Opinion ID: 183968
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Intercepted wiretap communications

Text: We review the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence gathered via electronic surveillance under a mixed standard of review. United States v. Malekzadeh, 855 F.2d 1492, 1496 (11th Cir. 1988). Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and the application of law to those facts is reviewed de novo. United States v. Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070, 1073-74 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Ramirez, 476 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th Cir. 2007)). 9 Allen argues that the government failed to show necessity for the wiretap of Cornell Roberts’ cell phone and failed to exhaust all other investigative procedures, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518. The provision on which Allen relies states that an application for interception of wire communications must contain “a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(c)(1). The statute authorizing wiretaps is not intended “to be routinely employed as the initial step in a criminal investigation,” United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515, 94 S. Ct. 1820, 1827 (1974), but rather, it is designed to ensure that electronic surveillance is neither routinely employed nor used when less intrusive techniques will succeed. Id. This does not, however, mean that the statute requires “a comprehensive exhaustion of all possible techniques, but must simply explain the retroactive or prospective failure of several investigative techniques that reasonably suggest themselves.” United States v. Van Horn, 789 F.2d 1492, 1496 (11th Cir. 1986). Here, Allen maintains that the government did not exhaust all of its investigative procedures before seeking to wiretap Cornell Roberts’ cell phone. However, 18 U.S.C. § 2518 and relevant case law do not require the government to explore every possible avenue of investigation open to it before pursuing electronic surveillance of wire communications, only those avenues which 10 do not reasonably appear unlikely to succeed or which are not too dangerous. Allen argues that the wiretap was not necessary because the government had not exhausted all of the other investigative avenues open to it. Specifically, Allen asserts the government could have used a cooperating confidential informant to infiltrate the Cornell Roberts organization or set up a sting operation through an undercover DEA agent Roberts had been speaking with. The government points out that these were not reasonable avenues for the government to explore at the time. Specifically, when the wiretap was applied for in July 2005, the confidential informant Allen refers to was already in jail on bank robbery charges, and a sting sale of real cocaine would not have advanced the goals of the investigation (to discover the source of Roberts’ powder cocaine) since agents would have had to immediately arrest Roberts in order to prevent the cocaine from entering the stream of commerce, thus shutting down the investigation. Based upon these facts, we find no error in the district court’s denial of Allen’s motion to suppress the intercepted wiretap communications.