Opinion ID: 2803541
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jeremy Duncan

Text: Jeremy Duncan challenges Application #6 on the basis of necessity. Beyond the alreadydiscussed allegations of boilerplate language and the failure to exhaust traditional investigative techniques, Duncan raises an additional necessity argument: he claims that agents had to exhaust traditional investigative methods with respect to each individual particular interceptee or target. This circuit has no published decisions explicitly addressing whether necessity must be shown with regard to each particular interceptee or investigatory target. But see United States v. -15- Nos. 13-3803/3814/3883/4019/4081/4086, United States v. Darin Wright, et al. Sherrills, 432 F. App’x 476, 481 (6th Cir. 2011) (determining that even though an affidavit concerned his co-defendant, there was “no reason” to exclude the applicability of that affidavit to the defendant because, “[v]iewing the affidavit as a whole,” the targeted telephone was linked to a “high volume of calls made to other numbers associated with individuals known or suspected of drug trafficking”). We hold that necessity must be shown only for the investigation as a whole, not for each interceptee or target. We begin with the words of the statute and attribute to them their ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning. United States v. Plavcak, 411 F.3d 655, 660 (6th Cir. 2005). Title III's necessity provision requires “a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). After reviewing that statement, the issuing judge may issue an interception order if satisfied that normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c). These provisions speak only of “investigative procedures” and say nothing of “individuals,” “targets,” or “interceptees.” This language suggests that the issuing judge must analyze the necessity of a wiretap within the context of the investigation as a whole, not in relation to individual targets or interceptees. It also accords with the directive that courts judge the evidence in the affidavit based “on the totality of the circumstances and in a reasonable and common sense manner.” Alfano, 838 F.2d at 161. Other circuits have adopted this reading. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 911 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he necessity requirement is directed to the objective of the investigation as a whole, and not to any particular person. If the Government can demonstrate that ordinary investigative techniques would not disclose information covering the scope of the drug -16- Nos. 13-3803/3814/3883/4019/4081/4086, United States v. Darin Wright, et al. trafficking enterprise under investigation, then it has established necessity for the wiretap.”); United States v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 1307, 1312 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding that necessity did not have to be established “as to all named interceptees”). As explained above, the affidavit in support of Application #6 satisfied necessity as to the investigation as a whole. Duncan’s argument therefore fails.
Duncan alleges that the affidavit in support of Application #6 failed to establish probable cause that he was involved in drug trafficking, linking him to the conspiracy on the basis of only three phone calls between him and the investigation’s other targets. As the district court explained, however, when placed in context, these intercepted conversations revealed that Duncan was participating in a drug conspiracy. In his affidavit, SA Porrini explained: With regard to the TREGGS DTO, DANTE L. BRANCH and ANTHONY L. TREGGS were intercepted in a telephone conversation over [Branch’s wiretapped phone] on January 30, 2012, in which TREGGS advised BRANCH that he would be in town (Akron) during that week. Later that same day, JEREMY S. DUNCAN, a courier for TREGGS, was intercepted over [Branch’s phone]. DUNCAN advised BRANCH that he was in town and wanted to meet with BRANCH. BRANCH met with DUNCAN at “the Club,” a warehouse located at 1074 Bank St., Akron, OH. Based on intercepted conversations between BRANCH, using [his phone], and DERRICK WATSON, using [his phone], it was apparent that DUNCAN dropped off an unknown, multi-pound quantity of marijuana to BRANCH and WATSON. Additional intercepted telephone conversations suggested BRANCH was expecting another shipment from TREGGS/DUNCAN during the second or third weeks of March. Intercepted calls over [three wiretapped telephones] indicated that BRANCH, WATSON, DUNCAN and [UNKNOWN CONSPIRATOR] arranged for a shipment of an unknown amount of marijuana from California to Akron, OH that arrived in Akron on March 29, 2012. Surveillance units observed BRANCH and DUNCAN meet at 1074 Bank St., Akron, OH to complete the delivery. Additionally on April 06, 2012, TREGGS was intercepted over [Branch’s phone] advising BRANCH (who was in California, visiting with TREGGS’ father) to come to his residence, I got something for you. TREGGS then asked his father to show BRANCH -17- Nos. 13-3803/3814/3883/4019/4081/4086, United States v. Darin Wright, et al. what TREGGS had given to his father (marijuana) and advised, “I got a whole lot.” SA Porrini believed and so stated in his affidavit that these conversations, coupled with his experience and observations, evidenced participation in drug trafficking by Duncan. The district court properly concluded: “The affidavits reveal that Porrini was an extremely experienced and accomplished narcotics investigator who could reliably interpret the conversations. [The issuing judge] acted within his discretion in accepting the Agent’s interpretations of the calls.” See United States v. Caicedo, 85 F.3d 1184, 1192-93 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that probable cause supported a search warrant because the affiant’s interpretation of illegal behavior was entitled to deference in light of the affiant’s “15 years’ experience in law enforcement generally and at least seven years’ experience specifically in narcotics investigations”). Accordingly, the district court had a substantial basis from which to determine probable cause existed.