Opinion ID: 1212339
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Award of Enhanced Fees to Irell Junior Attorneys

Text: The EAJA allows for the award of attorneys' fees based upon the prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished, capped at $125 per hour, unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(D)(2)(A) (emphasis added). In Pierce, 487 U.S. at 571, 108 S.Ct. 2541, the Supreme Court examined the phrase limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved in the EAJA. The Court explained that the statute contemplated attorneys qualified in some specialized sense, rather than just in their general legal competence, such that attorneys hav[e] some distinctive knowledge or specialized skill needful for the litigation in question. Id. at 572, 108 S.Ct. 2541. Distinctive knowledge, in turn, may be an identifiable practice specialty such as patent law, or knowledge of foreign law or language. Id. Although a court may find that other special factors counsel in favor of an enhanced fee award, these special factors may not be of broad and general application. Id. at 573, 108 S.Ct. 2541. For example, the Pierce Court concluded that the district court in that case had abused its discretion by relying on broad factors such as the `novelty and difficulty of issues,' `the undesirability of the case,' the `work and ability of counsel,' and `the results obtained.' Id. The Court concluded that consideration of these factors was inappropriate because, as opposed to factors demonstrating specialized knowledge or skill, these factors merely reflected an extraordinary level of the general lawyerly knowledge and ability useful in all litigation. Id. at 572, 108 S.Ct. 2541. Though the Pierce Court mentioned only patent law and foreign law in its discussion of specialties, subsequent cases in our circuit have recognized that other practice specialties may qualify as distinctive knowledge or skills for which enhanced fees are appropriate. See, e.g., Pirus v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 536, 541 (9th Cir.1989). For example, in Pirus, we affirmed an award of enhanced fees to attorneys who had developed a social security practice specialty. Id. We reasoned that, like patent lawyers, they had expertise with a complex statutory scheme; familiarity and credibility with a particular agency; and understanding of the needs of a particular class of clientsin this case, the elderly and of how those needs could best be met under the existing statute and regulations. Id. The attorneys had also litigated a similar case all the way to the Supreme Court. Id. With these principles in mind, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in awarding enhanced fees to the junior Irell attorneys. Contrary to the requirements set forth in Reilly and Pirus, the Plaintiffs never established that these attorneys had a practice specialty at all, much less distinctive skills that were needed in the litigation. Notwithstanding this deficiency, the district court analogized the junior Irell attorneys to counsel in Pirus, and found that the junior Irell attorneys here acquired distinctive skills litigating a concurrent companion case before the same court, involving similar factual and legal issues, on behalf of nearly identical clients, and against the same agency, including some of the same opposing counsel. The district court further found that this experience provided Plaintiffs with unique skills and knowledge unavailable elsewhere at the statutory rate. We do not agree with the district court's reasoning. Although the Supreme Court has not precisely enumerated what may constitute a practice specialty or special factor, we decline to expand these terms to encompass the degree of expertise that the record indicates the junior attorneys may have gained here from participating in the companion case. [2] We expect all attorneys to be experts of their own cases and their clients' litigation goals. Having held that the Irell junior attorneys did not acquire sufficiently distinctive skills merely by participating in litigation surrounding the companion case, we see no other basis for awarding them enhanced fees. Although environmental litigation may constitute an identifiable practice specialty, Plaintiffs must first establish that their counsel had such a specialty. Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n, Inc. v. Carlucci, 867 F.2d 1224, 1226 (9th Cir.1989), abrogated on other grounds by Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1149 (9th Cir.2001). Here, the record indicates that the junior Irell attorneys had no experience in environmental law other than what they gained in the concurrently litigated companion case. Plaintiffs also point to a variety of exigent circumstances surrounding the litigation in NRDC II. Specifically, they argue that the time-sensitive circumstances created by the Fourth of July weekend, the successful resolution of the case in ten short days, and the government's use of seventeen attorneys in the case justify enhanced fees for all counsel. This court has not yet addressed whether mere exigency surrounding litigation is sufficient to warrant enhanced attorneys' fees under the EAJA. The D.C. Circuit, however, has concluded that even where the government creates an artificial emergency or where an appeal is expedited, this consideration is insufficient under the logic of Pierce to support a statutory cap increase. Role Models Am., Inc. v. Brownlee, 353 F.3d 962, 969 (D.C.Cir.2004). We agree with the reasoning of Role Models America and hold that the exigency reflected in the record of this case is an insufficient basis to find a special factor. Producing high-quality work on a short deadline hardly satisfies th[e] standard in Pierce of work requiring specialized skills or knowledge beyond what lawyers use on a regular basis. Role Models Am., 353 F.3d at 969. We intend no denigration of the performance of counsel under time-sensitive and stressful conditions, including that of Irell's junior attorneys in this case, but the work that was done here is similar to the work and ability of counsel and results obtained that were rejected as insufficient in Pierce. 487 U.S. at 573, 108 S.Ct. 2541. We also note that the Irell junior attorneys were aided by NRDC co-counsel who specialize in public interest environmental litigation and who had one month of pre-filing preparation. That junior counsel from Irell were able to work so quickly and ably speaks to their general litigation skills and competence. It is not, however, sufficient to qualify for an enhanced fee award under the EAJA. In rejecting the district court's decision to award enhanced fees to the junior Irell attorneys, we are mindful that facing a team of seventeen government attorneys is a daunting task. However, we have previously held that oppos[ing] the enormous resources of the federal government adds nothing to our analysis because this disincentive to file suit is the very reason that the EAJA awards fees to a prevailing party. Animal Lovers, 867 F.2d at 1227 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiffs are not entitled to convert the very rationale for awarding fees in the first instance into a reason for awarding enhanced fees in their particular case. We thus agree with the Navy that the junior Irell attorneys were not entitled to enhanced fees and we reverse the district court's decision to the contrary.