Opinion ID: 1784669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mental Health Testimony

Text: Jones claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate and present mental health testimony. The following standards apply to all ineffective assistance claims: An ineffective assistance claim has two components: A petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. To establish deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (citation omitted) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). The prejudice prong of the analysis requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Therefore, to succeed on his claims, Jones must establish both deficient performance and prejudice. Jones argues that trial counsel failed to present the testimony of Dr. Ernest Miller. [10] This testimony, Jones argues, should have been presented to rebut the cold, calculated and premeditated (CCP) aggravating circumstance. At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that he retained Dr. Miller, a psychiatrist, to examine Jones because he wanted to resolve the tension between Jones's golden past as a model citizen and the crimes he committed. In addition to his interview with Jones, Dr. Miller reviewed copies of the offense and incident report, the homicide continuation report, the motion and information filed, the affidavit for arrest warrant, and the evidence technician's reports. He provided a report, dated November 5, 1993, to trial counsel stating that Jones was competent to proceed and not insane at the time of the offense. From his testimony at the hearing, Dr. Miller would have testified about specific aspects of Jones's mental health. Dr. Miller confirmed that Jones had a compulsive personality. He further testified that, when a person of this nature faces disorder, more primitive emotions surface and destructive behavior can result. His mental state may result in unpredictable and violent acts. Jones's problems finding employment after leaving the Navy, his financial problems, and his separation from his wife and two daughters substantially impacted him. Other stressors like his conflict with Stow and his car's mechanical problems were also significant. Dr. Miller opined that Jones's crimes were not logically planned but, instead, emotionally reactive. However, Dr. Miller also stated that a compulsive personality can function quite well in this world. Trial counsel did not think there were many, if any, areas of Dr. Miller's report that at the time would have caused [him] alarm that [he] should have sought . . . more psychiatric testimony. Therefore, he did not discuss with Dr. Miller Jones's mental state at the time of the crime or any information that could potentially rebut the CCP aggravator. He also never asked Dr. Miller to do any follow-up interviews, investigations, or evaluations. In denying Jones relief on this issue, the circuit court found that [t]he evidence Defendant suggests should have been presented during the penalty phase was inconsistent with evidence that was actually presented by the defense at the penalty phase. We have affirmed denials of relief in similar circumstances. Strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance if alternative courses of action have been considered and rejected. Rutherford v. State, 727 So.2d 216, 223 (Fla.1998) (quoting State v. Bolender, 503 So.2d 1247, 1250 (Fla.1987)). In Banks v. State, 842 So.2d 788 (Fla.2003), the defendant argued that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to consult mental health experts. Id. at 790. However, counsel did consult experts and decided on a strategy after considering his options. Id. at 791. The experts' reports discussed the defendant's alcoholism and possible childhood physical abuse. Id. We found no deficient performance because counsel felt that the child abuse strategy would be ineffective and that introducing evidence of the defendant's consumption of alcohol would be inconsistent with his theory of the case. Id. Trial counsel have discretion in determining whether and how to present mental health evidence. In Jones's case, counsel made a strategic decision not to call Dr. Miller as a witness to rebut the CCP aggravator. We find three bases for this conclusion: (1) Dr. Miller's testimony would have been inconsistent with other evidence already presented; (2) counsel did not want to open the door to damaging cross-examination and rebuttal evidence; and (3) trial counsel decided to focus on the humanization of Jones through lay testimony. We explain each of these points in turn. First, Dr. Miller's testimony that Jones's financial problems impacted him would have contradicted and undermined evidence already presented. For example, at the penalty phase Jones's wife testified that she moved to Pensacola with their children not because of financial issues, but to be closer to her family. Meanwhile, Jones sought employment, turned down unsuitable job offers, and saved money from his unemployment checks. He was seeking a better job close to his family and never got frustrated over his unemployment. He also purchased a car during that time. His financial problems were clearly minimal at best, which would have contradicted Dr. Miller's testimony. In addition, the circuit court concluded that [t]he . . . testimony . . . during the penalty phase painted a picture . . . of a loving family man. The testimonies of Jones's siblings, wife, friends, and parents established that Jones was not violent and had never been in trouble with the law. In particular, Jones's brother-in-law testified that Jones was a family man . . . enjoyed being with the kids . . . and with his wife. He was not violent, but a soft spoken type of guy, always went out of the way to help others. Dr. Miller's testimony regarding Jones's emotionally reactive and destructive behavior would have been counterproductive and might have diminished this persuasive picture of a loving family man. Second, [c]ounsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to present evidence that would open the door to damaging cross-examination and rebuttal evidence that would counter any value that might be gained from the evidence. Johnson v. State, 921 So.2d 490, 501 (Fla. 2005) (citing Breedlove v. State, 692 So.2d 874 (Fla.1997)). Dr. Miller's report merely indicates that Jones had a common problem coping with stressful situations. Nothing else in the record demonstrates that Jones was mentally ill. In fact, Dr. Miller admitted that individuals such as Jones can function quite well in this world. His testimony would have harmed, rather than helped, Jones. His statements regarding Jones's primitive emotions, emotionally reactive and destructive behavior, and unpredictable and violent acts would have cast serious doubt on the jury's picture . . . of a loving family man. Therefore, trial counsel understandably did not want to open the door to these aspects of Dr. Miller's testimony on cross-examination by calling him as a witness during the penalty phase. They would counter any marginal value that might be gained from the testimony as a whole. In light of the stronger evidence of Jones's background, when viewing Dr. Miller's report the right move for trial counsel was to do nothing. He made a strategic decision to withhold this less compelling, and potentially damaging, information. Due to these problems, trial counsel could not resolve the tension between Jones's golden past and the crimes he committed. Thus, at the penalty phase, he concentrated on the testimonies of Jones, Jones's family, and his friends. We have found no deficient performance where, although counsel was aware of possible mental mitigation, he made a strategic decision to focus on the humanization of the defendant through lay testimony. See Rutherford, 727 So.2d at 222-23 (where trial counsel was aware of the defendant's personality disorder and purported alcoholism, but instead focused on the lay testimony from a friend, family members, and the defendant himself regarding his positive character traits, his meager upbringing, and the consequences of his involvement in Vietnam). The testimonies of Jones, Jones's family, and his friends clearly portray Jones as a model citizen. In his eight years in the Navy, Jones received two honorable discharges, two good conduct awards, top scores in his annual performance evaluations, and various medals, awards, commendations, and ribbons. Jones's sister, Ardee Harris, testified that he was one of those fun loving people [who] could get along with everybody. He looked after his siblings and interacted well with them. He was not a violent person, and he always spent time with his family and interacted well with his wife's family. Jones's wife stated that he was a loving, caring father. Almost all of the witnesses testified that he never had any problems with the law. In addition, Jones expressed deep remorse for his crimes. As in Rutherford, trial counsel elected, under the circumstances, to humanize Jones. Counsel made an informed choice and most likely reasoned that focusing on Jones's background was the best strategy. Jones, therefore, cannot demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient. Even if counsel had rendered deficient performance, however, Jones cannot demonstrate prejudice. Dr. Miller's testimony was not persuasive and, even worse, could have damaged Jones's chances for a life sentence. Furthermore, Jones fails to show that the testimony would have changed the jury's recommendation of death or the trial court's imposition of the death penalty. Dr. Miller's unconvincing testimony does not undermine our confidence in that result. Accordingly, we deny this claim.