Opinion ID: 777955
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence linking Dixon to the packaged drugs in the car

Text: 61 As noted above, the New York Court of Appeals suggested in Sanchez that when the drugs possessed by a defendant are packaged for individual sale, possession of a specific number [of packages] would generally give rise to an inference defendant knew he possessed that particular quantity of drugs. 86 N.Y.2d at 34, 652 N.E.2d at 929, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 183; see also Cruz v. Greiner, No. 98 CIV. 7939(AJP), 1999 WL 1043961, at  (S.D.N.Y. Nov.17, 1999) (although the amount of drugs possessed exceeded the statutory requirement by a narrow margin, the fact that the drugs were packaged in separate vials, allow[ed] the jury to infer that [defendant] knew the total weight of the drugs based on the number of vials in his possession); People v. Barry, 226 A.D.2d 266, 267-68, 641 N.Y.S.2d 280, 282 (1st Dep't 1996) (sole evidence of defendant's knowledge that drugs weighed ¼ ounce plus 14 grains was fact that drugs were packaged in numerous vials ... which were uniform in appearance and prepared in such a way as to facilitate marketing in a drug-prone neighborhood); People v. Diaz, 228 A.D.2d 368, 369, 645 N.Y.S.2d 11, 11-12 (1st Dep't 1996) (where defendant possessed 1¼ ounces of cocaine, the fact that the drugs were packaged in two separate bags ... as well as his possession of a substantial quantity of `telltale' commercial drug packaging materials such as vials and colored caps, was sufficient to support the inference that defendant had knowledge of the weight of the controlled substance in his possession and that it was in excess of the statutory threshold of one half ounce), appeal denied 89 N.Y.2d 921, 677 N.E.2d 295, 654 N.Y.S.2d 723 (1996) (TABLE); Hardy, 226 A.D.2d at 653, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 368 ([I]nasmuch as the defendant was also found in possession of a quantity of small ziplock bags and an amount of drugs that could be packaged into 70 `doses' or saleable units, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the defendant intended to sell the drugs and was sufficiently familiar with drugs so as to be able to determine their weight.) appeal denied 88 N.Y.2d 936, 670 N.E.2d 454, 647 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1996) (TABLE); cf. People v. Martinez, 228 A.D.2d 185, 186, 643 N.Y.S.2d 551, 552 (1st Dep't 1996) (evidence that defendant possessed a bag of crack cocaine weighing 2% ounces and 21 grains was insufficient by itself to establish that he was aware that he possessed at least two or more ounces of the drug where the crack cocaine was uncut, not packaged for sale and unaccompanied by any other saleslike conduct); People v. Diaz, 227 A.D.2d 167, 168, 641 N.Y.S.2d 672, 672-73 (1st Dep't 1996) (The mere fact that a package of heroin weighing 4½ ounces, 8 grains was found under a seat in a cab in which defendant and a cohort were passengers, without more, failed to establish that he had knowledge that he possessed at least the four ounces. (emphasis added)). 62 The heroin found under the seat of the car that Dixon was driving on December 8, 1977 was packaged into thirty-seven glassine envelopes, thus indicating that it was ready for sale. Officer McGeown testified that [a] glassine envelope [is] a see-through celephane [sic] envelope which has traditionally been used in the packaging of heroin. Tr. 88 (March 31, 1982). Since under New York case law one found possessing drugs that are packaged for sale is deemed to know the weight of those drugs, it is permissible to infer that Dixon knew the weight of the heroin if Dixon possessed the heroin found under the seat of the car. 63 There was testimony focusing on Dixon's relationship to the car that he was driving on December 8, 1977, which was sufficient to support a jury's inference beyond a reasonable doubt that Dixon possessed the heroin found in that car. 64 New York Penal Law § 220.25(1) (1973) contains a permissive presumption that all passengers in an automobile have knowing possession of a controlled substance found in that automobile. Thus, a conclusion by the factfinder that Dixon knowingly possessed the drugs found under the seat of the car would be proper as long as the prosecution showed that both Dixon and the drugs were present in the car. The testimony at trial establishes that Dixon was pulled over and arrested on December 8, 1977 for his involvement in a November 30, 1977 drug sale. Following the arrest of Dixon and his passenger, the car was impounded and searched by the police. As a result of this search, a brown paper bag containing thirty-seven glassine envelopes of heroin was recovered. Based on this evidence, a conclusion that Dixon knowingly possessed the heroin was proper. As discussed above, once Dixon was found to have possessed the heroin, an inference that he had knowledge of its weight would also be proper because the heroin was packaged in saleable units. 65 Even if we ignore the presumption in New York Penal Law § 220.25(1) (1973), there is ample evidence to link Dixon to the heroin because the testimony at trial indicates that Dixon had an owner-like relationship with the car he was driving on December 8, 1977. 5 The testimony of the police officers establishes that Dixon drove the car on several occasions and was responsible for its retrieval from police custody. Although the car was not registered in Dixon's name, Officer McGeown testified that he had seen Dixon driving the same car on two occasions prior, to his arrest. Other witnesses also testified that they had seen Dixon driving the car on other occasions. For example, Julius Petty and Mickey Mayo, two of Dixon's witnesses who knew Dixon from the neighborhood, both stated that they'd seen Dixon driving the car before December 8. See Tr. 1377-78 (April 5, 1982), Tr. 1401 (April 5, 1982). Michelle Johnson, who was Dixon's co-defendant, testified she believed the car belonged to Dixon. Tr. 1412 (April 6, 1982) (Q: And to your knowledge, whose car was that? A: His car he was driving, I believe.) McGeown also testified that he observed Dixon driving the same car after the arrest date. This testimony establishes Dixon's link to the car, regardless of Dixon's legal rights to it. 66 Furthermore, Officer Myron, who was responsible for vouchering the car while it was in police custody, testified that Dixon was authorized by the registered owner of the car to pick it up. Tr. at 1219, 1241-42 (April 1, 1982). Police records and the testimony of Officer McGeown and Officer Nekiunas establish that Dixon did pick up the car when it was released from police custody. Dixon's repossession of the car indicates that Dixon was responsible for the car, whether or not he was the legal owner. In light of evidence that Dixon drove the car before his arrest, picked the car up upon its release, and drove it after it was released, it was not incorrect to find that Dixon possessed the drugs in the car on December 8, 1977. 6 67 Whether we rely on the presumption contained in New York Penal Law § 220.25(1) (1973) or the additional evidence of Dixon's link to the car, there is ample evidence for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Dixon possessed the drugs found in the car. If it is permissible for a jury to make such a conclusion about Dixon's possession of the drugs, New York law makes it possible for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the weight of the drugs in the car. See Sanchez, 86 N.Y.2d at 34, 652 N.E.2d at 929, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 183; Hardy, 226 A.D.2d at 653, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 368.