Opinion ID: 1385884
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Marlowe's Sentence

Text: Marlowe appeals only from the life sentence imposed on count 3, and does not challenge the decision to sentence him to the statutory maximum of 10 years' imprisonment on each of counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7. Marlowe faced a sentence that included life imprisonment because the jury found that Marlowe's denial of necessary and appropriate medical care to Kuntz resulted in his death. As with Conatser, the applicable sentencing guideline for civil rights violations required that the district court apply the base offense level applicable to any underlying offense. USSG § 2H1.1(a) (2002). [6] There is no dispute that, unlike Conatser, the underlying offense was homicide and the critical determination was whether to apply the base offense level from the guideline applicable to second degree murder, USSG § 2A1.2, or the substantially lower base offense level applicable to involuntary manslaughter, USSG § 2A1.4. The district judge explained' that, in his view, the record reflected malice aforethought and culpability for second degree murder. After determining the base offense level to be 33, the district court added six levels because the offense was committed under color of law, USSG § 2H1.1(b)(1)(B); two levels because the victim was restrained in a cell at the time of the offense, USSG § 3A1.3; four levels because Marlowe was an organizer or leader, USSG § 3B1.1(a); and two levels for obstruction of justice by providing materially false information to authorities investigating Kuntz's death, USSG § 3C1.1. With a total offense level of 47 and a criminal history score of 0, the corresponding guidelines sentence was not a sentencing range but a term of life imprisonment. After receiving testimony from a number of witnesses, the district court addressed the relevant § 3553(a) sentencing factors, denied Marlowe's request for a below-guidelines sentence, and sentenced Marlowe to life imprisonment on count 3. We turn to Marlowe's specific claims on appeal.
We begin with Marlowe's challenge to the guidelines calculationwhich is a component of the procedural-reasonableness review. Specifically, Marlowe maintains that facts do not support the conclusion that the underlying homicide offensethat is, causing Kuntz's death by denying him medical careinvolved the malice aforethought that distinguishes second degree murder from manslaughter under federal law. The district judge's interpretation of the guidelines is reviewed de novo, while his findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Canestraro, 282 F.3d 427, 431 (6th Cir. 2002). Murder is the unlawful, killing of a human being with malice aforethought, while [m]anslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(a) and 1112(a). Involuntary manslaughter is further defined as an unlawful killing either [i]n the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or in the commission in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection, of a lawful act which might produce death. 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a). Malice aforethought may be inferred when the defendant grossly deviates from the standard of care to such an extent that a jury could conclude that he must have been aware of a serious risk of death or serious bodily injury. United States v. Sheffey, 57 F.3d 1419, 1430 (6th Cir.1995); see also United States v. Milton, 27 F.3d 203, 206 (6th Cir.1994). Marlowe argues that he was performing a lawful action when attempting to revive Kuntz, and that his conduct amounted to, at most, criminal negligence or reckless manslaughter. In support of the claim that he was not aware of a serious risk of death or serious bodily injury, Marlowe insists that he did not know that Hale had struck Kuntz in the head. The evidence showed, however, not only that Marlowe himself had beat Kuntz twicestriking him in the head both timesbut also that Marlowe had asked Hale to take care of Kuntz when he started banging on the door again. Hale understood this to mean that he should use whatever force it took to make Kuntz stop banging on the door, and proceeded to deliver several full:powered punches to the side of Kuntz's head that caused his head to bounce against the concrete wall each time. Hale reported to Marlowe that he had taken care of it, and Kuntz was quiet after that. Although not present during the assault by Hale, Marlowe would have known from prior experience that Hale had silenced Kuntz by beating him, Not long after Hale assaulted Kuntz, Marlowe and Hale were told that Kuntz had undergone brain surgery within the last year or two. Nonetheless, Marlowe emphasizes his lack of medical training and claims that he thought Kuntz's condition was due to severe intoxication. The evidence at trial was that symptoms of extreme intoxication are similar to the symptoms of a subdural hematoma. There is no dispute that Kuntz was severely intoxicated when he arrived at the jail at 3:30 p.m., and it was estimated that his blood alcohol level at that time was .26. Between then and 5:00 p.m., however, Kuntz was assaulted three times. When checked at 6:00 p.m., Kuntz was awake but not did not respond to Hale; by 7:00 or 7:30 p.m., Kuntz had vomited on himself and could not be roused; by 9:00 p.m., Kuntz had vomited again and was so nonresponsive that he could not be roused by being doused with ice water or with the use of smelling salts; and before 10:00 p.m., Kuntz was found lying with his eyes open and did not respond when a flashlight was shone in his eyes. Despite being aware of his worsening condition and knowledge of the assaults that preceded it, no medical attention was sought or provided until after Marlowe agreed to call Hale's father. Even then, neither Marlowe nor Hale mentioned to Hale's father or the EMTs who responded to the jail that Kuntz might have hit his head, which further delayed appropriate evaluation and treatment. There was evidence that a Subdural hematoma can generally be treated successfully within several hours after a head injury. Kuntz, however, suffered irreversible brain damage and died. It was not clearly erroneous for the district judge to conclude that Marlowe's conduct so grossly deviated from a reasonable standard of care that he must have been aware of a serious risk of death or serious bodily injury. Accord United States v. McDougle, 82 Fed.Appx. 153 (6th Cir.2003) (upholding use of base offense level for second degree murder in calculating the guidelines sentence on a conviction for violation of civil rights resulting, death). [7] As such, it was not error to draw the base offense level from the guideline applicable to second degree murder.
Aside from the above challenge to the guidelines calculation, Marlowe also argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district judge neglected to consider the other § 3553(a) factors and did not articulate the reasons for imposing the life sentence. Procedural reasonableness does not require ritual incantation of the other § 3553(a) factors by the district judge as long as the record demonstrates the district court's consideration of the relevant factors, Williams, 436 F.3d at 709. That is, [t]tle sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority. Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2468. We find, as the following excerpt from the sentencing hearing reveals, that Marlowe's argument on this score is misplaced. The district judge explained as follows: The Court also has to consider the request for sentence outside the guideline range. In that, the Court has to order a sentence that's sufficient but not greater than necessary. [It] has to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant. The sentence must reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, provide adequate deterrence, protect the public, [and] provide needed educational vocational training and medical care. [It h[as to consider the kinds of sentences available, the advisory guideline range and guideline policy statements and avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. And to provide restitution. Mr. Marlowe has relied on the following grounds, as I understand them. That the circumstances at the Wilson County. Jail were overcrowded, too few guards and lack of training. He is relying on his youth and inexperience and lack of training. He is relying on the fact that he is esteemed by his friends, and that's reflected in 33 letters of support and 893 signatures on the petition that was submitted to the Court. He is relying on his lack of criminal record, his family ties and responsibility. Has a young wife and young son. He argues a life sentence is too drastic. That his actions were tacitly approved by his supervisors. Inmates were aggressive. He is unlikely to repeat the offense or be able to. He's otherwise had an exemplary life. He's been rehabilitated. And he also argues that his status as a former jailer makes his conditions of confinement especially harsh. He raises the disparity with the 108-month sentence for Gary Hale and generally the totality of the circumstances. The Court has heard from a number of witnesses today. We have had testimony from family members, his wife, his brother [who the defendant cared for through 25 surgeries], his father, [and] his sister-in-law about his character and family ties and other matters. Had three witnesses really speak to the rehabilitation issue, his pastor and assistant pastor, [and] neighbor. And then we have had intermittent testimony about lack of training and lack of proper guidance at the facility. And the Court has also heard from the Kuntz family, Ms. Thompson and the two Mrs. Whites, about the impact on their family. In the view of the Court, most of the heart-wrenching aspects of this case are not appropriate reasons to go outside the guideline range. It is a family tragedy to both the Marlowes and the Kuntz[es] that's heart breaking. It is difficult to hear. Takes a piece out of you every time you hear a case like this, but regrettably the terrible family consequences are, a usual rather than an unusual consequence of criminal conduct. The Court has considered it, but it is not something that outweighs the criminal conduct engaged in by Mr. Marlowe. Also considered the other factors that have been argued. Some have more merit than others. I do think that lack of criminal history and lack of training are particularly strong to be considered. The factor I am most concerned about and have weighed along with all the others is concern that there not be sentencing disparity with Mr. Hale. Mr. Hale received 108 months [imprisonment] from the Court. And the basic reason for that is Mr. Hale pled guilty to Count One that had a ten-year maximum [and] received a downward adjustment in light of his cooperation for 108 months sentence rather than 120-month sentence. And that concerns me because in the view of the Court, Mr. Marlowe beat Mr. Kuntz. Mr. Hale then . . . killed Mr. Kuntz with his bare hand. But Mr. Marlowe allowed Mr. Kuntz to die through no intervention, and that's supported by the jury's verdict on. Count Three. So the Court is mindful of that really Mr. Hale is very culpable in the death of Mr. Kuntz. Mr. Marlowe is culpable as well. And got to balance all of that. I have looked back at Mr. Hale's presentence report and the judgment that the Court entered. And Mr. Hale would have had offense level of 40, very long guideline range of 292 to 365 months but for the statutory maximum [on Count One.] There are dissimilarities between Mr. Hale and Mr. Marlowe. Mr. Marlowe was a supervisor. Mr. Marlowe was convicted of seven counts, not one. There was substantially more evidence at trial about Mr. Marlowe abusing other inmates. So they are not really similarly situated, . . . but I have satisfied myself that that's not an unwarranted sentencing disparity under the totality of the circumstances. . . . So where does that put me? It is admittedly a difficult case and a hard decision, but I am going to deny the request for sentence below the advisory guideline range. I think on balance the guideline sentence of life is the appropriate sentence considering 3553 and the guidelines. This brings us to Marlowe's claim that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. As noted earlier, the properly calculated guidelines recommendation of life imprisonment is the starting point for our substantive-reasonableness review, and a within-guidelines sentence is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. Williams, 436 F.3d at 708. Marlowe contends that his sentence is unreasonable because the district judge failed to give adequate weight to the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Taking the last first, it is clear from the record that the district judge exercised his discretion and gave significant consideration to the difference between Hale's sentence of 108 months and the prospect of a life sentence for Marlowe. Marlowe contends that because he and Hale were similarly situated, the district court should have given the advisory guidelines less weight to avoid this substantial disparity in sentencing. As the district judge ably explained, although it was Hale who inflicted the injuries that would kill Kuntz, the jury found that Marlowe's actions in denying Kuntz necessary and appropriate medical care resulted in his death. While the disparity was the product of the plea bargain and downward departure Hale received, a coconspirator's decision to plead guilty and cooperate with the government may be a valid reason for such sentencing disparity. In addition, the district judge explained that Marlowe and Hale were not similarly situated in several important respects. On this record, we find that it was not unreasonable to conclude that the disparity in sentences between Marlowe and Hale did not justify a below-guidelines sentence. With respect to the other factors, Marlowe contends that the district judge failed to give adequate weight to the mitigating facts relevant to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant. Specifically, Marlowe argues that a lesser sentence was warranted by the fact that he was a young, misguided boy who was not mentally prepared for a job as a correctional officer; that the jail was overcrowded, underfunded, and understaffed; that he did not receive proper training or supervision; and that he followed the example of others and performed as he thought was expected. In addition to these circumstances, family, friends, and neighbors testified at sentencing that Marlowe was a family man who, among other things, generously cared for a brother with scoliosis through 25 surgeries, was the primary caregiver to his young son while his wife completed college, and contributed his time and talents to work with children and teens. Letters and petitions of support were received and considered by the district judge, as was the testimony concerning the counseling Marlowe underwent prior to trial that was described as having led to a genuine transformation and sincere expressions of remorse. We find that the arguments and evidence with respect to Marlowe's plea for a lesser sentence were fully before the district judge, and were expressly noted and considered. Explaining that the case was difficult and presented a hard decision, the district judge nonetheless believed that the heart-wrenching circumstances did not warrant a below-guidelines sentence. Ultimately, the district judge concluded that on balance the guideline sentence of life is the appropriate sentence considering [§] 3553 and the guidelines. Having properly considered and weighed the competing reasons for leniency, and for a harsh penalty, the district judge made a reasonable determination as to the appropriate sentence in light of the purposes of § 3553(a). United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 810 (6th Cir.2006). The sentence, while indeed harsh, is not substantively unreasonable. Webb, 403 F.3d at 385.
Last, but not least, Marlowe seeks reversal of his life sentence on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally imposed in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Since there seems to be no dispute that Marlowe raised these objections at sentencing, we will review the constitutionality of this sentence de novo. United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516, .536 (6th Cir.2004). Marlowe argues first that his sentence was unconstitutional because it was based on a fact not admitted by him or found by the jury. Specifically, it is the finding that Marlowe's conduct involved the malice required for second degree murder and the attendant increase in the guidelines' recommended sentence that is challenged. [8] As Blakely made clear, the relevant maximum in this regard is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). It is true, as Marlowe argues, that Booker applied Blakely to the federal sentencing guidelines and held that it would violate the Sixth Amendment to increase a defendant's sentence based on judicially found facts under the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines scheme. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). The remedy adopted in Booker, however, was to render the guidelines advisory. Id. at 246-49, 125 S.Ct. 738. Where, as here, the district court recognized the advisory nature of the guidelines, the increase in a defendant's sentence based on facts not admitted by the defendant or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt does not violate the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Kosinski, 480 F.3d 769, 775 (6th Cir.2007). In other words, Booker did not eliminate judicial factfinding. United States v. Coffee, 434 F.3d 887, 898 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2313, 164 L.Ed.2d 831 (2006); see also United. States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 461 (6th Cir.2006); United States v. Cook, 453 F.3d 775, 777 (6th Cir.2006). Nor are we persuaded that the Supreme Court's application of Blakely and Booker to California's determinate sentencing law in Cunningham v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 856, 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (2007), requires a contrary conclusion. [9] Relatedly, Marlowe argues that, although the issue was not decided in Booker, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that judicially found facts must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. This argument is foreclosed by this court's holding that judicial fact-finding in sentencing proceedings using a preponderance of the evidence standard post-Booker does not violate either Fifth Amendment due process rights, or the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. United States v. Gates, 461 F.3d 703, 708 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 602, 166 L.Ed.2d 446 (2006); see also United States v. Moncivais, 492 F.3d 652, 655 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 633, 169 L.Ed.2d 409 (2007). Finally, it is argued that application of a presumption of reasonableness renders the sentence unconstitutional because it lends the guidelines a heightened status not contemplated by Booker and impermissibly shifts the burden of proof to the defendant. Although Marlowe seems to argue that the presumption was applied by the district court at sentencing, the record belies such a claim. Defendant objected on that basis, and the district court specifically stated that it would afford the guidelines no presumption of reasonableness. Moreover, our precedents are clear that the presumption of reasonableness recognized in this circuit is an appellate standard of review, which the Supreme Court has held does not violate the Sixth Amendment. Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2463. The Court in Rita explained that the presumption, unlike a a trial-related evidentiary presumption, reflects the fact that, by the time an appeals court is considering a within-guidelines sentence on review, both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the proper sentence in the particular case. Id.; see also United States v. Liou, 491 F.3d 334, 337 (6th Cir.2007). Marlowe has not shown that his sentence was unconstitutionally imposed.