Opinion ID: 844210
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Certification of a Rest Period Subclass

Text: In granting class certification, the trial court accepted without modification the proposed class and subclass definitions. The rest period subclass covers Class Members who worked one or more work periods in excess of three and a half (3.5) hours without receiving a paid 10 minute break during which the Class Member was relieved of all duties, from and after October 1, 2000 (`Rest Period Subclass'). That the trial court did not apply improper criteria, i.e., decide certification on a basis other than whether superiority of the class action mechanism, commonality of issues, and other relevant factors had been shown, is undisputed. (See Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 332; Walsh v. IKON Office Solutions, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1451 [56 Cal.Rptr.3d 534].) Nor, as we have discussed, was the trial court obligated as a matter of law to resolve all legal disputes concerning the elements of Hohnbaum's rest break claims before certifying a class. ( Ante, pt. II.) Hence, the only remaining question is whether the court abused its discretion in concluding that common questions predominate. We conclude it did not. The issue for the trial court was whether any of the rest break theories of recovery advanced by Hohnbaum were likely to prove amenable to class treatment. ( Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 327.) The complaint alleges Brinker failed to provide rest periods for every four hours or major fraction thereof worked per day to non-exempt employees. Though Hohnbaum briefs multiple theories of liability, to conclude class certification was not an abuse of discretion we need consider only one: the theory that Brinker adopted a uniform corporate rest break policy that violates Wage Order No. 5 because it fails to give full effect to the major fraction language of subdivision 12(A). (21) Hohnbaum presented evidence of, and indeed Brinker conceded at the class certification hearing the existence of, a common, uniform rest break policy. The rest break policy was established at Brinker's corporate headquarters; it is equally applicable to all Brinker employees. Under the written policy, employees receive one 10-minute rest break per four hours worked: If I work over 3.5 hours during my shift, I understand that I am eligible for one ten minute rest break for each four hours that I work. [13] Classwide liability could be established through common proof if Hohnbaum were able to demonstrate that, for example, Brinker under this uniform policy refused to authorize and permit a second rest break for employees working shifts longer than six, but shorter than eight, hours. Claims alleging that a uniform policy consistently applied to a group of employees is in violation of the wage and hour laws are of the sort routinely, and properly, found suitable for class treatment. (See, e.g., Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1299-1305; Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd., supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1533-1538; Bufil v. Dollar Financial Group, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1205-1208 [76 Cal.Rptr.3d 804].) (22) In reversing class certification, the Court of Appeal concluded that because rest breaks can be waivedas all parties agreeany showing on a class basis that plaintiffs or other members of the proposed class missed rest breaks or took shortened rest breaks would not necessarily establish, without further individualized proof, that Brinker violated the Labor Code and Wage Order No. 5. This was error. An employer is required to authorize and permit the amount of rest break time called for under the wage order for its industry. If it does notif, for example, it adopts a uniform policy authorizing and permitting only one rest break for employees working a seven-hour shift when two are requiredit has violated the wage order and is liable. No issue of waiver ever arises for a rest break that was required by law but never authorized; if a break is not authorized, an employee has no opportunity to decline to take it. As Hohnbaum pleaded and presented substantial evidence of a uniform rest break policy authorizing breaks only for each full four hours worked, the trial court's certification of a rest break subclass should not have been disturbed. We observe in closing that, contrary to the Court of Appeal's conclusion, the certifiability of a rest break subclass in this case is not dependent upon resolution of threshold legal disputes over the scope of the employer's rest break duties. The theory of liabilitythat Brinker has a uniform policy, and that that policy, measured against wage order requirements, allegedly violates the lawis by its nature a common question eminently suited for class treatment. As noted, we have at the parties' request addressed the merits of their threshold substantive disputes. However, in the general case to prematurely resolve such disputes, conclude a uniform policy complies with the law, and thereafter reject class certificationas the Court of Appeal did places defendants in jeopardy of multiple class actions, with one after another dismissed until one trial court concludes there is some basis for liability and in that case approves class certification. (See Fireside Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1078.) It is far better from a fairness perspective to determine class certification independent of threshold questions disposing of the merits, and thus permit defendants who prevail on those merits, equally with those who lose on the merits, to obtain the preclusive benefits of such victories against an entire class and not just a named plaintiff. ( Id. at p. 1083.)