Opinion ID: 1833605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the trial court erred in refusing adams's request for a continuance when the state disclosed to adams a highly prejudicial letter on the first day of trial.

Text: ¶ 3. The trial in this matter was held on March 1-3, 1999. On March 1, 1999, Adams's ex-wife, Kellie Adams (Kellie), gave the State a letter that Adams had written to his daughter. The State immediately produced the letter to Adams's defense attorney. Adams's attorney read the letter in the presence of the State and, without objection, proceeded to participate in jury selection. ¶ 4. After the jury was selected, several motions were presented to the judge. At this time, Adams made a motion for a continuance, or in the alternative for exclusion of the letter, based upon surprise to Adams regarding the contents of the letter. The State argued that because Adams had written the letter, there could be no surprise to him regarding its contents. The State further argued that the motion was not timely, since Adams waited until the jury had been seated, thereby invoking double jeopardy. The judge, however, ruled that the motion was timely made. ¶ 5. The judge held off ruling on the motion until March 2, 1999, when Kellie could be questioned by the court regarding the letter. After questioning Kellie, the judge ruled that there was no surprise to Adams because he wrote the letter. The judge also ruled that there was no discovery violation. As such, there would be no continuance, and the letter would be allowed into evidence. ¶ 6. Adams argues that the judge erred in not following the Box guidelines when the State presented Adams with an inculpatory letter written by him to his daughter. Box v. State, 437 So.2d 19, 23-24 (Miss.1983)(Robertson, J., specially concurring.) According to Adams, the State violated U.R.C.C.C. 9.04 by not producing the letter when requested by him. Among other things, Rule 9.04 provides that the defendant is entitled to disclosure of his written statements. U.R.C.C.C. 9.04(A)(2). Adams argues that this late discovery triggered an analysis of the Box guidelines, which the judge failed to follow. The State argues that because it turned over the letter to Adams immediately after being given the letter by Kellie, there was no discovery violation, and a Box analysis was not triggered. ¶ 7. In Box v. State, 437 So.2d 19 (Miss. 1983), Justice James L. Robertson wrote a specially concurring opinion in which he expressed his concern with the State failing to disclose discovered evidence to the defense. Id. at 22. Further, Justice Robertson expressed concern that the majority in Box did not give trial judges clear guidelines to follow when the state fail[s] to make discovery.... Id. at 22-23. In his suggested guidelines, Justice Robertson suggests that the Box analysis is not triggered unless the State seeks to offer into evidence that which it ought to have disclosed pursuant to a discovery request but didn't.... Id. at 23. ¶ 8. The Court of Appeals recently stated that [t]he Box analysis only applies when the State withholds inculpatory evidence and then attempts to introduce that inculpatory evidence at trial. Johnson v. State, 760 So.2d 33, 36 (Miss.Ct.App.2000). The language of U.R.C.C.C. 9.04(I) states: If during the course of trial, the prosecution attempts to introduce evidence which has not been timely disclosed to the defense as required by these rules, and the defense objects to the introduction for that reason, the court shall act as follows: 1. Grant the defense a reasonable opportunity to interview the newly discovered witness, to examine the newly produced documents, photographs or other evidence; and 2. If, after such opportunity, the defense claims unfair surprise or undue prejudice and seeks a continuance or mistrial, the court shall, in the interest of justice and absent unusual circumstances, exclude the evidence or grant a continuance for a period of time reasonably necessary for the defense to meet the nondisclosed evidence or grant a mistrial. 3. The court shall not be required to grant either a continuance or mistrial for such a discovery violation if the prosecution withdraws its efforts to introduce such evidence. U.R.C.C.C. 9.04(I) (emphasis added). By the very language of the rule, there must be a discovery violation in order to trigger the Box analysis. ¶ 9. Adams cites as support for his argument Robinson v. State, 662 So.2d 1100 (Miss.1995). In Robinson, the prosecution produced a letter written by the defendant to the victim. Id. at 1102. In the letter, the defendant apologized and asked for forgiveness for his actions. Id. The prosecution received the letter the day before trial began and disclosed the letter to the defense. Id. The defense made no objection to the letter until the prosecution attempted to introduce the letter at trial. Id. at 1103. ¶ 10. The defense maintained, outside the presence of the jury, that the letter was extremely prejudicial to his client and asked for a mistrial. Id. The judge denied the motion and simply asked if the State was satisfied that the Box requirements had been met. Id. No further discussion was had regarding the Box requirements. The judge allowed the defense a short recess to examine the letter. Id. at 1104. This Court ruled that Robinson was allowed a reasonable period of time in which to review the letter. Id. ¶ 11. Adams's reliance on Robinson is misplaced. This Court's ruling in Robinson undergirds the fact that the trial court was correct in its handling of the letter. In the case sub judice, the trial court declined to rule on the motion asking for a continuance until it could interview Kellie. This effectively gave the defense a continuance until the next day in which to review the letter. As this Court has said, [t]here will no doubt be cases where postponement of a day or two, or in some cases even an hour or two, will suffice. Id. at 1104 (quoting Stewart v. State, 512 So.2d 889, 892-93 (Miss.1987)). This Court went on to say that it could not say that Robinson had been ambushed or prejudiced by the letter because there was no indication that it would have made any difference to Robinson's defense if his attorney had known of the letter at an earlier time. Id. ¶ 12. This Court's reasoning in Robinson is clearly applicable to this case. The letter written by Adams was, in essence, a confession, as was the letter written by Robinson. Robinson was only given a short recess in which to review the letter, while Adams was given an overnight chance to review the letter. As was the case in Robinson, there is no indication that Adams's defense would have been helped or hindered by his defense attorney learning of the letter at an earlier time. ¶ 13. Adams also argues that a discovery violation did occur because Kellie, a prosecution witness, knew of the letter a year before trial. According to Adams, the prosecution was deemed to have known about the letter and should have disclosed it much earlier in discovery. Adams argues that [f]or purposes of discovery and other matters in criminal prosecutions the State is considered a team consisting of various members including witnesses for the prosecution and other persons cooperating in the prosecution of the case. Box, 437 So.2d at 25 n. 4. Justice Robertson, in the footnote in his concurring opinion in Box, cites to United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55 (5 th Cir.1973), for the proposition that prosecution witnesses are part of the prosecution team. Box, 437 So.2d at 25 n. 4. However, closer review reveals that Deutsch merely stands for the proposition that the different arms of the government are not severable entities for the purposes of discovery. Deutsch, 475 F.2d at 57. ¶ 14. The State contends that Kellie could not be a prosecution team member for the purposes of imputing knowledge to the State regarding the inculpatory letter. In King, this Court stated that a prosecutor is deemed to possess information in the hands of all members of the prosecutorial team, both investigative and prosecutorial personnel. King v. State, 656 So.2d 1168, 1176 (Miss.1995). Kellie was not an investigative or prosecutorial member of the team. She is the mother of the victim and a prosecution witness. ¶ 15. This Court also said in King that the requirement that the government possess the evidence can be satisfied if the evidence was in the possession of the prosecutor or anyone over whom the prosecutor had authority. Id. (quoting United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1309 (11 th Cir.1989)). While Kellie was a prosecution witness, it cannot be argued that the prosecutor had control over Kellie. This argument fails. ¶ 16. Since no discovery violation occurred in this case, the decision of the judge to grant or deny a motion for a continuance should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard: Trial judges have wide latitude in deciding whether to grant continuances, and that decision is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Lambert v. State, 654 So.2d 17, 22 (Miss.1995). Denial of a continuance is not reversible unless manifest injustice appears to have resulted from the denial. Hatcher v. Fleeman, 617 So.2d 634, 639 (Miss.1993). Morgan v. State, 741 So.2d 246, 255 (Miss. 1999). ¶ 17. The trial judge declined to rule on Adams's motion for a continuance until he was able to hear testimony from Kellie. She testified that while her daughter had received the letter a year earlier, Kellie had since forgotten about the letter. She only discovered the letter when searching for a certified copy of her daughter's birth certificate. Kellie noted that she found the letter on February 28, 1999, and turned it over, along with her daughter's birth certificate, to the State on March 1, 1999. ¶ 18. The trial judge made a thorough ruling in deciding to admit the letter into evidence: After hearing the testimony of [Kellie], the mother of [the daughter], it appears to the Court that this letter was discovered by her on the 28 th day of February 1999 while looking for a birth certificate at her home in Prentiss County, Mississippi, that she was looking for the original birth certificate so that she could provide this to the district attorney's office; that in doing so she came across this letter, and she produced it to the district attorney's office on Monday, 3-1-99. The district attorney's office in turn produced the letter to Mr. Comer, the attorney for the defendant David Adams. This letter, the Court finds, is a letter written by the defendant, David Adams, to his daughter. It is in his handwriting, it is a letter that he wrote. The Court is of the opinion that it is no surprise to the defendant, because he is the author of this letter. Because there has been no discovery violation in the opinion of this Court, that the motion for a continuance or in the alternative the exclusion of this letter, both is [sic] overruled. The letter will be allowed to come into evidence. It will be allowed to be used for those reasons. After reviewing the trial judge's ruling in this matter, we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge. As such, this assignment of error is without merit.