Opinion ID: 4520638
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clanton

Text: First, Hoit challenges the District Court’s conclusion that Clanton cannot be held liable under § 1983 because he was not acting under color of state law. The 10 District Court reasoned that the Amended Complaint “fail[ed] to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Defendant Clanton’s actions in restraining Plaintiff were made possible only because he was clothed with the authority of state law or that he was misusing some power that he possessed by virtue of state law,” and that the fact Clanton “was employed by CDTA, on duty, in uniform, and on CDTA’s premises during work hours is insufficient to plausibly suggest that he was acting under color of state law.” Sp. App. 23–24. We identify no error in the District Court’s analysis. Since “there is no bright line test for distinguishing personal pursuits from activities taken under color of law,” we look to the nature of the officer’s act to determine whether he acted under color of state law, not merely his “status” of being on or off official duty. Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945) (holding that § 1983 does not pertain to the “personal pursuits” of government officials); Patterson, 375 F.3d at 230 (2d Cir. 2004) (observing that claims of harassment by “nonsupervisory co-workers” have been construed by other circuits as “personal-frolic hazing or horseplay and not as state action”); Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that a defendant who sexually harassed and assaulted his secretary did not do so under color of state law even though the relevant events occurred in an office where the defendant 11 regularly conducted city business and while he was a city employee). It is undisputed that Clanton exercised no supervisory authority over Hoit at the time of the Incident. Moreover, Clanton’s assault of Hoit was a “personal pursuit” unrelated to Clanton’s duties as a mechanic. See Screws, 325 U.S. at 111. With regard to Hoit’s NYSHRL claim against Clanton, the District Court granted summary judgment for Clanton on the ground that Clanton could not be held liable under the aiding-and-abetting provision of the NYSHRL. The court reasoned that, under the NYSHRL, it is an employer’s participation in the discriminatory practice which serves as the predicate for the imposition of accessory liability, such that the failure of Hoit’s NYSHRL claim against the CDTA foreclosed his aiding-and-abetting claim against Clanton. We agree with the District Court that because there is no employer liability—either for the CDTA or for any employee capable of being considered an “employer” within the meaning of the NYSHRL—there can be no accessorial liability for Clanton. See Murphy v. ERA United Realty, 674 N.Y.S.2d 415, 417 (2d Dep’t 1998) (“It is the employer’s participation in the discriminatory practice which serves as the predicate for the imposition of liability on others for aiding and abetting.”). Indeed, Hoit does not challenge this reasoning on appeal. Rather, Hoit argues that the District Court should have considered whether 12 Clanton was primarily liable under the NYSHRL for his own conduct of tackling and dry humping Hoit. This argument fails because Clanton, as a “coemployee who has not been shown to have any ownership interest in the corporate employer or to have the power to do more than carry out personnel decisions made by others” is not subject to liability under the NYSHRL except as an aider-andabettor. Id. at 417; see also N.Y. Exec. Law § 296.