Opinion ID: 1665551
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Prior Sex Offenses as a Juvenile

Text: Bell's final point of appeal concerns evidence admitted at the sentencing phase of his trial. As a juvenile, he was adjudicated delinquent for two sex offenses, felony rape and misdemeanor sexual assault. The circuit court permitted testimony on this subject from the victims in those two cases. The court prohibited disclosure of the adjudication for sexual assault but allowed the State to establish, through the testimony of the victim's father, that Bell was adjudicated delinquent for rape. Bell does not contest the admissibility of the fact of adjudication on the rape charge. He agrees that, pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-345(a) (Repl.2002), the adjudication of delinquency for rape, an offense for which he could have been tried as an adult, may be used at the sentencing phase in subsequent adult criminal proceedings against him. Likewise, the State did not contest the inadmissibility of the adjudication for sexual assault, as it was a misdemeanor for which Bell could not have been tried as an adult. Therefore, we need only consider the testimony of the victims regarding the facts and circumstances that led to both charges. Pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 16-97-103(6) (Repl.2006 & Supp.2007), evidence of aggravating circumstances is admissible at sentencing. Section 16-97-103 also refers to the criteria for departure from the sentencing standards as examples of evidence of aggravating circumstances. Id. One such criterion is that [t]he offense was a sexual offense and was part of a pattern of criminal behavior with the same or different victims under the age of eighteen (18) years of age manifested by multiple incidents over a prolonged period of time[.] Ark.Code Ann. § 16-90-804(c)(2)(F) (Repl.2006 & Supp.2007). The testimony of the victims in Bell's prior rape and sexual assault cases shows a pattern of criminal behavior with victims under the age of eighteen. Therefore, such testimony is admissible as evidence of an aggravating circumstance. Bell nonetheless contests the admissibility of this evidence on the basis of Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-345 (Repl.2002). This section reads as follows, in its entirety: (a) Juvenile adjudications of delinquency for offenses for which the juvenile could have been tried as an adult may be used at the sentencing phase in subsequent adult criminal proceedings against those same individuals. (b)(1) No other evidence adduced against a juvenile in any proceeding under this subchapter nor the fact of adjudication or disposition shall be admissible evidence against such juvenile in any civil, criminal, or other proceeding. (b)(2) However, the evidence shall be admissible where proper in subsequent proceedings against the same juvenile under this subchapter. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-345. Clearly, subsection (a) refers to evidence that is admissible at the criminal trial of an adult who was adjudicated delinquent when he or she was a juvenile. Conversely, subsection (b)(2) refers to evidence that is admissible at a subsequent juvenile proceeding of a person who remains a juvenile. [4] Subsection (b)(1), however, is the source of contention on this subject. Bell suggests that no evidence adduced at the prior juvenile proceeding (i.e., evidence regarding the facts and circumstances leading to the charge) is admissible at any subsequent proceeding, even after the juvenile becomes an adult. We disagree. The legislature used the term juvenile in subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2), as contrasted with the term individuals, used in subsection (a) to refer to juveniles who had become adults. The basic rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. McKeever v. State, 367 Ark. 374, 240 S.W.3d 583 (2006). We construe a statute just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning. Id. In addition, when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no need to resort to the rules of statutory interpretation. Id. Because Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-345(b) refers exclusively to the admissibility of evidence against a juvenile, that statutory provision is inapposite in a case involving an adult defendant. Therefore, Bell cannot claim protection under this statute. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony of the victims.