Opinion ID: 203677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Elicit Opinion from Government Witness With Respect to Extreme Atrocity or Cruelty

Text: Petitioner further alleges that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally deficient performance by failing to elicit testimony, on cross-examination, from the Commonwealth's psychologist, Dr. Whaley, regarding petitioner's capacity to appreciate the atrocity or cruelty of his actions. In an affidavit submitted by Dr. Whaley, after trial, in support of petitioner's new trial motion, Dr. Whaley states that he believed that petitioner's mental illness prevented him from being able to mentally appreciate that he was acting with extreme atrocity or cruelty when he killed his son. Although Dr. Whaley testified at trial as to petitioner's diminished capacity to premeditate  a defense to the other theory of murder of which he was acquitted  Dr. Whaley was not asked, and thus did not testify to his conclusions regarding the effect of petitioner's diminished capacity upon his subjective ability to appreciate atrocity and cruelty. Petitioner argues that trial counsel's failure to elicit that opinion prejudiced petitioner in fact because such testimony would have been a colorable defense to charges of first degree murder based on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, of which he was ultimately convicted. The government asserts that this claim, which petitioner raised for the first time in an addendum to his second new trial motion, was rejected by the state court based on an adequate and independent state procedural ground, and thus, federal habeas review is barred. See Walker, 506 F.3d at 21 (Normally, the fact that a claim is procedurally defaulted in state court is an adequate and independent state ground precluding federal habeas relief.). As [i]t is customary to address the procedural default issue on habeas first, Lynch, 438 F.3d at 47 n. 10, we will begin by considering whether Yeboah-Sefah's claim regarding ineffective assistance based on the failure to elicit this particular opinion from Dr. Whaley was denied by the Massachusetts court based on an independent and adequate state procedural ground. We concluded that it was. This federal claim was raised by petitioner for the first time in petitioner's second new trial motion in 2005, which was denied by the trial court. Petitioner appealed the denial and the claim was ultimately disposed of in a memorandum decision by a single justice of the SJC pursuant to Massachusetts' gatekeeper statute, on the ground that the motion did not raise a new or substantial issue for the court. [13] Boateng, No. SJ-2006-0021, at 4. An issue is not new for purposes of the statute if it could have been addressed at trial or on direct review, had the defendant properly raised it there. See Commonwealth v. Ambers, 397 Mass. 705, 493 N.E.2d 837, 839 (1986) (explaining that § 33E requires that the defendant present all his claims of error at the earliest possible time, and failure to do so precludes relief on all grounds generally known and available at the time of trial or appeal). We hold that the single justice's decision to deny full SJC review of petitioner's claim under § 33E is based on a state procedural waiver, namely, his failure to raise that claim in prior state proceedings, and therefore, rests on an independent and adequate state ground for decision. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30, 111 S.Ct. 2546. This court has previously held, on facts similar to those before us, that a gatekeeper justice's denial of a petition for collateral review on the ground that the federal claim raised therein was not new and substantial, pursuant to § 33E, constitutes an independent and adequate state ground for decision. See Simpson v. Matesanz, 175 F.3d 200, 206 (1st Cir.1999). At least [w]here there has been procedural waiver below, the denial of review under § 33E qualifies as an independent and adequate state ground. Id., cf. Phoenix v. Matesanz, 189 F.3d 20, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding that denial of review by gatekeeper justice on grounds that petitioner's ineffective assistance claim was  not substantial  (although new), reached the merits of the federal claim, and thus could not be treated as being grounded in state law) (emphasis added). The single justice who considered petitioner's § 33E petition found that this particular ineffective assistance claim, which was raised for the first time in petitioner's second new trial motion, was not new or substantial, within the meaning of the statute. Noting that [a]n issue is not `new' under the statute `if it could have been addressed at trial or during a previous appeal,' Boateng, No. SJ-2006-0021 at 4 (citing Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 780 N.E.2d 58, 64 n. 7 (2002)), the justice reasoned that because the essential factual basis of this second motion for new trial was spread upon the pages of the 2003[SJC] decision [on petitioner's direct appeal], the questions raised here `could' have been addressed in that appeal. Id. at 5. Although the gatekeeper justice briefly discussed the merits of petitioner's waived claim in determining that it was also not substantial, the decision primarily rested on the determination that the claim was not new, based on a procedural waiver below, which serves as an independent and adequate procedural basis. See Phoenix, 189 F.3d at 26 n. 2 (noting that it does not undercut the adequacy and independence of the state grounds if the single justice found a procedural default, but then briefly reviewed the merits of a claim for miscarriage of justice under state law). Thus, we are persuaded that the state court decision rejecting petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel rested on adequate and independent state procedural grounds. Finding procedural default, we are precluded from reaching the merits of the claim unless petitioner can show cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law. Lynch, 438 F.3d at 45 (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546); see also Walker, 506 F.3d at 21 (discussing grounds upon which procedural default can be excused). To the extent that Yeboah-Sefah makes a cursory attempt to attribute cause to the ineffective assistance of his prior post-conviction counsel, this argument is easily dismissed. Deficiency by counsel rising to the level of constitutionally ineffective assistance under Strickland can serve as cause to excuse the procedural default of another habeas corpus claim. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 120 S.Ct. 1587, 146 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000). [14] However, to the extent that petitioner superficially makes such a claim, he fails to develop it properly, and in any event, has not exhausted it by raising it in the state courts. See Lynch, 438 F.3d at 46 (explaining that any ineffective assistance claim must be itself exhausted before it may be used to excuse a procedural default of another federal claim). As petitioner has failed to excuse his procedural default, [c]onsiderations of comity and federalism bar the federal court's review. Simpson, 175 F.3d at 206. (internal quotation marks omitted).