Opinion ID: 1934583
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Heading: Sidewalk and Stoop as an Occupied Structure.

Text: At common law, burglary could only be committed in a dwelling house. 3 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 325, at 251 (15th ed.1995) (hereinafter Wharton's). The crime was considered to be an offense against the security of habitation or occupancy, and was tied to the ancient maxim that a man's home is his castle. Id. §§ 316, 325, at 223, 253. It was not designed to protect property or ownership, rather the notion that people should be able to feel secure in their homes. Id. As one court put it: Burglary laws are based primarily upon a recognition of the dangers to personal safety created by the usual burglary situationthe danger that the intruder will harm the occupants in attempting to perpetrate the intended crime to escape... [t]he laws are primarily designed, then, not to deter the trespass and the intended crime, which are prohibited by other laws, so much as to forestall the germination of a situation dangerous to personal safety. State v. Nible, 200 Cal.App.3d 838, 844, 247 Cal.Rptr. 396 (1988) (quoting State v. Lewis, 274 Cal.App.2d 912, 920, 79 Cal.Rptr. 650 (1969)). A dwelling house at common law included not only the house regularly used for sleeping, but also out-buildings within the curtilage of the home. See Wharton's § 326, at 259. The curtilage encompassed the cluster of buildings which were in reasonably close proximity to the dwelling house and closely associated with it. Id. The rationale for making buildings located within the curtilage the subject of burglary was derived from the continuing need to protect the occupants of the house when they used nearby buildings as a part of their occupation of the principal dwelling. Id. § 326, at 262. The dweller might have occasion at night to walk out to his barn to tend to his animals or, if he heard a suspicious noise, he might walk out to the barn to investigate. The danger to the dweller if confronted by an intruder in an out-building is sufficiently comparable to danger of such confrontation in the dwelling house itself to justify extending protection of the law of burglary to out-buildings. Id. Although the subject of burglary at common law extended to buildings within the curtilage of the dwelling home, the curtilage itself was not protected apart from its relationship to a building. See Jerome C. Latimer, Burglary is for Buildings, or is it? Protected Structures and Conveyances Under Florida's Present Burglary Statute, 9 Stetson L.Rev. 347, 350-51 (1980). Only buildings in the curtilage of the dwelling home fell within the scope of the burglary offense. Id. Iowa historically followed the common law approach to burglary. Under our original burglary statute, as with common law, only a dwelling house could be the subject of the offense. See Iowa Code § 2608 (1851). This limitation remained, for the most part, until 1978 when our legislature rewrote the burglary statute, in part, to replace dwelling house with occupied structure. See 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245, § 1301. More significantly, it subsequently defined occupied structure to include any building, structure, appurtenances to buildings and structures, land, water, or air vehicle, or similar place adapted for overnight accommodation of persons, or occupied by persons for the purpose of carrying on business or other activity therein, or for the storage or safekeeping of anything of value. Iowa Code § 702.12 (1985). Thus, our legislature not only expanded the burglary statute to include buildings, structures, vehicles, and similar places, but appurtenances to buildings and structures, as long as the protected place was also adapted for overnight accommodation of persons, or occupied by persons for the purpose of carrying on business or other activity therein, or for the purpose of storage or safekeeping of anything of value. See id. § 702.12 (1997). Therefore, our definition of an occupied structure has two prongs. The first describes the type of place that can be the subject of burglary, and the second considers its purpose or use. In considering the first prong, we observe the term appurtenants was principally used at common law to help describe the nexus between the dwelling house and the surrounding buildings that were within the scope of the curtilage. See 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 225 (1769) (and if the barn, stable or warehouse be parcel of the mansion house, though not under the same roof or contiguous, a burglary may be committed therein; for the capital house protects and privileges all its branches and appurtenants, if within the curtilage of the homestall); 12A C.J.S. Burglary § 30 (1980) (an outhouse is within the curtilage ... if it is parcel of, or appurtenant to, the dwelling and connected therewith....). Originally, the curtilage referred only to the area surrounding a castle that was encircled by a wall. United States v. Romano, 388 F.Supp. 101, 104 n. 4 (E.D.Penn.1975). The buildings within the curtilage, therefore, could be easily identified. Over time, however, the curtilage rule continued to be applied even though there was no fence around the principal dwelling. Wharton's § 326, at 261-62. Yet, if an out-building was so remote from the dwelling house that a person who broke into it would not be expected to disturb the owner's repose, the building was outside the scope of burglary. See id. § 326, at 262; State v. Jake, 60 N.C. 471 (1864) (if an owner chooses to place an out-building so far from the dwelling that his repose would unlikely be disturbed by the breaking, the law of burglary provides no protection). On the other hand, the burglary laws protected the out-buildings which were appurtenant to the dwelling house because, like the dwelling house, they were places of the owner's repose. Wharton's § 326, at 262; see State v. Newman, 313 N.W.2d 484, 486 (Iowa 1981) (the gist of burglary is a trespass against a secure place with the requisite intent). Although the term appurtenant may have been used at common law to define the relationship between an out-building to the dwelling house, we recognize our legislature has used the term in our present statute as a noun to describe a specific place which may be the subject of burglary. Thus, like a building, structure, vehicle, or similar place, an appurtenance to a building or structure may be the subject of burglary under the statute as long as it satisfies the second portion of the definition of an occupied structure. We have previously defined an appurtenance broadly as That which belongs to something else; an adjunct; an appendage. Something annexed to another thing more worthy as principal, and which passes as incident to it, as a right of way or easement to land.... State v. Baker, 560 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Iowa 1997) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 103 (6th ed.1990)). A thing is an appurtenance when it stands in relation of an incident to a principal and is necessarily connected with the use and enjoyment of the latter. Id.; accord State v. Hill, 449 N.W.2d 626, 628 (Iowa 1989). The key factor employed in determining if something is an appurtenance is whether it is connected in use with the principal. Baker, 560 N.W.2d at 13. We have applied these definitions to find a fenced enclosure behind an automobile parts store to be an appurtenance to a building. Hill, 449 N.W.2d at 628. More recently, in Baker, we concluded a driveway fell within the definition of appurtenance to a building or structure. We found a driveway was an appurtenance because it was closely associated with and connected to buildings and structures, and was built to enhance the use and enjoyment of the building or structure. Baker, 560 N.W.2d at 13. Considering our broad definition of appurtenance, we conclude a step or stoop outside the door of a home, as well as the cement walkway leading to the step, would fall within the definition of an appurtenance to the house. Like the driveway in Baker, a step or stoop, as well as the adjoining sidewalk, is easily recognized as a thing connected with the use and enjoyment of the house, and belongs to the house. The fighting question is whether it also qualifies under the second prong of the definition of an occupied structure as a place adapted for overnight accommodation of persons, or occupied by persons for the purpose of carrying on business or other activity therein, or for the storage or safekeeping of anything of value. We found this second prong of the definition of an occupied structure was satisfied in Baker because the driveway in the case was occupied by persons for the purpose of carrying on activities, and was also used for the storage or safekeeping of things of value. Id. at 14. We observed driveways are often occupied by persons for numerous types of activities, such as sporting activities, child's play, cookouts, and countless other activities. Id. Additionally, we observed driveways were commonly used to store automobiles, boats, and trailers. Id. In this case, there was no evidence indicating the step or stoop outside the door was occupied by persons for the purpose of carrying on some activity. There was no testimony addressing the issue, and the photographic evidence revealed nothing but a small cement area with a step leading to a door. Unlike Baker, we are unable to take judicial notice that the step or stoop would be occupied by persons for the purpose of carrying on some activity. The only apparent purpose of the step or stoop in this case would be to assist persons in entering or exiting the house. Yet, we do not believe this transient action is the type of occupation or activity which gives an appurtenance the protection of an occupied structure. There are three principal reasons to support this conclusion. First, our legislature did not extend the subject matter of burglary to include all appurtenances to buildings or structures, but only those occupied by reason of an activity. If the legislature intended to include acts such as walking or standing as the type of occupancy and activities within the statute, there would be little need for a second prong of the definition. It is difficult to imagine an appurtenance to a structure that would not fall within the definition of an occupied structure if merely walking over or momentarily standing upon an appurtenance was occupancy for the purpose of carrying on an activity. We do not construe statutes so as to render a part of it superfluous, but presume our legislature included every part of the statute for a purpose and intended each part to be given effect. State v. Graves, 491 N.W.2d 780, 782 (Iowa 1992). Second, the exclusion of sidewalks and steps from the definition of an occupied structure is consistent with the fundamental common law concept of burglary as an offense against security of occupancy. Burglary was never intended to cover all structures, but only those occupied by reason of some activity occurring in the structure. Although our legislature expanded the definition of occupied structure beyond a common law dwelling house concept, it specifically retained the requirement that the subject matter of burglary be occupied in conjunction with some activity which takes place in the structure. We interpret statutes consistent with common law unless the language of the statute clearly negates the common law. Cookies Food Prods., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447, 452 (Iowa 1988). Finally, our restrictive construction of the second prong of the definition of an occupied structure is compatible with the constitutional mandates associated with criminal statutes. We are required to construe criminal statutes strictly, and resolve all ambiguities in favor of the accused. State v. Finchum, 364 N.W.2d 222, 225 (Iowa 1985). Although the concept of an appurtenance can be broad and imprecise, the second prong of the definition of an occupied structure exists to help narrow its parameters. Statutes must not be viewed so broadly that they threaten the constitutional due process prohibitions against vagueness and uncertainty. State v. Hunter, 550 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Iowa 1996). Thus, in most instances this second prong will require evidence which would objectively reveal that an activity occurs in or upon the appurtenance which causes persons to occupy it with a sense of security or repose similar to that enjoyed in the principal structure. Thus, outdoor furniture located on a deck or a patio, or a bench located on a porch or stoop, would be indicia of the type of occupancy that could bring an appurtenance into the definition of an occupied structure. See People v. Thompson, 114 Mich.App. 302, 319 N.W.2d 568, 569 (1982) (issue of whether a porch with two chairs and a rug constituted a dwelling house was properly left for the jury). Any other interpretation could lead to unreasonable results. We cannot imagine our legislature intended to make appurtenances such as the sidewalk and steps described in this case the subject of burglary. If this were true, a person who entered a sidewalk or step of a house, without a right, license, or privilege, with the intent to pick a flower from a pot located on the sidewalk or step would commit burglary. See State v. Hamilton, 660 So.2d 1038, 1045 (Fla.1995). Similarly, a person who entered to take a basketball left outside on a sidewalk of a house would be guilty of burglary. Legislative enactments presume a reasonable result was intended, and we interpret criminal statutes to avoid impractical results. See State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Iowa 1987). Under the facts of this case, we conclude the sidewalk and step or stoop to the door of the house were not occupied structures under the statute. Consequently, Pace did not commit burglary when he entered the sidewalk or stoop.