Opinion ID: 21517
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Comparison with the Federal System

Text: 25 Our conclusion also finds support in the fact that in the reverse situation, receipt of a TCHR letter would not trigger the analogous EEOC ninety-day filing period. The stated purposes of the Texas act suggest that the state legislature intended it to conform to the policies contained in the federal act; therefore, we may consider how the federal act is implemented under clauses similar to those at issue in the Texas act. Eckerdt, 802 S.W.2d at 72; see also Benavides v. Moore, 848 S.W.2d 190, 193 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied) (When Texas case law fails to address questions raised under the [TCHRA], we look to federal case law for guidance.). As Eureka concedes, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) states only that the ninety-day period will be triggered by receipt of a right to sue letter from the EEOC. Receipt of the federal letter appears to be the exclusive mechanism for commencing the federal filing period. See Muth v. Cobro Corp., 895 F. Supp. 254, 256 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (holding that the ninety-day period for filing federal anti-discrimination action is triggered only by receipt of EEOC right to sue letter); Black v. Brown Univ., 555 F.Supp. 880, 884 n.8 (D. R.I. 1983) (This Court rejects plaintiff's assertion that the right-to-sue letter from the [Rhode Island equal employment agency] is equivalent to the EEOC right-to-sue letter. The plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) requires, as a condition precedent to litigating in federal court, a right to sue letter issued by the EEOC.); Foreman v. General Motors Corp., 473 F. Supp. 166, 177 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (finding that plaintiffs failed to satisfy the prerequisites for a Title VII suit because they only received aright to sue letter from the state agency, not the EEOC). 26 Despite this clear statutory language, Eureka relies on two cases to argue that a TCHR right to file a civil action letter also triggers the federal ninety-day filing period. Neither of these cases is persuasive. In Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam), this Court observed-in passing dicta only-that [section] 2000e-5(f)(1) provides that a civil action must be commenced 'within ninety days' after the charging party has received a 'right-to-sue' letter from the EEOC or state or local agency. Id. at 789 (emphasis added). This observation is simply incorrect. First, section 2000e-5(f)(1) refers only to receipt of the EEOC letter as the triggering event. Second, the case Dao cites, Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 621 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1980), concerned a plaintiff's failure to file her federal suit within ninety days of receipt of her EEOC letter. None of the authority cited in Dao supports its statement that both federal and state/local right to sue letters trigger the federal ninety-day filing period. 27 Eureka also cites James v. Texas Department of Human Services, 818 F.Supp. 987 (N.D. Tex. 1993) for the same proposition. James found that a plaintiff's receipt of a TCHR right to file a civil action letter would exhaust her administrative remedies under the ADA, that is, the TCHR letter would trigger her federal right to sue. See id. at 990. The James court simply takes this for granted and only cites Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard Division of Pullman, Inc., 678 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) for support. Pinkard, in turn, merely stands for the unremarkable idea that a Title VII plaintiff must receive an EEOC letter before filing suit. See id. at 1215. Like Dao, James has no support for its statement that a TCHR letter can trigger the federal ninety-day filing period, and like Dean and Battee, is not persuasive. In sum, neither Dao nor James demonstrates that a TCHR right to file a civil action letter would start the federal ninety-day filing period; based on the plain language of section 2000e-5(f)(1), it is receipt of notice from the EEOC only that will start the period.