Opinion ID: 1305042
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Mandamus lies to enforce the memorandum of understanding.

Text: (6a) The usual remedy for failure of an employer to pay wages owing to an employee is an action for breach of contract; if that remedy is adequate, mandate will not lie. (See Elevator Operators etc. Union v. Newman (1947) 30 Cal.2d 799, 808 [186 P.2d 1] and cases there cited.) But often the payment of the wages of a public employee requires certain preliminary steps by public officials; in such instances, the action in contract is inadequate and mandate is the appropriate remedy. (See Tevis v. City & County of San Francisco (1954) 43 Cal.2d 190 [272 P.2d 757] (mandate to compel officials to approve payroll); Ross v. Board of Education (1912) 18 Cal. App. 222 [122 P. 967] (mandate to compel officials to approve payment); cf. Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Ross (1964) 61 Cal.2d 199 [37 Cal. Rptr. 425, 390 P.2d 193] (mandate to compel controller to certify that funds have been appropriated).) The superior court in the present case concluded that since enforcement of the rights of [plaintiffs] requires obtaining the official cooperation necessary to implement the application of the formula agreed upon in the Memorandum of Understanding.... [Plaintiffs] do not have a speedy or adequate remedy at law to prevent the deprivation of their rights other than by mandamus. [20] Although defendants do not challenge the court's conclusion that plaintiffs have no other adequate remedy, they nonetheless urge that the remedy of mandamus is not available. Defendants contend that the adoption of a salary ordinance constitutes a legislative act within the discretion of the city council, and that mandamus will not issue to compel action lying within the scope of agency or official discretion, or to compel performance of a legislative act. [21] Defendants' contention rests upon the mistaken impression that the trial court mandated the enactment of a new salary ordinance. The trial court's judgment, however, proceeded upon the theory that the council's approval of the memorandum of understanding in itself constituted the legislative act that fixed employee salaries in accord with that understanding. The writ, therefore, did not command the enactment of a new salary ordinance, but directed the non-legislative and ministerial acts of computing and paying the salaries as fixed by the memorandum and judgment. [22] The use of mandamus in the present case thus falls within the established principle that mandamus may issue to compel the performance of a ministerial duty [23] or to correct an abuse of discretion. [24] (7) The critical question in determining if an act required by law is ministerial in character is whether it involves the exercise of judgment and discretion. ( Jenkins v. Knight (1956) 46 Cal.2d 220, 223-224 [293 P.2d 6].) (6b) In the present case, the city entered into an understanding which, we have held, became a valid and binding agreement upon approval by resolution of the council. That agreement, as interpreted by the trial court, is definitive, and admits of no discretion. The findings and judgment establish precise mathematical standards which, applied to the survey data, yield the exact sums due. The trial court, in fact, awarded plaintiffs prejudgment interest on the ground that the action was one to enforce an underlying monetary obligation the amount of which was certain or could have been made certain by calculation.  (Italics added.) Unquestionably the negotiation and approval of the understanding involved the exercise of discretion by city officials. ( San Joaquin County Employees' Assn., Inc. v. County of San Joaquin, supra, 39 Cal. App.3d 83, 87-88.) But in approving the understanding, the city exhausted that discretion; the duty of its officials to carry out its obligations is of ministerial character.