Opinion ID: 2567033
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: La Farge/Cummings Substantive Due Process Analysis

Text: {20} As we concluded above, Section 41-5-13 is not tolled by George's alleged fraudulent concealment because Tomlinson knew of her cause of action within the statutory period. Because the doctrine of fraudulent concealment does not allow Tomlinson's claim to go forward, we next address whether the district court properly applied the substantive due process analysis of La Farge and Cummings. {21} In La Farge, we concluded, on constitutional substantive due process grounds, that the plaintiff's claim should be permitted because the negligent act was not discovered until eighty-five days before the statutory deadline. 119 N.M. at 541-42, 893 P.2d at 437-38. [A] statute of repose that allows an unreasonably short period of time within which to bring an accrued cause of action violates the Due Process Clause of the New Mexico Constitution. Id. Thus, this Court concluded that an eighty-five day period was unreasonably short under the specific facts of the case so as to violate the plaintiff's due process rights. La Farge's due process analysis and unreasonably short period of time standard is further delineated by this Court's holding in Cummings. {22} Following La Farge, we again examined, at length, due process and Section 41-5-13 in Cummings. We addressed Section 41-5-13 in a case in which a defendant negligently missed a cancerous mass on x-rays and the plaintiff filed her claim after the three-year statute of repose expired. Cummings, 1996-NMSC-035, ¶¶ 4-9. Fraudulent concealment was not an issue under the facts of Cummings. Id. ¶¶ 54, 56. The plaintiff was last treated by the defendant on August 10, 1988, and [s]he discovered that the masses in her lung and kidney were cancer on February 23, 1990, approximately a year and a half before the limitations period expired. Id. ¶ 57. The plaintiff argued that the occurrence rule of the statute of repose violated her due process rights of access to the courts, contending that a patient may suffer a legitimate injury caused by a verifiable act of malpractice and would nevertheless be barred from legal recovery if the three-year limit runs before the injury becomes evident. Id. ¶ 32. We rejected this claim, concluding that where there is no cause of action, a plaintiff cannot claim they have been denied access to the courts. And if they have no right of access to the courts, they cannot claim to have been denied due process. Id. ¶ 33. We determined that [a] plaintiff has no expectancy of a cause of action that has been legitimately denied by the legislature before it accrues. Id. We also noted that we have allowed a claim to be filed in cases involving peculiar facts in which a case conflicts with the filing requirements, and when a good faith effort has been made to comply with the Act. Id. ¶ 56. The Court in Cummings noted the holding in La Farge that an eighty-five day period of time was unconstitutionally short. Id. ¶ 55. However, we concluded that the plaintiff's period of time, approximately one and one-half years, was not too short a time in which to file her claim. The Court concluded that [t]he most determinative fact against [the plaintiff] is that she did not exercise diligence when she first learned she had been misinformed about the mass in her lung by [the defendant]. Id. ¶ 57. The Court relied on the fact that the plaintiff had approximately one and a half years to file her claim before the statute of repose ran; [n]evertheless, she sat on her rights and did not file any claim for more than two years. Id. The plaintiff lost her medical malpractice claim through her own lack of diligence. Id. It is irrelevant that the patient loses his or her malpractice claim through blameless ignorance. Id. ¶ 59 (quotation marks and quoted authority omitted). {23} Cummings thus demarcates the outer boundary of La Farge; we read these cases as complementary rather than conflicting. While La Farge holds that a plaintiff who discovers the injury or malpractice during the statutory period as it runs from the occurrence of the negligent act must have a reasonable period of time from the discovery to file his or her claim, Cummings concludes that one and one-half years is a constitutionally reasonable period of time within which to file a claim. See Cummings, 1996-NMSC-035, ¶ 57. Section 41-5-13 forecloses any cause of action that does not accrue within three years of the act of malpractice. Id. ¶ 33. In other words, a plaintiff that discovers his or her cause of action after three years from the date of malpractice is barred by Section 41-5-13 from filing a claim; that is the nature of a statute of repose. Thus, we conclude that this precedent resolves that the La Farge/Cummings due process analysis must apply only to claims discovered within the statutory period; if a claim is discovered after the statute has run, Section 41-5-13 is an explicit bar. We have recognized very few exceptional circumstances to this strict three-year occurrence rule, including fraudulent concealment. Cummings, 1996-NMSC-035, ¶ 54. {24} Because the fraudulent concealment doctrine does not toll Section 41-5-13 for Tomlinson, and because the district court ruled on the issue, we address whether the due process analysis excuses Tomlinson's late filing. In the present case, the district court determined that, under the substantive due process analysis of LaFarge, almost three years was not an unreasonably short period of time within which to bring an accrued cause of action. We agree. Tomlinson had almost the entire statutory period within which to file her claim. In LaFarge, we concluded that eighty-five days was an unreasonably short period of time. On the other hand, Cummings holds that one and one-half years is not too short a time and that a plaintiff who does not file his or her claim in that period of time loses the claim through a lack of diligence. Cummings, 1996-NMSC-035, ¶ 57. Thus, under the LaFarge/Cummings due process analysis, Tomlinson's two years and eight months is a constitutionally reasonable period of time within which to file her claim.