Opinion ID: 2599854
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to instruct on third party culpability

Text: Defendant's jury was properly instructed on the presumption of innocence, the People's burden of proof and the concept of reasonable doubt. Specifically, the jury was instructed that if it had a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt, he must be found not guilty. Defendant contends that inasmuch as his defense was that Vieyra sodomized and killed his mother, the trial court violated his federal constitutional rights to a jury trial and to due process by failing to instruct the jury that he need not prove his innocence or that Vieyra was guilty, but must merely raise a reasonable doubt as to his own guilt. As defendant concedes he did not request such an instruction, he necessarily claims the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury how the burden of proof applies to evidence of third party culpability. We disagree. The applicable principles are clear. A criminal defendant may introduce evidence of third party culpability if such evidence raises a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, but the evidence must consist of direct or circumstantial evidence that links the third person to the crime.' It is not enough that another person has the motive or opportunity to commit it. ( People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 625, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 760, 124 P.3d 363.) A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury sua sponte on general principles which are closely and openly connected with the facts before the court. ( People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 688, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) Finally, a trial court has a sua sponte duty to give instructions on the defendant's theory of the case, including instructions as to defenses `that the defendant is relying on ..., or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.' ( People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 669, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612, 101 P.3d 509.) The jury was instructed that defendant was presumed innocent and that to convict him, the jury must find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Had the jury entertained a reasonable doubt that defendant sodomized and killed the victim and instead believed Vieyra committed those crimes, presumably it would have acquitted defendant. (Assuming, of course, that it also found he did not aid or abet those crimes.) Thus, no special instruction on third party culpability was necessary to apprise the jury of the pertinent legal principles and, contrary to defendant's argument, the instructions given do not suggest he had the burden to prove Vieyra was guilty before he could reap the benefit of the jury's doubt about his own guilt. Neither Mathews v. United States (1988) 485 U.S. 58, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 nor People v. Adrian (1982) 135 Cal. App.3d 335, 185 Cal.Rptr. 506, on which defendant relies, requires a different result. In both cases, the defendant requested an instruction that the trial court refused. (Mathews, at p. 62, 108 S.Ct. 883; Adrian, at p. 337,185 Cal.Rptr. 506.) Neither is authority for the proposition that the trial court here had a sua sponte duty to instruct on third party culpability. Finally, even assuming for purposes of argument the trial court erred by failing to modify the instructions, no prejudice resulted. As noted, the jury was instructed on reasonable doubt and could have acquitted defendant had it concluded Vieyra was the killer. Moreover, the evidence  including defendant's expressions of anger and hatred towards his mother, his present need of money, Chachi's testimony defendant was arguing with the victim in her bedroom, Vieyra's testimony and lack of a motive  was overwhelming that defendant, not Vieyra, sodomized and killed Loza. Any instructional error in this regard was thus harmless.