Opinion ID: 2395763
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The recantation declaration of eyewitness Holly Boone

Text: Williams' second ground for relief is premised upon the recantation of eyewitness Holly Boone. In her declaration, Ms. Boone asserts that, when she was initially questioned in connection with the killing of Mr. McDonnell, she truthfully told homicide detectives that she knew nothing about the murder. She claims that the detectives subsequently harassed her on a daily basis and, over time, gave [her] the story piece by piece, without [her] telling them anything. After being shown the written statements of Easley and Paula Bowen, Boone claims to have succumbed and said what [police] wanted to hear. Boone now claims, contrary to her testimony at Williams' preliminary hearing and trial, that she neither heard Williams say that he was going to kill a white person, nor saw him commit a homicide. Williams contends that Ms. Boone's recantation constitutes after-discovered evidence and forms a basis for relief under the PCRA. The PCRA court's reasons for declining to hear Ms. Boone's recantation testimony, adopted from the Commonwealth's brief, included the axiom that recantation testimony inherently embodies a diminished degree of reliability. The PCRA court also concluded that Williams is unable to demonstrate prejudice related to Boone's trial testimony, even if false, because the Commonwealth's case included the testimony of two other eyewitnesses, Easley and Bowens, as well as corroborative medical and ballistics evidence. While this Court has often acknowledged the limitations inherent in recantation testimony, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Floyd, 506 Pa. 85, 94, 484 A.2d 365, 369 (1984)(characterizing recantation testimony as extremely unreliable), we have not foreclosed the possibility that, in some instances, such testimony may be believed by the factfinder and thus form a basis for relief. See generally Commonwealth v. McCracken, 540 Pa. 541, 659 A.2d 541 (1995)(upholding a grant of relief in the form of a new trial based upon the recantation testimony of a central witness). For this to occur, however, the testimony must be such that it could not have been obtained at the time of trial by reasonable diligence; must not be merely corroborative or cumulative; cannot be directed solely to impeachment; and must be such that it would likely compel a different outcome of the trial. See generally id. at 549, 659 A.2d at 545. In addition, an appellate court may not interfere with the denial or granting of a new trial where the sole ground is the alleged recantation of state witnesses unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 549, 659 A.2d at 545 (quoting Commonwealth v. Coleman, 438 Pa. 373, 377, 264 A.2d 649, 651 (1970)); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vi) (providing for post-conviction relief where a conviction is the result of [t]he unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become available and would have changed the outcome of the trial if it had been introduced). [9] See generally Commonwealth v. Wilson, 538 Pa. 485, 511, 649 A.2d 435, 448 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 850, 116 S.Ct. 145, 133 L.Ed.2d 91 (1995). Several other jurisdictions have found that, when questions of perjury and the credibility of a central witness' post-trial recantation are raised in support of a claim for post-conviction relief, the post-conviction court may dismiss the claim without an evidentiary hearing when he or she was the judge who presided over the defendant's trial. See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 298 Ill.App.3d 36, 232 Ill.Dec. 283, 697 N.E.2d 1213, 1215 (1998). These jurisdictions would permit the post-conviction court to resolve the questions of fact concerning the reliability of the alleged perjury and recantation by considering the witness' credibility, the trial record, and the affidavits in support of the post-conviction petition. Id. We do not here preclude the possibility that a credibility-based dismissal of a petitioner's claims involving recantation might be appropriate under some set of circumstances without the necessity of an evidentiary hearing. In this case, however, the PCRA court failed to make an independent credibility determination, yet, by the adoption of the Commonwealth's arguments, rested its decision, in part, upon credibility. Moreover, the incorporated segment of the Commonwealth's brief merely recited boilerplate principles concerning the inherent limitations of recantation testimonyit did not contain any particularized finding as to the actual credibility of Ms. Boone's prospective testimony as reflected in her declaration. Nor is there anything in the Commonwealth's brief which would demonstrate that the PCRA court actually considered Ms. Boone's recantation in light of the trial record of her testimony and her post-trial declaration. The PCRA court's decision, therefore, is tantamount to the per se preclusion of post-conviction relief based upon recantation evidence. Since this would be inconsistent with our precedent, we find that the PCRA court abused its discretion not only in failing to make an independent credibility determination, but also in adopting reasons in support of its decision that were insufficient on their face. The PCRA court also found that Williams could not demonstrate prejudice, because the Commonwealth's case did not rely solely upon the testimony of Ms. Boone. Rather, Michael Easley and Paula Bowens also testified both to having overheard Williams' statements as to his intention to kill and to having witnessed the killing. While this argument would appear to have merit on the cold face of the record, we decline to validate the dismissal of Williams' claim on this ground in the present posture of the case. Rather, to rectify the PCRA court's error related to issues of credibility, and because the PCRA court as factfinder is in a superior position to make the initial assessment of the importance of Ms. Boone's testimony to the outcome of the case, the PCRA court is directed to conduct a hearing, at which Ms. Boone can be heard, to consider the second ground for relief raised in Williams' post-conviction petition. We also direct the PCRA court to render its own, independent findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning Ms. Boone's credibility and the impact, if any, upon the truth-determining process which can be discerned from such testimony.