Opinion ID: 1098089
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Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Effect of the 1991 FCC Declaratory Ruling

Text: Having determined that the candidates' claims are dependent on, or arise from, a duty imposed by § 315(b), we must now address the question whether the 1991 FCC Declaratory Ruling properly states that federal law preempts the candidates' state-law tort and contract claims. The candidates rely upon the language from Miller v. FCC, 66 F.3d 1140, 1144 (11th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1155, 116 S.Ct. 1543, 134 L.Ed.2d 647 (1996), that characterizes the 1991 FCC Declaratory Ruling as the mere opinion of the FCC and concludes that it is not a decision, a letter of admonition, or an order levying a penalty of forfeiture, a loss of operating authority, or a refund to the candidate. In Miller, the candidates in this action, along with other similarly situated candidates from Georgia, asked the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit to invalidate the 1991 FCC Declaratory Ruling and declare that federal law does not preempt state-law claims derived from 47 U.S.C. § 315(b). Id. at 1140. The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the action on Article III grounds, holding that the candidates had presented only a hypothetical question rather than an actual case or controversy. Miller, 66 F.3d at 1140. The 1991 FCC Declaratory Ruling also was considered in separate litigation in California. In Wilson v. A.H. Belo Corp., 87 F.3d 393, 397 (9th Cir.1996), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the 1991 FCC Declaratory Ruling fits the statutory definition of an `order.' The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides that [t]he agency, with like effect as in the case of other orders, and in its sound discretion, may issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty. 5 U.S.C. § 554(e). The Ninth Circuit held that the FCC issued the Declaratory Ruling to terminate controversy and to remove uncertainty with respect to political advertisements and the `lowest unit charge' requirement. Wilson, 87 F.3d at 397. When the United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on a federal-law issue and there is a split of authority among the various federal courts of appeals on that issue, this Court is free to select the interpretation it considers most sound. Ex parte Bozeman, 781 So.2d 165 (Ala.2000). We find the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit more persuasive and conclude that the 1991 FCC Declaratory Ruling qualifies as a final order. As a general matter, two conditions must be satisfied for agency action to be `final': First, the action must mark the `consummation' of the agency's decision-making process[;] ... it must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by which `rights or obligations have been determined,' or from which `legal consequences will flow.' Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (internal citations omitted). The 1991 FCC Declaratory Ruling squarely meets both prongs of the Bennett test. First, the Declaratory Ruling represents the consummation of the FCC's decisionmaking process because it was adopted only after a notice and comment period and was subject to reconsideration. See 1991 FCC Declaratory Ruling, 6 F.C.C.R. 7511 (1991), on reconsideration, 7 F.C.C.R. 4123 (1992). Second, definite legal consequences flow from its adoption. The exclusive original jurisdiction for claims dependent on, or arising from, a duty imposed by § 315(b) is limited to the FCC itself. We consider the ousting of state circuit courts and federal district courts of subject-matter jurisdiction to be an important legal consequence. Because we find the 1991 FCC Declaratory Ruling to be a final order, we conclude that the substance of the Declaratory Ruling is reviewable only by a federal court of appeals. The court of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of(1) all final orders of the Federal Communications Commission made reviewable by section 402(a) of title 47. 28 U.S.C. § 2342. See, also, FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466 U.S. 463, 104 S.Ct. 1936, 80 L.Ed.2d 480 (1984). This Court cannot entertain a collateral challenge to the validity of the 1991 FCC Declaratory Order, nor can Alabama courts provide a forum in which the candidates can attack the order. The proper forum for adjudicating the claims brought by the candidates is the FCC. However, even if the 1991 FCC Declaratory Ruling were not a final order, we still would hold that the Ruling represents a proper exercise of regulatory authority by the FCC. Unlike the Eleventh Circuit in Miller, we are confronted with a live controversy. We find the 1991 FCC Declaratory Ruling makes sense in light of the FCC's comprehensive role in regulating the television-broadcast industry. Courts should generally defer to a permissible construction of a statute by the agency charged with its enforcement. It is settled that courts should give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged with the enforcement of that statute. The Comptroller of the Currency is charged with the enforcement of banking laws to an extent that warrants the invocation of this principle with respect to his deliberative conclusions as to the meaning of these laws. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 403-04, 107 S.Ct. 750, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987) (quoting Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626-27, 91 S.Ct. 1091, 28 L.Ed.2d 367 (1971)). See, also, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); QCC, Inc. v. Hall, 757 So.2d 1115, 1119 (Ala.2000). We agree with the substance of the FCC's Declaratory Ruling, that federal communications law preempts state causes of action for claims dependent upon, or arising from, a duty created by § 315(b). The FCC's regulation of television broadcasting is pervasive, and Congress has invested the FCC with the power to enforce the Communications Act of 1934. See KVUE, Inc. v. Moore, 709 F.2d 922 (5th Cir.1983). Furthermore, 47 U.S.C. § 315(d) specifically grants the FCC the power to prescribe appropriate rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this section. This enforcement clause has been construed as a congressional direction to the FCC to recognize the importance of this particular section of the statute and to prescribe separate rules and regulations to deal with the multitudinous situations that arise in applying it to all federal, state and local candidates for office throughout the nation. Kay v. FCC, 443 F.2d 638, 643-44 (D.C.Cir.1970). We also find persuasive the FCC's view that violations of the Communications Act of 1934 have not traditionally been seen to provide a private cause of action. See Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Communication Network Found., 22 F.3d 1423 (8th Cir.1994) (holding that there is no private cause of action to enforce the equal-time provision of the Communications Act); Lechtner v. Brownyard, 679 F.2d 322 (3d Cir.1982) (stating that the personal-attack rule does not provide a private cause of action); Belluso v. Turner Communications Corp., 633 F.2d 393 (5th Cir.1980) (finding no private cause of action for violations of the equal-opportunity provisions of the Communications Act); Daly v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 309 F.2d 83 (7th Cir.1962) (holding that § 315(a) neither creates nor authorizes private causes of action); Arons v. Donovan, 882 F.Supp. 379 (D.N.J.1995) (concluding that the obligation of broadcasters to operate in the public interest does not create private causes of action). The candidates argue that applying the Declaratory Ruling retroactively violates their substantive-due-process rights. We cannot agree. In Alabama, retroactivity is generally disfavored. See Alabama Home Builders Licensure Bd. v. Grzelak, 705 So.2d 406 (Ala.Civ.App.1997). However, when a lawmaking body thoughtfully considers the burdens and benefits of retroactively applying a law and makes clear its intent that the law have legal consequence in pending cases, courts must follow the law's intent. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). This is especially true in cases that merely change the jurisdiction from one forum to another. We have regularly applied intervening statutes conferring or ousting jurisdiction, whether or not jurisdiction lay when the underlying conduct occurred or when the suit was filed.... Application of a new jurisdictional rule usually `takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case.' Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (citing Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 36 S.Ct. 202, 60 L.Ed. 409 (1916)). Landgraf reflects the situation in this matter, where federal law has ousted state courts of jurisdiction. The candidates still are able to seek a remedy for their alleged wrongthey simply cannot seek it in the Alabama court system. In this matter, the intent of the FCC and the apparent need for the Declaratory Ruling are clear. The 1991 FCC Declaratory Ruling was adopted in part because of this litigation. Furthermore, the candidates do not possess matured state-law claims. They never had claims under state law. Without jurisdiction, a court has no power to act. In this case, jurisdiction was never proper in the Alabama circuit court; thus, Alabama courts had no power to remedy any alleged wrong. The candidates' final argument is that the saving clause of the Communications Act of 1934 precludes federal preemption of their claims. The clause states that the Act does not abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law.... 47 U.S.C. § 414. We cannot agree with such a broad interpretation of this clause. Their remedy did not exist at common law. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Communications Act preempts state-law libel actions and provides federal immunity for broadcasts regulated by § 315. See Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 79 S.Ct. 1302, 3 L.Ed.2d 1407 (1959). The Court states that it has not hesitated to abrogate state law where satisfied that its enforcement would stand `as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' WDAY, 360 U.S. at 535, 79 S.Ct. 1302 (footnote omitted). Analyzing the effect of 47 U.S.C. § 414 as applied to a state-law breach-of-contract action against a long-distance telephone carrier, Judge Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that a literal reading of § 414 would empower state courts to gut the federal regulatory scheme. Cahnmann v. Sprint Corp., 133 F.3d 484, 488 (7th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952, 118 S.Ct. 2368, 141 L.Ed.2d 737 (1998). The Seventh Circuit stated that even though the saving clause is broadly written, it cannot be used to evade substantive FCC regulation. Id. We find the reasoning in Cahnmann compelling and agree that the candidates cannot by filing carefully worded pleadings in a state court avoid the reality that their claim is fundamentally a federal claim. `The question of jurisdiction is always fundamental, and if there is an absence of jurisdiction over either the person, or the subject matter, a court has no power to act, and jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be created by waiver or consent.' Mobile & Gulf R.R. v. Crocker, 455 So.2d 829, 831 (Ala.1984), (citing Norton v. Liddell, 280 Ala. 353, 194 So.2d 514 (1967)).