Opinion ID: 2972784
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Agent Baber’s testimony

Text: Whether profile evidence is admissible depends upon the purpose for which it is introduced. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) states that “[e]vidence of a person’s character . . . is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion,” unless the evidence involves “a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime [and is] offered by the accused” or involves the “a pertinent trait of character” of the accused himself. The latter form of evidence must be “offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same.” Id. In keeping with this rule, “[c]ourts have condemned the use of profiles as substantive evidence of guilt.” United States v. Long, 328 F.3d 655, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Profile evidence is properly admissible, however, when it is introduced “to demonstrate why the defendant was stopped for investigation, to rebut inferences raised by the defendant’s testimony, or to show modus operandi.” United States v. Ward, Nos. 96-5731 / 5892, 1998 WL 45491, at  (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 1998) (unpublished) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of a search and noting that “the fact that [the factors used to establish reasonable suspicion] may be set forth in a ‘profile’ does not . . . detract from their evidentiary significance as seen by a trained agent”); United States v. Valme, No. 98-1340, 1999 WL 519232, at -7 (6th Cir. July 16, 1999) (unpublished) (holding that evidence that the defendant fit a “drug courier profile” was admissible because it “was offered only to explain why the authorities pursued the vehicle driven by [the defendant]”). The government argues in its brief that Agent Baber’s testimony was offered “to show why Baber focused on Baldwin as a suspect and not victim . . . [and] to explain why Baber conducted the interview of Baldwin in the manner he did.” This rationale was apparently accepted by the district court. If Baber’s focus on Baldwin as a suspect or his interview technique had been at issue, Baber’s testimony would presumably have been admissible. See Valme, 1999 WL 519232, at -7. No such issues, however, were ever raised. The personality profile also had nothing to do with the modus operandi of the staged kidnapping, so it could not have been relevant in that respect. Because neither Baber’s state of mind nor his interrogation technique had been raised as an issue by the defense, his testimony about Baldwin’s personality profile was irrelevant. The district court therefore erred in admitting it. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a).
Even where a district court erroneously admits evidence, we will not reverse the defendant’s conviction if the error is deemed harmless. Rodriguez v. Renico, No. 02-2327, 2004 WL 771954, at  (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (upholding the defendant’s conviction despite the introduction of profile evidence because “[t]here was substantial evidence in the record apart from the profile evidence which established the petitioner’s guilt”) (quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original); see also United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 478-79 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that “the district court probably erred by admitting” certain recorded conversations, but declining to reverse because “any error was harmless”). An error is harmless No. 04-3199 United States v. Baldwin Page 6 “when it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17-18 (2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In the present case, there was overwhelming evidence of guilt beyond the erroneously admitted testimony. After Baber pointed out the implausibility of his initial story, Baldwin confessed to the crime. Baldwin recanted his confession only after he realized that his parents would find out that Baldwin had killed his own dog. Rosales also testified that Baldwin recruited him for a “fake kidnapping,” and that he went along with Baldwin’s plan. The combination of Baldwin’s original confession, the testimony of his coconspirator, and the implausibility of Baldwin’s initial story establish “that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 17-18. We therefore conclude that the district court’s error in admitting the personality profile testimony was harmless under the circumstances of this case.