Opinion ID: 2096091
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Final Argument

Text: In arguing for a new trial based on denial of severance, appellants direct our attention not so much to the evidentiary phase of the trial, but more to the way final argument unfolded. It was during final argument in the guilt phase that Rouster and Williams first began accusing each other. These accusations continued during final argument in the penalty phase. Following the State's summation in the guilt phase, Williams' counsel spoke first. He told the jury that it was Rouster who had gone berserk. Rouster's counsel countered in his final argument that the real maniac was Darnell Williams. He argued that because Williams was twenty years old and Rouster only eighteen at the time of the murders that Williams was the leader. In response to this development, the trial judge allowed Williams a rebuttal argument. Rouster claims on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing rebuttal argument by his codefendant. Despite the absence of pretrial motions clearly stating any intentions to advance mutually antagonistic defenses, the trial judge anticipated by trial's end the possibility that the defendants might turn on each other during final argument. He altered his previous plan to allow each defendant forty-five minutes to address the jury and informed Williams and Newsome that they could have an additional fifteen minutes to rebut any aspersions cast their way in Rouster's final argument. Rouster objected on the grounds that it was unfair to allot more time to his codefendants. The trial judge attempted to assuage his concerns by offering him additional time. The judge said: Well, what if during the course of your final presentation I perceive that you have turned on either Newsome or Williams and by some signal then give you an additional fifteen minutes, would that be satisfactory? Record at 2462-63. Rouster's counsel still objected, stating, [w]e feel the codefendant should not have the opportunity to rebut anything that we have to say. Record at 2463. The judge then ruled that he would take his glasses off and place them on the bench in front of him to signal Rouster's counsel that he had an additional fifteen minutes. This in fact occurred, and each defendant was thus allotted an equal amount of time for final argument. Record at 2592. [2] Control of final argument is assigned to the discretion of the trial judge. Unless there is an abuse of this discretion clearly prejudicial to the rights of the accused, the ruling of the trial court will not be disturbed. Jenkins v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 589, 335 N.E.2d 215; Kallas v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 103, 83 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 336 U.S. 940, 69 S.Ct. 744, 93 L.Ed. 1098. Although the trial court's action in this case was unusual, it was plainly within his discretion. Each defendant was allotted equal time; each was given a chance to rebut any argument by a codefendant that pointed toward his guilt. Rouster, by virtue of going second, had the chance to hear his codefendant's argument before addressing the jury. The trial judge merely gave Williams the same opportunity. We fail to see how this was prejudicial to Rouster.