Opinion ID: 3151133
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Consequences of Count 1

Text: Before entering a guilty plea, a court must ensure that the defendant understands any maximum possible penalty, including imprisonment, fine, and term of supervised release. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(H). Here, rather than explaining the consequences of the gun counts (counts 1 and 4) separately, the district court said merely, in relevant part, [R]egarding the gun, the statutory - 6 - penalty is at least five years, statutory minimum; not more than life imprisonment . . . supervised release that can go as high as five years; plus the payment of a special monetary assessment that's consecutive. The court accurately stated the penalties for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (count 4). See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)2; 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a)(2)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(1). The court did not, however, indicate that possession of a firearm in a school zone (count 1) carried the potential for a separate term of imprisonment not more than five years, required to run consecutively, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(4), and its own concurrent term of supervised release, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a). The government argues that the court's statement that the gun counts may require a consecutive sentence was adequate notice, but Alvira-Sanchez is correct that nothing in that formulation served to inform him that the gun counts carried the potential for separate multiple sentences rather than a single sentence, and that the consecutive nature of those sentences was mandatory as opposed to permissive, and that they must be consecutive not only to all non-gun counts, but also to each 2 Although 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) does not explicitly state that it carries the possibility of a life sentence, its silence as to any maximum sentence creates an implicit maximum sentence of life. See United States v. O'Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 241 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring). - 7 - other. Failure to explain correctly the interaction of the consecutive sentences on the two counts was thus obviously erroneous. Cf. United States v. Santiago, 775 F.3d 104, 106–07 (1st Cir. 2014) (government conceded that failure to inform defendant that sentences must run consecutively was an obvious error). That error, though, did not affect Alvira-Sanchez's substantial rights. Given that count 1 does not require any minimum sentence, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(4), and that AlviraSanchez already knew he risked up to a 20-year term for counts 2– 3 and a consecutive life sentence for count 4, there is no reason to think that the risk of an additional 5-year term would have affected Alvira-Sanchez's willingness to plead. He does not allege as much. See United States v. Romero-Galindez, 782 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2015) (finding no plain error where district court understated the supervised release period by two years at the change of plea hearing because, inter alia, the discrepancy was but a small fraction of the life-imprisonment penalty defendant was facing). The same analysis holds for the district court's failure to describe accurately count 1's term of supervised release. Alvira-Sanchez knew that he faced a potential term of supervised release under count 4 that would never be more than five years. Because supervised release terms must run concurrently, see 18 - 8 - U.S.C. § 3624(e), and because no authorized term of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583 exceeds five years, any term of supervised release under count 1 could not have increased AlviraSanchez's total exposure. Alvira-Sanchez nevertheless argues that the number of concurrent supervised release terms being served is consequential, as it could affect the consequences should he violate his conditions of release. Alvira-Sanchez fails, however, to allege that such an indirect and potential ramification of the plea would have affected his decision to plead guilty, had he been properly informed of count 1's concurrent supervised release term. Nor would such an allegation be remotely persuasive. Nor did the failure to inform Alvira-Sanchez of count 1's potential for an added monetary assessment likely affect his decision to plead. The court mentioned a monetary assessment in connection with the gun charges and did not specify any dollar amount. Alvira-Sanchez elected to plead without knowing what his financial liability might be. It is not likely that the omission impaired Alvira-Sanchez's substantial rights because it is not likely that he would have reversed course had he known that he faced two assessments of unknown value in connection with the gun charges, rather than one.