Opinion ID: 1278622
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Leinweber

Text: In Leinweber, defendant Harry Leinweber was charged with second-degree intentional murder in the death of his wife, who was killed in the kitchen of their home by a single round fired from his wife's rifle. 303 Minn. at 415-16, 228 N.W.2d at 122. The trial court instructed the jury on the offense charged as well as on the lesser-included offenses of unintentional third-degree murder (depraved mind) and second-degree manslaughter (culpable negligence), but denied Leinweber's request that the jury be instructed on first-degree manslaughter (heat of passion). Id. at 416, 228 N.W.2d at 123. Leinweber was convicted of unintentional third-degree murder. Id. at 415, 228 N.W.2d at 122. On appeal, we held that the refusal to give the requested manslaughter instruction was error, and reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. The holding in Leinweber is better understood in the context of the case's key facts. First, Leinweber did not dispute that the rifle discharged while he was handling it, killing his wife. Id. at 416, 228 N.W.2d at 122. However, Leinweber testified that the shooting was accidental, the result of the rifle firing as he dislodged a jammed shell. Id. In contrast, the state argued that the killing was intentional  but not committed in the heat of passion. Id. The state presented evidence that the Leinwebers' marriage had become increasingly discordant and that Leinweber had threatened to kill his wife six weeks earlier. Id. at 417, 228 N.W.2d at 123. Mrs. Leinweber's eleven-year-old son testified that he was awakened on the night of the shooting by the argument between his mother and Leinweber  his step-father  before hearing a gunshot. Id. at 418, 228 N.W.2d at 124. The son further testified that he saw his mother on the floor and that she cursed and swore at her husband for two minutes before she died. Id. Our holding in Leinweber acknowledged the difficult problem faced by trial courts when determining which lesser-included offense instructions should be given in homicide cases. Id. at 419, 228 N.W.2d at 124. After setting forth the lesser-included offense principles from Jordan, 272 Minn. at 86-87, 136 N.W.2d at 603-04, we stated: To this we add that in a murder case it is preeminently the trial court's duty in the exercise of its discretion to determine what lesser degrees of homicide to submit.    Neither the prosecution nor the defense can limit the submission of such lesser degrees as the trial court determines should be submitted. Leinweber 303 Minn. at 421, 228 N.W.2d at 125. Having established the trial court's duty to instruct when necessary, the Leinweber court then articulated a test for trial courts to employ when determining whether a lesser-included offense instruction should be given: [T]he test should be whether the evidence would reasonably support a conviction of the lesser degree and at the same time is such that a finding of not guilty of the greater offense would be justified. Id. at 422, 228 N.W.2d at 125-26. Applying this test to the facts before us in Leinweber, we emphasized that, because the shooting was unwitnessed, the jury was faced with the task of reconstructing what actually occurred prior to and at the time of the shooting. Id. In this process, the jury was free to credit or reject not only any part of defendant's testimony but also any other testimony, including that presented by the state. Id. at 417, 228 N.W.2d at 123. Thus, despite the fact that Leinweber testified that the rifle discharged accidentally and the state argued that the killing was intentional, the jury could reasonably have inferred from the evidence that the shooting occurred in the heat of passion. Id. at 418-19, 228 N.W.2d at 123. We then summarized the evidence in the record from which the jury could have drawn such a reasonable inference, emphasizing the known tensions in the Leinweber marriage, recent public displays of those tensions, Mrs. Leinweber's visit to an attorney in contemplation of a divorce, and her son's account of events the night of the killing. Id. at 418, 228 N.W.2d at 124. Accordingly, we concluded that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on heat-of-passion manslaughter. Id. at 415, 228 N.W.2d at 122.