Opinion ID: 480752
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: enforcement of the r & s as a consent decree

Text: 29 The remaining issue is whether the district court may enforce the consent decree beyond the guarantees contained in the federal Constitution and laws simply because it is a consent decree. 30 Appellees argue, as best we can decipher, that because the Order of June 5, 1985, is remedial in nature and for the purpose of enforcing a consent decree, the origin of the protected right is not at issue. The order may be enforced as long as it is not inconsistent with federal constitutional or statutory law. Appellees would draw support from Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986) for the proposition that a federal court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court could have awarded after a trial. Id. at ----, 106 S.Ct. at 3077. This argument founders on several grounds. 31 First, appellees interpret Firefighters v. City of Cleveland far too broadly. For one thing, that case emphasizes that a consent decree must spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. If the court has no jurisdiction, as a result of the application of the Eleventh Amendment through Pennhurst II, Firefighters v. City of Cleveland does not apply. Additionally, Cleveland addressed the entry of a consent decree and held that the parties' agreement could result in a decree whose terms would exceed the court's remedial authority under a governing statute. It does not enlarge the court's latitude to issue its own, different order enforcing or modifying the decree, for in that case we presume the court must fall back on its inherent jurisdiction. The Court in Cleveland cited Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 104 S.Ct. 2576, 81 L.Ed.2d 483 (1984) with approval of the proposition that in modifying a consent decree, the court may not act inconsistently with the underlying statute. Cleveland, --- U.S. at ----, 106 S.Ct. at 3078-79. 32 Second, appellees' argument cannot be reconciled with the rejection in Pennhurst II of pendent jurisdiction, a judge-made doctrine, to validate the exercise of authority over state law claims. The Court stated that neither pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment. Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 121, 104 S.Ct. at 919 (emphasis added). Pennhurst II thus would prevent a federal court from exercising remedial authority in any form if the award of such relief against a nonconsenting state is based on a state law claim. 33 Third, the right/remedy distinction urged by appellees inevitably collides with the principles of federalism and comity which animate the Eleventh Amendment and Pennhurst II. The restriction upon the federal courts' jurisdiction over suits against a nonconsenting state government implements our system of dual sovereignty. [I]t is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law. Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 106, 104 S.Ct. at 911. Therefore, the only legitimate basis for federal court intervention, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment is the vindication of federal rights. If a federal court remedy unfounded in federal law intrudes into the governance of matters otherwise presided over by the states, no federal right has been vindicated. The right and remedy are not severable--in terms of the principle behind the Eleventh Amendment, they go hand in hand. 11 34 In this case, as has been demonstrated, paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Resolution and Settlement closely track the Texas statute defining standards of habilitation for the state's mentally retarded citizens. 12 No comparable federal right to a least restrictive alternative environment exists. When the court chose to enforce the decree by requiring furlough of patients to community centers, however, this state-law-right, according to appellees' theory, suddenly mutated into a federal remedy which appellees deem to be inviolable. 13 Not only does the right-remedy distinction clash with Pennhurst II, but on a more fundamental level, it gives consent decrees a life of their own virtually outside the law. If, as appellees argue, a federal court may take almost any action against a state to enforce a consent decree so long as it is consistent with the spirit of the applicable constitutional law and the decree itself, there is no limitation on the scope of the court's power. Lack of restraint on an organ of government (even the judiciary) is the antithesis of law. 35 Appellees contend that in reality the Eleventh Amendment defense asserted by the State is a red herring, because the State (a) failed to raise it at the hearing preceding the June 5 Order, (b) consented to the decree from which the June 5 Order springs, and (c) alternatively, waived the Eleventh Amendment defense by virtue of legislative appropriations designed to comply with the Resolution and Settlement. We reject these contentions. 36 Because the Eleventh Amendment deprives a federal court of jurisdiction over a controversy in which a state is sued on a non-consenting state law claim, and the issue may be raised even for the first time on appeal. Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 99 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. at 907 n. 8; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945). The Eleventh Amendment defense was, in any event, not obscured from the district court, because its order approving the Resolution and Settlement noted that the State had raised that defense. (Record at 216 (Vol. I)). 37 It is further incorrect to suggest that the State in effect consented to suit and thus waived the Eleventh Amendment defense. Waiver of a state's sovereign immunity, like waiver of any constitutional right, is strictly construed in favor of the holder of the right. Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 99, 104 S.Ct. at 907; see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 673, 94 S.Ct. at 1360-61. Consent to suit against the State in federal court must be unequivocally expressed. Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 99, 104 S.Ct. at 907. The State's original consent to the settlement with appellees must be viewed in the context of then-existing law. In 1983, pre-Pennhurst II, it was assumed that a federal court had jurisdiction over pendent state law-based claims. Texas state officials could not knowingly and intentionally waive Eleventh Amendment protection because at the time of the settlement they did not know they possessed that defense. 14 38 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that a consent decree must be modified to adjust to changes in governing law. System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 81 S.Ct. 368, 5 L.Ed.2d 349 (1961). Like the Second Circuit, addressing a proposed modification of a consent decree following the Supreme Court decision in Youngberg v. Romeo, [w]e can see no reason for a different view when the requirement is constitutional and a subsequent decision of the Court has made clear that the court entering the decree interpreted the requirement too broadly. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 971 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915, 104 S.Ct. 277, 78 L.Ed.2d 257 (1983). The implications of Pennhurst II on the consent decree itself therefore had to be considered by the district court and could not be waived by the State. By the same token, legislative appropriations to comply with a consent decree cannot be seen as a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment defense. That the State felt it must comply with a court order, until that order should be modified or superseded, hardly binds its hands to take advantage of a favorable change in the law regarding that order. The consent is to be read as directed toward events as they then were. It was not an abandonment of the right to exact revision in the future, if revision should become necessary in adaptation in events to be. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114, 52 S.Ct. 460, 462, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932). 39 Appellees' argument that the State consented to suit in federal court on the matter of community placements, and thus impliedly consented to the June 5 Order, rests, in part, on an assumption that the Resolution and Settlement requires such placements. The district court likewise found that the general guarantee in the R & S that class members must be furnished the least restrictive alternative living conditions equated with community-based placement. Interpreting the Resolution and Settlement within its four corners, United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682, 91 S.Ct. 1752, 1757, 29 L.Ed.2d 256 (1971), as we must, we find no such requirement. On its face, the R & S sets no goals or timetables for placement of the retarded into community facilities. Its goal for individual care is to provide habilitation in a setting least restrictive of individual liberty and to provide each member of the class the least restrictive alternative living conditions possible.... Nothing in these two key paragraphs compels the State to set up community facilities. 15 Indeed, the State's only obligation is to use best efforts to overcome all obstacles and barriers to the creation of facilities and programs for habilitation outside the institution.... Record at 180 (Vol. I) (R & S, p 9). The R & S permits [a] variety of residences [to] be used or adapted for each plaintiff class member regardless of degree of disability, Record at 184 (Vol. I) (R & S, p 17), and it forbids the relocation of a class member from an institution to a non-institutional residential program unless such program will offer ... a better opportunity for personal development and a more suitable living environment. Record at 184 (Vol. I) (R & S, p 19). It prohibits services received by any person, whether or not a member of the plaintiff class, to be reduced by the Resolution and Settlement. Record at 187 (Vol. I) (R & S, p 30). Finally, it recognizes that the Texas legislature is not bound by the Resolution and Settlement to appropriate funds. Record at 187 (Vol. I) (R & S, p 31). It should be noted that defendant's obligations under the R & S are reflected in no fewer than 18 paragraphs of the R & S; paragraphs 7 and 8 constitute only a small part of the duties imposed on the State. 40 Ignoring the best efforts provision, the district court focused on paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Resolution and Settlement. It failed to consider other constraints imposed by the Resolution and Settlement on the State's provision of care, which recognized the need for realistic trade-offs between the goals declared in paragraphs 7 and 8 and the other quality standards mandated by the Settlement. To the district court, paragraphs 7 and 8 erroneously became an independently enforceable guarantee to the class rather than one among a constellation of reforms toward which the state was required to progress. Review of the Resolution and Settlement as a whole, however, contradicts the district court's conclusion that it mandates community placement. 41 Lest there be any doubt that the Resolution and Settlement did not specifically require community placements, the district court itself referred to the limited nature of such relief in its July 1983 Order approving the Resolution and Settlement. The district court commented that, only paragraphs 9, 17, and 19 specifically refer to community residential facilities. Record at 205 (Vol. I). It observed that PART's concerns about wholesale parolling of the mentally retarded into inadequate local facilities should be mollified by the phrase to the greatest extent possible in the definition of habilitation. Record at 223 (Vol. I). 16 The court also noted the objection of one group to the R & S on the ground that it failed to provide a timetable for complete de-institutionalization. Record at 220 (Vol. I). None of these contemporaneous observations limiting the scope of the Resolution and Settlement can be reconciled with the district court's subsequent embrace of the theory that it requires expedited community placement efforts. To the extent that the State consented in the R & S to support habilitation in the least restrictive setting, our construction of the R & S leads us to conclude that it did so only because the R & S tracked the requirements of state law and because such a setting must be provided only if this could be done consistent with other standards of care mandated by the Resolution and Settlement. The State did not consent to a federal court's usurpation of the decision when and how to effect community placements. 42 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court was without jurisdiction to enforce the R & S or remedy any violation thereof by ordering the State to make community placements of class members. Because the court could not award this relief, its concomitant wholesale revision of state procedures governing parents' participation in community placement decisions is unnecessary and therefore likewise unenforceable. Finally, given our disposition of the Order of June 5, 1985, we find it unnecessary to consider revising or modifying that Order to prevent enforcement of any provisions grounded in state law or to prevent entry of any order for community placements. 43 The judgment of the district court is VACATED and the case REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.