Opinion ID: 419596
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Government's Revenue Interests

Text: 50 Of course, the first amendment interests implicated by the FAA's subject matter restriction must be measured against the government's countervailing interests--especially the government's interest in ensuring advertising revenue. Given the financial raison d'etre of the airports' display advertising areas, the district court concluded that reservation of the display space for commercial use allows TDI to maintain a higher level of long-term commercial revenue than could be obtained by opening the displays to less professional short-term candidacy or issue oriented advertising. Memorandum Decision, RD 23 at 7. On its face, however, this conclusion encompasses two concerns that are either wholly conjectural or that can be served by far less restrictive means than the FAA's blanket proscription of political advertisements. 51 The court's concern with short-term advertising is seriously overstated. There is nothing in the record of this case to suggest that the three-month lease negotiated by the Council and TDI was of unusually short duration, see Advertising Cross Order, reprinted in Affidavit of George N. Terris (Attachment 5), RD 15, or that political advertisements in general would tend to run for shorter periods of time than commercial ads. But to the extent TDI and the government wish to ensure a long-term advertising medium, they can more precisely serve this interest by requiring minimum time periods in their advertising leases, applicable to all, than by prohibiting only political ads--short-term and long-term--in particular. 52 Similarly, the trial court's concern with less professional advertising has nothing on its face to do with political advertising per se. In its brief, the government states that it is easy to imagine those who in order to pay for the display rental might scrimp on the expense associated with a professional layout .... Government Brief at 14. But this hypothetical concern applies to any organization, commercial or noncommercial, whose advertising budget may become strained. And, in either situation, TDI and the government already have the power to insist that all advertisements be professionally designed. See FAA-TDI Contract, supra p. 761. Thus, the government need not fear that [t]he high quality, commercial nature of the displays could easily diminish if political expression in any format were permitted in order to avoid claims of First Amendment violations. Government Brief at 16 (emphasis added). Our opinion today does not affect the government's ability to require that all advertisements at National and Dulles be prepared by advertising professionals or to preclude the government from establishing standards for such things as the size, color, or lighting of advertising displays. 53 Given the content-neutral time and format requirements that the government may impose, there is virtually nothing in the record before us which adequately demonstrates that a broad scale ban on political advertisements is necessary to protect government revenue. At most, the record reveals the suspicion of one TDI official that [t]he placement of controversial political advertising in TDI displays at National and Dulles Airports could hurt TDI's image as a professional advertising firm and discourage commercial advertisers from using the airport displays. This in turn could reduce revenue to TDI and to the FAA under the FAA-TDI contract. Affidavit of Jon Boisclair, TDI Regional Manager, RD 13, p 9. This single, conclusory statement, however, hardly provides a compelling factual basis on which to justify a wholesale prohibition of political speech. Cf. Solicitation and Leafletting Procedures at National and Dulles International Airports, 45 Fed.Reg. 35,316 (1980) (discussing comprehensive traffic flow study used to develop factual basis for content-neutral soliciting and leafletting rules). For example, the statement provides no indication that the number of discouraged commercial advertisers is likely to be significant. Indeed, the record contains at least two indications why such an adverse reaction is unlikely. First, there has been no significant commercial reaction to other forms of political speech; commercial display areas in the airports' central concourses and lobbies continue to be considered the most desirable locations by commercial advertisers despite the fact that they are located in precisely those areas where political leafletting and solicitation are most common, cf. 14 C.F.R. Sec. 159.93(g) (1982) (describing areas open to leafletting and solicitation); Affidavit of Jon Boisclair, RD 13, p 11 (large dioramas, as opposed to wall displays, are always leased). Second, the market forces underlying airport advertising will continue whether political advertising is allowed or not; airport advertising generally will remain uniquely adapted to reaching the business air traveler, cf. TDI, Airport Advertising--The Blue Chip Medium, supra (TDI is the way to reach and communicate with the frequent air traveler.). Although we do not foreclose the possibility that the FAA may yet develop evidence to demonstrate that political advertising would significantly threaten the FAA-TDI revenue base, the point is not so self-evident that its mere assertion in an affidavit can sustain a summary judgment for the government. As the Supreme Court has warned, an undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 508, 89 S.Ct. 733, 737, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969). We thus leave the door open for more concrete evidence that political advertising at the airports would be basically incompatible with the government's revenue objectives. Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2303, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) ([t]he crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.). As it stands now, however, the only hard evidence of record in this case is the loss--in the name of revenue production--of over $7,500 in advertising revenue from the rejection of the Council's proposed advertisement. See TDI Advertising Contracts, reprinted in Affidavit of Barbara Settle (Attachments 1 & 3), RD 13. The commercial interests of the government are hardly furthered by rejecting revenues.