Opinion ID: 2516377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury instruction on malice aforethought

Text: Wegner contends that the jury instructions in this case created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption of malice aforethought, which incorrectly relieved the State of its burden to prove every element of the crime charged. Jury instruction number 8 stated: There are certain classes of murder which carry with them conclusive evidence of malice aforethought. One of these classes of murder is murder committed by means of child abuse. Therefore, a killing which is committed by child abuse is deemed to be murder of the first degree whether the killing was intentional or unintentional. This instruction is erroneous. See Collman v. State, 116 Nev. ___, 7 P.3d 426 (2000). We now turn to the question of whether giving the erroneous jury instruction is harmless error. Erroneous jury instructions are reviewable according to a harmless-error analysis. Id. at ___, 7 P.3d at 447 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 13-15, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999)). An error is harmless when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error. Neder, 527 U.S. at 18, 119 S.Ct. 1827. Moreover, Neder concluded that jury instruction errors are subject to a harmless-error analysis if they do not involve the type of jury instruction error which vitiates all the jury's findings and produces consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate. Id. at 10-11, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993)). Where a defendant has contested the omitted element and there is sufficient evidence to support a contrary finding, the error is not harmless. Id. at 19, 119 S.Ct. 1827. In Collman, the jury instruction error was determined to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The same cannot be said for this case. In both cases other instructions informed the jury that malice aforethought was a necessary element of the crime of first degree murder. Other factors distinguish this case from Collman, however, and prevent a conclusion that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Most notably, the Collman jury also found that Collman tortured the victim, while such a finding is neither present nor supported by any evidence in this case. In Collman, this court determined that the jury's unanimous finding of torture beyond a reasonable doubt showed that the jury also found implied malice. Id. at ___, 7 P.3d at 450. There was no such finding in this case. Furthermore, this case involves only one instance of alleged child abuse. In Collman, there was evidence of repeated child abuse. The Collman opinion warns that a malice instruction is necessary to avoid the circumstance where a single abusive impulsive act by an otherwise decent caretaker would lead to a first degree murder conviction. This case also lacks overwhelming evidence of guilt. The case against Wegner relies almost exclusively on the medical evidence. The various medical experts provided conflicting testimony. Some of the medical testimony suggested that the victim may have already been injured before being placed in Wegner's care. The jury may have concluded that Wegner committed child abuse, aggravating a previous injury without malice aforethought. It is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found Wegner guilty of first degree murder absent the erroneous jury instruction. This court cannot conclude that the error was harmless and therefore Wegner's conviction must be reversed.