Opinion ID: 2637056
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to instruct on manslaughter as lesser included offense of murder

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct, sua sponte, on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder on the theory that the killing was committed either in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion or in unreasonable self-defense. The omission of such instructions, he argues, deprived him of his rights to due process, a fair trial, trial by jury, confrontation and cross-examination, presentation of a defense, effective assistance of counsel, equal protection, and reliable guilt and penalty phase verdicts in a capital case, guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and article I, sections 7,15 and 17 of the California Constitution. We conclude any error in the trial court's failure so to instruct the jury was harmless. In criminal cases, even absent a request, the trial court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) This obligation includes giving instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question whether all the elements of the charged offense were present, but not when there is no evidence the offense was less than that charged. (Ibid.) The trial court must so instruct even when, as a matter of trial tactics, a defendant not only fails to request the instruction, but expressly objects to its being given. (Ibid.; see also People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 196, 199-203, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531 [trial court must instruct on heat-of-passion and unreasonable self-defense theories of manslaughter, if supported by evidence, even when defendant objects on the basis that such instructions would conflict with his defense].) [7] Error in failing to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense is harmless when the jury necessarily decides the factual questions posed by the omitted instructions adversely to defendant under other properly given instructions. ( People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 721, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913, overruled on another ground in People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) Manslaughter, an unlawful killing without malice, is a lesser included offense of murder. (ง 192; People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 422, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442.) Malice is presumptively absent when a defendant kills upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion (ง 192, subd. (a)), provided that provocation is sufficient to cause an ordinarily reasonable person to act rashly and without deliberation, and from passion rather than judgment. ( People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 515, 134 Cal.Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777.) Additionally, when a defendant kills in the actual but unreasonable belief that he or she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, the doctrine of imperfect self-defense applies to reduce the killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter. ( In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 771, 773, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574; see People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 645, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.) Without specifying precisely how he was provoked, defendant argues that the killing occurred during the course of a conflict with the victim. As the Attorney General observes, however, the evidence shows the victim tried to distance himself from defendant just before the shooting, and Currie, in his role as security monitor, attempted to resolve the tension between the two men. Any provocation arising out of defendant's prior arguments with the victim was no longer immediately present by the time of the shooting, such that a reasonable person in defendant's position would have reacted with homicidal rage. Hence, we cannot say the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion. Citing his testimony that he shot Martinez in response to the latter's assaulting him with a knife, defendant argues further that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the doctrine of unreasonable self-defense. The Attorney General appears to concede that the evidence supported the giving of the instruction, but he argues its omission was harmless under the rule of People v. Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at page 721, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913, because the jury necessarily rejected the unreasonable selfdefense theory in returning a true finding on the robbery special-circumstance allegation. This finding signified the jury's unanimous conclusion that the killing occurred during the commission of a robbery and that defendant committed the murder in order to carry out or advance the commission of the crime of robbery. We agree that any error in failing to instruct the jury on the definition of manslaughter and the doctrine of unreasonable self-defense was harmless.