Opinion ID: 209457
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Our jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal such as that brought by P & G in this case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) and (c)(1). Taken together, these subsections provide that this court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from interlocutory orders granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), in any case over which this court would have jurisdiction of an appeal under § 1295. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1). The Supreme Court has interpreted § 1292(a)(1) as providing a limited exception to the final judgment rule that is only available when a litigant can show that an interlocutory order of the district court might have a `serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,' and that the order can be `effectually challenged' only by immediate appeal. Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84, 101 S.Ct. 993, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (quoting Balt. Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181, 75 S.Ct. 249, 99 L.Ed. 233 (1955)); see also Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 287-88, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988) (Section 1292(a)(1) will, of course, continue to provide appellate jurisdiction over orders that grant or deny injunctions and orders that have the practical effect of granting or denying injunctions and have serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence. (internal quotation marks omitted)). In Woodard, this court stated that [a]n order which is deemed to deny a preliminary injunction readily satisfies the Carson requirements. 818 F.2d at 851; see also id. at 853. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over P & G's appeal if the trial court's stay order had the practical effect of denying P & G's motion for a preliminary injunction. Under this standard, we conclude that jurisdiction is proper. The trial court explicitly refused to consider the merits of P & G's motion for a preliminary injunction. Indeed, the judge concluded it was moot. Even if this statement is merely a refusal to consider the merits of P & G's motion until after the stay is lifted, such a decision cannot effectually be reviewed after the trial. Woodard, 818 F.2d at 851 (By that time the question of relief or of maintaining the status quo during trial will have become moot.). Accordingly, we conclude that the stay order, as implemented in this case, can be deemed to have denied P & G's motion for a preliminary injunction, meets the Carson requirements, and is therefore reviewable under § 1292(a)(1) and (c)(1). Because we have jurisdiction to review the effective denial of P & G's motion for a preliminary injunction, we also have jurisdiction over the trial court's decision to stay this case pending reexamination proceedings before the PTO. When this court reviews a properly appealable interlocutory order, other interlocutory orders, which ordinarily would be nonappealable standing alone, may be reviewed. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 804 F.2d 129, 134 (Fed. Cir.1986). Whether an appellate court exercises this `doctrine of pendent jurisdiction at the appellate level' is a matter of discretion. Id. [T]he major factor in determining whether to exercise this jurisdiction is the extent that review of the appealable order will involve consideration of factors relevant to the otherwise nonappealable order. Id. In this case, our consideration of the denial of P & G's preliminary injunction motion necessarily implicates the district court's imposition of the stay. As the Ninth Circuit reasoned in Privitera v. California Board of Medical Quality Assurance, Under the unique circumstances of this case, we conclude that the portion of the order staying the action is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). To hold otherwise would mean that the denial of the preliminary injunction would be effectively unappealable because a reversal on that issue would have no effect. Our mandate would return to a black hole. A stay should not insulate the denial of a request for preliminary injunction from appellate review in this way. For this reason, the denial of the preliminary injunction and the stay must be considered together. 926 F.2d 890, 892-93 (9th Cir.1991); cf. Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal Lite, Inc., 159 F.3d 1337, 1339 (Fed.Cir.1998) (citing Privitera 's rule that when a stay order accompanies a denial of injunctive relief, the entire order is subject to appellate review, and noting the role of Ninth Circuit opinions in providing useful guidance for this court's jurisdictional inquiries). [1] Accordingly, we exercise our discretion to consider the stay in conjunction with the effective denial of the preliminary injunction.