Opinion ID: 736924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ski Mask

Text: 46 Appellant contends that the district court erred when it admitted evidence of the ski mask. He claims that the ski mask constitutes evidence of another bad act that should be excluded under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). He asserts that the presence of a homemade ski mask in the front seat of a car in Memphis in August suggests that the mask was intended to be used during criminal conduct. 47 In reviewing a decision to admit evidence under Rule 404(b), this court applies a three-part standard. United States v. Merriweather, 78 F.3d 1070, 1073 (6th Cir.1996). First, it reviews the factual findings of the district court for clear error. Second, the court reviews de novo the district court's legal determination that the evidence was admissible for a legitimate purpose. Finally, the court reviews for abuse of discretion the district court's determination that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect. Merriweather, 78 F.3d at 1073; United States v. Johnson, 27 F.3d 1186, 1190 (6th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1115, 115 S.Ct. 910, 130 L.Ed.2d 792 (1995). 48 Where a defendant has objected to 404(b) evidence, the government must articulate a legitimate, specific purpose for the admission of the evidence. The district court then must determine whether the evidence is material or in issue in the case. Id. 49 In the instant case, the government argued that it was required to prove that defendant had knowing possession of the firearm. The government contended that the mere presence of the gun in the car was not sufficient evidence to prove that defendant had knowing possession of it. Consequently, it was required to prove that defendant had the intent to control the gun. The presence of the ski mask, the government argued, tended to prove that defendant was aware of the gun's presence because it suggested that he had an intent to use it. In support of its argument, the government referred the district court to United States v. Hatfield, 815 F.2d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir.1987). 50 In Hatfield, the defendant denied knowing that a firearm was in the van. The Hatfield court allowed the admission of evidence of certain burglary tools found with the weapon. The court held that the presence of the burglary tools tended to prove the defendant was aware of the weapon. On the basis of Hatfield, the district court ruled that the evidence of the ski mask was admissible. 51 On appeal, Murphy first argues that the district court erred because Hatfield is distinguishable. He contends that the burglary tools in Hatfield, which included lock picks and police scanners, were strongly connected to illegal conduct. In contrast, he argues that a ski mask could have a perfectly innocent explanation. 52 Defendant's proposed distinction has no basis either in the analysis of Hatfield or in the facts of this case. The Hatfield court in no way limited its holding to burglary tools. Moreover, if the ski mask in this case does not suggest other illegal conduct, Rule 404(b) would not come into play. It is only because of the possible implication of other illegal conduct that the ski mask may be excludable under Rule 404(b). 53 Second, defendant argues that, unlike the defendant in Hatfield, he has never contended that he was unaware of the presence of the weapon. Instead, he claims that he defended solely on the ground that he was not the person driving the car and therefore had no part in the constructive possession of the weapon. As this court explained in Johnson, 27 F.3d at 1192, intent is not placed in issue simply because a defendant denies having committed the underlying offense. Instead, 404(b) evidence may be introduced only where defendant expressly places his intent or knowledge in issue, as in Hatfield, or when the crime itself requires specific intent, separate and apart from underlying prohibited conduct, is made an element of the crime charged. Id. Knowledge is a 'material issue' when the defendant claims he was unaware that he was committing a criminal act. Id. at 1194. 54 We reject Murphy's assertions that he did not place his knowledge or intent in issue. In opening statements to the jury, defense counsel argued: 55 I think that a jigsaw puzzle is a very good analogy to how this case is going to be put together, but just as all of us have probably experienced, putting together a jigsaw puzzle, if just one piece is missing, then the picture is not complete. And the pieces can be analogized to the elements that are necessary to prove that Mr. Murphy is guilty. If just one element is missing, for instance, whether he knowingly possessed a weapon, whether he knew it was there, ... then you will have to acquit Mr. Murphy. 56 Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 36 (emphasis added). Counsel clearly suggested that, even if the jury were to conclude that Murphy had been driving the car, they had to decide whether he knowingly possessed the weapon. Because the presence of the ski mask tended to prove that the weapon was in the car for an illegal purpose, it tended to prove that Murphy knew the gun was present and intended to use it. See Hatfield, 815 F.2d at 1072. The ski mask therefore was admitted for a lawful purpose. 57 In addition, the possibility of unfair prejudice in this case was small. The charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm is an offense that is particularly unlikely to be affected by the admission of evidence that could imply defendant intended some other crime. If the jury were to believe that the defendant were the driver of the LTD, it would be difficult if not impossible to believe that he did not possess the firearm. This is not a circumstance where the jury would be inclined to convict a person of a wholly different crime simply because of the inflammatory nature of uncharged conduct. Instead, evidence of the ski mask potentially would suggest that defendant intended to commit some other offense only if the jury already had concluded that the weapon was in defendant's possession. Thus, the potential for prejudice was very slight. 58 Finally, in light of the other evidence against defendant, even if admission of the ski mask constituted error, it would be harmless error. See, e.g., United States v. Cowart, 90 F.3d 154, 157-58 (6th Cir.1996); Johnson, 27 F.3d at 1194 (concluding that erroneous admission of evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) was harmless error). Defendant was identified as the driver of the vehicle by two police officers; he admitted to police officers that he had been driving the vehicle; he was the person who reported to his mother that the car was stolen at about the time the driver had successfully eluded police; he and his mother were the only two people with knowledge where his mother's gun was stored; and he volunteered information about the gun at a time when he would have had no reason to know a gun was involved. 59 In light of the overall evidence against defendant and the small potential for prejudice in the case, the admission of the evidence of the ski mask, even if error, would be harmless. 60