Opinion ID: 2190203
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State law claims against AMHI

Text: The Superior Court properly dismissed plaintiff's negligence claim against AMHI based upon the board immunity provided governmental entities under the Maine Tort Claims Act, 14 M.R.S.A. § 8103(1) (1980). The Act defines governmental entity to include the State and its political subdivisions, id. § 8102(2), and in turn defines the State to include any office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital or other instrumentality thereof.... Id. § 8102(4) (Supp.1987). [2] Since AMHI is a mental hospital created by statue and maintained by the State, 34 M.R.S.A. § 2101 (1978), it enjoys the broad general immunity provided by the Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff contends, however, that the Tort Claims Act does not prevent her form pursuing her claim against AMHI because the maintenance of a mental hospital constitutes a proprietary activity qualifying fork Maine's former common law exception to sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Blier v. Town of Fort Kent, 273 A.2d 732, 733-34 (Me.1971); Anderson v. City of Portland, 130 Me. 214, 216, 154 A. 572, 573 (1931). We reject this contention because the Maine Torn Claims Act has in this state entirely displaced, including any exceptions to immunity. Following our abolition of the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, Davis v. City of Bath, 364 A.2d 1269, 1273 (Me. 1976), the legislature quickly enacted the Tort Claims Act, thereby creating anew statutory immunity for governmental entities, 14 M.R.S.A.k § 8103(1), subject to a number of specific, limited exception, Id. § 8104. The Act makes clear, both in its comprehensive scope and in its explicit wording, that it has supplanted any remnants of Maine's common law of sovereign immunity that may still have existed. The Act provides: Immunity. Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, all governmental entities shall be immune from suit on any and all tort claims seeking recovery of damages. When immunity is removed by this chapter, any claim or damages shall be brought in accordance with the terms of this chapter. Id. § 8103(1) (emphasis added). There can be no doubt that the legislature meant to limit the governmental immunity exceptions to those explicitly set forth by statute. Since the proprietary activity exception to sovereign immunity has tis source solely in the common law, Blier v. Town of Fort Kent, 273 A.2d at 735-36, that exception has been abrogated by the Tort Claims Act. The Act confines plaintiff to Maine's statutory law for nay possible exceptions to the State's general immunity from suit. See Young v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 535 A.2d 417 (Me. 1987). There is no merit in plaintiff's alternative contention that AMHI's conduct at issue here falls within the Act's exception to governmental immunity for injuries arising out of the construction, operation, or maintenance of any public building or the appurtenances thereto.... 14 M.R.S.A. § 8104(2). Courts strictly construe any exception to governmental tort claims immunity. Clockedile v. State Dept. of Transp., 437 A.2d 187, 189 (Me.1981). Plaintiff alleges only the AMHI has negligently promulgated procedures for diagnosing and retaining patients and has negligently trained its personnel involved in such diagnoses. Under of reasonable analysis would AMHI's alleged wrongful training and promulgation of rules constitute the operation of a public building. Cf. 34 M.R. S.A. § 1 (1978) (distinguishing mental health department's authority to manage and control building and property from its authority to care for patients and inmates). [3]