Opinion ID: 5330
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Basic Issues

Text: Hudson contends that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing his petition. He asserts that, contrary to the court's determination, he could not have brought the Brady claim earlier since he was unaware of Wilson's identification of and the arrest of Larry Jones until he obtained a copy of the police reports in 1988 in connection with a state post-conviction proceeding. The district court's decision to dismiss Hudson's petition under Rule 9(b) lies within its sound discretion, and will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion. Schouest v. 8 Rule 9(b) provides that: A second or succeeding petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits, or if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ. 10 Whitley, 927 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 1991) (superseding Schouest v. Smith, 914 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1990)). In 1991, the Supreme Court decided McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991), on abuse of the writ which goes substantially beyond simply requiring proof of a persuasive reason for earlier failure to raise the issue. In McCleskey, the Court held that the cause and prejudice test applicable to cases of procedural default enunciated in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), is applied also to determine if there has been an abuse of the writ through inexcusable neglect. McCleskey, 111 S.Ct. at 1470. Claims raised for the first time on a second or subsequent habeas petition will be dismissed as an abuse unless the petitioner can show cause for the failure to raise the claim in an earlier habeas petition, but the petitioner is also permitted to show prejudice resulting in a lack of fundamental fairness in the trial. Nonetheless, even if the petitioner cannot satisfy the cause and prejudice standard, courts may still entertain a serial petition to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The miscarriage of justice exception applies only to extraordinary instances when a constitutional violation probably has caused the conviction of one innocent of the crime. Id. McCleskey is applied retroactively. See Russell v. Collins, 944 F.2d 202, 205 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (finding that [a]s [the McCleskey] standard applies here only to procedure in the habeas review, retroactive application of the standard is not at issue 11 and, thus applying McCleskey), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 112 S.Ct. 30, 115 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991); Woods v. Whitley, 933 F.2d 321, 323 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that [a]lthough this case was decided by the district court prior to the issuance of McCleskey, the procedure the court followed and the result it reached comport with that case).9 We apply the cause and prejudice standard in the evaluation of this petition by Hudson.