Opinion ID: 214621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Further State Proceedings

Text: Gaskins returned to state court after the district court's dismissal without prejudice of his habeas petition and filed another motion for new trial in April 2000. He asserted two grounds relevant here: 1) prosecutorial misconduct in light of the Womack affidavit; and 2) erroneous jury instructions which permitted an inference of malice on less than a strong likelihood of death. See Commonwealth v. Gaskins , No. 91-018642, Order at 4 (Mass.Sup.Ct. July 12, 2002). The Superior Court ordered an evidentiary hearing on the prosecutorial misconduct issue and further argument on the jury instruction claim. Id. at 6-7. The evidentiary hearing took place in December 2002. In an order dated February 13, 2003, the Superior Court denied the motion with respect to the jury instruction issue. The Court reasoned both that Gaskins had waived the jury instruction issue because it was not addressed in his direct appeal or any post-trial motions, and alternatively, that the argument failed substantively. Womack did not testify at the December 2002 evidentiary hearing, asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Somewhat ironically, he claimed before the hearing that he was coerced into signing the very affidavit in which he announced that he was coerced to lie at Gaskins's trial, and thus argued that he did not waive his Fifth Amendment rights by providing that affidavit. As a result of Womack's refusal to testify, the superior court, although it accepted evidence from many of the individuals involved in preparing Womack for trial, did not reach the substance of Gaskins's claim that Womack had essentially recanted his trial testimony. However, based on Womack's testimony at an in camera hearing [3] limited to his Fifth Amendment claim, the court rejected Womack's claim that he was coerced into signing the recantation affidavit and thus held that Womack had waived his Fifth Amendment privilege. The court concluded that [o]n the circumstances surrounding the preparation and signing of the affidavit . . . Womack's testimony [was] not credible or believable. In addition, the court stated that on the claim of coercion in the signing of the affidavit, Womack did not appear, and I find he was not, truthful. In light of all the circumstances and evidence, Womack's explanations were not plausible and I do not accept them. Commonwealth v. Gaskins , No. 91-018642, slip op. at 4 (Mass.Sup.Ct. Feb. 13, 2003). The superior court stayed the proceedings in order to allow Womack to pursue an appeal of the court's Fifth Amendment ruling. The SJC ruled against Womack, holding that he could refuse to testify at a reconvened hearing and then appeal from any ensuing contempt order. In re Womack, 444 Mass. 1015, 831 N.E.2d 881 (2005). The matter returned to the same superior court judge in 2006, in order to reach the remaining merits of Gaskins's new trial motion, which by then had been pending for more than five years. Womack again refused to testify. Finally, in February 2008, the judge issued a twelve-page decision denying Gaskins's new trial motion on two grounds. See Commonwealth v. Gaskins , No. 91-18642, Order at 11-12 (Mass. Sup.Ct. Feb. 25, 2008). First, while referring to its 2003 order, [4] the court stated that it had previously found that `Womack's explanations [regarding the prosecution's alleged actions] were not plausible' and that the court `[did] not accept them.' (brackets in original). This was erroneous because, as previously noted, the 2003 order addressed Womack's credibility only with respect to whether he was coerced into signing the recantation affidavit, and not the affidavit relating to the issue of whether Womack was coerced to testify falsely at Gaskins's trial. The second basis for denying the new trial motion was the additional evidence submitted by the Commonwealth in connection with the motion that undermined the perjury claim, which the court summarized as follows: In response to Gaskins' motion for a new trial and the court's July 12, 2002, decision, the assistant district attorney assigned to prosecute the motion, Kevin Mitchell (ADA Mitchell), filed an affidavit on May 8, 2001. The affidavit stated that ADA Mitchell had spoken with Womack's defense attorney, Larry McGuire (McGuire). McGuire, after reviewing Womack's case file, had told ADA Mitchell that he and Womack met with then prosecutor, now Superior Court judge, Howard Whitehead (Judge Whitehead) and Lynn Police Lt. Dennis Flynn shortly before Womack testified at Gaskins' trial. McGuire also stated that this was the only meeting that occurred between Womack and the Commonwealth, and that neither Judge Whitehead, nor law enforcement, made any attempts to encourage Womack to testify falsely. Judge Whitehead also filed an affidavit on May 8, 2001. That affidavit stated that he, acting for the Commonwealth, had entered into a plea agreement with Womack on February 12, 1992, shortly before Gaskins' trial. The agreement established that, in exchange for certain concessions on the part of the Commonwealth, Womack would testify, truthfully, against Gaskins. Judge Whitehead also stated that he memorialized the meeting with handwritten notes. During the meeting with the Commonwealth, Womack gave his account of the events surrounding the murder, which was consistent with the testimony Womack provided at trial. [footnote omitted] Judge Whitehead also stated that he never advised Womack to tailor his testimony in any manner. [5] In addition to the affidavits, the court also described testimony given at the December 2002 hearing. In sum, McGuire corroborated Mitchell's and Whitehead's affidavits when he testified that: he and Womack met with Whitehead and Flynn shortly before Gaskins's trial; this was the only meeting between Womack and the Commonwealth; and neither Whitehead nor law enforcement attempted to encourage Womack to testify falsely. [6] Relying at least as much on the evidence provided by McGuire, Mitchell and Whitehead as it did on its erroneous recollection of its finding about Womack's credibility, the court concluded that Gaskins's conviction was not based on prosecutorial misconduct or perjured testimony and denied his new trial motion on February 28, 2008. Gaskins subsequently sought leave to appeal the February 2008 order to the SJC. The SJC gatekeeper justice denied the motion, first finding that the claims related to the jury instruction on malice, destruction of exculpatory evidence, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel were not new (or substantial), and do not require consideration by the full court. [Mass. Gen. Laws ch.] 278, § 33E. Commonwealth v. Gaskins , No. ESCR1991-1864, slip op. at 1-2 (Mass. Aug. 7, 2008). Next, the justice found the prosecutorial misconduct issue to be new, and thus addressed it. Id. Although repeating the error made by the superior court regarding Womack's credibility, the justice also noted that Womack's accusation of coerced perjury was countered by the considerable evidence provided by Gaskins's defense attorney and prosecutors. Id. at 2. Accordingly, after reviewing the record, the gatekeeper justice concluded that the prosecutorial misconduct issue was not substantial, and did not refer the matter to the full court. Id.