Opinion ID: 1142334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: sequestration of jury members

Text: The defendant argues that the trial court violated La.Code Crim.P. art. 791(B) by failing to sequester individual jurors after they had been accepted by both sides. [17] At the time of this trial, La.Code Crim.P. art. 791(B) provided: In capital cases, after each juror is sworn he shall be sequestered. [18] Under La.Code Crim.P. art. 788(A), an individual juror must be sworn immediately by the trial court after he has been accepted by the state and the defendant as a prospective juror. Once the jury selection process is completed, the entire jury panel is then sworn again by the trial court. La.Code Crim.P. art. 790. It was anticipated by the state and the defense that jury selection in this case would be lengthy. In fact, as we have noted, it took 11 days. After the first panel of 12 prospective jurors was examined and just before both sides were about to exercise their peremptory challenges, the trial court made the following ruling, outside the prospective jurors' presence, regarding sequestration and swearing: THE COURT: Before bringing the prospective jurors in, I want to state for the record that this court is proceeding in accordance with Article 788, Section B, with regards to jury selection utilizing the system of simultaneous exercise of challenges. The Court will further note that under Article 790 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that jurors are to be sworn at one time once all of thewhen the selection of jurors and alternate jurors has been completed, and all issues properly raised under Article 795 have been resolved, the jurors shall be sworn together to try the case in a just and impartial manner. The Court in following the dictates of 790 and taking into consideration of 788 will allow counsel for the defense to exercise simultaneous challenges. However, the court will not swear these jurors in accordance with 790 in view of the fact that 791(B) dictates that each jurorafter each juror is sworn sequestration is to take place, so this would be, the court does not feel that if we select any persons from this panel that we could properly swear them because all jurors have not been selected. State do you have any objections to this procedure? MR. SINQUEFIELD: No, your honor, I think it's a correct procedure. THE COURT: Defense? MS. JACKSON: No, sir. MR. BOREN: No, your honor. In accordance with this ruling, and without objection from either of the parties, [19] jurors that were not peremptorily challenged were not immediately sworn, as La.Code Crim.P. art. 788(A) requires. Instead, the trial court informed the individual jurors that they would be serving on the jury, and allowed them to return to their homes and to work until the trial began. The trial court admonished the individual jurors not to discuss the case with anyone, not to listen to news accounts about the case, and not to read written reports about the case during this time. Once jury selection was completed, the entire jury panel, and the two alternates, were then sworn in accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 790. The defendant now complains that this procedure violated the swearing requirement of Article 791(B), and that his conviction and sentence should be reversed since the violation deprived him of due process, a fair trial and an impartial jury. From the trial court's statement quoted above and the colloquy thereafter, it is evident that the state and the defense agreed to, or at least acquiesced in, the procedure proposed by the trial court, which effectively consisted of a waiver of the sequestration requirement by delaying the individual swearing requirement of Article 788(A). Historically, this Court has adhered to the principle that an accused may not consent to waive the sequestration requirement. State v. Luquette, 275 So.2d 396 (La.1973); State v. Craighead, 114 La. 84, 38 So. 28 (1905); State v. Hornsby, 8 Rob. 554 (La.1844). The rationale behind this rule being that a [d]efendant ought not to be placed in the position of having to consent, or perhaps prejudice the jury by withholding consent. State v. Luquette, 275 So.2d at 400, citing State v. Craighead, supra . We find this jurisprudentially established rule unnecessary. This is reflected by recent legislative activity. During the 1995 legislative session, La.Code Crim.P. art. 791(B) was amended by La.Acts Nos. 1172, § 1 and 1277, § 1, to provide: In capital cases, after each juror is sworn he shall be sequestered, unless the state and the defense have jointly moved that the jury not be sequestered. (Emphasis added.) With this change, it is clear that a waiver of the sequestration requirement is now possible. Since this amendment was enacted well after the defendant's trial, and did not become effective until August 15, 1995, it does not apply here. Nevertheless, it lends support to our conclusion that the jurisprudentially-created prohibition against waiver is no longer necessary. The concerns expressed in the cases cited above, namely, placing the defendant in a position of having to consent or prejudicing him in the eyes of the jury if he withholds consent, may be remedied by using the proper procedure. Considering the issue of waiver of sequestration, if it is even raised, outside the presence of prospective jury members would prevent jury members from becoming aware that the sequestration requirement may be waived. In the unlikely event that a jury member is aware of the possibility of waiver, he would still be unable to form prejudices against the defendant because it would be impossible to determine which party refused to consent to the waiver. The amendment to La.Code Crim.P. art. 791(B) also achieves this result. By requiring both the defendant and the state to agree to the waiver, the defendant is neither placed in a position of having to consent nor is he prejudiced by his refusal to consent to the waiver. Although 1995 La.Acts Nos. 1172, § 1 and 1277, § 1, effective August 15, 1995, changed the law regarding waiver of the sequestration requirement it may still have limited viability in previously tried cases. To this extent, we overrule those cases prohibiting waiver of the sequestration requirement. Because, at the very least, the defendant in this case impliedly waived the sequestration requirement by acquiescing in the trial court's proposed procedure, this assignment of error is without merit.