Opinion ID: 501787
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Damage Caused by Subsidence of Land Overlying Underground Mines

Text: 243 Industry appeals the district court's ruling upholding the Secretary's regulation requiring the restoration of subsided land. We now affirm. 244 Subsidence occurs when a patch of land over an underground mine sinks, shifts, or otherwise changes its configuration. It is a costly and serious problem, particularly in urban areas, where land overlying and adjoining underground mines has been developed. In 1977, Congress noted that the estimated cost for controlling subsidence under 200 urbanized areas now affected is approximately $1 billion. H.R.REP. NO. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS 593, 658. In response, the Secretary promulgated regulations to deal with the subsidence problem pursuant to Secs. 516(b)(1), 516(b)(2), and 515(b)(10) of SMCRA. These 1983 regulations provide that a mine operator shall [c]orrect any material damage resulting from subsidence caused to surface lands, to the extent technologically and economically feasible, by restoring the land to a condition capable of maintaining the value and reasonably foreseeable uses which it is capable of supporting before subsidence. 30 C.F.R. Sec. 817.121(c)(1) (1984). 245 Industry contends that by establishing a duty to restore land damaged by subsidence--as opposed to prevention of subsidence--the regulation exceeds the Secretary's authority under any of the three statutory sections relied on. In the course of this case's lengthy and complicated history, the Secretary has alternated between two mutually exclusive explanations to justify his authority. Secretary Andrus first promulgated regulations requiring restoration of subsided land in 1979, see 30 C.F.R. Sec. 817.124(b) (1979), basing his authority to impose such a duty on the Act's requirement for maintenance of the surface's value and reasonably foreseeable future uses. 44 FED.REG. 15,275 (1979); see SMCRA Sec. 516(b)(1). 73 Industry attacked the 1979 regulation in the original round of litigation before the district court. PSMRL I (Round I), 14 E.R.C. at 1088. The district court sustained the regulation, but not on the ground articulated by the Secretary. Id. In the court's view, Sec. 516(b)(1) does not address the restoration of land damaged by subsidence. Rather, the Secretary has authority under the discretionary language of Sec. 516(b)(10) 74 to apply to underground mining operations the general restoration duties of Sec. 515, which otherwise only apply to surface mining. Critical to the court's reasoning was the statutory language in Sec. 516(b)(10) that with respect to surface impacts not specified in [subsection 516(b) ], the Secretary shall require an underground mine to operate in accordance with the standards established in section 515; provided, however, that the Secretary shall modify the Sec. 515 requirements as necessary to accommodate the distinct difference between surface and underground coal mining. The district court found that the restoration of lands damaged by subsidence was not a surface impact ... specified in Sec. 516(b)(1), even though that subsection did specifically address the problem of subsidence. 246 While appeals from the district court's decision were pending, the new Secretary of Interior, James Watt, announced the Department's intent to reconsider all the challenged SMCRA regulations. This court accordingly remanded the entire case; and in 1983, Secretary Watt repromulgated subsidence regulations, which were changed in certain minor respects but retained the basic requirements of the 1979 regulations. In particular, Secretary Watt retained the duty to restore subsided land. The explanation accompanying the 1983 regulations, however, adopted the district court's theory that a duty to restore subsidence damage derived from the incorporation of Sec. 515 via Sec. 516(b)(10). 48 FED.REG. 24644 (1983). In so doing, the Secretary necessarily renounced the Department's prior position that Sec. 516(b)(1) authorized the regulations since Sec. 516(b)(10) could apply only if restoration of subsidence was not a specified impact for Sec. 516(b)(1) purposes. And not surprisingly, since the Secretary was now relying on the court's previous interpretation of Sec. 515(b), the district court upheld the regulations based on the authority of Sec. 516(b)(10). The Secretary's briefs before us have also relied on Sec. 516(b)(10). But at oral argument, counsel for the Secretary reverted to Secretary Andrus' original view that a duty to restore subsided land arises directly from the language of Sec. 516(b)(1). We now find authority to rest with the latter--Sec. 516(b)(1). 247 We agree with Industry that the language of Sec. 516(b)(10) and the structure of the Act do not permit the wholesale incorporation of Sec. 515 requirements whenever the provisions of Sec. 516 are less stringent than those of Sec. 515. Industry argues that subsidence is not subject to the requirements of Sec. 515 because it is a surface impact specifically treated in Sec. 516(b)(1). The district court's theory is that Sec. 516(b)(1) deals with the prevention of subsidence causing material damage, not remedial measures. 48 FED.REG. 24644 (1983). Therefore, reasoned the district court, Sec. 515 standards are made applicable to the extent that they pertain to remedial measures. Id. It is clear, however, that the language of Sec. 516(b)(10) precludes that interpretation. By its terms, Sec. 516(b)(10) is triggered only by surface impacts not specified. It does not purport to be operative for remedies not specified. The district court's interpretation would so expand the scope of incorporation of Sec. 515 via Sec. 516(b)(10) as to be inconsistent with Congress' decision to create a separate and distinct set of performance standards--set forth in Sec. 516--for underground mining. 248 We hold the Secretary's original justification, Sec. 516(b)(1), the more reasonable interpretation of the two. Section 516(b)(1) requires the mine operator to maintain the value and reasonably foreseeable use of land subject to subsidence. For the Secretary to construe that language as authorizing a regulation requiring the restoration of subsided land is certainly not inconsistent with the section's language: maintaining the value of land may well require restoring it after it has been damaged. The legislative history of the Act, although not offering any specific guidance on the construction of Sec. 516(b)(1), makes clear that Congress regarded subsidence as a serious problem. See H.R.REP. NO. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS 593, 658. This history also suggests that reclamation was anticipated for a broad range of mining impacts. See H.R.REP. NO. 45, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 202 (1975) (After surface operations or other mining impacts are complete at a particular site, the area must be regraded and a diverse and permanent vegetative cover established.). Finally, Industry has not pointed to any clear evidence of an intent to preclude a duty to restore--a necessary prerequisite here to rebut the inference that Congress meant to delegate to the Secretary the authority to interpret the general and ambiguous terms of Sec. 516(b)(1). See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). 249 Our review of the Secretary's decisionmaking is, of course, limited to the reasoning evidenced on the record. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196-97, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1577-78, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947). This time-honored rule prevents a court from affirming administrative action on a basis not provided by the agency and thereby guards against judicial encroachment into the policymaking domain of the administrative agency. Id. at 196, 67 S.Ct. at 1577. The Chenery doctrine also facilitates judicial review by ensuring that a court has a clear statement of the rationale it is reviewing. It will not do for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency's action. Id. at 196-97, 67 S.Ct. at 1577. Here the record contains two alternative bases for the Secretary's regulation, one reasonable and one not. We think that suffices when, as here, the Secretary's original rationale was reasonable and the second was adopted in obvious reliance on the district court's opinion. This is not a case where we must construct a theory for the agency's action or where the agency's reasoning is too sparse or confusing to permit review. Rather, the record contains a clear statement of the basis on which we affirm the Secretary, and therefore a remand is not required by Chenery. 250