Opinion ID: 2098544
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: psychological impairments, and (2) social history.

Text: Defendant's post-conviction petition includes affidavits from neuropsychologist Dr. Michael Gelbort and mitigation specialists Dr. David Randall and Jeffrey Eno. Dr. Gelbort found, inter alia, that defendant's IQ was at the bottom of the low average range and just slightly above the borderline mentally deficient range of functioning. Dr. Gelbort opined that defendant had an attentional deficit disorder, described as a form of minimal brain dysfunction arising out of hereditary, congenital, or developmental problems and leads to deviations from normal behavior including, in this case, poor reasoning, problem solving, judgment, and impaired inhibition. Dr. Gelbort, as well as Dr. Randall and Eno, all concluded that defendant's background is consistent with some type of psychological impairment or abnormality; further, this condition was present and observable in defendant at the time of and subsequent to his crime. Dr. Randall and Eno concluded that defendant's trial counsel should have explored this area of mitigation, and was constitutionally deficient for failing to do so. This contention fails both the deficiency and prejudice prongs of the Strickland test. First, considering the totality of the circumstances, we cannot say that the performance of defendant's trial counsel was objectively incompetent. Although defendant did not testify on his own behalf at trial, he testified at the sentencing hearing. He maintained his innocence of the crimes charged here and insisted that he was not guilty of these offenses. `The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions.' Evans, 186 Ill.2d at 96, 237 Ill.Dec. 118, 708 N.E.2d 1158, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695. After defendant testified that he did not commit the murder, it would have been contradictory for his trial counsel to present mitigation evidence to explain or clarify why defendant committed the murder. See, e.g., Sanchez, 169 Ill.2d at 491, 215 Ill.Dec. 59, 662 N.E.2d 1199; People v. Holman, 164 Ill.2d 356, 373, 207 Ill.Dec. 467, 647 N.E.2d 960 (1995); People v. Kokoraleis, 159 Ill.2d 325, 329-31, 202 Ill.Dec. 279, 637 N.E.2d 1015 (1994). Defense counsel could not be expected to present mitigation evidence that contradicted defendant's protestations of innocence. `A reasoned decision to make the best of a bad situation by pursuing a particular line of defense satisfies the constitutional minimum.' Evans, 186 Ill.2d at 97, 237 Ill. Dec. 118, 708 N.E.2d 1158, quoting Kokoraleis v. Gilmore, 131 F.3d 692, 697 (7th Cir.1997). Even assuming that trial counsel was deficient under the first prong of Strickland, defendant must still show prejudice under the second prong. In the context of a death sentencing hearing, a defendant must prove that there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's deficient conduct, the sentencer would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d at 403, 233 Ill.Dec. 789, 701 N.E.2d 1063; Griffin, 178 Ill.2d at 87, 227 Ill.Dec. 338, 687 N.E.2d 820. A court must assess prejudice realistically based on the totality of the evidence. Accordingly, it is improper to focus solely on the potential mitigating evidence. Rather, a court must also consider the nature and extent of the evidence in aggravation. People v. Coleman, 168 Ill.2d 509, 538, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919 (1995) (collecting cases). In this case, the aggravation evidence was extensive. We note that, in addition to the evidence adduced at trial, the aggravation evidence included testimony regarding several offenses for which defendant was arrested but not prosecuted. However, when balancing aggravating and mitigating factors, a sentencing judge may consider all relevant and reliable testimony. Specifically, testimony involving misconduct not resulting in prosecution may be reliable and relevant to sentencing. The relevance and reliability of such testimony is left largely to the sentencing judge's discretion. Richardson, 123 Ill.2d at 361-62, 123 Ill.Dec. 908, 528 N.E.2d 612. The record shows that in November 1971 defendant was arrested for stealing gasoline from an automobile. In March 1972 defendant was arrested for striking a woman in the face. These charges were subsequently dismissed. Between 1972 and 1975 defendant served in the United States Marine Corps. In October 1975 defendant was arrested for setting an automobile on fire and being involved in a fight among several persons near the car. He was charged with arson and disorderly conduct. When he subsequently failed to appear in court on these charges, an arrest warrant issued. The record does not show the disposition of these charges. In January 1976 defendant was going to be arrested for disorderly conduct. However, the arresting officer discovered the outstanding arrest warrant for the arson. Leave to file charges for the disorderly conduct was subsequently denied. In January 1977 defendant and his brother were arrested for robbery. Their victims were 17-year-old David Lomax and his brother Warren. After demanding money from David, defendant and his brother beat David in the face and threw him through a plate glass window. They also attacked Warren, breaking a tooth. Police officers apprehended them. The record does not show the disposition of these charges. In June 1977 defendant robbed a victim of money and a watch. He pled guilty to robbery and was sentenced to a prison term of one to three years. He was released on parole in February 1978. In April 1978 defendant stole a van. He was convicted of felony theft and sentenced to a 30-month prison term. He was released from prison in September 1979. Two weeks after his release, defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct; leave to file charges was subsequently denied. In September 1980 defendant assaulted with a stick in front of the Cook County Criminal Courts Building a witness who was to testify in a case. Defendant was arrested; the charges were later dismissed. On April 1, 1980, defendant committed the offenses in this case. He robbed a grocery store and fatally shot the victim. On April 5, approximately one mile away, defendant robbed a tavern. The victim, who was the owner, was standing behind the bar at the cash register. Defendant entered the tavern waiving a handgun. The victim turned to escape. Defendant jumped over the bar and shot the victim in the back. As the victim lay face-up, defendant stood over the victim and asked him where was more money. Defendant departed when the victim told him that there was no more money. In January 1981 defendant was arrested for possession of a controlled substance. He was convicted and sentenced to a one-year prison term. In February 1981 defendant was on parole. Chicago police officers went to defendant's apartment to serve him with a warrant. Upon entry, they saw defendant holding a laundry bag with the butt of a gun protruding therefrom. The gun was a loaded 20-gauge sawed-off shotgun. The officers arrested defendant and charged him with unlawful use of a weapon. He was convicted and sentenced to a two-year prison term. Defendant was released on parole in January 1982. In May 1982 defendant was arrested for armed robbery. The testifying victim and her friends drove into a parking lot. Defendant approached them as they were about to exit their car. Defendant produced a pistol, placed it against the victim's side, and demanded all of the group's money and other valuables. He repeatedly threatened to kill the victim, struck her in the face, and tore her shirt. Defendant fled, but was apprehended a short time later. Defendant was then held in the county jail to stand trial in this case. In December 1983, a correctional officer searched defendant's cell and found homemade liquor and a copy of the bylaws to the Black Gangster Disciple street gang. The officer confiscated these items and showed them to his superior, Sergeant Thomas Cadilis. When Cadilis confronted defendant, he cursed Cadilis, announced, I am the Black Gangster Disciple, and then struck Cadilis several times. Defendant also head-butted another officer who arrived to assist Cadilis. In mitigation, defense counsel presented three witnesses: defendant's wife, mother, and defendant himself. Defendant's mother testified that after her husband died, she worked two jobs to make ends meet. Defendant was the second child and oldest son of six children. To help his mother provide for the family, defendant dropped out of high school at approximately age 15, held a paper route, and performed various jobs at a local grocery store. Although defendant worked at various day labor jobs, he could never find steady employment. Accordingly, defendant had nothing to do except be on the corner. His mother viewed defendant as the father figure who looked after his mother and siblings. He was close to his siblings and chastised them when they misbehaved. During his periodic imprisonments, he maintained a fairly close relationship with his family through visits, telephone calls, and letters. Defendant's wife testified that defendant tried to support her and their two children. Defendant treated his children well, one of whom particularly admires him. Defendant was a good person who wanted to accomplish something out of life and who had to make life a little better for her and their children. Defendant experienced problems in life because the world did not accept him. Defendant, then 29 years old, testified and essentially corroborated the testimony of his mother and wife regarding his employment history. He added that he eventually passed his GED examination. Defendant admitted committing the other crimes for which he had been convicted. However, he denied any involvement in the crimes in the present case, or in the April 5, 1980, tavern armed robbery and shooting. He also denied that he owned the sawed-off shotgun found in his apartment. Further, he did join the Black Gangster Disciple street gang the first time he was imprisoned. However, he did so only to obtain protection. He admitted having gang literature in his prison cell. However, he denied taking part in any gang activity. Defendant's contention that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of psychological impairments fails the second prong of the Strickland test. We conclude that there is no reasonable probability that, had defendant's trial counsel introduced defendant's proffered evidence, the trial judge would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Evidence of mental impairments as described in defendant's affidavits is not inherently mitigating. See Holman v. Gilmore, 126 F.3d 876, 882-84 (7th Cir.1997). Proof of defendant's mental handicaps not only could evoke compassion from the trial judge, but also could have demonstrated defendant's continued dangerousness. Evans, 186 Ill.2d at 102, 237 Ill.Dec. 118, 708 N.E.2d 1158; accord Coleman, 183 Ill.2d at 406, 233 Ill.Dec. 789, 701 N.E.2d 1063.
Defendant contends that his trial counsel should have investigated and introduced evidence also relating to defendant's social history. Defendant's post-conviction petition includes affidavits from members of defendant's family, a friend of defendant, and mitigation specialists Dr. Randall and Eno. The testimony reflected in these affidavits would have included information on, inter alia, defendant's disadvantaged and troubled childhood, history of substance abuse, strong family ties, and good character. However, such testimony from these additional witnesses, or additional testimony from the witnesses who did testify, would have been merely cumulative of information already before the trial judge. See Sanchez, 169 Ill.2d at 490-91, 215 Ill.Dec. 59, 662 N.E.2d 1199. Further, such evidence is not inherently mitigating. Stewart v. Gramley, 74 F.3d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1996). The trial judge might have considered such evidence to be an aggravating factor. The judge could have regarded defendant's troubled life, with his criminal record, as an indicator of future dangerousness. See Evans, 186 Ill.2d at 101, 237 Ill.Dec. 118, 708 N.E.2d 1158. Specifically, the trial judge could have considered a history of substance abuse as an aggravating circumstance rather than a mitigating circumstance. See Coleman, 183 Ill.2d at 404, 233 Ill.Dec. 789, 701 N.E.2d 1063; Madej, 177 Ill.2d at 138, 226 Ill.Dec. 453, 685 N.E.2d 908. We conclude that the introduction of the evidence now proffered by defendant regarding his psychological impairments and social history would not have created a reasonable probability of a different sentence. See Sanchez, 169 Ill.2d at 491-92, 215 Ill.Dec. 59, 662 N.E.2d 1199. We cannot say that the death sentence imposed on defendant was unreasonable or unfair.