Opinion ID: 2431503
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: THE COMMONWEALTH WILL BE PERMITTED TO OFFER EVIDENCE REGARDING THE NATURE OF PRIOR OFFENSES. KRS 532.055(2)(a)(2).

Text: The nature of prior offenses is a much broader term than present limitations applicable to the use of prior felonies in PFO proceedings. At present, evidence is limited to designating the offense involved, but none of the details of the nature of the prior offense are admitted. Evidence of the nature of a prior offense calls for reconsideration of the evidence from the previous case. We can expect nothing less than complete review because of subsection (2)(b) which permits the defendant to introduce evidence which negates any evidence introduced by the Commonwealth. Thus, both sides will be indulged at length on the nature of a prior offense. This evidence requirement in subsection (2)(b) generates a subsidiary issue of considerable consequence: is this limited only to evidence that directly contradicts the evidence offered by the Commonwealth regarding previous offenses, or does negate mean to mitigate? Is the defendant entitled to introduce any evidence available regarding his background, i.e., the social, psychological, employment, family, and other factors motivating his behavior which serve indirectly to offset or negate evidence of prior offenses? It is a rule of longstanding that a criminal statute subject to more than one interpretation must be interpreted in favor of the defendant. This is the rule of lenity. Roney v. Commonwealth, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 863 (1985). Under this rule the defendant rightfully should be entitled to introduce any evidence of a nature tending to negate the effect of the evidence of prior convictions that has been introduced against him. This is a sentencing hearing to determine punishment within the range provided by statute. It is a rule of constitutional magnitude that in such a hearing, once the door is open to extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence in aggravation or mitigation other than proof relating to the crime for which he stands convicted, that the defendant has a right to go beyond evidence that simply contradicts the Commonwealth's evidence. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18 L.Ed.2d 326 (1967). Unlike a PFO proceeding, wherein no evidence is introduced regarding the nature of the offense, in the expanded circumstances now presented any effort to limit the defendant's presentation of negating evidence, direct or indirect, has serious Due Process implications. See Specht, supra .