Opinion ID: 1169302
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the proper issue

Text: Appellant has misunderstood the basis of the district court's decision. Of the six issues he identifies for our review, five involve the willful abandonment of the child. Apparently he believes that the district court relied upon § 1-22-110, W.S. 1977, which states in part:  In addition to the exceptions contained in W.S. 1-22-108, the adoption of a child may be ordered without the written consent of the parents or putative father    if the court finds that the nonconsenting parent or putative father has:       (iii) Willfully abandoned or deserted the child. (Emphasis added.) But the district court never relied upon § 1-22-110 in its letter opinion or order. The court only discussed appellant's willful abandonment because it tended to show that his objections to the adoption were not valid. The validity of appellant's objections was, in turn, only one factor in the court's analysis under § 1-22-108(c), W.S. 1977. The district court properly treated § 1-22-108(c), W.S. 1977, as a complete and independent adoption statute. Three facets of the statutory scheme show that the legislature intended the statute to apply in some contested adoptions, regardless of whether § 1-22-110, W.S. 1977, might also apply. First, § 1-22-110, W.S. 1977, treats § 1-22-108 as an independent basis for an adoption. Section 1-22-110 begins with the following proviso:  In addition to the exceptions contained in W.S. 1-22-108, W.S. 1977, the adoption of a child may be ordered without the written consent of the parents or putative father if   . (Emphasis added.) Second, § 1-22-108 contains substantive law which provides an alternative procedure for contested adoptions. At the hearing, the district court is to take evidence on each of the four factors identified in subsections (i) through (iv) of § 1-22-108(c), supra. Once the district court has heard the evidence, subsection (e) of § 1-22-108 permits it to base its decision on the manner in which the factors balance. Subsection (e) states: Based upon its determination and findings after a hearing, the court may enter its order or decree in accordance with W.S. 1-22-111. [1] Finally, an important distinction between these two statutes is that § 1-22-110 provides grounds for an adoption when either the child's parents or his putative father fails to consent but § 1-22-108 applies only when the nonconsenting party is a putative father. The scheme makes perfect sense. Section 1-22-110 provides a set of circumstances, such as the nonconsenting party's abuse, abandonment or failure to support the child, under which an adoption is justified no matter who the nonconsenting party is. But the more liberal adoption test of § 1-22-108 applies to only those adoptions contested by putative fathers who have already shown their lack of concern for their children by failing to establish legal paternity. This scheme functions as the legislature intended when we recognize § 1-22-108 as a ground for adoption fully independent of § 1-22-110. In summary, the district court applied § 1-22-108 as the legislature intended  without regard to the requirements of § 1-22-110. Appellant's willful abandonment was just one factor the court considered when trying to decide whether appellant's objections were valid. We will review the willful abandonment finding, as well as the court's other findings, as part of the four-part test of § 1-22-108(c).