Opinion ID: 2308960
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Merits of the BZA's Ruling

Text: The BZA is charged with interpreting the zoning regulations promulgated by the District of Columbia Zoning Commission. See Page Associates v. District of Columbia, 463 A.2d 649, 655 (D.C.1983); Keefe Co. v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 409 A.2d 624, 625 (D.C.1979). This court must defer to the BZA's interpretation of those regulations, related to matters within its expertise, unless that interpretation is plainly wrong or inconsistent with the regulations or with the statute under which the BZA acts. Blagden Alley Ass'n v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission, 590 A.2d 139, 142 n. 6 (D.C.1991); [17] see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801-02, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945); Columbia Realty Venture v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission, 590 A.2d 1043, 1046 (D.C.1991). With this standard in mind, we examine the BZA's ruling. The BZA order interpreted section 801 of the zoning regulations, which lists uses permitted as of right in C-M districts, as encompassing the use proposed by the applicant. The BZA found that the activities to be conducted on the property consisted solely of collect[ing], separat[ing], bal[ing] and ship[ping] five different types of material that will subsequently be recycled at a facility located away from the site. It found further that the procedures described in the [applicant's] testimony, and shown in the video tape, demonstrate that CWI will subject the materials collected to a particular method of handling (collecting, separating and baling) to effect a particular result (having marketable units to sell to recycling facilities). It concluded that the term `processing' appears to apply to the activities that will take place at the site. The applicable regulations do not expressly exclude or include the applicant's proposed use of the property as an activity which may occur as a matter of right. Section 801.7(j) of the regulations permits operation of any... processing ... establishment as a matter of right in a C-M district, but the term processing is nowhere defined in the regulations. In this situation, another regulation directs the BZA to refer to the dictionary for the applicable definition. 11 DCMR § 199.2(g), published in Title 11 Errata List, 39 D.C.Reg. 4204 (1992); [18] see Wallick, supra note 17, 486 A.2d at 1185 (discussing similarly worded predecessor to section 199.2(g)). [19] Adopting the dictionary definition of the verb process, quoted in note 7, supra, the BZA concluded that the applicant's proposed activity was processing as that term is used in section 801.7(j). We see nothing unreasonable in the BZA's reading of section 801.7(j), or in its conclusion that the proposed use of the property would constitute processing under that section and would therefore be permitted as a matter of right. The BZA's reference to the dictionary is mandated by the regulations, and its analysis is not irrational or otherwise erroneous. Countless cases tell us that we must uphold the BZA's ruling if there is a rational basis for it. E.g., Citizens Coalition v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 619 A.2d 940, 947 (D.C.1993). Having determined that there is, we find no grounds for disturbing the BZA's conclusion in this case that a variance is not required.