Opinion ID: 2396480
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: quo warranto proceedings

Text: The only proper method for attacking the validity of a city's annexation of territory is by quo warranto proceeding, unless the annexation is wholly void. Hoffman v. Elliott, 476 S.W.2d 845, 846 (Tex. 1972) (per curiam); Kuhn v. City of Yoakum, 6 S.W.2d 91, 91 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, judgm't adopted); Graham v. City of Greenville, 2 S.W. 742, 745 (Tex.1886); City of Hurst v. City of Colleyville, 501 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Tex.Civ.App.Fort Worth 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), on appeal after remand sub nom. State ex rel. City of Colleyville v. City of Hurst, 521 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Civ.App.Fort Worth 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); L. Lowe, 6A Texas Practice § 1203 (1973). The purpose of a quo warranto proceeding is to question the right of a person or corporation, including a municipality, to exercise a public franchise or office. In this case, Alexander questions the City's annexation authority. Through quo warranto proceedings, the State acts to protect itself and the good of the public generally, through the duly chosen agents of the State who have full control of the proceeding. Fuller Springs v. State ex rel. City of Lufkin, 513 S.W.2d 17, 19 (Tex.1974). Therefore, the State must bring the action to question irregular use of the delegated annexation authority. Furthermore, quo warranto proceedings serve another purpose. By requiring that the State bring such a proceeding, we avoid the specter of numerous successive suits by private parties attacking the validity of annexations. Kuhn, 6 S.W.2d at 92. The judgments of suits brought by private parties are binding only on the parties thereto so conflicting results might be reached in subsequent suits by other individuals. These problems are avoided by requiring quo warranto proceedings because the judgment settles the validity of the annexation on behalf of all property holders in the affected area. Id.; see also Superior Oil Co. v. City of Port Arthur, 726 F.2d 203, 206 (5th Cir.1984). [4] The requirement that an action seeking to set aside annexation for irregular use of power be brought as a quo warranto proceeding dates back as early as 1886. Graham v. City of Greenville, 67 Tex. 62, 2 S.W. 742, 744-45 (1886). It continues to be followed today. See, e.g., Hoffman, 476 S.W.2d at 846; City of Houston v. Savely, 708 S.W.2d 879, 889 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert, denied, 482 U.S. 928, 107 S.Ct. 3212, 96 L.Ed.2d 698 (1987); Larkins v. City of Denison, 683 S.W.2d 754, 756 (Tex.App. Dallas 1984, no writ); City of Nassau Bay v. Webster, 600 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Tex.Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.]), writ ref'd n.r.e., 608 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1980). The fact that the Legislature has reacted to other holdings regarding annexation, [5] but has not acted to expressly provide a private action to set aside annexation in reaction to these cases, supports the position that a quo warranto proceeding is required to set aside annexation unless it is void. The only express remedy for failure to provide services to the annexed area is disannexation. Tex.Loc.Gov't Code § 43.141; see also Larkins, 683 S.W.2d at 757. Because this is not a direct attack by quo warranto, the City will be entitled to summary judgment if it can show as a matter of law that the ordinance is not void. FAILURE TO FOLLOW STATUTORY PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTIS ACTION TAKEN VOID OR VOIABLE? The City offered proof in support of its argument that the City had subject-matter jurisdiction to issue the ordinance which was fully activated by giving proper notice under the Code. Alexander's reply to the City's motion is that certain procedural irregularities render the ordinance void. Alexander relies on City of Duncanville v. City of Woodland Hills, 489 S.W.2d 557, 558 (Tex. 1972) (per curiam), to support its contention that full compliance with statutory requirements as to notice and hearing is necessary to the validity of an ordinance. Historically, private challenges of annexation ordinances have been sustained and the ordinance held void in the following instances: an annexation of territory exceeding the statutory size limitations, Deacon v. City of Euless, 405 S.W.2d 59, 64 (Tex.1966); an attempted annexation of territory within the corporate limits of another municipality or which was not contiguous with its own limits, City of West Orange v. State ex rel. City of Orange, 613 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tex.1981); City of Waco v. City of McGregor, 523 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex.1975); an attempted annexation in which the boundary of the annexed territory did not close using the description contained in the ordinance, State ex rel. Rose v. City of La Porte, 386 S.W.2d 782, 789 (Tex.1965). The common trait in these cases is whether the municipality exceeded the annexation authority delegated to it by the Legislature. The power to annex is committed to the political branches of state government; it is a legislative prerogative. See City of Wichita Falls v. State ex rel. Vogtsberger, 533 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex.), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 298, 50 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976); Hammonds v. City of Corpus Christi, 226 F.Supp. 456, 459 (S.D.Tex.1964), affd, 343 F.2d 162 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 837, 86 S.Ct. 85, 15 L.Ed.2d 80 (1965). The Annexation Act expressly states that [a] municipality may annex area only in its extraterritorial jurisdiction unless the municipality owns the area. Tex.Loc.Gov't Code § 43.051. The extraterritorial jurisdiction of a municipality depends on its size, and the limits are specified in section 42.021. Section 43.055 sets forth the limits on the amount of territory which may be annexed in one year. As discussed previously, the Act also expressly prohibits strip annexation. Id. at § 43.054. Alexander's allegations regarding the timing of the hearing notice and commencement of annexation proceedings are without basis because the City met the minimum notice posting requirements as a matter of law. The record establishes that the City published notice of the hearings more than ten days in advance and that the City did not begin to commence annexation proceedings until 20 days after the second hearing. TEX.LOC.GOV'T CODE § 43.052. The annexation ordinance was within the power of the municipality to promulgate, and its jurisdiction was activated by giving notice required by statute. The resulting ordinance is not void. Alexander's allegations directed at whether the service plan was adequate and whether a quorum was required to conduct the hearing are matters that could be raised in a direct attack by quo warranto, but are insufficient grounds for a private challenge. See, e.g., Universal City v. City of Selma, 514 S.W.2d 64, 73 (Tex.Civ.App.Waco 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (act unauthorized by law or color of law may be challenged by collateral attack but mere irregular exercise of valid authority must be brought by quo warranto); May v. City of McKinney, 479 S.W.2d 114, 120 (Tex.Civ.App.Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (collateral attack must show entire want of power and it is not sufficient to show mere irregularity in exercise of annexation authority); City of Irving v. Callaway, 363 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex.Civ.App.Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (complaints directed at irregularities which would make ordinance voidable only must be brought by quo warranto proceeding). Although Alexander urges that Duncanville supports its contention that the annexation was void, we decline to follow Duncanville. In Duncanville, the court issued a per curiam opinion refusing to grant an application for writ of error. In that case the court stated that full compliance with statutory requirements as to notice and hearing is necessary to the validity of an ordinance. 489 S.W.2d at 558 (emphasis added). However, the Duncanville opinion conflicted with the long line of authority that only the state can challenge annexation for such procedural irregularities because such irregularities merely result in voidable ordinances. See Hoffman, 476 S.W.2d at 846; Kuhn, 6 S.W.2d at 91; Graham, 2 S.W. at 744-45; May v. City of McKinney, 479 S.W.2d 114, 120 (Tex.Civ. App.Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); City of Houston v. Harris County Eastex Oaks Water & Sewer Dist, 438 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Tex.Civ.App  Houston [1st Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); City of Irving v. Callaway, 363 S.W.2d 832, 834-35 (Tex.Civ. App.Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lefler v. City of Dallas, 177 S.W.2d 231, 233-34 (Tex.Civ.AppDallas 1943, no writ). [6] Given that the Duncanville opinion did not even cite or discuss the cases regarding the requirements to bring a quo warranto proceeding, it is clear that the court did not intend to overrule these cases. Thus we overrule Duncanville to the extent that it allows a private party to challenge annexation without proof that the action is void. [7] The Texas Constitution confers the power to annex territory on cities and the legislature has provided the scheme to be followed. Tex. Const, art. XI, § 5; Tex.Loc. Gov't Code § 43.021; City of Irving v. Dallas County Flood Control Dist, 383 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Tex.1964). The annexation in the instant case was authorized by color of law, namely the Municipal Annexation Act; thus, any irregularity in annexing the property could only be challenged through a quo warranto proceeding. Therefore, we agree with the holding of the court of appeals that the City prevails because the summary judgment proof shows that the ordinance is not void ab initio.