Opinion ID: 779713
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Government is a health care provider for purposes of this suit.

Text: 20 Ultimately, whether the recovery cap applies to the Plaintiffs' present suit turns on whether this FTCA suit against the United States, arising from the actions of a nurse and health care administrators, is a suit against a health care provider within the meaning of the recovery cap statute. To answer this question, we begin with the text of the statutory provisions governing FTCA liability. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), the district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States... for injury ... caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2674, the United States shall be liable ... in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. Finally, as already noted, New Mexico's statutory recovery cap applies only to suits against health care providers, a term that includes hospitals but does not include either nurses or hospital administrators. 21 The issue before us is one of statutory interpretation. If private person, § 1346(b), and private individual, § 2674, includes employers, then the recovery cap applies here because the private employer analogous to a government hospital is a private hospital. Section 1346(b) unmistakably is couched in the language of an employer's respondeat superior liability, creating jurisdiction over actions against the United States ... for injury ... caused by the ... wrongful act ... of any employee ... while acting within the scope of his office or employment. § 1346(b). See, e.g., Restatement (Second), Agency § 219(1) (A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment.) Further, § 1346(b) refers to circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable. Because in reality the United States is not an individual employee but only an employer, this phrasing suggests that the only shoes that the Government stands in under the FTCA are those of private employers. 22 We think the text of the FTCA best supports the Government's employer interpretation, a conclusion buttressed by our rule that any waiver of sovereign immunity `must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign and not enlarged beyond what its language requires.' United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 253 F.3d 543, 547 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1991)) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). 23 To the extent that this issue is not resolved by the text of the statute, we look to legislative intent, and we conclude that Congress has spoken to this question. In enacting the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Congress found that [t]he United States, through the Federal Tort Claims Act, is responsible to injured persons for the common law torts of its employees in the same manner in which the common law historically has recognized the responsibility of an employer for torts committed by its employees within the scope of their employment. § 2(b), 102 Stat. 4564, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 note. Cf. H.R. Rep. 100-700 at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5949 (describing government's FTCA liability as vicarious). 24 Accordingly, we conclude that the Government's liability under the FTCA is limited to that of a private employer under like circumstances. Our conclusion is consistent with that of at least two other circuits. See St. John v. United States, 240 F.3d 671, 676 (8th Cir.2001) (The FTCA is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, allowing the federal government to be sued for the actions of `any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment' under circumstances where the United States would be liable if it were a private employer. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) and 2674.); Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 730 (5th Cir.1995) (All FTCA liability is respondeat superior liability.... Under the FTCA, the United States is not liable if the private employer would not be liable pursuant to local law.); see also Bryant v. United States, 126 F.Supp.2d 1227, 1234 (2000); cf. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 420, 115 S.Ct. 2227, 132 L.Ed.2d 375 (1995) (Generally, [FTCA] cases unfold much as cases do against other employers who concede respondeat superior liability.). The only circuit to reach a contrary conclusion did so in a split decision. Knowles v. United States, 91 F.3d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir.1996) (2-1 decision). The issue in Knowles was similar to the one that we face, namely whether an FTCA suit against the United States arising from the alleged malpractice of medical specialists employed by the government was subject to South Dakota's $1 million cap on medical malpractice damages. The Knowles majority concluded that the recovery cap did not apply, reasoning as follows: 25 Under the FTCA, the United States will be held liable to the same extent as a private party. It is standing in the shoes of the medical service specialists. Therefore, the United States shares in the protection of the statute to the same extent the individuals would if they were sued directly. It follows, then, that if medical services specialists, individually, are not protected by the statute, neither is the United States shielded from the consequences of their negligence. 26 91 F.3d at 1150 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). In dissent, Judge Beam reasoned that the `hypothetical private party' is analogous to a private employer, Id. at 1153, and [t]he government cannot stand in the shoes of a negligent federal employee, individually, because the employee is immune from suit. Id. at 1154. Ultimately, the dissent concluded that the government has waived immunity and hence is liable only under a statutorily-imposed respondeat superior theory. Id. 27 We find the Knowles dissent more persuasive. The panel majority made no effort to come to grips with the language of § 1346(b), which, as noted above, supports the view that FTCA constitutes respondeat superior liability. Nor did it acknowledge Congress's statement of intent in the note to § 2671. Finally, the majority did not purport to construe strictly Congress's FTCA waiver of sovereign immunity.