains that his stop-order sales transaction at $104 per share on 1,000 shares of a certain stock was placed and remained unexecuted 10 minutes later, the Wood affidavit speaks only to the time Ameritrade took to route the order to the market at the stop-limit price of $105-1/2 per share. The Wood affidavit does not respond to all of the allegations in paragraph 45 of the petition, much less present evidence which would dispose of all the causes of action set forth in paragraph 52 et seq. In summary, Ameritrade has failed to properly produce evidence demonstrating its entitlement to judgment. See Newman v. Thomas, supra .