Opinion ID: 2633602
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine

Text: ¶ 12 The fugitive disentitlement doctrine is a common law rule which provides that one who flees a court's jurisdiction while on appeal waives his or her right to pursue that appeal. Washington courts first recognized the doctrine in State v. Handy, 27 Wash. 469, 67 P. 1094 (1902). In that case, Handy was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses and sentenced to two years in prison. Handy filed an appeal and later escaped from jail. This court, relying on cases from other jurisdictions, adopted the doctrine and explained that dismissal was appropriate because the defendant would not be available if the appeal were successful and a new trial ordered and would not be available for execution of the sentence if the appeal were not successful. The court ordered the appeal dismissed unless the defendant was returned to custody within 60 days. Handy, 27 Wash. at 470-71, 67 P. 1094. ¶ 13 More recently, the Court of Appeals expanded application of the doctrine. State v. Estrada, 78 Wash.App. 381, 896 P.2d 1307 (1995). In Estrada, the defendant was convicted of vehicular homicide, but fled the state before sentencing. Estrada was apprehended eight years later. After judgment and sentence, Estrada attempted to appeal his conviction based on alleged errors in his trial. The Court of Appeals held that by fleeing the jurisdiction, Estrada waived his right to appeal. The court adopted the analysis of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and found the fugitive disentitlement doctrine applied for three reasons. First, a defendant demonstrates disrespect for the judicial process by fleeing from the jurisdiction; second, a court's refusal to consider claims of former fugitives tends to discourage escape and promote the orderly operation of the judicial process; and third, a defendant may prejudice the prosecution and benefit himself of herself by escaping for an extended period of time because the government must retry the defendant after memories have faded and evidence has been lost. Estrada, 78 Wash.App. at 383, 896 P.2d 1307 (citing United States v. Persico, 853 F.2d 134, 137 (2d Cir.1988)). ¶ 14 French argues that Estrada was wrongly decided because the analysis relied entirely on federal cases and failed to address the fundamental right to appeal criminal convictions guaranteed by article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution. [1] He contends that in Washington, a defendant cannot be deemed to have waived the constitutional right to appeal unless the State can show the defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of that right. State v. Sweet, 90 Wash.2d 282, 286, 581 P.2d 579 (1978) (holding there is no presumption in favor of the waiver of the right to appeal. The State carries the burden of demonstrating that a convicted defendant has made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to appeal.). French asserts that because there is no federal constitutional right to appeal, federal courts may rely on utilitarian and pragmatic concepts such as mootness and disrespect to the judiciary to justify using the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. He argues, however, that Washington's constitutional guaranty of the right to appeal in all criminal cases trumps the doctrine's traditional justifications. [2] ¶ 15 French is correct that our cases have recognized that article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution expressly guarantees the right to appeal in all criminal cases. We can presume that a defendant who has already filed an appeal has been informed of the right to appeal. The same presumption, however, does not apply to a defendant who has not yet begun the appellate process. Also, we have held that the State bears the burden to show a defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his or her right to appeal. Sweet, 90 Wash.2d at 286, 581 P.2d 579. ¶ 16 The reasons that justify dismissal of an appeal when an appellant flees become attenuated when applied in the context of a convicted but unsentenced defendant. First, since sentencing has not occurred, there is nothing yet to appeal. Second, upon sentencing of the defendant, the terms of his or her sentence can be appealed. Third, the deterrent effect of dismissal is adequately addressed by the fact that the State may pursue additional charges for the act of fleeing. Fourth, the defendant presumably is not informed of the right to appeal before sentencing, thereby negating the knowledge requirement of a valid waiver. Finally, under the facts of this case, the State has not argued or established prejudice. Declining to extend the doctrine to the facts of this case is consistent with preserving the constitutional right to appeal. ¶ 17 We hold the fugitive disentitlement doctrine generally does not apply to a defendant who absconds after conviction but before sentencing. We overrule Estrada to the extent it holds a former fugitive who absconds after conviction but before sentencing has waived his or her right to appeal the conviction in all cases. The State has not shown any relationship between French's former fugitive status and the appellate process that would require dismissal of this appeal, nor has the State argued that it would be prejudiced in this case if French were allowed to pursue his appeal. Because we find French's appeal is not barred by the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, we reach the substantive issues of his appeal.