Opinion ID: 795717
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Denial of Defendant Lupo's Motion to Suppress

Text: 121 This Court conducts a de novo review of a district court's legal conclusions concerning a motion to suppress, but reviews the district court's factual findings for clear error. United States v. Spikes, 158 F.3d 913, 922 (6th Cir.1998). [T]he evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the district court. Id. 122 On August 1, 2002, FBI agents executed a federal search warrant on Lupo's home in Shelby Township, Michigan. Lupo filed a motion to suppress in the district court arguing that the affidavit supporting the warrant presented insufficient facts to establish probable cause. Lupo alleged that the information provided in the affidavit was vague, unsupported, uncorroborated or stale. (J.A. at 164.) Lupo further argued that the warrant was overbroad. The district court denied Lupo's motion, finding that there was probable cause to believe that Lupo had committed a crime and that evidence of the crime would be found at his residence, that the warrant was not overbroad because the items to be seized were alleged with particularity, and that the information in the warrant was not stale because the information provided established an ongoing criminal enterprise, and also because Hudson had spoken to federal agents regarding Lupo's criminal activities on June 26, 2002, about one month before the search warrant was issued. The district court further opined that the items sought in the search warrant are items that individuals usually retain for many years. 123 We agree with the district court that there was probable cause, that the warrant was not overbroad, and that the information was not stale. 124
125 According to the Fourth Amendment, no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 979 (6th Cir.2000) ( en banc ) (Clay, J. dissenting) ([T]he requirement that a warrant shall be supported by specific evidence of criminal activity before being issued is deeply rooted in our history.). The protections of personal privacy and property embodied in the amendment require that probable cause be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate. . . . United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1377 (6th Cir.1996) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948)). For the magistrate to be able to properly perform this official function, the affidavit presented must contain adequate supporting facts about the underlying circumstances to show that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant. Id. (citations omitted). [T]he information presented must be sufficient to allow the official to independently determine probable cause and he cannot merely ratify the bare conclusions of others. Id. In making a probable cause determination, 126 [t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. 127 United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)); United States v. Washington, 380 F.3d 236, 240 (6th Cir.2004). To justify a search, the circumstances must indicate why evidence of illegal activity will be found in a particular place. There must, in other words, be a nexus between the place to be searched and the evidence sought. Carpenter, 360 F.3d at 594 (quoting United States v. Van Shutters, 163 F.3d 331, 336-37 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted)); Washington, 380 F.3d at 240. 128 The affidavit at issue in the present case established probable cause. The affidavit supporting the warrant was eight pages long, and included allegations from Hudson and Kim Carter stating that Lupo had received individual cash payments in the amount of $20,000 from Hudson, as percentage payment for the CCS and EDPS contracts. The affidavit contained specific information from Hudson's day planners regarding dates that payments were made, as well as cancelled checks showing payments to R, and witness statements from Carter, Hudson and Scothorn that Hudson referred to Lupo and Contesti as R and R. The affidavit also included specific allegations as to the free work performed on Lupo's home by HCI. With regard to this work, the affidavit provided information from invoices of contractors detailing the cost of work done at Lupo's home, and that this work was paid for by HCI. 129 The affidavit further provided the details of the May 2002 meeting between Lupo and Hudson, at which time Lupo patted Hudson down and instructed Hudson to say that he had paid for the work on his house if it ever came up during the course of the federal investigation. The swearing officer stated in the affidavit that Hudson had told investigators that Lupo maintained an office in his residence, and that Hudson also indicated that HCI had built a hidden room in the basement of Lupo's home, where Lupo intended to install a safe. The swearing officer also said that it was his experience that individuals would store currency, valuables, financial records, and other business documents in such safes. 130 We conclude that there was probable cause to search Lupo's home given the plethora of evidence provided by witnesses cooperating with the government, as well as the financial documentation that had already been uncovered that implicated Lupo in the conspiracy. Moreover, the evidence that Lupo maintained an office at his residence, and a hidden room with a safe, provided a nexus between the place to be searched and the alleged criminal activity. 131
132 General warrants are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976). The Fourth Amendment requires warrants to `particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.' United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1026 (6th Cir.1991) (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV). A general order to explore and rummage through a person's belonging is not permitted, rather [t]he warrant must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be seized. Id. (citations and quotations omitted). The degree of specificity required depends on the crime involved and the types of items sought. Id. 133 The search warrant in this case provided that the items to be seized should cover the time frame from 1994 up to the date of the search, and could be in various forms, including, but not limited to documents, videotapes, computer disks, etc. The warrant specifically stated that records to be seized included: financial documents; currency, stock certificates and instruments of monetary value; correspondence between Lupo and HCI, Contesti, or Hudson; business records involving Lupo, Contesti, L & C Development, Hudson, HCI, and any other individuals associated with CCS; documents, including deeds, certificates of title, and other ownership records related to Lupo's residence or other properties he may own, and records of any improvements, repairs or construction projects at these locations; gambling records; travel records; investment records; telephone records; records related to payment of personal and business expenses and cash purchases; personal financial statements and tax documents; day planners, calendars, diaries, schedules, etc. recording Lupo's activities; address, telephone and email directories; records reflecting a relationship between Lupo and Hudson and Contesti; records and notes of financial transactions. (J.A. at 197-98.) 134 The record shows that the warrant stated with particularity all items to be seized at Lupo's residence, and thus provided guidance to the searchers as to what they were authorized to seize. Lupo was accused of being involved in a financial bribery and extortion scheme. All of the items authorized to be seized would likely provide evidence of Lupo's connection and criminal enterprise with Hudson and Contesti. Therefore, we conclude that the warrant was not at all overbroad. 135
136 Lupo lastly argues that the information provided in the affidavit was stale because the alleged conspiracy ended years before the search warrant was executed. In determining whether a probable cause finding is stale, we are to consider the defendant's course of conduct; the nature and duration of the crime; the nature of the relevant evidence; and any corroboration of the older and more recent information. United States v. Helton, 314 F.3d 812, 822 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Czuprynski, 46 F.3d 560, 567 (6th Cir.1995) ( en banc )). In this case, the allegations were of an ongoing criminal conspiracy, covering a period of several years, and involving two of Lupo's associates. The evidence provided by the witnesses, including Hudson, Carter and Scothorn established that Lupo was taking bribes for present and future contracts, suggesting an ongoing enterprise. Furthermore, the primary witness, Hudson, had only just spoken to police on June 26, 2002, approximately one month prior to the date that the warrant was issued. Police could not have obtained the information about Lupo at an earlier time. 137 Even more crucially, however, it was alleged that Lupo met with Hudson to convince Hudson to lie to the police about the fact that Lupo had not paid for the work on his home, a mere three months before the warrant was issued. Furthermore, the affidavit alleged that Lupo had spoken with the swearing officer on May 30, 2002 at Lupo's home, and had acknowledged that HCI had done some remodeling projects at his home, but claimed that checks were written for these projects. (J.A. at 179.) Subsequently, in response to a subpoena, Lupo produced some records related to the work on his residence, but none from HCI. 138 Because of the nature and circumstances of this case, and the fact that investigators had received recent evidence and corroboration of events that had taken place some time ago, we uphold the district court's finding that the information supporting probable cause was not stale. Federal investigators moved to secure a warrant shortly after interviewing Hudson, Carter, and Scothorn. This was an ongoing investigation of an ongoing criminal enterprise, and the government was only able to obtain solid evidence against Lupo and other individuals involved as of 2002 when Hudson, a primary participant, began to cooperate. Furthermore, we agree with the district court's conclusion that financial documents, receipts, and business records of the sort sought in this investigation are generally kept for a number of years, and therefore, it was not unreasonable to think that key evidence would still be available at Lupo's residence.