Opinion ID: 1690207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether sheriff gant is entitled to qualified immunity to plaintiff's claims.

Text: ¶ 17. Under this issue, Sheriff Gant contradicts a portion of his previous argument. In asserting that he cannot be subject to liability for strictly obeying the order of the justice court, Gant argued, in effect, that his responsibilities in adhering to commitment orders are ministerial. In fact, he referred this Court to the following statement at 60 Am.Jur.2d, Penal and Correctional Institution s § 22, at 1140-41 (1987): The duty of an officer in executing the mandate of a judicial order in the nature of a commitment is purely ministerial and his power with respect thereto is limited and restricted to compliance with its terms.... The custodian of a prison on receiving a commitment can do only what the commitment orders him to do, that is, receive and safely keep the prisoner, so that the latter may then be discharged in due course of law. (footnotes omitted). He also pointed to United States v. Hoffman, 13 F.2d 269 (N.D.Ill.1925), aff'd, 13 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1926). There the court stated, In cases where a person is committed to prison pursuant to his conviction of a prison offense, the jailer has no discretion (except in cases of emergency) but to obey the warrant of commitment. Id. at 271. ¶ 18. Now, in developing his argument for qualified immunity, Gant asserts that his duties regarding Thompson's incarceration were discretionary and that he is, thus, entitled to qualified immunity. Indeed, the doctrine of qualified immunity has generally been perceived to shield from liability public officials acting in good faith in the performance of lawful duties requiring personal deliberation, decision, and judgment. Davis v. Little, 362 So.2d 642, 643 (Miss.1978). Ignoring for the moment Gant's apparent contradiction, we must simply determine whether Gant's acts in regard to the incarceration and release of Thompson were discretionary or ministerial. ¶ 19. McQueen v. Williams, 587 So.2d 918 (Miss.1991), is a companion case to Robinson, which is discussed above. In McQueen, the family of another individual murdered by the same escaped inmates in Robinson brought a wrongful death action against the sheriff for his negligence in securing the inmates. Id. Directing this Court to various Mississippi statutes which impose upon a sheriff the duty to keep prisoners confined, the plaintiffs argued that the sheriff had violated a ministerial duty. Id. at 922. We rejected the plaintiffs' argument and found that, though there is a duty to keep prisoners confined, there is discretion, deliberation, and judgment involved in the manner in which such a duty is performed. Id. We held that, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' ability to demonstrate a duty owed by the sheriff to the public, because the duty regarding the incarceration of prisoners was one involving discretion, the sheriff was shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Id. ¶ 20. The facts of the case at bar more strongly compel a finding of qualified immunity than those in McQueen. Gant was specifically ordered by the justice court to let [Thompson] go to work every day. If qualified immunity shielded the sheriff in McQueen, who had unequivocal orders to confine two convicted murderers, then the protection of that doctrine should be available to Gant, who was adhering to the justice court's specific orders to release the inmate. Thus, despite Gant's previous contradictory indication that Thompson's confinement was a ministerial duty, we find that Gant was performing a discretionary act in allowing Thompson's release and is, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity.