Opinion ID: 1676535
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mayor's Authority to Purchase and to Contract

Text: Burke first contends on appeal that there is no statutory authority that allows cities of the second class to pass an ordinance authorizing their mayors to make purchases up to $5,000 or to contract for labor and materials up to the same amount. She points out that while this court has held on occasion that cities of the second class are by implication deemed to be included in statutes made specifically applicable to the cities of the first class, this implied authority is not applicable here where the power involved is merely for convenience and is not indispensable. The appellees counter that this authority for the mayor is essential for the efficient operation of the City and that constant consultation with the city council would impede day-to-day purchases and contracts made on the City's behalf. The pivotal issue in this case is whether the City had the authority to enact Ordinance 86-6. As already noted, the circuit court found that Ordinance 86-6 was passed to enable the City to perform essential and indispensable functions incidental to the operation of the City. Our standard of review of a circuit court's finding following a bench trial is whether that finding was clearly erroneous. City of Pocahontas v. Huddleston, 309 Ark. 353, 831 S.W.2d 138 (1992). This court has often stated that municipalities are creatures of the legislature and as such have only the power bestowed upon them by statute or by the Arkansas Constitution. Jones v. American Home Life Ins. Co., 293 Ark. 330, 738 S.W.2d 387 (1987). See also City of Ft. Smith v. O.K. Foods, Inc., 293 Ark. 379, 738 S.W.2d 96 (1987); City of Little Rock v. Cash, 277 Ark. 494, 644 S.W.2d 229 (1982). Additionally, this court has held that any substantial doubt concerning the existence of a power in a municipal corporation must be resolved against the City. City of Little Rock v. Cash, supra . Recently, this court summarized what powers can be exercised by a municipality: Cities have no inherent powers and can exercise only (1) those expressly given them by the state through the constitution or by legislative grant, (2) those necessarily implied for the purposes of, or incident to, these express powers and (3) those indispensable (not merely convenient) to their objects and purposes. Cosgrove v. City of West Memphis, 327 Ark. 324, 326, 938 S.W.2d 827, 828 (1997). The statute from which the City purports to get its power is § 14-58-303. The relevant portions of that statute read: (a) In a city of the first class, the mayor or his duly authorized representative shall have exclusive power and responsibility to make purchases of all supplies, apparatus, equipment, materials, and other things requisite for public purposes in and for the city and to make all necessary contracts for work or labor to be done or material or other necessary things to be furnished for the benefit of the city, or in carrying out any work or undertaking of a public nature therein. (b)(1) The municipal governing body shall provide, by ordinance, the procedure for making all purchases which do not exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars ($10,000). Ark.Code Ann. § 14-58-303(a) & (b)(1)(Repl.1998) (emphasis added). By the clear terms of the statute, it only applies to cities of the first class. Thus, the first category for establishing a municipality's power under Cosgrove v. City of West Memphis, supra , that is, an express grant of the authority, is inapposite to the instant case. We further conclude that the second and third categories for establishing a city's authority under Cosgrove have not been met. The circuit court based its finding that the mayor's power was either incidental to an express power or indispensable on two cases and cited Conner v. Burnett, 216 Ark. 559, 226 S.W.2d 984 (1950), and Weeks v. Texarkana, 50 Ark. 81, 6 S.W. 504 (1887). Neither of these cases, however, is controlling. In Weeks v. Texarkana, supra , this court held that even though the statute at issue did not expressly authorize the council of an incorporated town to compensate its recorder, because onerous duties are devolved upon him, requiring time and labor for their performance, such power may be fairly inferred as essential to the purposes of the incorporation. Otherwise the efficiency of the municipal government might be crippled and the best interests of the town suffer, from the impossibility of procuring a competent man, who would give his services gratuitously Id. at 83, 6 S.W. at 505. We held, in essence, that compensation of a recorder was indispensable to the efficient administration of city government. In Conner v. Burnett, supra , the plaintiff filed suit, claiming that a city of the second class was not authorized to vary or increase the compensation for a marshal fixed by statute. The statute at issue stated that the marshal of a city of the second class shall receive like fees as sheriffs and constables in similar cases. Id. at 560, 226 S.W.2d at 984 (citing Ark. Stat. Ann. § 19-1104). This court held that the General Assembly intended to and did authorize cities of the second class to pay their marshals a salary and cited the statute that gave cities of the first class power to fix salaries for their municipal officers. We noted that though this same power was not expressly given to cities of the second class, this court had held that the statute does by implication delegate that power to these smaller municipalities. Id. (citing Weeks v. Texarkana, supra . ) Moreover, we note that the increased salary for increased duties was ancillary to the statutory authority setting the marshal's compensation in the same range as that of sheriffs and constables for like cases. We turn then to the case at hand. We observe initially that there is a problem in this court's simply expanding the scope of § 14-58-303 to second-class cities. If the General Assembly had intended to include cities of the second class, it easily could have done so. There are many instances in the code where the General Assembly has made statutes specifically applicable to both cities of the first and second classes. See generally Ark.Code Ann. §§ 14-234-302 (Repl.1998) (power to create commission to operate waterworks); XX-XXX-XXX (Repl.1998) (power to make expenditures for public health); XX-XXX-XXX (Repl.1998) (power to create recreation commission); XX-XXX-XXX (1987) (power to compel railroad to provide public foot-walk over railroad tracks). Thus, unless Ordinance 86-6 falls within the parameters of the remaining two categories of Cosgrove , the clear language of § 14-58-303 should control. We find no basis for concluding that the purchasing and contracting power in the City's mayor under Ordinance 86-6 is authority that is incidental to an express power. The remaining issue then is whether the mayor's purchasing authority can be deemed to be essential or indispensable as opposed to merely convenient. The trial court relied on the testimony of appellee Vicki Strange, the recorder/treasurer for the city, in determining that it would be inefficient and unnecessary to go through the city council for insignificant matters. Ms. Strange testified at one point: We have, say for example, a generator or whatever breakdown at the waste water plant and it is going to cost $3300.00, and we have this waste water running all over town. Yeah, we need something like this so we can immediately repair that and not endanger the citizens. This was the only testimony regarding the necessity for Ordinance 86-6. There was nothing in the record about how often the city council meets in Huntington or how cumbersome it would be to call city council meetings. Simply because a witness testifies that it is inefficient and unnecessary to go through the city council for purchasing matters does not mean the purchasing and contracting power in the mayor is essential to the operation of the City. Moreover, it is difficult for us to see why the city council should not be summoned into session for emergency situations such as those described by Ms. Strange. It stands to reason that, as a practical matter, the mayor's purchasing and contracting authority at issue in this case is used more for mundane matters and as a matter of convenience than for purchasing equipment or contracting for labor and materials in times of crisis. Powers assumed by a city merely for convenience do not qualify as indispensable or implied powers. See Arkansas Utilities Co. v. City of Paragould, 200 Ark. 1051, 143 S.W.2d 11 (1940). As such, it does not meet the criteria for an essential or indispensable power. We reverse the circuit court on this point.