Opinion ID: 1191742
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: attorney fees and interest

Text: On its cross-appeal, Barton argues that the trial court's award of $100,000 in attorney fees was unreasonably low. Barton requested $160,000 in fees. The trial court refused to award Barton fees for paralegal and clerk time and for a frivolous rule 11 motion. Barton does not challenge the court's deletion of these items from the award but contends that after deleting them, the court should have awarded Barton $148,000 in fees rather than $100,000. Barton's argument is based on the court's statement that it had no reason to believe that the fees in this case... were not all reasonable and necessary. Barton's focus on this sentence fails to capture the reasoning of the court's order. The trial court necessarily has broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney fee and will not be reversed unless the court abuses its discretion. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 991 (Utah 1988); Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah 1982); Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982); In re Smith's Estate, 108 Utah 537, 162 P.2d 105, 111 (1945). The trial court's discretion arises from the fact that it is in a better position than an appellate court to gauge the quality and efficiency of the representation and the complexity of the litigation. The trial court considered the factors set out in Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985), in fixing attorney fees: [1] The difficulty of the litigation, [2] the efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, [3] the reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case, [4] the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services, [5] the amount involved in the case and the result attained, and [6] the expertise and experience of the attorneys involved. Although the court ruled that time billed for clerks, for paralegals, and on a rule 11 motion should be deducted from the fees requested, the court did not attribute a dollar amount to the items and did not go through with a calculator and determine exactly what amounts to deduct from the requested fees, because the court was not attempting to take out specific dollars. The trial court also reduced Barton's award for other reasons. However, a trial court is not required to use a set formula or precise mathematical calculation in determining the amount of an award but may take into account a wide variety of qualitative factors. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 989-90 (Utah 1988). Although the trial court stated that it had no reason to believe that the fees billed were not all reasonable, it nevertheless ruled that Barton's attorneys were somewhat inefficient in their use of time on some matters. Accordingly, the court further reduced the award and ruled that $100,000 was a reasonable award of fees. [7] In our opinion, that did not exceed the bounds of the court's discretion. Barton also disputes the trial court's award of interest to Tsern on the purchase price from the date the option was exercised until the day title was conveyed. Barton argues that interest for this time should not be awarded because of Tsern's refusal to repair the elevator, thereby prolonging the closing of the sale. During this period, however, Barton had full possession of the premises, had no obligation to pay rent, and had not yet tendered the purchase price. On the exercise of an option to purchase, a seller is entitled to interest on the purchase price, notwithstanding delays in closing caused by the seller if the buyer is in possession of the premises during that time. Pack v. Hull Dev. Co., 667 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah 1983); Blomquist v. Bingham, 652 P.2d 900, 902 (Utah 1982); Amoss v. Bennion, 23 Utah 2d 40, 456 P.2d 172, 174-75 (1969). If the buyer does not have possession and the seller causes the delays, the date from which interest is computed is postponed until the date of possession. Blomquist, 652 P.2d at 902; Amoss, 456 P.2d at 174. Because Barton was in possession during the disputed time, it follows that interest should be paid on the purchase price from the time the option was exercised. Finally Barton argues that the trial court should have deducted its offsets from the purchase price before calculating the interest owed Tsern. The Utah Court of Appeals has held that offsets should be deducted before interest is calculated when an interest bearing award arises at the same time as the offsets. See Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 152 (Utah Ct.App.1992). Here, however, the awards arose at different times. Tsern's right to interest on the purchase price accrued when the option was exercised October 29, 1992. Barton's right to interest on its largest offset, the cost of repairing the elevator, did not accrue until June 4, 1993. Deducting this amount from the interest owed Tsern on the purchase price when Tsern's right to the interest vested several months previously would be unfair. In sum, the trial court ruled correctly. Affirmed. DURHAM, J., concurs.