Opinion ID: 1238399
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Departures related to the conviction for failing to appear at sentencing

Text: The next two departures imposed by the district court related to Arhebamen's conviction for failure to appear at sentencing in his tax-fraud case. In connection with his failure to appear, Arhebamen obtained reports from two physicians who recommended postponement of the sentencing hearing. He also moved to Arizona without authorization. The district court invoked the Guidelines departure provisions to increase Arhebamen's sentence in response to those acts. We will address the two departures in turn.
The district court imposed a two-level upward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.7, which relates to the disruption of governmental functions. This departure was imposed because Arhebamen not only failed to appear for sentencing in the tax-fraud case, but also misled [two physicians] about his background and circumstances and used letters from [the physicians] to manipulate proceedings before Judge Rosen and avoid being sentenced. The court stated that Arhebamen actively solicited [the two physicians'] unknowing assistance, and concluded that such manipulation and the corresponding adjournment of sentencing is an unusual aggravating circumstance that was not adequately considered by the Sentencing Guidelines. Reasoning that the conduct resulted in the significant disruption of a government function ( i.e., the timely sentencing of the Defendant), the court imposed a § 5K2.7 departure. The policy statement regarding § 5K2.7 provides that [d]eparture from the guidelines ordinarily would not be justified when the offense of conviction is an offense such as bribery or obstruction of justice; in such cases interference with a governmental function is inherent in the offense, and unless the circumstances are unusual the guidelines will reflect the appropriate punishment for such interference. Both parties agree that the underlying offense herethe failure to appear for sentencingis one in which interference with a governmental function is inherent. Id. A Guidelines departure is therefore appropriate only if the circumstances are unusual, such that the underlying Guideline does not reflect the appropriate punishment for Arhebamen's failure to appear at his July 2001 sentencing in the tax-fraud case. Id. Arhebamen argues that his alleged manipulation of the two physicians does not create unusual circumstances warranting additional punishment. He contends that obtaining an adjournment of less than a month [by obtaining a recommendation from the first physician] hardly constitutes an extraordinary or egregious disruption of the administration of justice, and that the fact that [he] enlisted the support of a report by [the second physician] did not make the delay any longer, nor did it disrupt the judicial process any further. The government argues in response that the circumstances surrounding defendant's failure to appear [were] particularly significant because they involved the unwitting involvement of third parties. In support of this argument, the government cites United States v. Heckman, 30 F.3d 738 (6th Cir.1994). That case involved a conviction for filing false documents with the IRSan inherently disruptive act. The court affirmed the application of a § 5K2.7 departure because, in addition to attempting to avoid his own tax liability, the defendant used the IRS to harass numerous persons who had the misfortune of coming into contact with him. Id. at 743. According to the government, Arhebamen's alleged harassment of the two physicians as innocent third parties makes Heckman like this case. But Arhebamen did not harass the physicians or cause them any harm or inconvenience; rather, he lied to them about the seriousness of the charges against him and his criminal background in an initially successful attempt to delay his sentencing. No case cited by the government suggests that the means employed by a defendant to interfere with a government function is material in deciding whether to apply the § 5K2.7 departure. Instead, the caselaw supports the proposition that such a departure is appropriate where the harm is greater than usual for the initial government-interfering offense, or where the defendant has interfered with a second, independent government function. See Heckman, 30 F.3d at 743; United States v. Garcia, 900 F.2d 45, 49 (5th Cir.1990) (affirming a § 5K2.7 departure for a defendant convicted of mail theft because the scale of the operation caused an unusually serious disruption of the mail); United States v. Anderson, 353 F.3d 490, 508 (6th Cir.2003) ( superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized in United States v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360, 374 (6th Cir.2004)) (affirming a § 5K2.7 upward departure from a tax-fraud sentence for the defendants' disruptive behavior at trial). In this case, Arhebamen's lies to the first physician delayed his sentence by one additional month beyond the delay that would have ensued had he simply failed to appear for his original sentencing date. No additional delay was caused by the report of the second physician. Nor does the record reflect that the physicians themselves were harmed or even inconvenienced by Arhebamen's dishonest interactions with them. In light of § 5K2.7's command that the departure not apply except in unusual circumstances, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in departing upward by two levels on the basis of a one-month delay to Arhebamen's sentencing. The underlying Guideline § 2J1.6 adequately accounts for the harm caused by Arhebamen's failure to appear at his sentencing, making the use of § 5K2.7 to add additional punishment a procedural error.
During the one-month extension period that the district court granted in response to the first physician's report, Arhebamen moved to Arizona in direct defiance of his pretrial-services officer's orders. In response to this act, the court imposed an additional departure pursuant to § 5K2.0 in connection with the conviction for failure to appear at sentencing. The district court decided that a two-level upward departure was appropriate for Arhebamen's move to Arizona by employing an analogy to § 2F1.1(b)(6)(A) (2 level Specific Offense Characteristic where Defendant `relocated or participated in relocating, a fraudulent scheme in order to avoid law enforcement or regulatory officials'). As set forth above, § 5K2.0 departures are appropriate where the case involves characteristics of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission. The government argues that this departure was appropriate because the relocationin direct contravention of the orders of his pretrial services officerwas a serious aggravating circumstance that demonstrated total disregard for the authority of the district court and ma[d]e [this] case much different from the average failure to appear case. Arhebamen counters that because the jurisdiction of the U.S. Marshall is nationwide, he was at all times within the grasp of the authorities to return him to custody, and [t]he fact that he did not stay in the Eastern District of Michigan can hardly be characterized as unusual or extraordinary so as to impose an additional 2 levels of departure. We do not find the district court's analogy to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(6)(A) persuasive here. Nothing in the record reflects that Arhebamen relocated in order to avoid law enforcement or regulatory officials or the authority of the court. See id. To the contrary, Arhebamen's wife provided a forwarding address to the pretrial-services officer and, as a result, Arhebamen was promptly arrested after he failed to appear. In light of these facts, Arhebamen's move to Arizona did not take his failure to appear for sentencing out of the heartland of similar cases, or burden the government in any unusual way. We are also unaware of any case that endorses the use of § 5K2.0 under analogous circumstances. In sum, we conclude that the district court committed a procedural error in imposing this two-level upward departure.