Opinion ID: 1057944
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Indictment and Aggravating Factors

Text: In assignment of error 4, Prieto argues that, had the grand jury intended to indict him for a crime for which he would be subject to the death penalty, then it needed to include the aggravating factors in the two capital indictments. By failing to do so, he contends, the most that he should have been sentenced to was life imprisonment. We have previously considered and rejected this argument. Jackson v. Warden, 271 Va. 434, 450, 627 S.E.2d 776, 790 (2006) (There is no constitutional requirement that a capital murder indictment include allegations concerning aggravating factors.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1122 (2007); Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 494, 619 S.E.2d 16, 40 (2005) (We hold that aggravating factors are not constitutionally required to be recited in a capital murder indictment.), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1136 (2006). 9 2. Constitutionality of Virginia's Death Penalty Statutes In assignment of error 12, Prieto argues that Virginia's death penalty statutes are unconstitutional because: (a) The death penalty statutes fail to adequately direct the jury regarding how to evaluate the aggravating factors of vileness or future dangerousness or mitigating factors so as to prevent the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. (b) Unadjudicated criminal acts can be considered for the finding of future dangerousness. (c) Hearsay in the post-sentence report can be considered. (d) The sentence of death is unable to be set aside upon a showing of good cause. (e) The proportionality and the passion/prejudice review conducted by this Court are not consistent with the Eighth Amendment and other federal or state constitutional provisions. We rejected these same arguments in numerous prior opinions as set forth in our decision addressing Prieto's previous appeal and, therefore, will not review them again. Prieto I, 278 Va. at 415-16, 682 S.E.2d at 937. 3. Reference to General Public for Future Dangerousness In assignment of error 34, Prieto argues that the circuit court erred when it permitted the Commonwealth to refer to his future dangerousness to the general public when the only society he would ever be a part of if convicted would be prison society. We have previously rejected the argument that the only society that the jury should consider is prison society. Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 149-50, 547 S.E.2d 186, 201-02 (2001) (citing Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 10 Va. 497, 516-17, 537 S.E.2d 866, 878-79 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 815 (2001)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1094 (2002). 4. Prieto's California Death Sentence In assignments of error 35 and 105, Prieto argues that the circuit court erred in admitting two certified copies of his capital convictions from California because they showed he had been sentenced to death. Prieto contends that admitting this evidence violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because it undercuts the responsibility the jury should feel in sentencing a person to another death sentence. We already addressed this issue in Prieto's first appeal and found that there was no error in the admission of such evidence. Prieto I, 278 Va. at 413-15, 682 S.E.2d at 936.