Opinion ID: 161452
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pendent State Claim: Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy

Text: 27 Dr. Craven's public policy claim never reached the jury. Instead, the district court granted summary judgment for UH on sovereign immunity grounds, I Aplt. App. 154-55, rejecting Plaintiff's argument that 24-10-106(1)(b) of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA) waived UH's immunity as to her claim. Plaintiff renews this argument on appeal. 28 We review an award of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Stamper v. Total Petroleum, Inc. Retirement Plan for Hourly Rated Employees, 188 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the [appellee is] entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added). Plaintiff's appeal involves a narrow question of pure law: whether 106(1)(b) waives the State's sovereign immunity with respect to a wrongful discharge action against a public hospital by a former employee whose job duties did not include patient care. Because the Colorado Supreme Court has not yet considered this question, we must predict what that court would do in order to resolve Plaintiff's claim. See Lytle v. City of Haysville, Kan., 138 F.3d 857, 868 (10th Cir. 1998). 29 Under 106(1)(b) of the CGIA, [s]overeign immunity is waived by a public entity in an action for injuries resulting from: . . . (b) The operation of a public hospital, correctional facility, . . . or jail by such public entity . . . . Colo. Rev. Stat. 24-10-106(1). The statute defines operation as the act or omission of a public entity or public employee in the exercise and performance of the powers, duties, and functions vested in them by law with respect to the purposes of any public hospital, [or] jail . . . . Colo. Rev. Stat. 24-10-103(3)(a). Neither the CGIA nor any other statute defines the purpose of [a] public hospital, cf. Neiberger v. Hawkins, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1194 (D. Colo. 1999) (citing statutory purpose of particular hospital), nor has the Colorado Supreme Court articulated a definition of a public hospital's purpose. The Colorado Court of Appeals, however, has held that the primary purpose of a hospital is to provide medical or surgical care to sick or injured persons. Sereff v. Waldman, No. 99CA1193, 99CA1497, 2000 WL 1785165, at  (Colo. App. 2000) (citing Plummer v. Little, 987 P.2d 871, 874 (Colo. App. 1999)). While not binding on this court, decisions by a state's intermediate appellate courts provide evidence of how the state's highest court would rule on the issue, and we can consider them as such. Stauth v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 236 F.3d 1260, 1267 (10th Cir. 2001); accord West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940) (Where an intermediate appellate state court rests its considered judgment upon the rule of law which it announces, that is a datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.). 30 In contrast to the dearth of case law as to the purposes of a public hospital, the Colorado courts have considered the purposes of a jail or correctional facility also referenced in 106(1)(b) on more than one occasion. In both Flores v. Colo. Dep't of Corrections, 3 P.3d 464 (Colo. App. 2000), and Pack v. Arkansas Valley Correctional Facility, 894 P.2d 34 (Colo. App. 1995), the courts held that the purpose of a correctional facility is to manage convicts safely and effectively . . . . Flores, 3 P.3d at 466; accord Pack, 894 P.2d at 37 (purpose of the correctional facility [is] to confine inmates safely and effectively). Although the purpose of a correctional facility has no bearing on the present case, the courts' decisions in Flores and Pack are instructive on a related, yet more subtle, point. Taken together, those cases stand for the proposition that the alleged injury underlying the action must be directly related to the purpose, as distinct from the operation, Pack, 894 P.2d at 37, of the 106(1)(b) facility before the court will find that the State's sovereign immunity has been waived. 31 In Flores, for example, the court held that the State's sovereign immunity had been waived where the plaintiff alleged that she had slipped and fallen on a wet floor inside the secure visitor's area of the [correctional] facility. 3 P.3d at 465. [B]ecause the purpose of a correctional facility is to manage convicts safely and effectively, and [because] visitation within the facility directly assists in meeting that purpose, the maintenance of the visitor area within the custodial facility here is directly related to the purpose of the correctional facility. Id. at 466 (emphasis added). In Pack, however, the court had held that sovereign immunity was not waived with respect to a claim arising from a slip and fall in the correctional facility's parking lot. 894 P.2d at 37. In so holding, the court of appeals carefully distinguished the operation of the facility from its purpose: 32 [T]he maintenance of visitor parking areas in order to facilitate prison visitation is not directly related to the purpose, as distinct from the operation, of a correctional facility. . . . 33 Although the [Department of Corrections] has established and is maintaining a visitors' parking lot, such function merely is ancillary to the purpose of the correctional facility. Therefore, it is not part of the operation of the correctional facility as defined under the CGIA . . . . 34 Pack, 894 P.2d at 37 (emphasis added). We believe the Colorado Supreme Court would agree with this distinction. 35 Further, we believe that the Court would agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that the primary purpose of a hospital is to provide medical or surgical care to sick or injured persons. Sereff, 2000 WL 1785165, at ; see also Plummer, 987 P.2d at 874. Just as a parking lot is merely . . . ancillary to the safe and effective confinement of persons convicted of crimes, Pack, 894 P.2d at 37, the personnel action at issue here is only remotely related to UH's primary purpose. The relation between a hospital employee's discharge and the provision of medical or surgical care to sick or injured persons is particularly tenuous with respect to administrative employees like Dr. Craven. See, e.g., II Aplt. App. 1. Accordingly, we cannot construe 106(b)(1) as a waiver of the State's CGIA immunity with respect to Plaintiff's claim. Although Plaintiff correctly notes that Colorado Supreme Court broadly construe[s] the CGIA provisions that waive immunity in the interest of compensating victims of governmental negligence, Springer v. City & County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 798 (Colo. 2000) (citations omitted); accord Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082, 1086 (Colo. 2000); State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 506 (Colo. 2000), the Court has also cautioned that [n]onetheless, our primary task in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Nieto, 993 P.2d at 506 (citation omitted). As explained, we do not believe the Colorado General Assembly intended 106(1)(b) to be applied to claims like the one before us. 36 Accordingly, the jury's verdict on the plaintiff's 1983 claim is VACATED and that claim is REMANDED to the district court for the entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant. The district court's award of summary judgment in favor of the defendant on plaintiff's public policy claim is AFFIRMED.