Opinion ID: 392171
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Constitutional Count

Text: 18 Though the appellant's complaint alleged several violations of fifth and eighth amendment rights, the only argument he presses on this appeal is that the District violated his eighth amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, appellant argues that placement in a dormitory at Lorton Youth Center in which violent prisoner assaults frequently occurred, and the District's subsequent failure to take reasonable precautions to protect him from such assaults, violated his constitutional right to be free from an unreasonable risk of assault. Brief for the Appellant With Respect to Appellee D.C. at 20. 19 The Supreme Court has laid out the standard of proof necessary to establish an eighth amendment violation. The Court has held that deliberate indifference of prison authorities to a prisoner's serious medical needs may constitute such wanton infliction of unnecessary pain as to be  'repugnant to the conscience of mankind,'  or incompatible with  'the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-05, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290-91, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). The Court took pains in that opinion to distinguish between negligen(ce) or an inadvertent failure, which does not invoke constitutional protections, and deliberate indifference, which does. Id. at 105-06, 97 S.Ct. at 291-92. The district court here correctly concluded, and the appellant does not now challenge, that 20 (t)here is no indication ... from any of the testimony here that the police (sic) officers deliberately did anything or willfully violated any of their responsibilities to protect Murphy(.) 21 Tr. 5/9/79 at 428. 22 However, as appellant correctly points out, this conclusion does not end the constitutional inquiry because the existence of deliberate indifference can be inferred from evidence that assaults are sufficiently pervasive to reasonably apprise prison officials of the need for protective measures. Under these circumstances the failure to institute protective measures can rise to the level of a constitutional violation. While a prisoner has no right to demand the level of protection necessary to render an institution assault-free (he is only entitled to reasonable protection from assaults, see note 18 supra ), commitment to an institution where terror reigns, or even where the risk of ... assault (is) a serious problem of substantial dimensions, may violate the eighth amendment. See Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 at 1373 (5th Cir. 1981); Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 161 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 136, 66 L.Ed.2d 59 (1980). But to prevail under such a constitutional theory, the prisoner must show thatviolence and sexual assaults occur ... with sufficient frequency that the ... prisoners ... are put in reasonable fear for their safety and to reasonably apprise prison officials of the existence of the problem and the need for protective measures. 23 Id. Not all prisoners need be subject to this fear. It is enough that an identifiable group of prisoners do, if the complainant is a member of that group. Id. 28 24 However, we must agree with the district court that no such showing was made here. The sole evidence proffered, again, was the raw number of assaults (twenty) that occurred in Lorton Youth Center I (population 344), and the number (six) in Dormitory # 3 (population 100) where Murphy was housed during the 1976 calendar year, numbers we have already found insufficient in this case to prove unreasonableness. See p. 642 supra. Furthermore, the appellant made no attempt to show that the rate of assaults in this facility exceeded the norm for like institutions or that one identifiable group of inmates was especially susceptible to attack. See notes 19 & 20 supra. Particularly in view of the appellant's stipulation that he did not fear for his safety prior to the attack, 29 we cannot find in this record any support for appellant's contention that so escalated a level of violence existed that the prison officials must have been deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's need for reasonable protective measures. 30 Hence, we uphold the trial court in its refusal to submit the constitutional count to the jury.