Opinion ID: 2980834
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of Acuity’s Right to Appeal

Text: At the outset, we address the Fryes’ argument that, in light of the Stipulation of the Parties and Acuity’s Statement Regarding Necessity of Proceeding Toward Trial, Acuity waived its right to appeal the amended judgment and dismissal is thus appropriate. We acknowledge that the unusual post-trial filings in this case indeed muddy the waters with regard to the propriety of the instant appeal. Upon piecing together the Stipulation and the Statement, it would appear that after the district court’s order granting a new trial for damages Acuity 1) conceded that the Fryes’ proof would show that their damages exceeded the policy limit; 2) agreed that there was no factual dispute with regard to damages and thus, no need for a new trial; and, 3) acknowledged, at least implicitly, that the Fryes were entitled to an amended judgment in the amount of the policy limit. It would then appear that, upon entry of the amended judgment, Acuity promptly and inexplicably appealed the judgment to which they had just consented. Equally perplexing, Acuity’s Brief makes no mention at all of its post-trial stipulation or its statement deeming a new trial unnecessary, nor does it address the potential or perceived effect of these documents on its right to appeal. In its Reply Brief, Acuity addresses for the first time the effect of the post-trial stipulation as it relates to the Fryes’ waiver argument. First, Acuity correctly points out that the stipulation itself 3 The parties also agreed by stipulation that the policy limit should be amended per its terms from $218,500 to $225,565.25. -5- No. 10-6459 Acuity Mutual Ins. Co. v. Frye contains an anti-waiver provision, which explicitly states that Acuity did not intend to waive its right to appeal any rulings made during or after trial, the stipulation regarding the dollar amount of damages notwithstanding. Acuity argues that this provision preserves its right to appeal the district court’s order granting a new trial on damages and explains that “the practical effect of the stipulation is that if [the appellate court] finds that the order granting a new trial is correctly based on law and fact,” then Acuity will concede that “the amount of damages exceeds the policy limits and there [will be] no need for a new trial. If, however, [the appellate court] finds that the trial Court’s order granting a new trial . . . is inappropriate [then] the original jury verdict must be upheld.” We find that Acuity’s interpretation of the anti-waiver provision is correct and that Acuity properly preserved its right to appeal the trial court’s order granting a new trial on damages. We proceed, therefore, to the merits of Acuity’s argument that the district court abused its discretion in granting the Fryes’ motion for new trial on damages.