Opinion ID: 1351343
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cross-examination of defendant's character witnesses.

Text: In cross-examining defendant's character witnesses, the prosecutor brought out evidence of defendant's commission of numerous nonviolent crimes, many of which were committed when defendant was a juvenile. The incidents included receiving stolen property, malicious mischief, truancy, and various traffic infractions. Other evidence touched upon defendant's tardiness at work, lying, and sexual promiscuity. In some cases the witnesses themselves knew of the behavior; in others they had merely heard reports. Under People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772-776 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782], all this evidence, because it does not fall under any of the statutory aggravating factors, would be inadmissible in the prosecution's penalty case-in-chief. (52) Such evidence is, however, admissible to impeach testimony of defendant's good character. As we said in People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 791, [o]nce appellant placed his general character in issue, the prosecutor was entitled to rebut with evidence or argument suggesting a more balanced picture of his personality. Such rebuttal evidence need not meet the requirements for admissibility established in People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d 762. (See Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 792.) The prosecutor made very skillful use of this testimony in argument. After a defense psychologist had testified that defendant had an underlying schizophrenia, the prosecutor presented rebuttal testimony by a psychologist who said defendant was a sociopath. Then, at argument, the prosecutor noted that some of the acts brought out on cross-examination, such as juvenile vandalism, truancy, and habitual tardiness at work, are not only evidence of bad character but also diagnostic factors for sociopathy. Reviewing the diagnostic categories of DSM III, the prosecutor demonstrated that defendant's behavior corresponded to the diagnostic factors. (53) Defendant argues that this argument improperly used evidence admissible only to impeach as if it were admissible as substantive proof, and argues that the court should have instructed the jury on the limited use of impeaching evidence. He points to CALJIC No. 2.42, which directs the jury that [w]here on cross-examination, a witness is asked if he has heard of reports of certain conduct of a defendant inconsistent with the traits of good character as to which the witness has testified, such questions and the witness' answers thereto may be considered only for the purpose of determining the weight to be given to the opinion of the witness or to his testimony as to the good reputation of the defendant. Such questions and answers are not evidence that the reports are true and you must not assume from them that the defendant did in fact conduct himself inconsistently with such traits of character. Defendant did not request this instruction, but here contends that it should have been given sua sponte. Defendant cites two decisions which have held that CALJIC No. 2.42 should be given sua sponte ( People v. Grimes (1957) 148 Cal. App.2d 747, 750-751 [307 P.2d 932]; People v. Bentley (1955) 131 Cal. App.2d 687, 691-692 [281 P.2d 1]). But defendant and the Attorney General both fail to note that Grimes and Bentley were overruled in People v. White (1958) 50 Cal.2d 428 [325 P.2d 985]. In that case the rebuttal testimony offered was admissible only to impeach, but the jury was not so instructed. We held that [i]n the absence of such a request, there [is] no duty upon the trial court to instruct the jury that the rebuttal testimony was admissible solely for the purpose of impeaching the witness. (P. 430.) The same reasoning applies to impeaching testimony elicited on cross-examination. We conclude that the court did not err in failing to give the instruction sua sponte, [32] and, in the absence of such an instruction and of any objection from the defense, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct in arguing that the evidence could be used to show the truth of the matters stated. Defendant also argues that his sentence should be overturned because it was based in part on unreliable evidence, i.e., hearsay and rumor which were introduced through the cross-examination of defense witnesses. But by presenting a psychological expert defendant necessarily opened the door to cross-examination inquiring into the factual basis of the expert's opinion; likewise by presenting character evidence defendant opened the door to cross-examination inquiring into the factual basis of the witness's judgment of his character. If defendant presents such evidence he must expect that it will be tested by cross-examination. Thus defendant cannot prevent the evidence in question from being heard by the jury; his only remedy to reduce the risk that the penalty sentence is based in part on that evidence is to request a limiting instruction. [33]