Opinion ID: 165234
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act

Text: 37 The government argues that Appellants are not federal employees, and that 25 U.S.C. § 1660b(a) does not extend FTCA immunity to them. We agree, and thus AFFIRM the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss and the motion to substitute the United States. 38 In the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), Congress consented to suits against the United States for certain torts committed by federal employees while acting within the scope of their employment. The government's consent to be sued under the FTCA extends only to 39 claims against the United States for money damages, ... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury of death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 40 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (emphasis added). An FTCA action against the United States is the sole remedy for any injury to person or property caused by the negligent or wrongful acts of a federal employee acting within the scope of his or her employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). The purpose of this `exclusive remedy' provision was to give federal employees an absolute immunity from common law tort actions[.] Jamison, 14 F.3d at 227 (4th Cir.1994). 41 1. Were Dr. Covington and Dr. Ahmad federal employees under the Federal Tort Claims Act? 42 The [FTCA] is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity that only applies to federal employees. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813, 96 S.Ct. 1971, 48 L.Ed.2d 390 (1976). The Act defines government employees to include officers and employees of any federal agency, but excludes any contractor with the United States. Id. (quotation omitted); 28 U.S.C. § 2671. The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the federal employee requirement as gatekeeper: It is inconceivable that Congress intended to have waiver of sovereign immunity follow congressional largesse and cover countless unidentifiable classes of `beneficiaries.' Orleans, 425 U.S. at 816, 96 S.Ct. 1971. 43 In Orleans, the Supreme Court described the test for ascertaining whether a claimant is a federal employee covered by the Act, or an independent contractor not so immunized. A critical element in distinguishing an agency from a contractor is the power of the Federal Government `to control the detailed physical performance of the contractor.' Id. at 814, 96 S.Ct. 1971 (quoting Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 528, 93 S.Ct. 2215, 37 L.Ed.2d 121 (1973)). The question here is not whether the community action agency receives federal money and must comply with federal standards and regulations, but whether its day-to-day operations are supervised by the Federal Government. Id. at 815, 96 S.Ct. 1971. We have devised seven factors to guide this determination: 44 (1) the intent of the parties; (2) whether the United States controls only the end result or may also control the manner and method of reaching the result; (3) whether the person uses his own equipment or that of the United States; (4) who provides liability insurance; (5) who pays social security tax; (6) whether federal regulations prohibit federal employees from performing such contracts; and (7) whether the individual has authority to subcontract to others. 45 Lilly v. Fieldstone, 876 F.2d 857, 859 (10th Cir.1989); see also Curry v. United States, 97 F.3d 412, 414 (10th Cir.1996). 46 We have had several opportunities to apply these seven guiding factors in medical malpractice actions, where the employee is a physician or a nurse. For example, in Bird v. United States , we held that a nurse at an Indian hospital was a federal employee because he was not only subject to the rules and regulations and, indeed, a statute placing him under the control and supervision of physician employees of the hospital, but he was under their actual control to the extent they chose to exercise it. 949 F.2d 1079, 1086 (10th Cir.1991). Additionally, we relied on the following considerations: He was required to work with patients designated by others. He maintained no separate office. He used hospital equipment exclusively. He could see patients in no other place nor under any other circumstance than as directed by government employees. He was under the control and supervision of the government surgeon at the hospital to the same extent that ... a regular employee of the government [ ] was. 47 Id. 48 When it comes to physicians, we have explained that the day-to-day control test may be more difficult to apply. In Lurch v. United States, we provided dicta suggesting that a modified control test may be more appropriate because a physician must exercise his own professional judgment, no one controls the detailed physical performance of his duties. 719 F.2d 333, 337 (10th Cir.1983); see also Thomas K. Kruppstadt, Determining Whether a Physician is a United States Employee or an Independent Contractor in a Medical Malpractice Action Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 47 BAYLOR L.REV. 223 (1995). However, we later declined to adopt a modified control test for physicians, because we [did] not find that label helpful. Lilly, 876 F.2d at 859. Instead, we simply take into account the doctor's medical and ethical obligations of independent judgment when we apply the traditional control test: 49 It is uncontroverted that a physician must have discretion to care for a patient and may not surrender control over certain medical details. Therefore, the control test is subject to a doctor's medical and ethical obligations. Whether we label the test control or modified control is not determinative. What we must do in the case of professionals is determine whether other evidence manifests an intent to make the professional an employee subject to other forms of control which are permissible. A myriad of doctors become employees by agreement without surrendering their professional responsibilities. 50 Id. 51 We ultimately held that the doctor in Lilly was an independent contractor with the Army hospital, rather than a federal employee, because he maintained a private off-base office, he billed the Army separately, he was not provided office space or secretarial help, and he was never regularly scheduled on the hospital duty roster. Id. at 860; see also Ezekiel v. Michel, 66 F.3d 894, 900 (7th Cir.1995) (finding that a resident physician was a governmental employee under the day-to-day control test, even though he was `without compensation' status at the hospital and not compensated directly by the VA for his services); Wooten v. Hudson, D.O., 71 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1153-54 (E.D.Okla.1999) (finding that the physician was an independent contractor, because [t]he record in this case is sparse at best on the level of day-to-day control exercised by the Hospital over [doctor's] activities). 52 Where there is a contract between the government and the physician, clear language regarding government control or federal employee status can often prevail over facts that might otherwise support a finding of day-to-day control. For example, in Duplan v. Harper , we held that a doctor who provided treatment at an Air Force hospital was an independent contractor, rather than a federal employee, because his contract with the government explicitly designated the doctor as an independent contractor, he wore a name tag identifying himself to the patients as a contract physician, he was paid by a private provider, and the private provider had control and responsibility for liability insurance. 188 F.3d 1195, 1200-02 (10th Cir.1999). These facts outweighed other facts indicating that patient records were maintained by the government, the government retained the power to conduct periodic quality reviews of the doctor's performance, the government imposed minimum standards for doctors, the government required doctors to follow certain rules (including a dress code), the government supplied virtually all equipment and support personnel at the clinic, and the government required the doctor to be at the clinic during designated hours. Id. Similarly, in Lurch, 719 F.2d at 338, we held that the contractual language prohibited treating the doctor as a governmental employee. 53 In the instant case, Appellants do not even argue that the government exercised day-to-day control over the COAIHC or Drs. Covington and Ahmad. The record on appeal contains no contracts or other evidence relevant to this inquiry. 9 Accordingly, we hold that these defendants have failed to demonstrate that they are entitled to FTCA immunity as federal employees. 54 2. Did Congress Extend Federal Tort Claims Act Immunity to These Defendants in 25 U.S.C. § 1660b(a)? 55 Appellants in this case argue that the statute creating the COAIHC, 25 U.S.C. § 1660b(a), when considered in light of legislative history and intent, expanded the FTCA to them. The district court disagreed because any such waiver of sovereign immunity was not made express in the statute. We review this legal interpretation de novo, see United States v. Cline, 349 F.3d 1276, 1284 (10th Cir.2003), and AFFIRM. 56 Because the FTCA only waives the government's sovereign immunity for federal employees, and explicitly exempts independent contractors, an independent contractor will be permitted to substitute the government as defendant only if Congress has expressly expanded the reach of the FTCA in their case. This is because [a] waiver of the Federal Government's sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text and will not be implied. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996) (citation omitted). For example, in Dedrick v. Youngblood , the court explained that although the FTCA does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity over suits against independent contractors, Congress may pass another statute expressly extending FTCA immunity to certain independent contractors. 200 F.3d 744, 746 (11th Cir.2000); see also Galimi v. Jetco, Inc., 514 F.2d 949, 952 (2d Cir.1975) (Congress retains the power to modify the FTCA by means of other statutes.). 57 As the government points out, there are many statutes that expressly designate certain independent contractors with the government to be federal employees for purposes of FTCA immunity. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 233(g)-(k) (Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act of 1992, expressly extending FTCA coverage to eligible community health centers by specifying that their employees are employees of the Public Health Service for certain purposes); 50 U.S.C. § 2783 (Atomic Testing Liability Act, expressly providing that the FTCA applies to negligence actions against contractors carrying out atomic weapons testing program under a contract with the United States and that the employees of such contractors are to be considered employees of the federal government for FTCA purposes). 58 In this case, the COAIHC and the doctors argue that in passing the following statutory language, Congress expanded the FTCA's coverage to reach them: 59 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Oklahoma City Clinic demonstration project and the Tulsa Clinic demonstration project shall be treated as service units in the allocation of resources and coordination of care and shall not be subject to the provisions of the Indian Self-Determination Act for the term of such projects. 60 25 U.S.C. § 1660b(a)(2003) (emphasis added). They then explain that service unit here means either (1) an administrative entity within the Indian Health Service [IHS] or (2) a tribe or tribal organization operating health care programs with funds from the IHS under the Indian Self-Determination Act. 25 U.S.C. § 1603(j). Because the COAIHC is not a tribe or tribal organization, Appellants argue that the term service unit here can only mean an administrative entity within the IHS. See id. They then point to various pieces of legislative history and the structure/function of the Clinic, and conclude that Congress intended to expand the FTCA to the COAIHC and its employees in this statute. 61 It is true that § 1660b(a) deems the COAIHC to be an administrative entity of the IHS for the purposes of allocating resources and coordinating care. However, this is not an express application of the FTCA. The statutory language regarding the allocation of resources does not expressly waive the government's sovereign immunity for purposes of FTCA suits against the COAIHC, and Appellants' argument that FTCA immunity is a resource to be allocated is too tenuous. The Supreme Court has cautioned: A statute's legislative history cannot supply a waiver that does not appear clearly in any statutory text; the `unequivocal expression' of elimination of sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in the statutory text. Lane, 518 U.S. at 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092 (quotations omitted). In fact, the express language of § 1660b(a) weighs against Appellants' argument because it prohibits the application of the Indian Self-Determination Act (ISDA), an Act which does expressly expand the FTCA to certain independent contractors for Indian services. See 25 U.S.C. § 450f(d). 62 In summary, because Appellants are neither federal employees under the government's day-to-day control, nor independent contractors to whom Congress has expressly expanded FTCA's reach, they are not entitled to FTCA immunity.