Opinion ID: 4529727
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: John Brown, Jr.

Text: Our analysis of the timeliness of Brown’s claims is less complicated. We find the State’s argument that Brown failed to exercise due diligence in presenting his claims because his attorney did not uncover information about the informant during cross-examination of Vaughn unavailing. While evidence is “new” if it was not available at the time of trial through the exercise of due diligence, Kidd v. Norman, 651 F.3d 947, 952 (8th Cir. 2011), due diligence does not require a defendant to root out information that the State has kept hidden. See Dennis v. Sec., Penn. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 293 (3d Cir. 2016). The State cannot play “hide and seek” with information it was required to disclose and then accuse defense counsel of lacking due diligence. See id. Due diligence does not require defense counsel to possess psychic abilities and discover potentially favorable evidence during trial that the State chose to conceal, particularly when defense counsel specifically requested disclosure of the evidence now at issue. As to the issue of when Brown learned or should have learned about his claims, the Innocence Project that represented Early is separate from the Midwest Innocence Project representing Brown. The Midwest Innocence Project agreed to represent Brown in June 2016, at Jimerson’s evidentiary hearing. There is no evidence from which we can conclude that Brown learned or could have learned the factual predicate for his actual innocence claim before Early’s counsel revealed that Early -15- had confessed. Early’s counsel testified at Brown’s evidentiary hearing that she never talked to any of the co-defendants and the first time she disclosed her client’s confession was via email to counsel on December 22, 2015. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Jimerson’s counsel at the Legal Clinic was communicating with Brown during the course of her investigation or when she filed her habeas petition. The State has cited no authority for its assertion that due diligence obligates a defendant to monitor his co-defendant’s court filings for information that could give rise to post-conviction relief. Such a requirement would go beyond the statutory requirement of due diligence, particularly when the petitioner, like Brown, was indigent, had been incarcerated for over 20 years, and had no means for funding an investigator or attorney. In Anjulo-Lopez, we explained that due diligence required a defendant to check his own docket entries to ensure that his attorney had filed an appeal. Anjulo-Lopez v. United States, 541 F.3d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 2008). A requirement that a defendant stay informed about his own case is notably different than being held responsible for knowing what is occurring in a co-defendant’s case. “[D]iligence can be shown by prompt action on the part of the petitioner as soon as he is in a position to realize that he has an interest in challenging the prior conviction.” Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 308 (2005). The earliest possible date for which the limitations period under § 2244(d)(1)(D) started running was December 22, 2015, the day Early’s counsel revealed to co-defendants’ counsel that Early had confessed and taken sole responsibility for the crimes. After being informed about the confession, Brown had a duty to make reasonable efforts to discover the facts supporting his actual innocence claim and other potential claims. The record demonstrates that Brown discovered the predicate facts for his constitutional claims at Jimerson’s June 2016 evidentiary hearing. We find the claims in Brown’s petition filed on December 21, 2016, were filed within one year of discovering the factual predicate for each claim. -16- We conclude that Brown’s claims9 were timely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).