Opinion ID: 1695460
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the mississippi constitution prohibits the youth court judge from exercising both judicial and executive functions of government.

Text: Appellants requested that an extraordinary writ be issued prohibiting Judge Johnston from enforcing his temporary injunction, issuing any other order regarding the appointment of personnel at the Youth Court Detention Facility, and from interfering in any way with the appointment of J.B. Carter as Youth Court Facilities Administrator. Appellants conclude that to the extent that Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-119 (1972) or any other provision makes the youth detention and shelter facilities administrator an employee of the youth court or permits youth court judges to appoint and/or supervise the duties of the facilities administrator, it is unconstitutional. This Court has made clear that a strong case must be presented in arguing against the constitutionality of legislative enactments: With regard to the duties cast upon the assailant of a legislative enactment, the rule is fixed that a party who alleges the unconstitutionality of a statute has the burden of substantiating his claim and must overcome the strong presumption in favor of its validity. It has been said that the party who wishes to pronounce a law unconstitutional takes on himself the burden of proving this conclusion beyond all doubt, and that a party who asserts that the legislature has usurped its power or has violated the Constitution must affirmatively and clearly establish his position. Van Slyke v. Board of Trustees, 613 So.2d 872, 880 (Miss. 1993). citing 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Laws § 132 (1937). As always, an appellant is not entitled to raise new issues on appeal since to do so denies the trial court the opportunity to address the matter. Crowe v. Smith, 603 So.2d 301 (Miss. 1992). The issue of whether § 43-21-119 or any other part of the Youth Court Act is unconstitutional was not raised in the appellants' complaint. Accordingly, appellants' extensive argument presented here alleging control of the Youth Court facilities by Judge Johnston would impermissibly encroach on the executive branch of government in violation of separation of powers was not considered below. We decline to here consider the argument. This Court can determine this appeal concerning whether Judge Johnston had the authority to hire a new Youth Court Administrator without considering whether the challenged portions of the Youth Court Act are constitutional. We also note that the constitutionality of the Youth Court system has been both directly, and by implication, upheld. In Interest of T.L.C., 566 So.2d 691 (Miss. 1990); In Interest of M.I., 519 So.2d 433 (Miss. 1988). In the latter case, this Court declined to analyze the issue of whether a residential detention facility for girls was legal. The Court noted: It is not necessary that we decide the constitutional issues. Courts will not decide a constitutional question unless it is necessary to do so in order to decide the case. Mississippi PSC v. Miss. Power & Light, 593 So.2d 997 (Miss. 1991), citing Kron v. Van Cleave, 339 So.2d 559, 562 (Miss. 1976). As error, [Appellant] would have us determine, among other things, the legality of his home for girls... . We are of the opinion that this issue is not properly before the Court, and decline to wade through this quagmire of constitutional dilemmas inappropriately assigned as error in the case at bar. It is for this Court to determine only whether the orders of the youth court are supported by statutory authority under Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-21-101, et seq. (the Youth Court Act) and the case law thereunder. Id. at 434. The evidence established that Margaret Steele, formerly employed as the Youth Court Administrator, performed traditional administrative functions and all non-judicial tasks for the Youth Court, under the direction of Judge Johnston. See Miss. Code Ann. § 9-17-3. The current dispute only arose when Steele resigned her position in July of 1993. As Touart candidly admitted, the dispute simply boils down to who has the authority to fill the position formerly held by Steele. Considering Touart's testimony we find: Q: Mr. Carter  you already knew that Judge Johnston had appointed somebody to fill Ms. Steele's position and you all appointed Mr. Carter to the same position? MR. TOUART: That's not exactly the way it happened. Q: Well, that's why we're here, isn't it? Both of you want to put somebody in the same job. We don't need to make light of that, that's what this lawsuit is all about. MR. TOUART: I agree, that's what it's all about. In dismissing the complaint, Judge Pigott, in concluding his order opined: The Court further finds ... that the Jackson County Board of Supervisors have authorized the Youth Court of said county to submit an annual budget for the year ending September 30, 1993, and approved said budget; therefore as provided in the code sections cited above, within the limits of the budget approved by the Board of Supervisors, the Youth Court Judge may employ such persons as provided in the budget from time to time and specifically to employ a Youth Court Administrator to replace Ms. Margarett E. Steele with all of the duties and authority provided in Section 9-17-3. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Youth Court of the Youth Court Judge has the lawful and sole authority to appoint and/or employ a Youth Court Administrator as provided for in the budget. Examining the Youth Court Act, Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-21-101, et. seq., (Supp. 1979), the following relevant provisions are found: § 43-21-103. Construction and purpose. It is the public policy of this state that the parents of each child shall be primarily responsible for the care, support, education and welfare of such children; however, when it is necessary that a child be removed from the control of such child's parents, the youth court shall secure proper care for such child. § 43-21-105. Definitions. Designee means any person that the judge appoints to perform a duty which this chapter requires to be done by the judge or his designee. The judge may not appoint a person who is involved in law enforcement to be his designee. § 43-21-119. Youth court personnel. The judge or his designee shall appoint as provided in section 43-21-123 sufficient personnel, responsible to and under control of the youth court, to carry on the professional, clerical and other work of the youth court. The cost of these persons to appointed by the youth court shall be paid ... out of any available funds budgeted for the youth court by the board of supervisors. § 43-21-123. Expenditures by the youth court. In preparation for said funding, on an annual basis at the time requested, the youth court judge or administrator shall prepare and submit to the board of supervisors, or the municipal governing board of the youth court wherever the youth court is a municipal court, an annual budget which will identify the number, staff position, title and amount of annual or monthly compensation of each position as well as provide for other expenditures necessary to the functioning and operation of the youth court. When the budget of the youth court or youth court judge is approved by the board of supervisors ... then the youth court or youth court judge may employ such persons as provided in the budget from time to time. § 43-21-127. Cooperation. It is hereby made the duty of every public official or department to render all assistance and cooperation within his or its jurisdictional power which may further the objects of this chapter. § 43-21-153. Powers of youth court; contempt. (1) The youth court shall have full power and authority to issue all writs and processes including injunctions necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction and the carrying out the purpose of this chapter. Further, § 19-9-96 (Supp. 1994) specifically allows the board of supervisors of any county to set aside, appropriate and expend moneys ... to be used for funding of the operation of the youth court division... . Payment of salaries to include court administrators, ... and other professional personnel, secretaries and other clerical or other court-appointed personnel is specifically authorized. Next, Miss. Code Ann. § 9-17-1 provides that the office of court administrator may be established at the discretion of the judges and chancellors of the various courts of Mississippi. Section 9-17-3 specifically describes the functions of a court administrator in this state: It shall be the duty of the court administrator to: (a) Perform all nonjudicial tasks of the court; (b) Maintain all statistical reports; (c) Serve as liaison with the general public and members of the bar; (d) Coordinate and assist in the duties of the clerks of the courts of the district related to the judicial duties of the clerks; (e) Provide general administrative support for all judges and chancellors of the district; and (f) Perform other duties assigned by the judges. Miss. Code Ann. § 9-17-1, combined with the approval of the Youth Court budget, as mandated by § 43-21-123 and § 19-9-96, clearly authorizes the hiring by the youth court judge of a youth court administrator who performs non-judicial, administrative functions of the youth court. Support for the lower court's finding that Margaret Steele formerly served in the position of Youth Court Administrator, which position Judge Johnston had the authority to fill upon her resignation, is thus found in the statutory scheme of the Youth Court Act, as well as in the overwhelming evidence presented below. Judge Pigott's second order in this matter, resulting from appellants' Motion for Reconsideration, reiterated that the Youth Court Judge has the exclusive, sole and only lawful authority to appoint and/or employ a Youth Court Administrator as provided in the budget therefor. Further, Judge Pigott held that under Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-109, the Board was authorized to construct and maintain the youth court facilities, but no more. The learned trial judge correctly found there was no statutory provision which allowed the county board of supervisors, board attorney, county administrator, or any other person to exercise any authority over or interfere with the lawful operation of the Youth Court, juvenile detention center and/or shelter or the appointment and/or employment of the Youth Court Administrator within the budget for the Youth Court adopted by the Board of Supervisors. Section 43-21-109 specifically provides: Any county or municipality may separately or jointly establish and maintain detention facilities, shelter facilities, foster homes, or any other facility necessary to carry on the work of the youth court. For said purposes, the county or municipality may acquire necessary land by condemnation, by purchase or donation, may issue bonds as now provided by law for the purpose of purchasing, constructing, remodeling or maintaining such facilities; may expend necessary funds from the general fund to construct and maintain such facilities, and may employ architects. As the trial court found, no statute expressly provides that the Board is authorized to fill a position entitled, Youth Court Facilities Administrator. Neither is there such a position found in the youth court budget request presented to the Board for approval. In sum, there is clear statutory support for Judge Johnston's action in hiring an individual to replace Ms. Steele as Youth Court Administrator. There is no support, however, for Touart's position that in doing so, Judge Johnston exercised executive, rather than judicial authority. By simple analogy, this Court has hired a Court Administrator under the identical statutory authorization granted to Judge Johnston for the Youth Court. See Miss. Code Ann. § 9-17-1. No doubt this Court has not delved into the realm of exercising unconstitutional executive authority in doing so, but has instead recognized the need for an administrator to handle the non-judicial functions of this Court. Further, § 9-21-1 establishes the Administrative Office of Courts, while § 9-21-3 specifically charges that office with the duty of assisting the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mississippi with his duties as the chief administrative officer of all courts of this state... . Continuing the analogy, the Chief Justice of this Court does not impermissibly encroach upon the functions of the executive branch of our state government by supervising the administrative or non-judicial functions of the judicial branch. The same holds true for Judge Johnston in his appointment of a Youth Court Administrator. This is simply a case of a bid for power between the Board and Judge Johnston, in which the Board has produced little support for its position and accordingly, cannot prevail. This issue was needlessly complicated by the assignment of constitutional questions for review by this Court, disposition of which are not necessary to decide this appeal. On the core question of who has the authority to fill the position of Youth Court Administrator, on which the relevant evidence was presented below, the lower court correctly determined Judge Johnston acted within his statutorily granted authority. This issue is without merit.