Opinion ID: 217289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: IDOC Printout and Career Offender Testimony

Text: Boling claims the district court erred by admitting evidence of the IDOC printout and by permitting Captain Almaroad to testify about both the definition of the term career offender and Boling's criminal history. In addition, he argues that he was denied due process because he was convicted based upon this evidence, which was later shown to be inaccurate.
At trial, Boling objectedon the grounds of relevance and hearsayto the admissions of the IDOC printout and Captain Almaroad's testimony about the definition of career offender and Boling's criminal history. On appeal, he argues only relevance. Boling's defense relied on showing that Captain Almaroad wanted to threaten him with federal prosecution so he would work as an informant. In response to cross-examination from Boling, Captain Almaroad explained that he had pursued federal prosecution because Boling would, if convicted, be eligible for a career offender sentence enhancement. Any evidence of Boling's career offender status was relevant because such evidence substantiated Captain Almaroad's explanation. See Fed. R.Evid. 401. But not all of the IDOC printout or Captain Almaroad's testimony related to Boling's career offender status. The IDOC printout listed two convictions for possession of a controlled substance, neither of which affects the career offender enhancement. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). Similarly, Captain Almaroad testified that Boling had five prior felony drug convictions, but not all felony drug convictions influence the career offender enhancement, so this testimony also went beyond explaining Boling's eligibility for the enhancement. See id. The district court therefore may have erred by admitting parts of the IDOC printout and Captain Almaroad's testimony about Boling's five felonies. [1] Despite these potential errors, we will not reverse if we are convinced the jury would have convicted Boling absent the potentially erroneous admissions. Conner, 583 F.3d at 1025. In this analysis, we consider the overall strength of the government's remaining evidence against Boling. See United States v. Savage, 505 F.3d 754, 762 (7th Cir.2007). The government argues any error was harmless because Boling later testified in detail about his criminal history. It cites no authority in support of this argument, and we find none. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 299 n. 7 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding erroneous admission of testimony was not rendered harmless by defendant's testimony on the same subject because the error occurred prior to [the defendant] taking the stand, making it impossible to make a post-hoc assessment as to whether [he] would have testified without the damaging, inculpatory testimony). We therefore reject the argument that the admissions of Captain Almaroad's testimony and the full IDOC printout, if erroneous, would have been rendered harmless by dint of Boling's later testimony. Nevertheless, we will not reverse because the remaining evidence of Boling's guilt is overwhelming. United States v. Dennis, 497 F.3d 765, 769-70 (7th Cir. 2007). The October 3 search of Boling's person yielded sixteen individually packaged rocks of crack cocaine and a digital scale. Captain Almaroad testified that Boling had admitted possessing the crack cocaine. Boling has a prior conviction based on very similar factsfor possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, which was properly admitted to show his intent in this case. There is video and audio evidence of each controlled purchase of crack cocaine from Boling. McCurdy left each time with $50 and returned each time with crack cocaine. In response, Boling offers only accusations of conspiracy and implausible explanations of the video evidence. Even without this overwhelming evidence, the alleged error would be harmless. The district court properly admittedwith an appropriate limiting instructionevidence of the crimes that had led Captain Almaroad to believe Boling was eligible for a career offender sentencing enhancement. Any prejudice from the erroneous admission of evidence of two additional (lesser) offenses was negligible.
Boling argues he was denied a fair trial because he was convicted based on evidencethat of his status as a potential career offenderthat was discovered after trial to be inaccurate. But before he can make this argument on appeal, he must have made it to the district court. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 33; United States v. Ogle, 425 F.3d 471, 476 (7th Cir.2005) (refusing to consider claim, unsupported by newly discovered evidence, that government introduced false testimony because it was not included in a timely motion for a new trial); United States v. Higham, 98 F.3d 285, 293 (7th Cir.1996) (concluding that the question of whether newly discovered evidence entitled defendant to a new trial is one addressed to the district court's discretion, in the first instance). Boling did move for a new trial, but his motion did not refer to any false testimony or evidence. We decline to consider his argument for the first time on appeal.