Opinion ID: 2330450
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Disclosure-of-Probation-Status Claim

Text: Sullins next claims that the Superior Court erred by admitting Probation Officer Sullivan's testimony that Sullins was under probation supervision at the time of his arrest. Sullins asserts that the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the relevance of this testimony under D.R.E. 403. [22] We review the trial judge's refusal to grant a motion to suppress evidence for abuse of discretion. [23] Under D.R.E. 403, evidence, even if logically relevant, may be excluded as not legally relevant if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. . . . [24] In a factually similar case, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has held that the probative value of a probation officer's testimony that the defendant was a probationer and that the defendant verified that the place where drugs were found was his residence, was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. [25] Similarly, here, Sullins chose to present the testimony of two witnesses that they shared living quarters with him. Sullins' purpose was to suggest that the drugs that police found in the Carter Street residence may have belonged to someone other than himself. As a condition of his probation, however, Sullins was required to keep the probation department apprised of his living arrangements, including the persons with whom he was living. During rebuttal, Sullivan testified that Sullins never reported to his probation officer, Ms. Sullivan, that he shared his residence with either of those witnesses. Ms. Sullivan's rebuttal testimony was both an adequate and a necessary link between Sullins and his residence where the drugs were found, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The Superior Court, fully aware of the risk surrounding testimony given by Sullins' probation officer, gave the jury an appropriate instruction. Thus, [t]o the extent that there was prejudice it was mitigated by an instruction given by the [Superior Court] to the effect that the jury should not consider the defendant's probationary status as evidence of guilt. [26] We find that in concluding that the prejudicial effect of Sullivan's testimony was outweighed by the probative value of the evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Sullins argues, in the alternative, that Ms. Sullivan's testimony should have been excluded under D.R.E. 404(b), [27] citing Getz v. State. [28] Sullins argues that the testimony would have revealed that Sullins had been convicted of some other crime, yet invited speculation as to the nature of the conviction and the underlying conduct. Essentially, Sullins argues that Ms. Sullivan's testimony did not satisfy the fifth Getz prong, which requires that the trial judge exclude the evidence unless the probative value of the evidence outweighs the potential for unfair prejudice. Because Sullivan's testimony was admissible under D.R.E. 403, Sullins' Getz argument fails for the same reasons. And, because Sullins failed to identify what other Getz prongs were not satisfied, we need go no further in reviewing his Getz claim.