Opinion ID: 2647624
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Condominium Act Claim

Text: “We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Butler v. Sheriff of Palm Beach Cnty., 685 F.3d 1261, 1265 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). We conclude that a claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. But when a complaint permits the court to infer only the mere possibility of misconduct, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. 5 Case: 13-11744 Date Filed: 12/26/2013 Page: 6 of 10 Florida courts have held that Condominium Act provisions similar to § 718.202(3) require plaintiffs to make a plausible showing of prejudice. In Bruce v. O’Neill, for example, the condominium seller failed to include statutorilyrequired clauses in the buyer’s contract, and the buyer sought to rescind the contract on that ground. 445 So. 2d 379, 380 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). The trial court had found that omission to be sufficient to prove a claim for statutory rescission under the Condominium Act, but the appeals court disagreed, noting that “there [was] absolutely no demonstration that the plaintiff/purchaser was even slightly prejudiced by the technical statutory noncompliance of the seller.” Id. Without a showing of prejudice, the seller’s failure to include a statutorily-required clause was not grounds for rescission. 3 Id. Based on the Bruce decision, the plaintiffs in this case were required to plead prejudice as well. See Bravo v. United States, 577 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that we are “bound by decisions of a 3 An appeals court in Florida’s second district reached a similar conclusion about the need to allege prejudice when bringing a claim under the Florida Condominium Act. In Beach Place Joint Venture v. Beach Place Condo. Ass’n, Inc., a condominium owners association sought to have an office unit owned by the seller converted into a common element owned by the association. 458 So. 2d 439, 440–41 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Though the association had already received the interest it had bargained for and even had notice that the office space belonged to the seller, it asserted ownership over the office unit on the ground that an error in condominium paperwork made ownership of it unclear. Id. at 441. The appeals court rejected that claim, noting that even if an error had occurred, the condominium association had shown no prejudice as a result of it. Id. at 442. Both parties had instead received the benefits of their bargains. Id. Because the seller had made a “good faith attempt to comply with the disclosure requirements of the Condominium Act,” the court held that a “technical error” “should not be used to provide a windfall to the [buyers].” Id. at 441–42. 6 Case: 13-11744 Date Filed: 12/26/2013 Page: 7 of 10 state’s intermediate appellate courts unless there is persuasive evidence that the highest state court would rule otherwise”) (quotation marks omitted). 4 In the present case, the plaintiffs allege only the possibility that Kolter caused them prejudice by printing the disclosure once. They do not allege that they never saw the disclosure; only that they were “deprived of the benefit of seeing [it] a second, re-emphasized time.” Complaint ¶ 56. Had they seen the disclosure twice, their argument goes, the added emphasis “would likely have caused [them] to pay much closer attention to [the disclosure] which possibly could have resulted in a number of eventualities.” Complaint ¶ 52 (emphasis added). We will never know which “eventualities” might have come to pass if the plaintiffs had seen the disclosure twice. However, we know the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim by alleging the mere possibility that an act or omission caused prejudice. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–58, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007) (“[S]omething beyond the mere possibility of loss causation must be alleged . . . .’”). The plaintiffs’ remaining allegations of prejudice have no basis in law at all. They allege, for example, that they suffered prejudice because “they were not 4 The plaintiffs have cited federal district court and bankruptcy court opinions for the proposition that prejudice need not be alleged in order for them to state a claim under § 718.202(3). As our decision in Bravo indicates, we are bound by Florida courts’ interpretation of Florida law, not the decisions of federal district or bankruptcy courts — especially when those decisions are unpublished, inapposite, or otherwise non-precedential, as was the case with the plaintiffs’ cited authorities. 7 Case: 13-11744 Date Filed: 12/26/2013 Page: 8 of 10 made aware by Kolter that the purpose of Florida Statute 718.202 is to protect purchasers under preconstruction condominium contracts from loss of their deposits should the developer fail to perform its contractual obligations.” Complaint ¶ 49. But Florida law places no duty on Kolter to educate the plaintiffs on the purpose of § 718.202 or otherwise act for their benefit. See Taylor Woodrow Homes Fla., Inc. v. 4/46-A Corp., 850 So. 2d 536, 541 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (“In an arms-length transaction, . . . there is no duty imposed on either party to act for the benefit or protection of the other party, or to disclose facts that the other party could, by its own diligence have discovered.”) (quotation marks omitted); Garcia v. Santa Maria Resort, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1296 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“[A party to a contract] cannot avoid his obligations thereunder by alleging that he did not read the contract, or that the terms were not explained to him, or that he did not understand the provisions.”). The district court correctly concluded that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under § 718.202(3) on which relief can be granted.