Opinion ID: 771716
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The PTO's Rejection of Victoria's Secret's Application

Text: 93 Finally, A&H argues that the District Court erred in failing to give weight to the fact that the PTO attorney rejected Victoria's Secret's application to register The Miracle Bra for swimsuits, bathing suits and bikinis on the ground that there was a likelihood of confusion between its mark and Miraclesuit. 12 A&H does not argue that a PTO determination is controlling, but rather that it is important evidence that should be given considerable weight. 13 94 There is some jurisprudence, although not in Third Circuit case law, suggesting that a PTO determination that marks are likely to be confused should be given weight as a matter of law. See, e.g., Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. American Guardian Life Assur. Co., 943 F. Supp. 509, 523 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (While not dispositive of the issue of likelihood of confusion, the PTO's refusal to register Defendant's marks is entitled to substantial consideration by this Court.); Driving Force, Inc. v. Manpower, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 21, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (same); Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharm. Co., 437 F.2d 566, 569 (2d Cir. 1971) (refusal of Patent Office to register a mark is entitled to great weight). 95 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has held that a preliminary determination by a low-level PTO administrator should not be accorded much weight, especially where the PTO officer did not have access to the full panoply of information that might inform a likelihood-of-confusion analysis. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 1970). The court explained: 96 Any such determination made by the Patent Office under the circumstances just noted must be regarded as inconclusive since made at its lowest administrative level. . . . The determination by the Patent Office is rendered less persuasive still by the fact that the Patent Office did not have before it the great mass of evidence which the parties have since presented to both the District Court and this court in support of their claims. 97 Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, other courts have held that a court need not defer to the patent office when there is relevant evidence not considered by the office that informs the analysis. See, e.g., Marketing Displays, Inc. v. Traffix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 934 (6th Cir. 1999). 98 We find Carter-Wallace and Marketing Displays persuasive, and conclude that, although an initial PTO determination by an examining attorney may be considered, it need not be given weight when the PTO attorney did not review all the evidence available to the District Court. In A&H I, 926 F.Supp. at 1255, the District Court concluded that even a preliminary PTO determination should be given substantial weight, but it gave no weight to the PTO's decision in its most recent opinion. It was not clear error to refuse to do so. As in Carter-Wallace, the PTO in this case was making a low-level preliminary determination, and did not have the benefit of the complete record before the District Court. Furthermore, the PTO attorney's decision was conclusory, not searching or analytical. See note 9, supra. Although we prefer to avoid conflicts with the PTO, we do not think that such a decision needed to receive deference here, where the District Court's conclusion that the marks were not confusingly similar relied upon the housemarks and Victoria's Secret's disclaimer, matters apparently not considered by the examining attorney.