Opinion ID: 1844309
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: WHETHER CARR IS ELIGIBLE FOR THE DEATH PENALTY PURSUANT TO ATKINS v. VIRGINIA.

Text: ¶ 40. In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), the United States Supreme Court determined that imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded inmates constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Atkins decision did not define who is or is not mentally retarded for purposes of eligibility for a death sentence but instead leave[s] to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences. 122 S.Ct at 2250. ¶ 41. Because Carr was sentenced pre Atkins, the issue of his possible mental retardation was not scrutinized under the standard which Atkins imposed, nor under the standards we adopt today in Chase v. State, 873 So.2d 1013, 2004 WL 1118688 (Miss.2004). ¶ 42. Carr's counsel argues he is entitled to a jury trial to determine whether he is mentally retarded. We disagree. Carr erroneously relies on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) which held unconstitutional a sentencing scheme where a judge rather than a jury determined whether there were sufficient aggravating circumstances to warrant imposition of the death penalty. In the present case, however, the death penalty has already been imposed by a jury after weighing both mitigating and aggravating evidence pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-101. And in Foster, we clearly stated that the issue of whether a defendant is mentally retarded such that he may not be executed under Atkins will be considered and decided by the circuit court without a jury. Foster, 848 So.2d at 175. See also Russell v. State, 849 So.2d 95, 147-48 (Miss.2003). ¶ 43. The issue before this Court is whether Carr is ineligible for a death sentence which has already been imposed by a jury. Neither the trial court nor this Court has acknowledged him to be mentally retarded and the State challenges any such claim. Dr. Kallman's report was compelling, but left unanswered questions raised by Atkins. ¶ 44. Notwithstanding the evidence which is before this Court regarding Carr's claim of mental retardation, we determine that under Atkins and the new standards set forth today in Chase v. State, 873 So.2d 1013 (Miss.2004), we cannot constitutionally deny him the opportunity to present the issue of his possible mental retardation to the trial court. It is at the trial court that all the arguments presented by the State as well as those of Carr shall be heard and be weighed in accord with the standards and procedures set forth in Chase, and a final determination made as to whether Carr is mentally retarded and, thus, ineligible for the death penalty. ¶ 45. We therefore grant Carr leave to proceed in the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he is still eligible for the death penalty. Evidence from Dr. Kallman's prior evaluation of Carr may be utilized in addition to new evidence presented. If in fact Carr is determined to be sufficiently mentally retarded to meet the criteria of Atkins and Chase, then the trial court should vacate the death penalty and resentence him accordingly.