Opinion ID: 2609747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: unauthorized communications between the bailiff and the jury during jury deliberations

Text: After the jury had been deliberating for over three days, the trial judge received the following note from juror Alma Baugh: Message to the Court. I have been accused by the Bailiff of not doing my job properly. Therefore I ask to be excused from jury duty. The trial judge refused to excuse her, however, see note 11 supra, and a few hours later the jury returned verdicts of guilty against the appellants. At a post-verdict hearing, ostensibly to ascertain the facts underlying juror Baugh's message and the possibility that the appellants had been prejudiced, the trial judge asked juror Baugh a single question of substance: THE COURT: Mrs. Baugh, the Court would like to at this time inquire whether anything that is contained  the subject matter of what is contained in this message, did it in any way prevent you from being able to continue as a fair and impartial juror in this case? JUROR BAUGH: No. It did not. The judge did not ask for details of the incident with the bailiff. Nor did he inquire whether juror Baugh had talked with other jurors about the incident, and if so, whether they had demonstrated concern over it. Only after an examination of juror Baugh by Mr. Sherwood did the facts of the event begin to emerge: as the jurors adjourned for lunch on the third day of their deliberations, the court's bailiff stated to juror Baugh, If you would put down your knitting, you might be able to do your job. After foreclosing further inquiry by Mr. Sherwood into the impact of this confrontation with the bailiff on juror Baugh's state of mind, the trial judge found that juror Baugh had properly done the job. Trial by jury is considered fundamental to our system of criminal justice. The law therefore zealously protects the efficacy of the right to jury trial by erecting a strong presumption of prejudice when the integrity of jury deliberations has been compromised by unauthorized contact with non-jurors. See, e.g., Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954); Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-150, 13 S.Ct. 50, 36 L.Ed. 917 (1892). While the presumption of prejudice is not conclusive, the burden rests heavily on the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant. Remmer v. United States, supra, 347 U.S. at 229, 74 S.Ct. at 451 (emphasis added). The outside influence need not touch directly on the guilt or innocence of the defendant to trigger the presumption of prejudice  it is enough that during the crucial period of jury deliberations there was a private communication bearing even remotely on the trial or the jury's functions in it. See, e.g., Gold v. United States, 352 U.S. 985, 77 S.Ct. 378, 1 L.Ed.2d 360 (1957) (per curiam), facts reported in 99 U.S.App.D.C. 136, 237 F.2d 764, 775 (1956) (Bazelon, J., dissenting); Laine v. State, Ind. App., 289 N.E.2d 141 (1972). The task of the trial judge at the hearing required by an unauthorized communication with the jury is to determine, first, what actually took place, and second, whether the impact of the communication was clearly not prejudicial to the defendant. United States v. Betner, 489 F.2d 116, 119 (5th Cir.1974). In addition, the judge must afford a full hearing at which counsel [are] free to introduce any evidence relevant to the alleged conversation. Morgan v. United States, 399 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1025, 89 S.Ct. 635, 21 L.Ed.2d 568 (1969). When measured against these standards, the procedure followed by the trial judge was demonstrably inadequate in many respects. (1) The trial judge improperly attempted to discharge the entire burden of proof placed on the State. As Remmer v. United States, supra, 347 U.S. at 229, 74 S.Ct. at 451, mandates, the burden is on the  Government to establish ... that ... contact with the juror was harmless. (Emphasis added). See Badgwell v. State, 418 P.2d 114, 117 (Okl.Cr. 1966) (showing of unauthorized communication automatically shifts the burden upon the state to show non-prejudice by competent evidence). Yet the State offered no evidence at the hearing, choosing instead to rely on the purported showing of non-prejudice made by the trial judge himself. While it is within the discretion of a trial judge to examine witnesses to bring out needed facts which have not been elicited by the parties, this discretion is necessarily circumscribed by his responsibility not [to] assume the role of an advocate or of a prosecutor. E. Cleary, McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 8, at 12, 13 (2d ed. 1972). I find it clearly improper for the trial judge to have attempted to carry the State's entire burden of proof in this hearing when it was his primary responsibility to sit in judgment on the facts. See Canons of Judicial Ethics No. 15. (2) There was insufficient evidence of non-prejudice from the bailiff's remark. Even if it is assumed that the trial judge properly attempted to discharge the State's entire burden of proof, the record of the hearing is woefully inadequate to this end. Several circumstances combined to make the remark of the bailiff to juror Baugh particularly dangerous to the appellants. First, the jury had been deliberating for the lengthy period of three days when the remark was made. Second, they had earlier indicated the presence of a deadlock in a message to the court. Third, the comment itself  If you would put down your knitting, you might be able to do your job  on its face was an attempt by the bailiff to accelerate the jury's deliberations at a time when the jury was already burdened in this regard by the very length of their previous deliberations. [19] Fourth, the remark by the bailiff arguably singled out juror Baugh as a recalcitrant obstructionist and thus may have pressured her personally to accede to the desires of the majority. [20] Finally, the actual impact of this remark on juror Baugh was to disgruntle her to the point of requesting relief from further jury duty. Yet despite these circumstances, the only indication on the record that the bailiff's remark left no prejudicial impact was juror Baugh's statement of self-assessed subjective impartiality in response to the trial judge's single question, whether the bailiff's remark in any way prevent[ed] you from being able to continue as a fair and impartial juror in this case. Cf. part I of this opinion. This does not constitute discharge of the heavy burden on the government to show an absence of prejudice. Remmer v. United States, supra, 347 U.S. at 229, 74 S.Ct. 450. It is not clear, distinct, concise and convincing proof that the remark of the bailiff had no impact on the jury's deliberations. Scott v. State, 448 P.2d 272, 275 (Okl.Cr. 1969). The trial judge's generalized request of juror Baugh to assess her own subjective impartiality for his benefit, after she had just voted to convict the appellants, invited its own answer. Cf. Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. at 728, 81 S.Ct. 1639. Obviously a more probing inquiry into the incident and its impact on juror Baugh was needed, unless, as the record suggests, the trial judge was bound to protect the jury's verdicts of guilty at all costs. I note finally that the trial judge omitted entirely any inquiry into the impact, if any, that the bailiff's remark had on the jurors other than juror Baugh. Whether any other jurors were accelerated in their deliberations by the bailiff's expression of impatience the trial judge evidently did not care to know. Cf. Lambert v. State, Ind. App., 306 N.E.2d 115, 118 (1974). (3) Appellants were denied a full hearing on the impact of the bailiff's remark. The hearing required by Remmer v. United States, supra , necessarily includes a meaningful opportunity for the defense to adduce evidence of prejudice stemming from an unauthorized contact with the jury. Morgan v. United States, supra . This is especially important where the initial showing of non-prejudice is as fragile as it was here. Yet the trial judge consistently foreclosed inquiry by the defense into juror Baugh's state of mind  the principal issue in the hearing. He expressed his erroneous understanding of the purpose of the inquiry when he stated: This is only as to what transpired between the juror; and, if necessary, whether the juror was not able to function as a juror. That's all. Of course, the applicable legal standard is not whether the outside influence rendered juror Baugh not able to function as a juror, but whether there was a reasonable possibility that it influenced her or other jurors in their deliberations. Cf. Paz v. United States, 462 F.2d 740, 745-746 (5th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820, 94 S.Ct. 115, 38 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974). To this end, the defense asked, and sua sponte was foreclosed from pursuing by the trial judge, questions touching on juror Baugh's level of decision or indecision on the question of guilt at the moment the bailiff accused her of not doing her job properly. [21] If her response to these questions had indicated indecision, there would have been objective evidence that the remark did affect her thinking in ways that her simple response to the trial judge's general question on impartiality did not reveal. By disallowing this line of inquiry, the trial judge rendered the hearing exceedingly one-sided and disabled the appellants from pursuing the reasonable possibility of prejudice to them resulting from the incident between the bailiff and juror Baugh.