Opinion ID: 196298
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Objection to Use of the Phrase Common Sense

Text: 37 James Murray argues that the prosecutors repeatedly urged the jurors to use common sense in evaluating the case and that this effectively lowered the standard of proof below the reasonable doubt standard. James Murray's counsel moved for a mistrial on this ground. Though the district court denied the mistrial motion, it agreed to make clear in [its] charge that the standard is beyond a reasonable doubt, and that's not equivalent of common sense. The court in fact addressed the distinction between common sense and proof beyond a reasonable doubt in its charge. 10 Murray did not object that the court's treatment of the issue was inadequate in any way, but he now contends that the court failed to respond to the improper arguments. Since there was no contemporaneous objection, we review only for plain error affecting substantial rights, and resulting in a miscarriage of justice. United States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1317-19 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 947, 130 L.Ed.2d 890 (1995). 38 There is nothing improper about instructing the jury to use its common sense in deliberations. See DeMasi, 40 F.3d at 1317-18; United States v. Ocampo-Guarin, 968 F.2d 1406, 1412 (1st Cir.1992). The district court's instructions drew a distinction between common sense, as methodology, and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, as a quantum of proof. The court also told the jury specifically that arguments of counsel were not determinative statements of the law: It is perfectly appropriate now for counsel to have mentioned the law in their closings. That's helpful. But take the law from me. We see no reasonable probability that the jury could have been misled on this record, and we most certainly see nothing that approaches plain error resulting in a miscarriage of justice. 39 There was no error in either respect. 40