Opinion ID: 161349
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voluntariness of Consent to Transfer

Text: Russell asserts that he was misinformed about the federal parole system by the magistrate at the time he consented to the transfer. Although he admits he was properly informed, as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 4108(b)(2), that “the sentence shall be carried out according to the laws of the United States and that those laws are subject to change” (Doc. 2, at 5), he asserts he was also told that the “usual requirement” is that an offender is released on parole after serving one-third of the total sentence imposed and at most he would serve two-thirds of the sentence before being released. (Doc. 25, at 5.) While this may have been a correct representation of federal law before 1987, it was incorrect at the time it was made in 1990 with respect to Russell’s offense, which was committed in 1989. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4205-4206 (repealed effective Nov. 1, 1987). -4- Russell’s challenge to the voluntariness of his consent to the transfer is analyzed under the standards that apply to defendants challenging the voluntariness of their guilty pleas. See Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1190 (2d Cir. 1980). The magistrate judge in this case cited Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985), for the proposition that “[e]ven though Mr. Russell may not have understood the details concerning when he might be eligible for parole, how his good time credits might be applied, and how long he might be on supervised release, this lack of understanding does not render his consent to transfer invalid.” (Doc. 31, at 4.) In other words, the magistrate judge appeared to hold that a defendant’s misunderstanding of the parole system could never render his consent involuntary. This is an incorrect reading of Hill. There is dictum in Hill suggesting that the courts and other state officials are not required to inform a defendant of his parole eligibility. See 474 U.S. at 56 (“We have never held that the United States Constitution requires the State to furnish a defendant with information about parole eligibility in order for the defendant’s plea of guilty to be voluntary . . . .”). That does not mean, however, that these state officials may give the defendant erroneous information without calling the voluntariness of his consent into question. As a number of federal appellate courts have recognized, “[W]here parole eligibility information is provided to a defendant by the state or the -5- defendant’s attorney and that information is grossly erroneous, a defendant may be entitled to habeas relief where he can show that he would not have pleaded guilty had accurate information been provided.” Meyers v. Gillis, 93 F.3d 1147 (3d Cir. 1996) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1549 n.5 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[I]f a trial court provides the defendant information regarding parole eligibility that is materially incorrect, the defendant may be entitled to withdraw his plea on voluntariness grounds . . . .”); Czere v. Butler, 833 F.2d 59, 63 n.6 (5th Cir. 1987) (same). It is at least possible that Russell’s consent to the transfer was rendered involuntary by the misinformation he received from the magistrate. It is less clear that Russell has alleged he was prejudiced by this misinformation – that he would not have consented to the transfer had he not received the misinformation. At the very least, however, it is appropriate to give him a chance to amend his petition to cure this defect. See Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend.”). If on remand the district court determines that Russell has not waived his objections, the court should then consider (1) whether he received such grossly -6- erroneous misinformation from the magistrate that his consent to transfer was involuntary, and (2) whether he was prejudiced by this misinformation.