Opinion ID: 4472688
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does Kelly’s Claim Warrant Habeas Relief?

Text: Section 552.020.8 provides, “If the court determines that the accused lacks mental fitness to proceed, the criminal proceedings shall be suspended and the court shall commit him to the director of the department of mental health.” (Emphasis added). The circuit court determined Kelly lacked mental fitness to proceed, as the court’s order stated he “lack[ed] capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense.” But the circuit court did not follow the procedure in section 552.020.8, as it did not subsequently suspend the proceedings. Instead, in the same order, the circuit court accepted Kelly’s NGRI plea, acquitted him, and then committed him to the department of mental health. 4 mental disease or defect. See section 552.030.2 (“Upon the state’s acceptance of the defense of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility, the court shall proceed to order the commitment of the accused.”). For these reasons, and contrary to the dissenting opinion’s assertions, Kelly did not have the section 552.020 remedies available to him. 4 Had the circuit court adhered to the statutory requirement and committed Kelly to the department of mental health pursuant to section 552.020.8, six months after his commitment Kelly would have been entitled to an examination to ascertain whether he was fit to proceed. Section 552.020.10(1). Indeed, section 552.020.10 provides it is the circuit court’s duty to order an examination. Section 552.020.10(1). If found fit to proceed, the criminal proceedings would have resumed. Section 552.020.10(4). If found unfit to proceed with “no substantial probability” of fitness to proceed in the reasonable future, the charges would have been dismissed and Kelly would have been discharged. Section 552.020.10(6). In this situation, the probate division has jurisdiction over the accused to determine whether he should be 6 A circuit court’s adherence to section 552.020 procedure is necessary to protect a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial. State v. Driskill, 459 S.W.3d 412, 423 (Mo. banc 2015). Upon a finding of a defendant’s incompetency, “due process considerations require suspension of the criminal trial until such time, if any, that the defendant regains the capacity to participate in his defense and understand the proceedings against him.” Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448 (1992). 5 “[C]ommitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.” Oxenhandler, 491 S.W.3d at 592 (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983)). Accordingly, by accepting Kelly’s NGRI plea despite finding him incompetent to proceed, the circuit court violated Kelly’s due process rights. involuntarily detained or declared incapacitated and placed in a mental health facility. Id. But because the circuit court committed Kelly to the department of mental health as a result of the NGRI plea – rather than as a result of his incompetence – Kelly has not received a mental evaluation following his commitment 28 years ago, and he has remained in the department of mental health’s custody ever since. 5 Other states’ courts have made similar statements of law. Allen v. State, 956 P.2d 918, 919 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (“A criminal defendant must be competent to go to trial or to enter a plea.”); Thompson v. Crawford, 479 So. 2d 169, 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (“We further conclude that the trial court lacked authority to find [the defendant] not guilty by reason of insanity because [the defendant] was considered to be, and, in fact, was found to be, incompetent at the time said finding was made.”); State v. Champagne, 497 A.2d 1242, 1248 (N.H. 1985) (“[A] defendant cannot be competent for some trial proceeding purposes and incompetent for others.”); State v. Smith, 564 P.2d 1154, 1155 (Wash. 1977) (“[T]he original not guilty by insanity plea was invalid. . . . The record indicates, and both parties expressly agree, defendant was incompetent when the original plea was entered.”), overruled on other grounds by State v. Jones, 664 P.2d 1216 (Wash. 1983); Commonwealth v. Harris, 243 A.2d 408, 409 (Pa. 1968) (“Unless a person is mentally competent, he should not be required to either stand trial or plead to a criminal indictment.”); State v. English, 424 P.2d 601, 607 (Kan. 1967) (“It has long been recognized in this state that an insane person cannot be required to plead to a criminal charge and cannot be tried.”). 7 When a petitioner asserts a due process violation as a result of the circuit court exceeding its authority pursuant to section 552.020, a writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy. See Rule 91.01; McKee, 39 S.W.3d at 570 (holding habeas was the proper avenue of relief for the petitioner’s claim that a finding of incompetency precluded the circuit court’s acceptance of his NGRI plea). For these reasons, habeas relief is proper in this case, and Kelly’s NGRI plea is vacated.