Opinion ID: 77845
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court Had Jurisdiction over the Charge of Criminal Contempt.

Text: Before we consider the merits of the appeal, we address sua sponte whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over a charge of criminal contempt based on the violation of an order issued by a court that lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying controversy. See Eagerton v. Valuations, Inc., 698 F.2d 1115, 1118 (11th Cir.1983). At our request, the parties addressed this issue in their oral arguments. We conclude that, notwithstanding the ultimate dismissal of the underlying controversy for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district court had jurisdiction over the charge of criminal contempt. The Supreme Court has held that a district court may impose sanctions, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, for conduct that occurred during a proceeding in which the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 112 S.Ct. 1076, 117 L.Ed.2d 280 (1992), and the two-fold reasoning of that decision is instructive. First, the Willy Court explained that, because the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions did not require an assessment of the legal merits of the complaint, the district court did not adjudicate a controversy over which it lacked jurisdiction when it imposed the sanctions. Id. at 138, 112 S.Ct. at 1080-81. Second, the Court distinguished Rule 11 sanctions from civil contempt, which requires subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying controversy. Id. at 138-39, 112 S.Ct. at 1081; see also U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76-80, 108 S.Ct. 2268, 2270-73 (1988). Civil contempt is remedial and aims to force compliance with an order of the court. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-42, 31 S.Ct. 492, 498 (1911). The punishment for civil contempt continues until the contemnor chooses to comply with the order. Id. at 442, 31 S.Ct. at 498. Rule 11 sanctions, in contrast, are punitive. Willy, 503 U.S. at 139, 112 S.Ct. at 1081. Their purpose is to punish a party who has already violated the rules of the court. Id. The difference in purpose between a sanction for civil contempt and a punitive sanction under Rule 11 determines whether the absence of subject matter jurisdiction in the underlying proceeding affects the validity of the sanction. The interest of the court in levying sanctions for civil contempt disappears if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, because the purpose of civil contempt is to force compliance with an order. Id. The interest of the court in imposing punitive sanctions under Rule 11 does not disappear if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, because the court retains an interest in parties' obedience to its authority. Id. Both aspects of the reasoning of Willy apply to Straub's conviction for criminal contempt. First, as with Rule 11 sanctions, the adjudication of a charge of criminal contempt does not require an assessment of the legal merits of the underlying controversy, so the court that hears the criminal contempt charge does not adjudicate a controversy over which it lacks jurisdiction. Whereas [p]roceedings for civil contempt are between the original parties, and are instituted and tried as a part of the main cause[,] . . . proceedings at law for criminal contempt are between the public and the defendant, and are not a part of the original cause. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 444-45, 31 S.Ct. at 499. Second, like Rule 11 sanctions, a sanction for criminal contempt is punitive and aims to vindicate the authority of the court. Id. at 441, 31 S.Ct. at 498. Rule 11 sanctions and criminal contempt both differ from civil contempt, which is remedial and aims to force compliance with an order of the court. Id. Although we have stated in dicta that if the issuing court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying controversy or personal jurisdiction over the parties to it, its order may be violated with impunity, In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1401 (11th Cir.1991) (citing In re Green, 369 U.S. 689, 82 S.Ct. 1114, 8 L.Ed.2d 198 (1962); Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 718, 5 S.Ct. 724, 726, 28 L.Ed. 1117 (1885); United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 511 (5th Cir. 1972)), that language should be construed narrowly. We relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court in which the court that issued the order either lacked or might have lacked jurisdiction to issue the order itself, and each of these decisions is distinguishable. The first decision we cited in our dicta in Novak was Fisk, in which the court that issued the order had subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying controversy but lacked jurisdiction to issue the order. Fisk, 113 U.S. at 726, 5 S.Ct. at 730. In Fisk, a federal court had ordered the defendant in a civil suit to submit to a deposition, but the Supreme Court determined that a federal statute prohibited the court from ordering the deposition. 113 U.S. 713, 5 S.Ct. 724, 28 L.Ed. 1117. The district court in Straub's case, in contrast, lacked jurisdiction over the underlying controversy but issued an order that was otherwise within the authority of the court. The second decision we cited in Novak was Green, in which the court that issued the order might have lacked jurisdiction to issue the order as a result of federal preemption. In Green, a state court had issued a restraining order that prohibited a union from picketing. 369 U.S. at 690, 82 S.Ct. at 1115. The Supreme Court held that the state court violated the defendant's due process rights when it held him in contempt without providing him with a hearing to establish whether the restraining order was preempted by federal law. Id. at 692-93, 82 S.Ct. at 1116-17. The Court explained that the contempt conviction could not stand if the restraining order was preempted by federal law. Id. at 692, 82 S.Ct. at 1117. Green, like Fisk, did not involve a situation analogous to Straub's case, in which the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying controversy but issued an order that was otherwise within its authority. The dicta in Dickinson, which was a decision of our predecessor court that we also cited in Novak, relied largely on Green. Dickinson, 465 F.2d at 511 & n. 16. The decision of the Supreme Court in Willy resolves this issue. We conclude that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to resolve the charge of criminal contempt against Straub. Our dicta in Novak is inapposite.