Opinion ID: 2276127
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the abortion statutes.

Text: The Commonwealth argues that the penal code's definition of person as a human being ipso facto requires application of the definition of human being in KRS 311.720(6) to the penal code. As noted supra, that statute defines human being as any member of the species homo sapiens from fertilization until death. However, while the introductory sentence in KRS 311.720 purports to apply the definitions enumerated therein to KRS 311.710 to 311.820, and laws of the Commonwealth unless the context otherwise requires  (emphasis added), the definition of human being was added to KRS 311.720 by an Act entitled, AN ACT relating to abortion. 1982 Ky. Acts, ch. 342, § 2. Section 51 of our Constitution provides that [n]o law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title .... (Emphasis added.) Thus, the definition of human being set forth in KRS 311.720(6) cannot constitutionally be applied to the homicide provisions of the penal code. Edwards v. Land, Ky.App., 851 S.W.2d 484, 487 (1992) (if a portion of the Act falls within the scope of the title and another portion falls outside the scope of the title, the portion falling outside may be omitted), overruled on other grounds by O'Bryan v. Hedgespeth, Ky., 892 S.W.2d 571, 578 (1995). [7]