Opinion ID: 3208092
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Criminal History Point Assessment

Text: “Under the plain error standard, we will reverse the district court’s sentencing determination only when we find: (1) an error or defect (2) that is clear or obvious (3) affecting the defendant’s substantial rights (4) and seriously impugning the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1096 (internal quotation marks omitted). Jenkins also controls the plain error analysis of Gill’s criminal history claim. In Jenkins, we determined plain error had occurred because “under Application Note 6 to Section 4A1.2, the trial court erred when it assigned three criminal history points as arising from [the defendant’s] previously invalidated AUUW conviction.” Id. at 1098. Here, we apply the same analysis as the Jenkins court, id. at 1097–99, and conclude that the district court committed plain error with regard to Gill’s criminal history score. This court has “repeatedly held that ‘a sentencing based on an incorrect Guidelines range constitutes plain error and Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198 13 warrants a remand for resentencing, unless we have reason to believe that the error in no way affected the district court's selection of a particular sentence.’” Id. at 1097 (quoting United States v. Love, 706 F.3d 832, 841 (7th Cir. 2013)). Under the sentencing guidelines, Gill was assessed five points for his AUUW conviction—three points for the actual conviction and two additional points for being on parole at the time of the commission of his AUUW offense. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a), (d). But, an exception to this rule appears in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 n.6: Sentences resulting from convictions that (A) have been reversed or vacated because of errors of law or because of subsequently-discovered evidence exonerating the defendant, or (B) have been ruled constitutionally invalid in a prior case are not to be counted. This court has read Subsection (B) to contain two requirements: “(i) the sentence resulted from a conviction that was ruled constitutionally invalid; and (ii) that ruling occurred in a prior case.” Jenkins, 772 F.3d at 1097. Gill meets the first requirement because both this court and the Supreme Court of Illinois have held the applicable portion of the AUUW statute to be constitutionally invalid. See id. at 1097. In December 2012, in response to a facial challenge, this court in Moore held that provisions of the Illinois AUUW statute, notably the “flat ban on carrying ready-to-use guns outside the home,” violated the Second Amendment. 702 F.3d at 940, 942. In September 2013, in Aguilar, the Supreme 14 Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198 Court of Illinois held that applicable portions of the AUUW statute were facially unconstitutional, but limited its holding to the “Class 4” form of the offense. 2 N.E.3d at 327–28. Recently, in Burns, the Supreme Court of Illinois “clarif[ied]” Aguilar and held that the “[AUUW] statute is facially unconstitutional, without limitation.” 2015 IL 117387 at . In Illinois, when a statute is held to be facially unconstitutional, it renders a defendant’s conviction void because “‘the statute under which [the defendant] was charged and prosecuted was not in effect when the alleged offenses occurred.’” Jenkins, 772 F.3d at 1097–98 (citing People v. Tellez– Valencia, 723 N.E.2d 223, 225 (Ill. 1999)) (alteration in original). Therefore, in light of Moore and Burns, Gill has met the first requirement of Subsection (B). The government seeks to distinguish Gill’s alleged “Class 2 form” AUUW conviction from Jenkins and Aguilar, both of which concerned a “Class 4 felony” AUUW conviction. 2 The government’s argument fails. In clarifying Aguilar, the Burns court explicitly declared that “[t]here is no ‘Class 4 form’ or ‘Class 2 form’ of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon,” and it ultimately held that the AUUW was statute “facially unconstitutional, without limitation.” 2015 IL 117387 at , . Gill also fulfills the second requirement of Subsection (B) because his sentence was ruled constitutionally invalid “in a prior case.” Gill was resentenced after both Moore and Agui- 2 The record does not clearly state whether Gill’s AUUW conviction was a “Class 2 felony” or “Class 4 felony.” However, the PSR description of his conviction—“Aggravated Unlawful Use of a Weapon in A Vehicle With A Previous Conviction”— suggests a “Class 2 felony” via 720 ILCS 5/24–1.6(d)(3). Nos. 14-3205 & 15-1198 15 lar were decided: Moore predated Gill’s sentencing by twenty-one months and Aguilar by nine months. See Jenkins, 772 F.3d at 1098 (determining that the defendant met the second requirement of Subsection (B) because Moore and Aguilar predated his sentencing). We conclude that, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 n.6, the district court erred when it assigned five criminal history points based on Gill’s previously invalidated AUUW conviction. And this court has held that “[a] district court’s adoption of erroneous information in a PSR that results in an incorrect Guidelines range, however correct such information appears, constitutes plain error on review.” Jenkins, 772 F.3d at 1098 (collecting cases). Thus, the district court committed plain error in its assessment of Gill’s criminal history.