Opinion ID: 2807807
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State's proposed remedy

Text: ¶51 In its brief and at oral argument, the State argued that even if the court of appeals' remedy violates Chamblis's right to due process, the proper remedy is to allow Chamblis to withdraw his guilty plea. Drawing on Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 283, the State maintains that plea withdrawal is the exclusive remedy for a defendant's plea being unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary. While that may be true where a defendant appeals his or her conviction seeking plea withdrawal, that is hardly the situation we have here. ¶52 In Bangert, we set forth a burden-shifting procedure for circuit courts to follow when faced with a defendant's motion to withdraw his or her guilty or no contest plea on the basis that it was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274-76. That procedure is not implicated in the instant action because Chamblis neither filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea nor appealed his conviction. Indeed, defense counsel made clear at oral argument that Chamblis does not wish to withdraw his guilty plea. ¶53 The State suggests that Chamblis should be required to withdraw his plea anyway. According to the State, Chamblis is 26 No. 2012AP2782-CR not entitled to conviction and sentence for a sixth offense because the evidence shows that he already possessed six prior drunk-driving related convictions when he entered his guilty plea in this case.14 Colloquially speaking, the State argues that Chamblis should not get a free pass on the circuit court's purported mistake. ¶54 We find it fundamentally unfair and thus violative of due process to require Chamblis to withdraw his guilty plea in this case.15 [T]he concern of due process is fundamental fairness. State ex rel. Lyons v. De Valk, 47 Wis. 2d 200, 205, 177 N.W.2d 106 (1970). '[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.' Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). ¶55 Here, we can think of at least a couple reasons that requiring Chamblis to withdraw his guilty plea is fundamentally unfair. First and foremost, forced plea withdrawal deprives Chamblis of the benefit of his bargain. A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to the enforcement of a negotiated plea agreement. State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 271, 558 14 Chamblis did not appeal the portion of the court of appeals' decision that concluded the State had sufficiently proved the prior Illinois conviction. 15 In response to a question at oral argument, defense counsel maintained that Chamblis could not be required to withdraw his guilty plea without violating his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. We choose not to address that argument because it was not briefed by the parties. 27 No. 2012AP2782-CR N.W.2d 379 (1997). 'Although a defendant has no right to call upon the prosecution to perform while the agreement is wholly executory, once the defendant has given up his bargaining chip by pleading guilty, due process requires that the defendant's expectations be fulfilled.' Id. (citation omitted). ¶56 A substantial number of plea bargains are no doubt motivated at least in part by the hope or assurance of a lesser penalty than might be imposed if there were a guilty verdict after a trial to judge or jury. Brady, 397 U.S. at 752. This case is no different. Chamblis entered into the plea agreement with the hope that he would face a less severe penalty than if he went to trial. As noted, the State agreed to dismiss charges of OWI as a repeater, obstructing an officer as a repeater, and battery by prisoner in exchange for Chamblis's plea and voluntary waiver of constitutional rights. Thus, a forced plea withdrawal in this case subjects Chamblis to greater punishment, not just with respect to the charge of operating with a PAC, but to these additional charges as well. That is fundamentally unfair, particularly in light of the fact that Chamblis has already served the 2 year confinement portion of his originally imposed sentence and therefore has an expectation of finality in that sentence. ¶57 Second, we note that the State was not without options to avoid this dilemma. For example, the State could have withdrawn its plea offer in response to the circuit court's determination that it would accept a plea only to the lower charge. In fact, the circuit court went out of its way to give 28 No. 2012AP2782-CR the prosecutor and defense counsel an opportunity to discuss whether the State wished to proceed with the plea given the evidentiary ruling. The State then could have sought review of the circuit court's decision by filing a petition for leave to appeal a non-final order pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2).16 However, the State chose to go through with the plea agreement anyway, despite the constitutional implications, perhaps because it too benefits from such a bargain. Id. (For the State there are also advantages—the more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof.). 16 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.03(2) provides: Appeals by permission. A judgment or order not appealable as a matter of right under sub. (1) may be appealed to the court of appeals in advance of a final judgment or order upon leave granted by the court if it determines that an appeal will:
litigation or clarify further proceedings in the litigation;
irreparable injury; or