Opinion ID: 2629972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence Concerning Defendants Financial Status

Text: Defendant contends admission of evidence concerning his depleted bank balance in May 1993 and his limited income in the weeks prior to the commission of the crime constituted a violation of his right to due process of law. He refers to evidence that three of his checks had been returned to his bank for insufficient funds during the month of May and that two checks were returned for insufficient funds in June 1993. Evidence was admitted that defendant's bank account contained $1.20 on May 21, 1993 and that defendant deposited $100 on May 28 and $300 on June 3, 1993. Defendant earned approximately $1,500 in May 1993. Cable service to defendant's home was discontinued on April 16, 1993 for nonpayment of the bill, and was restored on June 4, 1993. Referring to this evidence, the prosecutor stressed at closing argument: It's not because [defendant] is destitute and that he was desperate for money. That is not the reason the evidence of his finances [was] put on. That was to show he didn't have money and then did. . . . We observe first that the claim is forfeited because, as defendant concedes, at trial defense counsel failed to object on any basis to the admission of this evidence. ( People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1076, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335.) In any event, the claim lacks merit. [13] Ordinarily it would be unfair to persons in difficult financial circumstances to permit general evidence of their poverty to be introduced for the purpose of establishing a motive for theft or robbery. The risk of causing suspicion of indigent persons generally outweighs the probative value of such evidence. ( People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1076, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335 [evidence of a defendant's poverty generally may not be admitted to prove a motive to commit a robbery or theft; reliance on such evidence is deemed unfair to the defendant, and its probative value is outweighed by the risk of prejudice]; see also People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 939, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212.) Relying on federal court authority, a recent Court of Appeal decision explains that although evidence of poverty to establish motive for theft seems logically relevant, `[t]he trouble is that it would prove too much against too many.' [Citation.] As the court explained in United States v. Mitchell (9th Cir.1999) 172 F.3d 1104, `Lack of money gives a person an interest in having more. But so does desire for money, without poverty. A rich man's greed is as much a motive to steal as a poor man's poverty. Proof of either, without more, is likely to amount to a great deal of unfair prejudice with little probative value.' ( People v. Carrillo (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 94, 102, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 878, italics added.) On the other hand, evidence of the defendant's indebtedness or relative poverty may be admitted without undue prejudice to persons of limited means in order to eliminate other possible explanations for a defendant's sudden wealth after a theft offense. ( People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1024, 254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1; see also People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1076, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335; United States v. Weller (10th Cir.2001) 238 F.3d 1215, 1221 [trial court properly admitted evidence of the defendant's possession of large sums of money after a robbery, when prior to the crime she had an empty bank account, `maxed out' credit cards, and no other obvious source from which to obtain cash].) A recent federal court decision supplies a helpful illustration: If a man is notoriously broke and cannot buy a pack of cigarettes Tuesday, that night a laundromat is burglarized, and on Wednesday the man buys a carton of cigarettes and a $40 bottle of scotch, all with quarters, the man's financial circumstances have obvious and significant probative value. ( United States v. Mitchell, supra, 172 F.3d at p. 1108.) Persons at most economic levels have limits to their wealth; sudden possession of greater wealth than usual is relevant circumstantial evidence in a theft-related prosecution, but does not present a risk of unfair prejudice to persons of limited means. Contrary to defendant's claim that admission of the evidence rendered his trial fundamentally unfair, it was within the trial court's discretion to admit evidence of defendant's financial circumstances, in light of the evidence of his sudden wealth and, indeed, his possession of currency in the denominations taken in the charged robbery, immediately following the robbery. The possibility that he came into possession of the money legitimately was rendered more doubtful by the circumstances that his earnings were extremely modest and his bank account was depleted at the time of the crime. Defendant's effort to dress his claim in constitutional garb adds nothing to the merit of his position. He cites Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385, but that case does not suggest that the admission of relevant evidence in a criminal trial led to a denial of due process. ( Id., at pp. 70-71, 112 S.Ct. 475 [permitting admission of evidence of battered child syndrome to be admitted as relevant evidence in a prosecution for murder of a child and observing that, although the due process clause `guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial,' it does not turn the high court into a body responsible for making rules of evidence for the states].) Defendant claims that the admission of this evidence as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief forced [him] to explain that he was not impecunious, a difficult task given that much of [his] income apparently came in under-the-table cash payments for carpentry work and sales of refurbished vehicles, and that [t]o force a person to establish income is the `relative disadvantage' [that has been noted] as the inherent danger of admitting this sort of evidence. Defendant, having failed to object below, did not offer this explanation in the trial court, so we cannot fault that court for failing to identify the potential source of prejudice to which defendant alludes. In any event, the evidence in question was relevant to the prosecution's case and was admissible pursuant to the authority cited above, and its introduction no more forced defendant to respond than any other probative evidence presented by the prosecution. Nor did the evidence unfairly force defendant to respond under circumstances in which a person of greater wealth who suddenly possessed an unusual sum of money would not be forced to respond. We also do not understand why it would have been particularly difficult for defendant to secure evidence from various employers or clients establishing that they had paid him for his work, even under the table. Also unpersuasive is defendant's claim that there was no evidence of the suddenness with which he came into possession of $1,500 in cash, and that the court merely assumed he acquired the money suddenly. Prior to admission of the evidence of which defendant complains, defendant's girlfriend testified that she was concerned about his purchase of an automobile on the date of the crime because she and defendant were then experiencing financial difficulties. It was within the court's discretion to conclude the evidence did not constitute mere general evidence of poverty going to the issue of motive, but instead constituted admissible circumstantial evidence that defendant was the person who committed the crime.