Opinion ID: 1631067
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Exclusion of trailer's out of service status and causation

Text: ś 37. Carla argues that the trial court erred by excluding her expert, Mark Dunlap, from testifying that the truck was out of service at the time of the collision due to a lack of reflective tape. [4] She argued that the lack of tape was in direct violation of the FMCSRs and, therefore, the truck should not have been on the roadway. ś 38. The trial court qualified Dunlap as an expert in State and Federal Motor Carrier Safety Codes. At trial, Carla proffered the testimony of Dunlap on the issue of whether the truck was out of service. The proffered testimony was as follows: Q. Mark [Dunlap], would you tell this Court what your findings are regarding whether or not this trucking company should have been permitted to have this vehicle on the road the day of the accident? A. Should not have been on the road in that condition. Q. Why not? A. Did not meet the requirements for the conspicuity tape, 393.13. Q. Okay, and can you tell us whether or not you have an opinion regarding whether or not that truck and trailer were in service or out of service? Based on the violations for the conspicuity tape? A. Right. The truck â Q. â Scratch truck. Just the trailer? A. The trailer was not out of service. However, had I come across it, I would have held it due to the fact it was a dangerous violation. Q. Meaning you would not have allowed it to continue? A. I would not have allowed it to continue on the road. Q. Give us your opinion on causation in regards to the injuries as to Preston Utz? A. The only thing that I could comment on is the fact the truck should never have been on the road in the first place. That would be my causation. Q. Okay. No further questions. (Emphasis added.) ś 39. Carla contends that the trial court erred by finding that this issue concerned strict liability. Instead, Carla contends that, once R & R and Hunter admitted that they had violated the FMCSRs, a violation of state and federal law, the trial court should have granted a peremptory instruction as to liability in lieu of the negligence-per-se instruction and should have permitted her to have expert testimony on causation with regard to the trailer being out of service. ś 40. The trial court, in the order granting in part and denying in part R & R's motion to strike various opinions to be offered by Carla's expert witnesses, determined that all of the expert witnesses for Carla had a common theme of strict liability against R & R, based on her theory that the truck had no reflective tape and, therefore, it should not have been on the roadway. The trial court stated: Causation â Strict Liability 17. A common theme running through all of the opinions of the plaintiff's experts is their position that because the truck failed to have the federally required amount of reflective tape on the rear of the truck, the truck should not have been on the highway, and thus they conclude the defendants are liable for the injuries and death of the plaintiff simply because the truck was on the roadway. By this argument, the plaintiff seeks to impose strict liability against the defendants. 18. Strict liability is not pled in the complaint. Also, this court is of the opinion that this case is not one premised on strict liability. Although the violation of federal regulations alleged by the plaintiff â the failure to have reflective tape attached to the rear of the trailer â is a factor that may be considered by the jury when assessing liability, there must exist some casual connection between the alleged violation and the accident. Without such a causal connection, it is this court's view that no liability would attach to the defendants premised only upon an alleged violation of federal or state regulations. 19. For the reason stated above, no expert will be permitted to opine or give testimony to the effect that the subject truck should not have been on the highway due to its alleged failure to comply with federal regulations. (Emphasis added.) ś 41. The trial court did not err by excluding Dunlap's expert testimony on whether the truck was out of service. Based on Dunlap's proffered testimony, he clearly stated that the truck was not out of service, although he would have placed it out of service had he inspected it. Notwithstanding his testimony that the truck was not out of service, this Court has held that violations of traffic laws, in and of themselves, do not amount to strict liability. This Court requires that in order to incur liability when a party is negligent, that negligence also must be the proximate cause of the injury. See Jones v. U.S. Fid. and Guar. Co., 822 So.2d 946, 948 (Miss. 2002) (We note our opinion in Richardson v. Adams, 223 So.2d 536, 537 (Miss.1969), establishes that the violation of a statute demonstrates a duty and breach thereof, but not proximate cause of injury which is a question still left for the jury to answer); see also Choctaw Maid Farms, Inc. v. Hailey, 822 So.2d 911, 923-24 (Miss.2002) (this Court held that no punitive damages were warranted where there was no nexus between Choctaw's alleged gross negligence and the collision and where Choctaw's trailer had an expired tag, was old, and was missing a log book, among other things). This issue is without merit.