Opinion ID: 435832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: instruction on co-conspirator liability

Text: 45 Galiffa next contends that the following jury instruction given by the district court was prejudicial. 46 If you find that the defendant Galiffa is guilty of conspiracy as charged in Count I, you may also find that defendant guilty of the offense charged in Count IV, provided that you find that the essential elements of Count IV as defined in these instructions have been established beyond a reasonable doubt, and provided that you also find beyond a reasonable doubt that the possession of the 234 pounds of marijuana with intent to distribute was committed pursuant to the conspiracy and that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy at the time the substantive offense was committed. The reason for this is that a co-conspirator committing an offense pursuant to a conspiracy is the agent of the other conspirators. 47 This instruction comports with the law in this and other jurisdictions following the Pinkerton theory of co-conspirator liability, Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1940), 8 wherein each person who is involved in a continuing conspiracy which contemplates and encompasses an illegal act is responsible for the acts of his co-conspirators. United States v. Shelton, 669 F.2d 446, 454 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 934, 102 S.Ct. 1989, 72 L.Ed.2d 454 (1982); United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1230 (7th Cir.1981). 48 From what we can discern, Galiffa's brief apparently raises two objections to this instruction. First, he contends that the instruction unfairly added Count IV as if it were an overt act that proved the existence of the conspiracy. We do not draw this conclusion from our reading of the instruction. Rather than the possession charge being used to establish the conspiracy, the instruction provided that if a conspiracy is found and one of his co-conspirators was shown to have possessed marijuana with intent to distribute then Galiffa could be convicted of the substantive criminal act of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. As pointed out above, this instruction comports with the Pinkerton doctrine. 49 While not citing any cases to support his position, Galiffa next objects to the jury instruction claiming that it amended the indictment and, therefore, departed from the original indictment and the proof presented at trial. Regarding the proof presented at trial, we fail to ascertain any departure. Evidence was received at trial that Ashenfelter, one of Galiffa's admitted co-conspirators, possessed the marijuana with intent to distribute. 9 This obviously is enough evidence to establish grounds for the Pinkerton instruction since Ashenfelter, as a co-conspirator, had taken all of the requisite steps to be charged and convicted of possession with intent to distribute. 50 The jury instruction also did not constitute an amendment of the indictment. In the instant case, there obviously was no literal amendment of the indictment since Galiffa was charged with and convicted of possession with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a). There was also no constructive amendment of the indictment. The leading case of Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) is not dispositive. In that case, the defendant was indicted for a Hobbs Act violation, but at trial, over the objection of the defendant, evidence was introduced proving a second violation of the Act. The Supreme Court stated that this action destroyed the defendant's substantial right to be tried only on the charges presented in the indictment returned by the grand jury. Id. at 217, 80 S.Ct. at 273. 51 Constructive amendments have been found where there is a complex of facts distinctly different from those set forth in the charging instrument and not ... where there is a single set of facts, United States v. Von Stoll, No. 726 F.2d 584 at 586 (9th Cir.1984) (quoting C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Criminal, Sec. 516 at 27 (1982)), or where the crime charged was substantially altered at trial, so that it was impossible to know whether the grand jury would have indicted for the crime actually proved. Id. In this case there was no complex set of facts different from the indictment proved at trial, nor was the crime altered at trial so that it was impossible to know whether the grand jury would have indicted for the crime charged. Pursuant to Rule 7(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the indictment recited the counts in plain and concise language alleging both the conspiracy and the substantive crime of intent to distribute along with respective statutory provisions. See United States v. Roman, 728 F.2d 846 (7th Cir.1984) (citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1)). Galiffa was convicted of these exact crimes. No cases have been cited to us, nor have we discovered any cases, that hold that an indictment must contain the specific theory of law which the prosecution intends to use in its attempt to convict the defendant. 10 For these reasons we hold that the Pinkerton co-conspirator instruction was not an amendment of the indictment. 52 Turning to the question of variance, our court has recently stated: 53  '[A] variance will not be deemed fatal where the defendant is so informed of the charges against him that he is protected against a second prosecution for the same offense and is able adequately to prepare his defense against the charges set forth in the indictment.'  54 United States v. Lisinski, 728 F.2d 887 at 893 (7th Cir.1984) (quoting United States v. Warden, 545 F.2d 32, 35 (7th Cir.1976)). Clearly the jury instruction regarding the Pinkerton theory did not constitute a prejudicial variance from the indictment. The substantive count in many instances is based upon the allegation of the underlying conspiracy charge. See United States v. Boyle, 338 F.Supp. 1028 (D.D.C.1972) (citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946)). The fact that the Pinkerton theory was not specifically charged in Count IV does not mean that Galiffa was prejudiced because of such an omission. When one is charged with conspiracy, it is probable that he will also be charged with the substantive offenses committed by a co-conspirator because one who is found to be a part of the conspiracy may be liable for the substantive crimes committed by his co-conspirators springing from the conspiracy. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946). We cannot see how Galiffa's counsel was prejudiced in his preparation of Galiffa's defense simply because the Pinkerton rule was not expressly included in the language of the indictment. 11 Therefore, we hold that it was not improper for the district court to instruct the jury under the Pinkerton theory.