Opinion ID: 5139201
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Plaintiff Hidalgo

Text: New Ichiro Sushi, in its separate appeal, challenges the award of $4,568.00 in damages and prejudgment interest to Roberto Hidalgo, whom the district court found to be an employee of New Ichiro Sushi and determined had proven various violations of the FLSA and NYLL against New Ichiro Sushi. On appeal, New Ichiro Sushi argues that there is no evidence in the record, beyond Hidalgo’s own testimony at trial, that he was an employee of New Ichiro Sushi from September 17, 2014 to October 2, 2014 (after Ichiro Sushi closed), or that he worked 72 hours per week during those weeks. Moreover, New Ichiro Sushi contends that Hidalgo’s testimony was contradicted by bank records establishing that “the restaurant was closed for two weeks from September 17, 2014 to September 30, 2014” such that Hidalgo could not, as he claimed, have worked at the restaurant during that time. Appellant’s Br. at 1. Thus, New Ichiro Sushi asserts it was clear error for the district court to credit his testimony. As discussed above, we do not “second-guess the bench-trial court’s credibility assessments,” Krist, 688 F.3d at 95, and here, the district court found that Hidalgo was “clear about what he did and did not remember” and that his testimony was credible. Special App’x at 5. We show deference to the district court’s credibility determination in such circumstances because “only the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief in what is said.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575. Although New Ichiro Sushi suggests that a rational factfinder cannot credit a witness’s 11 testimony at trial unless there is corroboration, we have repeatedly rejected any such rigid corroboration rule. See, e.g., Sealey v. Giltner, 197 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Triers of fact, whether juries or judges, have the obligation to assess the credibility of witnesses, including parties, and a plaintiff’s testimony in support of his own claim, if credited and persuasive, will normally suffice. This does not entitle a plaintiff to win merely by testifying, . . . but only by presenting testimony that the trier concludes is both credible and, along with other evidence, if any, sufficiently persuasive to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden of proof by the requisite preponderance of the evidence.” (emphasis added)); Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 291 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Although [plaintiff’s] evidence may be thin, his own sworn statement is adequate to counter summary judgment in this case and must be weighed by a trier of fact.”); N.L.R.B. v. Sandy Hill Iron & Brass Works, 165 F.2d 660, 663 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[R]espondent . . . argues that the testimony of . . . discharged employees was uncorroborated and thus not reliable, probative, and substantial. . . . [But] the fact that the evidence was in no other way substantiated is immaterial. Lack of corroboration goes only to the question of credibility.”). We similarly reject New Ichiro Sushi’s contention that the bank records introduced at trial conclusively demonstrated that the restaurant was closed for renovation during the last two weeks of September 2014 and, thus, the district court erred in crediting Hidalgo’s testimony that he worked (and was not properly paid) during that period. It is not self-evident from the numerous pages of bank records introduced at trial as to why such records would conclusively demonstrate the restaurant was closed during the renovation period, nor did any witness provide such an explanation at trial by deciphering those records for the district court. Therefore, because “there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them 12 cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court as to the award to Roberto Hidalgo.