Opinion ID: 2509294
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Claims of Judicial and Other Bias and Inflammatory Publicity

Text: Defendant claims that bias pervaded the proceedings, rendering them unfair. He again cites the incidents that supported his venue and disqualification motions. Not only have we already concluded that none of these incidents justified either disqualification of the trial court or a change of venue, but also defendant fails to show that any juror or prospective juror witnessed or was aware of any of these incidents. Therefore, we reject his assertion that these events had any impact on his trial. Next, defendant asserts the trial court's response to his allegation of mistreatment by jail staff evinced bias against his religious beliefs. Defendant claimed that, during the trial, jail staff entered his cell without his consent and defaced his copy of the Koran and his trial notes. When defense counsel brought this allegation to the trial court's attention, the court agreed to have its bailiff investigate and urged defendant to file a formal complaint with the sheriff. The trial court noted, in passing, that it had had the bailiff look into previous complaints made by defendant and determined they were unfounded but, nonetheless would have my deputy check into defendant's fresh complaints. Defendant contends the trial court's response was inadequate or indicative of judicial bias against him, but the trial court's actions were reasonable and responsive to his request. Defendant also asserts the trial court and prosecutor ridiculed his religion. This assertion is without merit. After the discussion of defendant's mistreatment in the jail, the prosecutor pointed out that, earlier in the trial, defense counsel expressed concern that jurors might be prejudiced against defendant because he is Muslim. He noted that the trial court had permitted defendant to bring a Koran into the court but in a place where the jurors could not see it. He observed, however, that I think it's important to note for the record the Koran, when this case started, was about two inches by three inches in size, and now he's bringing one the size of a telephone book each day when he comes into court. [ķ] I think it is important for the issue of bias and prejudice, that counsel has brought up on this record over and over, that this is a situation that is being created at this point by the defendant by bringing this book in. The court noted that defendant was also kissing the Koran while witnesses were testifying against him. I told him I thought he should sit there and quietly [ sic ] not make any overt movements during the trial that might be interpreted one way or the other by the jury. [ķ] The defendant instead is flaunting the Koran in front of the jury and has been seen by me to be kissing the Koran at various times during the trial. [ķ] So that is of record. It doesn't require any further response. There's no issue to be litigated on this. The jury was not present during this exchange and defendant made no objection to either the prosecutor's remarks or the court's response. He now argues that the trial court stif[led] his use of a spiritual guide during the proceedings. The trial court, however, despite its concern that defendant's use of the Koran might be a distraction, apparently neither prevented him from continuing to bring the book into the courtroom nor otherwise interfered with his religious practice. Defendant next complains about an incident in which the victim's mother kissed the trial judge's bailiff. The record shows that the bailiff was not a willing participant but attempted to move away from the victim's mother. It was also unclear whether any juror witnessed the incident. Furthermore, the prosecutor admonished the victim's mother to have no further contact with anyone related to the case. Defendant rejected the trial court's offer to replace the bailiff and moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion but suggested polling the jurors to determine whether they saw the incident. Defense counsel responded by requesting that the penalty phase be moved to another courthouse. The trial court denied the request. Defense counsel then requested that the court instruct the jury that any interaction between the victim's mother and the bailiff was improper and to disregard it. The trial court replied, She's not on trial. I'm not going to do that. [ķ] I would be happy to tell them if they saw any interaction, obviously that should play no role whatever in their determination of what happened in the case. Defense counsel rejected the trial court's proposal and declined to make any further requests. Misconduct on the part of a spectator is a ground for mistrial if the misconduct is of such a character as to prejudice the defendant or influence the verdict. [Citation.] A trial court is afforded broad discretion in determining whether the conduct of a spectator is prejudicial. ( People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1022, 245 Cal.Rptr. 185, 750 P.2d 1342.) The incident appears to have been brief and it was not clear that any juror even witnessed it. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's mistrial motion. In the absence of any indication on the record that any juror actually observed the incident, we reject defendant's further claim that the trial court erred by failing to admonish the jury to disregard the incident. Defendant next claims that the trial court was biased against his family and supporters, as evidenced by three incidents involving his mother, and a fourth incident involving some of his supporters. During the discussion of the kissing incident between the victim's mother and the bailiff, the trial court noted that the defendant's mother was sitting in the court crying almost uncontrollably right now while my bailiff is trying to console her. As the hearing progressed, defendant's mother became more and more voluble until, according to the court, she was out of control. It ordered her removed from the courtroom. No juror was present when this occurred. Defendant argues the court's removal of his mother indicated its bias against her. We disagree. Trial courts possess broad power to control their courtroom and maintain order and security. ( People v. Woodward (1992) 4 Cal.4th 376, 385, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 434, 841 P.2d 954; Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(1)-(5).) The trial court's removal of defendant's mother was a reasonable exercise of this power. The second incident involving defendant's mother occurred when the trial court was informed that she had been seen in the vicinity of the parking structure reserved for court employees. In a closed session, the trial court briefly asked her whether she had been parking there and was satisfied by her explanation that, because it was rainy and wet, she had been dropped off at the parking structure. Defendant asserts this was evidence the trial court was biased against his mother and his supporters. We disagree. The trial court's concern that a witness was parking in an area reserved for court employees was reasonable, its inquiry was brief, and it was satisfied with the explanation given. Defendant also asserts that the trial court showed its bias against his mother because it refused to order television cameras to be turned off during her testimony as requested by defendant. However, at the in camera proceeding to which he directs us, defendant did not make this request. He asked for special transportation for himself to the court because he had been spat at and taunted by other prisoners on the bus ride from the jail to the court. In passing he mentioned that some of them had said they had seen his mother on television and they're going to have somebody from their friends do something to her. At no point did he request the cameras be turned off during her testimony. Lastly, defendant claims the trial court evinced bias against his supporters because it conducted a hearing during which the bailiff charged with guarding the jury during its deliberations informed the judge that three men, apparently supporters of defendant, appeared to have been following or shadowing the jury. Out of the presence of the jury, the bailiff told the court he asked the men for identification and ran a warrant check; one of the men had three outstanding warrants. The court held him until he could be taken into custody. The court briefly addressed the other two men and admonished them not to follow the jury. Defense counsel objected to the disparate treatment of our witnesses and said he had observed the victim's mother in the cafeteria while the jury was also there. The trial court replied, The jury is deliberating, and I want to make sure the jury does its best to reach a verdict without the kind of outside influences you are concerned about. As to the presence of the victim's mother in the cafeteria, the court pointed out that there was no report that she had followed the jurors. On this record, it is clear that the trial court's action, in response to the bailiff's allegation, was intended to prevent any impairment of or interference with the jury's deliberation. We therefore reject defendant's claim of judicial bias. We further reject defendant's more global claim that not only judicial bias, but courthouse personnel bias and community bias so created an emotional atmosphere that the jury was unable to reach a fair verdict. Every incident cited by defendant either clearly or apparently occurred outside the presence of the jury and could have had no impact on its deliberations or its verdict.
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional rights when it denied mistrial motions based on claims of inflammatory publicity. As we have previously explained, a mistrial should be granted `only when `a party's chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged.'' [Citation.] We review the trial court's ruling for abuse of discretion and find no such abuse here. ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 873, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1, quoting People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 282, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3.) The first incident involved a newspaper article that alleged prosecutors had reported that defendant was involved in a plot to kill a prosecution witness, Rauni Campbell. When the article was brought to the trial court's attention, the trial court inquired of the jurors whether they had had any exposure to articles or television reports about the case. None had. At the end of its inquiry, the court, which had previously ordered the jurors not to read newspapers, watch any television reports, or listen to any radio reports about the case, directed them not to read the newspaper at all, except for the sports and classified sections. Defendant engages in the unsupported assertion that the trial court's admonition was either inadequate or ineffective, but we presume the jury followed the court's instructions. ( People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 426, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 886 P.2d 1193.) Defendant's second mistrial motion was made on January 9, 1995, after defense counsel learned that the victim's mother had given a television interview in which, according to defense counsel, she demanded the death penalty for defendant. The trial court reminded counsel he had admonished the jury not to watch television reports of the case and offered to poll them. Sometime later in the proceedings, the trial court returned to the subject. The trial court said it would order the Parker family not to discuss the case with anyone, including the press, during the remainder of trial. Regarding the television report, the court stated it was hopeful that the jurors had been abiding by its admonition not to watch television. Defense counsel characterized this as wishful thinking and moved for a mistrial. The trial court admonished the victim's family but did not rule on the motion, nor did defendant press for a ruling. Again, we presume that the jury followed the trial court's admonition to avoid any publicity about the case. Accordingly, even assuming defendant has not forfeited this claim by failing to press for a ruling, we would find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion.