Opinion ID: 784134
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hodge's Statement to His Sister The Day After the Shooting

Text: 38 Lawrence also argues that the district court erred in not admitting testimony by Berenice Hodge about the decedent's statements to her the day after the shooting. He claims that the evidence was admissible as an excited utterance. When Berenice Hodge first saw her brother at the hospital, he was having trouble speaking, but he kept repeating Ogami to his sister. When she repeated Ogami back to him, he nodded his head yes. Hodge also said T during this exchange. 39 The district court initially rejected Lawrence's claim of an excited utterance when defense counsel first tried to elicit the testimony during cross-examination of Sergeant Curtis Griffin, asking him if Berenice Hodge identified any suspects during his interview of her. After the government objected, a conference occurred at side bar. R. 774-75A. During that conference the court stated that testimony regarding what the witness told Berenice Hodge was double hearsay and therefore inadmissible. 7 However, defense counsel contended that the statement should be admitted as an excited utterance. The court rejected the argument. Later, defense counsel tried again to admit this evidence during its case-in-chief. However, the court again rejected the claim explaining: An excited utterance would be if [the victim] talked to the [police officer at the scene of the shooting] and said, `So and so shot me.' The court noted that the statement Lawrence was trying to elicit was a statement Hodge made to his sister after he was taken to the hospital. His sister was the first family member to speak with him. 40 We agree that Hodge's statement to his sister was not an excited utterance under Fed.R.Evid. 803(2). That rule allows hearsay to be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule if a declarant makes a statement relating to a startling event while under the stress of excitement caused by the event. However, the proffered statement must be made as a result of and while the declarant's utterance is the direct result of the exciting event. See Fed R. Evid. 803(2), Advisory Committee's Note. The district court believed that too much time elapsed between the shooting and the subsequent statement at the hospital to allow Hodge's mention of Ogami to qualify as an excited utterance. The fact that Hodge waited until he was speaking to a family member to utter the declaration supports the court's conclusion. It strongly suggests that the statement was more the product of deliberation than an overpowering and exciting event. Had the same statement been uttered to the police at the scene under different circumstances, it may well have constituted an excited utterance. However, that is not what happened. Rather, Hodge waited until the following day before he made the disputed declaration. 8 Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit it. 41 It must also be noted that if the court allowed defense counsel to introduce this exchange with Berenice Hodge, the government would have been able to also elicit testimony that Hodge also whispered T in the same exchange that he said Ogami. We fail to see how Ogami can qualify as an excited utterance, but not T. That would open the door to arguing that Hodge was attempting to identify Lawrence. There is evidence that Lawrence is known as Trini, and Tall Boy. Given the totality of the evidence here, the jury may well have concluded that Hodge was referring to the defendant when he uttered T. Accordingly, not only did the district court's ruling not deny Lawrence a fair trial, it is likely that it quite properly closed a door that a skilled prosecutor would otherwise have been likely to walk through. 42