Opinion ID: 1121458
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Conflicts Resulting From the Campaign, Election and Recusal

Text: The Mendocino County Public Defender, Susan Massini (Massini), personally represented the defendant from the inception of this case. At Massini's request, Joseph Allen (Allen), an experienced capital defense lawyer, was appointed assistant attorney pursuant to section 987.2. Both Massini and Allen played active roles in the defense. At a time not disclosed in the record, Massini decided to run for Mendocino County District Attorney. The record does not indicate whether Massini's campaign was discussed with the defendant. Massini was elected district attorney in June 1986. She took office on January 5, 1987. On June 25, 1986, a few weeks after the election, Allen moved to recuse the district attorney's office from prosecuting defendant's case. On July 21, 1986, the court granted the motion. The Attorney General was substituted as prosecutor. To place these events in the context of the trial, jury voir dire began on October 20, 1986. Presentation of evidence began on March 9, 1987.
(18a) Defendant did not register any objection in the trial court to Massini's representation. Therefore, contrary to defendant's assertions, the automatic reversal rule enunciated in Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, 435 U.S. 475 ( Holloway ), is inapplicable to this case. ( People v. Easley, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 724; Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980) 446 U.S. 335, 348 [64 L.Ed.2d 333, 346-347, 100 S.Ct. 1708].) Further, defendant's assertions of an actual conflict with Massini during her campaign are unpersuasive. On this record, we do not find that Massini's personal interest in winning the election for district attorney threatened her loyalty to defendant. It is not the law that a public defender creates a conflict of interest merely by seeking employment with the district attorney's office or even by campaigning to assume that office while continuing to represent criminal defendants. ( People v. Marshall, supra, 196 Cal. App.3d at p. 1257 [defense counsel's acceptance of employment with district attorney does not require finding of actual conflict of interest].) Any conflict between an attorney's personal interest in obtaining employment and his or her client's interest in loyal and effective representation is too attenuated to impute a violation of professional ethics in each such case. Moreover, the record does not support a conclusion that Massini's alleged conflict of interest adversely affected defendant's representation. [20] Defendant was also represented by Allen during Massini's campaign. [21] Allen did not suffer from any alleged conflict of interest and was not an employee of Massini. Allen was an experienced death penalty and criminal defense attorney. He appeared for defendant during the motions to suppress and his name appeared on the numerous pretrial motions along with Massini's name. (19)(See fn. 22.) Allen's participation in the defense supports our conclusion that the defense was neither constitutionally inadequate nor tainted by the alleged conflict. [22] (18b) Allen was in a unique position to observe whether Massini's representation of defendant was adversely affected as a result of her campaign. Allen's silence regarding any deficiencies in his cocounsel's representation of their mutual client reinforces our conclusion, which is based on our review of the record, that Massini's representation of defendant was not adversely affected by her personal interest in winning the election. Nevertheless, defendant urges two examples of instances where Massini's representation was impaired by the conflict of interest. First, defendant points out that his motion to suppress did not specifically argue that Detective Kelley's search of the clothing found in Smith's car constituted an impermissible independent search. This argument, however, lacks merit. (See, ante, at pp. 979-980.) This lack of merit, rather than the conflict of interest, is the likely reason why this specific argument was not pursued. Another reason to explain this purported failure could be that Arizona v. Hicks, supra, 480 U.S. 321, was not decided until after defendant's motion was heard. Finally, Allen, not Massini, wielded the laboring oar on this motion. Defendant wisely refrains from contending that Allen's representation was adversely affected by Massini's alleged conflict of interest. Second, defendant challenges defense counsel's failure to explicitly argue that the necessary probable cause and exigent circumstances were not present to justify the taking of defendant's blood without a search warrant. While the record does not indicate that defense counsel raised this particular argument, defense counsel did argue that the blood sample should be suppressed on Fourth Amendment grounds. Defendant contends that his counsel's failure to raise the specific argument that he has raised on appeal must be attributed to Massini's desire not to anger the police with whom she might soon be closely working. We cannot ascertain from this record the reasons why the argument was not pursued. To impute this decision to Massini's campaign, however, would be to engage in sheer speculation. For example, we would have to assume that Allen, as well as Massini, was laboring under divided loyalties and harbored some reason not to anger the police. Such an assumption does not make sense, since Allen no longer even regularly practiced in Northern California during the time in question. On this record, we do not find that `it is demonstrated ... that the nature of the defense afforded deprived the defendant of a constitutional right.' ( People v. Mroczko (1983) 35 Cal.3d at 86, 105 [197 Cal. Rptr. 52, 672 P.2d 835], quoting People v. Keesee (1967) 250 Cal. App.2d 794, 798 [58 Cal. Rptr. 780].) We also reject defendant's related contention that the alleged conflict warrants a per se reversal of his conviction and sentence based upon the public policy rule announced in People v. Rhodes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 180 [115 Cal. Rptr. 235, 524 P.2d 363] (hereafter Rhodes ). In Rhodes, this court reversed the conviction of a defendant who was represented by a part-time city attorney, who simultaneously discharged prosecutorial responsibilities in the county in which the defendant was tried. In so doing, this court announced a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure that city attorneys, who exercise prosecutorial responsibilities, may not represent criminal defendants. ( Id. at pp. 186, 187.) Since Rhodes, however, we have recognized that in cases where the conflict between prosecutorial and criminal defense responsibilities is less direct, reversal is not required in the absence of prejudice to the representation. ( People v. Pendleton (1979) 25 Cal.3d 371, 381 [158 Cal. Rptr. 343, 599 P.2d 649].) The serial nature of Massini's criminal defense and prosecutorial responsibilities removes this case from the ambit of the Rhodes rule. (Cf. People v. Marshall, supra, 196 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1257-1259.)
Defendant further contends that the trial court erred in failing to inquire about Massini's alleged conflict of interest and in failing to obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver from the defendant of the same. Defendant contends that these failures constitute reversible error under Wood v. Georgia (1981) 450 U.S. 261 [67 L.Ed.2d 220, 101 S.Ct. 1097]. (20) As we have consistently recognized, [w]hen a trial court knows or should know that defense counsel has a possible conflict of interest with his [or her] client, it must inquire into the matter [citations] and act in response to what its inquiry discovers [citation]. ( People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1136 [282 Cal. Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757].) Failure by the trial court to make the necessary inquiry or to respond to what its inquiry reveals is reversible error only if the defendant shows that an actual conflict of interest existed and that that conflict affected counsel's performance. ( People v. Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 837-838.) In this case, we need not determine whether the trial court's failure to inquire into the circumstances surrounding Massini's campaign and continuing representation of the defendant was error. Even assuming the trial court's omission was error, defendant is not entitled to the reversal that he seeks, since the record supports neither a finding of actual conflict nor impaired representation.
(21) Defendant argues that the trial court erred by modifying the recusal order to permit consultation and assistance by the district attorney's office to the Attorney General's office. Briefly, these modifications permitted (1) the district attorney's office to provide clerical and logistical support to the Attorney General, and (2) the Attorney General to consult with Robert Hickok (Hickok), the deputy district attorney who prosecuted the case prior to the recusal. The court specifically prohibited any direct participation by Hickok in the trial and any communication concerning the case between Hickok and Massini. We find no grounds upon which defendant would be entitled to relief. The decision to recuse the Mendocino County District Attorney's Office is not challenged on appeal. That decision is governed by section 1424 and requires a showing that a conflict of interest exists such as would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial. The issue on appeal is limited to the effect of continuing contacts between the district attorney's office and the Attorney General's office following recusal. We conclude that the recusal was not undermined by the modifications to the order. While defendant has not specified any purported harm flowing from the continuing contacts between the district attorney's office and the Attorney General's office, we assume that his objections are premised upon the possibility that confidential information was made known to the prosecution. We find no support for such a claim. First, the modifications to the protective order incorporated safeguards protecting defendant's confidential information. The first two modifications to the recusal order provided for consultation with Hickok to end prior to the time that Massini was scheduled to assume her new office. The order as finally modified incorporated an ethical wall around Massini for purposes of this case by prohibiting Massini from discussing the case with Hickok and limiting the areas of consultation between Hickok and the Attorney General to events that occurred prior to Massini's election. These safeguards were sufficient to protect defendant's interests in the confidentiality of the communications between defendant and Massini. (See People v. Hernandez (1991) 235 Cal. App.3d 674, 680 [286 Cal. Rptr. 652]; People v. Lopez (1984) 155 Cal. App.3d 813, 827 [202 Cal. Rptr. 333].) Second, no support exists for an inference that Massini actually violated the court's orders by breaching her ethical duties to defendant. Defendant acknowledged, by virtue of his stipulation to the recusal order as finally modified, that Massini would not violate her professional obligations by revealing his confidences or strategy or otherwise cooperating in his prosecution. (Cf. People v. Chadwick (1980) 106 Cal. App.3d 108, 116 [164 Cal. Rptr. 864].) The trial judge, who knew both Massini and Hickok, expressed his confidence in their professional integrity and ethical judgment. That assessment, made from a vantage point close to the circumstances and people involved, is entitled to our deference. ( People v. Lopez, supra, 155 Cal. App.3d at p. 827, citing People v. Conner (1983) 34 Cal.3d 141, 149 [193 Cal. Rptr. 148, 666 P.2d 5].)