Opinion ID: 1377776
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Majority's Interpretation and Application of Former ORS 482.570.

Text: The statute which gave the defendants a right to a presuspension hearing in both State v. Tooley and State v. Adams, supra , was former ORS 486.221, which in relevant part provided: Before the division suspends    the license of any person   , the division shall notify the licensee    as set forth in ORS 482.570. The statute which gave Dooney the right to a presuspension hearing in this case is former ORS 482.540. The portion of that statute which is relevant to this inquiry is: Notice of the intention to suspend or notice of an order of suspension shall be served as provided in ORS 482.570. Thus, it can been seen that both former ORS 486.221 and former ORS 482.540 refer to former ORS 482.570 for the purpose of serving the notice upon the defendant driver. Former ORS 482.570 provides: When the division, as authorized or required, suspends, revokes or cancels a license or the right to apply for a license to operate motor vehicles, it shall give notice of such action to the person whose license or right is affected. The notice shall state the nature and reason for the action and, in the case of a suspension, whether it was ordered by a court. Service of the notice is accomplished either by mailing the notice by certified mail restricted delivery, return receipt requested, to the person's address as shown by division records, or, by personal service in the same manner as a summons is served in an action at law. There are three different possible interpretations of the legislative scheme provided by the combination of former ORS 482.540(3) and former ORS 482.570 as it pertains to the service of the notice by MVD upon Dooney. First, the notice shall be served in the manner provided by former ORS 482.570, that is, either by mailing    by certified mail restricted delivery, return receipt requested    or, by personal service in the same manner as summons is served   . Second, the notice shall state the nature and reason for the action. Third, a combination of the first and second interpretations. In this case Dooney did not receive an adequate notice under any of the three above interpretations. The notice in this case was dated May 4, 1984. Its contents were different from the notices in Tooley and Adams. The relevant parts of the Dooney notice are as follows: We have received a police officer's Sworn Report that you refused to submit to a chemical breath test on 03-30-84. As a result, YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGES WILL BE SUSPENDED EFFECTIVE 12:01 A.M. ON 06-03-84 UNTIL 10-01-84, in accordance with ORS 482.540(1)(2), ORS 482.440. You may request a formal hearing to contest the elements of the Sworn Report as found in ORS 487.805. If you request a hearing, the request MUST be in writing and MUST be post marked within 20 days of the date of this notice.   . Once a suspension goes into effect, ORS 482.505 requires that a $25 reinstatement fee be paid to the Motor Vehicles Division before a license can be fully reinstated. This fee is IN ADDITION to any other requirements which may be necessary for a license reinstatement. By law, a suspended license must be returned to the Division. You may be eligible to apply for an occupational license during the suspension period. Applications are available at local DMV offices. This case is not as complicated as Tooley. There a large part of the battle concerned whether Tooley was entitled under former ORS 486.221 to a presuspension hearing. The decision in Tooley does not directly refer to former ORS 482.570. This would lead to the conclusion that the Tooley court determined that the statute only directed the manner of the service of summons  that is, served by mail or personal service. Then, as determined by the Tooley opinion, the contents of the notice had to comply with the statute that allowed the presuspension hearing, former ORS 486.221. Here the MVD agrees that Dooney was entitled to a presuspension hearing as provided by former ORS 482.540. It argues that it complied with former ORS 482.570 because the above quoted notice stated the nature and reason of the action. Therefore, it claims that it did everything the legislature requires because it met the literal wording of the statute. I disagree. Here former ORS 482.570 and former ORS 582.540 must be read together. The latter provided: (1) Upon receipt of this report of a police officer as required in ORS 587.805(2), and in accordance with subsection (2) of this section and ORS 482.550(1), the division shall suspend the reported person's license, permit or privilege to drive a motor vehicle in this state for a period of 120 days. (2) Upon receipt of the report of the police officer, the division shall notify the reported person by mail of the intention to suspend and allow said person a 20-day period after the date of mailing said notice to request in writing a hearing before a representative of the division as provided in this section. If no request is filed within the 20-day period, the division shall thereupon suspend the license, permit or privilege of the person to drive a motor vehicle. (3) Notice of intention to suspend or notice of an order of suspension shall be served as provided in ORS 482.570. The nature and reason for the action taken by MVD is set out in the above statute. The action is that Dooney's driver's license may be suspended. The reason for the action is that the MVD has received a report from a police officer that Dooney has refused to take a breath test. The nature of the action is not separately defined. It must have a meaning different from reason or the legislature would have used a single term. One of Webster's definitions for nature is: the inherent character or basis constitution of a thing. I submit that a presuspension hearing is a part of nature of the action and the legislature required that the licensee be given such notice. Former ORS 582.540 specifically provides  the division shall notify the reported person by mail of the intention to suspend.  (Emphasis added.) The above quoted notice did not notify Dooney that his license would be suspended if he did not request a hearing. The notice in unequivocal terms stated YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGES WILL BE SUSPENDED EFFECTIVE 12:01 A.M. ON 06-03-84. The average reader would interpret the notice to mean that he could have an after-the-fact hearing to contest the police officer's report.