Opinion ID: 2967044
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The employee belongs to a protected group.

Text: 2. The employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment. 3. The harassment complained of was based upon sex. 4. The employee's reaction to the harassment affected tangible aspects of the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. The acceptance or rejection of the harassment must be an express or implied condition to the receipt of a job benefit or cause of a tangible job detriment to create liability. Fur- 7 ther, as in typical disparate treatment cases, the employee must prove that she was deprived of a job benefit which she was otherwise qualified to receive because of the employer's use of a prohibited criterion in making the employment decision. 5. The employer, as defined by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), knew or should have known of the harassment and took no effective remedial action. Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 658 (4th Cir. 1990) (footnote omitted). The fifth element was automatically met when the harassment was alleged to have been perpetrated by a supervisor. Id. at 658 n.10 ([W]here the harassment is being committed by one of the employer's supervisors . . . knowledge of the harassment is imputed to the employer.). The magistrate judge concluded that Brown had forecast sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on the first three elements of the quid pro quo test. However, she held that Brown had produced no evidence to establish the fourth element, i.e. , that Boyd assisted [Brown] in obtaining a job benefit or caused her to suffer a detriment. The magistrate judge also noted the requirements of circuit prece- dent concerning claims of what the judge characterized as the second form of Title VII sexual harassment, the creation of a hostile work environment. To establish a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff was required to prove four elements: (1) the subject conduct was unwelcome; (2) it was based on the sex of the plaintiff; (3) it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff's conditions of employment and to create an abusive work environment; and (4) it was imputable on some factual basis to the employer. Spicer v. Virginia, 66 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). The magistrate judge found Brown's evidence sufficient to sustain a find- ing in her favor on the first three elements, but not the fourth. At the 8 time of the judge's decision, circuit law provided that liability could only be imputed to an employer in a hostile environment claim based on a supervisor's conduct if a plaintiff could prove that the employer knew or should have known of the illegal conduct and failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action. Andrade v. Mayfair Management, Inc., 88 F.3d 258, 261 (4th Cir. 1996). The magistrate judge concluded that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the remedial action taken here was anything short of prompt and adequate. Brown appealed, asserting that the magistrate judge had erred with respect to both her quid pro quo and hostile environment claims. Brown maintained that she had forecast sufficient evidence to entitle her to trial on both theories. The parties fully briefed and we heard argument on the viability of these theories under the facts of this case. Recognizing that the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Faragher and Burlington and that the Court's resolution of those cases could clarify or even change the governing legal principles, we held this case in abeyance pending the issuance of those decisions. The Supreme Court's opinions in those cases did indeed change the applicable legal principles, and the parties in this case accordingly submitted supplemental briefs, which we appreciate and have carefully considered.1