Opinion ID: 78287
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: INS v. St. Cyr

Text: INS v. St. Cyr addressed the way that two statutory amendments to the INA  namely, AEDPA and IIRIRA  impacted § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c). [11] Before AEDPA and IIRIRA, § 212(c) authorized the Attorney General, in her discretion, to waive an alien's deportation if the alien was a lawful permanent resident who had lived in the United States continuously for seven years. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c). [12] Congress first began tinkering with § 212(c) relief with the Immigration Act of 1990. See Pub.L. No. 101-649, § 511(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5052 (IMMACT-90). That Act amended § 212(c) to preclude from discretionary relief anyone convicted of an aggravated felony who had served a term of imprisonment of at least five years. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 297, 121 S.Ct. 2271. In 1996, Congress amended § 212(c) two more times. See Chuang v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 382 F.3d 1299, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2004) (summarizing impact of AEDPA and IIRIRA on § 212(c)). First, it passed AEDPA. Section 440(d) of that statute bars § 212(c) relief for aliens who committed a broad set of offenses, including a controlled substances offense. See 110 Stat. 1277 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)). And in September of 1996, IIRIRA repealed § 212(c) relief altogether. See § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-597. In its place, Congress created a cancellation of removal procedure. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 297, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (citing IIRIRA § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-594) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b). [13] IIRIRA § 304(b) stripped the Attorney General's authority to waive deportation, now called removal, for any alien convicted of an aggravated felony. Id. St. Cyr addressed whether an alien who was convicted of a deportable offense was still eligible for § 212(c) relief where (1) he was convicted of an aggravated felony in March of 1996, (2) deportation proceedings did not begin until April 10, 1997 (after both IIRIRA and AEDPA went into effect), and (3) he was otherwise eligible to apply for § 212(c) relief but for the retroactive application of IIRIRA and AEDPA. 533 U.S. at 315, 121 S.Ct. 2271. Put differently, the question was whether IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c) relief had an impermissible retroactive effect on aliens whose convictions were obtained through guilty pleas, notwithstanding the fact that they were eligible for § 212(c) relief at the time they pled guilty. The Supreme Court said yes. Drawing on Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), the Supreme Court held that IIRIRA had an impermissible retroactive effect on aliens whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for § 212(c) relief at the time of their plea under the law then in effect. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326, 121 S.Ct. 2271. The Supreme Court first explained that [r]etroactive statutes raise special concerns. Id. at 315, 121 S.Ct. 2271. It reasoned that the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Id. at 316, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (quotation marks omitted). And it warned that retroactive legislation has the power to sweep away settled expectations suddenly and without individual consideration and raises the specter that Congress may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution against unpopular groups or individuals. Id. at 315, 121 S.Ct. 2271. Although Congress has the power to enact laws with retroactive effect, Congress must clearly indicate that it intended such a result. Id. at 316, 121 S.Ct. 2271. Accordingly, `congressional enactments... will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result.' Id. at 315-16, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (omission in original) (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208, 109 S.Ct. 468, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988)). Therefore, the first step in the impermissible-retroactive-effect determination is to ascertain whether Congress has directed with the requisite clarity that the law be applied retrospectively. Id. at 316, 121 S.Ct. 2271. The Supreme Court held that IIRIRA failed that test. Id. at 319-20, 121 S.Ct. 2271. But the absence of clear intent did not end the Supreme Court's Landgraf analysis. Rather, the Supreme Court instructed that even if Congress has not spoken clearly, courts must proceed to a second step to determine whether depriving removable aliens of consideration for § 212(c) relief produced an impermissible retroactive effect for aliens convicted pursuant to a guilty plea. Id. at 320, 121 S.Ct. 2271. This second inquiry into whether a statute operates retroactively requires courts to make a commonsense, functional judgment about whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. Id. at 321, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (quotation marks and citation omitted). A statute has retroactive effect when it takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.  Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court did not stop there. It added that the judgment whether a particular statute acts retroactively `should be informed and guided by familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.' Id. (quoting Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 358, 119 S.Ct. 1998, 144 L.Ed.2d 347 (1999) (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270, 114 S.Ct. 1483)) (emphasis added). Applying this framework to those who entered into plea agreements with the expectation that they would be eligible for [§ 212(c)] relief, the Supreme Court in St. Cyr first determined that IIRIRA's repeal of any possibility of § 212(c) relief ... clearly attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past. Id. (quotations marks and citations omitted). To demonstrate a new disability to a past transaction or consideration, the Supreme Court explained that aliens reasonably rely on the possibility of obtaining § 212(c) relief in considering whether to waive their right to trial and plead guilty: Plea agreements involve a quid pro quo between a criminal defendant and the government. In exchange for some perceived benefit, defendants waive several of their constitutional rights (including the right to a trial) and grant the government numerous tangible benefits, such as promptly imposed punishment without the expenditure of prosecutorial resources. There can be little doubt that, as a general matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions. Given the frequency with which § 212(c) relief was granted in the years leading up to AEDPA and IIRIRA, preserving the possibility of such relief would have been one of the principal benefits sought by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial. Id. at 321-22, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (quotation marks and citations omitted). The key transaction or consideration already past was the alien's decision to abandon his constitutional right to trial and plead guilty in reliance on the old § 212(c). Id. at 325, 121 S.Ct. 2271. Because respondent, and other aliens like him, almost certainly relied upon that likelihood in deciding whether to forgo their right to a trial, the elimination of any possibility of § 212(c) relief by IIRIRA has an obvious and severe retroactive effect. Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that § 212(c) relief remains available for aliens, like respondent, whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for § 212(c) relief at the time of their plea under the law then in effect. Id. at 326, 121 S.Ct. 2271. The Supreme Court did not directly address whether an alien who pled guilty had to show individualized reliance on § 212(c) in entering a guilty plea or whether the class of aliens who pled guilty reasonably relied on § 212(c). But the tenor of St. Cyr as a whole appears to treat aliens who pled guilty before IIRIRA as a group of similarly-situated applicants eligible for such relief. Id. at 322, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (There can be little doubt that, as a general matter, alien defendants considering whether to enter into a plea agreement are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions.); id. at 325-26, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (concluding that St. Cyr and other aliens like him remain eligible for § 212(c) relief); id. at 325, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (Because respondent, and other aliens like him, almost certainly relied upon that likelihood in deciding whether to forego their right to a trial ....); id. at 323, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (Given the frequency with which § 212(c) relief was granted in the years leading up to AEDPA and IIRIRA, preserving the possibility of such relief would have been one of the principal benefits sought by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial.). [14] As noted earlier, Ferguson did not plead guilty, and she asks us to extend St. Cyr outside of the guilty plea context.