Opinion ID: 2295026
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: hudson county proceedings

Text: The Hudson County Ethics Committee filed a presentment dealing with four charges. It made affirmative findings of unethical conduct in two instances, but as to the two remaining charges it concluded that a violation of the disciplinary rules had not been established by the requisite standard of clear and convincing evidence. Our independent review of the record with that burden of proof in mind leads us to the same conclusion with respect to the charges of which respondent was exonerated by he Committee. Hence we address only those counts on which disciplinary infractions were found. Those charges arose out of respondent's handling of two separate personal injury claims, one on behalf of Grace B. Harris, whose infant son, Ronald, was struck by an automobile in January, 1970, and the other on behalf of Lottie B. Harris, Grace Harris's mother, who sustained a fracture of the arm from a fall on ice in December, 1969. Both claims were referred to Mr. Netchert by one D.R., an attorney who with his son J.R. practices under the firm name of R. and R. [3] As the Committee's presentment observes, the charges against respondent must be viewed in the context of his relationship with R. and R. and particularly with D.R., and for that reason the testimony before the hearing panel and the presentment itself focus on that relationship in elaborate detail. We need not, however, dwell here on the particulars of the R.s' practice (in part for the reasons set forth in n. 3 supra ) beyond the observations which follow. The firm's practice is devoted almost exclusively to negligence cases. During the period with which we are concerned, and for many years prior thereto, any claim appearing to be other than a sure thing was referred to other counsel. As D.R. put it in his testimony before the hearing panel, Well, if the case was one that just couldn't be lost, in my opinion, my son worked on it and if a case had any complications  maybe had to go to trial or things like that, I haven't been to Court in 20 years and I would forward it to any other lawyer who wanted to handle the case and become the attorney. Among those to whom cases with complications were forwarded was respondent. D.R. said he would make a record of the case, then turn it over to Mr. Netchert who from that point forward would act as the attorney. He testified further that there was no specific arrangement as to compensation with respondent or, for that matter, with any of the other attorneys to whom cases were referred. Respondent, on the other hand, averred that D.R. insisted that his firm remain as attorney of record at all times and that all retainers be executed in the name of R. and R.; that on the cases handled by respondent the fee was, invariably, split on a 50-50 basis; and that all moneys paid out on R. and R. cases were disbursed at that firm's office and in the presence of D.R. Mr. Netchert further testified that early in 1972 he terminated his relationship with the R. and R. firm because he was not content with the way [D.R.] was operating his business, particularly in that D.R. asked respondent to give him certain funds in cash, over and above the agreed 50-50 split, in order to take care of some people who were sending him cases. As to those R. and R. matters pending when the relationship was severed, respondent said the majority of materials    was in [D.R.'s] office and was retained by him; and as to those on which respondent had files (which he described as worksheets and possibly other related material), he hand delivered them to the R. and R. office, usually leaving them at a designated place on the library table. This arrangement, such as it was, between R. and R. and respondent  one characterized by the Committee (generously, we believe) as haphazard and sloppy  is at the root of the complaints of Grace B. Harris and Lottie B. Harris; for while their claims are separate and distinct, the relevant facts pertaining to the asserted ethical violations are similar. In each case respondent allegedly undertook to represent the complainants after an initial meeting in the office of R. and R. and terminated his representation by returning their files to R. and R. In each case respondent took the position that he had never agreed to represent the complainant, and that his function was, at D.R.'s request, to do investigative or preliminary legal work on the claims. In support thereof he produced copies of retainer agreements evidencing an attorney-client relationship between R. and R. and complainants. On the other hand the Committee had before it communications from respondent, on his own office stationery, to the insurance carriers involved in which he stated that he represented the respective claimants. Without detailing the specifics of the complaints, suffice it to say that in each instance the basis of the grievance was that the complainant was simply ignored. Information on the progress of the cases was not forthcoming. Telephone inquiries produced no satisfaction. And while the Committee did not accept the complainants' assertions that Mr. Netchert had settled their cases but had failed thereafter to forward the settlement funds (the insurance companies' files demonstrated the contrary), nevertheless it did find that in each instance respondent did in fact represent the complainant, did not return the complainant's file to R. and R., and was guilty of violating DR 7-101(A)(2) in that he failed to carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client and did not withdraw in a manner permitted by DR 2-110. More particularly, the Committee concluded that respondent violated DR 2-110(A)(2) by withdrawing without taking reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, including giving due notice to his client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, and delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client was entitled. In addition the Committee found that respondent had violated DR 2-107 by dividing his fees with R. and R. without regard to the services performed and responsibility shared by each party. The presentment contains a specific finding of the Committee that Mr. Netchert's testimony as to the fee splitting arrangement was credible and was supported by D.R.'s own records, which demonstrated that in most cases [R. and R.] received exactly 50% of the attorney's fees collected by Mr. Netchert.