Opinion ID: 884377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: kornder-owen's alleged violation of the 25 m.p.h. posted speed limit

Text: Roe contends that at the time of the accident Kornder-Owen was driving in excess of the 25 m.p.h. posted speed limit and therefore, that Kornder-Owen was negligent. In support of her contention, she submitted the affidavit of Dr. Denny Lee, an expert witness, who opined that the Kornder-Owen vehicle was traveling at a speed of 27 to 29 mph at the time of the accident. However, as previously stated, a party opposing summary judgment must allege facts which are material. In an action which alleges negligence, if the plaintiff fails to offer proof on any one of the elements of negligenceduty, breach, causation, and damagesthen the action in negligence must fail and summary judgment in favor of the defendant is proper. Wiley v. City of Glendive (1995), 272 Mont. 213, 216, 900 P.2d 310, 312; Pappas v. Midwest Motor Express, Inc. (1994), 268 Mont. 347, 350, 886 P.2d 918, 920; White v. Murdock (1994), 265 Mont. 386, 389-90, 877 P.2d 474, 476. In other words, the fact that Kornder-Owen exceeded the speed limit by 2 to 4 m.p.h. is only material if there is evidence that that difference in speed contributed as a cause of the parties' collision. We held in Busta v. Columbus Hospital Corp. (1996), 276 Mont. 342, 371, 916 P.2d 122, 139, that when multiple causes of an event are alleged, the test of causation is whether the conduct in question was a substantial factor in bringing about the event. After a review of the record, we conclude that Roe offered no evidence that the speed at which Kornder-Owen drove actually contributed as a cause of the parties' collision. In other words, Roe did not offer evidence that if Kornder-Owen had been going 25 m.p.h., rather than 27 or 29 m.p.h., the likelihood of a collision would have been reduced. Therefore, the difference of 2 to 4 m.p.h. was not proven to be material. Roe contends that the judgment of the District Court must be reversed based on this Court's decisions in Sweet v. Edmonds (1976), 171 Mont. 106, 555 P.2d 504, and Ryan v. City of Bozeman (1996), ___ Mont. ___, 928 P.2d 228, 53 St.Rep. 1258. However, we conclude that there are slight distinctions in the facts of both cases and, to the extent that they are similar, we conclude that the preferable rule is the one articulated in this case. In Sweet, which also involved an intersection collision, the disfavored driver testified that before entering the intersection he looked in the direction from which the defendant driver approached, had a clear view for the distance of one city block, but did not see the defendant's automobile. Furthermore, it was undisputed that the defendant in that case was driving in excess of the legal speed limit, and the defendant's whereabouts in relation to the intersection when the plaintiff entered the intersection was undetermined. We held that under those circumstances there was a jury issue regarding whether the defendant's speed was the cause of the collision, as opposed to the disfavored plaintiff's failure to yield. Regarding the issue of causation, we found it significant that the defendant had been drinking prior to the collision; and ... he did not see plaintiff's automobile until immediately before the collision. Sweet, 171 Mont. at 109, 555 P.2d at 506. While the facts in Sweet are similar to those in this case, the extent to which the parties agreed the defendant had exceeded the speed limit was greater than is alleged in this case; and, in Sweet, even greater speed could be inferred from the fact that when plaintiff looked in the direction from which the defendant approached prior to entering the intersection, the defendant's vehicle was nowhere in sight. Although the Court's reference to drinking in the Sweet case is nonspecific, it is also apparent that that fact played some role in the Court's decision. There is no allegation in this case that alcohol consumption was a factor. In Ryan, the plaintiff collided with the defendant in an uncontrolled intersection in Bozeman. Plaintiff was the favored driver since she approached from the defendant's right. Following a jury trial, the jury found that each party was fifty percent negligent and that each parties' negligence contributed as a cause of the collision. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiff notwithstanding the jury's verdict after concluding that there was no basis in fact for finding that the plaintiff had been negligent. Ryan, ___ Mont. at ___, 928 P.2d at 229, 53 St. Rep. at 1259. On appeal, after observing that the speed limit at the location of the collision was 25 m.p.h., and that there was evidence that the plaintiff had been traveling as fast as 37 m.p.h. just before impact, we concluded that the district court erred when it held as a matter of law that plaintiff's speed was totally irrelevant to the question of causation. Ryan, ___ Mont. at ___, 928 P.2d at 232, 53 St.Rep. at 1261. We held, without further elaboration, that under those circumstances the issue of whether the plaintiff's contributory negligence contributed as a cause of her injuries was a question for the jury's determination. Ryan, ___ Mont. at ___, 928 P.2d at 232, 53 St.Rep. at 1261. We did not discuss in that opinion whether there was also expert testimony that exceeding the speed limit by nearly fifty percent would have contributed as a cause of the parties' collision. Therefore, it is unclear whether our decision in Ryan was based on evidence which has not been presented in this case, or whether we assumed from the record that had the plaintiff been traveling 25 m.p.h., rather than 37 m.p.h., the collision would not have occurred as it did. To the extent that the former is true, the distinction between that case and this case is self evident. To the extent that the latter is true, we incompletely analyzed the law of negligence and we decline to follow that decision. In this case, Roe testified that when she first observed Kornder-Owen's vehicle at a distance of one-half block away, it did not appear to be traveling in excess of the speed limit, but that Kornder-Owen must have accelerated when she switched lanes. In other words, although the plaintiff did not personally observe the defendant driving at what appeared to be an excessive rate of speed, she assumed that speed must have been excessive from the fact that a collision occurred. Even the plaintiff's efforts to prove excessive speed based on post-accident reconstruction demonstrated, at most, that Kornder-Owen exceeded the speed limit by 2 to 4 m.p.h. In the short distance from which the defendant was first observed to the point at which the collision occurred, a difference of 2 to 4 m.p.h. may or may not have contributed as a cause of the collision. On the state of the record, the District Court was left to do nothing but speculate. If the speed at which Kornder-Owen was traveling did not contribute as a substantial factor to the parties' collision, then the fact that she operated her motor vehicle at a speed of 27 to 29 m.p.h., as opposed to 25 m.p.h., was not material and did not satisfy the plaintiff's burden of demonstrating a material factual issue. We conclude, based on the record before us, that the undisputed cause of the collision was Roe's breach of her duty, pursuant to § 61-8-341, MCA, to stop and then to yield to other vehicles which were approaching so closely ... as to constitute an immediate hazard. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of Colleen Kornder-Owen. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. TURNAGE, C.J., and REGNIER, NELSON and GRAY, JJ., concur.