Opinion ID: 754069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Britton's Motion for a Mistrial

Text: 35 During the trial, U.S. Customs Agent Denise Webber testified that a cellular telephone seized from Britton at the time of his arrest was a cloned cellular telephone. However, Agent Webber acknowledged that the telephone was not used in connection with the instant conspiracy. At the close of the evidence, Britton's counsel moved for a mistrial on the grounds that Agent Webber's testimony improperly placed evidence of other crimes before the jury. This evidence, Britton argues, had no probative value and was highly prejudicial as it reflected adversely on his character. The motion for mistrial was denied by the district court. The district court further determined that a specific curative instruction should not be given because it would merely call further attention to the evidence. 36 A district court's refusal to grant a mistrial based on the admission of prejudicial evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Limones, 8 F.3d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir.1993). If the motion for mistrial involves the presentation of prejudicial testimony before a jury, a new trial is required only if there is a significant possibility that the prejudicial evidence had a substantial impact upon the jury verdict, viewed in light of the entire record. Id. at 1007-08. 37 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). An inherent danger in admitting evidence of other acts is that the jury might convict the defendant for the extrinsic offense rather than for the offense charged. United States v. Ridlehuber, 11 F.3d 516, 521 (5th Cir.1993). 38 Britton has not shown that the district court's decision not to grant a mistrial was an abuse of discretion. Agent Webber's references to stolen cellular telephone services and to hijacked calls were isolated remarks that were not dwelled upon by the parties. Further, neither party referred to the stolen telephone services in their closing arguments. 39 In denying Britton's motion for a mistrial, the district court stated: 40 It seems to me that it was said in such a quick, quick blush that any attempt to cure this by the Court would just call further attention to something that I am positive, in my opinion, looking at the Jury at the moment that it happened, no one either heard or appreciated it at the time it was given. 41 I will not allow any argument, however. I think the safest way to cure that situation is not to allow any argument on that particular situation during closing arguments. Even if it is considered to be intrinsic evidence, which I don't suggest it is or it isn't, because it really is not particularly germane, I don't really believe it was other crimes of [sic] evidence. I don't see it being in the same nature as relating to some other type of crime for which the only alternative would be a mistrial situation, and, again, at the time it was given and in the manner given, I don't perceive it to be a situation where a mandatory mistrial is required. 42 You cleared it up, in fact, to a certain extent, when you talked about those records don't even show any phone calls. So I don't really appreciate this as being a mistrial situation, but your request is certainly noted. 43 Although the district court did not give a specific curative instruction concerning the reference to the stolen telephone services, the district court did generally instruct the jury that the Defendants are not on trial for any act or conduct not alleged against him [sic] in the indictment. This Court has consistently held that an erroneous admission of evidence may be cured by such a limiting instruction because jurors are presumed to follow the court's instructions. See United States v. Scott, 48 F.3d 1389, 1396-97 (5th Cir.1995); United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 484 (5th Cir.1978). Even if the admission of the testimony concerning the stolen telephone services was error, there is not a significant possibility that it had a substantial impact on the jury's verdict in light of the other overwhelming evidence of Britton's guilt presented at trial as discussed above. See Limones, 8 F.3d at 1008. Therefore, even if the admission of the testimony was error, we do not find that a new trial is required. Id.