Opinion ID: 786462
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reasons for and Length of Silverwood's Delay

Text: 34 The district court found that Silverwood has not explained why it delayed so long before ... [attempting] ... to intervene. On appeal, however, Silverwood contends that it did not move to intervene sooner because it was not aware until late in the proceedings that its interests might be impaired. 35 Silverwood argues that it did not realize its interests were adverse to the United States because it thought that its recorded lien against Alisal gave it priority over rival creditors. Silverwood contends that it first became aware that the United States might assert priority as a rival creditor during a phone conversation on May 9, 2002, in which an attorney for the United States informed Silverwood that it intended to assert priority under the Federal Priority Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3713 (2000). 6 Silverwood also contends that it could not have intervened earlier because it was incurring significant financial expenses in its own judicial proceedings to enforce its judgment against Alisal. 36 To the extent that Silverwood did not raise these arguments before the district court, we will not consider them. As a general rule, [appellate courts] ... will not consider arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal. Smith, 194 F.3d at 1052. A review of Silverwood's filings in the district court indicates that its explanation for its delay in seeking intervention was not presented to the district court. Thus, on the basis of the materials before it, the district court correctly determined that Silverwood had offered no adequate explanation for [its] ... delay in seeking intervention. See id. 37 Furthermore, even if these arguments were properly raised, they are not persuasive. A party must intervene when he knows or has reason to know that his interests might be adversely affected by the outcome of litigation. Oregon, 913 F.2d at 589. The United States requested substantial civil penalties against Alisal in its third amended complaint, filed with the district court on August 15, 2001. Thus, Silverwood was on constructive notice of the United States' potentially adverse interest in August 2001. 38 Moreover, the expense of conducting its own proceedings against Alisal does not excuse Silverwood's delay. An applicant's desire to save costs by waiting to intervene until a late stage in litigation is not a valid justification for delay. To hold otherwise would encourage interested parties to impede litigation by waiting to intervene until the final stages of a case. See Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Janet Greeson's A Place For Us, 62 F.3d 1217, 1221-22 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Banco Popular v. Greenblatt, 964 F.2d 1227, 1234(1st Cir.1992) (stating that it seems inequitable to allow a latecomer, who fiddled while Rome burned, to collect a share of the fire insurance)). 39 Because the district court properly considered the relevant factors and resolved them against Silverwood, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Silverwood's motion to intervene on the ground that it was untimely.