Opinion ID: 619070
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Eitzen's Presence

Text: Casteel contends [t]here is no evidence he took Eitzen's car from her presence because the Casteels did not demand Eitzen's keys and she was initially unaware they took her keys from her purse and stole her car. Section 2119 does not define the phrase from the person or presence of another and we have not decided the meaning of the phrase as it relates to carjacking. Interpreting the identical phrase in the general robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2111, we explained [p]roperty is in the presence of a person if it is so within his [or her] reach, inspection, observation or control, that he [or she] could if not overcome by violence or prevented by fear, retain his [or her] possession of it. United States v. W.T.T., 800 F.2d 780, 782 (8th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Burns, 701 F.2d 840, 843 (9th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (upholding the robbery conviction of a defendant who threatened a man at gunpoint inside a store to obtain his keys, and then took the keys and car just outside the store) (internal marks omitted)). Relying on Burns and its progeny, every circuit court to consider this issue has determined the presence requirement of the carjacking statute may be satisfied when the victim of the carjacking is inside a building and the stolen car is parked outside. See United States v. Savarese, 385 F.3d 15, 19-20 (1st Cir.2004); United States v. Davis, 233 Fed.Appx. 292, 295 (4th Cir.2007) (unpublished per curiam); United States v. Boucha, 236 F.3d 768, 771-74 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 486 (3d Cir.2001); United States v. Edwards, 231 F.3d 933, 936-37 (5th Cir.2000); United States v. Moore, 198 F.3d 793, 797 (10th Cir.1999); United States v. Kimble, 178 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (11th Cir.1999); United States v. Murray, 56 F.3d 74 (9th Cir.1995) (unpublished); cf. United States v. Rockenback, 136 Fed.Appx. 950, 952 (8th Cir.2005) (unpublished per curiam) (concluding a defendant who broke into the victim's apartment, disabled the phone, stole her keys from the counter, and entered the victim's car outside did not qualify for a sentence reduction for mere attempt to carjack in violation of § 2119 because the defendant had completed the acts to take control of the car from [the victim]). Nevertheless, these cases make clear that the presence requirement is not boundless. In the carjacking context, courts have required the victim to have both a degree of physical proximity to the vehicle and an ability to control or immediately obtain access to the vehicle. Savarese, 385 F.3d at 20. The reasoning of the other circuits is persuasive and consistent with our related precedent. We hold a motor vehicle is in a person's presence for purposes of § 2119 if it is so within his [or her] reach, inspection, observation or control, that he [or she] could if not overcome by violence or prevented by fear, retain his [or her] possession of [the vehicle]. Burns, 701 F.2d at 843. Viewing the evidence in this case in the light most favorable to the jury verdict and giving the verdict the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we conclude a reasonable jury could find Casteel took Eitzen's vehicle from her presence. Before the robbery, Eitzen's keys were in her purse, inside her home. Her car was in her driveway. Eitzen controlled both until the Casteels broke into her home and robbed her at gunpoint. With Eitzen forcibly confined to a chair, the Casteels stole Eitzen's keys from her purse and her car from her drivewayjust twenty feet from her house where she sat. Had Eitzen not been under Casteel's control and afraid to move from the chair, she could have easily walked out the door ... and driven away in her car, thus preventing [Casteel] from taking it, Moore, 198 F.3d at 797, or called for help. See also Kimble, 178 F.3d at 1168 ([The victim's] car was ... parked right outside the restaurant. Had [the victim] not been in fear for his safety, he could have reached the car and prevented its taking.). And Casteel's actions also deprived Eitzen of the availability of her car when she needed transportation to seek help from her neighbor, requiring Eitzen to walk a considerable distance in the rain. Casteel's assertion that [t]he evidence does not support a finding that the motor vehicle was in [Eitzen's] reach, observation or control fails. We also reject Casteel's unsupported contention that the presence requirement of § 2119 was not met because Eitzen was initially unaware the Casteels had stolen her keys. Even if we assume Eitzen's knowledge is relevant to the presence element, the evidence of Eitzen's knowledge was sufficient to support the verdict. Eitzen was aware she was being robbed by two armed men. During the robbery, Eitzen's conversation with Casteel made her wonder if Casteel planned to take her car and dump it, and maybe her too, in the river. As soon as Eitzen felt free to move after the robbers left, she looked out the window to see if they had stolen her car. The Casteels' use of force, intimidation, and threats of violence held Eitzen frozen in her chair, preventing her from discovering the theft and taking steps to stop it. That Casteel's actions rendered Eitzen temporarily unaware her car was stolen does not make it unreasonable for the jury to find him guilty of carjacking.