Opinion ID: 204669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Vallar's Motion to Suppress his Post-Arrest Statement

Text: Vallar appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress his post-arrest statement. When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we review de novo whether the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, and we review the district court's factual findings and credibility determinations for clear error. United States v. Shabaz, 579 F.3d 815, 819-20 (7th Cir.2009). Vallar asserts three arguments on appeal. First, he argues that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. He points out that he was arrested at his home at 6:30 AM by officers with weapons drawn, that he was handcuffed for about an hour while agents searched his home, and that he was then taken to the police station and forced to listen to audio tapes implicating him in the alleged conspiracy before he received and waived his Miranda rights and provided the post-arrest statement he seeks to suppress. Vallar's argument is unpersuasive. Defendants may waive their Miranda rights, but only if the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). Determining whether a waiver meets this standard requires a two-step inquiry: First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). When reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we consider the defendant's background and conduct, the duration and conditions of the interview and detention, the physical and mental condition of the defendant, the attitude of the law enforcement officials, and whether law enforcement officers used coercive techniques, either psychological or physical. Shabaz, 579 F.3d at 820. Vallar voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Agent Michael Zobak, who participated in Vallar's arrest, testified at the suppression hearing that Vallar was handcuffed while officers searched his home; that agents permitted Vallar to use the restroom at his house while the officers were present; that nobody threatened or shouted at Vallar; that Vallar was offered a beverage and the use of a restroom upon arriving at the station, both of which he declined; and that Vallar was not handcuffed during the interrogation except when agents moved him to different rooms. Agent Zobak also testified that he read Vallar his Miranda rights and that Vallar waived them and signed an advice of rights form without any indication that he was confused. The district court credited Agent Zobak's testimony. Considering the facts Vallar points out above and Agent Zobak's testimony, we conclude that Vallar's waiver was voluntary. Further, the district court found that Vallar was capable of understanding his rights, and, thus, that his waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. Vallar does not challenge this finding on appeal, and we find no indication in the record that this finding was error. See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574-75, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987) (affirming a district court's finding that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights where the defendant failed to allege that he did not understand his Miranda rights or the consequences of waiving them). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision that Vallar voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Second, Vallar argues that the agents should have known that playing the recordings was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, and, thus, that it constituted an impermissible interrogation because Vallar had not received Miranda warnings before the tapes were played. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); see also Enoch v. Gramley, 70 F.3d 1490, 1500 (7th Cir.1995) (We have stated that, under Innis, the issue is whether a reasonable objective observer would believe that the encounter was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect and therefore constituted the functional equivalent of interrogation. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). See generally Easley v. Frey, 433 F.3d 969, 973-74 (7th Cir.2006). Vallar's argument is unavailing. Merely apprising Vallar of the evidence against him by playing tapes implicating him in the conspiracy did not constitute interrogation. See Easley, 433 F.3d at 973-74 (7th Cir.2006) (holding that an officer's statement informing the defendant of the evidence against him and the possible consequences of the charges the defendant faced did not constitute interrogation, even if its weight might move a suspect to speak); United States v. Sutton, 77 Fed. Appx 892, 895 (7th Cir.2003) ([M]erely reciting the evidence supporting an arrest is not the functional equivalent of an interrogation.); Enoch, 70 F.3d at 1500 (holding that where the police identif[ied] the victim to the suspect and briefly stat[ed] the evidence against him, followed by the suspect's allegedly incriminating statements did not constitute interrogation because [b]riefly reciting to a suspect in custody the basis for holding him, without more, cannot be the functional equivalent of interrogation). But more critical to our analysis is the fact that Vallar made no statement in response to the tapes before he received and waived his Miranda rights. See United States v. Peterson, 414 F.3d 825, 827-28 (7th Cir.2005) (writing that the problem with the defendant's argument that his confession violated Miranda, where agents laid out the evidence against him, administered Miranda warnings, obtained a waiver, and secured a confession, was that none of the defendant's statements preceded the warnings). Vallar's next argument is unpersuasive for the same reason. Vallar's last argument is that the tactics agents usedspecifically, playing taped conversations demonstrating that he participated in the alleged conspiracy before reading Vallar his Miranda rights and receiving a waiveris improper under Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004); see also United States v. Stewart, 388 F.3d 1079, 1086-90 (7th Cir.2004). In Seibert, the Supreme Court reviewed a police protocol that called for interrogating a defendant and receiving a confession before giving Miranda warnings, then informing the defendant of his Miranda rights, receiving a waiver, and interrogating the defendant a second time, again obtaining a confession. 542 U.S. at 604, 124 S.Ct. 2601. In a divided decision, the Court found the confession inadmissible. Id. at 617-618, 622, 124 S.Ct. 2601. We have construed Seibert as holding that post-warning statements are inadmissible if they duplicate pre-warning statements intentionally elicited in an effort to evade Miranda.  Peterson, 414 F.3d at 828. The agents' strategy of playing taped conversations and then reading Vallar his Miranda rights, receiving a waiver, and beginning to interrogate Vallar does not violate Seibert. The defendant in Seibert was interrogated and made incriminating statements both before and after waiving his Miranda rights. Id. at 604, 124 S.Ct. 2601. Vallar was interrogated only after he received and waived his Miranda rights and he made no incriminating statements before signing his advice of rights form. See Peterson, 414 F.3d at 827-28 (holding that a defendant's confession did not violate the interrogation technique prohibited by Seibert where agents presented the evidence against him before reading him his Miranda rights and obtaining a waiver because the defendant did not make any pre-warning statement). We affirm the district court's denial of Vallar's motion to suppress.