Opinion ID: 2383775
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Governing Legal Framework

Text: The license to practice law in the District of Columbia is a continuing proclamation by this Court that the holder is fit to be entrusted with professional and judicial matters, and to aid in the administration of justice as an attorney and officer of the court. D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 2(a). Accordingly, all applicants for admission to our Bar have the burden of demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, that they possess good moral character and general fitness to practice law in the District of Columbia. D.C.App. R. 46(d), (e). We impose such a burden for the protection of prospective clients, and the assurance of the ethical, orderly, and efficient administration of justice. Manville I, 494 A.2d at 1298. As the foregoing statements imply, the character and fitness test is two pronged. Not only must [an applicant] demonstrate the requisite moral qualifications and learning in the law, but he [or she] also must show that [his or her admission to] the practice of law will not be detrimental to the integrity of the bar, the administration of justice, or the public interest. In re Prager, 422 Mass. 86, 661 N.E.2d 84, 90 (1996). We have said that in the bar admission context, the term good moral character refers to traits such as fairness, honesty, truthfulness, discretion, trustworthiness, reliability, respect for the rights of others and the law, and reasonableness traits that bespeak the applicant's willingness and ability to act in accordance with the Rules of Professional Conduct and other applicable ethical and legal strictures. Manville I, 494 A.2d at 1298; see also Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 264, 77 S.Ct. 722, 1 L.Ed.2d 810 (1957); In re Matthews, 94 N.J. 59, 462 A.2d 165, 173 (1983). [6] The term fitness requires consideration of additional factors. An applicant may be of sterling moral character but be unable to assume the duties of a lawyer on account of other deficiencieslack of legal proficiency or ill health, for example. In addition, it is appropriate ... to consider the public perception of and confidence in the bar when determining the fitness of original applicants to practice law.... Prager, 661 N.E.2d at 90. This latter consideration has long been recognized explicitly in D.C. Bar R. XI, § 16(d)(2), which provides that an attorney who has been disbarred on account of misconduct and who seeks to be reinstated must prove, in addition to his or her moral qualifications and competence, [t]hat the resumption of the practice of law by the attorney will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar, or to the administration of justice, or subversive to the public interest. There is no reason why applicants for original admission should be held to a lesser standard. A conviction for a crime involving moral turpitudesuch as the crimes committed by the applicant now before us [7] is conclusive evidence of lack of good moral character [and, we would add, fitness] at the time of the offense. Prager, 661 N.E.2d at 89. This is tautologically so. Indeed, when a member of our Bar is convicted of such a crime, disbarment is automatic and unavoidable. D.C.Code § 11-2503(a) (2001). Our inquiry in this case does not end there, however. In line with most, if not all, jurisdictions, this court held in Manville I and Manville II that a prior criminal conviction does not necessarily require exclusion of an applicant from the Bar for all time. Cf. In re McBride, 602 A.2d 626, 641 (D.C.1992) (en banc) (holding that an attorney disbarred upon conviction of a crime of moral turpitude may petition for reinstatement after five years). Such a per se rule of exclusion would collide with the principle that good character [and fitness] at the time of application is the appropriate test. Manville II, 538 A.2d at 1132 (citing Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 246, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957)) (emphasis added). Animating our rejection of a per se rule even when the applicant's past offenses are grave ones is [t]he concept that human redemption is possible and valuable a belief that is both well established in law and premised upon long-standing, even ancient traditions. Prager, 661 N.E.2d at 89 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, rather than taking the view that prior serious misconduct invariably requires disqualification, [we] consider the facts of each case in light of the totality of circumstances surrounding an application for bar admission. Manville I, 494 A.2d at 1295. Without minimizing or discounting the adverse inferences to be drawn from an applicant's criminal record, we also take evidence of reform and rehabilitation into account. Id. To guide the totality of circumstances inquiry, our opinions in Manville I and II identified the following factors that other courts have deemed relevant to consider in evaluating the moral fitness of applicants with criminal backgrounds: 1. The nature and character of the offenses committed. 2. The number and duration of offenses. 3. The age and maturity of the applicant when the offenses were committed. 4. The social and historical context in which the offenses were committed. 5. The sufficiency of the punishment undergone and restitution made in connection with the offenses. 6. The grant or denial of a pardon for offenses committed. 7. The number of years that have elapsed since the last offense was committed, and the presence or absence of misconduct during that period. 8. The applicant's current attitude about the prior offenses (e.g., acceptance of responsibility for and renunciation of past wrongdoing, and remorse). 9. The applicant's candor, sincerity and full disclosure in the filings and proceedings on character and fitness. 10. The applicant's constructive activities and accomplishments subsequent to the criminal convictions. 11. The opinions of character witnesses about the applicant's moral fitness. Manville II, 538 A.2d at 1133 n. 4. In our Manville decisions and in subsequent cases we have consistently evaluated bar applicants with criminal records by reference to these factors. We have done so, however, on the understanding that the list is illustrative rather than exhaustive.... These factors can, at best, serve as mere indicia of an applicant's good moral character. Manville I, 494 A.2d at 1297. All of this is emphatically not to say that overcoming past criminal convictions, even of offenses less heinous than manslaughter, armed robbery, or illegal drug transactions, is easy. In re Demos, 579 A.2d 668, 672 (D.C.1990) (en banc). Felony misconduct is highly probative of a person's character, and overcoming such evidence of one's charactereven with the passage of yearsis a difficult task. Thus, we took pains in our Manville decisions to emphasize that even though, at that time, Rule 46 describe[d] the applicant's burden in terms of `preponderance of the evidence' rather than `clear and convincing' or `beyond a reasonable doubt,' an applicant with a background of a conviction of a felony or other serious crime must carry a very heavy burden in order to establish good moral character. Manville II, 538 A.2d at 1134 n. 7. Such an applicant, we stated, must prov[e] his full and complete rehabilitation subsequent to the conviction. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Without reservation, we agreed with the Supreme Court of New Jersey that [t]he more serious the misconduct, the greater the showing of rehabilitation that will be required.... [and] in the case of extremely damning past misconduct, a showing of rehabilitation may be virtually impossible to make. Id. (quoting Matthews, 462 A.2d at 176). Furthermore, on the issue of general fitness apart from moral character, the more serious the misconduct, the heavier will be the applicant's burden to dispel the concern that his or her admission to practice lawto assume the responsibilities and privileges of an officer of the courtwill be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar. [8] As is true when we consider petitions for reinstatement filed by attorneys who have been disbarred for crimes of moral turpitude, we must be assured, for example, that the public will not perceive an applicant's admission to the bar as an indication that the original offense was not viewed with sufficient gravity. In re Borders, 665 A.2d 1381, 1382 (D.C.1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also id., 665 A.2d at 1388 (King, J., concurring) ([I]n some cases the criminal conduct is so offensive, so contrary to the norms of society, and so destructive of the system of justice, that a conviction should result in disbarment, if not for life, then for such a significant period of time that there is no danger that reinstatement would result in diminished respect for members of the bar, the legal profession, and the system of justice by the public at large.). If the burden of proof was daunting in 1988, when Manville II was decided, it became even more so the following year. In 1989 this Court amended Rule 46 to require applicants to our Bar to prove their character and fitness by clear and convincing evidence. [9] See Demos, 579 A.2d at 673 n. 8. This was no mere cosmetic change. See id. at 674-75 (Farrell, J., concurring). A preponderance of the evidence standard simply requires the fact finder to believe that the existence of the contested fact is more plausible than its nonexistence; in contrast, the standard of clear and convincing proof requires evidence that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established. In re T.J., 666 A.2d 1, 16 n. 17 (D.C.1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). While the preponderance standard allows both parties to share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion, the more stringent clear and convincing standard expresses a preference for one side's interests by allocating more of the risk of error to the party who bears the burden of proof. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390, 103 S.Ct. 683, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, under Rule 46, the public interests in the protection of the community and the integrity of the administration of justice are preferred, as it were, over the applicant's private interest in obtaining a law license. As a reflection of that preference, the applicant bears the risk of error more heavily than before on the issues of character and fitness. Now, in the words of the New Jersey Supreme Court, the applicant's attitude and behavior subsequent to disqualifying misconduct must demonstrate a reformation of character so convincingly that it is proper to allow admission to a profession whose members must stand free from all suspicion. Matthews, 462 A.2d at 176.