Opinion ID: 201470
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Guilty Plea To Count Three

Text: 6 Serrano argues for the first time on appeal that the district court erred procedurally in accepting his guilty plea to Count Three. His argument is that the district court failed to explore the factual basis of the guilty plea as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(3), which states: Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the plea. Serrano argues that had the district court done so, it would have found that there was no factual basis for Serrano's guilty plea because Serrano only admitted to providing armed transport for the drug shipment, but not to having possessed a firearm. The admission that he was armed was insufficient, he now argues, because it might have meant that he was armed with a big stick. 7 We review a Rule 11 challenge raised for the first time on appeal only for plain error. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 74-76, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002); United States v. Cheal, 389 F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir.2004); see also United States v. Mills, 329 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir.2003) (An error not objected to at the plea hearing is reversible only where the error is plain, affects the defendant's substantial rights, and seriously affects the fairness of the proceeding.). As to the underlying issue of compliance with the Rule, [o]n a plea, the question under Rule 11(f) [now Rule 11(b)(3)] is not whether a jury would, or even would be likely, to convict: it is whether there is enough evidence so that the plea has a rational basis in facts that the defendant concedes or that the government proffers as supported by credible evidence. United States v. Gandia-Maysonet, 227 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2000). In this case, there was no error. 8 Serrano's argument mischaracterizes his plea colloquy by ignoring the aiding and abetting and in furtherance of the conspiracy aspects of the charge against him in Count Three. The district court's Rule 11 colloquy focused on those aspects of the charge. It is irrelevant whether there were facts to show that Serrano was personally armed with a gun or a big stick. During the Rule 11 colloquy, Serrano specifically agreed that in aiding and abetting each other a gun was possessed in furtherance of the conspiracy (emphasis added). Furthermore, Serrano's counsel explained that Serrano understood that although he did not carry the firearm  (emphasis added), he was responsible for the firearm(s) carried by his codefendant(s) under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946). Rule 11(b)(3) is meant to protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969) (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). The district judge ascertained that Serrano understood that he could be held liable for the firearms charge without having carried the gun himself and that Serrano was aware of the gun Juma possessed as part of the armed escort they provided for the drug shipment.