Opinion ID: 721413
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Exclusive Remedy Provision of the Colorado Worker's Compensation Act.

Text: 27 The district court ruled that to the extent plaintiffs' emotional distress claims are based on United's alleged vicarious liability for harassment by the striking pilots under a respondeat superior theory, the claim is precluded by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Colorado Worker's Compensation Act (WCA). Under the WCA, injured claimants are compensated if a sufficient nexus exists between the employment and the injury. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Messina, 874 P.2d 1058, 1063 (Colo.1994) (en banc). Whether the injury arises out of and is in the course of employment depends on an examination of the totality of the circumstances. Id. 28 On appeal, plaintiffs argue that Colorado law mandates that the exclusive remedy provision is inapplicable for injuries sustained by specific targets. The cases they rely on, however, are inapposite. See, e.g., Velasquez v. Industrial Comm'n, 41 Colo.App. 201, 581 P.2d 748 (1978) (denying compensation based upon the fact that the assault originated from the private life of an employee and the shooting happened only coincidentally at the workplace); Ferris v. Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Union, Local 26, 867 P.2d 38 (Colo.Ct.App.1993) (finding a genuine factual controversy regarding the job relatedness of plaintiff's claims of sexual harassment), cert. denied, Colo. Jan. 31, 1994. 29 Better guidance is provided by Rendon v. United Airlines, 881 P.2d 482 (Colo.Ct.App.1994), where the Colorado Court of Appeals held the claims of harassment and assault by a plaintiff, who was specifically targeted because of his sexual orientation, were inherently connected to and arose out of his employment. In Rendon, the plaintiff was harassed for a characteristic wholly unrelated to work; nevertheless, the court held the injuries have an inherent connection with the employment and are compensable even if the subject of the dispute is unrelated to the work and if the work merely brought the employees together and created the relations and conditions resulting in the dispute. Id. at 484-85 (citing In re Question Submitted by U.S. Court of Appeals, 759 P.2d 17, 23 n. 8 (Colo.1988)). Thus, when the friction and strain created by [tense labor relations in] the work environment ... place[ ] claimant in a position to receive the impact of his coworker's personality and increase[ ] the likelihood of assault, the claim is compensable under the WCA. Id. at 485. In the instant case, the admitted reason for the harassment arose directly from employment: the plaintiffs were specifically targeted because they chose to work during a strike. 30 Finally, plaintiffs contend that Colorado does not recognize a zone of danger for those acts causing injury occurring at their homes or away from work. It is uncontroverted that the majority of the alleged incidents of harassment occurred while the plaintiffs were working. As for the remaining incidents, the Colorado Supreme Court has indeed recognized a zone of special danger as a variable that Colorado courts should consider in any WCA analysis. Messina, 874 P.2d at 1063 (citing e.g., City & County of Denver v. Lee, 168 Colo. 208, 450 P.2d 352, 355 (1969)); see also Tri-State Commodities, Inc. v. Stewart, 689 P.2d 712, 714 (Colo.Ct.App.1984) (holding claim compensable because it occurred within zone of special danger created by conditions of employment). Accordingly, to the extent applicable, plaintiffs' emotional distress claims against United, based on vicarious liability, are precluded by the exclusive provisions of the WCA. CROSS-APPEAL 31 The plaintiffs' remaining emotional distress claims against ALPA arise out of the undisputed facts that during and following the twenty-nine day strike of United by ALPA, the working pilots and their families were the targets of massive abuse--some unspeakably vile--which has continued over a period of many years. The purpose of this abuse was to punish the working pilots for crossing the picket line, drive them out of their jobs at United, and make such a severe example of them that in future strikes union members would not dare to cross the line. See, e.g., Appellants' App. Vol. VI at 1713-14, 1717, 1726, 1731.