Opinion ID: 2061276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Were the hearings before the selectmen either judicial or quasi judicial?

Text: In the hearings on the Edison petitions the selectmen in each instance under the statute were called upon to exercise judgment and discretion. In each of the three towns hearings were held where opposing points of view were presented. We may refer by analogy to the State Administrative Procedure Act, G.L.c. 30A, which, while it does not apply to actions by towns, defines in § 1 an adjudicatory proceeding as a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of specifically named persons are required by constitutional right or by any provision of the General Laws to be determined after opportunity for an agency hearing. See Cambridge v. Railroad Commrs. 153 Mass. 161, 169-170 (the order of the Board of Railroad Commissioners for a city to construct an overpass was quasi judicial); New York Cent. R.R. v. Department of Pub. Works, 354 Mass. 332, 333-335 (a decision not to allow a requested grade crossing was in an adjudicatory proceeding). That the selectmen may exercise some ministerial function does not mean that their proceedings concerning the Edison petitions are not adjudicatory. Sudbury and Wayland rely most heavily on Locke v. Selectmen of Lexington, 122 Mass. 290, a case which is not persuasive. There the court said, The selectmen of a town are not a court, and, independently of the St. of 1873, c. 214, exercise no judicial functions which could be revised by writ of certiorari; but only powers which are purely executive or ministerial.... The exception cited by the court, however, is a statute which provides for a hearing similar to that provided for in c. 166, § 22, and the case would seem to support the position that the hearings before the selectmen were indeed in adjudicatory proceedings.