Opinion ID: 2270462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: manufacturing methamphetamine: sufficiency of the evidence.

Text: Prior to 1998, manufacturing methamphetamine was not a specifically defined offense within the Controlled Substances Act. Under the pre-1998 statutory scheme, trafficking in a controlled substance by manufacturing meant, inter alia, possession of an immediate precursor of a controlled substance with the intent to convert it into a controlled substance. KRS 218A.010(3), (9), (11), (24); Commonwealth v. Hayward, Ky., 49 S.W.3d 674, 674-75 (2001). We held in Hayward that under the pre-1998 statutory scheme, [p]ossessing the primary precursor ..., ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, along with all the other necessary chemicals for the manufacture of methamphetamine provided a legally sufficient basis for the jury to find that Appellant was trafficking in methamphetamine. Id. at 677 (emphasis added). KRS 218A.1432(1), enacted in 1998, provides: A person is guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine when he knowingly and unlawfully: (a) Manufactures methamphetamine; or (b) Possesses the chemical s or equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. (Emphasis added.) As noted supra, the trial judge did not instruct the jury on KRS 218A.1432(1)(a), effectively granting a directed verdict of acquittal on that issue; thus, no issue with respect to that statute is raised on appeal. [1] Appellant asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of manufacturing methamphetamine under KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) because the Commonwealth did not prove that he possessed all of the chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine or that he did so with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. The Commonwealth responds that a conviction under KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) can be premised upon possession of any of the chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine and that the evidence at trial was sufficient to create a reasonable inference that Appellant intended to manufacture methamphetamine. The evidence found during the search of the maroon Buick consisted of 2.39 grams of methamphetamine, six boxes of Equate antihistamine tablets, two lithium batteries, six cans of starting fluid, one glass vial, one Kerr Mason jar, one glass jar with lid, one black cooking pot, one small glass jar, one weighing scale, three pieces of hose (green, black and white), one green funnel, one wooden stirring spoon, a cotton ball, a.22 caliber Ruger handgun, and one glove containing rock salt. The glass vial, the Mason jar, the glass jar, the pieces of hose, and the cotton ball were subsequently tested and found to contain methamphetamine residue. According to the Commonwealth's expert, there are three ways to manufacture methamphetamine: (1) the P2P method that was popular in the 1970's and used phenol 2 propanol as a chemical precursor; (2) the red phosphorus and iodine method (see Commonwealth v. Hayward, supra, at 675-76); and (3) the ephedrine reduction method most commonly used in Kentucky and the method at issue here. Specifically, the expert testified that the manufacture of methamphetamine by the ephedrine reduction method requires possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine (which could be extracted from the antihistamines), lithium (which could be extracted from the lithium batteries), ether (a common ingredient of starting fluid), sulfuric, hydrochloric or muriatic acid (commonly found in drain cleaners), salt, and anhydrous ammonia. The expert admitted that methamphetamine cannot be manufactured by the ephedrine reduction method without anhydrous ammonia. Thus, Appellant clearly did not possess all of the chemicals necessary to manufacture methamphetamine. The expert also identified the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine as including spoons, dishes, glassware, filtering material ( e.g., cotton balls), funnels, hoses, and other household items. Although the expert did not specifically testify that Appellant possessed all of the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine, a jury could conclude from his description of the ephedrine reduction method of manufacturing methamphetamine that the equipment found in the Buick was sufficient to accomplish the task. Whether a conviction under this statute requires possession of all (as opposed to any ) of the chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine under some manufacturing process is a matter of statutory construction. First, we examine the language of the statute, itself. United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 338-39 (6th Cir.2000) (The starting point in a statutory interpretation case is the language of the statute itself.). Obviously, the multiple manufacturing methods and the availability of a broad range of readily available chemicals and equipment necessary for each manufacturing process militates against itemizing within the statute all of the possible chemical and equipment combinations by which methamphetamine could be manufactured. Nevertheless, KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) does not read [p]ossesses chemicals or equipment, or [p]ossesses some of the chemicals or equipment, or [p]ossesses any of the chemicals or equipment. It reads [p]ossesses the chemicals or equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine. The presence of the article the is significant because, grammatically speaking, possession of some but not all of the chemicals or equipment does not satisfy the statutory language. The is [u]sed as a function word before a plural noun denoting a group to indicate reference to the group as a whole. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2369 (1993). In decisions spanning three different centuries, the appellate courts of this Commonwealth have found use of the word the to have a significant effect upon meaning. See Revenue Cabinet v. Hubbard, Ky., 37 S.W.3d 717, 719-20 (2000) ([U]se of the definite article `the' indicates that the statute refers to the entire body and not to discrete parts or components ....); Cardwell v. Haycraft, Ky., 268 S.W.2d 916, 918 (1954) (the trial court's contributory negligence instruction was erroneous in that it contained the definite article the before the words proximate cause and such language indicates that `the sole' rather than `a contributing' cause was meant.); Schardein v. Harrison, 230 Ky. 1, 18 S.W.2d 316, 319 (1929) ([I]f the makers of the Constitution had intended to qualify the word `office' [in Ky. Const. § 161] they would have inserted the definite article `the' before `office.') (quotation omitted); Sheriff of Fayette v. Buckner, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 126, 128 (1822) (holding that legislative act referencing  the clerk of the court intended a particular clerk of court referenced elsewhere in the legislation). For similar interpretations by other jurisdictions, see, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 466 Mich. 142, 644 N.W.2d 715, 718 (2002); Patricca v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 527 Pa. 267, 590 A.2d 744, 751 (1991); McClanahan v. Woodward Constr. Co., 77 Wyo. 362, 316 P.2d 337, 341-42 (1957); Williams v. McComb, 38 N.C. (3 Ired. Eq.) 450 (1844) ([G]rammatically speaking, `The,' is a definite article before nouns, which are specific or understood, and is used to limit or determine their extent.). We are directed by the General Assembly to construe our statutes according to the common and approved usage of language. KRS 446.080(4). Following that directive, we construe the chemicals or equipment to mean all of the chemicals or all of the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine. This construction is also supported by the General Assembly's own subsequent enactments with respect to the possession of chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. The 2000 General Assembly enacted KRS 250.489(1) (2000 Ky. Acts, ch. 233, § 4), which provides: It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly possess anhydrous ammonia in any container other than an approved container. It defined an approved container as one which meets or exceeds the requirements of the Federal law or regulation for the storage and handling of anhydrous ammonia. KRS 250.482(4) (2000 Ky. Acts, ch. 233, § 1.) It also enacted KRS 250.991(2) (2000 Ky. Acts, ch. 233, § 7), which provides: Any person who knowingly possesses anhydrous ammonia in a container other than an approved container in violation of KRS 250.489 is guilty of a Class D felony unless it is proven that the person violated KRS 250.489 with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of KRS 218A.1432, in which case it is a Class B felony for the first offense and a Class A felony for each subsequent offense. (Emphasis added.) Appellant did not possess any quantity of anhydrous ammonia. The relevance of the 2000 enactments of KRS 250.489(1) and KRS 250.991(2) to this case is their clarification of legislative intent with respect to whether, by its 1998 enactment of KRS 218A.1432(1)(b), the General Assembly intended that the offense of manufacturing methamphetamine could be committed by possession of less than all of the necessary chemicals or equipment. Congress must have been presumed to have known of its former legislation in the Acts of 1853 and 1866, and to have passed the new laws in view of the provisions of the legislation already enacted. These statutes must be construed together and effect given to all of them. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 198, 207, 40 S.Ct. 120, 122, 64 L.Ed. 225 (1920). See also Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596, 100 S.Ct. 800, 814, 63 L.Ed.2d 36 (1980) ([W]hile the views of subsequent Congresses cannot override the unmistakable intent of the enacting one, such views are entitled to significant weight, and particularly so when the precise intent of the enacting Congress is obscure.) (internal citations omitted); Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 90, 79 S.Ct. 141, 145, 3 L.Ed.2d 132 (1958) (Subsequent legislation which declares the intent of an earlier law is not, of course, conclusive in determining what the previous Congress meant. But the later law is entitled to weight when it comes to the problem of construction.); Shewmaker v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 30 S.W.3d 807, 809 (2000) (It is presumed that the Legislature was cognizant of preexisting statutes at the time it enacted a later statute on the same matter.); California Sch. Township, Starke Cty. v. Kellogg, 109 Ind.App. 117, 33 N.E.2d 363, 366 (1941) (If it can be gathered from a subsequent statute in pari materia what meaning the legislature attached to the words of a former statute, they will amount to a legislative declaration of its meaning, and will govern the construction of the first statute.); 2B Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 49:11, at 120-21 (6th ed. 2000) (Where a former statute is amended, or a doubtful meaning clarified by subsequent legislation a number of courts have held that such amendment or subsequent legislation is strong evidence of legislative intent of the first statute.). It would have been redundant for the General Assembly to create a new Class B felony of possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container with intent to manufacture methamphetamine if mere possession of anhydrous ammonia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine was already a Class B felony under KRS 218A.1432(1)(b); ergo, the legislative intent with respect to KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) must have been that possession of only some of the necessary chemicals or equipment, e.g., anhydrous ammonia, even with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, does not constitute manufacturing methamphetamine. The interpretation urged by the Commonwealth would also create negative double jeopardy ramifications. As noted, the Commonwealth contends that possession of any chemical or piece of equipment with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine constitutes manufacturing methamphetamine in violation of KRS 218A.1432(1)(b). Anhydrous ammonia is a chemical used to manufacture methamphetamine. Thus, under the Commonwealth's interpretation, possession of anhydrous ammonia with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine would be a violation of KRS 218A.1432(1)(b). Consider, then, the double jeopardy implications if, e.g., Appellant had also been in possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container. KRS 250.489(1) criminalizes mere possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container as a Class D felony. KRS 250.991(2) further provides that possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine is a Class B felony. Notice that if mere possession of anhydrous ammonia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine would constitute manufacturing methamphetamine in violation of KRS 218A.1432(1)(b), as the Commonwealth suggests, that offense would be an included offense within the Class B felony version of the offense described in KRS 250.489(1) and KRS 250.991(2). Evidence of possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine would prove both offenses. Thus, because under the Commonwealth's interpretation, KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) would be an included offense of the Class B felony version of KRS 250.489(1), convicting a defendant for possessing anhydrous ammonia under both statutes would constitute double jeopardy. KRS 505.020(1)(a) and (2)(a). Indeed, if the Commonwealth's interpretation of KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) were correct, the class B felony version of KRS 250.489(1) would be superfluous because it would be the same offense as that described in KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) except that it would require proof of the additional element of an unapproved containerand no prosecutor would charge one version of the same offense if conviction of another version could be obtained with less proof. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31, 122 S.Ct. 441, 449, 151 L.Ed.2d 339 (2001) (It is `a cardinal principle of statutory construction' that `a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.'); Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562, 110 S.Ct. 2126, 2133, 109 L.Ed.2d 588 (1990) (Our cases express a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment); Commonwealth v. Phon, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 106, 108 (2000) (statutes should be construed in such a way that they do not become meaningless or ineffectual.). If, however, as we conclude, a conviction of manufacturing methamphetamine pursuant to KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) by the ephedrine reduction method by possession of the chemicals necessary to do so requires proof of (1) possession of anhydrous ammonia, and (2) possession of all of the other chemicals necessary to manufacture methamphetamine, and (3) the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, then the enactment of KRS 250.991(2), the Class B felony version of KRS 250.489(1), neither has double jeopardy implications nor is superfluous. Conviction of the Class B felony version of KRS 250.489(1) requires proof of (1) possession of anhydrous ammonia, (2) in an unapproved container, and (3) the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Thus, while each offense requires proof of possession of anhydrous ammonia with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, each also requires proof of an element that the other does not. KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) requires proof of possession of all of the other chemicals necessary to manufacture methamphetamine while KRS 250.489(1) and KRS 250.991(2) do not, and the latter statutes require proof that the anhydrous ammonia was possessed in an unapproved container, while KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) does not. See Commonwealth v. Burge, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 805, 809-11 (1996). In addition to the 2000 General Assembly's enactment of KRS 250.489(1) and KRS 250.991(2), the 2002 General Assembly enacted KRS 218A.1437(1), a Class D felony, viz: A person is guilty of unlawful possession of a methamphetamine precursor when he or she knowingly and unlawfully possesses a drug product or combination of drug products containing ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine, or their salts, isomers, or salts of isomers, with the intent to use the drug product or combination of drug products as a precursor to methamphetamine or other controlled substance. Thus, again, the legislature has enacted a separate statute to criminalize the same conduct that the Commonwealth asserts is already criminalized by KRS 218A.1432(1)(b). And, although KRS 218A.1437(1) cannot be applied to this case because it was enacted subsequent to the offense, it does shed further light on the legislative intent with respect to KRS 218A.1432(1)(b); for if the General Assembly had intended possession of a methamphetamine precursor with intent to manufacture methamphetamine to be a Class B felony under KRS 218A.1432(1)(b), it would not have subsequently enacted KRS 218A.1437(1) to make the same offense a Class D felony. E.g., Seatrain Shipbuilding, supra, at 596, 100 S.Ct. at 814. And logic precludes a conclusion that the General Assembly intended to classify possession of a methamphetamine precursor as a class D felony but possession of lithium batteries or starting fluid (or, for that matter, a Mason jar, a wooden spoon, or a cotton ball) as a class B felony. 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46:05, at 175-76 (The general rule is followed that prior and later statutes dealing with the same subject matter although in apparent conflict, should as far as reasonably possible be construed in harmony with each other so as to allow both to stand and to give force and effect to each.). Obviously, KRS 218A.1437(1) and the Class B felony version of KRS 250.489(1) were intended to fill the gap where there is proof of possession of a methamphetamine precursor or anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine but not proof of possession of all of the other chemicals necessary to manufacture methamphetamine. This leads us to the inescapable conclusion that KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) applies only when a defendant possesses all of the chemicals or all of the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine. Absent possession of all of the necessary chemicals or all of the necessary equipment, a defendant can be convicted under the present statutory scheme of (1) a Class B or D felony under KRS 250.489(1) and 250.991(2) for possession of anhydrous ammonia in an unapproved container (depending upon the presence or absence of an intent to manufacture methamphetamine); (2) a Class D felony under KRS 218A.1437(1) for possession of a methamphetamine precursor (with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine); but not (3) a Class B felony under KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) for possession of less than all of the other necessary chemicals or equipment (even with the requisite intent). Whether a defendant can be convicted of criminal attempt to manufacture methamphetamine by possession of less than all of the necessary chemicals or equipment will be more fully discussed in Part IV-B of this Opinion, infra. We also note that double jeopardy principles would preclude convictions of both manufacturing methamphetamine premised upon possession of all the necessary chemicals under KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) and of possession of a methamphetamine precursor under KRS 218A.1437(1), if possession of the same precursor is used to prove both offenses. In that scenario, the latter statute does not require proof of an additional element that the former does not. Burge, supra . Both offenses require proof of possession of a methamphetamine precursor with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. In addition, KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) requires proof of possession of all of the other necessary chemicals with the requisite intent whereas KRS 218A.1437(1) requires proof of no additional elements; thus, KRS 218A.1437(1) would be a lesser included offense of KRS 218A.1432(1)(b). KRS 505.020(2)(a). However, if the conviction under KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) were predicated only upon the equipment alternative, a separate conviction under KRS 218A.1437(1) for also possessing a methamphetamine precursor with intent to manufacture methamphetamine would not constitute double jeopardy (because a precursor is a chemical, not an item of equipment). As for Appellant's final argumentthat mere proof of the element of possession of the equipment used in the manufacture of methamphetamine does not prove the additionally required element of intentwe note that there was evidence in this case that, in addition to possessing the necessary equipment, (1) Appellant also possessed some of the chemicals necessary to manufacture methamphetamine, including a substantial quantity of a necessary precursor, (2) Appellant admitted that he knew how to manufacture methamphetamine and (3) that he had previously manufactured the 2.39 grams of methamphetamine found during the search of the Buick, as corroborated by (4) the fact that several items of the equipment found in the Buick contained methamphetamine residue. This was ample evidence from which a reasonable juror could believe beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant possessed the equipment found in the Buick with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Commonwealth v. Benham, Ky., 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (1991).