Opinion ID: 1705000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for Shuqualak.

Text: ¶ 7. Spann argues that the trial court erred in finding that no genuine issue of material fact remained as to the negligence of Shuqualak. To survive summary judgment, Spann bears the burden of producing evidence sufficient to establish the existence of the conventional tort elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages. ¶ 8. Spann relies heavily upon Keith v. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co., 168 Miss. 519, 151 So. 916 (1934). In Keith, a fire set on the railroad company's right-of-way caused dense smoke to pass over an adjacent highway. Keith, 168 Miss. at 522-23, 151 So. 916. The diminished visibility caused by the smoke led to an automobile accident. Id. at 23, 151 So. 916. The Court found that a jury would be warranted in finding that the agent and employees of the railroad company might reasonably foresee that some injury might result to those who had the right to travel the public highway. Id. at 523-24, 151 So. 916. The Court noted that the driver had a right to be where he was at the time of the accident, and that a jury could infer that the railroad company was negligent in causing the smoke. Id. While the term duty is not discussed in Keith, the Court implied that the railroad had a duty not to obscure drivers' visibility in such a way as to create an unreasonably dangerous condition. See id. at 522-24, 151 So. 916. ¶ 9. We find that Shuqualak had a duty to refrain from creating an unreasonably dangerous condition that impeded drivers' vision. With duty established, we turn to the remaining issues of breach, causation, and damages. ¶ 10. Spann cites Warren v. Allgood, 344 So.2d 151 (Miss.1977), for support. In Warren, a motorist alleged that he was struck from behind as he slowed down while entering a cloud of dust on the highway. Warren, 344 So.2d. at 152. The motorist claimed that this cloud originated from a liming operation in a nearby field. Id. Conflicting evidence was presented at trial as to whether the cloud of dust actually was present at the time of the accident. Id. This Court affirmed the jury's verdict that the landowners were not [] responsible in any way for the accident. Id. ¶ 11. Likewise, in the instant case, testimony conflicts as to whether the dense fog, steam, and/or smoke released from Shuqualak's plant actually was present at the time of the accident. Spann stated that the steam was present at the time of the accident. Shuqualak, while not admitting that the steam was present at that particular time, denied neither that its plant emitted steam nor the potential for this steam to drift across the roadway. Even if such conditions were present, a question of fact remains as to whether the steam caused an unreasonably dangerous condition. ¶ 12. Finally, [f]or a particular damage to be recoverable in a negligence action, the plaintiff must show that the damage was proximately caused by the negligence. In order for an act of negligence to proximately cause the damage, the fact finder must find that the negligence was both the cause in fact and legal cause of the damage. Glover v. Jackson State Univ., 968 So.2d 1267, 1277 (Miss. 2007) (quoting Dobbs, The Law of Torts, § 180 at 443 (2000)). A defendant's negligence is the cause-in-fact where the fact-finder concludes that, but for the defendant's negligence, the injury would not have occurred. Id. Once established, the cause-in-fact also will be the legal cause of the damage provided the damage is the type, or within the classification, of damage the negligent actor should reasonably expect (or foresee) to result from the negligent act. Id. (quoting Dobbs, The Law of Torts, § 180 at 443). ¶ 13. Both parties gave evidence that it was raining and cloudy on the day of the accident. [4] Whether the weather or the steam was the cause-in-fact of the accident is a question within the province of a jury. Furthermore, if cause-in-fact is established, Shuqualak might reasonably foresee that an automobile accident could occur. See Keith, 168 Miss. at 522-24, 151 So. 916.