Opinion ID: 2576303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Common Law Parentage

Text: ¶ 13 Common Law: Carvin asserts that, because she lacks an adequate remedy at law, equity and the common law should accord her standing as a de facto parent. See Corr. Suppl. Br. of Resp't at 9, 11-12. Britain objects to the recognition of a common law right, asserting that such considerations are properly the province of our legislature. Pet. for Review at 18-19. ¶ 14 So long as it is consistent with Washington statutory law, Washington courts adopt and reform the common law. The common law, so far as it is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, or of the state of Washington nor incompatible with the institutions and condition of society in this state, shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this state. RCW 4.04.010. Early in our state's history, this court construed RCW 4.04.010 to mean that, in the absence of governing statutory provisions, the courts will endeavor to administer justice according to the promptings of reason and common sense, which are the cardinal principles of the common law; but will not blindly follow the decisions of the English courts as to what is the common law without inquiry as to their reasoning and application to circumstances. Bernot v. Morrison, 81 Wash. 538, 544, 143 P. 104 (1914) (citing Sayward v. Carlson, 1 Wash. 29, 23 P. 830 (1890)). Washington courts have also construed this statute to permit the adaptation of the common law to address gaps in existing statutory enactments, providing that the common law may serve to fill interstices that legislative enactments do not cover. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. State Pers. Bd., 61 Wash.App. 778, 783-84, 812 P.2d 500 (1991) (citing RCW 4.04.010), cited with approval in Clark County Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 150 Wash.2d 237, 245, 76 P.3d 248 (2003). ¶ 15 Washington courts have consistently invoked their equity powers and common law responsibility to respond to the needs of children and families in the face of changing realities. We have often done so in spite of legislative enactments that may have spoken to the area of law, but did so incompletely. [6] With these common law principles in mind, we turn to whether Washington's common law recognizes de facto parents. ¶ 16 Washington's Recognition of Common Law Parentage: Carvin asks this court to affirm the Court of Appeals' holding recognizing a common law de facto parent status, asserting that the same is consistent with our jurisprudence and that severing such a parent-child relationship, regardless of its lack of statutory recognition, would be detrimental to the child. See Resp. to Pet. for Review at 7-8. Britain counters that because she is the biological mother of L.B. and there has been no finding that she is unfit, the law presumes she acts in the best interests of her child and the state should not interfere in her decisions, regardless of their impact on L.B. Pet. for Review at 11 (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70, 120 S.Ct. 2054). Further she contends that granting parental status to `psychological parents' would have wide reaching implications opening the door to claims by teachers, nannies, parents of best friends, . . . adult siblings, aunts, [] grandparents, and every third-party. . . caregiver. Id. at 12, 15. ¶ 17 Washington courts have long recognized that individuals not biologically nor legally related to the children whom they parent may nevertheless be considered a child's psychological parent. [7] See, e.g., In re Welfare of Aschauer, 93 Wash.2d 689, 697 n. 5, 611 P.2d 1245 (1980); see also In re Custody of Dombrowski, 41 Wash.App. 753, 756-57, 705 P.2d 1218 (1985) (describing apparent father, whose presumption of paternity was rebutted by blood test, as, nevertheless, the only father [the child] has ever known). Yet Carvin's claim here seeks more than a simple recognition of her status as a psychological parent  she seeks standing as a de facto parent. ¶ 18 Two Court of Appeals cases support Carvin's claim that Washington's common law recognizes the status of de facto parents. Implicitly recognizing de facto parentage status, these courts have awarded custody to nonbiological parents over the objection of otherwise fit biological parents. In In re Marriage of Allen, 28 Wash.App. 637, 626 P.2d 16 (1981), noting that unique circumstances may warrant unique custody decrees, id. at 639, 626 P.2d 16, Division Three affirmed a trial court's custody decree in favor of a deaf child's stepmother over the objection of the child's biological father. The stepmother parented the child from age three to age seven, and during that time, due in large part to the stepmother's dedication, devotion and determination, the child showed remarkable development. Id. at 641-42, 626 P.2d 16. The court recognized that, in custody disputes between parents and nonparents, [g]reat deference is accorded to parental rights yet those rights are balanced by the State's interest as parens patriae in the child's welfare. Id. at 646, 626 P.2d 16. When these interests come into conflict, the parent's rights may be outweighed. Id. (citing In re Welfare of Sumey, 94 Wash.2d 757, 762, 621 P.2d 108 (1980)). The court then found that parental unfitness or a determination that the child's growth and development would be detrimentally affected by placement with an otherwise fit parent could serve to outweigh parental rights. Id. at 646-47, 626 P.2d 16. The Court of Appeals then made two findings: one, that despite the father's fitness as a parent, the child's development would be detrimentally affected if his father was awarded custody, and two, that the child had become integrated into the family unit formed by the father and stepmother. Id. at 647-48, 626 P.2d 16. With regard to the second finding, it noted: Where the reason for deferring to parental rights  the goal of preserving families  would be ill-served by maintaining parental custody, as where a child is integrated into the nonparent's family, the de facto family relationship does not exist as to the natural parent and need not be supported. In such a case, custody might lie with a nonparent. Id. at 648, 626 P.2d 16 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The court concluded that the psychological relationship [here] is equivalent to that of a natural family entity. Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 19 Division One reached a similar conclusion in In re Custody of Stell, 56 Wash. App. 356, 369, 783 P.2d 615 (1989). There, the child referred to his aunt as `Mom' and expert testimony established that she had become his psychological parent. Id. at 359, 783 P.2d 615. Testimony also showed that because of the child's special need for stability and consistent parenting, placement with the father would be detrimental. Id. at 361, 368, 783 P.2d 615. The Court of Appeals additionally found that the record reflected that the aunt was the psychological parent of the child, that the two represent a family unit, and that these considerations cannot be ignored. Id. at 369, 783 P.2d 615. The Court of Appeals thus reversed the trial court's award of permanent custody to the child's father. Id. at 371, 783 P.2d 615. ¶ 20 The cases of Allen and Stell support the proposition that Washington common law recognizes the significance of parent-child relationships that may otherwise lack statutory recognition. [8] In addition, both cases make clear that individuals may comprise a legally cognizable family through means other than biological or adoptive. B