Opinion ID: 2167906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sufficiency of the injunctive relief.

Text: As we have indicated, the trial judge originally stated that he would deny all injunctive relief. After reading several of our opinions, however, the trial judge changed his mind in this regard and decided that he should take additional testimony to determine the scope of the injunctive relief. The Beanes objected to this, contending that the verdict of the jury for $2,000.00 in their favor and the ultimate judgment on the verdict, concluded the issues in regard to the wrongful channelization and increase of the flow of surface water onto their property and that this condition resulted in substantial damage to the Beanes. Hence, say the Beanes, the trial court should proceed to fashion the equitable relief based upon the decided premises mentioned. Although, as we will later more fully consider, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to take additional testimony in regard to the practical ways in which injunctive relief might be fashioned, we are of the opinion that the trial court was not at liberty to disregard the premises already established by the verdict and judgment. Subtitle BF of the Maryland Rules provides for MANDAMUS AND INJUNCTION AS ANCILLARY RELIEF IN AN ACTION AT LAW and Rule BF43, entitled Equitable Principles Applicable to Claim for Injunction, provides: In determining whether or not an injunction shall be granted pursuant to this Subtitle, the court shall apply the same tests and standards as would be applied in an action in equity. Rule BF43 does not mean that, in considering injunctive relief ancillary to the action at law, the trial court is to proceed as if the granting of injunctive relief were a matter de novo in equity with the right to the trial judge to disregard or reach conclusions contrary to the factual matters already determined by the jury. In short, the jury's factual findings  either upon a special verdict or inherent in a general verdict  are conclusive in regard to those facts as if the trial court sitting as a trier of fact had so found. If it be concluded that the jury had no substantial evidence upon which to reach its verdict, the remedy is by the granting of a judgment n.o.v. If there were other deficiencies in the verdict, a new trial could be granted. In the present case, the trial court, properly we think, declined to grant the County's motion for a judgment n.o.v., concluding that there was legally sufficient evidence to support the verdict. The County made no motion for the granting of a new trial and no new trial was granted. Thus the verdict and judgment became final and no appeal from the judgment was taken to this Court. There was a conflict in regard to the County's undue channelization of the surface water, its increased amount and velocity, as well as in regard to its damaging effect upon the Beane property. The evidence offered on behalf of the Beanes indicated that prior to the improvement of Sansbury Road by the County and the subsequent installation of the pipe from that road to the Beane property, the only land which drained into the old roadbed was that of the McMullens and perhaps the land of the Mabes next to the McMullen land. It indicated that there was no sloping ditch from Sansbury Road to the Beane property and this was corroborated by Charles Baumann, a disinterested witness, familiar with the neighborhood, who had been called as a witness by the McMullens. It also indicated that after the pipe and catch basins along Ritchie-Marlboro Road had been installed, water continually stood in the old roadbed. This condition had not existed prior to the installation. Indeed, George Martin, a witness for the County, testified that the difference between the runoff of water of a gravel road and a macadam road was that the former was 60% of the latter. The County and the McMullens, on the other hand, introduced evidence to show that there was a sloping ditch from Sansbury Road of approximately two feet to the Beane property where its depth was some eight feet. The County also offered evidence to show that there was no increase in the drainage area as a result of the installations of catch basins and the pipe. The jury believed the Beane testimony, found a verdict for the Beanes and awarded $2,000.00 damages against the County. Accepting the facts implicit in the jury's verdict as established in the case, the Beanes would be normally entitled to an injunction against the County to alleviate the increased flow of surface water upon their land resulting from the canalization of surface water by the County's installation of the catch basins and pipe, Baer v. Board of County Commissioners of Washington County, 255 Md. 163, 257 A.2d 201 (1969). See also Grant v. Katson, 261 Md. 112, 274 A.2d 88 (1971), citing Baer with approval. The Beanes urged the lower court to issue a mandatory injunction to compel the County either to (1) remove the pipe and catch basins and restore the drainage to its status prior to the installations, or (2) carry the present pipe forward through the Beane property and have the water deposited in a suitable place. Counsel for the Beanes offered to confer with the County officials in regard to possible other solutions to the problem if the county officials thought the recommended solutions to be too expensive or impracticable. This offer, however, was not pursued; and the trial court passed an order on September 7, 1971, providing as follows: This matter having come on for jury trial on July 12, 1971, and said trial having extended to and including July 16, 1971, at which time a judgment was entered in favor of the Counter-Claimants, EUGENE C. BEANE, SR., and MARY BEANE, his wife, against the Counter-Defendant, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND, the request for injunctive relief having been ultimately taken under advisement, and there having been had a further hearing on the request for injunctive relief on the 26th day of August, 1971 over the objection of the Counter-Claimants, EUGENE C. BEANE, et ux., at which time testimony was taken and exhibits considered, it is this 7th day of September, 1971, by the Circuit Court for Prince George's County ORDERED, that the prayer of both EUGENE C. BEANE, and MARY BEANE, his wife, for injunctive relief is granted to the extent that the Counter-Defendant, PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND, be and it is hereby ordered to remove that portion of the drainage pipe installed on the property of EUGENE C. BEANE and MARY BEANE, his wife, from the westerly property line of the Counter-Defendants, McMULLENS, to the westerly terminus of said drainage pipe, all as more particularly shown on Exhibit 4 introduced at the hearing held on August 26, 1971, and is further ORDERED that any further claim for injunctive relief be and it is hereby denied. We observe, in limine, that the order, in form, does not comply with Rule BB78 a, which provides: An order granting an injunction shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; and shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act sought to be required or commanded or restrained or forbidden. Although the prior proceedings indicating why injunctive relief was being given in an action at law are given, no reasons for the issuance of the injunction are set forth as the Rule requires. Then, too, the court, in noting the location of the portion of pipe to be removed, refers to Exhibit 4 introduced at the hearing held on August 26, 1971, which is another document, the use of which is forbidden by the Rule with respect to supplying the particulars of the Act commanded to be done. The relevant portion of Exhibit 4 could have been reproduced, relevant explanations inserted upon the reproduction and the plat so produced attached to the order and incorporated in it by reference to an appropriate legend placed upon the reproduction. But this was not done. Inasmuch as this aspect of the case must be remanded for further proceedings, in any event, the order ultimately passed can be made to conform to the provisions of Rule BB78 a. More importantly, however, is the failure of the order for the granting of the injunction to grant the Beanes any substantial relief from the canalization of the surface water and its increased flow over and above the natural flow of such water prior to the County installations. It is true that the removal of the 40 feet of pipe on the Beane land  placed there without the consent of the Beanes and obviously a continuing trespass  does abate a continuing trespass of that 40 feet of pipe; but it does nothing to abate or relieve the abnormal and unlawful flow of water on the property of the Beanes. Indeed, as a result of the order, 40 feet more of the Beane land will be subject to the abnormal and unlawful flow of water! No specific consideration was given by the trial court to any principle of comparative hardship although this was urged by the County as a possible reason to deny equitable relief. The doctrine of comparative hardship is available for consideration in considering injunctive relief in actions at law. Dundalk Holding Co. v. Easter, 215 Md. 549, 137 A.2d 667, cert. den. 358 U.S. 821, reh. den. 358 U.S. 901 (1958). On this question, there was testimony in the present case by Henry M. Eldridge, a registered surveyor, a witness for the Beanes, that the installation of a 21 inch pipe for 763 feet would cost $4,435.00, whereas the County evidence indicated that the estimated cost would be some $32,000.00 to continue the pipe down to Fernwood Road. There were, however, no specifications or definitive data given so that these figures, at best, do not appear to be especially helpful in determining any question of comparative hardship. In view of all the circumstances, we will reverse the order of September 7, 1971, and remand the case to the lower court for the purpose of taking additional testimony, if required, in order to fashion an order, in proper form, to give more complete relief to the Beanes, in addition to the removal of the 40 feet of pipe from their land, from the abnormal and unlawful flow of water on the Beane property resulting from the County installations, unless some doctrine of equity precludes injunctive relief in which event the Beanes would be enabled to proceed, without prejudice, to recover recurring damages resulting from such installations subsequent to July 21, 1971, when the $2,000.00 judgment should have become final.