Opinion ID: 2803325
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal Standards and Procedural History

Text: Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), an alien seeking asylum must demonstrate either (i) proof of past persecution, or (ii) a well-founded fear of future persecution in his home country “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2009). “Although these two roads to asylum are doctrinally distinct from one another, they intersect.” Camara, 580 F.3d at 202. Specifically, a well-founded fear of future persecution, without more, entitles an applicant to asylum. Id. But a “demonstration of past persecution can be rebutted by the government if the government ‘establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the applicant could reasonably avoid persecution by relocating to another part of his or her country or that conditions in the applicant’s country have changed so as to make his or her fear no longer 5 reasonable.’” Id. (quoting Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 592 n.3 (3d Cir. 2003)). An application for withholding of removal is reviewed under a more stringent standard. In that case, an alien “must establish a clear probability, that is, that it is more likely than not that [his] life or freedom would be threatened if returned to [his] country” because of his protected class. Kaita v. Att’y Gen., 522 F.3d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Regardless of whether an alien demonstrates he is eligible for relief, he will be deemed inadmissible and ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal if he has engaged in terrorist activities, including the provision of material support for terrorist groups. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(v), 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I), 1231(b)(3)(B), 1227(a)(4)(B). A. Decision of the Immigration Judge After conducting a hearing and considering evidence, the IJ found Sesay credible and concluded that he was a victim of past persecution on account of his membership in a particular social group, i.e., those who vocally opposed forced conscription into the RUF. As a result, he was entitled to a rebuttable presumption of future persecution. See Camara, 580 F.3d at 202. The IJ found, however, that the Government rebutted this presumption by demonstrating that in the years since Sesay fled, the RUF disbanded, and reconciliation in Sierra Leone generally has been successful. Accordingly, with the presumption of future persecution rebutted, the IJ found Sesay ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal. 6 In the alternative, the IJ also found Sesay ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because he provided material support to the RUF, the same group that beat him, imprisoned him, and forced him to provide menial labor under threat of death. To reach this determination, the IJ found that the RUF was an unclassified, or Tier III, terrorist organization.3 Then, citing our holdings in McAllister v. Attorney General, 444 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2006), and SinghKaur v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2004), the IJ found that Sesay’s carrying of weapons, ammunition, food, and water for the RUF constituted material support. Finally, the IJ conducted a statutory analysis of the INA and concluded that it does not contain a duress exception to the material support bar. The fact that Sesay’s actions were involuntary, the IJ found, was irrelevant. B. Proceedings before the BIA In a single-member, non-precedential opinion, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Sesay’s appeal. The 3 A Tier III terrorist organization is defined as a “group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in, [terrorist activities.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III). The parties agree that the RUF was a Tier III terrorist organization during the relevant time period and that Sesay understood this for purposes of the Act. After Sesay left Sierra Leone, the RUF was designated as a Tier II terrorist organization. See Designation of 39 “Terrorist Organizations” Under the “PATRIOT USA Act,” 66 Fed. Reg. 63620-01 (Dec. 7, 2001). The distinction between these two categories is not material to our disposition here. 7 BIA did not consider whether Sesay had a well-founded fear of future persecution. Instead, it agreed with the IJ that Sesay’s actions constituted material support for terrorism and that there was no duress exception. Sesay now petitions for review of the BIA decision. The parties agree that two issues are presented: whether the record supports that Sesay provided material support for terrorism, and if so, whether there is a duress exception to the material support bar.