Opinion ID: 294464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of the Induction Order

Text: 7 The primary contention on this appeal is that Dannehy had no duty to report for induction because he had no valid order to report in Anchorage on June 23, the time and place specified in the indictment. 8 The argument made before this court was premised in large part upon the factual statement of his appeal counsel that Dannehy's original order from the Anchorage board failed to specify a place for reporting for induction. In its brief, the government pointed out that the order, as indicated in the record on appeal, did in fact specify that he was to report in Anchorage. Despite the government's effort to clarify this matter, Dannehy's reply brief persisted in this claim and went so far as to include an appendix which was a copy of an order addressed to Dannehy with the place of reporting left blank. 9 Much confusion has resulted from this error on counsel's part. In point of fact, the record on appeal clearly shows that the order to report for induction specified Anchorage as the reporting place. At oral argument counsel conceded that his view of the facts was incorrect and that, therefore, much of his argument was faulty since it was based on an erroneous premise. 10 We will not conjecture as to why the copy supplied in appellant's reply brief was blank as to reporting place-- the only copy that is relevant in this appeal is the copy in the record from the district court. We think it necessary, however, to express our displeasure with a brief which relies heavily on an erroneous view of the facts and admonish counsel to use more purdence in verifying the facts, as reflected by the record, before launching into an exhaustive (and lengthy) attack on the decision below. 11 Our analysis necessarily begins, therefore, with the fact that Dannehy received an order in Eugene from his Anchorage board which was, in all respects, unquestionably valid. Even though this order was valid, appellant argues that the transfer to Eugene and re-transfer to Anchorage invalidated that order. 12 This argument is based upon a lengthy and involved argument which weaves in and out of numerous sections of the Selective Service Regulations including his interpretations, many of which are, at best, strained. In short, however, it suffices to say that the regulations do not mention the 're-transfer' situation involved here and therefore we need not attempt to fit this case into the regulations. 13 Thus, this case is much like Beierle v. United States, 400 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1968) in that 'the Selective Service Regulations are silent on the subject.' Id. at 132. In Beierle, the registrant received orders to report on January 31. At his own request he was sent to the induction center ahead of that date and was subsequently indicted for his refusal to submit on January 27. 14 Here, as in Beierle, 'the question is when the duty, already extant, was to be performed.' Id. at 131. The court there concluded that the local board clerk had the authority to advance the date at Beierle's request and noted that 'as is the case with a postponement of the reporting date, we do not believe that issuance of a new Order to Report for Induction is necessary.' Id. at 132. 15 What we have here, in essence, is a postponement of the reporting date at the request of Dannehy. We are well aware of the frequency with which local boards, through their clerical personnel, are called upon to modify reporting dates to accommodate the personal needs of registrants. To interpret the regulations as Dannehy would have us do for his purposes would work to the disadvantage and inconvenience of numerous other registrants and further impersonalize a system which is often criticized for being inflexible and unwilling to adjust to personal requirements. 16 Dannehy's final argument here is that the new reporting date in Anchorage must be established by the local board and not by letter from the executive secretary. United States v. Ritchey, 423 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1970), involved a registrant who reported for induction on several occasions but on each occasion prior to the last was unable to complete the induction process. What was said there answers Dannehy's contention that the executive secretary lacked the power to reset his reporting date. 'The clerk could have signed the notice of induction without a formal board meeting. (Citing cases) A fortiori, she could sign the subsequent letters assigning new dates upon which Ritchey could complete his induction process.' Id. at 686. 17 In any event, Dannehy has failed to suggest any possible prejudice from the local board actions which all took place at his request for his convenience. Absent some such showing, we are extremely reluctant to reverse solely because of a highly technical and dubiously arguable violation of some obscure regulation. See Briggs v. United States, 397 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1968).