Opinion ID: 2011054
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: reduction of compensatory damages awarded by jury

Text: On cross-appeal, plaintiffs argued that the trial justice erred by subtracting $28,540 (the increased construction costs claimed by plaintiffs) from the jury's compensatory damage award of $340,000 and by conditioning plaintiffs' recovery of the $28,540 on their starting and completing the construction of a new furniture store by certain dates. At trial, plaintiffs submitted a summary of damages that listed seven items totaling $391,331, but the jury awarded plaintiffs only $340,000 in compensatory damages against all defendants. After trial, in response to defendants' motion to alter or amend the judgment, the trial justice amended the verdict by denying defendants' request for a remittitur but granting defendants' request to place conditions on plaintiffs' recovery of $28,540 in putative increased construction costs. Public interest requires that jury verdicts possess a conclusiveness that will preserve the finality of the jury trial as an instrument for doing substantial justice. Newport Fisherman's Supply Co. v. Derecktor, 569 A.2d 1051, 1053 (R.I. 1990)(quoting Roberts v. Kettelle, 116 R.I. 283, 300, 356 A.2d 207, 217 (1976)). For the same reason, judgments are presumed to have been made up after careful deliberation and are not to be disturbed without substantial reason. Chase v. Almardon Mills, Inc., 102 R.I. 579, 581, 232 A.2d 390, 391-92 (1967)(quoting Kolker v. Gorn, 202 Md. 322, 325, 96 A.2d 475, 477 (1953)). We hold that if a trial justice cannot ascertain whether a particular item of damages was included in the jury verdict, the justice may not alter or amend the verdict by removing that item. See Walker v. St. Laurent, 103 R.I. 636, 639, 240 A.2d 414, 415 (1968)(in order to alter a confused, ambiguous, and inconsistent verdict, a trial justice must be able to say with certainty what the jury meant). In this case, the jury award of compensatory damages in the amount of $340,000 was not itemized to reflect its component parts, nor was the jury questioned regarding its subtraction of $51,331 from the amount that plaintiffs claimed as damages. Although it is clear that the jury discounted that amount from the itemized list of damages submitted by plaintiffs, neither the trial justice nor this court can ascertain from the verdict which item or items the jury discounted. In the trial justice's opinion, five of the seven items listed by plaintiffs seemed clear and concise and the only approximate items are the lost income and increased construction costs. Although the trial justice acknowledged the uncertainty over which item(s) the jury discounted by commenting that [s]omewhere along the line they [the jurors] knocked off $50,000[,] he proceeded to conclude that [i]n the Court's opinion, the only area [the jurors] could knock it off is the lost income and profit. Even if we accept the trial justice's statement that five of the seven items were clear and concise, there still remained the two approximate items of lost income and increased construction costs. Although the trial justice concluded that the only area [the jurors] could knock it off is the lost income and profit[,] nothing in the verdict suggests that the $51,331 was discounted from lost income rather than from increased construction costs. Because the trial justice's assumption that the jury award included increased construction costs was not discernable from the verdict, his decision to deduct the increased construction costs must be reversed. Accord Krock v. Chroust, 330 Pa.Super. 108, 112-15, 478 A.2d 1376, 1378-80 (1984)(where it was impossible to ascertain from the general verdict whether damages were awarded to compensate work loss or the decedent's pain and suffering, it was improper for the trial justice to mold the verdict by deducting the work-loss benefits). The trial justice could permissibly have conditionally corrected or modified the jury award by ordering a remittitur if the justice had concluded that the award was unreasonable in light of the evidence presented at trial. Reccko v. Criss Cadillac Co., 610 A.2d 542, 545-46 (R.I. 1992); Cotrona v. Johnson & Wales College, 501 A.2d 728, 733 (R.I. 1985). A trial justice may not, however, reduce a jury award without using a remittitur. The trial justice in this case denied defendants' request for a remittitur, then impermissibly proceeded to reduce the jury award. Accordingly, we vacate items 1 and 2 of the amended final judgment and reinstate the original jury award of $340,000.