Opinion ID: 2744070
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Prejudgment by the Service

Text: Finally, Fogo de Chao argues that the Service’s process as a whole was tainted because, in its view, the agency had prejudged the Gasparetto petition. Where a single agency decisionmaker is challenged in this fashion, we “will set aside an official’s decision not to recuse ‘only where he has demonstrably made up his mind about important and specific factual questions and is impervious to contrary evidence.’” Power v. FLRA, 146 F.3d 995, 1001–1002 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (brackets and additional internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Metropolitan Council of NAACP Branches v. FCC, 46 F.3d 1154, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). Fogo de Chao has not met that high burden. The sole, specific evidence of alleged prejudgment proffered is that, in opposing Fogo de Chao’s motion to refer this case to mediation, the government’s opposition brief referenced the Service’s “determination that these individuals do not qualify for L-1B ‘specialized knowledge’ visas,” and concluded that the parties “are at an impasse.” J.A. 27. While that statement was made shortly after the agency had reopened the proceedings on Gasparetto’s petition, it was argumentation in a brief made in connection with settlement discussions encompassing, on Fogo de Chao’s part, not just the Gasparetto visa application, but also its future petitions as well. Id. at 27–28. Equally importantly, the sentence in question was not authored by the Vermont Service Center Director who was considering Fogo de Chao’s application upon reopening or by any member of the Appeals Office. It was made by litigation 40 counsel in a court filing. That does not come close to demonstrating that “the final decisionmaker has    made a decision” in advance of further proceedings. Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corp. v. Department of Labor, 118 F.3d 205, 214 & n.12 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting attempt to rely on agency litigating position) (emphasis added). Fogo de Chao’s reliance on Cinderella Career and Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970), is misplaced. In that case, right after the Federal Trade Commission staff announced its intention to appeal a decision to the full Commission, the Commission’s Chairman gave a speech citing two examples of unfair and deceptive practices drawn directly from the case he was to hear. See id. at 589– 590. We concluded that the Chairman’s failure to recuse was a denial of due process because “a disinterested observer may conclude that the agency has in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the law of a particular case in advance of hearing it.” Id. at 591 (brackets omitted) (quoting Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 469 (2d Cir. 1959)). That bears no resemblance to this case. An isolated statement in an adversarial court filing by counsel reciting the agency’s litigation position does not remotely establish that the actual decisionmaker has a closed mind and is impervious to evidence or argument.