Opinion ID: 757674
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Exercise of Jurisdiction over Means' Pre-Trial Habeas Petition

Text: 46 In addition to arguing that the district court was correct in denying Means' petition, the Appellees contend that the court should never have entertained the petition in the first place. Originally, Appellees contended that the district court should not have considered Means' habeas petition because he was not detained as required by 25 U.S.C. § 1303. However, they have now conceded that this is not the case, and that Means is sufficiently detained by the fact that, as conditions of his release on bail, he is forbidden from leaving the reservation and from contacting children. 47 Currently, Appellees' principal contention is that the district court should not have entertained Means' petition because he has not yet been tried. They acknowledge that pre-trial habeas petitions may be reviewed, but only if special circumstances are shown. Carden v. Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 83 (9th Cir.1980). They claim that the district court should have required Means to show that such special circumstances existed before allowing him to proceed with his petition. 48 While this particular issue does not appear to have been raised before in the context of the habeas remedy peculiar to the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1303, the general reluctance to interfere with on-going state criminal trials can generally be said to extend to tribal courts. However, this is usually examined in the context of the requirement that tribal remedies be exhausted before the federal courts will get involved. The principles of federalism and comity that preclude most pre-trial grants of habeas relief in state cases are reflected here in the exhaustion requirement. See Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 & 16 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 971, 94 L.Ed.2d 10 (1987) (holding, in the context of a civil case, that considerations of comity direct that tribal remedies be exhausted before the question is addressed by the District Court and that [e]xhaustion is required as a matter of comity, not as a jurisdictional prerequisite). Duro itself was a pre-trial habeas case, and even with all the discussion over whether the writ should have been granted, it does not appear to have been disputed that the district court's review of the petition was proper. 49 Our cases make clear that pre-trial relief was appropriate in these narrow circumstances. [W]hen a tribal court attempts to exercise criminal jurisdiction over a person not a member of a tribe, no requirement of exhaustion need be enforced. Selam v. Warm Springs Tribal Correctional Facility, 134 F.3d 948, 954 (9th Cir.1998) (quoting Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 826 (9th Cir.1995)). Further, to the extent that any exhaustion was required in this case, it would appear that Means has in fact met the requirement. He presented his jurisdictional argument first to the Tribal Court, and then to the Northern Cheyenne Court of Appeals. Both courts denied his claim before he filed his petition with the district court. Since the purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to promote tribal self-government and self-determination by allowing tribal courts to have the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for the challenge to [their] jurisdiction, the requirement would appear to have been satisfied here. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 15-16, 107 S.Ct. 971. The Northern Cheyenne courts appear to have had a full opportunity to examine the jurisdictional question. Therefore, we affirm the district court's exercise of jurisdiction over Means' habeas petition.