Opinion ID: 2594572
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denying Motions to Discharge the Jury Panel and Certain Prospective Jurors for Cause or Continue the Trial Because of News Accounts

Text: Defendant's brother Ronaldo Ayala was tried shortly before defendant for crimes arising from the same events. In the aftermath of news coverage of the death sentence imposed on Ronaldo Ayala, defendant moved either to dismiss the jury panel or to continue the trial until the coverage's effects had lessened. He also moved to excuse certain prospective jurors for cause, namely their exposure to the coverage. The trial court denied his motions, and he claims error as a result. The People contend that defendant failed to preserve his claim for review, to the extent his motion sought discharge of the jury panel, because the trial court denied the motion as premature without prejudice, pending voir dire, and he failed to renew it afterward. The question is close, but we disagree. The People are correct that the court denied the motion to discharge the panel as premature. It appears, however, that the court may have reiterated its prior denial of the motion to discharge the panel at the point at which defendant moved to be equipped with additional peremptory challengesin other words, when jury selection was well underway. At least implicitly, the court finally denied the motion. We will proceed to decide the matter on the merits. Doing so, we observe that there was no need to discharge the jury panel unless, after the jury was selected, jurors were sworn who, because of their knowledge of the trial or sentence, or both, of Ronaldo Ayala, could not be fair in defendant's case. (See People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 228-229, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643.) Near the end of jury selection, the trial court stated that it had excused for cause any juror[s] that showed a slight leaning that [knowledge of Ronaldo Ayala's case] might well impact their ability to be fair to [defendant].... The parties agree that defendant challenged 36 panelists for cause on the basis of their knowledge of the Ronaldo Ayala case, and that of those, 13 were excused, leaving 23. Defendant acknowledges that those 23 prospective jurors agreed that their knowledge of the Ronaldo Ayala case would not affect their ability to try his fairly. He claims, however, that the opposite must be true because Ronaldo Ayala's death sentence was reported on television and in the newspapers, and the prospective jurors were exposed to the information. That, however, is not enough. Defendant's claim is purely speculative. He acknowledges that the panelists testified that they would not be improperly affected by their knowledge of the sentence in Ronaldo Ayala's case. He produces no evidence to support his claim that the jury panel was irremediably tainted by exposure to Ronaldo Ayala's case and should have been excused. For the same reason, his argument that his motion to continue the case should have been granted is without merit. [4] Defendant next contends that eight prospective jurors should have been removed for cause because they could not be fair and impartial. Either party may challenge an individual juror for `an actual bias.' [Citation.] `Actual bias' in this context is defined as `the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to any of the parties, which will prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.' [Citations.] A sitting juror's actual bias that would have supported a challenge for cause also renders the juror unable to perform his or her duties and thus subject to discharge. [Citation.] `Grounds for ... discharge of a juror may be established by his statements or conduct, including events which occur during jury deliberations and are reported by fellow panelists.' [Citation.] The term `actual bias' may include a state of mind resulting from a juror's actually being influenced by extraneous information about a party. ( People v. Nesler (1997) 16 Cal.4th 561, 581, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 454, 941 P.2d 87 (lead opn.).) `On review, if the juror's statements are equivocal or conflicting, the trial court's determination of the juror's state of mind is binding. If there is no inconsistency, we will uphold the court's ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.]' [Citation.] A juror's bias need not `be proven with unmistakable clarity. [Citations.] Rather, it is sufficient that the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law in the case before the juror.' ( People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1035, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 988 P.2d 531.) We turn to the specific prospective jurors to whom defendant refers. Charles G. had read a newspaper article about the killings in 1985 when they occurred, and was vaguely aware that another man, whose name he could not recall, had recently been sentenced to death as a result. He denied that he would be influenced by Ronaldo Ayala's sentence; rather, it was possible that two people might be accused and only one of them is guilty. Acknowledging that defendant might prefer jurors who were absolutely ... ignorant of the situation, he testified that he could be fair and impartial. I'd only judge by the trial that I'm on. The trial court ruled that Charles G. could be impartial despite his awareness of Ronaldo Ayala's case. The record supports its ruling. There was no error in denying the challenge for cause. Lois B. testified on voir dire that she worked at home and would keep the television on in the background. By that means she might have heard something about the case, but she did not pay attention to it. She thought that defendant's brother might have been convicted of crimes, but was not sure. She stated in essence that this fleeting exposure would not affect her ability to be impartial. Defense counsel challenged Lois B. as an afterthought, and only because [i]t's my intention to challenge any juror who has knowledge of Ronaldo Ayala's case. Her challenge was so perfunctory that the trial court did not explicitly rule on it. But it told the prospective juror to await further instructions, and so implicitly denied it. The record supports its implicit ruling. There was no error in denying the challenge for cause. Charles C. testified on voir dire that he had what may be characterized as an extremely vague recollection that there might have been another trial arising from the killings and that someone may have been convicted. He testified that my knowledge is so hazy that I'm not going to rely on it. The trial court ruled that Charles C.'s knowledge of the case was trifling and that he could be impartial. The record supports its ruling. There was no error in denying the challenge for cause. Catherine S. had only the faintest memory of Ronaldo Ayala's case. She recalled reading or hearing that another criminal defendant with the same last name had been convicted of something, but knew nothing more and knew nothing about the Ronaldo Ayala proceedings or outcome. The trial court denied without comment defendant's challenge for cause, which was based as much on counsel's suspicion that I'm not sure she's been entirely candid as on what she said on voir dire. On this record, we see no evidence that Catherine S.'s vague awareness of Ronaldo Ayala's trial affected her impartiality. The court's ruling was proper. Dwight S. testified that he experienced a bit of exposure to the legal consequences of the murders when he saw a newspaper headline about Ronaldo Ayala's sentence. He did not read the accompanying article. After completing his questionnaire, he realized that defendant might be Ronaldo Ayala's brother. He testified that he assumed the evidence in the two cases must be different, or the two would have been tried jointly, and that Ronaldo Ayala's sentence would not affect his ability to be impartial. The trial court denied defendant's challenge for cause, commenting that Dwight S. would make his decision based upon the evidence as it comes in this case. The record supports the trial court's observation. There was no error in denying the challenge for cause. Robert K.'s exposure to publicity was the same as Dwight S.'s. But as in Dwight S.'s case, Robert K.'s answers on voir dire made clear that he would not prejudge the case against defendant. In the abstract, he opined, one brother can intimidate another brother to come along with him ... or they both can be willing participants. (Indeed, portraying defendant as the deferential follower of Ronaldo Ayala was part of the defense strategy at the penalty phase.) He insisted that he could be impartial. The trial court denied defendant's challenge for cause, and the record supports its decision. There was no error in so ruling. Ingeburg C. had read a newspaper article reporting Ronaldo Ayala's sentence and mentioning that jury selection in defendant's case was pending. She testified that she only vaguely recalled its content and that it doesn't affect me; I have an open mind, and you have to prove ... that he's guilty. The trial court denied defendant's challenge for cause. Reviewing the record, we see no evidence that Ingeburg C.'s knowledge of Ronaldo Ayala's sentence affected her impartiality. The record is, rather, entirely to the contrary. The ruling was proper. The other prospective juror to whom defendant refers, Bette C, was not, in fact, the object of a challenge for cause. In sum, the court committed no error under state law in respect of any of the contentions defendant presents regarding the aspects of jury selection discussed in this section. Because defendant's constitutional claims are predicated on a violation of state law, they must be rejected. In addition, defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied a motion to give him additional peremptory challenges. As a result, he claims, three jurors, unable to be impartial because they knew about Ronaldo Ayala's conviction or sentence, or both, were seated. He refers to Jurors Lois B., Charles C, and Charles G. But as we have explained, there was no evidence of bias among them. Because the factual predicate of his claim is inaccurate, it cannot be sustained on review.