Opinion ID: 1541730
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lawanda Harris.

Text: Appellant Lawanda Harris timely notified the District of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage. See D.C.Code § 12-309. Further, the District acknowledged receipt of her letter and informed her that it would process her claim. Ms. Harris's common law claims against the District therefore meet the statutory notice requirements. The District disputes liability on two grounds. First, the District states that the Municipal Regulations requiring notification applied only to abandoned or Illegally parked vehicles, not recovered stolen vehicles, and that the internal police orders do not establish a standard of care. See Clark v. District of Columbia, 708 A.2d 632, 636 (D.C.1997) (Because the Suicide Prevention Plan is only an unpublished internal agency procedure and not a statute or regulation, it cannot embody the standard of care under a negligence per se theory.). However, this court has further noted that although internal guidelines cannot themselves embody the standard of care, the procedures may properly be received in evidence as `bearing on the standard of care.' District of Columbia v. Wilson, 721 A.2d 591, 598 n. 13 (D.C.1998) (quoting Washington Area Metro. Transit Auth. v. Jeanty, 718 A.2d 172, 177 n. 11 (D.C.1998)). Although the court in Clark agreed that the procedures may bear on the standard, it stated that expert testimony would still be required to establish the standard of care. 708 A.2d at 636. Yet in this case, Commander Griffith of the MPD conceded in deposition that MPD has the responsibility of notifying vehicle owners of the towing of their vehicles. [11] Second, the District argues that because its officers recovered the vehicles in the course of their law enforcement duties, their performance of that public duty is not actionable absent a special relationship, which the District asserts was not involved here. Under the public duty doctrine, `a person seeking to hold the District of Columbia liable for negligence must allege and prove that the District owed a special duty to the injured party, greater than or different from any duty which it owed to the general public.' Powell v. District of Columbia, 602 A.2d 1123, 1129 (D.C.1992) (quoting Klahr v. District of Columbia, 576 A.2d 718, 719 (D.C.1990)). This special duty is also referred to as a special relationship. See Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 3 (D.C.1981) (en banc). This court has recognized at least two ways to demonstrate a special relationship: (1) by showing direct or continuing contact between the victim and the governmental agency, along with justifiable reliance by the victim, see Platt v. District of Columbia, 467 A.2d 149, 151 (D.C.1983); or (2) by a statute prescribing mandatory acts for the protection of a particular class of persons rather than the public, see Turner v. District of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662, 667 (D.C. 1987). Ms. Harris has proffered facts which, if proven, demonstrate direct contact with MPD. Following the theft of her car, she repeatedly contacted MPD. She filed a stolen vehicle report on the date of the theft. Then, she asserts that she contacted MPD every two days to ask about her car. During one of these contacts, she alleges that an MPD officer told her that the police would contact her when they recovered her car. On October 18, 2000, MPD recovered the car. Ms. Harris, or a friend, continued to call MPD after this date. But it was not until six days after the recovery that she learned of the impoundment (and this information came from a call by her friend, not one from MPD). These repeated contacts arguably reflect `some form of privity between the police department and the victim that sets the victim apart from the general public.' Powell, supra, 602 A.2d at 1130 (quoting Warren, supra, 444 A.2d at 10 (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); see also id. at 1131 (finding direct contact where a vehicle owner registered her vehicle and paid a fee, which required the District to issue a license and registration tags to her). [12] But Ms. Harris cannot prove justifiable reliance. Justifiable reliance, in this context of proving a special relationship, means particular or special reliance. See Powell, supra, 602 A.2d at 1131 n. 11 (quoting Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306, 1315 (D.C.1983)). The court has drawn a distinction between cases involving victims who suffer from public officials' fail[ure] to show up at all or do nothing after their arrival, and those who suffer from public officials' affirmative negligence. Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted). That is, while the District may be liable for an official's affirmative act that worsens a victim's condition, it will not be liable for that official's inaction or futile action. See id. (citing Johnson v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 140, 143 (D.C.1990)); see, e.g., Morgan, supra, 468 A.2d at 1317-18 (no special relationship where the wife of a police officer asked a police captain to keep her abusive husband away from her); Warren, supra, 444 A.2d at 3 (no special relationship where citizens informed the police of a rape in progress, even though the police responded to the call and violated internal investigatory procedures). Here, Ms. Harris alleges only a failure to act, not an affirmatively negligent act. Because she cannot establish justifiable reliance, she cannot establish a special relationship with the District. Therefore, her claim against the District must fail.