Opinion ID: 2218955
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the issue of contributory negligence constitute a question of fact for the jury?

Text: Jensen strongly argues that the issue of contributory negligence should not have been submitted to the jury for determination. We disagree. Jensen argues that trial court abused its discretion in not granting his motion for a new trial, and, therefore, the judgment entered against him was improper. We agree that a new trial should be granted as set forth in our later discourse on different issues. This objection is based on the assertion that decedent's negligence was more than slight, as a matter of law, in comparison with Jensen's negligence. In considering the issue of whether decedent was more than slightly contributorily negligent as a matter of law, thereby barring any recovery, we must examine our statute referring to comparative negligence. SDCL 20-9-2 provides: In all actions brought to recover damages for injuries to a person or to his property caused by the negligence of another, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery when the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was slight in comparison with the negligence of the defendant, but in such case, the damages shall be reduced in proportion to the amount of plaintiff's contributory negligence. In considering the application of this statute to contributory negligence cases, we have said that, [t]he comparison is made with the negligence of the defendant, rather than with the ordinarily prudent person... Lovell v. Oahe Elec. Co-op, 382 N.W.2d 396, 399 (S.D.1986). However, this Court must also consider, the norm of conduct of an ordinary, reasonably prudent person ... in determining the extent to which each party fell below that standard, and thus, was found negligent or contributorily negligent. Mitchell v. Ankney, 396 N.W.2d 312, 313 (S.D.1986); Lovell, 382 N.W.2d at 399. The term slight in SDCL 20-9-2 has been defined to mean small in quantum in comparison with the negligence of the defendant. Crabb v. Wade, 84 S.D. 93, 167 N.W.2d 546, 549 (1969); Estate of Largent v. United States, 910 F.2d 497, 499 (8th Cir.1990). It is a question of fact which varies with the facts and circumstances of each case whether a plaintiff's negligence is slight compared to that of the defendant. Urban v. Wait's Supermarket, Inc., 294 N.W.2d 793, 796 (S.D.1980); Estate of Largent, 910 F.2d at 499. A contributorily negligent plaintiff may not, however, recover anything in South Dakota if the plaintiff's negligence is more than slight in comparison with the negligence of the defendant. SDCL 20-9-2. Here, we cannot say that, as a matter of law, the decedent's conduct constituted negligence which was more than slight. Rather, we characterize this as a classic factual dispute which must be determined by the triers of fact, the jury. We refer to a Supreme Court case in Pennsylvania. See, Gillespie v. Bentz, 401 Pa. 588, 166 A.2d 25 (1960). The Pennsylvania case also involved impairment of vision by the sun. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to hold that the driver was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. In its rationale, the Pennsylvania court reflected that the driver was not required by any rule of law to anticipate that a vehicle would be blocking the highway. Was the combine blocking the highway? Was it blocking the highway so that the He Crow vehicle could not pass through the bridge? Could the He Crow vehicle have avoided the combine? These are questions which a jury should decide. In Gillespie, the court dismissed the idea that the vehicle should have made an instantaneous stop to avoid a collision as it might precipitate another peril. Under South Dakota law, a driver may assume that other drivers will exercise ordinary care on the highways. Burmeister v. Youngstrom, 81 S.D. 578, 139 N.W.2d 226 (1965). Pamela He Crow, deceased, it can be argued, had the right to believe that Jensen would exercise ordinary care and, thus, not block both sides of the traveled portion of the road. We note that the driver of the combine testified that he did not travel faster through the bridge because he was afraid he might damage the combine. It might well be argued that it would have been better judgment to hurriedly cross the bridge to avoid a longer exposure to danger. An accident reconstruction expert for the Estate testified that the combine was oversized and was taking up the entire roadway and that the driver of the combine did not stop or get off the road or make any effort to stop the combine. Further, this expert testified that the combine driver could easily have moved over to the right, by lifting the cutter bar on the header of the combine and then putting it out over the top of the bridge rail. Thus, the expert testified that both combine and automobile could have fit on the bridge if only the combine operator had made this adjustment. Another fact to be considered is that there were radios in the combine and in a truck driven by one of the other employees of Jensen. These employees did not use the radios which could have possibly obviated this tragic accident because the radios could have been employed to advise the combine driver when it would be safe to cross the bridge. Appellant/Jensen owned the combine in question. On the date of the accident, Jensen's employees were harvesting a field for Schwarting, a farmer. Kaplan, Jensen's employee, was moving the combine from Schwarting's west field to his east field. No instructions or supervision on transporting the combine was given to employees on the manner or the route of moving the combine from the west to the east field. These apparent facts, coupled with the non-use of radios, plus the slow movement over the bridge and the non-removal of a header on the combine, establish that these are factual issues which a jury should consider. Therefore, we cannot say that the He Crow Estate may not recover anything because Pamela He Crow's negligence is more than slight, as a matter of law, in comparison with negligence of Jensen. SDCL 20-9-2. We are not unmindful that decedent was quite familiar with this stretch of highway, having traveled it frequently. This stretch of highway was between decedent's house and her mother's house. The decedent had driven this same road two hours before that same day. Testimony was admitted that the sun's position and concomitant effect on vision was generally known among frequent travelers over this stretch of road. Jensen advocates that our decision in Dartt v. Berghorst, 484 N.W.2d 891 (S.D.1992), and Howard v. Sanborn, 483 N.W.2d 796 (S.D.1992), upholds his theory that He Crow was negligent in driving and that her negligence therefore bars recovery as a matter of law. We have reviewed both of these cases and hold that the facts are distinguishable from the present factual scenario. Howard involved headlights on a busy highway in the evening time, facts which are far different than this rural setting. In Berghorst, inter alia, Berghorst admitted during the trial that he shouldn't have hit the plow. I shouldn't have been in that kind of condition. I should have stayed behind him. Berghorst had been advised by C.B. radio that two snowplows were on the highway and it was difficult to see because snow was being kicked up by the plow. We simply hold that these two cases are inapposite to the case before us. If under all of the evidence, both parties could be found to be negligent, the comparative negligence of the parties is a question of fact which is within the province of the jury. Thomas v. St. Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 283 N.W.2d 254 (S.D.1979). Trial court reasonably reached a legal conclusion, under the circumstances of this case, to submit this case for a jury's deliberation. No abuse of discretion is found on this issue. Pejsa at 245.