Opinion ID: 202688
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Crack and Powder Cocaine Equivalency Ratios

Text: 33 The remainder of González-Rivera's arguments, none of which he raised below, involve the 100:1 equivalency ratio of crack to powder cocaine used to calculate his sentence. See United States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 54-57 (1st Cir.2006) (describing the history of the disparate treatment of crack and powdered cocaine embedded in the federal sentencing guidelines (commonly referred to as the 100:1 ratio)). In 1994, we upheld the sentencing distinction between crack and powder cocaine against both due process and equal protection challenges under the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 740-41 (1st Cir.1994). We said that Congress had sufficient reasons for treating crack more harshly than powder cocaine, and that there are racially neutral grounds for the classification that more plausibly explain its [disparate] impact on [minorities]. Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). González-Rivera offers no arguments that we have not consistently rejected before, see Pho, 433 F.3d at 61-65 (rejecting a variety of arguments against the ratio, including those based on the Sentencing Commission's effort to ease the discrepancy), and even so, based on our clear precedent, there was obviously no plain error on the part of the district court in applying the equivalency ratios. 34 González-Rivera also challenges the equivalency ratio as so disproportional as to be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. The First Circuit has not squarely decided this issue, but every other circuit has rejected the argument that the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See United States v. Brooks, 161 F.3d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir.1998); United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1158 (11th Cir.1997); United States v. Fraiser, No. 94-30287, 1995 WL 528004, at  (9th Cir.1995) (unpublished opinion) (citing United States v. Harding, 971 F.2d 410, 414 (9th Cir.1992)); United States v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1421, 1424 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Smith, 34 F.3d 514, 525 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Fisher, 22 F.3d 574, 580 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 96 (3d Cir.1992); United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1034 (6th Cir.1990); United States v. Thomas, 900 F.2d 37, 39 (4th Cir.1990); United States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975, 980-81 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Cyrus, 890 F.2d 1245, 1248 (D.C.Cir.1989). Moreover, we have stated many times before that [t]he decision to employ a 100:1 crack-to-powder ratio . . . is a policy judgment, pure and simple, and therefore it is up to Congress—not the courts—to adopt rational drug equivalency ratios. Pho, 433 F.3d at 62-63. 35 Although this is enough to defeat González-Rivera's argument under a plain error standard, we also point out that a defendant seeking proportionality review under the Eighth Amendment must demonstrate, at the threshold, an `initial inference of gross disproportionality' between the `gravity of [the] criminal conduct and the severity of the . . . penalty' imposed. United States v. Cardoza, 129 F.3d 6, 18 (1st Cir.1997) (internal citation omitted) (alterations in original). We have previously upheld a 280-month sentence for the distribution of 85.3 grams of crack cocaine against an Eighth Amendment challenge. United States v. Graciani, 61 F.3d 70, 76-77 (1st Cir.1995). Here, González-Rivera's sentence was seventy months less for a conviction involving over ten grams more crack. We therefore cannot infer gross disproportionality in this case.