Opinion ID: 2584939
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Admission of Testimony of Bernard Sanchez

Text: Defendant next contends the trial court erred in permitting witness Bernard Sanchez to testify regarding an adoptive admission by defendant that supported the finding that he had shot Deputy Perrigo. Sanchez, an employee at the rice mill, testified defendant and Estrada walked into the packing building where he was working sometime prior to their surrender to police. Defendant still had on his handcuffs. Sanchez overheard another worker, Guadelupe Duran, ask Estrada if they still had the murder weapon. Estrada replied the gun was hidden in the alfalfa. Duran asked which one of them had done that wicked thing, a reference to the murder of Deputy Perrigo. Estrada motioned with his head toward defendant, who made no response. Defendant then stated that nothing would have happened if the lady had not called the police on them. Defendant asked the workers for money to buy clothes so that he and Estrada could flee to Oregon. (12) Defendant's claim that Sanchez's testimony was untrustworthy and violated his rights under the confrontation clause of the federal Constitution must be rejected. Evidence Code section 1221 provides, Evidence of a statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is one of which the party, with knowledge of the content thereof, has by words or other conduct manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth. As was explained in People v. Preston (1973) 9 Cal.3d 308 [107 Cal.Rptr. 300, 508 P.2d 300], [i]f a person is accused of having committed a crime, under circumstances which fairly afford him an opportunity to hear, understand, and to reply, and which do not lend themselves to an inference that he was relying on the right of silence guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and he fails to speak, or he makes an evasive or equivocal reply, both the accusatory statement and the fact of silence or equivocation may be offered as an implied or adoptive admission of guilt. ( Id. at pp. 313-314.) Defendant is wrong in suggesting the statement was admitted under the statement against penal interest exception to the hearsay ruleit was clearly proffered and admitted as an adoptive admission under Evidence Code section 1221. Moreover, it is well settled that an adoptive admission can be admitted into evidence without violating the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation on the ground that `once the defendant has expressly or impliedly adopted the statements of another, the statements become his own admissions, and are admissible on that basis as a well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule.' ( People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 190 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521], quoting People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 624 [247 Cal.Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070].) Defendant's claim that Sanchez's testimony regarding the adoptive admission violated his rights under the confrontation clause is therefore unavailing. We have further considered and must reject defendant's claim that he received no notice at all of Sanchez's proposed testimony. The record reflects that defendant did receive discovery detailing Sanchez's presence at the scene of the conversation in question and the inculpatory statements made at that time, and further reflects that Sanchez's name was on the prosecution's witness list. Indeed, defense investigators had sought to contact Sanchez to discuss his testimony. In any event, even were we to find that Sanchez's testimony regarding defendant's adoptive admission that he killed Deputy Perrigo was erroneously admitted, there could be no prejudice since defendant admitted as much in his own confession shortly after his surrender to authorities.