Opinion ID: 1460047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Abboud's Proposed Meaning

Text: 1. Application of the Rules of Interpretation. According to Abboud, the term names in ¶ 1.1(a)(A) denotes only trademarks or service marks and therefore does not convey rights to his personal name. The ordinary-meaning rule yields Abboud's interpretation. The interpretation flows not from the ordinary usage of the term names, which, of course, can be used to refer to personal names and property interests in them, but from the appearance of the term in context: [t]he names, trademarks, trade names, service marks, logos, insignias and designations identified on Schedule 1.1(a)(A). Sale Agreement ¶ 1.1(a)(A) (underline omitted). Because, as noted, Schedule 1.1(a)(A) appears to identify only marks, not personal names, and the schedule identifie[s] what is conveyed by the Sale Agreement in ¶ 1.1(a)(A), it seems to me reasonable to conclude that what is conveyed by ¶ 1.1(a)(A) is only marks, and not the personal name of Joseph Abboud or his property rights in it. The text in ¶ 1.1(a)(A) therefore is reasonably susceptible to Abboud's proposed interpretation. The rule against surplusage supports this reading. The phrase Trademark Report by Mark, which is the page heading of the first five pages of Schedule 1.1(a)(A), must be given meaning. And if it is to mean nothing more than, as it says, a set of marks, then it cannot also mean personal names. If, departing from Abboud's interpretation, one does not restrict names and its surrounding terms to the property identified by Schedule 1.1(a)(A), and does not interpret that property to include only marks, one thereby ignore[s]. . . words that . . . must be given meaning, Kass, 91 N.Y.2d at 568, 696 N.E.2d at 181, 673 N.Y.S.2d at 357, albeit words in a schedule and not the body of the agreement. [5] This application of the ordinary-meaning rule and the rule against surplusage is bolstered by ¶ 3.6 of the contract, which states that Schedule 1.1(a)(A) sets forth a list of all of the trademark registrations, service mark registrations and applications and copyright registrations and applications currently used by [Abboud] in connection with the Trademarks. Sale Agreement ¶ 3.6 (underline omitted). That list omits any mention of personal names. 2. The Panel Majority's Analysis. The panel majority looks to Schedule 1.1(a)(A), as the text of ¶ 1.1(a)(A) instructs, and concludes that its listing plainly did not exhaust Abboud's right to use his name in the future. Supra at 398. I agree. But I am less certain about the panel's view that brand names [i.e., marks] are similar to the items immediately following the word `names' in [¶ 1.1(a)(A)], to wit `trade names, service marks, logos [and] insignias.' Supra at 398. I think that the rule against surplusage requires the term names to have a meaning different from the words in that list. [6] The panel majority also observes that the defined term the `Trademarks'  which collectively identifies property conveyed in ¶ 1.1(a)(A)  would seem to connote existing or pending uses. Id. But I would think that drafters define terms in contracts in order to avoid speculative meanings. The term the `Trademarks,' as defined, connote[s] nothing more than the set of terms it is defined to mean; it tells us nothing about how to interpret the terms that define it, including the term names. [7] Finally, the Court finds significance in the language of ¶ 1.1(a)(C), which conveys [a]ll rights to use and apply for the registration of new trade names, trademarks, service marks, logos, insignias and designations containing the words Joseph Abboud, designed by Joseph Abboud, by Joseph Abboud, JOE or JA, or anything similar thereto or derivative thereof, either alone or in conjunction with other words or symbols (collectively, the New Trademarks), for any and all products or services. Sale Agreement ¶ 1.1(a)(C) (emphasis added). I do not see how this text tells us whether Abboud transferred the rights to his personal name by including the term names in ¶ 1.1(a)(A). The term is absent from ¶ 1.1(a)(C). If ¶ 1.1(a)(A) did transfer to JA Apparel the right to use Abboud's personal name along with the listed trademarks, ¶ 1.1(a)(C) would still be necessary  or at least advisable  to ensure the transfer of the separate right to use and apply for new trade names, trademarks, service marks, logos, insignias and designations containing the words `Joseph Abboud' [and associated combinations]. The rights in question  the right to use a personal name for commercial purposes and the right to apply for and use a new trademark containing the words of that name  are different and independent. It seems to me that if Joseph Abboud sold the right to use his personal name as a personal name, the purchaser could open and run and advertise a clothing line called Joseph Abboud Men. And if he already owned the mark Joseph Abboud Men, and sold it, the purchaser would then have the right to use that term as a mark. But I do not think it necessarily follows from either hypothetical transaction that the purchaser could then have the exclusive right to apply for and use, as marks, new trademarks made up of or derived from the words Joseph Abboud, e.g., Joseph Abboud Women. Without an explicit sale of the right to apply for and use, as marks, new marks similar to or including his personal name, I should think both Abboud and the purchaser might each apply for such marks, and the rightful owner of that property would be determined by application of ordinary principles of trademark law. For these reasons, the drafter's decision to cover the use of the name Joseph Abboud in the context of new trademarks in ¶ 1.1(a)(C) does not seem to me to indicate that the parties meant not to transfer the use of the name along with existing trademarks in ¶ 1.1(a)(A).