Opinion ID: 152884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Nunc Pro Tunc Relief

Text: Petitioner also argues that, as a matter of equity, he is entitled to nunc pro tunc relief in order to avoid the application of the departure bar. [13] He asserts that this relief is warranted because the BIA erred by denying his motion for a stay of removal on July 17, 2008. Had the stay been granted, petitioner contends, he would not have been removed from the country prior to the Board's order granting his motion to reopen. Therefore, in petitioner's view, the appropriate remedy is that the BIA's September 10, 2008 order, which reopened his removal proceedings and remanded the case for clarification of the IJ's finding that his asylum application was frivolous, should have been granted nunc pro tunc to the date of the erroneous denial of his motion for a stay of removal. (Pet'r Br. 22.) It is ... beyond question that an award of nunc pro tunc may, in an appropriate circumstance, be granted as a means of rectifying error in immigration proceedings. Edwards v. INS, 393 F.3d 299, 309 (2d Cir.2004) (emphasis added, footnote omitted). However, the doctrine of nunc pro tunc is a `far-reaching equitable remedy' applied in `certain exceptional cases,' typically aimed at `rectify[ing] any injustice [to the parties] suffered by them on account of judicial [or agency] delay.' Iouri v. Ashcroft, 464 F.3d 172, 182 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Iavorski, 232 F.3d at 130 n. 4 and Weil v. Markowitz, 829 F.2d 166, 175 (D.C.Cir.1987)). We have not previously decided whether the doctrine of nunc pro tunc is available as a means of providing equitable relief where the BIA is divested of jurisdiction by the departure bar to consider an alien's motion to reopen. To our knowledge, the BIA has not expressed a view on this question, either. [14] Nevertheless, we need not resolve that issue in this case. Even assuming, arguendo, that the departure bar does not foreclose equitable relief, petitioner has not demonstrated that a nunc pro tunc remedy is warranted. Petitioner relies principally on Edwards v. INS . There, the BIA denied three aliens an opportunity to apply for § 212(c) relief, i.e., a waiver of deportation, [15] based on an interpretation of the INA that we later deemed to be legally erroneous, see St. Cyr v. INS, 229 F.3d 406, 418 (2d Cir.2000), aff'd 533 U.S. 289, 326, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001); Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 130 (2d Cir.1998). See Edwards, 393 F.3d at 303-06. After the BIA erroneously denied the § 212(c) relief, each petitioner accrued more than five years' imprisonment, which rendered them independently ineligible for the waiver under the INA as it existed at the time. See id. at 307 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996)). Following the decisions in Henderson and St. Cyr, the Edwards petitioners asked the BIA to reopen their immigration proceedings and to reconsider whether they were eligible for § 212(c) relief. See id. at 303. These applications were denied, however, on the alternative basis that each petitioner had been incarcerated for more than five years. See id. at 303-06. In Edwards, we rejected the application of the INA's five-year bar and concluded that, under the doctrine of nunc pro tunc, the petitioners were entitled to apply for § 212(c) relief based on the facts as they existed at the time of their initial, erroneously denied applications. See id. at 312. We held that an award of nunc pro tunc relief [should] ordinarily be available where agency error would otherwise result in an alien being deprived of the opportunity to seek a particular form of deportation relief. Id. at 310-11. On the other hand, agency error would not `result' in an alien being deprived of the opportunity to seek deportation relief where the alien would have independently been barred at the time of the error from applying for the form of relief at issue. Id. at 311 n. 15 (emphasis in original). Petitioner seeks to attribute error to the BIA's denial of his request for a stay of removal. In denying that aspect of his motion, the Board reasoned that it ha[d] concluded that there [was] little likelihood that the motion [to reopen would] be granted. Petitioner asserts that there is no question that the BIA erred in issuing this decision because the Board ultimately granted the motion to reopen, notwithstanding its initial characterization of the submission as having little likelihood of success. (Pet'r Br. 24.) This contention, though flawed as a matter of formal logic, is not without intuitive appeal. Cf. Dada, 128 S.Ct. at 2320 (suggesting that it may constitute an abuse of discretion for the BIA to deny a motion for a stay of removal where the motion states nonfrivolous grounds for reopening). However, in Edwards we concluded that principles of equity favored a nunc pro tunc remedy in response to a significant error by the BIA. 393 F.3d at 309. There, the significan[ce] of the error had a constitutional dimension: We noted that an erroneous denial of the opportunity to apply for § 212(c) relief may constitute a due process violation. Id. at 308-09 (citing United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 70-71 (2d Cir.2004) and United States v. Sosa, 387 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir.2004)). By contrast, in assessing the BIA's denial of petitioner's application for a stay of removal, it must be remembered that: (1) petitioner's motion to reopen relied on the Board's entirely discretionary sua sponte authority, Ali, 448 F.3d at 518; [16] and (2) because the motion was based on a 2007 BIA decision, In re Y-L-, that was issued after petitioner's 2001 merits hearing, the motion did not, strictly speaking, call into question the merits or procedure underlying the IJ's findings, cf. NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 55 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir.1995) (Appellate courts ordinarily apply the law in effect at the time of the appellate decision....). Viewed in that light, the BIA's denial of petitioner's motion for a stay of removal due to its belief that the motion was unlikely to succeed was not, as petitioner suggests, necessarily an abuse of discretion. Moreover, there is no allegation of undue dely or misconduct by the BIA in resolving petitioner's motion to reopen. If anyone can be faulted for delay, Iouri, 464 F.3d at 182, it is petitioner. He did not appeal the IJ's original findings to this Court after the BIA affirmed her decision in 2003, and he did not file his motion to reopen and the application for a stay of removal until after he was placed in detention and his removal was imminent. The motion was also filed almost fifteen months after the issuance of the BIA decision upon which it relied, In re Y-L-. It was for these reasons that the BIA properly characterized petitioner's 2008 submission as opportunistic. [17] Cf. Azize v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 594 F.3d 86, 93 (2d Cir.2010) (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting) (reasoning that the petitioner's delay in seeking relief militated against granting a nunc pro tunc remedy); Edwards, 393 F.3d at 311 n. 15 (noting that nunc pro tunc relief may be rendered inappropriate by the existence of unclean hands, or other equitable factors (emphasis in original)). This timing takes on added significance due to petitioner's argument that, because his father was granted asylum in 2006, he would be eligible for asylum as a derivative beneficiary under the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA), see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3), if the IJ were to vacate her finding that his prior application was frivolous. Because petitioner has offered almost no documentation to support this contention, we are unable to assess its merits. However, potential eligibility for asylum under the CSPA gave petitioner and his counsel every reason to pursue challenges to the IJ's frivolousness finding both zealously and expeditiously. Petitioner did not do so and instead waited until the eleventh hour to file his motion for a stay of removal. Finally, in Edwards it was crucial to our analysis that the relief for which those petitioners sought to apply was granted in a significant percentage of cases. 393 F.3d at 311. In fact, we remanded one of the cases with specific instructions to grant the petitioner § 212(c) relief without any further proceedings. See id. at 312. But that cannot be said in this case. Petitioner has asked us to direct that the BIA's September 10, 2008 order be entered, nunc pro tunc, as of the date the Board denied his motion for a stay of removal. However, that order did not vacate the IJ's frivolousness finding. Instead, the BIA reopened and remanded the removal proceedings for clarification,  and the Board specifically noted that it did not necessarily disagree with the [IJ's] ultimate findings. (JA 19-20 (emphasis added).) As such, the link between the relief petitioner wishes to pursue and the mechanism by which he hopes to obtain it is far more attenuated than in Edwards. The procedural mechanism to which petitioner seeks access through the doctrine of nunc pro tunc is a remand to the IJ for compliance with In re Y-L-. But he does not simply seek a more thorough explanation, he hopes to have the frivolousness finding vacated. Petitioner offers nothing but speculation as to how, in the context of such a remand, he would obtain that relief. Balanced against this conjecture, we find little reason in the record to think that the IJ would abandon her frivolousness finding. At the outset of the April 4, 2001 merits hearing regarding petitioner's applications for relief from removal, the IJ issued warnings about the consequences of filing a frivolous application for asylum. (JA 178.) The BIA recently clarified the guidance it offered in In re Y-L- by noting that [s]ufficient notice [of the possibility of a frivolousness finding] is afforded when the [IJ] explains the consequences of filing a frivolous asylum application, either at the time the asylum application is filed or prior to commencement of the merits hearing. In re B-Y-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 236, 242 (BIA 2010). After receiving this notice, petitioner indicated that he understood the IJ's warnings and elected to proceed with his application. (JA 179, 182-83.) Early in his testimony, the IJ indicated to petitioner that the manner in which he was answering questions was adversely affecting her assessment of his credibility. ( See JA 197-98 (The law provides that if you only give vague answers you may well be denied [asylum] for that reason alone because it may impair your believability.); see also id. at 198.) Subsequently, while petitioner was being cross-examined, the IJ made a finding on the record that one of his responses was not credible, believable or factually accurate. (JA 224.) Immediately following petitioner's testimony, the IJ ruled on the record that his asylum application was entirely frivolous. (JA 229.) The IJ reasoned as follows: I believe the lies you have told to the [c]ourt are material and I believe they were told to the [c]ourt purely to secure an [i]mmigration benefit. (Id. (emphases added).) After the hearing, the IJ issued a nineteen-page decision that reviewed petitioner's testimony, nearly line by line; identified numerous statements that she viewed as misrepresentations; and characterized his testimony, on the whole, as absurd. (JA 88; see also id. at 76 (It is the [c]ourt's opinion that [Zhang] just plain made this up.); id. at 77 ([T]his is the vaguest testimony I have heard in a long time and ... [Zhang] gave the [c]ourt the impression repeatedly during this hearing that he had memorized a story and was afraid he would miss a bit ...).) In the conclusion of the decision, the IJ found that petitioner had submitted a frivolous application for asylum ... supported entirely by ... perjurious testimony. (JA 90.) On direct appeal, the BIA affirmed and adopted the IJ's decision as its own. Petitioner did not seek judicial review of that conclusion. Thus, although it is largely undisputed that the IJ's frivolousness finding ran afoul of the intervening procedural protections articulated by the BIA in In re Y-L-, petitioner has done little to challenge the IJ's findings that: (1) his testimony was perjurious as to material elements of his asylum application; and (2) he committed such perjury purely to secure an [i]mmigration benefit. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.20 ([A]n asylum application is frivolous if any of its material elements is deliberately fabricated.). Therefore, petitioner's speculation that he could obtain vacatur of the IJ's frivolousness finding in a remand pursuant to In re Y-L- runs headlong into a record that strongly suggests that the IJ would not abandon that conclusion.