Opinion ID: 2266029
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the sentencing of veney

Text: Applying the foregoing principles to the present case, we have no difficulty in concluding that the sentencing proceedings were in compliance with the Act, and that Veney's rights were fully protected. The judge was aware of his authority under the DCYRA to sentence Veney as a youth offender. He entertained defense counsel's claims that Veney was an appropriate candidate for rehabilitation. The judge expressly evaluated, on the record, the potential benefits said to be available to Veney at the Youth Center. [8] He concluded, reasonably in our view, that the risk of danger to the community which a youth offender sentence would entail trumped any such benefits. [9] The judge's oral explanation of his decision, which we have quoted at p. 430 supra, reflects a thoughtful and conscientious discharge of his sentencing responsibilities. It now appears, in hindsight, that the necessity for this appeal might well have been avoided if the judge had framed his comments in the language of the Act. [10] The phrase no benefit, however, is not a sacred talisman, and any expression showing that the judge considered and rejected the rehabilitative option available under the Act is sufficient. Notwithstanding the judge's use of words other than those in the DCYRA, his articulation satisfied that statute. See Dorszynski, supra, 418 U.S. at 444, 94 S.Ct. at 3053; Taylor v. United States, 324 A.2d 683, 685 (D.C.1974). To order the judge to sentence Veney as a youth offender would be altogether unwarranted, for imposition of an adult sentence was well within the judge's discretion, and his decision to impose one is not subject to appellate second-guessing. To remand the case to the judge with directions to rephrase his explication of the sentence would be patently futile. Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is Affirmed. [11] WAGNER, Chief Judge, concurring in the judgment: We granted en banc review to determine whether D.C.Code § 24-803(d) imposes procedural limitations or other preconditions upon the sentencing court before it can sentence an age eligible youth offender as an adult under other applicable penalty provisions. In Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974), the Supreme Court answered this question for us when it interpreted an identical provision of the federal statute from which § 24-803(d) was copied. [1] The court today holds that our local no benefit provision, which, in all material respects, is identical to the one under consideration in Dorszynski, requires something less for compliance than the Supreme Court specified. I perceive no basis in our local statute or its legislative history to support this court's variant interpretation of the borrowed language or its departure from our well-established practice of considering such precedent as persuasive authority when interpreting a local provision that is substantially patterned on a federal statute. Benefits Communication Corp. v. Klieforth, 642 A.2d 1299, 1303-04 (D.C.1994); see also Foster v. United States, 615 A.2d 213, 217 (D.C. 1992) (Because the Youth Rehabilitation Act, passed by the Council of the District of Columbia to `fill the void created by congressional repeal of the Federal Youth Corrections Act,' is patterned after the federal act, interpretations of the federal act are instructive here.) (citation omitted). In Dorszynski, in interpreting § 5010(d) of the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5005 et seq. (FYCA), the Supreme Court held that while an express finding of no benefit must be made on the record, the Act does not require that it be accompanied by supporting reasons, 418 U.S. at 425-26, 94 S.Ct. at 3044, and that the no benefit provision does not constitute a substantive standard. Id. at 441, 94 S.Ct. at 3052. In explicating its ruling, the Court provided a clear guideline for compliance with the no benefit provision when it stated that [l]iteral compliance with the Act can be satisfied by any expression that makes clear the sentencing judge considered the alternative of sentencing under the Act and decided that the youth offender would not derive benefit from treatment under the Act. Id. at 444, 94 S.Ct. at 3053. I agree with Judge Reid that the court's formulation today does not comport with the Supreme Court's interpretation, particularly in its failure to require that there be an expression on the record which reveals that the trial judge has exercised his discretion and decided that the youth will derive no benefit from YRA treatment. [2] Post at 438. The Youth Rehabilitation Act (YRA) included no changes from the FYCA which altered the no benefit provision at issue in this appeal. [3] The provisions of the YRA, to which this court points, apparently as a basis for rejecting the Dorszynski interpretation, specifically §§ 24-803(c) and (f), effected no material change supportive of a different interpretation of the no benefit language of § 803(d). Section 803(f), which states that the options created by the YRA constitute sentencing alternatives in addition to the options already available to the court, codifies the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation of the FYCA as set forth in Dorszynski. Specifically, the Supreme Court recognized that § 5010(d) of the FYCA was intended to increase the sentencing options of federal trial judges, rather than to limit the exercise of their discretion whether to employ the newly created options. Dorszynski, supra, 418 U.S. at 440, 94 S.Ct. at 3051. Accordingly, the Court held that the discretion vested in a district judge under § 5010(d) is essentially the same as the traditional discretion vested in the court, for example, to impose the minimum sentence on a first offender or a larger sentence on a recidivist. Id. at 442, 94 S.Ct. at 3052. It concluded that a no benefit finding did not constitute a substantive standard and that therefore, the sentencing court was not required to state reasons for choosing an alternative adult sentence. Id. at 441, 94 S.Ct. at 3051-52. Since the substance of § 803(f) of the YRA essentially capsulizes these aspects of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the FYCA at the time it decided Dorszynski, there is no basis for concluding that the inclusion of § 803(f) in the YRA constrains us to interpret our no benefit provision any differently than the Supreme Court did. Therefore, I disagree with the court that adoption of the government's `fall-back' position in interpreting the no benefit finding is required [i]n order to reconcile subsections (d) and (f) and to accommodate the language of each of these provisions. See ante at 434. The court also finds significant to its holding that § 803(c) of the District's YRA, which requires that the sentencing court state reasons for imposing a YRA sentence, represents a change which reverses the FYCA's tilt in favor of youth offender sentencing. [4] Assuming that to be the case, this additional requirement for imposition of a sentence under § 24-803(c) of the YRA effected no material change in the no benefit requirement of § 803(d). Section 24-803(c) provides that [w]here the court finds that a person is a youth offender and determines that the youth offender will derive benefit from the provisions of this chapter, the court shall make a statement on the record of the reasons for its determination. In addition to allowing the youth offender to present facts to the court bearing upon its sentencing decision, one purpose of this provision, as reflected in the legislative history, is that it affords the prosecutor an opportunity to argue against such treatment. Report at 3. Significantly, in discussing this new provision, there follows a statement that [t]he judge may also impose an adult sentence if he or she finds that there will be no benefit.  Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the intention to retain the no benefit finding requirement, already clear from the inclusion in the YRA of § 803(d), is further buttressed by this expression of legislative intent in spite of the enactment of the new § 24-803(c). For these reasons, there appears to be no basis for concluding, as the majority seems to, that the provisions of § 803(c) require a change in the interpretation accorded the language in § 803(d) by the Supreme Court. This jurisdiction's adoption of the universally recognized principle of statutory construction requires that [w]hen a local provision is borrowed directly from a federal statute, the Council [of the District of Columbia] is presumed to have borrowed the judicial construction thereof as well. Meiggs v. Associated Builders, Inc., 545 A.2d 631, 635 (D.C.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1116, 109 S.Ct. 3178, 104 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1989) (quoting Hughes v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 498 A.2d 567, 571 n. 8 (D.C.1985)) (alteration in original) (other citations omitted). We should adhere to this proposition and to the sound principle of recognizing the Supreme Court's interpretation of the identical federal statutory provision as persuasive, if not controlling, authority. See Klieforth, supra, 642 A.2d at 1303-04; see also District of Columbia v. Patterson, 667 A.2d 1338, 1343 n. 14 (D.C.1995) (Supreme Court interpretations of general federal statutes are, of course, binding on all courts, state or federal.) (citations omitted). Therefore, I disagree with the court's determination that because of additional provisions in the YRA, we view our decisions under the FYCA as helpful but not controlling in the future. [5] While the trial court's no benefit determination was not a model of clarity, it was adequate to meet the requirements set forth in Dorszynski and its progeny in this jurisdiction. In Dorszynski, the Supreme Court stated that compliance with the Act was met by any expression that makes clear the sentencing judge considered the alternative sentencing under the Act and decided that the youth offender would not derive benefit from treatment under the Act. 418 U.S. at 444, 94 S.Ct. at 3053. In light of this instruction from Dorszynski, this court has held that compliance with the no benefit finding requirement does not require that the trial court parrot the statutory words if it explained its grounds for rejecting the [Youth Act] proposal. Taylor v. United States, 324 A.2d 683, 685 (D.C.1974); see also Bettis v. United States, 325 A.2d 190, 198 (D.C.1974). Here, essentially, for the reasons stated by Judge Reid in her concurring opinion, I conclude that the record of the sentencing proceeding reveals that the trial court was well aware of appellant's eligibility for sentencing under the YRA, articulated on the record some of the reasons for and against sentencing him under the Act, and found that he would not benefit from such a sentence. See Taylor, 324 A.2d at 685. For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the court. REID, Associate Judge, joined by RUIZ, Associate Judge, concurring in the judgment: The majority holds that: [A]n adult sentence may be imposed if the record reflects that the judge was aware of the availability under the Act of youth offender treatment, that he considered that rehabilitative option, and that he rejected it. The dissent would remand the case for resentencing on the ground that: [T]he trial judge's ruling did not meet [the following] test[:] [B]efore denying treatment of an eligible youth offender under the District of Columbia Youth Rehabilitation Act (YRA) ..., the trial judge must make an explicit `no benefit' finding, as was required under the former Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA) interpreted in Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974). While we agree that the judgment should be affirmed, we respectfully disagree with the majority's interpretation of D.C.Code § 24-803(d). The word considered is not equivalent to an express finding of no benefit... made on the record.... Id. at 425-26, 94 S.Ct. at 3044. We also reject the majority's reading of § 24-803(f) in that it eviscerates the substance of §§ 24-803(c) and (d). Although we are more inclined toward the dissent's interpretation of § 24-803(d), we disagree with the conclusion that: an explicit `no benefit' finding is required. (Emphasis added). The Supreme Court in Dorszynski did not use the word explicit. Rather, it chose the word express: We conclude that while an express finding of no benefit must be made on the record, the Act does not require that it be accompanied by supporting reasons. 418 U.S. at 425-26, 94 S.Ct. at 3044 (emphasis added). We believe that, as used by the dissent, the word explicit demands more than does the word express in the context of Dorszynski. The dissent in the division opinion in Veney, which is incorporated in the dissent here, seems to require the record to unmistakably [show] that no benefit would result to the defendant from youth offender treatment. Veney v. United States, 658 A.2d 625, 644 (D.C.1995). The trial judge would have to use words that can only be construed to mean `no benefit.' Id. at 646. An example of an unmistakable showing would be the [incorporation of] an expert report or finding that showed that Veney would not gain from YRA sentencing. Id. at 645. Another example would be the use of the exact statutory words. Id. at 646. When Dorszynski is read as a whole, the type of precision the dissent requires cannot be found. The purpose of the express no benefit finding is to insure that the sentencing judge exercised his discretion in choosing not to commit a youth offender to treatment under the Act. 418 U.S. at 443, 94 S.Ct. at 3052. Moreover, the express no benefit finding is not to be read as a substantive standard.... [and] the Act does not require that it be accompanied by supporting reasons. Id. at 441, 94 S.Ct. at 3052. Hence, we conclude that before denying YRA treatment, the trial judge must make an express finding of no benefit on the record, but the Act does not require the finding to be accompanied by supporting reasons. It is sufficient if the record reveals that the trial judge has exercised his discretion and decided that the youth will derive no benefit from YRA treatment. The record of Veney's March 16, 1993, sentencing reveals that the trial judge exercised his discretion and decided that Veney would not benefit from YRA treatment. We agree with the dissent that rehabilitation and community safety are two sides of the same coin, and that: The judge is authorized to find `no benefit' if the youth's prospects for rehabilitation, through YRA treatment, are unlikely to assure community safety upon his release. Here, the trial judge concluded that Veney's prospects for rehabilitation, through YRA treatment, would be unlikely to assure community safety upon his release. This is what he obviously meant in making the statement: And although I don't think it would be a very wise decision for them [i.e., YRA authorities] to release you earlier than you would be released as an adult [,][u]ltimately, the Court doesn't have any control over it. The trial judge clearly regarded the case as difficult. Nonetheless, he exercised his discretion, reached a decision and made an express finding of no benefit after weighing evidence before him and arguments made concerning Veney's mental age, his psychological and emotional problems, and his dangerousness. The sentencing record reveals that the trial judge regarded Veney's dangerousness as extending beyond his one heinous act of manslaughter while armed, as manifested by the following on the record statement: I can't overlook the fact that you have been carrying around a gun for a while and I cannot assure myself that you only had that gun for Mr. Locus, because of something that he had done to you, as opposed to having that gun for its general use whenever you felt it happened to be needed. The trial judge listened to the arguments of Veney's counsel that there was a danger of his victimization at Lorton, that he would have more supervision at the Youth Center than Lorton. He also heard the arguments of the government that it was not clear whether in practice, as opposed to theory, Veney would receive better psychiatric counseling at Lorton than the Youth Center. After weighing Veney's background, his dangerousness to the community, and whether he would receive better psychiatric counseling at Lorton or at the Youth Center, the record reveals that the trial judge exercised his discretion by deciding that Veney would not benefit from YRA treatment because his prospects for rehabilitation through the YRA program were unlikely to assure community safety upon his release. No incantation or recitation of the words no benefit was necessary so long as the sentencing record reveals that the trial judge made an express finding of no benefit. On the record before us, we believe that the requisite finding was made. Therefore, we concur that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed. FERREN, Associate Judge, dissenting: Respectfully, I dissent for the reasons set forth in my separate opinion in Veney v. United States, 658 A.2d 625, 631 (D.C.1995) (Ferren, J., dissenting), in particular Part II., id. at 638-650. I conclude that, before denying treatment of an eligible youth offender under the District of Columbia Youth Rehabilitation Act (YRA), D.C.Code § 24-801 (1989 Repl.), the trial judge must make an explicit [1] no benefit finding, as was required under the former Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA) interpreted in Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974). See 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (repealed). I further conclude that in this case the trial judge's ruling did not meet that test. I therefore would remand for resentencing. At this time, I would add only two observations for emphasis. First, by stressing that the sentencing judge, in evaluating benefit, must focus exclusively on the rehabilitation that can be expected under the YRA, Veney, 658 A.2d at 643 (Ferren, J., dissenting), I have noted that rehabilitation and community safety are two sides of the same coin. The judge is authorized to find no benefit if the youth's prospects for rehabilitation, through YRA treatment, are unlikely to assure community safety upon his release. See id. at 642-44. Second, because the YRA's focus is exclusively on the youth's potential for rehabilitation (including protection of the public from antisocial behavior), I emphatically disagree with the majority's view that the sentencing judge may reject YRA sentencing for a youth who concededly would benefit from YRA treatment. See Cole v. United States, 384 A.2d 651, 652 (D.C.1978) (applying FYCA). I do not believe the YRA permits the judge in such a case to impose an adult sentence instead, sending the youth to prison solely to mete out punishment or to accomplish general deterrence. Ante at 434. Those additional sentencing motives are wholly outside the YRA's purview. The majority finds authority for its punishment/deterrence rationale from D.C.Code § 24-803(f), which says that the YRA's sentencing provisions, subsections (a) through (e), provide sentencing alternatives in addition to the options already available to the court. In light of the required benefit or no benefit finding under D.C.Code §§ 24-803(c) & (d), I do not believe § 24-803(f) can be read to mean that an adult sentencing option, based on deterrence and punishment rationales, is available for youths who concededly would benefit from YRA treatment. Given the history and purpose of the YRA, the only sound reading of § 24-803(f) is simply to confirm that the YRA, with its benefit/no benefit requirement, has been added toand perforce qualifiesthe sentencing options already available.