Opinion ID: 509516
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of the District Court's Determination of the Merits Of Harris' Claim

Text: 172 We begin our analysis of Harris' contentions concerning the alleged instructional error looking to applicable California statutes for guidance concerning the evidence the jury can consider in selecting the proper punishment in a capital case. The introductory paragraph of section 190.3 explains the wide range of evidence that is admissible during the penalty phase: 173 ... In the proceedings on the question of penalty, evidence may be presented by both the people and the defendant as to any matter relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence, including, but not limited to, ... the defendant's character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition. 174 (Emphasis added). Thus, [t]he admission of evidence is not limited to matters relevant to the specified aggravating or mitigating factors. 9 People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 773, 631 P.2d 446, 470, 175 Cal.Rptr. 738, 762 (1981) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 1280, 71 L.Ed.2d 464 (1982); see also Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 967, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 3433, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (the Constitution does not prohibit consideration at the sentencing phase of information not directly related to either statutory aggravating or statutory mitigating factors, as long as that information is relevant to the character of the defendant or the circumstances of the crime) (citing cases). [T]he jury [i]s free, after considering the listed aggravating and mitigating factors, to consider any other matter it thought relevant to the penalty determination. Boyd, 38 Cal.3d at 773, 700 P.2d at 790, 215 Cal.Rptr. at 9. Thus, psychiatric evidence is admissible to show defendant's present character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d at 774 n. 39, 631 P.2d at 470 n. 39, 175 Cal.Rptr. at 762 n. 39. 175 Harris argues that the court's modified instruction permitted the use of mental or physical condition as an aggravating factor so as to arbitrarily weigh a sentencing decision in favor of death. The court's modified instruction cannot be reasonably so construed. 176 During the guilt phase of the trial, Harris testified that he had nothing to do with the murders. During the penalty phase, Harris recanted that testimony, and expressly admitted the crimes and stated he was sorry. He sought to support his claim of remorse by calling Deputy Sherrif Mendoza who testified that when he inquired into Harris' emotional state after he cut his arm in an alleged suicide attempt, Harris appeared to feel remorse for his crimes. 177 Harris points to the testimony of Dr. Wait Griswold, a psychiatrist who had examined Harris in the early morning hours of July 6, 1978, to demonstrate that the nonstatutory factors of mental and physical condition were used by the prosecution as aggravating circumstances. Dr. Griswold was called by the prosecution to testify in rebuttal to Harris' claim of remorse. The psychiatrist testified that he was of the opinion that Harris had a personality disorder known as an antisocial personality in psychiatric nomenclature. 178 Antisocial personality is listed as No. 301.70 in DSM-II: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (3d ed. 1980) (hereinafter DSM III ). This disorder is also known as a psychopathic or sociopathic personality. This personality disorder is not a neurosis or a psychosis. An individual is not born with this personality disorder; rather, it is a product of the individual's background, upbringing, and environment. 179 Dr. Griswold testified that an antisocial individual tends to be immature, emotionally unstable, callous, irresponsible, manipulative, impulsive, egotistical, has an inability to profit from past experience or punishment, projects the blame on someone else, and does not feel true remorse for crimes he commits. He stated this type of individual would be able to have the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his actions, the ability to control his actions, and to deliberate and premeditate upon a murder. 180 The factors the jury was asked to consider concerning the defendant's character, background, mental condition, and physical condition were stated neutrally. They were not described as aggravating or mitigating. The jury heard that Harris had a dismal childhood, and the evidence showed that his father had severely beaten Harris when he was an infant. There was also evidence about his minimal education, the conviction of his father for sexually molesting his sister, and his mother's conviction for bank robbery. Under the court's instruction all of the foregoing evidence could be considered in mitigation of the punishment Harris should suffer for his crimes. The Supreme Court has often repeated the principle that [w]hat is important at the selection [of punishment] stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2743-44, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (emphasis in original) (citing cases). Evidence of a defendant's character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition permit such a determination. The court's instruction impartially informed the jury that it was proper to consider such evidence in selecting the appropriate punishment. 181 Citing to language in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 885, 103 S.Ct. at 2747, Harris claims the trial court permitted appellant's sentencing jury to find as aggravating factors which '... actually should militate in favor of a lesser penalty, such as perhaps the defendant's mental illness.'  The Supreme Court in Stephens cited Miller v. Florida, 373 So.2d 882 (Fla.1979) for this proposition. 182 In Miller, after the defendant had been charged with murder, he was found incompetent to stand trial and committed to the state mental hospital. After two and one-half years of confinement and treatment, he was found sufficiently competent to stand trial; his mental illness was in remission through the use of tranquilizing drugs. Testimony was presented at the sentencing hearing that the defendant was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and hallucinations. He had been committed to mental hospitals on several previous occasions. 183 The trial judge, during the penalty phase, concluded that the mental sickness or illness that [defendant] suffers from is such that he will never recover from it, it will only be repressed by the use of drugs. Id. at 885. Relying principally on this factor, the judge sentenced defendant to death because this was the only assurance society can receive that this man never again commits to another human being what he did to that lady.... Id. 184 Miller is clearly distinguishable from the circumstances presented in the instant matter. The primary reason that the Florida Supreme Court reversed the sentence of death is that the trial judge relied on a nonstatutory aggravating factor. Under Florida law, a trial judge is not permitted to consider a nonstatutory circumstance in selecting the proper penalty. Furthermore, the evidence concerning Harris' mental condition is distinguishable from the evidence of psychosis (paranoid schizophrenia) relied upon by the trial judge in Miller. Dr. Griswold testified Harris had a personality disorder, i.e., antisocial personality, DSM III 301.70, and expressly distinguished this type of mental disorder from a psychosis or neurosis. A personality disorder is not analagous to the incurable and dangerous mental illness of a person diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia and hallucinations. 185 The jury is entitled to consider the character of the defendant during the penalty phase to make an individualized determination of the sentence. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 879, 103 S.Ct. at 2744. The defendant properly introduced evidence at the penalty phase that he felt remorse notwithstanding his earlier testimony that he did not commit the homicides. The prosecution was also entitled to rebut this belated recantation and acceptance of responsibility by introducing evidence about Harris' background and personality to his attempt to mitigate his homicidal conduct. [T]he presence or absence of remorse is a factor relevant to the jury's penalty decision in a capital case. People v. Ghent, 43 Cal.3d 739, 771, 739 P.2d 1250, 1271, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 103 (1987). The instruction permitting the jury to consider the defendant's character, background, history, mental condition, and physical condition properly narrowed the class of persons eligible for the death penalty who reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 877, 103 S.Ct. at 2742. The giving of the modified instruction was not error. 186 We AFFIRM the order of the district denying the petitions for writ of habeas corpus. We VACATE our stay of execution.