Opinion ID: 4103812
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wainwright v. Witt

Text: During the jury selection proceedings known as ―death qualification‖ (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 170–171), the prosecutor challenged seven prospective jurors for cause on the ground their views concerning capital punishment rendered them unfit to serve on the jury. Defendant contends the prospective jurors were not excludable for cause under the standard set forth by 13 the United States Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 (Witt), and that by excusing the seven prospective jurors, the trial court violated her state and federal constitutional rights to due process of law, an impartial jury, and a fair capital sentencing hearing. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 5, 16 & 17.) We conclude the trial court did not err. The law is settled. As the high court has explained, ―the systematic removal of those in the venire opposed to the death penalty [can lead] to a jury ‗uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die,‘ [citation], and thus ‗woefully short of that impartiality to which the petitioner was entitled under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.‘ ‖ (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 6 (Uttecht), quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 518, 521; see also Uttecht, supra, at p. 9 [―a criminal defendant has the right to an impartial jury drawn from a venire that has not been tilted in favor of capital punishment by selective prosecutorial challenges for cause‖].) The high court set forth the applicable test in Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, and we have explained and applied the Witt test in many subsequent decisions. Thus: ―To achieve the constitutional imperative of impartiality, the law permits a prospective juror to be challenged for cause only if his or her views in favor of or against capital punishment ‗would ―prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror‖ ‘ in accordance with the court‘s instructions and the juror‘s oath.‖ (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 741, citing Witt, supra, at p. 424, and Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38, 45.) ― ‗ ―[A] prospective juror who would invariably vote either for or against the death penalty because of one or more circumstances likely to be present in the case being tried, without regard to the strength of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, is . . . subject to challenge for cause . . . .‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 915.) Even if the prospective juror would not invariably vote one way or another, ―[a] prospective juror can properly be 14 excused for cause if he or she is unable to conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including the death penalty where appropriate.‖ (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 340.) The degree of a prospective juror‘s impairment—that is, his or her inability or unwillingness to perform the duties of a juror and follow the law—must be substantial. ―[A] juror who is substantially impaired in his or her ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law framework can be excused for cause; but if the juror is not substantially impaired, removal for cause is impermissible.‖ (Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 9.) Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have cautioned that mere personal opposition to capital punishment is an insufficient basis on which to justify dismissal of a juror during jury selection. ― ‗[N]ot all who oppose the death penalty are subject to removal for cause in capital cases; those who firmly believe that the death penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors in capital cases so long as they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.‘ ‖ (People v. Jones, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 915, quoting Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176.) ―Because ‗[a] man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the State,‘ [citation], . . . ‗a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty . . . .‘ ‖ (Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 6.) The critical issue is whether a life-leaning prospective juror—that is, one generally (but not invariably) favoring life in prison instead of the death penalty as an appropriate punishment—can set aside his or her personal views about capital punishment and follow the law as the trial judge instructs. ― ‗A prospective juror personally opposed to the death penalty may nonetheless be capable of following 15 his oath and the law. A juror whose personal opposition toward the death penalty may predispose him to assign greater than average weight to the mitigating factors presented at the penalty phase may not be excluded, unless that predilection would actually preclude him from engaging in the weighing process and returning a capital verdict.‘ ‖ (People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 446, italics omitted, quoting People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 699.) That prospective jurors are not always clear in articulating their beliefs (or accurately assessing their ability to set aside those beliefs) is a difficulty trial and appellate courts frequently encounter in capital cases. Accordingly, although we have cautioned that, ―[b]efore granting a challenge for cause, the ‗court must have sufficient information regarding the prospective juror‘s state of mind to permit a reliable determination as to whether the juror‘s views would ― ‗prevent or substantially impair‘ ‖ ‘ performance as a capital juror‖ (People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 592, quoting People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 445), we have also recognized that, ― ‗ ―[i]n many cases, a prospective juror‘s responses to questions on voir dire will be halting, equivocal, or even conflicting. Given the juror‘s probable unfamiliarity with the complexity of the law, coupled with the stress and anxiety of being a prospective juror in a capital case, such equivocation should be expected.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 497.) Thus, both this court and the United States Supreme Court have recognized that ― ‗ ―many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made ‗unmistakably clear‘; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings.‖ [Citation.] Thus, when there is ambiguity in the prospective juror‘s statements, ―the trial court, aided as it undoubtedly [is] by its assessment of [the venireman‘s] 16 demeanor, [is] entitled to resolve it in favor of the State.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 41, quoting Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 7.) In light of the inherent ambiguities associated with the death qualification of juries, two rules have emerged. First, a prospective juror‘s bias against the death penalty, or the juror‘s inability to set aside his or her personal views and follow the law, need not be demonstrated with unmistakable clarity. (People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 25; People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 497– 498.) Instead, after examining the available evidence, which typically includes the juror‘s written responses in a jury questionnaire and answers during voir dire, the trial court need only be left with a definite impression that the prospective juror is unable or unwilling to faithfully and impartially follow the law. (Whalen, supra, at pp. 25–26; Abilez, supra, at pp. 497–498.) Second, in assessing a prospective juror‘s true state of mind, the trial court occupies a superior position vis-à-vis an appellate court, for the former court is able to consider and evaluate a juror‘s demeanor during voir dire. (People v. Whalen, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 26; People v. Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 41.) ― ‗ ―[A]ppellate courts recognize that a trial judge who observes and speaks with a prospective juror and hears that person‘s responses (noting, among other things, the person‘s tone of voice, apparent level of confidence, and demeanor) . . . gleans valuable information that simply does not appear on the record.‖ ‘ [Citations.]‖ (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 378.) Accordingly, the trial court‘s ruling regarding the juror‘s true state of mind is entitled to deference on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Leon, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 593; People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 541.) As the high court has explained, ―[t]he judgment as to ‗whether a venireman is biased . . . is based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge‘s province. Such determinations [are] entitled to deference . . . .‘ ‖ 17 (Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 7.) With these precepts in mind, we examine the juror questionnaires and voir dire of seven prospective jurors that defendant claims were improperly excused because of their views on capital punishment.
According to his written answers in the jury questionnaire, Prospective Juror Peter B. was 65 years old and had spent much of his life serving in the military. He explained he was generally in favor of the death penalty, having ―actively supported‖ the 1978 initiative to reinstate the death penalty and opposed the confirmation of Chief Justice Rose Bird based on his assessment of her views on capital punishment. Asked what purpose was served by capital punishment, Peter B. answered: ―It removes from society a very bad person who is a danger to all.‖ But asked whether a person who intentionally kills should either always, or never, receive the death penalty, he indicated that he ―disagreed somewhat‖ with both propositions, noting that it ―depends.‖ His feelings about the death penalty were not so strong that he would vote one way or the other in every case. He elaborated on his views during voir dire, telling the trial court ―there are certain cases where a crime is so vicious that I believe [the death penalty] would fit the crime.‖ He would not vote against a conviction or a special circumstance allegation in order to avoid facing the penalty question and, asked to place himself on a spectrum of persons who would either always or never impose the death penalty, he located himself in the center, a five on a scale of 10. He would have no problem voting for death in a case involving a vicious, multiple killing, but he did not know whether he would vote for the death penalty for a murder with a single victim. When the trial court asked whether he could vote for the death penalty for an intentional murder for financial gain, Peter B. initially replied he would ―favor life imprisonment,‖ but then amended that view, saying he would ―always‖ vote 18 for life imprisonment in that situation. In follow-up questioning, he explained that sentencing someone to death would be ―awfully difficult,‖ but that ―I wouldn‘t say never; I wouldn‘t use the word never. The potential is there.‖ In response to the prosecutor‘s questioning, the juror further stated he had ―some really strong feelings against killing people‖ due to his training and experiences in the military and in the Vietnam War. He continued: ―I‘ve seen slaughters in Vietnam. I never killed anybody. I never came close to being killed, but the danger was always there. [¶] You see all these pictures, and training is brutal in the Armed Forces. The things they show you, the things you go through, the public doesn‘t see. And I come back, and I don‘t like that any more. [¶] And I see people that are being sentenced to death, and I sort of sympathize with them. [¶] I understand some of them deserve it, and I said that they got what they should have, but overall the thought of people being put to death sometimes doesn‘t go well with me. It would have to be [a] very vicious crime for me to [vote for the death penalty].‖ He would vote for the death penalty for mass killings, like if ―somebody . . . went into a dormitory, and killed seven nurses,‖ ―but I don‘t know if I would put a person to death for killing one on one, you know, in a one-on-one situation.‖ Asked by the prosecutor to place himself on a scale of one to 100 for one-on-one murders, with one representing someone who would never vote for the death penalty and 100 as someone who would always do so, he said he was in the ―bottom 10.‖ The prosecutor challenged Peter B. for cause and the trial court sustained the challenge, saying: ―With the exception of where he put himself at a 5, and I don‘t reconcile that with the rest of his answers, other than he seems to be a man who wants to answer his own questions, rather than questions that are put to him, I find he is substantially impaired. [¶] Again, the scale I don‘t think is a total litmus test, but he sure puts himself in the 1 to 10 down at the—I think every one 19 of his answers, but for the 5—that‘s a conflict with his scale of one to 100. [¶] I find he‘s substantially impaired.‖ Defendant first contends Prospective Juror Peter B.‘s views on the death penalty were less objectionable than two jurors the United States Supreme Court found were improperly dismissed in Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. 38. In Adams, the high court articulated for the first time what has become known as the Witt standard, i.e., ―a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.‖ (Adams, supra, at p. 45.) Citing two of the jurors in Adams—Juror Mahon and Juror Coyle—defendant gleans their voir dire responses from the appendix in the high court‘s Adams opinion and compares them to the voir dire for Peter B. But using Adams as a reference point for evaluating the excusal of Peter B. is inapt because Adams concerned the particular statutory scheme in Texas, whereby ― ‗[p]rospective jurors shall be informed that a sentence of life imprisonment or death is mandatory on conviction of a capital felony. A prospective juror shall be disqualified from serving as a juror unless he states under oath that the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact.‘ ‖ (Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. at p. 42, quoting Tex. Pen. Code, § 12.31(b), italics added.) As the Adams court explained, the statutory scheme is inconsistent with the standard demanded by the federal Constitution because ―neither nervousness, emotional involvement, nor inability to deny or confirm any effect whatsoever is equivalent to an unwillingness or an inability on the part of the jurors to follow the court‘s instructions and obey their oaths, regardless of their feelings about the death penalty.‖ (Adams, supra, at p. 50.) Those concerns are not pertinent to the excusal of Peter B. Moreover, the individual responses by the two jurors in Adams 20 played little or no part in the Adams court‘s decision to reverse the conviction in that case. The high court‘s reasoning was more global, explaining that the Texas statute permitted the excusal of jurors who would otherwise be qualified under federal constitutional principles, and thus ―the Constitution disentitles the State to execute a sentence of death imposed by a jury from which such prospective jurors have been excluded.‖ (Adams, supra, at p. 51.) Accordingly, Adams does not require reversal here.4 Defendant further contends the trial court‘s suggestion that Peter B.‘s responses were inconsistent—first ranking himself as a five on a scale of 10, and then in the ―bottom 10‖ on a scale of 100—is inaccurate. We agree the trial court may have been mistaken on this particular point, for the two metrics concerned different questions. Peter B. described himself as a five on a scale of 10 on the death penalty generally, but in the ―bottom 10‖ out of 100 of those willing to impose the death penalty in the particular circumstance of a criminal having killed a single victim for financial gain. But the juror equivocated when he first said he would always vote for life in a case of a single murder victim killed for financial gain but then said he would not use the word ―never‖ and the ―potential is there‖ for imposing the death penalty in that circumstance. Defendant argues the juror merely experienced ―a moment of confusion,‖ but that is not the only possible explanation, and the trial court was entitled to resolve the ambiguity concerning the juror‘s true state of mind in favor of dismissal. 4 Defendant makes the same comparison to the jurors in Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. 38, in arguing the trial court erroneously excused Prospective Jurors Nancy N., Maria G., Brenda M., Kusum P., Betty F., and Yolanda N., because of their views on the death penalty. We reject those arguments for the same reason, i.e., that the comparisons to Adams, which concerned a very different Texas statute, are inapt. 21 More importantly, in resolving the larger question—whether the juror‘s views would substantially impair his ability to be fair and impartial—the court‘s ruling is substantially supported by the record. Noting that the scales were not the ―total litmus test‖ and considering the totality of the circumstances, it appeared to the court the juror was so unlikely to vote for death in a single killing committed for financial gain—in the ―bottom 10‖ out of 100—that he was substantially impaired within the meaning of Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412. As noted, ante, a prospective juror‘s inability to fairly weigh the facts and apply the law need not be demonstrated with unmistakable clarity. (People v. Whalen, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 25–26.) We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court‘s decision that Prospective Juror Peter B.‘s views permitted his dismissal from the venire.
Prospective Juror Nancy N. was 54 years old, African-American, a librarian, and a Republican. Her questionnaire answers revealed a person who was generally ―opposed to capital punishment‖ because the likelihood of ―human error seems to indicate that the jurors may convict an innocent person,‖ and that she had voted against the 1978 initiative measure to reinstate the death penalty. Where the questionnaire asked what types of crimes warranted the death penalty, she answered: ―None.‖ Asked what purpose the death penalty served, she answered: ―Very little—persons who would kill aren‘t concerned with society‘s approval.‖ She indicated she would ―always‖ vote against sentencing an offender to death, but disagreed only ―somewhat‖ with the statement that those who kill intentionally should always receive the death penalty. Nancy N. attempted to clarify her views during voir dire. She admittedly disfavored capital punishment in general and, asked whether there could ―ever‖ be 22 a case in which she would vote for the death penalty, answered: ―No, I don‘t think so.‖ Asked about the notorious serial killer and cannibal Jeffrey Dahmer,5 she said the death penalty ―could be appropriate‖ and that, in an appropriate case, she could personally vote to impose the death penalty, but estimated only 1 out of 100 cases would fall into that category. Nancy N. would not decline to vote guilty just to avoid a penalty phase, and she affirmed that although sitting on the jury would make her ―extremely uncomfortable,‖ she would consider all the aggravating and mitigating factors before making a penalty decision. The prosecutor challenged Nancy N. for cause and the trial court granted the motion, finding Nancy N. ―substantially impaired,‖ adding: ―I don‘t think she even comes close.‖ Defendant contends the record shows Nancy N. ―was a life-leaning juror, but that she was willing to consider and weigh those factors that might support the death penalty.‖ Defendant also emphasizes the juror averred that, ―in an appropriate case, she could vote for the death penalty.‖ But although the juror indeed made such assertions, she also said there were no crimes for which she would vote for death, and would always vote against the death penalty. Given these contradictory answers, it was for the trial court to discern the juror‘s true state of mind. Because she gave some answers suggesting she would not fairly consider death as a penalty in an appropriate case, and would leave open the possibility of capital punishment only in a rare and extreme case, we conclude 5 Jeffrey Dahmer was a serial killer who was convicted of the murder of 15 men and boys between 1978 and 1991. His crimes often involved dismemberment, retention of body parts and, in some instances, necrophilia and cannibalism. He was beaten to death in prison by another inmate in 1994. 23 substantial evidence supports the trial court‘s assessment of the juror‘s true state of mind, and we defer to its decision to excuse the juror. (People v. Gonzales and Soliz (2011) 52 Cal.4th 254, 316.)
Prospective Juror Maria G. was a 36-year-old secretary who wrote in her questionnaire that her views about the death penalty were ―50/50‖ because imposition of it ―would depend on the circumstances,‖ and that the penalty would be appropriate in extreme cases like for serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer. She ―disagreed somewhat‖ that anyone who kills intentionally, or kills more than one victim, should always (or never) get the death penalty, and her feelings about the death penalty were not so strong that she would always vote for, or against, a guilty verdict, a special circumstance allegation, or to impose the penalty itself. Although she was a Catholic, she was ―not in total agreement with the church.‖ (Underscoring in original.) During voir dire, she stated that, as a general matter, she believed the death penalty had a place in society and she thought she could impose the death penalty in an appropriate case, but when asked about a murder for financial gain, she said she ―would favor life without possibility of parole‖ and that it would be ―a difficult decision on my part‖ to vote for the death penalty. She admitted she might, depending on the facts, ―possibly‖ vote for death under those circumstances, but rated herself only a 2.5 on a 10-point scale of those who, faced with a financial gain murder, would impose the death penalty. Under the prosecutor‘s questioning, Maria G. said she rated herself low on the 10-point scale because there were extreme cases such as that of Jeffrey Dahmer for which she would vote for death. In addition she said she believed cases involving the rape or murder of a child warranted the ultimate penalty. Asked by the prosecutor whether there were other kinds of murders in which she 24 could see herself voting for the death penalty, she replied: ―No.‖ Asked directly what kind of evidence would convince her to vote for death in a case involving financial gain, she said the possibility she would vote for death in a financial gain situation was a ―slim‖ one, and that ―it‘s unlikely‖ she would vote for death in that situation. The trial court then sustained the prosecution‘s challenge for cause, explaining that ―the words ‗slim‘ and ‗it‘s unlikely‘ ‖ showed her to be substantially impaired under Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412. Defendant argues Prospective Juror Maria G. was unequivocal about her ability to impose the death penalty, that she stated ―unambiguously that she would be able to vote for death in certain circumstances, and specified that she could consider the death penalty in rape and murder situations.‖ But when questioned about her willingness to consider the death penalty in situations other than those involving a serial killer or the rape and murder of a child, she offered no other situations in which she would consider death an appropriate penalty. She then equivocated slightly, saying there was a ―slim,‖ but ―unlikely,‖ possibility she would vote for death where a murder for financial gain was involved. This evidence suggests that, although the juror‘s views would not wholly prevent her from fulfilling her duties as a juror, they would ―substantially impair‖ her from doing so. The trial court apparently found that she was willing to fairly consider the death penalty only in two narrow circumstances (a serial killer or one who rapes and kills a child) and was not willing to fairly and impartially consider the appropriateness of the death penalty in other types of murders, including the type (financial gain killing) in this case. Although defendant argues this juror did not completely close the door to capital punishment for a person who killed for financial gain, emphasizing she said there was a ―slim‖ although ―unlikely‖ possibility, the Witt standard does not require a prospective juror‘s inability or unwillingness to fulfill her duties as a juror be proved to an unreasonably high 25 degree. Instead, the evidence must simply show the juror‘s views ― ‗substantially impair the performance of [her] duties as a juror.‘ ‖ (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424, italics added.) On this record, substantial evidence supports the trial court‘s assessment of Maria G.‘s state of mind, and we defer to its decision to excuse her. (People v. Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 316.)
Prospective Juror Brenda M. was a 30-year-old administrative analyst working in the psychology department at the University of California, Los Angeles. She felt the death penalty ―is right in a few cases—a very few.‖ For emphasis, she underlined the phrase ―a very few‖ four times. Her views stemmed from the fact that ―[i]f a verdict is wrong there is no way of righting the wrong.‖ She ―disagreed somewhat‖ with the statement that ―[a]nyone who intentionally kills another person should always get the death penalty,‖ explaining: ―There are circumstances that are not always known.‖ She ―agreed somewhat‖ with the statement that ―[a]nyone who intentionally kills more than one person should always get the death penalty,‖ explaining: ―There could be mental problems that need to be reviewed.‖ Brenda M. reiterated and expanded on her views during voir dire. She repeated that she felt there were ―very few cases that I would go for [the] death penalty,‖ and when asked whether there were any circumstances in which she would vote for death, she replied: ―I can‘t say for sure right now, but I would think that I would have a very hard time voting for it.‖ But when asked by codefendant Sanders‘s attorney whether she would set aside her personal opinions and follow the law if instructed to do so, she replied in the affirmative, later adding she had no doubt that she could do so. She affirmed she could follow the court‘s instruction to consider the two penalties (life in prison without parole or death) should defendant be convicted. 26 Questioned by the prosecutor, the prospective juror affirmed that the irreversibility of the death penalty was a concern to her, but she would have less concern if the accused admitted his guilt. If a defendant contested his guilt, however, she agreed she would not want to participate in the life-or-death decision. ―I‘m just saying that I—just in the small amount that I know about the case, I don‘t think I would go for the death penalty, even not knowing anything— any evidence or even knowing what they did.‖ ―I‘m trying to think of a case that I would say the death penalty is appropriate. I can’t offhand think of any.‖ (Italics added.) The trial court then attempted to clarify the juror‘s feelings, asking her whether, where a defendant contests her guilt, but the jury finds her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the juror would nonetheless refuse to ―impose the death penalty because [the accused] never admitted to full complicity in the crime?‖ She answered in the negative, explaining that a person‘s admission of guilt would simply make the life-or-death decision ―a little bit easier because of the point that there‘s no slight bit of percentage that they could be innocent.‖ Asked about different criminal scenarios, Brenda M. replied: ―I honestly don‘t want to make a decision on someone‘s life or death, and I‘m—it‘s hard to say, but almost in any case, I would probably go for life without possibility of parole just because I can‘t do that. Okay?‖ The trial court then asked her: ―Do you feel you could personally impose the death penalty yourself in the appropriate case?‖ She answered: ―I don’t think so. No.‖ (Italics added.) She later elaborated: ―You need to deliberate with the jury, and if somebody could give me a good enough reason why I would have to change my own personal feelings on the case, maybe, maybe I could go for the death penalty. [¶] But like I said, I very much doubt it.‖ (Italics added.) 27 The prosecutor then challenged Brenda M. for cause, arguing that she was impaired under Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412. Defense counsel countered by highlighting the many times the juror said she could impose the death penalty and set aside her personal feelings of reluctance. The trial court excused Brenda M., explaining: ―My feeling is if there ever was a situation that is [Witt], this is it. The woman is tortured. Both sides attempting to drag her from one side of the line to the other. [¶] I feel there‘s substantial impairment.‖ The court continued: ―I really do feel that she is close to the line. I don‘t even think she got dragged over the line.‖ As the trial court observed, whether Brenda M.‘s written and oral responses demonstrated that her views about capital punishment would have ― ‗prevent[ed] or substantially impair[ed] the performance of [her] duties as a juror‘ ‖ (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424), was a close call. Although she acknowledged that the life-or-death decision would be a difficult one for her, she was open about her views and at times seemed willing to fairly consider both sides. On the other hand, she admitted she could conceive of very few situations in which she would find the death penalty an appropriate punishment (signaling that she might be unable to fairly consider both sides of the question), and eventually stated she did not think she could vote for the death penalty (―I don‘t think so. No‖). Under the circumstances, given that the trial court was able to observe her demeanor (noting, ―[t]he woman is tortured‖), ―[t]o the extent [the juror] gave conflicting answers, the trial court reasonably resolved those conflicts in determining her true state of mind. Because the trial court‘s determination is fairly supported by the record, we defer to it.‖ (People v. Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 316.) 28
Prospective Juror Kusum P. was a 34-year-old Indian-American who worked as a maintenance administrator for Pacific Bell. Regarding her views on the death penalty, she stated: ―I don‘t believe that [the] death penalty is good. I won‘t go for that,‖ and would ―instead give some punishment that will change other people.‖ She held that opinion, ―[b]ecause if one [person] got [the] death penalty, it‘s not going to change other people[] committing crimes,‖ and ―[i]t‘s not going to teach [a] lesson.‖ In response to another question, she opined that the death penalty served no purpose. When asked whether someone who intentionally kills more than one person should always, or never, receive the death penalty, she answered paradoxically that she ―[a]gree[d] somewhat‖ to both questions. During follow-up voir dire, Kusum P. stated she felt the death penalty had no place in our society, that she could not personally vote for it ―in any kind of case,‖ and she could not personally ―send somebody to the gas chamber and execute them.‖ Pressed on the point, she admitted she did not know whether she could vote for death in the ―most heinous, brutal type of killing,‖ and that ―maybe‖ she could in a case in which ―five small children were tortured to death.‖ She would not vote not guilty just to avoid a penalty trial, or vote for a special circumstance just to get to a penalty trial. She would not always vote for death or for life without regard for the facts of the case. She reiterated the views expressed in her questionnaire, saying the death penalty does not deter others from committing crimes. Asked by the prosecutor if she could personally send someone to their death, she first said ―no,‖ then said: ―It depends. When I go to after all the facts [sic], like what happened and everything, then I might change my mind, but it‘s like it depends on what happened and what were the circumstance[s].‖ But then asked whether, ―if the circumstances were really 29 terrible, could you actually look at this individual, and say it‘s my decision that you should die?‖ she answered, ―No.‖ The prosecutor challenged Kusum P. for cause and the trial court granted it, explaining: ―The court finds based on the answers to the questionnaire, answers in court, she‘s substantially impaired.‖ As the record demonstrates, Prospective Juror Kusum P. had generally strong feelings against the death penalty. Although she was never asked expressly whether she could set them aside and follow the law, her answers provided substantial evidence that she could not fairly consider both sides. (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 53.) That she gave contradictory answers at times illustrates the high court‘s observation that ―many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made ‗unmistakably clear‘; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings. Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record, however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.‖ (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 424–426, fn. omitted.) As with the other challenged jurors, the trial court fairly determined Kusum P.‘s true state of mind and, as it is supported by substantial evidence, we defer to that decision. (People v. Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 316.)
Prospective Juror Betty F. was a 54-year-old African-American who worked for a federal defense contractor. She was generally in favor of the death penalty, writing: ―I feel [the death penalty] is necessary to deter the increase in [the] unnecessary killing of . . . innocent people.‖ Asked in what type of crime the death penalty should be imposed, she suggested the death penalty was appropriate 30 for crimes that victimized the mentally ill and children. She ―strongly disagreed‖ with the propositions that an offender should ―always,‖ or ―never,‖ receive a sentence of either life or death, opining that the circumstances of individual cases must be reviewed. Betty F.‘s voir dire began with her largely confirming her written responses. Although she initially expressed reluctance when asked whether she could ―personally vote to have somebody executed,‖ she affirmed she could vote for death in some unspecified circumstances. She would not change her vote to avoid a penalty phase nor would she do so in order to get to a penalty phase so she could sentence someone to death. She initially stated that in a case of murder for financial gain, she would not always vote for either life or death, but then admitted she ―would prefer life imprisonment‖ to the death penalty in such cases. Asked to elaborate, Betty F. said she would not prefer life imprisonment ―in every situation‖ or ―no matter what the facts [were],‖ but on a scale of one to 10, with one being someone who would always impose a life sentence, the juror put herself at two on the scale. Questioned by defense counsel, Betty F. agreed she thought the death penalty was appropriate for ―horrible‖ murders such as for those who tortured and killed children. Questioned by the prosecutor, the juror explained her initial answer to the court suggesting she would be reluctant to vote for the death penalty: ―I wasn‘t really prepared to—I didn‘t think I was going to be able to explain why I felt I could go for the death penalty, but with him I did explain whether or not kind of—what had to be a horrible [crime], and I could in those instances, that I could separate from some of them.‖ But she placed herself as a two on the scale because she ―would have a hard time voting for death if all of the circumstances led me to believe it wasn‘t horrible, horrible.‖ She agreed with the prosecutor that, for a murder that was not ―horrible‖ or ―gross,‖ such as involving children, sexual 31 brutalization or dismemberment, it would be extremely unlikely she would vote for death. At this point the trial court intervened to clarify the juror‘s views. ―THE COURT: Let me—Here you are not dealing with a child and dismemberment, and you are not dealing with a situation of torture, you are not dealing with a number of murders. One murder that‘s deliberately done, intentionally done for the purpose of getting money. ―Can you see yourself imposing the death penalty in that type of case? ―PROSPECTIVE JUROR [Betty F.]: No. ―THE COURT: No matter what the facts were? It‘s not as gruesome as what you were talking about. ―Would you always vote for life in prison? ―PROSPECTIVE JUROR [Betty F.]: Yes.‖ (Italics added.) Thereafter the trial court excused her for cause, explaining: ―I find she‘s substantially impaired,‖ and ―I think she‘s honest. I think this is the difficulty we have with a lot of these people. They just don‘t comprehend the subject.‖ Although initial indications suggested Betty F. could fulfill the duties of a juror in a capital case, her later elaboration of her views made clear she would never vote for the death penalty in a case of murder for financial gain. It was for the trial court to resolve these ambiguities regarding her true state of mind, and because substantial evidence supports the trial court‘s determination that she was impaired within the meaning of Witt (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424), we defer to the court‘s decision to sustain the prosecution‘s challenge for cause. (People v. Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 316). 32
Prospective Juror Yolanda N. was a 54-year-old Latina who worked for the Los Angeles County Sheriff‘s Department in an unspecified capacity. She was generally reticent about the prospect of putting people to death for their crimes, writing: ―Although rapist[s] and child molesters . . . are the worst crimes, still I don‘t know if all deserve the death penalty.‖ Asked the purpose of the death penalty, she wrote that it would serve as an example to other criminals. Asked what type of crime deserved the death penalty, she offered: ―Child molesters and rapists.‖ She ―agreed somewhat‖ with the proposition that someone who killed intentionally, or killed more than one person, should ―always‖ receive the death penalty, and ―disagreed somewhat‖ that such persons should ―never‖ be sentenced to death. She affirmed that she would not vote one way or the other ―regardless of the evidence presented‖ in order to reach a certain result. During voir dire, Prospective Juror Yolanda N. stated that if she thought defendant was guilty, she would not vote to acquit in order to avoid a penalty phase trial, nor would she vote to convict (or sustain a special circumstance allegation) despite entertaining a reasonable doubt simply to ensure that defendant would face a penalty trial. She was then asked whether, ―without knowing anything about how or why [a murder] was carried out, without knowing anything about the defendant, would you always vote to impose the death penalty [or, alternatively, life in prison] just because of the type of murder it was?‖ She replied in the negative, agreeing with the court that she would want to know more about the case before making such a decision. But when later asked by the prosecutor whether she would consider life and death ―on an equal basis,‖ she replied that she thought she would lean heavily in favor of life in prison, explaining that, being a religious person, she believed ―[a] person should be given a chance to repent.‖ Pressed on the point by the prosecutor, the juror said she did 33 not believe in the Old Testament teaching calling for ―an eye for an eye,‖ saying that giving someone the death penalty would be ―very much‖ against her personal beliefs. The following colloquy then occurred: ―[THE PROSECUTOR]: So if we asked you then whether or not personally you could ever vote for the death penalty, could you ever personally vote for the death penalty? ―PROSPECTIVE JUROR [Yolanda N.]: In which case? ―[THE PROSECUTOR]: In any case of murder? ―PROSPECTIVE JUROR [Yolanda N.]: 99.9 percent, no.‖ (Italics added.) The trial court then sought to clarify the juror‘s views, asking whether, without knowing anything else, if an adult victim was intentionally, and with premeditation, murdered for purposes of financial gain, ―do you feel you could ever see yourself voting for the imposition of the death penalty if you felt the facts surrounding the crime or the facts surrounding the defendant would call for it?‖ She replied: ―Very hard that I would vote for death.‖ The court then asked: ―You said that you would 99.9 percent [of the time] never vote for the death penalty,‖ to which she replied, ―Yes.‖ The trial court thereafter excused Prospective Juror Yolanda N. without much elaboration, saying: ―The fact that a juror [such a Yolanda N.] favors in the abstract one [penalty] or the other doesn‘t disqualify [her].‖ The important consideration, the court said, was whether the juror‘s views regarding the death penalty would ―substantially impair[]‖ her in performing the duties of a juror, and the court concluded she demonstrated such impairment when she said she would impose life imprisonment instead of death in 99.9 percent of possible cases of murder for financial gain. 34 As with several other prospective jurors excluded from the jury, although initial indications suggested Yolanda N. could fulfill the duties of a juror in a capital case, more in-depth questioning revealed she would almost never vote for the death penalty in a case of murder for financial gain. It was for the trial court to resolve these ambiguities regarding her true state of mind. Because substantial evidence—in the form of the juror‘s own statements—supported the trial court‘s finding that Yolanda N. was substantially impaired within the meaning of Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at page 424, we defer to the court‘s assessment (People v. Gonzales and Soliz, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 316). In sum, although defendant challenges the excusal of seven prospective jurors due to their views on the death penalty, we find the trial court‘s determinations that they were all substantially impaired within the meaning of Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at page 424, adequately supported by the record. We thus reject the claims.