Opinion ID: 1364463
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Per Diem Workers Can Be Considered Part-Time Employees

Text: Additionally, the ERS persuasively argues that per diem workers, including per diem judges, can be included within the category of part-time employees to whom the agency may deny membership in the system under HRS § 88-43. The two statutory sections at issue, currently designated HRS §§ 88-42 and 88-43, were both part of the original version of HRS chapter 88, enacted in 1925, see Act 55, §§ 3(1) and 3(3), 1925 Haw.Sess.Laws, although per diem workers were not specifically mentioned in § 3(1) of Act 55. Both sections have been amended since 1925. We have reviewed the available legislative history for all subsequent amendments to both sections and have found nothing that speaks directly to whether per diem workers can be considered part-time employees. However, as the ERS points out, although per diem workers were not specifically recognized as eligible employees and granted membership in the system until 1951, see Act 110, § 1(b), 1951 Haw.Sess. Laws, the ERS has possessed the specific authority to deny membership to any class of part-time employees since the original 1925 version of the retirement law. The ERS notes that the Hawaii State legislature in 1951 decided to grant membership status to per diem workers specifically to provide[] a retirement allowance computed in the same manner for all government employees and remove[] the exclusion of a group not at present permitted to become members because of the method of payment (daily or hourly basis). Sen. Stand.Comm.Rep. No. 357, in 1951 Senate Journal, at 842 (emphasis added). The ERS therefore concludes that the legislature intended merely to permit per diem workers to enter the system on the same basis as all other government employees. The ERS argues that per diem workers should consequently be subject to the same qualifications and restrictions as all other government employees, specifically including those pertaining to part-time employees under HRS § 88-43. The ERS further notes that in Act 110, the legislature amended the § 88-21 definition of employee to specifically include workers employed and compensated on an hourly or daily basis, i.e., per diem workers. Act 110, § 1(a), 1951 Haw.Sess.Laws. Because the ERS possessed the general authority to exclude from membership any class of part-time employees from the inception of the retirement law, the agency concludes that the legislature, obviously aware of the ERS's general exclusionary authority, must have intended that per diem workers also be subject to that authority, in common with every other class of employee. The ERS thus admits that per diem workers are expressly admitted to membership in the system under HRS § 88-42, along with all [other State or county] employees. However, the agency contends that HRS § 88-43 gives it the specific authority to then exclude from membership any class of part-time employees who would otherwise be members of the system under HRS § 88-42. In other words, according to the agency's view, HRS § 88-42 is the general admission section from which HRS § 88-43 gives it the power to carve out specific exceptions under the part-time employee provision. An analysis of the specific statutory language at issue supports the ERS's argument. The term part-time employee is left undefined by the statute. However, the term employee, as defined in HRS § 88-21, specifically includes per diem employees. Moreover, simple logic dictates that part-time employees must likewise be included within the more general class of all employees, and HRS § 88-42 specifically provides that all employees ... shall be members of the system[.] Thus, the plain language of HRS § 88-42 dictates that all employees  full-time, part-time, and per diem  shall be members of the system. However, HRS § 88-43 just as plainly gives the ERS the power to deny membership to any class of part-time employees and therefore must logically be considered a specific qualification of HRS § 88-42's blanket admission of all employees. The issue presented is whether the ERS can include per diem employees within the class of part-time employees over which HRS § 88-43 gives the agency authority. We note that in its administrative rule implementing HRS § 88-43, the ERS does not differentiate between per diem and part-time employees. The agency simply assumes that part-time employees are those individuals who work less than full-time, and further assumes that any per diem worker who falls into this category must also be a part-time employee under the statute. Vail's sole argument against the ERS position is that, because HRS § 88-42 specifically mentions both all employees and per diem workers, per diem employees must represent a special class not subject to the restrictive power of the ERS under HRS § 88-43. But as previously discussed, this interpretation runs afoul of the specific § 88-21 definition of employee as including per diem workers. Otherwise, the most that can be said for Vail's argument is that the applicable parts of HRS §§ 88-21, 88-42, and 88-43 give rise to some ambiguity, and that, by failing to define the broad term part-time employees, the statute leaves the ERS's authority to include per diem workers within the class of part-time employees less than crystal clear. However, as we have noted, in the case of broad or ambiguous statutory language, the applicable standard of review regarding an agency's interpretation of its own governing statute requires this court to defer to the agency's expertise and to follow the agency's construction of the statute unless that construction is palpably erroneous. Aio v. Hamada, 66 Haw. 401, 407, 664 P.2d 727, 731 (1983). Vail has failed to demonstrate that the ERS's construction of HRS §§ 88-42 and 88-43, and its implementation of HRS § 88-43 through administrative rule § 6-21-14, are palpably erroneous. On the other hand, the ERS has persuasively argued that per diem employees are included in the class of part-time employees to whom the agency may deny membership in the system under HRS § 88-43 and its implementing administrative rule § 6-21-14. Therefore, because at least portions of Vail's time as a per diem judge fell within categories specified in Rule § 6-21-14, we hold that the agency correctly determined that Vail did not qualify for full-time credited service under the retirement law. [6]