Opinion ID: 1121511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ex post facto law and double jeopardy

Text: Petitioners argue that the Statute is unconstitutional, because it violates the double jeopardy clause and the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Generally, these clauses apply to criminal matters. Thus, if the Statute is civil rather than criminal in nature, the Statute survives this challenge. We conclude that the Statute is civil, and hold that it does not violate either double jeopardy or the ex post facto clause. [1] The categorization of a particular statute as civil or criminal is largely a matter of statutory construction. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368, 92 L.Ed.2d 296, 106 S.Ct. 2988 (1986); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248, 65 L.Ed.2d 742, 100 S.Ct. 2636 (1980). The Supreme Court has adopted a 2-part analysis: First, we have set out to determine whether Congress, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other. Second, where Congress has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention. (Citations omitted.) Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49. Thus, we look first to the language of the Statute and the legislative history, then turn to an analysis of the purpose and effect of the statutory scheme. Both the language of the Statute and the legislative history evidence a clear intent to create a civil scheme. The section of the law as enacted by the Legislature is entitled Civil Commitment, Laws of 1990, ch. 3, part X, and is codified at RCW Title 71, Mental Illness. [1] Persons committed are placed in the custody of the DSHS and housed at a DSHS treatment facility. RCW 71.09.060(1); WAC 275-155. The Department of Corrections has no role in caring for committed sex predators. In addition, the provisions at issue here are compared in the text of the Statute to RCW 71.05, the civil involuntary commitment act. RCW 71.09.010. An examination of the Act's legislative history further supports a civil intent. The Legislature's final report refers to the section as Civil Commitment, and reports that [a] new civil commitment procedure is created for `sexually violent predators.' 1990 Final Legislative Report, 2nd SSB 6259, at 144. Moreover, the Legislature enacted a bill substantially similar to that proposed by the Governor's Task Force on Community Protection. In its report, the Task Force quite plainly recommended a civil law, because neither the criminal system nor the existing civil system could accommodate the special needs of sex predators. Report, at II-20 through II-23. In light of the Statute's language and legislative history, then, it is clear that the Legislature intended a civil statutory scheme. [2] This does not end our inquiry, however. We next consider whether the actual impact of the Statute is civil or criminal: [T]he civil label is not always dispositive. Where a defendant has provided the clearest proof that the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention that the proceeding be civil, it must be considered criminal.... (Italics ours.) Allen, 478 U.S. at 369 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49). In performing this inquiry, we take particular notice of the high level of proof petitioners must satisfy in order to overcome the presumption favoring the Legislature's civil designation. Allen, 478 U.S. at 369. In Allen, a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination case, the Supreme Court held that an Illinois statute which provided for civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons was properly categorized as civil, not criminal. Allen, at 369. Under the Illinois statute, a sexually dangerous person was one who suffered from a mental disorder ... coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses. Allen, 478 U.S. at 366 n. 1. In holding the statute civil, the Court found several factors significant: the Illinois Supreme Court had determined that the statute was civil in nature; the State had a statutory obligation to provide care and treatment designed to effect recovery for those committed; detainees were discharged when no longer dangerous; and, conditional release was also available. Allen, at 369. The Court summarized: In short, the State has disavowed any interest in punishment, provided for the treatment of those it commits, and established a system under which committed persons may be released after the briefest time in confinement. Allen, at 370. The provisions of our sexually violent predator Statute are remarkably similar to those of the Illinois statute upheld in Allen. Most notably, the Statute's definition of sexually violent predator is almost identical to Illinois' definition of sexually dangerous person  both require a mental disorder which leads to the commission of violent sex offenses. Compare RCW 71.09.020(1) with Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, ¶ 1051.01 (Smith-Hurd 1980). Similarly, both the Illinois statute and RCW 71.09 require care and treatment for the committed individual, and provide this care in a psychiatric facility. Compare RCW 71.09.060(1) and RCW 71.09.080 with Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, ¶ 105-8 (Smith-Hurd 1980). In addition, under both schemes, committed persons must be released as soon as they are no longer dangerous. Compare RCW 71.09.090(1) with Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, ¶ 105-9 (Smith-Hurd 1980). [3, 4] Petitioners argue that the Court's holding in Allen is distinguishable because the Illinois statute provides for commitment in lieu of serving a criminal sentence. While this is a distinguishing factor, it is by no means a contradictory one. That the State of Illinois chose to forego criminal liability for the offender's initial actions does not require Washington to do so. See, e.g., Bailey v. Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150 (8th Cir.1991) (constitutional to both civilly commit and imprison sexually dangerous individual), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1516 (1992). As we discuss below, the goals of civil and criminal confinement are quite different; the former is concerned with incapacitation and treatment, while the latter is directed to retribution and deterrence. The sexually violent predator Statute is not concerned with the criminal culpability of petitioners' past actions. Instead, it is focused on treating petitioners for a current mental abnormality, and protecting society from the sexually violent acts associated with that abnormality. Additional guidance for the determination of whether a statute is criminal was set forth by the Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 9 L.Ed.2d 644, 83 S.Ct. 554 (1963). The court should consider: Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment  retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.... (Footnotes omitted.) These factors weigh heavily on the side of a finding that this Statute is civil. Although the scheme here does involve an affirmative restraint, the civil commitment goals of incapacitation and treatment are distinct from punishment, and have been so regarded historically. Moreover, no finding of scienter is required to commit an individual who is a sexually violent predator; the determination is made based on a mental abnormality or personality disorder rather than on one's culpability. Furthermore, the Statute is necessary to serve the legitimate and vital purpose of protecting innocent potential victims. [2] [5, 6] Finally, we also inquire into the purposes of the legislation. Our construction of the Statute should be that which best advances the legislative purpose. Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wn.2d 148, 151, 812 P.2d 858 (1991). The Statute promotes civil ends rather than criminal ones. The Statute before us is primarily concerned with incapacitation and treatment. Incapacitation has often been recognized as a legitimate civil goal. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 60 L.Ed.2d 323, 99 S.Ct. 1804 (1979). Treatment is also a proper aim of civil legislation. As one commentator has remarked: the Sexually Violent Predator civil commitment scheme is not a method of punishment. Washington is undertaking to treat the offender pursuant to its parens patriae power and to protect the public from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill pursuant to the state's police power. Marie A. Bochnewich, Comment, Prediction of Dangerousness and Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Statute, 29 Cal. W.L. Rev. 277, 278 (1992). In contrast, the Supreme Court has said repeatedly that retribution and deterrence are punitive, and thus are the goals of criminal law. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448, 104 L.Ed.2d 487, 109 S.Ct. 1892 (1989); Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n. 20, 60 L.Ed.2d 447, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979). Thus, the Court reasoned: a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term. Halper, at 448; accord Austin v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 125 L.Ed.2d 488, 498, 113 S.Ct. 2801 (1993). This court has applied similar reasoning: [T]he determinative factors for resolving a double jeopardy claim are whether [the sanction] has a rational connection to some purpose other than retribution or deterrence, and whether the sanction appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose. O'Day v. King Cy., 109 Wn.2d 796, 817, 749 P.2d 142 (1988) (citing Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69). Absent any indication that a criminal purpose was intended, or actually served by the statute, the stated civil goals of the Legislature are controlling. See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69. [7] In sum, we conclude that the sexually violent predator Statute is civil, not criminal, in nature. The language and history of the Statute so indicate, as do its purposes and effect. Petitioners have failed to provide the clearest proof to the contrary. Turning to the specific challenges made here, petitioners argue that RCW 71.09 violates the ex post facto clause. The prohibition against ex post facto laws is expressly leveled against states in U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10. A law violates the ex post facto prohibition if it aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; permits imposition of a different or more severe punishment than was permissible when the crime was committed; or, changes the legal rules to permit less or different testimony to convict the offender than was required when the crime was committed. State v. Edwards, 104 Wn.2d 63, 70-71, 701 P.2d 508 (1985) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798)). The purposes of the prohibition are to give individuals fair warning of the effect of legislative acts, and to restrict the power of the State to impose arbitrary or vindictive legislation. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29, 67 L.Ed.2d 17, 101 S.Ct. 960 (1981). [8, 9] The ex post facto clause has been interpreted to apply only to criminal matters. Calder v. Bull, supra ; see William W. Crosskey, The True Meaning of the Constitutional Prohibition of Ex-Post-Facto Laws, 14 U. Chi. L. Rev. 539 (1946-1947), cited in 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 2.4 n. 9 (1986). In addition, at least one court has held that sexual psychopath proceedings did not involve the ex post facto prohibition because it was not a criminal remedy. State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 1253, 232 S.W.2d 897, 24 A.L.R.2d 340 (1950). Because the Statute is civil, therefore, the ex post facto prohibition does not apply. Petitioners argue further that the prohibition against double jeopardy is violated by the Act. The Fifth Amendment provides, in part: [N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. The double jeopardy clause prohibits multiple punishment for the same offense. Halper, 490 U.S. at 440; O'Day, 109 Wn.2d at 816. This prohibition has deep roots in our history and jurisprudence. Halper, at 440. [10, 11] In general, the prohibition against double jeopardy applies only to criminal measures: [a] double jeopardy violation does not occur simply because two adverse consequences stem from the same act. In re Mayner, [107 Wn.2d 512, 730 P.2d 1321 (1986)] at 521. Double jeopardy does not apply unless the sanction sought to be imposed in the second proceeding is punitive in nature so that the proceeding is essentially criminal. Beckett v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 87 Wn.2d 184, 188, 550 P.2d 529 (1976) [ overruled on other grounds by Dunner v. McLaughlin, 100 Wn.2d 832, 676 P.2d 444 (1984)]; see Emory v. Texas Bd. of Med. Examiners, 748 F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir.1984). O'Day, at 816-17. The prohibition has, however, been found to be implicated in some circumstances by civil penalties as well as criminal. In Halper, the Supreme Court found that a civil fine imposed in a Medicare fraud case after a criminal sentence had been served violated double jeopardy. Halper, at 452. The Supreme Court focused on whether the sanction was remedial or punitive in nature, noting that the purpose actually served by the sanction, rather than the underlying nature of the proceeding, determined the issue. Halper, at 447 n. 7. The Court held that a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment. Halper, at 448. Here, as noted above, the statutory scheme has not been shown to serve any punitive goal; indeed, it does not. Moreover, in Halper, the Court inquired as to the remedial function of the civil penalties, and questioned if the Government could impose a monetary penalty after a criminal sentence had been exacted. Essentially, Halper ruled that the State may not bring a separate civil action based on criminal conduct that is not rationally related to a legitimate civil goal. Halper, at 449. Incapacitation and treatment, though, are legitimate civil goals, as evidenced by the ordinary civil commitment law. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 60 L.Ed.2d 323, 99 S.Ct. 1804 (1979). Therefore, enforcement of the Act does not violate double jeopardy.