Opinion ID: 76025
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: appears to be

Text: 28 We now turn to Hall's claim that the district court's jury instructions were erroneous in light of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002). All three counts of the indictment alleged that Hall violated 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) (2000), which makes it a felony for any person knowingly to receive or distribute child pornography in interstate commerce by any means, including by computer. At the time of Hall's indictment and trial, the definition of child pornography included both images made using actual minors, 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A) (2000), as well as virtual child pornography, as added by the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996. 29 Thus, in charging the jury, the district court defined child pornography using the words of the statute: 30 [C]hild pornography means any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where — 31 (A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; 32 (B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; 33 (C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or 34 (D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.... 35 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (emphasis added). Subsequent to Hall's trial, the Supreme Court in Free Speech Coalition struck down as unconstitutional the words or appears to be from the definition of child pornography contained in § 2256(8)(B) and the entire definition of child pornography in § 2256(8)(D). 122 S.Ct. at 1406. Free Speech Coalition left intact the ban on actual child pornography in the remainder of § 2256(8). Id. at 1396. 36 On appeal, Hall challenges his conviction in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Free Speech Coalition. Hall argues that the district court erred in its jury charge, rendering it impossible to determine from the record whether the jury relied on the unconstitutional definitions of child pornography in convicting him. 10 37 Because Hall did not object to this jury instruction defining child pornography, we review this issue for plain error. See United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250, 1280-81 (11th Cir.2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 942, 122 S.Ct. 1327, 152 L.Ed.2d 234 (2002). Thus, Hall must show that there is (1) error, (2) that is `plain,' and (3) that `affect[s] substantial rights.' Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error `seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Sanchez, 269 F.3d at 1281 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770) (other internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [W]here the first two prongs of the plain error rule established by Olano are satisfied, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the plain error `affec[ted] substantial rights.' United States v. Mitchell, 146 F.3d 1338, 1343 (11th Cir.1998) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770) (internal quotation marks omitted). In most cases, this means that the `error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.' Mitchell, 146 F.3d at 1343 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770). 38 The government properly concedes that this jury instruction was erroneous because it included the words or appears to be, and that the error was plain. It submits, however, that the error did not affect Hall's substantial rights and, alternatively, that affirming Hall's convictions would not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. We agree that Hall has not carried his burden as to either the third or fourth prong of plain error review. 39 We reach this conclusion because (1) the evidence established that the children depicted in the pictures introduced at trial were actual children and (2) no one ever claimed, or even hinted, that the images were of virtual children. For example, Detective Dubord works with the Innocent Images Task Force, a federal task force investigating child exploitation on the Internet. Dubord testified that based on his training and experience, the images depicted minors. In addition, the pictures sent out to the jury are in the record before this court and they show actual children. In fact, there was no evidence at trial of any kind indicating or inferring that the pictures contained images of virtual children as opposed to actual children. 40 In a recent post- Free Speech Coalition case, United States v. Richardson, 304 F.3d 1061 (11th Cir.2002), this Court concluded that a jury instruction including appears to be was plain error but affirmed the defendant's conviction under the same statute because the children in the images were actual children. Id. at 1064. In Richardson, this Court stated that it had examined the images shown in the actual pictures sent out to the jury and [t]he children depicted in those images were real. Of that we have no doubt whatsoever. Id. (internal citation omitted). Thus, we concluded that a reasonable jury could not have found that the images in issue there were of virtual children created by computer imaging technology as opposed to actual children. 11 Id. at 1064 n. 2. Likewise, after examining the pictures sent out to the jury during Hall's trial, we conclude that the evidence showed that the children depicted in those images were real and that no reasonable jury could have found that the images were virtual children created by computer technology as opposed to actual children.