Opinion ID: 2291835
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the double-jeopardy issue

Text: General Laws 1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 9-24-32 provides in part: In any criminal proceeding, the attorney-general shall have the right to object to any finding, ruling, decision, order or judgment of the superior court or family court, and the attorney-general may appeal such findings, rulings, decisions, orders or judgments to the supreme court at any time before the defendant has been placed in jeopardy   . The agreed statement of facts submitted to the trial justice stated clearly that all parties agree that for the purposes of a pre-trial determination of the legal basis for Counts 18 and 19, and only for that purpose, this Statement of Facts should be accepted by this Honorable Court as proven facts. (Emphasis added.) Toward the end, the statement of facts also contained this language: The preceeding is the agreed Statement of Facts of the parties. It is the parties' intentions that the aforementioned facts are for the purposes of informing the Court as to the facts the State would present in order to maintain a prima facie case as to Counts 18 and 19   . This agreed Statement of Facts is in no way to be construed as a limitation upon the facts the State would present at trial if it were successful on the merits of this motion. Nor are they admissions by the defendants to be used in any manner whatsoever should this case proceed to trial. The record establishes clearly that the right to a trial by jury was specifically reserved by defendants in the event that their motions to dismiss were denied. [T]he accused may    with leave of the court, waive a trial by jury   . G.L. 1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 12-17-3. Rule 23(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the waiver take place in open court, in writing, and with approval of the court. That did not happen in this case. Here the trial justice was empowered by the agreement of the parties to consider the facts only for a pretrial determination. The defendants specifically reserved their right to trial. During oral argument on the motion, Pari's attorney stated, We are not here to try the case. It is clear that if the motion had been denied, the parties would have proceeded to trial. In view of this fact, we cannot accept the defendants' assertion of a double-jeopardy violation. The facts in this case are virtually identical with those in Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975). In that case the defendant filed a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment accompanied by an affidavit of facts. The District Court granted the motion to dismiss, and the government appealed. The Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's claim that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because of the double-jeopardy clause. The Circuit Court discussed its earlier opinion in United States v. Pecora, 484 F.2d 1289 (3d Cir.1973),  in which it noted that the defendant in that case also had not waived his right to a jury trial; that no jury had been sworn at the time the trial court ruled on his motion to dismiss the indictment  and ruled that jeopardy had not attached. The court ruled that the dismissal was an order that was appealable by the government. The Circuit Court in Serfass reached the same conclusion, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court reiterated the view it had consistently adhered to, that jeopardy does not attach until a defendant is put to trial before the trier of the facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge. Serfass, 420 U.S. at 391, 95 S.Ct. at 1064, 43 L.Ed.2d at 275 (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479, 91 S.Ct. 547, 554, 27 L.Ed.2d 543, 553 (1971)). Without risk of a determination of guilt, jeopardy does not attach, and neither an appeal nor further prosecution constitutes double jeopardy. Id. at 391-92, 95 S.Ct. at 1064, 43 L.Ed.2d at 276. The defendants argue that when the trial court ruled that the agreed statement of facts was not sufficient to establish factual guilt as a matter of law, the ruling constituted an acquittal under the double-jeopardy clause. As authority they cite the case of Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 1745, 90 L.Ed.2d 116 (1986). In that case the trial court had sustained the defendant's demurrer which he filed pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. The demurrer would be approximately equivalent in effect to our Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. The Pennsylvania State Supreme Court ruled that the double-jeopardy clause did not ban an appeal by the Commonwealth. The United States Supreme Court reversed. However, Smalis is of no benefit to these defendants because that defendant's demurrer was heard and granted during a jury-waived trial and after the prosecution had presented its evidence and had rested. Clearly jeopardy had attached when that trial began. The procedural course of this case is really an anomaly under our practice. The arrangement was that the trial justice would apply the criteria applicable to a motion for judgment of acquittal. That meant, we assume, that the trial justice would view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, would draw every reasonable inference consistent with guilt, but would neither assess the credibility of witnesses nor assign weight to the evidence. State v. Gazerro, 420 A.2d 816 (R.I. 1980); State v. McGranahan, 415 A.2d 1298 (R.I. 1980). The motion for judgment of acquittal is normally made at the end of the state's case or before the case is submitted to the jury at which point in either instance jeopardy has attached. The situation in this case was quite different. The defendant argues, in effect, that by applying the Rule 29 criteria to the motion to dismiss, the hearing on the motion became the equivalent of a trial. We reject that proposition. At the motion hearing defendants' attorneys stated that they reserved the right to proceed to trial. They also reiterated that the statement of facts before the trial justice was to be used only for the very limited purpose of the motion to dismiss. In fact, Pari's attorney stated, We are not here to try the case. The record before us indicates that the parties intended only that the standards for the criteria for a motion for judgment of acquittal apply to the motion to dismiss  not that the motion itself be transformed into a motion for judgment of acquittal. We conclude that these defendants were not in jeopardy at the hearing on the motion to dismiss and therefore could not suffer double jeopardy as a result of this appeal.