Opinion ID: 4539740
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: r.s. (2019).

Text: • Serve a summons and copies of the pleadings to all parties. § 38-1-103(1), C.R.S. (2019); see also C.R.C.P. 4(c) (outlining the contents of a summons). • “[N]egotiate in good faith for the acquisition of any property interest sought prior to instituting eminent domain proceedings.” § 38-1-121(3). • Furnish all interested property owners of record with a written final offer if negotiations fail to reach agreement. § 38-1-121(6). Once the valuation hearing begins, in cases where the fact finder determines the amount of just compensation exceeds 130% of the condemning authority’s final written offer, interested landowners are also entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees. § 38-1-122(1.5), C.R.S. (2019). While in some instances, the number of restrictive covenant holders with whom the government would have to go through this process might be relatively small, in others it might be hundreds or even thousands. As the Supreme Court of Georgia explained in the face of a similar suit: Appellees’ contention, if carried to its extreme, is that, if there was an addition to the city in which there were 10,000 lots, the city would be required to serve the owner or owners of each lot in a suit to condemn 17 any one of such lots for public purposes. Such contention, if established as the law governing such matters, would be practically to prohibit the city from condemning property so situated for public use; it would at least greatly restrict the rights of the city to condemn property for public purposes. It is apparent that, if it could not do so in cases where the owners of lots are 10,000 or more in number, it could not do so when they are 1,000 or 1,500 in number. Anderson, 3 S.E.2d at 88. ¶29 Smith established a broad rule that neighboring property owners are not entitled to compensation under the Colorado Constitution when the government uses land it acquires in a manner that violates a restrictive covenant. That rule is consistent with our takings jurisprudence more generally. Moreover, policy concerns about the burdens that a different rule would impose on necessary public improvements militate against reversing course now. We will therefore not depart from the doctrine of stare decisis. Instead, we reaffirm our decision in Smith.