Opinion ID: 2499976
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court Erred in Denying Kozel's Motion To Intervene

Text: ¶ 9 The trial court erred in denying Kozel's motion to intervene pursuant to CR 19(a). [1] CR 19(a) provides, in relevant part, as follows: A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if ... (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (A) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest. A party satisfying the requirements of CR 19(a) is a necessary party. Burt v. Dep't of Corr., 168 Wash.2d 828, 833, 231 P.3d 191 (2010) (plurality opinion); id. at 839, 231 P.3d 191 (Sanders, J., concurring). There appears to be no dispute that if Kozel has standing under RCW 4.24.010, she would be a necessary party under CR 19(a). Kozel was clearly subject to service of process, and her joinder would not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Kozel also satisfies the second requirement of CR 19(a) by claiming an interest in participating in the wrongful death action arising out of her adopted daughter's tragic and untimely death. Further, RCW 4.24.010 creates only one cause of action, and failure of the parent not named as a plaintiff to join shall bar such parent's action to recover any part of an award made to the party instituting the suit. Failure to join Kozel therefore effectively denies her the opportunity to recover for the wrongful death of her daughter. Thus, Kozel satisfies the final CR 19(a) requirement. ¶ 10 The fundamental point of contention in this case is whether Kozel has standing to proceed under RCW 4.24.010. This requires that we interpret the statute. Interpretation of a statute is guided by well-established principles. A court's fundamental objective when interpreting a statute is `to discern and implement the intent of the legislature.' Flight Options, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, 172 Wash.2d 487, 500, 259 P.3d 234 (2011) (quoting State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003)). Legislative intent is implemented by giving effect to the plain meaning of a statute, and the plain meaning may be gleaned `from all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question.' Id. (quoting Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)). If a statute is `susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations,' the statute is ambiguous. Id. (quoting Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wash.2d 416, 423, 103 P.3d 1230 (2005)). However, a statute is not ambiguous merely because two or more interpretations are conceivable. Id. If a statute is ambiguous, we may look to the legislative history of the statute and the circumstances surrounding its enactment to determine legislative intent. Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wash.2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598 (2003). ¶ 11 We must pause to address whether this statute is to be liberally or strictly construed. The Court of Appeals strictly construed the statute because it is in derogation of the common law. Bunch, 159 Wash.App. at 865, 248 P.3d 565. Amicus curiae Washington State Association for Justice argues that the wrongful death statutes should instead be given a liberal construction because they are remedial in nature. The distinction between liberal construction and strict construction is easily overstated. Neither a liberal construction nor a strict construction may be employed to defeat the intent of the legislature, as discerned through traditional processes of statutory interpretation. See Armijo v. Wesselius, 73 Wash.2d 716, 720, 440 P.2d 471 (1968) (Whether done liberally or strictly, judicial interpretation is necessary.). Strict construction is simply a requirement that, where two interpretations are equally consistent with legislative intent, the court opts for the narrower interpretation of the statute. [2] See State v. Johnson, 119 Wash.2d 167, 172, 829 P.2d 1082 (1992); cf. State v. Ervin, 169 Wash.2d 815, 823 n. 1, 239 P.3d 354 (2010) ([T]he rule of lenity ... is applicable only after employing tools of statutory construction. (citation omitted)); Wichert v. Cardwell, 117 Wash.2d 148, 154-55, 812 P.2d 858 (1991) (discussing, in dicta, the proper use of strict construction). In any event, in the context of wrongful death statutes the modern trend of this court has been away from strict construction. See, e.g., Beggs v. Dep't of Social & Health Servs., 171 Wash.2d 69, 82, 247 P.3d 421 (2011); Klossner v. San Juan County, 93 Wash.2d 42, 47-48, 605 P.2d 330 (1980); Armijo, 73 Wash.2d at 720-21, 440 P.2d 471. In line with this modern trend, we hold that RCW 4.24.010 should be given a fair reading, one that is neither strict nor liberal, to effectuate the legislature's intent. ¶ 12 We now turn to the language of RCW 4.24.010 that forms the basis of the disagreement in this case: A mother or father, or both, who has regularly contributed to the support of his or her minor child, and the mother or father, or both, of a child on whom either, or both, are dependent for support may maintain or join as a party an action as plaintiff for the injury or death of the child. (Emphasis added.) In particular, the key question is whether the term has regularly contributed requires that the support be continuing at the time of the child's death. The context of the statute, together with our duty to avoid absurd results, see State v. Hall, 168 Wash.2d 726, 737, 230 P.3d 1048 (2010), compels us to conclude that it does not. ¶ 13 The term has regularly contributed is in the present perfect tense. See The Chicago Manual of Style 5.126, at 237 (16th ed. 2010). This tense denotes an act, state, or condition that is now completed or continues up to the present. Id. The dual meaning of this construction is apparent: it may either indicate a completed action that took place at a time in the indefinite past or a past action that comes up to and touches the present. Id. Several courts have noted the potential for ambiguity. See Padilla-Romero v. Holder, 611 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 2010); In re Interest of A.H.B., 791 N.W.2d 687, 689 (Iowa 2010). However, the term is not necessarily ambiguous the plain meaning of has regularly contributed may simply include both temporal definitions (i.e., both completed and ongoing actions). Absent contrary legislative intent discerned from the context, this is the plain meaning of the statute. ¶ 14 The use of the word regularly does not call into question the plain meaning of the statute. We may accept the dictionary definitions offered by the Court of Appeals of `[o]ccurring at fixed intervals; periodic: regular payments,' `[o]ccurring with normal or healthy frequency,' and `[n]ot varying; constant.' Bunch, 159 Wash.App. at 862, 248 P.3d 565 (quoting The American Heritage Dictionary 1521 (3d ed. 1992)). Even so defined, the term regularly does not contradict or alter the present perfect tense. Rather, it specifies that within the designated period beginning in the past, whether completed or ongoing as of the date of injury or death, the contribution of support must not have been merely sporadic, but must have occurred with normal or healthy frequency. American Heritage Dictionary, supra, at 1521. ¶ 15 Context confirms that the legislature did not intend to exclude a parent who has regularly contributed to the support of his or her child in the past from participation as a plaintiff in a lawsuit under RCW 4.24.010. Two aspects of the statute make this a reasonable inference. First, in the same sentence, the legislature uses the present tense are dependent to refer to parents that may recover for the injury or death of a child without respect to the child's minority. RCW 4.24.010. As the Court of Appeals has recognized, this statute requires that the relevant determinations be made at the time of the accident. Blumenshein v. Voelker, 124 Wash.App. 129, 135, 100 P.3d 344 (2004). Thus, under the statute, the determinations the legislature has called for are whether parents are dependent for support on their children as of the time of the accident and whether a parent has regularly contributed to the support of his or her minor child as of the time of the accident. [3] RCW 4.24.010. This suggests that the legislature deliberately chose not to employ the present tense with respect to contribution of support, either alone or as a requirement in addition to the present perfect tense. See Koenig v. City of Des Moines, 158 Wash.2d 173, 182, 142 P.3d 162 (2006) (When the legislature employs different terms in a statute, we presume a different meaning for each term.). Second, the statute plainly contemplates participation by parents with differing involvement in the child's life and provides for damages to be awarded accordingly. RCW 4.24.010 ([D]amages may be awarded to each plaintiff separately, as the trier of fact finds just and equitable.). This context certainly suggests that the legislature did not intend for the parent's regular support to have necessarily continued through the time of the child's injury or death to participate in an action pursuant to RCW 4.24.010. ¶ 16 An interpretation of the statute requiring that the parent's support be ongoing at the time of the child's injury or death would also lead to absurd results. For example, if a child is kidnapped and, years later, the child suffers injury or death, under the interpretation adopted by the Court of Appeals, the child's parents would be unable to bring an action under RCW 4.24.010 because, at the time of the injury or death, the parents were not contributing support. As another example, the Court of Appeals interpretation would leave a child's parent who had been in a coma for a period of months unable to recover if the child were injured or killed during those months. These results would be manifestly absurd; the legislature could not have intended them. Consequently, we are compelled to reject an interpretation that would allow for these results. ¶ 17 In sum, we hold that a parent who has regularly contributed to the support of his or her minor child, RCW 4.24.010, may bring or join an action for injury or death of the child, even if, at the time of death, the parent is not presently providing support. [4] The undisputed record in this case clearly establishes that Kozel met this standard. The term support in RCW 4.24.010 encompasses emotional, psychological, and financial contributions; any one type of support is sufficient. See Postema v. Postema Enters., Inc., 118 Wash.App. 185, 197-99, 72 P.3d 1122 (2003) (interpreting support in light of legislature's statement of intent). From 1998 until 2003, Kozel lived with and directly supported Ashlie. This is sufficient to give Kozel standing. Insofar as the trial court concluded otherwise, it abused its discretion.