Opinion ID: 151784
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: .Dismissal under the Statute of Limitations

Text: The district court provided a second ground upon which it dismissed the claims against both Korb and Yale: the untimeliness of the Gerenas' claims under the applicable Connecticut statutes of limitations. The district court reached this result by applying Connecticut choice of law, and thus Connecticut's limitations period, without discussion. But there was a preliminary choice of law issue here that the district court failed to acknowledge. Federal courts sitting in diversity generally apply the law of the state in which they sit. However, cases that are transferred from one federal district to another present an exception to this general rule. When an action has been transferred, a federal court sitting in diversity must determine whether to apply the law of the transferor state, or the law of the transferee state in which it sits. If a district court receives a case pursuant to a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), for improper venue, or 28 U.S.C. § 1631, for want of jurisdiction, it logically applies the law of the state in which it sits, since the original venue, with its governing laws, was never a proper option. See Schaeffer v. Village of Ossining, 58 F.3d 48, 50 (2d Cir.1995) (transferee laws apply after transfer under § 1406(a)); Levy v. Pyramid Co. of Ithaca, 871 F.2d 9, 10 (2d Cir.1989) (transferee laws apply after transfer for lack of personal jurisdiction). In contrast, when a case is transferred for convenience under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the law of the transferor state is to be applied so long as the transferor state could properly have exercised jurisdiction. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 635-39, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964); Fin. One Public Co. Ltd. v. Lehman Bros. Special Fin., Inc., 414 F.3d 325, 333-34 (2d Cir. 2005); SongByrd, Inc. v. Estate of Grossman, 206 F.3d 172, 179-80 (2d Cir.2000) ([I]n a transferred action the law of the transferor jurisdiction applies ... only if the transferor court has personal jurisdiction. (internal citation omitted)). In the instant case, the district court failed to consider that New York choice of law might apply, since Judge Sand appears to have granted Yale's motion to transfer the case to Connecticut under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), for convenience. Yale specified that its motion was not being made for lack of personal jurisdiction, but rather for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice. To be sure, Judge Sand's brief handwritten order did not specify which provision he was transferring under, but simply stated: The motion to transfer the case to the District of Connecticut is granted in the interest of justice. [2] However, given that the motion being granted requested transfer under § 1404(a), it seems reasonably clear that Judge Sand intended to transfer the action for convenience's sake without ever making a finding regarding personal jurisdiction. Therefore, New York law, as the governing law of the transferor court, should still have been applied by the District of Connecticut, as long as jurisdiction in New York would have been proper. Cf. SongByrd, Inc., 206 F.3d at 179-80. Of course, if jurisdiction was not proper in New York, then the district court correctly applied Connecticut choice of law and Connecticut procedure. With respect to Yale, the issue need not be further explored, given that we are affirming the district court's opinion on the alternate ground that Yale was not timely served. However, with respect to Korb, whom we now deem properly served, it must be determined whether personal jurisdiction over Korb existed in New York, such that New York choice of law should have governed the claims against him. This is not a determination we are equipped to make in the first instance. Although Korb vigorously disputed whether personal jurisdiction over him could be obtained in New York, the district court made no finding in this regard. Judge Sand, before he transferred, expressed the opinion that dismissal on jurisdictional grounds would have been inappropriate absent an inquiry into the extent of Korb's contacts in New York. Korb himself admits that he was employed in New York for approximately nine months in 2006. Moreover, in plaintiffs' ex parte motion to Judge Sand to appoint a United States marshal to serve Korb, they explain that in March 2008, Korb's probation officer communicated to the Gerenas that Korb was in Europe and planning to attend NYU. Given that Korb clearly had some contacts with New York, we must ask the district court to consider more thoroughly whether Korb might have been subject to personal jurisdiction in New York, such that New York choice of law principles should govern the action against him. If the district court determines on remand that Connecticut law properly governs, we agree with its conclusion that the Gerenas' claims are barred under Connecticut law by the three-year limitations period contained in Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-577. Although appellants urge that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-590, which allows for tolling when a defendant is absent from the state, should save their claims, this provision applies only when by reason of the defendant's absence, it was impossible to commence an action in personam against the defendant. Venables v. Bell, 941 F.Supp. 26, 27 (D.Conn.1996) (quoting Dorus v. Lyon, 92 Conn. 55, 57, 101 A. 490 (1917)); see also Cadlerock Joint Venture II, L.P. v. Milazzo, 287 Conn. 379, 392-93, 949 A.2d 450, 457-58 (2008). Because Connecticut's long-arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction over nonresidents who commit tortious acts within the state, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-590 is inapplicable. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-59b(a). Under section 52-59b, the Gerenas could have served Korb at any point by serving the secretary of state and mailing a copy of the process to the defendant's last known address. See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-59b(c). Furthermore, the possibility that equitable tolling might apply here is foreclosed by Connecticut precedent, which establishes Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-577 as a statute of repose not susceptible to equitable tolling. See Carter v. Univ. of Conn., 04-cv-1625, 2006 WL 2130730, at  (D.Conn. July 28, 2006), aff'd, 264 Fed.Appx. 111 (2d Cir. 2008). On the other hand, if it is determined that New York law should govern, the outcome of the inquiry into the timeliness of the Gerenas' claims might be different. We leave it to the district court to determine in the first instance, if necessary, how New York law should be applied to the facts of this case. However, because we find the analysis a difficult one, we offer a few thoughts on how a New York choice of law analysis might proceed. Whereas Connecticut law would almost certainly govern the substantive aspects of this case under New York choice of law, New York still adheres to the traditional substantive/procedural dichotomy in its choice of law analysis and generally classifies statutes of limitations as procedural, except for those limitations periods which it designates as statutes of repose. See Tanges v. Heidelberg N. Am., Inc., 93 N.Y.2d 48, 58-59, 710 N.E.2d 250, 254-55, 687 N.Y.S.2d 604, 608-09 (1999); Stuart v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 158 F.3d 622, 626-27 (2d Cir.1998) (New York courts generally apply New York's statutes of limitations, even when the injury giving rise to the action occurred outside New York.). New York's statute of limitations would thus probably govern the Gerenas' claims under New York choice of law. Although Connecticut has categorized Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577's three-year limitations period as a statute of repose, we doubt that New York courts, under the framework laid out by the New York Court of Appeals in Tanges, would agree for purposes of New York choice of law. Cf. Tanges, 93 N.Y.2d at 57, 687 N.Y.S.2d 604, 710 N.E.2d 250 (finding Connecticut's own classification only instructive, not binding). First, the structure and legislative history of section 52-577 do not suggest that its limitations period was intended to create a right, rather than merely erect[ ] a limitation around the existing common-law causes. Tanges, 93 N.Y.2d at 56-57, 687 N.Y.S.2d 604, 710 N.E.2d 250; see also Sanborn v. Greenwald, 39 Conn.App. 289, 304-05, 664 A.2d 803, 811-12 (Conn.App. 1995) (finding that section 52-577 did not restrict a cause of action but, rather, only establishe[d] the time period in which a plaintiff must assert this right). Furthermore, there is no compelling policy rationale for New York to interpret section 52-577, which merely sets forth a general torts limitations period, as a statute of repose. Unlike in the products liability context addressed in Tanges, where there is justifiable reliance by manufacturers and their insurers on the inability of plaintiffs to bring suit after a certain period of time, there is no analogous justifiable reliance by general tortfeasors. Moreover, New York's policy of always giving its residents the benefit of New York's own statute of limitations, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 202, would be undercutin all those cases in which a resident was injured in the adjacent state of Connecticutif New York were to treat Connecticut's general three-year limit for all general tort actions as a statute of repose. Accordingly, it seems likely that New York would look to its own laws, rather than to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577, to determine the timeliness of this action. Under New York law, an action is commenced upon filing, not upon service on the defendant. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 304; Gershel v. Porr, 89 N.Y.2d 327, 330-31, 675 N.E.2d 836, 838, 653 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (1996). Therefore, under New York's commencement rule, the Gerenas' claims were commenced April 24, 2007. And because New York provides that a plaintiff shall have one year from the termination of any criminal proceedings against a defendant to commence a related civil action, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(8)(a), it appears that the Gerenas' claims, which were brought within one year of Korb's no-contest plea for related misdemeanor offenses on October 30, 2006, were timely under New York law.