Opinion ID: 624266
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motions For Summary Judgment On Defamation And False Light Claims

Text: The Milligans also brought suit against Sinclair Broadcasting, claiming that Fox 17's Operation report was defamatory and portrayed Milligan in a false light. The district court granted summary judgment to Sinclair Broadcasting, finding that the Tennessee fair report privilege applied to Fox 17's coverage of the Operation and barred the Milligans' defamation and false light claims. This Court reviews a district court's grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, Himes v. United States, 645 F.3d 771, 776 (6th Cir. 2011), and the moving party bears the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact remaining in the suit, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The Tennessee fair report privilege is a qualified privilege that raises the state of mind requirement in both defamation and false light actions to an actual malice standard. See Lewis v. NewsChannel 5 Network, L.P., 238 S.W.3d 270 (Tenn. Ct.App.2007); cf. West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640, 648 (Tenn. 2001) ([A]bsolute and conditional privileges apply to the invasion of privacy torts. . . .). Media defendants benefit from this privilege when reporting on an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern. . . . Lewis, 238 S.W.3d at 285 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611, at 297 (1977)). As the privilege is qualified, not absolute, it applies only when the report is a fair and accurate summation of the proceeding and display[s] balance and neutrality. Id. at 284 (quoting Smith v. Reed, 944 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996)). Thus, Sinclair Broadcasting may take advantage of the fair report privilege's actual malice standard if it (1) reported on an official action, and (2) provided a fair and accurate report of the events. We must first determine whether Fox 17's report concerned an official action. The fair report privilege does not protect a media defendant's reporting on all statements made by any governmental employee in any circumstance, but rather it is limited to reports of public proceedings or official actions of government that have been made public. Lewis, 238 S.W.3d at 285. The privilege has expanded to include reports of public meetings of local government, reporting on the contents of arrest and search warrants, as well as reports of judicial documents and proceedings. Id. at 284-85. In Lewis, a Tennessee court drew a distinction between a media defendant's report of the mere occurrence of an arrest and an arrest report including statements from the police or witnesses discussing the facts of the case. Id. at 287. Looking to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court noted: [A]n arrest by an officer is an official action, and a report of the fact of the arrest or of the charge of crime made by the officer . . . is within the fair report privilege; however, statements made by the police or by the complainant or other witnesses . . . as to the facts of the case. . . are not. Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611 cmt. h, at 301) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, Fox 17's Operation news story is a report of an official action for purposes of the fair report privilege. The report included only one statement concerning Milligan, asserting that [t]heir first arrest came early Paula Milligan wanted on four counts of forgery and one count of identity theft. This report does not include any opinions or embellishments from third parties and is limited to reporting only the fact of the arrest [and] the charge of [the] crime. Id. at 287. We must next turn to the issue of whether Fox 17's Operation news report was a fair and accurate portrayal of Milligan's arrest. The fair report privilege protects only fair and accurate portrayals of the official action; however, a report need not be a verbatim, technically accurate account in every detail, as long as it conveys a correct and just impression of what took place. Id. at 284. Minor, insignificant factual discrepancies will not overcome the fair report privilege, but a media defendant may not rely on the privilege when reporting false statement[s] of fact regarding what occurred during the proceeding . . . or [a] one-sided account of the proceeding. . . . Id. The Milligans contend that Fox 17's report was not fair and accurate because it erroneously implied that the officers arresting Milligan had a warrant physically present at the time of arrest. The Operation segment opened with the phrase with warrants in hand, teams of officers swarmed across Middle Tennessee. The report later showed footage of Milligan's arrest and stated that she was arrested on four counts of forgery and one count of identity theft. It should first be noted that the statement with warrants in hand is most appropriately viewed as an introductory remark, not commentary on the particulars of Milligan's arrest. But even if this comment is imputed directly to Milligan's arrest, this minor inaccuracy is insufficient to defeat the fair report privilege because it is an insignificant, technical discrepancy. See id. The overall gist of the report is that Milligan was arrested on forgery and identity theft charges, and whether the officers physically had a warrant in hand at the time of this arrest or radioed it in to the Warrants Division has no real effect on whether the report conveyed a just impression of what took place. Id. Even though the with warrants in hand statement is false as applied to Milligan, it is not such a large transgression that it creates a one-sided . . . defamatory account of the official action, and therefore, it is covered by the fair report privilege. See id. Because Fox 17 provided a fair and accurate report of an official action, the fair report privilege requires the plaintiff to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice. Id. at 283. A defendant's defamatory remark is made with actual malice when made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). The Milligans do not contend that Sinclair Broadcasting had actual knowledge that Milligan was erroneously arrested, so the question is whether the report was made with a reckless disregard for the truth. Whether a statement was made with reckless disregard for the truth is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published or would have investigated before publishing, but by whether the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of its publication. Compuware Corp. v. Moody's Investors Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 526 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968)) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted). In fact, a failure to investigate before publishing, even when a reasonably prudent person would have done so, is not sufficient to establish reckless disregard. Harte-Hanks Comm., Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989). The Milligans are unable to meet their burden of establishing actual malice because their argument solely rests on the Defendant's failure to conduct an independent investigation. They argue that the reporter should have read the arrest file or conducted independent research on the validity of Milligan's arrest warrant as well as the aftermath of her arrest. However, the Milligans are unable to provide any evidence suggesting that the reporter entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the report, Compuware Corp., 499 F.3d at 526, and their contention that a reporter should investigate prior to publication, even when he has no doubts as to the truth, is not a legally cognizable basis for establishing actual malice, see Connaughton, 491 U.S. at 688, 109 S.Ct. 2678. Additionally, Tennessee follows the single publication rule, meaning that a plaintiff's cause of action accrues only once, at the time of publication, and later publications do not give rise to additional defamation causes of action. See Applewhite v. Memphis State Univ., 495 S.W.2d 190, 193-97 (Tenn.1973). Because the Operation news story originally aired on November 2, the Milligans' cause of action then accrued. Any additional publications that occurred due to technical difficulties between November 2 and November 13, after Fox 17 was aware of Milligan's erroneous arrest, are, therefore, not separately actionable under the single publication rule. Therefore, we conclude that the district court properly found that the Tennessee fair report privilege shields Sinclair Broadcasting's liability for any inaccuracies in their Operation news report regarding Milligan's arrest. The Milligans were unable to meet their burden under the fair report privilege of proving actual malice, and because no genuine issues of material fact relating to the defamation or false light claims exist, the district court properly granted Sinclair Broadcasting's motion for summary judgment.