Opinion ID: 1680628
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of the Opportunity Scholarship Program

Text: In our review of the constitutionality of the OSP, [t]he political motivations of the legislature, if any, in enacting [this legislation] are not a proper matter of inquiry for this Court. We are limited to measuring the Act against the dictates of the Constitution. School Bd. of Escambia County v. State, 353 So.2d 834, 839 (Fla.1977). We are also mindful that statutes come to the Court clothed with a presumption of constitutionality, City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So.2d 143, 146 (Fla.2002) (quoting Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So.2d 879, 881 (Fla.1983)), and that the Court should give a statute a constitutional construction where such a construction is reasonably possible. See Tyne v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., 901 So.2d 802, 810 (Fla.2005). However, in this case we conclude that the OSP is in direct conflict with the mandate in article IX, section 1(a) that it is the state's paramount duty to make adequate provision for education and that the manner in which this mandate must be carried out is by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools.
This Court has long recognized the constitutional obligation that Florida's education article places upon the Legislature: Article XII, section 1, constitution [the predecessor to article IX, section 1] commands that the Legislature shall provide for a uniform system of public free schools and for the liberal maintenance of such system of free schools. This means that a system of public free schools ... shall be established upon principles that are of uniform operation throughout the State and that such system shall be liberally maintained. State ex rel. Clark v. Henderson, 137 Fla. 666, 188 So. 351, 352 (1939). Currently, article IX, section 1(a), which is stronger than the provision discussed in Henderson, contains three critical components with regard to public education. The provision (1) declares that the education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida, (2) sets forth an education mandate that provides that it is a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing within its borders, and (3) sets forth how the state is to carry out this education mandate, specifically, that [a]dequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools. (Emphasis supplied.) Justice Overton explained in his concurring opinion in Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness that [t]his education provision was placed in our constitution in recognition of the fact that education is absolutely essential to a free society under our governmental structure. 680 So.2d at 409. Justice Overton also noted that [t]he authors of our United States Constitution and our general governmental structure have acknowledged the importance of education as well. As James Madison said: Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean to be their own governours must arm themselves with the power that knowledge gives.... Learned institutions ought to be favorite objects with every free people. They throw that light over the public mind which is the best security against crafty and dangerous encroachments on the public liberty. Robert S. Peck, The Constitution and American Values, in The Blessings of Liberty: Bicentennial Lectures At The National Archives 133 (Robert S. Peck & Ralph S. Pollock eds., 1989). Thomas Jefferson said it even more succinctly: If a nation expects to be ignorant and free ... it expects what never was and never will be. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel Charles Yancey (Jan. 6, 1816). Further, in one of the most important cases ever decided by the United States Supreme Court, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691, 98 L.Ed. 873, 880 (1954), the Court stated that education is important to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities.... It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Id. (alterations in original).
In the 1999 legislation creating the OSP, the Legislature recognized its heightened obligation regarding public education imposed by the 1998 amendment to article IX, section 1: (1) FINDINGS AND INTENT.  ... The Legislature recognizes that the voters of the State of Florida, in the November 1998 general election, amended s. 1, Art. IX of the Florida Constitution so as to make education a paramount duty of the state. The Legislature finds that the State Constitution requires the state to provide the opportunity to obtain a high-quality education. § 229.0537(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). In 2002 legislation that renumbered the statutory provisions dealing with education, the Legislature made essentially the same finding in language that more closely tracked the language of article IX, section 1(a): The Legislature finds that the State Constitution requires the state to provide a uniform, safe, secure, efficient, and high-quality system which allows the opportunity to obtain a high-quality education. § 1002.38(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). Although these statements purport to fulfill the constitutional mandate, the legislative findings omit critical language in the constitutional provision. In neither the 1999 nor the 2002 version of the OSP legislation is there an acknowledgment by the Legislature that the state's constitutional obligation under article IX, section 1(a) is to provide a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools.  (Emphasis supplied.) The constitutional language omitted from the legislative findings is crucial. This language acts as a limitation on legislative power. See generally Savage v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 101 Fla. 1362, 133 So. 341, 344 (1931) (The Constitution of this state is not a grant of power to the Legislature, but a limitation only upon legislative power. . . .). Absent a constitutional limitation, the Legislature's discretion reasonably exercised is the sole brake on the enactment of legislation. State v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 126 Fla. 142, 170 So. 602, 606 (1936). Article IX, section 1(a) is a limitation on the Legislature's power because it provides both a mandate to provide for children's education and a restriction on the execution of that mandate. The second and third sentences must be read in pari materia, rather than as distinct and unrelated obligations. This principle of statutory construction is equally applicable to constitutional provisions. As we stated in construing a different constitutional amendment, the provision should be construed as a whole in order to ascertain the general purpose and meaning of each part; each subsection, sentence, and clause must be read in light of the others to form a congruous whole. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Millender, 666 So.2d 882, 886 (Fla.1996); see also Physicians Healthcare Plans, Inc. v. Pfeifler, 846 So.2d 1129, 1134 (Fla.2003). The second sentence of article IX, section 1(a) provides that it is the paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing within its borders. The third sentence of article IX, section 1(a) provides a restriction on the exercise of this mandate by specifying that the adequate provision required in the second sentence shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure and high quality system of free public schools.  (Emphasis supplied.) The OSP violates this provision by devoting the state's resources to the education of children within our state through means other than a system of free public schools. [10] The principle of construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another, leads us to the same conclusion. This Court has stated: [W]here the Constitution expressly provides the manner of doing a thing, it impliedly forbids its being done in a substantially different manner. Even though the Constitution does not in terms prohibit the doing of a thing in another manner, the fact that it has prescribed the manner in which the thing shall be done is itself a prohibition against a different manner of doing it. Therefore, when the Constitution prescribes the manner of doing an act, the manner prescribed is exclusive, and it is beyond the power of the Legislature to enact a statute that would defeat the purpose of the constitutional provision. Weinberger v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 93 Fla. 470, 112 So. 253, 256 (1927) (citations omitted); see also S & J Transp., Inc. v. Gordon, 176 So.2d 69, 71 (Fla.1965) (providing that where one method or means of exercising a power is prescribed in a constitution it excludes its exercise in other ways). We agree with the trial court that article IX, section 1(a) mandates that a system of free public schools is the manner in which the State is to provide a free education to the children of Florida and that providing a free education ... by paying tuition ... to attend private schools is a `a substantially different manner' of providing a publicly funded education than... the one prescribed by the Constitution. Holmes v. Bush, No. CV99-3370 at 10, 2000 WL 526364 (2nd Cir. Ct. order filed March 14, 2000) (citation omitted). In reaching this conclusion, we distinguish Taylor v. Dorsey, 155 Fla. 305, 19 So.2d 876, 882 (1944), in which the Court declined to apply the expressio unius est exclusio alterius maxim based on its determination that the statute at issue did not conflict with the primary purpose of the relevant constitutional provision. In Taylor, the Court considered whether a law that allowed married women to manage and control their separate property by, inter alia, suing or being sued over the property conflicted with a constitutional provision allowing a married woman's separate property to be charged in equity to satisfy claims related to that property. See id. at 880. The Court concluded that it was not the primary purpose of [the constitutional provision] to effect the adjudication in equity of all claims against married women, but to require positive action on the part of the legislature to insure enforcement in equity against their separate property of claims having equitable qualities because they represented money traceable into the property. Id. at 882. Unlike the constitutional provision at issue in Taylor, which had a narrow primary purpose, article IX, section 1(a) provides a comprehensive statement of the state's responsibilities regarding the education of its children. The dissent considers our use of rules of construction such as in pari materia and expressio unius unnecessary to discern the meaning of a provision that the dissent considers clear and unambiguous. Ambiguity suggests that reasonable persons can find different meanings in the same language. Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla.1992). It is precisely because the amendment is not clear and unambiguous regarding public funding of private schools that we look to accepted standards of construction applicable to constitutional provisions. See Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So.2d 432, 435 (Fla.2000) (stating that if the language of the statute is unclear, then rules of statutory construction control); Zingale, 885 So.2d at 282, 285 (applying rules of statutory construction, including in pari materia, to constitutional provisions); Caribbean Conservation Corp. v. Florida Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm'n, 838 So.2d 492, 501 (Fla.2003) (same). In pari materia and expressio unius are objective principles to apply in our analysis. Although parents certainly have the right to choose how to educate their children, [11] article IX, section (1)(a) does not, as the Attorney General asserts, establish a floor of what the state can do to provide for the education of Florida's children. The provision mandates that the state's obligation is to provide for the education of Florida's children, specifies that the manner of fulfilling this obligation is by providing a uniform, high quality system of free public education, and does not authorize additional equivalent alternatives.
The Constitution prohibits the state from using public monies to fund a private alternative to the public school system, which is what the OSP does. Specifically, the OSP transfers tax money earmarked for public education to private schools that provide the same service  basic primary education. Thus, contrary to the defendants' arguments, the OSP does not supplement the public education system. Instead, the OSP diverts funds that would otherwise be provided to the system of free public schools that is the exclusive means set out in the Constitution for the Legislature to make adequate provision for the education of children. Section 1002.38(6)(f), Florida Statutes (2005), specifically requires the Department of Education to transfer from each school district's appropriated funds the calculated amount from the Florida Education Finance Program and authorized categorical accounts to a separate account for the Opportunity Scholarship Program. Even if the tuition paid to the private school is less than the amount transferred from the school district's funds and therefore does not result in a dollar-for-dollar reduction, as the dissent asserts, it is of no significance to the constitutionality of public funding of private schools as a means to making adequate provision for the education of children. Although opportunity scholarships are not now widely in use, if the dissent is correct as to their constitutionality, the potential scale of programs of this nature is unlimited. Under the dissent's view of the Legislature's authority in this area, the state could fund a private school system of indefinite size and scope as long as the state also continued to fund the public schools at a level that kept them uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality. However, because voucher payments reduce funding for the public education system, the OSP by its very nature undermines the system of high quality free public schools that are the sole authorized means of fulfilling the constitutional mandate to provide for the education of all children residing in Florida. [12] The systematic diversion of public funds to private schools on either a small or large scale is incompatible with article IX, section 1(a).
In addition to specifying that a system of free public schools is the means for complying with the mandate to provide for the education of Florida's children, article IX, section 1(a) also requires that this system be uniform. The OSP makes no provision to ensure that the private school alternative to the public school system meets the criterion of uniformity. In fact, in a provision directing the Department of Education to establish and maintain a database of private schools, the Legislature expressly states that it does not intend to regulate, control, approve, or accredit private educational institutions. § 1002.42(2)(h), Fla. Stat. (2005). This lack of oversight is also evident in section 1001.21, which creates the Office of Private Schools and Home Education Programs within the Department of Education but provides that this office ha[s] no authority over the institutions or students served. § 1001.21(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). Further, although the parent of a student participating in the OSP must ensure that the student takes all statewide assessments required of a public school student, § 1002.38(5)(c), the private school's curriculum and teachers are not subject to the same standards as those in force in public schools. For example, only teachers possessing bachelor's degrees are eligible to teach at public schools, but private schools may hire teachers without bachelor's degrees if they have at least 3 years of teaching experience in public or private schools, or have special skills, knowledge, or expertise that qualifies them to provide instruction in subjects taught. § 1002.38(4)(g), Fla. Stat. (2005). In addition, public school teachers must be certified by the state. See § 1012.55(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). To obtain this certification, teachers must meet certain requirements that include having attained at least a 2.5 overall grade point average on a 4.0 scale in the applicant's major field of study and having demonstrated a mastery of general knowledge, subject area knowledge, and professional preparation and education competence. See § 1012.56(2)(c), (g)-(i), Fla. Stat. (2005). Public teacher certification also requires the applicant to submit to a background screening. See § 1012.56(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2005). Indeed, all school district personnel hired to fill positions that require direct contact with students must undergo a background check. See § 1012.32(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005). This screening is not required of private school employees. See § 1002.42(2)(c)(3), Fla. Stat. (2005) (providing that owners of private schools may require employees to file fingerprints with the Department of Law Enforcement). Regarding curriculum, public education instruction is based on the Sunshine State Standards that have been adopted by the State Board of Education and delineate the academic achievement of students, for which the state will hold schools accountable. § 1003.41, Fla. Stat. (2005). Public schools are required to teach all basic subjects as well as a number of other diverse subjects, among them the contents of the Declaration of Independence, the essentials of the United States Constitution, the elements of civil government, Florida state history, African-American history, the history of the Holocaust, and the study of Hispanic and women's contributions to the United States. See § 1003.42(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005). Eligible private schools are not required to teach any of these subjects. In addition to being academically accountable to the parent, a private school participating in the OSP is subject only to the ... curriculum ... criteria adopted by an appropriate nonpublic school accrediting body. § 1002.38(4)(f), Fla. Stat. (2005). There are numerous nonpublic school accrediting bodies that have widely variant quality standards and program requirements. Florida Department of Education, Private School Accreditation, http://www.floridaschoolchoice.org/Information/Private-Schools/ accreditation.asp (last visited Jan. 3, 2005). Thus, curriculum standards of eligible private schools may vary greatly depending on the accrediting body, and these standards may not be equivalent to those required for Florida public schools. In all these respects, the alternative system of private schools funded by the OSP cannot be deemed uniform in accordance with the mandate in article IX, section 1(a).
Reinforcing our determination that the state's use of public funds to support an alternative system of education is in violation of article IX, section 1(a) is the limitation of the use of monies from the State School Fund set forth in article IX, section 6. That provision states that income and interest from the State School Fund may be appropriated only to the support and maintenance of free public schools. Art. IX, § 6, Fla. Const. It is well established that [e]very provision of [the constitution] was inserted with a definite purpose and all sections and provisions of it must be construed together, that is, in pari materia, in order to determine its meaning, effect, restraints, and prohibitions. Thomas v. State ex rel. Cobb, 58 So.2d 173, 174 (Fla.1952); see also Caribbean Conservation Corp., 838 So.2d at 501 ([I]n construing multiple constitutional provisions addressing a similar subject, the provisions `must be read in pari materia to ensure a consistent and logical meaning that gives effect to each provision.') (quoting Advisory Opinion to the Governor-1996 Amendment 5 (Everglades), 706 So.2d 278, 281 (Fla.1997)). Reading sections 1(a) and 6 of article IX in pari materia evinces the clear intent that public funds be used to support the public school system, not to support a duplicative, competitive private system. Further, in reading article IX as a whole, we note the clear difference between the language of section 1(a) and that of section 1(b), which was adopted in 2002 and provides in full: Every four-year old child in Florida shall be provided by the State a high quality pre-kindergarten learning opportunity in the form of an early childhood development and education program which shall be voluntary, high quality, free, and delivered according to professionally accepted standards. An early childhood development and education program means an organized program designed to address and enhance each child's ability to make age appropriate progress in an appropriate range of settings in the development of language and cognitive capabilities and emotional, social, regulatory and moral capacities through education in basic skills and such other skills as the Legislature may determine to be appropriate. (Emphasis supplied.) Although this provision requires that the pre-kindergarten learning opportunity must be free and delivered according to professionally accepted standards, noticeably absent is a requirement that the state provide this opportunity by a particular means. Thus, in contrast to the Legislature's obligation under section 1(a) to make adequate provision for kindergarten through grade twelve education through a system of free public schools, the Legislature is free under section 1(b) to provide for pre-kindergarten education in any manner it desires, consistent with other applicable constitutional provisions. We reject the argument that the OSP falls within the state's responsibility under article IX, section 1(a) to make [a]dequate provision ... for ... other public education programs that the needs of the people may require. As this Court explained in Board of Public Instruction, the reference to other public education programs added in 1968 obviously applies to the existing systems of junior colleges, adult education, etc., which are not strictly within the general conception of free public schools or institutions of higher learning. 231 So.2d at 2. The OSP is limited to kindergarten through grade twelve education.
The OSP is distinguishable from the program at issue in Scavella v. School Board of Dade County, 363 So.2d 1095 (Fla.1978), under which exceptional students could attend private schools because of the lack of special services in their school district. Id. at 1097 (emphasis supplied). The program allowed a school board to use state funds to pay for a private school education if the public school did not have the special facilities or instructional personnel to provide an adequate educational opportunity for certain exceptional students, specifically physically disabled students. See id. at 1098 (emphasis supplied). Further, it was not the program itself that was challenged in Scavella but a subsequent amendment to the program that placed a cap on the amount of money a school district could pay to a private institution. See id. at 1097. The issue was whether the cap violated the students' right to equal protection under article I, section 2, Florida Constitution, which expressly provided that [n]o person shall be deprived of any right because of ... physical handicap. See id. at 1097. [13] The Court held that the statute requires the school districts to establish a maximum amount that would not deprive any student of a right to a free education, and that so interpreted the statute did not deny anyone of equal protection before the law. Id. at 1099. We conclude that the First District erred in relying on Scavella to support its determination that the OSP does not violate article IX, section 1(a). [14] We reject the suggestion by the State and amici that other publicly funded educational and welfare programs would necessarily be affected by our decision. Other educational programs, such as the program for exceptional students at issue in Scavella, are structurally different from the OSP, which provides a systematic private school alternative to the public school system mandated by our constitution. Nor are public welfare programs implicated by our decision, which rests solely on our interpretation of the provisions of article IX, the education article of the Florida Constitution. Other legislatively authorized programs may also be distinguishable in ways not fully explored or readily apparent at this stage. The effect of our decision on those programs would be mere speculation.