Opinion ID: 196984
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Juan Jose Miranda-Santiago

Text: 79 Appellant Miranda-Santiago was indicted on the drug and firearms charges detailed in Counts One, Three, Four and Five of the superseding indictment in this case. At his arraignment, Miranda-Santiago pled not guilty to all charges. On September 7, 1994, he offered to change his plea to guilty. Under a plea agreement entered into pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(A) & (B), Miranda-Santiago offered to plead guilty to Count One, charging him with possession with intent to distribute narcotics, 21 U.S.C. § 846. In addition, the parties recommended to the court a base offense level of 30, with a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b)(1) & (2), resulting in a sentencing range of 70-87 months. 29 More specifically, the parties agreed to ask for a sentence of 84 months. 80 The Miranda-Santiago PSR contained the same general recital of the facts as that contained in the other PSRs discussed above. As to Miranda-Santiago's role in the enterprise, the PSR indicated that this defendant worked as a drug distributor. He was not identified as someone who used firearms or provided protection for the operation. The PSR designated him as a minor participant in the offense. Notwithstanding that finding, the probation officer did not include a two-level downward adjustment as part of the sentencing calculation. The PSR recommended a base level of 30, with only a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 81 The appellant was sentenced on January 11, 1995. During the hearing, the defendant voiced no objection to the findings contained in the PSR. 30 Although he did not do so during the sentencing hearing, in the written judgment the judge adopted the PSR's factual findings, without exception. The district court arrived at a base offense level of 27 and sentenced Miranda-Santiago to a prison term of 78 months, eighteen months above the mandatory minimum for that offense. 82
83 On appeal, Miranda-Santiago challenges his sentence, arguing that the district court erred by failing to adjust his offense level downward two levels for his role in the offense. The appellant contends that since the sentencing court adopted the factual findings of the PSR, the decision not to grant Miranda-Santiago a minor participant adjustment was a simple misapplication of the Guidelines. Our review--notwithstanding the appellant's failure to raise the issue below--should be plenary and the sentence vacated. 84 The government disagrees and makes, essentially, two arguments: First, it contends that, as a procedural matter, this Court ought not review this issue because the appellant waived is rights by not raising the question below. Second, the government asserts that, even if the issue is not waived, the appellant challenges a factual determination at sentencing and the determination was not clear error. 85 We will consider each of the government's arguments in turn. 86
87 The government argues that Miranda-Santiago, in voicing no objection to the PSR at sentencing, has waived his right to raise this issue on appeal. The appellant argues that neither counsel nor the appellant noticed the error, and that, particularly given the pressures put on non-English speaking defendants with respect to lengthy reports only orally translated into Spanish, the absence of an objection should not constitute waiver. 88 We find that this defendant, given these circumstances, forfeited his rights but did not waive them. The difference is critical: Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make a timely assertion of a right, waiver is the 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.'  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); see also Carrozza, 4 F.3d at 87 & n. 13. Under Olano, the defendant who forfeited his right is entitled to review for plain error. This is a compelling case for the doctrine. After all, the claimed error could well have an impact on the length of defendant's incarceration. 89
90 The standard of review is nonetheless imposing. The appellant seeks the benefit of a plenary review of the question. We disagree. Where a defendant has failed to raise the legal issue below, the issue can be examined only for plain error. 31 Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); Olano, 507 U.S. at 730-32, 113 S.Ct. at 1775-77. 91
92 When a defendant is determined to be a minor or minimal participant in criminal activity, a sentencing court is directed to decrease the base offense level. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a) & (b). 32 A minor participant is one who plays a part in committing the offense that makes him substantially less culpable than the average participant. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment (backg'd). 33 93 On appeal, Miranda-Santiago argues that he was entitled to that reduction, that, indeed, the district court adopted factual findings consistent with granting the reduction and that the Court committed plain error in denying him the benefit of the role-in-the-offense adjustment. The government argues that the defendant was not entitled to the adjustment in the first instance and that the sentencing should not be disturbed at this late hour, in any event. 94 The appellant has the better argument. 95 It is a fundamental obligation of a district court at sentencing to state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). To accomplish this goal, the court ordinarily must make reasonably specific findings and explain, generally, how it computed the applicable guideline range. United States v. McDowell, 918 F.2d 1004, 1012 (1st Cir.1990). 96 This obligation has become particularly critical since the enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines. Under the guideline regime, factual determinations made by the sentencing judge may have a profound effect on the length of defendant's incarceration. Ensuring our ability to engage in meaningful review of those findings is essential. So while we have found that a sentencing court can comply with section 3553(c) by adopting findings from the PSR, see, e.g., United States v. Savoie, 985 F.2d 612, 618 (1st Cir.1993), this technique cannot be employed when the PSR itself is unclear or inherently contradictory. Moreover, we have repeatedly urged district courts, in the interests of buttressing sentencing calculations and facilitating appellate review, to make certain that the bases of the calculations are clearly set forth. See United States v. Van, 87 F.3d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir.1996) (collecting cases). 97 In this case, the district judge made few findings at the sentencing hearing. In his judgment, he simply adopted the PSR, in toto. There is a problem with that procedure in this case: The PSR, as best we can decipher it, judged Miranda-Santiago a minor participant in the conspiracy. It was merely in calculating the sentence that this finding did not translate into a two-level downward adjustment. The record therefore does not provide an adequate factual basis for the district court's determination with respect to Miranda-Santiago's role. 98 This error is clear, obvious, and potentially affects the appellant's substantial rights. Accordingly, we vacate this sentence and remand this case to the district court for the purpose of having the court file supplemental findings with respect to appellant Miranda-Santiago's role in the offense. In the event that the district court finds its computation in error, the court should include such a determination in its findings.