Opinion ID: 787450
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Regarded As Employees and the Right to Reasonable Accommodation

Text: 101 To the extent Williams relies upon a claim that PHA perceived his impairment to be greater than it was, PHA advances an additional argument. It insists that a regarded as disabled employee is not entitled to accommodation under the ADA and that, accordingly, Williams suffered no adverse employment action other than his termination. 17 This presents an issue that is one of first impression in this Circuit and has occasioned a circuit split elsewhere. We assume for purposes of our analysis that the trier of fact will find erroneous PHA's perception that Williams's depression prevented him from being around others carrying, or having access to, guns. 102 Based on the statutory text and the legislative history of the ADA, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a regarded as disabled employee is entitled to be accommodated. Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir.1996). The better-reasoned district court decisions reach the same result. See Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F.Supp.2d 151, 163-71 (E.D.N.Y.2002); Jewell v. Reid's Confectionary Co., 172 F.Supp.2d 212, 218-19 (D.Me.2001); see also Lorinz v. Turner Const. Co., 2004 WL 1196699,  n. 7 (E.D.N.Y. May 25, 2004) (endorsing Jacques ); Miller v. Heritage Prod., Inc., 2004 WL 1087370,  (S.D.Ind. Apr.21, 2004) (same). We also find Judge Block's analysis in Jacques particularly persuasive, and will largely track his approach below. 103 As PHA stresses, however, there are two Courts of Appeals who have reasoned to a contrary conclusion, see Kaplan v. City of North Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1231-33 (9th Cir.2003); Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir.1999), and two have so concluded without analysis, see Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir.1999); Newberry v. East Texas State University, 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir.1998). 18 We find ourselves unpersuaded by the reasoning of Weber and Kaplan. 104 Weber acknowledged that the statutory text did not distinguish between actually and regarded as disabled employees. It declined to apply the statute as written, however, because doing so, in its view, would lead to bizarre results. 186 F.3d at 916. In so concluding, it declined to attribute to Congress an intent to create a disparity among impaired but non-disabled employees, denying most the right to reasonable accommodations but granting to others, because of the employers' misperceptions, a right to reasonable accommodations.... Id. at 917. In Kaplan, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, despite finding that on its face, the ADA's definition of `qualified individual with a disability' does not differentiate between the three alternative prongs of the `disability definition,' 323 F.3d at 1232, adopted the rationale of Weber, again suggesting that a formalistic reading of the ADA would lead to bizarre results. Id. Specifically, Kaplan endorsed the windfall theory suggested in a dictum by our Court: it seems odd to give an impaired but not disabled person a windfall because of her employer's erroneous perception of disability, when other impaired but not disabled people are not entitled to accommodation. Pathmark, 177 F.3d at 196 (citing Deane, 142 F.3d at 149 n. 12). 105 While we do not rule out the possibility that there may be situations in which applying the reasonable accommodation requirement in favor of a regarded as disabled employee would produce bizarre results, we perceive no basis for an across-the-board refusal to apply the ADA in accordance with the plain meaning of its text. Here, and in what seem to us to be at least the vast majority of cases, a literal reading of the Act will not produce such results. Accordingly, we will remain faithful to its directive in this case.
106 As we have heretofore explained, the ADA makes it unlawful for a covered employer to discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), and discrimination in this context includes, with an exception not here relevant, not making reasonable accommodation to the ... mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). The definition of disability includes  being regarded as having ... an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (emphasis added). Thus, as all would agree, the statutory text of the ADA does not in any way distinguish between [actually] disabled and `regarded as' individuals in requiring accommodation. Pathmark, 177 F.3d at 196.
107 Moreover, the legislative history of the ADA confirms that Congress meant what its text says. As Congress explained: 108 [The objective of the regarded as provision of the ADA] was articulated by the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline. The Court noted that although an individual may have an impairment that does not in fact substantially limit a major life activity, the reaction of others may prove just as disabling. Such an impairment might not diminish a person's physical or mental capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially limit that person's ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of others to the impairment. 109 The Court concluded that, by including this test, Congress acknowledged accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment. 110 Thus, a person who [suffers an adverse employment action] because of the myths, fears and stereotypes associated with disabilities would be covered under [the regarded as prong], whether or not the employer's perception was shared by others in the field and whether or not the person's physical or mental condition would be considered a disability under the first or second part of the definition. 111 H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(III), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453 (footnotes omitted). Thus, the ADA was written to protect one who is disabled by virtue of being regarded as disabled in the same way as one who is disabled by virtue of being actually disabled, because being perceived as disabled may prove just as disabling. This case demonstrates the wisdom of that conclusion, in that but for PHA's erroneous perception that Williams was unable to be around firearms because of his mental impairment, Williams would have been eligible for a radio room assignment.
112 In addition to the statutory text and legislative history, the Supreme Court's decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987), also requires that regarded as employees be entitled to reasonable accommodations. Arline involved a claim based on the Rehabilitation Act. The Court pointed out that the Act's definition of handicapped individual had been amended to read as follows: 113 [A]ny person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment. 114 Arline, 480 U.S. at 279, 107 S.Ct. 1123. The Court explained that this expansion of the definition was intended to preclude discrimination against `[a] person who has a record of, or is regarded as having, an impairment [but who] may at present have no actual incapacity at all.' Arline, 480 U.S. at 279, 107 S.Ct. 1123 (quoting Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405-406 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979)) (alterations in original). The Court held that the teacher plaintiff, who had a contagious but not substantially limiting form of tuberculosis, fell into this category. It found that employers had an affirmative obligation [under the Rehabilitation Act] to make a reasonable accommodation for such an employee, Arline, 480 U.S. at 289 n. 19, 107 S.Ct. 1123, and remanded so that the District Court could determine whether the School Board could have reasonably accommodated her, id. at 288-89, 107 S.Ct. 1123. 115 Given that the regarded as sections of both Acts play a virtually identical role in the statutory scheme, and the well-established rule that the ADA must be read to grant at least as much protection as provided by ... the Rehabilitation Act, Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998), the conclusion seems inescapable that regarded as employees under the ADA are entitled to reasonable accommodation in the same way as are those who are actually disabled. Of course, additionally, Congress specifically endorsed the Arline approach in crafting the regarded as prong of the ADA's definition of disability. Neither the Eighth Circuit's decision in Weber nor the Ninth Circuit's decision in Kaplan address Arline.
116 PHA, arguing the windfall theory to our Court, suggests that Williams, by being regarded as disabled by PHA, receives a windfall accommodation compared to a similarly situated employee who had not been regarded as disabled and would not be entitled under the ADA to any accommodation. The record in this case demonstrates that, absent PHA's erroneous perception that Williams could not be around firearms because of his mental impairment, a radio room assignment would have been made available to him and others similarly situated. PHA refused to provide that assignment solely based upon its erroneous perception that Williams's mental impairment prevented him not only from carrying a gun, but being around others with, or having access to, guns — perceptions specifically contradicted by PHA's own psychologist. While a similarly situated employee who was not perceived to have this additional limitation would have been allowed a radio room assignment, Williams was specifically denied such an assignment because of the erroneous perception of his disability. The employee whose limitations are perceived accurately gets to work, while Williams is sent home unpaid. This is precisely the type of discrimination the regarded as prong literally protects from, as confirmed by the Supreme Court's decision in Arline and the legislative history of the ADA. Accordingly, Williams, to the extent PHA regarded him as disabled, was entitled to reasonable accommodation. 19