Opinion ID: 278831
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: It would be of the softer material.

Text: 101 Q. Would it be wood or metal? 102 A. It would be metal. 103 Q. And from the installation from the arrangement of the RX System shown in Exhibit 20, and the photograph Exhibit 3, and the duplicate, I will call it by number, Exhibit 38, what would happen or what could happen to the portion of the metal from that stripped thread? 104 A. It would fall down into the regulator. (R. 427 b) 105 In view of Mr. Hale's and Professor Young's testimony, we find no error in the District Court's allowing the jury to consider the plaintiffs' stripped thread theory. 106 The District Judge allowed the jury to consider whether the RX System installation at Marineland violated the Liquid Petroleum Gases Regulations of Michigan, and instructed the jury that violations of those regulations would be evidence of negligence. Defendants urge reversible error in this regard on the ground that the undisputed evidence showed the RX System installed in November of 1958 to have been approved by the Michigan fire marshal. The undisputed evidence relied on by the defendants was a news flash which the Pyrofax Gas Corporation sent to all of its Pyrofax bulk distributors in the southeast Michigan area on July 18, 1960, nearly a year and a half after the installation of the RX System at Marineland. The news flash stated in pertinent part that: 107 The State Fire Marshal has finally approved the installation of the `Pyrofax' Gas RX Bulk Service. 108 Without passing upon the efficacy of defendants' proof of approval, it must be noted that there was no evidence offered to indicate precisely what was approved by the State Fire Marshal and, further, there was no evidence offered to indicate that the installation at Marineland substantially conformed to whatever might have been approved by the fire marshal. 5 109 The evidence offered did not require a finding that either the specific installation at Marineland had been approved by the State Fire Marshal or that at the time of the fire the same conformed to whatever system might have been approved at some other time. Furthermore, evidence was admitted at the trial from which the jury could conclude that at the time of the fire certain aspects of the installation at Marineland did not conform to the Regulations. Under these circumstances, we conclude that it was proper for the District Judge to allow the jury to consider the Regulations. See: Douglas v. Edgewater Park Company, 369 Mich. 320, 119 N.W.2d 567 (1963). 110 As noted above, plaintiffs took the position in the District Court that the RX System at Marineland failed due to the effects over a period of time of one or a combination of many items of negligence or defects in the design and installation of the System. Faced with a general verdict, obviously we are unable to determine the specific basis upon which the jury found in the plaintiffs' favor. 6 However, from a thorough review of the entire record, and in accordance with our previous discussion, we conclude that no issues of fact were improperly submitted for the jury's consideration. See: Roth v. Swanson, 145 F.2d 262 (C.A.8 1944). Moreover, we are of the view that the evidence, together with the legitimate inferences, was sufficient to support the general verdict in the plaintiffs' favor. Sitta v. American Steel & Wire Div. of U. S. Steel Corp., 254 F.2d 12 (C.A.6 1958). Therefore, the District Judge properly denied defendants' motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 111 Defendants urge that the District Judge erred in failing to give certain of their requested instructions. Those instructions fall essentially within the following three categories: 112
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114 3. A burden of proof charge incorporating and setting forth 17 of the plaintiffs' factual claims. 115 Further, defendants allude to 17 portions of the charge wherein they claim the District Judge erred. 116 Defendants urge, in substance, that by reason of the District Judge's failure to give their requested instructions and by his giving of certain instructions over their objection, the jury was misled with regard to the significance of certain items of evidence and also with regard to what the evidence reflected. 117 As might well be gleaned from our discussion thus far, a multitude of facts were developed during the lengthy trial of this case. In his charge, the District Judge clearly and fairly summarized the factual claims of the parties and certain aspects of the evidence. Viewing the charge as a whole, we find no basis for the defendants' claim that the District Judge misled the jury either with regard to the significance of certain items of evidence or with regard to what the evidence reflected. We conclude, therefore, that there was no prejudicial error in the charge as given or in the District Judge's failure to give certain of the defendants' requested instructions. Brown v. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., 300 F.2d 280 (C.A.6 1962). 118 In the middle of the trial, and after the plaintiffs had offered some evidence on the issue of damages, the parties met outside the presence of the court and reached an agreement as to the amount the plaintiffs would be entitled to recover in the event of a verdict in their favor. (R. 632 b-633 b) In colloquy between the court and counsel after this agreement was reached, no mention was made of the matter of interest from the date of the loss until the date of any potential judgment. 119 Under Michigan law, the matter of interest from the date of a loss to the date of judgment is one which is properly submitted to the jury. Currie v. Fiting, 375 Mich. 440, 134 N.W.2d 611 (1965); Grand Trunk Western R. Co., v. H. W. Nelson Co., Inc., 116 F.2d 823 (C.A.6 1941). Notwithstanding this fact, in making their requests for instructions the plaintiffs included no request that the jury be instructed on the matter of interest from the date of the loss to the date of judgment. Rather, the plaintiffs' requested instructions repeatedly stated that in the event of a verdict in the plaintiffs' favor, the jury was to return a verdict for the plaintiffs in the amount stipulated against Jerry Ritter Appliances, Inc., and Pyrofax Gas Corporation. In his charge, the District Judge made no mention of the matter of interest from the date of the loss until the date of judgment. The plaintiffs took no exception to the charge in this regard. 120 Approximately six months after judgment was entered against the defendants, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Interest wherein they requested interest from the date of the loss until the date of the judgment. The District Judge denied this motion for the reason the parties stipulated damages for which the judgment should be entered in the event the jury found liability. Taking into consideration all of the circumstances mentioned above, we conclude that the plaintiffs' Motion for Interest from the date of loss until the date of judgment was properly denied. 121 The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.