Opinion ID: 2979723
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jones’s plea agreement

Text: In January 2006, Jones pled guilty to the second count of the second superseding indictment, which charged him with engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise involving narcotics, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848. The parties agreed to the following offense elements that the government would need to prove at trial: (1) that from approximately 1995 to June 2001, on at least three or more occasions, Jones knowingly committed, as part of a continuing series of related violations, felony violations of federal narcotics laws under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and § 846; (2) that -2- No. 08-1658, United States v. Jones Jones’s continuing series of federal narcotics violations was undertaken in association and in concert with five or more other people, regarding whom Jones was an organizer and occupied a management and supervisory position; (3) that Jones obtained substantial income and resources from the continuing series of violations; and (4) that a portion of the continuing violations occurred in Detroit and involved the distribution of at least five kilograms of a substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine. At Jones’s plea hearing, his counsel agreed that these are the elements of the offense that the government would have to prove at trial, with the qualification that, as is required under 21 U.S.C. § 848, Jones was taking responsibility for actions by his coconspirators that were reasonably foreseeable to him even if Jones did not personally engage in all of those actions. Jones stipulated in his plea agreement to the following facts in support of these offense elements: (1) he agreed with the coconspirators to distribute cocaine, marijuana, and heroin; (2) this distribution involved over five kilograms of cocaine; (3) he directed the activities of at least five other participants in the distribution of these drugs; (4) he controlled and directed the distribution and storage of cocaine and marijuana from several private residences in Detroit that the coconspirators referred to as the “Dog Pound”; (5) he “and at least [five] other participants used the locations to plan the robberies, kidnaping and intentional killings of rival drug traffickers and their associates,” including the murders of two specific individuals; and (6) “that he obtained substantial income and resources from this continuing series of narcotics and narcotics-related violations.” Jones also admitted most of these facts at his plea hearing, with a few qualifications that do not affect his satisfying the elements of his offense. -3- No. 08-1658, United States v. Jones The plea agreement stipulates that Jones’s adjusted Guidelines adjusted offense level is 47, with a criminal-history category of V, which calls for a life sentence. This calculation is consistent with the government’s statement at Jones’s plea hearing, to which Jones did not object, that the parties agreed to a Guidelines calculation that calls for life imprisonment. The parties also agreed that the statutory sentencing range for the charged offense is a mandatory minimum of 20 years in prison, with a maximum of life imprisonment. Both Jones’s plea agreement and the statements made at his plea hearing describe his waiver of appellate rights. His plea agreement contains the following paragraph titled “Waiver of appeal rights”: If the Court imposes a sentence that does not exceed the top of the range described in ¶ 2 of this agreement [i.e., a life sentence], defendant waives any right he may have to appeal his conviction or sentence. If the Court imposes a sentence that is not below the bottom of the range specified in ¶ 2, the U.S. Attorney waives any right he may have to appeal the sentence. In addition, the agreement provides as follows in a section titled “Adjusted Sentence Recommendation”: The parties agree that if the U.S. attorney determines that defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation and prosecution of others, the U.S. Attorney will recommend that defendant be sentenced to a term of 360 months .... In the event the court sentences the defendant to a period of confinement in excess of 360 months, the defendant will be afforded the opportunity to appeal such decision. Concomitantly, in the event the court imposes a sentence less than 360 months, the government will be afforded the opportunity to appeal such decision. The parties also discussed Jones’s waiver of his appellate rights at his plea hearing. First, the government pointed out that the plea agreement contains a “significant waiver . . . of appeal -4- No. 08-1658, United States v. Jones rights.” Jones’s attorney then clarified that “there might appear to be some conflict . . . or inconsistency between the two references to appeal rights, but clearly, it’s my understanding that this agreement provides Mr. Jones the right to appeal any sentence that is in excess of 360 months.” The government responded by noting that this appellate right existed only if the government filed a motion under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for a downward departure based on Jones’s substantial assistance. Jones’s attorney then asked Jones if he wished to ask a question, but Jones responded, “No, that’s okay. That’s fine,” and Jones’s attorney stated, “I think we’ve resolved that.” Jones and his attorneys signed the last page of his plea agreement under a statement providing that “[b]y signing this document, the defendant acknowledges that he has read (or been read) this entire documents, understands it and agrees to its terms; and also acknowledges that he is satisfied with his attorney’s advice and representation.” Several questions and answers at Jones’s plea hearing also reflected that Jones understood the nature of his guilty plea and the rights he was forfeiting by entering into the agreement. The district court accepted Jones’s plea as being made knowingly and voluntarily. The Probation Office’s Presentence Report (PSR) calculated a Sentencing Guidelines offense level of 49 (as opposed to the offense level 47 in the plea agreement), but this difference is inconsequential because offense level 43 is the maximum level under the Guidelines. Jones objected to a number of factual determinations that were made in the PSR, as well as to the PSR’s Guidelines calculation. These objections included Jones’s claim that the Guidelines did not allow for murder to be considered under the continuing-criminal-enterprise charge that he agreed to in his plea agreement and that there was no factual basis to find him responsible for the Grice and Carruthers -5- No. 08-1658, United States v. Jones murders or, at the very least, for first-degree murder. The court held a hearing and denied Jones’s numerous objections. As promised, the government later filed a motion for a downward departure to a sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment based on Jones’s substantial assistance. At Jones’s sentencing hearing in May 2008, the parties and the court reaffirmed his guilty plea. Jones argued for a sentence lower than 360 months based in part on the claims that he had already raised in his objections to the PSR. The court ultimately accepted the government’s sentencing recommendation as well as the facts and Guidelines calculation in the PSR. Based on these findings, the court sentenced Jones to 360 months in prison on the continuing-criminal-enterprise charge, as well as to five years of supervised release.