Opinion ID: 2975223
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Theory of Liability

Text: As an initial matter, we first consider whether the instant case is distinguishable from our decision in Jones because the Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claim here is predicated on a different theory of liability. As noted above, the Plaintiffs-Appellants say that the district court erred in failing to evaluate their § 1983 claim under a “direct injury” theory of liability rather than according to the “state created danger” doctrine. Unsurprisingly, Defendants-Appellees say that the PlaintiffsAppellants’ claim is unsustainable under a “direct injury” theory of liability and argue that the district court applied the proper standard in evaluating the Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claim. Ultimately, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claim fails irrespective of how the Court characterizes their theory of liability.
“Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for civil damages against an individual acting under color of state law who deprives another of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’” Jones, 438 F.3d at 689 (internal citation omitted). Here, PlaintiffsAppellants say that the Defendants-Appellees deprived them of their substantive due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment through their conduct leading up to an illegal drag race. In characterizing their claim as one of “direct-injury,” Plaintiffs-Appellants say that the pertinent inquiry is not whether the defendant officers’ failure to act was constitutionally infirm. Rather, they No. 06-1959 Draw, et al. v. City of Lincoln Park, et al. Page 5 argue that the Defendants-Appellees directly injured the Plaintiffs-Appellants through “grossly negligent” or “reckless” conduct that “shock[s] the conscience,” which the Supreme Court has held constitutes a constitutional violation. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998). The Court agrees that the Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claim does not constitute a typical “failure to act” case. However, neither does the record support a direct injury claim. In Lewis, the Supreme Court held that police conduct may violate the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of substantive due process. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 836. To find such a constitutional injury, however, the Court held that a Plaintiff must show that the police possessed a purpose to cause harm, such that their actions were sufficiently arbitrary and reckless that they shock the conscience. Id. The police conduct alleged in the instant case, although reprehensible, does not lend itself to such a claim. Here, the defendant officers’ conduct was irresponsible. However, no evidence in the record indicates the officers intended to cause any harm through their actions or otherwise acted in a manner sufficient to transform wrongful behavior into unconstitutional conduct. The PlaintiffsAppellants attempt to circumvent this failing by arguing that the defendant officers “aided and abetted the commission of crimes i.e., drag racing and gambling, which resulted in the injuries to Appellants.” Stated otherwise, the Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that the defendant officers and the drag racers themselves engaged in a conspiracy to engage in unconstitutional conduct. The Court finds this argument unavailing for a number of reasons. First, in the conspiracy cases cited by the Plaintiffs-Appellants, such as Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1993) and Meeker v. Edmundson, 415 F.3d 317 (4th Cir. 2005), the state officials at issue actively solicited or encouraged conduct by third parties that – if engaged in by a state actor – was inherently unconstitutional. For example, in Dwares, police officers indirectly precluded demonstrators from exercising their First Amendment rights by encouraging “skin heads” to assault individuals who were burning a flag. Dwares, 985 F.2d at 96. Similarly, in Meeker a government official solicited others to savagely engage in constitutionally impermissible corporal punishment of students. Meeker, 415 F.3d at 332. Here, even if the Court construes the defendant officers’ conduct as conspiratorial, there is no evidence that the goal of the purported conspiracy – the facilitation of an illegal drag race – was in and of itself unconstitutional. Although violative of Michigan law, drag racing does not implicate constitutional concerns. Second, the Plaintiffs-Appellants’ direct-injury argument ignores the fact that otherwise impermissible police conduct must truly be extraordinary in nature to qualify as “conscience shocking.” “[T]he due process guarantee does not entail a body of constitutional law imposing liability whenever someone cloaked with state authority causes harm.” 523 U.S. at 848. Rather, the “constitutional concept of conscience shocking . . . points clearly toward . . . [liability], only at the ends of the tort law’s spectrum of culpability.” Id. Here, the defendant officers stupidly encouraged third parties to engage in tortious conduct. Without question, such conduct showed incredibly poor judgment. However, the conduct in question does not meet the high threshold set out in Lewis. Accordingly, we find that the Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims are unsupportable under a direct-injury theory of liability.
Even if the “state created danger” doctrine is the correct legal standard for analyzing their § 1983 claim, the Plaintiffs-Appellants say that the Jones Court’s application of the doctrine was in error and should not control in the instant case. Specifically, the Plaintiffs-Appellants say that the Court should either overrule the Jones Court’s application of the state created danger doctrine or request en banc review to resolve what they see as a conflict between this Court’s decision in Jones and conflicting Supreme Court and Sister Circuit precedent. Defendants-Appellees, in contrast, No. 06-1959 Draw, et al. v. City of Lincoln Park, et al. Page 6 argue that no basis exists for the Court to either overturn its decision in Jones or request en banc review of the instant case. In the Sixth Circuit, prior published decisions are controlling unless inconsistent with a decision of the United States Supreme Court or the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc. Schoenberger v. Russel, 290 F.3d 831, 841 (6th Cir. 2002) (“...one panel of this Court cannot overturn a decision of another panel; only the Court sitting en banc may do so.”). Because no such inconsistency exists in this case, the Court agrees with the Defendants-Appellees that the Jones Court’s application of the state created danger doctrine is controlling.