Opinion ID: 2559012
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Failure to present alibi defense

Text: Appellant next claims that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to investigate, develop, and produce alibi evidence. Appellant acknowledges that his alibi witness, David El, died before trial, [21] but argues that El had given a signed statement to police detectives James Dougherty and Paul Raley, who also signed the statement as witnesses, which supported an alibi. El's statement indicated that he was at home asleep on the morning of the murder when appellant, whom he called Manny, knocked at about 6:00 a.m. and asked to stay. [22] Appellant had stayed overnight at El's home in the past. El let appellant in and appellant fell asleep on the couch. Several hours later, while appellant was still there, El went to a bar nearby, where he learned that the victim had been murdered and that the police were looking for appellant. El returned to his home, told appellant that the police were looking for him and asked appellant to leave. Appellant left and El did not see him again before speaking to police detectives later that month. Appellant interprets El's statement as proving that he was with El in El's home at the approximate time the Commonwealth alleged that the murder occurred. [23] Appellant asserts that he informed trial counsel that he wished to assert an alibi based on El's statement and that El's statement was available to trial counsel, but counsel did not pursue the alibi. Citing Commonwealth v. Toth, 455 Pa. 154, 314 A.2d 275 (1974), appellant contends that El's statement was admissible, notwithstanding his unavailability to testify at trial, merely to prove that a potentially exculpatory statement was made and not for the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. Appellant also contends that counsel should have called Detectives Dougherty and Raley to testify to their opinions of the reliability of El's statement. Finally, appellant layers his claim by alleging direct appeal counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise trial counsel's failure to pursue this alibi. The Commonwealth responds, first, that appellant's current theories arguing that El's statement was admissible under Toth, either as proof that an exculpatory statement was made or through the testimony of the police detectives, were not raised in any of appellant's various PCRA petitions and are therefore waived. Commonwealth's Brief at 36 (citing Commonwealth v. Cousar, 593 Pa. 204, 928 A.2d 1025, 1041 (2007) and Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 555 Pa. 125, 723 A.2d 162, 170 (1999)). The Commonwealth also argues that these waived theories lack merit; we need not reach that point because we agree with the Commonwealth's primary argument that these particular sub-theories have not been preserved. Appellant did not cite Toth in any of his PCRA petitions or amendments. Appellant's pro se Rule 1925(b) statement (at ¶ 8) and the Federal Defender's Rule 1925(b) statement (at ¶ 34) both identify the claim as premised on allegations that trial counsel failed to investigate and develop alibi evidence, but both statements frame the issue in general terms and do not mention Toth or the theory that the police could testify to a hearsay statement's reliability. Thus, these sub-claims are waived. On the merits of appellant's general ineffectiveness/alibi claim, the Commonwealth argues that appellant's theory that El's out-of-court statement establishes an alibi clearly entails use of El's statement for the truth of the matter asserted, which is prohibited hearsay under Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 801, 802, and 804. The Commonwealth posits that the only potentially applicable hearsay exception would be Rule 804(b)(3), statement against interest, in which case the police detectives' testimony might be admissible to corroborate the statement's trustworthiness. But, according to the Commonwealth, El's statement was clearly not against El's interest and there is no other basis for its admissibility. Commonwealth's Brief at 36-37. More fundamentally, the Commonwealth argues, El's statement that appellant was at his apartment on the morning of the murder from about 6:00 a.m. or 7:00 a.m. until after 10:00 a.m. does not qualify as alibi evidence. This is so because the evidence would not conclusively exclude appellant as the murderer since, according to Dr. Hood's testimony, the killing occurred between 4:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., and perhaps even as early as midnight. That time frame left sufficient time for appellant to both commit the murder and appear at El's residence afterwards. The Commonwealth also notes that several aspects of El's statement would have been harmful to appellant even if the statement was admitted, including: El's assertion that it was unusual for appellant to appear at his home in the early morning; that appellant's appearing at that time gave El a feeling that something had happened; and El's description of suspicious conduct on appellant's part, including that when El told appellant that the police were looking for him, appellant did not inquire as to a reason, but simply left El's apartment; and that appellant disappeared and had no contact with El after the attack on the victim became known. Thus, the Commonwealth argues, even if El's statement had been admitted and credited, it was not reasonably likely to have convinced the jury to overlook the Commonwealth's substantial evidence of appellant's guilt. The PCRA court concluded that appellant's underlying claim premised upon El's statement as an alibi was meritless because El's death prior to trial made his statement inadmissible hearsay. PCRA Ct. Op. at 46 (citing Commonwealth v. Sims, 513 Pa. 366, 521 A.2d 391 (1987)) (written out-of-court statements of eyewitnesses inadmissible hearsay when witnesses cannot be found to testify). [24] We agree. Hearsay, which is a statement made by someone other than the declarant while testifying at trial and is offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted, is normally inadmissible at trial. Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 913 A.2d 220, 254 (2006); See Pa.R.E. 801(c) & 802. Of course, out-of-court statements by an unavailable declarant may be admissible if they fit within one of several recognized hearsay exceptions, such as former testimony, a statement under belief of impending death, a statement against interest, or a statement of personal or family history. See Pa.R.E. 804. In the alternative, out-of-court statements may be admissible because they are non-hearsay, in which case they are admissible for some relevant purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See Commonwealth v. [Raymond] Johnson, 576 Pa. 23, 838 A.2d 663, 680 (2003) (defendant's statements threatening witness's family admissible as verbal acts, a form of non-hearsay, because evidence not offered to establish truth of matter asserted, but rather, to demonstrate fact of attempted influencing of witness); Commonwealth v. Puksar, 559 Pa. 358, 740 A.2d 219, 225 (1999) (statements by witness who overheard defendant and his brother (the victim) arguing were admissible as non-hearsay because not offered to prove truth of matter asserted, but rather to establish motive for killings). Generally, an alibi is a defense that places the defendant at the relevant time in a different place than the scene involved and so removed therefrom as to render it impossible for him to be the guilty party.... At the core of an alibi defense is, of course, consistency between the date and time of the crime and that of the defendant's alibi. Commonwealth v. [Raymond] Johnson, 600 Pa. 329, 966 A.2d 523, 538 & n. 5 (2009). Here, the PCRA court correctly determined that appellant's underlying claim lacks merit because El's statement was inadmissible hearsay. El's statement could only be relevant to establish alibi if it was proffered for the truth of the matter asserted therein (that appellant supposedly was elsewhere, with El, when the victim was murdered). The bald fact that El's statement was made proves nothing, and certainly does not support an alibi. El's statement therefore was hearsay, unlike in Johnson and Puksar. Nor has appellant argued that El's statement fits within any of the recognized hearsay exceptions, such that it could be proffered for its truth, notwithstanding El's unavailability. In addition, as the Commonwealth notes, El's statement concerning appellant's whereabouts from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. would not have established an alibi because Dr. Hood's testimony established that the killing occurred between 4:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. and perhaps even earlier. El's account, thus, would not render it impossible for appellant to have been the murderer. Trial counsel cannot be faulted for failing to pursue an alibi defense, premised upon an inadmissible hearsay statement of an unavailable witness that would not even establish alibi; appellant's derivative claim respecting appeal counsel necessarily fails as well. [25]
Appellant next raises a confused claim sounding in direct appeal counsel's supposed ineffectiveness for failing to adequately federalize twenty-five of appellant's twenty-seven direct appeal claims by citing additional supportive federal decisions and constitutional provisions. Appellant claims that counsel's failure deprived him of the opportunity to have his claims adjudicated under federal constitutional standards. Appellant cites Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971) and Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) in support of this theory. In addition to this general claim, appellant more specifically faults appeal counsel for failing to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to seek suppression of the clothes iron appellant used to beat the victim. Appellant notes that the clothes iron was the basis for his conviction of possession of an instrument of crime. In a non-sequitur to his suppression argument, appellant asserts that a clothes iron is not commonly used for criminal purposes and that the admission of the clothes iron here, without objection by counsel, tainted the entire trial. Appellant contends that an argument for suppression of the clothes iron should have been federalized by direct appeal counsel pursuant to Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). The Commonwealth responds that appellant's overall federalization complaint fails to state a cognizable claim under the PCRA. The Commonwealth argues that appellant has not provided sufficient legal authority for this abstract claim, nor has he explained how appeal counsel's failure to federalize his claims caused actual prejudice such that, but for appeal counsel's alleged lapse, the result of appellant's direct appeal would have been different. To the Commonwealth, appellant's claim is nothing more than an assertion that appeal counsel's alleged ineffectiveness might adversely affect appellant in some hypothetical future federal habeas corpus proceeding, which is not a cognizable ground for relief under the PCRA. The Commonwealth also argues that Kimmelman, a federal habeas decision, does not speak to whether state direct appeal counsel may be found ineffective on this type of claim. Regarding the clothes iron, the Commonwealth notes that the evidence showed that the iron was specially adapted for criminal use when appellant used it to beat the victim; the iron therefore became an instrument of crime pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(d)(2). The Commonwealth asserts that because a motion to suppress the iron would have been meritless, trial counsel cannot have been ineffective for failing to seek suppression. [26] Picard and Duncan do not speak in terms of due process rights, but instead in terms of federal habeas exhaustion requirements for state prisoners who would seek to collaterally attack their final state convictions in federal court. In Picard, the U.S. Supreme Court held that state courts must have the first opportunity to hear a federal claim that a state prisoner anticipates raising in federal habeas proceedings so that all state remedies will be properly exhausted before federal review; in short, such claims generally must be fairly presented at the state court level before a federal complaint can be heard. 404 U.S. at 275, 92 S.Ct. 509. Duncan then speaks to the mechanics of exhaustion: to properly exhaust federal claims, state prisoners must present them expressly and specifically enough so that the state court addressing them will surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. 513 U.S. at 365, 115 S.Ct. 887. In short, on federal habeas review, state prisoners should not be heard to complain about a state court's supposed rejection of federal claims that were not first identified and argued as such to the state courts. Obviously, appellant's global ineffectiveness/federalization claim proves nothing in the abstract; to secure relief, he must prove ineffectiveness with respect to some specific federal claim that he feels was inadequately presented on direct appeal. The only claim appellant identifies with any specificity is his Kimmelman claim respecting trial counsel's failure to seek suppression of the clothes iron. But Kimmelman, like Picard and Duncan, speaks to a procedural matter, i.e., the cognizability, on federal habeas review, of claims of counsel ineffectiveness arising from defaulted Fourth Amendment claims. The U.S. Supreme Court held that while Fourth Amendment claims in and of themselves cannot be litigated on federal habeas, pursuant to Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), a derivative Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim, based upon a defaulted Fourth Amendment issue, may be so litigated, subject to the settled test for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 382-83, 106 S.Ct. 2574. Here, appellant, who obviously has confused the theoretical availability of claims with what is necessary to prove them, has not set forth any basis to conclude that the clothes iron was admitted in violation of the Fourth Amendment, such that a motion to suppress the iron should have been made. Appellant's argument that a clothes iron is not commonly used for criminal purposes is no basis for suppression of relevant evidence. It is a claim implicating evidentiary sufficiency. Notably, that very issue was resolved by this Court on direct appeal. See Lester, 722 A.2d at 1002 (holding that clothes iron was specially adapted for criminal purpose of murder pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(d) when appellant broke handle off, used plate or front of iron to inflict lacerations on victim's head, and used handle to inflict punctures and lacerations around her left eye). Appellant's federalization claim, therefore, fails. [27]