Opinion ID: 2395552
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Deliberations and Return of the Verdicts

Text: The jury began deliberations on the afternoon of February 21, 1995, and they were excused for the day at approximately 4:00 p.m. After deliberating all morning the following day, the jury sent a note which read, Does `assault with intent to kill' on Steve Robinson apply to conscious disregard? After conferring with counsel, the court responded with a note to the jury, explaining that conscious disregard applied only to the charge of second-degree murder. [1] During the afternoon, the court learned that the mother-in-law of one of the jurors had died. The court discussed with counsel whether a partial verdict should be taken. Both sides agreed that the jury should continue to deliberate and that the question of taking a partial verdict should be deferred until the next day. The jury sent a second note that afternoon which reported that they could not agree on the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon and that they requested a mistrial. The court inquired whether the jury had reached a unanimous verdict on any of the charges. The jury reported that it had reached unanimous verdicts on counts 1.a (Murder I W/A), 1.b (Murder II W/A), 1.c (voluntary manslaughter while armed), and 2.a (AWIK-W/A). The court inquired in open court of the foreperson whether the jury had reached a unanimous verdict as to some of the charges, and the foreperson stated that they had. The foreperson delivered the verdict of not guilty for both Murder I and Murder II. Another juror stated immediately, second degree is guilty, and others appeared to nod in agreement. The trial court inquired whether the foreperson had the verdict form, and he said that he did not. The court requested that the jury return to the jury room, look at the verdict form and make sure that you all agree as to what your verdict is. When the jury returned to the courtroom, the court stated that it wanted to start all over to make absolutely certain about the verdict. The jury again delivered a verdict of not guilty as to Murder I, but guilty as to Murder II. At a bench conference, the court discussed with counsel for the parties the jury's earlier report that it had also reached a verdict on the charge of voluntary manslaughter while armed. Defense counsel agreed with the court that the jury should return to the jury room because they had been instructed not to consider the lesser included manslaughter count if they reached a verdict of guilty on the greater offense of second-degree murder. The court then instructed the jury again that it should consider the manslaughter count only if they found the defendant not guilty of the second-degree murder count. When the jury returned to the courtroom, the court explained that it would begin again the process of taking their verdict. The jury, speaking through its foreperson, returned a verdict of not guilty of Murder I and AWIK-W/A and guilty of the Murder II count. Defense counsel immediately requested a poll of the jury. Each juror confirmed the verdict during the poll. The court excused the jurors for the evening with instructions that they return the next morning to continue deliberations. The court explained that it was too soon to conclude that they could not reach a unanimous verdict as to the count on which they had reported an impasse. The following morning, the jury sent a note, which stated: There was some discrepancy on the understanding of charge 1.B [Murder II W/A]. We understand this is serious, but no longer can we agree on the verdict of 1.B. As we deliberated at length on the second charge (a & b) we became aware of the error in full understanding of the charge of 1.B and believe we will not come to a consensus on any of the charges. The government argued that the partial verdict delivered the day before was final, and that it could not be impeached. Defense counsel argued that the verdict was not unanimous under the circumstances and to hold to a verdict that this jury ... clearly doesn't agree with would be a violation of [Boykins' rights]. He contended further that the rule favoring verdict finality should not apply because the jury had not yet been discharged, which, he contended, is a critical factor underlying the rule. The trial court held that the partial verdicts were final and that the rule against impeachment of a jury's verdict applies. As to the remaining counts, the government moved for a mistrial. After lengthy arguments addressing the finality or lack of finality of the partial verdict and the appropriate course in light of the status of the case, defense counsel stated that he would take no position on the government's motion for mistrial, but that he did not oppose it. Having concluded that the jury's notes indicated that there's no reasonable likelihood that [the jury] will reach a unanimous verdict on the remaining counts, and the lack of opposition to the government's motion, the trial court granted the motion for mistrial and discharged the jury. Boykins filed a timely motion for a new trial pursuant to Super. Ct.Crim. R. 33. In support of his motion, he attached an affidavit from a juror stating that [m]y vote of guilty on second degree murder was a mistake. The juror explained that her mistake was caused by a misunderstanding of the jury instructions. By written order, the trial court denied the motion, concluding, as it had in its prior ruling, that the partial verdict was final and that the juror could not impeach it.