Opinion ID: 39691
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of the Settlement Agreement; validity of its release of all claims.

Text: 25 The Garcias challenge the Settlement Agreement on grounds of inadequacy of consideration and coercion. Neither of these complaints has merit. 26 The Garcias first argue that [t]he October 23, 2001 Release ... upon which LumaCorp rely [sic] was predicated upon the existence of [the 1993 Plan] which had been revoked almost nine months prior ... to the date of the Release itself. The Release is therefore void and fails as consideration for the Agreement. This assertion makes little sense, but even taking the argument at face value, it is not clear how the release was predicated upon the existence of the 1993 Plan. The summary judgment evidence shows that Mattingly explained to Garcia that he had long since exhausted his benefits under the 1993 Plan. The release was based on LumaCorp's offer to pay Garcia's then-outstanding medical bills plus an additional $10,000, all of which was independent of the 1993 Plan and well in excess of its maximum benefits. 27 The district court, noting that the Garcias apparently confused the issue of failure of consideration with that of adequacy of consideration, addressed whether they raised a genuine issue of material fact as to adequacy. The court did not err in granting summary judgment for LumaCorp on this issue. As the Garcias acknowledge in their brief, for consideration to be deemed inadequate under Texas law, it must be so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience, being tantamount to fraud. 8 The district court correctly found that Garcia was in fact paid more than he was entitled to receive under the 1993 Plan, and that LumaCorp was under no obligation to pay him anything at all once the Plan benefits were exhausted. LumaCorp's offer to pay Garcia's then-outstanding medical bills — in excess of $14,000 — plus an additional payment of $10,000, in exchange for the release was surely not so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience. 28 The Garcias devote the remainder of their second point of error to their contention that LumaCorp coerced Garcia to sign the release. They allege coercion based on LumaCorp's having descend[ed] upon the home of Mr. Garcia en masse. ... with a check in hand, admittedly making verbal representations which were not included in the Release ... and with no document in Spanish. They further argue that [t]he actions of LumaCorp rise to the level of economic duress .... It's [sic] acts of coercing Mr. Garcia to sign the Release was a [sic] economic duress which voided the terms of the release. 29 Yet, the Garcias did not present, and do not direct our attention to, any record evidence whatsoever to support these assertions. As they recognize in their brief, we will uphold a grant of summary judgment where the nonmovant is unable, in turn, to point to any evidence in the record that would sustain a finding in the nonmovant's favor on any issue on which he bears the burden of proof at trial. 9 The only potential record sources of support for the Garcias' claims are their personal affidavits, which state generally, I have had the Plaintiff's Answer to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment translated to me from English into Spanish ... and I understand what was read to me, to the best of my ability. Each statement herein is within my personal knowledge, true and correct. These affidavits, even when read in conjunction with the referenced Plaintiff's Answer, are insufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. All we have are the Garcias' unsubstantiated assertions. Needless to say, unsubstantiated assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence. 10 The district court did not err in finding that the Garcias' allegations of coercion were unsupported by competent summary judgment evidence. The Settlement Agreement was valid and enforceable.