Opinion ID: 788410
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) Exception

Text: 106 As a preliminary matter, the affirmative BFOQ defense set forth in § 4(f)(1) of the ADEA is inapplicable in this case because Yellow Cab failed to raise it in its motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court has repeatedly described the BFOQ defense as an affirmative defense, Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 206, 111 S.Ct. 1196, Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 112, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985), which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires to be specifically pleaded. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c). Failure to plead an affirmative defense therefore results in a waiver of that defense. See Bank Leumi Le-Israel, B.M. v. Lee, 928 F.2d 232, 235 (7th Cir.1991). Since Yellow Cab did not specifically plead the BFOQ defense in its motion for summary judgment, Yellow Cab effectively waived this defense. 107 More importantly, even if Yellow Cab were permitted to raise the BFOQ defense in district court, the defense would nonetheless fail as a matter of law. The majority believes that to establish a BFOQ defense, Yellow Cab need only prove that it terminated Mr. Enlow temporarily and not in bad faith. The majority repeatedly states that according to Yellow Cab, the termination of Mr. Enlow was to be temporary. The opinion does not explain, however, why this would make a difference. The ADEA prohibits age discrimination with respect to ... compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment .... 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). It does not only prohibit permanent termination. Thus, although this fact is contested, it is not a material fact requiring us to remand the case. 108 The Supreme Court has established that the BFOQ defense is a narrow exception to the ADEA that only applies in special situations. See Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 201, 111 S.Ct. 1196; Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412, 105 S.Ct. 2743, 86 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977). In particular, the BFOQ defense applies only in situations where an employer who discriminates on the basis of age demonstrates that age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). Thus, one of the elements that a defendant invoking the BFOQ defense must satisfy is that its age-based discrimination relates to a particular business, which the Supreme Court defined in Thurston as the particular job from which the protected individual is excluded. 469 U.S. at 122, 105 S.Ct. 613. 109 In Thurston, more specifically, the Supreme Court held that Trans World Airlines' (TWA's) discriminatory transfer policy was not permissible under § 4(f)(1) because age is not a BFOQ for the particular position of flight engineer. Id. The transfer policy explicitly allowed airplane captains displaced for reasons other than age to bump less senior flight engineers. Id. Those captains disqualified from their position after reaching the age of 60, however, were denied the transfer privilege altogether because of their age. Id. The Court determined that a BFOQ defense was meritless because age is not a BFOQ for the position of flight engineer. Id. at 123, 105 S.Ct. 613. TWA had actually employed at least 148 flight engineers who were over 60 years old, thereby defeating the contention that captains over 60 years old were too old or incapable of performing as flight engineers. Id. n. 18. 110 Here, too, Yellow Cab's discriminatory insurance policy is not permissible under § 4(f)(1) because age is not a BFOQ for the particular position of cab driver. Yellow Cab's own pleadings acknowledge that Mr. Enlow, a nineteen-year employee of the company, maintained a solid job performance. In addition, Yellow Cab's supplemental brief to this Court reiterated that the cab company did not consider Mr. Enlow to be an unsafe driver. Accordingly, Mr. Enlow's age did not affect his ability to carry out his duties for Yellow Cab; he was neither incapable of performing his job, see Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 201, 111 S.Ct. 1196(explaining that an age-based BFOQ defense must relate to the employee's occupation, including his ability to do the job) (emphasis added), nor a potential safety risk, see Criswell, 472 U.S. at 419, 105 S.Ct. 2743(finding that an age-based BFOQ purportedly justified by safety interests must be reasonably necessary to the overriding interest in public safety). Thus, Mr. Enlow's dismissal, despite his continued ability, violated the particular business requirement of the BFOQ defense. 111 Furthermore, we have refused to consider economic costs as a basis for a BFOQ defense. The majority opinion recites at length Yellow Cab's claim that it laid off Mr. Enlow solely for the time necessary for Yellow Cab both to avoid termination of its business license and to negotiate with Star Insurance to waive the age exclusion provisions in its policy. In EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d 1039, 1042(9th Cir.1983), however, we stated that [e]conomic considerations ... [could not] be the basis for a BFOQ — precisely those considerations were among the targets of the Act. 2 As a result, it is irrelevant whether Yellow Cab terminated Mr. Enlow temporarily or because it failed to exercise rational business judgment in purchasing an insurance policy the terms and conditions of which it did not know. 112 In an effort to save costs, Yellow Cab ultimately adopted a new insurance policy that did not cover drivers over 70, and, consequently, discriminated against Mr. Enlow. Even though Yellow Cab's previous insurance policy covered drivers over 70, Yellow Cab nonetheless chose a new policy that effectively saved the company $10,000 in annual insurance premiums. But Yellow Cab made this business decision at Mr. Enlow's discriminatory expense. An employer's deliberate indifference toward a new discriminatory policy it chooses to adopt is therefore no excuse for age discrimination. 113