Opinion ID: 1518773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: did the trial court err in denying appellant a continuance?

Text: Appellant was indicted on December 20, 1991, and the trial was set for April 5, 1994. The trial date had been established by order entered on April 6, 1993, by the Laurel Circuit Court. Venue was changed on October 6, 1993, to the Madison Circuit Court. In February of 1994, Appellant sought a ninety-day continuance to allow additional time to prepare the case for trial. The grounds set forth in the motion were that the brief in Appellant's earlier death penalty case was due on the same day that the trial was scheduled, that an associate of trial counsel's had left his office abruptly and, generally, that he needed more time to adequately prepare. Defense counsel also stated that he had a trial in federal court set for the end of the month of February. In rejecting the motion the trial court noted the following factors: That Appellant would not be prejudiced by the requested continuance; that the ninety days sought was not unduly lengthy; the delay sought was not caused by Appellant; that individual voir dire lengthens the trial; that there were two judges in the circuit; that the trial judge had cleared the month of April when assigned the case; that death penalty cases are complicated and emotionally and physically exhausting, especially when the same defendant and counsel had previously had a prior death verdict rendered against them. After noting that there is leeway to be given when the unexpected arises in the preparation of a capital case, the trial court denied the motion and offered to submit an affidavit in support of a motion for extension of time in which to file the brief due in the appellate court. Appellant argues on appeal that this denial of a continuance violated his right to both federal and state due process standards by failing to provide him with the opportunity for complete evaluation, preparation, and presentation of a defense. Hunter v. Commonwealth, Ky., 869 S.W.2d 719, 722-24 (1994); see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). He contends that, as argued at the time of the motion, his preparation of the defense was impaired, specifically as to the mitigation evidence, or more precisely, the complete lack of mitigation evidence. Appellant states that possible theories of mitigation were clearly manifest, thus, there was a substantial risk of skewing of the fact-finding process. Snodgrass v. Commonwealth, Ky., 814 S.W.2d 579 (1991), sets forth the seven factors to be considered by the trial court in ruling upon a motion for continuance: (1) length of delay sought; (2) whether there have been previous continuances; (3) the inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court; (4) whether the delay is purposeful or caused by the accused; (5) the availability of competent counsel, if at issue; (6) the complexity of the case; and (7) whether denying the continuance would lead to any identifiable prejudice. Id. at 581. As noted above, the trial court analyzed each factor. In a close case, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying this continuance. Factors 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 all weigh in favor of Appellant. However, there is clear evidence that the granting of a continuance would have caused inconvenience to the court and further, and most importantly, there is absolutely no evidence of identifiable prejudice to Appellant arising from the denial of the continuance. Even at this distance from the trial, Appellant is able to set forth nothing specific that would have been presented, or even an avenue that could have been pursued, that would have constituted mitigating evidence admissible at trial. Having had in excess of two years to prepare for this trial, there can be no viable argument that Appellant did not have time to investigate and prepare for trial. This case is easily distinguished from the situation set forth in Hunter, supra , wherein the defense was given only six months to prepare for a capital murder case. The trial court did not err in denying the continuance.