Opinion ID: 781557
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preparation of an EIS

Text: 7 Under NEPA, federal agencies must include an EIS in every recommendation for major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (emphasis added); City of Evanston v. Regional Transp. Authority, 825 F.2d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir.1987). Conversely, an agency is not required to prepare an EIS where the proposed action will not significantly affect the environment. See id. at 1125 (citing cases). The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has promulgated regulations to establish uniform procedures for determining whether, when, and how to prepare an EIS. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-4347 (establishing the CEQ); see also, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1517. When a proposed action is neither one normally requiring an environmental impact statement nor one categorically excluded from the EIS process, 5 the agency must prepare an environmental assessment (EA). 6 An EA has been described as a rough-cut, low-budget environmental impact statement designed to show whether a full-fledged environmental impact statement — which is very costly and time-consuming to prepare and has been the kiss of death to many a federal project — is necessary. Rhodes, 153 F.3d at 788 (quoting Cronin v. United Stated Dep't of Agriculture, 919 F.2d 439, 443 (7th Cir.1990)). [T]he purpose of an environmental assessment is to determine whether there is enough likelihood of significant environmental consequences to justify the time and expense of preparing an environmental impact statement. River Road Alliance v. Corps of Engineers of United States Army, 764 F.2d 445, 449 (7th Cir.1985). In this case, the Forest Service made a finding of no significant impact at the culmination of the environmental assessment process for the forest openings project, and therefore did not prepare an EIS. 8 The CEQ regulations require agencies to examine two dispositive considerations in formulating an EA to determine whether the proposed action may have a significant effect on the environment, thereby requiring an EIS: context and intensity. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27; 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); see also, Sierra Club v. United States Forest Serv., 843 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir.1988). 7 In this case the plaintiffs argue on appeal that the Forest Service failed to properly consider only one of the ten factors that the CEQ regulations identify as indicia of intensity: (4) The degree to which the effects on the quality of the human environment are likely to be highly controversial. 8 The plaintiffs contend that the existence of scientific dispute over the effects of the proposed action on wildlife requires a finding that the action is significant, thereby demanding an EIS. 9 Hence, we begin our analysis of the plaintiffs' claim by looking at the language of the statute. This circuit has yet to address the appropriate manner in which agencies should address this specific indicia of intensity, and neither NEPA, nor its implementing regulations, defines highly controversial. The primary rule of statutory interpretation is that words used in statutes must be given their ordinary and plain meaning. United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 291 (7th Cir.1998). Webster's defines controversy as a difference marked especially by the expression of opposing views. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 497 (1981). The term controversial is then modified by the term highly, limiting the controversies worth consideration to only those that create a substantial dispute. Those controversies described by the regulation are further limited to only those that concern the effects of the regulation on the environment, and therefore mere opposition to a proposed action will not create high controversy. See State of N.C. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 957 F.2d 1125, 1134 (4th Cir.1992) (noting that if controversy were equated with opposition, the EIS outcome would be governed by a heckler's veto). Therefore in order for a proposed action to be highly controversial it must be subject to a substantial dispute concerning the specific environmental effects of the action. 10 While this is the first instance that we have had an opportunity to address this issue, a substantial body of case law has developed in the Ninth Circuit. 9 The Ninth Circuit has held highly controversial in NEPA context does not encompass all public opposition to a proposed action, but instead only applies to a substantial dispute as to the size, nature, or effect of an action. Wetlands Action Network v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1122 (9th Cir.2000). See also, Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir.1998) (stating that controversy, in this context, requires a substantial dispute [about] the size, nature, or effect of the major Federal action rather than the existence of opposition to a use.) (citing Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1335 (9th Cir.1993)); Sierra Club v. United States Forest Service, 843 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir.1988) (accord); LaFlamme v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 852 F.2d 389, 400-01 (9th Cir.1988) (accord). Thus, controversy does not refer simply to the existence of public opposition to a use. LaFlamme at 401; see also Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir.1972) ([t]he suggestion that `controversial' must be equated with neighborhood opposition has also been rejected by others). Therefore, in reconciling our interpretation of the statute with the developed case law, this factor considers whether there is a substantial dispute about the size, nature or effect of an action in the relevant community. However, the analysis does not end with that conclusion. See Sierra Club v. Watkins, 808 F.Supp. 852, 862 (D.D.C.1991) (holding that a controversy does not exist simply because there are conflicting views among experts). If there is such a dispute, NEPA then places the burden on the agency to come forward with a well-reasoned explanation demonstrating why opinions disputing an EA's conclusions do not suffice to create a public controversy based on potential environmental consequences. LaFlamme, 852 F.2d at 401. 11 In Sierra Club, for example, the Forest Service decided to award several timber contracts that allowed harvesting in forests containing groves of giant sequoia redwoods. The Forest Service reached this decision without preparing an EIS. Sierra Club, 843 F.2d at 1192. The Sierra Club produced testimony from numerous biologists, conservationists and other experts showing that the EA inadequately addressed these concerns and therefore cast serious doubt on the Forest Service's conclusions. The Ninth Circuit observed that [t]his is precisely the type of `controversial' action for which an EIS must be prepared. Id. at 1193. See also, Public Citizen v. Department of Transportation, 316 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir.2003) (finding that a project was sufficiently controversial when 90% of the comments opposed a DOT project and these comments were not addressed by an EA). The Ninth Circuit followed the same approach but reached a different conclusion in Wetlands Action Network, where the court found that because the EA addressed the concerns and objections raised by conservation groups, there was no significant controversy under NEPA. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1122. 12 Read together, Sierra Club and Wetlands Action Network establish a two-step approach to determining whether an agency has acted arbitrarily or capriciously in deciding not to prepare an EIS in the face of scientific controversy. First, plaintiff organizations must demonstrate a substantial dispute concerning the size, nature or effect of the proposed action. If they succeed in doing so, the agency must consider the dispute and address the concerns in its final decision. This two-step approach recognizes that as long as the agency has taken a hard look at the relevant issues involved in the preparation of an EIS and satisfactorily explained its subsequent decision, the agency decision should not be set aside. 13 This standard is appropriate considering that our review of the Forest Service's action under NEPA is governed by the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Heartwood Inc. v. United States Forest Service, 230 F.3d 947, 953 (7th Cir.2000). Under the APA, courts must set aside agency decisions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 802, 98 S.Ct. 2096, 56 L.Ed.2d 697 (1978). To determine whether an agency action is arbitrary or capricious, we must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been clear error of judgment. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989) (citations omitted). We must satisfy ourselves that the agency examine[d] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a `rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.' Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). If an agency considers the proper factors and makes a factual determination on whether the environmental impacts are significant or not, that decision implicates substantial agency expertise and is entitled to deference. Marsh, at 376, 109 S.Ct. 1851; see also Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir.1992). Pursuant to this deferential standard, reviewing courts should not substitute their judgments for those of an agency as to the environmental consequences of its actions. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410, n. 21, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976). Consequently, the standard of review when examining an agency's decision under NEPA is a narrow one. See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378, 109 S.Ct. 1851. 14 Thus we must ask on this appeal whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial dispute as to the effects of the forest openings project on the environment and whether the Forest Service's decision to proceed despite this scientific disagreement is arbitrary or capricious. 10 The plaintiffs direct our attention to the comments submitted in response to the Forest Service's request and contained in the administrative record from four acknowledged experts on bird issues: Dr. Donald Whitehead, Donald Winslow, Dr. Jean Graber, and Scott Pruitt (collectively referred to as the Dissenting Scientists). 11 Each of these scientists disputed the Forest Service's conclusion that the maintained openings would benefit various bird species dependent on early successional habitat. More specifically, these experts believed that the project would actually have a negative effect on forest interior bird species, no effect on most open land bird species, and, contrary to the EA, believed that no bird species is dependent on these small artificially maintained openings. 15 For example, according to Dr. Whitehead, eight of the bird species described by the Forest Service as benefitting from the project have never been tallied in the Forest. 12 Thus it would be impossible for the project to benefit these species, as the Forest Service claims. Whitehead also contends that the Forest Service was wrong in its assertion that the scarlet tanager would benefit from maintained openings because, in his opinion, the openings would reduce the scarlet tanager's available breeding habitat and would expose it to increased cowbird parasitism. In Whitehead's view, the Forest Service was so obviously wrong about the scarlet tanager that it seriously undermines the scientific credibility of the [environmental] assessment. Dr. Graber and Pruitt also dispute the claim that the openings benefit birds that live in early successional habitat. They contend many of the openings are too small to provide an adequate habitat, especially for Henslow's sparrow and similar species that only benefit by large acreages of early successional habitat. Thus these experts disputed the beneficial effects of the project and challenged the Forest Service's conclusions as to open-land dependent bird species. The plaintiffs therefore assert that the forest openings maintenance project is highly controversial within the meaning of 40 C.F.R. 1508.27(b)(4) because they have demonstrated that experts and state and federal agencies disagree about the effects of the forest openings project on the human environment. 16 We agree that the plaintiffs have presented evidence of a controversy as to the effects of this action. However that does not end our inquiry. Rather, we must now consider whether the administrative record shows that these concerns were addressed by the Forest Service in finding that the project would not significantly affect the environment. We conclude that these concerns were addressed. The administrative record is replete with scientific data addressing the concerns of the Dissenting Scientists. During the comment period, Dr. John Castrale, a non-game biologist from the Indiana Division of Natural Resources (IDNR), Division of Fish and Wildlife, voiced his findings in support of the project. His findings are that 14 bird species would benefit from openings maintenance, [s]ince very little timber cutting has occurred during the last 20 years, maintenance of forest openings is now the only planned way to maintain a proportion (albeit small) of the forest in early successional habitats. Rex Watters, IDNR Reservoir Wildlife Specialist, commented that in light of the IDNR's maintenance of openings on Monroe Reservoir, [t]he benefits of maintaining these openings far [outweigh] the expense and effort required. Gary Doxtater, Director of the IDNR Division of Fish and Wildlife, discussed the benefits of openings maintenance on several bird species, bobcats, rabbits, and small rodents. Mark Banker, Regional Biologist for the Ruffed Grouse Society, stated that [w]ildlife survey data for Indiana strongly supports the Forest's contention that the management of early successional habitat is critical. Similarly, the Indiana Chapter of the Wildlife Society (a self-described organization of professional biologists dedicated to conservation and research concerning wildlife in Indiana) concluded that the openings maintenance will benefit several bird species. These comments were cited extensively in Appendix E of the EA where the Forest Service responded to the comments and criticisms raised during the comment period. See Environmental Assessment, Forest Openings Maintenance Project, June 28, 1999, cmts. G-15, P-2, P-3, P-18, P-41, P-49, P-50 (responding to general comments, and comments about plant and animal effects, and providing additional references where appropriate). 17 In the direct administrative appeal of the FONSI decision, the Forest Service hearing official noted that while dissenting scientific opinions exist, the project was not highly controversial thereby requiring an EIS. 13 Those courts that have addressed this issue have consistently held that when an agency's finding of no significant impact is based upon adequate data, the fact that the record also contains evidence supporting a different scientific opinion does not render the agency's decision arbitrary and capricious. Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1120-21. See also Greenpeace Action, 14 F.3d at 1333; cf. Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir.1998) (requiring an EIS only when the EA contains virtually no references to any material in support of or in opposition to its conclusions); Foundation for North Am. Wild Sheep v. United States Dep't of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir.1982) (finding that an agency's failure to address certain crucial factors, consideration of which was essential to a truly informed decision whether or not to prepare an EIS, rendered unreasonable its decision that no EIS was necessary). This is because scientific dispute is a part of the everyday existence for agencies involved in environmental projects and thus, as the Supreme Court has noted, when specialists express conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts even if, as an original matter, a court might find contrary views more persuasive. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378, 109 S.Ct. 1851; see also Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 986 (9th Cir.1985) (NEPA does not require that we decide whether [a pre-EIS report] is based on the best scientific methodology available, nor does NEPA require us to resolve disagreements among various scientists as to methodology.). NEPA does not demand scientific unanimity in order to support a FONSI; if it did, agencies could only act upon achieving a degree of certainty that is ultimately illusory. Greenpeace Action, 14 F.3d at 1336. See also, Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F.Supp. 96, 115 (D.D.C.1995) (noting that disagreement [among experts] does not render the agency's action arbitrary and capricious). 18 In this case the dispute involves only a few bird species among the many wildlife species impacted by the project, and the Forest Service has provided alternative scientific data that addresses the controversy. The Forest Service's own assessment that the project is not objectively highly controversial is entitled to deference if it is made after a hard look at the controversy and rationally related to the data. Because the Forest Service properly reached this conclusion, based on a consideration of the appropriate factors, it did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in finding no significant impact of the forest openings project and an EIS was not required under NEPA. 19