Opinion ID: 1727284
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the goal of judicial efficiency

Text: In addition to our recognition of the possibility that the failure to review certain serious sentencing errors would undermine the fairness of the judicial process, we do not find that rigid adherence to the contemporaneous objection rule always serves the goal of judicial efficiency. As Judge Altenbernd observed: If a goal of criminal appeal reform is efficiency, we are hard pressed to argue that this court should not order correction of an illegal sentence or a facial conflict between oral and written sentences on a direct appeal when we have jurisdiction over other issues. Although it is preferable for the trial courts to correct their own sentencing errors, little is gained if the appellate courts require prisoners to file, and trial courts to process, more postconviction motions to correct errors that can be safely identified on direct appeal. Denson v. State, 711 So.2d 1225, 1229-30 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). The assumption of some of the appellate courts that declined to address even serious unpreserved sentencing errors on appeal was that defendants would not be without a remedy because they could seek postconviction relief. See Maddox, 708 So.2d at 621. For example, the Fifth District reasoned that: Certainly, there is little risk that a defendant will suffer an injustice because of this new procedure; if any aspect of a sentencing is fundamentally erroneous and if counsel fails to object at sentencing or file a motion within thirty days in accordance with the rule, the remedy of ineffective assistance of counsel will be available. It is hard to imagine that the failure to preserve a sentencing error that would formerly have been characterized as fundamental would not support an ineffective assistance claim. Id. (emphasis supplied). But see Judge, 596 So.2d at 79 n. 3. Even assuming the availability of postconviction relief for sentencing errors not preserved on direct appeal, if a goal of the reform is efficiency, we are hard-pressed to conclude that shifting to defendants the burden of filing postconviction motions, and to trial courts the burden of processing these additional motions, advances the overall goal of judicial efficiency. Another potential problem with requiring defendants to correct unpreserved sentencing errors through postconviction motions is that defendants in noncapital cases will not necessarily be afforded counsel during collateral proceedings. See Russo v. Akers, 724 So.2d 1151, 1152-53 (Fla. 1998) (stating that there is no absolute right to counsel in a postconviction proceeding). Judge Altenbernd has expressed the additional concern that to the extent that collateral relief replaces direct appeal as the means for correcting these serious sentencing errors, the defendant may be constitutionally entitled to counsel on postconviction claims. See Bain, 730 So.2d at 309 (Altenbernd, J., dissenting). As the State made clear during oral argument, it has no interest in any defendant serving a sentence that is longer than the sentence authorized by law. Based on all these considerations, we conclude that the interests of justice will not be advanced if appellate courts decline to correct certain categories of sentencing errors for criminal defendants whose appellate briefs were filed during the window period after the enactment of the Act but before the adoption of our recent procedural changes in Amendments II.