Opinion ID: 1281182
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Robert's Claims

Text: The court of appeals determined that Robert's claims, however denominated, are based on alienation of affections and criminal conversation, both of which are barred by the `heart balm statute.' To determine the nature of the action, an examination of the substance of the complaint is required. Erickson v. Publix Cab Co., 134 Colo. 203, 206, 301 P.2d 349, 351 (1956); see Great Western Sugar Co. v. Jackson Lake Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 681 P.2d 484, 494 (Colo. 1984). In Goldberg v. Musim, 162 Colo. 461, 467, 427 P.2d 698, 701 (1967), we stated that an action for alienation of affections requires the following: (1) the defendant must intend to induce the spouse to separate; (2) the defendant must induce the spouse of the plaintiff to leave or to remain separated from the plaintiff; and (3) such an action must result in loss of affection and consortium, including loss of society, companionship, and aid. Criminal conversation is essentially adultery and the action may be brought by the innocent spouse. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 124, at 917 (5th ed. 1984). Robert alleged that while counseling Edna, Grabrian engaged in conduct he knew or should have known would lead to additional marital problems between the plaintiff and Edna and would cause the probable dissolution of their marriage. Robert further alleged that Grabrian and Edna entered into an intimate relationship which contributed to the ultimate dissolution of the marriage between the plaintiff and Edna. The complaint asserts that the conduct of Grabrian affected the plaintiff and his marriage in the following manner: There are minor children of that former marriage, and upon learning of the relationship between the Defendant Grabrian and Edna, the Plaintiff's ability to maintain a working parental relationship with Edna has been rendered impossible, any chance of salvaging the marriage was rendered impossible, and the Plaintiff has suffered and endured excruciating mental pain and suffering. The substance of the first two claims in the complaint relates to the adulterous conduct of Grabrian that resulted in the destruction of the marriage and the injuries allegedly arising from that conduct. See Gasper v. Lighthouse, Inc., 73 Md.App. 367, 373, 533 A.2d 1358, 1361 (1987). In our view, these allegations plainly set forth claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation. We choose not to recognize any of Robert's common law claims apart from the third claim for relief because they are plainly claims for alienation of affections and criminal conversation. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly dismissed Robert's first and second claims in the complaint under section 13-20-202, 6A C.R.S. (1987). Robert's third claim is one for breach of fiduciary duty. One standing in a position of trust is liable for harm resulting from a breach of the duty imposed by that position. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 (1979). The third claim alleges that the fiduciary duty breached by Grabrian and the diocese arose as a result of the counseling relationship entered into by Robert and Edna with Grabrian. As we concluded in reviewing Edna's first claim for relief, we believe that the nature of the counseling relationship alleged here gives rise to a clear duty on Grabrian's part to engage only in activity or conduct calculated to improve the Destefanos' marriage. This duty to refrain from any conduct which carries with it a risk of harm to the marital couple extends to both Robert and Edna. See Horak v. Biris, 130 Ill.App.3d 140, 85 Ill.Dec. 599, 474 N.E.2d 13 (1985). We have no difficulty in finding that Grabrian's intimacies with Edna falls within conduct which carries with it a risk of harm to Edna and Robert. As such, Robert's third claim for relief is sufficient to withstand the C.R.C.P. 12(b) motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment granted by the court of appeals, but affirm the resulting dismissal of Edna's second and fifth claims for relief and Robert's first and second claims for relief. We return the case to the court of appeals with directions to remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. QUINN, C.J., specially concurs, and MULLARKEY, J., joins in the special concurrence. MULLARKEY, J., specially concurs, and QUINN, C.J., and LOHR and KIRSHBAUM, JJ., join in the special concurrence.