Opinion ID: 199640
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: parsing the statutes

Text: 18 Having erected the appropriate analytical framework, we now explore the ramifications of the federal and state statutes germane to this controversy. The task of interpreting and reconciling these statutes presents abstract legal questions engendering de novo review. See Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 691 (1st Cir. 1994). 19
20 The case at bar involves two interrelated federal statutes. The grand jury indicted the appellant under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), quoted supra note 1, and the incorporated term misdemeanor crime of domestic violence is defined elsewhere as: 21 an offense that -- 22 (i) is a misdemeanor under Federal or State law; and 23 (ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim. 24 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A). Reading these statutes together, the proscriptions contained in section 922(g)(9) extend to any person who has been convicted under state law of a misdemeanor crime that (1) contains as an element the use or attempted use of physical force and (2) involves an enumerated relationship status between perpetrator and victim. We previously have held, and today reaffirm, that the use or attempted use of physical force constitutes an essential, and formal, element of a section 922(g)(9) predicate offense. See Meade, 175 F.3d at 218-21. Thus, the case at bar requires us to determine whether Congress, by codifying physical force as a formal element of such predicate offenses, intended to reach misdemeanants convicted under either branch of Maine's general-purpose assault statute. 25 To resolve this issue, we turn to time-honored principles of statutory construction. Where statutory interpretation is in prospect, the jumping-off point always is the text of the statute itself. United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 604 106 S.Ct. 311692 L.Ed.2d 483(1986); United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 823 F.2d 685, 688 (1st Cir. 1987). In scrutinizing the language, we presume, absent evidence to the contrary, that Congress knew and adopted the widely accepted legal definitions of meanings associated with the specific words enshrined in the statute. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952); United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 99 (1st Cir. 1994). Predictably, we turn to Black's Law Dictionary to glean the most widely accepted legal meaning of physical force. 26 This venerable reference work defines physical force as force consisting in a physical act. Black's Law Dict. (7th ed. 1999) (cross-referencing the definition of actual force). The word force means [p]ower, violence, or pressure directed against a person or thing. Id. The word physical, although not separately defined in Black's, has a corporeal aspect. See American Heritage Dict. of the Eng. Language (4th ed. 2000) (defining physical as of or relating to the body as distinguished from the mind or spirit); Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dict. (1989) (defining physical as of or relating to the body). Synthesizing the various definitions, physical force may be characterized as power, violence, or pressure directed against another person's body. 27 If statutory language points to a plain and unambiguous meaning, courts are bound to follow that signpost -- at least as long as that revealed meaning is neither unreasonable nor absurd. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1997); Charles George Trucking, 823 F.2d at 688. In the context of section 921(a)(33)(A), the phrase use or attempted use of physical force falls into this category. Physical force is an elementary concept, readily understood. And from a policy perspective, proscribing gun possession by individuals convicted of misdemeanor crimes characterized by the application of physical force advances Congress's evident purpose -- curbing the escalating societal problems associated with domestic violence. Meade, 175 F.3d at 217. 28 Since the straightforward employment of the term physical force in section 921(a)(33)(A) produces an entirely plausible result, we are not obligated to consult other aids to statutory construction. Salinas, 522 U.S. at 57-58; Meade, 175 F.3d at 219. We nonetheless mention two additional facts that confirm the absence of any congressional intent either to engraft a bodily injury requirement onto section 921(a)(33)(A) or otherwise to inspire a grudging construction of the words physical force as used in that statute. 29 The subsection immediately preceding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) precludes the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force . . . that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii). This qualifying clause limits the reach of section 922(g)(8) to a specific subset of physical force: physical force that is reasonably expected to generate physical injury. Following the settled rule that a statute must, if possible, be construed in such fashion that every word has some operative effect, United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992), the modifying clause in section 922(g)(8) cannot be dismissed as mere surplusage. This means that we must read the unqualified use of the term physical force in section 922(g)(9) as a clear signal of Congress's intent that section 922(g)(9) encompass misdemeanor crimes involving all types of physical force, regardless of whether they could reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury. After all, when Congress inserts limiting language in one section of a statute but abjures that language in another, closely related section, the usual presumption is that Congress acted deliberately and purposefully in the disparate omission. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S. Ct. 2120, 2124-25 (2001); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983). 30 The legislative history of section 922(g)(9) further suggests that Congress did not intend to import an injury requirement into section 922(g)(9). On this point, we find particularly instructive the comments of Senator Lautenberg (the statute's principal architect). Discussing section 922(g)(9) on the Senate floor shortly before its passage, Senator Lautenberg observed: 31 [T]he revised language includes a new definition of the crimes for which the gun ban will be imposed. Under the original version, these were defined as crimes of violence against certain individuals, essentially family members. Some argued that the term crime of violence was too broad, and could be interpreted to include an act such as cutting up a credit card with a pair of scissors. Although this concern seemed far-fetched to me, I did agree to a new definition of covered crimes that is more precise, and probably broader. 32 Under the final agreement, the ban applies to crimes that have, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon. This is an improvement over the earlier version, which did not explicitly include within the ban crimes involving an attempt to use force, or the threatened use of a weapon, if such an attempt or threat did not also involve actual physical violence. 33 142 Cong. Rec. S11,877 (1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). 34 While the remarks of the chief sponsor of a bill by no means control a court's construal of the enacted statute, they nonetheless can provide reliable insights into its construction. N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982); Meade, 175 F.3d at 219. Here, the specificity of the comments, precisely directed toward the intended meaning of the statute's mode of aggression component, lends substantial credence to them. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 237 (1984). We conclude, therefore, that Senator Lautenberg's statements, which plainly indicate that a principal purpose underlying Congress's substitution of crimes involving the use or attempted use of physical force for crimes of violence in section 922(g)(9) was to broaden the spectrum of predicate offenses covered by the statute, are worthy of respect. 35 In context, these insights are quite helpful. A comparison of the plain meanings of crimes of violence and physical force highlights the consonance between the purpose and effect of the revised language. Violence is essentially a subset of physical force involving injury or risk of harm. See Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dict. (1989) (defining violence as the exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse); see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (defining violent felony to include crimes involving conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another). The substitution of physical force as the operative mode of aggression element effectively expanded the coverage of section 922(g)(9) to include predicate offenses whose formal statutory definitions contemplated the use of any physical force, regardless of whether that force resulted in bodily injury or risk of harm. 36 To summarize, the usual and customary meaning of the phrase physical force persuades us that Congress intended section 922(g)(9) to encompass crimes characterized by the application of any physical force. The additional signposts point unerringly in the same direction. Accordingly, we use this as the operative definition. 37
38 The grand jury denominated the appellant's prior conviction under the Maine general-purpose assault statute as the predicate offense underlying the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). As previously stated, the Maine statute provides that [a] person is guilty of assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 207(1). Based upon the statute's disjunctive structure, either bodily injury or offensive physical contact constitutes a sufficient actus reus. In the pages that follow, we explore the scope of these two varieties of assault, according respectful consideration and great weight to the views of Maine's highest court. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938). 39 1. Bodily Injury. Parsing the bodily injury variant of assault is a straightforward task. Maine's criminal code defines bodily injury as physical pain, physical illness or an impairment of physical condition. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 2(5). The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (the Law Court) has imported this definition of bodily injury into Maine's general-purpose assault statute. See State v. Griffin, 459 A.2d 1086, 1091 (Me. 1983); State v. Carmichael, 405 A.2d 732, 735 (Me. 1979). Thus, the latter statute, under the bodily injury variant, proscribes acts that cause physical pain, physical illness, or impairments of physical condition. 40 2. Offensive Physical Contact. The definition of offensive physical contact, as used in Maine's general-purpose assault statute, is more elusive. Maine's criminal code does not explicate the phrase. There is, however, pertinent case law, which arises in two contexts: lesser included offenses and jury instructions. We examine those precedents. 41 In State v. Rembert, 658 A.2d 656 (Me. 1995), the defendant appealed from a robbery conviction premised upon a statute that included, as a required element, the use of physical force. 4 The defendant maintained that it was impossible to commit robbery involving physical force without also committing criminal assault involving offensive physical contact. The state attempted to distinguish the two on the ground that robbery involving physical force did not necessarily entail any bodily contact between robber and victim, whereas assault involving offensive physical contact required a direct touching of the victim. Id. at 657-58. In rejecting the state's argument, the Law Court subscribed to the Restatement position, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 18 cmt. c (1965), originally formulated in the context of civil battery. Accordingly, the Law Court held that offensive physical contact was not limited to direct touchings, but also could be effected by indirect touchings (e.g., the touching of items intimately connected to the body, such as clothing or a cane, customarily regarded as part and parcel of an individual's person). Rembert, 658 A.2d at 658. Since the use of physical force on another necessarily involved some type of offensive physical contact, assault was a lesser included offense of robbery. Id. 42 Contrary to the government's importuning, Rembert's conclusion that the use of physical force invariably involves some type of offensive physical contact does not definitively establish the converse proposition: that offensive physical contact necessarily entails the use of physical force. Rather, Rembert leaves open two possibilities: offensive physical contacts may categorically entail the use of physical force, or, alternatively, offensive physical contacts characterized by the use of physical force may represent a subset of a broader universe of offensive physical contacts. We shall return to, and resolve, this question in Part IV, infra. 43 In determining the scope of offensive physical contact, as that term is used in Maine's general-purpose assault statute, we also derive enlightenment from State v. Pozzuoli, 693 A.2d 745 (Me. 1997). There, the defendant was convicted on a charge of assault (an offense which, as we have explained, may consist of offensive physical contact). The Law Court approved a jury instruction that defined offensive physical contact as: 44 [K]nowingly intending bodily contact or unlawful touching done in such a manner as would reasonably be expected to violate the person or dignity of the victim. 45 It's something less than bodily injury . . . but requires more than a mere touching of another. And basically it's a question of was the contact under the circumstances such that a reasonable person would find it to be offensive. 46 You may consider what a reasonable person might consider under the circumstances to be offensive . . . . 47 Id. at 747. 48 For present purposes, the lesson to be learned from this approved instruction is that offensive physical contact entails something less than bodily injury . . . but requires more than a mere touching of another. The first part of this definition reiterates the Law Court's view that the presence or absence of bodily injury distinguishes the two variants of assault contemplated under Maine's general-purpose assault statute. See Carmichael, 405 A.2d at 735 (We view section 207 as specifying two independent types of simple assault, one where bodily injury results and another where there is merely an offensive physical contact without resulting bodily injury.). The second part of the definition emphasizes that not every physical contact is actionable under the general-purpose assault statute. Two factors distinguish mere touchings from offensive physical contacts: the mens rea requirement, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 207(1), and the application of a reasonable person standard to determine whether a contact is offensive, see Pozzuoli, 693 A.2d at 747-48; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 19 (A bodily contact is offensive if it offends a reasonable person's sense of dignity.).