Opinion ID: 785761
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The NJLAD Claim

Text: 58 The NJLAD prohibits any unlawful discrimination against any person because such person is or has been at any time disabled or any unlawful employment practice against such person, unless the nature and extent of the disability reasonably precludes the performance of the particular employment. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-4.1. Further, the New Jersey Administrative Code requires that an employer must make a reasonable accommodation to the limitations of an employee or applicant who is a person with a disability, unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship. N.J. Admin. Code tit. 13, § 13-2.5. This duty to accommodate, however, is subject to an exception ... where it can reasonably be determined that an ... employee, as a result of the individual disability, cannot presently perform the job even with reasonable accommodation. N.J. Admin. Code tit. 13, § 13-2.8(a). 59 Conoshenti claims that PSE & G violated his rights under NJLAD by denying him a reasonable accommodation. Generally, a prima facie case of failure to accommodate requires proof that (1) the plaintiff had a LAD handicap; (2) was qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without accommodation; and (3) suffered an adverse employment action because of the handicap. Bosshard v. Hackensack University Medical Center, 345 N.J.Super. 78, 783 A.2d 731, 739 (2001) (citing Seiden v. Marina Assoc., 315 N.J.Super. 451, 718 A.2d 1230, 1237 (1998)). 60 The District Court first correctly ruled that Conoshenti's temporary disability constituted a handicap under NJLAD. See Soules v. Mount Holiness Mem. Park, 354 N.J.Super. 569, 808 A.2d 863, 865-66 (2002) (holding that a temporary inability to work while recuperating from surgery or injury is a handicap under NJLAD); see also Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 173 N.J. 1, 800 A.2d 826, 835 (2002) (noting that [t]he term `handicapped' in LAD is not restricted to `severe' or `immutable' disabilities and has been interpreted as significantly broader than the analogous provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)). 61 As to the second element, however, the District Court found that, as of the end of his FMLA-protected leave, Conoshenti was unable to perform any of the functions of his job. Accordingly, the District Court concluded that the only reasonable accommodation that would protect his employment status as of that date would have been a leave of absence. While noting the existence of federal cases recognizing a leave of absence as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, the District Court nevertheless held that a leave of absence was not a reasonable accommodation under the NJLAD. It did not err in so holding. 62 As we have noted, the New Jersey Administrative Code provides an exception to an employer's obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation where it can reasonably be determined that an applicant or employee, as a result of the individual's disability, cannot presently perform the job even with reasonable accommodation. N.J. Admin. Code tit. 13, § 13-2.8(a) (emphasis added). This provision of the New Jersey regulation reflects a significant difference between the ADA and NJLAD. While the ADA applies to employees who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m), NJLAD protects only an employee who can presently perform the essential functions of his job with or without the reasonable accommodation. The NJLAD regulation thus requires that the handicapped employee be able to perform the essential functions of his job during the application of the reasonable accommodation — that is, at the same time that the reasonable accommodation is being implemented. The ADA, however, does not contain any such temporal requirement. Accordingly, the federal courts that have permitted a leave of absence as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA have reasoned, explicitly or implicitly, that applying such a reasonable accommodation at the present time would enable the employee to perform his essential job functions in the near future. See, e.g., Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 444 (1st Cir.1998) (Criado offered evidence tending to show that her leave would be temporary and would allow her physician to design an effective treatment program.). That reasoning is precluded under NJLAD because of the present performance exception. 63 We decline to hold that a temporary leave of absence must be granted under NJLAD to reasonably accommodate a handicapped employee's inability to presently perform the essential functions of his job. Such a holding would effectively defeat the application of the present performance exception. Requiring PSE & G to grant Conoshenti a leave of absence as an accommodation following his FMLA leave would not have enabled him to presently perform his job; rather, it would have excused Conoshenti from present performance contrary to the explicit requirements of the NJLAD regulation. We are confident that the New Jersey Supreme Court would not sanction such a conflict. We will therefore affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of PSE & G on Conoshenti's NJLAD failure-to-accommodate claim.