Opinion ID: 706973
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Clifford House

Text: 22 Armenta argues that he has standing to challenge the search at the Clifford house because he was an overnight guest at the house. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1687-88, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990) (defendant's status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable). In support of this argument, Armenta presented the following evidence: his own sworn declaration stating that he was an overnight guest; Kraus' testimony that Armenta had spent the night inside the house; the fact that his wallet, baptismal certificate, and social security card application were found inside the house; and his attorney's declaration that Batiz-Guzman would testify that Armenta was a guest at the Clifford house and had run of the house. 23 The district court held that this evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that Armenta was, in fact, an overnight guest at the Clifford house; the court accordingly held that Armenta lacked standing to challenge the search of the house. For the following reasons, we affirm. 24 Armenta's bald assertion that he was an overnight guest (and Batiz-Guzman's statement to that effect) is not sufficient to establish that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house. See United States v. Carr, 939 F.2d 1442, 1445-46 (10th Cir.1991) (defendant's statement, without further proof, that he had been staying for three weeks in hotel room registered to another was not sufficient under Olson ). 25 The totality of Armenta's situation is vastly different from that of overnight guests who do have legitimate expectations of privacy in their hosts' homes. In Davis, for example, in which we found a legitimate expectation of privacy, the guest had a key to the apartment, stored things there, and was free to come and go as he pleased. The guest took the precaution of storing his items in a locked safe in the owner's apartment to ensure his privacy. The guest had previously lived in the apartment and continued to pay a portion of the rent. 932 F.2d at 757. In this case, by contrast, there is no identifiable host who could or did give Armenta permission to stay at the Clifford house. 3 Moreover, Armenta had only a wallet and two other documents in the house, but no clothing or other indicia that he was even temporarily living or staying there. He also took no precautions to ensure his own privacy in the house. Armenta's situation does not suggest an overnight guest of the sort recognized by this court in Davis or of the sort envisioned by the Supreme Court in Olson, i.e., one who is in the owner's home with the permission of his host, and one who is engaging in a longstanding social custom that serves functions recognized as valuable by society. 495 U.S. at 98-99, 110 S.Ct. at 1689. At most, the evidence suggests that Armenta was legitimately on the premises, which is insufficient to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy. See Olson, 495 U.S. at 97, 110 S.Ct. at 1688 (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142-48, 99 S.Ct. at 430-33). 26 We hold that Armenta has failed to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the Clifford house, as an overnight guest or otherwise. Therefore, we affirm the denial of Armenta's suppression motion as to the house.