Opinion ID: 2195278
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Pretext[4]

Text: ¶ 31. Pursuant to the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, defendants have offered evidence in support of a legitimate business reason for their actions: the elimination of the Manager of Formulations position, and the inclusion of certain qualifications in the job description for the new Supervisor of Drug Delivery position were the result of restructuring done in response to large employee turnover and a perceived lack of scientific ability and expertise in certain specialty areas in the Research and Development department. The important element of this justification, for purposes of this case, is that Govil, and senior management who approved the restructuring, made an early, pre-recruitment decision that the necessary qualifications and skill for the senior drug development jobs did not exist among the employees who were left after the extensive turnover. Thus, in creating the restructuring plan and job descriptions, Govil made the decision that neither plaintiff or any other existing employee would be hired to fill the new jobs. At this second stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, defendants have only a burden of production, rather than one of persuasion, see Boulton, 2003 VT 72, at ¶ 15, 834 A.2d 37, and plaintiff does not dispute that the reasons defendants proffered for their hiring decision, if believed, were legitimate and nondiscriminatory. We conclude that defendants have met their burden under McDonnell Douglas. Thus the only question that remains is whether the total evidence offered by plaintiff is sufficient to carry her ultimate burden of demonstrating that Bertek's justification is a mere pretext for discrimination. We conclude that plaintiff has not carried her burden here. ¶ 32. As we indicated above, we have generally followed the burden allocation rules applicable to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The United States Supreme Court has addressed the burden of demonstrating pretext in a number of cases, and its latest discussion of the nature of the burden in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000), is the most pertinent. Although Reeves is an Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) case, it was decided on the basis that the burdens for the ADEA and for Title VII are the same. See 530 U.S at 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097. The Supreme Court took the case to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to whether a plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination, combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, is adequate to sustain a finding of liability for intentional discrimination. Id. at 140, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (internal citations omitted). The Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence of pretext, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated. Id. at 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097. The Court also recognized, however, that this will not always be the case: Certainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory. For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred. Id. Although the Court was describing the standard for determining whether the employer was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, commentators and courts after Reeves have concluded that the decision also describes the standard for determining whether the employer is entitled to summary judgment. See Williams v. Raytheon Co., 220 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir.2000) (applying Reeves to a summary judgment motion); C. Thompson, Juries Will Decide More Discrimination Cases: An Examination of Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 26 Vt. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2001); L. Ware, Inferring Intent from Proof of Pretext: Resolving the Summary Judgment Confusion in Employment Discrimination Cases Alleging Disparate Treatment, 4 Employee Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 37, 63 (2000); Note, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products: Stemming the Tide of Motions for Summary Judgment and Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law, 52 Mercer L. Rev. 1549, 1565 (2001). In part, they have reached this conclusion because the Reeves Court commented that the standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the standard for judgment as a matter of law, such that the inquiry under each is the same. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (internal quotations omitted). ¶ 33. Reeves explained the application of its ruling in terms consistent with our law on summary judgment, as set out above. Whether summary judgment is appropriate under Reeves depends on a number of factors, including the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered on a summary judgment motion. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-49, 120 S.Ct. 2097. The Reeves Court further clarified this standard: Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge. Thus, although the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. That is, the court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses. Id. at 150-51, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (internal citations and quotations omitted). ¶ 34. Plaintiff has relied in part on the Reeves holding. Having adopted the burden shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas, we see no reason not to adopt the standard of Reeves as a reasonable approach to analyzing evidence in an employment discrimination claim brought under FEPA. Thus, we would normally allow plaintiff to avoid summary judgment at this third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis by demonstrating that there is an issue of material fact underlying the question of whether the employer's reason for its action was pretextual. We conclude that plaintiff has failed to meet this burden. ¶ 35. The difficulty with plaintiff's position is that the hiring decision was not a simple choice among applicants for a preexisting job. Defendants' assertion that they restructured and redefined the research and development management is largely unchallenged by plaintiff. This Court may not second-guess an employer's non-discriminatory business decisions, regardless of their wisdom. Williams v. New York City Dep't of Sanitation, No. 00 Civ. 7371(AJP), 2001 WL 1154627, at  (S.D.N.Y. Sept.28, 2001) (citing cases); see also Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir.2001) (courts should not act as super personnel departments that second-guess employer's business judgments); Tarshis v. Riese Org., 211 F.3d 30, 37 (2d Cir.2000) (Title VII ... [does] not grant courts authority to second-guess the wisdom of corporate business decisions....). Moreover, much of the evidence plaintiff has relied upon is entirely consistent with defendants' reason for their action and does not raise an inference of pretext. ¶ 36. To the extent that plaintiff has attempted to show that defendants' rationale for the hiring decision was a pretext, she has relied upon three theories. The first is that Govil manipulated the hiring process in violation of company policies to allow him to hire Miller. As we held above, this evidence helped plaintiff to demonstrate a prima facie case, the first stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework, but it is unhelpful in demonstrating pretext. Once Govil decided that the existing Bertek employees did not have the necessary skills to lead the research and development of drugs, he had to conduct a search for persons with the needed qualifications. It is obvious that he could not find highly skilled persons with advanced educational degrees in the narrow field involved by simply announcing that positions were open and hoping that the right persons saw the announcement and applied. Consistent with his goals, Govil actively recruited Dr. Miller even before the restructuring was approved. Although Govil put less emphasis on the application process for internal candidates, we cannot conclude that he violated any company policies in the process, [5] and plaintiff did apply and was interviewed. In summary, at best plaintiff may have showed that Govil violated the spirit of company hiring procedures, but the arguable violations reinforced Govil's rationale for hiring Miller, rather than showing the rationale was a pretext for discrimination. ¶ 37. Her second theory of pretext  that she was more qualified than Miller  also does not meet her burden. It is undisputed that plaintiff did not meet the posted minimum qualifications for the job of Supervisor of Drug Delivery. There is no evidence to support plaintiff's argument that Govil adopted the minimum qualifications solely to give the job to Miller. Indeed, the minimum qualifications were entirely consistent with the business rationale of upgrading skill levels. ¶ 38. We cannot agree with her arguments against these central facts. Plaintiff's personal opinion of her relative qualifications cannot be determinative. See Lee v. GTE Florida, Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir.2000) (plaintiff's opinion that she was more qualified than the person who was hired for the job she sought is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the reasons given for the hiring decision were pretextual). Nor can we conclude that plaintiff has met her burden by showing that some of the responsibilities of the new job of Supervisor of Drug Delivery overlapped with those of the job she was performing on an interim basis. See Lesch v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 282 F.3d 467, 473 (7th Cir.2002). ¶ 39. We do not believe that plaintiff's related allegation that the company had waived minimum qualifications in the past helps plaintiff's position in this context. Since the whole point of the restructuring was to upgrade skill and competency of research and development managers, any waiver of qualifications to hire an existing employee would defeat this point. Nor are we persuaded that plaintiff showed pretext by her husband's testimony that the General Manager of Bertek, Matthew Costigan, once told him that Miller should not be interviewed because he was an academician and did not have the industrial experience necessary for the job. Irrespective of the views of Costigan, who was not responsible for the hiring, it is undisputed that Miller met the minimum qualifications for the job, including five years of transdermal formulations experience, and that plaintiff did not. ¶ 40. We do not belittle plaintiff's evidence in support of her third theory  that women were subject to widespread discrimination at Bertek. Her evidence suggested that Bertek's work culture was frequently hostile to women, [6] that men held the upper research and development positions, [7] that Govil was a poor manager and supervisor especially with respect to women employees, or that cultural differences adversely affected his attitude toward women employees. This evidence may be relevant under Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151-52, 120 S.Ct. 2097, to support sufficient evidence that the stated reason for the hiring decision was pretextual, but it does not replace such evidence. It does not respond to defendants' business rationale for their hiring decision and show that it is a pretext. ¶ 41. In general, plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut defendants' rationale beyond her own conclusory allegations, see Quechee Lakes Landowners' Ass'n, 170 Vt. at 28, 742 A.2d at 736 (conclusory allegations without facts to support them are insufficient to survive summary judgment), to contradict this evidence. See Smith v. Am. Express Co., 853 F.2d 151, 154-55 (2d Cir.1988) (summary judgment for defendant appropriate when plaintiff failed to show pretext in selection of better qualified candidate for promotion). We conclude that plaintiff failed to meet her burden and that the trial court properly granted summary judgment against her on her claim that defendants illegally failed to promote her. [8]