Opinion ID: 1227141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: motion to dismiss wheeler's appeal

Text: On July 19, 1990, Scott filed a motion to stay the execution of the judgment, or alternatively, to dismiss the appeal of Wheeler. In his brief supporting the motion, Scott alleged that Wheeler had taken inconsistent positions by filing an appeal of his judgment while simultaneously executing on the judgment. Attached as an exhibit to Scott's brief is a copy of a garnishment affidavit filed May 3, 1990, and a garnishment summons issued the same date. [1] The affidavit states that Scott is indebted to Wheeler in the sum of $24,243.00 and for an attorney fee of $14,059.75 and $1,349.00 for the costs of the action. In his brief objecting to Scott's motion, Wheeler does not deny that he had sought to collect the judgment amount. The rule is well established that any act by an appellant that recognizes the validity of a judgment either expressly or by implication, operates as a waiver of the appellant's right to appeal from the judgment. Mosier v. Mosier, 121 Okl. 4, 246 P. 1099 (1926). Litigants who voluntarily accepted the fruits of a judgment cannot bring an appeal to reverse it because accepting the benefits of the judgment waives the right to appeal the portion detrimental to that litigant. Adams v. Unterkircher, 714 P.2d 193, 196 (Okla. 1985). Although Wheeler admits he has attempted to collect on the judgment, there is nothing in the record to reveal that he has succeeded in receiving any part of the awarded judgment. Additionally, there is no record of a supersedeas bond having been posted to stay the execution on the judgment against Scott. [2] The issue is whether an attempt by an appellant to execute on the judgment from which he appealed results in a waiver of the appeal under the acceptance of benefits doctrine, even though the appellant received nothing from the attempted execution. The issue before us is one of first impression. The authority on this issue is meager. The authority which exists supports a rule that benefits must actually be received by an appellant in order to waive his right to an appeal. [3] Oklahoma case law recognizes similar principles. In Bras v. Gibson, 529 P.2d 982, 983-984 (Okla. 1974), this Court held that a party who accepts the benefits of the part of the judgment favorable to him waives the right to appeal the portion that is unfavorable. The Court explained: Bras needed only to appeal the trial court's actions to protect his interest. His act in cashing the voucher was voluntary and for his benefit. That act was not done in defense of an to protect his rights. As to the trial court's orders, Bras could do nothing more than object and appeal. As to the voucher, Bras could accept or refuse. This was his choice. [Emphasis added.] The implication of the emphasized sentence in Bras is that acts done in defense of or to protect one's rights may not constitute a waiver of a party's right to appeal under the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine. Such a case is now before this Court. In order to constitute a waiver, a party must intend to relinquish a known right, either expressly or by such conduct as warrants an inference of such a relinquishment. Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. Schrimsher, 179 Okl. 643, 66 P.2d 944, 948 (1937). [4] A mere attempt to collect a judgment does not relinquish the right to appeal because no fruits of the judgment have been accepted. Wheeler's attempt to collect his judgment may have been motivated by a desire on Wheeler's part to force Scott to post a supersedeas bond. [5] Use of such a tactic is not improper and is not inconsistent with an appeal. Because there is nothing in the record to show that Wheeler accepted any of the benefits of his judgment, the motion to dismiss his appeal is denied. Scott also moves this Court to stay execution of the judgment citing Rule 1.31(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases, 12 O.S.Supp. 1990, ch. 15, app. 2. [6] Scott alleges the trial court denied his motion to stay, and he attaches merely a copy of a pre-trial conference order, not a document of record, of the garnishment proceeding. The copy notes: Motion to stay overruled and appears to be signed by the trial judge, no order appears in the record. Because the order is not a part of the record, it cannot be reviewed. Chamberlin v. Chamberlin, 720 P.2d 721, 723-724 (Okla. 1986). The motion to stay is dismissed.