Opinion ID: 1286553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the relevance of scott

Text: New Mexico courts have long recognized that an essential element of establishing a contract of hire is an agreement whereby the worker receives wages in exchange for labor. Joyce v. Pecos Benedictine Monastery, 119 N.M. 764, 767, 895 P.2d 286, 289 (Ct.App.1995); Jelso v. World Balloon Corp., 97 N.M. 164, 168, 637 P.2d 846, 850 (Ct.App. 1981). [T]here must be mutual assent, express or implied. Joyce, 119 N.M. at 767, 895 P.2d at 289. Sierra Blanca argues that a valid employer-employee relationship requires mutuality lacking on these facts. Sierra Blanca reasons that Benavidez was obligated to provide labor by virtue of his status as a prisoner and that its obligation ran to the Department of Corrections. Sierra Blanca relies on Scott and analogous precedent from other jurisdictions for the proposition that Benavidez's obligation to provide labor was not voluntary. In Scott the inmate-claimant worked for the city pursuant to an ordinance allowing a judge to order physically-fit prisoners to perform work. The inmate-claimant was not paid wages for the work performed; instead, he received monetary credit against a fine imposed for his charged crime. While working on a city street, the claimant sustained an injury and consequently sought workers' compensation benefits. This Court affirmed the denial of compensation, holding that [s]o long as his status was that of a prisoner, there could not exist the employer-employee relationship resulting from a contract of hire as contemplated by the Act. Scott, 69 N.M. at 331, 366 P.2d at 855. The Scott Court relied on Professor Larson's workers' compensation treatise, which had stated at that time `a convict cannot and does not make a true contract of hire.' Id. (quoting 1 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, § 47.31 (1952)). Under the same rationale, courts have denied workers' compensation benefits to prisoners when the nature of the work relationship is not voluntary, or when other circumstances preclude the formation of a contract of hire. The Virginia Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Woodward, 249 Va. 21, 452 S.E.2d 656, 658 (1995), denied benefits to a prisoner because prisoners not on a work release program are incapable of making a true contract of hire with the authorities by whom he is confined. Likewise, in Republic-Franklin Insurance Co. v. City of Amherst, 50 Ohio St.3d 212, 553 N.E.2d 614 (1990), the Ohio Supreme Court denied benefits to an individual injured while performing community service in lieu of a jail sentence. The court held that a community-service worker cannot be considered an employee, reasoning there is no express or implied contract of hire between the parties because one who consents to perform community service in lieu of sentence enters into an agreement with the court, not the agency where the work is performed. Id. 553 N.E.2d at 618. Because it is undisputed that Benavidez was a prisoner at the time of the accident, the judge might have granted Sierra Blanca summary judgment on the basis that Scott barred Benavidez's recovery. The judge might have concluded that similar authority from other jurisdictions represented the majority view. The Court of Appeals distinguished Scott on its facts. We agree that Scott is distinguishable on its facts. The statutory scheme under which Benavidez was employed requires a different analysis than the ordinance at issue in Scott. Since Scott was decided the New Mexico Legislature has enacted a penitentiary inmate-release program whereby certain eligible inmates may contract to work for private entities seeking to procure prisoner labor. See NMSA 1978, §§ 33-2-43 to -47 (Repl. Pamp.1990) (enacted by 1969 N.M.Laws, ch. 166, § 1). Under the program, inmates meeting statutorily-defined standards may venture beyond the penitentiary to work at paid employment in private business. Section 33-2-44. While participation in the program is voluntary, Section 33-2-43(D), those who choose to work must be compensated for their efforts at not less than prevailing market rates and must be provided with similar conditions of employment as regular employees. Section 33-2-43(B). In turn, participants are required to pay the State for appropriate and reasonable costs incident to administering the program and for their confinement. Section 33-2-43(C). The New Mexico Constitution, Article XX, Section 18, prohibits the State from leasing convict labor for its own remuneration. Cf. N.M. Const. Art. XX, § 15 (requiring prisoner's net earnings from employment in beneficial industry to be paid to dependent family for their support). Thus we agree with the Court of Appeals that [t]o pass constitutional muster, the program must necessarily provide, even if only implicitly, that any prisoners working for private enterprise must act on their own accord, irrespective of their status as prisoners. Benavidez, 120 N.M. at 843, 907 P.2d at 1024. In fact, Section 33-2-43(D) characterizes participants as volunteers. Further, Section 33-2-47, which describes the conditions of employment of the inmate-release program, states: No prisoner under the provisions of the inmate-release program is an agent, employee or involuntary servant of the penitentiary of New Mexico while attending school, working in private business or going to or from such assignment. Under the statutory scheme, inmate-release volunteers act for their own benefit, subject to certain restrictions inherent in their status as prisoners. Id. Scott is therefore distinguishable because the ordinance at issue there allowed community service to be involuntarily imposed on any physically-fit prisoner who could not pay the fine that accompanied his or her sentence, whereas the statutory scheme at issue here allows prisoners to volunteer to work for private employers at going market rates. Sierra Blanca has argued that this scheme conflicts with more general provisions regarding prison labor. We next address this contention.