Opinion ID: 1735417
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Contents of the Buckets and Testimony.

Text: ś 95. Walker argues that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence, during the testimony of the crime lab expert, Sharon Jones, [15] the evidence buckets and their contents, which were recovered at the scene of the crime. Walker claims that the proper foundation was not laid and that there were no witnesses that testified to the chain of custody of the buckets. Walker claims that the testimony of Jones, who was a witness allegedly not disclosed until the eve of trial. This Court is unable to find any evidence in the record supporting Walker's claim that Jones was not disclosed as a witness until the eve of trial and cannot find any objection by Walker in the record regarding allowing Jones to testify at trial. This Court has stated that it must decide each case by the facts in the record, not assertions in the brief, however sincere counsel may be in those assertions. Facts asserted to exist must and ought to be definitely proved and placed before us by a record, certified by law; otherwise, we cannot know them. Moawad v. State, 531 So.2d 632, 635 (Miss.1988) (quoting Mason v. State, 440 So.2d 318, 319 (Miss.1983)). In the absence of anything in the record appearing to the contrary, this Court presumes that the trial court acted properly. Id. at 635 (collecting authorities). Therefore, this Court will not rely on assertions in Walker's brief unsupported by the certified record on appeal. Additionally, Walker claims that to allow Jones to testify regarding another's finding violates due process and the principles of fairness. ś 96. In regard to the chain of custody issue, the State argues that Walker failed to object at trial or at sentencing. Failure to raise an issue at trial bars consideration on an appellate level. See Burns v. State, 729 So.2d 203, 219 (Miss.1998) (citations omitted) (where this Court held that when a party makes an objection on specific grounds, it is considered a waiver regarding all other grounds); Smith, 729 So.2d at 1201 (A trial judge will not be found in error on a matter not presented to him for decision.); Williams, 684 So.2d at 1203 (contemporaneous objection rule is applicable in death penalty cases); Foster, 639 So.2d at 1270 (If no contemporaneous objection is made, the error, if any, is waived. This rule's applicability is not diminished in a capital case.). The record does not reveal an objection by Walker in regard to a chain of custody violation. Consequently, Walker is procedurally barred from raising this issue for the first time on appeal. ś 97. Alternatively, and without waiving any procedural bar for failing to object, this issue is without merit. The evidence buckets were two buckets found at the scene of the crime, in the utility room where the fire began, and these buckets were part of the physical evidence taken from the scene of the crime. Jones, during examination, confirmed that the buckets contained gasoline. ś 98. The admissibility of the buckets themselves, and their contents, is not an issue. Walker agreed to the admitting into evidence of the buckets and their contents during the testimony of Captain Walker, the State's fire expert witness, which was prior to the testimony of Jones. Thus, any claim that the items themselves were improperly introduced is waived. The only issue for consideration here is the propriety of the crime lab expert's testimony regarding this evidence. Although Walker initially objected to the introduction of the buckets, noting that there might not be a witness from the Mississippi Crime Lab to testify as to the results, the State argued that the buckets should be admitted during Captain Walker's testimony so that Captain Walker could confirm the chain of custodyâ the State wanted the buckets admitted into evidence so that it could tie up a chain of custody with this witness. ś 99. The trial court, with the understanding that Walker had reserved his right to object to any expert testimony regarding the contents of the buckets, then asked Walker if he had any objection to receiving both the buckets and their contents into evidence. Walker thereafter stated, If that's all with this witness, I have no objection. Following the admission of the buckets into evidence, Captain Walker testified as to the chain of custody. Captain Walker testified that he personally took the buckets from the laundry room, and then took them to the Mississippi State Crime Laboratory in Jackson. According to Captain Walker's testimony, Once the crime lab analyzed them, they were returned back to me, and they have been under my custody, under lock and key, and I brought them in here this morning. Furthermore, Captain Walker testified that he personally picked them up himself from the crime lab. ś 100. On cross-examination, Captain Walker was asked if he could state the source and origin of the fire without relying on the crime lab results. The following dialogue ensued: BY MR. BRISTOW: Without relying upon the crime results and their testing of Exhibits 42, 43 and 44, are you able to state that the source, the originâ the origin of this fire was that in the utility room? BY CAPTAIN WALKER: What I can do without knowing the results of this is tell you that the fire started in the utility room, and it did not start from any electrical components of that room, and it started somewhere on the area of the floor in front of the dryer where there was no possible source of ignition. BY MR. BRISTOW: And your testimony is that the pour patterns lead you to suspect an incendiary agent or liquid; is that right? BY CAPTAIN WALKER: The pour patterns led me to concentrate on gathering evidence to see if there was an ignitable liquid present. (Emphasis added). ś 101. As previously mentioned, Jones testified subsequent to Captain Walker. Walker was then asked whether he wished to voir dire Jones as to her qualifications to which he responded, No, Your Honor. The defense is satisfied. Thereafter, Jones was qualified as an expert in the field of forensic science with a technical specialty in examination of fire debris for the purposes of determining flammable liquids within by the trial court. ś 102. Jones testified that she had been qualified as an expert over fifty times in the field of forensic science examination and had been qualified as an expert in fire debris analysis. Jones further testified that she was involved in assessing or actually technically reviewing and analytically reviewing the testing that associate Lisa Futrell, who is also employed by the crime lab, did on the buckets. Jones further testified that such peer review is standard operating procedure in the crime lab: BY MS. JONES: All analyses that are performed in the Mississippi Crime Laboratory have to be reviewed technically and analytically, and they are reviewed in a peer review situation. So, with Ms. Futrell being the analyst of record on this particular case, I was the peer reviewer, and I made an independent analysis of theâ of theâ of the chromatograms that she had actually generated from the instrumentation, and they agreed with the same conclusions that she had. (Emphasis added). Thus, it is clear that Jones was testifying as to her own independent conclusions. ś 103. Jones testified that all evidence is received into the laboratory by an evidence technician from a law enforcement agency, and that evidence is assigned to whatever section is requested for an analysis. Jones also testified that the buckets were intact, having been sealed in the evidence container in which it was received, and having been labeled with both the crime lab case number and the initials of Futrell. ś 104. Jones confirmed that an independent analysis had been performed on each of the evidence buckets in order to determine the presence of flammable liquid substances inside each. Jones also stated that she performed a peer review of each of Futrell's analyses regarding the buckets, thereafter signing off on Futrell's analysis as correct. Jones testified: I looked at [Futrell's] data that she had generated from the instrument and also made an independent conclusion myself, and in my conclusion agreed with her conclusion of it containing ignitable liquids. [16] ś 105. At this point, Walker objected reasoning that Jones did not personally observe the testing of the buckets; therefore, Walker claimed that Jones was precluded from testifying regarding the results because such would be hearsay. The trial court overruled Walker's objection. The record reveals that Jones made an independent analysis of each of Futrell's results, and was presenting her own conclusions to the jury. In allowing Jones's testimony, the court held: BY THE COURT: The Court finds that this witness has satisfactorily explained the procedure followed at the Mississippi Crime Lab and that this procedure is used as a matter of routine, as I understand it, throughout the United States. She has also testified that the tests were preformed under her direction and control by Ms. Futrell, and the witness has verified the test results made by Ms. Futrell, and has signed off on the analysis done by Ms. Futrell after peer review of the test conducted by Ms. Futrell, where this witness has testified that she agreed with the results reached by Ms. Futrell and that she came up with the same results on her own. Therefore, the objection of the defense shall be overruled. ś 106. Walker's assignment of error is not meritorious for two reasons. First, the testimony regarding the contents of the buckets was properly admitted. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 703 states: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. See also Jones v. State, 776 So.2d 643, 650 (Miss.2000) (holding that a pathologist was allowed to testify as to statements made by a forensic anthropologist confirming pathologist's findings). In Alexander v. State, 759 So.2d 411, 420 (Miss.2000), this Court noted that the comment to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 703 expressly states that an expert witness may use data that is presented to the expert `outside of court and other than by his personal observation.' ś 107. We hold that the trial judge did not err in allowing Jones to testify based upon the report of Futrell. Jones independently confirmed and approved this report. Jones was a qualified expert, who was accepted without objection by Walker, and Jones was testifying about items already admitted into evidence. Based on the Mississippi Crime Laboratory's standard operating procedure, Jones regularly relies on information initially procured by associate employees. Therefore, the trial court was correct in ruling that Jones's testimony was not hearsay. ś 108. It can hardly be said that the testimony regarding the contents of the buckets is reversible error in light of the overwhelming evidence in favor of admission of the evidence. See Ellis v. State, 667 So.2d 599, 605 (Miss.1995) (quoting Ray v. State, 503 So.2d 222, 224 (Miss. 1986)) (emphasis in original) (stating that this Court's review should disturb the findings of the lower court only where there is an absence of substantial credible evidence supporting it.). Walker confessed on three separate occasions that he set the house on fire. Furthermore, Walker confessed to taking gasoline from a nearby lawnmower can in the laundry room and pouring the gasoline from the can on the floor, which ignited. ś 109. The following facts are undisputed: (1) a fire actually occurred; (2) the cause of the fire was arson; (3) a pour pattern was found on the floor of the utility room; (4) there was a gasoline can at the scene; and (5) the buckets and their contents were already in evidence prior to the testimony of Jones. Therefore, the only thing Jones's testimony adds to the mix is that the buckets also contained evidence of gasoline. The jury still had as evidence Walker's statements, a gas can at the scene, and Captain Walker's testimony that the cause of the fire was arson. ś 110. Reversible error may be found only where a substantial right of a party is affected and the party claiming error raised an objection or made an offer of proof at trial. Lynch, 877 So.2d at 1281 (citing Miss. R. Evid. 103(a)). See also Mitchell v. State, 792 So.2d 192, 217 (Miss.2001); Murphy v. State, 453 So.2d 1290, 1293-94 (Miss.1984); Brown v. State, 338 So.2d 1008, 1009-10 (Miss.1976). The admission of testimonial evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and it will be found in error only when it has abused that discretion. Lynch, 877 So.2d at 1281 (citing Harris v. State, 731 So.2d 1125, 1130 (Miss.1999)). ś 111. In the case sub judice, Walker has not presented evidence proving that his rights were substantially affected. The jury had before it Walker's statements that he intended to burn the house. Walker has failed to prove that he was prejudiced by the testimony of Jones. Therefore, notwithstanding the procedural bar for failing to object to the chain of custody and Jones's testimony initially, Walker's assignment of error is devoid of merit.