Opinion ID: 387949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disclosure to Civil Division Attorneys

Text: 21 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(A)(i) grants disclosure of grand jury materials to an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such attorney's duty. Such disclosure is a matter of right; it may be accomplished without court order, e. g., In re Grand Jury, 583 F.2d 128, 130 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); United States v. Garcia, 420 F.2d 309, 311 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 54(c) provides: 22 Attorney for the government means the Attorney General, an authorized assistant of the Attorney General, a United States Attorney, (or) an authorized assistant of a United States Attorney .... 23 The United States accordingly contends that the portion of the district court's order that disclosed to Civil Division attorneys was proper, and in fact superfluous. 24 Sells, Witte, and Sells, Inc., contend that Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i) applies only to disclosure in aid of criminal, rather than civil, law enforcement. They argue that such attorney's duty refers only to the Justice Department's criminal prosecution duty. To support this argument, they refer to the history of enactment of the present version of Rule 6(e). 25 Rule 6(e) first became effective on March 21, 1946. It entitled attorneys for the government to access to grand jury proceedings other than deliberations and votes of the grand jurors. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 327 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1946). The Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules indicated in its accompanying notes that that portion of proposed rule 6(e) continued existing practice. The note stated that the provision for disclosure to attorneys for the government was included because they may be present in the grand jury room during the presentation of evidence. 26 Rule 6(e) remained essentially unchanged until 1976 when, because the increasing complexity of grand jury investigations required that United States Attorneys have the technical aid of other government personnel in order to adequately assist grand juries, see, e. g., In re Grand Jury Investigation (William H. Pflaumer & Sons), 53 F.R.D. 464, 468, 475-76 (E.D.Pa.1971), the Supreme Court recommended amendment of Rule 6(e) to include within the term attorneys for the government such other government personnel as are necessary to assist the attorneys for the government in the performance of their duties. Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 425 U.S. 1157, 1161 (1976). The Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules stated in its notes that (t)he proposed amendment reflects the fact that there is often government personnel assisting the Justice Department in grand jury proceedings. Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, reprinted in 18 U.S.C.App., at 413 (Supp. I 1977). Thus, the Committee continued the focus of the exception to the secrecy requirement on governmental employees assisting grand juries in their deliberations. 27 Before the proposed amendment could take effect, Congress exercised its authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1976) to modify the proposal. See Act of July 30, 1977, Sec. 2, Pub.L.No. 95-78, 91 Stat. 319. Like the Advisory Committee, the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary noted that modern conditions made the assistance of experts, often agents of the FBI, IRS, or Treasury Department, essential to prosecutors' evaluation of evidence. S.Rep. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 527, 529-30; H.R.Rep. No. 95-195, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 3-4 (1977). Because of varying judicial interpretations of Rule 6(e), both as then in effect and as proposed, Congress chose to redraft the rule. See S.Rep. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 527, 530. The present version does not materially differ from the redraft. 28 Because of the overriding emphasis on aiding federal prosecutors in their duty of assisting grand jurors, neither the 1946 nor the 1976 Advisory Committee Notes even mention civil use of grand jury materials. The issue did arise in the courts, however, and several federal courts approved access to grand jury materials by United States Attorneys for use in civil enforcement suits. In re Grand Jury, 583 F.2d 128, 130 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); In re Grand Jury Investigation (William H. Pflaumer & Sons), 53 F.R.D. 464, 472 (E.D.Pa.1971); United States v. General Electric Co., 209 F.Supp. 197, 199, 202 (E.D.Pa.1962); Washington v. American Pipe & Construction Co., 41 F.R.D. 59, 62 (S. & N.D.Cal., D.Hawaii, D.Or. & W.D.Wash.1966); In re Petroleum Industry Investigation, 152 F.Supp. 646, 647 (E.D.Va.1957). On the other hand, neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ever ruled on the matter. 29 In construing Rule 6(e), we start with the traditional and fundamental policy of grand jury secrecy. See generally Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1939). That policy is especially important here because of the broad investigatory powers of the grand jury: 30 It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime. 31 Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282, 39 S.Ct. 468, 471, 63 L.Ed. 979 (1919). Investigation for civil enforcement is relatively limited. In fact, frustration over limitations on civil discovery may have prompted the government to convene the grand jury here. To grant the government an absolute right of access to grand jury materials for civil use might irresistibly encourage use of the grand jury as a tool of civil discovery. It would also severely limit court review of any such abuse. 32 In view of the strength of the secrecy policy, any statutory exception should be construed in the context of the considerations that prompted enactment of the exception. The history of Rule 6(e) shows that the exception allowing disclosure to attorneys for the government was motivated primarily, if not solely, by the grand jury's need for legal and technical assistance. Accordingly, we are not inclined to extend the attorney for the government exception to the secrecy rule beyond disclosure for use in assisting grand juries and related aspects of criminal law enforcement. 33 The 1977 Senate Report supports this position. It indicates that civil use of grand jury-developed evidence may be accomplished through a subsection C court order. It strongly implies that a court order must be obtained, stating that there is no reason why such use is improper, assuming that the grand jury was utilized for the legitimate purpose of a criminal investigation. S.Rep. No. 95-354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 527, 532. We hold that Congress intended a court order under subsection C to be the avenue to access to grand jury materials by the government for civil use. The contention of the United States that Civil Division attorneys have an absolute right to access is therefore rejected. Accord, In re Grand Jury, 82 F.R.D. 70, 73 (N.D.W.Va.1979); see also In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1956). 34 The district court granted access to Civil Division attorneys as a matter of right. Although expressing the opinion that the requirements for a subsection C court order were met, the district court expressly stated that it need not reach the issue. Because we find that Civil Division attorneys enjoy no absolute right of access under subsection A, we must determine whether a court order was proper under subsection C. As previously stated, the subsection C standards also apply to disclosure to secretaries, paralegals, and assistants. 35