Opinion ID: 2640414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the plain language of rpc 4.2(a) permits self-represented lawyers to contact represented parties

Text: ¶ 34 Court rules like the Code of Professional Responsibility are subject to the same principles of construction as are statutes. In re McGlothlen, 99 Wash.2d 515, 522, 663 P.2d 1330 (1983). Thus, when interpreting a rule we give the words their ordinary meaning, reading the language as a whole and seeking to give effect to all of it. Heinemann v. Whitman County Dist. Court, 105 Wash.2d 796, 802, 718 P.2d 789 (1986). If the plain language of the rule is unambiguous, additional interpretation is unnecessary. See Nevers v. Fireside, Inc., 133 Wash.2d 804, 815, 947 P.2d 721 (1997); Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wash.2d 674, 682-87, 80 P.3d 598 (2003). ¶ 35 The plain language of RPC 4.2(a) unambiguously exempts self-represented lawyers.  In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so. RPC 4.2(a) (emphasis added). A client is a person who consults or engages the services of a legal advisor, WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 422 (2002), or a person or entity that employs a professional for advice or help in that professional's line of work. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 271 (8th ed.2004). In other words, a client is a third party who engages a lawyer. Because self-represented lawyers have no client, see Somers v. Statewide Grievance Comm., 245 Conn. 277, 287, 715 A.2d 712 (1998), under RPC 4.2(a) they may contact a represented party. ¶ 36 The majority concedes that RPC 4.2(a) applies only when a lawyer is representing a client but nonetheless construes it to cover self-represented lawyers. Majority at 1269. Apparently, the majority concludes that self-represented lawyers are employing or engaging themselves for advice, help, or services. Id. at 1267. ¶ 37 This ingenious bit of legal fiction illustrates the wisdom of avoiding interpretations conceivable in the metaphysical sense when the plain language of a statute is both necessary and sufficient. Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wash.2d 416, 423, 103 P.3d 1230 (2005). Assuming that a self-represented lawyer represents a client certainly produces the majority's preferred outcome. Unfortunately, it does so only at the expense of coherence. Lawyers cannot retain themselves any more than pro se litigants can claim legal malpractice or ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (holding that a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of `effective assistance of counsel'); State v. DeWeese, 117 Wash.2d 369, 379, 816 P.2d 1 (1991); Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 320 (6th Cir. 2000). Undoubtedly, wise lawyers follow their own counsel. But it is a neat trick indeed to advise oneself. ¶ 38 The majority's claim to follow an emerging majority rule is unavailing. Indeed, it cites decisions from six states concluding that self-represented lawyers are their own clients. See In re Segall, 117 Ill.2d 1, 509 N.E.2d 988, 109 Ill.Dec. 149 (1987); Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Simmons, 184 W.Va. 183, 399 S.E.2d 894 (1990); Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103 (Wyo. 1994); Runsvold v. Idaho State Bar, 129 Idaho 419, 925 P.2d 1118 (1996); Vickery v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241 (Tex.App.1999); In re Discipline of Schaefer, 117 Nev. 496, 25 P.3d 191 (2001). But none offers any more convincing a rationale for this curious conclusion than the majority. Conclusory statements cannot substitute for legal reasoning, and another court's error cannot justify our own. ¶ 39 Likewise, the majority's reliance on the purpose of RPC 4.2(a) is misplaced. As the author of the court rules, we are in a position to reveal the actual meaning which was sought to be conveyed. Heinemann, 105 Wash.2d at 802, 718 P.2d 789. But in the interest of certainty and consistency, we approach them as though they had been drafted by the Legislature. Id. Whatever the purpose of RPC 4.2(a), it cannot extend to persons and actions its plain language excludes. We may not expand the scope of a rule by fiat. If we conclude that self-represented lawyers should not contact represented parties, we should simply rewrite the rule to clearly prohibit that conduct. Other states have already done so. Compare Cal. R. Prof. Cond. 2-100 discussion § 2 (explicitly permitting self-represented lawyers to contact represented parties) with In re Smith, 318 Or. 47, 53 n. 5, 861 P.2d 1013 (1993) (noting that DR 7-102, Oregon's equivalent to RPC 4.2, was amended effective January 1991, to add the phrase, `or in representing the lawyer's own interests'). Lawyers should not have to read slip opinions to divine their professional obligations.