Opinion ID: 211528
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Valve means”

Text: As an alternative ground for affirming the district court’s judgment of noninfringement, TFY argues that the court’s construction of the “valve means” limitation, which included a deformable diaphragm as a corresponding structure, precludes a finding of literal infringement. Because the claims recite the limitations “deformable diaphragm disposed in the body” and “valve means” separately, TFY asserts that an accused device must contain separate structures meeting the respective limitations before there can be literal infringement. To support its position, TFY cites Gaus v. Conair Corp., 363 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2004), which it interprets as instructing that one component of an accused device cannot perform “double duty” and thereby satisfy two separate limitations of a claim. According to TFY, because the accused products have only one structure, viz., a deformable diaphragm, that meets two separate limitations, there can be no literal infringement of the claims. We do not agree with TFY that the district court’s construction of the claim limitation “valve means” compels us to affirm its judgment of noninfringement. We first note that neither TFY nor Cannon challenges the district court’s construction of “valve means.” Thus, for purposes of this appeal only, we will assume that the court properly construed the “valve means” limitation. Using that assumption, we conclude that the ’850 patent specification does not require that the “deformable diaphragm” and the “valve means” limitations must be embodied by separate components. In fact, the 05-1063 10 specification teaches that it is the return of the diaphragm to its original, undistorted position that causes the negative pressure in the body of the pump to be “released,” thus performing the function of the “valve means” limitation. ’850 patent, col. 7, ll. 4551. Because the district court construed the claims to require a single diaphragm that meets both the “deformable diaphragm” and “valve means” limitations, the fact that the accused products have a single diaphragm that meets those claim limitations does not preclude a finding of literal infringement. See In re Kelley, 305 F.2d 909, 914 (CCPA 1962) (explaining that “[w]e see no reason why a single structural element . . . which performs two separate functions, cannot support a claim reciting broadly these two separate functions”). On the contrary, such a finding would prove that the two limitations have been met. Moreover, under TFY’s position that a single diaphragm cannot meet two separate limitations as a matter of law, no device could literally infringe the ’850 patent because the district court construed the claims to require a single diaphragm to meet the two limitations. That would be an illogical result. Moreover, TFY’s reliance on Gaus to support its position is misplaced. The facts here are readily distinguishable from Gaus. In Gaus, the patent at issue was directed to a safety mechanism that prevents fatal shocks to users of electrical appliances, e.g., when the user drops a hairdryer into a bathtub. 363 F.3d at 1285. As TFY notes, the relevant claim language provided that the housing of the claimed device was comprised of “an electrical operating unit” and “a pair of spaced-apart electrically exposed conductive probe networks.” In Gaus we determined that, based on the description contained in the patent specification, the two limitations were embodied as two separate structural components of the claimed invention. Id. at 1288-90. The accused product in 05-1063 11 Gaus, however, did not have two separate components meeting the respective limitations, and thus we held there was no literal infringement. Id. at 1290. That is not our case. As explained above, there is nothing in the ’850 patent specification or the claims that require the “deformable diaphragm” and “valve means” limitations to be embodied as two separate structural components. On the contrary, the court’s construction of those limitations requires that both be embodied by the same single structure, viz., a deformable diaphragm. Tellingly, TFY does not cite any case law prohibiting a claim from reciting two limitations embodied by the same structural component. As another alternative ground for affirming the district court’s judgment, TFY argues that the claims are invalid because the “valve means” limitation does not comply with the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, in particular, that the specification contains no structure corresponding to the claimed function of the “valve means.” TFY’s invalidity argument attempts to broaden the district court’s judgment. Because the district court did not decide that issue, it is inappropriate for us to do so in this appeal. The matter may be considered on remand. COSTS Each party shall bear its own costs. 05-1063 12