Opinion ID: 2179292
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Right to Proceed Pro Se

Text: The court ( Perkins, J. ) appointed counsel for Gallant in December 1988. In September 1989, defendant's counsel moved to withdraw, citing defendant's desire to present an unsupportable defense. After a hearing on the motion, the court granted the motion to withdraw and appointed another attorney to serve as Gallant's counsel. Prior to jury selection and immediately after the court's ruling on Gallant's insanity defense, the defendant again expressed dissatisfaction with his counsel. He asked to be permitted to proceed pro se, stating it's going to be an unfair trial and having a lawyer just gives it credence. The court questioned Gallant and ascertained that he was unfamiliar with court rules and procedures, that his actions were only a protest, and that Gallant felt the trial system is stacked against people without money. The court denied Gallant's motion, concluding that he had not intelligently waived the right to an attorney and that he had not unequivocally demanded the right to proceed pro se. The court did, however, permit Gallant to present his own testimony in narrative form. The protection afforded by article 1, § 6 of the state constitution is commensurate with that of the sixth amendment to the federal constitution. See State v. Clark, 483 A.2d 1221, 1224 n. 2 (Me.1984); see also State v. Carter, 412 A.2d 56, 60 (Me.1980). In our cases in which a defendant has argued that he has been denied the right to proceed pro se, we have required that the defendant show both a waiver of counsel and an unequivocal invocation of the right to proceed pro se. See State v. Walls, 501 A.2d 803, 806 (Me.1985) (distinguishing the case where a defendant is asserting the right to proceed pro se from the case where the defendant contends that his right to counsel was compromised); State v. Crafts, 425 A.2d 194, 196 (Me.1981) (court must require that demand to exercise one's right of self-representation be stated clearly and unequivocally). Here, the court did not err by determining that Gallant's waiver was not unequivocal. See State v. Morrison, 567 A.2d 1350, 1351 and n. 2 (Me.1990) (a finding of waiver or a lack thereof is subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review). In light of Gallant's history of conflicts with his attorneys and his explicit purpose to protest the proceedings, the court was entitled to interpret the defendant's conduct as less than an unequivocal demand to proceed pro se. See Crafts, 425 A.2d at 196. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. All concurring.