Opinion ID: 1868710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the trial court erred in granting jury instructions p-27, p-29(a) and p-30 which were peremptory and confusing.

Text: Dixie objects to the trial court's granting of instruction P-27 arguing that it takes away from the jury the issue of whether or not the '76 Dodge wrecker was covered under the policy. Dixie goes on to argue that although instruction D-12 required the jury to decide the coverage issue based on whether the Mooneyhans made a material misrepresentation, P-27 takes away the essential features of both the materiality and the misrepresentation by stating that the lack of authorization and the fact that the truck was a wrecker are not defenses. Dixie maintains that the instructions are contradictory and amounted to a situation where two instructions are in hopeless and substantive conflict requiring reversal. Payne v. Rain Forest Nurseries, Inc., 540 So.2d 35, 41 (Miss. 1989); Strickland v. Rossini, 589 So.2d 1268, 1273 (Miss. 1991). The Mooneyhans argue that there was no question of fact as to whether the '76 truck was covered because even though Dixie was not authorized in the State of Mississippi to write policies for commercial vehicles it was still bound by the apparent authority of its agent. The Mooneyhans contend that the issue was whether Dixie had an arguable reason to deny the coverage, namely whether the Mooneyhans made a material misrepresentation as to the truck's type and use. They also state any defect in P-27 does not require reversal because when all instructions are read together they adequately instruct the jury. Detroit Marine Engineering v. McRee, 510 So.2d 462 (Miss. 1987). The trial court held as a matter of law that the fact that the '76 Dodge was a wrecker and Dixie was not authorized to write policies for commercial vehicles did not effect coverage and was not a defense unless it was proven that the Mooneyhans materially misrepresented the fact that the truck was a wrecker. Although P-27 may be somewhat confusing, the other instructions, especially D-12, adequately informed the jury that if the Mooneyhans made a material misrepresentation that would have affected Dixie's issuance of the policy then Dixie had an arguable reason to deny the claim and would not be liable to the Mooneyhans. See James W. Sessums Timber Co. v. McDaniel, 635 So.2d 875, 879 (Miss. 1994). P-27 and D-12 did not significantly contradict each other and reversal is not required because both were given.
Dixie argues that instruction P-209(a) infers that Dixie wrongfully canceled the Mooneyhans' policy when cancellation was not at issue. When P-29(a) was first submitted, Dixie objected on these grounds. However, the trial court offered to amend the instruction and resubmit it. When the instruction was resubmitted after modification, Dixie stated it had no objection to it being offered. Thus, Dixie waived its right to challenge the instruction on appeal. Arledge v. McFatter, 605 So.2d 781, 787 (Miss. 1992); Young v. Robinson, 538 So.2d 781, 783 (Miss. 1989); Shell Oil Co. v. Murrah, 493 So.2d 1274, 1276 (Miss. 1986).
Dixie contends that P-30 is silent as to what acts on the part of Dixie might amount to a grossly negligent manner tantamount to intentional disregard for the rights of the Mooneyhans and that no other jury instruction cures this error. They cite Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Reeves, 486 So.2d 374, 387-388 (Miss. 1986), to support their proposition that Mississippi law requires jury instructions to specify those facts upon which they may find liability. In that case this Court stated that the instruction was erroneously given over the appellant's objection. Although Dixie did object to P-30 it was on grounds that the first paragraph was misleading and the second and third paragraphs were out of context, lumping the '69 and '76 trucks together as if they were one. Dixie did not object on the grounds that specific facts alleged to amount to gross negligence were not included in the instruction. [W]here a party fails to make a proper, specific objection to allow the lower court to consider an issue, this court will not normally entertain the assignment of error. Dedeaux v. J.I. Case Co., Inc., 611 So.2d 880 (Miss. 1992). See also, T.K. Stanley, Inc. v. Cason, 614 So.2d 942, 954 (Miss. 1992). This issue was not properly preserved for appeal.