Opinion ID: 1189752
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cantrell's Second-Degree Burglary Conviction

Text: Cantrell argues the district court erred in determining Cantrell was subject to an increased range of punishment as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 because Cantrell's 1988 Missouri state court conviction for second-degree burglary constituted a crime of violence as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. We review de novo the district court's conclusion a particular offense constitutes a crime of violence under the career offender provision of § 4B1.1. See United States v. LeGrand, 468 F.3d 1077, 1081 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), a crime of violence is defined, in relevant part, as any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . is burglary of a dwelling [or other specified offenses] or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. The official Commitment Report in Cantrell's burglary case states: On or about [the] 14th day of May, 1988, in the County of Wright, State of Missouri, the Defendant violated Section 569.170 RSMo by committing the Class C felony of Burglary second degree punishable upon conviction under Sections 558.011.1(3) and 560.011 RSMo in that the Defendant knowingly entered unlawfully in an inhabitable structure . . . for the purpose of committing stealing therein. Under Mo.Rev.Stat. § 569.170, A person commits the crime of burglary in the second degree when he knowingly enters unlawfully or knowingly remains unlawfully in a building or inhabitable structure for the purpose of committing a crime therein. Cantrell's Commitment Report does not specify what type of inhabitable structure Cantrell entered unlawfully. Under Mo.Rev.Stat. § 56.010(2): Inhabitable structure includes a ship, trailer, sleeping car, airplane, or other vehicle or structure: (a) Where any person lives or carries on business or other calling; or (b) Where people assemble for purposes of business, government, education, religion, entertainment or public transportation; or (c) Which is used for overnight accommodation of persons. Any such vehicle or structure is inhabitable regardless of whether a person is actually present[.] Cantrell argues, based on the limited information in the Commitment Report and the broad definition of inhabitable structure in the Missouri statute, it was impossible for the district court to determine whether Cantrell burglarized a dwelling or whether his offense constituted a burglary as defined in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). In Taylor, the Supreme Court grappled with how to define burglary within the meaning of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), [6] when convicting states' definitions of burglary varied. Id. at 580, 110 S.Ct. 2143. The Court reasoned the definition of burglary should be uniform, so as to avoid sentencing disparities for identical conduct in different states. Id. at 590-92, 110 S.Ct. 2143. Thus, the Court held an offense constitutes burglary under the ACCA, regardless of differences in individual states' definitions of burglary, when the offense contains the basic elements of a generic burglary, which are unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime. Id. at 598-99, 110 S.Ct. 2143. It appears Cantrell's offense fits within Taylor 's definition of burglary. In Cantrell's case, however, we need not analyze whether Cantrell's conviction constituted burglary as defined in Taylor, because Cantrell's offense was clearly a crime of violence under the otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another clause of § 4B1.2(a). [7] Indeed, Taylor made clear [t]he [g]overnment remains free to argue that any offenseincluding offenses similar to generic burglaryshould count towards enhancement as one that `otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk to another[.]' Id. at 600 n. 9, 110 S.Ct. 2143. In concluding Cantrell's second-degree burglary conviction was a crime of violence, under the otherwise involves clause, the district court correctly anticipated the Supreme Court's decision in James v. United States, 550 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007), which was decided after Cantrell's sentencing. In James, the Court held attempted burglary, as defined by Florida law, is a violent felony under the otherwise involves provision of the ACCA. Id. at 1597-98. The Court examined whether the risks posed by attempted burglary were similar to the risks posed by the most closely related enumerated offensecompleted burglary. Id. at 1594. In concluding attempted burglary posed a serious risk of potential physical injury to another, the Court reasoned: The main risk of burglary arises not from the simple physical act of wrongfully entering onto another's property, but rather from the possibility of a face-to-face confrontation between the burglar and a third partywhether an occupant, a police officer, or a bystander  who comes to investigate. That is, the risk arises not from the completion of the burglary, but from the possibility that an innocent person might appear while the crime is in progress. Id. at 1595-96. This reasoning applies with equal force in Cantrell's case. Cantrell unlawfully entered an inhabitable structure for the purpose of committing stealing therein. Missouri law limits the definition of inhabitable structure to only those structures where people live, carry on business, assemble, or spend the night. See Mo. Rev.Stat. § 569.010(2). Thus, regardless of whether the inhabitable structure Cantrell unlawfully entered was a house, car, boat, airplane, or other inhabitable structure, there existed the risk of a violent confrontation between Cantrell and the occupant, the police, or another third party. We therefore conclude the district court did not err in determining, regardless of whether Cantrell's state court burglary conviction was a generic burglary as defined in Taylor, Cantrell was subject to an increased range of punishment as a career offender under U.S. S.G. § 4B1.1, because Cantrell's state court second-degree burglary conviction constituted a crime of violence under the otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.