Opinion ID: 194621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Selection of the Grand Jury

Text: Doe's argument that he is entitled to challenge the composition of the grand jury and thus entitled to disclosure of such information is also meritless. Doe asserts that the court's failure to permit him to discover information about the composition of the grand jury violated his statutory rights under the Jury Selection and Service Act (Jury Selection Act), 28 U.S.C. 1861 et seq., and under the Constitution. Doe appears to find support for his statutory argument in Test v. United States, 420 U.S. 28 (1975) (per curiam), in which the Supreme Court held that a convicted defendant had the right to inspect jury lists pertaining to the grand jury which indicted him and to a pending petit jury in his case. The Court found that section 1867(f) of the Jury Selection Act gives a litigant an unqualified right to inspect jury lists. In a footnote, which Doe seizes upon, the Supreme Court essentially defined the term litigant to mean the United States and the defendant in a criminal case, and . . . any party in a civil case. The Court's language, taken out of context, might suggest that a civil contemnor like Doe is a party in a civil case who would have a right to challenge grand jury -10- selection procedures. (We assume that it is obvious that Doe is not a defendant in a criminal case.) Even a cursory reading of the statute, however, shows that such an interpretation would be wrong. The provision in question permits parties in civil cases in which a petit jury is empanelled to challenge jury selection procedures, see 28 U.S.C. 1867(c), and so does not apply to persons held in civil contempt by a court or witnesses testifying before a grand jury. Indeed, Doe's argument that he may challenge the composition or selection of the grand jury has no support at all in case law. As far as we have been able to determine, all courts which have considered this question, including this court, have held that a recalcitrant witness has no standing to challenge the composition or selection of the grand jury, whether under the Jury Selection Act or under the Constitution. See In re Maury Santiago, 533 F.2d 727, 730 (1st Cir. 1976) (a recalcitrant witness has no standing to challenge the composition of a grand jury); United States v. Duncan, 456 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir.) (a recalcitrant witness did not have standing under the Jury Selection Act to challenge grand jury selection procedures because she was not a defendant and had not been indicted by the grand jury), vacated on other grounds, 409 U.S. 814 (1972); United States v. Caron, 551 F. Supp. 662, 665 (E.D. Va. 1982) (neither the -11- language nor the purpose of the Jury Selection Act supports a witness's right to challenge the grand jury's composition, nor did a recalcitrant witness have standing under the Constitution to raise irregularities in the empanelling of the grand jury), aff'd, 722 F.2d 739 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103 (1984); cf. Matter of Special February 1975 Grand Jury, 565 F.2d 407, 412 (7th Cir. 1977) (although an indicted defendant would clearly have standing to challenge the composition of the grand jury, the court doubted that witnesses subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury had standing to challenge the composition of the jury on equal protection grounds) (dictum). We have found no contrary authority on point.4 Because Doe had no right to challenge the grand jury's empanellment, he had no right to obtain discovery about grand jury selection procedures under the Jury Selection Act. See Matter of Archuleta, 432 F. 4. In United States ex rel. Chestnut v. Criminal Court of New York, 442 F.2d 611, 615 n.7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971), the court concluded that defendants who had been convicted of criminal contempt for refusing to answer questions before a state grand jury under a grant of immunity could challenge the selection of the grand jury where it was the grand jury who had ordered the filing of an information charging criminal contempt. The Second Circuit itself has indicated that that case would be a weak reed to rely upon for any witness held in civil contempt who tries to challenge a grand jury array under the Jury Selection Act. See Matter of Archuleta, 561 F.2d 1059, 1063 n.7 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Matter of Archuleta, 432 F. Supp. 583, 590-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (stating, after extensive discussion of more recent case law, that we have substantial doubt whether Chestnut, . . . is still controlling). -12- Supp. 583, 587, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (denying grand jury witness's motion for discovery of materials regarding grand jury selection procedures after concluding that a subpoenaed witness had no standing to challenge the selection of the grand jury on a motion to quash the subpoena). Doe further alleges that imprisoning him for civil contempt without affording him the opportunity to review the Grand Jury is a violation of his rights to Due Process of Law, as well as, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. But Doe makes no attempt to support his allegation with case law, nor does he explain precisely how his constitutional rights under the specific amendments he names have been violated. The tone of his brief is purely hortatory -- without legal support or any argument, he urges the court to give Doe the same right as criminal defendants to question whether the grand jury was duly empanelled simply because, like a convicted criminal defendant, he has been incarcerated. Arguments not seriously developed on appeal are, as is well settled in this circuit, deemed waived. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1082 (1990).