Opinion ID: 2832667
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver Language

Text: Shannon first argues that the district court erred in allowing the Government to introduce portions of his proffer statements into evidence. Specifically, Shannon challenges the district court’s determination that he waived the protections of his proffer agreement by offering evidence that was inconsistent with his proffer statements. Shannon contends that he did not “offer any evidence” because he did not “call any witnesses or put on any defense case.” Appellant Br. 20. The Government, on the other hand, asserts that Shannon waived the protections of his proffer agreement when he cross-examined Akhtar, thereby eliciting responses that were inconsistent with his proffer statements. This cross-examination, the Government argues, amounts to an “offer of evidence.” In considering this issue, we engage in a two-part analysis. We first look at the terms of Shannon’s proffer agreement for an interpretation of its contents. The agreement is a “contract that must be interpreted ‘to give effect to the intent of the parties.’” United States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d 109, 117 (2d Cir. 2005). “Because the interpretation of a contract is generally a question of law, we first review the first issue de novo.” Id. “If we conclude that the proffer agreement waiver does apply in this case, our second step is to review for abuse of discretion the district court’s evidentiary rulings admitting [Shannon’s] proffer statements, and we will not reverse unless an error affects a ‘substantial right.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). Generally, statements made by defendants in proffer sessions are inadmissible under Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Barrow, 400 F.3d at 116. The rule states in pertinent part: Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible 6 No. 14-1727, United States v. Shannon against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions:

(3) a statement made during a proceeding on either of those pleas under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 or a comparable state procedure; or (4) a statement made during plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority if the discussions did not result in a guilty plea or they resulted in a laterwithdrawn guilty plea. Fed. R. Evid. 410 (emphasis added). However, defendants may waive Rule 410 objections, “absent evidence that a waiver is unknowing or involuntary.” United States v. Fifer, 206 F. App’x 502, 509 (6th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 205 (1995) (holding that Rule 410 creates “‘a privilege of the defendant,’ and, like other evidentiary privileges, [it] may be waived or varied at the defendant’s request.”). The waiver provision at issue here, permitted the Government to use Shannon’s proffer statements “to rebut any evidence offered by [Shannon] that [was] inconsistent with the statements made during [the proffer session].” (R. 496-2, Proffer Agreement, Pg ID 2149). Shannon does not challenge the validity of the proffer agreement; instead, he urges this Court to find that he did not violate the provisions of the agreement because he did not “offer evidence” by cross-examining Akhtar. Shannon contends that his cross-examination of Akhtar was simply a rebuttal of the Government’s direct questioning and was aimed at establishing Akhtar’s lack of first-hand knowledge about payments to beneficiaries. We find Shannon’s arguments unpersuasive. While Shannon relies heavily on this argument, guidance from our sister circuits’ precedent is more compelling. 7 No. 14-1727, United States v. Shannon In United States v. Krilich, 159 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 1998), the defendant contended that the waiver provision in his proffer agreement was limited to evidence presented through his own witnesses, not evidence obtained by cross-examination of the prosecution’s witnesses. 159 F.3d at 1025. The waiver provision stated: [S]hould [defendant] subsequently testify contrary to the substance of the proffer or otherwise present a position inconsistent with the proffer, nothing shall prevent the government from using the substance of the proffer at sentencing for any purpose, at trial for impeachment or in rebuttal testimony, or in a prosecution for perjury. Id. at 1024. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument finding that “[e]vidence is evidence, whether it comes out on direct or cross-examination.” Id. at 1025. It opined that “[o]ne can ‘otherwise present’ a position through arguments of counsel alone, so it is very easy to see how a position can be ‘presented’ by evidence developed on cross-examination and elaborated by counsel.” Id. The court concluded that “[i]ntroduction of the [proffer] statements [] was proper if either [the defendant’s] testimony, or evidence that he presented through the testimony of others, contradicted the proffer.” Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). In Barrow, 400 F.3d 109, the defendant challenged the district court’s finding that his counsel’s trial conduct triggered the waiver clause of his proffer agreement. The waiver provision permitted the government to use the defendant’s proffer statements “‘to rebut any evidence offered or elicited, or factual assertions made, by or on behalf of [him] at any stage of a criminal prosecution.’” Id. at 116. The defendant contended that only a “specific or direct contradiction between his proffer statement and an assertion by counsel” would trigger the waiver clause. Id. at 117. The Second Circuit disagreed, determining that the waiver’s use of the words “any evidence” created an expansive waiver, and applied to all evidence, whether “offered directly or elicited on cross-examination.” Id. at 118 (emphasis added). Finally, in 8 No. 14-1727, United States v. Shannon United States v. Hardwick, 544 F.3d 565 (3d Cir. 2008), the defendant’s proffer agreement provided that the government could “rebut any evidence or arguments offered on [the defendant’s] behalf.” 544 F.3d at 570. The Third Circuit determined that the “testimony elicited from [] witnesses on cross-examination was aimed at inferring that [others], rather than [the defendant], were responsible for the murders [], contrary to the statements [defendant] made under the proffer agreement.” Id. at 571 (emphasis added). Relying on these cases, we agree with the district court that Shannon did offer evidence when he elicited testimony from Akhtar on cross-examination. Shannon’s argument that he did not offer any evidence because he did not call any witnesses or put on a defense case is unconvincing. Evidence is defined as “something (including testimony, documents, and tangible objects) that tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact; anything presented to the senses and offered to prove the existence or nonexistence of a fact.” Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). A party does not offer evidence only by calling its own witnesses or putting on its own case. Indeed, as noted by the Krilich court, evidence may be offered through crossexamination. Krilich, 159 F.3d at 1025. And as is consistent with the Barrow court’s determination, because Shannon’s waiver provision allowed the government to rebut “any evidence,” this included evidence offered on direct or elicited on cross-examination. Thus, we reject Shannon’s argument and conclude that the elicitation of testimony from Akhtar on crossexamination amounted to an “offer of evidence” under the terms of the proffer agreement. Shannon contends that reliance on these cases is misplaced because the waiver provision at issue in each of these cases was broader than the waiver provision in the instance case. Shannon argues that the waiver provisions are distinguishable because an “offer of evidence” does not equate to an “argument” as used in Hardwick; a “position” as used in Krilich; or 9 No. 14-1727, United States v. Shannon “elicited evidence” as used in Barrow. Shannon’s argument is unavailing. While the waivers are not identical, they need not be. All three cases support the general rule that crossexamination of a witness can amount to an “offer of evidence.”