Opinion ID: 2359622
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial Court's Refusal to Give Flannel Instruction

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it rejected his proffered instruction on unreasonable self-defense or imperfect self-defense pursuant to People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1]. He asserts that the instruction was justified because of statements he made to the police that he fired at the victims in response to gunfire he believed was directed at him. Defendant acknowledges that this doctrine applies to the issue of guilt. ( Id. at p. 672 [a defense of imperfect self-defense negates malice so that the offense is reduced from murder to manslaughter].) Nonetheless, he maintains that, had the instruction been given at the penalty phase, defense counsel would have been able to remind [the jury] of this legal principle ... and argue that lingering doubt [remained] concerning [defendant's] mistake of fact in determining whether [defendant] should be sentenced to death. In Murtishaw II, defendant contended that the trial court had erred by failing to give an unreasonable self-defense instruction sua sponte. We expressed doubt that the court had a sua sponte duty to so instruct but went on to reject the claim on its merits. That decision controls here. [Defendant] further claims that the failure to so instruct precluded the jury from considering the evidence adduced at the penalty retrial which was suggestive of an unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense. [¶] We may quickly reject this latter contention. The jury was instructed that a defendant's reasonable belief in moral justification was a mitigating circumstance [citations], thus possibly raising the negative inference that an unreasonable belief was not a proper consideration. However, the jury was also instructed to consider in mitigation `[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.' [Citations.] Had the jury believed defendant's evidence that he harbored an honest but unreasonable belief in the need for self-defensive action, the instructions permitted consideration of that information as a mitigating factor under [section 190.3,] factor (j)-(k). [Citation.] ( Murtishaw II, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1017.) For the same reason, we further rejected defendant's claim that the trial court's failure to instruct on imperfect self-defense violated the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution because it prevented him from arguing lingering doubt as a factor in mitigation. The factor (j)-(k) instruction given at the second penalty trial allowed the sentencer to consider any `lingering doubts' about the culpability of defendant's conduct. No error appears.  ( Murtishaw II, at p. 1018, italics added.) In this case, as in Murtishaw II, the trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC former No. 8.88.1, which included section 190.3, factor (k) allowing the jury, in determining the appropriate sentence, to consider [a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial. Just as in Murtishaw II, instructing the jury with this factor permitted the jury to consider defendant's imperfect self-defense claim in determining the appropriate sentence. Accordingly, under the law of the case doctrine, defendant's argument is foreclosed. [7] We are not persuaded by defendant's further argument that changes in the law since Murtishaw II have eroded our reasoning so as to preclude application of the law of the case doctrine. Defendant notes that in rejecting his claim the trial court had a sua sponte obligation to instruct on unreasonable self-defense, we included a citation to People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307 [185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311]. In Wickersham, we characterized unreasonable self-defense as a defense such that an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on this theory was required only if requested or, sua sponte only, `if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.' ( Id. at pp. 328-329.) (7) In People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531], we revisited our characterization of unreasonable self-defense as a defense. We concluded that it was not a true defense but a shorthand description of one form of voluntary manslaughter, obligating the trial court to instruct on it, sua sponte, as a lesser offense of murder whenever the evidence is such that a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant killed the victim in the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense. ( Id. at pp. 200-201.) This discussion in Barton does not, however, undermine our conclusion in Murtishaw II that the failure to give an unreasonable self-defense instruction in a penalty phase trial was not error because other instructions permitted jury consideration of that claim as a factor in mitigation.