Opinion ID: 2081366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Right to a Speedy Trial

Text: The final issue that Victor raises on appeal is that he was denied his right to a speedy trial, as guaranteed to those accused of committing a criminal offense by both the federal and state constitutions. U.S. Const. Amend. VI; R.I. Const. art. 1, sec. 10. He contends that the trial justice erred in denying his pre-trial motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. Bearing in mind that historical findings of facts are reviewed only for clear error with due weight given to inferences drawn therefrom, this Court reviews de novo a trial justice's ultimate determination that a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has not been violated. State v. Austin, 742 A.2d 1187, 1193-94 (R.I.1999). In conducting its review, this Court considers the four factors set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) namely: [1] [the l]ength of [the] delay, [2] the reason for the delay, [3] the defendant's assertion of his right, and [4][the] prejudice to the defendant. See also State v. Zmayefski, 836 A.2d 191, 194 (R.I.2003); State v. Crocker, 767 A.2d 88, 91 (R.I.2001). The first Barker factor, the length of the delay, is a threshold consideration that triggers review of the remaining factorsbut only if the delay is long enough to be considered `presumptively prejudicial.' State v. Verrecchia, 766 A.2d 377, 385 (R.I.2001); see also State v. Bleau, 668 A.2d 642, 645 (R.I.1995) (If the delay is long enough to be considered `presumptively prejudicial,' a review of the remaining three factors is required.). This Court has held that a delay of more than twelve months is `presumptively prejudicial.' Crocker, 767 A.2d at 92. It is undisputed that the length of the delay in the present case was more than twelve months. (Indeed, the state's brief concedes that the delay was presumptively prejudicial.) Accordingly, that amount of delay necessitates our examination of the additional three factors outlined in Barker, but, as we explain below, those factors do not sufficiently support defendant's speedy-trial claim. As for the second Barker factor ( viz., the reason for the delay), Victor argues that the delay in this case was largely due to elements that should not be attributed to him and that should weigh against the prosecution. [26] We do not agree. Victor was arrested in the early morning hours of August 14, 1998. On February 11, 1999, a Providence County Grand Jury returned a true bill charging him with murder, and he was arraigned on March 3, 1999. At the time of his arraignment, Victor was represented by a public defender. During the next four months, the public defender was twice unavailable to proceed and, on July 28, 1999, the court appointed a private attorney to represent Victor. As conceded by defense counsel in his brief to this Court, [i]t then took new defense counsel approximately a year to track down all of [Victor's] past mental health records, including those from an out-of-state treating facility   . Thereafter, from July 21, 2000, until June 1, 2001, the case was postponed eighteen times: three times because defense counsel was excused by the court [27] and once because he was unavailable; [28] twice because the prosecutor was on trial in another court [29] and once because defense counsel was on trial in another court; [30] twice because no Superior Court justice was available to preside over the trial at that particular time; [31] and nine times so that further investigation could be conducted. [32] The record further reveals that during the above-referenced period, the court granted two motions submitted by the prosecution which sought to compel defense counsel to respond to an outstanding discovery request. [33] In denying Victor's pretrial motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, the trial justice found that [a] great bulk of the time that was consumed    was used to collect medical and psychiatric materials that were out of State. He further found that part of the time was used so [that] the defendant could indeed and in fact secure a witness that would act as his expert. We perceive no error in those findings. Accordingly, in view of the fact that a significant portion of the delay in this case was attributable to the preparation of Victor's own defense, we conclude that he bears primary responsibility for the delay in this case and that he has failed to satisfy the second Barker factor. We next consider the third Barker factor  that is, whether Victor asserted his right to a speedy trial. We have previously stated that when assessing a defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, this Court looks for actions sufficiently aggressive to constitute the equivalent of a `banging on the courthouse doors.' Bleau, 668 A.2d at 645 (quoting State v. Powers, 643 A.2d 827, 833 (R.I.1994) and Tate v. Howard, 110 R.I. 641, 656, 296 A.2d 19, 27 (1972)). [34] The record reveals that, although defendant did file a motion for a speedy trial on September 24, 1999, he concedes in his brief to this Court that he was unprepared to proceed to trial at that time. [35] Furthermore, defendant's later failure to respond to the prosecution's discovery requests, thereby hampering the prosecution's preparation of its case, can hardly be considered to be consistent with banging on the courthouse doors. Bleau, 668 A.2d at 645. With respect to the fourth and final Barker factor, Victor contends that, even though there was not any particular witness that could not be located as a result of the delay, the fact that he was held without bail as he was awaiting trial is enough to demonstrate that he suffered prejudice. We do not agree that Victor has sufficiently demonstrated prejudice for the purpose of our analysis under Barker. As we have stated previously, to the extent that incarceration disrupts one's freedom, employment, and familial associations,    this disruption merely constitutes a prejudice inherent in being held while awaiting trial and is insufficient alone to satisfy the fourth and final Barker factor. State v. Austin, 643 A.2d 798, 801 (R.I.1994). Furthermore, although Victor was initially held without bail, the record reveals that, on September 15, 2000, a Superior Court hearing justice granted defense counsel's motion for admission to bail and set bail at $300,000 with surety. After balancing all of the relevant factors and considering them as a whole, we conclude that Victor's right to a speedy trial was not infringed upon and that the trial justice properly denied his motion to dismiss to the extent that it was based on this contention.