Opinion ID: 2274086
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Statewide Professional Standard of Care for Tennessee Attorneys

Text: In Spalding v. Davis, 674 S.W.2d 710 (Tenn.1984), the Court noted that [t]he settled general rule in most if not all [United States] jurisdictions is that an attorney . . . may be held liable to his client for damages resulting from his failure to exercise [the] ordinary care, skill, and diligence . . . which is commonly possessed and exercised by attorneys in practice in the jurisdiction.  Id. at 714 (emphasis added). [1] Twice since 1984, in Lazy Seven Coal Sales, Inc. v. Stone & Hinds, P.C., 813 S.W.2d 400, 405-06 (Tenn.1991), and in Sanjines v. Ortwein & Assocs., 984 S.W.2d 907, 910 (Tenn.1998), we repeated with approval, though without further elaboration or analysis, the Spalding formulation. However, none of these cases presented a good opportunity to define the term jurisdiction. Since 1984, various panels of the Court of Appeals have been inconsistent in defining the jurisdiction referenced in Spalding . On the one hand, two reported opinions of the Court of Appeals have linked the legal malpractice standard of care with the medical malpractice standard, which is governed by a statutory locality rule. [2] See Underwood v. Waterslides of Mid-Am., Inc., 823 S.W.2d 171, 183 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1991) (finding that a professional's familiarity with the local standard of care is the exception rather than the rule, with the principal exceptions being law and medicine); Cleckner v. Dale, 719 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tenn.Ct.App.1986) (a lawyer's standard of care does not differ markedly from that of physicians or other professionals) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). On the other hand, one intermediate appellate court panel understood jurisdiction to mean Tennessee. See Wood v. Parker, 901 S.W.2d 374, 379 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995) ([w]e find nothing . . . to show that defendant . . . deviated from the accepted standard of care for attorneys in Tennessee ) (emphasis added). In this case, the Court of Appeals, in its opinion below, also adopted a statewide professional standard of care. We agree with the instant decision of the Court of Appeals. A jurisdiction is [a] geographic area within which political or judicial authority may be exercised. Black's Law Dictionary 855 (7th ed.1999); see also Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1227 (1993) (defining jurisdiction as the limits or territory within which any particular power may be exercised). This Court allows an attorney with a Tennessee law license to practice anywhere in the state. See Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 7 § 1.05 (2006) (All persons admitted to the bar of Tennessee are . . . (i) officers of the courts of Tennessee, eligible for admission to practice in any court in this State . . . and (ii) subject to the duties and standards imposed from time to time on attorneys in this State.). An attorney practicing in Tennessee, then, must exercise the ordinary care, skill, and diligence commonly possessed and practiced by attorneys throughout the state. Indeed, while there may be local rules of practice within the various judicial districts of our State, there are no local standards of care. There is only one standard of care for attorneys practicing in Tennessee: a statewide standard. By extension, an expert who opines in a legal malpractice case about an attorney's adherence to our professional standard of care must be familiar with the statewide professional standard of care. Bearfield argues that the medical malpractice locality rule should be extended to legal malpractice actions. However, the locality rule for medical malpractice is a creature of statute. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-26-115(a)(1) (Supp.2005) (standard of care relates to the community in which the defendant practices or in a similar community). Neither this Court nor the legislature has created a similar standard for the legal profession, and we decline to create one here. We also believe the adoption of a statewide professional standard of care for attorneys who practice law in Tennessee is good policy. Three concerns motivate our conclusion. First, if a local professional standard of care prevailed, plaintiffs might have difficulty proving their legal malpractice cases because local attorneys might not be willing to speak against their colleagues. See 3 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 19.5 (5th ed.2000). Second, local variations in the standard of care could create an inefficient and inequitable morass of professional standards of care, reducing the likelihood that some attorneys would face malpractice claims while increasing the likelihood for others. See id. Finally, the emergence of the internet as a primary tool for legal research undercuts historical transportation and communications arguments favoring local variations in the standard of care. See Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 510 A.2d 436, 438 (1986). We join those states which have accepted these and other rationales for maintaining a statewide standard of professional care for their attorneys. See, e.g., Brett v. Berkowitz, 706 A.2d 509, 517 (Del.Super.Ct.1998); Kellos v. Sawilowsky, 254 Ga. 4, 325 S.E.2d 757, 758 (1985); Fenaille v. Coudert, 44 N.J.L. 286, 289 (N.J.1882); Little v. Matthewson, 114 N.C.App. 562, 442 S.E.2d 567, 570 (1994), aff'd 340 N.C. 102, 455 S.E.2d 160 (1995); Feil v. Wishek, 193 N.W.2d 218, 225 (N.D. 1971); Smith v. Haynsworth, Marion, McKay & Geurard, 322 S.C. 433, 472 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1954); Russo v. Griffin, 147 Vt. 20, 510 A.2d 436, 438 (1986); Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Clausing, 73 Wash.2d 393, 438 P.2d 865, 866 (1975); Moore v. Lubnau, 855 P.2d 1245, 1250 (Wyo.1993). Because there is a statewide professional standard of care for attorneys practicing in Tennessee, the Court of Appeals correctly overturned the trial court's award of summary judgment to Bearfield. The Chapmans' expert affiant did not need to assert knowledge of any practice standards peculiar to the upper East Tennessee area. To the contrary, he correctly asserted his knowledge of the professional standard of care for attorneys practicing in Tennessee. Instead, it was Bearfield's original affidavit which relied upon the erroneous professional standard of care. Because we hold that the trial court used an incorrect standard of review in considering Bearfield's motion for summary judgment, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the grant of summary judgment was error and that this case must be remanded to the trial court. It is therefore unnecessary to determine whether, even if Bearfield's affidavit is subjected to the correct standard of review, it is otherwise sufficient to shift the burden to the Chapmans to demonstrate genuine issues of material fact in controversy. [3] At this stage, it is also unnecessary for us to determine the adequacy of any pleadings or affidavits submitted subsequent to the original affidavit.