Opinion ID: 1735195
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the trial court erred in limiting the cross-examination of jeffrey moss.

Text: ¶ 12. The Fielders' first contention of error involves the testimony of Jeffrey Moss, the driver of MBC's truck. In the questioning of Michael Davis, president of MBC, the Fielders sought to elicit testimony regarding the post-accident driving record of Moss, namely having pled guilty to a DUI offense. The trial court refused to allow such an examination, noting that the Fielders had not limited their inquiry to the relevant time frame. Prior to the testimony of Moss, MBC moved in limine to preclude the Fielders from questioning Moss with respect to his driving record after the accident in question. In response to an inquiry by the trial court, the Fielders indicated that they did not intend to question Moss with respect to a number of traffic violations that had occurred since the December 18, 1992, accident. The trial court granted MBC's in limine request and noted that the intended testimony was in no way admissible under Rules 608 and 609 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence (M.R.E.). ¶ 13. The Fielders contend that the trial judge's ruling in this regard was erroneous because MBC opened the door by first inquiring of Davis about the company's safety precautions in hiring drivers. The record reveals that Davis testified on direct examination to the fact that MBC drivers were required to have a Class A or Class B license under the Mississippi Department of Transportation's rulings. Davis further testified that Moss had a Class A license and was one of my best (drivers). When the Fielders attempted to cross-examine Davis concerning subsequent traffic violations, including DUI and speeding, MBC's objections were sustained. Over objections, the Fielders were able to elicit testimony from Davis that Moss was no longer employed with MBC. ¶ 14. M.R.E. 611(b) sets forth the scope of cross-examination and reads, Scope of Cross-Examination. Cross-examination shall not be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. M.R.E. 611(b) allows wide-open cross-examination so long as the matter probed is relevant. M.R.E. 401 defines what is relevant evidence: Relevant Evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. M.R.E. 401. The trial court sustained MBC's objection to the Fielders' cross-examination of Davis, because it found the inquiry irrelevant as improper in time frame. In other words, Moss's driving record after the accident has no bearing on the accident itself. ¶ 15. Questions of relevancy and admissibility are left to the discretion of the trial court. Century 21 Deep South Properties, Ltd. v. Corson, 612 So.2d 359, 369 (Miss.1992). The scope of cross-examination is broad. However, its primary limit is the discretion of the trial judge and reversal only follows an abuse of that discretion. M.R.E. 611(b); Cantrell v. State, 507 So.2d 325, 330 (Miss.1987). Therefore, MBC argues that the trial court here was well within its discretion, because evidence showing Moss had received traffic violations after the accident is wholly irrelevant to the jury's determination of the matters at issue. MBC further argues that such testimony would not have assisted the jury in determining the relevant issues involving the December 18, 1992, accident and would have only confused or mislead the jury by causing them to believe that Moss was a chronic violator of traffic laws. See M.R.E. 403. ¶ 16. Also, the Fielders assert that such testimony is admissible under the exceptions to M.R.E. 404(b), which states: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. M.R.E. 404(b). The Fielders quote the Comment to M.R.E. 404(b), but do not specifically refer this Court to any one particular exception. They do however cite Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743 (Miss. 1984), for the proposition that evidence of another crime is admissible where the offense in the instant case and in the past offense are so inter-connected as to be considered part of the same transaction. Also, the Fielders refer to Carter v. State, 450 So.2d 67 (Miss.1984), where this Court said that evidence of a prior crime or act may be admitted to show identity, knowledge, intent, or motive. ¶ 17. Regardless, Moss may have opened the door to permit cross-examination of Davis on his knowledge of the traffic violations. In affirming the admission of prior bad acts evidence in Puckett v. State, 737 So.2d 322 (Miss. 1999), this Court held that: Consequently, in the case at bar, once Puckett offered evidence of his good character in the form of the glowing recommendation letter from Griffis and the fact that he did not act hostile upon his termination, this opened the door for the prosecution to offer evidence in rebuttal proving otherwise. Accordingly, this testimony was properly admitted under Rule 404(a)(1). Under the Puckett rationale, Moss also opened the door to inquiry into specific instances of conduct where Moss offered character evidence in the form of Davis's opinion testimony. Additionally, the analysis as to the admissibility of specific instances of conduct on cross-examination under Rule 405 appears to apply equally to prior and subsequent acts. Similar to Rule 404, Rule 405 makes no distinction between prior and subsequent specific instances. United States v. Latney, 108 F.3d 1446, 1449 (D.C.Cir.1997). ¶ 18. As recognized by a number of courts, in the context of the admissibility of other bad acts evidence, Rule 404 makes no distinctions between prior and subsequent acts. See Bullock v. Virginia, 27 Va.App. 255, 498 S.E.2d 433, 437 (1998) (holding that the same principle of admission of prior bad acts applies equally in cases of subsequent bad acts.); United States v. Whaley, 786 F.2d 1229, 1232 (4th Cir.1986) (The mere fact that the other acts at issue occurred after the events charged in the indictment does not render them irrelevant.... Subsequent conduct may be highly probative of prior intent.). United States v. Latney, 108 F.3d 1446, 1449 (D.C.Cir.1997) ( quoting United States v. Delgado, 56 F.3d 1357, 1365 (11th Cir. 1995)) (`the principles governing what is commonly referred to as other crimes evidence are the same whether the conduct occurs before or after the offense charged'). ¶ 19. Nevertheless, it was harmless error to prohibit Fielder from inquiring into Davis's knowledge of relevant specific instances of Moss's conduct on cross-examination. Generally, character evidence is not admissible in civil cases unless character is one of the issues in the case. Daniels by Glass v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 634 So.2d 88, 93 (Miss.1993). Also, the accident occurred in 1992 and the subsequent traffic violations occurred sometime in 1995 or 1996. Davis's opinion that Moss was one of his best drivers refers to the period during which Moss was employed by MBC. It is not clear from the record whether these violations occurred during the time in which Moss was employed with MBC or after his employment ended. If the violations occurred during his employment, the Fielders would be entitled to impeach Davis's general opinion testimony. However, since the record is not clear as to the time frame involved, we can not say that the trial court erred in prohibiting the cross-examination on the issue of Moss's driving record. The trial court is affirmed.