Opinion ID: 184763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appropriate Hourly Rates

Text: 6 Davis County also seeks $221,219.75 in attorney fees. Attorney fees are explicitly permitted by section 7607(f), but the statute does not specify the location in which the hourly rate will be computed, i.e., the situs of the law firm or the situs of the legal proceedings. Davis County's lodestar calculation is based on District of Columbia rates (discounted by $5-$60/hour to account for ... inefficiencies) although the case was handled by a Salt Lake City firm. EPA states that Davis County's settlement offers on the fees issue were based on its normal billing rates; Davis County states that its offers reflected significant discounts from D.C. rates. EPA acknowledges that Davis County is entitled to attorney fees, but argues that D.C.'s rates--which appear to be approximately 70% higher--are not the correct ones. 7 In defending its use of D.C. rates, Davis County cites several cases for the proposition that the location of the court deciding the case is normally the relevant market. The sole D.C. Circuit case cited, Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240, 251-52 (D.C.Cir.1982), awarded D.C. rates to Mississippi lawyers who handled a voting rights case, including trial, in this circuit, even though much of the preparation work was performed in Mississippi. Assuming the normal rule is that the rate is based on the forum of the litigation, not the business location of the lawyers, we recognized that the rule has an exception--when an out-of-town attorney is used because of special expertise or the unwillingness of local counsel to take the case, out-of-town rates apply; as long as local attorneys are available and competent to handle the case, however, local rates should prevail. See id.; National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 317-18 (4th Cir.1988); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 226, 232 (2d Cir.1987). Based on this exception, the Donnell court made the fee calculation for one attorney on (lower) Mississippi rates because he was retained due to his expertise on a particular county in Mississippi. 8 EPA would distinguish Donnell and other cases cited by Davis County as involving situations where a substantial part of the attorneys' work took place, as was the case in Donnell where a trial was conducted, in the venue where the prevailing market rate was applied. This distinction, however, is certainly not made explicit in Donnell. In Donnell, the court did not distinguish between work performed in-town and out-of-town while discussing the question of the appropriate rate. It observed that, [a]lthough there may be cases, such as this one, where much of the work must be performed away from the district court's community, we do not believe that this alone provides a sufficient reason for deviating from the general rule. Donnell, 682 F.2d at 252. Thus, the court awarded D.C. rates for one attorney whose only involvement was preparing the fee application, a task she performed in her Mississippi office. Nor do the other cases cited by Davis County appear to turn on where any particular portion of the work was performed or whether a trial or appellate court was involved. 9 Were we to adhere strictly to Donnell, D.C. rates would be the appropriate ones to use in calculating Davis County's attorney fees award as this case was before a D.C. court and could have been handled by D.C. attorneys. For reasons we now explain, however, we decline to follow Donnell to the extent it dictates this result, and hold instead that Davis County's fee award should be based on Salt Lake City rates. Although the forum rate rule has been widely adopted, we have found few cases applying the rule in situations like the one we face, where out-of-jurisdiction lawyers would receive substantially higher rates than they ordinarily command for work done almost exclusively in their home territory. But see Garmong v. Montgomery County, 668 F.Supp. 1000, 1007 (S.D.Tex.1987); Mary Frances Derfner & Arthur D. Wolf, Court Awarded Attorney Fees p 16.03, at 16-103 (1997) ([T]he rule is equally applicable where counsel's customary rates are lower. In that event, out-of-town counsel can recover the higher forum rate.). The combination of these two factors along with intervening decisions by the Supreme Court impels us to create a second exception to Donnell for cases where the bulk of the work is done outside the jurisdiction of the court and where there is a very significant difference in compensation favoring D.C. This exception would not alter the fee award in most instances as most cities' rates are on a par with our own, see National Survey Ctr., Partner, Associate & Legal Assistant Billing Rate Survey for Law Firms, National Edition 3-4 (1998), but it would prevent the occasional erratic result where the successful petitioner is vastly overcompensated given the amount he contracted to pay for legal services. In all other cases the D.C. forum rates would apply. 10 Donnell offered two rationales for the forum rate rule. First, administrative ease: It requires the district court normally to determine only the prevailing market rate within its jurisdiction, an inquiry about which it should develop expertise. Donnell, 682 F.2d at 251. Second:[I]t is a neutral rule which will not work to any clear advantage for either those seeking attorneys' fees or those paying them. High-priced attorneys coming into a jurisdiction in which market rates are lower will have to accept those lower rates for litigation performed there. Similarly, some attorneys may receive fees based on rates higher than they normally command if those higher rates are the norm for the jurisdiction in which the suit was litigated. 11 Id. at 251-52. A Third Circuit task force offered similar reasons for preferring the forum rate rule: 12 The Task Force acknowledges that standardized rates applicable to all types of cases, even when broken into categories, will undercompensate certain attorneys and overcompensate others. Nonetheless, it concludes that the objectivity and efficiency that would be achieved by using uniform rates is preferable to the current system. 13 Court Awarded Attorney Fees, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force, 108 F.R.D. 237, 261 (1985) (footnote omitted). We consider these reasons sufficient to justify awarding fees based on rates charged in the District of Columbia to all lawyers except those few who practice in far less expensive legal markets and perform the bulk of their work on the case at home in those markets. Cf. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 96, 109 S.Ct. 939, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989) (reasonable attorney fee award may be higher than fee called for by contract between prevailing client and attorney). 14 Because we have simplified the process for calculating reasonable attorney fee awards since Donnell was decided, the administrative ease rationale it relied on carries less weight today. In 1982, the twelve-factor inquiry put forth by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974), and adopted by us in Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 187-88 (D.C.Cir.1974), was still central to the lodestar approach. See Jordan v. United States Dep't of Justice, 691 F.2d 514, 518 & n. 28 (D.C.Cir.1982). The lodestar approach has become significantly simpler since then, see Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clear Air, 478 U.S. 546, 564-65, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986), reducing the likelihood that lack of knowledge of a litigator's home community will hinder a court shaping a fee award. 5 Nonetheless there is reason to continue using the D.C. rates when they are not significantly higher than out-of-town rates or when most of the work is in fact performed here. 15 We think the neutrality rationale in Donnell is still sufficient to justify forum rates in all but the extreme situation we face here. We will presume that Washington rates will apply so long as the judicial forum is here, unless the work done here is minimal and the difference in rates substantial. Like basing awards on the situs of the work performed, the use of Washington rates is neutral in that it does not afford an automatic advantage to either prevailing or losing parties. 16 While both approaches can thus be termed neutral, we find the use of home market rates is preferable when the home market is substantially less costly and the site of the bulk of the legal work because it produces a result that better reflects the purpose of fee shifting statutes. [T]he aim of such statutes [i]s to enable private parties to obtain legal help in seeking redress for injuries resulting from the actual or threatened violation of specific federal laws. Delaware Valley, 478 U.S. at 565, 106 S.Ct. 3088. Parties should be just as able to obtain such help when fees are based on the jurisdiction in which the clients and the lawyers reside and practice as if those fees are based solely on the judicial forum. While limiting lawyers to less than their usual rates would present problems for private parties seeking help, limiting lawyers to what they normally receive in their home market should not. Conversely, while awarding higher Washington rates would not make it harder for parties to find counsel, it would produce windfalls inconsistent with congressional intent. See id. ([t]hese statutes were not designed as a form of economic relief to improve the financial lot of attorneys); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 580, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986) (plurality) (Congress did not intend statutory fee awards to produce windfalls). 17 Our decision today is confined to the situation before us and effects a limited exception to Donnell. In this case, as far as we can tell from the record, virtually all of the work was performed in Utah, the less expensive legal market. The only time spent in Washington by Davis County's lawyers, as far as the record reflects, was for the purpose of examining the administrative docket and participating in a short oral argument. In a case where out-of-town lawyers must spend much more time in Washington--for example, when a lengthy trial is held--a different analysis favoring an award of D.C. rates is appropriate. 18 Nor do we suggest that the Donnell rule should no longer be applied when lawyers from a more expensive market litigate here. In fact, consideration of the purpose of fee shifting statutes suggests preserving the Donnell rule and not adopting a home market rate presumption on such facts. As long as there are lawyers here who are competent to handle a case, the party seeking legal assistance will be able to find it even if the potential fee award is limited to D.C. rates instead of higher home market rates. On the other hand, when a party deliberately chooses pricier out-of-town lawyers who will be undercompensated relative to their normal rates, the principal purpose of the fee shifting laws, i.e., to assure adequate counsel, will not be impugned. The exception to the Donnell rule allowing home market rates for attorneys from a more expensive jurisdiction when lawyers in Washington are not available or competent to handle the case remains in place. This exception reflects a proper concern with protecting the ability of a private party to attract a lawyer.