Opinion ID: 852583
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure To Object to the Belt as a Tactical Choice of Trial Counsel

Text: The law is clear that counsel's performance is presumed effective. [T]he defendant must overcome the strongest presumption of adequate assistance, and judicial scrutiny is highly deferential. Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 261 (Ind.2000); see Conner, 711 N.E.2d at 1252. Moreover, as is frequently pointed out: There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Counsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and these decisions are entitled to deferential review. Isolated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective. Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 746 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-690, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Timberlake, 753 N.E.2d at 603; Perez v. State, 748 N.E.2d 853, 854 (Ind.2001)). The State contends that trial counsel made a tactical decision to allow Stephenson to wear a stun belt. The record does not support this contention. At post-conviction, Anthony Long, one of Stephenson's trial counsel, explicitly stated that he made a conscious decision to allow Stephenson to appear before the jury in a stun belt: I understood our choices were either [the stun belt] or shackles and that was certainly not an acceptable alternative. Similarly, trial counsel Dennis Vowels testified: Q: Do you recall any discussions with Anthony Long about the benefits of a stun belt as opposed to being shackled? A: I don't recall them, but we probably talked about it. I know we were not going to let him be shackled in front of a jury. I knew that. Q: Would you agree that a stun belt worn under the clothes would be preferable in front of a jury to the handcuffs, the waist and the leg irons? A: Yes. At the time of Stephenson's trial in 1996 and 1997, no Indiana ruling had addressed the use of stun belts. As in Wrinkles, counsel cannot be faulted for selecting the belt over more visible shackles, given that the case law addressing the issue had largely focused on the visibility of the restraint, and not, as Wrinkles later pointed out, on the belt's potential effect on the defendant's demeanor and ability to participate in the defense. Wrinkles, 749 N.E.2d at 1194. Although counsel explained their preference for the belt over shackles, they did not explain why they conceded that any restraint was appropriate and failed to require any finding on the record as to the need for restraint. As explained above, at the time of Stephenson's trial it was well-settled as a matter of both state law and the requirements of federal due process that no form of visible restraint was permissible without an individualized finding that the defendant presented a risk of escape, violence, or disruption of the trial. Deck, 544 U.S. at 626-27, 125 S.Ct. 2007; Coates, 487 N.E.2d at 169. Counsel's unquestioning acceptance of the need for any form of restraint cannot be justified as a tactical decision where the decision was made without awareness of the applicable law favorable to the defendant. Dixon v. Snyder, 266 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir.2001) (If counsel was unaware of the statute, then his decision not to cross-examine Carlisle cannot be accorded the same presumption of reasonableness as is accorded most strategic decisions because it was not based on strategy but rather on a `startling ignorance of the law.' (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986))). Finally, the State's claim of a tactical decision does not enjoy the same support it had in Wrinkles. In Wrinkles's case, the penalty, not guilt or innocence, was the only real issue. The decision to challenge the belt arguably fell into the tactical range, balancing the likelihood of success against the risk of alienating the judge by challenging an announced policy. In Stephenson's case, unlike Wrinkles, guilt was vigorously disputed, so that justification for counsel's omission is weakened, and in any event no such tactical consideration was advanced by counsel in post-conviction.