Opinion ID: 1209860
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Give An Unlawful Imprisonment Instruction

Text: Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error in refusing his request to instruct the jury on unlawful imprisonment, a lesser included offense of the charged offense of kidnapping. He contends this error requires reversal of his first degree murder conviction, as well as his kidnapping conviction. The murder case went to the jury on both premeditation and felony murder theories. The trial court did not follow the procedures suggested by earlier cases to determine whether the murder conviction was based on premeditation, felony murder, or a combination of both. See State v. Lopez, 163 Ariz. 108, 111, 786 P.2d 959, 962 (1990); State v. Smith, 160 Ariz. 507, 513, 774 P.2d 811, 817 (1989). Therefore, on appeal, we must assume that the verdict is based, at least in part, on a finding of felony murder. State v. Schad, 142 Ariz. 619, 621, 691 P.2d 710, 712 (1984). On felony murder, two predicate felonies were alleged: kidnapping and sexual assault. The jury acquitted defendant of sexual assault, instead finding him guilty of the lesser included offense of sexual abuse, which is not a predicate felony for felony murder. Defendant argues the jury might also have acquitted him of kidnapping if it had been given the option of convicting him of the lesser included offense, unlawful imprisonment. Unlawful imprisonment, like sexual abuse, is not a predicate felony for felony murder. Although defendant requested an unlawful imprisonment instruction, which the trial court refused to give, the state contends the defendant has waived the issue on appeal by failing to make a further record on this issue in the trial court. Rule 21.3, Ariz. R.Crim.P., provides that a party may not assign as error the failure to give an instruction unless the party objects before the jury retires to deliberate. If the record is incomplete, a party is precluded from raising any error on appeal regarding instructions. See, e.g., State v. Whittle, 156 Ariz. 405, 406, 752 P.2d 494, 495 (1988); State v. Lucas, 146 Ariz. 597, 604, 708 P.2d 81, 88 (1985); but see State v. Flores, 140 Ariz. 469, 474, 682 P.2d 1136, 1141 (App. 1984). The purpose of making a record is to give the trial court an opportunity to consider and rule upon the position advanced by the party. Here, defendant's reason for requesting an instruction on a lesser included offense was obvious. In Arizona, trial judges know that lesser included offense instructions must be given if requested and if supported by the evidence. See Rule 23.3, Ariz.R.Crim.P.; State v. Vickers, 159 Ariz. 532, 542, 768 P.2d 1177, 1187 (1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1033, 110 S.Ct. 3298, 111 L.Ed.2d 806 (1990). Nothing would be added to the trial court's vantage point or to this court's review by a mechanistic recital in the record: Your Honor, I object to the refusal to give the unlawful imprisonment instruction as it is a lesser included offense of kidnapping and is supported by the evidence. Because we consider the issue adequately preserved for appeal under the facts and circumstances of this particular case, it is unnecessary for us to consider or resolve whether it would be fundamental error to fail to instruct on a lesser included offense of a predicate felony in a capital felony murder case, even absent a request. We turn, then, to the merits of the requested instruction. To determine whether there is sufficient evidence to require the giving of a lesser included offense instruction, the test is whether the jury could rationally fail to find the distinguishing element of the greater offense. State v. Noriega, 142 Ariz. 474, 481, 690 P.2d 775, 782 (1984), overruled on other grounds, State v. Burge, 167 Ariz. 25, 804 P.2d 754 (1990). The distinguishing element between kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment is the perpetrator's state of mind, i.e., whether the unlawful imprisonment was accompanied with one of the enumerated intents set out in A.R.S. § 13-1304 so as to elevate the unlawful imprisonment to kidnapping. See Lucas, 146 Ariz. at 604, 708 P.2d at 88; Flores, 140 Ariz. at 473, 682 P.2d at 1140. Defendant was charged with kidnapping with the intent to inflict death, physical injury or a sexual offense on the victim. A.R.S. § 13-1304(A)(3). The jury rationally could have found that defendant lacked this requisite intent: the prosecution's chief witness conceded that defendant was so enraged during the ordeal he might not have known what he was doing, and several witnesses testified that defendant had consumed a prodigious amount of alcohol. Indeed, the trial court instructed the jury on intoxication precisely because it concluded that defendant's intoxication could negate specific intent on the part of the defendant. Defendant was entitled to the instruction he requested on the lesser included offense of unlawful imprisonment. Because the jury may have used kidnapping as a predicate felony for felony murder, the trial court's failure to give defendant's requested instruction on unlawful imprisonment was reversible error on both the kidnapping and the murder count. Accordingly, we reverse defendant's kidnapping and murder convictions. [2]