Opinion ID: 1511651
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Propriety of the Appointment of Sean's Mother As Her Son's Interpreter

Text: Our Rules of Evidence explictly acknowledge that resort to interpretation may at times be required during the course of a court proceeding. Evid. R. 17 provides in part: A person is disqualified to be a witness if ... (a) [he] is incapable of expressing himself concerning the matter so as to be understood by the judge and jury either directly or through interpretation by one who can understand him    An interpreter is subject to all the provisions of these rules relating to witnesses. [Emphasis supplied] An interpreter should never be appointed unless necessary to the conduct of a case. That is, interpretation should be resorted to only when a witness' natural mode of expression is not intelligible to the tribunal. See, e.g., People v. Starling, 21 Ill. App. 3d 217, 315 N.E. 2d 163, 166-168 (Ct. App. 1974); 3 Wigmore on Evidence § 811 at 277-279 (Chadbourn Ed. 1970); 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 326 at 27. This is so because no matter how disinterested an interpreter might be, there always exists a possibility that he will inadvertently distort the message communicated by the primary witness. The overwhelming majority of cases in which interpreters have been employed have involved situations in which either (a) the primary witness was physically incapable of speaking, see, e.g., Kley v. Abell, 483 S.W. 2d 625 (Mo. App. 1972) (deaf-mute); Prince v. State, 169 Tex. Cr. 559, 336 S.W. 2d 140 (Ct. App. 1960) (deaf-mute); Burgess v. State, 256 Ala. 5, 53 So. 2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (deafmute); 3 Wigmore, supra, § 811 at 279-280; or (b) the primary witness could speak only a foreign language, see, e.g., United States v. Frank, 494 F. 2d 145 (2d Cir.1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 828, 95 S.Ct. 48, 42 L.Ed. 2d 52 (1974) (Spanish); People v. Allen, 22 Ill. App. 3d 800, 317 N.E. 2d 633 (Ct. App. 1974) (Arabic); Lujan v. United States, 209 F. 2d 190 (10th Cir.1953) (American Indian); 3 Wigmore, supra, § 811 at 279-280. Nonetheless, other situations may arise in which resort to interpretation is necessary. See, e.g., United States v. Addonizio, 451 F. 2d 49, 68 (3d Cir.1971), cert. denied 405 U.S. 936, 92 S.Ct. 949, 30 L.Ed. 2d 812 (1972) (witness was unable to speak above a loud mumble); Renick v. Hays, 201 Ky. 192, 256 S.W. 26 (1923) (witness has a speech impediment); 3 Wigmore, supra, § 811 at 280 (witness cannot speak loudly enough to be heard). The decision as to whether an interpreter is required  i.e., as to whether a witness' natural mode of communication is unintelligible  is a matter primarily entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. His decision in this regard will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is manifest. See, e.g., State v. Milosh, 5 N.J. Misc. 120, 120-121 (Sup. Ct. 1927); United States v. Addonizio, supra, 451 F. 2d at 68; United States v. Sosa, 379 F. 2d 525, 527 (7th Cir.1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 845, 88 S.Ct. 94, 19 L.Ed. 2d 111 (1967); People v. Starling, supra, 315 N.E. 2d at 167; Kley v. Abell, supra, 483 S.W. 2d at 627; 3 Wigmore, supra, § 811 at 278. In theory an interpreter should be totally impersonal. That is, his role is merely that of a conduit from the primary witness to the trier of fact. As such, he should not aid or prompt the primary witness in any way, nor should he merely render a summary of what the primary witness has stated. Instead, as far as is possible, he should translate word-for-word exactly what the primary witness has said. See, e.g., People v. Starling, supra, 315 N.E. 2d at 168; Kley v. Abell, supra, 483 S.W. 2d at 628; State v. Rodriguez, 110 Ohio App. 307, 13 Ohio Op. 2d 79, 169 N.E. 2d 444, 451 (Ct. App. 1959); Prokop v. State, 148 Neb. 582, 28 N.W. 2d 200, 201-202 (Sup. Ct. 1947); 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 326 at 27. Any interpreter selected should also ordinarily be an individual who has no interest in the outcome of the case. This is so because the danger that a primary witness' message will be distorted through interpretation is compounded when the interpreter is biased one way or the other. See, e.g., Kley v. Abell, supra, 483 S.W. 2d at 628-629; United States v. Addonizio, supra, 451 F. 2d at 68; Lujan v. United States, supra, 209 F. 2d at 192; People v. Allen, supra, 317 N.E. 2d at 635; Prince v. Beto, 426 F. 2d 875 (5th Cir.1970). Thus, for example, relatives of a party to the proceeding are not usually allowed to act as interpreters. See, e.g., Prince v. Beto, supra ; Kley v. Abell, supra . Nor are persons who serve as primary witnesses ordinarily deemed competent to act as interpreters for other witnesses. See, e.g., People v. Allen, supra . It has been recognized, however, that situations may arise in which it is necessary to appoint an interested interpreter. Courts have agreed, however, that such an interested person should not be utilized unless and until the trial judge is satisfied that no disinterested person is available who can adequately translate the primary witness' testimony. See, e.g., People v. Allen, supra, 317 N.E. 2d at 635; Lujan v. United States, supra, 209 F. 2d at 192; Kley v. Abell, supra, 483 S.W. 2d at 629; Burgess v. State, supra, 53 So. 2d at 570-571. Even if this requirement is satisfied, however, the trial judge must still interrogate the interested interpreter in order to gauge the extent of his bias, and to admonish him that he must translate exactly what the primary witness has said. See, e.g., United States v. Addonizio, supra, 451 F. 2d at 68. When the trial judge in the present case allowed Mrs. W. to be sworn as interpreter, he did not instruct her to translate every answer given by her son. From his voir dire examination of Sean, he had concluded that as a general matter the child could communicate his thoughts without aid. Since the child's stepfather had previously testified that Sean at times employed idiosyncratic gestures and speech patterns, however, the judge felt that during the course of the child's testimony instances might arise in which the court would not be able to understand his communications. It was for this reason that the judge appointed an interpreter. The court made clear that Mrs. W. was to interpret only when the court so requested  that is, only when the court, after considerable effort, would be unable to comprehend the child's responses. Indeed, on only seven occasions during Sean's ensuing testimony did Mrs. W. interject her words into the colloquy between her son and counsel. As previously noted, resort to an interpreter can properly be had whenever a witness' natural mode of communication is unintelligible to the tribunal. Incomprehensibility due to idiosyncracies of pronunciation and gesture is encompassed within this doctrine. Given the judge's explicit limitation of interpretation to those instances when Sean's responses would in fact be unintelligible, his decision to employ an interpreter was well within his discretion. The court's use of Mrs. W. as an interpreter, however, is an entirely different matter. Mrs. W. was definitely not a disinterested translator. First, she was the boy's mother. As such, it cannot be doubted that she was desirous of having the juvenile whom she believed had hurted Sean appropriately punished. And yet, the judge never held any sort of a hearing to determine whether a less interested interpreter was available. Possibly the child's aunt, uncle or other close relative or family friend could have performed this task. Of greater concern, however, is the fact that Mrs. W. also served as a primary witness. In her role as primary witness, she testified that on the morning following the alleged offense, Sean had pointed to his rectum and stated back here, and that she understood Sean's actions as indicating that R.R. had placed his penis in the boy's rectum. In her role as interpreter, the following colloquy occurred: Q:    And what did [R.R.] do? A: (indiscernible)
Q: Say it louder. A: Back here. The Court: I didn't hear that. Mrs. W.: He put his penis back here. The Court: That's what he did? Q: And did you have your pajamas on? A: No. The Court: The record will show that he pointed to the rear part of his backside. In effect, Mrs. W., in interpreting the boy's gestures and words, corroborated the testimony she had given as a primary witness. The judge's decision to utilize Mrs. W. as an interpreter therefore amounted to an abuse of discretion. Although the trial judge erred in appointing Mrs. W. as interpreter, however, it does not necessarily follow that the delinquency adjudication should be reversed. Mrs. W. interpreted her son's remarks on only seven occasions. Two of these interpretations were irrelevant to any question at issue in the case. One interpretation was favorable to the defense rather than the State. On two occasions, the judge requested Mrs. W. to interpret because he could not hear what the child had stated. The remarks, however, were sufficiently loud to be heard by the court reporter, for he typed in the boy's answer and then the mother's answer. Both answers coincided exactly. In one instance, the court was not satisfied to rely on Mrs. W's interpretation; he therefore continued to ask Sean about the matter using simpler questions. The answers given by the child to these questions were in accord with the mother's earlier interpretation. The only instance in which the mother's interpretation may possibly have been harmful in the abstract was that described above, see ante at 120, when Mrs. W. interpreted her son's words and gestures as meaning that R.R. had placed his penis in the boy's rectum. But even in that instance the boy had pointed to his backside. Moreover, a review of the record as a whole shows clearly that this interpretation was harmless. Immediately following this colloquy, the court and the prosecutor continued to ask the boy questions concerning the matter, and the boy's responses indicated that something unusual had occurred and that the boy's pajama bottoms had been removed. Further, the defense was not precluded on cross-examination from inquiring into this matter. Most importantly, the judge, in reaching his conclusions, did not rely on the mother's interpretation, inasmuch as he ruled that the State had failed to prove that penetration had occurred. Accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and the delinquency adjudication reinstated. For reversal and reinstatement  Chief Justice HUGHES and Justices MOUNTAIN, SULLIVAN, PASHMAN, CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER and HANDLER  7. For affirmance  None.