Opinion ID: 71503
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the obstruction of justice conviction

Text: 4 Brenson was convicted under the omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503: 5 (a) Whoever ... corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished as provided ... 6 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (1995). The omnibus clause is essentially a catch-all provision which generally prohibits conduct that interferes with the due administration of justice. United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651, n. 3 (11th Cir.1990). 7 In order to convict Brenson under the omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, the government had to prove that: (1) Brenson corruptly; (2) endeavored; (3) to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice. Thomas, 916 F.2d at 651. The government contends that the evidence presented at trial provided sufficient proof as to all the necessary elements of § 1503. Brenson argues on appeal, as he did during the trial, that because he in no way impeded, obstructed or influenced the grand jury investigation of Fernandez or the indictment of Fernandez, his conviction for obstruction of justice is not supported by the evidence and the jury instructions given by the district court concerning the elements of § 1503 were in error. 8 The sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law which receives a de novo review by this court. United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725, 733 (11th Cir.1991). In considering appellants' claims of insufficient evidence, this court must view all of the evidence, together with all logical inferences flowing from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the government, and must draw all credibility choices in favor of the finder of fact. United States v. Perez, 698 F.2d 1168, 1169 (11th Cir.1983). When a jury finds a defendant guilty, its verdict must stand if 'any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'  United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 711 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 510 U.S. 950, 114 S.Ct. 396, 126 L.Ed.2d 344 (1993) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)) (emphasis in original). However, if a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilty, then the conviction must be reversed. United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 653 (11th Cir.1990). 9
10 According to Brenson, the facts of this case require this court to place the metes and bounds on the very broad language of the catchall provision in § 1503 out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress, as recognized in Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 105 S.Ct. 3127, 87 L.Ed.2d 152 (1985), and out of concern that fair warning be given so the common world can understand based on the language used what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. United States v. Aguilar, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 2362, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995). Brenson argues that the omnibus clause of § 1503 was not intended to apply to his actions in disclosing secret grand jury information. 11 The Government responds by demonstrating that the omnibus clause of § 1503 has been given a broad reading by this court. Section 1503 forbids interferences with the due administration of justice, i.e., judicial procedure. United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir.1984). The statute aims 'to prevent a miscarriage of justice.'  Silverman, 745 F.2d at 1393. 12 In United States v. Brand, 775 F.2d 1460, 1465 (11th Cir.1985), this court recognized that [w]e have stated more than once that the omnibus clause in broad enough to cover any act committed corruptly, in an endeavor to impede or obstruct justice. This court previously determined that [t]he statute [§ 1503] reaches all corrupt conduct capable of producing an effect that prevents justice from being duly administered, regardless of the means employed. United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir.1984). Upon review of the evidence presented at trial, it is clear that Brenson's disclosure of grand jury information to the target of the grand jury investigation 2 , prior to any indictment being returned, is the type of conduct capable of being punished under § 1503. 13 In United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir.1978) 3 , the defendants were convicted of conspiring to obstruct justice in violation of § 1503 by attempting to sell transcripts of secret grand jury testimony to persons under investigation by the grand jury. On appeal, the court determined that the appropriation and disclosure of secret grand jury materials constitutes an obstruction of justice by breaching the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings. Howard, 569 F.2d at 1336. 14 This court has previously determined that [a]ny person 'who knowingly violates Rule 6(e)(2) [Fed.R.Crim.P.] 4 or induces or attempts to induce another person to violate the Rule may be [convicted] for obstruction of justice under § 1503.'  United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 713 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 510 U.S. 950, 114 S.Ct. 396, 126 L.Ed.2d 344 (1993) (quoting Blalock v. United States, 844 F.2d 1546, 1561, n. 22 (11th Cir.1988) (JJ. Tjoflat and Roetger, concurring specially)) (alteration in original). Contrary to Brenson's argument, a person who improperly reveals grand jury information in violation of Rule 6(e)(2) can be convicted for obstruction of justice or contempt 5 , provided the elements of § 1503 are proven. 15 According to Brenson, recently decided cases support his argument that the act of disclosing grand jury information is insufficient to support a conviction of obstruction of justice. In making this point, Brenson relies on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Aguilar for the proposition that the providing of false information to agents that the defendant knows will testify before a grand jury was insufficient to demonstrate that Aguilar's action would have the natural and probable effect of impeding the grand jury proceeding. However, upon review of the Aguilar decision, the Supreme Court expressly stated that [t]he Government did not show here that the agents acted as an arm of the grand jury, or indeed that the grand jury had ever summoned the testimony of these particular agents [those agents who interviewed Aguilar] and evidence at trial relied on by the Government would not enable a rational trier of fact to conclude that [Aguilar] knew that his false statement would be provided to a grand jury ... --- U.S. at ----, ---- - ----, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 2362-63. Thus, a close reading of the Aguilar decision refutes Brenson's characterization of the holding. 16 Similarly, Brenson relies on this court's decision in United States v. Thomas, for the proposition that an attorney providing false testimony is not enough to prove an obstruction of a grand jury. In the Thomas decision the court pointed out that the court was not even convinced that the government established that Thomas's testimony was false. 916 F.2d at 653. However, the court did determine that even if they did believe that a jury could reasonably find that Thomas's testimony was false beyond a reasonable doubt, the government's case as to obstruction of justice under § 1503 fails because no evidence was introduced that the statements had a natural and probable effect of impeding justice. Thomas, 916 F.2d at 654. 17 Based on our reading of Thomas, the decision does not include any determination that the act of giving false testimony could not serve as a basis for an obstruction of justice conviction, but rather reversed the conviction based on the absence of the necessary evidence that such false testimony would have the natural and probable effect of impeding justice. While the Thomas decision can be fairly read to require that Brenson's actions of disclosing grand jury information must be accompanied by proof of the natural and probable effect of such disclosures on the due administration of justice in order to support a conviction, we conclude that the Thomas decision does not support Brenson's argument that his illegal disclosures are actionable only as contempt of court and not as a basis for an obstruction of justice conviction. 18
19 Brenson argues that the evidence presented in his case failed to meet the nexus requirement of § 1503 previously defined by this court in United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir.1990), and adopted by the United States Supreme Court in the Aguilar decision: 20 The action taken by the accused must be with an intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings; it is not enough that there be an intent to influence some ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation independent of the Court's or grand jury's authority. United States v. Brown, 688 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir.1982) (citing cases). Some courts have phrased this showing as a nexus requirement--that the act must have a relationship in time, causation or logic with the judicial proceedings. United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir.1993); United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 679, and n. 12 (3d Cir.1975). In other words, the endeavor must have the  'natural and probable effect'  of interfering with the due administration of justice. Wood, supra, at 695; United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir.1990); Walasek, supra, at 679 ... [I]f the defendant lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding, he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct. 21 United States v. Aguilar, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 2362, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995). According to Brenson, there was insufficient evidence at trial to establish that he could have or wanted to affect the grand jury deliberations during the week before the indictment was signed by giving information to DeMaria. 22 The government is not required to prove that the action taken would directly and immediately obstruct justice in order to violate § 1503, but rather that Brenson's conduct has a probable effect of obstructing justice. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651-52. The government is not required to prove ... that the defendant harbored the specific purpose of obstructing the due administration of justice; all the government has to establish is that the defendant should have reasonably foreseen that the natural and probable consequence of the success of his scheme would achieve precisely that result. Silverman, 745 F.2d at 1393. In other words, the government is not required to prove that a defendant had the specific purpose of obstructing justice, but it must establish that the conduct was motivated at least in part, by a 'corrupt motive.'  United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 713 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 510 U.S. 950, 114 S.Ct. 396, 126 L.Ed.2d 344 (1993). 23 In United States v. Saget, this court determined that when the defendants met with a grand juror, questioned the grand juror about the investigation and asked the grand juror to keep them informed of developments, the disclosure of secret information by a grand jury, which otherwise would not have been revealed, was a reasonably foreseeable result of such a meeting, thereby concluding that defendants' actions had the natural and probable effect of impeding the due administration of justice. 991 F.2d at 713. It directly follows that when Brenson meet with DeMaria and Fernandez, provided details about the investigation and answered questions along with agreeing to keep them informed of later events, it was reasonably foreseeable that such actions would have the probable effect of obstructing the due administration of justice. 24
25 Brenson argues that the nexus requirement of § 1503 mandates that the government prove that his actions had the natural and probable tendency of influencing that the grand jury proceeding involving Fernandez. Relying on the language in Aguilar requiring that the government prove that a defendant's actions were intended to influence a judicial proceeding, rather than some ancillary proceeding, Brenson argues that his actions must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to have been an endeavor to influence, obstruct or impede the Grand Jury proceeding involving Fernandez and not merely an endeavor to influence, obstruct or impede the due administration of justice generally. 26 Based on this legal argument, Brenson requested the following jury instruction during the charge conference: 27 Title 18, United States Code Section 1503, makes it a federal crime to corruptly influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice in any Federal Court. 28 Count 2 charges the Defendant, RONALD A. BRENSON, with corruptly endeavoring to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in November, 1993, during the federal grand jury investigation of United States v. Armando Mandy Fernandez, et al. 29 To endeavor to influence, obstruct or impede a grand jury investigation means to commit an act that has the natural and probable tendency of influencing, obstructing or impeding the grand jury's investigation. 30 Therefore, the Defendant can be found guilty of that offense if all of the following facts are proven beyond a reasonable doubt: 31 First: That there was a pending grand jury proceeding as alleged; 32 Second: That the defendant committed an act that had the natural and probable tendency of influencing, obstructing or impeding that grand jury's investigation; and 33 Third: That the defendant's acts were done knowingly and corruptly. 34 To act corruptly means to act knowingly and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert or undermine the integrity of the grand jury proceeding. 35 (R1-48). At the charge conference, the government objected to the phrasing of the nexus requirement in terms of the grand jury rather than as to the due administration of justice based on the terms of the statute, the charges in the indictment and the Thomas decision. (R11-126 to 127). After reviewing the Thomas decision, the district court agreed with the government and ruled that the government's proposed jury instruction on the substantive offense of § 1503 would be given along with direct quotations from the Thomas decision. The district court denied Brenson's requested instruction on § 1503 as covered by the instructions to be given. 36 When charging the jury in this case, the district court gave the following instructions on § 1503, that were largely taken from the Thomas decision: 37 Title 18, United States Code, Section 1503, a section of that book, Title 18, makes it a Federal crime or offense for anyone to corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct or impede the due administration of justice in any Federal Court. The defendant can be found guilty of that offense if all of the following facts are proved, beyond a reasonable doubt: 38 First, that there was a pending Grand Jury proceeding in this Court as alleged; second that the defendant endeavored to influence, obstruct or impede the due administration of justice; and third, that the defendant's acts were done knowingly and corruptly. These are the three things that the government must prove and I will explain them in just a few seconds. 39 In order to convict an individual under this statute, the statute that I just spoke about, Section 1503 of that Title 18, the government must prove that he, must prove that he, the defendant: Number one, corruptly or by threat; number two, endeavored; and number three, to influence, obstruct or impede the due administration of justice. 40 Corruptly describes the specific intent of the crime. Generally, the government must show that the defendant, Mr. Brenson, knowingly and intentionally understood an action from which an obstruction of justice was a reasonably foreseeable result. 41 Although the government is not required to prove that the defendant, Mr. Brenson, had the specific purpose of obstruction of justice, it must, the government, must establish that the conduct was prompted at least in part by the corrupt motive. 42 The endeavor element of the offense describes any attempt or effort to obstruct justice. 43 It is not necessary that an individual succeed in actually obstructing justice to violate Section 1503. A Section 1503 offense is complete when one corruptly endeavors to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice. The prosecution need not prove that the due administration of justice was actually obstructed or impeded. 44 An individual is prohibited from engaging in any activity constituting an effort to influence, obstruct or impede the due administration of justice. The action taken by the defendant does not need to directly and immediately obstruct justice to be prohibited by Section 1503. The defendant's conduct must be such, however, that its natural and probable effect would be the interference with the due administration of justice. That is the definition of Section 1503, Count II. 45 (R12-60 to 63). A trial court's refusal to give a requested instruction is reversible error only if (1) the substance of the instruction was not covered in an instruction given, (2) the requested instruction is a correct statement of law, (3) the requested instruction deals with an issue properly before the jury, and (4) the party seeking the requested instruction suffered prejudicial harm by the court's refusal. United States v. Hooshmand, 931 F.2d 725, 734 (11th Cir.1991). Since these four elements are in the conjunctive, if the requesting party cannot show any one of the elements, then the district court did not commit reversible error. United States v. Jennings, 991 F.2d 725, 731 (11th Cir.1993). 46 In reviewing the district court's decision to refuse the instruction requested by Brenson, the court recognizes that [a] district judge is vested with broad discretion in formulating his charge to the jury so long as it accurately reflects the law and the facts. United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1395 (11th Cir.1984). The jury instructions given by the district court required a finding that there was a grand jury proceedings pending at the time of Brenson's actions. Therefore, the district court incorporated Brenson's request that the jurors be asked to focus on the grand jury proceedings, although not in the exact terms that Brenson desired. 47 Alternatively, the instruction requested by Brenson was not a correct statement of the law. [T]he court is bound to refuse a requested instruction that is incomplete, erroneous, or misleading. Silverman 745 F.2d at 1396. The phrase due administration of justice has been defined by the former Fifth Circuit as judicial procedure, and as the performance of acts required by law in the discharge of duties such as appearing as a witness and giving thoughtful testimony when subpoenaed. United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1334, n. 4, 1337 (5th Cir.1978) (quoting United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903, 98 S.Ct. 298, 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977)). 48 While it is clear that a grand jury proceeding is a recognized part of the judicial proceedings that can be impeded or obstructed, it is not the only part of the judicial proceeding that is protected by § 1503 from impediments, improper influence or obstruction. Section 1503 employs the term due administration of justice to provide a protective cloak over all judicial proceedings, irrespective of at what stage in the judicial process the improper activity occurs. In this case, Brenson's illegal disclosure of grand jury information occurred prior to the return of an indictment, an arrest, seizure or forfeiture of any assets, and well before the trial of any individuals being investigated by the grand jury. Therefore, his act of disclosing secret grand jury information must be considered in relation to its natural and probable effect of impeding, influencing or obstructing any of the present or future stages of the judicial proceedings related to any offenses by Fernandez or others that were the subject of the investigation. 49 Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the jury instructions given by the district court accurately reflect the necessary elements of proof for a conviction under § 1503. As long as the jury instructions inform jurors that the government is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant corruptly took some action, the natural and probable effect of which would be to obstruct or impede the enforcement of the law of the land in a judicial proceeding, the nexus requirement has been adequately explained. Therefore, we find no error in the district court's refusal to give the jury instructions requested by Brenson. 50