Opinion ID: 220779
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proposed Amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines

Text: On January 19, 2011, the Sentencing Commission proposed a series of amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 6 (effective date: Nov. 1, 2011). One would change the sentencing enhancement in illegal reentry cases for certain prior convictions. Id. Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(B) of the Guidelines currently provides that if a defendant illegally reenters after a conviction for a felony drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed was 13 months or less, [the offense level] increase[s] by 12 levels. This provision does not include any time limit for the prior conviction to have this effect. The proposed amendment would increase the offense level by 12 levels only if the conviction receives criminal history points under Chapter Four or by 8 levels if the conviction does not receive criminal history points.  U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 6 (effective date: Nov. 1, 2011) (emphasis added). Mr. Vasquez-Alcarez's cocaine trafficking conviction did not receive criminal history points. Under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(2), prior convictions with sentences of 13 months or less do not count for criminal history points if the sentence was imposed 10 years before the new offense. Compare U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(1) (providing criminal history points for sentences over 13 months if they were within 15 years of the new offense). Mr. Vasquez-Alcarez's cocaine trafficking conviction was in 1995, and he was sentenced to 150 days in jail. Under the proposed amendment, his offense level would only be enhanced by 8 rather than 12 levels, thereby decreasing his total offense level from 17 to 13 and his Guidelines range from 27-33 to 15-21 months. Mr. Vasquez-Alcarez argues that the proposed amendment demonstrates the substantive unreasonableness of his sentence because the amendment would adjust for the staleness of his 1995 conviction. We disagree. The amendment has been proposed, not adopted. Even if the amendment were adopted, it would not apply retroactively unless the Commission says it does. As Justice Kennedy recently explained: Federal courts are forbidden, as a general matter, to modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); but the rule of finality is subject to a few narrow exceptions. Here, the exception is contained in a statutory provision enacted to permit defendants whose Guidelines sentencing range has been lowered by retroactive amendment to move for a sentence reduction if the terms of the statute are met. Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2685, 2689-90, 180 L.Ed.2d 519 (2011). That statutory provision is 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which provides that, after the Commission decides that an amendment may apply retroactively, a district court may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. See also 28 U.S.C. § 994(u) (If the Commission reduces the term of imprisonment recommended in the guidelines applicable to a particular offense or category of offenses, it shall specify in what circumstances and by what amount the sentences of prisoners serving terms of imprisonment for the offense may be reduced.). The proposed amendment here contains no retroactivity provision. Shortly before oral argument, Mr. Vasquez-Alcarez submitted a letter pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 28(j) that encourages us to follow the First Circuit's decisions in United States v. Godin, 522 F.3d 133 (1st Cir.2008) and United States v. Ahrendt, 560 F.3d 69 (1st Cir.2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2815, 174 L.Ed.2d 308 (2009). We find these cases distinguishable. In both Godin and Ahrendt, an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines had become effective after the defendants' sentencing, and the Sentencing Commission did not adopt the change to apply retroactively. See Godin, 522 F.3d at 134; Ahrendt, 560 F.3d at 78-79. Nonetheless, the First Circuit remanded the cases for resentencing to give the sentencing judges the opportunity to reconsider the sentences in light of the amendment. Godin, 522 F.3d at 136; Ahrendt, 560 F.3d at 80. In both cases, the First Circuit said that the district court could preserve the original sentence on remand. Godin, 522 F.3d at 136; Ahrendt, 560 F.3d at 80. In this case, the amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines has merely been proposed, not adopted. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 6 (effective date: Nov. 1, 2011). We would have to take a step further than Godin a step no federal appellate court has takento remand for resentencing following a proposed amendment. We do not take that step. Godin itself has been sharply criticized. Judge Posner called it an outlier and said it took a big step toward making [amendments] retroactive, thus introducing a new cause of delay in sentencing and interfering with the Sentencing Commission's prerogative of determining whether to make a particular amendment to the guidelines retroactive or just prospective. United States v. Alexander, 553 F.3d 591, 593 (7th Cir.2009). In this case, the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and then decided to sentence Mr. Vasquez-Alcarez consistent with the Guidelines range incorporating the 12-level enhancement. That the Commission may later adopt an 8-level enhancement does not mean that the district court was unreasonable in sentencing Mr. Vasquez-Alcarez at the bottom end of the applicable Guidelines range.