Opinion ID: 1652455
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: circuit court's denial of holly's request for a time extension

Text: ¶ 5. Holly contends that the circuit court should have granted his request for additional time to file a brief after his attorney was found murdered and due to financial strain. Holly also argues that the circuit court's denial of his petition, based upon a limited record, was in error, because he cannot afford to pay for his hearing transcript. Cleve McDowell, Holly's attorney, was killed on March 13, 1997. 1997 Miss. Laws, Senate Concurrent Resolution 642. Judge Evans entered his order affirming the EAB's decision on March 17, 1997. Holly filed his motion for a time extension on March 24, 1997, one week after Judge Evans entered his order. ¶ 6. Appeals from EAB decisions must be made by filing a petition in circuit court and filing a bond to cover the cost of preparing a transcript of the EAB hearing. Miss.Code Ann. § 25-9-132 (1991). The petition and bond must be filed within thirty days of receipt of the EAB's final decision. Id. The EAB's final decision in this case was entered on March 29, 1996. The rules governing the filing of briefs in the Supreme Court apply to appeals on the record in circuit court. URCCC 5.06. Failure by the appellant to timely file his brief can result in dismissal of the appeal. M.R.A.P. 31(d). Suspension of briefing may be ordered when not opposed by either party or in response to a filing or other action which affects the record or the briefing process.... M.R.A.P. 31(e). To the degree that a trial judge's decision to grant or deny a motion for an extension of time is based upon precept of law, the standard for this Court's review shall be `plenary'; otherwise, this Court shall simply apply the abuse-of-discretion standard. In re Estate of Ware, 573 So.2d 773, 776 (Miss.1990). We find that the circuit court's refusal to allow Holly an extension of time after final judgment was entered in the case was not an abuse of discretion. ¶ 7. Holly maintains that the EAB and circuit court erred in issuing their rulings on his appeal without the benefit of a transcript of his hearing, which he blames on the inaction of his attorney and his own lack of finances. However, the burden of providing that transcript is placed upon Holly, as the appellant in this case. Miss.Code Ann. § 25-9-132 (1991). We have not recognized any right to an attorney or funds to appeal a decision from the EAB to circuit court or to this Court. The United States Supreme Court has held that as a general rule, fee requirements ordinarily are examined only for rationality. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 117 S.Ct. 555, 567, 136 L.Ed.2d 473 (1996). The State's need for revenue to offset costs, in the mine run of cases, satisfies the rationality requirement, see Ortwein, 410 U.S., at 660, 93 S.Ct., at 1174-1175; States are not forced by the Constitution to adjust all tolls to account for `disparity in material circumstances.' Id. (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)). The three recognized exceptions to that general rule are fees that prevent participation in the political process as voters and candidates, fees limiting access to the judicial process in criminal or quasi-criminal cases, and fees in cases affecting termination of parental rights. Id. at 102, 117 S.Ct. at 568. Even if there were a recognized exception allowing in forma pauperis appeals from termination proceedings by the EAB, Holly has presented no evidence in the record to prove his IFP status. With no recognized right to an attorney or funds in his appeal, and no proof of Holly's IFP status, we find Holly's complaints regarding the loss of his attorney and his economic status unpersuasive.