Opinion ID: 901815
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Muhm was Denied Constitutional Protections by the Circuit Court's Denial of his Motion to Require the State to Elect One Specific Act as the Sole Basis for Each Count.

Text: [¶ 14.] As previously mentioned, before trial, the thirty-seven counts of the indictment were reduced to five. Each surviving count alleged a different sexual act involving either J.C. or C.S. Because the children alleged that each type of sexual act occurred repeatedly, Muhm moved to require State to elect one particular act as the sole basis for each count and to exclude evidence of the repetitive acts involving that same sexual offense. Muhm argued that without limiting the State's proof to one predetermined act for each count, the State would have multiple acts available to prove each count. Muhm contended that without an election, the indictment was multiplicitous and duplicitous depriving him of due process and the protections provided by the Double Jeopardy Clause. [¶ 15.] The State responded that it would be unable to proceed with the prosecution if an election were required. The State explained that because of the young ages of the children and the repetitive nature of the alleged abuse over such a lengthy period of time, it would not be possible to make such an election before trial. The prosecutor explained: There is no way for me to know sitting here today what those two boys are going to say when they take that stand. They are so young and so damaged. This abuse went on for so long. There is not going to be any way I can specify one particular act of rape when they were raped every weekend for four years. I can't do it. They can't do it. [¶ 16.] The circuit court denied the motion recognizing the repetitive nature of the allegations and the difficulty a young child would have recounting any particular act. [3] The court also indicated that the defense had taken contradictory positions by first requesting a dismissal of the multiple counts charging each repeated act; and then, after having obtained the State's agreement to dismiss the multiple counts, seeking to restrict the State from relying on the repeated acts to prove its case. [¶ 17.] On appeal, Muhm argues that the counts were multiplicitous and duplicitous. He further points out that the children testified in vague fashion (they did not differentiate between every repeated act within each category). Therefore, he argues that one or more acts, or even different acts, could have been the basis for the guilty verdict on each count. Muhm contends that this method of charging and proof deprived him of due process and the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. [¶ 18.] We begin our analysis by discussing multiplicity, duplicity, and the related constitutional concerns. Whether an indictment is multiplicitous or duplicitous is a question of law reviewed de novo. United States v. Roy, 408 F.3d 484, 491 (8th Cir.2005); United States v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618, 622 (6th Cir.2005). [¶ 19.] `Duplicity' is the joining in a single count of two or more distinct and separate offenses.... Multiplicity, on the other hand, is the splintering of a single offense into separate counts in an indictment. 1 Nancy Hollander et al., Wharton's Criminal Procedure § 5:12 (14th ed. 2008). In other words, a duplicitous indictment or information includes a single count that captures multiple offenses, whereas a multiplicitous indictment or information includes multiple counts all charging a single offense. [¶ 20.] Muhm argues both multiplicity and duplicity. However, after the State dismissed all but five counts, the surviving counts were not multiplicitous: each surviving count alleged a different offense involving a different child. On the other hand, the surviving counts were duplicitous. Each count potentially captured repetitive offenses involving the same child. Because Muhm's indictment did not involve multiplicity, [4] we limit our discussion to duplicity and its related double jeopardy and due process concerns.
[¶ 21.] One vice of duplicity is that a general verdict for a defendant on that count does not reveal whether the jury found him not guilty of one crime or not guilty of [all potential crimes covered by the count]. Conceivably, this could prejudice the defendant in protecting himself against double jeopardy. United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 116 (3rd Cir.1975). The numerous acts of criminal conduct falling within a duplicitous count, together with generalized allegations of proof, may not, in some cases, prevent a second prosecution from being brought against a defendant. That risk occurs if it is unclear exactly which crimes were considered in the first trial. See id. [¶ 22.] This double jeopardy concern is not, however, implicated in this case. Concededly, the language of each of the five counts is not tied to a specific time and place. Therefore, each count was broad enough to allow a jury to have considered different sexual acts as the basis for its verdict on each count. Nevertheless, each count did allege that the sexual offense occurred with a specific victim during a period of time. Further, the entire record provides context from which we can conclude that the State would be barred from re-prosecuting on the same or lesser included offenses involving the same children during that period of time. [¶ 23.] As noted in a slightly different situation in State v. Basker, 468 N.W.2d 413, 417 (S.D.1991), a nonspecific charge, conceivably involving multiple acts of child sexual abuse occurring over a lengthy period of time, does not violate double jeopardy if the defendant cannot be recharged for sexual offenses occurring within that period. Although an information should be as specific as possible with respect to time, [we noted that] it is not always possible to know with certainty when an offense occurred. This is especially true in sexual molestation cases involving a minor victim who does not immediately complain to authorities. Id. Consequently, we examined non-specific charges involving repeated sexual abuse occurring over several years in the context of the allegations and defenses actually at issue. When considered in that context, we concluded the indictment adequately apprised [defendant] of the accusations against him such that he could ... plead any judgment of conviction founded upon the indictment as a bar to any subsequent prosecution. Id. The same is true in Muhm's case. [¶ 24.] Considering the allegations and defenses actually presented in this case, Muhm could not be prosecuted again for the same or lesser-included sexual offenses involving these children during the periods of time alleged. The original indictment, bill of particulars, and discovery revealed that the allegations involved weekly sexual acts involving two children and four statutory offenses. Muhm's defense was a complete denial of any sexual act occurring during the entire period of time covered by the indictment. Muhm asserted that there was never any sexual misconduct, that he could not understand why the children would make such allegations, and that the children were not credible. Therefore, all acts of sexual abuse involving the four statutes and two children were at issue at trial, and any further prosecution involving these children during this time period for these or lesser included offenses would be barred. See id. See also State v. Lafferty, 2006 SD 50, ¶ 13, 716 N.W.2d 782, 786 (noting that [b]oth the United States Constitution and the South Dakota Constitution protect [the defendant] from such relitigation.). For that reason, the duplicitous counts did not violate Muhm's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

[¶ 25.] Muhm argues that the duplicitous indictment violated his due process right to the notice necessary to prepare and present an adequate defense. The California Supreme Court described these rights in a similar case involving repetitive, undifferentiated allegations of sexual abuse. The preeminent due process principle is that one accused of a crime must be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. Due process of law requires that an accused be advised of the charges against him so that he has a reasonable opportunity to prepare and present his defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at his trial. Thus, the right to defend has two related components, namely, the right to notice of the charges, and the right to present a defense to those charges. Jones, 51 Cal.3d at 317, 270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d at 656 (citations omitted). [¶ 26.] We have considered these due process rights in a case involving improper sexual contact with a minor occurring over a long period of time. See Basker, 468 N.W.2d at 416. We first observed that a generally phrased indictment alleging repeated sexual contact with a minor over a lengthy period of time is not insufficient. For an indictment to be sufficient, it must contain the elements of the offense charged such that it apprises the defendant with reasonable certainty of the accusations against him.... When time is not a material element of the offense charged, the indictment need not allege the precise time at which the offense was committed. Id. (citations omitted). Because time is not a material element of the offense in crimes involving sexual abuse of minors, State v. Nuzum, 2006 SD 89, ¶ 18, 723 N.W.2d 555, 559, Muhm's indictment was sufficient. [¶ 27.] Further, considering the entire record, our conclusion in Basker regarding notice and presentation of an adequate defense is applicable here: we do not believe the lack of specific dates of the alleged sexual misconduct prohibited [defendant] from asserting [a defense]. 468 N.W.2d at 417. As the California Supreme Court also explained: So long as the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing supports the number of offenses charged against defendant and covers the time frame[s] charged in the information, a defendant has all the notice the Constitution requires. Jones, 51 Cal.3d at 312, 270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d at 653. We see no reason why the same rule should not apply when pretrial notice is furnished through a grand jury transcript or through pretrial discovery procedures. See id. at 320, 270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d at 657 (observing that in light of modern trial practice, including the right of cross-examination, generic child molestation charges by no means deprive the defendant of a reasonable opportunity to defend). [¶ 28.] Muhm, however, argues that J.C. and C.S. testified in a vague fashion, thereby making it impossible to effectively defend. This argument has not been accepted in child sex abuse cases involving similar vague, generic testimony: [T]he defendant's due process rights are implicated by the inability of his young accuser to give specific details regarding the time, place and circumstances of various alleged assaults. Frequently, as here, these cases involve the so-called resident child molester who ... has continuous access to him[.] In such cases, the victim typically testifies to repeated acts of molestation occurring over a substantial period of time but, lacking any meaningful point of reference, is unable to furnish many specific details, dates or distinguishing characteristics as to individual acts or assaults. Although the cases are widely conflicting, some courts have concluded that prosecutions based on such nonspecific or generic testimony deprive the defendant of due process by preventing him from effectively defending against such charges, and by precluding a unanimous jury verdict as to each act charged in the information. Yet testimony describing a series of essentially indistinguishable acts of molestation is frequently the only testimony forthcoming from the victim. To hold that such testimony, however credible and substantial, is inadequate to support molestation charges would anomalously favor the offender who subjects his victim to repeated or continuous assaults. Id. at 299-300, 270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d at 645. In such cases, more specificity is simply impossible: Multiple sex offenses committed by adults upon immature and inarticulate children over a long period of time are very likely to result in an amalgamation of the crimes in the child's mind. The child is unlikely to be able to give any testimony approximating the date of any one separately describable offense even in the uncomplicated case. Where the number of offenses is so numerous even an adult would not be able to count them, the child's testimony will often be reduced to a general, and customarily abbreviated, recitation of what happened on a continuing basis. Id. at 313, 270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d at 653-54 (citation omitted). Thus, like the court in Jones, we conclude that considering the totality of the record (including the bill of particulars, grand jury transcript and pretrial discovery disclosing the specifics of the children's allegations), any duplicitous counts did not deprive Muhm of his due process rights to notice and the opportunity to prepare an adequate defense.
[¶ 29.] Another vice of duplicity is that because the jury has multiple offenses to consider under a single count, the jury may convict without reaching a unanimous agreement on the same act, thereby implicating the defendant's right to jury unanimity. See United States v. Garcia, 400 F.3d 816, 819 (9thCir.2005); United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 415 (6thCir.2002); United States. v. Karam, 37 F.3d 1280, 1286 (8thCir.1994); Jones, 51 Cal.3d at 316, 270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d at 656. In some situations, a general verdict may not reveal whether the jury unanimously found the defendant guilty of one offense or more offenses, or guilty of one offense and not guilty of others. United States v. Crisci, 273 F.3d 235, 239 (2ndCir.2001). [¶ 30.] This concern is of even more significance in cases like this where Muhm was charged with single act offenses. [5] In such cases, the due process right to jury unanimity requires that the jury be unanimous as to the single act or acts that are the basis for the verdict. In other words, even though due process may not require time specificity in charging such cases, the jury must have been in agreement as to a single occurrence or the multiple occurrences underlying each count. And, for single act offenses, jury unanimity is not achieved if some of the jurors believed the crime occurred on one occasion during the timeframe and others believed that the crime occurred on a different occasion. Cooksey v. State, 359 Md. 1, 9, 752 A.2d 606, 610 (2000). [¶ 31.] Muhm argues that his right to jury unanimity was violated because of the general verdict, the duplicitous counts, the long time frames of alleged abuse, and the boys' generic testimony of repeated, undifferentiated acts. Muhm contends that under these circumstances, it is impossible to determine whether the jury reached a unanimous decision on the particular act that was the basis for the conviction on each count.