Opinion ID: 1702151
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: is fiore ever applicable in florida?

Text: Although this Court applied Fiore in State v. Klayman, 835 So.2d 248 (Fla.2002), to require the reversal of a final conviction of a drug trafficking offense, Justice Wells remains committed to his position in his dissent in Klayman that Fiore has no application in Florida. I respond to his contentions below.
Consistent with his dissenting opinion in Klayman, Justice Wells asserts that L.B. was a nonretroactive change in the law, rather than a clarification subject to Fiore. According to Justice Wells, because a decision of a district court is binding upon all Florida trial courts in the absence of interdistrict conflict, this Court in reviewing district court decisions can only change, rather than clarify, the law. In Justice Wells' view, Fiore can never apply in Florida because of the different appellate court structure in this State. I disagree, not only because Fiore is based on constitutional principles of due process of law but also because Justice Wells' description of the roles played by this Court and the district courts of appeal is incomplete. As the Second District has recognized, the function of the district courts in interpreting the law of the state is secondary to its primary function of error correction: Under our present constitutional scheme, the district courts of appeal engage primarily in the so-called error-correcting function to insure that every litigant receives a fair trial. This frees the supreme court to discharge its judicial policy-making function of clarifying the law and promulgating new rules of law. Whipple v. State, 431 So.2d 1011, 1014 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Therefore, although the principle that a district court decision can be binding on trial courts outside that district guides trial courts on what law to follow under certain circumstances, it does not diminish this Court's power to authoritatively interpret the law when conflict arises or constitutional issues are at stake. A district court decision is never binding on this Court or another district court. Differences in the structure of the Pennsylvania and Florida court systems, on which Justice Wells relies, do not warrant a contrary conclusion. It is true that this Court's discretionary review authority is more circumscribed than that of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which issued the decision clarifying the law of that state and requiring the reversal of Fiore's conviction. Compare 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 724 (West 2004) (providing that final orders of the Superior Court and Commonwealth Court may be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon allowance of appeal by any two justices of the Supreme Court upon petition of any party to the matter) with art. V, § 3(b)(3)-(4), Fla. Const. (authorizing discretionary review of only those district court decisions that meet specific criteria). But the difference in how cases can reach the high courts of Florida and Pennsylvania is of no significance to the authority of decisions made by these courts. Florida and Pennsylvania are among the great majority of states that have intermediate appellate courts to facilitate the prompt administration of justice. In this type of system, the existence of mid-level courts does not diminish the authority of the state's highest court to interpret the law, resolve conflicts among lower courts, and determine issues of constitutional stature or statewide importance. The fact that district courts, performing their primary function of error correction, dispose of most criminal appeals without opinion further weighs against precluding the application of Fiore in Florida. In a recent year (July 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999), district courts issued per curiam affirmances (PCAs), which are not directly reviewable by this Court, in 69.2 percent of all criminal appeals, and citation PCAs, which are reviewable only if at least one of the cases cited is under review by this Court, in another 6.9 percent of criminal appeals. See Judicial Management Council, Final Report and Recommendation, Committe on Per Curiam Affirmed Decisions Appendix D-6 (May 2000) (available on this Court's website at h ttp:// www.flcourts.org/sct/sctdocs/bin/pca-report.pdf.). The availability and prevalence of the PCA means that a district court could issue an opinion construing a provision such as section 790.001(13) against a defendant and then affirm all other appeals raising that issue through a PCA. In fact, the Second District issued a PCA in Bunkley's direct appeal. See Bunkley v. State, 539 So.2d 477 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). The court did not address any of the three issues raised by Bunkley concerning the weapon enhancement: (1) section 790.001(13) provided unconstitutionally inadequate notice that his pocketknife was statutorily defined as a weapon  the very issue subsequently addressed by the Second District in L.B.; (2) the evidence was insufficient to establish that he possessed a weapon, and (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it could apply the weapon enhancement even if Bunkley did not use the knife during the burglary. Unless Fiore applies, litigants such as Bunkley who are precluded by a PCA from seeking discretionary review in this Court would never be able to obtain the benefit of a subsequent decision of this Court clarifying that their conduct was not prohibited. Fiore requires that the dictates of due process of law take precedence over the legitimate interest in the finality of district court decisions under these circumstances.
In Klayman, this Court held that Fiore applied to a decision that had come before the Court on certified conflict. We determined that a defendant could not be legally convicted of drug trafficking under the law as properly interpreted. Specifically, this Court held in Klayman that this Court's decision in Hayes v. State, 750 So.2d 1 (Fla.1999), was a clarification of extant law under Fiore and that Klayman was entitled to the benefit of that subsequent clarification of the drug trafficking statute. See Klayman, 835 So.2d at 254-55. Until we decided Hayes, a defendant possessing an identical amount of tablets containing hydrocodone under identical circumstances could be convicted of drug trafficking in the Fourth and Fifth Districts but not in the First and Second Districts. [34] Individuals convicted of drug trafficking are subject to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of twenty-five years and a mandatory fine of $500,000. See Hayes, 750 So.2d at 2 (citing section 893.135(1)(c)(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996)). On the other hand, under a proper interpretation of the provision the only possible crime by defendants possessing tablets containing 15 milligrams of hydrocodone would be unauthorized possession of a Schedule III substance, a third-degree felony punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed five years. See id., at 2 (citing section 893.13(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes (Supp.1996), and section 775.082(3)(d), Florida Statutes (1995)). The effect of our opinion in Hayes was to provide a clarified definition of trafficking in hydrocodone which excluded conduct under which defendants in the Fourth and Fifth Districts had been convicted. This is why this Court properly held in Klayman that Hayes was a clarification of the drug trafficking statute that, under Fiore, applied to a defendant whose conviction of trafficking in hydrocodone became final before the decision in Hayes.
In this case, the majority's determination that the issue decided in L.B. was a jury question at the time of Bunkley's trial, and therefore that L.B. was a nonretroactive change in the law rather than a clarification, is contrary to Fiore and inconsistent with Klayman. I agree with Justice Wells that the inconsistency cannot be justified by any distinction between statutes that cede discretion to the courts and those that employ precise language. See concurring op. at 54. L.B., which construed the common pocketknife exception to the definition of deadly weapon, is no less a clarification of the law than Hayes. However, as previously stated, unlike Justice Wells, I cannot conclude that district court decisions before L.B. created the law of the state that made L.B. a change in the law and render Fiore, and hence Klayman, inapplicable to convictions that were final when L.B. was issued. Extending Fiore to this case would not have a profoundly detrimental effect on our criminal justice system, as Justice Wells suggests. Quite the opposite. Our citizens expect that a defendant should not be incarcerated for conduct that the law does not prohibit. Further, there are critical limitations to the application of Fiore. Fiore applies strictly to first-time statutory clarifications by a state's highest court. In comparison, under Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922 (Fla.1980), a decision overruling or receding from our prior precedent can be held to apply retroactively to final convictions. Additionally, Fiore applies only to those first-time clarifications that interpret a statutory offense under which the State has been allowed to convict a person of a crime without proving the elements of that crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 531 U.S. at 229, 121 S.Ct. 712. Because of its narrow criteria, I believe that relatively few district court decisions will be overturned pursuant to the stringent standards of Fiore. Moreover, any impact on finality of decisions caused by Fiore is minimal in contrast to the significant due process concerns of incarcerating an individual for conduct that was in fact never criminal under the statute as properly clarified. Regarding the concern that trial courts will be unduly burdened, granting relief in this case would not compel a retrial. Bunkley's conviction would be reduced to simple burglary and his sentence adjusted accordingly, akin to the discharge for possession of a weapon on school grounds ordered in L.B. As this Court has stated in applying the Witt test of retroactivity, [i]n the limited number of decisions that are retroactively applied, we have determined that concerns for basic fairness and uniformity of treatment among similarly situated defendants outweigh any adverse impact that retroactive application of the rule might have on decisional finality. Dixon v. State, 730 So.2d 265, 267 (Fla.1999). The same considerations apply to decisions meeting the narrow criteria of Fiore.